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Authorised Translation,
THE
FRENCH CAMPAIGN
1870—1871. *
MILITARY DESCRIPTION
BY
A. NIEMANN.
WITH MAPS AND PLANS.
Translated from the German by
Colonel EDWARD NEWDIGATE.
I <fc »
LONDON :
W. MITCHELL & CO., MILITARY PUBLISHERS,
39, CHARING CROSS.
1872.
ilk
LIST OP MAPS.
Page
General Map of the most impor^nt march^ pf the German Armies
antil tiie armistice . .• 1
Map of the strategical formation at the end of July 15
Map 9§ the Fight at Weissenburg and of the Battle of Woerth ... 53
Map of the Fight at Saarbriicken 71
Map of the Battle of Courcelles 93
General Map of the movements on the 15th und 16th of August. Marches
to the battle-fields of Vionville and Gravelotte 99
Map of the Battle of Gravelotte. I. Advance of the German Armies . 119
Map of the Battle of Gravelotte. 11. After the decision 133
Map of the Battle of Sedan. I. Advance of the Germans and com-
mencement of the engagement 165
Map of the Battle of Sedan. 11. Moment of the Emperor's surrender . 173
Map of the Investment of Metz on the 3rd of September 196
Map of the Battle of Noisseville 205
Map of the Siege of Strasburg . 225
Map I of Pads. General map 257
Map II of Paris. South-west front 315
Map III of Paris. East front 307
Map IV of Paris. North front 297
Map of the Operations of the Loire Army 323«
Map of the Operations of the Northern Army 351
Map of the south-eastern theatre of war 367
Map of the Siege of Belfort " 381
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
FIRST PART: TO THE CAPITULATION OF SEDAN.
Pages
Introduction 7-14
FIRST CHAPTER.
The strategical disposition 15—51
"War declared against Prussia p. 15. — Order of battle of the French Army p. 88. —
Order of battle of the German Armies p. 88. —Small fights at the end of July p. 49.
SECOND CHAPTER.
The concentrated offensive movement of the German Armies in the he-
ginning of August 1870 62 — 78
The fight at Weissenburg on the 4th of August p. 64. — The battle of Woerth on
the 6th of August p. 68. — The fight at BaarbrtLoken (Bpeiobern) on the 6tb of
August p. 71.
THIRD CHAPTER.
The investment of Strasburg and the first battle near Metz (Courcelles) 79 — 98
The retreat of the French corps p. 79. — The advance of the German Armies
p. 86. — The investment of Strasburg p. 87. — The battle of Courcelles (fiomy)
on the 14th of August p. 92.
«
FOURTH CHAPTER.
The battle of Vionville (Mars la Tour) on the 16th of August . . 99—117
FIFTH CHAPTER.
The battle of Gravelotte on the 18th of August 118—142
SIXTH CHAPTER,
The capitulation of Sedan 143—177
Mao Mabon*s undertaking upon Mets p^ 147. — The fight at Busancy on the 27th of
August p. 160. — The fight at Nouart on the 89th of August p. iM- — The
engagement at Beaumont on the SOth of August p. 156. — The battle of Sedan on
the 1st and 8nd (^ September p. 1S6.
SECOND PART: THE WAR WITH THE REPUBLIC.
SEVENTH CHAPTER.
The military situation of France after the catastrophe of Sedan 181 — 195
EIGHTH CHAPTER.
Pages
The investment of Metz 196—224
Battle of Noisneville on the 8l8t of August and the 1st of September p. 204. —
Attacks upon Kummer*8 Diyisipn on the 2nd and 7th of October p. 222.
NINTH CHAPTER.
Siege operations 225 — 256
The conquest of the fortress of Strasbnrg p. 226, of Sohlettstadt p. 289. of Keu-
Breisach and Fort Mortier p. 240^ of Pfalzburg p. 242 . of Thionville p. 244.
of Montm^dy p. 246^ of Longwy p. 248, of M^zidres p. 248, of Bocroy p. 249,
of Toul p. 250, of Soissons p. 261, of Verdun p. 268. of La Fdre p. 264, of Pironne
p. 266.
TENTH CHAPTER.
The Siege of Paris 257—321
The fortifications of Paris p. 269. — The investment in the month of September
p. 274. — Order of battle of tiie Parisian army of defence p. 278. — Small fights
during the inyestmeut of Paris p. 286. — The sortie fights in October p. 290. —
The sortie fights in November p. 300. — The sortie* fights in December p. 806. —
The combat round Brie and Champiguy p. 306. — Sortie ou the 21st of December
p. 309. — The beginning of the artillery attack. Bouibardment of Mont Avron
p. 310. — The bombardment p. 312. — Sortie on the 19th of January p. 817. — -
The armistice negotiations p. 820.
ELEVENTH CHAPTER.
The Attempts for the relief of Paris 322—366
I. The operations of the Loire Army 323—351
Occupation of Orleans by General von der Tann p. 326. — Orleans is re-taken by
the French p. 826. — Gambetta's organisations in November 1870 p. 327. — The
Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Sohwerin*s operations from the 9th of November to
the Ist of December p. 330. — Encounter of the French Loire army with Prince
Frederick Charles's army p. 382. — Fights at Ladon, Maizidres and Bois eommun
on the 24th of November p. 334. — Engagement at Beaune la Bolande on the 28th
of November p. 836. — Battle of Orleans on the 2nd to the 4th of December
p. 337. — Pursuit and observation of the divided French army p. 341. — Advance
upon Le Mans p. 344. — The crisis at Le Mans p. 348.
•
H. The operations of the Northern Army 351 — 366
Battle of Amiens on the 27th of November p. 858. — Advance upon Bouen p. 866. —
General Faidherbe's offensive p. 367. — Battle on the Hallue on the 28rd of De-
cember p. 359. — Combats at Bapaume on the 2nd and 8rd of January p. 862. —
Battle of St. Quentin on the 19th of January p. 864. —
TWELFTH CHAPTER.
The operations of the South-Eastern Army and the fall of Belfort 367 — 400
General von Werder's advance in October p. 368. — Fight on the Oigoon p. 371. —
March upon Gray p. 372. — Occupation of Dijon p. 374. — General von Werder's
advance upon Auxonne and Dijon in November p. 376. — The fight at Nuits
p. 378. — The investment and bombardment df the fortress of Belfort p. 381. —
Bourbaki*8 approach p. 385. — The battle of Belfort on the 16th, 16th and 17th of
January p. 388. — Manteuffers arrival and Bourbaki's retveat into Switzerland
p. 898. — The fall of Belfort p. 399.
Conclusion. The conventions of Versailles and Belfort . . . 401 — 409
Calender of the campaign , . 410 — 414
Index 415—420
FIRST PART.
TO THE CAPITULATION OF SEDAN.
fl
INTRODUCTION.
The great war of 1870 and 1871 was carried on between two
nations whose warlike renown was equal whilst it stood. far aboTe
that of any other nation. This war in which prond France bowed her
head to the German conqueror, in all its principal phases offer,
examples of the art of war which indicate a new epoch, and in com*
plete variety give new laws to the generals for new and hitherto
unheard of problems.
It is true that Germany is not indebted to her arms alone for
victory, nor solely to the genius of her generals and the ability of
her officers and soldiers. These grounds of victory which are at once
apparent to the eye of the observer, are only the Evidences and effects
of higher laws , in the fulfilment of which nations rise and fall in the
ocean of struggling humanity. Moral force decided this conflict for
Germany. Victory resulted from the application of the strength of a
whole nation, which rose superior to its foe in earnest morality
and high intolligence , and burst the narrow limits of the false and
obsolete statesmanship of its enemies both abroad and at home, as
a giant breaks the chains with which dwarfs encompassed him whilst
he slept.
Yet marvels enough are to be found in glancing at the external
phases of this development of noblest powers, and in following the
victorious advance of the German army upon the enemy's territory.
Having the same object of operations in view as in earlier wars
with France, namely the complete overthrow of the enemy in his
capital Paris, German generalship has accomplished feats in this war,
8
with forces cemented in the same manner as formerly, which have
never been approximately reached in any previous war, both as re-
gards the mass of the troops and their provisioning, as well as in their
employment in the greatest combined operations. The capture of the
whole army which France had formed in the beginning of the campaign
for the invasion of Germany, together with the reserves called out after
the first great defeats, is a wonderful fact, unparalleled in the history
of wars. The single results also, each considered separately, the
investment and conquest of the Fortress of Paris, a city within
whose walls were half a million of men bearingarms, whilst three large
armies were in movement for her relief; the capture of one French
army exceeding a hundred thousand men in strength, with the head of
the state himself in their midst, through the capitulation of Sedan ;
the surrounding, enclosing and capture of another army of two
hundred thousand men, the special corps d'dlites of France, in the
fortress of Metz; the defeat of an army of threefold overpowering
numbers in the three days battle at Belfort, and its being driven
OB to the neutral ground of Switzerland, are events of war such as
absolutely never occurred before.
These incomparable successes must be regarded, in general, as the
results of a military sci^ice which understood how to take into account
the improved means of transport, the altered army organization and
the arms of precision, new factors which the adversary was as yet
unable to appreciate; of a military art which knew how to mobilise
with the greatest rapidity armies of unparalleled magnitude, provided
with weapons brought to great perfection, and to move them according
to new principles of strategy and tactics, whilst the adversary, it is
true, also possessed large armies, yet did not understand their organ-
ization, and employed them according to ancient rules.
Since the rapid advances in science exercise their influrace upon
military matters, so that new and more perfect fire arms are provided
every ten years, it is the constant endeavour of army-leaders to adapt
their tactics to this technical progress in the various kinds of weapons,
and to make such changes as their new claims demand. This can only
be suocessfiilly done by the earnest persevering endeavours of
intelligent and discerning men. It is a very laborious and difficult
task.
9
When this earnestness and judgment are wanting, the inclination
is to trust to the weapon alone as an efBcacions lever of victory;
endeavours are made to employ arms of a particularly deadly and
perfect kind, the spirit is neglected and the machine is confided in.
Thus it was with France. Possessing a superior infantry rifle
and a description of gun, not in use in the German army, the
French believed victory to be certain, as, from a superficial judgment
of the Russian victories in 1866, they had attributed their success to
the needle gun alone. They consequently practised the single tactical
formations which most enhanced the ^caoy of their fire arms, for
example, the fighting of the infantry from shelter trenches, but the
general character of their tactics remained upon the old system. No
one who has read the French regulations for the use of the Mitrailleuse
and the report of the commission upon the trial of the Chassepot rifle,
can avoid the conviction that the French actually grounded their cpn^^
fidence in victory for the greatest part, in the superiority of their
weapons.
A strange delusion!
Then again Strategy is a science, which always progresses and
takes account of the changed laws of arms of modern times in the
same way as she employs the new means of communication, the
railway and the telegraph, for their corresponding ends. The
universal obligation of arms, whilst considerably increasing the
strength of the army, alters the rules of strategy.
Armies of half a million of men can no longer be moved upon the
principles which held good for those of a hundred thousand.
France, as well as Germany possessed an enormously large army,
bat she did not understand how to make these masses flexible, to
unite them upon the decisive points, or to throw them quickly from
one line on to another.
The German leadera possessed this skill. They understood, in
the first place, how to make use of the numerous lines of railway
which lead to the frontier, simultaneously and without confusion, in
such a manner that masses of troops were enabled to form up
against the enemy with astonishing rapidity, upon points 'Which had
been previously decided upon. Then in the whole further course of
the war, thanks to the capability of the officers and to the superb
10
discipline y they understood how to make judicious use of so many
roads and ways running parallel, that armies of a hundred thousand
men were moved forward, united and divided, with the rapidity of
small divisions.
The Prussian . staff has called into life an entirely new
strategy.
The different armies march in such connection with one another
that their heads form a single strategical front. During the advance
so many roads near one another are made use of, hy which the
columns can move forward leyel in height, that the quickest develop-
ment and concentration to the front can take place at the moment of
collision with the enemy. Thus the enemy who perhaps hoped to
overthrow a dismembered army or to brei^k through its line, imme-
diately finds himself kept back by the ranks quickly deployed in his
front and energetically supported, and he is entangled and surrounded
as if ensnared in the meshes of a net which is drawn together round
him. This is the only explanation for the enormous number of
prisoners made by the German armies. It is a phenomenon which
has occurred in no previous war. The plan of a concentrated attack,
of outflanking and of surrounding, predominates in all the battles
as well as in all operations which have a battle for their aim,
and has produced more brilliant results than any other previous
method.
The beginning of the war offers a striking example of this strategy,
whilst at the same time it throws a clear light upon the defects of
French generalship.
The German operations at the commencement of the campaign
consisted in a concentrated strategical attack upon the whole of the
enemy's position.
A plan which aims, at once, at surrounding and crushing the
enemy in front and on both flanks, can only be carried out with a pros-
pect of success by an army numerically superior and under a Direc-
tion which is secure of the most precise execution of its complicated
dispositions.
In earlier wars similar plans have frequently been proposed but
have never been carried out so effectually.
A plan of this kind can only succeed with completely drilled
11
and disciplined troops^ under distinguished leaders. This has clearly
been made evident in history. The frequent failure of the concen-
trated attack had even led to the opinion, that operations such
as Prussia undertook in 1866 and even in the last campaign were
entirely faulty.
It is true that; generally, in a concentrated attack the danger
for the assailant is great, the moment that any part of the army
machinery fails. The different bodies of troops advance upon lines
of operation which converge, but only meet upon the jenemy's
territory, consequently at a point the possession of which must first
be obtained. The danger is imminent, lest the enemy with concen-
trated forces should defeat these bodies one after another by attacking
them in detail.
Prussian generalship however succeeded in holding together in
one hand all the threads of the numerous members.
There was always a single direction in chief.
With this idea of a concentrated attack, it knew how to combine
and carry out a tj^tic, which at the same time secures to itself all
advantages and avoids all disadvanta^s, which is able to bring into
full effect all the superiority of the means of communication of pro-
gressing modern times, above all the telegraph, and fire arms brought
to the highest degree of perfection.
^ compainson of the different battles with the strategical
operations as a whole, clearly shows how greatly this idea of the
concentrated attack Ues at the foundation of the whole Prussian
war system. In the same way that armies advance surrounding
and closing in towards the enemy's forces, so do regiments and
battalions march upon single positions m the battle, out^-flanking
and enclosing them. Tactics and strategy come from the same
source.
The final aim of the strategical movements has, also, frequently
been the object of the concentrated strategical attack, whilst at the
same time the final aim was the object of the concentrated tactical
attack. This was the case in the battle of Kdniggrfttz.
On the other hand the campaign of 1870 took another form at
the commencement.
The French army was divided into corps, each of which took up
12
independently^ an excellent tactical position, without perceptible con-
nection, and without essential mutual suppoi*t, forming altogether a
strategical line, still not having a disposition in common, no oppor-
tunity was offered for a general engagement.
The single direction was wanting. The corps gave battle
independently by standing in the way of, or throwing themselves
upon the German armies which were pressing forward in pursuance of
a previously determined line of operation.
The^ were conquered, completely broken up, destroyed and taken
prisoners. •
In contrast with German leadership, the French generals still did
homage to obsolete traditions, to which the name of Napoleon I.
imparted sacred lustre. Instead of the well grounded military instruc-
tion which gave a secure foundation to the original plans of the
German leaders, the French, for the most part, only possessed a mili-
tary routine, above which they were never capable of raising them-
selves, being entangled in the fatal illusion of their own absolute
superiority. The French had fought against the Chinese, the Eabyles
and the Mexicans, for which do particular art of war was necessary ;
here they had conquered by tactical routine and the bravery of
the soldiers as well as through superior arms. They had further
triumphed over the Russians and Austrians. Here also their superior
tactics and the impetuosity of the troops were the grounds of victory,
whilst their faulty strategy in the Crimea and Upper Italy had
well merited such defeats as Prussian generalship prepared for them
at last. The strategy of the Russians and Austrians was however
still more deplorable than that of the French.
In order to give greater freedom of action to the individual corps
leaders, a system was current in the French army which left each
corps to follow a particular strategy for itself, that should, however,
correspond with the general plan. This system had already borne
evil fruit in the Crimea and Upper Italy. Undertakings such as Mac
Mahon's flank march from Chalons to Sedan, and exhibitions such as
the splitting up of the Army in the beginning of August 1870 were
nothing new in French generalship. Similar things had happened
in 1859 and as great follies had also taken place in 1854. In both
wars although the French conquered, a great want of unanimity was
13
exhibited in military action; however, aince victorieB had been won
in former wars in spite of faulty generalship, this generalship was
estimated as being of the highest genins, and its maxims were
established in the heads of French strategists as approved principles.
The generals who had commanded in the Crimea and Upper Italy,
in Mexico and Algeria were esteemed distinguished comnuunders, and
in 1870 the Emperor committed to them, in full confidence, a power
of authority which he ought to have kept in his own hands if he
had possessed the capacity for it. When these generals now saw an
enemy opposed to them who did not remain inactive and waiting for
them, but who unexpectedly attacked, them, they fell into the greatest
embarrassment and each caring for himself, left one another in the larch.
Thus, the superiority of the German art of war was established
over that of the French.
But the quality of the materials which formed the annies is
another important factor, the military capacity of the officers and
men, as well aa the moral qualities of the private soldiers.
The Germans have gained many victories by understaaiding how
to collect superior forces upon critical points, others they have won
with equal forces through skill and bravery, and in isolated cases
when they have been inferior in numbers, by the tenacity and courage
of the ti'oops alone. They have proved themselves superior to the
French, battalion against battalion, squadron against squadron, battery
against battery.
At the same time, the arms of the French infantry were superior
to those of the Germans.
There can however be no doubt, that as the German officer stood
above the French officer in education and military capacity, so the
.German soldier was also superior to the French soldier, and for the
following reasons :
The motive powers in the French army were chiefly ambition,
vanity and avarice. These qualities are only restained with difficulty
by discipline, and in victory only by good fortune.
In the African regiments this army had received elements
which had a destructive influence upon its spirit. The license
which it was necessary to allow these troops of low moral stand-
ing, whilst endeavouring to gloss over their licentiousness by flattery
14
about their warlike fierceness, was a contagions example for all
corps.
The motive powere in the German army were chiefly a high sense
of duty, love for the fatherland and exasperation.
The discipline in the German army was at the highest pitch that
can, in general, be reached; the faculty of obedience is especially a
German quality.
The French army was in a high degree warlike, the German
army as far as the men were concerned, peace loving; but this
love of peace did not injure their courage in the smallest degi*ee. In
general of a prevailing melancholy temperament, the German warrior
much more frequently went into action with his thoughts upon
death, than did the French who was of a prevailing sanguinary
temperament; but just because he had made himself familiar with the
king of terrors in his thoughts, nothing was able to shake him. He
had made up his mind to conquer or to die, he carried out his reso-
lution with the greatest integrity — his bearing when advancing to
the assault, terrified the French.
There is still an element in the German army which is not
to be found in . the French. This is the number of highly educated
men who carry the rifle. These men transported into a position
which rouses all the faculties, and incoi'porated in all parts of the
troops, exhibit warrior qualifications, which being developed in them
by culture, might still never have been drawn out in peace rela-
tions, and a light of intelligence spreading from them as it were,
illuminates a wide circle of their less cultivated comrades and is
capable of ennobling the spirit of the whole army.
Thus a highly educated nation, trained for many years in grave
discipline and the most elevated sciences shows the slowly ripened
fruits of an harmonious growth by the results also of a development
of its warlike power.
— ♦^•►•♦-
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CHAPTER I.
The Strategical Formation.
The formal declaration of war from France to Prussia was
delivered to Count Bismarck at 1.30 o^clock in the afternoon of the
19th of July. However, the agreement to the demands for credit for
the war in the assembly on the 15thof Jnly^ and the declaration of the
French government upon that day, constituted in fact, a declaration
of war, and the North German Confederation consequently began its
preparations on the 16th of July. It may be inferred from the speech
of the president Rouher to the Emperor, as well as from official and
other information, that France had been preparing for a German war
ever since 1866, and considering the present as the most favourable
moment, had taken special military measures to have a numerous
mobile army for disposal in the middle of the month of July.
The most important of these measures was the addition to
the army in the camp of ChMons, which in consequence of the number
of troops being doubled, consisted in the middle of July of about
80,000 men, and thus comparatively near the German frontier.
The ciroumstance that in the eastern departments there were a pre-
ponderating number of garrisons, and that besides, a number of small
fortified places with the fortresses of Metz and Strasburg lay
opposite the German frontier, facilitated in a high degree, the concen-
tration of an army for the invasion of Germany, upon a secure base
of operations.
On the other hand the North German Confederation, which the
attack most nearly concerned, neither possessed the considerable
L
16
frontier fortresses nor the accumulation of garrisons in the threatened
proyinceS; nor a standing camp. Except at the fortresses of
Cologne, Coblent4*and Mayence, the Prussian Rhine provinces lay
open to the enemy, and a large portion of the army had to be
brought a long distance from the eastern provinces, to the threat-
ened frontier.
If France, as she had reckoned on, had only had the North
German Confederation opposed to her, probably the occupation of
the left Rhine territory by the French army would have formed the
commencement of the war.
The conduct of the South German States first gave the war an
unfavourable tui*n for France. Surprised by the adhesion of these
countries to the alliance with the Confederation, the French Govern-
ment fotmd itself compelled to change its war plans, and even apart
from political grounds, this change in the military situation explains
in a great measure, the delay of action.
The theatre of war extended along the whole frontier from Saar-
gemtind to Hiiningen,, and it must have been the consideration of an
attack from Baden or from the Bavarian Palatinate, which paralyzed
the advance of the French army into Rhinish Prussia.
In order to compensate for the numerical superiority of the
German armies opposed to the Emperor Napoleon, which the con-
duct of the southern states now made still more striking, the French
Direction conceived the idea of passing quickly over the Rhine in order
to hinder the junction of the North and South German Armies, and in
the hope of gaining allies among the neutral states, through the
impression produced by a firet success.
In conformity with this idea the French active forces were formed
up in three large bodies, disposed in such a manner that the enemy
should be kept in ignorance as to their destination. At Metz 150,000
men were to be concentrated, 100,000 at Strasburg, and 50,000 in
the camp of Chalons. This an*angement gave scope for the conjecture
that an attack would be made either against the Rhine provinces or
against Baden.
After the concenti*ation was completed, the Emperor Napoleon
would unite the Metz and Strasburg armies and cross the Rhine at
Maxau with an army of 250,000 men, leaving Rastatt on his right
17
and Germersheim on his left, and thrust himself between the North
German Confederation and the Southern States.
Meanwhile the army of Chfllons was to direct its march upon Metz
in order to cover the rear of the invading^ army and to watch the
north-westerp frontier ; at the same time a fleet with ap army to eflTect
a landing, would threaten the Prussian coasts from the North-Sea and
the Baltic, and retain there a portion of the North German army.
It will not be uninteresting to mention the grounds given by the
Emperor himself for the failure of these plans, in his publication
'^Des causes qui ont amen6 la capitulation de S6dan''.
He here says :
''This plan had not a chance of succeeding, unless the enemy
could be outstripped in quickness. For this object, not only must
the required number of soldiers be assembled at fixed points
in a few days, but also the essential accessories, such as waggons,
train, artillery paries, pontoons, gunboats to protect the passage of
the Rhine, and finally the indispensable provisioning with biscuit for
the support of a numerous army marching in an united body.
"The Emperor flattered himself that these results could be
attained, and this was his error ; for like eveiy one else he cherished
the illusion that a concentration of so many men, horses and war
material could take place by the railways with the necessary order
and precision although it had not all been regulated by a careful
administration long beforehand.
"The chief cause of our retardation lay in the faults of our mili-
tary organization, as it had existed for fifty years, and which
showed themselves from the first moment. Instead of having army
corps always organized as in Prussia, which are recruited in one
province and possess the necessary material and accessories upon
the spot, the troops forming the army of France are scattered over
the whole territory, whilst the material is accumulated in a few cities,
and stored in magazines.
"If is required to form an active division upon some point of
the frontier, the artillery usually comes from a far distant place, the
military train and ambulances from Paris and Vernon, almost the
whole of the provisioning from the capital, and tlie soldiers of the
reserve fi*om all parts of France. The railroads are insufficient to
18
transpoi*t the men, the horses and the material, confusion every-
where arises, and the railway stations are often full of objects,
whose nature and destination are unknown.
''In 1860 the Emperor had decided that the recruits of the second
category of the contingent should be exercised at the depdts of their
departments, in order in time of war to be allotted to the regiments
taking the field. This disposition combined the advantages of the
Prussian systejn with those of the French. It was only necessary
for the reserved to repair from their villages to the chief towns of
their departments where they could be collected, equipped in a shoi*t
time and enrolled in the different regiments.
"Unfortunately this system was modified by the war ministry
in 1866, and from the first moment of his levy each soldier was
told off to a certain re^ment. By this plan the reserve troops,
when called to arms in 1870, had frequently to reach their regiments
in the most complicated manner. For example those in Strasburg
and whose regiments belonged to Alsace, instead of assembling in
the Strasburg depots, were sent to their respective depots, perhaps
in the south of France, or even in Algeria, and had to return again
from there to Alsace in order to be incorporated in their regiments.
"It will be understood what delay such an organization must
occasion in collecting the reserve troops.
"The same thing occurred in the camp equipage of the men and
officers, as well as in the ambulance waggons.
"Instead of being distributed in the depOts in the centre of each
department, they were stored up in a small number of magazines,
and by this means a large number of reserve troops came to their
regiments very imperfectly equipped, without knapsacks, tentes-abri,
dishes, flasks, cooking kettles, all objects of absolute necessity.
"To these faults must be added the small initiative committed to
the generals who commanded the departments and to the intendants.
A ministerial order was necessary for the smallest article. For example,
it was impossible to give the officers what was indispensable, or even
the necessary arms to the soldiers without an order from Paris.
"This routine of administration deprived the generals of all that
activity and foresight which sometimes redeem the faults of or-
ganization.
19
''We will therefore hasten to say that in order to place an army
together, the intelligence of individnals mnst not be somnch depended
on, as a solid organization which sets in motion a simple machine
capable of working with regularity in war, because it has been
accustomed to work with regularity in peace."
Thus spoke the Emperor Napoleon.
The weaknesses which have been disclosed in this representation
may be considered as really proved by what the German troops saw
and heard when in France, and especially by a great number of docn-
ments found in the Chateau of St. Cloud, which bear witness to the
profligate confusion and unprepared state of the French army, and
furnish a wonderful illustra;tion of the fact, that the French provoked
the war, in the opinion that they had brought their preparations to the
highest point of completion.
But supposing that these weaknesses had not existed, that the
Emperor Napoleon had even been able to mobilise his whole army
as quickly as Germany, the attempt to throw it between North and
South Germany would have been a ruinous imprudence. The army
of the North German Confederation alone might have been able
to cause a deplorable fate for the invading French army.
That Napoleon actually wanted to carry on an offensive war, is
fully proved by the circumstance that maps of Germany only, were
distributed through his army.
In the face however of manifest impossibilities, he gave up all
bold plans very soon after the declaration of war.
Thus a delay arose in forming up the French army, which gra-
dually brought the intended offensive into a defensive disposition.
For on'th^ German side, the mobilization of the immense forces
took place with unparalleled celerity and circumspection, and in the
space of fourteen days overtook the long preparations of the French.
In consideration of the supposed French plans, the question arose
for the German Direction whether it would be more advantageous in
the first instance, to keep back a French invasion with stationary
troops, or whether a concerted movement should be made at the
risk of abandoning the frontier provinces.
The latter course was decided upon. The garrisons stiationed
nearest to theu frontier only, were to foi*m a frontier cordon in order to
8*
20
deceive the enemy^ whilst the mobilization was being pressed forward
in the interior of the country, with that steadiness which a lasting
army direction alone renders possible.
Brilliant generalship and the sacrifice of weak detachments, which
^the safety of the frontier required, made the execution of this bold
idea possible. From the moment of the declaration of war to the
storming of Weissenburg, a period of seventeen days, a few ie^plated
regiments held the whole of the French army in check , by raising
the belief that there were already considerable corps on the frontier,
and so made the French imagine that the whole of the military
preparations were completed.
The strategical formation of the French army immediately
after the declaration of war, which only imperfectly corresponded with
the above quoted idea of the three bodies, was as follows :
1st Corpsy Commandant^ Marshal Mac Mahon, head-quarters
Strasburg. The railway lines from Lyons, Epinal and Nancy con-
ducted the troops to this place.
The 5th Corps, Commandant^ General de Failly, composed
of four Infantry and one Cavalry Divisions, head-quarters Bitsch, joined
the left wing of the 1st Corps. This corps had no line of railway to
itself but must base its operations towards the rear either upon the
line already named, or on that from Metz and Thionville. The front
was directed towards the railway from Eaisei*slautern to Zweibrticken,
and the line from Landau to Rastatt. The left wing joined the 2nd.
Corps, Commandant, General Frossardy head-quarters St. Avoid.
This village lies to the north of the railway between Metz' and Saar-
brtickcn, only a few miles from the Prussian towns Lauter and Earls-
brunn to the south of Saarlouis; here there is an important junction
of roads which permits of operations being carried on towards Saar-
brUcken and Saarlouis, or towards Bitsch and Strasburg.
The Brd Corps^ Commandant y Marshal Bazaine, was based
upon Metz and threatened the fortress of Saarlouis, by the high roads
through Boulay and Bouzonville.
The 4tlh Corps, General Ladmirault , forming the left wing,
rested upon Thionville, and could advance by two r^^ads into the
21
Moselle country. One towards the north^ leading by Sierk to Saar-
burg and Trier^ the other through Bouzonville to Saarlouis by the
road joining that from Metz.
Canroberfs Corps at ChMons, Feluv Douajfs at Belfort and
the Imperial Guard under Bourbaki in and about Nancy, formed
the second line.
The Fi*ench army was therefore extended upon a line 20 miles
in length (72 English miles) threatening South Germany with its right
wing at Strasburg, the Prussian Saar with its left wing at Thion-
ville and Sierk, and the Bavarian Rhine Palatinate with its centre
at Bitsch, whilst the Guards, Canrobert's and Douay's Corps formed
the reserve.
During the last few days before hostilities began, a change was
made in this original formation, on account of the concentration of
considerable German forces in the Rhine Palatinate and in the southern
part of the Prussian Rhine province, which made Napoleon appre-
hensive that his long line might be broken through. Marshal Mac
Mahon was ordered to draw neai*er to the main army and to march
towards the neighbourhood of Bitsch. This retrograde movement in
the defensive was, already, the surrender of all the earlier offensive
plans against South Germany and the Rhine, and the French, con-
sequently, now entrenched themselves in great haste in all their posi-
tions. Mac Mahon pushed forward Abel Douay's Division towards the
Lauter, to occupy Weissenburg for the purpose of covering his intended
flank nuCrch.
ORDER OF BAHLE IN THE FRENCH ARMY
at the beginning of the war.
Commander in chief of the Army: Emperor Napoleon III. — Chief of the
Staff of the Army : Marshal Leboeuf. — Deputy chief of the Staff: General
of Division Lebrun, — Deputy chief of the Staff: General of Division
Jarras. — Commander in chief of Engineers : General of Division Soleille.
— Commander in chief of Artillery : General of Division Cofjmieres de
Nordeck, — Commandant of Imperial Head Quarters : General Leiellier
de Blanchard,
THE GARDE CORPS.
General of Division Bottrbaki. Chief of the Staff, General Dauvergne.
DIVISIONS.
1st Inf. Div.
General of Division
Deligny.
2nd Inf. Div.
General of Division
Ficard.
Cavalry Div.
General of Division
Desvaux.
BRIGADES.
REGIMENTS.
1st Brig. Gen. Brincourt,
2nd Brig. Gen. Gamier.
1st Brig. Gen. Janingros.
2nd Brig. Gen. Poitevin.
Ist Brig. Gen. du Fretay.
2nd Brig. Gen, de France.
3rd Brig. Gen. du Preuil.
Jager Battalion.— 1st and
2nd Voltigeur R.
3rd and 4th Voltigeur R.
Zouave R. — Ist Grena-
dier R.
2nd and 3rd Grenadier R.
Guides R. — Chasseurs R.
Lancer R. — Dragoon R.
Cuirassier R. —
ncer R.
Carbi-
The Garde Corps numbered 21 battalions, 24 squadrons and 12 batteries.
23
FIRST CORPS.
»
(The alterations whioh took place after the battle of WOrth are ehowii in parenthesis.)
Marshal Mac Mahon^ Due of Magenta. (General Ducrot.) — Chief of the
Staff, General Colson. (General Faure. — Col. Robert.)
■ '
DIVISIONS. J BRIjSADES.
REGIMENTS.
Ist Inf. Div.
General of Division
Ducrot.
• (Gen. Wolff.)
2nd Inf. Div.
General of Division
(Abel) Douay.
(G. Pelld.)
1st Brig. Gen. Wolff.
13th Jager Bat. — 18th and
96th B. of the Line.
2nd Brig. Gen. du Postis
du Houlbec.
46th R. of the Line. —
1st Zouave R.
Ist Brig. Gen. Montmarie.
16th Jager Bat. — 50th and
74th R. of the Line.
3rd Inf. Div.
General of Division
- Raoul.
4th Inf. Div.
General of Division
de Lartigue.
2nd Brig. Gen. Pell^.
78th R. of the Line.
l6t R. Algerian Tiraill.
Ist R. de Marehe.
1st Brig. Gen. L'H^rUlier.
(Gen. Cartret-Trecourt.)
8th Jager Battalion. — 36th
and 48th B. of the Line.
(2nd Zouave R.)
2nd Brig. Gen. Lefebvre.
2nd Zouiive R.— 2nd R.Al-
gerian Tiraill. (48th R. of
the Line. — 1 Bat. Frane-
tireurs from Paris.)
1st Brig. Gen. Fraboulet.
1st Jager Batt. — 56th and
87th B. of the Line (re-
mained in Strasburg (2nd R.
de Marehe).
2nd Brig. Gen. Laeretelle.
3rd Zouave R. — 3rd R.
Algerian Tirailleurs.
Cavalry Div.
General of Division
Duhesme.
1st Brig. Gen. de Septeuil.
drd Hussar and 11th Chas-
seur R.
2ud Brig. Gen. de Nansouty.
2nd and 6th Lancer R. —
10th Dragoon R.
3rd Brig. Gen. Michel. | 8th and 9th Cuirassier B.
The first Army Corps numbered in July, 62 battalions, S8 squadrons and 18 batteries.
24
SECOND CORPS.
General of Division ' Froward. . Chief of the Staff, General Siiget.
DI ^ ISIONS.
BRIGADES.
REGIMENTS.
Ist Inf. Div.
General of Division
VergiS.
2nd Inf. Div.
General of Division
Bataille.
Ist Brig. Gen. Tixier, later
Gen. Letellier-Valaze.
3rd Jager Bat. — 32nd and
55th R. of the Line.
2nd Brig. Gen. Jolivet.
76th and 77th R. of the
Line.
Ist Brig. General Pouget.
12th Jager Bat. — 8th and
23rd R. of the Line.
2nd Brig. G. Fauvart-Bastoul.
66th and 67th R. of thg
Line.
3rd Inf. Div.
General of Division
de Laveancoapet.
1st Brig. Gen. Docns, later
Gen. Maudhuy.
10th Jager Bat. — 2nd and
63rd R. of the Line.
2nd Brig. Gen. Michelet.
24th and 40th R. of the
Line.
Cavalry Div.
General of Division
Lichtlin.
1st Brig. Gen. Valabregue.
4th and 5th Chasseur R.
2nd Brig. Gen. Bachelier. 7th and 12th Dragoon R.
The second Army Corps numbered 39 battalions, 16 squadrons and 16 batteries.
THIRD CORPS.
Marshal Bazcdne (later Gen. Deca^n, later Marshal Leboeuf). Chief of the
Staff, General Maneque.
DIVISIONS.
BRIGADES.
REGIMENTS.
1st Inf. Div.
General of Division
1st Brig. Gen. Aymard.
18th Jager Bat. — 5 1st and
62nd R. of the Line.
Montaudon.
2nd Brig. Gen. Clinchaut.
8l8tand 95th R. of the Line.
2nd Inf. Div.
General of Division
1st Brig. Gen. Cambriels.
15th Jager Bat. — 19th and
41st R. of the Line.
de Castagny.
2nd Brig. Gen. Duplessis.
69th and 90th R. of theLine.
3rd Inf. Div.
General of Division
1st Brig. Gen. de Potier.
17th Jager Bat. — 7th and
29th R. of the Line.
de Mettmann.
1
2nd Brig. Gen. Arnaudeau.|59th and 71stR. of thcLine.
4th Inf. Div.
General of Division
* ^ -o ' n J r» 11th Jager Bat. — 44th and
l8t Bng. Gen. dc Bauer. ^^^^ ^ ^^ ^^^ j. .^^
Decaen.
2ndBrg. G. Sangle-Ferriercs.
80th and 85th R. of the Line.
DIVISIONS.
25
BRIGADES.
REGIMENTS.
Cav. Div.
General of Division
dc CierambauU.
l8t Hrig. Gen. Bruchard.
2nd Brig. Gen. Maubrunehcs.
3rd Brig. Gen. de Juniac.
2nd 3rd and 10th Chas-
seur R.
2nd and 4th Dragoon R.
5th and 8th Dragoon R.
The third Army Corps numbered 63 battaliong, 88 tqaadroDS and 18 batterioi.
FOURTH CORPS.
General of Division de Ladmirault. Chief of the Staff, General Desaint.
DIVISIONS.
1st Inf. Div.
General of Division
de Cisscy.
2nd Inf. Div.
General of Division
Rbsc.
3rd Inf. Div.
General of Division
• de Lorcncey.
Cav. Div.
General of Division
Legrand.
BRIGADES.
1st Brig. Gen. Braycr.
2nd Brig. Gen. dc Colbert.
1st Brig. Gen. Bellecourt.
2nd Brig. Gen. Pradier.
1st Brig. Gen. Pajol.
2nd Brig. Gen. Berger.
1st Bmg. Gen. de Montaigu.
2nd Brig. G. de Goudrccourt.
REGIMENTS.
20th Jagcr Bat. — 1st and
6th R. of the Line.
57th and 73rd R. of the Line.
5th Jager Bat. — 13th and
43rd R. of the Line.
(54th and 98th R. of the Line.
2nd Jager Bat. — 15th and
33rd R. of the Line.
54th and 65th R. of the Line.
2nd and 7th Hussar R.
3rd and 7th Dragoon R.
The fourth Army Corps numbered 89 battalions, 16 squadrons and 16 batteries.
FIFTH CORPS.
General of Division de Failly (later dc WimpfFen). Chief of the Staft',
General Besson.
DIVISIONS.
Ist Inf. Div.
General of Division
Goze.
BRIGADES.
ist Brig. Gen. Grenier.
2nd Brig. Gen. Nicolas.
REGIMENTS.
4th Jager Bat. — 11th and
46th R. of the Line.
6l8t and 86th R. of the
Line,
DIVISIONS.
2nd Inf. Div.
General of Division
de TAbadie.
3rd Inf. Div.
General of Division
Guyot de Lcspart.
Cavalry Div.
General of Division
Brahaut.
26
BRIGADES.
REGIMENTS.
1st Brig. Gen. Lapassct*).
2nd Brig. Gen. dc Manssion.
1st Brig. Gen. Abatucci.
2nd Brig. Gen. de Fontange.
Ist Brig. Gen. de Bcrnis.
2nd Brig. G. de la Mortiere.
14th Jager Batt. — 49th and
84th R. of the Line.
88th and 97th R. of the Line.
19th Jager Batt. — 17th and
27th R. of the Line.
30th Jnd 68th R. of the Line.
5th Hussar and 12th Chas-
seur R.
3rd and 5th Lancer R.
The fifth Army Corps numbered 39 battalioni, 16 sqaAdrona and 16 batteriei.
SIXTH CORPS.
Marshal CanroberL Chief of the Staff, General Henri.
DIVISIONS.
BRIGADES.
REGIMENTS.
1st Inf. Div.
General of Division
Tixier.
2nd Inf. Div.
General of Division
Bisson.
3rd Inf. Div.
General of- Division
Lafont de Villiers.
4th Inf. Div.
General of Division
Le vassor-Sorval .
Cav. Div.
General of Division
de Fenelon.
1st Brig. Gen. Pechot.
2nd Brig. G. Leroy de Dais.
9. Jager Batt. — 4th and
10th R. of the Line.
12th and 100th Reg. of the
Line.
Ist Brig. Gen. Noel.
2nd Brig. Gen. Maurice.
1st Brig. Gen. de Sonnay.
2nd Brig. Gen. Colin.
Ist Brig. G. de Marguenat.
2nd Brig. G. de Chanaleibles.
1st Brig. Gen. Tilliard.
2nd Brig. Gen. Snvarcssc.
3rd Brig. Gen. de Beville.
9th and 14th R. of the Line.
20th and 30th Reg. of the
Line.
75th and 9l8t Reg. of the
Line.
93rd and 94th Reg. of the
Line.
25th and 26th R. of the Line.
28th and 70th R. of the Lino.
1st Hnssnr and 6th Chass. R.
1st and 7th Lancer R.
5th and 6th Cuirassier R.
1
*) This Brigade which held posies^ion of Saargemftnd in the beginning of Auguit, got sepft-
rated from the Corps in the retreat to Chalons, ftQd retired apon Mets with the third Corps.
27
The Bizth Army Corps numbered 49 bafctalioni, 24 squadrons and 18 batteries.
The 14th 20th and 80th Regiments of the Line were separated from the sixth Corps at
Frouard, and afterwards joined the 12th Corps which was reformed in Chalons. The whole
Cavalry OiTision was unable to reach the Corps in Mets, and later formed the oaralry of
the 12th Corps.
SEVENTH CORPS.
General of Division {FeHx) Doxwy* Chief of the Staff, Gen. Renson.
DIVISIONS.
BRIGADES.
REGIMENTS.
Ist Inf. Div.
General of Division
Conseil - Damesnil.
2nd Inf. Div.
General of Division
Liebert.
3rd Inf. Div.
General of Division
Dumont.
Cav. Div.
General of Division
Ameil.
Ist Brig. Gen. Brettevillc,
later Gen. Morand.
2nd Brig. Gen. Maire, later
Gen. St. Hilairc.
1st Brig. Gen. Guiomar.
2nd Brig. G. de la Bastidc.
1st Brig. Gen. Bordas.
2nd Brig. Gen. Bittard des
Fortes.
1st Brig. Gen. Cambriel.
2nd Brig. Gen. Jolif du
Coulombier.
17th Jager Bat. — 3rd and
2l8t R. of the Line.
47th and 99th R. of the Line.
6th Jager Bat. — 5th and
37th R. of the Line.
53rd and 89th R. of the Line.
52nd and 72nd R. of the Line.
82nd and83rdR. of theLine.
4th Hussar and 4th and 8th
Lancer R.
6th Hussar and 6th Drag. R.
The seventh Army Curps numbered S8 battalions, 20 squadrons and 16 batteries.
The 8nd Cavalry Brigade which was formed in Lyons, never reached the Corps.
FIRST RESERVE CAVALRY DIVISION.
General du Barrail.
1st Brig. Gen. Margueritte. 1st and 3rd Chasseurs d'Afrique.
2nd Brig. Gen. de Lajaillc. 2nd and 4th — —
SECOND RESERVE CAVALRY DIVISION.
General de Bonnemain,
1st Brig. 1st and 2nd Cuirassier R.
2nd Brig. 3rd and 4th —
THIRD RESERVE CAVALRY DIVISION.
1st Brig. Prince J. Murat. 1st and 9th Dragoon R.
2nd Brig. Gen. de Grammont. 7th and 10th Cuirassier R.
28
The strength of this mobile Field Army^ at the beginning of
the war is reckoned therefore in the following manner : The Infantry
Divisions consisted almost without exception of 13 Battalions, and the
Cavahy Divisions of 4, 6, 6, even 7 Regiments. The Battalions
numbered about 720 men, the Cavalry regiments numbered 500
horses.
No. of DIVISIONS.
MEN.
HORSES.
-: — : — r-== — .
BATTB-
RIES.
GUNS.
CORPS.
INFANTEY
CAVALRY.
Garde C.
2
17.280
3000
12
72
1st*
4
37.440
3500
20
108
2nd
3
28.080
2000
15
90
3rd
4
37.440
3500
20
108
4th
3
28.080
2000
15
90
5th
3
28.080
2000
15
90
6th
4
3
37.440
3000
20
108
7th
27.360
2500
1^
90
Cavalry
Reserve.
3
6000
Total 241.200 27.500
756
The Corps which was destined for landing on the German coast,
or probably for co-operation with the Danes in Jutland, is not here
taken into account, for its formation was not completed, by reason of
the rapid victories of the Germans.
This effective strength of the army formed up in the eastern
provinces at the beginning of the war and estimated at a united
capitation of 310,000 men, differs without doubt considerably from
*) In order to distiDgmsb more easily between the French and German Corps, the
former will be always indicated by Arabic figures, and the latter by Roman figures.
29
the said strength of the whole Field Army, wliose war state in com-
batants was reckoned as follows :
304,000 Men Infantry
40,000 „ Cavalry,
46,000 „ Artillery,
11,000 „ Engineers,
10,000 „ Train,
as well as 13,000 Officers of all arms.
Total 424,000 Men.
In Artillery 3 batteries, including one mitrailleuse battery, were
allotted to each Infantry Division, and a reserve of 6 batteries includ-
ing one horee battery to each Army Corps.
Thus a Corps of 3 Divisions had 15 batteries with 90 guns, and
a Corps of 4 Divisions 18 batteries with 108 guns.
The Engineer troops in each corps were composed of a company
of Engineers for each Division, and one company with the Engineer
Park for the Corps.
According to the preceding order of battle the following troops
were not employed with the army in the field: the 16th 38th 39th
and 92nd Regiments of the Line, 3 Battalions of African Light
Infantry, 1 Foreign Regiment, the 8th Hussars, the 1st and 9th
Chasseurs, and 3 Regiments of Spahis. These troops were stationed
in Algeria and in addition, the 22nd 34th 58th and 79th Regiments
of the Line which were stationed on the Spanish frontier.
Lastly the 35th and 42nd Regiments of the Line which were in
Civita Vecchia, and the 7th and 8th Chasseurs which were in France,
but not with the Army.
30
In contrast to the precipitate haste with which the French troops
had been thrown upon the frontier immediately after the declaration
of war, followed by the loss of a series of days in uncertain delays and
insecure operations, the sti*ategical formation of the armies in Germany
was only commenced after the mobilization according to a settled plan
had been completed, and its accomplishment was indicated by an
immediate energetic advance, and a victorious encounter with the
enemy upon hostile territory.
Three armies had been organized in the last week of July, and
concentrated upon Coblentz, Mayence and Mannheim as their basis of
operations.
The First Army ^ under the command of General von SteinmetSj
head quarters Coblentz, formed the right wing.
The Second Army^ under the command of Prince Frederick
Charles^ head quarters Mayence, formed the centre.
The Third Army^ under the command of the Crown Prince of
Prussiay head quarters Mannheim, formed the left wing.
This disposition, owing to the peculiar rapidity and energy of
German Leadership, combined with the irresolution of the enemy,
resulted in the desired power of taking the offensive being now
entirely given up to the Germans. Until this favourable state of
affairs the German Direction had to consider the probability of an
attack on the part of the French, and could not lose sight of the pos-
sibility that the French army would make use of the railroad so favour-
ably situated via Metz- Thionville- Luxemburg for an invasion of the
Rhine provinces, although in violation of the neutrality of Luxem-
burg. The position of the right wing in Coblentz, was a position of
defence opposite the Luxemburg frontier.
At the same time this disposition showed how disadvantageous tiie
German-French frontier was for Germany. Whilst the French army
could be concentrated in the immediate neighbourhood of the frontier
upon secure points, the German army must abandon considerable pro-
31
vinces in order to obtain a safe basis of operations. Between the line
mentioned and the frontier such an one was not to be found.
Besides the unexpected attack upon Alsace which was carried
into execution, the position of the German left wing also made the
defence of Baden feasible, in case the French army had directed its
attack against South Germany. The enemy's entry into Baden would
have been a flank march against the army of the Crown Prince. How-
ever the position of the three armies collectively, at once removed the
danger for South Germany, because by it the main body of the Ger-
mans was brought nearer to its object of operations, just as the
French army would have been nearer to theirs by an invasion of
South Germany. Paris on the' one side, and Berlin on the other had
been the chief aims of the strategical operations from the beginning,
and all the movements which might have had other aims could only be
of secondary interest.
Thus, through its strategical importance, the disposition from
Mannheim to Goblentz defended South Germany.
1
32
ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE GERMAN ARMIES
in the beginning of the war, until after the battle of Gravelotte
on the 18th August 1870.
Commander in Chief: King William 1st of Prussia. — Adjutant Generals:
Infantry General von Boyen, Lieut. General von Treskow, Major General
Baron von Steindcker^ Lieut. Colonel Count von Lehndorff, Lieut. Colonel
Anton Radziwill, Lieut. Colonel Count von Waldersee, Major von Alten.
— Chief of the Staff of the Army: Infantry General Baron von Moltke.
— Quarter master General : Lieut. General von Podbielski, — Deputy
Chiefs of the Staff: Lieut. Colonel Bronsart von Schellendorff, Lieut.
Colonel von Verdy du Veimois, Lieut. Colonel von Brandenstein. —
Inspector General of Artillery : Infantry Gen. v. flindersin. — Inspector
General of Engineers : Lieut. General v. Kleist.
FIRST ARMY.
Commander in Chief: Infantry General von Steinmetz. — Chief of the Staff:
Major General v. Sperling. — Chief Quartermaster: Colonel Count v.
Wartensleben. — Commander of the Artillery: Lieut. General Schwartz.
— Commander of the Engineers and Pioneers: Colonel Biehler.
FIRST ARMY CORPS.
Cavalry Gen. Baron v. Manteuffel, Chief of the Staff, Lieut. Col. v. d. Burg.
DIVISIONS.
BRIGADES.
REGIMENTS.
Ist Inf. Div.
Major General von
Bentheim.
Ist Inf. Brig. Major General
V. Gayl.
2nd Inf. Brig. Major Gen.
V. Falkenstein.
Gren. R. Crown Prince No. 1
Inf. R. No. 41.
Grenadief R. No. 3.
Infant. R. No. 43.
Jager Battalion No. 1 and Dragoon Regiment No. 1.
DIVISIONS.
33
BRIGADES.
2nd Inf. Div.
Major General
V. PritKelwitz.
8rd Inf. Brig.
Major General v. Memerty.
4th Inf. Brig.
Major General v. Zglinitzki.
REGIMENTS.
Grenadier R. No. 4.
Infantry R. No. 44.
Grenadier R. No. 6.
Infantry R. No. 45.
Dragoon Regiment No. 10.
Regiment of Field Artillery Ko. 1, Pioneer Battalion No. 1, Battalion of
Train No. 1.
Altogether 86 l»»ttalioos, 8 iqusdrong, 84 gunSf bMides pioneen and train,
recruited in, and garriaons Bast and Weit Praeaia.
This Corps ia
SEVENTH ARMY CORPS.
Infantry General v. Zmtrow. Chief of the Staff, Colonel v. Unger.
DIVISIONS.
BRIGADES.
REGIMENTS.
13th Inf. Div.
Lieutenant General
V. Gliimer.
25th Infantry Brig.
Major General Baron
V. d. Osten called ^acken
Inf. R. No. 13.
Fusilier R. No. 73.
26th Infantry Brig.
Major General Baron
V. der Goltz.
Inf. R. No. 16.
Inf. R. No. 65.
Jager Battalion No. 7 and Hussar Regiment No. 8.
14th Inf. Div.
Lieutenant General
V. Kamecke.
27th Infantry Brig.
Major Getieral v. Fran9ois.
28th Inf. Brig.
Major General v. Woyna II.
Fusilier R. No. 39.
Infantry iR. No. 74.
Infantry K. Nu. u3.
Infantry R. No. 77.
Hussar Regiment No. 16.
Regiment of Field Artillery No. 7, Pioneer Battalion No. 7, Train
Battalion No. 7.
Altogether 86 battalions, 8 aqnadrona, 84 guns, besides pioneers and train. The Corps
\\ recruited in W^tphalia, Niederrhein and Hanover, and garrisons Westphalia and the
Rhine province.
S
34
EIGHTH ARMY CORPS.
Infantry General v. Goehen. Chief of the Staff, Col. v. Witzendorff.
DIVISIONS.
BRIGADES.
REGIMENTS.
15th Inf. Div.
Lieutenant General
V. Weltzien.
29th Infantry Brig.
Major General v. Wedell.
30th Infantry Brig.
Major General v. Strubberg.
Fu8. Reg. No. 33.
Inf. Reg. No. 65.
Inf. Reg. No. 28.
Inf. Reg. No. 67.
16th Inf. Div.
Lieut. General
Baron v. Barnekow.
Jager Battalion No. 8, and King's Hussar Reg. No. 7.
Slst Infantry Brig.
Major General Count Neid-
hardt v. Gneisenau.
32nd Infantry Brig.
Colonel V. Rex.
Inf. Reg. Ifo. 29.
Inf. Reg. No. 69.
Fusilier Reg. No. 40.
Infantry Reg. No. 72.
Hussar Regiment No. 9.
Regiment of Field Artillery No. 8, Pioneer Battalion No. 8, Train
Battalion No. 8.
Altogether 25 battalions, 8 squadrons, 90 guns, besides pioneers and train. The Corps is
recruited in the Rhine province and garrisons it, regiment No. 38 in East Prussia. The 68th
and 70th remained in Coblents and Saarlouis as garrisons, and their places were filled by the
67th and 72ud regiments, from the IV. Corps, but who afterwards changed again with them.
CAVALRY DIVISIONS ALLOTTED TO THE FIRST ARMY.
DIVISIONS. BRIGADES.
REGIMENTS.
1st Cav. Div.
Lieut. General
1st Cavalry Brig.
Major General v. Liideritz.
C-uirassier R. No. 2.
Ufilan R. No. 4.
Uhlan B. No. 9.
y. Ilartmann.
2nd Cavalry Brig.
Major General Baumgarth.
Cuirassier R. No. 3.
Uhlan R. No. 8.
Uhlan R. No. 12.
3rd Cav. Div.
Major General
Count v. d. Groeben.
6th Cavalry Brig.
Major General v. Mirus.
Cuirassier R. No. 8.
Uhlan R. No.. 7.
7th Cavalry Brig.
Major Gen. Count zu Dohna.
Uhlan R. No. 5.
Uhlan R. No. 14.
Altogether 40 squadrons, 12 guni.
35
SECOND ARMY.
Commander in Chief: Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia. — Chief of the
Staff: Major General v. Stiehle. — Chief Quartermaster: Colonel von
Hertzberg. — Commander of the Artillery: Lieut. General v. Colomier.
— Commander of the Engineers and Pioneers: Colonel Lenthaus.
GARDE CORPS.
Cavalry General Prince Augustus of Wurtemherg. Chief of the Staff, Major
General v. Dannenberg.
DIVISIONS.
BRIGADES.
1st Guards Inf. Div.
Major General
V. Pape.
Ist Guards Infantry Brig.
Major General v. Kcsscl.
2nd Guards Inf. Div.
Lient. General
V. Budritzki.
Guards Cavalry
Division
Lieut. General
Count v. d. Goltz.
2nd Guards Infantry Brig.
Major General v. Medem.
REGIMENTS.
1st Foot Guards.
3rd Foot Guards.
2nd Foot Guards.
4th Foot Guards.
Fusilier Guards.
Guards Jager Battalion.
3rd Guards Infantry Brig.
Col. Knappe v. Knappstadt.
4th Guards Infantry Brig.
Major General v, Berger.
Kaiser Alexander's Grenad.
Guards No. 1.
Queen Elizabeth's Grenadier
Guards No. 3
Emperor Franz Grenadier
Guards No. 2.
Queen's Grenadier Guards
No. 4.
Guards Schiitzen Battalion.
Ist Guards Cavalry Brig.
Migor General
Count V. Brandenburg I.
2nd Guards Cavalry Brig.
Lieut. General
Prince Albert of Prussia.
3rd Guards Cavalry Brig.
Major General
Count V. Brandenburg II.
Gardes-du-Corps
Cuirassier Guards.
1st Uhlans of the Guard.
3rd Uhlans of the Guard.
Ilnssar Guards.
1st Dragoon Guards.
2nd Dragoon Guards.
2nd Uhlans of the Guards.
The Guards Field Artillery Regiment, the Guard Pioneers and the Guard
Train Battalions.
Altogether 29 battalions, 82 tquadrona, 90 guns besldee pioneers and train. The Corps
is recruited in the whole kingdom, and chiefly garrisons Berlin and its neighbourhood.
8*
36
SECOND ARMY CORPS.
Infantry General v. Fransecky. Chief of the Staff, Colonel v. Wiehmann.
DIVISIONS.
BRIGADES.
REGIMENTS.
3rd Inf Div.
5th Infantry Brig.
Major General v. Koblinski.
Frederick William IVth
Grenadiers No. 2.
Inf. Reg. No. 42.
Major General
V. Hartmann.
6th Inf. Brig.
Colonel V. d. Decken.
Inf. Keg. No. 14.
Inf. Reg. No. 64.
Jager Battalion No. 2 and 3rd Dragoons.
4th Inf. Div.
7th Inf. Brig.
Major Genei-al du Trossel.
Colberg Grenadiers No. 9.
Inf. Reg. No. 49.
Lieut. General
Hann v. Weihern.
8th Infantry Brig.
Major General v. Kettler.
Inf. Reg. No. 21.
Inf. Reg. No. 61.
Dragoon Regiment No. 11.
Regiment of Field Artillery No. 2, Pioneer Battalion No. 2, Train
Battalion No. 2.
Altogether 25 battftlions, 8 squadrons, 84 guns, besides pioneers and train. The Corps is
recruited in the provinees of Pomerania and Posen, and garrisons them.
THIRD ARMY CORPS.
Lieutenant General v. Alvensleben II. Chief of the Staff, Colonel v.
Voigts-Rhetz.
DIVISIONS.
BRIGADES. REGIMENTS.
1
5th Inf. Div.
9th Infantry Brig.
Major General v. Doring.
Leib Grenadiers No. 8.
Inf. Reg. No. 48.
Lieut. General
V. Stiilpnagel.
10th Infantry Brig.
Major General v. Schwerin.
Grenadiers No. 12.
Inf. Reg. No. 62.
Jager Battalion No. 3 and 12th Dragoons.
6th Inf. Div.
11th Infantry Brig.
Major General v. Rothmaler.
Inf. Reg. No. 20.
Inf. Reg. No. 60.
Lieut. General
V. Buddenbrock.
12th Infantry Brig.
Colonel V. Bismarck.
Inf. Reg. No. 24.
Fusilier Reg. No. 35.
Dragoon Regiment No. 2.
Regiment of Field Artillery No. 3, Pioneer Batt. No. 3, Train Batt. No. 3.
37
Altogether 86 battalions, 8 squadrons, 84 guns, besides pioneers and train. The Corps is
recruited in the prOTinoe of Brandenburg and garrisons it.
FOURTH ARMY CORPS.
Infantry General v. Alvenslehen I. Chief of the Staff, Colonel v. Thile.
DIVISIONS.
7th Inf. Div.
Lieut. General
V. Gross, called
V. Schwarzhoff.
BRIGADES.
13th Infantry Brig.
Major General v. Borries.
REGIMENTS.
14th Infantry Brig.
Major Gen. v. Zychlinski.
Inf. Reg. No. 26.
Inf. Reg. No. 66.
Inf. Reg. No. 27.
Anhalt Inf. Reg. No. 93.
Jager Battalion No. 4 and Dragoon Reg. No. 7.
8th Inf. Div.
Lieut. General
V. Scholer.
15th Infantry Brig.
Major General v. Kessler.
l^th Infantry Brig.
Colonel V. Scheffler.
Inf. Reg. No. 31.
Inf. Reg. No. 71.
Fusilier Reg. No. 86.
Inf. Reg. No. 96.
Hussar Regiment No. 12.
Regiment of Field Artillery No. 4, Pioneer Battalion No. 4, and Train
Battalion No. 4.
Altogether 26 battalions, 8 squadrons, 84 guns, besides pioneers and train. The Corps
garrisons the provinoe of Saxony and Anhalt, and is recruited from the same places with the
exception of the 86th Regiment from Sohleswig Holstein.
NINTH ARMY CORPS.
Infantry General v. Manstein. Chief of the Staff, Major Bronsart von
Schellendorff.
DIVISIONS.
BRIGADES.
18th Inf. Div.
Lieut. General
Baron v. Wrangel.
35th Infantry Brig.
Major Gen. v. Blumenthal.
36th Infantry Brig.
Major General v. Below.
REGIMENTS.
Inf. Reg. No. 25.
Inf. Reg. No. 84.
Grenadier Reg. No. 11,
Inf. Reg. No. 86.
Jager Battalion No. 9 and Dragoon Reg. No. 6.
DIVISIONS.
38
BRIGADES.
REGIMENTS.
25th Grand Dacal
Hessian Division
Lieut. General
Prince Louis of Hesse.
49th Infantry Brig.
Major General v. Wittich.
50th Inf. Brig.
Major General v. Lypcker.
Hessian 25th Cavalry Brig.
Major Gen. v. Schlotheim.
Hess. Leib-Gnard R. No. 1.
Hess. Inf&ntry Reg. No. 2.
Hess. GuardjagerBat. No. 1.
Hess. Leib-Reg. No. 3.
Hess. Inf. Reg. No. 4.
Hess. Leibjag. Bat. No. 2.
Hess. 1st Horse Reg.
Hess. 2nd Horse Reg.
2 divisions of the 2nd Regiment of Field Artillery, Hessian Field Artillery,
1/2 Pioneer Battalion No. 9, Hessian Pioneer Company, Vs T^roXn Batta-
lion No. 9, and Hessian Train Division.
The Hessian Infantry Begiments numbered only 2 battalioni, therefore altogether there
were 28 battalions, 12 aquadrons, 90 gnns, besides pioneers and train.
The I8th Infantry Division, which properly belonged to the 9th Army Corps, remained
behind for the defence of the coast.
The 18th Division garrisoned Sohleswig-H olstein , the 9th regiment was recruited in
Silesia, the 26th in the Rhine province, and the 6th Dragoons in the Magdeburg province,
the remaining troops in Schleswig-Holstein.
TENTH ARMY CORPS.
Infantry General v. Voigts-Rhetz. Chief of the Staff, Major v. Caprivi.
DIVISIONS.
BRIGADES.
REGIMENTS.
19th Inf. Div.
Lieut. General
V. Schwarzkoppen.
20th Inf. Div.
Major General
V. Kraatz-Koschlau.
37th Infantry Brig.
Colonel Lehmann.
38th Infantry Brig.
Major General v. Wedell.
Inf. Reg. No. 78.
Oldenburg Inf. R. No. 91
Inf. Reg. No. 16.
Inf. Reg. No. 67.
9th Dragoons.
39th Infantry Brig.
Major General v. Woyna I.
40th Infantry Brig.
Major General v. Dirings-
hofen.
Inf. Reg. No. 17.
Inf. Reg. No. 56.
Inf. Reg. No. 70.
Braunschw. Inf. R. No. 92.
Jager Battalion No. 10 and Dragoon Reg. No. 16.
Regiment of Field Artillery No. 10, Pioneer Battalion No. 10 and Train
Battalion No. 10.
Altogether 26 battalions, 8 squadrons, 84 guns, besides pioneers and train. The Corps is
recruited in the provinces of Hanover and Westphalia, and in Oldenburg and Braunschweig.
39
TWELFTH ARMY CORPS (ROYAL SAXON).
General Crown Prince Albert of Saxony. ^ Chief of the Staff, Lieut. Colonel
V. Zezschwitz.
DIVISIONS.
BRIGADES.
REGIMENTS.
23rd Inf. Div.
Lieut. General
45th Infantry Brig.
Major Gen. v. Craushaar.
l8t(Leib-) Gren. R. No. 100.
2nd Grenadier Reg. No. 101.
Prince George of
Saxony. •
46th Infantry Brig.
Colonel V. Months.
Inf. Reg. No. 102.
Inf. Reg. No. 103.
Schutzen Reg. No. 108.
24th Inf. Div.
47th Infantry Brig.
Major General Tauscher.
Inf. Reg. No. 104.
Inf. Reg. No. 106.
Major General
Nehrhoff v. Holder-
berg.
*
48th Infantry Brig.
Colonel, V. Schultz.
Inf. Reg. No. 106.
Inf. Reg. No. 107.
Jager Battalion No. 12.
Jager Battalion No. 13.
Cavalry Division
Major General
Count znr Lippe.
23rd Cavalry Brig.
Colonel Krug v. Nidda.
Guard Horse Reg.
Ist Horse Reg.
Uhlan Horse Reg. No. 17.
24th Cavalry Brig.
Colonel Senfft v. PilHach.
2nd Horse Reg.
3rd Horse Reg.
Uhlan Hdrse Reg. No. 18.
Regiment of Field Artillery No. 12, Pioneer
Battalion No. 12.
Battalion No. 12, Train
Altogether 89 battaliouB, 24 equadrone, 96 guni, besidea pioneeri and train. Throughout
Royal Saxon troops.
CAVALRY DIVISIONS ALLOTTED TO THE SECOND ARMY.
DIVISIONS.
BRIGADES.
REGIMENTS.
•
11th Cavalry Brig.
Major General v. Barby.
Cuirassier Reg. No. 4.
Uhlan Reg. No. 13.
Dragoon Req:. Na 19.
5th Cav. Div.
Lieut. General
Baron v. Rheinbaben.
12th Cavalry Brig.
Major General v. Bredow.
Cuirassier Reg. No. 7. •
Uhlan Reg. No. 16.
Dragoon Reg. No. 13.
13th Cavalry Brig.
Major General v. Redern.
Hussar Reg. No. 10.
Hussar Reg. No. 11.
Braunschw. Hus. R. No. 17.
40
DIVISIONS.
6th Cavalry Div.
Lieut. General
Duke William
of Mecklenburg-
Schwerin.
BRIGADES.
REGIMENTS.
14th Cavalry Brig.
Colonel Baron v. Diepen-
broick-Griiter.
15th Cavalry Brig.
Major General v. Rauch.
Cuirassier Reg. No. 6.
Uhlan Reg. No. 3.
Uhlan Reg. No. 15.
Hussar Reg. No. 3.
Hussar Reg. No 16.
Altogether 66 Bquadrons, 18 guoi.
THIRD ARMY.
Commander in Chief: General of Infantry Crown Prince Frederick William
of Prussia. — Chief of the Staff: Lieut. General v. Blumenthal. — Chief
Quartermaster: Colonel v. Gottberg. — Commander of the Artillery:
Lieut. General Herkt. — Commander of the Engineers and i'ioneers:
Major General Schulz.
FIFTH ARMY CORPS.
Lieot. General v. Kirehbach. Chief of the Staff, Colonel v. d. E«ch.
DIVISIONS.
BRIGADES.
REGIMENTS.
•
9th Inf. Div.
17th Infantry Brig.
Colonel V. Bothmer.
Inf. Reg. No. 58.
Inf. Reg. No. 59.
Major General
V. Sandrart.
18th Infantry Brig.
Major Gen. v. Voigts-Rhetz.
King's Grenadier Reg. No. 7.
Inf. Reg. No. 47.
•
Jager Battalion No. 5, and Dragoon Reg. No. 4.
10th Inf. Div.
Major General
V. Schmidt
19th Infantry Brig.
Colonel V. Henning auf
SchonhofF.
Grenadier Reg. No. 6.
Inf. Reg. No 46.
20th Infantry Brig.
Major General Walter v.
Monbary.
Fusilier Reg. No. 37.
Inf. Reg. No. 50.
Dragoon Reg. No. 14.
Regim|nt of Field Artillery No. 5, Pioneer Battalion No. 5, Train Bat-
talion No. 5.
Altogether 25 battalions, 8 sqaa^ong, 84 gam, beeidee pioneers and train. The Gorpa it
reornlted in the diBtriots of Poien and Liegnita, and garriaone them.
41
SIXTH ARMY CORPS.
Cavalry General v. TUmpUfig, Chief of the Staff, Colonel v, Salviati.
DIVISIONS.
BRIGADES.
REGIMENTS.
11th Inf. Div.
Lieut. General
V. Gordon.
2l8t Infantry Brig.
Major Gen. v. Malachowski.
22nd Infantry Brig.
Majo¥ Gen. v. Eckartsberg.
Grenadier Reg. No. 10.
Inf. Reg. No. 18.
Fnsilier Reg. No. 38.
Inf. Reg. No. 61.
Jager Battalion No. 6, and Dragoon Reg. No. 8.
12th Inf. Div.
28rd Infantry Brig.
Colonel Gilndell.
Inf. Reg.
Inf. Reg.
No.
No.
22.
62.
Lieut. General
V. Hoffmann.
24th Infantry Brig.
Major Genera] v. Fabeck.
Dragoon Re
Inf. Reg.
Inf. Reg.
No.
No.
23.
63.
!g. No. 15.
»
Regiment of Field Artillery No. 6, Pioneer Battalion No. 6, Train Bat-
talion No. 6.
Altogether S5 baitnUone, 8 aquadroue, 84 gone, beaidee pioneert and train. T)ie Corpa ia
reoruitad in the diatriota of Brealau and Oppeln and garriiona them.
ELEVENTH ARMY CORPS.
Lieutenant General v. Boae. Chief of the Staff, Major General Stein von
Kaminski.
DIVISIONS.
BRIGADES.
REGIMENTS.
2l8t Inf Div.
41st Infantry Brig.
Colonel v. Koblinski.
Fusilier Reg. No. 34.
Fusilier Reg. No. 80.
Lieut. General
v. Schachtmeyer.
42nd Infantry Brig.
Major General v. Thile.
Inf. Reg. No. 82.
Inf. Reg. No. 88.
Jager Battalion No. 11, and Dragoon Reg. No. 6.
22nd Inf. Div.
48rd Inf. Brig.
Colonel V. Kontzki.
Inf. Reg. No. 32.
Inf. Reg. No. 96.
Lieut. Greneral
v. Gersdorff.
44th Infantry Brig.
Major General v. Schkopp.i
Inf. Reg. No. 88.
Inf. Reg. No. 94.
Hussar Reg. No. 13.
.. ..1 —
Regiment of Field Artillery N9. 11, Pioneer Battalion No. 11, Train Bat-
talion No. 11.
42
Altogether 26 battaliona, 8 squadrons, 84 girns, beeidei pioneers and train. The Corps
is recruited in the prorinces of Hesse and Nassau , in Saxe - Weimar , Gobnrg-Gotha and
Meiningen, and garrisons these t>l»oes.
CAVALRY DIVISIONS ALLOTTED TO THE THIRD ARMY.
DIVISIONS.
BRIGADE^.
REGIMENTS.
2nd Gav. Div.
Lieat. General
Connt zn Stolberg-
Wemigerode.
4th Cav. Div.
General of Cavalry
Prince Albert of
Prnssia.
3rd Cavalry Brig.
Major General v. Colomb.
4th Cavalry Brig.
Major General Baron v.
Barnekow.
5th Cavalry Bri^.
Major General v. Banmbach.
8th Cavalry Brig.
Major General v. Hontheim.
9th Cavalry Brig.
Major General v. Bernhardi.
10th Cavalry Brig.
Major General v. Krosigk.
Leib Cnirassier Reg. No. 1.
• Uhlan Reg. No. 2.
Ist Leib Hussar Reg. No. 1.
BlUchers Hnssar R. No. 5.
Hassar Reg. No. 4.
Hnssar Reg. No. 6.
Cuirassier Reg. No. 5.
Uhlan Reg. No. 10.
Uhlan Reg. No. 1.
Uhlan Reg. No. 6.
2nd Leib Hussar Reg. No. 2.
Hussar Reg. No. 14.
Altogether 48 squadrons, 24 guns.
ROYAL BAVARIAN FIRST CORPS.
Infantry General Baron v. d. Tafm-R(Xt?isamhau8en. Chief of the Staff,
Colonel Diehl.
DIVISIONS.
1st Division
Lieut. General
v. Stephan.
BRIGADES.
REGIMENTS.
1st Infantry Brig.
Major General Dietl.
•
Leib-Reg.
1st Inf. Reg.
2nd Jager Battalion.
9th Jager Battalion.
2nd Infantry Brig.
Major General Orff.
2nd Inf. Reg.
11th Inf. Reg.
4th Jager Battalion.
Ist Cavalry Brig. •
1st Cuirassier Reg.
2nd Cuirassier Reg.
3rd Light Hqrse Reg,
DIVISIONS.
43
BRIGADES.
REGIMENTS.
2nd Division
Lieut. General
Count Pappenheim.
3rd Infantry Brig.
Major Gen. Schuhmacher.
3rd Inf. Reg.
12th Inf. Reg.
Ist Jager Battalion.
4th Infantry Brig.
Major General Stranb.
10th Inf. Reg.
13th Inf. Reg.
7th Jager Battalion.
• 2nd Cavalry Brig.
Major General v. Mayer.
4th Light Horse Reg.
Ut Uhlan Reg.
1st Regiment of Artillery, and 1 Field Engineer Division.
Altogether %9 battalions, 20 ■quadroni, 96 gna*.
ROYAL BAVARIAN SECOND CORPS.
General of Infantry v. Hartmwm. Chief of the Staff, Colonel Baron v.
Horn.
DIVISIONS.
BRIGADES.
REGIMENTS.
5th Infantry Brig.
Major General v. Schleich.
6th inf. Reg.
7th Inf. Reg. '
8th Jager Battolion.
3rd Division
Lieut. General v.
Walther.
6th Infantry Brig.
Major General Joner-
Tettenweiss.
14th Inf. Reg.
15th Inf. Reg.
3rd Jager Battalion.
3rd Cavalry Brig.
Major General Baron v.
Dietz.
1st Light Horse Reg.
6th Light Horse Reg.
2nd Uhlan Reg.
4th Division
7th Infantry Brig.
Major General v. Ribeau-
pierre.
5th Inf. Reg.
9th Inf. Reg.
6th Jager Battalion.
10th Jager Battalion.
Lieut. General
Connt V. Bothmer.
8th Infantry Brig.
Major General Maillinger.
4th Inf. Reg.
8th Inf. Reg.
5th Jager Battalion.
*
4th Cavalry Brig,
Major General v. Tausch.
2nd Light Horse Reg.
5th Light Horse Reg.
2nd Regiment of Artillery and 1 Field Engineer Division.
Altogether 89 battaliona, 80 ■qaadroiu, 96 gune.
44
COMBINED WURTEMBERG AND BADEN CORPS*).
Lieut. General v. Werder, Chief of the Staff, Lieut. Colonel v. Leszczynski.
i)ivisioNs.
T
BRIGADES.
REGIMENTS.
Royal Wurtemberg
Division.
Lieut. General
V. Obernitz.
Chief of the Staff
Colonel V. Bock.
Ist Infantry Brig.
Major General v. Reitzen-
stein.
Ist Inf. Reg.
tth Inf. Reg.
2Bd Jager Battalion.
2nd Infantry Brig.
Major General v. StarklofT.
2nd Inf. Reg.
5th Inf. Reg.
3rd Jager Battalion.
3rd Infantry Brig*
Colonel V. Hiigel.
3rd Inf. Reg.
8th Inf. Reg.
1st Jager Battalion.
Horse Division
Major General Count v.
Scheler.
Ist Horse Reg.
2nd Horse Reg.
3rd Horse Reg.
4th Horse Reg.
1 Field Artillery Regiment, 2 pioneer companies, 1
Fieldjager squadron.
The Wurtomberg Infuiiry RegimenU only numbered S battalione , therefore there were
altogether lb battolione, 16 equadronB, 64 guns. 2 Wurtemberg regimente remained behind
iu Ulm.
DIVISIONS.
BRIGADES.
REGIMENTS.
(vrand Ducal
Haden Divituon
Lieut, General
V. Beyer.
Ist Infantry Brig.
Lieut. General Baron v.
Laroche du Jarry.
1st Leibgrenadier Reg.
2nd Grenadier Reg.
2nd Infantry Brig.
Major General Baron v.
Degenfeld.
3rd Inf. Reg.
4th Inf. Reg.
3rd Infantry Brig.
Mi^or General Keller.
5th Inf. Reg.
6th Inf. Reg.
Cavalry Brig,
Migor General Baron v.
Laroche-Starkenfels .
1st Leib-Dragoon Reg.
Snd Dragoon Reg.
3nl Dragoon Reg.
Baden Field Artillery Regiment, detachments of Baden Pioneers and Train.
AHofetber 18 battaUone. 1 i $n»«ditme, 54 guae, b«idee tilonean and train.
«. Aflar Ike battle of W6ith IhtCoif* uity
diteoNad. aiid bvm tliat IUm tha
45
THE MOBILIZED TROOPS LEFT BEHIND AT FIRST IN NORTH
GERMANY FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE COUNTRY.
THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT, IN THE CONSCRIPTION OF THE
I. II. IX. AND X. ARMY CORPS.
General of Infantry Vogel v, FtUkenstein. Chief of the Staff, Colonel Veit.
THE GENERAL COMMAND OVER THE MOBILE TROOPS, IN THE
CONSCRIPTION OF THE I. II. IX. AND X. ARMY CORPS.
General of Infantry the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg'Schwerin, Chief of
the Staff, Colonel v. Krenski.
DIVISIONS.
BRIGADES.
REGIMENTS.
17th Inf. Div.
Lieut. General
V. Schimmelmann.
(Belonging to the
IX. Corps.)
33rd Infantry Brig.
Major General Baron v.
Kottwitz.
34th Infantry Brig.
Colonel V. Manteutfel.
Fusilier Reg. No 36.
Infantry Reg. No. 76.
Infantry Reg. No. 76.
Mecklenb. Gren. R. No. 89.
Mecklenb. Fusil. R. No. 90.
Mecklenb. Jager Battalion
No. 14.
17th Cavalry Brig.
Major General v. Ranch.
1st Mecklenb. Dragoon R.
No. 17.
2nd Mecklenb. Dragoon R.
No. 18.
Uhlan Reg. No. 11.
».2 Regiment of Field Artillery No. 9, Vg Pioneer Battalion No. 9, ^/j Train
Battalion No. 9.
Altogether 16 battalions. 18 squadrons, 48 guns.
The DWision garrisons Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklenburg, the SAth regiment is re-
cruited in Magdeburg, the 7Ath and 7()th in Hansostttdten and Hanover, the lUh (Thlans
in Brandenburg.
DIVISIONS.
Guard Landwchr
Inf. Div.
Lieut. General
Baron v. Loen.
1st Landw. Div.
(Pomeranian)
Major General-
V. Treskow.
BRIGADES.
Ist Guard Landwehr Brig.
Colonel Girodz v. Gaudi.
REGIMENTS.
1st Guard Landwehr Reg.
2nd Guard Landwehr Reg.
Ind Guardiandwehr Bri^. i2st Gren. Guard Landw. H.
Colonel V. Roehl.
i2nd Fren. Guard Lnndw. R.
1st Pom. Landwehr Brig.
Colonel Baron v. Budden-
brock.
2nd Pom. Landwehr Brig.
Major General v. Avemann.
1st comb. Pom. Landw. Reg.
2nd comb. Pom. Landw. Reg.
3rd comb. Pom. Landw. Reg.
4th comb. Pom. Landw. Reg.
DIVISIONS.
46
BRIGADES.
REGIMENTS.
2nd Landw. Div.
(Brandenburg)
Major General
V. Selchow. .
3rd comb. Landwehr
Division.
Major General
Schnler
v. Senden.
Ist Brandenburg Landwehr
Brig.
Colonel V. Amoldi.
2nd Brandenburg Landwehr
Brig.
Colonel Ranisch.
West Prussian Landw. Brig.
Major General v. Ruville.
Fosen Landwehr Brig.
Colonel V. Gilsa.
1st comb. Brandenburg
Landwehr Reg.
2nd comb. Brandenburg
Landwehr Reg.
3rd comb. Brandenburg
Landwehr Reg.
4th comb. Brandenburg
Landwehr Reg.
West Prussian comb. Land-
wehr Reg.
Niederschl. comb. Landwehr
Regiment.
Ist comb. Pos. Landw. R.
2nd comb. Pos. Landw. R.
Baoh Landwehr Regiment of the Ouard nnmbered 3 battalions, each Regiment of the
Line 4 battalions.
LANDWEHR CAVALRY.
Reserve Dragoon Reg. Nos. 1 and 3.
Reserve Dragoon Reg. Nos. 2^ 3 and 5.
Reserve Uhlan Reg. Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5.
Altogether 16 Reserve Cavalry Regiments were formed. 9 of these as above were allotted
to the mobile Landwehr Divisions, the other 7 (2nd Reserve Dragoons, 1st, 4th and 6th
Reserve Hussars, and 1st, 6th and 7tb Reserve Uhlans) were appointed to occupy fortresses.
ARTILLERY.
Reserve Foot divisions of the Guard and of the 11 Line Artillery Regi-
ments, 3 batteries to each (18 guns).
Of these batteries only 2 were allotted from each division to the mobile Landwehr
Divisions, but the third was subdivided for the formation of 2 sortie batteries to each, and
assigned to the garrisons of fortresses.
Total of the mobile Landwehr-Di visions : 60 battalions, 30 squadrons, and 144 gnna.
The first, second, and sixth Corps also remained behind in the country at the beginning
of the war, and only joined their respective armies after the beginning of hostilities.
47
Strength of the North German Arut Corps.
THE GARDE CORPS.
9 Infantry Regiments, 1 Garde -Jagef and 1 Garde - Schntzen
Battalion, 2 Regiments of Divisional Cavalry, 4 Batteries of Divisional
Artillery, 1 Cavalry Division consisting of 8 Regiments with 3 Horse
Batteries, finally 1 Foot detachment of the Artillery Corps. In addition
to these 1 Battalion of Pioneers, 1 Battalion oC Train and 9 Munition
columns. Total 29,000 Infantry, 4800 Horses and 90 Guns.
The I., II., III., IV., v., VI., VII., X. and XI. Army Corps
each consisted of: 8 Infantry Regiments, 1 Jager Battalion, 2 Regi-
ments of Cavalry, 2 detachments of Foot Artillery, also a detachment
of Foot Artillery yd 2 Horse Batteries from the Artillery Corps,
1 Battalion of Pioneers, 1 Battalion of Train and 9 Munition columns.
Total of each Army Corps: 25,000 Iirfantry, 1200 Horses and
84 Guns.
The VIII. Army Corps counted 1 additional Horse Battery,
consequently it had 90 Guns.
The IX. Army Corps consisted of the 18th Infantry Division
and the Hessian (25th) Division. It numbered 8 Infantry Regiments,
.3 Jager Battalions , 3 Regiments of Cavalry , 15 Batteries. Total
23,000 Infantry, 1800 Horses and 90 Gmis.
The XII. (Saxon) Army Corps numbered 9 Infantry Regiments,
2 Jager Battalions , 2 Horse Regiments and 2 detachments of Foot
Artillery. It had further a Cavalry and Artillery reserve : 4 Regi-
ments of Cavalry, 2 Horse Batteries, 2 detachments of Foot Artillery
and in addition to these 1 Battalion of Pioneers, 1 Battalion of Train,
and 9 Munition columns. Total 29,000 Infantry, 3600 Horses and
96 Guns.
The first Cavalry Division consisted of 24 Squadrons and 1 Horse
Battery; tiie second numbered 24 Squadrons, 2 Horoe Batteriesr; the
third, 16 Squadrons, 1 Horse Battery; the fourth, 24 Squadrons, 2
Horse Batteries; the fifth, 36 Squadrons, 2 Horse Battieries ; the sixth,
20 Squadrons, 1 Horse Battery. The first and third were assigned
48 '
to the I. Anny, the fifth and sixtli to the II. Anny, the second and
fourth to the III. Army. •
The 17111 DiviMon « 13,000 Infantry, 1800 HorBes and 36
Guns, as well as 4 Landwehr Divisions, 3 of which consisted of 9600
Infantry, 1 of 12,000 Infantry, with 600 Horses to each, and 18 Guns
remained behind for coast defences.
In addition to these, 4 Infantry Regiments remained behind to
garrison the fortresses of Mayence and Rastatt, and 1 Infantry Regi-
ment was left at Cologne, 1 at Coblentz and 1 at Saarlouis, none of
which have been included in the order of battle at the commen^^ement
of the war.
The mobilised Field Army of the North German Con-
federation^ reckoning the Battalions at 1000 men and the Cavalry
Regiments at 600 Horses, consisted of 382,000 Infantry, 48,000
Horses and 1218 Guns without including the Landwehr.
The ttnited capitation of combatants in the North German Field
Army, exclusive of the Landwehr, was therefore about 550,000 men.
The Landwehr numbered 198,000 combatants.
The Army of the North German Confederation , including the
Landwehr amounted in all to about 750,000 men.
The Bavarian Army numbered 16 Regiments of Infantry and
10 Jager Battalions ; 10 Regiments of Cavalry, 32 Field Batteries of
Artillery, including 4 Batteries of Horse Artillery, besides 1 Regiment
of Engineers and 4 Companies of Train. Its strength without
reckoning the Landwehr and ^ the troops for replacing casualties
amounted to 58,000 Infantry, 5800 Horses and 192 Guns.
The fVurtemberg Army consisted of 8 Regiments of Infantry,
3 Jager Battalions, 4 Regiments of Cavaby, 9 Field Batteries of
Artillery, besides 2 Companies of Pioneers and a detachment of Train.
Its strength, exclusive of the Landwehr and reinforcing troops, was
16,000 Infantry, 2400 Horses and 54 Guns.
The Baden Army numbered 6 Regiments of Infantry, 3 Regi-
ments of Cavalry, 9 Field Batteries of Artillery, besides 2 Companies
of Pioneers and 1 detachment of Train. Its strength, exclnsive of the
Landwehr and reinforcing troops, was 10,600 Infantry, 2800 Horace
and 54 Guns.
49
The wliole South Oerman Field Army is therefore reckoned at :
Infantry 84,600 Men.
Cavalry 9000 Horses
Artillery 300 Guns
i. e. an united capitation of over 100,000 Combatants.
The total strength of the German Field Army at the
beginning of the war amounted therefore to about 850,000
Combatants.
Until the concentration of these Armies was accomplished in the
last days of July, the weak detachments upon tlie extreme frontier
were entirely without reserves, witli the charge of making the enemy
imagine that they were in considerable masses. They succeeded in
this so well by bold attacks, by marching hither and thither, even by
disguises which made them appear to the enemy like new kinds of
troops, that the accounts in the French newspapers of the German
forces in the Palatinate and Rhine provinces , raised their strength
to more than 200,000 men, and the French Corps were also so
completely deceived that they would not risk an attack. A mixed
Baden Corps composed of the three arms roused the belief, at the
same time, that South Germany was strongly occupied, by continually
marching backwards and forwards during the whole time and showing
itself at different points on the Baden Riiine frontier.
The following are some of the smaller Fights which took place
with the French outposts, without reckoning the raids which were
of daily occurrence.
On the 19th of July, an encounter between French Chasseurs
d'Afrique who had passed the frontier at Saarbrucken and Prussian
Uhlans.
On the 21st of July, likeVvise at Saarbrtlcken upon French
territory, a skirmish between a part of the HohenzoUern Fusilier
Regiment No. 40 and Fi*ench troops.
On the 24th of July, the enemy endeavoured with one battalion
to take possession of the bridge of fVehrden^ it was however forced
to retreat by a battalion sent out from Saarlouis and a detachment of
Uhlans. On the same day there was a skirmish at Gersweiler near
SaarbrUcken when a company of the 8th Rhinish Infantry Regiment
50
Nr. 70 took the cuBtom house at Sckrecklingenj and Uhlans of the
7th ]Regiment blew up a viaduct at the railway junction of Saar-
gemfind and Hagenau.
On the 24th of July, French Infantry were repulsed by Prussian
Uhlans and Pioneers together with Bavarian Jagers at the bridge of
Rheinkeim on the Blies, to the north-east of SaargemUnd, *and a
recognisance of the country round Hagenau was made by the Wurtem-
berg staff officer, Count Zeppelin with three Baden officers.
On the 27th of July three companies of French Infantry and 80
men of the Cavalry made an attack at Vdlklingen to the west of
Saarbrticken and were repulsed.
On the 29th of July, firing took place between Bavarian Jagers
and French Cavalry at Schweyen near Neuhoiiibach in the Palatinate.
On the 30th of July a French column of Infantry with Artillery
made an attack upon Saarbrticken without success.
On this day however, the German Armies were already about to
advance. Prince Frederick Charles removed his head-quai'ters from
Mayence to the westward, the Crown Prince of Prussia repaired to
Speyer and General von Steinmetz directed his columns from the
Rhine on to the line Trier-Saarlouis-Saarbrttcken. From this moment
the danger of a French invasion was averted, and the superiority of
the strategical position on the other side, began clearly to show itself.
The constantly increasing attempts made by the French to
procure * single advantageous positions, chiefly in the country about
Saarbrticken, as well as to induce the Germans to develope their
strength, bore the character of indecision and aimlessness , until at
last upon the 2nd of August, the attack of the whole of FrossartTs
Corps upon Saarbrttcken, proved that a general combined offensive
movement no longer existed in the French war plan.
This attack, in the presence of the Emperor and the Prince
Imperial, had apparently the sole object of producing a victory for
the impatient French people, with which the Imperial name should
be associated.
For after the battalion of the Hohenzollern Fusilier Regiment,
which held Saarbrticken all alone for an hour, had been compelled to
retreat from the town, and it had been occupied by Frossard's Corps^
51
the conqueror made no use of his advantages, but was satisfied with
holding a defensive position opposite the line of the Saar, until this
strong position, together with the apparent advantages gained on the
2nd, was torn from him on the 6th of August, by the Prussian Corps
which had then arrived.
The helplessness of the French chief command appears all the
clearer, if one considers the grand preparations which preceded this
theatrical manoeuvre.
Frossard's Corps had been stationed at St. Avoid since the 20th
of July. Ladmiraulfs Corps had been moved forward from Thion-
ville towards Bouzonville on the Nied, for the support of* his left
flank, Bazaine's Corps to Forbach for the support of his centre, and
Lapassef 8 Brigade from the 5th Corps, occupied Saargemflnd in order
to cover Frossard's right 'flank. Over 100,000 men Were brought
together in order to assist at the Prince Imperiars baptism of fire.
Upon the same day an aimless demonstration wag also made at
Rheinheim to the east of Saargemtind, by the advance of a strong
French column. The column moved back again after a vigorous fire
upon German patrols;
Thus the energetic, powerful advance of the numerically superior
German Armies found itself opposed by an enemy, inferior in numbers,
and still with no decided aim.
4*
CHAPTER II.
The concentrated offensive movement of the German Armies
in the beginnino of august.
On the 2nd of August King fVilUam of Prussia, accompanied by
his chief of 'the Staff, Baron von Moltke, amved in the head-quarters
&t Mayence and took command of the united German armies which
were approaching the French frontier, with their leading divisions
extending over a front from Trier to Landau.
The army of the left wing, the Third Army, under the command
of the Crown Prince of Prussia was appointed to advance as far as
the Lauter on the 5th of August, aiid to cross it with the advanced
troops. For this purpose the Crown Prince had to pass through
the Bienwald by four roads, and was commanded to drive back the
enemy wherever he might be met.
Marshal Mac Mahon, against whose strategical position this
advance of an army of 160,000 men was du'ected, had liis corps
scattered about like- all the rest of the French arpiy. On the 25th
of July, his 1st Division (Ducrot) was to the eastward of Woerth, the
2nd (Douay) at Hagenau, the 3rd and 4th (Raoul and de Lartigue)
in Strasburg. The cavalry were placed in front, de Septeuil's Brigade
in Sulz, de Nansouty^s in Selz, covering the whole space between the
Vosges and the Rhine, and Michel's Cuirassier Brigade in reserve.
The Marshal had, in a peculiar manner,' attached single infantry
battalions to this cavalry with the view of supporting it. By this
means he robbed the cavalry. of all power of moving.
On the 2nd of August he gave General Douay the command to
occupy Weissenburg, in order to cover his right flank more securely
during his intended march towards Bitsch.
53
After having carried out the order^ this General heard on the
evening of the 3th of August/ of the approach of the third German
army, and communicated the intelligence to General Ducrot who was
stationed atWoerth, and to whom the Marshal had given the command
of the Ist and 2nd Divisions, contingently.
General Ducrot imparted to him, in the name of the Marshal, the
strict command to give battle.
For the 4th of August the following disposition was given out for
the German Corps.
^The advanced guard, Bothmer's Division from Hartmann's Bava-
rian Corps, to move off fi*om its bivouac at § o'clock a. m. in the
direction of Weissenburg, and to endeavour to take possession of
the town. To secure its right flank by sending a detachment through
Bellenbom towards the Bobenthal. The remainder of the Corps,
Walther's Division, to move off from its bivouac at 4 o'clock a. m.,
and march to Ober-Otterbach going roun^ Landau through Impflingen
and Bergzabem.
' "The Cavalry Division to concentrate at 6 o'clock a. m. on the
south of Mersheim, and to march by Insheim, Rohrbach, Billig-
heim, Barbelroth, Kappellen as far as the Otterbach, 4000 paces to
the west of Ober-Otterbach.
"The V. Prussian Corps to move off from its bivouac at Billig-
heim at 4 o'clock a. m., and to march through Barbelroth and Nieder-
Otterbach upon Gross - Steinfeld and Kapsweyer. It was to form a
special advanced guard, which would cross the Lauter at St. Remy and
Waghslusel, and place out-posts upon the heights on the opposite side.
