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PUBUC  LIBRARY- 
KANSAS  CITY,  MO. 

YOUR  CAi  III  lit 


OCT 


THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 
AND  ITS  HIDDEN  CAUSES 


THE 
FRANCO -PRUSSIAN  WAR 

AND 

ITS  HIDDEN  CAUSES 

BY 

EMILE   OLLTVIER 

OF -THE   ACADEMIE  FRANgAISE 


TRANSLATED  FROM  THE  FRENCH 

WITH  AN  INTRODUCTION  AND  NOTES  BY 

GEORGE  BURNHAM  IVES 


WITH  ILLUSTRATIONS 


BOSTON 
LITTLE,  BROWN,  AND  COMPANY 


Copyright,  J918, 

BY  LITTLE,  BKOWN,  AND  COMPANY, 


All  rigkU  mewed 
Published,  November, 


APli  6   1SII 
}  '6  *,    6 


8.  J.  PAEWOW  &  Co,,  BOSTOW,  U,S»A. 


PREFACE 

SOME  two  or  three  years  ago  I  happened  to  read  in 
the  Revue  des  Deux  'Mondes  the  chapter  of  his  History 
in  which  Emile  Ollivier  told  of  the  publication  of 
the  news,  in  July,  1870,  that  Prince  Leopold  of 
Hohenzollern  had  been  offered  and  had  accepted  the 
throne  of  Spain.  Previously,  I  had  had  a  vague  idea 
that  M.  Ollivier  was  commonly  held  up  to  obloquy  as 
being  mainly  responsible  for  the  War  of  1870 ;  but  I 
was  not  aware  that  he  had  been  engaged  for  many 
years  in  writing  a  history  of  the  Second  Empire  which 
was  to  be  at  the  same  time  a  defence  of  his  own  brief 
administration . 

My  interest  being  once  aroused,  I  began  to  read 
back,  and  to  read  collaterally,  and  so  convinced  myself 
that  in  the  common  attribution  of  responsibility  to 
M.  Ollivier  much  injustice  had  been  done;  and  that, 
in  this  country  at  least,  save  among  historical  students, 
there  is  little  acquaintance  with  the  actual  causes  of 
the  conflict.  Believing  that  M.  Ollivier  should  have 
an  opportunity  to  plead  his  own  cause  in  English  to 
those  who  might.be  alarmed  by  the  many  volumes  of 
his  work,  I  entered  into  correspondence  with  him  as  to 
the  possibility  of  making  extracts  therefrom  suitable 
for  translation,  which  should  set  forth  clearly  the 
story  of  this  Hohenzollern  candidacy  and  its  sequel. 
Eventually  M.  Ollivier  himself  made  up  the  volume 
which  is  here  presented  in  translation. 


vi 

It  seemed  la"  "life;- while  propadng  the  translation, 
that,  in  addition"  to*  supplying,  as  well  us  1  could,  the 
annotations  necessary  to  explain  {illusions  to  past 

events,  it  was  advisable  to  accompany  what  is,  in 
evitably  and  indeed  confessedly,  an  ex  parte  narrative, 
with  parallel  views  of  'the  same  events  derived  from 
other  sources.  Curiously  enough,  the  frantic  parti 
sans  of  the  war,  and  the  extreme  Republicans  who, 
after  doing  their  utmost  to  make  war  inevitable, 
claimed  to  have  been  mortally  opposed  to  it  united 
in  making  scapegoats  of  the  Ministers  who  were  forced 
into  declaring  it;  and  especially  of  their  titular  head, 
Many  of  the  so-called  histories  of  the  period  can  be 
fairly  characterised  in  the  terms  applied  by  TVL  Ollivier 
to  Taxile  Delord's  Ilistoire  du  Second  Empire  —  as 
political  broadsides  against  the  Empire  and  the  Liberal 
Ministry.  Jules  Favre's  (Jouvernement  de  la  l)6fon,w 
Nationale  is,  in  addition,  a  labored  plea  in  favor  of 
his  own  disinterested  devotion  to  the  cause  of  his 
country ;  while  the  embittered  tone  of  M.  Welsehinger's 
very  recent  work  —  La  Guerre  de  1870  (19 10)  —  I 
can  attribute  only  to  the  publication  of  the  fourteenth 
volume  of  M.  Ollivier's  L* Empire  LiMraL  The  ex 
haustive  work  of  M.  Pierre  dc  La  Gorcc,  —  IliMoire,  du 
Second  Empire,  —  however,  is  admirably  moderate  and 
impartial,  while  it  certainly  does  not  err  on  the  side  of 
lenity,  and  I  have  found  it  difficult  to  restrain  the 
temptation  to  quote  from  it  at  great  length. 

I  have  not  presumed  to  attempt  to  write  history; 
but  simply  to  present  M.  Ollivier's  defence,  in  his  own 
words,  together  with  the  views  of  other  writers  on  the 
same  events,  for  purposes  of  comparison.  It  has  often 
seemed  to  me  that  he  has  omitted  in  his  abridgment 


PREFACE  vii 

some  passages  of  Ids  main  work  which  could  less  well 
be  spared  than  some  of  those  included,  and  I  have 
added  a  good  many  of  these  in  the  notes. 

M.  Palat  ("Pierre  Lehautcourt")  has  printed  a 
bibliography  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  including 
everything  that  has  been  written  on  the  subject,  so 
far  as  he  could  discover.  It  is  a  volume  of  some  three 
or  four  hundred  pages,  so  that  I  need  hardly  say  that 
it  lias  been  impossible  to  make  an  exhaustive  examina 
tion  of  the  authorities;  but  thanks  to  the  generous 
treatment  accorded  by  the  authorities  of  the  Harvard 
Library  to  even  the  humblest  of  investigators,  I  had 
their  collections  at  my  disposal,  and  I  have  tried  to 
make  a  fair  selection  therefrom. 

The  following  works  are  cited  frequently  in  the 
notes  by  their  authors'  names  only :  — 

P.  de  La  Gorce,  Histoire  du  Second  Empire;  Albert 
Sorel,,  llistoi/re  Diplomatique  de  la  Guerre  Franco- 
Allemande;  Due  de  Graniont,  La  France  et  la  Prusse 
(want  la  Guerre;  Cointe  Benedetti,  Ma  Mission  en 
Prm^e;  UP.  Lehautcourt"  (Palat),  Histoire  de  la 
Guerre  de  1870-71 ;  Henri  Welschinger,  La  Guerre  de 
1870.  By  the  "Memoirs  of  the  King  of  Roumania," 
frequently  cited,  is  designated  the  most  important  of 
all  the  authorities  as  to  certain  phases  of  the  Hohen- 
zolleru  question ;  namely,  Aus  dem  Leben  Konigs  Karl 
von  Koumanien  (1805). 

All  notes  in  brackets  have  been  supplied  by  the 
translator;  those  without  brackets  are  always  in  the 
language  of  M.  Ollivier  himself:  those  in  quotation 
marks  being  additional  passages  from  the  text  of 
U  Empire  lAbtiral,  those  without  such  marks  being  foot 
notes  f roEi  the  same  work ;  all  footnotes  having  been 


viil  PREFACE 

omitted  from  the  volume  hero  translated.  Ill  many 
cases  the  authorities  cited  in  M.  Ollivier's  notes  have 
not  been  consulted  or  the  citations  verified,  the  works 
in  question  not  being  readily  available*  As  they  are 
not  always  consistent  with  each  other,  their  accuracy 
is  not  vouched  for,  but  it  seemed  the  better  way  to 
insert  them  as  I  found  them.  The  references  to 
Bismarck's  Autobiography  (Reflections  and  Reminis 
cences)  I  have  generally  been  able  to  verify. 

SALEM,  MASS.,  October,,  1912. 


CONTENTS 


v 

TltANBLATOR*B  iNTKODirOTION „  X1H 

iNTHOinJtJTrON «..,..  1 

CHAPTXft 

L      BlHMAttCK  CONTEMPLATES  WAR  WITH  FRANCO)      ...  13 
11*      BlHMAHC'K  TAKBH   UP  THE  HoHfiNZOLL&KN  CANDIDACY  ANEW 

AFTEIt  THE   FLKBIBCITK   IN  FttANOB                         ...  27 

III.      TlIE   IIOHKN'KOLLKKN  SOHKMK   EXPLODES  AT  MADBID  ,           .  42 

IV.      TlJK   nOHKNKOLLttttN   SOKKME   EXPLOD1SA  AT  PARIS        .           «  48 
V.      TllK    OOHENZOLLKRN  (CANDIDACY  AROUSBJS  INDIGNATION  IN 

FUANC'K  AN!)  EMPHOIJATION  IN  KUROPR  ....  OS 

VI.    OiMi  INABILITY  TO  NFXJOTIATB,    OUE  PEKPLBXITY     .        .  7S5 

VH.      I)K<^AILVnoN   OF  JUfcY  0,  1870 81 

VOL    TH«  Foint  PA<?IKKJ  NEGOTIATIONS      .  101 

IX.    (*H\MONT*H  NJ-XIOTIATIONB  WITH  THE  POWERS    .        .        .  117 

X.    THE  NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  TUB  KING  OF  PRUSSIA  AT  EMS  *  13£ 

XL    THUS   NEGOTIATION   WITH    PxtiNCB  ANTONY*     THIS  WITH 
DRAWAL   ,        .        »        ,        .        .        P        ,        *        .109 

XIL    Ki«w,rr  AT  PAKIS  OF  TUB  ABANDONMENT  OF  TUB  CANDIDACY  IBB 

XIII.  THK  DEMAND  OF  (hTARANTWOB 215 

XIV.  THE  KMPKUOU'B  I^TTBR  TO  (*KAMONT  ON  THE  DEMAND  OF 

GIURANWIB     » £30 

XV,    THE    MORNING    OF   JTw/r    13    AT   EMS.     THB   KING   OF 

PlU'HHIA   lUtt'HUEH   AHIt>E  THE   DEMAND   OF  GUARANTIES  .  241 

XVL    TIIK  MouMN'd  OF  JULY  IS  AT  PAHM         ....  248 

XVII.    THK  EvKNiNtj  OF  JULY  IS  AT  EMB &C0 

XV!  1 1.    THK  KYKNING  OF  JULY  13  AT  BKKLW.    BIBMABCK*B  SLAP 

IN  THIS   PA<!&    .*.......  &70 

ix 


x  CONTENTS 

WIAPTRK  I'AflB 

XIX.    THK  EVENING  OF  JULY  13  AT  PAIUB.    PACIFIC!  MEASURES 

PREVAIL 5405 

XX.    EXASPERATION"  AT  PAIUrt  CAUSED  BY  THE  KlWH  DEHPATW  ,  308 
XXL    Ouu   REPLY  TO   BIHMAIWK'H  SLAP  IN  THE   FACE,    THE 

DECLARATION  OF  JULY  15 I  JIM 

XXIL    UPON  Wuow  SHOULD  THM  RWHPONMIWLITY  FOR  THIS  WAR 

FALL-  •-  FRANCE  ou  (JERMANY? 300 

XXI II.  SUMMARY  AND  JIUXJMENTH 384 

XXIV.  CONCLUSION 400 

APPENDICES 

A.    LETTER  FROM  KMILK  OLumwu  TO  ^ROFEHHOE  If  ANH  l)i*iumuoK» 

OF  BKHUN      .........  407 

JL    TUB  SPANISH  REVOLUTION  OF  1808 419 

0,     TlIK   IIOUENZOLLKUN   CANDIDACY   FOR  TIlW  SPANWH  THUONB      .  422 

/).      PlttNOK   LEOPOLD  OF   IIoilKNHOliU'JttN            .....  4S|> 

1L     THM   1)U<!  DM  (irUAMONT 438 

F»    PttiNdiPLKS    OF    INTIORNATIOKAL    LAW    APPUOAUU<J    TO    THK 

IIOHKNUOWjKUN   Al''FAItt     ..*•..,  445 

0,    TIIK  DMULARATION  OF  JULY  0 451 

II.    HWMAUCK'H  CiuouuMt  NOTH  OF  JULY  Itt  TO  TUB  POWKHH       .  401 

/.    I'nw  NEGOTIATION  AT  KMH        ..*.«,«  40H 
,/»    I.  THM  I)u<!  DM  GUAMONT'H  (/imniLAit  NOTK  OF  JULY*  24  TO 

TUK  POWKIW    .........  476 

II,  RAHON  WKHTUMH'H  HF.POUT  OF  tun  CONVEUHATION  WITH 

(iltAMONT  ON  JllLY   12 480 

A".    TUB  KMH  DKHPAT<!H 484 

//*    INTKUVIKW  BKTWEKN  (IOITNT  BIHMAKCK,  AND  Lotti)  A*  I/)FTt!Hf 

BiiiTiHU  AMBAHHADOU      .**.«,..  4fH 

M.     TlUC  (!OMMIHH10N  OF  JULY    15  AND  TUK   KMH  ComWrtPONDKNCB  405 


LIST  OF  PORTRAITS, 

Emm  Otanrnm        .....-*•       Frontispiece 

PAGJB 

MAWBHAL  PEIM        *.  14 

IjKOl*OLl)  OF  IIonS3N2JOLI*BRN       .••*.«**          »o^i 

DUO  DM  GUAMONT 

C-OMTB  VINCENT  BBNEDBTTI *™ 

NAPOLEON  III m 


PttlNCK  VON  BlBMAltOK 


TRANSLATOR'S  INTRODUCTION 

THE  book  of  which  this  is  a  translation  consists 
of  extracts  from  the  thirteenth  and  fourteenth  volumes 
of  the  author's  elaborate  work,  not  yet  completed, 
IS  Empire  Liberal,  preceded  by  an  introductory  chapter 
taken  from  the  exordium  in  the  first  volume  of  that  work. 
It  was  published  in  Paris  in  1911,  under  the  title  Phi 
losophic  <Tune  Guerre9  for  which  a  more  descriptive  and 
more  accurate  title  has  been  substituted. 

Between  fifteen  and  twenty  years  ago,  being  already 
seventy  years  old,  M.  Gllivier,  who  had  lived  practically 
in  retirement  since  the  overthrow  of  his  Ministry  on 
August  9,  1370,  after  the  news  of  the  first  serious  re 
verses  of  the  French  arms,  began  the  publication  in  the 
Re&ue  des  Deux  Mondes  of  the  series  of  articles  which, 
expanded  and  elaborated,  with  notes  and  appen 
dices,  have  been  reprinted,  year  by  year,  in  the 
successive  volumes  of  L'Empire  Liberal  Fifteen  of 
these  volumes  have  already  appeared,  the  last  of  which 
(1911)  discusses  exhaustively  the  question  whether 
France  was  prepared  for  war,  and  describes  vividly  the 
deplorable  conditions  that  obtained  in  the  French  armies 
at  the  outset,  and  the  hesitation  about  taking  the 
offensive  until  the  opportunity  was  gone  forever. 
In  the  spring  of  the  present  year  (1912),  M.  Ollivier 
being  now  eighty-seven  years  of  age,  the  Ramie  printed 
the  usual  number  of  articles  dealing  with  the  first 
great  battles  of  the  war,  Woerth  (or  Relehshoffen)  and 
Spieheren,  and  narrating  with  abundance  of  moving 

Xlii 


xiv        THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

detail  the  story  of  the  downfall  of  the  Ministry  of 
January  2.  These  articles  will  soon  appear  us  volume 
sixteen. 

L*  Empire  Literal  is,  in  fact,,  a  history  of  the  Second 
Empire,  and  the  first  eight  or  nine  volumes  are  occu 
pied  exclusively  with  the  acts  of  the  imperial  govern 
ment  when  it  was  still  the  "Empire  Autoritairo,"  and 
before  it  had  acquired  any  right  to  the  title  of  Liberal. 
But  the  later  volumes,  from  1805,  perhaps,  may  fairly 
be  considered,  generally  speaking,  M'.  Ollivier's  Apo 
logia  pro  wild  $ua;  and,  from  whatever  standpoint  one 
considers  them,  one  cant  hardly  withhold  one\s  admi 
ration  of  the  spirit  and  energy  and  eloquence  with 
which  this  venerable  statesman  of  a  past  generation 
maintains  the  sincerity  of  his  Liberal  opinions  and  the 
rectitude  of  his  conduct  from  the  beginning  of  his 
public  career  to  its  premature  close,  under  the  shadow 
of  what  he  at  least  believes  to  bo  unmerited  obloquy, 
when  he  was  still  in  the  prime  of  life, 

Bmile  Ollivier  was  born  at  Marseilles,  July  2,  1845. 
His  father,  Dcmosth&ne  Ollivier  (179JM884),  was  a 
merchant  in  that  city,  and  sometime  municipal  coun 
cillor.  In.  April,  1848,  the  father  was  dec  led  to  the 
Constituent  Assembly  from  the  Bouehos-du-Rhone. 
He  sat  with  the  Extreme  Left,  and  bitterly  opposed 
the  policy  of  Louis  Napoleon,  as  President  of  the  Re 
public.  For  protesting  vigorously  against  the  cowp 
ff&tat  of  December  2,  1851,  lie  was  in  great  danger  of 
transportation  to  Cayenne,  but  was  saved  therefrom 
by  the  exertions  of  his  son,  through  his  relations  with 
Prince  Napoleon,  and  was  simply  expelled  from  France* 

whither  he  returned  in  I860, 

/> 

Einile  Ollivier  was  bred  to  the  bar  and  began  to 


TRANSLATOR'S  INTRODUCTION         xv 

practise  in  Paris.  In  February,  1848,  by  the  influence 
of  his  father's  friend  and  fellow  republican,  the  cele 
brated  Ledru-Rollin,  he  was  made  Commissioner  of 
the  new  Republic  in  the  department  of  the  Bouches- 
du-Rhone,  resident  at  Marseilles.  That  he  displayed 
great  activity  in  that  post  is  beyond  question;  but 
his  administration  is  praised  or  condemned,  apparently, 
according  to  the  personal  prejudices  of  the  critic.  He 
was  recalled  by  General  Cavaignac  in  July,  and  ap 
pointed  prefect  of  the  department  of  Hautc-Marne. 
On  the  election  of  Louis  Napoleon  as  President  (De 
cember,  1848)  over  Cavaignac  and  Ollivier's  patron, 
Ledru-Rollin,  he  lost  his  prefecture  and  resumed  his 
practice  at  the  bar  of  Paris. 

He  became  favorably  known  as  an  advocate,  no  less 
by  his  talent  than  by  his  eloquence,  and  covered  him 
self  with  glory  in  several  important  political  trials, 
besides  conducting  a  large  private  practice.  In  1857 
he  was  chosen  deputy  for  one  of  the  "circumscriptions" 
(the  3d)  of  the  Seine,  and  for  several  years  thereafter, 
until  1863,  he  was  one  of  the  famous  Five,1  who  alone 
constituted  the  opposition  during  those  years.  He 
was,  in  fact,  the  leader  of  the  little  band  that  "strug 
gled  so  vigorously  for  the  recovery  of  the  public  liber 
ties/'  Endowed  with  liberal  instincts,  overflowing 
with  liberal  enthusiasm,  as  the  great  majority  even  of 
his  critics  admit  him  to  have  been,  it  is  difficult  to  see 
why  he  should  not  have  been  drawn  toward  the  Em 
pire  when  he  saw,  or  thought  that  he  saw,  indications 
of  a  purpose  on  the  part  of  the  sovereign  to  restore  the 
public  liberties, 

*  The  olhur  four  were  Louis  Alfred  Darimon,  J.  L,  Hfcxon,  Ernest  Picard, 
Favr«, 


xvi          THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

The  best  brief  summary  that  I  have  found  of  the 

successive  steps  in  the  liberalizing  of  French  institu 
tions  in  the  sixties  is  that  given  by  Sir  Spencer  Walpole 
In  his  History  of  Twenty-Five  Years,  volume  ii,  page 
473  and  following  pages.  He  says  :  — 

"The  little  group  of  deputies  — the  five  of  1857  — 
had  gradually  become  a  power  in  the  land;  and  the 
principles  which  they  had  hardly  dared  to  enunciate 
in  the  beginning  were  becoming  the  commonplaces  of 
Imperial  policy.  In  1859  the  ranks  of  the  Opposition 
were  recruited  by  the  return  to  Franco,  under  an 
amnesty,  of  the  exiles  of  1851 ;  in  1860  discussion  was 
made  effective  by  the  concession  to  the  Chamber  of 
the  right  to  address  the  Crown;  by  the  appointment 
of  Ministers  specially  selected  to  defend  the  Imperial 
policy  in  the  Legislature,  and  by  the  publication^  in 
the  Moniteur,  of  the  debates.  In  1861,  the  Chamber 
obtained  a  closer  control  over  the  finances  of  the 
State  by  the  division  of  the  supplies  into  sections, 
each  of  which  was  separately  voted.  At  the  general 
election  of  1863,  the  five  developed  into  a  compact 
opposition  of  thirty-five,  and  the  Emperor  found  him* 
self  in  the  unusual  position  of  looking  to  the  more 
moderate  members  of  the  Opposition  for  a  defence  of 
his  policy.  In  1867,  he  actually  made  M.  Ollivier, 
the  most  prominent  person  among  the  original  five, 
an  offer  of  office.1  In  1868  the  Emperor  went  a  step 
farther  and  gave  the  Chamber  the  right  of  questioning 
his  Ministers,,  who  were  authorized  to  attend  the 
Chamber,  and  defend  their  own  action;  and,  what 
was  still  more  striking,  he  removed  the  restrictions 
which,  since  1851,  had  paralysed  the  newspaper  press, 

1  As  Minister  of  Public  Instruction,    Naturally,  the  offer  was  declined* 


TRANSLATOR'S  INTRODUCTION       xvfl 

and  accorded,  on  certain  conditions,  the  right  of  hold 
ing  meetings  to  discuss  questions  of  public  policy." 

It  was  on  November  24,  1860,  that  the  Emperor 
issued  a  decree  permitting  the  publication  of  the 
debates  in  full  in  the  then  official  organ,  the  Moniteur. 
"The  Liberal  Empire  had  been  inaugurated,"  says  M. 
de  La  Goree,1  "by  a  memorable  decree,  that  of  Novem 
ber  24,  I860*  and  by  a  personage  eminent  among  all, 
M.  de  Morny,2  Morny  had  prematurely  disappeared. 
In  that  great  void,  the  man  who  had  been  the  associate 
of  his  plans,  the  confidant  of  his  latest  views,  M.  Emile 
Ollivier,  did  not  despair.  A  few  days  after  the  funeral, 
March  27,  1865,  he  invoked  the  memory  of  the  de 
parted,  and  proclaimed  that  true  wisdom  lay  not  in 
resisting  the  wishes  of  public  opinion  but  in  yielding 
to  them  in  time ;  then,  when  the  Address  was  under 
discussion,  he  announced  that,  breaking  with  the  opposi 
tion,  he  would  move  a  favorable  vote;  it  would  not, 
he  said,  be  a  vote  of  entire  agreement,  but  a  vote  of 
hope." 

The  last  four  of  the  concessions  enumerated  by 
Walpole  in  the  passage  quoted  were  announced  by  the 
Emperor  in  a  letter  of  January  19,  1867,  to  the  Minis 
ter  of  State  (Rouher), 

"It  is  said  that  on  the  morrow  of  the  Emperor's 
letter,  Prince  Napoleon  exclaimed:  *If  tlie  Emperor 

1  Hutoire  du  Second  Empire,  vol.  v,  p.  840. 

2  The  Due  de  Homy,  an  illegitimate  son  of  Queen  Hortensc  and  uterine 
brother  of  Napoleon  III,  is  often  said  to  have  been  the  instrument  of 
M.  Ollivier's  adhesion  to  the  Empire,    The  post  of  councillor  to  the  Viceroy 
of  Egypt  in  the  matter  of  the  Suez  Canal,  which  M.  Ollivier  held  in  1804, 
and  which  occasioned  the  abandonment  of  his  legal  practice,  is  sometimes 
charged  to  have  been  a  bribe  offered  by  M,  de  Moray.    He  died  in  March, 
1805.    He  was  the  original  of  the  Due  de  Mora  in  Baudot's  romance  Le 
Nabob. 


xviii       THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

wishes  to  be  consistent  with  himself,  there  is  nothing 
for  him  to  do  but  form  a  new  cabinet  with  Eniile 
Ollivier/  Extraordinary,  premature,  as  this  solution 
may  have  appeared  at  that  moment,  strict  logic  would 
have  explained  it."  * 

The  partisans  of  the  "  Empire  Autoritaire,"  headed  by 
M,  Rouher,  founded  a  club  on  rue  de  r Arcade  (whence 
the  name  "Arcadians"),  where  they  discussed  methods 
of  maintaining  the  old  imperial  phalanx  and  barring 
the  road  to  the  Liberals.  Their  motto  was;  "Lei  us 
indulge  the  Emperor  in  his  Liberal  whims,  since  he 
absolutely  insists  upon  them,  but  let  us  do  it  as  cheaply 
as  possible;  let  us  yield  to  him,  but  paralyze  him  at 
the  same  time,  and  above  all  let  us  protect  him  against 
those  who  would  destroy  him."  2 

"Of  all  the  liberals,"  says  La  Goree,  "M.  femilo 
Ollivier  was  the  most  bitterly  attacked.  As  they 
could  not  deny  his  oratorical  powers,  they  denounced 
his  ambition.  lie  had  striven,  they  said,  to  raise 
himself  high  enough  to  grasp  a  portfolio;  but  high 
office  would  elude  the  *  parliamentary  Tantalus"  many 
another  time,  and  for  a  long  while,  if  not  forever,  he 
would  remain  a  fixture  on  his  *  bench  of  patience/ 
Others,  the  better  to  assure  the  aim  of  their  shafts,  con 
cealed  them  under  an  appearance  of  praise,  c  Eniile 
Ollivier,'  they  said,  chas  talent,  great  talent;  really, 
it's  a  great  pity  that  he  is  unpopular,  like  all  turncoats ; 
that  he  lacks  authority,  that  he  lacks  it  to  the  extent 
of  endangering  every  cause  that  he  claims  to  serve.1" 

In  1868  the  law  restoring  the  liberty  of  the  press 
occasioned  great  agitation.  Introduced  in  fulfilment 

1  La  Gorcc,  M  mp, 

2  Ibid,  vol.  v,  p,  34)9. 


TRANSLATOR'S  INTRODUCTION        xix 

of  the  Emperor's  promise  In  the  letter  of  January  19, 
18C7,  it  was  bitterly  attacked  in  the  Chamber,  notably 
by  M.  Granier  cle  Cassagnac,  and  was  so, lukewarmly 
defended  by  ministers  that  it  would  have  been  defeated, 
but  for  Napoleon's  determination  to  support  it  despite 
the  opposition  of  the  Empress,  and  of  M.  Rouher  him 
self.1 

Despite  the  vigorous  resistance  of  the  inveterate 
partisans  of  the  personal  power  of  the  sovereign,  the 
years  1808  and  1809  witnessed  the  irresistible  progress 
of  Liberal  ideas.  Such  incidents,  among  many  others, 
as  the  founding  of  the  Lanterne  by  Henri  Rochefort 
(suppressed  after  the  third  issue)  and  the  subscription 
in  honor  of  Buudin,  the  deputy  killed  in  the  bar 
ricades  in  December,  1851  (in  connection  with  which 
Gambetta  delivered  the  great  speech  in  defence  of 
Delescluze,  which  made  him  famous  in  a  moment), 
sufficiently  indicated  the  trend  of  affairs.  The  In 
ternational  Association  of  Working  Men  made  its 
appearance  as  a  political  factor.  In  anticipation  of 
the  elections  of  I860,  all  the  elements  of  opposition 
cooperated,  save  only  the  intransigent  Royalists  and 
the  radical  Republicans. 

In  the  3d  circumscription  of  the  Seine,  M.  Qllivier, 
a  typical  representative  of  liberal  reform,  was  opposed 
by  M.  Bancel,  a  no  less  typical  representative  of  the 
revolutionary  tradition,  "Both  were  in  the  full  ma 
turity  of  age  and  talent.  By  a  singular  coincidence 
they  had  a  similar  past,  both  having  suffered  from  the 
coup  (T&tat  and  having  lived  amid  tales  of  exile.  But 

1  The  debates  on  this  law,  as  well  as  those  on  the  law  concerning  the  right 
of  assembly,  which  was  passed  under  somewhat  similar  conditions,  are  in 
terestingly  summarised  by  M.  dc  La  Gorce,  in  vol,  v>  pp.  851-369. 


xx          THE  FRANCQ-PKUSSIAN  WAR 

Bancel,  settled  upon  foreign,  soil,  had  remained  in  the 
legend  of  1792,  and  had  confined  himself  to  disguising 
its  commonplaces  beneath  eloquent  phrases.  Ollivier 
had  speedily  set  himself  free  from  the  legend,  and  in 
his  reconstituted  mind  had  kept  but  one  cult,  that  of 
liberty/51 

M.  Ollivier  was  defeated  by  10,000  votes,  but  was 
returned  for  the  department  of  the  Var,  The  election 
resulted  in  the  return  of  a  sufficient  number  of  "offi 
cial"  candidates  to  assure  a  majority,  "on  the  sole 
condition  that  that  majority  should  retain  its  confidence 
in  itself,  and  find  leaders  to  guide  it." 

"The  drift  towards  parliamentary  government  was 
steadily  gaining  force,"  says  Walpole,  although  the 
Emperor,  while  "ready  to  remove  every  restriction 
which  hampered  the  expression  of  opinion,  either  in 
Parliament  or  in  the  press,"  was  "unwilling  to  part 
with  the  executive  power  which  he  still  retained.  He 
was  ready  to  trust  a  Chamber  elected  by  the  people, 
but  he  could  not  bring  himself  to  trust  a  Minister  se 
lected  by  himself.  He  was  ready  to  invest  a  legis 
lature  with  almost  sovereign  powers  of  control;  and 
he  hesitated  to  take  the  final  plunge  by  making  his 
advisers  responsible  to  Parliament.  „  .  . 

"After  the  general  election  of  1869,  the  moderate 
men  of  all  parties  joined  hands  in  desiring  a  parlia 
mentary  Ministry,  and  no  fewer  than  one  hundred  and 
sixteen  deputies  signed  an  interpellation  demanding 
the  appointment  of  a  Ministry  responsible  to  the 
Legislature.2  Napoleon  III,  even  in  the  hour  of  his 

1  La  Gorce,  vol.  v,  p.  481. 

2  The  interpellation  was  decided  upon  by  a  meeting  of  42  deputies,  and 
was  drawn  by  a  committee  consisting  of  MM.  Buffet,  Chevandtor*  Plickon, 


TRANSLATOR'S  INTRODUCTION         xxi 

strength,  might  have  found  it  difficult  to  resist  this 
movement.  In  1869  he  endeavored  to  meet  it  half 
way.  On  the  12th  of  July,  when  the  session  began, 
he  instructed  M.  Rouher  to  make  fresh  concessions 
giving  the  Legislative  Chamber  greater  control  over 
legislation,  over  finance,  and  over  its  own  business. 
In  order  to  mark  more  clearly  the  importance  of  these 
reforms,  he  followed  them  up  by  removing  M.  Rouher 
from  the  office  which  made  him  the  spokesman  of  his 
master's  policy,  and  by  choosing  a  new,  and  — • 
in  a  political  sense  —  somewhat  colorless  ministry. 
Ever  halting,  however,  between  two  opinions,  he  ac 
companied  these  concessions  with  a  stroke  which  irri 
tated  the  very  men  in  whose  favor  they  were  made. 
On  the  12th  he  had  endowed  the  Chamber  with  new 
powers;  on  the  13th  he  prorogued  it  to  an  indefinite 
date/' 

The  Senate  was  summoned,  however,  to  confirm 
the  reforms  announced  in  the  Emperor's  message  of 
July  12,  and  after  weeks  of  discussion  they  were  sanc 
tioned  by  the  Senatus  Consultum  of  September  8. 

"What  the  decree  of  November  24,  1860,  had  begun, 
what  the  letter  of  January  19,  1867,  had  continued, 
the  message  of  July  12,  1869,  completed.  These  three 
acts,  inseparable  from  each  other,  marked  the  three 
stages  of  the  liberal  evolution,  .  ,  .  By  the  act  of 
July  12,  Napoleon  most  nobly  surrendered  what  was 
left  of  his  absolute  power."  l 

The  Emperor's  concessions,  however,  still  fell  short 
of  full  ministerial  responsibility;  he  "could  not  yet 

Segris,  Louvct,  and  Oilivier,  all  of  whom  were  to  be  members  of  the  hapless 
Ministry  of  January  fc. 
1  La  Gorce,  vol.  v,  p.  404. 


xxil         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

make  up  his  mind  to  yield  the  titles  to  his  pilots,  and 
stand  on  the  quarter-deck  of  the  ship  of  State,  in  the 
uniform  of  an  admiral,  but  without  the  admiral's 
power.  When  the  Chamber  was  at  last  suffered  to 
meet,  on  the  29th  of  November,  he  unfolded  his  own 
views  in  one  of  those  phrases  which  he  knew  so  well 
how  to  coin,  *  France/  he  said,  'desires  liberty,  but 
liberty  and  order.  For  order,  1  am  responsible.  Help 
mo,  gentlemen,  to  endow  her  with  liberty/  Every 
day,  however,  showed  him  that  the  views  of  the  Cham 
ber  were  gravitating  more  and  more  directly  to  "the 
institution  of  a  Ministry  which,  if  it  represented  'the 
cause  of  liberty,  should  relieve  the  Emperor  of  his 
responsibility  for  order.  Within  a  month  of  the  meet 
ing  of  the  Legislature,  Napoleon  found  it  necessary  to 
part  with  the  provisional  cabinet  of  the  summer,  and 
to  entrust  M.  Emile  Ollivier  with  the  task  of  forming 
a  new  Ministry,  prepared  to  act  in  the  spirit  us  well 
as  on  the  letter  of  the  Scnatus  Conmltum  of  Septem 
ber."1 

The  negotiations  between  the  Emperor  and  M.  Olli 
vier  began  early  in  the  autumn,  and  were  earned 
on  at  first  through  Duveraois  and  others ;  and  after 
October  81  partly  by  personal  intercourse*  They  are 
detailed  at  great  length  by  M.  Ollivier  in  chapters 
5,  6,  and  7  of  his  twelfth  volume.  It  is  only  fair 
to  say  that  from  the  beginning  ho  firmly  refused  to 
lend  his  assistance  to  prop  the  reactionary  ad  interim 
ministry  by  accepting  office  therein,,  and  that  his 
steadfast  insistence  upon  a  thoroughgoing  change  of 
system,  to  be  evidenced  by  a  similar  change  in  the 
Cabinet,  triumphed  at  last.  It  is  interesting,  too,  to 

1  Walpole,  vol.  Ii,  pp.  477-481, 


TRANSLATOR'S  INTRODUCTION      xxiii 

follow  the  turns  and  windings  of  tlie  affair,  which  led 
finally  to  the  compulsory  inclusion  of  MM.  Buffet  and 
Darn  from  the  Left  Centre,  the  majority  of  the  new 
ministers  being  taken  from  the  Right  Centre,  to  which 
M.  Ollivier  belonged  —  the  son  of  an  exiled  republican 
and  himself  the  one-time  leader  of  the  Five.  Not 
until  the  last  hours  of  January  1,  1870,  were  the  ar 
rangements  finally  made,  to  be  announced  in  the 
Journal  Official,  on  the  following  day,  which  gave  its 
name  to  the  new  Ministry. 

"The  new  Ministers/5  says  La  Gorce,  "so  far  as  they 
were  known  at  all,  were  known  for  honorable  men,  of 
perfect  integrity  and  enlightened  mind,  and  there  was 
no  reason  to  doubt  that  they  would  be  loyal  servants 
of  the  Prince  and  the  country.  Moreover,  they  repre 
sented  a  new  element  in  the  Emperor's  government, 
and  every  novelty  awakens  the  idea  of  hope.  Thus 
the  Imperial  act  was  greeted  with  remarkable  favor. 
And  thus  opened,  under  the  reposeful  auspices  of  peace 
and  liberty,  that  year  1870,  which  was  to  be  the  last 
of  the  Empire,  and  of  all  the  years  of  our  history  as  a 
nation  the  most  tragic."  l 

The  same  judicious  historian,  after  a  brief  sketch  of 
each  of  the  new  Ministers,  continues:  "Among  all 
these  men,  M,  Emile  Ollivier  stood  prominently  forth. 
He  was  not  President  of  the  Council,  and,  indeed,  the 
deputies  of  the  Left  Centre  had  exerted  themselves  to 
prevent  or  to  neutralize  any  suggestion  of  superiority. 
These  precautions  denoted  neither  antipathy  nor 
jealousy,  but  simply  a  slight  distrust.  They  feared 
his  inexperience,  his  enthusiasms,  his  changeableness, 
his  superb  flights  which  were  of  an  artist  rather  than 

1  Vol.  v,  pp.  027,628, 


xxiv         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

a  statesman :  hence  the  idea  of  holding  him  in  check, 
of  hedging  him  about  with  his  equals  in  authority,  of 
maintaining  a  sort  of  equilibrium  between  the  various 
temperaments  and  groups  which  would  mutually 
counterbalance  one  another.1  But  despite  this  effort,, 
public  opinion  attributed  a  preponderant  position  to 
the  former  deputy  of  the  Left.  It  was  he  to  whom  the 
Emperor  had  entrusted  the  commission  to  form  the 
new  administration.  It  was  he  who,  as  Keeper  of  the 
Seals,,  had  countersigned  the  appointments.  Among 
the  advisers  of  the  Crown  he  was  the  only  one  whose 
name  was  known  to  the  masses,  some  being  accustomed 
to  extol  his  liberalism,  others  to  revile  his  backsliding. 
That  which  more  than  all  the  rest  would  place  him  in 
a  rank  apart  would  be  his  admirable  eloquence^  al 
ways  ready  to  attack  or  to  retort,  which  no  incident, 
even  the  most  unexpected,  could  disconcert.  And  so, 
without  the  official  title,  he  appeared,  in  the  eyes  of 
the  nation,  the  real  head  of  the  Cabinet ;  and  from  the 
first  day  the  ministry  of  January  %  was  known  as  the 
Ollivier  Ministry." 2 

Lack  of  space  forbids  more  than  the  briefest  refer 
ence  to  the  rude  shock  that  the  ministry  received  be 
fore  they  were  warm  in  their  seats,  by  the  killing  of 
the  journalist  Victor  Noir  by  Prince  Pierre  Bonaparte, 
the  Emperor's  cousin.  The  revolutionary  party  seized 
upon  the  incident  as  a  pretext  for  a  determined  effort 

l<<In  the  facility  with  which  I  deigned  to  submit  to  these  precautions/* 

says  M.  Ollivier  himself  (vol.  xii,  p.  2&7)»  "  there  was  more  scorn  than  humil 
ity.  I  felt  that  I  was  the  stronger.  .  .  .  They  might,  therefore,  claim  as 
much  as  they  pleased  that  I  was  admitted  as  a  favor  to  the  Dtiru-Buftyt 
Ministry.  1  was  sure  that  the  Ministry  of  January  &  would  be  the  Minis 
try  of  Emile  Ollivier*"  *  VoL  vi,  pp,  $,  4. 


TRANSLATOR'S  INTRODUCTION       xxv 

to  overthrow  the  Empire  and  proclaim  the  republic.1 
It  was  thwarted,  however,  by  the  vigorous  preparations 
of  the  ministry,,  assisted  by  the  timely  prudence  of 
Rochefort  and  others  of  the  leaders. 

The  Ministry  of  January  2  found  still  in  force  but 
one  important  remnant  of  the  autocratic  regime  — 
the  exclusive  power  of  the  Senate  to  amend  the  Con 
stitution.  The  Emperor,  acting  upon  the  advice  of 
his  ministers,  signified  to  the  Senate,  in  February,  his 
wish  that  the  Constitution  should  be  revised  in  this 
respect;  and  by  the  Senatus  Consultum  adopted  on 
April  20  the  power  of  changing  the  Constitution  was 
transferred  to  the  Legislature  as  a  whole.  By  the 
advice  of  M.  Rouher  the  Emperor  decided  to  give 
greater  significance  to  this  decision  by  asking  the  peo 
ple  to  pronounce  on  the  reforms  that  had  been  adopted. 
After  much  discussion,  in  which  the  various  parties 
and  groups  exhibited  curious  differences  of  opinion,2 
the  vote  was  taken  throtighout  the  country  on  May  8, 
upon  this  proposition :  "The  people  approve  the  liberal 
reforms  introduced  in  the  Constitution  since  1860,  by  the 
Emperor,  with  the  concurrence  of  the  great  governing 
bodies  of  the  State,  and  ratified  by  the  Senatus  Consul 
tum  of  April  20,  1870."  There  were  7,358,786  affirma 
tive  and  1,571,939  negative  ballots — a  vote  nearly  as 
large  as  that  by  which  the  introduction  of  autocratic 
Imperialism  had  been  sanctioned  eighteen  years  before. 

That  the  idea  of  the  plebiscite  was  at  first  unpalatable 

1  In  the  Souvenirs  d'un  Ilomme  de  Litres,  of  Alphonse  Baudot,  there  is 
a  chapter  on  Bmile  Ollivior,  in  the  author's  best  vein,  which  contains  a 
vivid  paragraph  or  two  concerning  the  commotion  caused  by  the  death  of 
Noir,  and  an  account  of  an  interview  with  M.  Ollivier  on  that  subject.  The 
whole  chapter  is  well  worth  reading, , 

s  The  different  views  are  described  by  M.  de  La  Gorce,  in  vol.  vi,  book  18. 


xxvi        THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

to  M.  Ollivier,  and  made  doubly  so  by  its  suspicious 
source-,  is'  undoubtedly  true;  but  he  made  the  best  of  it, 
and  the  energies  of  the  Ministry  were  devoted  to  seeming 
the  largest  possible  majority.  Unfortunately  M.  Buffet's 
opposition  to  the  plebiscite  was  too  great  to  be  overcome, 
and  while  the  discussion  was  pending,  he  resigned,  to  be 
followed  almost  at  once  by  Com  to  Darn  and  the  Marquis 
do  Talhouet,  the  former  of  whom  was  succeeded  by  the 
Due  de  Gramont.  However,  the  result  of  the  ballot 
seemed  to  be  generally  accepted  as  proof  that  the  Em 
pire  was  as  solidly  established  as  ever. 

In  the  spring  of  1870,  M.  Ollivier  was  chosen  a  mem 
ber  of  the  Academic  Frangaise  in  place  of  Alphonse 
de  Lamartine.  lie  is  said  to  have  been  the  only 
person  ever  admitted  by  a  unanimous  vote.  The  war 
and  its  consequences  caused  the  postponement  of  his 
**  address  of  reception'5  until  1873 ;  and  public  senti 
ment  was  even  then  in  such  an  excited  state  that  the 
characteristically  vigorous  defence  of  the  Emperor  which 
he  introduced  into  his  eulogy  of  M.  de  Lamartine 
aroused  bitter  recrimination.  For  many  years  now, 
M.  Ollivier  has  been  the  clean  of  the  Academy. 

M,  de  La  Goree  draws  a  sympathetic  arid  attractive 
picture  of  the  new  Minister  of  Justice,  as  he  appeared 
at  the  ministerial  receptions  at  the  Chancellery,  "going 
from  group  to  group,  good-humored,  expansive,  ra 
diant,  smiling  on  everybody,  smiling  also  at  his  good 
fortune,  and  overflowing  with  a  confidence  which  then 
seemed  justified.  In  those  fleeting  hours  everything 
prospered  as  he  would  have  it,  and  his  young  wife,  at 
his  side,  completed  the  image  of  his  happiness."  * 

1  Vol.  vi,  p.  21 ,  M,  Ollivier*  e  first  wife  was  a  daughter  of  Liszt,  the  illustrious 
composer  and  pianist.  He  had  married  for  the  second  tune,  in  1800,  the 
daughter  of  a  merchant  of  Marseilles. 


TRANSLATOR'S  INTRODUCTION     xxvii 

The  following  sketch,  is  drawn  by  M.  Welschinger 
as  a  companion  piece  to  that  of  the  Due  de  Gramont, 
quoted  at  the  end  of  Appendix  E. :  — 

"Less  self-satisfied  [than  M.  de  Gramont]  and  yet 
as  sure  of  his  own  infallibility,  but  more  fidgety  and 
feverish,  appeared  M.  Emile  Ollivier.  Tall  and  thin, 
always  dressed  in  black  as  if  he  were  on  his  way  to 
somebody's  funeral,  with  gold-bowed  spectacles  over 
eyes  always  in  motion,  a  sallow,  pale  face  encircled 
by  thin  black  whiskers,  a  strong,  firmly  set  mouth 
and  high  forehead;  quick  and  emphatic  in  gesture, 
incisive  and  hurried  in  speech,  always  ready  to  retort, 
upheld  by  his  great  reputation  as  a  lawyer  and  political 
orator,  defying  any  opponent  whomsoever  on  any  field, 
and  accepting  at  every  moment  contests  of  the  most 
diverse  nature,  without  a  sensation  of  fatigue.  .  .  . 
Blessed  with  a  self-assurance  due  to  his  impassioned 
eloquence  and  alert  intellectual  resources,  he  had  ac 
cepted  the  heavy  burden  proffered  him,  with  the  hope, 
nay,  the  certainty  of  triumphing  over  all  obstacles."  l 

Lack  of  competence,  even  more  than  lack  of  space, 

1  La  Guerre  de  1870,  vol.  i,  p.  94.  This  called  forth  the  following  reply 
from  M.  Ollivier,  printed  in  the  $claird$3em&nt$  to  vol.  xv,  p.  599 : —  "My 
gold-bowed  spectacles.  —  I  have  been  represented  as  always  dressed  in  black, 
wearing  gold-bowed  spectacles  —  a  sort  of  cross  between  a  countryman  and 
an  undertaker's  'mute/  Dear  readers,  who  have  followed  me  kindly  for 
so  many  years,  let  me  tell  you  that  none  of  the  chosen  friends  among  whom 
I  have  lived  have  ever  seen  me  so.  To  be  sure,  being  near-sighted,  I  have 
worn  spectacles  since  my  youth,  but  not  with  gold  bows  —  modest  spec 
tacles,  with  bows  of  burnished  steel.  It  has  sometimes  happened  with  me, 
as  with  other  men,  that  on  days  of  mourning  I  have  worn  a  black  coat ;  but 
ordinarily  I  have  never  worn  anything  but  dark  blue  or  dark  gray  clothes 
and  if  I  have  endured  cruel  suffering  during  my  life,  I  have  always  made  it  a 
point  not  to  display  it  in  the  lugubrious  aspect  of  my  outer  man," 


xxviii        THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

deters  the  translator  from  attempting  to  give  even  a 
bare  sketch  of  the  external  relations  of  France  from 
1865  to  1870.  He  can  hope  to  do  no  more  than  explain 
some  of  the  allusions  in  the  text  —  especially,  perhaps, 
the  repeated  reference  to  a  battle  between  Prussia 
and  Austria  as  an  event  for  which  France  was  entitled 
to  seek  revenge.  The  summary  that  follows  is  taken 
mainly  from  Professor  Macvane's  translation  of  Sei- 
gnobos's  Political  History  of  Europe  since  181 J^  chapter 
xxvii,  pages  798  ff. 

"The  question  of  the  duchies  of  Sehleswig-IIolstein 
.  .  .  was  reopened  by  the  extinction  of  the  Danish 
dynasty  in  1863.  The  German  states  supported  the 
Duke  of  Augustenburg ;  the  European  powers  de 
fended  the  integrity  of  the  Danish  monarchy ;  Austria 
and  Prussia  took  an  intermediate  position.  ,  .  . 

"The  Danish  government  was  counting  on  Euro 
pean  intervention."  But  England  and  France  could 
not  agree,  and  Prussia  and  Austria  began  war  against 
Denmark  in  January,  1864.  The  peace  of  Vienna 
(October  30)  ceded  the  duchies  to  Prussia  and  Austria. 

"Austria  and  Prussia  had  been  in  conflict  since  I860, 
when  reform  of  the  Confederation  had  been  attempted. 
But  the  Austrian  government,  having  fallen  out  with 
the  German  states  .  .  -  had  made  overtures  to  Prussia. 

"The  conflict  began  again  with  the  question  of  de 
termining  the  disposition  of  the  duchies  they  had  con 
quered  together.  A  special  council  of  the  Prussian 
ministers,  July  21,  1865,  declared  Austria's  conces 
sions  insufficient  and  advised  immediate  war.  But 
King  William  was  unwilling  to  attack,  and  Austria, 
having  no  money,  wished  to  avoid  a  war.  The  Gas- 
tein  convention  in  August  settled  the  question  pro- 


TRANSLATOR'S  INTRODUCTION        xxix 

visionally  by  dividing  the  duchies.  France  protested 
against  this  act  as  a  violation  of  the  principle  of  na 
tionalities  and  the  popular  will,  and  as  a  revival  of  a 
procedure  that  had  become  obsolete  in  Europe.  .  .  . 

"Napoleon  had  made  advances  to  Italy,  bringing 
up  the  Roman  question  by  the  September  Convention, 
1864.  The  peace  party,  which  had  held  the  ministry 
since  1862,  hoped  to  reconcile  Italy  with  Austria  by 
inducing  the  latter  to  give  up  Venetia.  But  the  Italian 
government  wished  to  keep  its  army  ready,  and  Aus 
tria  still  refused  to  recognize  the  Kingdom  of  Italy. 

"  Bismarck  tried  to  conclude  an  alliance  with  Italy 
against  Austria.  Italy  could  do  nothing  that  France 
did  not  approve;  Napoleon's  authorization  must 
therefore  be  obtained.  Bismarck  came  to  ask  it  of 
him.  The  Biarritz  interview  of  October,  1865,  was  the 
decisive  act  of  this  negotiation.  Napoleon  resumed 
his  personal  policy :  to  bring  about  the  national  unity 
of  Italy,  to  fortify  Prussia  against  Austria,  and  to 
profit  by  the  conflict  to  gain  territory  and  destroy  the 
treaties  of  1815.  Bismarck's  game  was  to  encourage 
these  hopes  without  making  any  formal  engagement. 
He  prevailed  on  Napoleon  to  promise  the  neutrality 
of  Prance."  1 

After  much  difficulty  Bismarck  succeeded  in  obtain 
ing  an  alliance  with  Italy  for  three  months  (April  8, 
1866).  "Italy  promised  armed  support  to  Prussia's 
plans  for  the  reform  of  the  Confederation,  and  Prussia 

1  The  details  of  the  Biarritz  interview  have  never  been  disclosed.  Who 
ever  is  curious  to  read  the  story  of  Bismarck's  handling  of  the  many-sided 
negotiations  of  1805-60,  will  find  it  told  in  illuminating  but  not  tedious  de 
tail,  especially  with  reference  to  the  Chancellor's  beguiling  of  Napoleon,  by 
Sir  S.  Walpole  ua  vol.  ii»  chapter  10  of  his  History  of  Twenty-fwe  Years* 


THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

promised  to  secure  the  cession  of  Venetia.  .  .  .  Napo 
leon  promised  neutrality. 

"Austria's  policy  was  to  delay  a  rupture  in  Germany 
in  order  to  force  Prussia,  by  taking  the  aggressive  role, 
to  alienate  the  German  states  (which  plan  succeeded), 
and  in  Europe  to  isolate  Prussia  by  satisfying  Italy. 
She  proposed  to  Prussia,  on  April  25,  that  both  sides 
should  disarm,  but  not  in  Italy.  She  left  France  the 
hope  that  she  would  code  Vonetia  if  Italy  remained 
neutral.  As  compensation  for  Venetia  she  spoke  of 
taking  back  Silesia  from  Prussia." 

Napoleon  in  his  perplexity  proposed  a  European 
congress,  "to  revise  the  map  of  Europe,  England  and 
Russia  agreed;  Prussia,  and  Italy,  from  regard  for 
Napoleon,  had  agreed  beforehand.  Austria  defeated 
the  scheme  by  demanding  that  no  increase  of  territory 
should  be  discussed  and  that  the  Pope  should  be  in 
vited." 

The  rupture  was  provoked  on  the  very  eve  of  the 
expiration  of  the  throe  months*  alliance  with  I  tuly.  The 
Six  Weeks"  War  of  180(5  was  decided  in  a  single  day, 
by  the  overwhelming  defeat  of  the  Austriaius  at  Sa~ 
dowa,  or  KSniggr&ltt,  on  July  3. 

"The  Austrian  government  .  .  .  ceded  Venetia  to 
Napoleon,  begging  him  to  negotiate  peace  with  Italy, 
Napoleon  seemed  to  be  the  arbiter  of  Europe,  The 
Minister  of  .Foreign  Affairs  (I)rouyn  do  Lhnys),  who 
favored  Austria,  urged  him  to  mobilize  ami  stop  Prussia 
by  threatening  to  lake  possession  of  the  left  ba.nk  of 
the  Rhine,  which  was  unprotected.  But  "the  Minister 
of  War  confessed  that  the  army  was  disorganized  by 
the  Mexican  expedition,  and  that  he  could  not  got 
together  more  than  409000  men.  Napoleon,  who  was 


TRANSLATOR'S  INTRODUCTION       xxxi 

in  ill  health,  hesitated  between  two  policies ;   whether 

to  impose  peace  on  Prussia  or  negotiate  with  her  to 
secure  advantage  for  himself.  He  thus  let  slip  the 
moment  for  intimidating  Prussia  by  a  demonstration 
on  the  Rhine.  The  policy  of  the  Prussian  govern 
ment  was  to  put  Napoleon  off  with  vague  promises, 
keeping  him  passive  while  the  Prussian  army  was 
marching  on  Vienna.1 

"Napoleon  first  tried  to  check  Italy  by  threatening 
to  join  Austria  against  her :  Italy  replied  that  she 
could  agree  to  nothing  without  Prussia  and  refused 
an  armistice.  Napoleon  then  sent  to  the  Prussian 
camp  to  ask  the  King  to  authorize  a  truce  for  Italy. 
He  then  (July  14)  proposed  the  bases  of  a  peace: 
integrity  of  Austria,  dissolution  of  the  Confederation, 
confederation  of  Northern  Germany,  and  cession  by 
Austria  of  her  right  to  the  Duchies.  On  these  condi 
tions  all  were  agreed.  The  difficulty  was  In  arrang 
ing  additions  of  territory;  Prussia  wished  to  annex 
several  German  states,  but  Austria  dared  not  abandon 
her  allies  to  that  fate.  Napoleon  wanted  to  secure 
some  territory  to  compensate  France  for  the  increase 
of  Prussia.  But  Bismarck  knew  that  Prussia's  army 
made  her  mistress  of  the  situation,  and  he  stood  out 
for  his  own  terms. 

1  See  Walpole,  vol.  it,  pp  250  ff.  "With  some  misgivings,  but  with  som% 
hope  he  [Napoleon]  decided  to  trust  to  Count  von  Bismarck's  spoken  prom 
ises,  and  with  this  object  to  instruct  M.  Beiiedetti,  the  French  Ambassador 
in  Berlin,  to  repair  to  the  headquarters  of  the  Prussian  array,  and  to  preach 
the  wisdom  of  moderation:  with  some  misgivings,  for  the  Emperor  could 
not  conceal  from  himself  that  M.  Beuedetti  did  not  speak  with  the  authority 
of  a  nation  prepared  to  enforce,  its  counsel  in  arms;  with  some  hope,  for 
the  Emperor  recollected  the  specious  prospect  which  the  Prussian  Minister 
had  held  out  to  him  at  Biarritss  and  was  disposed  to  credit  other  men  with 
the  weak  benevolence  of  his  own  character."  P.  259, 


xxxii  PRAN(X)-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

"By  the  preliminary  peace  of  Nikolsburg,  July  £6, 
Austria,  withdrew  from  German  affairs,  ceding  her 
right  in  the  Duchies  and  leaving  Prussia  free  to  es 
tablish  a  now  confederation,  and  to  annex  the  North 
German,  states  except  Saxony.  Bismarck  made  con 
cessions  of  form:  1.  The  German  states  soulh  of  the 
Main,  left  out  of  the  new  confederation,  should  have 
the  right  to  form  a  union  of  their  own,.  °2.  The  north 
ern  districts  of  Schleswig  should  be  restored  to  'Den 
mark  if  their  population  so  wished.  The  final  peace 
of  Prague,  of  August  23,  preserved  these  two  clauses, 
but  they  remained  illusory.1 

'*  Napoleon  asked  Prussia  for  a  territorial  enlarge 
ment,  and  the  Prussian  envoy  let  him  hope  for  one 
(July  TO),2  When  the  Tsar  proposed  a  congress  to 
settle  the  changes  in  Germany,  it  was  Napoleon  that 
refused,  hoping  to  gain  more  from  Prussia.  lie  offered 
a  secret  understanding  for  mutual  enlargement ;  France 
to  have  the  possessions  of  Bavaria  and  Hesse  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Rhine.  Bismarck  insisted  upon  a 
written  draft  of  the  scheme  (to  use  against  Napoleon), 
then  refused  it,  and,  later  published  it  in  a  conversa 
tion  with  a  correspondent  of  the  M2tf/0.  In  face  of 
the  commotion  in  Germany,  Napoleon  withdrew  his 

1  It  wan  the  necond  of  these  two  clauses  to  which  Ihe  charges  of  violation 
vof  the  Treaty  of  Prague,  reiterated  in  the  debates  during  the  oriain  of  July, 

1870,  referred. 

2  The  Prussian  envoy  referred  to  was  the  Prussian  Ambawiador  to  France, 
Count  von  Goltss,  "a  man  almost  as  remarkable  a«  Count  von  Bismarck 
himself."    This  statement  of  Walpolo  (voL  u,  p.  $01)  in  amply  borne  out 
by  his  account  of  this  conversation  of  July  19,  in  which  Von  Gollz  **nue* 
eceded  so  well  that  he  permiaded  the  Emperor  to  agree  to  the  trawler  of 
Hanover,  Electoral  HOHSC,  and  Frankfort,  or  of  some  4»500»000  people,  to 
Pruasia ;  and  to  postpone  for  the  moment  any  negotiation  on  the  compensa 
tion  which  should  be  awarded  to  France,"    J*.  £05. 


TRANSLATOR'S  INTRODUCTION      xxxlii 

project,  denied  the  rumors  of  negotiation  (August  12), 
and  turned  to  Belgium.  He  proposed  (August  20) 
that  Prussia  should  aid  France  to  acquire  Belgium 
and  Luxemburg.  Bismarck  had  the  plan  written 
out  at  Napoleon's  dictation ;  he  published  it  in  1870 
to  embroil  England  and  Belgium  with  France.1 

"The  South  German  States  were  isolated  and  quickly 
crushed  by  Prussia.  They  at  once  asked  for  the  media 
tion  of  France ;  but  Bismarck  showed  them  Napoleon's 
plans  for  annexation  at  their  expense,  and  in  August 
induced  them  to  conclude  with  Prussia  secret  treaties 
of  offensive  and  defensive  alliance. 

"Napoleon  therefore  obtained  no  positive  result, 
and  Prussia,  by  a  single  war,  acquired  first  place  in 
Germany." 

Bismarck  continued  to  play  upon  the  hopes  of  the 
Emperor  (luring  the  summer  of  1866,  while  he  was 
negotiating  the  secret  treaties  of  alliance  with  the  South 
German  States,  which  assured  him  of  a  united  Ger 
many  in  case  of  a  foreign  war.  It  became  evident,  at 
last,  that  "the  objects  at  which  the  Emperor  had 
originally  aimed  were  unattainable.  Prussia  had  no 
intention  of  surrendering  an  inch  of  territory  on  the 
Rhine  to  satisfy  French  ambition,  or  to  heal  the  wounds 


*Thc  publication  of  this  draft  treaty,  which  Bismarck  caused  to  be 
photographed  and  distributed  in  facsimile  soon  after  the  outbreak  of  war 
'  (it  appeared  in  the  Time*  of  July  25),  had  a  decisive  effect  on  public  opinion 
in  England.  It  was  in  Benedetto's  handwriting  throughout,  and  was  de 
clared  by  him  to  have  been  written  at  Bismarck's  dictation  and  by  his  sug 
gestion.  "  When  M .  Benedetti  had  laid  down  the  pen,  M.  de  Bismarck  folded 
the  document  and  put  it  away  as  one  docs  with  a  thing  that  may  be  of  use. 
A  second  time,  he  had,  in  accordance  with  the  recommendation  of  the  great 
Frederick,  procured  something  in  writing"  La  Gorce,  vol.  v,  p.  69.  Sec  also 
Walpolc,  vol.  5i,  pp.  447-440. 


xxxiv      THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

of  French  discontent;  and  Prussia  had  equally  no 
intention  of  moving  a  man  or  a  gun  to  facilitate  a 
French  attack  on  Belgium."  Thereupon  Luxemburg 
presented  itself  as  offering  perhaps  the  very  com 
pensation  that  the  Emperor  desired.  It  was  still  gar 
risoned  by  Prussia  (under  a  doubtful  claim  of  right, 
the  old  Germanic  Confederation  having  been  dissolved). 
It  belonged  to  the  King  of  Holland,  not  to  Holland, 
and  he  was  anxious  to  sell  it.  "  Napoleon  grasped  at 
the  opportunity  to'  secure  additional  territory.  Ho 
believed  that  the  Prussian  government  was  only  await 
ing  a  pretext  to  withdraw  its  garrison  in  such  a  way  as 
not  to  offend  public  opinion ;  Bismarck  left  him  under 
this  delusion.  The  King  of  Holland  agreed  to  sell, 
provided  Prussia  would  consent.  Bismarck  did  not 
refuse  distinctly.  .  .  .  He  told  the  King  of  Holland 
that  he  would  leave  to  him  the  responsibility  for  his 
acts.  The  King,  believing  that  Bismarck  wished  only 
to  have  his  hand  forced,  notified  Napoleon  that  the 
sale  would  be  made  (March  30,  1867). 

"The  treaty  of  cession  had  been  drawn  up  and  an 
nounced  to  Europe,  when  an  interpellation  was  made 
in  the  Reichstag  on  the  rumor  of  a  sale  of  Gorman 
territory  by  a  prince  of  German  blood.  Bismarck 
replied  that  nothing  had  yet  been  arranged  and  sent 
word  to  the  King  of  Holland  that  in  the  present  agitated 
condition  of  opinion  in  Germany  the  cession  of  Luxem 
burg  would  mean  war.  The  King  withdrew  his  con 
sent  in  spite  of  French  insistence."  2 

1  Walpole,  vol.  ii,  p.  453. 

2  Seignobos,  p.  804.    A  clear  and  concise  account  of  these  various  trans 
actions  is  contained  in  the  first  chapter  of  Albert  Sorel's  Histoire  Diploma 
tique,  etc.    For  the  most  judicious  and  lively  detailed  account,  see  books 
30  ami  32  of  vol.  v,  of  La  Gorce. 


TRANSLATOR'S  INTRODUCTION      xxxv 

In  the  end,  Luxemburg  was  neutralized,  in  accord 
ance  with  the  conclusions  of  a  congress,  held  at  the 
instance  of  England ;  but  another  item  had  been  added 
to  the  Emperor's  list  of  grievances  against  Prussia. 

The  years  from  the  conclusion  of  the  Luxemburg 
affair  to  the  accession  to  power  of  the  Ollivier  Minis 
try  were  marked  principally  by  the  attempts  of  France 
to  form  an  alliance  with  Austria  and  Italy;  the  sole 
result  being  a  promise  by  each  of  the  three  sovereigns 
to  conclude  no  other  alliance  without  notifying  the 
other  two. 

On  accepting  office  M.  Ollivier  declared  himself 
in  favor  of  depriving  Bismarck  of  every  pretext  for 
seeking  a  quarrel:  of  refraining  from  espousing  the 
cause  of  the  Danes  and  from  interfering  with  the 
progress  of  the  unification  of  Germany.  "German 
unity  so  far  as  we  are  concerned  is  complete.  .  .  . 
What  interest  have  we  in  preventing  the  democrats 
of  Wiirtemberg  and  Bavaria  from  boring  Bismarck 
to  extinction  in  his  parliaments,  since,  on  the  day  of 
battle,  all  Germany  would  be  against  us  ?"  * 

Early  in  February,  at  the  instance  of  the  French 
Foreign  Office,  Lord  Clarendon,  then  Foreign  Secretary, 
undertook  to  transmit  to  Berlin  a  proposition  looking 
to  eventual  disarmament.  Bismarck  gave  a  most 
discouraging  reply  to  the  overtures  of  Lord  A.  Lof tus ; 
but  a  fortnight  later  the  French  ministry  appealed 
again  to  Lord  Clarendon,  announcing  at  the  same  time 
that  the  "contingent"  force  of  the  army  for  1870  would 
be  reduced  by  10,000  men.  This  attempt  had  no  better 

1 L' Empire  Liberal,  vol.  xii,  pp.  I34-,  135.  See  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  pp.  175- 
177,  on  the  pacific  disposition  of  the  ministry  and  the  consequent  disturb 
ance  of  Bismarck's  designs. 


xxxvi      THE  FBANCCMPRTJSSIAN  WAR 

success  than  the  earlier  one,  but  the  proposed  reduction 
was  carried  out  none  the  less.  It  was  during  the  de 
bate  in  the  Chapaber  on  this  reduction,  on  June  309 
that  M.  Ollivier,  in  reply  to  a  question  from  Jules 
Favre,  made  his  often-quoted  statement:  "In  what 
ever  direction  we  turn  our  eyes,  we  see  no  irritating 
question  in  dispute,  and  never  at  any  time  has  the 
maintenance  of  peace  in  Europe  been  better  assured." 
Less  than  three  weeks  later,  France  and  Prussia 
were  at  each  other's  throats;  in  another  three  weeks 
the  Ministry  of  January  2  was  overthrown  after  the 
first  victories  of  the  Prussian  arms ;  and  before  another 
month  had  passed  the  Emperor  was  a  prisoner  and  the 
Empire  dead. 

*felt  was  between  the  12th  and  14th  of  July  that  war 
was  morally  declared/3  says  one  of  the  few  defenders  of 
the  action  of  the  Emperor  and  his  ministers,  "not  by 
the  will  of  the  Ministry,  but  by  the  imperious,  impatient 
will  of  the  country,  expressing  itself  at  the  same  mo 
ment  through  all  its  organs :  the  Chamber,  the  press 
and  public  manifestations."  1 

It  is  absolutely  certain  that,  if  M.  Ollivier  and  his 
pacifically  inclined  colleagues  had  resigned  their  posts 
when  they  found,  on  July  13,  that  they  were  being 
driven  into  a  position  that  must  inevitably  lead  to 
war,  their  places  would  have  been  filled  by  ministers 
chosen  from  the  rabidly  bellicose  Right,  the  "Arca 
dians"  or  extreme  Bonapartists,  who  believed  in  the 

1  Fernand  Giraudeau,  La  V&riU  sur  la  Campagne  de  1870  (1871),  p.  58. 
This  little  volume  is  particularly  valuable  because  it  gives  copious  extracts 
from  the  newspapers,  in  Paris  and  the  provinces,  amply  confirming 
M.  Ollivier's  statements  in  the  text  as  to  the  general  attitude  of  the  press. 


TRANSLATOR'S  INTRODUCTION    xxxvil 

necessity  of  a  foreign  war  to  solidify  the  dynasty  no 
less  than  Bismarck  believed  in  a  similar  necessity  to 
forward  the  unity  of  Germany.  It  may  jbe  well  for 
Americans  to  recall  the  events  of  1898,  when  an  equally 
reluctant  administration  allowed  itself  to  be  forced 
into  war,  by  a  similar  clamorous  demonstration  of  the 
public  will  "through  all  its  organs."  Then,  perhaps, 
we  shall  be  better  prepared  to  judge  the  conduct  of 
men  the  sincerity  of  whose  patriotism,  as  well  as  of 
their  desire  for  peace,  no  historian  save  the  bitterest 
partisan  has  failed  to  acknowledge. 

Of  all  the  persons  who  played  a  leading  part  in  the 
critical  days  of  July,  1870,  only  M.  Ollivier  and  the 
Empress  Eug6nie  are  still  living  in  this  year,  1912. 


THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 
AND  ITS  HIDDEN  CAUSES 


INTRODUCTION 

"As  there  is,  in  all  human  affairs,  something  that 
paves  the  way  for  them,  something  that  determines 
one  to  undertake  them,  and  something  that  causes 
them  to  succeed,  the  true  science  of  history  consists 
in  taking  note  of  those  secret  combinations  which 
have  paved  the  way  for  great  changes,  and  of  the 
momentous  conjunctures  which  have  caused  them 
to  come  to  pass.  In  truth,  it  is  not  enough  simply  to 
look  at  what  is  going  on  before  one's  eyes ;  that  is  to 
say,  to  consider  only  those  great  events  which  suddenly 
decide  the  fate  of  empires.  He  who  would  thoroughly 
understand  human  affairs  must  begin  further  back." 

Whosoever  would  understand  the  War  of  1870 
should  bear  in  mind  this  precept  of  Bossuet.  If  one 
would  discover  the  real  causes  of  a  war  which  over 
turned  the  territorial  arrangement  of  Europe,  which 
restored  the  ancient  international  law  of  the  barbarians, 
which  arrested  the  regular  forward  movement  of 
civilization,  which  forced  the  nations  to  undergo  the 
discomfort  of  armaments  that  they  abhor,  and  imposed 
upon  Germany  the  penalty  of  a  victory  beyond  her 
moral  strength,  it  is  all  the  more  important  not  to  look 
simply  before  one's  eyes,  but  to  begin  further  back, 
to  observe  the*  secret  combinations  from  which  the 


2  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

successive  events  resulted;  because  sooner  or  later 
this  drama  of  1870  will  prove  to  be,  whether  at  home 
or  abroad,  but  the  prelude  of  crises  no  less  grave, 
whereby  the  form  and  fortunes  of  empires  will  once 
again  be  changed. 

There  has  been  much  declamation  concerning  the 
expedition  to  Mexico  —  that  the  real  cause  of  our  cata 
strophe  dates  back  to  that.  It  is  said  that  we  were 
beaten  in  1870  because  the  Empire  "had  squandered 
all  our  blood,  all  our  gold,  all  our  strength,  on  the 
plains  of  Mexico/' l  Now  what  was  the  average 
figure  of  our  effective  force  in  1866  ?  Four  hundred 

1  Jules  Simon,  Gouvernement  de  la  Defense  Nationals,  p.  377.  Moltke, 
too,  who  is  ordinarily  inaccurate  as  to  anything  in  which  we  arc  concerned, 
because  he  repeats  the  assertions  of  the  enemies  of  the  Empire,  says,  in  his 
Memories  of  the  War  of  1870,  that  the  Mexican  War  "  cost  enormous  sums 
and  disorganized  our  military  strength." 

In  the  M emoirs  of  Marshal  Randon,  vol.  ii,  p.  75,  we  read:  "On 
December  13,  1862,  the  Mexican  expedition  comprised  28,000  men,  5845 
horses,  549  mules,  8  12-pound  siege  guns,  6  12-pounders  in  reserve ;  24  cam 
paign  4-pounders,  and  12  mountain  guns.  This  force  was  not  afterwards  in 
creased  by  more  than  a  few  thousand  men,  and  the  maUriel  was  not  increased 
at  all."  See  also  pp.  169  and  228. — In  another  official  report  that  I  have 
before  me  the  number  of  mountain  guns  is  given  as  16  instead  of  12,  and 
there  are  2  Mexican  mortars  in  addition,  making  a  total  of  56  pieces. 

[The  best  account  in  English  of  the  ill-fated  enterprise  of  Maximilian  in 
Mexico  may  be  found, in  Sir  Spencer  Walpole's  History  of  Twenty-five  Yean, 
vol.  ii,  pp.  69-1 00.  "The  prince,  who  was  shot  in  America,  was  the  vic 
tim,"  says  this  distinguished  historian;  "the  Emperor,  who  survived  at 
Paris,  was  the  instigator  of  the  crime.  And  the  shuttle  of  destiny  was 
already  weaving  the  warp  of  fate  into  the  woof  of  Napoleon's  winding 
sheet.  The  dream  which  the  dreamer  had  dreamed  was  dissolved,  not 
only  in  Mexico,  but  in  Europe.  The  Mexican  enterprise  had  eaten  up 
the  resources  of  the  Empire,  and  had  deprived  Napoleon  of  the  power  to 
exert  his  will  nearer  home.  The  crowd,  indeed,  who  only  recollected  the 
past,  still  regarded  him  as  the  master  of  many  legions,  the  man  on  whose 
will  the  future  of  Europe  depended;  men  more  intimately  acquainted 
with  politics  were  already  perceiving  that  his  power  was  waning,  and 
that  his  own  faith  in  his  destiny  was  yielding  to  circumstances"  (p.  99),] 


INTRODUCTION  3 

thousand  men.  How  many  cannon  were  there  in 
our  arsenals  ?  There  were  10,944  brass  guns,  besides 
nearly  three  thousand  of  iron.  How  many  men  were 
employed  in  Mexico  ?  From  35,000  to  40,000.  How 
many  guns  ?  Fifty ! !  As  for  the  expense,  it  was 
adjusted,  during  Thiers's  presidency,  at  three  hundred 
millions,  from  which  it  is  proper  to  deduct  what  those 
3£,000  to  40,000  men  would  have  cost  for  their  keep 
in  France  —  that  is  to  say,  nearly  one  half.  That 
is  how  Mexico  devoured  all  our  blood,  all  our  gold, 
and  all  our  strength !  Moreover,  the  losses  of  that 
campaign,  in  men  and  matiriel,  were  abundantly  re 
paired  by  the  results  of  the  Niel  military  reform  of 
1867.1  That  expedition  impaired  the  personal  pres 
tige  and  the  infallibility  of  Napoleon  III,  but  even 
if  it  reflects  little  honor  on  the  history  of  the  Second 
Empire,  its  influence  was  no  more  unfortunate,  no 
more  decisive,  than  that  of  the  Chinese,  Cochinchinese, 
and  Syrian  expeditions  was  fortunate. 

According  to  others  it  is  to  the  Italian  War  of  1859 
that  we  must  attribute  the  beginning  of  our  downfall, 
because  it  led  us,  by  the  way  of  Italian  unity,  to  Ger 
man  unity.2  In  reality  there  was  at  that  time  no 
necessary  connection  between  the  Italian  movement 
and  the  Geimanic  movement;  and  even  if  we  had 
not  gone  down  into  Italy  to  prevent  Austria  from 

1  [  An  excellent  brief  account  of  the  plans  of  Marshal  Niel,  and  of  the 
resistance  which  those  plans  encountered  and  which  led  to  their  practically 
complete  failure,  will  be  found  in  volume  six  of  P.  de  la  Gorce's  Histoire  du 
Second  Empire,  pp.  133-147.    Niel  died  in  August,  1869.] 

2  [A  most  lucid  and  informing  narrative  of  the  circumstances  which  led 
Napoleon  HI  to  join  Italy  against  Austria  in  1859,  and  of  the  result  of  that 
war  upon  his  subsequent  policy  and  fortunes,  is  given  by  Mr.  W.  R.  Thayer 
in  his  recent  work :  The  Life  and  Times  of  Cavour.    Boston,  1911.] 


4  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

becoming  definitively  mistress  there,  German  unity, 
the  intense  desire  for  which  Chateaubriand  had  noticed 
at  the  time  of  his  embassy  to  Berlin,  would  not  have 
interrupted  its  progress,  daily  more  determined,  which 
no  opposition  from  without  or  within  could  have 
prevented  from  triumphing  sooner  or  later. 

No,- the  War  of  1859  was  not  the  prelude  to  our 
decline :  it  added  some  noble  pages  to  our  military 
annals,  it  restored  two  splendid  provinces  to  the  mother- 
country,  and  showed  us  to  the  world  as  being  what 
we  have  always  been,  under  the  old  monarchy  as 
under  the  Republic,  save  for  a  few  rare  moments  of 
aberration,  the  defenders  of  the  weak,  the  protectors 
of  the  independence  of  nations,  and  "the  morning 
bugle-call  of  the  world/' 

Others  again  have  assumed  to  refer  the  succession 
of  our  misfortunes  to  the  supineness  of  our  government 
in  the  affair  of  the  Danish  Duchies.1  This  is  to 
ascribe  undue  importance  to  a  trivial  event,  the  solu 
tion  of  which,  whatever  it  may  have  been,  was  not 

1  The  controversy  concerning  the  status  of  the  duchies  of  Schleswig  and 
Holstein,  which  had  passed  through  many  phases  during  the  mid-nineteenth 
century,  reached  its  most  acute  crisis  in  1863,  when  the  death  of  Frederick 
VII  of  Denmark  brought  a  change  of  dynasty  and  the  accession  of  Chris 
tian  of  Gliicksburg.  The  war  of  1864  between  Denmark  and  Prussia 
resulted  in  the  handing  over  of  the  duchies  to  Prussia  and  Austria,  and  in 
the  eventual  absorption  of  both  by  Prussia.  The  whole  SchleswJg-Holstein 
question,  which  at  one  time  seemed  likely  to  lead  to  a  general  European 
war,  is  said  by  Sir  Spencer  Walpole  to  have  been  "  one  of  the  most  complicated 
matters  recorded  in  history.  The  facts  are  so  involved,  the  merits  of  the 
dispute  are  so  confused,  that  it  is  difficult  to  make  them  intelligible  or  to 
pronounce  a  confident  opinion  upon  them."  (Life  of  Lord  John  Russell, 
vol.  ii,  p.  896).  France,  although  her  interests,  like  those  of  England,  were 
associated  with  the  cause  of  Denmark,  failed,  as  did  England,  to  go  to  her 
aid — hence  the  charge  of  "  supineness ."  For  a  bird's-eye  view  of  the  whole 
complicated  subject,  see  Walpole,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  871-897.] 


INTRODUCTION  5 

of  a  nature  to  prolong  its  influence  on  the  development 
of  affairs.  Napoleon  III  would  have  been  mad  enough 
for  a  strait-waistcoat,  if  alone,  abandoned  by  Eng 
land,  he  had,  on  that  occasion,  endangered  the  for 
tunes  of  France  in  a  war  with  all  of  Germany;  for 
at  that  time  the  Germanic  Confederation,  that  is  to 
say,  the  States  of  the  South  and  Austria,  would  have 
gone  with  Prussia. 

The  first  cause  of  the  War  of  1870  is  to  be  found  in 
the  year  1866.  It  was  in  that  year,  to  be  marked 
forever  with  black,  it  was  in  that  year  of  blindness 
when  one  error  was  redeemed  only  by  a  more  griev 
ous  error,  and  when  the  infirmities  of  the  government 
were  made  mortal  by  the  bitterness  of  the  opposition ; 
it  was  in  that  accursed  year  that  was  born  the  supreme 
peril  of  France  and  of  the  Empire.  If  the  year  1870 
is  the  terrible  year,  1866  is  the  fatal  year.1  The  Ro 
mans,  according  to  Cicero,  considered  the  battle  of  the 
Allia  more  disastrous  than  the  taking  of  Rome  because 
that  last  misfortune  was  the  result  of  the  first. 

Everybody,  in  all  Europe  as  well  as  in  France, 
is  in  accord  touching  the  importance  of  the  fateful 
year,  and  this  historic  truth  is  not  contested.  But 
everywhere  the  error  committed  by  Napoleon  III 
is  mistakenly  characterized.  It  was  his  chimerical 
loyalty  to  the  principle  of  nationalities,  people  say, 
which  led  him  to  allow  Prussia  to  constitute  a  great 
power  that  was  a  menace  to  ourselves.  Say  just 
the  contrary,  and  you  will  be  in  the  right.  It  w;as 
his  disloyalty  to  the  principle  of  nationalities  that 
was  the  source  of  all  of  Napoleon  Ill's  misfortunes 
our  own. 

1  [See  the  translator's  Introduction,  «w$>ra.] 


6  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

People  would  not  deny  it  if  they  had  a  better  com 
prehension  of  this  theory  of  nationalities,  which  every 
body  talks  about  without  understanding  it,  or  under 
standing  it  all  awry.  The  theory  of  nationalities 
may  be  reduced  to  a  few  maxims  of  luminous  sim 
plicity  :  — 

Every  freely  constituted  nation  forms  a  sovereign, 
intangible  organism,  however  weak,  which  cannot 
be  placed  under  foreign  domination  without  its  consent, 
or  be  kept  there  against  its  will.  It  does  not  recognize 
conquest  as  a  legitimate  means  of  acquisition.  Only 
the  will  of  the  people  has  the  power  lawfully  to  create, 
to  transform,  to  diminish,  or  to  increase  kingdoms. 

Whence  it  follows:  first,  that  no  nation  has  the 
right  to  meddle  in  the  affairs  of  another,  to  object 
to  its  international  arrangements,  to  prevent  it  from 
separating  from  a  state  to  which  it  was  united  by 
force,  or  from  annexing  itself  to  another  to  which 
it  is  drawn  by  its  sympathies  or  its  interests.  Further 
more,  Europe,  assembled  in  congress  or  conference, 
is  not  possessed  of  a  collective  right  of  its  own,  which 
is  denied  to  each  nation  separately,  on  the  pretext, 
of  preventing  any  nation  from  disturbing,  at  its  pleas 
ure,  the  general  system  to  which  it  belongs. 

The  underlying  principle  of  the  theory  of  national 
ities  is  easily  distinguishable  from  others  with  which 
it  is  too  often  confused  —  that  of  great  agglomera 
tions,  of  natural  boundaries,  and  of  race.  The  will 
of  the  people  concerned  may,  if  it  seems  fitting,  con 
stitute  great  agglomerations,  but  it  may  constitute 
small  ones  as  well.  It  does  not  recognize  natural 
frontiers.  The  real  frontiers  are  those  established 
by  the  will  of  the  people;  the  others  are  the  walls 


INTRODUCTION  7 

of  a  prison,  which  one  has  always  the  right  to  tear 
down.  Woe  to  the  country  that  drags  a  province 
in  its  train  like  a  millstone  about  its  neck;  woe  to 
that  one  whose  people  do  not  bask  in  its  sunshine 
with  free  and  joyful  hearts.  To  create  moral  unity 
is  more  essential  than  to  satisfy  the  strategic  demands 
of  a  mountain-chain  or  a  stream. 

Nor  does  the  theory  of  nationalities  recognize  a 
pretended  right  of  race,  manifested  by  a  common 
language  or  by  historic  tradition,  by  virtue  of  which 
all  the  nations  born ,  of  a  common  stock  and  speak 
ing  the  same  language  must  needs,  whether  they  will 
or  no,  and  without  being  consulted,  be  united  in  a 
single  state.  The  idea  of  race  is  a  barbarous,  ex 
clusive,  retrograde  idea,  and  has  nothing  in  common 
with  the  broad,  sacred,  civilizing  idea  of  fatherland. 
Race  has  limits  which  cannot  be  overstepped ;  father 
land  has  none :  it  may  expand  and  develop  unceas 
ingly;  it  might  become  all  mankind,  as  under  the 
Roman  Empire.  On  our  European  continent  races 
long  since  became  blended  in  fatherlands,  and  it  would 
be  impossible  to  undo  the  mysterious  process  from 
which  have  flowed  the  beautiful  products  of  that 
blending. 

There  is  an  ineffable  sweetness  in  the  word  father 
land,  just  because  it  expresses,  not  a  preordained  ag 
gregation,  but  a  free,  loving  creation,  wherein  millions 
of  human  beings  have  placed  their  hearts  for  centuries 
past. 

The  will  of  the  peoples,  then,  is  the  one  dominant, 
sovereign,  absolute  principle,  whence  the  modern 
law  of  nations  in  its  entirety  should  flow  by  a  series 
of  logical  deductions,  as  from  an  inexhaustible  spring. 


8  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

It  is  the  principle  of  liberty  substituted  in  international 
relations  for  geographical  and  historical  inevitable- 
ness. 

Of  course  the  principle  of  nationality  does  not  do 
away  with  all  wars.  There  remain  the  wars  waged 
for  honor,  for  religion,  for  the  diversion  of  despots; 
but  it  eliminates  the  most  common  and  most  danger 
ous  sort,  —  those  of  conquest ;  and  it  tends  toward 
the  progressive  abolition  of  other  wars,  by  virtue 
of  the  civilizing  principle  which  is  its  inspiration. 
It  should  be  cultivated  everywhere  with  respect, 
and  propagated  by  men  of  progress  and  liberty.  In 
Prance  it  should  be  a  national  dogma,  since  it  is  our 
incontestable  right  to  reconquer  our  dear  Alsace, 
brutally  wrested  from  us  by  conquest,  and  annexed 
to  the  foreigner  without  her  consent. 

Were  the  events  that  occurred  in  Germany  in  1866 
the  logical  outcome  of  the  principle  of  nationalities? 
Was  it  by  virtue  of  that  principle  as  we  have  defined 
it,  that  Prussia  annexed  the  Danish  Duchies,  the 
free  towns,  Prankf ort,  Hesse-Darmstadt,  and  Hanover, 
although  it  was  the  declared  desire  of  the  peoples 
thereof  to  retain  their  autonomy?  No,  it  was  by 
virtue  of  a  denial  of  that  principle  that  those  annexa 
tions  were  carried  out.  Bismarck,  who  was  not  fond 
of  hypocritical  euphemisms  of  speech,  said  in  so  many 
words,  "It  was  by  right  of  conquest."  The  year 
1866,  therefore,  was  not  the  triumph  of  the  principle 
of  nationality,  but  its  defeat,  and  the  victorious  resur 
rection  of  the  principle  of  conquest.  The  real  error 
of  Napoleon  III  consisted,  not  in  forwarding  that 
civilizing  principle,  which  had  already  raised  him 
30  high,  but  in  becoming  the  compliant  tool,  in  the 


INTRODUCTION  9 

hope  of  a  reward,  of  those  who  were  rending  it  with 
their  swords. 

He  was  at  liberty  not  to  oppose  by  force  the  con 
quests  of  Prussia,  if  he  did  not  consider  that  the  in 
terest  of  France  demanded  it;  but  he  should  have 
seconded  the  efforts  which  others  (Russia,  for  ex 
ample)  were  making  to  arrest  them,  and,  in  any  event, 
should  not  have  approved,  much  less  have  encouraged 
them,  and,  less  still,  have  demanded  a  reward  for 
that  encouragement.  But  that  is  what  he  did:  he 
gave  Prussia  his  formal  assent,  refused  to  second 
Russia  in  suggesting  the  assembling  of  a  congress, 
and  solicited,  as  a  reward,  first  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine,  then  Belgium,  and  finally  Luxembourg. 

Prussia  welcomed  his  adhesion  with  sarcastic  cor 
diality,  and  refused  with  insolent  ingratitude  the  wage, 
even  when  it  was  reduced  to  the  minimum.  She 
did  more:  she  snapped  her  fingers  at  the  man  to 
whose  kindly  neutrality  she  was  indebted  for  not 
being  crushed  on  the  battle-field,  and  she  instantly 
disregarded  the  promise  she  had  made  at  Prague 
to  arrest  her  predominance  at  the  Main :  she  passed 
that  boundary,  in  a  military  sense,  by  means  of  treaties 
of  alliance,  and  thus  constituted  the  military  unity 
of  Germany  —  the  only  form  of  unity  which  was 
dangerous  to  us. 

The  Emperor,  disconcerted  by  the  failure  of  his 
plans,  regretting  that  he  had  favored  fruitlessly  the 
principle  of  conquest,  and  had  imprudently  abandoned 
the  principle  of  nationality,  wavered  from  1867  to 
1870  in  a  state  of  incoherence  and  indecision,  daring 
neither  to  accept  nor  to  repudiate  the  results  of  his 
complaisance* 


10   .        THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

It  was  my  ambition,  when  he  honored  me  with 
his  confidence,  to  restore  to  the  Empire  the  ground 
that  it  had  lost  since  1866,  by  returning  definitively 
to  the  principle  of  nationality,  which,  since  the  ir 
revocable  events  of  1866,  bade  us  not  to  oppose  the 
internal  transformation  of  Germany,  even  though 
it  must  end  in  rounding  out,  by  political  unity,  the 
military  unity  already  constituted.  In  a  letter  ad 
dressed  to  Walewski l  on  January  1, 1867,  and  intended 
to  be  shown  to  the  Emperor,  I  said :  — 

"I  criticised  and  regretted  the  events  of  last  year, 
and  the  ill-advised  circular  note  which  passed  them 
over;  but  I  now  consider  German  Unity  as  an  ir 
revocable,  predestined  fact,  which  France  can  accept 
without  danger  or  humiliation.  So  long  as  I  shall 
not  desire  to  ruin v  my  country  by  fallacious  counsel, 
I  shall  not  urge  her  to  contemplate  joining  exhausted 
Austria  in  a  new  Seven  Years'  War,  in  which  we  should 
find  Russia  by  the  side  of  Prussia,  without  being 
certain  of  Italy's  following  our  lead.  Whatever  we 
may  attempt  agianst  Prussia  will  facilitate  her  work 
instead  of  hampering  it:  even  a  Jena  would  not  im 
pair  it.  Peace  without  any  mental  reservation — 
such  is  the  only  external  policy  to  which  I  can  adapt 
myself." 

My  language  in  my  conversations  with  the  Emperor, 
when  I  was  forming  my  ministry,  was  no  less  ex 
plicit. 

"Our  policy,"  I  said  on  November  1,  1869,  "should 
consist  in  depriving  Herr  von  Bismarck  of  any  pre- 

1  [Comte  Alexandra  Walewski,  reputed  to  be  an  illegitimate  son  of  Napo 
leon  I,  was  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  for  several  years  previous  to  1800, 
and  afterwards  president  of  the  Corps  L£gislatif.] 


INTRODUCTION  11 

text  for  picking  a  quarrel  with  us,  and  for  making 
his  King  eager  for  war,  which  he  is  not  now.  There 
are  two  firebrands  of  war  already  lighted,  and  we 
must  stamp  them  out:  in  the  North  the  question 
of  Schleswig;  in  the  South  that  of  the  line  of  the 
Main.  Although  sympathizing  deeply  with  the  Danes, 
we  have  no  right  to  involve  our  country  in  a  conflict 
in  order  to  ensure  a  quiet  life  to  a  few  thousands  of 
them  who  are  unjustly  oppressed.  As  for  the  line 
of  the  Main,  it  was  crossed  a  long  while  ago,  at  least 
so  far  as  we  are  concerned.  Have  not  the  treaties 
of  alliance l  brought  about  the  military  unification 
of  Germany,  and  the  renewal  of  the  Zollverein  its 
economic  unity?  German  Unity,  as  against  us,  is 
complete ;  that  which  remains  to  be  completed,  politi 
cal  union,  concerns  Prussia  alone,  to  whom  it  will 
bring  more  embarrassment  than  strength.  What 
interest  have  we  in  preventing  the  democrats  of  Wur- 
temberg  and  the  Ultramontanes  of  Bavaria  from 
annoying  Bismarck  in  his  parliaments,  when,  in  the 
day  of  battle,  all  of  Germany  would  be  united  against 
us?" 

The  sovereign,  who  recognized  his  own  ideas  in 
mine,  approved  my  policy,  notwithstanding  some  res 
ervations,  and  the  ministry  of  January  2  was  formed, 
not  to  make  ready  for  war  with  Germany,  but  to  make 
such  a  war  impossible.2 

1  [This  term  refers  to  the  secret  treaties  between  Prussia  and  the  various 
South  German  states,  after  Sadowa,  whereby  Prussia  acquired  complete 
control  of  the  military  forces  of  all  Germany  in  case  she  should  be  attacked 
or  her  territory  even  threatened.    See  Albert  Sorel,  Histoire  Diplomatique 
de  la  Guerre  Franco-Allemande,  vol.  i,  pp.  43-44.  ] 

2  [  The  members  of  the  ministry  as  originally  constituted  were :  Emik 
OIKvier,  Keeper  of  the  Seals  and  Minister  of  Justice,  Comte  Dam,  Foreign 


12  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

And  yet  it  was  that  ministry  which  was  compelled 
to  declare  it.  One  is  reminded  of  the  musicians  in 
Romeo  and  Juliet,  who,  being  invited  to  the  marriage 
feast,  arrived  just  in  time  to  sing  the  burial  music. 
There  are  few  tales  so  tragic  as  this.  I  propose  to 
tell  it. 

Affairs,  Buffet,  Finances,  General  Le  Boeuf,  War,  Admiral  Rigauit  de  Gen- 
ouilly,  Marine,  Chevandier  de  Valdrome,  Interior,  Segris,  Public  Instruction, 
Louvct,  Commerce,  Marquis  de  Talhouet,  Public  Works,  Maurice  Richard, 
Fine  Arts,  Parieu,  President  of  the  Council  of  State.  Comte  Daru  and  Buffet 
resigned  in  April,  and  were  soon  followed  by  the  Marquis  de  Talhouet.  The 
vacancy  in  the  Foreign  Office  was  filled  for  a  short  time  by  Ollivier,  but  he 
handed  the  portfolio  to  the  Due  de  Gramont  in  June ;  Segris  was  transferred 
to  the  Department  of  Finance  and  Plichon  took  his  place  as  Minister  of 
Public  Instruction.  The  ministry  suffered  no  further  change  during  its 
brief  life.  For  characterizations  of  the  different  ministers  see  La  Gorce,  vol. 
vi,  pp.  3,  4,  117,  216, 


CHAPTER  I 

BISMARCK   CONTEMPLATES  WAR  WITH  FRANCE 

IN  1866,  on  the  field  of  Sadowa,  Austria  not  only 
lost  her  former  preponderance  in  the  Germanic  Con 
federation,  but  was  excluded  therefrom.  The  inter 
vention  of  France  prevented  the  victory  of  Prussia 
from  being  complete:  she  was  allowed  to  annex  cer 
tain  territory,  but  the  States  of  the  South  were  set 
outside  of  her  Confederation,  and  the  Main  became  the 
artificial  boundary  between  the  two  sections  of  Ger 
many.  Thenceforth  Bismarck's  policy  had  but  one 
object :  to  destroy  that  boun3Sr^^  bridges 

across  the  Main  whereby  the  two  sections  of  Germany 
might  be  united.  With  keen  and  intelligent  foresight, 
he  saw  that  there  could  be  no  drawing  together  of  the 
States  of  the  North  and  those  of  the  South .  so  long  as 
the  gory  memories  of  1866  stood  between  them.  A 
campaign  made  by  them  in  common  against  France 
seemed  to  him  the  only  means  of  wiping  out  all  trace 
of  these  internal  dissensions. 

For  some  time  he  hoped  that  France  would  seek 
such  a  rencounter,  and  would  try  to  recover  the  pre 
ponderance  of  which  the  victory  of  Sadowa  had  de 
prived  her;  but  France  perorated,  sulked,  and  did 
not  stir. 

The  accession  to  power,  on  January  2,  1870,  of  the 
liberal  ministry  definitively  blasted  that  hope  of  Bis 
marck's  of  an  aggressive  policy  on  our  part.  He 

13 


14  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WA£... 

determined  thereupon  to  assume  himself  the  respon 
sibility  for  aggression  which  we  declined,  and  to  force 
us  to  the  field  of  battle.  As  soon  as  it  appeared  that 
it  was  our  policy  not  to  oppose  the  internal  transfor 
mation  of  Germany,  he  was  unable  to  conjure  up  any 
cause  for  war  in  that  direction.  He  set  his  wits  at 
work,  therefore,  to  find  one  in  Spain. 

Queen  Isabella  had  just  been  dethroned,  and  as  the 
republicans  were  not  in  a  majority,  Spain  was  in  search 
of  a  king.1  Pending  his  discovery,  the  Cortes  had 
made  Serrano  Regent  of  the  kingdom ;  but  the  actual 
dictator  of  Spanish  policy  was  the  Minister  of  War  and 
President  of  the  Council,  General  Prim.2  Bismarck, 
by  means  of  hard  cash,3  came  to  an  understanding 

1  [See,  infra,  Appendix  B,  "The  Spanish  Revolution  of  1868."] 

2  [For  a  brief  history  of  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy,  from  its  first  con 
ception,  see,  infra,  Appendix  C. 

General  Prim,  in  his  youth,  fought  in  the  army  of  Maria  Christina  (widow 
of  Ferdinand  VII,  and  Regent  during  the  minority  of  her  daughter  Isabella 
II)  in  the  CarHst  troubles  of  1838-40.  He  was  prominent  in  the  over 
throw  of  the  Regent  Espartero  in  1843.  Having  attained  high  rank  in  the 
army,  he  won  the  victory  of  Los  Castillejos  in  the  Moroccan  War  of  1860, 
and  was  made  a  marquis  in  honor  thereof.  He  commanded  the  Spanish 
forces  sent  to  Mexico  in  1862  to  act  in  conjunction  with  the  English  and 
French ;  but  he  did  not  approve  of  Napoleon's  plans,  and  took  his  troops 
back  to  Spain,  where  his  action  was  sanctioned  by  the  Cortes.  As  leader  of 
the  Progressists,  he  was  one  of  the  triumvirate  which  assumed  control  on 
the  overthrow  of  Isabella  —  the  others  being  Admiral  Topete  and  Francisco 
Serrano  y  Dominguez,  who  became  Regent.  As  commander  in  chief  of  the 
armies  of  Spain,  in  addition  to  his  high  civil  posts,  Prim  was  the  most  power 
ful  and  influential  man  in  the  kingdom  until  his  death,  by  assassination,  in 
December,  1870.  "He  was  the  active  man,  and,  as  was  said  in  Europe,  *the 
king-maker/"  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  p.  199.] 

8  One  of  the  best  informed  of  English  publicists,  Sir  Rowland  Blenner- 
hassett,  contributed  to  the  National  Review  for  October,  1902,  a  remark 
able  study  on  the  "Origin  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War."  He  says :  *— 

"It  has  often  been  asked  whether,  at  this  time  or  some  other  (when  Lothat 
Bucher  and  Versen  were  sent  to  Spain  in  April,  1870),  money  was  supplied 


MARSHAL  PRIM,  MARQUIS  DE  Los  CASTILLEJOS 
1814-1870 


BISMARCK  CONTEMPLATES  WAR        15 

with  him  to  put  forward  the  candidacy  for  the  Spanish 
throne  of  a  prince  of  the  Catholic  branch  of  the  house 
of  Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen :  a  mediatized  house, 
closely  allied  to  the  royal  family  of  Prussia  by  the 
bonds  of  filial  obedience,  and  with  sons  serving  in  the 
Prussian  army.  The  head  of  this  branch  was  Prince  An 
tony,  a  very  shrewd  person,  ambitious  and  wealthy,  and 
it  was  his  oldest  son,  Leopold,  whom  Bismarck  and  Prim 
jointly  chose  as  a  candidate  for  the  crown  of  Spain.1 

Both  were  well  aware  that  France  would  not  endure 
that  a  Prussian  prince  should  be  set  up,  a  Prussian 
sentinel,  across  her  southern  frontier,  so  that  she  would 
be  caught  between  two  fires  in  the  event  of  a  war  on 
the  Rhine.  "France  will  never  put  up  with  such  a 
candidacy,"  was  Prince  Antony's  reply  to  the  first 
overtures  made  to  him  for  his  son.  Bismarck  knew  it 
as  well  as  he,  and  that  is  precisely  why  he  contrived 
the  scheme. 

by  the  Prussian  agents  to  forward  the  Hohenzollem  candidacy.  I  nave 
reasons  for  thinking  that  a  very  considerable  sum  was  expended  for  that 
purpose.  Indications  of  this  might  be  found  in  the  papers  of  the  late  Lord 
Acton,  and  proofs  could  be  furnished  by  a  certain  banking  house  which  I 
could  name."  4 

In  the  more  extensive  work  from  which  the  present  volume  is  taken,  M. 
Ollivier  says :  — 

"The  arguments  of  Bismarck's  agents  were  not  of  the  sort  to  convince  a 
gentleman  of  his  (Prim's)  stamp  —  a  gambler  and  libertine,  corrupt  in  every 
way.  He  required  chinking  arguments.  None  of  those  who  have  gone  to 
the  bottom  of  this  affair  doubts  that  Bismarck  made  use  of  them.  It  is  not 
probable  that  history  will  ever  acquire  proof  of  the  fact :  one  does  not  ordi 
narily  go  before  a  notary  and  set  down  such  arrangements  in  a  contract 
under  seal.  In  Bernhardi's  memoirs  everything  relating  to  this  negotiation 
is  omitted,  and  in  the  writings  of  Lothar  Bucher,  the  decisive  agent  in  the 
last  stage  of  the  affair,  all  that  has  reference  to  this,  the  most  important 
episode  in  his  career,  is  not  printed."  IS  Empire  Lib&ral,  vol.  xiii,  p.  38. 

1  [See,  infra,  Appendix  D,  "Prince  Leopold  of  Hohenzollem,  his  Family 
and  Relationships."] 


16  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

The  negotiations  which  were  thereupon  entered 
into,  with  profound  secrecy,  were  unknown  to  Na 
poleon  III.1  Prim  commissioned  a  Spanish  Deputy, 
Salazar  y  Mazaredo,  who  was  subsidized,  like  himself, 
to  take  to  Berlin  .the  words  which  he  did  not  choose 
to  put  upon  paper.  Salazar  arrived  in  January,  1870, 
supplied  with  letters  of  introduction  to  Bismarck  and 
the  King. 

He  was  received  without  delay  by  Bismarck,  for  he 
was  his  agent.  But  he  found  the  King's  door  closed. 
William,  having  read  Prim's  letter,  refused  to  receive 
his  envoy,  and  wrote  to  Bismarck.  "The  enclosed 

1  "If,"  says  M.  Ollivier,  "Prim's  designs  were  'disinterested  and  avowable, 
why  should  he  have  concealed  them  from.  Olozaga,  his  former  comrade  in 
political  battles  ?  and  from  me,  whom  he  knew  to  be  so  well  disposed  to 
oblige  him  ?  Why  should  he  not  have  revealed  them,  to  the  Emperor,  from 
whom,  despite  his  desertion  of  him  in  Mexico,  he  had  received  so  many 
proofs  of  good-will,  and  whose  loyalty  in  keeping  a  state  secret  ho  had  fully 
tested  ?  .  .  .  And  why  that  threat  to  the  one  man  from  whom  he  was  not 
in  a  position  to  conceal  anything  —  Salazar :  'If  you  open  your  mouth,  I'll 
blow  the  lid  off  your  brain'  ?"  I? Empire  LibSral,  vol.  xiii,  pp.  39,  40. 

[The  truth  seems  to  be  that  Prim,  in  common,  with  every  one  else  con 
cerned,  was  perfectly  well  aware  what  would  be  the  effect  upon  French  opin 
ion  of  the  announcement  of  the  candidacy,  and  it  is  supposed  that,  expecting 
to  meet  the  Emperor  at  Vichy  in  July,  he  desired  to  be  the  first  to  mention 
the  subject  to  him,  hoping  that  he  might,  by  making  the  most  of  Prince 
Leopold's  kinship  with  the  Bonapartes  (see  Appendix  D),  bring  about  a 
peaceful  solution  of  the  affair.  See  the  article  by,  II .  Leonardon,  "  Prim  et  la 
candidature  Hohenzollern,"  in  th«e  Revue  Historique,  vol.  ixxiv  (1900),  pp. 
287-310 ;  and  see  also,  infra,  Chap,  iii,  p.  42,  note.  —  "Improbable  as  it  may 
appear,  he  flattered  himself  that  he  could  win  over  Napoleon  III  to  his  plans. 
Emboldened  by  his  parliamentary  triumphs,  full  of  confideijce  in  his  dexterity, 
he  said  to  himself :  *I  will  persuade  the  Emperor  as  I  persuade  my  majority. 
After  he  has  heard  me,  he  will  accept  my  candidate,  who  is  his  kinsman ;  if 
not  I  will  make  him  buy  me  off  by  a  formal  promise  to  quiet  the  apprehensions 
of  the  Court  of  Florence  and  to  give  me  the  assistance  which  he  has  hitherto 
refused  me  in  ray  negotiations  to  secure  an  Italian  prince."*  C.  Victor 
Cherbulliez,  in  L'Espagne  Politique,  cited  by  Sorel,  vol.  i,  p.  57.] 


BISMARCK  CONTEMPLATES  WAR        17 

letter  shocks  me  like  a  thunder-clap  in  a  clear  sky. 
Here  is  another  Hohenzollern  candidacy !  and  for  the 
crown  of  Spain !  I  had  no  suspicion  of  such  a  thing. 
I  was  joking  not  long  ago,  with  the  prince's  heir, 
about  the  previous  mention  of  his  name,  and  we 
agreed  in  rejecting  the  idea  as  a  jest.  As  you  have 
heard  details  from  the  prince,  we  will  confer  about  it, 
although  on  principle  I  am  opposed  to  the  thing"  (Feb 
ruary  26,  1870.)1 

The  King  was,  in  truth,  opposed  to  this  enterprise, 
which,  in  the  first  place,  he  considered  hazardous,  and 
in  which  it  was  repugnant  to  him  to  compromise  the 
dignity  of  his  house.  He  was  well  aware  that  it  would 
offend  the  Emperor  Napoleon,  whose  predilection  for 
Alf onzo,  as  heir  to  the  Spanish  throne,  was  notorious ; 
and  lastly,  considering  the  disposition  of  French  opinion, 
he  feared  serious  complications,  and  he  wanted  noth 
ing  of  the  kind. 

If  he  had  held  to  his  first  impulse,  the  business  would 
not  have  been  begun.  According  to  existing  statutes 
and  treaties,  the  princes  of  the  Catholic  branch  of 
the  Hohenzollerns  were  strictly  bound  to  enter  upon 
no  important  act  of  their  lives,  public  or  private,  with 
out  the  formal  approval  of  the  head  of  the  family 
first  obtained.  On  no  occasion  did  those  princes  deny 
this  disciplinary  obligation;  on  the  contrary,  they 
deemed  it  to  their  honor  and  glory  to  submit  to  it. 
If  therefore  the  King  had  uttered  a  formal  no,  he 
would  have  put  a  stop  to  the  whole  affair,  especially 

1  Sybel,  whose  whole  narrative  is  a  constant  distortion  of  the  truth,  says 
that  the  King  knew  nothing  of  the  negotiation,  which  was  carried  on  behind 
his  back,  until  after  it  was  at  an  end ;  that,  consequently,  he  could  not  have 
informed  Count  Bismarck  of  divers  incidents  thereof,  because  he  had  no 
knowledge  of  them  himself.  [Von  Sybel,  English  trans.,  vol.  vii,  p.  319  J 


18  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

as  that  was  the  inclination  of  the  princes  themselves.1 
But  Bismarck's  whole  policy  hung  upon  the  success 
of  his  Spanish  plot,  and  his  influence  over  his  master 
was  then  more  predominant  than  at  any  other  moment 
of  his  career.  He  argued  against  the  veto.  At  first 
his  arguments  did  not  avail  to  overcome  the  King's 
repugnance.  The  concession  that  he  obtained  was 
that  the  King  would  not  utter  a  definitive  no;  that 
he  would  place  himself  again  in  the  position  he  had 
taken  in  1866,  at  the  time  Prince  Charles  assumed  the 
throne  of  Roumania,  saying  neither  yes  nor  no,  leav 
ing  the  princes  at  liberty  to  accept  or  decline,  and 
declaring  himself  ready  to  approve  their  decision. 

Consequently  he  summoned  them  to  Berlin,  and  on 
March  15  there  was  held  a  council  at  the  Royal  Palace, 
where  the  Hohenzollerns  had,  as  their  custom  was, 
taken  up  their  abode.  Prince  Antony  described  the 
meeting  to  his  son  Charles  of  Roumania  in  terms 
which  deserve  to  be  given  literally  :  — 

"I  have  been  for  a  fortnight  immersed  in  family 
affairs  of  the  greatest  importance :  they  concern  noth 
ing  less  than  the  acceptance  or  refusal  by  Leopold  of 
the  Spanish  crown,  which  has  been  officially  offered 
to  him  by  the  Spanish  government  under  the  seal  of 
a  European  state  secret.  Bismarck  favors  acceptance 
for  dynastic  and  political  reasons,  but  the  King  does  not 

1"Sybel  is  the  only  serious  historian  who  has  maintained  the  dishonest 
position  that  the  King's  consent  was  not  necessary.  'That  the  King,  as 
head  of  the  family,'  says  Ottokar  Lorenz  (Wilhelm  I,  p.  212),  'could  forbid 
the  Prince's  acceptance  of  the  crown,  cannot  be  questioned  by  anybody.'  — 
*It  is  certain/  says  Hans  Delbrtick,  *that  no  Hohenzollern  prince  would  have 
come  to  such  a  decision  without  having  inquired  anxiously  of  the  King's 
wishes,  and  without  being  guided  entirely  thereby.'  ('The  Secret  of  tiie 
Napoleonic  Policy  in  1870 ' :  in  Preussische  Jahrbttch&r,  Oct.  1895,  p.  28.)  "  — 
L'Empire  Liberal,  vol.  xiii,  p.  42.  See  also,  vol.  xiv,  pp.  67,  68,  and  notes. 


BISMARCK  CONTEMPLATES  WAR        19 

vish  it  unless  Leopold  so  decides  of  his  own  free  will. 
3n  the  15th  a  very  interesting  and  important  council 
iras  held  under  the  presidency  of  the  King,  in  which 
the  following  took  part:  the  Prince  Royal,  we  two, 
Bismarck,  Moltke,  Roon,  Schleinitz,  Thile,  and  Del- 
briick.  The  council  resolved  unanimously  in  favor  of 
acceptance,  which  means  the  performance  of  a  patriotic 
Prussian  duty.  Alter  a  great  struggle  Leopold  refused. 
As  they  want,  above  all  things,  in  Spain,  a  Catholic 
Hohenzollern,  1  proposed  Fritz."  * 

The  deliberation  was  followed  by  a  dinner  at  Prince 
Antony's.  "If  Napoleon  takes  this  in  ill  part,  are 
we  ready  ?  "  asked  Jules  Delbriick.  To  which  Moltke 

1  [Aits  dem  Leben  Konigs  Karl  von  Rumanian  (Stuttgart,  1894),  vol.  ii,  p.  72 ; 
Freiicli  translation  (Bucharest,  1899),  vol.  i,  p.  570.  An  abridged  English 
translation,  by  Sidney  Whitman,  was  published  in  1895 .  Count  Bismarck,  in 
his  address  to  the  Federal  Council  on  July  16, 1870,  after  war  had  been  practi 
cally  declared,  said  that  the  negotiations  concerning  the  candidacy  of  Prince 
Leopold  "had  been  brought  unofficially  to  the  knowledge  of  the  King  of  Prus 
sia,  on  the  express  condition  that  he  would  keep  them  secret.  As  they  con 
cerned  neither  Prussia  nor  the  Confederation  of  the  North,  the  King  agreed  to 
that  condition,  and  therefore  he  did  not  speak  of  the  affair  to  his  government, 
as  it  was  to  him  simply  a  family  matter."  And  in  his  Circular  Note  of  July  18 
to  the  Powers,  he  said :  "The  statement  is  also  untrue  that  His  Majesty  the 
King  communicated  the  candidacy  of  Prince  Leopold  to  me,  the  undersigned 
Chancellor  of  the  Conf ederation.  I  was  casually  informed  in  confidence  of  ike 
Spanish  offer  by  a  private  person  concerned  in  the  negotiations"  See  the  full  text 
of  the  Note  in  Appendix  H.  When  the  Memoirs  of  the  King  of  Roumania  ap 
peared,  they  presented  a  categorical  denial,  notably  in  the  letter  quoted  in  the 
text,  of  the  Bismarckian  theory  of  the  relation  of  the  Prussian  King  and  govern 
ment  to  the  candidacy.  In  the  Appendix  to  vol.  xiii  of  L'Empire  Liberal 
(pp.  639-641),  M.  Ollivier  quotes  from  Bismarck's  Reflections  and  Reminis 
cences,  vol.  ii,  p.  90,  as  follows :]  "The  Memoirs  of  His  Majesty  the  King  of 
Roumania  are  not  exactly  in  accord  with  the  details  of  the  part  played  by  the 
ministry  in  the  matter.  This  council  of  ministers  held  at  the  palace,  of  which 
they  speak,  never  took  place.  Prince  Antony  was  quartered  in  the  palace  as 
the  King's  guest,  and  he  had  invited  the  sovereign  and  some  of  his  ministers 
to  dine  with  him.  I  am  inclined  to  think  that  the  Spanish  question  was  hardly 


20  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

replied  in  the  affirmative,  with  cheering  confidence.1 
That  the  Emperor  would  take  it  in  ill  part^  no  serious- 
minded  man  doubted,  especially  in  Spain;  and  the 
Prussian  minister,  Kaunitz,  announced  from  Madrid 
that  "  many  perils  would  spring  from  that  candidacy." 
Leopold,  who  had  been  treated  by  Napoleon  III 
with  the  utmost  kindliness,  confidence,  and  affection, 
could  not  make  up  his  mind  to  the  felonious  act,  un 
worthy  of  a  gentleman,  into  which  Bismarck's  craft 
would  have  hurried  him.  In  truth  nothing  could  be 
less  honorable  than  the  motives  appealed  to  by  Bis 
marck,  as  Prince  Antony  describes  them.  "It  was," 
he  says,  "the  performance  of  a  patriotic  Prussian 
duty."  What  patriotic  Prussian  duty  could  there 
be  to  be  performed  in  Spain  at  that  precise  moment, 

mentioned  at  the  table."  "If,"  comments  M.  Ollivier,  "there  were  an  abso 
lute  contradiction  between  Prince  Antony  and  Bismarck,  it  would  be  im 
possible  to  hesitate  a  moment  between  the  testimony  of  Prince  Antony,  a 
truthful  person,  writing  to  his  son  at  the  time  of  the  occurrence,  and  Bis 
marck  the  liar,  writing  many  years  later,  from  vague  memories,  whose  in 
accuracy  is  described  by  Lothar  Bucher"  (see  infra,  p.  £3,  note).  "But,  in 
reality,  there  is  no  contradiction  between  the  two.  Bismarck  says  that  there 
was  no  council  of  ministers,  and  he  is  right ;  but  Prince  Antony  does  not  say 
that  there  was :  he  speaks  only  of  a  council  of  high  officers  of  State,  whom  he 
names,  and  among  whom  there  is  hardly  a  minister.  Bismarck  talks  about 
a  dinner,  during  which  he  thinks  that  hardly  an  allusion  was  made  to  the" 
Spanish  question.  Again  he  is  right :  it  is  certain  that  they  did  not  discuss 
the  question  whether  Prince  Leopold  should  or  should  not  accept  the  Spanish 
crown,  before  servants  standing  behind  their  chairs  or  serving  courses.  But 
Prince  Antony  speaks  of  a  council  and  not  of  a  dinner-party,  and  the  dinner 
party  referred  to  by  Bismarck  did  not  take  place  until  after  the  council. 
Bismarck  dares  not  deny  the  fact  of  that  council ;  he  omits  to  mention  it, 
and  thereby  confirms  it.  ...  In  reality  he  impliedly  confirms,  although  he 
pretends  to  contradict  them,  the  explicit  memoirs  of  Prince  Antony.  And 
so  Lothar  Bucher,  Ottokar  Lorenz,  and,  one  may  say,  all  Germans,  regard 
Prince  Antony's  narrative  as  one  of  those  historical  facts  which  are  beyom4 
all  question." 

1  Hans  Delbrtick,  in  Preussische  Jahrlucher,  Oct.,  1895. 


BISMARCK  CONTEMPLATES  WAR        21 

if  not  to  stir  up  that  war  against  France  without  which 
German  Unity  would  have  to  come  to  anchor  ? 

The  revelations  of  Prince  Antony  concerning  the 
council  of  March  15,  under  the  presidency  of  the  King 
of  Prussia,  strike  at  the  root  of  the  structure  of  glitter 
ing  falsehoods  intended  to  prove  that  "Leopold's 
candidacy  was  a  palliative  family  affair,  entirely  Span 
ish,  of  which  the  Prussian  government  knew  abso 
lutely  nothing." 

"The  French  have  always  been  convinced,"  says 
Hans  Delbriick,  "that  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy 
was  Bismarck's  work;  in  Germany  people  did  not 
choose  to  believe  it,  and  I  myself,  as  well  as  Sybel, 
protested  earnestly  against  that  reproach.  But  facts 
have  demonstrated  that,  in  this  instance,  the  reproach 
of  the  French  was  well  founded.  The  King  of  Rou- 
mania,  for  reasons  by  no  means  easy  to  comprehend, 
they  say,  thought  it  his  duty  to  relieve  his  family 
from  all  responsibility  for  the  affair,  but  the  secret 
which  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  at  Berlin  had 
kept  with  a  solicitude  that  was  never  relaxed,  is  now 
disclosed,  and  there  is  no  longer  the  slightest  doubt 
upon  this  point :  namely,  that,  although  the  first  sug 
gestion  came  from  Spain,  the  candidacy  was,  neverthe 
less,  the  work  of  Bismarck."  1 

It  was  natural  that  the  King  should  consult  Bis 
marck  about  a  private  matter,  as  he  consulted  him 
about  everything.  But  what  concern  in  a  question 
of  this  nature  had  that  areopagus  of  diplomatists, 
warriors,  and  administrative  officers,  whom  the  King, 

1  Hans  Delbriick,  uU  sup.  It  is  a  mistake  to  say  that  the  first  suggestion 
of  the  candidacy  came  from  Spain.  It  came  from  Lisbon,  having  reached 
there  from  Germany  and  Brussels.  [But  see,  infra,  Appendix  CJ 


n          THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

who  was  very  jealous  of  his  authority  as  head  of  the 
family,  would  certainly  not  have  convoked  and  con 
sulted,  if  it  had  been  a  matter  of  some  simple  intimate 
affair  of  no  international  importance  ? 

It  is  unquestionable,  therefore,  that  the  King,  as 
soon  as  he  was  informed  of  the  candidacy  of  Prince 
Leopold,  considered  it  an  affair  of  state,  and  that  he 
consulted  upon  it  the  most  influential  men  of  his 
government,  under  the  seal  of  secrecy.  It  is  unques 
tionable,  too,  that  Bismarck  had  not  chosen  Leopold 
because  of  his  presumptive  capacity  to  govern  Spain 
wisely,  or  because  of  his  alliance  with  the  royal  family 
of  Portugal;  but  solely  because  he  belonged  to  the 
royal  family  of  Prussia  and  bore  the  name  of  Hohen- 
zollern.  He  had  thought  at  first  of  Prince  Charles, 
then  of  Prince  Leopold,  and  if  need  were,  would  con 
tent  himself  with  Prince  Fritz.  Whether  he  was 
capable  or  not  mattered  little ;  the  essential  point  was 
that  his  name  was  Hohenzollern ;  that  is  to  say,  that 
his  name  would  cause  alarm  in  France  and  would 
wound  her  sensibilities.  In  very  truth  there  would  be 
neither  justice  nor  loyalty  nor  common  sense  in  this 
world  if,  in  presence  of  such  facts,  one  could  still  ask 
one's  self  from  whom  came  the  provocation  to  that 
terrible  war. 

While  they  were  waiting  to  learn  whether  Prince 
Fritz  would  be  more  compliant  than  his  brother 
Leopold,  Salazar  was  requested  to  leave  Berlin  and 
return  to  Madrid,  without  awaiting  a  final  answer, 
"lest  some  one  might  find  out  that  a  Spaniard  was 
having  numerous  interviews  with  Prince  Bismarck."  x 

1  Memoirs  of  King  Charles  of  Roumania  [French  trans.,  vol.  i,  p.  571. 
And  see  Leonardon,  "Prim  et  la  candidature  Hohenzollern,"  in  the  Revue 


BISMARCK  CONTEMPLATES  WAR        23 

The  Chancellor  was  not  of  those  who  are  discouraged 
by  obstacles.  He  did  not  choose  to  allow  others  to 
be  more  discouraged  than  himself,  or  that  Prim  should 
be  disturbed  by  Leopold's  negative  response,  of  which 
Salazar  was  the  bearer.  He  wished  also  to  dispel  the 
objection  of  the  King  and  the  princes  based  upon  the 
perils  of  the  undertaking;  and  in  the  early  days  of 
April  he  despatched  as  agents  of  the  Prussian  govern 
ment,  although  their  quality  was  concealed  under 
incognitos,  two  men  in  his  confidence,  -Lothar  Bucher 
and  Major  Versen.1  The  former,  a  keen,  close-mouthed 

Historique,  vol.  Ixxiv:  "Salazar  had  already  set  out  for  Spain,  fearing  to 
arouse  suspicion  by  a  longer  sojourn  in  Berlin,  and  by  his  numerous  visits  to 
Bismarck."] 

1  [Dr.  Mtiritz  Busch  (1821-95)  who  became  attached  to  the  service  of 
Bismarck  early  in  1870,  as  a  sort  of  what  would  be  called  to-day  "publicity 
agent,"  diligently  kept  a  diary,  which  was  eventually  published,  first  in  an 
English  version  in  1898,  under  the  title :  Bismarck:  Some  Secret  Pages  of  his 
History;  then  in  French,  and  finally  in  German,  hi  1899.  He  was  closely 
connected  in  his  service  with  Adolf  Lothar  Bucher  (1817-1892),  through  whom 
the  Chancellor's  memoranda  for  newspaper  articles  to  be  written  by  Busch 
were  generally  delivered  to  the  latter ;  and  on  pages  433  ff .  of  volume  one 
of  the  two-volume  English  version  will  be  found  a  lifelike  sketch  of  that  able 
and  trusted  fellow-worker  of  the  Chancellor.  He  had  had  a  stormy  youth  of 
a  sort  that  seemed  unlikely  to  lead  him  to  that  relationship :  a  revolutionist 
in  1848 ;  imprisoned,  then  practically  an  exile  in  London,  where  he  lived  until 
the  amnesty  of  1860  enabled  him  to  return  to  Berlin.  In  the  Eclaircissements 
to  his  13th  volume  (pp.  634-636),  M.  Ollivier  tells  the  story,  from  Pos- 
chinger's  Life  and  Works  of  Lothar  Bucher,  a  Forty-Eighter,  of  Bucher's  en 
tering  the  government  service:]  "At  a  meeting  of  the  ministry,  Count 
Lippe,  then  (Aug.  1864)  Minister  of  Justice,  said :  'Something  extraordinary 
happened  to-day.  Lothar  Bucher  has  asked  to  be  employed  in  the  bureau 
of  law.  Naturally  I  can't  accept  that  fellow/  —  'What's  that  ?'  cried  Bis 
marck,  'Bucher  wants  to  enter  the  service  of  the  State;  very  good !  if  you 
don't  take  him,  I  will.'  General  amazement.  Thereupon  Bismarck  wrote 
to  Bucher.  The  latter,  who,  as  every  one  knows,  was  one  of  the  founders  of 
the  National  Association,  then  wrote  to  Bismarck:  'Your  Excellency  knows 
my  national  point  of  view,  which  I  shall  never  abandon/  —  Bismarck  replied 
at  once:  'I  am  perfectly  well  aware  of  your  national  point  of  view;  but  I 


24  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

man,  of  wide  experience,  acquainted  with  all  the  wind 
ings  of  Bismarckian  politics,  who  had  retained  from  his 
demagogic  origin  an  intense  aversion  to  Napoleon  III ; 
the  second,  a  soldier  of  great  decision  of  character, 
who  was  wonderfully  conversant  with  the  Spanish 
tongue.  They  were  to  place  themselves  in  communi 
cation  with  Salazar  and  Bernhardi,  encourage  Prim, 
travel  through  the  country,  and  report  on  the  chances 
of  success  of  the  candidacy.  This  step,  no  less  than 

need  just  that  to  carry  out  my  policy,  and  I  shall  employ  you  only  in  doing 
things  which  lie  within  the  sphere  of  your  national  opinions.'  Bucher  has 
tened  to  inform  Bismarck  that,  in  that  case,  he  gladly  accepted  the  position 
offered  him."  [For  more  than  twenty  years  he  filled  many  important  posts 
and  performed  many  arduous  and  delicate  tasks,  under  the  Chancellor,  to 
whom  he  was  perfectly  loyal  after  his  fall,  in  1890,  and  whom  he  assisted  in 
the  preparation  of  his  memoirs. 

M.  Ollivier  notes  the  interesting  fact  that  the  English  edition  of  Dr. 
Busch's  book  is  much  the  most  complete,  many  passages  being  suppressed 
in  the  French  and  German  editions,  especially  in  the  former.  He  gives  many 
examples  of  such  suppressions,  mainly  statements  made  to  Busch  by  Bucher 
concerning  Bismarck's  failure  of  memory.  One  instance  must  suffice.  "It 
is  not  only  that  his  memory  is  unreliable,"  said  Bucher  to  Busch,  "but  he 
also  purposely  gives  a  false  turn  to  the  simplest  proved  facts.  He  will  not 
admit  that  he  ever  had  a  share  in  anything  that  turned  out  ill ;  and  he  thinks 
that  nobody  is  of  any  consequence  compared  to  himself  except  possibly  the 
old  Emperor,  to  whom,  in  order  to  annoy  the  young  Emperor,  he  assigns  a 
higher  place  than  he  deserves.  .  .  .  Even  where  his  policy  succeeded  brill 
iantly,  he  is  unwilling  to  admit  the  truth,  as,  for  example,  in  the  matter  of 
the  trap  set  for  Napoleon  in  the  Spanish  business.  He  denied  his  letter  to 
Prim  until  I  reminded  him  that  I  myself  handed  it  to  the  general  at  Madrid. 
The  whole  Hohenzollern  candidacy  was  represented  as  a  private  affair  of 
the  court,  and  he  was  obliged  to  confess  that  it  was  discussed  at  a  session  of 
the  Council  of  Ministers." 

Major  von  Versen  "accepted  with  joy,  being  of  those  who  love  adventures 
full  of  glory,"  according  to  his  biographer,  Freiherr  von  Werthern :  General 
von  Versen,  aus  hinterlassenen  Brief  en  und  Aufzeichnungen  zusammengestellt, 
For  Versen's  investigations  and  favorable  conclusions,  see  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi, 
p.  205,  and  Leonardon,  "Prim  et  la  candidature  Hohenzollern,"  heretofore 
cited.  As  to  the  unpopularity  of  Prim's  selection,  as  evidenced  by  caricatures 
and  puns,  Welschinger,  La  Guerre  de  1870,  vol.  i,  p.  42.] 


BISMARCK  CONTEMPLATES  WAR       25 

the  council  of  March  15,  "proves  that  it  had  been  de 
cided  at  Berlin  to  follow  up  the  Spanish  affair  in  all 
seriousness,  and  that  the  government  was  more  deeply 
involved  in  it,  than  it  had  publicly  and  officially 
admitted."  l 

While  Versen  and  Bucher  are  pursuing  their  in 
quiries  in  Spain,  Fritz  von  Hohenzollern,  having  been 
found,  arrives  at  Berlin  from  Paris.  But  Fritz  is 
more  recalcitrant  than  his  brother,  for  the  very  reason 
that  he  is  just  from  the  Tuileries,  where  he  has  been 
overwhelmed  with  courteous  attention.  He  will  accept 
only  if  the  King  so  commands  —  otherwise  he  will 
decline.  The  King  does  not  choose  to  command. 
Fritz  declines.  Prince  Antony  telegraphs  his  decision 
to  Lothar  at  Madrid,  and  writes  mournfully  to  his 
son  Charles  of  Roumania :  "A  great  historical  moment 
for  the  Jhouse  of  Hohenzollern  has  past  —  such  a 
moment  as  never  presented  itself  before  and  will  never 
occur  again."  2 

Lothar  Bucher  and  Versen  had  been  received  with 
exceptional  warmth  and  cordiality;  they  were  taken 
about,  cajoled,  and  taught  their  lesson.  They  saw 
things  as  Prim  showed  them,  and  they  returned  to 

1  Ottokar  Lorenz,  p.  246. 

2  [Prince  Antony's  letter  was  dated  at  Berlin,  April  26.    "The  Spanish 
question  has  brought  me  here  again,'*  he  says,  "it  is  now  approaching  its 
decisive  stage.    After  Leopold  refused  the  offer  for  weighty  reasons,  Fritz's 
candidacy  was  seriously  taken  in  hand.    An  immediate  settlement  was 
necessary,  as  pressure  was  brought  to  bear  from  Madrid;   your  brother, 
however,  most  decidedly  declared  that  he  could  not  undertake  the  task ! 
The  matter  must  therefore  be  allowed  to  drop,  and  a  great  historical  moment, 
etc.  .  .  .    If  the  king  had  commanded,  Fritz  would  have  obeyed;  but  as  he 
was  left  free  to  decide,  he  thought  best  to  refuse.    Now  it  is  ail  over,  and  this 
episode  will  fall  into  oblivion  until  some  historian  of  our  family  shall  revive 
it  in  the  distant  future."     Aus  dem  Leben  Konigs  Karl  von  Rumanian; 
cited  by  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  p.  206;  French  trans.,  vol.  i,  p.  578.] 


26  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

Berlin  on  May  6,  convinced  that  the  candidacy  offered 
the  best  chances  of  success :  there  was  no  reason  for  not 
accepting  it.1 

They  did  not  find  Bismarck  at  Berlin.  Exhausted 
by  his  labors,  by  his  Gargantuan  appetite,  he  had  been 
obliged  to  lay  aside  public  affairs  temporarily,  and  to 
go  to  Varzin  to  restore  his  digestion.  In  default  of 
Bismarck,  it  was  to  the  King  that  Versen  made  his 
report.  The  King,  left  to  himself,  recurred  to  his 
original  repugnance,  and  attached  but  the  slightest 
importance  to  Versen's  favorable  conclusions;  he 
attributed  their  "rosy  hue"  to  the  courtesies  with 
which  his  envoys  had  been  overwhelmed.  Meanwhile 
he  questioned  Prince  Fritz  anew,  who  repeated  his 
reply :  "If  the  King  had  commanded,  I  would  have 
obeyed ;  he  did  not,  so  I  decline." 

1  [The  visit  of  Bucher  and  Versen,  early  in  April,  followed  very  close  upon 
an  event  which  really  put  an  end  to  Montpensier's  candidacy,  although  it 
was  momentarily  resurrected  in  June  (L'Empire  Liberal,  vol.  xiii,  565  ff.). 
He  killed  his  brother-in-law,  Don  Enrique  de  Bourbon,  in  a  duel,  was  tried 
by  a  council  of  war,  and  sentenced  to  pay  a  fine  and  to  a  month's  exile  from 
Madrid ;  a  cabinet  crisis  followed,  resulting  in  the  retirement  of  his  partisans. 
See  I* Empire  LiUml,  vol.  xiii,  pp.  51,  52.] 


CHAPTER  II 

BISMARCK    TAKES    UP    THE    HOHENZOLLEBN    CANDIDACY 
ANEW  AFTER  THE  PLEBISCITE  IN  FRANCE 

ALTHOUGH  the  plebiscite  l  did  not  settle  directly  the 
question  of  peace  or  war,  since  neither  the  government 
nor  the  opposition  had  submitted  that  question  to  the 
people,  it  was  indirectly  a  pacificatory  event  by  reason 
of  its  soothing  effect  upon  the  internal  situation  of  the 
country.  It  had  intensified,  if  such  a  thing  were  pos 
sible,  our  inclination  for  peace.  We  were  moved  by 
the  confidence  and  loyalty  of  the  country  people,  and 
as  peace  is  their  principal  concern  and  their  most  un 
varying  desire,  we  felt  more  than  ever  bound  to  safe 
guard  it  with  great  care. 

To  claim  that  the  plebiscite  was  one  of  the  causes  of 
the  war  is  devoid  of  common  sense,  so  far  as  France  is 
concerned.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  quite  true,  if  we 
consider  it  from  Bismarck's  standpoint.  The  victory 
of  Napoleon  III  was  an  unpleasant  surprise  to  him; 
he  had  supposed  that  the  liberal  administration  would 
lead  the  Empire  to  its  ruin;  he  found,  on  the  con 
trary,  that  that  administration  had  strengthened  the 
Empire.2  The  guaranties  which  the  Emperor's  success 

1  [A  very  brief  account  of  the  plebiscite  may  be  found  in  the  translator's 
Introduction,  supra,  p.  xxvj 

2  [The  subject  is  elaborated  by  M.  Ollivier  in  his  13th  volume,  pp. 
546  ff.    See  also  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  pp.  176, 177,  where  Bismarck's  discomfi 
ture  is  attributed  rather  to  the  whole  initial  policy  of  the  ministry  of  January 
fc,  than  to  the  plebiscite  alone.    The  Chancellor  was  disturbed  at  the  time  by 

27 


28  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

afforded  of  the  continuance  of  peace,  escaped  nobody 
in  Germany.  At  Berlin  people  asked  one  another  if 
they  would  not  be  forced  to  abandon  the  idea  of  the 
conquest  of  Germany,  and  content  themselves  with 
being  just  Prussia  and  no  more.  "The  internal  situa 
tion/'  Ottokar  Lorenz  admitted,  "could  not  be  re 
lieved  except  by  an  attack  from  France."  Now  it  was 
becoming  certain  that  France  would  not  be  the  first 
to  make  the  attack  which,  since  186?,  Bismarck  had 
vainly  awaited.  It  had  not  come ;  it  would  not  come ; 
it  was  necessary,  therefore,  to  provoke  it.  He  resolved 
to  wait  no  longer,  but  to  bring  matters  to  a  head.1 

As  soon  as  he  had  recovered,  he  left  his  retire 
ment  at  Varzin  and  attended  the  last  sessions  of 
the  Reichstag  of  the  Confederation  of  the  North 
(May  22). 

Versen,  who  had  taken  a  fancy  to  the  Spanish  enter 
prise,  and  liad  found  no  consolation  for  the  contempt 
with  which  the  King  had  received  his  report  and 

the  growing  spirit  of  autonomy  in  the  States  of  the  South,  notably  Bavaria 
and  Wiirtemberg.  "In  his  domestic  embarrassments,  Prance  had  hitherto 
been  his  main  resource."  (La  Gorce.)  See  also  Sorel,  vol.  i,  pp.  48,  49.] 

1  "In  1867  Bismarck  avoided  war  because  he  thought  that  Prussia  was  not 
strong  enough.  In  1870  that  difficulty  was  out  of  the  way,  Germany  was 
sufficiently  armed.  The  Arcadians  desired  war,  the  Ultramontanes,  with  the 
Empress  at  their  head,  were  striving  ardently  to  the  same  end.  France  was 
visibly  strengthening  her  army  and  seeking  alliances.  If  hitherto  we  had 
been  able  to  rest  our  hope  on  delay,  such  delay  was  now  becoming  a  danger, 
and  thence  resulted  for  the  true  statesman  the  duty  of  substituting  for  a 
policy  that  postponed  decisive  action  a  policy  that  hastened  the  coming  of  what 
was  absolutely  inevitable.  In  the  interest  of  Germany,  and  no  less  in  the 
interest  of  all  Europe,  it  was  essential  to  find  some  means  of  surprising  the 
French,  who  were  not  entirely  prepared  for  the  contest,  in  such  wise  as  to 
force  them  to  lay  aside  their  reserve."  [Moritz  Busch,  cited  by  Ollivier, 
vol.  xiii,  pp.  548,  549.  The  ultra-Bonapartists  were  called  "Arcadians," 
because  their  club  was  on  rue  de  1' Arcade.] 


BISMARCK  AND  THE  CANDIDACY      29 

broken  off  the  negotiations,  had  attempted  to  take 
up  the  affair  secretly  with  tliQ  Crown  Prince,  under 
whom  he  had  served.  He  had  striven  to  such  good 
purpose,  that  he  had  won  the  Prince  over  to  his  cause.1 
He  had  no  doubt  that  Bismarck,  fortified  by  this  new 
concurrence,  would  go  on  with  his  scheme.  As  soon 
as  he  learned  that  the  Chancellor  had  returned  to 
Berlin,  he  hastened  to  the  Palace  of  the  Reichstag  and 
told  him  of  his  report  and  of  the  King's  refusal  to  take 
any  notice  of  it. 

Bismarck,  greatly  displeased  by  this  check,  said 
that  the  affair  must  be  set  in  motion  again  forthwith. 
"For  Germany  it  was  an  object  the  attainment  of 
which  was  unconditionally  desirable  and  worthy  of 
being  striven  for." 2  First  of  all  Prim's  confidence  must 
be  restored  and  he  must  be  given  the  countersign. 
To  this  end  Lothar  Bucher  was  sent  to  him  once  more, 
bearing  an  autograph  letter  from  Bismarck.  "Prim 
will  be  ill-advised  to  consider  the  Hohenzollern  candi 
dacy  abandoned ;  it  depends  upon  him  alone  to  revive 
it*  The  essential  point  is  never  to  involve  the  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  or  the  Chancellor  of  the  Empire,  or 
Bismarck  himself.  If  he  has  any  communications  to 

1  [Versen  obtained  from  the  Crown  Prince  a  letter  to  Prince  Antony,  then 
at  Dtisseldorf,  and  left  Berlin  May  20.    He  finally  found  the  Prince  at 
Nauheim,  and  argued  with  him  so  strenuously  that  he  succeeded  in  convincing 
him  that  all  was  not  lost ;  then  he  induced  him  to  write  to  the  Crown  Prince 
a  letter,  wherein,  instead  of  reiterating  his  former  refusal,  he  manifested  un 
certainty  and  hesitation  —  hesitation  which  asked  nothing  better  than  to  be 
overcome.  ...    On  May  26,  writing  to  Charles  of  Houmania,  Prince  An 
tony  confides  to  him  his  budding  hope:   "The  affair  is  not  yet  altogether 
buried ;  it  hangs  by  a  few  threads,  but  they  are  only  spiders'  webs."    La 
Gorce,  vol.  vi,  p.  207,  citing  Werthera's  General  von  Versen,  and  the  Memoirs 
of  Charles  of  Roumania  (French  trans.,  vol.  i,  pp.  584,  587).] 

2  Ottokar  Lorenz,  p.  247. 


SO  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

make,  he  lias  only  to  forward  them  through  Salazar  or 
the  Doctor  (Bernhardi)."  1 

For  the  plot  to  attain  its  full  fruition,  only  the  con 
sent  of  the  princes  was  now  lacking.  Bismarck  bent 
his  energies  in  that  direction.  Prince  Antony  being 
already  favorably  disposed,  the  Crown  Prince  set 
about  indoctrinating  his  friend  Leopold,  who,  under 
his  urgent  arguments,  began  to  discover  some  scruples 
touching  his  refusal,  in  the  first  place  because  of  his  duty 
to  the  house  of  Hohenzollern,  and  secondly  because  of 
his  country  and  its  prestige.  Finally  he  reached  the 
point  of  semi-assent  (May  28)  .2 

Meanwhile  the  Spaniards  were  losing  patience. 
Every  day  Salazar  pressed  Lothar  Bucher  to  obtain  a 
definite  answer.  "Never  mind  that,"  said  Lothar; 
"let  us  go  together  in  search  of  the  assent  that  they 
don't  send  us."  They  did  both  set  out,  travelling 
separately  so  long  as  they  were  in  France,  for  fear  that 
someone  might  recognize  them,  and  not  meeting  until 
they  were  on  German  soil. 

They  went  first  to  Reichenhall.  They  added  their 
entreaties  to  the  half -victorious  ones  by  which  Leopold 
was  beset,  and  had  the  satisfaction  of  extorting  his  full 
acceptance.  Leopold  determined  "  to  set  aside  all  per- 

1  [As  to  the  letter  from  Bismarck,  see  supra,  chap,  i,  p,  £4  n.]    This  letter 
was  not  Bismarck's  first  reply  to  the  overture  brought  to  Berlin  by  Salazar 
in  February.    Prim  had  already  received  one  or  more  letters;   but  after 
Bismarck  went  to  Varzin,  the  King  and  the  Hohenzollern  princes,  despite 
Versen's  favorable  report,  had  broken  off  the  negotiation.    There  had  been 
a  long  silence,  and  Prim  might  well  have  feared  that  the  scheme  was  aban 
doned.    It  was  against  this  apprehension  that  Bismarck  reassured  him- 
[Major  Bernhardi  was  councillor  to  the  Prussian  embassy  at  Madrid.    See 
L' Empire  LiMral,  vol.  xiii,  pp.  575,  576,  for  his  previous  employments  and 
his  **  anti-French  sentiments-."] 

2  [See  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  pp.  207,  208.] 


BISMARCK  AND  THE  CANDIDACY      31 

sonal  considerations,  and  allow  himself  to  be  guided  only 
by  necessities  of  greater  moment,  because  he  hopes  to 
render  his  country  a  great  service." 1 

What  was  the  great  service  to  be  rendered  to  his 
country,  what  were  the  exigencies  of  greater  moment, 
which  impelled  him  thus  to  lay  aside  personal  con 
siderations  ;  that  is  to  say,  to  play  the  part  of  a  man 
without  honor  with  reference  to  the  Emperor  Napo 
leon?  Let  the  German  historians  and  their  French 

1  [Many  years  later  (1883),  Bucher  described  to  Busch  Ms  second  journey 
to  Madrid  and  back,  "It  was  a  rush  lather  and  thither,  in  zigzag,  accident 
playing  a  large  part  in  delaying  and  hindering  as  well  as  in  promoting  my 
purpose.  Salazar  came  to  me  on  the  Saturday  and  wanted  to  have  the 
Prince's  final  decision  by  Monday.  I  replied  that  it  would  not  be  possible 
in  such  a  short  time,  particularly  as  I  did  not  know  where  the  Prince  was 
staying  at  the  moment,  and  of  course  he  would  have  to  be  consulted  first.  .  .  . 
He  said  that  he  knew  the  Prince  was  at  Reichenhall,  and  added :  'Selon  ce 
que  vous  me  dites,  je  renonce/  I  replied :  *I  assume  that  you  will  write  a 
statement  of  what  has  passed  between  us,  which  will  find  its  way  into  the 
Spanish  archives,  and  as  they  will  one  day  be  open  to  historians,  I  should  not 
wish  to  take  this  responsibility  upon  myself.  I  will  travel  with  you  first  to 
Madrid  [improbable,  but  so  I  understood],  and  then  to  the  Prince  of  Hohen- 
zollern.*  He  said  he  would  take  with  him  one  of  his  liegemen,  a  man  who 
would  fling  himself  out  of  window  without  hesitation,  if  he  bade  him.  .  »  . 
Well,  we  started  for  Reichenhall,  travelling  first  in  separate  compartments, 
so  as  .to  avoid  notice  in  Paris,  and  afterwards  together,  as  he  did  not  under 
stand  German  and  his  companion  spoke  only  Spanish."  They  failed  to  find 
the  Prince  at  Reichenhall,  but  finally  ran  both  him  and  his  father  to  earth  at 
Sigmaringen.  "They  both  agreed.  They  could,  however,  decide  nothing 
without  the  consent  of  the  King,  who  was  at  Ems.  We  went  thither,  and 
were  received  by  the  old  gentleman,  who  was  very  gracious  to  me  and 
agreed  to  what  I  submitted  to  him.  I  then  went  to  Varzin  to  report  to  the 
Chief."  Bismarck:  Some  Secret  Pages  of  his  History,  vol.  ii,  pp.  367  ff. 
As  will  be  seen,  this  account  varies  in  some  of  the  details  from  that  given,  in 
the  text.  And  see  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  pp.  £09,  210.  This  author  names  Salazar 
alone  as  the  one  who  removed  Leopold's  last  scruples. 

These  random  notes  upon  different  phases  of  the  mysterious  scheme  are 
but  supplementary  to  M.  Leonardon's  full  narrative  of  the  whole  matter  of 
the  Hohenzoilern  candidacy,  in  the  Revue  Historique,  summarized  in  Appen 
dix  C.]* 


n          THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

copiers  answer  this  question;  let  them  tell  us,  in  un 
equivocal  terms,  what  great  service  a  Hohenzollern 
could  render  to  his  country  at  that  moment,  unless  it 
were  to  compel  France  to  make  that  attack  which  was 
demanded  by  the  internal  condition  of  Germany.  That 
is  the  leit-motif  of  this  narrative :  I  shall  recur  to  it 
unwearyingly. 

The  Prince's  consent  being  obtained,  the  two  envoys 
separated.  Lothar  Bucher  went  to  Berlin  with  Prim's 
reply,  and  Salazar  returned  to  Madrid  bearing  the 
assent  of  the  princes.  But  everything  was  not  settled 
by  this  twofold  assent  at  Madrid  and  Sigmaringen. 

While  the  underground  plot  was  being  laid,  the 
King  of  Prussia  unexpectedly  left  his  capital  on  June 
1,  and,  attended  by  Bismarck,  went  to  Ems  to  meet 
the  Czar,1  who  was  on  his  way  to  Wtirtemberg. 

On  June  4,  Bismarck  was  back  in  Berlin,  whence 
he  set  out  again  for  Varzin,  where  Lothar  Bucher 
and  Keudell  joined  him.  Ordinarily  he  went  there 
to  rest,  and  turned  away  those  advisers  who  might 
bring  his  thoughts  back  to  the  anxieties  of  the  day. 
On  this  occasion  he  works  harder  than  ever  there. 
He  plans,  writes,  sends  messengers,  receives  telegrams 
in  cipher.  Keudell  and  Bucher  spend  more  than 
half  the  day  deciphering,  and  when  they  are  no  longer 
equal  to  the  work,  Bismarck  himself  lends  a  hand, 

1  [Alexander  II  was  the  son  of  Princess  Alexandra  of  Prussia,  King  Wil 
liam's  sister.  "The  Emperor  Alexander  professed  a  chivalrous  admiration 
for  his  uncle  William ;  King  William  had  always  manifested  a  warm  affec 
tion  for  his  nephew.  The  union  of  the  two  courts  had  been  a  tradition  since 
1813."  Sorel,  vol.  i,  p.  45.  —  Whether  or  not  the  probability  of  war  between 
Prussia  and  France  was  discussed  at  this  interview  at  Ems,  it  seems  certain 
that  the  two  sovereigns  reached  a  complete  understanding  subject  to  certain 
conditions,  notably  with  reference  to  the  States  of  the  South.  Sorcl,  pp.  47, 
48 ;  L* Empire  Liberal,  vol.  xiii,  pp.  555  ff.] 


BISMARCK  AND  THE  CANDIDACY      33 

as  does  his  daughter,  the  Countess  Marie.     The  scheme 
soon  to  be  put  in  execution  is  definitely  decided  on.1 

The  action  is  to  be  begun  by  Prim.  He  will  send 
Salazar  to  make  a  formal  offer  of  the  crown  to  the 
Prince ;  he  will  hold  the  Cortes  in  session  until  Salazar's 
return,  will  announce  to  that  body  Leopold's  accept 
ance,  and  will  carry  by  storm  the  vote  that  will  pro 
claim  him  King.  Leopold  will  come  at  once  to  take 
possession  of  his  throne.  Meanwhile  the  utmost 
secrecy  will  have  been  preserved:  France  will  have 
no  suspicion  of  the  candidacy  until  it  is  proclaimed 
by  the  Cortes;  thus  Napoleon  III  will  be  unable  to 
throw  himself  in  the  path  of  the  undertaking  and 
thwart  it.  France,  being  rudely  awakened,  will  be 
angry;  her  government  will  request  the  King  to 
forbid  his  kinsman  and  subject  to  go  to  Spain;  but 
the  French  Ambassador  will  find  at  Berlin  neither 
the  King,  who  is  at  Ems,  nor  Bismarck,  who  is  under 
cover  at  Varzin ;  he  will  be  forced  to  appeal  to  Thile, 
the  mute  of  the  seraglio.  Thile  will  affect  amazement : 
he  knows  nothing  about  it ;  the  Prussian  government 
has  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  Leopold's  candidacy; 
the  choice  of  a  king  is  the  business  of  the  Spaniards 
alone ; '  Prussia  is  too  careful  of  her  independence 
to  inflict  a  blow  on  that  of  other  nations. 

He  had  no  doubt  that  we  would  refuse  to  allow 
ourselves  to  be  hoodwinked  thus,  and  that  we  would 
insist  upon  our  demand;  thereupon  he  would  come 
out  of  his  mole-hill,  would  shriek  about  provocation, 
would  stir  up  Germany,  and  would  summon  Spain 
to  the  rescue,  whose  interest  would  be  made  identical 
with  that  of  Prussia  by  our  prohibition.  If  we  should 

1  Poschinger,  Life  and  Works  of  a  Forty-Eighter. 


34  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

commit  the  stupid  blunder  —  of  which  he  liked  to 
believe  us  capable  —  of  taking  Spain  to  task,  then 
Prim  would  enter  upon  the  scene,  would  cast  to  the 
winds  the  mouth-filling  phrases  of  his  hidalgoesque 
rhetoric,  would  reply  to  our  protests  by  hastening 
on  the  result  against  which  we  were  protesting,  and 
Bismarck  would  hurry  to  the  assistance  of  the  German 
Prince,  who  had  become,  by  a  free  election,  the  head 
of  a  friendly  nation.  Thus,  whatever  course  we  might 
take,  he  would  force  us  into  inextricable  embarrass 
ments;  and  he  was  confident  that,  having  lost  our 
heads,  not  knowing  with  whom  to  deal,  finding  ourselves 
subjected  on  all  sides  to  unprecedented  humiliations, 
we  should  discover  no  other  issue  from  this  no-thorough 
fare  than  the  war  which  was  necessary  to  him,  and 
which  we  should  be  obliged  to  wage  on  the  Pyrenees 
and  on  the  Rhine  at  one  and  the  same  time. 

This  diplomatic  plan  of  campaign  was  as  admirably 
conceived  as  Moltke's  military  plan.  Every  contin 
gency  was  provided  for.  There  was  no  external 
interference  to  be  feared.  Gladstone  was  not  anxious 
to  exert  a  European  influence,  and  would  have  done 
so  only  to  the  profit  of  Prussia ;  if  Clarendon  should 
give  way  to  his  French  sympathies,  Gladstone  would 
hold  them  in  check.1  Beust,  active  only  with  the  pen, 

1  [Gladstone's  first  ministry  had  been  in  power  since  1868,  Lord  Clarendon 
being  Foreign  Minister.  Clarendon  died  on  June  27,  1870,  just  before  the 
Hohenzollern  "bomb"  exploded,  and  was  succeeded  by  Earl  Granvilie,  who 
received  the  seals  only  on  July  C,  just  in  time  to  hear  from  Lord  Lyons  in 
Paris  that  the  Spanish  crown  had  been  offered  to  Prince  Leopold.  "The 
death  of  Lord  Clarendon  occurred  at  a  singularly  unfortunate  moment,  both 
for  this  country  and  for  France.  ...  So  far  as  France  was  concerned,  no 
man  in  England  —  perhaps  no  man  in  Europe  —  was  held  in  higher  esteem 
at  the  Tuileries.  Lord  Clarendon,  in  fact,  spoke  to  the  Emperor  and  the 


BISMARCK  AND  THE  CANDIDACY      35 

had  about  his  ankles  two  balls  and  chains,  Hungary 
and  Russia,  which  would  keep  him  from  stirring.1 
The  Roman  Question,  mooted  in  Italy  by  a  ministry 
devoted  to  Prussia,  would  overcome  the  grateful  good- 
Empress  with,  an  authority  to  which  no  other  statesman  could  pretend. 
Excellent  as  was  the  advice  that  the  Emperor  received  from  Lord  Granville, 
it  would  have  carried  more  weight  if  it  had  been  given  by  Lord  Clarendon. 
There  is  no  use  speculating  on  the  course  which  events  might  have  taken  in 
other  circumstances.  But  it  is  possible  that,  if  Lord  Clarendon  had  survived 
till  the  autumn  of  1870,  and  Lord  Cowley  had  remained  at  the  English 
Embassy  at  Paris,  the  united  influence  of  these  two  men  might  have  saved 
the  Emperor  from  the  rash  policy  which  led  to  the  disastrous  war  of  1870." 
Walpole,  History  of  Twenty-Five  Years,  vol.  ii,  p.  481,  n.  3.] 

"  An  important  event,  which  caused  no  immediate  sensation,  brought  a 
new  element  of  luck  to  Bismarck's  game.  This  was  the  death  of  Clarendon. 
Bismarck  considered  him  a  formidable  adversary.  Whether  Clarendon 
would  have  had  the  strength  to  resist  the  combined  wills  of  Gladstone  and 
the  Queen  may  be  doubted ;  at  all  events,  his  successor,  Granville,  did  not 
even  attempt  it.  Granville' s  pacific  sentiments  were  no  less  earnest  than 
Clarendon's,  who  was  called  the  'travelling  salesman  of  peace' ;  he  was  as 
amiable  and  as  generally  liked,  but  he  had  less  skill  in  handling  men,  attract 
ing  them,  and  convincing  them ;  he  had  not  the  same  spirit  of  initiative  or 
the  same  consistency,  and  he  readily  allowed  himself  to  be  led  from  one  party 
to  another ;  he  knew  Europe  less  well,  and  did  not  exert  the  same  authority 
there.  .  .  .  He  knew  our  country,  our  language,  our  statesmen,  and  the 
Emperor ;  he  had  no  ill-will  against  us,  but  was  not  disposed  to  be  sympa 
thetic  any  further  than  he  was  permitted  to  be  by  Gladstone,  and  above 
all  by  the  Queen,  .  .  .  whom  he  had  served  against  his  chief,  Palmer- 
ston."  L' Empire  Liberal,  vol.  xiii,  pp.  611,  612. 

1  [Count  Friedrich  Ferdinand  von  Beust  (1809-1886),  by  birth  a  Saxon, 
was  especially  distinguished  by  one  trait,  hatred  of  Bismarck.  He  was 
responsible  for  Saxony's  joining  Austria  in  the  War  of  1866.  He  entered  the 
Austrian  service  and  was  Francis  Joseph's  first  minister  from  1867  to  1871. 
The  Due  de  Gramont,  who  was  Ambassador  of  France  to  Austria,  1861-1870, 
being  equally  hostile  to  Bismarck  and  Prussia,  worked  zealously  to  effect  an 
alliance  between  France  and  Austria  during  the  critical  years  after  Sadowa.  See 
La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  pp.  149  ff.  "When  two  years  had  passed  in  these  mutual 
coquetries,  it  became  necessary  to  cut  loose  from  prolegomena.  There  are 
some  books  which  are  all  preface.  The  Franco-Austrian  alliance  was  one  of 
those  books"  (p.  151).  See  also  Sorel,  vol.  i,  pp.  37-40 ;  Welschinger,  vol.  i, 
pp.  198  ff.] 


36  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

will  to  France  of  Victor  Emanuel.1  Failure  could  not 
ensue  unless  the  King,  the  Hohenzollerns,  or  Prim 
himself,  should  allow  themselves  to  hesitate  and  should 
fail  to  carry  out  energetically  his  or  their  part  in  the 
common  task.  And  there  seemed  no  reason  to  fear 
that  on  the  part  of  any  one  of  them. 

There  was  some  hesitation  as  to  the  best  moment 
for  putting  the  plan  in  execution.  Should  it  be  in 
June  or  in  October  ?  June  was  preferred,  first, 
because  it  was .  the  time  of  year  when  the  general 
dispersal  of  sovereigns  and  diplomatists  would  make 
explanations  difficult,  notably  at  Berlin,  where  the 
exodus  would  be  most  complete;  secondly,  because 
secrecy,  an  essential  condition  of  success,  would  become 
less  and  less  assured,  as  the  number  of  persons  ad 
mitted  to  the  secret  was  increased.2 

1  [In  December,  1866,  the  French  garrison,  which  had  been  maintained  at 
Rome  ever  since  the  stamping  out  of  the  Roman  Eepublic  of  1848  by  French 
troops  under  General  Oudinot,  was  withdrawn  in  accordance  with  the  Con 
vention  of  September,  1864.     (See  Walpole,  History  of  Twenty-Five  Years, 
vol.  ii,  pp.  217  ff .)    But  in  October,  1867,  a  second  expedition  was  despatched 
to  defend  the  Pope  against  the  threatened  invasion  of  Garibaldi's  revolu 
tionary  bands.    The  revolution  was  defeated  at  Mentana  in  November,  and 
the  French  troops  remained  in  Rome.    It  was  hardly  conceivable  that  Victor 
Emanuel  would  form  an  effective  alliance  with  France  except  on  the  condi. 
tion  that  the  Roman  garrison  be  withdrawn,  which  alone  prevented  the 
realization  of  Cavour's  dream  and  his  own,  of  Rome  as  the  capital  of  a  united 
Italy.    While  he  owed  Napoleon  much  for  his  cooperation  in  the  War  of 
1859,  he  was  indebted  to  Prussia  for  the  recovery  of  Venice  in  1866.    After 
Sedan  the  French  troops  in  Rome  were  hastily  summoned  to  the  defence  of 
their  own  country,  and  the  Italians  entered  the  city  that  has  ever  since  been 
their  capital.] 

2  [See  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  p.  £10.    "A  single  question  remained,  but  one  of 
extraordinary  importance,  namely,  at  what  moment  and  in  what  shape  the 
Intrigue,  thus  far  kept  secret,  should  be  disclosed.    The  shrewdest  plan 
seemed  to  be  to  spring  the  denouement  suddenly,  and  to  take  advantage  of 
the  Cortes  being  in  session  to  carry  the  election  in  that  body  by  surprise. 


BISMARCK  AND  THE   CANDIDACY        37 

Bismarck  communicated  this  plan  to  Prim,  and 
numerous  despatches  and  letters  were  exchanged, 
if  not  directly,  at  all  events  through  intermediaries. 
At  this  juncture  arrived  Salazar  from  Sigmaringen, 
bringing  the  assent  so  ardently  desired.  Prim  accepted 
Bismarck's  plan,  as  well  as  the  time  fixed,  and  agreed 
with  him  as  to  the  smallest  details.  Prim  sent  Salazar 
again  to  Sigmaringen,  where  he  arrived  on  June  19. 
As  he  did  not  speak  German,  Versen  went  along  to 
act  as  interpreter.  Leopold  would  have  preferred  to 
postpone  his  election  to  the  autumn,  but  Salazar 
explained  to  him  the  necessity  for  hastening  the  con 
summation:  the  Cortes  were  in  session  and  awaiting 
his  reply;  there  was  not  an  instant  to  be  lost.  The 
princes  at  once  agreed  to  take  the  last  step  indispen 
sable  according  to  the  statutes  of  the  family,  with  which 
they  had  always  complied,  and  Leopold  asked  the 
King,  then  at  Ems,  for  his  sanction :  he  insisted  upon 
the  sacrifice  he  was  making  to  the  glory  of  his  family 
and  the  welfare  of  his  country.  Prince  Antony  him 
self  wrote  and  begged  the  King  to  approve  his  son's 
decision.  These  letters  were  taken  to  Ems  by  Salazar 
and  Versen. 

ff 'Versen  relates  that,  at  the  supreme  moment  of  cutting 
the  cable  and  setting  the  affair  adrift  amid  the  tempest, 
"the  King  fought  a  great  inward  battle."  His  un 
easy  conscience,  abandoned  to  itself  at  a  distance 
from  Bismarck,  detected  the  disasters  which,  with  a 

In  this  way,  all  parties  would  be  bound  simultaneously  —  Spain  and  Prussia 
and  the  Prince  himself.  As  for  Napoleon,  he  would  find  himself  caught  off 
his  guard,  facing  an  accomplished  fact;  and  his  embarrassment  would  be 
twofold,  as  he  would  be  confronted  not  only  by  Prussia,  but  by  the  Spanish 
government  whose  freedom  of  choice  he  would  be  reduced  to  the  necessity 
of  contesting. 


38  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

simple  word,  he  could  hold  in  check  or  unloose.  He 
had  not  the  courage  of  his  honesty  of  intention,  and  he 
granted  the  fatal  approval  on  June  20.1 

Salazar  had  announced  to  Prim  the  Prince's  accept 
ance  subject  to  the  King's  assent.  This  assent  being 
obtained,  he  telegraphed  to  the  President  of  the  Cortes 
that  he  would  reach  Madrid  on  June  26,  "that  the 
election  would  take  place  forthwith,  and  that  a  delegation 
of  fifteen  members  of  the  Cortes  would  journey  to 
Sigmaringen  to  offer  the  crown  in  solemn  form  to  the 
Prince." 

