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Full text of "The French Navy During the Recent War with Tunis"

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■ 










1 




HARVARD COLLEGE 
LIBRARY 


\m/ 

THANSFEBRED 

mOM TMK 

GRADUATE SCHOOL 

or 

BUSINESS ADMmBTRATION 










1 




OPERATIONS 



k 



THE FRENCH NAV . 



BBCENT WAK WITH TDNI8. 



AitaLATXD vaoM L'AMitiB Makitimk (1880-1801), 

BY 

Linrtaunt M. FISHES TSIOHT, U. B. Xavy. 



omcB or VATAL ntTKLuoncK, 

BITRKA.U OB* NA.VIO-A.XIOX, 
XAVr ItSPAKTHlXT. 

1HS3. 



WASniNGTOlf! 
OOTSBXIIEKT PBIXTIirO OFPIOK. 



, TV (wv Nj^^ • ^n„„o course uimw 

J MCIIVIO r (jtwaH THE 

lUaiHUS ADMIMSIRKTUM 

ail**-*. '<;»•« 




TRANSIiATOR'S NOTE. 



Am there im noch diraTslty in the way of spelling Aimbiaa proper names, I have 
followed^ wherever poeeible, the spelling given in Rami Si McNally^s ''Index Atlas 
mi the Worid." 

In the original aKiole there were several diagrams, that have uecessarilj been 

•■BittMl. 




THE TDNISIAN EXPEDITION. 

•1 



^ 



OBlfEBAI. REifARKS. 

9 Ikr M reganis tbe ex|)cditioti to Tunin, our tnek codimtiih only tb* 
e pvsn by the navy to the land forces. Tbe diiilomut: 

I has fciven rise to ao many debatpfi, not only id Farlininenc. 
bvfe wlmo in tl>e acwsiMiiHsnt, tb»t it *kv\i\k 8iit>nrdiiDiia to treat of it beis 

Tbe cabinet of ^ptembtT 23, ItlUW (ua mentioned by M. RnrthiSlenij^. 
8Bb)l-HiUtn>, uiniBter of forpigti affairs, in a circular uddrcHKcd J 
31^ ISSl, to tbe reprpsentativM of France abroad), "bad foiind, on as- 
mmmittfi tbe n-innof i^vomuient, tbat tbe Tunisian (laedlion bad become 
mmth rotniiglrd, and that ihi-»ltiialio[i wan becoming more conipllcRted 
•ffV7 day by a sDCTMsion uf nventa detrimental to Frfncb InSnence In 
tta KrgBDcy, and likely even to coinproiuidv oar dominion in Altiicra." 
Ftanoehad two in^evancfw; one of them waf of loiifr «tandiug, the 
«Arr iiiiii m'<r«' rtHx-cii and of much gn-nter niouu'ut. For many y^ars 
MrfhativwwiiikstataofooatifiiiAldittartiMwe; oar tribM border- 
ia|[ vpon Tnnta ooaM not enjoy a moment of repose. Depredatfona of 
Icrritory byXaniaian troopeor by ananbdned tribes, bnniing of forest*, 
eoDirmband of war, refage given to malefsctora, pillaf^ng of veaaela, 
robberiea of all kinds, mnrdera and assassinations — all \Uese offenses 
SBd all tbeae crimes increase'l beyond endnranoe. In ten years tbe 
oatngea that ooald be officially stated alone "amounted to 2,379; that 
■, to about 2S0 per annum." The Government of tbe Bey was utterly 
peverless to prevent this inveterate evil even when it wished to do ao, 
■hick waa not alwayathe case; and the damages, when obtained, were 
•at of all proportion to theiiuoriea saatained, not to mention the bipws 
conatantJy inflicted apon onr prestige throagh the impanity of tbe offend- 
tn, who Bometimea even profited by the connivance of the local author- 

NiML 

Anolber grievance of an altogether different natnre required on onr 
part, according to M. Barth^lemy Salnt-Hitaire, stilt more eerioas at- 
mtioa. SInee the conqoeat of Algiers, during nearly half a centnry, 
Mi despite a few trivial diapntes, we bad lived in very goo<l accord with 
Tnna; bnt daring the year 1880 onr relationa became singularly altered, ^ 

Md it was evident tbat in the Government of tbe Bey there was a £&EtT_ 

■tettcaatioUed by impnidentadvice,had adopted a policy of ousting tu 
kM all o«r «ntetprtee»,- ofigaoriag oarmoat aathentio rigbla -, ot 'v\o- 
*IV mii eoatnteta with as ; of tavoriag at oar expenae ttio mod ua- 



6 OFBSATIONS OF THE FBBNCH MATT 

jnstifiabteriTatries; of rejectingoarclaimB.evenwbennudoi 
foanded, in order to admit tlie most illegal pretenNOtiB of onn 
of menacing persons and property for tbe sole faalt of being 
heaping up vexations aadt outrages of all kinds ; in a wore 
mining in detail tbe credit of France In Tunis io order to st 
and to imperil even the security of onr great African colon, 

ThiK was a state of affairs that could not last indefinitely 
ter^st, and tbe simplest form of prudence made it oar dnt 
end to it ; but, from couBiderations of a high order, France ba 
to show mncb forbearance towards all these niacbiuationa 
preferred not to encourage byattacbing to them undue impoi 
was still hesitating when the unexpected attack of the V. 
cided her, permittingheroo longer to delay avenging the mi 
soldiers. 

The result of our expedition is well known. Thanks to tl 
our young army, nnder the direction of vigilant and skillful 
insurgent tribes hare been repulxed, almost without loss ol 

This is not the first time that France has bad to interfere 
affairs. In April, 1864, an insurrection broke out in the ref 
the insnigents arrived within a day's march of the city of Tui 
masters of tbe interior and east coast of Tunis. The Eiirof 
a massacre. France sent a naval division to Tunis, but 
hours afterwards a Turkish commissioner arrived with V 
May 28 our Mediterranean Hfjuadron anchored bufore Tun 
miral Bouet-Wuillanmez notified the Turkish commiseioi 
wonld sink any TnrkiMh vesBcl attempting to land men a 
tbe Tunisian coast. The landing was not made; and Ni 
Ualdar Effendi left the harbor of Ooletta and returned w 
frigates to Turkish waters. The Ottoman Porte bad mad 




DURIHG THE RECENT WAR WITH TUNIS. 7 

port it to the point where political exigencies might reqnire the decisive 
Mow to be stmck." 

That period is now very distant when the press and even the Parlia- 
ment supported the specious theory that the advent of torpedoes had 
deprived the navy of its usefnluess, and that that costly institntion 
•booM be much reduced if not altogether abolished. 

The Chilo-Peruvian war has already shown the preponderant part 
which the navy may be called upon to play in general strategy. This 
ift still further shown by the Tunisian expedition. This expedition, in 
tS^t, like the Chilian war, independently of the particular interest it 
pn ss esn es from a naval standpoint, possesses a still greater interest as 
reirmnis the conduct of combined operations of a fleet and an army. 

The special mission which devolved upon the navy in the Tunisian 
exprdition consisted, in the first place, of the transportation of the troops 
and their baggage, and of insuring the revictualing of the exi>edition- 
iry forcf. As prompt action was necessary, the Government decided 
to call for all the steamers of the Transatlantic Company immediately 
Bvailable. Four hours after receiving notice the company was ready, 
smi, without interfering with its mail service or disturbing its regular 
IiDra» it effected the transport to Bona and La Calle. The port of Toulon 
a14o furnished several large transi>orts. In five days these vessels 
vere overhauled and their engines tested. The squadron of evolution 
VM re^erve<i for unforeseen contingencies. 

fWniiles the service of transi)ortation and revictualing, apparently so 
'nd:ti^ tint in reality kg important, the niivy was to take ])art in theop- 
•^r^iiMh.n in a more dirert manner by etre4;ting and protecting with its 
■wri ivMMircvK the landing of troops on the coast of Tunis. 

Thi^ o|HTation of landing the troops wa8 the most deliciite and trouble- 
•■•mt* part of the navy's duty. The Tunisian i'jpedition^ if it had nerved 
90* other pttrp<Mr than to d rate attention to the importance of prtlimimiry 
ktiifhdife of the eharaeterinticH of titr eoant lehrr a landimj is to be made^ 
«j tr^U tu of the jHiHnennion of a proper vquiprntnt of light ern^ hoata^ and 
itiattng kttigrn^ would hare bi*en of immense htiujit to our naUorn, The dif- 
Vultu-rt wert* at times sucli that at Jerba, while landing the niule>s 
AXid hornet, they were obliged io remain all day in the lighters, where the 
^A iniveretl them at times as hi^h as the breast. Here let us remark, 
u |ia«^in^, that the exiR'Hence of this expedition s^^eins to demonstrate 
riM- »u|ienonty of the Boulogne pinnace, which is ii4lapte<l to all kinds 
"f iiea-ciuifit, and which is lifted by the breakers instea4l of bein/i^sub- 
iM-r^ff^, art often hapiiens with the lighters. 

From an administrative i>oint of view the exptnlition has shown, 
uaong other things, the ne<*essity of n»storinj;, at least provisionally, 
:b« |iort regulations <»f Sfax, Susii, Turbarkah, (toletta, and Hiserta. 

Thr reader will not exjiect us to enter here into the detjiils ot' the 
ailitiunk' operations on the Tnuinmu noil. It is suflicient^ in on\ev Vo Vl\v^ 



8 0P£EATI0N8 OF THE FSGNCH NAVY 

a general sbeteti of the campaign, to remember tbat the ei 
force waR composed of five brigades, the command of w! 
~~^ trosted to General Fo rgemol . Of these five brigades, two, 
fVom the province of OoDBtantiue, were to operate by the a 
M^jerdah to the south of the eaemy'n country, and the 
called brigades of reserve or support, coming from Frai 
take the coast for a base, establishing themselves in the is 
b rkah, which had been designated in the first place as 
landing. These last three brigades were to form the left 
army. 



APSIL1S,1B8L 

On April 16, 1881, Oeberal Forgemol, commanding the 
ary force, ordered the captain of the Surveillante to send i 
Hy^ue to visit the coast of Turbarkab. According to bis 
the captain of tbe Hyfene (Lieutenant Claze) was to confine 
simple reconnaissance, and was to avoid an action unless it 
npon him. He was to try to communicate with the inbabi 
gather information about the disposition of the native popv 
mainland, as well as tbe attitude of the Tunisian garriso 
moreover, to examine ft-om a military point of view tbe ii 
preaches, the houses, and esi»ecially tbe fort situated on thi 
mainland, its ranges, the sides where it could be attacked 
those by which its approaches could be defended, and also tl 
to land a body of men. He was also to determine the elc 
should be given to tbe guns of the fleet to reach the fort 
to st-« that the isonndlngB weni niiirk<'il rorrt^clly on ilie cha 




DURING THE RECENT WAR WITH TIJNI8. 9 

TboMjid seotinela. On the mainland there were about 400 men. 
While the boat was taking soundings, the natives, angered by seeing 
It HO near, crowded into the fort, loading their guns. They filled the 
air with shouts, calling for their officers, and would undoubtedly have 
conmitted some overt act of hostility if the captain of the Hy^ue had 
Doi rpcalleil the whale lM>at. Just then a shot was heard and a bullet 
fell alongside. This shot was succeeded by several others, and the cap- 
tain, in oliedience to his instructions, weighed anchor and steamed away 
at full s|»eed, after having received about forty shots, which whistled 
faamiletiiily over the deck. 

On hMving, the llyene steered for a small Italian craft that was 
making for the island. She then returned under Gape Tnrbarkah, and 
thrt-ailed her way, at a little distance from the coast, as far as Cape 
lUmx. Several musket-shots were fired at her from the mountains. 
The cattle were grazing, and the men were working in the fields. The 
gu U-boat came to anchor off La Calle. 

Thus was accomplished the reconnaissance of Turbarkah. Lieuten- 
ant Cluze had determined ihe position of his anchorage by means of 
angles, and the soundings he found to agree substantially with tbose on 
the charts. The fort, on the faces which command the anchorages to the 
eai^c and to the west, was armed with eight guns, four on the front and 
two on each bastion. These guns ap|>eared to be old-fashioned muzzle- 
kttder*. In the southeast bastion, however, there was a heavier gun. 
The fiionth face was somewhat dilapidated. The island wiis almost coni- 
f<U-r*Iy :iliandone4l, and tho chateau fort, in ruins, was not ann(Ml. 

1 fM- rt->uItH of tlu* n'l'onnaissance just made can be suinnuMl upas 



' •'.!••« ^: 



^^ itlj a >liip ariiuMl with heavy ^uiis anchonMl to the w«»st\vani to 

• .••utf tlje f«»ii. and a smaller ve>sel to inaki* the passage inipraetieahle 
^r.i r«i pifvi-nt re enforreineiits tVoni the niainhin<K the landing of troops 

• - •! iM 4 npation ot* tlie ishiiid wouhl be easy. I'or tliis piirpos<* it would 
•-■ !i»tt-»-.irv to be in positi(»n bv tlavbreak. Onee master t»t' tlie island 
' .•- {iiM <iinhl In* easily rapturiMl and held. 

7 // K I. A s It I s fi A I rr i: u a i: k a n, 

APRIL 2fS, 1881. 

I tit- T*»nrviMe. not liavin;: snllieicnt armor to attack a tort, embarked 
V. *r«*i»{is. material, and Iioi-m's 4lis<-liai;;e<l from thi» Suivrillaiiti*. 

1 !;f SniveiMante left the harbor o! l>ona Apiil 17, 1S'^1, at t» p. m., 
ik- •! .ft{>]N'ai«'fi l»ff(»ie TurlMikah, aiM-ompanied by tlie thin* ^mhi boats, 
"•< 'ti.i4.il, th«* I/'opard, and the II>cne. Sht* «'aiii((I the small tbiet* in- 
>:i<i*-4l ?<» a«*t as a (*<»rps ot' occupatiiin iltM) iiitantry, as'*etioii ot'artiHery. 
*:.-l a MM*ti4in of thr en;:ine<Ts), with its pro\ i.sions, h4»r.Ne,s, muh'.**, ami 

T4*war«l.H the end of tin* />;i»;i;:e an arri.Ient to the \l\e\\e > v\v;;\\\^ 
^'^Ufrr^I L^r to bt- taken in tou umi <ir/ave<l the arriviil oV \\\e m\vuvv\vva\ 



10 0FBBATI0N8 OF THE FBENCH HATT 

before tbe island, so that the people along the coast had tim 
the presence of the flotilla to the interior. The Snrveillant^ 
(7^ a. m., April 22} at 1,300 meters to tbe north of Bor 
Anothersbip, the Corr^ze, bad arrived with a re-enforcemen 
talious of the line) for tbe expeditionary force. But the ii 
actiof; cautiously, and above all tbe unfavorable state of the 
rendered the landing very perilons, necessitated a delay. 

Tbe following were tbe measures taken by tbe captain c 
veiltante should the governor refuse to surrender the fort, oi 
should resist, as he had said that be would : 

The )>oint chosen for the landing was the part of the b( 
eastward of the fort between the mouth of tbe river TnrI 
the sand sboal which at low water connected the island witl 
land. This place, which was the most sheltered and tbe most 
was of Hufficieut extent to permit tbe siinultaneoas landing 
boata We were, therefore, able to land so many men atom 
could protect themselves. The landing was cov(>red to tbe 
river, whose jtassage was commanded by the H.vftne and 
which a section of infantry had been embarked. The bills 
manded the landing place on tbe west and south, and the ravji 
the two that le<l to tbe fort, formed an amphitheater that c 
bekeptclearof the enemy by the flre of our artillery. Our Irt 
fore, could land without being seriously molested, pnivided tl 
ftttnt of the fort could lie silenced. This was the object to be : 
tbe bombardment which was to precede tbe landing. Tbe fo 
was very poorly armed; so far as we could find out, the only 
formidable was a rifled gun mounted in barbette on tbe 
bastion. 

Tbe Tonrvitle, encumbered witb men, horses, materia), aud 




DURING THE RECENT WAR WITH TUNIS. 11 

onftroidftble. On April 25, the swell havinggonedown somewhat^ the 
l»tAiii of the Surveillante seized the opportUDity which seemed alK)ut 
to mcaiie, feeling sure to linish on the next day an nudertaking which 
eoohi not be entirely effected in one afternoon. He sent a sammous to 
the governor, and on receiving an unsatisfactory reply he opened fire 
at 4 o'clock. The gunboats could not take part on account of the 
bfavy «well; they limited themselves to firing upon the island, which 
wMs^ i|airkly abandoned. The garrison^ seeing that when we occupied 
the fort they would be taken prisoners, fled to the mainland by way of 
the Handv Khoal. 

Although the fort made no reply, the Surveillante continue^l the fire 

antil the entire east front was dismantled, in order that the troops should 

bavtf no fear that the enemy might change their minds during the land- 

tDc and fire u^ion the lighters. The captain of the Leopard stated that 

ibr fire of the Surveillante (2,(NH) meters), after the first few shots, was 

AliiMi*t mathematically correct, while that of the Tourville (4,000) was 

i^ulsttNi more slowly, but also became very accurate. The effect of 

oar ibhrlls on the masonr>', of rather \hk>t quality, was very great. At 

S;>i tht-raptuin of the Surveillante, judging that the fort was then harm- 

'>r«% CHI that side, made signal to cease firing. At nightfall the Tourville 

iLrrrttrtI her electric light upon the shore, and several shells were fired in 

Uir ilirection of M>nie Kroomir camps, where large camp-fires were seen. 

Kjrly ill th«* morning of the 2Gth the Corri^ze and the Tourville took 

tknr |Kmitions f«»r the laiitling ; but the heavy swell cau8e<l by the fresh 

:.! *hr brt-«*/4> not ]M*rmitting a landing on the l)eadi, (Captain Lacombe 

■■»• . ^i^ihImi;: iIh' Siirvrilliiiito) onh»rcMl the ishiiid to b«* occupitMl by ,% 

•^ * "fi *>( thr iiiival brij;;ide iuid a section of infantry. This was 4loiu». 

•:.i '^»- ii«N»|iH nirt uitli no resistance. Our sailors made prisont'rs ot' 

'« • rijni?«i.ih xijihcrs ulioha4l remained on the island from fear of the 

\:<« :!j;r^. w(i«» had pilhi^ed them the night before. 

'Alt:!*- this was lN*iiig dour, the La (iallissoni<*re, tlyin^ th4' tla^^ or 
:>^T A«lmir.i] Conrad, was signaled from tlie |K)int of Turl)arkah, and 
•■'.•• '^mm aftt'rwanls rame to anehor near the ishin<l. 

rijr c-.iptain of the SurveiUante had siMit Commander (talarhr, who 
• x* Ml rlLirge of the landing, to see if tin* beach were suitable, and his 
>:i<'rt tw-in^ favonible, the landing was eoinmeneed, with the aid of tlie 
^''^jnj Unrith and large cutters of the La (iallissoniere. 
Thf U-ai-h having lN*en clean*d by th«» lire of the Surveillante and 
L- 2un Utiit"* detailetl for that s«»rvice, the landing pii>gressed very 
**;«:I*» The firnt body of tnM)ps was landed at 2 o'chn-k, and at ')..'>0 
■ i* * iilir** force, compiising artillery, baggage, and some inuh»s for th»» 
'^■»«-»-s», AX well AS a considerable cjuantity of provisions aiul munitions of 
>^r\r. WA« hafely landtMl, without any danger of its communiration 
« :b th«- il«-ft lieing interrupted. 

.\% •<^»n a«» A certain numlHT of mm had lM*en landiHl, Ibe lTiH>\\s \i\i\>k 
pr^MrMtiiit of the bvights that commnmU-il the l>each aud \\ve twev. 



12 OPERATIONS OP THE FEEKCH HATY 

and then others pnslied on to tbe fori, wlicre Ibe French flag i 
at 3.45. The Kharpt^liudters on the left, bad, by their fite. <lri 
Arabs who shotved themselves in the plain and »u the o] 
cUvitieu. Dnriiig all these operations Arab horseman were 
plnin and behind tbe sand dunes which bontered the east c 
were kept at adistanee, however, by the mnchine gans of the 
sels and the fire of the Hy^iic and Chaeal. 

The night was calm ; the plain and the river were kept i 
by the electric lii:bts of the vessels, and the Arabs did no 
the sentries. 

At 4.30 of the 27tb tbe landing of stores, &c., was re.tnm 
possible activity. The Snrvetllante fnrnished working pai 
Toarville and to the Corr^ze, but at 10,30, the beach having 
suitable ou account of the heavy sea, the lauding was sus| 
the boats were recalled. Tlie sea whs so high that most of 
were nuable to hoist their boats, which were .11 choral un 
of the iHlaud, where were also the gunboats. The weiitbersi 
very bud, and did not mend until the 28th. On the 29thf 
trouble, a few lioat^loadi) were lauded. 

Thus It may be seen that the bad weather caused much I 
deluy in landing nud discharging the boats; the gunboats it 
gnSenHl very much, whether at anchor or iu their eomniuDi< 
tbe port of Calle. 

On Ibe morning of April .30 the Surveillante arrived at 
rep«irted to Kear-Adniir»l Conrad, to co-operate in the oe 
Biserta. 

THE LASDiyO JT HISERTA. 

KiT 3. 1B81. 




DURING THE RECENT WAR WITH TUNIS. 13 

tev« rseciTed no eooimoBieatioo IVom foreign oonsnU. Thii satisfactory result, ob- 
vitlMWt firing a shot, is dne to the combined action of a heavy naval force, 
and seamen have displayed the most meritorion»seal. 

tnnsports mentiooed above were the Sarthe and the Drjade. 
Tke troopSy which were embarked at Toalou, compriBed a regiment of 
uifaatry, a battalion of ^'chanseurs & pied," and a battery of artillery — 
abool 2,000 men. 

BOMBABDMBNJ OF 8FAX. 
JULY 9 1881. 

Tbe neceMity of aeting with vigor in the province of Gran, where, aa 
Ite molt of a premature retreat of a part of the first expeditionary 
fbree, th* fkoatic Marabouts were trying to provoke an insurrection, 
the Crovemmeut to hcnd troops into that province. In fact, the 
of Tunis had been withdrawn too soon, for the excitement waa 
fiv frooi being calmed. 

Tbe village of Sfax, on the coast, was soon overrun by bands of Arabs 
Kcrelly incited by Turkey and by other secret influences. The Euro- 
pcAos took retuge aboard the squadron, and Sfax was to be bombarded 
by aeau These events also reiidereil necessary the occupation of Gabes 
amI of tbe island of Jerba. 

Tlie following is an account, according to the correspondent of Le 
Teai|Mi, of what took place before Sfax from the 5th to the 9th of July : 

Jaly 5, tbe Reine-BIanche, Gaptain Marquessac, ordered the Ghacal 
To t>*»mh<ini the water battery, ffettinj^ ii8 near inshore as possible. 
Tlii^ vf-.-vM*! approached to within 5,(MK) nietiTs and soon ctHnuienccil 
triTi;:. Thf land batteries replied, their shot at tirst fallinj; short, hut 
;.tti»- i»v little tliev eorreeted their aim until finally their shot reached 
xLr- ^hi|i. After an hours bombardment the lieine- Blanche made sig- 
nal ti> era.M* tiring, alter which the shore battery fired five shots. At 
Uitfk uioment the ^unlioat Pi<jue entered the harbor, and soon it was setMi 
t&at niir ^uns ha<l ma<ie a breach in the water battery. The land bat- 
lrncj» had finMl only ei^^hteen times. 

Ituririf; the ni^ht ot the 5th and <>tli the besieged r4*paire4i as well a^i 
lb^> oKild the (iama^es the battery had sustained, with lar^i* balls of 
prt-iwM*<l ^rass. 

AlMjut 4..'V^ .Inly li, the Heine Blanche and the Alma approa4'hed tho 
Laci«l. anil towards «'i.40 there corvettes opened tin* on the town, the first 
'fu th*- p.irt to the ri^ht 4)f the niinar4*t, the second on tli<* part to tin* l4*fL 
Tbf ftrv u.ishIow. After the 4:rews had tli4*ir <linn4»r, tln» K'*"hoats Tiipio 
Ab«l ( h.wal t(M>k up their fi^htin^ positions at *J,I<N) nnMers ticun the 
•ftfT^*. Ill alwini :\h meters 4)f wat4'r; then, at 12.ir>, 4*4»mm4Mic4Ml tli4» jren- 
»T9\ IxMnhanlment of the town ainl forts. Th4> land batt4*rit*s iepIi4Ml 
with thirteen i*h4)ls, firiMl nuire parti<*nlarly at the <'lia4%il, luU tl\v\v IVt^ 
«»A iMMMi mlenceiL TIw II \ me tin ivrtl mid an4*h4)re4l newt l\\e VAvavvvX 
MS 4, 1 J. Thi» sawe eveniiif:, at H,30^ thr Keine Hhiiuht* l\reiV uw wwtt^ 



14 OPEBATIONS OF THE FRENCH HAVY 

Bbot at the town, and an hoar arcerwards the Pique set eai 
At the end or the general bombardment of Jaly 6 the order 
to fire on the Casbah,* at the extreme left of the town. Fii 
at 3 p. m., by order of the Renior officer. 

Early on the morning of Jnly 7 the corvettee the Reine-B 
tbe Alma recommenced their slow fire npon the town. At ' 
morning tbe two gunlwats Hy6ue and Cbacal were spru 
to present their starboard batterieB to the enemy. Tliey c 
firing uiwn tbe land batteriee at 11.10. Some moments 
the Bteam-launcb of the AIm», carrying Commander Mod 
and several other naval officers, haviug approached very c: 
laud in making a reconnaissance, fired some very well-dire 
on the water battery, which replied with several shots, none 
however, hit the mark. During the evening the "canot-tt 
sort of shallow barge made of sbeet<iron, armed with a gnn ' 
meters, approached the land veryclosely to join with the steai 
of the Bquadron in firing on the water battery. 

Un Friday, July 8, a military demonstration was niadi 
armed laDuches of the Alma, Sarthe, and UeineBlanehv- 
proacbcd the land to withiu 1,(H>0 mt-ters and kept up a li< 
tbe enemy. At 10.25 the Uyi>ne aud Chtical cnme to the sup 
boats. Shortly iifterwanls the captains of tbe Alma and 
Blanche, as well hh tbechief of the mountain battery, anseinb 
the Cliaual, whence orders were issued to the diO'erent poi 
senior otileerastbn action devoloped.itself. The enemy re«i> 
seven shuts, one of which, from a mitrailtense, wns Hred at 
and woanded a sailor slightly. At 11.45 the order was gi\ 
Jiring, and a general recall was hoisted. Onr fire aimetl a 

M.l left t 




DURIKO THE RECENT WAR WITH TUNIS. 15 

only »t high tide. The bottom was composed of mud so deep and soft 
that the men were unable to wade ashore. 

HaTing anchored the iron-clads, according to their draft of water, at a 
mcmn distance fh>m the shore of 6,500 meters, Admiral Oamault ordered 
a alow bombardment with the heavy pivot-guns, while the gunboats, sta- 
tioned at 24^00 meters, were to demolish the defenses erected on the 
beach and to make a breach in the high walls of the city. 

On the morning of the 16th of July, after a very violent bombardment 
which began at daylight, the commander-in-chief ordered the landing 
of the naval brigade of the squadron and that of the division of the 
Levant, together with the six battalions of the 92d and 13Gth Hegi- 
mentsof the line, under command of Colonel Jamais. Taking advantage 
of the high tide, the bluejackets dashed towards the shore with an en- 
thaaiaMm and energy surpassing all praise, and occupied successively 
the «liff)Hrent points of the beach and the town. They blew up the gates 
by meauH of gun-cotton, which had been prepared for the purpose in ad- 
vance, and they engaged in a hand-to-hand conflict from Iiouhc to house. 
The liattalion of the 92d lan<led about half an hour after the seamen, 
and their help was ver^* welcome in face of the organized resistance 
vhirh the naval brigade now encountered. The other battalions soon 
followcrd. 

The loHS Austained by the landing corps was 9 killed, of whom 7 
were bailors, and among them MidHliipman I^eonnec, of tlio Alma, and 
♦«• «<iunde<l, among them Kimign Vignier, of the Hevanclie, wounded 
*. j:U:l\ ni tin* fmv. 

1 iif J«»l!i»\%in^ is a synopsis of tlio arraii^(*iiHMits inadr in vi<»\v of the 
• •ri;iMi«hn«'nt and landing: 

A« •oiilin;: to nrih*rs ^iv«»n by tin* ronnnamlcM* inchirf, tin* bombard- 
Hi* o: »a> t^> iM'L'in lM*tw«HMi 4..'iO and ."> a.m., at tht» first shot from the 

* ••!l»tit. It was to 1m* so arraii^j^iMl that all tht» boats Ioad<Ml with m(»n 
3» !•• ti» ainvf a.s n«»ar to tln» lH*ach as possibb* bt'fon* i\ a. m. A sijjnal 
•'. ri.i;: Ir«»m th»* l^'opard, and n*pcat*Ml by all tin* Vfssids, was to indi- 

• a:*' Tit«- ni« noMit t<» dash in and lainl. 

1 h«- lN»,its id* tin* t1«M»t, to;;etlMT with som«* natJN «• boats frallrd mahon 
%^» ^hnh ha«l Ihmmi pn»sM*<l into stTvirts atfonlcd room for laiidin;,'.*iJMM) 
» • ti jt «0H'»* : «il thf.sf l^.^^M) wt*rr sailors and 1,1<M» .soIdirrN — tin* former 
'J -lit- Intrt'pidf and thi* latter in the Sartln*. The infantry riMiiaining 
.••i !h«' l.ir;;«* fransport.H were to 1m* landed as soon as the boats could 
•- * r ti. 

I !i*- adiniral himself sn|MM*intended the ordrr. rapidity, and security 
'f ':i«- landin;:. m» that, once a.shoic, the troops, imniediat«'l\ forno*d, 
»« i!>I.iT onrr. under the gen4'ral command of (*oloncl damais, be marched 
i:-.n llo* |»«»iiits when* they were t<» o|M*rate. 

.' • the uater shcKiliMl verv ;:radually, there was but oin* \MMnt where 
•L'- i-ul^ could apj>n>ac}i tht* brm-li, and fhls )M)iiit was expoM'A \i> \\u^ 
ir«f .>/ thf tomti ImtterUs. Tltr mlniirnl hiul also onlered u Hovl o\ \Wa\- 



16 0PEBATI0N8 OF THE FBEHCH KAVY 

fng landing stage to be made by using the topsail-yards < 
iron-clads. This raft wna to be cODstructed, auder the oha 
Jage, as uear as possible to the beacb. 

The pulling boot« of the Colbert, Revanche, and Friedia 
•qoip|>ed, as well as the iron tmrges (canot-tamboar) of t 
Intr^pide (each carrying ii hirge howitzer), under the con 
tain Trillot, were to be, tivtween 4^ and A a. u., as near 
possible, and were to aid the gonboats by their fire in 
abore to protect the flotilla. 

The several rafts whicb had been prepared by the six 1 
to be towed daring the night before as near the beacb as { 
•team-launch belonging to each vessel. Captain Juge 
with the task of lashing them together and towing thei 
the whale-boats, to serve as a landing stage. Each iroQ-cl 
Tide two torpedo-boats, furnished with small torpedoes a 
bags made on board. 

The landing at the beacU was to be com manded by Caj: 
•ac, of the Reine-Blannbe, having under his ordent Ca 
Beaulien, Jnge, and Trillot, as well as all the officers of tfa 

The companies of the landing party were divided into th 
commanded respectively by CaptAins Miot, of the Alma, 
Uitaire, of the Colbert, and Mardchal, of the Trident. The 
squadron was under the orders of Captain Tabarean, of t 

The sqnadron had famished a detachment of torpedo- 
op any obstacles, and the whale-boats were reserved to tc 
atage and to fkcilitate afterwards the landing of the boat 
troops. 

Thirty -eight maho»ium, each furnished with four oars f< 
the iirine<l bimta of tlii' wtnunlroii. wprc to ttet thi'ir allolt 




IWI illM m WMCMBT^ WAM WITB TOKOL 17 

^AiHfnlOowaAluidliotatodhtoflagmboMdtte Wh«i 

IkTotmUe, be hofaMd tihe tignal, wtA Viim 
M«r tiielandyliad been itfpoted to the i^^ 
r, sade tlie beet of tlicdr wej totbe beed^ 
plMii each dqtieliaeat aoop being engaged* Tte lapid eenf* 
«iec ef the mwibm htMmj and of the aontii ttenek b^r the mw of the Tri* 
rlMi feed landed fliati under 9aef gn Oontonrieri enabled the land- 
to fBtni on the beaeh,and from tiliat time tiie operation wae eon- 
bf • aeriea of taolated actions. The bombardment had driven 
tta JMbeibnft had aotnmden praetieable toeadi in the walla. 
Ik vaa that the beat gnna and torpedoes ptov^A of great servioe 
laUasrf«f npflmgalesiwhieh gave aeeess to the town to the right and. 
titta Isll^ Onee insidei the eolnmn of attaok advaneed nnder the flie 
sfttaaMaqrbgroeenpfing the booses one after tiie other. Thebattal- 
immiOm diviahm of the Levanti having as an objeotive point the Ga^ 
hri^ hai flm ft ulh e at to go. Oommaii^er Miot, after having Mown op 
iatarior gatsS| took possession of theOasbah at 7.90 a. m. 

tte whole aetion eommnnleation was eonstantly kept op 
flm diffHont detaehments Ikom the right, where the 82d and 
to tte left| where Miot had eommand. These coimonisa' 
kept q^ bgr Captain Maieq de Saint- Hilaiiey who was in eon^ 
widi Ookmellaaiais. 
Vba inegeiBg givea a good idea of the operation as a whole. AslSnr 
Urn dataila of tteatflEBvent engagements in whioh the soldiers and sailors 
part before becoming masters of the town, the best way to describe 
wHl be to give the reports of the officers engaged. 
Following is the report of Bear- Admiral Conrad, commaDding the 
ral division of the Levant, sabmitted to the commander-iu -chief of 
the Mediterranean sqoadion ot evolution : 



Oic Board thk La OAixiMONitRs, 

At Amchtr of 8/aXy Juip 18, 1881. 

Mtmmtmcm lb Vick-Amiiul: 1 hare the honor to sabniit to yoo, in acoordAnoe with 
r, thm IbUowing report of the military operations which reealted on July 16 
\ tke tb r c ibW occopatioo of Sfaz. 

T«« hmd ihm kiodoeaa, in taking charge of tbeee operations, to give the poet of honor 
I tkie atlAck to the diTieion of the Levant, which was first on the spot, to intrust to 
de Marqacaeac, commanding the Reine- Blanche, the command of the landing, 
very dUSeiiH by local conditions, and to Captain liiot, commanding the 
thm ctMsmasd of the naval brigade from the Levant division, with the duty of 
awpjlag as^aiekly as possible the Casbah. You also authorised me to hoist my flag 
Savteg tke arUoo od board the L^pard, in order to direct the fire of the gunboats. 
I afli Sa>ply faiSabCed to yon, Admiral, for these different marks of confidence, and I 
la bopa ibat the brilliant manner in which the assaalt was conducted by the 
aftba Rafae- Blanche and the Alma has received year highest approbation, 
ta iIm Ikff^aaeing ofdera which you had issued, aU the seamen of the land- 

H. Mia. 31 2 





18 OPEBATIONS OF lUS FRENCH NATT 

ing put; wore ftt tbelr )>o*U bjr dk^UKkk. Covend by the g(«er»l bomliftrdmsiit of 
tba Iron-olada and of the guuboata, and afterwarda aDttjiiiMd bf tbo Sre of the bokti 
•tationed to corer the Uodiog, aad bj the fire of tbr liowltz«tB which the Sanhe and 
lotrfpida had iDOQDted In their lighters, the naTal brigade (formed in three colanaf 
at about 1,000 nieUra fWim the water batter;) approached the pointe of landing. Tba 
two oolnuitu on the left steered toward the wharf in face of thu hHtter)*, attd tb« right 
oalamn tow;ud a wharf about 300 meters to the right, called tbe AJpba Wharf. The 
pilot, liowBVHT, fearing that there would not be oDuugb water at thix jioiiit, CnptAin 
do Marquesaac eaaaed the third eolumu to laud at the emne place an the oChur two. 

TheCnabah, the water-batlery of the mole, Bud the fort caliinl the Troia-!'iAc«>,wbieh 
was near it, bad opened ■ Are of tual^hinc'gaIl• upon our boat*; at the iuimi> tinio a 
ItTol; fiuillade was kept up froiu the housc4 and from a trench parallel to the abora. 
In aplte of this fire tho boala and Ugbtera jwled IhemMlvM as rapidly m p«eslbl« (»• 
wud tho landing plac«, wh«r« Cftptalu Juge bad Dz»d the bridge ooustruol«d uf tbm 
topanU-fanls of the inin-eUds. It would be liupowsible for me to praUs too higblj 
the promptness and preoisioa with which theee muvemeuti were exevulfld bj Captxla 
Juge under a heavy Dre. Thanks to this akillftil arrnnjiemeDt, the troop* landed irj' 
shod in ajilMs of the ahual wuter, while the seamBn, leaping from their boata, dn>*« 
away the defender* of the battery aud pursued lo tho luft tfaoas in the Mutli treneli- 
Captain Miot faatAued bis boat-flag to an emhntaureoftliewaler-tiutUry, wLlloalioat'a 
ercw from the Trident did the same, perhaps evea a few Micwuds sooner. It wa* at 
this moment that a uumber of sailors fell, killed or woundeil. 

The Arabs were driven hack with great la«, and the two oolnmns, led bj- Captaioa 
Hlot and Saint- Hi lain, dashed Into the town through tho breach. 

The landing company of (be La Oallissoniira was ohargud with the dnty of aaptnr> 
Ing the fort called Trois- Pieces. This it aoeoniplished by waling the walls; and itt. 
BanoD, midshipman of the OrstelaM, and Oanbert, i)itart«r-gi inner, hauled down tb« 
flag, which they replaced with the Franch ensign. The gnns were splkml and th* 
powder was sent to tho reaerve, while a rigorone fight was carried on tgalosl tlM 
Arabe established in the naighboriiig houiwa. 

Captain Miol conducted bis att«ok most brilliautly and drove back the Arabs, dri*tiic 
tbeu ont of the trench and from thehousFH. where tliey fired ou him as ho advanced. 
Be blew np thegato of the Arab town by monnsuf atorpnlo, and with tbocompaiilen 
of thii RcinB>BUncheand of the Alma be charged upon the Casbsb. ThU fort waa 
oocujiiod at 7.45 a. m. During the ohargn the ftro of the enetny wa* deailly. and 11 
wia bafore the Cosbah that Mr. Lconnoc, midshiputau of the drst class, received tlw 
woands of which lie soon afterwards died. 

The fin) of the veeseU had coaaod since the landing, the gunboala alono contiDuing 
toflre a few shot* at the Arabs dying from oar troops. The different convoys of boata 
wsce ceaselessly employed in landing troops from the Intr^pide, and iu a few boors 
the entire expeditionary force, infantry and artillery, was aafoly landed. 

The DnA batlAlion landed (VtM of the line) made itaway to the extreme right tewuil 
the eemolefy, where a very lively oagagiiment took place, and then to the axtramitj 
ottlMAlfawaroboiuwa. The Sntcompany engaged hail a great number wounded tfca*^ 
abont twenty, of whom two were oflto*r». It wasat this uiotuont.U.^O, that the armsd 
boats, ouaountrating on the right, silenced the enemy's fire, while tho ballory vfbttw- 
Itiors contributed to this result by eatabliBfaiug itself at the northeasl^angle of tlie 

> aum up, the taking of Sfax doe* great crrtllt to the markuiuuubip of 
W kmialstlblo dash of out sailon, and U> the troops who aoeistMl tbs 
I have the boaur, Ac, 



DUBIKO THE RECENT WAR WITH TUNIS. 19 

Am we hsTe seen, Oaptain de Saint-Hilaire had been placed in charge of 
the Imdiog on the beaoh at Sfiix. The following is his report upon the 
opcratkms aooomplished nnder his directions: 

On Board thb Colbbrt, 

At Aw)h&r dfSfax, July 17, 1881. 

APHxaAL: I bare the honor to rabmit to yoo the following report of the part taken 
Vj(th* BaTsI brigade of the eqnadron in the capture of Sfaz : 

XMi^mMmm mmd •r^ert.—PorMeeing that a separation was almost inevitable, the in- 
tetry waa formed Into two battalions, composed of each of the divisions of the sqnad- 
rsa. I rrarnred to myself more especially the command of the first and Captain Mar- 
4cbal commanded the second. The artillery, as usnal, formed two batteries (of 6 pieces 
•f S millimeters each) nnder the orders of Commander Tabarean ; the sqnadron fnr- 
BMbi*d. in addition, a torpedo sqnad, commanded by Lieutenant Lafon ; Snrgeon Gillet 
ksd charge of the ambnlances. 