"The XL. Corps to move off at 4 o'clock a. nu from Rohrbach
and to march by Steinweiler, Winden, Scheldt through the Bienwald
upon the Bienwaldshtitte. It was to form a special advanced guard
which would cross the Lauter and place out-posts upon the heights on
the other side.
"Werder^s Corps to march by the high road towards Lauterburg,
to endeavour to take possession of the place, and to place out-posts
upon the opposite shore. «
"Von der Tann's Corps to move off from its bivouac at
54
4 o'clock a. m,y and to march by the high road through Siilzheim
to Langenkandely to the west of which place it would bivouac.
"The head-quarters would be previously removed to Nieder-
Otterbach."
The fVeisienburg lines (v. ii^ap), for the capture of which these
dispositions were made, oflfered military hindrances, chiefly in the
'ancient fortress of Weissenburg, and in the entrenchments erected in
eai'lier times along the Lauter. These fortifications were again brought
into use the last time the frontier was occupied, and had been aug-
mented by artificial strengthening of the Geisberg, a position naturally
difficult to assault.
The whole elevation rising about 800 feet, with its north-eastern
slopes falling to the Lauter, presented peculiar disadvantages to the
assailants crossing, not only from its lying behind the river and
offering good positions for the Artillery, but also from its being
especially favourable for the fire of riflemen from behind the stone
walls enclosing the vineyards.
General Douay^ reinforced by the 74th Line Regiment, the 3rd
Hussars, and the 11th Chasseurs acheval, thus having a force* of
16 Battalions, 8 Squadrons and 4 Batteries including 1 Mitrailleuse
battery, occupied Weissenburg with 1 battalion of the Ist Regiment
of Algerian Tirailleurs and 1 battalion of the 74th Regiment, and had
barricaded the gates of the town. Upon the southern heights he had
posted 2 battalions and 1 battery, and with the main body of his
Division he strongly held the Geisberg.
The morning of the 4th of August was dull and rainy.
The Crown Prince left Landau with his staff and suite at
5. 15 o'clock a. m. On his arrival upon the heights to the eastward
of Schweigen at about 9. 15 o'clock a. m., the head of Bothmer's
advanced guard had come up in front of Weissenburg and the first
shots fell. The place showed itself completely prepared for defence,
the advanced guard deployed its 3 battalions, the regiment of light
cavalry and 1 battery of artillery and opened fire, in order to await
the arrival of the remaining columns.
In consequence of the canqpnade fires very soon broke out in two
places in the town. ...
55
Meanwhile the advanced guard of the V. Corps, the 17th Infantry
Brigade, after having crossed the Lauter, debouched at St. Remy and
Wagh&usel, at a quarter to 10 o'clock, and formed for attack upon the
opposite heights, where they received a vigorous cannonade at
10 o'clock a. m.
An hour later, the 18th Brigade began to develope itself upon
the right flank of the 17th, at 11 .30 o'clock a. m. it took Altenstadt,
and debouched upon the south bank of the Lauter for the purpose of
going forward to attack the Geisberg.
Up to this moment Bothmer's Division had confined itself to a
cannonade against Weissenburg, now however, the 9th Division
having crossed the Lauter, it was also possible to make an attack
upon the town from the south east; 2 battalions of the 47th Regiment,
18th Brigade, and 1 battalion of the 58th Regiment, 17th Brigade,
wei*e sent out for this purpose from Altenstadt, on to the south bank of
the Lauter, and at 12 o'clock the general storming of Weissenburg
cofnmenced*
The barricaded gates of the town were broken open by
artillery. The Prussian and Bavarian battalions, attacking simul-
taneously, took the entrance at the first assault. An obstinate fight
then developed itself in the town, which ended in the gamson being
taken prisoners.
The southern height of fVeissenburg was assaulted at the
same time.
At 11 o'clock the heads of the XI. Corps arrived on the left,
near the 17th Brigade of the V. Corps. General von Bose had*
marched through the Bienwald and crossed the Lauter without meet-
ing with opposition, and had then, in accordance with the orders
given to him, continued the advance by Schleithal in the direction of
Ingolsheim. Debouching upon Schleithal at 11 o'clock, the heads of
the corps were immediately directed towards the Geisberg.
Aftier a vigorous artillery fight, carried on by the V. Corps, in
which the Artillery Corps also shared, the 18th Infantry Brigade
advanced at 12. 15 o'clock from Altenstadt, and the 41st Brigade of
the XL Corps from Schleithal, thus marching in a westerly direction for
a concentrated attack upon the Geisberg.
The appearance of the 41st Brigade had already induced the
56
enemy to throw back his left flank. The line of his front now
corresponded exactly with the configuration of the Geisberg. Swarms
of riflemen carried on a devastating fire from the vineyards upon the
advancing columns, in which the superiority of the Chassepot rifle, in
percussion strength at long ranges, was for the first time clearly
manifested.
The mitrailleuse battery opposed to Prussian artillery, did not
answer the expectations which the French had placed on this newly
introduced arm. Three shots only could be delivered, before a shell
striking in the midst of the battery, produced such destruction among
the serving troops, that it had to be withdrawn.
The Prussian Infantry advanced in columns up the steep height,
with incomparable calmness and bravery, in spite of the great
difficulties of the ground and the murderous fire. The steady move-
ment of the battalions never wavered for an instant.
Amid gi-eat losses, in which the King's Grenadiers, at the head,
especially suffered, the outer premises were taken atl2. 30 o'clock,
and at 1 o'clock, the castle^ lying behind, in the first assault.
At 1. 30 o'clock p.m., the Grown Prince rode through Altenstadt
on to the Geisberg heights.
With the loss of this hill the French position was deprived of
its principal point cfappui. The French certainly endeavoured to
make another offensive attack at 1. 30 o'clock, but this fruitless effort
may only have been to cover the retreat, which was commenced, in
three columns, towards the south-west, pursued by the Artillery fire of
I the two Prussian Corps, and from 2 o'clock on, by the two Cavalry
Regiments of the 9th and 10th Divisions. Over 1000 unwounded
prisoners, amongst whom were about 30 officers, fell into the hands of
the conquerors, also a gun taken from the 5th Jager Battalion, and the
whole camp equipment and baggage of the 2nd Division. General
Douay had fallen, his Division had lost about 1200 men in killed
and wounded.
The loss of the Germans in killed and wounded was also great,
it may perhaps have surpassed that of the French.
All the German troops which had been in the battle moved forward
as far as the heights to the south of the Lauter and placed out-posts.
Werder's Corps, which had not beeft engaged, had occupied Lauter-
67
burg, pushed forward one Brigade towards Selz and stationed ont«
posts in connection with those of the XI. Corps.
In winning this battle, besides the moral effect upon the two
armies, the possession of the important roads leaduig to Strasbnrg and
Bitsch was obtained. Consequently the right flank of the French
position was placed in imminent danger; Alsace, unproteq^d, lay
open to the third army, and the isolation of Strasburg could now
hardly bei averted.
The valley of the Rhine, extending open and free from the south
of Weissenburg to Strasburg, and thence beyond, is bounded on the
west by the Vosges, which rise from the Weissenburg heights, now
taken by the third army. ,
It now became necessary that the French Army, whose right
wing had lost as it were the key of their position, should endeavour
above all things to hold the passages of the Vosges, unless they al-
ready wished to change the whole strategical front, and move back
upon the line of tlie Moselle.
The flank of the main body of the French Army was separated
from the assailants by the Vosges. Mac Mahon's task should be to
defend this chain to the utmost, for which object all his strength must
be employed, and the Marshal determined to accomplish this task
by a defensive battle near Woerth.
Upon the other side, the Crown Princess Army moved off on the
morning after the victorious fight, in order to follow the same direction
in which it had hitherto advanced. This march direction must
infallibly lead on to the flank and rear of the French position. It
offered the chance of completely rolling up this position, unless the
French Army at once commenced a general retreat.
The Crown Prince's Army, being numerically superior to each
single French Corps, and even to two or three of them, was more
than a match for any possible concentration of the enemy to the
front. It was foreseen that the French aimy could only offer sufficient
resistance to the Crown Prince by a concentration towards the rear,
consequently upon the left flank. Without however taking into con-
sideration the French confidence of victory, which this defensive
movement did not revoke, such an operation on the part of the enemy
would have had the disadvantage of giving full time to the first
58
and second Gennan armieB^ to join in the action on their side, and by
a simple advance, to unite with the third Army.
A combined operation on the part of the French Army could not,
however, be an*anged. As already mentioned, Marshal Mac Mahon
threw himself alone , against the enemy and on the 5th of August
occupied a favourable position along the Sauerbachy upon the easteni
slopes of the Vosges (v. map of the battle of Woerth). This position
was fitly chosen for the defensive, whilst offering at the same time
favourable opportunities for the offensive.
It was formed by the valley of the Sauer^ 800 paces wide,
running from north to south, whose western bank, bordered by steep
and partly wooded heights, indicated the lyitural front of the French
Army. The village of Elsashausen, forming by its position on a steep
hill a kind of retired bastion, was the key of the whole position, to
which the village of Froschweiler was a favourable point dappui.
The flanks were protected by the villages of Morsbronn and Eberbach
in the south, Neuweiler in the north, as well as by deep enfrench-
ments most favourably placed. At the foot of the whole position
about one and a half hours *") wide, the highroad leading from
Hagenau to Woerth upon an embankment formed a first rate line of
communication, whilst its elevation above the wide meadow valley of
the Sauer could also be most advantageously used as the first line of
defence, and was so used. The eastern slopes, partly planted with
vines, which greatly impeded the movement of the Gernvan troops,
fall down steeply towards the Sauer, and are commanded from the
opposite shore. The little stream itself, only about 10 paces wide,
has such steep banks, and after the continued rain was so much
swollen, that the French commander in chief may probably have
considered it impossible to wade through. The only passages
across this mountain stream, were at the Bruchmtihle, at Spachbach
and Woerth.
It is, however, a great question whether the Marshal acted
wisely, in here placing himself in the way of the Crown Prince's force,
although the position in. itself was very strong, and could be
advantageously defended. He must be prepared to resist an army
*) between 4 and 6 English miles.
59
of much greater strength and must bear in mind that if the
Corps had the misfortune of being completely routed, the
passage through the Vosges would be quite open to the German
Army. The Marshal staked all his chances upon one throw, by
placing his Corps in position at Woei'th, whilst had he declined one
great battle, and by distributing his forces, occupied all the most
important defiles of these bamer-like mountains, he would probably
have succeeded in making a longer and more obstinate resistance in
defence of the Vosges.
On the day that Douay's Division was beaten at Weissenburg,
Mac Mahon had thi-ee Divisions still at his disposal, concentrated to
the east of Reichshofen. He had been apprised of the attack upon
Weissenbui^g after he had sent an order by telegraph to the commandant
of the 7th Corps (General Douay), which was provisionally under his
command, to dispatch Conseil-Dumesnil's Division for his support.
On the night of the 4th of August, he received the news of the defeat,
and on the morning of the next day he made preparations to deliver
a battle in the position of Woeiih and Gunstett, as he could not doubt
that the Crown Princess Army would advance towards Hagenau by
the roads commanded from here.
In a tactical point of view this position was , without doubt,
excellently chosen. But, even reckoning upon Couseil-DumesniFs
Division and Douay's beaten Division, the Marshal could not assume
that he would be able to bring together more than 50,000 men, con-
sequently his plan was very rash, and testifies' to the want of a
correct estimation of his adversary, which was so frequently to be
observed in this war.
The firat idea was to occupy the plateau of Gmistett with
one Division and the heights upon the right (west) bank of the Sauer
with the main body; as, however, this position would have been
greatly extended in proportion to the strength of the troops, the
Marshal confined himself to the occupation of the latter entrenched
position, and made the following disposition: the 1st Division near
Langensulzbach, the 3rd near Woei*th, the 4th upon the right flank
at Elsashausen, the Division retiring from Weissenburg to form the
Reserve of the centre, the Reserve Artillery to form up between
Froschweiler and Elsashausen, the numerous Cavalry consisting of
60
BonnemaiD^s Cuirassier Division , Michel's and SepteniFs Brigades to
the plain in rear of the centre ^nd right wing, and he then awaited the
arrival of Conseil-Dumesnirs Division to reinforce the right wing.
This Division was delayed although it still came up in time for the
battle. On the 4th, upon the erroneous announcement of a concentra-
tion of troops at Ldrrach in the Black Forest, it had left its station
at Colmar to go to Mllhlhausen, to which place Li^bert*8 2nd Division
of the 7th Corps was also directed, whilst the 3rd, Dumonfs, was
still being formed in Lyons.
Conseil-DumesnlFs Division had scarcely left; the railway at
Mfihlhausen when it was again embarked in the evening between 8
and 10 o'clock, and arrived at Hagenau at 2 o'clock on the morning
of the 5th of August, from whence it took the route towards Reichs-
hofen. There it arrived upon the evening of the 5th, and was formed
up in rear of Lartigue's Division. The Artillery belonging to it, which
was upon the march from Colmar to Mfihlhauseu on the 4th August,
was at Ensisheim when it received a counter order. On the 5th it
marched back to Colmar where it was embarked on the railway in
the evening. The 2nd Division, now commanded by General Pelld,
which had retired from Weissenburg to Hagenau, an*ived from thence
on the evening of the 5th, by railway, and was formed up in reserve.
At the same time that the plateau of Gunstett was abandoned, at
11 o'clock a. m. on the 5th of August, the Marshal issued an order
that all the bridges over the Sauer, between Woerth and the Bruch-
mfthle, were to be destroyed; which proves that he intended merely to
deliver a defensive fight. An hour later, however, when the heads
of the German advanced guard already showed themselves upon the
left bank, he recalled the order, in order to keep the possibility
of an offensive movement, yet at that time he was carefully occupied
with the lines of retreat, he obtained detailed information about them
from engineer officers acquainted with the country, and issued the
necessary instructions for a retreat, to which he added the remark,
that they would have to deal with considerable forces, and a power-
ful Artillery.
A dispatch from the Emperor however, which aiTived at 8. 30
o'clock p. m. announcing that the 5th Corps, de Failly's, was placed
at his disposal, changed this aspect of the military situation.
61
The Marshal immediately Bent a telegram to General de Failly,
the tenor of which was: ^The Emperor places your Corps at my
disposal^ endeavour to join me as soon as possible.'' —
The Marshal was so delighted at this unexpected reinforce-
ment and had such confidence in the strength of the position he
had chosen, that he exclaimed joyfully ^Messieurs les Prussiens
je vous tiens!^^ —
On the 6th of August the Crown Princess Army was moved
forward on the line of the Selz, the V. and XI. Prussian Corps
in the centre on the road to Hagenau, the two Bavarian Corps
on their right, the Wurtemberg and Baden Divisions on their left
flank, the Cavalry Division in reserve.
During the night of the 5th of August, the II. Bavarian Corps
bivouacked at Lembach, the I. Bavarian Corps at Ingolsheim, the
V. Corps at Preuschdorf, the XI. at Sulz, von Werder's Corps at
Aschbach and the Cavalry Division at Schonenburg. The Baden
troops, which were not engaged in this battle, were stationed mote
to the south, at Buhl. The head-quarters were at Sulz. Advanced
posts were stationed along the Sauer towards the south and to the
east of Woerth.
The Croum Prince had issued no dispositions for the
attack on the 6th of August y as it was , not the intention to
give battle upon that day. On tlie contrary, only a narrower
concentration towards the front had been commanded, in order to
make a complete approach, with all the Corps together, upon the
French position, before attacking it.
The Wurtemberg Division was to advance from Aschbach to
Hohweiler and Reimerswiller, the XL Corps from Sulz to Hdlsch-
loch, whilst the V. Corps was to remain stationary, fronting the
Sauer, the I. Bavarian Corps was drawn near Preuschdorf towards
the Centre, the Cavalry Division at Sch5nenburg, and the head-
quarters in Sulz, would remain there.
By day break, however, whilst the Corps which had to
change their positions had Just begun to move^ a small
skirmish took place between the out-posts, of both sides, along
the Sauer.
62
HartmanrCs Bavarian Corpis was on the extreme right flank,
and Bothmer's Division of it encountered the advanced troops of
Ducroi's Division. The fight was hot and earnest, the Bavarians
followed up the advantage which they had gained beyond Lembach
as far as Langensubsbach.
Upon General Ducrof s announcement of the Bavarians' attack,
Marshal Mac Mahon repaired, at about 7 o'clock a. m., to his left
flank for the purpose of observation. He declared that the
enemy could not yet be sufficiently far advanced to make a real
attack; it was evidently nothing more than a demonstration, and
he only expected the battle on the following day.
Thus the Marshal, judging from the distance between
Weissenburg and Woerth, and the German dispositions based there-
on, calculated quite correctly. But he had not taken into account
the extraordinary warlike ardour and enthusiasm of the German
officers and soldiers, which led to the victoiy 24 hours sooner
than originally intended by their commander in chief.
The Marshal therefore, during the first hours of the battle,
planned out instructions for General de Failly, founded upon the
supposition that a battle would take place on the 7th of August.
An officer of the engineers, well acquainted with the country,
was charged with the delivery of this dispatch. He left Frosch-
weiler at 9. 30 o'clock, and selected for his road a neighbouring
valley behind Reichshofen; for the nearest way, the valley of
Niederbronn was considered endangered by German scouring
pati'ols. He reached Bitsch at about 1 o'clock. General de Failly,
however, did not afibrd the Marshal the requisite support, although
he had received the order to march to Woerth, the previous evening at
9 o'clock. His conduct offers a striking example of the want of
a single Direction in the French Army, and of the defectiveness
of a principle, which allowed great independence to the individual
corps leaders, and the initiative in situations of the greatest moment
and of entirely general importance.
Of the 5th Corps, the 1st Division (Goze's), and Maussion's Brigade
of the 2nd Division (Labadie's) were stationed about 2 kilometres*)
*) 1 English mile.
63
to the west of Bitsch, and guarded the d^bouch^s of the roads
from Zweibrflcken and Saargemfind. The 1st Brigade, Lapassefs,
of ihe 2nd Division, Labadie^s, occupied the latter town. Upon
General de Failly's receipt of Mac Mahon's dispatch, instead of
immediately commencing the march with his whole Army Corps,
excepting the detachments of observation necessary for keeping up
the connection with the 1st Army Corps, he contented himself with
issuing an order for the march of the 3rd Division on the follow-
ing day.
General Guyot de Lespart consequently commenced the march
early on the 6th of August, but a few hours after, the com-
mandant of the Corps sent him a counter order, commanding him
to halt, in the apprehension that he would himself be attacked
from Zweibrticken. At this time the Division was at Philippsburg,
at most 15 kilometres*) from the field of battle.
When the engineer ofQcer, sent from the Marshal, amved at
Bitsch at 1 o'clock, and delivered his dispatch, de Failly declared
that it would be impossible to carrry out the order, his Corps
would be scattered, he dared not abandon Saargemttnd, he must
keep a Division with the reserve Artillery in Bitsch, and had many
other arguments to justify his inactivity. Finally, however, upon
its being represented to him, how near Guyot de Lespart's Division
was to the field of battle, he decided to give him the order to
advance, and it arrived upon the field of battle in the course of
the afternoon, for the most part by railway.
Major General fValther von Montbary commanding the
out-posts of the German V. Corps was, like General Bothmer on
the right fiank, involved in a fight in the centre. He could not
help inferring from the movements of the enemy, that he was
carrying out a retreat, and therefore ordered a reconnaissance to
be made. A battalion of the Westphalian Fusilier Regiment Nr. 37
was moved forward against Woerth, under cover of the fire of the
out-post batteries, in order to make the enemy unfold his forces,
and to gain an insight into his comparative strength. This battalion
*) 9 English miles.
64
came upon a front which wag very strongly occupied, and was
consequently, drawn into a vigorous fight.
General von Kirchback, commanding the V. Corps, however,
issued an order at 8 o'clock, to break off the fight, in pursuance
of the dispositions made for this day by the commander in chief.
But from this point a lively cannonade was now audible upon
the right flank,, caused by the fight of the 11. Bavarian Corps,
whilst on the left flank the XI. Corps was observed to be engaged
with the enemy. In consequence of this, the fight was also
continued here at Woerth. By breaking it off, the adjacent Corps
would have been isolated, and their flanks endangered.
The thunder of cannon upon the right, had been perceived by
Major General von Schachtmeyer^ who was with the advanced
guard of the XI. Coi'ps, as early as 7 o'clock, at Holschloch.
Soon after, the firing ceased for a short time, and the General
ordered his Division, the 2l8t, to move into bivouac at the place
named, in accordance with the previously issued dispositions. From
here, tlie French camp could be seen upon the heights to the west
of Gunstett, on the opposite side of the Sauer. Gunstett itself was
occupied by 2 companies and 2 squadrons of the V. Corps. The
cannonade at Woerth now began afresh, and became more violent
every moment. General Schachtmeyer therefore formed his ad-
vanced guard at the western egress of the Niederwald (it was about
8 o'clock, when the 87th Regiment, the first corps, debouched from
the Niederwald w>tli Gunstett in its front), sent a battalion to
reinforce the detachment at Gunstett, and directed the artillery of
the main body to the same place, for which purpose it would have
to pass the Niederwald.
These preliminary movements had hardly been carried out
when a French battery showed itself in position opposite, and
French columns of Infantry were also observed, marching on
Gunstett
Immediately after the advanced guard had developed, the 4
batteries formed upon tlie height to the north-west of Gunstett
and opened fire; the order being given to hold Gunstett, and the
line east of the Sauer.
66
Thus ai 9 o^cloek^ the fight had begun along the whole
line^ although the greater part of the Corps were still far in
rear, Aj^ yet the I. Bavarian Corps had not been engaged at
ally of the V. Corps only the advanced troops, the 22nd Division
of the XI. Corps had just reached Surburg, and General von Werder's
Corps had only arrived at Reimerswiller.
The V. Corps had been engaged, since soon after 8 o'clock,
in a serious attack upon the position at Woerth. After the Artillery
of the advanced guard had again opened fire, the Artillery Corps
was also ordered to form up on the heights to the east of Woerth.
Soon after, the 10th Infantry Division was formed up in the first
line, and the 9th Infantry Division in the second line, both of
them « cheval of the road from Preuschdorf to Woerth.
At 10 o'clock all the 14 Batteries of the Coi'ps had opened
fire, and an hour later, when the superiority of this Artillery over
that of the French had become evident, and the XL Corps had
also made progress. General von Eirchbach commanded the
advanced guard to take Woerth, and establish itself upon the hills
on tlie other side.
In the XL Corps, the 22nd Division which had made pre-
parations to bivouac at Surburg, was apprised of the state of affairs
by the thunder of cannon, and at the same time by a report from
the 21st Division, the General * commanding, von Bose^ appearing
with it. The Division immediatefly commenced to march on Gun-
stetty the 43rd Infantry Brigade, and the Artillery in front, then the
44th Infantry Brigade, both taking the route round the southern
corner of the Niederwald. The 6th Thtiringian Infantry Regiment
Nr. 95, and the Artillery were afterwards directed to the north of
Gunstett, and the 2nd Thtiringian Infantry Regiment No. 32 to the
south of the village, on the Sauerbach.
General von Werder's Corps received intelligence that the
battle had begun, at 11 o'clock The General at once ordered
Count Scheler's Brigade of Cavalry and Starkloff's Infantry Brigade
(whose baggage was left behind)^^ from the Wurtemberg Division,
under Lieutenant General von Obemitz, with the Artillery belong-
ing to it, to move off from Reimerswiller, by Surburg, towards Gun-
stett. All the remainder waited in bivouac ready to march off.
66
In the meanwhile a change had taken place upon the
right flank, the effects of which extended as far as the centre.
Shortly after the battle bad begun, on receiving 'the iqtelligeBce
that the Artillery of the V. Corps was to be brought into action
upon the heights against Woerth, as before mentioned, the Crown
Prince had ordered the fight to be broken, off until the other Corps
had come up in sufficient strength. But before this command had
rea<^ed the field of battle, Bothmer's Division, of the II. Bavarian
Corps, had ah*eady gained gi'ound towards Woerth beyond Langensulz-
bach; this General also wrongly received the command to break
off the fight at 10. 30 o'clock, in consequence of which he now
retreated upon the position at Langensulzbach.
Marshal Mac Mahon, being thus relieved upon his left flank,
was now able to direct his whole force against Woerth.
This was the critical moment of the battle. The V.
Prussian Corps in a thrice repeated assault endeavoured in vain to
advance beyond Woerth.
Whilst the battle was here raging at its highest, the Crown
Prince, accompanied by Lieutenant General von Blumenthal and
suite, came to take the command of the troops collected upon the
battle field, and occupied the rising ground immediately in front
of Woerth, in the centre of th^ fighting lines, as a point oi ob-
servation. It was now about 1 o'clock.
The French offensive had not been confined to Woerth.
At 10. 30 o'clock, the same moment at which the Bavarians
broke off the fight, Lacretelle's French Brigade, composed of
Zouaves and Algerian Tirailleurs, broke forward from Morsbronn
against Gunstett, now occupied only by the advanced guard of the
2lBt DtvifiioB. .
To meet this attack, the Division strengthened the position
at Gunstett by 2 battalions from. the main body, pushed forward
one battalion, of the 87th Regiment to the Bruchmiible which was
occupied by a company of Jagers, and sent 3 battalions into the
ravine to the north of the village of Spachbach. This was done
under the fire of 2 of the enemy's batteries and a mitrailleuse battery
in position opposite Gunstett, which fire was soon after augmented
in a dangerous manner by 2 fresh French batteries which were
67
driyen np to the edge of a hill, flanking ElsaBhausen on the east
However the chief effect of these latter, was averted from the
columns of the 2lBt Division by the fire of a battery of the V.
Corps, in position to the north of Spachbach, and the S first mentioned
batteries were played npon by the Artillery of the XI. Corps,
posted on the north of Gunstett.
The French Brigade met with a vigorous reception at the
Bruchmtlhle; it was repulsed, and pursued across the meadows to
the highroad embankment, where it obtained excellent cover.
Further north, however, French tirailleurs had established
themselves upon this side of the Sauerbach, and French columns
now appeared in still greater strength upon the heights.
At 11 o'clock, General von Boss came into Gunstett, promis-
ing the arrival of the 22nd Division and the Artillery Corps.
Half an hour later, the anticipated second attack upon Gun-
stett began. It was caiTied on to the outskirts of the village, but
was nevertheless repulsed, with the assistance of the Jager Battalion
No. 11, which had just arrived.
At about 12 o'clock, the 22nd Division was also seen
advancing in the direction of Landsberg (also called Albrechts-
hauserhof) and Eberbach, to the south of Gunstett.
The right flank of the French 'Army here made a desperate
resistance, but in spite of it, was forced to give ground, and the
Artillery of both Divisions united upon the height of Gunstett.
Thus the battle stood at 1 o*clock^ surging to and fro
wider the repulsed assaults of the French Army; then the
arrival of the Crown Prince in the centre of the Ihie of battle^
indicated the commencement of the irresistible pressure of the
German columns.
About this time th^ Wurtemberg Cavalry appeared upon the
extreme left flank, the Artillery Corps of the XI. Corps had arrived
at 12.45 o'clock ; upon the right flank, the leading troops of the
I. Bavarian Corps began to draw near the line of battle, between
Langensulxbach and Gorsdorf and the U. Bavarian Corps took
up the fight anew upon the extreme right. The battle having
been maintained for five hours, by single divisions against a
greatly superior French foixe, numerical equality was now restored
6*
68
by the gradual arrival of fresh troops, whieh produced an alteration
every moment in favour of the Germans, until at last the superiority
in numbers was also entirely on the German side.
General von Werder had received orders, shortly after 12
o'clock, to leave one regiment for the protection of the head-
quarters on the south of Sulz, and to push forward with all his
remaining troops through the Niederwald towards Gunstett in order
to support the XL Corps. Htigers Wurtemberg Brigade, as yet
left behind, as well as the Artillery Corps now immediately
advanced, and carried out the prescribed march beyond Gunstett;
the out-posts stationed towards the south were also withdrawn and
Beyer's Division followed that of Obernitz.
General von Werder repaired to Gunstett just as StarklofTs
Brigade reached it.
At the same time that the XI. Corps , reinforced by the
Wurtembergers, was in a position to undertake a successful offensive
attack, the V. Corps in the centre attacked the position of fVoerth
with irresistible strength. The village was taken by the advanced
guai*d after an obstinate resistance.
Twice the French columns threw themselves upon the Prus^an
Regiments to rescue Woerth, but the village was held, the French
retired, the 19th Infantry Brigade reinforced the 20th and the
wood to the south of Woerth was occupied by a battalion of the
18th Infantry Brigade.
At 1 o'clock the Infantry of the 21st Division of the XL
Corps under General von Thile crossed the Sauer to the south of
Spachbach. They were followed by part of the Artillery of the
Corps whilst the other part remained in position at Gunstett. The
Division directed its attack against Eisashausen. At the same
time the Wurtemberg Cavalry Brigade appealed upon .the left flank
to the west of Gunstett.
Thus between 1 and 2 o^clock, the bow of the German
front of attack had been drawn closer and firmer round the
French position, and encompassing it from north to south
began to stifle the desperate attacks of the marshal.
(The moment in the battle represented on the map.)
69
Amid sanguinary fighting. General von Rose gained the high-
road embankment and the heights to the west of it ; step by step
the 2l8t Infantry Division pressed forward towards Elsashaosen,
until at 2 o'clock, in conjunction with parts of the V. Corps, it
succeeded in taking the burning village. General von Bose was
here wounded by a shot in the thigh, but remained on horseback
at the head of his Corps.
In vain Marshal Mac Mahon made a furious attack with
Infantry and Cuirassiers from Froschweiler^ with the intention of
breaking through the German centre. He was repulsed.
The v. Corps was now joined by the I. Bavarian Corps,
which entered at once, energetically into the fight, in spite of the
long march it had already made, and to this was united the 11.
Bavarian Corps from the north. The brave Bavarians drove the
left wing of the French before them with irresistible power.
Upon the left, the Wurtemberg Division joined the XI. Corps.
Thus Frosehweiler y the centre and Q\uQi point dappui to the
French position, was attacked.
This village, situated upon the hill on the road from Woerth
to Reichshofen, commanding the surrounding country, was most
obstinately held. Both lines stood for a long time opposite to
one another without wavering, whilst clouds of smoke rose up all
over the battle field from burning farms and villager. It was here
that the French Cuirassiers were destroyed, when throwing them-
selves with impetuous valour upon the German Infantry, in order
to break through the enemy, in old Napoleon fashion, by the
weight of their masses. General von Bose was here wounded for
the second time.
Froschweiler was taken at 3. 30 o^clock. The Bavarians
on the north, the Prussians on the east and west and the
Wurtembergers on the south, attacked on all sides and took the
village with several thousand of the enemy enclosed in it.
fFtth this the battle was definitively decided.
The French Regiments, which had been unable to obtain any
success in spite of the utmost bravery, broke into disorderly flight,
some towards Reiciishofen , some in a north-westerly direction to-
wards J&gerthal, some even back towards the south, leaving guns.
70
colonrs and numerous prisoners in the hands of the victors. A small
detachment of Infantry had occupied J&gerthal before the com-
mencement of the battlC; as the Marshal recognized the importance
of this defile, which led towards Bitsch.
After Froschweiler was iakeUy the Cavalry of all the
German Divisions immediately commenced the pursuit and
continued it for six miles,*) reckoning from Woerth to Zabern
(Saveme).
Guyot de Lespart's Division of the 5th Corps, alone was in
a position to resist in some measure this pursuit, and to cover
the retreat of the 1st Corps. This Division was then moved
back to its Corps at Bitsch, and by this movement made the
Germans 'believe that the main body of Mac Mahon*s Army had
retired upon Bitsch, so that the pursuit was diverted from the
principal line of retreat.
The loss of the French in killed and wounded was 5000
men, in prisoners 8000 men, among whom were 2500 wounded.
General Colson, the French Chief of the Staff, had fallen. They lost,
in guns ^5 cannon and 6 mitrailleuses, besides 2 eagles and a
quantity of valuable baggage, including the Staff carriages and the
Marshal's correspondence.
A large propoiiiion ot this booty was taken by the Wurtemberg
Cavalry Brigade, which in conjunction with the Reserve Artillery
was sent out from ijfunstett on the enemy's right flank, and also
the EurmErkische Regiment of Dragoons No. 14, the 2nd Regiment
of Hessian Hussars No. 14, and the Bavarian 3rd Light Horse
Regiment.
The loss of the Germans in killed and wounded, was equal
to that of the enemy.
Owing to the unfortunate course of the war for France, there
are, in general, no accurate French accounts of the battles. The
tactics adopted on the French side therefore, can at present only
be inferred from observations made on the German side. From
these it appears that in the battle of Woerth, Mac Mahon at
different times attempted changes of front, and that his prevailing
*) 27»/i English miles.
nCHTofl
Stormit
Cowfi Froi
71
idea was to break throagh the enemy's centre, by means of large
masses. Assaults were made from Morsbronn against Gnnstett and
especially, at a later phase in the battle, from Froschweiler against
Elsashansen and against Woerth.
At all events the French fought very bravely, and until the
numerical superiority of the Oeimans told, they offered a success-
fnl resistance.
The Marshal had, also, managed his troops well in the
battle; this is clearly proved, by the fact that the Germans after
the fight estimated the strength of his corps, as greater than it
actually was.
His Army, aiPter the losses in Douay's Division, may still
have numbered 33,000 Infantry, 3,400 Cavabry and 107 Guns, to
which must be added Bonnemain's Cavalry Division of 16 squadrons,
Conseirs Division of 13 NBattalions and 3 fiiatteries, and Guyot de
Lespart*B Division of 13 Battalions and 3 Batteries which bring
the whole force under the Marshal at the battle of Woerth to about
5*2,000 Infantry, 5,400 Cavalry and 143 Guns.
On the same day that the German left wing gained the victory
of Woerth, their right wing stormed a strong position, which served
as a point of appui to the French position at SaarbrUcken. As at
Woerth, this fight took place a day sooner than the General
commanding had intended.
The impatience of the troops to measure their strength with
the French, led to a wonderful feat at SaarbrUcken. The leading
troops- of the columns, on the line of march, fought a battle with
the most favourable results, which would have been the duty of
the columns themselves after they had completed their formation
in position. *
Opposite the town of SaarbHtckeriy upon French territory, the
heights of Speicheren rise, with one comer jutting out towards the
north, and steep, partly wooded slopes towards the north-west
and north-east, similar to a natural fortress, (v. map.)
72
The approach to these heights from the town is rendered
difficult by numerous lakes and ponds, and by wooded ground
whose different declivities form so many positions for the combat.
This strong position was occupied by FrossartTs CorpSy and
strengthened by artificial defences.
From here, Saarbrdcken had been taken on the 2nd of August,
yet the offensive had been carried no further; the untenable part
of Saarbrdcken together with the exercising ground on the south
of the town had been evacuated, and only the slope of the valley
to the south-west of the exercising ground, and the Galgenberg
hill lying behind it ; thus the ground in front of the actual position,
remained occupied. The French Direction having been convinced,
since the 2nd of August, that no hostile forces would be opposed,
to Saarbrttcken, Bazaine's Corps had been drawn off towards the
east. His 1st Division had marched towards Saargemiind, to
strengthen Lapasset's Brigade, the 2nd Division towards Puttlingen^
and the 3rd and 4th had taken up a position between St. Avoid
and Marienthal.
Meanwhile the guards were moved from Metz towards Boulay,
and on the 6th of August were stationed at Courcelles, about 3\^3
miles*) in rear of St. Avoid.
Frossard's Corps, on this day, was still upon the heights of
Speicheren; Laveaucoupet's Division was stationed to the north of
this village, on the right of the road from Forbach to Saarbrttcken,
Verge's Division was on the left of the road, Bataille's Division
formed the reserve. The Speicheren heights were especially adapted
for the defence. Frossard's Corps, encamped in the neighbourhood
of Forbach, could easily be reinforced by the railroad from Metz,
as well as quickly effect its retreat; Saarbrticken and the line of
th« Saar in front, gave him moreover, in great measure, the power
of observing the movements of the enemy.
Nevertheless this observation was entirely neglected.
The disposition! of the Commander in Chief of the first German
Army*, on the 5th of August, had ordered the VII. Army Corps to
advance as far as the Saar on the 6th. The 13th Division was
") 151/3 English miles.
73
directed towards Pnttlingen ; their out-poBts, to be pushed forward
HB far as V51klingen and RockershauBen. The 14th Division was
to reach Guichenbach, and out-posts to be pushed forward towards
Saarbrtlcken and Louisenthal. The Artillery Corps was to follow
the 14th Division as far as Hensweiler. These dispositions coincided
with the movements of the second Army, whose head-quarters were
removed to Homburg on the 6th, and whose advanced guard
approached the French frontier at Saargemtind.
General von Rheinbaben^s Division of Cavalry, which was on
the strength of the first Ai*my, had, on the moraing of the 6th of
August, already pushed forward a Light Cavalry Regiment as far
as the Saar, for the purpose of observing the position of the
enemy. It was ascertained that Saarbrtlcken and its environs
were evacuated, and that the enemy had withdrawn to the heights
of Speicheren. The General commanding, von Zmirawy received
this report shortly before 10 o'clock in the morning, when he was
on the point of marching towards Dilsburg, and the news was
confiimed and amplified at 10 o'clock, by a report from Lieutenant
General von Kamecke, commanding the 14th Infantry Division,
according to which the enemy had taken up a position on the
heights of Speicheren, and appeared to be embarking on the rail-
way at Forbach.
In consequence of this, General von Zastrow, at 1 o'clock,
ordered the 13th Infantry Division, under General von GlUmer, to
maixih towards Volklingen and Wehrden, to push foi*ward their
advanced guard across the Saar upon Forbach and Ludweiler, and
to gain information as to the strength and intentions of the
enemy.
The 14th Infantry Division was to reinforce its advanced guard,
which was to take up a position near Saarbrtlcken, upon the left
bank of the Saar, and its main body to be directed by Neudorf
upon Rockershausen. Patrols to be sent forward in the direction
of Forbach.
The Artillery Corps was to follow to Puttlingen.
The General's intention, on this day, was to push up the main
body of his Corps on to the Saar, at Volklingen and Rockershausen,
and early op the 7th, to attack the enemy at Forbach.
74
The independent advance of the 14th Infantry Division
did not allow this plan to be cati'ied out, but brought on a
serious encounter with the enemy on the 6th. Rheinbaben's
Cavalry Division was the first to arrive in Saarbriicken. It passed
through the town at 12 o'clock, and sent out some squadrons to-
wards the heights on the south side, who were fired upon when
advancing beyond them.
Between 12 and 1 o*clock the 14M Division had already
reached Saarbriicken^ consequently before the General command-
ing had given the order for it to remain at Rockershansen. It
passed the town^ and immediately attacked the portions of
Frossard's Corps which were in the valley, below the heights of
Speicheren.
The French troops were forced to evacuate the groutid in
front, and were pursued as far as the steep heights, which
presented an extraordinary obstacle to the advance of the 14th
Division.
General von Eamecke made dispositions for the attack of
these heights upon both flanks, and sent information of his position
to General von Zastrow. He received this report at 3 o'clock,
and immediately repaired to the battle field, by Saarbriicken; yet
before reaching Saarbrticken he heard the thunder of the fight,
and sent an officer to inform the 13th Division at Vdlklingen, of
the action in which the 14th IMvision was engaged.
The advanced guard of the 13th Division had arrived at
V6lklingen, in accordance with the order, at 2. 30 o'clock; the
main body commenced the march from Ttittlingen to Ydlklingen
at 3 o'clock. Nothing was here known of the fight begun near
SaarbrUcken, as the woody, mountainous country intercepted the
sound of the firing. The information from General von Zastrow,
brought by the officer mentioned, only reached its destination at
5 o'clock.
When General von Zastrow arrived to take command at
4. 30 o'clock, the situation upon the field of battle was as follows
(v. this moment upon the map):
Upon the German right flank, the 28th Infantry Brigade,
after heavy losses, had gained possession of the wood, bordering
75
he railway between Drathziig and Stiring, and held it. In the
front, 6 batteries in position upon the Focksterhdhe and Galgen-
berg, had opened fire, viz: the foot division of No. 7 Regiment
of Field Artillery and 2 batteries belonging to the VIII. Corps.
The HohenzoUem Fusilier Regiment No. 40, df the latter Corps,
had also come np to the support of the 14th Division, and the
General commanding^ von Goben^ was himself upon the spot and
conducted the fight.
To the east of Drathzug, the 15th Hussars, of the 14th
Infantry Division, and the 11th Hussars, of the 5th Cavalry Division,
were halted under cover. There was no infantry at all in front.
Upon the left flank, the 27th Infantry Brigade, commanded
by General von Francois, had effected an unparalleled feat, amid
the heaviest losses. Under ttie very eyes of the antagonists, who
were far superior in murderous artillery and infantry fire, it had
climbed to the summit of a projecting nose of the heights, and
established itself upon the plateau, partly in the midst of a wood
which was defended by the enemy. Here General von Francois
fell, killed in the fight.
The HohenzoUern Fusilier Regiment No. 40, was advancing in
support of this brigade.
Several regiments of the 5th Cavalry Division were in rear
of the left wing, concealed at the foot of the hill.
The position of all these troops was hazardous in the highest
degree. The overpowering enemy held the heights with inflexible
firmness, so that the right wing, the 28th Infantry' Brigade, was
unable to gain much ground. With the assist-ance of the 40th
Regiment, which had come up, the 27th Infantry Brigade succeeded
it is true in completely taking the wood at 5 o'clock, but it was
impossible for the present to press further forward. There were
no more infantry in reserve. In endeavouring to push on against
the £a*eutzberg, from the acquired south-west point of the wood,
the German lines were brought to a stand by the powerful attacks
of the enemy.
The greatest devotion and bravery of these troops alone
prevented the ground obtained, being again lost.
The thunder of cannon, however, audible afar in the direction
76
of Saarbrttcken and beyond, had reached the columns of the III.
Army Corps, which was approaching the frontier; they followed
the direction of the sound in accelerated march, and at 5 o'clock,
General von Ahensleben^ the commanding General of this corps,
arrived upon the field of battle with 5 or 6 battalions.
These battalions were immediately sent to support the troops
on the heights.
But in spite of this most necessary reinforcement, they did
not succeed in progressing further than the ravine, which the
Kreutzber^ forms at a particular segment of the Speicheren heights
and which offered an especially favourable position for the French
offensive.
At 5. 30 o'clocky the action here came to a standy and
remained in the same position until 8. 30 o'clock.
At 7. 30 o'clock the first artillery arrived upon the plateau,
a battery of the III. Corps having, by the utmost exertions, succeeded
in bringing the guns up the hill. It took up a position upon
the south-west point of the, wood, and fired with success upon the
French batteries.
During these three hours French columns advanced five
or six times, but each time the attack was repulsed by the
Germans.
The battle at this place, only died out when complete dark-
ness set in.
The 16th Division which reached Saarbrttcken in the evening,
was placed at the disposal of General von Zastrow, in a reserve
position, by the verbal order of General von SteinmetZy who
appeared upon the field of battle at 7 o'clock, having received an
announcement of the fight, at 5 o'clock, when at Eiweiler.
The French on the left also attempted an attack upon the
German right flank at 6. 30 o'clock, and commenced it with a
strong battery in position at Stiring. But the efficacious fire of a
German battery, concentrated upon this point, very soon obliged
the enemy's battery to drive off, and forced the infantry to
return.
About 8 o'clock in the evening, however, the surrounding of
the French line of retreat towards Forbach was effected by the
77
13th Division^ npon the extreme right flank. 'This presBiire upon
the French position^ which General von Zastrow had prepared by
his march dispositions for the 7th of August, and accelerated by
the announcement of the attack made by the 14th Division, induced
the severely-shaken enemy to vacate the position, so long and
obstinately held, and at the same time caused a Division of
Bazaine^s Corps, which was approaching to Frossard's assistance,
to return to St. Avoid.
The 13th Infantry Division, .which had crossed the Saar at
Wehrden, marched towards Forbach by Rosseln, the advanced guard,
under General von der Goltx) debouched from the Forbach wood
towards 8 o^clock, and 2 battalions of the 55th Regiment with 1
battery, immediately went forward to attack the Eaninchen hill,
which was strongly occupied and strengthened by cover trenches.
These trenches were taken just before dai*k, and the battery was
enabled to open fire upon Forbach and the masses 6f the enemy
still visible there.
At the sound of this fighting upon tlie flank and in tlie rear, .
the troops, who were still energetically defending the Kreutzberg,
began a rapid and disorderly retreat.
fFith this the action came to an end. The fall of night
put a stop to the pursuit.
To cover the retreat, several batteries were driven up on to
the Belschberg and its western projections, and continued the fire
for long, without however producing any effect upon the German
troops. At 9 o'clock, the French Army withdrew by Eslingen
upon Blittersdorf leaving behind numerous prisoners, the camp
equipage, a pontoon column, several provision waggons, and large
stores of forage and clothing in Forbach.
The loss in killed and wounded, in this hot and murderous
fight, was extraordinarily great upon both sides. It amounted in
each Army to at least 6000 men.
General Frossard had remained entirely without support from
Bazaine. Montaudon's Division of the 3rd Corps, which was
stationed in Saargemtlnd on the 5th and 6th of August, had moved
back to the 2nd Division which held Puttlingen, at 4 o'clock in
the aftenioon of the 6th. The latter Division marched about the
78
whole day, now fowards Saargemflnd now towards Saarbrficken^
but not upon the field of battle.
The important result of the three victories, at Weissenburg,
Woerth and Saarbrticken, was that the whole of the French Army
gave up its original position and began a general rapid retreat.
By this means alone was it enabled to escape the fate of being
rolled up by the Army of the Crown Prince, or surrounded and
forced back from its line of retreat towards the north.
THIRD CHAPTER.
The Investment of Strasburg and the first Battle near
Metz (Courcelles).
The Dorth-east of France, which became the theatre of war shortly
after the German victories on the 6th of August, — the table land
of Lorraine and the Rhine valley separated from it by the Vosges — ,
by its natural formation and consequent limited military character
caused the operations of the war to be divided into two parts.
The acquisition of Strasburg was no less important to 4he
German Leadership than the pursuit and destruction of the main
body of the French Army, whose next natural front must be the
line of the Moselle. Strasburg possessed a double impoiiance as
a fortress by its position in front of the great passes of the Vosges
and in the middle of the open plain, which leads in a southerly
direction to Franche Comt6 and Bourgogne in the centre of France.
The Vosges, the natural western boundary wall of Germany,
which border the Rhine valley on the west, rise quickly upwards
from the plateau land of the Burgundy gate in the south, and
form an unbroken chain to the valley of the Lauter, diminishing in
height towards the north, with steep declivities towards the Rhine
and sloping gradually down towards the table land of Lorraine on
tlie west* In the southern third, these moyntaina attain the greatest
height and width, the ridge is no where less than 3000 feet high
and rounded off, near the eastern side, the granite^ wooded summits
rise 1000 feet higher.
Where the. granite masses cease at the sources of the Meurthe,
the mountains are smaller, lower, and the peaks are less impoiiant.
80
Then comes the principal pass of the mountains^ which begins
on the eastern slope at Zaberne (Saverne) and leads by Pfalzbnrg
to the Meurthe towards Luneville.
This pasSy the entrance gate as i^ were between Germany and
France, and near the gate of Burgundy which is occupied by the
fortress of Belfort, has been, since the most ancient times, a road
for the Roman, French and German Army columns, and the posi-
tion of Strasburg was deemed essential to it. The railroad from
Paris, by Chalons and Toul to Strasburg, passes through it, and
the canal, which in its further continuation leads to the Marne. On
the other side of the pass, the last third of the mountain range
begins, stretching as far as the Lauter valley, where the advanced
troops of the French Army were overthrown on the 4th of August,
and is a very intersected, hilly country, with citadels crowning the
summits. The small fortresses of Bitsch, Lichtenberg and Lfltzel-
stein lie in this northernmost part of the Vosges.
Strasburg, the largest town in Alsace and the strongest fortress
in this eastern part of the theatre of war, formed a bulwark to the
great pass of the Vosges just described, it was also a central point
of defence for the Rhine valley, and the first rampart against an
entry by the gate of Burgundy.
For the successful defence of this fortress, the support of an
army holding the Vosges was certainly necessary. After Mac Mahon
was beaten at Woerth, and his troops had evacuated the passes of
the Vosges in disorderly flight, Strasburg became an isolated foii;;
ress, similar to the fortress of Pfalzburg lying by itself in the
great pass; only much larger, far more important in a political
point of view, and provided with a numerous garrison, which might
have been able to undertake dangerous operations in rear of the
German Army, and became in consequence, an important object of
operations for the left wing of the advancing Army.
The table land of Lorraine which stretches out as far as
the Ardennes towards the north, and to the deeply indented valley
of the Meuse towards the west, became the other principal theatre
of war, upon the further side of the Vosges. The upper level of
this table land is hilly, its streams mostly flow in deeply cut beds,
and are difficult to cross. The chief river is the Moselle which
81
rises at Ballon de Svlz, south of the Vosges^ and leaves the plateau
of Langres at Epinal. It forms an excellent defensive position
through its mountainous banks^ and a strategical line of great impor-
tance by the powerful fortress of Metz and the fortress of Thion-
ville. Upon its right side, first the Meurthe runs into it^ upon
which Luneville and Nancy are situated ^ then comes the Saar,
the sh^am which the first Army Corps and part of the second
victoriously crossed on the 6th of August, which rises in the north
of the Vosges, and upon which are the towns of Saarburg and Saai*-
gemflnd.
The effect produced upon the French army^ by the defeats
on the 4th and 6th of August^ was that all the Corpst without
reference to their original formation, streamed on to the Moaolle
line, fused into two large masses^ without any determined plan
for continuing the defensive struggle. A rent went through the
army, which even violently sundered the corps unity of de Failly's^
troops, so that Lapasset's Brigade which was in SaargemQnd, sepa-
rated itself entirely from its own Corps, and joined the 3i*d Corps
in the retreat towards Metz, whilst the main body, under the com-
mand of the General himself, endeavoured to form a junction with
the army which was being formed at Ch&lons.
The retreat of the French Corps necessarily led to the forma-
tion of two different armies, the army of Metz and the army of
Ch&Ions. The latter was formed of the Ist, 6th, 7th and the
12th Corps which was raised at a later period, and the former of
the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th Corps and the Imperial Guard.
After the defeat at Woerth, the Ist Corps fled, in the first
instance, in all directions, the main body however arrived at Saverne,
and upon the 7th of August some order was again restored in the
regiments. The Marshal then made them march through the night,
and on the morning of the 8th they reached Saarburg. On the
dth the Corps was at Blamont, on the 10th in Luneville. Then,
under the apprehension that the enemy might have pressed forward
to Nancy and destroyed the railroad by Bar-le-Dnc to Ch&lons, the
Marshal decided upon taking a more southerly direction. He wished
to make use of the railway which loUows the valley of the Marne,
by Chaumont, Joinville and St. Dizier.
6
82
The march was therefore directed by a branch line .of that rail-
way upon Nenfch^tean, first to Bayon on the Moselle, where it
was encamped on the 11th; the next day to Harou^, on the 13th
to Vicherey; on the 14th; the Corps arrived at Neufch&teaU; from
whence one part embarked on the rail way , so as to arrive at
Ch&lons on the 15th; whilst the remainder, especially the cavalry,
marched, and only later made use of the railway at Joinville and
St. Dizier. The strength of the 1st Corps, on arriving at Ch&lons,
was from 20,000 to 22,000 men.
General de Failly heard of the defeat at Woerth on the evening
of the 6th, and immediately gave orders to commence the retreat
on the following morning. In the well grounded apprehension
that he might be cut off, he decided to move off during the night.
The train was directed that evening towards Saargemtind, the whole
of the baggage was taken into the fortress of Bitsch, and at
8 o'clock in the evening the Corps began to march, and arrived at
Ltttzelstein on the 7th, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. From here it
followed the 1st Corps, keeping about two days march in its rear,
eventually covering its retreat. On the 8th., Genei'al de Failly
arrived at Lixheim, on the 9th at Saarburg, on the 10th at
Avricourt, and on the evening of the 11th at Luneville. From this
place he marched to Chaumont, and drew in his rear guard, Guyot
de Lespart's Division. From Chaumont the Corps travelled by rail
to Ch&lons, where it arrived on the 19th and 20th of August.
The 7th Corps, which after the departure of Conseil-Dumes-
nil's Division to the Ist Corps, only consisted of Li^bert's Division,
a Brigade of Cavalry and the Reserve Artillery (the 3rd Division
was still in course of formation in Lyons), had gone from Belfort to
Mtlhlhausen on the 6th of August, for the purpose of encountering the
supposed enemy in the Black Forest. On the following morning
General Douay received a dispatch from Mac Mahon, informing him,
of the loss of the battle at Woerth, and an hour later a second
dispatch which ran. thus:
^'If possible throw one Division into Strasburg, and cover
Belfort with both of the other Divisions.'' signed: Napoleon.
The Commander in Chief of the army and the Chief of the Staff
consequently did not know that the 3rd Division (Dumont's) of the
83
7th Corps, was still in process of formation in Lyons, and that the
Ist Division (Couseil - Dumesuil's) had been detached, two days
before, to the 1st Corps.
In consequence of this command. General Douay drew back
towards Belfort. The departure from Mahlhausen took place, at
midday on the 7th of August, with real precipitation. These troopa
arrived in Belfort again on the 8th of August, and prepared to
complete the fortifications of the place, especially the three advanced
works, the Barres, the Grandes Perches, and the Petites Perches,
the earthworks of which had only been traced out.
The different portions of Dumont's Division arrived in Belfort
about the 13th of August, and, besides the 1st Division which
remained with Mac Mahon, only Jolif du Coulombier's Cavalry Bri-
gade was wanting* It was kept back at Lyons, and never joined
its corps.
This was therefore the next destiny of those corps which, later
on, formed the principal part of the Army of Ch&lons.
The corps which formed the army of Metz arrived in the
following manner for the purpose of concentration at this fortress.
When the German advanced guard approached Saargemttnd on
the 7th of August, General Frossard who had on that moniing
retired there from Blittersdorf, considering it wiser to place more
gi'ound between himself and the enemy, departed at 1 o'clock for
the purpose of reaching Bazaine at Puttlingen. He arrived there
at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. This hasty retreat, before an enemy
who had only just shown himself, brought disorder and mistrust
among the troops, who had previously accused their General of not
having allowed himself to be seen during the action.
General Frossard liad, in fact, been engaged in business trans-
actions about minor concerns with the Mayor of Forbach during the
attack of Kamecke's Division upon the heights of Speicheren.
Upon receiving the news of the overthrow of the 2nd Corps,
Marshal Leboeuf, the chief of the Staff, ordered an immediate con-
centration of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and Guai'ds Corps, around Metz.
This was effected on the 7th, 8th and 9th of August. At the same
time the 6th Corps arrived, by railway from ChUlons, at Metz,
where the Imperial head-quarters had been established, and thus
6*
84
five corps were assembled there, an army of about 200.000
men mik 468 guns.
On the 12th of August, these active forces were in posi-
tion on the right bank of the Moselle^ under cover of the
eastern outer forts of Metz.
The Dews of the condition of the army, which had emanated
from the French Chief command, had in the meantime pro-
duced an uneasy feeling throughout the whole country, which,
reacting again, had a pernicious effect upon the Direction of the
army.
Although the defeats of the 4th and 6th of August must have
been a temble awakening from the delusions under which France
laboured, yet only two corps and single divisions of two other corps
had been immediately concerned in them, consequently only the
smaller part of the army, and it was the duty of the Chief
command to remind the army and the country, in an appropriate
manner, of the forces still at hand.
But the dispatches from head-quarters, instead of having a
calming influence, represented a complete helplessness in the Direc-
tion of the army, and made a change in the Chief command
necessary, in opposition to public opinion in the country and in
the army.
The kind of dispatches were as follows:
Metz, 7th August 8 o'clock a.m.
''It is necessary that France and Paris should prepare for
the greatest effoi*ts, for the greatest sacrifices. No weakness!
Mac Mahon covers Nancy. Frossard's Corps is well led. The
Chief of the Staff is with the advanced posts."
11.55 o'clock a.m.
''The concentration of the troops upon Metz is carried on with-
out difficulty. The trial which we have to encounter is severe,
but it does not exceed the patriotism of the nation.''
4 o'clock p.m.
"The enemy is not pursuing Mac Mahon. The Marshal is con-
centrating his troops.^
85
On the morning of the 7th, Paris had already been declared
in a state of siege, a decree called upon all young men, under
30 years, to serve- in the Garde Mobile, and all citizens, between
30 and 40 years of age, to serve in the Garde Nationale.
The Division, which occupied Papal territory, was embarked
for France as early as the 6th of August, all the dispensable
troops were brought away from Algiers, and even some that were
necessary there; the embarkation of an army to invade the German
coasts was interrupted and the troops recalled, and even the marines
wei'e incorporated in the land army.
The 12th Corps was also formed, under General Trochu
(later Lebrun, v. the order of battle), and the 13th Corps, under
General f^inoyj (the Corps numbered 8, 9, 10 and 11 were
intended for the military commands in Paris, Lyons, Toulon and
Algiers).
In the mean time the German Army Corps ^ following up
the advantages they had already gained, poured across the frontier
in uninterrupted succession.
On the 9th of August the Chief head-quarters were removed to
Saarbrttcken, the head-quarters of the second army, upon the same
day, were in SaargemQnd, the head-quarters of the third army in
Ober-Moddem, having been at Mersweiler on the 8th, and the pre-
vious day in Hegweiler, Eberbaoh and Surburg.
The Geiman armies made a strategical wheel to the right, and
by that means gained a new front, which corresponded with the line
of retreat taken by the enemy.
This new disposition imposed the following conditions: that the
country between the Saar and the Moselle should be firmly held
by the firat army whilst remaining stationary, that the second
army should be opened out, whilst the heads of tlie columns only
moved slowly forward, and that the third army should force its way
through the Vosges chain by rapid marches.
How far the second army extended towards the rear, in con-
foimity with the original disposition, at the time that the battle of
Woerth was fought, is evident from the Saxons (XII. Corps) having
only reached Kaisei'slautem on the 7th, Homburg on the 8th, and
Saarbrttcken not until the IJth.
86
But whilst the main bodies of the first and second armies, moving
slowly forward, were united in compact membership, the independent
cavalry Divisions at their heads formed an advanced line two days
march in front, keeping at the heels of the retiring French corps,
carefully watching them and at the same time concealing the German
operations by an impenetrable veil. As early as the 10th of August
these heads had passed the districts of Saar«Union, Gros-Tenquin,
Faulquemont, Fouligny and Les Etangs.
The task which had devolved upon the third army, besides
the advance through the Vosges, included various other operations
against the fortresses lying among the mountains, and also the impor-
tant detaching of forces whose aim was Strasburg.
Bitseh, the most western of the Vosges fortresses, bars a cross
road through the mountains. Here three roads leading from the
valley of the Rhine unite, and continue as two to the Saar. From
its natural strength, situated upon the cone of a hill and on a
lake, with bomb-proof casemates, a well . 246 feet deep, richly
provided with stores, furnished with 80 guns and 1000 men, Bitsch
offered an invincible resistance to the detachment of the XL Bavarian
Corps, which had moved forward to besiege it on the 8th of August
and at once commenced the bombai'dment with a field battery. The
corps had therefore to make a long detour by Lemberg, Montbronn,
and St. Lorenzen, by mountainous roads, with the greatest difficulty
and to content itself with investing the fortress.
The castle of Lichtenberg^ situated upon rocks, likewise re-
fused the summons to surrender, sent by the Wurtemberg Division,
but capitulated however on the 10th, after the houses had been
partially set on fire, the day before, by the bombardment This
success was gained by the 1st and 2nd Jager battalions, the 1st
Field Artillery division and two companies of the 2nd Infantry
Regiment, und«r General Hiigel, when 280 prisoners besides the fort
itself were delivered into the hands of the Germans.
Fort Liltzelstein (la Petite Pierre) j lying somewhat further
south, was taken by the II. Bavarian Corps on the 9th of August.
On the other hand, the important little fortress of Pfalzburgy
unusually strongly situated upon a hill 1160 feet high, in the
middle of the principal pass mentioned above, held out like Bitsch
87
and compelled the third army to make a circuit by Petersbach.
The fortress was invested.
The head-quarters remained in Petersbach from the Uth to the
13th of August. Here the town of Luneville surrendered, after iiaving
been visited by the cavaliy of the advanced guard. Nancy had
already been ridden through by German cavalry patrols on the
12th. Upon the same day the I. Bavarian Corps, on the right flank,
reached DiemeKingen near Saar-Union.
Immediately after the battle of Woerth, whilst the main body
of the third army thus passed the Vosges, and with its extreme
right flank effected a junction with the left: flank of the second
army, the Baden Division was moved forward towards the south.
On the morning of the 7th, the cavalry brigade, under General von
La Roche, appeared before the gates of Hagenau, and took the town
by a coup de maiuy capturing over 100 prisoners, 80 horses, and
a great many arms and articles of equipment. The Division marched
in on the evening of the same day.
On the 8th, tlie Baden cavalry appeared before Strasburyy and
destroyed the railway and the telegraph wires to Lyons ; the divi-
sion followed them; on the night of the 7th, the troops stationed
at Rastatt had already thrown a bridge across the Rhine, by which
24 heavy guns were moved over for the attack upon Strasburg.
On the 9th, the north side of the great fortress was invested, and
General von Beyer^ Commandant of the Baden troops, sent a sum-
mons to the Commandant of the fortress, General Vkrichy to surrender.
The Freni^h General refused the summons.
Strasburg is not laid out according to the most modem prin-
ciples of the art of fortification, there are no outer forts; still it
is as strong a fortress as Vauban's more simple system alone could
produce ; the Rliine and the III used for inundating, offer a natural
means of strength. A rich equipment of artillery was at hand
for the defence, as the fortress had been destined for the principal
point of exit for the invasion of Germany.
88
The town, with a population of 84.000 inhabitants^ is sur-
rounded by a cincture of fortifications which nearly takes the form of
a conical bullet, lying with its blunted point towards the east soutli east.
The longimeter of the fortress is 4 kilometres*), the transverse
diameter, measured at the base of the triangle, considered as an
isosceles, surrounding the fortress, is 2^4 kiloqaetres**).
On the east side, the fortifications extend as far as the westeru
arm of the Rhine and enclose the citadel, which is .quite separated
from the town proper. The citadel }s an enclosed work composed
of five bastions, commanding the wall of the enceinte wliich sur-
rounds the whole town, and horn works are thrown out below the
citadel towards the north-east and south-east. The enceinte con-
sists of bastions, which can be inundated on the south-east front
by the Rhine and the 111, and are strengthened by advanced
works and outer lines the north and north-west fronts, on the
other hand, have large horn works and advanced lunettes, thrown
out in front of the bastions. The railway station which unites
the line from Kehl with those from Paris and Lyons, lies behind
the north front.
An excellent system of flooding enables the east and southern
fronts to be inundated by the waters of tlie Rhine and of the
navigable 111, which flows through the town.
The garrison of the fortress consisted of 11.000 men of in-
fantry of the Line and Artillery, besides Gardes Mobiles and Gardes
Nationaux. On the other hand, Engineer troops were entirely wanting.
A tolerably large number of troops had, moreover, been driven
into the fortress by the panic produced by the defeats of Weissen-
burg and Woerth, and formed a motley crew, which had to be
organized afi'esh in the necessary formation. At the beginning of
the campaign, the defence of Strasburg had never been taken into
consideration.
The north side of the fortress had already, on the 9th, been
invested by the Baden Division, as before mentioned, the head-quarters
*) 2Vs EnglUh miles.
) about iVs English miles.
••'
89
were in Lampertheim, On the 14th, General von Werder was
nominated to the Chief command of the siege corps, which was to
consist of the Baden Division, the Prussian 1st reserve Division and
the Garde-Landwehr- Division, as well as the siege artillery and
technical troops. Lieutenant General von Decker was appointed
to the command of the siege artillery, and Mtgor General v. Mertens
commanding engineer.
On the 13th, the head-quarters were ti*ansfeiTed toMundolsheim,
and the investment was drawn closer upon the north-west, north
and east fronts, whilst the enemy shewed no activity in the of-
fensive.
On the 15th, Schiltigheim , Ruprechtsau, and K5nigshoffen
wer6 brought into the cordon of the investment, but the regular
siege had not as yet begun and the guns required for the bombard*
ment. were still wanting.
Upon the other side of the Vosges, the advance of the three
German armies had progressed without delay. The table land of
Lorraine had been passed as far as the line of the Moselle without
fighting, whilst the first army continued its direction towards Metz,
the second army upon Pont-k-Mousson and the third upon Nancy.
The Chief head - quarters were in St. Avoid on the 12th
and were removed, on the 18th, to Faulquemont, near which place
is the castle Herny, 3 miles^), from Metz, in which the King him-
self took up his quarters.
The first aimy, now joined by the I. Army Corps and the
1st Cavalry Division, had advanced as far as the line of St. Barbe-
Frontigny at midday on the 14th; their advanced posts were one
mile**) from Metz and. felt the enemy.
The second army, whose head-quarters were transferred to
Gros-Tenquin on the 12th, having satisfied themselves that the
•) 134/5 English miles.
••) 43/5 English mile?.
90
Nied would not be defended by the French, in spite of the entrench-
ment which had been thrown up and the villages having been
placed in a state of defence, made preparations to cross the Moselle
on the 14th and 15th. For this purpose the head-quarters moved
off, on the morning of the 13th, to Pont-a-Mousson^ the principal
passage over the river. From the different reconnaissances which
had been made it was foreseen that no opposition would be offered
to crossing at this place. Neither the stone work of the bridge
in the town nor the small wooden portion of it on the left bank,
had been destroyed. As the German infantry were taking ppssession
of the town on the 13th, a French battalion, which was coming
up by the railway from Metz, returned to Metz by the same route.
Upon this the cavahy destroyed the rails and telegraph wires
upon the other side of the Moselle. On the following day the head-
quarters had, already, been established in the town.
The main body of the third army was approaching Nancy on
the 14th, on the 15th the II. Bavainan Corps came upon the fortress
of Marsaly 4V2 miles*) from Nancy. This fortress situated in the
mai*shy fells of the Seille, completely surrounded with wet ditches
and furnished with a garrison of 600 men and 70 guns, formed
the centi*al point of a natural defensive position ; it offered however
no defence. After a short bombardment on the south side, it capi-
tulated upon the same day; 512 un wounded prisoners, about 600
remounts, 60 guns and a lai'ge quantity of provisions fell into the
hands of the conquerors.
In Nancy nothing was to be seen of the enemy, on the 14th
the advanced guard of the Germans had already reconnoitred the
fortress of Touly and summoned it to surrender.
The French army had, therefore, given up the whole of the
country east of the Moselle, without making any further fight.
The positions on the Gennan and those on the French Nied, which streams
unite in the Nied, midway between St. Avoid and Metz, I'/j miles**)
north of the straight road which joins both places, wei'e as little
defended as the positions on the Seille although an obstinate resis-
*) 20Vto English miles.
**) Nearly 7 English miles.
91
tance might here have been made by the rear guard, and they
were also found by the Germans to have been prepared for defence.
It is doubtful whether the line of the Moselle might not even
now have been held by the Fr^ich, by summoning up their whole
strength. The circumstance, that Pont<k-Mou8son was not occupied,
and that, on the 14th, Toul had already been summoned to surrender,
indicates that the general defence of the whole line was not intended,
or else that Mac Mahon had given up the defence of the southern
tract in adopting the views of the French Chief command in oppo-
sition to his own.
With the passage at Pont-k-Monsson, the possibility of sur-
rounding Metz at once appeared.
In the publication*) inspired or written by the Emperor Napoleon
himself it is said: '^the Prussians concealed their movements so
well behind their formidable curtain of cavalry, which they spread
out before their front in all directions, that in spite of the most
persevering researches it was never really known where the main
body of their troops was<" But even had the French Direction
been acquainted with the position of the Germans on each day as
they advanced from the frontier, it still might not have been able
to accomplish the defence of the line of the Moselle, but only
to secure and hasten, in a more cautious manner, a further retreat
to the line of the Meuse. For the insufficiency of their forces
made it impossible to hold so long a line against such an extended
assailant. It is true that the army assembled round Metz was
sufficient for the noctheni part, but as Mac Mahon was no longer
able to take the field, or as yet unable to take it again, and his
army consequently, not in a fit state to form the right wing of the
position, even if a front had also been opposed to the second
army, it would have been impossible to avoid a surrounding by
the army of the Crown Prince. Under these circumstances the
line of the Moselle was absolutely untenable* And now the
French Direction committed the fault, of not commencing the retreat
*) Campagne de 1870. Des' causes qui ont amen€ la capitulation de
Sedan par an officier attach^ a T^tat major g^n^ral. Braxelles, J. Rozez.
92
in time from this untenable position; they still retained the army
in the fortress of Metz, whilst the first German army appeared in
front and the second army threatened the right flank. The inter-
ference of the ministry in Paris in the military operations, as well
as the change made in the chief commimd bore no small share in
the half measures of this epoch. The defeats of the army, as
previously mentioned, had roused a general distrust in the general-
ship of the Emperor; in consequence of this feeling, on the
12th, he transferred the Chief command of the ''Rhine Army,'' viz.
the corps united at Metz, to Marshal Bazaine, to whose command
General Decaen succeeded. Marshal LebcBuf was dismissed from
being Chief of the StaflF.
The Emperor, however, still remained with the army, his
influence always cari*ying weight, the ministry sent urgent coun-
seils, and a ruinous insecurity in the military measures necessarily
resulted from these complicated relations.
The German Direciiony on the other hand, well aware of
the advantages of its own situation, and the disadvantages of that
of the enemy, hoped to get in rear of the French Army^ by
making a circuit upon the left bank^ whilst the advance of the
third at^my averted any danger that tnight by chance arise
to the second army during the wheel, from Mac Mahon,
At midday on the 14th of August, the I. Army Corps was
stationed on the French Nied, with its Ist Division at Courcelles-
Cliaussy, on the road from St. Avoid to Metz, and its 2nd Division
at Les Etangs, upcm the road from Boulay to Metz. Of the VII. Army
Corps, the 13th Division was at Pange, and the 14th Division, on
the same stream, at Domangeville. The VIII. Army Corps was in
reserve at Varize and Vionville on the German Nied. The 3rd
Cavalry Division was stationed upon the right wing at Ste. Barbe,
the Ist Cavalry Division on the left wing at Frontigny.
The French army was, on the morning of this day, in large
bivouacs to the east of the outer forts of Metz , and between them,
upon the right bank of the Moselle. The troops stationed furthest to
the east occupied earth entrenchments at Colombey and Nouilly,
upon the little rivulets, which flow to the Moselle from the right,
about 3000 paces beyond the outer forts.
The ground between tlie flerman troope and the outer for te.
only by bringing np the last regervea and by the gvosb
tion, that it was able to make a stand until the 36th
apon the little rivulets, which flow to the Moaelle from the right,
about 3000 pacee beyond the outer forte.
93
The ground between the German troops and tlie onter forts,
offered hindrances difficnit to surmount, in the projecting heights,
sinking down to the Moselle, which are here intersected by numer-
ous brooks, and had been rendered of militaiy impoi'tance to the
Frencli by cover trenches and gun-emplacements, one behind another
in different lines.
The 26th Infantry Brigade, forming the advanced guard of the
VIL Ai-my Corps, under the command ofGeneral von derGoltz, observed
movements in the enemy opposite, during the afternoon, which led
to the inference that they were departing. In consequence of this
an attack was ordered at about 4 o'clock, for the purpose of
making a reconnaissance, which being directed against Colombeyy
would ascertain whether this was actually the case, and at the
same time compel the enemy to develope his strength. In this
attack the 26th Infantry Brigade encountered an obstinate resis-
tance from the Srd French corps, and was involved in a violent
fight, in which it suffered gi*eat losses from the enei*getic, deliberate
fire of the infantiy lying concealed. General von Zastrow ordered
the 25th Infantry Brigade to move forward in support, from their
bivouac at Pange, and directed their attack against Marsilly beyond
Colllgny. At the same time the 14th Infantry Division received
the order to move off from its bivouac at Domangeville, and to
march upon Laquenexy. The artilleiy corps, w^hich was bivouack-
ing at Bazoncourt, was also ordered to follow the 14th Infantry
Division. Upon the right wing, the advanced guard of the I.
Army Corps, under the command of Major General von Falckensteiu,
moved forward, at the same time, for the attack; the Corps
followed the du*ection of the two high roads leading to Metz from
Boulay and St. Avoid, the 2nd Division, under General von Pritzel-
witz, by the north road upon Noisseville, the 1st Division, under
General Bentheim, by the south upon Montoi. (v. the map of the battle
of Courcelles.)
The 26th Infantry Brigade which was first engaged, came
upon an overpowerhig enemy, whose masses were continually being
more strongly developed, and was in a veiy perilous position ; it was
only by bringing up the last resei^ves and by the gi'eatest devo-
tion, that it was able to make a stand until the 2dth Infantry
94
Brigade had come up by Colligny, which did not take place
UDtil about 6 o'clock in the evening. This Brigade deployed so
that three battalions attacked the entrenchments in the wood to the
north of Colombey, on the right flank of tlie 26th Brigade, and two
battalions remained closed to the west of Coincy. The artillery
of the 13th Division came into position upon the hills to the east of
Colombey, and prepared for the attack upon the French position
by opening an efficacious fire, even thougli exposed to infautiy fire.
The French had by degrees developed two Corps, Decaen's
and Ladmiraulf s. They made such a powerful offensive attack
towards Colombey and Noisseville, that both the 13th and the
2nd Divisions could with difficulty hold their positions.
At Colombey a more favourable turn was first produced by the
arrival of the head of the 14th Infantry Division at 6.50 o'clock.
General von Zaatrow directed the 28th Infantry Brigade, under
Major General von Woyna, against the right flank of the enemy,
still in position at Colombey ^ whilst he. made the 27th Infantry
Brigade form up as a reserve, upon the heights to the east of
Colombey. This attack upon his right flank compelled the enemy
to give way; he fell back slowly upon Boniy, and gave up the
wood which lies to the south-east of this place, after an obstinate
defence. The wood lying to the north of Colombey was also
taken, after a severe fight, by the 25th Infantry Brigade, under
Major General von Osten-Sacken. ki NoisseviUey by the timely
co-operation of the Artillery Corps and Infantiy reserves, the I. Army
Corps succeeded in repulsing the enemy's assault, and thus a great
danger for the VII. Army Corps was averted, its right wing having
been threatened by the French offensive movement at this place.
General Count von der Groben's Cavalry Division, upon the extreme
right flank of the ai*my, also took an active part in the fight,
pressing upon the left wing of the French at Servigny.
The French army fell back slowly, holding successively the
foi*tified earth entrenchments, lying one behind the other, and thus
inflicting heavy losses on the German army.
The 1st Cavalry Division upon the left flank was engaged
in the same way as the 3rd Cavalry Division upon the right.
Lieutenant General von Hartmann, who was commanding, directed
95
bis attack agaiuBt Mercy <le-Haut, and commenced it uitli his Horse
battery. It was supported by the extreme riglit flank of the
second army, the 18th Infantry Division^ which took part in the
battle when it was at its height. The Fusilier Regiment No. 36,
captured Jury and stormed Mercy-le-Haut, and a battalion of the 84th
Regiment took Peltre. Thus tliese troops gained the enemy's flank
and threatened his line of retreat.
Towards 8 o'clock in the evening, the French army was
repulsed on all points, and driven back until it wa^ between the
outer forts, Quienleu, Les Bottes and St. Julien. The Germans,
naturally, could not attempt a further pursuit, as they would have
come under the fire of the fortifications; they bivouacked in the
position wrested fropi the enemy, in order to insure the oare and
transport of the numerous wounded, although contrary to the order
of the Commander in Chief of the first army, who had directed
that the original position, on the Nied, was again to be occupied
in the night. The YIIL German Army Corps was not engaged
in the combat. '
In forming a judgment upon the importance of this battle, there
are many sides to be considered.
The circumstance that the attack was only begun towai'ds
evening, and that it was undertaken with a comparatively weak
force, indicates that, at midday at least, it was not the intention
to give battle, but that the alteration in the military situation,
through the depai*ture of the French army, wlueh was noticed by
the advanced guard, had induced the German attaek. It therefore
became the duty of the first army to attack the enemy, in order
to hold him fast in the retreat which he appeared to be beginning,
but in other respects to maintain the waiting position it had
taken up.
The position of the French army on the 14tl), indicated the
intention of a battle upon the right bank of the Moselle, rather
that a pi*emeditated retreat. The whole army stood that morning
in the open country, with an entrenched line, 9 kilometres*) in
*) 5Vs English miles.
96
lengthy their rear covered hy the unassailable foiiifieations of Metz,
consequently in an excellent tactical position^ carefully prepared
for fighting. This position raised the ccmjecture^ that the resistance
originally projected on the Nied against fui*ther pursuit having
been made^a pitched battle was to be fought here on the 15th, Napo-
leon's fete day.
The obstinate, partly offensive fight which was carried on at
Colombey and Noisseville, has also more the appearance of a
defensive movement for the purpose of holding the position than
of a retreating fight. Had the French Direction really intended
to evacuate the right bank of the Moselle and the fortress, before
the attack of Goltz's Brigade, it surely, could easily have carried
out this movement in spite of this attack, when so close to
the outer-forts, by withdrawing the army completely between the
fortifications, whilst leaving a rear guard behind. Bazaine should
either have attacked the first army with his whole force, or retired
in good time. On the part of the Fi'ench, this battle was a half
measure, resulting from complete ignorance of the enemy's move-
ments, and from their own want of design. That the Pi*ussian
divisions should have been allowed to deploy in front of an army
of more than 60.000 men, whilst there was not a moment to be
lost, is an incomprehensible error, its principal fault being that it
permitted the sun^oiinding movement, by the second army, to be
oaaried out.
Various important statements exist concerning the French Army
Direction, which lead to the conclusion that the retreat upon Verdun
was a settled affair even before the beginning of the battle, and
these agree with the report of Major General von der Goltz on
the afternoon of the 14th. "The enemy has begun his retreat,
and the advanced guard will therefore attack him.''
Again, it is significant that the Emperor left Metz with the
Prince Imperial at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and at 10 o'clock
in the evening of this day sent off a dispatch from Longeville, (under
Mont St. Quentin, near Metz). "Our army commences to retreat upon
the left bank of the Moselle. In the morning, our reconnoitring
patrols had not reported the presence of any hostile Corps. When
however, the half of our army had crossed the Moselle, the Prusssians
97
attacked us with considerable foives &c." Then Marshal Bazaine says*):
'^ After the brilliant fight at Bomy (on the 14th to the east of Metz)
the troops engaged in it received the command, on the morning
of the 15th, to continue tlieir retreating movement upon Verdun,
in the two directions assigned to them." From this it follows
that a retreat upon Verdun had been ordered, even before the
battle. The Marshal further says most distinctly in another publi-
cation**): "I had instructions to lead tlie army from the right
bank of the Moselle, where it had been united since the 11th,
over to the left bank, in order to direct it upon Verdun. In the
middle of the execution of this movement on the 14th,. which took
place from both flanks, towards 2 o'clock in the afternoon the
German troops began the attack upon Mettman's Division of the
3rd Corps. . . . We had not the satisfaction of frustrating the
enemy's plan, which was to delay our concentration upon the
plateau of Gravelotte, and so gain time to arrive there before us.''
In another publication***) which appears to be drawn up from
excellent sources, it is maintained that a council of war was held
at Metz on the 13th, which led to the decision that a retreat should
be made upon Chd,lons. Orders were therefore given to commence
the march of the troops upon the morning of the 14th, and the
2nd Corps began to retire at 3 o'clock a.m. of this day, but had
only progressed very slowly.
If one now considers the observations in the publication men-
tioned above as proceeding from the Emperor himself "on the
14th of August, as also upon the 16th, no one had an idea that
the whole of the enemy's army was before us, and no one doubted
at Gravelotte that it would be possible to reach Verdun with ease
upon the following day," it is probable that the resolution for a
general battle upon the right bank of the Moselle, was definitively
abandoned when it was learnt that the enemy's reconnoitring patrols
*) Rapport du Marechal Bazaine, bataille de Rezonville le 6 Aoiit 1870.
**) Rapport sommaire snr les operations de rarm^e du Rhine du 13 AoCit
an 29 Octobre 1870, par le commandant en chef Marechal Bazaine.
*•*) La campagne de 1870 jusqu*au ler Septembre, par un officier de
Tarm^e du Rhin.
7
98
had arrived in Vigneolles, and in the conntry round Briey, on the
line of retreat towards Verdnn, and the movementB of the second
army towards Gorze also became known ; therefore on the morning
of the 14th or even on the iSth, although attention had been drawn
to the threatened danger^ it was imagined that there was still time
enough to escape from it.
The first army consequently obtained a brilliant result in
obliging the enemy to show front, when on the point of with-
drawing. The Battle of Courcelles (Borny) rendered possible
the surrounding of Metz and the battles on the 16th and 18th.
Without this conflict the French army would have been able to
commence its march towards Verdun on the 14th and Idth under
cover of the fortress, unencumbered by a large number of wounded,
and with their organization undisturbed by a defeat. In Marshal
Bazaine's' first named report it says: ^'The delays occasioned
to the 2nd and 3rd Corps, by participating in the battle of Borny,
unfortunately prevented their being able to begin their movements
(the retreat on the 15th) sufficiently early to enable them to com-
plete it in the time fixed.'^
On the morning after the battle the King made a reconnaissance
of the field of battle in person. From the highest points nothing
more could be seen of the enemy upon the right bank of the
Moselle. Thick clouds of dust upon the other side of tlie river
disclosed the departure of the French army.
/
General Map
MOYEMEHTS from 15* tp IPS' August 1870.
(March to the battie fields of Vionville aitd Cravelotte.)
Les fitdire'f^
Mafsrtab 1: 300,000.
It f
^3C
zMeHerv.
tstMLfBenx^ WWvebiviHm.
Girpr.
ting eon.' ^Augutt
'<le
vpd) ZKCarpi (Leboeuf)
irinjjtj
)ent)
FOURTH CHAPTER.
The Battle of Vionville on the 16th op August.
In the KJDg^s dispositions on the 15th of Angnst, fnrtlier
steps were taken to arrest the departure of the French Army,
which had been commenced towards Verdun, and to cut off their
line of retreat, whilst at the same time, measures were taken to
offer a strong resistance to any ofFensive movement which might
possibly be contemplated upon the right bank.
Of the first army, the I. Ai*my Corps remained in the
position, to the east of Metz, that the whole of the first army
had occupied on the previous day of battle; the VIL and VUI.
Army Corps moved off at day break, from their bivouac positions
before Metz, and marched, in columns to the left, upon the line
between Arry and Pommerieux which they were to occupy on
the 16th.
Of the second army, the 11. Army Corps remained stationary
at HansurNied and the IX. at Bnchy, having in view the same
object as the L Army Corps, viz. to hold Metz in check upon
the east. The Hessian (25tli) Division of the IX. Army Corps
was pushed forward as far as the village and castle of Mercy
le Haut.
All the remaining Corps made progress in crossing the
Moselle between Metz and Frouard.
The whole of this ti*act presents considerable obstacles to
such large masses of troops in columns of march, in consequence
of the numerous bends of the Moselle, enclosed by steep and
wooded heights. The river itself, winding through a naiTow
7*
.4
100
valley, had only two standing bridges, which the French had
neglected to break up, at Pont-a-Mousson and at Nov^ant.
The Moselle hills upon the right bank from Metz to Pont-k-Mousson
are only small, rising about 1000 feet, with nan'ow, difficult,
transverse valleys at Corny, Arry and Champey; the hills become
higher and wider to the south of Pont-a-Mousson , where they are
intersected by the valleys leading to Dieulouard and Marbache.
The heights upon the left bank are steeper, and a few
hundred feet more lofty, their average width is a German mile*).
They sink gradually towai*ds the west, whilst falling pre-
cipitously towards the river. There are only a few narrow defiles
leading from the Moselle, in a north-westerly direction, towards
the road from Metz to Verdun which the German army had to
reach. Gorze and Onville are situated in the only two valleys to
the north of Pont-k-Mousson.
Thus the Army Corps which had commenced the march
simultaneously, were obliged, for the greater part, to make consider-
able detours to the west and south-west, in order to gain gi'ound
without stoppages and confusion, and then by wheeling to the noi*th,
had to press forward against the line of retreat of the FrencJi
army between the Moselle and Meuse hills. The nearer to
Metz that the corps concerned could penetrate the chain of hills
so mnch the quicker would they reach their destination. Those
divisions only, which, being furthest towards the north, had to
describe the smallest arc, could advance sufficiently far to be in
time to cross the enemy's line of march, and it therefore depended
upon their tenacity whether the enemy could be detained sufficient-
ly long, to allow the remaining corps, which were wheeling round,
to be brought effectually into operation as they, gradually, came up.
Pont-a-Mousson^ where the Commander in Chiefs head-
quarters, of the second army, were established during the whole
of this detour, was from its situation, the proper focus of all the
operations. From this place a road traverses both chains of hills
in an unbroken line, and roads also lead to the noii;h and south
on both banks of the river. Besides these, the principal roads for
•) 43/5 English miles.
101
ft
the movements of the ti'oops were those which led across from
Dieulouard and Marbache by Les Saizerais, and all the causeways,
hihg roads and by ways which run parallel with the Moselle,
in the approximate direction of Teul, towards Conians.
The ordering and execution of these marches by so many
different roads, through a eounti*y in which there was the greatest
difficulty in keeping up the connection between the corps, is a
master work in tactics.
On the 15th of August, Prince Frederick Charles's Army
Corps, wliich had been appointed for operations upon the left
bank, occupied the following positions and was canying out the
following movements, (v. the general map.)
The III. Army Corps was on the march from Vigny to
Cheminot.
The 6th Cavalry Division was pushed forward, on the right
flank, towards Metz.
The XII. Army Corps (Saxons) was stationed at Soigne.
The X. Army Coi*ps was passing Pont-a<Mousson, the advanced
guard was beyond it.
The 5th Cavalry Division was stationed at Thiaucourt, upon
the left bank of the Moselle, and towards the road from Metz to
Verdun. This Division was, therefore, tlie most advanced.
The Garde Corps was stationed at Dieulouard, with the
advanced guard at Les quatre Vents.
The V. Army Corps was on the march from the Seille to-
wards Marbache.
On the French stdcy the whole army began its departure
by both roads towards Verduny upon the morning of this day.
The 2nd Corps was ordered to take the southern high road,
by Rezonville, Mars-la-Tour and ManheuUes, followed by the 6th
Corps, the Imperial Guard, the reserve Artillery and. Parks; the
3rd and 4th Corps were to move by the. northern road by
Conflans and Etain. The first column was protected by the
Division of reserve Cavalry under General de Forton, consisting of
'two Dragoon and two Cuirassier Regiments, and the second column
by the Division of reserve Cavalry under General du Barrail,
consisting of four Regiments of Chasseurs d'AMque.
102
The points to be reiiched on the 16th of Augost, were Vion-
ville by the 2nd Coi*ps, Rezonville by the 6th, Doncourt by the
4thy St. Marcel and Verneville by the 3rd Corps. The Guards
were to occupy Gravelotte, in reserve.
After reaching Vionviile, de Forton^s Division was to in-
vestigate the country towards the south-west, and du BarraiFs
Division was to hold Jaiiiy, and watch the road to Conflans.
The backwardness shown in tlie development of the Park
and Train columns, and the retardment of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th
Corps occasioned by their participation in the battle of Courcelles,
prevented this army (which since the commencement of the war
had been pursued by the misfortune of being surprised in its
formation), from completing this intended concentration round
the plateaux of Gravelotte and Vionville in sufficient time.
The 3rd Corps, which was to have followed the 4th, had
taken the lead, whilst the 4th was altogether unable to commence
the march upon the 15th. But even the 3rd Corps was only able
to reach the plateau of Gravelotte at 10 o^clock in the evening
of the 15th.
Only the 2nd and 6th Corps with the Guards arrived near
the points appointed for them.
In the course of this day the German Chief command was
convinced that an offensive movement on the part of the French
was not to be expected, but that Bazaine's departure for the west
had been commenced. Orders were therefore given for the further
advance of the 5th Cavalry Division (Rheinbaben's) at 7 o'clock in
the moiTiing, towards the road from Metz to Verdun, in connection
with the Dragoon Guards Brigade (Count Brandenburg II.) which
had drawn towards the north from Rogeville ; part of the X. A]*my
Corps was to support this cavaliy by marching upon Thiaucourt;
and finally, a reconnaissance was to be made upon the left bank
of the Moselle towards Metz, by portions of the X. Army Corps.
At 2 o'clock in the afternoon, the lU. Army Corps was
ordered to cross the Moselle by the bridge which had been laid
at Champey, and that corps was to advance, on the following day,
by Gorze to Mars-la-Tour, and the XU. Army Corps, at Nom^ny,
was also to advance.
103
On this day Marshal Bazaine had learnt the movements of
the enemy upon the left bank of the Moselle, and inferred that a
strong concentration would be made upon his left flank. As he
would be able to offer an energetic resistance to any possible
attack, and was sure of the reciprocal support of his two great
columns, he issued commands, in the evening, for the corps to
maintain the positions they then occupied until midday on the 16th,
in order to await the amval of the 4th Corps.
The conjecture that an attack would be made, was, without
doubt, well founded. Prince Frederick Charles issued the follow-
ing Army order, at 7 o'clock in the evening, at Pont-k-Mousson for
the 16th of August (v. the general map):
The III. Army Corps and the 6th Cavalry Division will
cross the Moselle below Pont-k-Mousson, and reach the road
from Metz to Verdun at Mars-la-Tour and Vionville, marching
by Nov^ant-sur-Moseile and Gorze.
The X. Army Corps and the 5th Cavalry Division will
continue the advance, by the road towards Verdun, nearly as
far as St. Hilaire and Maizeray.
The XII. Army Corps will march from Nom^ny to
Pont-k-Mousson, with the advanced guard as far as Regn^viile-
. en-Haye.
The Garde Corps will march to Bem^court, with the
advanced guard as far as Rambucourt.
The IV. Army Corps will march to Les Saizerais and
Marbache, the advanced guard to Jaillon (upon the road to
Toul).
The IX. Army Corps will march to Sillegny in order to
follow the III. Army Corps, across the Moselle, and by Gorze
on the 17th.
The II. Army Corps will march with its head as far
as Buchy, and will commence the passage of the Moselle on
the 17th, at Pont-k-Mousson.
The head-quarters of the army will remain at Pont-k-
Mousson.
These orders were modified in the evening after receiving
directions from the Chief head-quarters, dated Herny, 15th of
104
August 6*/3 o'clock p. m. y that two corps were to take up a
position on the line from Arry to Pommerieux on the 16th- The
IX. Aimy Corps was therefore now directed to continue the
march on the 16th, to move near to the Moselle, and, in immediate
connection with the III. Army Corps, to cross the Moselle by the
bridge which they had repaired, and to continue following the
III. Corps to Mars-la-Tour, with parts on the 16th and parts on
the 17th.
On the evening of the 15 th, the III. Army Corps com-
vienced the passage of the Moselle at three points.
The 5th Infantry Division {StUlpnagets) and the 6th Cavalry
Division (Duke fVilliam von Mecklenburg's)^ being the furthest
north, crossed by the standing bridge at Nov^ant, the 6th Infantry
Division {Buddenbrocks) by the bridge laid at Champey; the
Artillery Corps crossed the river at Pont-a-Mousson in order to
continue the march towards the north, in junction with the 6th
Infantry Division, by the. high road along the Moselle.
These troops had two valleys before them, by which they
could penetrate through the Moselle hills. The Corps commander,
Lieutenant General von Alvenslebenj directed that the 6th Cavalry
Division, after it had crossed the bridge at 5. 30 o'clock on the
morning of the 16th, should march upon Vionville by Gorze,
that the 5th Infantry Division should follow it, that the 6th Infantry
Division and the Artillery Corps should direct their march, by
Arnaville and Onville, upon Mars-la-Tour. The heads of the two
Infantry Divisions were to be pushed forward, on the evening of
the 15th, as far as Gorze on one side, and Onville on the other,
which points were reached between midnight and 3 o'clock in the
morning of the 16th. One column had to accomplish a march
of 1*/^ miles*) from Nov^ant, by Gorze to Vionville, the other
about 2^/2 miles**) from Arnaville, by Onville, to Mars-la-Tour.
The X. Army Corps, which was next to these divisions, had to
march from Pont-k-Mousson to St. Hilaire, 4*/2 miles***). Con-
sequently these bodies of troops could only form up successively
♦) 69/io English miles.
••) IIV2 English miles.
*••) 20Vio English miles.
106
against the Metz and Verdun road. The position of the points of
imfiration, Vionvilley Mars-la-Tour and St.- liilaire, offered however
._J
arrived) and Lafont de Villier's Division on the left, with
August 6</j o'clock p. m. , tLat two corps were to take up
") iV/i'KngRib iniles. ■'
•"} 807,0 EnglUh miles.
106
against the Metz and Verdun road. The position of the points of
operation, Vionville, Mars-la-Tour and St; liiiaiie, offered however
the probability of still being able to stop the enemy, even if he
had continued his march towai'ds the west with unforeseen rapidity,
and so had escaped the effective flank attack of the columns
pressing forwards by Gorze.
It was about 9. 30. o'clock on the mommg of the 16tk
when the French vitlettes, upon the plateau of Vionville^
perceived the approach of the enemy, (v. the general map.)