1  [There  is  much  uncertainty  as  to  the  dates  of  these  various  transactions, 
and  the  actual  order  of  the  steps  in  the  negotiation  is  more  or  less  a  matter 
of  conjecture.  M.  Ollivier  says  in  a  note  to  his  larger  work  that  all  this  part 
of  the  Hohenzollern  plot  has  been  laid  bare  by  Werthern's  General  von  Versen, 
previously  mentioned.]  "  But  the  editor  of  those  memoirs  has  combined  with 
the  documents,  whose  authenticity  is  unquestionable,  some  errors  as  to  the 
dates  to  which  they  should  be  assigned,  which  I  have  corrected  by  the  aid  of 
what  I  have  gathered  from  other  sources,  especially  the  memoirs  of  Salazar, 
Bucher,  and  Bernhardi."  [But  Bismarck  covered  his  tracks  very  carefully, 
and  they  remained  covered  until  the  publication  of  the  memoirs  of  King 
Charles  of  Roumania  disclosed  a  large  part  of  the  secret,  and  led  to  the  cyni 
cal  admissions  of  the  Chancellor's  own  Memoirs  and  to  the  revelations  of 
Dr.  Busch's  diary.  The  subject  was  eminently  one  for  a  special  study,  and 
M.  Leonardon's  monograph  (see  Appendix  C)  probably  comes  as  near  to  the 
full  truth  of  the  matter  as  we  are  likely  to  arrive.  It  will  be  noticed  that  in 
the  paragraphs  preceding  this  note  there  is  no  mention  of  Bucher  as  Salazar's 
companion  in  the  last,  successful  mission  to  Sigmaringen,  and  thence  to  the 
King  at  Ems.  See  Bucher's  statement  to  Busch,  supra,  p.  31  n.  In  Bucher's 
account  of  his  gracious  reception  by  "the  old  gentleman/'  who  "agreed  to 
what  I  submitted  to  him,**  there  is  no  trace  of  the  "great  inward  battle." 
But  see  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  pp.  209,  210.  The  date,  June  20,  given  by  M. 
Ollivier  as  that  of  the  King's  notification  of  his  approval,  is  probably  too 
early,  although  the  date  given  by  Sorel  and  others,  June  28,  is  certainly  too 
late,  as  Salazar's  telegram  announcing  his  arrival  in  Madrid  for  the  26th  was 
not  despatched  until  the  King's  assent  had  been  obtained.  According  to 
Sybel  (Die  Begriindung,  etc.,  English  trans.,  vol.  vii,  p.  312),  the  King  con 
fined  himself  to  saying :  "If  he  has  a  bent  that  way,  I  have  no  right  to  oppose 

it.-] 


BISMARCK  AND  THE  CANDIDACY        39 

And  now,  all  is  ready,  each  of  the  accomplices  is  at  his 
post.  Salazar  is  crossing  France  with  the  brand  which 
is  to  set  the  whole  country  on  fire.  As  soon  as  he  shall 
have  reached  Madrid,  the  explosion  will  take  place. 
Moreover,  no  one  has  a  suspicion  of  the  drama  which  is 
on  the  eve  of  performance.1 

And  yet,  amid  the  general  tranquillity,  one  fact,  to 
which  the  public  paid  no  heed,  attracted  the  attention 
of  close  observers.  The  Prussian  Ambassador  at 
Madrid,  who  had  been  granted  a  leave  of  absence,  re 
ceived  on  June  30  orders  to  remain  at  his  post,  and  al 
lowed  his  wife  to  set  out  alone  for  The  Hague.  Mercier 2 

1  [At  this  point  M.  Ollivier  has  omitted  some  thirty  pages  of  his  larger  work 
(vol.  iii,  pp.  582-617),  in  which  he  touches  upon  several  matters  of  great 
interest,  among  others,  the  debate  in  the  Corps  Legislatif  early  in  June  on 
the  participation  of  Germany  in  the  construction  of  the  St.-Gothard  railway. 
But  the  most  significant  passage  bearing  on  the  special  subject  of  this  work, 
and  especially  on  the  genuineness  of  the  Emperor's  inclination  for  peace 
and  his  hearty  cooperation  with  his  ministers,  is  that  relating  to  the  mission 
of  General  Lebrun  to  Vienna  in  June,  1870,  following  the  visit  of  Archduke 
Albert  to  Paris  in  May.    The  details  of  this  last  vain  effort  to  gain  Austria 
as  an  ally  are  given  in  General  Lebrun' s  report  to  the  Emperor  of  June  30, 
and  by  innumerable  writers  upon  the  war;  but  the  extraordinary  fact  is 
that  the  secret  of  the  mission  was  confided  only  to  Le  Bceuf,  Minister  of 
War,  and  a  general  or  two,  and  that  it  never  came  to  the  knowledge  of  M. 
Ollivier,  then  titular  head  of  the  government,  until  five  years  later  1]    "It 
was  not  until  1875,"  he  says,  "that  I  first  learned  of  this.    Having  heard 
that  Lebrun  was  preparing  his  memoirs,  I  asked  him  to  read  them  to  me. 
When,  in  his  reading,  he  reached  his  mission  to  Vienna,  I  uttered  an  exclama 
tion  of  surprise.    'Why,  didn't  you  know  that  story?'  he  said.    'If  I  had 
known  that,  I  wouldn't  have  read  it  to  you."*     [But  M.  Ollivier  attributes 
the  Emperor's  silence  to  his  being  "so  far  from  believing  in  the  hnminence  of 
the  danger,  in  prevision  of  which"  he  had  taken  the  step,  "  that  he  did  not 
deem  it  necessary  to  inform  his  ministers,  not  even  Gramont,  of  General 
Lebrun's  mission,  its  origin,  its  nature,  and  its  results."  ] 

2  [M.  Mercier  de  Lostende  was  French  Ambassador  to  Spain.    His  sus 
picions  apparently  had  not  been  aroused  by  the  presence  in  Spain  of  Bucher 
and  Versen,  if,  indeed,  he  had  been  aware  of  it.    (See  If  Empire  LiUrd,  vol, 


40  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

advised  Gramont  of  the  fact,  but  his  confidence  in 
Prim's  word  was  still  so  great  that  he  was  not  alarmed. 
"I  have  not  heard  a  word  of  the  Hohenzollem  candi 
dacy,"  he  added  (July  1).  And  yet  that  was  the  little 
cloud  that  announces  the  storm. 

xiii,  pp.  53,  54.)  On  June  11,  Prim  made  a  speech  to  the  Cortes  in  which, 
after  detailing  his  various  disappointments  in  his  search  for  a  king,  he 
alluded  to  another  candidate  whom  he  could  not  name,  but  whose  qualifi 
cations  he  described  in  such  terms  as  to  leave  little  doubt  of  his  identity.  He 
represented,  however,  that  he  had  as  yet  had  no  better  success  in  this  direc 
tion.  "The  ministry  has  not  been  fortunate ;  it  has  no  candidate  to  present 
for  the  crown ;  at  least,  it  has  none  for  the  moment,  but  will  it  have  to-mor 
row  ?  That  I  cannot  say."  M.  Ollivier,  who  gives  a  great  part  of  the  speech 
(L*  Empire  Liberal,  vol.  xiii,  pp.  568  ff.),  says  that  this  was  false  because, 
when  he  was  speaking  he  knew  from  Salazar  that  Leopold  would  accept, 
and  was  discussing  with  Bismarck  the  details  of  the  election.  But  this  does 
not  accord  with  the  dates  given  above  of  Salazar's  various  journeys,  and  it  is 
a  fair  question  whether  Prim,  even  at  this  time,  had  not  begun  to  realize  that 
he  had  got  himself  into  a  scrape.  (See  Appendix  C.)  At  all  events,  the 
Emperor,  having  read  Prim's  speech  in  the  Journal  des  Dtibats,  with  Prince 
Leopold's  name  supplied,  bade  Gramont  write  to  Mercier  to  find  out  whether 
it  was  true  that  there  was  a  well-matured  plot  to  seat  a  Prussian  prince  on 
the  Spanish  throne.  M.  Ollivier  quotes  at  considerable  length  from  the 
correspondence  between  Gramont  and  Mercier,  but  he  seems  hardly  to  do 
full  justice  in  his  conclusions  to  the  latter's  discernment.  Mercier  wrote 
that  he  suspected  that  there  was  an  intrigue  in  progress  at  Madrid  tending 
to  some  such  result;  that,  although  it  had  never  been  taken  seriously  by 
prominent  men,  and  it  seemed  strange  that  Prussia  should  care  to  take  such  a 
risk,  still  we  [France]  ought  to  be  the  more  suspicious  of  her,  because  Prim 
in  despair  may  decide  to  recur  to  the  Hohenzollem.  "He  talked  to  Prim 
himself,  who  seemed  annoyed,  as  if  he  were  afraid  that  he  was  detected ;  he 
denied  the  intrigue,  declared  that  he  no  longer  had  a  thought  of  the  Hohen 
zollem,  and,  to  put  the  Emperor's  vigilance  altogether  to  sleep,  gave  Mercier 
his  full  confidence:  he  expected  to  go  to  Vichy  in  July  and  hoped  to  see 
Napoleon  there  .  .  .  who  alone  could  get  him  out  of  his  scrape.  .  .  .  Mercier 
was  convinced  that,  even  if  the  candidacy  was  not  definitively  abandoned, 
there  would  be  nothing  .new  until  after  the  interview  with  the  Emperor. 
Being  reassured  himself,  he  set  Gramont' s  mind  at  rest,"  says  M.  Ollivier. 
But  in  the  next  sentence  he  quotes  a  confidential  letter  of  Mercier  of  June 
24 :  "I  have  very  strong  reasons  for  beliving  that  this  [Hohenzollem]  project 
has  existed,  and  for  fearing  that  it  may  spring  up  again  after  being  aban- 


BISMARCK  AND  THE  CANDIDACY      41 

A  few  days  later  the  heavens  were  ablaze.  "The 
season  of  perfidy  draws  nigh ;  the  way  lies  open ;  they 
will  reign  by  craft,  the  wretches,  and  the  noble  heart 
will  be  caught  in  their  snares."  * 

doned,  but  it  seems  to  me,  for  the  moment,  to  be  laid  aside.  However, 
there's  something  in  the  wind,  that  is  clear,  and  we  cannot  be  too  much 
upon  our  guard."  IS  Empire  Liberal,  vol.  xiii,  pp.  571-579. 

Whatever  Prim's  real  inclination  may  have  been  at  this  period,  he  was  so 
far  involved  with  the  Hohenzollerns  and  Bismarck  that  he  could  not  well 
draw  back,  and  he  evidently  set  about  hoodwinking  Mercier ;  but  after  read 
ing  the  correspondence  as  given  by  M.  OUivier  one  can  but  wonder  that  the 
"explosion  of  the  bomb"  should  have  caused  so  much  amazement  in  certain 
quarters  in  Paris. 

M.  Welschinger  cites  an  article  in  the  Temps  of  January  11,  1910,  in 
which  M.  G.  de  Coutouly,  "one  of  our  most  distinguished  publicists," 
who  was  in  Madrid  in  the  spring  of  1870,  gives  his  recollections  of  the  state 
of  public  opinion  there  concerning  the  candidacy  of  Prince  Leopold,  and  of 
Mercier's  views  thereon;  vol.  i,  p.  4£. 

Sorel  says  (vol.  i,  p.  57),  apropos  of  the  great  parade  in  Madrid  of  cordial 
sentiments  toward  France,  that  there  was  some  talk  at  this  tune  of  bestowing 
the  Golden  Fleece  on  M.  Ollivier.] 

1  Goethe,  Goetz  von  Berlickingm. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  HOHENZOLLERN   SCHEME  EXPLODES  AT  MADRID 

SALAZAR  arrived  at  Madrid,  bubbling  over  with 
delight,  on  the  day  announced  by  him  by  telegraph  — 
June  26.  He  called  upon  Prim,  failed  to  find  him, 
and  hastened  to  the  Department  of  the  Interior. 
"The  President  is  hunting,"  said  Rivero ;  "I  am  acting 
in  his  place."  "If  that  is  so,  let  me  tell  you  that 
I  have  brought  Leopold  of  Hohenzollern's  acceptance 
of  the  throne."  And  he  displayed  to  the  thunder 
struck  Rivero  a  letter  from  Prince  Leopold  himself, 
saying  that  he  was  highly  flattered  by  the  overtures 
that  had  been  made  to  him  and  would  be  most  happy 
to  accept  the  crown  of  Spain  if  it  were  offered  him  by 
the  majority  of  the  Cortes;  thenceforward  he  would 
be  a  Spaniard  and  nothing  else.  "We  must  see 
to  it  that  the  Cortes  vote  forthwith,"  added  Salazar. 
"But  the  Cortes  have  adjourned!"1  "Then  they 

1  [There  is  more  or  less  mystery  attending  the  adjournment  of  the  Cortes. 
Salazar  had  sent,  through  Major  Versen,  two  despatches,  as  stated  in  the  text, 
one  to  Prim,  and  one  to  Seftor  Zorrilla.  M.  Leonardon  concludes  that  they 
must  have  been  sent  on  the  19th  or  20th  of  Juae.  "On  the  21st  Prim  and 
Zorrilla  allowed  a  motion  by  their  friend  Martos  to  be  presented  and  adopted, 
authorizing  the  President  to  put  an  end  to  the  session  whenever  he  should 
see  fit.  On  the  23d  Zorrilla  declared  the  session  closed,  in  view  of  the  absence 
of  important  business,  and  expressed  a  decided  hope  that  in  November  the 
constitutional  edifice  would  be  crowned. 

"To  explain  this  procedure  the  Spanish  government  pretends  that  Sala- 
zar's  despatch  announcing  his  return  for  the  26th  reached  Madrid  with  a 
change  in  the  wording  which  caused  July  9  to  be  substituted  for  June  26 

42 


THE  SECRET  DIVULGED  AT  MADRID    43 

must  be  recalled  at  once ! "  exclaimed  Salazar,  much 
discountenanced. 

Rivero  wrote  to  Zorrilla,  the  President  of  the  Cortes, 
and  told  him  the  news.  He  was  no  less  surprised  than 
his  colleague.  But  the  Cortes  could  not  be  summoned 

in  deciphering  it.    For  fear  that  the  affair  would  become  known,  they  dared 
not  hold  the  Cortes  in  session  so  long,  the  members  being  anxious  to  adjourn. 

"  Considering  the  end  that  Bismarck  had  in  view,  that  error,  if  it  really 
occurred,  was  deplorable.  For  the  complete  and  unequivocal  success  of  the 
Prussian  scheme,  it  was  necessary  that  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy  should 
be  presented  while  the  Cortes  was  in  session.  When  that  assembly  was  offi 
cially  informed,  no  backing  out  was  possible  on  the  part  either  of  Prim  or  of 
Prince  Leopold,  and  the  protests  of  France,  by  offending  the  Spanish  deputies' 
sense  of  their  sovereign  independence,  might  well  result  directly  in  the  im 
mediate  election  of  the  Prince.  If  thereupon  Napoleon  III  should  call  the 
Prussian  government  to  account  for  its  share  in  the  intrigue  and  should  go 
so  far  as  to  declare  war,  Spain  and  her  new  monarch  could  not  evade  the 
obligation  to  take  up  arms,  and  a  diversion  in  the  Pyrenees  would  help  to 
ensure  Prussia's  success. 

"  We  venture  to  doubt  the  error  in  deciphering  Salazar's  telegram  to  Zor 
rilla.  Prim  was  perfectly  well  aware  that  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy  could 
not  be  agreeable  to  France.  Witness  the  absolute  ignorance  of  Salazar's 
negotiations  in  which  he  kept  the  Spanish  Ambassador  at  Paris,  Olozaga, 
whom  he  well  knew  to  be  most  friendly  to  France.  But  he  expected  to  see 
the  Emperor  in  July ;  he  knew  of  the  friendship  that  Napoleon  professed  for 
Prince  Charles  of  Eoumania,  Leopold's  brother,  and  he  probably  hoped  that 
by  making  the  most  of  the  relationship  between  the  Hohenzollerns  and  the 
Bonapartes  [see  Appendix  D],  he  might  win  his  consent.  This  was  an  illu 
sion  which  Bismarck  himself  had  helped  to  keep  alive :  at  the  beginning,  the 
Augsbourg  Gazette  (in  April,  1869),  and  afterward  Salazar,  in  Ms  deliverance 
of  October  of  the  same  year,  had  called  attention  to  those  bonds  of  kinship. 

"To  arrive  at  this  friendly  solution,  Prim  needed  time  to  talk  to  the  Em 
peror;  it  was  essential  that  he  should  be  the  first  person  to  mention  the 
candidacy  to  him,  and  that  he  should  not  assume  the  attitude  of  proposing 
to  force  his  hand.  When  he  realized  that  Bismarck  wished  to  force  Mm  to 
take  the  decisive  step  more  quickly  than  he  had  planned  to  do,  he  tried  to 
dodge,  and  it  was  in  order  to  secure  the  necessary  time  and  freedom  of  action 
that,  in  concert  with  Zorrilla,  he  brought  the  session  of  the  Cortes  hurriedly 
to  a  close,  on  a  trumped-up  pretext.  ,  .  .  He  himself ,  being  supposed  not  to 
expect  Salazar  until  July  9,  left  Madrid  June  25  for  his  country  estate  in  the 
mountains  of  Toledo."  The  above-quoted  conclusion  of  M.  Leonardon  (in 


44  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

without  Prim's  sanction;  so  that  the  urgent  thing 
was  to  send  for  him.  The  messenger  chosen  was 
Herreros  de  Tejada,  the  only  person  who  was  in  the 
secret.  It  would  have  been  wise  not  to  spread  the 
news  before  the  marshal's  arrival,  but  Zorrilla  did 
not  feel  called  upon  to  keep  a  secret  which  he  had  not 
been  asked  to  keep,  and  he  informed  his  friend  Ignacio 
Escobar,  editor  of  the  Epoca.  A  confidential  communi 
cation  to  a  newspaper  man  is  at  once  spread  broad 
cast.  In  a  moment  it  burst  out  at  the  very  centre  of 
gossip,  the  Puerta  del  Sol,  and  everybody  exclaimed : 
"  Ya  tenemos  Hey  ! "  (We  have  a  king.) 

Prim,  being  advised  of  what  had  happened,  hastened 
back  ;to  the  capital  during  the  night  of  June  30.  Vic 
tor  Balaguer,  the  deputy,  and  two  friends,  were  await 
ing  him  at  the  station.  They  expressed  their  joy. 
Prim  frowned,  twisted  a  glove  that  he  held  in  his  hand, 
and  exclaimed  in  a  lugubrious  tone  :  "Trouble  thrown 
away  !  the  candidacy  has  fallen  through  !  God  grant 
that  that  is  the  worst  of  it !"  1 

the  Revue  Historique)  is  adopted  by  La  Gorce  (vol.  vi,  p.  211),  but  many 
authorities  simply  state  the  error  in  deciphering  the  despatch  as  a  fact  which 
led  to  the  adjournment  of  the  Cortes,  and  thereby  interfered  with  Bismarck's 
plans.  See,  for  instance,  the  memoirs  of  Charles  of  Roumania  (French 
translation),  vol.  i,  p.  589.  M.  Leonardon's  views  as  to  Prim's  disposition 
toward  Bismarck  at  this  time  may  be  found  in  Appendix  C.] 

1  Muniz,  vol.  ii,  p.  117.  [All  the  other  authorities  that  I  have  seen  give  the 
night  of  July  1-2  as  the  date  of  Prim's  return  to  Madrid.  Leonardon  says 
that  it  was  Balaguer  who  described  the  scene  at  the  station.  The  unexpected 
disclosure  of  the  plan  compensated  in  a  measure,  from  Bismarck's  standpoint, 
for  the  ill-effect  of  the  inopportune  adjournment  of  the  Cortes,  in  that  Prim 
was  equally  forced  to  show  his  hand.  According  to  La  Gorce  (vol.  vi,  p.  212), 
Mercier  had  heard  the  rumors  afloat  in  the  city.  "  On  July  2,  rumors  came 
to  his  ears,  vague  at  first,  then  more  distinct.  They  had  a  candidate !  That 
candidate  was  a  Hohenzollern.  A  little  later  in  the  day  a  deputy  wrote  him 
that  the  Cortes  would  undoubtedly  be  summoned  forthwith,  and  would  pro- 


THE  SECRET  DIVULGED  AT  MADRID    45 

In  truth,  at  the  first  step  the  scheme  had  met  with  a 
setback,  which  might  ruin  the  whole  business.  It 
had  been  agreed  with  the  King  and  Bismarck  that  the 
secret  should  be  kept  until  the  communication  to  the 
Cortes  and  their  immediate  vote,  so  that  the  panic- 
struck  Emperor  could  not  defeat  the  conspiracy. 
Doubtless  Salazar,  who  had  been  so  discreet  up  to 
that  time,  would  not  have  been  so  indiscreet  had  he 
known  that  the  Cortes  was  not  in  session. 

If  something  goes  wrong  in  the  execution  of  a  ma 
turely  devised  plan,  men  of  little  decision  of  character 
take  fright,  halt  where  they  are,  and  improvise  a  new 
and  insufficiently  thought-out  scheme,  which  Increases 
the  confusion;  men  of  daring  are  not  disconcerted, 
but  persist,  and,  by  the  vigor  of  their  action,  check 
mate  the  malicious  whim  of  Fortune.  Thus  did  Prim, 
who  was  that  day  a  worthy  associate  of  Bismarck. 
He  recovered  himself,  picked  up  the  scattered  frag 
ments  of  his  glove,  and  hurried  on  the  execution  of  his 
plan. 

It  was  impossible  longer  to  postpone  the  communi 
cation  to  the  French  Ambassador ;  he  no  longer  sought 
to  avoid  it.  That  first  step  was  the  least  agreeable. 

ceed  to  the  election  of  a  king.  Late  in  the  afternoon,  it  was  known  that  a 
council  of  ministers  was  in  session.  Instinctively  alarmed,  M.  Mercier  did 
not  wish  to  wait  until  morning  to  obtain  a  confirmation  or  contradiction  of 
the  news.  Although  the  day  was  far  advanced  he  went  to  Prim's  house." 
M.  de  Gramont  speaks  of  Prim  having  published  the  scheme  himself  on  July 
8,  because  of  his  impatience,  and  says  that  his  premature  action  so  displeased 
and  embarrassed  the  Prussian  government  that  there  was  some  thought  of 
abandoning  the  whole  undertaking.  La  France  et  la  Prusse  avant  la  Guerre 
(1872),  pp.  24,  25.  But  Gramont  wrote  very  soon  after  the  war,  when  very 
littje  material  for  the  accurate  ascertainment  of  facts  was  available ;  more 
over,  his  work  is  often  marred  by  carelessness,  or  something  worse,  even  in 
matters  of  greater  importance  than  this.] 


46  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

The  trustful  Mercier  had  not  heard  the  rumors  afloat 
in  the  city.  On  Saturday,  July  2,  in  the  evening,  he 
went  to  pay  his  respects  to  Prim.  He  found  him  in 
his  salon,  his  manner  unwontedly  constrained.  After 
a  few  moments  of  halting  conversation,  the  marshal 
said :  — 

"Come  with  me;  I  must  have  a  talk  with  you." 
And  he  led  him  to  his  study.  "I  have  to  speak  to 
you,"  he  continued,  "of  a  matter  which  will  not  be 
agreeable  to  the  Emperor,  I  fear,  and  you  must  help  me 
to  prevent  his  taking  it  in  too  ill  part.  You  know  how 
we  are  situated.  We  cannot  prolong  the  interregnum 
indefinitely,  nor  Indeed  can  we  appear  before  the 
Cortes  without  some  solution  to  propose  to  them. 
We  must  have  a  king,  and  here,  at  the  moment  of  our 
greatest  embarrassment,  one  is  proposed  to  us  who 
fulfils  all  the  conditions,  —  Leopold  of  Hohenzollern, 
a  Catholic,  of  royal  lineage,  thirty-five  years  of  age, 
married  to  a  Portuguese  princess,  and  with  two  sons, 
which  will  inevitably  prepossess  men's  minds  greatly 
in  his  favor ;  furthermore,  comely  of  person  and  a  sol- 
dier.  You  understand  that  I  cannot  let  this  last 
chance  of  averting  revolution  escape,  especially  under 
such  conditions.  How  do  you  think  the  Emperor  will 
take  it?" 

"Th^re  are  no  two  ways  of  taking  it,"  Mercier 
replied.  "But  first  of  all  let  me  remind  you  that  I 
cannot  consent  to  talk  on  this  subject  as  ambassador ; 
for,  having  no  other  instructions  than  simple  absten 
tion,  I  have  no  right  to  speak  for  the  Emperor.  But, 
if  you  allow  me  to  give  you  my  personal  opinion,  I 
shall  not  hesitate  to  say  that  you  could  not  take  a 
more  momentous  step,  or  one  likely  to  bring  in  its  train 


THE  SECRET  DIVULGED  AT  MADRID    47 

more  disastrous  consequences.  In  France  the  election 
of  a  Prussian  prince  to  the  throne  of  Spain,  in  view  of 
the  present  state  of  the  public  mind  with  regard  to 
Prussia,  cannot  fail  to  produce  an  extraordinary  effect. 
National  sentiment  will  see  therein  a  downright  insult; 
and  be  assured  that  a  Napoleon  cannot  leave  the  na 
tional  sentiment  in  distress." 

Thereupon  ensued  between  Prim  and  Mercier  a  con 
versation  in  which  Mercier,  speaking  like  a  true  am 
bassador  of  our  glorious  France,  made  an  admirable 
display  of  dignity,  plain-speaking,  and  decision.  Prim 
thought  to  embarrass  him  by  referring  to  the  Mont- 
pensier  candidacy.  ! 

"Very  good  1  rather  Montpensier  !"  cried  Mercier. 

"What !  you  believe  that  the  Emperor  would  prefer 
Montpensier  to  a  Hohenzollern?" 

"He  never  told  me  so,  but  I  have  no  doubt  of  it. 
The  Emperor  is  a  Frenchman  first  of  all."  * 

1  [Practically  the  whole  of  the  interview  as  reported  by  Mercier  to  the 
Foreign  Minister  on  July  3  (see  Gramont,  La  France  et  la  Prusse  avant  la 
Otierre,  pp.  360-365),  is  given  by  M.  Ollivier  in  his  vol.  xiv,  pp.  11-15, 
and  by  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  pp.  212-215.  In  reply  to  Mercier's  representa 
tions  as  to  the  sensitiveness  of  French  opinion,  Prim  remarked:  "Bah! 
as  for  the  consequences  so  far  as  France  is  concerned,  I  would  accept  them, 
but  it's  the  Emperor  whom  it  would  be  extremely  painful  for  me  to  offend." 
—  "Do  you  imagine,  pray,  that,  in  such  a  matter  it  is  possible  to  separate 
France  from  the  Emperor  ?"  —  "In  that  case,  what  are  we  to  do?  Take 
the  Almanack  de  Gotha  and  try  to  find  a  prince  there  with  whom  we  can 
make  shift !"  —  Prim's  method  of  referring  to  the  Montpensier  candidacy 
was  to  say  slyly:  "If  we  let  this  opportunity  escape,  we  are  thrown  back 
perforce  on  Montpensier  or  the  Republic."] 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  HOHENZOLLERN    SCHEME   EXPLODES   AT   PARIS 

ON  the  evening  of  July  2  the  Gazette  de  France  pub 
lished  the  following  paragraph  :  "The  Spanish  govern 
ment  has  sent  a  deputation  to  Germany  to  offer  the 
crown  to  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern."  On  the  3d, 
in  the  afternoon,  the  Havas  Agency  in  its  turn  pre 
sented  the  information  :  "A  deputation  sent  to  Prussia 
by  General  Prim  has  offered  the  crown  to  the  Prince 
of  Hohenzollern,  and  he  has  accepted  it.  This  candi 
dacy  will  be  proclaimed  independently  of  the  Cortes." 

Still  the  government  knew  nothing  officially.  The 
first  advice  that  came  to  hand  was  a  telegraphic  de 
spatch  from  Mercier,  Ambassador  at  Madrid,  on  the 
morning  of  July  3.  It  said  t  "The  Hohenzollern  busi 
ness  seems  to  be  well  advanced  if  not  actually  con 
cluded.  Marshal  Prim  himself  told  me  of  it.  I  am 
sending  Bartholdi  to  Paris  with  the  details  and  to 
receive  your  instructions." 

On  receipt  of  this  despatch  Gramont1  hastened  to 
Saint-Cloud.  Francheschini  Pietri,  who  was  present, 
described  to  me  the  Emperor's  extreme  astonishment 
at  that  unexpected  blow;  up  to  that  time  he  had 
received  no  suggestion  of  the  project  either  from 
Prince  Leopold  or  Prince  Charles  or  Prince  Antony.2 

1  [As  to  Gramont,  see  Appendix  E,  infra.] 

2  The  assertion  of  Keudell  to   the  contrary,  already  impliedly  contra 
dicted  by  the  absolute  silence  of  the  memoirs  of  Charles  of  Roumania  con 
cerning  the  alleged  communication,   is   formally  contradicted  by  Hans 

48 


THE  SECRET  DIVULGED  AT  PARIS      49 

When  others  had  spoken  of  it,  he  had  asked  questions, 
but  had  stopped  at  the  first  word  of  denial,  in  the  con 
viction**  that  if  ever  the  Hohenzollern  princes,  to  whom 
he  had  always  shown  so  much  affection,  should  con 
ceive  such  an  idea,  he  would  be  informed  of  it  by  them 
selves.  So  it  was  that  the  Empress  wrote  to  me  :  "The 
candidacy  exploded  like  a  bomb,  without  warning" 

The  Emperor  was  even  more  distressed  than  offended 
by  this  disloyal  act  which  he  did  not  anticipate.  He 
authorized  Gramont  to  send  despatches  of  exploration 
to  Madrid  and  Berlin. 

On  leaving  Saint-Cloud,  Gramont  called  on  Olozaga,1 

Delbriick,  in  the  Preussiscke  Jahrbiicher  for  October,  1895:  "His  Royal 
Highness  Prince  Leopold  informed  me  explicitly  that  the  statement  to 
the  effect  that  the  late  Prince  Charles  Antony  informed  the  Emperor  of 
the  proffer  of  the  throne  of  Spain,  is  altogether  erroneous.'*  [Note  of 
M.  Ollivier  in  vol.  xiv,  p.  16.] 

1  [The  fact  that  Don  Salustio  Olozaga,  the  Spanish  Ambassador  to 
France,  had  been  kept  in  complete  ignorance  of  the  Hohenzollern  affair 
has  been  previously  mentioned  in  these  notes.  On  July  4,  Lesourd,  the 
French  chargS  d'affaires  at  Berlin,  telegraphed  to  Gramont:  "I  learn  that 
M.  Olozaga  telegraphed  yesterday  from  Paris  to  the  Spanish  minister  at 
Berlin  [Rascon],  that  in  his  opinion  the  report  of  the  offer  of  the  Spanish 
crown  to  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern  is  untrue.  M.  de  Rascon  declares 
here  that  he  shares  that  opinion,  and  that  that  step  would  be  of  a  nature 
justly  to  excite  our  susceptibility."  Gramont,  pp.  19,  £0. 

On  July  3,  Prim  made  a  virtue  of  neccessity  and  wrote  Olozaga  a  letter 
in  which  he  freely  admitted  his  belief  that  the  news  would  create  an  un 
favorable  effect  in  France,  and  urged  Olozaga  to  do  his  utmost  to  bring 
the  Emperor  around  to  a  favorable  view  of  it.  The  letter  is  given  in  full 
by  M.  Ollivier  (vol.  xiv,  pp.  18-20),  who  adds:]  "In  this  letter  as  in  his 
conversation  Prim  recurs  again  and  again  to  the  displeasure  wMch  the 
Emperor  is  sure  to  feel,  and  thus  once  more  the  fable  accredited  by  the 
memoirs  of  Marshal  Randon,  that  the  Emperor,  in  September,  1869, 
advised  that  candidacy,  is  flatly  contradicted." 

[On  July  19,  after  war  was  declared,  Bismarck,  in  pursuance  of  his  un 
ceasing  efforts  to  make  out  a  case  against  France,  dictated  to  Busch  the 
following  among  other  items  "to  be  worked  up  for  the  German  newspapers 


50  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

but  did  not  find  him.  He  then  went  to  the  chancellery, 
but  was  no  more  successful  in  finding  me.  July  3  was 
Sunday,  and  I  had  gone  to  Egli,  a  small  village  in 
Seine-et-Oise,  to  the  house  of  my  chief  clerk  and 
friend,  Adelon,  to  be  present  at  the  christening  of  a 
church  bell  of  which  my  wife  was  the  godmother. 
On  my  return  to  Paris  in  the  evening  of  that  single 
day  of  rest  that  I  had  enjoyed  for  several  months,  I 
found  the  following  letter  from  Gramont :  — 

July  3,  10  P.M. 

MY  DEAR  OLLIVIER,  —  I  am  writing  at  your  desk 
to  say  that  I  came  to  inform  you  that  Prim  has  offered 
the  crown  to  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern,  who  has 
accepted  it !  It's  a  very  serious  business !  A  Prussian 
Prince  at  Madrid  !  I  have  seen  the  Emperor  —  he 
is  greatly  disturbed.  While  maintaining  officially  and 
ostensibly  our  r61e  of  abstention,  we  must  defeat  this 
intrigue.  I  like  to  believe,  and  I  am  tempted  to 

outside  Berlin,  such  as  the  Kolnische  Zeitung,  and  for  the  English  and 
Belgian  papers:  ...  *It  now  appears  to  be  beyond  all  doubt  that  the 
French  Government  was  aware  of  the  candidacy  of  the  Prince  of  Hohen 
zollern  for  months  past,  that  they  carefully  promoted  it,  and  foolishly  imagined 
that  it  would  serve  as  a  means  of  isolating  Prussia  and  creating  a  division 
in  Germany.  No  trustworthy  information  has  been  received  as  yet  as  to 
whether  and  how  far  Marshal  Prim  had  prepared  the  way  for  this  intrigue, 
in  agreement  with  the  Emperor  Napoleon.  But  doubtless  that  point  will 
ultimately  be  cleared  up  by  history.  The  sudden  disappearance  of  Spain 
from  the  political  field  as  soon  as  the  difference  between  France  and  Prussia 
broke  out  gives  matter  for  reflection  and  suspicion.  It  cannot  but  be 
regarded  as  strange  that  after  the  zeal  shown  by  the  Spanish  Government 
in  respect  to  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy  had  been  raisod  to  boiling  point, 
it  should  suddenly  have  fallen  below  zero,  and  that  the  relations  of  Marshal 
Prim  to  the  French  Cabinet  should  now  appear  to  be  of  the  most  friendly 
character,  while  the  Spaniards  seem  no  longer  to  feel  any  irritation  at  the 
interference  of  France  in  their  internal  affairs.'"  Busch,  Bismarck:  Some 
Secret  Pages  of  his  History  (English  trans.,  vol.  i,  pp.  38,  89) .] 


THE  SECRET  DIVULGED  AT  PARIS      51 

believe,  that  Olozaga  knows  nothing  of  it;  but  at 
Madrid  they  have  hoodwinked  Mercier.  To-morrow 
we  shall  begin  a  prudent,  but  effective  campaign  in 
the  press.  Further  details  to-morrow.  I  have  been 
to  Olozaga's,  but  could  not  find  him. 

Yours  ever. 

On  reading  this  letter  J[  was  more  moved  than  Gra- 
mont  was  while  writing  it.  I  had  a  violent  paroxysm 
of  anger  and  despair.  For  four  years  in  the  tribune, 
for  seven  months  in  the  ministry,  I  had  striven  labori 
ously  to  avoid  every  subject  of  irritation,  to  smooth 
over  the  unpleasant  incidents  between  Prussia  and 
ourselves  by  patience  and  courteous  conduct,  and  to 
turn  aside  definitively  the  barbarous  war  which  so 
many  declared  to  be  inevitable.  And  behold,  Prim 
and  Bismarck  had  suddenly  destroyed  what  I  was, 
after  such  painful  efforts,  on  the  point  of  achieving, 
and,  seizing  me  on  the  shore  where  I  hoped  at  last  to 
breathe  freely,  hurled  me  back  into  the  waves  !  All 
my  labor  thrown  away  !  The  most  distressing  presenti 
ments  assailed  me.  "It  was  Bismarck,"  I  said  to 
myself,  "who  engineered  this  candidacy;  henceforth, 
whatever  we  may  do,  he  will  not  withdraw  it;  and, 
on  the  other  hand,  however  pacifically  inclined  we  may 
be,  it  is  absolutely  impossible  for  us  to  tolerate  it. 
And  then?"  Afraid  to  utter  the  word,  I  yet  felt  in 
my  heart  the  lamentable  on-coming  of  a  war,  of  that 
war  which  I  held  in  horror !  Labor  thrown  away ! 
labor  thrown  away  ! 

This  paroxysm  of  emotion  lasted  but  a  moment: 
with  me  anger  is  like  the  spark  made  by  striking  a 
stone,  and  dies  out  instantly.  Well  aware  that  lack- 


52  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

adaisical  manners  do  not  persuade,  I  have  always  put 
passion  into  my  speeches  and  my  acts;  but,  as  Dari- 
mon1  observed,  who  formerly  had  much  intercourse 
with  me  and  who  has  spoken  disparagingly  of  me,  I 
retain  my  lucidity  of  mind  at  moments  of  difficulty. 
In  the  course  of  that  crisis  I  was  destined  to  pass 
through  many  agonizing  moments,  to  know  much 
mental  torture,  to  be  obliged  often  to  make  up  my  mind 
quickly ;  but  at  no  time  did  *I  lose  control  of  myself ; 
I  acted  as  if  I  had  a  problem  in  geometry  or  algebra 
to  solve :  inaccessible  to  any  influence,  whether  of  the 
press,  or  of  the  Emperor  or  Empress,  or  of  my  friends 
or  my  enemies ;  paying  no  heed  to  what  people  would 
say  or  would  not  say,  following  my  own  initiative,  and 
determining  my  course  solely  by  considerations  deriv 
ing  from  my  duty  to  my  country  and  to  mankind. 

It  was  fortunate  that  Gramont  did  not  find  me  at 
my  office,  and  was  obliged  to  write  to  me,  for  his  letter 
manifests  moderation  and  bears  witness  to  the  eleva 
tion  of  his  sentiments.  It  is  not  the  outcry  of  an 
irascible  man,  on  the  watch  for  a  long-awaited  pre 
text  for  insulting  a  destested  nation;  it  is  the  reflec 
tion  of  an  honorable  minister,  wholly  master  of  him 
self,  who  thinks  only  of  turning  aside  from  his  own 
country  and  from  Europe  the  calamities  of  war.  He 
does  not  exclaim  as  Cavour  did  in  1859  and  Bismarck 
in  1866:  "At  last  we  have  our  casus  belli!'9  He  says 
simply:  "It's  a  serious  business;  we  must  defeat  this 
intrigue."  And  the  campaign  that  he  advises  is  not  a 

1  Darimon,  Notes  pouvant  sermr  d  VHistoire  de  la  Guerre  de  1870,  p.  178. 
pDarimon  was  one  of  the  "Five,"  of  whom  Ollivier  was  the  chief,  who 
alone  represented  the  opposition  in  the  Chamber  of  1857.  See  translator's 
Introduction,  supra,  pp.  xv,  xvi] 


THE  SECRET  DIVULGED  AT  PARIS      53 

campaign  on  the  Rhine  but  a  campaign  in  the  Con- 
stitutionnel.1  To  make  him  out  an  impulsive,  irascible 
man,  is  surely  a  most  ridiculous  biographical  perver 
sion.  Gramont  was  a  placid  creature,  too  well  broken 
to  public  affairs  to  allow  himself  to  be  excited  by  them. 
Like  us  all,  he  was  anxious  and  preoccupied;  at  no 
time  did  we  see  him  irritated  and  giving  way  to  vio 
lent,  unconsidered  impulses,  resulting  from  old  grudges 
held  in  check  since  1866. 

On  returning  to  his  department  he  sent  the  two 
despatches  agreed  upon  with  the  Emperor  to  Mer- 
cier  and  Lesourd.2  To  Mercier  .he  said :  — 

"This  intrigue  plotted  by  Prim  and  Prussia  against 
France  must  be  effectively  fought,  and  to  succeed  in 
defeating  it  requires  no  less  of  tact,  prudence  and  dis 
cretion  than  of  adroitness  and  vigor.  Act  upon  the 
press  and  through  your  friends,  without  compromising 
yourself.  The  Prince  of  Hohenzollern  is  the  grandson 
of  a  Murat.  Make  the  most  of  the  second  of  May.3 
Do  not  show  any  temper,  but  manifest  some  distrust 
while  protesting  your  respect  for  the  declared  will  of 
the  Spanish  people." 

1  [The  Constitutwnnd,  edited  by  Robert  Mitchell,  ''customarily  received 
inspiration  from  M.  Emile  Ollivier,"  says  La  Gorce  (vol.  vi,  p.  230).    It 
was  the  only  Parisian  newspaper  which  could  possibly  be  called  an  organ 
of  the  government,  and  that  only  in  a  very  limited  sense.    For  Gramont's 
first  note  in  that  paper,  see  Ollivier,  vol.  xiv,  pp.  27,  28.    And  see  infra, 
p.  68.  n.  2.] 

2  [Lesourd  was  in  charge  of  the  embassy  at  Berlin,  Comte  Benedetti, 
the  Ambassador,  being  then  absent  at  Wildbad.    Bismarck  was  at  his 
country  estate  at  Varzin,  and  Herr  von  Thile,  Under-Secretary  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  was  his  locum  tenens.] 

8  [Prince  Leopold's  paternal  grandmother  was  a  niece  of  Joachim  Murat, 
King  of  Naples,  who  commanded  the  French  troops  in  Spain  in  1808,  and 
on  the  2d  of  May  in  that  year  put  down  the  insurrection  in  Madrid  against 
the  French  domination.] 


54  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

To  Lesourd  lie  telegraphed :  — 

"We  learn  that  a  deputation  sent  by  Marshal  Prim 
has  offered  the  Spanish  crown  to  the  Prince  of  Hohen  • 
zollern,  who  has  accepted  it.  We  do  not  consider  the 
candidacy  as  put  forward  seriously,  and  believe  that 
the  Spanish  nation  will  reject  it.  But  we  cannot  see 
without  some  surprise  a  Prussian  prince  seeking  to 
seat  himself  on  the  Spanish  throne.  We  should  prefer 
to  believe  that  the  Berlin  cabinet  is  not  privy  to  this 
intrigue;  in  the  contrary  event,  its  conduct  would 
suggest  to  us  reflections  of  too  delicate  a  nature  to  be 
mentioned  to  you  in  a  telegram.  I  do  not  hesitate, 
however,  to  say  to  you  that  a  bad  impression  has  been 
created,  and  I  urge  you  to  express  yourself  to  this 
effect.  I  await  such  details  as  you  may  be  able  to 
give  me  of  this  regrettable  incident."  (July  3.) l 

The  next  morning,  the  4th,  Gramont  saw  the  Spanish 
Ambassador  and  told  him  the  news  that  had  come 
from  Mercier  the  night  before.  Olozaga's  stupefac 
tion  proved  even  more  convincingly  than  his  protesta- 

1  [The -sending  of  this  despatch,  to  Berlin  seems  to  have  been  the  first  of 
the  several  steps,  each  more  disastrous  than  the  last,  which  M.  de  Gramont 
took  without  consulting  his  colleagues  in  the  ministry  —  or,  at  least,  with 
out  consulting  those  most  concerned.  M.  Ollivier  says  that  the  Foreign 
Minister  had  conferred  with  the  Emperor,  but  it  is  clear  that  he  himself 
knew.nothing  of  it,  and  M.  de  Gramont  does  not  mention  even  the  Em 
peror,  although  he  speaks  of  the  despatch  as  "the  attitude  assumed  at  the 
outset  by  the  government,"  La' France  et  la  Prusse,  p.  28.  "Thus  did  M. 
de  Gramont  express  himself  at  the  first  moment,  and,  as  it  were,  ab  irato," 
says  La  Gorce.  "Did  he  consult  his  colleagues  ?  At  all  events,  this  despatch, 
which  already  smelt  of  war,  was  sent  without  the  knowledge  of  the  man 
who  presided  over  the  affairs  of  the  army.  Not  until  the  next  day,  when 
he  arrived  at  the  Palais-Bourbon,  did  Marshal  Le  Boeuf  learn,  from  the 
conversation  of  the  deputies,  that  a  new  question,  called  *the  Hohenzollern 
question,'  had  arisen  in  Europe.**  Vol.  vi,  pp.  218,  219,  citing  Le  Boeuf  s 
deposition  in  the  Inquiry  concerning  the  4th  of  September.] 


LEOPOLD  OF  HOHENZOLLERN 
1835-1905 


THE  SECRET  DIVULGED  AT  PARIS      55 

tions  that  lie  knew  nothing  of  it.  He  complained 
bitterly  that  negotiations  of  so  serious  a  nature  should 
have  been  carried  on  without  his  even  being  informed 
of  them,  and  he  admitted  to  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  that  he  was  unable  to  give  him  any  explanation 
of  a  matter  which  he  knew  of  only  through  what  the 
minister  himself  had  just  disclosed  to  him.  Gramont 
repeated  to  Olozaga  the  protests  made  by  Mercier  to 
Prim,  and  bade  him  repeat  them  without  delay  to  his 
government. 

That  same  day  he  called  upon  Werther,1  who  was 
about  to  start  for  Ems.  He  begged  him  to  inform  the 
King  that  France  would  not  tolerate  the  seating  of 
the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern  or  any  other  Prussian 
prince  on  the  throne  of  Spain.  He  adjured  him  to 
exert  his  utmost  efforts  to  induce  his  Majesty  to  com 
pel  his  nephew  to  refuse  the  Spanish  crown.  I,  in  my 
turn,  saw  the  Prussian  ambassador,  and  besought  him 
to  help  us  extinguish  this  dangerous  firebrand.  We 
found  him  (and  that  fact  ruined  him  in  Bismarck's 
esteem)  in  a  most  conciliatory  frame  of  mind.  With 
out  expressing  his  opinion  touching  the  actual  crux  of 
the  controversy,  he  manifested  genuine  good-will,  to 

1  [Werther  and  Gramont  were  old  acquaintances,  having  been  colleagues 
at  Vienna.  According  to  Lord  Lyons,  the  British  Ambassador,  Gramont 
informed  him  "that  he  had  declared  categorically  to  Baron  de  Werther 
that  France  would  not  tolerate  the  establishment  of  the  Prince  de  Hohen- 
zollern  or  any  other  Prussian  Prince  on  the  Throne  of  Spain."  Lyons  to 
Earl  Granville,  in  the  British  government  publication,  Correspondence 
respecting  the  Negotiations  preliminary  to  the  War  between  France  and  Prussia, 
1870  (hereafter  cited  as  Blue  Book),  p.  1.  This  agrees  with  the  text,  but 
M.  de  Gramont  himself  says:  "I  let  him  see,  without,  however,  making  an 
explicit  assertion  to  that  effect,  that  France  could  with  difficulty  resign  her 
self  to  accepting  a  state  of  things  on  her  frontier  which  might  at  any  moment 
endanger  her  security/*  La  France  et  la  Prusse,  p.  35.] 


56  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

such  a  degree  that  Gramont  felt  justified  in  asking 
him  to  inform  him  by  telegraph  of  the  result  of  his 
mission. 

No  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  being  placed  unex 
pectedly  in  such  a  thorny  position,  could  have  acted 
with  more  decision  and  at  the  same  time  more  self- 
possession  and  prudence.  Unfortunately,  at  Madrid 
as  at  Berlip.,  our  judicious  conduct  was  confronted  by  a 
scheme  as  powerfully  devised  as  it  was  resolutely 
executed. 

Realizing  the  impossibility  of  replying  to  our  objec 
tions  to  the  anti-French  candidacy,  Prim  hastened  to 
remove  it  from  the  domain  of  confidential  interviews, 
and  to  convert  it  at  the  earliest  possible  moment  into 
a  fait  accompli,  beyond  discussion  or  defeat.  On  July  4 
he  issued  an  urgent  summons  to  the  ministers  to  meet 
at  La  Granja,  under  the  presidency  of  the  Regent. 
One  and  all,  including  the  latter,  were  unadvised  of 
the  secret  negotiation.  Prim  unfolded  it  to  them  in 
his  own  way,  dissembled  and  belittled  its  dangers,  and 
obtained  their  unanimous  approval  and  the  summon 
ing  of  the  Cortes  for  July  20.  He  reckoned  the  certain 
majority  at  two  hundred  votes.  Although  warned  of 
our  opposition,  on  the  5th  he  sent  word  to  Prince 
Leopold,  by  Vice-Admiral  Polo  de  Barnabe,  of  the 
decision  of  the  council  of  ministers.  On  the  6th  he 
notified  it  by  telegraph  to  all  the  diplomatic  repre 
sentatives,  insisting  upon  the  advantages  which  Spain 
would  reap  by  her  alliance  with  a  military  power  of 
the  first  rank,1  These  measures  signified  that  our 

1  [See  the  letter  of  July  ¥  from  Earl  Granville  to  Mr.  Layard,  British 
minister  at  Madrid,  in  Blue  Book,  p.  5.  "I  have  seen  the  Spanish  minister 
to-day.  He  translated  to  me  a  telegram  which  he  had  received  from  his 


THE  SECRET  DIVULGED  AT  PAEIS     57 

observations  would  not  be  listened  to,  that  they  would 
not  consent  to  discuss  the  matter  with  us,  and  that  we 
were  face  to  face  with  an  irrevocable  determination. 

At  Berlin  Gramont's  overture  had  no  better  success. 
On  July  4  Lesourd  called  upon  Thile.  At  his  first 
word  on  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy,  Thile  interrupted 
him  with  extraordinary  warmth.  If  he  (Lesourd) 
were  instructed  to  demand  officially  explanations 
from  him  touching  the  matter  that  he  mentioned, 
then  he  (Thile)  must,  before  replying,  take  the  "King's 
commands. 

Government  announcing  that  the  Crown  of  Spain  had  been  offered  by  them 
to  Prince  Leopold  of  Hohenzollern,  and  that  the  offer  had  been  accepted 
by  his  Highness,  and  expressing  the  conviction  that  the  choice  thus  made 
by  them  of  a  Sovereign  for  Spain  would  be  agreeable  to  all  the  Powers  of 
Europe. 

"  I  told  Sefior  de  Ranees  that  I  had  been  surprised  by  the  news,  which 
I  had  received  two  days  ago ;  ...  it  was  impossible  not  to  have  foreseen 
that  such  a  choice,  secretly  made  and  suddenly  announced,  would  create 
great  irritation  in  France." 

After  the  British  Foreign  Minister  had  requested  Ranees  to  lay  before 
his  government  the  urgent  wish  of  Her  Majesty's  government  that  they 
would  not  give  effect  to  a  step  which  "  might,  on  the  one  hand,  bring  on 
great  European  calamities,  and  which,  on  the  other,  was  almost  certain  to 
render  the  relations  of  Spain  with  a  Power  which  was  her  immediate  neigh 
bour,  of  a  painful,  if  not  hostile  character  .  .  .  Sefior  de  Ranees  explained 
that  the  project  was  one  which  had  not  been  intended  as  hostile  to  France; 
that  it  was  the  natural  result  of  other  combinations  which  had  failed.  .  .  . 
But  he  begged  me  to  remark  that  it  was  only  a  resolution  of  the  Ministers 
with  a  view  to  put  some  proposition  before  the  country;  that  the  Cortes 
would  have  to  decide ;  that  there  was  no  reason  to  suppose  they  would  take 
any  rash  or  injudicious  step." 

On  the  5th,  Mr.  Layard  had  telegraphed  to  Lord  Granville  the  decision 
of  the  Spanish  ministers,  adding :  "  The  Cortes  is  summoned  for  the  20th 
of  this  month,  and  it  is  expected  that  he  [Leopold]  will  be  accepted  by  the 
requisite  majority."  Ibid.,  p.  1. 

M.  Leonardon  is  of  opinion  that  at  this  time  Prim  was  already  trying  to 
find  some  means  of  getting  rid  of  the  candidacy.  His  conclusions,  with 
the  grounds  on  which  they  are  based,  will  be  found  in  Appendix  C,  infra.} 


58  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

Lesourd  replied  that  he  did  not  intend  as  yet  to 
give  such  weighty  significance  to  the  step  he  was  taking ; 
but  that,  being  informed  of  the  excitement  caused 
at  Paris  by  the  news  that  he  had  referred  to,  he  had 
it  in  view  simply  to  inform  the  Due  de  Gramont  of 
the  role  which  the  Prussian  government  proposed  to 
assume  in  the  negotiation  which  had  just  come  to  light. 

Thereupon  Thile,  one  of  the  members  of  the  council 
of  the  15th  of  March,  at  which  the  candidacy  had 
been  resolved  upon,  in  an  indifferent  tone  which  re 
sembled  irony,  affected  the  most  absolute  ignorance. 
He  had,  it  is  true,  read  now  and  then  the  name  of 
the  Prince  .of  Hohenzollern  among  the  candidates 
for  the  Spanish  throne,  but  he  had  attributed  so  little 
importance  to  such  rumors  that  he  was  still  wondering 
to  which  of  the  two  princes  they  referred  —  the  He 
reditary  Prince,  who  was  married  to  a  Portuguese 
princess,  or  Prince  Fritz,  a  major  of  cavalry  in  the 
Prussian  army.  The  Prussian  government  was  en 
tirely  in  the  dark  touching  the  affair ;  so  far  as  that 
government  was  concerned  it  did  not  exist ;  consequently 
he  was  not  in  a  position  to  give  the  French  gov 
ernment  any  explanation;  the  statesmen  and  people 
of  Spain  had  a  right  to  offer  the  crown  to  whom 
ever  they  chose,  and  to  that  person  alone,  to  whom 
the  offer  had  been  made,  belonged  the  privilege  of  ac 
cepting  or  declining.1 

Lesourd  imagined  that  Thile  was  embarrassed  be 
cause  he  had  not  as  yet  received  his  instructions  from 
the  King  and  Bismarck,  and  that  he  would  have 

1  Lesourd  to  Gramont,  July  4.  [For  Thile's  version  of  the  interview,  as 
given  to  Lord  A.  Loftus,  British  Ambassador  to  Prussia,  see  Loftus  to 
Granville,  July  6,  Blue  Book,  p,  13.] 


THE  SECRET  DIVULGED  AT  PARIS     59 

spoken  differently  if  he  had  had  them.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  Thile  spoke  solely  by  virtue  of  explicit  in 
structions  from  the  King  and  Bismarck.  According 
to  Schultze,  his  reply  was  a  result  of  Bismarck's  plan 
to  manoeuvre  so  that  the  wrath  of  France  could  find 
nobody  in  Prussia  to  respond  to  its  demands  until 
the  affair  had  reached  its  conclusion  at  Madrid.  Bis 
marck,  for  his  part,  avowed  later  his  reason  for  referring 
us  to  Spain  through  the  medium  of  Thile.  "It  was 
difficult,"  he  says,  "for  France  to  find  a  pretext  in 
international  law  for  intervening  in  the  election  of 
a  king  of  Spain.  I  reckoned  that  the  sensitive  Spanish 
honor  would  revolt  against  such  intervention." 1 

Thile  made  no  secret  of  his  reply.  He  repeated 
it  at  once  to  Loftus,  the  English  Ambassador,  and 
one  after  another  to  the  foreign  ministers  who  came 
to  discuss  the  matter  with  him.  Like  a  soldier  carry 
ing  out  an  order,  he  repeated  imperturbably  to  all  that 
"the  Prussian  government  denied  all  responsibility  with 
respect  to  the  candidacy  of  Prince  Leopold,  and  that 
that  candidacy  could  not  be  the  subject  of  official 
communications  among  the  different  governments."2 

This  reply  was  forthwith  transmitted  and  em 
phasized  at  London  by  the  Prussian  Ambassador, 
Bernstorff.  He  went  to  Granville  and  said  to  him 
that  "the  government  of  the  North  German  Con 
federation  did  not  desire  to  meddle  in  the  affair; 
that  it  would  leave  to  France  the  business  of  taking 
such  measures  as  seemed  fitting,  and  that  the  Prussiar 

1  Bismarck's  Reflections,  etc.  [English  trans.],  vol.  ii,  pp.  89-93, 

2  [See  p.  58,  n.  1.]     Also,  Granville  to  Lyons,  July  8,  Blue  Book,  p.  9 
Granville  to  Loftus,  July  15,  ibid.,  p.  30;   Loftus  to  Granville,  July  1< 
(No.  81),  find.,  p.  51. 


60  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

representative  at  Paris  had  received  orders  to  abstain 
from  taking  any  part.  The  government  of  North 
Germany  had  no  wish  to  stir  up  a  war  of  succession; 
but  if  France  should  choose  to  make  war  upon  that 
government  on  account  of  Spain's  choice  of  a  king, 
such  a  proceeding  on  her  part  would  demonstrate 
her  inclination  to  make  war  without  a  lawful  cause. 
However,  it  was  premature  to  discuss  the  question 
so  long  as  the  Cortes  had  not  decided  to  accept  Prince 
Leopold  as  King  of  Spain/' l 

At  the  same  time  there  began  in  Prussia  a  skilfully 
organized  newspaper  campaign.  Bismarck  issued 
instructions  to  the  effect  that  the  tone  of  the  official 
and  semi-official  sheets  should  continue  to  be  most 
reserved,  but  that  all  the  other  journals,  not  known 
to  be  under  his  influence,  should  hold  the  most  in 
sulting  language  toward  France  and  its  government. 
These  articles,  inspired  by  Bismarck  and  written 
by  Lothar  Bucher,  were  sent  from  Varzin  to  Busch 
for  publication.2 

1  [Granville  to  Lyons,  July  8,  Blue  Book,  p.  9.    I  have  in  this  one  in 
stance  translated  M.  Ollivier's  French  version  of  Earl  Granville's  despatch; 
the  sense  is  unchanged.] 

2  [''Immediately  on  the  commencement  of  the  difficulties  with  France 
respecting  the  election  to  the  Spanish  throne  of  the  Hereditary  Prince  of 
Hohenzollern,  letters  and  telegrams  began  to  arrive,  which  were  forwarded 
by  Bucher  under  instructions  from  the  Chief.    These  consisted  in  part  of 
short  paragraphs  and  drafts  of  articles,  as  well  as  some  complete  articles 
which  only  required  to  be  retouched  in  the  matter  of  style,  or  to  have  refer 
ences  inserted  with  regard  to  matters  of  fact.  .  .  . 

"July  7,  evening.  —  A  telegram  to  me  from  Varzin:  'The  semi-official 
organs  should  indicate  that  this  does  not  seem  to  be  the  proper  time  for  a 
discussion  of  the  succession  to  the  Spanish  throne,  as  the  Cortes,  who  are 
alone  entitled  to  decide  the  question,  have  not  yet  spoken.  German  gov 
ernments  have  always  respected  Spanish  independence  in  such  matters, 
and  will  do  so  in  future  as  they  have  no  claim  or  authority  to  interf ere  and 


THE  SECRET  DIVULGED  AT  PARIS     61 

All  these  manoeuvres,  as  Ottokar  Lorenz  admits,1 
placed  Gramont  in  an  extremely  embarrassing  position : 

lay  down  regulations  for  the  Spaniards.  Then,  in  the  non-official  press, 
great  surprise  should  be  expressed  at  the  presumption  of  the  French,  who 
have  discussed  the  question  very  fully  in  the  Chamber,  speaking  as  if  that 
assembly  had  a  right  to  dispose  of  the  Spanish  throne,  and  apparently  for 
getting  that  such  a  course  was  as  offensive  to  Spanish  national  pride  as  it 
was  conducive  to  the  encouragement  of  republican  tendencies.  ...  It 
would  appear  as  if  the  Emperor,  who  has  instigated  this  action,  wanted  to 
see  the  outbreak  of  a  new  war  of  succession.* 

"  A  letter  from  Bucher,  which  was  handed  to  me  on  the  evening  of  the 
8th,  further  developed  the  idea  contained  in  the  last  sentence.  ...  *  Pre 
vious  to  1868  Eugenie  was  pleased  to  play  the  part  of  an  obedient  subject 
of  Isabella,  and  since  the  September  revolution  that  of  a  gracious  pro 
tectress.  She  unquestionably  arranged  the  farce  of  the  abdication  [of 
Isabella],  and  now,  in  her  rage,  she  incites  her  consort  and  the  ministers. 
As  a  member  of  a  Spanish  party,  she  would  sacrifice  the  peace  and  welfare 
of  Europe  to  the  intrigues  and  aspirations  of  a  corrupt  dynasty. 

"  *  Please  see  that  this  theme,  a  new  war  of  succession  in  the  nineteenth 
century,  is  thoroughly  threshed  out  in  the  press.  The  subject  is  inviting, 
especially  in  the  hands  of  a  correspondent  disposed  to  draw  historical 
parallels,  and  more  particularly  parallels  ex  averso.  Have  not  the  French 
had  experience  enough  of  Spain  with  Louis  XIV  and  Napoleon?  .  .  . 
Have  they  not  excited  sufficient  hatred  by  all  those  wars  and  by  the  Spanish 
marriage  of  1846  ? 

"  *  Bring  personal  influence  to  bear  ...  on  the  editors  who  have  been 
intimidated  by  the  Stock  Exchange,  representing  to  them  that  if  the  Ger 
man  press  takes  up  a  timid  and  hesitating  attitude  in  presence  of  the  rhodo- 
montades  of  the  French,  the  latter  will  become  more  insolent  and  put  for 
ward  intolerable  demands  in  other  questions  affecting  Germany  still  more 
closely.'  .  .  . 

"  The  following  was  a  third  subject  received  from  Varzin  on  the  same 
day :  *  Is  Spain  to  inquire  submissively  at  the  Tuileries  whether  the  King 
whom  she  desires  to  take  is  considered  satisfactory  ?  Is  the  Spanish  throne 
a  French  dependency  ?  .  .  .  In  France,  where  on  other  occasions  so  much 
is  said  of  national  independence,  the  attempt  of  the  Spanish  people  to 
decide  for  themselves  has  immediately  revived  the  old  diplomatic  traditions 
which  led  to  the  Spanish  war  of  succession  160  years  ago/  " 

Busch,  Bismarck:  Some  Secret  Pages  of  his  History,  vol.  i,  pp.  26-28.] 

1  Whenever  it  is  possible,  I  shall  allow  the  Germans  themselves  to  pass 
judgment  on  the  facts  I  shall  narrate.  [Note  of  M.  Ollivier.] 


62          THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

whatever  happened,  the  Empire  was  driven,  by  the 
attitude  of  Prussia,  to  the  brink  of  the  precipice.  The 
observation  is  true :  at  our  first  step  in  the  negotiation 
we  were  stopped  short.  At  Madrid  as  at  Berlin  we 
were  told  that  no  heed  would  be  paid  to  our  obser 
vations.  At  Madrid,  they  went  forward  as  if  we 
had  said  nothing;  at  Berlin  they  shut  the  door  in 
our  face  and  mocked  at  us.  How  then  could  we 
avoid  falling  into  the  pit  that  Bismarck  had  dug  before 
our  feet  ? 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  HOHENZOLLERN  CANDIDACY  AROUSES  INDIGNATION 
IN  FEANCE  AND  REPROBATION  IN  EUROPE 

WHAT  made  our  deliberations  more  difficult  was 
the  fact  that  the  walls  of  our  offices  were  assailed 
by  a  storm  of  indignation  which  demanded  extreme 
measures  on  our  part.  Public  opinion,  much  less  in 
control  of  its  feelings  than  we  were  of  ours,  manifested 
once  more  the  prominent  feature  of  our  character, 
which  has  been  noted  by  observers  of  all  times.  "The 
decisions  of  the  Gauls  are  sudden  and  unforseen, 
and  they  resolve  hastily  upon  war  (mobiliter  et  celeritev)" 
wrote  Julius  Caesar.  "We  are  a  volcanic  nation," 
says  Dumouriez. 

On  July  4,  in  the  niorning,  there  occurred  one  of 
these  sudden,  irresistible,  volcanic  explosions..  The 
foreign  ambassadors,,  unmoved  and  watchful  ob 
servers,  noted  it.  "When  the  news  of  the  acceptance 
by  Prince  Hohenzollern  of  the  nomination  to  the 
Spanish  throne  reached  Paris,"  wrote  Metternich, 
"it  caused  very  sudden  and  very  intense  excitement. 
Men  saw  in  it  a  scheme  devised  by  Marshal  Prim  and 
Prussia."  l 

Lyons  was  more  emphatic.  "Without  considering 
how  far  the  real  interests  of  France  may  be  in  question, 
the  nation  has  taken  the  proposal  to  place  the  Prince 
of  Hohenzollern  on  the  throne  of  Spain  as  an  insult 
and  a  challenge  from  Prussia.  ...  [I  observed  that] 

1  Metternich  to  Beust,  July  15. 


64          THE  FRANCO-PEUSSIAN  WAR 

we  could  not  shut  our  eyes  to  the  fact  that  the 
feelings  of  the  French  nation  would  now  render  it  im 
possible  for  the  government,  even  if  they  wished  it, 
to  acquiesce  in  the  elevation  of  Prince  Leopold  to 
the  Spanish  throne.'*1 

And  Taxile  Delord,  in  his  "History  of  the  Second 
Empire/'  rather  a  political  pamphlet  than  a  history, 
says:  "This  possibility  was  too  menacing  to  the 
interests  of  France,  for  her  government  to  neglect 
to  use  its  utmost  efforts  to  secure  the  renunciation 
of  the  candidacy  of  Prince  Leopold  of  Hohenzollern."  2 

There  was  not  a  politician,  not  a  military  man,  who 
did  not  express  aloud  his  condemnation  of  the  Prussian 
enterprise.  Marshal  Vaillant  wrote  in  his  note 
book  July  5:  "We  learn  that  Prim  has  offered  the 
Spanish  throne  to  the  Prussian  Prince  of  Hohen 
zollern.  It  seems  to  me  that  this  means  war,  or  some 
thing  very  like  it."  Doudan,  laying  aside  his  jeering 
tone,  exclaimed:  "In  my  opinion  we  could  not  "in 
honor  suffer  the  affront  of  a  Prussian  colonel  reigning 
on  the  other  side  of  the  Pyrenees."3  Jules  Favre 
admitted,  although  the  point  was  open  to  discussion, 
that  the  candidacy  of  the  Hohenzollern  prince  to 
the  throne  of  Spain  might  be  a  casus  belli.4  Jules 
Simon  could  not  see  how  it  was  open  to  discussion. 
"France,"  he  said,  "could  not  without  endangering 
her  security  and  her  dignity,  tolerate  Prince  Leopold's 

1  Lyons  to  Granville,  July  7.    [Blue  Book  (Nos.  10  and  12),  pp.  6  and  9. 
The  last  sentence  is  from  a  conversation  between  Lyons  and  Count  von 
Solms-Sonnewalde,  Prussian  chargg  d'affaires  in  Paris.] 

2  VoL  vi,  p.  128. 

*  Doudan  fo  Piscatory,  July  10.  [Doudan  was  "one  of  the  keenest- 
sighted  observers  of  the  second  Empire,"  according  to  La  Gorce  (vol.  vi, 
p.  229).]  4  Gouvernement  de  la  D&f&nse  Nationale,  vol.  i,  p.  25. 


EFFECT  OF  THE  CANDIDACY  65 

candidacy."1  Thiers  said  that  "France  must  look 
upon  that  candidacy  as  an  affront  to  her  dignity  and 
an  enterprise  adverse  to  her  interests."2  Gambetta 
was  even  more  violent :  he  exclaimed  that  all  French 
men  must  unite  for  a  national  war.3 

The  opinion  of  foreign  statesmen,  at  that  moment 
when  selfish  considerations  did  not  restrain  the  sincere 
expression  of  their  sentiments,  declared  itself  on  all 
sides  as  identical  with  that  of  French  statesmen. 
"It  was  impossible/'  said  Granville  to  the  Spanish 
Ambassador  to  England,  "not  to  have  foreseen  that 
such  a  choice,  secretly  made  and  suddenly  announced 
would  create  great  irritation  in  France."4  He  was 
no  less  explicit  with  his  agent  at  Berlin.  "  The  strict 
secrecy  with  which  these  proceedings  have  been  cop- 
ducted  as  between  the  Spanish  ministry  and  the  prince 
who  has  been  the  object  of  their  choice,  seems  in 
consistent  on  the  part  of  Spain  with  the  spirit  of  friend 
ship  or  the  rules  of  comity  between  nations,  and  has 
given  what  her  Majesty's  government  cannot  but  ad 
mit  to  be,  so  far  as  it  goes,  just  cause  of  offence,  which, 
it  may  perhaps  be  contended,  it  may  be  impossible  to 
remove  so  long  as  the  candidature  of  the  prince  con 
tinues."  5 

Beust,  in  an  interview  with  the  Spanish  minister, 
earnestly  expressed  his  surprise  and  disapproval. 
He  telegraphed  to  his  minister  at  Madrid:  "The 
idea  may  be  excellent  in  itself,  but  its  effect  would  be 
deplorable  and  would  endanger  the  peace  of  Europe." 6 

1  Origine  et  Chute  du  Second  Empire,  p.  159. 

2  Speech  of  July  15.  3  Police  report. 

4  Granville  to  Layard,  July  7.  [Blue  Book,  p.  5.  See  supra,  p.  56,  n.  1. 
Chapter  4.]  5  Granville  to  Loftus,  July  6.  [Blue  Book,  p.  8j 

6  Beust  to  Dubsky,  July  7. 


66          THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR" 

The  excellent  Topete  was  exasperated  with  Prim. 
"What!"  he  said  to  Mercier;  "why,  to  set  about 
insulting  France  in  our  present  condition  is  madness ! 
We  proposed  to  do  something  that  might  not  be  agree 
able  to  the  Emperor,  but  we  were  fully  convinced 
that  everything  could  be  arranged  without  disturbing 
the  relations  between  the  two  countries.  If  necessary, 
I  will  make  my  mea  culpa  before  the  Cortes.  I  will 
say  that  I  repent  of  the  part  I  took  in  the  Revolution, 
and  that  I  go  back  to  Prince  Alfonso." x 

Maria  of  Hohenzollern,  Countess  of  Flanders,  the 
candidate's  sister,  wrote  to  Antony  Radziwill :  "  This 
would  be  a  second  Sadowa;  France  would  not  allow 
it." 2  The  daughter  repeated,  on  the  explosion  of  the 
plot,  what  her  father  had  said  when  it  was  still  in  the 
future :  "France  would  not  allow  it."  Thus  was  the 
French  sentiment  in  some  sort  justified  by  those 
who  had  aroused  it. 

The  Czar,  who  did  not  as  yet  fathom  the  full  scope 
of  his  ally's  purpose,  avowed  to  General  Fleury,  in 
the  first  impulse  of  sincerity,  that  he  realized  how 
offensive  the  offer  of  the  throne  to  the  Prince  of  Hohen 
zollern  was  to  France,  and  that,  however  insignificant 
the  candidate,  he  would  none  the  less  become  a  battle- 
flag  for  Prussia  at  a  given  moment.3 

The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  at  The  Hague, 
Roest  van  Limburg,  when  the  Spanish  Ambassador 
told  him  the  news,  "remarked  that  the  choice  appeared 

1  Mercier  to  Gramont,  July  4.    [Admiral  Topete  de  Caballo  was  one  of 
the  triumvirate  who  divided  the  power  in  Spain  after  the  fall  of  Isabella.] 

2  This  fact  is  told  by  King  William  to  Queen  Augusta  in  a  letter  of  July  5 
printed  by  Oncken  [Unser  helder  Kaiser]. 

3  Fleury  to  Gramont,  July  9. 


EFFECT  OF  THE  CANDIDACY          67 

to  be  very  unacceptable  to  the  French  government."  * 
And  the  Spanish  minister  at  Berlin  himself  admitted 
that  our  dissatisfaction  was  justified.2 

In  Southern  Germany  Bismarck  was  unanimously 
regarded  as  the  inventor  of  this  unlooked-for  candi 
dacy;  it  was  believed  that  Marshal  Prim  had  been 
bought  for  hard  cash  by  the  Prussian  minister,  who 
drew,  for  all  transactions  of  this  sort,  upon  the  funds 
derived  from  the  sequestrated  fortune  of  the  King  of 
Hanover.  Even  in  the  Confederation  of  the  North, 
the  Saxon  minister  considered  our  grievance  well 
founded.  He  did  not  hesitate  to  say  that  the  fact  in 
itself,  and  the  mystery  with  which  it  was  surrounded, 
were  of  a  nature  to  arouse,  on  our  part,  a  just  sense 
of  injury,  and  that  France  was  entitled  to  be  displeased ; 
the  demand  of  France  was,  in  fact,  in  conformity 
with  the  precedents  of  European  international  law. 
Although  in  his  eyes  the  accession  of  a  Hohenzollern 
to  the  throne  of  Spain  seemed  unlikely  to  cause  any 
danger  whatever  to  the  interest  of  France,  he  none 
the  less  recognized  the  fact  that  it  was  for  us  to  deter 
mine  and  measure  the  importance  of  that  eventuality. 
He  added  that,  "by  invoking  the  sanction  of  a  doc 
trine  already  accepted  and  confirmed  several  times 
by  the  great  powers  of  Europe,  the  Emperor's  govern 
ment  justified  its  resistance  to  the  plan  of  the  Spanish 
government,  and  gave  proof  of  its  desire  for  concilia 
tion."  * 

The  newspapers  reflected  these  opinions  of  states- 

1  Vice- Admiral  Harris  to  Granville,  July  11.    [Blue  Boole,  p.  24  J 

2  Lesourd  to  Gramont,  July  5.    [See  Gramont,  La  France  et  la  Prusse, 
p.  30.] 

8  Ch&teaurenard  to  Gramont,  July  9-10. 


68  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

men  with  unrestrained  vehemence.  "The  press,'5 
said  Thiers,  "is  the  voice  .of  the  nation." l  If  the  press 
is  in  truth  the  voice  of  a  nation,  never  did  nation 
express  its  feelings  more  unmistakably.  Nor  could 
any  one  say  that  we  were  responsible  for  it,  for,  save 
the  Constitutionnel,  our  official  organ,2  we  had  no 
influence  over  any  of  the  journals.  How  much  more 
impressive  would  be  this  stirring  of  the  country's 
heart,  of  which  the  press  was  then  the  outward  expres 
sion,  if  we  could  reproduce  the  words  that  were  ex 
changed  in  the  public  squares,  in  salons,  and  in  work 
shops  !  Public  opinion  had  already  gone  beyond  the 
last  stages  of  submission. 

JL  note  this  state  of  public  opinion  with  the  more 
freedom  because  I  have  no  purpose  of  invoking  it 
to  evade  my  own  responsibility.  Public  opinion 

1  In  a  speech  in  1868.    [In  vol.  xiv,  pp.  41-48  and  notes,  M.  Oliivier 
quotes  many  passages  from  the  Parisian  press  in  support  of  his  thesis.] 

2  "Of  all  the  newspapers  whose  opinions  I  have  reproduced,  there  was 
not  one  which  could  have  been  called  'governmental.'    The  only  one 
which  could  possibly  be  so  described  was  the  Constitutionnel,  which  its  owner, 
Gibiat,  had  placed  at  our  disposal,  and  whose  editor-in-chief,  my  friend 
Mitchell,  was  devoted  to  a  pacific  policy  from  conviction.    The  Patrie 
ordinarily  supported  us,  but  with  less  zeal  since  it  had  pronounced  against 
the  plebiscite,  and  its  editor  Saint- Valry  had  not  our  confidence.    In  the 
other  papers  there  were  some  men  with  whom  I  was  on  friendly  terms,  like 
Dalloz  of  the  Moniteur  Univ&rsel,  Pessard  of  the  Gaulois,  and  even  Nef ttzer 
of  the  Temps  and  Herve  of  the  Journal  de  Paris,  who,  despite  their  good 
will,  were  not  by  any  means  in  love  with  my  policy  and  followed  individual 
opinions  over  which  I  possessed  no  influence.    I  was  not  in  accord  on  the 
question  of  peace  or  war  with  [Emile  de]  Girardin  —  a  true  .friend  he,  whose 
devotion  I  had  tested.    He  had  just  given  over  the  Libert^  to  his  nephew 
by  marriage,  L6once  Detroyat,  a  former  naval  officer,  a  man  of  heart  and 
intelligence,  whom  I  hardly  knew ;  he  [Girardin]  had  reserved  the  right  to 
express  his  own  opinion  in  the  paper  when  he  chose,  and  that  opinion, 
whenever  foreign  affairs  were  in  question,  would  continue  to  be  opposed  to 
mine."    ISEmpire  Lib&ral,  vol.  xiv,  p.  48. 


EFFECT  OF  THE  CANDIDACY  69 

should  be  the  rule  and  the  law  of  a  constitutional 
sovereign,  as  he  is  irremovable,  and  as  his  abdication 
would  be  a  worse  evil  than  an  ill-advised  political 
measure;  moreover,  as  the  last  word  must  belong  to 
the  nation  and  not  to  him,  he  is  constrained  to  yield 
to  the  national  demand,  even  though  it  be  not  in 
conformity  with  his  personal  views.  As  ministers 
are  removable,  and  as  the  stability  of  the  state  does 
not  depend  upon  their  remaining  in  power,  they  are 
not  to  be  excused  for  yielding  to  the  wishes  of  public 
opinion  unless  they  deem  those  wishes  just  and  reason 
able.  If  they  disapprove  them,  it  is  their  duty  to 
oppose  them,  especially  as  such  opposition  will  perhaps 
set  them  right. 

The  justification  of  the  Emperor  Napoleon  III  is 
complete  the  moment  it  is  established  —  and  the 
evidence  is  overwhelming  —  that  he  opposed  the 
Hohenzollern  candidacy  at  all  risks  because  an  al 
most  unanimous  public  opinion  compelled  him  to  do 
it.  But  the  justification  of  his  ministers  is  not  even 
suggested  by  such  demonstration.  It  remains  for 
them  to  prove  that  public  opinon  was  right  in  exercis 
ing  that  compulsion  upon  the  Emperor.  If  it  was  in 
error,  their  duty  constrained  them  to  controvert  it, 
to  declare  open  war  upon  it,  and,  if  they  did  not  suc 
ceed  in  overcoming  it,  to  retire  and  to  leave  to  others 
the  melancholy  privilege  of  consummating  an  act 
of  madness. 

What  importance  should  have  been  attached  to  the 
fact  of  a  German  prince  taking  his  seat  on  the  throne 
of  Spain  ?  Was  it  a  fact  devoid  of  menace  so  far  as 
we  were  concerned,  and  without  advantage  to  Prussia, 
and  did  we,  by  raising  a  great  outcry  over  that  pos- 


70  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

sibility,  make,  as  Scherr  says,  an  elephant  out  of  a 
flea  ?  That  is  the  question  that  we  considered,  Gramont 
and  I,  in  a  few  hours,  which,  because  of  the  intensity 
of  our  mental  toil,  were  equivalent  to  many  long  days.1 

We  reached  this  conclusion :  that  the  press  and  the 
public  opinion  of  France  were  not  in  error  and  were 
not  simply  yielding  to  a  heedless  impulse  of  Chauvin 
ism  by  proclaiming  their  wrath  against  the  Prussian 
candidacy,  but  that  they  were  in  error  when,  alleging 
an  intimate  connection  between  that  candidacy  and 
the  events  of  1866,  they  repelled  it  as  the  last  drop, 
insignificant  in  itself,  but  formidable  only  because  it 
falls  into  a  vessel  already  full  to  the  brim;  it  was  a 
flood  more  than  sufficient  in  itself  to  fill  an  empty 
vessel.  Even  if  there  had  been  no  shadow  between 
Prussia  and  ourselves,  if  our  relations  since  Sadowa 
had  been  affectionate  and  trustful,  that  candidacy 
would  none  the  less  have  retained  its  threatening 
character.  We  did  not  therefore  "take  a  flea  for  an 
elephant/*  and  we  did  not  manufacture  phantoms  when 
we  looked  upon  a  Hohenzollern  at  Madrid  as  a  serious 
menace  to  our  safety. 

We  decided  that  we  would  not  associate  ourselves 
with  those  who  saw  in  the  Hohenzollern  affair  simply  a 
pretext  for  making  up  for  our  inaction  in  1866,  for 
taking  our  revenge  for  Sadowa,  and  for  blocking  the 
ulterior  developments  of  the  Prussian  victory;  but 

1  [At  this  point,  in  Ms  larger  work  M.  Ollivier  discusses  the  principles  of 
international  law  applicable  to  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy,  and,  in  con 
nection  therewith,  the  different  cases  of  recent  occurrence  in  which  similar 
questions  had  arisen.  He  also  considers  at  some  length  the  question  whether, 
irrespective  of  precedents,  it  would  have  been  expedient,  in  this  instance, 
for  France  to  allow  Prince  Leopold  to  ascend  the  Spanish  throne  without 
objection.  See  Appendix  FJ 


EFFECT  OF  THE  CANDIDACY  71 

that,  on  the  other  hand,  we  would  second  with  all  our 
might  resistance  to  a  candidacy  which  was  at  once  a 
challenge  and  a  danger. 

Gramont,  had  he  been  free  to  follow  his  private 
inclinations  as  a  diplomat  of  the  old  school,  would  not 
have  been  averse  to  generalizing  the  dispute,  instead 
of  confining  it  strictly  to  a  particular  question;  but 
he  would  have  done  it  at  the  cost  of  an  immediate 
rupture  with  me,  for  I  would  never  have  agreed  to 
become  the  foe  of  that  principle  of  nationalities  which 
I  had  championed  for  so  many  years.  And  in  the 
event  of  a  rupture,  the  advantage  would  not  have  been 
with  him,  for  I  had  explained  to  him,  before  we  took 
up  the  government,  my  policy  of  friendly  abstention 
with  respect  to  the  Germanic  movement,  and  he  had 
acceded  to  it.  As  he  was  loyal,  he  did  not  try  to  go 
back  on  that  agreement,  and  it  was  fully  understood, 
that,  whatever  those  about  us  might  say,  there  should 
never  be  any  question  of  Sadowa  and  its  results,  but 
solely  of  the  candidacy  and  its  impossibility.  We 
agreed  even  more  readily  on  the  methods  to  be  em 
ployed  against  it:  they  were  to  be  only  those  which 
had  been  sanctioned  by  international  law  as  then  in 
force,  and  which  Prussia  herself,  since  1815,  had,  in 
concert  with  the  other  powers,  helped  to  establish.  To 
be  rid  of  the  candidacy,  we  would  not  apply  to  Spain, 
but  to  Prussia. 

Gramont  and  myself  submitted  to  the  Emperor  the 
conclusions  at  which  we  had  arrived.  He  approved 
of  them  absolutely,  without  any  objection,  and  au 
thorized  us  to  put  them  in  execution  at  once. 


CHAPTER  VI 

OUR    INABILITY  TO   NEGOTIATE  —  OUR    PERPLEXITY 

THE  aggression  being  manifest,  we  tad  the  right, 
without  a  word,  to  recall  our  reserves,  to  despatch 
them  to  the  frontier,  and,  when  they  had  concentrated 
there,  to  announce  the  beginning  of  hostilities  by  a 
flag  of  truce  sent  to  the  outposts.  We  gave  a  striking 
proof  of  our  moderation  by  not  making  use  of  our 
undeniable  privilege  of  immediate  reprisals.  We  did 
more :  instead  of  discussing  the  course  to  be  pursued 
in  case  the  Hohenzollern  should  actually  become  King 
of  Spain,  we  tried  to  prevent  him  from  becoming  so. 
We  determined  to  defeat  the  plot  and  to  avoid  war  by 
diplomatic  negotiations. 

We  encountered  much  incredulity  in  the  experienced 
men  to  whom  we  confided  our  purpose.  However,  we 
persisted  in  our  determination  to  negotiate,  without 
knowing  just  how.  Gramont  and  I  had  expounded  the 
rules  of  international  law ;  the  Emperor  had  approved 
our  theoretical  conclusions ;  but  that  carried  us  a  very 
short  distance.  It  remained  to  discover  the  way  to 
avoid  falling  over  the  precipice  to  whose  brink  Prim's 
haste  and  Thile's  persiflage  had  driven  us. 

On  the  5th,  at  ten  in  the  morning,  the  Emperor  sum 
moned  us  —  Gramont  and  myself  —  to  Saint-Cloud, 
for  consultation.  If  we  had  sought  simply  a  pretext 
for  war,  the  conversation  would  have  been  very  short ; 
we  had  that  pretext  at  hand,  and  to  make  use  of  it 
would  not  have  been  difficult.  But  although  we  were 

72 


OUR  INABILITY  TO  NEGOTIATE         73 

resolved  to  forbid  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy,  even  at 
the  cost  of  war,  we  were  passionately  desirous  that  it 
should  disappear  without  war. 

Beust,  whose  prudence  had  been  highly  praised  to  us, 
proposed  a  most  original  plan :  let  the  French  govern 
ment  declare  that,  being  offended  by  Prussia's  action, 
it  could  do  no  less  than  forbid  Prince  Leopold  to  pass 
over  its  territory  on  his  way  to  Madrid.  Being  unable 
to  go  through  France,  the  prince-candidate  would 
necessarily  embark  either  on  the  Mediterranean  or  on 
the  North  Sea.  Then  let  the  French  government, 
being  on  the  alert  and  informed  by  its  agents,  cause 
the  vessel  bearing  the  Prince  to  be  attacked  at  sea, 
and  thus  obtain  possession  of  the  corpus  delicti.  After 
that,  they  could  negotiate  and  would  speedily  reach  an 
understanding ;  for  it  went  without  saying  that  Prussia 
would  find  it  a  very  simple  affair,  and  the  incident 
would  be  at  an  end. 

I  need  not  say  that  we  did  not  discuss  this  comic- 
opera  plot,  in  which  the  lover  of  practical  jokes  is 
easily  recognized.1 

Others  advised  us  to  announce  simply  that,  in  case 
the  Hohenzollern  should  be  elected,  we  should  with 
draw  our  ambassador,  espouse  the  cause  of  the  rejected 
pretenders,  and  allow  Carlists  and  Alphonsists,  horses, 
guns,  and  powder,  to  enter  Spain  across  the  open  fron 
tier. 

Such  tortuous  tactics  were  not  to  our  liking;  we 
considered  them  degrading.  Moreover,  they  had  the 
disadvantage  of  making  the  affair  a  Spanish  one, 
which  we  did  not  want,  because  Bismarck  did  want  it. 
Nor,  indeed,  would  Leopold's  government  have  looked 

1  [See  P.  Leliautcourt,  Histoire  de  la  Guerre  de  1870-1871,  vol.  i,  p.  248,  n,  3.] 


74  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

dumbly  on  at  our  manoeuvres;  it  would  have  com 
plained,  would  have  called  upon  us  to  put  an  end  to 
them,  and  would  have  met  hostilities  with  hostilities. 
In  that  conflict  Prussia  would  have  intervened,  and  we 
should  have  found  ourselves  at  war  with  Spain  and 
Germany  united. 

The  only  plan  that  we  discussed  seriously  was  that 
of  a  conference  of  the  powers.  If,  before  July  20, 
when  the  Cortes  were  to  assemble,  we  had  been  able 
to  convoke  a  conference,  we  should  certainly  have 
adopted  that  plan;  for  the  first  act  of  the  powers 
would  have  been  to  demand  from  Spain  a  postpone 
ment  of  the  date  of  the  election,  thus  giving  us  time 
to  turn  round.  But  Spain  and  Prussia  would  have 
refused  at  the  outset  to  agree  to  a  conference.  Spain 
would  have  invoked  her  right  as  an  independent  nation 
to  govern  herself  as  she  saw  fit,  and  Prussia  would 
have  supported  her  the  more  earnestly  because  she 
had  always  repelled  the  interference  of  Europe  in  the 
internal  affairs  of  Germany.  The  other  powers  would, 
before  ente'ring  into  any  engagements,  have  discussed 
the  programme  to  be  submitted  to  the  plenipotentiaries, 
whence  exchange  of  notes  and  despatches  and  dupli 
cates  and  triplicates,  and  days  and  days  absolutely 
wasted.  And  while  all  that  scribbling  was  being  done 
to  no  purpose,  the  20th  of  July  would  have  arrived, 
and,  as  Prim  -was  pushing  his  affair  with  all  his  force, 
we  should  have  learned  at  one  and  the  same  time  that 
the  Cortes  had  elected  the  Prussian  aspirant,  and  that 
he,  overflowing  with  gratitude  and  zeal,  had  taken 
possession  without  delay  of  his  new  realm.  And  by 
this  process,  as  by  the  others,  the  affair  would  have 
become  Spanish,  and  we  should  have  been  placed 


OUR  INABILITY  TO  NEGOTIATE         75 

between  an  impossible  submission  and  war  against 
Spain  and  Prussia  united.  There  was  no  one  who  did 
not  realize  this.  Metternich  said  as  much  to  Gramont : 
"If  Prince  Leopold  arrives  in  Spain  and  is  proclaimed 
there,  then  it  will  be  Spain  that  you  will  have  to  make 
war  on." 

And  so,  in  whatever  direction  we  turned,  we  fell 
always  into  the  abyss.  We  were,  at  this  point,  per 
plexed  and  anxious,  when  suddenly  a  gleam  of  light 
passed  through  my  mind.  I  recalled  that  on  May  3, 
1866,  on  the  eve  of  the  war  between  Prussia  and 
Austria,  Thiers  had  said:  "What  course*  then,  should 
be  followed  with  regard  to  the  power  that  threatens 
the  peace  of  Europe?  I  do  not  bid  you  to  declare 
war  on  her.  But  is  there  no  other  way  to  make  her 
confess  the  truth?  I  propose  to  consider  all  the 
methods,  from  the  harshest  to  the  mildest,  and  it 
seems  to  me  that  there  is  not  one  which  should  not  be 
successful.  I  do  not  advise  the  harshest,  but  I  know 
governments  that  would  have  resorted  to  it.  In  truth, 
when  one  desires  what  is  just  and  right,  one  can  afford 
to  be  plainspoJcen ;  and  what  could  be  fairer,  for  in 
stance,  than  to  say  to  Prussia :  *  You  are  threatening 
the  equilibrium  of  Europe,  you  are  threatening  the 
peace  of  the  whole  world;  it  is  well  known  that  you 
alone  are  responsible,  and  not  Austria.  Very  good  t 
we  will  not  endure  it !'"  And  recently,  in  the  debate 
of  June,  1870,  he  had  recurred  to  the  same  idea: 
"We  might  have  spared  Europe  that  disaster  [Sadowa], 
and  a  word  would  have  been  enough." 

"Good!"  I  exclaimed  to  myself,  "there  is  our 
course  all  marked  out.  Let  us  utter  that  word  which 
Thiers  blames  the  Emperor  for  not  uttering  to  pre- 


76  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

vent  the  war  of  1866.  We  cannot  adopt  the  mild 
form,  for  that  would  necessitate  a  conversation,  and 
that  they  refuse  to  allow.  Let  us  not  adopt  the  harsh 
form  either,  but  let  us  hold  to  the  firm,  decided  form. 
Our  cause  is  just;  let  us  say  frankly  what  we  will 
not  allow.  If  we  had  no  one  to  deal  with  but  Bis 
marck,  Prim,  and  Leopold  of  Hohenzollern,  that  word 
would  be  unavailing,  and  we  should  be  forced  into  war 
none  the  less;  for  it  is  not  supposable  that  either  of 
the  three  conspirators  will  fail  to  keep  his  agreement 
with  the  others.  But  beside  Bismarck  there  is  the 
King,  who,  according  to  our  information,  has  em 
barked  reluctantly  in  this  adventure;  beside  Prim 
there  is  Serrano,  who  is  well-disposed  toward  us,  and 
will  not  be  sorry  to  play  a  trick  on  his  mayor  of  the 
palace ;  beside  Prince  Leopold,  there  is  Prince  Antony, 
a  very  prudent  man  and  easily  alarmed.  Outside  of 
the  powers  immediately  interested  there  is  Russia, 
whose  Tsar  is  emphatically  desirous  of  peace,  being 
convinced  that  war  would  unchain  the  revolution,  his 
nightmare;  there  is  England,  whose  ministers  are 
opposed  on  principle  to  every  warlike  commotion. 
Tsar  and  ministers  would  perhaps  rouse  themselves 
from  the  supine  attitude  of  indifferent  observers  if 
they  should  see  the  possibility  of  a  conflict  which  they 
dread  staring  them  in  the  face.  And  thereupon  the 
negotiations,  official  or  non-official,  which  are  now 
denied  us  might  be  entered  into.  Since  we  are  refused 
a  diplomatic  t£te-a-t£te,  we  have  no  other  resource 
than  to  proclaim  from  the  tribune  to  the  two  con 
spirator  powers  what  one  does  not  choose  to  under 
stand  and  the  other  does  not  choose  to  hear,  and  to 
awaken  a  benumbed  Europe," 


OUR  INABILITY  TO  NEGOTIATE        77 

Gramont  immediately  entered  into  my  idea,  and 
found  in  his  memory  as  a  diplomatist  examples  of  dec 
larations  which,  in  similar  cases,  had  by  their  vigorous 
tone,  ensured  peace.1  The  Emperor  instructed  him  to 
prepare  a  declaration  to  be  submitted  to  the  next 
day's  Council,  for  our  colleagues'  approval. 

On  July  5,  about  two  o'clock,  Cochery,  a  deputy  of 
the  Left  Centre,  was  proceeding  quietly  to  the  session 
of  the  Corps  Legislatif.  Thiers,  one  of  whose  lieu 
tenants  he  was,  accosted  him  and  called  his  attention 
to  the  gravity  of  the  Spanish  business  and  urged  him 
to  give  notice  of  an  interpellation.2  Cochery  agreed, 

1  [Several  such  examples  are  given  by  M.  Ollivierat  this  point  in  vol.  xiv, 
pp.  89-92 :  the  famous  Don  Pacifico  case,  in  1850,  when  the  relations  between 
France  and  England  became  somewhat  strained,  and  the  more  recent 
Luxembourg  affair,  in  1866.    He  adds]:  "All  English  statesmen,  without 
distinction  of  party,  Palmerston  as  well  as  Disraeli,  agreed  in  declaring  that 
in  1853  a  more  emphatic  firmness  of  language  would  have  halted  Nicholas. 
Lord  Derby  formally  accused  the  ministry  of  deceiving  the  Czar  by  allowing 
him  to  think  that  England  would  never  oppose  with  arms  the  invasion  of 
Turkey." 

2  ["M.  Cochery  sat  on  the  confines  of  the  Left  and  the  Left  Centre,  that 
is  to  say,  in  that  portion  of  the  Chamber  most  hostile  to  the  bare  idea  of 
war.    If  we  are  to  believe  his  subsequent  declaration  (May  9,  1878),  he 
flattered  himself  that  he  could  *  bridle*  the  warlike  policy  by  forcing  it  to 
unmask."    La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  p.  221. 

"M.  Cochery  was  supposed  to  have  M.  Thiers  as  his  Egeria."  Lehaut- 
court,  vol.  i,  p.  226.  This  author  (pp.  224-225)  refers  the  genesis  of  the 
Cochery  interpellation  to  the  unfruitful  attempt  of  the  Marquis  de  Massa 
to  bring  about  an  understanding  between  the  Emperor  and  Thiers,  through 
the  Duchesse  de  Mouchy,  as  related  by  M,  Ollivier  in  a  kter  chapter.  See 
infra,  pp.  153-155.  It  will  be  noticed  that  M.  Ollivier  places  this  inci 
dent  on  July  10-11,  whereas  Lehautcourt,  in  order  to  connect  it  with  the 
Cochery  interpellation,  places  it  about  a  week  earlier  —  July  4.  But  he 
quotes  the  Souv&nirs  of  M.  de  Massa  himself  to  the  effect  that,  while  he 
took  no  notes,  he  thinks  that  it  was  not  previous  to  the  time  when  the 
withdrawal  of  the  candidacy  by  the  candidate's  father  became  known,  that 
is  to  say,  about  July  12. 


78  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

However,  before  handing  it  to  the  President  of  the 
Chamber,  he  sent  two  of  his  colleagues,  Planat  and 
Genton,  to  me,  to  ask  if  I  could  see  any  reason  why 
the  notice  should  not  be  given. 

The  interpellation  was  signed  by  Cochery  and  nine  others. 

"A  deputy  of  the  Left  Centre,  who  showed  himself  that  day  to  be  far  from 
circumspect  as  a  politician,  offered  an  interpellation  'concerning  the  possible 
candidacy  of  a  prince  of  the  Prussian  royal  family  to  the  throne  of  Spain/ 
This  interpellation  was  responsive  to  the  general  trend  of  public  opinion,  but 
it  was  a  serious  mistake.  By  carrying  the  affair  to  the  tribune  for  speech- 
making,  M.  Cochery  and  his  friends  cut  short  all  hope  of  diplomatic  inter 
vention  by  Europe."  Sorel,  vol.  L  p-  64. 

On  this  subject  M.  Ollivier  has  this  to  say  (vol.  xiv,  pp.  94,  95) :]  "The 
enemies  of  'fatal  parliamentarism'  have  accused  Cochery  of  helping  to  create 
in  the  country  the  outburst  of  public  feeling  which  precipitated  the  war,  and 
they  have,  in  some  sense,  held  him  responsible  for  it.  No  accusation  could  be 
more  puerile.  Cochery's  conduct  was  irreproachable,  and  he  is  not  responsi 
ble  for  the  war  either  proximately  or  remotely.  His  interpellation  did  not  dis 
close  a  fact  that  was  previously  unknown :  it  was  the  evidence  and  the  result, 
not  the  cause,  of  the  public  excitement ;  it  was  impossible  that  Parliament 
should  continue  to  be  indifferent  to  a  matter  about  which  the  whole  country 
was  talking,  and  if  there  had  been  no  Parliament,  the  government  would  have 
had  to  explain  itself  by  a  note  hi  the  Journal  Official,  as  it  did  in  1856  and 
1859.  The  terms  of  the  interpellation,  it  is  true,  by  bringing  in  the  *  Prussian 
royal  family/  were  not  inoffensive.  But  how  could  we  have  found  a  form  of 
words  which  would  not  have  betrayed  the  uneasiness  caused  by  the  insolent 
enterprise  ?  Even  if  it  had  been  unseasonable,  the  real  culprit  would  not  be 
Cocnery  who,  before  offering  it,  questioned  the  government ;  but  the  govern 
ment,  which  did  not  decline  to  receive  it,  as  the  rules  of  'fatal  parliamenta 
rism  '  authorized  it  to  do.  In  fact,  some  old  parliamentarians  did  reproach  us 
for  accepting  it  and  applauded  Doudan's  ebullition  on  this  subject :  *  I  imagine 
Desages  learning  that  Marshal  Prim  puts  forward  Prince  Leopold  for  the 
throne  of  Philip  V.  He  would  have  put  the  letter  in  his  pocket  and  have 
meditated  thrice  twenty-four  hours,  waiting  for  news  to  come,  before  making 
the  Chamber  a  confidant  of  his  troubles/  We  should  have  kept  the  unpleas 
ant  news  in  our  pocket  more  than  thrice  twenty-four  hours  if  everybody 
had  not  read  it  at  the  same  time  that  we  did,  in  the  newspapers  of  all  lands. 
The  Havas  Agency  had  spread  it  abroad  during  the  3d,  when  we  ourselves 
learned  of  it.  How  could  we  have  concealed  it  ?  When  we  spoke  from  the 
tribune  the  press  of  the  world  had  been  discussing  it  for  three  days."  [And 
see  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  pp.  £29,  230.] 


OUR  INABILITY  TO  NEGOTIATE        79 

Had  negotiations  been  then  in  progress,  or  had  we 
had  any  hope  of  beginning  negotiations  in  any  direc 
tion,  I  should  have  refused  to  accept  the  interpellation 
and  Cochery  and  his  friends  would  not  have  insisted. 
But  I  had  the  telegram  in  which  Lesourd  advised  us 
of  Thile's  categorical  refusal  to  enter  into  explanations, 
so  there  was  no  objection  to  the  interpellation ;  on  the 
contrary,  it  afforded  us  a  perfectly  natural  means  of 
placing  a  barrier  between  the  Prussian  enterprise  and 
the  date  of  July  20,  and  of  making  from  the  tribune 
the  declaration  on  which  we  had  decided  that  morning. 
Being  thus  authorized,  Cochery  rose  and  declared 
that  he  desired  to  interpellate  the  government  con 
cerning  the  possible  candidacy  of  a  prince  of  the 
reigning  house  of  Prussia  to  the  throne  of  Spain. 
"Instantly  he  was  surrounded  and  congratulated  and 
advised  to  strike  firm  and  hard.  It  may  well  be  said 
that  the  measure  is  full  to  overflowing."  1 

Had  our  preconceived  purpose  really  been  to  attack 
Prussia,  had  our  susceptibility  been  but  a  farce,  and 
our  real  aim  not  to  allow  this  war,  that  we  desired,  to 
escape  us,  how  easy  it  would  have  been  for  us  to  begin 
it  at  that  moment !  Gramont  had  only  to  rise,  after 
Cochery,  and  read  Lesourd's  telegram,  accompanied 
by  an  inflammatory  word  or  two :  general  acclama 
tions  would  have  greeted  his  words,  and  the  decisive 
resolutions  would  have  been  adopted  on  the  spot. 
But  we  held  our  peace. 

That  evening  my  official  reception  was  more  numer 
ously  attended  than  usual.  Nothing  was  talked  of 
but  the  interpellation.  It  was  strongly  approved,  and 
I  was  urged  on  all  sides  to  reply  to  it  in  vigorous  terms. 

1870.] 


80  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAK 

Lyons  having  come,  I  expressed  our  Ideas  to  him  with 
a  freedom  inspired  by  confidence.  That  confidence 
was  absolute.  The  statements  of  many  diplomats  are 
open  to  suspicion,  either  because  they  hear  imperfectly, 
or  because  they  repeat  all  awry.  But  Lyons's  upright 
ness  and  serious-mindedness  were  superior  to  every  test : 
if  one  asked  him  to  forget  a  conversation,  he  was  dumb  ; 
if  one  authorized  him  to  make  use  of  it,  he  would 
repeat  it  almost  word  for  word.  He  was,  like  Walew- 
ski,  one  of  those  men  whose  reports  could  always  be  re 
garded  as  true.  I  felt  bound  to  no  reticence  with  him. 
"You  know,"  I  said  to  him,  "how  little  .opposed  I 
am  to  the  movement  for  the  free  internal  expansion  of 
Germany ;  on  that  account,  I  feel  all  the  more  keenly 
the  unexpected  affront  which  she  seeks  to  put  upon  us, 
and  my  indignation  is  no  less  than  that  of  the  public. 
Be  well  assured,  and  so  inform  your  government,  that 
it  is  impossible  for  us  to  permit  a  Prussian  prince  to 
become  king  of  Spain.  Even  if  we  should  consent, 
the  nation  would  not  go  with  us :  any  cabinet,  any 
government,  which  should  be  so  weak,  would  be  incon 
tinently  overthrown.  I  am  not  disturbed,  because  I 
have  a  firm  hope  that  that  contingency  will  be  avoided ; 
but  be  sure  that,  if  it  should  come  to  pass,  we  would 
not  put  up  with  it."  1 

1  [Lord  Lyons  reported  this  interview  of  July  5  to  Ms  chief  on  July  7, 
In  his  despatch  the  last  sentence  quoted  by  M.  OUivier  is  given  as  a  reply  to 
his  (Lyons's)  urgent  advice  that  the  declaration  to  be  made  on  the  6th  should 
be  moderate  in  tone.  "M.  Ollivier  assured  me  that  it  should  be 
as  mild  as  was  compatible  with  the  necessity  of  satisfying  public  opinion 
in  France.  But,  in  fact,  he  said,  our  language  is  this :  *  We  are  not  uneasy, 
because  we  have  a  firm  hope  that  the  thing  will  not  be  done ;  but  if  it  were 
to  be  done  we  would  not  tolerate  it.' "  Blue  Booh  p-  6.  See  Sorel,  vol.  i,  p.  66, 
for  a  summary  of  a  conversation  between  Gramont  and  Prince  Metternich, 
Austrian  Ambassador  to  France,  on  the  same  day.] 


CHAPTER  VII 

DECLABATION  OF  JULY   6,  1870 

IN  the  morning  of  the  6th,  at  the  Council  of  Minis 
ters,  Gramont  described  what  had  happened.  Dis 
cussion  followed.  We  inquired  first  of  all  concerning 
our  military  and  diplomatic  situation.  That  was  the 
indispensable  preliminary.  In  truth,  there  is  a  sort  of 
pride  which  is  forbidden  to  him  who  has  not  the  strength 
to  maintain  it,  as  there  are  submissions  which  are  dis 
graceful  to  him  who  cannot  invoke  his  weakness  of 
spirit  to  submit  to  them.  At  Olmtitz,  Bismarck  had 
felt  as  bitterly  as  any  Prussian  the  affront  put  upon 
Prussia  by  Schwarzenberg's  insolent  demand;  but 
when  the  minister  of  war  informed  him  that  the  army 
was  not  ready,  he  had  advised  temporary  humility 
until  Prussia  should  be  in  condition  to  take  her  re 
venge,  which  she  did  with  interest  in  1866.1 

Our  first  question,  then,  was :  Is  our  army  ready  ? 
And  we  asked  the  question  for  form's  sake  simply,  for 
not  one  of  us  had  any  doubt  as  to  the  reply.  We  had 
all  followed  the  desultory  discussion  that  had  been  had 
on  the  subject  in  the  Chambers  since  1866,  renewed  at 
least  twice  every  session.  We  had  in  mind  all  of  the 

1  [The  Conference  of  Olmiitz,  between  Prussia,  represented  by  Von 
Manteuffel,  and  Austria,  represented  by  Schwarzenberg,  was  held  in  Novem 
ber,  1850,  under  the  mediation  of  Russia.  It  dealt  principally  with  the  affairs 
of  Schleswig  and  Holstein.  At  that  time  Bismarck  was  simply  an  unofficial 
member  of  the  Prussian  National  Assembly,  but  his  rise  from  the  ranks 
began  very  soon  thereafter.] 

81 


82  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

Emperor's  words  to  the  Chambers:  "Our  completed 
armament,  our  overflowing  magazines  and  arsenals, 
our  trained  reserves,  the  mobile  National  Guard  now 
in  process  of  organization,  our  transformed  fleet,  our 
fortifications  all  in  good  condition,  supply  what  was 
indispensable  to  the  solidification  of  our  power.  The 
constant  aim  of  our  efforts  is  attained;  the  military 
resources  of  France  are  henceforth  on  a  level  with  her 
destiny  in  the  world."  1 

We  recalled  Neil's  assertions :  "I  regard  the  questions 
of  peace  or  war,  which  are  being  agitated  all  about 
us  in  other  lands,  very  philosophically,  because,  if 
war  should  become  necessary,  we  should  be  in  perfect 
shape  to  undergo  it.  ...  To-day,  whether  we  are 
at  peace  or  at  war  is  of  no  consequence  to  the  minister 
of  war;  he  is  always  prepared/'2  And  those  even 
more  significant  words  before  the  committees  of  the 
Senate  and  Corps  Legislatif:  "When  one  has  such 
an  army,  not  to  make  war  is  downright  virtue." 
And  he  had  said,  too:  "In  a  fortnight,  we  would 
have  an  army  of  415,000  men." 

Marshal  Vaillant,  Generals  BourbaM,  Frossard, 
Failly,  and  many  others,  expressed  a  like  confidence. 
Le  Boeuf3  shared  it  absolutely.  Having  no  vain- 

1  January  18, 1867. 

2  L'Empire  Lib&ral,  vol.  xi,  p.  350,  and  vol.  x,  p.  376. 

3  [Marshal  Le  Bceuf  (1809-1888)  had  had  an  honorable  military  record; 
he  became  Minister  of  War  on  the  death  of  Marshal  Niel  in  1869,  and  was,  with 
the  exception  of  Admiral  Rigault  de  Genouilly,  Minister  of  Marine,  the 
only  member  of  the   Rouher   Cabinet  who  retained  his  portfolio  in  the 
ministry  of  January  1.    "Brave,  intelligent,  of  fine  physique,  with  a  frank, 
hearty  manner  which  made  him  popular  in  the  Chamber,  the  new  minister 
combined  a  large  measure  of  frivolity  with  a  profound  love  of  popularity  and 
all  the  tastes  of  the  courtier.    We  have  seen  him  give  his  assent  to  an  in 
comprehensible  reduction  of  the  contingent  force  of  the  army  on  the  very 


DECLARATION  OF  JULY  6,   1870         83 

glory  in  what  concerned  himself,  he  said  to  me,  "I 
am  good  for  only  60,000  men."  On  the  other  hand, 
he  believed  the  army  to  be  capable  of  all  sorts  of 
miracles,  and,  without  dissembling  the  inferiority 
of  its  effective,  to  be  likely  to  furnish  an  additional 
demonstration  of  number  overmatched  by  quality. 
Military  affairs  concerned  the  Emperor  alone: 
he  had  claimed,  and  we  had  not  denied  him,  the  im 
perial  '  privilege  of  regulating  and  superintending 
them,  except  in  the  exclusively  political  department 
relative  to  fixing  the  number  of  troops.  Le  Boeuf 
was  in  error  when  he  spoke  of  presenting  reports  to 
the  Council :  the  Council  asked  him  for  none  and  he 
submitted  none  to  it.1  His  communications  were 

eve  of  the  declaration  of  war.  .  .  .  Surely,  his  share  is  a  heavy  one  in  the 
blunders  which  were  to  be  so  dearly  expiated."  Lehautcourt,  vol.  i,  p.  196. 

"Marshal  Le  Boeuf,  the  Minister  of  War,  —  who,  perhaps,  after  the  Due 
de  Gramont,  holds  the  chief  responsibility  for  the  great  tragedy  which  was 
impending  — "  Walpole,  History  of  Twenty-Jive  Years,  vol.  ii,  p.  496.] 

1  [Le  Boeuf  made  the  "error"  attributed  to  him,  in  his  deposition  before 
the  Committee  of  Inquiry  concerning  the  4th  of  September.  He  then 
testified  that  he  said  in  the  Council  of  July  6 :  "  The  mobilization  of  the  active 
army  would  cover  perhaps  350,000  men ;  but,  in  order  not  to  commit  myself 
too  far  in  so  serious  a  matter,  I  will  promise  only  300,000.  .  .  .  I  have  strong 
hopes  that  within  a  fortnight  we  shall  have  250,000  sufficiently  organized. 
...  To  assemble  300,000, 1  think  that  we  shall  need  at  least  three  weeks," 
See  Sorel,  vol.  i,  p.  73 ;  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  p.  226. 

M,  Ollivier  supports  his  statement  in  the  text  by  a  letter  from  his  col 
league,  M.  Segris,  dated  Feb.  14,  1873 :]  "Never,  to  my  knowledge,  did  the 
marshal  read  or  exhibit  to  us  any  figures.  .  .  .  But  I  do  say  this,  that  at  the 
last  moment,  when  we  abandoned  the  decision  which  we  had  formed  at 
quarter  to  six  in  the  afternoon  of  the  12th,  and  which  postponed  the  declara 
tion,  of  war,  the  marshal,  in  reply  to  a  question  from  me,  did  not  say  simply, 
*  We  are  ready/  but  added  that  'France  would  never  have  such  a  chance  to 
settle  her  quarrel  with  Prussia.' "  IS  Empire  Liberal,  vol.  xiv,  p,  99. 

[For  Le  Boeuf  s  further  testimony  before  the  Committee  of  Inquiry,  etc.f 
as  to  his  reasons  for  believing  in  the  success  of  France  despite  her  probable 
inferiority  in  numbers,  see  Sorel,  uH  sup. 


84          THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

made  to  the  Emperor  alone ;  It  was  with  the  Emperor 
alone  that  he  discussed  them ;  and  it  was  in  one  of 
them  that  he  said,  "We  are  stronger  than  the  Prussians 
an  a  peace  footing  and  on  a  war  footing"  The  Council 
simply  asked  him :  "Marshal,  you  promised  us  that  if 
war  should  come,  you  would  be  ready.  Are  you  ? " 
The  marshal  did  not  say,  like  an  absurd  braggart, 
and  with  a  show  of  marking,  the  stages  of  our 
march  on  Berlin,1  that  the  war  would  be  simply  a 
military  promenade;  on  the  contrary,  he  said  that 
it  would  be  a  hard  struggle,  but  that,  being  inevitable 
sooner  or  later,  since  they  offered  us  an  opportunity, 
we  could  face  it  without  fear.  The  army  was  in  ad 
mirable  trim:  disciplined,  well-drilled,  and  brave; 
its  musket  far  superior  to  the  Prussian  musket;  its 
artillery  commanded  by  a  picked  corps  of  officers; 
and  our  mitrailleuses.,  of  which  the  Prussians  had  none, 
would  have  as  terrible  an  effect  as  our  muskets.  The 
mobilization  and  concentration  could  be  effected 
rapidly  according  to  Marshal  Neil's  plan.  And  if 
we  acted  with  decision  and  without  wasting  time, 
we  should  surprise  the  Prussians  in  the  midst  of  their 
preparations,  by  an  energetic  offensive  movement. 
At  the  outset  we  could  deal  one  of  these  fortunate 
strokes  which  exalt  the  morale  of  an  army,  double 
its  force,  and  are  a  pledge  of  its  ultimate  success. 
Chevandier,  who  was  quite  familiar  with  the  Prussian 
organization,  doubted  whether  we  were  in  a  position 
to  anticipate  them  in  offensive  action.  Le  Boeuf 

Lehautcourt,  vol.  i,  p.  231,  gives  the  memorandum  of  the  forces  of  the 
Empire,  said  to  have  been  handed  by  Le  Boeuf  to  the  Emperor,  on  July  6, 
at  the  latter's  request.] 

1  This  remark  has  been  falsely  attributed  to  him,  as  have  many  others. 


DECLARATION  OF  JULY  6,  1870         85 

replied  that,  thanks  to  the  superiority  of  our  peace 
footing,  it  was  perfectly  possible,  and  he  repeated 
to  us,  what  he  constantly  declared  to  every  one  who 
questioned  him,  as  MacMahon  bears  witness,1  that 
"the  French  army,  even  though  inferior  in  number, 
would  whip  the  enemy/5 

His  official  staff  held  the  same  language.  During 
the  stormy  sessions  of  the  Chamber,  my  brother 
happened  to  meet  Le  Boeuf's  secretary,  Clermont- 
Tonnerre,  in  the  lobby,  and  expressed  to  him  his 
anxiety.  "Don't  be  disturbed,"  that  gallant  officer 
replied;  "I  was  with  the  Prussian  army  in  1866"; 
and  he  added,  outlining  a  triangle  on  his  palm,  "as 
sure  as  that's  a  triangle,  we  shall  whip  them." 

Admiral  Rigault  de  Genouilly,  Minister  of  the 
Marine,  was  no  less  convinced  of  the  strength  of  the 
French  army.  "Never,"  he  said,  "have  I  believed 
in  any  institution  as  I  believe  in  our  army." 

The  starting-point  of  our  deliberations,  therefore, 
was  that  our  army  was  ready,  and  in  condition  to 
win.  Next  we  took  up  the  question  of  alliances. 
We  were  all  in  favor,  especially  the  Emperor  arid 
myself,  of  maintaining  a  firm  friendship  with  England. 
But,  at  that  conjuncture,  we  could  expect  no  material 
aid  from  her,  because  we  had  nothing  to  offer  her. 
On  the  other  hand,  we  had  something  to  offer  to  Italy, 
Austria,  and  Russia.  To  Italy,  evacuation  of  the 
Papal  States  and  an  opportunity  to  prove  her  gratitude 
to  us  for  services  rendered;  to  Austria,  revenge  for 
Sadowa;  to  Russia,  revision  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris. 

We  had  no  doubt  of  Italy.  I  knew  of  Bismarck's 
manoeuvres,  his  relations  with  Garibaldi  and  Mazzini, 

1  UnpubEshed  Souvenirs,  in  the  Archives  of  the  War  Department. 


86  .        THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

and  the  hostility  of  the  Italian  Left.  But  that  rev 
olutionary  faction  formed  a  small  minority;  power 
was  in  the  hands  of  the  moderates,  who  were  openly 
favored  by  our  minister,  Malaret,  and  their  assistance 
seemed  to  us  certain.  We  relied,  moreover,  on  the 
King's  reminding  them  of  their  duty  if  they  should 
forget  it. 

The  choice  to  be  made  was  between  alliance  with 
Austria  and  alliance  with  Russia.  The  difficulty 
was  born  of  the  strained  relations  .between  those 
two  countries.  We  could  not  think  of  forming  al 
liances  with  both  at  once;  intimate  relations  with 
one  would  imply  at  least  a  coolness  with  the  other.1 

A  close  connection  with  Austria  aroused  in  me  an 
insurmountable  aversion.  She  did  not  seriously  desire 
to  be  revenged  for  Sadowa;  the  military  party  was 
still  smarting  with  the  humiliation  of  that  defeat, 
but  at  the  same  time  it  bore  a  grudge  to  Napoleon  III, 
who  had  facilitated  the  catastrophe.  Among  the 
other  classes  there  was  little  mourning  for  a  disaster 
to  which  the  nation  owed  its  liberties.  The  Hungarians 
rejoiced  over  it,  because  from  it  dated  the  recognition 
of  their  just  claims;  the  Slavs,  discontented  and 
engrossed  by  their  national  aspirations,  were  indifferent 
to  the  prestige  of  the  Empire,  and  the  Germans  were 
not  indifferent  to  the  fulfillment  of  the  Germanic 
destiny.  Despotism  had  been  the  sole  bond  between 
all  these  different  nationalities,  juxtaposed  rather 
than  commingled:  when  that  bond  was  broken, 
the  sheaf  had  fallen  apart  —  some  toward  Germany, 

1  [The  "strained  relations"  between  Russia  and  Austria  grew  out  of  the 
latest  Polish  insurrection,  of  1862.  See  Sorel,  vol.  i,  pp.  226,  227;  also 
Eustow  (French  trans.),  vol.  i,  p.  113.] 


DECLARATION  OF  JULY  6,   1870         87 

others  toward  Panslavism  or  Russia,  —  and  the 
situation  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire  seemed 
to  me  to  be  depicted  to  the  life  by  the  words  of 
the  great  John  De  Witt  to  Louis  XIV,  concerning 
the  Germanic  Empire :  "The  Empire  is  a  skeleton, 
whose  bones  are  fastened  together,  not  with  nerves, 
but  with  wire,  and  do  not  move  naturally;  so  that 
there  is  no  reliance  to  be  had  on  her  friendship  or 
her  assistance." 

I  felt  strongly  drawn  to  the  Russian  alliance.  I 
had  refused  to  join  in  the  demonstrations  in  favor 
of  the  last  Polish  insurrection;  had  I  had  time  to 
formulate  a  foreign  policy,  I  should  have  tried  to 
form  a  solid  alliance  with  Russia,  by  bringing  about 
an  understanding  between  her  and  England.  The 
Emperor  was  favorable,  judging  by  the  insistence 
with  which  he  urged  me  to  read  a  pamphlet,  attributed 
to  Jomini's  son,  on  the  suitability  of  a  Franco-Russian 
alliance.  Consequently  I  advised  going  straight  to  St. 
Petersburg  and  offering  a  complete  revision  of  the 
Treaty  of  Paris. 

While  not  denying  in  principle  the  value  of  the 
Russian  alliance,  Gramont  did  not  believe  that  we 
could  secure  it  at  the  moment.  It  was  too  long  a 
time  that  Russia  had  been  at  odds  with  us,  and  united 
to  Prussia  both  by  family  ties  l  and  by  services  rendered 
in  the  Polish  business;  we  ought  to  deem  ourselves 
fortunate  if  she  adhered  to  a  policy  of  neutrality. 
Moreover,  the  slightest  movement  on  her  part  would 
alienate  Hungary  from  us,  without  whose  consent 
Austria  could  not  form  an  alliance  with  us.  Now 
Austria  was  very  favorably  disposed,  and  she  had  a 

1  [See  supra,  p.  32  nj 


88  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

fine  army,  fully  prepared,  whereas  Russia  was  not 
in  condition  to  act,  so  long  as  her  railways  were  not 
finished. 

These  arguments  of  the  former  Ambassador  to 
Vienna,  the  friend  of  Beust,  made  a  strong  impression 
on  us.  Nevertheless  I  was  offering  some  further 
mild  objections,  when  the  Emperor  rose,  walked  to 
a  desk,  opened  a  drawer,  took  therefrom  the  letters 
of  the  Emperor  of  Austria  and  the  King  of  Italy  in  the 
autumn^  of  1869,  and  read  them  aloud  to  us.1  He 
did  not  explain  what  had  led  to  the  letters  being  written ; 
he  interpreted  them  as  a  conditional  promise  of  assist 
ance  in  such  a  case  as  that  in  which  we  now  were, 
and  he  was  absolutely  convinced  that  Francis  Joseph 
and  Victor  Emanuel  would  keep  their  promises.  The 

1  [As  to  the  secret  negotiations  between  the  Emperor  and  the  Austrian 
and  Italian  governments  in  1869,  which  resulted  in  this  exchange  of  auto 
graph  letters  of  the  sovereigns,  see  Sorel,  vol.  i,  pp.  39-41;  La  Gorce, 
vol.  vi,  pp.  154-157 ;  Welschinger,  vol.  i,  pp.  £5-£7.  These  negotiations  were 
known  to  very  few  persons:  Beust,  Metternich,  Vitzthum,  for  Austria, 
Vimercati,  for  Italy,  Rouher,  for  France.  (La  Gorce,  p.  154.)  To  these 
should  doubtless  be  added  La  Valette,  then  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
Even  Gramont,  then  Ambassador  to  Austria,  who  had  exerted  himself  to 
the  utmost  to  bring  about  an  alliance  between  that  country  and  France, 
knew  nothing  of  the  correspondence  until  he  presented  his  letters  of  recall 
in  May,  1870.  "On  his  return  to  Paris,  Gramont  reproached  the  Emperor 
because  he  had  not  given  him  his  full  confidence.  The  Emperor  excused 
himself  on  the  ground  that  he  had  not  had  time  to  inform  him,  for  his  depar 
ture  from  Vienna  had  been  too  hurried.  The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
not  concealing  his  anger,  demanded  confirmation  of  the  Emperor's  protesta 
tions,  and  requested  the  recall  of  La  Valette  and  Benedetti,  Ambassadors  at 
London  and  Berlin.  Napoleon  would  have  consented  to  recall  Benedetti, 
but  he  hesitated  about  La  Valette,  who  stood  high  in  the  Empress's  good 
graces.  As  it  was  essential  that  the  two  should  be  recalled  at  the  same  time 
.  .  .  they  both  remained  at  their  posts."  Welschinger,  ubi  sup.,  citing  Les 
Coulisses  de  la  Diplomatic,  by  J".  Hansen.  As  to  the  mission  of  General 
Lebrun  and  the  visit  of  Archduke  Albert,  see  supra,  p.  39,  n.  1.] 


Due  DB  GRAMONT 
1819-1880 


DECLARATION  OF  JULY  6,   1870         89 

report  of  General  Lebrun  and  the  plan  of  Archduke 
Albert,  which  were  then  in  his  hands,  but  which  he 
did  not  mention  to  us,  certainly  contributed  to  impart 
a  tone  of  expansive  confidence  to  his  language.  In 
fact,  those  letters  did  not  constitute  what  is  properly 
called  a  treaty,  but  they  exhibit  that  identity  of 
opinions  and  interests  from  which  treaties  naturally 
flow  at  the  propitious  moment.  This  sort  of  per 
manent  moral  alliance  often  exists  without  being 
formally  reduced  to  writing;  treaties  are  signed  when 
the  vaguely  foreseen  contingency  of  a  war  is  crystallized 
into  an  imminent  fact;  y indeed,  they  are  a  proof  that 
war  is  about  to  begin,  and  that  is  why  the  signature 
is  often  postponed,  although  the  parties  concerned 
act  upon  their  provisions.  The  agreement  between 
Cavour  and  Napoleon  III  was  reached  at  Plombieres 
in  July,  1858;  the  treaty  of  alliance,  offensive  and 
defensive,  between  Prance  and  Italy,  was  not  signed 
until  January,  1859,  on  the  eve  of  hostilities. 

The  fact  that  no  formal  treaty  of  alliance  had  been 
concluded  proves  that  the  war  took  us  by  surprise 
and  was  not  premeditated  by  us.  The  Emperor 
had  not  carried  to  completion  the  agreement  out 
lined  in  1869  because  his  thoughts  were  altogether 
pacific;  but  as  soon  as  an  unlooked-for  aggression 
seemed  to  him  imminent,  he  did  not  doubt  for  an 
instant  —  and  we  were  as  confident  as  he  —  that 
Italy  and  Austria  would,  without  waiting  to  be  asked, 
convert  the  letters  of  1869  into  an  offensive  and  de 
fensive  treaty.  Our  second  starting-point,  therefore, 
was  that  we  could  rely  on  those  two  allies. 

Thereupon  Gramont  read  his  declaration.  A  few 
purely  grammatical  corrections  were  made  in  the  first 


90  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

part.  Then  we  all  agreed  that  the  last  sentence  was 
too  elliptical  and  too  halting,  and  that  it  must  be 
made  more  emphatic.  The  Emperor  proposed  this 
form:  "To  put  aside  a  project  which  would  disturb 
to  our  detriment  the  present  equilibrium  of  Europe 
and  would  imperil  all  the  material  interests  and  the 
honor  of  France." 

Even  that  phrase  seemed  insufficient  to  me ;  I  took 
the  pen,  and  while  listening  to  the  suggestions  and 
criticisms  of  each  of  my  colleagues,  I  sought,  at  the 
common  dictation,  so  to  speak,  some  better  phraseology. 
This  task,  which  was  very  carefully  done  and  ear 
nestly  discussed,  and  in  which  I  took  the  principal 
part,  especially  in  the  last  sentence,  finally  led  us  to 
the  definitive  draft.  The  text  as  agreed  upon  was 
read  twice  by  me,  after  which  it  was  put  to  vote, 
each  man  answering  to  his  name,  and  was  unanimously 
adopted.1 

It  is  not  true  that  Gramont  brought  to  the  Council 
a  violent  screed,  which  we  softened;  it  was  we  who 
gave  more  sharpness  of  outline  and  more  emphasis 
to  the  somewhat  colorless  text  that  he  had  drawn. 
It  is  inexact,  therefore,  to  speak  of  the  declaration 
of  July  6  as  "Gramont's  declaration":  it  was  the 
declaration  of  the  Emperor  and  the  Cabinet  no  less 
than  his;  and  if  the  fact  of  having  conceived  the 
idea  of  it  and  of  having  drawn  the  principal  parts 
confers  paternity,  I  am  he  to  whom  it  belongs.  I  do 
not  say  this  to  deprive  Gramont  of  the  exclusive  credit 
for  an  act  which  I  regard  as  meritorious,  but  because, 
by  attributing  it  to  him  it  is  possible  to  see  therein  an 

1  [The  Declaration  of  July  6.    See  Appendix  G,  infra.] 


DECLARATION  OF  JULY  6,   1870         91 

act  of  resentment  for  Sadowa  —  a  secret  motive  which 
no  one  can  attribute  to  me. 

While  I  was  reading  it  the  second  time,  the  Emperor 
passed  to  Gramont,  who  was  at  my  right,  the  follow 
ing  note:  "I  think  it  advisable  to  send  to  Fleury 
in  cipher  this  simple  telegram:  'Notify  Prince 
Gortchakoff  that  if  Prussia  insists  upon  the  accession 
of  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern  to  the  throne  of  Spain, 
it  will  mean  war.'"  Gramont  put  the  note  before 
me.  The  Emperor,  near  whom  I  was  sitting,  saw 
him  do  it.  He  leaned  over  to  me  and  said:  "The 
Emperor  of  Bussia  does  not  want  war;  he  will  bring 
about  the  withdrawal  of  the  candidacy."1  Thus 
the  word  "war"  was  uttered  by  the  Emperor  only 
as  the  most  efficacious  means  of  preserving  peace. 

We  left  Saint-Cloud  at  half  after  twelve.  Gramont, 
having  returned  to  the  Foreign  Office,  dictated  the 
declaration  to  two  secretaries.  At  two  o'clock,  when 
the  Corps  Legislatif  opened  its  session,  he  was  not 
ready,  and  the  session  was  suspended  until  his  arrival. 
I  went  into  the  Chamber  first.  Before  taking  my 
seat,  I  went  to  Cochery  and  said:  "You  will  be 
satisfied  with  our  declaration;  it  is  pacific,  although 

1  This  was  not  the  first  time  tjiat  the  Emperor,  by  a  declaration  of  similar 
force,  had  forestalled  a  project  the  execution  of  which  would  certainly  have 
led  to  war.  When  it  was  proposed  to  force  Denmark  to  enter  the  Germanic 
Confederation  absolutely,  a  similar  despatch,  sent  by  Drouyn  de  Lhuys  to 
St.  Petersburg  and  Copenhagen,  caused  the  project  to  be  abandoned. 

[The  despatch  sent  by  Gramont  to  Fleury  on  My  6  reads:  "We  are 
convinced  .  .  .  that  Russia  will  recognize  the  impossibility  on  our  part  of 
accepting  a  combination  so  evidently  aimed  against  France,  and  we  should 
be  glad  to  learn  that  she  will  consent  to  exert  her  influence  at  Berlin  to  fore 
stall  the  grave  complications  which  may  arise  from  a  misunderstanding  on 
this  subject ...  for  ...  if  that  power  insists  upon  the  accession  of  Prince 
Leopold,  it  means  war."] 


92  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

very  explicit;  support  it  by  a  few  decided  words.35 
He  answered  that  he  did  not  consider  himself  of  suf 
ficient  prominence,  and  he  repeated  my  desire  to 
Daru.1  The  latter  agreed  with  him  upon  a  declara 
tion  to  be  read  after  ours. 

My  colleagues  came  in  one  by  one,  and  at  last  Gra- 
mont  appeared.  He  went  straight  to  the  tribune, 
and  read,  without  changing  a  word,  the  text  agreed 
upon  in  the  morning :  — 

"I  rise  to  reply  to  the  interpellation  addressed  to 
me  yesterday  by  the  honorable  M.  Cochery.  It  is 
true  that  Marshal  Prim  has  offered  Prince  Leopold 
of  Hohenzollern  the  crown  of  Spain,  and  that  that 
prince  has  accepted  it.  But  the  Spanish  people  have 
not  yet  declared  their  will,  and  we  do  not  as  yet 
know  the  actual  details  of  a  negotiation  which  has 
been  concealed  from  us.  So  that  a  discussion  at  this 
time  could  lead  to  no  practical  result.  We  urge  you, 
Messieurs,  to  postpone  it.  We  have  never  ceased  to 
manifest  our  sympathy  with  the  Spanish  nation,  and 
to  avoid  anything  that  could  possibly  have  the  appear 
ance  of  meddling  in  any  way  with  the  internal  affairs 
of  a  great  and  noble  nation  in  the  full  exercise  of  its 
sovereignty.  With  respect  to  the  various  claimants 
of  the  throne,  we  have  never  departed  from  the  most 
rigid  neutrality,  and  we  have  never  manifested  prefer 
ence  or  aversion  for  any  one  of  them.  We  shall  con 
tinue  in  that  course.  But  we  do  not  consider  that 
respect  for  the  rights  of  a  neighboring  people  obliges 
us  to  suffer  a  third  power,  by  placing  one  of  its  princes 
on  the  throne  of  Charles  V,  to  disturb  to  our  detriment 

1  [Comte  Daru,  it  will  be  remembered,  was  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
in  the  OHivier  ministry  during  the  first  four  months  of  its  existence.] 


DECLARATION  OF  JULY  6,  1870         93 

the  existing  equilibrium  of  Europe,  and  to  imperil  the 
material  interests  and  the  honor  of  France.  [Loud 
applause.]  That  contingency,  we  confidently  hope, 
will  not  become  a  reality.  To  prevent  it  we  rely  at 
once  on  the  wisdom  of  the  German  people  and  on  the 
friendship  of  the  Spanish  people.  If  it  should  be 
otherwise,  strong  in  your  support,  Messieurs,  and  in 
that  of  the  nation,  we  shall  perform  our  duty  without 
hesitation  and  without  faltering."  [Long-continued 
applause.  Acclamations  renewed  again  and  again.] 
The  cheers  followed  Gramont  to  his  seat.1 

This  declaration  is  beyond  reproach,  and  I  re-read 
it,  after  so  many  years,  with  satisfaction.  It  is  cate 
gorical,  no  doubt,  and  includes  an  ultimatum  in  the 
event  that  its  warning  should  not  be  heeded.2  In 
deed,  that  was  the  secret  of  its  effectiveness.  And 
yet,  being  restrained  in  tone,  and  free  from  any  sug 
gestion  of  a  challenge,  it  does  not  go  beyond  a  proper 
firmness,  and  refrains  from  anything  like  recrimina 
tion.  It  confines  itself  strictly  to  the  Spanish  affair, 
with  no  allusion  to  the  occurrences  of  1866,  to  Luxem 
bourg,  or  to  the  numerous  annoyances  already  under- 

1  Thiers  says  in  his  deposition  [before  the  Committee  of  Inquiry  concerning 
September  4] :  **M.  Ollivier  came  to  me;   although  full  of  animation  with 
everybody  else,  he  was  a  little  embarrassed  with  me.    He  was  sure  that  I 
would  condemn  the  insane  thing  that  they  had  just  done."    That  is  abso 
lutely  false :  I  never  had  with  Thiers  the  embarrassed  manner  that  he  attrib 
utes  to  me,  especially  after  an  act  which,  far  from  being  insane,  seemed  to 
me  an  act  of  supreme  sanity.    [See  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  p.  ££9j 

2  Guizot,  on  March  2, 1843,  said  much  the  same  thing:  "If  the  Spanish 
monarchy  were  overthrown,  if  the  sovereign  who  reigns  in  Spain  to-day 
were  robbed  of  her  throne,  if  Spain  were  handed  over  to  an  exclusive  influ 
ence  that  threatened  peril  to  us,  if  there  should  be  an  attempt  to  take  the 
throne  of  Spain  away  from  the  glorious  family  that  has  sat  upon  it  since 
Louis  XIV,  why,  then,  I  should  advise  my  king  and  my  country  to  keep 
watch  and  to  take  counsel."     [Note  of  M.  Ollivier.] 


94  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

gone.  Not  a  single  word  aims  at  being  disagreeable 
to  the  Bang  or  his  minister  —  still  less  to  their  people. 
Accuse  it,  if  you  will,  of  awkwardness  (the  effect  it 
was  soon  to  produce  will  answer  that  charge),  but  do 
not  say  that  it  was  a  challenge.  Even  if  there  could 
be  found  therein  —  which  there  cannot  —  any  arro 
gant  expression,  it  would  have  been  a  legitimate  act 
of  defence,  as  it  would  have  been  simply  a  retort  to 
an  undeniable  challenge:  the  parry  of  a  thrust,  and 
in  no  sense  a  thrust  itself ;  it  was  not  the  cannon-shot 
that  begins  a  battle,  but  the  alarm-gun  which  calls 
for  help. 

Cochery  did  not  think  that  the  words  that  he  and 
Daru  had  prepared  met  the  situation.  He  went  to 
Gramont  and  said  simply  this :  "I  will  not  interpellate 
you  any  further." 

Had  our  declaration  been  colorless,  the  deputies  of 
the  Left  would  have  taunted  us  with  cowardice;  it 
was  dignified,  so  they  called  it  bellicose.  Gamier- 
Pages,  with  his  affectation  of  a  horse-jockey's  bon 
homie,  declared  that  "the  princes  may  hate  each  other 
and  want  war,  but  the  nations  love  each  other  and 
desire  peace/5  Raspail  interjected  some  probably 
insulting  exclamations,  which  were  lost  in  the  uproar. 
Glais-Bizoin  shouted:  "It's  a  declaration  of  war !" 
"It  is  war  already  declared/*  added  Cremieux. 

"No!"  I  cried  energetically. 

Thereupon  Cremieux  rejoined :  "I  know  well  enough 
that  you  are  hesitating ;  that  you  want  neither  peace 
"  nor  war." 

That  being  so,  it  was  not  war  already  declared. 
Cremieux  concluded  nevertheless  by  insisting  upon  the 
necessity  of  interrupting  the  discussion  of  the  budget, 


DECLARATION  OP  JULY  6,  1870         95 

then  under  way,  until  there  had  been  fuller  explana 
tions.  Were  that  done,  the  debate  that  the  govern 
ment  wished  to  postpone  would  have  been  opened. 
Emmanuel  Arago,  who  very  recently  had  supported 
Keratry's  lamentations  concerning  our  long-suffering 
in  the  Saint-Gothard  affair,  supported  Cremieux's  de 
mand.  "The  ministry  had  been  imprudent,  involving 
France  against  her  will.  [No !  No  1]  In  our  despite, 
it  had  named  the  King  of  Spain,  then  declared  war/' 

Each  one  of  these  assertions  was  interrupted  by 
numerous  violent  protests.1  Our  declaration  being 
thus  distorted,  it  became  my  duty  to  restore  its  real 
meaning.  I  did  so. 

"I  ask  the  Assembly  not  to  accept  the  motion  of 
the  honorable  M.  Cremieux,  and  to  resume  discussion 
of  the  budget.2  The  government  desires  peace.  [Very 
good!  very  good!]  It  desires  it  passionately  [Excla 
mations  on  the  ,Left]>  but  with  honor!  [Emphatic 
tokens  of  assent  and  approval.]  I  cannot  admit  that 
by  expressing  aloud  its  sentiments  regarding  a  situa 
tion  which  concerns  the  security  and  prestige  of  France, 
the  government  jeopardizes  the  peace  of  the  world. 
In  my  opinion  it  is  employing  the  sole  remaining  means 
of  solidifying  that  peace ;  for  whenever  France  displays 
firmness  without  ostentation  in  defence  of  a  legiti 
mate  right,  she  .is  sure  to  obtain  the  moral  support 
and  the  approval  of  Europe.  [Very  good  !  very  good  1  — 
Applause.]  I  beg,  therefore,  the  members  of  this 

1  [Some  of  these  interruptions  are  given  by  M.  OlMvier  in  vol.  xiv,  pp.  112, 
113 ;  more  by  Lehautcourt,  vol.  i,  pp.  £33  ff.  According  to  the  latter,  the 
sitting  had  to  be  twice  suspended  on  account  of  the  confusion  and  uproar, 
between  Gramont's  reading  of  the  declaration  and  M.  Ollivier's  speech.] 

2  [A  part  of  the  opening  paragraph  of  this  speech,  omitted  here,  is  given  in 
vol.  xiv,  p.  113,  and  by  Gramont,  pp.  43,  44u] 


96  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

Assembly  to  be  well  assured  that  they  are  not  assist- 
ing  at  disguised  preparations  for  an  act  toward  which 
we  are  proceeding  by  devious  paths.  We  say  all  that 
is  in  our  minds :  we  do  not  want  war ;  we  are  intent 
only  upon  maintaining  our  dignity.  If  we  believed 
that  war  is  inevitable  some  day,  we  would  not  embark 
in  it  until  we  had  asked  and  obtained  your  approval. 
[Very  good !  very  good  J]  Then  there  will  be  a  discus 
sion,  and  if  you  do  not  concur  with  our  opinion,  as  we 
are  living  under  a  parliamentary  regime,  it  will  not  be 
difficult  for  you  to  express  your  own ;  you  will  simply 
have  to  overturn  us  by  a  vote,  and  entrust  the  con 
duct  of  affairs  to  those  who  seem  to  you  likely  to 
manage  them  according  to  your  ideas.  [Murmurs  on 
the  Left.]  Have  no  doubt  of  the  absolute  sincerity  of 
what  we  say ;  I  declare  upon  my  honor  that  there  is 
no  reservation  in  the  mind  of  any  one  of  us  when  we 
say  that  we  desire  peace.  I  say  further  that  we  hope 
for  it,  on  one  condition :  that  all  differences  on  matters 
of  detail,  all  factional  differences,  shall  disappear  from 
among  us?  and  that  France  and  this  Assembly  shall 
show  themselves  to  the  world  unanimous  in  their  pur 
pose."  [Very  good!  very  good! — r  Cordial  approba 
tion.]  1 

Once  more  the  press  was  a  faithful  reflection  of  the 

1  "Imagine  that  there  had  been  on  the  opposition  benches  true  patriots 
and  not  unmanageable  partisans,  enlightened  friends  of  peace  and  not 
systematic  enemies  of  the  government,  —  they  would  have  followed  the  ad 
vice  I  had  given  to  Cochery.  One  of  their  orators  would  have  expressed  his 
assent  to  my  explanation  and  would  have  repelled  the  Prussian  candidacy 
no  less  emphatically  than  we  did ;  he  would  have  taken  up  and  emphasized 
our  hope  of  a  pacific  conclusion ;  thus  would  have  been  created  about  us  a 
patriotic  imanimity  which  would  have  alarmed  our  adversaries,  increased 
our  power  of  action,  and  contributed  effectively  to  preserve  the  two  nations 
from  the  calamities  of  war."  ISEmpire  Liberal,  vol.  xiv,  p.  115. 


DECLARATION  OF  JULY  6,  1870         97 

public  excitement.  "If  this  last  affront  had  been  sub 
mitted  to/'  cried  the  Gaulois,  "  there  would  not  have 
been  a  woman  in  the  world  who  would  have  accepted 
a  Frenchman's  arm.  Now  our  honor  is  secure ! " 
Paul  Dalloz,  always  so  moderate  in  his  tone,  was  no 
less  outspoken  in  the  Moniteur  Universel:  "  The  blame 
for  this  momentous  conflict  can  never  be  imputed  to 
the  French  government.  For  our  own  part,  being 
fully  convinced  that  it  has  public  opinion  on  its  side, 
we  can  see  nothing  extreme  in  the  course  which  it  has 
decided  to  follow,  and  which  was  ratified  yesterday  by 
the  enthusiasm  of  the  Chamber.!'  The  commendatory 
article  in  the  Figaro  was  the  more  remarked  because 
that  journal  at  the  moment  maintained  an  attitude  of 
almost  personal  hostility  to  the  Emperor. 

The  most  striking  article  was  that  in  the  Correspond- 
ant,  written  by  Lavedan.  Its  effect  was  considerable. 
"Prussia  has  no  avowable  interest  in  the  Peninsula; 
and  she  could  not  interfere  there  without  being  guilty 
of  genuine  proyocation.  So  that  we  are  of  those  who 
applaud  the  firm  attitude  adopted  by  the  government. 
For  too  long  a  time  our  courtesy  has  been  at  the  ser 
vice  of  other  people's  aggrandizement ;  we  are  relieved 
to  find  that  we  have  become  Frenchmen  once  more ! 
Like  the  Chambet,  all  patriotic  hearts  salute  the 
declaration  of  the  powers  that  be,  rejoicing  to  recog 
nize  therein  the  old-time  accent  of  the  national  pride  !" 
Louis  Veuillot,  little  open  to  suspicion  of  com 
plaisance  toward  any  one  on  earth,  unless  perhaps  the 
Pope,  was  quite  as  explicit  in  the  Univers:  "This 
declaration  was  the  only  subject  of  conversation  last 
night  in  all  the  clubs  and  public  places.  The  firm 
language  of  the  government  was  unanimously  approved, 


98  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

and  even  applauded.  The  Prussian  agents,  therefore, 
will  be  able  to  inform  His  Majesty  King  William  and 
M.  de  Bismarck  that  our  ministers  were  unquestion 
ably,  on  that  occasion,  the  restrained  organs  of  public 
opinion." 

The  Debats,  hitherto  so  favorable  to  the  Cabinet, 
had  shown  some  coolness  since  the  beginning  of  the 
trouble;  but  one  of  the  principal  editors,  Saint-Marc 
Girardin,  expressed  approval.  "As  for  us,  we  think 
that  the  government  has  don,e  well  to  speak,  —  we 
are  wrong, —  has  done  well  to  reply.  What  would 
have  been  said  if  the  government  had  maintained  a 
silence  which  the  public  would  have  considered  cowardly 
and  suspicious  ?  It  would  have  been  accused  of  bend 
ing  its  head  a  second  time  before  the  cannon  of  Sadowa. 
It  was  essential  to  know  that  the  parliamentary  gov 
ernment  was  prepared  and  determined  to  provide  for 
all  the  requirements  of  the  national  grandeur."1 

1  [More  extracts  from  the  Parisian  journals  are  given  in  vol.  xiv,  pp.  118- 
122;  an«I  see  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  p.  230.  Says  M.  Ollivier  (p.  121) :]  "There 
was  no  ideally  sensational  opposition  except  in  the  journal  of  the  old  Bona- 
partist  party,  the  Public,  edited  by  Dreolle,  the  deputy,  under  the  lofty 
inspiration  of  M.  Rouher  [formerly  Prime  Minister  and  at  this  time  Presi 
dent  'of  the  Senate] :  *  We  do  not  share  the  excitement  caused  by  the  accept-  , 
,  ance  of  the  Spanish  throne  by  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollera's  eldest  son.  What 
has  taken  place  between  Berlin  and  Madrid  seems  to  us  perfectly  natural. 
.  .  .  Upon  whom,  then,  should  the  popular  emotion,  now  manifest  in  France, 
fall?  Upon  the  ministers.  It  is  the  ministers  whom  we  must  call  to  ac 
count  for  their  conduct.  And  when  we  see  that  M.  Prim  is  bestirring  him 
self  like  a  Spaniard,  and  that  M.  de  Bismarck  is  acting  like  a  Prussian,  we 
must  find  out  whether  MM.  Ollivier  and  de  Gramont  are  conducting  them 
selves  like  Frenchmen.  They  tell  us  that  the  Cabinet  proposes  to  resist 
M.  Prim's  project.  How  will  it  resist?  England  approves  it,  Prussia 
accepts  it,  and  it  is  not  impossible  that  Spain,  for  the  very  reason  that  we 
object  to  it,  will  subscribe  to  it.  What  will  our  ministers  do  then  ?  Make 
war  on  Prussia  ?  That  would  be  monstrous.  On  Spain  ?  That  would  be 
insane.'  —  No  intransigeant  had  dared  to  speak  like  that ;  so  that  the  amaze- 


DECLARATION  OF  JULY  6,  1870         99 

A  large  number  of  officers,  among  them  Albert  de 
Mun,  who  has  himself  recalled  the  fact,  offered  Gra- 
mont  their  congratulations. 

Lyons,  whose  clear  judgment  was  clouded  by  no 
preconceived  opinion,  wrote:  "The  declaration,  how 
ever,  forcible  as  it  was,  did  not  go  beyond  the  feeling 
of  the  country.  .  .  .  The  wound  inflicted  by  Sadowa 
on  French  pride  had  never  been  completely  healed,  — 
nevertheless,  time  had  begun  to  produce  the  effect  of 
reconciling  men's  minds  to  what  was  done  and  could 
not  be  helped,  and  irritation  was  subsiding.  Now  this 
unhappy  affair  has  revived  all  the  old  animosity ;  the 
government  and  the  people  have  alike  made  it  a  point 
of  honor  to  prevent  the  accession  of  the  Prince,  and 
they  have  gone  too  far  to  recede.  I  do  not,  however, 
believe  that  either  the  Emperor  or  his  ministers  either 
wish  for  wary  or  expect  it.  At  this  moment  they  con 
fidently  hope  that  they  shall  succeed,  without  war,  in 
preventing  the  Prince  from  wearing  the  crown  of 
Spain."  In  another  despatch  on  the  same  day  he 
said  that  "the  feelings  of  the  French  nation  would  now 
render  it  impossible  for  the  government,  even  if  they 
wished  it,  to  acquiesce  in  the  elevation  of  Prince 
Leopold  to  the  Spanish  throne.55 1 

The  declaration  which  France,  by  an  immense  ma 
jority,  greeted  with  passionate  approval,  aroused  in 

ment  was  general.  The  Emperor  was  aroused  and  wrote  to  Gramont: 
*I  am  greatly  distressed  by  the  article  in  the  Public,  and  I  have  let  Rouher 
know  it,  although  I  am  convinced  that  he  had  nothing  to  do  with  it.'  Dreolle 
at  once  ceased  his  attack :  through  hatred  of  the  ministers  he  had  declared 
against  war;  through  servility  to  the  Emperor,  he  became  one  of  its  most 
frantic  supporters." 

1  [Lyons  to  Granville,  July  7 ;  Blue  Book,  pp.  6  and  7  (no.  10),  and  p.  9 
(no.  13).] 


100        THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

Europe  neither  surprise  nor  indignation,  except  in 
the  case  of  some  of  those  timid  diplomatists,  who  take 
alarm  at  everything  that  rises  above  the  level  of  their 
customary  tittle-tattle.  It  was  perfectly  understood. 
The  Times  of  July  8,  in  its  leading  article,  criticised 
severely  the  policy  of  Prussia.1 

The  organ  of  the  Conservatives,  the  Standard, 
expressed  the  same  opinion  as  the  Times.  The  Daily 
Telegraph,  a  journal  with  an  immense  circulation, 
recognized  the  justice  of  our  position.  "If  a  Hohen- 
zollern  should  once  become  firmly  seated  on  the  throne 
of  Spain,  by  the  support  of  Prussia*  and  in  defiance  of 
all  French  policy,  every  year  would  add  to  his  power 
to  play  a  deadly  part  in  every  struggle  that  might 
arise  on  the  Rhine.  Immediate  humiliation,  future  peril, 
that  is  what  the  succession  of  the  Prussian  prince 
would  really  mean  for  France."  The  Pall  Mall  Gazette 
jeered  at  the  claim  of  the  King  of  Prussia  to  be  regarded 
as  knowing  nothing  of  the  affair. 

1  [The  Times  article  is  quoted  in  full  by  M.  Ollivier  (vol.  xiv,  pp.  123, 124), 
and  by  Gramont,  pp.  33,  34,  The  passage  from  the  Daily  Telegraph  in  the 
following  paragraph  is  a  translation  of  M.  OlHvier's  French  version,  and  not 
a  transcript  of  the  original.] 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  FOUK  PACIFIC   NEGOTIATIONS 

OUR  declaration  was  not  inspired  by  the  wish  to 
make  a  rupture  inevitable.  It  seemed  to  us  the  last 
chance  to  ensure  peace  by  the  commotion  that  it 
would  cause  in  the  hesitating  purposes  of  the  Powers 
and  by  the  salutary  reflections  which  it  would  arouse 
in  the  moving  spirits  of  the  affair.  And  so  the  appro 
bation  that  came  to  us  from  all  quarters,  instead  of 
depriving  us  of  our  self-possession,  augmented  it.  In 
stead  of  plunging  us  into  extreme  measures,  it  incited  us 
to  further  pacific  efforts,  and  we  resumed  our  negotia 
tions  with  the  more  ardor  in  that  they  no  longer  seemed 
to  us  doomed  to  failure.1 

Having  determined  not  to  depart  from  the  conse 
crated  rules  of  international  courtesy,  we  could  not 
appeal  to  Spain.  Mercier  had  urged  upon  us  such 
abstention  as  early  as  June  £4.  "Our  opposition  will 
have  all  the  more  weight  in  the  premises,  if  it  be  aimed 
directly  at  Prussia  and  consequently  inflict  no  wound 
on  Spanish  pride."  2 

1  "The  Prussians  found  at  Saint-Cloud  and  published  the  confidential 
telegram  that  I  sent  to  the  Emperor  after  the  session.    It  proves  the  sincerity 
of  the  sentiments  that  I  had  just  expressed  in  the  tribune.    'The  declara 
tion  was  greeted  by  the  Chamber  with  emotion  and  tremendous  applause. 
The  excitement,  at  first,  even  went  beyond  what  we  expected.    One  would 
have  said  that  it  was  a  declaration  of  war.    I  took  advantage  of  an  interrup 
tion  by  Cr6mieux  to  set  the  thing  right.    I  would  not  allow  ourselves  to  be 
represented  as  premeditating  war;    we  desire  only  peace  with  honor."* 
L'Empire  Lib&rcd,  vol.  xiv,  p.  126. 

2  [The  question  whether  the  French  government  chose  the  more  judicious 
course  in  making  its  formal  demand  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  candidacy  at 

101 


102         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

To  appeal  to  Spain  was  to  fall  into  the  snare  that 
Bismarck  had  set  for  us.  Nevertheless,  without  enter 
ing  upon  negotiations  properly  so-called,  without  a 
formal  note  or  an  ultimatum,  we  conceived  that  we 

Berlin  rather  than  at  Madrid  is  discussed  at  greater  or  less  length  by  all 
the  historians  of  the  war.  M.  de  Gramont,  himself,  as  if  conscious  that  his 
course  in  that  respect  was  open  to  criticism,  explains  it  thus :  "The  news  of 
the  Prussian  candidacy  for  the  throne  of  Spain  arrived  July  3  by  telegraph. 
The  first  act  of  the  government  was  to  address  itself  to  Berlin.  For  there 
it  was  that  we  must  look  for  the  fait  accompli  which  awoke  our  legitimate 
anxiety.  At^  Madrid  there  was,  as  yet,  only  a  contingency;  for  the  vote  of 
the  Cortes,  although  very  probable,  was  not  yet  cast  in  Prussia's  favor. 
Moreover,  the  French  government  could  not  with  propriety  place  itself 
athwart  a  national  manifestation  of  the  Spanish  people.  An  intervention 
of  that  sort,  being  contrary  to  the  principles  of  our  constitution,  would  not 
have  failed  to  offend  Spain,  and  to  further  a  different  result  from  that  which 
we  sought.  So  that,  while  at  Madrid  we  confined  ourselves  to  appealing 
to  the  justice  and  the  friendly  sentiments  of  which  the  Spanish  statesmen 
had  so  often  assured  us,  we  gave  expression  at  Berlin  to  our  justifiable  sur 
prise  and  to  the  hope  that  the  King's  government,  following  the  example 
set,  under  similar  circumstances,  by  England,  by  Russia,  and  by  France 
herself,  would  consent  to  put  aside  a  complication  which  threatened  the 
repose  of  Europe  by  destroying  the  equilibrium  of  the  Powers."  La  France 
et  la  Prusse  avant  la  Guerre,  pp.  27,  28.  And  see  Sorel,  vol.  i,  p.  62.  La 
Gorce  (vol.  vi,  p.  198)  criticizes  the  failure  of  the  then  government  to  make 
any  representations  to  Spain  when  the  candidacy  of  Leopold  was  being  dis 
cussed  in  1869  (see  Appendix  C). 

"He  [Gramont]  turned  to  Prussia,"  says  La  Gorce,  ''less  as  a  statesman 
who  seeks  to  dissipate  a  misunderstanding,  than  as  an  insulted  person  seek 
ing  reparation.  If,  at  the  outset,  he  proposed  to  call  the  cabinet  of  Berlin 
into  court,  prudence  counselled  a  lessening  of  the  danger  of  direct  explana 
tions  by  an  adroit  moderation  in  the  matter  of  form.  A  contrary  pre 
occupation  seems  to  have  inspired  the  French  minister.  In  the  very  first 
communication,  the  agitated  brevity  of  the  language  used  discloses  the 
mental  excitement.  One  is  conscious  of  long  arrears  of  rancor  and  evil 
memories,  hitherto  held  in  check  and  ready  to  overflow.  Behind  the  haughty 
words  that  escape,  can  be  discerned  the  irreparable  words  that  are  still  held 
back.  Wrath  betrays  itself  by  the  very  efforts  that  are  made  to  dissemble 
it.  One  would  say  that  it  was  not  a  diplomatic  negotiation,  but  the  pre 
liminaries  of  a  duel  —  something  like  the  scene  between  Don  Rodrigue  and 
Gormas  in  the  second  act  of  Le  Cid"  vol.  vi,  p.  218.] 


THE  FOUR  PACIFIC  NEGOTIATIONS     103 

ought  to  try  once  more  to  arouse  and  frighten  the 
Spanish  government.  Gramont  telegraphed  to  Mer- 
cier :  — 

"You  will  say  to  Marshal  Prim  that  this  choice  is 
the  worst  that  could  be  made,  and  that  the  national 
affront  to  France  which  results  from  it  is  very  keenly 
felt  by  his  Majesty.  They  who  propose  it  to  Spain, 
and  who  advise  it,  assume  a  very  considerable  respon 
sibility  before  their  peoples  and  before  Europe.  You 
are  thoroughly  familiar  with  the  Emperor's  opinions; 
remain  on  the  ground  on  which  you  stand.  Say  that 
nothing  is  further  from  our  thoughts  than  to  seek  to 
place  any  restraint  on  the  liberty  of  the  Spanish  people, 
but  that  the  test  is,  in  very  truth,  too  much  for  us. 
We  hope  that  our  appeal  wiU  be  heeded,  and  that  that 
friendly  government,  that  great  nation,  being  persuaded 
of  the  friendly  feelings  toward  them  by  which  we  have 
invariably  been  actuated,  will  recognize  the  justice  of 
our  emotion  at  the  thought  that  they  might  become 
the  instrument  of  schemes  so  opposed  to  our  political 
interests.  And  if,  despite  our  legitimate  representa 
tions,  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern  should  be  chosen, 
however  great  our  friendship  for  Spain,  we  should  find 
ourselves  in  the  painful  necessity  of  not  recognizing 
him.'5 1 

Mercier  talked  to  no  purpose  —  Prim  paid  no  heed 
to  him  and  did  not  pause.  He  continued  his  prepa 
rations  for  the  election  as  calmly  as  if  we  had  not  said 
a  word.  "There  is  nothing  for  us  to  do  but  go  ahead," 
he  said  to  a  Madrid  banker.  And  he  wrote  to  a  friend : 
"I  could  never  have  believed  that  France  would  take 
this  matter  so  much  to  heart;  I  never  dreamed  that 

i  July  6-7. 


104         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

it  could  give  occasion  for  European  complications  which 
distress  me  sorely;  but,  at  the  point  that  we  have 
reached,  to  withdraw  would  be  disgraceful.  Before 
all  else  we  must  save  the  honor  of  the  nation.  I  con 
clude  therefore  by  saying,  with  my  hand  upon  my  con 
science,  and  fully  persuaded  that  we  have  dealt  no 
blow  to  the  warm  friendship  that  unites  us  to  our 
neighbors  the  French:  'Forward^  and  long  live 
Spain!'"1 

And  he  sent  to  us,  through  Olozaga,  a  circular  note 
signed  by  Sagasta,  his  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
which  flouted  us  without  concealment:  "The  wholly 
favorable  conditions  surrounding  that  prince  and  the 
cordial  reception  which  his  selection  has  met  with  in 
the  public  opinion  of  the  country,  afford  the  govern 
ment  the  gratifying  hope  that  its  candidate  will  soon 
be  chosen  King  by  the  Cortes  by  a  great  majority,  and 
that  thus  will  be  brought  to  a  close  the  glorious  inter 
regnum  which  began  in  September,  1868."  Lastly, 
Prim  caused  Salazar  to  republish  his  little  book  of 
October,  1869,  in  which  he  has  the  insolence  to  say 
that  "It  is  notorious  that  the  defeat  of  Montpensier 
and  the  Republic  depends  upon  Napoleon's  veto.  .  .  . 
The  Prussian  government  did  not  intervene  in  this 
negotiation ;  the  Prince  informed  the  King,  at  Ems,  of 
his  final  decision,  as  an  act  of  courtesy." 

Thus  Prim  defied  us  more  and  more  openly,  hoping 
to  exhaust  our  patience,  and  to  drive  us  to  the  vio 
lent  measures  against  Spain  which  his  friend  Bismarck 

1  [See  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  p.  220 ;  Lehautcourt,  vol.  i,  pp.  2&7,  258,  citing 
Darimon,  Histoire  d'un  Jour.  On  July  7  Mercier  telegraphed  that  Prim 
said  to  him :  « 'How  can  I  get  out  of  it  ?  I  see  but  one  way :  let  the  Prince 
say  that  he  finds  obstacles  in  the  way  of  the  King's  consent,  and  then, 
instead  of  persisting,  I  will  facilitate  his  withdrawal."  Gramont,  p.  366.] 


THE  FOUR  PACIFIC  NEGOTIATIONS     105 

was  awaiting.  But  our  determination  not  to  allow 
ourselves  to  be  drawn  into  that  course  was  unshaken, 
and  Gramont,  as  calmly  as  if  we  had  not  felt  the  prick 
of  the  needle,  telegraphed  again  to  Mercier :  — 

"In  spite  of  Marshal  Prim's  circular  note  and  the 
communication  which  M.  Olozaga  has  just  made  to 
me,  we  have  too  much  confidence  in  the  sentiments  of 
the  Spanish  nation,  to  believe  that  the  people  at  Ma 
drid  will  persist  in  the  only  solution  which  attacks  at 
once  our  material  interests  and  our  dignity.  We  shall 
pursue  our  friendly  course  of  conduct,  therefore,  and 
shall  continue  to  maintain,  on  the  Spanish  frontier, 
the  vigilant  observation  necessary  to  put  a  stop  to 
whatever  is  likely  to  foment  disturbance  in  the  Pen 
insula.  We  shall  be  true  to  our  sympathies  until  the 
last ;  most  assuredly  we  shall  not  be  the  first  to  break 
bonds  which  were  dear  to  us,  and  which  we  hoped  that 
we  had  made  indissoluble." 

Nor  had  we  anything  to  hope  from  Bismarck,  as 
represented  by  his  retainer  Thile.  Gramont  deter 
mined  none  the  less  to  point  out  how  pitiful  were  the 
grounds  upon  which  Thile  refused  all  discussion.  A 
despatch  to  Lesourd  showed  that  we  were  not  deceived 
by  his  evasions. 

"They  will  never  make  any  one  believe  that  a  Prus 
sian  prince  can  accept  the  Spanish  crown  unless  he 
has  been  authorized  by  the  King,  the  head  of  his  family. 
Now,  if  the  King  has  authorized  him,  what  becomes 
of  the  alleged  ignorance  of  the  Cabinet  of  Berlin, 
behind  which  M.  de  Thile  has  taken  refuge?  In  the 
present  case,  the  King  can  either  permit  or  forbid; 
if  he  has  not  permitted,  let  him  forbid.  A  few  years 
ago,  under  analogous  circumstances,  the  Emperor  did 


106         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

not  hesitate.  His  Majesty  publicly  disavowed  Prince 
Murat  when  he  put  forward  his  candidacy  to  the  throne 
of  Naples.  We  should  regard  a  similar  decision  on 
King  William's  part  as  a  most  friendly  act  toward  us, 
and  we  should  see  therein  a  powerful  guarantee  of  the 
desire  of  Prussia  to  strengthen  the  bonds  that  unite 
us  and  to  assure  their  permanence."  l 

This  calm  refutation  had  no  more  effect  than  our 
representations  to  Prim,  and  we  were  forced  to  the 
conviction  that  we  must  definitely  abandon  negotia 
tion  and  either  submit  to  the  candidacy  or  have  re 
course  to  war.  But  we  were  no  more  desirous  of  war 
than  of  the  candidacy,  and  we  persisted  more  obsti 
nately  than  ever  in  our  determination  to  negotiate. 

The  Emperor,  being  aware  of  the  secret  rivalry 
between  Prim  and  Serrano,  thought  that  therein  lay 
the  means  of  countermining  Prim.  Serrano  was  a 
friend  to  France,  and  was  on  excellent  terms  personally 
with  Napoleon  III.  It  occurred  to  the  Emperor  to 
appeal,  directly  and  secretly,  to  his  friendly  sentiments. 
He  summoned  Bartholdi,  Mercier's  messenger,  to  Saint- 
Cloud,  and  ordered  him  to  start  for  Madrid  on  the 
following  day.  On  his  arrival  he  was  to  go  to  the 
Regent,  and  request  him  as  a  personal  service  to  the 
Emperor,  for  which  he  would  always  be  in  his  debt, 
to  make  representations  at  once  to  Prince  Antony  of 
Hohenzollern,  to  the  end  that  that  prince  should  per 
suade  his  son  to  withdraw  his  candidacy.  Bartholdi 
asked  the  Emperor  if  it  would  not  be  more  correct  for 
the  Ambassador  himself  to  make  this  request.  "No," 
the"  Emperor  replied;  "you  may  mention  it  to  Mer- 
cier;  but  immediately  on  your  arrival  go  yourself  to 

1  July  7. 


THE  FOUR  PACIFIC  NEGOTIATIONS      107 

Serrano,  as  coming  on  a  special  mission  from  me. 
That  will  have  a  greater  effect.  Insist;  say  to  the 
marshal  that  I  appeal  to  his  friendship  for  me." 

Nor  did  we  give  over  making  a  supreme  effort  in 
the  direction  of  Prussia.  We  could  not  think  of  seek 
ing  out  Bismarck  at  Varzin :  he  would  have  shut  the 
door  in  our  face  even  more  roughly  than  Thile  had 
done.  There  remained  but  one  means :  to  have  re 
course  to  the  King  of  Prussia,  then  at  Ems.  We  had 
not  to  deal  with  a  constitutional  king,  in  duty  bound 
to  hold  aloof  from  public  affairs ;  William  both  reigned 
and  governed;  on  all  occasions  he  declared  that  his 
ministers  were  mere  instruments,  that  their  acts  were 
simply  the  carrying  out  of  his  personal  ideas.  So 
that  there  was  nothing  irregular  in  our  proceeding,  nor 
was  it  the  first  time  that  the  King  had  discussed 
matters  directly  with  sovereigns  or  their  representa 
tives.  This  method  of  negotiating  was  dangerous  only 
to  ourselves,  since  it  would  all  be  confidential  and  by 
word  of  mouth,  and  there  could  be  no  exchange  of 
notes  which  would  make  it  possible  to  prove  later,  by 
irrefragable  testimony,  the  rectitude  and  prudence  of 
our  procedure.  We  were  not  unaware  that  it  is  not 
in  accordance  with  etiquette  to  disturb  a  sovereign 
when  taking  a  cure;  but  the  matter  was  urgent  and 
not  by  our  fault,  and  as  we  had  no  other  means  of 
averting  the  conflict,  we  were  forced  to  disregard  the 
proprieties  to  that  extent. 