The naval brigade carried with it provisions for the day ; the men had 96 cartridges 
«rh. the artillery carried 56 charges for each gun ; a reserve of provisions and ammu- 
iition was a?«> formed. In so far as the actual landing was concerned I wan under 
Ike orders of Captain Marqnensac, who commanded that part of the operations. The 
li«C batCaltoD. in native boats (mahonnes), which were first towed and afterward 
psWd. wan to krep in the only existing channel, Just iNdhind the mahonnes of the dt- 
Tift:oa of th^ Levant, and was to land, as well as the latter, at the wharf of the Marine. 
TV se^rond battalion, keeping to the left in the armed launches of its division, was 
Sna to rl«ar the beach and then to land at the same place as the first battalion. The 
IM battAlion of infantry was to land simultaneously with the seamen at a point 
30O m^er* to the rigbt. After the landing, according to the orders of Colonel Jamais, 
^ gpoeral r<»mmand of the troops, I was to occupy the quartier-franc,* on the left, 
aftd tak^ rharge of the operations on that side. I gave my orders in advance ac- 

y • • •,♦ Tr<>*ifi<i '.and*-il were to vhar^o upon tlie luittery and the treiirlHvs which I 
•1.- ■ •' ■! ••■ ?ii"l «>!» th»' Iwaoli, in raM«» th<*y Mtill ln-ld out a^aiiiHt tlio divi.Hinii of th« 
I^- .- • TV-\ wtTi- :if»»Tward to advaiirc into Xhv qiirirtiiT-fraiic hy the Irtt, whilo 
• 4. • J •• .' f«r \u an !• k fnmi that hi<l«*. Th«* last cooipanicH witi* to H«»rvo as a re - 
•*r • T ••• Ji»*! l»at?»My had onliTs to jnihh itM srrtions forwanl a** rapidly as tln'y 
•.-■ '1 '• rni. ainl lii»»l for itn jjeiinral jxwition th«» riMilrr of tlio action; tin* nim-oikI l»at- 
•*7- f \« ••► •rijiport thr optrationn of tli« l«'ft. (Th«^ battery of tho divJHion of tho 
r^*. ft- t ««« t'> t r»-M|HTat<- in tho attack on the right, which wjia intniHted to tho IKM 
• %'•%'..' '> '.f til*" '.:ne. ) 

"^^4.v.ii» -TL»* Ujat"* arrivi'd at tho a]tpointcd time and tlir landing t<K»k i)lace in 
tL* •T»*.^r .riilir.it«*i!. th*- rnalionne^ k«'i»pin>; in th<* c«'nter and «te«»ri!i^ for th«' i»attery 
1 !.:• w th thi' twi» lowiTM. On a]ipri>:irliin;; ♦In* nUoh* tin* M-cond battulion ra«t off 
r^* !*■-» r^y^^i and n»wi"d in tho n-nf <if th*' i!"«'iann'. Tin* l^Jd licin^; -omowhat hIow, 
; •• - : •.. !!,r!n th*» .Siirv«Mnant#''M ntoani-Iaiinrh. Soon aftrrward I tirdi-rrd tin- niTonii 
■ h'*.\' r. !•• ir:rli:if lo tht* rijjlit. a?* tlM*v wit** in tla:i;;«'r of ^;'»iTijj tim f.ir t«» tlit* li'ft. 
7 - ■ r ' *\ .:.j wainid tin* roiniMafiding hIII'mt of tin* *.»*Jd tli.it il:i- wal»'r wmmM pro- 
. ■. •,^.»i.i|l at :?!♦' Alfa wliaif. tin- latt«T ord»T.tl t1i« '•.itta'i'»ii t.» ';i!iil at tho 
K*' • ^ •- »r?" A I.ji ^ ♦!, J* *n-.-.ini'' tlji" ••111', l.iiiilin:: i»oiiit. 

■A . •^. •' ij 1 I- liii-.-ri •!,♦ njii-t I'f' till li.ia!". li. -m: l-'Hi nr l'"' !i ilt-r- fr.-r" T?'- -Imri*, 

,...■-. t tT^» T.' '»•• -•■!lflil' d. Att!,»' N.MIM- t illi«- «■! ;i i, iif ■■ I'tii ;\ .lid' * -^ !•■ t.i 

- .;• -. i:;il a!' ll.'- I'^'iT" li f»!« :n d to Till -l.t'H- at I ! • I i:t' ■■* -1 1. 

J ■ .! ii'!.. r- '-'. p'i:':;. I»!;» .li • "f !!m ;n ■'li""^ iti:^ I'- ij'- I ■ ■ ■ ■ • »1 aiid 

. •■• •?.■ • I •• •! :'[•■ I • lit :i;i T;":ii "»Ip n-. '!"':■• -« il I-itv," ■■■ ■•.-■i l.i-r 

• m • ' ,:, r ' . •r-t I J. tI.« r ill ••<".■ ". imI t"..\ iiI«<I !••. fli • >•. ; a , ♦ t • * i*. ^* .!•» 



« 



) ■•■ r ■■■ ■ • ■ '• ' !' •••;.■ It. 



20 OFEBATIONB OK THE FBENCH KATT 

•xpeoted, paled tbelr bo>U mtbtm, eTOMJon fn ubnA at the fliat b»l 
flnt launch of theTrtdent wu tba flrst to reach tlia wharf ander thebal 
oelTcd, fortDnatoly withoot effect, a oantioii-ahot almost at th« moule. 
toricr, with remarkable bravery, jamped npoD the wharf; B foaileer wa 
to him ; another fnuleer, named Uartin, d»«hed into the battery with hli 
down the green flag. The company of the Trident laaded'anderavery li 
attacked the Araba in the trench and battery, which they foroed them U 

When 1 landed myeelf, aonie momenta afterwards, at the foot of the bl 
right of the wharf, leaving behind the flnt battalion, which, in apite o 
tentions, conld not arrive at the uime time, I perceived abont two at 
Sarveillan tea Just forming at my left nnder the trench. Then, pashingfi 
the company of the Trident reaaeembling under the baition to the righi 
take their position on the left. A. little beyond the Surveillante'a m( 
which had reaobed the shore, were landing their men in aome eonfnaloi 
unavoidable on account of the ardor of aome, the limited apaoe at wh 
waa feaaibie, and thedlaorder oanaed by the nnforeeeen change In theord* 

The 9Sd waa aUII at aome diatanoe. I tent my midshipman, Mr. Hi 
the captain ortheSnrvelllant«,hnt he oonld not be fonnd. I havesloee 
he hadjaat gone to the right. laent an order to the Marengoa, who wi 
ing, to hasten towards the left to aopport the Tridenta. I then went ■ 
central gate of the qu artier-franc, leaving orders to send me a aeetlonof 
the first troop* that shonld be available; I expected to throw them i 
after having demolished the gate. While waiting, having a few men « 
t«mpted to force the gat«, but was Dnsncoesaful. Finally a section of 
peared; the Trldent^a, I believe. Jnat aa tbebatteijhad got into poaltt 
arrived with hia torpedo aqnad. I ordered the artillery to keep fast, and 
blown up by a torpedo. 

Hearing on the left a lively ftiailladewhleheeemed lobe approaching,! 
direction and fonod the Tridenta at the Harbl gate and the Uarengoa 1 
left, near tbe aea, firing upon a band of Arabs and aome horsemen wh< 
•ortie fhuu the Darhi gate, and exchanging a lively fualllade with ifae ( 
Uarengoa, more aheltered than the otbera, were in advance, aa well as a 
Colberta. The Colberts dashed on In pnisnit of the Araba, and expoaei 
more than I could have wished. While thna engaged a man named B 
vei-«ly itouiided ; be, together nilh a atrHennl of I he Trident, hail throw 




DUEINO THE BECENT WAS WITH TUNIS. 21 

Um boiuM. I took with me the FriedUnds and the Colberta, with 
of Aitilkrj, hoping that I could make use of them. Aa for the Surveil- 
I bad no iafonBaiion of their whereabouta, but I toppoeed that they were on 
tke aKtmno right. 

Wo ftled aloog the wall of the town and went out by the Harbi gate. Just as the 
aftilfory waa ps— ing tbroagh the gate it was met by a liyely fVisillade fh>m a house on 
tkt loft. Tbo Fnedlands had a man killed there, and the La Gallissoni^res and the 
Enao-Blaacbea bad some men disabled. The artillery then took up a position in the 
ia evdcr to fire on the houses, but they were soon sent to the right, where they 
mrgontly needed. 

We eoalia«ed to advance towards the north. On the comer of the Casbah we saw 
the FkcBch dag hoisted at 7.60, and our men greeted the sight with cries of '* The repub- 
lic fsfwcr r* We kept on our way, the Friedlands and the artillery keeping close to the 
walla a»d the Colberts at some distance out. Soon after this the Friedlands had four 
maa wosaded by maaketry fire from the middle tower. We then advanced rapidly 
ssfiv as %bm weat angle of the town, followed by those men of the 136th that by this 
iMae had landed ; we waited some time in this position, answering the fire from the 
leo and occasionally firing at the Arabs posted on the garden side. At one 
it appealed to aa thai the cavalry was massing behind the oil magaxines and we 
ready to ** receive cavalry.'' Nothing resulted from it, however. I then or- 
tba Colberts to occupy the oil magasinea, and the Friedlands, with a section of 
that had followed us, wera ordered to carry the Bab-Oabbi gate. The 
rere occupied without difficulty, but it was far otherwise with the gate. 
Thie last operation was very well carried out by Mr. Texier, who entered the town 
sad occapied the grand mosque. In this engagement a number of Arabs were killed 
m attaaiptiag m> gain the open country. 

fioaM Arabe still remaining in the gardens before us, I sent there the Colberts and a 
esKpaay of the 136th, who exchanged some shots with them. Our riflemen, moving 
Wy tW nght flank. Joined tboee of the 92d battalion, who were still engaged in front of 
lift asgaxiijeii on tk<* «*aiit. 1 also sent a •cctioii of artillery to their luwiHtunce. I 
tiiTC ptacnl oivurlf in cotnruunicatioD with the coiniiiandin^ oHicor, and, coiiHidoriiig 
oar ta*k a* liuished, 1 recalled every one I had in advniu'«', including the Surveillantis, 
wb«'Cu 1 ff'uuii at the extreme ri^ht towardM the H<*a and whom I had not Heen Hin<;e 
ZicTXiiii^e. Unr UMrn. lieiu^ very much fatigued, were allowed to rent theintHdven nu- 
<i#r Abeitrr of the i^alU, and 1 went to the princi]»ul ^ute to report to the eohuiel. We 
iuristiiAUty fi»unii a wi-11 in the town near the ^ate, and I had the fact nuide kno\^ n to 
tJLr u.^:j. W hilf our nun wi-reoceupird in ;4ettin^ watera funillade waMpnnred ii|M>n 
iLi'M* inmt a little m<m«ine on the opiMmite Hide. F<irtun:itely it did no duniu^e, hut 
.: «a« iircr*,A.»ry to dinhnl^e the enemy. The FricdlandH, who oct iipi<'d that part of 
u^ !i»»rj. m»»r»' jiciven charge of the o|»eration. We were unaMe to aeromplinh this 
&^t*i iLr arn\al of Mr. l^fon, who, havinf( lMH*in detained innide the town, ha4l not 
'^M^t, aiiir to arrivr nntil thiH moment. Am noon an the door wan hlowii in the .Vrabn 
9ibrT*tt*\rtr^\. W'r capiitred forly-two priminers, of whom tuie MTmcd a |MTM»na^e of 
MBesir ;a.)Mtrtaiicr ; liut w«* had fi vt* m**n kille<l and ei^ht \« onnded. The«M- priHonem were 
•»o: u» LrjMl«(Uarteni. 1 vinited all thr poHt.s that ue ha<l ewtahliHhrd inHJi!** thf town, 
hz^i. rr-'ri^jiij* bo npiy from hea^hinartcrrt, I wrnt thrn* myhelf. Whil«* trav»'i-»infj 
l^ Arab to« ii I could iwe no out* except the rriedlandfi in th«' northtTn part : the 
att^^r (ii.artrrA M-tmtd rntirely dcM'rted. I found the r<ilonfl in the (|iiiirtifr franc. 
JkJUT ba».fit; recened my report he told me that he wuMahout to ndievf uh. um hr hail 
XT. {'.txi^r u*-^*\ of our «ervice»i. and Miid that 1 mi^ht return <>n iHianl. thankinj; me 
as titr macur liui** for the aiDiiirttance of the Mjiilont. Hftraciuf^ my Mtepn through the 
t*«b. I had all my men anaenibh^l and marrheil them to the l»each. I irintalled my- 
••if i3 one of the hoiiaen there. Captain Mar^ihal wan (d)liged to wait iK»me time for 
t^ truo|«« wbtch were t«» n'lieve him. 

Tward* a p. m, thf rutjrv bh^mlc mbj reoa^mhled on the \>eae\\. T\\e. \ueu ^et^ 



22 OPERATIONS OF THE FRENCH NATT 

^^luiuted *nd I WM Dluble to iHne to them a ration of brud mad win 
have liked to do, the rteHn-lkiuicbea ooDtalnlug the proTistoiu being 
towing. I OAllod tbfl oaptaine together to iufonn me of wbU I liad be 
•ee end to leport their loaee. The qoArtermnsten of companlee were lei 
the killed, who had been plaoed ink boose of the qaertier-ftuio ; •■fort 
they had been lent kboard the Sartbe sb bat u they wen bronght 
b«>oh. ' 
The following ia « rAww/of what happened In my raar and on the ri( 
The Kevanohea, whom I bad left in the town to aearch it tfaoronghl; 
operation two men killed and three wonuded, among whom was lit. Vl| 
The Uarengoe, after the engagement on the left which followed the lane 
log whioh one of their men waa aererely wonnded, remained aa a eorpi 
tloD on the left of the European qnart«r. The Trident, which oeonpit 
franehe," had, in aearohing It, flre men wonnded, among{tbem Sergeant^t- 
who was wonnded while going with Qnartennaeter Dronalt, onder Are 1 
to the aaaiatanee of two wonnded men of another Teaael. Tho Trldani 
a company of Infiuitry, then haatoned to the right, where they aadated 
on the oU magaainei. 

Aa for the Sarvelllantea, two of whoae aeotione I bad eeen forming at tl 
meut, and whom I bad not aeea again nntil much later, on tbe extreai 
had played a very brilUant part. With hla flrat two eeetioni landed, 
Lunotbe-Doportall, had followed for an Inatant the Tridenta, had thoi 
attack on the right and had driven back tbe enemy in that direotion, 
by Captain HarMial, wI>o had oommaod of tbat wing. Tbey aoon leai 
etery withont loaa. There an engagement of ebarpahootere took pt 
Arabe, in which tbe Snrvelllante had one man killed and three wonndt 
Teillantea were anpported anooeaaively by a aeotlon of the Tridenta oo 
Mr. Beynand, mideblpman, and landed probably tbe laat; then by bw 
tioni, and finally by a company of tbe SSd of the line and by artillery, 
which ia beyond the oemetery waa charged and carried at tbe point of 
One man waa killed and two wonnded. The affair woand np with an e 
•liaipahooter^ the Sarrelllantee holding tbe right towarda tbe aea ani 
left. The latter pnrened aafar aatbegardena and enatalnedaeriooa loaaea, 
TigOTonaly and akillfnily conducted, ooet tbe Tridenteone killed and thi 
>. two killpJ iiud Hvo vromidwl. TLe batlMlion »f tbe 




MBBMI IBB BSOm WAB WITH TUSUL 



OKmmiiammmli idiMte <pwitiiMiBimg theaitobllaliineiitof thefloal^ 
ii|r«li0it*r tt0 liBdiBf at ffhac me jbnowing is lihe xq^oit of 0$ii^ 

tilB JifB^ Bta^ ItfiA clweie of it iioder fbe orders Oaptain de Saint-, 

« 

Oir BOAH^ ma UjomKOOf. 

y la olMainMW to yovr Mdwii %o rapuit to yoa oohombp 
AM niallT* to tiw avamlitiiir of tiM aoelli^ 
of Uw ifMidioBi anCtekiiia tt Mhoro to Mrfol fa 

TtMtfUfiStm ■lnm4MnMii of ttio laftv^ido Aoned off ftwa 

■lolo ioali plaooi ot nydiipooltloiiiOodilNMtluiTlaeaa 

tlM gaaboati^ to wkooo owo Uw diliH«Dt ralli tod 

^•ooa 00 we onlTod, tho itoiwi>Uianoh took fai 

tir bo tiw Imid of tiio Mdi#^ oad llio oIlMn^ 

llf tbonftoiOilealibMlowod OB bolted, ond to oad. Uadvllioi^porTliioa 

^toaipHj and oooiuoljr modo. Tho Mdgo boiag Him 






I w e to eaw ^ tooitBoia to oboat jao mot i io Ikomttio i a o i o . At 

agiifiiiifteMUwxoflroBdyOO Ibat thootiom- 

ao on aliaoporpoiidioidor to ttio boodi; 

oBOOiJr andellboionoliiDO wwo in tbobiot 

4J0 e> m»f and wo wmaiaod la tiiat podtJoa 




ateoot obmol of wl byotdor of OMtofai 

to towUwflMboaiio% boopinf ono num of oaob 

of Uw btidgo. Tbo gropaol woo woigbod, tbo ftoMn-looiiob 

pttDod «l tbo ooi% trjfng tonmliitolii tbo aUgmnont of tbo 

■ooB obliged to coot off tbo tow, and we hauled onxoelyes in by 

of a fiafiiol earrlod ont hj the Tridenft dinghy, and a small anchor which I 

aoberti bj tbo whale-boat of the Marengo. The hoata which landed flnt in- 

with oar morenieati aomewhat. We Anally, however, made oar bridge fiMt 

TVidenfa boat had landed, and our bridge oerred for the rest of the expe- 



JUQE. 

The eoBBiaDd of the armed boats, which, by their active oo operation, 

the huidiDg of the troops, was giyea, under the orders of Oap- 

Xareq de Saint-Hilaire, to Oaptain Trillot This officer expressed 

Ibllows in his report to the oommander-in chief of the sqoad- 

of erolntion: 

Ok Boabd thb FsntDUum, 

At An€kor •/ 5/oo, Julp 19, 1861. 

: I have tbo honor to bring to yonr notice, as briefly as possible, the fol- 
oooesraing my aerrioe and the military operations which were confided 
■as ia tbe plan of attack on the town of Sfisz : 

wbieb you were so kind as to giTO me yerbally the night before, 

ropoalsd to mo by Captain V ignes, chief of staff of the sqnadron, garo 

of tbe armed boats, with the doty of approaching by daybreak as 

to tbo fortlfieation on the beach. I was to order the beach to bo 

by sitilloiy and mosketry fire. In order to prsrent tbo conoontnAioik ot ^Sbia 

0omiag &om oataido the wailo to introdnco snooot oc to lAi oi^ >3^ 




24 OPEE&TIONB OF THE FBENCH SATT 

olEuislTfl ; kad I w>* to mppraw •• far m pa«alble the Bn ftom tb« wktei 
the ikinpMta, lu order to facilitaM the luidiog of tbe troops. B«Bldea t 
•nit afaoald prove DofkTorable to qs> I w>a to protect the re^mbM'kitiK • 
TheKenerftldiapoaitioDBfor tbe ooinb*t to Jadiciously UTKOged, the d 
tad theexoellent ditcipline of tbe troops engaged, ahowed from theatait 
precAUtioQkry meaaure woDld not be needed aud that tbe Bnt part ool; c 
tioDi would lequiie to be oanied out. I had nuder my ordera the armet 
fiiatdlvialoaofthewiaBdroii. Tbey wBTeoommuidedaafoUawa: Thoaei 
by LieatAoant Ugard, thoee of the Revaaobe by Lieutenant BoDoet, 
Friedland by Lieutenant Oigon, and thoM of the Sarthe by Eaaign Fe 
eighteen boata, oarryiog, aa artillery, fonr ■hell-gun* of 13 oentimetera, 
MOtlineten, and thirteen levolring eannon. I ahonld add to the militar; 
tbe ibeet-iron lighten of the tranapott*, tbe Sarthe and the InttAplde, 1 
bad the happy thought of placing, in that of the Sarthe, oommanded b 
lener, one-gon of 14 eeutimeterii, model of ld&8, and in that of the In 
nanded by Lien tenant Fort, a rided gnn of 16 oentimetera. TbeM two ligta 
u gmat aerrioe dnrlDg the action, and, in aplte of their alowneai and i 
they dlatlngniahadthemaelvMby their good aerricaa and by thaaealand 

At 2.30 the boati left thereapeotive veaeela aud aaaembled nuder mj on 
tbe Alma, aud at UO ther were arranged in order of attach, in a alnglelii 
COO metetatotheeaatof the waler-battery. The evening before, in anig 
•anoe made with the captain of the Colbert, we had not been able to gel 
lafonnation abont the obaonel to be followed even for boata going aah 
aground Mveral timea in graea and iballow water. 

At the first tound of artillery fh>m the eqnadton I opened fire on tbe m 
ttoia which acme mnahet-ahota had been fired, a* well aa on a amall fra 
of tbe east fh>ut oC the fortiSoation. Behind eomemoundaof dried grat 
Arabs were in ambusoade, and from time to time they would fire on oi 
shells very soon set fire to the hay and produced an unboped'for result iu 
that the smoke, which was very dense and waa urged by a fresh easterly b 
the garrison of the small fort to evacuate it, and, by being driven in ou 
«f tbe town, it favored the attack and was very aDOoylug to the defeni 
parta In this place, an well as the trenohes which we saw, seemed to b 
and our fire and tbe smoke tugetber, as I have been informed by several 




DURIHO THE BECSNT WAH WITH TUNIS. 26 

lUft tkmm mj boa* Iwpl np * oonalant Are of mnskeirj and artillery on the same 
laiata. TiM foaa of 14 and 16 oentimeteta had a seriont task. Their shells and the 
eaal eoafbaioo among the enemy, slackened their fire, and assisted Tery 
to tks taking of the battery, when onr seamen ooorageonsly dashed throngh the 
imbff—i rts a»d boisled the Freneh flag. 

Tbia boiog aeeoopUshed, my attention was drawn to the beaoh, and by the fire of 
s«r H ssnfimMsr aheU-gnns and the shell-guns of the lighters I supported the at- 
lock of oar tioops on the houses next the ramparts and assisted in the taking of the 
IwMtfng horn the gardens, which I had rendered impassable daring the morning. 
At 9 o^ck«k oar task was finished, and the rapid falling of the tide obliged us to 
i toto the cbaanel, so as to be ready for any emergency. At the outset, before 
aok« ooeosss seemed assored. We remained thus about 1,000 meters ftom the 
ODcbotod by oar grapnels. I went ashore to infonn Captain Marquessao, 
rith the organisation of affairs on the beach, that I held myself at his orders. 
I ffOTe Um sbob dinner, as they had had nothing since the night before, and I permit- 
to take a abort rest. As soon as the flood tide made I weighed anchor and 
morning position. It was here that the order reached me to go ashore 
to the rs smbsrkatiop of the landing party. The operation was carried out 
apftdliy and without d;jsorder. Then, at the request of Colonel Jamais, I remained on 
^Bovi mil aight with two of my boats. Nothing of interest happened. 

1 tktokf admiral, that I haTS nseftilly accomplished the trusts confined to me and 

that I hare oorreetly interpreted the orders 1 reoeired. I venture to hope that you 

wiD tonsidsr that the serrices rendered by the boats under my command have been 

all thoS ooaM bo hoped for ftom men who, though exhausted by fktigue, were animated 

hf the bsot qiirit of discipline and devotion. I have had occasion only to praise them 

sod to ooogratolate them on their calmness and $an§frMd^ which made my task an 

msf ODO. As for the offlcers, I was sure of them beforehand, and convinced that, 

alMloTvr might happen, they would rise to the occasion. 

I MB, Ac, 

TRILLOT. 

The captare of Sfax does great honor to our brave sailors and to the 
^Uot officers who couimauded tlieni. A landing in the face of an en- 
tay M> near the shore could not take place without piesenting man}" 
ditBculties of execution and many i^al dangers. Thanks to the prudent 
uhI ingenious measures taken by the commander-inchief, an<l to the 
(Ush of our mt*u, our losses were not nearly so great us was to be feared. 



occur ATI OX OF CABES. 
JULT 34, 1881. 

On the 21st of July the Ii^oi)anl brought onlers for the commander- 
tiKhtff of the squadron of evolution to leave Sfax and repair to Cabes 
v:th all the vessels of his squiulron, two ironchulsof the division of the 
Levant, and four gunboiits. On the evening of July 23 the La Gallisso- 
i^re, the Iteine Blanche, the VuUigeur,the Ilyene, the Leopard, theCtla- 
diatrur, and the Chacal left the anchorage oQHfax, where the Terrible, 
the Pique, and the Alma ha<i been left in observation, and arrive^l at 
daybreak Iwfore Cal)es. These vessels anchored as close in shore as 
poaaible. Bpriogs had been prepared, so that as soon as the aiicUocb v:er^ 
dovn the hrtxyAmdes were brought to bear on the beac\\. N\\\\\«i\Xi\% 




OPERATIONS OF THE FEENCH NAVT 



B being done the boata were armed and the naval brigade took U* 
place in them. 

Appearances seemed to ghov that there would be no resistance «D- 
conntered at the oataet. The Arabs, taken completely by Burprise, had 
not bad time to aasemble on the plain, but the; could be seen mnDing 
from all eide« towards the village of Mentsel, while thoae of the {mini- 
IfttioD who would be nselesa for the defense were seen going out with 
camels and baggage. 

Towards 6 a. m. the naval brigade reached the shore, but not witliont 
some trouble. The nature of tlie beach was such that the men could not 
land dry-ebod, and they were obliged to jarap into the water. The •«• 
being smooth just then, the inconvenience was not very great ; bat the 
breeze having freabened a little daring the day from the east, the com- 
munication became difficult, and the re- embarkation of the troops tbat 
were to return on board in the evening bade fair to be interrupted. The 
river Oabes waa not available for the purpose of lauding, aa ita month 
was obstructed by a bar which, even at high water, would allow only th« 
lightest kind of boats to enter. Besides this the left bank of the tivtt 
is covered with a thick wood, very favorable to ambuscades, of whiok 
the Arabs did not fail to profit, and in which they had even placed two 
cannon. These guns, which had been immediately perceived by Um 
L(k)pard, anchored at the mouth of the river, served as a target for b«r 
fire. The Araba who served at the guna soon abandoned them, and Lien- 
tenant Mallarm^, captain of the Leopard, lost no time in taking poflaeft- 
Bion of them. 

The naval brigade, haNnng landed without being distorbed, formed 
on the beach. While a few of the companies marched towards the gov- 
ernor's house, the doors of which were so strong and so solidly dosed tbat 
it was necessary to blow tbem open, the greater part of them marohed 
earefUUy and lu good order towards the village, Mentzel. 

The commaDdor-in-chtef had thoagbt that the occupation of the gor- 
emor's house without striking a blow would not be in proportion to the 
force employed, and that this simple operation would not sofBciently 
impress the Arabs. Admiral Conr»(I had, In conaequciice, given orders 
toUaptain Marci) du Saiut-Hilaire, commanding the naval brigade, Id 
march upon Mentzel, to make upon it a serious demoDstration, uid, 
if not too formidable, to take jiosseasion of it. But the commander-tn- 
chief had at the same time made known hhi firm intention of not ocoa- 
pying any village far from the beach. 

Toward ]0 a. m. the fort which commanded Mentzel, and the ontlylng 
Tillage, Uzara, were in the posaession of our troops. These two vtllkgM 
were in great part occnpied by our men. (>aptain Maroq, not wiahiDg 
to engage farther away from the beach nor to expose bis men to nselen 
louea, gave the order to fall back on the house of the governor. Thii 
movement, carried out slowly and calmly, bronght onr iKAmeD baok 
ttjufer shelter from the beat of a burning san. They were able to dliM 



DUSnrO THE RECENT WAR WITH TUNIS. 27 

in pcAce mod to rest themseWes while waiting for the sea to go down, so 
that the extra companies could retnm on board. It was while the men 
ytfft thus resting in the afternoon that the fort of Mentzel was blown up. 
Thoogh landing at Cabes presented no difficaltiee or dangers compara- 
ble with those at the eaptore of Sfitz, it nevertheless was conducted with 
taMseas and skill. The following is the report of the officer in com- 
■and, CH>tain Maroq de Saint-Hilaire, to the commander-in-chief of the 
iqnadnm of evolution : 

On Board ths Colbkrt, 

At Anchor of Calf, Juip 25, 1881. 

AsMiBAi.: I bare the honor to sabmit to yoa my report on the landing effected be- 
fae the town cT Mentsel (Gulf of Cabee) during July 24. 

Tear ori«n directed me to land on the right bank of the riTer, toxxHSupy the honae 
if the gvvenior, mad then to march apon Mentzel, at 3 kilometera from the beach, but 
wttheal tacarriaK any unneceetary riak ; to try to take some hoetages there ; then to 
ftn kaek, I— vipg at the goTemor'e honae troope enough to occupy it in safety and to 
fslan om board with the rstt of the men. 
F« that oyatkia yoo placed under my orders the companies of the six iron-dads 
twa iHipatrb- boats of the squadron, with their artillery, besides the companies 
ths La Oalllssonl^re, the Reine-Blanche, and the Voltigenr, with their artillery 
ia all 1, 100 infantry and seventeen pieces of artillery. We were to be supported, 
r, by the firs of the armed boats and by that of the vessels. As nearly as 
lid Jadge, the Arabs numbered 400 to 500 cavalry, grouped mostly on the high 
to the left, and ftom 1,500 to 2,000 infantry in the town and the neighboring 
It was said that they expected re-enforcements. 

horagee of the ships indicated not only the order in which the boata should 
ible, bot also the order of the formation on shore. On the left were the oompa- 
of tb« Marrngo and of the Snrveillante, nuder the orders of Captain Mar^chal, 
cbarired especially with the* dnty of guarding that flank which, aM it was an open 
plain, was liable to b« attacked by the enemy's cavalry. In the center, which was 
aiy po«t, were the Tridente, the CoUierts, and the Desaixn, under the orden of Lieu- 
tensDt Locaa, and to them was amigned the occupation of the small fort and afler- 
w'ards the attack on the center of the town. On the right were the companies of the 
B#Taoche. Krie<lland, and Hirondelle, under the orders of Lieutenant Texier, who 
w«re in the ftmt place to take poeeeseion of the governor's house, then occupy the 
▼illage of r>fara, and Anally to attack the town of Mentzel on the right, guarding 
lb# bndge which connectii Mentzel with Dzara. The La Gallissoni^res and the Voltl- 
gvcrm. Doder the orders of Captain de Courtivr«)n, were to remain at the house of the 
gvf^n^tr. in watch the river, which i» everywhere fonlahle. and to assure commnni- 
eatj'^fi with the beach. The Keine-Blanches served as a general reser%'e and wore to 
b* krpt rVMi or I'jO meters in rear of the first line. I reM*rve<l her men to guanl against 
aaj aoforrw^n rcmlingencies that might present themselves. The artillery, under 
thm orders of Captain Tahareau, was distributed in the center and on the wings, in 
of the cnoip«Di#^. 

rallviog pnmtA were the govenior^s house or the little fort, according to cir- 
Mr. fJillet, chief surgeon in charge of the ambulaucrii, had onlers to 
atehlish him«elf ma soon a« posnihle in the governor's house, ("aptain Trillot, In 
ckarge of the boata. waa, after the landing, to l>ear a little to the right and take meaa- 
wtfm to protect and facilitate a re-eniharkation. 

The vesaels were no sooner anchore<1 than they anued their boata, and at 6.15 the 
laadmg waaefleeted without firing a shot. The l>each waA desert^. The large boata 
•eald not approach th<* shore anj n^»rrr than 50 meters, and the wV\a\e-V>o%\.a w^t^ 
•Miged lojurtju /Sfrrjrbomts; mAtiy of tb** njen in their haste Jumped Vivlo iVie ii%\«t 




28 OPERATIONB OF THE FRENCH NAVY 

and wkded •^ora. As aoon •■ foroHd v« took op oui mftroli in the «rd 
ftbove. Oa the neighborlDg bills * cousiderkble laovemeDt of th« e*v 
Mrved. Tbe s>ndy nstore of (he toil made the progrew of the artlUi 
onlt, and tbe crewi had to be helped li; laea from tbe oompkniea. The 
gOTeroor wa* found to be deaerted, aod waa oooopied wltboot ao.v tronl 

When we arrived at about a thonuDd metera froiu the fort we dred a : 
and aUo a fetr volleya of muHketrj. It eeeuied to me that no repi; waa tai 
It waa found aooo afterwarda that there were guoa there which had ver;^ 
flred. After a few raiantea we aaw a white flag waved fram Ihe gate. 
tbe fort, aod aent the men we found there, about IweDty In number, 
aud f^m there the; were aent aboard abip. Having no Interpreter, 1 1 
ontil aome time afterward that these men were Taolalans. 1 gave ordi 
the arms aud powder and to spike the gans, after having thrown tbem ii 
bnt to spare tbe fort itaelf, whiob, poor as it was, might be of service in 
iulte oocupatiou. 

The right wing enconntered some realatance at tbe faubourg of Daara 
of which it occupied. During this time the center began its attack on 
Uentiel. The artillery had comuieured its fire, aud onr riflemen exchani 
the Araba concealed in the honaea, nearly all of which wem fumiahed wl 
When the rigbt wing arrived In line the companien of the Trident and i 
made a bayonet charge and entered the town by different streets, some ( 
obstructed by banieadea, which tbe torpedo party were obliged to bloi 
same time the I'riedlBnd'a men entered the town on the right. The lefl, 
to its orden, held itself on tbe left of the town, but without entering, mi 
retreating enemy. At aeveral placea a hand-to-hand combat with the 
plaoe. We had eight men wounded, two of them aerioualy. After aquar 
of hard fighting we were masters of the town, and we eatablidied oon 
mosqaea, where we fonii^ leveral red and green flags ; we also took poa 
house of the cadi and of the telegraph ofBce. The Araba took flight in 
notions, bnt, as it seemed to me, all the cavalry went to the left.. 

I thought it uaeleaa to puraue the enemy beyond tbe towo, aa we did 
occupy it. Uosidea this, I did not care to have my men drawn into a leo 
suit, which would have rendered a rallying difficult, and might have c 
barraaaing transportation of wounded men ; it was also necessary to pn 
the retnni of tbe eneniy'a cavalry by way of the vaat plain behind ua 




■hiba ifbr Ottr 1*il ahnt thf> ftirt hlR«- np, plthrr fVom thottfTcnt nfonriiholl or rram 

HnlaM*Bii da Uw p«n nf III* Armba; howavcr tt vms there w>i>ui«(l Ut liu nianj 00. 

Am »I Ika fan at tb* Itnxi. J 

Ci|«*lBTH1lirt likvln|{r»]M>rt«i1 tu timthat on wiruiiut of thesMi-brevzo thoihorebiM 

tiwi rrry iflfflratt oTac^oM. t took mpsaurHi Tor a iniccpunive re-embnrkntion. TUn 

*^>M *«■ ir»t Mnt no board, Ibcn Ibe compnniM of tbp iHvlMon of thn I.oTanl,'' | 

TtilrtlvwM* •Irawlj partly nmharkiKl whrn yonr order rvarbnl mc totnknmniwiirw ' 

■ >k*if apa«lh1r nccnpallon Ii,t IhMw lanin rnmpRDlni. I IbrrpfoTf ordored lh«tt I 

Uimi ifals aad await thrlbni nrdnn, which did not arrlro iiiiUI & o'Mork ; tbey rt>l 

f^ti mm (o rHam oo tMaril with the ninu of Utt itrioMlron, aiid Ui Inavp on ahorfl 'i 

^ kM af Oa LrraDt dlTlolon. Ai K>on aa tb« IalU>r had Inken puaBowlim uf tb* I 

tMM IrtMtod t» return with the foor tnit cnmpanicii. The 8arvvillnnt«. tbv Mfti«ii- 

fi^ m4 Mtt iQapaUJi-boal* hwl alrrady hrra tirat back. Thts embarkntiun took plaM 

«llk Ika ntiaal JtBraltj:' ; the <wa broke at a hundnut melcnt from the boHch ; th« ' 

iMp baala c««ld imm appmacli an; nearrr. and ovon the whalc-boatit hnd to rcmala , 

M MM« 41lUlkM, *»i tb*D tbpy threatened to Hll at anj luomunt ; hoocver. In OM I 

wtf mr aaatlivr •• maaajtwl xo rmbark the material. Aa for tbn man, tha; wm* i 

aM^4 to ■nrfnva, «ih1 hj tsrTjlnn tbnir rlothra and eiialpinenla auapondad by thttc | 

ttgmml* lb«j wara abla t« rvMth thn whalti-boalu, I>7 whlcli th«f w«t« cMnv«j«d 1^ | 

tta Ihvv baata. Haaj of tbem wers rolled over bj the aurf, but there waa forto-, ( 

MWlr M Meldml. I 

Tte Ml^t waa t>iirlwt]f dark wbeo the ntnbarkalioQ wu eomplMed. At0.3(l p. m. 4 

k*d W tuni ad OD board ntcvpt the Frlrdlandu, whnae iHuta, oronpled Id 

la* tbey at flrat Tti>rr< lo rirnnint, linil 1) ~ 

I did 1i«I U>l»k It adv.Ml.l.^ to I.I.V.. Hmm .^iiilm 

•vManwi flMT ««•» «a9taf«d la, MMKfas Ot aatatkMlmii «nd w«* OiMMak 
l«ft«»1te«MWirai»imtMr. AlteWviBfpatntbdtlMWohAeMzlMn. 

1 1« gM •• iMifBiM a* ««ar dtaplay^ bj atttrr OM In tUa Uttte opwkttm, n 

r, did not interftTB with tbeordar and t^nlarity ofton wdlffloolt 

MABCt) OK BLOim DK SAIMT HILAIBB. 

Oar MUDCa eooooDtered at Mentzel and Dura a serions rMiatanoe, 
wUeh owed most of iu stabboninesa to fanatluisn]. If our losses were 
idaUrdy licbt it shoald be ascribed to the prndeDoeof oaroperationa, 
th% wisdom of the oommander, sod the discipline or the meo. 

Ob Jal; 26 the aqoadroQ set sail for Goleta, tonching at Mehedlab, 
Mo— stCT, aad Bosa. From Ooleta it went to Bona and thentoBiserta. 
It raCaned to Booa and west from there to Algiers, and flnatlf to 
Tbaloa. 

occofATios or TBS laiASD or jsbbah. 

JULY a,utL 
Ib order to oooiirfete the measarea taken to insnre the seonrity of the 
••■tbcaot eoast of the B^'gency there remained to be occnpied the island 
•r Jcriiah. I>nring the night of the 27th and 28th of Jalj, Admiral 
C— lad took poasesaloD of Honm-Boak, the principal town of that 
UMid. Tha faUowlag la the silmirml'i report, addressed to the miniater 

Jiaa^m, J«^ n, VWV. 
/ « ' »***# <*• ocnpmOoa of tha port of Hww^eak, oaplUJl o( )««MJa 



80 ' OPKBATIONS OF THE FBENCH NATT, ETC. 

JuDftla; Ua mllltftrj poaitlon IsmA fram*ttM)k. I un wklUng for * bi 
•Mtton of HtUlerr eomiac from 8f»x b^ tb« Intrtfplde. We BhaU thu 
the «nttr« iiUnd, whoM •othoritioa h«Te anbinittod to the OoTemiM 
teulng Ui« Inonnioiu ef tho Aiaba, wUoh It will b« x«tj eamj to pnvMit 
tlw fort* oomwndlng tli* forda oommanioktlng with the mslnlamd. Hm 
•nehond (ad mllM Itom the aliora, the difflooltlea of the nlght-Uadb 
fiWAt, tlwre b«ing » heaTy tern and a rtlff breeie ; nsTNthalaw do aoold* 

The OUe and the Tramblon aMiated Id the landing, and the bacgca hi 
Oiae enabled tu to laud the entire ptnomat at one time. 

I laft tha Bytae at Cabea, where I shall retnm aa aoon aa poadble ; 1 
Tery Important to ahow mjielf before Zania, to Jndga of the situation t 
on the Crantler and la taid to be verr hoatile to na. 



OCCUPATION OF BU8A. 

SEFTEIIBBB U, 1881. 

The oocapation of Sosa having been decided npon, thi 
AJaooio and Eleber, of the Transatlantic Oompany, left Tonio 
IffiOO men, while the Tarn embarked the troops of the adn 
serrioes and a battery of artillery, all destined for Snaa. 
and the La GalliB8onite«, nnder the command of Admiral i 
oelved orders to aooompauy the ttwiBports and to protect ti 
Leaving Toolon on the evening of September 9, the AJacc 
£leber anchored at 6 a. m. of the lOUi in the roadstead of J 
squadron did not arrive nntil an hoor and a half later, and n 
for the suirender of Snsa were immediately set on foot. It vi 
that resistance would be made, but there was none. The < 
of the town was, on the contrary, of a very accommodating ( 
which was no doubt caused by fear of a bombardment. B 
volantarily the Casbah and all the strategic points of the t 
laiidiiig immediat<ih' comitieucod. Tlic Alma aeiit her boi 




War Series, ^o. II. 

INFORMATION FROM ABROAD. 



THE WAR 



ON HIS 



PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA 

BETWKEN 

CHILE 

AND THE ALLIED REPUBLICS OF 

PERU AND BOLIVIA. 

1879-'81. 

BY 

LIKFTENA^T THEODORUS B. M. MASO\, 

r SITED STATKS NAVV 



okfkm: or naval iNTKLLi(;i:NrK. 
mri^KAi: <>v n'^ a v i c; a 'IMox 

NAVV DKI»AKTMENT. 



WASHIN(;T<)N: 
QOYKHJiMKyT I'l: ! y T I S G OFFICE, 



4' 



I «. 



.' f 



4 



K 



WMHnrOTOH, D. O., Jid^ 10i 1883. 

^: I kaire the konor to ratmiit the foUowiog aoooant of the war mi 
FawilecoMfeof aonfli Amfiri<ml>etweeii0liil6aiidQi8aIltedBepa^ 
•r Feni aad Bdivfak 
Tte ■■fgriil far tte paper htm been deriyed from peraonal otMerv»> 
IhMi qpfmeBlly aotheptlc pabUeetJonay fiom the leporta of Ueii- 
•BMwMSoauaaaiden D. W. M allan and J. J. Brioe and Ueatenaiiti 
J. BwBvina aad V.T. Houton, and from the notee of LirateDaiit*Ooiii* 
aMidenJ.S.OtaigaBdlLB.BQfiiidaiid LbBnteoaiiti J. F. Keig8,B, 
1L iBgenoll, aad R. P. Bodgera. 



Vaty r ci pe c tfli lly, 



SeereUny of the Navy, 



THEO. B. M. MASON, 

Lieutenant. 



INDEX. 



I.— Th«otiginof tlie WH r 

II. — GeogropIiiGal aod mililsrj stataaof the beltigerentB 

III> — Naval Htreni^h of tbe belligereDta 

IT.— Preparalioniforwar 

T.—t'Tom tbe declarstion of war, Aprils, 1879, to tbe naval battle of Iq 

May 12. 1879 

TI. — From tbe re-eafablUliment of the blockade of Iqniqni to the ba 

Angamos, Oclober 8, IM79 

VII.— From the landie); at PiaeK"*, November 3, 1(<79, to tbe lauding at 

oba, February 24, IBBO 

VIII. — From the laoding at Pacocha to tbe captors of Arica, Jnne &, ItiS 
IX.— Prom the fall of Arica to the &I1 of Lima, Jannary 17, 1881 




THE WAR ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH 

AMERICA. 



I. 

THE OBIGIS OF THE WAR, 

Tlie war id which the three leading repablics of the Pacific coast of 
Sooth America have been engaged coinmeuced on the 2d of April, 1879, 
nd hail extended to the present period. 

Like mnAt of the coautries of Central and South America, Chile, 

Pern, aod Bolivia were settled by the Spaniards, who deserve credit 

far their energy as pioneers of civilization. 