At this moment the army, under the command of Mai*shal
Bazaine^ was standing with the 2nd Corps to the we^st of Rezon-
,ville, and with the 6th Corps, in the same line, to the i*ight of the
high road. Three Divisions and the Cavalry of the 3rd Corps were
between VemevlUe and St. Marcel, but Mettman's Division was
still on the march to join his Corps, the 4th Corps was marching
in the direction of Conflans, but was, as yet, far behind. The
Guards were at Gravelotte.
The out-posts had hardly announced the advance of the
Germans, when two regiments of the 6th Cavalry Division, ac-
companied by horse artillery, debouching at Vionville, rushed
upon the bivouac of de Foiiion's and Valabr^gue's Cavalry
Divisions of the 2nd Corps, and drove them back in rapid flight
to Rezonville, behind the bivouac of the 2nd Corps.
At the sound of the cannon General Frossard made his
Corps seiz& their arms, and occupy the positions which had been
reconnoitred for this purpose on the previous day. Bataille's
Division deployed upon the right flank, on the plateau command-
ing Flavigny, Verge's Division to the left, upon the same rise of
ground. Lapasset's Brigade, of the 3rd Corps, wheeled to the leffc
in the rear, in order to watch the extensive woods to the south
of Rezonville and Gravelotte, and to cover the exit of the defile
from Gorze.
Marshal Canrobert also deployed his Corps and occupied
the ground between the road to Verdun and the village of St.
Marcel; Tixier's Division on the right, the 9th Regiment of the
line (the only one belonging to Bisson's Division which had
arrived) and Lafont de Villier's Division on the left, with the left
106
flank reaching to the road. In rear, and parallel to this highway,
by which it had advanced, Levassor-Dorvars Division (formerly
Martimpiey's) took up its position. Its mission was to support
Lapassefs Brigade and to watch the numerous gullies which lead
from Nov6ant and Ars, through the woods, on to the flank and in
rear of the army.
Marshal Leboeufj who commanded* the 3rd Corps (General
Decaen having been severely wounded in the battle of Courcelles),
was ordered to wheel up his left wing and seize the assailants
in flank.
The French position thus presented important tactical ad-
vantages. Commanding the plateaux of the heights, so difficult to'
surmount, in possession of the debouches of all the defiles, master
of the highi'oads which facilitated the communications of the troops.
Marshal Bazaine's army had considerable advantages over the
German army, whose leading troops had to climb laboriously up
the heights from the narrow valleys. The French, moreover,
were considerably superior in numbers, and were almost
completely united, whilst the Germans had to carry on the fight
for many hours with only the III. Corps and parts of the Corps
which was next coming up.
But even at this moment^ in spite of all tactical ad-
vantages, the situation of the surrounded army^ in a strategical
point of vieWy might be called a desperate one. Even had they
succeeded in completely beating the assailants for the moment, and
throwing them back upon Gorze, they would have been exposed
to flank attacks, from the coi'ps marching in the direction of
Mars-la-Tour and St. Hilaire, whilst prosecuting their retreat upon
Verdun, and would, besides, be exposed to the pursuit of the
enemy who in the first instance had been repulsed.
But they did not even succeed in vanquishing the first
enemy; General von Alvensleben's Corps sufficed to stop them.
It is true this was only done amid the greatest losses in the
German regiments, which attacked with matchless pertinacity.
After a reconnaissance had been made of the enemy's out-
posts at Tronville and Vionville, Buddenbrock's Division had
continued its march by Onville in a northerly direction as far as
107
the edge of the plateau to the south of Vionville, and there, in
a eovered position, awaited the approach of the 6th Cavalry
Division. At 8 o'clock, a second report from the patrols led to
the supposition that the enemy was departing in a northerly
direction, and the Division was therefore ordered to continue its
march in the dii'ection of Mars4a-Tour and Jamy. Upon an'iv-
ing at Tronville General von Buddenbrock received the command
to wheel to the right, and to proceed to the attack.
The 6th Cavalry Division had by this time reached the
plateau, and by its unexpected attack, had thrown back the enemy's
cavalry upon Rezonville, which compelled Bazaine to develope
his army.
On the German side, it was known that the rising ground
round Vionville and Flavigny was occupied, whilst the mass of
the enemy was stationed to the north and east of Vionville and
at Rezonville. The artillery opened the battle by firing upon the
French positions.
By the march towards Tronville, Buddenbrock's Division and
Rheinbaben's Cavalry Division had become connected. The latter
had bivouacked at Xonville, had moved off from the bivouac at
8 o'clock, and had felt de Forton's Division at Mars-la-Toui*. At
9. 15 o'clock, they trotted on from Puxieux towards Tronville,
taking with them four battenes, two of which had been supplied
to them for this day by the Ai*tillery Corps. General von Rhein-
baben announced that he was to support the attack of Budden-
brock's Division upon the left flank, by Mars-la-Tour, and at the
same time to send word to the X. Army Corps, on the march
to St. Hilaire. A detachment under Colonel Lehmann, commander
of the 37th Infantry Brigade, was allotted, in addition to support
this Cavalry Division, on the 16th; the detachment consisted of
the 91st Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 78th Regiment, the
2nd and 4th Squadrons of the 9th Dragoons, and a heavy battery.
Colonel Lehmann had started from Thiaucouii; at 4, 15 o'clock, and
moved on to the battle field by Dommartin and Chambley. He
kept up the connection with another detachment under Colonel
von Lynker, which had joined the 5th Infantry Division (Stfilp-
nagel's). This consisted of the 2nd and Fusilier Battalions of the
108
78th Regiment, the 1st and 3rd Squadrons of the 9th Dragoons
and a light battery, and was pushed forwai*d on the 15th, from
Vandieres to Noveant. StUlpnageFs Division mounted the plateau
upon the road from Gorze to Vionville before 10 o'clock, hit upon
the enemy's Infantry to the west of the thicket near Vionville,
who were endeavouring to reach tlie edge of the plateau from
Rezonvitle by Flavigny, for the purpose of preventing the Division
from debouching. A vigorous combat was here carried on between
the enemy and General von StOlpnagel, supported by Lynker's
detachment, which ended, after a bayonet fight, in the retreat of
the French upon Rezonville, and a cessation for a short time. At
the same 'time, 10. 15 o'clock, Buddenbrock's Division had also
moved forward, and taken the rising ground in front of Flavigny
and Vionville after a severe fight, and had then wrested the villages
from the enemy in the first assault.
During this engagement, the Artillery Coi*pB had taken up a
position upon the edge of the heights, in front of the road from
Gorze to Vionville, with, their left flank near Flavigny.
As soon as Marshal Bazaine clearly understood the direction
of the attacks of the two German Divisions of the III. Army
Corps, one from the south, the other from the west, he completed
the dispositions afready made, by ordering the Guards to take up
a reserve position before Gravelotte with their front to the south-
west, being especially anxious to secure his left flaflk and fearing
the loss of his line of retreat to Metz. At .the same time he counted
upon Ladmiraulfs Corps coming up to the assistance of the 3rd
Corps, which had been wheeled, in order to come upon the teft
flank of the Germans by Bruville, and at the same time took into
consideration the safety of his right flank, before the arrival of the
3rd Corps in the line of battle, by forming de Forton's Division
in rear of the 6th Corps with its back upon the wood Villers-
aux-Bois. At the same time, the 12 -pounder batteries of the
reserve artillery were drawn forward, in order to oppose the
German artillery in position, facing the 2nd Corps.
General von Ahemleben had to carry on the fight alone,
with his Corps, the two Cavalry Divisions and Lynker's
Detachment against these greatly superior forces^ until 11. 30
109
o'clock^ and then only an inconsiderable reinforcement arrived in
Lehmann^s Detachment at Tronville.
The X. Army Corps, which was the nearest for the support
of the in., was widely distributed over the ground to the south
of the Metz and Verdun road. Lieutenant General von Schwarz-
koppen, commanding the 19th Infanti-y Division, had still for
duty under his immediate command , after deducting Lehmann's
and Lynker's two Detachments, the 38th Infantry Brigade (von
Wedeirs) and two batteries, and had commenced the march from
Thiaucourt, by St. Benoit-en-Vo6vre, upon St. Hilaire at 5 o'clock,
in connection with the^ Dragoon Guards Brigade. The 20th
Infantry Division (Rraatz) and the Artillery Corps were moved off
from Pont-a-Mousson at 4. .30 o'clock. The latter, at Thiaucourt,
was coigmanded to march to the field of battle at 11. 30 o'ch)ck,
and Lieutenant General von Schwai-zkoppen , at St. Hilaire, at
12 o'clock. Colonel Lehmann however, being nearer to the field
of battle, took the road by Cliambley, upon the sound of cannon
becoming audible, and Count Brandenburg II. that from St. Hilaire
with the Dragoon Guards Brigade.
At midday the III. Army Coi*ps held the positions which it
had gained at Flavigny and Vionville, and with the aid of parts
of the 6th Cavalry Division which at 1 o'clock in the afternocm
attacked in the direction of the high road, leaving Flavigny on
the left, successfully repulsed all attempts made by the enemy to
retake Vionville. The French General of Division, Bataille, was
wounded at 12. 30 o'clock, his Division began to yield, and this
movement drew back part of Verge's Division with it, the left
wing of which, together witli Lapasset's Brigade, alone remained in
position. In order to fill up this gap for the moment, Marshal
Bazaine ordered a chai'ge to be made against the enemy's infantry,
by the 3rd Lancers and the Cuirassiera of the Guai*d. The attack
of the Lancers was repulsed, and the Cuirassiers, who charged in
three echellons, were unable to shake the squares. A squadron
uf the Braunschweigschen Hussars from Rheinbaben's Division,
pursued the retiring cavalry as far as a battery of the Guards,
in the midst of which the Marshal himself was standing, so that '
110
he and his Staff had to draw their swords and engage in the fight
with bare weapons.
General von Buddenbrock was now ordered to direct his
further attack so as to able to press forward to the north of
Vionville with the mass of his Division, for the purpose of gaining
ground in the wood situated to the north, whilst liis right wing
held Vionville and Flavigny. The 24th Regiment supported by
the 2nd Battalion of the 91st Regiment (Lehmann's Brigade)
pressed into the wood and carried on a vigorous, obstinate fight,
with varying success.
Fresh troops were again brought forward on the French side.
Picard's Division, the Grenadiers of the 'Guard, under the leader-
ship of General Bourbaki, gathered together Verge's and Bataille's
Divisions, and deployed on both sides of the village of Rezonville,
whilst the left flank was supported by a brigade of Levassor-
Dorval's Division from the 6th Corps. Deligny's Division, Vol-
tigeurs of the Guard, was ordered to go forward as far as the Bois
des Ognons, to occupy it with a Jager Battalion, and to watch
the d^bouch^s by which the plateau of Gravelotte could be
approached.
At the same time Marshal Leboeuf's manoeuvre, which had
been ordered at the beginning of the fight, came into effect upon
the German left flank. The Marshal was on the march to Don-
court with the 3rd Corps, when he received the order to wheel to
the left. After carrying this out his front was towards the south,
and Bnddenbrocks Division was endangered. General von Alvens-
leben had only two battalions of the 20th Regiment, which had
been kept in reserve to the south-west of Vionville, and the 91st
Infantry Regiment which arrived soon after, to oppose to this new
enemy who was observed ascending the plateau to the south of
Bruville. Towards 2 o'clock, these troops were placed at the disposal
of General von Buddenbrock. The 91st Regiment, two battalions
of which were already engaged, was directed upon the western
border of the wood, which lies to the north of Vionville. To this
place it was followed by the 1st Battalion of the 78tli Regiment,
belonging to Lehmann's Brigade. These battalions afterwards
took their share in the heavier fighting which some battalions of
Ill
Baddenbrock^s DivisioB had to sustain to the north of Fion-
ville.
The fight in the wood was at the cost of immense sacrifices,
because the French artillery, composed of batteries brought up from
the reserve artillery, in a strong position to tlie north of the road,
fired very effectively on the wood as well as upon the German
batteries stationed at Vionville. .Buddenbrock*s Division made
assaults against this position of the enemy, which at length,
resulted in driving the batteries from tlieir good position and in
the capture of a gun.
A second position of the enemy's artillery, upon the plateau
more to the east, which endangered General von Buddenbrock's
left flank, in connection with the sniTounding movement, was
attacked by Bredow's Oavalry Brigade, by order of General von
Alvensleben. The ground gained was worth maintaining at
any price.
General von Bredow advanced with the 7th Cuirassiers and
16th Uhlans. Received by a most vigoi*ous fire, the Uhlans
nevertheless broke through the infantry of the right wing of the
6th Corps, and the Cuirassiera forced themselves into the batteries,
cutting down the men serving them. Thus they reached the
second body of the enemy. De Forton's Cavalry Division, how-
ever, threw itself upon their flank, the firat body of infantry closed
up behind them, and they only effected their retreat amid the
greatest losses.
Upon the right wing, Stttlpnagers Division had maintained
its position during this combat, and repulsed all the attacks of
the enemy.
Between 2 and 3 o'clock, the position of both armies
was changed from what it had been at the beginning of the
fighty the French front was no longer towards the west, but
was now directed towards the souths and was continually being
more developed upon the line of Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte;
the left flank of the Gei^nans was always being further
surrounded by the French Corps , although , it is it*ue, they
still victoriously held the positions they had originally taketi
around Vionville and Flavigny^ as well as those places themselves.
112
Marshal Bazaine having observed the sound of cannon from
Bruville at 2 o'clock, had issued orders to Marshal Leboeuf to
hold his positions strongly with Nayral's Division, to re-establish the
connection with the 6th Corps by means of Aymard's Division, and
to direct Montaudon's Division upon Gravelotte, for the purpose of
occupying the d^bouch^s from Ars-sur-Moselle. Bazaine made the
Divisions of the 2nd Corps, which had been repulsed in disorder at
the commencement, but were now again collected, march to the
same point, and also caused 12-pounder batteries and mitrailleuses
to form up in front of the d^bouch^s in order to receive the
enemy's columns energetically, which would endeavour to come up
that way.
This strong occupation was rendered necessary by the
appearance of the 16th Infantry Division of the VIII. Army Corps,
which had arrived in Arry at 12 o'clock noon, had crossed the
Moselle at Nov^ant, and by making a further advance, would
threaten the extreme left flank and re^r of the French army.
In the meantime Ladmirault's Corps had continued its march
as far as the battle field, and his first troops arrived in the line
of battle at 3 o'clock. Greniei'^s Division , led by General Lad-
mirault himself, and supported by de Cissey's Division, at first
strengthened the right wing of the 6th Corps, advanced with it
by St, Marcel and then directed its attack against the wood to
the north of Vionville, which was defended by Buddenbrock's
Division; Clerambault's Division moved forward upon the right,
accompanied by the 2nd Regiment of Chasseurs d*Afrique and a
Brigade of Cavalry of the Guard, Lancers and Dragoons, which
had just escorted the Emperor Napoleon as far as Etain, and had
now returned on hearing the noise of the battle.
This entire force, which by this time consisted of the united
Corps of Leboeuf, Ladmirault and Cam'obert, did not, however,
succeed in driving the III. Army Corps from its position round
Vionville.
^/ 3. 30 o'clock, the Commander in Chief of the 11. At*my^
Prince Fredeinck Charles, arrived upon the field of battle
from Pont-d'Mousson, and reinforcement began, gradually, to
arrive from the X., VIIL and IJC. Corps,
113
Kraatz's Division and the Artillery Corps of the X. Corps
had taken the road from Thiaueourt by Chambley. From here
the batteries of the Artillery Corps hastened forward in the
dtreetion of Tronville, and, at about 3. 30 o'clock, took up a
position to the west of this place, and to the north of the road
from Vionville to Mars-la-Tour, to oppose the columns of Leboeuf s
Corps on the march from Bniville. The leading troops of Kraatz's
Division arrived at Tronville towards 4 o'clock. The Division
engaged in the fight, which was still being vigorously carried on
in the wood to the north of Vionville^ aa the battalions moved
up. Two batteries supported the advandng battalions.
Eight battaUons of Kraatz's Division were engaged here,
three of which remained in reserve with two batteries to the
south of the wood, whilst three battidions and two batteries were
directed to Flavigny upcm their arrival, and from here took part
in the fights of Stttlpnagers Division. Of Schwarzkoppen's Division,
Wedell's Brigade, with which the Division Oeneral was present,
arrived at St. Hilaire at 12 o'clock, and from here went away on
the right, to the battle. Towards 4 o'clock, it came upon Leboeol's
and Ladmirault's Corps at Mars4a-Tour, and attacked them, whilst
the 16th Regiment byMars-la-Tour, and the 1 stand Fusilier Battalions
of the 57th Regiment together with two companies of Pioneers,
leaving Mars-larTour upon the left, went forward against the French
position upon the rising ground to the north- east of that village.
The attack was supported by the two batteries of the Division
which had taken up a position in front of the village.
As soon, however, as the 16th Regiment had passed Mars-
la-Tour, the enemy opened a vigorous bombardment which set
fire to the village. It is true , that the battalions continued to
advance beyond the heights, and over the ground lying to
the north-east, against the hill upon the other side, but there
the onset was broken by strong masses of the enemy's infantry
who encountered them. The retreat had to be commenced,
amid severe losses, under cover of the Artillery Corps of the
X. Corps, which had followed the movements of Wedell's
Brigade and had taken up a position close to Mars^la-Tour, upon
the east.
8
\
114
WedelFs Brigade formed at Tronville, and its falling back
also canBed a retrograde movement in Kraatz's Division. General
von Voigts-Rhetz, commanding the X. Corps, ordered the Division
Commander to return to the heights of Tronville for the reception
of WedeU's Brigade. Connt Brandenburg II. Guard Dragoons
Brigade went forward to release ihe retreating battalions from the
pursuit of the French infantry. During the advance of WedelFs
Brigade it had taken up a position to the north of Mars-la-Tonr,
and after that the 1st Guard Dragoons had been detached to the
right, for the protection of the advancing Artillery Corps.
When WedelFs Brigade was forced to retreat, this regiment
endeavoured to check the pursuit by an attack upon the right
flank of the approaching enemy's infantry. The attack, energe-
tically carried out, was accompanied by heavy losses. The 2nd
Guard Drngoons had also, several times, attacked divisions of
infantry. Further to the left, Rheinbaben's Division with Barby's
Brigade accompanied by the 13th Dragoons and 10th Hussars,
had gone round Mars-la-Tour. Here they came upon the French
Cavalry Brigade of Guards and the 2nd Regiment of the
Chasseurs d'Afrique, and overthrew tiie enemy in a brilliant attack.
Buddenbrock's and StalpnageFs Infantry Divisions had maintained
their positions all through this fight, in spite of the superiority of
the enemy, by extraordinary efforts on the pai*t of the troops, who
had been under fire, uninterruptedly, since the beginning of the
battle, and with heavy losses. When the enemy, after many in-
effectual assaults against the front of these troops, at last attempt-
ed to surround them by pressing forward through the woods to
the south of Reaonville and Gravelotte, he was stopped by paints
of the VIII. and IX. Army Corps which had joined in the fight
late in the afternoon, and whose approach by Nov^nt, had been
learnt by Marshal Bazaine soon after midday.
After the march from Frontigny, Lieutenant General von
Barnekow had made his Division, the 16th, rest for one hour at
Arry (at which place the 11th Infantry Regiment, from the
IX. Army Corps, was attached to him by oixler of Lieutenant
General von Wrangel), until 1 o'clock, and then had arrived with
his leading troops at Gorze, by Nov^ant, at 3. 30 o'clock.
115
From here^ after a communicatioii with Lieutenant General
von Stfllpnagel, three batteries and three squadrons of the 9th
Hussars were brought forward to the field of battle of the
5th Division, whilst Rex's Brigade, consisting of the 72nd
and 40th Infantiy Regiments, in conjunetion with the 11th
Infantry Regiment, were directed by Cote-Mousa, through the St.
Arnould wood, upon Rezonville, for the purpose of attacking the
enemy in flank and rear, in pursuance of the arrangements of the
Commander in Chief.
On account of the thick brushwood these regiments were
ordered to maroh by a road, and their heads only reached the
outskirts of the St. Arnould wood toward 5 o'clock. The 72nd
Regiment was ordered to press forwainl out of the wood, in the
direction of Rezonville, and the 40th Regiment was to be the next
to follow it
The attack of this infantry was made under the greatest
difficulties, caused partly by the rising, wooded country, full
of hollows, and partly by the strong occupatioti of the positions
lying opposite.
As mentioned before, the reserves of the Garde Corps, the
2ud Corps, and a powerful artillery from the Reserve were
formed up, and the deployment from the d^bonch^s had to be
effected whilst opposed to these superior masses. The fight lasted
here until dai*k, without any considerable acquisition of ground
on the side of the Germans, yet it had the great result of
keeping Bazaine in anxiety for his flank and rear, and he,
therefore, could not venture to employ still stronger masses
against StttlpnageFs Division. Towards 7 o'clock in the evening,
this Division had also received some re-infoi*cemeuts from the
IX. Army Corps. At 12. 30 o'clock in the afternoon. Prince
Frederick Charles, on receiving the first reports from the
III. Army Corps, when at Pout - k - Mousson , directed General
von Manstein to cover the right flank of that Corps and
to support it generally as far as his strength would allow.
In consequence of this, the 49th Infantry Brigade, three batteries
and the Ist Cavalry Regiment from the Hessian Division (No. 25),
under the leadership of the Division Commander, Lieutenant
a*
116
General Prince Louis of Hesse, crossed the Moselle at Noy^ant
and moved forward npon 6or2e. Two batteries of Stfllpnagers
Divisiisn were brought out from Gorze, and joined very
efficaciously in the fight, towards evening, upon the right front
of the artillery of the Division. The 49th Infantry Brigade,
which was followed by one battery, was directed through the
Bois des Ognons. In this thick wood the Ist Hessian Infantry
Regiment met with resistance from the enemy, and a persistent fire
fight was carried on there, first with six companies, and later
on, supported by two additional companies and the 2nd Hessian
Infantry Regiment, which only ended with the fall of night
Thus, whilst fresh forces . an*ived j at sunset, in the right centre
and upon the right flank, the left flank and left centre once
again went forward. The Prince Commanding in Chief made
parts of Kraatz's and Buddenbrock*s Divisions advance in a
north-easterly direction, and the Artillery Corps of the HI. Army
Corps in the mean time took up a position still fttrther forward.
Lafont de Villiers' Division, in the French centre, was forced to
give way, the eagle of the 93rd Regiment was captured and a
gun taken. The enemy was compelled to make renewed efforts
and changes of position. Marshal Bazaine stopped the march
of Montaudon's Division upon Gravelotte, and made him return
for the support of Lebceufs Corps; he ordered de Forton's
Cavalry Division, which had retired, to form up afresh at the
wood of Villers, to the north of Rezonville. General Deligny
reinforced his 2nd Brigade by four battalions of Voltigenrs, for
the purpose of supporting and receiving the retiring Grenadiers
of the Guard upon the heights of Rezonville. General Bonrbaki
united all the guns at his disposal in the centre, in one battery
of 54 guns, against the pressing on HI. Army Corps. Vala-
br^gue^s Cavalry Division charged forward from the Rezonville
heights, and wrested the lost eagle and gun from the Germans.
It was towards 8 o'clock when the Prince Commanding in
Chief made the Brigades of the 6tfa Cavalry Division ride on
to the attack in the direction of Rezonville, from Flavigny; it
was here that the Zietensche Hussars, followed by the 16th
Hussars, rode down the French squares. The 5th Cavalry
117
Division also attacked with success, and endeavoured to sniTound
the right wing of the French at Blara^la-Tour. Tliese were the
last actions on this day. Darkness setting in put an end to the
sanguinary battle, (v. the map.)
Both armies bivouacked upon the long contested positions.
The loss of the Germans, amounted to about 17,000 men in
killed and wounded.
This battle, which .had been carried on with marvellous
tenacity and boldness on the Oerman side, resulted in the
frustration of the French plan of operations. Marshal Bazaine's
army was stopped on its march to Verdun; he had lost the
main road to the south, and saw the one to the north strongly
threatened; the organization of the army was so shaken that the
highest auns now attainable were securing the wounded, complet-
ing the ammunition, and holding the line of retreat towards Metz,
a& well as the positions to the west of it. U they were unable
to force the inconsiderable forces which opposed their further
advance upon the 16th, still less could they think it possible
to do so on the following day, for new divisions of the German
corps, advancing between Hets and Verdun, were aiTiving every
hour.
Consequently the single tactical advantages in the battle
of Vionville, which the French can claim, are entirely with-
out significance. The continuation of the .retreat, was alone of
great importance to the Marshal. Even if he had purchased it
at the sacrifice of a Corps, a success would Itave been obtained;
but his having been forced to develope his- whole Army, and in
the evening his possessing less ground than in the morning,
constitute a strategical and tactical i defeat. Nevertheless the
Marshal and France claim the victory, because the iirmy was not
completely thrown back from all its positions.
FIFTH CHAPTER.
The Battle of Gravelotte.
Mai*8hal Bazaine has been so frequently and perseveringly
accused by the French, of ^Hre^ason^ even by men who observed
the phases of the war comparatively with the object, and with the
evident endeavour, to arrive at the truth, that this reproach cannot
be, summarily, passed over.
It is certainly not worth the trouble to try to refute the
opinion of those who represent the Marshal as having been bought
by Prussia : but there are others who cite matters, which in them-
selves are very possible, as the grounds of their severe judgment,
and ascribe ambitious views to the Marshal, which he may very
probably have entertained.
It therefore comes to this, looking at it in a military point of
view, could Bazaine have acted otherwise than he did, in the conduct
of the chief command of the anny of Metz ? The opinions which will
here be considered, make out that Bazaine' s first, most important
step towards the ruin of his army, was not renewing the battle on
the 17th, in order to obtain by force a line of retreat towards
Verdun. They maintain that Bazaine did not wish to expose him-
self to* any defeat, in order that (as soon as he had been set free
from Metz by another army,) he might obtain the regency for him-
self at the head of an unconquered ai*my, and they ground their
accusation upon the possibility of a retreat to Verdun on the 17th
of August. Setting aside the probability, that the General who
should set Bazaine free from Metz would surely be nearer to the
Regency than the liberated Bazaine himself, there is still great
119
doubt whether BMsame's wno^mm^ enpaUe oi repulsing tbe German
army on the 17th«..aad jQiat wQdd-lta»uJMuu»
"What oonoems hb is, that the Corps are l>5>^-i , ^ ^
^^*^y. off for pro-
should set Bazaine "«« "»" «"" -""" "-"' "" u"»rer m tne '
Regency tb»n the liberated Baaiine hlBBelf, there is stUl gre.t
119
doubt whether Bazaine's army was capable of repnlsiog the German
army on the 17th, and that wonld have been necessary, in order
to get to Verdun. A circuitous march by Briey, for instance, would
only have led to a most successful flank attack on the part of the
Germans.
It is true that a more talented General, and one of greater
energy, would probably have made the attempt to defeat the
German army on the nth. But such a general would never, in
the first place, have got himself into such a situation as Bazaine
had. The chances in favour of the French army, had become
essentially worse since the previous day. What was impossible on
the 16th, was still less likely to succeed on the 17th.
The fault, lay in the short comings of the days from the 12th
to the 16th of August. On the 17th, they could no longer be
mended. Thus Bazaine may be called an incapable general, but
none will call him a traitor after a careful and impartial examina-
tion of his situation on the 17th of August. Such an examination
leads one to suppose that Bazaine did not clearly appreciate bis
position, that he had not judged his opponents intentions con*ectly,
that he, perhaps, hoped Mac Mahon would in some way or other
come to his assistance, or that he otherwise deluded himself.
After the battle of Vionville, the Mai'shal informed the Emperor
and the minister of war of the situation of the French army at
Metz, in a dispatch dated the 17th of August; from which he has
published the following extract:
'^It is said to-day that the King of Prussia is in Pange, or
in the castle of Aubigny, that an army of 100,000 men follows
him, besides the numerous masses of troops which have been
seen on the road to Verdun, and at Mont-sous-les-Cotes.
^'What gives a certain probability to this news of the King
of Prussia's arrival, is the circumstance, that at this moment, when
I have the honour of writing to your Majesty, the Prussians are
directing a serious attack against Fort Queuleu. They have
erected batteries at Magny, Mercy-le-Haut and in the wood of
Pouilly; even at this moment the fire is pretty lively.
''What concerns as is, that the Corps are badly off for pro-
120
yisions; I will endeavonr to have some brongfat in by the Ardennes
road, which is still open. General Soleille, who I have sent into
the fortress, informs me that its snpply of ammunition is small,
and thiit it can only fdrnish ns- with 800,000 cartridges, which
is one day's consumption for our soldiers. In the same way and there
is only a small amount of shot for the 4-pounders, at hand,'' —
lastly, he adds that ''the pyrotechnic establishment has not the mdans
necessary lor replenishing the cartridges.
''General Soleille has been obliged to demand from Paris, the
indispensable necessaries for the instant repair of the field tools;
but will they arrive in^ time? .General Frossard's regiments have jko
more camp equipments and cannot eook their provisions. We will
do all we can to make up our stores of every description, so
that we mdy be able to commence our march again in two days,
if possible. I will take the road by Briey. We will lose no
tii^ie, provided that no fresh battle frustrates my plans."
In corroboration of this dispatch, the Marshal writes in his
^* Rapport Sommaire^'i "Conjectures have been made as to
the possibility of having continued the march to Verdun in the
night of the 16th, They are erroneous. Those who formed them
did not know the situation. The enemy received considerable
reinforcements every moment, and had sent out troops to occupy
the position of Fresnes, before Verdun; the French army, which
had been on the march for several days, had just fought two
sanguinary battles, and parts of it were still behind, including the
large army reserve park, which was kept in Toul, and waited for
a favourable opportunity of uniting with the army, which it
did not succeed in doing. The army might have received a very
serious shock, which would have had a disadvantageous influence
upon later operations."
This representation of the French Commander in Chief is in
accordance with the observations, made later, on the German side,
and with the light thrown upon the subject by a series of dis-
patches found in the chd,teau of 8t. Cloud, relative to the defective
equipment of the army in the field and of the fortresses. It is
however contested and maintained on the other hand, that 500
waggons with provisions remained untouched at Plappeville.
121
li ist howevert cerium^ that after ihe battle of Fi&nviUe
the French army could not have carried out its march upon
Ferdun^ even had it been completely supplied with provisions
and ammunitian, and had had the reserve park at its disposal.
The road to Verdun could only have been opened on the
17th of. August by a viotory upon the battle field of the previous
day. The southern road to Verdun, was n6 longer in possession
of the Freneh; the northern road lay so near the German front
th«t) a departure by it was. a manifest impossibility; it would, no
doubt, have been possible for a well equipped army to reach the
road by Btiey, on which Ste. Marie-aux-Ghenes lies ; but to arrive
at Ferdun by it, with the German army against it would cer-
tainly not have succeeded. Mars-la-Tour lies nearer to Verdun
than Briey, and the German army oonld, therefore, have arrived
at Verdun sooner than the French. Besides which, Briey itself
could be reached by the German troops from Hars-la-Tour , by
Jamy, just as soon as by the French from Gravelotte. Briey lies at the
apex of an isosceles triangle, the base of which is formed by the
points Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte.
If therefore the security of the wounded on the French side
had been abandoned, and the army had retired, even on the night
of the 16th, by the road to Briey, there is no doubt tliat an
attack of the German army against Ste. Marie-aux-Chenes on the
17tb, would have burst in upon the middle of the army, retiring
in long ;iarrow columns upon the road, whilst at the same time
a corps, marching by Jarny upon Briey, would have come into
collision with' the heads of this column. A march of the French
by Briey would, consequently, have resulted in their being driven
towards Luxemburg and Belgium, whilst engaging in the most dif-
ficult retreating fights, but Verdun and a junction with Mac Mahon
would have been completely lost.
The situation of the French army would have had this dis-
asterous termination, if it had undertaken the march by Briey, even
supposing, that by extraordinary efforts, a suificiency of provisions
could have been collected and that the numerous wounded, lying
from Mars-la-Tour to Gravelotte, had been completely disregarded;
122
bat all the accounts prove, that the French army was in no way
capable of marching immediately.
Without considering the scarcity of provisions, ammunition
and water, which last the Marshal especially emphasizes, the army
was greatly disorganized by the battle of Vionville, paying no
regard to their corps and divisional oombinations. In order to
meet the unexpected attack upon the left flank, the troops neai*est
to this side had been deployed, and then were supported by the
divisions wheeling one after another, without regard to the order
of battle. The 4th Corps which arrived last, had taken up the
retiring Divisions of the 6th corps. Picard's Division, the gi*enadiers
of the Guard had fought intermixed with Verge's and Bataille*s
Divisions, from Frossard's Corps, to the north of Rezonville. Deligny*s
Division, Voltigeurs of the Guard, fought at last, in the centre, at
Rezonville, intermixed with the left wing of the 6th Corps, whilst
later, part of the Garde Corps, in junction with the divisions of
Frossard's Corps which had retired, carried on a fight in the wood
to the south of Gravelotte. Montaudon's Division had become sepa-
rated from its corps (Leboeuf s) during its engagement at Bruville
and had been sent on towards Gravelotte. In the middle of the
march, at 7 o'clock in the evening, it received a counter order,
and was sent back to Mars-la-Tour, The close, intersected country,
abounding in woods, especially to the north of Vionville and round
Gravelotte, must have transformed this mixture of the divisions into
complete disorder. It was quite impossible to place this army on the
march under cover of the darkness, which lasted from 9 o'clock in
the evening until about 3 o'clock in the morning.
,The Commander in Chief decided to do the only thing which
appeared to him easy, under the circumstances. He endeavoured
to take up a position wliich would offer the greatest possible advant-
ages of ground for the following day's impending battle, and at
the same time devoted his attention to the care of the wounded,
and to completing the supply of ammunition and provisions.
The dispatch quoted above, proves clearly that on the 17th,
the Marshal was ' still in darkness as to the real importance of the
battle of Vionville, and the main object of the German plan of
operations. The conjectured presence of the King at Pange, con-
123
sequently upon the right bank of the Moselle, as well as the con-
straction of batteries in front of Fort Quenleu occupied the French
Direction ; the whole importance of the blow which had been
directed upon the left bank, only appears to have become palpable
to them in tiie battle of Gravelotte. Perhaps no one at the French
head-quarters believed in the possibility of wheeling an army of 200,000
men, 360 degrees, upon a radius of 3 miles*), and in the most
difficult counti*y. They did not believe that the German Direction
would have been capable of this master-work of energy, arrange*
ment and rapidity,' because they would have been unable to carry
it out themselves. The attack at Vionville, on the 16th, was con-
sidered a skilful diversion by a, relatively, small part of the enemy's
forces.
Thus the battle of Gravelotte, this defensive fight on the 1 8th
of August, is only a proof of Bazaioe's incapacity. He fought this
battle, not because it was necessary, but from embarrassment* He
did not know whether to advance or retire, and consequently
remained passive in a well chosen tactical position. If, as he has
been accused of doing, he wished to avoid any opportunity of a
defeat, and to preserve his army for a later occasion, it would
have been simpler to have retired upon Metz, and not to have
fought at all.
The position taken up by the French army, on the 17th of
August, extended from St. Pi*ivat-la-Montagne in the north to Roz^-
rienlles in the south. Thus the only line of retreat by Briey, still
remaining open, was held by the right wing, and at the same time
the position offered advantages for a favourable defence.
The German Direction, on this day, waited for the battle to
be renewed, presuming that the enemy possessed the same quali-
ties as themselves, namely a clear appreciation of the military situa-
tion, and a decisive execution of the measures considered advisable.
In order to reach Verdun, it was necessary that on the 17th, the
French army should renew the attempt to overthrow the German
army, standing in its way. Upon the German side it was impos-
♦) IIV5 English miles.
124
Bible that there could be predse information as to the scarcity of
ammunition and provisions, which prohibited all operations on the
part of the French army. Snch a scarcity could not be imagined
in any army which had just left; the strongest fortress and the
diief place of arms in the country, and was quite incredible.
As early as 4. o'clock, on the morning of the 17th of August,
Prince Frederick Chaiies, who had - returned towards Gorze, in the
evening after the battle, appeared again upon the battle field, and
rode over it, in (Hrder to reconnoitre the positions and movements
of the enemy. The King, whose head-quarters had been removed to
Pont-a-Mousson on the 16th, arrived soon after 6 o'clock, upcm the
heights of Gorze, inspected the field of battle, and meeting the
Prince, took his reports. In the course of the morning the troops
which had bivouacked in their positions of the 16th, the X. and
III. Army Goipd, the cavalry divisions under Duke William and
Rheinbaben, parts of the VIII. Corps and the Hessian Regiments
were joined by the IX. Corps which took up a covered position to the
south of the road from Gorze to Vionville. A strong line of French
tirailleurs advanced against the German lines from Rezonville;
they did not, however, open the expected battle, but were, appa-
rently, intended to conceal the retreat of the corps into the new
position. Cavaliy patrols pushed to the front, soon brought this
departure to tiie knowledge of the King.
The immediate pursuit of th^ enemy with the forces present,
was not in accordance with the plan of operations. A destructive
blow must be given, and therefore the arrival of the remaining
corps must be waited for, before beginning a new battle.
These were approaching by forced marches. The VII. and
VIII. Army Corps, had been ordered to follow immediately after
the IX. over the Moselle, the Garde Corps pursued the direction
of' Mars -la -Tour, the Saxon (XII.) Army Corps even marched
to this place from Pont-^-Mousson, and arrived in the rendez-vous
position shortly after midday, whilst the Guards moved into bivouac
at Mars-la-Tour, near the left of tiie Saxons, at 3 o'clock.
Reconnaissances brought information that the French army
was encamped on the plateaux to the east of Gravelotte, and
was in movement in the neighbourhood of Verneville, whilst their
125
rear guards had passed the road from Doneonrt to Conflans; con-
sequently, there was an end to all expectation of a battle on this day.
In conformity with the leading idea of detamwg the left
wing of the French at Gravelotte^ until the right could bt^
surrounded by the German left mng^ the VII. Army Corps
was directed to try and feel the enemy. General von Zastrow,
therefore took up a position at Ars-sur- Moselle, and along the
road leading from this place to Gravelotte. He pushed foi*ward
the 7th Jager Battalion into the Bois de Vaux, and extended
his line of outposts as far as the plateau to the south of Grave-
lotte, Here it joined the out posts of the VIH. Corps, which
was stationed at Gorze. It could be distinctly seen that the
enemy had brought up several batteries to command the open ground
round -Gravelotte.
The outposts of the second army joined on to those of the
YIII. Army Corps ^ which formed a line from the Bois des
Ognons, passing, south of Rezonville, to the northern edge of the
wood which lies on the noiiih-west of VionvillC; and from there as
far as the Yronbach.
Towards 2 o'clock, the King, upon the height to the south of
Flavigny, directed General von Moltke, the Chief of the Staff, to
issue the following dispositions for the next day:
"The second Army will advance at 5 o'clock to morrow
morning, the 18th, in echellon, between the Yronbach and
the Gorzebach (the chief part between Ville- sur-Yron and
Rezonville). The VIII. Army Corps will conform to this
movement, upon the right flank of the second Army. It
will be the duty of the VII. Army Corps, at the commence-
ment, to secure the movements of the second Army from
any possible attempts made by the enemy on the side of
Metz. Further directions will depend upon the measures
taken by the enemy. Reports for his Majesty the King to
be sent, at first, to the height, south of Flavigny."
From this disposition it is evident that the departure of the
enemy by Briey, was no longer considered possible, although a
battle was expected in the positions in which it actually took place
on the 18th.
126
The King returned towards evening to Pont-k-MousBon, and
Prince Frederick Charles established his head-quarters in Bruxi^res.
No alteration took pla^^e in the situation of affairs until the
•morning of the 18th of August, no disturbances had taken place,
and the Prince issued the following dispositions, in accordance with
the an*angements made by the King on the previous day:
"The second Army will continue the advance to-day, endea-
vouring to force back the enemy from his line of retreat,
and to beat him wherever he may be found.
"The Army will advance in echellon from the left of the
XII. Army Corps, which will march at 5 o'clock, in the
direction of Jarny, the Garde Corps next to it on the right,
in the directidn of Doncourt. The IX. Army Corps will
move off at 6 o'clock, upon the right rear of the Garde
Corps, and march between Rezonville and Yionville, leaving
St. Marcel close on the left in its further advance.
"The VIII. Army Corps will conform to the echellon
movement in the right rear of the IX. Army Corps.
"In the second line, the X. Army Corps, with Rhein-
baben's Cavalry Division, will follow the XII. Army Corps,
the III. Army Corps and Duke William of Mecklenburg's
Cavalfy Division, will follow between the IX. and Garde
Corps.
"The advance is not to be made in columns of march,
but the divisions will move forward disposed in separate
masses. The Commander in Chief will be in front of the head
of III. Army Corps."
In conformity with these dispositions, General von Steinmetz
left the VII. and VIII. Army Corps, in the positions which they
had occupied on the 17th.
The second Army moved off at the time appointed (v. map I.).
The King had left Pont-a-Mousson as early at 4 o'clock in the
morning, and driven towards Gorze, where he mounted his horse
and arrived upon the height of Flavigny at 6 o'clock.
The reports all agreed that the enemy was not departing
towards the north, but had concentrated his principal strength to
127
the west of Metz. Gravelotte was not occupied by biDi, aiid the
rear guards had quitted BruviUe and St Marcel.
Apparently the French army was now in the hopeless situa-
tion, which had been the aim of the German operations. It must<
either fight or retire into the fortress. The exact position that it
had taken up was not, however, known, and tlie advance of the
second Army towards tiie north was provisionally arrested until
dear information upon this point had been obtained.
The IX. Army Corps, took up a position, at 8.30 o'clock, io
the south of the road from Gravelotte to Doncourt, with orders to
reconnoitre towards St. Privat-la-Montagne and AmanvUlers, and
also to establish a connection with the Garde Corps. The latter
was ordered at the same time to halt at Doncourt, the XII. Army
Corps at Jarny, and the X. at Bruville.
Cavalry were pushed forward by Giraumont and Jouaville
upon Coinville, near the road to Briey, upon Ste. Marie-aux-Ch^ues,
and in the direction of the heights of Amanvillers.
Soon after 10 o'clock, the position of the French army was
accurately! ascertained, (v. map I.)
The undulating plateau on the west of the Moselle, with hills
and dales extending in every direction, forms several long ridges
in front of Metz, the occupation of which were favourable for the
French army. Excellent defensive positions w^e formed by this
chain of heights lying, one behind another in front of the fortress,
towards the noii;h-north-west, extending from Malancourt by St. Privat-
la-Montagne, Leipzig, and Moscou, as far as Ara, as well as by
the heights of the Bois de Saulny, and the plateaux of Plappeville
and St. Queutin, lying still nearer to Metz. .Marshal Bazaiue had
occupied the first line, and held his reserves in i^adiness upon the
plateau of Plappeville. His position was very well chosen, and
every thing was done to increase its natural strengtli by artificial
means. The ground lyii^g in front of the heights was for the
most part free and open, so tliat the assailants would have to pass
over a long tract, without protection from the enemy's fire, whilst
the defended positions were provided with cover trenches and gun
emplacements one above another. The villages of St. Pi*ivat-la-
Montague, Ste. Marie-aux-Ch^nes, St. Ail, and Amanvillers as well as
12S
numerous farms, were especially adapted for the support of the
defence along the whole front. The buildings are in general
massive, the roofs covered with tiles, the gardens and partly even
the fields enclosed with walls. All this stonework offered oppor-
tunities for keeping up a rapid fire en nuuse, with the excellmit,
long ranged rifies of the French infantry, whilst under safe cover.
The position was especially well fortified upon the right flank ; the
village of St. Privat, on high ground, with about 100 houses and
farms, formed the principal point d'appui ; here the 6th Oorps was
placed, to which the Guards Grenadier Division was sent, later, as
a reserve. Upon the left flank it joined the 4th Oorps, which,
again, was united with the 3rd; the 2nd corps formed the left
wing, whilst the Guards with the Reserve Artillery, were formed up
upon the plateau of Plappeville. The object of this reserve was
to support the front line, but at the same time to foil any possible
attack against the communications with Metz, by Yaux and St.
Ruffine.
The German corps received orders towards 10 o'clock, to
re-commence their movements. The IX* Corps was to advance to
Vemeville and La Folic, the Garde Oorps to investigate the country
towards Amanvillers and St. Privat, the XII. Oorps was' also to
march towards the road to Briey for the purpose either of stop-
ping the enemy, if by chance be had begun to depart in the direo-
tion of Ste. Mane-aux-Oh^nes, or of attacking his position. The
VII. and VIII. Oorps, were to begin a detaining fight at Grave-
lotte, carrying it on until the left flank could be surrounded.
The II. Army Oorps, which had left Pont-a-Mousson at 2 oVlock
in the morning, was to follow the first Army and the III. and X.
Army Oorps to follow the second Army in the second line.
By these dispositions the fight which wa^ now about to
begin, took the character of a front attack which was to be
brought to a crisis by a pressure upon the right flank of the
French at St. Privat.
In consequence of the nature of the ground, the battle consisted
chiefly in i&fantry and artillery fights for single positions, and
the German artillery was of even greater importance than usual,
for not only did it open the battle by firing for an hour, along
129
the whole line, but It was also frequently obliged to stippoi^t the
infantry, who after having begun to attack the enemy*8 positionB
were unable to approaeh nearer on account of the bverpowering
fire of the concealed French infantry.
The centre of the French Army was attacked first, by the
batteries of the IX. Corps in position upon the heights near Fer-
nevflle-j this was at midday.
The corps was marched upon the farm Caulre, leaving St.
Marcel upon the left, and had established itself in the wood to
the north of liiis place, the Bois de la Cusse, as far as Anoux-
la-Grange , whilst the enemy opened a vigorous fire of shell and
shrapnel, against the advanced troops, fi*om its batteries at Bte.
Mane, St. Privat and Amanvillers.
The situation i*emained the same here, in the centre, until
4 o'clock in the afternoon. Tlie fii'C of the artillery corps of the
IX. Corps, supported by the batteries of the infantry divisions,
endeavoured to shake the enemy; the infantry firmly held the
positions they had occupied, and served as a protection to the
artillery against the assaults which were attempted from time to
time. On the side of the French, a continued concentrated can-
nonade was directed against the artillery and the wood, which
occasioned considerable losses to the Germans. At last, at
4 o'clock, the German side obtained the preponderance of fire
by the arrival of the batteries belonging to the Garde Corps, upon
the left wing.
General von Steinmetz, who was opposed to the left wing
of the French, gave orders for the attack, when the thunder of
cannon sounded across from Verneville, and announced the engage-
ment in the centre. The Artillery of the VII. Corps deployed upon
the heights to the south and east of Gravelotte, and then advanced
under the most vigorous fire of the enemy, as far as the edge of
the plateau, where in the course of about an hour it silenced the
French batteries opposed to it. Goltz's Brigade, which was stationed
at Ars-sur-Moselle for the security of the valley of the Moselle, had
previously been engaged in the fight upon the exti'eme right flank.
It had taken the village of f-'aua; in the Moselle valley and then
stormed the heights of Jvssy^ and kept possession of them. The
130
main body of the infantry of the VII. Corps^ remained provisionally
in a covered position in the wooded valley which separates Grave-
iotte from the farm Point-du-Jour. Simnitaneously with the advance
of the VII. Army Coi*p8, the VIII. Anny Corps commenced to move
forward in an easterly direction from Resonville. It, at first,
deployed a strong force of artillery npon the road in its front,
whilst the 1st Cavalry Division took up a concealed position in rear,
and the infantry advanced to the attack of the wood lying in front?
which was strongly occupied. Here a very sanguinary engage-
ment took place for an hour, in which, owing to the ground being
of such a nature that it was impossible to overlook it, the con-
tending parties fell into complete confusion, so much so that some
parts of the German line which met with the most obstinate resis-
tance, were only able to press slowly forwards, whilst other parts
soon reached the eastern edge, and debouching from- it, even began
the attack upon the further heights and the farm of St, Humbert.
This last was finally taken by storm and mainlined, after repeated
attacks and heavy losses, whilst all efforts to press further forward
up to the edge of the heights failed in consequence of the strongly
occupied cover trenches,, owing to which the infantry fight here
came to a stand. Soon after 3 o'clock, there was a pause in the
fight upon this flank, as the French artillery were silent, and the
Germans could not see any object in their front, for an efficacious
bombardment. General Steinmetz could not help assuming that,
possibly, the enemy was withdrawing, and therefore ordered Hart-
mann's Cavalry Division to cross the defile in front and to follow
the departing enemy, and eventually, to furnish information as to
their new positions. Towards 4 o'clock, therefore, two horse bat-
teries, and the 4th Uhlan Regiment advanced across the defile and
formed up half-right. Now, however, it became evident that the
enemy had not withdrawn, but had only concealed themselves from
the hot artillery fire. The ti'oops which had gone forward, fell
instead into a murderous infantry fire, supported by guns and
mitrailleuses. Numerous killed and wounded marked the road
which these brave troops had taken, nevertheless both batteries
dismounted under the enemy's fire and powerfully replied to it,
whilst the cavalry took up a position in rear for their support.
131
These two batteries held out in their exposed position until far
on in the evening, and were only brought back late by the assistance
of reserve horses sent after them; over half the men and horses
were left upon the spot. Towards 4 o'clock, the artillery upon
the heights of Gravelotte re-opeued fire, the enemy having again
shewn themselves on this advance being made, and with such good
effect that they wei*e deterred from any further attempts; they
also set fire to the farms lying within their range, so that the
troops holding them were driven out, and in their depaiture were
most effectively cannonaded. The thick black clouds from the
burning farms were now added to the smoke of the powder which
rose up from afar all over the field of battle.
In conformity with the dispositions of the Chief Com-
mand y the German right wing ^ thus held the enemy fast
even to the centre, without pressing him too strongly ^ until
the le/t wing was able to surround the French right, on the
other side.
The French, undoubtedly, opposed the execution of this idea
of battle, with gi'eat tenacity and bravery, but without the initiative
of a counter plan, and without success. In general they remained
on the defensive, and submitted to the military situation imposed
upon them by the Geiman side, as had been the case from the
beginning of the war.
It is true they made use of the utmost exertions to contest
the possession of the woods in the centre with their assailants, for
they recognized the importance of this point d*appui to the whole
German order of battle, but their struggles here had the least
prospect of success, because the reserves could have been brought
into use in case of necessity, with the gi^eatest rapidity.
The IX. Army Corps, however, fought the battle alone until
the engagement of the Guards and Saxons.
The French infantry columns advanced, several times, against
the Bois de la Cusse after preparation had been made for the
attack by a fearful cross fire of guns and mitrailleuses. But the
German troops, althouglj terribly weakened by the shots striking
in the wood (the Army Corps lost about 5000 men in this battle),
kept their ground through all the attacks, and drove the French
9*
132
back into their fortafied positions. In the same way the vehement
attacks of the French infantry against tlie Prussian batteries npon
the heights of f^emevfile, were repulsed, and in a pursuit of the
French, who again gave way, the Fusilier battalion of the 85th
Regiment (Holsteiner) reached even as far as the height in front
of the village of AmanviUerSj where, however, it lost half its men
and its commander.
A furious combat was also carried on around the Bois des
Geniveauo) J opposite the farms La Folic and Leipzig. Here
the 18th Division (WrangeVs) was engaged. The enemy had occu-
pied the edge of the wood in force, and had strengthened it with
deep trenches and earth rampaiiis so that the assailants could be
received by a fire en etages, besides which the approach was com-
manded by mitrailleuses. In spite of this a repeated attack was
attempted, wliich although not completely successful, led to the
occupation of the south part of the wood as well as of the farm
Chantrenne,
The severe fighting, in which the IX, Army Corps had been
involved, induced Prince Frederick Charles, who had been present
and had then gone to the Garde Corps, to place the 3rd Garde
Infantry Brigade, with the Garde Schiitzen battalion, and a battery
at the disposal of General von Manstein.
The din of the combat at Verneville, made the Garde
Corps hasten its advance, towards Batilly, which had commenced
at 10.30 o'clock from Doncourt. From Batilly, their march was
directed to the eastward, against the positions of SL Privat,
The line of hills which stretches from Amanvillers by St,
Privat and Boncourt to Malancourtj lias in a northerly direction
with a slight forward bend towards the west. The general height
of the hills at Amanvillers is 1150 feet, at St. Privat 1028, and
at Malancourt 1278 feet The western slope is pretty steep at
the commencement, 6 — 8 degrees, becoming more gradual farther
on, and is divided into different sections by some small descents.
Ste, Marie-auX'Chenes lies upon a projection of the slope which
forms a kind of plateau. A small brook rises in the village, whicli
flows through a valley in a northerly direction, enclosed by steep
133
slopes. Towards the east two small neighbouring valleys open into
mtimatllmaHtdatmmmmink^ at first
r ^ «
«Mt«A t>a\f« ■PSl>* «•«»>«» •»««•> V. r - •
and the Garde Jager Battalion) had arrived
^e to
back into their fortified positions . In the Mme vny the veliemeiit
attacks of 1
MAP I
flowB throiig)) a valley in a northerly direction, encloBed by steep
133
slopes. Towards the east two small neighbouring valleys open into
it. The western dedivity of this pi*ojeetlng plateau sinks at first
in levels, forming several trays and inflections, but afterwards des<
cends with steep sides into the valley as far as the brook of
Habonville. The hamlet of St. Ail lies upon the road to the north
of Habonville half way to Ste. Mai*ie-aux-Chenes, with about 140
inhabitants, consequently about 30 houses aad farms. The village
of Ste. Marie-aux-Ohdnes contained 330 inhabitants and, perhaps, «
60 houses and farms ; it resembled an irregular pentagon, the high
road to MontmMy forming a street through it, from which a second
street branches off at the church in a westerly direction.
The village of St, PHval'la-Montagnej 2500 paces to the
east of Ste. Marie-aux-Chenes, lies a little to the north of the
high road which leads straight from Metz. It has an open square
near the church, and four village streets leading from it. The
little cluster of houses called Jerusalem lies upon the high road.
The village contains 480 inhabitants with about 100 houses and
farms; there is a thicket upon the ridge of the heights to the
west of the valley, through which the brook flows which rises at
Habonville, and to the south of it is the village of Batilly numbenng
about 200 inhabitants. The French artillery, in position at the
foot of the steep slope of St. Privat together with the infantry in
the gardens and buildings of Ste. Marie-aux-Ch^nes, held the country
under fire as far as the edge of the valley.
This uncommonly difficult section of the great battle field,
most skilfully prepared for defence, was the object of the opera-
tions of the Garde Corps and the Saxons.
The Garde Corps commenced the combat, first of all, at
midday.
The advanced guard of the 1st Garde Infantry Division, the
Garde Fusilier Kegiment, advanced with loud hunahs and made
themselves masters of the thicket, on the edge of the brook at
Habonville, and of the village of St. AiU ^t the first assault.
Shortly before midday, the 1st Garde Infantry Division (the 1st
and 3rd, 2nd and 4th Foot Guards, the Garde Fusilier Regiment,
and the Garde Jager Battalion) had arrived in the little ravine to
134
the west of St. Ail. The whole of the artillery corps opened, simul-
taneously, a vigorous fire upon the commanding position of St, PnvaL
During this attack, and throughout, no cover was to be obtained.
A murderous fire was conducted by the infantry, who were
almost invisible to the Germans, from the massive buildings and
from behind the stone walls, in conjunction with the artillery in
emplacements.
An infantry advance at this place was, for a time, not to be
thought of.
The General Commanding, Prince Augustus of Wuiiiemberg,
ordered the fight to be carried on solely by the artillery, in order
to shake the enemy's position, and to wait for the arrival of the
2nd Garde Infantiy Division and the Saxons.
Major General Prince Hohenlohe, Commander of the Artillery,
who had already had nine batteries in position, firing since 1
o'clock, and afterwards brought two more horse batteries into line,
and later three batteries of Budritzky's Garde Division, now
selected a new position nearer to that of the enemy, and
carried out the task entrusted to him with heroic endurance.
At 2.30 o'clock, the Commander in Chief of the second Army,
Prince Frederick Cliarles, who, had been upon the hill to the west
of Habonville since 2 o'clock, received the report from the Crown
Prince of Saxony that the XU. Corps was advancing to the attack
upon Ste, Marie with the 24th Infantry Division, and with the 23 rd
Infantry Division, was on the point of surrounding the right flank of
the French by Coinville, and the small wood situated between that
place and Roncourt.
At this time several batteries of the Saxon Corps were in posi-
tion to the west of Ste. Marie, and directed their fire against this
village, which was still occupied by the enemy.
The 47th Infantry Brigade, Colonel von Leonhardi, deployed
in a north-westerly direction for an attack upon this place, and at the
same time the advanced guard of Pape's Garde Division was on the
march against the village from St. Ail.
After a short fight Ste. Marie was taken.
The Saxon Artillery Corps now moved forward into a new
position to the north of the village, against St, Privat and Roncourt,
135
The Garde Artillery, in position between St. Ail and Habon-
ville, had meanwhile silenced the enemy's artillery by their eflPec-
tive fire, so that at 4 o'clock, Prince Hohenlohe was enabled to
bring up the whole mass of his fouiiieen batteries, in echellon,
nearer to St. Privat.
The artillery of the IX. Corps had also silenced the enemy's
artillery at Montigny and Amanvillers, but had suffered consider-
able losses, and fifteen guns were hors de combaL Here the farm
of Champenoisj was taken by the Hessian Jager Battalion, and
Wrangel's Division held the captured Chantrenne, Verneville, and
the Bois de la Cusse, against all attacks of the enemy.
Of the 25th Division, Prince Louis of Hesse's, the 49th Bri-
gade was stationed in the Bois de la Cusse, the 50th Brigade was
in resei*ve between this wood and the Bois Deseuillons, with the
Hessian Cavalry Brigade near it.
Of the reserves of the second Anny, the HI. Army Corps ar-
rived at Verneville at 3 o'clock, and the X. Corps at Batilly at
2 o'clock. The former made the Artillery Corps take up a posi-
tion between Verneville and the Bois des Genivaux, whilst the
latter halted.
The Saxoji Army Corps^ had a very long . distance to
march, and only reached the line between Ste. Marie and Joeuf
at 5 o'clock.
The advanced hour of the day did not allow time to wait
for the execution of the movement which had been begun against
Roncourt by Montois ; instead, it appeared necessary to bring on a
crisis now with the Gai*de Corps, whose infantry was still waiting
for the order to attack. The departure of the whole army ap-
peared to be commencing, as large bodies of the French were
already moving between St. Privat and Roncourt, and dusk coming
on would have aided the enemy in so doing.
Prince Augvstus of fVurtemberg therefore gave orders at
5 o'clock^ for the attack upon St. Privat.
The 4th Garde Infantry Brigade (the Regiments Franz and
Augusta) first received this order. They deployed and advanced
up the edge of the height for the assault, the artillery fire with
136
their iitinogt efforts only masking them slightly. The enemy offered
the most tenacious resistance, unseen by the storming Grenadiers,
they opened such a fearful, rapid, long-ranged fire, from their
secure positions behind houses, walls, and from ti*enches, that in
a few minutes the attacking troops suffered most tremendous losses,
especially in officer^. The. two regiments, nevertheless, pressed
forwai*d iiTcsistibly.
In the meanwhile, the 1st Garde Infantry Division had also
deployed, and a quarter of an hour later, engaged in the fight upon
the left flank of the Garde Infantry Brigade, whilst their advanced
guard still firmly held the village of St. Marie-anx-Chenes, which
had been ipreviously taken in the course of the afternoon. The
Garde Fusilier Regiment was, however, soon brought forward in
order to render additional support to the left wing. The 1st
Garde Infantry Brigade, under the command of Major General von
Kessel (the 1st and 3rd Regiments of Foot Guards), and the 1st
Company of the Garde Pioneers advanced upon the left flank,
whilst close to them upon the rigfit, the whole of the 2nd Garde
Infantry Brigade, (2nd and 4th Foot Guards) under the command
of Major General Baron von Medem, stormed St. Privat. The
Generals and the Staff remained on horseback at the head of their
troops, 1>nt in a shoii; time all their horses were shot under them.
For about 1500 paces in circumference, the ground and all the
troops were overwhelmed by . a regular hail storm of bullets.
The crash of the explosions drowned all words of command, the
smoke of the powder together with the concealment of the enemy
prevented the asfiailants from taking any aim and deprived them of
the power of making use of their fire arms.
The General Commanding who had been present during the
first part of the fight near the artillery corps, and at the beginning
of the infantry attack had gone along the ' front of the 4th Garde
Infantry Brigade to the western exit from Ste. Marie, could observe
from here, how severe were the losses already suffered, and decided
to check the further onset of the resolute Guards still pressing
forward, until the engagement of the Saxons could take effect. He
commanded that every thing should stop. General von Pape, the
Divisional General, at this moment's pause, hurried along the front
137
of the troopfi to encourage them ; in this ride he lost two aides-de-
eamp, and twice his horse waA shot under him. The loss of the
Guards in officers and men was enormous.
The artillery now carried on the figiit aione, with admirable
enduranoe, although themselves under the infantry fire. St. Privat
began to burn at several points, but the French, nevertheless, main-
tained their positions with courage and resolution, and their fire
was not in the least diminished.
The Saxon Artillery were, at first, formed up upon the left
fiank of the Guards, and had opened fire against the enemy, at a
great distance, between St. Privat and Roncourt. The Saxon 3rd
Infantry Brigade (Regiments 104 and 105) had then taken Ste.
Marie -aux- Chines ^ in conjunction with the 1st Prussian Garde
Brigade.
The XII. Army Corps thus obtained a firm point d'appui for
its wheel to the right. It had continued its mov^ement upon Ron-
court. When the Artillery corps, endeavoured to take up a
position against this place, such a hot fire was opened from the
walls of the fields, and from the wood which projects between
Malancourt and Roncourt, that it was necessary in the first instance,
to take the wood.
The 7th Infantry Regiment No. 106, attacked the outskirts,
although the greater part of it had been detached for other objects,
and took the wood with heavy losses, which it maintained with
the assistance of the 2nd Jager Battalion and other I'cinforcements
who had taken Malancourt, Thus the country was free and
sixteen batteries were immediately deployed against the French
right flank.
' The French adhered to their positions with the most te-
nacious energy, but all resistance was in vain against the power-
ful fire of the Saxon Artillery, carried on with the greatest cer-
tainty and calmness.
At 6.30 o'clock, the Saxon Grenadier Brigade advanced^ and
a quarter of an hour later, Roncourt was taken. At the same
time the Prussian Guards, who had got breathing time daring the
Saxon attack, again renewed their powerful asaault againgt St,
138
Private in which they were supported by the Saxon 45th Infantry
Brigade, Major General von Craushaar's, and the batteries of the
23rd Division, Prince George of Saxony's. The Artillery and
Kraatz's Division belonging to the X. Army Corps, were also
moved forward from Batilly for the decisive blow. The Prussians
on the south-west, pressed into the fortress-like village, every
house of which was defended with exasperation, some what earlier than
the Saxons on the north. The village was gained after a most
desperate struggle. The enemy fled in the direction of Metz, pur-
sued by some of the Garde Battalion)^. General von Cranshaar had
fallen in the battle.
Thus, was the fig hi upon this wing decided at 7 o'clock.
The French Army was in consequence cut off from all possi-
bility of escape.
But upon the German right wing, the fight still wavered,
and in the centre the battle had also come to a stand. When
General von Manstein observed the attack of the Guards upon his
left flank, soon after 5 o'clock, he ordered the Infantry to break
forward towards Amanvillers from the Bois de la Cusse; the 3rd
Garde Infantry Brigade, which had been placed at his disposal,
was directed to go forward to the south of the little wood.
Here also, the troops were obliged to advance over quite open
ground, and they suffered the severest losses. They only suc-
ceeded in gaining ground upon the left wing, and were able to
occupy the heights to the west of Amanvillers, whilst upon the
right wing, General von Blumenthal had to be satisfied with main
taining his position at Chantrenne.
. The Artillery Corps only of the III. Army Corps, stationed
between Verneville and the Bois des Geuivaux, with a further
reinforcement of ten batteries, had been engaged in this fight.
The first Army had a difficult position at Gravelotte, as the Po-
meranian Army Corps which was appointed to reinforce it was still
unable to draw near. At 7 o'clock, when the victory inclined to the
German side on the other wing, by the capture of St. Privat, the
French here made a vigorous onslaught. Strong columns, with dense
and numerous swarms of Tirailleurs in front, amid wild cries
and incessant firing, came out at full speed from behind the
139
heights of RozerieuUes, poured into the valley of the Bois
de Vaux and the Bois des Ognons, and endeavoured to storm
up the other side of the slope towards Gravelotte. The Prussian
battalions, reduced by heavy losses, were overcome in the ravine,
and there was great danger lest the Oerman line of battle,
at this place, should be broken through. The artillery, how-
ever, firing over the heads of the infantry, from the heights
of Gravelotte, had already severely shaken the French columns
as they came Jdown, and the obstinacy of the infantry in the
valley brought them to a staiid, and then caused them to yield.
Nevertheless the situatiop was very serious, and the arrival
of the Pomeranians was impatiently looked for. The French attack
might be renewed at any moment, and the troops were fatigued
by the long struggle.
The King himself with his suite, had repaired to the critical
point, and remained at Gravelotte exposed to the shell fircj whilst
General von Moltke rode to meet the II. Corps.
At last the first columns appeared with General v. Fransecky
at their head; General von Moltke drew his sword and led the
troops himself to the critical spot.
In spite of the long march of 6 miles*) which they had ac-
complished, the Pomeranians engaged with the greatest energy.
The French were thrown back from one position to another,
the wood and the villages were taken from them with the bayonet,
the heights of Rozerieulles were occupied and, the battle was
decided upon this wing also.
The I. Army Corps , which occupied, a position upon . the
right bank of the Moselle, to the east of Metz had also a share in
this great battle. Zychlinisky's Brigade with a battery and a squadron
was moved forward along the right bank in the direction of f^aua:.
The battery came into position upon the noi*them edge of the height
lying opposite to Vaux, and fired upon the enemy's artillery at
Sey, under Mont St, Qucntin. The infantry were shelled from
*) 23 Englisch miles.
140
this fort and obliged to take up a covered positioo. This diversion
of the Brigade made it impossible for the enemy to make any
attempts to break through with single divisions towards the
south; he was, on the contrary^ obliged to retain I'eserves at
Plappeville, which he would otherwise have employed in the first
line, for fear of an attack being made in his rear.
The battle was over, and darkness setting in put an end to
the pursuit.
Thus the chief nucleus of the . French active forces was cut
off from all its communications, and constrained to retreat upon the
fortress ; it was brought uito a situation from which there was but
one escape^ — capitulation.
The eight German Army Corps which fought at Gravelotte,
still amounted altogether to about 230,000 men, after the losses
they had suatained from the 6th to the 18th of August. Reckoning
the loss of the French ' in the battles of Goureelles and VionvlUe,
at 20,000 men, the French Army at Gravelotte was 180,000
strong. The loss of the Germans in killed and wounded exceeded
20,000 men. The French loss is not known, but it appears to
have been smaller. As at Goureelles and Vionville, the French
had fought with the advantage in positions and with a superior
infantry rifle, but had retired when these positions were stormed
by the Germans coming up in the open. It was at this moment
that they sustained the greatest loss , but it did not last long as
the darkness prevented a lengthened pursuit. At the capitulation
of Metz the strength of the French Army, including the sick
and wounded, whose numbers must have increased considerably
between the 18th of August and the 28th of October, was still
stated at 173,000 men, in which the garrison of Metz is, doubtless,
reckoned. Very few prisoners were made, no colours or eagles
fell into the hands of the victors, for the fortress was too near
at hand as a city of refuge for the defeated Army.
The resistance made by the French Army had been most
desperate, as soon as they perceived that not only their honour
was concerned but the only road of escape was endangered. An
appreciation of the situation had electi*ified even the individual
141
soldiers and bearing in mind their high M^arlike renown, the Army
had accomplished the utmost in courage and tenacity.
Bat the German wan*ior also knew what was at stake; he
knew it sooner and better than the French. Seldom in the events
of war are the end and means so clearly manifest as in this
battle, and seldom is the logic of the Army Direction so evident
and intelligible to each of tlte combatants as was the case
in the surrounding of Metz.
The. pr^ze of this victory had the prodigious result, that the
principal Army of the enemy could be invested in the strongest
fortress in the land, under such circumstances, that the powerful
means of resistance of the enclosed enemy, were not only unable
to render mutual suppoH but, on the contrary, mutually paralysed
each other. In this respect the investment of Metz, which com-
menced immediately after the battle of Gravelotte, is a remark-
able and interesting event.
The fortress is so strong in itself, that with a garrison of
20,000 men and well provisioned, it might have been able to
offer an incalculably long resistance. Bazaine's Army was still
sufficiently large and fit for battle, to render important service in
the open field. As soon, however, as this army was enclosed in
a narrow space, with small d^bouch^s, and its destiny insolubly
bound up with that of the fortress, its excessive numbers were an
injury to the fortress, and the fortress itself was unable to employ
tliem. On the one hand, the great mass of men and horses
consumed <all the provisions and necessaries of life in a much
shorter time than the defence required, and on the other hand,
the army was unable to develope quickly enough to make a
successful attempt to break through. Thus the size of the army
diminished the power of resistance of the fortress, and* the fortress,
from its excellent situation in the centre of hills crowned with
forts, hindered the development of the strength of the army.
The strength of both when united must come to ruin.
Before the beginning of the battle, the Saxon Army Corps
had, already, received oi*dei*s to intercept the communications
between Metz and Thionville, this instruction was repeated in the
evening, v/liilst attention was drawn to the importance of the point
142
of Woippy. On the evening of the 18th, the Saxon Cavalry
succeeded in tearing up the railroad between the two fortresses.
In the following days the investment of Metz was completely
effected, and in the closest manner. The German Army encamped
round the outer-foiiB in a large circle, and carefully entrenched
itself at all points where an attack from the enemy might be
expected, or an attempt made to break through.
SIXTH CHAPTER.
Sixth The Capitulation of Sedan.
After the battle of Gravelottd, the capture of Metz was not
tlie only aim of importance, bnt the pLan of operations against
Paris had also to be pursued.
For the latter object, three Corps were separated from what
had hitheiiio been the first and second Armies, the Garde Corps,
the IV. and the XII. Corps, and together with the 5th and 6th
Cavalry Divisions were formed into a fourth Army, and placed
under the command of the Crown Prince of Saxony. This army
was to operate in combination with the third Army, whilst the
remauiing eight Army Corps, reinforced by Rummer's Reserve
Division, with the 1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions, and the 3rd
Reserve Cavalry Brigade,, remained behind as the investing Army
of Metz, under the chief command of Prince Frederick Charles.
During the battles near Metz, tlie Army of the Crown Prince
of Prussia, which by this time, had been joined by the VI. Army
Corps (General von Tfimpling), had covered the operations of the
first and second Armies, against any possible disturbance on the
part of Marshal Mac Msihon's Army, and after the battle of
Gravelotte had commenced its march upon Paris, in which it would
be opposed in all probability, by Mac Mahon.
On the 17th of August, the Crown Prince's head-quarters
were removed from Luneville to Nancy, the advanced guard,
Prince Albert of Prussia's Cavalry Division, had passed the Meuse
on the 16th, the infantry of the V. and XI. Army Corps had
144
moved forward towards this river on the 17th, and on the 19th
and 20th the wliole of the third Army had eroBsed, after having
first rested on the day of the battle of Gravelotte. The march
was continued on Bar-le-Duc.
On the 20th, the Crown Prince left Nancy for the chief head-
quarters, for a conference with the King, his father; on the 21st
he removed his head-quarters to Vaucouleurs.
An Army having been collected at Chd.lons, under Mac Mahon,
this place became the next object of operations, and the fortress of
Toulj upon the direct line to ii, was a considerable obstacle. Toul
had refused a summons to surrender, and defeated an attack by
a detachment of the IV. Army Corps on the 16th of August, after
which it was watched by a brigade of the II. Bavarian Corps.
From Vaueouleurs, the head-quarters of the third Army were
moved, on the 23rd, to Ligny.
The Army of the Crown Prince of Saxony, likewise, began
the advance against Obd^lons, and left the neighbourhood of Metz
on the 22nd of August. Like the third Army, its charge was to
seek out Mac Mahon, and it marched by the very roads to Verdtm
which Baeaiue had in vain endeavoured to make use of. Against
this fortress, an attach by surprise Was attempted on the 23rd,
which, however, was unsuccessful. The Saxon Army Corps advanced
towards Verdun, the 23rd Infantry Division taking the road by
Etain, the 24th Infantry Division and the Artillery Corps taking
tliat by Fresnes. The advanced guard of the 23rd Division, the
Schfltzen Regiment No. 108, gained possession of the Faubourg-
le-Pan^ with great bravery, and kept possession of it in spite of
the fire ft'om the works, whilst the artillei*y vigorously bombarded
the fortifications and the town itself.
Verdun was, however, prepared for defence, sufficiently gar-
risoned, ^nd showed guns of heavy calibre. Tlie summons was
most decidedly refused, and tlie XII. Corps gave up the attack,
which could only have been suceesssfnl tlirough a surprise, and
crossed the Meuse i^ve and beloM^ Verdun, leaving the 47th
In^ntry Brigade to watch tlie forti'ess.
Oil the 25th of August the fourth Army had advanced as far
as Clennont-en-Argoune, and the head-quarters of the third Army
145
had already been established at Bar-le-Duc on the 24th. Had the
French Army been atiU in the camp of Ghalons, it would have
been attacked on two sides by these two Armies^ the chief command
being held by the Kmg himself. Bnt on the 23ih1 of August, the
snrpristog announcement that Mac Hahon had evacuated Cli&lons,
reached the head^qoarters of the third Army in Ligny. The King
had arrived this day in Ligny, and in the evening his head-quarters
were removed to Bar-le-Duc The German Army Direction was in
complete ignorance of the line taken by the French Army, and
various possibilities were discussed between von Moltke and von
Biumentlial, the two Chiefs of the Staff. It was thought most
probable, that Mac. Mahon considered his army incapable of
defending the position of Clarions and liad retired towards Paris, in
order to gain an advantageous position or in other respects more
favourable conditions and prospects for a great battle.
Both armies were, therefore, provisionally to continue the
advance on their previous lines of march.
As it turned out the French Army was destined for an
opemtion, which the German Army Direction could not foresee.
Although it must always remain a matter of astonishment,
that the feeling between the German armies and Mac Mahon's army
was so completely lost, it must on the other hand, be acknow-
ledged as an admirable performance in Fr^ncli railway manage-
ment, that this large army could be united in ChMons and convey-
ed from there with such rapidity.
Whilst the battles were taking place before Metz Marshal
Mac Mahon had united in the camp of Chdions, the remains of
his army beaten at Woerth, with the 5th Corps which had retired
from Bitsch, and the 7th Corps which was stationed at Belfort at
the beginning of the war, and there also the 12th Corps had been
newly formed.
The 1st, 5th and 7th Corps had again nearly attained the
strength which they had at the beginning of the war ; the regiments
had been made up to their complements by numerous drafts of
young soldiers of the reserve, and of the second category of the
contingeiri; as well as by the recruits of 1869.
10
146
The 7th Corps had, it is true, only one brigade of cavalry,
the other having remained in Lyons, as prevlonsly mentioned.
The 12tk Corps was composed of 1 Division of Infantry of
the Line (the lour Line Regiments which had been on the Spanish
frontier); 1 Division, consisting of 3 Line Regiments and 4 Regi-
ments de marche, and 1 Division of Marine Infantry, 12,000 men
in strength. F^n^lon's Cavalry Division and 15 Batteries of
Artillery were allotted to the Corps in addition.
The Corps was consequently, entirely composed of regular
troops; the Garde Mobile Division, which was also in the camp
of Chalons at the commencement of the war, had been sent to
Paris under the command of General Trochu^
ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE TWELFTH FRENCH CORPS.
Commander in Chief: General of Division Lebrun. Chief of the Staff:
Brigade General Grelej.
DIVISIONS.
BRIGADES.
REGIMENTS.
1st Inf. Div.
General
tst Brig. Gen. Cambriels.
Jager Marche Battalion. —
22nd and 34th R.of the Line.
Grandchamp.
2nd Inf. Div.
. General
Lacretelle.
3rd (Marine) Inf. Div.
General
de Wassoigne.
Cav. Div.
General F^nelon.
2nd Brig. Gen. de ViUeneuve. 58th and 79th R.of the Line.
1st Brig. Gen. Bernier.
14th, 20th and 30th R. of
the Line.
2nd Brig. Gen. Marquisan.
2nd and 4th B. de Marche.
1st Brig. Gen. Reboul.
1st and 2nd R. of Marine
Infantry.
2nd Brig. Gen. Martin des
Pailli^res.
3rd and 4th R. of Marine
Infantry.
1st Brig. Gen. Savaresse.
1st and 7th R. of Lancers.
2nd Brig. Gen. de B^ville. 5th and 6th R.of Cuirassiers.
In addition to this a new Reserve Cavalry Division was
formed and allotted to Marshal Mac Mahon's army^ which was
composed as follows:
DIVISIONS. ' BRIGADES.
REGIMENTS.
lat Reserve Cav. Div.
Brigade General
Margueritte.
1
1st Brig. Gen. Tilliard.
1st R. of Hussars and 6th
R. of Chasseurs.
2nd Brig. Gen. Margueritte.
1st, 3rd and 4th R. of
Chasseurs d'Afrique.
147
In these distributionB it is to be remarked,
iBt) tliat Bemier's Brigade of the 2Dd Infantry Division
originally belonged to the 6th Corps, and was cut off from it at
Frouard by the surrounding of the second German Army. It had
gone to Chalons.
2ndly) that the Regiments of F^n^lon'^ Cavalry Division and
of Tilliai*d's Brigade of -Margueritte's Resei*ve Cavalry Division,
likewise belonged to the 6th Corps, but had remained behind on
the departm*e of this corps to Metz, and at a later period they
were not able to reach it.
. 3rdly) that the 1st and 3rd Regiments of Chasseurs d'Afrique
had belonged to the Emperor's escort on the 16tli of August, and
had not been sent back to Metz.
The Marshal's Army thus consisted of 4 Corps and 2 Reserve
Cavalry Divisions (Margueritte's newly formed Division, and Bonne-
main's Division which had been placed under the Marshal sinc^
Woerth).
The 1st Corps, Dncrot, numbered 40,000 men,
„ 5th „ de Pailly, „ 25,000 „
„ 7th „ Douay, „ 30,000 „
^ 12th ^ Lebrun, ^ 45,000 ^
Total: 140,000 men.
This Army had over 400 guns.
The employment of this active force formed, however, a
point of dispute between the political parties, and public opinion
was more considered than the rules of strategy.
Although the Emperor Napoleon had been with this army
since the 18th of August, and was still the Head of the State,
yet the war minister in Pai*is, Cousin Montauban, Count Palikao,
gave the final word, and it waa decided, after much wavering, that
the Mai*shal should turn northwards, in order to reach Metz by a
wide circuit, supported by tlie fortresses lying on the Belgian
frontier, and relieve Bazaine.
Success alone could rescue this plan from the reproach of
madness.
This army was at the same time, the only one which Fi*ance
10 «
148
could for the mom^iit place in the field^ and half its importance
lay in being the main support of the fortresB of Paris in offering
a long resistance 7 but then the connection of the army with
Paris was given up, and still the aimy in itself was quite
incapable of caiTying out such a plan. For this, thoroughly
disciplined and hardened troops would be necessary, who were
very mobile and capable of marching, and the army was deficient
in all these qualifications. Added to wfaieli the attempt was to be
made in the face of an enemy who was superior in every respect.
Never, perhaps, has a plan of operations been undertaken with
less prospect of sucoess.
The Gardes Mobiles, who had shewn themselves very mutinous
and unmanageable, had, as mentioned above, been sent back from
Chalons to the camps of St. Maur and Vincennes ; the army which
was aet ip motion from Chalons, on the 21st of August, towards
Rheims is described in a French pftblication*), in the following
manner.
"The 1st Corp^ formed for the chief part from the African
Regiments, h£j.d given proof of heroic valour at Froscbweiler, which
could only be overoome by the overwhelming numerical superiority
of the enemy. These troops, greatly affeeted by the defeat, and
by the crushing effects of the Prussian Artillery, carried away
from the battle field bad tendencies^ which were still more aggravated
by the long, incessant marches, and matenal privations on tlie
retreat to Chltlons. Marshal Mac Mahon did not deceive himself
on this point and was aware that before bringing them again
under fire, it would have been wise to have giv6n them time for
repose, and to restore steadiness. ' They were our oldest troops,
BuiTOunded with the renown which rightly belongs to our African
soldiers, and they had amply justified it. The spectacle of their
discouragement before the rest of the army, was therefore doubly
to be feared.
"The 5th Corps, particularly, had already auffered from the
effects. Exhausted, also, by the precipitate marches which it had
made from Bitsch across the Vosges, by Neuf-Ch^teau and la
*) **De8 causes qui ont amen^ la capitulation de Sedan," ascribed to
Napoleon III.
149
Haute^Marne to the oamp of OfaalooBy having lost without fighting,
a portion of its ms^rial and nearly all its baggage^ the 5th Corps
presented an aspect of lassitude and disoi^anisation sufficient to
oause graye uneasiness.
^^The 7th Corps, whose late organization was scarcely yet
completed, had it is true, not passed through the 9ame trials as
the two pi*ecediug Corps; but owing to the long retreating march
which it had made from Belfort, through Paris, to the camp of
Chalons, it did not present that solidity which eould have been
desired.
""As to the 12th Corps which had been quite recently created,
it contained elements of valour in great variety. The 1st Division
was composed of new regiments upon which one had raison to
depend; the 2Bd was composed of four regiments de marche,
formed from fourth battalions with incomplete cadres, and of soldiers
who had never fired a shot.
^Laatly^ the 3rd Division was composed of four i*egimonts of
marine infantry, who behaved bravely at Sedan, but who being
little accustomed to long marches, cov^:^d the road with stragglers.
— Such were the troops on whom was imposed the execution of
the boldest and most difficult plan of the campaign.^'
The observations on the German side in the further course
of the war have confirmed the above mtidsm, with the exceptions
of the eajoleries with which it is gamislmd.
When first it Was ordered from Paris that Marshal Mac Mahon
should attempt to reach Mets^ he deol«red that he could not
expose his troops to this danger, representing the imprudence
of such a hopeless endeavour, and, as he considered the position
at Chalons untenable, he led his Army to Rheims on the
21st. From here he could fepulse toy enemy advancing towards
Paris, both on the side of Paris and also on that of Soissons, by
a flank position.
The Emperor accompanied the Army to Rheims.
The command for the relief of Metz was, however, repeated
from Paris , and the • Marshal forfeited his renown as an able
Commander, by obeying this order.
Consequently^ on the 2^rd the Army ayam moved off
150
from Rheims^ and proceeded in a north -easterly direction.
The march should have heen carried out with great rapidity, for
speed was the first condition of success, but hardly had a day's
march been accomplished and the army formed up on the Saippe,
in Bethniville, when the difficulty of provisioning forced the
Marshal to approach the line of railway. He made his left wing
carry out a movement, and on the 24:th arrived in Rethel in
order to provide his troops with the means of subsistance for
several days. The distribution of these occupied the whole kA the
25th of August.
From Rethely the head-quarters were removed to Tour-
teron.
Here the Prince Imperial was sent away from the head-
qnartera, on account of the great dangers of the expedition, and
was conducted to M^zi^res, whilst the Emperor perseveringly
followed the army.
On the 27th the Army arrived at Ch^e-populeux\ On
this day the advanced troops of de Failly's and Douay^s Corps
encountered the advanced troops of the Crown Prince of Saxony;
a cavaby fight at Busancy ensued.
By this time it must have been clear to the Marshal that
his undertaking would fail, and that he must give up his base
of operations, for to make a flank march in the face of the numeri-
cally stronger Germans would, naturally, be tempting the enemy
to attack him upon his right flank, without his having a prospect
of reaching Metz. There was absolutely no chance of being able
to appear unexpectedly at Metz, for he had already met with
resistance from that ai*my which he ought to have got round
unobserved.
The Army of the Crown Prince of Saxony had still
continued its march against Chdlons on the 25^A, although the
cavalry Divisions, moving in front, had brought the information
that Chlllons was found to be unoccupied. Taking into consider-
ation the possibility of Mac Mahon's reaching Metz along the
Belgian frontier, although it was not thought probable, the
destruction of the railway between M^zi^res and Tihonville, by a
party sent out to the side for that purpose, was not neglected.
161
On this day the Army of the Crown Prince of PruBsia took
the little fortress of Fitry le FranpatSy without resistance from
the garrison, an important point for the connection between Nancy
and Paris^ as the fortress barred the passage across the Marne
and the railroad. The King's head-quarters were established in
Commercy.
Perhaps, as it is maintained through the indiscretion of a
French newspaper, or more probably earlier still by means of
reconnaissances, the new, unexpected direction in which the French
army had marched was now learnt, and the order was issued
to both armies, during the night of the 26 th^ that each n>as
to wheel at once, independently y to the rights to advance m
a northerly direction y and intercept the enemy on his way
to Met».
The third Army commenced this movement from Vitry^
by St. Mhiehould and Suippes, on the 26/A, the Mouse Army
(fourth Am^j Crown Prince of Saxony) wheeled at Clermont^
the Krng^s head-quarters on this day, and in the evening
reached Varennes with the left wing (the XII. Army Corps), and
with the right wing (the IT. Army Corps), Fleury, upon the right
banls: of the Mouse, whilst the Garde Corps moved up in rear of
the centre as far as Dombasle, on the road between Verdun and
Clermont The cavalry was pushed forward a long distance
towards the north and discovered the enemy's encampment at
Vouaiers.
On the 27th, the XU. Army Corps was also moved across
the Mouse, in order that this important line might be most
resolutely held, against any attack by the French from the west,
especially at the points Dun and Stenay. The III. and IX. Corps
of the army investing Metz, were also foimed up with their front
towards Etain, in a north-westerly direction, in order to resist any
possible attempt by the French Army to break through between
the Mouse Army and the Belgian frontier. The XII. Army Corps
reached Dun on this day, and bivouacked ne the parositions which
had been selected for defence.
The 2nd Cavalry Brigade only, whilst reconnoitring Busancy,
came upon six squadrons of the 12th Chasseurs. An attack was
152
here made by the first and half of the fiflKh squadrons of the 3rd
Horse Regiment, whilst the fire of Zenker's Horse Battery obliged
the enemy to give way. The Commander of the Ohassenr Eegimeirt
was taken prisoner. This fight confirmed the supposition that the
enemy was at Vouziers and to the noiih of it, and the IV. Corps
and Garde Corps therefore continued their march upon Bwancy
and Vouziers on the 28th, whilst the XU. Army Corps remained
in position at Dun. '
The royal head-quarters were still in Clermont.
The third Army had continued on the march towards the
north, on the 26th, so that it must come upon the right flank
of the enemy, whilst the Mouse Army moved against Mm in
the front.
The Crown Prmce's head-quai*ters were at St. M^nehouM on
the 28th. This array having had a longer distance to march
was still behind in eomparisDn with the Mouse army, and in order
to bring about a general engagement, the lattei* was obliged to
make a slew advance.
On the 2dth the Frrach advanced troops were driven back
by the 4th Cavalry Division, Marshal Mac Mahon's head-quai^ters
were removed the same day, to Stonne.- The Marshal made this
movement against his will. The encounter with the Saxons at
Busancy on the previous day, had taught him the frnitlesaness of
hia midertaking, and he wished to return. The dispositions for
the march to the west had already been made, but in the night
of the 27th the most decide oi*der Arrived from Paris to oontinue
the march to Metz.
The delays arising from these alterations, made it impossible
to concentrate the army at Stonne on the 28th.
The Marshal determined to reach Stenay and frmn thence
to get on to Monimedy^ but the enemy already occupied the
first of these towns. The German armies moved quickly, whilst
the French army had only accomplished 25 leagues *) in six days.
On the 20th the head-quarters were removed to Raucourt, and the
army commenced the passage across the Meuse at Mouzon.
*) About 67 English miles.
153
Lebrun's G<Mrps passed the rtirer ob the eveniag of the 29thy aad
the other corps were to cross in the early morning of the 30th,
Generals, de Failly and Doaay were to remain with their troops
apon the left bank until the last, in order to cover the passage
against the approaching Germans, and then to go over themselves.
On the Gei-man side, the possibility of the French left wing
extending its line of retreat towards the Belgian frontier, and
perhaps even attempting to cross it, for the sake of safety upon
Belgian territory, had to be kept in view; it was therefore
determined to compel the enemy to give battle upoti the ground
between the Ardennes and the Mouse.
The Armies of the Crown Princes of Prussia and Saxony,
now united into one Army under command of the King, were
advancing, on the 29th, in the following order of march:
Of the third Army, the 1st Bavarian Corps, had, on the 27th,
pushed forwai'd by VouAiers upon the road to Stenay, as far as
Bar and Busaney ; it was now marching upon Sommauthe in front
q( the enemy at Beaumont, and had established the connection
with the IV. Army Corps upon the left flank of the fourth Army«
The II. Bavarian Corps followed the first. The V. Army Corps
was marching from Brigenay and Authe upon Pien*emont and
Oehes and thus formed part of the left wing. The Wurtembei'gers
had taken the direction by Ghatillon to Chene-populeux. The XI.
Army Corps was also marching towards this point, but had taken
the route by Vouziers and Quatrechamps, and, on the left of the
Wurtembergers, a flank column of the XI. Corps was to occupy
Voncq on the Aisne. The VI. Army Corps was to march behind
them towards Vouziers. The dth Cavalry Division was to place
itself in front of Chene-populeux, to the west of the place whilst
directing its march upon Tourteron, the 4th Cavahry Division was
to follow the XI. Corps to Qnati'echamps and then wheel up
upon Chatillon, the 6th Cavalry Division was to advance upon
Seinuy, and push forward its out-posts as far as Boavellemont,
whilst it took the direction of M^zi^res. The 2nd Cavalry Division
was to halt near Busaney.
The Cavalry received orders to retain feeling with the
154
enemy, but not to engage in a serions fight as the infantry were
Btill too far behind.
On the morning of the 29th, direetions were given to the
Crown Prince of Saxony, to take np a defensive position with his
army, between Aincreviile and Landres, on the left bank of the
Meuse, and to watch the Meuse from Dun to Stenay. In con-
sequence of this, the XII. Army Corps returned from the right to
the left bank, the Garde Corps took up a position on its left,
and the IV. Army Corps formed the left wing; the Garde Cavalry
and the Saxon Cavalry Division reconnoitred towards Oches and
Beaumont.
FIGHT AT NOUART.
When the XII. Army Corps was moving towards Nonart, the
advanced guard, the 46th Infantry Brigade, discovered at midday,
that the heights in rear of this place were occupied by the 5th
French Corps. The Saxons immediately attacked them, and to-
wards evening, after a long resistance, took the heights from the
French. At the same time the cavalry brought infoimation l^at
another mass of the enemy's troops was formed np at Foss^, to
the north-east of Nouart. The Crown Prince made his troops
move into bivouac, and established his head-quarters at Bariconrt.
The village of Voncq upon the left wing, occupied by infantry,
had been taken by storm the same evening, by two dismounted
squadrons of Hussars.
Every preparation was made to destroy Mac Mahon's isolated
Army.
The difficult problem of a change of front, and the disposition
of both armies to the right flank, was completely solved and
carried out with surprising rapidity and certainty, in spite of the
long distances and the communications being in parts very imperfect.
165
COMBAT AT BEAUMONT.
The strategical dispogition of the third and fourth ArmieB in
one line of about 4 miles*) in extent^ was so far completed on
the morning of the 30th of August, that both armies, the fourth
upon the right flank and the third upon the left, could advance
to the attack in a north-easterly direction, fairly iB the same line.
Mac Mahon had given oi'ders that the 3rd Corps, which was
still upon the left bank of the Mouse, was to cross the river this
day at any price. The 5th Corps was to march upon Mouzon,
the 7th upon ¥11104*8, the Ist upon Remilly.
General Margueritte was to cover the advance towards
Mouzon and Carignan, and General Bonnemain to follow the
1st Corps.
The French Army was, however, inteiTupted in its passage
across the Meuse, although it was only de Failly's Corps which
was principally engaged upon the left bank.
The King^s head-quarters were in Grandpr^ on the night
of the 29th, and the head-quarters of the Crown Prince of Prussia
were in Cenuc.
At 10 o'clock, on the morning of the 30th, the Crown Prince
of Saxony commenced the advance against Beaumont The IV.
Army Corps formed the left wing, the XII. Army Corps the right
wing, the Garde Corps remained in a reserve position at Nouart.
The two Corps of the first line moved forward in four columns,
each consisting of one Division, with cavalry for investigating the
ground in front and upon the flanks.
General de Failly's troops were encamped opposite to them
in a position that could be easily defended, namely upon the
wooded heights in front of Beaumont, commanding the valley of
the Meuse. One Division was laying to the north and the other
to the south of the town; although the Corps had been engaged
the previous day at Nouart, and could not well ignore the vicinity
of the enemy, yet it had marvellously, neglected to take the
slightest precautions for security. The French troops bivouacked
*) About 18^5 English miles.
156
entirely without out-posts in spite of the danger to which they
were exposed.
The reconnaissances made by the fourth Army had brought
information to the Crown Prince of Saxony, that the nearest
stationary Division of de Failly's Corps was in the act of cooking
with the greatest negligence. The columns were therefore concealed
as much as possible, and approached the French camp without
being seen, a battery moved up quickly to within range and suc-
ceeded in opening an unexpected fire of shells upon the encamp-
ment, which was immediately followed by the attack of the two
Infantry Divisions of the IV. Army Corps. The French fled in^
the greatest confusion, leaving behind them tents and other camp
equipage, their cooking kettles and every thing that could hinder
a rapid flight.