To  give  more  weight  to  his  representations  to  Ser 
rano  and  King  William,  Gramont  sought  the  support 
of  all  the  powers.  He  telegraphed  to  Fleury:  "We 
are  convinced  that  the  Russian  ministry  will  see  the 
impossibility  of  our  accepting  a  candidacy  so  plainly 


108         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

aimed  against  France,  and  we  should  be  happy  to 
learn  that  it  will  exert  its  influence  at  Berlin  to  fore 
stall  the  complications  on  this  subject  which  might 
ensue  between  the  Emperor  and  Prussia."1 

To  Malaret,  at  Florence,  he  telegraphed:  "Re 
quest  M.  Visconti-Venosta  to  direct  the  Italiau  agent 
at  Madrid  to  exert  his  influence  with  the  statesmen 
there,  and  especially  with  the  Regent,  to  detach  him 
from  an  intrigue  in  which  Prim  alone  has  taken  the 
initiative  so  injurious  to  our  dignity  and  our  in 
terests."  2 

He  urged  Metternich  to  ask  Beust,  "to  be  good 
enough  to  make  it  clear  at  Berlin  that,  in  view  of  the 
national  irritation  here,  they  would  be  well  advised, 
in  the  interest  of  peace,  to  induce  Prince  Leopold  to 
decline  this  candidacy." 3 

Gramont  was  especially  urgent  with  England,  from 
whom  he  hoped  for  most  effective  assistance.  He 
suggested  to  Lyons,  as  a  solution  of  the  difficulty, 
that  England  might  advise  the  voluntary  withdrawal 
of  his  candidacy  by  Leopold  himself,  which  would  be 
less  humiliating  to  Prussia  than  a  withdrawal  exacted 
or  advised  by  the  King.  Such  "a  voluntary  renuncia 
tion  on  the  part  of  the  Prince,"  said  Lyons,  "would, 
M.  de  Gramont  thought,  be  a  most  fortunate  solution 
of  difficult  and  intricate  questions;  and  he  begged 
Her  Majesty's  government  to  use  all  their  influence 
to  bring  it  about."  4 

Gramont  telegraphed   directly  to  La  Valette,   our 

1  July  6. 

2  My  17  [7  ?].    [See  Granule  to  Lyons,  July  9,  Slue  Book,  p.  12.] 

3  Metternich  to  Beust,  July  8. 

4  Lyons  to  Granville,  July  8.     [Blue  Book,  p.  11.] 


THE  POUR  PACIFIC  NEGOTIATIONS     109 

Ambassador  in  London:  "I  have  begged  Lord  Lyons 
to  request  Lord  Granville  that  the  English  govern 
ment  be  especially  insistent  with  the  Regent,  to  in 
duce  him  to  divorce  his  cause  from  that  of  Marshal 
Prim  in  this  matter.  If,  as  we  hope,  the  Cabinets  will 
of  their  own  motion  use  their  influence  to  enlighten 
Marshal  Serrano  concerning  the  perils  of  the  intrigue 
of  which  Marshal  Prim  is  the  real  author,  we  are  con 
fident  that  that  dangerous  intrigue  will  fail."  (July  7.) 
And  on  the  next  day,  the  8th,  he  returned  to  the  charge 
once  more :  "It  is  urgently  necessary  that  the  powers 
which  are  in  a  position  to  make  King  William  listen 
to  the  counsels  of  moderation  and  wisdom  should 
intervene  without  loss  of  time,  before  the  true  character 
of  this  business  has  been  distorted  by  national  sensi 
tiveness.  Neither  the  dignity  of  the  Spanish  people 
nor  that  of  the  German  people  is  at  stake ;  but  if  the 
discussion  drags  on  for  a  few  days  only,  popular  pas 
sions  will  inevitably  inflame  it  by  rearousing  those 
rivalries  between  the  two  countries  which  will  be  an 
additional  obstacle  to  the  government  bent  upon 
maintaining  peace." 

He  even  appealed  to  the  States  of  the  South,  in  order 
to  show  that  he  had  no  secret  unfriendly  design  against 
Germany.  He  telegraphed  to  Saint- Vallier  [at  Wiir- 
temberg] :  "I  have  no  doubt  that  the  German  courts 
wfU  put  forth  all  their  powers  of  persuasion  to  dis 
suade  King  William  from  supporting  the  candidacy 
of  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern ;  and  I  am  confident 
that  their  efforts,  upheld  by  the  patriotic  good  sense 
of  the  German  nation,  will  not  be  without  influence  on 
the  conduct  of  Prussia  in  this  matter."  l 

1  July  8. 


110         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

Where  in  these  instructions,  so  nobly  pacific  and 
conciliatory  in  tone,  can  one  detect  the  slightest  trace 
of  angry  impatience,  the  slightest  desire  to  humiliate 
the  King  of  Prussia  or  to  seek  a  rupture  with  him  ? 
Explicitness  is  never  carried  to  the  point  of  discourtesy, 
and  the  desire  to  have  done  with  the  business  does 
not  degenerate  into  an  impertinent  demand.  There 
is  "neither  contradiction  nor  hesitation/'  as  the  rhet 
oricians  say,  who  know  not  the  mental  flexibility  de 
manded  by  the  changing  aspect  of  affairs.  To  be 
sure,  he  speaks  now  of  advice,  now  of  orders,  now  of 
spontaneous  withdrawal,  and  again  of  enforced  with 
drawal,  but  the  gist  of  the  thought  never  varies  for 
an  instant,  it  is  always  the  same  —  to  obtain  with 
out  war  the  disappearance  of  the  candidacy. 

In  fine,  Gramont^  the  madman,  the  challenger, 
was  so  eager  to  avoid  war,  like  all  of  us,  that  he  con 
ceived  the  idea  of  telegraphing  to  Benedetti,  to  "go  to 
see  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern,  in  order  to  induce 
him  to  withdraw,  and  thereby  avert  the  ills  which  his 
candidacy  made  inevitable/' 1 

The  Emperor,  whose  sensitive  nature  was  wounded 
to  the  quick  by  the.  criminal  conduct  of  a  family  so 
affectionately  distinguished  by  him,  would  not  consent 
to  this  step.  It  had  seemed  to  him  perfectly  natural, 
as  Gramont  had  suggested  to  Lyons  and  Metternich, 
that  the  neutral  powers  should,  on  their  own  initiative, 
try  to  obtain  the  Prince's  withdrawal,  and  he  had 
himself .  sent  Bartholdi  to  suggest  it  to  Serrano ;  he 
forbade  that  any  request  whatever  should  be  made 
directly  of  the  Hohenzollerns  in  his  name.  As  soon 

1  July  8, 1  A.M.  [M.  Benedetti  had,  meanwhile  (July  7),  been  ordered  to 
Ems  to  negotiate  directly  with  the  King.  See  Sorel,  vol.  i,  p.  90.] 


THE  FOUR  PACIFIC  NEGOTIATIONS     111 

as  the  despatch  to  Benedetti  was  placed  before  him 
he  wrote  to  Gramont :  — 

"My  DEAR  DUKE,  —  I  have  received  your  despatches. 
I  deem  it  neither  advisable  nor  dignified  on  my  part  to 
write  to  the  Bang  of  Prussia  or  to  the  princes  of  Hohen- 
zollern.  Moreover,  I  think  that  you  should  not  tell 
Benedetti  to  go  to  the  Prince.  It  is  with  Prussia,  and 
with  her  alone,  that  we  have  to  do.  It  is  not  consist 
ent  with  our  dignity  to  implore  the  Prince  to  withdraw. 
I  beg  you  therefore  to  countermand  the  instruction  to 
Benedetti  on  this  subject.  He  must  not  think  that  the 
sentiment  of  the  nation  rejects  the  idea  of  war." 

Gramont  at  once  telegraphed  to  Benedetti  (July  9) : 
"You  must  not  see  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern ;  the 
Emperor  does  not  wish  any  overture  made  to  him." 

At  this  juncture  Olozaga  came  of  his  own  motion 
to  propose  that  he  should  himself  attempt  the  mission 
to  the  Hohenzollerns  which  the  Emperor  regarded 
as  inconsistent  with  his  dignity,  but  which  he  would 
have  been  overjoyed  to  see  others  attempt.  Olozaga, 
offended  that  so  momentous  a  negotiation  should 
have  been  carried  on  without  his  being  concerned 
in  it,  could  not  resign  himself  to  the  idea  that  the 
destiny  of  his  country  should  be  arranged  without 
his  knowledge;  he  was  eager  to  prove  that  it  was 
not  so  simple  a  matter  as  they  thought  to  do  without 
his  assistance,  and  he  burned  to  repay  Prim  in  his 
own  coin.  Moreover,  he  had  a  sincere  sympathy 
for  France  and  the  Emperor,  and  would  have  been 
happy  to  spare  them  the  perils  of  a  terrible  war.  In 
his  meditations  on  the  subject,  it  occurred  to  him 


11%        THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

that  he  might  be  able,  through  the  medium  of  Strat, 
the  Roumanian  agent,  an  alert,  shrewd,  intelligent 
man  who  stood  well  with  the  Hohenzollern  family, 
to  bring  Leopold  to  the  withdrawal  which  the  whole 
body  of  European  diplomacy  was  about  to  seek,  prob 
ably  in  vain.  He  sent  him  an  urgent  summons 
during  the  night.  At  four  in  the  morning  Strat  found 
him  pacing  the  floor  in  extreme  agitation. 

"If  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy,"  he  said,  "is  a 
pretext  for  war,  planned  by  Bismarck  and  desired  by 
the  Emperor,  there  is  nothing  to  be  done;  if,  as  is 
possible,  it  is  mainly  an  ambitious  proceeding  on  the 
part  of  the  Hohenzollern  family,  perhaps  they  might 
be  persuaded  not  to  persist.  You  have  friendly  re 
lations  with  that  family;  are  you  willing  to  under 
take  a  mission  to  them  with  the  object  of  securing  the 
withdrawal  which  would  save  the  whole  situation  P"1 

1  AU  these  details  and  those  which  follow  were  given  to  me  by  Strat  and 
by  Olozaga.  [The  text  leaves  the  date  of  Strat's  mission  in  some  uncer 
tainty,  but  the  memoirs  of  the  King  of  Roumania  supply  explicit  informa 
tion  on  this  point  as  well  as  with  regard  to  the  circumstances  under  which 
the  mission  was  undertaken.  Under  date  of  July  6  we  find  what  follows :  — 

"Meanwhile  the  storm  aroused  by  the  Spanish  question  has  upset  every 
thing,  and  Prince  Charles  [he  was  proclaimed  King  of  Roumania  only  in 
1881]  is  suspected  of  having  conspired  behind  the  scenes  with  the  alleged 
foes  of  France ! 

"As  soon  as  Strat  hears  these  charges,  he  goes  to  the  Due  de  Gramont, 
to  ask  him  if  it  is  true  that  Prince  Charles  is  supposed  to  be  concerned  in 
his  brother's  candidacy.  The  duke  replies  frankly  that  he  cannot  deny 
it,  and  concludes  with  these  significant  words:  "The  moment  that  Prince 
Charles  conspires  against  French  interests,  it  is  no  more  than  fair  fighting 
to  do  our  utmost  to  overturn  him,  and  indeed  to  begin  right  there  in  case 
of  war  with  Prussia,  in  order  to  satisfy  to  some  extent  public  opinion  which 
has  many  a  time  reproached  the  Emperor  for  putting  a  Hohenzollern  on 
the  Danube!* 

"In  vain  did  Strat  try  to  convince  the  Due  de  Gramont  that  Prince 
Charles  had  had  absolutely  no  part  in  Prince  Leopold's  candidacy.  When, 


THE  FOUR  PACIFIC  NEGOTIATIONS      .13 

Strat  asked  for  time  to  reflect;  he  had  not  time 
to  communicate  with  his  government,  and  he  was 
afraid  of  interfering  with  its  plans. 

"In  short/'  said  Olozaga,  "you  do  not  consent, 
but  neither  do  you  refuse.  I  will  go  and  talk  with 
the  Emperor  about  it." 

He  was,  in  truth,  too  shrewd  to  make  the  venture 
carelessly.  He  went,  therefore,  to  the  Emperor  and 
asked  him  whether  he  did  or  did  not  want  war ;  whether 
the  Hohenzollern  affair  was  simply  an  opportunity 
to  restore  the  equilibrium  that  was  destroyed  in  1866, 
and  whether  an  inopportune  interference  on  his  part 
would  thwart  it.  If  the  Emperor  desired  peace, 
he  thought  that  he  could  assure  it  by  getting  rid  of 
the  candidacy.  And  he  explained  how. 

The  Emperor  replied  without  hesitation  that  he 
did  desire  peace;  he  had  no  interest  to  be  subserved 
by  war,  and  was  not  seeking  a  pretext  for  it.  His 

he  saw  that  the  duke  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  his  protestations,  he  begged  him 
to  maintain  a  neutral  attitude  with  regard  to  Roumania  for  five  days, 
agreeing  to  furnish*  him  within  that  time  proofs  of  the  loyalty  of  the  Prince 
of  Roumania' s  purposes,  and  thus  to  destroy  the  tissue  of  falsehoods  spread 
broadcast  in  the  French  capital  by  the  subversive  faction  of  the  Roumanian 
opposition.  .  .  . 

"  Two  hours  later,  Strat  started  for  Sigmaringen,  in  order  to  inform  Prince 
Antony  of  the  state  of  affairs." 

Lehautcourt  (vol.  i,  p.  259)  cites  Darimon  (Eistoire  d'un  Jour)  for  the 
statement  that  before  leaving  Paris,  on  July  8,  "M.  Strat  deemed  it  neces 
sary  to  have  an  understanding  with  M.  Olozaga."  It  will  be  seen  that 
some  of  M.  Ollivier's  statements  are  inconsistent  with  the  passages  quoted, 
notably  as  to  Olozaga's  initiative,  and  as  to  the  stipulation  that  Gramont 
should  be  kept  in  ignorance  of  the  affair;  but  the  details  are  important 
only  because  it  is  evident  that  this  mission  of  Strat  had  much  to  do  with 
the  later  withdrawal  of  Prince  Leopold's  candidacy ;  so  that  if,  as  there  was 
every  reason  to  anticipate,  war  had1  been  avoided  by  that  withdrawal,  it 
would  have  been  so  avoided  from  no  higher  motive  than  the  safeguarding 
of  the  Hohenzollern  interests  in  Roumania.] 


114         THE  FKAJNCU-rJttJSSIAN  WAR 

sole  preoccupation  was  that  no  blow  should  be  dealt 
at  the  interests  of  France.  If  he  were  satisfactorily 
assured  of  that,  he  would  ask  for  nothing  more.  Al 
though  he  did  not  believe  in  the  success  of  Strat's 
attempt,  he  would  be  glad  to  have  it  made,  provided 
that  his  name  was  not  involved  in  it. 

Olozaga  at  once  sent  for  Strat  again  and  repeated 
this  conversation.  As  he  still  hesitated,  Olozaga  pro 
posed  to  take  him  to  the  Emperor.  He  agreed,  on 
condition  that  no  one  should  be  informed  of  the  inter 
view,  for  if  it  should  be  made  known,  the  success  of  the 
mission  it  was  proposed  to  entrust  to  him  would  be 
come  impossible.  He  went  to  Saint-Cloud  secretly 
at  two  in  the  morning.  The  Emperor  told  him  how 
earnestly  he  desired  him  to  undertake  the  mission 
of  which  Olozaga  had  spoken  to  him,  and  again  ex 
pressed  his  pacific  opinions  in  such  wise  that  Strat 
ceased  to  doubt  their  sincerity. 

Thereupon  Strat  said:  "Sire,  my  intervention 
will  not  be  effective  unless  I  have  something  to  offer 
in  return  for  the  sacrifice  that  I  shall  ask.  Now  there 
is  a  group  of  Roumanians  here  in  Paris,  whom  M. 
de  Gramont  receives  and  who  are  conspiring  against 
Prince  Charles.  The  duke  [Gramont]  himself  has 
expressed  himself  in  very  harsh  terms  concerning 
the  Prince,  whom  he  accuses  of  being  an  accomplice 
in  his  brother's  candidacy,  and  he  threatens  to  assist 
at  overthrowing  him  in  order  to  satisfy  public  opinion, 
which  has  many  a  time  reproached  the  Emperor  for 
placing  a  Hohenzollern  on  the  Danube.  Furthermore, 
Austria  is  ill-disposed.  Your  Majesty  must  authorize 
me  to  assure  Prince  Antony  against  this  threefold 
menace,  and  to  promise  him,  without  fear  of  the  promise 


THE  POUR  PACIFIC  NEGOTIATIONS     115 

being  disavowed,  that  his  son,  far  from  having  to 
fear  the  ill-will  of  the  French  government,  can,  if  oc 
casion  arise,  rely  on  its  support." 

The  Emperor  made  the  promises  that  Strat  requested, 
and  the  latter  accepted  the  mission,  demanding 
that  neither  Gramont  nor  any  one  else  should  be 
informed  of  it.  The  Emperor  promised  secrecy, 
and  his  most  abundant  favor  if  he  should  succeed; 
and,  thanking  Olozaga  anew  for  his  initiative,  said 
to  him:  "This  is  the  last  arrow  that  we  have  in  our 
quiver;  I  shall  be  very  much  surprised  if  it  reaches 
the  mark,  but  it  would  make  me  very  happy." 

Strat  started  at  once  for  Diisseldorf,  to  find  out 
where  the  Hohenzollern  princes  were. 

Thus  four  pacific  efforts  —  that  upon  Serrano  at 
Madrid,  that  upon  King  William  at  Ems,  that  upon 
the  Hohenzollern  princes  at  Sigmaringen,  and  that 
upon  the  friendly  cabinets  —  were  about  to  meet 
and  blend  and  assist  one  another,  although  each  was 
ignorant  of  the  others,  —  all  four  tending  to  the  same 
end:  to  maintain  peace  by  the  withdrawal  of  the 
candidacy;  all  four  conceived,  encouraged,  or  guided 
by  the  Emperor  or  his  ministers,  those  so-called 
quarrel-seekers,  on  the  alert  for  a  pretext  for  war ! 1 

1  [I  much  regret  that  M.  Ollivier  has  thought  it  best  to  omit  here  three 
or  four  pages  of  his  main  work  in  which  he  gives  some  instances  of  the  harry 
ing  of  the  ministry  by  politicians  and  the  press  during  the  days  immediately 
following  the  declaration  of  July  6.  I  quote,  however,  one  passage  charac 
teristic  of  both  the  parties  concerned.  On  July  7]  "  I  was  just  entering  the 
legislative  hall,  when  Jules  Favre,  taking  the  floor,  asked  that  the  adjourned 
debate  should  be  assigned  for  the  next  day  or  the  day  after  that.  I  simply 
requested  the  Chamber  to  postpone  the  debate.  —  'Indefinitely?'  cried 
Jules  Favre ;  'so  that  you  can  have  a  change  to  take  a  flyer  on  the  Bourse  ? ' 
—  I  could  hardly  feel  that  that  vile  insinuation  was  aimed  at  me,  as  I  had 
not  a  share  of  anything  dealt  in  on  the  Bourse ;  but  I  could  not  endure  it. 


116        THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

According  to  my  habit,  I  walked  straight  up  to  the  insulter.  'To  whom  does 
M.  Jules  Favre  address  the  words  he  just  uttered  ?  *  My  threatening  glance 
and  gesture  said :  *  Is  it  to  those  who  sit  on  the  ministerial  benches  ? '  There 
upon,  according  to  his  habit,  he  beat  a  retreat  under  cover  of  an  inoffensive 
generality.  ...  *  To  all  who  speculate,'  he  replied.  I  rejoined:  'When 
the  government  considers  that  it  is  in  a  position  to  furnish  the  Chamber 
with  useful  information,  it  will  itself  invite  discussion ;  it  will  allow  no  one 
else  the  privilege  of  fixing  a  day  for  that  purpose.  Surely,  if  there  is  a  re 
proach  from  which  the  present  government  is  immune,  it  is  that  of  conceal 
ing  anything  whatever  from  this  Chamber,  since  the  interpellation  of  one 
of  its  members  sufficed  to  cause  it  to  explain  an  event  which,  so  far  as  the 
government  was  concerned,  was  only  a  day  or  two  old.  The  Chamber  and 
the  country  may  rest  assured  that  we  shall  not  fail,  under  the  present  circum 
stances,  to  unite,  as  always,  firmness  with  moderation ;  that  we  shall  forget 
neither  what  the  Chamber  wants  nor  what  the  country  wants ;  but  we  refuse 
to  engage  prematurely  in  reckless  and  unconsidered  discussions.' "  L* Empire 
Ubfral,  vol.  xiv,  pp.  143,  144. 


CHAPTER  IX 

GKAMONT'S  NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  THE  POWEKS 

ALTHOUGH  our  four  negotiations  were  carried  on 
contemporaneously,  it  is  important  to  take  them  up 
separately,  in  order  to  follow  them  the  more  readily 
in  their  logical  interdependence;  and  as  the  action 
of  the  friendly  cabinets  was,  in  some  sense,  the  frame 
in  which  the  private  interventions  at  Madrid,  Ems, 
and  Sigmaringen  followed  their  course,  I  -shall  describe 
that  first  of  all. l 

The  powers  had  replied  to  our  request,  each 
after  its  own  fashion.,  Gortchakoff  failed  to  justify 
the  hope  that  the  Emperor  had  placed  in  Russia: 
he  sneered  at  our  sensitiveness.  "When  another 
HohenzoUern  prince  procured  himself  to  be  proclaimed 
King  by  the  Roumanians,  despite  the  opposition  of 
Russia,  but  with  the  support  of  France,"  he  said, 
"y°u  confined  yourselves  to  remonstrances  and 
accepted  the  accomplished  fact.  Do  as  much  now. 
You  ask  our  assistance,  but  France  is  Russia's  debtor ; 
it  would  be  necessary  for  her  to  give  conciliatory 
pledges  touching  the  Orient.  Not  that  there  is  a 
question  of  a  revision  of  the  humiliating  treaty  of 
1856,  which  Russia  endures  with  pain;  she  under- 

1  [On  the  subject  of  this  chapter,  generally,  see  Sorel,  vol.  i,  pp.  61-71, 
140-148 ;  Welschinger,  vol.  i,  Chap,  vi ;  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  pp.  148-157, 182- 
188;  TaxUe  Delord,  Histoire  du  Second  Empire,  vol.  vi,  pp.  132  ff.,  145  ff., 
167.] 

117 


118         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

stands  that  France  is  not  alone,  and  that  she  can 
act  only  in  concert  with  England."  Later,  to  Fournier, 
the  attache  of  the  legation  at  St.  Petersburg,  Gort- 
chakoff,  admitted  the  malevolence  of  his  expressions. 
"France,"  he  said,  "needed  a  lesson." l 

The  Tsar,  on  the  other  hand,  seemed  touched  by 
Napoleon's  confidence..  He  bade  Fleury  to  inform 
him  that  he  had  strong  reasons  for  thinking  that  the 
intrigue  woven  by  Marshal  Prim  would  not  succeed.2 
He  wrote  to  King  William,  counselling  moderation 
and  abstention.  Although  William  replied  that  he 
had  nothing  to  do  with  the  offer  made  to  the  Prince 
of  Hohenzollern,  and  that  his  government  was  not 
a  party  to  the  negotiation,  the  Tsar  sent  still  another 
despatch,  which  he  read  to  Fleury,  in  which  he  press- 
ingly  besought  his  uncle  to  order  the  Prince  to  with 
draw.  "By  such  a  command,  the  King  would  cease 
to  be  interested  in  the  candidacy,  which  would  then 
become  purely  a  Spanish  affair,  and  would  not  be 
long  in  disappearing  in  discord,  before  the  disapproval 
of  all  Europe."  "War  would  be  a  European  calamity," 
the  Tsar  added  to  Fleury,  "of  which  the  Revolution 
would  reap  all  the  profit.  Say  to  your  government 
that  I  will  do  all  that  I  can  to  prevent  it,  within  the 
limits  of  my  advice  and  influence.  My  good-will 
toward  the  Emperor  cannot  be  questioned:  recently 
the  Due  d'Aumale  and  some  of  his  people  formed 
the  plan  of  coming  here  to  visit  Grand  Duke  Con- 
stantine  and  making  the  tour  of  Russia ;  I  sent  word 

1  [See  Lehautcourt,  vol.  I,  pp.  196-204,  253-256;  Sorel,  vol.  i,  p.  96;  La 
Gorce,  vol.  vi,  pp.  234-235 ;   Welschinger,  vol.  i,  p.  222.    See  also  Sir  A. 
Buchanan  to  Granville,  July  9  and  11,  Blue  Book,  p.  49.] 

2  Fleury  to  Gramont,  July  9.    And  see  La  France  et  la  Russie  in  1870 » by 
Comte  Fleury. 


NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  THE  POWERS      119 

to  the  Orleans  princes  that  after  the  recent  vote  of 
the  Chamber,  their  journey  to  Russia  seemed  to  me 
inopportune/' 1 

Beust  never  refused  us  his  good  words.  He  wrote 
to  his  ambassador  at  Berlin:  "The  French  nation 
has  held  in  check  the  sentiments  to  which  the  aggran 
dizement  of  Prussia  in  Germany  gave  birth  in  its  mind ; 
but  that  suspicion,  hardly  overcome,  would  not  only 
be  rearoused,  but  would  reach  the  point  of  serious 
disquiet,  if  an  attempt  should  be  made  to  bring  Spain 
under  Prussian  influence  by  placing  on  the  throne 
a  member  of  the  royal  family  of  Prussia.  Your  Ex 
cellency  will  not  conceal  from  the  statesmen  of  Prussia 
that  we  can  see  danger  of  genuine  agitation  in  the 
candidacy  of  Prince  Leopold,  and  will  express  our 
strong  desire  that  love  of  peace  and  the  Bang's  lofty 
intelligence  may  prevent  the  irruption  into  European 
politics  of  an  element  of  discord  so  full  of  menace." 2 

Visconti-Venosta,  who  was  much  more  circumspect, 
expressed  the  same  hopes  at  Berlin,  and  was  more 
insistent  at  Madrid,  although  still  with  reserve.  He 
instructed  his  representative,  Cerutti,  to  call  atten 
tion  to  the  fact  that,  until  the  decision  of  the  Cortes, 
any  advice  might  be  tendered ;  it  was  therefore  proper 
for  the  governments  friendly  to  Spain  to  point  out  the 
extreme  gravity  of  a  situation,  the  peaceful  outcome 
of  which  depended  solely  on  the  wisdom  and  politic 

1  Fleury  to  Gramont,  July  12.    This  conversation  proves  how  untrue 
it  is  that  the  understanding  between  the  Czar  and  King  William  concern 
ing  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy  was  reached  at  Ems.    He  would  not  have 
advised  the  withdrawal  of  a  candidacy  to  which  he  had  given  his  approval. 
[Note  of  M.  Ollivier  in  vol.  xiv,  p.  15S.] 

2  Beust  to  von  Munch,  July  6.    [See  Sorel,  vol.  i,  p.  71 ;  Lehautcourt, 
vol.  i,  p.  248  and  n.] 


120         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

spirit  of  her  representatives.  The  Italian  minister 
was  directed  to  insist  on  the  tremendous  responsibility 
which  the  Cortes  would  assume  in  raising  to  the  throne 
a  prince  whose  accession  would  be  the  signal  for  a 
European  war ;  he  was  to  express,  in  the  name  of  his 
government,  the  fear  that  a  monarchy  founded  under 
such  auspices,  far  from  giving  to  Spain  the  security 
and  repose  to  which  she  aspired,  would  expose  her  to 
fresh  trials  and  fresh  perils.  He  was  even  authorized 
to  support  the  English  Ambassador,  and  to  see  how 
far  the  two  nations  could  agree  upon  a  common  course.1 
The  South  German  States  did  not  give  us  the  assist 
ance  that  Gramont  expected  from  them.  They  showed 
once  more  how  blind  was  the  policy  which  exalted 
defence  of  their  territory  into  a  dogma,  and  they  began 
to  turn  their  backs  on  us.  The  weather-cock  of  Wiir- 
temberg,  Varnrbtihler,  whose  views  Saint- Vallier  was 
too  ready  to  share,  began  to  turn.  Although  not  in 
a  position  to  judge  of  the  imperative  reasons  for  our 
declaration  of  the  6th,  he  had  the  assurance  to  regret 
that  our  "confidence  in  the  justice  of  our  cause  did 
not  advise  more  moderation  in  its  form" ;  and  he 
pretended  to  be  amazed  and  alarmed.2 

Bray,  with  more  sincerity  and  downrightness,  was 
no  more  encouraging.  He  said  to  Cadore:  "If  war 
should  break  out  between  France  and  Prussia,  our 
position  would  be  most  embarrassing;  for  while,  on 
the  one  hand,  it  is  beyond  question  that  the  affair  is 
of  no  interest  to  Bavaria,  we  could  not,  on  the  other 

1  Malaret  to  Gramont;  Layard  to  Granville  [My  10,  Blue  Boole,  p.  18]; 
Paget  to  Granville  [July  9  and  12,  Blue  Book,  pp.  29,  SO.    See  also  Sorel, 
vol.  i,  p.  95 ;  Letautcourt,  vol.  i,  p.  249.] 

2  [Lehautcourt,  vol.  i,  pp.  338  and  n.,  340  and  nj 


NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  THE  POWERS     121 

hand,  remain  unmoved  by  the  invasion  of  German 
territory  by  a  French  army,  on  the  pretext  that  Spain 
has  summoned  a  Prussian  prince  to  govern  her.  Prus 
sia  denies  all  participation  in  the  matter  of  the  Prince's 
candidacy;  she  says  that  it  is  no  affair  of  hers,  and 
people  are  beginning  to  think  that,  if  you  are  not 
satisfied  with  that  assertion,  it  must  be  that  your 
government  proposes  to  seize  this  opportunity  to 
recur  to  the  events  of  1866.  The  line  of  conduct 
followed  by  your  government  and  the  language  of 
its  journals  give  some  probability  to  these  suspicions ; 
you  make  our  situation  very  difficult.  I  have  always 
maintained  that  the  treaties  of  alliance  are  defensive 
in  character ;  if  Prussia  could  with  any  show  of  justice 
accuse  you  of  being  the  aggressors,  and  say  that  your 
armies  first  crossed  the  frontier,  we  should  be  obliged 
to  enter  the  field  against  you,  which  I  should  deeply 
regret,  for  Bavaria  has  never  had  reason  to  do  aught 
but  praise  France,  and  of  all  the  German  states  it 
is  the  one  where  the  public  feeling  is  most  favorable 
to  you.5' 1 

The  English  Cabinet  failed  to  see  what  a  decisive 
influence  it  might  exert.  With  a  word,  if  it  had  chosen, 
it  could  have  stopped  the  war ;  it  would  have  been 
enough  for  it  to  say:  "A  rule  of  international  law, 
originated  by  us  in  Belgium,  and  submitted  to  by 
us  in  Greece,  forbids  every  great  power  to  place  one 
of  its  reigning  house  on  a  foreign  throne,  without  the 
consent  of  Europe  first  obtained.  We  consider  that 

1  July  13.  [See  Lehautcourt,  vol.  i,  p.  839.  As  to  the  immediate  action 
of  the  Bavarian  and  Wiirtemberg  governments  after  the  declaration  of  war, 
see  despatches  of  Sir  H.  Howard  and  Mr.  Gordon  to  Earl  Granvule,  July  17, 
in  Blue  Book,  No.  3,  p.  1.] 


THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

there  is  occasion,  under  circumstances  which  threaten 
the  peace  of  the  world,  to  summon  a  conference  to  inquire 
into  the  value  of  this  rule  and  to  determine  how  far 
it  should  be  made  applicable  to  the  candidacy  put 
forward  in  Spain." 

This  proposition,  which,  if  made  by  us,  would  have 
been  met  with  a  curt  refusal  by  Prussia  and  Spain, 
was,  on  the  contrary,  certain  of  acceptance  if  England 
had  taken  the  initiative  in  it.  Our  assent  would  have 
been  immediate,  that  of  Austria  and  Italy  would  not 
have  been  long  delayed,  nor  that  of  Russia.  Bismarck 
would  have  grumbled,  but  his  King  would  not  have 
listened  to  him;  the  conference  would  have  been 
held,  and  would  have  settled  the  dispute. 

The  English  Cabinet  could  make  up  its  mind  neither 
to  approve  nor  to  blame  nor  to  hold  aloof ;  its  conduct 
was  two-faced,  sordid,  and  cowardly.  It  supported 
us  as  if  we  were  in  the  right,  and  seemed  to  contest 
our  claim  as  if  it  had  not  supported  us.  Granville 
received  in  a  cold  and  embarrassed  way  Gramont's 
appeal  for  his  assistance:  he  realized  the  agitation 
that  must  have  been  aroused  in  France  by  news  which 
had  surprised  himself  no  little;  he  thought,  however, 
that  we  had  perhaps  taken  a  little  too  much  to 
heart  a  fact  the  consequences  of  which  did  not  seem 
to  him  of  such  grave  importance  as  the  imperial  govern 
ment  attributed  to  it.  He  regretted  that  Gramont 
had  used  such  forcible  language  to  Werther ;  he  won 
dered  whether  the  attitude  we  had  felt  called  upon 
to  assume  was  not  calculated  of  itself  to  create  more 
serious  complications  than  those  which  would  be 
caused  by  the  incident  itself.  However,  coming  to 
the  point,  he  declared  that  he  was  ready  to  "use  what 


NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  THE  POWERS     123 

influence  they  [the  government]  might  possess  both 
with  Prussia  and  with  Spain;  and  without  any  pre 
tension  to  dictate  to  either  power  they  would  advise 
them  to  take  into  their  most  serious  consideration  .  .  . 
all  the  bearings  of  this  question." 1 

Strange  language !  If  dynastic  questions  in  Spain 
were  of  so  little  consequence,  why  did  Palmerston 
threaten  Louis-Philippe  with  war  in  case  the  Due 
d'Aumale  should  become  the  Queen's  husband  ?  and 
why  did  he  manifest  such  indignation  when  Mont- 
pensier  became  the  husband  of  the  Infanta  ?  2  Would 
Granville  himself  have  remained  unmoved  and  dumb 
if  he  had  been  informed  that  Prince  Napoleon  was 
about  to  be  chosen  King  of  Spain  ? 

Gladstone,  to  whom  La  Valette  expressed  his  regret 
at  Granville' s  lukewarixi  attitude,  replied:  "We  must 
begin  cautiously.  We  knew  nothing  of  the  question  at 
issue,  and  we  do  not  as  yet  know  the  details."  They 
did  in  fact  begin  very  cautiously,  and  with  abundance 
of  circumlocution  ,  and  reservations.  They  instructed 
their  ambassadors  at  Berlin  and  Madrid  to  counsel 
prudence,  avoiding  any  discussion  of  Spain's  right 

1  [Granville  to  Lyons,  July  6,  Blue  Book,  p.  2.] 

2  [The  so-called  question  of  the  Spanish  Marriages  nearly  involved 
France  and  England  in  war  in  1846.    The  young  Queen  Isabella,  and  her 
sister,  Maria  Luisa,  were  both  a  marier,  and  Lord  Palmerston,  then  Foreign 
Minister  in  the  government  of  Lord  John  Russell,  strove  to  defeat  the  en 
deavors  of  the  government  of  Louis  Philippe  to  obtain  a  preponderant 
influence  in  Spain  by  marrying  the  Queen  to  the  King's  fourth  son,  the  Due 
d'Aumale.    In  the  end,  the  Queen  married  her  cousin,  and  the  hand  of  the 
younger  princess  was  bestowed  on  the  Due  de  Montpensier,  fifth  son  of 
Louis  Philippe,  who,  as  we  have  seen,  was  a  candidate  for  the  Spanish  throne 
in  1870.    See  the  Life  of  Viscount  Palmerston,  by  Sir  Henry  Bulwer  (Lord 
Bailing),  who  was  British  Minister  at  Madrid  and  Palmerston's  chief  agent 
in  the  affair,  and  Sir  Spencer  Walpole's  Life  of  Lord  John  Russell ;  also  the 
Memoirs  of  Charles  C.  F.  GrevUle,  2d  Series.] 


124         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

to  choose  her  own  sovereign,  and  any  appearance 
of  putting  pressure  on  Germany,  or  any  admission 
that  the  accession  of  a  Hohenzollern  would  justify  the 
immediate  recourse  to  arms  which  Prance  threatened. 
"Her  Majesty's  government/'  GranviUe  wrote  to 
Loftus,  "certainly  hope,  and  they  cannot  but  believe, 
that  this  project  of  which  they  have  been  hitherto 
ignorant,  has  not  received  any  sanction  from  the 
King.  ...  [I  venture,  therefore,  to  hope  that]  the 
King  [and  his  adviser's]  will  find  it  consistent  with 
their  own  views  [of  what  is  best  for  Spain]  effectually 
to  discourage  a  project  fraught  with  risk  to  the  best 
interests  of  that  country.  .  .  .  The  King  of  Prussia, 
whose  reign  has  brought  about  so  signal  an  aggran 
dizement  of  that  country,  has  now  an  opportunity 
not  less  signal  of  exercising  a  wise  and  disinterested 
magnanimity,  with  the  certain  effect  of  conferring 
an  inestimable  service  on  Europe  by  the  maintenance 
of  its  peace."  l 

He  instructed  his  ambassador  at  Madrid,  Layard, 
"while  carefully  abstaining  from  employing  any  lan 
guage  calculated  to  offend  them  [the  Spanish  gov 
ernment],  to  use  every  pressure  upon  them  which, 
in  your  judgment,  may  contribute  to  induce  them 
to  abandon  the  project  of  conferring  the  throne  of 
Spain  on  Prince  Leopold  of  Hohenzollern.*'  2 

This  advice  was,  in  reality,  given  in  the  interest  of 
Prussia  rather  than  in  ours.  Granville,  although 
personally  inclined  toward  France,  was  swayed  by 
the  Queen's  German  predilections.  As  for  Gladstone, 
his  sympathies  were  absolutely  Prussian.  Both  alike 

1  [Graaville  to  Loftus,  July  6,  Blue  Book,  p.  3.] 

2  [Graaville  to  Layard,  July  7,  Blue  Book,  p.  5.] 


NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  THE  POWERS    125 

regarded  the  greatness  of  Prussia  as  a  British  interest. 
They  dreaded  war  from  motives  of  sincere  philan 
thropy,  but  also  because  they  feared  that  it  might 
result  too  favorably  for  us.  This  fact  is  confirmed 
by  the  testimony  of  the  Prussian  Ambassador,  Berns- 
dorff.  He  frequently  heard  it  said,  in  the  most 
aristocratic  and  most  influential  English  clubs,  that, 
while  they  esteemed  highly  the  genius  and  ability  of 
Bismarck,  as  well  as  the  valor  of  the  Prussian  army, 
they  considered  that  Napoleon's  qualities  as  a  states 
man  and  the  valor  of  the  French  army  should  be 
rated  much  higher.1 

The  overtures  of  friendly  diplomacy  had  no  success 
at  Berlin.  Thile  persisted  in  his  sneering  reticence, 
and  began,  by  his  telegrams  to  his  agents,  the  cynical 
series  of  Prussian  impostures.  "Prussia  had  never  in 
terfered  in  the  choice  of  a  monarch  in  Spain;  any 
confidential  discussion  of  details  with  France  had 
been  prevented  by  the  tone  that  the  French  ministry 

1  Bernsdorff,  Im  Kampfe  fur  Preussens  Ehre,  p.  618.  [As  to  the  attitude 
of  England  in  the  early  days  of  July,  see  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  p.  234 ;  Sorel, 
vol.  i,  pp.  70,  71 ;  Lehautcourt,  vol.  i,  pp.  246-248  and  notes ;  Welschlnger, 
vol.  i,  pp.  224-228 ;  also  Granville  to  Layard,  July  8,  Blue  Book,  p.  9 ;  Layard 
to  Granville,  July  7  and  10,  Ibid.,  pp.  14,  18.  The  following  passage  occurs 
at  this  point  in  M.  OUivier's  larger  work  (vol.  xiv,  p.  160) :  —  ] 

"A  hazardous  argument  on  Gramont's  part  came  near  arresting  the 
intervention  of  England.  He  had  said  to  Lyons  [Lyons  to  Granville,  July  8, 
Blue  Book,  p.  10]  that  we  had  begun  to  prepare  for  war,  although  in  reality 
we  had  done  nothing  at  all ;  he  hoped  thus  to  arouse  the  apprehensions  of 
the  English  Cabinet  and  to  make  its  action  more  energetic.  The  contrary 
result  was  on  the  point  of  being  produced.  *The  Council  considered  whether 
it  was  worth  while  to  continue  to  seek  an  amicable  solution  when  the  facts 
spoke  more  loudly  than  pacific  exhortations,  and  whether  it  would  not  be 
well  to  wait  until  things  had  calmed  down  a  little,  so  that  the  voices  of 
friends  could  make  themselves  heard.'  [This  seems  to  be  a  paraphrase  »of  a 
passage  in  Granville  to  Lyons,  July  9,  Blue  Book,  p.  12.]  La  Valette's 
explanations  put  an  end  to  this  hesitation." 


126         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

had  assumed  in  its  public  utterances  in  the  Assembly." 1 
Two  falsehoods  coupled  together :  the  French  ministry 
spoke  in  the  Chamber  on  the  6th,  and  a  confidential 
discussion  of  details  had  been  declined  on  the  4th. 
Nor  had  European  diplomacy  any  better  fortune 
at  Madrid.  The  skill  with  which  we  had  avoided 
offending  Spanish  sentiment  had  placed  Prim  in  a 
difficult  position.  Neither  Serrano  nor  Sagasta  had 
been  admitted  to  the  secret  of  his  plot;  indeed,  Sa 
gasta  had  given  his  word  in  good  faith  to  Mercier 
that  there  had  been  no  letters  exchanged  between 
Prim  and  Bismarck.  Prim,  being  unable  to  disclose 
his  base  performance  to  them,  took  refuge  definitely 
in  the  mystification  that  he  had  outlined  to  Mercier. 
He  played  the  part  of  an  innocent  man,  surprised 
at  the  excitement  he  had  caused,  and  shocked  by  the, 
news  he  had  received  from  Paris :  he  had  had  no 
evil  intention  against  France  or  her  Emperor;  he 
had  had  no  suspicion  that  either  could  take  alarm 
at  an  arrangement  suggested  solely  by  the  urgent 
necessity  of  putting  an  end  to  a  disastrous  interregnum. 
It  had  been  kept  a  secret  only  to  avoid  premature 
discussion,  which  might  have  blocked  the  solution: 
the  purpose  of  offending  the  Emperor  had  been  so 
far  from  his  mind  that  he  expected  to  go  to  Vichy 

1  [Under  date  of  July  13,  Busch  quotes  the  following  as  having  been 
dictated  to  him  by  Bismarck  for  publication  in  "other  papers"  (than  the 
official  Norddeutsche  Zeitung')  :  "It  cannot  be  denied  that  a  Spanish  govern 
ment-  disposed  to  promote  the  cause  of  peace,  and  to  abstain  from  con 
spiring  with  France,  would  be  of  some  value  to  us.  But  if,  some  fourteen 
days  ago,  the  Emperor  Napoleon  had  addressed  himself  confidentially  to  Ber 
lin,  or  indicated  that  the  affair  was  attracting  attention,  Prussia,  instead 
of  adopting  an  indifferent  attitude,  would  have  cooperated  in  pacifying  public 
opinion  in  Paris."  Bismarck :  Some  Secret  Papers,  etc.,  vol.  i,  p.  35.] 


NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  THE  POWERS     127 

and  obtain  his  concurrence  at  the  same  time  that 
Prince  Leopold  was  to  inform  Napoleon  III,  directly, 
of  his  candidacy.  He  gave  an  appearance  of  sin 
cerity  to  these  outrageous  but  not  yet  unmasked 
falsehoods,  by  feigning  to  assist  us  to  extricate  our 
selves  from  the  embarrassment  into  which  he  had 
"unwittingly"  led  us. 

"How  are  we  to  get  out  of  it  ?  "  he  said  to  Mercier. 
"I  see  but  one  way:  let  the  Prince  inform  me  that 
he  has  met  with  obstacles  to  the  King's  consent; 
then  I  myself  will  facilitate  his  withdrawal."1 

"Take  the  initiative,"  said  Mercier. 
•  How  could  he  have  taken  it?  He  knew  that  the 
King's  consent  was  granted,  and  he  can  hardly  have 
thought  of  obtaining  its  revocation.  He  replied  that 
he  could  not  do  it,  and  asked  Mercier  not  to  disclose 
the  fact  that  he  had  suggested  that  way  out  for  us. 
Meanwhile  there  was  no  change  in  his  official  conduct. 
Sagasta  and  he  received  in  a  friendly  way  the  well- 
meant  representations  of  Layard  and  the  other  dip 
lomatic  agents;  they  repeated,  as  often  as  any  one 
wished,  that  the  Spanish  government  had  never  had 
any  idea  of  forming  an  alliance  with  Prussia,  or  of 
taking  any  step  hostile  to  France,  and  that  it  was  as 
desirous  as  possible  to  find  a  way  out  of  the  difficulty 
into  which  it  had  fallen  without  suspecting  it.  But  they 
held  out  no  hope  of  the  withdrawal  of  the  candidacy ; 
they  did  not  go  beyond  evasions,  and  did  not  post 
pone  for  a  day  the  meeting  of  the  Cortes,  still  appointed 
for  July  20. 

Prim  and  his  acolytes  conceived  once  more  the 
lofty  fantasy  of  making  sport  of  us,  while  lulling 

1  [Mercier  to  Gramont,  July  7 ;  see  Gramont,  pp.  63,  366.] 


128         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

our  suspicions  by  deceitful  assurances.  "Why,"  they 
said  to  Mercier,  "lay  so  rnucli  stress  on  this  date 
of  the  20th  of  July  ?  Let  the  days  pass  quietly  with 
out  worrying  us  and  without  getting  excited  your 
self.  The  state  of  public  opinion  •  has  changed  ma 
terially:  at  the  outset  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy 
seemed  sure  of  unanimous  acceptance;  to-day  it  is 
doubtful  if  it  obtains  a  majority;  our  army  will  not 
care  about  fighting  for  a  German  prince  who  is  a  grand 
son  of  Murat ;  do  not  you  oppose  the  free  expression 
of  the  national  will.  There  is  no  surer  way  of  getting 
rid  of  Prince  Leopold." 

Mercier,  from  policy,  pretended  to  be  taken  in  by 
this  buncombe.  "My  r61e,  which  is  not  an  easy  one," 
he  wrote  to  Gramont,  "is,  while  doing  my  utmost  to 
influence  public  opinion,  to  make  it  easier  for  individ 
uals  to  change  sides.  Be  good  enough  therefore,  I 
pray  you,  not  to  impute  to  weakness  what  I  may  do 
to  that  end.  A  certain  amount  of  careful  handling 
will  take  nothing  from  the  firmness  of  my  attitude 
and  my  language.  I  am  as  distrustful  as  I  ought  to 
be,  believe  me."  1 

Gramont  did  not  take  seriously  what  seemed  to 
be  so  far  from  serious,  and  neither  he  nor  the  Cabinet 
nor  the  Emperor  halted  in  the  measures  they  were 
taking. 

Thus  the  intervention  of  the  powers  had  failed 
at  Berlin  and  at  Madrid.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
secret  personal  negotiation  of  the  Emperor  with  Ser 
rano  was  wholly  successful.  Gramont,  knowing  that 
Mercier  had  been  let  into  the  secret  by  Bartholdi, 
thought  that  he  should  confirm,  by  his  instructions  as 

1  From  a  private  letter. 


NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  THE  POWERS     129 

responsible  official  chief,  those  of  the  Emperor.  On 
the  9th,  the  day  following  the  Regent's  return  to 
Madrid,  he  urged  Mercier  to  call  upon  him  and  to 
say  to  him  that,  "at  the  point  which  affairs  have  now 
reached,  he  alone  can  ensure  peace  to  Europe  by 
representations  to  the  King  of  Prussia  and  the  Prince 
of  Hohenzollern.  Add  that  France,  together  with 
the  whole  world,  will  be  grateful  to  him,  and  that  the 
government  of  the  Emperor  will  never  forget  so  mag 
nanimous  an  action." l 

Is  this  the  language  of  a  minister  "whose  deliberate 
purpose  it  was  to  precipitate  a  rupture  and  to  make 
the  most  of  the  quarrel  instead  of  putting  an  end  to 
it?'5 

-Bartholdi  reached  Madrid  in  the  morning  of  July 
10.  Having  communicated  his  instructions  to  Mercier, 
he  hastened  incontinently  to  Serrano,  and  laid  before 
him,  with  adroit  earnestness,  the  -Emperor's  wish. 
Serrano,  since  he  had  been  unable  to  keep  his  en 
gagements  with  Montpensier,  had  lost  interest  in 
the  search  for  a  king,  and  had  accepted  the  Hohen 
zollern  without  objection.  The  news  from  Paris 
had  roused  him  from  his  torpor.  He  would  have 
been  very  glad  to  draw  back,  but  being  very  careful 
not  to  step  outside  of  his  constitutional  r61e,  and 
having  also  given  his  assent,  he  dared  not  follow  his 
impulse.  He  was  lavish  of  friendly  words  to  Mefcier, 
assuring  him  of  his  good-will:  he  had  not  realized 
what  he  was  doing.  He  defended  Prim  and  repeated 
the  cock-and-bull  stories  that  the  latter  had  told  him ; 
he  even  denied  that  there  had  been  letters  exchanged 
between  Prim  and  the  Prince.  And  after  all  this 

1  Gramont  to  Mercier,  July  8. 


130         THE  FEANCO-PRTJSSIAN  WAE 

was  said,  lie  added  with  premeditated  candor:  "To 
say,  after  that,  that  he  is  not  concerned  in  it  —  no, 
indeed,  for  one  tells  many  lies  in  this  sort  of  business."  l 
The  confidence  in  him  manifested  by  the  Emperor 
touched  him  more  than  all  the  arguments  of  Mercier 
and  Layard  and  the  other  diplomats,  and  decided  him 
to  venture  what  his  personal  inclination  prompted. 
He  promised  Bartholdi  to  send  some  one  to  Prince 
Leopold;  neither  the  ministers  nor  Olozaga  were  to 
be  informed  of  a  mission  which  he  deemed  himself 
bound  to  regard  as  of  a  mysterious  and  wholly  pri 
vate  nature.  He  informed  Prim  alone.  That  hypo 
critical  confederate  of  Bismarck  was  careful  not  to 
discourage  him;  he  relied  on  Leopold's  firmness  and 
his  loyalty  to  Bismarck  and  himself,  and  had  no  doubt 

1  [Mercier  to  Gramont,  July  9  and  10.  See  the  despatches  in  full  in 
Benedetti,  Ma  Mission  en  Prusse,  434-436.  The  words  quoted  by  M. 
Ollivier  do  not  appear  in  either  despatch.] 

Serrano  being  in  Paris  in  1884, 1  requested  Darimon,  whom  at  that  time  I 
still  regarded  as  a  friend,  to  see  him  and  to  ask  him  in  my  name  the  fol 
lowing  questions :  1.  Who  conceived  the  idea  of  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy  ? 
Marshal  Serrano  declared  that  he  was  absolutely  ignorant.  He  did  not 
learn  of  the  candidacy  until  Prim's  return  from  hunting  in  the  mountains 
of  Toledo ;  that  is  to  say,  July  1, 1870.  He  was  unable  to  make  any  oppo 
sition  to  the  choice  because  he  had  no  other  to  offer ;  because  the  character 
of  Prince  Leopold  had  been  highly  praised  to  him ;  and  especially  because 
he  was  assured  that  that  candidacy  would  give  rise  to  no  complications  with 
France.  The  ex-Regent  knew  nothing  of  the  steps  that  had  been  taken  by 
M.  de  Ranees  at  Berlin  in  March,  1869,  and  had  aroused  the  suspicion  and 
susceptibility  of  the  Imperial  government.  2.  What  part  did  Prim  play  ? 
The  marshal  was  very  reserved  on  this  subject.  He  declared  that  Prim  told 
him  nothing  of  what  he  did.  The  Cortes  had  given  Prim  carte  blanche. 
It  was  to  that  body  alone  that  Prim  owed  an  account  of  the  machinery  set 
to  work  to  discover  a  candidate.  He  put  forward  Prince  Leopold,  but  the 
Council  of  Ministers  assembled  at  La  Granja  under  the  presidency  of  the 
Regent  did  not  ask  him  how  he  had  set  about  attaining  his  end.  [Note  of 
M,  Ollivier,  vol.  xiv,  p.  165.] 


NEGOTIATIONS  WITH  THE  POWERS     131 

that  the  Regent's  messenger  would  be  met  with 
an  immovable  refusal.  Whereupon,  turning  upon 
Serrano,  he  would  have  said  to  him:  "Inasmuch 
as  the  Prince  is  determined  to  go  on  to  the  end,  the 
honor  of  the  noble  Spanish  nation  compels  us  to 
follow  him."  But  as  he  preferred  not  to  give  his 
assent  to  a  step  of  which  he  desired  and  anticipated 
the  failure,  he  got  the  Regent  to  agree  that  he  should 
be  supposed  to  have  known  nothing  about  it. 

On  the  10th,  at  nine  in  the  evening,  Serrano  wrote 
to  Mercier :  "He  started  at  half  after  five.  Silence !" 
The  messenger  whose  departure  was  thus  announced 
was  the  Regent's  nephew  and  secretary,  General  Lopez 
Dominguez,  an  officer  of  unusual  distinction.  He  was 
to  go  to  Sigmaringen,  there  to  lay  before  the  head  of 
the  family  the  weighty  reasons  which  necessitated  the 
withdrawal  of  Prince  Leopold's  candidacy.  He  was 
also,  in  the  event  that  it  should  become  necessary, 
accredited  to  the  King  of  Prussia  and  to  Bismarck. 

By  this  very  act  of  accrediting  his  messenger  to  the 
King  and  Bismarck  as  well  as  to  the  Hohenzollerns, 
Serrano  in  his  turn  confirmed  what  we  were  hearing 
on  all  sides,  that  both  had  had  a  share  in  the  con 
spiracy.1 

This  step  on  the  Regent's  part  was  an  important 
one:  it  would  become  decisive  only  in  case  it  were 
not  thwarted  by  the  will  of  the  King  of  Prussia.  Thus 
the  negotiation  that  we  had  undertaken  with  him  at 
Ems  overshadows  the  other  diplomatic  incidents. 

1  [On  this  whole  subject,  see  Appendix  C.  Also  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  pp. 
251-253;  Sorel,  vol.  i.  pp.  106, 107;  Lehautcourt,  vol.  i,  pp.  257-259.] 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  NEGOTIATIONS  WITH   THE  KING   OF  PRUSSIA  AT 

EMS1 

THE  idea  of  a  negotiation  at  Ems  once  agreed  upon, 
we  did  not  hesitate  concerning  the  plenipotentiary 
to  be  sent  thither.  Public  opinion,  in  its  frantic  rage, 
attacked  our  ambassador  at  Madrid  as  well  as  him  at 
Berlin.  Even  in  the  only  journal  that  had  an  official 
character,  the  Constitutionnel,  there  were  some  sharp 
criticisms  of  Benedetti.  We  were  advised  to  recall 
both  him  and  Mercier:  both  alike  were  blamed  for 
not  detecting  the  Hohenzollern  plot,  and  Benedetti 
especially  for  leaving  us  in  ignorance  of  Prussia's  am 
bitious  views,  and  for  not  advising  us  of  her  under 
standing  with  Russia. 

It  was  not  true  that  Benedetti  had  not  warned  us  of 
the  ambitious  views  of  Bismarck  and  the  Prussian 
government :  he  had  done  so  often,  and,  in  particular, 
in  his  fine  despatch  of  January,  1870,  which  I  analyzed 
in  its  proper  place,2  and  he  had  neglected  no  opportunity 
of  reminding  us  that  the  understanding  with  Russia 
was  one  of  the  means  of  action  held  in  readiness  by 
that  ambition.  But,  after  he  had  informed  us  of  it, 
he  had  been  too  reassuring  in  recent  months,  repre 
senting  it  to  us  as  postponed  and  forgotten. 

It  was  true  that  in  1869  he  had  advised  his  govern 
ment  of  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy ;  but  he  was  en- 

1  [On  the  subject  of  tHs  chapter,  generally,  see  infra,  Appendix  I J 

2  [This  despatch  is  given  by  Benedetti,  p.  284.] 

132 


COMTB   VINCENT   BENEDETTI 
1817-1900 


THE  EMS  NEGOTIATION  133 

titled  to  no  great  credit,  as  the  majority  of  the  German 
newspapers  were  full  of  the  scheme.  But  it  was  in 
March,  1870,  that  Benedetti  should  have  detected  the 
plot ;  and  not  only  did  he  fail  to  do  it,  but  he  allowed 
himself  to  be  deceived  concerning  the  cause  of  the 
presence  of  the  Hohenzollern  princes  at  Berlin,  al 
though  he  should  have  been  put  on  his  guard  by  the 
alarm  of  the  preceding  year.1 

If  we  had  complied  with  the  demand  of  public 
opinion  by  tossing  to  it,  as  scapegoats,  the  two  ambassa 
dors,  we  should  have  cast  off  our  own  responsibility 
amid  universal  applause.  We  were  not  even  tempted 
to  do  it.  Urged  onward  by  the  course  of  events, 
having  no  time  to  investigate  the  conduct  of  Mercier 
and  Benedetti,  we  resolved  the  doubt  in  their  favor. 
We  caused  a  cessation  of  the  attacks  in  the  Constiiu- 
tionnel,  we  kept  Mercier  at  his  post,  and  we  entrusted 
the  much-abused  Benedetti  with  the  negotiation  with 
King  William  at  Ems.  Was  not  this  protecting  and 
shielding  him  more  efficaciously  than  by  a  declaration 
from  the  tribune  or  in  the  press,  of  which  we  had  not 
at  hand  the  necessary  elements,  and  which  would  have 
given  rise  to  irritating  and  fruitless  disputes.?  Bene 
detti  afterward  ill  requited  this  generosity  on  our  part.2 

If  a  person  has  a  physical  deformity,  it  is  the  first 
thing  that  one  notices  in  him.  Leo  XIII  had  for  his 
Master  of  the  Chamber  a  certain  Monsignor  Macchi, 
who  was  blessed  with  an  inordinately  long  nose.  The 
Pope  used  to  say:  "Si  vede  un  naso,  poi  Macchi." 
(One  sees  a  nose,  and  then  Macchi.)  It  is  the  same  with 

1  [See  supra,  pp.  18,  19.] 

2  [By  the  publication  of  his  self-exculpatory  volume,  Ma  Miwion  m 

,  in  1871,    See  Appendix  L] 


134         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

moral  Imperfections ;  that  which  first  impressed  one  in 
Benedetti  was  an  absorption  in  himself  which  amounted 
to  a  mania.  "When  he  looks  upon  himself,"  said 
Gramont,  "he  is  dazzled.5'  Had  he  a  part  in  some 
successful  negotiation,  its  success  was  due  to  him  alone. 
If  the  negotiation  did  not  succeed,  the  blame  belonged 
to  some  one  else,  and  he  had  an  inexhaustible  stock  of 
wiles  and  sophistries  to  denounce  that  other.  More 
over  he  belonged  to  the  school  of  his  friend  Rouher's 
mandarin  J.  M.  F.,  and  any  counsel,  so  long  as  it  was 
skilfully  supported,  seemed  to  him  the  best.  He 
said  to  me  one  day  with  a  self-satisfied  little  smile : 
"Thouvenel  has  asked  me  for  a  report  in  favor  of  rec 
ognizing  Italy ;  I  could  just  as  well  have  made  another 
of  the  contrary  tenor." 

The  hereditary  diplomats  declared  that  he  lacked 
something  because  he  began  his  career  in  the  consu 
lates.  However  that  may  be,  he  speedily  acquired 
what  was  then  considered  the  most  useful,  quality  of 
the  diplomat:  he  knew  how  to  frame  a  despatch. 
When  one  had  said,  "He  can  write  a  despatch,"  that 
was  the  highest  praise.  Now  let  me  tell  what  framing 
a  despatch  is :  it  is  saying  in  ten  pages  what  might  be 
said  in  ten  lines;  stretching  out  the  unimportant 
facts  to  the  point  of  tearing  them  apart,  so  that  they 
may  reach  a  respectable  length;  drowning  the  im 
portant  facts  in  a  flood  of  monotonous  rhetoric,  in 
which  they  lose  all  color  and  all  sharpness  of  outline; 
extending  one's  self  in  vapid,  sententious  platitudes 
with  an  air  of  profundity ;  and  placing  in  a  subordinate 
clause,  beside  the  opinion  or  prognostication  set  forth 
in  the  principal  clause,  a  lot  of  *buts  and  ifs  and  fors, 
in  such  wise  that,  whatever  happens,  one  can  boast 


THE  EMS  NEGOTIATION  135 

of  being  a  true  prophet.  Whenever,  in  my  investiga 
tions  in  the  Archives,  I  fell  in  with  one  of  those  endless 
despatches  written,  worse  luck !  not  with  the  lasting  black 
ink  used  by  our  old  diplomats,  upon  which  time  can 
make  no  impression,  but  in  a  pale,  already  almost  invisi 
ble  ink,  I  heaved  a  little  sigh ;  and  when  I  had  finished 
my  reading,  would  say  to  myself,  "How  much  this 
abundance  of  words  would  have  gained  by  being 
reduced  one  half  I"  And  if,  after  that,  I  happened  on 
the  narrative  of  a  Talleyrand,  a  Fleury,  or  a  Mercier, 
who  could  not  "frame  a  despatch,"  but  who  set  forth 
concisely  exact  facts  or  words,  what  a  delight  it  was  ! 

Benedetti  was  thoughtful,  diligent,  hard-working, 
entirely  devoted  to  his  duties,  but,  after  the  fashion 
of  the  majority  of  the  diplomatists  of  that  time,  he 
failed  to  realize  that  an  ambassador's  first  care  should 
be  to  learn,  when  he  is  unacquainted  with  it,  the  lan 
guage  of  the  country  where  he  is  to  reside.  Bismarck 
had  no  sooner  arrived  at  St.  Petersburg  than  he  bought 
a  grammar  and  began  to  study  Russian ;  he  had  done 
the  like  at  Paris.  Benedetti  lived  several  years  at 
Berlin  without  a  thought  that  it  would  be  useful  to 
him  to  learn  German,  and  that  the  best  sort  of  intelli 
gence  is  that  that  one  picks  up  on  the  streets  or  over 
hears  in  a  conversation  between  the  natives  of  the 
country.  He  excelled,  however,  in  supplying  what  he 
missed  in  that  direction  by  a  peculiar  aptitude  for 
spying  and  surmising  and  guessing;  but  there  again 
he  was  not  sufficiently  on  his  guard  against  another 
tendency  which  I  will  call  "the  diplomatic  failing": 
an  artless  credulity,  as  a  result  of  which,  suspicion 
was  succeeded  by  the  most  unbounded  confidence. 
For  the  rest,  a  man  of  distinction,  with  an  intelligent, 


136         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

open  countenance,  agreeable  manners,  not  too  effusive, 
most  attractive  in  conversation,  without  noisy  self- 
assertion,  of  a  ready  wit,  skilful  in  slipping  between 
the  crevices  of  events,  trained  in  the  art  of  exposition 
and  argumentation,  able  at  need  to  say  disagreeable 
things  without  being  disagreeable  himself, —  in  fine,  an 
excellent  diplomat,  to  whom  one  could  in  all  confi 
dence  entrust  a  difficult  mission.1 

Bismarck  had  not  been  disturbed  by  the  explosion 
of  French  wrath:  he  had  foreseen  it  and  wished  for 
it.  Our  declaration  irritated  his  self-esteem  a  little, 
but  did  not  make  him  depart  from  his  immobility. 
He  did  not  complain,  demanded  no  explanation,  but 
waited.  Until  the  meeting  of  the  Cortes  on  July  20, 
and  the  election  of  Leopold,  he  did  not  propose  to 
depart  from  that  attitude  of  expectation.  The  send 
ing  of  Benedetti  to  Ems  gave  him  his  first  uneasy 
moment.  The  King,  being  at  a  distance  from  him 
and  in  the  neighborhood  of  his  enemy,  Queen  Augusta, 
who  was  at  Coblentz,  might  yield  to  his  aversion  from 
war:  his  seventy-three  years  made  him  afraid  of  en 
dangering  the  laurels  won  in  1866 ;  he  had  gone  into 
the  enterprise  only  with  regret,  and  did  not  know  the 
true  inwardness  of  it.  Would  he  not  be  too  concilia 
tory,  and  would  not  his  concessions  destroy  the  plan 
so  laboriously  constructed  ?  Bismarck  wrote  at  once : 
"I  beg  your  Majesty  not  to  treat  with  Benedetti,  and 
if  he  is  persistent,  to  reply :  cMy  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  is  at  Varzin.  * "  2 

1  [As  to  the  difficulties  of  the  mission,  see  Sorel,  vol.  i,  pp.  100,  101 ;  La 
Gorce,  vol.  vi,  pp.  238,  239.] 

2  According  to  Oncken  [Unser  helden  Kaiser,  pp.  123-125],  Bismarck  in 
Ms  wrath  first  wrote  this  telegram;   "Mobilize  at  once,  declare  war,  and 


THE  EMS  NEGOTIATION  137 

In  fact,  the  Hohenzollern  affair  greatly  disturbed  the 
King.  He  had  been  much  vexed  by  the  unforeseen 
incident  which  had  caused  it  to  be  noised  abroad  too 
soon.  He  wrote  to  the  Queen  July  5  :  "The  Spanish 
bomb  has  exploded  all  at  once,  but  in  an  entirely 
different  way  from  what  I  had  been  led  to  expect. 
We  have  not  heard  a  word  thereon  from  our  cousin. 
At  Berlin  the  French  charge  d'affaires  has  already 
spoken  to  Thile  about  it,  who  naturally  replied  that 
the  government  had  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  the 
affair,  and  that  such  negotiations  as  had  taken  place 
between  Prim  and  the  Hohenzollern  family  had  not 
yet  been  communicated  to  us.  At  Paris,  too,  the  minis 
ter  questioned  Werther,  who  was  able  to  reply,  with  a 

attack  before  France  is  ready."  This  telegram  is  regarded  by  German 
critics  as  an  unfounded  conjecture.  Nor  should  we  pay  any  greater  heed 
to  the  tales  told  of  Bismarck's  amazement  and  wrath  at  Varziu  when  he 
read  Gramont's  declaration  [of  July  6].  He  was  not  indignant  until  later, 
when  it  had  produced  its  effect  adverse  to  him.  [Note  of  M.  Ollivier  in 
vol.  xiv,  p.  173.] 

[See  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  pp.  279,  280;  Lehautcourt,  i,  pp.  238,  239  and 
notes ;  Sorel,  vol  i,  pp.  102,  103  and  note.  Lehautcourt  refers  to  Bismarck 
as  "Gramont's  German  partner."  According  to  Sorel,  it  "seems  clear  that, 
at  first,  seeing  that  the  success  of  the  affair  was  endangered,  he  [Bismarck] 
advised  his  master  to  abandon  Prince  Leopold  and  save  the  honor  of  Prussia. 
(He  said  so  in  so  many  words  to  Jules  Favre ;  see  Favre,  Gouvernement  de 
la  Defense  Nationale,  p.  176.)  He  was  not  for  war  whatever  the  cost,  but 
only  under  circumstances  favorable  to  his  schemes.  He  did  not  abandon 
the  hope  of  bringing  such  circumstances  into  being,  but  he  awaited  the 
opportunity.  Believing  that  war  was  resolved  upon  by  the  French  govern 
ment  and  forced  upon  France  by  her  social  condition,  he  waited  for  the 
imprudence  of  his  adversary  to  force  the  King's  hand  and  sweep  public 
opinion  in  Germany  off  its  feet.  It  seemed  to  him  wise  to  be  moderate.  .  .  . 
The  position  taken  by  M.  de  Bismarck  was  undoubtedly  a  very  strong 
one.  .  .  .^  It  was  possible  to  turn  it,  but  it  was  necessary  first  of  all  to 
reconnoitre  it.  This  is  what  the  French  government  seems  to  have  entirely 
neglected  to  do.  It  was  unable  to  discover  the  plan  of  campaign  that  M. 
de  Bismarck  was  pursuing;  or  if  it  had  any  suspicion  of  it,  it  paid  no  heed."] 


138         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

perfectly  clear  conscience,  that  he  knew  nothing  about 
it."1 

On  July  6,  William  wrote  to  Prince  Antony  that  he 
could  not  understand  how  General  Prim  could  have 
informed  the  French  ambassador  of  the  acceptance  of 
the  hereditary  prince  before  the  Cortes  had  been  con 
sulted.  "I  regard  it  as  possible  that  the  excitement 
aroused  in  France  may  yet  be  quieted,  but  none  the 
less  I  regret  that  the  opinion  first  expressed  by  the  Prince 
of  Hohenzollern  was  not  followed,  namely,  that  they  must 
make  sure  of  the  assent  of  France.  This  was  not  done 
because  General  Prim  desired  it  to  be  kept  secret,  and 
Count  von  Bismarck  "argued  that  every  nation  is  free 
to  choose  its  king  without  consulting  another  nation."  2 

Our  declaration  produced  the  salutary  effect  upon 
the  King  that  we  had  anticipated;  it  wounded  his 
susceptibility,  unquestionably,  but  at  the  same  time 
it  set  him  face  to  face  with  the  reality,  and  convinced 
him  that  the  public  agitation  in  France  would  be 
allayed  only  by  the  withdrawal  of  Prince  Leopold. 
The  scruples  which  had  deterred  him  before  embarking 
on  the  enterprise  reawoke;  his  conscience,  which  was 
honest  when  it  was  not  blinded  by  deceitful  appear 
ances  took  account  of  the  equivocal  action  to  which 
he  had  given  his  sanction.  The  observations  of  the 
Tsar  and  of  Queen  Victoria  intensified  those  scruples 
and  mental  perturbations,  and,  in  obedience  to  these 
various  motives,  he  resolved  to  do  what  was  in  him 
to  side-track  the  candidacy,  of  which  he  saw  clearly 
enough  the  inevitable  menace. 

1  [Oncken,  Uns&r  helden  Kaiser,  p.  184.    This  letter  is  not  printed  in  the 
collection  cited  on  the  next  page.] 

2  [Memoirs  of  the  King  of  Boumania,  French  trans.,  vol.  i,  p.  590J 


THE  EMS  NEGOTIATION  139 

In  a  letter  to  his  wife,  of  tine  7th,  he  approves  our 
action  in  refusing  an  interpellation,  and  explains  his 
point  of  view :  he  considered  the  candidacy  as  purely 
a  Spanish  matter;  the  honor  of  France  was  not  in 
volved;  and  he  calculated  thus  the  chances  of  the 
election  by  the  Cortes :  — 

"The  French  will  spend  many  millions  to  buy  votes, 
we  shall  not  spend  a  thaler;  but  their  violent  articles 
have  exasperated  public  opinion,  which  fact  will  tend 
to  make  the  vote  more  favorable  to  the  Hohenzollern." 
And  that  prospect  was  far  from  filling  him  with  rap 
ture.  "Be  it  said  between  ourselves,  I  would  gladly 
see  Leopold  fail  of  election." 1 

With  a  word  he  could  prevent  that  election.  It  was 
enough  for  him  to  let  the  Prince  know  that,  in  view 
of  all  the  circumstances  it  would  be  the  wiser  course 
for  him  to  decline ;  he  would  have  been  obeyed  on  the 
instant.  But  that  decisive  course  was  offensive  to  his 
pride :  it  would  have  lowered  him  in  the  eyes  of  Ger 
many  and  Spain  and  his  own  family,  and  would  have 
exasperated  Bismarck.  He  tried  to  induce  the  Hohen- 
zollern  princes  to  extricate  him  from  embarrassment  by 
taking  the  responsibility  of  withdrawal.  He  hinted, 
impressed  upon  them  the  seriousness  of  the  business, 
urged  them  to  reflect  carefully  on  the  inconveniences 
of  obstinacy,  and  without  saying,  "Withdraw,"  he 
assured  them  that,  if  they  should  decide  to  do  so,  it 
would  be  with  great  pleasure  that  he  would  bestow 
upon  such  withdrawal  the  sanction  that  he  had  lately 
accorded  to  their  acceptance. 

But  for  the  Hohenzollern  princes  as  well,  considera- 

1  [Britfe  Kaiser  Wtthelms  d&r  Erste  (1911),  p.  218.] 


140         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAK 

tions  of  their  dignity  were  complicated  with  a  question 
of  honor.  By  accepting  the  candidacy  they  had  been 
guilty  of  a  crime  against  the  Emperor  Napoleon;  by 
withdrawing  their  acceptance  they  would  become 
guilty  in  respect  to  Prim  and  Bismarck,  to  whom  they 
had  bound  themselves.  They  evaded  the  necessity  of 
replying  to  the  King  by  pretending  not  to  understand 
his  hints.  But  the  King  would  not  allow  that  equivo 
cation,  and  pressed  them  to  explain  themselves.  - 

He  was  awaiting  their  reply  when  Benedetti  arrived, 
on  July  8  at  11  o'clock  at  night.  He  requested  an 
audience  forthwith.  The  King  appointed  it  for  the 
next  day  at  three  o'clock,  sending  word  to  him  that 
he  would  keep  him  to  dinner,  and  apologizing,  with 
good  grace,  on  the  ground  of  his  health  and  the  ex 
pected  arrival  of  the  Queen,  for  his  inability  to  receive 
him  earlier. 

Benedetti's  instructions  were  contained  in  an  official 
letter  of  July  7,  and  in  a  private  letter  of  the  same 
date  at  midnight.  At  Berlin  and  at  Madrid  we  were 
assured  that  the  King  of  Prussia  had  not  given  his 
assent  to  the  candidacy.  We  were  convinced  of  the 
contrary,  although  we  had  then  no  proofs.  Gramont, 
being  obliged  for  the  nonce,  by  a  diplomatic  hypothesis, 
to  take  Thile's  assertion  as  a  starting  point,  said  in  his 
official  letter :  — 

"If  the  head  of  the  Hohenzollern  family  has  here 
tofore  been  indifferent  to  this  affair,  we  request  that 
he  will  no  longer  be  so,  and  we  beg  him  to  intervene, 
if  not  by  his  command,  at  least  by  his  counsel,  with  the 
Prince,  and  to  put  an  end,  together  with  the  schemes ' 
based  by  Marshal  Prim  upon  that  candidacy,  to  the 
profound  uneasiness  which  it  has  everywhere  aroused. 


THE  EMS  NEGOTIATION  141 

In  King  William's  intervention  to  prevent  the  execu 
tion  of  these  schemes  we  should  see  first  of  all  the 
service  that  it  would  render  to  the  cause  of  peace, 
and  a  pledge  of  the  strengthening  of  our  friendly  rela 
tions  with  Prussia.  The  Emperor's  government  would 
appreciate  such  a  friendly  step,  which  would,  there 
can  be  no  doubt,  be  greeted  at  the  same  time  with 
universal  approbation."  l 

In  the  private  letter,  written  on  the  same  day,  at 
midnight,  Gramont  is  more  urgent,  because  he  has 
received  additional  information. 

"We  know  from  the  admissions  of  the  Prince  him 
self  that  he  has  carried  on  the  whole  affair  with  the 
Prussian- government,  and  we  cannot  accept  the  evasive 
reply  with  which  M.  de  Thile  seeks  to  escape  from  the 
dilemma  which  has  been  propounded  to  him;  it  is 
absolutely  necessary  that  you  obtain  a  categorical  reply, 
followed  by  its  natural  consequences.  Now  this  is  the 
only  reply  which  will  satisfy  us  and  prevent  war :  'The 
King's  government  does  not  approve  the  Prince  of 
HohenzoUern's  acceptance,  and  orders  him  to  abandon 
his  decision  made  without  the  King's  permission/  It 
will  remain  for  you  then  to  let  me  know  whether  the 
Prince,  in  obedience  to  that  injunction,  abandons  his 
candidacy  publicly  and  officially.  We  are  very  much 
hurried,  because  we  must  make  the  first  move  in  case 
of  an  unsatisfactory  reply,  and  must  begin  on  Satur 
day  the  movements  of  troops  with  a  view  to  taking 
the  field  in  a  fortnight.  I  insist  especially  on  the 
importance  of  allowing  no  time  to  be  wasted  in  evasive 
replies ;  we  must  know  whether  we  are  to  have  peace, 
or  whether  a  plea  in  abatement  will  force  us  to  declare 

1  [Benedetti,  pp.  316-318;  Gramont,  pp.  58-60.] 


142         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

war.  If  you  obtain  the  King's  promise  to  revoke  the 
Prince's  acceptance,  it  will  be  a  tremendous  triumph 
and  a  great  service.  The  King,  for  his  part,  will  have 
assured  the  peace  of  Europe;  otherwise,  it  is  war."  1 

In  common  parlance  these  two  letters  may  be  sum 
marized  thus :  "  You  will  inform  the  King  that  we 
will  not  tolerate  the  enthronement  in  Spain  of  the 
Prussian  Prince  Leopold  of  Hohenzollern,  and  as  that 
Prussian  Prince,  being  a  member  of  his  family  and 
subject  to  his  authority,  cannot  accept  a  crown  with 
out  his  authorization,  we  ask  him  not  to  grant  such 
authorization,  if  it  has  not  already  been  obtained, 
and  to  withdraw  it  if  it  has  been."  2 

Gramont  communicated  his  instructions  to  Lyons, 
who  was  kept  informed  of  our  proceedings  almost 
hour  by  hour.  As  he  seemed  to  fear  that  the  candidacy 
was  only  the  beginning  of  the  trouble,  Gramont  told 

1  [Benedetti,  pp.  319,  320 ;  Gramont,  pp.  61,  62.    The  concluding  para 
graphs  of  the  letter  are  worth  quoting:   "As  for  the  Prince,  his  reign  in 
Spain  will  not  last  a  month ;  but  the  war  caused  by  this  intrigue  of  M.  de 
Bismarck  —  how  long  will  it  last,  and  what  will  be  its  consequences  ? 

"So,  no  beating  about  the  bush,  no  dawdling.  No  mission  was  ever 
more  important.  May  you  be  successful ;  that  is  my  most  earnest  wish."] 

2  It  is  incomprehensible  that  any  one  could  claim  that  there  is  any  dif 
ference  between  the  instruction  sent  and  the  way  in  which  Benedetti  inter 
preted  it.    He  understood  that  he  was  to  obtain  first  the  withdrawal  of  the 
candidacy,  then  the  King's  acquiescence  therein ;  whereas  Gramont  wished 
the  withdrawal  to  be  the  result  of  the  King's  command  or  advice.    The 
absurdity  of  this  antithesis  does  not  need  to  be  demonstrated.    With  whom 
was  Benedetti  to  negotiate,  and  from  whom  could  he  obtain  the  withdrawal 
if  not  the  King  ?    A  withdrawal  without  the  King's  participation  might 
be  obtained  by  others  than  him,  through  negotiations  at  Madrid  or  at 
Sigmaringen,  and  thereupon  would  arise  the  question  of  the  King's  ac 
quiescence.    But  it  was  impossible  to  admit  the  hypothesis  of  a  withdrawal 
obtained  by  Benedetti  from  anybody  except  the  King,  because  the  King 
was  the  only  person  with  whom  he  was  negotiating.    [Note  of  M.  Ollivier 
in  vol.  xiv,  p.  179,    See  Benedetti,  p.  322.] 


THE  EMS  NEGOTIATION  143 

him  once  more  just  what  we  were  resolved  to  obtain, 
what  we  were  prepared  to  consider  sufficient. 

Lyons  faithfully  sent  these  declarations  to  Gran- 
ville:  "M.  de  Gramont  told  me  that  I  might  report 
to  your  Lordship  that  if  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern 
should  now,  on  the  advice  of  the  King  of  Prussia, 
withdraw  his  acceptance  of  the  Crown,  the  whole  af 
fair  would  be  at  an  end." l 

In  the  morning  of  the  9th,  at  Ems,  Werther  went 
to  Benedetti  for  information,  so  that  the  King,  being 
advised  of  what  Benedetti  had  come  to  ask,  should 
not  be  taken  by  surprise.  Our  Ambassador  told 
him  our  sentiments,  our  demands,  our  wish  for  an 
immediate  solution.  Werther  did  not  conceal  the 
fact  that  "His  Majesty,  having  been  consulted 
by  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern,  had  deemed  it  not  to 
be  within  his  power  to  place  obstacles  in  the  way  of 
his  desire  to  accept  the  crown  of  Spain,  and  that  it 
was  now  very  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  request 
him  to  abandon  it."2 

1  [Lyons  to  Granville,  July  10,  Blue  Boole,  p.  17.    This  seems  to  be  the 
first  despatch  of  Lord  Lyons  in  which  Benedetti's  presence  at  Ems  is  men 
tioned,  and  the  only  reference  to  it  is  this :  "The  King  of  Prussia  had  told 
M.  Benedetti  last  evening  that  he  had  in  fact  consented  to  the  Prince  of 
Hohenzollern's  accepting  the  crown  of  Spain;   and  that,  having  given  his 
consent,  it  would  be  difficult  for  him  now  to  withdraw  it.    His  Majesty 
had  added,  however,  that  he  would  confer  with  the  Prince,  and  would  give 
a  definitive  answer  to  France  when  he  had  done  so."    The  paragraph  quoted 
in  the  text,  in  which  Gramont  is  reported  as  practically  reiterating  the 
statement  previously  made  by  him  to  Lyons  (see  supra,  p.  108),  assumed 
great  importance  in  its  effect  upon  the  attitude  of  England  when,  the  Prince 
having  actually  withdrawn,  the  situation  was  rendered  hopeless  by  the 
demand  of  guaranties.] 

2  [Benedetti  to  Gramont,  July  9;  Benedetti,  p.  325.]    He  did  not  say 
as  Sybel  falsely  asserts,  that  the  King  was  unable  to  'place  obstacles  in  his  way, 
but  that  he  had  deemed  it  not  to  be  within  his  power;  which  implied  that  he 


144         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

Benedetti  thereupon  went  to  the  King  and  set  forth, 
with  much  tact  and  with  entire  respect,  in  very  firm 
and  well-measured  words,  the  object  of  his  mission; 
he  appealed  to  William's  wisdom  and  his  heart,  and 
implored  him  to  advise  Prince  Leopold  to  reconsider 
his  acceptance.  He  described  to  him  the  excitement 
that  the  candidacy  had  caused  in  France,  —  an  excite 
ment  shared  by  other  countries,  notably  England, 
where  the  press  was  unanimous  in  deploring  a  com 
bination  that  was  equally  disastrous  to  the  repose  of 
Spain  and  to  the  maintenance  of  friendly  relations 
among  the  great  powers.  He  assured  him  that  the 
Emperor's  government  had  no  other  desire  than  to 
put  an  end  to  that  excitement.  He  conjured  the 
King  to  give  to  Europe  a  testimony  of  the  generosity 

might  have  done  it.  [Note  of  M.  OHivier  in  vol.  xiv,  p.  180.  But  Von 
SybePs  English  translator  (vol.  vii,  p.  353)  makes  Werther  say  that  the 
King  "felt  he  had  no  right  to  forbid,"  etc. 

After  finishing  his  private  letter  of  July  7  to  Benedetti,  Gramont  re 
ceived  the  telegram  from  Mercier  quoted  on  page  127,  covering  Prim's 
suggestion  that  the  Prince  himself  should  inform  him  [Prim]  that  "he  had 
met  with  obstacles  to  the  King's  consent."  "I  confess,"  says  Gramont, 
"that  on  July  8,  at  one  in  the  morning,  I  had  the  idea  of  forcing  the  inter 
vention  of  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern,  and  in  my  desire  to  avert  a  con 
flict  whose  gravity  I  foresaw,  I  telegraphed  these  words  to  Comte  Bene 
detti,  at  the  same  time  repeating  to  him  the  despatch  from  Madrid :  *  Say 
this  to  the  King,  and  at  need  go  to  the  Prince  himself  and  say  it  to  him/ 
I  was  wrong.  The  Hohenzollern  candidacy  was  not  put  forward  without 
the  concurrence  of  the  King  of  Prussia ;  it  was  a  Prussian  candidacy,  and 
it  was  as  such  that  Prance  rejected  it.  Being  put  forward  by  the  King,  it 
was  to  the  King  alone  that  M.  Benedetti  must  address  himself.  I  had  allowed 
myself  to  be  carried  away  by  a  very  natural  desire  to  leave  nothing  undone 
that  might  facilitate  a  peaceful  solution.  But  my  despatch  had  no  sooner 
started  on  its  way  than  I  realized  its  inopportuneness,  and  after  taking  the 
Emperor's  orders,  I  sent  the  following  telegram  the  next  day:  *You  must 
not  see  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern.  The  Emperor  wishes  no  overtures 
made  to  him.* "  Gramont,  pp.  66,  67.] 


THE  EMS  NEGOTIATION  145 

of  his  sentiments :  the  'Emperor's  government  would 
see  therein  a  guaranty  of  the  strengthening  of  its 
friendly  relations  with  his  Majesty's  government, 
and  would  congratulate  itself  mightily  on  a  decision 
which  would  be  welcomed  everywhere  with  no  less 
gratitude  than  satisfaction. 

The  King  set  forth,  with  calm  and  courteous  decision, 
the  well-considered  thesis  which  he  intended  to  oppose 
to  our  demands  and  from  which  he  never  departed. 
The  Prussian  government  was  not  a  party  to  the 
negotiation;  appropriating  Thile's  language,  he  did 
not  conceive  that  the  Berlin  Cabinet  could  be  called 
to  account  concerning  a  matter  of  which  it  knew  noth 
ing,  and  for  which  it  was  no  more  responsible  than 
any  other  cabinet  in  Europe.  He  admitted,  however, 
that  his  prime  minister  had  been  kept  posted  on  the 
various  phases  of  the  question.  His  personal  inter 
vention  thus  avowed,  he  claimed  to  have  intervened 
only  as  the  head  of  the  family,  not  as  sovereign;  and 
even  as  head  of  the  family,  his  part  had  been  in 
some  sense  passive :  he  had  taken  no  part  in  the  nego 
tiation,  he  had  refused  to  receive  -an  envoy  of  the 
Spanish  Cabinet  bearing  a  letter  from  Prim;  he  had 
not  encouraged  Prince  Leopold  to  accept  the  Span 
ish  overtures,  but  had  contented  himself  with  not 
forbidding  him  to  do  so,  when  the  Prince,  having  de 
cided  to  accept,  had  solicited  his  consent  on  his 
arrival  at  Ems.  He  deemed  it  incompatible  with 
his  royal  dignity  to  demand  from  the  Prince  a  re 
nunciation  of  the  crown,  after  he  had  refrained  from 
forbidding  him  to  accept  it.  If  the  Prince  should 
spontaneously  withdraw  his  candidacy,  he  would 
abstain  from  advising  him  against  that  step :  he  pro- 


146         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

posed  to  leave  Mm  the  most  entire  freedom  of  action, 
after  no  less  than  before  his  acceptance.  He  had 
placed  himself  in  communication  with  Prince  Antony, 
who  was  then  at  Sigmaringen,  and  had  questioned 
him  as  to  the  effect  of  the  agitation  in  France  upon 
Ms  mind  and  his  son's ;  he  would  make  his  own  course 
conform  to  the  reply.  He  deemed  it  useless  to  con 
tinue  the  interview;  he  hoped  to  be  informed  soon, 
but  some  time  must  necessarily  elapse,  for  he  could 
not  use  the  telegraph,  having  no  cipher  at  Ems  for 
that  means  of  correspondence. 

Then  he  proceeded  to  give  his  views  concerning  our 
action.  He  approved  the  first  part  of  our  declara 
tion,  but  had  felt  keenly  the  second  part.  Start 
ing  from  the  premise  that  Prussia  had  no  part  in  Leo 
pold's  candidacy,  he  saw  an  unfounded  interpretation, 
almost  an  insult,  in  our  words  concerning  the  views 
of  "a  third  power."  Our  emotion  seemed  to  him 
unjustified;  we  exaggerated  the  effect  of  the  seating 
of  a  prince  of  his  family  on  the  throne  of  Spain,  which, 
for  his  part,  he  had  never  desired.  The  present  Spanish 
government  was  supreme,  recognized  by  all  the  powers, 
and  he  could  not  conceive  how  we  could  place  it  under 
guardianship  and  oppose  the  choice  of  a  sovereign  freely 
elected  by  the  representatives  of  the  nation ;  there  was 
nothing  to  do  but  await  the  meeting  of  the  Cortes. 
"It  is  at  Madrid,  and  not  to  me,  that  you  should  apply, " 
he  said.  "You  have  only  to  exert  your  influence  to 
induce  the  government  of  the  Regent  to  abandon  its 
project.  The  honor  of  France  has  not  been  and  cannot 
be  assailed  by  the  decision  of  the  Prince  of  Hohen- 
zollern;  it  was  preceded  by  negotiations  which  the 
Cabinet  of  Madrid  opened  of  its  own  will,  and  in  which 


THE  EMS  NEGOTIATION  147 

no  other  government  took  part ;  it  cannot  therefore  be 
a  subject  either  of  dissent  or  of  conflict,  and  war  cannot 
result  from  an  incident  in  which  no  one  of  the  powers 
has  intervened."  1 

In  fine,  the  King  refused  to  give  either  orders  or 
advice  to  the  Hohenzollerns ;  he  had  questioned 
them  as  to  their  intentions,  and  he  awaited  their  reply. 
He  wrote  to  his  wife  of  the  audience:  "Yesterday, 
after  you  left,  Benedetti  was  with  me ;  he  was  calm  and 
unexcited  except  in  speaking  of  the  newspapers,  c  which 
are  demanding  his  head  and  a  court  to  try  him.' "  2 

The  account  of  this  audience,  which  reached  us 
July  10,  lessened  neither  our  perplexities  nor  our  appre 
hensions.  The  King  had  made  therein  significant  ad 
missions  which  proved  his  participation,  and  that  very 
fact  gave  more  importance  to  his  refusal  to  compel  the 
disappearance,  by  direct  command,  or  by  advice  (which 
amounted  to  the  same  thing),  -  of  the  scheme  which  he 
had  known  of  and  approved.  He  took  up,  and  devel 
oped  more  fully,  the  inadmissible  argument  of  Thile 
that  the  Prussian  government  knew  nothing,  although 
the  King  and  Bismarck  knew  all  about  it.  Was  the 
Prussian  government  Thile?  Was  it  not  Bismarck 
and  the  King  ?  Imagine  Louis  XIII  saying  to  a  for 
eign  government:  "I  knew  that  Cardinal  Richelieu 

1  [See  Benedetti's  report,  of  July  9,  of  which  M.  Ollivier  gives  a  para 
phrase  of  only  a  portion,  in  Ma  Mission  en  Prusse,  pp.  328-338.] 

The"  Prussian  documents  give  to  the*  King's  answers  a  stiffness  which 
does  not  appear  in  Benedetti's  report.  The  Official  Journal  of  July  9  says : 
"The  Ambassador  of  France  to  the  [North  German]  Confederation,  having 
travelled  to  Ems,  was  received  by  the  King  and  requested  His  Majesty  to 
forbid  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern  to  accept  the  Spanish  crown;  the  King 
refused."  [Note  of  M.  Ollivier  in  vol.  xiv,  p.  183.] 

2  [Brief e  des  Kais&r  WiLhelms  der  Erste,  pp.  218,  219.] 


148         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

was  fully  advised,  but  still  the  affair  was  not  known  to 
my  government !" 

"Was  it  not  rather  too  subtle  an  idea/5  said  Scherr, 
"which  ascribed  to  mankind  in  general,  and  to  the 
French  in  particular,  the  credulity  to  put  faith  in  the 
*  unofficial  knowledge'  that  we  had  of  the  candidacy, 
and  in  the  *  official  non-knowledge'  in  which  we  still 
remained  with  respect  thereto  ?  "  l 

It  was  precisely  this  fashion  of  juggling  with  words 
which,  was  later  to  contribute  to  the  currency,  in  France 
and  elsewhere,  of  the  opinion  that  the  Hohenzollern  can 
didacy  was  "from  a  to  z  a  ruse  deliberately  devised  by 
the  Prussian  government/'  This  ruse  was  peculiarly 
transparent  in  Prussia,  where  Bang  and  State  are  all 
one.2 

King  and  State,  they  tell  us,  are  in  truth  the  same 
thing  when  the  Bang  is  acting  as  king.  But  there  is 
in  the  King  a  head  of  a  family  who  is  distinct  from  the 
King,  and  when  it  is  the  head  of  the  family  who  acts, 
the  State  is  not  identified  with  him.  Scherr,  whose 
book  on  the  war  is  from  end  to  end  simply  a  frantic 
diatribe  against  France  and  the  Empire,  agrees  that 
"it  must  be  said,  out  of  regard  for  the  truth,  that  it  is 
impossible  to  bear  the  French  a  grudge  because  the 
distinction  between  King  William  as  head  of  the  house 
of  Hohenzollern  and  King  William  as  King  of  Prus- 


* 


1  Johannes  Scherr,  1870-1871,  p.  114. 

*  "And  it  was  Bismarck  himself  who  told  us  so.  *  You  deny  the  King,'  he 
said  after  the  Convention  of  Gastein  [1865],  'possession  of  the  Prussian  half 
of  the  Duchy  of  Lauenburg,  on  the  theory  that  it  belongs  to  the  State,  not 
to  the  Kong.  The  flaw  in  this  theory  is  the  separating  the  King  from  the 
State  —  a  separation  that  is  impossible  in  Prussia  from  the  standpoint  of 
law  and  facts  and  policy  alike.'  Speech  of  Feb.  30,  1866."  L'Empire 
Lib&rd,  vol.  xiv,  p.  185. 


THE  EMS  NEGOTIATION  149 

sia  was  too  fine  —  as  fine  as  a  hair  —  for  them  to 
heed."  * 

The  German  writer  is  mistaken :  it  did  not  seem  to 
us  too  fine,  and  we  understood  the  distinction,  but  we 
considered  it  amusing.  It  reminded  us  of  our  own 
Moliere's  Maitre  Jacques,  now  cook,  now  coachman, 
according  to  the  costume  he  wore,  and  saying  to  Har- 
pagon :  "Is  it  to  your  coachman,  Monsieur,  or  to  your 
cook  that  you  intend  to  speak  ?  for  I  am  both/5  "To 
both,"  Harpagon  replies.2  In  like  manner  we  said  to 
the  royal  Maitre  Jacques,  now  head  of  the  family,  now 
king,  "It  is  to  both  that  we  intend  to  speak." 

In  fact,  the  King  was  head  of  the  family  only  because 
he  was  King  of  Prussia.  But  even  if  he  were  consid 
ered  solely  as  head  of  the  family,  that  did  not  make 
him  immune  from  our  action.  A  head  of  a  family 
cannot  give  to  a  prince,  a  subordinate  member  thereof, 
a  valid  authorization  to  accept  a  crown,  if  he  himself 
is  not  authorized  to  that  effect  by  the  great  powers. 
And  if  such  authorization  has  not  been  secured,  his 
strict  duty,  as  a  member  of  the  great  European  family, 
is  to  forbid  the  prince  to  take  part  in  an  intrigue  which 
has  become  a  cause  of  disturbance.  That  is  what  we 
asked  the  Bang  of  Prussia  to  do. 

Ottokar  Lorenz  does  not  deny,  as  Sybel  had  mis 
takenly  done,  that  the  King  had  the  power  to  forbid. 
"But,"  he  says,  "it  was  impossible  that  such  a  pro 
hibition  should  be  uttered  at  the  demand  of  a  foreign 
power."  3  And  why,  pray  ?  Would  it  have  been  the 
first  time  that  such  a  thing  had  happened?  Was  it 

1  Sckerr,  pp.  110,  111. 

2  [In  tlie  comedy  of  L'Avare.] 

3  Lorenz,  p,  254. 


150         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

not  at  the  public  demand  of  England  that  Louis-Phi 
lippe  refused  the  Belgians  his  son  de  Nemours  for  their 
King,  and  the  Spaniards  his  son  d'Aumale  for  their 
Queen's  husband  ? l  Was  it  not  at  the  demand  of  Russia 
and  France  that  the  Queen  of  England  declined  the  of 
fer  of  the  crown  of  Greece  for  her  son  Alfred  ?  Wherein 
does  one  offend  or  humiliate  a  sovereign  by  asking 
him  to  submit  to  a  general  rule  of  international  law 
to  which  everybody  before  him  has  submitted,  and 
which  he  himself  helped  to  establish  ? 

What  were  we  to  think  of  the  King's  communication 
to  the  Hohenzollern  princes.  Was  it  sincere,  or  was 
it  a  new  trick  ?  We  were  sorely  puzzled  to  decide,  on 
reading  Benedetti's  interpretations;  they  perplexed 
us  by  their  convolutions.  "Must  we  conclude  from 
the  King's  language  to  me  that  he  has  determined  to 
comply  with  our  wishes,  leaving  it  for  the  Prince  of 
Hohenzollern  to  take  the  initiative  instead  of  advising 
him  to  do  so,  in  order  to  avoid  making  personally  a 
concession  which  might  be  severely  criticised  in  Ger 
many  ?  Or  does  he  simply  desire  to  gain  time  in  order 
to  make  his  military  arrangements  in  advance  of  us, 
and  at  the  same  time  allow  the  meeting  of  the  Cortes 
to  draw  near,  in  order  to  argue  that  it  is  proper  to  await 
the  vote  of  that  body  ?  Considering  only  his  attitude 

1  [Busch  notes  under  date  of  July  8 :  "  Another  communication  to  Bucher 
from  Varzin  runs :  *The  precedents  furnished  by  Louis  Philippe's  refusal  of 
the  Belgian  throne  on  behalf  of  the  Due  de  Nemours,  in  1831,  on  the  ground 
that  it  would  create  uneasiness,  and  by  the  protest  which  England  entered 
against  the  marriage  of  the  Due  de  Montpensier  to  the  sister  of  Queen 
Isabella,  are  neither  of  them  very  applicable,  as  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollem 
is  not  a  son  of  King  William,  but  only  a  remote  connection,  and  Spain  does 
not  border  on  Prussia."  Bismarck:  Some  Pages,  etc.,  vol.  i,  p.  28. — For 
an  elaboration  of  this  theme,  see  the  passages  from  L' Empire  Lib&ral,  given 
in  Appendix  FJ 


THE  EMS  NEGOTIATION  151 

and  what  I  have  gathered  in  his  entourage,  I  should 
perhaps  incline  to  think  the  first  of  these  two  hypotheses 
the  more  probable,  if  it  were  not  that  we  are  justified  in 
being  incredulous,  or,  at  least,  suspicious" l  In  a  pri 
vate  letter  of  the  same  date  he  added :  "I  do  not  know 
what  we  ought  to  expect  from  his  Majesty's  better 
judgment,  and  I  cannot  conceal  from  you  my  impres 
sion  that  we  may  perhaps  have  to  reckon  more  with  his 
shrewdness  and  his  habit  of  resorting  to  expedients. " 
It  was  our  impression  that  the  King  was  playing 
with  us.  Feeling  that  we  were  surrounded  by  liars, 
fearing  every  moment  to  be  surprised  by  some  fresh 
perfidy,  beset  by  that  date  of  July  20,  which  was  ever 
before  our  eyes  like  a  scarecrow,  we  could  not  believe 
in  the  truth  of  any  word  uttered  by  the  authors  of  the 
plot  that  we  were  trying  to  foil.  And  this  step  on  the 
part  of  the  King,  who  was  sincere  and  whose  intentions 
were  certainly  pacific,  seemed  to  us  one  more  incident 
in  the  comedy  of  duplicity  in  which  we  were  enveloped : 
the  reply  of  the  princes  whom  he  had  consulted  would 
be  that  they  would  persist  in  their  candidacy ;  whence 
it  resulted  that  the  King  had  written  to  them  only  to 
shelter  his  own  responsibility  behind  theirs.  We  con 
sidered  that  the  negotiation  was  virtually  closed,  and 
.  that  all  hope  of  peace  had  vanished.  I  find  this  feeling 
expressed  in  a  short  note  that  I  wrote  to  Gramont,  after 
reading  Benedetti's  despatch  which  he  had  sent  to  me : — 

MY  DEAR  FRIEND,  —  I  am  summoning  all  our  col- 
leagues  to  meet  at  your  office  at  two  o'clock.  Bene- 

1  [This  is  quoted  from  a  telegram  sent  by  Benedetti  before  his  detailed 
report  of  his  first  interview  with  the  King,  and  the  passage  following  from 
a  private  letter  sent  after  the  report  —  all  on  the  same  day :  July  9.  Bene 
detti,  pp.  327,  388,  339.] 


THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  _  WAR 

dettfs  despatch  is  very  clear :  it  confirms  all  my  pre 
sentiments,  and  from  this  moment  war  seems  to  me  to 
be  forced  upon  us :  it  only  remains  for  us  to  make  up 
our  minds  to  it  fearlessly  and  with  energy.5' 

Our  colleagues  viewed  the  situation  as  we  did,  and, 
pending  the  drafting  of  resolutions  to  be  adopted  the 
next  day  by  the  Council,  under  the  presidency  of  the 
Emperor,  we  requested  Gramont  to  telegraph  and 
write  to  Benedetti  that  we  were  more  and  more  sub 
merged  by  public  opinion,  that  we  were  counting 
the  hours,  and  that  he  must  absolutely  insist  upon 
a  reply  from  the  King  —  that  we  must  have  it  on 
the  following  day:  the  day  after  that  would  be  too 
late.1 

The  Emperor,  on  his  side,  agreed  with  Le  Boeuf  upon 
a  most  serious  step.  He  sent  Staff-Colonel  Gresley 
to  Algiers  with  orders  to  MacMahon  to  embark  at  the 
earliest  possible  moment  the  troops  from  Africa  which 
were  to  serve  on  the  continent,  and  to  inform  him  that 
he  was  summoned  home  to  take  command  of  one  army ; 
the  most  distant  troops  must  be  at  Algiers  on  July  18. 
Furthermore,  the  generals  of  artillery  and  of  engineers 
were  sent  on  a  confidential  tour  of  inspection  —  that 
is  to  say,  in  citizens'  clothes  —  to  the  forts  in  the  North 
east,  so  that  we  might  be  prepared  to  supply  such 
deficiencies  as  should  be  pointed  out ;  all  the  generals 
of  brigade  were  ordered  to  ascertain  whether  the  re 
cruiting  offices  were  ready  to  despatch  orders  of  recall 
forthwith;  and  Intendant-General  Blondeau,  Director 
of  Administration  of  the  War  Department,  was  au- 

1  [For  the  despatches  in  which  Gramont  carried  out  the  request  of  his 
colleagues,  see  Benedetti,  pp.  34£,  343;  also  infra,  Appendix  I.J 


THE  EMS  NEGOTIATION  153 

* 

thorized  to  exceed  by  a  million  francs  the  credit  as 
signed  for  the  administrative  service.  * 

On  July  10,  it  was  the  general  opinion  that,  by  the 
suspicious  whimpering  of  the  King  of  Prussia,  we*  were 
forced  to  choose  between  a  degrading  submission  and 
war.    This  conviction  inspired  Thiers  to  take  a  sig 
nally  honorable  course.    He  was  present  at  the  ses 
sions  of  the  Chamber,  closely  attentive,  but  silent, 
recommending   prudence   but    without   rejecting    the 
possibility  of  war,  for  he  was  too  well  aware  of  our 
interests  in  Spain  to  think  that  we  could  quietly  allow 
a  Prussian  prince  to  be  seated  on  that  throne.    When 
the  possibility  of  that  result  approached,  he  conceived 
the  patriotic  idea  of  offering  the  Emperor  his  assistance. 
He  might  well  have  confided  that  excellent  purpose  to 
me,  and  I  would  instantly  have  escorted  him  to  Saint- 
Cloud.    But  that  would  have  seemed  to  him  too  com 
promising  ;  he  adopted  a  roundabout  course.    He  was 
accustomed  to  go  every  Sunday  to  Madame  Roger's  • 
on  Rue  de  Moray ;  she  was  the  sister-in-law  of  Phi 
lippe  de  Massa,  a  young  officer  of  brilliant  intellect  and 
charmingly  distinguished  manners  and  character,  an 
equerry  to  the  Emperor,  in  high  favor  at  the  Tuileries, 
and  on  intimate  terms  with  the  Due  and  Duchesse  de 
Mouchy.    On  Sunday,  July  10,  he  sent  Massa  to  the 
duchess  to  request  her  to  inform  the  Empress  that,  if 
we  did  not  succeed  in  averting  war,  the  Emperor  could 
rely  on  his  patriotism ;  that  he  would  support  from  the 
tribune  the  request  for  military  appropriations,  so  that 
they  might  be  voted  unanimously,  as  was  most  desir 
able  ;  and  that  he  would  associate  himself  with  all  tke 
efforts  of  the  government.    This  was  not  a  formal  re 
quest  to  be  received,  but  a  very  plain  hint  that  he  would 


154         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

be  very  glad  to  be  summoned.  Such  a  step  was  most 
natural.  It  was  the  Emperor  who  had  made  the  first 
advances,  when  he  sent  to  Thiers  by  Le  Boeuf  a  request 
to  defend  the  contingent;  and  Thiers  very  nobly  of 
fered  to  supplement  the  service  that  had  been  asked  of 
him  by  an  even  greater  service  which  was  not  asked. 

Massa  went  to  the  Duchesse  de  Mouchy's  on  Boule 
vard  de  Courcelles.  She  thought  that  such  a  message 
should  be  delivered  without  loss  of  time,  and  she 
started  at  once  for  Saint-Cloud.  Instead  of  addres 
sing  herself  to  the  Empress,  she  went  to  the  Emperor, 
who  was  walking  in  the  park,  gloomy  and  absorbed. 
She  repeated  what  she  had  heard ;  and,  as  the  Emperor 
received  the  communication  without  warmth,  even 
coldly,  she  insisted,  dwelling  upon  the  strength  that 
such  concurrence  would  give. 

"Doubtless,"  replied  Napoleon  III,  "M.  Thiers  is 
very  familiar  with  military  questions.  But  he  's  a 
demolisher;  he  has  pulled  down  all  who  have  trusted 
him.  Besides,  we  are  not  at  that  point  yet,  and  this 
is  not  the  time  to  make  changes  in  the  government. 
Send  word  that  the  Emperor  relies  on  the  patriotism 
of  the  author  of  Le  Consulat  et  VEmpire,  on  the  opposi 
tion  benches  no  less  than  in  the  ministry/* 1 

The  duchess  transmitted  these  words  to  Massa, 
who  called  upon  her  at  five  o'clock.  It  was  not  a  gen 
erous  response.  It  was  not  the  time  to  characterize 
Thiers's  general  conduct :  the  only  one  of  his  acts  that 
there  was  occasion  to  recall  was  his  speech  of  June  30, 
in  which  he  had  so  admirably  defended  the  army  against 
his  own  friends,  and  had  done  justice  to  the  Emperor's 
new  policy  —  a  speech  for  which  he  was  entitled  to 

1  [As  to  the  time  at  which  this  incident  occurred,  see  supra,  p.  77,  n.  2.] 


THE  EMS  NEGOTIATION  155 

gratitude  which  had  not  yet  been  made  manifest  to 
him.1  A  well-turned  compliment  was  not  the  reception 
due  to  that  expression  of  good-will. 

"Thank  M.  Thiers,"  the  Emperor  should  have  re 
plied,  "thank  him,  and  say  to  him  that  I  should  be 
delighted  to  talk  with  him  on  such  a  day,  at  such  an 
hour." 

The  failure  to  summon  Thiers  at  that  moment  is  as 
incomprehensible  as  the  failure  to  offer  the  portfolio 
of  Public  Instruction  to  Victor  Hugo  at  an  earlier  date. 
Unconquerable  personal  antipathy  alone  can  explain 
this  error  on  the  part  of  a  sovereign  usually  so  careful 
to  hurt  the  feelings  of  no  one.  I  would  have  saved  him 
from  it,  if  he  had  consulted  me.  Unluckily  his  uncle's 
fatal  maxim  was  deeply  graven  on  his  mind:  "Never 
give  your  full  confidence  to  any  one."  He  did,  how 
ever,  remember  this  embassy  of  the  Duchesse  de 
Mouchy,  when  on  setting  out  for  the  army,  he  said  to 
Le  Boeuf :  "Thiers  might  be  your  successor."  Thiers 
remembered  it  too,  but  to  different  purpose. 

On  the  llth  we  arrived  at  the  Council  with  the  pur 
pose  of  taking  warlike  measures.  Gramont  read  two 
telegrams  received  that  morning  which  modified  our 
point  of  view.  In, one,  Benedetti  said  that  the  King, 
meeting  him  the  evening  before,  as  he  returned  from 
driving,  had  accosted  him  and  told  him  that  there  was 
no  reply  from  the  Prince,  and,  at  his  request,  had 
granted  him  a  second  audience.  In  the  second  tele- 

1  [The  debate  in  the  Corps  Legislatif  on  June  30,  1870,  was  on  the  propo 
sition  of  the  government  to  reduce  the  regular  "contingent"  of  the  army 
from  100,000  to  90,000  men.  Thiers  opposed  a  further  reduction,  advo 
cated  by  various  deputies,  and  supported  the  ministerial  measure.  See 
Delord,  vol.  vi,  pp.  139  ff. ;  Lehautcourt,  vol.  i,  pp.  175-179 ;  Welschinger, 
vol.  i,  p.  43;  OlHvier,  vol.  xiii,  pp.  602  ff.] 


156         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

gram  he  said :  "You  will  allow  me  to  add  that,  in  my 
opinion,  war  would  become  inevitable  if  we  should 
openly  begin  military  preparations."  1 

Inasmuch  as,  while  facing  firmly  the  possibility  of 
war,  we  by  no  means  wished  to  make  it  inevitable,  we 
decided  to  postpone  all  compromising  measures :  we 
were  ignorant  of  that  already  taken  by  the  Emperor  in 
concert  with  Le  Boeuf,  which  might  have  had  grave 
results  if  the  negotiations  had  not  come  to  an  end  be 
fore  it  was  carried  out.  We  simply  authorized  the 
creation  of  the  fourth  battalions,  and  the  recall  of  the 
volunteers.  Admiral  Rigault,  who  generally  had  noth 
ing  to  say  at  our  deliberations,  thereupon  asked  for 
authority  to  recall  six  thousand  seamen.  The  Council 
refused,  fearing  to  precipitate  a  crisis.  Whereupon 
the  admiral,  taking  up  his  portfolio,  said:  "You  can 

1  [M.  Ollivier  reverses  the  order  of  these  telegrams,  both  sent  on  the 
evening  of  the  10th,  which  are  given  by  Gramont,  pp.  380,  381,  and  by 
Benedetti,  pp.  343,  344.  In  the  second,  the  Ambassador  refers  to  the  attacks 
made  upon  him  by  the  Constitutionnel  and  requests  Gramont  to  inform  the 
Chamber  of  his  despatches  relating  to  the  HohenzoHern  candidacy  in  1869. 
—  It  is  important  to  note  that  on  the  10th  Gramont  had  received  several 
despatches  from  Mercier  at  Madrid  indicating,  as  Gramont  himself  says, 
that  a  definitive  revulsion  of  feeling  had  taken  place  in  the  Spanish  govern 
ment.  The  first  despatch  was  as  follows:  "The  Kegent  has  arrived.  I 
have  had  a  very  satisfactory  conversation  with  him.  He  has  found  the 
ministers  inclined  to  prudence,  and  he  desires  to  withdraw  from  the  affair 
in  a  dignified  manner.  He  thinks,  as  does  Marshal  Prim,  that  the  best 
way,  since  Prussia  claims  to  have  had  no  part  in  the  enterprise,  would  be 
for  the  King  of  Prussia  to  refuse  his  consent.  He  admits  that  the  public 
opinion  is  no  longer  the  same  as  at  first." 

This  was  dated  at  Madrid  at  10.20  A.M.  on  the  9th.  On  the  same  day, 
at  11.55  P.M.,  Mercier  telegraphed:  "Have  seen  the  Regent  again.  He  is 
disposed  to  do  his  utmost,  but  he  cannot  act  independently  of  Marshal 
Prim.  He  had  a  long  interview  with  him  this  morning,  and  he  is  able  to 
assure  me  that  he  (Prim)  is  more  concerned  than  any  one  and  very  desirous 
to  find  a  way  out.  He  did  not  realize  the  full  scope  of  what  he  did ;  nor  did 
the  Regent  either.  That  is  what  comes  of  meddling  with  what  one  does  not 


THE  EMS  NEGOTIATION  157 

take  it,  or  leave  It  where  it  is."  And  before  that  ul 
timatum,  we,  with  very  ill  grace,  reconsidered  our 
refusal.1 

understand.  He  will  see  Mm  to-morrow  morning,  and  if  Prim  consents,  lie 
asks  nothing  better  than  to  send  a  confidential  messenger  to  the  Prince  to 
induce  him  to  withdraw.  He  dwelt  strongly  on  Marshal  Prim's  regret 
and  his  good-will.  He  told  me  also  that  the  certainty  of  having  a  majority 
in  the  Cortes  is  diminishing  from  day  to  day."  Again,  on  the  10th,  at  2.30 
P.M.,  Mercier  informs  Gramont  of  the  determination  to  send  a  messenger  to 
the  Prince,  "who  will  be  authorized  also  to  see  the  King  and  Bismarck." 
As  we  saw  at  the  end  of  the  last  chapter,  the  messenger  was  actually  sent  on 
the  10th. 

Gramont  sent  at  least  one  of  these  despatches  to  Benedetti  with  his  pri 
vate  letter  of  that  date;  "That  from  Madrid,"  he  wrote,  "will  serve  to  set 
the  King's  conscience  at  rest  if  he  deems  himself  bound  by  the  Spanish  over 
tures,  to  which  he  yielded  with  so  little  consideration  for  us."  Benedetti, 
pp.  346,  434-486 ;  Gramont,  p.  72.  In  reporting  his  second  audience  with 
the  King  on  the  llth,  Benedetti  says :  "I  do  not  use  the  information  that 
came  to  you  from  Madrid.  You  know  already  that  the  King  claims  that 
we  have  no  ground  for  any  step  except  to  request  the  Spanish  government 
to  withdraw  voluntarily  from  the  plan  it  has  conceived,  and  His  Majesty 
would  not  have  failed  to  make  that  information  a  pretext  for  insisting  upon 
that  view."  Benedetti,  p.  350.  As  to  this  change  of  front  on  the  part  of 
Prim,  see  Darimon,  Histoire  (Tun  Jour,  pp.  18  ff.,  cited  by  Lehautcourt,  vol. 
vi,  p.  258;  also  Sorel,  vol.  i,  p.  107;  and  the  despatches  of  July  10  and  11 
from  Layard  at  Madrid  to  Lord  Granville,  Blue  Book,  pp.  18  and  24 ;  and 
of  July  9  and  12  from  Paget  at  Florence  to  Granville,  Ibid.,  pp.  29  and  30.] 

1  [In  Benedetti's  first  despatch  of  the  10th,  after  his  first  audience  of  the 
King,  he  says :  "M.  de  Werther  leads  me  to  hope  that  the  King  may  summon 
me  again  to-morrow,  to  resume  our  interview.  His  Majesty  has  received 
despatches  to-day  from  Prince  Antony  of  Hohenzollern ;  Prince  Leopold 
not  being  with  his  father,  the  information  that  has  reached  His  Majesty  thus 
far  is  still  incomplete  or  insufficient.  You  will  allow  me  to  add,"  etc.  (see 
p.  156). 

Commenting  thereon,  Gramont  says :  "It  was  evident  that  we  must,  at 
any  cost,  await  the  result  of  the  second  interview,  which  was  to  take  place 
during  the  day.  ...  On  the  other  hand,  the  necessity  of  refraining  from 
open  military  preparations  placed  us  in  a  position  so  much  the  more  dis 
advantageous  in  that  when  nothing  could  be  done  openly,  nothing  could  be 
done  at  all,  because  our  institutions  and  our  administrative  regulations  did 
not  lend  themselves,  as  those  of  Prussia  did,  to  secret  preparations  for  mobili- 


158         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

The  audience  accorded  to  Benedetti  by  the  King 
on  July  11  was  again  of  a  dilatory  character.  The  King 
had  received  a  letter  from  Prince  Antony  the  night 
before,  which  was  not  satisfactory  to  him.  "My 
cousin/'  he  wrote  the  Queen,  "is  much  impressed  by 
the  turn  things  are  taking  at  Paris,  but  he  thinks  that 
he  cannot  draw  back,  and  that  I  am  the  one  who  ought 
to  break  off  the  affair.  I  have  replied  that  I  could  do 
nothing  about  it,  but  that  I  would  approve  a  rupture 
on  his  part  (with  joy)/'1  He  found  the  cousins  very 
slow  of  comprehension,  and  he  sent  a  second  messen 
ger  to  Sigmaringen,  Colonel  Strantz,  bearing  a  letter  in 
which  he  said:  "It  is  plain  that  France  wants  war, 
but  in  case  Prince  Antony  should  have  decided  upon 
the  abandonment  of  the  Spanish  candidacy  by  the 
hereditary  prince,  the  King,  as  head  of  the  family, 
would  be  in  accord  with  him,  as  when  he  intimated  his 
assent  to  his  acceptance  several  weeks  since."  2  And 
he  wrote  again  to  the  Queen:  "God  grant  that  the 
Hohenzollerns  have  an  understanding  mind  !**3 

Disturbed  by  our  insistence,  as  we  ourselves  were  by 
his  postponements,  he  had  telegraphed  to  Roon,  who  had 
returned  to  Berlin:  "The  news  from  Paris,  which  has 
been  communicated  to  your  Excellency  by  the  Foreign 

zation.  So  that  this  recommendation  of  our  ambassador  was  the  subject 
of  a  long  discussion  in  the  council  held  that  morning ;  but  political  considera 
tions  carried  the  day,  the  government  did  not  propose  to  endanger  the 
chances  of  peace  on  any  account,  an,d  decided  to  wait."  Gramont,  pp.  78, 
79.  See  Sorel,  vol.  i,  pp.  Ill,  112.] 

1  [Brief  e  des  Kctis&r  Wilhelms  d&r  Erste,  p  220.] 

2  [See  Memoirs  of  the  King  of  Roumania  (French  trans.),  vol.  i,  p.  592. 
Welschinger  apparently  confuses  the  Ejng's  messenger  to  Sigmaringen  with 
the  Roumanian  agent  at  Paris  (supra,  pp.  112  ff.)  and  refers  to  him  several 
times  as  "Colonel  de  Stratt  " ;  Welschinger,  vol.  i,  pp.  68,  72,  etc.] 

*  [Brief e,  etc.,  p.  221.] 


THE  EMS  NEGOTIATION  159 

Office,  requires  that  you  prepare  the  necessary  measures 
for  the  safety  of  the  Rhenish  provinces,  and  of  Mayence 
and  Saarbriick." 

Roon  had  replied,  after  consulting  such  ministers 
and  generals  as  were  at  hand,  that  no  special  measures 
were  immediately  necessary;  that  Saarbriick  could 
be  put  in  a  state  of  defence  in  twenty-four  hours,  and 
Mayence  in  forty-eight.  If  war  seemed  unavoidable, 
he  would  advise  mobilization  of  the  army  at  a  stroke. 

Thus  the  second  audience,  at  noon  of  the  llth,  did 
not  improve  the  state  of  affairs;  rather,  it  made  it 
worse.  The  King,  being  unable  to  tell  the  story  of  his 
thus  far  ineffectual  pourparlers  with  his  cousins  at 
Sigmaringen,  invented  a  fable:  "Prince  Leopold,  ex 
pecting  that,  in  accordance  with  Prim's  programme, 
the  Cortes  would  not  be  called  together  for  three 
months,  and  that  the  project  would  not  be  made  public 
till  then,  had  thought  that  he  might  go  away  without 
causing  inconvenience.1  But  he  must  have  joined  his 
father  by  now,  and  a  definitive  reply  from  him  may  be 
expected  to-night  or  to-morrow." 

It  is  to  be  observed  here  that  what  the  King  "was 
awaiting  was  not  Prince  Antony's  decision  in  his  son's 
name,  but  that  of  the  son  himself.  It  was  the  son  who 
had  solicited  his  consent,  and  it  was  he,  not  his  father, 
who  was  to  withdraw  if  there  were  occasion. 

On  Benedetti's  remarking  that  at  Paris  they  would 
not  believe  in  the  hereditary  prince's  absence,  the  King 

1  The  despatches  sent  by  Salazar  after  the  King's  consent,  and  repro 
duced  by  Major  Versen,  give  the  lie  to  this  assertion  and  prove  clearly  that 
it  was  in  July  that  the  affair  was  to  come  off,  and  that  this  journey  of  the 
Prince  was  an  invention.  [Note  of  M.  Ollivier,  vol.  xiv,  p.  196.  Welschinger 
(vol.  i,  p.  66)  avers  that  Bismarck  devised  Leopold's  journey  in  order 
to  get  him  out  of  reach  of  suggestions  contrary  to  his  (Bismarck's)  plans.] 


160         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

replied :  "If  you  tell  the  whole  truth,  as  I  tell  it  to  you, 
they  ought  to  believe  you;  and  if,  notwithstanding, 
they  do  not,  then  it  must  be  that  they  have  a  reason 
for  it,  and  I  think  that  I  know  that  reason  from  Gra- 
mont's  declarations :  it  is  that  he  wants  war,  and  the 
armatnents  going  on  in  France  are  well  known  to  me. 
I  ought  not  to  conceal  from  you  that  I  myself  am  taking 
precautions  against  being  surprised."  He  realized  at 
once  the  imprudence  of  such  an  admission,  and  tried  to 
take  it  back,  or  at  least  to  lessen  its  force.  He  still  had 
confidence,  he  said,  in  the  preservation  of  peace:  it 
would  not  be  disturbed  if  the  people  in  Paris  would 
wait  until  he  was  in  a  position  to  contribute  to  it, 
and  give  him  the  necessary  time.  Still  amiable,  he 
invited  Benedetti  to  dinner  again  for  the  morrow. 

Benedetti  informed  the  King  of  the  impatience  of 
the  Senate  and  Corps  Legislatif,  of  the  necessity  on 
the  part  of  the  Emperor's  government  of  paying  due 
heed  thereto,  and  of  the  peril  of  such  a  state  of  affairs  — 
a  peril  increased  by  every  day's  delay.  And  he  com 
bated  the  arguments  again  advanced  by  the  King  on 
the  distinction  between  the  sovereign  and  the  head  of 
the  family.  It  was  all  in  vain.  The  King  remained 
immovable  in  his  formula :  "I  will  neither  command  nor 
advise  my  kinsmen,  whom  I  authorized  to  accept,  to 
reconsider  their  decision ;  but  if  they  do  spontaneously, 
and  of  their  own  motion,  reconsider  it,  I  will  approve 
their  withdrawal  as  I  approved  their  acceptance." 
And  he  asked  Benedetti  to  telegraph  in  his  name,  in 
stantly,  that  he  expected  to  receive  "this  evening  or 
to-morrow"  a  communication  from  Prince  Leopold.1 

1  [Benedetti's  report  of  his  second  interview,  here  summarized  by  M. 
Ollivier,  is  given  in  M a  Mission  en  Prusse,  pp.  349-357 ;  and  by  Gramont, 
pp.  381-388.] 


THE  EMS  NEGOTIATION  161 

In  the  afternoon  of  that  same  day,  the  llth,  we  were 
ourselves  engaged  with  the  intractable  opposition  in 
the  Chamber.  Although  we  had  no  announcement  to 
make,  we  thought  that  we  ought  not  to  refuse  to  say  a 
few  words  in  response  to  the  public  demand.  Gramont 
went^to  the  tribune  and  said:  "The  government  ap 
peals  to  the  patriotism  and  political  good  sense  of  the 
Chamber  and  asks  it  to  await  the  reply  of  the  King,  on 
which  the  government's  decision  depends."  1 

For  the  second  audience  as  for  the  earlier  one,  the  Prussian  documents 
give  the  King's  replies  without  any  of  Benedetti's  conciliatory  expressions. 
This  is  the  way  the  Official  Journal  describes  this  second  audience :  "July  II 
Count  Benedetti  continues  to  urge  upon  the  King  that  His  Majesty  com 
pel  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern  to  withdraw  his  candidacy  for  the  throne; 
the  King  rejects, this  demand."  [Note  of  M.  Ollivier,  in  vol.  xiv,  p.  197.] 

1  [The  whole  of  Gramont's  speech  as  reported  by  himself  (p.  81),  and  by 
M.  Ollivier  (vol.  xiv,  p.  198)  was  as  follows :  "The  government  appreciates 
the  impatience  of  the  Chamber  and  of  the  country,  and  shares  their  anxiety ; 
but  it  is  impossible  for  it  to  bring  to  their  knowledge  a  definite  result.  It 
awaits  the  reply  on  which  all  its  decisions  depend.  All  the  cabinets  to  which 
we  have  appealed  seem  to  admit  the  legitimacy  of  our  grievance.  I  hope  to  be 
very  shortly  in  a  position  to  enlighten  the  Chamber,  but  to-day  I  appeal 
to  its  patriotism,"  etc. 

The  passage  italicized  was  not  allowed  to  pass  unchallenged.  "It  was 
strictly  true,"  says  Gramont,  "and  our  communications  had  met  every 
where  a  sympathetic  reception,  when  we  had  set  forth  through  our  repre 
sentatives  the  considerations  which  rendered  the  withdrawal  of  the  candidacy 
desirable"  (p.  83).  On  the  12th  Lord  Lyons  sent  to  Earl  Granvllle  an  ex 
tract  from  the  report  in  the  Journal  Officiel  of  the  debate  of  the  llth  (Blue 
Book,  p.  19) ;  whereupon  the  English  Foreign  Minister  wrote,  on  the  13th, 
after  quoting  the  above  passage:  "While  making  every  allowance  for  the 
generality  of  statements  made  in  debate,  I  nevertheless  think  it  right  to 
observe,  though  without  wishing  to  raise  any  formal  question  with  his  Ex 
cellency,  that  the  Due  de  Gramont's  statement,  in  the  terms  in  which  it  is 
reported,  is  not  applicable  to  Her  Majesty's  Government.  No  such  general 
admission  has  been  made  by  me  in  writing  to  your  Excellency  or  in  convers 
ing  with  M.  de  Lavalette ;  and  I  have  no  doubt  that  a  reference  to  M.  de 
Lavalette's  reports  to  his  Government  will  bear  me  out  m  what  I  say. 

"I  have  expressed  regret  at  an  occurrence  which  had,  at  all  events,  given 


162         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

Notwithstanding  this  request,  Emmanuel  Arago, 
drowning  all  the  murmurs  with  his  ear-splitting  voice, 
asked  whether  "  the  questions  addressed  to  Prussia  have 
reference  only  to  the  special  episode,  to  the  offer  made  by 
Marshal  Prim  to  a  Prussian  prince;  if  so,"  he  said,  "it 
seems  to  me  that  we  should  hope  for  a  satisfactory  reply, 
an  assurance  of  peace.  But  if  the  questions  are  com 
plex,  and  of  a  nature  to  arouse  discussion  upon  other 
subjects  than  the  Hohenzollern  incident,  then  we 
should  be  compelled,  unhappily,  to  look  upon  them  as 
affording  other  pretexts  for  a  declaration  of  war." 

Our  declaration  of  July  6,  relating  solely  to  that  par 
ticular  incident,  was  not  therefore  a  declaration  of  war, 
as  the  same  orator  had  at  first  vociferously  asserted.1 

Gramont  rose  with  the  purpose  of  stating  that  we  had 

rise  to  great  excitement  in  the  Imperial  Government  and  French  nation; 
but  I  have  carefully  abstained  from  admitting  -that  the  cause  was  sufficient  to 
warrant  the  intentions  which  had  been  announced ;  while  I  have  at  the  same 
time  deprecated  precipitate  action,  and  recommended  that  no  means  should 
be  left  untried  by  which  any  interruption  of  the  general  peace  could  be 
averted."  (Blue  Book,  p.  22.) 

"It  was  not  without  some  surprise,"  says  Gramont  (p.  84),  "that  I  learned 
a  few  days  later  from  the  English  Ambassador  that  Lord  Granville  denied 
the  accuracy  of  my  words.  .  .  .  This  tardy  disclaimer,  which  all  our  in 
formation  tended  to  disprove,  naturally  produced  a  painful  effect,  for  it 
was  the  first  indication  of  the  extreme  reserve  which  the  government  was 
destined  to  encounter  thenceforth  in  the  assistance  rendered  by  Great 
Britain.  The  real  cause  of  this  performance  was  not  then  known.  We 
should  have  divined  it  without  difficulty  if  we  had  had  before  us  the  report 
of  the  conversation  which  took  place  the  same  day  at  Berlin  between  Lord 
A.  Loftus  and  Count  Bismarck,  in  which  the  latter  expressed  a  wish  that  the 
English  government  *  should  take  some  opportunity  of  bearing  public  testi 
mony  to  the  calm  and  wise  moderation  of  the  King  of  Prussia,  his  Govern 
ment,  and  of  the  public  press.' "  Complete  report  of  this  conversation  in 
Loftus  to  Granville,  July  13,  Blue  Boole,  pp.  32,  33,  reproduced  in  Appendix 
L.  See  Welschinger,  vol.  i,  p.  69.] 
1  [See  supra,  p.  95.] 


THE  EMS  NEGOTIATION  163 

raised  no  question  unconnected  with  tlie  Spanish  candi 
dacy,  and  that  we  should  raise  no  other.  A  veritable 
tempest  on  the  benches  of  the  Right  prevented  him  from 
uttering  a  word,  and  he  was  unwillingly  doomed,  by  a 
vote  of  closure,  to  a  silence  in  which  the  bad  faith  of  our 
opponents  triumphed.  "People  will  draw  such  infer 
ences  from  the  minister's  silence  as  it  naturally  sug 
gests,"  they  said.1 

Lyons,  who  was  present  at  the  session,  drew  the  only 
inference  from  the  incident  that  could  honestly  be  drawn 
from  it.  "It  is  quite  true  that  the  nation  is  exceedingly 
impatient,  and,  as  time  goes  on,  the  war  party  becomes 
more  exacting.  It  has,  in  fact,  already  raised  a  cry 
that  the  settlement  of  the  Hohenzollern  question  will 
not  be  sufficient,  and  that  France!  must  demand  satis 
faction  on  the  subject  of  the  Treaty  of  Prague."  2 

My  interpretation  did  not  differ  from  that  of  the 
English  ambassador.  On  leaving  the  Chamber  I 

1  ["A  word  would  have  sufficed  to  banish  the  anxieties  of  which  M.  Arago 
made  himself  the  mouthpiece,"  says  Gramont  (p.  82).    "'We  have  raised 
no  question,'  the  minister  would  have  said,  'foreign  to  the  Spanish  candidacy 
and  shall  raise  none;  we  seek,  we  desire,  like  yourselves,  a  solution  which 
will  ensure  the  peace  of  Europe.'    But  those  words  from  the  minister  would 
have  instantly,  and  in  a  sense  regularly,  according  to  the  customs  of  the 
Chamber,  reopened  the  field  of  discussion  which  the  President  had  had  so 
much  difficulty  in  closing.    So  that  [the  uproar]  had  its  advantages;  butt, 
on  the  other  hand,  it  left  without  reply  the  serious  insinuations  of  the  radical 
opposition,  which  at  once  gave  form  to  them  in  this  final  shaft:  *  People 
will  draw  such  inferences,'  "  etc.    See  Sorel,  vol.  i,  pp.  113,  114;  Lehaut- 
court,  pp.  262,  263.] 

[The  following  sentence  occurs  at  this  point  in  L' Empire  Liberal  (vol.  xiv, 
p.  200) :] "  So  that  observers  who  were  unf  amUiar  with  the  actual  state  of  affairs 
could  write  as  Waldersee,  the  Prussian  military  attach^,  did,  imputing  to  the 
government  manoeuvres  which  were  really  the  ruses  of  its  opponents: 
'The  situation  is  as  serious  as  possible,  I  am  thoroughly  convinced  that 
the  French  are  bent  on  war  whether  Hohenzollern  withdraws  or  not.' " 

2  [Lyons  to  Granville,  July  12,  Blue  Book,  p.  19.] 


164         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

wrote  to  the  Emperor  at   Saint-Cloud   (July   11,   6 
P.M.)  :  — 

"SiKE, — There  is  taking  place  at  this  moment  ia 
the  Corps  Legislatif  a  movement  of  which  it  is  important 
that  I  advise  your  Majesty.  When,  after  Gramont's 
declaration,  which  was  very  well  received,  Emmanuel 
Arago  asked  the  ministry :  'Have  you  raised  any 
other  questions  than  that  of  the  Prince  of  Hohen- 
zollern?'  Gramont  having  risen  to  reply,  the  Right, 
with  extraordinary  vehemence,  demurred.  This  atti 
tude  may  be  explained  by  patriotism,  doubtless,  but 
also  by  the  ideas  which  are  finding  utterance  in  the 
lobbies.  The  Right  declares  aloud  that  the  Hohen 
zollern  affair  should  be  regarded  only  as  an  incident; 
that,  even  if  it  should  be  favorably  concluded,  we  must 
not  stop  at  that,  but  must  raise  the  question  of  the 
Treaty  of  Prague,  and  resolutely  place  Prussia  between 
accepting  a  congress  and  war.  This  sort  of  talk  was 
indulged  in  by  MM.  Gambetta  and  Montpayroux  of 
the  Left,  and  Jer6me  David  and  Pinard  of  the  Right, 
and  all  alike  made  no  secret  of  their  intention  to  attack 
the  Cabinet  if  it  should  halt  after  the  settlement  of 
the  Hohenzollern  affair.  M.  Thiers  expressed  him 
self  with  extreme  warmth  in  the  opposite  sense:  he 
considers  that  the  Prussian  retreat,  in  which  he  has 
more  faith  than  I,  would  be  a  satisfaction  with  which 
we  must  be  content." 

However,  this  goading  did  not  persuade  us  to  widen 
the  discussion  as  we  were  urged  to  do,  and  we  kept  it 
strictly  within  the  limits  in  which  we  had  entered  upon 
it,  —  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy,  and  nothing  more. 


THE  EMS  NEGOTIATION  165 

The  King  was  content  with  the  language  we  had  held 
in  the  session  of  the  llth.  He  wrote  to  his  wife: 
"  Gramont's  calm  speech  is  probably  the  result  of  Bene 
detti5  s  telegram  after  our  interview  at  ten  o'clock  yes 
terday  morning,  of  which  I  wrote  you." l 

The  King  was  mistaken:  the  thing  that  had  made 
Gramont  calm  was  our  personal  resolution  not  to 
cease  to  be  calm,  and  not  the  story  of  Benedettf  s 
second  audience,  which,  on  the  contrary,  had  done  lit 
tle  to  reassure  us.  We  could  not  make  up  our  minds  to 
believe  that  the  Prince  had  really  taken  a  trip  to  the 
Tyrol,  when  a  Spanish  deputation  might  appear  at  any 
moment  to  offer  him  the  crown.  This  improbability 
made  us  fearful  that  his  alleged  trip  had  been  thought 
of  solely  to  gain  time  and  to  get  nearer  to  July  20. 

Gramont  explained  to  Benedetti  the  frame  of  mind 
which  the  King's  constant  evasions  induced  in  us.  "At 
the  point  which  we  have  now  reached,  I  cannot  hesitate 
to  inform  you  that  your  language  no  longer  represents, 
in  respect  to  firmness  of  tone,  the  position  assumed  by 
the  Emperor's  government.  You  must  to-day  make 
it  more  emphatic.  We  cannot  admit  the  distinction 
between  the  ~Kin^  and  his  government  which  has  been 
suggested  to  you.  We  demand  that  the  King  forbid 
the  Prince  to  persist  in  his  candidacy.5'2 

1  [Oncken,  Unser  hdden  Kaiser,  p.  187;  Brief e  Kaiser  Wiffielms  der 
Erste,  p.  222.  Other  passages  from  the  same  letter  are  quoted  on  pp.  183, 
184u] 

2  July  11,  6  P.M.  [Benedetti,  p.  361 ;  Gramont,  p.  88.  This  despatch 
was  sent,  it  should  be  noted,  immediately  after  the  session  of  the  Chamber 
of  the  llth,  and  before  the  receipt  of eBenedettiV  despatches  reporting  his 
second  interview  with  the  King;  Gramont,  p.  89.  As  the  Council  of  that 
morning  had  determined  to  await  the  report  of  that  interview  before  taking 
any  further  step,  Gramont's  action  was  clearly  impelled  by  the  scene  in  the 


166         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

Thus  far  Benedetti's  negotiation  with,  the  King  had 
remained  at  precisely  the  same  point.  It  had  con 
sisted  in  conjugating  the  verb  "to  await/5  —  "I  am 
awaiting  a  letter  from  the  princes,"  William  had  said. 
"Has  Your  Majesty  received  the  letter  you  were  await 
ing?"  The  dialogue  between  the  Ambassador  and 
the  King  had  been  reduced  to  this. 

Benedetti  wrote  to  Gramont:  "I  spare  neither  my 
time  nor  my  efforts,  and  I  am  in  despair  at  my  inability 
to  succeed."  Later,  in  an  apologetic  and  sophistical 
screed  against  Gramont,  he  claimed  that,  even  if  he 
had  failed  to  induce  the  King  to  intervene  directly,  by 
command  or  advice,  with  the  Hohenzollern  princes,  he 
had,  by  his  shrewd  management,,  led  him  to  sacrifice 
the  political  plans  of  his  advisers  and  to  declare  that 
he  would  put  no  obstacle  in  the  way  of  Leopold  V  ^with 
drawal.1 

Now,  it  is  clear  from  the  King's  letters  to  the  Queen 
and  from  the  messages  despatched  to  Sigmaringen, 
that  before  Benedetti's  arrival  at  Ems,  William  had 
thrown  over  a  candidacy  of  which  he  had  never  been  a 
strong  partisan ;  that  without  commanding  or  advising 
its  abandonment,  he  had  hinted,  in  very  transparent 
fashion,  that  he  would  be  overjoyed  if  his  kinsmeni 

Chamber  following  M.  Arago's  interruption.    See  Sorel,  vol.  i,  p.  114.    For 
Benedetti's  reply  to  this  despatch,  see  infra,  Appendix  I J 

1  [M.  Ollivier  presumably  refers  to  Benedetti's  -essay^oj^Hs  mission  to 
Ems,  printed  in  his  volume  of  Essais  Diplomatiques,  where  this  claim  is  made 
more  precisely,  although  it  is  really  the  burden  of  the  chapter  devoted  to  the 
same  subject  in  his  earlier  book,  M a  Mission  en  Prusse,  published  in  1871, 
which  gave  great  umbrage  to  the  Due  de  Gramont  and  is  said  by  him  to 
have  induced  the  writing  and  publication  of  his  own  volume,  La  France  et 
la  Prusse  avant  la  Guerre.  As  to  the  controversy  between  them,  see  infra, 
Appendix  EJ 


THE  EMS  NEGOTIATION  167 

should  take  the  initiative,  and  that,  in  that  case,  lie 
would  immediately  approve  their  decision.  At  Bene 
detto's  first  audience  he  had  informed  him  of  his  ques 
tion  to  Sigmaringen.  Benedetti  therefore  had  no  occa 
sion  to  obtain  what  was  already  conceded  to  him  in  the 
King's  mind. 

This  vain  braggadocio  adds  nothing  to  the  merit 
of  his  negotiation  —  which  was  genuinely  meritorious, 
none  the  less.  To  make  a  most  irascible  monarch 
swallow  harsh  words,  without  offending  him,  to  be 
firm  without  being  obsequious  or  yielding  —  that  is 
what  Benedetti  accomplished ;  and  by  that  feat  alone 
he  approved  himself  the  equal  of  the  most  skilful  diplo 
matists.  But  he  did  well  in  other  respects.  Harassed 
by  public  opinion  and  by  our  own  anxieties,  we  spurred 
him  on,  urged  him  to  greater  energy,  and  he  was  wise 
enough  to  withstand  our  impatience,  and  to  endanger 
by  no  imprudent  step  the  object  he  was  pursuing. 
Thus  he  had  obtained  leave  to  open  the  negotiation, 
which  was  a  considerable  achievement  after  Bismarck's 
prohibition,  and  had  extorted  from  the  King  valuable 
admissions.  "If  he  had  laid  down  an  ultimatum,  he 
would  have  caused  us  to  lose  the  advantages  which  were 
assured  to  us  by  the  disloyal  treatment  accorded  us  at 
Berlin  and  Madrid." 

He  was  not  content  to  be  prudent  himself :  he  put 
us  on  our  guard  against  impulsive  action.  He  knew 
enough/jnot  only  to  carry  out  his  instructions  tactfully, 
but  not  to  follow  those  which  he  deemed  injudicious. 
For  instance,  Gramont  having  sent  to  him  information 
concerning  Serrano's  disposition,  he  took  it  upon  him 
self  not  to  make  use  of  it,  and  to  call  his  chief  to  account 
for  his  lapse,  "As  you  know,  the  King  claims  that 


168         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

our  only  remedy  Is  to  call  upon  the  Spanish  government 
itself  to  abandon  the  project  it  has  conceived ;  and  his 
Majesty  would  not  have  failed  to  seize  upon  what  I 
told  him  as  a  pretext  for  insisting  upon  that  view.55  l 

This  first  part  of  the  negotiation  at  Ems  will  always 
be  one  of  the  excellent  pages  in  our  diplomatic  history. 
It  had  a  result  most  unpalatable  to  Bismarck,  —  the 
sending  of  Werther  to  Paris  by  the  King.  Despite  his 
minister's  urgent  remonstrances  the  King  had  dis 
cussed  affairs  with  Benedetti  in  two  audiences;  by 
splitting  hairs  he  could  claim  that  it  was  in  the  capacity 
of  head  of  his  family,  and  not  as  king.  By  sending  his 
Ambassador  to  treat  with  us,  he  acted  as  king,  and  no 
longer  as  head  of  his  family,  and  made  the  question  an 
affair  of  state.  We  were  satisfied  therefore  with  the 
royal  decision,  more  especially  because,  the  discussion 
being  transferred  to  Paris,  between  an  ambassador  and 
ministers,  it  would  take  a  freer  course. 

In  a  note  which  I  left  for  Gramorit  in  the  evening  of 
the  llth,  I  urged  him  not  to  continue  with  Werther 
the  mild  tone  which  Benedetti  had  been  compelled  to 
observe  with  the  King ;  to  insist  upon  the  twofold  char 
acter  of  threat  and  insult  attributable  to  the  Hohen- 
zollern  candidacy;  to  press  Werther  hard;  to  meet 
with  vigorous  rejoinders  the  trickery  already  exposed 
to  the  light;  to  force  an  abandonment  of  the  equivo 
cating  process  which  we  could  endure  no  longer;  to 
extricate  us,  in  short,  from  the  period  of  trifling  and 
bring  us  face  to  face  with  a  yes  or  a  no.  We  had  been 
played  with  long  enough ;  it  was  time  to  abandon  the 
habit. 

.  156  n.  (on  p.  157).] 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE  NEGOTIATION  WITH  PRINCE  ANTONY  —  THE  WITH 
DRAWAL 

BEFORE  Gramont  and  Werther  had  met,  a  sudden 
coup  de  tMdtre  upset  all  anticipations.  Strat's  mission 
to  Sigmaringen  had  succeeded  even  better  than  Bar- 
tholdi's  at  Madrid,  and  the  affair  took  on  a  new  aspect. 

Strat  had  gone  first  to  Dtisseldorf ,  to  find  out  where 
Prince  Antony  and  Prince  Leopold  were.  He  had 
learned  from  certain  old  family  retainers,  to  whom  he 
was  well  known,  that  Prince  Antony  was  at  his  country 
house  at  Sigmaringen,  and  that  Prince  Leopold,  after 
a  trip  to  the  Tyrol,  had  returned  and  was  keeping  out 
of  sight  in  the  neighborhood  of  Sigmaringen,  ready  to 
take  ship  at  Genoa  as  soon  as  the  vote  of  the  Cortes 
should  be  brought  to  him.  Thus  informed,  Strat  be 
took  himself  to  Sigmaringen  (July  8) ;  there  he  found 
Prince  Antony  both  disturbed  and  angered  by  our 
declaration  of  the  6th.  To  Strat's  first  overtures  he 
replied  by  a  wrathful  refusal:  his  son  had  ceased  to 
be  the  master  of  his  own  decision;  he  was  bound,  he 
had  given  his  word,  he  could  not  withdraw  without 
dishonor.  Moreover,  what  would  be  gained  by  such 
a  discreditable  retreat?  The  Emperor  was  simply 
seeking  a  pretext  for  war ;  this  one  being  removed,  he 
would  stir  up  another. 

Strat  demonstrated  that  the  Prince  was  in  error  con 
cerning  Napoleon  Hi's  purpose;   he  had  no  such  hid- 

169 


170         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

den  designs,  and  Ms  desire  for  a  peaceful  settlement  was 
earnest  and  sincere.  Then,  without  wasting  his  time 
in  futile  sentimentalities  about  the  calamities  of  war 
and  the  terrible  responsibility  of  him  who  is  the  cause 
of  it,  he  went  straight  to  the  practical  arguments.  He 
painted  in  the  gloomiest  colors  the  situation  into  which 
Prince  Leopold  was  on  the  point  of  plunging ;  he  would 
have  to  contend  against  the  plots  of  Alfonsists  and 
Carlists,  encouraged  by  France,  against  the  intrigues  of 
discarded  rivals  and  especially  of  Montpensier,  -and 
against  republican  risings;  at  the  announcement  of 
his  candidacy  there  was  an  enormous  majority  in  his 
favor  in  the  Cortes,  but  every  day,  under  the  action 
of  fear  or  of  hatred,  that  majority  was  diminishing, 
and  the  most  favorable  result  that  could  be  looked  for 
was  that  it  would  remain  large  enough  to  impose  upon 
him  the  duty  of  going  to  Spain,  but  not  large  enough 
to  assure  him  of  sufficient  strength  to  maintain  himself 
in  power.  He  would  probably  not  have  time  to  take 
his  seat  on  that  broken-legged  throne;  he  would  be 
hurled  back  as  he  climbed  the  steps,  and  would  be 
very  fortunate  if  he  escaped  with  his  life;  he  was 
summoned  to  a  disaster,  not  to  a  reign. 

Strat  next  directed  the  Prince's  attention  to  the 
situation  in  Roumania  of  his  son  Charles,  the  object 
of  his  anxious  solicitude :  a  formidable  conspiracy  was 
being  formed  against  him ;  its  threads  were  in  Paris ; 
it  was  in  the  Emperor's  power  to  cut  them  or  to  set 
them  at  work;  he  would  cut  them  if  Leopold  should 
withdraw;  he  would  set  them  at  work,  if  he  were  ob 
durate.  Was  it  wise  to  endanger  *a  throne  in  possession 
for  the  sake  of  a  problematical  one  ? 

These  considerations  notwithstanding,  the  Prince 


THE  CANDIDACY  WITHDRAWN        171 

refused  to  be  moved.  But  tlie  mother  was  present  at 
those  painful  interviews :  she  was  perturbed,  agitated, 
alarmed,  convinced;  and,  moved  by  her  twofold 
maternal  anxiety,  she  came  to  Strat's  aid  and  strove 
to  overcome  her  husband's  resistance.  Despite  her 
tears,  she  did  not  succeed  for  two  days,  and  the  Prince 
replied  to  the  first  questioning  letter  from  Ems  that  he 
was  prepared  to  obey,  but  that  he  would  not  volunta 
rily  withdraw  his  son's  candidacy. 

The  mother  refused  to  be  discouraged,  and  at  last, 
on  the  third  day  (July  11),  she  triumphed  and  the 
father  imposed  silence  on  the  Prussian  and  the  ambitious 
man.  "This  decision,"  Strat  told  me  emphatically 
many  times,  "was  a  genuinely  spontaneous  act,  the 
impulse, of  a  father's  heart,  which  no  external  influence 
prompted.  Before  me  no  one  had  advised  or  requested 
the  withdrawal  of  the  candidacy,  and  during  my  stay 
at  the  castle  of  Hohenzollern,  no  one  came  to  my  as 
sistance,  directly  or  indirectly.  King  William  was 
telling  the  truth  when  he  said  again  and  again  that  he 
had  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  the  withdrawal; 
that  it  had  come  about  without  any  pressure  from  him ; 
that  he  had  neither  ordered  it  nor  advised  it.  I  was 
not  aware  at  that  time  that  he  had  even  desired  it."  * 

1  ["The  mission  of  M.  de  Strait  to  the  princes,  supported,  without  the 
slightest  doubt,  by  confidential  advices  from  the  King  of  Prussia,  had  suc 
ceeded.'*  Sorel,  vol.  i,  p.  1£4.  How  far  the  King  actively  interfered  must 
remain  almost  entirely  a  matter  of  inference.  It  appears  sufficiently  in  his 
correspondence  with  the  Queen,  as  well  as  in  his  letter  of  July  6  to  Prince 
Antony  (supra,  p.  138),  that  he  regretted  the  turn  affairs  had  taken  and  would 
have  been  glad  to  know  that  the  candidacy  had  disappeared;  but  there 
seems  to  be  no  direct  evidence  that  he  urged,  far  less  commanded,  Prince 
Leopold's  withdrawal.  It  is  a  very  different  question,  however,  whether, 
considering  his  relation  to  the  affair,  and  the  momentous  importance  that  it 
had  assumed,  Ms  kinsmen  would  have  notified  everybody  else  of  the  with- 


172         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

When  Prince  Antony  informed  his  son  of  his  decision, 
he  refused  to  adopt  it:  the  same  honorable  scruples 
which  had  caused  him  to  hesitate  so  long  before  ac 
cepting,  because  of  his  relations  with  Napoleon  III, 
made  him  reluctant  to  withdraw  because  of  his  agree 
ments  with  Prim  and  Bismarck.1  To  persuade  the 
Prince  would  have  taken  time,  and  there  was  need  of 
haste.  Strat  induced  the  father  to  exert  his  authority 
and  to  take  it  upon  himself  to  withdraw  in  his  son's 
name,  knowing  that  Leopold  would  not  dare  to  dis 
avow  him  publicly.  And  that  is  how  the  withdrawal, 
instead  of  being  made,  as  the  acceptance  was,  by  Leo 
pold  himself,  was  made  by  Prince  Antony.  He  would 
have  preferred  at  least  to  notify  the  head  of  the  family, 
in  conformity  with  the  family  statute,  before  informing 
the  Spaniards  and  the  public,  but  that  course  would 
necessitate  more  delay,  and  Stra{,  unaware  of  the  King's 
real  preference,  feared  that  some  opposition  might  come 
from  him.  He  got  the  Prince  to  agree  that  the  public 
announcement  should  not  be  postponed.  Prince  An 
tony  consented  the  more  willingly  because,  knowing  the 

drawal  by  telegraph,  and  have  left  him  alone  to  learn  it  by  messenger.  So 
that,  even  before  the  publication  of  his  letter  to  the  Queen  (p.  173,  n.  1), 
it  was  a  fair  assumption  that  he  was  already  aware  of  the  withdrawal  when 
Benedetti  told  him  of  it  on  the  morning  of  the  13th,  that  his  surprise  was 
feigned,  therefore,  and  that  his  persistence  in  waiting  for  direct  advices  was 
due  to  Ms  desire  to  give  greater  plausibility  to  his  claim  that  the  withdrawal 
was  altogether  spontaneous  on  the  Prince's  part,  and  that  the  King,  in  merely 
giving  his  assent,  "as  he  had  given  his  assent  to  the  acceptance,"  was  still 
acting  as  head  of  the  family,  and  not  as  king.  See  Benedetti,  pp.  367, 368 ; 
Gramont,  pp.  133,  134.] 

1  "His  wife  could  not  make  up  her  mind  to  put  away  from  her  head  the 
superb  crown  which  she  coveted,  and  which  she  seemed  to  feel  already  resting 
upon  it."  [OlEvier,  vol.  xiv,  p.  209.  The  Princess  Leopold  was  sister  to  the 
King  of  Portugal.] 


THE  CANDIDACY  WITHDRAWN       173 

King's  secret  wishes,  lie  was  certain  that  the  head  of  the 
family  would  not  take  umbrage  at  that  infraction  of 
family  Discipline. 

Without  losing  a  minute,  Strat  despatched,  that 
same  evening,  the  llth,  a  telegram  in  cipher  to  Olozaga, 
advising  him  of  the  fortunate  result,  which  telegram 
arrived  at  Paris  late  in  the  evening.  It  had  already 
been  sent  when  the  King's  messenger,  Colonel  Strantz, 
arrived,  having  been  delayed  by  an  accident  to  his 
carriage.1  Prince  Antony  told  him  the  news,  and  he 
at  once  telegraphed  to  his  master  the  decision  already 
transmitted  to  Olozaga. 

On  the  morning  of  the  12th  three  telegrams,  not  in  ci 
pher,  were  sent  by  Prince  Antony.2  This  was  the  first : — 

"To  MABSHAL  PRIM,  Madrid :  — 

"  In  view  of  the  complications  which  the  candidacy 
of  my  son  Leopold  for  the  throne  of  Spain  seems  to 
have  encountered,  and  of  the  painful  situation  which 
recent  events  have  created  for  the  Spanish  nation,  plac 
ing  it  in  a  dilemma  where  it  can  take  counsel  only  of 

1  The  time  of  Strantz's  arrival  is  fixed  in  a  letter  from,  the  King  to  the 
Queen,  of  the  12th:  "As  there  was  an  accident  to  General  Strantz's  train, 
he  did  not  reach  Sigmaringen  until  last  evening."    [Note  of  M.  Ollivier, 
vol.  xiv.  p.  210.]    This  being  so,  the  decision  to  withdraw  would  have  been 
reached  even  before  Prince  Antony  received  the  King's  letter  from  Strantz. 
The  lOng's  reply  to  Benedetti  is  inconsistent  with  his  further  statement  in 
the  same  letter  to  the  Queen,  that  Strantz  had  telegraphed  that  Leopold  had 
withdrawn.    Briefe  des  Kaiser  Wtihelms  der  Erste,  p.  22£. 

2  It  is  evident  what  one  should  think  of  the  fanciful  conjecture  put  forth 
later  by  Benedetti,  in  an  outburst  of  personal  excitement,  that  "  this  trans- 
nussHiL  Of  Prince  Antony's  despatch  had  been  arranged  between  Ems  and 
Sigmaringen/*  and  that,  on  the  12th  the  King  had  in  his  hands  the  copy  of 
the  despatch  sent  by  Prince  Antony  to  Olozaga  on  the  same  day.     [Note  of 
M.  Ollivier,  vol.  xiv,  p.  210.    But  the  author  has  just  stated  that  Strantz 
learned  the  news  and  repeated  it  to  the  King  on  the  night  of  the  llth.] 


174         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

its  own  sentiment  of  independence;  and  being  per 
suaded  that  under  such  circumstances  its  choice  would 
not  have  the  sincerity  and  spontaneity  upon  which 
my  son  counted  when  he  accepted  the  candidacy,  I 
withdraw  it  in  his  name." 

The  second  was  addressed  to  Olozaga :  — 
"To  THE  SPANISH  AMBASSADOE  AT  PARIS:  — 
"  I  deem  it  my  duty  to  inform  you,  as  Spanish  repre 
sentative  at  Paris,  that  I  have  but  now  sent  to  Madrid, 
to  Marshal  Prim,  the  following  telegram.'5    Then  fol 
lows  the  text  given  above. 

The  third  telegram  was  addressed  to  the  principal 
journals  of  Berlin  and  of  Germany,  notably  the  Gazette 
of  Augsbourg  and  the  Gazette  of  Cologne,  and  to  the 
German  telegraphic  agencies :  — l 

"The  Hereditary  Prince  of  Hohenzollern,  in  order  to 
restore  to  Spain  her  freedom  of  initiative,  withdraws 
his  candidacy  for  the  throne  of  Spain,  being  firmly 
resolved  not  to  allow  a  question  of  war  to  grow  out  of  a 
family  question  of  secondary  importance  in  his  eyes. 
—  By  order  of  the  Prince, 

"LESSER,  Councillor  of  his  Chamber/' 

The  telegram  to  Prim  returned  from  Madrid  to 
Paris  about  five  in  the  evening.  The  despatch'  to 
Olozaga  reached  Paris  at  1.40  P.M.  That  to  the  Ger 
man  newspapers  reached  them  in  the  afternoon,  early 
enough  for  the  agencies  to  send  the  news  before  night 

1  [The  SwaUan  M&rcwry  is  generally  mentioned  as  the  German  journal 
in  which  tie  news  was  first  published ;  and  Bismarck  is  said  to  have  read  it 
there.  See  Sorel,  vol.  i»  p.  124;  Welschinger,  p.  72.] 


THE  CANDIDACY  WITHDRAWN        175 

to  their  correspondents,  clubs,  bankers,  journals,  etc. 
The  Gazettes  of  Cologne  and  Augsbourg  and  other 
papers  published  it  in  their  evening  editions.  Thus  the 
news  did  not  reach  Paris  from  Madrid:  it  reached 
Paris  and  Madrid  at  the  same  time,  and,  soon  after, 
it  became  known  in  all  the  important  centres  of 
Europe. 

While  the  telegrams  were  flying  to  Paris  and  Madrid, 
Strat  and  Strantz  left  Sigmaringen,  the  latter  returning 
to  Ems  with  a  letter  from  Prince  Antony  setting  forth 
the  reasons  of  his  spontaneous  decision,  the  former  carry 
ing  to  Olozaga  the  original  draft  of  the  withdrawal. 

There  remained  at  Sigmaringen  a  gentleman  who, 
like  everybody  else  at  .that  period,  was  waiting.  It  was 
Admiral  Polo  de  Bernab6.  He  had  arrived  several 
days  before,  with  Prim's  official  letter  offering  the  crown 
to  Prince  Leopold.  Prince  Antony,  still  deliberating, 
had  told  him,  as  the  King  of  Prussia  told  Benedetti, 
that  the  Prince  was  travelling  in  the  Tyrol ;  and  the 
admiral,  was  awaiting  his  return.  The  withdrawal 
being  decided  upon,  Prince  Antony  so  informed  him, 
saying  that  he  might  now. consider  his  mission  con 
cluded  and  return  to  Madrid. 

The  admiral  objected  that,  despite  that  assurance, 
his  mission  would  not  be  concluded  until,  the  document 
of  which  he  was  the  bearer  having  been  delivered  to 
Prince  Leopold,  that  Prince  should  give  him  his  formal 
response.  It  became  necessary  therefore  to  summon 
the  Prince  from  his  hiding-place,  exhibit  him  to  the 
Spanish  admiral,  and  obtain  from  him  a  formal  letter 
of  withdrawal.1 

1  Letters  from  Admiral  Polo  de  BernabS  to  E.  Olttvier  of  July  Ifc  and 
August  £,  1888. 


176         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

The  Prince  refused.  Thereupon  there  were  painful 
scenes  between  the  father  and  son.  Those  Hohen- 
zollern  princes,  under  a  delightful  exterior,  concealed 
a  substratum  of  tyrannical  harshness ;  everything  about 
them  bent  beneath  a  discipline  as  inflexible  as  steel. 
The  young  Prince  ended  by  submitting,1  and  handed 
the  admiral  his  withdrawal.  When  General  Lopez 
Dominguez  arrived,  the  admiral  informed  him  that 
there  was  nothing  for  him  to  do  but  return  with  him 
to  Madrid ;  that  it  was  all  over.2 

1  Concerning  Prince  Leopold's  disposition  in  the  matter  I  have  the  con 
cordant  testimony  of  the  two  Spanish  envoys.    Admiral  Polo  de  Bernab£ 
wrote  me  on  August  £, 1888 :  "  Creo  tambien  la  contrarietad  del  hi  jo  por  esa 
resolucion  de  su  Padre" ;   and  Lopez  Dominguez  on  July  17,  1888 :  "Ord6n 
que  aim  contrariendole  mucho  acatabe  il  archiduque"  (prince). 

2  [In  a  passage  of  several  pages,  omitted  here,  M.  Ollivier  insists  that  the 
whole  credit  for  Prince  Leopold's  withdrawal  belonged  to  Strat  and  Olozaga, 
although  it  was  claimed  by  "all  those  who  had  labored  or  felt  disposed  to 
labor,"  to  bring  it  about.]     "'My  dear  friend/  Olozaga  wrote  me,  'I  have 
read,  as  you  have,  in  the  English  despatches  certain  hints  which  might  in 
duce  the  belief  that  it  was  the  cabinet  of  St.  James  that  obtained  Prince 
Leopold's  withdrawal.  ...    I  am  in  a  position  to  prove,  by  the  testimony  of 
M.  Strat,  who  was  my  intermediary  with  the  Sigmaringen  Hohenzollerns, 
that  no  one  before  myself  suggested  the  withdrawal  directly  or  indirectly. 
Nor  did  any  one  assist  me  in  any  way  to  obtain  it;  that  is  all  that  I  can  tell 
you.     I  should  add  that  all  the  steps  I  have  taken  to  find  out  something 
concerning  the  motives  or  the  pretext  of  the  hints  that  were  calculated  to 
make  people  believe  that  the  English  government  obtained  the  withdrawal 
were  absolutely  fruitless.    I  am  so  far  from  desiring  for  myself  the  monopoly, 
so  to  speak,  of  having  conceived  the  idea  of  the  withdrawal,  and  the  good 
fortune  of  having  obtained  it,  that  I  should  have  preferred  a  thousand  times 
that  no  one  should  have  known  what  I  had  done,  and  that  the  government 
of  one  of  the  first  powers  of  Europe  should  have  obtained  the  wit  drawal, 
because  in  that  case  it  would  have  turned  it  to  good  account  and  would  have 
avoided  war,  which  was  what  I  desired  with  aE  the  force  of  which  I  am 
capable.    After  I  had  been  so  fortunate  in  what  the  Emperor  regarded  as 
almost  an  impossibility,  I  cannot  console  myself  for  being  so  powerless.* 
(March  14,  1871.)"    L'Empire  Lib&rab  pp.  £18,  214. 

[As  to  the  "hints"  concerning  the  credit  due  to  the  English  government. 


THE  CANDIDACY  WITHDRAWN        177 

The  way  in  which  Bismarck  learned  of  the  collapse 
of  his  scheme  was  almost  tragic.  From  the  solitude 
to  which  he  had  betaken  himself  to  await  the  ex 
plosion  of  his  mine,  kept  informed  from  hour  to  hour 
by  Abeken,1  he  followed  with  close  attention,  becoming 
more  and  more  perturbed  and  at  last  thoroughly 
angry,  at  what  was  taking  place  at  Ems  between  Bene- 
detti  and  the  King.  He  was  furious  because  the 
King  received  our  Ambassador  before  he  had  received 
reparation  for  what  he  (Bismarck)  called  Gramont's 
insults ;  because  he  avowed  his  share  in  the  candidacy 
and  in  the  negotiations  with  Prince  Antony,  and 
promised  Benedetti,  if  Leopold  should  decide  to  with- 

see  especially  the  despatches  of  Granville  to  Lyons  of  July  13,  Blue  Book, 
pp.  22,  23  (Nos.  33  and  35).] 