\ Of the three coantries, that known as Pern seems by far the most at* 

f tractive. Its climate was the mildest; its land, at a short distance 

fr^m the coant, tho most fertile; its mineral wealth the most evident 

Vi 1 «»ht liiiable. It was thirkl^' populated by a mild and iiidustriouH 

.*w ol Ituiiaiis, if wc can believe the historians and the proof furnished 

(^ fi^ry nide by niina, aqueducts, roads, and terraced mountain sidt»s. 

*"li.l»*, on the contrary, was apparently less invitin;;, and was inhab- 

itril l»y .1 hardy^ warlike race. 

li*»!:vi;i, l\in;^ inland, detached by a r:in;:e of hi;zh mountains ami 
:-':j.i*'>.r««.l by warlike tribes, pn^sented fe.w attractions to tln3 8|)aniards, 
*:.•! to thi.H day her race h:us preservinl many of its ori;;inal character- 
a: ..-.*. 

I»ir.n^ the n'bellion a;cainst the mother eountry, in the early part of 
•i.* it-ntury, ('hile wan the first of the Paeili<* colonies to ;;ain her inde- 
f*:. i ••:)!**•. This ;i4!« omplished, her people, aisled by that in<loniital)le 
>''r.Iniian, I>»rd ('ochrane, and a small but well trained band of his 
*^'^:.rr>m«'ii and of our own, went to the assistance of their IVruviaii 
>!j:Sl>orH. Th«* free<lom of IVru was due mainlv to this timelv aid. 
Tli** Spaniards who remained in IVru after the first coinpu'st were 
J»r v ij.ally military men, who made themselves the proprietors of all of 
i:»w#-alth. 

.Vji th^ first settlers were accompanied by few women, they were 
fant*d to marry Indian women, thus founding a mixed race. 'V\w \\\Uv>. 
4«rtioo of vttgTvea to supply the places ot the Indians who \\av\ eWWt 
hniar withdrMwa to the interior, and also that of the C\iU\e6e> ci>o\\i» 



b THE WAJt OS THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AUE 

to replace the negroes who bad become affected by the cLa 
dition, Btill further affected the character of the people. 

Darin? the uolocial 6ay» many Spaniards, with their famil 
the conntry, most of them in the employ of the Govemm 
however, as bona fide colonists, and their descendants to-da; 
an element of the Peruvian nation ; they are generally plante: 
be regretted that a large aamber of them has left the coantr^ 
never to retnm. 

The colonial government was administered either by Spe 
tang or by the mesclados. 

The Indians have witbdrowD to the interior, where they rei 
brought to the coast as soldiers, sailors, or servants. Comm 
and indnstry tempted raany foreigners to the conntry. The 
foUen mostly into the hands of Italians, Germans, French, 
commerce into those of the English, specnlative enterprises < 
to onr countrymen, and the hard work to negroes, Cliiuesc, at 
There aro no manufactnres, goods of all kinds being imports 

Chile is a narrow strip of conntry lying Iwtween the mon 
the sea; it had been colonized by a bardier set of 3paniar 
desirous with their brothers in Pern to proSt by their adven 
Like their neighbors they brought the aborigines under sub 
made them tbeir coworkers and songbt to educate them. ' 
tion and elevation of the lower classes prevented the neci'ssi 
dncing large numbers of foreign laborers and made the C 
purer and more homogeneous. The country did not attract 
olators. The foreigners who settled in it came to work, and 
nnprejudiced, liberal-minded, intelligent people, intermarried 
BO that they became more than personally interested in the 




WAR ON THE PACIHO COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA. 7 

The provioce of AtAcama, or more properly the desert of Atacama, 
kad remained for maDy years witboat a definite owner, at one time 
dained by BoliTia, at another by Chile, bat never considered of snf- 
ident importance to warrant the establishment of a boundary line until 
the discovery of the guano nitrates and other mineral wealth which it 
eontained. In 1866, the republics being allied in war against their com- 
moQ enemy S|>ain, a treaty between Bolivia and Chile established the 
bonndary at the 24th parallel of south latitude, and further stipulated 
that Chilian citizens already land-owners between the parallels of 23^ 
and 24^ south should be allowed to mine and export the valuable prod- 
fMctA without tax or hindrance from the Government of Bolivia. To 
fiKiIitate the execution of this a^rreement Chile was allowed to have a 
reprenentative in the customhouse at Antofagasta. The nitrate busi- 
waA chiefly in the hands of a company, the principal parties in which 
the English house of Oibbs, a Chilian named Edwards, and the 
Chilian (iovernment. On the 23d of February, 1878, Bolivia levied a tax 
of ten centavos \fet quintal on all nitrates. When remonstrated with 
for thin allege<l breach of treaty stipulations, the Bolivian Government 
DOC only refused to remit the tax but declared it retroactive, and further 
deeired that if the taxes were not paid before the 14th of February, 
I479rthe nitrates in the hands of the exporters should be seized and 
aold at auction. Chile remonstrated against these proceedings, and 
menx ber fleet, under liear- Admiral ReboUedo Williams, to prote<*t the 
prr>perty of her citizens at Antofagasta. This fleet arrived on the day 
tx*^\ for thf» <M'iznre. 

♦n xhv l!lth of January th«* (Miiliaii (tov(»nunont lormallv ordered 
th»- <<^*npation of Antofagasta, whicli was <»(iuivah*nt to a declariitioii 
1'/ WAT with Bolivia. On the day on which this order was issu(Ml r>(M> 
'^bilian re^cnlars were landod at Antofagasta, wliich becaiiu* tlie liead- 
'inarten* for fnrtlier operati<»ns. (\)l<»nel Sotoinayor was afterwards 
•^nt to Caraeolfs to proteet the mining interests with his troops. On 
Man-h 2.'J a light <H*enrred at (\ilania between this eohiinn an«l a Ixxly 
(»f Ii4>li\ians under Dr. Ladislao C^ahrera, in whi<h tlie latter were de- 
ft-^t*-«l and forced to retire, with a loss of l!0 killed or wounded and 'M) 
f»ri**inen*, ineluding one eolonel and tw(» other otlieers. The Chilian 
'.♦•^ in killwl and wounded was llf men. Vmi sc*nt »'nvo\s to La Paz, 
th#- capital of Bolivia, and Santiago, tht» eapital of riiih». (!hil«« do- 
c^anih-^l t*( VvTii the reasons for Iut preparations for war, and that they 
*L«*fdd ifUM*. Not U'ing satisfied with the answef, CMiile, on tln' LNl of 
Af-nl. formally declarecl war, and at the same time a>s4Tted that she 
it^rw of a MH*n*t treaty of Fehniarv <», IST:?, hetween INtii and ISolivia. 



THE WAE ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AME 



CBOGRAPBIVAL AND MiLITAUY STATUS OF THE BELLIQ. 

Tlie continent of South America ia diviilcd into two wati 
the Andes Moiiiitaina, wbicli cxteml from tbe Istkinutt of Pai 
totUeStraitsof MiigellaD. Tlie western waterelieOisestremi 
not exceeding 300 uiileu iu its widest imrt. Owing to tlie 
rain, eHpeeially between the latitudes of Cuquimbo and tbe 
Biver, it is arid in tbe extreme. At rare intervals small stren 
dry in the soathern sumuier uioiiths, flow from tbe mountains 
These streams have formed valleys that in some eases are v 
though separated from each other hy dreary and almost 
wastes of desert. In these valleys is congregated most of the ] 
and through mauyof them enterprising foreigners have const 
ways, establishing iu some cases coiiimunication with tlie r 
water-shed. The coast line is very regular, troudiug for lonj 
in the same direction, without dangerous headlands or outl, 
Tbe reefs are close inshore, and donnt present any obstacle to ] 
Uigb bluBs separate tbe deserts from tbe ocean, and where 
exteud to the sea broad plains are found. With the except 
divin, Valparaiso, Co<iuimbo, Mejilloues de Bolivia, Callao, 
and Paitu, there are uoharborsin tbe countries of which we w! 
The other ports are open roadsteads and mer« landing plauf 
boats. Some of the latter are I'eacbed through narrow pass 
reefs, some by running through the surf, and others can only 
by means of baskets or cages letdown from high iron piers oi 
the cliffs tbemselves. The winds on tbe coast are very regul 
with almost uniform force from south to north. Wiib the e 




I UK WAR OX TIIK PACIFIC COAST OF SOUni AMERICA. 9 

!^«.i:ii«'Mi liinit of tin* rainless belt, is arid in the extreme. South of 
( •-;<i:iiiiM ii i!iij»r«)Vf*s until it assumes quite a promisino^ aspect at 
r.tl4Mliii.in.i and Valdivia. The populati(ui of Cliile in 1ST!) numbered 
4!m>(K i:.lM)jHH). The principal seaports, none of wliich arc naturally 
4i!.i]<:r«l lor tlitrnsi*. are Valdivia; Taleahuana, the sea port of C'oneep- 
•-:oii. «-*i:inf«-teil with it and Santiaj^o by rail ; Valparaiso, a lar^e eity, but 
^!%ii thi* >«M port of Santiago, the capital, with whieh it is connected by 
.-.a:! ; i 'tM|uimbo, cnniiectrd by rail with La Serena ; Iluasco, and C'aldera. 
1 hf A i-.tlfs, fortunately for Chile, form an excellent western boundary 
lir.v hfT the Ar;;entine Republic. Chile and the Argentine Republic, 
until l.iU'ly, have Ikhmi continually at variance on the boundary <pU'8tion, 
a.-tii ii IS pt»s<«ible that the two allies who were to be arrayed against 
C'ii.ir rxpt'CKti valuable aid from the Argentines. 

Chdi*. through the imlustry and enterprise of her inhabitants, is ul- 
ni«i^t .M'lf-supiMiriin;;. Reef is the only absolute necessary of life that 
h-A< til b«* im|Hirted. Most of this is driven across the mountains on the 
h«ifil iiiiin pampa.N. 

iliiliv ia, with the exception ot a small extent of sea coast from the 21st 
tti th«- L'4th dr'xn'e of south latitude, lies to the eastward of the AndeM, 
^ L.ili r.in^e, with the almost impassable <leserts to the westwaid, virtu- 
ally i-^4il.ites the more thickly ])opulate<l districts, communication be- 
tvt^-n xUviu iH'iii^ maintained through Peru to the sea-coast and thence 
:•» Al•li•^lca^ta. The interior of R(»livia is well endowed by nature, l)ut 
til-- «4'.i iiKiAl is wholly arid, as there is not even a valh*y to redeem it. 
i' • ■ :•■ n'»: fi»r the latrly discovered numeral wcaltli of liiis n';;ion it 
1 ••• .\M .lii.HiiIuti* uildeini»ss. As it is, ilir riiiliaiis, in siarrh of 
-. :.;\i- ^m.'iioiuiicd >oiiH» of iisdillirullii's, ainl iiiivf built a railway 
:•• \ ■i.n.M'-ra iii\\:m)>. tin* Cmactilr^ juiiiiii;^ tlistriri. Tluir i.s no 
i' '■ • I* A!rtiit.i;::i>tii. :iim1, on account of dan;^(-n)?is ici'is ;inil a n:irr«iw 
. »• ;, « iifii.'ii iiii'Miioii u i: h I lit* *>iiori' is rlVcrird l»\ ImkUs. As in many 
. ■ r ' .fiin;^ jM»it.'* on tin- coa^t, ri«'>li wali r is distil]t'«l :ii»ni sra-watfr. 
^I' I.;.- lii- i*i»li\ la, a-^ it is railed, to ili>tin;.ni-<h it I*n»ni anolh(*r 
■!- . i- *. i"» a -a.ali -m*; ilrnimi nf woikmni «*Mi]il«)\i'd in the ;:iiano 
• ;•■* ' * 'ii..i ill* nrai it. TIh* inhabitants i>f t]ii> par; of lH»li\ i.i, cxript 
. '• . • ■ «i .• ! ^ arnl ♦►liM*r-ii"ld«'i «*. an- < iiiiian^.. i I*'ol:i .ipliii\j||\ I lii.s pio\" - 

■ 1. •! bi i«»i::: fiM lull', \\lii»Hi- iKstni.tl lMHinilai> i^ tlu-iixtr Lna ; 

•- :..*- !• i:aial whil' i of i!iili\ia ti> tin* ^i-.i i^ tbi'tci;^!! tiit* I'l iii\ian 
:■ :i • ■ .;.?* Ill MtMj<if;;nii and Aif«| lip.i. I'. ili\ la i> -« If ^nppls .ni: as 

* ' • ■ • • *-alIi'N III itir. It li.l.s brrll iinpo<>NiI»lf tiMii)(,iiii irii.ib.c .st.ili>- 

* • : t ;miJi;i1 iMnli nl ilijs rnnntiA. but it i.ia> l'«* --l.rfd a> appioxi- 
' '. iM r.vi-fM t\\«» .mil tliii'i* millions. 

I ■■ ; , a riMiiit I V neai 1\ tin i-i*t iini'S a> lar^e as t ranr«', r\ tfiid.'% fioni t in* 

* ••: l^t.i iti (hi* month <if tin* <iiia\a<pii), an«l lioni thi'orran tn near 
'L- ni.i'.tj^i' i*f 111** ci»ntiiHMit, u Inie it tioidiMs iipun r>ra/il. Tm* nartuw 
*T|i iff :»-rr;itiry l> in;; iM-twmi tin* Ai/drs an«l tlie »»riMU ve>*\\v\Avs \\u* 

\iu:x^ivi u if^rt ut' f'itili mill thi* roa>r ]»rovijn'r of liohvii, \va>V \A \\\v* 



10 THE WAB ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AHS 

TDoootftine the conntr; is as beaiitifol and as fertile as any oi 
The magDiflcent steppes of the AdiIcs and the plaioviod vnl 
headwaters of the Amazon, if properly colonized and gover 
alone make Pern one of the richest coantries in the world. 
open op this territory that the Oroya Railway was planned an 
constrncted by onr conntryman, Henry Meiggs, ably assie 
brother John and a large staff of American engineers. Tbi 
which has an average grade of 4 feet in 100, follows the vt 
Bimac from Cnllao, through Lima and a nnmber of small towi 
along and up the faces of precipices by cuts, V.8haped can 
manner of loops; over bridges spanning chasms In some cs 
sand feet deep, some bnilt at once on a grade and a carr 
tnnnels of great length ; making miles of detonr to gain one< 
ami finally piercing, with a tunnel 4,(HH> feet long, the very li 
the Andes, 15,645 feet above the level of tiie sea. Over 8ti 
miles necessary to reach the town of Oroya are already ope 
Tbw roadway is prepared as far as the summit, and, had [tea 
in a few years more the coffers of Pern wonld be filling from tl 
almost iiiexhaustiblu region. American enterprise is now try 
a way to Uii« district by steamer np the Amazon and then by r 
the valleys of its tributaries. Tlieprincipnl sea-ports of I'eru 
and l*i»agna, both sitnated on the edge of tLe desert of Tar 
connected by rail with the nitrate deposits of that province, 
these places has a harbor, and each has to be snpplietl wltl 
artificial means. Aric^ another port without a harbor, is I 
minns of an important railway running to Tacna, from whi 
road leads to I^a Paz, the capital of Bolivia. Ilo and ilt 
mere landing pUices, the first being the outlet of the ric 
Hoquegnn, with the city of which name it is connected 1 




THE WAS ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA. 11 

this wmr^ hitherto onprovided for in the law of nations. At the Con- 
gmHi of the lostitoCe of International Law, held at Brassels in Septem- 
ber. 1879, the following resolution was adopted : 

1. It woold be weU if the Mverml powers wonld declare the destmction of sabma- 
rias cahlcv on the htxh MAt mn infraction of the law of nations, and determine the 
^oalljr of the ollrnse. On this last point such nnifonnity should bo attained as 
w««ld caoform with the different criminal codes. 

S. Tbo right to seize guilty or suspected individuals should \m given to all men-of- 
war, with the restrictions detennined by treaty; but the right of jurisdiction should 
hv vcBUd in the Government of the sccused. 

X A aobmarine cable between two neutral territories should be inviolable. 

4. It is to br deeiPMl that when telegraphic communication should cease on account 
of a stale of war, se<| nest rat ion should replace destruction. At any rate, destruction 
•boald l«e prarticed in a very limit^l de^rt*e, and the belligerent who should resort 
to it sbt>ald mtore the cable communication as quickly as possible after the termina- 
tMNi of the war. 

Chile hail in her presidential chair Don Annibal Pinto. 
B«ilivia was rnled bv (leiieral Ililarioii Daza. 
The Preaiident of Ptru was Mariano I. Prado. 

The Chilian regular army had never exceeded 3,500 men of all arms. 
lo 1879 it numbered — 

lafaotry 1,500 

Artillrry 410 

Cavalry 5:i0 

Total ; 2 440 

FU**i«b'.H \\w n*;riil;irs, i^nrh city had a iinit\)rin(Ml body of inilitia ; tliat 
• ■f V.ilparaiH<. forriiiii;: a bri^adcof infantry, which would have compared 
%#-r\ f.iviiralily with like troops in onr own eonntry. 

T!i«* ri-giilars \\rii* lecniited from the Indian element princi|)allv, and 
Wf r»* a«* tin** a ImmIv of men in <rfneral appeaianee and discipline us 
f..n!d !m' touml in anv army in the wnrhl, sn«r;restin^' very foreilily th<» 
j-H...iU:!ify of ntili/in;: our own Indians in the sam«» w;iy. The Chilian 
«'ffi«*ir^, nt»t •Mjjoyin;c the ailvantaijes of a teelinieal edueation, and pos- 
««-%«in^ but limited knowlcd;;!* of niilitar\ ojierations t»eyond barra(*k- 
>^rd • \«»iuth>nN, wen* rrlativ»*ly not as «»tliei«'nt an tin* men. The tacti(*H 
ar.W ri'.itin.il wt-n* mod«*h'4l on thn>«» of thi* Spanish for mn/zle l<>adin^ 
■■• aiNiiiH, :iii(| ui'H' not adapt<*d to tln» nsr of modiTn lin* jirms. The men 
vfH- ut*il clothed, th«* uniforms iesemi>Iin;: in eoh»r anil fashion thostMif 
tii«- Fffiu-h annv ; in faet, manv of* them w«»re manntartunMl l»v (oulillot. 
.n P.tri-*. The i><|uipnients wcrr ohi-IV.shioned, and wrre f'oniid so!>:iillv 
«d iptt-il to th«* nMpiir«*m«Mits of modern warfare that aft«*r a short ox- 
y^fifiiif th«*\ wen* re|»hiced by others mon* >niltMl to the p«*ri«M|. and 
ahi'li u ill 1h* dcMTilM'd in aiiotln'r plaee. 

Th<* itif.intry (re;:nlar) had just be«'n armrd with tin* Comblain i\\U\ 
tr.anuru'tnrtMi in Helj^inm. This arm resemblrsthe Sharps riM«% with itM 
miAMhlf bloik. the imlv ilif1't*n*nri* In^iu^ the union t»f l\\e \A\u*Vv •a\u\\\>\ 
Mf.immJm;:i'M trith tin- hn*o<'h hhnk. T/ie niotal u^MMl \u t\\e u\a\\v\Vav:\vw 



12 THE WAE OM THE PACIFIC COAST OP SOUTH AME 

of the breech-block, bamla, &c., was pliosplioric Itronze, whinb 
into ttliape, rcqtiiifil but little hiiisliin;;. The artillery was > 
obsoK'lc Rims, ultliouRli a few Knipp rifles were in Rtore. 1 
wut) iirmet) wilU FraiK^h nabers nnd Cumblain earbim-s. 

Ai-cnnliiiR to tippnrontly reliable Hourvett, the Boliuaii re, 
□uinlH^retl 2,30« men and I.OIM) oftleera. 

The unifiirius of the men were made of a niiilerial reseaib 
cloth, coarsely dyed in iniitatiurtof the Freiicliiiiiifurni. The 
of the most, obsolete type, sevoral battalions being provided 
lock iniiKketa. 

The standing army of Pern, including the (rendarmerie 
poliire, has been variuasly etitimated at from 0,{HW to 13,000 
arms. As in most S|ianish eonntries, each corps was ki 
nanui instead of a number. Tim following is a summary of i 
trooi>8, as given in Seflor Paz-Soldaa's very iuterestiug worl 





IXFAXTRT. 


PU'lihii-lin Battalion. 


jRth of March BattBlinn. 


AjKiii'liu Dattulton. 


1 Till of March BjtUlion. 


Cftlku Itultiitioii. 


Chech Butt alioD. 


PBiiyan Uattjiliuii. 


Piiliu Buttaljiin. 


laadmeuUBltuliin. 


1 lluiilK-uvy Uattslioti. 


PauonT|>Bta Batiftlion. 






CATJIBT. 


Jnnin Huzzani. 


1 Uiiiflo Lfttici-nt 


Tmd> Mounted Eifita. 


1 4th Pn>vi>,iOD«l. 




JBTILIEBT. 


1 l>sl>l l'utt^ri''« inoTiiitalii 


1 gunn, onn 1 1 balt.iry slnitoguu*. 




THE WAB ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AMEHICA. 13 



III. 



THE SAVAL STRKNGTII OF TUE BELLWERENTS, 

Th<^ <*hiiiaii navy had l)ecn fostered by the Qovernineiit, which was 
fully alive to tlie vital itni>ortance of tliis branch of the national de- 
ffUitef Mil rounded as Chile was by nations more or less hostile, but 
vho, owiuj; to her natural defenses of mountains and deserts, would be 
fofCi^l to attack her by sea. Willing: to proHt by th<», costly experi- 
in«-ntK carrieil on in other countiies, and having no home interests to 
pn«t«-<-t, she sent Iier oQicers abroad — the okler ones to examine the 
Ut«'^t ships and [:^\\\\^^ the youn^^er ones to enter the foreign services 
and piln ex|H*rienci' in their duties. The result has been that she has 
^Ideil to her fleet two lino Kiiglishbuilt ironcliuls of the very best 
it«-ag«Miig ty|)e, an excellent corvette*, and a corps of young ollicers well 
»:ixti d to handle them. 

Th«* Chilian navy is administered by a minister of the marine, who 
1^ al!««> minister of war. General B. Arrutia hehl the oilice at the out- 
break of thf war. 

Thf p^rMonnel of the n-gular nary was as follows: 

^ ^^ admiral I • 

k^^r »«*iiiiral« {mntrti nlmiramtr) '•{ 

« ^;«*^in* t'aifntnm Jr nnrio) ^^ 

* -u 'ii-^fiilvrw rapifan de fratjnta ) l*-^ 

! •:•••• I'.r-i »nl'l■^t^t\t'^H (''apltan df r'trf'ita) 11 

I • ; • - '' ;. !• 'I'* ifr Jiri'Htnt rfaHMf) 1*" 

i ,' it!* il- »r iun4iii t I't-m ) *S* 

/•Jttrt'ni miirinii > •>** 

.'*. . j»ij.»'ti • •fjnninti ) iW' 



V..-. 



i;r ••! 



'^» ■••i tn' ii4fy tnnjitr) I 



• " Tj'n:. * J. '■lift/ r'» nn lii^tt > 
I' •;.#*•/ r "f ri .i# liiii*»rv , . . 
r. J r*>r- •■! Til* 'J*\ rI:iH-i 



n 



Mr> 



10 



1 

10 
*J0 



»< 



l**^ -i«|«^r '..f 

!'*- ti.A**' r* < f :!.*- lp*t I'l.mn 
I u 



1 

'A 







?' »•#.! •;,» r; trii.mfiintr» 



■ »• 






Tt.»'r»» W.I-, I H'MidfH, a c<»r;>s />/* //;;!/ i/irs. ulio, wIhmi as\HU*e,\\\TU\vv\ vax\ 



14 THE WAB OH THE PACIFIC COAST OP SOUTH AHt 

The materiel of tbe iiary consisted of the armored, boz-< 
aeft-going rams Almiraute Coohrane and Blanco Encolada 
ValparaiHo), both designed by Sir £. J. Beed, M, P., and oon 
him among bis best conceptions ; bnilt by Earle's Ship-Bail 
pan J', at Hull, Kngland, in 1871; engines constrocted by Jo 
Sons; cost of each, about 11,000,000 in gold. Their leogt 
perpendicQlara was 210 feet-, beam, 45 feet 9 inches; drangt 
18 feet 8 inches — aft, 19 feet 8 inches; height of battery at 
line, 5 feet 6 iocbes; diaplacement, 3,560 tons; engines, 
oompound, horizontal tmnk; horae-power, 2,960; screw-pn 
speed, measured mile, 12.8 knots. 

The armament consists of six 9-inch 12-tou mnzele loading 
rifles, mounted on Scott muzzle-pivoting carriages, iu a < 
battery, with double re-entering forward and after ports, tb 
ment permitting the forward gun on each side a train from r 
to abeam, the central gun from 70° forward of the beam t< 
the beam, and the after one fh)m abeam to right astern, 
carried, besides, ooe 30-i>oander, one 9-ponuder, and one 
The Blanco Encalada carries two 1-inoh ^-pouuderlfordeDrel 
guDS, one on each end of tbe bridge, and the Almirante Co 
mounted ou the knight-heads forward. After the battle ol 
severul notchkiss revolving guns were added to tbe armame 
agaiuint tori>edoe8. In addition to these light gnus, 12 pick* 
in action are stationed in tbe fore and maiu tops, protected I 
vatioii by s<Teens, The battery- is 7 j feet high; the armo 
stniken, the lower of which is H inches and tbe upper 6 inch 
the Hidctt and forwanl part, while on tbe after part both bavi 
thickness of 4^ inches. Tbe armor is backed by about 14 incl 
inside of which is a thin iron skin. The armoretl transverse 




THB WAB OS THE PACIFIC COABT OF SOUTH AMERICA^ 16 

their stoam-laanches, of ordinary type, are fitted to carry spar torpe- 
do(«. Benides its regular armament each carriea a rocket-tube and rock- 
cU. Keither Lb fitted for torpedoes. 

The sten is a solid casting, ramshaped, and strengthened by backing 
and bracing. The ram extends 7 feet 6 inches beyond the bow, and the 
point is 6 feet 9 inches below the water-line. Condition of the halls, 
good; Blanco's Iwttom, very foul; Cochrane's better, as she had been 
taken to England to be doi-ked and cleaned. The Blanco's bottom is 
sheathed with wood and zinc. 

The oorrettes CHiggins and Chacabuco, wooden hulls, built in Eng- 
laml in 1867. Length between perpendiculars, 217 feet; beam, 35 feeti 
Mean drmnght, 15 feet inches; displacement, 1,670 tons; engines, 
flisple« old type ; screw, single and lifting ; siieed, 8 to 10 knots ; rig, 
ahip: armament, three 7-ton muzzle-loading Armstrong rifles, on pivot 
CArrages; two 70pounder muzzle-loading Armstrong rifles, in broad- 
aide ; four 40 pounder muzzle-loading Armstrong rifles, broadside ; nuni- 
brr of crew, 160 men ; condition, hulls fair, boilers very old and i>oor. 

Thei-or\'ette Abtao, builtin England, 1864. Ilull, wood ; disphicement, 
LOTiOtons; engines, simple, old style ; liorse-i)ower,300; screw, single ; 
•perd *» to 6 knots; armament, three 150-pounder muzzle-loading Arm- 
atn>og rifles, on pivot carriages ; three 30-i>ounder muzzle-loading Arm- 
strong rifles, two in broadside, one on i>ivot carriages; rig, bark ; con- 
dithMi. hulliNjor, engines so defective that she ha<l been sold to private 
parti»-H, who ha^i removiMl tliem in order to convert her into a sailing 
^♦■*M-I. ISepiircliasod <*n;;ines and boilers replariMl. 

Tii«« -iiHi]! of Wiir Ksinrrahla, hnilt in Kn^land in isr>4. Hull, wood; 
!• :.^'li l»T'A«-fii iMTpeiMiiciilius, iMiO I'tM't ; Immiii, .T) l'iM*t ; ilrau;;lit, 14 lV»i»t ; 
:.'M:.t^f. i»l«i nieasiinMiH*nt, STiO tons; *-nj;inrs, siiiiplr, oM t.xpt*; iioni- 
i: ji Im^fm* |Hi\\«T.lf<N»; M*n*w, siii;;]r aiHl lilliii;:; spfMMl,.'i knots; ii;^,.sliip; 
^:: :.it;.ti)t. ori;;inaI, ci^ht 40-iKmii<lcr niiiz/Ic loailin;:: Arinstioii;: rities, 
.u I'ru.olMiIf, inrn'Hsoii to foiirtiM*n 40-poiinfl(T luu/zk* loailiii^ Arm- 
•7:*ii;:xitlt*>. l)r«»a(l*^i<l«': new, \i\0 men ; cfMiflitionot'lnill, old aiidi'otlen; 
• :!••!*. viTV <»ld and ahiio^t niisiMvir<*abl<». 

Ti.r mm*i»ih1 rlassrorvrtte Ma;;i*llaiii*s, built in Kn;;lan(l, l-sTt. Hull, 
• •'!». j.«'.-;:r : It-n;;tli lH*twt»en p«TpiMHii(!niars, IHO tW\ ; hi'ain, L*7 trot; 
TTi-.i?! ilrai];:Iit, l.J iM't ; diNpIacdiMMit, 77- tons; iMi;:inrs, ron)poiin<l 7 
t».ri ^iiws; liorM* powrr, 1,L*.'J0; s|hmm1, 11 knots pn* litinr, on IM Ions 
<iMi fMT day: ri;r, barkfntine; arniannMit, one 7 ton nin/zlc Inadiii;^ 
Arrn-tfitpi; rilli*. on pivot raiTia;;«* ; out* (U |H>un(l«*r nni/./Ieloadin;; Arm 
»*r"iu' riil«% on pivot rania;;^: on<* 'Jtf pounil«-r nm/zlr loading Arm- 
•:i«-i.: rjllr, tin pivot rarriajrr; roiidilion, «*\(U'llfnt ; riiii>in;; under 
< "fiiff: iiiij^T Lat4irr«* in tii«* Straits of Ma^xdlan. 

'Ill*- L'inilMMt (*ovadon|;a, cMptniiMl tVoin tlo* Spanai'd.> in \^*U\ by th«* 
K«:n*'rrfld.«. Tf>n!ia^«\ old nifasnmncnt, IlL': t'it;:iiii'>. old st\li', 110 
iiopM' iK>Wfr: sm^U^fU^irn,' inuximum s/wrd, o kni»ts; r\,:,\\\\vo\\vAs\\M\ 
U>jt%iiil HcLwuiT : t^fuditiuti, hull jnun\ rn;r'tH*?* and \>oilrrs \wh»\; awwa- 



16 THE WAR ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AUE 

ment, two 70-i>oiindpr mtizKle- loading Armstrong riUes, on 
ijages. 

The finiall side wheel tender Toltwi, carryiup a fevv light g 

BenidcB these nienofwar, Oliilo had an ex<rel!eiit Iin« i 
built ixiitst Rtenmers and a number of fiteanierni-ngiiged in ti 
ores, &c., belonging to the Coiisiao estate. 

There is no regular niivj-yanl, althcngli one han been pre 
will probnidy l>e completed, as tiie oxperipncen of the war 1 
its necettsity. There arc several large mncliinv shops nt Val|i 
of which, belonging to the PaeiBc Bteani NavigatioD Coinpi 
ttcalnrly well ndapted for repairs to steam machinery. In 
of Valparaiso are two large tloating docks, capable of nnsing 
vesHels, bat not of tsnfficient strengtli for the heavy iron-clu 
is an arsenal for naval stores at Valparaiso, where there 
limited number of workshops for slight repairs. 

Chile has a naval school where the yonng officers of the li 
cate<l. She has also a naval observatory and a hydrngra 
whoM> publications are excellent. The smaller vesseirt of tl» 
emph>yed in surveying the Chilian coast, Smythe's Cbnnn 
Straits of Magellan. 

The Cochrane was sent to England a year before the wu 
slight alterations and to have her Imttoni cleaned. 

The nniforni of the Chilian navy is modeled after onr ow 
reseMihletl in almost every jiarticnlar bef(»ro we adopted liroi 

The l>ook of regulations is almost identical with ours of 1(4 
vatu modification of the present international code of signals 
communicating between vessels. 

The supply of coals is drawn almost entirely from Wale 




THE WAR ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AlfERICA. 17 

ftll ref»|iect8 to the UdIoti, was lost in the great tidal wave at Arioa. Since 
itaw iofaflion of new material nothing has been added to the Pernvian 
narj except the little transport Talisman, which belonged to the Piero- 
lista |wrty« and c^ame from England loaded with amis for the revolution 
of II a y« 1 H77. It may be interesting here, for many reasons, to retros|>ect 
a little and give a description of one of the events of this revolution. 
Chief Engineer King, in his useful work, The War Ships and Navies of 
the Worhl, gives a graphic account of this action, which is heroin re- 
peated. 

In Npeaking of the engagement that occurred in the Pacific off the 
bay of lio, Ma^- 29, 1877, between the British unarmored vessel Shah, 
aM»i«te«l by the corvette Amethyst^ and the Peruvian ironclad Huascnr, 
be Miys : 

Thi« ATiiim. if worthy to be called by that name, wa« lm)n>jht about by very otraiifrt) 
prnrniurvvi oil thr part of th«* officers of the Huam^ar. The frint of the reports is an 
to^iaw*: l^iiniiK • rvvolution couimon to South Americau (lOvenimeDtM, the adhtr- 
•%:* of ao in«orKfiic Ifailer. Niculas de Pierola, }N*rHnaded t he offieersof the Huascar 
U' r^twl a;caiui«t ihe Peruvian (tuvernnient, aud with their consent a uumbnr of thrne 
«rn •riiHl Ihe vr<«i«*l in the harbor of Calla<i. under the cover of darkueM, and put to 
«ra. %aihu;: to thi* mmthward. At Cobija, in Bolivia, IMerola embarked on the Huuh- 
r%r. whirh then Ntramt^l io the north with a view to effect a landing. Very shortly 
aft^r ihi« the .Shah, with Hear Ailmiral de Horsey on board, arrived at Callao, aud 
W;tijc iDf*>nu<d of the aliove facts, alwi that deprinlations had l>Men committeil by the 
HcMwar (»n KntiMh pmpiTty and against BritiKh subjects, Aduiirnl de Horsey made 
''^ f>'aiitt To thr IVruvian (tovi-rnment, and n*ceiving in reH|MmHe a decree decbiriiig 
tb» HfiaM-»r a pirate, ottrrinc a rewnnl for her ca]duns and repudiating; all respon.^i- 
V. ..!. tli#« frirt "f l'9Tii fnr acti* <'oinniitt4*d by lior, hedi»t4*nni!ie<l to pnx'i'od a^ain^r 
*-• i{-:a.M ^r With hi^ ri.i;:Hhip, tli«* Shah, and tin- AniethvHt. llaviuf; put t4» H4>a for 
•• • • iT].. •« . :i* *:;;l»tfil thi' nuHH<ar oilthi* tnwn nf Ho ou thi» a!l«*rn«M>n of May *J'.», 
^ ' • ■ •; ..•,., I \.vT tn inrp'iidiT. TliiH Hriiiirn<»nH thi* ('oiiiinaiiilinj^ nilJjMT n'fujwMl lo 
• •-•'%.?■ I V»* **h.ih thru tin*d. fiFNt a hhmk i-artriil;;*' and thi'ii a Mh<»tt«Ml charij*', 
••■■• •'» H'; !»• ir ••ti'l r^fiiitin;; to •iurn-niliT. a Htt-aily aiitl wi*ll-NiiHlaiii«'il Mn* from hi»th 
"r." *• «h i.i't Aiii«»'liv«t w;iH diriTtfd a^aiiint luT. Tin* li^lit \% as partly in <>haH«> and 
»" -. ■ .r> iil^r. thi* (ii>'t.iiii'«* b**twi*i*u the rotuhatafits Ihmu^ lor thr ^rrator part nl* 
' • . • ir iMi \,'jf** ti» V*,rf<H» \ard"*. TIm' tinM»fiiip]«»\ ''d in th** i'n«;aj;»'iii»*Mt uaNahdiit 
'.••■ * ..■ r*. tli'- ti^hf Ih-iiijj t«>riiiinat4'd hv <larkiifHH roinin^ uii and lli«< llna.Hi'ar ^llll• 
.• ..** 1 •ii^rt* w l.»'r»* th«' >hah <-«nili| not fnljuw. rnii>«4M|u**iit np«»u hi-r j^n*aiiT 
'•i ^y* « It fl,.- pn •]«•<■ I lift thrriwii fnmi th«* Kn;:hHh ••hipH it is n-p«»rt«-d that M»fiit' 
•» ".»-, ..f • i^lit\ ••tnif-k thf iriiii-r|]i«l. priiM-i]»:i]|y about iIh* npjMT iIim k-», bridgi*, 
■-*••• AU*i '••».»!*: oiM* ]in»ii*i tib* frtnn tin* h»-avy j^im pi«Tr»*d th** muIi* on the ]>ort 
• ■••r .' f • . t »liii%»- tin* w.ifiT. \* lnTr tin* aiini»r was '2^ nr H inthi's tliitk, and brought 
- «; I •: t!i' 'i|f!Mi«it«' •*m1'-. killiiii; Miif uian an<i woiirniiii;^ itnoth* i : t\M>nth<>r prn- 
'■•. ,,.:,..•,«} .1, fj,,. nit\v arnii»r tn tJif rxtfiit of :{ in(-h«-*«. Tlw iMrn-r u .i-* •^tIll^•k 
, % I'T"]* III** frf>m th«« loMvy jjnris of thr Shah: it w;ih :i iliii-rt Mow. Imf p«-!n»- 
■•»■'- J 1 ■'• h»-<» .iiily. Thf hull "^howfd that •M'Nf-ral <>l-poufi«l«'r -h'ft Ii:ii| -itnn k it , 
■ ' •■• . ■:^iii.tik«. Wht'U at i'litH*' fjiiart'TH, w hirh thf Hiia-^'-ar ••oti;4;ht I'-ir tin* pnr- 
"v -f rAii.ui.i ,:. tilt- (tatliug gun in tin* Sli.ih'*! t'orftop ilro\i> thf lui-n tioiu th«- mm ir- 
*"■"••* ^'iv* "if ?hf fiituKT. Oil oiM* of tlifM* Mr(';t*iiouH a Whittlii-ud ti»rp«*i|o waji 
4---*:*- 1 At t'if irttu-t-la'l. hut a-* ^ht- alt»-ri'i| ht-r i oiir«»i* .ilwrnt thi* xaiiir mutant th« 
■■— •,',f, f»i!nj r. •frik«* iXm m.irk. 

AIrboii;:h it ban \y**f*]i siHSfTtnl thnt thr Iliiasrar's lun*»t >^ ah hXtwvV 
z^urm^m hv u L*47'jMfuntl Hhot, it wniiUl /lanJIv seem \)osk\U\i» V\\;\\ t<\\v\\ 



18 THE WAR ON THE PACIFIC CUA8T OP SOUTH AUK 

could bave been thu weight of the projectile, beoaase othc 
the same weight have since pierced the eaine turret when gl 
slight angle. Owing to the entire absence of even ordiuarilj 
guunera ou board tlie Huascar, the English ships were do 
the turret guns, and only a 40poun()er shot passed thi 
rigging. Had this not been the case the result might h&\ 
palling. As it is, this shouUl prove a ver; asvful lesson to v 
not as well prepared, either iu ships, gnns, or kuowiedge o 
such ships and guns, as the English were. 

There being no sea-going natives amongst the Peruvians, 
forced to rely almost entirely on foreigners recruited in Oal 
thoirships. These were the off-scouring of foreign nierchan 
services, the best among them being Chilians. This materit 
ratings of seamen and onlinary seamen and supplied the pel 
The landsmen wore native (3holos. The be^t officers in tlie v 
not have made anything out of such material. The activi 
comm-tnded by Bear Admiral de la Haza, who had his he 
established in the Callao arsenal. 

The material of the Heet was as follows 

The iron-clad ram frigate ludependeucia, built by Samnda, 
on-Thnues, England, in I8G4. Hull, iron, divided into three 
compartments ; length, 215 feet ; beam, 44 feet 1) inches ; di 
wan], 21 feet 6 inches— aft, '2'i feet 8 inches ; height of bat 
water-line, 10 feet ; displaccmeut-, 2,004 tons ; machinery by 
& 8ous, old type; indicated horse-power, l,fiOO; maximan 
trial, April 27, 187!>, 12 knots ; coal capacity, 400 tons; arm 
150-pounder muzzle-loading Annstrong rifles, on spar-de< 
twelve 70-pounder muzzle-loading Armstrong rifli-s, iu broi 
clear gun-deck. To this, at the outbreak of the war, were 




THE WAR ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA. 19 

4 lc«C 6 im*he8; draught, foiward, 15 feet — afr, IG feet; displacement, 
L.13U toDR; maehitif ry, by Laird Brothers, simple, jet coDdeDser; 
trrew, single, foar-bladed, Don-mising; indicated horse-power, 1,200; 
ccmU capacity, 300 tons; turning capacity,' through 180^, 2 minutes 0.3 
MTomla: maximam speed, II knots. Armament: Two lOinch, 12J-ton, 
3uu fioander niazzle-loadiug Aimstrong rifles, mounted in a revolving 
torret, placed forward. This turret is on Captain Coles^s plan, being 
»apporte<I cm rollers and revolved by hand-gearing. The exterior di- 
amc'ter is 22 fet-t. Owing to a topgallant forecastle forward, and the 
roDuing tower and stationary* bulwarks aft, the tunetgunscommandonly 
ISf^^ of the horizon ; that is, from 10^ ou either side of the bowline to 
3S^ oD eUhi*r side of the Ht4*rn-line. Two 40 ]K)under muzzle-loading 
Armatning rifles, one on the starboard quarterdeck and one in the 
•trrn ; one Impounder muzzle-loading Armstrong on the i>ort quarter- 
drck. These light guns are all mounte<l on wooileu Marsilly carriages. 
Annur : Tht* side armor, extending 3 feet 6 inches below the load water- 
hu«», has a thickness of 4^ inches abreast the turret chamber. Are and 
ebgioe rooms, diminishing to 2^ inches at the 1)Ow and stern. This is 
tia^-ked by 10 inches of t^ak and an inner iron skin ^ inch thick. The 
huv ia re-enforcecl and shape<l for ramming. The decks are protected 
by :: inch plates. The spar-deck terminates forward in a small top- 
gallant fon'iuistle, about U fe(*t high, on which the anchors are secured,. 
and in an c»|»eu ihk>p aft. The bulwarks from the forecastle to the main 
rigging are of iron, hinged, and are let down when clearing for action. 
AIT the bulwarks are of w<N)d and stationary, sunnounted i y hainmock 
.••{l:ii;:'». Abaft the turret was }» conning tower, hexap>iial in shaj)!*, 7 
f-« r t; inrhe.H high and S feet wide by 5 feet 2 inches lonj;. It was plated 
» 'h .» uieh armor in vertieal slabs, backed by balks of teak S inclies 
ti.:' k. phu-e<l on en 1, and hehl in piisitioii b,v (extending down tlin)ii;;h 
!:.•' tlfi u. ;iiiii !»y an inner frame of an^le-irons, to whi<*h the arintir was 
:**lt*-«l thnui^h and through. The top was uiiannoied, and sni niouiited 
.} ift bri«l;:e or valk. The upper part of I'aeh plate was pier<'< d with 
>*<■.;: lionzoiital slits for si;:liting. Around the smoke staek, whieh was 
.:i-:riiii<ri-<L \%a> a tire r<K>in hatch, uith a hi;:li wooden combiii;:. The 
».«M- ot the smoke >ta4'k was unprovi<led with a iNinib proof ^ratin;;. 
The .irm«>r at' the turret is 5A inches thick, backed by l.'i in* hes of 
Vuk. M-f on end, .>iid a A inch inm inner skin. c\ce}»t around the ovnl 
^•r: h*»lei», uhen* the lhi<'kness of tin* armor is increased b\ -inch 
]'\^Ur^ li't into the baekin^^ which is reduced a like amount, 'riic tuiret 
.*'^i\i-rt4l with a sli;;li!ly convi*x roof of L* inch plates, in \\hi«li tin-re 
Aip :«!• hitli*--. Dtit.nide and abi vt* the lear of each ;:nn, co\ t-red with 
i^:.l bulh-t prr^»f hiNuls. These an* used fi»i hiNin;: the turret. The 
r-*It;#-r rf«* of the ordinary typ*, and iswork<d by a <*(»niinon >tecrin;:- 
vii^i nnder the {NNip, e.\<'ept in action, when the steerin;; is «l<ine 
'f^a* .1 *hf« I placed nniler the vninihi;: fower on the \>ei\\\-\\ecV.. WxvL". 
lin,:. » Jih Uiiniible btfH'ttprJt. Tin- /brenia,-^t w as a UipinX o\ uvm VwWs^ 



20 THE WAS ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOOTH AHE 

one placed nearly vertical amidships, well forward of the 
otber two inclining aft and towards the aides. These aft 
structed the range of turret fire. The mainmast was an on 
mast, its rigging (wire) netting np to the rail without cbani 
boats were carried on davits, two on each side of the quarter-i 
of tbese was a steam-laancb. 