It is true that their leadei*s succeeded in bringing them to a
halt after having gone some distance, but they were only capable
of a short resistance, and quickly retired to Beaumont where they
were collected and supported by the remaining parts of dc Failly's
and Douay's Corps, so that a vigorous fight was now developed,
in consequence of which a brigade of Lebrun's Corps was brought
back from the right bank of the Meuse.
Nevertheless the 7th t^russian Division, under the command
of Lieutenant General von Schwarzhoff, supported by the 8th
Division under Lieutenant General von Schdler, took the town
and forced the enemy to retreat towards Mouzon.
The small wood of Givodeau to the north of Beaumont was
still defended with great obstinacy by the rear guard of the
French, and thus relieved the retreat upon the Meuse, yet this
wood also was ultimately taken.
The French then once again offered resistance upon the
heights of the right bank, in front of Mouzon. They brought a
numerous artillery into position, and for a time opened a very
hot fire. At this place, only the right wing of the Meuse Army,
the Saxon Corps, took part in the fight.
Whilst the IV. Army Corps, upon the left wing, supported
by a Bavarian Brigade of von dei' Tann*s Corps, attacked in front,
the Saxons advanced upon Beaumont from Nouart, naixdiing by
167
LanenviUe through the For^ de Dtenlet. At the moment of the
attack being made against Houzon, the 45th Infantry Brigade
(Leib and 2nd Grenadier Regiments) with the Schtltzen Regiment
reaehed the action, and by vigorously pressing on with their lead-
ing troops, got as far as Villemontry.
Niglit coming on put an end to the fight, which had delivered
much booty iiito the liands of the Germans.
Above 9000 prisoners, 19 guns, and 8 mitrailleuses were count-
ed, with considerable war material, including several waggons. The
loss of the Germans amounted to .3000 men in killed and wound-
ed in the IV. Army Corps, and between 400 and 500 men in
the Saxon Corps. The loss of the Bavarians was small.
The Army of the Crown Prince of Pi'ussia moved on this
day, from the south towards Oches, the Bavarians on the right
wing, the V. Corps in the centre and the Wuiiiembergers with the
XI. Corps on the left wing, and the VI. Corps forming the reserve
of the left wing. This army came upon the French 7th Corps.
The first shots fell precisely at midday. They c<ame from
tlie hills in ft'ont upon the further side of the village of Oches,
where the French artillery had taken up a position and opened
fire upon some guns of the thii-d Anny, formed up on the heights
behind Busancy. The distance being nearly 5000 paces, the fire
of the French was inefficacious. It was also evident that the
French had no intention of offering a serious resistance here, as
they immediately gave up their position when the German Cavalry
advanced from the left flank towards Oches, and retired upon
Stonne, following the chain of the heights which rises behind
Oches.
The Crown Prince had gone forward through Busancy with
his Staff and suite, and taken up his point of observation on the
same spot upon which the enemy had directed his cannonade
shortly before. At first it was thought that the French would
try to make a stand at Stonne. However, in this retreat General
Douay stricitly followed the orders of the Marshal, who had laid
down tlie passage of the Meuse as the object of first importance.
Dispositions were immediately made to suiTound the enemy
on the south, south-west and south-east, by a semicircular
158
formation, the terminating points of which should oontiQually
encroach towards the north, like a pair of pincers, and surround
the enemy.
The numerical superiority of the Germans )yas well calculated
for this plan, the aim of which was to destroy or take prisoner
the whole of the French Army, in case it did not hasten to cross
over at once, into Belgian territory towards the north.
The German Armies numbered in all 250,000 men with
800 guns. Provided with a very numerous Cavalry (four in-
dependent Cavalry Divisions had been allotted to the third Army)
they followed close upon the heels of the French Army, and
kept them in constant danger of having to make front to the rear
against a surprise.
THE 3l8t OF AUGUST.
After the victorious combat at Beaumont, the German Armies
bivouacked in a line, the approximate direction of which was from
Raucourt to Villemontry. The Kmy's head-quarters were at
Busancy, the Crovm Prince of Prussia's at Rourmont, and the
Crovm Prince of Saxony's at Beaumont.
The King caused the following dispositions to given out for
the 31st of August.
The Mouse Army will prevent the enemy^s left wing
escaping in an easterly direction between the Belgian frontier
and the Mouse.
The third Army will continue the advance, attack the
enemy if he takes up a position on this side of the Mouse,
and operate simultaneously against the front and right flank,
in order to press the wliole French Army into the naiTow
space between the Mouse and the Belgian frontier.
In accordance with these arrangements the Crown Prince of
Saxony ordered the Garde Corps to cross the Meuse at Pouilly,
and the XII. Army Corps at Letanne with directions to advance
towards the line between Mouzon and Carignan.^ The IV. Army
169
Corps was to move forward upon the left bank of the Menae to
Mouzon, and keep up the connection with the third Army.
The Crown Prince of Pmaaia caused the I. Bavarian Corps
to march by Baucourt upon Bemilly, the XI, Army Corps from
the previous day's positions at Stonne, upon Ch^mery and Oheveuge ;
the latter Corps was ordered to halt upon the left bank of the
Meuscy and encamp in front of Donch^ry. The IL Bavarian
Corps was to follow the first, the V. Army Corps tlie eleventh.
The Wurtembergers were to advance by Yendresse and Boutan-
court to the Mense. By this means the lines of march of the
third Army converged towards the fortress of Sedan, within whose
walls and environs, according to the news brought, the French
Army was concentrated. The task was to enclose the enemy
in these positions and to force him either to sun*ender his
army, or to take flight over the Belgian frontier. As the latter
eventuality was not considered impossible, it was expressly stated
in the order of the day for the 30th that the German Corps
would have to follow the French without delay, in case they
were not immediately disarmed upon Belgian territoiy.
The Blst of August passed without serious fighting.
Of the Mouse Army, only the Saxon Cavalry Brigade had
been engaged. It was ordered to cross the Mease at Pouilly, on
the morning of the 31st, and to go forward down the valley of
the Mouse in connection with the Garde Cavalry Division directed
to march by Sailly and Carignan, for the purpose of intercepting
thfe departure of the Train belonging to the French ai'my. The
DivisioA upon the heights to the noi*th-west of the Bois-de-Vaux
discovered some railway trains standing ready in Carignan and
columns of the French 12th Corps movin^>' off, kgainst which the
horse battery immediately opened fire with success. In the fUrther
advance upon Douzy, which was strongly occupied by the enemy's
infantry, and therefore could only be fired upon by the horse
battery, an opportunity occurred of attacking a large train of
provisions and ambulance waggons, partly horsed and partly un-
horsed. For th.s object the Garde Horse Regiment had gone for-
ward at Brevilly across the Chiers in order to attack the columns
retreating upon the road; it could not however, press forward
160
beyond Pouru-Bt.-Remy , from whif^h plaoe it was fired upon by
strong detaehmentg of the enemy's infantry and espeeiaUy by tkie
inhabitants, and no infantry was at hand.
An attempt made by the 1st Uhlans No. 17 to press into
DotKsy, failed at the commencement on account of a vigorous
infantry fire; the regiment however succeeded, after further pre-
paration by the horse battery, in forcing Douey, and in capturing
the departing train, consisting of about 40 waggons, escorted by
two companies of tlie 24th Infantry Regiment, and thus made
several prisoners besides getting possession of the train standing
at the station.
Of the third Army, only the I. Bavarian Corps had an
encounter with the enemy. In advancing beyond Remilly a few
companies of Jagers belonging to the I. Bavarian Division came
upon the 12th French Corps which had moved from Mouzon by
Douzy towards Sedan, and occupied Bazeilles. A violent fight
ensued upon the right bank of the Mouse, in which the Bavarians
were repulsed.
In the meanwhile the main body of the corps approached
the river and two pontoon hridges were laid at Remilly. The
Crown Prince himself was present at this fight. He Iiad taken
up a point of observation on an eminence, just behind the church
in the village of Stonne, from whence a wide survey of the
country could be taken. After the fight was over at about
6 o'clock in the evening, the Cx'own Prince went to Chemery,
where his head-quarters had been established.
The other corps hajd been able to accomplish the marches
prescribed for them, during the day, without difficulty; the
French Army had retired to Sedan without any further attempt
at resistance.
On the evening of the 31st of August, the German Armies
occupied the following positions (v. map I.):
The Mouse Army formed the right wing and stood thus:
The Garde Corps at Carigna^ upon the right bank of
the Chiers.
The XII. Army Corps at Mairy.
161
The advanced guards of both Corps fronted towards the
west and north. They extended from Pouru-aux-Bois* to Pouru-
St.-Remy and Douzy; patrols had feeling with the enemy and
scoured the country as far as Francheval.
The IV. Army Corps was on the left bank of the Mouse at
Mouzon.
Of the Third Army, on the evening of the 31st:
The I. Bavarian Corps was at Remilly, the II. Bavarian
Corps at Raucoui*t, the V. Army Corps at Ch^hery, the XL Army
Corps at Donch^ry, the Wnrtemberg Division, at first, at Boutan-
court; it afterwards advanced to Dom-le-Mesnil. The VI. Army
Corps was only able to reach Attigny and Semuy this evening.
Thus, in case the enemy should really attempt a night departure,
it stood ready to place itself in his front still further to the west-
ward, and then bring him to a stand.*
It was the intention to have drawn all the Corps still closer
together, round the French Army on the 1st of September, and
only to offer battle on the 2nd. However the observations made
on the 31st of August, upon the demeanour of the enemy, caused
an alteration in this plan.
It had become perfectly clear, that each hour the resistance
was prolonged, the enemy's troops lost energy in fighting; whole
divisions had thrown away their knapsacks, and fled in masses;
the roads were strewn with overturned waggons, and thrown away
articles of baggage and equipment. It was above all, apprehended
that the enemy was no longer disposed to fight, and perhaps
meditated escaping during the night, as quickly as possible, to
M^zi^res or on to Belgian territory.
In order to prevent this, the King, after a long conference
with the Crown Prince, his son, with the addition of Oeneral von
Moltke and Lieutenant General von Blumenthal, commanded that
the storming of Sedan, and the French fronts between the
Meuse and the Ardennes, should be taken in hand on the follow-
ing day.
Even this evening, and during the night, the Wnrtemberg
Division was to advance by Dom-le-Mesnil, lay a bridge there
11
162
over the Menae, and cross the river. The XI. Army Corps was
to lay two* bridges at Donch^ry, and also to cross the Mease.
Thus it was hoped to cut off the road towards Mezihres
from the French Army.
Marshal Mac Mahon had most probably, intended to have
gone to M^zi^res, but must have thought that there was still
sufficient time to do so on the 1st of September.
After Mouzon had been evacuated by the enemy on the
evening of the 30th, and the last troops had been withdrawn to
the left bank of the Meuse, the Marshal seeing the manifest im-
possibility of bringing help to Marshal Bazaine, or even of reach-
ing Montm^dy, gave orders on the night of the 30th, that the
army was to retire upon Sedan.
This measure was without doubt, the worst of all. The town
of Sedan, which is included in the category of fortresses, is com-
manded on several sides by ground rising above it, and is not
well adapted to resist modem artillery. Moreover it was in-
completely armed, badly provisioned, and possessed no outer works
of defence. It was of no sort of value as a support to a retir-
ing army, and therefore, its only importance consisted in its being
connected with M^zi^res and Paris, by the railroad which passes
by Hirson, and which was the sole means of replenishing the
provisions and ammunition.
It might have been better to have remained at Mouzon, to
have occupied the heights upon the right bank, and to have
delivered a battle, which though without hope of success, would
at least have offered the possibility of a retreat.
But the Marshal probably entertained the hope of reaching
M^zi^res from Sedan. He was, perhaps, not informed of the
march direction of the left wing of the German Armies, as the
31st of August appears to indicate.
The troops wearied by their uninterrupted marches, their
mciral element impaired by the discomfitures which had followed
one upon another, retired for the most part in disorder upon Sedan.
The 1st and 5th Corps arrived there on the evening of
the '30th and early in the morning of the 3l8t, and were formed
up upon the heights to the west of Daigny and Qivonne.
n
163
The 7th Corps reached the neighbourhood of Villers-Oemay
on the morning of the Slst, and encamped there. It changed
its position at 3 o'clock, in the afternoon; leaving a very nn-
favourable tactical situation at Villers-Cemay, it took up a
position to the north-west of Sedan , which it still held on the
1st of September.
The 12th Corps remained at Mouzon until the last, and did
not begin to move until the morning of the 31st This was the
only corps of the French Army engaged on the 3lBt of August,
partly with its rear guard at Douzy, and partly at Bazeilles as
already related.
The Emperor Napoleon, who was with General Ducrofs
Corps at Carignan on the evening of the 30th, where it was
intended to have established the head-quarters, received the news
of the retreat during the evening, and Marshal Mac Mahon's
counsel to him to go by the railroad to Sedan. The Bmperor
took this advice and then remained in Sedan, preferring to share
the fate of his Army, in this desperate situation, to ensuring his
own personal safety.
General de Faiily was deprived of the command of his
Corps on account of his bad leadership, and it was transferred to
General Wimpffen.
Thus on the evening of the 31st the diffSerent Corps stood
as follows:
(v. map L of the battle of Sedan.)
The 12th Corps with the right wing resting upon Bazeilles,
the 1st and 5th Corps at Givonne,- Daigny and Moncelle, as
well as in the town itself, and the 7th Corps from Floing to
Calvaire d'lUy.
The Army was consequently formed in a semi^eircle round
the town; both flanks resting upon the Meuse^ and probably
no. army ever stood in battle, under more unfavourable
conditions. The troops were threatened on all sides, and above
all they had no line of retreat. If beaten they must flee into
the town, that is into a number of defiles without exit, through
narrow gates into streets that were overflowing with waggons and
baggage.
11 •
164
Marshal Mac Mahon mnst^ however^ have been very ill-
* informed as to his desperate sitaation, which is shown by various
circumstances that are related of the 31st of August.
Even in the afternoon^ when General Douay had proposed
to him the change of position of the 7th Corps above mentioned,
he answered in the following terms : ^I have no intention of being
fotced into the comer, in a fortress, like Marshal Bazaine at Metz,
but I shall manoBuvre before the enemy."
Whilst therefore, the 7th Corps executed the movement,
which he finally permitted, and whilst fighting was going on at
Bazeilles with the Bavarians, a peasant (according to the same
French source) informed General Douay that the enemy were
crossing the Meuse below Sedan, near Donch^ry, and 10,000 men
already appeared on the right bank. General Douay gave this
information to the Marshal ; he however took no counter measures ;
he had even, altogether, neglected to have the course of the
river reconnoitred as far as M^zi^res. He evidently reckoned
upon being able to reach M^zi^res upon the following day, and
considered the crossing of the enemy at Donch^ry as a mere
demonstration.
In the same way, a staff officer of the newly formed 13 th
French Corps (which was this day in Mdzi^res), who had been
sent by General Vinoy for the purpose of concerting some co-
operations with Mac Mahon, after waiting in vain for four hours
in the Marshal's anti-room, was finally obliged to retuiii with
his mission unfulfilled, as he feared that he might find himself
cut off later.
If such faults as these can be rightly laid to the charge of
Marshal Mac Mahon, who had always proved himself to be a
general of capacity and experience in war, it must be concluded
that the impossibility of the success of a plan, which was not his
own, had imposed such a crushing weight upon his mind, that
through it, he had lost his clear judgment.
165
BATTL£ OF SEDAN.
With the first glimmer of day, on the 1st of September, the
attacking movements of the Oerman Armies commenced.
The hour fixed by the Crown Prince of Saxony for the march
of his Corps was 5 o'clock, in the moiiiing; the Garde Corps
and the XII. Corps were to advance in three columns from Douzy,
Poni*u-St.-Remy and Fouru-aux-BoiB, against the line of Moncelle
and Givonne. The 7th Division was to remain in reserve at
Mairy, the 8th Division and the Artillery Corps of the IV. Corps
were to advance towards Bazeilles for the support of the I. Bava-
rian Corps.
The Crown Prince of Prussia disposed his Army as follows:
The I. Bavarian Corps to cross the Meuse at Remilly and
attack Bazeilles.
The II. Bavarian Corps to go towards Wadelincourt
and Fr6nois.
The XI. Army Corps to direct its march upon St.
Monges by Vrigne-aux-Bois.
The V. Army Corps and the 4th Cavalry Division to
follow this movement.
The Wurtemberg Division to remain on the defensive
towards M^zi^res, and at the same time to be in readiness
as a disposable reserve at Donch^ry.
Early in the Dooming of this memorable 1st of September,
a battle d^y, the results of which were the most brilliant if not
the most important of the whole war, a thick fog hung over the
heights and in the low land of the Meuse valleys, which com-
pletely concealed all distant objects from view, as the Bavarians
advanced against Bazeilles in the beginning of the fight It wad
only later in the morning that this veil, which obscured the scene
of the great event, began to sink, the heights became clear,
the fog, becoming less dense under the influence of the sun, began
to waver and fluctuate iitermixed with the smoke of the powder,
then withdrew into the valleyB, until at last, at midday, all the
movements of the army were executed under a clear sky.
166
The village of Bazeitles formed that point d^appui of the
French Army, which was first contested. It lies about 4000
paces from Sedan iu the neighbourhood of the Mouse, and was
the outermost point of the semicircular line of villages, farmsteads
and foundries which, following the chain of heights on the right
bank of the Mouse, indicated the French position. From Bazeilles
in a more northerly direction the villages of La Moncelle, Daigny
and Givonne should be named as forming part of this line; then
to the north-west Illy, Fleigneux, St. Monges and, to the south of
the latter, Floing.
Towards the east, the heights from Illy to Bazeilles were of
a nature to afford good opportunities for defence to the French
Army. They fall down steeply towards the brook, between
Daigny and Givonne they are wooded; here, and also further down
to the Mouse, they are divided into several sections by small
parallel valleys, and offer good positions for the most efficacious
infantry and artillery fire against the opposite slope, from which
the assailants must approach.
In the north, the Calvaire d'lUy, the height to the south of
Illy, was of great importance, and French generalship must venture
everything in order to maintain this commanding point, in the
centre of the line.
The French left wing, on the other hand, found less favour-
able conditions of ground. The villages of St. Monges and Floing,
with the eminence between them, here served as points d*appui.
General Douay, however, had done every thing to improve his
position, he had made the Engineer Corps lay gun-emplacemients,
and put the wood in his front into a state of defence.
In the middle of this semicircle, one mile*) in diameter, lay
the fortress of Sedan, a town of 16,000 inhabitants, surrounded
by extensive Vauban fortifications, which could be advantageously
reached with guns of long range from several sides, and
particularly well from the heights at Fr^nois and Wadelincourt
upon the left bank of the Mouse, where a mass of destructively
efficacious guns were formed up by the Germans, at a later
*) 43/5 English miles.
167
period of the battle , when the French Army was retiring to-
wards Sedan.
At break of day the King repaired to this point for a general
survey of the whole battle field, and occupied it until the end of
the fight.
Marshal Mac Mahon had issued no dispositions for the battle
on the 1st of September (according to French accounts), so that
each Corps Commander was obliged to act according to his own
judgment. As early as 5 o'clock, he went to the out-posts, and
soon after, whilst ordering some details for the Ist Corps, was
severely wounded in the thigh by the fragment of a shell. He
gave over the command to General Ducrot.
The battle began at Bazeilles, This well sun*ounded place,
completely built of stone houses, was occupied by the 3rd Division
of Lebrun's Corps, 12,000 men of the Marine Inftmtry, who
defended themselves with the greatest obstinacy, and for hearly
six hours contested every foot of ground, each house and every
step in the streets, with the storming Bavarians.
The advanced guard of the I. Bavarian Corps, under Major
General Dietl, moved forward against Bazeilles towards 4. 30
o'clock in the morning, followed by the 1st and then the 2nd
Division, so that the whole Corps was by degrees involved in the
fight round this impt^rtant place. The artillery was driven up on
to the heights to the north-east of Bazeilles, and although the
majority were obliged to venture into the fire of tirailleurs,
they opened a vigorous fire in order to shake the enemy's divisions.
The broad main street and the cross streets branching at right
angles firom it, the old wide village street lying next the Meuse,
as well as the park of the Chateau Monville, reaching ne^ly to
the subtrrbs, were advantageously situated for mutual support,
thus considerably increasing the tenacity of the defence, which
was effectively aided by cannon and mitrailleuses, whilst the French
detachments engaging made a vigorous stand and frequent onslaughts
with closed battalions.
Towards 10 o'clock, the whole place was in the hands of
the Bavarians, and it presented a terrible picture of destruction.
Not a single house remaitied standing.
168
Meanwhile, the XI. Army Corps was on the hill upon the
opposite side, after having accomplished the passage of the Meuse
during the night; in its farther advance to Vrigne-aux-Bois it had
not met with the enemy, and it was therefore clear that the march
to M^zi^res was not intended.
Each hour the enclosing of the French Army perceptibly
drew nearer to its completion.
The leading troops of the Crown Prince of Saxony had com-
menced fighting at Lamecourt and La Moncelle, at 6. 30 o'clock
in the morning. The 1st French Corps, had strongly occupied
Montvillers, La Moncelle and Daigny, lying opposite, as well as
the heights to the east of this place.
Half an hour later the advanced guard of the Garde Corps^
on the right of the XU. Army Corps came upon the French
position, whilst its columns, coming up by Pouru-St.-Remy and
Pouru-aux-Bois, in part wheeled gradually into line to the left,
and in part continued the march in the direction of Fleigneux, in
order to take up the connection with the troops who had advanced
from Vrigne-aux-Bois to attack the French left wing.
In a short time, the 24th Division succeeded in throwing
back the enemy so far that it was enabled to develope between
La Moncelle and Daigny. By this means the Saxons established
connection with the Bavarians. The first batteries of the Garde
Corps came into position at Yillera-Cemay, towards 9 o'clock. To
oppose their attack. General Ducrot, the new French Commander
in Chief, decided to take the offensive, and indeed, attempted to
surround the German right wing, between Givonne and Villers-
Ccmay.
For this object, be made the 2nd Brigade of Grandchamp's
Division advance from Daigny, and gave orders to Lartigue's
Division to take the plateau to tlve east of Givonne.
These troops made the attempt to carry out the disposition,
but were much too weak for it. . They were repulsed, Daigny
was taken by the Saxons at midday, and Haybes was wrested
from the French by the 2nd Garde Division.
At this time General Ducrot was superseded in the Chief
command by his senior, General fVinipffen, who claimed it.
169
The Prussian Garde Corps continued its movement upon
Fleigneux and Illy.
The 23rd Division also moved up the valley, and the 8th
Division pushed forward into the space between its left flank
and the Bavarians.
AH the disposable batteries were brought into position upon
the stormed heights, so that, upon this wing alone, about 100 guns
were in action.
At 2 o'clock^ the right wing of the Prussian Garde Corps
united with the left wing of the V. Corps at Illy.
Upon this side and at Floing, as well as in the south
of Sedan, the battle had developed itself in the f({llowing
manner :
At 7 o'clock in the morning the Crown Prince of Prussia
gave orders to the XI. Corps, which was at Briancourt, to march to
the front and wheel to the right upon St. Monges, the V. Corps
to follow the XI., and the 4th Cavalry Division to conform to the
movements of the last corps.
From the violence of the cannonade at Bazeilles, it was con-
jectured that the I. Bavarian Corps must have met with consider-
able resistance^ Walter's Division was therefore also ordered, at
7 o'clock, to move to Remilly in support of the I. Corps, Bothmer's
Division to Wadelincoui*t, and there to take up a position against
Sedan. Walter's Division crossed tie Mouse in rear of the I.
Bavarian Corps, formed up upon its left flank, and in conjunction
with it threw back the enemy by Bazeilles and Balan to-
wards Sedan.
At 7. 30 o'clock, the XI. Corps directed its advanced guard
upon St. Monges, where the 7th French Corps had taken up a
position, to the south of the brook.
Here the first shots fell at a quai*ter to 9 o'clock. After an
obstinate resistance the 7tli French Cprps evacuated the position
at St. Monges, and withdrew to its main position, upon the
heights between Floing and Illy.
The XI. Corps, perceiving that it could only fulfil its change
by taking possession of the heights lying in front, immediately
drove up the two leading batteries on each side of the unwalled
170
garden, which lies to the south of St. MoDges, upon the heights
to the west of Floing, and caused the infantry to follow.
The V. Corps had placed its Artillei^y Corps at its head,
and passed the brook to the north of Fleigneux, and had made
its batteries form up upon the heights to the south of Fleignenx
against the enemy's position. The infantry formed for the attack
in rear of the guns. At 11 o'clock, a vigorous cannonade took
place, between the batteries of both corps and the enemy's
artillery.
The Wurtemberg Division and the 2nd Cavalry Division had
crossed the bridges at Dom-le-Mesnil at 9 o'clock, and gone in the
direction of Vrigne-aux-Bois. At 9. 30 o'clock, the first received
orders to move to Donchdry, and remain in reserve to the north
of that place.
At 11 o'clock, the troops of the Third Army were disposed
as follows:
XI. Corps at St. Monges, the artillery to the south of
the place.
V. Corps at Fleigneux, the artillery also to the south.
4th Cavali-y Division to the south of Trolsfontaine ; the
horse batteries to the east of the copse, firing upon the enemy's
guns at Floing.
The Wurtemberg Division on the march to Donchery; one
detachment of Hiigel's Brigade at the bridge of Dom-le-Mesnil
and towards M^^eres.
The Artillery Corps of the I. Bavarian Corps was upon the
heights of Wadelincourt , with two batteries upon the tongue of
land to the north-east of Villette, engaged with the enemy's artillery
at Floing.
The I. Bavarian Corps and Walter's Division of the II. Corps
in Bazeilles.
The 2nd Cavalry Division to the west of Vrigne-aux-Bois.
The batteries of the V. Corps, to the south of Fleigneux,
constantly outflanked the right wing of the French 7th Corps,
and forced it to be always bringing fresh batteries into the line
of fire. Conseil Dumesnil's Division was shortly after, ordered to-
occupy the heights of the plateau towards Illy; Bordas' Brigade,
171
belongiDg to Dambnfs Division ^ was then sent out in the same
direction and liad taken up a position on tlie ieft of the road to
Illy, with its right flank joining Wolff's Division of the 1st Corps,
which had occupied the woods upon this side.
The fight along the whole line was originally an artil-
lery engagement.
Towards 10 o'clock, however, the French remarked that
strong infantry columns were descending the heights from St.
Monges, and moving towards the position of the 7th Corps.
Two mitrailleuse batteries, which had been brought up against
these columns (of the XI. Corps), no doubt inflicted great k)SBes
upon them, but were just as little able as all the other means of
defence, to prevent the extension of the German front of attack.
At midday General Wimpffen inspected the whole French
line of battle, which still formed an unbroken semicircle. On the
right, the 12th Corps, supported by the 5th Corps, still vigorously
maintained the defensive, although it had lost its original position ;
in the centre, the 1st Corps fought obstinately with the victorious,
but only gradually pressing on, Saxons and Prussian Guards.
Upon the left flank, the Divisions of the 7th Corps firmly held
their positions. General Douay here drew the Commander in
Chiefs attention to the importance of the plateau of Illy for his
Divisions, which, if taken by the enemy, would immediately make
the position of the 7th Corps untenable. General Wimpffen
assured him that this part of the battle field was already over-
strong in troops.
Shortly afterwards, however, the 7th Corps observed that
the plateau mentioned was precipitately evacuated by the 1st
Corps. The attack of the Prussian Guards had caused this retreat.
General Douay at once led two battalions to the imperilled
point,, and requested reinforcements from the Commander in Chief.
After some time he sent Lef^bvre's Brigade from the 1st Coi*p8.
The resistance, however, was quite inadequate against the
resolute advance of the Prussian columns. fVhen the Garde
Corps and the V, Corps united^ shortly aftertvards, upon the
plateau of Ilhfy the battle was decided.
172
The left wing of the French 7th Corps, threatened in the
flank, was as little able to maintain its position as the 1st Corps.
General Wimpffen had recourse to the cavalry.
With extraordinary impetuosity the French cavalry regiments
repeatedly threw themselves upon the threatening German columns
as they advanced, but without success.
Partly in line, partly in squares, the German infantry received
the charging troopers and drove them back with enormous losses.
Just as had been the case, before, in the battle of Woerth, the
devoted bravery of the masses of horsemen, attacking again and
again with obstinate persistency, led to no result which could
alter the course of the battle. Fresh proof was given that the
employment of cavalry, which frequently exhibited decisive results
in the battles of Napoleon I., is impossible against the precise and
rapid fire of infantry of the present day, and can only be termed,
a sacrifice of this arm. It may be that the cavalry attack
at Sedan originated chiefly in a feeling of proud shame, which
would not suffer the infantry and artillery alone to devote them-
selves to death.
After these desperate efforts had also failed, whole detach-
ments of the French Army retired upon Sedan, and for the most
part gave up the fight.
Considerable masses had been taken prisoners during the
combat.
The German artillery now commanded the field of battle
from all sides, and produced the greatest confusion amongst the
troops both in and outside the fortress.
Towards 3 o'clock in the afternoon. General Wimpffen con-
ceived the plan of attempting to break through at some spot,
with a resolute body of 3000 men, in order to deliver the Emperor
from the enclosing circle of the German Armies. But the Emperor
having been present in person upon the field of battle for a long
time, was convinced of the hopelessness of such an attempt, and
did not consent to this plan. General Wimpffen, seeing that a
capitulation was unavoidable, tendered his resignation. The Emperor
did not accede to his request, and addressed a letter to the General
in which he expressed his acknowledgement of his services.
^2 q nVfnrfr (t 'hi ' ''^- ~--'~ "^'*' ^-"""" ^rmiet
succeBB of
wrecked.
acceptable
MAP!
capitulation was unavoiffaBle,'" tend d. The Emperor
did not accede to bis request, ar er to the General
in which he ezpresBed hie ack > aerrices,
173
At 3 o^clocky (y. the map) the circle of the German Armies
was dravm together so closely round the French Army^ that
llic only apparent remaining choice lay between capitulation
and destruction. The heavy battery at Fresnois opeued fire upou
the town, and after only 20 minuteB, the falling shells produced
conflagrations in different parts.
The King perceiving the desperate situation of the con-
quered enemy j decided to offer capitulation. He ordered the
firing to cease, and sent off Lieutenant Colonel von Bronsart of
the Staff as a parlementaire, with the summons for the suiTender
of the army and the fortress. This parlementaire was met direct-
ly by a Bavarian officer, who brought the news to the King
that a French parlementaire had appeared at the gate of Sedan.
Simultaneously, therefore, with the King's decision to offer
capitulation, the Emperor Napoleon liad intended to propose
commencing negotiations. When Lieutenant Colonel von Bronsart
asked in Sedan, for the Commander in Chief, to his astonishment
he was brought before the Emperor, whose presence in Sedan
was not known for certain on the German side, although it was
conjectured.
In reference to the royal summons for a capitulation. Lieute-
nant Colonel von Bronsart was tlien referred to General Wimpffen,
and the Emperor wrote a letter to the King in which he sur-
rendered himself as prisoner of war. The imperial Adjutant
General, Reille, reached the King with this dispatch at 7 o'clock
in the evening , just after von Bronsart, who was somewhat in
advance of him, had communicated the presence of the Emperor.
In this memorable moment the war had reached a crisis.
The Imperial armies were vanquished. Whilst one, confined between
the foi*ts of Metz, had lost all communication witli the rest of the
country, tlie otfier now stood under the German guns, at the
mercy of the conqueror.
The object for which the French Emperor had begun the
war — moral and material compensation to the empire for the
success of K5niggr&tz — must now be regarded as definitively
wrecked. To restore peace on the other hand, if possible under
acceptable terms, must now be recognised as the object to be desired.
174
That this peaee did pot follow ^ after sach> deciBive events, is
owing to the circumstaiiGes, which at this moment; separated the
interests of France from those of the Empire.
After the King had given General Reille a letter for the
Emperor containing his acceptance of the Imperial sword, and at
the same time had verbally laid emphasis upon the disarmament
of the French army as a primary condition, he gave over the
charge of the diplomatic and military negotiations to the Chancellor
of the Confederation and the Chief of the Staff, and repaired
to Vendresse for the night, amid the rejoicings of his troops.
Generals von Moltke and de Wimpffen remained together in
Donoh^ry until the evening of the 1st of September.
They came however, to no agreement. The French General
could not consent to the conditions offered, which included the
imprisonment of the whole army. He returned to Sedan and
summoned all the Corps Commanders and Divisional Generals to
a council of war. In this 30 votes out of 32 pronounced against
the resumption of hostilities. General de Wimpffen had been out
of favour with his Imperial master before the war; he had only
been recalled to the army after the day of Gravelotte. Upon his
report, perhaps on account of his urgency — French sources
speak of stormy scenes between him and Napoleon — the
Emperor decided in the night, to enter into negotiations personally
with Count Bismarck.
Early on the following morning, in the cottage of a weaver
near Donch^ry, a conference of several hours took place between
the Emperor and the Chancellor^ in which General von Moltke
at times took part. What passed here has not; up to the present
day, been made known. Hot words may probably have fallen on
Napoleon's side.
It can well be imagined, that the conclusion of peace was
discussed; the demands however,, which Count Bismarck put
before the vanquished Emperor, could not have appeared accept-
able to him.
Even after the first battles round Metz the French press
made use of the phrase, so often repeated later: "France is rich
enough to pay for her misfortune"; after the panic in Paris on
175
the 7th of August, they had acoaatomed tiiemselves to own the
posBibility of a disasterouB war. ^'Money but not a foot of land''
was their motto.
The state of affairs was now altered. The unprecedented
and extremely rapid successes^ entitled the royal General and his
counsellors to require more than money as the price of victory
won by German strength , and the quantity of blood shed, laid
them under an obligation, to demand the country of their own
tongue^ which had been lost through German weakness, two
hundred years before.
Napoleon was unwilling to give his consent in authorisation
of such terms, which hard as they might be, would have spared
France a humiliation unexampled in her history. He probably
felt convinced that a peace which dismembered French territoiy
would make his dynasty impossible, and therefore refe^Ted the
peace negotiations to the Empress Regent. That is to say, he
refused the peace , for the coming events which upset the
regency, allowed themselves to be easily foreseen.
Thus General Wimpffen found himself obliged before midday,
to conclude with General Moltke the memorable capitulation of
Sedan.
This served later as a type for most of the other capitulations ;
its tenor is as follows:
Art 1. The French Army, under the Chief command
of General Wimpffen, surrender, as prisoners of war, being
at the present time enclosed in Sedan, by superior forces.
Art 2. In consideration of the brave defence made by
this French army, all generals, officers and officials with the
rank of officers ai^e here excepted, as soon as they have
given in writing their word of honour not to take up arms
again until the conclusion of the present war, and in no
way to act against the interests of Germany. The officers
and officials who accept these conditions, retain their arms
and the peipsonal effects belonging to them.
Art. 3. AH arms and war material, consisting of
colours, eagles, cannon, ammunition &q«, will be given up in
Sedan to a military commission, appointed by the French
176
General^ who will be held immediately responsible for them
to the German commissioners.
Art. 4. The fortress of Sedan is to be placed at the
disposal of his Majesty the King of Prussia, in its present
condition, and at the latest, on the evening of the 2nd of
September.
Art. 5. The officers who do not enter into the engage-
ment mentioned in Art. 2., will be disarmed as well as the
troops, and ordered to surrender according to their regiments
or corps in military order. This measure will be commenced
on the 2nd of September and completed on the 3rd. These
detachments will be conducted on to the ground which is
bounded by the Meuse at Iges, in order to be given
up to the German commissioners, by the officers, who will
then hand over their commands to their non-commissioned
officers. The army surgeons, without exception, will remain
behind for the care of the wounded.
Given at Fresnois, on the 2nd September 1870.
von Moltke. Count fVimpffen^
The interview which took place between the two Monarchs
at the Chateau Bellevue, on the road from Sedan to Donch^ry
(v. the map), did not occur until after this capitulation had been
signed. It only lasted for a quarter of an hour ; immediately
after, the captive Emperor, accompanied at his own request, by a
Pi'ussian escort, went by Belgium to WilhelmshShe, the residence
appointed for him.
The carrying out of the capitulation commenced forthwith.
The French Army, without means of subsistence for two days,
crowded together in the narrow streets and fortifications in and
round Sedan, already presented a picture of complete dis-
organization.
Of the 140,000 soldiers with which Mac Mahon had begun
his march to the north; a small part, about 10,000 men, had
escaped to M^zi^res and over the Belgian frontier, about 20,000
dead and wounded covered the battle field, above 20,000 had
been taken prisoners during the fight, and through the capitula-
tion, 39 generals, 230 field officers, 2095 subaltern officers.
177
excluding 500 released on pai*ole, and 84,433 men, became
prisoners of war. ^
400 field guns, including 70 mitrailleuses, and 150 guns
of position belonging to the fortress of Sedan, were amongst the
large quantity of material captured.
France's last army in the field was destroyed.
This enormous success called forth the most general rejoic-
ings in Germany; the end of the war was looked upon as imminent.
These hopes were doomed to disappointment.
The Republic which raised itself upon the ruins of the
overthrown Empire y entered upon the fatal inheritance of
this war.
18
SECOND PART,
THE WAR WITH THE REPUBLIC.
II*
SEVENTH CHAPTER
The ItlLItAttT SrrUATrOK of FletAKCE AFTS^ THK CATASTBOIte
OF 8£DAK.
what meatts h)id Frttii^ nt her eottunaiid fbt pros^Htihg this
w«r, after the Umpire had beeta ove^rown, and the meiAy Who
pr^tiottBly had fornied the oppoBiti<Mi; had UdurpM the telns of
gi(»vertiiiie&t on the 4th of September^ in order to carty on thfe wak*
to the uttermost?
What was the military situation of France?
A victorious German ahnff, <it 240,000 men, eoiifident bf
vietory, was ibarehing npon th^ eapital; the cavalry bf their
adtaneed guards Was already scouring the cotibtry within a Ifew
days march of Pluris. A second army ef the Dame stfbiigth, was
on the Moselle, and kept the strotigefirt fbHress in Frabee Abd her
ottly army, closely 6nm)ttnded; a hundred thotl6and GeilbAn Iw^air-
riors held the captured frontier cottntrf, and were gradually ebclbs-
ing all the fortified places between the Rhibe And Paris. The
important fortress of Strasbbrg had nearly sncoumbed; 160^000
men of the Landwehr were on the march ttom Gtermaby, and
arriving by de^*ees in the theati^ of war; lastly, over 200,000
troops stood in readiness^ in Oehnany, to replace easbaltiell.
On the othiBr htmd, a Frmth upiny di M» field did iMt
ejsut. There were still about 25,000 infenti^y, 21500 eavaliy
and 50 guns of the Imjierial army, disposable for em^ldymebt in
Fraaee; the rest could b<^, poMibly^ be withdMWb ^om Albert.
There were besides, a great number of depdtiS, fMni Which bodi^Js
ef troops oould be fbfllied in eitse of Med, Aftd hMd lilt«ady been
182
formed to some extent The old soldiers and . officers of the
empire^ who had served out their time, could be again enrolled. Then
the Garde Mobile could be brought' into the field ; a large number
of men, who, however, at first, bore very small resemblance to
serviceable troops ; lastly the Garde Nationale, a combative element,
whose fitness for war was certainly very doubtful.
There was a great scarcity of arms and horses;^ many of the
rifles were of obsolete construction.
France, nevertheless, possessed numerous and very strong
fortresses, which might be able to detain the enemy until an
army was formed out of the undrilled, unarmed but numerous
forces, capable, with superior handling, of offering some resistance
to tlie German armies. The credit of France sufficed for the
purchase of arms and horses, and lastly, her geographical for-
mation offered very favourable elements for a prolonged defence.
Under these circumstances, the new Republican government
formed the plan of prosecuting the war against the powerfully
developed strength of Germany.
The men, who had usurped the reins of government on the
4th of September, in the face of the most dangerous elements of
revolt by which it was threatened, were some of France's best,
with the exception of Bochefort and a few insignificant individuals,
and to them is due the merit of having, by their usurpation, made
the dominion of the Communists, at that time, impossible. They
were patriots, they loved their country, and were, ready to sacrifice
themselves for it, but— they, possessed neither the judgment, nor
the power of governing j under the difficult circumstances in whieh
France was theu placed. In order to remain at the head, they
were obliged to carry the tendencies of public opmion, by which
they were supported and entirely borne, too far; republicans
through conviction, and without bemg also endowed with special
statesmanlike qualities, they confounded the means with the end,
and pursued republican chimeras, under the delusion that they
were serving France. At a later period, after having tasted the
sweetness of command, a pure lust of power yras, in a few, added
to their other faults.
A great country possesses rich resources, and France was
188
quite one af the richest .ooimtrieB in Europe. A great power
hM further, by its very natare and properties, the advantage of
carrying within itself such an immense amount of strength, even
after severe defeats, that its victorious opponent would willingly,
be satisfied with a cheap peace, contenting himself with the main-
tenance of his right to secure himself against future danger. For
he knows, that a complete destruction of the conquered enemy is
accompanied by immense sacrifices upon his own side, and for a
long time to come renders a salutary intimacy, in every relation,
impossible.
Modem times have to some extent departed from the principle
of former days, that a nation's strength is founded in its neighbour's
weakness, and statesmen begin to discern that in destroying the
prosperity of a neighbouring state, the prosperity of a good cus-
tomer is also ruined. The Prussian government, the most enlight-
ened of all, certainly never entertained the foolish plan, imputed
to it by French organs, of forcing France to the level of a second
rate power.
The means of resistance which France still possessed after
the capitulation of Sedan, were quite adapted to serve as the
basis of a peace, which, although probably painful, would not have
been destructive to the state, and the republican government, whose
supporters in the legislative body had pleaded so zealously against
the war before its commencement, would now have found the most
favourable opportunity of oflTering the hand of peace, whilst imput-
ing all the blame to the Empire.
The members of the new government were, doubtless, not
altogether impervious to this view of the case. Whilst the approach
of the Germans and the investment of Paris was being effected, a
step was taken, by the more moderate among them, which had
peace for its aim. The clever parliamentary speaker, Jtdes Fanre^
appeared several times at the German head-quarters for negotia-
tions with Count Bismarck. These were, however, broken off
chiefly upon the same grounds as those which had wrecked the
negotiations with Napoleon on the 2nd of September. The men
of the 4th of September, had started with the phrase: ^^Ni un
pouee de noire terriiairey ni une pierre de nos forleresses /"
/
/
184
/ i Belleville the echo somided: ^^JVi un ieu de notre
\ Then, the republican govemment wonld not take upon
. •••v^ blame of a separation of territory, In opposition to the
French people, bo deeply wounded in their vanity, and syste-
matically deceived, becanse in bo doing they forcBaw their own
fall.
The welfaie of the whole of great France now fell a victim
to the aima of the republican party, jnst as it had, previonsly,
been Bacrifieed to the interesti of the Bonaparte dynasty. This
arose from an internal need ; it was the* consequence of o^tBries
of a perverted system of government, the terrible result of which
was, that no govemment was able to mmntain itself which did not
invest the state with external brilliancy.
In this state of affairs, it became the sacred duty of the
German goveiiiment to obtain secure guarantees for the conclusion
of a lasting peace; concessions, which might, perhaps, have been
{Hraoticable if opposed to a strong government and sound state,
could not be made to the ephemeral company of the Hdtel de
Ville.
Thus unhappy France had to reap in Ml measure the bitter
fi*uits of long accumulated faults; the ship of state was driven,
rudderless, in the storm iimong rocks. Under a complete misappre-
hension of their task, with unparalleled wantonness and haughty
boasting, the extreme party, whose soul was Gmmbetta^ soon began
a work which, in a short time, troafoled and exfaansted the best
sources of the nation^s prosperity, and uprooted the foundation of
moral and state order.
In order to inflame the nation for the prosecution of the war,
a 83natem of lies on a grand scale, was comm^ieed; the sruccesses
of the German arms were denied or lessened and their own situa-
ti<m was placed in a favourable light. This howev^, wa» managed
in such a short-sighted and nnskilfnl manner, that, very soon,
the infaiUble oonsequenoes produced by state lies showed tibemseives
in general mistrust and fear.
In order to eoUect the large armies which were required, the
levy of soldiers waa carried to excess, and men were assembled
in great numbers in the camps, and led to the battle fields, some
186
of whom were imfit for figMang, and others wore taken from civil
poftitioBSy from whieh they conld ill be spared without considerable
detriment to the productive strength of the country. Thus, at
first despondency, then general indiflferenee, indolence and negligence
gained ground amongst a population, previously famed for its
diligence and industrial tastes.
In order to strengthen and confirm their irregularly established
government, the rulers of the National Defence gradually loosened
all the bands of order, wliich had been imposed by the former
government, (although at the beginning still making use of the old
system, but with new members), and made as it were a clear
course, on which all the elements, bad and good, raged in unfet-
tered confusion. They appealed to the sympathies of all the
countries of Europe, but especially to the Sjrmpathies of all
republican parlies, and at home they called up all the strength
and talent, for an unlimited concurrence in the .defence of the
country.
This produced extraordinary activity and exertion, but at the
same time, great coufusion and want of design. Not only the
generality of the parties, but also all restless spirits, believed
that the time and oppoi*tunity had arrived^ each for himself to
make capital out of his own views.
In the general disorder, adventurers were attracted from all
the principal countries, in order to seek their own advantage, either
by serving their facticms, by pursuing selfish and ambitious plans
or only by robbery and plunder. With them came to light all
those dark existences of the disordered country itself, who, from
time to time, are obliged to conceal themselves from a strong
government, in the hiding places of the great towns, and are only
heard of, now and then,* on the discovejy of secret papers and a
conspiracy. These men now emerged and formed bands of thieves
and ro^bbers, or became the heads of factions, in order to begin,
later, the war of the Commune against the bourgeoisie.
And hardly lees, was the state injured by those more nobly
constituted, but impractical natures, who now eathusiastieally urged
their chimerical idea^, with proposals and plans, and perplexing
interference, in the arrangements c^ (he officials and generals.
}86
That amid such disturbing inflnences, and tinder an incapable
Chief Direction, a copsiderable resistance shonld, neveiiihelesB,
have been offered to the German armies, for almost five months
longer, is an evidence of the amount of military feeling and
of the many resources which France still possessed, and, on
the other hand, shows how favourable the geographical and po-
litical position of the country was for a defensive war.
With regard to the latter, three points are conspicuous, as of
essential moment In the first place, the importance of Paris*
This giant city was so completely the central point of the whole
of France, where, without exception, all the threads of government
and administration met together, and no possibility of any altera-
tion in this respect had ever been taken into consideration, that
the occupation of this capital, appeared to the enemy to be indis-
pensably necessary for the conclusion of the war. The Capital
was, however, , not only of the highest importance as the centre of
the state, but it was also a fortress of such strength that its con-
quest required an unusual exertion of power ; it needed such a vast
army to enclose it, that comparatively few troops were left for
other operations.
Secondly, Bazaine^s Army and the fortress of Metz,
formed an important factor in every calculation of the eventualities
of the war. These two means of strength, united together, hung
like a heavy weight on all the operations of the Germans in the
west. They represented a great combined force, which required
the continual pressure of 200,000 men in order to prevent a dan-
gerous explosion for the Germans.
So long as Metz held out, the armies which opposed the
advance of the Germans in the west, or moved on for the
relief of Paris, had always a powerful ally in rear of the
enemy.
The third substantial support of the defence^ was the long
line of advantageously placed sections of country^ extending
from Le Mans, by Orleans, along the course of the Loire as
far as the mountains of the Cdte dHOr^ to the plateau of
Langres and to the Fosges^ and ending at the still unconquered
Strasburg. Upon this whole line, which continually skirted the
187
lines of oommnnicationa of the advaaeing Oerman forces, annies
ooaid be united which would find powerfol assistance from the
extensiye ooontry in their rear, and find secure points of support
in the nature of the ground. These armies rendered it necessary
that the German lines of communication from the Rhine to Paris
should be strongly occupied, and thus weakened the German armies
destined for frirther operations, and, as soon as they had obtained
a certain amount of organization and strength, even threatened
the investing army round Paris. .
Again, in consequ^ice of its having been proclaimed Hhe
people's war'*, a state of general insecurity had been created in
the provinces already occupied by the Germans, rendering the
empl<^ment of troops everywhere necessary, especially in the
mountainous and ^oody country of Lorraine and the north of
Champagne. The safety of the Etappen stations and the transport
escorts, employed a large number of troops, which reduced the
efifective strength of the corps in battle.
Lastly, the whole of northern France is dotted with fortresses
of different sise and importance, which served as points of appui
to the resistance, as places of refuge to the bands of Franes-
Tireurs , as well as ti'oublesome checks in the way of the German
lines of communication. The conquest of all these fortified places
was essential, and required a considerable expenditure of troops
and gun material.
To take advantage of these favourable opportunities for de-
fence, this great country, of almost forty millions of inhabitants,
affiled a sufficient number of men who could be. made into sol-
diers by military art. In fact, the government succeeded in
bringing together a very numerous army, certainly of a very diver-
sified character, and generally, of very little value in a militfiry
pomt of view.
The active forces of France, at the beginning of September,
may be divided into the following laige bodies.
Of regular troops^ only an insignificant number still remained
in the field.
Of Infantry there were only seven regiments, and three battalions
left, via. first, the 16th, 38th, 39th and 42nd Regiments of thQ
Line and the Fomigi Bagimeiity as well us Hivee iMfttaUoaa off
j&ephiTB (Ld^ lafantry, a kind of p«iial detacfament). ThMe^ wifli
the exception of the ^ephiia, hod iilfeady been brovght over hrto
France from Algiers. SeoonMy, the 3dth and 42nA BegimMilB of
&.e Line, whkh had oome from OiFita YeceUa.
Of Cacalryy there were stili five regiments of the line
existing, the 1st and dud Chaateuie and the 8th HnssaiB, whkh
had, at first, been left in Algiem; the' 7th and 8th Ghasseiirs,
which bad remained on the Spanish frontier in the bcgiaiiiqg.
Of ArtUlerffj in formed bodies, there was onlj one xcgiment,
consisting of eight batteries, disposable ; this had been brought «Tcr
from Algiers.
For the formation of regular troops^ the depdt» were Ae
first aTailable means. .
There were 114 Infantry dep6ts of 6compaviee, 21JagerdepdtB of
fi companies, 60 cavalry depots of 1 squadron, and 2 1 Artillery depots <^
400 men, in existence, besides depots of Engineers and Train.
To these foundations other soldiers were added, thos6 who
liad served their time, partly reserves, partly old siMiers who had
been released from all duty in the service, but were now re-
engaged, as well as the recruits who had been drawn in. Out of
all these troops assembling at the dep5ts, four baUalions were
formed at first, and from these battalions. Infantry Reffimenls de
Marchcj consisting of three battalions, were formed. Of these
regiments, however, four belonging to the 12th Oorps had already
fallen into captivity at Sedan.
Altogether, there were formed from such ti*oops : of Infantry ^
56 regiments and 14 battalions (Jager battalions de marche); of
Cavalry^ 8 cavalry regiments de marche, 4 Zouave and 1 Alge-
rian Tirailleur regiment de marche ; a second foreign regiment was
also formed at a later period, composed of all sorts of elements.
At the beginning of the new epoeh in the war the Artillery
was very deficient in gun material; there were however, a tolerable
number of soldiers belonging to that branoh.
Thus there could be formed from 150,000 to 200)000 men,
who received the name of ^^ regular troops'* as a distinction,
although the greater part could not raise * very high elaim to
180
tlM <|ii|diii9»ti09i|l 9i s«A troop% 90li4itj in oiyaiUsfutio% AiBoipline,
9fiA yrfil gttiumMi inatraetiQii in tb^ ^8« of «jrm.
IKttit to tbe»& troops, tber« ware i^s»e tai^tioal boAi^ft compoi^
a^ follows : .
A prmmonai Zqu^^ refiw^ in Paris^ fanned from (he
4wp«m4 HiiMi of tbo old S^^ve regim^A^i furtbar time x^
ments of mixed cavalry^ and lastly the reg^iments €on»»d of
tl^fi G^dami^ ia Paris, 1 of foot imd 2 of bor^ 4)to|[ether per-
\i9^ 6000 men.
Tbi^ contingeat fonned from the Marine service must next
be matntioned, {is a really capable and serviceable element foi the
delenc^ of tbe country. The personal state of the whole fleet,
ln<^udi9g the colonial troops, mechanics and harbour workmen
amounted to about 100,000 men. It is true that a considerable
portion of the marine infantry had beeu annihilated at Sedau, but
there were still about 6000 men remaining, and in addition to
these certainly 20,000 sailors yet for disposal. These men not
only fornned excellent troops for serving the heavy guns, but were
also employed in battalions in the fight.
With regard to all the other active forces, we can only give
approximate numbers j as their strength was subject to great flue-
tuatbns according to 'circumstances. In the firet line must be
named the moMIe Garde Naiionahy also called the Garde
Mobile, 1M% force, according to the organization laws of the Ist
of February 1868, ought to have amounted to 550,000 men. The
laws of organization, however, never acquired real vital power,
aad the number of Oardes Ifobiles who allowed themselves to be
engaged to carry anas during the period up to the 2bd ai
September 1870, will not be set too low at 400,000. These
troops were formed in battalions and regiments, and also possessed
eriillery. Of cavalry, however, they had none.
Secondijf^ ther^ was a mobHised part af the esiablithed
Garde Nationale^ that is to say, thq^e Oardes Nationaux employed
^ d^taohnents. oat^ide tbeiv nativ/e plaoes, M wbo were properly
destiaed Uat the defei^ee pf their natiye towp^ Tbese trooips were
formed into Legions, but there were, probiiJ^y, i^t ipogce th«A
50,000 men altogether.
190
A very large proportion of the armed troops was formed,
thirdly J by the established Garde Natianale (Garde Sidentaire^.
Yet it is impossible to give their numbers, because thlsy appeared
in no regular formations, and also very frequently changed their-
character and played the part of peaceful citizens. In Paris alone,
during the siege, the armed men of the Garde Natiooale exceeded
300,000 men.
In the fourth place, there were different Legions ^ some com-
posed of natives, such as that of Colonel Charette, from the for-
mer Papal Zouaves, and others formed of foreigners like Gari-
baldi's. It is also impossible to give an estimate of these forces.
Only this much can be maintained, that, when Garibaldi's Legion
was at its strongest, and united with several bands of Francs-
Tireurs, he had about 30,000 men under his command.
Lastly, in the fifth place these Francs-Tireurs represented
a means of war, which generally showed itself only in small
bodies, but here and there also in bands of hundreds up to
thousands. Their number is beyond all reckoning. To these the
summons in the press referred, calling upon every one to kill one
of the enemy whenever an opportunity offered.
A wide field of activity was thus opened for the imagination
of the rich as well as for the hatred of the whole people, and
many associations, in the most wonderful costumes and with sedi-
tious laws, joined the large masses of the poorer classes who went
out in a more simple manner to kill.
It is certain that not only all penniless vagrants, the prole-
tarians of the plains and the towns, formed the nucleus of the
Franc Tireur bands, but also many a foolish and beguiled or inti-
midated peasant, many a young man, in misguided patriotism, also
associated himself with these lawless, robbing and murdering hordes,
which finally became more dangerous to the * proprietary class of
France than the German troops.
On the 2nd of November 1870 the delegation in Tours issued
a decree, that all men from 20 to 40 years of age were to be
enrolled in the army.
What success accompanied this measure will be shown in the
191
defloription of ttie fighting on the Loire, in the north and in
the east.
The active forces of France composed of such a varied assem-
blage, already allowed a conclusion to be formed, as to the kind
of warfare that would now be developed. Indeed the observer
who investigates the war against the Imperial army, with a shudder
on account of the enormous sacrifice of human life, whilst however
delighting in its military grandeur, finds in the battles of the later
period, a prevailing miserable spectacle and turns, with horror, from
the single, bloody encounters, which spread beyond the limits of the
battle fields, to the fields, woods, villages and upon all the roads.
The fVar Direction of the Germans ^ remained as grand as
before. Its hosts, now increased to 800,000 warriors, covered
France's territory, and pressing forward without a pause, pursued
great aims only with inexorable consistency, and without one unneces-
sary step ; its art of war always stood as high as its policy, whose
fixed and exalted aims it invariably served.
But the undrilled, badly organized masses of French troops,
almost without guidance, were no longer able to offer the spectacle
of a scientific and tenacious struggle with the enemy, which the
tactics of the Imperial troops had done; it is. true that they were
often thrown upon the decisive spot by able generals, but even in
battle, when considerably superior to the enemy in numbei's, the
French army resembled for the most part a fiock of sheep being
driven against the wolf. They certainly did not lack courage;
they attacked and attacked again, but they did not understand
making use of cover, neither did they understand how to take
advantage of favourable chances in the fight, and the unrelenting
sword of the practised warrior destroyed them ; they fell in great
numbers, the rest fled, and the prisoners could scarcely be counted.
And very frequently, the German ofBcer and soldier, through
the frenzied warfare of the people, unacquainted with the first
principles of war, and all the rules for ameliorating its horrors,
were forced to have recourse to fire and the sword, whilst their
hearts bled for the wretched sacrifice, old men, women and children,
whose welfare, means of existence, and whose lives were devoured
by the war.
192
That the kind of war which coipme^eed from this tii^i did
not lead to general barbarity and savagery is a proof of/ the
h\gh powt Qf cuttivation attained by iM^th nations^ the French as
^f3X B» the German^i, bat especially of the e4:ceUent discipline iq
the 6eTi|ian army.
la a loBg war even the best troops lose pore eathnaiasiD; the
nobler feelings are blunted, war becomes a customary en^pk>ymeqt,
and the mind is chiefly directed to material welfare. When, to
this is added y the constant betrayal of the confidence which the
soldier placed in the citizens and the peasantry, when the forbear-
ance shown towards the host of his quarters is converted into a
meaofi for his own destruction, then his good dis^sitioq is trans-
formed into mistrust and exasperation, and he begins to impoverish
aod ill use the population. It required all the noble elements, of
which the German army could boast, to maintain sueh admirable
discipline for so long a time.
That the French government was enabled to provide these
multitudes called up for battle, with a more or less good equip-
ment and armament, is owing to the advantageous coast formatiiOn
of the country, which enabled large stores to be imported from
England and America and landed at several pointa from whevice
they could be forwarded inland. Fraiice's manufactaries ctf
arms alone, wo^ld have been insufficient to have incre^ed the
existing stores to such an extent as was necessary for the jirose-
cution of the war. It is true that Paris, no longer able to in^ct
after the 19th of September, was chiefly furnished with home-
made guns and rifles, or with those in possession before the war,,
but almost everything which the country and the fleet could pro-
duce had, also, been conveyed there. The rest of the troops,
raised in the further course of the war, were for the most part,
furqished with English and American arms. As early as the 17th
of September an English newspaper, "The Daily News," brought
precise intelligence of 400,000 rifles of the newest construction, aueh
as Martini-Henry, Snider, Bemington and 30 millions of caxtridges, of
which part were in the course «f construction on French commis-
sion , ^nd part were ready, and on the point of delivery at Doyer,
Folkestone, Newhaven and Liverpool, for the purpose of being tr^ns-
193
ported to the French harbours. England, only, was concerned in
this and it occurred as early as the 17th of September. Number-
less supplies of rifles, revolvers and cannon followed these first
consignments, and they were accompanied by large quantities of
articles of equipment, such as, shoes, clothes, and leather. Horses
were imported from Algiers. In the autumn months of 1870, the
eqmpment of the greater part of the French troops was compara.
tively inferior — rifles of old construction converted into muzzle
loaders, and but little artillery; the number of detachments supplied
with good modem rifles, was, however, always increasing, and in
the battles which took place later in the .winter, there was by
no means any deficiency in artillery. In cavalry the Germans
always remained numerically superior ; yet this branch of the service
was of less importance in the winter, than it had been in the pre-
vious, summer, because the ground was frequently rendered imprac-
ticable by snow and ice. It can also be easily understood that
the other cavalry duties, patrols, reconnaissances and dispatch
service, were much impeded by the universally organized guerilla
warfare. In many districts, especially in the south, on the Lofare and
at Le Mans, enemies were concealed in every thicket, and marks-
men lurked in all the houses, who endangered single horsemen
and small patrols; even the peasant in the field carried his gun
and fired upon the enemy, although seeing his own destruction be-
fore his eyes.
The Getnnan operationSy afler the capitulation of Sedan
had the following aims:
The conquest of Paris was considered the most important ob-
ject. For this end the armies of the two Crown Princes, under
the personal direction of the King, moved straight towards this
capital, from Sedan.
To bring about the capitulation of Metz, and of Marshal Ba-
zaine, was of the next importance: and for this purpose Prince
Frederick Charles remained behind, with more than eight Army
Corps, for the investment of both.
Then, the whole of Alsace had to be conquered, and above
18
194
all the fortress of Strasburg, the most important place in this
province. This charge had been committed to General von
Werder.
Lastly, the lines of communication from Germany to Alsace
and Lorraine, and further to the west as far as Paris, must not
only be thoroughly secured from all attacks of the enemy, but
freed from all obstructions, and prepared for the transport of rein-
forcements, provisions, ammunition, and siege guns for Paris. For
this it was important that all the fortresses between the Rhine
and Paris should be taken, especially the fortress of Toul, which
barred the principal railroad, and also, that all the Etappen roads
should be strongly occupied. This duty fell chiefly to the share
of the Landwehr, and the charge of caiiying out the most impor-
tant operations in this radius, was especially entrusted to the
Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, with the 17th Divisioji, to
which other Divisions were allotted, sometimes of Landwehr, soroe-
timea of Line, according as they were required.
In opposition to these plans, the French government endea-
voured, first of all, to place Paris in as perfect a state of defence
as possible. Almost all the disposable troops, line, sailors, and
Gardes Mobiles, were assembled here ; the heavy guns of the fleet
were used for arming the forts; the existing fortifications were
strengthened as much as possible, and new temporary works erected ;
provisions were collected in enormous quantities.
Then, new armies destined for the relief of Paris, were
formed to the south of the Loire, and in the provinces of Artois and
Picardy in the north, as well as in Normandy and Brittany in
the west.
Lastly, in Burgundy and Franche Comt^, a petty warfare
was organized under Garibaldi's Direction, for the purpose of inter-
rupting the communications of the German armies with their base
of operations. The hopes of the French defensive rested upon a
long resistance being made by Metz and Paris. So long as Metz
held out, there was always the possibility of beating the enemy
before Paris by overpowering numbers. Paris had to hold out
against an army of from 300,000 to 400,000 men, until the
aimies of relief were organized and fit for battle.
195
Thus the snccessAil defence of Paris, was the final aim
of the French defensive, just as the conquest of this city was the
ultimate object of the German offensive.
Afier the capitulation of Sedan^ the whole war, including
both the battles in the field and all the siege operations, re-
solved itself into a contest for Paris.
As the capitulation of Metz forms the peculiar crisis of this
long and complicated military process , the development of the im-
portant and extensive fighting round this fortress until -its fall, will
be given first, in the following narration ; whilst the closing event,
and the consequences resulting from the capitulation, will appear
in their corresponding places in the war round Paris.
An account will then follow of the contests around the lines
of communication, as well as those for the possession of Alsace
and Lorraine, especially the conquest of Strasburg; then the siege
of Paris at its different periods, the capitulation of Paris, and the
attempts made for its relief.
The description of the siege of Belfort, and General von Werder's
conflicts with the French eastern army, as well as* the fall of Bel-
fort, will form the conclusion.
18*
EIGHTH CHAPTER.
Thb Investment of Metz.
Marshal Bazaine had hardly withdrawn his army after the
murderous battle of Gravelotte, under the secure shelter of the
forts of Plappeville and St. Quentin; scarcely had he begun to
restore order to the thinned and shaken masses, when the bayonets
of the German outposts, already, appeared upon the heights on
the left bank ^of the Moselle, which he had vainly endeawnred to
defend on the 18th of August, and along the whole length of the
hilly horizon as far as the eye could reach, whilst the muzzles of
German cannon were turned threateningly down upon the conquered
army, from the d^bouchds and the plateaux.
The Marshal pushed forward his reconnaissances towards his
opponents across the Moselle, in an easterly direction, to Mercy-le<
Haut and Noisseville, where he had previously fought on the 14th,
and searched the country along the course of the river to the north
and south. Everywhere his patrols came upon the enemy. Every-
where the same spectacle. A circle of observation posts, composed
of foot and horse, surrounded the whole of the great fortress with
its outer forts, in a close line; behind these, the outposts were
encamped in small thickets, in folds of the ground, and in deserted
buildings which had been loopholed ; and in a third line pick-axes
and shovels were at work strengthening the line of supports and
securing them against an attack. Batteries were erected, trees
were cut down at the edges of the woods to form barricades, in
open plaqes entrenchments were thrown up, the adjacent villages
were transformed into fortresses, and each single wall and
^^^amr'^mam/v't-^ ■ •
J
197
building was prepared for defence. The railroad to Thionyille
had been destroyed, and the bridges over the Ome broken up.
The consequences of the Marshal's dilatory, undecided gene-
ralship, now stood clear and terrible before his eyes. He was
enclosed in the fortress with his whole Army, In the ' early
morning of the 19th of August, he had, at first, in all silence
withdrawn his corps into a curved line, which still encompassed
the heights of Plappeville and St. Quentin, and extended from
LiOngeville by Sey and Lessy to Lorry, Goupillon, and finally, on
the right flank, as far as the front of the Moselle fort. On the
20th, these lines were still more contracted ; the Garde was drawn
back to the eastern slope of St. Quentin, the 4th Corps to Tigno-
mont, and the 3rd Corps placed in rear of the forts of Si
Quentin and Plappeville. The 6th Corps remained in the Valley
in front of the Moselle fort, the 2nd at Longeville. On the 22iid
three Divisions of the 3rd Corps moved on to the right bank, and
the fourth Division soon after; and upon this bank entrenched
works were commenced between the forts of St. Julien and
Queulen, similar to those which had already been set on foot on
the left bank. For the Marshal now considered it of great impor-
tance to fortify his position against attacks by the Germans, until
an opportunity presented itself of breaking through. This in any
case, was very difficult to accomplifiA.
On the west side, which was Bazaine's natural line of| retreat,
a break through was quite impracticable^ Here, the country was
most unfavourable, hills stood in his front lik^ a wall. To march
down the valley towards ThionvUle, was likewise hardly feasible,
because an aimy on the march could be reached and destroyed by
a flank fire from the heights on both banks of the river. In the
same way towards the south-east, the ground formed obstacles to a
break through. The only possibility of escape was towards the
north-east Here the even undulations of the country, on a tole-
rably extended scale from the river to Colombey, would allow the
development of the army with a wider front, and although hi
this direction the departure would lead towards Laxemburg insteaid
of into the interior of France, yet the acquisition of the plateau
of Ste. Barbe would be a first and most importanl step towards
198
their deliverance, which could be followed np by further opera-
tions against the flanks of the investing army. Was this ma<
noeuvre, however , practicable? What wa» the strength of the
investing army?
As yet Bazaine was not completely isolated, he succeeded in
getting single messengers through the Qerman lines, who conveyed
reports to the Emperor and brought back news, and in the same
wavering manner, with the same absence of self confidence, that
he had previously exhibited in the guidance of the army, the
Marshal depended upon deliverance from without, instead of trust-
ing to himself alone, and to the capabilities of his own army.
^^The Emperor was endeavouring to send him help; Mac
Mahon was on the march to his relief with a new army. The
German Armies too, must take precautions against Mac Mahon's
Army; it was impos^Ue that all their forces could be united
round Metz. An energetic sortie, carried out in combination with
Mac Mahon's attack from outside, must make a way of escape
from this terrible situation."
On the 19th of August, Bazaine informed the Emperor:
"The Army is formed upon the left bank of the Moselle from
Longeville to Sansonnet and describes a curved line, passing
through the heights of Ban St. Martin in rear of the Forts St.
Quentin and Plappeville. The troops are fatigued by the inces-
sant fighting which has not allowed them two or three days rest
to supply to some extent, their material wants. The King of
Prussia was in Rezonville to-day with Moltke, and every thing
indicates that the Prussians will enclose Metz. I still intend to
get away towards the north, to MontmMy, upon the St. M^n^ould
and Chalons road, if it is not too strongly occupied. In this case
I shall turn towards Sedan and even towards M^zieres in order
to reach Gh§,lons."
On the 20th of August he informed the Emperor:
"My troops still hold the same positions. The enemy appears
to be erecting batteries, which are to be points of appui for the.
blockade. He is constantiy receiving reinforcements. In Metz we
have more than 16,000 wounded.'^
On the 22nd of August he informed the Minister of war :
199
''We are in Metz, we have provisions and ammunition. The
enemy is continually accumulating more troops, and it appears to
be his intention to enclose us. I have written to the Emperor
who will have imparted to you my dispatch. I have received Mac
Mahon's dispatch, and told him in reply what I hope to do in a
few days."
This last message probably referred to Mac Mahon*s informa-
tion about the famous flank march, which came to an end at
Sedan, and in consequence of which measures wei^ commenced,
after some days, to lend a helping hand to an attempt at relief,
by the army advancing from Ch&lons.
Then, on the evening of the 25th of August, the Marshal
first issued orders, with the object of a sortie upon a grand
scale. These are worthy of notice, because, with some modifica-
tions, they were given out, »t a later period for the battle which
took place at Noisseville. They read thus:
''The 3rd Corps will leave one Di^sion at Metz, which will
take up a position towards Grigy, in front of Queulen. The
three other Divisions, with the cavalry and artillery, will direct
their march upon Noisseville, whilst keeping back their right wing,
which will rest upon the road to Saarlouis; their left wing will
come up to the Mey wood, upon the hill between Mey and
Nouilly. The 4th Corps will place itself 1800 metres (iVs English
miles) in front of Grimont, perpendicular to the road to Ste.
Barbe, the right wing near the Mey wood, in eonnection with the
3rd Corps, the left wing 1200 metres (^/i English miles) f^om
Villers TOrme, and the Cavalry pushed forward. The Corps will cross
by the bridge above Chambi^re. The 6th Corps *will take up a
position in front of the Grimont wood behind Villers rOiine, the
right wing at equal height with the left wing of the 4th Corps,
«
the left wing as far as the 216th mile stone, drawn back on the
left of the Bouzonville road, and the cavalry in front of the bridge
below Chambi^re. The 2nd Corps, will form a second line in
rear of the 3rd Corps, with its right wing resting on the farm
Belle-Croix, and its left on the heights upon the right side of the
Vantoux ravine; it will take the road to Saarlouis, marching off
through the Porte de France «nd then through the Porte des
200
Allemands. The cavalry Divisions of the 3rd and 2nd Corps,
will place themselves upon the right flanks of their respective
CorpSy for employment as ^claireurs. The reserve Artillery and
the companies of Engineers will follow their Corps , and place
themselves in rear of the second bodies of each. The Garde, the
reserve Cavalry and the Artillery of the Army Reserve, will take
up a position between Fort St. Julien and the Grimont wood, a
cheval of the road to Bouzonville, the left wing in rear of Gha>
tillon, and the right wing directed towards the 2nd Corps, They will
pass over the Chamhi^re bridges after the 4th and 6th Corps,
probably at 7.30 o'clock a.m. The head-quarters will be in the
village of St. Julien. The whole of the Train and baggage will
move towards Chambi^re.
The 6th Corps, will leave behind, in its lines, one infantry
and one cavalry regiment, the 2nd Corps likewise, the 4th Corps
one infantry regiment only, and the 3rd Corps one battalion at Mon-
tigny. These troops will show themselves as much as possible,
and the cavalry will reconnoitre to the front.
The tendency of these arrangements was in short. '^ The
offensive of all the Corps massed together to the north-east, in
the direction of Ste, Bat^e and Malroy-Charlyy for the pur^
pose of opening the roads to Tkionville, lying nearest to the
Moselle, whilst demonstrations were made towards the east
and west.
On the morning of the 26th, the execution of the movements
conmianded began, but met with several hindrances. The weather
was cold and rainy from the commencement, so that the roads
became heavy, and both meoi and horses suffered; then, of the two
bridges newly built by the artillery, it was found that only one
was serviceable for the transit of waggons, which caused con-
siderable delay. Lastly, a violent storm with gales and toiTents
of rain came on, whilst the positions in front of St. Julien were
being taken up in sgite of it.
Under these difficult circumstances, Bazaine, considering his
plan impracticable, assembled a council of war in the farm Gri-
mont, and then commanded that the troops should again take up
their original positions. The advanced troops had come into
201
ooDtact with the German eutpostB ; slight skirmishes had taken place,
and all the German Corps upon the right bank of the Moselle
had developed, in expectation of a battle —but the French did
not attack; they returned to their old positions and remained
quiet
At the council of war held in the famiy Grimontj a con-
sultation took place, (according to Bazaine's testimony,) not only
upon tlie momentary situation of the army, but also upon the
direction of affairs for tlie future. He arrived at the conclu-
sion that it would be to the advantage of France, if the army
remained, provisionally, in Metz. By that means 200^000 of the
enemy were, at once, detained before Metz, and France gained
time to organize further resistance; the fortress of Metz also re-
quired the army, in order to be able to defend herself; without
the protection of tlie army, Metz would be unable to hold out for
fourteen days.
Allowing that these assertions are correct, that council of war
must, surely, have been obliged to acknowledge that the above
named, beneficial results for the further resistance of France,
would have been attained in a far higher degree by making a
successful sortie, and conquering the Army of Investment, and as
the investing army was rightly computed at. 200,000 men, the
question may, perhaps, be raised: Was the relative strength of
the opposing armies such, that the French council of war was,
already, obliged to forego the idea of victory?
The Army of Investment y under the Chief Command of
Prince Frederick Charles, consisted of the First Army under the
command of General von Steinmetz, viz. the I., VII. and VIII.
Corps, besides the II., III., IX. and X. Corps of the Second Army,
the 1st and 3rd Cavalry Divisions, and lastly Eummer*s Reserve
Division, with the 3rd Reserve Cavalry Brigade.
Altogether, eight- and -a- half Army Corps, and two-and-a-half
Cavalry Divisions.
After the losses in the previous battles, which, in August,
had not as yet been replaced (the reinforcements for the regiments
only began to arrive in the middle of September), the strength of
this Army, at most, was 200,000 men,
202
The French Army on the other hand, numbered 135,000
combatants*).
The German Corps stood in acircaitof about7miles (3 2^/5 Eng-
lish miles) round Metz, distributed upon both banks of the river,
whilst the French Corps were united. Although on the German
side numerous bridges had been laid over the river, and above
all, no measures had been neglected which would facilitate rapid
communication and mutual support of the Corps, yet the cir-
cumstance of their extent allowed the possibility of an attack being
made from Metz against some part of th^ investment, with supe-
riority in numbers, for many hours, over the opposing forces; so
that by a skilful use of the advantages gained at the beginning,
with a due reinforcement by reserves, the German line of de-
fence might have been completely broken through, and even
danger to the German flanks was not beyond the reach of pos-
sibility.
In fact the German Army was none too strong for its under-
taking.
It is possible that the German Direction had estimated the
French Army at 30,000 to 40,000 men below its actual strength,
and for this reason a greater number of troops had not been left;
behind for the investment. This low estimate may have been
caused by ignorance as to the presence of Lapa«set's Brigade,
of the 5th Corps, and especially by estimating the French losses
too high.
*) According to the official accounts of the capitulation of Metss,
which reckon the prisoners of war at 173,000, the strength should he set
down as still higher; yet these estimates which are prohahly made out
from the maintenance states, may also include the Garde Sedentaire etc.,
and thus do not show the comhatants of the regular Army only. A good
authority (Notes to the translation of <Hhe war round Metz hy a Prussian
General," by a Staff Officer of the Rhine Army, — which are ascribed
to Marshal Bazaine, himself) gives the strength of the French Army on the
14th of August at 168,000 men and 540 cannon, including 84 mitrailleuses,
and the loss of the three battles on the 14th, 16th and 18th of August at
32,817 men, among whom were 1642 officers. The French authority
also reckons those upon t|ie mainteaance states.
203
Public opinion in Germany, the press, which drew its
information from the army, always estimated the invested army,
at that time, at fi*om 80 — 100,000 men, and indeed still lower.
(The Prussian '^Staatsauzeiger'* , expressed astonishment, in the
beginning of October, at the inactivity of Marshal Bazaine, who,
even at the moment of the blockade, had an army of 80,000
men under his command.)
It is, however, also possible, that the strength of Bazaine*s
Army was not underrated by the German Army Dii*ection, and
yet the investmg army could not be strengthened, or this would
have been done. By so doing the Third and Fourth Armies would
have been weakened. Besides, dispositions had been made for the
dispatch of troops to replace casualties, and for the concentration
of a new Army Corpsy on the Seille, under the command of the
Grand Duke of Mecklenburg -Schwerin] these reinforcements
could not, however, arrive until the beginning and middle of
September.
Thus, in regard to the numerical strength of the opponents,
Bazaine's prospects of breaking through were not, originally, so
very unfavourable, although the country, doubtless, was very dif-
ficult, and on the north-east side only, would allow of a proper
development.
The opinion of the council of war, upon the power of resist-
ance of the fortress of Metz, is very surprising. It was always
considered the strongest place in France, and was the principal
depdt of the French Army; it had been rebuilt according to the
latest principles in the art of fortification, surrounded with strong
outer forts, and was naturally very favourably situated. But it
has been proved without doubt, that as late as the 14th of
August, the fortress was not in a condition capable of defence;
that the forts were unarmed, and not. completely finished in the
interior. In the battle of Courcelles, single detachments of the
German advanced troops, pressed forward, unhindered, up to the
glacis of the forts.
It was besides decided, in the council of war, to establish
partisan detachments both in the cavalry and the infantry, for
1
204
the purpose of fatiguing the enemy by coups de main and, at
the same time, of raising tlie moral element of their own army.
On the 30th of August, the prospect of a successful attempt
to break through appeared to be approaching. A messenger, who
had been sent by Bazaine to the Emperor, returned with the fol-
lowing information:
''Your dispatch of the 19th, received in Rheims. I am moving
iit the direction of Montm^dy; the day after tomorrow I shall
have passed the Aisne, and then, acting according to circumstances,
will come to your assistance."
Until now nothing had been lost. On the contrary, by sparing
the army since the battle of Gravelotte, it had regained the soli-
dity necessary for a powerful offensive. To undertake the attack
Upon the investment^ in connection with Mac Mahon, offered the
most favourable chances.
Bazaine undertook this attack.
BATTLE OP NOISSEVILLE.
On the 31st of August and 1st of September.
If, even previously, under normal conditions, an offensive
attack from Metz had not been entirely without prospect of suc-
cess, Mac Mahon's march towards the Meuse, in the last days of
August, produced circumstances, which now gave a very favourable
turn of affairs for Bazaine.
In order to oppose the probable attack of the Army of
Chalons, in case the Third and Fourth Armies had not succeeded
in stopping it, the Army of Investment had taken up a position,
during the last days of August, which left but a comparatively
small force for the investment proper, whilst strong masses were
pushed forward to the north-west of Metz, in the direction of
Montm^dy and Longwy, as far as the line Verdun-Thionville, and
beyond.
On the evening of the 30th of August, the Head-Quartei*s of
the Army were in Malancourt
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205
The Army was disposed in the following manner:
The 25th (Hessian) Division 'stood beyond Pierrevillers ,
2 miles (9^/5 English miles) from Metz; the 18th Divisioii and
the Artillery Corps of the IX. Corps beyond Roncourt^ at the
same distance.
The II. Corps was detached for observation towards Aumetz
and Longuyon^ about 5 miles (27^/5 English miles) to the north-
west of Metz.
The lU. Corps was at Doncourt and Coflnans, 2^/3 miles to
the west of Metz.
The X. Corps was in reserve, in rear of the IX. Corps, in
the neighbourhood of Marange. On the jother hand, only the fol-
lowing divisions stood in the neighbourhood of Metz:
Rummer's Division in rear of the line Malroy — Charly, • 1
mile (43/5 English miles) north of Metz.
The Ist Infantry Division, in and behind the line Failly-
Servigny-Noisseville, at the same distance to the north-east of the
fortress.
Joining the left flank of these, the 2nd Infantry Division stood
ft'om Ars-Laquenexy as far as Mercy-le-Haut, which was occupied
by the advanced Iroops.
The YU. Corps, a cheval of the Moselle, held the southern
part of the line of investment
The occupation of the whole of the westeiii part, the left
bank of the Moselle, devolved on the VUI. Corps,
Accordingly the tract of country most endangered, was the
most favourable for Bazaine, from Malroy to Flanville, a line ^/^
of a mile (3^/3 English miles)' in length, and was occupied by
only three Divisions, that is to say by barely 30,000 men; the
other parts of the investment line were still more * weakly oc-
cupied.
It is uncertain, whether Bazaine possessed accurate informa-
tion as to the situation of affairs. At all events, his attack on
the 31st of August was attempted at the right spot, namely where
the country was favourable, and where there was a prospect of
escaping to the north.
The weather improved on the 29th, after the rain had poured
206
down^ unceasingly, on the 27th and 28th. In the mean time the
2nd Corps had been directed to Montigny, and had extended be-
tween the Moselle and Le Sablon, whilst Marshal Leboeof took up
a position with the right wing of his Corps resting upon the
Seille.
On the morning of the 30th of August, the Corps Comman.
dants who, for two days, had been in communication by telegraph
with the head-quarters, were informed that an operation might
possibly, be carried oul at 1 o'clock p.m. The issue of two days
rations of biscuit and bacon, was ordered to be set on foot at
once. These orders, with little secrecy, were widely promulgated
in the corps, so that in a short time they were known throughout
the whole camp and town. Towards 10 o'clock, however, it was
communicated that the intended operations would be postponed,
and finally, in the evening, dispositions were issued, similar to
those for the 25th of August, but with the following modifi-
cations :
'*The 3rd Corps will commence its movement at an early
hour; its 3rd Division will remain in Metz. The 4th Corps will
reach the Moselle at 6 o'clock, at the latest, and cross it by the
three bridges simultaneously. The 6th Corps will, as anticipated,
begin the passage at 7.15 o'clock, the Garde at 8.30 o'clock, the
Artillery of the Army Reserve at 9.15 o'clock, and the reserve
Artillery at 10 o'clock."
Accordingly the passage of the 3rd Corps (Garde, 4th and
6th) which were upon the left bank, was begun at 6 o'clock, on
the morning of the 31st of August, by the three Moselle bridges,
and the movement was completed at 5 o'clock in the evening.
The Artillery of the Army Reserve, which, for some days past
had been placed under the command of General Bourbaki, did
not reach the plateau until 6 o'clock; the only troops which ar-
rived after it was General Desveaux's Cavalry Corps, which had
been foimed on the 25th of August, from the Cavalry Division of
the Garde, and from General Forton's reserve Cavalry Division;
its strength was ten regiments.
It appears astounding and to have been a fanl^, that the
artillery of the Army Reserve was not moved across in front of
207
the other Corps, whilst, jnst at the commenceinent, a sufficient
artillery could not be employed in the German positions opposite*
In other respects the concentration of the army b^an at the
right time. As early as 7.30 o'clock, the German outposts of the
1st Division, observed great masses of the enemy, forming up in
position near the Forts St. Julien and Bell^-Croix, with artillery
in their front; at the same .time the outposts of Rummer's Divi-
sion discovered columns of the enemy, which were estimated at the
strength of a Division; clouds of dust in the background, led to
the conclusion that sti'oug reserves were coming up.
The situation was a very hazardous one^ for the Army
of Investment
At 8 o'clock in the morning, LeboBuf^s troops occupied the
positions assigned to them, namely three Infanti'y Divisions and
the Cavalry opposite Noissevilky the right wing tlirown back
upon the Saarlouis road, and the left wing upon the hill between
Nouilly and Mey. The 2nd Corps stood behind the 3rd, with
the right wing near the farm Belle-Croix, and the left upon the
hill of Valli^res.
Within about an hour, the attack of the French might take
place with a force of at least, 40,000 men. The German troops
in the first line were insufficient to repulse them, and in all pro-
bability, would have to give up their first positions. Reinforce-
ments for Kummer's Division and the 1st. Corps could only arrive
by degrees, after several hours, and indeed, owing to the provi-
sional state of aflPairs, from the north side only; on the east and
west the investment could not be slackened, because it was not
known upon which side the attack Was directed, nor whether
the development towards the north wan anything more than a de-
monstration.
Had the French 3rd and 2nd Corps been able to obtain rein-
forcements only quite gradually, yet at the same time uninterrupt-
edly, and the sortie, even in the afternoon, been able take the form
of a veritable break through of . the whole Army, Bazaine's plan,
of having all his Corps upon the right bank before attacking, may,
certainly, be defended.
But the whole development lasted much too long, and the
208
morning and midday were spent in demonstrationB ^ whilst the
Germans could qnietly take precautions to meet the attack.
At the commencement, the French sortie appeared to be e$pe-
cially directed towards the east. The columns, observed to the
south of Fort St. Jnlien, Lapassefs Brigade, suddenly broke for-
ward against the German 2nd Division, and at 9 o*clock in the
morning, were already in possession of Colombey.
Before 8 o'clock, on the first reports of the movements of
the enemy, General von Manteuffel had made the following dis-
positions :
"Ist) The 3rd Infantry Brigade of the 2nd Division, with
two batteries, will move to the SaarbrUcken road, in line
with Puche.
2nd) The Ist Cavalry Brigade of the 3rd Cavalry Divi-
sion will march towards Retonfay, for the purpose of cover-
ing the country between the SaarbrUcken and Saarlouis roads.
(The whole of the 3rd Cavalry Division aiTived there, by
order of General von Steinmetz.)
3rd) One Cavalry Regiment and one Battery of Kummer's
Division will move towards Ste. Barbe.
At the same time, a notification was sent to the Prince Com-
mander in Chief and to the General von Steinmetz.
Prince Frederick Charles, having in view the possibility of
an attack by the ChUlons Anny, would not give up his position
against Montm^y, but commanded all the Corps, at a distance
from Metz, to concentrate nearer to the fortress.
General von Voigts-Rhetz immediately made the disposable
portion of the X. Corps move back, by the bridge laid over the
Moselle at Hauconcourt, to the right bank, in conformity with
the arrangements, previously made by the Prince, for such a
case; the following orders were, besides, issued from the head-
quarters at Malanconrt, in view of the above named general dis-
position. ^
To General von Manstein, to concentrate the 25th Hessian Divi-
sion at Pierrevillers, the 18th Infantry Division and the Artillery
Corps at Roncourt, at 8.30 o'clock a.m:
209
To General von Fransecky, to concentrate the II. Anny Corps,
at 9.30 o'clock a.m. between Briey and Anbou^.
To General von Alvensleben XL, to march off, at 9.30 o'clock
a.m., with the III. Army Gor4>s, from Doncourt and Conflans, upon
St Privat.
The Prince Commander ixt Chief i*epaired to the hill le Hon-
mont, north of Ffeves, from whence a wide survey of the whole
valley of the Moselle, and of the fighting ground, could be ob-
tained; he arrived there at 11 o'clock a.m.
The French, as mentioned, had been successful in their first
attack, directed against Colombey, It was very soon evident that
the security of the right flank and, at the same time, a demon-
stration, were the only objects at this point; for no very ener-
getic attack was made upon the line Aubigny — Meix5y-le-Haut, and
after a long, stationary fight, there was a pause, which lasted
until 5 o'clock p.m.
The state of the fight appeared to threaten so little danger
here, that Major General von Pritzelwitz, who was bringing his
Brigade (the 28th) from Pouilly to support the 2nd Division,
allowed his men, quietly, t-o warm up their dinners at Courcelles.
The cooking began at 3.30 o'clock, but was not finished, for the
attack was renewed upon Aubigny soon after.
Bazaine was quke right to be satisfied here with the posses-
sion of Colombey, for he had chosen the plateau of Ste^ Barbe
as the object of the principal attack. It was now expected that
an energetic, powerfully supported, assault would be made there.
Still, however, it did not come to this; nothing was under-
taken upon the left wing but unimportant demonstrations along the
Moselle.
At 10.30 o'clock, a single cavalry regiment and a single
battery advanced against the position M air oy- Char hfy and General
von Kummer was able to drive away this detachment with some
shots fh)m his rifled guns. Neither can the fire of Fort St. Julien,
which now began, be considered as an efficient preparation for
the attack at this point, for the heavy shot, thrown at intervals,
inflicted no losses whatever on General von Kummer's troops.
14
210
By thiB long introduction of the attack, the Germans gained
time for new counter measures. As the main body of the French
Army, near Forts' St. Jnlien and Belle-Oroix, was constantly growing
stronger, and, on tlie whole, it might well be assumed that Bazaine
intended to move for\}^ard against the Plateau of Ste, Barbe, the
3rd Infantry Brigade was formed up at Retonfay and Senden's
Landwehr Division at Ste. Barbe. The detachments, appointed to
reinforce the X. and IX. Army Corps, were also by this time
approdching considerably nearer to the scene of the impending
battle. The head of the 25th Division after marching by Hau-
concourt and crossing the Moselle had arrived, at 2,30 o'clock
p. m. , at Antilly, immediately in rear of the line Malroy — Charly.
Nevertheless, at 4 o'clock, when the attack on the French side
really began, the chances were still very much in Bazaine's favour.
Three of the enemy's Corps were still absorbed in watching for the
Army of Chalons, and, within the next twelve houre, it was im-
possible that more than 60,000 Germany, at the most, could be
concentrated between Malroy and Flanville, if a skilful demonstration
was made towards the south, during the break through, for the
purpose of engaging the German VII. Corps. These 60,000 men,
moreover, could only be brought together by degrees; for the
next few hours, there were only from 30,000 to 40,000 men
available.
The French attack, consequently, began at 4 o'clock p. m.,
after the considerable forces, which had come up on the right bank,
had passed some hours in making coffee.
The 4th Corps had taken up its position perpendicular to the
Ste. Barbe road, the 6th Corps prolonged this line, with the left
wing upon the road to Bouzonville. The Garde, tlie Army Reserve
Artillery, and the Cavalry Corps were coming up between Fort
St. Julien and the Grimont wood, the left wing behind Chatillon.
The Corps, forming the first line, stood from the right to the
left wing thus : the 3rd, the 4th and the 6th. These would have
to commence the attack.
Towards 2 o'clock. Marshal Bazaine had gone forward upon
the road to Ste. Barbe, and on the left of this road (in line with
the 261st mile stone) he had caused a breast -work to be erected
211
for a battery, for the support and introduction of the projected
attack upon the line Servigny-Failly. At 4 o'clock, six 12-pounder8
fi'om the Reserve of the 4th Corps were placed behind this breast-
work, and another battery from the same reserve, was posted on
the right of the road, opposite Poix. In addition to these, three short
24-pounderB were taken out of Fort St. Julien, in order to be
placed in position, on the right of the road, in front of the farm
Grimont.
The fire from these batteries, which began at 4 o'clock, was,
however, not sufficient to silence the German batteries posted
opposite. On the contrary, these very soon gained the ascendency,
and made the French very sensible of the want of their remaining
reserve artillery. Nevei*theless, the French attacking columns went
forward with energy. Metman's Division was directed against
ISoniUy, Montaudon's Division, supported by Fauvart-BastouPs Divi-
sion, attacked Noisseville and, with one Brigade on the right, also
attacked Montoy and Flanville.
The right intention lay at the foundation of tliese movements;
which was to take the commanding position of Ste. Barbe, whilst
the enemy was engaged in the centre, and his left flank surrounded
by Retonfay.
In spite of the strong artillery fire from the German positions,
in which, at 5 o'clock, all the batteries of the I. Corps took part,
Leb(£ufs Corps succeeded in advancing from Nouilly, against
Noissevilhy in throwing back the German troops upon Servigny^
in establishing itself in and round Noisseville, in taking the batteries
in rear, which were in position before Servigny, by the fire of
skirmishers, and forcing them to drive off; and then in bringing a
number of batteries into position,, which vigorously bombarded
Servigny. Coincy was occupied, at the same time, by General
Lapasset from Colombey. It was now 6.30 o'clock.
With this, however, the good conduct of the sortie, again came
to an end. Instead of sending sufficient reserves after the divisions
which had g^e forward so successfully, which Bazaine was quite
able to do, he left the first line, for a time, entirely to itself; the
4th and 6th Corps waited Cor a further progress to be made
by the 3rd before they attacked on their side; the 3rd Corps was
14 *
212
not supported by the 2nd^ and' hardly advanced at all — the
attack was paralyzed and oame completely to a stand. At dark,
however, Memerty's Prnssian Brigade succeeded in re-taking Noisse-
ville. j4td 0^ clock in the evening the most important positions were
again in possession of the GermanSy and the fight was considered
at an end. The German troops in the first line were, indeed,
kept under arms for the night and the Landwehr, from Ste. Barbe,
were drawn nearer; but the 2nd Infantry Brigade with the
Artillery Corps, were moved back into bivouac.
Then, suddenly, at 10 o'clock at night, a fresh attack ensued,
upon the whole line, with the greatest vehemence. Whether this
was conducted by Bazaine's arrangement, and in consequence of a
premeditated plan, or through accidental circumstances, has not
been made clear. According to a good French authority*), the
impulse which led to it, proceeded from General Changarnier in
an hour of general irresolution. Sti'ong French masses went for-
ward from Leboeufs Corps, upon the Saarbriicken road, then
turning to the noii;h, attacked Fianvilie and took the village with
the bayonet, after an obstinate defence.