"The  vengeance  of  Bismarck  and  Prim  did  not  fail  to  light  upon  the  real 
authors  of  the  withdrawal,  and  thereby  to  designate  them.  The  Spanish 
candidacy  was  no  mere  act  of  family  ambition,  to  which  the  King  of  Prussia 
had  assented  through  condescension  for  a  kinsman ;  it  was  a  State  intrigue 
of  which  the  family  ambition  was  simply  an  instrument,  and  Bismarck  did 
not  forgive  Prince  Antony  for  forgetting  that  fact  and  acting  as  if  only  his 
own  interest  and  his  children's  were  involved.  The  Prince  fell  into  irrep 
arable  disgrace:  he  had  to  resign  the  honorable  duties  that  kept  Mm  at 
Diisseldorf ,  and  to  go  into  retirement  at  Sigmaringen.  .  .  .  Nor  did  Prim's 
dissembled  wrath  spare  Olozaga.  A  newspaper  having  announced  that  we 
proposed  to  give  him  the  Grand  Cross  of  the  Legion  of  Honor  hi  recognition 
of  the  services  he  had  rendered  us,  Mercier  wrote  to  Gramont  (July  18)  that 
*one  of  the  ministers  had  come  to  him  to  say  that  that  would  be  very  ill- 
timed,  and  that  the  ministry  would  not  permit  him  to  accept  it  because  Prim 
would  be  offended/  "  [L'Empire  Liberal,  vol.  xiv,  pp.  213-216.  And  hi 
a  note  on  p.  216 :]  A  letter  from  Martin  Hernandez,  Spanish  charge  d'affaires, 
to  E.  OUivier,  Nov.  12, 1870,  reads :  "M.  Olozaga  instructs  me  to  inform  you 
that  for  having  endeavored  to  do  everything  in  his  power  in  favor  of  France, 
he  has  found  himself  under  the  necessity  of  giving  in  his  resignation  as  am 
bassador,  and  retiring  to  the  country." 

1  [Busch,  Bismarck :  Some  Secret  Pages  of  his  History,  devotes  several 
pages  to  an  account  of  the  character  and  services  of  Heinrich  Abeken;  vol. 
i,  pp.  440-444.] 


178         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

draw,  to  inform  him  of  that  decision.  These  were 
concessions,  and  the  King  should  not  have  granted 
any  one  of  them,  but  should  have  shown  the  negotiator 
the  door  at  the  first  word,  and  not  have  taken  part  in 
any  discussion  whatsoever.  Did  the  King  propose, 
under  the  pacific  influence  of  Queen  Augusta,  to  ad 
vise  the  princes  to  abandon  the  game  ? 

Bismarck  determined  to  cut  short  all  compromising 
proceedings,  and  to  stop  William  on  the  incline  down 
which  he  was  slipping.  He  wrote  to  him  that,  as  his 
health  would  now  permit  him  to  travel,  he  was  ready 
to  go  to  Ems  at  his  Majesty's  command.  The  King 
sent  him  such  a  command,  and  on  the  morning  of  the 
12th  Bismarck  started,  with  Keudell,1  in  his  travelling 
carriage.  He  left  Lothar  Bucher  at  Varzin  with  his 
wife.  "He  was  more  taciturn  than  usual/'  says 
Keudell,  "although  his  manner  was  cheerful." 

As  they  drove  through  Wussow  his  friend  the  old 
pastor  Mullert,  standing  at  the  door  of  his  parsonage, 
waved  him  a  friendly  salutation;  from  the  back 
seat  of  his  open  carriage  Bismarck  replied  by  a  gesture 
mimicking  a  thrust  in  tierce  and  quarte,  to  suggest 
that  he  was  going  into  a  fight.2  It  was  his  purpose, 

1  [See  Busch,  ubi  supra,  vol.  ii,  pp.  104-111,  for  an  elaborate  estimate  of 
Herr  von  Keudell.] 

2  [Busch,  vol.  i,  p.  303.    "Dec.  19,  1870.    Abeken  then  talked  about  the 
events  at  Ems  which  preceded  the  war,  and  related  that,  on  one  occasion, 
after  a  certain  despatch  had  been  sent  off,  the  King  said:  'Well,  he*  (Bis 
marck)  'will  be  satisfied  with  us  now  ! J    And  Abeken  added,  *I  believe  you 
were/    *  Well,*  replied  the  Chancellor,  laughing, '  you  may  easily  be  mistaken. 
That  is  to  say,  I  was  quite  satisfied  with  you.    But  not  quite  so  much  with 
our  Most  Gracious,  or  rather  not  at  all.    He  ought  to  have  acted  in  a  more 
dignified  way  —  and  more  resolutely.    I  remember/  he  continued,  'how  I 
received  the  news  at  Varan.    I  Jhad  gone  out,  and  on  my  return  the  first 
telegram  had  been  delivered.    As  I  started  on  my  journey,  I  had  to  pass 
our  pastor's  house  at  Wussow,' "  etc.] 


THE  CANDIDACY  WITHDRAWN        179 

after  conferring  a  few  moments  with  Roon,  who  had 
just  arrived  at  Berlin,  to  push  on  to  Ems;  there  he 
would  put.  an  end  to  compliments,  courtesies,  and  con 
descensions;  he  would  show  how  the  honor  of  the 
country  was  being  sacrificed  and  would  bring  about  a 
peremptory,  and  perhaps  an  insulting,  notification  of 
refusal  to  withdraw  on  the  part  of  the  princes  and 
the  Bang.  He  would  repeat  Thile's  arguments  in 
a  brutal  tone ;  he  would  not  allow  the  King  to  dis 
cuss  with  us  any  further  his  acts  as  head  of  his 
family ;  lastly,  he  would  dismiss  Benedetti  and  would 
propose  the  summoning  of  the  Reichstag  with  a  view 
to  mobilization.1  As  a  preliminary  to  these  meas 
ures,  realizing  the  conciliatory  significance  of  the 
sending  of  Werther  to  Paris,  he  telegraphed  to  stop 
him,  but  Werther  was  already  on  the  way. 

Bismarck  reached  Berlin  at  six  in  the  evening, 
expecting  to  take  the  8.30  train  for  Ems.  As  he 
drove  along  Unter  den  Linden,  he  met  Prince  Gortcha- 
koff ;  they  stopped  and  shook  hands.  In  the  court 
yard  of  his  house,  among  the  despatches  which  were 
handed  him  before  he  left  his  carriage,  he  found  one 
from  Paris  announcing  Prince  Antony's  withdrawal. 
He  was  fairly  petrified.  He  had  no  idea  that  so  well- 
disciplined  a  prince  would  take  it  upon  himself,  with 
out  the  sanction,  or  rather  the  encouragement,  of  the 
King,  to  do  a  thing  which,  if  done  on  his  own  initiative, 

1  Bismarck,  Reflections,  etc.,  English  trans.,  vol.  ii,  p.  93.  M.  Matter, 
in  his  noteworthy  study  of  Bismarck,  was  the  first  writer  in  France  to  call 
attention  to  this  set-back  of  the  Chancellor.  "  The  work  of  many  months,  a 
secret  and  crafty  negotiation,  the  stirring-up  of  the  press,  the  irritation  of 
the  people,  all  had  come  to  naught ;  the  King  of  Prussia  had  yielded,  and 
for  the  first  time  in  his  political  career  Count  Bismarck  had  been  brought 
to  a  halt."  Vol.  iii,  p.  53.  [NeteTbf  M.  OHIvier,  vol.  xiv,  p.  218.] 


180         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

would  be  treason ;  could  it  be  that  a  Prussian  prince, 
a  friend,  a  confidant,  would  allow  himself,  alone,  in 
obedience  to  a  rash  impulse,  to  undo,  without  a  previous 
understanding,  a  work  which  had  been  so  laboriously 
planned  in  common  ?  In  a  flash,  he  saw  all  the  disas 
trous  consequences  to  himself  of  the  incident.  He 
was  discomfited,  beaten,  humbled,  deserted  by  his 
King  and  his  candidate;  ,he  would  speedily  become 
the  derision  of  Germany  and  Europe;  his  edifice 
of  craft  was  crumbling  about  his  ears.  Let  a  German 
writer  tell  our  historians  the  extent  of  this  catastrophe. 

"This  withdrawal,"  says  Lenz,  "meant  peace. 
His  journey  had  become  useless;  useless  the  up 
rising  of  the  nation  which  he  had  instigated  with 
all  his  strength ;  useless  his  attempt,  made  with  scien 
tific  craft,  to  prepare  a  counter-mine  for  the  efforts 
of  the  French.  Even  if  he  could  still  maintain  his 
position  externally,  the  game  was  lost.  Instead  of 
taking  France  by  surprise,  as  he  had  hoped,  he  found 
his  path  now  blocked  by  her.  The  moment  to  fall 
back  had  come ;  for  the  first  time  in  his  life  the  great 
statesman  had  suffered  a  defeat."  1 

This  crushing  result  was  due  in  great  measure 
to  our  declaration  of  July  6.  Olozaga  and  Strat 
would  not  have  succeeded  in  their  undertaking,  would 
not  even  have  thought  of  it,  but  for  the  facilities 
afforded  by  our  bold  ultimatum.  Nigra  recognizes 
this  fact.  "The  prince's  withdrawal,"  he  says," must 
be  attributed  mainly  to  his  wish  to  save  Europe  from 
a  conflagration,  as  well  as  to  the  resolute  attitude  of 
the  French  government.'9  2 

iLenz,  Geschickte,  "Bismarck,"  pp  ,349-350. 

2  March*  1895.    ["The  Hereditary  Priace  formally  withdraws  his  candi- 


THE  CANDIDACY  WITHDRAWN        181 

The  declaration  had  aroused  the  European  cabinets 
from  their  apathy  by  showing  them  the  peril,  had 
awakened  the  drowsy  conscience  of  the  King,  and 
inspired  in  Prince  Antony  a  salutary  dread;  it  had 
not  closed  the  door  to  negotiation,  but  had  thrown 
it  wide  open.  Thanks  to  the  adroitness  with  which 
we  had  made  use  of  it,  it  had  secured  for  us  what  soft 
words  or  the  long-spun  verbiage  of  timid  pourparlers 
would  not  have  done.  We  had  said,  "We  will  not 
tolerate  a  Hohenzollern  candidate";  and  the  Hohen- 
zollern  candidate  had  vanished.  We  had  not  fallen 
into  the  abyss  which  Bismarck  had  dug  under  our 
feet ;  we  had  thrown  him  into  it  himself. 

Guizot,  on  hearing  of  it,  exclaimed :  "Those  fellows 
have  insolent  good  luck :  it's  the  greatest  diplomatic 
victory  I  have  ever  seen  in  my  life."1  And  Thiers: 
"To  have  forced  Prussia  to  draw  back  from  an  enter 
prise  which  everybody  believed  to  have  been  de 
liberately  undertaken  by  her,  was  an  immense  ad 
vantage.  .  .  .  We  got  out  of  an  embarrassment  by  a 
triumph  !  Sadowa  was  almost  avenged  ! "  2 

Although  Bismarck  was  one  of  those  stout-hearted 
men  who  are  not  thrown  entirely  off  their  balance  by 
an  unfortunate  accident,  this  set-back  was  so  pro 
nounced  that  he  was  stunned  for  a  moment.  He  has 
told  about  it  in  his  Reflections:  — 

"My  first  thought  was  to  hand  in  my  resignation. 

dacy,  in  order  to  deprive  France  of  any  pretext  for  war  against  Germany/* 
Memoirs  of  the  King  of  Roumania  (French  trans.),  vol.  i,  p.  593,  under 
date  of  July  !£.] 

1  ["It  was  an  unhoped-for  success  after  the  Due  de  Gramont's  bluster/* 
says  Lehautcourt,  vol.  i,  p.  &63 ;  and  he  quotes  the  above  remark  of  Guizot 
on  the  authority  of  Darimon,  Hwtoire  &un  Jour,  p.  S9J 

2  In  his  deposition  before  the  Commission  of  Inquiry  concerning  the  4th 
of  September. 


182         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

After  all  the  insulting  provocations  that  had  there 
tofore  been  offered  us,  I  saw  in  that  withdrawal  which 
was  forced  upon  us  a  humiliation  for  Germany,  and  I 
did  not  propose  to  take  the  official  responsibility  for 
it.  The  feeling  that  the  national  honor  was  wounded 
by  that  compulsory  retreat  so  possessed  me  that  I 
had  already  decided  to  send  my  resignation  to  Ems. 
I  regarded  such  humiliation,  before  France  and  her 
gasconading  manifestations,  as  worse  than  the  Olmiitz 
affair.  The  Olmiitz  incident  can  always  find  its 
excuse  in  the  earlier  transactions  in  which  we  were 
involved,  and  in  the  impossibility  of  our  beginning 
a  war  at  that  time.  I  felt  sure  that  ^France  would 
make  the  most  of  the  Prince's  withdrawal  as  of  a 
satisfaction  accorded  to  her.  I  was  very  much  de 
pressed.  The  approaching  disaster  to  our  national 
position  which  our  timid  policy  caused  me  to  fear, 
I  saw  no  means  of  averting  except  by  seizing  awk 
wardly  upon  the  first  quarrel  that  might  come  to  hand, 
or  by  provoking  one  out  of  hand.  For  I  looked  upon 
war  as  a  necessity  which  we  could  no  longer  avoid  with 
honor.  I  telegraphed  to  my  people  at  Varzin  not 
to  pack  my  trunks,  not  to  start ;  that  I  should  return 
in  a  few  days.  At  that  moment  I  believed  in  peace. 
But  I  did  not  choose  to  assume  the  responsibility 
of  defending  the  policy  by  which  that  peace  would 
have  been  bought.  I  abandoned  my  journey  to 
Ems,  therefore,  and  requested  Count  Eulenbourg  to  go 
thither  and  lay  before  his  Majesty  my  point  of  view."  1 
He  instructed  Eulenbourg  to  try  the  great  coup, 
which  was  ordinarily  effectual,  of  offering  his  resig- 

1  Bismarck,  Reflections,  etc.,  English  trans.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  94,  95.    But  see, 
on  the  other  hand,  Infra,  p.  187,  additional  note. 


THE  CANDIDACY  WITHDRAWN        183 

nation,  and  to  say  to  the  King  that  Bismarck  regarded 
war  as  necessary,  and  that  he  should  return  to  Varzin 
if  that  war  were  avoided.1  He  anticipated  his  mes 
senger's  arrival  by  a  telegram  in  which  he  expressed 
his  determination.  "He  passed  the  night  without 
sleep,"  Keudell  adds.2  One  can  understand  it.  To 
decide  upon  war  was  a  simple  matter ;  but  he  was 
not  Frederick,  manipulating  the  state  at  his  sole 
pleasure.  He  must  needs  show  his  hand,  make  a 
provocation  to  order,  and  assume  the  r61e  of  aggressor, 
of  "seeker  after  quarrels,"  3  which  he  had  tried  to 
force  upon  France.  But  where  could  he  have  found 
his  quarrel?  Would  it  have  been  in  what  he  called 
the  insolent  terms  of  our  declaration?  That  had 
all  been  condoned  by  the  negotiation  at  Ems  and  by 
the  concessions  that  the  King  had  made  to  us.  "After 
the  principal  question  had  been  settled,  to  go  back 
to  it  would  have  been  too  ill-advised."  4  If  he  should 
find  a  pretext,  he  must  have  the  King's  assent,  and  it 
was  almost  certain  that  he  could  not  obtain  it. 

In  truth,  when  he  received  Colonel  Strantz's  message 
on  the  12th,  the  King  was  genuinely  relieved.  "This 
takes  a  weight  from  my  heart,"  he  wrote  to  the  Queen; 

1  These  are  Bismarck's  own  words  in  a  report  of  Sept,  25, 1888,  published 
in  the  Official  Journal.    They  constitute  an  admission  as  important  as  that 
concerning  the  Ems  despatch,  but  they  have  hitherto  passed  minoticed. 
[Note  of  M.  Ollivier,  vol.  xiv,  p.  222.] 

2  Throughout  his  narrative  Keudell  makes  his  chief  play  the  r61e  of  a 
peaceably  inclined  imbecile,  who  never  pays  any  heed  to  what  he  does ;  and 
he  explains  his  stopping  at  Berlin  even  more  absurdly.    "He  stopped,"  he 
says,  "because  he  was  not  well."    If  he  means  mentaly,  well  and  good ;  but 
if  he  means  physically,  it  is  idiotic.    Bismarck's  reminiscences  of  the  Ems 
despatch  restore  its  proper  aspect  to  the  affair.    [Note  of  M.  Ollivier ,  ibid.] 

3  Bismarck,  Reflections,  etc.,  vol.  ii,  p.  95. 

4  Von  Sybel,  Die  Begrundung,  etc.,  voL  vii,  p.  303.- 


184         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

"but  say  nothing  about  it  to  anybody,  so  that  the 
news  may  not  come  first  from  us ;  nor  shall  I  mention 
it  to  Benedetti  until  we  have  the  letter  actually  in 
our  hands,  delivered  by  Strantz,  to-morrow.  It  is 
all  the  more  important  now  that  you  make  a  point  of 
emphasizing  the  fact  that  I  leave  everything  to  the 
Hohenzollerns  so  far  as  their  decision  is  concerned, 
just  as  I  did  with  regard  to  their  acceptance."  l 

Gramont,  on  the  other  hand,  had  promised  at  the 
very  beginning  of  his  negotiations  with  Lyons  that, 
failing  a  withdrawal  ordered  or  advised  by  the  King, 
we  would  be  content  with  a  spontaneous  withdrawal 
by  Leopold,  provided  that  the  King  should  take  part  in 
it  in  some  fashion.2  As  his  participation  was  now 
beyond  doubt,  Benedetti  was  justified  in  saying  that, 
even  if  no  definite  conclusion  had  been  reached  on 
the  12th,  the  solution  of  the  difficulty  was  morally 
certain;  that  it  was  then  agreed  to  by  both  parties, 
and  that  nothing  remained  save  to  receive  the  King's 
declaration. 3 

Overjoyed  at  having  got  rid  of  the  "weight  on  his 
heart,"  the  King  had  accepted  an  invitation  to  sup 
with  Prince  Albrecht  and  a  few  friends  in  the  garden 
of  the  Casino.  As  he  was  on  his  way  thither  Abeken 
arrived  with  Bismarck's  comminatory  despatch.  The 
King  went  to  a  light  and  read  it.  His  face  lighted 
up,  he  exclaimed:  "This  is  the  most  important  de- 

1  [Briefe  des  Kaiser  WilMms,  etc.,  p.  222.    In  the  same  letter  the  King 
writes:  "Bismarck  will  be  here  to-morrow  morning;  at  heart  he  is  still  for 
the  candidacy.    However,  he  says  that  the  question  has  become  so  serious 
that  we  must  put  the  Hohenzollems  by  altogether,  and  leave  it  to  them  to 
make  a  final  decision."    See  Lehautcourt,  vol.  i,  p.  276  and  n.] 

2  [Supra,  p.  148  nj 

3  [Benedetti,  p.  368.] 


THE  CANDIDACY  WITHDRAWN        185 

spatch  I  have  ever  received.  Say  to  my  brother  that 
I  probably  shall  not  have  time  to  come  because  I 
must  work  with  Abeken,  and  that  it  is  understood  that, 
if  I  do  come  later,  no  one  is  to  rise." l 

The  supper  had  long  since  begun  when  the  King 
appeared,  alone.  He  motioned  to  the  guests  not  to 
rise,  and  took  the  seat  reserved  for  him  between  two 
ladies.  Chappuis,  who  was  taking  the  place  of  the 
Marshal  of  the  Court,  having  asked  him  if  he  would 
take  champagne,  the  King  replied,  "Give  me  some 
seltzer,  I  must  keep  my  mind  clear." 

The  King  passed  a  sleepless  night,  like  Bismarck. 
Was  Bismarck's  ultimatum  destined  to  turn  him  back, 
and  to  lead  him  to  retract  the  friendly  assurances  given 
to  Benedetti  ? 

The  reflections  of  insomnia  were  not  favorable  to  the 
Chancellor.  Bismarck  could  manage  the  King  only 
within  certain  limits,  and  on  condition  that  he  did  not 
collide  with  the  impregnable  ideas  that  he  had  adopted 
as  rules  of  conduct.  One  of  those  rules  was,  never  to 
take  the  initiative  in  a  great  war,  and  Bismarck  had 
drawn  him  into  such  a  war  twice,  only  by  persuading 
him  that  he  had  received  provocation.  Now,  in  this 
case  the  provocation  on  Prussia's  part  would  have  been 
too  manifest.  Another  of  those  rules  was  to  listen  to 
advice  from  every  quarter  before  making  up  his  mind, 
but  when  it  was  once  made  up,  to  brook  no  contradic 
tion.  Now,  he  had  during  the  last  few  days  declared 
so  freely  what  he  would  do  in  case  of  Leopold's  with 
drawal,  that  he  could  not  go  back  upon  a  decision  so 
fully  considered.  He  persisted  therefore  in  the  pur- 

1  [The  telegram  referred  to  is,  of  comse*  that  in  which  Bismarck  proffered 
his  resignation.] 


186  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

pose  to  bring  to  a  peaceful  close  an  adventure  wMch 
he  was  In  haste  to  have  done  with,  not  to  dismiss  Bene- 
detti,  and  to  communicate  to  him  personally  the  volun 
tary  decision  of  the  princes  which  he  was  about  to 
receive. 

If  j,  therefore,  no  new  complication  had  arisen,  this 
is  what  would  have  happened.  On  the  13th  the  King 
would  have  communicated  to  Benedetti  the  withdrawal 
he  was  expecting,  He  would  have  added  that  he 
approved  it,  and  would  have  authorized  our  Ambassador 
to  transmit  this  twofold  assurance  to  our  government. 
Thus  the  two  conditions  laid  down  by  Gramont 
would  have  been  complied  with:  the  abandonment 
of  the  candidacy  and  the  tangible  participation  of  the 
King  therein.  Our  victory  of  the  evening  of  the  l£th 
would  have  been  made  complete  on  the  13th,  and  Bis 
marck  would  have  been  definitively  beaten.  He  would 
have  withdrawn  from  public  affairs*  for  some  time  at 
least,  and  the  cloud  heavy  with  calamity  which  that 
barbarian  of  genius  was  holding  over  Europe  would 
have  vanished  from  the  European  horizon.  Our 
ministry,  having  given  the  country  liberty,  would 
have  assured  it  the  prestige  of  a  glorious  peace.1 

Alas !  that  I  cannot  stop  here  I  Why  am  I  com 
pelled  to  continue?  At  the  very  moment  when  Bis 
marck  was  trying  to  find  Ms  bearings  amid  the  tumultu 
ous  confusion  of  perilous  or  impossible  schemes,  others 
were  at  work  in  France  to  help  him  out  of  his  embarrass 
ment,  to  him  from  Ms  defeat,  to  restore  titn>  to 
the  position  wMch  he  had  lost  through  our  efforts, 
and  to  bring  back  luck  into  Ms  game.  That  is  tike  f  eat 
wMch  our  Right  was  about  to  accomplish,  led*  although 

1[See  I*  Goree,  vdL  m.  p. 


THE  CANDIDACY  WITHDRAWN        187 

composed  of  men  beyond  reproach,  by  two  villains, 
Jerome  David  and  Clement  Duvernois.1 

1  After  taking  part  in  public  affairs,  Duvemois  took  a  hand  in  private 
business.  There  he  was  less  fortunate  than  in  politics.  In  the  criminal 
court,  Nov.  25,  1874,  he  was  sentenced  to  two  years*  imprisonment  and  a 
fine  of  1000  francs  under  articles  13-15  of  the  law  of  July  24, 1876  [sic],  and 
articles  405,  459,  460  of  the  Penal  Code,  Gazette  des  Tnbunaux,  Nov.  26, 
1874.  Jer6me  David  ended  by  disavowing  flatly  what  he  had  said  and  done. 
[Note  of  M.  Ollivier  in  vol.  xiv,  p.  226.] 

ADDITIONAL  NOTE.  It  is  instructive  as  to  Count  von  Bismarck's 
methods  to  compare  the  quotation  from  his  autobiographical  work  on 
page  182  of  this  volume  with  his  observations  to  Jules  Favre,  then  Minister 
of  War  of  the  Government  of  National  Defence,  on  the  occasion  of  that 
official's  surreptitious  interview  at  Ferrieres  on  September  20.  "  When  I 
learned  of  the  quarrel  that  France  was  trying  to  pick  with  us  apropos  of 
the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern's  candidacy,  I  was  worried  by  your  Ambassa 
dor's  persistence  in  treating  with  nobody  but  the  King.  He  wearied  the 
Ejngj  and,  knowing  that,  I  advised  adopting  a  policy  which  would  giw  ycm 
satisfaction,  which  was  done.  When  I  learned  that,  in  accordance  with  my 
advice,  the  King  had  obtained  from  his  cousin  the  withdrawal  of  his  can 
didacy,  I  wrote  to  my  wife  that  it  was  all  over,  and  that  I  was  going  to 
join  her  in  the  country.  Great  was  my  surprise  when  I  found  that,  on  the 
contrary,  it  was  all  beginning  again."  Favre,  Gowernem&rd  de  la  Defense 
Natwnale,  vol.  i,  pp.  176, 177.  And  Jules  Favre  seems  to  have  been  glad 
to  believe  him. 


CHAPTER  XII 

EFFECT  AT  PARIS   OF  THE  WITHDRAWAL   OF  THE 

CANDIDACY 

ON  the  12th,  of  July,  In  the  morning,  the  Emperor  had 
come  to  the  Tuileries  to  preside  over  the  Council  of 
Ministers.  We  discussed  the  reply  to  be  made  to  the 
request  for  delay,  which  had  been  addressed  to  us  on 
the  preceding  day  by  Benedetti,  on  the  King's  behalf, 
in  decidedly  emphatic  terms.  We  authorized  Gramont 
to  telegraph  to  Benedetti  that  it  had  never  been  our 
purpose  to  provoke  a  conflict,  but  simply  to  defend 
the  legitimate  interests  of  France ;  and  so,  while  deny 
ing  the  justness  of  the  King's  arguments  and  persisting 
in  our  demands,  we  would  not  refuse  the  delay  requested, 
but  we  hoped  that  it  would  not  extend  beyond  a  single 
day.1 

This  matter  being  arranged,  we  were  giving  our  atten 
tion  to  current  business,  when  a  chamberlain  entered  and 
said  a  few  words  in  an  undertone  to  the  Emperor,  who 
at  once  rose  and  went  out.  He  returned  shortly  and 
took  part  again  in  our  conversation  about  business, 
without  a  word  in  explanation  of  his  unwonted  action. 
He  did,  in  fact,  go  out  to  receive  Olozaga,  who,  not  hav 
ing  been  able  to  take  to  him  during  the  night  the  tele- 

1  [This  Council  resulted  apparently  in  the  despatch  of  the  12th»  not  re 
ferred  to  by  M.  Offivier,  in  which  assent  was  given  to  the  King's  "urgent 
request**  for  further  delay;  "but  we  hope  that  this  delay  will  not  extend 
beyond  another  day.**  Gramont,  p.  10£.  See  infra,  Appendix  L] 

188 


EFFECT  AT  PAEIS  189 

gram  in  cipher  from  Strat,  had  sent  in  an  urgent  request 
to  see  him  at  once,  in  order  to  give  him  that  important 
information.  That  telegram  in  cipher  told  of  tlje  tele 
grams  not  in  cipher  which  Prince  Antony  had  sent 
on  the  morning  of  the  12th.  Olozaga  requested  the 
Emperor  to  regard  his  communication  as  confidential 
until  the  arrival  of  those  telegrams,  which  alone  would 
impart  an  irrevocable  character  to  the  withdrawal  of 
the  candidacy.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  the  Emperor 
consented  to  bind  himself  to  keep  the  matter  secret 
temporarily  from  his  ministers.  If  he  had  told  us  at 
that  time  of  the  secret  negotiation  of  which  we  knew 
nothing,  if  he  had  apprized  us  of  its  fortunate  result, 
we  should  not  have  been  taken  by  surprise  by  the  news, 
as  we  were  a  few  hours  later.  We  could  have  exchanged 
our  ideas  thereupon,  at  leisure,  we  could  have  discussed 
it  and  reflected  upon  it,  and  should  not  have  been  in 
consistent  or  embarrassed  in  our  attitude  before  the 
Chamber  and  the  public. 

About  two  o'clock  I  left  the  department,  to  walk  to 
the  Chamber  across  the  garden  of  the  Tuileries.  I 
was  profoundly  depressed ;  it  seemed  clear  to  me  that 
Prussia  was  determined  to  force  war  upon  us,  and  that 
we  were  driven  to  the  wall.  The  prospect  drove  me 
to  despair.  I  had  taken  only  a  few  steps,  absorbed 
by  my  distressing  reflections,  when  I  was  as  it  were 
abruptly  awakened  by  the  voice  of  a  clerk  in  the 
Department  of  the  Interior,  who  handed  me  a  letter 
from  Chevandier.  It  contained  a  copy  of  the  de 
spatch,  not  in  cipher,  from  Prince  Antony  to  Olozaga, 
which  had  just  arrived,  and  in  which  was  included  the 
text  of  the  Prince's  withdrawal  in  the  name  of  his  son. 
There  was  in  the  Department  of  the  Interior  a  special 


190         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

detail  of  clerks  whose  duty  it  was  to  take  copies  of 
all  despatches  passing  through  the  Paris  office,  whether 
sent  from  or  received  there,  which  were  of  such  a  nature 
as  to  concern  the  public  peace.  As  Prince  Antony's 
despatch  came  within  this  description,  it  had  been 
copied,  and  Chevandier  sent  a  copy  to  me,  and  at  the 
same  time  to  the  Emperor  and  Gramont. 

I  hastily  retraced  my  steps  in  order  to  tell  my  wife 
the  good  news ;  then  resumed  my  walk.  Certain  doubts 
beset  me.  What  was  the  meaning  of  this  withdrawal 
falling  suddenly  from  the  sky?  Was  it  sincere? 
Was  it  not  a  trick  of  the  stock  market  ?  Why  had  not 
Olozaga,  with  whom  I  was  in  daily  communication, 
given  me  a  hint  of  it  ?  The  Emperor  seemed  to  have 
no  suspicion  of  it  at  the  Council;  did  he  know  of  it, 
or  did  he  not  ?  had  he  spoken  of  it  with  Gramont  ?  I 
put  aside  these  suspicions.  It  seemed  to  me  impossible 
that  a  step  thus  announced  should  be  a  trick ;  I  looked 
upon  it  as  a  fact.  Thereupon  I  believed  that  the  whole 
situation  was  saved,  and  so  great  was  my  joy  at  having 
peace  within  our  grasp,  so  great  my  dread  of  losing  it 
again,  that  the  combative  disposition  which  I  had  dis 
played  in  my  note  of  the  evening  of  the  llth  melted 
away  before  the  warmth  of  the  unhoped-for  news. 
There  was  no  further  occasion,  to  appear  stiff  and  un 
yielding,  but  rather  accommodating  and  pliant,  and  to 
make  more  certain  the  result  arrived  at,  instead  of 
endangering  it.  The  incident  was  certainly  at  an  end, 
if  we  were  guilty  of  no  imprudence;  and  I  was  so 
overjoyed  that  at  times  I  could  not  believe  it. 

However,  it  seemed  to  me  that  I  ought  not  to  make 
public  the  document  which  I  held  in  my  hand,  and  which 
I  read  again  and  again  as  if  I  should  find  therein  the 


EFFECT  AT  PARIS  191 

secret  of  what  had  happened.  It  was  a  document  se 
cured  by  the  police  power  of  the  government,  and  so  not 
of  a  character  to  be  officially  avowed,  and  I  was  bound 
not  to  disclose  its  existence.  So  I  put  it  in  my  pocket, 
where  it  burned  a  hole,  so  to  speak. 

I  had  taken  only  a  few  steps  more  when  I  was  over 
taken  by  a  messenger,  this  time  from  my  own  office  — 
Boissy.  He  brought  me  a  report  in  which  it  was  stated 
that,  at  a  meeting  of  the  irreconcilable  Left,  on  rue 
de  la  Sourdiere,  Gambetta 1  had  just  made  a  magnifi- 

1  [Leon  Gambetta  had  first  come  prominently  into  public  notice  in  the 
autumn  of  1868,  when  he  was  retained  to  defend  M.  Delescluze,  proprietor 
of  the  radical  newspaper  Le  Revett,  in  the  prosecution  instituted  by  the 
government  against  the  organizers  of  the  subscription  for  a  monument  to 
the  memory  of  Baudin,  a  deputy,  who  was  killed  on  the  barricades  during 
the  execution  of  the  coup  tfetat  of  December  2,  1851.  Gambetta  failed  to 
obtain  a  verdict,  "but  he  won  his  cause  in  the  country.  His  speech,  less  a 
defence  of  his  client  than  an  attack  on  the  Second  Empire,  rang  like  a  chal 
lenge  to  the  Emperor,  which  the  whole  nation  seemed  ready  to  support.** 
Walpole,  History  of  Twenty-jive  Years,  vol.  ii,  p.  476. 

When  the  Corps  Legislatif  resumed  its  labors  after  the  constitution  of  the 
Olliver  ministry,  the  "Irreconcilables"  (that  is  to  say,  the  Extreme  Left) 
-  disclosed  their  tactics,  which  was  to  consist  "in  multiplying  questions,  ia 
inflating  to  the  point  of  menace  the  rumble  of  their  voices.  Their  hope, 
their  sole  hope,  was  that  the  government  would  lose  patience  and  yield  to 
some  ill-advised  temptation  to  exact  reprisals.  .  .  .  The  most  aggressive 
was  Gambetta.  He  questioned  the  Minister  of  War  concerning  two  soldiers 
who  had  been  sent  to  Algeria  for  having  frequented  public  meetings.  Then, 
branching  off  into  more  general  considerations,  he  took  the  whole  Cabinet 
to  task,  and  in  terms  of  studied  severity,  declared  war  without  quarter  upon 
it.  M.  Emile  OHivier  had  just  appealed  to  all  his  colleagues,  even  those  of 
the  opposition.  *If,*  retorted  Gambetta,  'you  rely  on  our  assistance  to  lay 
the  foundation  for  liberty^ou  must  make  up  your  minds  never  to  obtain  it. 
You  have  prated  about  universal  suffrage.  In  our  eyes  universal  suffrage 
is  incompatible  with  the  form  of  government  which  you  propose.  .  .  .  Be 
tween  the  form  now  predominant  and  universal  suffrage  there  i$  absolute 
incompatibility.  .  .  .  Between  the  Republic  of  1848  and  the  repubEc  of 
the  future  you  are  merely  a  bridge ;  and  that  bridge  we  propose  to  cross.' " 
La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  pp.  8,  9.  During  the  debate  on  the  proposed 


192         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

cent  speech :  its  purport  was  that  we  should  regard  the 
Hohenzollera  affair  simply  as  a  detail,  and  should 
firmly  demand  the  execution  of  the  Treaty  of  Prague, 
and  the  demolition  of  the  fortresses  that  threatened 
our  frontier.  "If  he  should  make  this  speech  in  the 
Chamber/'  I  was  told,  "the  Ministry  could  not  with 
stand  it." 

I  arrived  at  the  Corps  Legislatif ;  some  one  asked 
me:  "What  is  there  new?"  I  was  very  careful  not 
to  say  what  I  had  just  learned.  "Nothing  as  yet,"  I 
replied,  "but  Gramont  is  to  confer  with  Werther 
immediately,  and  by  the  end  of  the  day  we  shall  know 
definitively  what  course  we  must  adopt." 

At  that  moment  Olozaga  entered  the  hall ;  his  face 
glowing  with  excitement,  waving  a  paper  in  his  hand, 
he  rushed  up  to  me  and  drew  me  into  a  corner.  "Is 

there  was  a  discussion  (on  April  4)  of  an  interpellation  concerning  the  con- 
tftifatmt  power.  "The  discussion  was  proceeding  without  great  amplitude, 
with  no  lofty  flights,  when  Gambetta  appeared  in  the  tribune.  It  was 
through  his  participation  in  the  debate  that  it  deserves  to  be  remembered, 
even  to  this  day.  Up  to  that  time  the  deputy  from  Belleville  had  distin 
guished  himself  by  his  noisy  violence,  and  in  the  eyes  of  a  great  number  of 
people  was  hardly  to  be  differentiated  from  the  mob  of  ^clubists.*  The  hour 
had  struck  when  he  was  to  take  his  place  among  political  orators."  Before 
his  speech  the  Left  had  inveighed  against  the  appeal  to  the  people  as  an 
additional  weapon  in  the  hands  of  despotism,  and  the  Bonapartists  gave 
indications  of  delighted  satisfaction,  "Gambetta  alone  dared  to  go  to  the 
bottom  of  the  appeal  to  the  people,  to  confiscate  it  to  the  profit  of  his  party, 
to  turn  it  against  the  Empire.  .  .  .  'The  plebiscite  is  the  knowledge  and 
conscience  of  the  people.*  .  .  .  With  a  singular  combination  of  insinuating 
argument  and  fiery  vehemence,  the  orator  undertook  to  define  universal 
suffrage :  *  Universal  suffrage  is  the  national  sovereignty  acting  constantly ; 
now,  there  is  but  a  single  form  of  government  adequate  to  universal  suffrage ; 
that  form  you  will  not  allow  me  to  refrain  from  naming,  because  it  is  on  my 
lips,  because  it  is  in  my  heart ;  it  w  the  republican  form.9  The  great  word 
was  out,  and  it  had  been  led  up  to  so  sMlf ully  that  not  a  murmur,  not  an 
interruption  halted  the  supreme  audacity  on  its  passage."  Ibid,  pp.  97,  98.] 


EFFECT  AT  PARIS  193 

Gramont  here?'*  —  "No,  he  is  at  the  Foreign  Office 
in  conference  with  Werther."  —  "You  see,  I  have  good 
news  for  you."  And  he  read  me  the  despatch  of  which 
I  had  a  copy.  "So  this  news  is  genuine?'*  I  asked. 
"Yes,  yes,  do  not  doubt  it;  it's  all  over."  And  he 
left  me,  to  go  to  Gramont. 

The  deputies  who  had  noticed  Olozaga's  entrance, 
his  pantomime,  the  waving  of  the  paper,  crowded  about 
me  as  soon  as  he  had  left  me.  "Is  there  anything  im 
portant?"  Thereupon  there  took  place  in  my  mind 
a  deliberation  as  swift  as  thought  itself.  Should  I 
make  public  the  despatch,  or  should  I  keep  it  to  my 
self  ?  The  copy,  seized  on  the  wing  and  handed  to  me 
by  the  police  service  of  the  government,  had  become 
an  authentic  document,  displayed  before  numerous 
persons  by  the  ambassador  to  whom  it  was  addressed. 
A  communication  made  under  such  circumstances  did 
not  indicate  a  desire  for  secrecy;  the  very  character 
of  the  despatch  excluded  such  an  idea;  one  does  not 
send  a  despatch  in  plain  language  unless  one  means  to 
make  it  public.  Why  should  I  have  concealed  from 
those  deputies,  in  order  to  parade  my  own  importance 
to  no  useful  purpose,  a  fact  which  everybody  would 
learn  from  the  evening  papers,  —  which  many  knew 
already,  at  the  department,  at  the  telegraph  office,  at 
the  embassies  and  chancelleries,  at  the  offices  of  news 
agencies  and  newspapers  ?  The  shameless  adversaries 
with  whom  I  was  engaged  would  not  have  failed  to 
denounce  my  silence  as  a  concession  to  speculators. 
I  certainly  should  not  have  hesitated  to  take  that  risk  — 
although  I  was  much  more  sensitive  to  it  than  to  others 
to  which  I  exposed  myself  day  after  day  —  if  any  public 
interest  had  demanded  it.  But  none  did,  for  I  could 


194         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

not  regard  as  a  matter  of  public  interest  the  vain  hope 
of  preventing  a  manifestation  in  the  Chamber  on  the 
part  of  the  war-party,  —  a  manifestation  which,  being 
postponed  to  the  next  day  and  more  fully  prepared, 
would  have  been  only  the  more  violent.1 

And  so  I  read  the  telegram  to  those  who  questioned 
me.  One  of  my  auditors  was  the  celebrated  engineer, 
Paulin  Talabot,  the  creator  of  French  railways,  who  was 
an  advocate  of  peace  both  on  principle  and  by  interest. 
"Prussia  is  making  a  fool  of  you,"  he  whispered  in  my 
ear. 

There  were  calls  for  me  in  the  Salle  des  Pas-Perdus. 
A  mob  rushed  at  me  and  questioned  me.  I  could 
not  conceal  in  one  hall  what  I  had  just  disclosed  in 
another. 

1  [On  M.  Ollivier's  procedure  on  receipt  of  the  news  of  the  withdrawal,  see 
Sorel,  vol.  i,  pp.  126-128;  Welsdiinger,  vol.  i,  pp.  72-74;  Lehautcourt,  vol. 
I,  pp.  265,  266 ;  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  pp.  257, 258 ;  Von  Sybel,  Founding  of  the 
German  Empire  (Eng.  trans.),  vol.  vii,  pp.  366-368.  The  general  tone  of  the 
comment,  that  is  to  say,  of  those  writers  who  are  not  influenced  by  an  unal 
terable  prejudice  against  the  ministry  and  all  its  works,  is  to  the  effect  that 
M.  Ollivier's  action  was  impulsive  and  ill-advised,  but  was  the  result  of  a 
sincere  and  earnest  desire  for  peace,  which  he  honestly  believed  to  be  ensured 
by  the  withdrawal.  "  At  heart,"  says  Sorel  (vol.  i,  p.  126),  "he  desired  peace ; 
without  reflection,  without  consulting  Ms  colleagues,  he  rushed  to  the  Corps 
Legislatif  to  announce  the  news.  His  intentions  were  good,  but  that  heedless 
haste  compromised  everything.**  And  La  Gorce  (vol.  vi,  pp.  257,  258) : 
Ollivier's  "simple  and  straightforward  mind  interpreted  the  despatch  accord 
ing  to  its  natural  meaning,  that  is  to  say,  as  announcing  peace.  Neither 
his  education  nor  his  disposition  had  trained  him  to  diplomatic  reserve. 
Overjoyed  by  the  changed  aspect  of  affairs  (for  no  one  had  a  greater  horror 
of  war  than  he),  he  could  not  forbear  to  make  his  joy  public.  .  .  .  These  ex 
pansive  communications  were  characteristic  of  a  good  citizen  rather  than  a 
politician.  Calm  prudence  is  not  so  quick  to  publish  abroad  even  its  joys. 
Genuine  sagacity  (easier,  it  is  true,  to  discover  afterward  than  to  work  out . 
in  the  excitement  of  those  feverish  days)  would  have  consisted  in  keeping 
silent  until  the  expected  despatches  from  Benedetti  should  bring  the  King's 
approval."] 


EFFECT  AT  PARIS  195 

"Yes/'  I  replied,  "there  is  a  despatch  to  Olozaga  from 
Prince  Antony,  announcing  that  he  withdraws  his  son's 
candidacy." 

"And  what  about  the  Treaty  of  Prague?5*  cried  a 
voice. 

"We  have  never  mentioned  it  to  Prussia;  our  pour 
parlers  have  dealt  solely  with  the  candidacy." 

"  Does  this  mean  peace  ?  "  some  one  shouted. 

I  replied  by  throwing  my  arms  apart  in  an  evasive 
gesture,  which  was  intended  to  mean,  "I  do  not  pro 
pose  to  answer."  But  if  my  lips  remained  mute,  the 
glow  of  joy  that  lighted  up  my  face  told  of  the  hope 
that  filled  my  heart.1 

Noticing  among  the  listeners  Leonce  Detroyat, 
editor-in-chief  of  the  LibertS,  I  went  to  him  and  asked 
him  to  urge  his  uncle  to  strive  to  avert  war,  since  that 
course  had  become  possible  with  honor.  Girardm, 
who  was  very  anxious  and  too  nervous  to  come  to  the 
Salle  des  Pas-Perdus,  was  waiting  for  him  on  Place  de 
la  Concorde,  at  the  end  of  the  bridge.  Detroyat  hast 
ened  to  him  and  repeated  what  I  had  just  said.  Girar- 
din  left  him  abruptly  at  the  first  word,  with  a  shrug  of 
the  shoulders.2 

1  The  Rappel  (I  cite  one  of  the  most  hostile  papers)  described  the  incident 
thus :  "M.  Emile  OUivier  came  in  beaming  all  over.    Being  surrounded  and 
questioned,  he  announced  in  a  loud  voice  that  he  had  received,  through  M. 
Olozaga,  a  despatch  from  Prince  Antony  of   Hohenzolem,    Duke    [we] 
Leopold's  father,  declaring  that  he  would  order  his  son  to  withdraw.     M. 
Entile  OUivier  added :  *  We  have  never  asked  of  Prussia  anything  more  than 
the  Prince  of  HohenzoUern's  withdrawal.    Now  the  candidacy  may  be  re 
garded  as  withdrawn,'    He  did  not  finish,  but  the  conclusion  went  of  itself." 
[Note  of  M.  OUivier  in  vol.  xiv,  p.  233.] 

2  [See  supra,  p.  68,  n.  &.    This  passage  appears  in  sEghtly  different  form 
in  M.  Ollivie/s  larger  work.    "I  went  to  him  and  asked  him  to  urge  his  uncle 
'not  to  write  any  more  articles  like  tko$eof  the  last  few  day&>  and  to  strive/  etc. 


196         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

4 

At  the  same  time  an  excited  crowd  poured  forth  from 
the  Palais  Legislatlf „  There  was  a  grand  struggle  for 
the  cabs  on  the  stand,  which  were  escaladed,  carried  by 
assault.  "To  the  Bourse!  the  Bourse!"  cried  the 
speculators.  "We'll  pay  double  price  —  go  at  full 

*I  beg  you,*  I  said,  *to  have  the  courage  to  refuse  to  insert  Ms  articles; 
you  will  do  Mm  a  great  service  as  well  as  the  country.* "  Vol.  xiv,  p.  233. 
But  Detroyat  Mmself  seems  to  have  been  among  the  first  to  suggest  a  de 
mand  for  guaranties,  Robert  Mitchell  having  written  in  the  Constitutwnnel 
that  "we  should  have  notMng  further  to  ask  from  the  Cabinet  of  Berlin  if 
the  Spanish  people  should  spontaneously  reject  the  sovereign  whom  it  was 
proposed  to  force  upon  them,"  Detroyat  replied  in  the  LibertS:  "We  do  not 
agree  with  the  CcmMitidionnel;  we  think  that  it  would  remain  for  France  and 
for  Europe  to  demand  from  the  Cabinet  of  Berlin  such  guaranties  as  will 
bind  it  tight  for  the  future."  Lehautcourt,  vol.  i,  p.  £61.] 

Darimon  has  placed  this  anecdote,  wMch  he  had  heard  me  tell,  at  the  time 
of  my  arrival  at  the  Chamber ;  but  that  is  nonsense,  for  at  that  time  I  was 
dumb.  While  I  am  on  the  subject,  it  may  be  well  for  me  to  say  a  word  or 
two  about  that  gentleman.  He  was  one  of  the  Five,  and  I  Bad  never  for 
gotten  it.  Although,  at  the  time  of  my  rupture  with  Rouher,  he  had  declared 
himself  against  me,  I  put  myself  out  to  make  a  place  for  him  in  the  Cour  des 
Comptes.  After  the  war,  I  continued  to  admit  him  to  my  intimate  circle ; 
he  met  Gramont  there  and  we  talked  unsuspectingly  before  Mm-  On  leaving 
me  he  would  make  memoranda  of  what  he  had  heard.  If  those  memoranda 
had  been  a  truthful  reproduction,  they  would  have  made  a  valuable  docu 
ment,  but  they  were  always  written  down  by  an  idiot  or  a  villain,  who  either 
did  not  understand,  or  did  not  choose  to  understand ;  so  that  there  is  not 
one  of  them  beside  wMch  we  may  not  write  "false,"  or  "half -false."  To 
these  treacherous  memoranda,  he  added  all  the  fables  hostile  to  the  ministry, 
hawked  about  by  the  Imperialist  Right,  wMch  strove  to  make  us  the  scape 
goat  of  its  errors,  and  he  published  it  all  in  a  volume  entitled :  Notes  pour 
semr  a  rHwtoire  de  la  Guerre,  in  wMch  he  has  drawn  freely  from  all  quarters, 
frequently  without  indicating  Ms  authorities.  When  I  read  that  detestable 
book,  I  closed  my  door  to  the  author.  Nevertheless,  some  time  after,  when 
he  had  fallen  into  destitution,  I  induced  the  Academic  Franchise  to  name 
him  for  the  place  at  its  disposal  in  the  Asile  Galignani,  where  he  died.  I  say 
al  this  simply  because  every  serious  historian  should  regard  Darimon's 
statements  as  false,  unless  their  truth  is  proved  aliunde.  [Note  of  M.  OUivier 
In  vol.  xiv,  p.  23$.  Lehautcourt's  narrative  of  this  period  should  be  read 
with  this  caution  in  mind,  as  he  cites  Darimon  very  frequently  as  authority 
for  facts  wMch  are  not  mentioned  by  other  writers.] 


EFFECT  AT  PARIS  197 

speed !"  Among  the  newspaper  men  there  was  the 
same  haste,  and  a  concert  of  the  same  sort.  "To  the 
office  of  the  Marseillaise!"  they  shouted.  "To  the 
Eeoeill"  "To  the  Siecle!"  "To  the  Opinion  Nation- 
akr  "To  the  Rappel!" 

And  under  the  incitement  of  the  lash,  the  sorry  jades 
woke  one  after  another  from  their  repose  and  darted 
off  as  swift  as  arrows.1 

In  the  deputies'  lobby  Gressier,  the  ex-minister,  a 
resolute,  judicial-minded  man,  in  no  wise  inclined  to 
war,  accosted  me.  I  told  him  of  my  determination, 
if  the  withdrawal  was  genuine,  not  to  lend  myself  to 
the  setting  up  of  any  fresh  demand  on  top  of  the  Hohen- 
zollern  business  —  with  respect  either  to  the  Treaty  of 
Prague  or  to  anything  else.  "That  is  right/*  he  re 
plied;  "you  will  do  a  brave  thing;  but  don't  fail  to 
understand  this  —  it  means  your  fall ;  the  country  will 
not  be  satisfied  with  this  concession." 

A  large  number  of  deputies  grouped  about  me  and 
questioned  me.  Being  more  at  liberty  to  express  my 
thoughts  to  them  than  I  had  been  when  I  w^s  surrounded 
by  newspaper  men,  I  repeated  what  I  had  just  said  to 
Gressier.  There  were  numerous  protests.  Among  the 
members  of  the  Right,  there  was  an  ebullition  of  wrath. 
"  Ollivier  says  that  it's  all  over.  It's  a  shame  !  Prussia 
came  out  to  pick  a  quarrel  »with  us ;  we  must  make  an 
end  of  her." 

Several  members  assembled  in  one  of  the  offices  of 
the  Chamber,  decided  that  there  must  be  no  delay  in 
protesting  against  the  pusillanimity  of  the  Cabinet, 

1  [The  three  per  cent  consols  rose  almost  instantly  some  two  or  three 
points  —  from  67  to  70.  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  p.  257;  Lehautcourt,  vol.  i,  p. 
$65  and  n.  4 ;  Delord,  vol.  vi,  p.  162.] 


198         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

and  drew  up  a  demand  for  an  Interpellation,  which  Du- 
vernois  undertook  to  announce  at  once  from  the  tribune. 

I  entered  the  Chamber.  Clement  Duvernois  rose, 
and  in  a  threatening  tone,  as  if  in  reply  to  my  hopes 
of  peace,  announced  in  his  own  name  and  de  Leusse's 
the  following  interpellation :  — 

"We  ask  to  interpellate  the  Cabinet  concerning  the 
guaranties  for  which  it  has  stipulated,  or  for  which  it 
proposes  to  stipulate,  in  order  to  avoid  the  recurrence 
of  complications  with  Prussia."  He  added  that  he 
would  not  insist  upon  a  day  being  fixed,  but  would  leave 
that  to  the  Chamber  and  the  Government.1 

1  [Clement  Duvemois,  Napoleon's  "favorite,"  Iiad  been  the  intermediary 
between  him  and  M.  OlHvier  at  the  time  of  the  formation  of  the  liberal  min 
istry.  "He  had  special  reasons  for  animosity  against  M.  Ollivier;  he  took 
an  active  part  in  the  formation  of  the  cabinet ;  indeed,  he  was  a  member 
of  it  for  two  hours,  and  had  to  step  out  for  purely  personal  reasons.  On 
the  subject  of  the  law  concerning  general  councils,  M.  Ollivier  raised  ex 
plicitly  the  question  of  Ms  discharge  from  the  Emperor's  newspaper,  the 
Peuple  Frfmgau.  He  carried  his  point.  The  next  day  Duvernois  founded 
the  Vdontaire.  He  was  called  at  the  Tuileries,  'the  Emperor's  pen.*" 
Lehautcourt,  vol.  i,  p.  266  n. 

tl  Duvernois,  who  could  not  forgive  M.  Emile  Ollivier  for  having  caused 
him  to  be  excluded  from  the  ministry,  had  announced  that  morning,  that,  if 
affairs  assumed  a  pacific  aspect,  he  should  interpellate  the  government.  It 
was  a  deplorable  manoeuvre,  for  it  was  destined  to  lead  the  ministry  to  set  up 
new  claims  and  to  place  peace  in  danger  a  second  time."  WeLschinger, 
vol.  i,  p.  76. 

^  It  was  reported  that,  in  his  action  at  this  time,  Duvernois  was  the  mouth- 
piece  of  the  Emperor,  and  according  to  La  Gorce  some  members  of  the 
Centre  groups  thought  to  approve  themselves  good  courtiers  by  talking  in  a 
very  bellicose  vein.  Gramont  says,  however,  that  the  Emperor  greatly  re 
gretted  the  interpellation,  "because  it  compelled  his  government  to  hasten 
the  moment  of  explanations  which  prudence,  on  the  contrary,  bade  it  defer 
as  long  as  possible."  Gramont,  p.  130  and  n.  See  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi, 
pp.  £63,  £64 ;  Sard,  vol.  i,  p.  134.  Delord,  vol.  vi,  p.  169.  Duvernois  him 
self  declared  in  an  article  in  the  Ordre,  ol  Sept.  15,  1871,  that  "  the  Emperor 
did  not  even  know  of  Ms  proposed  interpellation,  and  that,  when  he 
learned  of  it,  afterward,  he  certainly  did  not  approve  it."] 


EFFECT  AT  PARIS  199 

"The  war-current,"  said  the  Gazette  de France,  " seems 
to  carry  the  day.  In  the  lobby  of  the  Corps  Legislatif 
a  Vendean  deputy  said  aloud  that,  if  the  Cabinet  rests 
content  with  the  withdrawal  of  Prince  Antony  in  his 
son's  name,  the  Extreme  Right  will  not  rest  content. 
In  fact,  the  majority  seems  bent  upon  war;  it  might 
well  be  that  the  Ministry  would  be  overthrown  if  it 
should  halt  now/' 

Duvernois  had  taken  his  seat;  an  usher  informed 
me  that  one  of  the  Emperor's  aides-de-camp  wished 
to  speak  to  me.  I  went  out,  and  the  aide-de-camp 
handed  me  the  following  note :  — 

"DEAR  MONSIEUR  EMILE  OLUTVIER,  —  I  would  like 
an  opportunity  to  talk  with  you  a  few  moments  before 
returning  to  Saint-Cloud.  You  know  of  the  Prince 
of  Hohenzollern's  despatch  to  Marshal  Prim.  If  the 
news  is  announced  to  the  Chamber,  we  must  at  the 
least  make  the  most  that  we  can  of  it,  and  cause  it 
to  be  clearly  understood  that  it  is  at  the  command  of 
the  King  of  Prussia  that  the  candidacy  is  withdrawn. 
I  have  not  yet  seen  Gramont.  The  country  will  be 
disappointed.  But  what  can  we  do?" 

This  was  the  first  pacific  note  that  reached  me.  I 
divined  the  wish  hidden  beneath  the  words,  "If  the 
news  is  announced."  Evidently  the  Emperor  would 
have  liked  me  to  go  into  the  tribune,  read  the  despatch, 
and  hint  that  the  result  was  due  to  the  imperative  in 
tervention  of  the  King  of  Prussia,  and  that  the  incident 
was  closed.  It  was  no  longer  opportune  to  read  the 
despatch,  as  all  the  deputies  had  knowledge  of  it;  as 
for  the  public,  they  would  learn  it  more  quickly,  or  as 


200         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

quickly,  through  the  evening  papers.  Nor  would  a 
reading,  as  indeed  the  Emperor  suggested,  be  of  any 
value  unless  accompanied  by  a  commentary  or  followed 
by  a  conclusion.  How  could  I  have  presumed  to  make 
a  commentary  or  a  conclusion  without  having  first 
agreed  upon  it  with  my  colleagues  ?  I  looked  about  in 
quest  of  them.  Not  one  was  present,  and  Gramont  was 
conferring  with  Werther,  just  from  Ems. 

One  can  judge  by  the  following  letter  from  Chevandier, 
what  would  have  happened  if  I  had  obeyed  the  Emper 
or's  implied  wish :  — 

"According  to  what  I  have  learned  from  our  col 
leagues,  the  Chamber  is  very  bellicose,  and  that  fact 
has  made  some  little  impression  on  them.  They 
complain  —  I  care  too  much  for  you  not  to  tell  you  —  of 
your  having  given  information  in  the  lobbies  concerning 
a  despatch  which  was  not  addressed  to  you  (as  to  that, 
you  would  be  absolved  by  the  communication  made  to 
you  by  the  Spanish  Ambassador),  and  of  which,  in 
any  event,  they  consider  the  disclosure  premature.  In 
my  opinion,  you  made  a  mistake.1  You  know  that, 
while  I  do  not  fear  war,  I  am  not  an  advocate  of  it 
through  thick  and  thin.  Let  us  not  plunge  headforemost 
into  peace.  It  is  the  goal  for  which  we  must  now  aim, 
but  we  must  surely  attain  it." 

This  language  from  the  most  pacifically  inclined  of 
my  colleagues  shows  to  what  a  pitch  the  most  moderate 
spirits  had  risen.  What  would  he  not  have  said,  what 
would  not  our  other  colleagues  have  said  in  accord 
with  him,  especially  Gramont,  if,  in  defiance  of  all 

1  Chevandier  was  not  aware,  when  lie  wrote,  of  the  circumstances  I  have 
narrated.  When  he  learned  of  them,  later,  he  considered  that  I  was  not  to  be 
blamed.  [Note  of  M.  Olivier  in  voL  xiv,  p,  2S7-] 


EFFECT  AT  PARIS  201 

conventions,  I  had,  on  my  own  authority,  declared 
to  the  Chamber  that  I  regarded  the  difficulty  as 
solved  by  a  despatch  that  still  remained  an  enigma  ? 
I  was  not  even  tempted  to  do  it,  and  I  went  to  the 
Tuileries  at  three  o'clock  to  confer  with  the  Emperor. 

As  I  passed  through  the  lobby,  I  met  Thiers.  "I 
saw/'  he  himself  has  said,  "M.  Ollivier  hastening  tow 
ard  me;  he  said,  'Yes,  we  have  succeeded;  we  have 
obtained  what  we  wanted,  peace  is  assured.'  M. 
Ollivier's  joy  was  extreme  and  was  displayed  without 
concealment." 

I  gave  him  the  despatch  to  read.  He  said  to  me, 
"Now  you  must  keep  calm."  —  "Never  fear/'  I 
replied,  "we  have  peace  in  our  grasp,  we  shall  not  let 
it  escape." * 

The  Emperor  was  in  the  antechamber,  surrounded 
by  his  officers  and  chatting  familiarly  with  them;  he 
was  saying,  with  an  accent  of  sincerity  which  impressed 
them :  "  It  is  a  vast  relief  to  me.  I  am  very  happy  that 
it  has  all  ended  thus.  A  war  is  always  a  great  risk." 

The  usher  announced:  "M.  Emile  Ollivier  is  at  his 
Majesty's  service." 

"I  am  coming,"  said  the  Emperor ;  and  he  came  out. 
He  seemed  to  me,  in  truth,  highly  content,  but  yet  a 
little  uneasy:  content  because  he  considered  the 
Hohenzollern  affair  completely  adjusted;  uneasy  be- 

1Thiers's  deposition  in  the  Inquiry  concerning  the  4th  of  September. 
It  is  not  true  that  it  was  necessary  to  run  throu^b  all  the  hails  of  the  Palais 
Legislatif  to  get  hold  of  the  despatch,  because  it  had  been  passed  from  hand 
to  hand,  I  did  not  let  it  go  out  of  my  hand  for  an  instant,  and  I  read  it 
word  for  word  only  to  those  deputies  who  surrounded  me  and  Thiers.  To 
the  others  I  simply  told  what  it  contained.  It  is  impossible  for  Thiers, 
even  when  he  teUs  the  truth,  not  to  mingle  some  inaccuracy  with  it.  [Note 
of  M.  Ollivier  in  vol.  xiv,  p.  238.] 


THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

cause  of  the  disappointment  which  the  country  would 
feel  at  not  fighting  out  its  quarrel  with  Prussia  to  the 
end. 

I  gave  him  the  reasons  for  my  silence  in  the  Chamber, 
and  asked  him  if  it  was  really  by  the  King's  command, 
despite  his  repeated  refusals  to  Benedetti,  that  the  with 
drawal  had  been  obtained.  Without  entering  into 
details,  the  Emperor  informed  me  that  the  withdrawal 
was  due  to  the  initiative  of  Olozaga  alone,  acting  of 
his  own  motion,  without  Prim's  knowledge,  but  with 
his,  the  Emperor's,  sanction. 

"In  that  case,"  I  replied,  "it  would  be  most  hazardous 
to  boast,  even  indirectly,  of  a  concession  on  the  part 
of  the  King  of  Prussia.  The  satisfaction  that  we  might 
afford  public  opinion  by  such  an  erroneous  assurance 
would  not  last  long :  Bismarck  would  give  us  the  lie 
brutally,  and  the  affair,  which  seems  to  be  at  an  end, 
would  begin  anew.  Moreover,  if  Olozaga  has  acted 
without  orders  from  his  government,  who  can  say  how 
his  initiative  will  be  received  at  Madrid?  And  who 
knows  what,  in  face  of  this  surprise,  will  be  the  language 
of  the  King  of  Prussia,  who,  thus  far,  has  made  no 
reply  to  our  requests  ?  " 

The  Emperor  acknowledged  the  good  sense  of  these 
suggestions.  I  added  that  I  could  not  present  to  the 
Chamber  as  an  official  communication  what  Olozaga 
had  communicated  to  me :  Olozaga  was  not  the  am 
bassador  of  Prince  Antony,  but  of  the  Spanish  govern 
ment  ;  nothing  from  him  was  official  except  what  he 
communicated  in  the  name  of  his  government.  Prince 
Antony's  telegram  was  not,  strictly  speaking,  anything 
more  than  the  act  of  a  private  individual ;  it  was  without 
official  character.  In  that  state  of  things,  an  announce- 


EFFECT  AT  PAEIS  203 

meat  would  be  untimely  and  might  become  dangerous. 
We  were  surrounded  by  obscurities;  we  were  unin 
formed  as  to  the  intentions  of  Berlin  and  those  of 
Madrid ;  was  it  not  our  only  prudent  course  to  wait  ? 
Sometimes  one  is  suddenly  surrounded  by  a  dense  fog  in 
a  mountain  path,  on  the  brink  of  a  precipice.  What 
does  one  do  ?  One  halts  until  the  fog  has  disappeared. 
Gramont,  as  the  result  of  his  conference  with  Werther, 
might  be  able  to  inform  us  of  the  purposes  of  King 
William;  at  any  moment  Olozaga  might  receive  a 
reply  from  Madrid.  Before  we  had  received  and 
considered  those  necessary  elements  of  a  decision,  it 
would  be  imprudent  to  enter  into  any  discussion. 

The  Emperor  adopted  this  point  of  view,  and  it 
was  agreed  that  nothing  should  be  decided  before  the 
meeting  of  the  Council  at  Saint-Cloud  at  nine  o'clock 
the  next  morning.1 

Nigra 2  followed  me.  The  Emperor  had  sent  for  Mm. 
He  handed  him  the  copy  of  Prince  Antony's  despatch 
to  Olozaga.  Nigra  read  it  and  heartily  congratulated 
the  sovereign.  "It  is  a  great  moral  victory  for 
France,  and  the  more  precious  in  that  it  has  been  won 
without  shedding  human  blood;  and  I  hope  that  the 
Emperor  is  satisfied  with  it,  and  that  he  has  Summoned 
me  here  in  order  to  announce  peace." 

"Yes,  it  is  peace/'  the  Emperor  replied,  "and  I 
sent  for  you  that  you  might  telegraph  your  govern 
ment  to  that  effect.  I  have  not  had  time  to  write  to  the 
King.  I  am  well  aware  that  public  opinion  in  France, 
in  its  present  excited  state,  would  have  preferred 
another  solution  —  war ;  but  I  realize  that  the  with- 

1  [TMs  agreement,  as  wiH  appear,  was  broken  by  one  of  the  parties.l 

2  [Italian  Ambassador  to  France.] 


204         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

drawal  is  a  satisfactory  solution,  and  that  it  removes 
every  pretext  for  war  —  at  least,  for  the  moment/'1 

Thus  the  Emperor  seemed  determined  to  content 
himself  with  the  withdrawal  of  the  candidacy,  pure 
and  simple,  and  had  made  no  allusion  to  guaranties 
to  be  demanded  of  the  King  of  Prussia. 

Le  Bceuf  coming  up,  the  Emperor  spoke  to  him  to 
the  same  effect,  and  so  emphatically  that  when  the 
marshal  returned  to  his  department  he  assembled  his 
chiefs  of  bureaus,  informed  them  that  peace  was  assured, 
and  ordered  them  to  put  a  stop  to  all  extraordinary 
expenses.  Our  military  attache  at  Vienna,  Colonel 
Bouille,  who  was  then  on  leave  of  absence  and  under 
orders  to  return  to  his  post  with  all  speed,  on  going  to 
the  department  to  take  leave  of  the  minister,  was 
informed  by  him  that  the  affair  was  settled  and  that 
he  might  defer  his  departure.  Lastly,  MacMahon  was 
ordered  to  suspend  the  embarkation  of  troops  in  Africa. 

Gramont,  being  closeted  in  his  private  office,  knew 
nothing  of  all  these  agitations  and  pourparlers  and  goings 
and  comings.  Foreseeing,  from  the  advices  he  had 
received,  that  the  candidacy  was  about  to  be  with 
drawn  spontaneously,  without  the  Bang's  command  or 
advice,  he  telegraphed  to  Benedetti  confidentially:  — 

"Exert  all  your  skill,  I  will  say  even  your  cunning,  in 
arranging  to  have  the  Prince's  withdrawal  announced, 
communicated,  or  transmitted  to  us  by  the  King  of 
Prussia  or  Ms  government.  It  is  of  the  utmost  im 
portance  to  us ;  the  King's  participation  must  at  any 

.  1  "On  receipt  of  Nigra's  telegram  reporting  this  conversation,  Victor 
Emanuel,  who  had  returned  to  Turin  [Florence?]  from  a  limiting  trip,  went 
back  to  the  mountains.'*  Ly Empire  Lib&rd,  vol.  xiv,  p.  241. 


EFFECT  AT  PARIS  205 

price  be  sanctioned  by  him  or  else  be  shown  to  result 
from  the  facts  in  some  tangible  way."1 

He  no  longer  demanded  the  direct  and  explicit  par 
ticipation  of  the  Eng ;  he  would  be  content  with  an 
indirect  participation,  implied  by  the  King's  trans- 

1  [TMs  despatch  is  given  by  Gramont  (p.  103),  as  Iiaving  been  sent  at 
1.40  P.M.  on  the  12th.  Benedetti  (p.  365)  gives  2.15  P.M.  as  the  hour  at  which 
it  was  sent.  Benedetti,  too,  in  his  version,  omits  the  phrase,  "I  will  even  say 
your  cunning"  (je  dirai  meme  wire  adresse)*  and  substitutes  "satisfactory" 
(svffimnte)  for  "tangible"  (saissante)  in  the  last  clause.  Gramont,  while 
attributing  these  variances  to  some  unintentional  error  in  deciphering  the 
despatch,  considers  them  of  importance.  "The  omission  of  the  words, 
je  dirai  meme  wire  adresse,  does  not  change  the  meaning,  it  is  true,  but  it 
lessens  the  urgency,  if  I  may  so  express  it,  for  it  is  evident  that  a  phrase  so 
confidential,  so  foreign  to  the  regular  customs,  was  used  only  under  the 
influence  of  a  very  earnest  desire  to  reach  a  pacific  solution.  .  .  .  The 
second  error  in  the  text  as  given  by  Comte  Benedetti  is  more  serious,  for  it 
tends  to  modify  considerably  the  sense  and  the  scope  of  his  instructions,  .  .  . 
By  the  use  of  the  word  suffisante,  the  King's  participation,  and  the  extent  to 
which  it  should  be  manifested,  were  made  in  some  measure  a  matter  of  opin 
ion,  and  instructions  of  that  sort  left  to  the  agent  a  certain  zone  of  freedom  of 
action,  within  which  he  was  at  liberty  to  determine  at  what  point  his  idea  of 
the  dignity  of  his  country  and  of  her  legitimate  interest  should  establish  the 
limit  of  a  'satisfactory  participation.*  On  the  other  hand,  by  using  the  word 
sais&able>  the  government's  purpose  was  clearly  enunciated.  It  was  not  a 
question  of  opinion,  but  one  of  fact.  Two  persons  may  differ  in  opinion 
when  it  is  a  question  of  deciding  whether  a  result  is  satisfactory  or  unsatis 
factory ;  there  can  be  no  difference  of  opinion  when  it  is  a  question  of  decid 
ing  whether  a  result  rests  upon  facts  —  whether  it  is  tangible  (taissabfe) 
or  not"  (pp.  105,  106).  He  also  berates  Benedetti  for  publishing  this  de 
spatch.,  which  he  (Gramont)  had  marked  "Most  confidential." 

The  most  interesting  question  connected  with  the  despatch  is,  whether  it 
was  sent  before  or  after  Gramont  had  learned  of  the  telegram  from  Sig- 
maringen  announcing  Prince  Antony's  withdrawal  of  the  candidacy  in  his 
son's  name.  Without  explicitly  so  stating,  he  makes  impossible  any  other 
inference  than  that  he  did  not  know  of  the  withdrawal  when  he  sent  the 
despatch,  because  he  speaks  of  it  (p.  114)  as  being  rendered  useless  by  the 
withdrawal.  But  most  of  the  historians  of  the  war  assume  that  the  despatch 
was  sent  after  he  had  heard  the  news.  Delord  says  bluntly,  without,  how 
ever,  giving  his  authority,  tnat  he  had  known  it  since  the  morning  (vol.  vi, 
p.  165),  and  wonders  why  he  had  not  telegraphed  it  to  Benedetti.  JLehaut- 


206         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

mission  of  the  Prince's  withdrawal,  accompanied  by  a 
few  gracious  words.  Such  indirect  participation  on 
the  part  of  the  King  was  assured,  without  the  neces 
sity  of  employing  either  skill  or  cunning. 

This  excellent  despatch  which,  had  it  been  the 
last  one  sent,  would  have  closed  the  crisis  to  our  honor, 
had  scarcely  gone  on  its  way  when  Gramont  in  his 
turn  received,  at  the  hands  of  a  messenger  of  the  De 
partment  of  the  Interior,  a  copy  of  the  despatch  from 
Prince  Antony  to  Olozaga.  He  did  not  welcome  the 
news  with  delight  equal  to  mine.  I  had  seen  therein 
simply  the  vanishing  of  the  candidacy,  caring  but 
little  for  the  manner  of  its  vanishing ;  he  was  particu 
larly  impressed  by  the  form,  and  in  the  direct  notifica 
tion  by  Prince  Antony  to  Prim,  he  detected  a  purpose 
to  dodge  tie  King's  indirect  participation.  From 
that  moment  the  complete  agreement  that  had  hitherto 
existed  between  us  came  to  an  end:  he  continued 
to  attach  the  greater  importance  to  this  participation 
of  the  King,  which  in  my  eyes  was  a  secondary  matter.1 

court  (vol.  i,  p.  264,  n.  1}  appeals  to  tlie  regular  practice  in  relation  to  politi 
cal  telegrams  to  prove  that  Gramont  must  have  had  a  copy  of  Prince  Antony's 
despatch  at  almost  the  same  time  that  it  was  handed  to  Olozaga.  Of  course, 
if  Gramont  sent  this  despatch,  urging  Benedetti  to  exert  himself  to  the  ut 
most  to  the  end  that  the  withdrawal  should  be  announced,  transmitted,  or 
communicated  by  the  Eang,  after  he  knew  of  the  withdrawal,  it  is  perfectly 
clear  that  the  demand  of  guaranties  was  not  the  result  of  the  withdrawal 
but  of  the  Duvernols  interpellation,  in  which  the  subject  of  guaranties  was 
first  mentioned  in  the  Chamber.  Both  La  Gorce  (vol.  vi,  p.  £59}  and  Sorel 
(vol.  i,  p.  I£7)  chaxacterize  the  despatch  as  wise  and  judicious,  and  regret  that 
circumstances  soon  led  Gramont  to  modify  his  language. 

M.  Offivier,  it  wUl  be  noticed,  says  that  a  copy  of  the  telegram  had  just 
been  Iianded  to  Gramont  when  his  interview  with  Werther  began.] 

1  [See  Gramont,  p,  118,  for  the  meaning  which  that  minister  read  into 
Prince  Antony's  despatch.  To  say  the  least,  his  interpretation  is  somewhat 
strained.] 


EFFECT  AT  PARIS  207 

This  new  fact  had  just  been  disclosed  to  Mm  when 
Werther  appeared  for  his  audience  (at  a  quarter  to 
three).  As  the  interview  was  beginning,  a  note  from 
Olozaga  was  handed  to  Gramont,  urgently  requesting 
to  be  received  at  once  on  a  matter  of  the  very  greatest 
importance.  Werther  was  good  enough  to  go  into  an 
adjoining  room,  so  that  Gramont  could  receive  Olozaga. 
The  Spanish  Ambassador,  showing  Gramont  the  de 
spatch  from  Prince  Antony,  congratulated  him  on  that 
solution  of  the  difficulty. 

Gramont  made  a  cold  response  to  his  felicitations. 
In  his  judgment,  he  said,  the  withdrawal  in  that  form, 
far  from  advancing  our  affairs,  complicated  them :  not 
a  word  of  France,  not  a  word  of  Prussia  —  the  whole 
thing  was  between  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern  and 
Spain.  The  text  of  the  despatch  would  offend  public 
sentiment:  it  seemed  to  imply  that  France  by  her 
demands  had  dealt  a  blow  at  the  independence  of  the 
Spanish  people. 

Engrossed  by  these  ideas,  he  resumed  the  interview 
with  Werther.  He  tried  to  obtain  from  him  an  ad 
mission  that  the  King  had  not  been  a  stranger  to  the 
withdrawal.  In  that  case,  the  situation  would  take 
care  of  itself ;  he  would  be  able  to  make,  without  con 
tradiction,  the  declaration  that  the  Emperor  felt  to  be 
necessary.  But  Werther  would  not  lend  himself  to 
that  artifice :  he  declared,  in  a  tone  that  admitted  of 
no  doubt,  that  "the  withdrawal  unquestionably  ema 
nated  from  Prince  Leopold  on  hi§  own  initiative." 
And  he  repeated  that  everlasting  clap-trap,  of  which 
our  readers  must  have  had  their  fill,  about  the  dis 
tinction  between  the  King  and  the  head  of  the  family, 
about  the  impossibility  of  the  King's  refusing  his  sane- 


208         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

tion  from  the  moment  that  the  Prince  accepted  the 
crown,  and  about  the  King's  conviction  that,  considering 
the  ties  between  the  HohenzoIIera  family  and  Napoleon 
III,  the  candidacy  could  not  be  offensive  to  France. 

Gramont  patiently  refuted  the  sophistries  of  Prussian 
bad  faith,  mentioned  the  Belgian  and  Greek  precedents, 
and  so  forth,  and  said  emphatically  that  the  Emperor 
regarded  the  Hohenzollerns,  not  as  relations  more 
or  less  distant  to  whom  he  had  shown  kindness,  but  as 
Prussian  princes,  officers,  subjects,  who  had  been  made 
use  of  to  disturb  and  humiliate  his  country,  and  that 
to  recall  that  relationship  was  to  wound  him. 

"You  say  that  the  King  has  never  intended  to  be 
offensive  and  to  give  umbrage  to  France;  I  do  not 
doubt  it,  since  you  say  so ;  but  why  should  not  the  King 
say  so  to  us  himself?  Why  should  he  not  write  a 
friendly  letter  to  the  Emperor,  in  which,  while  associat 
ing  himself  with  the  Prince's  withdrawal,  he  would 
say  that  we  have  mistakenly  interpreted  the  origin  and 
exaggerated  the  results  of  the  candidacy;  that  he 
attaches  too  much  value  to  friendly  relations  between 
our  countries  not  to  desire  that,  with  the  abandonment 
of  the  candidacy,  all  misunderstanding  and  every  sub 
ject  of  offence  may  disappear  ?  " 

And  he  developed  his  ideas  in  a  note,  the  terms  of 
which,  having  been  hardly  considered  at  all,  were 
simply  a  rough  draft  ad  memoriam  and  not  a  diplomatic 
note  to  be  despatched.  "By  authorizing  Prince 
Leopold  to  accept  the  Spanish  crown,  the  King  did 
not  consider  that  he  was  dealing  a  blow  at  the  inter 
ests  or  the  dignity  of  France.  His  Majesty  associates 
himself  with  the  Prince's  withdrawal,  and  expresses 
his  wish  that  every  cause  of  misunderstanding  be- 


EFFECT  AT  PARIS  209 

tween  his  government   and  tie  Emperor's  may  dis 
appear."1 

In  using  this  language,  Gramont  had  no  purpose 
to  commit  the  gross  impropriety  of  demanding  a  letter 
of  apology.  One  does  not  demand  an  apology  from  a 
king  who  is  at  the  same  time  a  gentleman,  when  one 
is  one's  self  a  gentleman  and  has  honorable  instincts. 
He  knew  that  the  King  would  have  replied  to  such  an 
impertinence  by  sending  to  the  frontier  under  escort 
the  ambassador  who  was  instructed  to  present  it,  and 
by  ordering  his  army  to  be  mobilized.  His  sincerely 
pacific  purpose,  the  respect  with  which  he  spoke  of  the 
Bong  while  expressing  his  own  sentiments  forcibly, 
made  it  impossible  for  Werther  to  believe  for  an  in 
stant  that  his  suggestion  was  intended  offensively. 
Werther  would  have  cut  the  interview  short  had  he 
been  talking  with  a  man  bent  upon  humiliating  his  sov 
ereign  ;  for  while  he  displayed  a  most  conciliatory  dis 
position,  he  did  not  fail  to  maintain  the  point  of 
view  of  his  government  with  invincible  dignity. 

1  [See  Gramont,  pp.  115-127,  for  Ms  account  of  the  interview,  and  Ms  refu 
tation  of  the  claim  that  he  demanded  that  the  King  write  a  letter  of  apology, 
pp.  122-124.  Gramont  says  that  he  gave  Werther  a  copy  of  the  proposed 
letter  to  be  written  by  the  King.  Neither  Gramont  nor  his  colleague  "seems 
to  have  realized  that  kings,  especially  kings  puffed  up  by  recent  victories, 
do  not  like  to  have  models  of  letters  whispered  to  them,  that  an  artful  interpre 
tation  might  easily,  at  Berlin  or  at  Ems,  characterize  as  excuses  what  were  in 
fact  merely  conciliatory  forms  of  speech,  and  that  in  that  way  a  pretext 
would  be  suppEed  for  arousing  German  susceptibility."  La  Gorce,  voL  vi, 
pp.  262,  263.  This,  of  course,  was  exactly  what  Bismarck  did.  See  Ms 
note  to  Count  Bernstorff,  Prussian  Ambassador  to  England,  dated  July  18, 
in  Further  Correspondence  respecting  the  Watr  between  France  and  Prmna, 
No.  &  (1870),  p.  5  (Appendix  H.  infra).  "Both  Ministers  demanded  that 
His  Majesty  the  King  should  write  an  apologetic  letter  to  the  Emperor 
Napoleon,  the  publication  of  wMch  might  pacify  the  excited  feelings  in 


210         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

Gramont,  then,  made  no  demand;  he  suggested 
an  expedient,  for  the  Ambassador's  opinion,  and  in 
that  expedient  there  was  nothing  novel  or  unusual. 
The  Emperor  had  himself  set  the  chivalrous  example 
which  Gramont  would  have  had  the  King  of  Prussia 
follow:  after  the  insertion  in  the  Journal  Officiel, 
at  the  time  of  OrsinFs  assault,  of  the  address  of  the 
colonels,  did  he  not  authorize  the  English  Ambassador, 
Cowley,  to  say  to  Queen  Victoria,  that  he  would  send 
Malakoff,  the  greatest  soldier  in  the  army,  to  London, 
to  atone  for  the  offence  caused  by  the  address  of  the 
officers  of  the  army  ?  With  the  purpose  of  dissipating 
the  distrust  rife  on  all  sides  since  the  Italian  War,  did 
he  not  write  a  public  apologetic  letter  to  Persigny 
(July  25,  I860),  and  assert  his  desire  to  live  in  the  ut 
most  cordiality  with  all  his  neighbors,  and  especially 
with  Germany  ?  Did  he  not  request  an  interview  with 
the  Regent  of  Prussia  and  with  the  German  princes 
assembled  at  Baden,  and  did  he  not  make  the  propo 
sition — much  more  weighty  than  a  mere  friendly 
letter —  to  carry  his  explanations  there  in  person  ?*  At 
the  time  of  the  Luxembourg  affair,  did  not  his  min 
ister  disavow  ad  ntmseam  "all  purpose  to  offend  and 
anger  Prussia'5? 

At  that  moment  (half-past  three)  I  arrived  at  the 
Foreign  Office.1  I  was  told  that  the  interview  with 

1  Gramont  seems  to  fix  my  arrival  at  three  o'clock  Pie  does  not  say  so] ; 
he  erroneously  assumes  (p.  1£5)  that  I  came  directly  from  the  Chamber, 
which  I  had  left  about  three.  He  forgets  that,  before  going  to  him,  I  had 
had  a  conference  with  the  Emperor  at  the  Tuileries,  which  had  required  at 
least  half  an  hour.  fNote  of  M.  Ollivier  in  vol.  xiv,  p.  £47.  Gramont  says 
that  the  Ambassador  was  announced  about  quarter  to  three,  and  that  it 
was  about  half-past  three  when  he  went  away.  "In  less  than  an  hour,  M. 
de  Gramont  had  changed  his  policy,  devised  new  expedients,  conceived  the 


EFFECT  AT  PARIS  £11 

Werther  was  still  in  progress.  I  sent  in  my  name. 
Gramont  came  out  to  me;  we  posted  each  other  in 
a  few  hasty  words,  then  I  followed  him  into  his  private 
office.  Thereupon  the  interview  changed  its  character. 
It  ceased  to  be  official,  as  it  had  been  before,  and  be 
came  one  of  those  unreserved  conversations  in  which 
public  men  indulge  when  they  are  not  acting  in  an 
official  r61e,  and  in  which  they  may  exchange  ideas, 
without  binding  themselves,  and,  a  fortiori,  without 
binding  their  governments:  "conversations  which 
could  not  be  forbidden  without  making  impossible 
the  familiar  relations  which  facilitate  good  under 
standings  between  ministers  and  governments." l 

Werther  seemed  to  me  uneasy,  excited,  depressed. 
He  let  slip  this  remark,  which  he  was  careful  not  to 
remember  in  his  report:  "Ah,  if  I  had  been  with 
the  King  this  unfortunate  business  wouldn't  have 
been  undertaken!"  —  "Most  unfortunate,  in  very 
truth,"  I  replied,  "in  its  future  consequences  even 
more  than  in  itself,  since  it  seems  now  to  be  at  an 
end,  or,  at  least,  in  a  fair  way  to  settlement.  It's 
the  state  of  mind  that  is  certain  to  endure  in  this 
country  after  the  solution  is  known,  that  disturbs 
me.  The  tranquillization  which  I  was  working  hard 
to  accomplish  is  in  danger :  instead  of  a  public  opinion 
resigned  to  the  result,  we  shall  be  confronted  by  an 
irritated  public  opinion;  the  Hohenzollern  question 
is  relegated  to  the  second  place,  and  people  are  talk 
ing  about  demanding  guaranties  from  Prussia  for 

Idea  of  a  letter  from  tlie  King  of  Prussia  to  the  Emperor,  made  a  draft  of 
such  a  letter  —  three  quarters  of  an  hour  had  sufficed  for  him  to  receive  two 
ambassadors,  confer  with  his  colleague,  reflect,  and  decide !"  Sorel,  vol.  i, 
p.  1SS.I 

1  Patmerston  to  his  brother,  Jam.  2$,  1 84£. 


212         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

the  faithful  execution  of  the  Treaty  of  Prague.  Shall 
we  be  strong  enough  to  check  this  movement?  Al 
ready  we  are  called  too  conciliatory,  and  the  war 
party  is  preparing  to  take  the  management  of  affairs 
out  of  our  hands.  As  the  duke  says,  King  William 
would  render  an  inestimable  service  to  our  two  coun 
tries  and  to  the  whole  world  if,  by  a  spontaneous 
act  of  friendship,  he  should  reestablish  the  cordial 
relations  which  he  himself  has  disturbed.  By  strength 
ening  our  hands  as  ministers,  he  would  afford  us  the 
means  of  pursuing  our  labors  in  behalf  of  peace." 

Thus  no  more  after  my  arrival  than  before  was 
there  question  of  any  demand  of  a  nature  to  change 
the  character  of  the  negotiation.  How  could  I 
have  allowed  myself  to  make  such  a  demand?  How 
could  I  have  failed  to  stop  Gramont,  if  he  had  made 
It,  when  I  had  agreed  with  the  Emperor,  only  a  few 
moments  before,  that  we  would  postpone  any  decision 
until  the  Council  should  meet  in  the  morning  at  nine 
o'clock?  There  are  certain  impossibilities,  logical 
and  moral,  which  are  in  themselves  proofs.  I  did, 
it  is  true,  approve  Gramont's  suggestion;  but  that 
suggestion,  not  having  been  approved  by  the  Emperor 
or  by  the  Council,  was  entirely  a  personal  matter  and 
had  no  sort  of  official  weight.  It  is  manifest  that,  if 
we  had  demanded  a  letter  of  apology  from  the  King, 
through  Werther,  we  should  immediately  have  re 
newed  our  demand  through  Benedetti,  and  he  would 
have  become  the  natural  conduit  of  this  new  requisi 
tion,  as  he  already  was  of  the  others.  Gramont  did 
not  communicate  this  suggestion  to  our  agent,  even 
by  way  of  information,  and  he  would  most  assuredly 
not  have  failed  to  do  so,  trained  as  he  was  in  diplo- 


EFFECT  AT  PARIS  213 

matic  methods,  if  it  had  had  any  real  importance.1 
It  matters  little  that  Werther,  an  honorable  but  dull- 
witted  person,  may  have  made  mistakes  in  repeating, 
in  a  hurried  report,  wh^t  he  thought  that  he  under 
stood  and  what  he  did  not  understand.  I  have  not 
to  consider  that  report.  Bismarck  said  many  a  time, 
and  common  sense  had  said  it  before  he  did,  that  it 
is  impossible  to  hold  a  minister  responsible  for  the 
words,  more  or  less  accurate,  which  a  foreign  ambas 
sador  puts  in  his  mouth.  He  is  bound  only  by  what 
he  has  himself  said  or  done. 

The  fact  is  that  there  is  no  official  despatch  of  our 
government  in  existence  demanding  a  letter  of  apology 
from  the  King.  Moreover,  Gramont  formally  con 
tradicted  Werther's  version  in  a  circular  note,2  and 
I  corroborate  his  contradiction  by  my  own.  Will 
any  truly  patriotic  Frenchman  prefer  the  assertion 
of  an  enemy  many  times  convicted  of  falsehood  to 
those  of  the  ministers  of  his  own  country  whose  verac 
ity  has  never  been  impugned?  This  transformation 
of  a  sincere  suggestion  looking  toward  peace  into  an 
unblushing  and  insulting  machination;  this  repre- 

1  Gramont  did  not  inform  Benedetti.    The  fair  interpretation  of  Ms 
omission  is  that  there  was  no  reason  for  doing  so,  since  he  had  put  forward 
no  new  demand.  —  "No,"  certain  historians  say,  "it  was  from  heedlessness." 
Who,  pray,  gives  you  the  right  to  speak  thus  of  a  minister  who  in  this  very 
matter  adjusted  his  conduct  so  vigorously  to  the  rules  of  the  profession  by 
keeping  Benedetti  posted  concerning  all  the  incidents  that  were  likely  to  be 
of  advantage  to  him  in  his  negotiation  ?    [Note  of  M.  Offivier  in  vol.  xiv, 
p.  £51.    Hie  balance  of  this  paragraph  and  the  whole  of  the  next  one  do  not 
appear  in  ISEmpire  Lib&raL 

The  result  of  the  failure  to  advise  Benedetti  of  the  interview  with  Wer 
ther  is  referred  to  in  Appendix  I,  "The  Ems  Negotiation."] 

2  [For  Werther's  report  of  the  interview,  and  for  Gramont's  circular  here 
referred  to,  see  infra,  Appendix  J.J 


214         THE  FBANCO-PBUSSIAN  WAR 

senting  a  suggestion  of  a  friendly  letter  as  a  demand 
for  a  letter  of  apology,  is  one  of  the  most  outrageous 
slanders  in  the  whole  legend  of  falsehood  manufac 
tured  by  low-lived  historians*  Only  malicious  im 
becility  can  persist  in  prating  of  letters  of  apology. 
With  creatures  of  that  stamp  one  does  not  argue, 
but  confines  one's  self  to  the  classic  retort:  Mentiris 
impudentissime.1 

We  left  Werther  at  four  o'clock.  Gramont  started 
for  Saint-Cloud.  When  we  parted  it  was  understood, 
as  it  had  been  with  the  Emperor,  that  we  would  come 
to  no  decision  until  the  Council  the  next  morning. 
As  I  returned  to  the  department  I  met,  on  the  bridge, 
Pessard,  editor  of  the  Gaulms,  distinguished  for  its 
virulent  articles.  I  told  him  that  I  considered  his 
scolding  absurd,  and  I  earnestly  requested  him,  now 
that  there  was  no  longer  a  Hohenzollern  candidacy, 
not  to  go  on  with  it.  And  I  used  the  same  language 
to  all  the- newspaper  men  whom  I  met  on  the  road. 

1  See  Welschmger,  vol.  i,  pp.  80,  81,  for  an  argument  in  opposition  to  M. 
OHivieor's  views  as  to  the  character  of  the  Werther  interview. 


CHAPTER 

THE  DEMAND  OF  GUAKANTIES 

ON  leaving  the  Tuileries  the  Emperor  was  calm  and 
composed.  Bourbaki,  the  aide-de-camp  on  duty,  who 
accompanied  Mm,  said  to  him :  "Shall  I  have  my  war- 
horses  saddled,  Sire?"  "Not  so  fast,  general,"  was 
the  reply.  "Suppose  that  an  island  suddenly  appears 
between  France  and  Spain;  both  claim  it;  it  dis 
appears  ;  what  is  there  for  them  to  go  on  quarrelling 
about?"1 

Nevertheless  the  Emperor  was  impressed  by  the 
extraordinary  acclamations  which  arose  as  he  passed, 
and  which  were  manifestly  a  warlike  demonstration. 
At  Saint-Cloud  he  found  himself  in  an  even  more 
highly  charged  atmosphere.  At  the  court,  the  Bight 
predominated,  and  the  war  party;  the  only  protest 
came  from  Bachon,  the  equerry.  "I  can't  understand/* 
he  said,  "how  a  man  can  think  of  war  when  he  can  no 
longer  sit  a  horse."2 

The  Empress,  who  also  was  convinced  that  France 
had  been  sick  ever  since  Sadowa,  had  taken  tie  course, 
after  the  temporary  depression  mentioned  by  Marshal 
Vaillant,  of  listening  eagerly  to  the  party  which  gave 
her  promises  of  victory.  General  Bourbaki,  an  excel 
lent  judge  in  the  matter  of  warfare  and  of  martial  valor, 

1  General  Bourbaki,  as  quoted  by  one  of  Ms  orderlies. 

2  [Tne  Emperor's  physical  condition  is  discussed  at  length  by  M.  Oflivier 
in  voL  xv  of  IS 'Empire  Lib&ral>  pp.  1S$  ff.J 

£15 


216         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

and  thoroughly  acquainted  with  the  Prussian  army, 
lavished  encouraging  assurances  upon  her.  "We  have 
eight  chances  out  of  ten  in  our  favor/'  he  said. 

The  plebiscite  had  placed  the  solidity  of  the  dynasty 
beyond  attack,  but  it  had  not  restored  the  preponder 
ance  of  France.  If  war  was  no  longer  of  importance 
to  the  dynasty,  it  was  still  of  importance  to  the  nation, 
and  the  Empress  deemed  it  to  be  the  Emperor's  duty 
to  retrieve  our  prestige,  especially  as  he  could  no 
longer  be  suspected  of  being  influenced  by  dynastic 
interests. 

On  her  husband's  arrival,  she  hastened  to  question 
him. 

"Well/'  he  said,  "it  seems  to  be  all  over." 

Faces  grew  dark.  The  Emperor  explained.  They 
listened  to  him  incredulously,  and  repeated  the  current 
phrase:  "The  country  will  not  be  satisfied."  When 
the  news  spread  among  the  staff  of  the  cMteau,  dis 
appointment  burst  forth  as  in  the  Corps  Legislatif. 
"The  Empire  is  lost!"  came  from  all  sides.  "It's  a 
disgrace!"  cried  the  Empress;  "the  Empire  will  fall 
like  a  card  house !"  General  Bourbaki,  who  was  the 
most  excited  of  all,  unbuckled  his  sword,  laid  it  on  the 
billiard  table,  and  said:  "If  that  is  true,  I  refuse  to 
serve." 

The  text  of  the  Duvernois  interpellation  was  handed 
to  the  Emperor:  he  divined  its  malevolent  purpose 
and  condemned  it ;  nevertheless  he  recognized  therein 
the  expression  of  a  public  demand  with  which  it  would 
perhaps  be  difficult  not  to  comply.1 

1  [See  Gramont,  pp.  128  ff. ;  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  pp.  £64-266 ;  Welsdbinger, 
vol.  I,  p.  81 ;  Sorel,  vol.  I,  p.  184.  Such  vague  references  as  this  in  the  text 
to  the  influence  of  the  Empress  at  this  critical  moment  are  about  all  that  one 


NAPOLEON  III 
1808-1873 


THE  DEMAND  OF  GUARANTIES        217 

At  this  juncture  Gramont  appeared.  He  told  of 
Werther's  exasperating  evasions,  of  Ms  declaration 
tliat  the  King  had  absolutely  nothing  to  do  with  the 
withdrawal;  he  pointed  out  the  palpable  inadequacy 
of  Prince  Antony's  act.  Thereupon  the  Emperor  for 
got  that  any  definite  resolution  had  been  postponed 
to  the  next  day's  Council,  and,  says  Gramont,  "a 
conscientious  discussion  was  at  once  opened."1 

finds  in  the  various  accounts  of  the  preliminaries  of  the  war.  La  Gorce  (see 
the  next  note)  is  rather  more  explicit  than  others.  The  fact  that  the  Em 
press  is  still  living  doubtless  counts  for  much  in  this  reticence. 

In  his  justificatory  volume,  so  frequently  cited,  Gramont  says:  "Never* 
theless  the  idea  of  that  interpellation  of  Duvernois  was  so  clearly  responsive 
to  the  feeling  of  the  majority  in  Parliament  and  to  that  of  the  public,  of  whom 
almost  the  entire  press  made  itself  the  vigorous  interpreter,  that  it  was  im 
possible  not  to  heed  it."  Sorel  comments  thus  on  the  statement  that  the 
majority  in  Parliament  were  in  sympathy  with  the  substance  of  the  inter 
pellation  :  "This  is  a  delicate  point  to  handle.  M.  Thiers  and  M.  de  Gra 
mont  contradict  each  other,  and  both  tell  the  truth.  We  must  not  forget 
that  the  majority  consisted  of  official  candidates,  timid,  reserved  men,  ac 
customed  to  a  halting  pace,  very  deferential  to  the  court,  exceedingly  ig 
norant  of  European  affairs  and  of  things  military,  every  one  of  them  having 
an  old-fashioned  substratum  of  Chauvinism,  easy  to  stir  up,  and  above  aH»  a 
solid  foundation  of  prudence  which  caused  them  to  dread  losing  the  favors 
of  the  master  and  the  public  by  showing  too  little  patriotism.  They  were 
surprised  by  the  declaration  of  July  6,  carried  off  their  feet  by  the  Cabinet, 
intoxicated  by  the  uproar  of  the  newspapers,  terrified  by  the  absolutist 
Bonapartists ;  they  would  have  preferred  peace  but  they  said  so  only  in  the 
lobbies."  Sorel,  vol.  i,  p.  135  n.] 

1  [Gramont's  exact  words  are  (p.  130) :  "I  pass  over  in  silence  the  con 
scientious  discussions  which  preceded  the  decision  which  tke  gommmmi  fete 
it  to  be  its  duty  to  make"  This  implies,  to  say  the  least,  that  the  dmsion  was 
the  decision  of  the  ministry,  and  not  of  himself  and  the  Emperor  and  the 
Emperor's  entourage.  Gramont's  silence  "deprives  history  of  the  principal 
source  upon  which  it  might  have  drawn,"  says  La  Gorce  (vol.  vi»  p.  265). 
"Momentous  as  was  the  crisis,  it  is  certain  that  there  was  no  official  de 
liberation.  .  .  .  M.  deGrainontreniained^yashorttimeattheCMteau, 
barely  an  hour,  for  we  know  that  at  seven  o'clock  he  was  back  on  QtM 
d'Orsay  sending  his  despatches.  ...  He  speaks  of  *  conscientious  discus 
sions  which  preceded  the  decision.'  In  the  absence  of  ministers,  who  were 


218         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

Who  took  part  in  that  discussion  ?  I  know  only 
those  who  were  not  invited :  they  were :  the  Minister 
of  War,  who,  having  been  assured  of  peace,  had  stopped 
his  preparations,  and  whose  responsibility,  none  the 
less,  might  well  become  so  heavy;  the  Keeper  of  the 
Seals,  who  bore  almost  alone  the  burden  of  public 
discussion  in  the  Chambers;  the  Minister  of  the 
Interior,  who  was  especially  familiar  with  the  move 
ments  of  public  opinion;  the  Minister  of  Finance, 
who  was  keeping  watch  on  the  fluctuations  of  the 
credit  of  the  State;  in  a  word,  no  member  of  the 
Cabinet  save  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.1 

The  result  of  the  discussion  was  the  following  de 
spatch  to  Benedetti,  which  Gramont  went  off  at  once 
to  send  (at  seven  in  the  evening)  : — 

"We  have  received  by  the  hand  of  the  Spanish 
Ambassador  the  withdrawal  by  Prince  Antony,  in  the 

the  non-official  friends  admitted  to  proffer  tiheir  opinions?  A  silence, 
hitherto  impenetrable,  has  shrouded  this  confabulation,  and,  although  we 
know  the  resolutions  that  resulted  from  it,  we  are  still  unable  to  apportion 
the  responsibility.  AM  the  probabilities  authorize  us  to  believe  that  a  pre 
ponderating  influence  was  that  of  the  Empress.  What  other  could  have 
been  powerful  enough  to  change  the  Emperor's  mind  as  by  a  sudden  blow  ? 
M.  de  Gramont^s  absolute  reserve  of  itself  leaves  one  to  conjecture  a  feeling 
of  delicacy  toward  an  august  person,  whom  an  honorable  loyalty  forbids 
him  to  unmask  and  call  by  name.**  (But  Lord  Malmesbury  declares  that 
the  same  Gramont,  in  conversation  with  him,  threw  all  the  blame  on  the 
Empress.  Memoirs  of  an  Ex-MiniMer,  p.  665.)  Lehautcourt,  vol.  i,  p.  274  n., 
cites  several  contradictory  statements  attributed  to  Gramont,  concerning 
the  Emperor's  attitude  toward  the  withdrawal,  and  quotes  Beust's  comment, 
that  these  inconsistenees  were  due  to  the  duke's  mobile  imagination.] 

1[The  four  ministers  referred  to  are  Le  Bceuf  (War),  OUivier  himself 
(Keeper  of  the  Seals),  Chevandier  (Interior),  and  Segris  (Finance) .  " c  On  July 
1£,  the  cabinet  was  not  consulted*  (unpublished  letter  from  Segris  to  PHchon, 
March  5,  1S71).  The  manuscript  correspondence  and  narratives  of  Louvet 
and  Plichon  agree  perfectly  with  M.  Segris's  statement/*  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi, 
p.  265  n.  And  see  Delofd,  vol.  vi,  p.  165 ;  Lehantccmrt,  vol.  i,  pp.  277,  278.J 


THE  DEMAND  OF  GUARANTIES        219 

name  of  his  son  Leopold,  of  the  latter's  candidacy 
for  the  throne  of  Spain.  In  order  that  this  with 
drawal  by  Prince  Antony  may  have  its  full  effect, 
it  seems  necessary  that  the  King  of  Prussia  should 
associate  himself  with  it,  and  should  give  us  an  assur 
ance  that  he  will  not  again  sanction  that  candidacy. 
You  will  go  at  once  to  the  King  to  ask  from  Mm  a 
declaration  to  this  effect,  which  he  cannot  refuse  if  he 
is  in  truth  actuated  by  no  secret  motive.  Despite 
the  withdrawal,  which  is  now  known  to  all,  the 
public  excitement  is  so  great  that  we  do  not  know 
whether  we  shall  succeed  in  controlling  it.  Make  a 
paraphrase  of  this  despatch  which  you  can  communi 
cate  to  the  King.  Reply  as  quickly  as  possible/' 1 

This  is  what  is  known  as  the  demand  of  guaranties. 

There  was  no  question  therein  of  the  Emperor's 
consent  to  write  the  letter  of  apology  which  Gra- 
mont  is  alleged  to  have  demanded  of  Werther  a 
few  moments  before.  A  letter  of  apology  would 
have  implied  simply  a  disavowal  of  the  past,  whereas 
the  demand  of  guaranties  exacted  a  promise  for 
the  future.2 

This  ill-advised  despatch,  neutralized  the  judicious 
one  sent  at  twenty  minutes  to  two.  It  was  not  con 
tent  with  tJie  avowed  participation  of  the  King  in  tibe 
present  incident,  but  demanded  a  promise  in  view  of 
certain  problematic  future  occurrences,  and  plunged 

1  [See  Gramont,  p.  131;  Benedetti,  p.  870;  La  Goree,  vol.  vi,  pp.  £67, 
£68;  Sorel,  vol.  i,  pp.  135,  1S6;  Belord,  vol  vi,  p.  165.    Delord  reads  into 
the  despatch  an  injunction  to  Benedetti  to  be  particularly  discreet,  because 
Gramont  **  dreams  of  an  unhoped-for  triumph  for  the  Empire,  and  wishes  to 
take  the  credit  aH  to  himself."] 

2  [The  last  two  sentences  were  added  by  M.  Olivier  in  the  present  volume. 
See  mfra  p.  £35  n.,  for  a  probable  explanation  of  the  addition.] 


220         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

us  anew  into  the  perils  from  which,  but  for  it,  we  were 
sure  of  coming  safely  Jorth.  What  need  was  there  to 
rush  matters  thus?  What  danger  was  to  be  feared, 
that  we  could  not  await  patiently  a  reply  from  Madrid 
and  Berlin  which  was  certain  to  arrive  in  a  few  hours, 
and  which  would  have  brought  us  sufficient  satisfac 
tion?  But  the  Right  did  not  propose  that  the  affair 
should  have  a  peaceful  ending.1  This  demand  of 
guaranties  was,  as  we  have  seen  from  Duvernois's 
interpellation,  which  preceded  it,  conceived  by  the 
Right.  At  the  outset,  joining  its  voice  with  that 
which  arose  from  every  French  heart  against  the 
challenging  candidacy,  it  assumed  that  we  could  not 
assent  to  it  and  that  Prussia  would  not  withdraw  it. 
As  soon  as  the  prospect  of  a  withdrawal  appeared,  it 
changed  its  tone,  and  we  heard  the  same  men  who  had 
deemed  the  Hohenzollem  candidacy  so  threatening 
that  its  success  would  have  been  our  ruin,  affect  to 
regard  it  as  merely  a  secondary  matter,  much  exag 
gerated,  at  which  we  had  been  wrong  to  take  fright, 
unless  we  were  determined  to  seek  therein  a  favorable 
opportunity  to  settle  our  permanent  quarrel  with 
Prussia.  I  had  called  the  Emperor's  attention  to  this 
movement  when  it  began  to  manifest  itself,  and  I  had 
opposed  it  with  unbending  determination.2 

The  Right,  not  hoping  to  overcome  my  opposition, 
attacked  me  savagely,  tooth  and  nail.  I  was  accused 
of  lacking  courage,  patriotism,  and  foresight.  The 
Pays  and  the  Public  put  forth  the  most  offensive  in- 

1  ["But  this  solution  [Prince  Leopold's  withdrawal]  upset  the  schemes  of 
the  ambitious  courtiers,  who  recoiled  from  no  folly  in  order  to  gratify  their 
passions."    Jules  Favre,  Qomemement  de  la  Def&ue  Ncctwncde,  p.  11.] 

2  [Supra,  p.  164.] 


THE  DEMAND  OF  GUARANTIES        221 

slnuaiions.1  But  all  that  outpouring  of  wrath  did  not 
move  me.  Gramont,  by  the  agreements  he  had  made 
with  Lyons  and  myself,  the  Emperor,  by  his  assent  to 
Gramont's  promises,  were  as  much  bound  as  I  was 
not  to  enlarge  the  field  of  discussion.  Thereupon  the 

1  [M.  Ollivier  omits  here  some  of  the  details  of  the  journalistic  attacks 
upon  him  of  which  lie  tells  in  Ms  larger  work.]  "Forgetting  that  Olozaga  was 
as  ignorant  of  the  HohenzoUem  candidacy  as  I  was  myself,  the  Pays  [Paul  de 
Cassagnac]  wrote :  *  When  M.  Olozaga  came  coquetting  about  Place  Ven- 
ddme  and  offering  his  Golden  Fleeces,  he  knew  doubtless  that  vanity  intoxi 
cates  and  confuses  men*s  brains.  And  if  the  eyes  of  our  rulers  were  closed 
and  blinded,  it  was  perhaps  some  grand  cordon  of  the  order  of  Noble  Dames 
that  served  them  as  a  bandage.'  Rouher's  Public  was  even  more  venomous. 
Violent  party  men  are  dishonorable  men  —  of  course,  I  do  not  refer  to  their 
private  lives.  Luckily  they  are,  in  general,  stupid,  which  fact  corrects  and 
paralyzes  their  villainy.  Thus  Dr£olle  manufactured  out  of  the  whole  cloth 
a  conversation  that  I  was  supposed  to  have  had  with  a  deputy.  In  the  first 
part  he  makes  me  say  that  I  desired  peace,  that  I  realized  the  necessity  there 
for,  and  that  I  knew  to  what  certain  disaster  a  warlike  policy  would  expose 
the  country.  And  then,  abruptly,  from  these  premises,  he  makes  me  conclude 
that,  during  my  brief  interim  service  at  the  Foreign  Office,  I  had  read  through 
our  diplomatic  files,  and  that  the  flush  of  shame  had  risen  to  my  brow :  I 
had  seen  France  degraded,  the  Emperor  on  his  knees  before  Europe,  and  I 
had  said  to  myself :  *  We  must  have  a  war  —  war  alone  can  set  us  up  again/ 
And  I  added :  'We  were  awaiting  only  an  excuse  or  an  opportunity :  the  Ho- 
henzoHern  affair  comes  in  the  nick  of  time!'  It  was  my  custom  never  to 
reply  to  personal  attacks,  and  that  course  was  all  the  easier  for  me  because 
I  never  read  any  newspaper  except  the  revolutionary  sheets,  which  I  was 
watching  very  closely.  Surely  if  there  ever  was  a  fable  to  which  silent  disdain 
appeared  to  me  to  be  the  only  fitting  reply,  it  was  Dreolle's.  .  .  .  But  the 
press  sendee  in  the  Department  of  the  Interior  .  .  .  took  alarm  at  the  article 
and  stirred  up  Chevandier,  and  the  editor  of  the  Patrie,  who  received  C.'s 
confidential  communications  as  Mitchell  did  mine,  came  to  me  and  begged 
me  to  authorize  him  to  contradict  it.  I  made  an  exception  to  my  rule  and 
consented,  and  Dreolle  had  his  shame  to  show  for  It.**  L'Empire  Liberal, 
vol.  xiv,  pp.  256-258. 

[See  further,  concerning  the  attitude  of  the  press  at  this  moment,  Le- 
hauteourt,  vol  i,  pp.  273, 274  and  note ;  especially  a  long  extract  from  Paul  de 
Cassagnac's  article  in  the  Pays  of  July  13.  Also,  Gramont,  pp.  128,  12$, 
citing  Feraand  Giraudeau's  IM  VM$  $w  let  Campagw  de  1870.] 


THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

Right  had  the  infernal  adroitness  not  to  meet  face  to 
face  a  resistance  which  it  was  sure  that  it  could  not 
overcome:  it  abandoned  all  talk  of  the  Treaty  of 
Prague,  and  set  to  work  to  envenom  the  Hohenzollern 
question,  which  we  could  not  refuse  to  discuss.  It 
shrewdly  seized  upon  what  there  was  open  to  criticism 
in  the  withdrawal :  the  English  newspapers  commented 
on  its  peculiar  form;  it  was  made  by  the  father  for 
the  son,  and  the  Standard  called  it  "this  curious  pro 
ceeding  ";  the  Times  was  amazed  that  the  name  of 
Prince  Leopold  himself  appeared  nowhere,  "although 
he  is  of  age,  thirty-five  years  old,  and  has  taken  an 
active  part  in  the  whole  affair.  It  remains  to  be  seen," 
it  added,  "how  far  the  young  Prince  will  consider  him 
self  bound  by  his  father's  action." 

"Pere  Antoine,"  said  the  Right,  "is  fooling  us  as 
truly  as  Prince  Augustenbourg  did."  On  November 
30,  1852,  the  head  of  the  Augustenbourg  family,  in 
consideration  of  a  million  and  a  half  double  rix-thalers, 
had  renounced  for  himself  and  his  son,  on  his  honor 
and  faith  as  a  prince,  all  his  rights  in  the  Duchies; 
his  son  none  the  less  laid  claim  to  the  succession,  at 
the  same,  time  retaining  the  sum  of  money  received ; 
and  when  the  validity  of  his  claim  was  contested,  he 
replied:  "What!  my  rights  not  valid!  why,  I  have 
already  sold  them,  and  they  are  still  good !"  * 

Luckily  the  members  of  the  Right  did  not  know 
that  Prince  Antony  had  renounced  the  candidacy  in 
Ms  son's  name  only  because  Prince  Leopold  had  at 
first  refused  to  do  it.  They  invoked  some  most  specious 

1  (The  daim  of  the  younger  Ehike  of  Augusfeabourg  to  the  duchies  of 
Schleswig  and  Holstein  was  supported  by  Austria  and  denied  by  Prussia  in 
the  negotiations  and  disputes  preceding  the  War  of  1866.] 


THE  DEMAND  OP  GUARANTIES        223 

historical  arguments;  they  quoted  that  weighty  re 
flection  of  La  Brayere:  "To  think  only  of  the  present 
is  a  source  of  error  in  politics."  That  is  why,  they 
argued,  serious-minded  statesmen  could  never  regard 
as  terminated  an  affair  apt  by  its  very  nature  to  be 
reopened,  so  long  as  the  present  solution  was  not  sup 
plemented  by  measures  providing  against  its  reopening 
in  the  future.  They  overwhelmed  us  with  examples 
of  cases  whose  immediate  settlement  had  been  made 
subordinate  to  a  guaranty  for  the  future.  After  a 
popular  uprising,  the  Austrians,  summoned  by  the 
Pope,  had  occupied  the  Legations :  Casimir  Perier  at 
once  sent  troops  to  Ancona,  and  the  Pope  concluded 
to  recognize  this  seizure  of  a  city  in  his  dominions  on 
condition  that  it  should  be  temporary,  and  that  the 
French  should  withdraw  from  Ancona  when  the  Aus 
trians  withdrew  from  Bologna.  Nevertheless  Thiers, 
then  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  subordinated  the 
departure  of  our  troops  to  guaranties  for  the  future*  in 
case  of  further  Austrian  intervention  based  upon  new 
uprisings.  His  successor,  Mol6,  having  evacuated 
Ancona  without  obtaining  such  guaranties,  Duchatei, 
Thiers,  Guizot,  and  Broglie  criticised  him  in  Parlia 
ment.1 

Palmerston  subordinated  the  end  of  the  Crimean 
War  to  the  obtaining  of  "guaranties  for  the  fiMure 
against  possible  enterprises  on  the  part  of  Russia."  2 
Prussia  and  Germany  persistently  demanded  from  the 
Danish  government  guaranties  for  the  future  in  favor  of 
Germans  settled  in  the  Duchies. 

If,  in  1869,  when  the  Hohenzollem  candidacy  was 

1  At  the  session  of  tlie  Chamber  on  Jan.  12, 183:9. 

2  Letter  of  Lord  Palmerston  to  Lord  John  Russell,  March  28, 185& 


224         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

first  mentioned,  the  Emperor,  following  the  example 
of  sober-minded  statesmen,  had  not  looked  simply  at 
the  present,  if  he  had  taken  hostages  for  the  future, 
he  would  not  have  been  taken  by  surprise  by  the 
Prussian-Spanish  intrigue.  He  was  blamed  for  that 
lack  of  foresight.  Ought  he  to  repeat  that  mistake, 
to  leave  open  the  possibility  of  a  third  claim  ?  It  was 
necessary,  then,  to  make  sure  of  the  future  by  request 
ing  from  the  King  of  Prussia,  not  only  his  approval 
of  the  withdrawal  of  the  candidacy,  but  a  formal 
guaranty  that  he  would  not  authorize  the  princes 
to  renew  it. 

These  arguments,  theoretically,  were  not  devoid  of 
justice.  It  is  undeniable  that,  when  an  affair  is  smoothed 
over  temporarily,  it  is  prudent  to  forestall  by  guaran 
ties  a  possible  revival.  But  such  was  not  the  present 
case.  The  incident  had  had  consequences  so  painful 
to  all  those  who  had  been  Involved  in  it  that  no  one 
could  suspect  them  of  being  tempted  to  reopen  it; 
and  the  King  of  Prussia,  who  had  gone  into  it  against 
Ms  will,  would  surely  never  listen  to  it  again.  More 
over,  when  one  is  considering  whether  to  do  or  not 
to  do  a  certain  thing,-  it  is  not  enough  to  consider  the 
thing  by  itself:  one  must  take  into  account  the  cir 
cumstances  amid  which  it  must  be  done.  The  King's 
acquiescence  in  the  Emperor's  demand  would  have 
produced  consequences  most  unfortunate  for  him.  If, 
to  the  withdrawal  which,  despite  all  contradictions, 
was  attributed  to  Mm,  he  had  added  any  promise 
whatsoever,  there  would  have  been  a  universal  outcry 
against  his  humiliation ;  the  perfidy  of  the  Right  con 
sisted  precisely  in  thus  putting  forth  a  claim  to  wMch 
it  was  impossible  for  our  opponent  to  accede.  The 


THE  DEMAND  OP  GUARANTIES 

demand  of  guaranties  cotdd  be  interpreted  only  as  a 
purpose  to  bring  on  war.1 

Most  of  the  leaders  of  the  Right  (it  is  proper  always 
to  do  justice  to  the  sincere)  cared  little  for  Spain  or 
the  Hohenzollerns  or  the  future:  the  present  alone 
interested  them.  Relying  on  the  triumph  which  the 
generals  promised  them,  they  wanted  a  war  which  we 
did  not  want,  in  order  to  force  us  out  of  the  govern 
ment,  to  resume  it  themselves,  and  to  fling  the  liberal 
regime  into  the  gutter,  like  an  old  rag.  They  expected 
from  the  wrath  of  the  King  of  Prussia  the  rejection  of 
the  demand  of  guaranties;  they  assumed  that  that 
rejection  would  embitter  men's  minds,  and  that  the 
dispute,  thus  envenomed  on  both  sides,  would  lead 
them,  by  that  roundabout  road,  to  war. 

Between  the  bellicose  propulsion  of  the  Right,  and 
the  pacific  policy  of  the  Ministry,  the  Emperor  oscil 
lated,  yielding  by  turn  to  one  and  the  other  of  those 
forces.  Did  peace  seem  assured  —  he  regretted  the 
gratification  that  war  would  have  afforded  the  coun 
try,  and  was  conscious  of  a  martial  thrill.  Did  war 
seem  imminent  —  he  recoiled  and  fell  back  upon  his 
real  preference  for  peace.  This  time,  by  adopting  the4 
Right's  demand  of  guaranties,  it  really  seemed  as  if 
he  had  made  up  his  mind  for  war;  and  as  he  was 
certain  that  he  would  obtain  neither  my  assistance  nor 
that  of  the  Cabinet  for  that  policy,  he  imposed  it,  by 
an  exercise  of  his  personal  authority,  upon  the  only 
one  of  Ms  ministers  who  would  lend  himself  to  such  a 

1  [This  plain  statement  of  the  purpose  of  injecting  into  the  discussion  what 
Benedetti,  in  the  Preface  to  his  book  (p.  7),  rightly  characterizes  as  "new 
claims  which  led  us  inevitably  to  wajc»**  constitutes  as  severe  an  indictment  as 
any  even  of  the  most  virulent  critics  of  the  ministry  have  presented  in  more 
violent  language.] 


THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

disregard  of  the  self -defensive  rules  of  the  parliamentary 
form  of  government. 

Gramont  was  not  thoroughly  imbued  with  the  re 
quirements  of  that  regime ;  he  was  still  the  ambassador 
accustomed  to  obey  his  sovereign's  every  command; 
in  the  utmost  good  faith,  he  had  no  conception  that 
that  was  not  the  correct  thing  to  do,  and,  although  a 
parliamentary  minister,  he  associated  himself  with  an 
act  destructive  of  parliamentary  power.1  On  his  part 

1  PH  Ms  book,  Gramont,  while  discussing  BenedettFs  despatches  from 
Ems  of  July  II,  paves  the  way  for  the  contention  which  was,  so  to  speak, 
forced  upon  him  by  later  developments,  that  the  "demand  of  guaranties" 
was  new,  if  at  all,  in  form  only,  not  in  substance.  **  Abandoning,"  he  says 
(p.  101),  "any  further  requests  for  an  initiative  which  there  was  no  longer 
any  possibility  of  obtaining,  the  government  determined  to  seek  in  an  indirect 
cooperation  on  the  part  of  the  King,  in  an  apparent  oneness  of  purpose,  the 
guaranties  which  it  had  failed  to  obtain  by  his  direct  concurrence.  Assuming 
that  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern,  without  the  King's  command,  without  any 
suggestion  from  the  King,  should  of  his  own  motion  abandon  the  candidacy 
and  inform  His  Majesty  of  his  purpose,  the  King,  making  hfinself  the  direct 
interpreter  of  his  cousin's  spontaneous  decision,  might  himself  announce  the 
withdrawal,  accompanying  the  announcement  with  a  gracious  word  or  two. 
The  withdrawal,  communicated  by  the  King,  would  thus  become  an  official 
act,  the  act  of  Prussia,  and  the  French  government  would  have  found  therein 
ike  shadow  of  a  guaranty  which,  for  love  of  peace,  it  would  have  magnified 
to  the  proportions  of  a  satisfactory  assurance.  I  do  not  know  how  far  public 
opinion  would  have  followed  us  in  this  direction ;  but  this  much  is  certain, 
that  the  government  would  have  accepted  it  with  no  mental  reservations. 
We  would  have  said  to  the  Chambers :  *The  King  of  Russia  has  informed  us 
of  Prince  Leopold's  withdrawal ;  it  is  from  bjm  that  we  learn  of  it,  and  we 
see  in  this  act  of  the  King  a  gitaranty  of  the  pacific  sentiments  of  his  govern 
ment  and  of  the  importance  which  he  attaches  to  the  removal  of  all  compli 
cations  of  a  nature  to  disturb  the  peace/*  —  And  yet,  in  his  interview  with 
Werther,  after  he  knew  of  Prince  Antony's  withdrawal  of  his  son's  candidacy, 
he  did  not  even  hint  at  guaranties  for  the  future,  but  suggested  that  the  King 
of  Prussia  should  disclaim  any  purpose  to  offend  France  and  express  his  regret 
for  the  misunderstanding.  It  seems  clear  enough  that  the  passage  quoted 
above  was  an  afterthought,  and  that  the  "demand  of  guaranties"  formulated 
in  the  despatch  to  Benedetti  of  July  12  at  7  P.M.,  was  due  to  the  influence  of 


THE  DEMAND  OF  GUARANTIES        227 

it  was  simply  obedience,  not  warlike  premeditation; 
on  the  Emperor's  part,  I  am  convinced  that  it  was 
simply  the  compliant  humor  of  weakness,  not  a  deter 
mined  stand  for  war.  My  familiarity  with  his  mental 
processes,  and  with  the  readiness  with  which,  refus 
ing  to  be  deterred  by  motives  of  self-esteem,  he  often 
retraced  his  steps  if  he  had  gone  too  far,  convinces  me 
that  it  was  an  afterthought  that  led  him  to  change 
from  the  wise  resolution  of  the  Tufleries  to  the  hastily 
conceived  folly  of  Saint-Cloud :  he  said  to  himself 
that,  after  all,  this  demand  of  guaranties,  which  had 
not  been  expressed  in  the  form  of  an  ultimatum,  was 
not  of  such  a  character  that  it  could  not  be  abandoned, 
if  it  were  likely  to  lead  to  war.  He  forgot  that,  in 
critical  situations,  certain  acts  produce  instant  and 
irrevocable  effects  and  drive  one  whither  one  does  not 
wish  to  go. 

Gramont  was  able  to  satisfy  himself,  upon  his  return 
to  the  department,  of  the  way  in  which  his  despatch 
from  Saint-Cloud  was  interpreted.  Lyons  having 
called  upon  him,  Gramont  did  not  conceal  from  him 
his  objections  to  the  insufficiency  of  Prince  Antony's 
action,  and  the  impossibility,  in  view  of  the  excited 
state  of  public  feeling,  of  closing  the  incident  without 
obtaining  some  sort  of  satisfaction  from  the  King  of 
Prussia. 

Lyons  expressed  his  surprise.  He  pointed  out  that 
the  situation  was  completely  changed.  "K  war  took 
place  now,  all  Europe  would  say  that  it  was  the  fault  of 

the  Emperor's  entourage,  combined  with  the  natural  tendency  of  men  not 


ing  pnbEc  sentiment.  M.  de  Gramont  asserts  that  it  was  necessary  for  the 
ministers  so  to  associate  themselves,  "if  they  would  retain  a  chance  of  being 
able  to  restrain  public  sentiment  on  the  safe  side  of  a  resort  to  arms  "  !] 


228         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

France;  that  France  plunged  into  it  without  any  sub 
stantial  cause,  merely  from  pride  and  resentment.  .  .  . 
If  there  should,  at  the  first  moment,  be  some  disap 
pointment  felt  here,  in  the  Chamber  and  in  the  coun 
try,  ,  *  .  the  Ministry  would  in  a  very  short  time  stand 
better  with  both  if  it  contented  itself  with  the  diplo 
matic  triumph  it  had  achieved  and  abstained  from 
plunging  into  war,  for  which  there  was  certainly  no 
avowable  motive." 

He  dwelt  especially  on  the  assurances  which  he  had 
been  officially  authorized  to  give  to  the  Queen's  govern 
ment,  that,  if  the  Prince  would  withdraw  his  candidacy , 
the  affair  would  be  at  an  end.  That  was  the  language 
of  common  sense  and  of  friendship. 

Gramont  admitted  that  he  had  authorized  him  to 
give  that  assurance,  but  on  the  condition,  which  Lyons 
forgot,  that  Prince  Leopold  should  withdraw  his  can 
didacy  by  the  admee  of  the  King  of  Prussia.  That 
advice  would  imply  a  tacit  engagement  that  the  can 
didacy  would  not  be  renewed ;  the  King  of  Prussia  had 
refused  to  proffer  it,  and  caused  us  to  be  informed  by 
his  ambassador  that  he  had  nothing  to  do  with  the 
wholly  spontaneous  decision  of  Prince  Antony.  The 
result  was  that  the  guaranty  upon  which  we  relied, 
and  to  which  we  had  subordinated  the  closing  of  the 
incident,  had  not  been  obtained. 

While  arguing  thus  Gramont  overlooked  his  despatch 
of  1.40  P.M.,  in  which,  supposing  the  case  of  a  with 
drawal  without  the  King's  command  or  advice,  he 
said  that  he  would  be  satisfied  with  indirect  participa 
tion  in  a  spontaneous  withdrawal;  and  he  had  no 
reason  to  believe,  when  he  discharged  his  last  despatch, 
that  such  participation  would  not  appear.  However, 


THE  DEMAND  OF  GUARANTIES        229 

impressed  by  tlie  Ambassador's  comments,  and  wishing 
perhaps  to  prepare  a  way  of  retreat,  he  said  to  Lyons 
that  the  final  decision  would  be  made  by  the  Council 
the  next  morning,  and  announced  forthwith  to  the 
Chambers.1 

1  [In  Lyons's  report  to  Granville  of  this  interview,  dated  July  12  (Blue 
Book,  pp.  20,  21),  there  is  no  mention  of  Gramont's  having  admitted  Ms 
previous  assurance  to  Lyons,  or  of  the  unfulfilled  condition  that  the  with 
drawal  should  be  brought  about  by  the  King's  advice ;  but  Lyons  had  pre 
viously  (July  10)  quoted  the  minister  as  attaching  such  a  condition.  "M. 
de  Gramont  told  me  that  I  might  report  to  your  Lordship  that  if  the  Prince 
of  Hohenzoilem  should  now,  on  the  advice  of  the  King  of  Prussia,  withdraw 
his  acceptance  of  the  Crown,  the  whole  affair  would  be  at  an  end."  Blue 
Book,  p.  17.  In  the  despatch  of  the  12th  from  which  M.  Ollivier  quotes, 
Lyons  reports  further  that  he  pointed  out  to  M*  de  Gramont  that  "one  of  the 
advantages  of  the  former  position  of  France  was  that  the  quarrel  rested  on  a 
cause  in  which  the  feelings  of  Germany  were  very  little  concerned,  and  Ger 
man  interests  not  at  all.  Now  Prussia  might  well  expect  to  rally  all  Germany 
to  resist  an  attack  which  could  be  attributed  to  no  other  motives  than  ill- 
will  and  jealousy  on  th6  part  of  France,  and  a  passionate  desire  to  humiliate 
her  neighbor.  In  fact,  I  said,  France  would  have  public  opinion  throughout 
the  world  against  her,  and  her  antagonist  would  have  all  the  advantage  of 
being  manifestly  forced  into  the  war  in  self-defence  to  repel  an  attack.'* 
Gramont  himself  does  not  mention  this  interview. 

Acknowledging  Lord  Lyons's  despatch,  Earl  Granville  telegraphed  on  the 
13th:  "Her  Majesty's  Government  learned  with  great  concern,  by  your 
telegram  of  yesterday  evening  .  .  .  that  .  .  .  the  Due  de  Gramoat  inti 
mated  to  you  that  the  French  Government  continued  to  be  dissatisfied  with 
the  communications  which  they  had  received  from  the  King  of  Prussia.  .  ,  . 
Under  these  circumstances  Her  Majesty's  Government  .  .  .  feel  bound  to 
impress  upon  the  Government  of  the  Emperor  the  immense  responsiblfty 
that  would  rest  on  France  if  she  should  seek  to  enlarge  the  grounds  of  quarrel 
by  declining  to  accept  the  withdrawal  by  Prince  Leopold 
of  his  candidature,  as  a  satisfactory  solution  of  the  question." 

See  Letaitcourt,  voL  i,  pp.  282-284 ;  Sorel,  vol.  i  pp,  187, 188.] 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE  EMPEROR'S  IIETTEB,  TO  GEAMONT  ON  THE  DEMAND 
OF  GUARANTIES 

I  WAS  not  interested  in  what  might  come  from  Berlin 
or  Ems.  I  was,  on  the  other  hand,  most  anxious 
concerning  what  was  to  arrive  from  Madrid,  and  I 
was  in  constant  dread  of  some  new  villainy  on  the  part 
of  Prim.  As  Gramont  very  justly  observed,  Prince 
Antony's  despatch  was  so  conceived  as  to  arouse  public 
sentiment  in  Spain ;  one  could  detect  therein  a  certain 
purpose  to  suggest  that  France  was  dealing  a  blow  at 
the  independence  of  that  nation ;  one  would  have  said 
that  it  was  his  intention  to  establish  a  close  connection 
between  his  son's  candidacy  and  the  national  pride  of 
Spain.  He  said  in  effect:  "If  I  should  not  withdraw 
my  son's  candidacy,  the  Spanish  people  might  well 
take  counsel  only  of  their  sentiment  of  independence, 
and  his  election  would  be  assured.  I  withdraw  it 
in  order  not  to  expose  Spain  to  the  necessity  of  defend 
ing  her  rights."1  Would  not  the  Spanish  government, 
covertly  incited  by  Prim,  following  the  example  of  the 
Greeks  after  the  declination  of  Prince  Alfred,  decide 
to  disregard  his  action  and  proclaim  Prince  Leopold 
king,  by  way  of  asserting  its  national  independence? 
And  would  not  the  Prince,  who  had  not  personally 
withdrawn,  imitate  the  action  of  his  brother  Charles 

1  [TMs  passage,  beginning  with  "Prince  Antony's  despatch,"  is  taken,  sub 
stantially  in  Mid&m  wrbu,  from  Gramont,  p.  113.] 

230 


THE  EMPEROR'S  LETTER  231 

in  Roumania,1  and  land  unexpectedly  on  the  Spanish 
coast.     Certain  -foreign    correspondence    so   affirmed. 

In  the  evening,  with  my  wife  on  my  arm,  I  walked 
to  Quai  d'Orsay,  where  the  Spanish  embassy  then  was. 
Olozaga  was  dining  out.  We  waited  some  time  for 
him,  walking  up  and  down  the  quay.  He  had  received 
nothing  from  Madrid  as  yet,  he  said,  but  he  encour 
aged  me :  he  had  no  doubt  that  his  initiative  would  be 
approved ;  if  it  should  be  disavowed,  he  should  cease 
at  once  to  be  ambassador ;  he  had  so  stated,  and  they 
would  not  dare  to  subject  him  to  that  embarrassment. 
He  confirmed  what  the  Emperor  had  told  me  as  to  the 
way  in  which  the  withdrawal  had  been  brought  about. 
"Despite  our  intimate  relations,"  he  said,  "I  told  you 
nothing  about  it  because  the  most  absolute  secrecy 
was  the  first  condition  of  success.  At  my  entreaty 
the  Emperor  maintained  the  same  reserve."  And  he 
thereupon  told  me  of  his  visit  to  the  Tuileries  during 
the  Council  that  morning.  To  these  confidences  he 
added  the  most  affectionate  and  most  judicious  advice. 
"Believe  me,  it's  all  over  so  far  as  we  are  concerned; 
the  withdrawal  will  be  accepted,  the  candidacy  will 
not  be  renewed ;  do  not  be  disturbed,  do  not  be  hasty 
in  your  decision,  and  it  will  all  arrange  itself/' 

Although  it  was  late,  after  eleven  o'clock,  we  went 
on  to  Gramont's  office,  his  department  being  only  a 
few  steps  away,  so  that  I  might  repeat  to  him  what 

1  [Charles  of  Roumania,  by  the  way,  had  not  once  withdrawn ;  moreover, 
he  was  secretly  supported  in  his  enterprise  by  Napoleon  in,  as  Prince  Gort- 
chakoff  did  not  fail  to  remind  the  French  Ambassador  when  the  Spanish 
business  was  discussed  by  them,  "At  a  not  very  distant  date/*  he  said, 
"another  Prince  of  Hohenzollern  was  invited  to  reign  over  Boumania. 
Russia  protested,  but  her  protest  awoke  no  echo."  Reury  to  Gramoat, 
July?;  dtedby!aGorce,voLvip.mj 


THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

1  had  just  heard  from  Olozaga's  lips,  and  might  learn 
if  any  information  had  come  from  Ems. 

In  reply  to  my  question,  Gramont  handed  me  his 
seven  o'clock  despatch  demanding  guaranties.  I  had 
not  finished  reading  it  when  an  aide-de-camp  was 
announced,  bringing  a  letter  from  the  Emperor.  Gra 
mont  read  it,  then  passed  it  to  me.  It  was  thus  con 
ceived  :  — 

"PAiiACE  OF  SAINT-CLOUD, 

"  12  July,  1870. 

"  MY  DEAR  DUKE,  —  Upon  reflecting  on  our  conversa 
tions  to-day,  and  upon  rereading  the  despatch  from 
*P&re  Antoine/  as  Cassagnac  calls  him,1  I  think 
that  we  must  confine  ourselves  to  making  more  em 
phatic  the  despatch  which  you  were  to  send  to  Benedetti, 
bringing  out  the  following  facts :  (1)  We  have  had  to 
do  with  Prussia,  not  with  Spain;  (2)  Prince  Antony's 
despatch  addressed  to  Prim  is  an  unofficial  document 
so  far  as  concerns  us,  which  no  one  has  been  formally 
instructed  to  transmit  to  us;  (3)  Prince  Leopold  ac 
cepted  the  candidacy  for  the  throne  of  Spain,  and  it 
is  his  father  who  renounces  it;  (4)  Benedetti  should 
insist  therefore,  as  he  has  orders  to  do,  upon  a  cate 
gorical  response  wherein  the  Bang  should  agree  for  the 
future  not  to  allow  Prince  Leopold,  who  has  made  no 
promise  to  follow  his  brother's  example  and  set  out 
for  Spain  some  fine  day;  (5)  So  long  as  we  have  no 
official  communication  from  Ems,  we  are  not  sup 
posed  to  have  had  any  reply  to  our  just  demands; 
(6)  So  long  as  we  have  no  such  reply,  we  shall  continue 
our  armaments;  (7)  It  is  impossible,  therefore,  to  make 

1Hus  clause  is  omitted  in  the  Emperor's  letter  as  given  by  Gramont 
[who  has  simply  "Prince  Antoine"  (p.  130)],  I  supply  it  because  it  indicates 
the  inspiration  of  the  letter.  [Note  of  M.  Olivier  in  vol.  xiv,  p.  267  J 


THE  EMPEROR'S  LETTER  233 

any  announcement  to  the  Chambers  until  we  are  more 
fully  informed. 

"Accept,  my  dear  Duke,  the  assurance  of  my  sincere 

friendship."  \ 

The  explanation  of  this  letter  is  as  follows.  During 
the  evening  certain  members  of  the  Right,  among  them 
Jerdme  David  and  Cassagnac,  had  gone  to  Saint- 
Cloud.  They  had  declared  (which  was  quite  true) 
that  "Pere  AntoineV*  withdrawal  was  the  joke  of  the 
day  in  Paris;  they  had  frightened  the  Emperor  by 
representing  the  dangers  and  the  ridicule  to  which  he 
exposed  himself  by  taking  his  pay  in  a  derisory  con 
cession  ;  they  had  pointed  to  the  dissatisfaction  of  the 
army,  the  grumbling  of  the  people,  the  hostile  sneers 
of  the  opposition,  our  inevitable  degradation  in  Europe ; 
and  they  had  threatened  him  with  Gambetta's  savage 
speech,  of  which  the  lobbies  were  talking.  The  Emperor, 
under  the  influence  of  their  harangues,  wrapping  him 
self  in  his  weakness,  wrote  to  Gramont  to  "make  more 
emphatic"  the  despatch  he  w&s  to  have  sent  to  Bene- 
dettL  The  interior  impulsion  of  Saint-Cloud  had  led 
to  the  seven  o'clock  despatch;  the  external  impulsion 
of  the  evening  visitors  dictated  the  letter  to  Gramont.2 
However  high  one  may  have  raised  one*s  spirit  above 
vulgar  susceptibility,  it  is  impossible  not  to  fed  treat 
ment  of  a  certain  sort.  To  have  agreed  with  the 
Emperor  at  three  o'clock  that  no  decision  should  be 
made  until  the  Council  of  the  next  day,  and  to  learn 
after  eleven  o'clock  at  night,  by  a  mere  chance,  that 

1  ["To  tell  the  truth,"  says  Gramont  (p.  1ST),  "this  letter  simply  summa 
rized,  while  staling  them  more  concisely,  our  earler  deliberations."] 

2  [See  Von  Sybel,  English  trans.,  vol.  vii  pp.  373  ff.] 


234         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

a  momentous  decision  had  been  reached  and  put  in 
execution  without  one's  being  consulted  or  even  noti 
fied;  to  find  one's  self,  when  one  arrives  to  finish  an 
interrupted  conversation,  confronted  by  an  accom 
plished  fact  of  very  great  importance  —  therein  was 
abundant  justification  for  an  explosion  of  harsh  words. 
But  I  controlled  my  feelings.  That  letter  of  the 
Emperor  —  the  first  one  marking  out  a  line  of  conduct 
for  the  Ministry  that  had  not  been  addressed  to  me 
—  caused  the  demand  of  guaranties  to  appear  to  my 
eyes,  not  as  the  prompting  of  a  colleague  forgetful  of 
the  necessity  of  ministerial  solidarity,  but  as  an  exer 
cise  of  personal  power  to  which  Gramont  had  assented 
as  a  matter  of  professional  habit.  It  was  not  to  him 
but  to  the  Emperor  that  I  proposed  to  address  my 
remonstrance. 

But  what  to  do  at  the  present  moment  ?  I  had  not 
the  power  to  demand  of  Gramont  that  he  recall  the 
seven  o'clock  despatch,  sent  in  pursuance  of  an  earlier 
order ;  nor  could  I  forbid  him  to  carry  out  the  second 
order,  which  he  had  just  received.  The  utmost  that 
I  could  have  done  would  have  been  to  ask  him  to  go 
with  me  to  the  Emperor,  to  the  end  that  we  might 
persuade  him  to  withdraw  his  commands.  If  it  had 
been  in  the  daytime,  I  should  not  have  failed  to  do 
it.  But  at  midnight  I  could  not  think  of  it.  Even  if 
I  had  succeeded  in  reaching  the  Emperor,  an$  had 
persuaded  him  to  recall  his  instructions  and  not  to 
recur  to  them,  a  large  part  of  the  night  would  have 
been  employed  in  the  process,  and  the  countermand 
would  not  have  reached  Benedetti  until  he  had  executed 
the  order.  The  thing  was  done  irrevocably;  I  had 
but  two  courses  to  choose  between;  either  to  protest 


THE  EMPEROR'S  LETTER  235 

by  resigning,  or  to  exert  myself  to  nullify  the  conse 
quences  of  that  step,  which  I  was  powerless  to  prevent.1 
Although  deeply  hurt,  I  thought  it  my  duty  first  of 
all  to  take  the  latter  course.  I  said  to  Gramont  in  a 
tone  of  deep  distress :  "  You  will  be  accused  of  hav- 

1  U  do  not  think  it  necessary  to  transcribe  the  comments  of  M,  Wel- 
seMnger  on  this  portion  of  IS Empire  Liberal.  They  may  be  found  in  the 
first  volume  of  his  book  on  the  war  on  pages  83  ff.  He  seems  to  me  both  un 
necessarily  and  unreasonably  severe  in  his  contemptuous  strictures,  especially 
in  the  argument  that  the  alleged  "  letter  of  apology  **  which  Gramont  sug 
gested  to  Werther  that  the  King  should  write,  was  in  fact  a  demand  upon  the 
King  for  guaranties  for  the  future,  and  that  M.  Ollivier  therefore,  having 
strongly  supported  that  suggestion,  was  estopped  from  objecting  to  the 
7  o'clock  despatch  to  Benedetti,  because  the  latter  was  no  more  serious  than 
the  other.  So  far  as  I  have  discovered,  no  other  serious  writer,  not  even 
Taxile  Delord,  or  Von  Sybel,  is  inclined  to  question  the  sincerity  of  M.  Oli 
vier  *s  belief  that  peace  was  assured  by  the  withdrawal  of  the  candidacy,  and 
of  his  chagrin  when  he  discovered  that  a  momentous  step  had  been  taken, 
not  only  without  consultation  with  him  or  his  colleagues,  but  in  direct  con 
travention  of  a  distinct  agreement  with  the  Emperor  and  Gramont  that 
nothing  should  be  done  before  the  Council  to  be  held  on  the  18th. 

Darimon,  Notes,  etc.,  pp.  75  ff.,  quotes  M,  OlKvier  as  saying  in  conversa 
tion,  in  1879,  that  there  was  **  a  lively  altercation  **  between  him  and  Gra 
mont,  which  ended  only  when  the  latter  agreed  to  send  a  despatch  softening 
the  earlier  one.  Also  that  "  by  entering  upon  negotiations  in  that  direction 
without  the  concurrence  of  his  colleagues,  the  Foreign  Minister  was  lacking 
in  delicacy  toward  them,  and  especially  toward  me.  Since  he  was  giving  a 
different  turn  to  the  negotiations,  he  should  have  informed  me.  The  Em 
peror  and  the  Due  de  Gramont  should  have  remembered  that  they  were  in 
the  presence  of  a  responsible  Cabinet."  Lehautcourt,  vol.  i  p.  £78.  **  But  I 
must  add,**  says  this  author, "  that  on  January  2,  the  Emperor  had  expressly 
reserved  for  himself  the  effective  presidency  of  the  Cound  and  the  appoint 
ment  of  the  ministers  of  War,  Marine  and  Foreign  Affairs."  !&&.,  n.  &. 

"  Very  late  in  the  evening  M.  Ollivier  went  to  the  Foreign  Office.  On 
learning  of  the  instructions  sent  to  Benedetti  he  concealed  neither  his  amaze 
ment,  nor  Ms  displeasure,  nor  his  anxiety.  Calmer  than  his  colleagues,  and 
unable  to  resign  himself  to  throwing  away  the  blessing  of  peace  reestablished, 

he  tried  to  soften,  at  least  in  form,  the  demands  of  Ms  government .    The 

step  was  a  wise  one  and  the  intention  meritorious ;  but  the  blow  was  struck, 
and  God  would  not  allow  anytMng  to  check  it  or  to  lessen  Its  force."  La 
Gorce,  vol.  vl  p.  268.J 


236         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

Ing  premeditated  war,  and  of  having  regarded  the 
Hohenzollern  Incident  simply  as  a  pretext  for  bringing 
It  about.  Do  not  emphasize  your  first  despatch,  as 
the  Emperor  bids  you,  but  soften  it.  Benedetti  will 
already  have  performed  his  mission  when  the  softened 
version  reaches  him;  but  in  the  Chamber  you  will 
have  In  It  an  argument  to  confirm  your  pacific 
views." 

Thereupon  I  sat  down  at  a  desk  and  wrote  the  two 
paragraphs  following :  — 

"In  order  that  we  may  be  assured  that  the  son  will 
not  disavow  his  father's  withdrawal,  and  that  he  will 
not  appear  ui  Spain  as  his  brother  did  in  Roumania, 
it  is  indispensable  that  the  King  deign  to  say  to  us 
that  he  will  not  allow  the  Prince  to  disregard  the  with 
drawal  transmitted  by  Prince  Antony. 

"Do  not  fail  to  say  to  the  King  that  we  have  no 
secret  motive,  that  we  are  not  seeking  a  pretext  for 
war,  and  that  we  desire  only  to  come  forth  with  honor 
from  a  difficulty  which  we  did  not  ourselves  create." 

The  difference  between  this  language  and  the  other 
was  considerable.  It  was  rather  a  transformation  than 
a  mere  softening;  aside  from  the  assurance  of  our 
pacific  purpose,  which  did  not  appear  in  the  first 
despatch,  it  contained  a  narrower  demand  of  guar 
anties  :  the  seven  o'clock  despatch  called  for  a  general 
guaranty  as  against  all  future  contingencies;  my  lan 
guage  limited  the  guaranty  to  the  present,  and  had  in 
view  only  the  event  of  Leopold's  not  confirming  the 

[It  is  needless  to  say  tliat  Gramont  does  not  refer  to  any  disagreement 
between  Mmself  and  Ms  colleague,  or  to  any  "softening**  of  the  first  despatch. 
He  says  simply  (p.  137} :  "The  Keeper  of  the  Seals  read  the  Emperor's 
letter,  and  we  agreed  to  send  to  Comte  Benedetti  a  second  telegram  more 
explicit  than  the  first"  And  see  Sorel,  vol.  i,  p.  139.] 


THE  EMPEROK'S  LETTER  2S7 

present  withdrawal  made  by  his  father.  Even  if  my 
friendly  counsel  should  be  mistakenly  called  collabora 
tion,  it  is  impossible  to  argue  therefrom  that  I  approved 
the  demand  that  was  hastily  despatched  without  my 
knowledge.  The  former  demand  could  not  be  accepted 
by  the  King,  whereas  it  was  almost  certain  that  he 
would  not  reject  the  second.1 

Having  written  the  above  lines,  I  rose,  and  as  I  had 
not  as  yet  clearly  discerned  wliat  course  of  action  the 
momentous  step  that  had  just  been  disclosed  to  me 
called  upon  me  to  follow,  I  took  my  leave,  perturbed 
and  anxious. 

Gramont  thought  my  advice  good,  but  he  followed 
it  only  halfway.  He  added  my  language,  which 
restricted  the  guaranty  to  the  present  case,  to  Ms 
earlier  text,  which  demanded  guaranties  for  the  future* 
and  thus  the  despatch  that  he  sent  to  Benedetti  after 
I  left  him  contained  a  contradiction  in  terms.2.  How 
ever,  as  I  had  foreseen,  the  despatch,  sent  at  11.45  P.M. 
did  not  reach  Benedetti  until  10.30  the  next  morning, 
when  he  had  already  seen  the  King. 

At  my  office  I  found  Robert  Mitchell.  He  asked  me 
what  he  should  say  as  to  Prince  Antony's  withdrawal  in 
the  Constitutionnel  the  next  morning.  As  I  had  not 

1  [The  last  two  saitences  are  not  taken  from  I?  Empire  U$>&ral.\ 

2  [As  finally  despatched,  the  second  telegram  read  thus:  "The  Emperor 
instructs  me  to  call  your  attention  to  the  fact  that  we  cannot  regard  the 
withdrawal  commmucated  to  us  by  the  Spanish  Ambassador,  which  was  not 
addressed  directly  to  us,  as  a  sufficient  response  to  the  just  demands  pre 
sented  by  us  to  the  King  of  Prussia ;  still  less  can  we  see  therein  a  guaranty 
for  the  future.**     (Then  foEows  the  first  paragraph  suggested  by  M.  OUivier 
word  for  word.)    "If  M.  de  Bismarck  comes  to  Ems,  be  good  enough  to  re 
main  there  until  summoned  to  Paris.    And  lastly  say  to  Count  Bismarck 
and  the  King,"  —  and  the  balance  of  M.  Gllivier's  second  paragraph. 
Guamont,  pp.  137, 138.] 


238         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

yet  reflected  on  the  course  I  should  follow,  I  said  nothing 
to  him  of  the  demand  of  guaranties,  and  simply  told 
him  my  own  opinion,  which  was  one  way  of  beginning 
the  struggle  with  Saint-Cloud :  "Say  that  we  are  satis 
fied,  and  that  it's  all  over." 

Mitchell,  who  supported  the  cause  of  peace  with  all 
the  vigor  of  his  wonderful  mind,  and  with  the  courage 
of  a  brave  heart,  almost  alone  amid  the  bellicose  ardor 
of  the  majority  of  Parisian  journalists,  welcomed  my 
assurance  as  a  personal  victory,  and  after  congratu 
lating  rne  cordially,  went  off  in  high  spirits  to  write 
Ms  pacific  article. 

Left  alone,  I  debated  with  myself  during  a  long 
sleepless  night  the  line  of  conduct  that  I  should  pursue, 
and  I  passed  in  review  all  the  happenings  of  the  day. 
My  first  impulse  was  to  resign. 

"You  are  too  overburdened  with  business,5'  one  of 
my  colleagues,  Parieu,  who  had  known  the  Right  at 
close  quarters  for  a  long  time,  wrote  to  me,  "to  keep 
an  eye  on  all  the  intriguing  that  is  going  on  about  you." 

In  fact,  although  I  had  not  had  time  to  watch  their 
intrigue,  I  had  divined  it.  I  was  conscious  of  being 
ill  served,  betrayed,  on  all  sides;  it  was  absolutely 
essential  to  purge  the  personnel  of  the  administration, 
and  I  had  not  the  hardness  of  heart  to  undertake  it. 
I  felt  deeply  wounded  by  this  renascence  of  the  sover 
eign's  personal  power.  I  was  weary,  and  I  wanted  to 
recover  my  breath.  The  mere  thought  of  being  forced 
to  give  the  signal  for  war  tore  my  heart ;  the  chance  to 
avoid  it  was  most  opportune,  and  I  was  violently 
tempted  to  grasp  it. 

But,  as  I  dug  deep  into  my  thoughts,  such  a  retreat 
seemed  to  me  reprehensibly  selfish.  It  would  have 


THE  EMPEROR'S  LETTER  239 

been  to  go  over  to  the  enemy  in  the  midst  of  the  battle, 
like  the  Saxons;  to  offer  myself  as  a  witness  against 
my  country's  cause ;  to  justify  Bismarck,  and  intensify 
the  arrogance  of  his  refusal  to  comply  with  our  demand ; 
to  invite  Europe  to  take  sides  against  us ;  in  a  word, 
to  destroy  the  only  hope  of  peace  that  was  still  left 
to  us.  I  had  no  doubt  as  to  what  would  happen. 
The  King  of  Prussia  would  approve  the  withdrawal  of 
the  candidacy,  but  would  refuse  any  promise  of  guar 
anties.  Immediately  on  my  resignation,  a  war  minis 
try,  which  was  all  prepared  in  the  lobby,  would  succeed 
me,  and  would  meet  the  King's  refusal  with  an  over 
bearing  insistence  from  which  war  would  inevitably 
result.  On  the  other  hand,  by  remaining  in  the  govern 
ment,  I  might  hope  to  secure  the  abandonment  of  the  de 
mand  of  guaranties,  and  persuade  the  Council  and  the 
Emperor  himself  to  accept  the  King's  refusal  and  not 
prolong  the  crisis  by  fruitless  insistence.  When  Daru 
sent  his  memorandum  without  consulting  the  Council, 
I  did  not  withdraw,  and  I  succeeded  in  emasculating 
the  memorandum.1 

I  was  certain  of  a  majority  in  the  Council;  would 
the  Chamber  follow  me  ?  Should  I  not  go  down  before 
a  coalition  of  Right  and  Lef t  ?  I  thought  not,  so  long 
as  the  Emperor  was  with  me.  In  any  event,  I  should 
fall  with  dignity,  having  refrained  from  sacrificing  the 
interests  of  my  country  to  my  personal  sensitiveness, 
however  well  justified  it  might  be.  And  so  I  did  not 

1  [The  Mmnorandum  of  April  6,  drawn  by  Comte  Daru  and  setting  forth 
the  views  of  the  government  concerning  certain  matters  connected  with  the 
supremacy  of  the  church  in  secular  affairs*  was  written  to  be  handed  to  the 
Pope  as  President  of  the  Vatican  Council,  then  in  session.  See  L*  Empire 
IMral,  vol.  xni,  pp.  182  ff . ;  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  pp.  7&-T4.  On  April  6,  Comte 
Daru  had  actually  ceased  to  belong  to  the  government.] 


240        THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

offer  my  resignation.  Thereby,  it  is  true,  I  made  myself 
officially  responsible  for  a  step  which  I  regretted.  To 
aU  appearance  I  associated  myself  with  it,  but  only  as 
the  lightning-rod  associates  itself  with  the  lightning, 
in  order  to  turn  it  aside. 


CHAPTER  XV 

THE    MOENTNG    OF    JULY    13    AT    EMS  —  THE     KING    OF 

PBUSSIA    BRUSHES    ASIDE     THE     DEMAND     OF 

GUARANTIES 

DURING  the  night  of  the  12th  and  13th  Benedettl 
received  Gramont's  seven  o'clock  despatch.  He  de 
clared  afterward  that  he  considered  the  demand  of 
guaranties  formulated  in  that  despatch  useless,  ill- 
timed,  and  hazardous.  "Were  such  guaranties  indis 
pensable,  and  what  reason  had  we  to  imagine  that  the 
King  of  Prussia,  having  once  got  clear  of  the  dispute, 
not  without  injury  to  his  prestige,  could  ever  consent 
to  go  into  it  again  ?  How  could  one  conceive  that  the 
King,  after  he  had,  in  a  communication  to  the  French 
ambassador,  approved  his  nephew's  decision,  would  be 
either  capable  or  desirous  of  authorizing  him  to  revive 
his  candidacy?"1 

That  being  BenedettFs  opinion,  he  should  not,  with 
out  remonstrance,  have  taken  a  step  of  which  he  fore 
saw  the  disastrous  results.  Was  he  constrained  to  do 
so  by  his  duties  as  ambassador?  An  ambassador  is 
not  simply  a  telephone  to  transmit  the  words  of  his 
government.  Doubtless  he  is  that,  but  he  is  much  more 
than  that  —  an  intelligencer,  an  adviser,  in  duty  bound 

1  Beaedetti,  Esmu  Di$omafagues>  p.  $85.  ["I  observed  to  M.  de  Gra- 
mont,"  Lord  Lyons  wrote  to  Graaville  on  the  ISth,  "that  I  could  hardly 
conceive  that  the  French  Government  could  really  apprehend  that  alter  a! 
that  had  occurred  Prince  Leopold  would  again  offer  himself  as  a  candidate, 
or  be  accepted  by  the  Spanish  Government  if  he  did."  Blue  Book,  pp.  £6, 27.} 

241 


242         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

to  be  on  the  alert  to  take  the  Initiative.1  Benedetti 
himself  often  practised  this  rule  opportunely;  tie  dis 
suaded  the  government  from  demanding  that  Italy 
guarantee  the  Pope's  power  in  1860,  and  procured  the 

*/  {M.  Ollivier  elaborate  this  subject  in  L9  Empire  Libfral,  vol.  xiv,  pp. 

27®~£78>  giving  several  instances  of  the  exercise  by  ambassadors  of  their 
individual  discretion.]  "There  is  no  doubt  as  to  the  strict  obligation  of  an 
ambassador  whm  he  detects  serious  inconveniences  in  the  instructions  sent 
to  him,  to  advise  his  government,  to  point  out  the  objections,  to  point  out 
the  shoals  and  quicksands  wHch  Ms  chiefs  seem  not  to  have  noticed,  but 
which  he  has  discovered,  having  scrutinized  men's  faces,  listened  to  their 
words,  and  fathomed  their  purposes.  .  .  .  Nevertheless,  if  the  command  is 
imperatively  repeated,  and  it  is  no  longer  possible  to  doubt  the  fixed  purpose 
of  Ms  government,  then  only  is  Ms  implicit  obedience  quite  free  from  blame. 
Tins  duty  of  the  ambassador  was  set  forth  with  a  great  flourish  on  a  momen- 
occasion  when  TMers  was  prime  minister  and  Guizot  his  ambassador 
at  London.  Hie  treaty  of  July  15,  1840,  relating  to  Egypt,  brutally  shut 
Prance  out  from  the  European  concert,  Thiers  was  forced  to  leave  the 
mimstiy ;  pasaonate  disputations  foiowed,  one  of  Thiers's  grievances  being 
that  Guizot  had  imperfectly  performed  his  ambassadorial  duty.  *  In  prin 
ciple  it  is  quite  true  that  the  minister  alone  is  responsible ;  it  is  quite  true 
that  when  there  is  a  division  of  opinion  between  the  minister  and  the  ambas 
sador,  the  manister*s  opimon  should  prevail ;  but  that  this  leads  to  any  such 
conseqiieBce  as  that  the  ambassador  ought  not  to  give  advice  or  even  to 
express  an  opinion  ccmcerning  the  policy  to  be  pursued,  it  is  impossible  to 
admit.  The  ambassador's  duty  is  to  keep  his  government  posted,  to  en 
lighten  it,  to  urge  it  to  act  or  not  to  act,  and  at  need  to  contradict  it.* 
Guizot  did  not  deny  TMers*s  theoretical  point  of  view ;  he  acknowledged 
that  it  is  the  ambassador's  duty  to  offer  advice.'*  [But  he  ckimed  that  he 
had  performed  that  duty.]  Speech  of  Nov.  26, 1840. 

["The  demand  of  guaranties  for  the  future  meant  war.  "What  was  only 
half  seoi  at  Saint-Cloud  through  the  mist  of  illusions,  appeared  at  Ems 
with  the  clearness  of  direct  evidence.  But  M.  Benedetti,  whose  laxity  the 
Due  de  Gramoat  had  already  reproved,  was  by  no  means  anxious  to  incur 
fresh  reproofs.  Being  a  reporter  of  news  from  day  to  day  rather  than  a 
statesman*  Ms  credit  was  not  sufficiently  assured,  or  his  intelligence  suffi 
ciently  exalted,  ©r  his  character  strong  enough,  to  venture,  even  in  view  of  a 
great  piWic  advantage,  to  discuss  Ms  instructions  or  postpone  their  exe 
cution.  Aimed  with  a  formal  command,  he,  like  a  docile  subordinate, 
considered  that  his  duty,  Ms  only  duty,  lay  in  perfect  obedience."  JM 
Gorce*  vol.  vi  p.  £&&,} 


MORNING  OP  JULY  13  AT  EMS       243 

omission  of  certain  clauses  from  the  treaty  relative 
to  the  conquest  of  Belgium,  in  1866.  He  had  remem 
bered  then  rule  in  this  very  negotiation  at  Ems:  he 
had  employed  more  temperate  language  than  that 
which  he  had  been  ordered  to  employ;  he  had  pre 
ferred  to  speak,  not  of  commands,  but  of  advice,  and 
had  refused  to  inform  the  King  of  the  sending  of  a 
messenger  by  Serrano  to  Prince  Leopold.1 

Gramont's  instructions  of  seven  o'clock  on  the  l£th 
were,  I  agree,  more  imperative  than  the  earlier  ones; 
but  they  were  more  momentous  as  well,  and,  far  from 
obviating  the  duty  of  remonstrance,  they  imposed 
that  duty  the  more  forcibly  because  the  effects  of 
an  ill-advised  step  were  likely,  in  his  opinion,  to  be 
irreparable.  "I  was  not  in  agreement  with  the  Due 
de  Gramont,"  he  wrote  in  1895.  But  he  should  not 
have  waited  so  long  before  advertising  his  disagree 
ment,  in  his  Essais  Diplomatiques  ;  he  should  have  done 
it  on  the  morning  of  July  13,  by  a  despatch  of  warn 
ing  and  remonstrance.  By  not  doing  that,  he  de 
prived  himself  of  the  right  to  censure  Gramont  and 
to  consider  himself  as  absolved  from  all  blame.  Not 
only  did  he  carry  out  his  instructions  without  sending 
a  word  of  criticism  to  Paris,  but  he  displayed  as  much 
insistence  in  carrying  them  out  as  if  they  expressed 
his  individual  convictions. 

On  the  13th,  at  the  earliest  moment,  he  called  upon 
the  aide-de-camp  on  duty,  Radziwill,  and  asked  him 
to  request  an  audience.  The  King  had  already  gone 
out.  However,  they  were  able  to  inform  him  of  the 
Ambassador's  wish,  and  he  replied  that  he  would 
receive  him  on  his  return.  While  he  was  waiting, 

1  [See  supra,  p.  156  n.  (on  p.  157)]. 


244      *  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

Benedetti,  strolling  about  in  the  park,  near  the  Springs, 
suddenly  found  himself  face  to  face  with  the  Bang 
(at  ten  minutes  after  nine). 

William  was  walking  with  his  brother,  Prince  AI- 
brecht,  followed  by  an  adjutant,  when  he  spied  Bene- 
detti  on  the  bank  of  the  Sahr,  near  the  Baths.  The 
Ambassador  was  too  courteous  to  accost  the  King; 
it  was  the  King  who  walked  toward  him.  Thosfc 
who  were  walking  there,  having  noticed  that  move 
ment,  looked  on  with  interest,  as  if  trying  to  fathom 
the  significance  of  the  meeting.  *  Thereupon  Prince 
Albrecht  and  the  adjutant  halted  a  few  steps  behind, 
to  keep  the  crowd  back  so  that  they  should  not  over 
hear  the  conversation. 

The  Bang's  face  was  bright  with  the  satisfied  ex 
pression  of  one  who  is  about  to  see  the  last  of  an  af 
fair  which  has  weighed  heavily  on  his  heart.  "The 
post  from  Sigmaringen  hasn't  arrived  yet,"  he  said, 
"but  here  is  some  good  news."  And  as  he  spoke, 
he  handed  Mm  a  supplement  of  the  Cologne  Gazette,  con 
taining  the  telegram  from  Sigmaringen.  "Thereby," 
he  added  joyfully,  "aJl  our  anxieties  and  trouble 
have  come  to  an  end."  l 

1  (M.  Offivier  cites  Von  Sybe!  (vol.  vii,  p.  387),  as  Ms  authority  for  the  inci 
dent  of  the  Cologne  Gazette  (whidb  was  first  mentioned  in  the  so-called 
"Official  Eeport  of  what  took  place  at  Ems,  prepared  under  the  direction  of 
the  King/*  see  infra,  Appendix  K) ;  but  does  not  refer  to  the  statement  of 
IfeaedettI  in  his  report  of  the  audience  (p.  378),  that  the  King  "seemed  sur 
prised"  when  he  (Benedetti)  told  Mm  of  the  step  taken  by  Prince  Antony, 
of  which  he  had  had  no  notice.  As  he  certainly  had  been  informed  of  it  by 
telegram  from  Colonel  Strantz  on  the  12th  (supra,  p.  ITS),  he  can  hardly  be 
acquitted  of  cisingenuousness  at  least.  La  Gorce  (vol.  vi,  p.  270),  mentions 
the  Cologne  incident,  and  Lehauteoiirt  (vol.  i,  p.  £8S)  says  that  the 

King  sent  the  paper  to  Benedetti  before  he  had  requested  an  audience,  and 
that  he  replied  that  he  already  had  the  news  from  Paris.] 