Two single-ti]m*ted harbor and river monitors, Ericssor 
AtabuaJpa and Manco Cai>ac (formerly the United States 
tawba and Oueota), built ander tbe snperrision of Chief I 
W. King, at Cincinnati, Ohio, in 186«; bought by PeruTiE 
meut, and were 11 mouths getting from Nfw Orleans to Cai 
delay b«ing necessary in Kio Janeiro, caused by the refusal 
and officers to proceeil further in the vessels. Large offers 
by the Peruvian Qovemment for any one who would contn 
them on to Callao. Hull, iron, single- bottomed ; length 
beam. 46 feet; depth of hold, 12feetCincbes} draugbtof w 
13 feet inches; displacement, 2,100 tons; engines, vibra 
single screw; maximum speed, 6 knots; indicated horse-i 
Armiiment: Two cast-iron smooth-bore muzzle-loading Df 
inch guns, mounted on Ericsson carriages, in a revolving ti 
mor : Laminated wronght-lron, 5 iiiclies thick on sides, extei 
- below the deck ; 10 inches on turret ; external diameter o 
feet 8 inches ; sweep of guns, all round except 40^ right aft 
ret is mounted on central spiudle, revolving by means of gea 
by steam-power. The pilot-house, with fighting wheel, is o' 
ret. Plusb deck, clearof obstructions except the sinoke-sta( 
tiluting shaft in rear of the turret. 

The wooden corvette Union, built at Nantes, France, iu li 
wowl ; h'lmtli. -43 iVet : beam. 3.'> fe<?tti inches: 




THE WAS OH THE PACIFIC C0A8T OF 80UTH AMERICA. 21 

the Paciflc Steam Navigation CompaDy, and were ased in carrying 
tnmps and officials along the coast. The npper works and cabins re- 
■allied standing as in the merchant service. 

The small transport Talisman, of 310 tons, and several small tags, 
eoaiplele^l the list of available vessels. 

B4»th Chile and Peru had qnite a large number of hnlks, the remains 
iif obfiolete tyi>es of steamers as well as sailing vessels. These were 
iM*t borne on the lists, as is nsnal with us, but were nevertheless useful 
a» school ships, store and coal hulks. 

The discipline of the Peruvian navy was very lax, and drills were 
aluKiat unknown. Peru had a naval school, but the important factor of 
prsictiral exercises was entirely omitted from the course. Like Chile, 
Prm had no navy yard, deiiending for repairs on private machine shops, 
of which there are a number at Callao, and on the works of the Paciflc 
Stram Navigation Company. There is an iron floatiug dock at Callao, 
lirloDging to an English company, capable of taking up a 3,000>ton 
ship. 

Pern depends on England, the United States, and Australia for her 
dial supply. 

The uniform of the Peruvian navy has been modeled after the Englishi 
riorpt that for the grades al>ove lieutenant they have retained the 
•hi»Qlder htrap. The full dress of flag-officers is also very much more 
rUhcirate. 



IV. 

rHErAiiATKtS'^ roil wau. 

A«* WM>it ;i.H it wan certain that Vvvw woulil ii^lit, the (Miilian (lovent- 
m»ijt U-^an to prefjare for war in eaiiu'st. Agents wvw scMit to 
EGri>|H' to [Hin'hasi* arms, e<|uipii)(*nts, and inilitaiy stores. A niiin* 
^••r itf r»-;:iinfnts were onlereil t<) 1h» raised, ami were soon tilltMl by 
i<»!uiitt-«-r.n. S«*veral were r«Tinite«l entirely from tlie miners who lia<l 
'•*D liriveii out of (,'liile. The re;:ular re;:iments were tille<l to their 
»Ar i»tn*n^th of alnrnt 1,LNKJ men. To ollieer the new re;:iments ollieer.s 
*nv tmnf^ferred from the re;ruhir serviei*; the vaeaneies in the re|;nlar 
>iritti»-iit« and those which remained, after the traiisfcis, in new tv^^x- 
&««-bt.«% were fllUnl from the non commissioned ranks of tiie r«';:nlars and 
fr'Bi p^uitalde material iti the volunt<»<Ts. Thf most ri;;id discipline wan 
tuU^tr^X and the un*ater part of eacii day was spent in ilrilliii;;. Ac 
forrliijn to our viewn, entirel\ too mnch tinje wasdevotetl to mcthanii-al 
^rrv'iAitfiu and t^Mi little to skirmishinK- Open-order ti^^htin^ did not 
wm to fonn {HArt of the system of tactics. The red and blue ch)th 
cftoChiog of the troops was supplemented by an excellent UUm^^i^ wwd 
truwsers of browu hoIJaut!n. A kvpi of the same u\iiU'r\'A\ rv\AvwiVM\ 
ci4Hif cmp Mod heavy nbako. BoittA, of undresseil, uueo\or\!v\ \v\vVVi^x> 



22 THE WAR ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AMI 

well sewiKl and pegge*!, with broad, thick iwles and low 
adopted for foot wear. A flannel scarf and two pairs of wi 
were isitued to each man. The old-fashioned cartrid^-t 
fiu[>er8ede«l, after the battle of Dolores, by broad canvas 
with an upper and a lower row of Bmall pockets, the whole c 
containing 200 roauds of ammunition. The lower mw wa 
on the march, tbe npi>er one beiug filled jnst before an actio 
field rciierve. Tbe swonl bayonet waa attached to a leatln 
large, roomy canvas haversack, in which provisions, small ar 
if necessary, ammunition, could be carried, was worn slnng 
russet-leather adjustable shoulder stap. Each mau was pro 
a half-galloD tin canteen, cylindrical in shape. Fitting overc 
a circular tin disb, with a deep cylindrical rim. Fitting over 
and holding tbe disb to the body of tbe canteen was a semi 
drinking cup; this was held in place by two projecting 1 
took the shoulder sliug-strap of russet leather. An ext 
bootees, a suit of cloth clothes, aud a poncho were issued, i 
in a roll over tbe l>o<l3'. Some of the regiments were pn 
with ulsters, made in various patterns of grayish or browuis 
Although these were not all exactly alike, they were very ci 
serviceable, and did not look badly. For their cloth do 
of the regiments had the old colors, but many of tbe ne« 
were provide<t with blue, gray, or brown materials. Ouoesp 
Ohacabuco, was uniformed so nearly in the prevailing color 
of the coast that, when lying off Antofagastu, it was almo.st 
to di.->tingnisb the regiment at drill on the hills behind the t 
average weight carried was (lU pounds. No regular wagot 
organized, but pack animals and pack saildles in great quan 




THE WAB ON THK PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA. 23 

Mider-inchief at ADtofagasta ; a regnlar commissariat was then or- 

paimK Rations are now issued and the men have coffee at daybreak^ 

bfetkfaiit at 10 a. m., and dinner at 5 p. m. Large soup-kettles were 

evned by each regiment, in which the provisions were cooked over 

cxtriuporised fire-places, a commissioned officer being present when the 

wntentB were iasued. 

The nitioo conaisted of: 

Grftint. 

Dry hfef 150 

B^mam 350 

Umwkfd ft brat 120 

'Sicr (for offic«-ni) 120 

B««r«it 200 

FfcMir 200 

TomUmI vhest 200 

Odi<*imi 50 

LMTd r>o 

r*^per 5 

Afelt 15 

FutMlttem 150 

^gvr i, bn»wD ) 25 

I «rbit^, fur officen) 25 

10 



Marching ration: 

GrHniH. 

Dry ht^r 4(i0 

B"w>ait 41)0 

T -k»*#.l uht-at 2tK) 

••: *• KH) 

I'':-,.- r H» 

Twi* hiiudnMl and thirty ^niriis of frrsli beef inav be snbstituteil in 
pl.n f tt( tljf *lry lK*4-f and Immiiis. 

Kri«»n ttir animalH: (trass, il kilo;^rarii.s; barley, ,'i kilograms. WImmi 
bjirU-\ ran not ^m* obtained, ^rass, la kilo;4rains. 

Ill*- «ir;.Mnization of the tr<M)]>s was as follows: 

Hmnmrtrn izaiHidorcn). — One regiment, reeinited from the miners at 
A!itftf.i;:a*«ta, ronsistin^ of fonr brigades ol two eompanien ea<*h, inini- 
t-rjii;; in all aUmt 1,200 m4*n. Tlieotlic^ers wi»n» ^en<*rally iMij^ineers by 
|irMf(»'s>«ion. ArniH, C'omblain ritle and sword bayoni't. No intreneliiii;; 
ti-d carried on the njarch : shovels, pirks, and hat4*ln*t.s carried by 
(t^k animals. 

ArttlUry. — Two regiments of three brigades eaeh, eaeh bri^jade <-oii- 
»>t:n;r i»f two batteries, eaeh battery of fonr or six jriins and abont HM> 
m*'tt. The cnns were of many kinds; but the batterit»s lonsisttHl as 
»rarl\,;iM |NMiHiblt* of the same elasses. The following; \« ere the kinds 
tocJuded: Twelve TJ jiounderT.ocentimeter bretH'hdoailinfz Krupp rifles; 
•PTroO |K)un<ier6.5-eentimeter br(*tH*.h-loading A rmstnmg rifles; twenty- 
Uirre 6 p<»under 7.5 centimeter bre^^eh doodling ritten, mouwXAXW KtwvV*\ 
iwtlre S-poaader 6 ceat/meter 6nfcc/i loading rifleH,mouT\U\u\>vTWVV^\ 
unkaown; six long GatUtifrti^ caliber .50. 



24 THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC CoAST OF SOUTH AMEI 

The men were all armed Titb swords, and the higher oa 
Wincbeeter repeating carbines and carried in action 80 roandi 
nition. The carriages were some of wood and some of iron, t 
fitted with brakes. 

The heavy guns were drawn by 8 horses each, and 20 sp: 

were allowed to each battery ; 8 of these were harnessed to 

wagons and 8 to the spare aramnnition caissons. Each nioi 

. and carriage bad three males and its ammunition four uth 

Oatling had four mnles. 

At Ihe battle of Tacna four 6-ponnder 6-oentfmet«r bree 
rifles, mountain Krupps, were captured and replaced the fou 
gtins. 

Cavalry. — The oivslry consisted of three regiments, eavhol 
Dicn, divided into four sqnadrous. The men were picked, as 
and heavy, but seemed tobeefflcient in their work. The horse: 
and well bail t, about 15 hands high. A modifleatiou oftli 
saddle, with a halter bridle, lusso, aud single picket, was 
sides being picketed, the horses are hobbled. The arms wi 
Chester repeating rifle slung across the back, aud a Prent 

Infantry. — The infantry was divided into regiments of eight 
each, the company numbering wheu full 150 men. The ofllc 
colonel, one lieutenant colonel, one mt^jor, eight captains, eig 
ants, sixteen sublieutenants, and oue cidor lieutenant. Eac 
hud a full band and each company its field music, consisting 
half of whom were also drummers. These regiments were 
britiades of from three to five regiments, according to 
strength ; two brigades formed a division. To each divisit 
Uii'lu'd twu brigndos ot uriillrry nml i 




mm wsM OS tub paoific coast of aouth ambbioa, 26 

m il wioold be tif—ome to follow them thioagb their varione stages, 
thv hftve been eiriketed here. 

patting her army in lighting trim, Ohile increaeed her navy 

the eorrette Abtao, by puroliasing tlie fine serew 

iiw • transport, ftom the Padllc Steam Navigation 

r, and by ehartering the Bimao, Itata, Lamar, Limari, and Loa 

of the Oiiiliaa Steam Navigation Gompauy, and the Mathias 

and other steamers of the Oonsifio estate. 

apper spam of the Chilian vessels were sent on shore, and the 

yarda, if retained to serve as derrioks, were eook-billedi The 

NMMM weie unrigged, and all bnt the standing bowsprits of 

wooden vessels sent with the npper spars. From the very ontset 

flhiliana showed their intention to earry on their operations under 





enwa of the ships were inoreased, plenty of material being at 
on aeeoont of the banishment of the Chilians ftom Peru and 
meeqneat inability of the Paoiflo Steam Navigation Company to 
saspligr Chilian erews ; not a few came direct ftom the Peruvian navy* 
Many oflloen who had retired from active service in the navy and 
other callings, or had taken service in the merchant marine^ 
their servioes and were reoommissioned. To this num- 
added oflleen of the merchant marine proper, especially those 
sf the steamship line, who^ by their knowledge of th6 coast, were 
■■laently Itted to take part in the war. Those officers of the navy 
vbo w«rp in foreign 8ervices also returned, briDging witii them the 
rtry UteHt ideaii from abroad. 

Thnii Chile wum euabled to array a small bat well-or^uized, well-cou* 
■UtotnUand well-di«ci|ilined army ami navy tocoi>e with heniuinerically 
MNV imverful enemiee. 

In b^^hvia a levy en mane waH ilecreeil, whieli, coupled with a prenenil 
panluo to thoiH* opiKMied to the rSgime in iM>wer, bron^ht a large number 
of a>eu to ihv colore. The mutcTial of the riink and file was exet'llent, 
Uit th«re were no offic-oni capable of reducing tliia raw material to a 
tnined army. The recruits were principally IndiauH, who Hln»w«Hl docil- 
ity, rndunincf, and determination worthy of all praiHe. For long and 
Uidaonie marcbcn theae men have no MuperiorH. AccuHfom«*d to |>er- 
long joomeys, carrying heavy loiuln, and NubniMting for dayn at a 
on the maatlcation of the coca leaf, they were naturally fitted for 
the work in hand. But for mo<lem war ]mr|)08e8 the chief re<|ulKiteM 
ttmld be im|iartcd by instructora only, and thefte instructoni aeeuK^l to 
W entirely wanting. To arm and equip these troofw a forced bmn wan 
4«rrfcd and only partially raised. Several thouaand Bolivian Indians, 
Mly naifarmed if uniformed at all, shod with aandals or barefcMit» 
with the fire-arms of every period but the present, without corn- 
transport, or medical serricofi, set out under OeuetaX l>«aba \o 
]m the Penrimiu mt Taeam. 



26 THE WAB OS THE PACIFIC COAST OP SOUTH AHB 

On the *26th of March, 1879, General Daza issued a deer 
letters of innrqiie to any one who would attack the Ohilian com 
refnge to all privateersmen who woald seize Chilian goods ii 
bottoms found. This call was not responded to, although a 
sent abroad. Most of the neutral Governments took aotr 
oppose it. 

Although the Chilians had accused the Pemvians of pr 
war, and bad demanded that the preparations should cease 
was actually done. The newspapers were clamorous for wai 
number of decrees were issued — one banishing every Chilian 
at first all women, even those uarriGil to foreigners and 
Pern. This was, of course, modified, as the foreigu miniatei 
matter in band. Very short time was allowed for these 
leave the country'. At some places on the coast it becami 
tor the foreign men-of-war to lend their assistance in mo 
The raising of a large number of regiments was ordered. 

The senior Peruvian naval officer afloat was Captain Mi 
who was bom in the northern city of Pnira in 1834; ednca 
nautical school of Paita, when that town was the headquar 
whaling fleet j waa graduatetl with distinction, when be was 
in a merchantman by his father. Returning from this cruise, 
a coast pilot, and in 1866 entered the navy as a sub-lieni 
1863 he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant, and two 
to that of lientenant'Commauder, passing shortly afterwi 
grade of commander. In 1868 he was ordered to command 
car. In the election of 1873 he was chosen to represent th< 
Paita in Congress. Here lie remainetl until the war cloud I 
he requested to be returned to his old command. Gran wonlt 
■lit to any s^'^vil;^^: a i:o«d seaiueu. an Jnlelligi 




THE WAR ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA. 27 

yo fitepil were taken at first to erect new fortifications at Gallao, nor 
even to improve those that already existed. 

The decrees ordering the organization of a large namber of regiments 
rpMiIted in bringing to Lima some tiionsands of Indians from the interior. 
WhiUt iu Chile drilling was going on on every side, in Peru there was 
mn apparent lack of that important pre))anition for action. There was 
no orininiKafion beyond that of regiments. There was no commissariat, 
DO artillery worthy of the name, no engineers, and no working general 
staff. The ambnlance corps were in some cases mere holiday organiza- 
tioos. The reiirnlar army, 3,000 of which ha<l been sent to Iquiqui, re- 
mainetl otherwise on a peace footing. Agents were sent abroad to buy 
arms, and soon began to forward Remington rifles, caliber .50, a large 
Domber of Peabody-Martini rifles bearing the Turkish stamp and with 
Slights marked in Turkish characters, and repeating carbines of various 
nnfaetures, notably the Winchester, Henry, Si)encer, and Peabody 
ke. Some Gatling machine guns were also sent, but at first no artil- 
lery. The two mountain batteries of the regular army were armed, 
h, with 4 obsolete mnzzleloading 6-pounder rifles. To this num- 
were added during the war about a hundred guns, mostly man- 
aCartored in Lima by inex|>enenced gun-makers. Among these were 
a Bomber of 12-ponnder and 6-pounder breech-loading White rifles. 
This gun was made of bronze, with an interrupted screw breech-])lug. 
The projectiles were steel shell, with soft metal expanding rings, and a 
fii«e €»f the maker's own invention. As is usual in bronze rifles, the lands 
•:r:|»ii»-<l aftiT a fi»w fires. Another variety wiis the (irieve 4A-iH)uniler 
nlir. n:a<b* frr»ni an ingot of steel bored out, with a wron^ht-iron truii- 
Xiwti baiul iii.d reinloiee band, Ixith shiinik on. They were fitted with 
thf wfd:;el»r«M'rh. The pn»ie<-tiles w<*n» steel shell with pereiission 
Igm- : rhiir;:*', ei;:ht onne<*s fine grain jujwder; I'xtrenn* ranp', r»,0(M> 
'i;Ard«». Another elass of sn)all st«'el {;un liad a reinforce band of bronze 
«hrnnk nu. It was impossible to asc«*rtain Ijow tlirsc worked. I'roni 
Krir"|>#* i-ame later a f«*w Krupps. Vavas.sriirs, and two Nordenfelt ina 
♦ hin#* gnns. 

Thf men subsisted thefnselvi*»<, re<'eivin;; a i>aper sol p<*r day, ^^hi^•h 
x.4n#-<l in value durin;; the war from 10 to 7 <'<Mits. T1m» soldiers wt're 
.i!v;i\<4 acfMinipanied by women and rhihiren. The niiifonn ainl eqiiip- 
n*-rit of the army were not in)proved durin;: tin* war, and the arms, 
-win;: to want of care, be<'aine eover(»<l with rust and ;riiinined with 

N^l C»!l. 



28 THE WAB ON THE PACIFIC COAST OP SOUTH AKE 



FROM TBE VECLABATIOS OF WAB, APSII.2, 1879, TO TBS XAT. 
OFIQVIQVI.'MAY 21, IWB. 

Whilst the Chilians and Boliviaofl were coDt«ndiDg tor tbe 
of the Atacania district, wbicb reault«d iu the fight at Calai 
described, tbe PeruTiunsscnt a force of 3,000 regalarfi, nnd 
Manoel Velarde, to Iqaiqai, where tbey were first placnl und 
mand of Colonel Davila, the prefect, this officer being at 
time relieved of his political dnties by General Loi>ez LavH 
General Jos^ Buendia was sent to coiiiiitand tbe Army ot 
as' it was called, Colonel Lopez being ordered to command t 
vangiiardia dirisiou of that army. Although these troops n 
Iqniqui, do attempts were made to fortify tbe town, whose * 
of defense was a battery of four 9- pounder field-pieces. Sei 
goDS were sent witli tbe troops, bnC for some reason they i 
mounted. Coincident with the declaration of war on April : 
ianH began to collect an army at Antofagasta, which was place< 
command of General Erasmo Escala. 

On the 5th of April the Chilian squadron, under Kear-Adu 
ledo Williams, consisting of tbe Cochrane, Blanco, (VUigg 
bnco, and Eanieralda, appeared off Iquiqui. The Chilian ( 
gave warning that all nentral vesnels must leave the port befo: 
when a n>gulur bl0(.-kHdc would be established. 

On thel^tbofApriltheChiliHucorvetteMugelIanes,anderC 
J. J. Latorre, on her way to join the squadron, met the 0ni< 
coniayo, under Captain Garcia y Garcia, off Point Chipan. 
mouth of tbe river Loa; tin action took place which lasted 




WAB OV THC PACIFIC COAST OF BOUTH AMKBICA. '29 

Ob the mme day the Ohilians were off Pieagna. A large quantity of 
atored bere for the nee of the railroad wbieh waa almost oom- 
|Mcd be t w e ea this piaoe and Iqaiqni. As at Mollendo, the l>oats sent 
te toeoamnnicate and destroy the launches were fired upon and several 
«f their ersws were reported by the Ohilians to have been killed. A 
heavy Ire of gone and roekets was opened on the town, and a great 
ftttt of is was destroyed by a conflagration caosed by a rocket. During 
the boBsbardaient the residence of the Bnglish consul was destroyed. 
The loas eansed Iqr the fire was estimated at $1,000,000, most of which 
■Bfatuale^ Ml npon foreigners. A woman and a Ohinaroui were the 
leraooa lulled. 

sqaadron then returned to Iqiiiqni, firom which place the €k)ohrane* 
It to Valparaiso to be overhauled. An intereeting fSnct conneotM 
with the blockade at Iqniqui was the difficulty experienced by the troops 
to obtainiag fkesh water. Befbre the war the supply was obtained in 
r-boata flron Arica, or by condensing. The failure of the first means 
the abaodonment of almost all of the small towns, and at Iqni- 
ao ofdcr irom the blockaders fbrbade the use of the condensers under 
a thraaS of bombardment. This could easily be enfi>rced, as the smoke 
the ehimoeys betrayed an inflraction of the order. A case of this 
oeeurred on the lIHh of April, in consequence of which fourteen 
ahril were thrown in the direction of the offending chimney, with- 
eat dotog serloas damage. 

Daring the night of May 16 President Prado, leaving the Oovem- 

ttent in chargi^ of Vice-President La Puerta, left Callao in the Oroya, 

Mn»mpauied by the Indei^endeiicia, Haascar, Limefia, and Clialaco. 

The Manco Capac aad Atahaalpa were to have ROue, but at the last 

SMHuent it was decided to leave them. The Prenident wan accompanied 

hj a large Ktafl* and a body-guard of 50 young Peru vians, of goo<i family, 

ftplendidly armeil, eqnippetl, and mounted. On board the transports 

and roenoTwar were several regiments, a quantity of aruiH for the Bo- 

hvian contingent, a good nupply of 8t4)re8, and a lar^e amount of money. 

It may be interesting to note here that although all movementu on this 

cQuiit have to be made by sea, the difticnltieH usually attending Kuch 

tnumportatlon are greatly reduced by the continual tine weather, which 

adnits of the men being very much crowde<l, and by the continual 

nuiDing of the steamers of the Pacific Steam Navigation Coni|mny, 

adftiMible by a clause in our treaty, aM well as by a *^ moMt favon^i 

sstion ^ claour in that with England. These steamern were made to 

iruMpurt most of the provisions for lioth armies, a flctitiouH or teuiiio- 

nry consignee being all that was necettsary. 

This expedition having run well out to sea reached Arica in nafety, 
vhoe President Prailo assumed the office of Supreme' I>irec;tor of the 
War, it having been arranged between the allies that the command 
ihsald rest with the commander-in-chief of the army be\ong\\\K ^ ^^^ 



30 THE WAR ON THK PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AHE 

eoiintry in which they were operating. Oeneral Basa bad 
TacDft with abont 4,(KK) of his uiea. 

Peru was now receiviug, by way of the latbmus of PaoMni 
ordered from abroad. With them came a uumber of Lay 
accompauied by tikilled machinists, and two HerreshofT tor| 
shipped in sections and put together in Oallao. One wae m 
first trial; the other, after loug practice aud many failarea, 
op to a speed of about nine knots. 

Having convoyed the transports to Arica, and having 
trooi>8 which they carried, the UnaHcar and Iudet>endeuo: 
place at 8 p. m. of the 20th for the south, news having reach 
the movement of the ChiliaD squadron to the north, and of 
quetitly onprotected state of the coast aud weakucHS of the t 
Iquiqui. 

In the mean time Adniira) Williams, having received infc 
the projmsed movement of the Peruvian fleet from Callao, aD< 
bring about a general actiou at sea, started uorth, May II 
Oochraue, Blanco, O'Higgina, Chat^bnco, Magellanes, aud 
latter filled with combustibles, it being inteuded to ose h( 
ship. The Esmeralda and Covadonga, whii:h on acooaut < 
condition of their engines would only have delayed the oi 
were left to enforce the blockade at Iqniqui. Kunning oloat 
shore in hopes of meeting the Peruvians, who, aa we haves) 
well out to sea, the Chilian squadron arrived off Callao durinf 
of May '21-^2. A uteam-lauuvh was ceut iu to reconnoiter, an 
discovered the absence of the enemy. At sunrise the wholf 
was seen steaming iu line ahead off the {tort, this evolution 
tinned until 11 a. m., when they left for the southward agaii 

It had bevn Admiral Williams's intention, if he foand tb< 




THB WAR ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA. 31 

pcMie of Prat, fnim the first, to fiprht, tboagh tbe disparity of force was 
■o irreat. Ue could not escape on account of his low speed, but he 
voald not have t)eeD much blamed by tbe world at large if be bad 
destroyed his ships, surrendering himself and bis crews, or if after a few 
•hitta he hud surrendered all. But Prat was not tbe man to take ad- 
Tuitaice of either of these methods of saving life. Born April 3, 1848, 
be van still a very young commander. Ue bad been a marked man in 
his service, having held positions of tbe greatest trust; by bis conduct in 
tbe capture of tbe Covadonga and in quelling a serious mutiny on board 
tbe IVraviau corvette Union he bad gained a reputation for gallantry; 
by being selected more than once as ati instructor in gunnery at tbe 
naral school he had proved bis theoretical proficiency in that all- 
UD|Kirtant branch of study. Was this young senior officer fitted by 
his aDtece«lents to surrender! Tbe answer to this question is bis con- 
duct iu the engagement which was about to take place — a fight tliat 
■/»tonishe<l the naval world; which established tbe precedent that, no 
Battrr what the odds be, vessels must l>e|fougbt to the last, and which, 
00 Acooant of the iutelligence and intrepidity that cbanicterized it, and 
00 aeoount of the harm that was actually done to tbe powerful opponent, 
dfurrveji a whole i»age in tbe reconls of fame. 

It was a curious combination of circumstances that brought Grau 
iml Prat together in deadly csombat, both to die, sword in band, in tbe 
brai of cumbat, within a few feet of tbe same spot on tbe deck of the 
Hu.iM*ar, ea€*h being at the time of bis death tbe senior officer of an iin- 
s.«!i«>«-l% iiifi-rior foire contending nobly against great odds. 

AT *^ a. m. tbe llnascar tinMl a shot that struck between tlie two 
( r..l:an ve>M*ls, and the action ininiediutely beeaiiie general, tbe Unas- 
'.•r •'ni;:Iiii;; out tbe Ksiiieralda, and the IiidepeiHleiieia tlie('(»v:Hloiiga. 
1:;«- i btli.in tr.in^p(»rt Liiniar, wbirb was also in port when tlie eiuMny 
«.i« •i;:ht«il. \i.i.s MMit <»tV to the soutbwanl and took nojiart in the tight 
.\!:tr Tilt* tiling ha<I tieen going on tor an hour, at <list:inees var\ing 
*.: •::■ :wi> thou.Nand yards to, |K'rhaps, one thousand, tlie ('ova<l(»nga 
-'r«:»-«) ti* th«* Aouth, the Independeneia following lier closely. 

lti«* ll-foeialda ri'niained in Iquiqui liarhor, li;4litiiig the lluaM'ar. 
h\ :hi-« tnne the Peruvian soldiers had dra;:^'< d a .field battery tn tli«' 
>^itj. .iiid o|»«*ned fire at distances not ex<'eeding four or five hundred 
;Ar>l«. Tiiu>. uitii the .UN) pounders of the lluaNear on on«* side and a 
l^iA tMtftr\ on tht* othir, the Ksmeraltla \\a> t'oie<Ml to altamlon Iter 
;••<•. *(>it: i,«'.ir the shore, wliieh she had taken to avoid a rain attack 
'.''•(ft :hf i-i.eui\. and uo farther (Mit in the bav. 1 h<* time wIm-u this 

• ■ nrn-ii. aiiil tliat at wliich the lluascar tirr^t lannucd. has tint bfen 
li*-«i •^.•ti<«f.ii't4iiil\ ; but it could not havt> be«>n tar ti'oiu halt |»a<«t ten, 
:«.• h«*tjr'» atld a half after the brginniiig of the ti^ht. It apptMis tliat 

* 4;i;.iiii (fr.iu was deterriNl from rammin;: l»> tin* fVar of toipt'«l<M*s 
vL:ru he snpiMififd were placed around the I^*«nieia\d.i *. ;\\u\\\\' \ AU\\\\vv\ 
*^-l> nheii the latter re^*M4'l svi^ ririven from the place >k\\\v\\ Aw \\av\ 



32 THE WAB ON THE PACIFIC COAST OP SOUTH AH£ 

first occupied, by the Are of the field battery on shore. Th« 
the Chilian veHsel would have fasted a much lonfrer time ■ 
had beeu decided entirely by the guns. The Hnascar ke\\ 
ftom nil lier giioH for four hours, and dnring this time mast 
at least forty shots from her twolJOO-itomiders; yet it is rei 
only one of these shots struck the enemy. This shot ]>a8s« 
the side, burst iutheeugine-room, and killed every one of the 
besides disabling the engine. The reply of the Esmeralde 
efilectivc. as is testified by Captain Oraa ; but musketry ant 
shot are no match for 7-inch armor. Captain Gran is in err 
speaks of the mitrailleuse fire of the Chilians in his report; 
Gsnieralda nor the Covadonga had machine gans of any I 
Hnascar had one long Oatling. 

When the F^smeralda came out in the bay Captain Graa i 
to ram her. In the first atteni|>t, the Hnascai', steaming ab< 
and steering NE., struck the Esmeralda, nearly motionless 
ing N., on the |>ort quarter. The Haascar's engine was sto 
she was about one shii>'<j length from her adversary. Thf 
harmless Captain Prat, followed by one man only, galiat 
on the foreciistle, and, swonl in baud, rusheil aft on the ]>ort 
deck, and was killed by a nmsket-ball at the foot of the ti 
command now devolved on Lieutenant S«rrano. The Ruas> 
ofl' and made at the Esmemlda again, this time heading 
Chilian vessel presented her bow ; the Huascar's engines w< 
too Honn, and she struck the starboard bow of the enemy, doi 
no damage. Again a boarding party, headed by the contmant 
Lieutenant Serrano, leaped on the Huascar's deck, but only 
down. The thini attempt of the Hnascar was better condn 
bend of tlie Ohiliau venwel had fallen off tu W.. and (.^itptnin ( 




THE WAR ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AMEKICA. 33 

«noa|:b to prevent her going anbore, because a bliut from one of tho 
CovadoDga*8 htiemen killed her helmsman. The only steering-wheel 
of the Iude|ien<lencia was the ordinary one on deck. 

It must have been 11.43 a. m. when the Independencia struck. Cap- 
tain Condell, M-eiug at once the state of aflairs, turned his vessel, and, 
p«Ai»iog along the htarlnmrd side of the enemy, coolly took his ])osition 
ai^tem uf him and l»egan-to tire. It has been asserted that the lude- 
pendfiiciaViruMgn was hauled down and a tiag of truce hoisted, on 
account of the delilHTate lire of the enemy and her inability to return 
XI, having fallen over on her stnrlM)anl side, and her lower psirt having 
illrd with water. To add to the discomfiture of those on hoard, a shell 
rroiD the Covadonga, or an accident, set fire to the after part of the 

IiDOie4liati*ly after the sum*nder of the Independencia, and before 

»he wan taken possession of, the Uuascar, which, having sunk the 

EMDfnilda at ILMO p. m., hsid remained to pick up the survivors of her 

crew, came around the western end of the island w hich forms the south 

•Mie of I<|uiqni Bay. She was al>out 10 miles oil', and the Covadonga, 

having evidently* dis|)osed of the IndeiK'ndencia, was steaming rapidly 

•way. The Ilnasear, after 8]>eaking her stninded consoit to asctTtain 

vbether there was any immediate danger to the life of the crew, ro- 

•Qibrd her pursuit of the Covadonga. This ])ursuit lasttnl until dark, 

nUrii Captain Giau, S4*eing that then' were still 10 miles iH'ttween him 

and thf rhaM\and probably uneasy about tlieeneui\\s iron chuls, whose 

I' >.:.i.n M.i.n uiikiM>\iii to hiiiu gave up the pursuit and returiit'd to the 

I •:• {'t-ijiIiiM-M. This vcssi'l it was eiraily iinp«»s.sil>l«» to savt*, and she 

»*• •« t «»ii lir«' and IhhikmI. 

N«»?l.:ii;: roulil liavr hvou hvWvT than Trat's plan fit action. Fiiwt 

:» :i.-i:ii;!>;^ ^T.ltil■lJaly in a rjuner brtwc-rn tlie inland antl tin* .sluur, ho 

i n.;T«d lli«- tii-ld *if his ad\i*i>aiy\s niancu\fi.s ti» lani, convi'N ing also 

':.• iilf.i tiiat li«' 111 as pioti-rti d bv those tt ircis nf nnulein na\a] war- 

: i:«-. tiiipi-ih»t >. Tins iMipn-s>inn was h'Im1**M"<1 «lnnl»lv crrtain in Cap- 

-^:r. <iiaii\ uiind \*\ the irpoit of tin* Prin\ian i-Mptain ot* tin* port 

• -: I>. :i.«{ni. w liti iiiana;:rd to iirX aboard tiir IIn.iNr:n in lii> lioat. Auaiii, 

' ;. u»«uniii>i: t]l!^ ]»4iMtioii lie i«dn('«'d (iiau to i)i«' I'.iJMtn] iM*f'("«Nit\ of 

^^^•i.iij hiH slifii.at nM»d«Tat«'ly slioil i:iiim', dn«Ttly towards tin* t«»\\ii 

wi. .« Ii i»a- I'lnipiMl b\ his own <'fninti\ inrn. W lu-n 1«"Mm*<1 b\ tin* fir*» 

-f ti.f *L*»rr ^'iMJs. iiiore danj:«*rous, at tli:it shon iai.;:«\ au.»in>t his 

v«.«lrii «.ilN than thi* .'MNl pniind«'rs ot' tin* iron <-lad. hr hn;^;:iil the 

*i.irf ;i> rhi««f!\ a?* possihh*. k<*«*pin^ np a hravy, wvU dinrttMl tii«* troni 

':..• ;:unM of all kinds, how will dircctfd tin* condition ot thi* llii.israr 

altrf thi' light eli-arl\ sh<»w<'d. One shot (•ntiM«d thi* turret through 

^'t.r of it< {Mirt-*, aii«l. after baMotinL' about 4*on>iil«'ralily, eann» to ri'^t 

Vilbuut injuring a!.*y one. Ilatl thisb<rn a sloll, it iiii;:ht have entailed 

oun%id«*nible hiss. Other nhots rnt fhe ImjhmI foreu.asl \\v;\\\\ \\\\vv\\ 

iDner-tf/'r- fl/d it IfecfPiiH' that (Mptunt (Jniu feared \\\a\ U >M>u\v\ VaW^ 
//. Mjj'. ma 7 



34 THE WAB ON TOE PACIFIC COAST OF SODTD AHE 

Id wbicb case it woald probably jam tbe tnrrrt Wbentb 
bff^an, Prnt callcil awoy bis boanlers, ami, as already etate 
eticcccdcO, xriib oue KcrgeiiDt ot'mnritieti, in rencbtiiR tbe eoi 
Had tbo contact been of longer duration lie ttouKI bare 
probably, in tntnsrerrhi^ Lis crow to tbe decks of tbe Euai 
very fair cbance, acconling to Captaia Gran Liinoelf, of caj 
Teasel, as tbe crew was, witli very few exoeplions, veiy mac 
iecd. Semino'tt attempt failed from ibe Bamu cause. Wben 
car did flnnlly snceeed in sinking tbe ENmeraldn, wbicb was 
more Ibnn a stationary target, sbe injured lier own bow i 
tbat exteneire repairs were iiecesfiary. The muKketry fire 
meralda was so well sustained tbat it was tbougbt tbat sb 
Tided witb miiebine guna. 

Condell could Dot bare done better witb bis little sbip. 1 
lowed tbe correct tactics in keeping close to tbe sboro was 
tbo results. Dis artillery fire, wbicb was continued tbroi 
cbase, was so excellent tbat be dismouoted tbe heavy bow j 
ludependencia before it bad succeeded in Fending more tbi 
into him. Wbat tbe effect would bavo been if tbis bad dc 
may be imagine<l from tbe fact tbat tbis sbot entoied tbe 
quarter, raked the whole leugtb of the ship, and passed out < 
bow. The other two guns, being protected by iron plntiog, 
to fire with bnt moderate results, owing to tbe want of trai 
gnns' crews. Tbe small arm fire of the Coradonga kept tl 
crew below, and killed tbe three helmsmen at tho critici 
according to Captain Moore, who, like Captain Gran, mia 
machine-gun fire. 

It was thus tbat Captain Prat's speech made to his officer 
bef<ire the tiglit was wirried ont in its fullest details. Had 






TAB <m TUB PACmO 00A8T OP 80UTH AMEBICA. 35 

fbe ftee pf the town. Daring this action the nuaiear was 

Iqra ISO-poiinder pnJttctUe andcr her ooanteri doae to the water- 

abot penetrated the armor, although it stmck aidewaja. 

grappled and cot the aabmarine cable, thus temporarilj 

ig fbe eoanaiiloation between that place and Yalparaiso. 

r then tamed north. Off Huauillos, at 5.60 a. m., Jane 
all^ted two resMla, which in the haze were sappoBed to be the 
OFQggiaa and Chaeabneo. She stood towanis them, and when aboat 
diatMit dIaeoTerd that she bad to deal with the Blanco and 
Tbeae Teasels gave chase. On acconnt of the bad qnality- 
ef the «al taken at Paoooha and Pisagnai the Hnascar at first could 
oalj aboat knota, bat after a time succeeded in increasing her 
aod alter 18 hoars of hard running managed to escape. A lew 
iOTO esehanged, bat without im]iortant results. 
Oa Jane 7 tbe Haaaear reached Oallao, where she waa received with 
OBtbaabwB ; her conmaoder waa fEted. A unanimous vote of 
pwwoled him to the grade of rear-admiral, but, at his own 
be waa allowed to retain his old command, as he realised that 
BO one to replace htm in that all-important position. 
JMarinl Oiaa now insisted upon being furnished with a new crew, 
raft Inat with aooM men on whom lie could rely as gu jners and helms- 
Tbeae wen eaaily picked up among the sailor boarding-houses, as 
iNeign Bcrehant ahips were out of employment on account 
entire ceasation of the nitrate and guano trades. Soon 
sfterward tlie unprecedented demand of the year for gniin ships al San 
took most of these vessels nortb. The trade of the whole 
coast was destroyed. Among the new men shipped were sev- 
regularly trained gunners. 

Midea organixing his new crew, Orau devoted himself to Hiii)eriii- 
liDg tlie repairs of his ship. The foremiist was remove<I, the main, 
wbieb was used for signals and as a post for a lookout, was left Htand. 
jBg, tbe main-top, fitted with an iron screen, wsis arraiigftMl as a post for 
a GatlJng and riflemen in action . 



VI. 

TBM UB-UTABLISBMEST OF THE HLnCKAOK OF I^nQI'I TO 
TBE BATTLE OF AAGAMOS, OrroHEU^,\><VX 

Ob tbe return of the Chilian squadron from Calhio, the Mo<*ka(le of 

ras re established under Capt^iin Simpson, of the Cochrane. 