From here they turned towards Retonfay and Noisseville, and
forced the German troops to retire as far as Chateau Gras, upon
the plateau of Ste. Barbe.
At the same time General Ladmirault had gone forward,
with Cissey's Division, on the right of the road to Ste. Barbe,
Grenier's Division on the leflr of it, and Lorencez's Division in the
second body, and a concentrated attack by surprise was made upon
Servignj/y which was carried out partly by Metman's Division and
partly by the troops of the 4th Corps, Cissey's Division. The
French succeeded in getting possession of the greatest part of the
village. Grenier's Division and General Cissey's 2nd Brigade, directed
their attack upon Poix, to the north-west of Servigny, and upon
Failly, but with only partial success, as this night action was, in
general, conducted without steadiness on the French side, and
without lasting force. Servigny was very soon rettaken by the
Germans, and the only positions maintained by the French, were
i
•) Journal d'un officier de I'arm^e du Rhin. Bruxelles, C. Muquardt.
213
NoiBseville, Goincy, Flanville and the country round these villages.
Upon the left wing of the French line of battle, Marshal Canrobert
had taken possession of ChieuUes and Vany with his partisan-
companies; General Tlxier was established on the right, General
Lafont de Villiers on the left, and General Levassor - Sorval in
reserve, and cavalry fronted the d^bouch^ from Malroy.
The retreating movement of the 4th and drd Corps, which
soon followed, obliged Canrobert likewise to I'etire.
The battle was concluded for this day^ and the result of
the ^\st of August wAs, that the French Arfny — after having
been in possession of the most important positions ^ and, in a
tactical point of view, had been able to carry out its break-
through — was turned back, into nearly the same situation which
it had been in be/ore the attack, from the want of reserves
being brought up in time.
Once in the course * of the afternoon , when Colombey and
Noisseville were taken and Servigny strongly thi'eatened, and
again towards 11 o'clock p. m., when even Flanville and Noisseville
had been taken, and a concentric attack could have been made
upon Failly, the French attacking front was so extended, that
nothing but the want of will on the part of the Generals, stood in
the way of bringing up sti'ong reserves.
General Ladmirault had not, as yet, exhausted his reserves,
the 6th Corps had hardly been engaged, tli^ Garde and 2nd Corps
were still completely intact; the numerous cavalry, which could
act under favourable circumstances against the roads to Saarlouis
and Saarbrttcken, by which they could threaten to surround the
enemy or attack the foe posted at Retonfay, had not yet taken
any serious part in the combat, with the exception of the fight at
Coincy.
The difficulties connected with the development of large masses
from narrow defiles, cannot well . be mentioned, after the first body
had already placed itself in possession of villages and other positions,
extending over a mile of front (4^5 English miles).
But, how little Marshal Bazaine had the intention of pursuing
a plan to break through at any price, is at once proved by his
214
leaving the battle-field, at 9 o'clock in the evening, before the
last attack, and returning to St. Julien.
Bazaine was kept back by the fear of being destroyed
by the pursuing German Army^ even after a successful break
through.
Although, however, the favourable moment had been lost on
the 3lBt of August, and the only advantage that can be mentioned
as remaining to the French, was the occupation of the villages of
Coincy, Flanville and especially Noisseville, the attempt to break
through was repeated, on the 1st. of September, and naturally,
under far more difficult circumstances, and with far less prospect
of success.
The German Army ^^iood in readiness, on the 1st of September,
in the following order:
Kummer's Division and the I. Army Corps, in the first line,
upon the battlefields of the previous night; in the second line,
at Antilly, and on the march to Charly, the 2dth and 18th
Divisions (the latter had been marching all through the night), so
that the whole of the IX. Army Corps was now ready for the
fight upon the right bank of the Moselle.
The VII. and VIII. Army Corps , as on the previous day ;
the n., in. and X. Corps, upon the left bank of the Moselle, to-
wards Montm^dy; the first two however were only l^/a miles
(6®/io English) from Metz, and the last were immediately on
the river, so that it would be possible for them to engage in the
fight of the investing army within some hours.
The French dispositions for this day, again indicated an
assault upon Ste. Barbe, but this was already restricted, by the
command to rest satisfied with maintaining the positions of the
3 1st of August, until the evening, in case the enemy had been
reinforced.
The fight began at 4 o'clock a. m. on the German side, by
the 3rd Infantry Brigade endeavouring to re-conquer the village
of Noisseville, which had been wrested from it.
The morning was very misty, so- that only the tops of the
hills could be distinguished; in the valley, however, only the
objects near at hand were visible.
215
The first attack of the Germans upon the village, occupied
by Glinchant's Brigade and the 32nd Line Regiment, failed; the
French held the village and even proceeded to make sorties.
General von Manteuffel brought up the 2nd Infantry Brigade,
and begged for assistance from General von Manstein, who support-
ed him by sending at first, the 1st Hessian Infantry Brigade, the
Artillery Corps of the IX. Corps, and the Hessian Cavalry Brigade;
and later, after the 18th Infantry Division had arrived in rear
of Kummer's Division, the 2nd Hessian Infantry Brigade.
As soon as the Hessians were on the march to Ste. Barbe,
the second attack upon Noisseville was attempted by the 2nd
Infantry Brigade. It succeeded, with very heavy losses, in
taking the outskirts and part of the village, but the French brought
fresh troops into the fight, and also several mitrailleuses, and
again drove the Germans out. Three times the outskirts were
taken and again lost, until at last. General von Manteuffel desisted
from the offensive, withdrew his troops, and contented himself with
opposing the further progress of the enemy.
It was now 8 o'clock a. m.
In the meanwhile, the announcement of the re-commencement
of the battle had reached Prince Frederick Charles at Malancourt,
to which place he had ridden back, from the hill at F^ves, on
the previous evening.
Here, in the head-quarters of the Army, between 7 and 8
o'clock, the fire of cannon was now audible in the direction of
Montm^dy, as to the signification of which, conjectures only could
be formed. It was the thunder of the action raging round
Bazeilles, 12 miles (55 V5 English) off, the commencement of the
battle of Sedan. Soon however the hot engagement on the right
bank of the Moselle, drowned the dull. roar in the distance.
The Prince commanded Lieutenant General von Alvensleben
to send an Infantry Division, strengthened by Artillery, towards
Maizi^res-lies-Metz, made a part of the X. Army Corps move back
upon the right bank of the Moselle, and shortly after 8 o'clock,
he again took up his point of observation of the previous day.
As the state of the battle of Noisseville appeared hazardous.
General von Zastrow received an order by telegraph, at 9. 15
216
o'clock, to lead his whole Corps to the assistance of General von
Mantenffers left wing, and to leave only a single brigade in the
line of investment.
Simultaneously with this, General von Gdben received orders
to push the reserve of the VUI. Army Corps to the right, in order
to be able eventually, to relieve the investing line of the VII.
Corps entirely.
General von Kummer was directed, at 9. 30 o'clock, to
place himself at the disposal of General von Manteuffel, with the
whole Division, as soon as it had been relieved in its position
by the leading brigade of the X. Army Corps.
Whilst the German Corps were distributed, in this well con-
sidered and careful manner for mutual support and relief, Marshal
Leboeuf, on the French side, fought the hard battle of Noisse-
ville, with his Corps almost alone, and even after the action had
become general, and extended from Failly to beyond Flanville,
the 4th and 6th Corps did not engage in such a manner as to
render him support. Too large a part of these corps remained
inactive, in reserve. The 2nd Corps and the Garde did not even
leave their reserve position this day.
Consequently, after the attack of the Germans upon Noisse-
ville had been repulsed, no energetic offensive was taken, which
might have turned to good account the advantages, won with so
much difficulty. Marshal Leboeuf was satisfied with holding his
position, and was obliged passively to allow one battery after
another to be brought into position to the south of Ste. Barbe,
opposite Noisse ville, for the purpose of driving him out of the
village by artillery fire. The 1st Hessian Infantry Brigade, which
arrived at Ste. Barbe at 8 o'clock, and five Hessian foot batteries,
which came up a quarter of an hour later, appeared exactly at
the right time for General von Manteuffel. Not long after the
Hessian Cavalry Brigade also arrived, and was directed 4o support
General von Memerty (3rd Infantry Brigade) behind his left wing,
to the north-east of Ste. Barbe.
General von Kummer reported that Wrangel's Division (18th)
had arrived, and occupied the Bois de Failly with Below's Brigade
217
(36tb) and one battery, as well as that the 2nd Hessian Infantry
Brigade was on the march to Ste. Barbe.
A communication also came soon after, from the Prince Com-
mander in Chief; that the X. Army Corps was to move over the
Moselle in rear of Kummer's Division.
It therefore now appeared possible to General von Manteuffel
to gain possession of the village of Noisseville, and at firat, he
made 50 guns open fire, amongst which were the Hessian
batteries, in order to shower rifled cannon shot upon the
village itself, as well as upon the French reserves, standing
behind it
At the same time, the 28th Infantry Brigade carried out an
energetic attack by Puche, against Flanmlkj which was successful,
and was then directed against Comcy. It managed to drive
Fauvart-Bastours French Division from its position, and back to
the Saarbrttcken road in a line with Coiney. As this retreating
movement endangered the right wing of the Brigade of Montaudon's
Division, which had occupied Moutoy and Flanviile, Marshal
Leboeuf ordered Fauvaii; Bastoul's Division to go forward again.
This did not however succeed, and in face, of the great losses
among the troops, Marshal Leboeuf himself, now gave the order
to retire.
This entailed the retreat of Montaudon's Division also.
Noisseville began to bm*n in several places. The bombard-
ment had been continued for almost two hours, and at 11 o^clock
a. m. the capture of the village was effected.
Senden's Landwehr Division and Memerty's Brigade moved
into JVoissemlley amid inconsiderable fighting with the gradually
departing troops of the French 3rd Corps, who had held out
so brilliantly for seven hours. Thus the chief fight came to
an end.
But there had also been hard fighting opposite Failly and
Servigny, and, in a south-easterly direction, a demonstration had
been undertaken from Mets against Mercy-le^Hauty which engaged
the German VII. Army Corps.*
These fights began at about 8 o'clock in the morning, and
took the following course: •
218
The 4th Corps maintained its position for a long .time, in
front of Poix and Servigny; Lorencez's Division had replaced
Gissey's Division in the first line, but was unable to gain any
ground, and retired. Oeneral Tixier had begun the attack upon
Failly, with the 6th Corps, when he perceived the immobility of
the 4th Corps and afterwards its retreat, drawing with it the
whole of Canrobert's Corps. At 11 o'clock a. m. the general
reti'eat was commanded.
The Germans had gained the victory here, with E^ummer's
Division, and Below's Brigade. The Hessian Division, and the
Artillery Corps of the IX. Army Corps still remained in reserve.
Upon the extreme left flank, masses of French had advanced
against Mercy4e*Haut , to whom the castle had to be yielded.
Towards 11 o'clock, it was re-taken, but again had to be evacuated
at 12 o'clock.
Soon after, the influence of the fight in the centre, and upon
the right wing, began to take ^ effect; the French retired here also,
and at 4 o'clock, the old positions were again taken up.
The loss of the German Army, in the two day's contest,
amounted to 120 officers and 2358 men in killed and wounded.
The loss in the French Army amounted to 141 officers and
2664 men.
The latter took up their old positions again on the 2nd of
September; the 2nd and 3rd Corps upon the right bank, and the
remainder of the Corps upon the left bank.
On the same day, Prince Frederick Charles, after receiving
tidings of the action at Beaumont, and being set at rest in regard
to an attack by Mac Mahon's Army, issued new orders relative to
the Investment of Metz, in conformity with which the position of
the II. Army Corps, to the north-west, was confined to the line
. Arbou6 — Briey, whilst the remaining corps returned to the enclos-
ing of the fortress; and now, the south-eastern portion of the
investment line was especially strongly occupied, for after the
unsuccessful attempt to break through towards the north-east, the
probability of a sortie in the direction of Strasburg was increased.
Also upon the following day, the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-
Stchwerinie Army Corps, the XIU., consisting of the I7th Infantry
219
Division, and von Selchow'ff and von Gayl's Landwehr Divisions,
wliich until now had been concentrated on the Seille, amved for
the reinforcement of the Investing Army,
This was now distributed as follows (v. the map "Investment
of Metz, on the 3rd of September 1870"):
The First Army, with the Grand Duke's Army Corps, held the
right, the Second Army the left bank of the Moselle ; and Kummer's
Division retained the position Malroy — Charly, which it had
hitherto occupied, but later changed to the neighbouring position
on the left bank; the I. Army Corps joined on to its left flank,
and extended its own left wing until it commanded the Saar-
brflcken road. Then, the space from tliis road to Pouilly, was
occupied by the Grand Duke. The VII. Army Corps stood upon
both banks of the Moselle to the south of Metz, and had detached
Woyna's Brigade to the Seille, in order to hold the passage across
this river. The country between this Corps and the Grand Duke's
was occupied by Count GrOben's Cavalry Division, whose lino of
out-posts was pushed forward as far as the Chateau Frescaty.
Upon the left bank, the VIII. Army Corps occupied the space
from Jussy to Chatel, keeping, however, its Artillery Corps and
one Infantry Division in reserve, so that it could be immediately,-
detached to the Moselle valley, for the relief of the VII. Army
Corps, which in the event of Bazaine's attempting a soi*tie to the
south-east, would move back on the Seille. The lU. Army Corps
stood further towards the north, from Chatel to Saulny, and the
X. Army Corps was in the valley of the Moselle, to the north of
MetZ; and upon the heights of Saulny as far as Marange. At this
point, Bazaine's natural line of retreat to the interior of France,
the IX. Army Corps stood in reserve, from Roncourt to PieiTe-
villers, with its head-quarters in Montois.
In addition to this, Hartmann's Cavalry Division was detached
towards the neighbourhood of Jouaville, for the purpose of observ-
ing the tract of country ftom Lqp;uyon to Etain, aiid securing
the lines of communication of the Mouse Army against the raids,
which were attempted by the Freach from Verdun.
The head-quarters of the Army, remained, provisionally, in
220
Malanconrt, bat soon after, on the 9th of September, they were
removed to Corny.
On the 2nd of September, the news of the battle of Sedan
spread through the German Army, and thundering shouts of joy
bore the tidings to the French camp.
The chances of success now left to the Marshal for a break-
through, were extremely small. In .the first place the investing
army wan stronger , and very judiciously distributed ; it had been
made aware of the weakness of its former positions in each
particular, and was exalted by the feeling of having gained a
victory under* unfavourable circumstances; then on the other side,
the battle of NoissevtUe had produced a deplorable moral con-
dition in the French army. Mistrust in their leaders and in their
own powers gained possession, more and more, of the minds of
the officers and soldiera, who were always conquered.
The belief, that Metz might have been left on the Slst of
August, spread universally, and, everywhere. Marshal Bazaine's
generalship and conjectured views were most severely criticised.
And in fact the conduct of the Marshal roused the con-
jecture, that he wished to act, not only as a General hut
also as a Statesman; that he wished, independently, to make
military action accord with political events; that he even
believed, he could pursue his own ambitious views and at the
same time the interests of France, The temptation, of playing
an important political role in the general overthrow of existing
affairs, when at the head of the largest military body which
France possessed, no doubt came home to an ambitious Bonapartist
General.
When Bazaine directed the break-through on the 30th of
August, he knew that Mac Mahon's army was on the march. He
very probably hoped to beat Prince Frederick Charles in co-
operation with Mac Mahon, but it could scarcely have been his
plan to undertake the hazardous venture, by himself alone. Even
after a successful break-throng^ if he had been followed by the
whole of the Prince's Army, whilst Mac Mahon might also, have
been overcome on his side, not only his own plans would have
come to an end, but the army also. Consequently he did not
221
hasten the attack, always expecting to hear the thnndei*of the
cannon of the Chalons Army, from the north-west. Then, when
the attack upon the mvesting Army had heen developed, and there
appeared to be a very good chance of effecting a break-through,
he decided, notwithstanding the advantage gained, to |^o no further,
but to content himself with holding what he had got, because, on
this day, nothing could be discovered of the Army of Chalons,
but perhaps on the following day he might reckon on Mac Mahon's
assistance.
When, however, on the 1st of September still no trace could
be seen of the expected army of relief, Bazaine willingly re-
conciled himself to the necessity of remaining in Metz. He had
satisfied his military duty by attempting to break through ; as the
second condition ,* the help promised by the Emperor had failed,
his remaining in Metz was wiser in every respect, and also in
regard to his own ambitious plans. Probably Mac Mahon was
conquered, he, Bazaine, was the commander of the only army
which Fiance possessed, the Emperor had become an impossibility,
France must now conclude peace, and Metz was the pivot round
which the peace negotiations turned.
Thus the Marshal might have calculated.
That he calculated falsefyy is learnt by a succession oif
great events which developed themselves, in a manner unexpected
by all the world.
When the war was prolonged beyond all reckoning, when the
army of Metz was in want of the necessary means of existence,
Bazaine fell from his commanding sHuation, into one in which he
was completely governed. He was obliged to submit, very much
against his will, to the plain military laws of war, although, even
at the last moment, fourteen days before the capitulation, he
endeavoured to open political negotiations, and to give political
importance to his position, by sending General Boyer to the German
head-quai*ters.
The military operations at Metz, which were still attempted
by the French after the battle of Noisseville, are of subordinate
importance. They were confined to skhrmishes with the enemy,
and some sorties on a larger scale, for the purpose of occupying
n
222
the Aany, and acquiring gmall advantages for the out-post posi-
tions, as well as of capturing provisions. No attempt was again made
to break through.
The most important, and at the same time the last under-
takings of this kind, were the attacks upon the position of Kum*
mer's Division on the 2Qd and 7th of October.
On the first named day the sortie was directed against La-
donchamps, Ste. Agathe, St.* Remy and Bellevue. The Germans
were driven from their most advanced line, from Ladonchamps and
Ste. Agathe, but held the fortified second line, and in the further
progress of the fight completely repulsed the French.
German loss: 6 officers and 109 men killed and wounded.
On the 7th of October, the French made an offensive manoBUvre
on an extended scale. Towards 2 o'clock in the aftenioon, on
the left bank of the Moselle, French infantry columns with two or
three batteries were directed against Bellevue, St. Remy, Grandes-
Tapes and Petites-Tapes, and threw back the advanced posts of
Rummer's Division, from all their stations, after an obstinate
defence.
General von Voigts-Rhetz sent the 38th Infantry Brigade to
their support; General von Alvensleben II. dispatched the 9th
Infantry Brigade towards the wood of Woippy.
•This .attack on two sides caused the enemy to retire, and it
ended, at the commencement of dusk, with the re-capture of all
the positions.
But a demonstration had also been made by French troops,
on the right bank, against the line Malroy — Charly, and such
numerous masses of troops had come up against the I. Army
Corps at Villers TOrme, that General von Manteuffel sounded the
alarm for his whole Corps, and made them move into position;
the VII. Corps was, also, deployed, and the Prince Commander in
Chief made arrangements for the support of the I. Corps by detach-
ments of the X. Army Corps.
The fight in front of the I. Army Corps had, at first, the
character of a demonstration, and ended in a hot tirailleur fight
upon the line Villers-rOrme — Nouilly.
No attack was made against the line Malroy — Charly.
223
At 6.30 o'clock p.m., the fight on the right bank of tlie
Moselle was silent.
The loss on the German side, in killed and wounded, amounted
to 65 officers, and 1665 men, and chiefly affected the Landwehr,
as Kummer's Division had been most severely engaged.
The situation of the enclosed army, under the twofold in-
fluence of moral and physical suffering, became more deplorable
every day. The months of September and October brought a
great many days of rain, and made the bivouacs outside the town,
in which the whole mass of troops was distributed, between and
outside the Forts, comfortless and unhealthy. The scarcity of the
necessaries of life was detrimental in a still higher degree ; it was
always becoming more palpable, and from its monotony engendered
disease. Horseflesh had been almost the only food, besides bread,
during the greater part of the time the investment lasted. The
bread was given out daily in rations of 500 gi*ammes , and in
the beginning of October, in rations of even 300 and 250 grammes,
only. The number on the sick list increased daily.
The German Army also suffered extremely from remaining
stationary so long upon great battle fields, in wet weather. The
sick list was extraordinarily great, and in many divisions amounted
to 50 per cent.
In order to hasten the capitulation, the project was, at one
time, proposed, of advancing against Queulen from the heights to
the south and east of this fort, and for this object 40 rifled
12-pounder siege guns were brought up. The plan was, however,
given up, and the guns were distributed round the fortress, to act
against possible sorties. It was then determined to dam the
Moselle, and cause an inundation which would make it impossible
for the French to encamp in the valley. The army was occupied
until the end of the investment, in constructing a great number of
fascines for this purpose. The capitulation, however, commenced
before the plan could be carried out.
From the 14th of August until the 7th of October, the French
Army had lost in killed, wounded and missing, without reckoning
the sick, 25 generals, 2099 officers of all ranks and 40,339 non-
commissioned officei*s and soldiers.
224
On the 7th of October, Marshal Bazaine directed a letter to
the Commandants of the Corps of the fortress and of the special
arms, in which, with a statement of his reasons, he called together
a council of war, to decide what further steps should be taken,
in this desperate situation. On the 10th of October the council of
war assembled, and decided upon the necessity of entering into
negotiations with the enemy.
These negotiations, which, at first, were canied on with Ver-
sailles, occupied as long as 17 days, during which time the suf-
fering condition of the unfortunate French Army was considerably
heightened, and then led to an issue, which had been unavoidable
after the unsuccessful attempt to break through at Noisseville, — to
the renowned capitulation, which was of decisive importance for
the occun'encies at Paris and on the Loire.
re d.v A. ITiemajm
UldbvcAjuiceo. ,
NINTH CHAPTER.
SiEOK Operations.
The conquest of the fortresses of Strasburg, Schlett-
siadt , Neu - Bretsoch , Pfalzburg , Thtonviile , Montmedy ,
Long my ^ Mezieresy Rocroy^ Toul^ Soissansj f^ef*dun, La Fere
and Peronne.
STRASBUEG.
(Compare thq plan of the Siege of Strasburg.)
Whilst the two main bodies of the German Army invested
Metz on the one side, and on the other side marched upon Sedan,
then to Paris, and enclosed the' great city, smaller divisions
of the army carried on the contest upon other points of the wide
theatre of war, partly in order to gain possession of a country^
which it was hoped tvouid be won back for Germany^ and partly
for the purpose of bringing into German power, the impor-
tant and necessary communications for carrying on the siege of
Paris,
The most important siege which became necessary for these
ends, yfRBih^ siege of Strasburg. The investment of this fortress had
already been begun, immediately after the battle of Woerth*), and
had been completed on the 15th of August by the occupation of
Schiltigheim, Ruprechtsau, and Konigshoffen. Sti*asburg was very
•) Vide page 87.
15
226
easily inyested. It depended only, apon cutting off the north-west
front. As for the rest, the wide extent of aiiificial inundation,
formed as much an investment for the besieged, as a protection
against the besiegers. The investment was all the easier, as noth-
ing was undertaken fi'om Strasburg to hinder the enemy's occupa-
tion of high points and positions lying near. Tliis neglect on the
pai*t of the defence, is sufficiently explained by the defective state
of the garrison. The Corps which General Uhrich united under
his command in the fortress, strong in numbers though it was,
could only produce very few serviceable elements. Before the
battle of Woerth, the really capable troops in the gairison con-
sisted only of two battalions of artillery, one battalion of pontoon
train, two squadrons of cavalry, and the marine troops of the
Rhine flotilla. Pioneers were completely wanting, and tliese would
have been just of the most importance. The rest of the garrison
consisted of newly formed battalions of the Line and Gardes Mo-
biles, about 10,000 men, upon whom General Uhrich could not
sufficiently depend for the difficult operation of occupying and de-
fending the ground in front.
Naturally also, a thoroughly good element, had not been
supplied to him in the line troops of the Army beaten at Woerth.
Half of them consisted of men, belonging to every variety of
regiment, demoralized by defeat; on the other hand^ the remain-
ing half, the 87th Regiment of the Line, under command of
Colonel Blot, was a very valuable accession. This regiment,
whilst marching through to join Mac Mahon's Corps, on the 6th of
August, had been commanded by the Marshal to remain in the
fortress.
About 7000 men of the Garde Nalwnale sedenlaire y^ of
Strasburg, made up the numerical strength of the garrison, by de-
grees, to about 25,000 men; there were very few officers, and
only five engineer officers in the town.
Strasburg was provided with guns in very great number.
Besides the 500 guns belonging to the equipment of the foi-tress,
there was the siege train destined for ' the German foiixesses, so
that the number of guns amounted to about 1200. The serving
troops necessary for the defence were sufficient: with the pontoon
227
train and marines of the Rhine flotilla there were about 3000
artillerymen in the place.
ThuBy no hindrance on the part of the French was placed
in the way, of the gradual, close surrounding by the Siege Corps,
although at the commencement, until the 13th and 14th of August,
this only consisted of the Baden Division, and consequently was
not so strong as the garrison. From this time additional detach-
ments, certainly, arrived successively: the 7th Reserve and Garde
Landwehr Division, 37 companies of Siege Artillery, a Prus*
sian pioneer battalion and a Bavarian pioneer company, so that
altogether, the strength of the Siege- Corps rose to above 50,000
men.
General von fVerdeVj in entering upon his command on the
14th of August, found himself immediately opposite the outworks
of the fortress itself, and accoi'dingly, able to proceed at once to
the attack, without a long detention at starting, by having to
conquer the surrounding villages or earthworks raised on the
exterior. The only question was, what manner of attack it
should be.
The garrison of Strasburg was as little fitted for an intelli-
gent and devoted defence, as the fortress was prepared for siege
in a fortification point of view. The chief strength of the fortress
lay in the inundations, which made an attack impossible, except on
the north-west front ; on this side also, water was a main hindrance
to the assailants, as several wet ditches had to be overcome.
In other respects, however, the works offered no unusual difficulties,
though, at the same time, they certainly presented, tliroughout,
no particular weakness.
The revetments are from 24' to 30' in height, 5' thick at
the top, 12' at the bottom, with 18' buttresses. In order to
increase the capability of resistance of the masonry thus formed,
all the important lines are provided with couvrefaces and counter-
guardB. The command of the different lines of fortification is very
trifling, Bastion 12, Ravelin 50 and Lunette 52 have nearly the
same height of rampart. The ditches of the fortress, which through-
out ai*e wet, have i*evetted escarps, and upon the north-west front
the counterscarp of the main ditch is also revetted. In the year
16*
22*^
1867^ Stra»barg wai5 provided with traverseB^ as Napoleon had
ordered the fortress to be put in order.
The defence was very badly circnmsCanced^ in regard to all
measures of preparation, by the sudden outbreak of the war; it
was witliout its proper troops through tlie lack of foresight on the
part of the French Government, and only scantily supplied with
ammunition and other material , but superabundantly with guns in
respect to numbers. Very little had been done towards strengthening
the works, and the security of the garrison by means of bomb proof
cover, and through its innctivity during the first, important, period
of the investment had imbued the besiegers with a low, but
quite correct, opinion of tlie capability of the defence.
Upon due consideration of the worth of the garrison, as well
as of the nature of the works, no doubt could exist, in a military
point of view, upon tlie kind of attack.
Strasburg J from a military^ point of view, invited a
bombardment.
The besiegers duty was to force the fortress to capitulate, as
quickly as possible, with the greatest saving of their own troops,
and they could count upon a bombardment completely demoralising
the garrison, and moving the citizens to exeii; an influence upon
the commandant for the purpose of a surrender. That this second
element, the influence of the citizens, was rightly taken into con-
sideration (apaii; fi'om frequent experience), is clear from a proclama-
tion of the commandant, Uhvich, and the prefect, Baron Pron, dated
the \Qth of August which says :
^^To the inhabitants of Strasburg. Disquieting and terrifying
rumours, li^ve been spread during the last few days, unintentionally
or by design, in our brave city. Some individuals have dared to
entertain the idea that the place would surrender without striking
a blow. We protest enei^etically, in the name of the courageous
French population, *against this cowardly and criminal puBillanimity.
The ramparts are armed with 400 cannon. The garrison is com-
posed of 10,000 men, without counting the garde nationale se-
dentaire. If Strasbui'g is attacked, Strasburg will defend herself
as long as a soldier, a biscuit, or a cai*tridge remains. The good
229
may re-assure themselves; as for the others, they have only to
go away."
This proclamation confirms the fact that a smaller or larger
party were dis^iosed to surrender, even before a shot had fallen,
and indirectly characterises this faction as Germany by contrasting
it with the courageous French,
As the necessary guns were not, at first, on the spot, for a
lieavy and surrounding bombardment, the cannonade was begun
with field guns, and directed for the most part against the works
of the forti'ess, in order to disturb the preparations for defence,
which were only now commenced, after and during the investment.
The garrison only began, on the 8th of August, to clear the
ground in front, to place the fortifications in a state of defence
against a powerful attack {armement de s^rete), and to set about
otlier works in the lines. These works, instead of being the
ei'ection of bombproof cover and the construction of traverses etc.,
consisted, solely, in placing palisades in the covered way ; a super-
fluous measure.
The fire of the German field guns, which was directed against
these preparations, also reached the town in places, and wounded
and killed some of the inhabitants. The preparations for the
defence of the fortress were considerably hindei*ed, whilst the
damage to the town was comparatively small.
« On the 16th of August the first sortie was made, on tlie part
of the garrison; it was very unfortunately conducted, the troops
returned witli the loss of 8 guns, 70 killed and wounded, amongst
these a colonel of pontoons; they also lost some prisoners. On
the IStk of August the German siege guns first opened fire.
It was directed h*om the batteries erected at Kehl by the Baden
Artillery, against the. citadel and the military buildings on the
esplanade, and^ therefore, was not as yet the bombardment of
the toum. Nevertheless General Uhrich replied to this fire, by
firing upon the open town of /Cehl, which was an unnecessaiy
bai'barity as well as a great folly, because, if the town of Stras-
burg was now bombarded, the besiegers would only be making
reprisals, and this they were formally challenged to do.
In the meanwhile, the Prussian siege train was gradually
230
drawing near. In the night of the 23rd of August, 13 bombarding
batteries (Nos. 1 to 13) were able to be erected in the line Kdnigs-
hoffen — Aue; from 1500 to 1800 paces from the enceinte, and
were equipped with about 100 guns. These consisted, besides
some 50pound mortars, of rifled 24 -pounders.
On the evening of the^ 24ith the firing upon the town
commenced^ and was continued^ with several interruptions^ for
three days.
The destruction in the town was considerable; many private
houses, besides public buildings, were greatly damaged, 40 inhabi-
tai|ts, including 12 women and children, were killed, and a far
larger number, about 150, were wounded.
The summons to surrender was refused by General Uhrich.
The bombardment of the town was stopped, and the
regular siege began.
The reasons for this change were, however, not of a military
nature.
With a reinforcement of the cannonade by mortar batteries in
surrounding positions, it was anticipated that the capitulation would
follow after a short time.^ At least, experience has proved the
efficacy of this means with twelve other French fortresses — Toul,
Soissons, Verdun, Schlettstadt, Neu-fireisach with Foit Mortier,
Thionville, Longwy, Mpntm^y, La F^re, M6zi6res and P^ronne,
which were all taken by bombardment. During the whole war,
Paris excepted, the bombardment with siege guns has never failed
in its object of causing a surrender.
Strasburg was spared on political grounds.
Strasburg, with its renowned cathedral, and so many reminis-
cences dear to Germany, so long a favourite child of the German
nation , became , after the first victorious battles in France ^ the
ardently longed for, and eagerly demanded, object of universal de-
sire. Strasburg must again become a G^man town.
On this account the first shots which fell in the town, ex-
cited sympathy and indignation in Germany; one of , the most po-
pular German authors gave expression to his pain in telling
language; through the whole country the question was heard: ''is
this then necessary?' Public opinion demanded the cessation of
231
the bombardment, with the same force with which, at a later pe-
riod, it required the bombardment of Paris, whilst the bombardment
of less interesting fortresses passed by unnoticed.
But the German Army Direction itself, had also decided
with reluctance upon the militarily prescribed bombardment;
for Slarasburg was to revert to the German empire. It was
th^efore given up as soon as the first terroi* had proved to be
inefficacious.
The German Ai*my Direction was already in such a favourable
position, that it could allow itself to guide the war in a luxurious
manner, on some points. It therefore took into account public
opinion and its own wishes, and began the regular siege/ It is a
question whether the population really suffered less from this, than
they would have done from the bombai*dment , had it been con-
tinued. It is probable that the smaller but constantly repeated
losses during the long period up to the 27th of September, came
altogether to a largw sum, than the greater, though transitory
damages which would have been produced, had the bombardment
been continued. The injuries to numerous civilians during the
regular siege, were owing to several shot flying, unintentionally,
over the rampart and falling in the town; this was especially apt
to be the case at night, when the exact aim could not be seen,
and the artillerymen had chiefly to be guided by the laying of
the guns. The sum -total of the losses sustained by the civil
population is reckoned at 261 killed, and 1100 wounded; very
heavy in comparison with the losses during the days of the
bombardment.
It is, howerer, possible that greater conflagrations caused by
a prolonged bombardment, would have quickly raised the losses
considerably, and increased the injury to the town. Thus there
is always reason to suppose, that Strasburg was in reality spared.
The fire of the French garrison had been unable to attain
any success against the German batteries, and no fresh sortie was
attempted; after the bombardment ceased, no steps were taken to
discover the further intentions of the besiegers, no reconnaissances
were made, nor were electric lights turned upon the works of the
Germans at night. They consequently succeeded in the night of
232
the 29th of August, quite undisturbed aod unobserved, in opening
the firui parallel, at a distance of from 700 to 800 paces from
the outermost glacis , under a vigorous fire against the ramparts.
It extended from the inundation on the left, to Kdnigshoffen on
the right y was half a German mile {2^j\^ English) in length,
4' deep, and was furnished, the same night, with 10 new batteries
lying behmd it (Nos.-14, 16, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, and
46 rifled 12-ponnders). At the same time, the centre and left eom-
munications were completed, by which a covered connection, not
overlooked from the fortress, was established with the gronnd
in rear.
On the following morning the garrison saw the gigantic work
with surprise and terror.
The attack was, consequently, directed against the Porte de
Pierres front.
What reasons the German Head -Quarters had for operating
against this more difficult front, rather than against the Porte Natio-
nale front, which is not covered by lunettes lyii^ before it, is
unknown. It was learnt at a later period, that the French had
expected an attack upon the latter front, and, it was more strongly
equipped witli guns and provided with a complete system of mines.
It is possible that this was known on the German side.
To oppose the fire of the besiegers, now strengthened by
46 new guns, the fire of the garrison was only augmented on the
night of the 31st of August, and on the following morning, it cer-
tainly obtained some advantages. But during the night the be-
siegers had again erected two fresh batteries, Nos. 26 and 28,
and towards evening gained a decided superiority. Several French
guns and many embrasures were dismounted.
The superiority of the quality of the Prussian artillery, both
in material and troops, was cleai*ly shown*
On the night of the 1st of September, zig-sags had been
pushed forward, by means of flying sap, from the 1st pai'allel at
two points, and the 2nd parallel had been traced. The garriscm,
on the other hand, undertook two sorties, directed against the
railroad buildings and the island of Waaken. Both were repulsed
after some fighting. The works were carried on also in the
_ J
r
233
day-time, but led to a misfortane. The PrusBian engineer officers,
Lieutenant Colonel von Gayl and Captain Hertzberg, who were
condneting their men in the prolongation of an approach against
the fortress, whieh had been erroneously ti*aced in the night, came
within range of the enemy's fire and were killed, together witb
several of the working party. In consequence of this the works
were stopped during the day-time.
From this time the garrison continued their sorties, for the
most part, certainly, with small forces. Their most important
undertaking, was Colonel Blot's attack on the night of the 2nd of
September. He directed it against the right wing of the attack,
crossed both parallels and came up to within 30 paces of the
Prussian battery No. 4; here, however, he was repulsed.
In addition to hindrances of this sort on the part of the
garrison, there was also veiy unfavourable weather; it rained al-
most incessantly, so that the trenches were full of water.
It was only on the night of the 5th of September that the
construction of the 2nd parallel was completely finished. Its length
was 2300 paces, width 12', depth fix>m 4' to 6'.
The cannon fight meanwhile, continued. On the German side,
ftx^m the 3rd to the 5th, the batteries 16a, 17a, 19a and 21a
(taking the place of the batteries 16, 17, 19 and 21) and
the dismounting batteries 29, 30 and 33, were greeted. The
mortar fire upon the works of the fortress was also increased at
the same time, by erecting the batteries 31 and 32, each for
4 50pound mortars, and 3 emplaoemeats each for 4 7pound mortars,
indicated as batteries 34, 36 and 37. On the 3rd of September,
two, q«ite new descriptions of guns, were added to the siege park,
short rifled 24-pounders and rifled 72pound mortars (21 centimetre),
from which lunette 44, which disturbed the siege works by a
flanking fire, was bombarded (batteries 5 and 35).
The Baden artillery at the same time, bombarded the citadel
from Kehl, with 16 rifled 24-pounders, and 16 rifled 12-pounder8,
as well as 12 2&pottnd and 60pound mortars.
Altogether 152 guns, including 52 mortars, were brought into
action against tiie citadel and the Porte de Pierres front be-
fore the 9th of September, and on this day the fire attam^^
234
such success that not a single French long barrelled gun could
show itself any more upon the ramparts. On the other hand the
garrison now began a . vigorous mortar fire upon the besiegers,
from mortars placed behind the ramparts, which, combined with the
fire from the 'walibttchsen^, exacted many a victim. The German
works, however, conducted with the greatest circumspection^ by most
skilful officers, and executed by numerous and courageous troops,
progressed with astonishing rapidity.
In the night of the 10th of September, the approaches to the
drd parallel, and the 3rd parallel itself were cottstructed with
the common sap, and in the 2nd parallel, 7pound mortars were
mounted, behind them 50pound mortars (Nos. 45, 46, 7a) and
even in front of them, rifled G-pounders.
The garrison only replied by mortar fire.
In the night of the 11th of September, the 3rd parallel was
completed; in the night of the 13th, a half parallel was carried
out, which approached to within 40 paces of the edge of the glacis.
Mining operations, which were expected as soon as the besiegers
touched the glacis, did not occur. To a certain extent, the
inundation, which could not everywhere be appropriately made
use of, may have been a hindrance ; on the whole, the blame lies
with the passiveness of the garrison. Even if miners were wanting, the
French engineer officers might still have managed some explosions.
But without any such difficulties the crowninff of the glacis^
in front of the lunettes 52 and 53, was accomplished on the 17th
of September, after Captain Ledebour, of the Engineers, had disco-
vered and fired the mining system in front of lunette 53.
With this the preparatory works came to an end, and the
introduction to an assault could be energetically proceeded with;
that is to say, the formation of a breach in the main rampart, and
a practicable road leading to the breach for the storming column.
It is here worthy of remark * that the breach was not made
from the works crowning the glacis, as is the rule in siege opera-
tions, but this result was obtained by indirect fire from the 2nd
parallel.
Battery No. 8 had already begun the breach, on the right
face of lunette 53, on the 14th of September, and completed it
235
the day before the crowning of the glacis. Battery No. 42, firing
6 short rifled 24-ponnder8 against bastion No. 11, and battery
No. 58, firing 4 guns of the same calibre against bastion No. 12,
then laid open the breach in the main rampart by indirect firing
at the distance of about 900 and 1000 paces. This breach
was begun on the 23rd of September. The engineers, in the
meanwhile, were actively engaged in forming the road to the breach,
in which the ditches filled with water' presented very considerable
difficulties.
Possession of both the lunettes must first be obtained.
Descents into the ditch were carried down to the water level
from the crown-work. The escarp wall of lunette No. 53 was
brought down on the 20th, to the widtli of 12', by a mine, and
now the ditches of the lunette could be bridged over by means
of a dam, supposing they were not defended.
The bold attempt succeeded. The garrison had been driven
out by the fearful artillery fire of the besiegers. The lunettes
were given up by the French without fighting.
liUnette 53 was approached by means of a dam leading through
the ditches, and occupied ; the deeper ditches in front of lunette 52,
were bridged over by the engineers, with ban*els and planks laid
upon them, under the direction of Captain Andreft.
Then, in the night of the 2l8t, a storming column forced its
way into this lunette also, with a loss, it is true, of 50 killed
and wounded, caused by the enemy's fire from the main rampart.
From the lunettes thus gained, the sap could now be pushed
forward up to the covered way of ravelin No. 50, and then along
it , and at the same time the effect of the breaching batteries upon
bastions 11 and 12 could be advantageously observed.
The effect of these was excellent. The batteries mentioned
had been augmented by three counter batteries, Nos. 51, 53 and
54, erected in the crowning, and on the 27th of September the
masonry of the right face of bastion No. 11 was brought down
to a width of 30 paces.
In order to make the assault possible^ it was now only
necessity to bring down, by shot, that part of the earthen
rampart, which still remained standing (to make the breach com-
236
pletely practicable), and to complete the passages over the two wet
ditches, upon this side and the farther side of the undressed and
unoccupied counter-guard.
The commandant of the fortress, tiowever, did not wait for
the preliminary measures for the assault to be completed.
After the crownmg had been accomplished in front of the
counter-guard of ravelin No. 50, on the morning of the 27th of
September, and after the existence of a breadi in the main rampart
had been confirmed, white flags appeared upon the Cathedral
Tower, and upon the attacked works, at 5 oVlock, in the after-
noon*).
This rapid surrender of the fortress , immediately after a
breach had been made, whilst, surely, the breach itself might have
been very obstinately defended, gives fi'esh proof, of what had
already been indicated by the scarcity of sorties, the neglect of
mining operations and other faults, that the garrison was intimidated
by the energetic manner of attack of the besiegera, and was espe-
cially discouraged by the superiority of the Prussian ai'tillety.
A retreat of the gai*rison to the citadel, which General Uhrich
had spoken of at the commencement of the siege, was impossible,
as the batteries at Kehl had destroyed all the buildings of the
citadel, and greatly injured the fortifications.
The siege had lasted 50 days, reckoning fi*om the 8th of
August, and the regular attack 31 days. The besiegers brought
into action, in siege guns, 46 long rifled 24-pounders, 12 short
rifled 24-pounders, 80 rifled 12-pounders, 27 50pound and 60pound
*) Very different opinions have been expressed, even by competent jadges,
upon this capitulation, as well as upon the whole siege of Strasburg. It is
not surprising that in France, General Uhrich should have been much ex-
tolled before he capitulated, and very hardly condemned after Strasburg had
fallen, but with so many diverse judgments on the part of others, one will do
well to consider tirst, the political point of view of the judge, and then also,
to remember that a siege is always a favourable object for criticism and
counter criticism. It is a complicated process, in which always many steps
might have been differently carried out.
On the whole, the siege of Strasburg ran the course that was to be
expected. The well prepared, excellently equipped besiegers, flushed with
victory, made rapid progress against the unprepared, ill-organized garrison.
237
mortarB, 24 25pouud mortars, 30 Tpound mortarS; 2 rifled (21 Cm.)
mortara, and fired from them, altogether, 193,722 shot aud shell
into the forti^ess. The total loss of the besiegers amounted to
906 men^in killed and wounded, that of the garrison to aboat
3000 men.
In the town about 400 jbouses were so much injured that
they required rebuilding from the foundations.
The tenor of the capitulation was as follows:
"Lieutenant General von Werder, of the Royal Prussian Army,
Commander of the Siege Corps before Strasbiirg, having been re-
quested by Lieutenant General Uhrioh, Governor of Strasburg, to
cease hostilities against the fortress, has agreed with him to con-
clude the following capitulation, in consideration of the honourable
and brave defence of the place:
Art. I. At 8 o'clock, on the morning of the 28lh of September
1870, General Uhrieh will evacuate the Citadel, the Porte d'Aoster-
litz , the Porte . des P^heurs and the Porte Nationale. At the
same time the German troops. will occupy these points..
Art, II. At 11 o'clock, on the sfime day, the French garrison,
including the Gai'des Mobiles and the Gardes Nationaux, will vacate
the fortress by the Poi*te Nationale, will form up between lunette
44 aud redoubt 37, and lay down their arms.
Art. HI. The troops of the Line and the Gardes Mobiles
become prisoners of war, and will march off at ouce with their
baggage.
The Gardes Nationaux and Francs- Tireurs are ftee, under a
written engagement, not to serve during the war, and muBt lay
down their arms at the Mairie before 11 o'clock, a. m. The list
of the officers of these troops will be given over to General von
Werder at the same hour.
Art. IV. The officers aoid officials with the rank of officers,
belonging to the French garnson of Strasburg, can depart to aneh
residences as they may select, after they have given a written
engagement, upon their word of honour. Those officers who
refuse to sign this engagement, will go with the garriaon to Ger-
many, as prisoners of war. All the army Burge^NiB will continue
their functions, until further orders.
23B
Art. V. Lieutenant General Ulirieh binds himself, directly the
laying down of the arms has been aecomplished, to hand over all
military effects, and all public monies etc., in the regular manner,
through the officials concerned, to the agents on this side.
The officers and officials, who will be charged with this mission
on each side, will be at the Place Broglie in Strasburg at 12 o* clock,
noon, on the 28th etc. etc. etc.*'
In consequence of this capitulation, 17,111 men and 451
officers, about 1200 guns, 1843 horses, great stores of rifles,
powder, prepared ammunition, and about 10 millions of francs, in
state money, fell into German hands with the fortress.
The conquest of the fortress was of great importance to
the Germans. It was an imposing event, and disheartening both
for the Parisians, who had already been invested about 14 days
when they received the news of it, and were cut off from all
intercourse with the rest of France, and also foi* the bands of
Francs-Tireurs, who were wandering about in the Vosges.
From Strasburg the conquest of the fortresses Schlettstadt,
Neu-Breisacli with Fort Mortier, and Belfort could be proceeded
with, and, above all, the whole of Upper Alsace could be subjected
to the conqueror.
Already two days after the taking of Strasburg, three mobile
columns, acting in concert under command of Major General von
Degenfeld went off, for the purpose of clearing out and subjecting
the Vosges, which were strongly occupied by Francs-Tireurs (v.
Chapter 12, on the operations of the southern Armies), and as
early as the 9th of October, Neu-Breisach and Schlettstadt were
invested.
The conquest of these fortresses was entrusted to the Atk
Reserve Division iSSchmeling), which was formed at Freiburg in
the Breisgau, in the beginning of October, and had crossed the
Rhine at Neuenburg. The Division first endeavoured to make
iVieti- flreiiwicA surrender, by bombarding it with field guns; the
attempt, however, failed , and it continued the march to Schlett-
stadt, after the former fortress had been invested.
239
The siege train, for both plaees, was provided from Stras-
burg.
SCHLETTSTADT.
Schlettstadt, containing 11,000 inhabitants, lies upon the left
bank of the 111, which is navigable from Colmar, and by the side
of which runs the upper Alsace railroad, the direct line of com-
munication between Strasburg and Belfort. The place is favour-
ably situated for defence , and is strengthened by inundations,
which cover, ^specially, the east front. All the ditches can be
filled with water. The fortress has a high revetment, a great
part of which is visible from afar, and a simple bastion tracing
with several high cavaliers. Xl^o garrison consisted of more than
4000 men, including the National Guard.
General von Schmeling decided upon bombarding the foiiress.
He commenced the cannonade with siege guns (rifled 12-pounders),
on the 19th of October. On this day however, only a single battery
could be brought into action in front of Heidelsheim, for the rest
of the siege train had not yet arrived, and this bombardment was
too weak to produce any result
In the night of the 22nd of October he was able to opep
the 1st parallel, opposite the Colmar gate, at a distance of from
500 to 700 paces, and to erect six batteries in it, which were
equipped with ,8 rifled 24 -pounders, 8 rifled 12 -pounders,
4 26pound mortars and 4 50pouiid mortars.
The fortress vigorously returned the fire until noon on the
following day ; the fire from the ramparts then ceased, and began
again in the afternoon, in an altered form, as a mortar fire behind
the ramparts.
Towards morning, however, after the 2nd parallel had been
laid during the night, the fortress capitulated witli 2400 men (not
including the Garde Nationale) and 120 guns.
The surrender was principally brought about, by the de-
moralization of the gaiTison produced by the bombardment. Dis-
240
cipline was completely Blackened, so that the CommandaBt, Count
Reinachy was obliged to beg the Germans to accelerate their
entry.
The town itself had suffered very little, for the inhabitants
had guarded their houses well, and the only buildings which were
destroyed were those situated on the front of the attack, which
were much exposed.
NEU-BREISACH and FORT MORTIER.
Neu-Breisach, simply a military fortress, with its numerous
towers of defence, and very picturesquely situated, has its east
front resting upon the Rhone-Rhine canal, which passes near the
town. The road parallel to the Rhine, as well as the less impor-
tant one, which, crossing the Rhine, leads from Alt-Breisach to
Neu-Bi*eisaeh, from whence it runs by Colmar, through the Vosges
to St. Di^, are, the one as well as the other, commanded by the
fire from the fortress at the point where they cross the Rhone-
Rhine canal.
The fortress lies in an open plain near the Rhine; the
detached . Foi*t Mortier, a quarter-(^-an-hour's walk from the shore
rampart of the Alt-Breisach road, is under the same command as
the fortress.
The ground tracing of Neu-Breisach, represents a regular
octagon; behind the casemated bastions are high tower redoubts,
in front of them outworks, lunettes and demi-lunes. The ditches
are filled with water. Besides these, there were numerous places
of artificial cover, of advantage to the garrison.
General von Sekmeling began the investment, as already
mentioned, on the 9th of October, and on the 2nd of November
opened fire upon both portions of the fortress. Against Neu-
Breisach, three batteries were erected, at Biesheim and Wolf-
gantzen; against Fort Mortier, three batteries at Alt-Breisach.
These were armed with 8 short rifled 24-pounder8, 4 21centim^tre
miortars and 4 long 24-ponnders, taken from the French.
241
Fort Mortier capitulated in consequence of the bombardment,
on the night of the 6th of November, with 220 men and 5 guns;
the excellent cover places of the fortress, however, stood ihe gar-
rison in such good stead, that they held out against the bombard-
ment, for nine days without capitulating, although, with the ex-
ception of a few buildings, the town was completely destroyed by
this long continued cannonade.
Indeed the besiegers, doubting the success of the bombard-
ment, intended to proceed to a regular siege, when, on the 10th
of November, the capitulation ensued, in consequence of a mutiny
of the Gardes Mobiles, which made it impossible for the com-
mandant to continue the defence. 5000 men, and 100 officers
became prisonei*s of war, and 100 guns were taken.
The fortress of Belfoi*t in the most southehi part of Alsace,
required a long continued siege, and the fighting round this place
was closely connected with great operations in the field, (v.
Chapter 12.)
Ex<>epting Belfort, and Bitsch (which never fell at all), the
last fortified place in Alsace passed into German hands with the
capitulation of Neu-Breisacfa.
In the adjoining Lorraine^ the places now in question were
PfaUbvrg and Thionviliej belonging to that part which was to
be won back again; as well as TquI^ which was very important
from being a bar to the only direct railroad to Paris; Ferduny
oi great consequence as a point of support to the enemy's under-
takings, and Longwjf aad Montmedt/j places which certainly were
of less importance, but still could not remain disregarded, as they
weie centres for the resistance of the enemy, in the midst of the
German lines of communication.
16
242
PFALZBURG.
The III. Aimy had already come in contact with Pfalzburgj
when marching past it on the 8th of August, and on the 14th it
was bombai'ded, by the whole of the artillei'y corps of the VI.
Army Corps, with GO field guns.
The sti'ength of Pfalzbnrg consisted in its position upon
high rocky hills. The place is only small, numbering 3700 in-
habitants, and was garrisoned by a battalion of the 63rd Line
Regiment, 100 artillerymen, a battalion of the Garde Mobile,
and 500 men, composed of scattered Turcos, Zouaves and other
"isoles".
As was always the case in the course of the war, the bom-
bardment of the works of the fortress with field guns produced
no result.
A considerable fire was ignited in the town, fifty -seven
buildings were destroyed, but the commandant. Major Taillantj
refused the summons to sun*ender, sent to him on the 15th of
August.
From the 16th therefore, only two battalions of the Line
remained behind for the investment, and from the 19th, three
Landwehr battalions from the Thuringian Regiments 31 and 71.
This was a very difficult operation, for the country round the
fortress can be but little surveyed, and in many parts is deeply
intersected, so that the line of investment had to be extended to 5 or
6 hours (from 18 to 22 English miles) in length, and consequently
a large number of outposts was necessary. Added to which, the
garrison carried on a very energetic petty warfare.
In consequence of two companies being ordered away, and
numbers falling sick from the fatigues of outpost duty, the
strength of the investing Corps until October was reduced to 1700
men ; but from the 20th of October it was again somewhat increased
by reinforcements in cavalry.
On the 24th of August, the garrison made a strong sortie,
which was very well executed. About 800 men advanced in
echellon, with great rapidity against the village Unter - Eichen-
243
Baracken, then suddenly closing together^ took the village and
threw back the German out posts. As soon as the investing troops
were concentrated and brought up, the French moved back under
cover of the guns of their fortress. Similar sorties were made by
the garrison, on the 25th of August, against Mittelbronn, and
again on the 27th of August, against Unter-Eichen-Baracken.
The situation of the investing troops was exposed to danger,
an4 did not cliange for the better until reinforced by the arrival
of a 4-pounder field battery from the Strasburg siege corps.
On the 14th of September tlie garrison made a sortie against
Bilchelberg, which was very successfully repulsed.
Until Strasburg had been taken, however, strong bands of
Fi'ancs-tireurs filled the country round Ltttzelburg, so that measures
for security had to be considerably increased, even in rear of the
cantonment, and the powers of the men were strained to the
utmost.
This condition improved from the beginning of October, when
the Franc8-tii*eurs departed to the south; a serious attack upon
the fcMrtress could not, however, be attempted.
Neither the regular siege nor the bombardment had a prospect
of success, for the nature ^f the ground rendered the formation
of covered approaches very diffictilt, and the rocky structure of
the lofty fortifications o£fSered too powerful a resistance to the
shot. Besides which, the place was not of sufficient value to
justify the toil and sacrifice of a strong attack, in order to gain
possession of it.
Upon one occasion, the 24th of November, a short bombard-
ment from field guns, was opened at 10.30 o'clock p.m., to make
reprisals for the frequent fire of the gamson upon single posts
and patrols; but otherwise, the investment only was carried out
with the object of subduing the place by starvation.
These means gained the object.
On the 30th of November pailementaires appeared from the
fortress, who tendered the capitulation, but also required the free
departure of the garrison.
The offer was refused by Major von Giese^ commander of
the investing troops.
16*
244
The commandant of the fortress now endeaironred to send
away the Gardes Mobiles in bodies as deserters, but the trick was
frustrated.
Then, finally, on the 12th of December, at 2 o'clock p.m..
Major Taillant offered to surrender at discretion.
On the 14th of December, the occupation of the fortress by
German troops ensued, 52 officers and 1838 men became prisoners
of war, and 65 guns were taken. All these guns had been pre-
viously spiked by the garrison, all the powder and ammunition
stores destroyed , and 12,000 rifles broken. No reproach can,
however, be made on this account, as no stipulation was made for
the articles named to be delivered up, and no protocol had been
drawn up, as to the mode of surrender.
The commandant of the fortress had simply declared that the
gates were open, and the gaiTison disarmed, although not con-
quered ; he bad entered into no engagements in the way of further
arrangements.
It was notorious that nothing but starvation, combined with
a small-pox epidemic, had brought about the surrender, and it
must be acknowledged that the defence had been excellent, espe-
cially in regard to the sorties; also, on the other hand, that the
fnvesting troops, so weak in numbers, had distlngnished themselves
by their performances.
THIONVILLE (now DIEDENHOFEN).
Thionville^ with 8000 inhabitants and a garrison of over
4000 men, had already been watched and invested during the
investment of Metz, soon after the battle of Gravelotte. This
measure was necessary for the security of the investing army.
The attack upon the fortress, however, only began after the
fall of Metz.
Situated upon the left bank of the Moselle, about three miles
(13^/5 English miles), down the stream, from Metz, Thionville has
a regular fortification, upon this bank, composed of ravelins and
bastions, with counter-guards lying in front, and a girdle of lunettes
«-
245
outside the covered way. Upon the right bank, there is a donble
tete de pont, for covering the passage across the Moselle and its
neighbouring arm.
The flat Moselle valley, lying immediately around, is bordered
by commanding hills, whidi endanger the fortress, at a distance of
from 2000 to 2500 paces upon the right bank, and 3000 to 4000
paces on the left bank.
The 14th Infanti*y Division, Lieutenant General von Kamecke^
was charged with the conquest of the fortress. He moved off from
Metz on the 9th and 10th of November, and approached by both
banks of the river. On the 10th, 11th .and 12th, General
von Ramecke made a minute reconnaissance, and then decided upon
a bombardment from the heights mentioned. Afta: this the fortress
was closely invested, thirteen companies of siege artillery belonging
to Metz were brought up, i. e. from Verdun (which at that time
had already been taken), and bombarding batteries were constructed
upon both banks.
Upon the right bank, 6 rifled 24-pounders, 6 rifled 12-ponnders
and 4 13 inch French mortars were placed in the Bois d'lllange
and the Bois dTutz, at a distance of about 2200 paces; besides
these, four heavy batteries of the 7th Field artillery Regiment were
also brought into position upon the hill of Haute Yuts and the
hill to the east, before Illange, partly for the .purpose of bombarding
the t^te de pont, and partly, the north-east front of the town.
Upon the left bank of the Moselle, at a greater distance, as
much as 5000 paces, were erected two batteries of 4 rifled 24-
pounders at Chd.teau Serre; one battery of 4 rifled 24-pounderB
to the north of the road from Thionville to Marapich, one battery
of 5 rifled 24-pounders at Maison neuve, one battery of 4 rifled
12-pounders at Weymerange, one battery of 4 rifled 24-pounder8
to the south of the road from Thionville to Bauvange, one battery
of 4 rifled 12-pounder8 to the north of the road Bauvange an
St. Michel, and three batteries of 4 rifled 12-pounder8 at Maison
rouge, to the west of the Luxemburg road.
This bombardment preparation was extraordinarily large in
comparison with its object.
Favoured by the ground, the batteries could, for the most part,
246
be constructed in the day time ; masking objects were at hand, so
that the work was but little disturbed by the enemy.
In the night of tlie 2l8t of November the constmction of all
the batteries was completed, and also their eqnipment, and, at the
same time, the line of investment was pushed closer to the fortress.
On the 22nd of November, at 7 o'clock a.m., the first shots fell,
and a regulated fire was then opened, whicli lasted until noon.
The fortress replied with vigour, and with well aimed shots.
At 1 o'clock p.m., the fire of the bombardment began aft'esh,
and was slowly sustained until the following morning.
During this night the first parallel was opened at a distance
of 800 paces to the west of the town, and this finished the prepara-
tions for a regular attack.
The following day the cannonade was continued in the same
manner as on the 22nd.
At 1.30 o'clock p.m., the fortress hoisted a white flag.
The commandant demanded a free departure for the women
and children, and an armistice for 24 hours. The negotiations
were broken off, and the fire was again commenced, and continued
until 10.30 o'clock a.m. on the 24th. At this hour the white
flag appeared afresh ; the commandant, Chef de bataillon MauricCy
had decided to surrender. On the following day the fortress was
occupied; 120 officers and about 4000 men became prisoners of
war, 200 guns were taken, and a ereat quantity of war material
and several magazines filled with provisions.
The unlucky little town had suffered very considerably, and
more, comparatively, than Strasburg.
MONTM^DY.
The conquest of Montmedy was set on foot, by Lieutenant
General von Kamecke^ immediately after the fall of Thionville,
and indeed simultaneously with the observation of Longwy.
The fortress of MontmMy, with a small town of about 2500
inhabitants, lies on the Chiers, one mile (4^/5 Engl, m.) from the
247
Belgian frontier, and forms a station on the railroad between
Thionville and Sedan. The fortress is characterised by two divisions.
The "'vUle haute" situated upon a three cornered rock, 200' high,
descending on all sides at an angle of from 30 to 45 degrees, is
i
very strong; it contains five barracks for 800 men, an arsenal
and two powder magazines. The ^''ville hass€'\ situated between
the Chiers and the vUle haute, is only defended by a loop-holed
wall, which being exposed on all sides can easily be shot down.
The garrison numbered over 3000 men, with 65 guns; they
had brought themselves into notice on the 11th of October, by
making a sortie against Stenay, and seizing the German £tappen
command at that place. General von Kamecke decided upon a
bombardment, and, on the 7th of December, commenced to construct
batteries. The rifled 24-pounders (8 long and 10 short), 20 rifled
12<pounderB and 20 rifled 6-pounders, field guns, were placed upon
the heights surrounding the fortress, at a distance of from 2000
to 3800 paces, and 4 rifled mortars in the valley, close behind
the village of Vigneulles. The construction of the batteries was
a very difficult undertaking, both on account of the activity of the
garrison, whose cannon and rifle fire forced the besiegers to work
exclusively at night, and also from obstacles of the ground —
the hill and valley roads being covered with hard frozen snow,
which Inteifered with bringing up guns and other material.
On the morning of the 12th of December, however, the
batteries were ready and equipped ; the fire upon the fortress began
at 7.30 o'clock, in bright weather.
After a short time, it was very energetically replied to, from
Montm^dy, and, although several guns upon the front attacked
were silenced, the fire of the fortress lasted until dusk.
On the following day, there being a thick fog, tjie cannonade
was only continued slowly, in the same manner as it had been
during the night ; in the eyening the town was observed to be on
fire, and at 7.30 o'clock, a parlement^ire appeared, to negotiate
the capitulation. A mutiny amongst part of the garrison had made
it impossible to continue the defence. The surrender took place at
2 o'clock p.m., on the 14th of December; in addition to the garrison,
236 German prisoners of war came into German hands.
248
LONGWy.
Longuy had been invested at the latter end of November,
by Colonel von Cosely by order of General von Kamecke, and
the bombardment first began on the 16th of January.
The fortress lies apon the right bank of the Chiers, and, like
Montm6dy, forms an upper and a lower town; the latter is not
fprtified at all, the upper town, however, is surrounded with bastion
fortifications, conforming to the shape of the rock on which it lies,
and is unusually strong. The fortress was erected by Vauban in
1680, as a. counter fort to Luxemburg. The town contains about
2700 inhabitants.
Longwy held out against the bombardment, from the 16th to
the 25th of January 1871, favoured by its high situation and
strong rock foiiifications. After that, the capitulation ensued, with
a garrison of 4000 men and 200 guns.
M&ZI^RES.
MeziereSj an impoiiiant point of support for the Franc -tireurs
in the Ardennes, was invested and bombarded in the latter days
of December, after the fall of Montm^dy. The siege corps was
under the command of Major General von fVoyna,
The fortress lies upon the right bank of the Mouse, in a
bend of the river, which here runs so close .that the fortress
resembles an island. Thus its capability of resistance lies , to a
great extent, in the surrounding water, which fills all the ditches,
and can be used for inundation. The town has about 6000 in-
habitants and forms the junction of the railroads to Rheims and
Thionville. The fortifications are characterised by a citadel with
seven bastions upon the east side, which commands the Meuse, and
a horn work upon the west side, from which a second horn work,
with three lunettes, is thrown out.
A bombardment of some days, which inflicted great losses on
the garrison and inhabitants, resulted iu the capitulation; this
249
took place on the 2nd of January 1871, and, with the fortress,
2000 men, 106 guns and large magazines of provisions were
brought into German power.
ROCROY,
The fall of M^zi^res was immediately followed by the taking
of Rocroy. Three days after the occupation of the former fortress,
five battalions and two squadrons of Senden^s Landwehr Division,
with six batteries, under the command of General von fVoynay
moved forward for the purpose of carrying Rocroy by surprise.
Quite unobserved, in a thick fog, they succeeded in enclosing the
fortress in the* foi*m of a cincture, and in directing 36 guns upon it.
The commandant was only madp aware of the presence of the
enemy, by the ariival of tlie German pariementaire with the
summons to surrender. The capitulation was refused, but marvellous
to relate, to the astonishment of the besiegers themselves, the fire
from the German guns which lasted for five hours, produced the
most decisive success, although there was no object for the gunners
to aim at, nor could the efficacy of the shots be discovered any-
where.
As it was imagined that the artillery fire, in such a thick
fog, was useless, General von Seuden, who arrived at noon, had
even given orders for the firing to cease at 5 o'clock p. m. and
made arrangements for the departure of his greatly fatigued troops,
leaving a rear-guard behind. He would not however, neglect once
more summoning the commandant to surrender, and sent the paiier
mentaire. First Lieutenant von F(^ter, again, into the fortress for
this purpose.
Lieutenant von FOrster was astonii^ed to see that the shot
thrown at random, had ignited considerable fires, and observed that
the garrison and inhabitants were in a state of ntter confusion^
The commandant, threatened with mutiny, beg^;ed that a rapid
entrance might be made by the German troops; the disorder had,
however, already risen to such a height, that most unusual steps
had to be taken instantaneously.
250
In order to take immediate poaBeBHiou of the gate. Lieutenant
voD ForBter armed 8 liberated German prisoners of war (5 of
the cavalry, 1 of infantry and 2 civilians) with rifles belonging
to the Garde Mobile, and mounted a guard at the gate which
kept order until the an-ival of two Prussian companies.
There fell into Geiman hands, with the fortress, 8 officers
and 300 men ; 72 guns, one colour, many arms, 400 cwt. of powder
and enormous stores of provisions, ammunition and articles of
clothing were acquired. Possession was taken on the 5th of January,
during cutting cold weather.
TOUL.
The conquest of Tout, was made long before the forts situated
on the Belgian and Luxemburg frontiers had been taken.
As early as the 10th of September the Grand Duke of Meeklen-
bnrg-Schwerin, who, with the XIIL Army Corps, had belonged to
the investing army of Metz since the 3rd of September, received
the mission of occupying Oh3,lous and Rheims, in order to secure
the lines of communication of the German army before Paris, and
to take Touly which barred the railroad to Paris.
The Grand Duke divided his Corps; the 2nd Landwehr Division
was directed upon ChUlons, the 17th Infantry Division, reinforced
by almost the whole of the Artillery Corps, and the 18th Dragoons
and 11th Uhlans (two light reserve batteries and the 17th Dragoons
followed the Landwehr) marched upon Toul, and arrived in their
cantonments round the fortress on the evening of the 12th.
Information was obtained by means of reconnaissances, that
Toul could certainly not be taken by a coup de mam, on account
of its wet ditches and high walls, but that it could be bombarded
with a prospect of success.
At present there were no heavy guns at hand, (with the
exception of some French guns taken at Marsal, which, as yet,
the artillery did not rightly understand how to use), and these had to
be waited for, from Cologne and Magdeburg. The Grand Duke
251
gave over the command to General vofi Scktmmelmann ^ and
repaired to the chief-head-qnai'ters, by command of the King.
Up to the 19th of September, the attack was limited to a
close investment, and an occasional bombardment from field gnns.
On this day, the 33rd Infantry Brigade, the Uhlan Regiment
and three light batteries were moved to Ch&lons.
The expected siege gnus arrived on the following day, and
on the morning of the 23rd, the construction and equipment of the
batteries had been completed. The Grand Duke was again present
at the bombardment. ^
At 4 o'clock in the afternoon, the white flag appeared on one
of the towers of the beautiful cathedral, after the fire from the
fortress had been tolerably brisk during the day, and the suburb
of Mansuy as well as the village of St. Evre, both of which were
occupied by the investing troops^ had been set on fire.
The capitulation, as was the case with almost all the fortresses,
was based upon the capitulation of Sedan. With the fortress,
109 ofticera, 2240 men, 120 horses, 1 Garde Mobile eagle, 197
bronze guns including 48 rifled, considerable stores of arms, equip-
ment and clothing, ns well as large magazines of provisions and
forage, fell into the hands of the Germans.
SOISSONS.
The conquest of Sois$ons likewise fell to the charge of the
Grand Duke of Mecklenburg's Corps; this fortress lay so near to
Paris, and was so dangerous to the investing army, besides being
of much importance as a point of obstruction on the railroad from
Rheims to Paris, that its capture was necessary.
The present fortifications of Soissons are of quite a late date,
— since 1840; they consist of a circumvallation of bastions, a
strong earth rampart with high escarp walls, ravelins and several
advanced horn works. The ditches are dry, but still the west
front had been inundated by damming the Aisne.
The garrison amounted to about 4800 men, and the equipment
consisted of 128 guns.
252
The Siege Corps was formed of the 8rd Landwehr Div-
ision, four companies of Siege Artillery, and two companies of
Pioneers; it brought 10 rifled 24-ponnders, 16 rifled 12'pounders,
6 7pound mortars, 2 35 centimetre French mortal's, and 4 22 cen-
timetre French mortars, besides two field batteiies.
The siege batteries were erected partly upon the hill of Vaux,
about 2000 paces from the enceinte, and partly upon the hill of
6enevi6re, at a distance of about 3000 paces. The mortars were
placed further to the front^ behind the railroad embankment.
The preparations were finished on the 12th of October, and
the bombardment commenced, combined with an efifbrt to make a
breach in the front lying opposite the hill of Vaox. In case the
bombardment did not effect the purpose quickly,- an assault was
to be attempted.
The fire of the fortress was very well directed ; it was aimed
at the right points for disturbing the work, even during the con-
struction of the batteries, and after that, replied very energetically
to the bombardment. On the firdt day too, the fortress had the
upper hand in the cannon fight; it succeeded in dismounting two
of the enemy's guns , whilst the besiegers only accomplished the
ignition of some fires in the town.
On the following day, however, the besiegers succeeded in
gaining the advantage, and a breaching fire was begun. On the
14th of October, in the evening, most of the ban*elled guiis of
the fortress were silenced, and a breach was also efl^ected. The fires
in the town could no longer be extinguished. Neveiiheless the
garrison continued the mortar fire, from behind the ramparts, with
great obstinacy.
But on the 15th of October, at 8 o'clock p.m., the commandant,
urged by the inhabitants, and disquieted by signs of demoralization
in a portiiMi of his troops, commenced, negotiations, which led to
the conduHon of a capitulation, in the course 0f the night.
The 6i*and Duke moved in on the 16th; 4633 prieioners
were made, and 128 guns and great depots and magazines wei'e
taken.
253
VERDUN.
After the attack of the Meuse Army upon f^erdun (v.
Chapter 6.) during their marcli, had proved abortive ^ and this
fortress had, for. a long time, been a cause of disturbance to the
investing troops before Mete, and to the Ikies of communication of
the German Army in the west, the observation of the place wa«
changed, on the 25tli of September, into a dose investment, and a
bombardment was projected.
The Meuse flows through .Verdun, it is surrounded by a cir-
cumvallation of bastions, and has a citadel. The fortress is com-
manded by heights, on all sides, at the distance of about 3000
paces. The garrison amounted to about 4000 men with 137 guns.
A provisional bombardment with field guns having failed,
just as it had already done on the 23rd of August, it became
necessary to wait for the arrival of the siege guns.
These did not make their appearance until the 12th of October,
and had, for the most part, been captured in Toul; they were
however, French guns throughout, — 14 rifled 24-pounder6, 24
rifled 12-pounder6, 4 22centim^tre mortars and 4 22centim^tre
howitzers; only two Prussian reserve batteries besides the French
material, were at hand, — 12 rifled 6-pounder8, with which the
fruitless bombardment had been made. The besiegers made pre-
parations for the cannon attack, with an equal number of guns
on both sides of the Meuse; they took possession of the heights
of Belleville upon the right bank, and of Thierville on the left
bank, drove the French out of the villages lying in front, and in
the night of the 12th, constructed all the batteries, at a distance of
about 3000 paces. The bombardment began on the following morning.
The construction of these batteries had, however, been too
hurriedly performed; the battery of 8 rifled 24-pounder8, which
was to make the breach, was erected on the ridge of the height of
Belleville, in such a manner that it could be plainly seen and
was greatly exposed. There was also a scarcity of ammunition,
so that some had to be manufactui*ed during the night; added to
which, the serving troops were quite unacquainted with the
French guns.
254
' The fire was thus opened with very unfavourable prospects,
and led to no satisfactory result.
The gaiTison replied by a well aimed , efileacioas fire, dis-
mounted several guns and inflicted severe losses upon the troops,
particularly those of the breaching battery, and finally attained
a decided superiority; although some fires had broken out in the
fortress and some guns had been dismounted on the ramparts.
Towards evening on the 15th of October, the German batteries
became silent from want of ammunition, and from this moment the
siege again clianged into an investment.
The garrison, which, shortly before the cessation of the bom-
bardment, had already decided to capitulate, now again took
courage, and in a short time made a powerful sortie, in which
it succeeded, under cover of night, in penetrating into the
enemy's batt^ies and spiking some of the guns.
Nevertheless on the 8th of November they surrendered, after a
cfNMiderable siege train had been provided from Metz, which place
had^ in the meantime, fallen into German hands.
The fortress capitulated with about 4000 men, 2 generals
and 161 officers, 136 guns, 23,000 rifles and considerable stock
of war material of different descriptions.
LA FERE.
The fortress of La FerCy lying on the left bank of the Oise,
between that river and the Serre, next eame into question; an
army far the relief of Paris, having been organized to the north
of that city, it was important to deprive it of this point of appui.
La F^re lay in the radius of the French Northern Army, which
made an attempt to relieve it on the 20th of November, and, as a
rallying point for the Francs -tireurs, was a troublesome neigh-
bourhood to Soissons and the surrounding counti*y, now occupied
by the Germans.
The foiiress is not large, it had a garrison of 2000 men,
including the Gardes Mobiles and Francs - tireurs, and was equipped
255
with about 70 guns. Its main strength lay in the considerable
inundations y which however were so far disadvantageous to its
capabilities ofa*esistance that the water penetrated into the cellars
and ground floors of the low-lying town, so that the inhabitants
could find no shelter during the bombardment.
La F^re was unable to resist a serious bombardment, and the
commandant was so much convinced of this, that before the invest*
ment began, he determined to save all the aitillery material by
sending it off to Lille. The inhabitants, however, opposed this,
and effected the i*elief of the commandant by an officer of marines,
who declared that the fortress would hold out until its last
biscuit.
In the night of the 24th of November, the besiegers brought
into position to the west of the fortress, at a distance of about
2000 paces,* 8 rified 24-ponnders, 12 rifled 12-pouiiders, 6 rifled
6-pounders and 6 mortars ; these silenced tlie guns of the fortress,
even on the fii*»t day, ignited fires in the town, and on the 26th
effected the capitulationj without having suffered any loss.
PERONNE.
PironnCy lying upon an island in the Somme, Is, similar to
La F^re, protected by water; this fortress also obtained some im-
portance in the operations of tlie Northern Armies, and its conqueat
is woilhy of remark, because it resulted exclusively from the fire
of captured French guns.
The garrison of P^ronne, over 3000 men with about 70 guns,
had brought itself into notice, during the time that part of
General von Mauteuffel's Army occupied Amiens, by seizing a care-
lessly returaing railway detachment in Ham] and, in other ways,
had caused some uneasiness to the German Noiiihern Army.
In consequence of this the German Artillery commandant of
the citadel of Amiens, First Lieutenant Schmidt^ prepared a siege
train, and upon a suggestion of his with respect to the bombard-
ment of P^roune, was sent out against this fortress, (which had
256
been invested for some days)^ on the 30th of December^ with 6 rifled
12'pounder8y 2 22centimetre mortars and 4 22centim^tre howitzers.
The French Army nnder General Faidherbe had^ at that time^ been
obliged to retire from the neighbonrhood of Amiens.
Lieutenant Schmidt had selected the sonth-western front for
the attack. The expedition met with considerable difficulties from
the roads covered with slippery ice upon the hard frozen ground,
and was .endangered by the ndghbonrhood of Faidherbe^s Army.
The bombardment began on the morning of the 2nd of January,
and was carried on for two days with favourable results (the delay
in Amiens having given the opportunity of becoming acquainted
with the French guns). Tlien, however, the bombardment had to be
suspended for a time in consequence of the issue of the battle of
Bapaume, after whidi both amues retired. The fire was continued
with three guns only, whilst the remainder were held in readiness
to drive off.
After some days, however, the danger disappeared and the
bombardment began afresh, and led to a capitulation on the
9th of January 1871, after having lasted altogether seven days.
The defence of almost all the fcHrtresses was undertaken and
proseented by the French with praiseworthy courage, and in some
eases also in an intelligent manner.
In almost all, the bombardment produced the decisive result,
it demoralized the garrison through the constant peril of death,
and moved the inhabitants 1o influence the commandant
The superior leadership and discipline on the German side,
the superiority of the Prussian artillery material, the insight and
energy of the German oUcers always bore away the victory.
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TENTH CHAPTER.
The Siege of Pabis.
The siege of Paris, which resulted in the capitnlation of this
giant fortress, is, incontestably , one of the greatest military
spectacles that the world has ever beheld; it was the most im-
portant event in the development of the whole war. Yet, looking
at it solely from a military point of view, is not sufficient to
obtain a correct idea even of the military importance of the event.
Neither the 'occurrences in Paris, nor the actions of the besiegers
can be measured by a military scale alone.
It is the peculiarity of this phase of the war, that not only
had a complicated political state of power to be taken into ac-
count, but also perfectly new and unexampled factors of military
power, and lastly the wavering humours of a large, helpless, ex-
citable and uncei*tain population.
Never has a policy had more reason and better opportunity
for acting with wisdom, than German policy after the overthrow of
the empire. The problem was solved with incomparable ability,
and yet, as it was not omniscient, at the end a fault was com-
mitted which was capable of calling into question tlie fulfilment
of the peace conditions. In stipulating the conditions of the
capitulation, neither the disarmament of the National Guard, nor the
occupation of the city were insisted upon. Thus it was possible
that an event so incredible as an out-break of civil war in the
city at last delivered from the enemy, could take place. Certainly —
who can tell what harm might have resulted from an occupation
of the city!
17
258
Mindful of its exalted poBition, as the director of a great
cultivated nation ^ the Prussian Government could not^ from the
first moment of the siege ^ even when considered as a military
question y overlook the fact that it was the most beautiful city in
the world, although a fortress, with which the German arms were
now concerned. It could not overlook the fact that the population
of Paris, uniting all the weaknesses and vices of mankind with
the amiable and estimable qualities of an educated people, was a
most unusual object for warlike measures, not only on account
of its multitude but also in regard to its character.
Paris, the nucleus of unequalled treasures in art and science,
was the property of the whole world, and what France had
forgotten in her downfall, great Germany would bear in mind.
An inextinguishable detestation pursues the destroyer of the
gi*eat centres of cultivation of mankind; the righteousness, of his
cause will not, here, protect the conqueror.
The melancholy occurrences of the civil war, which followed
the siege by the Germans, have shown to what horrors the con-
quest of the city Sy storm could lead, and the manner of defence
that the Parisians were capable of under the circumstances.
It adds to the honour of Germany, that it did not fall to
the lot of German troops to carry on the war which became the
duty of French troops in May and June 1871, through a weak
and therefore unfortunate government ; and that German troops did
not contribute to the destruction of the gorgeous, and historically
notable, buildings of the old, renowned city.
The conquest of Paris was in the highest degree honourable
both for the rulers and wamors of Germany ; but for France — it
has needed the sanguinary horrors of the civil war to make the
world fbrget, that the defence of Paris against the Germans was
well adapted to cover the French name with lasting ridicule. For
four months and a half, half a million of well armed defenders
of their country allowed themselves to be shut up, in the greatest
fortress of the world, by 200,000 men, whilst, during the whole
time, they never ceased congratulating each other upon their heroic
courage, and threatening the enemy with total destruction.
In order rightly to appreciate the vastness and multilateral
259
natnre of the tasks for the Direction of the German army and
state, one must first recall the external and interior condition of
th» great object of operations — Paris. The natural situation of
the fortress is not particularly favourable, but finds advantages in
some heights to the east and south-west, for excellently situated,
commanding outworks, and at other points, is protected from the
approach of the enemy's siege works, by the course of the Seine
and Marne, especially so in the west and north-west. Its main
strength lies in its, quite unusual, proportions, which have the
effect on the one hand, of making it impossible to attack the
outer forts, distributed in a circumference of 7 miles (32^5 English
miles), by a cross fire, but in the front only, and on the other
hand, of obliging the foe to accumulate extraordinarily large masses
of troops for a suiTOunding siege.
(Compare the general map of Paris.)
There is a double line of fortifications. The town itself and
part of the suburbs are surrounded by a very strong enceinte^ a
girdle of fortresses, whose longest diameter, from Porte Point du
Jour in the south-west, to the outermost point of la Villette in the
north-east is 1^/g of a mile (about TVs English miles), whilst its
shortest diameter, a line leading through the intersecting point of
the Seine (which flows through the enceinte and Paris), in the south-
east, by the Tuileries to Les Batignolles, is . 1.^5 of a ipile
(5^2 English miles) in length.
The enceinte consists of a circumvallation of bastions, with
masonry escarps, without outer works and without casemates; the
ditch is 35 feet wide, and can be filled by the Seine. Ninety
four bastions jut out upon all sides, and enable a concentrated
fire to be opened upon the assailant. They are distinguished by
numbers, and run from bastion 1, on the right bank of the Seine,
at the point where it enters the town, .to bastion 94 on the left
bank, exactly opposite No. 1. In the interior of the enceinte, a.
paved military road runs along the whole circumvallation, and
besides this, a railroad belt, which at tlie same time, unites all
the lines entering from outside with one another. Thus there is
the most excellent communication within the enceinte; in a very
17*
2G0
short time, a considerable nnmber of troops can be concentrated
upon any threatened point.
The suburbs extend beyond this inner circumvallation , and
from them, country houses and villages, in unbroken succession
for a mile (4^/5 English miles) in extent.
In an outer line of fortifications , a cincture of detached farU
and redoubts intersects these countless excrescences and satellites
of the great city. They present the first and strongest resistance
to the besieger, and although they do not lie sufficiently distant
from the enceinte, to impede, completely, the efficacy of the new
guns of the enemy upon the enceinte and beyond, yet they greatly
limit this efficacy, and at any rate, prevent an immediate attack
upon the town. They lie partly on hills and partly in the plain ;
on the eastern, southern and northern sides they lie close together,
on the west there is only one — but the most important fort. They
lie connected in such a manner, that no enemy can penetrate
between, and that any two or three of them, can concentrate their
fire upon one spot, whilst the assailant finds it impossible to bom-,
bard a single one from different sides at the same time.
The outer forts form different groups before the different
fronts of Paris.
(Compare the three special maps of the south-west front, the
east front, and the north front of Paris.)
The south-west front is distinguished by the Fortress of
Mont F'alirieny a real fortress in itself, lying farthest towards
the west, and then by the Forts Issy^ Vanvres^ Montrouge,
Arcueilj Bie^tre and Ivry. Whilst the fortress upon Mont
Val^rien is a full mile (4^/5 English miles) ttom the one lying
nearest to it. Fort Issy — the interval is filled up by a bend of
the ISeine — , none of the remaining forts are separated from each
other by more than firom 2600 to 3000 paces, and thus lie so
near one another, that even after one of them has been destroyed
by the enemy, he would only be able to advance Anrther under
the cross fire of the two neighbouring forts.
In front of these works, however, at a distance of about
1500 paces, there are hills rising to above 400 feet, which if
occupied by the besiegers, must greatly imperil the forts by their
261
dominating fire. These are the heights of Clamart^ Meudon and
Chatillou. As the limited time prohibited tlie construction of con-
siderable works upon these heights^ which, properly; were necessary
for the security of the south-west front , General Trochn had to
content himself wit^i simple field entrenchments. Works of this
description were laid out, before the arrival (tf the enemy , at
Moulin de la Tour, in front of Chatillon, at the village of
FtlUt/uify and to the east of Villejnif, at Moulin Saquei. Moreover
the villages of Villejuif and Vitry sur Seine were placed in a
state of defence. The very important hill of Montretout above
St. Cloud; on the other hand, was not fortified — time failed, and
the labour force of Paris was not properly utilised. To the north
of Mont Val^rien , however , a t^te de pont was erected for the
bridge of NeuUly^ and a fortification raised upon the hill of
SL Ouen.
The eatt front is the strongest of all; the position of the
fortifications here^ corresponds exactly with the formation of the
ridge of heights which stretches from the suburb Belleville; '/| of
a mile (about 31/3 English miles) outside the enceinte towards the
east. Towards the north these heights sink down to the canal
de rOurcq; and in the south; to the Mame. They are occupied
by a group of forts which command all the. approaches of the
enemy from ChftlonS; .Troyes and Meluu; as well as the passages
over the Seine and Mame near the spot where they unite into
one stream. The most northern of these forts is Rofnatmrille^
which lies only 1800 paces from the enceinte; below it; lines of
entrenchments lead down to the^ eanal de tOurcq, At 2000
paces to the east of this fort lies Fort Noisyy which is connected
with Fort Rosny, situated 2600 paces to the south-east, by the
redoubts of Monireuil and La Boissih'e, Fort Noyent and the
redoubt of Fontenay situated to the north of it; crown the south-
eastern extremity of the heights; which commence at BellevillC;
and lie about 3200 paces south of the most advanced lunette of
Fort Rosny.
To the south of this the windings of the MamC; which is
here 100 paces wide, form a hindrance to an approach; and at
the spot where the enemy would have the greatest facilities for
262
breakiiig through, in the event of his having Boceeeded in csioBBing
the river at its sonth-eaatem bend^ namely in the defile formed
by the bends of the river mnning near one another | the road is
barred by the redoubts of Grm^eUe and La Faumiderie with
the entrenchments lying between them. Again, 2600 paces from
the redonbt of Gravelle lies Fori ChareniaUy in the angle between
the Marne and the Seine, uniting the east front with the lonth-
west front. Then, in a second line, lies the fortified Chateau
of FmcenneSj on the east front, 2500 paces from the enceinte.
Fori St. Denis, Fori Aubervillers and the fortifications
along the St Denis canal form the north front. The town of
St Denis lies to the north of Montmartre (which played a part
at the siege of Paris in the year 1814, bnt is now completely
taken np by the increasing city, and rises within the enceinte),
is 4400 paces outside the walls and has three forts: Double
Couronney de CEst and de la Briche. At a later period, another
work was erected on the left bank of the Seine, at Fillemeuve
la Garenne^ in connection with the works of St Denis. Thus
St. Denis is also a complete fortress in itself, atid very strong;
the works are all defensively united with one another, and their
ditches can be uiundated by the stream Rouillon. Fort Auber-
vlllets, 2400 paces from the most north-easterly point of the
enceinte, covers Paris on this side, and commands the road to
Lille, but is a long way from its neighbouring fort — 4400 paces.
In order to give security to this wide interval, redoubts are erected,
in a second line, along the canals of St. Denis and de fOurcq.
All the fof'ts were moreover united with one another,
before and during the investment, by a running line of en-
trenchments.
This must be mentioned to the honour of General Chabaud-
Latour, who directed the great works of fortification.
Paris is thus surrounded by sixteen forts and, moreover, by
a multitude of redoubts and ratrenchments , and in its enceinte,
presents to the besieger, who has been fortunate enough to over-
come the first obstacles) a very strong line of defence. The forts
were new, since the year 1840^ very strongly and well btiilt ; that
of Mont Yal^rien was of extraordinary solidity. They were all
263
equipped with guns of the heaviest calibre, partly before and
paitly during the first stages of the siege.
The communicaiionsy inside the whole circle of the outermost
fortifications, are the best, altogether, that can be conceived. The
ground is interaected in all directions by raiboads, broad, well
paved or macadamized roads, and these offer the most favourable
means for collecting a considerable mass of troops, at any spot
where the defenders may desire, in a comparatively short time.
The Seine is crossed by a superfluously large number of the flnest
bridges. Telegraph wires united all the outer forts with the city
and with each other, and in the city itself there was a telegraphic
communication between all the important points. All the aids of
scieilce were at the command of the defebce ; the great mechanical
establishments, as well as the Urge gun foundries and arm matm-
factories of the state, were at its service.
It is also important to observe, that for making sorties Either
on a small scale or on the largest, with hundreds of thousands,
no more advantageous formation than that of the fortress of Paris
can be imagined. Each two foi*ts make an excellent sortie gate,
and these can prepare for it and support it by the fire of their
heavy guns. A whole army can, any day, be brought together,
unseen, inside the enceinte or at many points immediately behind
the foi*ts, which might break forth between the forts the hext
morning at dawn, in splendid developinetit, and always be four,
five or six times superior to an enemy at the given point, who
has not a whole million of soldiers for the siege*
Certainly if Mac Mahon had been allowed to lead the army,
which came to ruin at Sedan, to Paris, the German Army Direc-
tion would not have been able to carry out the investment of this
city, and if, instead, of going to the help of Bazaine, he had
drawn towards Orl^ns, the siege of Paris could not have been
»
undertaken at all.
The forces of France were allied with unexampled misfortune ;
they were squandered away before the siege of Paris, and trifled
away whilst it was goiHg on*
The following active forces were raised for the defence:
1) a Corps of able, brave men, expert in arms, the sailors
264
and marines^ under their educated and intelligent officers. In all
about 15,000 men. Amongst these regiments of marine infantry,
General Trochu has drawn attention to the superiority of Nos. 35
and 42. ii
2) A mass of soldiers and other state officials^ who were ex-
perienced in the use of arms, but not organized, and for the most
part completely demoralized — a real mosaic troop. They were the
depot battalions of the former Imperial Guard, the troops of the
Line which General Vinoy had brought away to Paris from
M^zi^res after the battle of Sedan, and old, time served soldiers,
who were again called up, with Douaniers and Forestrkeepers of
all kinds, and ci-devant Sergeants de Ville and Gendarmes. There
were besides these, the fugitives from previous battles and marches.
Altogether about 70,000 men.
3) The Gardes Mobiles from the province, chiefly Bretons
and Burgundlans; then there were mep from Berry, from Franche
Gomt^ and Champagne and other provinces, men who probably
had no clear idea of what a rifle was, especially on the system
of a Remington, a Chassepot or Martini-Henry ; but who possessed
patriotism and good physical qualities, and after six weeks of
judicious training could have furnished an efficient body of men
under a capable leader. General Trochu estimates their number
at 100,000.
4) The Parisian Garde Mobile. This was a corps which
combined all the bad qualities of the population of a great city
with the weaknesses of the provincial Gardes Mobiles. These
Gardes Mobiles had, already, been once attached to the army of
Chilons, and bad first brought Marshal Canrobert, into a state of
despair, and then perplexed Marshal MacMahon to such an extent
that he decided on dispensing with their assistance and sending
them back to Paris. There might have been 30,000 of them.
5) The Garde Nationale of Paris. This armed mass was,
according to Trochu's estimate, only 50,000 men sti*ong at the
beginning of the siege. In the middle of September a number of
so called battalions existed, of about 1000 men each, composed .
of citizens, tradespeople, doctors, lawyers, and officials. They were
recruited from the mass of those, who followed similar kinds of
265
ocoupatioU) in the same quarter of the town^ and who were possessed
of similar means; — during the siege they reached, on an average,
a strength of 1200 men. These battalions, to distinguish them
from those raised later, were called, old battalions. In the other
quarters of the town, where this regulation did not as yet exist
(the Government had always suppressed the legal formation of the
Gardes Nationaux, from fear of revolutions), in the suburbs and
districts of Belleville and Menilmontant for example, new battalions
were raised when the siege was threatened, each if which must,
very quickly, have reached a capitation of about 2000. Altogether,
in the month of October, the battalions numbered 266, whose
strength is reckoned by General Trochu at 260,000 men, and by
other authorities at a higher figure, up to more than 300,000 men.
Amongst these Gardes Nationaux the best and worst elements were
to be found recklessly mixed together. Powerful young men stood
shoulder to shoulder with poi*tly elderly gentlemen; men with
patriotic enthusiasm stood in the same rank with the most timid
egotists. Highly educated men, who, even when pampered by an
over-refined life always show themselves of moral courage and
great service in battle, were interBpei*sed in a battalion with men
who stood far below them mentally, and who could in no way
make up for their want of military capability.
At the commencement there was absolutely, no selection, no
division according to age or the good will of the men, and when
it was desired to begin this it was already too late.
The equipment of the army was very heterogeneous, still,
thanks to the active manufacture of arms, all the combatants were
supplied with good rifles in the course of a few weeks, and finally,
the artillery also, with numerous guns. Certainly the only arm
which the Parisians, with some exceptions, understood how to
serve ^ during this siege, was the stomachy which was contented
with unusually frugal fare. On the whole an enormous material
presented itself, the most part of which certainly, remained unem-
ployed, but from which an able general might surely have pro-
duced a serviceable army of 200,000 men, and from which a
leader of genius, capable of carrying the masses along with hiin,
266
might have nised a formidable army for andertakings on the spnr
of the moment.
The Commander in Chief of this entire army, abont half a
million of men, had however — and this is the most prominent
of all the peculiarities of the defence of Paris — far more deference
for his own army than for the enemy; or rather, he possessed a
well grounded respect for the enemy, but his fear of an enieuie
in his own troops was so great, that he allowed his regard for
the enemy to give place entirely to his anxiety for internal qnlet ;
he arranged little upon his own initiative, but, in most of his
acts, allowed himself to be driven by the population — the
Garde Nationals
General Trochu was a very unfit Commander in Chief for
such forces. A soldier of scientific eduoation, experienced and
sensible, he possessed just sufficient penetration to see clearly, all
the defects of his army, but had not the energy and talent to
obviate these defects and to bring the strong side of it into
account.