WILHELM  I,  GERMAN  EMPEROR 
1797-1888 


MOBNING  OF  JULY  13  AT  EMS       245 

He  expected  cordial  and  gratified  thanks.  Instead, 
Benedetti  said  to  him  in  a  tone  of  great  gravity :  — 

"A  telegram  from  the  Due  de  Gramont  informs 
me  of  the  Prince's  declination  of  the  Spanish  crown. 
The  Emperor  Napoleon  has  received  the  informa 
tion  with  satisfaction,  and  he  hopes  that  it  will  bring 
the  incident  to  a  close ;  but  he  wishes  to  obtain  from 
Your  Majesty  the  assurance  that  the  candidacy  which 
has  been  withdrawn  will  not  be  revived  in  the  future. 
And  I  ask  Your  Majesty  to  authorize  me  to  inform 
lite  Due  de  Gramont  that  you  would  on  occasion  for 
bid  the  Prince  to  put  forward  his  candidacy  anew." 

One  can  imagine  what  must  have  taken  place  in 
the  King's  mind.  Being  resolved  to  bring  the  affair 
to  a  peaceful  termination,  even  to  risk  a  rupture  with 
his  confidential  minister  and  to  subject  himself  to  the 
criticisms  of  German  public  opinion,  he  received  by 
way  of  reply  to  th£t  honest  effort  an  utterly  futile 
demand,  which,  despite  his  good-will,  it  was  impossible 
for  him  to  listen  to  without  self-degradation.  He 
showed  a  truly  royal  self-control.  With  great  firm 
ness,  but  omitting  none  of  the  outward  forms  of 
his  customary  courtesy,  he  expressed  his  surprise 
at  this  unexpected  demand,  and  explained  why  he 
rejected  it. 

"I  do  not  know  as  yet  Prince  Leopold's  decision; 
I  am  expecting  momentarily  the  message  which  will 
advise  me  thereupon.  I  cannot  therefore  give  you 
any  information,  or  authorize  you  to  transmit  to  your 
government  the  assurance  that  you  request." 

Benedetti  persisted,  urged  the  King  to  act  upon 
hypotheses,  to  assume  that  the  withdrawal  was  abso 
lute.  He  besought  him  —  thereby  admitting  a  dis- 


246         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

traction  which  lie  was  not  authorized  to  admit  —  to 
consent  as  head  of  the  family,  if  not  as  sovereign. 

The  King  said  nothing  as  to  his  approval  of  the 
Prince's  withdrawal,  and  peremptorily  refused  to 
give  any  guaranty  for  the  future.  "I  neither  can 
nor  will  make  such  an  agreement;  in  such  a  contin 
gency,  as  in  every  other,  I  must  reserve  for  myself 
entire  liberty  to  consider  the  special  circumstances. 
For  instance,  what  would  happen  if  Napoleon  him 
self  should  hereafter  consent  to  the  candidacy?  In 
that  case  should  I  be  bound  to  oppose  it?  I  have 
no  hidden  purpose,  and  this  business  has  given  me  too 
much  anxiety  for  me  not  to  desire  that  it  be  definitively 
jmt  aside.  However,  you  may  repeat  to  the  Emperor, 
your  sovereign,  what  I  now  say :  *I  know  my  cousins, 
Prince  Antony  of  Hohenzollern  and  his  son;  they 
are  honorable  men,  and  when  they  withdrew  from 
the  candidacy  which  they  had  accepted,  they  cer 
tainly  did  not  act  with  the  secret  purpose  of  renewing 
it  hereafter.'" 

Benedetti  returned  to  the  charge  a  third  time: 
"I  can  understand  that  up  to  a  certain  point  a  sover 
eign  or  his  government  would  not  be  willing  to  pledge 
the  future ;  but,  keeping  to  the  ground  on  which  the  King 
himself  has  taken  his  stand,  I  appeal  to  the  head  of 
the  Hohenzollern  family,  and  in  that  capacity  Your 
Majesty  may  assuredly  receive,  without  prejudice 
of  any  sort,  the  request  which  I  have  been  instructed 
to  make.  Our  action  is  without  mental  reservation; 
we  have  no  other  object  in  view  than  to  avert  any 
fresh  disagreement  and  to  restore  fully  the  confidence 
of  those  interests  that  have  taken  alarm." 

The  King  lost  patience  and  considered  such  per- 


MORNING  OF  JULY  13  AT  EMS       247 

tinacity  ill-placed.  Still  courteously,  but  in  a  sterner 
tone,  he  said:  "Monsieur  1'Ambassadeur,  I  have 
given  you  my  reply,  and  as  I  have  nothing  to  add  to 
it,  allow  me  to  retire." 

He  stepped  back,  bowed,  passed  through  the  crowd 
which  drew  aside  before  him,  and  returned  to  his 
quarters,  more  displeased  than  he  had  allowed  to 
appear;  in  the  narrative  he  sent  to  the  Queen,  he 
called  Benedetti  "almost  impertinent." 

Benedetti  instantly  sent  this  reply  to  Paris  by 
telegraph  (10.30).  A  few  moments  later  he  received 
Gramont's  second  despatch,  which  softened  and  nar 
rowed  the  first.  He  replied:  "I  am  expecting  that  the 
King  wiU  send  for  me  to  acquaint  me  with  the  message 
from  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern,  which  is  likely  to 
arrive  at  any  moment.  I  will  avail  myself  of  that 
opportunity  to  insist  upon  what  I  have  said  to  the 
King  this  morning,  and  to  execute  further  the  Emperor's 
command.55 1 

1  [BenedettTs  report  of  the  audience  is  printed  by  him  on  pp.  S76-S82, 
and  by  Gramont,  pp.  396-401.  Von  SybeFs  account  differs  little  from  Ben- 
edettfs  except  in  the  detail  mentioned  above.] 


CHAPTER  XVI 

THE  MOBNING  OF  JULY  13  AT  PABIS 

AT  Paris  the  18th  of  July  opened  with  Robert 
Mitchell's  article,  in  the  Conslitutionnel :  — 

"The  candidacy  of  a  German  prince  to  the  throne 
of  Spain  is  put  aside,  and  the  peace  of  Europe  will 
not  be  disturbed.  The  Emperor's  ministers  have 
spoken  clearly  and  firmly,  as  is  fitting  when  one  has 
the  honor  to  govern  a  great  nation.  They  have  been 
listened  to;  their  just  demand  has  been  satisfied. 
We  are  content.  Prince  Leopold  of  Hohenzollern 
had  accepted  the  crown  of  Spain;  Prance  declared 
that  she  would  resist  a  political  scheme  or  a  family 
arrangement  which  she  deemed  threatening  to  her 
interests,  and  the  candidacy  has  been  withdrawn. 
The  Prince  of  Hohenzollern  will  not  reign  in  Spain. 
We  asked  nothing  more;  we  welcome  this  peaceful 
solution  with  pride  —  a  great  triumph  which  has 
cost  not  a  tear  or  a  drop  of  blood/91 

I  found  the  article  to  be  in  conformity  with  my 
opinions,  and  admirable  in  its  optimistic  tone;  and 
I  went  to  Saint-Cloud,  to  the  Council,  at  nine  in 
the  morning,  resolved  to  obtain  from  my  colleagues 
official  sanction  of  what  the  intelligent  editor  had 
so  courageously  expressed. 

1  [TMs  artidb  was  K€Qfpii«d  as  expressing  M.  OOivier's  views.  La  Gorce* 
vol.  vi,  £7$;  Lehantcoiirt,  vol.  I,  pp.  S05,  806.  Th&  Cons^udAonnd,  in  the 

same  issue,  denied  ra  an  unofficial  note  that  tbeie  was  any  disagreement 
between  MM.  Gnunont  and  CUvier.    Weisdbmger,  voL  i  p.  94.] 

£43 


MORNING  OF  JULY  13  AT  PARIS      249 

Le  Boeuf,  in  common  with,  all  the  other  ministers, 
knew  nothing  of  the  despatch  of  the  demand  of  guaran 
ties.  In  the  lobby  of  the  Council  Chamber,  he  met 
the  Prince  Imperial,  attended  by  an  aide-de-canap. 
The  aide-de-camp  said  to  Mm  with  a  haughty  air: 
"It's  not  all  over  yet !  We  are  demanding  guaranties; 
we  must  have  them  ! " 

Le  Bceuf  jumped.  "Guaranties!  What  does  that 
mean  ?  What  has  happened  ?  Is  there  anything 
new?"  He  rushed  into  the  Council  Chamber  like 
a  madman,  and  spying  Gramont  and  myself  talking 
at  a  window,  demanded  in  a  wrathful  tone:  "What's 
all  this  ?  What  are  these  guaranties  ?  Has  the  quar 
rel  begun  again,  and  I  know  nothing  of  it?  Why, 
I  have  stopped  my  preparations !  You  don't  realize 
what  a  terrible  responsibility  rests  on  me !  This 
state  of  things  cannot  go  on :  I  must  know  absolutely, 
this  morning,  whether  it's  peace  or  war  ! " 

Hitherto  Le  Boeuf  had  sat  silent  at  meetings  of  the 
Council  and  had  not  advocated  war.  Indeed,  on  one 
occasion,  when  Chevandier  had  dwelt  upon  our  duty 
to  neglect  no  effort  to  preserve  peace,  Le  Boeuf  said 
to  him,  patting  his  leg,  "Don't  be  afraid  to  insist, 
that's  the  Emperor's  view."  But  on  this  day  he  en 
tered  into  the  discussion  like  a  gust  of  wind.  Gramont 
had  hardly  finished  reading  the  various  documents 
received  and  sent  since  the  last  meeting,  and  notably 
the  despatches  of  the  previous  evening,  when  Le 
Boeuf  demanded,  in  fervent  words,  the  immediate 
assembling  of  the  reserves;  after  which  he  would 
not  oppose  our  dealing  in  diplomacy  as  much  as  we 
chose.  "Every  day  that  you  force  me  to  lose,"  he  cried* 
"endangers  the  destiny  of  the  country  ! " 


250         THE  FBANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

To  summon  the  reserves  as  he  demanded  meant 
Immediate  war;  for  Prussia,  as  Benedetti  had  warned 
us,  would  have  retorted  at  once  by  the  mobilization 
of  her  army.  At  the  time  of  the  Luxembourg  affair, 
Niel,  having  sent  MaeMahon  to  Metz  to  look  after 
certain  supplies,  had  nearly  hurried  us  into  hostilities 
thereby.  The  summoning  of  the  reserves,  then,  meant 
that  war  was  inevitable.  Ought  we  to  wish  for  war  ? 
We  had  not  to  discuss  the  question  whether  it  was 
o*  was  not  advisable  to  emit  a  demand  of  guaranties 
which  was  in  the  hands  of  the  King  of  Prussia  at  that 
moment ;  we  could  not  deliberate  as  if  the  telegrams 
of  the  previous  night  had  not  been  sent,  and  as  if  the 
whole  question  were  still  open:  we  were  confronted 
fcy  an  accomplished  fact  by  which  we  were  bound, 
with  which  we  were  forced  to  reckon,  and  against 
which  there  was  no  possible  protest  open  to  us  save 
resignation.  No  one  mentioned  resigning,  nor  was 
there  a  word  of  recrimination  on  the  part  of  any 
body,  whether  from  respect  to  the  Emperor  or  because 
of  Its  futility*  There  was  but  one  practical  course 
to  follow:  -that  was,  instead  of  wasting  time  in  re- 
crimination,  to  prevent  the  unfortunate  step  that  had 
been  taken  from  producing  the  warlike  results  that  those 
who  inspired  it  had  anticipated.1 

We  gave  our  attention,  therefore,  solely  to  the  urgent 
question:  What  consequences  should  we  allow  to 
result  from  the  demand  of  guaranties  which  we  were 
powerless  to  recall?  As  yet  we  had  in  our  hands 
only  the  telegram  transmitted  by  Olozaga  contain 
ing  Prince  Antony's  withdrawal  of  the  candidacy, 
and  we  were  unaniiaously  of  opinion  that  we  could 

1  does  not  appear  in  L*Empw 


MORNING  OP  JULY  13  AT  PARIS     251 

not  regard  it  as  sufficient  so  long  as  it  was  not  ratified 
by  Prince  Leopold,  approved  by  the  King  of  Prussia, 
and  accepted  by  Spain.  If,  as  was  probable.  Prince 
Leopold  should  not  disavow  his  father's  act,  if  the 
King  should  approve,  as  he  had  agreed  to  do,  and  if 
Spain  should  conclude  to  abandon  her  candidate, 
should  we  declare  ourselves  content  even  though  the 
King  should  refuse  to  give  us  a  guaranty  for  the 
future?  Or,  on  the  contrary,  should  we  insist? 
Should  we  give  to  that  insistence  the  character  of  an 
ultimatum,  and  summon  our  reserves  in  order  to  sup 
port  our  demands?  It  was  under  this  form  alone 
that  the  question  of  peace  or  war  presented  itself. 

The  Council l  was  divided.  Mege  and  Maurice 
Richard  warmly  supported  Le  Boeuf's  demands: 
"Pere  AntoineV  withdrawal  was  not  sincere;  the 
exasperated  country  would  howl  at  us  if  we  should 
be  satisfied  with  it;  the  offence  had  come  from  the 
King  of  Prussia,  and  it  was  from  him  that  the  repara 
tion  should  come;  a  guaranty  for  the  future  was  the 
least  we  could  claim;  we  must  not  back  water,  and, 
in  order  to  be  ready  to  exact  it,  if  it  were  refused, 
it  was  essential  to  accede  to  the  marshal's  request 
and  to  order  the  summoning  of  the  reserves. 

The  Emperor  adopted  this  view;  he  repeated  the 
various  arguments  of  his  letter,  and  let  slip  in  a  bitter 
tone  the  remark:  "We  have  many  other  grievances 
against  Prussia  than  this  Hohenzollern  business." 

At  that  moment  the  discussion  was  interrupted  by 
the  arrival  of  a  letter  from  Lord  Lyons,  which  the 
Emperor  read  to  us.  It  contained  a  letter  from  Earl 

1  "The  Council  was  divided  for  the  first  and  last  time'9  L*  Empire  Ltb&ral, 
vol.  xrvv  p.  125* 


252         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

Granville,  pointing  out  the  tremendous  responsibility 
which  the  Emperor's  government  would  incur  if  it 
should  enlarge  the  ground  of  discussion  and  should 

not  declare  itself  to  be  satisfied  with  the  withdrawal. 
Referring  to  the  prompt  and  vigorous  support  that 
he  had  given  us,  he  urged  us,  in  friendly,  but  at  the 
same  time  most  pressing,  terms,  to  accept  the  solution 
offered  as  satisfactory.1 

The  discussion  was  renewed  —  dignified,  thoughtful, 
earnest.    Each  of  the  members  of  the  Council  was 

1  [Lyons  to  Granville,  July  13,  Blue  Book,  p.  £5  (No.  39)  :  "Your  Lord- 
sMp*s  telegram  dated  at  ^.30  A.M.  to-day  reached  me  at  Paris  at  half-past 
nine  o'clock  this  morning.  The  Council  of  Ministers  assembled  at  St. 
Cloud  at  0  o'clock.  It  was  impossible,  therefore,  for  me  to  execute  literally 
your  Lordship's  instruction  to  see  the  Due  de  Gramont  before  the  Council, 
and  renew,  in  the  name  of  Her  Majesty's  Government,  the  earnest  recommen 
dation  to  accept  the  .  .  .  renunciation  .  .  .  as  a  satisfactory  settlement  of 
the  whole  question.  I  embodied,  however,  the  substance  of  your  Lordship's 
telegram,  as  fast  as  possible,  in  a  letter,  which  1  sent  to  St.  Qoud  .  .  .  and 
which  was  put  into  M.  de  Gram-oat's  hand  at  the  table  at  which  he  and  the 
other  Ministers  were  still  sitting  in  Council  in  the  presence  of  the  Emperor.** 
Lyons*s  letter  to  Gramont  was  in  these  words:  "With  reference  to  our 
conversation  last  evening,  1  tHnk  it  right  not  to  lose  a  moment  in  making 
your  Es^lency  acquainted  with  the  substance  of  a  telegram  which  I  have 
just  received  from  Lord  Granvile.  His  Lordship  desires  me  to  represent 
to  the  Government  of  the  Emperor  the  immense  responsibility  it  will  incur 
if  it  enlarges  the  ground  of  quarrel  and  does  not  at  once  declare  itself  satisfied 
with  the  renunciation  of  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern.  Lord  Granvule  desires 
me  to  remind  you  that,  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  affair,  France  asked 
Her  Majesty's  Government  to  exert  their  influence,  and  that  they  did  so  at 
oace,  to  attain  the  immediate  object  —  the  withdrawal  of  the  candidature 
of  the  Prince  of  Hohenzoflem.  Her  Majesty's  Government  gave  the  aid 
that  jwas  asked  of  them  in  the  promptest  and  most  energetic  manner,  and 
allusion  was  made  to  this  in  public  by  the  French  Minister.  Lord  Granvifle 
considers,  therefore,  that  Her  Majesty's  Government  is  justified,  nay  bound, 
to  urge  the  Government  of  the  Emperor,  in  the  most  friendly  and,  at  the  same 
time,  most  pressing  manner,  to  accept  the  renunciation  of  the  Prince  a®  a 
satisfactory  settlement/*— "This  advice,  which  was  not,  followed,  was  listened 
to  with  favor,"  says  La  Gorce*  vol.  vi»  p.  274.1 


MORNING  OF  JULY  13  AT  PARIS      253 

called  upon  by  name  to  give  his  views.  I  opposed 
summoning  the  reserves  for  the  reasons  that  I  should 
have  urged  against  the  demand  of  guaranties  had  I 
been  consulted  before  it  was  sent;  and  I  maintained 
that,  even  if  the  King  should  refuse  to  give  any  sort 
of  guaranty,  as  he  was  almost  certain  to  do,  we  should 
not  insist,  but  should  declare  the  incident  closed  and 
not  summon  our  reserves  and  so  plunge  into  war  at 
the  very  moment  when  it  rested  with  us  to  assure 
peace. 

Segris  and  Chevandier  supported  me,  the  one  with 
his  noble  eloquence,  the  other  with  his  persuasive 
common  sense.  Louvet  and  Plichon  were  no  less 
urgent.  I  spoke  several  times,  repeating  the  same 
arguments  with  much  vehemence,  almost  with  violence, 
until  the  Emperor,  who  followed  the  discussion  with 
out  taking  part  in  it,  was  shaken  at  last  and  came  over 
to  my  side,  and  brought  Gramont's  concurrence  with 
him. 

We  proceeded  to  a  vote,  and  my  conclusions  were 
adopted  by  eight  votes  against  four  (the  admiral, 
the  marshal,  Mege,  and  Maurice  Richard),  and  it 
was  agreed  that  we  would  await  without  interference 
the  result  of  Benedettfs  efforts;  but  that,  if  they 
were  not  successful  in  obtaining  the  guaranties  de 
manded,  and  brought  only  the  King's  approval,  we 
would  be  content  with  that.  Thus,  without  with 
drawing  the  demand  of  guaranties,  which  was  impossi 
ble,  we  annulled  its  effect  in  advance.  The  wicked 
purpose  of  those  persons  who  had  inspired  it  was 
foiled,  and  I  congratulated  myself  on  not  having  yielded 
to  my  wounded  pride,  and  having  been  able  to  con 
tribute  to  this  peaceful  triumph. 


254         THE  ERANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

Meanwhile,  as  It  was  Impossible  for  us  to  announce 
and  justify  our  decision,  and  to  enter  upon  the  debate 
to  which  it  would  give  rise  until  we  had  received  the 
expected  replies  from  Madrid  and  Ems,  we  drew  up 
the  following  declaration,  to  be  read  from  the  trib 
une: — 

"The  Spanish  Ambassador  informed  us  officially 
yesterday  of  the  abandonment  by  the  Prince  of  Hohen- 
zollem  of  his  candidacy  for  the  throne  of  Spain;  the 
negotiations  which  are  now  in  progress  with  Prus 
sia,  and  which  ham  never  had  any  other  subject.,  are  not 
yet  at  an  end;  it  is  therefore  impossible  for  us  to 
speak  of  them  or  to  submit  to  the  Chamber  and  the 
country  to-day  a  general  statement  of  the  affair." 

This  declaration  accepted  as  official  the  communica 
tion  which  the  Emperor,  on  the  preceding  evening, 
had  very  properly  refused  to  accept  in  that  light. 
That  was  the  only  inaccuracy  that  we  ventured  upon 
in  that  crisis ;  it  was  inspired  by  our  wish  to  increase 
the  chances  of  peace,  by  giving  substance  to  Prince 
Antony's  much-discussed  act.  By  declaring  that  the 
negotiations  with  Prussia  had  no  other  subject  than 
the  Hohenzollem  candidacy,  we  brushed  aside  the 
demands  of  the  Right,  and  banished  Granville's  fear 
that  we  might  enlarge  the  ground  of  discussion;  by 
referring  to  our  demands  without  specifying  them, 
we  indicated  that  we  had  not  given  than  the  character 
of  an  ultimatum ;  our  silence  concerning  the  demand 
of  guaranties  paved  the  way  for  dropping  it. 

Suppose  that,  during  our  deliberations,  we  had 
received  a  telegram  from  Benedetti  specifying  the 
objections  which  tike  demand  of  guaranties  would 
call  forth,  and  informirig  us  that  he  would  postpone 


MORNING  OP  JULY  13  AT  PARIS      255 

presenting  it  until  we  should  repeat  our  instructions 
to  that  effect:  in  that  case,  the  Council,  instead  of 
avoiding  the  effects  of  an  accomplished  fact,  would 
have  prevented  it  from  reaching  that  stage.  As 
may  be  seen  from  this  truthful  account  of  the  first 
great  council  that  we  held  on  those  decisive  days, 
and  as  will  be  seen  even  more  clearly  soon,  in  *our 
deliberations  everything  was  well  weighed,  orderly, 
and  coherent,  and  our  decisions  varied  only  because 
events  themselves  varied.1 

1  [Gramont  lias  almost  nothing  to  say  of  tMs  Council  of  the  13th.  "The 
Council  strove  to  define  the  character  of  the  instructions  sent  to  our  Ambas 
sador,  They  did  not  constitute  an  ultimatum,  and  were  not  to  be  presented 
as  such.  .  .  .  The  demand  of  guaranties  was  susceptible  of  shading?  and 
concessions.  There  was  no  stipulation  as  to  the  form,  explicit  or  implicit, 
in  which  it  might  be  expressed,  and  in  that  respect,  the  government,  as  the 
sequel  will  prove,  was  inclined  to  almost  any  modification,  I  will  say,  even, 
to  any  compromise"  (p.  148). 

M.  Welschinger  (vol.  i,  pp.  132,  133)  asserts  that  at  this  Council  M. 
OUivier  should  have  seized  the  opportunity  to  express  his  reprobation  of  the 
extraordinary  performance  of  the  Emperor  in  forming  a  most  important 
decision  without  consulting  the  Council. 

La  Gorce  (vol.  vi,  pp.  271-273)  gives  some  details  of  this  Council,  taken 
mainly  from  the  unpublished  papers  of  two  of  the  ministers,  MM.  PKchon 
and  Louvet.  "When  the  duke  [Gramont]  had  divulged  the  fatal  demand  of 
guaranties  which  had  been  grafted  upon  the  original  demand,  a  long  silence 
followed  the  disclosure.  Several  of  the  ministers  could  not  conceal  their  ex 
cited  and  alarmed  surprise.  M.  de  Parieu  was  one — a  clear-sighted,  austere 
man,  instinctively  disposed  to  blame  a  contest  which  presented  itself  in  the 
guise  of  an  impulsive  and  hazardous  caprice.  Others  were  MM.  Plichon  and 
Louvet  —  men  of  lucid  intellect,  independent  and  staunch,  who  saw  in  war 
the  possibility  of  defeat,  in  defeat  the  imperilling  of  the  dynasty ;  and  they 
were  not  of  a  sort  to  hold  back  useful  truths.  By  their  side,  M.  Segris,  an 
excellent  soul,  but  timid  and  impressionable  to  excess,  was  really  terrified 
by  the  responsibility  of  which  he  must  bear  his  part.  It  was  from  tMs  little 
group  that  objections  came.  They  expressed  their  surprise  that,  contrary 
to  all  the  rules  of  parliamentary  government,  instructions  of  so  serious .  a 
nature  should  have  been  sent  to  Ems  without  the  previous  concurrence  of 
ministers.  They  laid  bare  the  dangers  of  this  new  exploration :  the  King 


256         THE  FEANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

The  session  at  an  end,  all  of  us  had  left  the  Council 
Chamber  and  gone  into  the  salon,  except  Segris,  Mau 
rice  Richard,  and  Parieu,  who  were  talking  in  a  corner, 

would  not  consent  to  give  the  guaranties ;  if  Count  Bismarck  wanted  war,  we 
were  supplying  Mm  with  a  pretext  to  push  his  people  into  it;  the  recent 
demands  were  of  little  profit  and  might  endanger  everything.  *It  is  war, 
probably,  almost  certainly,*  said  M.  Plichon  vehemently,  'and  who  can 
assure  us  the  victory  ?* 

**  Somewhat  disturbed  at  first  by  these  criticisms,  M.  de  Gramont  strove 
to  explain  his  extraorcinary  performance :  if  he  had  not  consulted  the  Cab 
inet,  it  was  simply  to  gain  time ;  if  he  could  have  suspected  any  differences 
of  opinion,  he  would  have  invited  a  discussion ;  the  pubHc  excitement  and  the 
smtunettt  of  the  Chambers  made  an  emphatic  policy  necessary ;  the  demand 
of  guaranties  was  no  new  demand,  but  was  simply  the  logical  sequel  of  the 
original  claim:  any  other  course  would  allow  Prussia  to  escape.  The  dis 
cussion  was  continued  for  some  time.  *  I  am  satisfied  with  the  Hohenzollern 
withdrawal,  no  matter  whence  it  comes/  said  M.  Louvet,  *on  the  single 
condition  that  it  is  certain.' 

"Throughout  the  whole  colloquy  the  Emperor  had  held  his  peace.  When 
the  discussion  was  exhausted,  he  asked  Ms  advisers  to  vote.  Was  there  good 
ground  for  being  content  with  the  withdrawal  of  the  candidacy  and  the  ap 
proval  thereof  which  the  King  would  signify  ?  Or,  on  the  other  hand,  was  it 
necessary  to  insist  on  the  demand  of  guaranties  for  the  future?  They 
proceeded  to  vote.  MM.  de  Parieu,  Plichon,  Segris,  and  Louvet  voted  in 
favor  of  resting  content  with  the  satisfaction  obtained.  The  others  ratified 
the  instructions  sent  to  Benedetti  on  the  night  before/* 

Perhaps  the  above  account  is  one  of  those  alluded  to  in  the  following 
passage  of  L'Empvre  IMral  (vol.  xiv,  pp.  £90,  291),  which  M.  OIHvier 
omitted  in  the  present  volume :  — ] 

"I  can  understand  that  those  who  read  the  imaginary  reports  of  our 
Councils  in  the  narrations  of  so-called  *wel-mformed*  historians,  regard 
us  as  frantic  madmen  who  knew  not  what  they  wanted  and  deliberated  inco- 
bercnily ;  the  incoherence  and  terror  are  not  in  our  acts,  but  in  the  narratives 
of  them  that  are  presented.  Even  what  is  true  is  denatured  because  it  is 
misplaced  chronologically,  and  I  wonder  how  a  reader  can  form  any  sort  of 
opinion  in  that  chaos,  in  which  there  is  nothing  constant  except  the  well- 
inatured  determinatioii  to  find  us  bungling  or  incapable  whatever  we  might 
do.  It  must  be  admitted,  however,  that  some  of  our  colleagues  have  con 
tributed  to  lead  the  historians  astray.  For  example,  in  accordance  with 
their  confidences,  surely  misunderstood,  tfojg  Council  of  the  ISth  has  been 
described  in  a  te%  exte«K&iary  fashion.  It  was  Plichon  and  Loravet  who 


MOENING  OP  ITJLY  13  AT  PARIS 

and  Admiral  Rigault,  who  was  standing  in  a  window 
recess.  Le  Boeuf,  who  had  followed  the  Emperor 
to  his  apartments  for  a  moment,  suddenly  rushed 
back  into  the  Council  Chamber,  wildly  excited  and 
breathing  hard,  threw  his  portfolio  on  a  little  oaken 
table  near  the  door,  and  exclaimed :  — 

"If  it  weren't  for  the  Emperor,  I  wouldn't  remain 
for  five  minutes  a  member  of  such  a  cabinet,  which 
is  endangering  the  destiny  of  the  country  by  its 
idiocies !" 

Segris  paused,  aghast,  and  Richard  went, to  him 
to  soothe  him. 

"Come,  my  dear  colleague,  — " 

Le  Boeuf  did  not  let  him  finish,  but  waved  him  aside : 

"Let  me  alone !"  and,  with  his  face  flushed  purple, 
he  entered  the  salon  whither  I  had  preceded  him, 
went  up  to  Pietri  and  Bachon,*  and  said  to  them: 
"The  summoning  of  the  reserves  was  rejected  by 
eight  to  four.  It's  a  disgrace,  and  there  is  nothing 
left  for  me  but  to  hand  in  my  resignation.  I  shall 
be  the  most  popular  man  in  France.  The  Emperor 
is  betrayed,  and" —  pointing  to  me  —  "there  is  the 
man  who  has  betrayed  him  !" 

led  the  discussion  and  urged  the  vote ;  I  am  not  even  mentioned :  I  remained 
dumb  and  gave  my  opinion  under  my  hat.  Now,  although  Louvet  and 
Pliehon  were  excellent  men,  whom  we  were  very  fond  of  and  upon  whom  we 
bestowed  our  regard,  they  had  in  our  councils  no  influence  superior  to  that 
of  any  one  of  us.  Louvet  seldom  spoke ;  PHchon  talked  more,  but  he  had  no 
special  gift  of  persuasion.  And  who  could  believe  that  I  was  present  for 
several  hours,  during  a  discussion  conceming  peace  and  war,  and  confined 
myself  to  admiring  Hichon's  speeches  ? '"  [In  the  Edairdss&m&rKts  to  vol.  xiv, 
p.  604,  M.  Ollivier  flatly  contradicts  Louvet's  statement  quoted  above  as 
to  the  form  and  result  of  the  vote.  He  says  that  if  it  had  been  taken  in 
the  alternative  form  as  alleged  by  Louvet,  his  own  vote  and  Parieu's  would 
liave  been  added  to  those  of  the  four  advocates  of  peace.] 


258         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

He  spoke  so  loud  that  Bachon  said:  "Be  care 
ful  —  M.  OUivier  will  hear  you.3* 

My  colleagues  often  blamed  that  outburst  of  the 
marshal's;  I  never  agreed  with  them.  The  sensation 
of  finding  himself  suddenly  subjected  anew,  without 
warning,  to  the  terrible  responsibility  from  which  he 
had  thought  that  he  was  delivered,  explains  the  unre 
flecting  impulses  of  a  military  spirit. 

The  news  of  our  pacific  decision  had  reached  the 
salon  where  the  Empress  and  her  suite  were  awaiting 
us  for  luncheon.  They  vied  with  one  another  in  turn 
ing  their  backs,  or  frowning  upon  us.  At  table  the 
Emperor  had  the  Prince  Imperial  on  his  right  and  the 
Empress  on  his  left.  I  sat  at  the  Empress's  left: 
she  ostentatiously  refrained  from  speaking  to  me, 
and  when  I  invited  her  to  talk,  she  barely  replied, 
with  brief  phrases,  seked  upon  a  remark  of  mine  about 
the  withdrawal  to  sneer  at  "Pere  Antoine/'  and  ended 
by  turning  her  back  on  me.  She  was  barely  polite 
when  we  took  our  leave.1 

From  Saint-Cloud  we  went  to  the  Chamber,  where 
the  dissatisfaction  of  the  court  awaited  us  in  a  more 
aggressive  form.  One  was  conscious  of  a  subdued 
quiver  of  intense  feeling  passing  over  the  benches  — 
a  sure  presage  of  a  stormy  sitting.  In  the  lobby 
Gaznbetta  accosted  Mitchell,  grasped  Mm  by  the 

1  fLefeaotarart  (vol.  vip.  ^)  rqports  an  o»  <l^  to  tlie  ^fect  iJiat  tte  Em- 

press  supported  Le  Bceuf  in  his  demand  that  the  reserves  should  be  sum 
moned.  Lord  Malmesbury  quotes  Gram-out  as  saying  to  fotTr?  in  conversation 
that  after  a  few  moments  of  discussion,  -the  Empress,  in  great  excitement, 
took  the  ioor  and  declared  vehemently  that  war  was  inevitable  if  they  had 
any  regard  for  the  honor  of  France.  She  was  at  once  supported  by  Marshal 
Le  Boeuf,  who  threw  his  portfoEo  violently  to  the  loor  and  swore  that,  if 
they  did  not  go  to  war,  he  would  not  resume  it  and  would  give  np  Ms  marshal's 
staff.  Memoirs  &f  «  p.  378J 


MORNING  OF  JULY  13  AT  PARIS      259 

coat,  and  said  angrily:  "Your  satisfaction  is  atro 
cious  ! "  An  officer  insulted  the  courageous  journal 
ist,  accusing  him  of  cowardice.  When  a  minister 
seems  to  be  in  a  strong  position,  people  vie  with 
one  another  in  speaking  to  him,  shaking  hands  with 
him,  smiling  on  him,  and  obtaining  a  word  with  Mm ; 
but  when  he  loses  strength,  there  is  equal  rivalry  in 
avoiding  him:  men  confine  themselves  to  bowing 
from  afar,  with  an  imperceptible  nod;  only  a  few 
faithful  friends  venture  to  approach  him,  perturbed 
and  questioning.  On  that  day,  people  saluted  us 
from  afar,  or  passed  us  without  stopping,  as  if  in  a 
great  hurry;  and  those  who  did  not  step  aside  shook 
our  hands  with  an  air  of  condolence. 

Gramont  went  into  the  tribune  and  read  our  declara 
tion.  Jer6me  David  inquired  from  whom  the  with 
drawal  came;  he  sought  to  reopen  the  dispute  about 
"Pere  Antoine." 

Gramont  replied:  "I  have  been  informed  by  the 
Spanish  Ambassador  that  Prince  Leopold  of  Hohen- 
zollem  has  withdrawn  his  candidacy  for  the  crown 
of  Spain.** 

"Yesterday,"  rejoined  David,  "there  was  a  report 
that  the  withdrawal  came,  not  from  the  Prince  of 
Hohenzollern,  but  from  his  father/* 

"I  am  not  called  upon  to  deal  with  rumors  that  are 
current  in  the  lobbies,"  retorted  Gramont,  diyly.1 

"That  statement,"  continued  Jer6me  David,  *cwas 
made  by  the  Keeper  of  the  Seals  publicly  in  the  lobby, 
not  only  to  deputies,  but  to  newspapermen  and  to 
all  those  who  were  near  him.** 

1  (Petard  (voi  vi,  p.  1TO)  says  of  to  reply  tliat  it  was  made  "with  a 
disdain  wKcfc  f  eU  with  fall  f  orce  on  Hue  Beeper  of  the  Scab."] 


260        THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

Gramont  made  no  reply,  and  Duvernois  Intervened. 
He  was  no  longer  unprepared,  as  on  the  previous  day. 
During  the  morning  he  had  consulted  Rouher  as  to 
the  guaranties  that  we  ought  to  demand.  Rouher 
was  in  fullest  agreement  with  him,  and  urged  him  to 
demand  disarmament.1  There  was  no  surer  way 
of  putting  a  torch  to  the  situation,  after  the  check 
to  our  efforts  in  January,  of  which  Rouher  must  have 
been  inf ormed  by  his  friend,  La  Valette.  2  To  revive 
the  question  of  disarmament  was  to  go  straight  to  war 
by  way  of  a  sharp  exchange  of  bitter  words,  as  swiftly 
as  if  we  had  demanded  the  execution  of  the  Treaty 
of  Prague,  or  a  relocation  of  the  frontier  near  the 
Rhine.  -Thus  prompted,  Duvernois,  in  a  malicious 
tone,  asked  the  Chamber  to  appoint  a  very  early  day 
for  the  discussion  of  his  interpellation. 

Without  awaiting  our  reply,  Jer6me  David,  angered 
by  his  failure  to  drag  Gramont  into  a  debate  on  "P&re 
ABtoine,"  rose  once  more,  and  in  a  sibilant  voice  read 
a  proposed  interpellation  —  a  veritable  indictment 
of  the  Cabinet :  — 

"Whereas  the  firm,  concise,  patriotic  declarations 
of  the  Ministry  at  the  session  of  July  6  were  greeted 
by  the  Chamber  and  the  country  with  favor;  and 
whereas  those  declarations  of  the  ministry  are  at 
odds  with  the  derisory  sluggishness  of  the  negotiations 
with  Prussia"  —  (Loud  murmurs  on  a  great  number  of 
benches.) — -*I  withdraw  the  word  "derisory"  if  you 
prefer*  —  (Uproar.)  —  " Whereas  those  declarations  of 

1  f*  According  to  Ms  confidences  to  M.  Knard,  Dnvemois  meant  tibat  we 
should  cai  upon  Prassk  to  disarm.  la  reality,  Ms  purpose  was  to  force 
the  Cabinet  to  resign.  Knard,  vol.  Si,  p.  48.**  Leliantcomt,  vol.  i,  p.  SOB  nj 

s  |See  the  translator's  Introduction,  mpnt,  p.  xacnrj 


MORNING  OF  JULY  13  AT  FAiilb 

the  Ministry  are  at  odds  with  the  sluggishness  of 
the  negotiations  with  Prussia,  I  ask  leave  to  inter 
pellate  the  Ministry  concerning  the  motives  of  its 
foreign  policy,  which  not  only  arouses  perturbation  in 
the  various  branches  of  public  industry,  but  also  bids 
fair  to  impair  the  national  dignity,"  *  (Exclamations 
and  commotion  of  varying  import.) 

To  no  purpose  did  he  withdraw  the  word  "derisory." 
His  game  was  already  lost,  in  face  of  the  exclamations 
and  murmurs  of  the  Right  itself.  One  cannot  com 
prehend,  unless  one  has  sat  in  a  legislative  assembly, 
those  instantaneous  impulses  which,  at  critical  moments, 
force  the  majority  from  its  course,  and  drive  it  from 
the  views  which  it  seems  to  have  adopted  with  pas 
sionate  earnestness,  into  the  diametrically  opposite 
views:  all  assemblies  are  moblike. 

Gramont,  while  protesting  against  Jer6me  David's 
language,  proposed  that  the  debate  should  be  set 
down  for  Friday  the  15th.  Clement  Duvemois  did 
not  object.  David  did  not  venture  to  intervene 
f urther.  Keratry  alone,  putting  the  seal  to  the  union 
in  process  of  formation  between  the  Right  and  a  section 
of  the  Left,  exclaimed :  "You  sent  the  King  of  Prussia 
an  ultimatum,  giving  him  three  days  in  which  to 
reply.  Those  three  days  expired  day  before  yesterday ; 
if  you  postpone  discussion  till  Friday,  you  are  playing 
into  ML  de  Bismarck's  hands,  who  is  simply  playing 
with  you.  As  a  Frenchman,  I  protest  in  the  name 
of  my  country  ! M 

1  f*The  name  of  the  interpolator,  who  was  one  of  the  leaders  of  tlie  Bight, 
tfee  bitter  phraseology  of  the  interpellation  itself,  &&  proved  that  the  foe  wm 
not  Prussia  alone,  whom  they  wished  to  %ht,  bwt  the  Cabinet,  whom  they 
dreamed  of  overtoiling/*  La  Goice,  voL  vi,  p.  276  J 


262         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

KJeratry  made  no  mistake  In  thinking  that  Bismarck 
was  playing  with  France,  but  I  do  not  know  where 
he  got  the  idea  that  we  had  given  the  King  of  Prussia 
three  days  to  reply. 

The  Assembly  passed  to  other  business  and  men's 
faces  became  smiling  once  more.  Some  members 
were  outspoken.  "You  owe  a  debt  of  gratitude/* 
they  told  us,  **to  Jerdme  David's  bungling  brutality; 
it  has  saved  you:  but  for  it  you  would  have  been 
overthrown  to-day/'  Lyons,  however,  notwithstand 
ing  our  victory,  was  not  misled  as  to  the  disposition 
of  tike  majority.  "There  was  no  very  violent  manifesta 
tion  of  opinion  in  the  Chamber,"  he  wrote  to  Gran- 
vile  on  leaving  the  hall,  "but  the  appearance  certainly 
was  that  the  war  party  were  in  the  ascendant/' l 

1  [Blue  Bmk,  p.  £ 0.    At  this  point  M.  Ollivier  omits  a  passage  of  IS  Empire 

LiMml,  relating  to  an  incident  which  seems  of  sufficient  importance  to  be 

noticed  here.]' 

"As  Gsamont  and  I  wait  out  after  the  interpellation,  we  met  Thiers 
just  going  in.  We  exchanged  a  few  brief  words ;  he  urged  us  to  be  prudent 
and  advised  us  to  invoke  tie  mediation  of  England.  In  the  inner  lobby  he 
found  himself  in  the  midst  of  the  htniy-bmiy  of  deputies .  .  .  exchanging  their 
views  in  violent  terms,  and  he  realized,  as  Lyons  did,  the  increasing  pre- 
domina&ce  of  the  war  party.  He  asked  Lowet  to  collect  some  of  his  col 
leagues  in  one  of  the  lobbies,  Five  ministers  .  .  .  went  at  once  to  the  room 
designated,  namely :  Mege,  Mamice  Richard,  Louvet,  Segris,  and  Chevandier. 
TMers  said  to  them:  *I  wanted  to  talk  with  you.  This  is  a  very  serious 
business.  Tney  want  to  drag  us  into  war,  but  the  fame  has  not  come  yet. 
Prussia,  it  is  true,  has  put  herself  seriously  in  the  wrong.  I  am  as  anxious 
as  you  to  obtain  reparation  for  the  events  of  18(56.  "Without  the  slightest 
doubt,  after  Sadowa  and  the  endless  provocations  of  Prussia,  it  is  to  be 
feared  that  vengeance  will  become  absolutely  necessary  one  day  or  another. 
Bat  the  present  moment  would  be  very  il  chosen.  We  must  be  wise  and 
await  the  hour  when  Germany,  driven  to  the  wai  by  the  inordinate  appetites 
and  the  exactions  of  Prass»»  shall  turn  to  us  as  Eberators.  To-day  we  are 
without  affiances.  Hie  cause  of  the  rapture  is  very  trivial.  Europe  wil 
hold  us  re^KmsiHe  and  it  may  be  that  we  shal  kindle  a  general  conflagra 
tion.*  lfce  COTfwa&m  was  confined  within  these  limits.  These  remarks 


MORNING  OF  JULY   13  AT  PARIS      263 

From  the  Chamber  Gramont  went  to  the  Senate. 
He_was  greeted  there  by  more  clearly  defined  demon 
strations.  Senators  vied  with  one  another  in  giving 
expression  to  their  bellicose  impatience.  "Why,  that 
is  nothing  at  all !"  came  the  cry  from  divers  directions 
after  he  had  read  his  declaration.  "It  tells  us  nothing 
about  Prussia's  attitude."  "And  what  of  article 
five  of  the  Treaty  of  Prague  ?"  added  Larabit. 

"Your  declaration  mentions  a  withdrawal/'  said 
Hubert  Delisle,  "but  does  not  tell  us  whether  it  comes 
from  the  Prince  or  his  father ;  it  does  not  say  whether 
any  sort  of  assent  thereto  has  resulted  from  the  nego 
tiations  entered  into  with  Prussia."  He  concluded  by 
alleging  the  necessity  of  offering  some  sort  of  pal 
liative  to  the  public  anxiety. 

were  made  and  repeated  slowly  and  several  times,  and  were  listened  to  with 
the  attention  due  to  the  position  of  the  speaker.  There  was  no  discussion. 

Thiers  had  no  occasion  to  overheat  himself  to  the  point  of  being  bathed  in 
sweat ;  the  interview  lasted  half  an  hour  at  most.  Not  a  word  was  said  by 
Mm  tending  to  suggest  a  suspicion  that  France  was  not  ready.  The  univer 
sal  conflagration  seemed  to  be  his  only  anxiety,  and  his  hearers  were  rather 
led  to  entertain  a  feeling  of  confidence,  if  the  conflict  was  to  be  confined  to 
Prussia  and  France,  Segris  went  out  with  Thiers.  *I  thank  you,*  he  said* 
*for  saying  what  you  did;  it  agrees  entirely  with  my  ideas.*" 

[In  his  deposition  at  the  Inquiry  concerning  the  4th  of  September,  Thiers 
testified:  "We  got  them  together  in  one  of  the  offices,  and  there  1  passed 
two  hours  talking  to  them.  Never,  I  think,  did  I  exert  myself  more  stren 
uously  to  convince  men.  I  spoke  with  extraordinary  vehemence;  I  was 
panting,  bathed  in  sweat !  I  told  those  ministers  that,  if  they  hesitated,  they 
would  destroy  the  dynasty,  which  did  not  concern  me  but  did  concern  them 
particularly,  whose  duty  it  was  to  defend  it;  but  that  they  would  also  de 
stroy  France,  which  was  much  more  serious,  and  that,  for  my  part,  I  had  no 
doubt  of  it."  M.  OHivier,  in  the  Appendix  to  vol.  xiv,  pp.  5S&-507,  quotes 
letters  from  MM.  Segris,  Maurice  Blchard  and  Lotivef,  absolutely  contra 
dicting  Thlers's  version  of  the  interview.  Welschitiger  (vol.  i,  p.  135)  tries, 
ineffectually  it  seems  to  me,  to  reconcile  them,  According  to  La  Gorce 
(voL  vi,  p.  27S),  Chevandier  and  Se^ris  had  pfomiml  M,  Tkwr$  on  the  l&k 
to  mtfport  §w  came 


264         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAE 

"There  is  no  question  here  of  palliatives!"  cried 
Bonjean;  "it's  a  question  of  the  national  dignity  I'9 

Brenler  went  even  further:  "While  maintaining 
that  the  right  of  the  Emperor  to  declare  war  cannot 
be  impugned,  I  undertake  to  prove  to  you  that  you 
ought  to  do  it." 

Gramont  refused  to  be  drawn  into  a  discussion, 
and  contented  himself  with  replying :  "We  will  go  to 
war  on  the  day  that  you  prove  that  it  is  necessary." 1 

The  older  Senators,  who  should  have  been  the  peace 
makers,  displayed  the  greatest  ardor.  "A  bad  session," 
Variant  wrote  in  his  note-book,  "and  even  worse  in 
the  Corps  Legislatif.  There  is  extreme  irritation 
against  Emile  Olivier." 

This  irritation  arose  from  the  fact  that  they  saw 
in  me  the  obstacle  to  a  war  which  they  were  determined 
to  have  at  all  hazards.2 

1  [On  the  debate  in  the  Senate,  see  Grmmont,  pp.  164-168.] 
f  [This  sentence  does  not  appear  in  U  Empire  Literal.  On  the  other  hand 
there  k  here  an  omission  of  several  paragraphs  from  the  larger  work,  voL 
xiv,  pp.  299-801,  which  emphasize  still  further  M.  OHivier's  disagreement 
with  Gwttont's  policy.] 

**  On  his  return  to  the  Foreign  Office,  Gramont  found  Lyons  there.  Hie 
English  Ambassador  expressed  his  regret  that  he  had  not  confined  himself  to 
fflmouncmg  amply  that  aB  trouble  with  Prussia  and  Spain  was  at  an  end. 
TMs  criticism  was  unjust:  Gramont  could  not  then  make  that  announce 
ment,  because  in  fact  it  was  not  true.  Gramont,  if  we  are  to  judge  by  Lyons's 
report,  was  not,  in  that  interview,  quick  to  make  the  most  of  our  advantages : 
hie  stack  to  the  fiction  of  an  official  withdrawal  of  the  candidacy,  to  the  point 
of  authorizing  Lyons  to  infer  the  personal  confirmation  by  the  son  of  Ms 
father's  withdrawal,  which  .  .  .  did  not  take  place  until  later.  It  would 
have  been  much  the  simpler  way,  speaking  to  a  keen  'and  gmuinely  loyal 
ambassador,  to  tell  him  the  truth  without  reticences  and  to  explain  to  him 
how  our  ardent  desire  not  to  inflame  the  excitement  of  men's  minds  and  not 
to  lessen  the  chances  of  accommodation  had  dedcled  us  ...  to  ascribe  an 
official  character  to  Oioaatga's  conmnmicaiioB,  although  it  would  not  have 
that  character  until  assented  to  at  Madrid ;  the  coEfidemce  and  good-will 


MORNING  OF  JULY   13  AT  PARIS      265 

of  the  English  government  would  certainly  not  have*been  weakened  thereby. 
GramoBt  was  even  less  well  inspired  when,  clinging  desperately  to  the  demand 
of  guaranties  which  the  Council  had  implicitly  disavowed,  he  invoked  the 
mediation  of  England  in  its  behalf.  He  set  forth  that  demand,  which  was 
becoming  hourly  more  incomprehensible,  in  the  following  note  which  he 
handed  to  Lyons :  *  We  ask  the  King  of  Prussia  to  forbid  the  Prince  of  Hohen- 
zollem  to  reconsider  his  decision.  If  he  does  that,  the  incident  is  closed.* 
Lyons  made  the  reply  which  sensible  men  in  all  the  comers  of  Europe  were 
addressing  to  Gramont,  that  he  had  difficulty  in  -understanding  how  the  French 
government  could  seriously  apprehend  that,  after  all  that  had  happened. 
Prince  Leopold  would  ever  offer  himself  as  a  candidate,  or  that  he  could  be 
accepted  by  the  Spanish  government.  Gramont  put  himself  still  more  at 
odds  with  the  opinion  of  the  Council  when  he  added  that  *if  the  King  refused 
to  issue  the  simple  prohibition  which  was  proposed,  France  could  only  suppose 
that  designs  hostile  to  her  were  entertained,  and  must  take  her  measures 
accordingly.'  This  was  very  Eke  an  ultimatum  and  the  Council  decided 
that  there  should  be  no  ultimatum."  [See  Lyons  to  Granvile,  July  13, 
Blue  Book,  pp.  26,  27.  Gramont  makes  no  other  reference  to  this  interview 
with  Lyons,  than  to  print  the  ktter's  despatch  to  Granvilk  side  by  side  with 
Loftus's  despatch  from  Berlin  of  the  same  date  (Blue  Book,  pp.  32,  S3),  and 
invite  the  reader  to  decide  which  of  the  two  governments  was  the  more 
warlike.  He  also  prints  in  this  connection  several  extracts  from  a  book 
published  in  England,  Who  i*  Responsible  for iheWar?  by  " Scrutator**  (some 
times  alleged  to  be  Mr.  Gladstone).  He  claims,  in  opposition  to  M.  Olivier, 
that  his  appeal  for  the  mediation  of  England  proved  dearly  enough  that  th» 
government  had  presented  no  ultimatum.  See  Gramont;  pp.  170-186.] 


EVENING  OF  JULY  13  AT  EMS        267 

« 

equally  determined  not  to  allow  this  interruption  in 
their  personal  intercourse  to  assume  an  offensive  char 
acter  either  to  France  or  to  the  Ambassador. 

This  determination  was  not  changed  by  an  incident 
which  might  well  have  tempted  a  sovereign  less  self- 
controlled  to  go  beyond  what  was  just  and  fair.  At 
8.£7  Werther's  report  of  his  interview  with  Gramont 
and  myself  had  come  into  Abeken's  hands.  Before 
mentioning  it  to  the  King,  Abeken  wished  to  consult 
the  ministers  of  the  Interior  and  Finance,  Eulenbourg 
and  Camphausen,  who  were  to  arrive  at  quarter  past 
eleven.  Their  opinion  was  against  handing  the  docu 
ment  to  the  King,  for  they  judged  that  Bismarck, 
to  whom  the  report  had  been  telegraphed,  would  be 
of  that  opinion.  They  went  to  the  King,  explained  to 
him  why  the  Chancellor  had  not  continued  Ms  journey, 
and  repeated  with  emphasis  his  advice,  already  given 
twice  by  telegraph,  to  break  off  all  relations  with 
Benedetti ;  otherwise,  to  the  serious  detriment  of  Ms 
prestige,  His  Majesty  would  be  held  responsible  for  a 
withdrawal  which  would  be  considered  a  surrender  to 
France,  and  Bismarck  would  lay  down  his  office. 

The  King  having  asked  whether  anything  had  been 
heard  from  Werther,  Abeken  said  that  a  report  had 
arrived  in  the  morning,  which  he  had  transmitted  to 
Berlin;  but  that  the  two  ministers  had  thought  that 
the  document  was  not  of  a  nature  to  be  communicated 
officially  to  His  Majesty. 

"Very  good,"  said  the  King;  "but  imagine  for  the 
moment  that  we  are  private  individuals,  and  read  It 
tome."1 

1  [La  Cproree  (vol.  vi  p.  277)  cites  as  aatJiority  for  this  detail,  Abdben, 


268         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

Werther's  report,  especially  as  read  and  interpreted 
by  Bismarck's  agents,  stirred  Mm  to  violent  wrath. 
"Was  ever  such  insolence  heard  of !"  he  wrote  to  the 
Queen.  "So  I  must  needs  appear  before  the  world 
as  a  repentant  sinner  in  an  affair  which  it  was  not  I  who 
planned  or  set  in  motion,  or  managed,  but  Prim,  and 
he  is  left  out  of  the  game !  Unfortunately  Werther 
did  not  leave  the  room  instantly  after  such  a  claim 
was  made,  and  refer  his  interlocutors  to  Bismarck. 
They  even  went  so  far  as  to  say  that  they  would  place 
the  matter  in  Benedetti's  hands.  Unhappily  one  can 
but  conclude  from  such  inexplicable  conduct,  that 
they  are  resolved  to  insult  us,  at  whatever  cost,  and 
that  the  Emperor,  in  his  own  despite,  allows  himself 
to  be  led  by  the  nose  by  these  inexpert  intriguers."  * 

When  his  first  burst  of  wrath  had  spent  itself,  the 
King  was  compelled  to  recognize  the  fact  that  there 
was  no  question  of  an  official  proposition  from  the 
French  government,,  but  simply  of  a  suggestion  of  two 
of  the  ministers  speaking  for  themselves  alone.  In 
deed,  he  might  have  reflected  that  that  very  morning 
Benedetti,  whose  instructions  were  later  than  the 
conversation  with  Werther,  had  not,  as  Werther  mis 
takenly  asserted,  received  orders  to  demand  a  letter 
of  apology.  His  wrath  therefore  was  really  directed 
against  Werther  rather  than  against  us :  by  receiving 
our  expression  of  our  wish,  the  Ambassador  had  by 
implication  admitted  that  Ms  sovereign  had  some 
thing  to  make  reparation  for,  which  fact  was 'indeed 
in  our  minds  and  in  Ms.  It  is*  the  King  had  written, 
**an  affair  wMch  I  did  not  plan  or  set  in  motion  or 
manage.5*  That  was  quite  tine.  But  it  was  no  less 

1  [Britfg  dm  Kmm>  W-OMm*  dor  Ew$e>  p.  ££6.] 


EVENING  OP  JULY  13  AT  EMS        269 

true  that  with  a  word  he  could  have  put  a  stop  to  it, 
and  he  was  the  more  blameworthy  for  not  uttering 
that  word  because  he  was  fully  awake  to  the  deplor 
able  consequences  of  the  enterprise.  He  owed  us 
some  reparation,  and  it  was  because  Werther  agreed 
with  us  that  it  was  so,  that  he  had  listened  to  us  to 
the  end.  That  is  what  wounded  the  King's  pride. 
He  wrote  to  Abeken:  "It  is  absolutely  essential, 
however,  to  telegraph  to  Werther  in  cipher  that  I 
am  indignant  at  the  Gramont-Ollivier  demand,  and 
that  I  reserve  for  myself  the  next  step."1  The  next 
step  was  never  taken,  or  the  "inexpert  intriguers" 
would  have  shown  him  that  they  respected  their  own 
dignity  too  much  to  offend  that  of  other  people, 

The  incongruities  of  Werther's  report  did  not  in 
any  wise  modify  the  King's  attitude  toward  Benedetti. 
Even  if  there  had  been  no  such  incongruities,  our 
Ambassador  would  not  have  been  received  again, 
for  it  was  the  fact  of  the  demand  of  guaranties  that 
had  offended  the  King  and  had  changed  Ms  sentiments, 
before  Bismarck's  telegram,  the  arrival  of  the  two 
Pl-ussian  ministers,  and  Werther's  report.  The  formal 
courtesy  of  sending  an  aide-de-camp  to  our  Ambassador 
was  modified  so  slightly  that  Benedetti  —  and  this 
is  a  significant  detail  —  had  no  suspicion  of  this  in 
cident.  Not  until  the  publication  of  the  diplomatic 
documents,  at  a  later  date,  did  he  learn  of  that  report 
which  he  afterward  exploited  with  so  little  sense  of 
honor.2 


1  fTbis  despatch  was  read  to  the  Kdkiistag  %  dwawlor  von 
Nov.  £8,  1892,  in  tike  course  of  Ms  coiimmmcaticw  respecting  the  Ems  de 
spatch.    LefeatitGC«rt»  vol.  i  p,  f8®  J 

*  Pee  awpm,  p.  2i6€»  n.  2;  also  Ay&ead&x  IJ 


£70'         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

At  two  o'clock  the  aide-de-camp,  Radziwill,  called 
on  Benedetti,  not  to  summon  Mm  to  the  King,  as  the 
latter  had  promised  the  day  before,  but  to  inform 

him,  that  the  expected  letter  from  Prince  Antony  had 
arrived  at  one  o'clock.  That  was  the  first  refusal 
of  an  audience.  Radziwill  told  him  that  Prince  An 
tony's  letter  informed  His  Majesty  that  Prince  Leo 
pold  had  abandoned  his  candidacy  to  the  crown  of 
Spain;  whereby  His  Majesty  regarded  the  affair  as 
settled. 

Thanking  the  King  for  this  communication,  Bene- 
detti  observed  that  he  had  constantly  requested  au 
thority  to  transmit,  together  with  the  Prince's  with 
drawal,  His  Majesty's  explicit  approval  of  that  step. 
He  said  further  that  he  had  received  a  later  despatch 
which  compelled  him  to  insist  upon  the  matter  which 
he  had  had  the  honor  to  mention  to  the  King  that 
morning;  that  he  found  himself  under  the  necessity 
of  having  a  definite  understanding  upon  those  two 
points  before  transmitting  to  his  chief  the  informa 
tion  that  His  Majesty  had  deigned  to  send  to  him* 
and  that  he  soEeited  an  audience  in  order  to  present 
once  mor€£  the  wishes  of  the  French  government. 

The  King  replied  through  his  aide-de-camp  —  this 
was  at  three  o'clock  —  that  he  had  given  his  approval 
to  the  Prince's  withdrawal  m  the  same  spirit  and  wiA 
fhe  same  purpose  as  in  the  case  of  his  assent  to  his 
candidacy,  and  that  he  authorized  him  to  transmit 
this  statement  to  Ms  government ;  as  for  the  guaranty 
for  the  future,  he  referred  to  what  he  had  said  that 
very  morning. 

This  was  a  second  refusal  of  an  audience;  but  in 
spite  of  ft,  Benedetti  insisted  upon  a  final  interview, 


EVENING  OP  JULY  13  AT  EMS        271 

"were  It  only  to  tear  His  Majesty  repeat  what  he 
had  said  to  him."  And  without  awaiting  any  further 
reply  from  the  King,  he  telegraphed  to  Gramont  that 
which  had  been  previously  brought  to  him  (3.45  P.M.).1 

Convinced  as  he  was  that  he  could  obtain  no  con 
cession,  Benedetti  should  have  understood  that  one 
does  not  annoy  a  king  solely  to  hear  him  repeat  what 
he  has  already  said  in  peremptory  fashion;  that  the 
least  insistence  to  that  end  would  be  tactless  and 
would  surely  result  in  an  unpleasant  rebuff.  To  be 
sure,  Gramont  had  instructed  him  to  insist;  but  the 
minister  could  not  take  into  account  the  exact  state 
of  the  King's  mind,  and  he  certainly  would  not  have 
repeated  the  instructions  if  he  had  been  on  the  spot. 
On  the  preceding  day  Benedetti  had  remonstrated 
against  his  chief's  over-eager  spurring ;  he  should  have 
done  it  all  the  more  freely  that  day  because  the  situa 
tion  had  become  more  serious. 

The  consequences  of  our  Ambassador's  ill-advised 
importunity  were  immediate.  The  King,  wearied 
by  such  persecution  after  repeated  refusals  couched 
in  tie  most  absolute  terms,  appealed  to  Bismarck. 
He  ordered  that  he  should  be  informed  of  the  condi 
tion  of  affairs,  and  the  whole  business  placed  in  Ms 
hands.  This  was  done  by  a  telegram  of  two  hundred 
words  from  Abeken,  despatched  to  Berlin  in  cipher 
at  twenty  minutes  to  four. 

EMBv/«If  IS,  8.40  PJI. 

His  Majesty  writes  to  me:  "Count  Benedetti 
stopped  me  on  the  promenade  to  ask  me  finally,  in 
most  urgent  terms,  to  authorize  him  to  telegraph 

1  {For  Beaedefctf  s  vsaxxas  <fesf>atdie%  see  Benecfetti,  pp.  S72»  375,  878, 
897-48BL] 


THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

forthwith  that  I  would  bind  myself  never  to  give  my 
consent  in  the  future  if  the  Hohenzollems  should 
renew  their  candidacy.  I  refused  in  rather  a  decided 
tone,  because  one  cannot  and  should  not  make  such 
agreements  for  all  time.  I  told  Mm,  naturally,  that 
I  had  as  yet  received  no  information,  and,  as  he  was 
informed  before  I  was,  both  from  Paris  and  from 
Madrid,  he  could  see  from  that  that  my  government 
was  not  interested." 

His  Majesty  afterwards  received  a  letter  from 
Prince  Charles  Antony.  As  His  Majesty  had  told 
Count  Benedetti  that  he  expected  to  hear  from  the 
Prince,  the  King  decided,  at  the  suggestion  of  Count 
Eulenbourg  and  myself,  not  to  receive  Count  Bene 
detti  again,  because  of  the  demand  referred  to  above, 
but  to  send  word  to  him  by  his  adjutant  that  His 
Majesty  had  now  received  from  the  Prince  confir 
mation  of  the  intelligence  that  the  count  had  already 
received  from  Paris,  and  that  His  Majesty  had  nothing 
further  to  say  to  the  ambassador.  His  Majesty 
refers  to  Your  Excellency  for  decision  the  question 
whether  Count  Bmedettfs  latest  demand,  and  the  refusal 
with  which  it  wm  met,  shotdd  be  communicated  at  once 
to  our  ministers,  to  foreign  nations,  and  to  the  press. 

The  King  dined  quietly,  and  then  disposed  of  Bene 
detti  by  sending  Radziwill  to  him  a  third  time  (5.30). 
The  aide-de-camp  told  him,  still  with  perfect  courtesy, 
that  the  King  "could  not  resume  the  discussion  with 
Mm  as  to  assurances  to  be  given  for  the  future;  he 
was  glad  to  give  his  full  and  unreserved  approval 
to  the  Prince's  withdrawal;  he  could  do  IM>  more." 
This  was  a  third  refusal  of  an  audience,  of  which 


EVENING  OF  JULY  13  AT  EMS       273 

Benedettl  might  very  well  Lave  spared  us  the  un 
pleasantness.1 

The  telegram  signed  by  Abeken  was  framed  in 
consultation  with  Eulenbourg  and  Camphausen,  Bis 
marck's  tools.  It  constitutes  the  first  serious  departure 
from  the  truth  as  it  is  set  forth  In  Radziwlll's  reports. 
I  have  been  agreeably  surprised  to  find  this  most 
Important  detail,  which  our  French  writers  in  their 
carelessness  have  overlooked,  taken  up  by  the  German 
historical  critics. 

"Abeken's  despatch  does  not  give  an  at  all  exact 
representation  of  what  took  place/'  says  Rathlef.  "It 
is  evidently  intended  to  make  things  out  worse  than 

1  Benedetti  has  maintained  that  RaxMwilFs  -visits  to  him  to  notify  him 
that  the  King  declined  any  further  discussion,  did  not  constitute  a  denial  of 
an  audience.  "Hie  King,"  he  says,  "did  not  refuse  to  receive  me."  And 
he  adds,  a  moment  later :  "He  did  not  receive  me,  it  is  true,  but  he  gave  as  a 
reason  that  we  had  no  occasion  to  continue  our  interview  on  the  third  point." 
(Deposition  at  the  Inquiry  concerning  the  4th  of  September.)  Whatever 
the  King's  reason  may  have  been,  as  a  matter  of  fact  he  did  not  receive  Mia. 
How  then  could  he  say  that  he  did  not  refuse  to  receive  bim  ?  Later,  in  Ms 
Esmis  Di'^omaiiyms  (p.  391),  he  repeated :  "The  Bong  did  not  dose  his  door 
to  me,  he  simply  declined  to  examine  anew  our  last  proposal.  Moreover, 
he  did  receive  me  the  next  day  at  the  railroad  station  before  Ms  departure/* 
Not  to  receive,  no  matter  for  what  reason,  a  person  who  persistently  seeks 
permission  to  talk  with  you  —  is  not  that  a  closing  of  your  door  to  him  ? 
We  shaJl  see  what  happened  on  the  14th,  but  at  this  moment  the  question 
is  whether  on  the  13th  the  King  refused  to  receive  Beoedetti.  Now,  it  k 
undisputed  that  on  that  day  the  King  closed  his  door  to  him  thrice :  at  twi 
o'clock,  at  three  o'dock,  and  at  half-past  five.  [Note  of  M.  Olivier,  in  vol 
xiv,  p.  .308.  Several  pages  (SOS-SIS)  of  the  text  of  I9 Empire  IMrtd  aw 
omitted  here,  containing  the  text  of  RadzrwilTs  report  coBcenamg  the  events 
01  July  13  and  of  the  Official  Report  of  what  took  place  at  Ems,  prepared 
under  the  direction  of  the  King,  and  a  discussion  of  the  contndictioos  be 
tween  the  two,  and  especially  between  the  former  and  the  Abeken  telegram. 
Hie  two  reports  were  appended  by  Bismarck  to  his  Circular  Note  of  July 
18,  and  aice  prikted  as  a  part  of  that  Note  in  Appendix  H  J 


274         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

they  are,  because  It  does  not  bring  out  the  friend 
liness  of  the  King's  attitude,  because  it  says  nothing 
of  the  sending  of  the  aide-de-camp  again  and  again, 
or  of  the  various  propositions  that  he  had  to  submit  ; 
and,  above  all,  because  it  gives  one  to  understand 
that  the  King  rejected  all  the  demands  of  France, 
mi  bloc,  whereas  he  agreed  to  two  out  of  three.  He 
rejected  only  the  third,  the  demand  of  guaranties,  and 
that  without  excluding  the  possibility  of  subsequent 
negotiations  at  Berlin."1 

Further,  the  telegram  stated  falsely  that  the  Ambassa 
dor  committed  the  impropriety  of  slopping  the  King  on 
the  promenade,  whereas  it  was  the  King  who  accosted 
the  Ambassador. 

This  first  perversion  of  the  truth  was  the  beginning 
of  Bismarck's  final  manoeuvre,  for  it  was  advised, 
obtained,  and  carried  out  by  his  three  agents  ;  and  the 
perversion  was  aggravated  by  conferring  upon  Bis 
marck  the  power  to  decide  "whether  Benedettfs  latest 
demand,  and  the  refusal  with  which  it  was  met,  should 
be  communicated  forthwith  to  the  ministers,  foreign 
nations,  and  the  press/' 

This  authorization  of  publicity  was  an  act  of  dip 
lomatic  disloyalty.  It  is  a  universally  admitted  rule, 
consecrated  by  unbroken  tradition,  that  so  long  as 
a  negotiation  is  in  progress,  its  various  phases  should  be 
scrupulously  kept  secret.  We  had  conformed  to  this  safe 
guarding  rale  ;  we  had  spoken  publicly  from  the  tribune, 
on  July  6,  only  because  at  Berlin  and  Madrid  they 
had  refused  to  negotiate  with  us  ;  since  the  King  had 
consented  to  negotiate  at  Ems,  we  had  refused  to  reply 


[vol.  S3t  *sDie  Emser  Depesche"],  p.  458,    See  also  SdMtze, 

Die  ff«bn2ofier». 


EVENING  OP  JULY  13  AT  EMS        275 

to  the  reiterated  questions  that  were  asked  us  In  the 
Chambers. 

The  King  had  rejected  the  demand  of  guaranties: 
that  was  his  right.  He  had  refused  to  receive  Bene- 
detti  again,  because  he  had  already  said  his  last 
word  to  him:  that  too  was  his  right.  But  all  this 
being  done,  it  was  his  bounden  duty,  before  taking 
the  public  into  his  confidence,  to  await  our  reply  to 
Ms  refusal.  If  he  had  obeyed  that  duty,  we  should 
have  taken  official  notice  of  his  refusal,  and  we  should 
have  dropped  the  demand  of  guaranties.  And  it  would 
have  meant  peace,  as  on  the  evening  of  the  12th; 
it  would  aot  have  been  so  triumphant  a  peace,  for  a  par 
tial  check  would  have  dimmed  its  brilliancy  ;  but  in  a 
certain  point  of  view  that  would  not  have  been  with 
out  its  advantage,  for  the  King  of  Prussia,  having 
thus  secured  some  alleviation  of  his  first  discomfiture, 
would  not  have  harbored  against  us  the  resentment 
bom  of  wounded  self-esteem.  By  prematurely  making 
public  his  refusal,  he  effectively  did  away  with  the 
possibility  of  a  resumption  of  the  negotiations  in 
Berlin,  which,  as  Rathlef  justly  remarks,  even  the 
language  of  the  telegram  left  open.  One  can  under 
stand  therefore  the  remark  that  Busch  attributes  to 
the  King  when  he  ordered  Abeken  to  send  his  despatch  ; 
"Now  Bismarck  will  be  satisfied  with  us/*1 


1  {Bismarck;  Some  Secret  Pages,  etc.,  EhgE&  fzaas*  voL  i>  1>.  SOS.] 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

THE    EVENING    OF    JULY    13    AT   BERLIN  —  BISMAKCK*S 

SLAP  IN  THE  FACE 

BISMABCK  tad  passed  the  day  of  the  13th  In  the  same 
frenzy  of  rage,  anxiety,  and  despair  In  which  he  had 
been  plunged  since  bis  arrival  at  Berlin,  roaring  like 
a  lion  behind  the  bars  of  Ms  cage.  The  more  he  re 
flected  upon  It,  the  more  heavily  weighted  the  episode 
seemed  to  be  with  consequences  painful  to  contem 
plate*  He  had  planned  to  be  the  trapper,  and  he  was 
trapped;  he  had  shown  his  hand  without  advantage; 
Ms  king  was  compromised ;  he  had  aroused  us  abruptly 
from  our  dreams  of  peace,  and  thenceforth  we  should 
surely  be  on  our  guard;  Europe  was  fully  informed 
as  to  the  value  of  his  reassuring  statements,  Prussia's 
prestige  in  Germany  was  diminished,  and  German 
Unity  under  tike  Prussian  sceptre  postponed.  He  cried, 
like  Shakespeare : — 

France,  I  am  bum'd  up  with  inflaming  wrath ; 
A  rage  whose  teat  hath  this  condition, 
That  nothing  can  allay,  nothing  but  blood, — 
The  blood,  and  dearest-valu'd  blood  of  France.1 

The  English  Ambassador,  Loftus,  having  called  to 
felicitate  him  on  the  passing  of  the  crisis,  Bismarck 
expressed  doubt  whether  the  withdrawal  would  settle 
the  dispute.  According  to  his  statement,  he  had 
received  that  morning  despatches  from  Bremen,  K5nigs- 
berg,  and  other  places,  expressing  strong  disapproval 

Jokm,  Act  HI,  Some  £.] 


EVENING  OF  JULY  13  AT  BERLIN    277 

of  the  Bang's  conciliatory  attitude,  and  demanding 
that  the  honor  of  the  country  be  safeguarded.  The 
English  Ambassador,  being  accustomed  to  his  ways, 
divined  what  he  had  in  mind.  "Unless,"  he  wrote, 
"some  timely  counsel,  some  friendly  hand,  can  inter 
vene  to  appease  the  irritation  between  the  two  govern 
ments,  the  breach,  in  lieu  of  being  closed  by  the  solution 
of  the  Spanish  difficulty,  is  likely  to  become  wider. 
It  is  emdent  to  me  that  Count  Bismarck  and  the  Prussian 
Ministry  regret  the  attitude  and  disposition  of  the  King 
towards  Count  Benedetti,  and  that,  in  view  of  the  public 
opinion  of  Germany,  they  feel  the  necessity  of  some 
decided  measures  to  safeguard  the  honor  of  the  nation.991 

What  should  those  decisive  measures  be?  Some 
times  Bismarck  thought  of  demanding  an  explanation 
of  our  alleged  armaments;  sometimes  he  was  for 
insisting  that  France  should  give  some  guaranty  to 
the  powers,  conceding  that  the  present  solution  of 
the  Spanish  question  was  a  satisfactory  answer  to  our 
demands,  and  that  no  further  claim  should  be  put 
forward  later.  "  We  must  find  out, "  he  said,  "  whether, 
the  Spanish  difficulty  being  out  of  the  way,  there  is 
not  some  other  mysterious  scheme  which  may  burst 
upon  us  like  a  thunder-clap."  Risum  teneatis. 

At  last  he  hit  upon  the  idea  of  addressing  a  per 
emptory  demand  to  us,  to  which  we  should  be  compelled 
to  reply  by  a  challenge,  or  be  dishonored ;  for  it  was 
of  more  importance  to  him  than  ever  that  we  should 
be  forced  to  take  the  initiative  in  the  rapture,  from 
a  diplomatic  standpoint.  He  would  have  called  upon 
us  to  retract  or  explain  Gramont*s  language  in  the 

1  [Lofte  to  Graiivile,  July  IS,  Sbul'Book,  pp.  *  38.  This  important 
<fespatdi  is  given  in  f  ul  in  Appendix  L.J 


278         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

tribune,  denouncing  it  as  "a  threat  and  an  insult 
to  the  nation  and  to  the  King."  He  could  no  longer 
"maintain  friendly  relations  with  the  Ambassador  of 
France,  after  the  language  addressed  to  Prussia  by  the 
French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  in  the  face  of 
Europe." 

This  aggressive  disposition  was  not  manifested  in 
words  alone.  The  German  press  raised  or  lowered 
its  voice  at  a  sign  from  him.  He  had  imposed  upon 
the  journals  known  to  have  official  connections  a 
sarcastic,  almost  indifferent,  placidity,  so  long  as  he 
had  believed  that  we  should  not  rid  ourselves  of  the 
Hohenzollem,  and  that  we  should  be  constrained 
to  assume  the  attitude  of  assailants.  When  he  was 
disappointed  in  that  belief,  he  unmuzzled  the  press 

1  [Loftas  to  Granviie,  July  13,  ubi  sup.] 

"These  reoinmiatioiis  were  pitiful  [adds  M.  Olivier  (vol.  xiv,  pp.  318, 
819)1  *ad  would  not  have  "withstood  discussion  before  the  public  opinion 
of  Europe.  We  should  have  said:  *You  claim  that  our  declaration  was  a 
threat,  an  insult.  Now,  when  was  it  read  from  the  tribune  ?  On  the  6th ; 
toad  not  until  the  ISth  do  you,  your  King,  your  press,  your  people,  discover 
tiiat  you  have  been  threatened,  insulted;  an  insult  makes  itself  felt  more 
quickly.  Your  King  was  outraged,  your  country  defied,  on  the  6th,  and 
you  remain  quietly  at  Varan  until  the  ISth,  and  your  sensibility  does  not 
awake  until  your  conspiracy  is  laid  bare  and  your  accomplice  has  abandoned 
you.  You  do  not  wish,  you  say,  to  be  aroused  by  a  thunderstorm;  it  is 
for  you  to  choose :  you  have  only  to  go  up  among  the  clouds  and  play  with  the 
lightning.  You  ask  us  for  guaranties.  For  what  ?  That  you  will  be  hence 
forth  loyal  and  peaceful,  attentive  to  your  own  business  and  not  to  other 
people's?  You  have  only  to  give  yourselves  that  guaranty;  we  shall  be1 
overjoyed.*  Loftus  warned  our  charg6  d'affaires,  Lesourd,  of  Bismarck's 
intentiozi&.  *If,  as  I  am  convinced/  he  said,  *the  French  government  is 
earnestly  desirous  of  peace,  let  it  not  make  parade,  in  the  tribune  at  least, 
of  the  favorable  issue  of  the  dispute ;  let  it  do  justice  to  the  King's  concilia 
tory  sprit,  aad  soothe  pubic  opinion  by  frankly  amicable  statements.  If,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  present  apprehensions  persist,  be  assured  that  war  is 
inevitable.*  (Lescmd  toGramont,  July  18.)" 


EVENING  OF  JULY  13  AT  BERLIN    279 

and  made  it  insulting.  He  Mmself  published  in  the 
Provincial  Correspondence,  an  official  newspaper,  a 
threatening  article;  he  complained,  as  we  alone  were 
justified  in  doing,  of  the  deplorable  traces  which  the 
insulting  attitude  of  France  would  leave  in  the  relations 
between  the  two  countries. 

In  the  midst  of  this  vaporing  he  received  Werther's 
report  from  Ems.  In  his  frantic  quest  of  a  means 
of  making  war  inevitable,  if  he  could  have  found  any 
plausible  ground  for  regarding  our  conversation  with 
the  Prussian  Ambassador  as  a  demand  for  a  letter  of 
apology,  he  would  have  had  right  at  his  hand  some 
thing  better  than  a  pretext  —  a  legitimate  cause  of 
war  —  and  he  would  not  have  let  it  escape  him.  But, 
with  all  his  anger,  he  was  too  much  the  statesman 
to  deem  himself  justified  m  finding  an  excuse  for  war  in 
an  interview  not  authenticated  by  him  to  whom  it  was 
attributed.  He  recalled  no  doubt  what  he  himself  had 
written  concerning  the  inaccuracy  of  ambassadors* 
reports.1 

He  telegraphed  to  Ems  not  to  show  the  report  to  the 
King  and  to  regard  it  as  not  having  arrived.  To  Wer- 
ther  himself  he  telegraphed :  "  Count  Bismarck  is  con 
vinced  that  Herr  Werther  misinterpreted  the  oral 
overtures  of  the  French  minister ;  overtures  of  that  sort 
seem  to  him  absolutely  impossible;  but  however  that 
may  be,  he  declines,  as  a  responsible  minister,  to  submit 
the  report  to  His  Majesty  as  an  cffidat  negotiation. 
If  the  French  government  has  commnnwalwm  of  that  sort 
to  make,  it  should  draft  them  i^elf  and  trammit  them 
through  the  French  Ambassador  at.BerKn" 

Thus,  at  Berlin  as  at  Ems  Werther's  report  had  not 

*  To  Ccramt  YOU  Sota,  at  Paris,  Mardi  II, 


280         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

the  slightest  Influence  on  the  negotiations  and  in  no  wise 
modified  their  progress.  Keudell,  who  was  at  Bis 
marck's  side,  so  states :  — 

"  The  report  hod  no  other  consequence  than  to  draw  down 
upon  our  representative,  in  addition  to  his  instant  dis 
missal,  a  severe  reprimand  for  his  readiness  to  become 
the  medium  of  transmission  of  so  offensive  a  proposi 
tion.  On  the  French  side,  there  was  never  any  mention 
of  the  report  in  connection  with  us" l 

Bismarck  did,  in  fact,  recall  Werther,  but  not  as  a 
means  of  informing  us  of  a  rupture,  for  Werther  was  to 
explain  Ms  departure  by  alleging  the  necessity  of  a 
water-cure;  he  recalled  him  to  punish  him,  because 
with  the  ingenuousness  of  an  honorable  man,  he  ap 
peared,  by  listening  to  our  grievances,  to  have  admitted 
their  justice.2 

1  KeudeB,  p.  405. 

2  ["  With  regard  to  the  departure  of  our  Ambassador,  I  only  remark,  as 

was  officially  known  to  the  French  Cabinet,  that  it  was  no  recall,  but  a  leave 
of  absence  requested  by  the  Ambassador  for  personal  reasons,"  etc.  Bis 
marck  to.  Bemstorff  (commimicated  to  Earl  Granville),  July  18.  See  Ap 
pendix  BL  —  "He  (Bismarck),  however,  sent  Werther  orders  to  quit  Paris  at 
once,  directing  Mm  to'  take  leave  of  absence  on  the  pretext  of  ill  health ;  at 
the  same  time  he  delivered  a  severe  rebuke  to  the  Ambassador  for  the  manner 
in  which  he  had  candaetecl  matters."  Von  Sybei,  English  trans.,  vol.  vii, 
p.  S§3. —  "At  this  juncture,"  says  Gramont,  writing  of  the  14th  of  July, 
"the  Prussian  Ambassador  was  announced  and  entered  my  private  office. 
His  face  bore  visible  traces  of  the  anxiety  which  obsessed  us  both.  Our 
interview  was  brief;  he  informed  me  without  comment  that  his  government 
tad  reproved  Mm  for  the  way  in  which  he  had  received  our  suggestions  at 
our  last  interview,  on  the  12th,  and  that  ke  had  received  orders  to  take  a 
furlough.  Consequently  he  had  come  to  advise  me  of  his  immediate  depar 
ture.**  And,  after  quoting  the  above  passage  of  Count  Bismarck's  circular 
letter,  he  adds:  "If  it  WBi^stffl  possible  to  be  surprised  at  the  lack  of  restramt 
with  wMcii  M.  de  Bismarck  substitutes  for  the  truth  fables  which  momen 
tarily  serve  his  purposes*  one  would  be  genuinely  stupefied  oa  reading  these 
Hues."  Granioiit,  pp.,  £0$,  900.] 


EVENING  OF  JULY  13  AT  BERLIN    281 

Realizing  that  he  had  nothing  to  expect  from  Paris, 
Bismarck  kept  his  ears  open  in  the  direction  of  Ems. 
Thence  it  was  that  the  pretext  for  kindling  the  war  that 
he  had  determined  on  was  destined  to  come.  How  had 
the  King  borne  himself  toward  Benedetti  after  the  ful 
minating  telegrams  with  which  he,  Bismarck,  had  as 
sailed  him  ? 

Roon  and  Moltke  were  at  Berlin.  Roon  had  hast 
ened  thither  on  the  10th;  Moltke  arrived  on  the  12th. 
On  the  following  day,  the  13th,  Bismarck  invited  them 
to  dinner,  that  they  might  be  with  him  to  receive  the 
decisive  news.  The  first  news  came  from  Paris;  it 
was  the  report  of  the  session  at  which  Gramont  had  read 
our  declaration  of  the  13th.  The  interpellation  had 
come  to  an  end  at  half -past  two,  and  the  Prussian  em 
bassy  and  the  various  news-agencies  had  immediately 
telegraphed  the  report  in  every  direction.  As  it  was 
short  and  not  in  cipher,  there  was  no  time  lost  in  trans 
lating  it,  and  it  reached  aU  parts  of  Europe  during  the 
afternoon.  Bismarck,  with  his  swift  perception,  real 
ized  its  full  significance :  we  did  not  propose  to  ram  any 
new  question  —  consequently,  no  recriminations  con 
cerning  the  disregard  of  the  treaty  of  Prague,  no  reser 
vations  against  German  Unity,  nothing,  in  a  word,  to 
arouse  the  national  sensitiveness ;  our  mild  words  about 
the  negotiations  then  in  progress,  when  placed  side  by 
side  with  the  emphatic  tone  of  our  ultimatum  of  July  6, 
left  no  doubt  that  we  were  ready  to  settle,  said  to  aban 
don  the  only  one  of  our  demands  that  was  of  a  nature 
to  lead  to  war  —  that  of  guaranties  for  the  future. 

Thus  it  was  still  peace,  as  in  the  evening  of  the  12th. 
The  war  that  Bismarck  needed  eluded  him  once  more. 
His  wrath  became  a  sullen  depression.  It  was  in  that 


282         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

frame  of  mind  that  Roon  and  Moltke  found  him.  He 
repeated  to  them  his  purpose  to  retire ;  it  seemed  plain 
to  him  that  the  King  had  allowed  himself  to  be  hood 
winked  ;  the  Hohenzollern  withdrawal  would  soon  be  a 
fact,  sanctioned  by  His  Majesty ;  he  could  not  take  part 
in  such  a  back-down. 

Roon  and  Moltke  fought  against  his  resolution. 

"Your  position,"  he  replied,  "is  not  like  mine :  being 
ministers  in  charge  of  special  departments,  you  are  not 
responsible  for  what  is  about  to  happen ;  but  I,  as  Minis 
ter  for  Foreign  Affairs,  cannot  assume  the  responsibility 
of  a  peace  without  honor.  The  halo  that  Prussia 
won  in  1866  will  fall  from  her  brow  if  once  the  notion 
gains  currency  among  the  people  that  she  'eats  crow.'" 

They  seated  themselves  at  table  in  melancholy  mood. 
At  half-past  six  Abeken's  despatch  arrived.  Bismarck 
read  that  unctuous  document,  which,  to  be  sure,  was 
not  without  venom,  but  which  laid  no  stress  on  any  so- 
called  impertinence,  and,  above  all,  by  leaving  the  door 
of  negotiation  still  ajar,  did  not  drive  France  into  the 
necessity  of  declaring  war.  The  two  generals  were 
thunderstaidk  by  what  they  heard,  to  the  point  of  for 
getting  to  eat  and  drink. 

Bismarck  read  and  re-read  the  despatch ;  then,  turn 
ing  to  Moltke,  he  asked  abruptly*  "Have  we  any  inter 
est  in  postponing  the  conflict  ?  " 

"  We  have  everything  to  gain  by  hastening  it,"  Moltke 
replied.  "Even  if  we  should  not  be  strong  enough  at 
the  outset  to  protect  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  the 
speed  with  which  we  could  take  the  field  would  be  much 
superior  to  that  of  France.5* 

With  that  Bismarck  rose,  tools,  his  seat  at  a  small 
table,  and  edited  Afoeken's  despatch  in  this  wise :  — 


PRINCE  VOK  BISMARCK 
1815-1898 


EVENING  OF  Jt'LY  13  AT  BERHN    283 

"When  the  news  of  the  withdrawal  of  the  hereditary 
Prince  of  Hohenzollem  was  transmitted  by  the  Spanish 
government  to  the  French  government,  the  French 
Ambassador  requested  His  Majesty  the  King,  at  Ems, 
to  authorize  him  to  telegraph  to  Paris  that  His  Majesty 
would  bind  himself  for  all  time  never  again  to  give  Ms 
sanction  if  the  Hohenzollems  should  renew  their  can 
didacy.  Thereupon  His  Majesty  refused  to  receive  the 
French  Ambassador  again,  and  sent  the  aide-de-camp 
on  duty  to  say  that  His  Majesty  had  nothing  more  to 
communicate  to  him."  1 

This  language  is  a  falsification2  of  a  document  that 
was  in  itself  falsified.  Abeken's  falsification  was  very 
serious,  for  it  declared,  as  Rathlef  remarks,  that  Bene- 
dettl  had  made  but  a  single  request,  that  of  guaranties 
for  the  future,  and  suppressed  his  other  request*  that 
of  approval  of  the  actual  withdrawal.  But  for  this 
suppression,  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  say  the 
King  refused  the  request  of  France ;  for  of  the  two  that 
were  put  before  him,  he  had  agreed  to  one. 

But  Abeken's  despatch  did  mention  the  exchange  of 
pourparlers;  Bismarck  omitted  all  mention  of  them; 

1  [It  is  to  be  understood  that  this  account  of  the  coof  ecence  between  the 
tibree  great  men  of  Prussia  is  taken  principally  from  Bismwifs  own 
disdosuies  of  later  years,  as  made  pubic  m  the  various  woife  of  Dr.  Bank 
and  in  Ms  own  Refaction*  and  Reminwcmem  (&i£mkm  vtnd 

In  Biman-'dc:  Some  Secret  Papen,  etc.,  vol.  i,  p.  3©4,  Brack  quotes  tie 
Chancellor,  on  Abeken's  authority,  as  saying  (in  Dec.,  187%) ;  **  As  I  react  it 
{Abeken's  telegram]  to  them  —  it  must  tore  beea  two-  hundred 

words  —  tEey  wem  bota  actually  terfified,  ®mA  MoltfceV  wkfe  beiag  sud 
denly  changed.    It  looked  a®  if  mr  ^o^  &mm@ms  under 
alLn    See  B^forfbiw  and  Eemini»em0c*9  voL  i,"p|>.  9$  ff.J 

2  FaMfimfvmy  accorfing  to  the  Bictlcteaiy  of  tbe  Academy :  Altering  wltfe 
ittbeDt  to  decme.    **I  imre  iafcm          ,not  %>  Msify  &e  meaaimg  of  a  sin 
passage/*    (FASCAJL.)  ,   {Ncfte  01  ML  i  'Gliwr  in  YO!  xiv,  p. 


THE  FKAJNUU-Fl-iUbbiAix 

he  Ignored  the  King's  discussion  with  Benedetti  on  the 
Promenade  at  the  Springs,  the  notification  to  the  Am 
bassador  of  an  expected  letter  from  the  Hohenzollerns, 
the  sending  of  the  aide-de-camp  to  advise  him  of  the 
arrival  of  that  letter ;  naught  remained  save  a  request 
and  a  brutal  refusal,  with  nothing  between,  without 
explanation  or  discussion.  Abeken's  muddled  despatch 
becomes  harsh,  brutal,  stinging,  arrogant,  and,  as  Nigra 
happily  phrases  it,  discourteously  laconic.  The  shell 
sent  from  Ems  had  only  a  fuse  calculated  to  explode 
without  effect ;  Bismarck  supplied  it  with  an  excellent 
one  wMch  would  cause  it  to  burst  with  a  thunderous  roar 
as  soon  as  it  should  touch  the  ground. 

If  Bismarck's  manipulation  of  the  despatch  had  been 
confined  to  these  suppressions  and  to  this  abridgment 
of  its  language,  the  charge  of  having  falsified  Abeken's 
text  would  be  abundantly  justified.  But  he  did  more : 
in  Abefcen's  despatch  there  was,  to  be  sure,  a  reference 
to  Benedetti's  having  been  denied  an  audience;  but 
that  fact  was  not  put  forward  prominently ;  it  was  men 
tioned  by  the  way,  as  the  natural  consequence  of  the  dis 
cussion  being  exhausted.  Bismarck  puts  it  forward  as 
being  the  essential  part,  or,  to  speak  more  accurately, 
the  whole  of  the  despatch ;  the  Ambassador  was  not 
received,  not  because,  the  King  having  said  to  him  all 
that  there  was  to  say,  there  was  nothing  left  for  discus 
sion,  but  because  he  did  not  choose  to  say  to  him  any 
thing  whatsoever.  Bismarck's  despatch  did  not  lie  in 
stating  that  the  King  had  refused  to  receive  Benedetti ; 
it  placed  a  false  interpretation  upon  a  veritable  fact, 
and  transformed  a  perfectly  natural  act  into  a  premedi 
tated  insult;  so  that  the  despatch  may  be  summarized 
in  a  word,  "Hie  King  of  Prussia  has  refused  to  receive 
the  French  Ambassador." 


EVENING  OF  JULY  13  AT  BERLIN    285 

Finally,  it  contained  a  third  source  of  aggravation 
more  wicked  than  the  others.  According  to  Abeken's 
despatch,  the  King  had  authorized,  but  had  not  ordered, 
him  to  make  public  —  what  ?  Weigh  well  the  words : 
Benedettfs  latest  demand,  and  the  refusal  with  which 
it  was  met.  He  had  in  no  wise  authorized  the  making 
public  of  the  refusal  to  receive  the  Ambassador ;  that  is 
to  say,  the  making  known  to  the  world  the  fact  that  he 
had  closed  his  door  to  the  representative  of  one  of  his 
royal  brethren ;  he  had  not  carried  to  that  point  Ms 
submission  to  his  Chancellor's  behests.  But  Bismarck 
went  a  step  further,  and  took  especial  care  to  publish  the 
very  thing  that  he  had  no  warrant  to  disclose. 

The  telegram  being  thus  doctored  and  its  publication 
decided  upon,  there  arose  the  question  of  the  method  of 
discharging  it  so  that  it  might  produce  a  terrific  effect, 
Bismarck  explained  to  his  guests  how  he  proposed  to 
proceed :  — 

"Success  depends  above  all  on  the  impression  which 
the  outbreak  of  war  will  cause  among  our  people,  and 
among  other  peoples.  It  is  essential  that  we  should  be 
the  party  attacked.  Gallic  presumption  and  excitability 
will  confer  that  r61e  on  us  if  we  announce  pvblicJy  to 
Europe,  so  far  as  possible  without  the  int&rf&rmce  of  -Om 
Reichstag,  that  we  accept  wikhoitt  apprehension  the  public 
insults  of  France." 1 

Why  attach  so  much  importance  to  having  the  refusal 
of  £«i  audience  made  known,  not  in  a  discussion  in  the 
Reichstag,  but  by  making  an  extraordinary  communi 
cation  to  Europe?  For  the  reason  that  the  enforced 
pubEcity  resulting  from  the  inevitable  explanations  of  a 

ant?  Remmsmmceg,  Bngfuk  trans,,  vol.  ii»  p.  101.    I  bare 
M.  Ollvier's  French  Trmmm*  font  tfae  smse  is  unchanged*] 


286         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAE 

minister  from  the  tribune  has  not  the  Insulting  character 
of  the  voluntary  publicity  resulting  from  a  communica 
tion  unusual  in  form. 

It  was  not  enough  for  the  Chancellor  to  strike  us : 
he  proposed  that  the  blow  should  arouse  such  an  echo 
that  it  would  be  impossible  for  us  to  avoid  returning 
it.  "  If  now,"  he  said,  "  availing  myself  of  His  Majesty's 
permission,  I  send  it  at  once  to  the  newspapers,  and  if, 
in  addition,  I  telegraph  it  to  all  our  embassies,  it  will  be 
known  in  Paris  before  midnight ;  not  only  by  what  it 
says,  bid  also  by  the  way  in  which  it  will  have  been  drcu- 
lated,  it  will  haw  the  effect  over  yonder  of  a  red  flag  on  the 
Gallic  bulL  We  must  fight,  unless  we  choose  to  have  the 
appearance  of  having  been  whipped  without  so  much  as 
a  battle/" l 

These  arguments  banished  the  gloom  of  the  two  gener 
als,  and  imparted  to  them  a  lightness  of  heart  which  sur 
prised  even  Bismarck.  They  returned  to  their  eating 
and  drinking. 

"The  God  of  the  old  days  still  lives/*  said  Roon,  "and 
lie  will  not  let  us  back  down  in  dishonor/* 

"Just  now/*  cried  Moltke,  "I  thought  I  heard 
the  drums  beating  the  retreat  —  now  it's  a  fanfare. 
If,**  he  added,  looking  joyously  upward  and  striking 
Ms  breast,  "I  am  permitted  to  live  long  enough  to  lead 
our  armies  in  such  a  war,  then  let  the  devil  fly  away  with 
this  old  carcass !  ** 2 

1  and  Remimwxmcm,  vol.  ii,  p.  101. 

*  It  has  been  very  distasteful  to  the  German  Qmuvinists  to  describe  this 
scene*  and  the  explanations  of  it  which  are  given,  notably  by  Qnckeii,  to 
lessen  Its  importance  and  magnitude,  are  so  ridiculous  that  they  do  not  deserve 
discussion,  Otfceis  have  conceived  the  Idea  of  maintaining  that  this  scene,. 
described  so  often  by  Bismarck  before  it  was  written  down  m  hi®  memoirs, 
was  a  pure  inve&tloB  <m  Ins  part,  and  for  proof  thereof  they  have  claimed 


EVENING  OP  JULY  13  AT  BEBIIN    287 

The  judgment  expressed  by  the  two  generals  concern 
ing  the  meaning,  the  purpose,  and  the  effect  of  the  fal 
sified  despatch  has  been  confirmed  since  by  all  honor 
able  and  sincere  Germans.  Even  Sybel  himself  ceases 
momentarily  to  be  unconquerably  partial,  and  sum 
marizes  with  the  arrogance  of  a  victor,  but  with  the 
accuracy  of  an  expert  historian,  this  machination,  which 
was  quite  worthy  of  that  artificer  of  intrigues  who,  in 
1866,  advised  the  Italians  to  cause  themselves  to  be 
attacked  by  a  body  of  hired  Croatians.1 

"By  the  utmost  concentration  in  form  and  the 
omission  of  decisive  circumstances,  the  meaning  of  the 
despatch  was  completely  transformed.  The  publication 
doubled  the  gravity  of  the  refusal  of  an  audience;  its 
conciseness  of  phrase  multiplied  it  tenfold ;  it  was  for 
the  French  now  to  consider  whether  they  preferred  to 
swallow  the  bitter  pill  or  to  put  their  threats  in  execu 
tion."  2 

"The  despatch,"  says  Eathlef,  "appears  as  a  report 
of  what  took  place  at  Ems,  and  as  a  historical  document 
it  is  calculated  to  give  a  false  idea  thereof,  or  to  arouse  a 
suspicion  that  the  Ambassador  was  perhaps  subjected 
to  something  that  he  was  not  subjected  to,  and  that  the 
King  perhaps  acted  as  he  did  not  act  and  as,  indeed,  lie 
could  not  act ;  it  may  lead  one  to  regard  what  was  in 

that  a  certain  letter  establsned  the  feet  that  on  the  13th  he  (fined  with  Ms 
sister,  Madame  von  Arnim.  M.  Paul  Matter  observes  that  in  order  to  assign 
that  letter  to  the  l&th  we  nrast  agjree  that  Bismarck  passed  part  of  the  day 
with  Eoon  on  Ms  estate  at  Gfteigotai»  an  hour  from  Berfin,  which  seems 
impossible  in  view  of  the  chancellors  numerous  interviews  —  with  Gort- 
chakoff,  Loftus,  etc. — and  the  constant  exchange  of  telegrams  between 
Ems  and  BeiKa.  (Note  of  M.  OBMeac  m  vol.  xrr,  p.  888  J 

1  General  Al<aso  La  Marmora,  A  iMeM^ffM§M  (Urn  j» put  & te*)« 

31  Von  Sybel  pSngKsi  tttooi  vol  vn»  pp.  806;  887. 


288        THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

fact  a  courteous  but  firm  reply  as  a  brutal  dismissal, 
and  to  believe  that  the  King  is  the  sort  of  man  to  reply 
to  a  suggestion  that  annoys  him  by  an  insult,  which  has 
never  been  the  case.  What  is  most  unpleasant,  and  in 
deed  in  my  judgment  most  distressing  for  us  Germans 
in  the  Ems  despatch  is  in  the  first  place  the  false  aspect 
of  affairs  that  it  suggests.  But  the  retort  which  that 
despatch  contained  had  in  view  not  only  the  provocations 
of  the  French  of  that  day :  it  was  the  retort  to  all  the 
irritations  that  Bismarck  had  been  subjected  to  on  the 
part  of  France  during  his  ministry  —  it  was  the  final 
rejoinder  to  the  acts  of  the  French  for  two  hundred  years 
past.  It  is  altogether  unjust  not  to  recognize  the  fact 
that  the  formal  and  official  promulgation  of  such  in 
telligence,  which,  for  the  very  reason  that  it  did  not  give 
an  exact  portrayal  of  the  facts,  was  looked  upon  and  ac 
claimed  as  a  ckattmge  to  France,  constituted  a  veritable 
insult  to  that  country.  Bismarck  would  certainly 
have  regarded  such  a  course  of  conduct  with  respect  to 
Germany  as  an  insult.  —  The  German  narratives  of  these 
events  fail  entirely  to  admit  this  offence  on  our  part. 
Therein  they  are  unfair."  l 

Karl  Bleibtrai  judges  these  facts  with  praiseworthy 
fairness;  he  declares  without  circumlocution  that  the 
telegram  unquestionably  contained  "a  premeditated 
public  insult,  a  public  outrage" ;  he  even  goes  so  far 
as  to  say  that  it  unquestionably  constituted  an  unpardon 
able  offeme? 

1  [vol.  Ii  "Die  Bmser  Depescbe"}*  P-  456. 

*  Wiife  seeBag  to  tone  down  the  severity  of  UK  judgment  pronoimeed 

by  ban  op«  tibis  act  of  Bismarck's,  in  the  article  from  tie  JcMwoh  quoted 
above  (because  ®£  the  e»iteneat  caused  in  'Germany  by  that  judgment  and 
the  eonseqiKol  attacks  open  Mm),  Georg  KatHef  again  acknowledged  in  a 
new  worfe,  putted  ia  at  Docpot.  ca  IHtwdfr  in  ffee  Pmwd 


EVENING  OF  JULY  13  AT  BERLIN    289 

"That  despatch,"  says  Erich  Marcks,  "completely 
changed  the  color  of  the  occurrences  at  Ems:  no  ex 
change  of  intelligence  and  of  declarations,  as  Radziwil 
had  transmitted  them,  was  mentioned  therein;  it  was 
simply  a  general  refusal,  and  of  biting  brevity.  Ac 
cording  to  that  despatch,  the  King  did  what  Bismarck 
and  his  friends  would  have  done  in  his  place :  he  passed, 
without  transition,  from  the  defensive  to  the  least  writ- 
jnd&us  and  most  irrevocable  form  of  the  offensive.  It  was 
a  slap  in  the  face  to  France,  the  consequence  of  which 
would  be  to  force  her  to  declare  war." i 

It  is  this  opinion  from  which  I  have  borrowed  the 
phrase,  "slap  in  the  face,"  at  the  head  of  this  chapter. 

Bismarck  at  once  put  his  plan  in  execution.  He  sent 
the  telegram  to  his  unofficial  organ,  the  North  German 
Gazette?  to  be  published  at  once  in  a  special  supplement, 
and  to  be  posted  on  the  hoardings.  At  nine  o'clock  in 
the  evening,  great  numbers  of  newsboys  appeared  IB 
the  streets  and  the  most  frequented  resorts  of  Berlin, 

'preceding  the  Franco-German  War,  that  the  opinion  that  the  Ems  despatch 
contained  a  counter-provocation,  a  counter-insult  to  France,  albeit  It  was 
justified  and  well-deserved,  was  becoming  more  and  more  general  in  Ger 
many.  Erich  Marcks,  Kammel,  Horst-Kohl  himself, so  characterize  It,  «ad 
that  opinion  can  but  be  confirmed  by  the  fact  that,  in  Ms  R^ctiofuaadRgm^ 
inwcmevs,  Bismarck  speaks  of  the  despatch  as  "a  red  flag  waved  before  the 
eyes  of  the  French  bull/*  [Note  of  M.  Olivier  in  vol.  xiv,  p.  S$l  J 

1  Erich  Marcks,  Kau&r  WUhdm,  vol.  i  p-  280.    f  A  number  of  commaats 
by  German  writers,  of  even  greater  severity,  are  quoted  by  WeteMnger, 
vol.  i,  pp.  121  ff.} 

2  Ik  a  speech  on  Feb.  &,  1876  [Bismarci:  sa£4 :]  "It  is  natural  that  govern 
ments,  for  certain  things  which  they  db  not  choose  to  say  in  their  official 
garottes,  should  reserve  as  much  Hank  'SfMce  in  some  friendly  sheet  as  they 
require  to  express  their  opinion  if*occamon  requires.    It  was  as  an  auxiliary 
of  this  sort  that  at  one  time  the  Nor^k  German  Gme&e  was  obligingly  placed 
by  Its  owners  at  tie  disposal  of  the  fovmnaemt."    [Note  of  M.  Olivier,  in 
wL  xiv,  p*  SS2  J 


2&0         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

distributing  free  the  supplement  giving  the  telegram. 
I  have  before  me  the  placard  which  contained  that  fatal 
news,  and  which  was  speedily  pasted  on  the  windows  of 
the  cafes,  and  read  and  commented  on  by  numerous 
groups.  An  enormous  crowd  thronged  the  broad  Unter 
den  linden  until  midnight.  "The  first  sentiment," 
says  an  eye-witness,  "was  a  profound  amazement,  a 
painful  surprise,  and  the  thunderstruck  attitude  of  the 
crowd  reminded  me  of  the  vast  mute  grief  of  which  the 
poet  of  the  PharsaMa  speaks :  *Exstat  sine  voce  dolor  !* 
I  conf  ess  that  there  was  something  heartrending  to  me 
in  the  spectacle  of  that  great  throng  surprised  and 
alarmed  by  news  which  presaged  bloody  battles  and 
shocking  disasters."  1 

Another  witness  was  especially  impressed  by  the 
warlike  impulses  of  the  crowd.  "The  effect,"  says  the 
Times  correspondent,  "which  that  bit  of  printed  paper 
produced  upon  the  city  was  terrible.  It  was  hailed 
by  old  and  young  alike ;  it  was  welcome  to  fathers  of 
families  and  to  beardless  youths;  it  was  read  and  re 
read  by  women  and  girls,  and,  in  an  outburst  of  patriot 
ism,  turned  over  finally  to  the  servants.  There  was 
but  one  opinion  concerning  the  manly  and  dignified 
conduct  of  the  King;  there  was  a  unanimous  determi 
nation  to  follow  Ms  example  and  pick  up  the  glove  that 
had  been  thrown  in  the  face  of  the  nation.  At  ten  o'clock 
the  square  before  the  royal  palace  was  filled  by  an  ex 
cited  multitude.  Hurrahs  for  the  King  and  shouts  of 
*To  the  Hhine  F  arose  on  all  sides.  Similar  demonstra 
tions  took  place  in  every  quarter  of  the  city.  It  was  the 
explosion  of  long-restrained  wrath." 

1  Berlin  eoresfjcutfeaee  of  the  GOM&B  de  Fmnee,  July  16.  Pee  La  Gcroe^ 
TdL  vi  pp.  28lt  885.] 


EVENING  OF  JULY  13  AT  BERLIN    201 

"The  excitement  was  tremendous,"  says  Von  Sybel ; 
"a  shout  of  joy  issued  from  the  depths  of  the  chorus  of 
myriads  of  voices  which  formed  but  a  single  voice; 
men  embraced  with  tears  of  joy;  acclamations  to 
the  King  rent  the  air."1 

The  fanfare  which  had  inflamed  the  generals  aroused 
Berlin.  The  diplomatists  did  not  mistake  the  signifi 
cance  of  the  uproarious  scene  that  was  enacted  before 
them.  Bylandt,  Minister  of  the  Low  Countries,  told  a 
friend  of  mine  that,  after  reading  the  supplement  of  the 
North  German  Gazette,  he  rushed  to  his  house,  translated 
it,  and  telegraphed  it  to  his  government  with  these 
simple  words,  "War  inevitable  now." 

At  half -past  eleven  the  placarded  despatch  was  sent 
to  the  Prussian  ministers  at  Dresden,  Hamburg, 
Munich,  and  Stuttgart,  and  at  half-past  two  in  the 
morning  to  St.  Petersburg,  Brussels,  Florence,  and 
Rome.2  In  the  morning  of  the  14th  the  Prussian 

1  [Von  Sybel,  vol.  vii  (English  trans.),  p.  400.    This,  being  a  translation,  of 
M.  OlHvier's  French  translation,  varies  slightly  from  that  made  directly  from 
the  German.] 

2  [The  precise  times  were  given  by  ChanceHor  von  Caprivi  (in  his  address  in, 
the  Reichstag,  Nov.  2S,  180£) .  But  Bismarck  in  Ms  circular  letter  of  the  IStfc 
(Appendix  H)  said :  "  There  exists  no  note  or  despatch  by  which  the  Prussian 
Government  notified  to  the  Cabinets  of  Europe  a  refusal  to  receive  the 
French  Ambassador.     There  exists  nothing  bat  the  wwgpaper 
known  to  all  the  world,  which  was  commimicated  to  the  German  Governments, 
and  to  some  of  our  Representatives  with  non-German  Governments  ...  in 
order  to  inform  them  of  the  nature  of  the  French  demands,  and  the  impossi 
bility  of  complying  with  tihein,  and  winch,  moreover,  contains  nothing 
injurious  to  France."  —  "By  a  skifral  splitting  of  hairs/*  says  La  Gorce 
(voL  vi,  p.  255),  "the  communication  was  made,  mot  officially,,  but  by  way 
of  information,  so  that,  if  France  should  protest,  they  could  feign  surprise, 
could  affect  to  be  amazed  that  she  should  take  offence  at  a  simple  tmofficM 
communication,  and  at  last,  could  denounce  lier  as  the  insalter.**    And  see 

pp.  280. 


292         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

Monitor  published  It  at  the  head  of  Its  unofficial  section. 
While  it  was  being  posted  on  the  hoardings,  cried 
in  the  streets,  and  authenticated  in  the  official  organ, 
the  telegraphic  agencies  spread  it  abroad  to  every 
country  reached  by  a  newspaper.  Lastly,  in  the 
principal  capitals,  the  ambassadors  or  ministers  of 
the  North  German  Confederation  called  upon  the 
ministers  of  foreign  affairs  and  officially  communicated 
it  to  them.  To  all  countries,  in  all  tongues,  flew 
the  insulting  falsification  put  forth  by  Bismarck. 
The  effect  of  this  detestable  publication  manifested 
itself  at  the  outset  with  no  less  intensity  through 
out  all  Germany  than  in  Berlin.  "People  welcomed 
joyfully  BenedettFs  dismissal  just  because  of  what  it 
seemed  to  import  of  brutality  and  insult  to  France." 

The  newspapers  fairly  raved.  Among  the  cari 
catures  was  this:  In  the  background  the  outer  room 
of  the  King's  suite;  in  the  foreground  Benedetti  in 
full  uniform,  shamefaced  and  abashed,  detained  by 
an  aide-de-camp,  who  blocked  his  way  with  a  mocking 
smile.  The  legend  was  to  the  effect  that  the  King  had 
abruptly  turned  his  back  and  said  to  his  aide,  "Tell 
this  gentleman  that  I  have  no  reply  to  give  him; 
I  will  not  see  him  again." 

"Even  before  the  King's  order  of  mobilization  the 
people  rose  like  one  man  with  one  mind.  This  mighty 
emotion  was  the  work  of  the  Ems  despatch.  That 
despatch  set  free  the  furor  teufamicus,  the  holy  wrath 
of  the  German  'Ich/"1  Since  that  time  it  has  always 
been  in  Germany  the  synonym  of  a  blow  aimed  at  an 
adversary.  Mommsen  put  the  seal  to  this  now  his 
toric  meaning  of  the  phrase  when,  in  an  open  letter, 

1  Onekm  [Unser  Mdm  ITauer],  p.  13& 


EVENING  OF  JULY  13  AT  BERLIN    293 

he  advised  the  Italians  to  be  discreet,  for  otherwise 
there  was  in  readiness  for  them  "another  Ems  de 
spatch."  l 

The  King,  like  his  people,  felt  the  effect  of  his  Chan 
cellor's  coup  de  main.  He  was  in  the  Promenade 
by  the  Springs  at  Ems  on  the  14th  in  the  morning, 
when  the  doctored  telegram,  which  bore  so  little  re 
semblance  to  the  story  written  by  Radziwill,  was 
handed  to  him.  He  read  it  twice,  deeply  moved, 
then  handed  it  to  Eulenbourg,  who  was  in  attendance, 
and  said,  "This  is  war  !  "  2 

"This  is  war  !  "  the  Prussian  minister  at  Berne 
exclaimed  at  the  same  moment,  as  if  he  had  heard 
his  sovereign's  exclamation.  Our  minister,  Comminges- 
Guitaud,  was  on  his  way  to  the  Federal  palace  on  some 
current  business,  when  General  Count  Boeder,  the 
Prussian  minister,  came  out  of  the  residence  of  the 
President  of  the  Confederation.  As  soon  as  he  saw 
Comminges-Guitaud,  he  went  up  to  him  and  said: 
"Well,  my  dear  count,  so  we  are  going  to  fight;  I 
am  fairly  aghast.  Let  us  shake  hands  once  before  we 
become  enemies." 

Comminges-Guitaud,  astounded,  exclaimed,  "Do 
you  mean  that  war  is  declared?" 

"Why,  yes,"  Roeder  replied;  "according  to  a 
telegram  received  last  night,  the  King  has  refused 
to  receive  Count  Benedetti,  and  has  sent  word  to 
that  he  rejected  the  demands  of  France." 


1  [The  last  two  sentences  are  not  in  L'  Empire  Liberal.] 

2  This  fact  was  told  by  Count  Eulenbourg  to  Hans  Delbriick  (Preusswhe 
Jahrbilcher,  1895,  p.  48),  and  nothing  proves  more  conclusively  Bismarck's 
falsification  than  this  exclamation  of  the  King.    [Note  of  M.  OlHvier,  in  vol. 
xiv,  p.  335.] 


294         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

Comminges-Guitaud's  first  words  when  lie  was  in 
President  Doubs's  presence  were,  "So  war  is  declared  ?  " 

"That  is  what  the  Prussian  minister  just  told  me," 
was  the  reply.1 

Thus,  on  the  I4th?  before  our  press  or  our  govern 
ment  had  uttered  a  single  word,  the  mob,  from  one 
end  of  Germany  to  the  other,  instinctively  inter 
preted  the  telegram  as  meaning  war.  And  that  terrible 
word  was  uttered  by  Germany  when  the  Cabinet  at 
Paris  was  still  contending,  energetically  and  not  with 
out  hope,  for  the  maintenance  of  peace. 

1  "  My  narrative  is  a  literal  transcription  of  a  note  which  Comminges- 
Cruitaud  was  good  enough  to  hand  me  on  June  £7,  1880,  and  which  was  in 
agreement  with  the  suggestion  of  Gramont  (p.  230),  based  on  the  official 
despatches.  This  narrative  is  very  favorable  to  us  in  that  it  shows  that  the 
words,  *  War  is  declared,*  as  characterizing  Bismarck's  act,  were  first  uttered 
by  a  Prussian  agent."  [L'Empire  LiMrd,  Appendix  to  vol.  xiv,  pp.  601,  603. 
And  M.  Ollivier  proceeds  to  demolish  a  story  told  by  Darimon  (Notes,  etc., 
p.  118)  to  the  effect  that  he  had  learned  from  Cbmminges-Guitaud's  own 
lips  that  he  overheard  the  Prussian  minister  reading  the  telegram  to  the 
Swiss  President,  and  received  no  direct  communicatioE  of  it,] 


CHAPTER  XIX 

THE    EVENING    OF  JULY    13   AT  PARIS  —  PACIFIC    MEAS 
URES  PREVAIL 

FROM  the  adjournment  of  the  Chamber  until  a  late 
hour  of  the  night  of  the  13th,  in  the  absence  of  definite 
news  from  Ems  and  Berlin,  the  agitation  of  men's 
minds  became  momentarily  more  violent  at  Paris. 
Our  reply  to  the  interpellation  called  forth  almost 
universal  reprobation.  The  Pays  said,  in  an  article 
that  men  fought  for  a  chance  to  read :  — 

"We  are  in  the  situation  of  those  officers  who  are 
hopeless  of  their  leaders  and,  having  broken  their 
swords,  throw  away  the  pieces.  It  is  with  a  feeling  of 
melancholy,  almost  with  disgust,  that  we  consent  to  take 
our  pen  in  hand  once  more  —  that  pen  which  is  power 
less  to  avert  the  shame  that  threatens  France.  The 
fact  is  that,  with  unparalleled  ingenuousness,  the 
Prime  Minister  sincerely  believed  that  everything  could 
and  would  be  settled  by  Prince  Antony's  despatch. 
Now,  what  has  this  grotesque,  run-to-seed  old  man, 
this  Pere  Ducantal,  this  *Pere  Antoine'  as  people 
already  call  him  —  what  has  he  to  do  in  all  this  business, 
—  this  old  man  to  whom  no  one  has  applied,  whom 
nobody  knows,  and  who  has  nothing  to  say  about  it  ? 
His  son,  Prince  Leopold,  is  more  than  of  age,  as  he 
is  thirty-five  years  old  and  has  nothing  to  do  with 
"his  father's  drivel.  He  did  not  consult  him  about 
accepting,  nor  has  he  consulted  him  about  declining* 

29,5 


296         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

It  is  to  Prussia  that  M.  de  Gramont  addresses  himself, 
and  it  is  Pere  Antoine  who  replies.  Why,  nothing 
could  be  more  comic,  that  is  to  say,  if  there  can  be 
anything  comic  in  the  degradation  of  our  country. 
And  it  is  this  sort  of  a  peace,  without  guaranty,  with 
out  surety,  resting  solely  on  an  old  man's  despatch, 
that  they  propose  to  offer  to  France  aroused  by  a 
national  outburst  of  feeling  ?  Prussia  holds  her  peace, 
Prussia  refuses  to  reply,  and  maintains  a  contemptuous 
silence.  And*  the  lawyers  who  govern  us,  content 
with  their  arguments  of  the  other  day,  abandon  their 
client,  France,  concerning  themselves  no  further  about 
her  honor,  her  dignity,  her  interests  ! 

"Ah !  if  events  were  destined  to  take  this  course 
definitively,  then  we  must  needs  blush  to  be  French 
men  and  ask  to  be  naturalized  as  Prussians !  But 
it  is  impossible,  and  the  Emperor  cannot  leave  us 
longer  with  our  heads  in  the  dust.  Last  evening  the 
boulevards  swarmed  with  an  anxious  crowd,  and 
bands  of  students  paraded  the  streets  singing  the 
'  Chant  du  Depart.  It  is  five  days  now  since  France 
decided  to  fight;  the  people  axe  murmuring  and  asking 
if  we  are  to  retreat  forever.  France  is  in  revolt  against 
ministers  who  know  how  neither  to  defend  her,  nor 
to  protect  her,  nor  to  shelter  her,  and  she  makes  a 
last  supreme  appeal  to  the  Emperor.  Let  Mm  sweep 
away  all  these  babblers,  these  manufacturers  of  vain 
and  empty  words,  and  let  us  come  at  last  to  deeds  1 
—  PAUL  BE  CASSAGNAC. 

"Latmt  News.—  Three  o'clock.  —  The  back-down 
is  consummated,  The  ministry,  through  M.  le  due  de 
Gramont  as  its  mouthpiece,  announces  that  France 
is  content  with  the  despatch,  of  Prince  Antony  of 


EVENING  OF  JULY  13  AT  PARIS         297 

Hohenzollern.    This  ministry  will  henceforth  have  a 
name  —  The  Ministry  of  Shame  !  —  P.  DB  C."  l 

Now  that  it  is  agreed  that  everybody  was  opposed 
to  the  war,  I  should  dumbfound  certain  persons  if  I 
should  remind  them  of  the  language  they  used  that 

1  [The  following  additional  sentences  from  this  article  are  given  in  vol.  xiv, 
pp.  £38,  839 :  —  ]  "  "They  propose  to  give  us  a  new  edition  of  the  Empire, 
revised,  corrected,  and  shorn  of  all  its  glory,  of  a  sort  that  an  Orleanist  can 
allow  his  son  to  read.' "  [And  in  the  postscript :  —  ]  *"  The  ministry  thinks 
that  it  has  strengthened  itself  and  proclaimed  peace,  but  it  is  mistaken. 
Everywhere,  in  the  Chamber  and  on  the  street,  people  are  saying:  "This 
is  the  downfall  of  the  Cabinet,  and  it  is  war  !"*" 

In  April*  1880,  this  same  Cassagnac  said,  in  the  Pays:  "You  should  have 
been  content  with  what  was  strictly  necessary  with  regard  to  the  national 
dignity.  Now,  what  was  strictly  necessary  was  Prince  Antony's  with 
drawal.  Nothing  more  was  needed.  The  honor  of  France  was  satisfied; 
her  interests  were  no  longer  impaired.  Even  with  a  formidable  armament, 
you  would  have  been  blameworthy  to  resist."  —  Of  what  use  is  it  to  offer 
any  comment  ?  [Note  of  M.  Ollivier  in  vol.  xiv,  p.  $39.  On  pages  839-84! 
he  gives  extracts  from  other  journals,  in  the  same  sense.  The  CwtMibw* 
twnnel  was  torn  to  pieces  and  thrown  into  the  gutter.  See  also  pp.  6>24»  625. 
No  other  papers  except  the  Temps  and  the  Debate  escaped  the  infection. 
Organs  of  the  Bight  and  Left  and  the  Legitimists  joined  in  the  attack, 
which  was  supplemented  by  the  exhortations  of  individuals.]  "Girardin 
came  to  me  and  urged  me  not  to  resist  the  bellicose  excitement  of  public 
f  eeling.  The  same  considerations  were  presented  with  much  greater  au 
thority  by  the  Due  d' Albufera.  Being  President  of  the  Right  Centre,  he  was 
really  the  leader  of  my  majority ;  I  had  always  found  him  loyal  in  my  sup 
port.  I  was  compelled  to  give  great  heed  to  his  opinion  and  to  listen  to 
him  with  deference.  He  came,  accompanied  by  Maurice  Richard,  to  beg 
me  not  to  stiffen  myself  against  necessity  and  to  remain,  by  submitting  to 
the  war,  a  minister  of  public  opinion.  He  warned  me  that,  if  I  did  not  decide 
to  do  it,  the  Left  and  Right  would  combine  and  overturn  us.  Buette,  the 
young  mechanic  at  whose  marriage  I  first  met  Gambetta  and  Jules  Ferry* 
came  and  told  me  of  the  impassioned  speeches  at  La  Sourdiere,  and  in  the 
name  of  that  democracy  which  was  not  ill-disposed  to  us,  he  conjured  me  not 
to  oppose  what  public  opinion  demanded  of  me.  In  April,  1874,  he  wrote 
to  me:  'At  the  moment  when  there  was  doubt  whether  you  were  inclined 
to  peace,  I  heard  the  speech  that  Gambetta  delivered  in  favor  of  war ;  and. 
I  expressed  his  thought  when  I  came  to  see  you  in  order  to  urge  you  in  that 
direction/" 


£98         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

afternoon.  "You  are  Incomprehensible/'  some  said 
to  me.  "You  are  the  minister  of  the  plebiscite; 
you  might  be  the  minister  of  victory,  and  you 
will  not!" 

"Whenever  I  shall  believe/*  I  replied," that  France 
is  threatened  in  her  dignity  and  her  honor,  I  shall 
be  the  first  to  utter  the  cry  of  war,  and  I  should  not 
have  hesitated  to  do  it,  had  not  the  candidacy  been 
withdrawn;  but  it  is  on  the  point  of  disappearing, 
and  you  would  have  my  government,  taking  advantage 
of  a  momentary  excitement,  engage  in  a  bloody  under 
taking  for  the  sole  purpose  of  exalting  my  own  per 
sonality  or  my  policy?  You  are  in  error  as  to  the 
consequences  of  a  war.  Victory  is  certain  —  to  that 
I  agree:  all  military  men,  great  and  small,  promise 
it.  But  what  shall  we  do  with  our  victory?  Shall 
we  take  the  Rhine  ?  According  to  our  French  theory 
of  nationalities,  conquest  no  longer  affords  a  just 
claim  to  acquisition  of  territory.  Do  you  imagine 
that  Germany  would  leave  you  in  peaceful  possession 
of  your  prey?  Her  children,  forcibly  separated  from 
her,  would  always  have  their  hands  stretched  out  to 
her,  and  war  would  break  out  again  and  again  so  long 
as  their  deliverance  had  not  been  achieved.  And,  to 
consider  moral  results  alone,  what  a  calamity  a  war 
between  two  such  highly  civilized  nations  would  be ! 
Doubtless  there  does  exist  a  barbarian  Germany, 
greedy  of  fighting  and  of  conquest  —  the  Germany 
of  the  clodhoppers,  a  Germany  pharisaical  and  god 
less,  the  Germany  of  the  unintelligible  pedants  whose 
empty  lucubrations  and  microscopical  investigations 
have  been  vaunted  to  us  overmuch.  But  these  two 
are  not  the  great  Germany,  the  Germany  of  the  artists, 


EVENING  OF  JULY  13  AT  PARIS        299 

poets,  and  tMnkers ;  that  Germany  is  kindly,  generous, 
humane,  charming,  and  peace-loving;  it  is  portrayed 
in  the  touching  remark  of  Goethe,  who,  being  asked 
to  write  against  us,  replied  that  he  could  not  find  it 
in  his  heart  to  hate  the  French.  If  we  do  not  oppose 
the  natural  movement  toward  German  Unity,  but 
allow  it  to  work  itself  out  quietly  through  its  successive 
stages,  it  will  not  give  the  supremacy  to  the  barbarian, 
sophisticated  Germany,  but  will  insure  the  triumph 
of  intellectual,  civilizing  Germany.  War,  on  the  other 
hand,  would  establish  the  domination,  for  a  period 
impossible  to  estimate,  of  the  Germany  of  the  clod 
hoppers  and  pedants,  for  it  would  be  the  rallying- 
point  of  the  struggle  to  return  to  the  Rhine." l 

How  many  times  in  a  few  hours  I  repeated  these 
arguments, 2  until  I  was  worn  out,  to  the  men  who 
crowded  about  me,  hoping  to  persuade  me !  The  other 
members  of  the  Ministry,  being  in  constant  communica 
tion  with  the  press,  fought  no  less  manfully.  Gramont 
alone  continued  his  dialogue  aside  with  Benedetti, 
paying  no  heed  to  the  decision  of  the  Cabinet  that 
morning.  At  half -past  eight  he  telegraphed :  — 

"As  I  have  already  informed  you,  public  opinion  is 
so  overexcited,  that  we  succeeded  only  with  the  great 
est  difficulty  in  postponing  our  explanation  until  Fri 
day.  Make  one  last  effort  with  the  King;  tell  Mm  that 
we  confine  ourselves  to  requesting  him  to  forbid  the 
Prince  of  Hohenzollern  to  reconsider  his  withdrawal; 
let  him  say  to  you :  *I  will  forbid  it/  and  authorize  you 

1  [Tbis  passage,  as  printed  in  L' Empire  IMral,  is  considerably  shortened 
here.] 

2  "Breathing  much  harder  thanM.Thiers  did  in  his  conference  with  my 
colleagues."    L* Empire  IMrafo  voL  sivv  p.  344. 


300         THE  FRANCO-PBUSSIAN  WAR 

to  write  us  to  that  effect ;  or  let  Mm  instruct  Ms  minis 
ter  or  Ms  ambassador  to  convey  that  information  to 
me  —  that  will  be  enough  for  us.  I  have  reason  to  be 
lieve  that  the  other  European  cabinets  consider  us  fair 
and  moderate  in  our  demands.  The  Emperor  Alexander 
gives  us  his  hearty  support.  In  any  event,  leave  Ems 
and  come  to  Paris  with  the  reply,  whether  affirmative 
or  negative/* 1 

A  few  moments  after  he  had  written  tMs  despatch, 
there  came  into  Gramont's  hands  proof  that  he  was 
deluding  himself  concerning  the  favorable  sentiments  of 
Europe,  of  which  he  assured  Benedetti.  At  half-past 
eight  he  received  a  courageous  warning  from  Saint- 
Vallier : 2  — 

"Any  further  insistence  with  Prussia  on  our  part 
would  be  now  regarded,  in  Southern  Germany,  as  proof 
of  warlike  intent,  and  would  confirm  the  current  opinion 
that  the  Hohenzollern  affair  is  a  pretext,  so  far  as  we 
are  concerned,  and  that  we  want  war.  The  with 
drawal  reverses  the  situation ;  those  who  approved  of  our 
attitude  blame  us,  and  we  shall  be  in  a  bad  position  if 
we  demand  further  guaranties/' 

Friend  Beust  himself  sent  word  to  Gramont  that  he 
would  make  a  mistake  if  he  should  force  matters  to 
extremities ;  that  no  one  was  in  a  better  position  than 
he  to  judge  of  the  disposition  of  the  states  of  the  South, 
and  that  he  was  convinced  that,  if  France  were  relying 

HPartoftEedespatdi,^^  See  Benedetti, 

pp.  384,  385;  also  Gramont,  pp.  189-1&1.] 

2  [Minister  to  WiMemberg] ;  It  was  dated  Stuttgart,  July  IS,  1  P.M.; 
received  at  8.SQ  P.M.  {The  whole  despatch  is  given  in  vol.  xiv,  p.  846.] 
"*We  might  have  hoped  for  the  neutrality  of  the  South  in  this  conflict 
(what  an  error !} ;  it  is  impossible  to  count  upon  it  to-day,*  **  etc. 


EVENING  OF  JULY  13  AT  PARIS        301 

on  the  sympathy  of  those  states,  she  was  making  a 
great  mistake.1 

Fleury,  at  St.  Petersburg,  was  no  less  outspoken. 
In  the  absence  of  Gortchakoff,  he  had  seen  the  Czar. 
Before  he  had  shown  him  the  text  of  the  demand  of 
guaranties,  Alexander  flew  into  a  veritable  passion. 
"I  have  taken  much  trouble  to  avert  war,  but  you  will 
have  it,  eh  ?"  And  when  Pleury  mentioned  our  honor, 
he  retorted  quickly :  "Your  honor  !  And  what  about 
others'  honor?"  When  he  had  read  Gramont's  de 
spatch  carefully,  he  calmed  down,  but  he  refused  to 
intervene  again  with  his  uncle.  Being  persuaded,  quite 
mistakenly,  that  the  withdrawal  was  due  to  the  King's 
personal  influence,  he  did  not  choose  to  exert  any  further 
pressure  on  him,  for  "his  pride  had  been  wounded,  and 
he  also  found  himself  face  to  face  with  German  national 
sentiment,  already  offended  by  Prince  Leopold's  with 
drawal." 

At  the  same  time  with  these  salutary  warnings,  more 
favorable  news  reached  us.  Olozaga  came  during  the 
evening  to  inform  me  that  his  government  had  sent  him 
its  approval,  and  that  after  he  had  informed  Prince 
Antony  thereof,  he  should  pay  no  further  attention  to 
the  candidacy.  But,  in  reality,  matters  were  not  so 
far  advanced.  Serrano  admitted  the  authenticity  of 
the  withdrawal ;  but  Sagasta  did  not  at  all  understand 
what  had  taken  place,  and  was  awaiting  confirmation 
by  the  Spanish  Ambassador  at  Berlin ;  furthermore,  he 
did  not  legard  a  withdrawal  not  emanating  from  the 
Prince  himself  as  intended  to  be  taken  seriously. 
Statesmen  like  Silvela  proposed  to  the  ministers  to  go 
ahead  despite  the  withdrawal,  and  to  cause  Leopold  to 

1  Bloomfidd  to  Granvile,  July  IS  [Blue  Book,  p.  60]. 


302         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

be  proclaimed  by  the  Cortes.1  "He  can  withdraw  again 
if  such  is  his  pleasure,  when  he  has  been  chosen/'  they 
said. 

We,  knowing  nothing  of  these  circumstances,  ac 
cepted  the  Ambassador's  assurances  and  regarded  the 
incident  as  closed  so  far  as  Spain  was  concerned.  I 
thanked  Olozaga  from  my  heart  and  said  to  him: 
"The  King's  approval  has  not  reached  us,  but  I  have 
no  doubt  that  it  will  be  forthcoming  and  I  have  made  up 
my  mind  to  not  obtaining  the  rest.  So  that  we  have 
peace  in  our  grasp.  To-morrow  morning,  before  the 
Council,  I  shall  prepare  a  statement  to  the  Chambers  to 
that  effect.  I  shall  speak  of  Spain  and  of  you,  and  I 
propose  that  you  shall  be  satisfied  with  what  I  say.  So 
come  to  see  me  early  to-morrow,  and  I  will  submit  my 
draft  to  you." 

He  promised  to  come.  I  went  then  to  the  Foreign 
Office  to  see  the  only  document  that  I  still  lacked  — 
the  King  of  Prussia's  reply  —  if  it  had  finally 
arrived. 

Gramont  was  not  there.  He  had  received,  in  addi 
tion  to  Olozaga's  communication,  a  third  and  fourth 
despatch  from  Benedetti,  between  half-past  ten  and 
eleven  o'clock.  The  third  (dated  3.45  P.M.)  said :  "The 
King  has  received  the  reply  of  the  Prince  of  Hohenzol- 
lern.  It  is  from  Prince  Antony,  and  informs  His 

1 This  was  told  me  in  May,  1882,  by  Del  Mazo,  Ambassador  at  Rome. 
[On  the  14th  Mr.  Layard  at  Madrid  telegraphed  to  Lord  Granville:  "I 
received  a  note  from  General  PiiiayeMm^ymormngfiidoTrDnLgw.e  tihat  the 
father  of  Prince  Leopold  .  .  .  had  withdrawn  the  acceptance  of  his  son  to 
become  a  candidate  for  the  Throne  of  Spain,  and  the  cause  of  the  misunder 
standing  with  Ffcanee  might,  consequently,  be  considered  at  an  end.'*  Blue 
Book,  p.  43,  The  candidacy  was  foimally  abandoned  by  the  Spanish  goYern- 
ment,  on  the  I5tk  Banees  to  Granville,  July  16,  Bine  Book,  p.  55J 


EVENING  OF  JULY  13  AT  PARIS        303 

Majesty  that  Prince  Leopold,  Ms  son,  has  withdrawn 
his  candidacy  for  the  Spanish  crown.  The  King 
authorizes  me  to  make  it  known  to  the  Emperor's 
government  that  he  approves  this  decision*  The  King 
sent  one  of  his  aides-de-camp  to  make  this  communica 
tion  to  me,  and  I  reproduce  its  exact  terms.  His 
Majesty  having  sent  me  no  message  on  the  subject  of 
the  assurances  for  the  future  that  we  desired,  I  have 
requested  a  last  audience  in  order  to  submit  to  him  anew, 
and  to  enlarge  upon,  the  suggestions  that  I  made  to  him 
this  morning.  I  have  strong  reasons  to  believe  that  I 
shall  obtain  no  concession  in  that  respect." 

The  fourth  despatch  (from  Ems,  7  P.M.)  said:  "In 
reply  to  my  request  for  a  further  audience  the  King 
sent  word  to  me  that  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  resume 
our  discussion  relative  to  the  assurances  which,  in  our 
opinion,  should  be  given  for  the  future.  His  Majesty 
caused  me  to  be  informed  that  on  that  subject  he  referred 
to  the  considerations  that  he  set  before  me  this  morn 
ing.  The  King  consents,  so  his  emissary  informed  me 
in  His  Majesty's  name,  to  give  his  full  and  unconditional 
approval  to  the  Prince's  withdrawal;  he  can  do  no 
more.  I  shall  await  your  orders  before  leaving  Ems. 
Count  Bismarck  will  not  come  here ;  I  note  the  arrival 
of  the  ministers  of  Finance  and  of  the  Interior."  l 

Gramont  had  lost  no  time  in  taking  these  important 
documents  to  the  Emperor  at  Saint-Cloud. 

On  returning  home  after  a  long  walk,  I  found  this 
note  which  had  been  waiting  for  me  some  time :  — 

"MY  DEAB  FEIEND,  —  I  am  going  to  Saint-Cloud. 
More  news.    He  (the  Xing)  has  communicated  the 

1  [Benedet&  pp.  375,  376.] 


304         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

HohenzoIIera  letter  to  us,  and  has  approved  it;    but 
that's  not  much."  1 

Copies  of  Benedetti's  telegrams  were  not  enclosed 
with  the  note.    I  replied  at  once  :  — 


DEAR  FRIEND,  —  It  does  not  seem  to  me  that 
the  approval  is  'not  much/  especially  in  connection 
with  the  despatch  Olozaga  showed  you.  Don't  bind 
yourself,  even  in  your  own  mind,  until  we  have  talked 
matters  over.  Ever  yours." 

At  Saint-Cloud  Gramont  fell  in  with  Jer6me  David, 
who  had  dined  there.  In  truth,  one  would  have  thought 
that  he  had  gone  there  to  make  his  report  of  some 
mission  and  to  receive  congratulations.  Gramont 
suggested  to  the  Emperor  that  that  dinner,  only  a  few 
hours  after  the  session  of  the  Chamber,  would  produce 
a  bad  impression;  and  as  it  turned  out,  the  warlike 
newspapers  announced  it  triumphantly  the  next  day. 

The  Emperor  replied  that  the  invitation  came  from 
the  Empress,  and  that  he  could  not  have  sent  David 
away. 

On  his  return  to  Paris,  at  a  very  late  hour,  Gramont 
made  haste  to  inform  me  of  the  result  of  his  visit  by  the 
following  note  :  — 

"My  DEAR  FRIEND,  —  I  am  just  back  from  Saint- 
Cloud.  There  is  great  indecision  there.  At  first,  war. 

1  [M  Offivier  here  omits  part  of  tins  note,  which  is  given  in  full  in  vol.  xiv, 
p.  350  J  —  "'BeEeve  that  I  cannot  forgive  myself  for  that  mot  in  my  reply 
to-day.  It  clistresses  me  to  think  that  any  one  conld  believe  that  I  had  in 
tended  to  injure  you.  It  is  so  far  from  my  heart  and  thought/  He  alluded 
to  the  contemptuous  words  concerning  reports  current  in  the  lobby,  which 
some  people  had  considered  as  aimed  at  me."  [See  supra,  p.  259  nj 


EVENING  OF  JULY  13  AT  PARIS        305 

Later,  hesitation  because  of  the  King's  approval.  It 
may  be  that  the  Spanish  despatch  will  make  the  balance 
incline  toward  peace.  The  Emperor  bade  me  request 
you  to  let  all  our  colleagues  know  that  he  expects  us  to 
dinner  at  seven  o'clock  to-morrow,  to  hold  a  Council 
during  the  evening.  Ever  yours." 

Here  again  Gramont  spoke  as  an  ambassador  rather 
than  as  a  responsible  minister.  Doubtless  the  opinion 
of  Saint-Cloud  was  of  some  importance,  but  my  opinion 
and  my  colleagues'  were  no  less  so,  and  at  that  hour,  and 
throughout  that  whole  night  of  the  13th,  there  was  no 
sort  of  uncertainty  in  my  mind :  King  William  had 
answered  with  a  conciseness  that  left  nothing  to  be 
desired ;  he  had  communicated  the  withdrawal  of  the 
candidacy  to  us,  through  Benedetti,  declaring  that  he 
approved  it ;  Olozaga  advised  us  of  unconditional  accept 
ance  of  the  situation  by  Spain ;  unless  they  were  not 
acting  in  good  faith,  no  one  could  deny  that  the  twofold 
acceptance,  by  Prussia  and  by  Spain,  implied  a  more 
than  sufficient  guaranty  of  the  future.  We  had  reached 
the  goal  that  we  had  set  before  ourselves.  There  was 
but  one  way  left  to  bring  on  war,  —  that  was  to  go  out 
side  of  the  question  that  was  now  settled  as  we  desired, 
and  to  resurrect  the  dispute  concerning  our  general 
grievances  against  Prussia;  to  that  I  was  determined 
not  to  consent; 

And  so  when  Mitchell,  according  to  his  wont,  came 
to  learn  the  news,  I  summed  up  the  situation  at  the  end 
of  that  day  in  a  word :  "Prim  and  the  King  of  Prussia 
accept  the  withdrawal,  and  we  shall  not  insist  on  the 
guaranties,  nor  shall  we  raise  any  other  question ;  the 
thing  is  really  settled  now/' 


306         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

Mitchell  took  Ms  leave  with  that  assurance.  He  met 
Paul  de  Cassagnac. 

"  Well,  what's  the  news  ?  " 

"I  have  just  come  from  Emile  Ollivier's;  peace  is 
assured,  thank  God  I" 

"Are  you  quite  sure  ?  My  father  saw  the  Emperor 
this  morning,  and  war  is  determined  on,  thank  God  I" I 

Pere  Cassagnac  was  mistaken.  Of  course,  the  Em 
press  and  her  cabal  were  for  war;  but  the  Emperor, 
as  we  have  seen  from  Gramont's  letter,  was  only  at  the 
stage  of  indecision.  Tinder  the  pressure  of  the  bellicose 
spirits  he  had  seemed  to  go  over  to  them ;  in  the  Council, 
under  the  influence  of  his  ministers,  he  would  have  ad 
hered  definitely  to  our  opinion,  and  his  momentary  hesi 
tation  would  have  been  changed  into  a  decision  in  favor 
of  peace.  Would  the  Chamber  follow  us  or  overturn 
us?  I  am  persuaded  that,  in  spite  of  everything,  if 
the  Emperor  had  declared  himself  unreservedly,  the 
Chamber  would  have  followed  us.2  Believing  that  we 

1  [Told  by  M.  Mitchell  in  an  article  in  the  Ccmrrwr  de  France  of  Sept.  24, 
1872,  as  having  taken  place  in  tlie  morning  of  the  14th ;  Lehautcourt,  vol.  i, 
p.  318  n.J 

1  "Meanwhile  the  Right  was  organizing  a  coalition  with  the  Left  to  make 
an  end  of  us.  Qement  Duvemois  still  kept  up  an  old  friendship  with 
Gambetta;  they  passed  the  evening  together;  Gambetta  promised  to  sup 
port  the  order  of  the  day  in  favor  of  disarmament,  which  Duvemois  would 
defend,  and  the  result  of  which,  if  the  Chamber  should  adopt  it,  would  be 
war.  Duveraois,  returning  to  the  office  of  the  Volontaire,  found  one  of  his 
editors  there  —  Castanet.  He  went  up  to  him,  with  a  beaming  face,  and 
held  out  his  hands.  "This  time/  he  said,  speaking  of  me,  'this  time  we've 
got  Mm;  he  won't  escape  us  ...  a  few  hours  more,  and  it  will  be  all  over 
with  Mm.  I  have  agreed  with  Gambetta  to  propose  to  the  Chamber  that 
the  mnfstry  be  instructed  to  inform  Prussia  that  we  are  ready  to  ,ffiaScn>nd 
reduce  our  military  force,  on  condition  that  she  disbandfher  axm^ylSd  does 
it  first  Gambetta  k  sure  el  Ms  friends'  support;  Thave  with  me  all  the 
cowards  of  the  Bi^kt,  and  they  are  numerous.  What  a  door  I  am  opening 


EVENING  OF  JULY  13  AT  PAEIS        307 

had  seen  the  end  of  our  agonies,  I  slept  peacefully  for 
the  first  time  in  many  days,  having  no  suspicion  of  the 
cyclone  that  was  destined  to  burst  upon  us  on  our  waking. 

for  them,  and  how  they  will  plunge  through  head  first  and  with  eyes  closed ! 
My  order  of  the  day  will  pass  by  a  large  majority.  You  can  judge  whether 
the  ministry  can  hold  out  against  this  double  blow.  Left  and  Right  !*  he 
added,  laughing.  .  .  .  'What  a  face  that  poor  Ollivier  will  make!*  And 
when  Castanet  asked  him  what  he  thought  Prussia  would  do  in  the  face  of 
such  a  suggestion,  'Prussia,'  he  replied,  .  .  .  'Prussia  will  tell  us  to  go  to 
the  devil,  and  then  we  shall  declare  war ;  you'll  see  how  prettily  we'll  bring 
this  thing  off  P"  L' Empire  Liberal,  vol.  xiv,  pp.  353,  354.  [M.  Ollivier 
says  that  Castanet  wrote  him  this  in  May,  1880.] 


CHAPTER  XX 

EXASPERATION  AT  PARIS  CAUSED  BY  THE  EMS  DESPATCH 

OK  the  morning  of  the  14th,  with  my  mind  at  rest  at 
last,  after  much  distress,  I  sat  down  to  draw  the  declara 
tion  which  I  proposed  to  submit  to  the  Council  of 
Ministers  at  Saint-Cloud  in  the  evening.  I  have  kept 
what  I  wrote :  — 

"A  week  since,  the  French  Government  declared 
from  this  tribune  that,  however  sincere  its  desire  to 
preserve  the  peace  of  the  world,  it  would  not  suffer  a 
foreign  prince"  (here  quote  our  words  of  the  6th). 
"To-day  we  are  certain  that  a  foreign  prince  will  not 
ascend  the  Spanish  throne.  This  victory  is  the  more 
valuable  to  us  in  that  it  has  been  won  by  force  of  reason 
and  justice  alone,  and  not  by  bloody  sacrifices.  In 
presence  of  the  patriotic  enthusiasm  which  our  attitude 
aroused,  it  would  have  been  easy  to  complicate  one  ques 
tion  with  another  and  to  manufacture  some  pretext  for 
dragging  the  country  into  a  great  war.  Such  conduct 
would  have  seemed  to  us  worthy  neither  of  you  nor  of 
ourselves;  it  would  have  alienated  the  sympathy  of 
Europe,  and,  eventually,  of  our  own  country-  When 
we  are  advancing  toward  a  definite  goal,  we  will  not 
conceal  it  from  you.  We  will  point  it  out  to  you  unmis 
takably.  We  requested  your  support  against  a  Prus 
sian  candidacy  to  the  throne  of  Spain.  That  candi 
dacy  is  eliminated ;  it  only  remains  for  us  now  to  resume 
with  confidence  the  works  of  peace.5* 

I  was  going  on  to  speak  of  the  part  played  by  Olozaga 
and  by  Spain,  when  the  door  opened  and  an  usher 

308 


PARIS  EXASPERATED  309 

announced  "His  Excellency  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs."  As  soon  as  he  had  crossed  the  threshold, 
even  before  he  had  reached  the  middle  of  the  room, 
Gramont  cried :  — 

"My  dear  fellow,  you  see  before  you  a  man  who  has 
received  a  knockdown  blow  !" 

I  rose.     "I  don't  understand;  explain  yourself/* 
Thereupon  he  handed  me  a  small  sheet  of  yellow 
paper,  which  I  shall  see  before  my  eyes  as  long  as  I 
live.    It  was  a  telegram  from  Lesourd,  sent  from  Berlin 
after  midnight  of  the  13th,  and  thus  conceived :  — 

"A  supplement  of  the  North-German  Gazette,  which 
appeared  at  ten  o'clock  this  evening,  contains  in  sub 
stance  what  follows:  'The  French  Ambassador,  at 
Ems,  having  requested  His  Majesty  the  King  to  author 
ize  him  to  telegraph  to  Paris  that  he  would  undertake 
not  to  give  his  consent  hereafter  to  the  Hohenzollern 
candidacy,  if  it  should  be  revived,  the  Bang  refused  to 
receive  the  Ambassador  and  sent  word  to  him  by  the 
aide-de-camp  on  duty  that  he  had  no  further  communi 
cation  to  make  to  him/  This  news,  published  by  the  offi 
cial  journal,  has  caused  intense  excitement  in  the  city." 

"Had  not  Benedetti  advised  you  ?"  I  asked  Gramont. 

"Here  is  what  he  telegraphed  me  yesterday  after 
noon,"  he  replied.  "These  four  despatches  came  in 
quick  succession  during  the  evening,  and  I  didn't  think 
it  necessary  to  enclose  them  with  my  note." 

After  reading  Benedetti's  despatches,  I  re-read 
Lesourd's.  I  understood  Gramont's  exclamation.  No 
one  ever  foundered  nearer  port.  For  a  few  moments 
I  stood  silent,  dumfounded.  "We  can  delude  our 
selves  no  longer,"  I  said.  "They  propose  to  force  us 
into  war." 


310         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

We  agreed  that  I  should  assemble  our  colleagues  at 
once,  in  order  to  acquaint  them  with  this  unforeseen 
blow,  while  he  returned  to  the  Foreign  Office,  Werther 
having  called  there. 

Thereupon  Olozaga  arrived,  as  calm  as  I  myself  had 
been  a  few  moments  earlier,  to  hear  me  read  my  pacific 
statement.  I  told  him  of  Benedettfs  despatches  and 
Lesourd's.  He  was  no  less  horrified  than  myself. 
Obliging  and  eager  to  be  of  service,  he  offered  to  go  to  see 
Werther,  in  order  to  obtain  an  explanation,  if  that  were 
possible.  I  accepted  his  offer,  but  he  did  not  find  the 
Prussian  Ambassador. 

Our  colleagues  soon  made  their  appearance,  greatly 
disturbed;  they  deemed  it  impossible  to  postpone  till 
evening  a  full  Council,  and  they  instructed  me  to  tele 
graph  to  the  Emperor,  begging  him  to  come  to  the 
TuHeries  in  the  afternoon,  to  preside  over  it.1 

At  half-past  twelve  the  Emperor  arrived  at  the 
Tufleries,  and  summoned  us  to  join  him.  He  had,  like 
ourselves,  passed  through  an  impatient,  wrathful  mob, 
from  which  arose  hoarse  cries,  incitements  to  disorder, 
and  protests  against  diplomatic  delays.2 

1  "At  the  same  time  a  very  urgent  message  from  Lyons  arrived,  'begging 
Gramont,  in  the  name  of  Her  Majesty's  Government,  not  to  commit  the 
Government  by  a  premature  declaration  to  the  Chambers/  and  represent 
ing  that  *it  would  be  more  prudent,  and  at  the  same  time  more  digni 
fied,*  to  wait  *at  least  until  the  time  origbiafly  fixed*  (the  following  day, 
Friday)."    I/ Empire  IMral,  p.  857.    [Lyons  to  Granville,  July  14,  Blue 
Book,  p.  36.] 

2  [See  Gramont,  p.  211.    "I  had  some  difficulty  in  reaching  the  Chamber, 
for  the  agitation  there  had  already  extended  to  the  masses,  and  the  approaches 
to  the  ministry  as  weft  as  to  the  Corps  Legislatif  were  crowded  by  an  impa 
tient  and  angry  multitude.    Hoarse  cries,  inflammatory  and  disorderly 
harangues,  protests  against  any  sort  of  negotiation  were  shouted  and  ac 
claimed  by  the  crowd  aH  along  the  quays  and  even  to  the  Tufleries."} 


PARIS  EXASPERATED  311 

Our  deliberations  lasted  nearly  six  hours.  At  the 
opening  of  the  session  Gramont  dropped  his  portfolio 
on  the  table  and  said  as  he  took  his  seat :  "After  what 
has  happened,  a  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  who  would 
not  make  up  his  mind  for  war  would  not  be  worthy  to 
retain  his  portfolio." 

Le  Boeuf  did  not  tell  us,  as  the  newsmongers  declared, 
that  the  Prussian  army  was  mobilized  and  marching 
toward  our  frontier :  if  mobilization  had  been  ordered, 
we  should  have  been  informed  by  Benedetti  and 
Stoffel.1  He  said  simply  that,  according  to  his  secret 
intelligence,  preparations  had  begun;  that  they  were 
buying  horses  in  Belgium,  and  that,  unless  we  wanted 
to  be  forestalled,  we  had  not  a  moment  to  lose. 

1  [As  to  Colonel  Stoffel,  military  attache*  of  the  French  embassy  at  Berlin, 
and  his  reports  from  1866  to  1870,  see  Welschinger,  vol.  i,  pp.  1CH12;  La 
Gorce,  vol.  vi,  pp.  129,  130.  —  In  the  Preface  to  M a  Mission  en  Prusm,  p.  9, 
Benedetti  says:  "Among  our  troops,  even  among  some  of  our  officers 
who  are  seeking  excuses  for  our  defeats,  it  is  assumed  as  a  fact  that  Prussia 
mobilized  her  army  in  time,  that  is  to  say,  several  weeks  before  the  declara 
tion  of  war ;  that  she  succeeded  in  concealing  from  my  scrutiny  the  execu 
tion  of  that  manoeuvre,  and  that  I  gave  no  information  of  it  at  Paris ;  that 
thus  we  were  forestalled  by  the  enemy  in  the  midst  of  the  arrangements  we 
were  making  to  take  the  field.  That  is  absurd,  because  it  is  false  and  impos 
sible.  You  know,  indeed,  that  Prussia  did  not  summon  her  reserves  until 
we  had  announced,  in  our  session  of  the  15th,  our  purpose  to  obtain  by  arms 
the  guaranties  they  refused  to  give  us  voluntarily,  and  that  it  is  idiotic  to 
suppose  hundreds  of  thousands  of  men  can  be  called  to  the  colors  at  one 
time,  and  the  measure  be  hidden  from  the  ken  of  the  pubKc  and  especially 
of  the  press."  The  reports  of  the  Prussian  general  staff  have  shown  since 
that  the  order  for  mobilization  was  issued  on  the  night  of  the  15th  and 
16th ;  but  Gramont,  writing  in  1872  in  defence  of  his  action,  declares  (pp.  232, 
233)  that "  the  armies  of  Prussia  were  actively  beginning  their  mobilization" 
—  on  the  14th  —  "and  everything  was  proceeding  on  the  other  side  of  the 
Rhine  as  if  war  were  declared.  The  sequel  proved  that  these  preparations  had 
been  begun  more  than  a  week  earlier;  but  for  twenty-four  hours  they  had  been 
going  forward  openly."  See  La  Gorce,  voL  vi,  p.  290 ;  Sorel,  voL  i,  pp. 
169  n.,  175, 176.] 


312         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

Despite  the  impression  made  upon  us  by  these  re 
marks  of  our  two  colleagues  and  the  indisputable 
reasons  that  inspired  them,  our  perplexity  was  of 
long  duration.  Refusing  to  yield  to  the  bidding  of 
our  first  impulse,  we  scrutinized  the  conduct  of  Bis 
marck  and  the  King  from  a  diplomatic  and  a  judicial 
standpoint.  We  inquired  first  what  was  the  nature 
of  the  document  printed  in  the  North  German  Gazette. 
If  it  had  been  simply  a  newspaper  item,  we  should 
have  paid  no  heed  to  it;  we  should  have  taken  no 
more  notice  of  it  than  of  so  many  others  which  we 
had  let  pass  without  comment.  But  this  was  a  special 
supplement  in  the  shape  of  a  white  poster  in  large 
type  (I  have  it  before  me  now),  which  could  be  pasted 
on  walls  and  shop-windows.  The  information  it 
gave  was  not  in  the  form  of  a  newspaper  article,  but 
the  exact  text  of  an  official  document,  which  could 
not  have  been  supplied  except  by  the  ministers  who 
drew  it,  and  with  the  deliberate  purpose  of  throwing 
it  to  the  public.  We  regarded  that  publication,  there 
fore,  as  an  intentional  insult. 

And  yet,  having  reached  that  conclusion,  we  could 
not  make  up  our  minds  to  take  the  decisive  step. 
We  clung  desperately  to  peace,  although  we  knew 
that  it  no  longer  existed.  We  struggled  long  between 
two  impossibilities,  seeking  palliatives  and  rejecting 
them,  recoiling  from  the  decisive  step,  and  irresistibly 
drawn  back  to  it.  **  Hesitation,"  said  they  who  never 
knew  the  torture  of  heavy  responsibilities.  "No," 
replies  the  great  Frederick,  "the  uncertainty  that 
precedes  all  great  events/5  l 

We  were  compelled  at  last  to  admit  that  submission 

1  Frederick  n  to  Ms  brother  Henry,  June  17,  1778. 


PABIS  EXASPERATED  313 

would  be  degrading,  that  what  had  taken  place  at 
Berlin  constituted  a  declaration  of  war,  and  that  the 
only  question  for  us  was  whether  we  should  bend 
our  necks  under  the  affront,  or  should  hold  our  heads 
erect  like  honorable  men.  On  this  question  there 
could  be  no  hesitation,  and  we  ordered  the  recall  of 
the  reserves  (four  o'clock). 

The  marshal  (Le  Boeuf)  rose  at  once,  to  go  to  the 
department  and  put  our  decree  in  execution.  He  had 
hardly  closed  the  door  when  he  was  attacked  by  a 
scruple.  He  returned  and  said:  "Gentlemen,  this 
that  we  have  decided  is  a  very  serious  matter,  but 
we  did  not  vote.  Before  signing  the  recall  of  the  re 
serves,  I  demand  a  yea-and-nay  vote." 

He  himself  asked  us  the  question,  one  after  another, 
beginning  with  me  and  ending  with  the  Emperor. 
Our  response  was  unanimous.1  "Now,"  said  the  mar 
shal,  "I  have  no  further  interest  in  what  you  may  do." 
And  he  went  off  to  the  department,  and  had  the  or 
ders  prepared  for  the  recall  of  the  reserves  (4.40  P.M.). 

Thereupon  I  laid  before  the  Emperor  one  last  means 
of  placing  his  desire  for  peace  beyond  all  suspicion. 
"Let  Your  Majesty  authorize  me  to  insist  in  the  Corps 
Legislatif  that,  in  spite  of  everything,  the  affair  is 
ended  and  that  we  attach  no  importance  to  the  Prus 
sian  pronouncement.  The  cause  is  a  weak  one;  I 
shall  defend  it  without  conviction  and  I  shall  not 
win  it;  we  shall  fall  under  a  crushing  vote;  but  we 
shall  at  least  have  sheltered  Your  Majesty  completely. 
Forced  by  the  Chamber  to  dismiss  a  peace  ministry 
and  to  name  a  ministry  bent  upon  war,  Your  Majesty 

1  ["Almost  unanimous/*  says  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi»  p.  291,  quoting  Le  Boeufs 
testimony  at  the  Inquiry  concerning  tiie  4th  of  September.} 


314         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

cannot  be  accused  by  your  enemies  of  having  sought 
war  in  your  own  personal  interest/' 

The  Emperor  did  not  relish  iny  suggestion.  "I  can 
not  part  with  you/*  he  said,  "just  when  you  are  most 
necessary  to  me/'  And  he  begged  me  not  to  insist. 

How  differently  would  matters  have  turned  out  if 
I  had  brought  the  Emperor  over  to  my  opinion ! 

We  had  begun-  to  settle  the  terms  of  our  declaration 
to  the  Chambers,  when  Gramont  was  advised  of  the 
arrival  of  a  despatch  in  cipher,  from  Benedetti.  We 
suspended  our  deliberations.1  The  despatch,  when 
translated,  proved  to  be  simply  an  expansion  of  the 
latest  telegrams.  But  the  language  which  it  attrib 
uted  to  the  King,  while  it  was  still  negative,  seemed 
unbending.  There  was  nothing  in  it  to  cause  us  to 
retrace  our  steps.  And  yet,  as  if  terror-stricken  by 
our  decision,  we  grasped  madly  at  that  faint  hope; 
and  thereupon  a  fresh  discussion  ensued  —  pusillani 
mous  now,  and,  above  all,  devoid  of  sense.  A  savage 

1 L* Empire  M^rol,  vol.  xiv,  pp.  36$,  864 :  "The  Chamber  was  in  session, 
effervescent,  anxious ;  to  pacify  it  and  to  obtain  information  we  sent  Maurice 
Ricliard  to  the  Palais-Bourbon.  On  Ms  return  he  described  the  aspect  of 
the  assemblage  as  About's  newspaper  did  a  few  hours  later:  'The  enthu 
siasm  is  immense.  If  there  is  a  declaration  to-day  the  Corps  Legislatif  will 
crumble  under  the  applause.  If  the  declaration  does  not  come,  it  will  be 
more  than  a  disappointment,  more  than  a  disillusionment;  there  will  be  a 
tremendous  burst  of  laughter  and  the  Cabinet  will  he  drowned  in  its  own 
silence.  Yesterday,  when  it  looked  like  peace,  people  called  that  peace  by  a 
very  pretty  name.  Historians  called  it  "halting,"  like  that  which  preceded 
the  St.  Bartholomew;  but  tie  ignorant  folk  called  it  a — No,  it  is  impossible 
to  tell  you  what  they  called  it.  It's  a  very  wicked  word  which  is  current 
in  country  markets,  but  which  is  not  used  in  the  Chamber  except  in  a  small 
company,  in  a  very  small  company,  and  in  the  lobbies.  —  Enters  M.  Maurice 
Richard;  he  is  questioned,  and  he  questions.  Evidently  he  wishes  to  see 
with  his  own  eyes  what  is  going  on.  If  he  reports  exactly  what  he  saw,  he 
can  tell  the  Emperor  that  fte  Chamber  is  a  huge  Leyden  jar.*  LeSoir  of 
July  14." 


PARIS  EXASPERATED  315 

had  struck  us  with  such  force  that  the  whole  world 
shuddered,  and  that  Germany,  even  before  the  sum 
mons  of  her  King,  was  up  in  arms ;  and  we  were  won 
dering  whether  that  resounding  blow  might  not  be 
wiped  from  our  cheek  by  a  conference  ! 

Gramont  started  the  idea.  We  approved  it,  my 
self  among  the  rest,  aye,  even  more  strongly  than  the 
rest;  for,  according  to  my  colleagues,  it  would  seem 
that  I  soared  to  the  loftiest  heights  of  eloquence.1 
Louvet  and  Plichon,  taking  advantage  of  a  moment's 
respite,  implored  the  Emperor  not  to  subject  the 
solidity  of  his  throne  to  the  hazards  of  war,  and  all 
of  us,  without  exception,  agreed  upon  an  appeal  to  a 
European  Congress. 

I  blush  as  I  write  of  this  eclipse  of  our  courage, 
which  does  us  little  credit,  but  I  have  promised  myself 
to  be  absolutely  frank.  The  expedient  of  a  congress 
was  well  worn :  whenever  he  found  himself  in  a  predica 
ment  the  Emperor  had  tried  it,  and  always  in  vain. 
We  strove  to  make  it  presentable  once  more  without 
absurdity  by  refurbishing  it  as  to  form.  We  tried  a 
great  number  of  drafts,  until  at  last  I  suggested  orally 
a  form  of  words  which  seemed  apt.  "Go  at  once  to  my 
study  and  put  that  in  writing,"  said  the  Emperor, 
putting  his  hand  on  my  arm.  And,  as  he  spoke, 
tears  were  rolling  down  his  cheeks. 

1  [La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  p.  &91,  quotes  "one  member  of  the  Council"  to  this 
effect,  but  does  not  name  Mm.  —  According  to  the  unpublished  papers  of 
M.  Louvet,  cited  by  La  Gorce  (p.  289),  PEchon  said  to  the  Emperor :  "  *  Sire, 
the  game  is  not  an  even  one  between  King  WiBiani  and  you.  The  King 
can  afford  to  lose  several  battles ;  for  Your  Majesty,  defeat  means  revolu 
tion.*  The  sovereign  seemed  neither  surprised  nor  offended  by  this  out 
spokenness.  £Ah !  Monsieur  Plichon,*  he  said,  'what  you  say  is  very  sad, 
but  I  thank  you  for  your  frankness."*  And  see  Sorel,  vol.  i,  p.  170.] 