WiUiama went to Valparaiso in tlie lihitieo. (i resit di^isiitisfae- 

eapresaed at the manner in which ho had conducted iiffA\v%^ 

it waa detemiiMd to relieve bim from command • Cw^X^xw ^;\W 

MfekkfcfMtmi!^ wMsonlered to Ctxiulmbo us Ci\pl;uu of \\vl^ vv>t\^ 




36 THE WAB ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH 11 

and Captnin Simpson, bia second in comRiand, waa sborl 
relieved by Captain Latorre, of the Macellariea. Simpsot 
to duty witb the arm.v at Antofaf^asta. Commodore i 
Veros was placed in command of the squadron, witb Lie 
mander CaRtillo as chief of staff. 

The O'iliggiiiB and Chacabuco were refitted and were ] 
new Iwilei's at Valparaiso, advantage being tnbeu of 
northers, vben it was reasonable to eitpect that the Pei 
not venture to risk Ibeir reduced forco on the Chilian ci 
ganization of the army at Antofagasta waa pushed abe; 
activity. 

About this time a torpedo-launch that bad been fltte 
Pvruviant was captured near I'isagua. 

The army of Turapaca, uuderGeucral Buendia, witb C'Ol 
of the Itolivian army, at Pisagnn, iiow numbered about 
men. For some unaccountable reason, Iquiqui was close 
wbilo PiMigua, its side door, was left open, so that throng 
vians wi;re able to receive re enforcements and provisioi 
the articles aaid to have been sent were three Lay torix 
expert to bundlo them. 

Alter being repaired and renianned the Iluascar starte 
raid to the aoutbwanl. On July sbe arrived at Aril 
admiral com mini tested with the director of Ibit war, frou 
wiivetl orders to proceed south and itiHict as much dat 
ble in csipturing or destroying the enemy's tian8i>ort« ani 
seltj, but on no account to risk a combat witb huitcHor 
forces. Qe was also informed that it was the custom of t 
to get under way during the night and nin well out to Be« 



THE WAR ON THE PACIFIC COAST OP SOUTH AMERICl. 37 

IVMunander Latorre claims to liavo pierced the ironclad at the water- 

hor. The Unascar turned and made another ram atUick, coming per- 

pmdkalarl}' to the enemy and aiming amidships; by a dash ahead this 

««• avoided. A foorth attempt was made to ram, bow to bow, but 

with no lietter 8U(*ces8. The Huascar had now fired six 300]>ounder pro- 

Jretilrs, tbf Magellanes one lI5pounder, one G4-i>ounder stand of grape, 

•it 20-ponnder shell, one 20pounder grape, 2,400 small-arm cartridges, 

and 3liil Adams n^volver cartridges, and, with the exception of a consider- 

ml4e eotling up of rigging, boats, &c., and tliree men slightly wounded, 

ihe renult.H were ai7. The firing brought (he Cochrane on the ground, 

and c^uri*^! the Iluasirar, in obi*dience to the instructions received by 

hrf commander, to leave after a short running fight. It was after this 

ft^t th.it Captain Simpson was relieved of the command of the Cochrane 

b. Captain I^itorre. 

Thtf Chilians now changed their tactics and remained at anchor dur- 
t»i; the night. On the night of July 10 the lookouts on board the 
Orhrane reiiorted an object in the water ne:ir the ship that was sup- 
f»He«J to lie a Liiy torfMNlo. Fire was immediatt*ly opened on it and 
i^rtly afterwanls forty shell were thrown into the town ; a numlK^r of 
r^ople, non comliatauts and others, were killed, and some proi>erty 
dr«tn>%«Nl. 

On the 17th of July the Fluascar again left Arica for the south, the 
I'ouMi accompanying her. They visited the i>orts of Caldera, Cavri- 
f*U Ujjo, and Pan de Azucar, destroyiu>>: the launches used for land- 
:'.::. an<l rapturing two UHTchaiitUMMi loaded with coal arid copper. 
t»-a thf i/titli the Hn^isear raptured the large transport Kiinac, that 
«A* riiif\«-\iiig .st4»n*s mul a fine battalion of cavalry — the Yungay, 
• '»l'*Ui\ Huluf.s — to Ant(»faga.sta. Among the stores captured was a 
^rf -*uppl\ of water skins, intended tor carrying water on a inarch 
•r»at waM then talked of from Antot'agasta across the dest»rt of Ata- 
1.1 tu l<pii<pii. Itesides these valuable <*aptnres tlu* llnascar had sue- 
\lrt\ 111 niiiking herself greatly feared, altlioiii;li (iian had not com- 
st.itrv-^l .1 .HJnglf ille;;al or cruel act. His expeditions had cansed Chili 
Ub •{•t-nd large aiiioiints in fortify ing her |»orts, hail riMHJered her trade 
QDrvrtain. and had stopjKMl tlit* transpoitation of tioops ami stores 
vilhf'Ut ainH*<l esi'ortM. 

Thf-JifliriTH captured in the liiniac, together uith tiio>e of tiie Ksin<'- 
r^d'A, mm- "M'tit tii^aliao in the Pilconiavo and thence acios> the nmnnt- 
*jn» (•» Tarma, wlM-re thev wen* afterwanl- joined h\ thr ravali \ nun. 

AlM'tit this time the fir>t a^'tuai iin|»ro\eni<Mits wt-n- niadt- in tlic 
f >rti flea ti< inn of rallaii. A sunken l>att4T\ was con^ti mttd on ihr ion;; 
«^^Nt»le {Miiiit known as tht* \Vlialc*s i>.ick. In this wcr«* nioitnti-«l t\\o 
:9i :iK-h 1.<NNI |Miiin«lersmfHith borr nni//ie loading uuns —one a l!«Mlni;in« 
?h^ other a HaldgnMi. Sever.il h«*avv gnns wen* aUo aihli-tl to the 
btttt^Tieii north of the fi>w7/. Aiirtni, a landing place \iovV\\ ^A' V\\\\A^\» 
w^l i'honUott, to tin* south, Hc/e ;i/.so .s|i'hll\ foilit\e«\. 



38 THE WAR ON TUE PACIFIC COAST OP SOUTH AUEl 

The Bitascar, Btill raUlint; in t)ie sonih, entered the port 
aii<l nliiiost c>n[ttureil tlie trauKport Lamnr, wliicb was 8av< 
being liatiled into very slioal water beliiiul the mole. 

Auioii«8t tito artti-l<'R captured in tlie Kimac was tbe ofE 
spoiideiice of tliu Goveniincnt, from wliicli it nas lenrnei 
Chilians expt^-twl two oargoes of arms from Euroi»« by i 
Straits. Tlie Union, under Captain Garcia y Ga'rciii, was th< 
patched to those waters, reaching Punta Arenas, the Chilian 
iu the Straits, Augast 18, just aftt^r the first cargo had passe 
The Union was coaled and provioionrd, 110 resir>tauce bein] 
the governor wilLi his little guard of forty aohliers. The g 
ia Huid, assured Onptiiin Garcia that both cargoes had passe 
biui off In pursuit Jnt^t as the second vessel was entering from 
tic. Tno Chilian t^liips were sent down after the Union, but 

Great diKSutisfaction was now expreB>ed in Chili in reg 
conduct of the wiir. The press began to cry loudly for c 
an advance of the army, for energetio movvnients by the ua 
tbc sncccssfnl career of the Qnascar, for anytbiiig, in fact, 
Qsniilly be done better on paper than on the face of the globe, 
pie, excited by the pn-ss, began to give vent to their |>ent-ap 
ntoeliiigR, some of wbich Imi-e a very close resemblance to 11 
Govermnent issaedm-veriil decrees; Abandoned the blockade 
bi ought all the vesfels that could be spared from the jirotcc 
tofiigiistutoViilpaniiso fur repairs; sniierseded Captain Simp 
maud of the Cochrane by Captain Lntorre, who was the I 
hour on account of his able uianagemcut of the Magellanes; 
Dun Hafael Sotoninyor minislcr of war, and seat him to Ant 
sapcriatend mutters. 

Cn tlio let of August tbo monitor Manco Capae, convo 




THB WAB ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA. 39 



r approacheil the Abtao, which lay at anchor ofif the reef, to a 
4urtaDce o(*200 yards. This diatiince had been selected by the expert, 
altboagh the admiral offenHl to place his vessel nearer. One of the tor- 
pnloes iraa then lauiichrd from the deck, and had proceeded some dis- 
teiiee on its coiinse when it began to turn to port, making a half circle in 
tkac ilirectiony and coming back towards the vessel. Efforts were made 
lo atop it«bnt nothing but a reduction in spee4l was effected. Lieuten- 
ant Dies Canseco, appreciating the danger to which all were exposed, 
Janpctl overboard and caused the torpedo to deviate from its dangerous 
eoarse. This trial thoroughly disgusted Grau with this system of tor- 
pHloc«,aud, on his return to Iquiqui, he had them landed and buried in 
the cemetery, where they were resurrected by the Uhiliaus some mouths 
iftenrard. 

The next day at 11 a. m. the Huasc^iir again ran in and engaged the 
tkore batteries and corvettes Magellanes and Abtao, severely damaging 
the latter vessel, besides killiug and wounding about 20 of her crew. 

The Uuascar was stinck by a 150-iK>uuder shell, that entered her 
iBoke-atack on the starboanl side, and, descending, ]»assedout through 
tke arooke-stack and coaming of the fire-room hatch, about eighteen 
isebeii from the deck, on the other side, killing the licuteuant command- 
iag tlie qaarterdeck division of guns, who happened to be behind the 
awke^tack at the time, wounding the ship*s bugler, and, ghincing on the 
wmttrr wuy, paaseil overl)oard without exploding. Had this shot been a 
h:tle lover it wouhl have passed tlirou::h the base of the stack, thence 
OTjiIrr Xhv armori'd derk into the port IxiiliTs, there being no bomb proof 
rntiri;: t«» .-vtofiit. A ;5t)0 ponn<h»r tiDunnon shrll, Hn^lisli sorvii'o pc»r- 
'-uA^Mii fuv. struirk tin* Abtao just at the end of its range of throe 
t.i<i:i%iritl \;ir«ls. Thi» Abtao was ;it anclu>r, wilhour steam, and at the 
t-nir htn-Iffl towards the Hnascar. This shell eanie in on the starboard 
*:«!••. travi*iMMl tin* iron mainmast, striirk tlie deck on the port si«le 
^»r»*.i<*t th«* tMi^int* room hat(;h, and exphxird, d.tiiia:^in;^ the mainmast 
arjil bihv.iiks, tiMiing a hoh* in the eoinp(»site di-ek alxait t'onr by six 
frt-:, tuiHtiri;; th«' iii>n ileekb4*arns, p:iM*e.N of th«' sln-ll bn-akin;r np the 
*»Tiji le riMiii ;:al iTv pl.iljn;; and pas>iii;; into tlie tto.il l)iMiU(»r>, the eoal 
ta « ir» ii ^av«■d tlj«» btittom <»f the shi|». TIm* ( Iiirt' «*n;iiMrei', uho was 
'j.i rj.f ^p.lr di'ik. arid livr nun wt-ic kiMrd. Om- lil* the lattei- had his 
L-**-A i :.iki-n i-ntiri-h 4itl by th<' bari< I ot' his ow n iilic, w hi« h he had sinng 
arr«»"i< ii:s lia«*k d!a;:onalIy. a piiMM' stiiUin;^ ihr rnn/./If, whieli |M«»j«Mt«»d 
4 -•■•■ ijii ri^lit hlmnhler, hi-* baek ImIm^ touaid> th«* i iiriny. Another 
♦.-:»;!. »r pr«»j»'etde, lirrd in the sahuMiMnul a minute all* i\\ aids. ;:! inrrd 
o^4 t. !• liriti;:e rail vnyrlosc to th«* eoinniamlni;; ntlierr, pa^^rd tliion;4h 
ti.«- iifid^** frame ami latbli-r, went thion-h the .^nnke >t;Mk. strntk a 
ca\ Jpl.itr in the poit water way, and exphuleil, Inil^in;; o:ii the shh'aml 
^^'i.:k^iu;Z the bulwarks i\\n\ dt-ek. Tliis .shot kilh-4l ri-lit mm. Hi»lh til' 
thr-.M* fuf-4 were rfmarkabJe fur nw^n dud aceuraex, ami U>v V\\e \h\\v\:V 
actiuo of tlw fuMes umuL 



40 TOE WAR ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AWE 

After leaviDg Antofagasta the Hnascar visited Tattal, Tot 
UejilloDes de Bolivia, capttirinK aud destroyiog hulks and 
She then returned north to Arica. 

The two vessels that were loaded witb arms and loumtioD 
escaiied from the Union, atrived safely at Valparaiso, and tin 
served to equip a tiew levy or 3,000 men, who were already 
state of discipline. Twelve mun-of-war and transports left 
on the 20tb of September for Antofagasta. 

On the Ist of October, the Cochrane having been put ir 
repair, the Chilian sqnadron, consisting of the Blanco, flag-sl 
modore Biveros, the Cochrane, the O'Uiggios, and Cuvadonf 
transitortH Loa andMathian CousiBo weiitnorth towani Arica. 
siQo.onapproachingArica.tookin towthesteam-Iannchesof t! 
clads rigged for torpedo service. A delay occurred in hoisti 
Blanco's boat; one of the pennants carried away, dropping an 
injuring it. This caused the attack to be delayed twenty-f 
At 3 o'clock on the morning of the 4th, the Consiiio havii 
what was supposed to be a short distance from the port, the be 
on their mission to destroy the Unascar. On account of a mis 
of the distance, the; faiU'd to arrive off the port until broac 
This, and the absence of the Pernviau iron clad, en used th 
be relinquished. From some fishermen Commodore Kiver 
that the Hnoocar and Union had started on another raid tc 
ward. A coaacil of war was called, and the question whet: 
better to remain, bombard the defenaes, and sink the Mativt 
the risk of injuries to their own ships and without a landi 
follow np their probable success, or to go south and attempt 
the Huascar, was decided in favor of the second proposition 

The Iluiisuiir Lud bot^ii aeut sontli with the Union on her 




THE WAR ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA. 41 

neocfd in controlliDg tbe steam on board his vessel, to prevent the 

Mcmsity of blowing off. Not a shot was fired from the shore batteries^ 

vhich bad been constracted at great expense, and were armed with 

piuii at leaMt one of which could have pierced the Uuascar's armor* 

After cmising about the harbor, finding no transports, and not being 

ible to draw the fires of the batteries, the two vessels went south 

anwDd the i>oint at a little after 3 a. m. All the next day they kept in 

nirbt to the southward of the port, managing to intercept two mail 

Afimens fTom which they learne<I of the (Chilian move to the north- 

winl. During tbe 0th and 7th the Peruvians moved up the coast, and^ 

ilthongh Admiral Gniu^s onlers were not to approach nearer than 70 

niteti to Aiitofagasta, where the Chilian squatlron was supposed to be 

vbf n be left Arica, he determined, on the strength of his later informa- 

tioD, to l«Hik in at that place, especially as it had been reported to him 

that the l*uchrane had broken down and was not able to accompany 

the M|uadron, us she could not use her engines. This fact, which was 

tnir, hail been remedied and she had pursued her course. Leaving the 

I'biou on lookout near Point Tetas, the Iluascar nin in towards the 

inrhorage off Antofagasta at about 1.30 on the morning of OctolKT 8. 

Fiadmg nothing to interest her there, she stood out and ngoined the 

Tbion at 3.15. Both vessels now stood round Point Tetas and headed 

Bodh. A few n inutes afterwanls they made the smoke of three vessels 

cnniDg along the coast, steering south, about G miles distant. These 

weff iMHin afriT recognized as vessels of war, and the course, at 3.30, 

rhaii;:fd t4i MKithwcst. 

Th»* rhili;4ii squadron at Mrjillones, having (mkiUmI, put to sea dur- 
ing: xhv nijrlit of the 7th in two divisions; the tirst, uinler (\)mino<lore 
Kivt-ru-, ri»iiM>ting of the slower vessels, Bhuu^o, ('ovadoii;;:!, and Ma- 
Viij^ roUMMo, left at ai>out 10 p. ni., and steered down the eoast to- 
wartU Aiitfifa;:asta ; tlie siM'ond, under Coiiiinander Latorre, consisting 
of th** TiN-lirane. <>*lliggiiis, and Loa, h*fr at al>ont 1 a. ni. of the Sth, 
w.th itnltT-* to eruise 1*5 niiU'S on and oil* Point An;ramos. This was 
d«»ri«* ui a<'<*<>rd.inee with teh'gra|»Iiie inst met ions from the director of the 
war, and ditlen'd sli<;htly from tluMtii^^inal plan (»f the commodore, who 
:*jft-»d«-4l to hive moviHl south along the coast in similar tlivisions, 
:b** Ar^t «livi««ion skirting the < oast ami Io<»king in at the hays, 
vl.:Ie the MTiind KtcHsl in tin* same direfti^m luit farther offshore, 
ATi«\ alM»nr 4o miles on the starboard qnaiter of the tirst. Hither of 
fb*-*^ plan-* nonhl probably have entailed the same rcNults. TIiii.n it. 
«a* iha!. at 3..'>0 on the moining of (>cl«d»cr S,the wratluT hiin;: tin«^ 
Am! I It-ar. the l(H>kout in th<' l»laMc«i\ top reported tin* smokr i»t' tuo 
i9-<Mi*'!« approai'hing from under Point Tetas, dJHt.mt about <* mih'>. At 
da> lipjhr th«* enemies n*cogni/rd each other. The Iluascar ran for an 
htfOr to the .Minthwest at full speeil. making about 1<)} knot.^, uirh si\ty 
r^vi»Intii»n«« and an aver;i^'e//n's>///T n/'i*.'>..'i |M)umls of s\ev\\\\,\W WX.wwv^ 
%T»d r^,titihmfi» followin;:^ mukiiii: nlumX 7^ knots. 'l\\e M;\\\\vas V\av 



42 THE WA.S OK TQE PACIFIC COAST OP SOUTH AHE 

flifio wan »eut in towards Aotofagasta, but later turned to 
ward iiDd luUowed ber coDsorts. Commodore Bivcros saw it 
tbiit tlie cbase was bopeless; still, on tbe cbance of an acl»' 
maubinery or tbe Uuascar or her ooiisort, or of tbeir tort 
Qortbward aud being cut off by tbe secoud divisioo, be det 
«oiitiiiiie it. 

It lias been asked, and witb good reason, wbetber tbe ni 
battle migbt not bave been different bad tbe Peravian Bbi| 
tbe Chilians at this time. It is true that the Union was a \ 
powerl'ul vessel than tbe Coradouga, and tbat both slie and tl 
bad a great advantage in t<peed. Wbeu, bowever, we consi<: 
adrairul'ti orders were very e.^plicit, and wisely so, that be i 
no risks witb Lis ebips, na tbe loss of tbe Huascar woul 
Chiliiina tbe command of the sea, it does not seem strauj 
sbonid have attvuipted to escape. Admiral tirau, finding t 
rapidly distancing his pursuers, torned to i he northward at 
j]nd eased his engines by reducing tbe revolutions to flfty-thrc 
beVn on deck all uigbt, bo now Kiy down for some mncb-ni 
At about 7.15 smoke was seen, from tbe Iluaacar, on tbe boi 
northwest, and at 7.30, she having stood slightly to the w 
recounoiter, tbe Cochrane aud her consorts were recognized 
ascar was seen at abont tbe same time from the I'ocbrane's t 
Iioa was sent to recounoiter. Admiral Gran, who had no 
<lcck, probably felt confident that he could eltide tbe Uochr 
8[ieed, accortling to tbe latest information in bis [tpssessioii 
«ight knott<,and stood for a short time towards the Loa. Fii 
over, that the Cochrane was changing her bearings morerapi 
biul anticipattnl, be stood more to the cast ami onlered full s 
Union, wbicli bud remained on tlie Unasuur'a port quarter, no 




WAB OV THE PACinO COAST OP BOUTH AMERICA. 48 

liiii sad after aniMhiiig the galley and oaasing some sligbt damage 
Uoa dcek withoat exploding. At this time the Blanco was aboat six 
■hs SBleni. Tlie Coohrane dfal not answer these shots, but stood on 
Mi within two thousand yards, when she opened fire. One of lier first 
iMs peoetiated the Haascarti armor on the port side, and, exploding, 
Ciicitd the turret chamber, where it set fire to the light wood-work, 
kilhd and woonded twelve men, some of whom were at the winches nsed 
liranilTie the turret, and drove its own fragmeuts aud iibriM of all 

ander the tnrret-tmcks, which it Jammed for the time being. A 
900 iioonder Palliser chilled shell iVom the Huascnr, fired at a 

of alx hnndrrd yards, struck the Gochmne's starlioard side srmor 
sa aagle of thirty degrees. The plate, which was six inches thick, 
iadentcd or scored out to a depth of throe inches, the bolts were 
aaved, and the backing was forced in ; a beam was ahK» broken. The 
tUL probably broke up. 

At 9M the Huascar stood a little to port, with the intention of 
mMiiag the CSochrane, but the latter prevented this by turning an 
^■al aaMNint to port and steering a iiarallel coarse. Ac 0.45 the con- 
ihg-towar was straok by a shell, which exploded in it, shattering it 
vny mack and blowing Admiral Orau to pieces— only one foot and a 
fcv fragBMUta being found. Admiral Grau usually directed the move> 
■mts of his vessel with his head and shonlders out of the top of the 
Iwfr; the shell, therefore, must have hit him at about the waist The 
twarsirioB from this idiot caused the death of Lieutenant Diego Ferr6, 
tlw admirars aide, who waa at the fl^htiiigi\'hc>el, ^epiinit(*il from the 
CDaiiin^tower b^' a light womlen frnitiii^ only. TIijh oflicei^H bo4ly was 
B»iak«'n fur that of liis comniniuler, hikI cuufu'd the erroiioouH 8tnte- 
■fOtH which appear4*<l at tlio time of tlio eotiihat. No wouihIh were 
fcaud on Lit-nteuuiit Ferr6*i» iKxly. Purt of tliis nliot nUo disubliMl the 
icbtiog-wh€*t*l, nnd the ve^Ki*! turned to Htarbouid niid nin to the esiKt- 
vard until the damnf^e having bcTU' rrpairt'd she Mas again headed 
Donh. AlMiut thin time u ^hel] penetrated the armor of the turret 
(iH*v trained on the iM»rt ipiarter) in its thiekest part to the h*ft of 
the port of the right gun, killing and disabling most of the guns* crows. 
Amrng the former weru the two guneaptains, and among the latter 
Commander Meliton Curbajal, chief of statf, \vh<» had come to inrorni 
l!*eaecond in comnnmd, Commander Klias Aguirre, that he was now in 
CDmmaml. This shot furnishes the data for the killing efl'ect of the 
ptvijeriile fired experiuientally at the (ilaiton Mime > eats agti, which 
hj a curious coincidence hiruck exactly the same part of the turret. 
blirf creva were M*ut to the guns, but. the tiling became very wild, oh 
the mm were conipanitively inex|HTieiiced. The light gun hail Ut^n 
daatiled by the shot above mentioned, which luMit the right compressor 
tad eap-aqnare. Lieutenant ICoiiriguez, while lo(»king out of one of the 
(sa-|iorta, hail hia he^id taken olf. An eye wituesH n»\H>t\H \\v.\V \\\^ 
9^%'^ pmri of the etvw wu^ much deiiioralized by iUe \oi&s o( lW\t «iova- 



44 THE WAE ON THE PACIFIC COAST OP SOUTH AMEBICA, 

mander. Tbe cabin and vardrootn were full of meD and officers, some 
wounded and mauy refugees from the upper deck, from which every one 
bad been driTen by the Nordenfelt and Bmall-arm Arc of the enemy. 

The Cochrane now attempted to ram, coming at right angles to her 
adverearj', firing her starboard bow gun at two hundred yards; the 
center gun miSHCd fire. She missed tbe Huascar and passed about five 
yards astern of her. A shot from one of tbe Cocbrane's port guns pierced 
the armor of her opponent on the Btarboard quarter, exploding and 
doing much damage, including carrying away the iron tiller-block, 
which served as a lead for both ordinary nu<l fighting wheel ropes. The 
Ei]ii8car now again headed to the eastward. A shell pierced the armor 
abreast the engine room, covering the engines wiih d^6rta and killing 
and wounding several persons in the engine-room gallery. Among tbe 
latter were Surgeon Tavaru and Mr. (iriffiths, the master of the schooner 
Coqiumbo, captured a few days before, and whose crew were forced to 
render service during the action. The relievingtackles, which bad a 
very bad lead behind the transoms in the admiral's cabin, were uoiF 
manned. The sleering was very uncertain, as Commander Aguirre had 
to conn the vessel from one of the lookout hoods of tbe turret, and the 
word had to be pasi^ed clear aft on the lower deck to tbe men at the 
relieving- tack lea. Tbe Cochrane again attempted to ram the Huascar, 
firing her starboard bow gun as before at two hundred yards, and com- 
ing on at right angles with the center guns trained abeam with three de- 
grees depression. She again missed her blow,'and passed astern. The 
center gun was being loaded at this time. 

It was now abont 10.10, and the Blanco arrived on the scene of action, 
passing between the Huascar and the Cochrane Just as the latter was 
preparing to ram a third time. Tbe Cochrane, to avoid the imminent 
ilanger in which nhv was I'liiced by her consort's ram, whs forced to turn 




THE WAB ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA. 45 

■aa went below. TIuh mast have been douo by the small-arm men in 

the Chilian tops; the latter were higher than that of the Huascar, which 

bad uo t«>i> covering or hood. The breast-high shield bore no evidence 

of liaviug been |)enet rated from below. At 10.25 the lluascar's colors 

i«*rv Hhot away at the flagstaff, and for some moments she was sup- 

poHnl to have surrendered, and all tiring ceased. A loader at one of 

tb« fTuns went aft and hoisted anotlier flag at the gaff. A shot about 

tbu time iienetrateil the turret of the Huascar, killinp^ or mortally 

loanding every man i]i it, including Commander Aguirre. 8ome idea 

of the terrible effects of this shot maybe drawn from the fact that 

«1m*d this officers luHly was found and identifle<l, all the upper part of 

thr brad wsM gone, the lower jaw on]3' remaining, four wounds on the 

nciit Ifg, a cut across the stomach, and six boily wounds; the right 

iiwulilrr and arm had disappeared entirely. He was standing at the 

timt> to the left and n>ar of the left gun, with his head in the sighting- 

btjuil. Lieutenant Pulacios was terribly wounded by this shot. At 

Ciimmander I^torre's urgent request, Palacios was sent on board the 

iM-xt northernlKiund mail steamer, but died before readiing Lima. 

The command had devolved upon the fimrth oflicer. Lieutenant Pedro 

iiarfZitn. The vesM*l was almost unnninageable and on tiiv in several 

PIjcva; htill the engines were kept going, and the left turret gun was 

firnl (Hfa^jonally. The C<N*hrane now returned and again tried to ram; 

•br «:ifi tuily pn*vente<l fnnn doing so by the cliaiiee moveinefits of the 

iiiu<H*.ir. Hoth LMiiliau ships now followed the Huascar, using tlH*')>ow 

•I'i •• i;T#r ;:iiii*'. arrompaiiii*d by an iincra.sin;^ showrrof sinall-arin and 

D iiiijiif ;;nii prujrrlih'S. 'i'lit* Cm'liraiM* was .stini'k diiriii;; tli(* action, 

i:«'M'.!\ \\lifn>lo- tninrd olV to ;rivr placi* to Ilit* lllanro, by a sIm-II 

*'i' ii iiiN-itMl ln-r unarnM»i'('d striii and can.MMl (•t)n>id«»rabl«« «Iania;:i', 

■"'ii.'Iii:;: ti*n nun. lit' wlmni two athMwards (IjimI. 'rin*('nvadon;:a now 

^^^ri.i- np and ^ln^t'l•d(•d in pnttin;; 1m I'M'lt on i'i><'onl bv tiiin;^ (»nc ^nn. 

i-»J!tiii.u.t <iaii'/.«in. at'h*r falling a i-nnncil of sur\i\in;; nllims, >«*nt 

>:i:> I.irntt-nanr Kiranlo llciTfia tn tin' rlii<*r rnuiiK'ci' n^ itli dMlrrs to 

^*Nl::jiI t'l >nik tlh-\«'Ss»'l bv oprnioL' ln'i val Vfs. < 'liii-f IjminrnMar- 

Mai.«-:i and l>i'« :t««<«iH(ant^ 'iin-iM-iMbMl in paitially :HM'tnii|i|i^jiii|M ||,is \^y 

•■;»Mn.; llif rjMuIating \ al\»*s ot' tin* <on»l«'nM'js. t«»dn wliirli llii'V had 

••• "t'p tin- t-n;!int*N. ThfV \\rn» at work on tin* bonnrt ot tin- main 

:ij*ti:.in \al\«' w hi'ii Limtcnant Sini)».s(in ot' tli*' rorliranr intfiti-ird, 

:•;..';# r III |jainl. \V|iiI«» this was goin;: on ImIow. ».nnM* ot tli*- mm tor 

*^ril f raw KmI up thioiigh thr t'oic hatrli and waved towrl^ and liand- 

^•■f'li-.it*, MM-iU;: whu'li tlif* Chilians rrasi'd tirinL'. Ilie tla;^ i^as ihrii 

tijuli.l d»fun. A« tlM* Hnasi'ar's eni^inrs did not vto|»at tirst, tln-v urn* 

r-uij ti* r(*4»iN*n tirr, wht-ii sin* brramr niotionli*s<. probably tor tin' 

r^iiMiii uln-adv Htated. Sin* was iniinrdiatflv boanli'd bv boat** liom 
• • • 

thr C\m-^p.iiii., und«'r Li4'Ut(*nant Simpson, and fnini tin* Pilarn'o, nndrr 
*-*^utMi;iiit-t om ma ndiT r;i.s//7/r>. r/iiVf of.Nfall" to the eou\\uoA«»Yv\ nv'\\\\ 



46 THE WAS ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF BOUTH AMI 

TheUbilian officers on taking possession fonnd from three 
of vratcr JD tbe hold. Somo of tbo boles mnde in tbe sides 
jectiies were nearly awash, and in a few more initiates the \i 
' have sunk. She was also funnd od fire in several places 
over tbo mngnzinos forward. Fortunately tbe sea was smoo 
valves being closed, the pnmps were started, (be ship freed I 
and the Are eztingninhed. Tbe wonnded iind prisoners were 
to the Chilian 8bi|is. Tbe Huascar's engines had received i 
and tbree out of fonr of the boilers were in cunditiou to be a 
fore, with very little assistance sbe was enabled to go into 
Uejillones during tbe afternoon, and in two days, her shot'h( 
been temporarily stoppe^l and eteeriug-gear repaired, she 
charge of » prize crew under Lieutenant PeSa, tbe execatii 
tbe Blauco, for Valparaiso, where sbe was completely overba 
plates wliicb had been dumagpd were either replaced by f 
bad been brought from England to plate the Chacabuco and 
or by plugging with masses of wroucbt iron hammered in. 
of December she was again ready for active service. 

The scene on board the Hnatfcar when boarded was terril 
was hanlly a square yanl of her upper works that did not I 
of having been struck with some species of projectile. Her r 
and conn iug- tower were nearly destroyed, ber boats gone, 
either entirely carried away or ben tout of all shape. He: 
riddled and port chain plates carried away, bat, strange to i 
ging was cut. The bulwurks, poop, forecastle, and batch-coa 
much injured. The capstan was struck and knocked over 
shot. The Chilian flremnst have been extremely nccnrate, a 
is not suprising, as the Huascar was reduced during tbe la 




THE WAB ON THE PACIFIC C0A8T OF SOUTH AMERICA. 47 

eu htrdly be imagioed. Nearly every time that she xras strnck the 
pvttfst possible temporary dania^^e was inflicted, and 3*et no perma- 
■nt injury was caosed. The armor in this case was only » p^reat 
dittdraotage to her. It served to explode the enemy's i)rojectiIe8, 
tbirh it in no case 8topi>ed when they struck at any but the smallest 
iB|;leii. The baokinfr and inner skin only served to increase the num- 
brrof fraf^menta, which were driven into the interiorof the vessel with 
dntlly effect. On the contrary, the shell that passed through the 
\\%hx iron sides of the forecastle did not explode and did but littlo 
danifre. The explosion of each shell — and each shell which pierced 
tbe armor exploded— set the ship on Are in a new ])lace. This would 
n^irest the great necessity of permanent water-mains with short 
ko§e ran nect ions in all parts of a vessel. The Chilian small arm and 
Sonlenfelt gun fire drove every one from the decks and away from 
tbe nuprotected quarterdeck guns, showing what an important factor 
tkit claM oC fire is to play in all future naval actions. The Chilians had 
tvelve of their best marksmen stationed in each of their fore and main 
tnpi. This fire would have been much more terrible had repeating-i ifles 
bcfo used. The fact that goo<l marksmen with rifles drove the crew 
•way from a machine gun should not be lost sight of The Nordeufelt, 
ikoadopte<l in the English service, is similar in cflTectstothe Ilotchkiss 
itToking cannon. It has proved itself not only eflToctive against the 
fnmmnel but also against the matMeL This class of arm is certainly 
of Ifreat importance. The mere fact of even the smaller cjililwrs being 
•l!f to pi*netrate the sides of any of onr uiiarmored vessels up to ei;;ht 
i»JD<lrHl meters (seventy pnjectiles a niinute), ou/jht to call our atten- 
tion to it ven sericiuslv. The difticnltv of niinniin^ when both vrssels 
v^ under way, even when one is almost ininianageable, is a feature 
»ort|jv of notice. 

It h:ir« kw-en asked, of what use would the Whitehead system (»f tor- 

I*fjr»«'«i havf* been in such an aetionf The answer would S4*eni to lu* 

tLat llif Wiiitrhejid or any of the diver;;iiigs\ stems would have ]»ro\e(l 

ff> !•«- tlaiip'rouH and suicidal. The sp;l^t^Ile alont* n)i;^ht have been 

nml. Thr t't«'at in eessity of ha\ in^ si^vrral dillerrnt nuaiis of steering 

*«nif» aiho to be well proved, espeeiaily some ot the s;^ stems propost*d 

f«ir steering along the keel, or perlia])s ev<*n a second i udder, as fitted 

tft th#* nt'W C class of Kngli**h e<irvettes. The placts whne eaeh of 

thfrw Mhtenis are worked should 1m* in din'et tele^Maplm* or voire-tiibe 

r&nne«'tH>n with the jK^sition or positions selceted tor the 4-ommafMlii!g 

••ftrt-r. Ihe (Kisitiofi of the eommaiKling oflicrr in action sct'ins another 

natter worthv c»f consideration. Near the hase of tin* smoke sta«k, the 

\mr%x vertical target on a vtssel, seems to 1m» the worst plar«*. I'Im* 

IJaa^car's tower had another disa(lvanta;;e ; it was lictwcui the sinoke- 

•lark and the turret, the next be>t taigt t. In this wav it stixxl an 

excellent chance of lM*in>,'' hit )ty thv /«rojeetiIes wliieb m'xsseA e\V\\vT vA 

prominent ohjeets. Tin* tup of tJir turret was tuuuA Vv> Vw* V\\^ 



48 THE WAR OK THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AJfZ 

best position with us, bat a Becond siiould certainly be pn 
splinter-f^ratinff over the engiues would nlao rcciii to l>e su| 
the mass of dibria nhich fell on them, but, almoat miraculoDi 
stop thviii. It in worth; of note that, while the Chilian ve 
alwayti briug ijonie of their ruhh tu bear ou the Buaaear, tli 
found herself in uiauy positions where only sbeeiing would 
gnus to bear on thorn. In fact, this action tends to prove I 
n>und fire, even inferior in single gnus, will have a great 
over » pre] lundera lice of Arc withiu ouly given limitM. 

The IIuaKcai's voyage Houth was oue continued ovation, 
ceptiou at Valparaiso was aecompauied by extensive relfg 
and military ceremonies. The reuiaius of Admiral Qran we 
at Suutiago with full military honors, and throughout Soul 
solemn masses were celebrated for the repose of his soul. T 
regi-et at his death was expn-ssed in Peru, Bolivia, aud C 
classes of people. Ilis record was a bright one. Ilis condi 
deared him alike to friends, foes, and niutrals. Ab an exai 
disinterested patriotism, he donated all the prizc-mouey whii 
him from his several captures to the fund for carrying on tli< 
told a friend, before leaving Arica for the south on his last < 
that the Huasear would bo his tomb, as she proved to be. 
Gruu, in any service, would have beeu an houor to the naoM 
mau and an oniamcnt to the naval profession. 

Commodore Riveros was promoted to the rank of rear-adi 
muuderLatorretu that of captain: and Lieutenant-Conimam 
to thiit of vommnnder and jilaccd in command of the Blanca 

Tlie lOKS of the Ilmiscar roused the PeniviHiis to a realizati 
position. A ])opuhir subscription whs the outgrowth of this 
Men donated theirmonoy, women their jewels. The money 




THB WAK ON THE PACIFIC COAST OP SOUTH AMERICA. 49 

embarked in their place on board the transport Itata, in a little less 
than two hoars. 

The Blaneo was sent to Valparaiso for some slight repairs. About 
this time the Chilians added to their fleet a rapid steel propeller, 
bronght to Valparaiso loaded with arms and transformed into the 
cruiser Angamos. Mounted on this vessel was one of Armstrong's 
new 8-inch breech-loading rifles. 

The allied army at Arica and the south numbered now about 20,000 
men. 



VII. 

FROM THE LANDING AT PISAOUA, NOVEMBER 2, 1879, TO THE LANDING 

AT PACOCHA, FEBRUARY 24, 1880. 

An exx)edition, consisting of the men-of-war and ten or twelve trans- 
ports of all sizes and descriptions, under Commodore Eiveros, carrying 
an army of about seven thousand men, under General Escala, started 
north from Antofagasta and appeared off Pisagna on the morning of 
November 2. 

The plan was to make a feint at the seaport of Pisagua, which is 
sitoated at the foot of an almost perpendicular bluff twelve hundred 
feet high. This bluff could be ascended only by the roadway of the rail- 
road or by two narrow zigzag paths ; this road and these paths were lined 
^ith rifle-pits, the angles being covered by redoubts. Colonel Granier 
was stationed with twelve hundred Bolivians at the Hospicio, on the 
aammit. The town and landing were defended by two lOOpounder R. 
M. Lr- gun batteries, situated to the north and south, and several lines 
of rifle-pits covering the beach. A force of three hundred men occupied 
the town, where General Bueudia himself happened to be at the time 
of the attack. The main attack was to have been made by a large force, 
which was to land at Junin, some miles down the coast. Jiiniu was 
undefended. After landing, this force was to tiauk the bluffs and attack 
the enemy in the rear during the ni^lit, ^uch a movement being quite 
possible owing to the almost total disregard of scouting and picketing 
in South American warfare. 

After some delay, seven hundred men were embarked in boats and 
pulle<l in towai-ds the landing at the north of the town of Pisa^nia, the 
war fcihips opening on the batteries and rifle ])its. This force w^as driven 
back. Soon afterwards a second force of similar size was sent in, and 
succeeded in making a landing at the south end of the line. Then fol- 
lowed a feat of arms highly creditable to the ])luck and enterprise of 
the Chilian navy, if not to its discretion. As soon as the soldiers had 
gained a footing, the boats' crews, with their oflBcers, joined them, leav- 
ing their boats in imminent danger of destruction from the rocks and 
H. Mis. 30 4 



so THB WAR OH THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AMI 

ami, to aay nothing of tiie fact that the boats oonld not ret 
ship for re-enforcements. 

In a few momenta the town, with its defenses, was carried, 
all that was intended, bnt it was not all that tJie men intei 
Step b; step, fighting every inch of their way, the whole foi 
Dp to the bloff in splendid style. The ships joined in and i 
worlis tthead of the troops. The resnlt was that in abont 
the heights had been carried, and the allies retreated preci 
the railroad, leaving behind a \Mge amount of stores of all 
had been landed for the army. So unexpected .was the t 
even the engines, rolling-stock, and rails of the road were left 
The Chilians immediately landed their main body, and se 
their transports baclc fur re-enforcements. The large fiat so 
to the sides of tbe transports, greatly expedited this landii 
the force landed at Junin came op they fonnd the Hoepicio 
posseKsioD of their friends, but the bulk of the enemy h« 
The Chilians are said to have lost over half the number of 
ing party in storming the heights. 

The allies fell back to La Koria and Pefia Grande, the i 
the Iqniqui Railroad, where they were joined by most of the t 
Iquiqui and from the cantonments at Molle and other plao 
few days' march, Iquiqui being left to the care of a battalion 
guards. The Chilians moved their advance guard to Agua I 
the head of tbe Pisagua Railroad. The greater part of tbe 
was moved to the heights of 8an Francisco, where intreiichi 
thrown up to wait fur the arrival of re-enforcements. Gem 
established his headqaartera at Jas Pampas. 

Having heard of the capture of Fisagua, PrcMident Pra 




THE WAB ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA. 51 

[ a ekargft was made, and althongh the troops behaved splendidly they 

mid not stand the Chilians' gnn, Oatling, and small-arm fire fh>m 

kkind their intrenched position. The advance being nnsnpported was 

fUkh repnlsed. The main body, surprised by the sudden attack and 

kuf^ withoot a leader, became completely demoralized. It is asserted 

Iktt the Bolivians were so confused that they opened fire on their re- 

InitiDg allies, mistaking them for Chilians. This cansed much ill feel- 

ing It the time, but when we consider the condition of affairs and the 

fcrt that the nniforiQS of l>oth armies were very similar in color, the 

■ivtake seems i>ossible. A general rout now took place, which was 

moi taken a4lvantage of by the Chilians. The loss on the allied side 

VB« state*! as high as four thousand ; but as nearly the whole Holivian 

diTi^ion Htarte<l immediately for Bolivia, it was impossible to obtain a 

MNTfet stat4*ment. It iH more than probable, however, that the allies 

kmt that nnmlier of elTectives. During the night Colonel Suarez col- 

kcted the remnants of the Penivian army and fell back to the town of 

Tarapaca. 

Iqniqni was evacuated, and a regimentof Chilians, with the iron-clad 
Cbrhraoe. sent to occupy it on the 22d. 
On the 18th of November the Blanco captured the gunboat Pil- 
ayo in a greatly damaged condition. Commander Ferreyras having 
all manner of attempts to destroy her. 
The OMIiggins and Magellanes api>eared off Mollendo, wlu^re they 
fnt th«* Hiibniarine calile, thns sovering communication between Arica 
«r>l Lriia. 

O:. •!;♦• JiHU i»f NovimiiIht, Prrsi^lnit l*ra<lo su(ldi»n]y n'tunied to 
L:-ii I, !ii\in;: tijiii»*d nvi^v liis ronimmnl to Admiral Moritero. 