It may be assumed that, throughout. General Troehu did not
deceive himself. He was completely convinced that the fate of
the capital, of which he was the governor, depended solely, upon
what measures the Germans would or could take. If the German
army in pursuit of General Vinoy's defeated troops, had passed the
outer line of forts on the 19th of September, suddenly taken the
enceinte by storm, and appeared before the Hotel de Ville on the
first day of the siege. General Trochu would have been one of
those , least surprised , at such a rapid solution of the affair. . If
the German army had destroyed some forts in the first four weeks,
and then undertaken the assault. General Trochu could not have
prevented it.
As however the Germans took a diflferent and a wiser coarse,
which led to peace as well as to the capture of the city, he was
filled with amazement at the enemy, and at the same time with
satisfaction in regard to his own situation. General Troehu was
an actor from the first day of the siege to the last, and was
obliged to be so in order to retain his position.
But why had be undertaken such a post?
267
He thought that he was as well- able to fill it as any one
else, and to perform his duty as a patriot.
Having fallen oat of favour, on account of his work on the
French army in 1867, and being an object of suspicion to the
Court as an Orleanist in spite of his service in Italy and Africa,
he had received an insignificant appointment at the beginning of
the war, and only on the formation of the 12th Army Owps had
he been named its commander, and on the 17th of August,
Governor of Paris.
The General has given extensive ea^lanaiions, *in the sittings
of the National Assembly on the Idth and 14th of June 1871,
as to his personal position both with regard to the political and
military situation of France, some points of which will be found of
interest here. The General affirms, thstt even before the French
defeats at Mete, he had pointed out to the Emperor Napoleon, the
necessity of a rapid retreat of the whole army upon Pai*is, that
his motion was approved of in the council of wai*, but that advices
from Paris had prevented the retreat fte*om being carried out.
Later, at another council of war, presided over by the Em-
peror, he was appointed Governor of Paris with the charge of
announcing and preparing for the Emperor^s arrival there. He ae-
ceptedj but only on the condition that Mac Mahon should lead
his army to Paris. He, Trochu, was to-be named Commander in
Chief of all the forces, whilst the Emperor himself would resume
the reins of government.
On hifi arrival in Paris, he was however, received with great
distrust by the Empress Regent, who declared that t^e plan of
the retreat upon Paris was quite altered. She asserted that the
Emperor was not coming to Paris, but would remain in Chd.lons;
Trochu might defend Paris without the Emperor.
Conti*ary to his own conviction, he, yet, accepted out of
loyalty and composed a proclamation beginning : ^I come as Governor
of Paris, appointed by the Emperor, with the charge of pro-
claiming a state of siege.^
The Empress wished to have the Emperor's name removed
from the proclamation, and in spite of his resistance, insisted upon
this alteration.
268
• •
The war miiuBter^ Count Palikao, had received him no better
than the Regent ^ and even declared to him that his arrival
fmstrated all the well prepared measmres for the defence. (Trochu
had become a favourite with the opposition ^ rince the Imperial
Government had slighted him.)
On the night of the drd of September he had learnt , from
an officer in the street , the news of the capitulation of Sedaii^
and General Soumain had afterwards given him proof that^ un-
beknown to him, General Palikao had been placed ov^ Mac Blahon's
army and also over that of Paris. His counsels were only met
with mistrust both by the Empress and the Minister, Palikao, and
the latter had broken off all business relations with him.
From this moment, his efforts were only directed towards the
defence of the legislature against the seditious multitude. Summoned
to take part in the government now forming at the Hotel de Ville,
he had undertaken the Presidency.
In regard to the defence of Paris, Trochu then gives the
following explanation: ^On the 5th of September, my colleagues
Jules Favre and Picard, requii*ed me to state what deterred me
from the undertaking ; I answered that every fortified place, which
is not supported by an external army, falls into the ^emy's
power; that Paris, with her emotions, would be subject to this
axiom more than any other town ; and consequently, since an army
no longer existed, we should be uniting in an heroic folly. But,
I added, this heroic folly is necessary, to save the honour of
France, and to give time to the amazed world to recover. —
I confess that I counted upon America's remembering Lafayette's
comrades, England those of Inkerman and Italy those of Solferino."
Trochu further says : ^The chief difficulty was to make people
believe in the siege of Paris. It was declared that the enclosing
was impossible, or maintained that, if it were possible, the city
would not hold out for fourteen days. I myself only believed
in a resistance of 60 days ..... The fortifications of Paris
were made for another description of artillery, and for other rifles.
Everything had to be made anew ".
Upon the sul^ect of the German lines of fortification, Trochu
said : "The Prussian works are the strongest that have ever been
269
made. I thank heaven, that I possessed the firmness to withstand
those who would have foi'ced me to make an attack npon them.
Had I led my troops out beyond the first line they would have
been lost. It is a consolation to me that numerous families have
been spared this misfortune. Recollect gentlemen, the exertions
of the insurgents; facts have proved the value of the defensive
positions which covered Versailles.''
In the further course of his speech, Trochu related how he
had followed the plan, projected by General Ducrot, of making a
sortie on a large scale from the peninsula Gennevilliers in the
direction of Rouen, for the purpose of forming a junction with the
Lille Army.
Gambetta's opposition had frustrated this plan. ^Gambetta
possessed considerable patriotism, but two innate faults. He thought
that , * after having called up all the strength of the country , he
must transfer the guidance of it exclusively to the men of a certain
party, and then he was involved in the military traditions of
1792, and believed it possible to fight with undrilled masses against
organized armies. That this was not the case, even at that time,
is attested by the memoirs of Dumouriez.'^
General Trochu's further explanations also prove that tlie
measures which he took, especially the sorties, were forced upon
him against his better conviction, partly by the population of
Paris, and partly by Gambetta.
'*More than twenty times", declared the General, ^'I was on
the point of sending in my resignation; I did not do so, I swal-
lowed the most cruelly bitter words, because I looked upon it as
an act of cowardice to resign."
For the German Direction, on the other hand, the problem
of the conquest of Paris, was combined with very many considera-
tions of the most diverse kinds.
The attainment of a favourable and secure peace was and
continued to be the main point. The capture of Paris was
important, for it was anticipated that it uiould brifig on the
peace, only Paris must be the capture of Paris ^ that is, of
the seat of the government and of prevailing influence upon
the whole country.
270
Further, PariB, when captured^ must be really and uneoiidi-
tionally in the hands of the conqneror, completely aubjeoted^ in-
clined for peace^ and disposing the provinces to peace.
In the event of Paris overthrowing the government of the
National Defence^ of anarchy breaking out in the city, or of the
German aimy taking a city in which daily disturbances had to be
suppressed — in these very possible cases Paris^ had not the high
value which the price of its difficult conquest must entail. For
under these circumstances, quite apart from the great sacrifices in
human life, it was to be feared that a new government would be
formed in the provinces, or, above all, that no government would
be established, with which peace conld be conclnded, and lastiy^
that the provinces would be encouraged to make a longer resistance,
by the permanent disturbances in Paris.
Although, therefore, the government of the 4th of September
was by no means legitimate, and indeed could not even claim the
authority of a municipal government, still the Chancellor of the
Confederation, whilst the investment was being completed, entered
into negotiations about an armistice with the delegate of this
government, Jules Favre, the minister of Foreign Affairs (v. page 289)
which might be looked upon as a preliminary to' peace ; and always
having in view the attainment of a legitimate peace as quickly as
possible, he proposed the mildest conditions whicb^ altogether, could
be offered. Even after tliese negotiations had been broken off, the
German government did not decline to recognise the Parisian
government. '
This government^ bad as it was, must be protected, on the
part of the Germans as if it were a real treasure, for it was
foreseen that after its overtlu*ow one still worse might spring up. It
needed but a. trifling diffienUy in order to put into its place the
dominion of a class of people, whose existence and aims were
evidently better known to Count Bismarck than to the French
government itself. The negotiations between the Chancellor of the
Confederation and the French Minister leave no doubt about this,
and it is a wonderful fact that the Frenchman displayed indignation
instead .of grateful intelligence.
Moreover, at the siege of the city, the German Army Direction
271
acted consistently with the end in view, that it was necessary
to bring the population to recognise their need of peace. The
thorough hopelessness of resistance , was dearly placed before
them by evidence^ time was given them to weigh the circumstances
(»l9ily, and everything that could unnecessarily excite or exasperate
them was avoided. That this wise moderation, nevertheless, did
not spare the great city the horrors of a most rigid siege and of a
bombardment, and that the defence against the external foe was
followed by the most sanguinary civil wai*, is entirely the fault
of the inhabitants; the result of the frivolity, pride and complete
want of political and military intelligence in this people, who
•Jiad been so badly governed for centuries.
Considered also from the narrower military point of view,
the intended conquest of Paris presented very great difficulties.
After the battle of Sedan an army of about 240,000 men was
disposable for the siege, no great number for a fortress whose
outer forts form a cordon 7 miles (32 ^'5 English miles) in length.
Besides which, it was known that a new French army was being
formed on the Loire, of little importance at first, but in any case
worthy of consideration*
It was perfectly welV known in the German head-quai*ters,
that the works of the fortress were incompletely equipped and in
bad condition, and that the defence, was as yet by no means
organized; so tbat there were some chances for a surprisal. But
an attack by force would certainly have cost very heavy sacrifices,
and then, the success of an attack by surprise could by no means
be reckoned on beforehand, and consequently was not thought of by
German Generalship. In any case an attack by force would have
been at variance with the fundamental idea of the German Army
Direction and policy^
In siege operations , another way . of quickly attaining the
object, is by a bombardment This also was not practicable at
once,, in the present case. The city, it is true, could be readied
by heavy guns from several points. A bombardment of Paris,
however, would have very small effect, unless caiTied out by a
very great number of guns, as experience proved later, and as
had been rightly judged at head -quarters beforehand. The chief effect
272
of a bombftrdment is Gonflagratioii ^ but not only Ib the city bo
enonnously Urge that the Bhells and shot from' rifled ganiy must
be too widely distribntedy bat the hooBes are also built, with Bach
solidity that only very inconsiderable damage coald be caused by
the shot, and ignitions only exceptionally produced. A shot, which
in Strasborg would have thrown down a whole house, in Paris,
that combination of colossal stones, knocked a hole in the wall,
or fell through the root and a couple of floors, destroying some
furniture but without injuring the stability of the house. There-
fore, for a bombardment of any importance, such a large park of
guns was necessary, that several months must elapse before it
could be procured.
To provide this, however, and the ammunition, necessary for
a protracted bombardment, such an enormous transport material
was required that the army supplies might have suffered in con-
sequence.
In order to judge of the difficulties caused by this alone, one
must consider that the investing army required on an average daily:
150,000 3lb. loaves, 1000 cwt. of rice and barley, 600 oxen,
that is, their weight in meat or bacon, 150 cwt. of salt, 28^000
quarts of brandy ; in forage, 10,000 cwt. of oats and 24,000 cwt.
of hay; and that there was a monthly consumption of about
1000 cwt. of tobacco and 12 millions of cigars.
Thu9 it was, that it being desirable to spare the troops
as much as possible, and at the same time only to destroy
Paris in case of the most urgent necessity, nothing remained
but the slow expedient of the investment^ with eventually the
regular siege.
Astonishment has frequently been expressed, even by those
who understand the subject, that the engineer and artillery attack
was so long deferred, and it has been said that even if the
general attack was necessai'ily delayed through difficulties recognised
on all sides, still that an attack upon some one single point
might have led to the rupture of the line of fortifications far
earlier than it actually took place. It is, no doubt, probable, that
after six weeks) sufficient siege material could have been at hand
for a successful attack, for instance, upon Forts Issy, Vanvres, and
273
Montrouge, or even St. Denis. Siege guns were on the spot as
early as the middle of October. It may also be assumed that the
forts would have succumbed to the attack some weeks later, so
that, consequently, the enceinte might have been attacked about
the middle of November. It is however, very gi'eatly to be
questioned, whether any considerable advantage would thus have
been gained towards the attainment of the final aim. Strong
sallies would, shortly, have been directed against the threatened
point, which, in any case, would have exacted many victims.
Then, however, even after a successful assault and considerable
sacrifices, there was still the risk of encountering long continued
street fighting and gi'eat destruction, the very evils which it was
desirable to avoid. If only some of the forts had been taken, or
perhaps the town of St. Denis , then the attack by storm would
have to be decided upon. To stop half way was out of the
question.
The other eoppedient led far more surely^ and with fewer
losses y to the object — that of first conquering the population
morally y and then of bringing on a capitulation by threatening
the city generally.
Investment J with starvation for its object ^ had plainly a
great prospect of success at Paris, contrasted with the disadvantages
of the other means of attack.
But even this way presented considerable difficulties. The
army appointed for the investment, must be sufficiently strong to
oppose all soiiiies. The cincture of the investing corps must be
between 9 and 10 miles (41 to 46 E. m.) in length, so that the
troops should not be placed immediately under the guns of the forts ;
that is, about 22,000 men of the investing troops to each mile
(4'*/5 E. m.), consequently a very small number. If the investment
lasted sufficiently long for the Paris troops to be formed into a
serviceable army, the position of the investing troops would become
very hazardous. The Parisians could have no difficulty in attacking
any point they might choose with a fourfold, or still greater
superiority in forces. It was anticipated however that Paris would
be unable to endure, for long, a rigidly carried out investment. Cut
off from all intercourse with the outer world and deprived of its
18
274
supply of pTovisioius, it was generally believed that the luxurious
city would very soon capitulate. Even in the German head-quarters^
it was probably not expected that four and a half months resistance
in privation, would be encountered from the spoilt , excitable,
swayed - by - every - wind , unstable foe.
But in this respect Paris deceived all expectation. Injured
vanityj scorn of the ^barbarians^^ and fear^ were so strong^
that in spite of all the hunger and misert/y one day after
another of passive resistance parsed away^ until a series of
months was gone.
SEPTEMBER.
After the news of the* capitulation of Sedan had spread in
Paris, after the first panic had been overcome; then after some
days had been uselessly spent in general rejoicings on account of
the republic of the 4th of September, the city set to work, in
anticipation of the enemy's approach, to prepare for a lengthened
siege, and engaged with renewed zeal in laying in provisions and
in the equipment of the fortifications.
The accumulation of the necessaries of life for Paris was
an immense task, and it was accomplished in a surprisingly grand
way, which does great honour to the Imperial minister of com-
merce, Clement Duvemois, who had been occupied with it as a
precautionary measure since the first defeats of the army.
The new republican government carried on successfully, the
work which had been begun.
The whole population of Paris had been raised by the fugitives
from the neighbourhood, and the Gardes Mobiles, to a capitation
of about 2,400,000. During the siege this mass of human beings
needed in bulk the following quantities^):
*y According to a calculation by A. Emminghaus, which is based upon
the statistical estimates ofHusson's work **La consommation de Paris'' 1856
and upon the ,, Journal des ^^onomistes'S
275
Flour
' Meat
and cut up for sale
PigB .
Sheep
Oxen
Horses
Food for these animals, in hay
Oats .
Straw
Potatoes
Or the whole value in hay
Salt .
Butter
Eggs.
Sugar
Coflfee
Olive oil
Beer .
Wine
Spirits
156,000,000 Kilogr.
32,796,000 -
8,189,000 -
75,431 head
148,876 -
60,672 -
75,021 -
63,636,365 Kilogr.
21,943,642 -
44,062,330 -
12,267,537 -
133,764,708 -
6,072,000 -
6,912,000 -
17,659,200
8,786,400 Kilogr.
1,342,000 -
427,200 Litres
16,240,800 -
164,208,000 -
5,640,000 -
A great quantity of other provisions, however, of which no
calculation can be made, are not here included, such as milk,
fowls, salt fish, fresh water fish, oysters, ice, and especially such
voluminous edibles as vegetables and potatoes (those mentioned
above, were as food for animals), which Paris requires in large
quantities under ordinary circumstances; therefore as these articles,
with the exception of milk, could not be procured afresh, and very
soon ceased to be in store, a still greater need of the above
mentioned articles becomes evident. In horses, for example, it is
certain that during the siege a far greater number were consumed,
and the corresponding amount of hay, oats and straw in hand
would be far greater.
The bulk of fuel consumed has not been reckoned.
A Paris newspaper of the 4th of October gives the following
official list of the provisions then in hand:
^In the different parks of the capital, as the Bois de Boulogne,
18*
276
Luxembourg^ and others, there are about 220,000 sheep, 40,000
oxen, and 12,000 pigs.
"In flour, Paris has a store of 300,000 cwt., besides the
supplies at the bakers, which are estimated at 200,000 cwt.
''There are from 30,000 to 40,000 cwt. of salt and preserved
meat, and a considerable amount of salt fish; lastly, an enormous
supply of salt, 100,000 cwt. of rice, and 10,000 cwt. of ooifee,
irrespective of all the other different products which are in the
warehouses and shops*)."
The beautiful parks, in which large lierds of animals were
collected, presented a remarkable spectacle, but the cattle soon
suffered greatly for want of proper care. Another remarkable
sight was presented by the public buildings, the stations, halls,
theatres, and above all the newly erected opera-house in marble
and gold, filled from cellar to roof with sacks of flour, grain,
potatoes and barrels of wine, the corridors and gi'een rooms arranged
as kitchens and offices, and the amphitheatres as hospitals.
The second question was the fortifications.
In what manner they were increased and strengthened under
the direction of General Trochu has already been mentioned. The
last weeks of August and the first half of September were really
well employed in the erection of these new works, and from this
time forth, they were continued diligently.
But the equipment of all the works, also, required great
activity, and an enormous material. Neither failed.
The arsenals of Paris and Vineennes were emptied, and every
gun, even the old trophies from the Invalides, were conveyed to
*) These estimates differ very much from the former calculation. The
number of sheep is much greater, that of oxen and pigs, much smaller.
Yet it may be assumed that a great number of animals, of the two last
kinds, were at the batchers.
The French estimate of the store of flour, shows only one sixth of the
quantity above reckoned , but quotes , on the other hand , considerable
quantities of rice.
All calculation is difBcult, because private families and tradespeople
naturally provided stores on their own account; still A. £mminghaus' estimate
is valuable, because it is based upon well founded scientific investigations,
into the actual requisites for the maintenance of life.
277
the ramparts; from Havre all the heavy guns of the fleet were
brought to Paris by the Seine, and the equipment of the forts
and of the enceinte was gradually completed. The fortress of
Mont Val^jfien carried 79 guns (amongst whieh were some giant
cannon such as the Valerie, and the Josephine), Fort Issy 64,
Vanvres 45, Montrouge 43, Bicetre 40, Ivry 70, Vincennes 117,
Charenton 70, Nogent 53, Rosny 56, Noisy 57, Romainville 49,
Aubervillers 66, de TEst 52, and de la Briehe 61 guns.
Altogether at the end of October, in all the fortifications,
2000 guns were to be found.
In order to carry out the preparations, which necessarily
precede the defence of every fortress, exertions were made to
clear the glacis in order to procure free play for the guns. These
efforts led to a terrible devastation all round the city, without
gaining their object, in consequence of the great number of thickly
dotted villages, villas, chateaux, parks and woods. It was in. vain
that the axe and fire raged in the charming woods ot Boulogne,
Vincennes, Bondy and Meudon ; the fire would not ignite the wood
which was full of sap, and the axe was paralyzed. It was impos-
sible to tear down the countless villages and country seats ; these
formerly favourite spots of the Parisians, and of all strangers visiting
Paris, were in too great abundance. But all . the inhabitants were
forced to leave their possessions, and numberless families had their
happiness and property unnecessarily destroyed.
In the interior, the army for the defence was organized. The
defence of the enceinte, and the security of public tranquillity, were
consigned to the Garde Nationale, which formed the First Army.
A Second Army was formed out of the regular troops and Gardes
Mobiles for the purpose of making sorties; and a Third Army of
the regular troops and sailors, was organized for the defence of
the forts*). ^
*) This distribution, certainly, did not come into full effect until the
beginning of November ; as however, an analogous employment of the different
kinds of troops took place from the beginning, the order of battle, which
was only given out later, here follows, in order that it may be more easily
comprehended f '
278
ORDER OF BATTLE OP THE ARMY OF PARIS,
Commander in Chief| General Trochu.
Chief of the Staff, General Schmitz,
Deputy Chief of the Staff, General Foy.
Commander of the Artillery, General Guiod.
Chief of the Engineers, General de Chabaud-Latour.
Intendant General, General Wolff.
FIRST ARMY.
Chief Commandant, in September and October, General
Tamissier^ from November, General Thomas.
Chief of the Staff, Colonel Montagut.
Commandant of the Cavalry Legion, Colonel Qnielet.
Commandant of Artillery, Colonel 8ch5lcher.
This army consisted of 266 (according to other authorities
276) battalions and finally numbered 300,000 men.
SECOND ARMY.
Chief Commandant, General DucroU
Chief of the Staff, General Appert.
Deputy Chief of the Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Warnet.
Commandant of Artillery, General Fr^bault.
Commandant of Engineers, General Tripier.
First Army Corps: General Fmoy. Chief of the Staff,
General de Valdan. Commandant of Artillery, General d'Ubexi.
Commandant of Engineers, General du Pouet.
1st Division: General Mabray. 1st Brigade: General Mar-
tenot. 2nd Brigade: General Paturel,
2nd Division: General de Maud^huy. 1st Brigade (Garde
Mobile from the provinces): Colonel Valentin. 2nd Brigade:
General Blaise.
3rd Division: General Blanchard. 1st Brigade (Garde
Mobile from the provinces) : Colonel Comte. 2nd Brigade :
General de Mariouse.
Second Army Corps: General Renauld. Chief of the
279
Staff, General Ferri-Rsani. Commandant of Artillery ^ General
Boissonnet. Commandant of Engineers, Colonel Corbin.
1st Division: General Susbielle, 1st Brigade: Colonel Bonnet.
2nd Brigade : General Lecomte.
2nd Division: General Berthaut. 1st Brigade: General
Bocher. 2nd Brigade: Colonel Boutier.
3rd Division: General de Maussion. 1st Brigade: General
Courty. 2nd Brigade: General Avill de Lanclos.
Third Army Corps: General dExea. Chief of the Staff,
Colonel de Belgaric. Commandant of Artillery , General Princeteau.
Commandant of Engineers, Colonel Ragon.
1st Division: General de Bellemare. 1st Brigade: Colonel
Foum^s. 2nd Brigade: Colonel Colomien.
2nd Division: General MattaL 1st Brigade (Garde Mobile
from the provinces): General Faron. 2nd Brigade: General Daudel.
Cavalry Division: General de Champeron. 1st Brigade:
General de Gerbrois. 2nd Brigade : General Consin. Regiment of
monnted Gendarmes: Colonel AUaveine.
In November this army numbered 120,000 men, with 80 field
and mitrailleuse batteries.
THIRD ARMY
(under the special command of General Trocku).
1st Division: General Soumatn. Chief of the Staff: Lieut.
Colonel Pdchin. 1st Brigade: General DargentoUe. 2nd Brigade:
General de Chassi^re.
2nd Division: Vice Admiral de la Rondure, 1st Brigade:
Colonel Lavoignet 2nd Brigade: Colonel Haurion. 3rd Brigade:
Captain of Frigate, Lamotte Tenet.
3rd Division: General de Lmiers. Chief of the Staff: Major
Morlaincourt. 1st Brigade: Colonel Filhol de Camas. 2nd Brigade:
Colonel de Chamberet.
4th Division: General de Beaufort. Chief of the Staff:
Major Lecoy. 1st Brigade: General Dumoulin. 2nd Brigade:
Captain of Frigate, d'Andr^,
1
280
5th Division : General . Correard, Chief of the Staff: Major
Vial. 1st Brigade: Gplonei Champion. 2nd Brigade: Colonel
Porion.
6th Division: General (tHugueg. Chief of the Staff: Major
d'EUoy. 1st Brigade: Captain of Frigate, de Bray. 2nd Brigade:
Colonel Bro.
7th Division: Bear Admiral Pothuau. 1st Brigade: Lieut.
Colonel Le Mains. 2nd Brigade: Naval Captain Salmon.
Cavalry: Ist Brigade: General de Bemis. 2nd Brigade:
Lieut. Colonel Blondel.
The strength of this army was 80,000 men.
In the month of September this distribution was only pro-
ceeding gradually. It had probably gone through many ohauges,
as the opinions upon the warlike capacity of the different corps
were altered affcer the first fights in September. This is shown
by one of General Trochu's ordera on the 11th of September, in
accordance with which the Garde Mobile of Paris was divided in
the following manner:
1st Division : General de Liniers (Head-Quarters in the Elysee).
Battalions of the arrondissements 8, 9, 16 and 17.
2nd Division : General de Beaufort d'Hautponl (Head-Qnaiiiers
in the Palais Royal). Battalions of the arrondissements 1, 2, 9
and 18.
3rd Division: General Berthaut (Head-Quarters in the Con-
servatoire de Tart et de Tindustrie). Battalions of the arron-
dissements 3, 4, 10, li, 12, 19 and 20.
4th Division : General CoiTeard (Head-Quarters in the Luxem-
bourg). Battalions of the arrondissements 5, 6, 9, 13, 14 and 15.
This distribution does not aj^ear in the order of battle given
above ; some of the Generals are not mentioned at all , and others
have different commands.
The strength estimates in the foregoing order of battle cannot
be regarded as very ti-ust-worthy. There was many a corps and
many a battalion the strength of which was unknown to its own
281
commander. Only thus much can be assamed, that the strength
of the army altogether was about 500,000 men.
The state of feeling which existed in the largest portion
of these masses y vis. the Garde Nationale, may be inferred
from a description given by Francisque Sarcey, a member of the
Garde Nationale, who has published a narrative of the state of
Paris during the siege ; and writes as follows ^ with regard to the
general feeling during the advance of the Germans ^ in the first
half of September:
"All the world expected to see the "Prussians" fall upon
Palis and force the gates, five or six days after Sedan. Their
progress could be traced by the notices in the papers, which
announced, one day: "The march to-day is only as far as Bar-
le-Duc", the next day : "to Vitry", the following day : "The march
to-day is only to Ch&lons", and then : "They are going to £pernay".
Thus we could calculate, by how many miles France had become
reduced in size. The railroad material moved back, from town
to town, upon Paris, and proclaimed how much country had been
abandoned to the enemy. The girdle with which the Prussians
enclosed us, drew closer every hour, until Asni^res and Vincennes
became the termini of the railroad lines. One day more and all
the carriages, all the engines, the whole material were collected
together in the carriage sheds at Paris, and the gates by which
they used to leave the gi*eat city were locked and walled up.
"It is highly probable that those who will relate the story of
the siege to posterity, will only represent the fixed, immutable
purpose of the Parisians at this time, to conquer or to die; they
will blazon forth the heroic courage of this great capital, which
broke through its habits of luxury and refinement without flinching,
and resolved to bury itself in ruins, rather tlian yield to a
cowardly capitulation.
"In reality however, the feelings which agitated the Parisian
citizens during this waiting period, were very complicated, and it
needs an observer of subtile mind to analyze them.
"At the bottom of every heart lay dormant — it was ab-
surd, in*ational and laughable — a secret hope that "the affair
would be arranged", and that the Prussians would halt half way.
282
Upon what were these strange illusions grounded? Upon every
thing and upon nothing. William had declared that he only made
war against Napoleon. **Now" said they, '*as the Emperor is
overthrown, why should the King of Prussia continue the cam-
paign against a nation which never did him any harm?" To this
was added: ^he will be afraid of the French republic, and the
spread of democratic ideas in his army.^' In fact all the demo-
crats of Paris composed long addresses to the soldiers of the enemy,
their "German brothers", and posted them on all the walls of
Paris, presumably with a view to their being conveniently read by
the agents of Monsieur von Bismarck. Besides, the intervention
of Europe was counted upon. **Ru88ia will not allow the con-
quests of Prussia to continue, which endanger the security of
Europe. England must perceive that after the conquest of France,
William will annex Holland and aspire to the dominion of the
sea." On the other hand the article in the "Times" was not
quoted, which deliberately enumerated the reasons why Europe
must remain neutral, and recommended an indifference, to which
Europe was only too much inclined.
"But what nourished this irrational dream of the population
more than anything else, was the incurable vanity, which is the
principal feature in our national character. To take Paris ap-
peared to us such a monstrous sacrilege, such an astounding
outrage against all laws, human and divine, that the thought of
such a thing would not enter our heads; such a crime could not
be committed, no — it was impossible. Sooner than that, the
earth would open and swallow up the accursed ones who should
venture to raise their hands against the holy ark. I am convinced
that this unconquerable hope held its ground with many amongst
us until the last day, that it blended with all their sensations and
if it ever entirely ceased to exist, it was only at the first shot
from Fort Val6rien."
Thus Francisque Sarcey.
And one must do him justice, for the whole demeanour of
the population, the diplomatic steps of the government and the
military actions of the besieged army, have confirmed his de-
scription. It is, besides^ worthy of remark, that upon the sum-
283
mons of the Government for all useless mouths to leave Paris, the
men of the well-to-do classes certainly conducted their families to
the south and to the sea side watering places, but whether from
curiosity, pride, wantonness or love of the beautiful city, with few
exceptions, they returned to Paris themselves, ^in order to take
part in the siege".
The German Army drew near immediately after the capi-
tulation of Sedany the XI. Army Corps only, remaining behind
provisionally, for the purpose of sending off the captured French
Army to Germany.
The King's Head-Quarters were removed to Varennes on the
4th of September, on the 5th to Rheims, on the 14th to Ghftteau-
Thierry, on the 15th to Meaux and on the 19th to the chateau of
Ferri^res. The armies of the Crown Princes of Prussia and Saxony
marched by the two main roads, leading from Sedan to Paris,
without meeting any resistance; and the troops delighted in the
beautiful country, which unfolded itself in greater loveliness and
richness as each day's march brought them nearer to the capital.
General Ftnoy^ who had been on the march to M^zi^res,
with the 13th Army Corps for Mac Mahon's eventual support,
rightly apprehensive for his own safety, had again returned to
Paris on the 6th and 7th of September.
The III. Army marched upon the southern line. The Head-
Quarters of the Crown Prince of Prussia were in Attigny on the
4th, in Warmereville on the 5th, in Rheims on the 6th, and in
Boursault, near Epemay, on the 9th. At this place and at Chd,teau-
Thierry, the IH. Army crossed the Mame, approached the city
between the Marne and the Seine, and reached Nogeut-sur-Harne
and Cr^teil with the advanced guard on the 15th of September.
On this day the Head - Quarters were removed from Montmirail,
where they had been since the 12th, to Coulommiers.
The IV. Army marched by Soissons, upon the northern line,
taking several roads. It only commenced the march on the 5th
of September, after having rested on the previous day. At
the same time, on the 5th, an attempt was made on Montm^y
284
by a strong detachment of the Garde Corps, whieh however, in
spite of a bombardment for* several hours, did not produce the
desired result upon this rock fortress, and was consequently, not
further continued.
The IV. Army Corps, which originally followed the Garde
Corps, advanced against Paris by Vendresse upon Laon; the XII.
Army Corps by Le Ch^ne and Rethel upon Cormicy. From
Launois, the Garde Corps turned to the south upon Craonne. On
the 11th of September, the line Laon-Craonne-Cormicy was reached.
As with the III. Army, the Cavalry Divisions were two days
march in advance. On the 9th of September, therefore, Duke
William of Mecklenburg , Commander of the 6th Cavalry Division,
was able, after a short parley, to move into LaoUy which was
given up by the French General, Theremin. Here occurred the
melancholy accident of the ignition of the powder magazine in the
citadel, after its surrender, probably by a non-commissioned officer
(Garde d'artillerie). The explosion cost the lives of 40 German
Jagers, £uid above 200 French Gardes Mobiles, and wounded many
others, including the Duke himself.
The Head-Quarters of the IV. Army were in the chateau
Marchais on the 10th and 11th of September, from the 13th to
the 17th the advance was continued upon Nanteuil, Aey and Lizy,
and Paris itself was reached on the 18th and 19th. The
IV. Army Corps passed Soissons on the 14th. The fortress refused
the summons to surrender and was invested.
Whilst the IV. Army thus approached the great city from
the north and then drew its line of investment on the north and
east, opposite the forts of iS^. Denis, AubervUlers^ RomamviUe,
Noisy, Rosny, the redoubt of Fontenay and Fort Nogenty the
III. Army continually extended further to the south and west,
and, marching by Bi^vre , Palaiseau and Versailles , enclosed the
forts of Charentony Ivry, Btc^tre, Montrouge, Fanvres, Issy
and the fortress of Mont Falirien.
On the l^th of September the circle was closed round
Paris.
The Head-Quarters of the III. Army were removed tp Ver^
sailles ; those of the IV. Army to Grand-Tremblay,
285
The enclosing mancenvre of the last few days had not taken
place, however, without fighting. Probably the plan of the de-
fence was, if possible, to hold the plateanx of Clamart and Meudon,
the heights before the soath-west front, already mentioned as im-
portant ; or perhaps the intention was only to distnrb the enemy's
manoeuvre for the moment.
General Ducrot*) repeatedly directed vehement attacks against
the troops wliich were in* the act of shutting off the south-west
front, on the 17th and 18th "and particularly on the 19th of
September.
These attacks would have greatly endangered the III. Army,
had sufficient forces been developed. In this they certainly failed.
General Ducrot brought into action four. Divisions of the regular
troops — 30,000 men at the highest estimate — , much too few for
so grave an undertaking as here presented itself. Consequently
nothing came of his attacks but a totally useless sacrifice of men,
and moreover it entailed the disadvantage of a defeat of those
troops, on which Paris had to place the greatest reliance at the
commencement of the defence.
The fights developed themselves as follows:
The V. Army Corps laid a pontoon bridge over tlie Seine,
above Villeneuve St, Georges ^ on the 17tli, and then accom-
panied by the 2nd Cavalry Division, marched towards Versailles with
the cavalry division in front. In order to cover the construction
of the bridge, the plateau from Limeil to Boissy St. Leger, north
of the point for crossing the Seine, and opposite to Fort Charen-
ton at the distance of a mile (4^/5 English miles), had been occu-
pied by the 17th Infantry Brigade, two squadrons and two bat-
teries. This position was attacked, in the wood of Brevannes,
at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, by six French battalions witli two
batteries from Creteil. ^ However , on the German side , the five
companies which were pushed forward to the northern point of the
wood, were sufficient in conjunction with the artillery and cavaliy.
*) The same General who commanded at Sedan after Mac Mahon, and
escaped the capitulation in some manner not yet quite cleared up.
286
to overthrow the enemy. The loss of the Germans amounted to
3 officers and 40 men, in killed and wounded.
In the meanwhile the passage of the Seine had been ac-
complished, and on the following day the march was continued
towards Versailles, as far as Bi^vre (9th Division) and Palaisean
(10th Division). Whilst this was taking place a skirmish occurred
to the north of Bibvre^ between detachments of the 9th Division
and French troops, who attacked from Plessis Piquet.
Early on the 19th the V. Amy Corps moved o£f from Bi^vre
and Palaisean, in order to reach Versailles the same day. In rear
of the V. marched the I. Bavarian Corps which had crossed by
the bridge at Villeneuve, one day later. Peaceable communications
with Versailles had been formed by a patrol, on the previous day.
Even before the commencement of the march, the French made
an attack from Petit-Bicesire. It was repulsed and the march
of the division was proceeded with. Then followed a renewed
violent attack, which obliged the Division to develope for fighting
with the front to the north. The combat was so vehement^ and
General Ducrot developed such overpowering masses of troops,
that the 10th Division was also obliged to give up its march in
order to move forward, with the artillery corps, to Villa-Coublay
in support of the 9th Divisiou. Still before the arrival of this
reinforcement, the advanced guard of the I. Bavarian Corps, DietFs
Brigade, had been so judiciously marched against the left flank
of the French, and had attacked with such energy, that the assault
against the 9th Division fell into disorder, and this Division
now succeeded, tolerably quickly, in defeating the enemy. Shortly
after 11 o'clock a.m. General von Kirchbach was again able to
continue the march with his corps to the west; he could leave
the section of ground which he quitted, as well as the enemy who
still held the other side of Plessis Piquet, to the care of the
II. Bavarian Corps, now marching from Lonjumeau in the south,
upon Chatenay and to his support.
General von Hartmann, relieving the V. Corps upon the tract
of country between Sceaux and Villa-Coublay, took up the enga-
gement.
Towards 12 o'clock, the Frencli were in the entrenchment
287
>
at Moulin de la Tour and along the ridge of the plateau to the
westward, as far as Plessis Piquet and beyond. The slope
which they held was furnished with cover trenches formed one
s^bove and another, and displayed six batteries in emplacements.
Their position was very strong, both on account of the steep-
ness of the slope and the strength of the fortifications. Then
in a short time, the French side again took the offensive.
Of the Bavarian Corps, the brigades of the 3rd Division were
moved forward upon Petit-Bicestre and upon Sceauo)^ whilst the
4th Division with the 8th Brigade remained at Croix de Vemis^
and the 7th Brigade was sent against Bourg. M6vements of the
enemy's troops were observed, at 11.45 o'clock, both towards
Plessis Piquet and towards Fontenay, which led to the supposi-
tion that an offensive effort was intended. This appeared to be
directed fi*om the enemy's left flank, against the infantry advancing
by Bourg; and General von Hartmann, therefore, commanded the
7th Bngade to confine itself to holding Bourg until further orders.
At 12 o'clock the 8th Brigade was moved to a reserve position
to the east of Chatenay, in order that it might be available to
support both wings of the corps.
It was, however, confined to an artillery action, and at 2.30
o'clock, the French evacuated their position.
The advanced guard of the 3rd Division followed immediately
and took possession of the abandoned entrenchments, with 7 12-
pounder field guns which had been left behind.
The French troops had apparently been unable to hold out
against the fire of the German artillery. In the meanwhile the
VI. Army Corps had advanced by two pontoon bridges over the
Seine at yUleneuve and by Villeneuve le Roi and Orly, towards
the fortifications of. Paris. The artillery fire from the entrench-
ments at Vill^uif then put an end to the advance of the* VI.
Corps. French infantry also showed themselves, but were defeated
without any considerable fighting, and advanced posts were established
upon the line Chevilly — Choisy. Several offensive attacks were still
made on the part of the French from the entrenchments, but
without success.
On the evening of the 19th of September, the Third Army
288
«
held the line Bougival, Sevres, Meudon, Bonrg, L'Hay, Chevilly,
Thiais, Choigy le Roi, Bonneuil.
ThiB day, the first of the InYestment, had heen very dis-
asterous for the French. In a panic of terror, the heaten diyisions
had fled through the forts, within the gates of the city itself, and
there spread alarm and confusion. The population, horrified and
at the same time indignant at the sight of the flying demoralized
soldiers, overwhelmed them with invectives, and some were arrested
by the Garde Nationale, to give an answer for themselves.
And yet these were the only regular troops which Paris then
possessed. When therefore the cry resounded through the city;
''Long live the Mobiles! Down with the Zouaves! Down with
the Line !'' this could only entail the • evil consequence of en-
gendering dissension in the army, at the expense of the better
troops.
The endeavours of the besieged, after this,^ were chiefly
directed to the instruction of the numerous bands of the Gai*de
Nationale and Garde Mobile. In addition to which, the principle
was observed of firing with heavy guns from the foi*t8 upon every-
thing that was visible of the besiegers, not only upon small de-
tachments, but also on single posts.
On the German side everything was at first done to render
the Investment really impenetrable, both as regards the passing
of single messengers as well as the. frustration of attempts for an
attack. By making use of every advantage of the ground, the
most advanced line of out-posts was pushed, with circumspection,
as near to the foi*ts as it was anywhere possible, in order to find
out each measure adopted by the enemy and every alteration in
his position. Entrenchments were made behind as a protection
against sorties; the defence capabilities of tlie outskirts of the
villages, were strengthened by earthworks, abatis, covertrenches
and baiTicades; the extensive park walls were everywhere provided
with loopholes, passages were made through the .walls, and the
points best adapted for positions were indicated beforehand by
sign boards.
Thus, in the midst of a labyrinth of countless buildings, of
the charming and beautiful resorts of pleasure round the city.
289
a cincture was drawn, of strong defensive entrenchments*), of consi-
derable depth, which in a short time was so completely closed uj),
that Paris was obliged to resoii; to quite unusual means of inter-
course through the air, in order to avoid absolute isolation.
The month of September only witnessed some unimportant
military events.
In the night of the 22nd the German out-posts, observing
that the entrenchments of Villejuif were evacuated by the French,
had established themselves in them. On the following morning,
however, they were driven out again by the fire of Forts Bicetre
and Ivry. Still Maud' buy' s Division, which now broke out of the
forts in pursuit, was repulsed.
On the same day Rear Admiral Saisset undertook a recon-
naissance upon the north front, against Le BourgeL
On the 24th, the German out-posts at St. Cloud and Shvres
were bombarded by gunboats, belonging to the Seine flotilla..
On the 30th, a sortie on a larger scale, again took place,
under the direction of General Vinoy, from the south-west front.
The real attack was made against the VI. Corps from the Forts
Montrouge and Bicetre, and fighting took place round Fillejuify
CheviUy^ Thiais and Choisy le Roij whilst demonstrations were
made against the Y. Corps from Fort Issy, and against the XI.
Corps from Fort Charenton. The French were repulsed with con-
siderable loss, and amongst others, their able General, Guilhem,
was killed.
On the 19th and 20th of September, the negotiations, already
mentioned at page 270, liad taken place between Count Bismarck
and Jules Favre, in the Chateau llaute-Maison, and in Ferri^res,
the royal head-quarters. The negotiations as to the possibility of
a definitive armistice had been broken off, for in fact, neither of
the two .parties was able to accept the demands of his opponent
*) For the better comprehension of the maps it may be remarked that
all the German works, which are not numbered^ are field entrenchments
and batteries to guard against sorties^ therefore of a defensive character,
whilst the numbei^ed works are siege batteries, that is bombarding batteries,
19
290
for an armistice pf snoh a kind. The position of affairs made
peace J most absolutely necessary; an armistice was, however, im-
possible if it were not the immediate preliminary to peace.
The negotiations were broken off because the republican govern-
ment was neither judicious enough, nor strong enough, to admit at
once the prospect of a separation of land.
OCTOBER.
The first days of October brought some small encounters be-
tween German cavalry and newly formed French troops, in a
wider radius round Paris. Immediately after the enclosing was
finished, the four Cavalry Divisions of the Investing Army had
received the mission of watching the country in the north-west
and west, especially also in the south as far as the Loire; an^
at the same time of bringing in requisitions the produce of which
would be for the benefit of the magazines established in Corbeil.
Single battalions were assigned for the support of the Cavalry.
General von Bredow, of the 5th Cavalry Division, whose
head-quarters were in St. Nom, had undertaken an expedition In
the direction of Rouen, on the 30th of September, with the main
body of his brigade and six companies; he here came upon
irregular troops, which he dispersed, and after destroying the rail-
road to Rouen, he occupied Mantes. Meanwhile the French had
4igain assembled at Pacy; General von Bredow, whilst making a
further expedition towards Evi^eux, attacked them afresh, drove
them away on the 5th of October, made requisitions in Evreua:
itself, collected quantities of cattle and forage from the whole
neighbourhood, and retui'ned with them to Paris. •
The 6th Cavalry Division, at the same time, advanced against
Chartres and during its march, drove away a Garde Mobile de-
tachment from the neighbourhood of Rambouillet, on the 2nd of
October.
The 15th Brigade, reinforced by two companies and a bat-
2Sft
tery, tinder command of Colonel von Alvensleben, went forward
from Rambonillet upon Epemon, scattered the out posts of a French
detachment near the wood of St. Hilaire on the 4th of October,
. occupied Bpernon in the evening, and returned to Rambonillet
with the rich results of the requisitions, leaving some small de-
tachments distributed in rear.
One of these detachments remaining behind, a squadron of
the 16th Hussars, had "quartered itself in the hamlet of Ablis^ and
here, in the night of the 7th of October, the first catastrophe
occurred from that new deplorable kind of warfare, which resulted
from the measures taken by the republican government and from
the instigations of the French press. The . inhabitants of Ablis
gave information of the presence of the Germans, to a band of
Franc -tireurs in the neighbourhood; these sniTounded the place
in the darkness, and, with the assistance of the inhabitants, killed
the greater part of the soldiers who were surprised in sleep. A
few only were able to escape. The Germans in consequence burnt
down the place as a terrible example.
The 4th Cavalry Division, under command of Prince Albert
of Prussia, had gone in the direction of Orleans, and on the 4th
of October was stationed at Toury. From here the approach of a
strong body of French was ascertained, who were advancing from
Orleans, in a northerly direction. The Cavalry Division moved
back to Etampes, and from there to Authon, and reported the
circumstance to the Chief Command.
These were ike first beginnings of the enterprises an the
Loire, which as yet, had certainly shown themselves of no offen-
sive importance for the investing army.
For all that, the circumstance deserved the greatest attention,
on account of the strategical importance of the point from whence
the French movement had proceeded, and therefore an Army De-
tachment, under the chief command of General von der Tann
was immediately formed from the Third Army, consisting of the
Ist Bavarian Corps, the 22nd Infantry Division, and the 2nd and
4th Cavalry Divisions, with the mission of discovering the plans of
•
the possibly newly raised French Loire Army and of opposing it in
case of necessity.
19*
292
General von der Tann, marched off for the south on the
7th of October. (For the operations on the Loire, v. Chapter 11.)
Before Paris itself , everything remained quiet at the be-
ginning of the month. The King removed his head-quarters to
Versailles^ on the 6th, On the 9th of October, the first 14
siege guns arrived in Nanteuil, via Weissenburg, and were then
transported with great trouble, and by a wide circuit to avoid the
forts, to Villa-Coublay. There, the siege* park was established.
The investing army was satisfied with the absolute isolation
of the great fortress, and the latter now began gradually to com-
prehend what was intended.
The account which Jules Favre publicly gave of his inter-
view with Count Bismai*ck, in a style which came liome to French
feelings, inflamed all hearts witli fresh indignation, and made the
fall of Strasburg, which had- now become known, easier to bear.
In Paris at that time was sung:
Bismarck si tu continues
De tons tes Prussiens il n'en restera giiere,
Bismarck si tu continues
De tons tes Prussiens il n'en restera plus.
Paris firmly counted on the assistance of the provinces, in
the same way that the provinces, on the other hand, reckoned
upon the endurance of Paris. Each party hoped that the other
would do the work.
As three weeks had elapsed since the investment, and still
no army of relief was approaching from the south, Gambetta set off
on the 6th of October in an air-balloon, in order to inspire the
sluggish deputation of the government in Tours, with the fire of
his southern French energy. He arrived in Tours on the 9th,
after having first descended at Rouen, and at once took away the
War Ministry from the aged advocate Cr^mieux, in order to con-
duct it simultaneously with the Ministry of the Interior; so that
he now had all the forces to be found outside Paris at his
disposal.
«
On the German side a diplomatic act took place. Count
Bismarck addressed a circular, in the beginning of Octob^, to tlie
293
repreBentatfves of the North German Confederation in foreign lands,
in which he impressively pointed out the dangers, to which the po-
pulation would be exposed, if the French capital held out until the
provisions were completely exhausted. Amongst other things, he in-
directly allowed the conclusion to be drawn, that only a short term of
resistance by the enemy, was reckoned upon at the German head-
quai*ters. The provisioning wets however on a surprisingly large
scale, and later the Parisians displayed extraordinary frugality.
Bismarck^s dispatch had no effect upon the measures of the
republican government.
After a rest of twelve days, General Trodiu fixed upon the
13<A of October for a new sortie, probably in consequence of
General von der Tann's departure having become known to him,
and from over-estimating the weakness thus caused to the in-
vesting army. On the day named, three columns, under the chief
direction of General Vinoy, broke forth against the heights of
Clamor ty after a vigorous fire had been previously opened from
the southern forts; in the centre, one brigade, under the command
of General Susbielle, moved against Chatillon, upon the right
flank, one battalion only against Clamart, and upon tlie left flank,
two battalions against Bagneux.
These troops were, numerically, quite insufficient to attain
any success.
General von Hartmann, against whose positions the attack was
directed, took measures according to the method always em-
ployed against French sorties, on the German side. He allowed
the enemy to press so far forward beyond the line of advanced
posts, that by surrounding him^ he could bring him under the fire
of artillery and infantry.
The French columns penetrated into Bagneux «,nd Ohatillon,
without meeting considerable resistance, made themselves masters
of the stone bridge between the latter place and Clamart; then
however, were received by such a cross fire, that they commenced
their retreat as quickly as possible.
The 2nd Bavarian Corps lost 388 men in killed and wounded,
amongst whom were 10 officers; the loss of the French was
considerably greater. On the same day, perhaps as a support to
294
this sortie y or as a demonstration, the fortress upon M6nt Valdrien
overwhelmed the Park and Chateau of Si. Cloud, where the
German ont-posts were stationed, with f^uch a hail of the heaviest
shot, that this beautifal and historically interesting building broke
into flames, and was completely destroyed. It was one of those
useless destructions of their own property which, in the contest
with the republic, so frequentiy bore evidence to the great lack
of the knowledge of war in many of the French commanders, and
of the love of destruction 4u uneducated, badly disciplined troops.
^ sortie again followed on the 21si of October , which it
is presumed was only ordered by General Trochu upon the con-
tinual urging of the population: ""that he would still attempt
something."
Three French columns, about 6500 men strong iu all, with
48 guns, supported by a reserve of 4600 men with 46 guns,
broke forth at 1 o'clock p.m., between the Seine and Rueil,
to the east of Rueil, and from Mont Valdrien, against the posi-
tions of the V. Army Corps, after the attack had been previously
announced by a vigorous fire from Mont Val^rien and the Seine
flotilU.
General Ducrot commanded the sortie.
At Malmaison the French encountered the foremost detach-
ments of the V. Corps, and were vigorously received. The Ist Garde
Laodwehr Regiment also engaged in the fight (the Garde Land-
wehr Division, which had taken part in the conquest of Strasburg,
had arrived shortly before, and was stationed at St. Germain).
A fire -fight was developed which lasted for three hours, with
heavy losses to the French, and was viewed by the King himself
from the Marly-viaduct. Finally the artillery of the IV. Army
Corps cannonaded the French columns from the right bank of the
Seine.
General Ducrot drew back his troops, with the loss of 2 field
guns, as well as 100 prisoners, besides numerous killed and
wounded.
Towards the end of the month there was again some serious
fighting on the north front of Paris.
The village of Le Bourget was in the radius occupied by
295
the 2nd Infantry Division of the Garde Corps; it was held by
one company. On the 28th of October, the French General
de Bellemare carried it by a surprise. As this inconsiderable event
- Le Boorget in itself was of no importance — was the first
lucky stroke for the Parisians, they did not fail to make out that
it was an affair of unusual importance, and took &esh courage.
The 2nd Garde Division, on the other hand, however, considered
it a point of honour to retake the village.
On the morning of the 30th, General von Budritzki undertook
a surrounding attack &om Dugny, Pont Iblon and Blanc-Mesnil
(v. map of the north front of Paris). Five batteries of the artil-
lery corps were at his command besides those of his Division,
and some battalions of the 1st Garde Division were held dispos-
able as a reserve. Three attacking colunms were formed and
stood ready at 7.45 o'clock ; that of the right wing, two battalions
strong of the Eaiser-Franz-Regiment , under Major von Derenthall,
in Dugny; that of the centre at Pont Iblon, under Colonel Count
Kanitz, consisting of the Queen Elizabeth's Regiment, one battalion
of the Queen's and the pioneer company of the 2nd Garde; and
that o^the left wing at Blanc-Mesnil, under Coionel von Zeuner,
composed of two battalions of the Emperor Alexander's Regiment.
In artillery, three horse batteries were brought into position at
Pont Iblon, and the four light and four heavy Garde batteries at
Blanc-Mesnil. Some cavalry was allotted to each column.
In case support should be necessary, the divisional artillery
was placed in readiness at Amouville, and the 2nd Garde Uhlan
Regiment at Bonneuil.
At 8 o'clock the horse batteries opened fire upon Le Bourgety
and at the same time Zeuner' s column was set in motion in order
to cross the brook Le Moleret on the road to Drancy, and, moving
along it, to take Le Bourget from the south-east.
Half an hour later the two other columns marched off, and
arrived at the village at the same time as the surrounding column.
It had been barricaded and placed in a thorough state of de-
fence by the French, who were, besides, supported by the fire of
the guns from the Forts d'Aubervillers and de I'Est, as well as
296
by their field batteries, between Courneuve and Le Boarget, and
also by the rifle fire of a detachment stationed in Drancy.
The fight was hot and sanguinary. Every house was ob-
stinately defended. It waa not until 12.30 o'clock that all resistance
was subdued, and the village again completely in German hands.
Cut off by Zeuner's column, the French had been unable to
fly, and 1250 un wounded prisoners, including 30 officers, were
taken. Great was the loss in killed and wounded on both sides.
The Prussian Garde mourned the loss of 14 killed and 21
wounded officers, and 44 killed and 405 wounded men.
The moral effect of this discomfiture in Paris was considerable^
because all the illusions raised upon the great importance of Le
Bourget now collapsed; but a still more disheartenmg , almost
stunning effect, was produced by the news of the fall of the
fortress of Metz, The rumour of this great catastrophe was
widely spread in Paris during the last days of October, and was
known for certain on the 31st.
In truth this event was of the greatest importance for the
conduct of the war on both sides.
On the 27th of October the renowned capitulation of Metz
was concluded with Marshal Bazaine. It delivered into the hands
of the victors, an army of 173,000 men, including 6000 offi-
cers and 3 marshals; the strong foi*tress and an enormous war
material, valued at 80 millions of francs ; about 800 fortress guns,
the material for more than 85 batteries, and 66 mitrailleuses; about
300,000 rifles, cuirasses, swords etc. in very great number; about
2000 •military waggons , witli many other valuable materials , and,
as badges of honour, 53 eagles and colours. The fall of Metz
happened at the right time for the Germans. In the north as well
as on the Loire, circumstances were taking place which would raise
the approach of the army, hitherto employed in the investment of
Metz, to the most critical importance; although on the German
side, no accurate comprehension could at this moment be obtained
of the whole daftger which lay in them, for the strength of tlie
newly formed republican army was unknown.
But on the French side, the whole importance of the capitu-
lation of Metz was now recognized^ and Gambetta's unmeasured
297
burst of fttry against the ^traitor'' Bazaine, proves the depth of
his despair. Within four weeks, a hundred thousand German
warriors would bo able to reinforce the army detachment, now at
Orl^ns, which, as a weak dam, had to oppose the great French
Loire Army in its march upon Paris; and sufficient masses could
be thrown against the Northern Army which was now in the act
of formation. Several weeks however were still necessary^ for the
newly organi«;ed armies to attain such efficiency that the relief of
Paris could be seriously undertaken by them.
Gambetta redoubled his overpowering activity to accelerate
this epoch, in order to bring into effect the attack upon the
inves|^ng army of Paris, before the German troops could draw
near from Metz.
Thus the end of October brought into action, in the calmly
flowing stream of the war, outside Paris, potent new forces, whose
impending collision formed a fresh crisis, full of suspense.
A diplomatic event also took place conjointly with the great
military transactions of this time. Thiers, who since the 12th of
September had been travelling to the capitals of England, Russia,
Austria and Italy, in order to gain these powers for France,
returned with baffled hopes, and, on the 30th of October, presented
himself at Vei'sailles for negotiations. He first received a safe
conduct to Paris in orcfei* to place himself in communication with
the government there, and returned to Versailles on the 1st of
November. Once again an armistice was discussed, and once
again the negotiations were broken off, ostensibly on the question
of the reprovisioning of Paris. It was just as natural that, on
the German side, the importation of provisions should not be
permitted without an equivalent, as it can be understood that, on
the French side, an armistice without this, was regarded as a
continuation of the war. The ai*ms of the Parisians were in fact
their stomachs.
Thiers's appearance in Paris on the 30th of October, combined
besides with the bad news from Metz, and the panic of Le Bourget,
produced in Paris itself .considerable and very different effects.
The bourgeoisie suddenly became deeply aware of their need of
peace. People were completely satiated with heroism, and at the
298
sight of Thiers, believed in the near prospect of peace. They
breathed more freely; the butchers everywhere brought out the
stores of meat which they had kept concealed, in order to sell
them at a high price, so that the wittiscism, le coehon €est la
pauvy was generally circulated. On the other hand the Proletariats,
led by Flourens, Felix Pyat, Delescluze, Ledru-Rollln and their
colleagues, rose in open revolt. Even from tiie beginning of the
investment they had been mutinous and threatening ; now they
declared aloud: Thiers was an agent of the Orleanists, he bad
sold France, and would make peace for the Due d'Aumale; Ba-
zaine, Trochu and the whole government were conspiring with the
Prussians, and it was just the time to set up the Commune in
order to save the country.
With this intention the men of Belleville, M^nilmontanti Mont-
martre and Clignancouii; surrounded the Hdtel de Ville on the
31st of October, and threatened the members of the government
there assembled, with death. Thanks to the timely appearance
of some battalions which scattered the crowd, the government was
saved, but the abyss upon which it stood had displayed itself
alarmingly.
NOVEMBER.
The prospects of an armistice were lost after the interviews
«
of the Chancellor with Thiers on the 1st and 3rd of November;
on. the 6th of November, the negotiations were completely broken
off by direction of the Parisian government, and Jules Favre
proclaimied to the city that resistance to the uttermost^ was the
only course that France could take.
With this prospect Paris was by no means edified; the dis-
position for combat had entirely vanished, and the revolt on the
31st of October roused afresh, strong fears in the heart of every
proprietor. It was generally asked, of what avail was a longer
resistance, for Paris anyhow must fall some time; and Edmond
About had even the courage to publish an article of cool reasoning
299
«nd Bound logic; which concladed with the assertion ^ that the
capture of Paris was simply an engineering calculation for the
Germans, and they could quietly await the result. The wisest
policy would he to grant them what they might desire, so that
they would only go home again. The author expressed what
every one thought, and the deepest dejection reigned in the great
city.
Pix)visions had already risen largely in price, so that a very
li^ge part of the population was obliged to suffer privations in
the most essential requisites of life. The mortality increased
rapidly, particularly amongst children. Added to this, the want
of gas condemned people to darkness for a fai* longer time than the
Parisians were accustomed to, and consequently many amusements
and distractions ceased. The state of isolation from the outer
world was still more sensibly felt. Many men had sent away
their families, and now remained without news of them; others had
been obliged to leave their business and property outside Paris,
and lived in anxiety with respect to them. The Gardes Mobiles
from the provinces suffered especially from home sickness. All
however felt very acutely the absence of political news from the
outer world, to which they were quite unaccustomed, and especially
of tidings as to the efforts of the provinces to come to the help
of the capital.
It is true that a certain connection with the exterior was
established in a very ingenious manner, by balloons and pigeon
posts; but these means were used especially for government dis-
patches, and could only respond in a very limited manner to the
universal wants of the public.
In order to tranquillize the people, and to prove to them that
he was using the utmost activity in the defence of the city,
General Trochu very frequently made the outer -forts cannonade,
even from the beginning of the investment. To this expedient he
added still another, that of often taking in hand the re-organization
of his army. Thus at the beginning of November the order of
battle appeared, which has ah'eady been given at page 278. The
Garde Nationale, called the First Army, was appointed for the
interior service, mi fpr the occupation of thQ QQceinte^ and the
300
latter whs divided into nine sections ^ each of which comprised
about ten bastions. The Second Army — regiments of the line,
regiments de marche and Gardes Mobiles — was destined for
operations in the field; and the Third Army — sailors, marines,
Gardes Mobiles, regiments de marche, dooaniers, forest officials
and the mobilized Garde Nationale — was to defend the line of
the forts.
But even this new order of battle was unable to inspire the
Parisians with fresh courage ; affairs had reached such a point that
the capitulation would probably soon have ensued, had not an
impulse come from outside.
The situation ehangedj howevevy at one stroke.
On the 9th of November, the French Loire Army, under
d^Aurelle de Paladines approached against Oridans in such
strength) that General von der Tann was obliged to retire upon
Tournfj after a hot fight. The news of this success, with em-
bellishments, arrived in Paris on the 15th, by pigeon post
The people drew breath; they exulted; in imagination they
even saw the investing army scattered, and loudly demanded —
resistance to the uttermost.
Neverl^eless it was not until the 29th of November that a
sortie was again attempted.
SORTIE ON THE 29TH OF NOVEMBER AND FOLLOWING DAYS.
The attack was now directed, as might be conjectured, towards
the south-east, and aimed, apparently, at establishing a connection
with the Loire Army, through the line of investment. Demon-
strations at different points were to occupy the Gennans.
On the 28th of November, Mont Avron, a plateau lying in
front of .the eastern forts , was occupied by Admiral Saisset and
General Hugues with troops of the Third Army; and a batteiy was
erected upon it and equipped, the fire of which could command
important passages for the investing troops, across the Mame at
Chelles and Goumay. At the same time preparations were made
301
to lay several bridges over the Mame upon the line Nogent sur
Mame — Joinville — St. Maur.
Vice Admiral Ronci^re le Noury concentrated a considerable
mass of troops at St, Denis ^ and two divisions were formed np
upon the peninsula of Nanterre.
In the night of the 28th and morning of the 29th of November,
the forts kept up a vigorous fire in all directions. Then followed
a sortie, under the direction of General Vinoy, with large masses
from Forts Ivry and BMlrCy against the positions of the VI. Army
Corps. The attack was supported by the fire of the flotilla upon
the Seine. The French indeed succeeded in getting possession of
the railway station Choisy le Rot for some time, but their attacks
at UHay were repulsed and they retired with gi'eat loss, including
several hundred prisoners. The German loss amounted to 7 officers
and about 100 men.
m
Upon the north front, the Vice Admiral, and upon the penin-
sula of Nanterre, General de Beaufort, carried out demonstrations
in the afternoon, but otherwise nothing more considerable took
place, which appears surprising after such great preparations.
General Ducrot had caused a proclamation to be posted at the
corners of all the streets, before the commencement of the sortie,
in which he promised great things, and declared that he would
return victorious or not at all. Why he did not support General
Vinoy better on the 29th, or sally forth for an independent under-
taking, is not clear. On one side it was asserted that he had been
unable to develope his trpops because Rochefort's barricades had
barred all the roads (Rochefoii; was a member of the Government
and president of the barricade committee), on the other side it
was maintained that the bridges over the Marne, by which Ducrot
had wished to cross the river, had been partly washed away.
The larger* sortie now only took place on the 30th of
Novemher, and the object of it was evidently to break through
the German lines of investment in the direction of Meauw and
Fontainebleau^ in order^ subsequently^ to enter into connection
loitk the Loire Army.
The concentration of large masses of troops for the purpose
of breaking forth against the line Champigny — Brie, was covered
302
and facilitated in a high degree by the confonnation of the ground,
and by the woods, parks and roads on the right bank of the
Mame. The neighbouring forts with that of Mont Avron, and also
nnmerons, lately made entrenchments and batteries, which command
the country for afar upon the left bank of the Mame, could, in
the most favourable manner, support the fight of the sortie troops
against the investing army.
General Trochu himself took the chief Direction from the
Chateau de Vincennes^ and early in the morning, had eight bridges
laid over the bend of the Blame between Joinville and Nogent,
by which the 1st and 2nd Corps of the Second Army went forward
to attack the Wurtembergai» positions. The strength of the French
troops was about 70,000 men.
The attack of the French with the main body, over 50,000
men, was made upon Champigny and Fidiers] with one Division,
Susbielle's, further to the south, by Cr^teil, against Mesly and
Montmesly.
Upon the threatened part ^ the investment line, on the east
side of Paris, the German advanced post positions were indicated
by the places. Noisy le Grand, . Villiers, Champigny, Coeuilly,
Chennevi^res, Sucy en Brie and Brevannes; and indeed the Saxons
had occupied Noisy ^ and from 5 o'clock a.m., Champigny also,
in relief of the Wurtembergers ; whilst on all the remaining points
the Wurtembergers were stationed — Reitzenstein's Brigade at
Villiers and Coeuilly^ StarklofTs Brigade at Sucy, and Scheler's
Brigade at Brevannes. On the left, at^ Villeneuve St Georges.
the 7th Prussian Infantry Brigade (du Trossers) joined the Wurtem-
bergers. The collective sjirength of the Germans upon the threatened
line amounted to about 17,000 men; of these, however, only about
6000 men, namely Reitzenstein's Brigade and the Ist battalion of
the Saxon 107th Infantry Regiment, were opposed to the main
assault of the French, which was carried out witli 60,000 men.
The only possibility of reinforcing these few troops was from
the Saxon side, for the main body of the Wurtembergers, at Sucy
and Brevannes, was itself attacked. Of the Saxon Coi^ps, howlever,
the 24th Infantry Division stood with its out-posts from Chelles to
Brie, and had the charge of acting as reserve both to tlie 23rd
303
Infantry Division (Chelles to Clichy), and also to the Wurtem-
bergers.
As early as 5 oVlock a.m., immediately after the Saxon battalion
had relieved the Wurtembergers in Champigny, the leading troops
of the French rushed unexpectedly on the former and defeated it,
after a violent struggle, with great losses.
The main body of the French then crossed the Mame and
assembled, under good cover, upon the plateau of the peninsular
sloping down to the river, for the. assault against Villiers, whilst
at the same time a fearful fire was kept up from the forts and
entrenchments, over the whole of the ground occupied by the
Germans.
The park of Villiers^ with a wall certainly not more than
1^/2 feet high, but sti*engthened by trenches and embankments,
formed the main point of the defence. In front of the park lay
orchards and vineyards which could be well defended, and which
were also occupied by the Wurtembergers and the Saxon bat-
talion. Coeuilly, moreover, was still held by the Wurtem-
bergers.
The fight against the French, pressing on in tenfold superior
strength, was very hot, and the German performances were admir-
able. The French did not succeed in taking Villiers, and the
Wurtembergers even passed at times into the offensive.
Neither did the French gain any advantages against Noisy
le Grand and Coeuilly, upon the two flanks, but their thickly
. placed heavy guns in the forts and entrenchments prevented the
Wurtembergers from being successfully supported by the Saxons.
An attack by the 24th Division against the flank of the main
body of the French, to the north-west, of Villiers, offered every
prospect of success, and was of course attempted. The greater
part of the 24th Division was concentrated in rear of the line
Noisy— Villiers, and Colonel von Abendroth, commander of the 48th
Brigade, seeing that the height to the north-west of Villiers was
menaced, made the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 107th Regiment,
the 3rd light battery and two squadrons of the 2nd Horse Regi-
ment attack at this point. But in spite of a first success — the
Saxons succeeded in routing the enemy and taking two guns—-
304
these troops were unable to stay under the fire of the rifled guns;
amid very great losses they were obliged to retreat, without being
able to carry the two guns away with them (these two guns were
represented as captured, in the French accounts of the victory),
and six companies of the 104th Regiment were brought up to
support them. Villiers itself, however, was reinforced from the
south side, by a battalion of the 104th Regiment and the 3rd and
4th light batteries, and towards 2 o'clock they succeeded in de-
terring the French from attempting any further attacks.
The attack g( Susbielle's Division, further to the south, en-
countered immediately behind Mesty, Mont MeHy and Bonneuil
(from where the advanced troops of the Wurtembergers had been
driven away at 9 o'clock a.m.) the 2nd and 3rd Wurtemberg Bri-
gades, supported by the 7th Prussian Brigade of the II. Army
Corps, which had been brought up to Paris after the capitulation
of Metz, and was cantonned in the south-east, in rear of the
positions of the VI. Army Corps and the Wurtembergers.
•
The French, here, had only a small numerical superiority
and were repulsed at all points. At 1 o'clock, the original posi-
tion was re-taken.
Thus the sole advantage to the French, resulting from the
whole soi*tie to the south-east, was the possession of the points
Brie and Champigny with the heights between these two places ;
an advantage any how, had they been able to continue their attacks,
but now without value, for the severe cold of the coming night
affected the troops, who encamped without blankets, to such an
extent that no further attack could be attempted on the Ist of
December. The day was passed in securing the wounded and
burying the dead, as well as in fortifying the positions gained.
It must also be observed, that a new description of war
machine was made use of on the French side during the fight;
two mailed Lowries, each with a heavy gun, were brought into
position by an engine, also mailed, on the MUhlhause railroad
against the German lines. The carriages were moveable on their
axles, so that the muzzles of the guns could be brought into
different directions.
Upon the north front. Vice Admiral Ronci^re le Noiiry had
306
made a demonstration on the 30th of November, and occupied
Epinai. This circumstance which was comprised in a dispatch from
General Trochu, with exaggerated and indistinct accounts of the
fighting in the south-east, and sent off by balloon, gave occasion
for proclamations and military measures on the Loire, most
characteristic of Gambetta's sanguine temperament and his want
of military judgment.
Tlie balloon with Trochu's dispatch went off on the evening
of the 30th of November and was driven out of its course, so
that it came down at Belle Isle en Mer. From there the dispatch
was telegraphed to Tours. The circumstance that the dispatch
had not come direct by balloon, caused Gambetta to believe
at first that it had come from Paris entirely by road, consequently
after ' the German line of investment had been broken tlirough.
Then the name of Epinai, gave him the idea that the Epinay
which lies to the south-east of Longjumeau was meant, and h^
concluded that Ronci^re le Noury must be in command of the
advanced guard of a sortie army, which, after a great victory,
was on the point of establishing communications with the Loire
Army.
In consequence of this, he issued proclamations on the 1st of
December, saying the moment for France's tardy triumph was at
hand, only a great effort by the Loire army was still necessary.
General Trochu was at Brie with a victorious army of 150,000
men, 20 kilometres from Paris (Brie is 3 kilometres from Fort
Nogent), and Admiral Ronciere was already at Epinay, beyond Long-
jumeau*), At the same time he gave orders to the Generals lo
advance forthwith towards Paris.
But on the 2nd of December, the successes of the 30th of
November had been lost again.
*) The words run thus : Cette m6me journee du 30 a donn^ lieu a une
pointe vigoureuse de Tamiral de la Ronciere-le-Noury ; toujours dans la
direction de THay et Chevilly, il s'est avaned sur Longjumeau et a enlev^ les
positions d*£pinay au dela de Longjumeau, positions retranch^es des Prassiens.
80
306
DECEMBER.
Not only did the French suffer greatly from the cold on
the night of the dOth of November^ but also the Geiman troops
who had fought so brilliantly during the day, and they too
were fully occupied the next day in attending to the killed and
wounded. Still measures were taken to meet energetically the fresh
attack which it was expected would certainly be made this day;
amongst others ^ the Saxon Artillery Corps was brought up, near
to Villiers. The day, however, passed quietly, and dispositions
were only made to drive the French completely away again from the
Mame peninsula, on the following morning. General von Fransecky
received the command for this, and brought some reinforcements
to the Saxons and Wurtembergers from the U. and VI. Army
Corps. On the French side, d'Ex^a's Corps was also brought over
on to the left bank of the Mame.
THE FIGHT ROUND BRIE AND CHAMPIGNY.
(Compare the map of the east front of Paris.)
As early as 6 o'clock on the morning of the 2nd of December,
consequently favoured by the darkness, a Saxon column, consisting
of the 1st and 2nd battalions of Regiment 107, the 3rd battalion
of Regiment 104, and the 4th pioneer company, pressed forward
against Brie^ and a Wurtemberg column, Reitzenstein's Brigade,
against Champigny, and the advanced guards carried both places
by surprise..
At 8 o'clock, the fight was decided on both points in favour
of the Germans (the Wurtembergers were further supported in it
by a battalion of the 49tli Prussian Regiment), and several
hundred prisoners had fallen into the hands of the Germans.
As soon as the day had broke, a devastating cross fire was
opened from all the forts and redoubts, and from. a great number
of field and mitrailleuse batteries on the right bank of the Marne,
upon the points occupied by the Germans, as well as the whole
«i*^»^M»lrtB
«a«fe
307
of thegronnd in rear, by which the reserves must approach. Soon after,
the French infantry again took the ofifensive in overpowering masses,
and after a desperate struggle with the battalions, who obstinately
defended house after house in the villages, they again established
the fight in their favour, although fresh troops from the II. Army
Corps had joined in the action at Champigny. In Brie above
400 Saxons, who would not give way, were taken prisoners, and
Champigny Avas again for the most part occupied by the French.
The attack was continued beyond both points, against ViUiers
which was held by the Wurtembergers ; from Noisy the Saxon
4th heavy battery was driven away by the cannon fire, and the
battle-field of the 30th of November was again filled by about
100,000 French. Nevertheless German valour and superior tactics
gained the final victory.
General von Fransecky united b;^ degrees about 50,000 men
upon the critical points, for the purpose of a surrounding attack
against the enemy, crowded together on the peninsula, which wa^
rendered possible by the formation of the ground.
The 3rd Infantry Division, and the Artillery Corps of the
II. Corps reinforced the centre, the left wing had already been
reinforced by the 7th Infantry Brigade, and the 8th Infantry
Brigade with a Brigade of the VI. Corps formed the reserves at
Chennevi^res.
Thus towards 4 o'clock p.m., after a sanguinary fight of
many hours the enemy was forced to retreat. At this time Cham-
pigny was again, for the greater part, in German hands ; at ViUiers
and Coeuilly the superiority of the Germans was decisive, and Brie
with the surrounding heights were alone in French power.
The French, convinced of the hopelessness of further attacks,
ceased firing, and also on the German side no fresh assault was
attempted, as darkness had commenced.
General Trochu decided upon a complete retreat on the
following day ; in order to cover it he caused a Fresh attack to be
made at Brie and Champigny on the morning of the 3rd of December,
and meanwhile conducted the army bapk to the right bank of the
Mai*ne. His loss, in the combats from the 30th of November to the
80*
308
3rd of December, amounted, according to French estimates, to
more than 6000 men including 414 officers.
The Germans hud lost in the four days about 5000 men. Of
these the Wurtembergers suffered the greatest loss, 2019 men and
61 officers; the Saxons 1096 men and 55 officers; and the II. Army
Corps 1517 men and 89 officers. This loss is extraordinarily
high. It was caused especially by the fire from the forts and
entrenchments. It is a wonderful feat that victory was gained in
spite of it, and notwithstanding the enormous numerical superiority
of the French at times; the Wurtembergers carried off the finest
laurels.
A heavy blow was inflicted on the defence of Paris by the
failure of this vigorous and obstinate soi*tie, which had been based
on the imaginary advantages of the French Loire Army. The
prospect of an independent rupture of the investing line from
within had to vanish completely.
It was the moment of a general great crisis for Paris, for
on the same days, at the end of November and beginning of
December^ in the north and also in the south the hopes of a
relief were frustrated.
The German Army from Metz, divided into two powerful
columns, had drawn near when the danger was at its highest.
On the 27th of November General von Manteuffel had beaten the
French Northern Army, and on the 28th Prince Frederick Charles
had led the first victorious conflict against the French Loire Army,
at Beaune la Rolande. On the 2nd of December, began the victorious
combats of the German Loire Army to the north of Orle^ans,
which led to the occupation of this important city on the night
of the 4th.
Such successes could not but excite the hope, that the Govern-
ment in Paris, perceiving the uselessness of resistance, would
sun'ender the city. General von Moltke informed General Trochu
by letter on the 5th of December, of the defeats of the Loire
Army, and the occupation of Orleans, at the same time inviting
him to send out an officer in order to ascertain the truth.
General Trochu's situation, however, bore but a small resem-
blance to that of a real commandant of a fortress; he gave an
309
answer, of which the Parisians said : "il eut de Tesprit uiie fois
en sa vie." With a caustic repetition of its expressions he in-
formed General von Moltke of the receipt of his letter, and declined
an enquiiy into the state of the case.
Still each day made it more difficult for the city of Paris
to maintain its haughty mien, and cold and hunger began to press
severely on the population. Outside, however, the preparations
for the bombardment were now seriously undeii;aken. The French
nevertheless, in spite of their sad experiences on the 2nd of
December, attempted another great sortie before the commencement
of the bombardment, though certainly with little energy, as well as
without any judicious strategical combination. For General Trochu
could hardly reckon upon a co-operation with the Northern Army
under General Faidherbe.
SORTIE ON THE 2l8t OF DECEMBER.
On the 20th of December, preparations for a sortie, which
would apparently be directed against the positions of the Garde
Corps, were perceived by the German posts of observation. In
the night of the 20th all the forts again opened a vigorous fire,
and in the fore-noon of the 21st, Admiral Ronciere, leading on
the marines and some other detachments, attacked Stains, Dugny
and Le Bourget from St. Denis and Fort Aubervillers. His troops
fought remarkably well, took Stains and Le Bourget, but before
3 o'clock p.m., were completely repulsed by the Prussian Garde
Corps. Upon this General Ducrot advanced, occupied Drancy
and Le Groslay with strong masses, and opened fire with his
artillery against Pont Ihlon and Le Blanc-Memil. He retired
again however in the evening without attempting a serious attack.'
Moreover, at midday, a Division had been led forward against
Sovran, Chelles and Ville Evrart, but soon fell under the fire of
the German batteries at Noisy-le- Grand, besides being attacked
310
by the 24th (Saxon) Infantry Division and returned in the
night of the 22nd after a protracted fight round Ville Evrart.
Upon other points, Epinai near St. Denis and the peninsula
of NanteiTe, demonstrations were made by the French.
The day bad been without any favourable result for the
French, but had led to considerable losses with the capture of
above 1000 unwounded prisoners; on the German side the loss
was far smaller; in spite of the unremitting fire of the forts, it
amounted to about 500 killed and wounded, of which 14 officers
and 400 men fell in the Garde Corps.
COMMENCEMENT OF THE ARTILLERY ATTACK. BOMBARPMENT
OF MONT AVRON.
It had become evident at the sorties in the end of November
and during the fight on the 2nd of December, that Mont Avron,
which the French had occupied with strong entrenchments and
76 guns, was very troublesome to the investing troops upon the
east front. In consequence of this, by directions from Versailles,
the Crown Prince of Saxony at a conference, held at Le Vert
Galant on the 18th of December, ordered the artillery attack
upon this advanced point of the besieged, — the first offensive
advance on the German side — , and that a demonstration should
be made at the same time to divert the attention of the Parisians
from the principal points of the projected artillery attack, to
the heights of Meudon and Clamart, and the park of St. Cloud.
By the 27th of December the siege batteries were completed
by the pioneers of the Garde, IV. and XII. Corps, under the
guidance of Major Klemm, in a line surrounding Mont Avron^
extending from the park of Raincy, and to the south of it, as far
as the south-eastern slope of the heights of Pressoir (v. map of
the east front of Paris), and were equipped with 76 heavy guns,
rifled 24-pounders, rifled 12-pounder8 and mortars.
Sll
At 7 oVlock in the morning of this day the fire was
opened.
The effect of the fire, quite unexpected by the French, was
considerable; it was returned indeed, but the commandant of
Mont Avron, Colonel Stoffel, was convinced even on the first day
that a lasting resistance against the German batteries, placed all
round, was impossible. He had intended to abandon it. But
in the defence of Paris military reasons were seldom of account
Paris was pleased to think that Mont A.vron was one of the most
important points of the fortifications, and the military authorities,
satisfied that the Germans did not dispute their triumph in having
occupied this place, had confirmed the population in their opinion.
They were now unable, in opposition to the people, to give
up Mont Avron without anything further, and applied forces to
maintain it, which the object would not have been worth even had
these forces been rightly employed. But the proper measures
were also wanting.
General d'Hugues, Commandant of the forts on the east
front, collected above 20,000 men on the night of the 27th of
December upon the imperilled plateau and in rear of it, in order
to be able to resist the possible infantry attack of the enemy.
The German patrols, however, brought information of the
occupation on the morning of the 28th, and therefore the bombard-
ment was continued. This resulted, in the withdrawal of the
closely packed French troops in rapid flight, under heavy losses,
and a general panic was spread in Paris, so that General Trochu
further ordered the plateau to be evacuated.
In the night of the 28th, after it had been impossible any
longer to reply to the German fire during the day, all the guns
were brought away with the exception of two dismounted 24-
pounders; and on the morning of the 29th, when the Saxons took
possession of the plateau, they found nothing but corpses and-
ruins. The Bombardment of the Forts on the east front could
now be commenced, and it was carried on with such good results
on the 31st of December and 1st of January, that the French
speedily evacuated their advanced positions on this front, and
even on the latter day were no longer able to reply, to the re-
312
cognized superiority of the German fire^ but contented themgelves
with repairing the damages caused to the foists.
Yet the besiegers did not approach the east front, for a de-
monstration only was to be made here.
Before Paris, the year 1870 came to an end amid zealous
preparations for the bombardment, which commenced on the 5th
of January 1871.
After the defeats of the Loire and Northern Armies, the war
had entered its final phase.
In trophies of victory, Germany counted 4 Marshals, 11,160
officers ; in non-commissioned officers and men, 333,885 unwonnded
prisoners, and 4640 guns, 115 eagles and colours. Each of
the fortresses of Mayence, Coblentz, Stettin, Erfurt, Magdeburg,
Glogau, Neisse, Wesel, Cologne and Kolberg lodged in great
camps 12,000, 15,000 up to 24,000 men, and many other small
fortresses and open towns enclosed other less numerous divisions
of the conquered French armies.
f
/
JANUARY 1871.
«
HET BOMBARDMENT.
The bombardment of Paris began on the 5th of January
1871. It was opened from the heights of Meudon, Clamart and
Chatillon and from the park of St. Cloud, against the forts of
Issy,/ Vanvres and Montrouge.
For some months public opinion in Germany had demanded
and urged its commencement. But the preparations necessary for
this great undertaking required a long time, and besides, the
German Army Direction would not begin the bombardment until
the period had arrived when the sufferings of the besieged city
had been so increased by hunger that the moral impression of
the falling shot would perhaps bring the decisive result.
The chief difficulty lay in the transport of the heavy guns
and of the enormous stores of ammunition and implements, from
313
the railway terminus, the station of Lagny, to Villa -Couhlay,
where the siege park was formed. The distance, it is true, was
only about 6 miles (27^/5 English miles), but just upon this tract
of ground the tbmmunications had been destroyed by the Pansians,
in several places, previous to the investment ; in particular the great
Marne bridge at Lagny itself, which had to be replaced by a
pontoon bridge above the former one. After all the destroyed
communications liad been restored, the war material, the transport
of which from its nature, required the gi*eatest caution, was brought
to the place of its destination, upon country roads, by beasts of
draught.
The construction of the batteries also was rendered very
difficult in consequence of the chalky nature of the ground, the
establishment of Battery No. 1 being particularly described as most
laborious. Several batteries had to be very ingeniously erected
behind cover, for they lay completely in the range of the fire
from the forts.
In the night of the 8rd of January, the batteries opposite
the south-west fronts which were to open the fire, were finally
equipped. They were the following (v. map II. of Paris):
No. 1. Position: at St, Cloud. Aim: the Seine with its
islands, and the works upon the peninsula Boulogne. Equipment:
6 rifled 12-pounders.
No. 2. Position: upon the terrace of Meudon. Aim: Bou-
logne, Billancourt, and the upper Seine. Equipment: 8 rifled
1 2-pounders.
No. 3. Position: upon the teiTace of Meudon. Aim: Enfi-
lading the south front and dismounting the west front of Fort
dlssy. Equipment : 6 long rifled 24-pounder8.
No. 4. Position: upon the terrace of Meudon. Aim: the
same as No. 3. Equipment as No. 3.
No. 5. Position: to the south of Clamart. Aim: enfilading
the west front, dismounting the south front of Fort d'Issy. Equip-
ment: 6 long rifled 24-pounders.
No. 6. Position: at Porte Chatitlon. Aim: enfilading the
west front and dismounting the south front of Fort de Vanvres.
Equipment: 6 long rifled 24-pounders.
314
No. 7. Position: to the east of Tour des Anglais. Aim:
enfilading tiie west front and dismonnting the sonth-west bastion
of Fort Issy. Equipment: 6 long rifled 24>poanderB.
No. 8. Position: to the east of Battery 7. Ikim: dismount-
ing the south-west front of Fort de Vanvres. Equipment: 6 long
rifled 24-pounders.
No. 9. Position: to the south of Battery 8. Aim: enfilading
the west ft'ont and dismounting the south-west bastion of Fort
de Vanvres. Equipment: 8 rifled 12-pounders.
No. 10. Position: to the south-east of Battery 9. Aim:
enfllading the west front and dismounting the south front of Fort
de Vanvres. Equipment: 6 long rifled 24-pounder8.
No. 11. Position: to the north-east of Fontenay, Aim:
enfilading and dismounting the west front of Fort de Montrouge.
Equipment: 8 rifled 12-pounders.
No. 12. Position: to the south of Battery 11. Aim: the
same as Battery 11. Equipment: 8 long rifled 24-pounders.
No. 13. Position: near Battery 7, on the west. Aim: to
bombard Fort Issy. Equipment: 2 21centimetre mortars.
No. 14. Position: behind Batteries 8 and 9. Aim: to
bombard Fort de Vanvres. Equipment: 2 21centimetre mortars.
No. 15. Position: in Bagnetur. Aim: to bombard Fort
Montrouge. Equipment: 2 21 centimetre mortars.
No. 16. Position: terrace of Meudon. Aim: dismounting
the gun emplacements to the west of Fort Issy. Equipment: 4
rifled 12-pounders.
No. 17. Position*: between Batteries 7 and 8. Aim: gun
emplacements between Issy and Vanvres. Equipment: 6 rifled
12-poanders.
The fire from these 17 batteries was to have begun on the
4th of January.
The thick fog which in January so frequently impeded all
distant views in the morning and evening, did not disperse at all
on the 4th of January, ^nd delayed the commencement of the
bombardment until the 5th of January, on which day the fire waB
opened at 9 o'clock a.m. in bright weather.
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315
No e£fect of a decided kind was produced upon the excellently
built, strong forts. It is true that some of the buildings in the
interiors were destroyed, also many an embrasure and many a gUB
was dismounted; the superiority of the German artillery came out
brilliantly, for even on the second day Fort Issy was no longer
able to reply, and gradually the serving ti'oops in the other
forts were also unable to continue holding out lastingly ; to
destroy the fortifications so quickly was, however, not possible.
The French stayed in the forts, covered themselves as well as
they could, repaired the damages that arose and spared their fire
in case the enemy should make a nearer approach. At the same
time tltey began in a very skilful manner to alternate their fire.
They had erected two batteries to the west of Fort Issy and also
laid out some emplacements between Issy and Vanvres; as soon
as they could no longer reply to the enemy^s fire in the forts
themselves, they began to fire from the batteries mentioned, and
if the German artillerymen fired upon the latter, the French began
to fire again from the forts. Yet the bombai*dment on the German
side had, at all events, gained the advantage of being able to
bombard the city itself from some of the batteries, from the 8th
of January , without its being possible for the French fire to
prevent it.
By the 14th of January the besiegers had . constructed five
new batteries Nos. 18 to 22, and ceased firing from No. 4 on
the 8th of January, No. 6 on the 9th and Nos. 10 and 11 on
the 11th.
No. 18 j (6 long rifled 24-pounders) lay to the west of
Bagnetuv. Aim: dismounting Fort de Montrouge. The fire com-
menced on the 8th of January.
No. 19, (4 long rifled and 4 short rifled 24-pounders) lay
to the east of Fleury, and on the 9th of January, began dis-
mounting and breaching the south-west bastion and the south-west
curtain of Fort Issy, and dismounting the enceinte of the city.
No. 20, (6 long rifled 24-pounders) to the west of Clamart,
to the south of Notre Dame de Clamart, commenced on the 10th
of January dismounting the south front and the left face of the
north-west bastion of Fort Vanvres.
316
No. 21, (6 short rifled 24-pounders) lay to the west of Cha-
tillon^ and on the 14th of January began dismounting and de-
molishing the south front of Fort Vanvres.
No. 22 (6 long rifled 24-pounderB) lay to the west of No. 18,
and on the 14th began to take over the aims of No. 11.
Although, however, the interior of the city was only fired
upon from the 8th of January, still even in the earlier days single
shots had flown far beyond the forts. They fell in the arrondis-
sem^nts of Vaugirard, Passy, and even at far greater distances, near
the Panth^n, Luxembourg and the. Hotel des Invalides to beyond
the Boulevard St. Germain.
The population of Paris received these first rifled * cannon
shot, as well as later those thrown much more frequently and
designedly, with a kind of curiosity and scorn, and also with
indignation at the ^barbarians"; but the bombardment decidedly
made no deep impression. The government was even obliged
to publish a proclamation, drawing attention to the danger of
running together in places where a shell had fallen, because the
people lost sight of all danger in order to snatch a .splinter.
A tolerable number of persons were no doubt killed and wounded,
and a quantity of people moved away from the endangered to the
safe parts of the city, but this number was not great enough to
cause any confusion, or the partial want of dwelling accom-
modation.
The material damage was small. The city was too large
and the buildings were too solid.
It may be concluded how insignificant the number of injured
buildings was in comparison with the whole mass, for after the
devastations of the French bombardment during the civil war, and
after the conflagrations of the Commune, the total number of houses
destroyed besides public buildings, such as the Tuileries, Hotel
de Ville.etc., only amounted altogether to 200, thus only a third
part of the number of houses which Haussmann, the Prefect of
the Seine , had the charge of pulling dpwn annually for beauti-
fying purposes, under the Imperial government.
By German shot probably very few, perhaps only isolated
buildings, were destroyed inside the enceinte; it was not until the
317
22nd of January that fires were perceived in the city, and fire
is the special agent of destruc^on in a bombardment ; the immediate
efficacy of the shot can only be material with very slightly built
houses. If therefore the bombardment had been continued until
the capitulation of Paris, there is still no reason to conclude that
this would have been the result of the bombardment.
Paris fell by starvation, and in the German Head-Quarters,
the chief authority had no doubt from the commencement as to
the right means of obtaining the end, although public (pinion was
taken into account.
The Parisians attempted some further small attacks in January,
and one sortie in large masses. They first attacked the German
outposts on the morning of the 10th of January near Clamart,
and were driven back; then in the night of the 12th an attack,
in the strength of perhaps a brigade, followed upon the south-
west front against the dangerous batteries upon •the heights of
Meudon and ClamarL The sortie was very soon repulsed.
Then, late in the evening of the 13th, some detachments once
again broke forth against the much contested village of Le Bourgety
upon th'e north front. This sortie was also beaten back with little
trouble.
SORTIE ON THE 19th OF JANUARY.
On the 19th of January, however, above 100,000 men were
developed, for a last desperate struggle upon the south-west front,
with the intention of attacking Versailles.
United round Mont Val^rien in three gi'eat masses under the
chief command of General Trochu himself, at 8 o'clock a.m. the
centre column pressed forward against GarcheSj under General
Bellemare; the column of the left wing, under General Vinoy,
against Montretoui] and after a very disadvantageous delay of
three hours, the column of the right wing, under General Ducrot,
by BuzenvaL
The late arrival of the last column, caused partly by a de-
318
fective execution of the dispoBitions, and partly by the fire of the
German cannon from the right ban% of the Seine ^ at once caused
a vacillation in the whole sortie. The troops in the centre and
on the left wing only advanced slowly, for they waited for the
support of the right wing, and when they met with the tough
resistance of the 10th Infantry Division B.t,GarckeSy a long con-
tinued stationaiy fight was developed even here.
On the German side the troops standing nearest, the 9th and
21st Infantry Divisions, acting' as reserves to the 10th, the Garde-
landwehr Division and the L Bavarian Corps, were moved forward
towards Versailles.
Still the French did not succeed in coming up so far that it
was necessary to employ these two last bodies of troops. They
were- unable to overcome the resistance of the Germans in Garches,
and satisfied themselves with occupying the heights lying in front,
from which the German advanced posts were driven away. They
took possession of the entrenchment of Montretout, which was only
weakly occupied by the Germans. Towards 2 o'clock p.m., how-
ever, two battalions of the King's Grenadier Regiment and one
battalion of the 59th Regiment made a successful advance, and,
at dark, completely threw back the French near Garches, The
entrenchment of Montretout was re-taken at 11 o'clock p.m. by
battalions of the 47th, 58th and 82nd Regiments. The loss of
the Germans amounted to 616 men and 39 officers. The loss of
the French was extraordinarily great; it amounted to about 7000
men. General Trochu maintained that the majority of the wounded
had suflfered from the awkwardness of the Gardes Nationaux, who
had continually fired upon their own troops. This is indeed pos-
sible. The Garde Nationale, who had unceasingly demanded,
during the whole siege, that the Governor should employ the other
troops in sorties, was this day led out for the first time, and may
probably not have possessed the sangfroid necessary to distinguish
between friend and foe.
Thus ended the last sortie which the Parisians attempted,
their last desperate attempt, still more deplorable than all that
had preceded it.
The continual failure of the offensive undertakings was
319
naturally founded ^ in general y on the great superiority In the
quality of the German troops, and in their excellent defensive
positions occupied by a numerous field artillery. Yet two special
circumstances which impeded the success of the sorties appear
prominently. In the first place , enormous labour and time were
required to bring together the badly ' disciplined French troops,
provided with few serviceable officers. It was even necessary to
assemble the troops for a sortie the day before, in order to have
them on the spot at the right time. This however, .naturally,
fatigued the soldiers before the fight, and in November, December
and January they were benumbed and dispirited by the severe
cold.
Then secondly, the unavoidably noisy and visible preparations
for the concentration of these troops, made the German posts of
observation aware of the enemy's undertaking so early, that in
most cases, the army of investment was able to make arrangements
for the reception of the enemy quite undisturbed.
Frequently, even, dispatches from Versailles gave information
in Germany, that a sortie would take place on the following day.
Thus undertakings, where a surprise was the main condition of
success, could not possibly have a fortunate result.
On the 21st of January, after the bombardment upon the
south'west front and the east front had been continued for sixteen
days, a bombardment of the fortifications on the north front
(v. map of the north front of Paris) was also begun, combined
with the bombardment of the town of Sl Denis, Here the Ger-
man shot had far greater success than in Paris itself, and con-
flagrations could be observed in St. Denis even on the second day.