316         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAB 

I  returned  with  my  draft;  we  made  a  few  changes 
in  it,  and  adopted  It.1  The  Emperor  would  have 
liked  us  to  read  it  to  the  Chambers  forthwith,  but 
it  was  too  late ;  neither  the  Senate  nor  the  Corps 
Legislatif  would  be  in  session;  moreover,  we  were 
worn  out,  in  no  condition  to  face  the  fierce  storm  that 
would  have  greeted  us.  So  we  postponed  our  dec 
laration  until  the  morrow.  However,  before  leaving 
the  Tuileries  the  Emperor  wrote  Le  Boeuf  a  note, 
which,  although  it  did  not  countermand  the  order 
to  recall  the  reserves,  hinted  at  some  doubt  con 
cerning  the  urgency  of  that  measure.2 

When  I  emerged  from  the  species  of  confinement 
in  which  we  had  been  deliberating  so  many  hours, 
I  felt  what  a  man  feels  on  coming  out  into  the  fresh 
air  from  a  stifling  atmosphere:  the  phantoms  of  the 
brain  vanish,  and  the  mind  resumes  the  consciousness 
of  realities.  The  plan  upon  which  we  had  agreed 
appeared  to  me  as  what  it  really  was,  a  mysterious 
failure  of  courage.  I  was  able  very  speedily  to  con 
vince  myself  of  the  interpretation  that  the  public 
would  have  placed  upon  it.  On  my  return  to  the 
chancellery,  I  assembled  my  family  and  my  secretaries 

1  [Gramont  (p.  212)  gives  the  following  as  the  substance,  if  not  the  exact 
words,  of  the  communication  to  be  made  to  the  Chambers:   "We  believe 
that  the  principle  tacitly  sanctioned  by  Europe  has  been  to  prevent  a  prince 
belonging  to  the  reigning  family  of  any  of  the  great  powers  from  ascending 
a  foreign  throne  without  a  previous  agreement  to  that  effect,  and  we  ask  the 
great  poweis  of  Europe,  assembled  in  Congress,  to  affirm  this  rule  of  inter 
national  law."    But  M.  OIHvier  says  that  these  few  lines  were  simply  an 
outline,  which  was  not  used.]    "My  draft  was  oratorical  in  form  and  pa~ 
thetic  in  tone;  I  have  been  unable  to  find  it  among  my  papers/*     [Note  in 
vol.  xiv,  p.  SS6J 

2  The  order  for  the  recall  of  the  reserves  was  not  withdrawn.    Gramont 
(p.  220)  is  mistaken  in  saying  that  it  WES,    [Note  of  M.  Ollivier,  ibid,] 


PARIS  EXASPERATED  317 

and  read  to  them  the  declaration  agreed  upon.  My 
brothers,  my  wife,  my  general  secretary,  Philis,  one 
and  all,  even  the  partisans  of  peace,  exploded  in  angry 
exclamations.  There  was  a  universal  chorus  of  amaze 
ment  and  reproach. 

Nor  was  our  appeal  to  Europe  more  favorably 
received  at  Saint-Cloud.  "Well !"  said  the  Empress  to 
the  Emperor,  "so  it  seems  that  we  are  to  have  war  ?" 

"No,  we  have  agreed  upon  an  expedient  that  may 
enable  us  to  avoid  it." 

"In  that  case,"  said  the  Empress,  handing  him  a 
copy  of  Le  Peuple  Frangais,  "why  does  your  paper  say 
that  war  is  declared  ?" 

"In  the  first  place,"  rejoined  the  Emperor,  "that 
is  not  my  paper,  as  you  call  it,  and  I  know  nothing 
about  that  item.  Moreover,  this  is  what  was  drawn 
up  at  the  Council."  And  he  gave  her  the  declaration 
to  read. 

"I  doubt/*  said  she,  "whether  this  accords  with 
the  sentiment  of  the  Chambers  and  the  country." 
Only  she  did  not  say  it  calmly,  as  one  would  suppose 
from  the  Emperor's  story  to  Gramont ;  she  expressed 
her  feelings  in  impetuous  terms.1 

1  ["  At  Saint-Cloud,  the  result  of  the  deliberations  at  the  Tuileries  was 
awaited  with  anxiety.  There  the  most  deplorable  passions  held  sway: 
those  born  of  presumption,  anger,  and  ignorance.  At  nightf  all  the  Emperor 
returned,  bringing  with  frirrx  the  faint  hope  of  a  congress.  .  .  .  There  can 
be  no  doubt  that  the  Empress  encouraged,  if  she  did  not  inspire  this  chorus 
of  reprobation.  A  most  honorable  reserve,  born  of  pity  for  misfortune  com 
bined  with  loyalty  to  an  august  sovereign,  has  veied  or  softened  most  of 
the  public  testimony  which  might  accuse  her.  But  from  all  the  unpublished 
correspondence  and  private  papers,  one  fact  stands  out  very  clearly;  and 
that  is  that  she  was,  on  the  side  of  France,  the  principal  author  of  the  war." 
La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  pp.  293,  294.  And  see  Welsdunger,  vol.  i,  pp.  147-151, 
for  an  elaborate  discussion  of  the  subject.] 


318         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

Le  Boeuf,  who,  despite  the  Emperor's  note,  had  de 
spatched  the  orders  for  mobilization  at  eight  hours  and 
forty  minutes  post  meridian,  went  to  Saint-Cloud 
after  dinner  and  urged  the  Emperor  to  assemble  the 
Council  that  evening,  in  order  to  decide  whether  the 
recall  of  the  reserves  should  be  revoked  or  confirmed. 

The  Emperor  telegraphed  to  me  to  summon  the 
ministers  to  Saint-Cloud  on  urgent  business.  He  then 
informed  the  marshal  of  our  plan  for  a  congress,  re 
solved  upon  after  he  had  left  the  Council. 

"Well!  what  do  you  think  of  it?**  inquired  the 
Empress. 

Le  Boeuf  replied  that  war  would  certainly  have  been 
preferable,  but  that,  since  that  idea  was  abandoned, 
the  declaration  in  question  seemed  to  him  the  next 
best  thing. 

"What !  so  you  too  approve  this  dastardly  thing?" 
she  cried.  "If  you  are  willing  to  disgrace  yourself, 
do  not  disgrace  the  Emperor  !" 

"Oh  !"  said  the  Emperor,  "how  can  you  speak  so  to 
a  man  who  has  given  us  so  many  proofs  of  devotion  ?  " 

She  realized  her  mistake,  and  as  impulsive  in  her  re 
gret  as  she  had  been  in  her  harshness,  she  embraced  the 
marshal  and  begged  him  to  forget  her  warmth.  She  had 
intended  especially  to  attack,  over  the  marshal's  head, 
the  middle  course  at  which  we  had  arrived.  In  that 
respect  her  words  were  not  too  strong.  That  evening 
she  felt,  thought,  and  spoke  justly.  Her  wrath  was 
legitimate,  and  she  did  well  to  employ  her  influence  in 
putting  aside  an  expedient  which,  without  preserving 
peace,  would  have  discredited  the  Emperor  forever.1 

1  PJI  Ms  krger  wwk,  M.  OIKvier  lias  this  to  say  of  a  last  attempt  of  tlie 
English  government  to  save  tibe  situation,]  "It  is  fortunate,  if  I  may  say 


PAEIS  EXASPERATED  SIQ 

When  I  set  out  for  Saint-Cloud  it  was  one  of  those 
delicious  evenings  that  we  sometimes  have  in  Paris 
before  August  has  burned  everything  and  withered 
the  foliage.  The  air  was  warm  without  being  oppres 
sive  ;  the  sparkle  of  the  stars  was  less  bright  than  in 

so,  that  we  were  prevented  from  displaying  our  poor  solution  of  the  diffi 
culty  in  the  tribune.  That  very  day  Bismarck,  at  Berlin,  showed  us  how  he 
would  have  accepted  it.  Granville  had  conceived  the  idea  of  a  compromise. 
He  caused  a  memorandum  containing  the  following  suggestion  to  be  placed 
before  the  King  of  Prussia :  'As  His  Majesty  had  consented  to  the  acceptance 
by  Prince  Leopold  of  the  Spanish  crown,,  and  had  thereby,  in  a  certain  sense, 
become  a  party  to  the  arrangement,  so  he  might  with  perfect  dignity  commu 
nicate  to  the  French  Government  his  consent  to  the  withdrawal  of  the 
acceptance,  if  France  shall  waive  her  demand  for  an  engagement  covering 
the  future/  [Granville  to  Lyons,  July  24,  Blue  Book,  p.  28.  Gramont, 
pp.  198-201,  discussing  this  English  proposal,  declares  that  it  was  substan 
tially  identical  with  the  request  of  France  that  the  King  should  *  announce, 
communicate,  or  transmit*  the  withdrawal  of  Prince  Leopold.]  ...  We 
should  have  accepted  this  suggestion,  since,  in  the  Council  ol  the  13th,  we 
had  impliedly  abandoned  the  demand  of  guaranties ;  but  Bismarck  did  not 
give  us  time.  He  received  with  very  ill  grace  a  proposal  which,  just  as  his 
trumpet  was  resounding  through  the  world,  would  bring  the  King  and 
Prussia  into  court.  He  did  not  disguise  Ms  ill  humor  and  assumed  a  very 
lofty  tone.  *  He  expressed  his  regret  that  Her  Majesty's  Government  should 
have  made  a  proposal  which  it  would  be  impossible  for  him  to  recommend  to 
the  King  for  His  Majesty's  acceptance.  Prussia  had  shown,  under  a  public 
menace  from  France,  a  calmness  and  moderation  which  would  render  any 
further  concession  on  her  part  equivalent  to  a  submission  to  the  arbitrary 
will  of  France,  and  would  be  viewed  in  the  light  of  ahumiHation  which  the 
national  feeling  throughout  Germany  would  certainly  repudiate  as  a  fresh 
insult.  .  .  .  The  Prussian  Government,  as  such,  has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
acceptance  of  the  candidature  .  .  .  and  had  not  even  been  cognizant  of  it. 
They  could  not,  therefore,  balance  their  assent  to  such  acceptance  by  their 
assent  to  its  withdrawal.  A  demand  for  interference  on  the  part  of  a  sover 
eign  in  a  matter  of  purely  private  character  could  not,  his  Excellency  con 
sidered,  be  made  the  sub  ject  of  public  communication  between  Governments, 
and  that,  as  the  original  pretext  for  such  a  demand  was  to  be  found  in  the 
candidature  itself,  it  could  no  longer  be  necessary  now  that  the  candidature 
had  been  renounced.'  [Granville  to  Loftus,  July  15,  Blue  Book,  p.  30. 
Both  the  proposal  and  its  rejection  were  made  through  Bernstorff,  Prussian 
Ambassador  to  England.}  .  .  .  One  may  judge  from  this  of  the  fate  in 


320         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

our  South  —  It  was  softer;  the  Seine  flowed  gently, 
with  a  languid  current;  along  the  quays  and  in  the 
avenues  of  the  Bois  de  Boulogne,  where  the  violent 
excitement  of  the  city  did  not  make  itself  felt,  an  in 
fectious  serenity  reigned ;  care-free  youths  and  maidens 
walked  hither  and  thither,  talking  and  laughing. 
The  council  of  Nature  was  for  peace,  the  source  of 
life  and  of  joy,  peace,  sister  of  the  Muses  and  Graces, 
lovable  and  fruitful  peace,  —  and  not  for  war,  the 
terrible  reaper.  'I  heard  her  voice,  and  I  was  like  one 
overwhelmed.  What  would  I  not  have  given  to  lay 
aside  authority,  and  lose  myself  in  that  heedless  throng  ! 

store  for  our  appeal  for  a  congress.  England  .  .  .  would  not  again  nave 
risked  drawing  upon  herself  a  personal  rebuff  and  a  certain  refusal.  Russia 
would  have  been  even  less  likely  to  do  it,  and  Bismarck  would  have  seized 
the  opportunity  to  give  us  a  second  slap  in  the  face,  as  the  first  had 
not  sufficed.  Then,  indeed,  we  should  have  deserved  the  epithet,  'Ministry 
of  Shame/  which  Cassagnac  had  unjustly  applied  to  us  the  day  before." 
U Empire  Lib&al,  pp.  367-369. 

[A  different  view  of  the  probable  result  of  the  suggestion  of  a  congress  is 
held  by  SoreL  "For  a  moment,"  he  says  (vol.  i,  p.  171),  "it  seemed  as  if 
the  ministry  were  going  to  be  clever,  as  if  the  Empire  were  going  to  abstain 
from  making  a  mistake,  and  for  once  at  least  to  defeat  the  schemes  of  its 
foes.  This  suggestion  of  a  congress  would  have  been  a  master-stroke. 
England  would  have  subscribed  to  it;  Russia,  which  had  just  proposed  a 
conference  [on  the  13th:  see  Granville  to  Buchanan,  July  20,  Blue  Book, 
p.  66],  would  undoubtedly  have  done  the  same ;  Prance  could  rely  on  Austria] 
Italy,  and  the  Turkish  Empire.  As  for  Prussia,  she  would  have  found  her 
self  in  the  greatest  embarrassment.  M.  de  Bismarck  considering  himself 
now  as  sure  to  be  challenged  was  rushing  toward  war;  at  the  moment  that 
the  ministry  were  deliberating  in  Paris,  he  was  rejecting  an  attempt  at  inter 
vention  by  England.  This  congress  would  have  surprised  Prussia  and 
upset  her  plans;  it  would  have  compromised  her  before  Europe  and  would 
have  forced  her  to  accept  the  arbitrament  of  the  powers  or  to  lose  their 
moral  support."  And  see  to  the  same  effect,  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  p.  193. 
Welschmger,  vol.  I,  pp.  145, 146,  is  rather  more  doubtful  of  the  result,  because 
the  congress  would  have  exacted  some  things  to  which  the  ultra-Bonapartists 
might  not  have  assented.  "Still,  anything  was  preferable  to  blind  precipi 
tation."] 


PARIS  EXASPERATED 

Under  the  influence  of  this  emotion  I  reviewed  the 
question  once  more  from  the  beginning.  I  set  the 
arguments  on  one  side  and  the  other  face  to  face  once 
more,  dwelling  especially  on  the  arguments  for  peace. 
Drops  of  sweat  born  of  my  inward  anguish  moistened  my 
brow.  Et  in  agonia  ego.  But  to  no  purpose  did  I  ar 
gue  and  quibble  and  contend  against  common  sense  — 
it  seized  me,  crushed  me,  vanquished  me,  and  I  came 
back  always  to  the  same  conclusion:  France  had 
been  wilfully,  grossly  insulted,  and  we  should  be  faith 
less  guardians  of  her  honor  if  we  tolerated  it.  When 
a  saint  is  struck,  he  kneels  and  offers  the  other  cheek. 
Could  we  propose  to  the  French  nation  to  assume  that 
attitude  ?  There  is  something  noble  and  triumphant, 
I  know,  in  a  fearless  insensibility  to  insults,  "whereby 
they  turn  and  fall  in  their  full  force  upon  the  insulters." 
But  is  it  not  true  that  such  disdain,  which  is  a  virtue  in 
the  individual,  is  the  degradation  of  a  nation  ? 

At  last  my  carriage  stopped  at  the  entrance  of  the 
Chateau  of  Saint-Cloud.  I  was  the  first  to  arrive.  I 
found  the  Emperor  alone.  He  explained  in  a  few  words 
the  reason  for  the  unexpected  summons;  then  he  said : 
"Upon  reflection,  the  declaration  that  we  agreed  upon 
this  afternoon  seems  to%me  far  from  satisfactory." 

"I  agree  with  you,  Sire;  if  we  should  offer  it  to  the 
Chambers,  the  people  would  throw  mud  at  our  car 
riages  and  hoot  us." 

After  a  few  moments'  silence,  the  Emperor  added : 
"Just  see  in  what  a  position  a  government  may  some 
times  find  itself :  even  if  we  had  no  admissible  excuse 
for  war,  we  should  be  obliged  none  the  less  to  make 
up  our  minds  to  it,  in  order  to  comply  with  the  will  of 
the  country/* 


322        THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

Our  colleagues  arrived  one  after  another  —  all 
save  Segris,  Louvet,  and  Pliclion,  whom  the  summons 
did  not  reach.1  The  Empress  was  present  at  the 
Council,  for  the  first  time.  Le  Bceuf  explained  the 
object  of  the  meeting.  The  Emperor's  note  had 
disturbed  him ;  then  he  had  been  informed  of  the  new 
scheme  upon  which  the  Council  had  determined; 
he  wanted  the  Council  to  decide  whether  this  new 
policy  could  be  reconciled  with  the  recall  of  the  reserves ; 
he  had  despatched  orders  to  that  end  as  the  result 
of  our  earlier  decision,  but  that  fact  need  not  influence 
our  deliberations :  if  we  thought  it  necessary  to  revoke 
the  order,  he  alone  would  assume  the  responsibility 
therefor  before  the  country,  and  would  resign. 

Gramont  did  not  give  us  time  to  discuss  that  con 
tingency.  He  placed  before  us  the  despatches  that 
had  arrived  since  we  had  left  the  Tuileries,  as  well 
as  Lesourd's  report  on  the  attitude  of  Bismarck  at 
Berlin  during  the  13th,  the  last  telegram  from  Ems,  and 
telegrams  from  Berne  and  Munich. 

Lesourd  informed  us  that,  after  the  news  of  the  with 
drawal  of  the  candidacy,  there  had  been  a  change 
in  Berlin  from  the  tranquillity  that  he  had  noted 
during  the  past  week  and  that  composure  had  sud 
denly  given  place  to  irritation.  He  told  us  of  the 
pessimistic  impressions  that  Loftus  had  brought  away 
from  his  interview  with  Bismarck. 

Benedetti,  in  an  embarrassed  tone,  put  us  au  courant 
of  the  events  which  we  already  know  of  the  last  day 
at  Ems. 

But  far  more  serious  and  significant  was  the  telegram 
from  Berne !  This  telegram  (sent  at  half -past  four) 

1  ["M.  Louvet  seems  to  tave  been  forgotten."    La  Goree,  vol.  vi,  p.  297.] 


PARIS  EXASPERATED 

from  Comminges-Guitaud,  our  minister,  was  in  these 
words :  — 

**  General  de  Roeder  this  morning  transmitted  to 
the  President  a  telegram  from  Count  Bismarck  announc 
ing  King  William's  refusal  to  bind  himself,  as  King 
of  Prussia,  never  again  to  give  his  assent  to  the  can 
didacy  of  the  Hohenzollern  prince,  if  it  should  be 
brought  forward  again;  and  also  the  King's  refusal, 
as  a  result  of  that  demand,  to  receive  our  Ambassador.'* 

Cadore,  our  minister  at  Munich,  said :  — 

"I  think  it  my  duty  to  transmit  to  you  an  almost 
literal  copy  of  the  despatch  sent  by  Count  Bismarck: 
*  After  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern's  withdrawal  was 
officially  communicated  to  the  French  government 
by  the  Spanish  government,  the  Ambassador  of  France 
demanded  of  His  Majesty  the  King,  at  Ems,  authority 
to  telegraph  to  Paris  that  His  Majesty  would  bind 
himself  to  refuse  his  assent  for  all  time  if  the  princes 
should  reconsider  their  decision.  His  Majesty  refused 
to  receive  the  Ambassador  again,  and  sent  word  to 
him  by  an  aide-de-camp  that  he  had  no  further  com 
munication  to  make  to  him.'  *' 1 

The  official  character  of  the  two  telegrams  was  evident. 
Comminges-Guitaud  and  Cadore  had  not  heard  of 
them  through  the  confidential  communications  of  col 
leagues,  but  from  the  lips  of  the  Presidents  of  the 
Swiss  Confederation  and  of  the  Bavarian  Council 
of  Ministers,  to  whom  the  Prussian  ministers  had 

1  "The  despatch  added  that  'The  King  of  Bavaria  would  doubtless  be 
impressed  by  the  fact  that  M.  Benedetti  had  accosted  the  King  on  the  prom- 
enade  in  an  insulting  manner.* "  L' Empire  IMrtd,  vol.  xiv,  p.  375.  ["This 
calumny  was  suggested,"  says  Gramont  (p.  £S2  n.)»  "by  the  desire  to  strike 
the  impressionable  imagination  of  the  young  King  of  Bavaria,  and  to  over 
come,  with  the  aid  of  that  romantic  prince,  the  hesitation  of  Ms  people.**] 


324         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

presented  them  at  official  audiences.  If  the  com 
munication  had  been  confined  to  Munich,  we  might 
have  thought  that  it  was  simply  a  matter  of  an  isolated 
notification  to  an  ally  who  was  interested  to  know  the 
status  of  an  affair  of  common  concern;  but  the  com 
munication  at  Berne,  to  a  neutral  government,  could 
be  explained  only  on  the  assumption  that  general 
instructions  had  been  transmitted  to  all  the  legations 
of  the  North-German  government.1 

It  was  as  certain  therefore  as  any  diplomatic  fact 
can  be  that  the  Prussian  government  had  officially 
informed  all  the  foreign  cabinets  of  the  refusal  of  the 
Bang  of  Prussia  to  receive  our  Ambassador  and  to 
consider  our  demands.  Had  we,  in  our  haste,  fallen 
into  a  trap  by  ascribing  an  official  character  to  that 
which  was  only  informal  ?  A  most  foolish  supposi 
tion.  To  no  purpose  should  we  have  cudgelled  our 
brains  for  whole  days  and  nights  —  we  could  never 
have  succeeded  in  understanding  that  a  communi 
cation  by  a  diplomatic  agent  to  a  foreign  minister 
is  not  an  official  act.  Between  diplomatic  agents 
and  foreign  ministers  everything  is  official.  There 

1  One  of  those  diplomatists  who,  with  a  certain  affectation  of  impartiality, 
have  most  distorted  the  acts  of  his  government,  Rothan,  has  said  (in  Alle- 
magne et  Italie,  vol.  i,  p.  17  n.) :  "The  Prussian  despatch  aroused  great  excite 
ment  in  all  the  diplomatic  centres,  bnt  nowhere  eke  was  the  same  official 
character  attributed  to  it  as  at  Berne  and  Munich  ! "  It  is  incomprehensible 
that  a  diplomatist  could  write  such  claptrap.  The  communication  made  at 
Berne  and  Munich,  which  he  recognizes  as  undeniably  official,  was  so  made 
by  virtue  of  general  instructions  sent  to  all  Prussian  agents.  So  that  one 
cannot  understand  how  it  could  have  been  of  one  character  hi  one  country 
and  of  a  different  character  in  another.  And  finally,  how  could  a  diplomatist 
be  ignorant  of  the  fact  that  a  communication  made  by  one  government  to 
all  other  governments  is  necessarily  official  ?  [Note  of  M.  Ollivier  vol  xiv 
p.  375J 


PARIS  EXASPERATED 

can  be  nothing  Informal  between  them  except  con 
versations,  when,  both  having  first  laid  aside  their 
diplomatic  functions,  they  exchange  their  opinions 
freely,  without  binding  their  governments  or  them 
selves.  The  very  form  of  official  documents  is  different : 
there  are  despatches  of  which  one  leaves  copies,  others 
which  one  reads  only,  and,  lastly,  there  are  some 
which  one  summarizes  orally,  without  reading  or 
leaving  copies.  Among  these  last  are  the  so-called 
despatches  of  information,  which  advise  diplomatic 
agents  of  certain  facts,  to  the  end  that  they  may 
communicate  them  to  the  governments  to  which  they 
are  accredited  without  asking  them  for  explanations.1 
Such  was  the  telegram  communicated  by  Bismarck, 

1  [M.  Ollivier  elaborates  his  argument  by  illustrative  notes  on  pp.  377, 
378.  And  on  pp.  378-380,  is  the  following  passage,  which  he  might  well 
have  included  in  the  present  volume,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  bitterest 
critics  of  his  administration  nave  made  light  both  of  the  Ems  despatch  itself, 
and  of  Bismarck's  mis-handling  of  it.] 

"It  was  not  long  before  we  acquired  superabundant  proof  that  we  had  mot 
erred  in  inferring  from  the  telegrams  from  Berne  and  Munich  that  aE  tlie 
Prussian  Ambassadors  had  officially  informed  the  foreign  cabinets  of  the 
King's  refusal  to  receive  our  Ambassador.  Thus,  our  minister  at  Dresden 
wrote  us  on  July  15 :  'This  telegram,  which  has  every  appearance  of  being 
official,  is  published  by  the  Dresden  Journal;  M  de  Nostitz  admits  that  it 
comes  from  the  Prussian  government/  Bismarck  himself  was  not  slow  to 
dissipate  all  doubt.  In  his  circular  letter  of  July  18,  he  enclosed  the  text  of 
the  telegram  with  this  title :  'Telegram  of  the  Prussian  Government.*  Hie 
telegram  of  a  government  is  manifestly  an  official  act.  He  had  atfiist  main 
tained  that  his  information  had  been  sent  to  a  few  German  governments 
only ;  but  he  rejected  that  fiction,  and,  in  instructing  Ms  Ambassador  to  place 
the  text  before  the  English  ministry,  he  gave  it  a  title  wjdch  tibe  Blue  Book 
translated  thus:  'Telegram  addressed  by  the  Prussian  Government  to 
Foreign  Governments.*  [Blue  Booh  No.  3,  p.  7.]  ...  This  much  from 
love  of  accuracy ;  for  the  information  sent  out  on  the  evening  of  the  13th, 
even  if  it  had  been  unofficial,  combined  with  the  spreading  broadcast  of  the 
North  German  Gazette*  would  have  seemed  to  us  as  intolerable  an  insult  as  if 
it  had  been  official."  [See  Appendix  K] 


326         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

first  to  Ms  official  newspapers,  then  to  his  agents  in 
foreign  countries. 

I  was  beaten  in  my  fight  for  peace.  In  the  most 
pacific  of  my  speeches,  I  had  said:  "We,  too,  are 
hungry  for  peace,  but  we  desire  peace  with  honor, 
peace  with  dignity,  peace  with  strength !  If  peace 
lay  in  weakness,  in  humiliation,  in  debasement,  I 
would  say  without  hesitation,  *  Better  war,  a  thousand 
times!9" 

After  this  slap  in  the  face  from  Bismarck  peace  was 
no  longer  possible  save  in  weakness,  in  humiliation, 
in  debasement,  for  "if  a  blow  does  not  hurt,  it  kills  !" 
Thenceforth  we  were  no  longer  justified  in  wasting 
time  in  fruitless  and  dangerous  sentimentality;  we 
had  only  t6  accept  the  meeting  to  which  we  were 
driven. 

We  confirmed  the  recall  of  the  reserves,  already 
under  way  since  forty  minutes  past  four,  and  it  was 
agreed  that  Gramont  and  I  should  prepare  the  draft 
of  a  declaration  to  be  considered  on  the  morrow  at  a 
Council  which  none  of  my  colleagues  would  fail  to 
attend.  In  this  meeting  at  Saint-Cloud  there  had  been 
no  discussion  properly  so  called,  but  only  a  conver 
sation  in  which  all  had  expressed  substantially  the 
same  opinions.  The  Empress  alone  listened  without 
uttering  a  word.  We  did  not  vote  by  name  and 
mm  voce*  as  our  custom  was  on  serious  questions.  In 
truth  we  could  not  adopt  a  definite  course  in  the  ab 
sence  of  three  of  our  colleagues,  for  whose  opinions 
we  all  had  great  respect.  Plichon  arrived  at  the  end 
of  the  session.  We  told  him  of  what  we  had  done. 

At  half-past  eleven  we  returned  to  Paris.  Thus 
ended  that  evening,  which  has  been  represented  as 


PARIS  EXASPERATED  327 

a  fatal  night  during  which  the  fate  of  France  and  the 
dynasty  was  decided,  and  when  peace,  after  triumph 
ing  for  half  an  hour,  was  cast  aside  by  the  power  of 
I  know  not  what  mysterious  legerdemain  whose  nature 
is  not  disclosed.  There  was  an  exchange  of  ideas, 
whence  came  the  conclusion  that  war  could  not  be 
avoided;  but  nothing  was  decided.  No  final  reso 
lution  was  reached,  no  irrevocable  step  was  taken. 
The  recall  of  the  reserves  was  confirmed,  but  it  had  been 
decreed  in  the  afternoon  session  of  the  Council  at  the 
Tuileries.  A  new  declaration  was  deemed  necessary, 
but  its  preparation  was  postponed  till  the  morrow.1 

1  [There  is  much  confusion  in  the  various  accounts  of  these  Councils  of 
the  14th,  not  only  as  to  just  what  was  done  at  each  of  them,  and  in  what 
order  the  different  measures  were  adopted  and  rescinded  and  adopted  anew, 
but  as  to  how  many  times  the  Council  actually  met.  M.  Ollivier  mentions 
only  two  meetings  —  in  the  afternoon  and  evening ;  but  Gramont  seems  to 
imply  that  there  was  one  in  the  morning  (p.  206),  and  other  writers  state 
without  comment  that  the  Council  met  at  nine  o'clock.  Lehautcourt,  voL  i, 
p.  314 ;  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  p.  286.  In  1886,  M.  Plichon  being  then  a  member 
of  the  National  Assembly,  M.  Ollivier  took  exception  to  a  statement  made 
by  him  in  debate,  to  the  effect  that  he  was  not  present  at  the  sitting  of  the 
Council,  when  war  was  decided  upon,  and  a  long  correspondence  ensued 
between  them,  all  of  which  is  printed  by  M.  Ollivier  in  the  Sdcdrcwemente  to 
vol.  xiv,  pp.  605-620.  M.  Plichon  claimed  that  the  decisive  action  was 
taken  at  the  meeting  on  the  evening  of  the  14th,  in  his  absence;  whereas 
M.  Ollivier  maintained  that  the  actual  decision  was  not  reached  until  the 
meeting  on  the  morning  of  the  15th.  Incidentally,  the  question  as  to  the 
number  of  councils  on  the  14th  was  raised  by  M.  Plichon,  who  stood  out  for 
three,  while  his  correspondent  declared  the  one  in  the  morning  to  have  been 
simply  a  conversation  between  ministers  at  the  Chancellery.  The  corre 
spondence  is  mainly  interesting,  however,  in  the  light  it  throws  upon 
the  reasons  which  actuated  some  at  least  of  the  ministers  who  were  op 
posed  to  the  war  in  accepting  the  accomplished  fact  and  maintaining  the 
solidarity  of  the  Cabinet.  See  Welsehinger,  vol  i,  pp.  159-165.  See  also 
a  passage  from  the  Cormd&ra&tns  sw  PHiMoire  du  Second  Empire*  by 
M.  Parieu,  quoted  by  Welsehinger,  p.  158. 

In  his  deposition  at  the  Inquiry  concerning  the  4th  of  September,  Marshal 
Le  Bceuf  testified  that,  at  eleven  o'clock  in  the  evening,  it  was  about  decided 


328         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

A  former  minister,  Grivard,  told  the  story,  as  told 
to  him  by  MacMahon,  who  learned  it  from  de  Piennes 
the  chamberlain,  that,  in  the  midst  of  our  deliberations, 
the  Emperor  was  suddenly  taken  with  a  syncope 
and  hurriedly  withdrew.  The  Empress,  instead  of 

to  postpone  mobilization,  when  a  despatch  was  handed  to  M.  de  Gramont. 
"That  despatch  was  read  to  the  Council.  It  was  of  such  a  nature  that  there 
was  a  reaction;  we  decided  that  the  order  for  mobilization  should  be  con 
firmed."  Which  despatch  this  was  of  those  which,  as  Gramont  says  (p.  220), 
"destroyed  one  after  another,  during  the  day,  or,  rather,  the  night,  the  hopes 
of  the  Cabinet  for  peace/*  has  never  been  disclosed ;  but  M,  Sorel,  by  a  pro 
cess  of  exclusion,  reaches  the  conviction  that  it  was  that  one  by  which  the 
Foreign  Minister  "received,  through  an  unofficial  source,  a  very  exact  account 
of  the  language  held  by  M.  de  Bismarck  on  the  preceding  day,  to  the  English 
Ambassador,  and  of  the  attitude  taken  up  on  the  13th  by  the  Cabinet  of 
Berlin.  ...  I  could  not  for  an  instant  doubt  the  accuracy  of  my  informa 
tion,  and  I  soon  had  tangible  proof  thereof."  Gramont,  p.  223.  (See 
Appendix  L.)  For  an  account  of  the  duke's  apparently  irreconcilable 
statements  as  to  the  time  at  which  he  first  learned  of  this  momentous  inter 
view,  see  Sorel,  vol.  i,  p.  177  n. 

By  way  of  refutation  of  this  reasoning,  perhaps,  M.  Ollivier  in  the  Appen 
dix  to  vol.  xiv,  pp.  618-619,  denies  Le  Bceuf  s  story  of  the  despatch  handed 
to  M.  de  Gramont  and  the  consequent  reaction  in  the  Council.  He  says 
that  from  the  first  moment  to  the  last  of  the  Council  in  the  evening  all  the 
members  present  were  agreed  that  in  view  of  the  slap  in  the  face  they  had 
received,  there  was  no  room  for  further  deliberation,  and  war  was  inevi 
table.  The  only  despatch  handed  to  Gramont  during  the  session  was  that 
from  Cadore  [at  Munich.]  "That  despatch  did  not  change  peaceable  to  war 
like  dispositions,  but  simply  confirmed  the  warlike  dispositions  which  we 
had  adopted  without  variation  or  dissent  from  the  first  moment  of  our 
meeting.  .  .  .  Nor  were  we  influenced  by  a  report  which  Gramont  received 
from  Vienna,  by  an  indirect  channel,  of  the  language  held  on  the  14th  by 
M.  de  Bismarck  to  the  English  Ambassador.  .  .  .  What  he  read  was  Le- 
sonrd's  despatches  telling  us  what  Loftus  had  told  Mm  of  Bismarck's  lan 
guage.  But  there  was  nothing  in  that  to  surprise  us,"  etc.  [And  see  Von 
Sybel,  English  trans.,  vol.  vii,  p.  413  n.] 

"The  whole  day  of  the  14th/*  satys  La  Gorce,  "is  summed  up  in  this  tragic 
contrast :  on  the  one  side,  France  hesitating  before  supreme  measures ;  on 
the  other,  Prussia  pressing  imperiously  upon  her  adversary  and  compelling 
her  to  complete  the  aggression"  (voL  vi,  p.  286).] 


PAKIS  EXASPERATED  329 

going  with  him  to  look  to  his  needs,  is  said  to  have 
remained  with  us  and  to  have  taken  advantage  of 
her  husband's  absence  to  change  our  views,  so  that  the 
Emperor,  having  recovered  and  returned  to  the  Coun 
cil,  found  the  ministers  in  warlike  mood  whom  he  had 
left,  a  few  moments  before,  peacefully  inclined.  If 
persons  who  were  not  present  witnessed  this  incident, 
I  declare  that  none  of  those  who  were  present  wit-, 
nessed  it.1 

1  [This  story  is  told  by  Welschinger  (vol.  I,  pp.  154-156),  from  "an 
unpublished  note  of  the  former  minister  and  senator,  Grivart,  who  got  It 
from  Marshal  MacMahon  and  from  M.  de  Piennes,  the  Empress's  chamber 
lain."  According  to  this  version  the  Emperor,  having  entered  the  Council 
Chamber  with  the  Empress,  read  a  speech  tending  to  pacific  measures.  He 
was  about  to  take  a  vote,  when  he  was  taken  ill,  and  was  obliged  to  leave 
the  room.  "  What  impelled  the  Empress  to  intervene  . .  .  was  the  despatches 
that  had  arrived  during  the  evening**  —  those  from  Ems  and  Berlin; 
and  the  telegrams  from  Berne  and  Munich..  "The  Council  believed  that 
those  two  telegrams  were  official.  .  .  .  Allowing  themselves  to  be  misled 
by  appearances,  and  fancying  that  they  must  reply  on  the  spot  to  the  provo 
cation,  the  ministers  who  were  present  realized  that  war  could  not  be  avoided. 
They  confirmed  the  recall  of  the  reserves,  and  decided  that  the  Due  de 
Gramont  and  M.  Emile  Ollivier  should  prepare  a  draft  of  a  declaration  of 
war.  The  Empress  had  proved  to  the  Council  that  there  was  nothing  left 
to  do  but  to  accept  the  meeting  to  which  Prussia  was  driving  us."  It  is 
incredible,  as  M.  Ollivier  suggests,  that  so  extraordinary  an  incident  should 
never  have  been  mentioned  by  any  of  those  present  at  the  Council. 

It  is  probable  that  the  paragraph  in  the  text  oWes  its  being  to  the  above- 
quoted  passage  in  Welschinger,  as  it  does  not  appear  in  L* Empire  Lvfo&ral; 
on  the  other  hand,  there  is  at  this  point  in  vol.  xiv,  pp.  381,  $82,  the  following 
paragraph.  "At  the  close  of  this  day,  begun  with  such  comforting  hope  and 
ending  with  so  tragic  a  prospect,  I  found  Mitchell  at  my  house.  I  told  him 
the  decision  ,we  had  formed  and  the  profound  grief  that  I  felt  at  being  com 
pelled  to  declare  war,  I  who  had  not  ceased  to  straggle  to  f orfend  any  war 
whatsoever,  and  especially  a  war  with  Germany !  He  shared  my  affliction. 
*  Well  !*  he  said,  *hand  in  your  resignation.*  —  *I  can't  do  it;  the  country 
has  confidence  in  me;  I  am  the  guaranty  of  the  compact  that  binds  the 
Empire  to  Ranee.  If  I  should  retire,  the  accession  of  a  Rouher  ministry 
would  be  regarded  as  a  sort  of  coup  d'etat  against  the  parliamentary  re 
forms  ;  the  situation,  already  so  grave,  would  be  complicated  by  internal 


330         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

That  morning  Lyons,  with,  his  usual  perspicacity, 
had  foreseen  the  effect  that  would  be  produced  by  the 
blow  from  Ems  when  the  public  should  be  apprized 
of  it.  "The  language  of  influential  members  of  the 
Cabinet/'  he  wrote  to  Granville,  "was  more  pacific, 
and  it  was  thought  possible  that  some  conciliatory 
intelligence  might  arrive  from  Prussia  and  enable  the 
Government  to  pronounce  the  whole  question  to  be  at 
an  end.  .  .  .  The  intelligence  of  the  publication 
of  this  article  [from  the  North-German  Gazette  ]completely 
changed  the  view  taken  by  the  French  government 
of  the  state  of  the  question.  .  .  .  Although  the  .  .  . 
article  in  the  North-German  Gazette  had  not  become 
generally  known,  the  public  excitement  was  so  great 
and  so  much  irritation  existed  in  the  army,  that  it 
became  doubtful  whether  the  Government  could  withstand 
the  cry  for  war,  even  if  it  were  able  to  announce  a  decided 
diplomatic  success.  It  was  felt  when  the  Prussian 
article  appeared  in  the  Paris  evening  papers,  it  would 
be  very  difficult  to  restrain  the  anger  of  the  people, 
and  .  .  .  that  the  Government  would  feel  bound 
to  appease  the  public  impatience  by  formally  declaring 
its  intention  to  resent  the  conduct  of  Prussia."  * 

difficulties.  And  then,*  I  added,  *war  is  decided  upon,  it  is  legitimate,  it  is 
inevitable;  no  human  power  could  avert  it  to-day.  Since  we  cannot  pre 
vent  it,  it  is  our  duty  to  make  it  popular.  By  retiring  we  should  discourage 
the  country,  we  should  demoralize  the  army,  we  should  contest  the  right 
eousness  and  justice  of  the  cause  of  Prance.'  —  '"What  do  you  hope  for, 
pray  ?*  —  'For myself,  nothing.  After  the  victory'  (of  which  I  was  certain, 
Hke  everybody  else)  *the  military  spirit  will  try  to  steal  my  work  If  we 
are  victorious,  God  save  our  liberties !  if  we  are  beaten,  may  God  help 
Prance !  * "  [This  conversation  was  printed  by  M.  Mitchell,  in  substantially 
the  same  words,  in  an  article  in  the  Cwrrier  de  France  of  Sept.  24,  1872. 
See Lehautcourt,  vol.  i,  p.  SIS;  WelscMnger,  vol.  i,  pp.  157, 158.] 
1  [July  14,  Elm  Bmk,  p.  $6.] 


PABIS  EXASPERATED  331 

The  explosion  of  public  feeling  surpassed  what 
Lyons  had  anticipated.  Clamor  belli  ascendit  ad 
coelum  id  tuba.  The  cry  for  war  arose  on  all  sides. 
The  journals  favorable  to  peace  hardly  dared  whisper 
a  word  or  two.  The  others  went  beyond  all  bounds. 

"It  is  all  war/*  Marshal  Vaillant  wrote  in  his  note 
book.  The  boulevards  wore  the  aspect  of  public 
holidays.  The  police  report  told  us:  "The  same 
crowds,  the  same  curiosity,  the  same  effervescence; 
the  movement. of  carriages  was  impossible;  the  omni 
buses  had  to  change  their  routes.  On  all  sides  there 
were  shouts  of  ' Vive  la  guerre!'  ' To  Berlin! '  In  propor 
tion  as  the  possibility  of  an  adjustment  had  caused  dis 
appointment,  the  rupture  of  the  negotiations  was  wel 
comed  with  feverish  excitement.  All  breathed  freely, 
as  if  delivered  from  a  burdensome  uncertainty/' 

The  Liberti,  by  the  pen  of  Albert  Duniy,  declared 
triumphantly  the  next  morning:  "The  declaration, 
which  the  Senate  and  Corps  Legislatif  awaited  with 
patriotic  anxiety,  did  not  appear.  But  in  compen 
sation  Paris  yesterday  made  its  declaration  of  war  on 
Prussia.  Paris  replied  with  the  Marseittaise  to  M.  de 
Bismarck's  latest  defiance."  x 

While  the  furor  teutonicus  and  the  furor  gattiem 
were  thus  unleashed,  Benedetti  continued  imper- 
turbdbly  to  solicit  audiences.  On  the  morning  of 

1  [Other  extracts  from  various  Parisian  papers  are  given  in  L' Empire 
Liberal,  vol.  xiv,  pp.  38S-3S7,  together  with  more  details  concerning  the 
scenes  of  excitement  in  th$  streets.  It  was  charged  in  some  quarters  that 
the  manifestations  were  started  and  subsidized  by  the  police.  But  they 
"embarrassed  the  government  more  than  they  assisted  it.  ...  A  single 
act  was  of  a  nature  to  make  us  appear  as  if  we  were  stirring  up  public  excite 
ment,  and  that  was  the  giving  permission  to  sing  the  Mar&eiGmse  at  the 
Opera.  Maurice  Kichard  obtained  the  permission  directly  from  the  Emperor. 
Hie  Council,  who  were  not  consulted,  were  not  pleased."] 


332         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

July  14  he  had  read  in  the  Cologne  Gazette  the  Ems 
telegram ;  he  made  no  mistake  either  as  to  its  source  or 
its  scope.  He  had  said  nothing  to  any  one  concerning 
the  events  of  the  previous  day,  so  that  the  despatch 
could  have  emanated  only  from  the  King's  cabinet ;  it 
gave  an  insulting  turn  to  the  last  incidents  of  the  negoti 
ations  at  Ems.  In  common  with  nations  and  statesmen 
he  had  heard  the  word  war  that  issued  from  that  de 
spatch.  "The  government,"  he  said,  "might  have  hesi 
tated  on  the  12th,  it  could  hardly  do  so  on  the  15th." 

There  was  nothing  left  for  him  to  do,  therefore,  but  to 
return  to  Paris,  whither  Gramont  had  summoned  him, 
and,  since  he  had  been  dismissed,  to  accept  his  dismissal 
and  take  his  departure  proudly,  without  a  word  to  any 
one.  But  he  had  not  had  enough  rebuffs  on  the  previ 
ous  days;  he  must  needs  invite  more,  and  they  were 
lavishly  bestowed. 

The  first  came  from  Eulenbourg,  Minister  of  the  In 
terior.  It  occurred  to  Benedetti  to  go  to  him  and  urge 
the  pacific  subtleties  invented  by  Gramont,  in  order 
to  take  upon  himself  the  appearance  of  having  secured 
the  King's  approval ;  they  were  quite  out  of  fashion  at 
that  moment.  The  Minister  expressed  his  intention  to 
submit  them  to  His  Majesty,  and  even  promised  to  see 
him;  again;  but  he  speedily  sent  word  to  him,  in  his 
turn,  that  he  "had  no  further  communication  to  make 
to  him.9*  Thus  our  Ambassador,  having  been  thrice 
refused  an  audience  by  the  King,  completed  his  collec 
tion  by  adding  to  it  a  refusal  of  audience  by  a  minister. 
Even  that  did  not  exhaust  the  zeal  of  his  humility. 

The  King,  realizing  that  that  was  not  the  time  to  con 
tinue  a  water-cure,  determined  to  start  that  same 
day  for  Coblentz,  so  as  to  reach  Berlin  the  next  day  and 


PARIS  EXASPERATED  333 

make  the  military  dispositions  which  the  situation  of 
affairs  would  certainly  demand.  Benedetti,  informed  of 
his  proposed  departure,  felt  called  upon,  in  order  not  to 
disregard  the  proprieties,  to  request  an  aide-de-camp  to 
tell  the  King  of  his  desire  to  take  his  leave  of  His 
Majesty.  This  step  brought  him  one  more  refusal  of 
an  audience.  His  Majesty  continued  to  keep  his  apart 
ments  closed  to  him,  but  admitted  him  to  a  railroad 
station,  that  is  to  say,  to  an  antechamber,  to  salute  him 
as  he  passed. 

And  so,  apparently  with  no  conception  that  he  repre 
sented  France  and  the  Emperor,  Benedetti  went  to 
wish  a  pleasant  journey  to  the  sovereign  who  was  leav 
ing  Ems  in  order  to  hurl  his  armies  of  invasion  against 
France  and  the  Emperor.  "The  King,"  he  said,  "con 
fined  himself  to  saying  that  he  had  no  further  com 
munication  to  make  to  me,  and  that  the  negotiations 
that  might  still  be  carried  on  would  be  continued  by  his 
government." l 

RadziwilFs  memorandum  is  even  more  concise: 
''Count  Benedetti's  wish  to  take  leave  of  His  Majesty 
on  his  departure  was  gratified,  for  the  King,  on  starting 
for  Coblentz,  July  14,  saluted  the  count  in  the  railway 
station  as  he  passed."  2 

1  [See  Benedetti's  despatches  of  July  14, 12.30  pjyL,  in  Benedetti  385-887; 
Gramont,  221-223.] 

2  [See  Appendix  K.    M.  Olivier  adds  at  this  point  in  L9 Empire  LMral 
some  details  of  the  comments  in  German  newspapers  on  the  King's  amia 
bility  to  Benedetti  at  the  station,  with  the  reflection  that]  "amiability  to 
the  person  of  an  ambassador,  whose  sovereign  one  has  abused,  is  simply 
adding  insult  to  injury"  (p.  389).     "That  same  evening  the   unofficial 
North  German  Gazette  published  in  huge  letters  a  short  notice  to  the  effect 
that  Benedetti  had  lost  sight  of  the  rules  of  diplomatic  relations  to  the  point 
of  not  refraining  from  disturbing  the  King  at  his  water-cure,  of  questioning 
Mm  OE  the  promenade,  and  of  extorting  explanations  from  him." 


CHAPTER  XXI 

OUR  EEPLY  TO  BISMAECK'S  SLAP  IN  THE  FACE:    THE 
DECLARATION  OF  JULY  15 

ON  Friday,  July  15,  at  nine  in  the  morning,  the  Coun 
cil  met  at  Saint-Cloud.1  The  Empress  was  present,  as 
were  all  the  ministers,  perfectly  free  to  decide  and  vote 
as  they  chose,  no  irrevocable  public  act  having  been 
done.  Even  those  among  them  who,  in  the  conversa 
tion  of  the  previous  evening,  had  believed  war  to  be 
inevitable,  might,  after  a  night's  reflection,  express 
different  views,  and,  rejecting  the  declaration  which  we 
had  prepared,  revert  either  to  the  proposed  appeal  to 
Europe,  or  to  any  other  solution. 

Gramont  read  the  draft  that  we  had  prepared  in  con 
cert.  I  had  looked  to  it  that  the  grounds  of  our  deci 
sion  should  be  stated  in  such  wise  that  no  one  could 
misunderstand  them,  and  that  it  should  be  beyond  ques 
tion  that  we  had  obstinately  refused,  at  the  last  moment 
as  at  the  outset,  to  extend  the  discussion  beyond  the 
Hohenzollern  candidacy;  that  we  invoked  neither  the 
Treaty  of  Prague  nor  the  breach  of  faith  in  respect  to 
Luxembourg,  nor  the  constant  double-dealing,  nor  the 

1  PJI  a  note  on  p.  391  of  vol.  xiv,  M.  OUivier  quotes  the  Journal  Offidel 
to  prove  tfiat  the  council  of  the  loth  was  held  at  Saint-Cloud  and  not  at 
the  Tmleries,  **as  some  parsons,  relying  upon  the  accuracy  of  their  memories, 
persist  in  asserting/'  He  evidently  refers  to  M.  PEchon,  who  made  that 
mistaken  assertion  confidently  in  the  correspondence  alluded  to  above 
p.  325  n.  See  vol.  x!v,  p.  609.] 

83* 


DECIAEATION  OF  JULY  15  335 

Incessant  provocation,  nor  the  impatience  to  have  done 
with  it  all  and  to  escape  from  an  enervating  and  intoler 
able  tension,  nor  the  necessity  of  wiping  out  the  memory 
of  Sadowa;  and  that,  even  in  the  Hohenzollern  affair, 
everything  was  not  equally  a  subject  of  complaint :  that 
we  alleged,  as  the  decisive  reason  for  our  action,  neither 
the  refusal  to  guarantee  the  future  by  a  simple  promise, 
nor  the  refusal  to  give  official  form  to  a  private  approval, 
nor  even  the  refusal  to  receive  and  listen  to  our  am 
bassador.  We  were  outraged  by  that  refusal  of  an  au 
dience  solely  because  it  had  become  a  palpable  insult 
by  virtue  of  the  promulgation  of  the  telegram  placarded 
in  the  streets  and  transmitted  to  the  legations  and 
newspapers.  In  other  words  our  declaration  was  simply 
a  reply  to  the  blow  inflicted  by  the  Ems  despatch  —  a 
reply  which  Germany  herself  seemed  to  advise  by  await 
ing  it  as  inevitable. 

At  the  words  with  which  it  concluded  the  Emperor 
clapped  his  hands.  Chevandier  took  the  floor  and  ^aid : 
"  Having  been  to  this  day  one  of  those  who  have  ex 
pressed  themselves  most  forcibly  in  favor  of  peace,  I 
ask  to  be  allowed  to  give  my  opinion  first.  When  any 
one  strikes  me,  without  stopping  to  consider  whether  I 
am  more  or  less  able  to  fight,  I  return  the  blow.  I  vote 
for  war." 

When  Segris's  turn  came,  he  turned  to  Le  Boeuf  and 
said  in  a  voice  trembling  with  emotion :  "Marshal,  you 
see  my  distress ;  I  do  not  ask  you  if  we  are  ready,  but 
if  we  have  a  fair  chance  to  win." 

The  marshal  replied  that  we  were  ready,  and  that  we 
should  never  be  in  a  better  position  to  settle  our  quarrel 
with  Prussia ;  that  we  could  be  perfectly  confident. 

No  one  raised  any  objections  or  maintained  the  possi- 


336         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

bility  of  peace.  Later,  certain  writers  of  the  Right1 
asserted  that  the  Emperor  opened  the  discussion  by 
saying  that,  being  a  constitutional  sovereign,  he  did 
not  wish  to  influence  in  any  way  the  decisions  of  his 
Cabinet ;  that  he  would  even  abstain  from  voting,  and 
that  war  was  decided  on  by  the  votes  of  a  majority  only. 
The  Emperor  did  not  make  that  ridiculous  remark,  and 
war  was  voted  unanimously,  his  vote  included.  The 
Empress  alone  expressed  no  opinion  and  did  not  vote. 

At  that  last  moment  of  the  crisis  the  Emperor  was  in 
the  same  position  that  he  had  occupied  from  the  begin 
ning  :  sighing  for  the  glories  of  war  as  soon  as  peace 
was  in  the  ascendant,  and  rushing  back  toward  peace 
in  dismay  when  war  seemed  necessary.  While  we  were 
on  our  way  to  the  Corps  Legislatif  he  received  Vitzthum, 
the  Austrian  minister  at  Brussels,  and  asked  him  to  pre 
vail  upon  his  sovereign  to  take  the  initiative  in  calling  a 
congress,  so  that  war  might  be  avoided.2 

Although  the  Constitution  of  1870,  like  all  monarchi 
cal  constitutions,  had  reserved  to  the  Emperor  alone  the 
right  to  declare  war,  I  had  promised,  in  the  name  of  the 
Cabinet,  that  if  at  any  time  we  should  consider  war 
inevitable,  we  would  not  engage  in  it  until  we  had  asked 
and  obtained  the  consent  of  the  Chambers ;  thereupon 
there  would  be  a  discussion,  and  if  they  did  not  share  our 
opinion,  it  would  not  be  difficult  for  them  to  enforce 
their  own  by  turning  us  out.  True  to  our  promise,  we 

1  [Ldiaiitcoiirt  (vol.  1,  p.  319)  is  the  only  writer  who  makes  the  statement, 
so  far  as  I  have  discovered,  and  his  confusion  of  the  various  councils  is  appar 
ent  from  the  fact  that  he  makes  Segris  and  Plichon  absent  from  this  one  of 
the  15th,  at  which  It  is  certain  that  all  of  the  ministers  were  present.    See 
supra,  p.  32£.] 

2  [Von  Sybei  (English  trans.),  vol.  vii,  pp.  423, 424 ;  based  upon  information 
derived  from  unpiibMshed  memoirs.] 


DECLARATION  OF  JULY  15  337 

did  not  propose  to  commit  any  act  of  war  —  beyond 
recalling  the  reserves,  a  measure  easily  countermanded 
—  until  the  Chambers  had  discussed  and  approved  our 
policy.  We  accompanied  our  declaration  with  a  request 
for  a  credit  of  fifty  million  francs,  —  a  quite  inadequate 
sum,  but  in  granting  or  refusing  it  the  Corps  Legislatif 
and  the  Senate  could  express  their  will  by  a  formal  vote, 
the  testimony  of  which  would  endure,  better  than  by 
fleeting  expressions  of  approval  or  dissent.  Hitherto  war 
had  been  an  act  of  the  sovereign's  personal  power.1  We 
proposed  that  it  should  be  this  time  the  free  act  of  the 
representatives  of  the  Nation. 

In  addition  to  the  request  for  fifty  millions  we  offered 
the  draft  of  a  law  authorizing  voluntary  enlistments 
limited  to  the  duration  of  the  war.  In  this  way  the 
young  men  who  loved  the  battlefield  and  hated  the 
barracks  would  not  be  discouraged  in  their  patriotic 
impulses  by  the  fear  of  remaining  under  the  flag  two 
years  after  the  peace.  A  second  proposed  law  called  into 
active  service  all  the  garde  mobile.  The  marshal,  in 
order  to  keep  down  the  expenses  and  to  avoid  compli 
cating  his  preparations,  had  confined  the  summons  to 
the  garde  mobile  of  the  departments  directly  threatened. 
Plichon  insisted  that  it  should  extend  to  all  of  the 
garde  in  all  the  departments,  and  the  Council  agreed 
with  him. 

1  Even  tinder  Lotna-PMlippe,  Lamartiae  complained  that  such  was  the 
fact.  Apropos  of  the  complications  of  1840  [concerning  the  affairs  of  Mehemet 
Ali]»  he  wrote:  "You,  a  free  nation,  a  democratic  nation,  the  nation  of  *89 
and  18SO  —  you  have  sunk  so  low  that  you  open  your  newspaper  anxiously 
every  morning,  to  find  out  whether  it  has  or  has  not  suited  seven  men, 
closeted  in  their  office  at  Paris,  to  set  war  loose  upon  the  world.  And  yon 
still  call  yourself,  in  face  of  suck  a  scandal,  a  representative  nation !  **  Fmmc& 
Parlementaire,  vol.  ii.  [Note  of  M.  ODivier,  in  vol.  xiv,  p.  895.] 


338         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

Before  entering  the  Chamber  I  stopped  at  Gramont's 
quarters  at  the  Foreign  Office.  There  I  found  Benedetti, 
who  had  arrived  that  morning.  We  questioned  him 
minutely ;  he  told  us  nothing  new  as  to  what  had  taken 
place  at  Ems,  and  confirmed,  without  adding  to  them, 
the  circumstantial  details  of  his  despatches  and  reports. 
As  to  what  had  taken  place  at  Berlin,  as  to  Bismarck's 
plotting,  he  knew  absolutely  nothing.  So  that  it  would 
have  served  no  useful  purpose  to  defer  action  in  order 
to  hear  him  in  Council.1  Indeed,  he  was  much  more 
disturbed  than  by  the  prospect  of  war,  by  an  article  in 
the  Constitutionnel  by  Leonce  Dupont  (Renal),  already 
several  days  old,  which  blamed  him  for  not  having 
warned  his  government  of  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy. 

1  [Etelord,  oil  what  authority  I  cannot  guess,  says  that  Benedetti  was 
before  the  Council  that  forenoon,  where  "he  completed  the  report  of  his 
negotiations  by  the  story  of  his  interview  with  Eulenbourg,  regarding  the 
fresh  attempt  that  he  proposed  to  make  to  reach  the  King.  He  concluded 
by  telling  of  the  King's  refusal  to  add  anything  to  what  he  had  said  on  the 
13th,  his  departure  for  Coblentz,  the  amiable  greeting  which  he  (Benedetti) 
had  received  at  the  station,  and,  finally,  the  declaration  of  William  I  that,  if 
further  discussions  should  become  necessary,  they  would  be  carried  on  by 
his  government.  As  there  had  been  no  other  words  exchanged  between  the 
Eing  of  Prussia  and  himself,  M.  BenedettTs  surprise  was  great  on  learning 
that  he  had  been  insulted,  and  France  with  him,  in  the  few  minutes  passed 
in  the  station  at  Ems.  No  one  was  in  a  better  position  then  he  to  point 
out  to  the  Cabinet  its  error  and  the  risk  it  was  running;  but  the  Empress 
wanted  war,  the  Emperor  submitted  to  the  Empress's  wish,  and  — •  M.  Bene 
detti  held  his  peace.  This  was,  perhaps,  his  way  of  avenging  himself  for  the 
desertion  of  the  ministry,  which  had  delivered  him  over  to  the  sarcasm  of 
its  own  newspapers,  when  it  would  have  been  so  easy  to  exculpate  him,"  De- 
lord,  vol.  vi,  p.  178.  —  Welschinger,  an  equally  bitter  and  uncompromising 
opponent  and  critic  of  the  government,  condemns  the  failure  of  Gramont  and 
Oliivier  to  summon  Benedetti  before  the  Council,  where  his  testimony  would 
have  been  singularly  useful  (vol.  i,  p.  169).  "  Certain  ministers  .  ,  .  did 
not  want  war,  and  hearing  what  Benedetti  had  to  say  would  have  suggested 
pertinent  questions,  called  forth  inuminating  replies,  dissipated  obscurities, 
and  perhaps  led  to  a  different  decision.*'  Ibid.,  p»  173.] 


DECLARATION  OF  JULY  15  339 

In  the  midst  of  the  negotiations  at  Ems,  he  had  employed 
half  of  a  telegram  in  asking  us  "to  say  in  a  few  words 
that  he  had  several  times  called  attention  to  the  steps 
that  were  being  taken  with  that  candidacy  in  view/' l 
We  were  unable  to  gratify  him,  for  if  he  had  warned  us 
in  1869,  he  had  suspected  nothing  in  1870,  at  the  deci 
sive  moment,  and  had  not  even  been  put  on  the  alert 
by  the  presence  of  the  Hohenzollern  family  at  Berlin  in 
March.  Having  no  regard  for  the  thoughts  by  which 
my  mind  was  besieged,  he  recurred  to  his  theme  with 
wearisome  importunity,  and  I  had  to  give  over  my  reflec 
tions  on  the  coming  struggle,  as  I  walked  to  the  Chamber 
with  him,  in  order  to  try  to  make  him  understand  that, 
as  I  paid  no  heed  to  attacks  directed  against  myself,  — 
and  surely  his  friends  were  not  sparing  of  them,  —  he 
could  not  justly  demand  that  I  should  give  my  atten 
tion  to  refuting  those  of  which  he  was  the  object, whether 
they  were  just  or  unjust. 

The  Chamber  was  full ;  the  tribunes  were  crowded ; 
all  the  ambassadors  were  present.  Amid  an  impres 
sive  silence,  I  read  our  Declaration :  — 

1From  Ems,  dated  July  10,  11.30  P.M.  [See  Benedetti,  p.  345.  In 
connection  with  this  despatch,  Gramont  says  (p.  382  n.) :  "Count  Bene- 
dettTs  demand  was  just;  but  to  defend  Jinn  at  that  moment  against  the 
papers  that  were  attacking  him,  we  should  have  had  to  disclose  all  the 
pourparlers  of  1869,  and  such  disclosure  would  inevitably  have  inflamed 
considerably  the  excitement  of  men's  minds  by  proving  that  .  .  .  the 
Prussian  government  knew  to  what  point  it  would  offend  French  opinion 
and  French  interests  by  recurring  to  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy.  The 
government  considered  therefore  that  it  was  in  duty  bound  to  keep  silent, 
and  supposed  that  Comte  Benedetti  would  consent  to  sacrifice  his  self-esteem 
a  little  longer,  justly  wounded  as  it  was  by  the  undeserved  attacks  of  certain 
journals.  Baron  Mercier  had  voluntarily  responded  to  that  thought,  and 
had  asked  us,  of  his  own  motion,  not  to  think  of  justifying  him  until  the 
proper  time." 


340         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

"The  manner  In  which  you  received  our  declaration  of 
July  6  having  given  us  the  assurance  that  you  approve 
our  policy  and  that  we  could  prevail  with  your  support, 
we  at  once  entered  into  negotiations  with  the  foreign 
powers,  to  obtain  their  good  offices  with  Prussia,  to  the 
end  that  she  might  acknowledge  the  justice  of  our 
complaints.  In  these  negotiations  we  asked  nothing  of 
Spain,  as  we  do  not  wish  to  arouse  her  susceptibility  or 
to  offend  her  independence.  We  did  not  approach  the 
Hohenzollern  princes,  whom  we  considered  as  protected 
by  the  King;  we  also  declined  to  introduce  any  acri 
mony  in  our  discussion,  or  to  extend  it  beyond  the  single 
object  to  which  we  ourselves  limited  it. 

"Most  of  the  foreign  powers  answered  our  appeal 
with  ardor,  and,  with  more  or  less  warmth,  they  ad 
mitted  the  justice  of  our  demand.  The  Prussian 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  met  us  with  a  plea  of  not 
guilty,  claiming  that  he  knew  nothing  of  the  affair,  and 
that  the  Berlin  Cabinet  had  always  been  a  stranger  to 
it.  [Murmurs  on  various  benches.}  We  were  obliged 
therefore  to  address  ourselves  to  the  King  in  person, 
and  we  ordered  our  Ambassador  to  go  to  Ems,  where 
His  Majesty  then  was. 

"  While  admitting  that  he  had  authorized  the  Prince 
of  Hohenzollern  to  accept  the  candidacy  that  had  been 
proffered  to  him,  the  King  of  Prussia  maintained  that 
he  had  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  negotiations  between 
the  Spanish  government  and  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern ; 
that  he  had  intervened  only  as  head  of  the  family,  in  no 
wise  as  sovereign,  and  that  he  had  neither  convoked  nor 
consulted  his  Council  of  Ministers  thereon.  His  Maj 
esty  admitted,  however,  that  he  had  informed  Count 
Bismarck  of  these  different  incidents. 


DECLARATION  OP  JULY  15  341 

"We  could  not  regard  this  reply  as  satisfactory.  We 
could  not  admit  the  subtle  distinction  between  the  sov 
ereign  and  the  head  of  the  family,  and  we  insisted  that 
the  King  should  advise  and  at  need  compel  Prince 
Leopold  to  abandon  his  candidacy. 

"While  we  were  engaged  in  discussion  with  Prussia, 
news  of  the  Prince's  withdrawal  reached  us  from  a 
quarter  from  which  we  were  not  expecting  it;  it  was 
handed  to  us  on  July  12  by  the  Spanish  Ambassador. 
The  King  having  determined  to  remain  a  stranger  to  it, 
we  demanded  that  he  associate  himself  with  it,  and  that 
he  declare  that  if,  in  one  of  those  fluctuations  of  purpose 
which  are  always  possible  in  a  country  just  emerging 
from  a  revolution,  the  crown  should  be  again  offered 
by  Spain  to  Prince  Leopold,  he  would  not  authorize 
him  to  accept  it,  so  that  the  discussion  might  be  con 
sidered  to  be  definitively  closed. 

"Our  demand  was  a  moderate  one;  the  terms  in 
which  we  expressed  it  were  not  less  so.  *Say  to  the 
King/  we  wrote  to  M.  Benedetti  on  July  12,  at  mid 
night,  *that  we  have  no  secret  motive,  that  we  do  not 
seek  a  pretext  for  war,  and  that  we  ask  only  to  reach  an 
honorable  solution  of  a  difficulty  that  we  did  not  create/ 

"The  King  consented  to  approve  the  withdrawal  of 
Prince'  Leopold,  but  he  refused  to  declare  that  he  would 
not  authorize  the  renewal  of  his  candidacy  hereafter. 

"'I  asked  the  King,'  M.  Benedetti  wrote  to  us  on 
July  13  at  midnight,  'to  consent  to  allow  me  to  in 
form  you,  in  his  name,  that  if  the  Prince  of  Hohen- 
zollern  should  revert  to  his  project,  His  Majesty  would 
interpose  his  authority,  and  would  forbid  him.  The 
King  absolutely  refused  to  authorize  me  to  transmit 
to  you  such  a  declaration.  I  persisted,  but  without  sue- 


342         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

cess  in  modifying  His  Majesty's  position.  The  King 
put  an  end  to  our  interview  by  saying  that  he  neither 
could  nor  would  make  such  an  agreement,  and  that  he 
must,  in  respect  to  that  as  to  all  other  contingencies, 
reserve  to  himself  liberty  to  consult  the  circumstances/ 

"Although  this  refusal  seemed  regrettable  to  us,  our 
wish  to  conserve  the  blessings  of  peace  for  Europe  was 
so  great  that  we  did  not  break  off  negotiations,  but, 
despite  our  just  impatience,  fearing  that  discussion 
would  carry  us  too  far,  we  asked  your  permission  to  post 
pone  our  explanations.  So  that  our  surprise  was  pro 
found  when  we  learned,  yesterday,  that  the  King  of 
Prussia  had  informed  our  Ambassador,  through  an  aide- 
de-camp,  that  he  would  not  receive  him  again,  and  that, 
in  order  to  give  to  that  refusal  an  unequivocal  character, 
his  government  had  communicated  it  to  all  the  cabinets 
of  Europe.  [Murmurs.]  We  learned  at  the  same  time 
that  Baron  Werther  had  been  ordered  to  take  a  leave 
of  absence,  and  that  armaments  were  under  way  in 
Prussia.1 

"Tinder  these  circumstances,  to  make  further  at 
tempts  at  conciliation  would  have  been  a  disregard  of 
dignity  and  an  imprudence.  We  have  omitted  nothing 
to  avoid  war;  we  propose  to  prepare  to  carry  on  the 
war  that  is  offered  us,  leaving  to  each  nation  that  share 
of  the  responsibility  which  belongs  to  it." 2 

1  We  did  not  say  that  Werther  had  been  recalled,  and  therein  we  were 
inaccurate.    [Nor  was  the  statement  true  that  armaments  were  under  way  in 
Prussia.]    Le  Bcenf  had  been  misinformed;   the  armaments  did  not  begin 
until  the  16th.    [Notes  of  M.  OUivier  in  vol.  xiv,  p.  400.    See  on  the  last 
point,  Gramont,  pp.  262-864.] 

2  fine  concluding  sentence  is  omitted:   "Yesterday  we  called  in  our 
reserves,  and,  with  your  concurrence,  we  propose  immediately  to  take  the 
necessary  measures  to  safeguard  the  interests,  the  safety,  and  the  honor  of 
France."  —  Tnesame  declaration  was  read  in  the  Senate  by  M.  de  GramontJ 


DECLARATION  OF  JULY  15  343 

The  final  sentences  were  drowned  by  bravos,  renewed 
plaudits,  and  shouts  of  "Vive  la  France !  Vive  FEm- 
pereurl"  Then  there  were  loud  cries  of  "Vote ! 
vote  !"  We  proceeded  at  once  to  vote.  A  very  great 
majority  of  the  deputies  were  so  excited  that  when  the 
"noes"  were  called  for,  a  few  members  of  the  Left  hav 
ing  risen,  the  others  turned  upon  them,  pointed  at  them, 
and  cried :  "Oh,  stand  up  !  stand  up  !  There  are  only 
sixteen  of  them  1  They're  Prussians  !" 

Urgency  being  voted,  Thiers  spoke  from  his  place.1 
After  rambling  endlessly  on  personal  matters,  he  said 
in  substance :  — 

"Is  it  or  is  it  not  true  that,  on  the  main  issue,  that  is 
to  say,  on  the  candidacy  of  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern, 
your  demand  was  listened  to,  and  that  it  was  complied 
with  ?  Is  it  true  that  you  are  going  to  war  on  a  ques 
tion  of  sensitiveness,  —  most  honorable,  I  agree,  —  but 
that  you  are  going  to  war  on  a  question  of  sensitive 
ness?  [Murmurs.]  Well,  gentlemen,  do  you  want 
people  to  say,  do  you  want  all  Europe  to  say  that,  the 
main  point  being  granted,  you  have  resolved,  for  a  mere 
question  of  form,  to  shed  torrents  of  blood?  [Noisy 
remonstrances.]  As  for  me,  let  me  tell  you  in  two  words, 
to  explain  both  my  actions  and  my  language,  let  me  tell 
you  that  I  look  upon  this  war  as  supremely  imprudent. 

1  ["He  had  no  sooner  risen  titan  from  the  Right  there  came  a  great  ex 
plosion  of  murmurs.  It  was  the  protest  of  all  those  who»  far  from  holding 
ministers  in  check,  considered  them  too  carcmnspecL  In  this  league  there 
were  acting  together  the  most  diverse  opinions:  the  credulous  ignorance  of 
belated  Chauvinists,  the  hoodwinked  good  faith  of  sincere  patriots,  the  ambi 
tions  violence  of  absolutists  in  quest  of  dbange.  Hie  rest  followed  from 
weakness,  from  that  confused  excitement  which  is  sometimes  born  of  fear, 
and  likewise  from  a  conviction  that  the  best  way  to  pay  their  court  was  to 
lack  sang-froid."  La  Gorce»  voL  vi  p.  301.  Thiers  had  voted  among  the 
sixteen  against  urgency.} 


344         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

This  declaration  offends  you,  but  I  surely  am  entitled 
to  have  an  opinion  on  such  a  question.  I  love  my  coun 
try  ;  I  was  more  grievously  affected  than  any  one  else 
by  the  events  of  1866,  and  more  earnestly  than  any  one 
else  I  desire  reparation  for  them ;  but  in  my  deep-rooted 
conviction,  and,  if  I  may  venture  to  say  so,  in  my  expe 
rience,  the  occasion  is  ill-chosen."  * 

Each  of  the  orator's  assertions  offended  the  over 
excited  feelings  of  the  assembly  to  such  a  degree  that 
they  were  greeted  with  incessant  contradictions  and 
impatient  mutterings.  However,  the  number  of  those 
who  demanded  silence  was  much  greater  than  that  of 
the  interrupters.  Among  the  latter,  his  friends  of 
the  Left  were  almost  as  numerous  as  his  opponents 
of  the  Right.  In  the  interruptions  there  was  no  in 
sult,  no  personal  abuse.  The  only  offensive  exclama 
tions  were  Fire's;  now,  it  was  a  notorious  fact 
that  that  brilliant  man  was  in  a  state  of  excite 
ment  bordering  on  madness.  On  the  other  hand, 

1  [THers's  speech  is  reported  at  much  greater  length,  with  much  detail  of 
interruptions,  etc.,  in  L'Empire  IMrcd,  vol.  xiv,  pp.  401-409.  See  also 
LaGorce,voL  vi,  pp.  301-303;  Sorel,  vol.  I,  pp.  182,183;  Gramont,  pp.  241- 
$4$;  Mrnntecwrt,  vol.  i,  pp.  323,  324;  Von  Sybel,  English  trans.,  vol.  vii, 
pp.  417,  418;  Favre,  vol.  i,  pp.  13-25.  —  "  As  the  uproar  drowned  his  voice, 
M.  Thiers  recalled  these  days  of  1866  when  the  Chamber,  having  listened  to 
him  once,  had,  at  the  most  critical  moment,  refused  to  hear  TITTH  again. 
*  To-day/  he  added,  CI  have  decided  to  listen  to  your  murmurs,  and,  if  neces 
sary,  to  defy  them/  The  uproar  redoubled,  and  through  the  hall  rang  the 
voices  of  incoherent  or  frantic  interrupters,  whom  no  warning  could  put  down. 
Such  were  the  Marquis  de  Pire,  M.  Dugue  de  la  Fanconnerie,  and  others 
even  more  obscure,  but  eager  to  pass  into  history  by  inscribing  their  names  in 
the  stenographic  report  of  that  imperishable  session.  Hie  Left,  too,  by 
its  applause,  heightened  the  tumult;  those  who  would  have  hesitated  to 
interrupt  M.  Thiers,  repudiated  Jules  Favre  and  his  friends.  At  kst,  at  the 
cost  of  a  long  straggle  against  passion,  the  orator  succeeded  in  approaching 
the  subject  of  the  debate.  *  Is  it  or  is  it  not  true,* "  etc.  La  Gorce,  vi,  302.] 


DECLARATION  OF  JULY  15  345 

all  the  interruptions  from  the  Left  hostile  to  the  minis 
try  were  of  an  insulting  character,  which  was  not 
to  be  found,  Pire  aside,  in  any  of  those  addressed  to 
Thiers.  So  that  he  had  not  to  make  any  notable 
display  of  heroism  in  order  to  gain  a  hearing.1 

If  any  one  man  in  France  can  be  accused  of  having 
brought  on  the  war,  that  man  is  Thiers.  By  his 
persistence  in  talking  about  the  degradation  of 
France,  in  representing  Sadowa  as  a  national 
calamity,  he  had  created  that  uneasy,  sensitive,  jeal 
ous,  excitable  frame  of  mind  which  was  fatally  cer 
tain  to  end  in  war.2  I  had  predicted  the  consequences 
of  his  irritating  language  as  early  as  1867.  "You 
acclaim  peace  at  every  opportunity,  you  declare  for 
it  at  every  opportunity,  and  in  reality  you  vote  every 
day  for  war.  It  is  necessary  that  this  Chamber, 
that  this  nation,  not  only  resign  themselves  to  what 
is  actually  done,  but  accept  it  without  reservation 
and  face  man-fashion  the  necessity  of  a  war  that  is  in 
evitable  sooner  or  later,  a  serious  war,  a  terrible  war, 
with  Germany/' 

To  be  sure,  while  lamenting  over  our  degradation, 
Thiers  always  concluded  with  counsels  of  peace.  He 

1  [At  this  point  in  vol.  xiv,  pp.  410-412,  M.  OIHvier  cites  several  cases 
both  before  and  after  1870  in  which  M.  Thiers's  action  seems  inconsistent 
with  the  stand  taken  by  him  in  the  debate  of  July  15.    "  How  different  would 
his  speech  have  been  on  that  day,  if  the  Emperor  had  received  him  at  Saint- 
Cloud  on  the  10th !"    See  supra,  pp.  153-155.] 

2  ["  Hardly  had  the  reading  of  the  Cabinet  programme  been  concluded, 
when,  first  and  foremost  of  them  all,  the  veteran  Thiers  took  up  the  battle, 
in  seeming  contradiction  to  his  entire  past,  and  to  the  utter  surprise  of  his 
hearers ;  for,  in  truth,  it  had  been  he  who  more  than  any  one  else  in  France 
had  spread  the  doctrine  that  the  growing  strength  of  Prussia  was  a  serious 
menace  to  the  vital  interests  of  France,  and  that  Napoleon  ought  long  ago 
to  have  interposed."    Von  Sybd,  English  trans.,  vol.  vn,  p.  147.] 


346         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

resembled  a  joker  who  should  call  out  to  a  coachman 
having  a  struggle  with  spirited  horses :  "Hold  them  in ; 
if  they  get  away,  they'll  break  your  neck ! "  and  who 
should  at  the  same  moment  put  briers  under  their  tails.1 

I  might  have  recalled  that  fact,  I  might  have  taken 
advantage  of  the  agitation  of  the  Assembly,  which, 
with  a  word  of  incitement,  I  could  have  led  on  to  the 
most  ill-considered  measures.  On  the  contrary,  I 
protested  against  the  demonstrations  which  I  had 
been  unable  to  prevent.  I  began  my  reply  by  say 
ing:  "The  more  unanimous  and  vehement  the  cur 
rent  of  public  opinion  is,  the  more  greatness  of  soul 
there  is  in  confronting  it,  when  one  deems  it  mis 
taken,  and  in  trying  to  check  it  by  saying  what  one 
believes  to  be  the  truth." 

An  almost  universal  assent  accentuated  this  trib 
ute  to  freedom  of  contradiction.  I  continued :  — 

"And  so,  after  listening  respectfully  to  the  honor 
able  M.  Thiers,  I  should,  according  to  my  custom, 
refrain  from  taking  the  floor  to  reply  to  him,  were 
it  not  that  there  are  assertions  in  his  speech  which  I 
cannot  accept/' 

Every  one  will  agree  that  that  is  not  the  language 
of  a  minister  who  incites  his  majority  to  intolerance. 
I  did  not  depart  for  one  instant  from  that  attitude, 
and  I  maintained  the  greater  restraint  the  more  ear 
nestly  I  was  urged  to  lay  it  aside.  While  he  was 

1  "'Point  out,*  the  Emperor  wrote  to  me  from  Wilhelmshohe  [where  he 
was  residing  as  a  prisoner  of  war  after  Sedan],  *that  it  is  Thiers  and  Favre 
who,  ever  since  1866,  have  so  often  repeated  in  every  tone  that  France's 
prestige  was  impaired  by  Prussia's  success,  and  that  we  must  have  revenge, 
that  the  first  thing  that  happened  was  enough  to  make  public  opinion 
explode.  They  had  piled  up  the  inflammable  matter  and  only  a  spark  was 
needed  to  start  a  conflagration.* "  L* Empire  IMral,  voL  xiv,  p.  413. 


DECLARATION  OF  JULY  15  347 

speaking  I  had  done  my  utmost  to  pacify  the  Assembly 
and  obtain  order;  having  nothing  to  conceal,  I  had 
the  most  sincere  desire  to  start  an  exhaustive  debate 
and  to  let  the  light  in  upon  the  smallest  details  of  the 
negotiations;  and  I  felt  that  those  who  made  par 
ticipation  in  the  debate  difficult  for  Thiers  virtually 
defeated  my  purpose. 

"We  too,"  I  continued,  "have  a  realizing  sense 
of  our  duty;  we  too  know  that  this  is  a  momentous 
day,  and  that  every  man  of  those  who  have  contrib 
uted  to  the  decision  about  to  be  adopted  assumes  a 
grave  responsibility  before  his  country  and  before 
history.  We  too,  during  our  six  hours  of  delibera 
tion  yesterday,  had  constantly  in  our  thoughts  all 
the  bitterness  and  pain  of  giving  the  signal,  in  this 
enlightened  age  of  ours,  for  a  bloody  conflict  between 
two  great  civilized  states.  We  too  declare  them  to 
be  culpable  who,  yielding  to  factional  passions  or  unre 
flecting  impulses,  engage  their  countries  in  such  adven 
tures.  We  too  believe  that  useless  wars  are  criminal 
wars,  and  if,  with  grief-stricken  hearts  [Fdme  d&$oUe]9 
we  resolve  upon  this  war,  to  which  Prussia  summons 
us,  it  is  because  there  never  was  a  more  necessary 
one."  [Numerous  lively  tokens  of  approval.] 

Thereupon  I  detailed  the  stages  of  the  negotiations, 
and  I  gave  prominence  to  the  fact  that  in  the;  very 
midst  of  our  pourparlers  we  had  learned  that  through 
out  Europe  the  Prussian  representatives  were  announc 
ing  and  causing  to  be  announced  in  the  newspapers 
that  the  King  of  Prussia  had  sent  an  aide-de-camp  to 
pur  Ambassador,  to  inform  Mm  that  he  refused  to  re 
ceive  him.  [Bravos  and  applause  from  the  Centre  and 
Right.  Interruptions  from  the  Left.} 


348         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

"The  honorable  M.  Thiers  has  dubbed  this  senti 
ment  sensitiveness.  I  do  not  recognize  in  that  term 
the  customary  accuracy  of  his  language.  Sensitive 
ness  is  not  the  fitting  word,  but  honor,  and  in  France 
the  safeguarding  of  the  national  honor  is  the  highest 
of  interests.  [Warm  approval  from  Centre  and  Right,] 
We  have  not  considered  whether  this  is  an  opportune 
or  inopportune  moment  to  attack  Prussia;  we  have 
no  purpose  to  attack  either  Germany  or  Prussia;  we 
found  ourselves  confronted  by  an  insult  to  which  we 
could  not  submit,  by  a  threat  which,  if  we  had  allowed 
it  to  be  carried  out,  would  have  reduced  us  to  the 
lowest  order  of  states."  ["  Very  good  I99]1 

1  [In  tliis  volume  M.  Ollivier's  speech  is  largely  abbreviated  and  the  order 
of  sentences  changed  from  the  form  in  which  it  is  given  in  L' Empire  Liberal, 
pp.  413-421,  425-482,  with  the  interruptions  and  interpolations,  notably  of 
MM.  Favre  and  Gambetta. 

"Such  words  demanded  a  reply.  Among  all  the  members  of  the  cabinet, 
M.  Olivier  alone  would  be  a  worthy  champion.  He  went  up  into  the  tribune. 
If  the  momentousness  of  the  occasion  had  left  any  room  for  surprise,  it 
would  have  been  a  sufficient  cause  thereof  to  see  in  what  positions  destiny 
had  placed  the  two  adversaries.  M.  Thiers  had  constantly  deplored  Sadowa, 
had  never  stopped  denouncing  Prussia,  and  he  was  the  one  who  was  doing 
his  utmost  to  smooth  over  the  controversy.  M.  Ollivier  had  taken  for  his 
hobby  the  cause  of  nationalities,  had  preached  union  with  Germany,  at  least, 
if  not  with  Prussia,  and  behold,  he  was  standing  forth  as  the  herald  of  war. 
His  speech,  eloquent  as  always,  bore  witness  to  the  singularity  of  his  posi 
tion.  He  began  by  asserting  his  love  of  peace,  and,  speaking  hi  that  vein, 
he  voiced  the  oldest,  the  most  sincere  thoughts  of  his  soul.  With  infectious 
emotion,  he  described  his  long  hesitation,  that  of  his  colleagues,  and  the 
eight-hours*  deliberation  of  the  preceding  night.  He  recalled  —  and  nothing 
is  more  undeniable  —  the  persevering  efforts  he  had  put  forth  as  a  deputy 
to  banish  the  misunderstandings  between  two  great  civilized  nations. 
What  he  had  tried  as  a  simple  representative,  he  had  followed  up  as  minister, 
and  had  exerted  himself  to  rearouse  no  disputed  questions,  but  to  establish 
relations  of  confidence  between  Paris  and  Berlin.  At  this  point  in  his 
discourse  M.  OlHvier  turned  a  sharp  corner  and  showed  himself  an  entirely 
different  man,  albeit  no  less  sincere,  who  appropriated  to  himself,  clothing 


BECIABATION  OP  JULY  15  349 

My  demonstration  concluded,  I  fell  Into  one  of 
those  oratorical  abstractions  with  which  public  speakers 
are  familiar.  I  forgot  Thiers  and  the  Assembly, 
the  time,  and  the  place;  I  imagined  myself  face  to 
face  with  the  brave  hearts  who  were  soon  to  fall  on 
the  battlefield,  face  to  face  with  the  fatherland  and 
with  posterity;  I  felt  rising  to  my  lips  a  cry  of  ad 
juration  to  those  heroes  of  duty,  to  our  beloved  France, 
to  the  impartial  future,  and,  on  the  threshold  of  the 
tragic  decision,  I  could  not  restrain  one  last  supreme 
assertion  of  my  integrity  of  conscience.  I  deemed 
myself  bound  to  bear  that  witness  to  my  colleagues 
and  myself,  and,  seeking  strong  words  with  which  to 
express  the  violent  emotion  that  agitated  me,  I  re 
membered  the  scriptural  maledictions  upon  the  impious 
heavily  burdened  hearts.1  I  paraphrased  them  and  said : 
"Yes,  with  this  day  there  begins,  for  the  ministers 
my  colleagues,  and  for  myself,  an  immense  responsi 
bility.  We  accept  it  with  light  hearts  !" 

Was  there  the  slightest  possible  uncertainty  as  to 
my  meaning  when  I  had  said  a  few  moments  earlier 
that  my  heart  was  grief-stricken  ?  Nevertheless,  before 

% 

them  in  his  own  eloquence,  the  arguments  of  M.  de  Gramont.  .  .  . 
Strangely  enough,  throughout  the  negotiations,  no  guiding  influence  had 
been  apparent;  there  had  been  no  president  of  the  Council,  gathering  up 
all  the  threads  and  holding  them  tight  in  his  hands.  When  everything  was 
consummated,  lo  1  the  Keeper  of  the  Seals  stood  forth  as  the  real  head  of  the 
Cabinet  and  assumed  responsibility  for  a  crisis  that  he  had  not  guided,  and 
for  acts  which  had  been  in  part  concealed  from  him.  Was  this  courage  or 
generosity?  Was  it  the  mobility  of  a  mind  no  less  impressionable  than 
brilliant  ?  despair  of  restraining  public  opinion  ?  conviction  that  war  was 
inevitable?  or  eagerness  not  to  complicate  such  terrible  problems  by  a 
ministerial  crisis  ?"  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi  pp.  803,  304.] 

1  Psalms,  iv,  3;  St.  Luke,  xxiv,  25,  m.  [Note  of  M.  OUivier,  voL  xiv, 
p. 


350         THE  FRANCO-PBUSSIAN  WAR 

I  could  finish  my  sentence  and  add  the  words  which 
would  have  made  any  quibble  impossible,  I  was  re 
called  to  the  melancholy  surroundings,  above  which 
I  had  risen,  by  a  malicious  snarl:  "Say  saddened  hearts! 
Your  heart  is  light,  yet  the  blood  of  the  nations  is 
about  to  flow  !n 

I  resumed  with  an  indignant  emotion  which  carried 
the  Assembly  with  me:  "Yes,  with  light  hearts; 
and  do  not  quibble  over  that  phrase,  nor  believe  that 
I  mean  to  say,  with  joy.  I  have  told  you  myself 
of  my  distress  at  being  forced  into  war:  I  mean, 
loith  a  heart  that  is  not  made  heavy  by  remorse,  with  a 
confident  heart,  because  the  war  that  we  shall  wage  we 
are  forced  into,  because  we  have  done  all  that  it  was 
humanly  and  honorably  possible  to  do  to  avoid  it, 
and,  lastly,  because  our  cause  is  just  and  is  entrusted 
to  the  French  army!"  [Numerous  lively  marks  of 
approval.  Renewed  applause.] 

How  often  have  my  enemies  pursued  me,  before 
the  ignorant  mob  of  high  and  low  alike,  with  that 
phrase,  *c  light  hearts  "  !  It  has  become  a  stereotyped 
formula  when  any  one  wishes  to  attack  me.  Even  if 
it  were  true  that  at  that  moment,  worn  out  by  mental 
anguish,  fatigue,  and  insomnia,  obliged  to  reply  un 
assisted  to  powerful  orators,  having  had  no  leisure  to 
reflect  for  a  moment  on  the  ordering  and  word 
ing  of  my  speech,  I  had  allowed  an  improper  ex 
pression  to  escape  me,  the  explanation  which  I  in 
stantly  gave  forbade  any  honest  misunderstanding 
of  the  meaning  of  my  words,  and  no  one  had  the  right, 
without  ceasing  to  be  a  man  of  honor,  to  extort  there 
from  a  revolting  avowal  of  hardness  of  heart  or  of 
indifference.  At  the  worst,  judges  of  oratorical  talent 


DECLARATION  OF  JULY  15  351 

might  have  criticised  therein  a  fault  of  the  orator 
or  the  man  of  letters.  But  my  expression  was  as 
irreproachable  as  the  sentiment  which  it  described, 
and  its  literary  correction  is  no  more  open  to  ques 
tion  than  its  moral  rectitude.  I  stand  by  it.1 

The  speech  in  which  Thiers  replied  to  me  was  a 
hodge-podge  of  truths  and  errors.2  He  blamed  us  for 

1  [The  foolish  pertinacity  with  which  this  unfortunate  phrase  has  been 
and  is  to  this  day  (see  Welschinger,  vol.  i,  p.  174),  harped  upon  by  critics 
of  the  ministry  would  seem  to  suggest  a  consciousness  of  the  weakness  of 
their  case,  as  against  M.  Ollivier  at  least.    By  charging,  directly  or  by  in 
nuendo,  that  he  used  the  phrase  in  any  other  sense  than  that  in  which  he 
claims  to  have  used  it,  —  which  is  surely  the  sense  which  it  naturally  bears, 
taking  the  surrounding  circumstances  into  account, — they  contradict  their 
own  previous  admissions  of  the  sincerity  of  his  desire  for  peace  and  of  his 
grief  at  the  outcome.    Welschinger,  ubi  sup.,  discusses  it  with  absurd  gravity. 
Even  Sir  Spencer  Walpole  says  that  M.  Ollivier  "will  Eve  in  history  as  the 
Minister  who  accepted  with  a  light  heart  the  responsibility  of  the  policy  which 
produced  the  greatest  tragedy  of  the  nineteenth  century.'*    History  cf 
Twenty-Fiw  Years,  vol.  ii,  p.  479.    La  Gorce,  almost  alone,  treats  the  subject 
as  it  should  be  treated.    "The  phrase  stuck,"  he  says,  "and,  being  removed 
from  the  explanation  which  accompanied  it,  was  repeated  later  with  more 
puerile  malice  than  justice"  (vol.  vi,  pp.  304,  305).    And  see  Lehautcourt, 
vol.  i,  p.  326. 

M.  Ollivier  has  thought  it  worth  while  to  place  in  the  Appendix  to  vol.  xiv, 
pp.  620-622,  two  pages  of  citations,  in  which  the  word  Uger  is  used  in  the 
sense  in  which  he  claims  to  have  used  it,  beginning  with  Littre's  definition : 
"That  which  does  not  depress  by  a  moral  weight."  His  examples  cover  all 
literature,  ancient  and  modern,  and  call  forth  a  sneering  allusion  from  M, 
Welschinger.  The  labor  of  collecting  them  seems  to  me  to  have  been  super 
erogatory.  "Even  if  I  had  not  used  that  phrase,"  says  the  author,  "they 
would  have  invented  another  and  persecuted  me  with  it  just  the  same/*] 

2  [Thiers's  second  speech  is  reported  at  length  by  M.  Ollivier,  in  vol.  xiv, 
pp.  433-442.  —  "Never  did  citizen  honor  himself  more  and  better  deserve 
the  gratitude  of  his  country  than  did  M.  Thiers  on  that  day,**  exclaims 
Delord  (vol.  vi,  p.  180),  "when  after  proving  the  Empire  to  have  been  the 
dupe  and  accomplice  of  Sadowa,  he  strove  vainly  to  preserve  France  from 
the  fate  that  awaited  her."    M.  Jules  Favre  (vol.  i,  ppl  14,  85)  is  fairly 
dithyrambic  in  his  laudation  of  M.  Thiers,  that  "dear  former  colleague/* 
in  whom  lie  was  to  find  such  efficient  support  of  the  "  Government 


352         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

not  giving  Europe  time  to  intervene.  European 
mediation  had  been  attempted  July  U  by  England, 
and  surlily  rejected  by  Prussia.1  One  seeks  media 
tion  in  disputes  concerning  material  questions,  one 
takes  counsel  only  of  one's  self  when  honor  is  at 
stake.  What  patriot  ever  taught  us  that  a  nation 
should  adjust  its  susceptibility  according  to  the  ad 
vice  of  strangers?  Surely  not  de  Tocqueville. 
"One  has  no  right,"  he  says,  "to  express  an 
opinion  as  to  what  accords  with  national  interest  and 
honor  except  when  speaking  of  one's  own  country."  2 
If,  as  Thiers  said,  ministers  had  cherished  the  wish 
to  obtain  reparation  for  Sadowa,  it  would  have  been 
proper  to  discuss  the  question  whether  they  had  chosen 
opportunity  well  or  ill.  But  not  one  of  them 
of  reparation  for  Sadowa,  which  they  consid 
ered  irreparable;  they  had  no  thought  save  for  pro 
tecting  the  national  honor,  and  such  emergencies  one 
deals  with  as  they  come  —  one  does  not  select  them. 

tional  Defence,"  although  lie  (Thiers)  claimed  not  to  approve  of  the  methods 
by  which  it  rose  to  power.  Lehautcourt,  wMle  admitting  that  he  displayed 
rare  moral  courage  "by  defying  unpopularity  in  order  to  say  aloud  what  he 
believed  to  be  the  truth,  —  a  rare  thing  among  us,"  —  thinks  that  his  declara 
tions  and  those  of  his  coHeagues  of  the  Left,  Gambetta  and  the  rest,  "  came 
too  late,  and  since  war  was  inevitable,  it  was  better  to  accept  it  with  the 
sobriety  and  resolution  which  it  requires.  Protests  like  those  of  Thiers  and 
Gambetta,  uttered  in  public  session,  could  not  but  impair  our  energy  and 
even  blaze  out  a  path  to  internal  discord.**  And  he  quotes  from  the  Opinion 
National  of  July  16,  these  words:  "The  Left  —  I  must  say  it,  much  as  I 
regret  to  do  so  —  tie  Left,  yesterday,  forgot  itself.  It  gave  its  grudges  and 
its  apprehensions  precedence  over  the  sentiment  of  nationality,  over  the 
prudence  which  was  enjoined  upon  it  by  the  duty  of  not  deadening  the 
French  impetus.  ...  As  for  M.  Thiers,  it  would  have  been  better  for  his 
memory,  if  his  career  had  ended  before  the  close  of  that  day."] 

1  [See  supra,  p.  818  n.  (on  p.  319).] 

2  Tocqueville  to  Henry  Reeve,  May,  185$. 


JJJKUJLAKATIUJN    UJb    JU.LY    15  353 

On  the  other  hand,  that  speech  contained  two  in 
dictments  which  history  will  ratify:  that  of  the  at 
tempt  of  Prussia,  in  the  face  of  the  least  disputed 
principles  and  of  immemorial  tradition,  to  seat  a  Ger* 
man  prince  on  the  throne  of  Spain;  and  that  of  the 
demand  of  guaranties,  which  was  defensible  as  a  mat 
ter  of  pure  logic,  but  unjustifiable  under  the  actual 
circumstances.  Thiers's  whole  argument  on  that  sub 
ject  was  irrefutable :  he  was  right  in  calling  the  demand 
of  guaranties  a  mistake;  although  the  mistake  was 
not  made  by  the  Cabinet,  I  could  not  shift  the  re 
sponsibility  from  our  shoulders,  because,  as  we  did  not 
resign,  we  associated  ourselves  with  it. 

But  Thiers  became  an  unfair  partisan  once  more, 
—  and  here  history  will  not  follow  him,  —  when  he 
declared  the  war  to  be  a  necessary  result  of  the  demand 
of  guaranties.  That  demand  was  not  submitted  to  the 
King  until  July  13,  at  nine  o'clock ;  it  was  not  known  to 
Bismarck  until  some  time  that  day;  consequently  it 
was  not  that  which  induced  the  Chancellor  to  form  a 
bellicose  resolution  which  he  had  imperiously  com 
municated  to  the  King  on  the  evening  of  the  I2th. 

Unquestionably  the  demand  of  guaranties  did  furnish 
Bismarck  with  facilities  for  putting  an  affront  upon  us, 
which  he  would  have  had  difficulty  in  finding  elsewhere  if 
we  had  not  proffered  them  to  him  by  reopening  a  nego 
tiation  already  happily  closed.  Nevertheless,  the  de 
mand  of  guaranties  did  not  necessarily  lead  to  war.  In 
its  modified  form  it  was  not  of  the  sort  that  must  per 
force  be  answered  by  an  insult ;  if  Bismarck  had  rejected 
it  in  accordance  with  the  ordinary  forms  of  diplomacy, 
courteously,  even  curtly,  the  crisis  would  not  have  re 
curred  ;  we  had  resolved  not  to  convert  it  into  an  ulti- 


354         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

matum.  It  was  rejected  with  contumely ;  it  was  that 
fact  alone  which  brought  on  the  war.  If  Thiers  had 
been  animated  by  patriotic  sentiments,  he  would, 
after  criticising  our  error,  have  reproved  much  more 
vigorously  the  insolence  of  Prussia,  and  would  have 
declared  it,  as  we  did,  intolerable.  To  be  sure,  he  did 
not  dare  to  justify  it ;  he  admitted  that  our  sensitive 
ness  was  honorable,  but  he  said  that  two  nations  do  not 
rush  at  each  other's  throats  "for  such  absurd  reasons.95 

To  have  been  slapped  in  the  face  before  all  Europe 
was  an  absurdity,  a  mere  matter  of  form  !  Such  mon 
strous  ideas  are  not  to  be  discussed.  Gramont  re 
proved  them  with  the  haughty  accent  of  a  gentleman 
and  a  man  of  heart,  which  electrified  the  Assembly, 

"After  all  that  you  have  just  heard,  this  one  fact  is 
enough  —  that  the  Prussian  government  has  informed 
all  the  Cabinets  of  Europe  that  it  had  refused  to  receive 
our  Ambassador  or  to  continue  negotiations  with  him. 
That  is  an  insult  to  the  Emperor  and  to  France,  and  if, 
which  is  impossible,  there  should  be  found  to  be,  in  my 
country,  a  Chamber  which  would  submit  to  it  or  toler 
ate  it,  I  would  not  remain  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
for  five  minutes  I" 

Enthusiastic  applause  drowned  those  dignified  words. 

Buffet  and  Jules  Favre  demanded  the  production  of 
the  Prussian  despatch  to  foreign  courts.1  How  could  I 

1  [In  the  course  of  Ms  speech,  M.  OIKvier  had  read  to  the  Chamber  the 
despatches  from  Berne  and  Munich,  without  naming  the  places  from  which 
they  came,  or  their  senders.  After  Gramonfs  brief  address,]  "Jules 
Favre  rose,  more  livid  than  ever,  his  Kp  more  contorted,  emphasizing 
more  than  ever  his  words,  envenomed  by  his  strident  snarl  of  hatred.  He 
had  advised  the  Emperor  to  make  war  on  Austria,  he  would  have  liked  a 
war  over  Poland  and  one  over  Denmark,  and  yet  he  raved  against  the  only 
war  in  which  France  was  really  interested !  .  .  .  The  war  had  no  avowable 
motive :  the_despatch  to  foreign  governments  was  fictitious.  He  demanded 


DECLARATION  OP  JULY  15  355 

produce  a  despatch  sent  to  third  parties  and  not  ad 
dressed  to  me  ?  The  very  cabinets  to  which  it  was  sent 
could  not  have  procured  it  for  us,  since  it  had  been  read 
to  them,  no  copy  being  left.  Bismarck  alone  could  have 
given  us  the  original  text,  as  he  did  later.  At  that 
moment  we  could  produce  only  the  despatches  from  our 
ministers,  who  transmitted  the  message  to  us  according 
to  the  reports  of  those  to  whom  it  had  been  officially 
read.  And  those  despatches  from  our  ministers  we  did 
not  refuse  to  read. 

I  was  preparing  to  make  this  explanation,  and  to  say 
to  Buffet :  Draw  your  motion  properly ;  modify  it  to  a 
request  for.  despatches  sent  by  the  French  government  or 
received  by  it,  and  we  will  accept  it,  when  an  outburst 
of  shouts  of  "Don't  answer  !  don't  answer !"  prevented 
me  from  uttering  a  word,  and  Jules  Favre's  motion  was 
lost  by  159  votes  against  84.1 

that  it  be  laid  before  the  Chamber."  L'Empire  IMral,  vol.  xiv,  pp.  446, 
447.  [After  M.  Thiers,  Jules  Favre  went  to  the  tribune;  "foreseeing  and 
concise  that  day,  but  too  much  suspected  of  hatred  not  to  arouse  distrust, 
he/ pressed  the  government  with  his  questions.  *  Where  is  the  official  de 
spatch?'  .  .  .  Among  the  members  of  the  Corps  Leglslatif  M,  Buffet 
was  one  of  those  most  heeded.  .  .  .  He  tried  in  his  turn  to  restrain  his 
colleagues  and  to  make  the  ministers  speak.  .  .  .  He  appropriated  Jules 
Favre's  motion,  and  demanded  the  production  of  documents,"  La  Gorce, 
vol.  vi»  305.  Favre  himself  wrote  later,  notwithstanding  the  evidence  then 
accessible,  that  the  alleged  despatch  to  foreign  governments  newr  exwteei  and 
that  Bismarck's  despatch  to  the  Cabinets  of  the  South  contained  simply  in 
formation  which  was  of  the  deepest  interest  to  them,  "conveyed  in  terms  which 
could  not  lead  to  a  conflict,  since  they  were  an  exact  reproduction  of  facts 
at  which  our  Ambassador  had  taken  no  offence.**  Gmmrmmmt  de  la  D&* 
fense  Natwnale,  vol.  i,  p.  27.] 

1  [The  names  of  the  84  are  given  by  Lehamtcourt,  voL  i,  p.  828,  n.  1. 
Among  them  are  those  of  M.  Bulfet  and  Comte  Dam,  the  two  men  who  had 
resigned  from  the  ministry ;  also  M.  Thiers.  Some  members  of  the  Left, 
notably  M.  de  K6ratry,  refused  to  go  with  their  colleagues.] 

Certain  deputies,  even  former  ministers  of  the  Empire,  have  tried  to  give 


356         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

The  bureaus,  upon  naming  the  Commission,  instructed 
it  to  demand  all  documents ;  and  we  ourselves,  as  soon 
as  the  Commission  was  organized,  under  the  presidency 
of  Albufera,  and  even  before  they  were  asked  for,  car 
ried  them  before  that  body.1 

I  arrived  first  ;2 1  explained  what  the  impatience  of  the 
Chamber  had  not  allowed  me  to  say,  and  I  announced 
that  Gramont  would  produce  all  the  documents  in  our 
possession:  namely,  (1)  The  telegraphic  despatches 
between  Gramont  and  Benedetti,  from  the  7th  to  the 
18th  inclusive;  (2)  The  despatches  from  Comminges- 
Guitaud,  Cadore,  and  one  or  two  others  of  our  agents, 
notably  the  one  at  Dresden,  which  had  reached  us  since. 
Then  I  asked  leave  to  withdraw;  urgent  affairs  to  be 
attended  to  demanded  my  presence. 

Gramont  arrived  at  this  juncture;   he  produced  all 

to  the  vote  of  tie  84  tlie  significance  of  a  protest  against  the  war.  One  of 
them,  Cochery,  did  it  in  187$.  ...  A  deputy,  Haentjens,  who  had  voted 
with  him  on  that  occasion,  recalled  him  to  the  truth.  ...  "I  am  one  of 
the  84  who  voted  with  M.  Cochery,  and  do  you  deny  that  I  knt>w  the  mean 
ing  of  my  vote  ?  I  declare  that  we  did  not  intend  to  vote  against  the  war ; 
we  simply  wanted  the  production  of  papers  which  were  denied  us*  ...  and 
I  think  now  that  they  were  right  to  refuse  to  produce  them."  [Note  of 
M.  OIHvier  in  vol.  xiv,  p.  449.] 

1  [The  Commission  consisted  of  the  following :   Due  d' Albufera,  Presi 
dent,  MM.  de  Talhouet,  de  Keratry,  Dreolle,  de  Lagrange,  Pinard,  Seneca, 
Chadenet,  and  Millon.] 

2  "I  arrived  first  with  Le  Bantf:"  vol  riv,  p.  451.    [And  M.  Ollivier 
(pp.  45&,  453)  gives  a  resum&  of  the  MarshaFs  statements  to  the  Commission, 
including  his  oft-repeated  assurance]  "  that  we  should  be  ready  before  the 
Prussians,  whose  mobilization  would  not  be  so  rapid  as  was  supposed; 
and  since  war  was  likely  to  be  forced  upon  us  sooner  or  later,  it  was  better 
that  it  should  come  before  the  Prussians  had  changed  their  muskets  and 
secured  good  mifraittrnM®,  and  before  the  opposition  had  finished  demolish 
ing  our  army.    Having  given  these  explanations,  he  took  TalhouSt  into 
a  corner,  and  said  to  him:  *  We  have  a  few  days'  start;  don't  make  us 
lose  it.'" 


DECLARATION  OF  JULY  15  357 

the  documents  that  I  had  mentioned.  -  They  were  most 
carefully  arranged  by  numbers,  that  is  to  say,  chrono 
logically,  because  that  order  was  fixed  by  the  date 
written  at  the  head  of  each  despatch.  He  read  and 
explained  the  principal  ones.  In  this  way  the  Com 
mission  was  able  to  verify  the  accuracy  of  those  that  I 
had  read,  and  to  assure  themselves  that  they  were  not 
contradicted  by  those  that  I  had  not  read.1 

Next,  Albuf  era  asked  if  we  had  any  alliances. 

"My  reason  for  keeping  the  Commission  waiting," 
Gramont  replied,  "is  that  I  had  the  Austrian  Ambassa 
dor  and  the  Italian  minister  with  me  at  the  Foreign 
Office.  I  hope  that  the  Commission  will  not  interro 
gate  me  further." 

Talhouet,  against  his  own  remonstrance,  was  appointed 
reporter.  This  choice  was  very  significant:  Talhouet 
not  only  enjoyed  general  esteem,  but  was  known  to  be  a 
prudent  man,  not  fond  of  compromising  himself  in  haz 
ardous  affairs,  and  his  presence  signified  that  this  one 
was  safe  and  could  be  entered  into  without  danger.2 

On  the  reopening  of  the  session  of  the  Chamber, 

1  [Here  again  M.  OlEvier  has  omitted  a  large  part  of  what  lie  lias  to  say 
in  UEmpire  Liberal  concerning  the  investigations  of  the  Commission  and 
its  report,  and  the  debate  thereon.    The  omitted  portions  will  be  found  on 
pp.  452  ff. ;  as  they  deal  largely  with  a  question  of  some  importance  which 
has  been  made  the  subject  of  much  discussion,  but  which  is  not  mentioned 
in  this  volume,  I  have  thought  best  to  consider  it  by  itself  in  an  appendix. 
See  infra,  Appendix  M :  The  Commission  of  July  15  .and  the  Ems  Corre 
spondence.    The  question  whether  Comte  Benedetti  should  have  been  heard 
by  the  Commission,  which  apparently  did  not  think  of  summoning  him*  is 
argued  affirmatively  by  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi»  p.  309 ;  Sorel*  vol.  i,  p.  186.] 

2  ["Talhoue't  was  one  of  the  most  honorable  men  of  a  Chamber  of  which 
almost  all  the  members  were  men  of  honor.    He  took  fright  at  the  task  and 
demanded  that  others  be  joined  with  him.    M.  de  Keratry,  a  fiery  partisan 
of  the  war,  and  M.  Dreoue,  who,  as  he  himself  said,  yielded  only  reluctantly 
to  the  current,  were  appointed  to  assist  him."    La  Gorcef  vi,  pp.  309,  $10.] 


358         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

Dreolle,  a  member  of  the  Commission,  came  to  my  bench 
and  said  to  me,  "I  have  drawn  the  report;  you  will  be 
satisfied  with  it." 

I  was  surprised  at  this  confidential  communication 
from  a  journalist  who  was  constantly  abusing  me. 

Talhouet  read  Dreolle's  report,  which  unanimously 
recommended  assent  to  the  government's  plan.  It  was 
greeted  by  bravos  and  prolonged  applause,  blended  with 
cries  of  "Vive  1'Empereur  !"  This  report  set  forth 
the  capital  fact  that  the  diplomatic  papers  had  been 
produced. 

Gambetta  delivered  an  artificial  harangue  which, 
while  apparently  against  war,  was  none  the  less  in  favor 
of  it.  His  purpose  to  differentiate  himself  from  Thiers 
was  manifest  in  every  sentence.  In  fact,  he  declared 
that  "no  word  should  come  from  his  mouth  which 
could  serve  the  cause  of  the  foreigner"  —  "as  M.  Thiers 
has  just  done,"  understood.  Thiers  had  deemed  it  quite 
natural  that  the  King  of  Prussia  should  be  unwilling  to 
make  any  agreement  concerning  the  future ;  Gambetta 
understood  that  "that  must  have  disturbed  us,"  and 
agreed  that  "it  was  our  duty  to  insist  upon  having  satis 
faction."  Thiers  had  regarded  as  exaggerated  suscep 
tibility  the  emotion  that  the  public  refusal  to  receive 
our  Ambassador  had  aroused  in  us ;  Gambetta  was  able 
to  understand  that  we  found  "that  conduct  irregular 
and  offensive."  He  was  quite  willing  to  have  war,  but 
a  war  of  revenge  for  Sadowa,  which  he  had  lauded  in 
Ms  speech  on  rue  de  la  Sourdiere;  the  ministry  gave 
insufficient  reasons  for  its  war;  it  sought  "in  wretched 
pretexts  the  decisive  reasons  for  its  conduct ;  it  did  not 
appeal  to  the  veritable  grievances,  but  rested  the  whole 
casus  belli  on  the  base  performances  at  Ems,  instead  of 


DECLARATION  OF  JULY  15  359 

justifying  its  decisions  by  the  necessity  of  atoning  for  a 
policy  which  he  deplored  and  detested  —  the  policy  of 
1866."  Like  the  deputies  of  the  Right,  he  blamed  me 
for  not  making  of  the  war  a  premeditated  revenge  for 
that  discomfiture.  And  still,  he  associated  himself  with 
the  demands  of  his  colleagues,  from  whom  he  had  not  the 
courage  to  set  himself  free,  and  strove  to  prove  that  the 
cause  which  we  assigned  for  our  susceptibility  was  not 
adequate;  he  would  wait  until  the  document  upon 
which  we  wrongfully  rested  the  whole  casm  belli  should 
be  communicated  directly  and  in  full  to  the  Commission. 
"  You  have  not  given  us  all  the  elements  of  certainty  that 
we  are  entitled  to."  * 

Albufera,  President  of  the  Commission,  interrupted 
to  say :  "  The  Commission  has  received  them  att*  I  so 
state  upon  my  honor." 

Gambetta  insisted. 

Albufera  interrupted  him  again.  "The  Commission 
has  read  the  despatch." 

Gramont  added :  "I  declare  that  I  handed  the  docu 
ment  to  the  Commission,  and  that  it  was  read  by  them." 

The  members  of  the  Commission  confirmed  this 
statement:  "Yes!  yes!" 

Albufera  continued :  "We  declare  that  we  have  read 
it,  and  if  you  do  not  believe  us,  you  must  name  other 
commissioners." 

It  was  impossible  not  to  be  convinced  and  silenced 

1  [As  to  Gambetta's  speech,  see  Sorel,  vol.  i»  p.  103 ;  La  Goree,  voL  vi, 
pp.  31$,  313;  Welschinger,  vol.  i,  p.  186.  "Gambetta's  language  was  very 
shrewd,"  says  Sorel:  "he  attacked  M.  Ollivier  in  his  past  opinions  —  the 
indulgent  contemplation  of  the  policy  of  I860;  and  in  his  present  conduct 
—  a  declaration  of  war  without  sufficient  justification.  Therein,  he  con 
formed  to  the  principles  of  J&at  faction,  of  the  revolutionary  school  which 
desired  both  'revenge  for  Sadowa/  amd  'abasement  of  the  Empire/"} 


360         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

by  such  emphatic  statements  made  by  such  men.  So 
that  for  the  time  Gambetta  stopped  short,  and,  for 
getting  that  he  had  just  been  content  to  call  for  com 
munication  of  the  documents  to  the  Commission,  he  said : 
"If  it  is  true  that  that  despatch  is  of  sufficient  impor 
tance  to  have  caused  you  to  make  this  decision,  you  have 
a  plain  duty,  and  that  is  to  communicate  it  not  only  to 
the  members  of  the  Commission  and  to  the  Chamber,  but 
to  France  and  to  Europe ;  and  if  you  do  not  do  it,  your 
war  is  simply  a  veiled  pretext,  and  it  will  not  be  a 
national  war."  [Numerous  protests.  Demonstrations 
of  approval  from  several  benches  on  the  Left.] 

Talhouet  protested:  "We  have  had  before  us  de 
spatches  from  four  or  five  of  our  representatives  at 
different  European  courts,  which  reproduce  this  docu 
ment  in  almost  exactly  the  same  words."  [Numerous 
voices:  "Very  good!  very  good!  "  —  "Go  on!  go  on!  "  — 
"Vote!  vote!"]  The  Chamber  had  had  enough.  It 
would  scarcely  allow  me  to  say  a  few  indignant  words  in 
reply,  before  it  proceeded  to  vote.1 

While  the  votes  were  being  counted,  I  met  Gambetta 
in  the  lobby. 

"How,"  I  said  to  him,  "can  you  deny  the  existence 

1  [The  "few  indignant  words'*  cover  several  pages  of  IS  Empire  JJh&ral 
(vol.  xiv,  pp.  466-471),  with  many  interruptions  toward  the  end,  when  M. 
de  Talhoue't  made  the  statement  first  repeated,  not  in  reply  to  Gambetta. 

The  limits  of  this  volume  make  it  impossible  to  expand  M.  OUivier's 
greatly  condensed  account  of  the  events  of  the  memorable  15th  of  July. 
I  can  do  no  more  than  supply  a  few  references  which  will  enable  the  reader 
who  desires  to  do  so  to  obtain  a  more  connected  idea  of  the  course  of  affairs 
from  somewhat  different  points  of  view.  Besides  M.  Ollivier's  L' 'Empire 
Liberal,  vol.  xiv,  chapter  6,  see  La  Gorce,  voL  vi,  pp.  298-313 ;  Gramont, 
chapter  12;  Sorel,  vol.  i,  chapter  5 ;  WeLschinger,  vol,  i,  chapter  5 ;  Lehaut- 
court,  vol.  i,  book  4,  chapter  8 ;  Delord,  vol.  vi,  pp.  177-200 ;  Von  Sybel, 
English  terns.,  voL  vii,  pp.  415-422;  Jules  Favre,  voL  i,  pp.15  ff.] 


DECLARATION  OP  JULY  15  361 

of  the  despatches  that  I  read  to  you  ?    I  will  show  them 
to  you  if  you  wish/* 

"I  don't  deny  them,"  he  said,  "but  you  didn't  read 
everything." 

"That  is  true:  Gramont  showed  the  Commission 
everything;  but  I  did  not  read  the  end  of  Cadore's 
despatch,  from  Munich,  to  the  effect  that  the  King  of 
Bavaria  was  informed  that  Benedetti  had  disrespect 
fully  accosted  the  King  on  the  promenade." 

"Very  good  !  that  is  the  very  thing  that  I  sought  to 
compel  you  to  read." 

"I  could  not  do  it  without  making  Cadore's  position 
at  Munich  impossible;  the  additional  light  that  that 
would  have  thrown  on  the  discussion  was  not  important 
enough  to  convince  me  that  I  ought  to  run  that  risk." 

Let  us  determine  the  significance  of  that  vote,  which 
furnished  us  with  a  credit  of  fifty  million  francs.  It  was 
not  a  question  of  carrying  on  a  war  that  had  begun; 
we  were  in  no  wise  compromised  or  bound ;  there  had 
been  no  declaration  of  war,  no  irrevocable  step  had'been 
taken ;  not  a  single  army  was  assembled ;  a  vote  refus 
ing  us  the  credit  we  asked  would  have  been  sufficient 
to  turn  the  scale  in  favor  of  peace.  Throughout  the  de 
bate  this  vote  was  treated  as  destined  to  decide  the 
question  of  peace  or  war. 

"From  the  decision  that  you  are  about  to  make," 
said  Thiers,  "there  may  result  the  death  of  thousands." 

"The  Cabinet,"  said  Gambetta,  "proposes  to  you  to 
take  upon  yourselves  the  responsibility  of  a  vote,  an 
attitude,  a  parliamentary  decision  which  will  allow  it  to 
engage  in  war."  And,  at  the  outset  of  Ms  remarks, 
he  said:  "Before  war  is  declared" 

Thus  the  Chamber  had  the  power  to  prevent  us  from 


36£         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

declaring  war.  The  duty  of  those  who  wanted  peace 
was  to  deny  us  the  funds  and  to  turn  us  out.  Under 
the  Restoration  the  members  of  the  opposition  would 
not  vote  the  necessary  credit  even  after  the  Spanish 
expedition  had  been  undertaken.  If  the  imperial  gov 
ernment,  before  sending  troops  to  Mexico,  had  gone  to 
the  Corps  Legislatif  to  ask  for  subsidies,  would  the  Five 
have  granted  them  ?  To  vote  the  credit  was  to  vote  for 
war.  And  so  the  deputies  who  had  declared  themselves 
resolutely  against  war  did  not  hesitate,  but  voted  No. 

The  votes  of  those  who  voted  Yes  meant,  "March 
against  the  enemy ;  the  Chamber,  the  mouthpiece  of  the 
country,  is  with  you."  Two  hundred  and  forty-five 
deputies  held  this  view,  among  whom  were  Gambetta, 
Jules  Simon,  Jules  Ferry,  Ernest  Picard,  Barthelemy 
Saint-Hilaire,  etc.  Only  six  voted  No:  Emmanuel 
Arago,  Grevy,  Desseaux,  Esquiros,  JGlais-Bizoin,  Ordi 
naire.  Thiers,  more  prudent  in  his  acts  than  in  his 
words,  abstained,  with  Cremieux,  Girault,  and  RaspaiL 
Jules  Favre  was  absent. 

Even  if  one  should  prefer  to  exclude  from  the  count 
all  the  official  candidates  and  to  regard  as  representing 
the  nation  only  the  fifty  or  sixty  deputies  chosen  with 
out  the  patronage  of  the  administration,  the  war  would 
still  have  commanded  an  imposing  majority. 

It  is  not  legitimate  therefore  to  represent  the  War  of 
1870  as  an  arbitrary  enterprise  of  despotism,  forced 
upon  the  nation  in  its  own  despite.  As  the  Emperor 
often  said  afterwards,  the  responsibility  should  be 
divided  equally  between  himself,  his  ministers,  and  Par 
liament.  "If  I  had  been  against  the  war,"  he  would 
say,  "I  should  have  dismissed  my  ministers ;  if  they  had 
not  deemed  it  necessary,  they  would  have  resigned ;  if 


DECLARATION  OF  JULY  15  363 

Parliament  had  disapproved,  it  would  not  have  voted 
for  it."  i 

Emperor,  ministers,  Parliament,  all  made  their  deci 
sion  with  entire  liberty  and  with  full  knowledge  of  the 
circumstances,  neither  of  them  having  been  deceived, 
or  having  deceived  the  others.  The  vote  of  the  fifty 
millions  settled  the  question. 

The  Chamber  proceeded,  without  discussion,  to  vote 
a  credit  of  fifteen  millions  for  the  navy,  the  law  author 
izing  the  limitation  of  voluntary  enlistments  to  the 
duration  of  the  war,  and  that  calling  the  whole  of  the 
national  garde  mobile  into  active  service.  This  session, 
which  began  at  one  in  the  afternoon  of  the  15th,  was 
adjourned  a  few  minutes  after  midnight.2 

In  the  Senate  the  declaration  was  greeted  with  cheers 

1Emile  Ollivier  to  Prince  Napoleon:  —  "Saint  Tropez,  March  18, 
1876.  My  dear  Prince:  When  I  came  to  you  in  1871,  I  complained 
vigorously  of  the  Bonapartist  polemic  which  aimed  to  hold  me  alone  respon 
sible  for  our  disasters.  You  transmitted  my  complaint  to  the  Emperor, 
who  replied  to  you :  *  In  truth  the  responsibility  can  not  be  concentrated 
on  E.  O.'s  head.  It  must  be  divided  equally  between  the  ministry,  the 
Chamber,  and  myself.  If  I  had  not  wanted  the  war,  I  would  have  dismissed 
my  ministers ;  if  the  opposition  had  come  from  them,  they  would  have  re 
signed  ;  finally,  if  the  Chamber  had  been  forced  into  the  enterprise  against 
its  will,  it  would  have  voted  against  it.*  It  may  be  of  very  great  impor 
tance  to  me,  in  view  of  certain  eventualities,  to  have  a  copy  of  that  letter, 
To  send  it  to  me  could  not,  in  any  case,  cause  you  any  embarrassnaent. 
That  is  why  I  ask  it  of  your  friendship." 

Prince  Napoleon  to  Emile  Ollivier :  —  "Paris,  March  21,  1870.  My  dear 
Ollivier :  What  you  remind  me  of,  as  coming  from  the  Emperor,  was  tend, 
not  written.  My  memory  is  perfectly  clear  on  that  subject.  On  my  next 
visit  to  Prangins  I  will  reread  and  search  among  my  cousin's  letters,  but  I 
am  almost  certain  that  he  did  not  write  the  sentence  that  you  recall :  he 
repeated  it  to  me  stfmrd  times"  [Note  of  M.  Olivier  in  vol.  xiv,  p,  474.] 

2  [Here  M.  Ollivier  devotes  three  pages  (475-478)  to  a  refutation  of  the 
charge  that  the  Chamber  acted  with  undue  haste,  comparing  it  with  the 
action  of  the  Legislative  on  August  20, 179&,  when  it  decreed  the  beginning 
of  the  great  war  of  the  Kevolution.] 


364         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

and  prolonged  applause,  mingled  with  shouts  of  "Vive 
la  France!  Vive  1'Empereur!"  The  public  galler 
ies  joined  in  the  enthusiasm  of  the  Senate  and  in 
tensified  it.  President  Rouher  having  asked,  "Does 
any  one  desire  to  speak?"  shouts  of  "No  !  no !  Vive 
FEmpereur  !"  arose  on  all  sides. 

Rouher  continued:  "The  Senate,  by  its  enthusiastic 
cheers,  has  given  its  full  approval  to  the  conduct  of  the 
government.  I  propose  to  the  Senate  to  adjourn  as  a 
token  of  our  cordial  sympathy  with  the  decision  of  the 
Emperor/' 

Shouts  of  "Vive  FEmpereur  !"  broke  out  afresh,  and 
the  session  was  adjourned.  On  leaving  the  building 
the  senators,  popular  for  the  first  time,  were  applauded 
by  the  crowd. 

The  next  day  the  Commission  of  the  Senate  met. 
Gramont  was  summoned  before  it.  He  laid  before  the 
commissioners  the  despatches  that  he  had  exhibited  to 
the  Corps  Legislatif  on  the  preceding  day.  Rouher's 
report  finally  disproved  the  charge  against  Gramont  of 
having  kept  from  the  Commission  of  the  Corps  Legis 
latif  the  despatches  prior  to  the  12th.  It  stated  that 
the  Commission  had  been  supplied  with  all  the  important 
despatches  since  July  6.1 

1  [See  Appendix  M.  President  Router's  report  is  given  in  full  in 
ISEmpire  Z/i&6rol,  vol.  xiv,  pp.  479,  480,  followed  by  an  account  of  the 
"demonstration"  arranged  by  him,  the  Senate  going  in  a  body  to  Saint>GIoud 
to  felicitate  the  Emperor.  Rouher  made  a  speech  which  M.  Ollivier  de 
scribes  as]  "the  speech  which  the  Right  had  failed  to  obtain  from  me  on  the 
15th:  a  counter-declaration  opposed  to  ours;  the  programme  of  the  war- 
party  set  up  against  our  programme.  .  .  .  Very  different  was  the  Emperor's 
reply.  No  bluster:  *We  are  beginning  a  serious  straggle.*  And  he  dis 
creetly  aligns  himself  with  the  ideas  of  his  Cabinet  and  not  with  Rouher's,, 
in  thanking  the  Senate  for  *  the  keen  enthusiasm  with  which  it  had  received 
the  declaration  that  the  Foreign  Minister  had  been  instructed  to  make," 


DECLARATION  OF  JULY  15  365 

Our  declaration  was  equivalent  to  a  declaration  of 
war.  King  William  so  understood  it,  for  as  soon  as  he 
was  informed  of  it,  during  that  same  night  of  the  15th, 
he  ordered  the  mobilization  of  his  army.  Neverthe 
less,  most  inopportunely,  in  response  to  the  obstinate 
persistence  of  Admiral  Rigault,  with  a  view  of  regulariz 
ing  the  prizes  that  we  never  took,  we  declared,  by  a  nete 
awkwardly  drawn  by  the  Foreign  Office  and  handed  to 
Bismarck  on  July  19,  that  we  considered  ourselves  to  be 
in  a  state  of  war.1 

But  this  attitude  was  so  discreetly  assumed  and  so  concealed  that  the  public 
did  not  take  it  in.  It  remembered  only  Rouher's  swaggering  and  compro 
mising  assertions.  .  .  .  The  speech-making  at  an  end,  the  sovereigns 
circulated  among  the  senators.  The  difference  in  their  attitudes  was  very 
marked.  The  Empress  was  most  expansive,  animated  by  triumphant  confi 
dence;  she  said:  *  We  are  beginning  with  all  the  chances  in  our  favor  that 
one  can  have;  all  will  go  well.'  The  Emperor  was  melancholy ;  he  said: 
*It  will  be  a  long  and  hard  struggle ;  we  shall  have  to  make  a  violent  effort.'  ** 
1  "A  declaration  of  war  was  a  superfluity.  .  .  .  But  there  are,  in 
addition  to  the  belligerents,  neutral  powers.  Neutrality,  being  a  special 
condition  in  a  legal  point  of  view,  can  result  only  from  a  visible,  regular 
state  of  things,  as  to  the  existence  and  nature  of  which  there  can  be  no  doubt. 
Hence  arises,  even  after  the  regularly  constituted  governing  powers  of  a 
nation  have  publicly  decided  upon  war,  the  necessity  of  an  official  notifica 
tion  to  the  enemy.  Ministers  did  not  deny  their  obigation  to  comply  with 
the  formality;  but  they  would  have  preferred  not  to  take  the  initiative. 
*We  should  leave  it  to  the  enemy,'  said  Le  Boeuf.  But  Rigault,  whose 
rare  intervention  was  always  overbearing  and  regrettable,  appealed  to  the 
provisions  of  the  treaty  of  Paris  concerning  naval  prizes,  as  if  our  fieet  were 
likely  to  be  over-supplied  with  them.  He  was  so  insistent  that,  fearing  to 
bring  about  a  dislocation  of  the  ministry,  we  conceded  the  declaration  of 
war.  ...  It  was  not  even  read  to  the  Council.  It  was  laid  before  the 
Chambers  solely  as  a  matter  of  form  and  without  discussion,  ...  In 
reality  it  did  not  give  us  the  initiative  in  attack :  we  had  taken  that  in  the 
tribune  on  the  15th."  L' Empire  IMrak  vol.  xiv,  pp.  499,  500. 


CHAPTER  XXH 

TJ!PON   WHOM  SHOULD   THE   RESPONSIBILITY  FOR  THE 
WAR  FALL  —  FRANCE   OR  GERMANY? 

IN  Ms  speech,  of  July  16  in  the  Bundesrath,  and  In  his 
circular  note  of  the  18th,  Bismarck  cast  upon  France  the 
responsibility  of  having  desired,  sought,  and  provoked 
the  war.  As  to  the  origin  of  the  business,  he  repeated 
the  language  that  he  had  placed  in  the  mouths  of  Thile 
and  the  King.  He  exerted  himself  particularly  to  modify 
the  real  character  of  the  Ems  despatch,  which,  as  he 
justly  said,  was,  in  the  last  analysis,  so  far  as  the 
French  ministry  was  concerned,  the  sole  ground  of  war. 
According  to  him  that  despatch  was  simply  a  newspaper 
telegram  sent  to  the  representatives  of  Prussia  and  to 
other  governments  regarded  as  friendly,  to  keep  them 
informed  as  to  the  -new  phase  which  the  affair  had 
assumed;  it  was  not  an  official  document.  "As  the 
determining  causes  of  this  deplorable  phenomenon  of 
war,"  he  said,  "we  shall  be  unable  unfortunately  to 
discover  nothing  more  than  the  basest  instincts  of  hatred 
and  jealousy  on  the  subject  of  the  autonomy  and  wel 
fare  of  Germany,  conjoined  with  the  desire  to  keep  lib 
erty  bound  hand  and  foot  at  home  by  rushing  the 
country  into  war  with  foreign  nations." 

The  paltry  arguments  so  artfully  woven  by  Bismarck 
produced  at  the  time  a  tremendous  effect  upon  a  fanati 
cal  people,  and  upon  an  international  opinion  always 
suspicious  of  Napoleon  HI.  Von  Sybel  lent  them  the 

366 


WHOSE  THE  RESPONSIBILITY  367 

authority  of  his  talent.  There  was  no  German  who  did 
not  assent  to  them  and  repeat  them.  Germany's  re 
nown  gained  nothing  by  this  system  of  imposture,  and 
impartial  judges  recalled  the  remark  of  Velleius  Pater- 
culus  on  the  Germans,  Natum  ad  mendacium  gmus^- 

Bismarck  himself  was  degraded  by  this  vulgar 
equivocation.  He  was  not  slow  to  perceive  how 
absurd,  puerile,  and  unworthy  of  him  was  the  r6le 
of  hypocrite  which  his  panegyrists  attributed  to  him, 
and  to  which  he  seemed  at  first  to  give  his  assent. 
Little  by  KMe  he  cast  aside  all  these  false  appearances, 
and  ended  by  avowing :  Ego  nominor  leo! 

An  English  correspondent  with  the  Prussian  army 
accosted  him  one  day,  saying:  "You  must  be  very 
angry  with  those  Frenchmen  who  have  forced  you  into 
this  war." 

"Angry !"  he  retorted;  "why,  it  was  I  who  forced 
them  to  fight  I"1 

Later,  he  authorized  Busch  to  divulge  the  mystery 
of  the  insulting  despatch.  His  confidant  did  not 
confine  himself  to  that,  but,  probably  without  authority, 
he  exhibited  the  Mephistopheles  of  the  State,  in  the 
grip  of  remorse,  at  the  moment  when  an  awakened 
conscience  tortures  the  man  who  has  tortured  others* 
admitting  that,  but  for  him,  three  great  wan  w&iM 
not  have  been  undertaken,  eighty  thousand  men  would 
not  have  died,  and  so  many  families,  so  many  fathers 
and  mothers  and  brothers  and  sisters,  would  not  be  left 
desolate. 

Bismarck's  fondness  for  expatiating,  in  his  speeches, 
on  the  War  of  1866,  was  equalled  by  his  reticence 
concerning  that  of  1870.  Except  on  the  day  when, 

1  Coirespoidmce  <>f  tke  Standard,  Feb.  10, 187& 


368         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

in  tlie  heat  of  the  Kulturkampf ,  lie  maundered  about 
the  effect  of  Ultramontane  influences,  he  seldom 
went  beyond  a  few  hasty  assertions.  Finally  the 
truth  was  told  officially  by  himself.  After  the  brief 
reign  of  Frederick  III  [1888],  a  German  review,  the 
Deutsche  Rundschau,  published  extracts  from  that 
Emperor's  journal,  written  when  he  was  Crown  Prince. 
A  note  dated  July  13  said  that  "Bismarck  confided 
to  him  that  he  regarded  peace  as  certain,  and  that 
he  proposed  to  return  to  Varzin."  A  statement  so 
manifestly  false  would  hardly  have  disturbed  Bismarck, 
had  he  not  been  denounced  in  other  extracts  as  having 
been  far  from  solicitous  to  establish  German  Unity. 
Now,  inasmuch  as,  but  for  the  War  of  1870,  that  unity 
would  not  have  advanced  beyond  the  stage  of  a  Utopian 
dream,  and  as  it  became  a  reality  solely  by  virtue 
of  that  war,  Bismarck  placed  his  renown  as  the  founder 
of  the  new  Germany  beyond  attack  by  claiming  the 
initiative  in  that  war.  He  declared,  in  the  report 
whereby  he  called  upon  the  Emperor  to  prosecute 
the  authors  of  that  publication  (September  28,  1888), 
that  the  documents  proved  that  "His  Royal  Highness 
was  already  aware  on  the  13th  that  I  looked  upon  the 
war  as  necessary,  and  that  I  should  not  have  returned 
to  Varzin  without  giving  in  my  resignation,  if  war  had 
been  averted." 

"""The  most  effective  blow  that  he  dealt  to  his  men 
dacious  legend  was  the  restoring  to  the  Ems  despatch 
the  official  and  wilfully  provocative  character  which 
he  had  at  first  denied  to  it,  and  thus  admitting  that  we 
were  in  the  right  as  to  the  sole  grievance  upon  which  we 
justified  the  war.  In  Ms  Reflections  and  Reminiscences, 
he  describes  the  scene  of  the  Ems  despatch,  and  draws 


WHOSE  THE  RESPONSIBILITY         369 

a  picture  of  it  equal  to  the  most  terrific  passages  of 
Macbeth,  a  picture  so  impressively  dramatic  beneath 
the  simplicity  of  the  words,  that  it  will  remain  forever 
in  the  memory  of  posterity.1 

"Vanity !"  some  one  has  said  of  these  solemn  as 
sertions  so  deliberately  multiplied.  No;  they  were 
due  to  the  just  reasoning  of  a  mind  in  full  control 
of  itself,  tired  of  seeing  others  appropriate  the  reward 
when  they  had  had  none  of  the  labor.  Perhaps  there 
was  involuntarily  mingled  therewith  some  impatience 
with  the  public  folly.  It  is  not  altogether  certain 
that,  weary  of  hearing  so  many  fools  or  knaves  repeat 
consequentially,  despite  the  evidence  to  the  contrary, 
that  the  war  was  engineered  and  sought  by  France, 
he  did  not  take  a  sort  of  malicious  pleasure  in  crying 
out  to  them:  "Well!  as  you  persist  in  ignoring  the 
fact,  let  me  tell  you  that  that  war  was  my  own  work!" 

But  there  is  one  point  on  which  he  insists  upon 
not  being  truthful.  That  is,  the  origin  and  develop 
ment  of  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy.  He  clings  to 
his  fable  of  the  first  moment,  doubtless  because  the 
truth  would  be  too  villanous  to  disclose.  There  is, 
in  fact,  an  agreement  between  him  and  his  accomplices 
to  keep  History  always  in  ignorance .  of  the  truth. 
Bernhardi's  Memoirs  would  have  unveiled  the  secret; 
the  published  portion  contains  nothing  about  his  mission 
to  Spain  except  picturesque  anecdotical  details ;  the  po 
litical  portion  has  been  suppressed,  and,  it  is  said,  will  never 
see  the  light.  On  the  other  hand,  the  papers  of  Lothar 
Bucher,  another  confidant,  were  burned.  We  should  have 
been  doomed  therefore  to  remain  in  ignorance  of  the 
beginnings  of  that  ambuscade,  had  not  Prince  Charles 
i  [See  Appendix  KJ 


370         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

of  Roumania,  by  publishing  his  Memoirs,  rendered  to  the 
truth  the  service  of  illuminating  with  a  light  which 
will  never  again  be  put  out,  the  only  dark  corner  of 
that  dark  affair.  I  have  been  told  that  he  was  ear 
nestly  urged  to  publish  them  by  Queen  Augusta. 

Some  historians  of  unconquerable  lack  of  candor, 
like  Oncken,  cling  obstinately  to  the  outworn  legends. 
But  serious  critics,  like  Ottokar  Lorenz,  Delbriick, 
Rathlef,  Lenz,  Johannes  Scherr,  and  Schultze,  have 
had  the  laudable  courage  to  free  themselves  from  the 
conventional  falsehood.  Concerning  the  origin  of  the 
conflict,  Lorenz  says :  — 

"Viewed  from  the  standpoint  of  international  law, 
Herr  von  Bismarck's  theory  could  hardly  be  sustained. 
All  the  candidacies  for  the  throne  which  have  arisen 
during  the  nineteenth  century  in  Spain  and  Portugal 
have  been  invariably  subjects  of  international  negoti 
ation,  and  the  Coburgs  in  Belgium,  as  well  as  the 
Danes  in  Greece  and  the  Hohenzollerns  in  Roumania, 
furnish  unquestionable  examples  of  the  fact  that 
such  dynastic  arrangements  have  always  been  pre 
ceded  by  an  understanding  between  the  powers  interested 
in  the  negotiations.  .  .  .  No  one  can  deny  that  the 
pretension  of  the  Prussian  government  that  it  was 
not  called  upon  to  concern  itself  with  such  a  matter, 
clearly  was,  and  was  certain  to  be  considered,  a  novel 
principle  in  diplomatic  history.  The  refusal  of  the 
Prussian  government  to  make  known  its  views  on  this 
question,  on  the  pretext  that  it  did  not  concern  the 
State,  added  to  the  difficulties  of  Benedetti's  task, 
because  he  was  certain  to  conceive  from  Herr  von 
Thile's  assertions  the  suspicion  that  there  was  some 


WHOSE  THE  RESPONSIBILITY         371 

scheme  in  progress  on  the  part  of  Prussia,  which  they 
wished  to  conceal." x 

He  characterizes  no  less  justly  the  sudden  changes 
of  July  13. 

"But  on  the  13th/  God  be  praised !  a  spirit  worthy 
of  the  great  Frederick  had  already  come  to  life  in  the 
German  nation.  They  were  not  only  determined  to 
fight,  but  they  longed  to  crush  the  French  and  wipe 
them  out.  It  was  the  spirit  of  1813.  The  great 
statesman  did  everything  to  assure  a  swift,  decisive, 
radical  contest,  and  to  forestall  the  intervention  of 
a  halting  peace.  Timid  historians  are  accustomed 
to  say  nothing,  or  to  mention  only  in  the  most  casual 
way,  the  decisive  diplomatic  skill  exerted  by  Bismarck 
to  fan  the  warlike  excitement  in  France.  While  he 
was  proving  by  his  audacious  plans  that  the  traditions 
of  Prussian  politics,  and  those  of  the  'Great  Fritz/ 
who  knew  enough  to  cross  the  Rubicon  at  need,  had 
not  fallen  into  oblivion,  these  timid  historians  represent 
him  as  still  playing  the  part  of  the  lamb  who  threatens 
the  wolf  on  the  bank  of  the  stream.  But  luckily 
the  cast  is  materially  changed  on  the  13th  of  July, 
and  it  is  Bismarck  who  plays  the  wolf  on  the  bank  of 
the  stream." 2 

Hans  Delbriick  has  very  fittingly  characterized  Bis 
marck's  sophistical  plea  of  not  guilty.  "Bismarck," 
he  says,  "thought  to  cover  his  act  with  the  veil  of  a 
private  affair  of  the  Hohenzollern  family.  Von  Sybel 
simply  accepted  this  fiction  in  his  history  and  sharply 
reproved  the  French  for  not  accepting  it  in  the  same 
way.  I  fear  that  with  that  method  of  narrating  facts 

1  Lorenz,  Kaiser  Wilhelm,  und  die  Begrundung  des  Reichs,  pp.  238,  239. 

2  Lorenz,  op.  dt.,  pp.  270,  £71. 


372         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

we  should  not  cut  a  good  figure  in  the  history  of  the 
world,  and  that  the  French  are  simply  laughing  at 
us."1 

Rathlef  passes  judgment  on  the  Ems  despatch  with 
out  hypocrisy.  "They  who  agree  that  the  affairs 
of  their  country  shall  be  managed  by  a  Bismarck, 
must  also  accept,  with  the  great  things  that  Germany 
received  from  him,  those  things  which  they  cannot 
justify  and  which,  it  may  be,  in  the  depths  of  their 
hearts,  they  reprobate.  But  in  such  circumstances 
there  is  always  more  or  less  injustice  done  to  the  ad 
versary.  Even  for  the  sake  of  Germany's  noble  cause, 
we  cannot  fail  to  deplore  immensely  the  shadow  that 
the  Ems  despatch  casts  upon  her ;  we  cannot  deny  it,  nor 
do  we  wish  to  do  so ;  and  the  more  momentous  that 
hour  is  in  the  history  of  Germany,  the  more  importance 
that  both  Germans  and  French  ascribe  to  it,  the  more 
reasons  have  we  for  attenuating  by  an  honorable  con 
fession  such  fault  as  is  attributable  to  us,  not  only 
because  we  owe  it  to  our  opponents,  but  because  we 
owe  it  to  ourselves."  2 

Johannes  Scherr  does  not  consider  that  the  re 
sponsibility  for  the  war  should  be  charged  to  the  French 
alone.  "Only  those  persons,"  he  says,  "whom  their 
patriotism  petrifies  in  ignorance,  or  whose  narrow- 
mindedness  prevents  them  from  understanding  any 
thing,  can  believe  that  France  alone,  or  the  Emperor 
of  the  French,  is  responsible  for  the  war.  Doubtless 
the  Bonapartist  faction  desired  it  for  several  reasons, 
and  Gallic  vanity,  as  well  as  the  chauvinistic  delusion 
of  grandeur,  drove  in  the  same  direction;  but  Prussia, 

1  In  Prewsische  Jahrbucker,  Oct.,  1895,  p,  34. 

2  Georg  RatHef,  "Die  Emse  Depesche,"  Jahrbuck,  1896,  p.  458. 


WHOSE  THE  RESPONSIBILITY         373 

extended  to  the  Main,  had  no  less  need  of  it,  and  desired 
it  no  less  earnestly.  Except  for  the  action  of  Herr 
von  Bismarck,  and  in  spite  of  Abeken's  despatch,  the 
negotiations  would  have  come  to  a  friendly  conclusion, 
not  only  because  of  what  happened  at  Ems,  but  be 
cause  in  many  quarters,  in  France,  there  were  signs 
of  a  disposition  to  leave  the  sword  in  the  scabbard."  l 

Schultze,  in  a  noteworthy  work  that  reveals  the 
honest  man  and  the  true  historian,  discussing  step  by 
step  the  uncontested  facts  and  documents,  demon 
strates  more  clearly  than  any  one  "that  the  Hohen- 
zollern  candidacy  always  had  the  anti-French  character 
that  Bismarck  denied  that  it  had ;  and  that,  while  it  was 
in  any  event  unfriendly  to  France  to  follow  up  the  affair, 
the  way  in  which  Bismarck  did  it  disclosed  a  premedi 
tated  design  to  hasten  the  catastrophe,  and  that,  in 
those  days  of  July,  Bismarck  worked  determinedly  and 
persistently  to  bring  on  war  —  that  the  HohenzoUem 
business  was  a  trap  set  for  Napoleon,  to  humble  him. 
The  Hohenzollern  scheme  was  to  Bismarck  one  method 
of  pursuing  a  policy  of  action  adverse  to  France.  In 
the  conception  of  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy,  Bismarck 
was  the  aggressor,  who  was  well  aware  at  the  outset, 
that,  so  far  as  any  one  could  foresee,  it  would  lead  to 
a  rupture,  and  who,  in  the  last  stage  of  the  affair, 
brought  that  rupture  to  pass  in  an  altogether  deliberate 
way,  and  knowing  full  well  what  he  was  about."  2 

But  it  would  not  be  fair  to  make  the  German  his 
torians  and  critics  say  more  than  they  have  said.  They 
have  declared  that  Bismarck  wanted  war,  not  to  blame 

1  Johannes  Scherr,  1870-1871,  p.  72. 

2  Walter  Schultze,  Die  Throrikandidatur  Hohenzollern  und  Graf  Bismarclc, 
pp.  54,  55. 


374         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

Mm  for  it,  but  to  glorify  him :  to  be  sure,  he  planned  it 
all  and  provoked  it  all,  but  that  was  where  his  genius 
shone  forth ;  his  offensive  tactics  were  simply  the  means 
of  forestalling  the  offensive  strategy  prepared  by  Na 
poleon  m.  He  knew  by  the  disclosures  of  Bernhardi, 
and  by  those,  even  more  reliable,  of  his  Austrian  and 
Italian  agents,  the  plans  for  a  triple  alliance  that  had 
been  discussed  since  1869  by  the  cabinets  of  Paris, 
Vienna,  and  Florence. 

"To  each  step  forward  in  the  formation  of  this  alli 
ance/5  says  Schultze,  "there  was  a  corresponding  step 
taken  by  him  in  the  preparation  of  the  candidacy. 
And  it  was  because  the  visit  of  Archduke  Albert  to 
Paris,  in  March,  1870,  convinced  him  that  Prussia  would 
be  attacked  the  next  spring,  that  he  sent  Lothar  Bucher 
to  Madrid,  in  order  to  hurry  forward  the  crisis,  and  to 
disconcert  by  his  sudden  attack  the  premeditated 
attack  for  which  everything  was  ready  both  in  a  diplo 
matic  and  in  a  military  way/* l 

Not  one  of  Schultze's  conjectures  has  the  slightest 
foundation.  Bismarck  knew  better  than  any  other  man 
what  to  expect.  He  was  fully  informed  of  the  Emperor's 
pacific  disposition,  especially  since  the  plebiscite ;  and 
the  interview  in  the  Cologne  Gazette  had  apprized  him 
and  all  Germany  that  mine  was  even  more  certain.2 
However  ardent  the  bellicose  sentiments  that  were 
attributed,  justly  or  unjustly,  to  the  Empress,  there  was 

1  Schultze,  ubi  sup. 

2  [The  resignation  of  Comte  Daru  in  April  was  ostensibly  due  to  the 
decision  of  the  government  to  resort  to  the  plebiscite,  although  he  did  not 
at  first  oppose  it.    M.  Ollivier's  article  in  the  Cologne  Gazette,  in  March, 
had  shown  its  author  to  be  not  inimical  to  German  unity,  —  an  attitude 
practically  in  direct  opposition  to  that  recently  announced  by  Comte  Dam. 
See  Welschinger,  vol.  i,  pp.  18  ff  J 


WHOSE  THE  RESPONSIBILITY         375 

no  occasion  to  take  them  into  account,  for  the  Emperor 
could  not  decide  to  make  war  without  the  assent  of  his 
Council,  and  the  Empress  possessed  no  influence  over 
the  members  of  that  body,  all  of  whom  were  notoriously 
devoted  to  peace. 

The  plans  for  a  triple  alliance  were  of  a  deterrent 
nature  only,  —  academic,  so  to  speak,  —  and  were 
never  reduced  to  practicable,  effective  shape. 

The  Archduke  Albert's  visit  to  Paris  could  not 
seriously  have  disturbed  Bismarck,  for  he  was  well 
aware  how  slender  that  gentleman's  influence  was  on  the 
course  of  political  affairs.  Even  if  he  had  attached 
any  importance  to  the  friendly  professions  of  Beust, 
whom  he  never  took  seriously,  he  was  protected  against 
them  by  his  understanding  with  Andrassy  and  the 
Hungarians,  without  whose  concurrence  no  war  was 
possible. 

Nor  did  Victor  Emmanuel's  inclination  toward  the 
Emperor  arouse  his  displeasure.  "The  alliance  of 
Italy  and  France,"  he  said,  according  to  Hohenlohe, 
"is  of  no  importance  for  the  moment.  The  Italians 
would  not  take  the  field,  even  if  Victor  Emmanuel,  who 
is  capable  of  anything  for  money  and  women,  wished  to 
conclude  a  treaty."  x  Moreover,  it  was  not  enough  to 
warrant  undertaking  a  campaign  against  Prussia,  that 
an  alliance  should  be  formed  by  Paris,  Vienna,  and 
Florence,  —  it  must  include  Munich  and  Stuttgart  as 
well.  Now,  there  exists  no  trace  of  any  negotiations 
with  these  two  last-named  cabinets,  for  we  were  well 
aware  that,  although  the  ministers  of  the  Southern  king 
doms  were  defending  their  states  against  absorption 
by  Prussia,  no  one  of  them  would  have  consented  to 

1  See  the  Memoirs  of  Hohenlohe. 


376         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

plot  an  aggression  against  their  powerful  neighbor. 
So  that  this  theory  of  offensive  tactics  made  necessary 
by  our  threats,  however  specious  it  may  appear,  neither 
explains  nor  justifies  Bismarck's  undeniable  challenge. 
The  true  explanation  is  quite  different;  my  readers 
already  know  it,  but  I  must  recur  to  it  one  last  time. 
^William  and  Bismarck,  assisted  by  two  military  or 
ganizers  of  the  first  rank,  had  resolved  to  complete  the 
conquest  of  Germany  begun  by  Frederick.  The  first 
step  was  the  breaking  up  of  the  Germanic  Confedera 
tion  and  the  exclusion  of  Austria  from  Germany.  The 
victory  of  Sadowa  achieved  this  first  result,  but  only  by 
endangering  the  final  object:  ^Germans  had  beaten 
Germans,  which  fact  was  not  of  a  nature  to  facilitate 
their  reunion  in  the  same  Empire;  the  only  means  of 
reconciling  them  was  to  associate  them  in  a  common 
triumph  over  the  hereditary  foe.  "This  war,"  said 
William  in  July,  1866,  "will  be  followed  by  another." 
From  that  moment,  the  ravisher  of  the  Duchies  and 
Hanover  accepted  that  other  war  as  a  historic  necessity 
as  inevitable  as  the  war  against  Austria  had  been. 

"I  was  convinced,"  says  Bismarck  in  his  memoirs, 
"that  the  gulf  between  the  Northern  and  Southern 
sections  of  the  Fatherland,  which  had  been  dug  in  the 
course  of  centuries  by  difference  of  sentiments,  race, 
dynasty,  and  mode  of  life,  could  be  happily  bridged  only 
by  a  national  war  against  the  near-by  nation,  our  ag 
gressor  for  ages  past.  These  political  considerations 
regarding  the  states  of  Southern  Germany  might  also 
be  applied,  mutatis  mutandis,  to  our  relations  with  the 
people  of  Hanover,  Hesse,  and  Schleswig-Holstein." 1 
After  his  triumph,  he  reverted  many  times  to  the  same 

iJBismarck,  Reflections  and  Reminiscences,  English  trans.,  voL  ii,  pp.  99, 100. 


WHOSE  THE  RESPONSIBILITY         377 

assertion.  "The  War  of  1870-1871  was  also  a  neces 
sity,"  he  said  at  Jena  in  1892;  "unless  we  had  beaten 
France,  we  could  not  have  completed  peaceably  the 
formation  of  the  German  Empire.  France  would 
have  found,  later,  allies  to  help  her  to  prevent  us.'5 1 

After  words  so  explicit  as  these,  how  can  any  intel 
ligent  mortal  still  seek  the  causes  of  the  War  of  1870, 
or  impute  them  to  Napoleon  III  and  his  ministers? 
Neither  the  King  nor  Bismarck  had  the  wish  or  the  power 
to  annex  the  states  of  the  South  by  force,  and  they 
were  sincere  when  they  denied'  having  such  a  thought. 
Sooner  or  later  .the  cause  of  Unity  must  prevail.  But 
when  ?  For'  the  momftit  the  resistance  of  the  people 
was  so  vehement  that  it  was  impossible  to  foresee  when 
it  would  cease. 

A  diversion  was  of  no  advantage  to  Napoleon  HI, 
who  had  just  learned  how  deeply  the  roots  of  his  dynasty 
were  buried  in  national  soil,  or  to  his  ministers,  who 
were  amply  content  with  the  glory  of  having  achieved 
the  transformation  of  their  country  into  a  liberal  empire. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  was  indispensable  to  Prussia :  the 
peoples  of  the  South,  overspent,  Exhausted  by  incessant 
military  alarums,  were  praying  for  mercy;  if  no  war 
should  break  out,  a  lightening  of  the  burden  of  miliw 
tarism  would  be  unavoidable;  a  conflict  between  the 
crown,  the  parliament,  and  the  nation  would  inevitably 
ensue,  and  under  more  difficult  conditions  than  the  last* 
as  universal  suffrage  had  come  upon  the  stage.  A  vict 
tory  over  France  would  solve  the  difficulty  in  an  instant; 
Hence,  under  pain  of  marking  time  indefinitely,  an4 
leaving  the  partly  built  bridge  over  the  Main  unfinished; 
war  was  a  necessity. 

1  Speech  of  Bismarck  at  Jena,  July  31, 1892. 


378         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

In  1867,  at  the  time  of  tke  Luxembourg  difficulty, 
Bismarck  was  inclined  to  push,  the  affair  to  a  conclusion, 
and  to  strike,  as  he  said.  But  he  did  not  find  himself 
sufficiently  prepared ;  he  was  sure  neither  of  the  coopera 
tion  of  the  states  of  the  South,  nor  of  the  connivance 
of  Russia.  In  December,  1869,  the  Czar's  good-will 
was  assured,  and  Moltke's  military  arrangements  per 
fected  ;  so  war  was  resolved  upon.  The  difficulty  was 
to  produce  the  appearance  of  aggression  on  our  part, 
in  order  to  draw  the  King  on.  Bismarck  waited,  so  long 
as  he  hoped  for  an  attack  from  us ;  as  soon  as  he  con 
sidered  that  to  be  absolutely  excluded  by  my  accession 
to  power  (in  that  sense  I  contributed  indirectly  to  the 
outbreak  of  the  war),  he  devised  his  challenge.  All  the 
early  months  of  the  year  1870  were  devoted  to  that 
conspiracy.  He  thought  at  first  of  proclaiming  the 
King  German  Emperor,  which  he  supposed  could  not 
be  submitted  to  by  France ;  but  the  governments  of  the 
South  did  not  lend  themselves  to  that  plan.  Then,  in 
March,  he  fixed  upon  the  Prussian  candidacy  in  Spain, 
which,  he  knew,  was  likely  to  irritate  our  people  more 
than  the  assumption  of  the  title  of  German  Emperor. 
Thus  this  was  an  offensive  war,  strategically  as  well  as 
tactically. 

This  whole  controversy  between  the  Germans  and 
ourselves  concerning  the  responsibility  for  tte* war  is 
controlled  and  solved  by  two  general  considerations. 
From  what  cause  did  the  war  arise?  From  the  Hohen- 
zollern  candidacy  in  the  first  place,  and  then  from  Bis 
marck's  disclosure  of  the  King's  refusal  to  receive  our 
Ambassador.  No  Hohenzollem  candidacy,  no  war. 
Even  after  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy,  no  disclosure 
of  the  Song's  refusal,  no  war-  JjTow,  was  it  the  Em- 


WHOSE  THE  RESPONSIBILITY          379 

,peror'&  government  that  instigated  the  Hohenzollern 
candidacy?  Was  it  the  Emperor's  government  that 
spread  broadcast  the  occurrence  at  Ems  ? 

JSven  if  it  be  true  that  we  showed  ourselves  to  be 
unskilful  diplomatists,  that  at  the  beginning  we  were  too 
stiff  and  "atTihe  end  too  exacting,  still,  it  is  true  that  we 
did  not  suggest  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy ;  that,  if  it 
had  not  been  secretly  hatched  by  Prussia,  our  bungling 
and  our  exactions  would  have  had  neither  pretext  nor 
opportunity  to  manifest  themselves,  and  peace  would 
not  have  been  disturbed.  -^ 

There  is  not  a  thinking  person  in  Europe  so  uncandid 
as  to  maintain  that,  face  to  face  with  a  German  candi 
dacy  in  Spain,  we  should  have  held  aloof,  submitted,  and 
said  nothing.  Now,  every  word  exchanged  between 
Prussia  and  ourselves  was  a  danger,  because  every  word 
that  was  not  uttered  aloud  would  have  lacked  dignity. 
Let  us  admit  that  we  mispronounced  that  word  which, 
as  everybody  admits,  we  were  bound  to  utter,  or  else 
to  abdicate :  it  is  still  an  undeniable  fact  that  it  was 
Prussia  who  forced  us  to  speak ;  that  but  for  her  con 
spiracy  with  Prim,  we  should  not  have  broken  oui 
peaceful  silence. 

Let  us  admit  further  that  we  were  .wrong  to  feel 
offended  by  the  official  insulting  promulgation  of  the 
refusal  to  receive  our  Ambassador;  the  fact  remains 
that,  if  Bismarck  had  not  proclaimed  that  refusal 
throughout  Europe,  the  Emperor  not  having  put  the 
demand  of  guaranties  in  the  form  of  an  ultimatum, 
French  susceptibility  would  have  had  no  occasion  to  run 
riot  and  to  rush  headlong  into  extreme  measures. 

theliHvertisement  of  the  refusal  to  receive  our  Ambassa- 


380         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

dor — ,  these  two  facts  of  which  the  conflict  was  born, 
these  two  facts,  without  which  there-wedyjb^axebeen  no 
war,  are  chargeable  to  Prussia,  not  to  Fraiice:"^  * 

If  the  French  ministers  had  been  on  the  watch  for  a 
pretext  for  war,  they  had  not  to  await  this  Hohenzollern 
candidacy,  which  it  was  not  in  their  power  to  instigate, 
and  which  might  never  have  been  put  forward.  They 
had  only  to  put  out  their  hand  to  cause  an  immediate 
explosion ;  they  had  only  to  demand,  in  slightly  urgent 
terms,  as  the  Cabinet  of  St.  Petersburg  suggested  their 
doing,  the  execution  of  the  Treaty  of  Prague  with  respect 
to  the  Danes  of  Northern  Schleswig.  "If  France  was 
determined  to  resent  by  a  war  against  Prussia  the  acces 
sion  of  a  Prince  of  Hohenzollern  to  the  Crown  of  Spain," 
said  Westmann,  GortchakofFs  assistant,  to  the  English 
Ambassador,  "she  might  unfortunately  find  a  pretext 
for  so  doing  by  calling  upon  the  Prussian  government 
to  fulfil  the  stipulations  in  the  Treaty  of  Prague  with 
respect  to  Schleswig."  l 

On  June  £8,  Fleury,  still  harping  upon  his  idea,  wrote 
to  Gramont :  "I  do  not  despair,  on  the  return  of  the 
hereditary  Grand  Duke  and  the  Czarevitch  from  their 
visit  to  Copenhagen,  of  seeing  the  question  of  the 
Duchies  enter  upon  a  new  phase.  It  will  be  easy  for 
me,  whenever  you  shall  order  me  to  do  so,  to  take  up 
the  thread  of  that  affair  which  I  had  carried  well  along, 
and  which  I  abandoned,  when  it  was  very  near  a  con 
clusion,  only  in  obedience  to  the  formal  commands  of 
one  of  your  predecessors." 

And,  in  refusing  to  support  our  demand  of  guaranties, 
did  not  the  Czar  say,  "On  the  question  of  the  Treaty  of 
Prague,  I  would  have  followed  you"  ? 

1  Buchanan  to  Granville,  July  11  [Blue  Book,  p.  49]. 


WHOSE  THE  RESPONSIBILITY         381 

What  did  the  French  government  do  ?  It  abstained, 
and  ordered  its  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  to  abstain, 
from  any  conversation  about  Schleswig.  It  stamped 
upon  the  lighted  brand  and  put  aside  the  pretext 
for  war  which  was  always  at  its  command. 

The  very  suddenness  of  the.oujt^ireak  o|  the  war 
shows  that  it  was  neither  desired  nor  sought  nor  -pre 
meditated  by  us.  Again/fiiSmarek  shall  be  ourlauthor- 
ity.  He  was  blamed  for  having,  long  before,  planned 
the  persecution  of  the  Catholics  known  as  the^Eultiff= 
kampf.  He  replied:  "From  the  suddenness  of  the 
change  the  orator  infers  that  the  purpose  to  change 
has  already  been  long  in  existence.  I  do  not  under 
stand  how  it  is  possible  to  reach  that  backward  conclu 
sion,  so  to  speak.  To  my  mind  it  is  the  very  sudden 
ness  of  the  change  that  attests  the  love  of  peace  by  which 
the  government  is  inspired.  The  change  is  explained 
simply  by  the  principles  of  self-defence.  When,,  in  the 
midst  of  peaceful  labors,  I  am  suddenly  attacked  by  an 
opponent  with  whom  I  hoped  to  be  able  to  live  in  peace, 
then  I  really  must  defend  myself.  In  every  defensive 
measure  there  is  something  unforeseen  and  sudden."  * 

This  theory  sums  up  the  whole  discussion.,  The  war 
was  unexpected  and  sudden  because  it  was  altogether 
self-defensive  on  our  part. 

It  is  true  that  our  formal  declaration  of  war  from 
the  tribune  preceded  Bismarck's.  The  explanation  is 
simple ;  to  induce  an  attack  upon  one's  self  when  neces 
sary  is  one  of  the  secrets  of  statecraft.  Certain  di 
plomatists  have  owed  their  renown  to  their  dexterity 
in  provoking  opportune  quarrels.  Thus  Charles  II  of 
England  had  in  his  service  one  Downing,  whom  he 

1  Speech  of  April  24, 18T3. 


382         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

would  send  as  ambassador  to  The  Hague  whenever  he 
wanted  the  United  Provinces  to  attack  him ;  and  that 
famous  wrangler  always  attained  his  object.  Bismarck 
at  all  times  gave  himself  credit  for  that  accomplish 
ment.  In  the  midst  of  Prussia's  dispute  with  the 
Elector  of  Hesse,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Bern- 
stoff,  asked  him :  "What  am  I  to  do  ? "  —  "If  you  want 
war/'  Bismarck  replied,  "appoint  me  your  under 
secretary,  and  I  will  undertake  to  provide  you  within 
four  weeks  with  a  German  civil  war  of  the  first  qual- 
ity." 1 

By  his  Ems  despatch  he  approved  himself  superior 
even  to  the  illustrious  wrangler  Downing :  he  drove  us 
to  take  the  offensive,  as  he  wished ;  for  it  is  the  offended 
and  not  the  offending  party  who  sendsjffie~™challei^e, 
and  we  were  not  the  aggressors,  although  we'Tiegan 
hostilities.  As  Louis  XIV  wrote  to  Saint-Geran,  his 
ambassador  at  Berlin  (February  13,  1672),  "The 
aggression,  according  to  the  accepted  usage  of  the 
nations,  is  not  determined  by  the  attack,  but  by  the 
affronts  which  have  necessitated  making  it."  Now, 
the  affronts  that  necessitated  the  war  were  not  inflicted 
by  us.  "War  is  declared,"  wrote  the  Dagblad  at  The 
Hague,  "it  was  Prussia  that  would  have  it." 