Tlj*- tLiv .ifriT th»* !».itrl«» ol'Siu Krain'is •» tli»» <Miili:iiis siMit a f'HHM* ot' 
a*«»ar twn thoiM.iiMl inon to nM*(»nnoiter the enemy. I)isr(»;:anliii;r his 
frfl^-rx. x\w eonniiamler of tlii«4 force |mis1hmI up to the hei;:lits above the 
t4/«i) of T.irapaea, whi're his men arrivcMl in an exlianHted eondition and 
V!th<iiit water. Tara|»aea is situated in a valley surrounded by high 
h r.«. The IVnivians had evaruatrd, and were already moving north 
*h*-Tj thfv wen» informed of the eondition of the Chilians, who had 
ffiTf-rnil thf town, parked their guns, and bivoua4-ked witliout a pic^ket 
LriK They retnnu'd and fell suddenly upon tin* <Miilians, routing them 
ftmi|.]»-trly and eapturing a ligiit Imtteiy <»f Kru|»p guns, whieli were 
t*.? ••ViMi out of paik. 

II ivifi;: ;:.ini«-d thi** >u<M'4»»*s, and lu'lng entirely out of a?nimiiiilion, the 
I'^-rj; MI;* ;«;;ain staitrd I'li tiifir niairli to Arira, w li«*r«* alniut tlin-e 
ti. -'N.ifid ttf thi-rn arrived. uniiM»l4**«t<Ml on tin* way, ra;:L*ed, linn;rry, and 
a.<*ftr i.f tlnrii uithout anus. (oMieial liut'iidia and <'oIonel Suaie/,. his 
'I. "f .,f' i»t.«fr, wt'Tv iiniiiediatelv plareil uihUm* arn-st. 

•'•"iHr.il Tanipero. with his division of Hojivians, wlio had In'en sup- 
^'^•*\ to Im- ni'iir th«- ]iuf* of fhi* /.o.i, rra/ipeared in l/A V\\7. w\>o\\\ \\\\* 



-Si*'. 



b2 THE WAS ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AUBRICA. 

Tbe Chilians now had complete posseeaion of the rich proviace of 
Taiapaca. 

' . Leaviug a Bmall force in garrison in the town of Tarapaca, tbe tnain 
bo<1y of the army was withdrawn to Pisagua and Iqii i qui, to which places 
the inhabitants and shipping began also to retu in. The army was r&en- 
forccd from the south until it numbered about seventeen thousand men. 
The small-pox, that had been raging on the coast for months, and the 
hot summer weather, caased a considerable loss to the army of occa. 
patiun. 

Tbe men-of-war were moved ap the coast, and Arica, Islay, and Ilo 
were blockaded, Molleodo being kept under surveillance. 

This blockade cut Arica off from communication with the north ex. 
cept by mule paths from Arequipa. General Baza had about three 
thousand men at Tacna, and Admiral Montero abont four thousand at 
Arica. 

On tbe 17th of December the Uu ion left Callao loaded with amoia- 
nition and stores for the army at Arica, her commander's orders being 
to get as near that place as possible and laud his cargo. This he suc- 
ceeded in doing at Ilo, from which place they were taken by rail to 
iUoquegua, and thence on male-back to Arica. 

President Prado suddenly left Callao on the erening of December 19 
for parts unknown, since ascertained to be the United States. All sorts 
of rumors were rife in regard to this departure. 

Seuor La Puerta, who was in poor health, succeeded to the supreme 
authority. General La Gotara, minister of war, a man of great personal 
courage, became the prime mover of the Government. 

During the afternoon of December 21 a revolution, which bad been 
smouldering in Pern for years, broke out, Sefio r Don iNii-hoIae Fierola 
[itor of laws and an ex-minister of state, who was at this time col. 




THB WAB OK THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AHEBICA. 63 

Aboat this time the Blanco, Amazonas, aud some of the smaller ves- 

ieb begmn to operate to the Dorthward of Callao, visiting the guano 

itftmtB at the Lobos Islands, where they stopped the loading, as they 

'tlft>didatIndependenciaBay. The Amazonas succeeded in capturing 

I large torpedo-boat, which had been sent across the isthmus to Pa- 

laaa, where it was put together and allowed to proceed to sea. These 

fmidn kept Callao and Lima in a continued state of disquietude. The 

OoTrminent displayed some activity in collecting raw levies about the 

eapttal. The Union, Atahualpa, and transports were moved into shoal 

vmfer and behind the mole, in onler to be in positions of safety. Had 

tJbe plac'e been strongly blockaded, these vessels could not have been 

—mi* efiectnally kept in |M)rt. 

Od the 6tb of January a force of about five hundred Chilians was 

landed at Ilo for the purpose of capturing the stores brought by the 

I, which were supposed to be there still, and of destroying the rail- 

and rolling-stock. The whole command embarked in a train and 

*^eot np the line to Moquegua, retuniing the next day; they re-em- 

liarkf^ without having accomplished anything. 

On the 7th of January a serious landslide on the Oroya Railroad 
■topped the running of the trains, effectually closing commnnication 
iMwcen Lima and the interior. 



VIII. 

^L^'M Tilt L.iSIUSa AT rACOcnA TO THE i\irTiHE OF Aliirj^ JIWE 

Thf C*hi]ians emharke<l 12,CKK) men in 20 transports at PiHa^rua, and 

^tartM north on the 24lh of Fel)niary, 1S,S0. Tlie next davtliey landed 

y<jnn infantrv and C4X) eavalrv at Paroclia, a small town alMMit TiO miles 

^rth of Ariea, the seajMirt of Moqnegua. with whii-li place it is coii- 

Vrte«l by a niilroad. At the same time .'^,0(K) men wrre landed at 

Vitor, sitnatiNl about 20 mil«»s s<»ntli of Paeocha. As s(M>n as tlie men 

^ff* Undeil th«* transjMirts wen* sent south for provisions an<! stones 

•ith whieh to attempt tlie H«»vere march across a desert C4»uiitry. This 

*i* uo f^mall iindertaliiii^ where even wat«T had to Im» pn»vifled. ( )ii the 

l.th of Mureli the advance «xuanK uinler ileneral |{a(]ue(1an(», consisting 

offf.fir rf^rimentH of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, ami ei;:liteen 

rHn-ji of artillerv, start<*<l inland towards Mo(iue;:ua, and after a pain- 

^•l nkiirt'll acro-Hji the desert of the Hospicio, ca?nped at Alto del <Ninde 

W •* a. iii,^ March 15, wlien» they remained until the 10th to recuperate. 

^i» the mean time the snrroundin;; country was thoroughly nM*oiiiioi- 

^^f^l ihi th« 19th an advance wa^ ma<le to Catalina, situate<1 alxmt 

^iftr mili^ from Moque;rua. At S.M the next niorniu): aunUxer \\\c\k^ 

^^mjul^, Mod ia three hours Mofiuegiui was ocoupie<\ wU\\v)V\V t^s^\vAr 



54 THB WAS ON THB PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AMEBICA. 

ance. From the heighte of Alto de la Yilla, which command the old 
towu of Moqnegua, aod which is fast beooiniiiK the actual site of the 
city since the earthquake of 1368, the Peruvian forces could be seen 
occupying the strong position of Los Angeles, so noted in South Ameri- 
can warfare. 

Los Angeles is situated on one of the spurs of Mount Torsta. There 
Oolonel Gamarro, having abandoned the less tenable position of Mo- 
qnegua, had intrenched his force of 2,000 men. This position was most 
important, as it covered the line of retreat of Montero and the army of 
Arica and Tacna on Puno and Areqnipa, and left commnnication open 
for General Beiugolea's army, which had reached lea on its march to 
the relief of Arica. The Peruvian position was in a triangle formed 
by the river Ilo and its branches. The Iront, of about four miles, 
was accessible only np a steep incline of over one thousand feet; the 
left was protected by a deep ravine, and the right was covered by a 
raof^e of almost impassable mountains. A front attack was rendered 
still more difficult from the fact that the ascent had to be first ap- 
proached down a sandy slope completely exposed to the Peruvian fire, 
and even then a ravine had to be crossed. The Peruvians had dug 
seven lines of riHe-pits across their front, in which the Grau regiment 
was deployed. Two companies were posted to cover the Sameqna 
ravine on the left. The remiiinderof the force was held in reserve. 
The right was undefended except by the mountains. (Jn the 21st the 
Chilian army was moved to within rifle-range. At 9 p. m. Colonel 
Munoz, with seven companies of the Second Regulars, one battalion of 
the Santiago regiment, Fuentes's battery of Krupp mountain guns, 
and 300 cavalry, started round by way of Tumiica to turn the Peruvian 
left. By some mistake the road was missed, and at daylight the Pera- 
viaus discoviTcd their enemies in the Sivmeqtiii Ravine. Fneute«"s bat- 




THB WAR ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA. 55 

vere punhing the war elsewhere. Id order to keep Admiral Montero's 
ftlUfDtion eupfcged, aud to prevent his sending any of his force to re-en- 
force Colooel Gamarro, an attack was made on Arica, on the 27tb of 
Febraary, by the HaaMcar and Magellanes. The Huascar ran in towards 
tbe More, engaging the batteries on that blaff and the monitor Manco 
Capac, anchoitHi off the town. Early in the engagement the Huascar re- 
opiTed a shot in her hull. Observing that troops were actually leaving 
11 the railway trains, the Chilian fire was directed upon them, causing 
tbnr return to the town. The fight now became very warm, seven men 
bung killetl and nine wounded on board the Huascar. Not desiring to 
expose their vessels any longer to the heavy plunging fire of the shore 
batieriifai, the Chilians withdrew, but were followed by the Manco Ca- 
pu. Seiug this, the Huascar was again headed in shore, and engaged 
ber antagonist at two hnndrcil yards range. The Huascar attempted 
Co nim« but desistiMl from the attempt on noticing that her opponent 
vu accompanied by a tori)edo-boat ; she thereui)on drew off and 
•tcsojed around in a circle. In doing tliis a shot struck the new fore- 
isaat which had l)een put in her at Valparaiso to replace the tripod 
virmovetl by Admiral Grau, so that she was again reduced to one mast, 
and came n<*ar having her turret disableil. Another shot killed her 
CDoiaiaiider, Captain Manuel Thompson, a valuable officer, of English 
<kMYnt« who hail diHtinguishe<l himself in the capture of the Cova* 
^Dffa fnim the Spanish, and who had returned to the service of his 
«Kintry, frrmi rivil life, at the outbreak of this war. After Thompson's 
W'-'irh Lieutenant Valverde assumed eonnnaiui, and after rontiuuing the 
«^*':iiri.it. mitiidiit important results, for about au hour, withdrew. Cap- 
tain < «in«l*-ll. of (*i>va(lou;;a fame, was now transferred from the com- 
3i4ri«l iif tli«' M;ig«'llanes to that of the Huascar. 

Oil the ITtli of Marrli the Teruvian corvette I'nion, under Captain 
Viil.ivH-tMicio, gallantly ran the blockade at Arica, and succeeiled in 
uij'iiti;: a v<ilu.il»l«* <*ar;;o 4>f supplier, althon;;h constantly exposcsl to 
tijt- lir*? of III*' bltN'kailcrs f«»r seven hours, the time requinMl for unload- 
'lij .ftij«l cii.ilini;. At 4Hie time the tire brcMine so severe that the au- 
trii>rrii-* on nlinre advisetl the captain to ruti his vessel a;;roiind. One 
*''i**' ••rrui ii The diM'k, breaking thn'c beams, darini^^ini; the smoke stacks 
intl *-!iil.in;:»'tiii;; th«* boil«*rs. Tin* (■hilians cxpertiMi the I'nion to 
Til. I'lif !•! fh«* north wanl, and made tli«*ir pn^parations accotdingly. 
^ilf.i*. ji«-nrjM, «in tin* contniry, sta:t«'d for the>onthwanl at tull spi-ed, 
•li ?«r.Mil i|.ivii;:hr, at ."» p. ni.. ami »«u<'cccd»Ml in n'.n'hiti;; Callao in safety. 
T)i:« «ii.>w«4 uliat pliirk and spccil comiiincd will ilo. 

A 'n lilt thw tinii* th«* Chilians paiil anoMn*r vi^jt ;o thi*<'liinc ha Nlands, 
■ !?•■>, in «;»:te of the daii;;er ot f.iptun*. soMie adv«'ntun»u*i niiTchant- 
Ci'Tiii.iil ttfiMi lo.iilini; ;:iiani». Th»*v destrovrd t hi* chutes and launches. 

*Mi iIm* rjtli of March. <*oloiM*l Silva, the Holivian coiiim iinler at 
*>-««h.4, revtilted, with Ins tri>o/is, ;i;,M/nsf the Cfoverumeul o\* V* »v\\\Vv*T*>. 
'^TfVf*}urioii WiM MiipprfHSi^d, lint u if hnut, however, greaVU* veUwAxw* 



66 THE WAR ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AMI 

the marob of four battalions intended for the re-enforcemeDt < 
at Moqnegaa. Oolooel Gatnaoho, the BoUrian commander-j 
cnaed SilvAjina very strong letter, of baring caused a daplio 
Camarones affair, And of baring been the vaiue of tbe perilo 
in which the allied cause vas placed by tbe entire catting ( 
tero's army of tbe south. 

On the 8th of April all the preparations were completed 
vance on Tacna, and the coontry tboroaghly reoonnoitered 
airy. In executing this service Oolooel Dubid Almieda, ch: 
vith tweoty-flve cavalrymen, were surprized at Locumba 
QDder Colonel Albaracin-Duble, only four men being able 
way out. The first Chilian division, under Colonel Ameng] 
MDtb by the coast roads towards Sitana, whilst the cavalry 
ond division moved from Moquegua towards Sinta and Saga; 
to turn Locumba. On the lltb tbe first and second diviaioi 
Locumba, and the third division moved oat of Pacocha. C 
gara, of the national guards, engaged the cavalry under A 
&ama on tbe IStb, completely routing him, with a loss of 1< 
a large number of cattle that were intended for the garriaoi 

TbeCbiliao cavalry was then pushed on without oppositioi 
Tacna. Tbe fourth division moved out of Pacocha on the 1< 

We will now leave the Chilians moving on Tacna, in ord< 
the course of events on the sea. Encouraged by the sao 
Union, the Oroya (armed rapid transport) was sent south t 
with a valnable cargo of monitions of war, including 7,000 1 
fle1d-guus(Krupp and Armstrong). These were safely land 
and were nsed to equip General Biengolea's army, which noi 
about 7,000 men and was located about Arequipa. Tbe < 
went to Tocopilla, where she captured the little steamer 1 




THS WAB ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AMEBICA. fi7 



oatHide of the Maelle d'ArseDa, or etone docks. Captain Villa- 
fieeoGio had moored the Udioii and Borrounded her with a strong tor- 
pedo-boom. Cnfortonately for Qonij in the collision with the fishing- 
boat one of his bow-sparH was carried away, so that when he struck the 
UoMMi'a boom protection and exploded his torpedo he became powerless 
lo iDJare the vessel itself, although he completely opened a passage to 
her. which be oonld have used himself, or which could have been used 
hj A companion, if he bad had one. The vessels immediately opened a 
hfmTj flmallann and machine-gun fire on the torpedo-boat, which was 
Ibroed to withdraw. 

Tbe next day the Rimac, Chalaco, Oroya, Union, and Atahualpa were 
oiorjred liehind the breakwater of the stone docks, where the Talisman, 
Aparimac (an old wocMlen frigate), Maraiion (school-hulk), and several 
aller vessels bad already been phiceti. 

At 6 a. m., April 10, the Chilian fleet appeared off Ctillao, and Ad- 
irml KiveniH sent, by flag of truce, a notice to the senior Peruvian of- 
that he bail come to blockade the iH>rt of Callao and the bays in 
vicinity, that eight diiys would be allowe<l for the withdrawal of 
tral merchant vessels, and that, as in the course of events it might 
become ne<*eHsar>' for him to bombard the city, he gave timely warning 
for the removal of non-combatants. Similar notices were sent to the 
dean of the o>nsular coriM and to the senior tbi-eign naval oflicer. The 
iofvign diplomatic authorities asked an extension of the time allowed 
to neutral vessels to fifteen days, and spiHiial warning in cam* of inten- 
tion To bomlmrd. Admiral Kivt*ros answeriNl that he would extend the 
t:rii«- to ten davM, and tliat ho (^onsidiMed Ins first notire as all that was 
Drt-t-^«**iry tor the n»rnoV}il of noiicoinliatants. He pnnnisrd, however, 
that li*- woulil not initi.ite li4)stihties until after the liOth, the day on 
«b'<-h thf (Nirt was to l>e eleareil. 

Thf «lt-tf*nM*s Iff Callao at this time — not inelnding the guns of the 

b;,»-ij •*! u«ir, « liieh were alni4>st eoniph^tely masked behind tiie stone 

j»s»*r^*cMi!»ist#*il of a series of batteries of almost every system and periinl, 

rxtf-hdiii;: in the form of a eiesi*ent around the sliores of tlie bay for 

AU>fi! thr»*«* niiirs, the town Immii;: at the middle ]>oiiit. The most 

«ofithrrly one, situated on the end of tli(* |)niiit iind 4-4>mmaiidin^ the 

br«t r^n^Tf of till' nsual Chilian position, was 4*alliMl the Dos <lr May4»; 

:t bj«i but latt'ly l>erii tinislieil, and 4:oiisist«Ml «)f an imimMiM* pit in tlie 

ni'iMf an«l gniVfl, ihi* insi<le fa<'«».s bnn;; n-vi-tted wilii sand ba;^s. Tiio. 

»uii p!.»tft»rnir> wen' on heavy erib work restin;; on pib'S, tiie platforms 

Xiirfhwlvrf* lMMii;;of st<»ne. In this work tJHTf* wen* tw«» *J0 jneh MntM»tli- 

'■•rv miiz/le lo^iilin;: KiNlmaiis — on<* of tin* navv, tiir 4»th«*r of tiif armv 

juttt-rii — iiM>unted on our 4>nlinary iron earrla^^cs, to >\hi4'h aiblitional 

c«injpr »*•«.«« MS Were fitte4l. Kxtreme 4'har^es wt-re nst-d in ihe^* j^uns, but 

ti»r|ji>«(ler wasof inferior (piality. These Kini^<'<*in">:*iid(Ml about M'Vi*n- 

ciiTbth^ of the h(»rix(m, imlndJnA'' fhe bays (»f Calla4> and V^\uu'\Wi>., \\\\\\ 

tbe boqa&fvu PuMHUfct* connvcihi^ tlwm. The next two b'AUevWH ^vt^i 



68 THE WAS OH THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AME! 

similar in coostractioa, one facing on Oallao Bay, tbe other 
OborilloB. They vere named Pierola and Tarapaoa, and 
mounted with two heavy 15-iucb Bmooth-bore mazzle-load 
greus. Kext came tbe Torre del Merced, a monitor turrei 
on masonry, and containing two 10-iucb muzzle-loadinfr . 
riSes. Next an old-faialiiuued brick fort, called Santa Boat 
were mounted two 11-iiioh muzzle-loading Blakely rifles, 
flanked by batteries armed with old-fashioned 32-ponnder 
which were tbe bigbly-ornamented bronze guns bronght c 
Spaniards. Next iu the town was tbe castle, the only impi 
of which for modern warfare was two maaoiiry towers or ta 
armed with two 11-iuch mnzzle-loading Blakely rifles. Quae 
by sand-bagH were mounted on the sea-pier of tbe docks or u 
were Ave 15-incb smooth-bore mnzzle-Ioadiug Dahlgrens, t< 
smooth-bore mnzzle-loudiug Dablgrens, and two32-ponnder8. 
the right of the town was the Ayacucho Fort — similiar to 
Bosa — armed with one ll-inch muzzle-loading Blakely rifle s 
inch smooth-bore mnzzle-loading Diihlgren. Next a moni 
called Juuin, mounted with twolU-iuch ArmstroDgmuzzle-loa 
and on the extreme right a new sand-bng battery, called ' 
mounted with fonr ICi-iuoh smooth-bore muzzle- lowling Uahl 

Callao was deserted by almoHt all of its non-combatant ii 
most of the shops were closed, and all buiiiiiet»s was transact* 
Ambulances were established and the volunteer tire depart 
constantly on duty. Au order was issued forbidding boating 
down. All communication with Lima from the sea beiug ( 
authorities, fearing a great rise iu tbe price of provisitm 
decree on the 14th of April flxiug their prices. 

April 20, at noon, the ten days' grace expired, the last mei 




THE WAB ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA. 59 

one handred and seventy shots, the Peruvians one hundred and tweuty- 
seveD, of vhicb seventy-eight were fired by the Union's Armstrong 
Bozxie-loadifig rides. The Marafion had a shell exploded in her hold. 
The Kioiac, Cbalaco, Talisman, and Union were strnck several times- 
and several shells passing over exploded in the Oroya Railroad' station 
and iu the town beyond. Admiral Riveros did not seem much inclined 
to riak his vessels, and probably intended the action more to show the 
PerovuiDii what his new long-range guns could do than as a serious 
attempt to destroy vessels which he hoped eventually to capture. 

Maoy reports in regard to torpedoes had been circulated, and the 
Chiliaoa were continually on the watch for them. Permanent moorings 
with buoys were laid down off the end of the island, to which the 
blockadeni nxle during the daytime, getting under way every night, 
IcAving two small vessels to guard the moorings. Two torpedo-boata 
were kept on patrol in the bay at night, and during foggy weather 
these often ran in close to the mole and among the foreign men-of- 
war. The Peruvians probably did lay down a few torpedoes, but 
they were placed close to the shore. They certainly made preparations 
for torpedoing, ami were moderately successful in the use of that weapon. 
They were provided with several regular torpedo-boats and had a num- 
ber of launches and small tugs fitted up for torpedo work. These were 
■ometimeH used for patrol duty. They were also provided with torpe- 
doea of the La^* s3>tem. Two serious acci<lent8 occurred to their tor- 
pedo curpH. One of the HerreMhoff boats was run into the mole and 
ftank, and on the Ist of May a serious explosion took place at the tor- 
jiT^lo manufactory at A neon. 

At M*ven o'clock on the morning of May 5 the Amazcnias. bein^ under 
w^y in the hay on ^nanl duty, discovered two small buoys covered b}- 
• hi«-lilK. TlierM' lloate<l about ei;;titeen inches out of tlie water, at a little 
dij*tance from each other. The connnandin^ otlicer of the Aniazonas 
f>rnt a lMi.it to JUNfM^ct them, and the admiral scMit in the torpedo-lKiat 
GM^*i»M.i. w|ii(di opened on them with her machine ^un, exploding one 
of the Ku«»\s with ;rreat violeni*e. The other was towed asliore, and,on 
iCriHiTjdin;:, expl«Ml«'<]. These ti»iped«»es wen* probably intended to foul 
I'ur Uiw> of \es>el>. 

A: l.l!r> p. m.. May 10, the Hlanco, Iluascar, Pilcomayo, Amazonas, 
And An;ramoH p>t under way and >tcamed over towards the battcrien. 
Tbr Ciirvelte 0'II:;:gins t«Mik up a position in tin* ]>o(iueion Pa>sa^e 
;if <«h*'ll the 20 inch Dtis dt» Mayo liatterj^ — ran;;e, 4,5on \aid>; the 
IiUn<-ij ttjok iM»si(ion 4,0<M) yanl> fronj the s.nne battery, with the same 
o^jr^-t. The Iluascartook po>ition at the hra4l of tlie linr. to the north- 
w-ird i»f the center of the ha>, witli tlie Pdcomayo, A ma/on. is, and 
Ari;;4im<><* In-lueen her antl the lUant'o. Tlie o!>jc<*tive point of th«*^c ves- 
**•!*» »a« lh«' .••hip.'* beliind the mole — ran;;e, about ."i^rnM) yanls. The 
liu^incar .iftc'rward." tilled her tloiible bottom with water. \eAvu\\\\;Wv 
frre board to :i feet, and aljanj:c<l her ninKc to 3,(KM> y ardn, NX \\\\^V \\V 



60 THE WAR ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AVE 

this close range ebe was pierced by a shot aa she rolled, an 
prereoted from sinkiug b; her water-tight bulkheads, ^di 
ros feared the effect of the 20-inch shot on the Huascair, am 
placed her fortbest from the Doe de Mayo battery. The acl 
tted Qutil 4.45 p.m., up to which time the Chilians fired 400 
the Peruvians 200. With the exception of the shot already 
tvo more that glanced off of the same vessel, and one that cc 
i^gSinK) t^he Chilians came out of the action without injur}-. 
Tians were almost as fortnoate. The Uuion was set ob fire 
but the fire was soon extinguished. The Saacy Jack, a 
bark, was sunk. A boat going to rescae her crew was str 
her people being killed and four wounded. A lew shells < 
the town. Seventy per cent, of the Chilian projectiles sti 
the mole or passed over it. About 20 Pemviuns were k 
(^Higgins managed with her broadside battery to drive thf 
from the 30 iocb gnna several times. 

At 2.30 a. m., May 25, a Peruvian old-type steam-lanncl 
merly belonged to the ill-fated ludei>endeucia, commanded 
ant Galvez, with a crew of sixteen men, and armed with a G 
in the bow and a 2-iuch breech-loading ride in the stem 
deuly ii|>on the Chilian steel Tfaornyoroft torpedo-launch 
which bad a speed of 11 knots and was fitted with thn 
pedoee, one right ahead and one on each bow. The Penivjai 
tail speed for the mole as soon as he made out his enemy, 
queo, a steel Yarrow torpedo-launch, with a speed of 
DOW appoaretl on the scene, and, passing ahead of ber 
exploded ber bow torpedo under the Peruvian's counter; i 
moment Lieutenant Qalvez and Surgeon Ugarte expto< 
J the Jaiiequeu'w bow, which opened a iHrge lenk a 




THE WAR ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA. 61 

vpoD bj the iibore batteries. The Haasoar headed towards the mole, 
and th« Peruvians at work on the sunken launch fled. At 10.42 the 
Hoa*car opened fire, and at 11.02 the Angamos opened at a range of 
Ibcir miles. The Chilian fire did some damage, setting fire to a house 
and killing several fiersons. The Uuascar fired at ranges of from two 
and three-quarters to thrive miles ; the Angamos, with her 8-inch breech- 
loBMling Armstrong rifle, from three and a half to four and a haif. Later 
in Che day the Peruvians again attempted to raise the launch, but were 
driTfO off by the Angamos, which approached quite near to them under 
eover of the foreign men-of-war. 

i>o the morning of May 30 the torpedo -launch Guacolda went in and 
cirove off the Peruvian launches that were at work on her sunken 
coonurt. She then remained over the spot, and a diver went down, 
vho plaited a tori>edo, by which the bone of contention was destroyed. 
Whilst this was going on the Peruvian boats were re-enforced by two 
other launches, and then by a small tug ; all of these were armeil with 
a 2 or 3 inch breech-loading rifle and machine guns. This flotilla ap- 
pruttched the Chilian launch to within pistol-shot, when they fired a 
gVD. The Chilian boat withdrew at full speed. At this time, about 6.42 
a. n., the Pilcomayo opened on the vessels behind the mole. She 
wmm flooo joined by the Huascar and Angamos. All of the shore 
batteries opened fire. The Angamos did some splendid firing. The 
Chilians kept their vess4*ls at long range; the Uuascar, from seven 
thoasand and ninety-five yanls to six thousand four hundred and 
*-i^hty six; the Pilromayo, from «ix thousand two hundrcMl and ei^hty- 
f<*fir \ardH to mx thousand eight hiindivd ; the Angamos Innng seven 
tbouHiind ninety -five yards fr<»in the nearest *JO-iiich battery. The 
lVni\ians, fH^ein^ that their enemy was deteiniiii(*<I to engage outside 
of Th»-ir range, towed the Atahualpa out about half a mile, but her shot 
«:.ii trll f«hort alNMit one iiiiie. The Oliilians sn(*<*(H*ded in siukiiig tiie 
w :]i4fl •^hip Tumbezanda hulk witli TOO tons of (iovernnieiit eoal, both 

• •:' ■L«*.«^* vi-?*M'ls bein^ brliind tlie iiioU*. 

1 |j«- bhnk.ide of* the coast \> :is inaintaiiird b,\ tlie <VHi;,^;iins eruis- 
.':^ U'tUfM'ii Annm and <'hanray, I 1m» .ships nil t'allao, thr (liaraburo 
^..•i i ov.iibni^.M olV tli«* roa>t of th(* piovinec of Airtpiipa, and tlic 
t 'M liiait*' tind Ma;;«'llan«'^ otf Arit-a. 

I: i-^ lMii«' to hMV<* tlie blockailin;; lh'«>t and see wliat is doin;^ in 
•r*»- -*.uth. Wr |«-li tlie four «li\isiMij.s ol ilie ( 'hilian army ni«>ving 

• '.. T.Kii.i. As snon as the main bo<ly reat'hiMl Saina tlic lia.sr of ^up- 
;*! t « w.i.« iti(»\«d to Itr, a >niall harbor ai>out L'i nii)f> fmin that place 
j:.i! « i*(in« (till uith it l»y '^tnui r4»a<ls, athlition.tl le cnfoifcnicnt.s wcic 
*r-'«i^'ht trtiin ^|si^^lIi^, and the Nvouinlcd anti sick wen* srnl mmjiIi. 

lt»-ftt'ial raiii|Nrio, the President ot liojivia, having put (b)\N n the icvnlt 
At Vi.ich«4, had hUce«'eded in joining Admiral Monterouith bet ween l'jnn) 
and 3.0^10 men. There wjim, b4'Hi(]t's^ a chance of succor tr\m\ V\v»Viv*\*A\ 
bfUigf^em, iMMt heard from near Arequipa, where U\s mew \vm\ Vi^^tw 



62 THE WAB ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AHE 

thorongtaly equipped from the c&r^ of the Oroya. The ftlli 
Tacoa, nnmberinfr abont fonrteen thonR&nd of nil arms, was o 
by General Campero. Admiral Montero commanded the i 
posed of Peruvians, and General Oamacho the left, composed of 
The Chilian army, of about equal numbers, was oommaaded 1 
Baqaedano. The allies were posted along tlie crest and 
slope of a line of hills northwest of Tacna and parallel to 
of the same name. These hills were connected with an immi 
plain, over which the Chilians were advancing by a gradual e 
had been strongly fortified. The sniitbem extremity of the 
occupieil by the left of the allies ti-rminated with a steep 
was eonsidored inaccessible. The right bent back towards tl 
was strongly intrenched and defended by artillery. Thie at 
of works conaisted of rifle-pits. About 1,060 yards in rear w 
line of trenches, extending along the whole front about 4} 
the right this line was thrown slightly to the front, in order 
with a well-constrncted fort placed on a slight eminence, all 
Bailable in front on account of the heavy sand, but easily B 
fh>m the rear. This fort enfiladed the whole line. Coverinj 
and so placed as to take the first line of intrcncbments in re 
a well'constnicted sandbag redoubt. On the crest of the 
second line of intrenchments, broken and echeloned to the 
rear. The artillery was distributed along the line, some of 
batteries covering the line of lifle-pits. The Bolivian cavalr; 
nnnwoiintable reanon, was posted on the extreme end of the 1 
to the left, where it could not poKsibly be brought into acti 
airy. The Pemvian cavalry covered the right of the line. 
At !t.50a. ni.. May 2G, the Chiitiui artillery, having taken i 
,nd 4.0OO varda 




THK WAR ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA. 63 

the Bolivians. The Navales regiment, taming its left, opened a heavy 

cttilladiug fire, which, conpled with the front attack of the other bat- 

ttlioDftt caosed a retreat, in which the artillery was abandoned. The 

Beoood Begohirs opened fire at 600 yards, and advanced to 80 yards 

fSrom the rifle-pitu, when Lieutenant-Colonel Del Canto ordered a bayo- 

BPt charge, and caused the Peruvians in his front to fall back on the 

tiVDcheii. The Santiago and Atncama regiments moved rapidly to the 

ftoDt. but they were opposed by a murderous fire from the guns and 

machine guns of the fort, and to a tremendous small-arm fire from the 

crhoehfs and riMloubt, and were soon checked. In the mean time 

MoDteni move«l up all of his reserves, and opposed liis whole force to the 

4,UUU Chilians who had come into action. The thiixl and fourth divis- 

ioD««. by some error having been retarded in their march, could not 

reinforce the fighting line at this imi)ortant moment. The Esmeralda 

rvgimt-nt liegan to break, as its ammunition was giving out. These men 

were pruvideil with lUO nninds when they went into the fight, instead of 

the IMt usually issued. This was not a green regiment, and this tre- 

Biendous expenditnre of ammunition in a few minutes ])oint8 out the 

gmt im|Mrtance of ammunition reserves. Fortunately for the Chilians, 

Xbe Second Kegnlars were on the left of the Esmeraldas, and the VaU 

pttraiao, a regiment made np of Valparaiso policemen — all old soldiers — 

was <»u its right. These sustained the action against heavy odds for 

ahont an hour, retreating in fierfect order. The Bolivians succeeded in 

rattinc off the ri^ht wing of the Navales n>giment, which had been 

Thi'i'^^in :irt>niiil rheir tl:ink, but the (Miiliaii (ireiiadier cavalry regiment 

r i<!»- .i l>iil!i.iiit riiiirire ami reseiied their eoinrades. The Navales (li(*n 

r»*:*«rr! «il m hmp of the Valparaiso and soon retook its position in line. 

T"r:»- -^Iji'Ii- I'l til*' Ataearna re;:iin«'nt liail been ileploved as skiiinislnTs 

■■:. Ml*' U-ft to n:<'ct a llaiik atta4*k tVoin tlu* I*<'rnvians, it liaviii;; l»een 

f-<:i:.<l :lt.it tli*-y ronlil not maintain their position in soii<l line. Things 

m*-T^ 1( Hiking very badly tor the (*hilians, when, at 12..'iO. the third di- 

Ti*i.»n arrivr*!. The inarine.s were wnt to support the right, tl.e (Miaca- 

tiiicii re;:inient the eenter, and the (!<Mpiiinl)o n*giinent moved up in rear 

of thf- At.ieania. The Ksmeralda regiment was n*torine(I, and a;;ain took 

i!a lNit.it ii*n in liii*'. The oll'ensive was re>uii ed by tli«» Chilians. The 

f'>ar?h division eame up, and biMng in rl(»siM*oIinnn sutVered eonsi«l<Tably 

fr<>Tii till' r«-ruvian tire, intended probably tor the tir>t line. KontfrilLr.s 

■u'tir\ uiis inovi-il up on the Irtt, and covered its di'ploMnrnt in tin* 

' l.^'Hiij;; uriN-r troni ii;:lit to h-l't : Z.ipadon's, 'TjiflfnH'H of the |)i'>rrl, 

I-i .r.iri». Tin- i»*M'r\»'divi«^ion, rnn>iNti!i;^<»t'tlM' I'li ^t, i'lind.arnl l'inii rh 

\'.' »':! ir-» .iml the Ituliirs iMttalmn, apptMitd in rf.ii' of thf i-« iiti-r nt ihi* 

.:• . Nil! :t w.iH not in-fi-ssary to iirpli.y I hem, a^ at our f»*i-hM U ;i ;:i;mii| 

i':'..irii f via** madi* all alon^ tlit* lim* and tin* iilh*m«-n i-ai i iimI ihr loir. 

!■.•• »ho!*- al]i»-d line retieated, p.iN^^ini: rapidl,\ lliii»n::h Tai-ii.! and 

s.A*.?,;^ for thf niiiiiiitaiiis. The tliilinii> lost jn this a-'liow *l,y)\\\\ \uv\\, 

L«-!l;. frifin thr rirrtt ami secuwl iUvi>ntus\ the AliuanvA i\\u\ SeemwV 



64 THB WAB ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AMI 

Besrnlar regimeots, which had alreul; been gn^«at]y redao 
tIouh serriue, losing about half of their effective strength, 
livian lOBSfS were not given, but it is known that Dasa's v< 
mont, the Colorado, was almost annihilated. The Peruvian 
men killed and 1,J)0U wounded, the loaaes falling heaviest on 
and Camavora regiments, which were opposed to the Secoi 
Begulars. Only 400 prisoners were taken. The Pernvian 
ambolances were admirably administered, giving prompt ci 
own wounded and to those of the Chilians left on the gr 
they were repulsed. 

The Chilian cavalry was pushed down the Arica Hailroad {i 
aftfr the battle. During llie uight they reached the Chaca; 
where the road crosses by a bridge. This bridge had been dt 
the Peruvians, and the approach to it planted with dynao 
one of which was exploded on the approach of the Chilians 
by this cxplosiou, which was ineffectual, the operator bein 
by the darkness, an immediate search was made, and the oi 
covered in a small hat where the firing-board was placed, 
pedoes were then traced and unearthetl. The 2d of Jun 
Baquedano pushed the reserve division, cnneisting of the F 
and Fourth Regulars and Bnlnes battalion, down the road, 
been repaired as far aa the bridge. 

The town of Arica is situated on a sandy plain by the e* 
out of this plain to the southward of the town is a hill callei 
The sea face and northand south sides of this hilt are almost ; 
and reach an elevation of about 1,20U teet; the east side is agn 
The plateau at the top of tbiu hill formed the citadel of thi 
its rim was crowned with saud bag batteries, in which heavy 
mounted. Around the thrt'i' land wides uf tho hill, iiiclucliu) 




TBI WIB <nr THE PACIFIC C018T OF BOUTH AMXBICA. 66 




twiee near the wftter-line by 160-poander prqjeotiles and oondd- 
fleMeged A shell entered one of the Oochrane'e porta and 
•eMnf tre to two cartridgee ; by the explosion of the shell 
that of the eartridges 27 men were woanded. After having flred 
ah ot s » and been llred at 74 times, the Ohilian ships were withdrawn 
the next day, when an assault was to be made. The plan of at- 
as Mlows : The Lantaro regiment was to attack the northern 
the >nt battalion that of Ban Jos^i the seoond that of Santa 
The Bolnes battalioa was to act as a support to the artillery 
to the Lantaro regiment The First, Third, and Fourth 
to attack the south forts. The first was to be held in 
; the first battalion of the Third was to attack the Oindadela 
epT c re d by the second battalion, and the Fourth regiment was to 
the elber two fbrts. All were in position at daylight, and the 
tnopa had advanced within 1,200 yards of the Ciudadda fbrt 
th^ were discorered by the pickets. The action became general, 
b the assaolt on the CMndadela fort a dynamite torpedo was exploded, 
killed a number of mei;, and so exasperated the Chilians that the 
gnrrfMHi of the fiirt, 4S0 in number, are said to have been slaugh* 
The Foorth carried its forts, but as the men occupied the east* 
it was blown np. In the mean time the Lautaro regiment had 
Forts San JosA and Santa Bosa, and the Peruvians, at 7 a. m., 
maSj held the east fiirts and the Moro. One of the east forts which com* 
aatsdcd the Moro wss next captured by the Fourth Begiment, and the 
ethers wt* re aliandoned. Colonel Bologiie^i, assisted b}* the uufortanate 
Captain Moore, of Independeiicia fame, rallied the garrisou aud the ref- 
age«« frum the other forts aud made a maguificent defeuse, which was 
UBMieorsiiful in the end. 

The Manoo Cajmc, which had borne but little part in the defense, 
was blown np by her commander when he saw the capture of the Moro. 
The crew gave themselves np on board the transport Itata. A torpedo- 
bnac attempted to escape, but was driven ashore by the Toro aud blown 
np by her crew. 

The Pemvians lost 700 men killed, 100 wounded, and 000 prisoners. 
The Chilians kMt 400 men, all told. 

Hnviog utterly destroyed the army of the south, having conquered 
the whole of the rich department of Moqnegua from Peru, being in 
poseeesion of the entire Bolivian seaboanl, and having blockaded Cal* 
lao and the principal sea-ports of the north, the main army went into 
Mmmer quarters. 

H.Mis. 



66 THE WAB ON THE PA.CIFIC COABT OF SOUTH AHEBICA. 



FBOil THE FALL OF JHICA TO THE FALL OF LIMA, JAA'VJHr 17, 1881. 

Oti the 3d of July a small coaster, or Hnaclio packet, as they are called, 
was seeu to leave the port of Callao and to steal along the coast to the 
northward. The nrioed transport Loa, which bad joitied the block- 
adiog squadron after the fall of Arica, was sent in chase. Shortly 
afterwards three meu were seen to leave the coaster in a small boat 
aud laud through the snrf. The small vessel was then takeu possession 
of, and found to be loaded with fruit, vegetables, and poultry — a valoa- 
ble iirize to a blockading force. She was taken alongside of the Loa, 
and the work of unloading commenced. Id a few momenta a tre- 
mendous explosion took place ; the Loa was soon seen to sink by the 
stern, careening to port, but righting, with her mast-heads above water, 
when she reached the bottom. It is supposed that the packet con- 
taiu<;d a large case of dynamite fitted with friction fuses, from which 
wires led to some of tbe packages of tbe cargo. In unloading, as in- 
tended, one of these packages was probably lifted and tbe torpedo ex- 
ploded, blowing a large hole in the Loa's side aud causing the loss of 
145 oCBcers and men oat of a crew of 200. 

Large amounts of war material of all kiods were being run into the 
Peruvian ports, some even into Callao. 

On the 24th of August the neutral men-of-war commenced to transport 
relbgees from Callao to Chimbote, which became the terminns of the 
Pacific Steam Xavigatiou Company's line. 

August 30 and 31 and September 1 the Angamos engaged the bat- 
teries, generally at four niik'H range. On t!ie last day the Union's boilers 





THS WAS OV mi FACmO COAST OF 80UTH AMXBIOA. 67 

Whital the Comdongs was blockading the Bmall port of Ohoneaj, 

of Cellaoi on the tSth of Iteptember, an empty gig was seen adrift. 

▲ boat waa sent to examine her. This was apparently thoroughly done ; 

the giff waa brought akmgaide, and tackles hooked to hoist her in. As 

aa a strain was brought on the after-tackle a tremendous explosion 

; the Comdonga'k side was blown in, causing her to sink 

Immediately. It is supposed thst this gig Ihad been fitted with a 

keel, pa^ed with dynamite, and fitted with an igniter, which was 

with the afker-tackle, so that no explosion coald take place 

vas made actually to hoist in the boat 

16 two Chilian vessels visited the small port of Supe, about 

sighiy milea north of Oallao, capturing all the provisions in town, but 

Orioae l LjiiA% ezpeditionaiy force landed at Paita, the sea-port of 
the most aorthi^y port (kT Peru, on the 18th of September, bum- 
tbe eostom-honse and other valuable Government property. 