Still the bombardment here, as on the east f^'ont, had more
the character of a demonstration.
Upon the south-west front, too, where the serious attack was
made, it succeeded before the 11th of Jaiiuary In setting fire
to the barracks of Forts Issy^ Vanvres and Montrouge, and
destroying the greater part of them.
On the 14th of January these forts were almost entirely
silenced, but took up the fire again later. On the 12th of January
the batteries of the city enceinte (v. map of the south-west front
320
of Pafifl) at Paint du JouTy began to fire very vigorouBly opon
battery No. 1 at St. Cloud. The German batteries, in a short
time, always attained the superiority when, on the French side,
new batteries were brought into action, or the forts re-opened
fire; nevertheless the bombardment would probably have had to
be continued some time longer for the preparation to appear suf-
ficient for a formal attack or an assault.
However the interior condition of Paris, and France's military
situation everywhere, made such measures no longer necessary.
On the 23rd of January negotiations for an armistice
commenced, which had so far prospered on the 2Qth, that from
12 o'clock at night the cannon fire on both sides was stopped.
The population of Paris had an*ived at a state of privation,
from the siege now lasting 129 days, which, without a fresh
supply of provisions and fuel , must lead within the short space
of eight to fourteen days, to the death of many thousands from
exhaustion. Bread and horse flesh, which for weeks had only been
given out in rations by the government, were first reckoned at
300 grammes fcrr each person, and at last at 30 gi*ammes, and
added to this the bread was of an uninviting composition.
The ''Commune" bestin^ed itself afresh on the night of the
21st and on the 22nd of January, in a revolutionary attempt
under Flourens's direction.
Every hope of a successful sortie had disappeared after the
defeat of the 19th of January, and when the repeated overthrows
of the former Loire Army at Le Mans, of the Northern Army at
St. Queutin and of the Eastern Army at Belfort became known,
all hope of relief from without vanished.
Thus the Government at last decided upon negotiations which
had for their object the capitulation of Paris, but an armistice at the
same time which was to be regarded as a preliminary to peace.
After the failure of the sortie on the 19th, General Ti'ochu,
under the pressure of general distrust, had resigned the Chief
Command, but still remained President of the Government; thus
he kept faithful to his assertion, that the Governor of Paris would
never capitulate. Jules Favre conducted the negotiations with
J
321
Count Bismarck^ and on the 28th of January concluded the
capitulation.
This formed part of the Convention of f^ersatlles*) and
determined the occupation of all the forts of Paris by the Ger-
man Army^ the disarmament of the French Line Army, Garde
Mobile and Marine troops^ who aUo became prisoners of war,
and the immediate re-provisioning of Paris. The Garde Nationale,
however, were to keep their arms and undertake the maintenance
of order in the city; the German Army was not to occupy Paris
during the armistice.
These last resolutions must have been repented of later by
the German government, but still more by the French government,
which, untaught by four-and-a-half months experience, opposed to
the utmost the better judgment and urgent desire of Count Bismarck.
When the Garde Nationale, which was to keep order in Paris,
seized the power with armed hands and brought on the civil war,
Jules Favre exclaimed in despair : "The German government wanted
these men to be disarmed, and I opposed it. 1 call upon God and
men to witness my repentance!"
Differing in all its phenomena from the phases through which
ordinary sieges pass, and surpassing the measure of foimer warlike
occurrences, the siege of Paris found a worthy conclusion in most
unusual conditions of capitulation.
*} See the tenor of the conveotioo at the close of the bookft
81
ELEVENTH CHAPTER.
The Attempts for the Relief of Pabis.
As the dangers which threatened France increased, the attempts
for the relief of Paris, undertaken on the French side, grew in
magnitude and energy. In the commencement of the war with
the Republic, the meaanres for the Defence were confined to the
limits, fixed and prepared by the Imperial government, for raising
troops from the people; the government of the National Defence
was satisfied with the formation of regiments de marche from
depot battalions, and time served soldiers, as well as with the
formation and instruction of the Garde Mobile and Garde Na-
tionale. But ajfter the fall of Metz and when the war -experienced
Corps of Prince Frederick Charles threatened to spread over the
interior of France, by forced marches in the direction of Orleans
in the south, and Amiens in the north, GambeHtty who at that
time led the government with dictatorial power, took measures
which bore great similarity to the levies of the year 1793.
Only, the numerous armies of the republic of 1870 did not meet
with the success of the armies of 1793, because this time the
war direction of the enemy was not divided and dilatory, and
encumbered with obsolete maxims, and did not leave time for the
undrilled masses to become bodies of troops.
When we see, however, that in spite of such unfavourable
circumstances, and of a fool-hardy dictator, the newly organized
republican armies were nevertheless able to oppose the best army
in the world, again and again, in the open field, although always
of the
I I
323
conquered; and to deliver a hundred fights, although no pitched
battle, we must willingly allow that the French nation, full of ardent
patriotism, has rendered itself worthy of esteem.
I. OPERATIONS OF THE LOIRE ARMIES.
(v. map of the operations of the Loire Armies.)
The attention of the German War Direction was directly draM^n
to the actual existence of a Loire Army^ the formation of which it
is true had been known for some time, through the reconnaissances
of Prince Albert* s Cavalry Division, in the beginning of October,
At that time the whole French army on the Loire, consisted
of one Army Corps, which bore the number 15 (Nos. 13 and 14
were in Paris). General de la Motterouge was in command; it
numbered about 10,000 men of the regular" infantry, an equal
number of Gardes Mobiles, 4000 men of the Francs-tireurs , the
cavalry regiments still existing, 2500 hoi*semen, and perhaps
8000 men of the artillery and train; altogether about 30,000
men.
On the 5th of October, this small army moved out from
Orleans for a reconnaissance in the direction of Paris, and en-
countered the German cavalry. It would surely have been wiser
if de la Motterouge had not shown himself, but had kept con-
cealed as much as possible behind the Loire, until his army had
become stronger ; for the cavalry had no sooner brought the report
to Versailles, than General von der Tann was sent oif from there
towards the south (compare page 291).
The valley of the Loire offered superior strategical advantages
to a French Army, which was gradually to reinforce itself, in
order, ultimately, to advance towai'ds Paris. The Loire, a powerful
stream bordered on its right bank, in the tract of country from
Gien to Orleans, by the wide-extended forest of Orleans, very
difficult for troops; and on the left bank, in its whole bend as
far as Blois, by the marshy, barren, roadless Sologne, formed an
21*
324
important line, which drew a sharply defined limit to the opera-
tions of the Germans from Paris. Upon the road from Paris to
Tours, either by Chateaudun or by Orl^ns, expeditions would
scarcely have now been attempted on the part of the Germans,
because weak detachments dared not venture so deep into the
country occupied by the enemy, and strong detachments could
only be furnished by the investing army under urgent necessity.
When therefore General de la Motterouge ventured forward beyond
Orleans, probably at the instigation of the delegation in Tours,
he drew attention to himself quite unnecessarily, and occasioned
the occupation of ike town of Orlians on the part of the
Germans.
The great importance of this town was fully appreciated by
the Germans, but, in spite of it, the task of a lasting occupation
could not devolve on Prince Albert's Cavalry Division. This
charge was for General von der Tami, with a whole Army De-
tachment.
The situation of the town, in a strategical point of view,
is as if made for a fortress, which should secure the south of
France and prevent the siege of Paris.
Orleans commands the principal passage over the Loire, and
unites the railroads from Nantes, Bordeaux and Toulouse, as well
as the central line which connects Lyons with Paris by Bourges.
An efficient army placed here, which could constantly be rein-
forced from the south, might render a siege of Paris almost
impossible, by continually threatening the besiegers.
The town possesses rich resources within itsdf, and has
about 70,000 inhabitants, a most well-to-do population.
If France had been able to reckon uf^on a war such as this,
Orleans would surely have been made a fortress.
835
OCCUPATION OF ORLEANS BY GENERAL VON DER TANN.
General von der Tann approached the town on the 11th of
October with the I. Bavarian Corps, the 22nd Infantry Division,
and the 4th and 2nd Cavalry Divisions, after having defeated the
advanced troops of the French at Artenayj on the previous day.
The 22nd Division, covered by the 4th Cavalry Division on the
right flank, marched by Hu^tre and Bonlay upon Ormes, the 1st
Bavarian Corps advanced in the centre, and upon the left flank
the 2nd Cavalry Division drew near by the edge of the great
woods.
' General de la Motteroage held possession of the country to the
north of Orleans, where favourably situated hills, covered with vines,
formed natural capabilities for defence, which he had strengthened by
entrenchments. The first ^ fight took place between Boulay and
Ormes ; after it had lasted for some hours, and reinforcements had
been concentrated upon this pointy on both sides, de la Motterouge
ordered the retreat. The French retired upon the town and from
there to the lefl; bank, but still held the outskirts of the suburbs
for a short time, so that some batteries were brought into position
at Ingr^ and bombarded the town. Very soon after this the
town authorities appeared to announce a peaceable submission.
The French Army dr.ew back upon Bonrges and Vierzon,
Orleans was occupied by the Germans on the evening of
the lllh of October y and became, with the surrounding country,
a rich and tranquil cantonment for a time. From here General von
der Tann sent out the 22nd Division and Prince Albert's Cavalry
Division towards the north-west, to suppress the movements of
the people there. On the 19th of October a hot fight took place
in Chateaudtoiy between these troops and about 4000 French, in
which this barricaded place was almost entirely destroyed. The
march was then continued upon Chartres, where a strong position
was taken up. '
326
ORLEANS BETAKEN BY THE FRENCH.
General de la Motterouge was immediately deprived of his
command by Gambetta (who had amved in Tours a few days
before)^ although he had done his duty thoroughly. He was re-
placed in the command of the Loire Army by Gener&l (t^uretle
de PaladineSy who was furnished by degrees with considerable
reinforcements, the 16th Corps and parts of the 17th Corps, and
received the mission of re-taking Orleans at any price.
At the end of October General d'Aurelle had concentrated
about 40,000 men at Vienson^ with a tolerably numerous artil-
lery; these were to be reinforced by 20,000 men from Tours,
and the whole would then be thrown between General von der Tann's
detachments, standing 8 miles, (nearly 37 £nglish miles) distant
from one another, in order to fight them singly if possible, or to
surround and capture the poi*tion stationed at Orleans.
The main body of the French Army was to be directed from
Vierzon upon Beaugency, to encompass Orleans from the west;
another division, in the centre, was to make a demonstration only,
against Orleans, from the south to keep the Germans in the town ;
the right wing, principally composed of cavalry, was to cross the
Loire at St. B^nott, above Orleans, to enclose the town from
the east.
The whole French plan was, however, wrecked by Gambetta's
injudicious interference.. By his command, the troops, concentrated
at Vierzon on the 2nd of November, were not to reach Beaugency
by marching, but to travel by rail through Tours. In spite of
d'Aurelle's objections this took place, and by this means, not only
was there a loss of three days in time, but also the German
cavalry remarked the trains continually following one another, and
General von der Tann received timely information*).
On the 7th of November the movements of the French be-
*) In this assertion the author relies upon the accounts in "Militarische
Gedanken und Betrachtungen" by the author of '*Krieges um Metz" (a Prus-
sian General), a work whose profound researches merit the deepest study.
327
came clear to the General, and although he was unable to bring
up the 22nd Division quickly enough, yet he baffled the enemy
by evacuating Orleans on the dth of November and taking up a
position at CoulmierSy which made a forcible separation of his
divisions impossible.
The French, who had failed in encompassing Orleans, owing
to the slow execution of their movements, advanced to the west
of it.
Consequently, on the 9th of November, an encounter took place
at Coulmters.
General d'Aurelle very judiciously made his numerous artillery
operate chiefly against the enemy, whilst he did not employ his
infantry in offensive attacks. Thus his young troops gained con-
fidence, when, they finally saw the enemy retreat at dusk.
General von der Tann had no intention of here making an
obstinate resistance against the foe, perhaps four times superior in
numbers; he retired upon St. P^ravy, Artenay and Toury, At
the last place, which he reached on the evening of the 10th of
November, the General halted, and brought up the 22nd Division
in the night.
General d^Aurelle did not follow him, for correctly estimating
the small advantage gained and the quality of his troops, it did
not appear to him advisable, even now, to being the French army
very near to the great German army round Paris. He contented
himself with the occupation of Orleans, and took up a strong
waiting position in order to oppose the German forces which had
been newly reinforced, on the 11th of November, by the arrival
of the 17th Division.
GAMBETTA'S ORGANIZATIONS IN NOVEMBER 1870.
Gambetta, on the other hand, pushed on with precipitate
haste, the reinforcement of the Loire Army, whose CommaAder in
Chief, whose bravery, and whose victory he thought he could not
sufficiently extol.
3S8
The French active forces at that time appear to have been
as follows:
' In the middle of October France had been divided into four
general governments, with fonr chief commands: Ist the North,
with the head-quarters at Lille, 2nd the West, with the head-
quarters at Le Mans, 3rd the Centre, with the head -quarters at
Bourges, and 4th the East, with the head-quarters at Besangon.
Within these general governments the previous distribution in terri-
torial military divisions was continued, and the forces already
called up under the Empire, time-served soldiers, Gardes Mobiles
etc., were organized and drilled under the guidance of the chiefs
of these militaiy districts.
Moreover Gambetta had recently, on the 2nd of November,
in desperation at the fall of Metz, set on foot a decree of the
delegation at Tours, according to which all men from 20 to 40
years of age, still free, were to be enrolled in the army. This
decree was more fully defined and enlarged in the next few days ;
the men already previously enrolled were to form a first levy,
those called in by the decree of the 2nd of November a second
levy, and this second was to be again subdivided into three
categories according to age, which would not be summoned all at
once, but one after another. It commenced with the first Ban, men
from 21 to 30 years of age, then the second Ban, men from 31
to 35, and lastly the thiM Ban, men from 36 to 40. In order to
transfoim the great masses of men, which the successive levies of
the three bans must bring together, into bodies of troops, Gam-
betta, on the 25th of November, decreed the formation of eleven
camps of instruction and defence, at St. Omer, Cherbourg, La
Rochelle, Bordeaux, Toulouse, Montpellier, Marseilles, Lyons,
Clermont-Ferrand, Nevers and Conlie. By degrees the recruits
called in according to the above-named categories and the time-
served soldiers would be collected in these camps, and there drilled,
and at the same time formed into armies. In view of the great
multitude of men composing all these levies, the number of which
might be calculated at a million and a half, the camps would
have to be very large, each prepared for 60,000 to 250,000 men.
The generals who commanded under the republic, were for
329
the most part, old officers, who had already retired from
active service, but now entered again on active service (de la
Motterouge and d'Aurelle de Paladines); partly marine officers, and
partly also junior Generals who had been recalled from Algiers.
To the last belonged General Faidherbe, Commander of the Northern
Army in December and January.
Gambetta's plan, considered by itself, appears judicious and
grand. But — it required at least two years time and some
thousands of superior officers, to carry it out. In Dace of the
situation of affairs as they were in reality, it was the pursuit of a
chimera.
Not that Gambetta could have found an organization more-
conformable to the purpose, but — resistance generally was a
sin against the prosperity of the country.
The situation of affairs imperiously demanded peace for France;
there were no means of carrying on the war without iiguring the
country in a high degree. After the army had been destroyed,
further resistance was impossible, or ought not to have l^en made,
in opposition to the active and powerful enemy; and no great
statesman, no great organizer and general would have attempted
it. No genius could now help France. Gambetta made the
attempt.
The occupation of Orleans and the fight at Goulmiers having
inspired him with fresh courage, he was now anxious, above all
things, for an immediate advance against the investing army of
Paris, in order to effect the relief before Prince Frederick Charles
«
could approach from Metz.
But in order, for the moment, to reinforce General d'Anrelle
sufficiently to enable him to attempt the relief of Paris, the decree
of the 2nd of November was still of no use; those troops only
could be reckoned on which had already been organized for weeks
and months. It is true their training was still, very defective,
but' the great number of old soldiers gave tolerable steadiness to
the rest. All were well armed, the artillery was numerous, and
even in cavalry, some serviceable corps had been newly formed
besides the imperial regiments still existing.
Gambetta, under the pressure of neeessity, consequently inter-
330
nipted all farther hiBtraction^ collected the detachments from all
the towii» and camps of the south and west^ and at the end of
November, brought together an army round Orleans which numbered
260,000 combatants, and might be capable of causing some anxiety
at the German Head-Quarters.
Everything now depended upon Prince Frederick Charles's ap-
pearing at the right time; otherwise the adv-ance of such a numerous
army, combined with a soii;ie en masse from Paris, might have
perilous consequences for the investment of the city.
The evacuation of the town of Orleans had, already, been a
disagreeable event for the German War Direction, less from the
impoi*tance of the thiug itself, than on account of the moral im-
pression which it exercised upon the French people.
Not only was Paris mad with joy and prepared for a sortie
with fresh courage, but the tidings of victory flew through the
whole of France, and soon lost all similarity to General d'Aurelle's
moderate report. Everywhere a change in the fortunes of war
was hailei, even Versailles, which was occupied by the German
head-quarters and in the midst of the powerful German army,
raised her head.
OPERATIONS OF THE GRAND DUKE OF MECKLENBURG-SCHWERIN.
9th OF NOVEMBER TO THE 1st OF DECEMBER 1870.
Immediately after the announcement of the retreat of General
von der Tann, a reinforcement of the troops to the south of Paris
was ordered /from Versailles, whilst, at the same time. Prince
Frederick Charles received orders to approach by forced marches
in order to be able to strike in between Paris and the Loire.
At that time, the Prince was, with his corps, in the neighbourhood
of Troyes, and to the north of the Aube and Seine.
On the 9th of November the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-
Schwerin led the 17th Division, which had been stationed in the
line of investment, opposite Fort Charenton and the village of
Gi*6teil, since the lOth of October, to the assistance of General
331
von der Tann's Army Detachment^ towards Angerville y and on
the 11th of November assumed the chief command of the bodies
of troops^ now united together: — the I. Bavarian Corps ^ 22nd
Division, 17th Division, and 2nd and 4th Cavalry Divisions. .
As to the intentions of the enemy nothing could, at first, be
known for certain, for the French, as yet too weak for a decisive
advance, fortified tlfeir position round Orleans and made very
skilful demonstrations in order to decoy the German Aimy Detach-
ment from the road to Paris and towards the west. General
d'Aurelle made detachments of the corps, stationed at Le Mans,
march upon Cha^res and Dreux for this purpose.
The demonstration, at first, completely succeeded in its object.
Upon the accordant reports that French detachments were ap-
proaching Paris from Normandy and Brittany, the Grand Duke,
believing perhaps that this might be the army of K6ratry (who
had left Paris on the 6th of October in the same way as Gambetta,
and who was known to be organizing an army in Brittany), com-
pletely changed his front from the south to the west; made the
17th Division, upon the right wing, march, on the 15th of No-
vember, from Angerville to Dreux ^ by Auneau, BambouiUet and
Maintenon, and directed the 22nd Division, which was followed
by the Bavarian Corps, upon Chateauneuf en Thimerais. (The
17th Division was commanded by the Adjutant General, Lieutenant
General von Tresckowy from the 16th of November, in place of
Lieutenant General von Schimmelmann, invalided.)
On the 17th of November, the 17th Division came upon the
enemy near Dreux j defeated him after a fight of about three
hours, and took the town. On the 18th the 22nd Division took
Chateauneuf] on the 19th it was engaged with French detachments
beyond this place, and on the 21st occupied La Loupe after in-
considerable fighting.
Now, however, the Grand Duke learnt that the enemy had
not retired towards the west, but to the south-west upon Le
Mans, He endeavoni*ed to keep feeling with the quickly retiring
detachments, once again changed his front and, after a wheel to
the left, pressed forward against Le Mans. On the 21st different
small fights took place to the south of La Loupe, on the 22nd
882
Nogent'le-Rotrou was occupied , and on the 23rd and 24th of
November, the Grand Duke continued Mb march as far as La Ferte
Bernard. Here, however, he received commands from the King's
Head-Quarters to proceed no further in the direction of Le Mans
and to march towards the east; soon after he also received direc-
tions from Prince Frederick Charles — who in the meanwhile had
come up by Troyes, Sens and Fontainebieau, Und was approaching
the theatre of war round Orleans to take the chief command of
all the German forces in the south — to march upon Orl^ns
and endeavour to unite with the Prince's army. From La Fert^
Bernard, the Grand Duke, therefore, continued his zig-zag march
towards Chateaudun; but in this march he met with still another
passing intermption, for in Bazoches the report suddenly reached
the Grand Duke that a French Corps was stationed at Brou^ thus
in rear of the Army Detachment. The march was directed upon
Brou, a collision took place with an isolated detachment of the
enemy, of which there were several wandering about at that time,
and it was then continued, in order to lead to the junction with
the Prince on the 1st of December at Orghres and Touryj the
starting point for the operations against the west.
ENCOUNTER OF THE FRENCH LOIRE ARMY WITH THE ARMY OF
PRINCE FREDERICK CHARLES.
Whilst the Grand Duke was executing his marches in the
west, General d'Aurelle had drawn together almost all the rein-
forcements, which at that time could be placed at his disposal,
in the south; namely the 17th Corps (General Durieux), the 19th
(General Barral) and the 20th (General Crouzat), so that with the
15th Corps (General Pallieres) and the 16th (General Chanzy), as
well as a Cavalry Corps (General Michel) which had been stationed
at Orl^ns since the middle of November, he united under his
command an army of about 200,000 combatants.
There were in addition still two corps in reserve, the 21st
333
under K^ratry, in rear of the left wing, and the 18th under
Bourbaki at Nevers, in rear of the right wing. (General Bourbaki,
commandant of the 18th Corps had escaped the capitulation of
Metz in an accidental and wonderfbl manner.)
Prince Frederick Charles — a Field Marshal^ like the Crown
Prince of Prussia , since the capitulation of Metz — brought up
three Army Corps^ the III., IX. and X. as well as the 1st Cavalry
Division, whilst another part of the former investing army of Metz,
the I. and YIU. Army Corps and the 3rd Cavalry Division, under
the command of General von Manteuffel had turned against the
French Northern Army and of the remidnder, the II. and VU.
Army Corps, the former moved off to Paris and the latter remained
behind provisionally for the occupation of Metz, and the siege of
Thionville. Both, at last, formed General von ManteuffePs army,
which drove Bourbaki's troops over the Swiss frontier.
General d^Aurelle had his large army upon a line of
considerable lengthy on the right bank of the Loire , in part
quite concealed from the reconnaissances of the Germans, by
the extensive forests of Orlians and Marchenoir, and distributed
in a manner y that even now allowed the subsequent division
of the army into two parts to be foreseen.
And indeed it appears that such a division was intended
for the advance upon Paris,
General d'Aurelle might probably have wished to avoid a great
decisive battle with Prince Frederick Charles, and therefore had
the plan of marching upon Paris by two roads, far distant from
one another, in order to deceive the enemy and to reach Paris
with at least one half of the army.
At the time of the first collision with Prince Frederick Charles,
the French corps stood partly concentrated on the right wing be-
hind the forest of Orleans, and partly on the left wing to the
west of Orleans. Certainly, the exact position of this left wing is
not known, but it appears to have stood somewhere between
Chateaudun and Venddme. At all events the centre, in .front of
the town of Origins itself, was only weak, and the right wing,
whose position and strength were known from the fights on the
24th of November, was not so strong and so far distant from the
334
centre without intention. D'Anreile appears on the contrary ^ to
have had the design ef turning the Prince's army, which came
from the north-east by Fontainebleau and Joigny, upon himself,
in order to occupy it and detain it in the forest of Orleans, whilst
the left wing was moved forward by Chateaudun and Chartres.
Prince Frederick Charles must have suspected some such plan.
He developed his forces cautiously, guarded himself well against
engaging too many troops in opposing the French right wing, or
of following it into the forest, and likewise unfolded a very ex-
tended front, which commanded the whole country between Orleans
and Paris, from Beaune la Rolande as far as Chateaudun. Thus
it came to pass, that the fights which led to the name of the
"battle of Orleans", were fought upon a front of about 6 miles
(27^5 English miles), in extent, a disproportionately long line in
comparison with the strength of both armies.
FIGHTS AT LADON, MAIZlilRES AND BOIS COMMUN.
24th OF NOVEMBER.
The first action between the two Loire Armies, took place
between a part of the French right wing, the 20th Corps, and
the Prince Field Marshal's left flank column, the X. Army Corps,
to the north of the great forest of Orleans, as the German army
developed itself, fronting south, to advance against Orleans. The
X. Army Corps, which crossed the river Loing on the 21st at
Montargis in the direction of Pithiiners had the task of uniting
around Beaune la Rolande on the 24th of November, and, in con-
junction with the Hessian Cavalry Brigade, of carrying out recon-
naissances against the enemy, whose presence at Gien on the Loire
and to the north of this -town, was known.
In order to reach Beaune, where the remainder of the Corps,
under General Voigts-Rhetz, had already an*ived, Valentini's Brigade,
with the Artillery corps advanced from Montargis, and Lehmann's
Brigade, by Ladon, towards the west, when the French broke
336
forth out of the forest of Orleans, in three heavy columns 30,500
men in strength, likewise in the direction of Beaune, with the
object of crossing the march of the two brigades, consisting of
about 12,000 men. The brigades developed towards the left flank ;
the artillery corps was brought on towards Beaune, and a vigorous
offensive was opposed to the enemy's attack. Lehmann's Brigade
took Ladofij Valentini*s MaizibreSy and the two united then threw
the enemy back upon Beilegarde, After the fight was ended the
march was continued upon Beaune, and the intended junction was
carried out.
The loss of the Germans amounted to 13 officers, and 220
men; the French loss was more cousiderable , besides one officer
and 170 men as prisoners.
Pfom the papers of a fallen French officer it was discovered
that the three divisions of the 20th Army Corps, General Crouzafs,
were to reach the points Beaune la Rolande , Juranville and * La
Loupe on this day; a proof that they commenced by a partial
oflFensive with the right wing.
This was, moreover, continued with vigour. The 20th Corps,
after the fights on, the 24th of November was reinforced by the
18th Corps, so that, according to French accounts, the strength
of the right wing was 70,000 men.
ENGAGEMENT AT BEAUNE LA ROLANDE. 28th OF NOVEMBEK.
The Prince Field Marshal did not allow himself to be led
astray by these operations. The German left wing received the
charge of rebutting the French attacks, and the further development
of the army continued notwithstanding.
The X. Army Corps retained, provisionally, its position near
Beaune la Rolande^ in order to serve as a point of support for
the operations of the other corps, wliich gradually formed front
to the south, and endeavoured, with the right flank to effect a
junction with the Grand Duke's Army Detachment.
336
On the 28th of November^ at 9 o'clock a. m. ^ the right wing
of the French made a frefth advance against the X. Corps ^ and
indeed; as the accounts of the German troops acknowledge ^ with
great rapidity and vehemence, as well as with decided obstinacy.
Several troops of the Line, old soldiers, formed the principal
element of the French attacking columns, and a numerous artillery
cannonaded the German positions. The X. Army Corps stood
upon the line from Beaune to Longoar, and had fortified its
positions. Beaune formed the centre of the engagement and was
strongly barricaded. The French attacked the place on three
sides simultaneously and also in the rear; it was defended by
WedelFs Brigade, ^he fight, along the whole line, was full of
desperation, and lasted until the commencement of darkness. At
4 o'clock in the afternoon, the 5th Infantry Division (from the
UL Army Corps) joined in the fight against the left wing of the
Fre/ich, with four battalions from Boynes, and the 1st Cavalry
Division came up as a support. The ^French Corps did not
commence their retreat into the forest of Orleans until towards
5 o'clock. A pursuit on the part of the Germans, after so hard
a fight, could certainly not be thought of, and moreover this
would not have been judicious in the present military situation.
The troops of the X. Army Corps had held out with ad-
mirable courage against greatly superior in numbers ; their tenacity
and knowledge of war, under the excelleui generalship of General
von Voigts-Rhetx overcame the furious assault, in the most
glorious manner. The Corps had lost about 1000 men; the loss
of the French amounted to considerably more, 1100 killed, 5000
wounded >and 1600 prisoners. It was the first example of that
enormous prodigality in human life, by which alone the French
republic could pay the cost of continuing the war, against the
proved and tactically superior army of Germany.
r
337
BATTLE OF ORLlfeANS. 2nd TO 4th OF DECEMBER.
After the failure of the 28th of Noyember, General d'Aurelle
brought his Corps closer together round Orleans and to the north
of it, still however retaining a very extended position. Upon the
right wing hQ placed the 18th Corps , opposite Beanne, on the
northern boundary of the great forest of Orleans, and the 20th
Corps upon the road from Orleans to Pithiviers, also in the forest
of Orl^ns. In rear of these Corps stood the 16th, nearer to
Orleans. Perhaps he now meant to entiee the enemy upon his
centi'e, in order then to advance by Fontainebleau, with the three
corps of the right wing.
In the meantime the Prince Field Marshal completed his
disposition towards the south , established his junction with the
Grand Dnke on the high road from Orleans to Paris, which now
formed the right wing of tlie united German Loijre Ai*my, and at
the same time leaving his left wing, the X. and in. Anuy
Corps, so far to the eastward, that he commanded the road by
Pithiviei^, and the country to the west of Loing.
The German Army might amount to 120,000 men, and the
French, as far as they could now be brought into battle, to 200,000.
On the Ist of December, Gambetta concluded from Trochu*s
reports upon the sorties from Paris ^ that a sortie army was
already on this side of Longjumeau, and he therefore now issued
the most urgent commands for the advance on all sides, nor did
he allow proclamations to be wanting for the inspiration of the
troops (v. page 306).
On the 2nd of December both armies stood facing one another,
ready to fight, and in fact were so placed that the French centre,
the 16th and 17th Corps, was opposite the German right wing,
whilst the French left wing, the 19th and 2 Ist Coi*ps, was further
to the west and south ^ behind the forest of Marchenoir. The
Corps on the German side had the advantage of being able to
unite and mutually support one another,, in the open country of
Org^res, Ai*tenay, as far as Pithiviers and to the east of it, with
greater facility than the French Corps, to whom the forest of
89
338
Orleans doubtless offered defensive advantages, but also interfered
very much with general supervision and mobility.
The firat collision occurred near the Paris and Orl^ns road,
when both the German right wing and the French centre made an
offensive advance.
On the evening of the Ist of December, a Bavarian recon-
noitring detachment sent out from the Grand Duke's /irmy- division
had come upon the advanced guard of the 16th French Oorpa,
between Orgbres and Patajfj and was thrown back. The whole
of the Grand Duke's army-division immediately moved forward, at
8 o'clock on the following morning; the Bavarians on the right
wing, from Org^res, flanked by the 4th Cavalry Division; the
17th Division in the centre, byBazoches; and the 22nd Division,
upon the left wing, in connection with the IX. Army Corps and sup-
ported by the 2nd Cavalry Division, along the high road.
These divisions had hardly passed Orghres and Bazoehes when
they were vigorously attacked by the beads of the advancing 16th
and 17th French Corps. The Bavarians were, at first, forced
back, but the 17th Division soon re-established the combat; the
French were defeated after a contest of two hours, Loigny was
stormed by the centre and right wing, Paupry by the left wing,
and the pursuit was carried on until close in front of Artenay*
General d'Aurelle led up the 17th Corps as a reinforcement, but
was unable to succeed in bringing the advantage to his side, and
on the evening of the 2nd of December, was obliged to leave the
points Loigny and Poupry in possession of the right wing of the
German Loire Army.
The 17th Division alone had taken 7 guns, and made 1800
prisoners, includmg one general and twenty officers.
The Prince Field Marshal now made dispositions for a sur-
rounding attack against Orleans, by all the Corps, upon converging
lines. The radiating roads leading to this town, formed the lines
of operations.
On the 3rd of December, the Grand Duke again continued
his movement on the right of the high road; next to him, in the
centre of the whole order of battle, upon this road and to the
left of it, was General von Manstein, whilst upon his left flank,
»
*
\
339
the 2nd Cavalry Division held the connection with General
von Alvensleben's III. Army Corps. This Corps marched from
Pithiviers upon Chiilenrs and, finally, the X. Army Corps, upon
the extreme left wing, by Boyne.
General d^Aurelle did not again take the offensive on the
3rd of December, neither was the resistance on this day generally
of a tenaciously obstinate character.
The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg and General von Mlnstein
threw the enemy back upon Chevilly^ General von Alvensleben
penetrated beyond Chttleurs, and General von Voigts-Rhetz attained
an equal level with the centre, in the forest of Orleans.
G^ieral d'Aurelle, in spite of his strength, drew back his
centre, whilst leaving his wings stationary, and exposed them, even
on this day, to the danger of a separation.
Probably the events of the 3rd of December still corresponded
with d^Aurelle^s original idea, of being able to advance towards
Paris with at least one strong wing, and indeed . he must now
have counted upon the left mng^ which retnained still intact^
and even unobserved, behind the forest of Marchenoir.
From this day, however, tlie French plan fell into confusion,
chiefly, it would appear, through Gambetta^s iuteiference. No
systematic action on the pai't of the French can any longer be
recognised. However, it must certainly not be inferred that the
march upon Paris would have succeeded had it not been for the
differences between Gambetta and d'Aurelle. The dispositions of
the Prince, models of circumspection and decision during the whole
Loire campaign, would scarcely have allowed a French army to
advance unobserved.
Gambetta issued the command that Orleans should be defended,
and this naturally was at cross purposes with General d'Aurelle's
dispositions ; the retreat was continued no further, a fight occurred
on the 4th, but the separation was, nevertheless, accomplished.
All the German Corps pressed forward this day against
Orleans, in the same direction as on the previous day.
General von Manstein, with the 18th Division in the first
line, and the 25th (Hessian) Division in the second line, came
upon the main position of the French to the south of Chevilly,
28*
840
in the line CercotteB — Gidy^ leading acrosB the high roid. A
combat ensued, lasting for many hours, with hot fighting in places,
which ended in the retreat of the French upon Orleans.
^ And now, whilst the German corps continued their march
upon Orleans with a front becoming continually more drawn
in, the marvellous division of the French Army into two great
masses took place, parting company up and down the Loire,
the one towards the south-west, the other towards the south-
east. This movement has since been explained by tactical reasons,
for the German corps, in the centre, had advanced so far that the
French wings were no longer able to reach Orleans and the centre.
Thus whilst d'Aurelle's conjectured plan was partially fulfilled,
he was at the same time hindered from independently exercising
his command, and the two strong wings, which should now have
gone forward, retired.
The 18th Corps passed the Loire at Sully, the 20th at
Jargeau in order to retreat upon Bourges, and the 15th Corps had
crossed at Orleans; the remaining corps had commenced their
retreat upon Meung^ partly also to their former position near
Venddme.
Meanwhile the German Army immediately followed the
retreating corps; the IX. Army Corps was m possession of the
suburb of St. Jean by the evening of the Acth of December,
after a vigorous fight, and^ in common with the Grand Duke^s
Corps, occupied the toum of Orleans early on the morning of
the hth of December.
In the three days fighting, the losses in the French Army had
been extraordinarily large, chiefly in prisoners, of whom above 10,000
fell into the hands of the Germans, together with 77 guns and
4 gun -boats, surprised upon the Loire. But the German loss also
was not inconsiderable, it amounted to about 5000 men in killed
and wounded.
341
PURSUIT AND OBSERVATION OF THE DIVIDED FBENOH ARMY.
The Prince Field Marshal established his head - quarters in
Orleans on the 5th of December, and fi'om here sent out detach-
ments in all directions which were to keep feeling with the enemy.
The division of the French Army, which Gambetta instantly
announced to the world as a strategical plan, was confirmed by
the German reconnaissances, and the track of the- French right
wing was followed for several days, with repeated small engage-
ments at GteHy Vierson and other points in the south-west and
south.
Contrary to Gambetta's hopes, however, the Prince made no
further pursuit of Bourbaki's Army (the three Corps of the right
wing) after the 10th of December, but now, correctly estimating
the importance of the French left wing, the lU. Army Corps was
recalled from its march upon Gien^ and the whole German Loire
Army was directed against the forces which showed themselves in
opposition to the Grand Duke's troops and the IX. Army Corps at
Meungy Beaugency and Blois.
The left wing of the army which had been beaten near
Orleans, the 16th, 17th, Sl9th and 21st Corps, had, under the
command of General Chanzy — d'Aurelle had fallen out with
Gambetta and been dismissed — concentrated on the right bank
of the Loire in the line Beaugency — Marchenoir, and first offered
resistance to the pursuing German Corps on the 7th of December
to the north of Meung.
An offensive movement in the direction of Paris y with
surrounding the German right wing,, was not attempted by this
strong army j although the present moment offered a better
prospect of success than ever.
Beaten by the 17th Division, the French rear guard drew
bfick upon Beaugency, and on the following day General Chanzy
moved against the Grand Duke with his whole force. A hot
engagement took place at Beaugency^ in which the French were
once again thrown back with considerable losses (1500 prisoners
and 6 guns).
On the 9th of December, amidst repeated fights, the Grand
342
Duke occupied the forest of Marchenoir and the districts of
Bouvalet, Cemay and others to the south of Beaugency, which
were still defended by the enemy.
Upon the report of the combat near Meung, the Prince Field
Marshal made the X. Army Corps follow the IX. and the Grand
Duke.
The 10th of December was to have been a day of rest for the
German Army^ but on this day General Ghanzy attempted the
offensive afresh; the combat, principally conducted by artillery,
ended in the retreat of the French^ who now went no furthet*
towards the south, but by Fenddme upon Le Mans.
The delegation of Tours had left that town after the battle
of Orleans, and fled to Bordeaux.
The German side was at fault, for some days, as to the line
of retreat taken by the French; it was believed that they had
fallen back upon Blois and Tours, and the march was therefore
continued in this direction. The head-quarters were in Beaugency
on the 12th, and in Suevres on the 13th.
On the latter day, however. General Voigts-Bhetz made the
discovery, after occupying Blois, that General Chanzy had drawn
off towards Fenddme.
In consequence of this the march was directed to the west,
upon yenddmCj from the 13th of December, the X. Aimy Corps
upon the left wing and the Grand Duke upon the right, in the
first line; following them, the III. Army Corps was to turn off
from Beai^en^ towards the west, and the IX. Army Corps was
to cross from the left to the right bank of the Loire at Blois.
On the Idth of December a sharp fight took place iu the line
Venddme — Morde on the Loir, against Chanzy's Army.
But Gambetta now appears to have conceived the new plan
of drawing the German Army continually further westward and
of occupying it^ whilst in the meantime, Bourbaki was to march
unimpeded towards the east^ and break away, past General
von Werder's small Army^ into Germany^ or completely to
interrupt the German communications (v. Chapter XU).
A lasting resistance was consequently not offered at Venddme,
but the retreat from this favourable position was decided on, and
343
commenced on the 16th of December. On the same day Venddme
was occupied with some fighting on the part of the Germans, and
six guns and a mitrailleuse were taken by the victorious X. Army
Corps.
The retreat of the French from Venddme, combined with the
news of BourbakPs position at Bourges and Gien, caused Prince
Frederick Charles to suspect that he was to be enticed to the
westward, in order, possibly, to send Bourbaki to Paris. He there-
fore returned to Orleans on the 19th, directed the Grand Duke
of Mecklenburg and General von Voigts-Rhetz to pursue General
Chanzy as far only as Epuisay and St. Calais, and then took up
a position of observation with his whole atfny^ both against
Chanxy and Bourbaki.
At the same time the latter commenced embarking his
army upon the railroad for Besan^on,
The Grand Duke and General von Vblgts - Rhetz occupied the
line Chartres - Chateaudun - Vendome - Tours with their own- Corps
and the 1st, 2nd and 4th Cavalry Divisions, the former on the
right and the latter on the left ; General von Manstein and General
von Alvensleben extended their Corps and the 6th Cavalry Division
towards the south-east and made reconnaissances upon Vierzon,
Bourges, and upon the right bank of the Loire, as far as Gien
and Briare.
These measures for observation were continued for a long
time; yet it appears that Bourbakfs movements here were not at
first detected, for the Prince remained at Orleans until the be-
gmning of January, and the Southern Army waj» on)y set in
movement for General Werder's assistance, at the commencement
of that month.
General Chanzy too, was in uncertainty on his side as to
w;hat the Prince was going to do; his army was not yet fit again
to undertake any great operation; it had been ten-ibly weakened,
not only by the enemy, but also by the severe weather.
The French troops were in the most deplorable condition,
deserting in crowds, large detachments of them without arms, and
all most insufficiently clad and fed. On the road from Orleans to
Blois alone, more than 6000 French wounded, who had been left
344
behind entirely without doctors , were found and attended to by
the Germans. Bat the German troops had also suffered from the
unceasing fighting and wintw bivouacking; their foot-gear was f<Hr
the most part in a wretched condition, and it is a great triumph
for their excellent moral qualities , and the masterly generalship
and administration, that they, nevertheless , remained * completely
ready for the fight.
From the 16th of December 1870 to the 6th of January
1871, nothing but reconnaissances occurred, in conformity with the
sitaation of affairs.
On the 21st of December, the 19th Division from the X. Army
Corps, whose head -quarters were at Blois, appeared before Tours^
via Chateau -Renault, after having defeated some of the enemy's
detachments on the 19th. The town, after some rifled cannon shot
had been thrown into it, requested a Prussian gan*ison, but it was
not occupied; the Division moved into cantonments in the
neighbourhood.
A detachment from the 20th Division at Venddme, six com-
panies, one squadron and two guns, under Lieutenant Colonel
von Boltenstem, went down the Loir on the 27th of December,
and came upon a superior force of the enemy between Montvire
and La Chartre, which completely surrounded the detachment
after sundry skirmishes. The detachment fought its way through,
and returned with a loss of about 100 men and 10 officers, and
with 230 men of the enemy as prisoners.
On the 31 st of December, the 20th Division, at Vendome,
was attacked by superior forces, but repulsed the attack, and the
Ist Cavalry Brigade, under General von Lfideritz, succeeded in
takmg 4 guns.
ADVANCE UPON LE MANS.
In the beginning of 1871 it was evident that Bourbaki would
make a push towards the east (v. Chapter XII.), and Prince Frederick
Charles, in accordance with the Chief Head -Quarters, whence
S45
spooial dispoBitions were made against Bourbaki, now decided,
on his side, to attack General Chanzy, who was stationed at
Le Mans.
On the 2nd ot January, the Prince commanded the XIII. Army
Oorps (17th and 22nd Infantry Divisions) to concentrate at Chartres,
the IX. at Orleans, the III. at Beangency and the X. at Venddme.
On the 6th of January the following points were to be reached:
BroUy upon the light wing, by the XIII. Army Corps and
the 4th Cavalry Division, and Nogeni le Rotrou by a flanking
detachment on the right.
Moree^ further down on the Loir, by the IX. Army Corps
(18th Infantry Division and Artillery Corps) and the 2nd Cavalry
Division.
Fenddmey in the centre, by the III. Army Corps, whose
advanced guard was to occupy the line of Azai; Monioire^ upon
the left wing, by the X. Army Corps and the 1st and 6th Cavalry
Divisions.
These dispositions indicate a surrounding attack against Le Mans,
and formed the introduction to a series of fights, which lasted
seven days, before commg to a crisis at Le Mans itself.
The peculiar formation of the ground, to the east of the
ancient Norman town of Le Mans, explains why the overthrow of
the western army was marked by a suoeeasion of fights instead
of by one great decisive stroke.
The two rivers Huisne and Loir^ running into the Sarthe
which flows by Le Mans towards Angers, form with their numerous
small tributaries, a number of tactically important positions, lying
regularly one behind another, in the hilly and undulating country
round Le Mans. The ground is, moreover, intersected by numerous
quick-set fences upon low earth banks, which enclose the fields;
numerous isolated farms, with several villages, thickets and many
solidly built chateaux lie scattered about, forming special points
of appui for the defenders. Added to this, a cold of 8 to 10
degrees (Reaumur) with snow and gales increased the difficulties,
on both sides it is true, of marching and fighting.
On the 6th of January the fighting began.
346
The French had, on the 5th of January, strengthened their
position opposite the 20th Infantry Division, and occupied the
forest of Vendome; from here, on the 6th of January, they made
attacks upon the outposts of the Division , which remained
stationary, whilst the latter was moving to the south-west upon
Montoire.. Soon however, towards midday, the heads of the
lU. Corps arrived at FenddmCy took up the combat and continued
it, against the tenacious, and reinforced, resistance of the enemy,
until his retreat behind the Azai line.
The X. Corps reached Montoire with slight resistance.
The regiments of the 38th Brigade, on the other hand, and
parts of the 1st Cavalry Division and the 6th Cavalry Division,
who were appointed to cover the march of the X. Coi*ps upon the
extreme left flank, in a position at St. Amand, were attacked
from Chateau -Renault, from the south-west, and forced back upon
Ambloy. — The enemy thus attempted to paralyze the attack, by
surrounding the left flauk of the Germans.
The IX. Coi*ps had reached Moree] the XIU. Corps, however,
had met with an obstinate resistance, and had only just reached
the vicinity of Brou, and not yet Nogent le Rotrou. It had
become evident in the course of the day, that Divisions of the
16th and 17th Corps had fought acainst the III., parts of the
21. Corps against the XIII., and a Division of the 16th Corps
had fought at St. Amand.
The Prince Field Marshal decided to continue the surrounding
attack upon le lians, and only to devote a secondary consideration
to the enemy at St. Amand.
By his dispositions for the 7th of January, the XIII. Corps
was to advance upon Mantmirail, the IX. upon Epmsay^ the X.
upon La Charire^ whilst rebutting the threatening upon its flank,
the UI. Corps upon Savigny and Epuisay , and he himself
towards Crilamesj in the centre.
A thick fog lay upon the ground and shut out the effect of
the artillery? so that the fighting had to be carried on by the
infantry alone. There were engagements at Epuisay, St. Amand
and Nogent le Rotrou. In the evenmg all the divisions had taken
up the previously indicated positions witibi the exception of the
347
X. Corps which had been retarded by a victorious fight at St.i^mand
and only got as far as Montoire with its main body. The Prince
established his head-quarters in Venddme, and ordered a general
continuation of the offensive for the 8th of January.
On this day the leading troops of the III. Corps reached
Ecorpain without a contest; the IX. Corps, in its rear, reached
St. Calais, to which place the head-quai*ters were also removed;
the X. Corps, after a slight resistance, reached la Chartre, and
the XIU. La Fert^ Bernard, and pushed out an advanced l!.^uard
beyond.
The orders for the 9th of January directed the Xin.'"Corps
to the hill of Moutfoi't, tlie UL upon Artenay, the IX. upon Bou-
loire, and the X. upon Parignd-Eveque. Detached divisions were
also commanded to undertake the destruction of the railway connec-
tions from Le Mans to Alen^on and Tours.
General von Hartmann, with a mixed detachment was charged
to throw the enemy's troops further back, which had threatened
the left flank of the X. Corps, on the 6th.
The previously indicated points, Artenay^ Le Breil, La Belief
inutile, L'Homme, Montreuil, St. Georges and Sceaux^ were almost
reached on all sides, amid hot fighting.
The Prince Field Marshal established his head-quarters in
Bouloire and ordered the surrounding advance upon Le^^Alans
itseify for the 10th of January. The IX. Corps was to form
the reserve of the centre.
The roads, since the 9th of January, had been c(5^ered wiOi
slippery ice, so that the march was rendered unusu^y difficult,
especially for horses.
But notwithstanding this hindranee and the obstinate resistance ,
offered by tiie enemy, chiefly against the III. and XIII. Corps,
the following points were reached m the evening. \;
The UL Corps stood in Chang^, between this plaee and
Parigniy to the west of St Hubert and in Champajfl^e. The
X. Army Corps at Grand Luce. Of the XUI. Corps, the 22nd
Division had only reached the line Couleon^hdtBau-Connerre
railway station; the 17th Division had not been able to force the
346
paaBBfif over the Huitne against Ronasean's Division of the 2l8t
Corps, and stood at Pont de Gesnes. The DL Corps was at
Baulaire,
TH£ CRISIS AT L£ HANS.
On the evening of the lOth of January, the French Army
was formed up with a cnrved front in a line three miles (IB^/s Eng-
lish miles) in extent, to the east and north-east of Le Mans, in
excellent positions for farther fighting. The 16th Corps was upon
the left wing, on the right bank of the Huisne, the 17th Corps
and palls of the 21st Corps, in the centre, on the left bank of
the Huisne, and one Division of the 19th Corps, upon the right
wmg, on the road to La Chartre. The Gardes Mobiles and
mobilised Gardes Nationaux, who had only arrived shortly before,
were in reserve.
The whole Army might still number 100,000 men.
The Pnnce Field Marshal again ordered the attack for the
11th of January, in the old, often proved Prussian manner; that
of surrounding the enemy with both wings and then attacking
^OTMisly from the centre and the wings.
The Xm. Army Corps was to accomplish the passage over
the Huisne on this day, and to move forward against Le Mans
f^m the north-east; the remaining Corps were to keep their pre-
sent directimis.
On this day the success was gained of wresting some very
important positions from the enemy; still the decisive combat re>
quired^^et a seventh day.
In the evening of the 11th of January, the III. Corps had
gained fibssession of Arches Chdieau and Noyers CkdteaUy and
the 18th Division, after a fight of many hours, had taken the
Plateau ^AuvouK The XIU. Corps had crossed the river at
Connenr6 with the 17th Division, and in the evening after a hard
349
fight, this Division occupied the conntry to the east of LombroUy
and the 22nd Division, La Chapelle.
The X. Army Corps had reached Les Mortes Aures and
MuLsanne late in the evening, and taken the height of Verd-
galanty an important point of support for the. enemy.
The 14th Cavalry Brigade with two battalions was, in the
evening, between Chdteau de la ^Paillerie and Parigni'tEv^que,
The Prince Field Marshal established his head-quarters in
the Ch§.teau AArtenay^ and gave the following orders for the
12th of Januaiy:
"The ni. and X. Corps will continue the o£fensive; the IX.
Corps will establish its artillery Corps upon the plateau d'Anvour
and, with a brigade of the 18th Division, support the XIII. Corps
whilst it debouches by the bridge over the Huisne.''
With the commencement of dawn, however, General Chanzy
first took the offensive. Shortly after, whilst still dark, the ad-
vanced posts of the III. Corps were engaged; at noon, those of
the IX. Corps in the neighbourhood of Fatines] and, at the same
time, the 17th Division, to the south-east of SL Comeille, was
attacked. *
General Chanzy risked a final desperate battle, and it is a
matter of astonishment that he was still able to move his Army
to such a fight as took place this day, after six days of almost
uninterrupted defeats.
On the German side, the 35th Brigade joined in the combat
at St. Corneille by a flanking movement ; the French were defeated,
and the Brigade reached Parance in the evening.
The 17th Division took St. Corneille and the passage over
the Parance stream at Thouvois-Chdteau.
The 22nd Division moved forward from La Chapellcy by
St, Celerie and Torce and reached the Bonn^table and Le Mans
road. In a further advance the Division came upon strong forces
of the enemy near Chanteloup, and after an obstinate combat,
placed itself, towards evening, in possession of La Croix.
The 4th Cavalry Division reached Ballon and Souligni.
General von Manstein had occupied the plateau d'Anvour with
360
several batteries, which opened fire upon Yvr^ and the retiring
columns of the enemy.
LiaBtly, upon the left wing, the X. Army Corps was marched
upon Le Mans; it had broaght batteries into position, and after
an hour's cannouade, entered, fighting, into the town at 4 o'clock
in the afternoon, without meeting considerable resistance.
The lU. Army Corps reached the ground to the south of
VEpau after a protracted fight, brought two batteries into action
against Le Mans in the afternoon, and with the 6th Division,
followed the X. Corps into the town, whilst .the 6th Division
still pushed forward advanced posts, across the Huisne, in the
evening.
The combat had ended in the complete defeat of the French
Army. They were in rapid retreat upon Alen^ou and Laval, and
their losses were enoimously great. The German Army had
made 18,000 prisoners in the seven days fighting, and taken 20
guns and mitrailleuses, and 2 colours. A large quantity of war
material fell into German hands at Le Mans.
The German loss amounted, altogether, in the seven days to
180 officers and 3470 men.
The victory of Le Mans was of decisive result in the theatre
of war in the south and west, and weighed heavily in the balance
in favour of the conclusion of tlie war. Chanzy*8 Army was
destroyed. The debris, which he led back upon Alen^on and
Laval, could not undertake any operations again for a long time;
also, from the 13th of January, the day after the last decisive
battle, they were puraued by the German Army, and lost 6000
men, in addition, as prisoners.'
The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg followed with the XIIL
Corps, the 4th Cavalry Division and the 12th Cavalry Brigade
upon Alen^on] General von Schmidt, with the 14th Cavalry Bri-
gade and detachments of the DC. Corps, upon LavaL
On the 14th, the forsaken camp of Conlie was found by a
ERATIONS d
351
detachment of the X. Army Corps, after some slight skirmishes
with the French rear guard, to be evacuated; largd stores of
provisions, ammunition and arms were captured in this grandly
established entrenched camp. Alen9on was reached by the German
troops on the night of the 16th, and the XIII. Army Corps was
m
directed thence upon Rouen ^ on the 20th, for the purpose of
operating against the French Corps at Havre, in company with
the Northern Army.
General Chanzy had been completely forced back into
Brittany.
German detachments also advanced towards the south; a
brigade of the III. Army Coi*ps marched upon Angers, and on
the 19th of January General von Hartmann, Commander of the 1st
Cavalry Division, occupied the town of Tours with his mixed de-
tachment of all arms.
Thus, profiting by his victories in all directions. Prince
Frederick Charles, who had established his head<quaii;ers at Le
Mans, held the departments of Orl^anais, Touraine, Anjou, Maine
and Normandy under the power of German arms, and frustrated
every hope of a relief of Paris from this quarter ; until, soon after,
the convention of Versailles, also profiting by the results of the
admirable successes of this army, put an end to the events of
the war.
n. OPERATIONS OF THE NORTHERN ARMIES.
(v. map of the operations of the Northern Armies.)
As early as the beginning of October, the existence of armed
French divisions, in the northern departments of Artois and Picardy,
had been confirmed by the reports of the cavalry, which had
been sent out from Paris, on all sides for reconnoitring purposes
and as stationary detachments.
Thus, in the early days of October, a French detachment,
several thousand strong, composed of Gardes Mobiles of the Marne
362
and the Somme, a portion of the 43rd Regiment of the Line and
a small fovce of Cavalry, advanced from Arras to make a re-
connaissance towards Paris, and came into collision with two Ger-
man squadrons in the neighbourhood of Breieuil^ to the south of
Amiens. They at once turned again in rapid retreat upon Amiens
and Arras.
These newly organized troops, however, did not gain impor-
tance as an army, which could endanger the investment of Paris,
until much later, at the same time that the French Loire Army
also attained a threatening strength in the south, under General
d'Aurelle.
General Farre had, originally, been charged with the organ*
ization of the active forces in the north; then, on the 22nd of
October, Bourbaki took over the Chief Command, after his depar-
ture from Metz; but in November, before there had been any
fighting in the north, he was called away to take up a command
on the Loire.
Even at the end of October the organization in the north
appeared of sufficient importance to the German Army Direction
for General von Manteuff^l to be sent there, after the capitulation
of Metz, with the I. and VIII. Army Corps (the I. was reduced
by having sent away detachments) and the 3rd Cavalry Division.
This Army Detachment, however, was only able to move off
from Metz on the 7th of November, for the I. Army (which con-
sisted of the VII. Corps and Senden's Division besides the por-
tions of troops named) had been given the charge of carrying out
the evacuation and removal of the captured army, in detachments,
from Metz. This arduous work, occupying much time, was finally
so arranged that the Laudwehr troops, hitherto belonging to
Kummer^s Division, should undertake the transport to Germany
and then remain at home on guard; it was then only that the I.
Army was distributed for the divers tasks of occupying Metz,
Thionville, Longwy, Montm^dy, M^zi^res, partially also for the siege
and observation of Verdun (v. Chapter IX.) and to advance against
the north-west of France.
Part of the VU. Corps remained in Metz, Senden*s Division
besieged Thionville and the fortresses on the Belgian frontier.
353
Zglinitzki's Brigade from the 1st Corps, reinforced by a squadron
and a battery, moved foi'ward by the railroad to Soissons for the
siege of La F^re, whilst Bentheim's Division was sent away for the
investment of Mdzi^res.
On the 7th of November General 7on Manteuffel commenced
his march with the remainder, by two main roads, towards the
west. The I. Corps, upon the right wing, followed the line of Briey-
Damvillers-Rethel-Laon-Noyon, and the VIII. Corps, upon the left
wing, that of Verdun-Varennes-Rheims-Soissons-Compi^gne.
On the 21st Ham. was occupied.
On the 23rd of November the advance upon Amiens, by
Montdidier and Roye, was made, preceded by the Cavalry Di-
vision. On the following day fighting took place with the advanced
guard, under Colonel von Ltlderitz at Quesnel and Mezieres;
on the 26th, the presence of strong forces of the enemy at
Thennes on the line of the Luce was ascertained, and dispositions
Were made for a battle on the 27th.
Of the I. Corps, only one infantry brigade, the Artillery
Corps and a cavalry regiment were on the spot ; the 1st Division,
now relieved before M^zi^res by Senden's Division, )vas still upon the
march, the VIII. Corps, on the other hand, was complete. How-
ever, the Regiments Kronprinz and No. 41, belonging to the 1st
Division, as well as the cavalry and artillery, still arrived in
time on the following day.
BATTLE OF AMIENS. 27th OF NOVEMBER.
General Faidherbe reckons the forces*), at that time on the
French side in Amiens, as consisting of only three brigades,
Lecointe's, Derroja's and Bfissots, with the garrison of Amiens,
altogether 25,000 men including 4 squadrons and 7 batteries under
•) In his publication *'Campagne*de TArm^e du Nord", dedicated to
Gambetta; a publication with excellent closing remarks, but written with
too decidedly political objects.
88
354
the eomnuuid of General Farre, Gardes MobUes^ Marineg and re-
gular infantry, and very nomerooB officers escaped from the c^i-
talations of Sedan and Metz. If these estimates are correct — and
Faidherbe's detailed acconnt makes it probable — the French anny
was about equal in numbers to the German, though much weaker
in cavalry and artillery. The entrenchments, in which the French
fought, certainly compensated for this disadvantage.
The German Army, on the morning of the 27th of November,
advanced for the offensive directly upon Amiens; the VULL Ckups
upon the left wing, and the detachments of the I. Corps upon the
right wing.
The French Army held an entrenched position, in a very
extended line, in front of Amiens.
The VIIL Corps attacked in a northerly direction towards the
town, threw back the enemy, who offered a brave resistance, from
one position to another, in a fight lasting for many hours, during
which several bayonet attacks were carried out, and a battalion
of marines was ridden down by the 9th Hussars; and in the
evening its leading troops were half a mile (2^/5 English miles)
flrbm Amiens. ,
The I. Corps, when advancing against the heights of Gentelles
and yUlerS'Bretonneux^ had to endure a still harder fight; it was
attacked by a French detachment which had taken up a position
for the defence of Corbie and the railroad to Arras and Lille.
The I. Corps was only able to gain ground slowly and amid
severe losses, yet being vigoroiisly supported on the right wing by
the Cavalry Division, this corps also succeeded at last in defeating
the enemy and taking the enti'enchment at Villers-Bretonneux.
With this the French army certainly was not driven out of
its last position before Amiens; yet its loss was so considerable,
and the steadiness of the troops so shaken , that a rapid retreat
to the north was commenced in the evening.
The loss of the Germans was pretty considerable ; it amounted
to 1800 men and 79 officers. Nevertheless 9 guns and 2 colom*s
were taken, and 800 unwounded prisoners made; the loss of the
French is estimated, by Faidherbe, at 266 killed and 1117 wounded,
besides a great number missing and scattered.
^55
No pursait was made after the enemy in retreat to the north ;
and therefore the resalts of the battle were only momentary. An
energetic pursuit would probably have put an end to the whole
war in the north; whilst as it was, the French army again
recovered and was reinforced in the noii;hem fortresses, so that it
was able to repeat many times its attempts to press forward across
the Somme towards Paris, and to engage in several fresh battles.
Whether a pursuit was impossible, caopot as yet be decided, for
sufficiently exact information is wanting as to the positions on both
sides and the condition of the troops after the combat. On the
French side only, is there a detailed account of the battle by
General Faidherbe, according to which the Geiman army was pre-
vented by its losses, and the fatigues of the contest, from profiting
by its victory, whilst the French had, for the greater part, retired
in good order. Less confidence can be placed in this account
than on the strength estimates from the same source, because a
description can easily be coloured ; nevertheless the course of events
gives it some likelihood. As the German army, with its superior
and numerous cavalry, had so greatly the advantage, in regard to
a pursuit, over an enemy almost entirely deficient in cavalry, it
is difficult to explain why better use was not made of the victory.
It is true that in general, a pursuit by cavalry, after the fashion
of former wars, is no longer possible, and this arises from the
new arms of the infantry. Formerly the cavalry remained so close
upon the heels of the retiring enemy, that it could take advantage
of each moment of disorder to fall upon it; now, however, even
a small detachment of infantry with the rapid-firing, long -ranged
breech-loaders, keeps the cavalry at such a distance, that all
feeling between the rear guard of the retiring body and the pur-
suing cavalry is easily lost. A pursuit, therefore, is only possible
now with all three ai'ms, and principally indeed with infanti*y still
thoroughly fit for marching or at least more fit for marching than
the enemy.
The whole war of 1870 — 71 presents no single instance of
a productive pursuit by cavalry, as was the case formerly, and
in general, only offers examples of pursuits of little energy and
value. This, naturally, is mainly owing to the principal battles
88*
36tf
at Metz and Sedan having ended with the retreat of the vanquished
foe into a fortress and a capitulation, which without doufot, was
of more value than any pursuit; but in other cases, after the
battle of Woerth for instance , no pursuit was made, because the
victors had not any fresh iufanti*y near enough to the enemy, and
because the cavalry was unable to pursue. Here, at Amiens,
however, the ground was more favourable for cavalry than at
Woerth.
On the 2Sih, Amiens was occupied by the Germans; but
the citadel held out until the following morning, and was only
taken after a short fight. At this place, 11 officers and 400 men^
30 guns and considerable war material fell into the hands of the
conquerors.
From the beginning of the campaign in the north, the character
of the population exhibited quite a different aspect to that met
with by the Germans in the south and in the Yosges. Here there
was nothing of fanaticism to be observed; the people, well-to-do
and of a quiet temperament, looked with great dislike upon the
continuance of the war, feared an excess of the Franc -tireur
motion, and above all every revolutionary movement, and frequently
sought protection from the German military authorities against the
armed proletariats of their own country. The towns, for the most
part, were not sorry to see a German garrison; the troops were
met in a friendly manner, and the billetting and requisitions of
the Germans were tolerated, as the lighter of the unavoidable evils
of the war, because every thing was done in order.
ADVANCE UPON ROUEN.
On the 29th and 30th of November, detachments followed
the enemy in the direction of Arras and Lille, and at the same
time the march upon Rouen, where other French forces were to
be found, was also arranged. A detachment was left behind to guard
against the enemy who had retreated towards the north, the
367
railroads leading from the north, were also destroyed, for greater
security, and General von Mantenffel then moved off on the Ist
of December, towards the south-west, against Rouen.
The VIII. Army Corps formed the right wing and went by
Poix, Forges and Buchy, and the I. Army Corps, which had now
again brought up the greatest paii; of its troops from M^zi^res
and La- F^re, marched upon the left wing and took the direction
of Breteuil — Groumay.
The rearmost troops of the enemy retired rapidly, were
pursued, and on the 4th of December General von G5ben came
upon a French corps of observation between Forges and Buchy.
The VIII. Corps attacked immediately; the enemy only offered
a slight resistance, and was soon driven away from several posi-
tions, with severe loss, besides 400 prisoners. General von Gdben
still reached Rouen on the same day.
The I. Corps likewise advanced, driving before it the enemy's
detachments, which made but an indifferent stand.
On the 6th of December, Rouen was occupied by a strong
garrison; General von Manteuffel moved in, in the afternoon, and
then immediately arranged the march of a detachment upon
Dieppe. This seaport town was occupied on the 9th of December.
The result was considerable, The French forces were here
completely driven away, and retired towards Havre; the im-
portant town of Rouen, with above 100,000 inhabitants, and
Dieppe; of consequence as a harbour, were in German power.
The troops, wearied by forced marches and repeated engage-
ments, could now be allowed a little rest*
THE OFFENSIVE BY GENERAL FAIDHERBE.
On the 3rd of December General Faidherbe had taken com-
mand of the united French forces, in Lille, and in a few weeks
had brought them up to the strength of three Divisions, Lecointe's,
Paulze d'lvoy's and Houlac's, whose foiH^e, as represented by
358
Faidherbe, was 30,000 men and 60 guns. With this army he
again moved off towards the south.
He directed the Ist Division, Lecointe's, npon St. Quentin.
It recaptured Ham on the 10th of December , and there made
210 prisoners. He then appeared with his whole force, before
La Fh'e, on the 12th. As this little fortress could not be taken
without a siege, General Faidherbe turned towards Amiens, The
special task of the Frencli northern army was the relief of Paris;
therefore this march appears remarkable. It was to be expected
that Faidherbe would go south from La Fere ; still he might have
feared a flank attack by Manteuffel and therefore would content
himself with disturbing the enemy's operations upon Havre.
On the 20th of December he was on the Hallue, a tributary
of the Somme, with his army, and the sortie by the Parisians
against Le Bourget, on the 2 Ist of December, which has been
described at page 310, took place in connection with his offensive
movement.
General von Manteuffel, however, had received timely intelli-
gence of these movements, and quickly approached the threatened
Amiens with his disposable force, which, after the departure of
the necessary garrisons for Rouen, Dieppe and other places, still
cx>nsisted of the VIII. Army Corps, one brigade of the I. Army
Corps and the 3rd cavalry Division, altogether perhaps less than
20,000 men.
Even on the 20th a fight took place in the front. The
French stood in cantonments in the valley of the Hallne stream,
upon the right «bank of the Somme, towards the south, covered
by this river and the canal, as well as by extensive marshes, and
had occupied Corbie besides the villages in the Hallue valley.
In this position considerable reinforcements were drawn together,
which had been organized in Lille, and consequently formed a new
corps, so that the French Northern Army now numbered the 22nd
and 23rd Corps, altogether about 40,000 men with 78 guns.
The 22nd Corps, under General Lecointe, two Divisions and six
batteries, took the line along the Hallue, from Daours to Beau-
court i l^e 23rd Corps, under General Paulae dlvoy, held Corbie
and its environs with its 1st Division and five batteries, and had
859
stationed its 2nd Division, in a second line, in the villages to the
south-west of Albert
On the 20th, a Oennan reconnoitring detachment came straight
upon the French centre at Querrieux , and a small' but hot fight
ensued.
BATTLE ON THE HALLUE. 23rd OF DECEMBER.
On the 23rd of December, General Manteuffel advanced for
the regular attack.
The offensive of the German army was directed from Amiens
against the front of the French, who, in the last few days, had
strengthened the heights upon the left bank of the Hallue by
some entrenchments, and intended to offer an energetic resistance.
Their position was, in fact, very well chosen, for their left wing,
which the German side might have wished to surround, lay greatly
protected, and the right wing curving to the rear with the con-
formation of the chain of heights, rendered an encompassing
difficult here also.
The German troops attacked, as always, with great courage,
threw back the French advanced troops from the localities and
positions which they occupied upon the right bank of the Hallue,
and then went forward to storm the heights upon the left bank.
The combat revolved chiefly about Daours upon the German right
wing, and about PonUNoyelles in the centre; upon the German
left wing an attack was undertaken against Frechencourt, These
localities were successfully wrested from the French; yet at
Frechencourt, where the attack appears to have been made with
weaker forces, no particular further success was gained ; the French
maintained themselves on this wing.
According to Faidherbe's acoount, towards 4 o'clock in the
afternoon. General von Manteuffel had again lost so many of the
advantages which he had originally gained, that on the French
side an offensive movement could be thought of, and, indeed, the
Germans, although at this time still in possession of the left bank,
360 .
had been hard pressed in the centre^ and it was the intention^ on
the side of the French , to threaten the German left flank by
wheeling up the right wing. The execution of this, however, only
resulted in trifling success, as night soon put an end to the op^a-
tions, the only result gained being the re-capture of Pont-Noyelles
and Daours. During the night, it is true, the Germans took pos-
session of both places a^esh, and made some hundred prisoners
in them.
Faidherbe^s account, written altogether with a recognisable
object, is here, apparently, at a loss to improve tlpon the situation
of the French Army.
A German detailed account of the battle does not exist; this
much is certain, that both armies bivouacked upon the field of
battle, and that the French army, which only retired in the after-
noon of the following day, was not pursued. These facts are
sufficient to form a judgment upon the combat; the battle on the
Hallue was certainly, not a success to any great extent; it was
very similar to the battle of Amiens on the 27th of November;
the enemy was beaten, but he was not deprived of the power of
withdrawing upon his basis of operations, in order to return
again in a short time with fresh forces. That the French were
conquered is, however, not to be doubted, and to beat an enemy
doubly superior in numbers and in excell^t positions was quite
a distinguished feat for the German army and its general.
General Faidherbe estimates his loss at- 141 killed, 906
wounded, some hundred prisoners and 1000 dispersed. The German
loss amounted to 38 officers and 824 men in killed and wounded,
as well as 93 missing.
The French northern army retreated upon Arras and Douay.
On the 25th General von Manteufiel commenced the march in
pursuit ; he reached Albert on the same day, but from here, only
followed with single detachments, an.d only as far as B^paume.
He kept the main body of his force at Amiens, and sent out
corps ot observation from there, in all directions.
General Faidherbe moved into cantonments between Arras and
Douay, with his front towards the south.
On the 27th the investment of P^ronne was undertaken from
361
Amiens, where General Count von der Grdben commanded. This
fortress proved itself of special importance at the battle of
St. Quentin, which took place later; but even before, it was of
essential consequence for the passage over the Somme, and it Is
an indication of the spontaneous intelligence of the* Prussian sub-
altern officer, as well as of the important position which even the
lower officers were obliged to, or could assume, at times, in this
long protracted and widely extended war, that the conquest of
T^ronne was carried out on the plan and proposal of First
Lieutenant Schmidt, of the 11th siege artillery division, who was
artillery commander in the citadel of Amiens.
The conquest of Peronne (v. page 256) had such a quick
result, because Lieutenant Schmidt, upon his own responsibility,
«
had fitted out the requisite siege park with great rapidity, — a park
which consisted entirely of French material.
General von Senden was first charged with the siege, then
General von Barnekow, with ten battalions, eight squadrons and
54 field guns, whilst Generals von Kummer and Count von der
Gr6ben were pushed forwards toward Arras for their protection,
with, altogether twelve battalions, sixteen squadrons and 30 guns.
There were besides five battalions, twelve squadrons and 30 guns
left at the disposal of General von G5ben, who had the direction
of the whole operation.
Besides this greater undei-taking , the next few days brought
some smaller encounters.
On the 28th, a flying column of three companies and three
squadrons, under Lieutenant Colonel Pestel, came upon an ad-
vancing column of three battalions of Gardes Mobiles near Longpre^
which were beaten, and lost 10 officers and 230 men as prisoners.
On the 30th of December, Colonel Wittich with another flying
column took 5 officers and 170 men prisoners at Souchex between
Arras and Bethune.
On the 31st of December, five battalions from Rouen, where
General von Bentheim was in command, made an attack against
the enemy's forces which had shown themselves on the left bank
of the Seine. These were par^ scattered and partly thrown
362
back into the strong castle, Robert le Dtable, which was stormed
by the Germans.
Actions of greater importance did not take place nntil January.
ENGAGEMENTS AT BAPAUME ON THE 2nd AND 3rd OF JANUARY.
In the beginning of January 1871, it was found necessary on
the German side to take into consideration that General Bourbaki
had marched off from the Loire with an army of about 140,000
men, with 300 guns, towards the east, i^parently with the intention
of falling on the German forces at Dijon, of relieving Belfort, and
above all of making fhe investment of Paris impossible, by operations
in rear of the main army of the Germans.
To prevent this, General von Werder, who commanded at
Dijon, was principally counted upon ; still General von Manteuffel
was also called away from his command in the north, and received
the difficult and honourable charge of attacking the now eastern
army of the French, according to circumstances, with an army
which was being newly formed, at Chd.tlllon sur Seine, out of the
II. and Vn. Army Corps.
General von G8ben^ commanding the VIII. Corps, received
the chief command in the north, in place of General von Manteuffel,
whilst General von Bentheim took over the command of the I. Corps.
On the 1st of January^ General Faidherbe, again, took
the offensive , with the intention of relieving Peronne. He
marched upon Bapaume by four parallel roads. On the 2nd of
January, the 2nd Division of the 22nd Army Corps, at Achiet-le-
Grand to the north-west of Bapaume, and the 1st Division to the
north of it, at Sapignies, came upon Strubberg's Brigade, of the
15th Infantry Division, to which place it had been pushed forward;
and from midday until evening made vigorous attacks against it,
but were always repulsed.
According to General von Goben*s own account, the infantry
of the YIU. Army Corps had, at that time, been so weakened by
illness and hardships, that the battalions, on an average, moved
363
into the fight only 500 men in strength, some even as low as 350
and 400 strong. The five battalions of the 3rd reserve Division
now standing before P^ronne, whicli had arrived immediately before,
were alone in greater strength. Strubberg's Brigade, therefore, did
its work in a superior manner.
In the evening General von Enmmer had, in consequence of
this fight, concentrated his whole Division — estimated by General
von GOben, at the highest, at 5500 men with 400 horses and
24 guns — at Bapaume, and before the following morning, all the
troops that could be disposed of were directed there by the corps
commanders, so that on the 3rd of December a detachment of
3 battalions, 8 squadrons and 24 guns, under Prince Albert of
Prussia, and another of five battalions with 24 guns, were ready
at the immediate disposition of General von Gdben, for the support
of the 15th Division. To the latter Division 12 guns were
assigned in addition.
Early in the morning General Faidherbe proceeded to the
attack. He succeeded in taking the villages to the north of
Bapaume, which were only weakly occupied; his repeated attacks,
however^ against the main position at Bapaume were completely
repulsed, and his attempts at surrounding were also wrecked by
the advance of the detachments brought up to assist General
Kummer.
The French army found itself compelled to commence its
retreat upon Arras early on the 4th of January, whilst General von
G5ben, on account of scarcity of ammunition, had even given the
order to evacuate the Bapaume position.
The loss of the French amounted to 53 officers and 2056 men,
besides 800 missing; the loss of the Germans to 47 officers and
996 men.
The German cavalry pursued for some miles, scattering singlt
battalions which were covering the retreat; but then the German
troops also retired, for in their weak numbers, they could not
have the object of moving forward against the fortresses of the Borth,
364
General von Benikehn, at the same time, conducted an ex-
pedition against the French General Roye, npon the left bank of
the Seine. He fell npon this corps on the 4th of January, scattered
it, and took 3 colours, 2 guns and about 500 prisoners.
BATTLE OF ST. QUENTIN. 19th OF JANUARY.
In January the German I. Army was distributed over a very
wide extent of country, at Rouen, to the south of this town, and
as far as the sea, also at Amiens and Peronne. The distribution
of the French Corps necessitated this extended radius of ob-
servation and occupation. Upon this General Faidherbe, formed
the plan of altering his station towards the east, and thus of being
able to execute a diversion in rear <rf the enemy.
He, designedly, caused the news to be spread that it was
his intention to advance upon Amiens, and, in the meanwhile, he
marched upon St. Quentin, in the middle of the month, with 40,000
men and 70 guns, but weak in cavalry.
General von Gdben, however, did not allow himself to be
deceived by the telegrams from Brussels, announcing Faidherbe*s
presence at Arras. His reconnaissances kept feeling with the French
Army, and in consequence of the reports brought to him by the
eavalry, he moved off, on tlie 18th of January, with all the troops
he could bring together, the whole of the VIII. Corps, part of
the I. Corps and the 3rd Cavalry Division, fi'om Amiens towards
St. Quentin, making use of the railroad. On this day he reached
Nesle. Peronne, having fallen on the 10th of January, was in
German hands, and secured the left flank.
General Faidherbe had caused the town of St, Quentin,
situated on both banks of the Somme, an important point of support
and a considerable railway station, to be occupied by his advanced
guard on the 15th, and, after the weak German garrison had
withdrawn, he moved in with his main body on the 17th, and
then took up a position upon the heights to the south of the
town. As early as the 18th, a collision took place with the German
365
advanced guard, under General von Memerty, in which the French
were defeated. On the 19M of January a decisive battle was
fought^ in which, besides the troops mentioned, Count Lippe's
Saxon Cavalry Division with the 12th Jager battalion and two
horse batteries, from La F^re, were able to take part, so that
the German strength, altogether, was 39 battalions, 53 squadrons
and 162 guns. General von G5ben, on the morning of the 19th,
directed the 15th Division, in the centre, upon Savy; Count
Grfiben's Cavalry Division with part of the I. Corps, upon the left
wing, for a surromiding, upon Marteville ; the 16th Infantry Division,
upon the right wing, by Seraucourt upon St. Quentin ; and finally,
the combined detachment from La F^re to make a surrounding
movement against this town upon the extreme right flank.
A reserve consisting of four battalions and regiment of cavalry
followed, with the commanding General's Staff, upon the road
Douchy — St. Quentin.
The 16th Division was first engaged. The enemy stood facing
it, in a strong position, between the villages of Grugis and Neu-
lUle St. Amanda which was obstinately defended. The last
village and Gauchy were occupied by the 1st Division of the
22nd French Corps, and the former and Castres by the 2nd Division.
Soon after the combat had arisen here, the 15th Division
also commenced the attack upon a portion of the French 23rd Corps,
at Javy. In the centre of the French position, the rising ground
with the windmill Tout-Venty General Faidherbe's point of view,
was also occupied by the 23rd Corps. The separation of the two
Corps by the canal de Crozal, so that they were unable to render
each other mutual support except by a circuit through the town,
proved disadvantageous for the French. The village of Castres
was soon evacuated by the 22nd Corps; at Gfmgis and Neuville
the fighting was hotter. At last, however, when the 16th division,
with the assistance of part of the reserves, had taken both these
villages after a contest of many hours, and amid great losses,
whilst upon both flanks the surrounding had come into effect, the
whole French tine was forced hack from its original position^
and constrained to occupy a second line, lying further back. The
undulating ground here favoured the French in a high degi'ce.
366
WhilBt the Oeiman colmnnB were following, Faidherbe, at 2 o'clock
p. m. y attempted an offenBive moyement. He made the 22nd Corps
advance with a strong force of artillery. The attack , however,
was without sncceBB, for the 23rd Corps was unable to render it
proper support, and at 4 o'clock, the whole French Army was in
full retreat, which, under the efficacious fire of the Gei'man batteries,
and the numerous pursuing cavalry, degenerated at 7 o'clock in
the evening into a rapid flight upon Cambrai and Guise. Here
9000 prisoners and 6 guns fell into the hands of the victors, and
in St. Quentin, which was occupied in the evening, after being
defended for a short time, 3000 wounded were found.
The German loss amounted to 94 officers and 3369 men.
The victory was dearly bought, but it was decisive, in a high
degree. The French Northern Army^ which, for two months,
had accomplished great things under its indefatigable and
energetic leader, was nearly destroyed, and need no longer
be of consideration in the further course of the war.
Thus the second army, which had be^n organized for the
relief of Paris, was also completely conquered, and its ovei*thr4t^
had a considerable share in the capitulation of the capital, and
in the conclusion of the armistice.
General von Gdben, in pursuit of the army which continually
became more broken up, moved in front of the fortress of Cambrai,
and caused it to be bombarded ; the armistice, however, which had
been concluded in the meantime, put an end to the military under-
takings in the north, and brought back the German Northern Army
over the line of demarcation.
i
:i
,..■*!'
.ij;
r of ihe SOUTHEASTl
TWELFTH CHAPTER.
The Operations of the South-Eastebk Abmies and the
Fall of Belfobt.
(y. the map of the south-eastern theatre of war.)
The operations in the sonth-eaBtern theatre of war, which
were carried on by the Germans in the departments of the
Vosges, Haute Marne, Cote d'Or, Haute Sa6ne, Poubs and Jura,
after the fall of the fortress of Strasburg until the fall of the
fortress of Belfort, may be divided into three sections according
to their different objects. In the first place, the French irregular
forces had to be driven away from that neighbourhood, and thus
to secure the chief road of communication between Germany and
Paris, the Strasburg-Toul-Lagny railway; secondly, Belfort had
to be conquered; and lastly, in the final stage of the war, the
powerful advance of the French Eastern Army, which threatened
to relieve Belfort and to lead on to an invasion of Baden, had to
be repelled.
The aim on the side of the French was to interrupt and
disturb the German undertakings by petty warfare. Belfort was
very well and very perseveringly defended ; there was, however,
no serious defence of the country by large masses. It was not
until January 1871, that the Eastern Army began great ope-
rations.
The peculiar foimation of the ground in this part of the
theatre of war, and its situation with respect to the rest of the
operations in the field, traced out the kind of military undertakings
and explains their objects.
368
From the high land of Auvergne, inferior chains of hills
extend towards the north, uniting with the Vosges by the Sichel-
bergcy and dividing the Rhone country from that of the Seine and
Meuse. They form two main sections, the Plateau of Langres in
the north, and the wine renowned series of hills of the Cdle (FOr,
in the south, and terminate the extended cincture of mountains
surrounding, on all sides, the table-land of Burgundy through
which flow tlie rivers Saone, Oignon, Doubs, to the Rlione stream,
which receives them. The occupation of this mountainous section
of country, so very favourable for petty warfare, was essential
for the security of the lines from Strasburg to Paris as well as
the Metz-Troyes-Orleans line. Prince Frederick Charles's road to
the Loire.
Then again, that remarkable and historically renowned inden-
tation which divides the southern slope of the Vosges from the
Jura mountains, rising perpendicularly on the other side, leads
down from the table-land of Burgundy, through Franche-Comte,
and forms a wonderfully, clearly defined, road from France to
Southern Gennany. This ^^Burgundian gate^', which France keeps
locked with two powerful bolts, Belfort in the first line and Be-
san9on in the second, gained importance, in a high degree, from
General Bourbaki's march in January 1871.
GENERAL von WERDER'S ADVANCE IN OCTOBER 1870.
On the 30th of September , the . King , then in Ferrieres,
issued orders for the formation of the XIV. Army Corps under
the command of General von ff^erder, who had just taken Stras-
burg. This Army Corps was to consist of the Baden Division
and another Division, which was formed of a combined Infantry
Brigade of the Line under Major General Krug, later von der
Goltz (30th and 34th Infantry Regiments), and the 1st combined
Landwehr Brigade under Colonel von Buddenbrock (Landwehr Re-
giments Nos. 14, 21 and 54) as well as two reserve Cavalry
Regiments. It was to force the Vosges and scatter the masses of
369
French troops, forming to the south of them, in the Cote d'Or.
Tlie order arrived in Strasburg on the 4 th of October.
Previously, on the Ist of, October, General von Werder,
having received information tliat the numerous bodies of volun-
teers, between St. Di^, Baccarat and Rambervillers, supported by
Gardes Mobiles, were assuming a military formation, had sent out
a flying column of Baden troops, composed of six battalions , two-
and-a-quarter squadrons and two batteries, under Major General
iwn Degenfeldy towards the Vosges with a similar charge. Tlie
flying column mai'ched, in three divisions, upon Schirmeck and
tlirough the Viller valley, everywhere found the roads entrenched
and barricaded, but only once, on the 4th of October, encountered
the enemy, at Champenay, and then concentrated, on the 5th of
October, at Raon FEtape^ a small town (m the Meurthe, which
was. occupied by Francs-tireurs.
These were scattered after a short fire-fight, and suffered very
gi*eat losses.
On this day General von Degenfeld received orders from
Strasburg, to consider his column as the advanced guard of the,
now newly formed, XIV. Corps, whicli was set in movement upon
Raon TEtape, Etival and St. Di^. The last place was to be occu-
pied, and reconnaissances were to be made to the west and sontli.
Accordingly, on the 6th of October, lie started upon the march
for St. Die, with the greater part of his troops; he was however
so .vigorously attacked on the right flank, at Etival j from Bruyeres
and Rambervillers, that he was unable tp reach the town, but had
to content himself with the repulse of the enemy, about 12,000
men in strength, consisting of line regiments de marche and Gardes
Mobiles. The fight lasted seven hours, and led to a loss on the
Baden side of 22 officers and 382 men; on the French side, of
1400 men, as well as of 582 un wounded men and 6 officers, as
prisoners.
On the 7th of October, General von Degenfeld remained
stationary to the south of Etival, in order to cover the columns
of the XIV. Corps, now debouching from the mountain passes,
into the valley of the Meurthe; St. Die, also, was occupied by
the leading troops of the eclaireurs.
24
370
On the 8th of October, strong columns of the Baden Division
debouched at Etival and St. Di6, and established the junction.
For the moment, General von Warder had only the Baden
field Division and a combined Prussian Brigade disposable for his
undertakings towards the west and south, as the remainder were
required to garrison Strasburg and the rest of Alsace. These
troops, were at Raon TEtape on the 9th of October, after accom-
plishing the passage, of tlie Vosges, and on the two following days
commenced the march upon Epinal, in four columns. On the
evening of the 9th, a reconnaissance had already led to a fight at
Rambervillers \ on the 10th, there was a small conflict at ^noi^M,
and on the 11th, at Brouvelliei^s. On the 12th, the enemy
attempted to take up a position at Epinal, but was driven away
by artillery fire.
On the 12th of October, General von fVerder removed
his head-quarters to 'Epinal^ and made reconnaissances towards
the west and south. It turned out that the enemy had marched
ofl^ upon Vesoul.
In consequence of this, from tlie 15th to the 18th of October,
the Corps moved towards Vesoul, by Xertigny and St. Loup, found
the communications everywhere interrupted, the railroads and via-
ducts destroyed and blown up, but met with no encounter as the
enemy had gone further back upon Bel fort and Besangon. In
the latter fortress, the head-quarters of General Cambtnelsj the
Chief Commander of the French forces in the east, it was learnt
that Garibaldi had also an'ived but had again departed to organize
a volunteer army in Dijon.
General von fVerder established his head - quarters in
Vesoul on the 20th. and 21st of October, and on the 22nd
commenced his movement against Besan9on, correctly anticipating,
that he would find some of the enemy's forces in the neighbour-
hood of this strong fortress.
The advance against the Oignon river was so arranged that
the 1st Baden Brigade, Prince William's, forming the right wing,
marched from Frasne-le-Chateau upon Pin, by Autorelle; the 2nd
Baden Brigade, Major General von Degenfeld's, in the centre, from
Fretigny upon Etuz and Cussey, by Oiselay; and the 3rd Baden
371
Brigade, Major General von Keller, upon the left wing, on Voray,
by Rioz. The Prussian Brigade followed, in the centre, as a re-
serve, under General Knig. Finally, Major General von Laroche
had been given the mission on this day, of reaching the country
of Dole and Auxonne, and of destroying the railroads there ; he had
eight squadrons, a horse battery and two companies of infantry
in waggons, under his command. In order to secure the connec-
tion, Vesoul remained occupied by two battalions and some cavalry;
the country was also investigated from Port-sur-Saone to the west
and soutli.
FIGHT ON THE OIGNON. 22nd OF OCTOBER.
The passage of the strongly swollen river had now to be
taken in hand, the crossing of whicli it was anticipated would be
defended, even on this side.
In fact at* 11 o'clock a.m., reports already came in to Ge-
neral von Werder, in Oiselay, that the left wing had come upon
the enemy to the sontli of RioZy and was driving liim before it;
that the centre had found Etus and Cussey strongly occupied,
and that the advanced guard of tlie right wing, only, had found
the passage free at Pin,
The order was now given for the centre, Degenfeld's Brigade,
to carry on a detaining fight against the positions lying in front,
until Prince William, informed of the situation of affairs, Kad
crossed the river, and could take the enemy, in rear, at Cussey,
on tlie left bank. General Keller was to advance steadily.
General von Degenfeld, consequently, attacked Elux^ but drove
the enemy out of it quicker than was calculated upon, so that he
was able to proceed to the attack of Cussey before the right
wing came up.
The village, lying on the other bank, and rising in the form
of terraces, offered considerable advantages for the defence; never-
theless the 2nd Brigade succeeded in taking the position quite
alone. The artillery bombarded the village from two points, and
84*
372
the infantry then rushed to the asganlt, over a stone bridge which
was there. Two chefs de bataillon of the enemy, eleven ofQcers
and 200 men were taken prisoners, and great losses in killed
and wounded were inflicted on the French.
The pursuit however, led to a further continuation of the
fight. The cavalry met with resistance in the direction of Auacon-
DeBsus\ and upon the heights at Chdtillon-le-Duc^ strong masses
of the enemy showed themselves, who also brought artillery into
action. The resistance, however, could not last long, for upon
the left wing. General von Keller's advanced guard was already
in Voray, and upon the right wing, the heads of Prince William's
Brigade had reached Auxon-Dessus. Against the last place, two
battalions and three batteries were pushed forward from Cussey,
two battalions moved against Chatillon-le-Duc, by Geneuille, and
one battalion for their support towards Geneuille. Thus the enemy
was soon defeated with con^derable losses, and Auxon-Dessus was
occupied as darkness was setting in.
The losses of the Germans amounted to 3 officers and
96 men.
THE MARCH UPON GRAY.
To attack the fortress of BesauQon was not in General von
W«rder*s power, nor did it lie in his mission. The enemy's
forces were, here, beaten and scattered; it consequently appe^ed
expedient to turn to the dpot where it was presumed, that Gari-
baldi formed a nucleus for the Francs-tireurs.
The march was, therefore, first directed upon Gray^ impor-
tant as a railroad-junction; from there it would lead upon Dijon.
On the 24th of October, the Army Corps was united in the former
town, and for some days, flying columns were sent out from
here, all round, to scatter bands of the enemy. Small fights took
place on the 27th of October, between the German troops and
the Francs-tireurs and armed peasants^ at three different places,
373
St. Seine tEglise^ Beneve and in the immediate neighbourhood
of Gray,
On the 28th, General von Werder, formed up his troops
along the Virgeanne, a tributary stream of the Sadne ; pushed for-
ward Prince William's Brigade towards Mirebeau, and intended to
move towards Dijon on the 29th.
This plan was, however, crossed by a command from the
King's Head -Quarters directing the XIV. Army Corps to hold
Gray for the purpose of commanding the plateau of LangreSy
in order that Prince Frederick Charles should not be troubled
by an enemy on his left flank, during his march from Metz, by
Troyes, to the Loire.
General von Werder returned, with the greater part of his
force to Gray, but made the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, under com-
mand of Lieutenant General von Beyer, continue the advance upon
Dijon y in order to occupy this important town, which, accord-
ing to the reports of the advanced guard, was denuded of
troops.
The whole country, in a wide circuit, was most insecure;
the population was stirred up by the government, by the chiefs
of the volunteer bands and by the priests, which latter tried to
kindle a religious warfare; the mountainous country favoured the
assembly and escape of the lawless bands; thus the German
bodies of troops were forced into marching to and fro continually,
and to almost daily conflicts; here also, more than elsewhere,
executions by martial law and other means of terror were em-
ployed against that part of the population who, contrary to all the
laws of war, appeared today as armed men and the next day as
citizens or peasants, but always with inimical designs.
General von Werder found himself compelled to march back
again from Gray to Vesoul, for new enemies had appeared in his
rear; meanwhile a contest had taken place at Dijon, in an un-
expected manner.
374
OCCUPATION OF DUON.
Prince William* b Brigade, which left Mirebean on the 30th of
October, met with resistance on the march to Dijon, and although
inconsiderable at first, it became every hour more vehement, and
culminated in an obstinate defence of the suburb of St. ApoUinaire.
At the approach of the Geimans, line battalions de marche and
Gardes Mobiles had, by the desire of some of the inhabitants of
Dijon, been Vought together at the last moment, out of the entire
neighbourhood for the defence of the town, which, although an
open one, was still well calculated for resistance. The commandant
of these troops , Colonel Fauconay, occupied the wall - enclosed
vineyard hills of the suburbs, as well as the ancient rampart with
its wet ditches, and only bridge -like approaches to the town.
The fight was very hot. Keller's Brigade not having yet
come up, and Prince William's Brigade not having completely con-
centrated, General von Beyer opened a preliminary fire of
artillery with 36 guns, so that several conflagrations had broken
out in the town in the evening. The fire was now stopped, while
both brigades stood ready, the 2nd upon the right wing near
St. Apollinaire, and the 3rd upon the left wing, to be able to commence
the assault on the following morning, or again to take up the
cannonade. But, even before break of day, a deputation fi*om the
town appeared, who ofiered the eapitulation of the city, and
declared that Dijon was evacuated by the French troops.
The loss of the Baden troops amounted to 32 killed and 213
wounded; that of the French to 160 killed and about 300 wounded.
Dijon was occupied an the -Zlst of October.