No  one  has  the  right  to  accuse  our  government  of 
having  deliberately,  without  cause,  in  the  interest  of  an 
individual,  to  gratify  its  passions,  to  prop  up  a  dynasty, 
to  popularize  a  child,2  torn  two  nations,  unexpectedly 

1  See  L*  Empire  Liberal,  vol.  v,  p.  548. 

2  "Or  even  from  terror  of  Rochefort."     L' Empire  Liberal,  vol.  xiv, 
p.  541.    [Henri  Rochefort  was  imprisoned  in  the  spring  on  conviction  of 
being  concerned  in  the  disturbances  following  the  killing  of  Victor  Noir  by 
Prince  Pierre  Bonaparte.    He  says  in  his  Mtmoires:  -—]  "I  will  add  that  at 
the  Tuileries,  it  was  the  conviction  of  the  Empress,  then  all  powerful,  that 


WHOSE  THE  RESPONSIBILITY         383 

and  by  intrigue,  from  their  peaceful  firesides,  and 
hurled  them  at  each  other.  The  war  surprised  the 
Emperor  and  his  ministers  in  works  and  thoughts  of 
peace ;  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy  was  neither  a  pre 
text  nor  an  opportunity;  it  was  the  sole  cause  of  the 
conflict,  and  if  Bismarck  had  not  avenged  himself  by  a 
deadly  insult  for  a  withdrawal  brought  about  without 
his  knowledge  and  in  his  despite,  if  he  had  not  placed 
us  between  dishonor  and  the  battle-field,  we  should  never 
have  begun  hostilities.1 

my  release  from  Ste-Pelagie  would  be  the  signal  for  a  revolution  that  would 
sweep  away  the  Empire,  and  that  that  fear  was  the  principal  cause  of  the 
declaration  of  a  foreign  war,  which  alone,  by  creating  a  diversion  and  re 
storing  the  imperial  prestige,  then  decayed  to  the  marrow,  could  delay  the 
smash." 

1  "The  real  author  of  the  war,  the  man  who  wanted  it,  sought  it,  pre 
meditated  it,  paved  the  way  for  it,  made  it  inevitable  when  the  hour  struck, 
was  Bismarck.  The  Empress  has  often  been  credited  with  the  remark: 
*  This  is  my  war.'  (Gambetta  claimed  that  Lesourd  repeated  this  remark  of 
the  Empress.  Lesourd  denies  that  he  ever  heard  it.  [See  Appendix  to 
vol.  xiv,  pp.  622,  623.])  If  she  ever  said  it,  she  boasted  unduly,  for  the  war 
was  not  hers  but  the  Prussian  Chancellor's.  He  had  succeeded,  as  he  did 
in  1866,  in  forcing  his  opponent  to  attack  him,  in  drawing  on  his  hesitant 
King,  and,  as  he  himself  expressed  it,  'in  making  Ms  old  nag  leap  the  ditch.5 
He  brought  upon  the  battle-field  two  peace-loving  sovereigns,  neither  of 
whom  wanted  war.  It  is  a  case  in  which  one  can  well  exclaim :  *See  what 
a  determined  will  can  do  T"  U Empire  labfoal,  vol.  xiv,  pp.  542,  54$. 

["No  man  who  dispassionately  examines  this  melancholy  history  will 
doubt  that  the  war  was  the  war  of  Count  von  Bismarck.  Germany  —  so 
he  had  determined  —  had  to  be  founded  on  blood  and  iron,  and  war  with 
France  was  only  the  concluding  act  of  the  bloody  drama,  which  had  been 
inaugurated  in  Schleswig  and  repealed  at  Sadowa.  The  Hohenzollern  can 
didature  might  not  have  been  a  thing  of  his  own  devising ;  but  it  was  em 
ployed  by  him  to  irritate  France  into  hostility ;  and  when  the  withdrawal 
of  the  Prince  removed  the  pretext,  which  his  acceptance  of  the  throne  had 
afforded,  his  King's  message  was  published  in  a  shape  which  he  anticipated 
would  goad  his  opponent  into  madness."  Walpole,  History  of  Twenty-Five 
Years,  vol.  ii,  p.  492.] 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

SUMMARY  AND  JUDGMENTS 

Now  that  we  have  examined  In  their  smallest  details 
all  the  individual  facts  and  overturned  the  legend  of 
falsehood  which  has  enveloped  or  distorted  them,  it 
remains  for  us  to  rise  above  these  details,  to  take  a 
bird's-eye  view  of  the  whole  affair,  and  to  review  the 
conduct  of  our  Cabinet  in  that  tremendous  crisis. 

The  plot  was  marvellously  well  laid.  No  one  of  our 
agents  having  divined  it,  it  wakened  us  with  a  start  in 
the  midst  of  our  dreams  of  peace.  All  parties  were 
unanimous,  the  Imperialists  with  the  rest,  in  the  de 
termination  not  to  have  a  Hohenzollern  in  Spain  at  any 
price,  even  though  war  should  result.  There  was  a 
single  point  of  difference  in  their  desires :  the  warlike 
souls  hoped  that  the  candidacy  would  endure,  so  that 
war  might  follow;  the  peacefully  inclined  did  their 
best  to  turn  aside  both  the  candidacy  and  the  war. 

Conformably  to  the  unbroken  international  tradition, 
we  ask  nothing  of  the  people  who  are  to  elect;  we 
address  ourselves  to  the  head  of  the  family  to  which  the 
candidate  belongs;  we  question  Prussia  quietly  and 
by  word  of  mouth.  Bismarck  having  shut  himself  up 
at  Varzin  in  order  to  be  out  of  reach,  his  deputy,  Thile, 
replies  ironically,  "The  Prussian  government  knows 
nothing  of  this  affair ;  apply  to  Spain." 

We  scent  the  trap ;  they  propose  to  keep  us  amused 
until  the  election  by  the  Cortes,  appointed  for  July  20, 

384 


SUMMARY  AND  JUDGMENTS          385 

shall  have  brought  us  face  to  face  with  an  accom 
plished  fact  and  embroiled  us  with  Spain.  We  defeat 
this  ruse  by  the  conciseness  and  firmness  of  a  public 
declaration  from  the  tribune  on  July  6.  As  our  declara 
tion  is  destined  to  receive  no  official  reply  from  Bis 
marck,  we  send  Benedetti  to  Ems,  to  the  King  of 
Prussia ;  we  support  him  by  skilful  negotiations,  and  to 
put  ourselves  absolutely  out  of  danger  from  Spain,  we 
detach  Serrano  from  the  conspiracy.  Finally,  we  do 
more  and  better  than  this :  we  annihilate  the  candidacy 
by  suppressing  the  candidate.  Prince  Antony,  unknown 
to  Bismarck,  under  the  impulsion  of  Olozaga  and  Strat, 
and  encouraged  by  the  Emperor,  withdraws  his  son's 
candidacy. 

Bismarck,  having  left  Varzin  for  Ems,  in  order  to 
persuade  the  King  to  summon  Parliament  and  mobilize 
his  army,  is  staggered  by  the  unexpected  news  and 
stops  at  Berlin.  All  his  knaveries  have  become  of  no 
avail,  the  casus  belli  is  eluding  him,  it  is  a  tremendous 
set-back  which  will  make  him  the  laughing-stock  of 
Europe.  Blood  alone  can  save  him  from  the  disaster. 
He  notifies  the  King  that,  unless  he  decides  for  war,  he 
will  resign.  The  King  declines  to  associate  himself 
with  his  ravings  and  to  break  off  his  pacific  conversa 
tions  with  Benedetti.  Bismarck  has  no  choice  but  to 
retire  to  Varzin;  the  world  can  breathe  freely  again. 

But  behold  Napoleon  III,  to  whom  this  victory  of 
peace  was  due,  has  suffered  a  weakening  of  the  will, 
and,  under  pressure  from  the  court  and  the  Right, 
without  taking  time  to  reflect,  without  consulting  his 
ministers,  he  reopens  the  affair,  and  orders  Gramont 
to  submit  to  the  King  a  demand  of  guaranties  for  the 
future.  The  ministers,  being  informed  of  this  demand* 


386        THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

are  ill  at  ease;  being  unable  to  withdraw  it. because  it 
is  already  consummated,  they  believe  that  they  can 
avert  the  danger  by  deciding  that,  whatever  the  King 
of  Prussia's  reply  may  be,  they  will  accept  it  and  will 
deem  the  incident  closed.  The  Emperor  and  Gramont 
give  their  assent  to  this  step  backward,  and  it  seems 
that  peace  is  saved  ! 

French  historians,  all  more  or  less  blindly  partisan, 
agree  in  pouring  scorn  and  insult  systematically  upon 
the  ministry  of  January  2.  Impelled  by  no  foolish 
vainglory,  but  by  a  sentiment  of  legitimate  pride, 
which  raises  its  head  under  injustice  and  abuse,  I 
rcteem  myself  justified  in  saying  that,  in  that  crisis,  that 
ministry  gave  proof  of  superior  capacity,  at  once 
determined  and  moderate,  yielding  and  firm,  conscious 
of  the  public  excitement  but  not  giving  way  to  it,  and 
ready  to  ward  off  unforeseen  accidents  with  vigilant 
rapidity.  And  it  was  its  very  ability  which  brought 
about  the  final  catastrophe:  Bismarck,  driven  to  the 
wall,  beaten  once  by  Leopold's  withdrawal  and  on  the 
point  of  being  beaten  a  second  time  by  our  abandon 
ment  of  the  demand  of  guaranties ;  forced  to  submit 
to  a  peace  which  involved  his  personal  extinction ;  in 
order  to  escape  from  the  circle  in  which  we  had  im 
prisoned  him,  threw  off  the  shackles  of  the  rules  of 
international  probity  and  resorted  to  one  of  those 
commonplace  brutalities  which  are  within  the  reach 
of  the  most  mediocre  of  men.  We  were  arguing  our 
cause;  he  struck  us  in  the  face,  by  announcing  urbi 
et  orbi,  to  the  newspapers  and  foreign  governments, 
that  the  King  had  refused  to  receive  our  Ambassador 
and  had  rejected  the  demands  of  France. 

Why,  it  is  said,  did  you  fall  into  the  snare  ?    A  brutal 


SUMMARY  AND  JUDGMENTS          387 

act  like  that  is  not  a  snare  into  which  one  is  free  to 
fall  or  not  to  fall,  and  from  which  one  can  pro 
tect  one's  self  by  skilful  diplomacy.  One  either  sub 
mits  to  it  or  retaliates.  We  retaliated,  and  without 
delaying  for  diplomatic  palavering,  which  would  have 
been  either  idiotic  or  platitudinous,  we,  being  the  in 
sulted  party,  sent  the  challenge. 

Upon  what  traditions  could  we  have  relied  to  sup 
port  a  different  course?  Upon  the  monarchical  tra 
dition  ?  We  had  not  forgotten  the  remark  of  Louis 
XIV:  "Everything  is  as  nothing  to  me  compared 
with  honor."  Upon  the  memories  of  the  Revolu 
tion?  The  men  of  those  heroic  times  inherited  that 
sentiment  of  the  Grand  Monarque.  The  minister  De- 
lessart  was  accused  by  the  Legislative  Assembly  of 
having  compromised  the  nation  by  an  undignified 
correspondence.  One  of  the  most  forcible  motives  of 
the  decree  by  which  the  same  Assembly  declared  war 
against  Francis  I,  King  of  Hungary  and  Bohemia, 
in  accordance  with  a  report  by  Condorcet,  —  "an 
invaluable  monument  of  common  sense  and  modera 
tion/'  says  Thiers,  —  was  that,  "the  refusal  to  reply  to 
the  last  despatches  of  the  King  of  the  French,  leaving 
no  hope  of  obtaining  by  friendly  negotiations  satis 
faction  for  the  grievances  of  France,  was  equivalent 
to  a  declaration  of  war.'* 

The  same  Assembly  taught  us  how  a  proud  people 
responds  to  a  refusal  to  receive  its  ambassador.  Du- 
mouriez,  calling  upon  the  King  of  Piedmont,  Victor 
Amadeus,  to  espouse  the  cause  of  France,  sends  Semon- 
ville,  our  diplomatic  agent  to  the  Republic  of  Genoa,  to 
him  with  the  mission  to  propose  an  offensive  and  defen 
sive  alliance  in  consideration  of  the  promise  of  Lorn- 


388         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

bardy .  Tlie  King,  being  allied  with,  the  Coalition  and  the 
6migr6s,  despatches  Count  Solara  to  meet  Semonville 
at  Alexandria,  with,  orders  to  prevent  him  from  going 
any  farther,  but  to  employ  only  friendly  means.  The 
count,  a  man  well  fitted  for  delicate  missions,  carries 
out  his  instructions  with,  urbanity :  he  invites  Semon 
ville  to  dinner,  and  as  it  was  a  Friday  and  he  did  not 
suppose  that  a  Jacobin  ever  fasts,  he  has  the  delicacy 
to  offer  him  a  dinner  of  flesh;  but  he  does  not  allow 
him  to  continue  his  journey  to  Turin,  denies  him  post- 
horses,  and  compels  him  to  return  to  Genoa. 

"The  insult  offered  to  France,  in  the  person  of  her 
representative,"  says  Nicomede  Bianchi,  "was  too 
plain  to  be  palliated."  Dumouriez  in  his  wrath  com 
plains  to  the  Assembly  and  concludes  in  favor  of  a 
declaration  of  war.  Acclamations  arise  on  all  sides. 
War  is  solemnly  declared  (September  15, 1792).  Later, 
when  peace  was  made  between  the  Republic  and  Victor 
Amadeus  (May  15,  1796),  one  of  the  principal  con 
ditions  was  that  the  King  should  disavow  the  insult 
offered  to  the  Ambassador  at  Alexandria. 

Bismarck's  conduct,  and  the  King's,  toward  us  was 
no  less  impertinent  and  much  more  public  than  Victor 
Amadeus's  toward  Semonville;  it  demanded  a  signal 
reparation. 

The  criticism  of  enterprises  which  end  in  failure 
would  be  much  less  listened  to  if  it  were  possible  to 
determine  what  the  result  would  have  been  of  the 
opposite  course.  We  see  the  results  of  defeat :  have 
we  reflected  upon  those  which  humiliation  would  have 
involved  ?  Could  we  forget  the  lesson  of  1840  ?  In 
the  midst  of  the  negotiations  in  progress  between 


SUMMARY  AND  JUDGMENTS  389 

the  five  great  powers  in  London,  the  English  Foreign 
Minister,  Palmerston,  suddenly  informs  our  Ambassa 
dor  Guizot,  that  a  treaty  of  cooperation  against  Me- 
hemet  Ali,  our  protege,  has  been  signed,  without  our 
knowledge,  by  the  other  four  powers,  and  is  being 
carried  into  effect  as  hurriedly  as  it  was  concluded. 

France  feels  that  she  has  l?een  insulted.  Remusat 
writes  to  Guizot:  "Such  as  it  is,  even  when  reduced 
to  a  mere  hasty  decision,  the  performance  is  intoler 
able,  and  the  only  way  to  avoid  being  humiliated  is  to 
show  that  we  feel  outraged."  The  ministry,  presided 
over  by  Thiers,  prepares  for  war  and  summons  the 
Chambers;  it  proposes  to  the  King  that  he  embody 
a  declaration  in  a  high  tone  in  the  speech  from  the 
throne.  The  King  declines,  because  the  declaration 
is  drawn  with  a  view  to  war.  "Unquestionably," 
he  says,  with  Guizot,  "they  set  very  little  store  by 
the  friendship  of  France;  she  is  wounded,  but  the 
offence  is  not  one  of  those  which  impose  war  and  jus 
tify  it ;  if  there  had  been  a  real  insult,  we  must  have  sac 
rificed  everything;  but  there  was  simply  a  lack  of 
consideration,  not  a  political  insult;  there  was  in 
difference,  rudeness,  but  no  downright  affront;  the 
taking  of  Syria  from  Mehemet  Ali  is  not  a  legitimate 
cause  of  war."  1 

Listen  to  the  terms  in  which  Thiers,  after  his  retire 
ment,  passed  judgment  upon  this  submission  of 
Guizot  and  the  King :  — 

"I  cannot  discuss  this  question  coolly;  I  cannot 
inquire,  —  I  should  blush  for  very  shame,  —  whether 

1  Guizot,  M£moires,  vol.  v,  p.  390,  and  Ms  speeches  in  the  debate  on  the 
Address  at  the  close  of  1850,  in  the  Chamber  of  Peers  and  Chamber  of 
Deputies, 


390         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

there  was  rudeness,  or  affront  —  I  make  no  distinc 
tion.1  .  .  .  If  France  backs  down,  she  descends  from  her 
rank;  this  monarchy  which  we  have  reared  with  our 
hands  —  I  could  not  again  face  the  men  who  accuse 
us  of  having  taken  office  only  to  debase  her.  What 
shall  I  be  able  to  reply  to  those  enemies  —  you  know 
who  they  are  —  when  they  say:  'We  do  not  know 
what  this  government  may  have  done,  but  it  is  con 
tributing  to  the  greatest  humiliation  we  have  ever 
"  undergone.'  My  colleagues  and  myself  retired  on 
the  day  when  we  were  no  longer  able  to  carry  to  its 
natural,  and  necessary  conclusion  the  firm  determina 
tion  that  we  formed,  not  to  make  war  on  Europe,  but 
to  demand,  in  language  which  would  have  given  no 
offence,  the  modification  of  the  treaty,  or  —  I  admit 
that  it  is  a  serious  thing  to  say  —  to  declare  war. 
The  English  minister  had  said  that  France,  after  a 
display  of  ill-humor,  would  hold  her  peace  and  yield. 
When  I  see  my  country  humiliated,  I  cannot  restrain 
the  sentiment  that  strangles  me,  and  I  cry:  "Come 
what  come  may,  let  us  aim  to  be  what  our  fathers 
were,  and  let  not  France  descend  from  the  rank  she 
has  always  held  in  Europe. '"  [Warm  approval  from 
the  Left.  Prolonged  applause.]  2 

Even  the  heir-apparent,  the  Due  d'Orleans,  said, 
"It  is  much  better  to  surrender  on  the  shores  of  the 
Danube  or  the  Rhine  than  in  a  gutter  on  rue  Saint- 
Denis." 

The  consequences  of  this  prudence, -or  this  pusil 
lanimity —  choose  which  word  you  will  —  of  Louis 
Philippe  were  fatal  to  Mm.  He  still  stood  on  his 

1  Speech  of  Nov.  25, 1840. 

2  Speech  of  Nov.  27, 1840. 


SUMMARY  AND  JUDGMENTS          391 

feet,  but  like  a  tree  whose  roots  are  decayed,  and  at 
the  first  gust  of  wind  he  was  overthrown.  The  irritated 
nation  thought  that  he  had  derogated  from  his  rank, 
and  was  "ripe  for  those  desperate  steps  which  such 
convictions  suggest  to  a  proud,  restless,  sensitive 
nation  like  ours."  Then  was  fulfilled  Tocqueville's 
prediction:  "A  peace  without  glory  is  one  of  the 
roads  leading  to  revolution.'5 1  All  political  relations 
with  England  became  difficult  (it  is  Guizot  who  admits 
it),  "because  of  the  burning,  bitter  memory  which 
these  incidents  have  left  in  the  hearts  of  the  people 
and  the  army."  2  The  most  trivial  event  was  exag 
gerated,  distorted,  poisoned;  a  dispute  so  micro 
scopical  as  that  about  the  Pritchard  indemnity,  an 
arrangement  so  beyond  criticism  as  that  concerning 
the  right  of  search,  caused  outbursts  of  wrath  which 
amaze  us  to-day;  the  government  was  not  hated, 
for  hatred  is  a  form  of  homage:  it  was  spat  upon. 
"Louis-Philippe,"  said  Chateaubriand,  "has  no  need 
of  honor ;  he  is  a  policeman :  Europe  may  spit  in  his 
face ;  he  wipes  it  off,  thanks  her,  and  shows  his  com 
mission  as  king." 

The  national  triumph  in  the  matter  of  the  Spanish 
marriages  did  not  rehabilitate  him.  At  the  last  mo 
ment  he  dared  not  even  defend  himself,  which  would 
have  been  easy  enough  in  a  material  way,  and  he 
fell  because  of  an  incident  which,  considered  in  itself, 
should  not  have  gone  beyond  the  proportions  of  an 
ordinary  police-court  prosecution. 

Proudhon,  the  socialist,  states  the  case  thus :  "  One 
of  the  causes  that  destroyed  the  last  monarchy  was 

1  Tocqueville  to  Reeve,  Nov.  7, 1840. 

2  Speech  of  Nov.  30, 1840. 


392         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

the  having  opposed  the  bellicose  instinct  of  the  coun 
try*  The  people  have  never  yet  forgiven  Louis- 
Phillippe  his  policy  of  peace  at  any  price;  he  did  not 
want  to  die  on  a  battle-field,  so  he  dies  in  a  sewer." l 

The  ultra-pacific  Victor  Hugo  also  reproaches  him 
for  not  caring  even  a  little  for  glory,  for  having  been 
too  modest  for  France.  "Hence  an  excessive  timidity, 
most  intolerable  to  the  nation  that  has  July  14  in 
its  civil  tradition  and  Austerlitz  in  its  military  tradi 
tion."2 

"The  usurpers/'  said  Louis  Veuillot,  "did  not  want 
glory,  because  they  wanted  no  trouble.  They  died 
out  because  they  sought  to  avoid  trouble  of  any  sort, 
that  is  to  say,  because  they  evaded  all  their  duties."  3 

Berryer  considered  the  humiliation  inflicted  on 
France  in  1840  as  "the  greatest  affront  possible  to 
receive."  4  What  would  he  have  thought  if  our  Ambas 
sador  had  been  shown  the  door  during  the  negotiations, 
and  if  that  pleasant  performance  had  been  announced 
to  all  Europe?  What  indignant  apostrophes  would 
he  not  have  uttered,  had  there  been  at  that  time  an 
Ems  despatch ! 

In  our  case  it  was  no  longer  possible  to  split  hairs, 
to  take  shelter  behind  "a  lack  of  consideration  that 
was  not  an  affront."  The  insult  was  direct,  palpable, 
stinging,  deliberate.  Palmerston  had  certain  excuses 
to  put  forward  to  justify  his  act,  notably  that  it  had 
been  preceded  by  a  year  of  fruitless  negotiations, 
and  that,  if  the  signatures  were  appended  secretly, 

1  Paix  et  Guerre,  vol.  i,  p.  97. 

2  Les  Misfrables. 

3  In  the  Unwers  of  May  18, 1873, 

4  Speech  of  Jan.  20, 1841, 


SUMMARY  AND  JUDGMENTS  393 

the  preparation  of  the  treaty,  its  possibility,  its  im 
minence,  were  not  unknown  to  the  French  government. 
For  Bismarck's  deed  there  was  no  excuse.  Palmer- 
ston  never  ceased  to  deny  that  he  had  intended  to 
affront  France  or  her  government;  Bismarck  said  ex 
plicitly  to  Loftus  that  that  was  what  he  proposed. 
If  a  Napoleon,  in  the  face  of  so  gross  an  insult,  had 
displayed  a  resignation  for  which  the  nation  had  not 
forgiven  Louis-Philippe  in  the  case  of  a  problematical 
insult,  it  would  have  blown  him  into  the  air. 

The  Empire  had  reached  the  end  of  the  account 
for  faint-heartedness  which  our  mania  for  peace  had 
opened  to  it.  It  had  undergone  two  bitter  humilia 
tions  :  in  Mexico  it  had  fallen  back  before  the  American 
challenge;  in  the  affair  of  Luxembourg  before  that 
of  the  victors  of  Sadowa.  The  challenge  of  the  govern 
ment  at  Washington  was  drowned  by  the  uproarious 
abuse  of  the  opposition  in  France.  The  Luxem 
bourg  retreat,  although  covered  by  the  screen  of  a 
secret  negotiation,  was  much  more  keenly  felt  by  the 
national  pride.  It  had  created  that  grumbling  ir 
ritation  which  we  had  so  much  difficulty  in  restraining 
at  the  time  of  the  Saint-Gothard  incident,  and  which 
burst  out  so  explosively  on  the  announcement  of  the 
Hohenzollern  candidacy.  A  second  repetition  —  more 
degrading  because  this  time  everything  took  place 
in  public  —  of  such  a  discomfiture  would  have  brought 
the  Empire  nearer  to  the  impossibility  of  a  longer  life 
than  the  Monarchy  of  July  was  after  1840. 

If  the  Empire  had  swallowed  the  affront,  the  op 
position  would  have  taken  up  Berryer's  apostrophe 
which  brought  the  whole  Assembly  to  its  feet :  "What, 
gentlemen !  can  it  be  that  there  is  a  country  on  earth 


394         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

where  ambassadors  listen  to  such  words  and  write  them 
down !  No,  it  was  not  of  France  that  that  was  said. 
Whatever  you  may  have  done,  no  one  has  said  that 
of  France  !  and  they  who,  in  the  days  of  our  greatest 
disasters,  they  even  who  at  Waterloo  saw  how  our 
soldiers  fell,  have  not  said  that  of  France !  It  was  not 
France  that  was  meant ! " 

Thiers  himself,  who  had  not  allowed  a  session  to 
pass  without  evoking  the  memory  of  Sadowa  against 
the  Empire,  would  have  repeated  his  own  speeches 
against  a  deadly  blow  to  our  honor  beside  which  1840 
would  have  seemed  a  triumph ;  Gambetta  would  have 
fulminated  in  harangues  more  inflammatory  than  those 
of  the  Baudin  trial;  Jules  Favre  would  have  spat 
upon  us  with  superb  disdain ;  Jules  Simon  would  have 
rent  us  with  honeyed  words,  and  one  and  all  would 
have  played  variations  on  the  theme  attributed  to 
Gortchakoff:  "The  man  on  the  Seine  is  kept  erect 
only  by  the  blows  that  Bismarck  gives  him  on  both 
cheeks  at  once.'5  No  obstacle  would  have  held  back 
the  inundation:  the  irreconcilables,  transformed  into 
the  heroes  of  public  wrath,  would  have  made  the  State 
their  prey,  and  the  army,  if  we  had  tried  to  employ 
it  against  them,  would  have  confirmed  the  words  of 
one  of  its  most  illustrious  leaders,  Marshal  Niel: 
"Our  people  are  extremely  sensitive  to  insult,  and  the 
greatest  misfortune  that  could  befall  them  would  be 
to  receive  an  insult  if  they  were  disarmed.  They 
would  overthrow  everything  in  their  neighborhood 
and  take  the  government  upon  themselves,  and  they 
would  do  right."  l 

Our  critics  assumed  as  a  starting-point  that  defeat 

1  Speech  of  March  20, 1860. 


SUMMARY  AND  JUDGMENTS          395 

was  inevitable.  To-day  it  is  demonstrated  that  our 
chances  of  victory  were  considerable,  and  that  our 
magnificent  army  disappointed  our  expectations  be 
cause,  passing  from  the  command  of  one  leader  who 
had  a  stone  in  his  bladder  to  another  who  had  one  in 
his  heart,1  it  was  left  without  guidance,  floating  at  the 
mercy  of  chance  encounters  —  a  ship  without  a  pilot 
amid  the  heavy  seas  of  battle. 

On  the  morrow  of  our  reverses,  the  generals  who 
caused  them  by  their  blunders  found  it  convenient  to 
relieve  themselves  of  all  criticism  by  attributing  those 
reverses  to  lack  of  preparation  and  to  our  numerical 
inferiority.  This  falsehood  is  confounded  to-day  by 
the  military  men  themselves :  they  have  proved  that 
we  were  sufficiently  prepared  to  win,  and  that  numeri 
cal  inferiority  was  not  the  cause  of  our  disasters. 

Until  August  5  we  had  an  undeniable  superiority 
in  the  matter  of  concentration,  and  if  we  had  crossed 
the  Sarre  and  established  ourselves  between  that  river 
and  the  wooded  zone  of  the  Palatinate,  we  could  have 
thrown  back  the  inferior  Prussian  forces  and  upset 
all  of  Moltke's  plans.  At  Woerth,  it  is  true,  we  did 
yield  to  numbers,  despite  a  heroism  worthy  of  the  troops 
of  Leonidas;  but  it  depended  only  on  MacMahon 
to  lessen  that  inferiority  by  postponing  the  battle 
until  the  Fifth  and  Seventh  corps  were  up.  At  Spi- 
cheren  we  had  the  superiority  in  numbers  during  most 
of  the  day,  and  it  was  in  Bazaine's  power,  by  going 
himself  to  the  field  and  sending  two  or  three  divisions 
thither,  to  turn  what  was  not  a  defeat  into  a  signal 
victory.  On  August  16,  at  Rezonville,  we  had  the 
superiority  in  numbers  and  position,  we  were  actually 

1  [Marshal  Bazaine.] 


396         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

victorious, .and  if  Bazaine,  with  a  blindness  deserving 
of  never-ending  tears,  had  not  given  the  order  to 
retreat  to  an  army  which  he  should  have  thrown  for 
ward  upon  an  enemy  poorly  placed  and  entangled  in 
gorges  and  ravines,  we  should  have  scored  one  of  those 
triumphs  which  put  an  end  to  wars.  Again  on  August 
18,  at  Saint-Privat,  if  the  Guard  and  the  artillery 
reserve  had  been  thrown  in  by  Bazaine  and  Bour- 
baki,  to  cut  through  the  centre  the  insane  enveloping 
movement  of  the  Germans,  or  to  wipe  out  the  Prussian 
Guard  already  decimated  by  Canrobert,  we  should 
have  found  again  on  that  day  the  good  fortune  that 
we  were  unable  to  grasp  on  the  16th.  And  even  after 
all  these  mistakes,  if  our  army  had  been  sent  back 
toward  Paris,  and  not  to  the  North  into  the  net  of 
Sedan,  France  would  have  been  saved,  as  Thiers  often 
said.  To  the  very  end  we  had  opportunities  to  re 
trieve  our  fortunes.  Yes,  we  could  have  and  should 
have  won.  And  we  were  justified  in  believing  it.  No 
impartial  judge  doubts  it  to-day. 

But  even  if  our  chances  had  been  less,  we  had  no 
choice.  Placed  between  a  doubtful  war  and  a  dis 
honorable  peace,  we  were  compelled  to  pronounce 
for  the  war.  "For  nations  as  for  individuals,"  said 
Thiers  in  his  good  moments,  "there  are  circumstances 
in  which  the  voice  of  honor  speaks  more  loudly  than 
that  of  prudence.  There  are  things  which,  though  one 
must  die  the  next  moment,  one  should  never  endure."  l 
Governments  succumb  not  to  reverses  alone  —  dis 
honor  as  well  destroys  them;  there  are  revolutions 
born  of  defeat,  but  those  bom  of  contempt  are  much 
more  to  be  dreaded.  Intuta  quce  inde  cora  —  there 

1  Histoire  du  ConsuLat  et  de  FEmpire,  vol.  xii,  p.  219. 


SUMMARY  AND  JUDGMENTS          397 

is  no  safety  in  ignominy.  A  military  disaster  is  an 
accident  which  may  be  repaired.  What  nation  has 
not  undergone  such?  Loss  of  honor,  accepted,  is  a 
death  from  which  there  is  no  return. 

Since  1870  I  have  often  imagined  myself  in  the 
tribune  on  July  15,  counselling  submission  to  the 
insult,  and  I  have  wondered  how  I  could  have  induced 
a  nation  so  sensitive  on  the  point  of  honor,  confident 
in  the  invincibility  of  its  army,  to  swallow  an  act  with 
out  precedent  and  so  manifestly  insulting;  how  I 
should  have  replied  to  the  outcries  of  the  Assembly 
and  to  the  contempt  of  all  men  of  heart;  and  I  have 
found  no  answer.  It  was  not  humanly  possible,  under 
the  circumstances  in  which  we  were  deliberating,  to 
act  otherwise  than  we  did. 

On  the  very  morrow  of  the  fall  of  the  Empire,  the 
publicists  of  the  Right  conceived  the  scheme  of  exon 
erating  the  Emperor  by  casting  all  the  responsibility 
on  the  Ministry.1  In  a  pamphlet  signed  by  Gricourt, 
one  of  his  chamberlains,  in  default  of  Persigny,  who 
refused  to  put  his  name  to  it,  the  Emperor  himself 
seemed  to  look  with  favor  on  this  manoeuvre.  In  the 
pamphlet  in  question,  we  read :  "The  Ministry  com- 

1  [See  IS  Empire  Liberal,  vol.  xiv,  p.  457  and  note.]  "The  Bonapartist 
party,  under  the  guidance  of  its  f  ormer  leaders,  adopted  the  tactics  of  cast 
ing  all  the  responsibility  on  the  liberal  ministry,  which  was  denounced  as  the 
real  artisan  of  ail  our  misfortunes.  .  .  .  This  programme  .  .  .  was  very 
clearly  disclosed  by  Paul  de  Cassagnac  in  an  article  in  the  Pays  of  Jan.  12, 
1876 :  *It  was  necessary  that  some  one,  either  Emperor  or  Ministry,  should 
be  and  remain  responsible  for  a  war  too  recklessly  undertaken.  Very  good ; 
it  did  not  suit  us  that  it  should  be  the  Emperor,  because  the  Emperor  had 
nothing  to  do  with  it,  and  the  only  culprits  are  the  vainglorious  liberals  of 
the  first  parliamentary  cabinet.  Whoever  excuses  M.  Ernie  OUivier  should 
remember  that  he  thereby  condemns  the  Emperor." 


398         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  _WAR 

mitted  the  grave  error  of  pronouncing  from  the  tribune 
a  sort  of  defiance  which  made  any  political  adjust 
ment  difficult." l 

Although  I  had  no  desire  to  add  to  the  sufferings  of 
the  noble  captive,  I  could  not  remain  silent  under  an 
undeserved  repudiation.  I  wrote  to  him  at  Wilhelms- 
hohe  on  December  28,  1870 :  — 

"SlRE,— 

"I  have  received  the  pamphlet  which  you  were 
kind  enough  to  send  me,  and  I  have  read  it  with  the 
liveliest  interest.  I  find  it  excellent  except  in  the  last 
part,  where  it  is  sought  to  separate  you  from  your 
ministers  and  to  throw  upon  them  the  burden  of  a 
common  decision.  I  am  sure  that  this  is  the  system 
which  certain  of  your  friends  propose  to  adopt.  This 
theory,  in  addition  to  being  contrary  to  the  truth, 
lacks  generosity;  it  is  unworthy  of  Your  Majesty. 
Nor  do  I  like  it  any  better  that  we  should  assume  the 
attitude  of  apologizing  to  Prussia  for  making  war  on 
her.  To  defend  ourselves  from  the  charge  of  having 
provoked  or  sought  it  —  nothing  can  be  better ;  that 
is  true,  and  in  that  respect  I  shall  always  bear  emphatic 
testimony  for  Your  Majesty ;  but  we  have  no  occasion 
to  defend  ourselves  for  having  accepted  it,  submitted 
to  it.  Suppose  that  one  day  your  government 
should  have  had  placarded  on  the  walls  of  Paris  (as 
King  William  did  at  Ems  and  Berlin)  the  statement 
that,  the  English  proposals  concerning  the  denounc 
ing  of  the  treaty  of  commerce  having  displeased  Your 
Majesty,  you  had  refused  to  receive  Lord  Lyons: 

1  Les  Relations  de  la  France  avee  rAtt&magne  sous  NapoUon  III  (Brus 
sels,  1871). 


SUMMARY^  AND  JUDGMENTS          399 

not  only  Gladstone  and  Bright,  but  the  English  cotton 
nightcaps  themselves  would  have  demanded  war. 
If  France  had  not  made  this  war,  she  would  have 
fallen  into  the  mire ;  it  is  much  better  that  she  should 
have  been  beaten  on  the  battle-field/' 

An  eclipse  of  equity  was  never  of  long  duration  with 
the  Emperor ;  he  replied :  — 

["Wilhelmshohe]  January  18,  1871. 

"  MY  DEAR  MONSIEUR  E.  OLLIVIER,  — 

"  In  reply  to  your  letter  I  will  say  to  you  that  I  do 
not  propose  to  separate  my  responsibility  from  that  of 
my  ministers  in  the  declaration  of  the  ill-fated  war  that 
recently  broke  out;  Gricourt's  pamphlet  has  no  other 
purpose  than  to  prove  that  it  was  not  to  further  a 
dynastic  interest  that  I  declared  war,  but  in  response  to 
the  justly  offended  sentiment  of  the  country." 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

CONCLUSION 

THIS   was   a   justifiable   war  —  was   It   Inevitable? 
Mommsen  thought  that  it  was,  and,  after  defending 
the  Emperor  for  having  insisted  upon  it,  he  adds  that, 
if  he  had  not  fought  it,  it  would  have  been  forced  on 
his  son.    I  do  not  believe  it.    There  have  always  been, 
and  there  are  still,  between  certain  nations  which  seem 
especially  typical  of  certain  forms  of  civilization,  fun 
damental  differences,  engendering  irreconcilable  rival 
ries,  which  can  be  settled  only  on  the  battle-field.    There 
was  not  between  Germany  and  Prance  one  of  those 
unadjustable  differences      Whatever  any  one  may  say, 
we  are  not  the  incarnation  of  the  Latin  genius  at  odds 
with  the  Germanic  genius.    There  is  some  Latin  in  us, 
but  with  how  many  other  elements  added  —  and  among 
them  the  Germanic  element  itself !    And  there  is  no 
greater  difference  between  us  and  Germany  than  be 
tween  Provence  and  Brittany,  between  Gascony  and 
Normandy,   or  even  between  certain   individuals   of 
those  provinces.    Kant,   Hegel,    Goethe,    Beethoven, 
Heine,  and  Frederick  are  as  fully  understood  and  as 
much  admired  in  Prance  as  Descartes,  Moliere,  Vol 
taire,  Balzac,  Renan,  and  Napoleon  are  in  Germany  — 
a  phenomenon  which  implies  a  sort  of  mental  similarity. 
The  cause  of  the  conflict  between  Germany  and 
Prance  was  only  one  of  those  "artificial  fatalities," 
born  of  the  false  conceptions  or  unhealthy  ambitions  of 

400 


CONCLUSION  401 

statesmen,  which  with  lapse  of  time  become  worn 
out,  transformed,  and  often  extinguished.  If  France 
had  but  resolutely  made  up  her  mind  not  to  meddle  in 
the  affairs  of  Germany,  not  to  regard  German  Unity 
as  a  menace  or  as  a  lessening  of  her  own  importance,  it 
would  have  seemed  perfectly  natural  to  her  that  a  nation 
so  powerful  in  every  way  —  in  intelligence,  imagination, 
poetry,  science,  and  arms  —  should  shape  herself  as 
she  chose,  with  full  liberty  of  spontaneous  action. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  the  German  professors,  content 
with  the  memories  of  1814  and  of  Waterloo,  could  but 
have  made  up  their  minds  to  forget  the  Palatinate  and 
Jena,  on  the  instant  this  alleged  fatality  of  war  would 
have  vanished,  and  the  only  relation  between  the  two 
nations,  established  by  mutual  consent,  would  have  been 
one  of  friendly  cooperation  in  the  common  task"  of  spread 
ing  light  and  of  emancipation  from  real  fatalities.  That 
was  the  hope  to  which  I  devoted  my  conduct  in  inter 
national  matters,  and  which,  as  minister,  I  would  have 
brought  to  fruition  had  my  power  endured. 

But  there  was  a  man  to  whom  it  was  important  that 
that  artificial  fatality  should  exist  and  should  end  in 
war.  It  was  that  powerful  genius,  who,  not  choosing 
to  abandon  to  time  the  glory  of  achieving  slowly  the 
work  of  Unity,  whose  hour  of  triumph  was  inevitable, 
determined  to  hasten  the  evolution,  to  force  upon  the 
present  what  the  future  would  have  accomplished  freely, 
and  to  retain  for  himself  alone  the  glory  which  his 
successors  would  otherwise  have  shared.  With  him 
out  of  the  way,  war  between  France  and  Germany 
would  have  ceased  to  be  predestined,  and  the  son  of 
Napoleon  III  would  have  escaped  it  as  well  as  his  father. 

Napoleon  III  wanted  peace,  but  with  a  vacillating 


402         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

will;  Bismarck  Wanted  war,  witli  an  inflexible  will: 
the  inflexible  will  overcame  the  vacillating  will.  A  fresh 
proof,  as  that  profound  thinker  Gustave  Le  Bon  so 
forcibly  says,  that  "the  faith  that  raises  mountains  is 
named  the  will.  It  is  the  true  creator  of  things." 

So  that  it  is  a  pitiful  thing  to  read  these  labored 
dissertations  of  our  trumpery  historians,  search 
ing  for  what  they  call  responsibilities,  and  struggling 
to  incriminate,  some  the  statesmen  of  the  opposition, 
others  those  of  the  government.  Unquestionably  the 
opposition  were  so  short-sighted  as  to  keep  alive  an 
irritable  agitation  in  men's  minds ;  unquestionably  the 
Emperor  should  not  have  reopened,  by  a  fruitless  de 
mand  of  guaranties,  a  question  already  closed  by  a 
triumphant  solution.  But  neither  the  declamations  of 
the  opposition,  nor  the  mistake  of  Napoleon  III,  were 
the  decisive  cause  of  the  war.  No  Frenchman  was 
responsible  for  it.  The  only  man  who  will  have  the 
glory  or  the  shame  of  it,  whichever  posterity  may  ad 
judge  it  to  be,  is  the  man  of  iron,  whose  indomitable  and 
heroic  will  controlled  events  and  made  them  serve  his 
ambition. 

Demosthenes  said  to  the  Athenians:  "Let  an  orator 
rise  and  say  to  you :  "It  is  Diopithus  who  causes  all  your 
ills ;  it  is  Chares,  or  Aristophon/  or  any  other  that  it 
pleases  him  to  name,  and  instantly  you  applaud  and 
exclaim  loudly,  'Oh  !  how  truly  he  speaks  !'  But  let  a 
plain-spoken  man  say  to  you :  C0  Athenians !  the  sole 
author  of  your  ills  is  Philip'  —  that  truth  angers  you ; 
it  is  even  as  an  arrow  that  wounds  you."  And  I  say  to 
our  Athenians :  "The  war  was  let  loose  upon  us  neither 
by  Diopithus,  nor  by  Chares,  nor  by  Aristophon,  but 
by  Philip,  and  in  1870  Philip's  name  was  Bismarck." 


CONCLUSION  403 

One  of  Bismarck's  panegyrists,  Johannes  Scherr,  Las 
described  most  excellently  the  character  that  should  be 
attributed  to  the  creator  of  German  Unity.  "After 
producing  so  many  giants  of  thought,  Germany  was 
destined  to  produce,  at  last,  a  hero  of  deeds.  In  the  age 
of  the  Reformation,  and  later,  we  had  had  an  abundance 
of  idealists,  but  not  a  politician.  We  lacked  the  prac 
tical  genius,  the  genius  unhampered  by  schedules.  Yes, 
just  that,  in  very  truth  !  For  reflecting  and  experienced 
men  must  needs  leave  where  it  deserves  to  be,  that  is  to 
say,  in  the  child's  primer,  the  worn-out  commonplace 
which  declares  that  'the  most  honest  politician  is  the 
best.'  There  has  never  been  such  a  thing  as  an  honest 
politician,  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  phrase,  and  there 
ought  never  to  be.  The  creative  statesman  should 
perform  his  allotted  task  without  taking  pains  to  find 
out  whether  his  adversaries  consider  it  'dishonest/  or 
whether  it  is  unpleasant  or  harmful  to  them.  It  is  not 
the  ethereal  arguments  of  a  subjective  idealism,  but 
stern  realities,  super-prosaic  material  interests,  as  well 
as  commonplace  and  exalted  passions,  which  in  combi 
nation  make  the  science  of  statecraft." 

Thus  would  Bismarck  have  liked  to  be  praised  —  in 
such  terms  it  is  fitting  to  speak  of  that  extraordinary 
man,  the  craftiest  of  foxes,  the  boldest  of  lions,  who  had 
the  art  of  fascinating  and  of  terrifying,  of  making  of  truth 
itself  an  instrument  of  falsehood ;  to  whom  gratitude, 
forgiveness  of  injuries,  and  respect  for  the  vanquished 
were  as  entirely  unknown  as  all  other  noble  sentiments 
save  that  of  devotion  to  his  country's  ambition ;  who 
deemed  legitimate  everything  that  contributes  to  suc 
cess  and  who,  by  his  contempt  for  the  importunities 
of  morality,  dazzled  the  imagination  of  mankind. 


404         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

After  the  affair  of  the  Duchies,  as  our  Ambassador, 
Talleyrand,  was  seeking  some  roundabout  phrase  by 
which  to  express  a  certain  degree  of  disapproval, 
" Don't  put  yourself  out,"  said  Bismarck,  "nobody 
but  my  Bang  thinks  that  I  acted  honorably." 

^Esthetically,  I  like  him  thus.  So  long  as  he  denies 
the  evidence,  plays  the  virtuous,  the  guileless  man, 
outdoes  himself  in  tarfufferie,  he  lowers  himself  to  the 
point  of  making  himself  contemptible.  As  soon  as 
he  reveals  his  true  self  and  boasts  of  his  audacious 
knaveries  which  raised  his  Germany,  until  then  divided 
and  impotent,  to  the  first  rank  among  the  nations, 
then  he  is  as  great  as  Satan  —  a  Satan  beautiful  to 
look  upon.  Bismarck  hatching  in  the  dark  the  Hohen- 
zollern  candidacy,  without  a  suspicion  that  war  will 
inevitably  be  the  result,  would  be  a  zany  to  be  hooted 
at;  Bismarck  devising  that  same  plot  because  it  is  the 
sole  means  of  causing  the  outbreak  of  the  war  which  he 
must  have  in  order  to  achieve  the  unity  of  his  fatherland, 
is  a  mighty  statesman,  of  sinister  but  impressive 
grandeur.  He  will  not  thereby  have  opened  for  himself 
the  gates  of  any  Paradise ;  he  will  have  won  forever  one 
of  the  most  exalted  places  in  the  German  Pantheon  of 
terrestrial  apotheoses,. 


APPENDICES 


APPENDIX  A 

LETTER  FROM  EMILE  OLMVIER  TO  PROFESSOR  HANS  DELBRUCK 
OF  BERLIN1 

ILLUSTRIOUS  PROFESSOR, — I  never  argue  with,  those  who 
criticise  me,  because  most  of  the  time  I  should  have  to  con 
tend  with  hatred,  bad  faith,  ignorance,  or  idiocy ;  but  you 
have  examined  my  story  of  the  Liberal  Empire 2  with  such 
elevation  of  mind,  such  scrupulous  care,  such  a  sincere 
purpose  to  be  just,  and  such  courteous  moderation,  and  the 
authority  of  your  judgment  is  so  great,  that,  for  the  first 
time,  I  feel  impelled  to  argue  with  one  who  contradicts  me. 
And  I  will  do  it,  despite  the  ever-bleeding  wound  in  my 
heart,  as  impartially  as  if  it  were  a  matter  of  giving  judgment 
on  the  dispute  between  the  Athenians  and  Philip. 

We  are  far  from  the  time  when  Bismarck  was  represented 
as  an  Arcadian  shepherd  suddenly  attacked  by  the  Gallic 
wolf,  what  time  he  was  dreaming  beneath  the  stars  and 
learned  by  mere  chance  that  there  was  a  vacant  throne  of 
Spain  and  a  Hohenzollern  ready  to  seat  himself  thereon, 
which  had  seemed  to  him  a  perfectly  natural  thing  since 
he  was  equally  unaware  of  the  existence  of  a  France  to  which 
such  a  neighbor  would  not  be  agreeable.  You  are  no  longer, 
monsieur  le  professeur,  in  the  bucolic  stage  of  the  early  days 
of  the  controversy.  You  admit  that  the  Hohenzollern  can 
didacy  was  the  work  of  Bismarck;  you  admit  that  it 
was  not  only  "a  provocation"  but  an  act  of  "astute  hos 
tility"  against  France  (pages  320-8*2).  Thus  far  we  travel 
together,  but  here  we  part. 

1From  L* Empire  Liberal,  vol.  xv,  pp.  533-545. 

2  In  the  Preussische  Jahrbucher,  August,  1909,  vol.  cxxxvii,  part  2,  pp. 
305  ff. ;  "  Ollivier  Uber  den  Krieg  1870." 

407 


408         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

You  admit  that  Bismarck  knew  that  the  announcement 
of  a  Prussian  candidacy  in  Spain  would  make  the  buzzing 
of  the  Spanish  fly,  in  which  Moltke  took  such  delight,  too 
strident,  and  would  arouse  intense  excitement  in  France; 
but  you  think  that  that  excitement  would  have  been  ephem 
eral,  and  that,  brought  face  to  face  with  an  accomplished 
fact,  we  should  have  submitted  after  crying  aloud  a  bit, 
should  have  turned  our  thoughts  to  something  else,  and 
should  have  allowed  the  Hohenzollern  to  establish  himself 
peacefully  in  Spain,  ready  to  fall  upon  our  rear  whenever 
war  should  break  out  on  the  Rhine.  You  consider  that  it 
is  slanderous  to  attribute  to  the  peace-loving  Chancellor 
the  prevision  that  our  transitory  excitement  would  find 
expression  in  an  act  of  war. 

In  support  of  these  theories 'you  invoke  three  documents 
which  you  consider  of  indisputable  force.  First,  a  letter 
of  July  I£,  from  the  King  of  Prussia  to  the  Queen,  from 
which,  you  think,  it  is  impossible  not  to  infer  the  abandon 
ment  of  the  candidacy.  Let  us  read  over  together  the 
letter  as  it  is  given  by  Oncken.  I  begin  with  the  German 
text:  ** Bismarck  ist  innerlich  gewiss  noch  fur  den  Can- 
didaten,"  which  I  translate:  "Bismarck  is  certainly  at 
heart  still  for  the  candidate."  So  that  he  had  not  abandoned 
him.  The  letter  continues:  "That,  however,  the  ques 
tion  has  become  so  serious  that  we  must  put  the  Hohen- 
zollerns  aside  altogether,  and  leave  the  final  decision  to 
them."  From  these  words  it  would  be  inferred  (such  is 
your  claim)  that  Bismarck,  while  still  at  heart  loyal  to  the 
candidacy,  nevertheless  abandons  it.  I  draw  precisely 
the  contrary  inference :  He  does  not  wish  the  King  to  med 
dle  with  it,  because,  if  he  does,  he  will  make  a  mess  of  it, 
and,  under  the  pacific  influence  of  the  Queen,  will  advise  a 
withdrawal;  whereas,  if  left  to  themselves,  the  Hohen- 
zollem  princes,  who  have  given  their  word  and  of  whom  he 
is  absolutely  sure,  wUl  hold  fast. 

Secondly,  you  invoke  the  Spanish  letter  which  I  have 


APPENDIX  409 

printed.1  This  letter  was  certainly  not  an  instruction  to 
Lothar  Bucher.  That  envoy  extraordinary  of  the  Chan 
cellor  was  not  despatched  to  Madrid  without  being  sup 
plied  with  complete  instructions,  which  did  not  require 
to  be  repeated  to  him  a  few  days  later  in  a  jumbled-up 
form.  Bismarck  knew  that  in  negotiations  of  a  certain 
sort,  genuine  conspiracies,  one  does  not,  unless  one  chances 
to  be  a  Benedetti,  write  what  one  can  say.  The  addressee 
of  the  letter  is  Bernhardi,  or  some  other  person  of  Prim's 
entourage.  It  does  in  fact  express  the  belief  that  the  excite 
ment  in  France  will  not  result  in  an  act  of  war.  In  recom 
mending  to  his  accomplices  a  step  which  will  lead  to  war, 
Bismarck  gives  him  to  understand  that  he  fdoes  not  an 
ticipate  it.  Can  such  language  be  taken  seriously?  Is  it 
not  the  commonplace  trick  of  those  who  are  laying  plans 
for  a  war,  to  abound  in  pacific  protestations  ?  Their  pur 
pose  is  of  the  sort  that  one  does  not  avow  even  to  one's 
shadow,  and  a  fortiori,  to  one's  agents :  one  maintains  their 
illusion,  so  that  they  may,  with  the  more  assurance,  put  to 
sleep  the  suspicions  of  the  person  on  whom  one  is  preparing 
to  pounce. 

"If  you  would  deceive  a  prince,"  says  Guicciardini,  "de 
ceive  your  ambassador  to  him."  The  hypocrisy  of  the 
Spanish  letter  is  simply  a  ruse  prepared  beforehand  for 
the  day  when  its  author  will  have  to  defend  himself  from 
the  charge  of  having  provoked  the  quarrel. 

Equally  a  mere  ruse  is  the  third  fact  which  you  put  for 
ward  as  decisive :  namely,  the  visit  which  Prim  announces 
his  intention  to  pay  to  Napoleon  in.  He  would  not  have 
announced  that  visit,  you  say,  unless  he  had  believed  that 
by  that  time  the  excitement  in  France  would  have  subsided. 
Quite  the  contrary  was  Prim's  purpose:  he  wished  to  lull 
the  Emperor's  suspicions,  so  that  he  would  not  prevent 

1  IS  Empire  Liberal,  vol.  xiii,  p.  564r.  [The  letter  referred  to  is  printed  in 
Appendix  C,  infra.] 


410          THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

the  fact  from  being  consummated.  I  have  demonstrated 
it  with  mathematical  precision. 

But  after  all,  of  what  avail  is  it  to  take  the  pains  to  seek 
for  Bismarck's  intentions  in  presumptions  more  or  less 
forced  ?  He  himself  disclosed  them  to  Busch,  -one  of  those 
intimate  coadjutors  before  whom  one  lets  one's  self  go  with 
out  restraint,  and  Busch  tells  us  the  story  in  his  Unser 
Reichskander l:  — 

"In  1867  Bismarck  had  avoided  war,  because  he  con 
sidered  that  Prussia  was  not  strong  enough.  In  1870  that 
difficulty  was  removed,  Germany  was  sufficiently  armed. 
The  Arcadians  wished  for  war,  the  Ultramontanes,  with 
the  Empress  at  their  head,  clamored  ardently  for  it.  France 
was  visibly  slrengthening  her  army  and  arranging  alliances. 
If  hitherto  we  had  been  able  to  place  our  hopes  on  delay, 
that  delay  was  now  becoming  a  danger,  and  hence  resulted, 
for  the  statesman,  the  duty  of  substituting  for  a  policy  which 
postponed  decisive  action,  the  policy  which  precipitated  what 
was  absolutely  inevitable.  In  the  interest  of  Germany,  and 
no  less  in  the  interest  of  Europe,  it  was  imperative  to  find  some 
way  to  seize  (fassen),  to  surprise  the  French,  who  were  not 
entirely  ready  for  the  contest,  —  in  such  wise  as  to  force  them 
to  lay  aside  their  reserve" 

Such  unqualified  testimony  as  this  scatters  all  doubts; 
and  yet  it  seems  not  without  profit  to  support  it  by  what  I 
shall  call  the  psychological  proof.  Since  the  days  of  Louis 
XIV, — under  Napoleon  I,  under  the  Restoration,  under 
Louis  XVllI,  under  Louis-Philippe,  —  at  all  times  we 
have  considered  that  our  security  was  dependent,  if  not 
on  the  friendship,  at  least  on  the  benevolent  neutrality, 
of  Spain,  and  that  the  first  care  of  whosoever  may  be  jealous 
of  the  grandeur  of  France  will  be  to  stir  up  trouble  for  us 
on  the  other  side  of  the  Pyrenees  —  to  fasten  a  ball  and 
chain  to  our  leg,  so  to  speak,  and  to  place  us  between  two 
fires.2  When  Palmerston  conceived  the  perfidious  idea 

1  Vol.  ii,  chap.  1,  p»  63.  *U Empire  Lib&ral,  vol.  xiv,  p,  64. 


APPENDIX  411 

of  substituting  for  the  Due  d'Aumale  (who  was  excluded 
from  consideration  by  England)  a  Coburg  as  husband  to 
the  Queen,  Bresson,  our  Ambassador  to  Spain,  wrote :  "  I 
regard  a  German  prince  in  Spain  as  the  most  piercing,  the 
most  humiliating  blow  to  the  honor  of  France,  and  to  the 
pride,  perhaps  to  the  very  existence,  of  our  dynasty."  (Sep 
tember  £1,  1844.)  Foreigners,  knowing  how  deeply  inter 
ested  we  were  in  union  with  Spain,  exerted  themselves 
to  prevent  her  from  becoming  our  friend ;  but  we,  on  our 
part,  would  not  allow  them  to  make  her  our  foe. 

If  Bismarck  had  been  ignorant  of  this  historical  truth, 
you  would  have  denied  him  a  certificate  of  scholarship,  for 
the  dullest  of  your  students  knew  it.  If,  knowing  it,  as  I 
have  no  doubt  that  he  did,  he  believed  that  we  should  be 
so  stupid,  so  heedless,  so  improvident,  so  careless  of  our 
interest,  as  not  to  suspect  the  purpose  of  aggression  which 
his  German  prince  would  bring  with  him,  and  to  tolerate 
it ;  if  he  supposed  that  France,  a  volcanic  nation  accord 
ing  to  her  critics,  —  France,  restless,  suspicious,  dissatisfied 
with  a  change  in  the  European  status  which  weakened  her 
—  that  France  would  not  emerge  from  her  state  of  peace 
able  resignation  and  suddenly  cry  out  to  his  government: 
"Never!  rather  war!"  —  if  he  did  not  see  these  things, 
which  were  as  visible  as  human  things  can  be,  he  must  needs 
have  been  the  most  imbecile  of  statesmen. 

Ah,  well !  although  I  have  every  reason  to  curse  that  man, 
I  cannot  make  up  my  mind  to  call  him  an  imbecile,  who 
let  loose  upon  the  world  a  ghastly  war  without  knowing 
what  he  was  doing.  It  is  distasteful  to  me  to  degrade  to 
that  point  a  personality  wherein  were  united  in  a  very  rare 
degree  all  the  superior  qualities  of  the  statesman,  and  who 
would  have  been  without  a  rival,  if  he  had  not  lacked  that 
generosity  and  that  grace  of  heart  which  round  out  the 
truly  great  man. 

And  lastly, — the  final  psychological  proof  of  his  war 
like  purpose,  —  he  selected  for  the  weaving  of  his  candidacy 


412         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

—  a  precaution,  say  you,  against  a  threat  of  war  —  the 
precise  moment  when  that  threat  was  fading  away.  Even 
before  the  advent  of  the  liberal  ministry,  he  had  no  ag 
gression  to  apprehend  on  the  part  of  France.  When  in 
formed  by  his  agents  at  Vienna  of  the  projects  of  an  alliance 
in  1869,  he  did  not  take  alarm ;  he  said  to  Bernhardi,  —  it 
is  you  who  tell  me  so,  on  page  333,  —  "Against  an  attack 
from  Austria  he  was  absolutely  protected  by  the  friend 
ship  of  Russia  and  by  the  determination  of  Hungary  not  to 
allow  it."  As  he  was  not  disturbed  on  that  score  during 
the  reign  of  ministers  who  deemed  themselves  to  have  been 
conquered  at  Sadowa,  how  could  he  have  been  under  my 
ministry  —  mine,  who  had  maintained  for  four  years  that 
Sadowa  was  not  a  French  defeat  for  which  we  ought  to 
seek  revenge  ? 

You  do  not  question  my  sincerity,  and  you  recur  to  it 
several  times  in  terms  which  I  appreciate,  but  you  think 
that  my  strength  was  not  equal  to  my  sincerity,  and  you 
represent  the  Emperor  as  making  ready  behind  my  back, 
and  without  my  knowledge,  for  the  unavoidable  war.  You 
are  mistaken. 

The  Emperor's  personal  confidence  in  me  was  absolute, 
and  my  daily  proofs  of  devotion  constantly  intensified  it. 
Once  wh$n  I  was  insisting  upon  some  measure,  I  forget  what, 
as  to  which  we  did  not  agree,  he  said  to  me  affectionately : 
"  I  am  well  aware  that  I  can't  do  without  you ;  don't  take 
undue  advantage  of  me."  The  fact  that  he  did  not  inform 
me  of  his  military  conversations  with  Archduke  Albert 
and  of  General  Lebrun's  mission  does  not  prove  that  he 
proposed  to  get  up  a  war  without  my  knowledge,  but  simply 
that  he  attached  no  importance  to  those  proceedings.  If 
you  had  been  in  frequent  intercourse  with  the  Emperor 
at  that  time,  you  would  not  doubt  my  statement,  for  he  was 
incapable  then  of  any  vigorous  determination,  and  it  would 
have  required  very  great  energy  to  invite  a  war  with  that 
Germany  of  whose  strength  he  was  not  unaware. 


APPENDIX  413 

Aggression  on  our  part  was  no  more  to  be  dreaded  in  one 
year  than  in  two.  We  had  no  need  of  it.  It  was  to  Mm, 
Bismarck,  that  war  was  indispensable.  Standing  at  bay; 
caught  between  the  impatience  of  the  National  Liberals 
and  the  growing  distrust  of  the  Conservatives;  threatened 
with  a  fresh  conflict  over  the  military  law ;  assured  that  the 
States  of  the  South  would  draw  away  rather  than  draw 
near,  and  that,  without  a  war  waged  in  common  against 
us,  they  would  not  be  absorbed ;  ambitious  not  to  leave 
to  time  alone  the  consummation  of  German  Unity  but  to 
be  himself  its  triumphant  architect,  he  saw  in  war  an  actual 
essential  of  existence. 

He  would  not  have  set  out  on  this  affair,  he  would  not 
have  put  compulsion  upon  his  King  and  the  Hohenzollern 
princes  and  declared  it  a  duty  imposed  on  Leopold  by  the 
honor  of  Prussia  to  accept  a  crown  that  he  did  not  want, 
he  would  not  have  devoted  all  his  ardor  to  overcoming  the 
numerous  difficulties  mentioned  in  his  Spanish  letter,  if 
he  had  not  desired  to  obtain  an  immediate  result  —  war. 
And  as  he  no  longer  expected  any  provocation  from  us, 
he  had  to  make  himself  the  provoker,  taking  care  at  the  same 
time  to  compel  us  to  assume  that  position  in  appearance, 
in  order  that  he  might  coerce  his  King  and  Ms  people.  Hence 
the  Hohenzollern  machination,  which  is  a  masterpiece  of 
ability. 

With  the  candidacy  and  the  candidate  thrust  aside,  the 
imprudent  demand  of  guaranties  waived,  the  war  was  slipping 
through  Bismarck's  fingers.  He  seized  it  again  by  an  act 
of  sheer  brutality,  wherein  there  was  no  ability  at  all,  but 
simply  an  energetic  resolution  —  the  Ems  despatch. 

The  genuine  Ems  despatch,  the  one  drawn  by  Abeken, 
was  in  itself  an  initial  Bismarckian  falsification  of  what 
had  happened  during  the  day ;  for  it  had  been  extorted  from 
the  King  by  the  imperious  telegrams  sent  by  Bismarck 
throughout  the  morning,  and  by  the  obsession  of  the  two 
ministers  who  arrived  from  Berlin  at  noon  to  reinforce  those 


414         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

telegrams.  Bismarck  deemed  that  falsification  insufficient ; 
lie  emphasized  it.  Some  of  his  admirers  deny  his  Shake 
spearean  story  of  the  dinner  with  Roon  and  Moltke.  There 
seems  to  me  to  be  no  serious  argument  to  cast  doubt  on  its 
accuracy;  Busch  and  others  had  told  it  before  Bismarck 
authenticated  it ;  and  although  in  the  different  versions 
one  can  discover  some  divergences  due  doubtless  to  the 
carelessness  of  the  narrators,  the  essential  facts  remain 
unchanged. 

However,  though  the  scene  were  imaginary,  it  is  none  the 
less  unanimously  proved  that  he  made  the  toilet  of  the  Ems 
despatch,  and  every  one  knows  how  he  set  about  it.  He  added 
nothing,  but  he  struck  out  all  the  explanatory  and  softening 
details  which  would  show  that,  if  the  King  did  reject  our 
demands,  he  at  least  listened  to  them,  discussed  them, 
and  complied  with  them  in  part.  He  imputed  an  insultingly 
laconic  form  to  the  principal,  the  real  fact — the  refusal 
of  an  audience.  Lastly,  he  altered  the  source  of  the  despatch. 
Having  been  redrafted  at  Berlin,  it  was  from  Berlin  that  he 
despatched  it  to  the  foreign  cabinets,  and  he  represented 
it  as  transmitted  from  Ems.  This  manoeuvring  trans 
formed  Abeken's  ponderous  despatch  into  a  strident,  stinging 
message  which  sank  into  the  flesh. 

You  do  not  deny  that  in  making  these  changes  Bismarck 
had  the  purpose  of  inciting  war.  You  are  not  surprised  that 
I  called  my  chapter  on  that  despatch  "Bismarck's  Slap 
in  the  Face " ;  but  you  blame  me  for  forgetting  that  that 
slap  was  simply  the  riposte  to  one  dealt  to  Germany  by  our 
demand  of  guaranties ;  that  that  blow  was  the  reply  to 
another  blow;  that  that  thrust,  which,  as  you  yourself 
agree,  we  could  not  tolerate,  was  simply  a  parry.  Be  good 
enough,  I  pray  you,  to  reflect  again. 

The  demand  of  guaranties  did  not  in  itself  contain  any 
thing  insulting ;  it  was,  in  fact,  defensible,  and  it  became 
inopportune,  offensive  if  you  choose,  only  because  it  was 
addressed  to  the  King  of  Prussia  under  circumstances  which 


APPENDIX  415 

made  it  impossible  for  Mm  to  accept  it  with  honor.  That 
demand  was  secret,  absolutely  unknown  to  the  public; 
it  had  not  the  form  of  an  ultimatum ;  if  the  King  deemed 
it  to  be  unjustifiable,  it  was  sufficient  for  him  to  reject  it 
by  a  refusal,  reserving  the  right  if,  upon  that  refusal,  we 
ventured  to  make  a  disturbance,  to  strike  back  accordingly. 
The  demand  of  guaranties  was  a  word  said  in  the  ear,  in 
a  closed  room ;  the  Ems  despatch  was  an  outcry  on  the 
public  square.  It  did  not  constitute  a  simple  contradiction, 
which  one  can  put  aside  by  a  no;  it  was  an  irrevocable 
moral  assault,  which  we  could  not  meet  with  dishonorable 
submission  or  with  an  angry  retort.  What  logical  simi 
larity  is  there  between  two  acts  so  unlike  ?  One  of  our  old 
proverbs  says :  Un  soufflet  par  un  stylet  (Answer  a  blow 
with  a  dagger).  The  French  do  not  answer  with  a  dagger 
but  by  sending  seconds,  and  that  is  what  we  did. 

It  displeases  you  that  this  manoeuvre  of  Bismarck's, 
as  to  the  purpose  and  character  of  which  we  are  in  accord, 
should  be  called  a  falsification.  In  our  language  it  is  im 
possible  to  qualify  it  otherwise.  To  falsify  does  not  neces 
sarily  imply  that  one  adds  something  to  a  document,  or  even 
that  one  omits  something  from  it ;  but  simply  that  one 
so  represents  it  that  one  changes  its  real  meaning  and  gives 
it  an  aspect  which  it  would  not  have  had  without  that 
handling.  A  dictionary  of  eminent  authority,  Littre's, 
notes  this  meaning  of  the  word  falsify :  "rv.  Not  to  represent, 
not  to  report  things  as  they  are."  Some  persons  in  Germany 
seem  to  have  adopted  a  different  definition.  They  main 
tain  that  we  must  not  say  falsify,  but  edit.  With  them  the 
difference  is  reduced  to  a  trifle.  We  call  that  battle  Woerth, 
which  you  call  Reichshoffen,  but  everybody  knows  that  they 
mean  the  same  thing.  It  may  be  understood  then  that  so 
to  "arrange"  a  despatch  that  it  will  produce  an  insulting 
effect  which  it  would  not  have  produced  without  that 
arrangement,  will  be  called  falsifying  in  France,  and  editing 
in  Germany. 


416         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

Your  objection  (page  315)  is  at  once  subtler  and  stronger. 
Bismarck  did  not  change  the  truth  —  he  simply  showed 
it  as  it  was.  His  despatch  is  not  to  be  measured  by  the 
scale  of  an  objective  historical  exposition,  it  should  be 
considered  as  a  political  act.  At  Ems  was  being  discussed 
the  claim  of  France  to  stand  above  all  others  as  a  great 
nation  and  to  deny  Germany  that  privilege.  The  King 
inwardly  thought  Benedetti  "importunate"  and  "imper 
tinent,"  but  as  he  was  most  courteous,  he  showed  his  feeling 
only  with  perfect  self-control  and  all  the  polite  forms  of  a 
man  of  the  world.  Bismarck  believed  that  the  common  mul 
titude  would  see  in  those  forms  a  submission  to  humiliation. 
He  reconstituted  the  situation  in  accordance  with  the  awful, 
terrifying  truth.  *  It  was  the  King  who  had  placed  a  false 
aspect  on  it  at  Ems  by  the  courtesy  of  his  manners,  which, 
according  to  the  strait  sect,  were  but  "vain  deception  and 
hypocrisy"  (ettel  Trug  und  Heuchelei). 

I  should  never  have  ventured  to  characterize  thus  the 
King's  conduct,  or  not  to  consider  him  sincere ;  but  I  am 
not  conscious  of  possessing  any  qualification  to  'contest  your 
judgment  and  I  bow  to  it. 

You  are  the  stronger,  but  that  is  not  enough  for  you, 
—  you  are  determined  also  to  have  been  the  more  just. 
That  feeling  does  you  honor  and  imparts  some  respecta 
bility  to  nonsense  which  would  otherwise  be  pitiable. 
But  the  truth  has  been  set  free,  the  history  of  that  epoch 
is  made  up.  It  will  attribute  the  responsibility  for  the 
War  of  1870  neither  to  the  Emperor  of  the  French  nor  to 
the  King  of  Prussia,  neither  to  the  French  people  nor  to 
the  German  people,  but  to  the  man  of  iron  who  drove 
them  both  to  lie  battle-field  which  his  ambition  had 
prepared.  He  is  the  author  of  the  war  against  France, 
as  lie  was  the  author  of  that  against  Denmark  and  of  that 
against  Austria. 

Who  has  said  it  more  plainly  than  he  on  that  pathetic 
evening  when,  seated  at  the  foot  of  the  laurel-crowned 


APPENDIX  417 

Victory,  at  that  half-veiled  hour  when  the  melancholy 
of  a  closing  day  intensifies  the  sadness  of  a  fading  life,  he 
exclaimed  before  his  agitated  familiar  friends:  "But  for 
me  three  great  wars  would  not  have  taken  place;  eighty 
thousand  men  would  not  have  perished;  their  fathers, 
mothers,  sisters  would  not  have  been  plunged  into  sorrow. 
Now,  I  have  that  account  to  adjust  with  God."  l 

If  he  had  not  succeeded,  the  old  women,  he  said,  would 
have  done  him  to  death  with  broomsticks.  He  did  succeed, 
thanks  to  Roon  and  Moltke ;  no  one  denies  him  a  glorious 
place  among  the  dominators  of  the  world.  But  a  political 
act  is  not  to  be  judged  by  its  immediate  results.  There 
are  far-distant  ones  which  change  into  disaster  what  had 
at  first  seemed  good  fortune,  and  render  bitter  the  victory 
wherein  one  had  rejoiced.  At  this  day  the  careful  thinker 
can  discover  the  sombre  aftermath  of  the  policy  which  led  you 
to  success.  Have  you  profited  by  conquering  peoples  whom 
you  cause  to  suSer,  who  detest  you  and  curse  you,  and 
await  only  a  favorable  opportunity  to  rise  against  you? 
Was  not  the  increase  of  territory  which  your  Unity  did 
not  need  dearly  bought  by  the  impossibility,  which  you  there 
by  created,  of  a  complete,  unreserved  understanding  with 
us  ?  Has  your  security  increased  since  you  crushed  a  nation 
whose  abasement  is  never  more  than  temporary,  and  which 
may  of  a  sudden,  on  the  morrow  of  a  Soubise  or  a  Bazaine, 
see  a  Turenne  or  a  Pelissier  arise  in  its  midst  ? 

France  and  Germany  living  in  a  state  of  mutual  distrust 
are  a  permanent  source  of  disturbance  in  Europe.  Joined 
in  a  friendly  alliance  they  would  have  bestowed  upon  the 
world,  reassured  and  grouped  about  their  united  power, 
a  new  pax  Romana,  as  it  were,  more  fruitful  than  the  earlier 
one.  That  was  the  dream  that  I  dreamed  in  opposition 
and  that  I  hoped  to  realize  in  the  ministry.  I  was  beaten 
in  that  undertaking  to  draw  our  two  great  countries  together. 

1  Moritz  Busch ;  Unser  RdchsJcanzler,  vol.  i,  p.  115. 


418         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

But  I  regard  it  as  the  signal  honor  of  my  life  that  I  con 
ceived  it  and  followed  it  to  the  farthest  limit  of  my  power. 
Overthrown  by  a  contrary  fate,  I  shall  say  to  my  last 
hour:  — 

"That  way   lay   common   sense,  prudence,  humanity, 
mutual  advantage,  and  the  interest  of  civilization." 


APPENDIX  B 

THE  SPANISH  REVOLUTION  OF   1868 

ISABELLA  II,  daughter  of  Ferdinand  VII  and  Maria  Chris 
tina,  was  born  in  1830,  and  was  but  three  years  old  when  her 
father  died.  Queen  Maria  Christina  acted  as  Regent  of  the 
Kingdom  from  1833-1840,  being  engaged  practically  all  the 
time  in  war  with  Don  Carlos,  the  claimant  of  the  throne. 
In  1840  she  was  deserted  by  the  army  and  compelled  to  flee 
to  France,  being  succeeded  in  the  Regency  by  Espartero, 
Duke  of  Vittoria,  who  became  military  dictator.  Isabella 
was  declared  of  age  in  1843,  and  for  the  next  quarter  century 
her  reign  was  simply  a  record  of  revolution  and  counter 
revolution,  the  various  parties  —  Moderates,  Progressists, 
Republicans  —  succeeding  each  other  in  predominance  with 
confusing  rapidity.  The  best  brief  epitome  of  Spanish  his 
tory  during  those  years  is  given  by  M.  Ch.  Seignobos  in  his 
Political  History  of  Europe  since  1814,  chapter  10  (translated 
by  Professor  S.  M.  Macvane). 

In  1864,  the  Queen,  yielding  to  her  natural  inclinations, 
had  sought  to  restore  the  absolutist  regime,  and  had  revived 
the  tradition  of  Catholic  absolutism  and  government  by  the 
camarilla,  or  junta  of  favorites.  The  Liberal  parties  became 
revolutionary,  and  finally  attacked  the  dynasty  itself.  The 
Progressists  endeavored  to  excite  the  army  against  the  "dy 
nasty.  Various  unsuccessful  insurrections  were  organized 
by  General  Prim,  then  in  exile.  The  government  dissolved 
the  Cortes  and  exiled  Marshal  Serrano,  President  of  the 
Senate. 

After  the  death  of  Narvaez,  who  had  been  the  principal 
instrument  of  the  restoration  of  despotism,  "the  three  per 
secuted  parties  —  Liberal  Union,  Progressists,  and  Demo- 

419 


420         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

crats  —  agreed  to  make  a  joint  revolution.  ...  It  began 
with  the  pronunciamento  of  Admiral  Topete,  commander  of 
the  Cadiz  fleet ;  followed  by  a  pronunciamento  signed  by  the 
principal  generals  of  the  opposition,  Prim  and  Serrano.  .  .  . 
There  was  but  one  small  battle,  at  Alcolea,  near  Cordova, 
on  September  £9.  After  this,  Madrid,  then  all  Spain,  joined 
the  insurgents.  Isabella  was  deserted  and  fled  to  France.'* 
Seignobos  (Macvane's  edition),  pp.  309,  310. 

"The  uprising  was  the  work  of  three  parties  acting  in 
common :  the  Unionists,  who  represented  the  moderate  views 
of  the  liberal  middle  class;  the  Progressists,  who  desired 
more  ample  reforms ;  the  Democrats,  who,  for  the  most  part, 
inclined  toward  a  federalist  republic.  From  the  revolution 
three  personages  emerged:  Marshal  Serrano,  Admiral 
Topete,  and  Marshal  Prim.  The  first  two  belonged  to  the 
Liberal  Union;  the  third,  who  was  to  play  the  most  impor 
tant  part,  was  the  leader  of  the  Progressists.  A  provisional 
government  was  organized.  Serrano  was  President  of  the 
Council ;  Prim,  Minister  of  War.  The  most  urgent  need  was 
to  reestablish  tranquillity.  The  new  authorities  did  not  spare 
themselves,  and  Prim,  who  during  his  life  had  led  four  or 
five  insurrections,  incontinently  set  about  preaching  dis 
cipline.  ...  In  January,  1869,  the  elections  for  the  Cortes 
took  place.  The  only  republicans  were  among  the  Demo 
crats  :  Unionists  and  Progressists  remained  loyal  to  the  mo 
narchical  principle.  The  ballots  reflected  these  tendencies, 
and  as  soon  as  the  names  of  all  those  chosen  were  known,  it 
was  manifest  that  Spain  would  simply  change  sovereigns." 
La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  pp.  189,  190. 

In  1869,  "the  Provisional  Government,  which  was  in 
stalled  at  Madrid,  and  in  which  Marshal  Prim  rapidly 
acquired  a  predominating  influence,  decided  on  framing  a 
constitution,  in  which  a  new  king,  chosen  by  the  nation, 
should  be  surrounded  with  democratic  institutions.  The 
adoption  of  this  Constitution  forced  the  men  who  framed  it  to 
commence  the  painful  and  difficult  task  of  searching  for  a 


APPENDIX  421 

fitting  sovereign."    Walpole,  History  of  Twenty-five  Years, 
vol.  ii,  p.  483. 

Finally,  in  November,  1870,  Amadeus,  second  son  of  Victor 
Emanuel,  was  chosen  King  of  Spain.  He  arrived  at  Madrid 
just  as  Prim  was  assassinated,  in  December.  After  a 
troubled  reign  of  two  years,  he  abdicated  in  February,  1873, 
whereupon  the  Cortes  proclaimed  a  republic.  Eventually,  in 
December,  1874,  Isabella's  son,  who  had  just  attained  his  ma 
jority,  was  recognized  as  King  of  Spain  —  Alfonso  XII. 


APPENDIX  C 

THE   HOHENZOLLERN   CANDIDACY   FOR   THE    SPANISH    THRONE 

NOTE.  —  The  greater  part  of  what  follows  is  taken  bodily  from  the  arti 
cle  by  M.  H.  Leonardon  in  the  Revue  Historique  for  1900,  vol.  Ixxxiv,  pp. 
287-310.  I  allow  this  statement  to  take  the  place  of  quotation  marks. 

SERRANO,  Topete,  and  with  them  the  majority  of  the 
Liberal  Union,  wished  to  give  the  crown  either  to  the  Due  de 
Montpensier,  to  his  wife,  the  Infante  Dona  Maria  Luisa  Fer 
nanda  (sister  of  Isabella),  or  to  their  oldest  son,  then  nine 
years  of  age.  Some  of  the  Unionists,  being  satisfied  by  the 
fall  of  Isabella,  desired  the  restoration  of  the  dynasty  in  the 
person  of  her  son  Alfonso,  the  Prince  of  Asturias,  under  the 
guardianship  of  Montpensier. 

The  Progressists  and  those  Democrats  who  had  not  pro 
nounced  for  a  republic  had  an  entirely  different  idea.  Long 
before  arriving  at  power,  they  dreamed  of  uniting  beneath 
the  same  sceptre  the  two  nations  of  the  Iberian  peninsula. 
The  revolution  accomplished,  they  seemed  to  be  on  the  point 
of  realizing  that  dream,  either  by  inducing  the  reigning  King 
of  Portugal,  Dom  Luiz,  to  accept  the  crown  of  Spain,  or  by 
offering  it  to  his  father,  the  widowed  King  Consort,  Fer 
dinand  of  Coburg. 

These  names  were  not  the  only  ones  put  forward  on  the  mor 
row  of  the  pronundamento  of  Cadiz:  in  political  circles 
men  mentioned  those  of  Amadeus,  Duke  of  Aosta,  of  Es- 
partero,  the  old  champion  of  the  Progressist  party,  of  Prince 
Philip  of  Coburg,  of  Prince  Frederick  Charles  of  Prussia, 
of  Archduke  Charles  of  Austria,  of  a  son  of  the  Queen  of 
England.  Lastly,  less  than  a  month  after  the  revolution, 
and  prior  to  mid-October,  1868,  there  was  already  talk  of  the 

422 


APPENDIX  423 

Hereditary  Prince  of  Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen,  Leopold ;  for 
the  moment,  however,  it  was  simply  an  unsubstantial  rumor, 
and  no  overtures  were  made  to  the  Hohenzollern  family. 

On  October  14,  1868,  Prince  Antony  wrote  to  his  son 
Charles  of  Roumania:  "In  Spain,  Prim  and  Serrano  are 
working  together  to  hasten  the  election  of  a  new  king. 
Among  the  candidates  other  than  the  King  of  Portugal  are 
mentioned  the  Hereditary  Prince  of  Hohenzollern,  Philip  of 
Coburg,  and  the  Due  de  Montpensier."  And  on  December  9 
following:  "The  candidacy  for  the  throne  of  Spain  is  thus 
far  only  a  phantom  stirred  up  by  the  newspapers.  We  do 
not  know  the  slightest  thing  about  it,  and  if  the  idea  were 
to  be  submitted  to  us  more  definitely,  I  should  never  advise 
accepting  that  risky  position,  which  has  only  the  gleam  of 
false  gold.  Moreover,  France  would  never  permit,  consider 
ing  our  relations  with  Prussia,  the  enthronement  of  a  Hohen 
zollern  across  the  Pyrenees.  She  is  already  frantic  with  envy 
at  the  sight  of  a  Hohenzollern  reigning  on  the  Lower  Danube.'* 
—  Memoirs  of  the  King  of  Roumania,  French  translation, 
vol.  i,  pp.  458,  473. 

"At  the  outset  of  the  Spanish  crisis,  it  is  not  without  in 
terest  to  note  what  ideas  were  exchanged  in  Germany. 
Many  thought  that  a  revolution  at  so  great  a  distance  could 
have  no  influence  on  the  destinies  of  the  Prussian  monarchy. 
'It's  a  matter  of  indifference  to  us,  and  we  can  await  the  re 
sult  in  peace,  thank  God  !'  said  Abeken  (Ein  schlicktes  Leb&n 
in  bewegter  Ztit,  p.  363).  In  other  circles  a  certain  appre 
hension  manifests  itself,  lest  the  Cabinet  of  the  Tuileries 
should  seek  to  profit  by  the  event.  On  October  30,  1868, 
in  a  letter  to  the  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia,  allusion  is  made  to 
the  future  fate  of  the  Spanish  peninsula.  *  Above  all  things, 
no  regent  under  the  aegis  of  France  P  But  a  rumor  of  which 
it  is  hard  to  discover  the  source  is  already  beginning  to  cir 
culate  in  Germany.  Vaguely,  in  veiled  words,  people  are 
talking  of  Prince  Leopold's  son,  oldest  son  of  Prince  Antony 
of  Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen,  and  brother  of  that  Prince 


424  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

Charles  who  had  been  called  two  years  earlier  to  rule  over 
Roumania.  The  news  is  reported  by  the  Journal  des  Debats 
(November  13, 1868),  on  tbe  word  of  a  Vienna  correspondent. 
At  Berlin,  Queen  Victoria's  representative,  Lord  A.  Loftus, 
picks  up  the  rumor.  In  a  private  letter  to  the  head  of  the 
Foreign  Office  he  transmits  the  information,  and  adds  this 
sentence:  *1  observe  that  if  the  Prince  should  be  elected, 
the  choice  would  be  looked  upon  with  jealousy  and  disfavor 
at  Paris.*  (Diplomatic  Reminiscences,  £d  Series,  vol.  i, 
p.  £36.)"  La  Gorce,  vol.  i,  pp.  190,  191. 

Two  months  passed  with  no  mention  of  that  candidacy  in 
Spain.  In  February,  1869,  a  deputy  belonging  to  the  Liberal 
Union,  Salazar  de  Mazarredo,  published  a  short  pamphlet 
in  which  he  shows  himself  to  be  a  very  decided  partisan  of 
Ferdinand  of  Portugal ;  but,  in  case  that  prince  should  not 
accept  the  crown,  he  points  out  to  his  fellow  citizens,  as  second 
choice,  Leopold  of  Hohenzollern. 

About  a  month  later,  M.  Ranees  y  Villaneuva,  Spanish 
Ambassador  to  Prussia  under  Isabella  II  and  transferred  to 
Austria  by  the  Provisional  Government,  paid  a  brief  visit 
to  Berlin,  ostensibly  to  pay  his  respects  to  King  William  on 
his  birthday,  March  ££.  His  visit,  coinciding  in  a  general 
way  with  the  revival  of  rumors  favorable  to  the  Hohenzollern 
candidacy,  aroused  the  attention  of  our  Ambassador,  Comte 
Benedetti.  Count  Bismarck  being  absent  at  the  moment, 
M.  Benedetti  applied  to  the  Under-Secretary  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  Herr  von  Thile,  and  took  up  the  question  with  him. 
Von  Thile  replied  by  "  a  most  explicit  assurance  that  he  has 
never  at  any  time  had  knowledge  of  any  fact  authorizing  such 
a  conjecture/*  He  denied  that  Sefior  Ranees  had  referred 
to  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy,  and  declared  that  he  had 
expressed  the  belief  that  Montpensier  would  be  the  final 
choice. 

It  is  a  fair  question  (says  M.  Leonardon)  whether  Benedetti 
had  serious  reasons  to  justify  this  step,  or  whether,  on  the 
other  hand,  he  did  not  risk  it  on  the  strength  of  mere  pre- 


APPENDIX  425 

sumptions,  thereby  carelessly  giving  Count  Bismarck  a 
chance  to  detect  a  sensitive  spot  in  the  Imperial  government, 
on  which  it  would  be  possible  some  day  to  wound  it  to  the 
quick.  (For  Benedetti's  report  of  his  conversation  with 
Von  Thile,  see  Ma  Mission  en  Prusse,  pp.  304-306.) 

No  document  has  ever  come  to  light  tending  to  prove  that 
Senor  Rances's  visit  had  any  relation  to  the  Hohenzollern 
candidacy.  On  the  other  hand,  certain  things  give  reason 
to  believe  that  Count  Bismarck,  very  soon  after  Benedetti's 
interview  with  Von  Thile,  managed  to  work  upon  the  Spanish 
government,  either  by  causing  the  idea  of  the  Hohenzollern 
candidacy  to  be  suggested  to  them,  if  they  had  not  already 
entertained  it;  or  if  they  had  entertained  it,  but  without 
giving  it  serious  thought,  by  bringing  it  to  their  attention 
anew.  The  fact  is  that,  in  April,  1869,  a  confidential  agent 
of  Prim,  Fernandez  de  los  Bios,  who  had  been  sent  by  him 
to  the  widowed  King  Ferdinand  in  January,  received  a  letter 
from  a  Portuguese  gentleman,  a  friend  of  Prim,  the  Marquis 
of  Niza,  telling  him  of  a  conversation  he  had  recently  had 
with  Oldoini,  Italian  Ambassador  at  Lisbon,  who  urged  him 
(Niza)  to  take  advantage  of  his  friendly  relations  with  Prim 
to  suggest  to  him  the  idea  of  applying  to  Leopold.  In  other 
letters,  Niza  quotes  Oldoini  asNsuggesting  that  secret  overtures 
be  made,  first  to  Bismarck,  then  to  the  Hohenzollern  family 
at  Diisseldorf ;  and  the  Portugal  minister  at  Brussels  also 
urges  the  choice  of  Leopold.  Prussia,  he  says,  will  be  glad 
to  see  it ;  as  for  Napoleon  III,  he  will  prefer  this  choice  to 
that  of  Montpensier,  and,  in  any  event,  he  will  not  dare  to 
oppose  it. 

These  suggestions  had,  for  the  moment,  no  result,  but  one 
cannot  find  their  traces  without  wondering  if  we  should  not 
ascribe  their  origin  to  Count  Bismarck.  It  is  to  be  noted  also 
that  the  intermediary,  the  Marquis  of  Niza,  was  of  the  imme 
diate  suite  of  King  Ferdinand,  whose  son-in-law  was  Leo 
pold  of  Hohenzollern,  husband  of  his  daughter  the  Infanta 
Antonia. 


426          THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

In  April,  Benedetti  was  summoned  to  Paris  by  the  Em 
peror.  During  his  absence,,  on  April  £6,  1869,  the  Augs- 
bourg  Gazette  published  a  letter,  said  to  be  from  Paris,  which, 
alluding  to  Leopold,  announced  that  the  Spaniards  con 
gratulated  themselves  on  having  found  a  young  and  intelli 
gent  prince,  related  to  the  Imperial  House  of  France.  M. 
Leonardon  does  not  hesitate  to  see  in  this  letter  a  document 
inspired  by  the  Prussian  minister,  and  intended  to  sound 
public  opinion  as  to  the  impression  which  that  candidacy 
would  produce  on  France. 

The  reply  was  not  slow  in  coming.  The  La  France  news 
paper  hastened  to  sound  the  alarm.  This  was  an  indication, 
and  it  was  confirmed  to  Count  Bismarck  by  an  interview 
that  Benedetti  had  with  him  early  in  May. 

M.  Leonardon  dismisses  as  unimportant  and  unworthy  of 
credence  certain  unconfirmed  reports  of  views  favorable  to 
the  candidacy  of  Leopold  or  his  brother  Fritz  being  held  by 
the  Empress  and  by  Princess  Mathilde,  especially  because 
they  are  in  flat  contradiction  of  the  Emperor's  remark  to 
Benedetti:  "The  candidacy  of  the  Due  de  Montpensier  is 
purely  anti-dynastic,  it  affects  nobody  but  myself,  and  I 
can  accept  it ;  the  candidacy  of  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern 
is  essentially  anti-national;  the  country  will  not  tolerate  it 
and  it  must  be  prevented." 

He  regards  it  as  the  capital  error  of  the  Imperial  govern 
ment  to  have  tried  to  prevent  the  candidacy  in  Prussia. 
Benedetti's  effort  in  that  direction  with  Bismarck,  as  reported 
in  his  despatch  of  May  11,  1869  (Benedetti,  pp.  307-311), 
was  simply  an  attempt  to  intimidate.  But  Bismarck  not  only 
was  not  intimidated,  but  carried  away  from  that  interview 
the  conviction  that  that  candidacy  was  sufficiently  distasteful 
to  the  Emperor  to  enable  him  (Bismarck)  to  extract  a  casus 
belli  from  it,  at  his  pleasure. 

It  would  have  been  much  more  adroit  for  the  French  gov 
ernment  to  address  itself  to  Spain.  It  could  easily  have 
broached  the  subject  with  Prim  in  a  friendly  tone.  The  gen- 


APPENDIX  427 

eral's  conduct,  Ms  persistent  hostility  to  the  Montpensier 
candidacy,  tend  to  prove  that  he  wished  to  please  the  Em 
peror,  and  he  would  doubtless  have  heeded  all  the  more  will 
ingly  a  discreetly  worded  warning  against  the  Hohenzollern 
candidacy,  because  he  had  not  as  yet  thought  seriously  of  it, 
or  bound  himself  by  any  overt  act.  M.  Leonardon  disposes 
of  the  report  that  Salazar  first  sounded  the  Hohenzollerns 
in  April,  but  he  agrees  with  La  Gorce  (vol.  vi,  pp.  197,  198) 
that  the  letter  of  a  Berlin  banker  to  the  Regent  Serrano,  in 
July,  dwelling  upon  the  advantages  of  the  Hohenzollern  can 
didacy,  was  inspired  by  Bismarck,  to  keep  the  thing  alive. 

Not  until  mid-September,  1869,  is  the  first  overture  made  to 
the  Hohenzollerns  on  the  part  of  Spain.    Baron  von  Wer- 
thern,  Prussian  Ambassador  at  Munich,  an  acquaintance  of 
Salazar,  asks  Prince  Antony's  permission  to  present  the  Span 
ish  deputy,  who  wishes  to  offer  the  crown  to  his  son.     The 
presentation  takes  place  on  September  17.    Salazar  comes* 
direct  from  Vichy,  sent  byTrim.     In  this  first  ^Tj 
pleads  his  country's  cause  with  warmth.    Tw&.days 
a  second  meeting  is  arranged  between  him^  .nd  the  old 
Prince  and  his  son  Charles  of  Roumania.    Tt  is  plain  that 
Salazar's  purpose  was  to  induce  some  Hjhenzollern,   no 
matter  which  one,  to  come  forward  as  a  candidate ;  for  on 
this  occasion  he  hints  that  the  eyes  of  Spaiit  are  turned  upon 
Prince  Charles,  who,  however,  categorical!^  declines.    In  the 
afternoon  of  the  same  day,  Salazar  is  received  by  Leopold, 
the  oldest  son,  who,  while  he  does  not  fy.  terms  refuse  the 
crown,  imposes  conditions  almost  equivalent  to  a  refusal: 
he  must  be  chosen  unanimously,  and  mu^t  be  assured  that  he 
will  not  be  dragged  into  a  policy  contrary  to  the  interest  of 
Portugal,  because  of  his  close  connection  with  the  reigning 
family  there.     (These  details  were  mftle  known  only  when 
the  Memoirs  of  the  King  of  Eoui^ania  were  published: 
see  vol.  i  of  the  French  translation,  pp.  525,  526.)     What 
ever  Prim's  connection  with  this  overture  of  Salazar's,,  it  is 
certain  that  about  this  time  he  made  another  unsuccessful 


428  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

attempt  upon  King  Ferdinand ;  and  then  turned  his  atten 
tion  to  the  Duke  of  Genoa,  whose  name  was  actually  proposed 
to  the  Cortes  in  October ;  his  mother,  however,  was  greatly 
opposed  to  his  acceptance,  and  Victor  Emanuel  finally  de 
clined  the  offer  in  his  nephew's  name. 

On  October  28  Salazar  published  a  letter  in  which  he  passed 
in  review  the  principal  candidacies,  arguing  against  them  one 
after  another,  until  he  came  to  Prince  Leopold,  whom  he 
extolled  as  a  Catholic,  well  educated,  father  of  three  sons, 
rich,  related  through  his  late  sister  and  his  wife  to  the  House 
of  Braganza  and  through  his  grandmother  and  mother  to 
the  Imperial  family  of  France  (see  Appendix  D),  while  his 
connection  with  the  reigning  branch  of  the  HohenzoUems 
assured  him  of  the  good-will  of  Prussia,  and  was  at  the  same 
time  too  distant  to  bind  him  to  its  policies. 

After  the  final  declination  of  the  Duke  of  Genoa,  Prim 
Determined  to  address  himself  unofficially  to  Leopold.  He 
^*  &II<J?#*P  directly  to  Berlin,  with  letters,  dated  February 
17, 1870, 1  r31  the  King  of  Prussia,  Count  Bismarck,  and  Prince 
Leopold.  \e>  negotiations  took  place  at  Berlin,  Leopold 
being  present,  in  the  last  days  of  February  and  the  early 
days  of  March.  ;  Bismarck  pleaded  earnestly  for  acceptance. 
In  a  memorial  addressed  to  William  he  showed  how  advanta 
geous  it  would  be,  ^politically,  to  be  able  to  rely  on  the  friendly 
disposition  of  a  nation  posted  on  the  flank  of  France;  he 
also  dwelt  upon  the  economic  advantage  which  German 
commerce  might  well  hope  to  derive  from  the  presence  of  a 
Prussian  prince  on  toe  throne  of  Spain.  King  William  re 
plied  by  raising  objections  and  left  it  to  Leopold  alone  to 
decide  upon  his  course.  The  Crown  Prince,  Frederick,  was 
very  lukewarm  and  Urged  Leopold  especially  to  make  sure 
that  the  Prussian  government,  which  perhaps  had  a  special 
object  in  view  at  the  foment,  would  always  be  disposed  to 
give  him  effective  support.  (See  Von  Sybel,  English  trans., 
vol.  vii,  pp.  305  ff. ;  Memoirs  of  the  King  of  Roumania, 
French  trans.,  vol.  i,  p.  569,  under  date  of  March  £.) 


APPENDIX  429 

We  have  already  heard  of  the  council  of  March  15,  1870, 
which  first  became  known  to  the  world  through  the  memoirs 
of  the  King  of  Roumania  (see  supra,  pp.  18  ff.  and  notes). 
It  may  be  said  here  that  it  would  have  been  advantageous  to 
Von  Sybel's  accuracy  in  dealing  with  this  portion  of  his 
history,  if  he  had  had  the  benefit  of  those  memoirs.  Under 
date  of  April  3,  1870,  "the  Prince  (Charles  of  Roumania) 
learns  from  Berlin  that  Bismarck  has  declared  categorically, 
several  times,  that  the  acceptance  of  the  Spanish  crbwn  by 
one  of  the  Hohenzollern  princes  is  a  political  necessity. 
Prince  Antony  has  imposed  three  conditions :  that  his  son 
shall  obtain  two  thirds  to  three  fourths  of  the  votes  in  the 
Cortes ;  that  the  State  shall  be  assured  against  bankruptcy ; 
that  the  anti-clerical  laws  shall  be  passed  before  Prince 
Leopold's  election."  Memoirs,  vol.  i,  pp.  573,  574. 

On  the  same  3d  of  April  Bismarck  despatched  Bucher  and 
Versen  to  Madrid,  and  their  journey  thither  and  its  results 
are  described  with  sufficient  detail  in  the  first  chapter  of  this 
book,  pp.  £3  ff.  Meanwhile  Prim  demands  a  categorical 
reply  forthwith.  Prince  Antony  is  summoned  to  Berlin  on 
April  20.  Bismarck  is  ill  at  Varzin.  The  King  refuses  to  force 
Leopold  or  Fritz,  and  on  the  22d  a  telegram  is  sent  to  Prim 
through  Bucher,  conveying  Prince  Leopold's  declination. 

Versen  returns  to  Berlin  on  May  6.  He  finds  that  the 
affair  is  well-nigh  abandoned.  Bismarck  is  still  sick,  and 
Versen.  takes  it  upon  himself  to  act  in  his  place.  He  ad 
dresses  himself  to  the  Crown  Prince,  causes  him  to  waver  in 
his  opinion,  and  obtains  from  him  a  letter  with  which  he 
joins  the  old  Prince  at  Nauheim  on  May  20.  He  argues 
insistently  in  favor  of  the  candidacy,  and  with  so  much  suc 
cess  that  Prince  Antony  and  his  son  decide  to  write  to  the 
Crown  Prince  letters  in  which  it  is  clearly  manifest  that  Leo 
pold,  being  attacked  by  scruples,  is  inclined  to  reconsider  his 
refusal.  The  Crown  Prince  informs  the  King  and  Bismarck' 
of  this  change  of  attitude;  the  latter  loses  no  time  in / de 
spatching  to  Prince  Antony  a  memorial  in  which  he. passes 


430  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

in  review  the  considerations  that  militate  in  favor  of  a  revival 
of  the  candidacy. 

Meanwhile  Prim,  on  receipt  of  the  telegram  of  April  £2, 
entered  into  negotiations  for  the  third  time  with  Ferdinand 
of  Portugal,  and  was  again  met  by  a  refusal.  He  seemed 
then  to  become  discouraged,  and  being  unaware  of  the  change 
of  heart  that  had  taken  place  in  Prussia,  he  informed  the 
Cortes  on  June  11  of  his  unsuccessful  overtures  to  King  Fer 
dinand,  the  Duke  of  Aosta,  and  the  Duke  of  Genoa.  In 
veiled  terms  he  alluded  to  unfruitful  negotiations  with  a 
fourth  candidate.  "I  may  be  permitted,"  he  said,  "not  to 
mention  his  name :  that  would  show  a  lack  of  tact ;  com 
plications  might  ensue,  and,  moreover,  I  have  given  my  word 
of  honor  to  that  effect."  This  anonymous  candidate  was 
Leopold.  (See  supra,  p.  40,  note.) 

On  the  following  day,  Prim  was  informed  by  a  letter  from 
Bismarck,  said  to  be  in  reply  to  his  letter  of  February  17, 
that  affairs  were  looking  well  for  a  resumption  of  negotia 
tions.  On  June  14  the  marshal  sent  Salazar  to  Sigmaringen 
with  full  powers. 

He  arrived  there,  with  a  secretary,  on  the  19th.  Major 
von  Versen  was  there  and  acted  as  interpreter.  They  quickly 
came  to  an  agreement.  For  the  glory  of  his  family  and  the 
welfare  of  his  country,  Leopold  is  resigned  to  the  sacrifice 
of  his  personal  inclinations.  A  letter  is  sent  to  King  William, 
then  at  Ems,  to  ask  his  approval.  Awaiting  the  reply  at 
Sigmaringen,  Salazar  sends,  through  Versen,  two  despatches 
to  Madrid,  one  to  Prim,  the  other  to  Zorrilla,  President  of  the 
Cortes:  in  the  first  he  announces  that  Prince  Leopold  will 
accept  the  crown,  subject  to  the  King's  approval;  in  the 
second  he  tells  Zorrilla  that  he  expects  to  return  to  Madrid 
on  June  £6.  Thereupon  the  election  will  take  place  and  a 
deputation  of  fifteen  members  of  the  Cortes  will  travel  to 
Sigmaringen  to  offer  the  crown  formally  to  the  Prince.  (With 
regard  to  the  premature  adjournment  of  the  Cortes  and  the 
doubtful  explanation  thereof,  see  supra,  p.  42,  and  note.) 


APPENDIX  431 

It  may  be,  says  M.  Leonardon,  that  Prim  had  suddenly 
an  intuition  of  the  r61e  of  irritating  agent  that  Bismarck 
proposed  to  make  him  play.  There  has  been  published  in 
Spain  a  confidential  document  which  discloses  with  singular 
distinctness  the  thesis  which  Prussian  policy  had  prepared, 
to  answer  any  observations  that  might  be  made  by  France. 
It  is  a  letter  of  Count  Bismarck  quoted  in  Senor  Pirala's 
Historia  Contemporanea,  but  with  no  indication  of  the 
person  to  whom  it  was  addressed  and  with  no  date.  The 
text,  however,  indicates  that  the  addressee  was  at  Madrid, 
and  that  the  letter  was  written  at  the  time  when  Bismarck 
replied  to  Prim's  letter  of  February  17.  This  long-delayed 
reply  of  Bismarck  was  designed  to  suggest  to  Prim  the  resump 
tion  of  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy.  M.  Leonardon  con- 
eludes  that  it,  as  well  as  the  undated  letter  which  follows, 
was  written  about  June  11. 

"It  is  possible,"  Count  Bismarck  writes,  "that  we  should 
see  a  transitory  effervescence  in  France,  and  doubtless  it  is 
necessary  to  avoid  whatever  would  help  to  arouse  it  and 
add  to  it.  This  being  so,  would  it  be  wise  to  introduce  my 
name  in  the  story  of  these  negotiations  ?  I  think  not,  but 
that,  on  the  contrary,  we  should  put  my  personality  entirely 
outside  of  the  whole  thing.  In  fact,  I  have  taken  no  part 
officially.  It  is  simply  a  question  of  an  expression  of  the  will 
of  the  Spanish  people  on  the  one  side,  and,  on  the  other,  of 
a  prince  who  is  of  age,  master  of  his  acts,  and  a  private  indi 
vidual.  Whether  he  had  or  had  not  reasons  for  securing  the 
consent  of  his  father  and  of  the  head  of  his  family  —  that 
is  a  private  matter,  not  an  affair  of  state.  To  give  the  King 
advice  on  such  matters  is  the  duty  of  the  minister  of  the 
royal  household.  But  I  have  not  aided  him  with  my  advice 
in  the  capacity  of  President  of  the  Council  of  Ministers,  but 
simply  as  being  in  charge  of  foreign  affairs,  and  as  a  confiden 
tial  servitor,  like  the  other  servants  of  the  state  who  are  in 
the  secret. 

"For  my  own  part,  I  think  that  the  Spanish  government 


432  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

will  do  better  to  publish  only  General  Prim's  letter  of  Feb 
ruary  17  and  the  reply.  We  shall  then  have  an  unassailable 
position  before  the  European  public.  If  they  make  a  noise 
in  France,  we  shall  ask  quietly ;  *  What  do  you  want  ?  Do 
you  propose  to  dictate  the  decision  of  the  Spanish  nation 
and  a  German  private  citizen  ?  *  In  that  case,  doctor,  there 
will  be  an  opportunity  to  utilize  your  suggestion.  Doubt 
less  they  will  shriek  about  intrigue,  and  they  will  be  furious 
against  me,  but  unable  to  localize  the  point  of  attack.  So 
far  as  my  reply  is  concerned,  it  is  simply  a  question  of  policy 
with  regard  to  the  general. 

"I  have  answered  his  letter.  I  hope  that  he  will  have  no 
doubt  of  my  respectful  sentiments  for  him,  or  of  my  con 
currence  in  the  project  the  realization  of  which  depends  only 
on  him  and  the  Cortes.  I  have  not  brought  the  affair  to  the 
point  it  has  now  reached  without  considerable  difficulty, 
which  M.  Gaina,  with  his  knowledge  of  the  ground,  will  be 
able  to  imagine  and  to  explain  to  the  general." 

This  letter  was  first  published  by  Pirala  in  his  Historic, 
Contemporanea.  He  seems  to  have  had  access  to  documents 
in  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  one  wonders 
whether  this  letter  may  not,  through  somebody's  indiscre 
tion,  have  come  to  Prim's  knowledge  and  have  given  him  food 
for  reflection. 

Prim's  return  to  Madrid  on  July  1  (  as  described  by  Victor 
Balaguer  in  Memorias  de  un  constituante)  and  his  subsequent 
interview  with  Mercier  are  told  at  sufficient  length  in  the 
text,  pp.  44  ff.  On  July  4  the  ministers  met  at  La  Granja 
and  resolved  to  submit  the  candidacy  of  Leopold  to  the 
permanent  committee  of  the  Cortes.  A  few  days  later  that 
body  was  summoned  to  meet  in  extraordinary  session  on  the 
20th. 

Meanwhile,  says  M.  Leonardon,  one  feels  that  the  Spanish 
government  is  anxious  to  clear  its  skirts  of  all  purpose  of 
Complicity  with  ?russia.  In  a  circular  note  dated  July  7, 
Minister,  while  instructing  his  representa- 


APPENDIX  433 

lives  abroad  to  announce  the  candidacy  officially  to  the 
powers,  took  pains  to  say  that  the  government  "has  acted 
solely  on  its  own  account  and  treated  directly  with  Prince  Leo 
pold,  without  for  a  moment  counting  upon,  or  even  supposing 
that  its  dignity  would  permit  it  to  count  upon,  the  slightest 
influence  of  a  foreign  Cabinet."  This  statement  is  further 
elaborated  and  emphasized  in  later  paragraphs  of  the  note, 
which  is  printed  in  full  in  Blue  Book,  pp.  15,  16. 

Prim,  for  his  part,  seemed  to  be  seeking  a  way  out  of  the 
scrape  in  which  he  had  involved  himself.  Luckily,  Gramont's 
declaration  of  July  6  was  sufficiently  moderate  in  tone  so 
far  as  Spain  was  concerned,  not  to  overexcite  popular  senti 
ment.  On  the  7th  Prim  took  the  first  backward  step  with 
his  suggestion  to  Mercier  that  the  Prince  should  find  ob 
stacles  in  the  way  of  the  King's  consent  (supra,  pp.  126, 127). 
Mercier's  despatches  of  the  9th  and  the  sending  of  a  special 
messenger  to  Sigmaringen  on  the  10th  (supra,  pp.  131, 156  n.) 
exhibit  the  growing  determination  of  the  Spanish  govern 
ment,  probably  under  pressure  from  England  and  Austria, 
to  rid  themselves  of  Prince  Leopold,  by  inducing  him  to 
withdraw  his  candidacy,  if  possible.  Only  let  M.  de  Gramont 
declare  that  in  the  declaration  of  July  6  the  word  "suffer" 
was  not  addressed  to  Spain. 

Then  came  the  mission  of  Strat,  first  conceived  by  Olozaga, 
whose  "loyal  efforts  to  adjust  the  difficulty  are  the  more 
noteworthy  and  creditable  in  view  of  the  shabby  way  in 
which  he  had  been  treated  by  his  government.  At  about  the 
same  time,  Olozaga  telegraphed  (July  8)  to  Saldanha,  prime 
minister  of  Portugal,  endeavoring  once  more  to  revive  the 
candidacy  of  Ferdinand,  to  which  Prim  turned  in  desperation 
on  the  same  day. 

The  letter  "of  Prince  Antony  withdrawing  his  son's  name 
(July  12)  was  followed  on  the  15th  by  Sagasta's  officially  in 
forming  the  diplomatic  agents  of  Spain  of  the  withdrawal  of 
the  candidacy.  In  October,  after  the  Prussian  victoriesa 
there  was  again  some  talk  of  putting  Prince  Leopold  forward ; 


434          THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

but  how  much  reality  there  was  to  it  is  uncertain,  as  nego 
tiations  were  then  pending  with  Victor  Emanuel  concerning 
the  candidacy  of  the  Duke  of  Aosta. 

ML  Leonardon  concludes  his  exhaustive  review  of  the  Ho- 
henzollern  affair  with  a  discussion  of  Prim's  real  attitude 
therein.  His  judgment,  much  less  severe  than  M.  Ollivier's 
is  that  if  Prim  had  been  the  conscious  and  determined  con 
federate  of  Bismarck  against  France,  he  would  not  have 
slunk  away  at  the  last  moment.  If  he  had  desired,  if,  as  was 
claimed,  he  had  sought  doggedly  the  gratification  of  an  old 
grudge  against  France,  going  back  to  the  Mexican  expedition, 
it  was  in  his  power  to  carry  the  vote  in  favor  of  Leopold  and 
draw  Spain  into  war.  His  responsibility,  weighty  as  it  is, 
is  limited  then  to  a  lack  of  clearsightedness  and  to  an  excess 
of  self-confidence.  He  was  guilty  of  a  mistake,  not  *of  a 
crime. 


APPENDIX  D 

PEINCE  LEOPOLD  OF  HOHENZOLLERN 

THE  following  particulars  are  taken  from  a  pamphlet  by 
Don  Francisco  Vila,1  who  declares  himself  to  be  in  principle  a 
republican.  Bowing,  however,  to  the  will  of  the  nation  as 
represented  by  a  majority  of  the  Cortes,  he  passes  in  review 
the  various  candidates  proposed  and  comes  forth  an  enthu 
siastic  partisan  of  Prince  Leopold,  in  whom  he  finds  all  de 
sirable  qualifications,  both  as  an  individual  and  by  virtue 
of  his  birth  and  connections ;  whereas,  "in  our  humble  opin 
ion  he  is  entirely  lacking  in  defects."  It  is  a  significant  fact 
that  this  author  refers  to  the  current  remark  that  France 
will  take  umbrage  at  the  candidacy. 

"If,"  he  concludes,  "monarchy  must  be  our  form  of  govern 
ment,  if  all  the  other  candidates  officially  and  extra-officially 
presented  offer  such  undesirable  conditions,  then  around 
the  altars  of  the  fatherland,  which  is  always  desirous  of  more 
peace  and  security,  let  us  all  unite  and  exclaim :  Long  live 
Leopold  the  First,  King  of  Spain !  Maledictions  on  his  head 
if  he  betrays  our  hopes  !" 

Prince  Leopold  Stephen  Charles  Antony  Gustavus  of 
HohenzoUem-Sigmaringen  was  born  September  22, 1835,  and 
was  therefore  85  years  old  in  1870.  His  father,  Charles 
Antony  Joaquin  Frederick,  Prince  of  Hohenzollem-Sig- 
maringen,  Burgrave  of  Nuremberg,  etc.,  etc.,  was  born 
September  7, 1811,  and  succeeded  his  father  in  the  principality 
on  August  27,  1848.  On  December  7,  1849,  he  abdicated  in 
favor  of  his  very  distant  kinsman,  King  William  of  Prussia, 
and  received,  in  March,  1850,  the  title  of  Highness,  with  the 

1EI  Principe  Leopoldo:  Juido  6  Historia  de  Este  Nuevo  Candidate. 
Madrid,  1870. 

435 


436  THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

prerogatives  of  a  royal  prince;  in  October,  1861,  by  royal 
decree  lie  was  given  the  title  of  Royal  Highness,  and  was 
made  military  governor  of  the  Rhine  provinces  and  West 
phalia. 

Prince  Antony  was  the  son  of  Charles  Antony  Frederick 
(born  February  20,  1785),  who  married  in  February,  1808, 
Marie  Antoinette  Murat,  niece  of  Joachim  Murat,  King  of 
Naples. 

Prince  Antony's  wife,  and  Leopold's  mother,  was  Joseph 
ine  Frederica  Louisa  (born  October  21,  1813),  daughter  of 
Charles  Louis,  Grand  Duke  of  Baden  and  of  Stephanie 
Louise,  Vicomtesse  de  Beauharnais,  adopted  daughter  of 
Napoleon  I. 

Prince  Antony's  other  children,  Leopold's  brothers  and 
sisters,  were  Charles  Eitel  Frederick,  born  April  20,  1839, 
chosen  Prince  of  Roumania,  April  20,  1866,  and  proclaimed 
King  in  1881  ;l  Frederick  Eugene  John  (Prince  "Fritz"), 
born  June  25,  1843 ;  Maria  Louise  Alexandrina,  born  No 
vember  17, 1845,  and  married  in  1867  to  Prince  Philip  of  Bel 
gium,  Count  of  Flanders. 

Prince  Leopold  was  married  September  12,  1861,  to  An- 
tonia  Maria  Fernanda  Micaela  Gabriela  Rafaela,  daughter 
of  Ferdinand  and  of  Dona  Maria  da  Gloria,  late  Queen  of 
Portugal,  horn  February  17,  1845.  Thus  the  Princess  Leo 
pold  was  the  daughter  of  the  widowed  King  Consort  of  Por 
tugal,  and  the  sister  of  King  Pedro  V,  who  died  in  1861,  and 
of  King  Luiz,  who  reigned  in  1870.  King  Luiz  married 
Donna  Maria  Pia,  daughter  of  Victor  Emanuel. 

Finally,  Prince  Leopold's  aunt,  Frederica  Wilhelmina, 
married  in  1844  Joachim  Napoleon,  Marquis  of  Pepoli, 
Italian  Ambassador  at  Vienna  in  1870.  He  was  born  in 
18&5,  and  was  the  grandson  of  Joachim  Murat,  King  of 
Naples,  through  his  daughter  Letitia,  who  married  the  Mar 
quis  of  Pepoli  in  1822. 

It  will  be  seen  that,  outside  of  the  candidate's  German 

1  King  Charles  — Carol  I — is  still  reigning  over  Roumania  (1912). 


APPENDIX  437 

connections,  lie  was  most  closely  akin  to  the  royal  house  of 
Portugal,  and  to  the  Murats.  His  relationship  to  the  Bona- 
partes  was  rather  shadowy :  his  maternal  grandmother  was 
an  adopted  daughter  of  the  first  Napoleon,  his  paternal  grand 
mother  a  niece  of  the  husband  of  Caroline  Bonaparte,  and 
his  aunt  the  wife  of  a  grandson  of  the  said  Caroline. 

Prince  Leopold  himself,  according  to  Bismarck,  answered 
the  question  whether,  in  the  event  of  trouble  between  France 
and  Prussia,  it  would  have  been  a  disadvantage  to  the  former 
to  have  him  on  the  Spanish  throne.    **  On  the  night  after  the 
battle  of  Sedan  I  was  riding  along  the  road  to  Donchery, 
in  thick  darkness,  with  a  number  of  our  officers.  ...    In 
reply  to  a  question  ...  I  talked  about  the  preliminaries  to 
the  war,  and  mentioned  at  the  same  time  that  I  had  thought 
Prince  Leopold  would  be  no  unwelcome  neighbor  in  Spain 
to  the  Emperor  Napoleon,  and  would  travel  to  Madrid  via 
Paris,  in  order  to  get  into  touch  with  the  imperial  French 
policy,  forming  as  it  did  a  part  of  the  conditions  under  which 
he  would  have  had  to  govern  Spain.    I  said:   'We  should 
have  been  much  more  justified  in  dreading  a  close  under 
standing  between  the  Spanish  and  French  crowns  than  in 
hoping  for  the  restoration  of  a  Spanish-German  anti-French 
constellation  after  the  analogy  of  Charles  V ;  a  king  of  Spain 
can  only  carry  out  Spanish  policy,  and  the  Prince,  by  assum 
ing  the  crown  of  the  country,  would  become  a  Spaniard/    To 
my  surprise  there  came  from  the  darkness  behind  me  a 
vigorous  rejoinder  from  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern,  of  whose 
presence  I  had  not  the  least  idea;   he  protested  strongly 
against  the  possibility  of  presuming  any  French  sympathies 
in  him."    Bismarck,  Reflections  and  Reminiscences,  English 
trans.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  87,  88. 
Prince  Leopold  died  in  1905. 


APPENDIX  E 

THE  DUG  DE  GRAMONT 

ANTOINE  AGENOR  ALFRED,  Due  de  Gramont,  some  time 
Due  de  Guiche  (1819-1880),  had  held  the  seals  of  the  Foreign 
Office  only  about  a  month  when  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy 
was  made  public,  M.  Qllivier  having  himself  acted  as  Foreign 
Minister  during  the  brief  interim  since  the  resignation  of 
Comte  Daru  in  April.  Gramont  had  represented  France  in 
various  foreign  countries,  notably  at  Rome  in  1860,  when 
Italian  Unity  became  a  fact,  and  had  shown  himself  a  con 
sistent  opponent  of  Italian  independence.  He  was  trans 
ferred  to  Vienna  in  1861,  where  "  he  was  at  first  rather  coldly 
received  by  Austrian  society,  which  was  ultra-Catholic, 
because  of  some  squabbles  he  had  had  with  Cardinal  Antonelli 
at  Rome.  But  an  event  which  took  place  in  his  family 
(his  wife's  conversion  to  Catholicism)  changed  this  feeling." 
Delord,  vol.  vi,  p.  123. 

"The  significance  of  this  alteration"  (in  the  ministry), 
says  Walpole,  "could  hardly  be  ignored.  Comte  Daru's 
presence  at  the  Foreign  Office  was  everywhere  regarded  as  an 
assurance  of  peace.  The  Due  de  Gramont  .  .  .  was  the 
partisan  of  the  Pope  against  Italy,  of  Austria  against  Prussia." 
History  of  Twenty-five  Years,  vol.  ii,  p.  481. 

"In  a  career  already  long,  the  new  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  had  learned  diplomacy,  and  in  despatches  that  were 
sometimes  noteworthy,  he  had  shown  himself  to  be,  at  in 
tervals,  very  shrewd  in  obtaining  information;  but  he  had 
never  practised  active  politics  ...  and  he  knew  nothing 
of  the  perplexing  responsibilities  imposed  by  high  office. 
Having  lived  long  away  from  his  country,  he  had  faithfully 
retained  in  his  heart  the  image  of  the  France  of  an  earlier 

438 


APPENDIX  439 

day ;  and  as  he  had  been  told  in  his  childhood  that  no  coun 
try  surpassed,  or  even  equalled,  ours,  he  had  reverentially 
become  fixed  in  that  conviction,  and  no  critical  education, 
no  habit  of  revising  his  opinions,  had  enlightened  him  con 
cerning  the  progress  of  our  neighbors  and  our  own  weaknesses. 
Hence  an  ardent  patriotism,  readily  led  into  recklessness, 
more  justifiable  in  a  soldier  than  in  a  statesman.    A  long 
residence  in  Austria  had  powerfully  influenced  the  duke's 
mind.    But  that  very  influence  had  been  to  him  more  a 
source  of  error  than  of  enlightenment.    Heartily  welcomed, 
because  of  his  birth,  in  the  aristocracy,  he  had  lived  on  in 
timate  terms  with  courtiers  and  military  men  who  dreamed 
of  revenge  for  Sadowa.      It  happened  then,  that   having 
carried  to  Vienna  the  illusion  of  French  omnipotence,  he 
brought  back  to  Paris  another  illusion,  that  of  Austrian 
friendship  for  France.    Taking  the  two  illusions  in  combina 
tion,   how  far  would  the  misconception  not  lead !    Fast 
bound  to  the  maxims  of  traditional  diplomacy,  M.  de  Gra- 
mont  had,  like  most  of  his  colleagues,  bemoaned  Italian  Unity 
and  German  Unity.    These  regrets,  which  were  those  of  a 
judicious  mind,  might,  by  taking  the  wrong  turn,  become  a 
source  of  peril.    They  would  be  especially  perilous  if  they 
should  inspire  a  wish  to  seek  in  hot  haste,  at  whatever  cost, 
compensation  for  France  and  humiliation  for  Prussia.    On 
joining  the  ministry  M.  de  Gramont  had  disavowed  any  war 
like  opinions,  and  there  was  reason  to  rely  upon  his  sincerity. 
Despite  these  protestations,  those  who  knew  him  best  did 
not  feel  altogether  reassured.    They  were  the  less  at  ease  in 
that  they  detected  in  him  a  certain  overbearing,  self-satis 
fied  disposition,  quick  and  irritable,  inexperienced  yet  arro 
gant,  not  at  all  suited  to  a  precarious  fortune  and  a  political 
situation  surrounded  by  pitfalls."    La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  pp.  216, 
217. 

The  most  recent  historian  of  the  war,  M.  Henri  Wel- 
schinger,  who  was  employed  in  the  Archives  of  the  Corps 
Legislatif  from  1868  to  1870,  and  claims  to  have  been  present 


440         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

at  all  the  sessions  of  the  Chamber,  is  much  more  severe  in 
his  judgment  of  the  Foreign  Minister,  as,  indeed,  he  is  a  most 
bitter  and  unsparing  critic  of  every  act  of  the  ministry  of 
January  £.    After  quoting,  with  something  very  like*  a  sneer, 
M.  Ollivier's  " extremely  flattering"  portrait  of  the  duke,  he 
says:    "It  is  certain  that  the  Due  de  Gramont  was  more 
solemn  than  shrewd,  more  pretentious  than  subtle,  more  ar 
rogant  than  insidious.    He  plumed  himself  on  all  occasions 
on  the  motto  of  his  family :  "Gratia  Dei  sum  id  quod  sum' 
(Thank  God  that  I  am  what  I  am).    He  was  about  to  have 
to  deal  with  an  extraordinarily  skilful  rival,  who  knew  all  the 
tricks  of  his  trade  and  disdained  neither  stratagem  nor  per 
fidy,  neither  audacity  nor  imposture.    Bismarck  had,   it 
seems,  in  a  moment  of  vulgar  mockery,  described  M.  de 
Gramont,  who  deemed  himself  a  great  politician,  as  'the 
stupidest  man  in  Europe.'    He  had  even  called  him  a  calf 
(Bindvieh).    This  brutal  description  had  wounded  the  pride 
of  the  French  diplomatist,  who  had  sworn  to  show  the  Chan 
cellor  that  he  would  have  to  reckon  with  him  sooner  or  later. 
That  is  one  of  the  secret  reasons  which  almost  instantly 
aggravated  the  approaching  conflict  between  Prussia  and 
France.    As  soon  as  he  heard  of  the  appointment  to  the 
ministry  of  foreign  affairs  of  the  Due  de  Gramont,  who, 
during  his  embassy  at  Vienna,  had  more  than  once  thwarted 
his  policy,  Bismarck  represented  the  new  minister  as  a  man 
who  was  dangerous  to  the  security  of  Europe.  .  .  .    He 
caused  it  to  be  said  by  the  reptiles  of  the  Prussian  press  that 
Gramont's  intimate  relations  with  Beust  .  .  .  were  of  a  na 
ture  to  endanger  peace.  .  .  .      The  Baron  von.  Vambiihler 
[Prime  Minister  of  Wtirtemberg]  said  to  M.  de  Saint-Vallier 
[French  minister  at  Stuttgart]  that  the  appointment  of  that 
minister  had  aroused  uneasiness  in  Germany,  and  that  the 
Emperor  of  the  French  had  certainly  selected  him  to  carry 
out  an  adventurous  policy  in  which  he  needed  a  minister 
more  yielding  than  serious-minded.  .  .  .   Thus  the  accession 
of  the  Due  de  Gramont  was  not,  as  M.  Emile  Ollivier  thought, 


APPENDIX  441 

a  guaranty  of  peace.  Although  the  new  minister  accepted 
the  events  of  1866,  with  the  maintenance  of  the  stipulations 
of  the  Treaty  of  Prague,  and  seemed  to  agree  to  the  policy 
of  abstention  for  the  present,  Prussian  diplomacy  attributed 
to  him  ambitious  and  threatening  projects."  La  Guerre  de 
1870  (1911),  vol.  i,  pp.  £4,  25. 

Bismarck's  uncomplimentary  references  to  Gramont  may 
be  found  scattered  through  Dr.  Busch's  various  works  and 
in  Bismarck's  own  Reflections  and  Reminiscences.  According 
to  Jules  Favre,  the  Chancellor,  in  the  famous  interview  at 
Ferrieres,  spoke  of  Gramont  as  "the  most  mediocre  of  dip 
lomats,"  and  said  that  Napoleon  so  regarded  him.  Gouveme- 
ment  de  la  Defense  Nationale,  quoted  by  M.  Ollivier,  vol.  xiv, 
page  598. 

"It  was  well  known,"  says  Von  Sybel,  "that  the  Emperor 
had  no  very  high  regard  for  the  ability  of  the  new  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs.  .  .  .  That  Napoleon  suggested  his  nom 
ination  is  not  at  all  likely.  Had  the  Emperor  really  cher 
ished  plans  of  war  at  the  time,  he  would  nevertheless  hardly 
have  selected  for  so  important  a  post  the  man  whom  in  1869 
he  had  excluded  from  participation  in  the  consultations  re 
garding  the  triple  alliance,  a  preparatory  step  to  war,  because 
of  his  inefficiency.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  Napoleon  was  anx 
ious  to  preserve  peaceful  relations  with  Prussia,  Gramont's 
advancement  is  still  more  inexplicable ;  for  the  duke's  hatred 
of  Prussia  was  quite  as  notorious  as  was  his  indiscretion. 

"And  who  may  it  have  been  by  whom  the  Emperor  was 
persuaded  to  this  nomination  ?  .  .  . 

"It  is  more  than  likely  that  in  Dam's  place,  Ollivier  de 
sired  a  colleague  who  was  disposed  ...  to  conduct  nego 
tiations  with  Prussia  with  fitting  fiainness  and  spirit.  ...  It 
mattered  little  whether  the  new  minister  possessed  more  or 
less  information  or  talent,  since  the  Prime  Minister  felt  that 
out  of  his  own,  superabundance  he  could  supply  any  deficiency 
in  this  respect  which  might  be  found  in  charge  of  the  Foreign 
Office.  From  this  point  of  view  we  can  readily  understand 


442         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

that  Gramont  must  have  been  just  the  man  for  Ollivier ;  for 
in  his  tendencies  he  was  thoroughly  clerical,  and  it  would 
have  been  difficult  to  find  in  all  Europe  any  one  more  eager 
for  an  opportunity  to  strike  at  Prussia,  and  above  all  else, 
at  Bismarck. 

"To  estimate  the  achievements  of  the  great  German  states 
man  according  to  his  principles  and  methods  of  action  was 
wholly  beyond  Gramont's  capacity.  He  saw  in  them  no 
more  than  the  triumphs  of  a  successful  course  of  disregard 
of  the  impositions  and  restrictions  of  the  ordinary  sense  of 
duty  and  honor.  .  .  . 

"Once  having  assumed  a  position,  he  was  proof  against 
all  argument,  the  irritation  caused  by  its  refutation  simply 
urging  him  on.  He  was  as  little  open  to  conviction  as  Ollivier, 
although  for  a  wholly  different  reason.  .  .  .  With  him  it 
was  merely  the  naive  arrogance  of  the  aristocrat  of  circum 
scribed  education,  who  is  undisturbed  in  his  opinions  by  any 
annoying  consciousness  of  the  rest  of  the  world."  Die  Be- 
grundung  des  deutsches  Reichs,  vol.  vii,  English  translation, 
pp.  273,  276. 

M.  Welschinger  draws  this  pen-picture  of  M.  de  Gramont, 
as  he  appeared  in  the  Salle  des  Pas  Perdus  immediately  after 
reading  the  declaration  of  July  6,  "seated  on  one  of  the 
benches,  with  his  back  to  one  of  the  great  windows  looking 
on  the  court  of  honor  of  the  Palais  Bourbon.  Before  him 
stood  seven  or  eight  deputies  of  the  Eight,  in  rapt  contem 
plation,  gazing  upon  him  with  touching  deference.  Still 
under  the  spell  of  the  enthusiastic  applause  that  had  greeted 
his  words  of  menace,  he  smacked  his  lips  over  what  he  deemed 
a  triumph.  His  lordly  head  emerged  from  a  high  collar  en 
circled  by  a  long  and  wide  cravat  of  black  silk.  His  slender 
hand  rested  on  a  portfolio  stufied  with  papers  wherein  every 
one  of  his  admirers  imagined  that  all  the  secrets  of  Europe 
reposed.  His  superb  presence  was  most  imposing.  He 
bore  himself  nobly.  He  seemed  the  living  arbiter  of  our 
destinies.  .  .  .  Seeing  the  minister  thus,  surrounded,  con- 


APPENDIX  443 

gratulated,  fawned  upon ;  looking  at  that  grave  and  solemn 
face,  that  glance  a  la  Metternich,  that  smile  a  la  Talleyrand, 
I  can  understand  that  more  than  one  member  of  the  majority, 
having  little  knowledge  of  diplomatic  affairs  and  regarding 
him  as  an  oracle,  might  well  have  believed  that  Count  Bis 
marck  had  at  last  found  his  master."  Vol.  i,  page  94. 

It  would  be  much  easier  to  multiply  indefinitely  unflatter 
ing  references  to  M.  de  Gramont  than  to  find  one  of  a  differ 
ent  tenor  except  in  the  pages  of  his  colleague  and  soi-disani 
chief,  M,  Ollivier ;  and  it  hardly  needs  to  be  said  that  his 
encomiums  of  his  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  are  not 
borne  out  by  what  he  has  to  say  of  the  course  pursued  by  him 
on  and  after  July  1£. 

In  the  autumn  of  1871,  Comte  Benedetti,  moved  thereto 
by  criticisms  of  the  way  in  which  he  performed  his  duties 
as  ambassador,  published  a  volume,  under  the  title  Ma  Mis 
sion  en  Prusse,  his  main  purpose,  as  was  evident  from  the 
preface,  being  to  defend  his  conduct  of  the  negotiations  at 
Ems  from  July  9  to  July  14,  although  a  large  part  of  the  book 
is  devoted  to  a  review  of  the  early  years  of  his  ambassador 
ship,  which  began  late  in  1864.  He  maintained  that  he  had 
successfully  accomplished  the  original  object  of  his  mission 
to  Ems,  in  that  the  King's  explicit  approval  of  the  withdrawal 
of  the  candidacy  of  Leopold  was  forthcoming  as  a  result  of 
his  representations ;  that  the  negotiation  was  unnecessarily 
complicated  by  the  futile  demand  of  guaranties,  and  that  the 
situation  created  by  that  demand  was  made  impossible  of 
amelioration  by  Werther's  report  of  his  interview  with  MM. 
Ollivier  and  Gramont  in  the  afternoon  of  the  l£th,  as  to 
which  no  information  had  been  sent  to  him. 

The  publication  of  Benedetti's  book  put  an  end  to  the  hesi 
tation  which  had  long  deterred  M.  de  Gramont  from  giving 
to  the  world  his  answer  to  the  criticisms  of  his  enemies  upon 
his  conduct  of  affairs  in  July,  1870,  and  in  1872  he  published 
his  self-justifying  work,  La  France  et  la  Prusse  avant  la  Guerre. 
He  vigorously  attacked  Benedetti  for  having,  as  he  claimed, 


444          THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

violated  all  the  traditions  of  diplomacy  by  publishing  official 
despatches  without  the  consent  of  the  government,  as  well 
as  his  (Gramont's)  private  and  confidential  correspondence 
without  his  knowledge  or  concurrence.  He  denies  that  the 
Ambassador  had  succeeded  in  his  mission  in  any  respect,  and 
strongly  hints  that  his  attitude  toward  the  King  was  too  con 
ciliatory.  But  his  book  is,  in  the  main,  a  vindication  of  his 
course,  the  nature  of  which  will  sufficiently  appear  from 
such  passages  as  are  quoted  in  the  notes  to  this  book,  and  in 
Appendices  G,  I,  and  M.  Like  most  of  his  colleagues  in  the 
ministry,  M.  de  Gramont  disappeared  from  public  life  with 
the  fall  of  the  ministry  on  August  9.  His  testimony  at  the 
Inquiry  concerning  the  4th  of  September  is  in  some  respects 
more  informing  than  his  book. 


APPENDIX  F 

THE  PRINCIPLES   OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  APPLICABLE  TO 
THE  HOHENZOLLERN  AFFAIR 

(From  Ollivier's  L'Empire  LiMral,  vol.  xiv,  pp.  54-63) 

IN  1815,  after  establishing  a  certain  equilibrium,  each  of 
the  great  powers  agreed  to  respect  it  and  not  to  profit  by 
any  changes  that  might  occur  in  the  internal  system  of  any 
state,  to  obtain  an  exclusive  influence  there  or  an  advantage 
not  shared  by  the  other  powers.  To  seek,  for  the  behoof  of 
a  member  of  his  family,  a  vacant  crown,  had  been  regarded 
as  one  of  the  most  dangerous  methods  of  securing  such  an 
influence  and  advantage.  .  .  .  Each  of  the  great  powers 
had  bound  itself  not  to  acquire,  to  the  behoof  of  a  member  of 
its  reigning  family,  a  vacant  throne,  without  the  formal 
assent  of  Europe.  It  was  not  long  before  this  rule  was  ex 
tended  to  a  hypothetical  case  which  had  not  at  first  been 
anticipated,  "where  a  prince,  not  belonging  to  one  of  the 
five  great  powers,  or  even  a  private  citizen,  should  become,  by 
his  accession  to  a  vacant  throne,  a  source  of  danger  to  a 
neighboring  power."1 

Palmerston  extended  still  further  this  balance-conserving 
rule.  "  The  choice  of  the  Queen's  husband,  in  an  indepen 
dent  country,"  he  said,  "  is  clearly  a  question  in  which  'the 
governments  of  other  countries  have  no  right  to  intervene, 
unless  it  is  possible  that  the  choice  may  fall  upon  some  prince 
belonging  to  the  reigning  family  of  some  powerful  foreign 
state,  who  would  probably  combine  the  policies  of^  his 
adopted  country  and  his  native  country  in  a  manner  inju- 

1  Protocols  of  January  27  and  February  7, 1831. 
445 


446         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

rious  to  the  interests  of  other  states."  [July  19,  1846, 
apropos  of  the  "Spanish  Marriages."] 

Numerous  examples  have  confirmed  these  rules.  In  1830 
the  sovereigns  of  Russia,  France,  and  Great  Britain,  the  lib 
erators  of  Greece,1  excluded  from  the  ranks  of  aspirants  for 
the  new  throne  all  the  princes  belonging  to  their  families. 
And  they  named  at  first  Prince  Leopold  of  Saxe-Coburg, 
afterwards  King  of  the  Belgians,  only  after  establishing  the 
fact  that  he  had  ceased  to  belong  to  the  royal  family  of  Great 
Britain.  In  1831,  after  the  revolution  which  separated  Bel 
gium  from  Holland,  Palmerston,  plenipotentiary  at  the 
Conference  of  London,  invoked  the  Greek  precedent  and 
caused  it  to  be  agreed  that "  in  case  the  sovereignty  of  Belgium 
should  be  offered  to  a  prince  of  either  of  the  families  reigning 
in  Austria,  France,  Great  Britain,  Prussia,  or  Russia,  such 
offer  should  invariably  be  declined."  2 

And,  despite  the  enthusiasm  which  greeted  the  election  of 
his  son,  the  Due  de  Nemours,  to  the  throne  by  the  National 
Congress,  Louis-Philippe  refused  his  assent,  as  head  of  the 
family,  to  the  desire  of  the  Belgian  people.  Considering  that 
the  sovereign  of  Belgium  must  necessarily  fulfil  the  condition 
upon  which  the  existence  of  that  country  depended,  —  neu 
trality, —  the  Prince  of  Leuchtenberg,  son  of  Eugene  de* 
Beauharnais,  was  also  excluded,  being  allied  through  his 
mother,  Amelia  of  Bavaria,  to  the  Bonaparte  family,  although 
he  belonged  to  neither  of  the  five  great  powers. 

As  a  result  of  these  exclusions,  the  Belgian  government, 
before  offering  the  crown  to  Leopold  of  Saxe-Coburg,  made 
sure  that  the  French  government,  which  was  at  first  opposed, 
had  abandoned  its  opposition ;  and  the  Prince  himself,  after 
the  vote  of  the  National  Congress,  accepted  the  crown  only 
on  the  assurance  of  the  representations  of  the  great  powers 
that  his  election  would  be  recognized. 

1  Protocol  of  the  Conference  of  London,  February  3, 1830. 

2  Protocol  of  February  1,  1831. 


APPENDIX  447 

In  1848,  despite  the  desire  of  the  Queen  Regent  of  Spain, 
Maria  Christina,  to  give  her  daughter  to  so  charming  a 
youth  as  the  Due  d'Aumale,  England  pronounced  a  formal 
decree  of  exclusion  against  that  marriage,  and  renewed  it 
later  against  the  Due  de  Montpensier,  so  that  Louis-Philippe 
was  fain  to  renounce  that  project  so  dear  to  his  heart. 

In  1859,  a  Tuscan  faction  offered  the  grand-ducal  crown  to 
Prince  Napoleon  (cousin  of  the  Emperor).  The  Emperor 
would  not  even  discuss  the  proposal;  and  with  respect  to 
Naples  he  peremptorily  put  aside  the  aspirations  which  the 
Murats  were  thought  to  entertain. 

In  186£,  after  King  Otho  was  expelled  from  Greece,  Na 
poleon  again  refused  to  sanction  the  candidacy  of  a  member 
of  his  family.  Nor  did  the  Tsar  Alexander  approve  the 
candidacy  of  Romanowski,  husband  of  the  Grand  Duchess 
Marie,  daughter  of  Nicholas,  although  it  was  open  to  ques 
tion  whether  the  Prince  had  been  admitted  to  the  ranks  of 
the  princes  of  the  imperial  family;  and  it  might  fairly  be 
claimed  that  he  was  in  a  position  analogous  to  that  of  Leo 
pold  of  Saxe-Coburg  with  respect  to  the  royal  house  of  Eng 
land,  when  he  was  chosen  as  sovereign  of  Greece  in  1830. 

England  followed  the  same  course  with  respect  to  Prince 
Alfred  (Duke  of  Edinburgh),  one  of  the  Queen's  sons,  and 
the  Hellenic  Congress  having  elected  him  none  the  less,  the 
Queen  would  not  allow  him  to  accept. 

And  in  respect  to  Spain  herself,  one  of  the  reasons  that  led 
the  Italian  ministry  to  reject  the  suggestion  of  the  Duke  of 
Genoa  as  a  candidate,  was  that  it  was  not  certain  that  the 
powers  would  consent. 

We  evolved  therefore  this  first  rule :  that  when  the  choice 
of  a  sovereign  is  in  question,  a  foreign  government  never  has 
the  right  to  claim,  but  always  has  the  right  to  exclude,  if 
the  candidate  proposed  belongs  to  one  of  the  reigning  fam 
ilies  of  the  great  powers,  or  if,  n,ot  so*belonging,  he  constitutes, 
by  his  individual  position,  a  source  of  danger  without  or 
within. 


448         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

We  asked  ourselves  another  question.  The  rule  being 
certain,  ought  we  to  invoke  it  ?  Would  it  not  be  more  in 
conformity  with  the  principles  of  modern  society  to  disregard 
it?  Had  it  not  become  obsolete  since  modern  institutions 
had  withdrawn  from  crowned  heads  the  unlimited  powers 
which  formerly  made  their  will  supreme  in  the  matter  of 
peace  and  war  and  alliances,  and  had  subordinated  them  to 
the  will  of  their  peoples  and  to  the  votes  of  legislatures? 
Guizot  had  already  swept  that  paltry  argument  from  the 
field  of  political  discussion.  "Superficial  minds  affect  to 
despise  the  ties  of  family  between  sovereigns,  and  to  consider 
them  as  of  no  account  between  states.  A  strange  display 
of  ignorance  !  Of  course  such  ties  are  not  inevitably  decisive, 
or  always  salutary ;  but  all  history,  ancient  and  modern,  and 
our  own  history,  are  at  hand  to  prove  their  importance  and 
the  advantage  that  political  skill  can  derive  from  them." l 

This  rule  is  so  great  a  safeguard  of  European  good  order, 
that  even  since  the  war  brought  about  by  its  violation,  it 
has  been  enforced  several  times.  At  the  very  outset  of  the 
war,  when  Don  Ferdinand  of  Portugal  seemed  on  the  point 
of  reconsidering  his  refusal,  the  first  condition  that  he  laid 
down  was  the  antecedent  consent  of  the  powers,  especially 
of  the  cabinets  of  Paris  and  London.  Prince  Amadeus  of 
Savoy  was  not  authorized  by  his  father  to  accept  the  crown 
of  Spain  until  he  had  formally  consulted  and  obtained  the 
consent  of  all  the  great  powers.  Prim  resisted  this  demand 
at  first,  for  it  was  a  retrospective  condemnation  of  his  con 
duct  toward  us.  But  as  the  Italian  government  insisted, 
he  was  compelled  (October  19)  to  request  the  sanction  of  the 
powers  —  a  f ormality  which  he  had  thought  it  his  duty  to 
neglect  in  the  case  of  the  Hohenzollern.  Finally,  Article  3 
of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  of  July  13,  1876  [1877]  at  the  conclu 
sion  of  the  Russo-Turkish  War,  stipulates  that  "  no  member 
of  the  reigning  dynasties  of  the  great  powers  shall  be  elected 
Prince  of  Bulgaria." 

1  Guizot,  Mfanoires,  vol.  ii.  p.  265. 


APPENDIX  449 

And  so  it  only  remained  for  us  to  ascertain  in  what  way 
this  right  of  exclusion  reserved  to  the  great  powers  had  been 
exercised  without  violating  the  higher  law  of  the  independence 
of  the  nations.  The  Conference  of  London  had  started  with 
the  principle  that  every  right,  of  nations  as  well  as  of  individ 
uals,  is  limited  by  the  rights  of  others,  and  that,  while  every 
nation  is  free  to  organize  itself,  and  to  choose  as  its  king 
whomsoever  it  pleases,  it  is  not  to  be  allowed  to  threaten  the 
tranquillity  of  a  neighboring  people  by  its  choice.  And  it 
had  authorized  Louis-Philippe  to  prevent,  by  force  if  nec 
essary,  the  election  of  the  Duke  of  Leuchtenberg.  This 
decision  of  the  Conference  came  to  be  regarded  as  an  abuse 
of  its  power,  and  Europe  did  not  insist  upon  it.  Europe 
regarded  as  overstrained  the  doctrine  that  the  mere  choice 
of  a  monarch,  independently  of  any  special  facts,  could  be 
considered  an  aggressive  act  authorizing  intervention:  a 
nation  was  not  required  to  account  to  anybody  for  the  use, 
good  or  bad,  that  it  might  make  of  its  sovereignty.  On  the 
other  hand,  Europe  had  confirmed  the  right  of  asking  the 
head  of  the  royal  family  to  which  the  sovereign  elect  belonged 
to  refuse  his  consent,  lacking  which  the  election  could  lead 
to  no  practical  result ;  thus  the  European  balance  of  power 
was  maintained  without  any  blow  being  dealt  to  the  inde 
pendence  of  a  nation. 

This  procedure  has  always  been  followed  in  cases  wher6 
there  was  occasion  to  resort  to  international  exclusion.  On 
the  occasion  of  the  candidacy  of  the  Due  de  Nemours,  the 
protest  of  England  was  addressed  to  France,  not  to  Belgium. 
She  informed  Louis-Philippe  of  her  purpose  to  prevent,  even 
by  war,  the  accession  of  his  son  to  the  Belgian  throne.  In 
like  manner,  in  1862,  the  powers  brought  pressure  to  bear 
on  England  and  Russia,  not  on  Greece,  to  exclude  from  the 
throne  the  son  of  the  Queen  and  the  Tsar's  kinsman.  Again, 
it  was  to  Louis-Philippe  and  not  to  Spain  that  England  in 
timated  her  veto  of  the  marriage  of  Queen  Isabella  to  a  prince 
of  Orleans.  ...  In  1866,  the  Russians  and  Turks,  dis- 


450        THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

pleased  by  the  election  of  Prince  Charles  of  Hohenzollem  to 
be  Prince  of  Roumania,  expressed  their  displeasure  at  Berlin, 
not  at  Bucharest. 

Thus  we  had  at  our  service  a  second  unquestionable  rule : 
to  prevent  the  enthronement  of  a  foreign  prince  whose  family 
would  gain  in  influence  thereby,  one  must  apply  to  the  head 
of  that  family  and  not  to  the  electing  nation. 


APPENDIX  G 

THE  DECLARATION  OF  JULY  D 

ON  pages  89-92  of  this  volume  will  be  found  what  M. 
Ollivier  has  to  say  as  to  the  wording  of  the  declaration  and 
the  responsibility  therefor.  In  the  Eclairdssements  to  his 
volume  xiv,  pp.  573-577,  he  cites  numerous  examples  of 
similar  declarations. 

In  his  testimony  at  the  Inquiry  concerning  the  4th  of 
September,  Marshal  Le  Boeuf  testified:  "In  the  morning 
of  the  6th  the  Council  of  Ministers  deliberated  concerning 
the  reply  to  be  made  to  M.  Cochery's  interpellation.  The 
Council  was  divided  concerning  the  form,  several  members, 
while  agreeing  that  the  draft  submitted  to  them  was  justi 
fied  by  the  conduct  of  Prussia,  thought  the  form  a  little 
too  sharp.  Allow  me  to  say  that  the  Emperor  was  of  that 
opinion.  The  words  were  softened  but,  on  our  arrival  at 
the  Chamber,  we  found  great  excitement  among  the  deputies. 
We  allowed  ourselves  to  be  swept  away  and  the  original 
draft,  or  something  very  like  it,  was  read  from  the  tribune. 
At  least,  that  is  what  I  seem  to  remember." 

Gramont,  in  his  testimony,  flatly  contradicted  this  ver 
sion,  which  is  so  improbable  that  it  seems  hardly  worthy  of 
the  arguments  by  which  M.  Ollivier  demolishes  it.  Vol. 
xiv,  Eclairdssements ,  pp.  571,  57£. 

"The  declaration  read  from  the  tribune  of  the  Corps 
L6gislatif ,"  says  Gramont,  "had  been  discussed  in  the  Council 
of  Ministers  that  same  morning  at  Saint-Cloud,  the  Emperor 
presiding.  On  this  subject  it  is  well  to  correct  an  error  which 
has  gained  some  credence  among  certain  persons.  It  is 
alleged  that  a  first  draft,  which  was  couched  in  very  sharp 

451 


452         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

terms,  was  corrected  and  softened  after  a  prolonged  dis 
cussion  ;  so  that  there  were  two  drafts  :  the  first  more  vigor 
ous  in  form,  which  the  Council  rejected ;  the  second  more  con 
ciliatory,  which  was  the  final  result  of  the  deliberation.  On 
arriving  at  the  Chamber,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  — 
or,  it  may  be,  the  whole  Cabinet  —  seeing  the  prevailing 
excitement  and  the  superintensity  of  the  outbursts  of  pa 
triotic  feeling,  allowed  himself  to  be  carried  away  by  this 
manifestation  of  the  general  opinion  and  read  from  the 
tribune  the  first  draft,  the  more  vigorous  of  the  two,  which 
had  been  rejected  in  the  morning  as  too  sharp. 

"According  to  another  somewhat  similar  version,  the 
minister  did  not  substitute  the  first  draft  for  the  second,  but 
simply  omitted  to  read  the  modifications  that  had  been  made 
by  the  Council  in  the  first  draft  in  order  to  make  it  milder. 

"These  two  stories  are  absolutely  false.  It  is  true  that 
the  draft  first  submitted  to  the  Council  was  modified  in  the 
course  of  the  discussion.  The  final  form  once  agreed  upon, 
I  read  it  once  more  to  the  Council,  and  it  was  voted  that  I 
should  read  it  to  the  Corps  Legislatif  at  the  opening  of  the 
session. 

"I  left  the  palace  of  Saint-Cloud  about  half -past  twelve, 
carrying  in  my  portfolio  the  minute  of  the  declaration  as  it 
had  been  agreed  upon.  I  went  directly  to  the  Foreign 
Office,  and,  sending  for  two  of  my  clerks,  I  myself  dictated 
to  them  the  official  text  of  the  declaration.  I  had  not  seen 
a  single  deputy,  nor,  ha  fact,  any  one,  since  I  left  Saint- 
Cloud  ;  consequently  I  was  in  no  way  exposed  to  the  risk  of 
allowing  myself  to  be  carried  away  by  an  excitement  of 
which  I  knew  nothing.  In  any  event,  nothing  on  earth 
could  have  made  me  forget  my  duty  to  the  point  of  changing 
a  syllable  in  an  official  document  agreed  upon  in  Council. 

"As  soon  as  I  had  finished  the  dictation,  I  started  for  the 
Chamber,  and,  going  up  at  once  into  the  tribune,  I  read  the 
declaration  from  one  of  the  copies  which  I  brought  from  the 
department.  On  coming  down  from  the  tribune,  I  gave  that 


APPENDIX  453 

copy  to  one  of  the  clerks  whose  duty  it  w'as  to  write  the  re 
port  of  the  sessions.  The  other  has  remained  among  my 
papers.  .  .  . 

"The  text  that  I  read  to  the  Chamber  was,  word  for  word, 
that  which  had  been  agreed  upon  in  Council  at  Saint-Cloud ; 
I  know  it  better  than  any  one,  for  the  minute  did  not  leave 
my  hand  for  a  moment  before  it  was  dictated  by  me  in  my 
private  office."  La  France  et  la  Prusse,  pp.  49-52. 

In  190&  the  manuscript  of  Gramont's  minute,  with  the 
interlineations  made  during  the  session  of  the  Council,  turned 
up  in  an  auction  room,  and  was  sold  for  350  francs  to  an 
unknown  buyer.  It  is  described  by  Welschinger  (vol.  i, 
pp.  50-52)  from  a  personal  examination.  It  substantially 
confirms  M.  Ollivier's  account,  but  shows  in  a  little  more 
detail  the  changes  made,  in  Ollivier's  handwriting  at 
least,  if  not  at  his  suggestion.  For  instance,  he  added  the 
phrase,  "by  placing  one  of  its  princes  on  the  throne  of  Charles 
V."  M.  de  Gramont  himself  wrote  on  the  minute:  "The 
conclusion  was  discussed  in  the  Council,  and  transcribed  by 
M,  Ollivier  after  it  was  accepted  and  unanimously  voted  by 
the  Council." 

A  Brussels  newspaper,  the  Independance  Beige,  printed  on 
March  6, 1874,  an  article  to  the  effect  that  after  the  Cochery 
interpellation  on  July  5,  a  council  was  held  at  Saint-Cloud, 
the  Emperor  presiding,  and  that,  while  he  was  thus  engaged, 
the  Empress,  who  had  been  in  a  very  excited  state  since  the 
3d  and  had  been  talking  in  a  most  warlike  strain,  had  an 
interview  with  Baron  Jer6me  David,  as  a  result  of  which, 
she  laid  hold  of  the  Emperor  as  soon  as  he  was  at  liberty  and 
talked  with  him  till  nearly  one  in  the  morning.  When  the 
ministers  assembled  at  ten  o'clock  on  the  6th,  they  were 
instantly  stricken  with  amazement  by  the  change  in  the 
Emperor's  attitude,  manifested  by  a  determination  to  give  a 
more  emphatic  tone  to  the  declaration;  and,  after  due  re 
monstrance,  they  yielded  to  his  wishes  in  great  measure;  so 
that  the  final  draft  represented  the  Emperor's  views  so  far  as 


454         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

it  was  couched  in  provocative  language,  but  did  not  entirely 
satisfy  him  in  that  respect. 

This  version  is  adopted  by  Lehautcourt  (vol.  i,  pp.  228- 
230  and  notes),  on  the  somewhat  inconclusive  ground  that 
Darimon  asserts  that  it  came  directly  from  Gramont  *s  office, 
and  that  it  is  not  contradicted  by  Gramont.  La  Gorce,  how 
ever,  with  the  better  reason,  rejects  it,  not  only  on  the  ground 
of  its  improbability,  but  because  it  is  directly  contradicted 
by  Gramont,  both  in  his  book  and  in  his  testimony  at  the 
Inquiry  concerning  the  4th  of  September,  and  by  his  col 
leagues,  especially  M.  Louvet,  "whose  testimony  deserves 
the  fullest  confidence,  for  he  was  the  very  soul  of  uprightness 
and  integrity,"  and  who  wrote  on  this  subject:  "The  In- 
dependance  Beige  has  dared  to  assert  that  the  Emperor  con 
tributed  to  make  the  declaration  more  emphatic  in  a  belli 
cose  sense.  This  assertion  is  absolutely  contrary  to  the 
fact." 

This  question  of  the  responsibility  for  the  form  of  the  dec 
laration  is  important  in  view  of  the  fact  that  it  has  been 
often  alleged  to  have  been  the  first  misstep  that  made  the 
avoidance  of  war  more  difficult  at  least,  if  not  impossible, 
having  regard  to  Bismarck's  now  generally  admitted  pur 
pose  "to  force  France  to  the  brink  of  the  precipice." 

M.  Welschinger,  one  might  almost  say  with  glee,  fastens 
upon  M.  Ollivier's  admission  that  he  wrote  the  concluding 
paragraph,  as  the  foundation  of  an  attack  on  the  Keeper  of 
the  Seals  as  the  approximate  cause  of  the  catastrophe  that 
ensued.  "These  few  lines,  the  importance  of  which  was  not 
realized  until  the  session  of  the  Corps  Legislatif  .  .  .  were 
to  mean,  in  the  very  near  future,  the  inevitable  clash  of  two 
great  nations,  deaths  by  tens  of  thousands,  frightful  de 
struction,  and,  for  ourselves,  billions  to  pay  and  two  prov 
inces  to  surrender.  It  is  an  extraordinary  thing,  which 
indicates  the  frivolity  of  its  author,  that  it  was  M.  Emile 
OUivier,  who  claimed  to  be  most  inclined  to  pacific  measures, 
—  that  it  was  he  who,  by  that  final  sentence,  set  about  lead- 


APPENDIX  455 

ing  us  infallibly  into  war"  (vol.  i,  p.  5£).  This  unreasonably 
harsh  judgment  is  explicable  perhaps,  in  a  measure,  by  the 
fact  that  it  was  written  after  the  publication  of  M.  Ollivier's 
fourteenth  volume.  It  exaggerates  the  importance  of  the 
modifications  of  the  original  draft,  and  disregards  the  fact 
that  the  declaration  was  unanimously  accepted  by  the  Coun 
cil  of  Ministers. 

M.  Jules  Favre  insists  that  Gramont,  "instead  of  hurling 
an  unusual  sort  of  challenge  from  the  tribune,  should  have 
requested,  by  a  note,  explanations  which  would  have  been 
forthcoming."  (Gouvernement  de  la  Defense  Nationale,  voL 
i,  p.  £6.)  But  M.  Favre's  criticisms  are  not  unbiassed,  to 
say  the  least,  and  the  ministry  certainly  was  justified  in 
believing  that  the  Prussian  government  did  not  propose 
to  enter  into  explanations.  That  it  was  indispensable,  in 
view  of  the  state  of  public  feeling,  to  make  some  official  an 
nouncement,  cannot  be  questioned. 

On  the  7th  Lord  Lyons  wrote  to  Lord  Granville  (Blue 
Book,  p.  7) :  "I  observed  to  the  Due  de  Gramont  this  after 
noon  that  I  could  not  but  feel  uneasy  respecting  the  declara 
tion  which  he  had  made  the  day  before  in  the  Corps  Legis- 
latif.  I  could  not,  I  said,  help  thinking  that  milder 
language  would  have  rendered  it  more  easy  to  treat  both 
with  Prussia  and  with  Spain  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  pre 
tensions  of  Prince  Leopold  of  Hohenzollern. 

"M.  de  Gramont  answered  that  he  was  glad  I  had  men 
tioned  this,  as  he  wished  to  have  an  opportunity  of  conveying 
to  your  Lordship  an  explanation  of  his  reasons  for  making 
a  public  declaration  in  terms  so  positive.  -Your  Lordship 
would,  he  was  sure,  as  Minister  in  a  constitutional  country, 
understand  perfectly  the  impossibility  of  contending  with 
public  opinion.  The  nation  was,  he  said,  so  strongly  roused 
upon  this  question  that  its  will  could  not  be  resisted  or  trifled 
with.  He  had  seen  me  in  the  Chamber  when  he  had  made 
his  declaration.  I  had,  therefore,  myself  witnessed  the 
extraordinary  enthusiasm  and  unanimity  with  which  the 


456          THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

announcement  of  the  determination  of  the  Government  to 
repel  the  insult  offered  to  the  nation  had  been  received.  He 
had  kept  within  bounds,  or  he  might  have  provoked  a  still 
more  remarkable  explosion  of  feeling.  Now,  the  indignation 
out  of  doors  was  equally  violent  and  equally  general.  Noth 
ing  less  than  what  he  had  said  would  have  satisfied  the  public. 
His  speech  was,  in  fact,  as  regarded  the  interior  of  France, 
absolutely  necessary;  and  diplomatic  considerations  must 
yield  to  public  safety  at  home." 

Lord  Lyons  goes  on  to  quote  M.  de  Gramont  as  to  the 
external  considerations  which  necessitated  the  declaration; 
but  it  will  be  fairer,  perhaps,  to  allow  the  Minister  to  state 
them  in  his  own  words.  In  his  book  he  wrote  (pages  38- 
43):- 

"It  was  no  longer  possible  to  entertain  a  doubt  as  to  the 
intentions  of  Prussia,  and  it  was  necessary  at  any  cost  to 
place  a  barrier  between  her  enterprise  and  the  date  of  July 
£0  [when  the  Cortes  were  to  reassemble].  At  Berlin  they 
refused  to  discuss  the  matter;  and,  indeed,  what  could  we 
have  added  to  the  arguments  which  our  ambassador  had 
already  urged  a  year  before  against  the  same  possibility  ? 

"At  Madrid,  Marshal  Prim  contented  himself  with  reply 
ing  :  'It  is  possible  that  the  first  impression  in  France  will  be 
adverse,  but  they  will  soon  think  better  of  it  on  reflection/ 

"Time  pressed:  we  had  left  only  the  single  resource  of  a 
declaration  to  the  Chambers,  thus  making  known,  by  official 
promulgation,  what  Spain  seemed  not  to  understand,  and 
Prussia  was  not  even  willing  to  hear. 

"It  was  under  the  influence  of  these  considerations  that 
the  government  determined  upon  the  declaration  which  was 
read  July  6  in  the  Corps  Legislatif.  As  we  could  not  give 
the  Chambers  incomplete  information,  and  as  we  desired 
to  avoid  overexciting  public  feeling  by  disclosing  the"  dis 
loyal  manoeuvring  of  the  Cabinet  of  Berlin,  the  government 
had  perforce  to  confine  itself  to  setting  forth  in  precise  terms 
its  attitude  toward  the  two  powers,  whose  combination  had 


APPENDIX  457 

been  managed  in  a  fashion  so  prejudicial  to  the  legitimate 
interest  of  France.  It  could  only  express  its  confidence  in 
the  friendship  of  the  Spanish  people  and  the  wisdom  of  the 
German  people.  But  if  the  vagueness  of  those  hopes  had  to 
be  made  up  for  by  language  more  decided  than  usual,  and 
by  a  categorical  exposition  of  its  duties,  those  persons  must 
be  held  responsible  who,  by  declining  its  first  overture,  made 
it  impossible  for  it,  at  the  outset,  to  lead  the  parliament  to 
cherish  the  probability  of  a  favorable  outcome ;  those  per 
sons  who,  in  contempt  of  all  international  proprieties,  had 
created  by  their  disloyal  actions  an  abnormal  situation  and 
had  made  a  crisis  imminent ;  who,  in  the  words  of  the  English 
newspapers  that  were  most  hostile  to  France,  had  preferred 
to  honorable  negotiation  a  perfidious  transaction  which  had 
all  the  appearance  of  a  vulgar  and  impudent  coup  d'etat. 
(The  Times,  July  8,  1870.) 

"Every  one  knows  how  the  Chambers,  the  public,  and  the 
press  received  the  government's  declaration.  .  .  .  Nothing 
was  further  from  the  government's  purpose  than  to  lead  the 
country  into  war,  and  the  sequel  of  the  negotiations  proves 
this  most  convincingly  to  every  honorable  and  impartial 
mind. 

"If  we  had  wished  to  inflame  the  public  mind  more,  and 
to  seek  in  its  excitement  the  corner-stone  of  an  aggressive 
policy,  we  should  have  begun  by  exonerating  our  agents  from 
the  unmerited  reproaches  heaped  upon  them  for  what  was 
termed  their  culpable  lack  of  foresight.  We  should  have 
told  the  Chamber  of  the  pourparlers  of  1869,  of  the  reassur 
ing  but  misleading  language  of  Herr  von  Bismarck  in  May 
of  that  same  year ;  we  should  have  placed  the  Chamber  in  a 
position  to  understand  thoroughly  the  premeditated,  hostile 
character  of  that  Prussian  conspiracy,  plotted  in  the  dark 
and  perfected  long  beforehand  against  us,  with  entire  knowl 
edge  of  the  resistance  it  was  sure  to  arouse  and  of  the  senti 
ments  it  was  sure  to  wound. 

*Now,  I  ask,  what  would  have  been  the  effect  upon  the 


458         THE  FRANCOPRUSSIAN  WAR 

Chamber  and  throughout  the  country,  if,  after  a  full  and 
exact  account  of  these  aggravating  circumstances,  the  Min 
ister  for  Foreign  Affairs  had  made  known  the  first  negative 
result  of  our  overtures  at  Berlin  ?  However  great  the 
emotion  which  the  reply  of  the  government  then  caused, 
it  would  have  been  vastly  exceeded  by  the  general  indigna 
tion  when  people  should  have  learned  that,  on  the  subject 
of  that  candidacy,  concocted  with  so  much  secrecy,  at  which 
all  Europe  was  beginning  to  take  alarm,  the  Prussian  govern 
ment,  which  had  planned  it,  refused  to  explain  itself,  profier- 
ing  the  absurd  reply  that  it  did  not  propose  to  bother  about 
the  matter,  that  it  had  no  existence  for  it. 

"By  maintaining  silence  on  all  these  matters  the  French 
government  imposed  upon  itself  a  genuine  sacrifice.  In  the 
first  place,  it  deprived  itself  of  the  strongest  arguments  to 
justify  the  firmness  of  its  language;  in  the  second  place, 
it  allowed  undeserved  blame  to  rest  on  its  diplomatic  staff, 
for  some  time  at  least.  Now,  this  sacrifice  it  made  solely 
to  its  desire  to  avoid  agitating  men's  minds  and  public  opinion 
overmuch  at  the  moment  when  recent  evidence  of  Prussia's 
evil  purpose-  caused  apprehension  of  the  difficulties  of  the 
negotiation  upon  which  it  was  about  to  enter. 