September SS the Cochrane and Tdlten bombarded the town of Cho- 
dhs, a watsiing-|daee situated on the boy of the same name, and dis- 
tmt aboot nine sdles southwest ftom Lima. 

Oa the 23d of September the Chilians bombarded Chancay and the 
islaring-plaee of Aaeoa, situated north of Callao. 

October 96 the Huasear, which had been sent to Valparaiso to receive 
tse new 18S-poonder 8-inch breech-loading Armstrong guns of the latest 
^pe, arrived at Arica, and proceeded to rejoin the blockading sqnadnm 
iff t*allao. Preparations were being made at Arica to transimrt the 
Chilian army north. Most of the troops were move<l down fh)m Tacna. 

Aboot November 1, Colonel Lynch's exiK>ditioiiary force waH landed 
aiQaiIca, with the intention of captiiriiii; AnH)iiii)a, but heariiiji: that 
General Bc-negolea was still in that neighborhoml with a Htronf;^ force, a 
iMmbarfcation took place. 

On the 3d of November the Hiiascar tried her new i^nns on the shore 
Wtteries at four-miles range. The PeniviaiiK phnIucimI a new gun with 
Abrtter range than any they had previouHly ummI. 

5oremt)er 9 all but two of the vesnels bloc*kadini; Callao went Ronth 
b convoy the army transi>orts north. Two tran8i>ortH landed about 
liOOO Chilians on Sten liorenzo Island, off Callao. 

On the 18ih of November alN>ut 7,(MNI ChiliaiiK wore landed at Pinco, 

lid marvbed to Chinches. Pierola reHigne<l the governnii'nt to Seftor 

U Farrta, and took command of the army in the Held. The neutral 

iiet made preparationa to aliifl its nuchora^o farther north, hh it fur 

a screen for the Chilian tor|M*do-l>oatH at ui^iht and reoonnaia- 

by day. I^rge numliem of refuge4*8 left for the north. 

The blockading squadron off Callao on the 24tli of Novenilier eoiiRiMted 

f the Cochraae, llnasear, and I^rin(*4*HH liouisi*. 

A mceciug of the forei/r» tft^nlor nnvnl offli^era off CalUio tiH)k\i\acft «^\\ 

hZHkafyormaben It waadeciilvil to take preliminary sle\>alowsLt^ 




p8 THE WAR ON THE PACIFIC COAST OK SOUTU AMERICA. 

tli« I'efugi'e bulks to Aucnn, und to auk U) bu allowt?< 
reprefleuUtlivus to tUe )ieiiili|UArt«r)i of butli b4!lli(;vrvuW tu 
progress of th« war, 

Lieutfuant-Coiiimander D. VV. Miilltui, of ihe Adams, viis iM-lrcl< 
accoupaiiy tbeCbilian beadquartors, and wiMit lu Pisco hi fJur Khtaanio 
Majesty's ship Osiirey, witli representatives from the ntin-r seaior ofll- 
Lieiiteuaiit N. T. Houston, of tbe Lackawaiiiia, was di«tatk<>l ta 
nDpBiiy General L'ierola. 
Early on the morning of December <i tbree Oiiliiut loqiedo-launekes 
were flred upon l>.v a Peruvian armed tuj;. Thw Chilians inintedJately 
gave (;hase, and ojtened a hot tire from their machine guns. Tb<> lay 
headed for tbe shore, returniug the fire. Ah soon as tbe launches werv 
in range the shore batteries opened on them, «oine of tbe shot falhof 
very close to (be neutral vessels. The Ilnasearaud Princess Louiw 
j engaged the tuitteries to oover the launches. No dsioage wan doiteM 

^^^ eitber side by tbe firing, except to tbe tori>edo launch Presia, which «■* 
^^^Lw badly damaged about the stern that she sank in tifteen fathom* tf 
^^^B water, alongside of a vessel, off San Lorenxo, to wbicb she bad b«a 
^^Fgecured by ch»iu8. Two additional torpedo-boats joineil in lltcBfAlt 
P but uo attempt was made to use torpedoes. 

' On tbe 11th of December the monitor Atabiialpa, aiwompaniid bfk 

I * tng, moved about a mile out from tbe mole. She was engaged bii'te 

I Buascar, the Pilcomayo, Angamos, and Chaejubuco, at long range. Dar 

lug the firing tbe ISO-pounder breecb-loiuling Armstrong (now moiM) 
of tbe Angamos flew bodily to the rear, slipping nut of its trannioB- 
band, and went overboard, killing a lieutenant belonging to one ut At 
other ships (wbo bad come aboard to iitke a few shots with tW |mI 
weapon), and the captain of the gun ; wounding several of the men- 
A slight movement had been noticed between the gun and ImoaiaQ- 
band before this fire, but it was not considered to be of euougfa impor- 
tance to warrant condemnation. This engagement had no importait 
^^H twults. 

^^^B By permission of tbe Chilian admiral tbe bulks werv moved to Am9iw« 
^^^H and were soon filled with refugees, as was the (own. 
^^^1 Tbe Chilian army for operations around Lima waa eommaoded lij 
^^H. General Baquedano, accompanied by His Excellency Don Joa6 Pru- 
^^^■eisooVergara, minister of war. U was organized in three divisioMaMl 
^^H k brigade of reserves). Kach division consisted of two brigadea. Tkt 
^^m artillery and cavalry wore about equally divided between tb« diriaioM^ 
^^V none being^beld in reserve. 

^^^ The first division, numbering 8,241 men of all arms, wu c- 
r by Captain Patricio Ljuch, Chilian navy. 

! Tbe second division, numbering 6,44>5 men of all anna, 

\ maiided by General Sotomayor. 

Tbe third division, Dumbering S,8T3 men of all arms, 
bjr Ooiouet D. Pedro Lagos. 



THE WAB ON THE PACIFIC COAST OP SOUTH AMERICA. 69 

The infantry nambered 21,008. The artillery, 1,370, with twelve 12- 
poonder 7.5-centiineter breech-loading rifled Kmpp campaign guDS ; six 
9-poander 2.5-inch breech-loading rifled Armstrongs ; twenty-three 6- 
poonder 7.5-centimeter breech-loading rifled Krupp mountain gans; 
twelve 6-ponnder G-centimeter breech loading rifled Krupp mountain 
goDS ; four 6-x>ounder 4-centimeter breech-loading rifled Kmpp mount- 
ain guns, and six Oatling machine guns, and about 1,200 horses. The 
cavalry, 1,252 men and horses. 

The reserve brigade, numbering 3,110, consisting of the Second Reg- 
nlara, Valparaiso (gendarmerie), Zapadores (engineers), and Quilotta 
battalioo, giving a grand total of 23,621 men and 63 guns. 

A mining or torpedo party accompanied the army, whose duty it 
was to search for and remove mines, or, if forced to act on the defen- 
sive, to place them. 

On the 18th of November, as we have before stated, the first divis- 
ion of the Chilian army, then under command of General Yillegran, 
landed at Pisco, the first brigade, under Captain Lynch, remaining in 
ttie small town at the port, the general taking up his quarters with the 
8eeond brigade in Pisco proper, situated about 3 miles inland. The 
Fourth Regulars and a battery of artillery, under Colonel Amunatigui, 
eommanding the second brigade, moved to lea, situated about 45 miles 
inland, and connected with Pisco by rail. On the Ist of December the 
first brigade of the second divivsion, under Colonel Gana, arrived at 
Pisco. On the afternoon of the 13th of December the first division, 
having been assembled at Pisco, started to march north by a road running 
along the sea-shore. They reached Tarabo-de-Mora at 9 a. m. the next 
morning, a distance of only 18 miles, having made but five short halts. 
After a halt until the ISth, Lynch's brigade attain started up the coast. 
General Villegran with the second brigade was ordered to return to 
Pisco. General Baquedano being probably displeased with the slow 
Advance up the coast. Villegran was relieved of his command, which 
was given to Captain Lynch. On the 20tli of December the second 
and third divisions, and on the 24tli the second brigade of the first 
division, left Pisco and landed at Chiica and Curayaco, afterward 
occupying the towns of Lurin and Pachacamac. The lauding was very 
expeditiously carried out, the regular shii)s' boats being assisted by 
the large flats which most of the ships carried, these being capable of 
carrying one hundred men at a time, with all their belongings. The 
xmid from Chiica to Lurin, about 15 miles distant, wa« very sandy, and 
all transportation had to be done by packing. The army went into 
eamp about Lurin, where the headquarters were established, except 

I the second brigade of the second division, which was posted at 
Pachacamac, distant about 3 miles from Lurin, and covering its ap- 
proach from the mountains. Gana's brigade of the first division was 
thrown across the river Lurin to protect the approaches from Chorillos, 
and to cover a bridge which had been left standing, and by which the 



70 THE WAE ON THE PACIFIC C0A6T OP SOUTH J 

army would hnve to crosa. Gomfortabln shelter-hats wai 
by the troops out of palm leaves and sugar-cane. These 
only for protection at^inst the eon aod dew, as it nevei 
part of the world. The time was devoted to drilling : 
practice for both infantry and artillery. Ou the 27th oi 
portion of Barboza's brigade encountered ColoHel SevilU 
mentof Peruvian cavalry, which had been giving Ca| 
brigade much tronble on his march north. Sevilla, tbi 
camac unoccupied, intended to go to Lima by the paa 
name. The action was quite severe. Sevilla was ki 
hundred of bis men either killed or captured ; the remain 
in cutting their way through, and reached Lima in aafetj 

On the 6th of January, General Baqnedano, with five 
airy, five hundred mountwl infantry, and a platoon of at 
noitered the Pernvian liueslteforeOhorilloa, about 7 mile 
Lurin. Some artillery firing took place. The whole Pen 
thoroughly Mt and located. 

On Sunday, January &, Colonel Barlmia, with several 
from tiiB brigade, reconuoitcred the town of Ate, approad 
4 miles of Lima. A eliglit skirmish took place. 

At 5.30 p. ra., January 1^, tlie whole army waa put in i 
U|i its [Kisition during the uigtit before the Peniviun ) 
the Ootgaimbo am) Mezpilla regimeuts, which were to ac 
for the left wing, m(*ved by what is known aa the Atooi 
almost impassable trail through the pusses of the mountaii 
impracticable by the Peruvian commanders. This puss, 
right angles to the Peruvian left. At 2.3U ou the mornii 
13 the Chilian army was massed in the end of the jiass 
3 Peruvians, who were utterly ieuonint of their 




THI WIB OV THB PAOmO OOAflT OF SOUTH AMBBICA. 71 

«m pooffty itted to oompato with fhe Teterany well-iurmed artillery of 
IhiCUliaM^ 

Ike reeeffee, eome 7|000 in nomber, eould hardly be called soldiers, 
litoa aeeooBt of fheirsaperior intollifpenoe and the fhot that they were 
Ifhliaff fur their homes they should have been more trostworthy than 
Ihi vohutesn. They were the men of Uma, called oat by a decree. 
IWy wem sapposed to have been drilled every day, and were ordered 
lidsep in tMr barracks at night. 

The v^golar armyi numbering 20,500 men of all arms, was divided 
iMi imr lUvfarioos of aboat 0,000 men each, commanded by Oolonds 
Ifhrias, Soarcs, DavilSi and Oaoerin ; the reserves, by Colonel Ech- 
iri^L The whole number of the army of Lima was about 33,600 men. 

Up to this time but little had been done for the protection of the rich 
ri^r of Lima. Bedoubts, mounted with a few heavy guns, bad been 
cneted on the summit of Mount St Ohristobal to the north and Mount 
Bartolomt to the south. One or two batteries had been thrown up 

the soiall liills south of the city. Two redoubts had been commenced 
the town of Miraflores. 

December 23, the first and second divisions, under Colonels Iglesias 
md Snares, SMived to Chorillos, and the next day the third, fourth, 
lid rrserres, under Colonels Davila, Qaoeris, and Ediiniqni, the first 
^ soioff to the Chorillos line, the latter to Miraflores, about 3 miles 
smrrr Lima, Chorillos being about 8 miles firom that city; 

The plan of the Peruvian commanders was to act on the defensive, 
M they had done throughout the war. For dc*feiiRive purposes the line 
•eifrtrii wan magnificent. ChorilloH, whioli is quite ii large town, con- 
taining many fine Hummer reHideiieeH, ir nituated at the Bouthern end of 
tke Iny of the name name, on the edge of the plain of Lima, which de- 
icmilii prN^ipitonaly to the Hea. Immediately to the Bouthward of the 
tovn lit a range of hilU ealle<l the Salto del Fraile. The weHtern Hide 
•f thiH range jntM out into the nea an«l forniH Point Solar, the simtherii 
boaiMlar>' of Chorilloa Bay ; the eastern Hide 8lo|>eM down iiit(» a valley 
tkat e«>iine(;ta the plain of Lima with a Randy desert ; the Kouthern Ride 
eoQuertM the Halto with this desert. The valley n*tern*<l to is alNHit 
titfvr mileR wide. In it ia the town of Villa. The eastern side of this 
miry iH funned by the end of a range of high hills that extend in a 
•ortb-northeaat direction for about 4 miles, where a break oeeurs, form- 
iiff a iieoond valley, which lesuls towards San Juan ; then the hills n*- 
UNDmence, and extend atout •'{ miles in a northeast direction to Mon- 
Moo Cbieo, where they meet and are Hanked by the eoast range, in a 
qmr of which we left the Chilian army massed for the attaek. The 
ilope of this creHcent of hills towanls the Chilians was steep and vfiy 
■ady; the reveme sloiw was gnulual and firm. Tlie Penivian n>gii- 
lini were formed in one line on the crest of these hills, extending fn»m 
Vaia to Monlerico Chieo, a iVistauce of 8 miles. Strong trene\ve>^. \\\T^^« 
devyv ^f'fr ^^^ ^^^f '"'' ^itb a sand-bag i»anipet two 1^*1 \\\v)3^^ 



72 THE WAS ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AUEBICA. 

were dug along the whole crest. The valley of San Jaan, aboot a 
quarter of a mile wide, was protected by field batteries and Gatlings 
placed behind earthworks on smalt hills, letired a little from the gen- 
eral Hue. The lell flank was sapposed to be thoroughly protected by 
the coaflt range, and the right flank, where the main attack was ex- 
pected and where the best troops were poete<], was eoverwl by heavy 
batteries ou the Salto del Fraile. Distributed along the whole line of 
intrench m en ts, in commanding positions, were between 60 and 70 gans 
and mitrailleuses. The fonr divisions of Peruvian regulars were posted 
in regular order from right to left, part of the first division manning 
the heights of the Salto del Fraile. The advanced slope along the 
whole line was thickly planted with torpedoes. About ii miles in rear 
of this first line, and almost parallel to it, was a second line, mauned by 
Colonel Ek;hiniqui's 7,000 reserves. This line, which extended across 
the plain of Lima ftom the sea to the mountains, consisted of five re- 
doubts connected by earthworks and adobe fences prepared for defense. 
Alt the fences in front of the line to a distance of about 500 yards were 
leveled, but beyond that they were left standing, to prove iu the end 
perfect breastworks for the Chilians. In the redoubts of this line a 
number of heavy guns were mounted, and, as an additional protection 
to the right flank, which was cut by the railroad from ChoriUos to 
Lima, a platform-car bad been converted into a movable battery, 
mounted with light guus and propelled by a locomotive. The town of 
Mirafiores was situated in rear of the right of this line. 

As has been the remarkable custom in this war, the Peruvians had 
almost no outposts. It is true a company or so was thrown a few hun- 
dred yards to the front, and from it a small picket was posted a little 
more to the front. 

General Fierola established his headquarters in ChoriUos, and is said 




THE WAB ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA. 73 

the Hoaacar; a tag was fitted with a Lay torpedo for the purpose. 
Instead of attacking the Haascar, the officer in charge took the tug into 
Anoon Bay, where he destroyed the torpedo and beached his vessel. 
Here she was discovered and entirely demolishfd, the next morning, by 
the PilcomayOy Tolten, and a torpedo-boat. The Chilian shells set fire 
to a portion of the town of Ancon. Some Peruvian Beserves, and the 
gans of the railroad battery previously referred to, which had been run 
down the Ancon road, replied to the fire, but without effect. 

On the 9th, Golonel Barboza's reconnaissance to At6 was reported to 
Pierola as a movement of 4,000 men to turn this flank by the Manchay 
Pasa. This caused an increase of the troops on the left of the line, and 
the {posting of a battery of light artillery on a hill a little in advance of 
the left flank, where it commanded the entrance to the pass. 

On the 10th the day of battle was considered to be near by the 
Peruvian commanders, as small pickets of Chilians were reported in 
sight on the plain and surrounding hills. Skill no additional precau- 
tions were taken to guard against surprise. 

We left the Chilian army massed in the pass of Manchay at 2.30 a. 
m., January 13. At about this time General Baquedauo and his staff 
arrived, and took up their position on a commanding eminence. The 
first division was to attack the Peruvian right, the second the center at 
Sao Juan, and the third the left, from San Juan to Monterico Chico* 
The reserve brigiuie, under Lieutenant Colonel Aristides Martinez, was 
to cover with the artillery the attack of the second and third divis- 
ions. At dawn, about 5 a. m., Lyuch's division gained a position 400 
yanls in front of the Peruvian right before it was discovered, and at 
first a straggling fire opened on it, which changed to a heavy fire, from 
both sides, along the whole line, as the second and third Chilian divis- 
ions came into ])osition. The fighting became general. A few tor- 
pedoes exfiloded, wounding man}' of the men and exasperating the 
survivors to fury. The second division, covered by the reserves, 
carried tbe town of San Juan at about o'clock, many of the Peruvians, 
notably the Lima police, throwing down their arms and tiyiug at the 
first charge. The artillery was very little used on either side, except 
that on the Salto del Fraile, which played on the Chilian left with great 
eft'ect. The center having been cat, the Peruvian left was driven from 
its position and towards Miraflores. Shortly afterwards the right, being 
flanked by the Chilian center, and attacked in front by the whole first 
division, was driven back to the Salto del Fraile and Chorillas. The 
Chilian cavalry, charging through the San Juan Valley, accelerated the 
flight of the Peruvian center and left. A large number of men belong- 
ing to the corps forming this portion of the line arrived in Lima that 
afternoon without arms. 

TJie first Peruvian division, under Colonel Iglesias, the secretary of 
war, now occupied the houses and garden-walls of Chorillos. There 
thej" were attacked by the first Ohihun division, which wa)i T^\)\\\a^ 



74 THE WAB OK THE PACIFIC COAST OP 80UTH AUEBICA. 

with great loss. The Chilians were now strougly re-enforced by troops 
from the other divisious and by moet of the artillery. Sot a man came 
to the rescue of the Peruvians, who, at the next assault, were driven 
back with great loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, among the latter 
their brave commander, to tbe batteries on the hill. These were soon 
asaanlted on all sides, and at 2 p. m, the Chilians were iu possession of 
the field of battle, with the whole Peruvian first division and many 
more as prisoners. 

The Peruvian loss in this day's fighting amonnted to 1,600 liiMed; 
wounded, 2,6U0 ; prisoners, 4,<>00 ; 5 standards and 70 pieces of artillery. 
The total Chilian loss amounted to about 3,000 men. 

The Chilians now rested on their laurels. Tbe whole Chilian army 
vas massed in and abont Chorillos, instead of immediately taking ap 
a position in opposition to the still complete second line of the Peru- 
vians. Oonaiderable demoralization, probably attributable to tbe large 
amount Of liquor in the shops, ensued. Had General Pierola taken ad- 
vantage of this coDdition of affaira with the large army still under his 
command, most of which wait entirely fresh, and perhaps eager to revenge 
its disgrace and defend its homes, Lima might have been rescued. 

During the forenoon of January 14, General Baquedano sent Don 
Isidore Errazuris, secretary to the Chilian minister of war, and Colonel 
Iglesias, the captured Peruvian minister of war, through the Peruviaa 
lines by flag of trace to General Pierola, with a proposition that, if the 
Peruvian army were disbanded, he would treat for peace on the basis of 
the Arica conference, with certain otlditions warranted by the present 
position of his forces. It was farther stated that if this proposition was 
not acceded to, hostilities would recommence, and Lima, if captured, 
would be sacked and burned. Tbe envoys returned, and later in the 
flftcrniOTp anpthcr CliiUnn offircr w»b ^iit. to rcFCivg the tvoBTreT, which 




THE WAR ON THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA. 75 

At aboat 2.30 p. m., whilst General Pierola was at lunch with the for- 

f jfTD naval officers, and the diplomats were waiting for the conference, 

Cjeneral Baqaedano rode up to the front of the Chilian line and onlered 

the whole of his third division to deploy into line parallel to the Pern- 

Tun rif^ht and extend to the sea-shore. The Chilian ships, which had 

takrn no part in the first day's fight, were anchored a little to the north- 

wifcnl of Miratiores, their guns enfilading the Peruvian position. Whilst 

•iiperintending the dejiloyinent, General Baquedano approache<l quite 

dote to that part of the line where the Peruvian men-of-war's men 

irere |ioMte<l. A few shots were fired — it is asserted — by them, they 

Bot iindenttanding the condition of affairs; this was followed by a gun 

fx\m line uf the riMlonbts, and soon a general fire was opened along the 

vhiile line. This was an entin* surprise to the commanders on both 

iide^. The Chilians, who were engaged in preparing their diniu'rs — 

oianr lN*ing diM|)erseil in search of water and woo<l — were taken entirely 

^ty sun^risf. and a panic ensue<l, whii^h was only clier.ked by the timely 

ArniMl of the reserve brigade. The ('hiliaii Heet now opened tirt% but 

ilirf^*r«*«l most of its attention to the town of Miratiores. The Peru- 

^i.iu reserves fou;;ht well, and succeeded in i-epelling an assault on the 

n;;ht redoubt at alNMit .'(..'Ml p. :u. The first division now re-enfoived the 

tiiinl, whilst the second brigade of the second division maneuvered to 

tnrn the Peruvian right flank. Thus re-enforceil, an assault was made 

'*n rhi* right nnbHibt, wliieh was carried, and the Peruvian right doul»led 

^.&rk on the <-4Miter. In the mean while a (Chilian ligiit batttTV gained 

»*: ••fii]ni-rii*i* t(» the Irft of tlie IN'riiviiin left, iiiid opened a dialling <*n- 

*■ ! I'iiii:: tir»* <in tlii'lim'. Tlie Chilian \'u>\ division, <M,v*'nMl l»y a *il pong 

•• .ri •■ oi .iinlli'rv iiml ravalrv. coiiiiinied to iiii>li towards tin* JNMiiviaii 

-• ;*. •Mir \ iriL^ oiM* Allvr anotht-r the remainiii;; t'oiir redoiilith. two ot* 

"^^ i, «1j wri»« biiiwn lip liv iiiiii«'s, witiioiit, iiow«'V«*i', d«»iiig ;:reat <lama;:r. 

>^'-r> I lit t1m> rriiMJan battalions rou;:lit \\('1K but many, ^^ith tiini otU- 

• -r"*. i.-rr»MTi-«l, thri»wln;x away their aims witlioiit tiiin;j a nIioI. Tin* 

* ... .m < '.ir.ilijiMTnN ravaliy n-uMuienl rh.ir;:«'il M'|MMt<<lly. wwU Si-hor 
"^^ • :;j.ir.i. iIh* niiniNtrr ot' \\ai\ at its hrail. Ii\ ."» ]*. in. the wimh* Priu- 
^ in .iini\ \^.i'^ tiffin;: towanls Lima, badlx bfatfii anil (Mitiiflv «h-mnr- 

-* /fil. |-'ii»ni thi> nioin4Mil tin* I'f ruvian arm\ iliNappfaifd, Minn- ir^Hn;; 

"^ •• *'ti*- rn>iiiiitains ti» lh<*ii' homo, othris to An<*on : tliD^f \x In* irinaiiHMl 

- ii I.iMi.i •-\i-h:ih.'<Ml ilii-ir iinit'oiiii> tor If^s rnn^iiifiions rlnrhini: ami 

Ti. > J «■.! »Mh till* pfoph*. Thi* Inss lit' the <'hi]ians amnnntfil m all to 

** '•• '!i>i:i-«.inil mi'ii:that ottln* IN-rnvi.in^ must havi- bf-rn still i^n-aifr, 

••.' w ,\\ ]ir<i!i.ilil V m-Vfi' bf arcniatflN aNici laiiifil. All tin- aim'*, am- 

-: :'i;;i«i!t. ;:ini>. <N:r., brlon;:Jn;; tu tlif Tf I n\ ian aini\ t'f II inti» tin- li.nnls 

• ' !iif t Ii;!:.!!!?*. Th«* tow II ot Miiatloif-H wa** *-iitiif Iv Imi mil. i M'n'ial 

''':-»;.*. with a ft»w t'riiMids, iftiifil to thf town m| i 'Ihmms. sifuatftl abtnit 

*-' iii:li'« friifii l.iina. 

liM- rhiliiin^ did not mov«* tni thf I'irv ot" L\ii\'.\ .iWev V\\e \\a\VV, 



76 THE WAB OH THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AUE 

probably on account of the fear of the comniander-in-chif 
scenes of Choriltos would be repeated in Lima. 

The inhabitants of Lima were in a terrible state of i 
feariuf; the Chilians, fearing the violence of their own mob, 
been larg:el; recruited by the stragglers {h>n) the army, an 
sared by the fact that Oeaeral Lacotera, minister of war an 
lia<l, at this dark hour, attempted by a revolution to seize tl 
power. Lacotera was not successful, and was placetl a p 
board of the Union, fh)m which vessel he escaped. 

The legations were full of women and children, fifteen ha 
ing collected in the honse of our minister. Ancon wassof^ll 
that, after filling the hulks and foreign men-of-war, it was ft 
sary to break open the bouses of the town. Bedding, ol( 
provisions were issued from the ships, and a strong guard 
men-of war's men was maintained in the town. By the latt«: 
refugees were disarmed; these were well generally i)roride< 
munition, but in many cases it was found that men carrying 
caliber .50 rifles were supplied with Peabody-Martini .45 ci 
ridges, and vice versa, and it was learnetl that this conditio 
had existed on the battle-field. 

Tlient was no serious disturbance in Limn Sunday itiomin 
16, but in the afternoon small knots of armed men, cooiposetl 
of deserters and negroes, were seen in tlie streets. Occa 
cliarges of fire-arms were heard, whicli increasetl during the e 
regular fusilude. At dp. m. an attack waHmadcon theOhinc 
which was soon looted and in flames. The mob then began 
bnm the liqnor stores and small shops, many of which belor 
eiguers, principally to Italians. During the night flnNt were 
iver the city. Several attemptaon the pint ol'thvlumgn I 




THE WAS OBT THE PACIFIC COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA. 77 

daj oMMniiog aod had arranged a capitulation of the cityi by the terms 
of which the Chilians were to take possession on Monday at noon with 
s saffldent Ibrae only to insure tranquillity and safety to the inhabit- 
aata. 

At 4J0 p. m. on Monday, the 17th day of January, the Urban Guard 
neeived the oolanin of occupation, and the city was formally surren- 
dend to General Saavedra, inspector-general of the Chilian army, who 
had been detailed as military governor of Lima. The forces detailed 
to gnaid the city were the First Begulars, Bulnes battalion (Santiago 
poUeemen), the Caiadores and Carabineros de Yungai cavalry regi- 
Bcnu, and three batteries of light artillery. These relieved the foreign 
poliee. 

On Tuesday Captain Lynch, with his division, occupied Callao, of 
which place be had been appointed military governor. 

The leaainder of the Chilian army was encamped in the fields and 
qoarteied in the haciendas about Lima, with the exception of two bat- 
talions which were sent up the Oroya road. 

On Thorsday, at 3.30 p. m., the Chilian flag was hoisted, with some 
tmnmoDj^ on the palace, which was now the headquarters of the army 
of oocnpation. 

Shortly after the surrender of Lima, General Baquedano, with alt 

but aboot 10,000 of his troops, returned to Chili. Admiral Eiveros^ 

with most of the ships, also withdrew, leaving Captain La Torre in com* 

maud on the Peruvian coast 

Since the fall of Lima there has been no battle of importance; many 

ftkirmiiibefi have taken place between portions of the army of ocicupatiou 

sihI Hmall bodies of Peruvians. There has alHo been a large amount of 

(ii]iloiDatic maneuvering, which, althonp^h belonging to history, conveys 

&o l««8on of %'alue to the naval or military student. 

TO EG. B. M. MASON, 

Lieutenant U. ^. Napy. 



mm 



ONTHK 



/ 



/ 



I • 




NFORMATION FROM ABROAD. 



REPORT 



OF THK 



BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 



IN 




18 8 2. 



BT 



r 

[ LIEUTENAHT-OOMMANDER CASPAR F. OOODRIOH, 



r N IT E n ST A 1 KS N A V V 



OFFICK OF NAVAL INTELMCENCK. 

NAVY DEPAltTMENT. 
1 H H :i . 



WASHINdTON: 

GOVERNMENT VKINTING OFFICE. 



CONTENTS. 



PART I. 

L— PnumxAKT 

n> MiotlatloDii liniMdIaUir ptM«dlDg boatilitiui. 

n.— Oemuul Rit%iKw on xnn DMrxients or Alkxa\i>8ia 

ni.— Tmb ATTAcsno Flret 

Alexukdn — Itillaxiblo — Suit*!)— Snpetb — Temenirn — iDTincl- 
bU— Mouarob— Praelniic— Onn-Tcawla. 

IT.— Tb* BowuMiMincT 

(Mm nt bklU»— Tb« mUuu— Bepurt uf the MbIot offlMt of Uw 
•AliM* DiBMlruu — Otbor detaiU, &.e. * 

v.— Turn ErrvcT i-k)k thi Siur§ 

At« Mil lira — Indexible— In vincibI«>-~Peaelopo — gulteii — Superb. 

TL— Tlu FiimrK'tnuM *.<«i> tuk PiiMA<tK» i>r«TAi\Ri> ur run.... 

SOidleb-nuni*— Ail»— ThsEM-el-TiuLiaM— ThKlliwpiUlIlftt- 

l«y— The Central Batt*ry— The Tower Ballsry— Th« Ll([ht- 

OauM Fori— Ssle A|rB->UuiiamiHl buttery— Ouy-P I- Kabelie— 

M«I U»M— Mm Fort — MBrtn-rl-KhiinBt — Murttbout— Atl. 

janl. 

VII.— <]k«kkal CoxcLCSioxs 

PART II. 

TIIL— OrxKATioxs BT THE Butu'h Navt at Alkxandria sl'bsbquknt 

TO THB BOMBARDMKNT 

naocoapatipD — The lauJiDg party from the Uaited 8t«tca fl«et — 
Arrival of tnmpa — ThedntraEliuii of Egyptlui kmmiinltioii— 
The n»T*l ballcry ■( RMuleh. 
IX.— OniKB OPBKATlU.Hg PUCKDIKO TIIR CnAMOB Of BasK 

Tte UmI d«feiiwi of Ateiandria— The occiipatioD of Ramleh— 
Defenwaof Ramleh- The ontpoat at Aatoniadca Oarden— 
Tb« TwcannaiManceinforceof ADgnat5 — Operation* at other 

X. — Th CoiiPOMTiox or the Expkditionart Forck 

XI.— Tmr Skucrr op Tne Bvwz Canal and tur CiiA.faR of Ba«r... 
Oaoacal rvporfr— Work at Port Bald— In the eanal-At lumailia— 
Soatb of Lahe Tinuah— At Chalonf- Action of M. de Lea- 
Mpi — Britlab proclatnationi. 

XIL— Tn CaMPAiOK 

Bilaua of Neaeb<^-E1 HaRfar— TeUlMahata and HahMuaeb- 
ffiT-l— '- •-•■-- of AnKDit IS, at KaMaMlv— Conditioo of 
tbc adTanecd troop*— Aelioo of Septembers, aiKaaMM\n— 
DbfoMiMi ofEgjptUn troop* at thU Ubm. 



XIII.— Thr Battlk or Tkl-ki^Kkbir and tbk CoNCtnaioif or thb ^ 
The battle— Seiiure of Zagazig— Of Cairo— Tbe wUbdn 
the British troopi, 

PART III. 

XIV.— Thk WoBKiNO or TRE Naval Transport Skrvice 

XV.— The Armkd Trains 

One employed at Alexandria — One employed on the luQAil 
Tel-el-Kebir line. 

XVI.— Thk Boat Transport on the Bweet Water Canal 

XVII.— The Naval Brigade AT Tel-bi^Kebir 

XVIII, — The Marine Battalions 

The Royal Harine Light Infantry— The Koyal Harine Ar 

XIX.— Tub Lines or CoifUUNiCATtoN 

XX.— The Commissariat AND Transport Corps 

XXI.— The Troops 

The cavalry- The moant«d inbotry— The infantiy. 

XXII.— The RoTAi. Artillery 

16-pdr. — 13-pdr. — Artillery work daring the campaisD — E 
far— Tel-el-Hahnta and Habsameh- Kaasassin. (For 
Kebir see p. 146 antt.) 

XXIII.— The Ratal Engineers 

The eth Company— 17tb Company— mth Company— SU 
pany — 34tb CompaDy^SGtb Company — Eatabliahmei 
field company — The pont«oD troop — Field park. 

XXIV.— The Railway CoMPAKT 

XXV.— Thi Tblboraph Troop 

XXVI.— The Corps or Bionalers 

XXVII.— The Military Police 

XXVIII.— The Medical Department 

XXIX.— The Abmt PosT-OrriCE 

XXX. — The Indian CoKTUtaEifT 

Pecnliarity of organiiation in Indian iegluenl« — Eqnipmc 




U. 8. Flaohhif LunusiBB, 2d IUxb, 

0raMMM(, AvbM^ if^ 30, 188S. 
to On BeputmeBtfi order of ^ngnct 29, 188^ I 
kBT» tlif iHinor ro forwun) r report npOD the Britiab nftTaluidiiiQitW7 
lUoos in Bgriit dnritiff tilB past year. 
Tbe Kpcirt ia l>aMe«l ajwu penonal obeerratioo on the spot, npon the 
inu of offlrani prrwot fit the Mvend engaf;eineBt>, npon offldal 
sod other trustworthy dooBinents. • • • 
lly eta hM bMo to nwko the derehipmeBt and progien of the cam- 
aa clear ae poeribte. I I^aTe toadied apon organiiatton and 
It oeljr ts BO ftr aa tbej are of e^edal Interert, aa they lerfe 
thmw light Dpon the methoda employed, or aa th«y fliniah matlcr 
d««Tvjng analyulK and nfrioaa attenctMi. • • • 

It wcMild give mi* plvajiare if the State DepartmMitoooldbeiiifbnnad 
of Um T»laatil« usfutaDrf* nodeied Bie by 0. Breed Bynaad, esq^ our 
rtec-otiunl at Malta. 

rhitiog my slay in Knjitt I eipariMieed nothing bat klndneaa whenrcr 
ilV tey aaUed nie. Wt>re I to mentloa the naaiea ot thoae to wbon I 
^~ for profteuioiiol and other coortedes, I ahonld dmply have 

t> hHkaa a list of the liriiish officers of both aerrtcea with whom I waa 
it in oodUoL 1 fibould, however, be gratified if some acknowledg- 
other than tujr own peraonal thanks conld bo made to General 
Wolaeley of Cairo, G. 0. 6., G. 0. M. G., &c., for his hospiUble 
of me at his btuulqaarters, and for his kindness in affording 
■* aO poaaible facilities for travel and for obtaining necessary data ; to 
^'■tial Lord Ainvtrr, 0. 0. B., &c., for his many acts of politeness, 
*Uth vcre ooly limited, in the direction of technical information, by 
*fc* floaidso tial nature of loanj ef the offlcial reports ; and to Major O. 
B- S. Martin. B. A., and Captain George S. Clarke, B. E., for peoollarly 
"hable awlstanca at the coat of much troable, and (in the last case) of 
Sl*M posoDal diaoomforL 

I MB, with great renpect, yonr obedient servant, 

C. F. GOODRICH, 
Ijievtenant-Commander, United BtaUi Navf. 
'^Oon. WlLLLlM I-:. (HAItDLEB, 

BtertUuj o/tMe Navg, Watkington, D. C. 

^'•wtrted. 

C. H. BALDWIN, 

Bear- Admiral, 
ffcw s—*i y erm/Ui/ StaU$ Xaval Forv on Jttropeaa Stattaiu 



A.BBBB'VI^TION'S. 



R.N.... 


..Boy«lN«Ty. 


■C" 


.Centimetre. 


R. A.... 


..Roy»l Artillery. 


A. D. C... 


.Aide-de-Mii 


R. E..- 


..RoyBlEngiDcen. 


V. C 


.Victoria Cr« 


R. H. A . 


..BajKl Hone Arlillory. 


C. B 


.Commander 


R. M. A . 


..Royal Mariue ArtlUitry. 


K-C.B... 


.Knight Coi 


B. M. L. 


.. Royal Marine Light lufBDtry. 




Batb. 


N. A.... 


..N Battery, A Brigade (Royal 


0. C.B... 


.Grand Com 




Hpwe Artillery). 




Bath. 


N. 2 


..N Battery, Second Brigade 


C. H. ., 










and Sail 


1. 3 


..Flrat Battery, Third Brigade 


K. C. M. 


-RnlghtCom 
chaelao 




(Field Battery). 




M. L. B . 




C.8. I.... 


.Commander 


B. L.R. 


..Breeoh-loading rifle. 


B. W. 0.. 


.Britiili wtM 


S. B 


..Smootli-bore. 


a. Ij. o... 


.Biflp. laige | 


Pdr 


..Pounder. 


H. M. 8.. 


.UorM»Jo8ty 




PA.ET I. 



THE BOMBARDMENT OF THE FORTITICATIONS 



ALEXANDRIA. 



• 1 




BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERA- 
TIONS IN EGYPT. 



I. 

PBELIMINABT. 

t 

The political events which brought aboat the bombardmcDt of the 
fortifications at Alexandria, and the dispatch of a British army corps 
to Egypt, do not come within the province of this report. It will not, 
however, be out of place to refer briefly to a few of the principal feat- 
ures io the state of affairs immediately preceding hostilities. 

It will be remembered that by a series of bold, insubordinate, and 
sacoessfal maneuvers, a group of men, for the most part officers in the 
Egyptian army, bad gradually but surely wrested the power from the 
bands of the Khedive, their legitimate ruler, and had wielded it in 
«och a manner as to paralyze trade, destroy confidence, and cause the 
foreign population to desert the country by thousands. The religious 
ftnaticism of the Mohammedans, the vast majority of all the sects in 
Egypt, had been excited to a dangerous pitch. The i)reseuce of the 
French and British fleets, sent to Alexandria early in the year, in the 
hope that the mere display of their enormous preponderance of force 
would exert a calming influence, had only served to still further arouse 
the now practically universal hatred of the European. The country 
liad already almost come to a standstill in all the arts of peace, when 
the massacre of June 11 completed the destruction of the hopes, yet 
entertained by a confiding few, that the excitement would pass away 
»nd matters return, of their own accord, to their original condition. 
The forbearance of the foreign residents was sorely tried ; yet, officially 
and privately, everything possible was done to avoid a conflict with the 
Datives. Ships-ofwar of all nations collected at Alexandria to receive 
and shelter or else forward the refugees that were swarming out of the 
land at the sacrifice of all their possessions, protection from insult and 
injur)' on shore being simply out of the question. 

The military party, openly conceded to be the sole rulers in Egypt, 
'^ow prcH^eeded to take active steps, strengthening the fortifications of 
-A^^^xandria, mounting new guns, &c. The British admiral, Sir Beau- 
champ Seymour, in view of the strained relations then existing, and of 
the formidable character of the unmounted guns at the disposition of 
the Egyptians, felt that he conid not be justified in perm\lWi\g ^vveXj^ 



10 BBITI8H NATAL AND UILITAKY 0PEEATION8 IN EC 

opeo acts of hostile preparation, which woald have for a 
infliction of increased injury upon the fleet he comniaDded, ii 
of an engagement, now almost ine\'itable. 

The action which Admiral Seymonr proceeded to take is in 
the following telegram, which be sent on the 6th of July to 
ralty in London : • 

Shall demand tmm militarf governor, to-moirow, oesMtioD ofkll wor 
teriea. As Freueb appear iudispoBed to act, shall detain Penelope faei 
of demand ia known. 

On the following day be telegraphs again : 

Military commander assnrea me, in reply to iny note of to-day, no gu 
recently added to the forte or military preparatloiu made. Den-iab Pai 
this statement. No Bigne of oporations aince yeatecday afternoon, prol 
dlence to Snltan'i eommandB. Shall nut heaitato actins if work* b 

This telegram is based upon the following letters of that d 

1. /VoM Admiral Sir BtaMchamp Stj/Mour to the HHHarji CmnniaHdaNf of 

1 have the honor to inform your Excellenoy that it has been oHIciall 
me that yoaterday two or mora additional gnns were mounted on the eea 
that other warlike praparatione are being made on the northern face a 
against the wguadron ooder my commaud. Under the olrcumetances I h 
yoor Excellency that nnleea aoch prooeedtngs be discontinued, or if, ha^ 
eontinoed, they ahonld be renewed, it will become my duty to open flra 
in oonrae of oonstmotion. 

3. TMrtpljF- 
To ik» Admiral of Ou BrilM Flttt! 

Uy Friind Ekgubu Admiral : I hod the honor to receive your let! 
Jnly, ID which you atate that yon had been informed that two gona had ti 
Bni< that other works are going on on the sea-Hhore, and in reply 1 beg I 




BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 11 

^ate, and paasing the Eaxopean cemeteriea, reached the old qnarantlne station, where 
X left my eairiage and proceeded on foot to the fort marked on admiralty chart '* Tabia 
^Silaile," and when within 50 yards of the said fort I observed inside two working 
parties of Arabs, abont 200 strong, nnder the superintendence of soldiers, parbuckling 
-Cwn smooth-bore guns, apparently 32-pounders, towards their respective carriages and 
«Iidf^9, which were facing in the direction of the harbor, and which seemed to have been 
ljtf>ly placed ready for their reception. 

Dated at Alexandria this 9th day of July, 1682. 

H. T. SMITH-DORRIEN, 
Lieutenant R, N,, JET. if. 8. Invincible. 

On the 10th the admiral sent the following letter to Toulba Pasha, 
"the military governor of Alexandria : 

I have the honor to inform yonr Excellency that as hostile preparations, evidently 
^irtcted against the squadron under my command, were in progress during yesterday 
«t Forts Isali,* Pharos, and Stlsili, t I shall carry pur. the intention expressed to you 
In my letter of the 6th instant, at sunrise to-morrow, the llth instant, unless previous 
'to that hour yon shall have temporarily surrendered to me, for the purpose of dinarm- 
iDg, the batteries on the isthmus of Ras-el-Tin and the southern shore of the harbor of 
-Alexandria. 