The siege operations in Alsace stand in connection with the
operations in the open field. As has been already related (Chapter IX),
the 4th Reserve Division, consisting of the 25th Infantry Regiment
of the Line, and the combined east Prussian Landwehr Regiments
Nos. 1, 2 and 3, and two reserve Cavalry Regiments, moved into
Alsace in October, under command of Major General von Schmeling,
had brought Schlettstadt to capitulate on the 24th, and had then
moved before Neu - Breisack. This last fortress fell on the lOth
376
of November. In October another detachment of Prussian Land-
wehr had been formed, likewise in the Grand Duchy of Baden,
consisting of one battalion from each of the Landwehr Regiments
10th and 84th, and two battalions from each of the Landwehr
Regiments, 7th, 47th and 51st, as well as two squadrons, under
the command of General^i^on DebsehUtz. These moved into
Alsace in the end of October, and there took up the duties of
General von Tresckow's Ist Pomeranian Landwehr Division. The
latter was now able to proceed towards the south, and on the
3rd of November, commenced also the attack of the fortress of
Belfort by a preliminary investment. After the fall of Neu-
Breisach, von Schmeling^s Division undeiiiook, on their part, the
security of the Etappen roads in the departments of the Vosges
and Haute -Saone, and thereby enabled General von Werder to
concentrate his troops of the Line for further enterprises of an
offensive nature, without having again to feai* a disturbance in
his rear.
Prince Frederick Charles's advance towards Orleans had been
secured from interruption with complete success, by the XIV. Army
Corps, from the plateau of Langres.
GENERAL VON HERDER'S ADVANCE UPON AUXONNE AND DIJON
IN NOVEMBER.
AuxonnCy a fortified place with a citadel, situated on the
Sadne, was, like Be6an9on, a- rendez-vous for the ever newly
rising bands of Francs - tireurs and foreign adventurers, who
followed Garibaldi's flag. General von Werder therefore wished,
by an operation upon Auxonne, to attempt to bring the enemy to
stand and fight, in the same way as he had succeeded at Besangon.
It did not, however, come to this. No enemy showed himself in
the open field, and, being deficient in siege guns. General von
Werder could not attempt the attack of the small, strongly occu.
pied fortress ; it might also be expected, that in the neighbourhood
376
of Dijon, if not here, a blow could be stnick with decisive
effect.
"Garibaldi was, according to the latest news, at Dijon. This
well-known, bold and fantastic Italian had come to France with
designs, which probably have completely destroyed his political
fame for ever, just as his military renown has been completely
annihilated by the very inconsiderable part which he played in
the campaign; and had attracted among his adherents, persons
whose presence prove that the old free -hooter had entirely lost
both his knowledge of mankind, as well as the mastery over the
elements led by him*). It was also a disgraceful undertaking on
his part, to take the field against the sons of a country with which
his own land was living in peace.
For all that, however, the ackaowledgment is due to him,
as well as to his sons and to some of his friends, that in the
field itself, in battle, and in thfeir treatment of German prisouei-s
and wounded men, they behaved chivalrously and knew how to
respect the enemy and the honour of their own names, better
than did many of the French generals and officers. It also will
not be forgotten that Riccioiti Garibaldi gave back the colour
of the 2nd battalion of the 8th Pomeranian Infantry Regiment
No. 61, which had fallen into his hands on the 23rd of January,
by an unlucky accident — the only colour of the whole German
army which was lost — j in just recognition of his brave enemy,
as it had not been taken in combat. *
Garibaldi's force has been reckoned, in the estimates appearing
in the "Riforma" at Florence, upon secure grounds, as follows:
.*) Colonel Riistow, in his interesting work *'Der Krieg unj, die Rhein-
grenze 1870 — 71", says: *'At the end of the year 1870 the troops of the
Italian southern army were reckoned, by the pay-office authorities, at
70,000 men, including about '2000 generals and colonels. Upon the battle
fields, however, no more than 15,000 men were ever seen, even in the times
of the greatest danger, and among them, perhaps, hardly more than
15 generals and colonels". Here , as in almost every respect, this excellent
military author has been very well informed. The detailed estimates, since
published in the ,,Rifornia", confirm his calculation.
377
Ist Brigade (Bossak ^ Hauke). . . 4001 men,
2nd Brigade (Delpech) .... 2088 „
3rd Brigade (Menotti Garibaldi) . 5560 „
4tb Brigade (Ricciotti Garibaldi) . 1157 „
Artillery .* 571 „
Cavalry 520 „
Isolated Volunteer Corps .... 1585 „
Various branches 1985 „
Total 17,467 men.
The town of Dijon had, without doubt, been occupied by
Garibaldi's bands, shortly after the Baden troops had left it in
order to march against Auxonne, in conjunction with the remaining
portions of the XIV. Corps.
When, however, General von Werder again turned against
Dijon, in the middle of November, the Garibaldians retired towards
the south-west, without a contest.
General von Werder established his head -quarters in Dijon,
sent out flying columns from here on all sides, Jbut at the same
time made Keller's Brigade continue the march by Nuils upon
Auiun, A small fight occurred on this march, at NuitSy on the
30th of November.
Keller's Brigade described a wide circuit in marching fi*om
Nuits to Autuu (1st of December), from there again to Beaune,
and thence towards the north.
Langres, a fortified place with a strong gamson, was watched
by the Pinissian Infauti'y Brigade, now under the command of
Major General von der Goltz. On the 16th of December, an
engagement took place at LongeaUy between this brigade and a
force of the enemy of about 6000 men, in which the French
were beaten.
Another encounter took place at Chdtillon^sur-Seine. There,
Unna's Landwehr battalion and two squadrons of the 5th reserve
Hussar Regiment, were attacked, on the 19th of November by
bands of volunteers, and were obliged to retire npon Chatean-Vilain,
with the loss of 120 men and 70 horses.
A combat also occurred at Dijon itself, for Garibaldi's troops
suddenly emerged to the north-west of the town. At night -fall
378
«
on the 26th of November, the oat-posts of a reconnoitring detach-
ment were attacked from Pasques, and, after receiving support,
repulsed the enemy. The following day General von Werder
himself advanced with three brigades, and through going round
by Plombi^res, reached the rear guard of the enemy at Pasqnes,
already in full retreat. A fight took place which soon converted
the retreat of Garibaldi's troops into a flight. The latter suffered
a loss of from 300 to 400 men ; the loss of the Germans amounted
to about 50 men, both days inclusive.
The next serious encounter with the moveable enemy, who
was so difficult to catch, did not take place until after the middle
of December, when already a large accumulation of troops in the
east seemed to wish to announce Bourbaki's powerful advance
beforehand.
Besides Garibaldi, a mass of about 15,000 men. Gardes
Mobiles and Francs-tireurs — called the Armee du Rhdne — had
collected more to the south, under the French officer, Cremer,
formerly a captajp on the Staff, who had given his word of honour
at Metz, on the 31st of October, not to fight against Germany
again as long as the war lasted, but now, having broken his word
of honour, he officiated as a General.
THE FIGHT OF NUITS.
The reports which came into Dijon in th^ middle of December,
confirmed the advance of the above mentioned anny from Beaune
towards the north. This movement was, probably, in connection
with Bourbaki's intended approach, and had the object of covering
the transport of the eastern army, commencing soon after by the
railroads from Bourges, Nevers and Lyons upon Besangon, and then
of securing the flank and rear for further operations, by a position
at Dijon, in conjunction with Garibaldi. In consequence of this.
General von Werder found himself obliged to send off the Baden
Division, now under the command of General von Gltmer^ towards
379
the Boath^ in order to throw back the enemy from his position at
Nuits.
General von Glfimer moved off on the 18th of December,
leading the main body himself, consisting of eight battalions, six
squadrons and five batteries, by Longwie and Epernay, against the
enemy's right wing; whilst, on his right, two small detachments
pressed forward against Villars - Fontaine , by Urcy and Temant,
and from Courcelles against GoncoBur, by GhamboBuf.
Rifle skirmishes began with the leading troops, even at Fenay,
but the mai*ch went on without delay, merely detaching numerous
parties, and closely searching the hilly, intersected country.
It was at Boncourt that an obstinate combat with the ad-
vanced guard first took place, which ended at 12.45 o'clock p.m.
with the capture of this locality and the piece of wood lying to
the north-west of It.
The advanced guard then took up a position in the line La
Berchfere - Agencourt, and discovered from here that the enemy had
very considerable forces for disposal at Nuits, and that columns were
on the march from Vougeot and Beaiine.
Gremer, having become aware of the danger to which his
right wing was exposed, here drew together his main force. The
French artillery was very advantageously placed upon the heights
to the west of Nuits, from where they could command the free
and open field of attack of the Germans.
On the German side, no action of the columns on the right
could yet be observed.
Towards 1 o'clock, the Baden troops were formed for the
attack, their ai*tillery tiled to shake the columns which were visible
opposite, and at the same time fired from the bridge, across the
Meuzin brook, upon the strongly occupied railway cutting as far
as to the Fontaine de Vosne. The cavalry was sent forward upon
the extreme left flank.
After the disposition for battle had been completed, the
infantry attack against the railway cutting was carried out ; General
von Gltlmer, as well as General von Werder himself, joined in
this hazardous undertaking. The troops could only advance amid
380
Hevere losses in the entirely open country, and under the fearfully
rapid fire of the enemy; — the Division commander as well as
Prince William were wounded, and Colonel von Renz, who suc-
ceeded to the command* was killed with his aide-de-camp — ,
nevertheless at 3.30 o'clock, the eastern side of the railway cutting
was stormed, with extraordinary courage. The artillery had also
gained ground, by degi-ees, in a self-sacrificing manner, as in so
doing they drew upon themselves the cannon fire of the enemy.
Likewise, after taking the railway cutting, connection was again
found with the nearest flanking detachment on the right; but upon
the left wing, the cavalry who had to cross the Meuzin brook,
was obliged to retire again, under- the hot infantry fire of the
enemy, to the heights of Agencourt. Cremer's troops were armed,
throughout, with Spencer and Chassepot rifles.
The town of Nuits itself had now still to be taken.
Supported by the artillery, of which PorbecR's and Holty's
batteries, amongst others, distinguished themselves by making a
brilliant advance, the infantry went forward, from the railway
cutting, against Nuits, gained the outskirts, stoimed one street
after another under an obstinate resistance, and at 4.30 o'clock,
when it was getting daA, had repulsed the enemy from all his
positions and driven him, in full flight, before it.
The losses of the enemy were considerable, above 2000 men
in killed and wounded, and 16 officers and 700 men as prisoners.
On the German side the loss amounted to 934 men, including
54 officers.
A report from the column on the extreme right flank only
arrived in the night. It had come upon the enemy in a very
strong, favourable position at VillarSj had been unable to defeat
him, and had returned by Chamboeuf to Perigny.
As it was not the intention to pursue the totally dispersed
enemy any further towards the south, the Baden Division re-
turned to Dijon on the following afternoon, the 19th of December.
redvANicm
381
THE INVESTMENT AND BOMBARDMENT OF THE FORTRESS OF
BELFORT.
(v. the map of the Siege of Belfort.)
Tresckow's Landwehr Division had, as already mentioned,
received the charge of, at first, investing the fortress of Belfort.
After several small fights at Les Errues, Rougemoni and Petit-
Magny, the Division succeeded, on the 3rd of November in ap-
proaching so near to the fortress, that a gradual blockade could
be commenced.
Even the first steps towards the investment were attended
with great difficulties, and the complete investment and finally the
siege formed one of the most arduous tasks of the whole war.
The position of the place is unusually favoured by nature, both
as regards the capabilities for defence of the fortress and the
forts themselves, and also as regards the country, which, in a wide
circumference, oflFers every possible obstacle to the approach of
an enemy.
Every spectator, even from afar, must be imbued with a sense
of the great power of resistance of this high rock fortress, with
its grand outlines, rising aloft from its cleft -divided, richly wooded
surroundings.
The fortress forms a pentagon, the regularity of which is
interrupted by the protruding citadel in the south-eastern angle,
and by a powerful horn-work upon the north front. High tower
redoubts, rise on all fronts like the citadel. The latter has two
bombproof barracks, three circumvallations furnished with flank
casemates, hollow traverses and redoubts in the covered way,
and its ditches are all excavated from the rock.
The base of the conical rock, upon which Belfort lies, is
washed by the river Savoureusej which winds through the valley
with numerous by-streams and tributaries. To the north-east of
the fortress, upon the I'ocky chain of heights whose buttresses fall
steeply do^Hi to the Savoureuse, rise the forts of La Miotte and
La Justice y which are connected, by fortified lines, with Belfort
and with one another, and in this manner form an entrenched
camp (camp relranchi permanent du vallan).
382
Both forts are of considerable sti*eiigth.
There are also two forts lying in the west, des Barres and
Bellevue. The first, originating from the year 1867 and built
in view of the meditated war against Prussia, takes the form of a
crown-work and is provided with several covered places ; it covers
the Faubourg des Anc^tres and the Faubourg de France ; the latter
fort, to the south of the Faubourg de France, is very irregular
and is not of the same importance as the other forts.
In the south and east there are still the Forts Hautes-Perchcs
and Basses- Perches J 2500 paces from the enceinte, which have
already been alluded to in the relation of the retreat of the French
corps, after the battle of Woerth (page 83). At that time the
troops of the 7th Corps were occupied in completing the earth
works of these forts and also of Fort de la Ferme. Both Perches
are built in the form of lunettes and crown a ridge of hills 400
feet high. They were quite new, and the present commandant,
Colonel Denfertj had neglected nothing in order to place them in
a condition . capable of defence.
Belfort thus forms a great mountainous entrenchment, which
is fortified, throughout, in the strongest manner, and is sufficiently
large to receive an army of 30,000 men. Added to this, the sur-
rounding villages, the woods, and the hills are all very easy of
defence in connection with the fortress.
A regular attack, approaching the enceinte by means of
trenches, is nearly impossible, the only expedient is to combine
the regular attack and the bombardment, with the object of laying
a breach from a distance. That too is associated with infinite
trouble. The complete investment, however, must be preceded
by the conquest of the ground in front.
In order to attain this, Tresckow's Division had to accomplish
extraordinary things. Belfort was defended by an energetic, ca-
pable officer with above 12,000 men.
At first the strong castle of Montbeliard (Mumpeigard), came
into question, situated in the proximity of the forti'ess, only
3 (about 14 English miles) miles distant, a junction for several
roads, at the confluence of the Allaine, the Savoureuse and the
383
Lisaine, as well as of the Rhine-RhOne canal, and a point for the
besiegers to obtain at all risks.
On the 9th of November the Germans succeeded in occupying
the castle, and now, in fourteen days fighting. General von Tresckow
gained so much ground round Belfort that the investment was ^flPec-
tually completed. After the occupation of Montb^liard, the German
outposts were, at first, at Bourogne, half way between Delle and
Belfort, then by degrees, first Sermamagny, in the north, was occu-
pied, and from here Valdoie; Cravanche, OflFemont and Vetringe
were taken, and on the 23rd of November, after all the positions
previously captured had been fortified and secured, the line of
investment round Belfort was closed, running nearly by the vil-
lages of Bavilliers, Chevremont, P6rouse and Cravanche. The
Head-Quarters were removed, this day, from La Chapelle to Fon-
taine. Continual sorties and constantly recurring fights round the
important village of BaviUiers^ had retarded, thus long, the ac-
complishment of the investment.
The most important of these fights Were: on the 16th of
November, a sortie by three battalions and six guns, from the
fortress against Bessoncourt] then on the 23rd of November, another
similar sortie, which ended in the Germans taking possession of
important positions, near the fortress. In the first combat, the
French suflfered the loss of 200 killed and wounded, and 58
prisoners.
In the beginning of December, the construction of batteries
and excavation of trenches was commenced, the completion of
which the besieged endeavoured to prevent by a vigorous fire from
about 70 guns.
Tresckow* s Division was reinforced by Prussian and Wurtem-
berg siege artillery for can*ying out the proper siege and bom-
bardment. In spite of the enemy's fire and the rocky ground,
the German pioneers succeeded in finishing a series of trenches
and embankments, in the night of the 2nd of December, in front
of the village of Essert, which may be called the first parallel.
In the irregular line mentioned, the batteries No. 1 to No. 6 were
erected and equipped (v. the map), so that on the morning of the
Srd of December J fire was opened from 28 gunsj against the
384
Forts des Barres and Bellevue, as well as against the citadel
itself.
The defenders replied with great energy, and obliged the
assailants to withdraw some of the less favonrably posted guns.
Most of the guns, however, held out, and brought into account
the superiority of the Prussian artillery material, in its accustomed
brilliant manner, so that, by the 9th of December, under the con-
stantly maintained efficacy of the rifled guns, paii; of the town
had been burnt down, and the works of the forts were considerably
injured. However the forts, especially Bellevue, also gained suc-
cesses against the villages of Essert and, particularly, BavillierB,
up to which the parallel had, by degrees, been opened, and
furnished with batteries Nos. 10 to 12.
On the 1 1th, the garrison attempted a sortie against the bat-
teries, which was, however, repulsed. The bombardment was now
also undertaken from the south-east, east and north, and then, in
January, although Bourbaki's approach w^ already in prospect,
preliminaries were made for the regular attack agaiiut the Forts
Basses-Perches and Haiiies- Perches , from DanjoutiUj amid un-
precedented difficulties. To this end, the village of Danjoutin had
first to be taken, with hard fighting, in the night of the 7th of
January; thus after a bombardment of nearly five weeks, from
distantly situated batteries. At the assault of this village — a
testimony to the obstinacy of the defence and the attack — , 700
un wounded prisoners with 18 officers fell into German hands,
without reckoning the heavy losses in killed and wounded.
When, however, all these advantages had been gained, and
the regular attack could commence, a temporary cessation in the
undertakings of the besiegers was brought on by the attack of
the French Eastern Army upon the positions of the XIF, Army
Corps. General von Tresckow was obliged to show front with
part of his Division towards the west, and to place a portion of
his heavy guns at General von Werder's disposal, against the new
oflFensive of the enemy.
Seldom, perhaps, has a siege been combined with sucli great
difficulties, and seldom so gloriously carried out.
385
BOURBAKrS ADVANCE.
After the engagement at Nuits, General von Werder had
again established his Head-Quai*ters in Dijon, and hoped, from his
central position in the Cote d'Or? to carry on, successfully, the
suppression of the people's warfare and the dispersion of Garibaldi's
and Cremer's bands. It then became evident from various signs
(what had long ago been conjectured), that Bourbaki's army, which
had been for a long time in the neighbourhood of Bourges and
Nevers like a threatening and constantly increasing thunder cloud,
was turning towards him. Botirbaki, as already mentioned (Chapter
XI.) united three Corps under his command, the 15th, 18th, and
20th; the 24th Corps, newly formed in Lyons, was moreoven^
now placed under him, making a total of about 140,000 men with
above 300 guns. In the last half of December and the first
days of January this army was completely concentrated at
Besangonj by making use of the railroads which, on the one side,
lead from Nevers to Besan9on by Chlilons-sur*Sadne , as well as
from Lyons direct, and on the other side, likewise thither by
ChUlons. This mode of traffic was obviously injurious to the
success of the undertaking*), since it was impossible to conceal
from the Germans, the transit across the last tract of country,
whilst an unexpected appearance at -Besangon was indispensable,
and besides, this mode of traffic injured in every respect the fitness
for battle of these young troops.
Bourbaki's departure had also become known in the King's
Head-Quarters at Versailles, 4lind a commaiid was issued, from here,
to General von Werder to retard the onslaught of the French,
whilst rapid measures were taken, at the same time, to send help
from the north to the XIV. Army Corps.
General von Werder was in a most hazardous position.
His forces were just sufficient to hold in check the enemy
*) The author here, once more, draws attention to the work **Milita*
rische Gedanken und Betrachtungen'*, by the author of the ^^Krieges um
Metz'*, in which Bourbaki's march, in relation to the use of railroads, is
very thoroughly treated.
86
3RC
now already upon the scene of war, but a new enemy had jcnned
the first, who alone waa in onmberB threefold saperior to the eom-
bined Oerman Army Corps. This new powerful army, also, was
under the command of a real soldier, the former commander of
the Imperial Guard, who was certainly a leader experienced in
war, although he could not be called a great general
The siege of Belfort could not be raised, lest a new, active
enemy should arise in rear of the German positions. The gap
between the Vosges and the Jura, above all, could not be set free,
else nothing could have prevented the entrance of the French into
Baden. To oppose the French forces, which, including Garibaldrs
and Cromer's troops and the garrisons of Belfort and Besan^on,
n^ust have amounted to more than 180,000 men, only one corps
of about 50,000 men — reckoning all together, even the siege
troops of Belfort — could be produced.
Should these troops be overthrown, the rapacious and revenge-
thirsting troops of the republic would pour into Baden without a
check. Assistance from the north-west, the German ^Southern
Army*' under lianteuffel, could not possibly arrive in time to retard
Bourbaki*8 advance.
The position of the XIV. Army Corps might have been a
desperate one, if — this Corps had not been a German one,
every man a capable^ faithful soldiery and the commander a
general.
As soon as General von Werder had gained the spot decided
on for stopping Bonrbaki's army, he gave up the extended line he
held possession of, and concentrated all %e disposable troops round
Vesoul ; these consisted of the three Baden brigades, which were at
Dijon, von der Goltz's combined Brigade, at Langres, and the
4th reserve Division which was very widely extended from Gray
to Lure; a Corps, put together from the most diverse sections
of the troops, whose firm cohesion and unanimous action form a
brilliant testimony to the excellent leadership and military capabi-
lity of each single part.
In the latter days of December the Corps was united at Fesoulj
with the rear guard at Gray, Here General von Werder be-
387
came conviuced that Bourbaki's offensive would be direeted agaiiist
Belforty and took measures accordingly.
Bourbaki approached very slowly. His main body, the 15th,
18th and 20th Corps, commenced its movement in the direction
of Belfort from Besan^on, his right wing, the 24th Corps, moving
along the Jura to the same destination. In order to cover his left
"flank, Garibaldi and Cremer were to operate from Dijon, and
these two commandera were probably destined to advance indepen-
dently against the German lines of communication, after the
hoped-for overthrow of the XIV. Army Corps.
As soon as the Germans had left Dijon on the 28th of De-
cember, Garibaldi's and Cromer's troops moved in. On the 2nd
of January 1871, Bourbaki himself arrived in Dijon, and on the
same day, 200 men, forming the outermost leading troops of the
French 24th Corps, who had already stolen near to the investing
corps of Belfort, by the extreme frontier of France and Switzer-
land, were driven on to Swiss teiTitory, by General von Tresckow,
at Croix to the south of Delle.
On the 5th and 6th of January different outpost fights took
place to the south of Vesoul, with the heads of Bourbaki's left
wing.
These removed all doubt as to Bourbaki's obj.ect. The French
army was going direct for Belfort
General von fVerder decided to retire upofi this fortress,
and J without giving up the siege of Belfort, to occupy the
favourable positions along the Lisaine^ fronting towards the
west. He at once made his dispositions for marching to the rear,
but first detached von der Goltz's Brigade and the 4th reserve
Division against the left flank of the French Army, in order to
cause it some further delay.
The bold undertaking of^these troops led to the hot fights
at Marat and Villersexel ft the 9th of January.
Villersexel, with its strong castle, and also Marat, had ahready
been strongly occupied by the troops covering the flank of the
French, when the German advanced guard approached. The Ger-
mans attacked resolutely, stormed (the 25th Infantry Regiment)
26*
388
the caatle of Villersexel, drove out the euemy from both places,
and made nearly 500 prisoners in Villersexel alone.
These fights , lasting for sixteen hours ^ completely falfilled
their object. Bourbaki sent strong columns, from all sides, to the
assistance of the beaten troops covering the flank, whose positions
had been taken by assanlt, from noon on the 9th of Jsinnary, by
the Germans, whilst these already re-commenced their further
march , in order to unite with the main body of the XIV. Army
Corps, which was steadily retiring upon Belfort.
This masterly retreatj in immediate feeling with the over-
powering enemy y had the favourable results of enabling General
von Werder to reach the defensive positions on the Lisaine
as early as the 11th of January^ and of allowing him time^
before the Ibth of January ^ to fortify his positions and equip
them in part with the Belfort siege guns.
THE THREE DAYS BATTLE OF BELFORT.
•
The small German army made preparations for the firat and
last defensive battle, which was fought, on the German side, during
the whole war — setting aside the sortie battles before Metz and
Paris. General von Werder had to occupy a line, the great ex-
tent of which was out of all proportion to the numerical strength
of his corps, — the whole range of heights and positions, extending
^m Frahier in the north to Delle in the south-east; a distance
of 3 German miles (nearly 14 English miles) on the left bank of
the Lisaine which flows into the Doubs and then back as far as
the Swiss frontier. The out-posts were stationed upon the right
bank, pushed some miles to the fr«|^, in order to watch the ap-
proach of the enemy, whose mighty masses rolled slowly on,
having been detained for several days by the fight at Villersexel.
Schmeling*s Division held the centre and the left wing; its
chief points of support were H^rieourt, Bussurel, B^thoncourt and
Montb^liard, and its advanced positions, the villages of Ste. Marie,
389
Aibre and Tavey. On its right stood von der .Goltz's Brigade,
whose chief point of support was Echenans, and whose advanced
ti*oops held Byans and Champey. The Baden Division was upon
the right wing as far as Frahier; a lai*ge pai*t of it^ however,
together with detachments from von der Goltz's Brigade, formed
the main reserve, between Hdricourt and Brdvilliers. Upon the
extreme left flank, in Montb^liard, there was still a portion of
Debschtltz's detachment, whose main body was further to the rear,
at Delle. This detachment had been brought up from Alsace to
the investing corps of Belfort, at the end of December.
All the villages and country surrounding them were' carefully
placed in a state of defence before the arrival of the French. The
roads and the outskirts of the villages were barricaded, and the
walls of the houses and those of the fields and gardens provided
with loop-holes and embrasures; small parts of the wood were
hewn down where they hindered the range of fire, and parts, in
favourable situations, were surrounded with abatis; gun emplace-
ments were prepared in all open places, redoubts constructed and
equipped with field artillery and siege guns, — especially upon
the great hill, Les Baragues, in the neighbourhood of H6rioourt,
which commanded the main road through H^ricourt and the villages
of Byans and Tavey, — and at Bussurel. Lastly, the bridges
across the Lisaine were so prepared that they could easily be
removed or blown up after the anticipated retreat of the advanced
troops.
General von Werder's Head-Quarters were in Br^villiers.
A remarkable contest then arose between the small, widely
extended German troops, but which were pliant, active and firm
as iron, and the great, clumsy masses of the French, unaccustomed
to war.
On the 13th of January, the first collision took place.
Bourbaki's advanced troops attacked the villages of Ste. Marie,
Aibre and Champey y occupied by the Germans, and took them
after an obstinate retreating fight of the troops who retired, con-
formably to the dispositions, on to the left bank. Vigorous attacks
also took place against Montb^liard, Bethoncoui*t and Bussurel,
390
which ended with the capture of Montbeliard by the French.
The castle only, remained in the hands of the Germans.
The chief attack, however, first commenced on the 15th of
January, against the, now recognised, position of the Germans, after
Bourbaki had concentrated his corps, already seriously shaken and
disorganised, and exhausted by scarcity of good nourishment.
On this day, the attack was, for the most part, directed
against the German left wing and centre. Colonel Zimmermann,
with the east Prussian Landwehr Brigade, had succeeded on the
previous day, in again forcing Montbeliard from the French,
which haa been taken by them on the 13th, and this day was de-
fended with gi*eat obstinacy. The French right wing was, however,
strongly re-inforced, so that a successful resistance here was not
to be expected. General von Werder therefore sent General
von Glttmer with the 1st Baden Brigade, from the main reserve,
to the heights on the north-west of Montbeliard, in order to cover,
from here, Colonel Zimmermann's retreat from this place. The
castle only remained in possession of the Germans, with the strong
position to the north-west of this place; in Montbeliard itself the
French established themselves. In the centre, Bourbaki's repeated
attacks remained absolutely without success. Here, the contest on
the German side was, especially, an artillery combat. Tlie field
batteries, from their excellently prepared positions, as well as the
heavy guns, sent a destructive fire upon the enemy's batteries and
infantry columns, a^ soon as they appeared upon the heights on
the right bank of the Lisaine. The attack upon Hericouri,
Bilhoncourt and Bussurel was the most desperate. In the latter
place the French infantry also succeeded in establishing themselves,
but still they did not come over the Lisaine.
Even the night did not completely put an end to the straggle.
Under cover of the darkness the enemy pushed forward his in-
fantry nearer to the German positions, for a renewed attack on
the following morning and in doing this repeated fights took
place.
On the 16th of January a change was made in the French
attack, for Bourbaki now made the attempt to soiround fhe
391
German right wing, whilst the assaults against H^ricourt, in the
centre, and against the German left wing, relaxed in vigonr.
This day more employment fell upon the infantry on both sides,
although the artillery still played an important part, chiefly on
the German side.
General von Werder held the same positions as on the pre-
vious day; the right wing, until now little threatened, was toler-
ably weak, the main body of the Baden troops was in reserve
behind H^rieourt, and one brigade still m position behind Mont-
b^liard.
General Bourbaki, whose left; wing had now been joined by
Cremer*s troops — Garibaldi, only, remaining at Dijon — attacked
upon all points with the infaiftry drawn closer up, after having
prepared the slttack with numerous guns and also mitrailleuses
batteries. Upon his right wing, whence the main attack only came
on at 3 o'clock, he was very energetically driven back, with very
severe losses. In the centre, where Reheral von Schmeling com-
manded on the German side, the exceedingly hot artillery fire of
the French was chiefly subdued by the superior fire of the
artillei*y, in position upon the hill of Les BaragueSj and four
infantry attacks were repulsed. Upon the left wing, on the other
hand, Bourbaki, this day, gained some successes. •
By 8 o'clock in the morning, the French opened a very
lively fire from their guns against Chenebier and its environs,
which GObel's and Krutzsch's batteries had to cope with alone.
The artillery fire on the French side was continually i*e-inforced,
during the day, by ft^sh batteries, and at last it was observed,
on the German side, that strong masses of infantry were drawing
near by the woodlands which border the slope of the valley from
£tobon to Frahier. This manoeuvre apparently aimed at sur-
rounding the flank. At the same time masses of infantry ad-
vanced to the north of Ohagey directly against the flank position
of the Germans.
Only the most insiignificant force, three battalions and three
batteries altogether, could be opposed to these attacks, which
were led by General Cremer with a force of about 15,000 men.
A gradual retreat of the German right wing was here inevitable;^
392
in spite of the greatest bravery and skill. The village of Che-
nebier was evacuated, and the position at the Ferme Bougeot
was then again taken up, in order to bar the road to Belfort
from the enemy. The obstinate defence had, however, fulfilled
its object for this day; Prahier and Ch^nebier were, indeed, oc-
cupied by the French, still the attack was continued no further.
Darkness also soon began to set in.
General von Werder, informed of the dangerous situation of
the right wing, sent Keller's Brigade there from the Reserve,
during the night, with the charge of retaking Ch^nebier on the
following day. In the centi*e, also, the night was to bring no
rest to the wearied troops, for Bourbaki here attempted an attack
by surprise. But this also failed, like the former one, through
the watchfulness of the German out-posts, and thus the morning of
the 17th of Jannaiy broke, without a gap haying been forced in
the positions of the Germans.
On this morning thcf P)sitions of the right wing, were chiefly
concerned, — the village of Gh^nebier and the woodlands in its
neighbourhood.
Two columns under Generals Keller and Degenfeld, alto-
gether eight battalions, four squadrons and four batteries in
skength, started from H^ricourt and Echevanne, as early as
3.30 o'clock in the morning, against Chenebier and the Bois des
Evants situated in front of it towards the north, and attacked
the enemy with great impetuosity. The intended surprise did
not, indeed, fully succeed, for a French out-post beat the alarm,
still it was possible to take a part of the village before the
French could o£fer a very considerable resistance. Then , it is
true, they showed in such considerable nummcal superiorily, that,
soon after the break of day, General Keller found himself com-
polled to commence a retreat, with a great number of French
prisoners and captured baggage. On his right General von De-
genfeld had been involved in a very hot and tedious combat round
the Bats des EvaniSj which ended towards noon in the defeat of
the French, and General von Degenfeld was able to move for-
ward from Ch^ebier as far as the northern edge. After General
Keller, in conjunction with von der Goltz's Brigade at Chagey,
393
^'i had occupied and stoutly defended the Bois Ferjfy opposite Che-
^ nebier, the fight lasted until the afternoon, when the exhaustion
1^ of both sides caused the chief action to fall to the artillery.
^ Upon the other points of the widely extended battle - field,
^ renewed attacks had been constantly made by the French in the
^ same manner as on the previous « days, and as before, they failed
through the firmness of the German lines.
In despair, Bourbaki commenced the retreat on the 18th of
January, endeavouring to cover it by his artillery. This retreat
was to lead to a terrible catastrophe.
„ He had lost from 3000 to 4000 killed and wounded in front
^ of the Lisaine positions, whilst the XIV. Corps had only suffered
^ the loss of about 1500 men; the march towards the south-west
was can*ied out, amid yet far greater losses.
Not only did General von Werder begin the pursuit on the
19th of January, but General von Manteuffel now appeared with
the German Southern Army, in a veiy threatening manner upon
the line of retreat of the French Army, which was so terribly
weakened by cold, privation and defeat.
MANTEUFFEL'S ARRIVAL AND BOURBARFS RETREAT INTO
SWITZERLAND.
In order to render assistance to General von Werder, the
German Army Direction had arranged a concentration of the IL
and VII. Army Corps at Ckdiillon^'sur-Seme. The first Corps
came from Paris, the latter from Metz and the Luxemburg frontier.
On the 12th of January the two Corps, in the strength of 56
battalions, 20 squadrons and 168 guns, stood formed for battle
upon the line Noyers — Nuits — Ravi^res — Gfi&tillon — Montigny;
General von Manteuffel assumed the chief command on the same
day, and, on the 13th of January, began a rapid advance in the
direction of f^esouty in order, if possible, to establish a connec-
tion with the XIV. Army Corps before Bourbaki's attack could
take place.
S94
The inarch was mrasnally difficult on acconnt of tiie slippery
ice, deep snow, cold and monntainoas conntry; yet on the 15th
and 16th of January, the leading troops debouched from the chain
of mountains of the Cote d'Or, at Selongey, Prauthoy and Lon-
gean, and on the 19th of January, the main body of the aimy
was united at Fontaine Frangaise (II. Corps) and Dnmpierre
(VII. Corps), whilst the advanced guards had 'already crossed the
Sadne at Gray and further up. Upon the outermost right wing,
and to cover the right flank, Kettler's Brigade, of five battalions^
two squadrons and two batteries, drew near the town of Dijon^
where Garibaldi himself, with wonderful composure, held united
about 30,000 men, which France had never needed more than
just now. From this time until the end of Muiteuffers manceuvres,
General Kettler kept the whole of Garibaldi's force in check.
Upon the left wing. General von Manteu£fel had pushed forward
a detachment of the VII. Corps by Luxeuil and St Loup, in
order to seek connection with General von Werder.
The whole great campaign, so rich in surprising strokes, in
talented military ^combinations, and exciting situations, scarcely
presents a moment of greater military interest than that shown in
the mutual situation of the armies at the moment when Bourbaki
made his last desperate attack against the Lisaine position.
An army, still consisting of 120,000 men in the east, press-
ing on furiously against the small chain ban'ier of Werder's
Corps, in the vicinity of the German frontier; a second German
army penetrating, by forced marches, the mountains of the C6te
d'Or, in the most hazardous direction, for the French army, imagm-
ing that Bourbaki was strongly covered in the rear at Dijon.
Added to this the formation of the ground ; no way of escape for
Bourbaki except by victoiy; behind him the table-land of Burgundy^
stretching in a great bend between mountains, his single road of
retreat, and ManteuffeFs army already on the northern edge of
this plateau. — A remarkable example, indicating the difference be-
tween warriors and armed multitudes, between generals and leaders
of adventure.
General von Mantenffel had learnt, even at Fontaine-Fran^aise-
Dampierre, that General von Werder had conquered; that the
395
Belfort Siege Corps had taken up the attack upon Belfort afresh,
and that Bourbaki was retiring. He immediately decided that an
advance in the former direction towards the south-east; was no
longer necessary^ but that the retreat of the French Army must
now be cut off.
Conformably to this, the Southern Army executed a wheel
to the right on the 19th of January, and marched against the
Doubs^ the VII. Corps upon Besan9on, the 11. Corps, by Pesmes,
upon D61e, in order, in the first place, to interrupt the railroad
communications here and at Villers-Farlay, towards the south.
Thus General von Manteuffel hoped, at any rate, to find the
French Eastern Army between the Sadne and the Jura, and to
foi*ce it to fight with its rear against Switzerland or Alsace. It
was a very bold undertaking, for the French possessed a double
superiority in numbers; a condition of sti'ength which was cer-
tainly favourable at the time of the contest against the republic.
Garibaldi on the other hand attempted nothing, and probably
he remarked nothing at all ; still he might easily have been able to
cross and hinder the marches of the German southern army, by
marching upon Auxonne and Be8an9on, so far as the distance was
concerned. At that time he issued the well known proclamation
to his troops which begins: ''Once more, yomig combatants for
freedom, you have seen the heels of Kiqg William's formidable
soldiers."
Several days still passed 'away, before it was exactly known
on the German side, where Bourbaki was directing his retreat;
the heads of the columns of all three Army Corps, amid repeated
small encounters, retained close feeling with the main body of the
French Army, which they, finally, found concentrated in the
neighbourhood of Besan9on, whilst, simultaneously, all the ways of
exit from the table-land of Burgundy, with the exception of that
leading into Switzerland, were barred.
On the 21st the II. Corps occupied D61e, destroyed the rail-
road -and captured 230 loaded waggons. The VU. Corps, on the
same day, marched dose past Besan^on and Wheeling to the south
of the fortress, occupied Dampierre and there captured 30 loaded
waggons. The passages across the Doubs were found undestroyed;
396
at Quingey^ to the goath-soath-west of Besan^ODy the railway eom-
munieation , from Besan^on, by Loiis le Sanlnier to Lyons, was
interrnpted ; on the 23rd the 14th Division had a fight at Danne-
marie y and confirmed the presence of the 20th French Corps,
later, also, of the 15th and 18th French Corps, and an the 25th
of January the road from Besan^on to Lyons ^ BourbakCs
single line of retreat, was completely barred.
On this day the VU. Corps was at St. Vit and Qaingej)
and behind it, the II. Corps, upon the line Salins — Dole.
At the same time the XIV. Corps drew near, towards the
noith-west, against the French army standing at Besan^on. The
immediate pursuit had, in the first instance, been made by Schme-
ling's Division only; on the 25th of January it occupied Baume
les Dames, on the Doubs, to the north-east of Besan^on. General
von Debschfitz moved forward from Blamont, nearer to the Swiss
frontier, in order, together with General von Schmeling, to operate
against the road from Besan^n to Pontarlier. General von Werder,
pushing to the right, with three brigades of his corps, had at
the same moment reached the neighbourhood' of Rioz, due north
of Besan^on, and relieved the detachments of the 14th Division,
which had, until now, held possession of the passages across the
Gignon at Voray, Etuz and Pin.
Thus Bourbaki at Besanfon was surrounded by a circle,
which was everytvhere closed except towards Switzerland , in
the direction of Pontarlier. \
The unfortunate General , owing to France's unparalleled
defeats in the battles at Metz, at which he had been present,
and at the sight of the terrible misery of his army, now surrounded
on all sides, had fallen into a condition of the deepest dejection.
He saw the disgrace of a capitulation or of a retreat upon Swiss
territory before his eyes, and he would not survive this inglorious
end of the last French army.
On the 24th of JaAuary, he gave up the chief command to
General Clinch ant at Besanfon, and sent a bullet into his head —
which, it is true, was not destined to put an end to his life.
General Clinchant commenced the retreat of all the Corps,
concentrated in the neighbourhood of the fortress, on the morning
397
of the 26th , upon Pontarlier ; the Cavalry Division and aboat
8000 Infantry, only, of the army liad got away, by Lons le
Sauhiier, towards Lyons, before the German Southern Army had
cut off this road. On the 28th of January this retreat was
effected, and the French Army stood in the neighbourhood of Pon-
tarlier on the Swiss frontier, fronting towards the north-west; the
18th Corps on the right; the 15th Corps, at Sombacdurt and
Chaffois, in the centre; the 20th Corps, upon the left wing, as
far as Frasne, and lastly, the 24th ^Corps, which had arrived in
the greatest confusion, as a reserve in rear of the centre.
General von Manteuffel, who had now assumed the chief
command of all three German Corps, made a surrounding approach,
with the II. Army Corps by Nozeroy, the VII. Army Corps by
Villeneuve, and Generals von Schmeiing and DebsohOtz, from the
north, along the Swiss frontier.
Garibaldi, too, who was still at Dijon, had not been forgotten;
affcer the fight oA the 23rd, which had cost the 2nd battalion of
the 61st Regiment its colour, in the night. General Hann
von Weyhern was sent to the assistance of General von Keller,
with Degenfeld's Baden Brigade, Ejiesebeck's Brigade and Willissen's
Baden Cavalry Brigade; he advanced, on the 27th' of January,
with his united forces, from Pesmes upon Dijon.
Whilst the situation of the French forces in the east was so
desperate a one, the Chancellor of the Confederation and Jules
Favre were negotiating an armistice in Versailles, and in so doing
a special convention was made with reference to the east, which
is an evidence of the illusions of the French Government, and
which was of great importance to the French Easteni Army. The
Chancellor demanded, amongst other things, the surrender of the
fortress of Belfort. As this might prejudice the question of the
annexation of the whole of Alsace with the fortress — and Jules
Favre was by no means disposed to give up Belfort, although,
as a matter of course, the principle of a cession of territory,
already formed the basis of the armistice negotiations, Jule^ Favre
proposed thai in the east, the armistice should not come into
effect. He must therefore have believed, up to the 28th of January,
that Bourbaki would be able to relieve Belfort, or otherwise gain sue-
898
ce88e& which would make it advantageous for France to carry on the
war upon this stage. Count Bisiftarck had no reason for opposing
this desire, and it was therefore established in the conveniiony
that the military operations in the departments of the Cdte d'Or,
Jura and Doubs^ and also the siege of Belfort should be con-
tinued* Jules Fayre at once telegraphed the conclusion of the
convention to Oambetta, but neglected to impart the special determi-
nations mentioned ; and Gambetta, naturally, simply announced the
conclusion of the armistice tf all the Generals of the republic;
Count Bismarck, on the contrary, caused information to be sent to
the German generals, of the article of exception as well. '
Thus misunderstandings were unavoidable.
On the 29th of January Manteuffel made a concentric attack
upon the advanced posts of the French Army.
The VII. Corps, retainbg possession of Levier, pushed forward
to the left, where it held the road from St. Gorgon to Pontarlier
as well as that from Levier to Pontarlier ; the 11^ Corps approached
from the south, by Frasne, whilst a detachment from it held
possession of the mountain road at Les Planches; General
von Schmeling and General von Debschfitz proceeded with their
march against Pontarlier, along the frontier, and von der Goltz's
Brigade (XIV. Army Corps) moyed upon Villeneuve from Arbois,
by Pont d'H^ry, and so formed the reserve of the centre.
General Clinehant, not being in a position to undertake anything,
with his troops in their most wretched condition, remained stationary
where he was;
In the afternoon a combat ensued. The advanced guard of
the 14th Division came upon the enemy at Sombacourt and Chaf-
foisy stormed the villages, which were still tolerably obstinately
defended, carried off 17 guns and 5000 prisoners, including two
generals, and thr/Bw the adversary back upon Pontarlier.
The following day, the II. Corps attacked Frasne^ captured
above 3000 prisoners, occupied the place, and drove the French
troops still further back.
On this day, the 30th of January, General Clinehant, upon
the strength of the armistice, now began to open negotiations.
General von Manteuffel, ns may be imagined, could not agree to
399
them, mid made a further advance; on the 3l8t, after a aharp
fight at Fatiw^ he occupied the cross roads at Ste. Marie, in the
mountains to the south of Pontarlier, and at mid -day, on the
1st of Febniary, stood ready for the attack with the heads of his
columns in front of Pontarlief.
On the same morning, however, General Cliuchant had con-
cluded a convention with the Swiss Commander ia Chief, General
Herzog, in accordance with which, the French army was to cross
over into Switzerland and there be disarmed.
The retreat began even on the day of its conclusion, the
1st of February, and only a rear -guard still covered the retreat
upon French territory. Du TrosseFs Brigade came to an engagement
with it in the afternoon, took Pontarlier, made 4000 prisoners
and captured an enormous number of waggons with stores, arms
and provisions.
General von Manteuffel established his head - quarters in Pon-
tarlier the same afternoon, whilst the French army moved into
Switzerland by various mountain roads, the main body at Les
Verri^res.
Such a catastrophe was never before known. Switzerland
received 85,000 men with 266 guns and about 10,000 horses,
and provided for the masses of men, who had sufifered so miserably
from cold and hunger, with that hospitable generosity, for which
this high-minded republic has always been distinguished. About
15,000 men had been taken prisoners in the retreating fights of
the last few days ; only about 20,000 men altogether, had escaped
towards the south, including Cremer's division.
Garibaldi had also appealed to the armistice, when General
Hann von Weyhern drew near, but then, as it was not recognised by
the enemy, he escaped so quickly to the south, by the railway,
that he could no longer be reached.
THE FALL OF BELFORT.
Immediately after the victorious termination of the combats
on the Lisaine, the regular siege of the fortress of Belfort was
400
again taken np with renewed zeal^ and was also continued after
tiie oondusion of the armistice, in conformity with Article I. of the
Convention. From this the inference may be drawn as well
as from the desire of the Chancellor of the Confederation, in
opposition to Jules Favre, at Versailles (v. page 397), that the
German government held the definitive acquisition of the fortress
with that of Alsace to be very essential.
The siege was associated with the greatest difficulties, for the
trenches had, partly, to be blasted out of the rock, and the severe
cold as well as the thaw which set in later, infinitely increased
the difficulties of this work. Between the villages of Danjouim
and Perouse — the latter was taken by storm in the night of the
20th of January — the parallels yere opened against Forts
Basses- Perches and Hanles - Perches ] the batteries were, by
degrees, brought up to the works, and on the 8th of February
the capture of both these forts was successfully carried out.
But a very great work yet remained. It was necessary to
force the fortress itself to surrender from the heights of the two
forts and from the parallels connecting them. The citadel, howerer,
as well as Fort La Justice could very well command the heights
of the Perches. A cannon fight ensued, lasting for eight days, in
which the Qermans came off conquerors, as they had done in efvery
action since the beginning of the war.
On the 16th of February the strong fortress capitulated, with
12,000 men. In consideration of the garrison's brave defence, the
German £mperor granted it a free departure.
CONCLUSION.
The convention of FersailleSy which was ratified on the 28th
of January 1871; put an end to the military operations of the
campaign 1870 — 71. The tenor of the convention is as follows:
CONVENTION.
The following convention has heen concluded between Count von Bis-
marck, Chancellor of the German confederation, in the name of His Majesty,
the German Emperor, King of Prussia, and Monsieur Jules Favre, Minister
of Foreign Affairs of the government of the National Defence, as authorized
plenipotentiaries :
Article 1.
A general armistice upon the whole line of the military operations, in the
act of being carried out by the German and French armies, begins on
this day for Paris , and in three days for the departments. The duration
of the armistice will be twenty-one days, commencing from this day, so
that, excepting in the case of a renewal, the armistice will have expired,
everywhere, at noon oft the 19th of February.
The armies engaged in war will retain their respecti^ positions, and
these will be separated by a line of demarcation. This line will commence
from Pont I'Fv^que on the boundary of the Calvados department, will lead
to Ligni^res in the north-east of the Mayenne department, passing between
Briouze and Frommentel; touching the Mayenne department at Ligni^res,
it will follow the boundary which divides this department from those of the
Orne and the Sarthe, as far as the north of Morannes and will then be
carried on to the point where the departments C6te d'Or, Ni^vre and Yonne
meet together, on the east of Quar^ les Tombes, — so that the depart-
ments Sarthe, Indre et Loire, Loire et Cher, Loiret and Yonne remain in
possession of the Germans. From this point, the direction of the line is
26
402
reserved for an agreement, which will take place wh»n the contracting par-
ties h^re been informed as to the present position of operations in the de-
partments Cote d'Or, Doubs and Jura.
The departments Nord and Pas de Calais, the fortresses Givet and
Langres with a radius of 10 kilometres (about 6V4 English miles) , and the
peninsula of Havre as far as the line Etretat — St. Romain , will not be
occupied on the German side. Both parties carrying on the war, and their
outposts on both sides, are to keep at a distance of, at least, 10 kilometres
from the line of demarcation.
Each of the two armies reserves to itself, the right of maintaining its
authority in the territory it occupies, and of employing such means as the
commanders judge necessary for this end.
The armistice applies equally to the naval powers of both countries,
and here the meridian of Dunkirk will form as the line of demarcation.
The French fleet will keep to the west of it, and the German men-of-war
now in the 'western waters , will withdraw to the east of it as soon as they
have been apprized thereof. The captures that may be made after the
conclusion of the armistice and before its notification will be restored, as
well as the prisoners made in the interval named.
The operations upon the territory of the departments Doubs, Jura and
Cdte d'Or as well as the siege of Belfort will be continued, independenty
of the armistice, until such time as the still reserved settlement of the de-
marcation line, in the departments named, shall have been supplementarily
agreed upon.
Article 2,
The object of the armistice concluded in this manner, is to allow the
government of the National Defence to call together a freely elected assembly
who will have to decide the question as to whether the war is to be con-
tinued, or upon what conditions peace shall be concluded.
The assembly will meet in the town of Bordeaux.
The commanders of the German Armies will render every assistance to
the elections and meeting of the deputies.
Abticle 3.
All the outer forts round Paris, with their war material will be de-
livered up to the German Army, by the French military authorities. The
commonalties and the houses outside and between the forts, may be occupied
by the German troops up to a line fixed by the military commissioners.
The ground between this line and the enceinte of the city of Paris may
not be set foot upon by armed men of either side.
\fi
403
The form and mode of surrender of the forts, and the line mentioned
will form the subject of an additional protocol to the present convention.
Article 4.
During the period of the armistice the German army will not enter
the city of Paris.
Article 5.
The enceinte will be disarmed, and the carriages of the guns will be
brought into the forts, appointed by a German commission.
Article 6.
The garrison (Army of the Line, Gardes Mobiles and Marine troops)
of the forts and city will be prisoners of war, with the exception of a
division of 12,000 men , which the military authorities retain in Paris for
duty in the interior.
The troops who are prisoners of war, lay down their arms, and these
are collected and delivered up at appointed places, according to the custo-
mary arrangements by commissioners. The troops remain in the city, the
enceinte of which they are not allowed to pass during the armistice. The
French authorities %i«st use vigilance, that each individual of the army and
Garde Mobile remains consigned to the interior of the city.
The officers of the troops, who are prisoners of war, will be specified
in a list, which will be delivered to the German authorities.
At the expiration of the armistice , all -the military , belonging to th»
army consigned to Paris, must present themselves as prisoners of war to
the German army, in case peace is not previously concluded.
The officers, who are prisoners of war, retain their arms.
Article 7.
The Garde Nationale retains its arms, and is entrusted with the protection
I ^ of Paris and the maintenance of order. This equally applies to the Gen-
e* darmerie and troops employed in a similar manner to them in the municipal
i^- service, as the Republican Guard, Douaniers and Pompiers; this category
i$> amounts, altogether to only 3600 men. All the corps of the Franc-tireurs
iif will be disbanded by command of the French government.
26*
404
Article 8.
Immediately after the ratification of the present conditions, and previous
to the occupation of the forts, the Commander in Chief of the German
armies will facilitate the task of the commissioners, who will be sent by the
French government both into the departments and to foreign countries,
to make arrangements for the re-provisioning of Paris, and to bring up the
stores destined for the city.
Article 9.
After the surrender of the forts , and the disarmament of the enceinte
and of the garrison, in accordance with Articles 6 and 6, the re-provisioning !
of Paris will proceed unimpeded, by the railways and water communications.
Stores destined for this re-provisioning, are not to be taken out of the
districts occupied by the German troops , and the French government binds
itself to procure them outside the line of demarcation which snrronnds the
German armies, unless the commander of the latter grants permission.
Article 10.
Every-one who wishes to leave Paris, must be provided with a regularly
drawn-up permit, by the military authorities, which is subjected to the
vis^ of the German out-posts. These permits and vis^ will be forwarded
as of right, to the candidates of the Provincial Deputation and the deputies
of the' National Assembly.
The persons provided with the permissions mentioned are only allowed
«to pass out between 6 o'clock a. m. and 6 o'clock p. m.
Article 11.
The city of Paris pays a contribution of 200 million francs. The
payment must be made before the fifteenth day of the armistice. The mode
of payment will be fixed by a mixed French and German commission.
Article 12.
During the armistice, nothing of public talue may be removed, which
might servfe as a pledge to cover the contributions.
405
Article 13.
Daring the armistice, the importation of arms, ammunition and material
for their fabrication, is forbidden.
Article 14.
The exchange of all prisoners of war made, on the side of the French,
since the commencement of the war, will be proceeded with without delay.
For this object the French authorities will, as soon as possible, deliver
special lists of the German prisoners of war to the German military authori-
ties at Amiens, Le Mans, Orleans and Vesoul. The German prisoners of
war will be set at liberty as near the frontier as possible. The German
authorities will, on the other hand , give up to the French authorities , in
the same manner and as soon as possible, an equal number of French
prisoners of war, of corresponding rank.
The exchange refers also to prisoners in civil positions, such as the
captains of German merchant vessels and French civilians interned in
Germany.
Article 15.
A postal service for unclosed letters between Paris and the departments,
will be regulated through the head-quarters in Versailles.
In ratification of the present convention , it is provided with the signa-
tures and seals of the undersigned.
Versa^es, the 28th of January 1871.
Biimarok. Favre.
The tenor of the protocol appended to the convention, men-
tioned in article 3 of the convention, is as follows:
Addition to ike convention of the 2Sih of January 1871.
Article 1.
Boundary line before Paris. — On the French side the boundary line
will be formed by the cincture wall of the city. On the German side (v.
map I. of Paris) :
1) Up<m the south front , the line runs from the Seine to the northern
point of the island of St. Germain, along the conduit of Issy, then between
the cincture wall and Forts Issy, Vanvres, Montronge, Bic^tre and Ivry,
keeping at a distance of about 600 metres from the fronts of the forts, up
to the spot where the road from Paris separates towards Port*k-r Anglais
and Alfort.
406
2) Upon the east fronts from the last mentioned point, the line croMes
the junction of the Marne and Seine, then passes along the western and
northern boundaries of the Tillage of Charenton, so as to reach the gate
of Fontenay just above the Place de I'Obelisque. From this it runs in a
northerly direction, to 500 metres west of Fort Rosny, and to the south of
Forts Noisy and Romainville, to the spot where the Pantin road strikes the
Ourcq canal.
The garrison of the ch&tean of Vincennes consists of one company
of 200 men, and will not be relieved during the armistice.
3) Upon the north front, it continues to a point 500 metres south-
west of Fort Aubervillers , then running by the southern border of the
village of Aubervillers and along the St. Denis canal , crosses the latter
500 metres to the south of its bend, and remains, equi-distant to the south
of the canal bridge running in a straight line, as far as the Seine.
4) Upon the west front, it continues, from the spot where the indicate^
line reaches the Seine, upon the left bank up the river as far as the conduit
of Issy.
Small deviations from this boundary line are permitted to the German
troops, in so far as they should be necessary in the position of the out-posts,
for the security of the army.
Abticle 2.
Passage through the boundary line. — Persons who have been granted
permission to pass the German out-posts, may do so only by the following
roads : the roads to Calais, Lille, Metz, Strasburg (gate of Fontenay), Basle,
Antibes, Toulouse, and road 189 and lastly by the bridges over the Seine,
including the one at Sevres, the reconstruction of which is permitted.
Article 3.
Surrender of the forts and earth-works. — This surrender will take
place on the 29th of January , commencing at 10 o'clock a. m. and in the
following manner:
The French troops will withdraw from the forts and neutral ground;
in each fort will remain, merely, the Commandant, the Superintendent of
Engineers and Artillery, and the gate-keeper.
As soon as a fort has been evacuated, a French staff officer will come
to the German out-posts, in order to give any explanations that may be
desired about the fort, as well as to show the way leading to it. After
taking possession of each single fort, and after the necessary explanations
have been given, the fortress commandant, the superintendents of Engineers
and Artillery, with the gate-keeper will repair to Paris to the garrison of
the forts.
407
Article 4.
Surrender of arms and war material. — The rifles, field guns, colours
and all the war material will be given up to the German authorities within
fourteen days, reckoning from the ratification of the present agreement,
and will be brought together in Sdvran, through the instrumentality of the
French authorities. An inventory of the arms and war material, will be
handed over, by the French authorities to the German authorities, before
the 4th of February.
The carriages of the cannon upon the ramparts must likewise be re-
moved before the above named time.
On the 15th of February, moreover, the Convention on the
surrender of Belfort and the continuation of the line of demar-
cation, succeeded the Convention of the 28th of January in the
following terms:
Article 1.
The fortress of Belfort will be given up to the commandant of the
besieging army,- with the war material which belotigs to the place.
The garrison of Belfort will leave the place with the honours of war,
and retain their arms , their means of transport , and the war material be-
longing to the troops, as well as the military archives. The commandants
of Belfort and of the besieging army, will place themselves in communi-
cation respecting the execution of the above stipulations, as well as con-
cerning details which have nt)t been foreseen, and in regard to the direction
and roads by which the garrison of Belfort will join the French army on
the other side of the line of demarcation.
Article. 2.
The German prisoners in Belfort will be released.
Article 3.
The line of demarcation , ' fixed as far as the point where the three
departments of Yonne, Nievre and Cdte d'Or come in contact, will be
continued along the southern boundary of the department of the Cdte d'Or
to the points where the railroad , which runs from Nevers by Autun and
Chagny to Ch&lons-sur-Sadne, crosses the frontier of the department named.
This railroad remains outside the German occupation , so that the line of
408
demarcation , which is drawn at the distance of one kilometre from the
railroad, reaches the southern boundary of the Cote d*Or department to the
east of Chagny and follows the boundary which divides the Sadne et Loire
department from the departments of the Cote d'Or and Jura. After following
the road from Louhans to Lons le Saulnier it will leave the department
boundary upon the height of the village of Malleret, from whence it will
run on so as to intersect the railroad from Lons le Sanlnier to Bonrg at
a distance of eleven kilometres to the south of Lons le Saulnier, whiUt
from there it is directed by the bridges of the Ain upon the Clairvaux road,
whence it will follow the northern boundary of the arrondissement of St.
Claude as far as the Swiss frontier.
Article 4.
A radius of ten kilometres will be kept, for the use of the garrison,
round the fortress of Besanyon. The fortified place, Auxonne, will be sur:
rounded by three kilometres of neutral territory, in which there will be free
circulation upon the railroad , leading from Dijon to Gray and Ddle , for
the military trains and those of the administration. The commandants of
the *troops on both sides, will regulate the re-provisioning of the two
fortresses and the forts which are in possession of the French troops, in the
departments of the Doubs and Jura, as well as the boundaries of the radii
of these forts, each of which will have three kilometres. The circulation by
the railroad and country roads, whith pass through these radii, will be free.
Abticle 5.
The three departments. Jura, Doubs and CiXte d'Or, will now be included
in the armistice, ratified on the 28th of January, and the whole of the
stipulations made in the convention of the 28th of January with respect to the
duration of the armistice as well as to the other conditions , will apply to
them.
Versailles^ the 15th of February 1871.
Jnlei Vavro. ▼. Bismarok.
The conditions of the convention were carried out without
hindrance.
The German Army Direction in consequence attained such
an auspicious military situation, that a continuation of the war, on
the part of France, could indeed no longer be attempted.
It is true that there were still French armies in existence.
409
At the conclusion of the convention General Ohanzy ought to have
had 120,000 men, General Faidherbe 60,000 and General Loysel
at HS,vre 30,000 men, whilst there should have been 250,000 men
in the different camps of instruction. These forces, however,
existed only on paper. Of troops fit for battle, Francie probably
possessed only about 50,000, and these were demoralized. On
the German side, on the other hand, there were 800,000 German
soldiers extending from the French — Swiss frontier as far as the
southern corner of Touraine, and up to the Atlantic ocean, in
possession of nearly all the foi*tresses and important positions of
northern and midland France, and also, by the occupation of the
forts of. Paris, commanding, in fact, the capital itself.
The whole number of French prisoners provided for in Ger-
man depots and places of internment, now amounted to 11,860
officers and 371,881 men, added to which all the soldiers of the
army of Paris were prisoners of war, with the exception of the
Garde Natiouale in the city itself, so that the number of the
prisoners of war almost reached the strength of the German armies.
The resumption of hostilities must have appeared impossible even
to the most extravagant members of the French Government.
The naval warfare had been devoid of any important encounter,
being confined solely to the injury of commerce, and remained
quite without any consequence, which, at the conclusion of peace,
could have weighed in favour of France.
Seldom perhaps has a state been so completely overthrown,
and its military power so crushed to its last members, as France
was now cast down and shattered, by the mistaken and criminal
continuation of this war, which was begun so thoroughly unpoliti-
cally and most wantonly.
Thus then, the annistice became the introduction to peace.
The National Assembly which met in Bordeaux on the 12th of
February pronounced for peace, and on the 26th of February 1871,
after the armistice had been twice prolonged, the preliminaries
of peace were concluded at Versailles j which was followed by the
definitive conclusion of peace, at Frankfort, on the 10th of
May 1871. •
Calender of the Campaign.
Summary of the events of the war in chronological order.
July 1870.
15« The demand for credit by the French government for the war is sanc-
tioned (Page 15). The troops in the camp of Ch&lons, and detach-
ments elsewhere ready for war are directed against the Germi^n frontier
(P. 15). The King of Prussia orders the mobilization of his army
(P. 16).
16. Mobilization of the Bavarian and Baden armies. The German frontier
is occupied by detachments for demonstration (P. 19).
17* Mobilization of the Wurtemberg Army.
19. France declares war against Prussia (P. 15).
19-30. Skirmishes on the frontier (P. 49).
Angrnst.
2* The King takes the chief command in Mayence (P. 52). The Emperor
Napoleon attacks Saarbriicken (P. 50).
4* Assault of the position of Weissenburg occupied by Douay's Division
by the III. German army (P. 5S).
6. Battle of Woerth in which the French right wing under command of
Marshal Mac Mahon is beaten by the Crown Prince of Prussia —
Battle of Saarbriicken (height of Speichern) where the French left
wing, Frossard's Corps is beaten by the leading troops of the I. army,
and detachments of the III. Army Corps. The French Army commences
its retreat (P. 58-84).
7* Paris is declared in a state of siege. Decree for the Garde Mobile
and Garde Nationale (P. 85).
7-14* Advance of the German I. and II. armies to Metz, and of the III. Army
to Nancy (P. 85).
8, Baden cavalry arrive before Strasburg (P. 87).
9. Liitzelstein occupied (P. 86).
10* Lichtenberg occupied (P. 86).
12« Marshal Bazaine receives the chief command of the Army of Metz (P. 92).
13. The King in Herny, Prince Frederick Charles in Pont-k-Mousson (P. 89).
14. Bombardment of Pfalzbarg by the VI. Corps (P. 242). Battle of
Courcelles in which the retiring French Army is held fast by the I.
Army on the right bank of the Moselle (P. 92-98). Reconnaissance
against Tonl (P. 90). General von Werder, Commandant before
Strasburg (P. 89). Napoleon leaves Metz (P. 96).
].5t Marsal capitulates (P. 90).
Avgust.
16. Battle of Vionville. The III. Army Corps, gradually reinJTorced stops
Bazaine's departure to Verdun (P. 99-117).
18* Battle of Gravelotte. The I. and II. Armies, under the command of
the King, force Bazaine to retire upon Metz (P. 118-142). Kehl is set
on fire by cannon from Strasburg (P. 229).
19* The III. Army begins the passage across the Meuse (P. 143).
21. Mac Mahon's Army leaves Ch&lons for Bheims (P. 148).
22» « The IV. Army (newly formed) commences the advance against Ch&-
lons (P. 144).
23* Unsuccessful attack upon Verdun by the IV. Army (P. 144). Mac
Mahon moves off from Bheims (P. 160);
24« Mac Mahon in Bethel (P. 150). The bombardment of Strasburg be-
gins (P. 230).
25. The III. Army takes Vitry le Fran9ais (P. 151). In the night, the
German Armies receive orders to wheel to the right (P. 151).
27. Mac Mahon in Chgne-populenx (P. 150). Fight ofBusancy (P. 151).
28. Mac Mahon in Stonne (P. 152).
29. Fight at Nonart (P. 154). In the night, the first parallel before Stras-
burg is opened (P. 232).
30. Engagement at Beaumont (P. 155).
31. The surrounding advance by the Germans against Sedan (P. 158).
Bazaine's sortie against Prince Frederick Charles's Army, Battle of
Noisseville which lasts till midday on the Ist of September (P. 204-218).
September.
1. Battle of Sedan. The French army is thrown back into the fortress,
and inclosed all round by the III. and IV. armies (P. 165-173).
2. Capitulation of Sedan (P. 175).
5. The royal head-quarters in Rheims (P. 283).
9« Laon occupied. The citadel is blown up (P. 284).
12. The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg invests Toul (P. 250).
14, The royal head-quarters in Chateau-Thierry (P. 283).
15* The royal head-quarters in Meaux (P. 283).
19* Fight at Petit-Bicestre. The V. and II. Bavarian corps repulse General
Vinoy's sortie (P. 286).
Completion of the investment of Paris (P. 284). Commencement of
negotiations between the Chancellor and J. Favre. Royal head-quarters
in Ferriferes (P. 270 and 289).
23. Capitulation of Toul (P. 251).
Combat at Villejuif to the south of Paris, sortie against the VI. Corps
(P. 289).
28. Capitulation of Strasburg (P. 236).
30* General Vinoy's sortie against the VI. Corps (P. 289).
October.
2* Bazaine's sortie against Kummer's Division (P. 222).
*4« CoI(Aiel von Alvensleben beats the French troops at the wood of St.
Hilaire and occupies Epemon (P. 291). Prince Albert of Prussia re-
connoitres from Toury towards Orleans and notes the French Loire
Army (P. 291).
5. General von Degenfeld's fight at Raon TEtape (P. 369). Fight of the 5th
Cavalry Brigade at Pacy to the west of Paris (P. 290).
7. General von der Tann marches off from Paris towards the south (P. 292),
Bazaine*8 sortie against Rummer's Division (P. 222).
9. Gambetta's arrival in Tours (P. 292).
412
October.
9. loTestment of Neu-Breisach (P. 240).
11. General von der Tann occupies Orleans (P. 326).
12* Commencement of the bombardment of Soissons (P. 262).
General von Werder in £pinal (P. 370).
13* General Vinoy'H sortie against Clamart, Chatillon , and Bagneux
(P. 293).
St. Cloud is set on Hre by the cannonade of the French (P. 294).
15* Capitulation of Soissons (P. 262).
19* Beginning of the bombardment of Schlettstadt (P. 239).
Combat round Chateaudun (P. 326).
20. General von Werder in Vesoul (P. 370).
2J. Sortie against the V. Army Corps (P. 294).
22. Fight on the Oignon, at EtuK and Cussey. General von Werder beats
the French south-eastern army (P. 371).
24. Capitulation of the fortress of Schlettstadt (P. 239).
General von Werder at Gray (P. 372).
27. Capitulation of Mete (P. 296).
28« The French take the village of Le Bourget to the north of Paris
(P. 296).
30. The 2nd Garde-Infantry Division re-take Le Bourget (P. 296).
Thiers negotiates in Versailles (P. 297).
31* General von Werder occupies Dijon (P. 374).
NoTember.
2* Beginning of the bombardment of Neu-Breisach and Fort Mortier
(P. 240).
3. The investment of Belfort begun (P. 381).
6. The armistice negotiations are broken off (P. 298).
?• Fort Mortier capitulates (P. 241).
General von Manteufi'el marches from Metz (P. 362).
8. Capitulation of Verdun (P. 264).
General von der Tann evacuates Orleans (P. 327).
9« Fight at Coulmiers between General von der Tann and General
d'Aurelle de Paladines (P. 327).
10, Neu-Breisach capitulates (P. 241).
!!• . The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin takes the command against
d'Aurelle (P. 331).
15. The Grand Duke marches to the west (P. 331).
17. Fight of the 17th Division at Dreux (P. 331).
18. Fight of the 22nd Division at Chateauneuf (P. 331).
21. The 22nd Division occupies La Loupe (P. 331).
General von Manteuffel occupies Ham (P. 353).
22. The Grand Duke occupies Nogent le Rotrou (P. 332).
The bombardment of Thionville begun (P. 246).
23. Completion of the investment of Belfort (P. 383).
24. Manteuffel's advanced guard fights at Quesnel and Mezieres (P. 353).
Thionville capitulates (P. 246). «
The Grand Duke reaches La Ferte Bernard (P. 332).
Fights of the X. Army Corps against the right wing of the French
Loire Army at Ladon, Maizicres, and Bois commun (P. 334).
26. Capitulation of La Fere (P. 255).
27. Battle of Amiens. General von Manteuffel beats General Farre (P. 353).
23. The Parisians occupy Mont Avron (P. 300).
Engagement at Beanne La Bolande; the X. Army Corps repulses the
attack of \he French 18th and 20th Corps (P. 336).
413
NoTember.
General von Mantenffel occupies Amiens (P. 366).
29* Sortie by the Parisians against the positions of the VI. Armv Corps
(P. 301). #
30. Great sortie by the Parisians against the south-east front (P. 301 f.).
Brie and Champigny remain in possession of the French.
Deeember.
!• The Parisians strengthen themselves at Brie and Champigny (P. 304).
General von Manteuffel commences the march upon Rouen (P. 356).
2« The Saxons and Wurtembergers , supported by the II. and VI. Army
Corps fight round Brie and Champigny (P. 306).
Beginning of the combat at Orleans between Prince Frederick Charles
and General d'Aurelle. Fight at Orgbres, Patay, Poupry, Loigny
(P. 337).
3« The ^Parisians retire upon the right bank of the Marne (P. 307).
Combats at Chevilly and Chilleurs near Orleans (P. 339).
The bombardment of Belfort begun (P. 383).
4« Combats at Cercottes and GiBy. Retreat of the French in two se-
parate bodies (P. 340).
5« Prince Frederick Charles occupies Orleans (P, 340).
6« General von Manteuffel occupies Rouen (P. 357).
8« Engagement at Beaugency. The Grand Duke beats General Chanzy
(P. 341).
9. The Grand Duke occupies Bou valet and Cernay (P. 342).
Occupation of Dieppe by one of Manteuffel's detachments (P. 367).
10. General Chanzy is forced to retreat upon Venddme (P. 342).
12. Pfalzburg capitulates (P. 244).
The bombardment of Montmedy begun (P. 247).
13. Prince Frederick Charles's march against Vendome (P. 342).
Montmedy capitulates (P. 247).
15* {Engagement on the Loir between Prince Frederick Charles and Ge-
neral Chanzy (P. 342).
16. Prince Frederick Charles occupies Vendome (P. 343).
IS. Fight at Nuits. The Baden Division beats the French under Cremer
(P. 378).
19. Prince Frederick Charles takes up a position of observation at Orleans
(P. 343).
21* Sortie by the Parisians against the Garde-Corps and the Saxons (P. 309).
23« Battle on the Hallue. General von Manteuffel beats General Faidherbe
(P. 359).
27* Commencement of the artillery attack upon Paris. Bombardment of
Mont Avron (P. 310).
Combats at Montoire and La Chartre in the neighbourhood of Ven-
dome (P. 344).
28. Combat at Longprd (Northern Army^ (P. 361).
29* Occupation of Mont Avron by the Saxons (P. 311). ,
30« Combat at Souchez (Northern Army) (P. 361).
31. Combat of the 20th Division at Venddme (P. 344).
The castle Robert le Diable in Normandy is stormed (P. 362).
January 1871.
2« M^ci^res capitulates (P. 248).
The bombardment of P^ronne begun (P. 266).
2-3. Combats at Bapaume. Faidherbe's attacks repulsed by General von
Goben (P. 362).
414
Jftmiftrj*
4* General von Bentheim icatters the French troops upon the left bank
of the Seine near Ronen (P. 864).
6. The Bonthem at|ack upon Paris begun. Bombardment of the sonthern
forts (P. 312).
Rocroy taken by a conp de main (P. 249).
The advance upon Le Mans beg^n (P. 344).
6-lS* Combats against General Chanzy, which end with his complete defeat,
and the occupation of Le Mans (P. 345).
8. The bombardment of the city of Paris begun (P. 316).
9« Engagement at Villersexel. General von Werder stops Bourbaki's
march by a flank attack (P. 887).
Capitulation of P^ronne (P. 256).
10* Sortie by the Parisians against Clamart (P. 817).
13. Sortie by the Parisians against Meudon and Clamart as well as against
Le Bonrget (P. 317).
14* The camp of Conlie near Le Mans is found forsaken (P. 360).
16-1 7* Battle of Belfort. Bourbaki's repeated attacks upon General von
Werder's position on the Lisaine are beaten back (P. 388).
!ۥ The bombardment of Longwy begun (P. 248).
19* Great sortie by the Parisians against Versailles (P. 317).
General von Hartmann occupies Tours (P. 361).
Battle of St. Qnentin. General von Goben beats General Faidherbe
(P. 364).
21, The bombardment of St. Denis begun (P. 319).
23« Commencement of the armistice-negotiations (P. 320). '
26. Longwy capitulates (P. 248).
26-27. At 12 o'clock at night firing at Paris ceases (P. 320).
28* Conclusion of the convention of Versailles, which includes the capi-
tulation of Paris (P. 321).
29* Fights at Sombacourt and Chaffois. Manteuffel beats the advanced troops
of the French eastern army (P. 398).
SO* Fight at Frasne. The French .eastern army is forced still nearer to
the Swiss frontier (P. 398).
31. General von Manteuffel occupies Ste. Marie. Fight at Vaux (P. 399).
Febmarj.
1. Fight at Pontarlier with the eastern army retreating into Switzerland
(P. 399).
16. Fall of Belfort (P. 400).
Index.
A.
Ablis, surprise of 291.
Achiet, fight at 362.
Albert, Crown Princei v. Saxony.
Albert, Prince of Pmssia, t. Loire
Army 291.
Alvensleben I, General von, v. Sedan
and Paris.
Alvensleben n, Qeneral von, v. Vion-
ville, Gravelotte, Investment of
Metz, Loire Army.
Amanvillers, v. Gravelotte 188.
Amiens, battle of 368.
Anonld, fight at 370.
Armistice, conclusion of 320. Tenor of
it, V. convention of Versailles 401.
Artenay, fight at 388.
Aubigpy, v. Noisseville 209.
Aurelle de Paladines, General d', v.
Loire Army. His advance' against
Orleans 326. Plan for a march
upon Paris 333.
Auxonne, march upon 375.
Avron, Mont 310.
B.
Bagneux, sortie fight at 298.
Bapanme, combats at 862.
Bar le Due, head-quarters of the King,
23rd of August 146.
Bavilliers, v. Belfort 388.
Bazaine, Marshal, takes the com-
mand 92, conduct after Vionville
118, during Noisseville 220, comp.
Meta 197.
Baseilles, combatronnd, v. Sedan 167.
Bazoches, fight at 888.
Beaucourt, v. Hallne 368.
Beaugency, engagement at 841.
Beaumont, engagement at 166.
BeaunelaRolande, engagement at 336.
Belfort, fortress 83, Investment of
381, Battle of 388, Fall of 400.
Bellegarde, Fight at 336.
Bellevue, interview at 176.
Bentheim, General von, v. Courcelles
and northern army.
Be8an9on, v. southern army 368, 370,
386, 396.
Bessoncourt, sortie at 383.
B^thoncourt, fight at 390.
Beyer, General von, v. Strasburg
87, Southern army 374.
Bi^vre, sortie fight at 286.
Bismarck, interview with Napoleon
174, negotiations with Favre 270,
289 and 320.
Bitsch, fortress 86.
Blois 341.
Bois commun, fight at 334.
Bois de la Cusse, v. Gravelotte 131.
Bois des Geniveaux, v. Gravelotte 132.
Bombardment of Paris 271, 312, of
Strasburg 228.
Boncourt, v. Nuits 379.
Bonneuil, sortie fight at 304.
Bomy, V. Courcelles 92 (the French
call the battle of Courcelles, the
battle of Bomy.)
Bose, General von, v. Woerth.
Boulay, fight at 326.
Bourbaki, v. Vionville, northern ar-
my 362, south-eastern army 886.
Bourg, sortie fight at 287.
Bourges, pursuit after 343.
Bourget, Le 296.
Bouvalet, fight at 842.
Brandenburg, count, v. Vionville 109.
Breisach, Neu- 240.
Breteuil, encounter at 862.
Brevannes, sortie fight at 802.
Briare, pursuit to 848.
41 n
Brie, sortie fight at 306.
Bronssrt, Lieutenant Colonel 173.
Bronvelliers, fight at 370.
Bnddenbrock, General von, v. Vion-
ville, Loire Army.
Bueancy, cavalry fight at 150, 151.
Bussnrel, fight at 390.
Bazenval, sortie against 317.
C.
Cambriels, General, v. south-eastern
army 370.
Camps , for the instruction of the
French armies 328.
Canrobert, Marshal, v. Vionville,
Noisseville 213.
Carignan 158.
Castres, v. St. Quentin 365.
Cercottes, fight at 340.
Cernay, fight at 342.
Chaffois, fight at 398.
Ch&lons, army of 81, 145.
Champcnois, v. Gravelotte 136.
Champigny 304, 306.
Chantrenne, v. Gravelotte 132.
Chartres 290, 325.
Chateaudun, destruction of 325.
Chateanneuf, taking of 331.
Chateau-Thierry , head-quarters of
the King 283.
Chatillon, sortie fight at 293.
Chatillon-sur-Seine 377, 393.
Ch^hery 161.
Chenebier, fight at 391.
Chene-populeux 150.
Chevilly, sortie fight at 289 (Paris.)
Chevilly, fight at 339. (Orle'ans.)
Chilleurs, fight at 339.
Choisy-le-Roi, sortie fight at 289, 301.
Clamart, sortie fight at 293, 317.
Clermont 152.
Cocuilly, sortie fight at 302.
Colombey, v. Courcelles 92. (The
battle of Courcelles is also called
the engagement at Colombey; v.
Noisseville 208.)
Conlie, camp of 350.
Corbie, v. Amiens and Hallue 358.
Courcelles, battle of 92 f.
Coulmiers, engagement of 327.
Cremer, v. south-eastern array 378.
Croix near Delle 387.
Cussey, fight at 371.
D.
Daigny, v. Sedan 166.
Danjoutin, v. Belfort 384.
Dannemarie, fight at 396.
Daours, v. Hallue 359.
Debschutz, detachment 375.
Declaration of war 15.
Degenfeld, General von 369.
Diedenhofen, v. Thionville 244.
Dieppe, occupation of 357.
Dijon, occupation of 374.
Division , of the French Loire Armv
340.
Donch^ry, v. Sedan 165.
Douay, Abel, General, v. Weissen-
burg.
Douay, Felix, General 83, 147.
Doubs 395.
Drancy, sortie fight at 309.
Dreux, fight at 331.
Ducrot, General, v. Sedan and Paris.
Dugny, sortie fight at 309.
E.
Elsashausen, v. Woerth 68.
Epernon occupied 291.
Epinai-les-St. Denis 310. Gambetta's
error respecting it 305.
Epinal occupied 370.
Etivat, fight at 369.
Etuz, fight at 371.
Evreux, reconnaissance at 290.
Faidhcrbe, General, v. northern ar-
my.
Failly, General de, retreat after
Woerth 82.
Farre, General 352.
Favre, Jules, interview with Bis-
marck 270, 289, 320.
Fenay, fight at 379.
Ferrieres, head-quarters of the King
283, 289.
Flanville, v. Noisseville 211, 217.
Flavigny, fight at, v. Vionville 108.
Floing, V. Sedan 166.
Forbach, retreat upon 76.
Frahier. fight at 391.
Francs-tireurs 190.
Fransecky, General von, arrival at
Gravelotte 139, fight round Brie
and Champigny 307.
Frasne, fight at 398.
Er^chencourt, v. Hallue 859.
Fresnois, v. Sedan 166.
417
Frederick Charles, Prince of Prassia,
V. Vionville, Gravelotte, Noisse-
ville, Metz, Loire Army
Froschweiler, v. Woerth 69.
Frossard, General, attack apon Saar-
briicken 2nd of August 50, engage-
ment at SaarbrUcken 6th of August
71, retreat 77, v. Vionville, Noisse-
irille.
0.
Gambetta 184, 327, v. Loire army.
Trochu's opinion of him 269.
Garches, sortie against 317.
Garde Mobile 86, 189.
Garde Nationale 85, 190.
Garibaldi, t. South-eastern army 376,
395.
Gauchy, v. St. Quentin 365.
Geisberg at Weissenburg 56.
Gentelles, fight at 354.
Gersweiler, skirmish at 49.
Gidy, fight at 340.
Gien, pursuit to 341.
Givonne, v. Sedan 166.
Gliimer, General von, v. South-eastern
army 378.
Goben, (General von, v. Saarbriicken,
Rouen, Bapaume, St. Quentin.
Gdrsdorf, v. Woerth 67.
Gravelotte, battle of 118—142.
Gray, March upon 372.
Gunstett, v. Woerth 64.
H.
Habonville, v. Gravelotte 133.
Hagenau, reconnaissance of 50.
Hallue, battle on the 359.
Ham, occupation of 353; re-taken
by the French 358.
Hartmann, Baron von. General, v.
Weissenburg , Woerth , Sedan,
Paris.
Hartmann, Lieutenant general, v.
Metx, Loire Army.
H^ricourt, fight at 390.
Hemy, castle, royal head-quarters
89.
I.
Illy, V. Sedan, battle of 169.
Interview of the King of Prussia with
Napoleon 176, Napoleon's with
Bismarck 174, Bismarck's with
Favre 270, 289, 320.
J.
Jarny, v. Gravelotte, battle of*
87
Javy, V. St. Quentin 365.
Jussy, V. Gravelotte 129.
K.
Kaninchenberg 77.
Kehl, bombardment of the town 229.
Kirchbach, General von, v. Woerth,
Sedan, Paris.
King William of Prussia joins the
army 52. Interyiew with Napoleon
176. Also V. Metz, Sedan,
Paris.
Kraatz-Koschlau , General von , v.
Vionville 113, Loire Army.
Kummer, General von, v. Noisseville,
Metz (Kummer's Division) 222.
L.
La Chartre, fight at 344.
La Croix, fight at 349.
Ladmirault, General, v. Vionville,
Noisseville.
Ladon, fight at 335.
La F^re, fortress 254.
La Fertd Bernard 332, v. Le Mans.
Lagny, station of 313.
La Loupe, capture of 331.
Lamotterouge, v. Motterouge.
Langres, fortified place 377.
Laon, explosion of the citadel of 284.
Leboeuf, Marshal 92, v. Vionville,
Noisseville.
LeBourget, sortie fights at 289, 294,
Legions 190.
Le Groslay, sortie fight at 309.
Lehmann, detachment of Colonel 107.
Le Mans, advance upon 344, Crisis
at 348—351.
Les Errnes, fight at 381.
L'Hay, sortie fight at 301.
Lichtenberg, fortified place 86.
Lisaine, battle on the, v. Belfort
388—893.
Loigny, fight at 338.
Loir, fights on the 342, 344.
Loire armies, operations of the 323
—351.
Longeau, combat at 877.
Longpr^, V. Hallue 361.
Longwy, fortress 248.
Lorraine, table land of 80.
Liitzelstein, fortified place 86.
Lynker, detachment of Colonel, v.
Vionville 107.
418
Mac Mahon, Marshal, t. Weissenbnrg,
Woerth, Sedan.
Mairy 160.
Maizieres, fight at 886.
Malancoart, ▼. Gravelotte 132, 187.
BlalmaiBOD, sortie fight at 894.
Manstein, GeDeral von, v. Vionville,
Gravelotte, Metz, Loire Army.
Mantes, reconnaissance to 290.
Mantenfifel, Baron von, General, v.
NoisseviUe, Northern army, South-
em army*
Marat, fight at 887.
Marine Infantry 189.
Marsal, fortress 90.
Mars-la-Tonr, v. Vionville.
Meanx, head-quarters of the King 283.
Mecklenburg-Schwerin , Grand Duke
of 330, V. Tonl, Soissons, Loire Ar-
my. — William, Duke of, v. Vion-
ville, Laon, Paris.
Mercy le Haut, v. Noisseville 217.
Mesly, sortie fight at 304.
Metz, army of 81, fortress 141, Battles
of, V. Courcelles, Vionville, Grave-
lotte, Investment of 196—224,
Capitulation of 296.
Meudon, heights of 261 , sortie fight
317.
Meung, fight at 341.
Meuse army, or IV. army, Formation
of 143, Sedan, Paris.
M^zi^res 162, 248.
M^ieres, fight at (Northern army)
853.
Mobilization of the army of the North
German Confederation 15.
Moltke, General, von, interview with
Napoleon 174.
Montauban, Cousin, v. Palikao.
Mont Avron 300.
Montbeliard, fight at, v. Belfort 390.
MonWddy, fortress 246, 288, 152.
Montmesly, sortie fight at 304.
Montoire, fight at 344.
Montoy, v. Noisseville 211.
Montretout, sortie against 317. En-
trenchment of 261.
Mont Val€rien, battle of, v. sortie
on 19th January 317.
Moselle line, strategical importance
of the 79, 91, 99.
Motterouge, General de la, advance
from Orleans 323.
Moulin de la Tour 287.
Monzon 157.
»•
Nancy 90.
Napoleon III. emperor, resigns the
command to Bazaine 92. His own
reasons for the failure of his plans
17, V. Metz, Sedan.
Nen-Breisach and Fort Mortier 240.
Neuville St. Amand, v. St. Quentin
365.
Nied, river 90.
Nogcnt-le-Rotron 382.
Noisseville, battle of*204.
Noisy-le-Grand , sortie fight at 302,
307.
Northern army, operations of the 351.
Nouart, fight at 154.
Nuits, fight at 378.
0.
Oignon, fight on the 371.
Order of battle, of the French army
22; of the German army 32;
of the French 12th Corps 146;
of the army of Paris 278.
Organizations, Gambetta's 327.
Org^res, fight at 338.
Orleans, strategical importance 324.
Occupation by General v. d. Tann
325. Evacuation of 326. Battle
of 337.
Ormes, fight at 326.
P.
Pacy, fight at 290.
Palikao, count, plan for the relief
of Metz 147. His relations with
Trochu 268.
Pange, fight at, v. Courcelles battle
of 93.
Parign^ I'Evgque, v. Le Mans 347,349-
Paris, importance of the city 186,
257, 269. Fortifications of 259.
Army of 263, 278. Equipment
of 276. Provisioning of 274.
Siege of 257 — 321. Investment
of 284.
Patay, fight at 338.
Peace 409.
Perches, Hautes and Basses, OuterforU
of Belfort 400.
P€ronne , fortress , conquest of 255.
Importance for the Northern arm/
361.
419
Petit-Bicestre, sortie fight at 287.
Petit-Magny, fight at 381.
Pfalzharg, fortress 86. Investment of
242. Conquest of 244.
Plessis-Piqnet, sortie fight at 287.
Pont-k-Monsson , importance of this
point for the Moselle-line and for-
tress of Metz 90, 100.
Pontarlier, fight at 899.
Pont Noyelles, v. Hallae 359.
Poailly, passage across the Meuse
at 168.
Ponpry, fight at 838.
Prisoners of war, French, their num-
ber at the end of 1870 312, at the
end of the war 409.
Q.
Qnesnel, fight at 353.
B.
Rambervillers, fight at 370.
Raon r£tape, fight at 369.
Regiments de Marche 188.
Reille , Napoleon's adjutant-general
173.
Beneve, fight at 373.
Republican government of the 4th
of September 1870. Its charac-
teristics. 182.
Rethel, Mac Mahon's head-quarters
24th of August 150.
Rezonville, battle of, v. Gravelotte
130.
Rheims , Mac Mahon's head-quarters
21th of August 1870 149. Head-
quarters of the King of Prussia
5th Sept. 283.
Rheinbaben's cavalry division, v. Saar-
briicken, Vionville.
Rheinheim, skirmish at 50.
Robert le Diable, storming of the
castle 362.
Rocroy, conquest of the fortress 249.
Ronconrt, v. Gravelotte, battle of
132, 134, 137.
Rouen , march of General von Man-
teuifel upon 356.
Rougemont, fight at 381.
Rozerienlles, v. Gravelotte 139.
8.
Saarbriicken, attack upon, by Fros-
sard's corps on the 2nd of August
50. Engagement at 71. The
smaller fights in July 49.
Saxony, Crown Prince Albert of, ▼.
Gravelotte, Sedan, Paris.
Saxons (XII. Army Corps), v. Grave-
lotte, Sedan, Paris.
Sapignies, combat at, v. Bapaume362.
Sceaux, sortie fight at 286.
Schlettstadt, conquest of the fortress
239.
Schmeling, reserve division, v. Viller-
sexel 387 and Belfort 388.
Schrecklingen 50.
Schwartzkoppen, General von, v. Vion-
ville 109.
Schweyen, skirmishes at 50.
Sedan, battle of 165. Capitulation
of, tenor 175.
Seille, river, importance of 90, 219.
Servigny, fight round , v. Noisseville
211.
SoisSons, conquest of the fortress 251.
Sombacourt, fight at 398.
Souchez, V. Hallue 361.
Southern army, German, v. Man-
teuffel's arrival 393.
South-eastern army , operations of
367—400.
Speichern , storming of the heights
71.
St. Ail, village of, v. Gravelotte 133.
St. Calais, v. Le Mans, advance
upon 347.
St. C^lerie, fight at, v. Le Mans,
battle of 349.
St. Cloud, destruction of the ch&tean
of 294.
St. Corneille, fight at, v. Le Mans,
battle of 349.
St. Denis, bombardment of 319.
St. Hilaire, fight at 291.
St. Humbert, v. Gravelotte 130.
Ste. Marie aux Chines, combat round,
V. Gravelotte, battle of 134.
St. M€ndhoi^d, march of the III.
army by 151. .
St. Privat la Montague, combat round,
v. Gravelotte, baUle of 133— -138.
St. Quentin, battle of 364.
'St. Seine FEglise, fight at 373.
Stains, sortie fight at 309.
Steinmetz, General von, v. Saar-
briicken, Courcelles, Gravelotte.
Stoifel, Colonel, commandant of Mont
Avron 311.
420
Stonne, head-quarters of Mac Mahon
152.
Strasbnrg, strategical importance of
the fortress 79. Forti6cations of
87. Siege of 226. Opinions
on bombardment of 228. Capita-
lation of 286.
Stiilpnagel, General Yon, v. Vionnlle,
battle of.
Switserland, entry of the French into
899*
T.
Tann, General von der, sent to Or-
igins 291. Occapation of Orl^ns
bj 826.
Thennes 353.
Thiais, sortie fight at 289.
Thiers, negotiations with 297.
ThionviUe, conquest of the fortress
of 244.
Toul, importance of, and conqnest
of 250.
Tours, the government delegation
leave the town 842. The 19th Divi-
sion reaches Tours 344. General
von Hartmann occupies Tours 861.
Toury 291, 332.
Tresckow's Land wehr Division , invest-
ment of Belfort 381.
Trochu, General, as Commander in
Chief and governor of Paris 266.
Tiimpling, General von, v. Sedan,
Paris.
U.
Uhrich, (General, commandant of
Strasbnrg, 87, /. Siege of Stras-
burg.
y.
Vaucouleurs, head - quarters of the
Crown Prince 21st— 28rd of Au-
gust 1870 144.
Vanx, V. Gravelotte 129, 189.
Vaux, fight at (south-extern army)
399.
Venddme, march of Prince Frederick
Charles upon 342. Engagement at,
V. Loir, Combats on the 342.
Verdun, in reference to Bazaine's
army 97, 118. Attack of the IV.
army upon 144. Conquest of 253.
Verneville, v. Gravelotte 129.
Versailles, bead-qvariers of die King
during the siege of Paria 292.
Convention of 401.
Vesoul, head-qaarters of Greneral von
Werder, 20th and 21st of October
1870, 370. Concentratioii of the
XIV. Army Corps near 386.
Vierzon, General d'AureUe's position
at 326. Pursuit of the French
Loire Army to 341.
Villa-Coablay, siege park of Paris at
813.
Villars, v. Nuits 879.
Villejuif, sortie fights at 287, 289.
Villeneuve-St.-6eorges , passage of
the V. Army Corps across the Seine
at 286.
Villers-Bretonneux, fight at, v. Amiens
364.
Villersezel, fight at 387.
Villiers, sortie fights at 302, 307.
Vinoy, General, v. Paris 283, 317.
Vionville , battle of (Mars la Toor)
99-117.
Vitry le Fran^ais, occupied by the
m. Army 161.
Volklingen, skirmish at 60.
Vosges, strategical importance 'of the
67, 79, 368. Conflicts in the 368.
Voigts-RhetK, General von, v. Vion-
ville, Loire army 336.
Voncq, conquest of the village by
dismounted hussars 164.
W.
Wedell's brigade, v. Vionville 109.
Wehrden, skirmish at 49.
Weissenburg, fight at 64—67.
Werder, General von, v. Strasburg
and South-eastern army.
Wimpffen, General, v. Sedan, battle
of 168, 174.
Woerth, battle of 68— 71.
Wurtemberg, Prince Augustus of, ▼
Gravelotte 136, Sedan, Paris.
Wurtembergers , v. Woerth, Sedan,
Paris, Combats round Brie , Cbam-
pigny and Villiers 302—308.
Z.
Zastrow, General von, v. Saarbrucken,
Metz.
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