"It  was  essential  to  formulate  our  policy  explicitly  and 
to  place  a  formal  declaration  athwart  the  Prussian  schemes, 
in  order  to  forestall  the  coup  d'etat  of  July  20.  That  done, 
we  were  ready  for  all  expedients  to  safeguard  peace  coin- 
cidently  with  the  honor  and  material  interests  of  France." 

M.  de  Gramont  published  his  book  in  1872,  so  that  most 
of  the  writers  on  the  war  had  his  attempted  justification 
before  them  as  a  text  upon  which  to  build  their  commentaries. 
In  addition  to  the  works  mentioned  in  this  appendix;  any 
of  the  others  quoted  from  time  to  time  in  the  notes  may  be 
consulted  for  criticism  of  this  declaration,  unbiassed  by  too 
great  friendliness  for  the  Empire  or  for  the  Ministry  of 
January  £.  v 

M.  Albert  Sorel,  whose  great  reputation  as  a  historian 


APPENDIX  459 

gives  peculiar  weight  to  his  judgment,  has  this  to  say  on  the 
subject :  — 

"The  imperial  government  believed  that  it  was  playing 
a  great  political  game  by  thus  throwing  down  the  glove  to 
Prussia.  In  reality  it  was  simply  playing  its  adversary's 
game.  Failing  to  measure  the  strength  of  the  position  taken 
up  by  Bismarck,  it  made  the  opening  for  a  sortie  upon  which 
the  Chancellor  had  reckoned.  Bismarck  had  but  one  thing 
to  fear :  that  France  would  show  some  prudence,  and,  with 
the  support  of  Europe,  would  enter  on  a  diplomatic  campaign. 
He  knew  that,  in  that  case,  the  King  would  not  make  up  his 
mind  to  a  rupture,  and  that  the  war  would  slip  through  his 
fingers,  M.  de  Gramont  relieved  him  from  that  anxiety 
at  the  very  outset  of  the  negotiation.  In  fact,  Europe  was 
thrust  aside;  that  peremptory  language  closed  the  mouths 
of  diplomatists.  Supercilious  in  form,  inexorable  in  its  con 
clusions,  the  declaration  of  July  6  called  upon  King  William 
either  to  submit  to  a  diplomatic  affront  or  to  declare  war. 
It  was  an  ultimatum,  and  despite  the  halting  commentary 
with  which  M.  Ollivier  accompanied  it,  no  one  was  de 
ceived.  .  .  . 

"In  this  fatal  enterprise,  the  declaration  of  the  6th  must 
be  regarded  as  the  first  disaster  of  France.  It  was  a  diplo 
matic  Woerth.  Prussia  must  submit,  or  it  was  war.  This 
dilemma  embarrassed  Europe,  which  did  not  want  war  and 
did  not  propose  to  force  King  William's  hand.  However, 
diplomacy  did  not  give  up  the  search  for  a  compromise,  but 
it  sought  it  without  much  hope.  The  powers  did  not  hesi 
tate  to  tell  France  that,  by  that  burst  of  passion,  she  had  lost 
all  her  diplomatic  advantage." 

The  effect  of  the  declaration  in  Germany,  North  and  South, 
and  in  the  other  European  countries,  is  described  by  La  Gorce 
in  vol.  vi,  pp.  £32-238.  Of  especial  interest  are  the  views 
of  the  statesmen  who  were  at  the  head  of  affairs  in  Austria 
and  Italy,  as  both  the  Emperor  and  Gramont  seem  to  have 
counted  upon  the  material  support  of  those  countries. 


460         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

In  addition  to  Bismarck's  retrospective  reflections  on  the 
declaration  of  July  6  (Reflections  and  Reminiscences,  English 
translation,  vol.  ii,  pp.  92,  93),  Dr.  Busch,  under  date  of 
July  9,  gives  us  the  Chancellor's  contemporaneous  remarks 
thereon :  "The  Secretary  of  State  handed  me  a  telegram  from 
Berlin  to  the  Chancellor,  which  was  returned  by  the  latter 
with  comments.  I  was  to  get  these  circulated  in  the  non- 
official  journals.  The  telegram  was  to  the  effect  that  Gra- 
mont  had  stated  in  reply  to  an  interpellation  by  Cochery, 
that  Prim  had  offered  the  Spanish  throne  to  the  Hereditary 
Prince  of  Hohenzollern  (Remark:  '  He  can  do  nothing  of  the 
kind.  Only  the  Cortes'),  and  that  the  Prince  had  accepted 
it.  (Remark:  'He  will  declare  himself  only  after  he  has 
been  elected.')  The  Spanish  people  has  not  yet,  however, 
expressed  its  wishes.  (Remark:  'That  is  the  main  point.') 
The  French  government  do  not  recognize  the  negotiations 
In  question.  (Remark:  'There  are  no  negotiations  except 
ing  those  between  Spain  and  the  eventual  candidates  for 
the  throne.')  Gramont  therefore  begged  that  the  discus 
sion  might  be  postponed,  as  it  was  purposeless  for  the  pres 
ent.  (Remark:  'Very.')  The  French  government  would 
maintain  the  neutral  attitude  which  they  had  observed  up 
to  the  present,  but  would  not  permit  a  foreign  power  to 
place  a  prince  upon  the  Spanish  throne  (Remark:  'Hardly 
any  power  entertains  such  an  intention,  except  perhaps 
France'),  and  endanger  the  honor  and  dignity  of  France. 
They  trusted  to  the  wisdom  of  the  Germans  (Remark: 
'That  has  nothing  to  do  with  it')  and  to  the  friendship  of 
the  Spanish  people.  (Remark:  'That  is  the  main  point.') 
Should  they  be  deceived  in  their  hope,  they  would  do  their 
duty  without  hesitation  or  weakness.  (Remark :  'We  also.')" 
Bismarck:  Some  Secret  Pages  of  his  History,  vol.  i,  p.  29. 


APPENDIX  H 

BISMARCK'S  CIRCULAR  NOTE  OF  JULY  18  TO  THE  POWERS 
(Printed  in  Blue  Book,  No.  3,  pp.  5-8) 

BERLIN,  July  18,  1870. 

THE  proceedings  of  the  French  Ministers  at  the  sittings  of 
the  Senate  and  the  Legislative  Body  on  the  15th  instant,  and 
the  misrepresentations  of  the  truth  there  brought  forward 
with  the  solemn  character  of  official  declarations,  have  re 
moved  the  last  veil  from  the  intentions  which  could  no  longer 
be  doubtful  to  any  disinterested  person,  since  astonished 
Europe  learned  two  days  before  from  the  mouth  of  the  French 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  that  France  was  not  satisfied 
with  the  voluntary  renunciation  of  the  hereditary  Prince 
and  had  further  negotiations  to  carry  on  with  Prussia. 
Whilst  the  rest  of  the  European  Powers  were  busied  in  con 
sidering  how  they  were  to  meet  this  new  and  unexpected 
phase,  and  perhaps  exercise  a  conciliatory  and  mitigating 
influence  on  these  alleged  negotiations,  whose  nature  and 
object  no  one  could  divine,  the  French  Government  has 
thought  proper,  by  a  public  and  solemn  declaration  which, 
while  misrepresenting  known  facts,  afclded  fresh  affronts  to 
the  threats  of  the  6th  instant,  to  carry  matters  to  such  a 
pitch  as  to  render  any  accommodation  impossible,  and,  as 
every  handle  of  intervention  was  taken  away  from  the 
friendly  Powers,  to  make  the  rupture  unavoidable. 

For  a  week  past  it  could  be  no  matter  of  doubt  to  us  that 
the  Emperor  Napoleon  was  resolved,  regardless  of  conse 
quences,  to  bring  us  into  a  position  in  which  we  should 
have  the  choice  between  war  and  a  humiliation  which  the 
honourable  feelings  of  no  nation  can  bear.  Could  we  have 

461 


462         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

entertained  any  doubt,  we  must  have  been  undeceived  by 
the  Report  of  the  Royal  Ambassador  on  his  first  conference 
with  the  Due  de  Gramont  and  M.  Ollivier,  after  his  return 
from  Ems,  in  which  the  first  described  the  renunciation  of 
the  hereditary  Prince  as  a  secondary  matter,  and  both  Min 
isters  demanded  that  His  Majesty  the  King  should  write  an 
apologetic  letter  to  the  Emperor  Napoleon,  the  publication 
of  which  might  pacify  the  excited  feelings  of  France.  The 
scorn  of  the  French  Government  press  anticipated  the  de 
sired  triumph;  but  the  Government  seems  to  have  feared 
that  the  war  might  still  escape  it,  and  hastened,  by  its  official 
declarations  of  the  15th  instant,  to  transfer  the  matter  to  a 
field  which  no  longer  admitted  of  intervention,  and  to  prove 
to  us  and  all  the  world  that  no  compliance  within  the  bounds 
of  the  national  feelings  of  honour  would  suffice  to  maintain 
peace. 

As,  however,  no  one  doubted,  or  could  doubt,  that  we 
sincerely  desired  peace,  and  a  few  days  before  considered  no 
war  possible,  as  every  pretext  for  war  was  wanting,  and  even 
the  last  artificially  and  forcibly  created  pretext,  as  it  was 
devised  without  our  aid,  so  it  had  disappeared  again  of  itself  : 
as,  therefore,  there  was  no  cause  at  all  for  war,  there  was 
nothing  left  for  the  French  Ministers,  in  order  to  their  seem 
ing  justification  before  their  own  people,  really  peaceably 
disposed  and  requiring  tranquillity,  but  by  means  of  misrep 
resentation  and  invention  of  facts,  the  falsity  of  which  was 
known  to  them  from  official  documents,  to  persuade  the  two 
representative  bodies,  and  through  them  the  people,  that 
they  had  been  affronted  by  Prussia,  thereby  to  stir  up  their 
passions  to  an  outbreak  by  which  they  might  represent  them 
selves  as  carried  away. 

It  is  a  sad  business  to  expose  the  series  of  untruths ;  for 
tunately  the  French  Ministers  have  shortened  the  task,  as 
they,  by  their  refusal  to  produce  the  note  or  despatch,  as 
demanded  by  a  part  of  the  Assembly,  have  prepared  the  world 
for  the  intelligence  that  it  has  no  existence  whatever. 


APPENDIX  463 

This  is  in  fact  the  case.  There  exists  no  note  or  despatch 
by  which  the  Prussian  Government  notified  to  the  Cabinets 
of  Europe  a  refusal  to  receive  the  French  Ambassador.  There 
exists  nothing  but  the  newspaper  telegram  known  to  all  the 
world,  which  was  communicated  to  the  German  Govern 
ments,  and  to  some  of  our  Representatives  with  non-German 
Governments,  according  to  the  wording  of  the  newspapers, 
in  order  to  inform  them  of  the  nature  of  the  French  demands, 
and  the  impossibility  of  complying  with  them,  and  which, 
moreover,  contains  nothing  injurious  to  France. 

We  have  addressed  no  further  communications  on  the  in 
cident  to  any  Government.  In  regard  to  the  fact  of  the 
refusal  to  receive  the  French  Ambassador,  in  order  to  set 
that  assertion  in  its  proper  light,  I  am  authorized  by  His 
Majesty  to  transmit  the  two  enclosed  official  documents  to 
your  Excellency,  with  the  request  that  you  will  communicate 
them  to  the  Government  to  which  you  have  the  honour  to 
be  accredited :  the  first  is  a  literally  correct  account  of  what 
took  place  at  Ems,  drawn  up  at  the  command,  and  with 
the  immediate  approval  of  His  Majesty  the  King;  the 
second  is  the  official  report  of  the  adjutant  in  attendance 
on  His  Majesty,  on  the  performance  of  the  duty  assigned 
to  him. 

It  may  be  unnecessary  to  point  out  that  the  firmness  in 
repelling  French  pretension  was  attended  with  all  the  con 
siderate  friendliness  both  in  matter  and  form  which  comports 
so  well  with  the  personal  habits  of  His  Majesty  the  King, 
as  well  as  with  the  principles  of  international  courtesy 
towards  the  Representatives  of  friendly  sovereigns  and 
nations. 

Finally,  with  regard  to  the  departure  of  our  Ambassador, 
I  only  remark,  as  was  officially  known  to  the  French  Cabinet, 
that  it  was  no  recall,  but  a  leave  of  absence  requested  by  the 
Ambassador  for  personal  reasons,  and  that  he  had  transferred 
the  business  to  the  First  Councillor  of  Legation,  who  had 
often  represented  him  before,  and  had  given  me  notification 


464         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

thereof  as  usual.  The  statement  is  also  untrue  that  His 
Majesty  the  King  communicated  the  candidature  of  Prince 
Leopold  to  me,  the  undersigned  Chancellor  of  the  Con 
federation.  I  was  casually  informed  in  confidence  of  the 
Spanish  offer  by  a  private  person  concerned  in  the  nego 
tiations. 

If  all  the  reasons  brought  forward  by  the  French  Ministers 
to  show  that  war  is  inevitable,  are  thus  reduced  to  nothing, 
and  appear  to  be  grasped  out  of  the  air,  there  unfortunately 
only  remains  to  us  the  sad  necessity  of  seeking  for  the  real 
motives  in  the  worst  traditions  of  Louis  XIV  and  the  first 
Empire  —  traditions  stigmatized  by  the  nations  and  Govern 
ments  of  the  civilized  world  for  half  a  century,  but  which  a 
party  in  France  still  writes  on  its  banners,  and  which  Na 
poleon  III,  as  we  believed,  had  successfully  withstood. 

As  motive  causes  of  this  lamentable  phenomenon  we  can 
but  recognize,  unfortunately,  the  worst  instincts  of  hatred 
and  of  envy  of  the  independence  and  welfare  of  Germany, 
with  the  endeavour  to  keep  down  liberty  in  their  own  coun 
try  by  involving  it  in  foreign  wars. 

It  is  painful  to  think  that,  by  such  a  gigantic  conflict  as 
the  national  exasperation,  the  magnitude  and  the  strength 
of  the  two  countries  give  us  the  prospect  of,  the  peaceful  de 
velopment  of  civilization  and  of  national  prosperity,  which 
was  in  advancing  bloom,  will  be  checked  and  driven  back  for 
many  years.  But  we  must,  before  God  and  man,  make  over 
the  responsibility  of  it  to  those  whose  outrageous  proceedings 
compel  us  to  accept  the  combat,  for  the  national  honour  and 
the  freedom  of  Germany;  and  in  such  a  just  cause  we  may 
confidently  hope  for  the  help  of  God,  as  we  are  already  sure 
of  the  help  of  the  whole  German  nation,  throughout  which 
there  are  ever-increasing  signs  of  a  glad  willingness  for  the 
sacrifice ;  and  we  may  also  express  our  confidence  that  France 
will  find  no  allies  for  a  war  which  she  has  so  wantonly  and 
so  unjustly  conjured  up. 

(Signed)  VON  BISMAKCK. 


APPENDIX  465 

INCLOSURES 

MEMORANDUM  OF  WHAT  OCCURRED  AT  EMS,  DRAWN  UP  AT  THE 
COMMAND  AND  WITH  THE  APPROVAL  OF  THE  KING  OF  PRUSSIA 

On  the  9th  instant,  Count  Benedetti  asked  at  Ems  for  an 
audience  by  the  King,  which  was  at  once  granted  to  him. 
Wherein  he  required  that  the  King  should  order  the  heredi 
tary  Prince  of  Hohenzollern  to  withdraw  his  acceptance  of 
the  Spanish  Crown.  The  King  replied  that,  as  throughout 
the  whole  affair  he  had  only  been  applied  to  as  head  of  the 
family,  and  never  as  King  of  Prussia,  that  as  therefore  he  had 
given  no.  order  for  the  accepting  the  candidature  for  the 
Throne,  neither  could  he  give  any  order  for  the  retraction. 
On  the  llth,  the  French  Ambassador  asked  for  and  obtained 
a  second  audience,  wherein  he  tried  to  exert  a  pressure  on  the 
King  to  the  end  that  he  should  urge  the  Prince  to  renounce 
the  Crown.  The  King  replied,  that  the  Prince  was  entirely 
free  in  his  resolutions;  moreover,  that  he  himself  did  not 
even  know  where  the  Prince,  who  wanted  to  take  an  Alpine 
journey,  was  at  that  moment.  On  the  Fountain  promenade, 
in  the  morning  of  the  13th,  the  King  gave  the  Ambassador 
an  extra  number  of  the  Cologne  Gazette,  which  had  been 
just  delivered  to  himself,  with  a  private  telegram  from  Sig- 
maringen,  on  the  renunciation  of  the  Prince,  the  King  re 
marking  that  he  himself  had  not  yet  received  any  letter 
from  Sigmaringen,  but  might -expect  one  to-day.  Count 
Benedetti  mentioned  that  he  had  received  news  of  the  re 
nunciation  from  Paris  the  evening  before;  and  as  the  King 
thereupon  looked  upon  the  matter  as  settled,  the  Ambassador 
now  quite  unexpectedly  required  of  the  King  that  he  should 
pronounce  a  distinct  assurance  that  he  never  again  would 
give  his  consent  il  the  candidature  for  the  Crown  in  question 
should  be  ever  revived.  The  King  decidedly  refused  such 
a  demand,  and  kept  to  that  decision,  as  Count  Benedetti 
repeatedly  and  ever  more  urgently  returned  to  his  propo 
sition.  Nevertheless,  after  some  hours,  Count  Benedetti 


466         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

sought  a  third  audience.  On  inquiry,  what  was  the  subject 
to  be  spoken  of,  he  returned  answer  that  he  wished  to  recur 
to  that  spoken  of  in  the  morning.  The  King  refused  a  fresh 
audience  on  this  ground,  as  he  had  no  other  answer  than  the 
one  given;  moreover,  that  from  thenceforward  all  negotia 
tions  were  to  go  on  through  the  Ministries.  Count  Benedetti's 
wish  to  take  leave  of  the  King  on  his  departure  was  acceded 
to,  as  he  saluted  him  at  the  station  on  the  14th,  in  passing 
on  a  journey  to  Coblentz.  According  to  this,  therefore,  the 
Ambassador  had  three  audiences  of  the  King,  which  always  bore 
the  character  of  private  conversations,  as  Count  Benedetti 
never  conducted  himself  as  a  Commissioner  or  negotiator. 

REPORT    OF    THE    ADJUTANT    IN    ATTENDANCE    ON    THE    KING 
OF  PRUSSIA  AT  EMS 

His  Majesty  the  King,  in  consequence  of  a  conversation 
with  Count  Benedetti  on  the  Fountain  promenade,  early  on 
the  13th  of  July,  graciously  sent  me,  about  £  in  the  after 
noon,  with  the  following  message  to  the  Count:  — 

His  Majesty  had  received  an  hour  before,  by  written  com 
munication  of  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern  from  Sigmaringen, 
the  full  corroboration  of  what  the  Count  had  communicated 
to  him  in  the  morning,  as  learned  direct  from  Paris,  in  regard 
to  the  renunciation  by  Prince  Leopold  of  the  candidature  to 
the  Spanish  Throne.  His  Majesty  therewith  looks  upon 
tifeus  affair  as  settled. 

Count  Benedetti  said,  after  I  had  delivered  this  message 
to  him,  that  since  his  conversation  with  the  King,  he  had 
received  a  fresh  despatch  from  M.  de  Gramont,  in  which  he 
was  instructed  to  request  an  audience  of  His  Majesty,  and 
to  submit  once  more  to  His  Majesty  the  wish  of  the  French 
Go  vernment :  — 

"1.  To  approve  the  renunciation  of  the  Prince  of  Hohen 
zollern  ;  and 

"£.  To  give  an  assurance  that  this  candidature  would  not 
again  be  taken  up,  even  in  the  future." 


APPENDIX  467 

Hereupon  His  Majesty  caused  answer  to  be  given  to  the 
Count  through  me,  that  His  Majesty  approved  the  renun 
ciation  of  Prince  Leopold  in  the  same  sense  and  to  the  same 
extent  as  His  Majesty  had  previously  done  with  the  accept 
ance  of  this  candidature.  His  Majesty  had  received  the 
written  communication  of  the  renunciation  from  Prince  An 
tony  of  Hohenzollern,  who  was  authorized  thereto  by  Prince 
Leopold.  In  regard  to  the  second  point,  the  assurance  for 
the  future,  His  Majesty  could  only  refer  to  what  he  had  him 
self  replied  to  the  Count  in  the  morning. 

Count  Benedetti  thankfully  accepted  this  answer  of  the 
King's  and  said  he  would  mention  it  again  to  his  Govern 
ment,  as  he  was  authorized  to  do. 

But  with  regard  to  the  second  point,  he  must  persist  in 
his  request  for  another  conversation  with  His  Majesty,  as  he 
was  expressly  instructed  to  do  so  in  the  last  despatch  from 
M.  de  Gramont,  and  even  if  it  were  only  to  hear  the  same 
words  from  His  Majesty  again;  the  more  so  as  there  were 
fresh  arguments  in  this  last  despatch  which  he  wished  to  sub 
mit  to  His  Majesty. 

Hereupon  His  Majesty  caused  answer  to  be  given  to  the 
Count  through  me,  for  the  third  time,  after  dinner,  about 
half-past  5  o'clock,  that  His  Majesty  must  positively  decline 
to  enter  into  further  discussions  in  regard  to  this  last  point 
(a  binding  assurance  for  the  future).  What  he  had  said  in 
the  morning  was  His  Majesty's  last  word  on  this  matter,  and 
he  could  do  no  more  than  refer  to  it. 

On  the  assurance  that  Count  Bismarck's  arrival  at  Ems 

could  not  be  positively  depended  upon,  even  for  the  next 

day,  Count  Benedetti  declared  that  he,  on  his  part,  would 

rest  content  with  the  declaration  of  His  Majesty  the  King. 

(Signed)  A.  RADZIVILL,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  and 

Adjutant-Major  to  His  Majesty  the  King. 

Ems,  July  13, 1870. 


APPENDIX  I 

THE  NEGOTIATION  AT  EMS 

M.  OLLIVIEB,  admits  the  unusualness,  to  say  the  least,  of 
the  step  taken  by  the  French  government  in  sending  the  Am 
bassador  to  treat  directly  with  the  King  of  Prussia  while 
he  was  taking  a  cure  at  Ems.  See  page  107,  supra.  The 
Due  de  Gramont  by  implication  makes  a  similar  admission 
when,  after  recapitulating  the  vain  attempt  to  obtain  any 
sort  of  satisfaction  at  Berlin,  he  says :  "It  was  not,  there 
fore,  of  our  own  will,  and  in  contemptuous  disregard  of 
diplomatic  customs,  that  our  Ambassador  appealed  to  the 
King  of  Prussia.  He  received  orders  to  that  effect  only  on 
the  day  when  the  official  channel  was  with  premeditation 
closed  to  us."  La  France  et  la  Prusse,  p.  57. 

We  owe  to  M.  de  La  Gorce  a  remarkably  clear  statement 
of  the  difficulties  of  the  task  imposed  upon  Benedetti.  "  Upon 
the  words  to  be  uttered  depended  the  repose  of  France,  per 
haps  the  future  of  the  world.  The  negotiation  began  on 
the  very  heels  of  a  manifesto  which  seemed  to  be  the  first 
act  of  a  war,  so  that  it  seemed  discredited  even  before  it 
began.  The  Ambassador  would  have  to  handle  carefully, 
at  one  and  the  same  time,  the  dignity  of  the  monarch,  who 
was  intent  upon  not  making  haste,  and  the  feverish  ardor 
of  his  government,  who  were  urgent  to  the  point  of  counting 
the  minutes.  A  twofold  danger  would  arise  from  the 
clamorous  outcries  that  were  kept  up  in  France,  and  the  deep- 
seated  wrath  that  was  accumulating  in  Germany.  The 
rank  of  the  sovereign  multiplied  the  perils.  The  Ambassa 
dor  must  needs  be  respectful  and  obstinate  at  once,  must 
detect  the  false  lights  without  seeming  to  have  divined  them, 

468 


APPENDIX  469 

and  fathom  the  King's  purposes  while  pretending  never  to 
have  suspected  them.     A  word  not  well  weighed,  a  demand 
not  clearly  defined,  or  misunderstood,  would  suffice  to  put 
the  honor  of  the  crown  at  stake  and  to  induce  an  irreparable 
explosion.     The  very  place  where  the  King  was  would  facili 
tate  his  means  of  evasion :  he  could  at  his  pleasure  pretend 
that  it  was  his  hour  for  taking  the  waters  or  that  he  needed 
rest,  or  he  could  plead  the  slowness  of  the  post.  .  .  .    The 
distance  from  the  capital,  instead  of  being  a  source  of  em 
barrassment  to  William,  would  be  a  valuable  resource.    If 
pressed  too  close,  he  would  take  refuge  behind  his  ministers, 
to  give  himself  time  for  reflection  and  to  give  his  ministers 
leisure  to  await  their  adversaries'  mistakes.     From  afar  M. 
de  Bismarck  would  watch  events,  would  sharpen  his  master's 
sensitiveness,  would  hold  himself  in  readiness  to  light  the 
fire  for  which  he  had  prepared  the  materials.    Everything 
would  be  a  danger,  even  the  reassuring  graciousness,  the 
cordial  courtesy  of  the  King.    They  who  knew  him  best 
knew  that  that  equanimity  of  temper,  half  natural,  half 
assumed,  was  never  at  fault,  even  in  the  greatest  crises.     It 
was,  as  it  were,  the  misleading  sign,  which  would  prolong 
the  sense  of  security  and  enable  the  monarch's  servants  to 
work  under  cover  until  the  moment  when  the  whole  affair 
should  be  disclosed."    La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  pp.  239,  240.    See, 
to  the  same  effect,  Sorel,  vol.  i,  pp.  100,  101. 

"In  my  judgment,"  said  Bismarck,  "His  Majesty  while 
at  Ems  should  have  refused  every  business  communication 
from  the  French  negotiator,  who  was  not  on  the  same  foot 
ing  with  him,  and  should  have  referred  him  to  the  depart 
ment  in  Berlin.  .  .  .  But  His  Majesty,  however  careful  in 
his  usual  respect  for  departmental  relations,  was  too  fond, 
not  indeed  of  deciding  important  questions  personally,  but, 
at  all  events,  of  discussing  them,  to  make  a  proper  use  of  the 
shelter  with  which  the  sovereign  is  purposely  surrounded 
against  importunities  and  inconvenient  questionings  and 
demands.  That  the  King,  considering  the  consciousness  of 


470          THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

his  supreme  dignity  which  he  possessed  in  so  high  a  degree, 
did  not  withdraw  at  the  very  beginning  from  Benedetti's 
importunity,  was  to  be  attributed  for  the  most  part  to  the 
influence  exercised  upon  him  by  the  Queen,  who  was  at 
Coblentz  close  by.*'  Reflections,  etc.,  English  translation,  vol. 
ii,  pp.  95,  96. 

The  course  of  the  negotiation  at  Ems  is  substantially 
covered  by  M.  Ollivier  in  this  volume.  It  probably  was  fore 
doomed  to  failure  in  any  event ;  for  it  is  hard  to  see  how  the 
war  could  have  been  avoided,  in  view  of  the  attitude  of  the 
extreme  partisans  of  the  Bonapartist  dynasty  and  of  the 
enemies  of  the  existing  government,  together  with  the  war 
like  tone  of  the  Parisian  press  and  the  more  or  less  artificial 
inflammation  of  public  sentiment,  on  the  one  side,  and  of 
Bismarck's  well-established  determination  on  the  other. 
But  it  is  certain  that  the  negotiation  had  reached  such 
a  point  on  the  l£th  that  the  responsibility  for  the  inevitable 
clash —  if  it  was  inevitable  —  might  have  been  avoided  by 
the  French  government,  but  for  certain  matters  over  which 
Benedetti  had  no  control. 

As  we  have  seen  (in  Appendix  E,  supra) ,  Benedetti  having 
published,  soon  after  the  war,  a  justification  of  his  conduct 
in  M a  Mission  en  Prusse,  in  which  he  made  public  all  the 
despatches  —  whether  confidential  or  not  —  which  were 
exchanged  during  his  stay  at  Ems  between  himself  and 
Gramont,  the  latter,  alleging  his  indignation  at  this  breach 
of  propriety  as  a  pretext,  replied,  in  1872,  with  his  volume, 
La  France  et  la  Prusse  avant  la  Guerre,  which  he  expanded 
into  a  vindication  of  his  conduct  during  his  brief  service  as 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  In  1895,  Benedetti  published  a 
second  volume,  —  Essais  Diplomatiques,  —  including  therein 
a  chapter  entitled  Ma  Mission  a  Ems,  which  was  writ 
ten,  he  says,  immediately  after  the  appearance  of  Gra- 
mont's  book.  "I  was  hesitating,  however,  about  entering' 
upon  a  discussion  that  was  undesirable  for  certain  reasons, 
when  M.  de  Gramont's  death  occurred.  Obeying  a  senti- 


APPENDIX  471 

ment  which  everybody  will  understand,  I  thereupon  deter 
mined  to  keep  the  work  in  my  portfolio,  reserving  the  right 
to  publish  it  if  new  developments  should  make  it  my  duty 
to  do  so.  The  contradictory  versions  which  have  constantly 
appeared,  both  in  France  and  abroad,  of  my  conduct  and  my 
acts,  on  an  occasion  of  such  great  interest  for  the  history  of 
my  time,  impel  me  not  "to  wait  until  I  in  my  turn  shall  dis 
appear  without  having  met  the  reproaches,  I  might  say  the 
accusations,  brought  against  me  by  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  who  was  my  last  chief." 

In  this  more  elaborate  discussion  of  the  negotiation  Bene- 
detti  devotes  himself  principally  to  combating  Gramont's 
repeated  assertion  that,  at  the  time  that  the  aspect  of  affairs 
was  entirely  changed  by  the  demand  of  guaranties,  he  had 
accomplished  absolutely  nothing.  On  his  arrival  at  Ems, 
Benedetti  received  an  official  despatch  from  his  chief,  as  well 
as  a  private  letter  (supra,  pp.  140-14&).  In  the  former  he 
was  instructed  to  request  the  Kong  to  intervene,  "  if  not  by 
his  command,  at  least  by  his  counsel,"  and  thus  put  an  end 
to  the  candidacy.  In  the  private  letter  he  was  told  that 
the  only  reply  from  the  King  which  would  prevent  war  was 
this  :  "The  King's  government  does  not  approve  the  Prince 
of  Hohenzollern's  acceptance,  and  orders  him  to  abandon 
his  decision  made  without  the  King's  permission."  "  I  obeyed 
M.  de  Gramont's  official  instructions,"  says  Benedetti,  "pay 
ing  no  heed  to  the  suggestions  contained  in  his  private  letter. 
I  did  not  ask  the  King^  to  order  the  Prince  to  revoke  his 
decision;  I  asked  him  to  advise  the  Prince  to  do  so." 

His  audiences  of  the  King  on  the  9th  and  the  llth  were 
marked  by  the  utmost  courtesy  and  apparent  good  feeling 
on  William's  part,  despite  Benedetti's  persistence  in  urging 
his  demands,  which  were  met  by  the  no  less  persistent  re 
fusal  of  the  King  to  intervene.  It  became  evident,  however, 
that  William  was  willing  enough  to  see  the  end  of  the  affair, 
provided  that  he  could  avoid  compromising  his  own  dignity 
in  the  eyes  of  his  people ;  while  stoutly  denying  that  France 


472         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

was  justified  in  taking  offence  at  the  candidacy,  he  never 
theless  admitted  that  he  was  in ,  communication  with  the 
princes  and  was  expecting  a  definite  answer  from  them,  and 
he  urged  Benedetti  to  telegraph  to  Paris  to  that  effect. 

Meanwhile  Gramont  in  Paris  was  multiplying  despatches 
to  the  Ambassador,  dwelling  upon  the  necessity  of  haste. 
In  obedience  to  the  request  of  the  Council  referred  to  by  M. 
Ollivier  on  page  15£,  Gramont  telegraphed:  "You  cannot 
imagine  the  degree  to  which  public  opinion  is  inflamed.  It 
is  submerging  us  on  all  sides,  and  we  are  counting  the  hours. 
You  must  absolutely  insist  upon  obtaining  a  reply  from  the 
King,  affirmative  or  negative.  We  must  have  it  to-morrow, 
the  next  day  will  be  too  late."  This  was  sent  soon  after 
midnight  of  the  10th,  and  at  about  6  P.M.  of  the  llth,  he 
followed  it  up  with  the  despatch  given  on  page  165,  supra, 
to  which  Benedetti  replied,  on  the  morning  of  the  12th  :  **I 
had  realized  myself  that  at  the  point  affairs  have  reached  I 
ought  to  use  stronger  language  and  show  myself  more  pressing. 
That  is  what  I  did  yesterday,  in  a  second  interview  with  the 
King  before  receiving  your  last  telegrams,  as  you  will  see  by 
the  report  which  will  reach  you  to-day.  You  will  be  of 
opinion,  I  doubt  not,  that  I  could  not  make  my  language 
more  emphatic  without  endangering  the  object  of  my  mission/5 

"It  is  important  to  note/*  says  Benedetti  (Essais  Diplo- 
matiques,  p.  361),  "that  on  the  morning  of  the  12th,  before 
he  knew  of  the  telegram  from  Prince  Leopold's  father  to  the 
Spanish  Ambassador,  before  he  received  M.  Werther,  before 
Duvernois's  interpellation,  M.  de  Gramont  was  fully  in 
formed  of  the  King's  intentions.  He  knew  that  he  refused 
absolutely  to  promise  us  to  give  orders  or  advice  to  Prince 
Leopold,  that  he  proposed  that  his  nephew's  withdrawal 
should  have  all  the  characteristics  of  a  free,  individual  de 
termination,  but  that  he  consented  to  acquiesce  in  it  by  a 
declaration  which  he  authorized  me  to  transmit  to  the 
Imperial  government.  And  M.  de  Gramont  knew  that  that 
declaration  would  be  made  in  a  short  time. 


APPENDIX  473 

"Did  this  arrangement,  which  satisfied  the  King  in  form, 
and  justified  us  in  substance,  meet  our  legitimate  demands  ? 
Ought  we  to  be  content  with  the  withdrawal,  supposed  to  be 
voluntary,  of  the  Prince  with  the  King's  simple  acquiescence, 
or  were  there  imperative  considerations  which  forced  us  to 
insist  that  the  King  should  openly  take  the  initiative  by  a 
command  or  advice  to  the  Prince  ? 

"These  questions  must  have  been  submitted  to  the  judg 
ment  of  the  Emperor  and  his  ministers.  What  was  their 
decision  ?  What  I  can  assert  is  that  the  first  communica 
tion  that  I  received  on  the  l£th,  immediately  after  the  arrival 
of  my  report  despatched  the  day  before,  fully  authorized 
me  to  believe  that  the  government  deemed  the  solution  which 
I  forecasted  sufficiently  satisfactory." 

Here  follow  two  despatches,  the  first  of  which  is  not 
printed  in  this  volume ;  in  it  Gramont  reluctantly  consents 
to  the  delay  requested  by  the  King.  The  second  is  the  one 
given  on  pages  £04,  &05,1  sent  after  Gramont  had  unofficial 
notice  of  the  Prince's  withdrawal. 

"What  is  the  inference  from  these  two  telegrams?" 
Benedetti  continues.  "That,  at  noon  of  the  l£th,  I  am  no 
longer  instructed  to  demand  of  the  King  that  he  forbid  the 
Prince  to  persist  in  his  candidacy,  or  even  that  he  advise  him 
to  withdraw  it.  Which  goes  to  prove  once  more  that  such 
was  not,  as  M.  de  Gramont  alleged,  the  sole  object  of  my 
mission.  It  is,  on  the  other  hand,  a  fair  inference  that  they 
had  decided  at  Paris  to  accept  the  withdrawal  under  the  con 
ditions  on  which  it  was  offered  us. 

"Moreover,  the  exact  meaning  of  these  telegrams  is  given 
us  by  M.  de  Gramont  himself ;  this  is  how  he  expresses  him 
self  on  this  subject :  — 

"'Let  us  suppose  that  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern,  withoul 
a  command  from  the  King,  without  advice  from  the  King 
alone,  of  his  own  motion,  abandons  his  candidacy,  and  s< 

1  In  his  later  work  Benedetti  restores  the  correct  text  of  this  despatdt 
See  supra,  p.  205  n. 


474         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

informs  His  Majesty :  the  King,  making  himself  the  direct  in 
terpreter  of  his  cousin's  spontaneous  resolution,  might  himself 
announce  the  withdrawal,  with  the  accompaniment  of  a  few 
gracious  words.  The  withdrawal,  transmitted  by  tne  King, 
would  thus  become  an  official  act,  a  Prussian  act,  and  the  gov 
ernment  would  have  found  therein  the  shadow  of  a  guaranty 
which,  for  love  of  peace,  it  would  have  magnified  to  the  pro 
portions  of  a  satisfactory  assurance.  ...  It  was  under  the  in 
fluence  of  these  ideas  that  the  two  telegrams  following  were 
sent  to  Comte  Benedetti.'"  See  Gramont,  pp.  101,  102. 

One  can  but  wonder  if  the  true  explanation  of  Gramont's 
indignation  at  the  publication  of  this  "very  confidential" 
telegram  (supra,  p.  £05  n.)  was  not  that  it  naturally,  almost 
inevitably,  suggests  the  inference  that  Benedetti  draws  from 
it.  (See  supra,  p.  428.)  At  all  events,  the  King  had  already 
agreed  to  do,  and  actually  did  do  later,  the  very  thing  that 
Benedetti  was  therein  instructed  to  use  all  his  skill,  "I  will 
even  say  cunning,"  to  induce  him  to  do.  Whether  the 
King's  action  was  already  in  his  mind,  or  was  due  to  Bene- 
detti's  urging,  it  seems  to  me  that  M.  Ollivier's  general 
commendation  of  this  part  of  the  negotiation  (page  168)  does 
not  need  to  be  qualified  by  stigmatizing  the  Ambassador's 
claim  to  have  brought  it  about  as  "vain  braggadocio." 

Then  came  the  demand  of  guaranties  and  the  fat  was  in 
the  fire. 

M.  Ollivier  maintains  that  it  was  the  demand  of  guaranties 
which  caused  the  King  to  determine  not  to  receive  Benedetti 
again,1  and  that  the  perusal  of  Werther's  report  of  his  inter 
view  of  the  l£th  simply  intensified  his  indignation.  He 
elaborates  the  subject  to  the  same  effect,  in  the  Eclaircisse- 
ments  to  vol.  xiv,  pp.  598-600.  Gramont,  on  the  other  hand, 
attributes  the  change  to  the  intervention  of  Bismarck.  "It 
is  manifest  that  Bismarck's  language  to  Lord  A.  Loftus  on 
the  13th  introduced  a  new  phase  in  the  relations  between  the 

1  A  "commemorative  stone"  marks  the  spot  where  they  exchanged  their 
last  words  on  the  Promenade. 


APPENDIX  475 

two  governments.  The  ministers  of  Finance  and  of  the 
Interior  had  joined  the  King,  and  his  attitude  was  to  coin 
cide  thenceforth  with  that  assumed  at  Berlin  by  the  Chan 
cellor.  Comte  Benedetti  is  at  fault  in  attributing  this  change 
to  the  unpleasant  effect  upon  the  King's  mind  produced 
by  Baron  Werther's  report.  .  .  .  This  individual  opinion, 
admissible  up  to  a  certain  point  if  one  could  put  one's  hand 
upon  no  other  cause  for  the  change  in  question,  loses  all  sem 
blance  of  probability  when  one  knows  the  circumstances  and 
details  of  that  interview,  and  especially  when  one  follows 
the  logical  interlocking  of  the  things  that  happened  simul 
taneously  at  Berlin  and  at  Ems."  Gramont,  p.  196. 

Benedetti  contends  with  much  vigor  that  Werther's  report 
was  the  decisive  factor,  and  he  complains  bitterly  of  the 
failure  to  inform  him  of  the  interview  to  which  it  related. 
He  declares  that,  had  he  been  informed  of  it,  he  would  have 
been  justified  in  arguing  to  the  King  that  his  own  later 
despatches  from  Paris,  being  entirely  inconsistent  with  the 
suggestion  made  to  Baron  Werther,  proved  that  that  sugges 
tion  had  been  abandoned  and  should  be  disregarded. 

But  the  question  seems  to  me  to  be  entirely  an  academic 
one,  for  I  cannot  conceive  that  the  effect  of  Werther's  report 
could  have  been  dissipated  by  such  argument  on  Benedetti's 
part.  Camphausen  and  Eulenbourg,  representing  Bismarck, 
arrived  at  the  psychological  moment,  when  the  King's  in 
dignation,  aroused  by  the  demand  of  guaranties,  was  inten 
sified  by  Werther's  report;  and  thereafter  no  adjustment 
was  possible  except  a  complete  back-down  on  the  part  of 
France.  Declining  to  accord  Benedetti  another  audience,  as 
he  had  agreed  to  do,  the  King  sent  his  aide-de-camp  to  him 
to  say  that  he  consented  to  give  his  full  and  unreserved  ap 
proval  1  to  the  withdrawal  of  the  Prince ;  but  it  was  too  late. 

1  But  Radziwill,  the  aide-de-camp  in  question,  in  Ms  report  of  the  transac 
tion  (see  Appendix  H)  declared  the  King's  message  to  have  been  that  he 
approved  the  withdrawal  in  the  same  way  that  he  had  previously  approved 
the  acceptance  —  that  is  to  say,  as  head  of  the  family,  and  not  as  king. 


APPENDIX  J 

I.      THE  DTJC  DE  GRAMONT5S  CIECULAE  NOTE  OF  JULY  24  TO 
THE  POWERS 

(Printed  in  Blue  Book,  No.  3,  pp.  39,  40) 

THE  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  has  addressed  to  the 
Diplomatic  Agents  of  the  Emperor  the  following  de 
spatch  :  — 

PARIS,  July  24,  1870. 
MONSIEUR  :  — 

The  Cabinet  of  Berlin  has  published,  relative  to  the  ne 
gotiations  at  Ems,  various  documents,  in  the  number  of 
which  is  a  despatch  from  Baron  de  Werther,  giving  an  account 
of  a  conversation  we  had  together  during  his  last  stay  in 
this  capital.  These  papers  do  not  present  the  veritable  as 
pect  of  the  course  pursued  by  the  Emperor's  Government 
under  these  circumstances,  and  the  Report  of  M.  de  Werther 
especially  attributes  words  to  me  which  I  believe  mytluty 
requires  me  to  rectify  on  several  points. 

The  Ambassador  of  Prussia,  in  our  interview,  dwelt  par 
ticularly  on  this  consideration,  that  the  King,  in  authorizing 
the  candidature  of  Prince  de  Hohenzollern,  had  never  had 
any  intention  of  wounding  the  Emperor,  and  had  never 
supposed  that  this  combination  could  give  umbrage  to  France. 
I  observed  to  my  interlocutor  that  if  such  was  the  case  a 
similar  assurance  given  would  be  of  a  nature  to  facilitate  the 
accord  we  were  seeking.  But  I  did  not  ask  that  the  King 
should  write  a  letter  of  excuse,  as  the  Berlin  journals  have 
pretended  in  their  semi-official  commentaries. 

476 


APPENDIX  477 

Nor  can  I  agree  to  the  observations  which  the  Baron 
attributes  to  me  on  the  subject  of  the  declaration  of  the  6th 
of  July.  I  did  not  admit  that  this  manifestation  had  been 
determined  by  Parliamentary  necessities.  I  explained  our 
language  by  the  sharpness  of  the  wound  we  had  received,  and 
I  in  no  way  put  forward  the  personal  position  of  the  Min 
isters  as  the  motive  determining  their  conduct.  What  I 
said  was,  that  no  Cabinet  could  preserve  in  France  the  con 
fidence  of  the  Chambers  and  public  opinion  in  consenting 
to  an  arrangement  which  did  not  contain  a  serious  guarantee 
for  the  future.  I  must  add,  contrary  to  the  recital  of  M.  de 
Werther,  that  I  made  no  distinction  between  the  Emperor 
and  Prance.  Nothing  in  my  language  could  authorize  the 
Representative  of  Prussia  to  suppose  that  a  strict  solidarity 
of  impressions  did  not  prevail  between  the  Sovereign  and  the 
whole  nation. 

Those  reserves  made,  I  arrive  at  the  principal  reproach 
made  against  us  by  the  Cabinet  of  Berlin.  We  are  said  to 
have  voluntarily  opened  the  discussion  with  the  King  of 
Prussia  instead  of  with  his  Government.  But  when  on  the 
4th  of  July,  in  accordance  with  my  instructions,  our  Charge 
d' Affaires  called  upon  Count  de  Thile  to  speak  to  him  of  the 
news  we  had  received  from  Spain,  what  was  the  language 
of  the  Secretary  of  State?  According  to  his  own  expres 
sion,  *the  Prussian  Government  was  completely  ignorant  of 
this  affair,  which  did  not  exist  for  it.'  In  presence  of  the 
attitude  of  the  Cabinet,  which  affected  to  have  nothing  to  do 
with  the  incident,  and  to  consider  it  as  solely  regarding  the 
Prussian  Royal  Family,  what  could  we  do  except  apply  to 
the  King  himself  ? 

It  is  thus  that,  against  our  will,  we  requested  our  Ambas 
sador  to  place  himself  in  communication  with  the  Sovereign 
instead  of  treating  with  his  Minister. 

I  have  resided  long  enough  in  the  Courts  of  Europe  to 
know  how  disadvantageous  that  mode  of  negotiation  is, 
and  all  the  Cabinets  will  put  faith  in  my  words  when  I  affirm 


478         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

that  we  only  pursued  that  path  because  all  others  were  closed 
to  us.  We  regret  that  Count  de  Bismarck,  as  soon  as  he  was 
aware  of  the  gravity  of  the  affair,  had  not  gone  to  Ems  to 
resume  his  natural  position  as  intermediary  between  the 
King  and  our  Ambassador ;  but  are  we  in  reality  responsible 
for  the  isolation  in  which  His  Majesty  doubtless  desired  to 
remain,  and  which  the  Chancellor  probably  found  favourable 
to  his  designs  ?  And  if,  as  the  Cabinet  of  Berlin  states,  the 
declaration  of  war  remitted  by  our  Charge  d'Affaires  consti 
tutes  our  first  written  and  official  communication,  whose  is 
the  fault  ?  Are  n,otes  addressed  to  Sovereigns  ?  Could 
our  Ambassador  so  far  derogate  from  customary  usages 
when  he  was  treating  with  the  King,  and  is  not  the  absence 
of  any  document  exchanged  between  the  two  Governments 
the  necessary  consequence  of  the  obligation  under  which  we 
were  placed  to  pursue  the  discussion  at  Ems,  instead  of  con 
tinuing  it  at  Berlin,  where  we  had  first  raised  it  ? 

Before  closing  these  rectifications,  I  must  refer  to  one 
observation  of  the  Prussian  Cabinet.  According  to  a  tele 
gram  from  Berlin,  published  by  the  journals  of  the  23d, 
MM.  de  Bismarck  and  de  Thile,  contesting  a  passage  in  my 
circular  despatch  of  the  £lst  of  July,  declared  that  "since 
the  day  they  heard  of  the  offer  addressed  to  the  Prince  de 
Hohenzollern,  the  question  of  that  candidature  to  the  Throne 
of  Spain  had  never  been  the  subject  of  the  least  conversation, 
either  official  or  private,  between  themselves  and  M.  Bene- 
detti."  In  the  form  in  which  it  is  produced,  this  affirmation 
is  ambiguous ;  it  seems  to  refer  solely  to  the  relations  of  our 
Ambassador  with  the  Prussian  Ministry,  posterior  to  the 
acceptance  of  Prince  Leopold.  In  that  sense,  it  would  not 
be  contrary  to  what  we  have  ourselves  said;  but  if  it  is 
extended  to  anterior  communications,  it  ceases  to  be  true, 
and  to  establish  that  fact  I  cannot  do  better  than  cite  here 
a  despatch  dated  the  21st  of  March,  1869,  addressed  by  Count 
Benedetti  to  the  Marquis  de  Lavalette,  then  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs. 


APPENDIX  479 

It  is  thus  conceived:  — 

"BERLIN,  March  31,  1869. 
"M.  LE  MARQUIS, 

"Your  Excellency  requested  me  by  telegraph  yesterday 
to  assure  myself  whether  the  candidature  of  the  Prince  de 
Hohenzollern  to  the  Throne  of  Spain  had  a  serious  character. 
I  had  occasion  this  morning  to  see  M.  de  Thile,  and  I  asked 
him  if  I  was  to  attach  any  importance  to  the  rumours  in 
circulation  on  this  subject.  I  did  not  conceal  from  him 
that  I  was  anxious  to  be  exactly  informed,  remarking  that 
such  an  eventuality  was  of  too  direct  interest  to  the  Emperor's 
Government  for  my  duty  not  to  compel  me  to  point  out  the 
danger  if  any  reason  existed  to  believe  that  the  project  might 
be  realized.  I  made  him  aware  that  I  intended  to  communi 
cate  our  conversation  to  you. 

"M.  de  Thile  gave  me  the  most  formal  assurance  that  he 
had  not  at  any  moment  been  aware  of  any  indication  what 
ever  which  could  authorize  such  a  conjecture,  and  that  the 
Spanish  Minister  at  Vienna,  during  the  stay  he  made  in 
Berlin,  had  not  ever  made  any  allusion  to  the  subject.  The 
TJnder-Secretary  of  State,  in  thus  expressing  himself,  and 
without  anything  I  said  being  of  a  nature  to  induce  such  a 
manifestation,  believed  himself  called  upon  to  pledge  his 
word  of  honour. 

"According  to  him,  M.  Ranees  had  confined  himself  to 
talking  to  Count  de  Bismarck  —  who  perhaps  was  anxious 
to  take  advantage  of  the  passage  of  this  diplomatist  to  obtain 
some  information  on  the  state  of  things  in  Spain  —  of  the 
manner  in  which  affairs  were  advancing  in  what  concerned  the 
choice  of  the  future  Sovereign. 

"That  in  substance,  is  what  M.  de  Thile  stated  to  me, 
several  times  repeating  his  first  declaration,  that  there  was 
not,  and  could  not  be,  a  question  of  the  Prince  de  Hohen 
zollern  for  the  Crown  of  Spain. 

"Accept,  etc., 

"BENEDETTI." 


480         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

After  this  quotation  I  believe  I  have  no  occasion,  to  enter 
into  any  further  explanations  on  a  point  we  must  consider 
as  definitely  established. 

GRAMONT. 

n,    BARON  WERTHER'S  REPORT  OF  HIS  CONVERSATION  WITH 

GRAMONT  ON  JULY  1£ 

PARIS,  July  12,  1870. 

I  arrived  at  Paris  this  morning,  soon  after  ten,  accompanied 
by  a  messenger  from  Count  Benedetti,  Baron  de  Bourqueney. 
The  Due  de  Gramont  at  once  sent  his  secretary,  Count  de 
Faverney,  to  me  to  ask  if  I  cpuld  call  upon  the  minister.  I 
replied  that  I  was  ready  to  do  so,  and  I  was  received  by  the 
Due  de  Gramont  with  his  customary  affability,  as  one  would 
expect  between  two  old  acquaintances.  Before  reporting 
our  interview,  I  will  say  that  it  was  interrupted  by  the 
arrival  of  the  Spanish  Ambassador,  who  had  an  official 
communication  to  present.  This  consisted  of  a  telegram 
from  Prince  Antony  of  Hohenzollern  (the  father),  in  which 
he  announced  that  his  son,  the  hereditary  prince,  in  view  of 
the  complications  caused  by  his  candidacy,  renounced  the 
throne  of  Spain,  and  had  advised  Marshal  Prim  directly  of 
his  decision. 

Our  interview,  begun  by  the  Due  de  Gramont,  turned 
principally  upon  the  subject  brought  up  by  M.  Benedetti : 
namely,  that  His  Royal  Majesty,  by  his  authorization  of 
the  Hohenzollern  candidacy  without  having  first  entered  into 
any  understanding  thereon  with  the  imperial  French  govern 
ment,  had  not  realized  that  he  had  thereby  offended  France. 

He  asked  me  if  that  were  really  the  fact.  I  explained  to- 
him  that  His  Royal  Majesty  could  not  officially  have  refused 
such  authorization,  when  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern  felt 
disposed  to  accept  the  crown  proffered  him,  and  that,  having 
regard  to  the  relations  of  the  Prince's  family  with  the  Em 
peror,  His  Majesty  could  not  have  thought  that  that  candi 
dacy  would  be  ill-received  in  France, 


APPENDIX  481 

The  Due  de  Gramont  cited  the  cases  of  the  Due  de  Nemours 
and  the  throne  of  Belgium,  and  of  Prince  Alfred  and  the 
throne  of  Greece,  as  cases  in  which  a  similar  authorization 
had  been  refused.  I  denied  all  analogy  with  the  present  case. 
The  Due  de  Gramont  went  on  to  say  that  France,  as  Spain's 
nearest  neighbor,  must  be  interested  in  the  occupancy  of  the 
throne  of  that  country.  The  secrecy  in  which  the  negotia 
tions  concerning  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy  had  been 
shrouded  could  not  fail  to  give  great  offence  here,  especially 
as  the  court  of  the  Tuileries  had  constantly  shown  the 
greatest  consideration  for  our  government  in  all  political 
questions.  Such  conduct  had  deeply  wounded  the  public 
mind  in  France  and  one  found  the  expression  of  that  feel 
ing  in  the  attitude  of  the  Chamber,  which  was,  unfortunately, 
now  in  session  —  which  fact  aggravated  the  situation. 

The  Due  de  Gramont  added  that  he  regarded  the  with 
drawal  of  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern  as  a  secondary  matter, 
for  the  French  government  would  never  have  permitted  his 
installation ;  but  he  feared  that,  by  reason  of  our  conduct, 
there  might  be  a  permanent  misunderstanding  between  our 
two  countries.  This  germ  must  be  destroyed,  and  to  that 
end  we  must  take  as  our  starting  point  that  in  our  actions 
toward  France  we  had  not  used  friendly  methods,  which 
fact  had  been  recognized,  to  his  knowledge,  by  all  the  great 
powers. 

In  all  sincerity,  he  did  not  desire  war,  but  cordial  and 
friendly  relations  with  Prussia,  and  he  knew  that  I  was  aiming 
at  the  same  result ;  we  ou^ht  therefore  to  work  together  to 
find  out  whether  there  was  any  way  of  exerting  a  soothing 
influence  in  that  direction,  and  he  submitted  to  my  judgment 
the  question  whether  the  true  expedient  would  not  lie  in  a 
letter  from  the  King  to  the  Emperor.  He  appealed  to  His 
Royal  Majesty's  heart,  and  he  would  give  his  just  consent. 
It  would  be  simply  a  matter  of  saying  in  the  letter  that 
His  Royal  Majesty,  in  deigning  to  authorize  Prince  Leopold 
of  Hohenzollern  to  accept  the  crown  of  Spain,  had  not 


482         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

intended  to  impair  the  interests  or  the  dignity  of  the  French 
nation;  that  the  King  associated  himself  with  the  Prince's 
withdrawal,  and  that  he  did  so  with  the  desire  and  the  hope 
of  seeing  every  subject  of  disagreement  between  our  two 
governments  vanish  therewith.  Such  were  the  words, 
destined  to  bring  about  the  tranquillizing  of  public  feeling, 
which  the  letter  in  question  should  contain ;  but  there  must 
be  no  mention,  observed  M.  de  Gramont,  of  [Prince  Leopold's] 
relationship  to  the  Emperor.  That  argument  would  be  par 
ticularly  offensive  here. 

I  directed  the  Due  de  Gramont's  attention  to  the  fact 
that  such  a  proceeding  would  be  made  extremely  difficult 
by  the  remarks  made  by  him  in  the  Chamber  on  the  6th 
instant :  they  contained  declarations  which  might  well  have 
wounded  the  King  very  deeply.  The  Due  de  Gramont 
sought  to  combat  this  argument  by  reminding  me  that  Prussia 
had  not  been  named  at  all,  and  that  his  speech  was  absolutely 
necessary  at  that  moment,  to  pacify  the  extraordinary 
excitement  of  the  Chamber. 

At  this  moment  the  Minister  of  Justice,  M.  Emile  Ollivier, 
joined  in  our  interview,  the  subject  of  which  the  Due  de 
Gramont  made  known  to  him.  M.  Emile  Ollivier  main 
tained  most  urgently  the  salutary  necessity  of  acting  in  the 
interest  of  peace,  and  earnestly  begged  me  to  submit  to  His 
Majesty  the  King  the  idea  of  a  letter  to  that  effect.  They 
both  said  that  if  I  felt  that  I  could  not  undertake  it,  they 
should  find  themselves  compelled  to  instruct  Count  Bene- 
detti  to  raise  the  question.  The  two  ministers,  while  dwell 
ing  upon  the  point  that  they  required  some  arrangement  of 
this  sort  to  calm  the  public  agitation,  having  regard  to  their 
ministerial  situation,  added  that  such  a  letter  would  authorize 
them  to  come  forward  in  defence  of  His  Majesty  the  King 
against  the  attacks  which  would  inevitably  be  made  upon 
him. 

Finally  they  both  informed  me  that  they  could  not  conceal 
from  me  that  our  conduct  in  the  Spanish-Hohenzollern 


APPENDIX  483 

affair  had  excited  the  French  nation  much  more  than  it  had 
affected  the  Emperor. 

In  our  conversation  the  Due  de  Gramont  made  this  remark : 
that  he  believed  that  the  Prince  had  withdrawn  under 
pressure  from  His  Majesty  the  King.  I  contradicted  this 
idea,  and  asserted  that  the  withdrawal  unquestionably  ema 
nated  from  the  Prince  on  his  own  initiative. 

In  their  intense  desire  to  hasten  matters,  the  ministers 
wished  me  to  report  this  interview  by  telegraph,  but  I  did 
not  consider  it  necessary. 

WEBTHEB. 


APPENDIX  K 

THE  EMS  DESPATCH 

TELEGEAMS  had  been  exchanged  between  the  King  and  Bis 
marck  on  the  subject  of  the  Werther  report.  In  reply  to  the 
King's  request  for  his  opinion  as  to  the  letter  to  be  written 
by  him,  Bismarck  had  telegraphed :  "  It  is  impossible  to  sign 
it."  1  So  that  there  is  nothing  strange  in  the  silence  thereon 
of  Abeken's  despatch  to  Bismarck,  dated  at  Ems,  July  13, 
3.50  P.M.  The  Chancellor's  purpose  in  handling  the  despatch 
as  he  did  was  disclosed  by  himself  with  his  usual  cynicism 
twenty  years  later,  and  is  made  clear  enough  in  the  text  of 
this  volume.  According  to  the  version  read  by  von  Caprivi 
in  the  Reichstag,  on  November  23,  189&,  Abeken  tele 
graphed  :  — 

" Seine MajestatderKonigschreibtmir  :  'Graf  Benedettifing 
mich  auf  der  Promenade  ab,  urn  auf  zuletzt  sehr  zudringliche 
Art  von  mir  zu  verlangen,  ich  sollte  ihn  autorisiren,  sofort  zu 
telegraphiren,  das  ich  fur  alle  Zukunft  mich  verpflichte, 
niemals  wieder  meine  Zustimmung  zu  geben  wenn  die  Hohen- 
zollern  auf  ihre  Kandidatur  zuriickkamen.  Ich  wies  ihn 
zuletzt  etwas  ernst  zuriick,  da  man  a  tout  jamais  dergleichen 
Engagements  nicht  nehmen  diirfe  noch  konne.  Naturlich 
sagte  ich  ihm,  das  ich  noch  nichts  erhalten  hatte,  und  das  er 
iiber  Paris  und  Madrid  friiher  benachrichtigt  sei  als  ich,  er 
wohl  einsahe,  das  mein  gouvernement  wiederum  ausser 
Spiel  sei.* 

"Seine  Majestat  hat  seitdem  ein  Schreiben  des  Fiirsten 

1  Interview  with  Bismarck,  printed  in  the  Neue  Fr&ie  Presse  of  Vienna, 
November  20,  1892,  three  days  before  Count  von  Caprivi's  address  to  the 
Reichstag  concerning  the  Ems  despatch. 

484 


APPENDIX  485 

bekommen.  Da  Seine  Majestat  dem  Grafen  Benedetti 
besagt  das  er  Nachricht  von  FCirsten  erwarte,  hat  Aller- 
hochstderselbe,  mit  Rlicksicht  auf  die  obige  Zumutung,  auf 
des  Grafen  Eulenburg  und  meinen  Vortrag,  beschlossen,  den 
Grafen  Benedetti  nicht  mehr  zu  empfangen,  sondern  ihm 
nur  durch  einen  Adjudanten  sagen  zu  lassen:  das  Seine 
Majestat  jetzt  von  Fiirsten  die  Bestatigung  der  Nachricht 
erhalten,  die  Benedetti  aus  Paris  schon  gehabt,  und  dem 
Bostschafter  nichts  welter  zu  sagen  habe. 

"Seine  Majestat  stellt  Eurer  Excellenz  anheim  ob  nicht 
die  neue  Forderung  Benedetti's,  und  ihre  Zuriickweisung 
sogleich  sowohl  unseren  Gefandten  als  in  der  Presse  mitge- 
theilt  werden  sollte." 

In  his  interview  in  the  Neue  Freie  Presse,  Bismarck  inter 
preted  the  last  paragraph  thus  :  "I  was  authorized  to  make 
such  erasures  as  seemed  to  me  necessary.  It  was  left  to  my 
discretion  to  publish  the  despatch  in  extenso  or  by  extracts. 
I  have  never  regretted  that  I  did  the  latter."  In  the  course 
of  a  long  and  exhaustive  discussion  of  the  subject,  M.  Wel- 
schinger  says  :  "Now,  the  paragraph  as  written  by  Abeken 
gave  no  such  authorization.  It  simply  left  Bismarck  at 
liberty  to  communicate  to  the  German  embassies  and  the 
newspapers  Benedetti's  latest  demand  and  the  King's  re 
fusal,  without  a  word  as  to  extracts.  ...  It  was  not  con 
cerned  with  the  refusal  to  receive  the  Ambassador,  but  simply 
with  the  refusal  to  accede  to  the  demand  of  guaranties. 
He  should  therefore  have  published  the  despatch  as  it  was, 
and  then  people  would  have  learned  that  Benedetti  had 
addressed  the  King  on  the  promenade,  to  ask  his  authority 
to  telegraph  that  he  would  undertake  not  to  give  his  approval 
if  the  Hohenzollerns  should  ever  renew  the  candidacy.  And 
they  would  have  learned,  at  the  same  time  with  the  King's 
refusal,  of  his  declaration  that  he  considered  that  his  govern 
ment  was  out  of  the  game,  by  reason  of  the  Prince's  with 
drawal.  In  this  part  of  the  despatch,  it  will  be  seen,  there 
was  nothing  brutal  or  particularly  offensive." 


486         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

He  proceeds  to  argue  that  the  second  paragraph  of  the 
despatch  Is  a  commentary  of  Abeken  and  Eulenbourg  on  the 
King's  own  message  contained  in  the  first  paragraph,  but 
that  their  commentary  was  inaccurate.  "The  despatch  was 
sent  at  3.50  P.M.,  and  two  things  had  happened  meanwhile 
since  the  interview  between  the  King  and  Benedetti  in  the 
forenoon,"  namely,  the  King's  announcements  through  his 
aide-de-camp  to  Benedetti  that,  the  Prince  having  withdrawn, 
he  considered  the  affair  as  concluded,  and  that  he  fully  ap 
proved  the  withdrawal.  "Abeken  and  Eulenbourg  did  not 
mention  these  two  important  facts  .  .  .  although  they 
knew  of  them  at  3.50,  and  still  they  left  it  to  Bismarck  to 
decide  whether  Benedetti's  new  demand  and  the  King's 
refusal  should  be  communicated  to  the  Prussian  ministers 
and  the  press.  It  is  more  than  doubtful  whether  the  King 
gave  that  authorization,  for  he  would  thereby  infallibly 
provoke  a  rupture  and  place  himself  in  disagreement  with 
himself.  In  truth,  how  could  he  have  written  to  the  Queen 
on  the  14th  that  he  proposed  to  transfer  the  negotiations  to 
Berlin  ?  And  how  could  he  have  said  to  Benedetti  when  he 
received  him  the  same  day  at  the  railway  station,  that  'the 
negotiations  which  remained  to  be  carried  on  would  be  con 
ducted  by  his  government?'  .  .  .  And  there  is  his  letter 
to  the  Queen  of  the  17th :  'The  anecdote  that  is  going  about 
of  a  Prussian  circular  which  provoked  the  declaration  of  war 
is  outrageous,  for  such  a  circular  never  existed.  It  is 
wretched  to  lie  so  I5  It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  the  sophisti 
cation  resorted  to  by  the  Chancellor  at  the  last  moment  was 
concealed  from  the  King. 

"But  why  did  Bismarck  act  thus  ?  Because  the  terms  of 
the  despatch  dictated  by  the  King,  although  silent  as  to  the 
Prince's  withdrawal  and  the  assurance  that  the  affair  was 
settled,  seemed  to  him  weak  and  colorless.  In  the  sentence  : 
'He  could  see  that  my  government  was  out  of  the  game,* 
the  Chancellor  saw  a  sort  of  apology.  ...  In  short,  the 
despatch  from  Ems  confined  itself  to  saying  that  the  King 


APPENDIX  487 

did  not  choose  to  receive  the  Ambassador  again  because  he 
had  nothing  to  add  to  the  reply  he  had  given  him  in  the 
morning.  To  the  Chancellor's  mind  that  was  neither  short 
enough  nor  sharp  enough.  And  so,  seizing  upon  the  per 
mission  given  him  by  Abeken,  to  decide  whether  he  should 
communicate  to  the  German  ambassadors  and  newspapers  the 
demand  of  guaranties  and  the  King's  refusal,  he  does  it  in 
these  few  incisive  words :  '-His  Majesty  refused  to  receive 
the  French  Ambassador  again,  and  sent  the  aide-de-camp 
on  duty  to  say  that  His  Majesty  had  nothing  more  to  com 
municate  to  him.  * " 

^  Bismarck's  "edition"  of  the  despatch  reads  as  foUows  :  — 
"Ens,  Juli  13,  1870  :  —  Nach  dem  die  Nachrichten  von  der 
Entsagung  der  Erbprinzen  von  Hohenzollern  der  Kaiserlich 
franzcisischen  Regierung  von  der  Koniglich  spanischen 
amtlich  mit  getheilt  worden  sind,  hat  der  franzcisischen  Bots- 
chafter  in  Ems  an  Seine  Majestat  nach  die  Forderung 
gestellt,  ihn  zu  autorisiren,  das  er  nach  Paris  telegraphiere, 
das  Seine  Majestat  der  Konig  sich  fur  alle  Ziikunft  ver- 
pflichte,  niemals  wieder  seine  Zustimmung  zu  geben,  wenn 
die  Hohenzollern  auf  ihre  Kandidatur  wieder  zuriickkommen 
sollten.  Seine  Majestat  der  Konig  hat  es  darauf  abgelehnt, 
den  franzosischen  Botschafter  nochmals  zu  empfangen  und 
demselben  durch  den  Adjudanten  von  Dienst  sagen  lassen, 
das  Seine  Majestat  dem  Botschafter  nichts  weiter  mitzu- 
theilen  habe." 

If  space  permitted  it  would  be  interesting  to  follow  M. 
Welschinger's  demonstration  of  Bismarck's  recklessness  of 
statement  as  shown  in  his  previously  quoted  interview  in  the 
Neue  Freie  Presse,  where  lie  so  described  his  handling  of 
the  despatch  as  to  make  it  perfectly  clear  that  he  was  talk 
ing  about  RadziwilPs  report  of  the  occurrences  of  the  14th 
(printed  as  a  part  of  Bismarck's  Circular  Note  in  Appendix 
H)  instead  of  Abeken's  despatch.  In  his  Reflections  and 
Reminiscences  (English  translation,  vol.  ii,  p.  101),  he  says: 
"I  made  use  of  the  royal  authorization  communicated  to  me 


488         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

through  Abeken,  to  publish  the  contents  of  the  telegram; 
and  in  the  presence  of  my  two  guests  I  reduced  the  telegram 
by  striking  out  words,  but  without  adding  or  altering.  .  .  . 
The  difference  in  the  effect  of  the  abbreviated  text  of  the  Ems 
telegram,  as  compared  with  that  produced  by  the  original, 
was  not  the  result  of  stronger  words,  but  of  the  form,  which 
made  this  announcement  appear  decisive,  while  Abeken's 
version  would  only  have  been  regarded  as  a  fragment  of  a 
negotiation  still  pending,  and  to  be  continued  at  Berlin." 

In  a  footnote  to  his  Political  History  of  Europe  (Macvane's 
edition,  p.  810),  M.  Seignobos  says :  "Bismarck  having 
boasted  later  of  having  modified  the  terms  of  the  note  to 
make  war  inevitable,  the  German  socialists  reproached  him 
with  having  falsified  the  Ems  despatch ;  and  the  French 
press  has  repeated  this  accusation.  It  is  enough  to  compare 
the  two  texts  to  show  that  there  was  no  falsification.  The 
despatch  sent  to  Bismarck  by  Abeken  in  the  Bang's  name  is 
in  a  confidential  and  obscure  form,  not  suitable  for  publica 
tion,  and  ends  thus :  *His  Majesty  leaves  it  to  your  Excel 
lency,'  etc.  The  note  published  by  Bismarck  adds  nothing 
which  is  not  in  the  despatch ;  it  simply  abbreviates  it." 

The  suggestion  that  it  was  simply  the  German  socialists 
who  discovered  a  "falsification"  of  the  original  despatch 
in  Bismarck's  version,  is  sufficiently  disproved  by  the  ex 
tracts  from  German  historians,  given  by  M.  Ollivier,  all  of 
whom,  as  he  says,  extol  Bismarck  for  that  falsification.  The 
further  suggestion,  that  in  France  only  the  press  have  re 
peated  the  charge,  needs  no  refutation  from  any  one  who  has 
glanced  into  any  of  the  histories  of  the  period.  See,  for 
example,  La  Gorce,  vol.  vi,  p.  £83. 

In  his  History  of  Twenty-Five  Years,  vol.  ii,  p.  491,  Sir 
Spencer  Walpole  says  :  Bismarck  "saw  that  if  he  published 
it  (the  King's  telegram)  as  it  was  received,  it  would  create 
neither  enthusiasm  in  Germany,  nor  resentment  in  France. 
But  he  saw  also  that  by  compressing  the  sentences  he  could 
create  the  impression  that  the  King  had  met  the  demand  of 


APPENDIX  489 

France  by  declining  to  see  the  French.  Ambassador,  and  had 
communicated  the  decision,  in  a  manner  that  was  discourte 
ous  or  even  offensive,  through  one  of  his  aides-de-camp.  In 
other  words  he  saw  that  he  could  convert  an  innocuous  piece 
of  paper  into  what  he  himself  called  a  red  rag  for  the  Gallic 
bull.  He  saw  that  he  could  produce  a  war  which  even  at 
the  eleventh  hour  might  otherwise  have  been  avoided." 

To  make  it  appear  to  his  own  countrymen  that  the  French 
Ambassador  had  made  an  unreasonable  demand,  and  to  the 
French  people  that  their  representative  had  been  insulted  — 
that  such  was  Bismarck's  purpose  there  can  be  no  possible 
question,  nor  that,  in  order  to  give  that  impression,  it  was 
essential  to  "denature"  Abeken's  despatch  by  some  means. 
For,  as  Benedetti  was  never  tired  of  saying,  "at  Ems  there 
was  neither  insulter  nor  insulted."  "I  received  no  insult 
at  Ems,"  he  told  the  Commission  of  Inquiry  concerning  the 
4th  of  September,  "and  my  correspondence  shows  that  I 
never  complained  of  any  ill-treatment."  And  he  quotes  the 
King  as  saying  several  years  later:  "M.  Benedetti  did  his 
duty  properly  —  that  is  all.*5  (Essais  Diplomatiques,  pp. 
20,  391.)  "At  Ems,"  says  Sorel  (vol.  i,  p.  160),  "the  King  did 
not  seem  to  suspect  that  M.  Benedetti  had  failed  in  proper 
respect  to  him,  nor  did  M.  Benedetti  suspect  that  the  King 
had  insulted  France  in  his  person."  But  "at  Berlin  no  one 
doubted  that  the  French  Ambassador  had  insulted  the  King, 
just  as,  at  Paris  the  next  day,  no  one  doubted  that  the  King 
had  insulted  the  French  Ambassador.  From  this  double- 
barrelled  imposture  sprang  the  twofold  wrath  which  impelled 
two  peoples,  equally  deceived,  against  each  other."  La 
Gorce,  vol.  vi,  p.  284. 

It  is  strange,  to  say  no  more,  that  it  occurred  to  no  member 
of  the  Council  to  interrogate  Benedetti,  in  the  light  of  this 
despatch.  It  seems  to  have  been  taken  for  granted  that  the 
bald  statement  contained  therein  was  true.  It  is  clear, 
however,  from  Gramont's  own  statements  to  Lyons,  as  re 
ported  by  him  to  Lord  Granville  on  the  15th,  that  he  was  not 


490         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

misled.  "Nor  indeed  had  the  King  really  treated  Benedetti 
with  the  rough  discourtesy  which  had  been  boasted  of  by  the 
Prussian  Government.  But  that  Government  had  now  chosen 
to  declare  to  Germany  and  to  Europe  that  France  had  been 
affronted  in  the  person  of  her  Ambassador.  It  was  the  boast 
which  was  the  gravamen  of  the  offence.  It  constituted  an . 
insult  which  no  nation  of  any  spirit  could  brook."  Blue 
Book,  p.  40.  So  that,  in  Gramont's  eyes,  the  insult  con 
sisted  in  the  false  pretence  that  there  had  been  an  insult. 
But  this  clearly  was  not  the  view  of  most  of  his  colleagues, 
fand,  above  all,  not  of  the  members  of  the  Commission  ap 
pointed  by  the  Chamber  to  pass  upon  the  government's 
proposed  war  legislation.  As  to  the  failure  of  the  Commis 
sion  to  hear  Benedetti,  see  Sorel,  vol.  i,  p.  186 ;  La  Gorce, 
voL  vi,  pp.  308,  309. 


APPENDIX  L 

INTERVIEW  BETWEEN  COUNT  BISMARCK  AND  LORD  A.  LOFTTJS, 
BRITISH  AMBASSADOR 

(Reported  by  Lof  tus  to  Lord  Granville.    Blue  Book,  pp.  3£,  33) 

BERLIN,  July  13, 1870. 

I  HAD  an  interview  with  Count  Bismarck  to-day,  and  con 
gratulated  his  Excellency  on  the  apparent  solution  of  the 
impending  crisis  by  the  spontaneous  renunciation  of  the 
Prince  of  Hohenzollern. 

His  Excellency  appeared  somewhat  doubtful  as  to  whether 
this  solution  would  prove  a  settlement  of  the  difference  with 
France.  He  told  me  that  the  extreme  moderation  evinced 
by  the  King  of  Prussia  under  the  menacing  tone  of  the 
French  Government,  and  the  courteous  reception  by  His 
Majesty  of  Count  Benedetti  at  Ems,  after  the  severe  lan 
guage  held  to  Prussia,  both  officially  and  in  the  French  press, 
was  producing  throughout  Prussia  general  indignation. 

He  had  that  morning,  he  said,  received  telegrams  from 
Bremen,  Konigsberg,  and  other  places,  expressing  strong 
disapprobation  of  the  conciliatory  course  pursued  by  the 
King  of  Prussia  at  Ems,  and  requiring  that  the  honour  of 
the  country  should  not  be  sacrificed. 

Count  Bismarck  then  expressed  a  wish  that  Her  Majesty's 
Government  should  take  some  opportunity,  possibly  by  a 
declaration  in  Parliament,  of  expressing  their  satisfaction  at 
the  solution  of  the  Spanish  difficulty  by  the  spontaneous  act 
of  Prince  Leopold,  and  of  bearing  public  testimony  to  the 
calm  and  wise  moderation  of  the  King  of  Prussia,  his  Govern 
ment,  and  of  the  public  press. 

491 


492         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

His  Excellency  adverted  to  the  declaration  made  by  the 
Due  de  Gramont  to  the  Corps  Legislatif,  "that  the  Powers 
of  Europe  had  recognized  the  just  grounds  of  France  in  the 
demand  addressed  to  the  Prussian  Government";  and  he 
was,  therefore,  anxious  that  some  public  testimony  should 
be  given  that  the  Powers  who  had  used  their  bons  offices  to 
urge  on  the  Prussian  Government  a  renunciation  by  Prince 
Leopold,  should  likewise  express  their  appreciation  of  the 
peaceful  and  conciliatory  disposition  manifested  by  the  King 
of  Prussia. 

Count  Bismarck  then  observed  that  intelligence  had  been 
received  from  Paris  (though  not  officially  from  Baron 
Werther)  that  the  solution  of  the  Spanish  difficulty  would 
not  suffice  to  content  the  French  Government,  and  that 
other  claims  would  be  advanced.  If  such  be  the  case,  said 
his  Excellency,  it  was  evident  that  the  question  of  the  suc 
cession  to  the  Spanish  Throne  was  but  a  mere  pretext,  and 
that  the  real  object  of  France  was  to  seek  a  revenge  for 
Koniggratz  [Sadowa]. 

The  feeling  of  the  German  nation,  said  his  Excellency, 
was  that  they  were  fully  equal  to  cope  with  France,  and  they 
were  equally  as  confident  as  the  French  might  be  of  mili 
tary  success.  The  feeling,  therefore,  in  Prussia  and  in 
Germany  was  that  they  should  accept  no  humiliation  or 
insult  from  France,  and  that  if  unjustly  provoked  they  should 
accept  the  combat. 

"  But,"  said  his  Excellency,  "  we  do  not  wish  for  war,  and 
we  have  proved,  and  shall  continue  to  prove,  our  peaceful 
disposition;  at  the  same  time  we  cannot  allow  the  French 
to  have  the  start  of  us  as  regards  armaments.  I  have,"  said 
his  Excellency,  "positive  information  that  military  prepara 
tions  have  been  made,  and  are  making,  in  France  for  war. 
Large  stores  of  munitions  are  being  concentrated,  large  pur 
chases  of  hay,  and  other  materials  necessary  for  a  campaign, 
are  making;  and  horses  are  being  collected.  If  these 
continue,"  said  his  Excellency,  "we  shall  be  obliged  to  ask 


APPENDIX  493 

the  French  Government  for  explanations  as  to  their  object 
and  meaning. 

"  After  what  has  now  occurred  we  must  require  some  assur 
ance,  some  guarantee,  that  we  may  not  be  subjected  to  a 
sudden  attack;  we  must  know  that  this  Spanish  difficulty 
once  removed,  there  are  no  other  lurking  designs  which  may 
burst  upon  us  like  a  thunderstorm." 

Count  Bismarck  further  stated  that  unless  some  assurance, 
some  declaration,  were  given  by  France  to  the  European 
Powers,  or  in  some  official  form,  that  the  present  solution 
of  the  Spanish  question  was  a  final  and  satisfactory  settle 
ment  of  the  French  demands,  and  that  no  further  claims  were 
to  be  raised ;  and  if,  further,  a  withdrawal,  or  a  satisfactory 
explanation  of  the  menacing  language  held  by  the  Due  de 
Gramont  were  not  made,  the  Prussian  Government  would  be 
obliged  to  seek  explanations  from  France.  It  was  impossible, 
added  his  Excellency,  that  Prussia  could  tamely  and  quietly 
sit  under  the  affront  offered  to  the  King  and  to  the  nation 
by  the  menacing  language  of  the  French  Government.  "  I 
could  not,"  said  his  Excellency,  "hold  communication  with 
the  French  Ambassador  after  the  language  held  to  Prussia 
by  the  French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  in  the  face  of 
Europe." 

From  the  foregoing  observations  of  Count  Bismarck,  your 
Lordship  will  perceive  that  unless  some  timely  counsel,  some 
friendly  hand,  can  intervene  to  appease  the  irritation  between 
the  two  Governments,  the  breach,  in  lieu  of  being  closed  by 
the  solution  of  the  Spanish  difficulty,  is  likely  to  become 
wider. 

It  is  evident  to  me  that  Count  Bismarck  and  the  Prussian 
Ministry  regret  the  attitude  and  disposition  of  the  King 
towards  Count  Benedetti,  and  that  in  the  view  of  the  public 
opinion  of  Germany  they  feel  the  necessity  of  some  decided 
measures  to  safeguard  the  honour  of  the  nation. 

The  only  means  which  could  pacify  the  wounded  pride 
of  the  German  nation  and  restore  confidence  in  the  mainte- 


494         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

nance  of  peace  would  be  by  a  declaration  of  the  French 
Government  that  the  incident  of  the  Spanish  difficulty  has 
been  satisfactorily  adjusted,  and  in  rendering  justice  to  the 
moderate  and  peaceful  disposition  of  the  King  of  Prussia  and 
his  Government,  that  the  good  relations  existing  between  the 
two  States  were  not  likely  to  be  again  exposed  to  any  disturb 
ing  influences.  I  greatly  fear  that  if  no  mediating  influences 
can  be  successfully  brought  to  bear  on  the  French  Govern 
ment  to  appease  the  irritation  against  Prussia,  and  to  counsel 
moderation,  war  will  be  inevitable. 


APPENDIX  M 

THE  COMMISSION  OF  JULY  15  AND  THE  EMS  CORRESPONDENCE 

THE  Commission  chosen  by  the  Corps  L6gislatif  on  July 
15  to  examine  and  report  upon  the  four  war  measures  pro 
posed  by  the  government  reported  unanimously  in  favor  of 
all  four.  Supra,  pp.  356-358. 

The  Commission,  in  its  report,  said  in  part :  — 

"Certain  diplomatic  documents  were  laid  before  us,  and 
very  clear  and  full  explanations  concerning  them  were  sup 
plied  to  us. 

"We  knew  that  we  should  carry  out  the  wish  of  the  Cham 
ber  in  making  careful  inquiry  into  all  the  diplomatic  incidents. 
We  have  the  satisfaction  of  informing  you,  messieurs,  that 
the  government,  from  the  outset  of  the  affair,  and  from  the 
first  phase  of  the  negotiations  to  the  last,  has  followed  stead 
fastly  the  same  end. 

"Thus,  the  first  despatch  sent  to  our  Ambassador  after  his 
arrival  at  Ems  to  talk  with  the  long  of  Prussia,  concludes 
with  this  sentence,  which  indicates  that  the  government  had 
clearly  set  forth  its  justifiable  demand:  — 

"'That  this  withdrawal  of  Prince  Antony  may  produce  its 
effect,  it  is  necessary  that  the  Kong  of  Prussia  shaU  associate 
himself  with  it,  and  give  us  the  assurance  that  he  will  not 
again  sanction  that  candidacy/ 

"Thus,  what  continued  to  be  the  only  point  in  dispute  in 
that  momentous  discussion,  was  formulated  at  the  very 
beginning,  and  you  will  realize  the  vital  importance  of  this 
fact  which  has  hitherto  been  unknown,  it  should  be  said,  to 
the  public. 

"But,  just  as  his  Majesty  the  King  of  Prussia  had  already 

495 


496         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

refused  to  give  the  satisfaction  justly  demanded  by  the  French 
government,  which  expected  the  best  results  from  the  un 
official  courtesy  of  the  Prussian  Ambassador,  who  left  Paris 
in  order  to  smooth  over  the  difficulty,  so  the  French  Ambas 
sador,  having  intervened  directly  with  King  William,  had 
done  no  more  than  obtain  the  confirmation  of  a  fact  which 
gave  no  guaranty  for  the  future. 

"Despite  these  facts,  which  are  only  too  serious,  your  Com 
mission  thought  it  well  to  require,  and  has  received,  com 
munication  of  the  despatches  from  several  of  our  diplomatic 
agents,  the  terms  of  which  are  identical  and  confirm,  as  has 
been  stated  to  the  Senate  and  Corps  Legislatif,  what  M.  de 
Bismarck  has  officially  made  known  to  the  Cabinets  of  Europe : 
that  His  Majesty  the  King  of  Prussia  had  refused  to  receive 
again  the  French  Ambassador,  and  had  sent  word  to  him, 
by  one  of  his  aides-de-camp,  that  he  had  no  further  com 
munication  to  make  to  him.  .  .  . 

"The  profound  conviction  produced  by  examining  these 
documents  is  that  France  could  not  brook  the  insult  put  upon 
the  nation ;  that  our  diplomatists  did  their  duty  in  confining 
their  just  demands  to  a  field  where  Prussia  could  not  escape, 
as  she  intended  and  hoped  to  do." 

It  is  to  be  borne  in  mind  in  this  connection  that  with  the 
exception  of  the  portion  of  one  despatch  quoted  in  this  report, 
and  of  such  of  the  other  despatches,  all  later  than  the  12th, 
as  were  read  by  M.  Ollivier  to  the  Chamber  on  the  15th,  the 
details  of  the  negotiation  at  Ems  were  not  publicly  known 
until  Benedetti  printed  all  the  despatches  in  Ma  Mission  en 
Prusse,  in  1871.  Not  long  after,  came  the  sessions  of  the 
Commission  of  Inquiry  concerning  the  4th  of  September,  and 
the  testimony,  among  many  others,  of  some  if  not  all  of  the 
members  of  the  Commission  of  July  15,  —  of  Dr6olle  and 
Talhouet,  at  least. 

As  to  the  telegram  sent  broadcast  by  Bismarck's  orders  on 
the  night  of  the  ISth,  it  is  unnecessary  to  say  anything  more 
than  is  said  in  the  text  and  notes".  Whoever  cares  to  read 


APPENDIX  497 

a  detailed  report  of  the  session  of  the  Chamber  of  the  15th, 
as  printed  in  almost  any  one  of  the  historical  works  cited  in 
the  notes,  will  find  that  this  telegram  was  the  main  subject 
of  controversy  both  before  and  after  the  report  of  the  Com 
mission.  We  have  seen  that  Jules  Favre  denied  in  1871  that 
such  a  telegram  existed,  except  by  way  of  information  to  the 
different  states  of  Germany  (supra,  p.  354  n.,  on  p.  355). 
It  may  be  of  interest  to  add  that  M.  Thiers  chose  to  give  the 
weight  of  his  authority  to  a  similar  assertion.  He  had  under 
taken  a  mission  to  England  and  Russia  at  the  request  of  the 
Government  of  National  Defence,  organized  on  the  4«th  of 
September.  On  September  13,  he  wrote  from  London  to 
Jules  Favre,  Foreign  Minister  under  that  government,  giving 
an  account  of  his  first  interview  with  Lord  Granville.  "At 
first  I  took  pains  to  prove,  by  a  truthful  recital  of  the  events 
which  brought  on  the  war,  that  France  did  not  desire  the 
war,  that  the  Chamber  itself  did  not  desire  it  and  had  yielded 
only  to  the  pressure  of  those  in  power,  always  irresistible  with 
the  Chamber,  and  that  notably  on  the  last  day,  July  15,  It 
had  allowed  itself  to  be  swept  off  its  feet  only  by  the  most 
culpable  falsehood  of  an  insult  put  upon  France." 

The  despatch  of  which  a  portion  is  quoted  in  the  report  (see 
supra,  pp.  218,  219)  begins  thus :  "We  have  received  by  the 
hand  of  the  Spanish  Ambassador  the  withdrawal  by  Prince 
Antony,  in  the  name  of  his  son  Leopold,  of  the  latter's  can 
didacy  for  the  throne  of  Spain."  And  there  are  certain  dif 
ferences  in  the  portions  quoted,  viz.:  the  original  reads: 
"In  order  that  this  withdrawal  may  have  its  full  effect,  it 
seems  necessary,"  etc.  Furthermore,  this  despatch  is  of 
the  12th,  and  was,  as  we  know,  very  far  from  being  the  first 
one  sent  to  Ems. 

It  seems  worth  while  to  consider  the  allegations  of  wilful 
misrepresentation  by  Gramont  to  the  Commission  as  evi 
denced  by  its  statement  of  the  grounds  on  which  it  based  its 
conclusion  that  the  only  point  in  dispute  (that  is,  the  ques 
tion  of  guaranties)  was  clearly  formulated  at  the  outset,  and 


498          THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

that  the  government  "from  the  first  phase  of  the  negotiations 
to  the  last"  had  followed  steadfastly  the  same  end.  The 
charge  is  supported  by  the  authority  of  Albert  Sorel  in  his 
Histoire  Diplomatique  de  la  Guerre  Franco-Allemande  (vol.  i, 
p.  189),  published  in  1875,  and  has  very  recently  (1910) 
been  reasserted  with  the  utmost  solemnity  by  M.  Welschinger, 
the  latest  historian  of  the  war,  who  adduces  the  testimony  at 
the  Inquiry  concerning  the  4th  of  September  of  the  Marquis 
de  Talhouet,  to  the  effect  that  the  Commission  of  July  15 
understood  that  guaranties  had  been  demanded  from  the 
first  day.  Guerre  de  1870,  vol.  i,  pp.  184  ff. 

In  dealing  with  this  charge,  M.  de  Gramont  first  of  all 
maintains  the  accuracy  of  the  Commission's  finding  that  his 
efforts  had,  from  the  outset,  followed  consistently  the  same 
end,  that  end  being,  hi  his  own  words,  "to  obtain,  by  means 
of  the  King's  participation  and  concurrence  in  the  withdrawal 
of  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy,  a  sufficient  guaranty  against 
the  return  of  similar  complications."  See  supra,  p.  £26  n. 
Coming  to  the  question  of  the  misstatement  of  fact  in  the 
report,  he  says :  — 

"By  a  material  error,  which  however,  as  I  have  just  proved, 
in  no  wise  invalidates  the  statement  of  the  report,  the  de 
spatch  of  July  12  was  cited  therein  as  being  the  first  despatch 
sent  to  Ems  at  the  opening  of  the  negotiations.  .  .  .  This 
has  aroused  the  heated,  retrospective  polemic,  the  refutation 
of  which  forces  us  to  go  into  these  details. 

"This  error,  as  I  have  already  said,  is  to  be  explained  in 
fact  by  the  unwonted  rapidity  with  which  it  was  necessary 
to  assemble,  proceed  to  hear  the  ministers,  deliberate,  and 
draw  the  report  in  accordance  with  the  deliberation  and 
conclusions  —  all  in  a  few  moments.  Nevertheless,  instead 
of  attributing  it  to  that  perfectly  natural  cause,  some  persons 
have  preferred  to  accuse  the  government  of  having  tried  to 
deceive  the  Commission. 

''The  report,  they  say,  would  not  have  originated  the  con 
fusion,  and  if  it  cited  the  despatch  of  the  12th  as  the  first 


APPENDIX  499 

one  sent  to  Ems,  it  was  because  tlie  ministers  did  not  produce 
those  that  preceded  it ;  and,  in  order  that  the  fraud  might 
not  be  detected,  they  antedated  the  despatch  of  the  12th 
and  presented  it  to  the  Commission  as  dated  the  7th  or  8th 
—  that  is  to  say,  as  the  first  one  sent  to  Ems. 

"It  would,  in  very  truth,  have  been  difficult  to  do  other 
wise,  for  everybody  knew  that  our  Ambassador  had  arrived 
at  Ems  on  the  8th  in  the  evening,  and  it  could  not  be  con 
ceived  that  he  had  been  left  there  four  days  without  instruc 
tions,  which  would  have  been  the  case  if  the  government's 
first  despatch  had  borne  the  date  of  the  12th.  .  .  . 

"But  let  us  see.  The  despatch  of  July  12  has  this  peculiar 
characteristic,  that  it  is  not  possible  to  antedate  it  since  its 
date  is  fixed  precisely  in  the  text  of  the  document  itself.  For 
we  find  therein  these  words :  cln  order  that  this  withdrawal 
may  produce  its  effect,  it  is  necessary  that  the  King  associate 
himself  with  it,'  etc.  Not  only  does  it  speak  of  the  with 
drawal  of  the  Prince  of  Hohenzollern  as  an  accomplished 
fact  .  .  .  but  it  points  out  what  is  necessary  in  order  that 
it  may  produce  its  effect.  Now,  inasmuch  as  the  Prince's 
withdrawal  was  not  known  until  the  12th,  at  2.40  A.M.,  it 
is  impossible  that  the  despatch  was  written  earlier,  and  its 
date  is  automatically  fixed  as  the  evening  of  the  12th.  .  .  . 

"This  once  proved,  it  seems  superfluous  to  add  that  the 
ministers  could  no  more  easily  have  concealed  from  the  Com 
mission  the  despatches  preceding  that  of  the  12th.  Would 
the  Commission  have  believed  that  Comte  Benedetti  was 
left  without  instructions  from  the  8th  to  the  12th  ?  Further 
more,  does  not  the  government's  communication  to  the 
Chamber  a  few  hours  earlier  speak  of  the  negotiations  prior 
to  the  12th,  of  representations  to  the  King  before  that  date  ? 
How  could  our  Ambassador  have  done  all  this  without 
despatches  and  instructions  ?  .  .  . 

"In  the  report  of  the  Senate  Commission,  we  read:  'The 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  came  before  the  Commission. 
He  set  forth  at  length,  reading  all  the  important  despatches, 


500         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

the  progress  of  the  negotiations  entered  into  at  Ems,  from 
July  6,  with  the  King  of  Prussia.5  Thus,  on  the  one  hand,  the 
government  laid  before  the  Commission  of  the  Senate  all 
the  important  despatches  from  the  beginning,  and  on  the 
other  hand  it  concealed  from  the  Commission  of  the  Corps 
Legislatif  the  same  documents  down  to  that  of  the  l£th. 
But  we  should  have  had  also  to  prevent  senators  from  talking 
with  deputies,  and  above  all,  to  prevent  the  publication  of 
the  report  made  to  the  Senate. 

"When  I  reached  the  Corps  Legislatif  during  the  night 
session  of  July  15,  the  report  of  the  Commission  had  already 
been  read,  and  I  had  no  knowledge  of  it  until  1  read  it  the 
next  day  in  the  Journal  Officiel.  Otherwise  I  should  not 
have  failed  to  call  the  honorable  reporter's  attention  to  an 
error,  trivial  in  itself,  which  it  would  have  been  so  easy  to 
correct  in  an  instant." l  La  France  et  la  Prusse,  pp.  £64  ff. 

M.  Ollivier,  in  the  fourteenth  volume  of  L'Empire  LiHral 
(pp.  45£  ff.)  goes  into  this  subject  at  length.  He  gives 
some  new  facts  concerning  the  testimony  before  the  Com 
mission,  in  support  of  his  contention  that  the  error  in  the 
report  must  have  been  a  mere  slip  of  the  pen ;  facts  which, 
uncontrolled,  seem  conclusive.  He  says,  in  the  first  place, 
that  all  the  documents  presented  by  Gramont  were  carefully 
arranged  in  the  order  of  their  dates,  and  that  he  read  and 
explained  the  principal  ones. 

"No  objection  was  raised  except  upon  a  single  point. 
AlbuMra  had  been  impressed  by  the  argument  of  the 
opposition  that  our  demands  had  constantly  increased  with 
the  concessions  that  had  been  made  to  us.  He  questioned 
Gramont  closely.  Gramont  replied  that  on  July  1£,  after 
the  withdrawal  of  the  candidacy  was  announced  by  Olozaga, 
when  we  had  as  yet  obtained  no  concession  from  Prussia, 
not  even  a  reply,  he  had  instantly  demanded,  at  one  and  the 
same  time,  both  the  King's  approval  and  the  guaranty  for 

1  M.  de  Talhoue't  testified  at  the  Inquiry  concerning  the  4th  of  Septem 
ber  that  Gramont  was  sitting  in  front  of  him  when  he  read  the  report. 


APPENDIX  501 

the  future,  and  not,  as  the  Left  claimed,  first  the  approval, 
then  the  guaranty.  *  I  understand  then,'  said  Albuf era,  *  that 
as  soon  as  the  withdrawal  had  been  secured,  you  did  immedi 
ately,  at  the  very  first  moment,  demand  both  concessions  at 
once?'  'Yes/  Gramont  replied.  And  he  read  and  placed 
in  Albuf  era's  hands  the  telegram  to  Benedetti  of  7  o'clock 
of  the  12th,  which  did  in  fact  cover  both  demands.  'I  am 
very  glad  to  hear  that  statement/  said  Albuf  era ;  'the  re 
port  will  surely  take  note  of  it,  for  it  is  of  a  nature  to  dissipate 
many  misunderstandings.' " 

M.  Ollivier  then  repeats,  without  other  comment  than  that 
it  seemed  to  impress  the  Commission,  Gramont' s  argument 
that  the  object  of  the  negotiations  had  never  varied.  We 
know  that  he  was  not  of  that  opinion. 

In  discussing  the  manifest  error  of  fact  in  the  report  he 
follows  the  line  of  argument  adopted  by  Gramont :  that  the 
despatch  bore  within  itself  the  proof  that  it  could  not  have  been 
the  first  one  addressed  to  Benedetti,  and,  moreover,  that  the 
error  was  corrected  by  the  ministerial  statements  in  their  formal 
declaration  read  in  both  houses  earlier  in  the  day.  He  con 
cludes  his  discussion  with  the  following  characteristic  passage. 

"When  the  war  was  at  an  end,  there  was  a  grand  rush  to 
deny  all  participation  in  the  acts  that  had  brought  it  to  pass. 
The  Bonapartist  party,  under  their  old  leaders,  adopted  the 
plan  of  casting  all  the  responsibility  on  the  liberal  ministry, 
which  they  denounced  as  the  real  artisan  of  our  disasters. 
Dreolle l  was  one  of  the  leaders  of  the  campaign.  He  exhumed 
as  a  fresh  argument  the  inaccuracy  in  the  report  of  July  15, 
which  everybody  had  forgotten:  reversing  the  r61es,  he 
charged  to  Gramont  the  error  committed  by  himself,  and 
characterized  that  harmless  and  involuntary  error  as  being 
premeditated  and  of  exceptional  gravity.  'It  was  with  full 
knowledge/  he  said,  'that  Gramont  suppressed  some  portions 
of  the  despatch  and  put  it  back  to  the  7th,  and,  as  it  was 
upon  that  antedated  and  altered  despatch  that  the  war  was 
1 A  member  of  the  Commission. 


502         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

begun,1  Gramont  deceived  the  Commission  and  through  it  the 
Chamber  and  the  country.' 

"The  authority  of  a  Dreolle  would  not  have  given  sufficient 
credit  to  the  fable ;  he  must  needs  obtain  Talhouet's  assent. 
If  the  real  TalhouSt  had  still  been  in  existence,  he  would  not 
have  succeeded,  but  the  poor  fellow,  stricken  in  the  brain, 
inconsolable  under  the  deadly  burden  which  his  report  had 
Imposed  upon  him,  was  only  the  shadow  of  his  former  self. 
When  Dreolle  went  to  him  to  tell  him  that  there  was  a  way 
to  exonerate  himself,  he  seized  upon  it  without  any  scrutiny, 
and  in  his  sudden  sense  of  relief  began  to  say  to  everybody : 
*Did  you  know,  the  despatch  was  altered,  the  despatch  was 
altered  !* 

"On  a  single  point  Dreolle  could  not  move  him.  The  im 
portant  thing  to  that  villain  was,  not  to  incriminate  Gramont, 
who,  after  all,  belonged  to  the  absolutist  regime,  but  to  reach 
me,  who  was  as  ever  the  immovable  personification  of  the 
regime  that  he  detested.  He  declared,  although  he  knew  the 
contrary,  that  I  was  present  (before  the  Commission)  during 
Gramont's  explanations.  Thereupon  the  gallant  man  and 
true  friend  reawoke  in  Talhoue't,  and  in  his  disposition  he 
said  that  I  had  retired  before  my  colleague  arrived.  .  .  . 

"Dreolle's  invention  achieved  a  rapid  success  with  the 
enemies  of  the  Empire.  .  .  . 

"I  had  in  my  hands  the  text  give*n  to  the  Commission  both 
before  and  after  it  was  so  given,  and  I  declare  that  it  bore  its 
date  at  its  head  and  that  it  agreed  in  every  respect  with  the 
text  published  by  Gramont  and  Benedetti  in  their  books, 
and  with  the  one  preserved  at  the  Foreign  Office.  Gramont 
would  have  been  an  idiot,  not  a  rascal,  if  he  had  played  a  trick 
before  the  Commission  which  we  had  ourselves  unmasked  in 
the  Senate  and  Corps  Legislatif,  and  which  the  text  of  the 
despatch,  altered  or  not,  put  to  confusion.  .  .  . 

"Every  calumny  cresdt  eundo.  Ere  long  it  was  neither 
Gramont  nor  Emile  OUivier  who  had  deceived  the  Com- 
1  This  particular  charge  was  made  also  by  Gambetta. 


APPENDIX  503 

mission  and  the  Chamber,  and,  through  the  Chamber,  the 
country  — it  was  the  Cabinet.  At  this  point  we  approach 
the  monstrous.  Here  we  have  a  dozen  men,  almost  all 
eminent  in  some  way,  having  held  first  rank,  either  in  the 
army  or  navy,  or  at  the  bar,  or  in  trade,  or  in  finance,  or  in 
diplomacy ;  they  were  not  ambitious  of  power ;  it  was  in 
some  sense  forced  upon  them  by  public  opinion ;  they  exer 
cised  it  not  without  success  and  with  devotion;  and  behold, 
scribblers  who  have  never  given  any  proof  of  capacity  of  any 
sort,  having  neither  commanded  a  division  nor  even  drafted 
a  despatch,  —  alleged  historians,  forsooth,  without  compe 
tence  or  authority,  —  presume  to  pass  judgment  helter-skelter, 
without  taking  the  pains,  or  without  the  intelligence  to  un 
derstand  !  Nor  do  they  stop  there :  they  accuse  honorable 
men  of  having  altered  documents  in  order  to  win  votes ! 
That  is  too  much  !  All  the  ministers  were  of  pacific  bent ; 
they  stood  out  as  long  as  they  could  amid  the  public  passion, 
in  order  to  prevent  war ;  they  were  compelled  to  decide  upon 
it  because  they  thought  their  country's  honor  wounded; 
they  would  have  pressed  the  members  of  the  Commission  to 
their  hearts  if  they  had  shown  them  that  their  sensibility 
was  overdone,  and  that  the  Ems  despatch  was  an  amenity 
which  we  could  afford  to  brook.  And  those  men  would  have 
held  back  or  altered  documents  in  order  to  assure  the  triumph 
of  an  opinion  which  they  would  have  been  overjoyed  to 
abandon,  though  their  fall  should  follow  instantly ! 

"Often,  very  often,  I  have  felt  indignation  rumbling  in 
my  heart.  How  many  times  I  have  stricken  out  angry 
sentences  as  soon  as  I  had  written  them,  in  order  that  this 
work  should  retain  its  character  of  mathematical  clearness ! 
But  now  I  no  longer  contain  myself,  and  I  say  to  those  who 
assert  or  insinuate  that  all  or  any  of  us  deceived  the  Com 
mission  by  a  trick,  in  order  to  assure  its  vote  and  as  a  con 
sequence  that  of  the  Chamber :  'You  are  cowardly  impostors 
in  whom  I  do  not  know  which  to  detest  more,  your  weakness 
of  judgment  or  the  perversity  of  your  conscience/" 


504         THE  FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR 

There  is  no  question,  however,  that  some  persons  were 
deceived  by  the  error.  M.  Fernand  Giraudeau,  for  instance, 
in  his  La  V&riti  sur  la  Campagne  de  1870>  published  early 
in  1871,  bases  his  very  vigorous  defence  of  the  ministry  on 
the  Commission's  statement  that  the  end  sought  at  Ems  had 
been  absolutely  the  same  from  first  to  last. 

On  this  point,  as  on  so  many  others,  M.  de  La  Gorce  takes 
what  seems  to  be  the  more  reasonable  and  saner  view.  "Did 
the  error  come  from  the  reporter,  who,  having  seized  on  the 
wing  the  despatches  as  they  were  read,  set  them  down  in 
accurately  ?  Or  on  the  other  hand  —  as  is  more  probable  — 
did  M.  de  Gramont  in  his  exposition  neglect  to  follow  the 
order  of  dates  and  confine  himself  to  summarizing  and  putting 
together,  according  to  his  views,  documents  which  it  would 
have  been  more  proper  not  to  mix  ?  On  this  point,  which 
was  discussed  at  great  length  by  contemporaries,  there  pre 
vails  an  uncertainty  which  in  all  probability  will  never  be 
cleared  away.  One  can  only  say  that  there  was  a  twofold 
fault  —  on  the  minister's  part  in  not  presenting  all  the  docu 
ments,  and  on  the  part  of  the  Commission  in  not  demanding 
them.  The  report  concluded  with  a  solemn  approval  of  the 
action  of  the  ministry.  And  in  very  truth  ilt  was  no  ordinary 
good  fortune  for  the  ministry  to  find,  at  the  critical  moment, 
the  most  worthy  and  venerable  of  men  [the  Marquis  de 
Talhouet]  to  countersign  its  final  resolution,"  Histoire  du 
Second  Empire,  vol.  vi,  p.  310. 


INDEX 


ABEKEN,  HEINBICH,  Ms  despatch 
of  July  13  to  Bismarck,  271 ; 
framed  in  consultation  with 
Eulenbourg  and  Camphausen, 
273;  wherein  the  despatch 
was  misleading,  273,  274 ;  this 
despatch  received  by  Bis 
marck,  282,  and  edited  into  the 
"Ems  despatch,"  283  ft.; 
177,  184,  185,  266,  267,  269. 

Albert,  Archduke,  of  Austria,  his 
visit  to  Paris,  89,  374,  375. 

Albrecht,  Prince,  of  Prussia,  184, 
185,  244. 

Albuf^ra,  Due  d',  president  of 
Commission  of  July  15,  356, 
357,  359. 

Alexander  II,  Tsar,  urges  King 
William  to  order  Leopold  to 
withdraw,  118;  refuses  to 
intervene,  301 ;  32  and  n.,  66, 
76,  91, 138,  300,  378,  380. 

Alfonzo,  Prince  (afterwards  Al- 
fonzo  XII),  son  of  Isabella,  17, 
66. 

Alfred,  Prince,  of  England,  150. 

Ambassadors,  duty  of,  as  to 
strict  obedience,  241,  242  and 
n. 

Andrassy,  Count,  375. 

Antony,  Prince,  father  of  Leo 
pold,  15 ;  letter  to  Charles  of 
Roumania,  quoted,  18;  and 
Strat's  mission,  169  ff. ;  de 
cides  to  withdraw  candidacy, 
171 ;  on  Leopold's  refusal,  acts 
in  his  name,  172-174 ;  induces 
Leopold  to  submit,  175,  176 ; 
his  despatch  not  official,  202 ; 
but  accepted  as  official,  254; 


Ms  authority  denied  by  the 
Right,  222;  possible  effect  of 
Ms  despatch  in  Spain,  230, 231 ; 
20,  21,  30,  37,  49,  76,  106,  114, 
138,  140,  159,  189,  199,  206, 
218,  219,  227,  228,  232,  246, 
272,  385:  And  see  Pe*e  An- 
toine. 

Arago,  Emmanuel,  95,  162,  164, 
362. 

Army,  French.  See  French 
army. 

Army,  Prussian.  See  Prussian 
army, 

Augusta,  Queen,  of  Prussia,  136, 
137,  139,  140,  147,  158,  165, 
166,  178,  183,  247,  268. 

Augustenburg,  Duke  of,  222. 

Aumale,  Due  d',  118,  123,  150. 

Austria,  •  after  Sadowa,  13 ;  Ol- 
livier  opposed  to  alliance  with, 
86;  conditions  in,  86,  87; 
Gramont  favors  alliance  with, 
87;  Napoleon's  secret  nego 
tiations  with,  88  and  n.,  89 ; 
exclusion  of,  from  Germany, 
376. 

BACHON,  M.,  215,  257,  258. 

Balaguer,  Victor,  44  and  n. 

Bartholdi,  M.,  Ms  mission  to 
Serrano,  128  fl. ;  48,  106,  107, 
110. 

Bazaine,  Francois  AcMlle,  395, 
396. 

Belgium,  precedent  of,  150. 

Benedetti,  Vincent,  French  Am 
bassador  to  Prussia,  public 
opinion  adverse  to,  132 ;  criti 
cised  by  the  Constitutionnel, 


505 


506 


INDEX 


132 ;  Ms  recall  demanded,  132 
Ms  record,  132;  sent  to  trea 
with  King  William  at  Ems 
133;  Ms  failings,  134,  135 
Ms  good  qualities,  135,  136 
at  Ems,  140;  Ms  double  in 
structions,  140,  141;  inter 
view  with.  Werther,  143 ;  Ms 
first  audience  of  the  King,  144- 
147 ;  Ms  report  criticised,  150 
151 ;  deprecates  open  military 
preparations,  156;  Ms  seconc 
audience,  158,  159,  160,  165 
result  of  Ms  efforts  to  July  11 
166,  167;  Ms  book  criticised, 
166  and  n. ;  Ms  conduct 
praised,  167,  168;  and  Gra- 
mont's  first  despatch  of  July  12, 
204,  205  n. ;  receives  Gra 
mont 's  modified  despatch  too 
late,  237;  Ms  opinion  of  the 
demand  of  guaranties,  241 ; 
Ms  duty  in  view  of  that  opin 
ion,  241-243;  Ms  Essais  Di- 
plomatiques,  243 ;  presents  de 
mand  of  guaranties  to  the 
King  in  the  park,  244  ff . ;  re 
ports  to  Gramont,  247 ;  King's 
changed  feeling  regarding,  266, 
267,  not  due  to  Werther's 
report,  267,  269;  unable  to 
obtain  another  audience,  270, 
271 ;  Ms  "  importunity J ' 
blamed,  271;  on  Abeken's 
despatch  to  Bismarck,  272; 
the  King's  final  reply  to,  272 ; 
misrepresented  in  Abeken's 
despatch,  274;  Gramont's  last 
instruction  to,  299,  300;  Ms 
last  despatches,  302,  303,  305 ; 
and  the  Ems  despatch,  332; 
rebuffed  by  Eulenbourg,  332 ; 
takes  leave  of  the  King  at  the 
station,  333 ;  in  Paris,  July  15, 
338;  aggrieved  by  newspaper 
attacks,  338, 339 ;  33, 110,  111, 
155,  175,  177,  184,  185,  186, 


188,  212,  232,  233,  234,  254, 

283,  284,  285,  309,  310,  311, 
314,  322,  323,  356,  361,  378, 
379,  385. 

Berlin,  excitement  in,  caused  by 
Ems  despatch,  289  ff. 

Bernhardi,  Major,  Ms  memoirs 
incomplete,  369 ;  24,  30,  374. 

Bernstorff,  Count  von,  59,  125. 

Berryer,  Pierre  Antoine,  392,  393. 

Beust,  Friedrich  F.,  Count  von, 
Ms  "  comic-opera  "  suggestion, 
73 ;  warns  Gramont,  300 ;  35 
and  n.,  65,  88,  108,  119,  375. 

BiancM,  NicomMe,  quoted,  388. 

Bismarck,  Countess  Marie  von, 
33. 

Bismarck,  Otto  E.  L.,  Prince  von, 
Ms  policy  after  Sadowa,  13; 
discomfited  by  accession  of 
liberal  ministry,  13,  14;  his 
understanding  with  Prim,  14 
and  n.,  15 ;  Ms  connection  with 
Leopold's  candidacy,  15  ff . ; 
and  the  Memoirs  of  Charles  of 
Roumania,  19  n. ;  at  Varzin, 

26,  32,  33 ;  and  the  plebiscite, 

27,  28;    writes  to  Prim,  29; 
Ms   newspaper   campaign,    60 
and  n. ;   and  Benedetti's  mis 
sion  to  Ems,  136,  177,  178; 
leaves    Varzin    for    Ems    via 
Berlin,    178,    179;    learns   of 
Leopold'^  withdrawal,  179 ;  its 
effect  on  Mm,  180,  181,  187  n.; 
Ms    Reflections,    etc.,    quoted, 

181,  182;    offers  resignation, 

182,  183;   regards  war  as  in 
evitable,    183;    effect   of   Ms 
resignation  on  the  King,  185, 
186 ;  and  the  demand  of  guaran 
ties,  266;    again  threatens  to 
resign,    266;     Abeken's      de 
spatch  of  July  13  to,  271 ;  his 
state  of  mind  July    13,  276; 
Ms  interview  with  Lof  tus,  276- 
278 ;  unmuzzles  the  press,  278, 


INDEX 


507 


279;  and  Werther's  report, 
279;  recalls  Werther,  280; 
the  historic  dinner  with  Roon 
and  Moltke,  281  ff.;  deter 
mined  to  retire,  282 ;  arrival  of 
Abeken's  despatch,  282;  "ed-! 
its"  the  despatch,  282,  283; 
his  version  (the  "Ems  de-! 
spatch"),  discussed,  283-285 ; 
how  it  was  made  public,  289, 
290 ;  seeks  to  cast  responsibil 
ity  for  war  on  France,  366; 
the  Ems  despatch  how  de 
scribed  by  him  at  the  time,  366, 
and  in  later  years,  368,  369 ; 
boasts  of  having  forced  France 
to  fight,  367,  368;  and  the 
Emperor  Frederick's  journal, 
368;  his  Reflections,  etc., 
quoted,  368,  369,  376,  377; 
maintains  his  non-responsibility 
for  the  Hohenzollern  plot,  369, 
370;  views  of  German  histo 
rians  on  Ms  responsibility  for 
the  war,  370  £L ;  reasons  for 
his  action  in  1870,  376  fif. ; 
not  ready  for  war  in  1867, 377 ; 
his  tactics  changed  by  acces 
sion  of  liberal  ministry,  378; 
quoted,  on  sudden  changes  of 
policy,  381 ;  drove  France  into 
hostilities,  382,  383;  alone 
responsible  for  the  war,  402; 
Scherr's  panegyric  of,  402, 403 ; 
37,  45,  51,  52,  55,  58,  67,  73, 
76,  81,  102,  104,  105,  107,  113, 
125,  130,  131,  135,  139,  140, 
147,  168,  213,  261,  262,  267, 
274,  311,  322,  323,  326,  331, 
353,  355,  365,  384,  385,  393. 

Bleibtreu,  Karl,  quoted,  on  Ems 
despatch,  288. 

Blennerhassett,     Sir     Rowland, 
quoted,  14  n. 

Blondeau,  M.,  152. 

Bonaparte,  Napoleon  E.  F.  J. 
Prince  Imperial,  249,  258. 


Bonjean,  M.,  264. 

Bouille*,  CoL,  204. 

BourbaM,  Gen.  Charles  D.  S.,  52, 
215,  216,  396. 

Bray,  Count  Otto  C.  H.,  120, 
121,  323. 

Brenier,  M.,  264. 

Bucher,  Adolf  Lothar,  sketch  of, 
23  n. ;  his  mission  to  Spain, 
23  and  n.,  24-26;  his  papers 
burned,  396;  29,  30,  32,  60, 
178,  374. 

Buffet,  Louis  Joseph  (1818- 
1898),  Minister  of  Finance, 
11  n. ;  resigns,  11  n. ;  demands 
production  of  Ems  despatch, 
354,  355. 

Busch,  Dr.  Moritz,  his  Bismarck 
quoted,  23  n.,  60  and  n. ;  Ms 
revelations  concerning  Bis 
marck,  367;  291. 

Bylandt,  Herr  von,  291. 

CADORE,  Due  DE,  120,  323,  356, 
361. 

Camphausen,  Baron  von,  267, 
269,  273. 

Canrobert,  Marshal,  396. 

Cassagnac,  Granier  de,  306. 

Cassagnac,  Paul  de,  221  n.,  232, 
233,  295-297,  306. 

Cavour,  Count  Camillo  de,  52, 89. 

Cerutti,  Signer,  119,  120. 

Charles,  Prince  of  Roumania,  Ms 
Memoirs  quoted,  18  n.,  22, 
25,  25  n. ;  great  importance  of 
Ms  Memoirs,  19  n.,  369,  370 ; 
18,  48,  170,  230. 

Chateaubriand,  Rene,  Vicomte 
de,  4,  391. 

Chevandier  de  Valdrdme,  Jean 
(1810-1878),  Minister  of  the 
Interior,  11  n.;  quoted,  on  the 
temper  of  the  Chamber,  200; 
84,  189,  190,  249,  253,  335. 

Clarendon,  Lord,  34  and  n. 

Clermont-Tonnerre,  Due  de,  85. 


508 


INDEX 


Cochery,  M.,  TMers's  "Egeria,' 
77  and  n. ;  his  interpellation 
of  July  5,  77  fl. ;  91,  92,  94. 

Cologne  Gazette,  the,  Leopold's 
withdrawal  published  in, 
and  n.,  374. 

Comminges-Guitaud,  M.  de,  and 
the  Ems  despatch,  293,  294 
322,  323,  356. 

Commission  of  July  15  (Senate) 
report  of,  364. 

Commission  of  July  15  (Corps 
Legislatif),  membership  of,  356 
and  n. ;  ministers  appear  be 
fore,  356,  357 ;  report  of,  358, 
495-504. 

Conference  of  the  powers,  sug 
gested  on  July  14,  315,  316 
the  plan  abandoned,  321. 

Constitution  of  1870,  right  to 
declare  war  under,  336. 

Constitutionnel,  the,  Ollivier's  re 
lations  with,  53  and  n.,  68  and 
n. ;  attacks  Benedetti,  132, 
133 ;  Mitchell's  editorial  in, 
July  13,  248;  237. 

Corps  Legislatif,  session  of  July 
11,  161-163;  attitude  of  par 
ties  in,  164 ;  session  of  July  12, 
197,  198;  withdrawal  of  can 
didacy,  how  received  in,  197, 
198 ;  Chevandier  on  temper  of, 
200 ;  session  of  July  13,  259  ff. ; 
debate  of  July  15,  339  ff.; 
reception  of  ministerial  decla 
ration,  343;  rejects  Favre's 
motion  for  production  of  Ems 
despatch,  355;  names  Com 
mission  on  proposed  credit, 
etc.,  356;  report  of  Commis 
sion  presented  to,  358;  votes 
the  credit  requested,  362,  and 
other  war  measur.es,  363- 

Correspondant,  the,  97. 
Cortes,  sudden  adjournment  of, 
42    and   n. ;     summoned   for 
July  20,  56. 


Council,  of  July  6,  89  ff.;  of 
July  10,  and  Benedetti's  first 
report,  152;  of  July  11,  de 
cides  to  postpone  military 
preparation,  156,  157 ;  of  July 
12,  188;  of  July  13,  votes 
against  recalling  reserves,  253, 
and  adopts  temporizing  dec 
laration,  254 ;  of  July  14,  noon, 
311  ff.  (votes  to  recall  reserves, 
313) ;  of  July  14,  evening,  322 
ff . ;  of  July  15,  334  £E.  (votes 
unanimously  for  war,  336). 

Cowley,  Lord,  210. 

Cremieux,  Isaac  M.,  94,  95,  362. 

DAGBLAD,  the,  382. 

Daily  Telegraph,  100. 

Dalloz,  Paul,  97. 

Daru,  Comte  Napoleon  (1807- 
1890),  Foreign  Minister,  11  n. ; 
resigns,  11  n. ;  92,  94,  239. 

David,  Baron  Je*r6me,  colloquy 
with  Gramont,  259 ;  his  inter 
pellation,  260,  261 ;  164,  187, 
233,  262,  304. 

Declaration  of  July  6,  discussed 
in  Council,  89  £f. ;  changes  in, 
90,  91,  451-454;  text  of,  as 
read  to  the  Chambers,  92,  93 ; 
Ollivier's  opinion  of,  93,  94; 
attitude  of  press  on,  96  ff. ; 
greeted  with  passionate  ap 
proval,  99;  how  judged  in 
Europe,  100;  responsible  for 
withdrawal  of  candidacy,  180, 
181 ;  remarks  on,  454-460. 

Declaration  of  July  15,  read  to 
Council,  334,  and  unanimously 
adopted,  336 ;  simply  a  reply 
to  the  Ems  despatch,  335 ;  read 
in  Chamber,  339-342 ;  in  Sen 
ate,  363,  364;  equivalent  to 
a  declaration  of  war,  365. 

Declaration  of  war,  formal,  made 
by  France,  July  19,  365,  381, 
382. 


INDEX 


509 


Delbriick,    Hans,    quoted,    21 ; ' 
on  responsibility  for  the  war, 
371,  372. 

Delbriick,  Jules,  19. 
Delisle,  Hubert,  263. 
Delord,  Taxile,  Histoire  du  Second 

Empire,  quoted,  64. 
Demand    of  guaranties.        See 

Guaranties,  demand  of. 
Denmark  and  the  Duchies,  4  n. 
DStroyat,  L6once,  195  and  n. 
DeWitt,  John,  quoted,  87. 
Doubs,  M.,  President  of  Swiss 

Republic,  294,  323. 
Dr6olle,  M.,  and  the  report  of  the 

Commission,  358. 
Duchies,    the.    See    Schleswig- 

Holstein. 

Dumouriez,  C.  F.,  63,  387,  388. 
Dupont,  Le"onee,  and  Benedetti, 

338. 

Duruy,  Albert,  331. 
Duvernois,  Clement,  Ms  interpel 
lation,  198  and  n.,  216,  220; 

187,  260,  261. 

EMS,  negotiation  with  King  Wil 
liam  at,  132  fl .,  468-475 ;  Bis 
marck  angered  by,  177,  178. 

Ems  despatch,  the  (Bismarck's 
version  of  Abeken's  despatch), 
discussed,  283-285,  approved 
by  Roon  and  Moltke,  286; 
divers  judgments  of,  287-289 ; 
how  published,  289  ff . ;  excite 
ment  in  Berlin  and  elsewhere 
caused  by,  290-293 ;  in  Paris, 
309 ;  reported  from  Berne  an<3 
Munich,  323,  324;  Lyons  on 
effect  of,  330;  declaration  of 
July  15,  a  reply  to,  335 ;  pro 
duction  of,  demanded  by 
Favre,  354,  and  denied  by 
Chamber,  355;  Bismarck's 
first  construction  of,  366 ;  his 
later  admissions  concerning 
368,369;  views  of  German  his 


torians  on,  371  ff.;  332,  347, 
348,  484-489. 

England,  relations  of  France 
with,  85 ;  Gramont's  appeal  to, 
108, 109 ;  her  policy  of  absten 
tion  shortsighted,  121,  122; 
attempts  to  avert  war,  318  n., 
352.  And  see  Granville  and 
Lyons. 

English  Cabinet,  its  attitude 
criticised,  122. 

Escobar,  Ignacio,  44. 

Esquiros,  M.,  362. 

Eugenie,  Empress,  in  favor  of 
war,  215  f. ;  frowns  upon 
Ollivier,  258 ;  opposed  to  con 
ference  of  powers,  317,  318; 
at  Council  of  July  14, 322,  326 ; 
and  Napoleon's  alleged  illness, 
328,  329;  at  Council  of  July 
15, 334,  336 ;  49, 153, 304, 306, 
374,  375. 

Eulenbourg,  Count  von,  and 
Benedetti,  332 ;  182, 267, '  269, 
273,  293. 

FAILLY,  GENERAL,  82. 

Favre,  Jules,  demands  produc 
tion  of  Ems  despatch,  354, 355 ; 
dodges  vote  on  war  measures, 
362;  64,  394. 

Ferry,  Jules,  362. 

Figaro,  the,  97. 

Fleury,  Comte  de,  French  Am 
bassador  to  Russia,  66,  91  and 
n.,  107, 118,  301,  380,  381. 

Fournier,  M.,  118. 

France,  various  causes  assigned 
for  defeat  of,  in  1870,  2  fl.; 
intervention  of,  after  Sadowa, 
13;  and  the  Hbhenzollern 
candidacy,  33;  public  opin 
ion  in,  63  ff. ;  alliances  of,  in 
1870,  85  ff.;  her  responsi 
bility  for  the  war  discussed, 
366-383;  had  pretexts  at 
hand,  if  she  wanted  war,  380 ; 


510 


INDEX 


and  Germany,  differences  be 
tween  not  fundamental,  400, 
401 ;  cause  of  the  conflict  an 
"artificial  fatality,"  400,  401. 

Francis  Joseph  of  Austria,  his 
letter  to  Napoleon,  88,  89. 

Franco-Prussian  War.  See  War 
of  1870. 

Frederick,  Prince  Royal  of  Prus 
sia  (afterwards  Emperor),  and 
the  candidacy,  19,  29,  30; 
extracts  from  his  journal  pub 
lished,  368. 

French  army,  readiness  of,  for 
war,  81  ff. 

Fritz,  Prince,  Leopold's  brother, 
suggested  candidacy  of,  22,  25, 
and  n.,  26,  58. 

Frossard,  General,  82. 

GAME  ETTA,  LEON,  his  speech  on 
July  15, 358, 359, 360 ;  65, 164, 
191  and  n.,  192,  233,  258,  259, 
361,  362,  394. 

Garde  Mobile,  the,  337. 

Garnier-Pag&s,  M.,  94. 

Gaulois,  the,  97,  214. 

Gazette  de  France,  the,  199. 

German  Unity,  Ollivier 's  policy 
concerning1, 10, 11 ;  at  the  root 
of  Bismarck's  policy  in  1870, 
376. 

Germany  and  France,  nature  of 
differences  between,  discussed, 
400,  401.  And  see  Prussia. 

Girardin,  Emile  de,  195. 

Girault,  M.,  362. 

Gladstone,  W.  E.,  quoted,  123 ; 
his  Prussian  sympathies,  124; 
his  dread  of  war,  125 ;  34. 

Glais-Bizoin,  Alexander,  94,  362. 

Gortchakoff,  Prince,  quoted,  117 ; 
91, 179,  394. 

Gramont,  Antoine  Alfred  Aggnor, 
Due  de  (1819-1880),  Foreign 
Minister,  11  n.;  letter  of,  to 
Ollivier,  50,  52 ;  his  character,  | 


53;  his  first  despatches,  53, 
54  and  n. ;  and  Olozaga,  54, 
55 ;  and  Werther,  55,  56 ;  his 
early  attitude  commended, 
56;  inclined  to  generalize  the 
dispute,  71 ;  conference  of 
Ollivier  and,  with  Napoleon, 
72  flf. ;  ordered  to  prepare 
declaration,  77 ;  at  Council  of 
July  6,  81,  89,  90;  opposed  to 
Russian  and  favors  Austrian 
alliance,  87,  88 ;  reads  declara 
tion  in  Chamber,  92,  93 ;  his 
instructions  to  Mercier,  103, 
105,  Lesourd,  105,  Fleury  and 
others,  107,  108;  letter  of 
Napoleon  to,  111 ;  seeks  inter 
vention  of  England,  108,  109; 
appeals  to  States  of  the  South, 
109;  general  tone  of  his  in 
structions,  110;  supports  Na 
poleon's  personal  negotiation 
with  Serrano,  128,  129;  his 
official  despatch  and  private 
letter  to  Benedetti,  140-142; 
his  speech  in  the  Chambers, 
July  11,  161  and  n. ;  his  de 
spatch  of  July  11  to  Benedetti, 
165 ;  and  of  July  12,  1.40  P.M., 
204,  205  and  n.,  206 ;  Olozaga 
communicates  Leopold's  with 
drawal  to,  206,  207 ;  his  mo 
mentous  interview  with 
Werther,  207  ff. ;  suggests  that 
William  write  a  letter  to  Na 
poleon,  208,  209;  his  action 
justified,  209,  210;  did  not 
demand  a  letter  of  apology, 
210,  212,  213 ;  at  Saint-Cloud, 
217;  the  "conscientious  dis 
cussion/'  who  took  part 
therein?  217,  218  and  n.; 
demands  guaranties  in  de 
spatch  to  Benedetti  of  July  12, 
7  P.M.,  217,  218 ;  was  pledged 
not  to  enlarge  field  of  discus 
sion,  221;  acted  as  an  am- 


INDEX 


511 


bassador  rather  than  as  a 
responsible  minister,  226 ; 
Lyons  remonstrates  with,  227, 
228;  his  inconsistency,  228, 
229 ;  letter  of  Napoleon  to,  on 
demand  of  guaranties,  232, 
233 ;  Ollivier  remonstrates 
with,  235,  236;  his  later  de 
spatch  to  Benedetti,  236,  237 
and  n. ;  colloquy  with  David; 
259;  his  last  despatches  to 
Benedetti,  299,  300 ;  is  warned 
against  insistence  on  guar 
anties,  300,  301 ;  letters  of,  to 
OlHvier,  303,  304;  at  Saint- 
Cloud,  304,  305 ;  and  the  Ems 
despatch,  309 ;  at  the  Councils 
of  July  14,  311  ff.,  322,  326; 
suggests  conference  of  the 
powers,  314 ;  reads  declaration 
of  July  15  in  the  Council,  334 ; 
replies  to  Thiers,  354;  before 
the  Commission,  356,  357; 
charged  with  having  misled 
Commission,  364,  495-504 ; 
40,  48,  49,  57,  58,  70,  114,  122, 
137,  151,  152,  155,  160,  162, 
163,  164,  168,  184,  199,  200, 
243,  245,  247,  249,  261,  263, 
264,  271,  277,  278,  281,  296, 
314,  332,  359,  380,  385,  386. 

Granville,  Lord,  quoted,  65;  his 
attitude  criticised,  122  If. ;  his 
instructions  to  Lof  tus  and  Lay- 
ard,  124;  inclined  to  France, 
124,  but  dreads  war,  125; 
his  letter  read  at  Council  of 
July  13,  251,  252;  34  n.,  59, 
143,  254,  262,  318  n.,  330. 

Greece,  precedent  of,  150. 

Gresley,  Colonel,  152. 

Gressier,  M.,  197. 

Gr6vy,  Jules,  362. 

Gricourt,  M.  de,  his  pamphlet 
quoted,  397,  398. 

Grivard,  M.,  328. 

Guaranties,  first  mention  of,  198. 


Guaranties,  demand  of,  in  Gra- 
mont's  despatch  of  July  12, 
7  P.M.,  218,  219;  an  ill-ad 
vised  step,  219,  220;  prece 
dents  for,  223 ;  an  act  of  per 
sonal  authority,  226;  not  an 
ultimatum,  227 ;  Napoleon's 
letter  to  Gramont  on,  232,  233 ; 
Benedetti's  opinion  of,  241; 
presented  by  him  to  William, 
243  if. ;  disastrous  effect  of, 
on  foreign  opinion,  300,  301; 
Ollivier 's  judgment  of,  353; 
war  not  a  necessary  result  of, 
353;  379,385,386. 

Guizot,  F.  P.  G.,  quoted,  181, 
389,  391. 

HAVAS  NEWS  AGENCY,  48. 

Herreros  de  Tejada,  44. 

Hohenzollern  candidacy,  the, 
Bismarck's  plans  concerning, 
32-34 ;  when  to  be  divulged,  36 ; 
attitude  of  Prussia  toward, 
58;  effect  of,  on  public  opin 
ion  in  France,  63  ff. ;  impor 
tance  of,  to  France,  70;  con 
ference  of  Gramont  and  Ol 
livier  with  Napoleon  concern 
ing,  72  ff. ;  Benedetti  and,  132, 
133;  attitude  of  King  Wil 
liam  toward,  137  ff. ;  with 
drawn  by  Prince  Antony,  173, 
174;  Bismarck  and  the  with 
drawal  of,  180, 181,  182,  87  n. ; 
withdrawal  of,  due  to  declara 
tion  of  July  6,  180;  with 
drawal  of,  communicated  to 
Napoleon,  188,  189,  and  to 
Ollivier,  189,  190;  effect  of 
Ollivier's  disclosure  of  with 
drawal,  196  ff. ;  withdrawal 
due  to  Olozaga  alone,  accord 
ing  to  Napoleon,  202;  Bis 
marck  always  denied  respon 
sibility  for,  369;  how  Ms 
agency  was  disclosed,  369, 


512 


INDEX 


370 ;  tlie  sole  cause  of  the  war, 

383;    summary  of  history  of, 

384  ff.,  422-434 ;  378,  379. 
Hohenzollern  family,  statutes  of, 

17,  18  and  n.,  relationship  of, 

to  Napoleon,  208. 
Hohenzollern  family  council  of 

March  15,  1870,  18,  21,  22, 

339. 

Hohenzollem-Sigraaringen,  15. 
Holstein,  Duchy  of.    See  Schles- 

wig-Holstein. 
Hugo,  Victor,  155,  392. 
Hungarians,  the,  86,  375. 

ISABELLA  II,  OF  SPAIN,  14  and 

n.,  123,  419,  420. 
Italy,  question  of  alliance  with, 

85,  86. 

JOSEPHINE.  (MURAT),  PKINCESS, 
OF  HOHENZOLLERN,  Leopold's 
mother,  urges  withdrawal,  171. 

journal  des  Debats,  the,  98. 

KAUNITZ,  HERB  VON,  20. 

KSratry,  M.  de,  95,  261,  262. 

Keudell,  Herr  von,  32,  178,  183, 
280. 

King  and  State,  distinction  be 
tween,  in  Prussia,  148,  149. 

Koniggratz.    See  Sadowa. 

Kulturkampf,  the,  381. 

LAKABIT,  M.,  263. 

IA  Valette,  Marquis  de,  French 
Ambassador  to  England,  108, 
123,  260. 

lavedan,  M.,  97. 

Layard,  Sir  A.  H.,  124,  127, 
130. 

Le  Bceuf,  Edmond  (1809-1888), 
Minister  of  War,  11  n.;  his 
character,  82  and  n. ;  and  the 
Council,  83  and  n.,  84,  85 ; 
and  the  demand  of  guaranties, 
249;  insists  on  summoning 


reserves,  249,  250,  253;  at 
tacks  OUivier,  257 ;  152,  154, 
156,  204,  311,  313,  318,  335. 

Lebrun,  General,  his  secret  visit 
to  Vienna  in  1870,  89. 

Lenz,  Herr,  his  Gesckichte 
quoted,  180. 

Leo  XIII,  Pope,  133. 

Leonardon,  H.,  his  Prim  et  la 
Candidature  Hohenzollern^  sum 
marized,  422-434. 

Leopold,  Prince  of  Hohenzol- 
lern-Sigmaringen,  candidate  for 
Spanish  throne,  15,  435-437; 
refuses  first  overture,  19 ;  Prus 
sian  view  of  Ms  candidacy,  21 ; 
wavers  in  his  refusal,  30; 
finally  accepts,  30,  31 ;  seeks 
King  William's  sanction,  37; 
the  grandson  of  a  Murat,  53 
and  n.,  436;  his  candidacy 
published  at  Paris,  48  ff. ; 
and  Strat's  mission,  169  ff. ; 
refuses  to  withdraw,  172,  175  ; 
his  father  acts  for  him,  173, 
174 ;  finally  submits,  175,  176 ; 
what  he  might  have  done,  230, 
231 ;  withdrawal  approved  by 
the  King,  270;  33,  42,  56, 
58,  63,  64,  73, 92, 103, 104, 108, 
110,  111,  112,  118,  119,  127, 
128,  129,  130,  131,  136,  138, 
139,  141,  143,  146,  159,  160, 
165,  207,  208,  219,  222,  228, 
232,  245,  246,  248,  251,  259, 
295,  301,  303. 

Lesourd,  M.,  French  chargS  d'af 
faires  at  Berlin,  Gramont's  de 
spatch  of  July  3  to,  54;  his 
interview  with  Thile,  57,  58; 
79,  309,  310,  322. 

Libert^  the,  331. 

Limburg,  Roest  van,  quoted,  66. 

Loftus,  Lord  Augustus,  British 
Ambassador  to  Prussia,  his 
interview  of  July  13  with  Bis 
marck  and  report  thereon, 


INDEX 


513 


276-278,  491-494 ;  59,  65, 124, 
322,  393. 

Lopez  y  Dominguez,  Serrano's 
messenger  to  Leopold,  131, 
176. 

Lorenz,  Ottokar,  Ms  Wilhelm  I 
quoted,  18  n.,  25,  28,  61,  149, 
370,  371. 

Louis  XIV,  382,  387. 

Louis  Napoleon.  See  Napoleon 
III. 

Louis-PMlippe,  150,  389,  390, 
391,392,393. 

Louvet,  M.,  Minister  of  Com 
merce,  11  n.,  253,  315,  322. 

Luxembourg  affair,  the,  210,  250, 
378. 

Lyons,  Lord,  British  Ambassador 
to  France,  quoted,  63;  Ms 
character,  80;  interview  of 
July  5  with  Ollivier,  80  and  n. ; 
on  the  declaration  of  July  6, 
99;  on  the  demand  of  guar 
anties,  227,  228,  229  and  n.; 
on  the  Ems  despatch,  330; 
108,  109,  110,  142,  143,  163, 
221,  251,  252,  262. 

MACCHI,  MGK.,  133. 
MacMahon,    Marshal,  Due    de 

Magenta,  85,   152,  204,  250, 

328,  395. 
Main,    the,   boundary   between 

North  and  South  Germany,  13. 
Malaret,  M.,  108. 
Marcks,  Erich,   quoted,  on  the 

Ems  despatch,  289. 
Maria,    Countess    of    Manders, 

Leopold's  sister,  quoted,  66. 
Maria     Christina,     Regent     of 

Spain,  14  n. 
Maria  Luisa,  Duehesse  de  Mont- 

pensier,*  Infanta  of  Spain,  123. 
Massa,  PMlippe  de,  and  TMers's 

overture  to  Napoleon,  153-155. 
Me*ge,  M.,  Minister  of  Public 

Works,  251,  253. 


Mehemet  AH,  389. 
Mercier  de  1'Ostende,  French 
Ambassador  to  Spain,  Ms  in 
terview  with  Prim,  46,  47; 
Gramont's  despatch  of  July  3 
to,  53 ;  and  Prim,  103 ;  public 
opinion  adverse  to,  132,  133; 
39  and  n.,  40,  48,  51,  66,  101, 
106,  126,  127,  128,  129,  130, 
138. 

Metternich,  Richard,  Prince, 
quoted,  63,  75,  108,  110. 

Mexico,  French  expedition  to, 
2  and  n.,  3. 

Ministry  of  January  2,  pacific 
disposition  of,  11 ;  members  of, 
11  n.;  effect  of  accession  of, 
on  Bismarck's  plans,  13,  378; 
its  attitude  toward  Germany, 
14;  fights  against  the  cur 
rent,  299 ;  had  abundant  cause 
for  complaint,  without  Hohen- 
zolleni  affair,  380;  surprised 
in  works  and  thoughts  of  peace, 
383;  attitude  of  French  Ms- 
torians  toward,  386;  its  con 
duct  of  affairs  defended,  386. 
And  see  Council,  Gramont,  and 
Ollivier. 

Mitchell,  Robert,  Ms  article  in 
the  Constitutionnel,  248;  237, 
238,  258,  259,  305,  306. 

Moltke,  General  Count  von, 
dines  with  Bismarck,  July  13, 
281;  the  Ems  despatch,  282 
ff. ;  2  n.,  19,  376,  378,  395J 

Mommsen,  Theodor,  on  the  War 
of  1870,  399. 

Moniteur  Universel,  the,  97. 

Montpayroux,  M.,  164. 

Montpensier,  Due  de,  Ms  can 
didacy  for  the  Spanish  throne, 
26,  47,  123. 

Mouchy,  Due  de,  153. 

Mouchy,  Duchesse  de,  153,  154, 
155. 

Mullert,  Pastor,  178. 


514 


INDEX 


Mun,  Albert  de,  99. 

Murat,  Prince  Napoleon,  106. 

NAPOLEON  I,  155. 

Napoleon  III,  and  the  Mexican 
expedition,  2  and  n.,  3;  and 
the  War  of  1859,  3,  4 ;  and  the 
SeMeswig-Holstein  question,  5 ; 
and  the  principle  of  national 
ities,  5  ff. ;  Ms  disloyalty  to 
that  principle,  8,  9;  and 
Ollivier' s  foreign  policy,  11 ; 
and  Prim,  16  n. ;  favors  Prince 
Alf onzo  for  Spanish  throne,  17 ; 
first  hears  of  Leopold's  can 
didacy,  48,  49;  his  attitude 
justified,  69;  approves  con 
clusions  of  Gramont  and 
OUivier,  71;  their  conference 
with  him  on  July  5,  72  ff. ; 
orders  Gramont  to  prepare 
declaration,  77;  quoted,  on 
military  and  naval  affairs,  82 ; 
supreme  in  military  affairs,  83, 
84;  his  secret  negotiations 
with  Austria  and  Italy  in 
1869,  88  and  n.,  89 ;  and  the 
declaration  of  July  6,  90,  91  ; 
how  he  was  the  first  to  utter 
the  word  "war,"  91 ;  appeals 
to  Serrano,  106;  objects  to 
direct  negotiations  with  Leo 
pold,  110,  111;  and  Strat's 
mission,  112  ff. ;  his  personal 
negotiation  with  Serrano  suc 
cessful,  128  ff . ;  military  meas 
ures  taken  by,  152,  153; 
TMers's  overture  to,  and  Ms 
reply,  153-155;  learns  from 
Olozaga  of  Leopold's  with 
drawal,  188,  189;  withholds 
news  from  Council,  189,  190; 
letter  to  Ollivier  thereon,  199 ; 
OUMer's  interview  with,  201- 
203;  seems  content  with  the 
withdrawal,  204 ;  relations  be 
tween  him  and  the  Hohen- 


zollerns,  208;  and  the  war 
party  at  Saint-Cloud,  215  ff . ; 
and  Duvernois's  interpellation, 
216;  pledged  not  to  enlarge 
field  of  discussion,  221 ;  blamed 
for  not  demanding  guaranties 
in  1869,  224;  Ms  hesitation, 
225 ;  demand  of  guaranties  an 
act  of  Ms  personal  authority, 
225;  Ms  letter  to  Gramont 
thereon,  232,  233;  source  of 
the  letter,  233 ;  favors  sum 
moning  reserves,  251,  then  op 
poses,  253 ;  his  alleged  syncope 
during  council  of  July  14 
denied  by  Ollivier,  328,  329; 
at  the  Council  of  July  15,  335, 
336 ;  on  responsibility  for  the 
war,  362;  Ms  pacific  disposi 
tion,  374,  375 ;  had  no  motive 
for  desiring  war,  377;  plan 
of  the  Right  to  exonerate,  at 
expense  of  Ministry,  397 ;  letter 
of  Ollivier  to,  thereon,  398, 
399,  and  Ms  reply,  399;  his 
attitude  as  between  peace  and 
war,  401,  402;  33,  45,  47,  85, 
125,  126,  127,  140,  169,  170, 
207,  210,  231,  245,  246,  254, 
257,  258,  296,  304,  305,  306, 
310,  311,  313,  314,  315,  317, 
318,  321,  322,  366,  379,  382, 
385,  386. 

Nationalities,  principle  <  of,  de 
fined  and  discussed,  5-9 ;  denial 
of,  by  Prussia,  8;  Napoleon 
not  loyal  to,  8,  9 ;  71. 

Nemours,  Due  de,  150. 

Niel,  Marshal,  Ms  plans  of  mili 
tary  reform,  2  and  n. ;  quoted, 
82;  250,294. 

Nigra,  Count  Costantino,  quoted, 
180,  203. 

North  German  Confederation,  13. 

North  German  Gazette,  Ems  de 
spatch  published  in,  289,  291, 
309,  312,  330. 


INDEX 


515 


OLLIVIER,  EMILE,  Ms  ambition  on  l 
taking  office,  10 ;  Ms  attitude 
toward  German  unity,  10,  71 ; 
Ms  foreign  policy  outlined  to 
Napoleon,  10,  11 ;    Keeper  of 
Seals  and  Minister  of  Justice, 
11    n. ;     learns    of    Leopold's 
candidacy,  50;    how  affected 
thereby,  51,  52;  and  Werther, 
55;    and  the   Constitutionnel, 
68  and  n. ;   Ms  relations  with 
other  journals,  68  n. ;  his  view 
of  significance  of  candidacy, 
70;     conference   of    Gramont 
and,   with  Napoleon,   72  ff. ; 
proposes   ministerial    declara 
tion  to  Chambers,  75,  76 ;  his 
official  reception  on  July  5, 
79,  80 ;  interview  with  Lyons, 
80  and  n. ;    opposed  to  Aus 
trian,  and  favors  Russian  al 
liance,  86,  87 ;  and  the  decla 
ration  of  July  6, 90,  91, 93, 94 ; 
his   speech   thereon,   95,   96; 
his  letter  to  Napoleon  on  atti 
tude  of  parties,  164 ;  learns  of 
Leopold's     withdrawal,     189, 
190;    and  Olozaga,  192,  193; 
discloses  fact  of  withdrawal  to 
deputies  and  others,  193-195 
and  notes ;  letter  of  Napoleon 
thereon,  199 ;  Ms  conversation 
with   TMers,   201,    and   with 
Napoleon,  201-203;    and  the 
Werther-Gramont     interview, 
210  n . ;  effect  of  Ms  interven 
tion,  211 ;  not  consulted  as  to 
demand   of   guaranties,    218: 
attacked  by  the  Right,  220, 
221;     learns    of    demand    oJ 
guaranties,  232;    is  wounded 
and  disturbed,  233-235;    re 
monstrates  with  Gramont,  235 
236;    urges  mitigation  of  de 
mand,   236;    Ms  impulse   to 
resign,  238 ;  result  of  his  medi 
tations,    239,    240;     opposes 


recalling  reserves,  253;  at 
tacked  by  Le  Boeuf ,  257,  258 ; 
the  Empress  frowns  on  him, 
258;  cause  of  irritation 
against,  264;  Ms  argument 
against  war,  298,  299;  be 
lieves  peace  assured  at  mid 
night  of  July  13,  307;  pro 
poses  to  ignore  Ems  despatch, 
313,  314;  on  the  proposed 
conference  of  the  powers,  315- 
317,  319  ff. ;  and  the  declara 
tion  of  July  15,  334;  Ms 
promise  to  the  Chamber,  336 ; 
reads  declaration  in  Cham 
ber,  339, 342;  replies  to  TMers, 
346  ff. ;  "  we  accept  with  light 
hearts,"  349-351,  351  n.; 
before  the  Commission,  356; 
colloquy  with  Gambetta,  360, 
361 ;  Ms  letter  to  Napoleon  on 
Gricourt's  pampMet,  398,  399, 
and  the  reply,  399 , 
Ollivier,  Madame  Emile,  190, 

231,  317. 

Olmtitz,  Conference  of,  81  and  n. 
Olozaga,  Don  Sallustio,  Spanish 
Ambassador  to  France,  and 
Gramont,  54,  55;  and  Strat's 
mission  to  the  princes,  111,  112 
and  n.,  113-115;  Prince  An 
tony's  despatch  to,  174,  175; 
informs  Napoleon  of  with 
drawal  of  candidacy,  188, 189, 
and  to  Ollivier,  192, 193 ;  alone 
responsible  therefor,  accord 
ing  to  Napoleon,  202;  com 
municates  withdrawal  to  Gra 
mont,  206,  207 ;  49  and  n.,  51, 
104,  105,  180,  200,  202,  203, 
231,  232,  301,  302,  305,  310, 
385. 
Oncken,  Dr.,  Ms  Unser  helden 

Kaiser,  quoted,  292. 
Ordinaire,  M.,  362. 
Orleans,  Due  d',  son  of  Louis- 
Philippe,  390. 


516 


INDEX 


Orsini,  Felice,  Ms  assault  on  Na 
poleon,  210, 

Pall  Mall  Gazette,  the,  100. 
Palmerston,  Lord,  123,  389,  392, 
393. 

Parieu,  Marquis  de,  President 
of  the  Council,  11  n.,  238,  256, 

Paris,  excitement  in,  295.  And 
see  Press,  Parisian. 

Pays,  the,  220,  221  n.,  295-297. 

Pe"re  Antoine,  Prince  Antony  so- 
called  in  derision,  222,  232, 
233,  251,  258,  259,  295,  296. 

Persigny,  Due  de,  210. 

Pessard,  M.,  214. 

Peuple  Franfais,  the,  317. 

Philis,  M.,  317. 

Picard,  Ernest,  362. 

Piennes,  M.  de,  328. 

Pietri,  F.,  48,  257. 

Pinard,  M.,  164. 

Pire*,  Marquis  de,  344,  345. 

Plebiscite,  the,  of  May  8,  1870, 
27;  effect  of,  in  Prussia,  28, 
374 

Pliehon,  Charles  (1814-1888), 
Minister  of  Public  Instruction, 
11  n.,  253,  315,  322,  326,  337. 

Plombi&res,  conference  of  Na 
poleon  and  Cavour  at,  89. 

Polish  insurrection  of  1862,  87. 

Polo  de  Bernabe,  Admiral,  56, 
175,  176. 

Prague,  Treaty  of,  192,  195,  263, 
380. 

Press,  German,  its  subservience 
to  Bismarck,  278,  279;  and 
Werther's  report,  279 ;  on  the 
Ems  despatch,  292. 

Press,  Parisian,  attitude  of  on  the 
candidacy,  67,  68  and  n. ;  on 
the  declaration  of  July  6,  96 
ff. ;  on  the  Ems  despatch,  331 

Prim,  Juan,  Marquis  de  los 
Castillejos,  Spanish  Minister 
of  War,  14  and  n. ;  his  under 


standing   with   Bismarck,    14 
and   n.,    15;    and    Leopold's 
candidacy,  15, 16  and  n.,  40  n., 
422-434 ;  and  Napoleon,  16  n. ; 
and  Bucher  and  Versen,  25, 
26;   Bismarck's  letter  to,  29; 
and  the  premature  disclosure 
of  the  candidacy,  44,  45;   his 
interview  with  Mercier,  46,  47 ; 
and  Olozaga,  49  n. ;    induces 
approval    of    candidacy    by 
Spanish  ministry,  56 ;  notifies 
foreign  governments,  56;  and 
Mercier,    103;    continues   his 
preparations,    103,    104;     his 
circular  note,  104 ;  his  difficult 
position,    126,    127;    his   dis 
ingenuous  conduct,  127,  128, 
130,    131;     Prince    Antony's 
letter    to,    withdrawing    can 
didacy,  173,  174;   33,  34,  37, 
38,  48,  51,  64,  67,  73,  74,  76, 
92,   106,   108,   109,   111,   129, 
130  n.,  127,  138,  140,  159,  162, 
199,  206,  230,  379. 
Prussia,    and    the    principle    of 
nationalities,  9 ;    position   of, 
after  Sadowa,  13 ;  attitude  of, 
toward   Leopold's   candidacy, 
59,     60,    affirmed     by     Wil 
liam   to   Benedetti,    147;   re 
jects  England's  proffered  me 
diation,  352. 
Prussian  army,  mobilization  of, 

ordered  July  15>  365. 
Prussian  Monitor,  the,  291,  292. 
Public,  the,  220. 

Public  opinion,  its  proper  rela 
tion  to  a  constitutional  sov 
ereign  and  to  his  ministers,  69. 

RADZIWILL,  ANTONY  VON,  243, 
270,  271,  272,  333. 

Randon,  Marshal,  his  Memoirs 
quoted,  2  n. 

Rascon,  Sefior,  Spanish  Ambassa 
dor  to  Prussia,  67. 


INDEX 


517 


Raspail,  M.,  94,  362. 

Rathlef ,  Georg,  quoted,  273,  275, 
287,  288,  372. 

RSmusat,  M.  de,  389. 

Reserves,  recall  of,  demanded  by 
Le  Boeuf,  249,  250;  council 
declines  to  order,  253,  then 
orders,  313;  order  for,  par 
tially  countermanded,  316, 
322,  then  confirmed,  326,  327. 

RezonviUe,  battle  of,  395,  396. 

Richard,  Maurice  (1832-1888), 
Minister  of  Fine  Arts,  11  n., 
251,  253,  256,  257. 

Rigault  de  Genouilly,  Charles 
(1807-1873),  Minister  of  Ma 
rine,  11  n.,  85,  156,  157,  253, 
257,  365. 

Right,  the,  attitude  of,  on  July 
11, 163, 164;  turns  victory  into 
defeat,  186, 187 ;  and  the  with 
drawal,  197,  198;  predomi 
nance  of,  at  Court,  215 ;  deter 
mined  on  war,  220;  attacks 
Ollivier,  220,  221;  denies 
Prince  Antony's  authority, 
222;  insists  on  guaranties, 
expecting  refusal,  223,  225; 
seeks  to  exonerate  Napoleon  at 
expense  of  ministers,  397. 

Rivero,  Sefior,  42. 

Roeder,  Count  von,  293, 294, 323 

Roger,  Madame,  153. 
Roman    Question,    the,    and    a 
French-Italian  alliance,  35  and 
n. 

Roon,  General  Count  Albrecht 
dines  with  Bismarck  on  July 
13,  281;    the  Ems  despatch 
282  ff. ;  19,  158,  159,  179,  376 
Rouher,    Eug&ne,  President    of 
the  Senate,  former  prime  min 
ister,  advises  Duvernois,  260 
364. 
Roumanian  conspirators  in  Paris 

114. 
Russia,   Ollivier  favors  alliance 


with,  87  ;  Gramont,  contra,  87, 
88  ;  closely  united  to  Prussia, 
87.  And  see  Alexander  II, 
Fleury,  and  GortchakofL 


,  battle  of  (1866),  results 
of,  13  ;  question  of  revenge  for, 
70,  71;   Thiers  on,  345;   352, 
358,  376. 
Sagasta,  Praxedes  M.,  104,  126, 

127,  301. 
Saint-Hilaire,  Barthelemy,  362. 
Saint-Marc  Girardin,  quoted,  98. 
Saint-Privat,  battle  of,  396. 
Saint-Vallier,  Comte  de,  109,  120, 

300. 
Salazar  y  Mazaredo,  and  Leo 

pold's  candidacy,  16  and  n., 

422  ff.  ;    divulges  the  secret, 

42,  43,  45;  30,  32,  33,  37,  38, 

39,  104. 

Saxony,  and  the  candidacy,  67. 
Scherr,  Johannes,  his  1870-1871 

quoted,  148,  149,  372,  373,  402, 

403. 

Schleinitz,  Herr  von,  19. 
Schleswig,    and   the   Treaty   of 

Prague,  380,  381. 
Schleswig-Holstein,  Duchies  of, 

and  the  War  of  1864,  4  >nd 

n,,  5. 
Schultze,  Walter,  his  Die  Thron- 

kandidatur  Hohenzollernquoted, 

373,  374. 

Schwartzenburg,  Prince  von,  81. 
Segris,  Emile  (1811-1880),  Min 

ister    of    Public    Instruction, 

11  n.  ;  of  Finance,  11  n.  ;  253, 

256,  257,  322,  335. 
Senate,  warlike  demonstration  at 

session  of  July  13,  263,  264; 

declaration  of  July   15,  how 

received  in,  363,  364. 
Serrano  y  Dominguez,  Francisco, 

Regent  of  Spain,  Napoleon  ap 

peals  to,    106,    107,    128   ff.; 

quoted  as   to  origin  of  can- 


518 


INDEX 


didaey,  130   n. ;   14,  56,  109, 
110,  126,  301,  385. 
Silvela,  Senor,  301. 
Simon,   Jules,    quoted,   64,   65 ; 

362,  394. 
Slavs,  the,  86. 

South  German  States,  treaties  of 
alliance  with  Prussia,  11  and 
n. ;  attitude  of,  toward  the 
candidacy,  67,  120 ;  a  foreign 
war  necessary'  to  unite,  to 
North  Germany,  376,  377 ;  13. 

Spain,  should,  France  have  ad 
dressed  remonstrance  to,  rather 
than  to  Prussia?  101  and  n., 
102 ;  fruitless  negotiations 
with,  126  ff.;  possible  effect 
of  Prince  Antony's  despatch  in, 
230,  231;  approval  of  with 
drawal  by,  301,  302,  and  n. 

Spanish  marriages,  the,  prece 
dent  of,  150,  391. 

Spicheren,  battle  of,  395. 

Standard  (London),  the,  100,  222. 

Stoffel,  Baron,  311. 

Strantz,  Colonel,  sent  by  King 
William  to  Sigmaringen,  158, 
175. 

Strat,  Roumanian  agent  at  Paris, 
his  mission  to  the  princes,  112 
ff .  and  notes ;  his  mission  suc 
cessful,  169  ff.,  171  n. ;  180, 
189,  385. 

Sybel,  Heinrich  von,  his  Begrun- 
dung  des  Deutsches  Reichs 
quoted,  266,  291,  366,  371. 

TALABOT,  PATTLIN,  194. 

Talhouet,  Marquis  de  (1819- 
1884),  Minister  of  Public 
Works,  11  n. ;  resigns,  11  n. ; 
reporter  of  Commission  of 
July  15,  357,  358,  359,  360, 
502. 

Thiers,  Adolphe,  quoted,  65,  68, 
75,  181,  387,  389,  396;  and 
Cochery,  77  and  n. ;  his  over 


ture  to  Napoleon,  153-155; 
and  Ollivier,  201 ;  his  speech  of 
July  15, ,  343 ;  opposes  min 
isterial  declaration,  343,  344 ; 
his  past  conduct  responsible 
for  public  agitation,  345,  346 ; 
Ollivier  replies'  to,  346  ff . ; 
his  second  speech,  351-354  ; 
Gramont's  reply,  354;  3,  164, 
358,  361,  362,  394. 

Thile,  Herr  von,  disclaims  all 
knowledge  of  candidacy,  57, 
58;  quoted,  125,  126;  19,33, 
59,  72,  79,  105,  107,  137,  141, 
147,  366,  384. 

Times,  the,  100,  222,  290. 

Tocqueville,  Alexis  de,  quoted, 
352. 

Topete  y  Caballo,  Admiral,  14, 
66. 

Treaties,  inchoate  and  complete, 
discussed,  89. 

Univers,  the,  97. 

VAILLANT,   MAESHALL,  Quoted, 

64,  82,  215,  331.  • 

Varnbtihler,    Friedrich    G.     K., 

120. 
Versen,  Major  von,  his  mission  to 

Spain,  23-26 ;  14  n.,  28,  29,  37, 

38. 
Veuillot,  Louis,  quoted,  97,  98, 

392. 
Victor  Emanuel  II,  of  Italy,  his 

letter   to   Napoleon,   88,    89; 

36,  375. 
Victoria,  Queen,  124,  138,  150, 

210. 
Viseonti-Venosta,  Marquis  Emi- 

lio,  108,  119. 
Vitzthum,  Herr,  336. 

WALEWSKI,  COMTB  ALEX  ANDRE, 

10  and  n. 
War,  right  to  declare,  under  the 

Constitution  of  1870,  336,  337. 
War  of  1859,  3  and  n.,  4. 


INDEX 


519 


Wai  of  1870,  the  first  cause  of,  5 ; ! 
Napoleon  on  responsibility  for, 
362,  363 ;  question  of  respon 
sibility  discussed,  366-383;  a 
necessary  step  in  achieving 
German  Unity,  376,  377 ;  con 
siderations  fixing  responsibility 
for,  378,  379;  Hohenzollern 
candidacy  the  sole  cause  of, 
383;  early  stages  of,  395;  a 
justifiable  war,  400;  Momm- 
sen  on,  400. 

War  measures,  proposed  by  Min 
istry,  July  15,  337  ff. ;  passed 
by  Corps  L6gislatif,.  362. 
Werther,  Baron  von,  Prussian 
Ambassador  to  France,  55,  56 ; 
Ms  interview  with  Gramont  on 
July  12,  207  ff . ;  an  honorable 
but  dull-witted  person,  213 ; 
his  report  of  the  interview  con 
tradicted  by  Gramont,  213; 
his  report  reaches  Ems,  267; 
its  effect,  267  ff.;  his  report 
reaches  Bismarck,  279;  he 
is  4ealled',  280;  text  of  his 
repu't,  480-483;  122,  137, 
W3,  168,  169,  179,  192,  193 
260,  310. 
Werthern,  Freiherr  von,  Ms  life 

of  Versen,  quoted,  24  n. 
Westmann,  M.,  quoted,  380. 
William  I,  King  of  Prussia,  at 
first  opposed  to  Leopold's 
candidacy,  16,  17,  18;  Ver- 
sen's  report  to,  26;  and  th< 
Tsar,  32,  118;  finally  assent 
to  candidacy,  37,  38 ;  French 
ministers  decide  to  appea 
directly  to,  107;  Benedett 
sent  to,  at  Ems,  133;  Bis 
marck's  protest  to,  136;  dis 
turbed  by  Hohenzollern  affair 
137,  139;  and  the  declara 
tion  of  July  6,  138, 146 ;  urge 
withdrawal  of  Leopold,  139 
140;  Benedetti's  first  audienc 


of,  144-147;    declines  to  put 
pressure    on    Leopold,     145; 
Ms  dual  personality,  145,  148, 
149,  160 ;  his  .power  to  forbid 
the  candidacy,  149,  150;    Ms 
motive  questioned,  150,  151 ; 
Benedetti's    second   audience, 
158,  159,  160;   sends  Strantz 
to  Sigmaringen,  158;    desires 
to  "save  Ms  face,'-'  166,  167; 
Bismarck    offers    resignation, 
182,  183,  184,  185 ;  rejoices  at 
withdrawal,    183,    184;     Ms 
purpose    unchanged    by    Bis 
marck's    threats,    185,     186; 
Ms    influence    in    the    with 
drawal    denied    by    Werther, 
207,  208;    Gramont's  sugges 
tion  of  a  letter  from,  to  Na 
poleon,  208,   209;    BenedettL 
instructed   to    demand   guar 
anties  from,  219;  unlikely  to 
sanction  renewal  of  candidacy, 
224,   241;    demand  of  guar 
anties  presented  to,  243  ff. ; 
Ms  peremptory  refusal,  246; 
effect  of  demand  on,  266,  267, 
and  of  Werther's  report,  267 
ff . ;   sends  Radziwill  to  Bene 
detti  to  communicate  defini 
tive  withdrawal  of  candidacy 
and  to  refuse  him  an  audi 
ence,  270,  271 ;  approves  the 
withdrawal,  270,  272 ;  wearied 
by  Benedetti's  "persecution," 
he  appeals  to  Bismarck,  27 1 ; 
Ms  final  reply  to  Benedetti, 
272 ;  Ms  authorization  of  pub 
licity  a  disloyal  act,  274,  275 ; 
his  attitude  to  Benedetti  fal 
sified  in  Ems  despatch,  283, 
284;    and  the  Ems  despatch, 
293;    leaves  Ems,  332;    sees 
Benedetti    at    station,    332; 
ordered  mobilization,  night  of 
July  15,  365 ;   22,  28,  29,  45, 
58,  76,  94,  105,  106,  109,  110, 


520 


INDEX 


127,  131,  143,  153,  165,  168, 
171,  175,  177,  178,  179,  199, 
202,  203,  237,  239,  251,  261, 
301,  302,  303,  305,  309,  312, 
314,  323,  324,  353,  358,  361, 
366,376,378,385,386. 


William  II, 

368.  * 

Woerth,  k   Me  of,  V.*;l 
WtLrtembi."  attil^v 


z  3 


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