The answer to the foregoing was signed by Ragheb Pasha, President 
«f the Conncil and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The translation from 
the original French is as follows : 

Alexandria, July 10, 1882. 

AoMntAL : As I had the honor to promise in the conversation which I had with you 
tbia morning, I have submitted to His Highness the Khedive, in a meeting of the 
^Disters and principal dignitaries of the state, the conditions contained in the letter 
JOQ vere good enough to address this morning to the commandant of the place, accord- 
log to the terms of which you will put into execution to-morrow, the llth iastant, at 
^ybreak, the intentions expressed in your letter of the 6th instant to the commandant 
^tbe place, if, before that time, the batteries on the isthmus of Ras-el-Tin and the 
MQthern shore of the port of Alexandria are not temporarily surrendered to you to 
^ disarmed. 

I regret to announce" to you that the Government of His Highness does not consider 
^U proposition as acceptable. It does not in the least desire to alter its good rela- 
tions with Great Britain, but it cannot perceive that it has taken any measures which 
^Q be regarded as a menace to the English fleet by works, by the mounting of new 
puis, or by other military preparations. 

Nevertheless, as a proof of our spirit of conciliation and of our desire, to a certain 
^teDt, to accede to your demand, we are disposed to dismount three guns in the bat- 
t«rie8 you have mentioned, either separated or together. 

If in spite of this offer you persist in opening tire, the Government reserves its freedom 
^action and leaves with you the responsibility of this act of a^j^gression. 

^^ive, Admiral, the assurances, &c., &c. 

Tbe rejoinder was as brief and to the point as the letter itself was long 
*^d rambling. The latter was handed to the admiral during the night 
^ July 10 and 11. The answer was returned at once. It ran thus : 

Iljave the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of yesterday's 
^^ and regret that I am unable to accept the proposal contained therein. 

* Saleh Aga. t Silsileh. 



» 



[12 BBITJSH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN BOTPTrl 

Ou Joly 10 the port was denerted by all the shipping tbat ■ 
get away except the Kgyptian GoverDment vessels, which weiw 
inside and brought close to the Raa-el-TiD palace, out of the nH 
Hliot, andthe inshore squadron of the British fle«t^ composed «fl 
following ships, viz, the Invincible (fl>ig), Monarch, and Penelope,! 
clads; the Beacon, Bilturn, Condor, Cygnet, and Decoy, gan-ved 
and the Helicon, tender and dispatch -boat. Ontside the bar w«ffl 
five armored ships, the Sultan (senior oSicer's), Alexandra, IiiHcn 
Superb, and Temeraire, anchored to the eastward of the Corvottu ■ 
and a targe fleet of merchant vessels and raen-of-war off the toofl 
the Central or Boghaz Pass and placed out of the line of flred 
Kgyptian batteries. M 

Pending the preliminary negotiations, and in anticipation of mI 
«urk in Egypt, the authorities in England had begun preparation 
warlike natnre. The channel fleet, which had rendezvoused at M 
was ordered to leave that port on July 9 for Cyprns, wilhinl 
reach of Alexandria, having on boani two regiiuent«i of infautjfl 
Some engineers belonging to the garrison of the former placv. J 
lured transports, the Neriasa and KboHina, were to follow immedfl 
with more troops. At home the selection was maile of the regU 
it van determined to hold in readiness for foreign service; tbedetH 
the commissariat and transport conipaoien were jierfected aud dnH 
animals secured, and the various officers of all brunches, likelyfl 
needed, were warned to expect definite orders nt any moment. ■ 

The Iris, steel dispatcli- vessel, with ordnance and other ctorvd 
the numt>er, ammunition ship, were sent to Alexandria from !■ 
while an additional light iron-clad, the Penelope, drawing bat Ifl 
6 inches of water, and manned by men of the coast guard or red 
sailed from the same |>ort on July 3 to reinforce Sir Beanbamp'n 
Two days later, the Tamar, troopship, with the Koyal Marine Lin 
fantry and Koyal Marine Artillery battalions, left Malta, for Q]fl 
Two small iron gnn-boafs for river service, the Don and the Dm)! 
sent out from England for contingent nse in the Suez Cannl, Itfl 
Plymouth ou July 9, in tow of the tug Sameon. In all the <loek-fl 
and arsenals unusual activity prevailed ; extra bodies of worknwH 
taken on and no exertion spared to expedite the fltliug ontoffl 
and the eqnipmont of men in both the army and the navy ; whOfl 
Bide, the Naval Transport Department was busy in preparing M 
■toamers available as hired transports, and in fletermlntng their <l 
Ity for troops, for stores, and for animals. I 

Before passing to the bonibardmeul, and the damase sitstftiafl 
the opposing force«, it is necessary to consider the nature nuU stiM 
of the [KwitioD defended and the resources of the attacking llevL j| 



BBinSH HAVAL AND MILITARY OPEBATIOKS IK EOTPT. IS 



II. 
GESERAL REVIEW OF THE DEFENSES OF ALEXANDRIA. 

A i^lance at Plate 1 will Bhow that the main harbor of Alexandria is 
i long, Dmrrow, uataral hasin of roughly rectangular shape, extend* 
iif io a general northeasterly and southwesterly direction, between the 
BtiolaiMl and an outlying limestone reef, bounded at one extremity 
^ tbe ahoolder of land terminating at Fort Adjemi, and at the other 
bj the stem of a T-shaped peninsula upon which the city is built The 
kfigtb of this harbor is between five and six nautical miles, and its aver- 
ife width one and a quarter. 

The western branch of the T-shaped peninsula is the longer of the 
tVQ. Upon its farther i>oint is the principal light-house of Alexandria. 
SlietchiDg beyond this, and separated from it by a small channel navi- 
pble by boats, is a handsome breakwater, completed in 1874, built 
ipoii the reef and inclosing a spacious and well-sheltered port. Beyond 
ttedty, to the eastward, is a small circular harbor, termed the New Portt 
iMd only by small craft. 

Throogh the leef referred to above are three passages. The eastern 
irConrelte Pass lies close to the breakwater, and affords an entrance 
iv Tet»els drawing under 18 feet of water. It makes a wide angle with 
the Keneral direction of the reef. 

Tbr Boghaz or Central Veu<» is the main ship-channel. It has a rather 
Mkvard turn at its Hhallowest part. With very smooth water it is 
urif^ble by vessels drawing as much as 22 feet. In general terms 
it* direction is normal to the reef. 

The western or MaralH)ut,ras8 Ih sohloin used, the leading-marks being 
^^ fur inland and rather cIohc* together. A KkiUfnl pilot can keep a 
•kip in not lt*i*s than 23 feet, jjrovided then» is no swell on the bar. 

Tb«* distance over which these api)roaclies are distributed (Adjemi 
fc^iDj: nuin* than 7 nautical miles from Silsileh) and the exiM)se<l sit- 
Wioo of the town have neeeHsitatcMl the extension of the st»a delenses 
^AWxandria along a line of inordinate length. The fortifications con- 
•at of nearly continuous series of open works, having closed works at 
^ principal nalientM. 

RHerring to IMate^l,and iH'ginning at the eastern extremity, it will 
•^•^u that the defenses are as follows: 

Ea*t of the city : 
1- Fort Silsileh. 

North of the city : 
•^ y^ffX Pharos. 
^ Ffirt Ada. 

i Tbe lUs-el-Tin Lines. 
^ The Ugbt'Houife Fort. 



14 BRITISH NAVAL AND HILITAUY OPERATIONS IN EOTPT. 

South of the city : 

6. Fort Baleh Ago. 

7. Uonamed open battery. 

8. Oom-el-Kabebe Fort. 

9. Fort Ktitnaria. 

Sontbwest of the city : 

10. The Mex Lines. 

11. Fort Mex. 

12. Mex Citadel or Fort NAmusia. 

West of the city : 

13. Fort Mars»el-Kbanat. 

14. Fort Marabout. 

15. Fort Adjemi. 

The nomeuclature adopted ie that of Admiral Seymour's official report 
of the bombard me at. It mast, however, be remembered that sevenl 
of these works bear other names as n'ell. 

The Bites of the forts were, in the main, selected with good judgment. 
Silsileh defends the eastern approach, Fliaros the eastern and northeni, 
aided in the latter by Ada, the Easel-Tin Lines, and the Light-House 
Fort. The command of this last fort includes the (^rvette aud Boglwi 
Passes and the inner harbor. 

Any vessel attempting the Corvette or the Boghaz Pass would alto 
be exposed to the fire of Salefa Aga, Oom-el-Eabebe, Eumaria, the Mei 
Lines, and Mex, while Marsa el-Khanat and Marabout were admirably 
placed to protect the Marabout Pass. 

Saleh Aga, Oom-el-Kabebe, and Kumuria were furthermore intended 
to aid in the defense of the narrow neck of land lying between the 
Mediterranean on the north, or, strictly speaking, Alexandria Harbor, 




BRITISH NAVAL AND MTLITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 15 

The gaDS in these works are moanted in the open, none having over- 
head protection except those in the casemates of Fort Pharos. In the 
majority of instances the parapet between the heavy rifles is provided 
with merlons, while the old-fashioned smooth-bores are mounted en 
hrhette. 

The rifled guns were generally in batteries apart from the more anti- 
qaated ordnance, although this rule was not observed in Forts Ada and 
Hex. 

Wliile guns of nearly every description in their possession were used 
dttODg the bombardment, the Egyptians placed most reliance upon 
the Armstrong rifles . 

The trace of the works was generally irregular, the irregularity 
sometimes, as in Fort Oom el-Kabebe, reaching the grotesque. The 
form of the fort, both as to trace and profile, seems to have been gov- 
erned by the configuration of the ground. The Light-House Fort was 
the ooly one with a complete bastioned front. 

Without exception, in every fort there were buildings, such as shell- 
stores, barracks, and even magazines, showing well above the crest of 
the parapet and affording admirable targets to the attack. 

Of the materials of which the fortifications are constructed it is impos- 
sible to speak in adequate terms. A limestone, quarried near Mex, so 
loft that it is simply cut out with sharp tools, bonded with conrse lime 
nortar overcharged with sand, formed the retaining walls, and these 
were backed with sand. The penetration of the British modern pro- 
jectiles into this masonry, could not be accurately determined. In the 
Marp of the Light-House Fort blind shell buried themselves more 
than ten feet, the debris behind them preventing the sounding rod from 
entering farther. A similar experience was had at Fort Ada. 

The parapets are usually formed of light sand, which, in this dry 
climate, will stand at a slope of about 30^. In the newer batteries the 
•nperior and exterior slopes are covered with a light plaster, which 
splits oflT freely when walked over. 

The embrasures have 60^ train, as a rule, and their soles a depression 
<^ffrom 3^ to 5^. Their cheeks are revetted with concrete, and the sill 
is formed generally of a single piece of granite. 

The interior slopes are vertical and of varying height. Tlie actual 

crest is ordinarily 18 inches 

»bove the top of the retaining 

^all, which is either built of 

^gular masonry or of rough 

^bble laid in mortar. 
The sides of the ramps, the 

^opes in rear of the terreplein, 

4c., have vertical walls. 

The tracks for the slide trucks of the rifled guns are of iron, laid on 
•^platforms ; for those of the smooth-bores, of wood (^uswaWy TOltft\i^^ 
^'iJUiged as ahown in Fig. 1, 

f 





16 BBITISH NATAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN E( 

The pivots are secared by wedges in the mnzzlea of o 

bore gnus sunk od end 

"^ ■ sonry, Figs. 2, 3. As a 

neatly-fashioned stone 

laid up to the ninzzle ol 

Great care has beei 

arrange the pieces of 

radially. As a resnlt 

absolately no support 

where sapporC is sad! 

In very few inslaDces 

pivots thns secured stoo 

of the action without co 

while in some the smoot 

has started from its b 

cases the pivot proved 

weakest poiot in the m 

the guns. The slide ol 

strong gun is fitted witl 

or holdfasts (Plate 35), 

which slip over the piv 

through the pivot hoh 

place. The recoil of the gnn naturally tends to lift these hi 

the pivot. Occasionally the key has broken or been sbeai 

holdfasts have left the pivot, the slide upended, and the gni 

abled (Plate 127). 

The magasines in these forts are, as a general rule, ftom 
below the surface. They lack sufficient overhead protectioi 
rule being withoat its exceptions in this interesting collect 





VATAL AHD MILITABT 0PBRATI0N8 IN SGnTFT. 17 



rans through the middle of a long room, with 
ithen fritatform on each side, 18 inohes high and 7 ibet bfoadi 
lilatSBmi asms as a bed. Along the wall is a shelf, and under* 
the shelf a row of pegs. The windows are unglazed, but pro- 
with shatters. There was evidently no lavish waste of ftinds cm 
eoaiodatioDs of a private soldier in Bgy pt. 
oidiiaiiee moanted in tibese works was of the following types : 



lO-lneh AnnttroDg M. L. R., of 18 tons. 
S-ineli Annstrong If. L. R., of 12 tout. 
S-iMh Anntteong If. L. R., of 9 ton*. 
7*iii6li AnutroDg IL L. R., of 7 tons. - 
4e-poiiiider Aniwtrong B. L. R. 



UOKTAm, 

XY^Mh. XX-inoh. 

X-laeh, hmmrj, Xni-inoh. w* senrioe. 

Z*iach, flMdloBi. XI Il-inoh, Uod aerrloo. 

X-i»ch.Uglit Xl-inoh. 

•HMh. X-lnoh. 



t AxmMnag guns bear dates ranging fh>m 1869 to 1874. The 
of eaeh eallber an not all of the same pattern. 
1 10-inch gnns were traversed by gearing, the smaller guns by 
it hooked to posts sank in the ground. Their carriages were all 
with plate oompresHOFH. Apparently' in the heat of action the 
rpMsofH were not alwa^'s carefully attended to. Keferring to Plate 
vill be observed that the rear slide trucks are placed ver}' far in 
lis the muzzle of the gun. The shock of the recoil, especially if 
itter is not controlled by the compresHor, and if the guu brings 
idently against the rear bufferH, would occanion a tremendous 
itijr Atrain ni)on the key tbrouf^h the pivot-lK>lt, and if this key 
to yield, nothing wouhl remain to pn^vent the gun, carriage and 
wn SMiaming the iNMition indicated in Plate 21. 
the AnnMtronK guuM, one, a inch, waii mounte<l on a Moncrieff 
ftffe, hehinil the Klie<li\VM palat;!^ in the lias-elTiu Lines. It would 
as tbiHigh no one in authority anions; the Egyptians knew how to 
this heavy and costly gun-carriage, f<»r it wan simply Mtuck up in 
ifo Kpaoe, towering high in air, and otVering an mlmirable target, 
ran wa» not Ared during^the action. 

p ojie of the X Vinch 8. H. ih not clearly eMtablishinl ; but the weight 
idenee ap|>ears9 to be agaiuHt their having l>een fired. They are 
red U» have been cant in France about forty years ago. In ex- 
I appearaooe they rei^enible the other sniimth-liores seen in many 
e plates. 

t e| iaeb guii^ tbww a ahot weighing about 30 pouud«u \u %a* 
ff. Jfia ^ " 



18 BRITISH NATAL AND MIHTAHY OPERATIONS IN Ei 

coaats of the engagement they are ft^qaeotly spoken of 
They date back to the time of Mehemet Ali. 

One Xinch howitzer was mounted in Fort Pharos. The 
too rotten to hare been used. 

The mortars in the Ras-el-Tin Lines " were used pretty frei 
and a Xinch mortar in marabout was undoubtedly Sred. 1 
nothing but misses. One hit would have probably given a i 
the present development of ordnance. 

The B. L. R, W-pdrs. were four in number. Two in the 
ment of Fort Pharos and one in Mex Citadel were mountetl 
garrison carriages and were used during the action. Tho 
mounted at tbe western end of the Ras el-Tin Lioe.s, on the I 
designed by Beverly Kennon, but was not used during the 

The mountings of the S. B. gnus were simple in the i 
wooden slide and top carriage, as shown in Plate 33, ge 
rotten for safe employment; wooden quoins for elevating a 
rant for laying the gun. Tbe tracks were even more rotte 
carriages. 

The Egyptian supply of ammonitiou was enormous. Thei 
kinds of U. L. B. shell, common and battering, in lavish profii 
store of shrapnel was not so great. There was a fair pn 
chilled shot. 

There weretaundredsofbarrelsof powder. Thepowderwast 
,r%y.^. in disks, shown in Figs. 4und 5, manufactured 

Iby Messrs. Curtis & Harvey, The cartridges 
] appear to have been filled as needed during the 
** engagement. The rudeness of tbe scales found 
' in or near the magazines must Lave caused 
the charge to vary in weight, and may thus 




UUn^ HAyAL ASD mUTABT OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. ID 

w plangn- free, an Impact, to nisb forward ng litint tlie itt* vl ucwUs ^ 
rftlMling tfao printioKi uid bcDcc, in turu, the iib(.U |^ 




ftitlM*ftniBeiinpowdof the faUowingparU: A priaier ignitod 
rvHMrin H tke thot Imtm ito MAt; a qniekmaMi aoDTiTiiic.tbe 

hMtoAalow-flnBporitioii; > awchMiiol device by wbioh the amonnt 
f Ulitov-flOBpoeltion to be boned ean be regnUted ; end, lastly, ■ 
haMi adaiitting the flame, after the desiied ls[>ae of time, throngh the 
■Hmi «f tbe ftise to the borsting-charge. The primer « is carried by 
'!)■■»/, hdd in tbe thimble B by a fine copper wire (which breaka 
TttebMTtto of tlie planger as the gao ia flred). d is a steel needle, 





'^IgirilMtte primer. The flame oommaaicatea with a qniek-mateb, 
^trtMBag ladiaDy aoiOM tbe fuse. The tlme^jompos^tioiL \a 1!X«iiir& 



20 BBinau natal and uilitabt opbbations in E( 

ia a cover tarned &t will and clamped by the nnt 0. Od the 
JB a groove, j, filled vith qaick-match. A firo-hote, k. Fig. 1) 
tfUDiog quick- com poeition, leads to this groove from a point 
torn of the cover D. Tbig point on the base of d oorrespc 
index mark on the outside of the fhze. From this groove j 
free passage to the base of the faze, inttirrnpted only by 
disk t, which is blown oat in action by the flame on its way t 
ing-charge of the shell. 

The safety appliance in the percussion train seems less t 
than thatof onr Schenkel fnze, and the time arrangement a) 
oomplicated. 

This faze was employed later in the war by the battery; 
mountain-gnn aocompanyiag the Indian Contingent. The 
this battery spoke well of its action. 

The followingifl adescription of the percnsaioa flize vhicl 
after the bombardment in the greatest aambers, and jnay 1 
to have been most employed : 




BBITIflH NAVAL AHD MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EOTPT. 2t 



A sUip tool. The fuxe is set by moving the plug a antil two feather- 
BurkA, one on the plag and one on the faze stock, coincide. The 
plunger. Figs. 16 and 17, contians a magazine of qaick-oomposition, h^ 
A second type of percussion fuze was not examined, through lack of 
mfplianoes for dealing with such|dangerous articles. It is of brass, and 
▼«I7 beantifiilly finished. Its external appearance is shown in Figs. 
r8aDdl9. ' 



^FC^* ^0» 





I 



A Hiatal time fuze waa UHcd having a hexagonal liea<l, on three side^ 
of vbtch were chisel marks, Figs. 20 and 21. These Rides had each 
^biil«- plugged with a soft resinous comiH)8ition. It is supposed that 
^•^ marks <*<invsiKmde<l to three known times of burning, but the fuze 
^'wiM not In* o|»ene<l for investigation. 

Tb#- other time fuzes were of the well-known Boxer type. In some 
**»«tliey iKire the Hritish broail arrow, and were paeked in boxes on 
•iiH'h were pasted instructions for use from the British Hoyal LalK)ni- 

tOfT. 

Tbe mortar time fuzes were of the usual pattern. The longest of these 
'**'• bams for G9 seconds. 

^or primerw, an ordinary friction tulw of the cross pattiTU was em- 
Pl^fd. as well as another ty|H* in which the fiihninate is packed in the 
^^tulie and is explode<l by a fine twiste<i wire passing: tlii-ough it. 
'^ODe smooth-lMire gun a cpiiek -match was found in tht' vent. 
•Od the jiart of the Kgyptians, at leiist, the manner of carrying on 
^•ctJon was that of the hist Cimtury. An enemy of to-day would have 
Phhtcd torpe<loes in front of the fortifurations and in the entnuKvs to 
^kartior to inch an extent as to seriously emliarra^s l\\e. vv\UwV,Va\\i 
*• \cpiimoM oeglected this branch of the art of uu\\lar>" vV^vww^ 



22 BBITISH NATAL AND HILITABT OPERATIONS IK S( 

although ample means were at haad. At Mez, after the bom 
Terefoond — 

SOO-pODDd gQD-ootton mines (Figs. 22, S3) 

2G0-poQDd gno-cuttoa miDM^Figa. U, S&) 

lOO-ponnd electro-coatact minea(Fig. 27) 

Circnit clown (Fig. 26) '. 

Bdo;b, See., in large namberB. 





SB NATAL AND MILITAST OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 23 

n Ibe detoDftior ttironj^li the tnoiitli-piece, and thu utbur 
i to Uifl Insiiln of th«> vnvitlDpe, indkiuj; u t«rmiDal earth. 
tpliiiDces occeasar}' for turpiMlo openttionii (fxcejtt cable were 
uffieteti t qDantitieH. Of cabin only two knotd could b<^ fonnd. 
umI copper wire of tbe iiHual size (about 22 B. W. G.)i fuid 
■d with gntta pen^ha. 

b« giui-<x>ttoii blown up b^' thu MouarcU duriiig the en- 
Aba Btores were ditu;orere<i near Mex. The giincottoD 

tn Are woodrn shtHlit, conHlmct^d for the purpose, each 
Kboat fire tons. Tlint foinul after the bombard in«ut wn« 
ID trout tl. M. S. Elecla. In a Kinith'u Mh«d were 166 oasea 
of Abets tnechanical pritnerH. The uircnit oloser was on 
n principle. A rertical rod, articnlated at thu lower ex- 
Tie* Dear its apper extremity an insulated metal eoUar 
> pole of tlie cirenlt. The rod \» kept c-eiitered in a water- 
ire in ibfl bwwl of the viuw by a flexible <iiHphmgiu. A 
: would brin^: the uollar in coutiivt with thu metal case, put 
mtth, and tbnit complete the circuit (see Fig. 26). 
re to employ tbiA torpedo apparatiin ninst be reearde<I us 
wk of experience and coini>etent petitonnel. Professionally 
gretied that such a fiivorableopportunity of demonstrating 
M of this i)y8t«m of harbor defense was lost. The more- 
I Beet wottldat least havebeenver>- greatly hampered by tlie 

erea if the ohipH themHelv&s bad entirelj' eacaped ii^ory. 
se« of Alexandria iiiiiv be diviih^il into tuu distinct Hues: 
I, or outer, with terminals at Pharos and the Lighl-Hoasej 
tbem, or inner, between Saleh Aga and Marso-el-Khanst, 
aoced flank at Marabout. 

only those gnns which could be trained upon the attack- 
^ northern line was capable of bringing to bear the follow- 
iz: 

nog M. L. R 4 

wg M. L. R •9 

■ogM. L. B 6 

avg H. L. R S 

orgB. I^ B 3 



y Urge modem rifled guna were all in good condition, uid 
iption were n»od ilaring the bombsidmeiit. "nkej tonMA. 

TiM mutwied oo the Jfon c ri<- ff c«rri»ge U^oTemutteA. 



24 BBITISU NAVAL AND UILITABY OPEBATIOKS TN E< 

tb.e main reliaoce of the Ecyptians, and a fair proportion of 1 
ioflictetl ui>on tlie ebips was due M tbem. 

It is difficult to ascertain the exact niimber of tlie S.B. gunt 
nor indeed can it be said tbat any exact number was emplo; 
conditions of tbe battle changed at every moment. Not lea 
fourth must be thrown out of consideration, as mounted to 
efficient or even safe utte. 

The mortars played, as bas been stated, a very iusignific 
the engagement. 

Including one of the Inflexible'a tnrrets, tbe working b: 
the ofTsbore squadron opposed to tbese batteries consisted o 
the following heavy guns : 

llt-inch M. L. E. oftJl tons 

12-iiiotiU. L. R. of 95 tons 

lO-inchU.L. R, of Intone 

9-Inch H. L, R. of 121«db 

8-iDcbU. L. B. ofQhiDi 

In All 

These were supplemented later by three more of 25 toi 
of 18 tons (the Temeraire's effective battery), and by the 
guDS in tbe InflrTihle's forward turret. These thirty-three 
all used against Ada and Pharos. 

The inner line proper (not taking Marabout into consider] 
bring to bear tbe following pieces, viz: 

ID-inch Armstrotig M. L.R 

9-iDch Armatrong H. L. R 

8-inch AmistToog M. L. R 

40.pdr. ArnutroDic B- L. B 

XV-iDcb8.B 

X-lncb8. B 




BSmSH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 25 

The bow and stern gnus of the Monarch were of great value, and may 
wnainly be counted as worth one more 9-ineh gun. 

The fact that the attacking force could concentrate its whole fire 
against any single work on shore must not be lost sight of. It is thus 
poaiiible to express the phases which the engagment either assumed, 
or might have been made to assume, in the form of numerical ratios : 

Fen PhAitM 4 to 33 (actual). 

Fort Ada 5 to 28 or 33 (actaal). 

t»^i-Tln Unrti 7 to 26. 

LiKbt-Hoow Fort 4 to 26. 

VonSfex 5 to 14 or 16 (actual). 

These ratios for the northern front might be almost indefinitely in- 
tnuti if allowance were made for tlie enormously superior weight of 
niDe of the British guns. They will, however, have sufficiently served 
thm parpoee if they convey a general, and not altogether inaccurate, 
K^n of the relative strength of the opi>osite sides in the action of 
Mv 11. 



) 



III. 

THE ATTACK J SG FLEET, 

Admiral Seymour had at his disposal eight iron-clads and five wooden 
inin lmat«. Of the former five attacked the outer line of defenses, 
vbile the i^niainiug three operated inside of the reef stretching from 
lL*-liri.;i|^w;it^.i- to Fort Marabout. Thi» ji^uii-boats were variously em- 
r'">«l, tlii'ir nit»st serious eft'ort Ikmii«^ directed against Fort Marabout. 

I^ 1^ thought that a brief description of each vessel will remilt in a 
^'ifarnr (tinri'ption (»f its powers of ofl'ense and defense. 




Ti • r - — ml . : — .■^- 



\ 







J 9 -» 



I' 1. 



^ffwp- tim* it 1 



•• f ♦ » -■ »~v — 






n /• /* 

t9^ fmr% tm*» 



^r outride S4|uailron was eoniposed of the Alexan<lra, Inflexible, 
^'^^Un, Hafierb, and Temerain*, and was under the c^nmuviwA o^ V?vkV- 
^i» Wftjfer J. Ilant'Grabbe, C\ B., A. 1). C, as Heuior officer. 



I 



I 2(1 BRlTISn NAVAL AND MILITAKV OPEKATIONS IN EaTPT. 

The Alexaiulra, complctud in 1877. Ih of a,-llK> toii» dUplavcmetit 
a,610 horsepower (indicated). A con\'«ntion»l view of her in giv-« 
Fig. "8. The Bnunred pnrtn are nhadetl. lu Fig. 29 are half | 
of her spar and main deckn. She is a betted caaemat« ship, hm 
Mtsnefi auijile bow and stvTii tire. Her armor is 13J* IncUeK Ihirk al 
vater-line amidships, and tap(«rH fore and aft tu 10 inches. Tbp I 
«a8eni3te has 9J iiithen of armor, and the upper, (J inches. The 
deck batterj- cotimRts of eight 10-inch M. L. K. of 18 tons, the two for 
ones being in comer ports and therefore capabh- of delivering thai 
either ahejul or al>eaiii. The 8par-<leck battery comprises Two 13 
M. L. B. of 25 tone, an<l two KMnch M. L. It. of IH tons, all nioiinti 
«omer porta. The larger guns can firt> from ahead to A little abaf 
beam, and the smaller from a little forward of the beam to dip 
aHtem. Forward of thecasemate, the 8hii)'s aide tumbles home to 
bow Are tram both main and spar deck batteries; abaft the caaei 
the same construction is adopted »t the height of the spur deck: 
The Alexandra in well spurred, and is rigged as a bark, f 
ried a crew of 670 men. She whh Admiral Seymoni^s reguhir &i%g- 
fo>m which he had tem|>orarily shifted bis flag to a lighter 
pable of readily entering the harbor of Alexandria. 

The Indexible is a double- turrctod sea-going ship of 11,880 torn 
placement and 8,010 indicated horse-power. (Figs 30 ant) 31.} 




i 




baa a contra! casemate, reaching to the spar deck and protect 
vital parts of the vessel. The armor of this casemate is on t^ 
■wioh principle. At water line 12 inches of iron, 1 1 iiiche« of n 
inche« of iron, C inches of wood, inner skin of 2 inches of into. 
-watM-lLue 12 inches of iron, 11 inchesof wootl, 8 inches of iroa, 10 
of wood, and an Inner skin of 3 inches of Iron. Below water 11 
of iron, 11 inchu of wood, 4 \nc\ie» ot mm, \\ Uwbwi of wi 
'Tb>f»a«^itonlatMtato*toU*itoa™Mi>'**^«WM 



BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 27 

inner skin of 2 inches of iron. Au underwater armored deok, 3 inches 
thick, 'extends from this casemate to the bow and stem. The tarrets 
are set at diagonally opposite comers of the citadel, so as to give com- 
plete fore-and-afb fire to all the guns. The turret armor is also on the 
sandwich principle, consisting of an outer compound plate of 4 inches 
of Bteel on 5 inches of iron, 8 inches of wood, 7 inches of iron, in all 
16 inches of metal. In each turret are two 16-inch M. L. B. of 81 tons 
weight. 

Forward of and abaft the .turrets are comparatively narrow super- 
Btractures (21 and 30 feet wide), each about 100 feet in length, and 
built, for the accommodation of the crew and officers, inside the lines of 
file. On top of the superstructures are a few small pieces, B. L. B. 
SO-pdrs., Nordenfeldts, &c. 

The elevating and depressing of the 81-ton guns is performed auto- 
matically. These guns have no top carriage, properly speaking. The 
tnmnions rest on blocks traveling on fixed slides, the recoil being taken 
up in hydraulic cylinders. The breech rests on a third block, sliding on 
abeam, which is capable of being turned about one end by a third piston. 
The gun is worked entirely by hydraulic power. 

The Inflexible is brig- rigged, and, though the largest man-of-war afloat 
to^y, carries only 484 men. 
Tbe Sultan, launched in 1870, is represented in Figs. 32 and 33. She 



.I^€t,32, 



llh 






JV>. 33. 




J6fton ^^ *•'» y*^ 



• 

^ of 9,290 tons displaeement, and has engines capable of developing 

v36hor8e-i)ower. She is bark-rigged. She has an annored belt iiround 

we water-line and an armored citadel on the main deck, at the forward 

end of which is a recessed port for obtaining bow fire. In this case- 

'oate are eight 10-inch M. L. R. of 18 tons weight. On the upper deck is 

aamaUer casemate containing four 9-inch M. L. 11. of 12 tons weight, for 

wUch fore-and-aft fire is obtained by carrying the spar-deck, tail \\i\5Q9Ci:^ 

out of the line ofMre. The armor varies in thickness from 11 \x> 1 mO^ift^* 



28 BBinSH NATAL ASD MILITARY OPERATIONS IN B* 

The Saltan had bat recently gone into commlsBion, with a i 
men. 

The Snperb, of 9,170 tons displacement and 7,430 indict 
power, was originally designed for the Tnrkisb QoTemment 
completed in 1878, and sold by the bnildem to the English G 
and eqnipped for sea-service in 1880. Stie is represented 




and 35. She has an armored belt at the water-line and i 
amidships, on the main deck, in which are monnt«d twelve 
L. R. of 18 tons weight The corner gans are in recessed po 




flie nearly ahead and astern. Fonr 10-iuch M. L. B. of 18 t 
complete her battery, two being carried in the bow and 




BRITISH NAVAL. AND MILITARY OPEBATIONS IN EGYPT. 29 

camrinf! on the apiier deck two fixed iiear-shaped opeu turrets. In the 

caMfinate are four 10-iiich M. L. K. of 18 tous, and two 11-inch M. L. K. 

of 'ITi ton.<«. the latter flrinf^ from corner i>ortJ9, either ahead or abeam. 

The turrem have e^ich a 25-ton fi^un mounted on the liendel system. 

The (runs are fired *m barbette^ then disappear by their own riKSoil ; are 

loailHl under cover and raised again to the firing position. The forwanl 

tam*t is protectetl by 1U inches of armor, the after one by 9^ inches. 

The urniortNl belt is 12J inclies thick amidships and tapers towards the 

biiv und stern. The casemate annor varies from 10 to 8 iiirJies in thick- 

M-As. Tills very efficient v(>ssel displaces 8,547 tons, and has engines 

ciiuble of developing 7,520 horsepower. She is ofiicially stated to 

hivif rust Ifss than $2,000,000. Like the Inflexible she is brig-rigged. 

Her crew numlNTe^l 5.'54 men. 

Tbf InMhore Mpiadron of armored ships, under the more immediate 
command of the Admiral, consisted of the Invincible (flagship), the 
Monan'h, and the TeneloiR'. 

The Invincible, of G,000 tons displacement and engined up to 4,800 
buFM* jNiwer, was designed in 1867. She is representiHl in Figs. 38and 39. 



1 —L^ 









rt 










\ 

I 

1 • 



^»i^ h.i^ .in :irmon'il bi'It and :i sliort casfinatt*. Th<» ii):iin*<1(M*k raso- 
^■'*»- iimunt."* MX !♦ inrh M. L. K. of 12 Urns w<«i;:lit. The spar de<rk 
^'*- Vrv i.s riini|K>siH| of tour similar j;uii'<. rarrird in a nMlmibt which 
i'f"»ir* ^iiiliiii-iitly rh-ar of thi* ship's sid«* to ;4iv«' iIm* drsin-d Ion* antl- 
*•' !.:•■ tr.iiii roriicr ports. In addition an* fonr nnpiotrctcd M. L. K. iV\- 
»"*"^ Ift-r armor rang«'S fnmi \^\ to "ij iiirlM*< in fliirkm'ss. Ih-i ni'w 

Hi* Mtfii.irrh. ri;:s. in and -11. is a mastrd, mm ;:oin;:. donlih* tiirirtcd 
^'"■' 'iir \*i!h liii^h IriM* Uianl, oi" .s,:{jo tons disiilarrno-nt and T.-^jn in- 
*«•' 4*1-11)1111- 1.1 . ptiuiT. silt' li:k>* an arriiorrd lii'tt.an arinnp'd rit.nlfl, and 
^f'Ji-hul •iiiU. In tJM' tniTt'ls .trr tunr Vl im-li M. L. II. ni" J.'i ton> \*ri;:lit, 
pf^'W?,.,! \%\ \\\ iiirfifs of iron. In tin* Im.w jut two W im-li .M. 1,. \\. <if 
1- tiifi* «i'i^lii, and in Ihi* >t«-in om* 7 inrh .M. L. I:, of \\\ ton-^ wri^lit. 
^* ^t-r hfif rii'.ini' dr4'k, wh'wh rifrnds fun* and at't a\M»\«' vW VwwaA'^, 

^^f^rmor larieM in thickm.^H frnin S.i tn ."i in«'bt'S. 



30 BRITISH NATAL AlTD MILITARY OPERATIONS IN El 

The Penelope, the smallest of tbe iron-clads which took ] 
engagement, is of the same general type as the Superb, 1 
(see Figs. 34, 35). Tbe Penelope is classed as a corvette. SI 
4,470 tons, and is engined ap to 4,700 indicated horae-powei 
belted casemate cmiser, mounting eight 8-inch M. L. B-of 9 
also carries three B, L. B. 40-pdr8. The maximom thicki 
armor is 6 inches, and her draught only 17 feet 6 inches. I 
223 men. 




In addition tbe ships carried some B. L. R. 20-pdrs., and 
supplied with Xordenfeldts and Oatlings. The ships tbei 
though spoken of by the popular name of iron-clad, are all in 
vessels. 

Tbe gun-boats present at Alexandria during the boutbardn 
of composite construction. Tbe larger ones are bark-rigged 




VATM. AMD IflUTABT OFBRATION8 IN SOTPT. 81 



XV. 

TBX BOMBABDMMNT. 

Duiaic the idslit of July 10 utd 11 the resselB of the Britiah fleet 
iNk ip the poeitioiie to which they had been Beverally assigned. At 
iVbmk of the 11th the nature of the attack became evident The 
kifier difpe were placed to engage the northern line and the lighter 
Aipi the inner Une. By referring to Plate 1 these original positions 
mj be seen plotted at E, F, G, H. The Alexandra, Bnltan, and Snperb 
Msca?ered nnder way at the outset, firing at the Light-House Fort 
led Bas^-nn Lines. The Inflexible was at anchor, difecting the lire 
tf oee turret against the Light-Honse Foil, that of the other against 
Oi»d.Kabebe. The Temendre was aground during the early part of 
tte daj, firing at Hex. The Invincible, Monarch, and Penelope were 
iito way oat of the line of the Temeraire's fire, engaging Hex and 
Htmel-Khanat. 

The day was perfectly dear and the sea smooth. The wind was light 
^ fte northward and westward, blowing the smoke from the shipa 
tMrtids tbashors and thus dmmring the target/or a long time qfUr eo/ch 
M •Id SHiMy it diJ/leuH to watek and profit by the fall of the $hot. A 
in ciptain can correct his aim much better when he sees himself where 
tteibot strikes than when it is neported from aloft by an observer. This 
ciRQiiistAnoe and the feet that the sun at the beginning of the action icae 
** tk cyef of the BritiMh gunners were the only disadvantages under 
^Ucfa the attack labored. Otherwise it would have been impossible to 
^^^^ more propitious conditions. 

Admiral Seymour's order of battle is here quoted at length : 

IMVIKCIBLK, at AUzandria, Juljf 10, 1^2. 

h the er^Dt of luT not rtH-rivinf{ a HutiNf»ctor>' annwctr to » HnmnionB which I ahal^ 
*^ lo the llilitaf7 (luvfrnor of Alexamlria, calling on him to dt'livcr up to me, tvm- 
'*'*nlj. tbr worka on ilir Roiitherii nhon* of th«* harbor and thf»iieon the Raa-el- 
"B ^iain«ala, the aiinMlroD ancl«*r my coniniaml will attack the forta an mH>n an the 
^*My.|o«r boon t^iren to Of iitralit to Icavo tin* |ilarc have expirfHl, which will bo 
**^^M.of the 11th. Th<*re will \te two attarkn: 

1* FntM Ui« iiwidc of the harlior, in which the Invinrible, Monarch, and IVnelope 

•fflUk»pMt. 

^ ^7 tka Saltan , Haperb, Temeraire, Alexandra, and Inflexible, from ontaide the 



vm eomnieaee bj ai|ni*l fr«»m roe, when the Hhip nearest the newly-erected 
Wftr Fort Ada * will lire a nhell into the earthwork. 
^ tW hattcrica openlBK on the offMhore nqnadron in reply, every eifort will be 
Mt ly t^ ahipa t* destroy the batterieii on the Kaa-el-Tin Pen in«a la, especial ly the 
*^i^Hs«M Bfttlary bearing on the harbor. When this is accomplished, the HultAo, 

* Tb0 HtmpiUl B»tter}\ Plates 91 and 9U. 



32 BBITISH NAVAL AND HIUTABT 0PBBATI0N8 UT » 

Snperli, and AleiandrA will more to the eutward and attack Fort P 

poBsiblA, the Silsileli Battery. 

I The Inflexible will move down this aftorooon to the poeition off the I 

awigned to her yesterday , and be prepared to open flr« on the giuu is tl 

Id snpport of the inshore sqasdron, when signal is made. 

The Tepieraire, Snltan, and Alexandra will flank the works on Baa-« 
The gaD-TewelsaDdgan-boata will remain ootside and keep ont of fin 

able opportnnity ofleis itself of moving in to the attack of Hex. 
Ships most be gnidad in a gniat measure by the Btat« of the weather, 

aochoi or remsiD niider way. If they anchor, a wire hawser ahoald 

The men are to hare breakfast at 4.30 a. m. and to wear bine working 

The inshore squMlron will be nnder my persocal command ; Uie offkboi 
that of Captain Hant-Gmbbe, C. B., of the Sultan. 

The Helicon and Condor will act as repeating ships. 

FfnaUy, the object of this attack is the destmction of the eartkwt 
mantliDg of the batteries on the sea fronts of Alexandria. It Is poari 
work may not be accomplished under two or three days. 

Shell is to Ite expended with caution, notwithstanding that the Hn 
fair proportion of reaerve ammunition, may be expected here on the Utl 

Should the Aohlllee arrive in time, she Is to attack Fort Fhana, or 
where the senior officer of the offshore squadron may direct. 

BEABIKOB. 

Line of ships NE. by B., Si cables apart. 

Altramdra. 
Ennostoa ■ light-house SB. by B. i E. 
Breakwater llght-honse 8. ( W. 
Black Kookt Batt«ry, distance 1,500 yards. 
Saltao. 
Eonustos light-bouse E. by 8. i 8. 
Breakwater light-bouse 8. i W. 
Barraok Point, t 1,750 yards. 






Z/IPTtSH (POUCSSTATiM) 

tNTHE RUC FR^N^UC 
C. C^RACt>LS (STM7K>N ttOUSCS) 

A/HCRICAN Co/^SULATr, 

€D BY THE OurStOg- SQUAOm^. 

'/rr/v BY THC jAfrLcxtace. 
- ' TemcRAiffe. 



fEO BY T1H€ iNSBORE 



.M«^h/\;:,';iA 



f- 




VATAL AHD MILITABT OPSRATION8 IK EOTPT. iS 

ro tht tangoing wamy be added the general instractionB to eommaiid- 
f cAeen to Ira back at any fort that might open on them. 
Fhe foDoving ia the official report of the action as given by Admiral 
jmoar. The paragrapha relating to individoals only are omitted: 

IinmrciBLB, cl XUoBamiHm^ Jul§ tO, IcM. 
In: 

U la oaalimwiioa of my oflMal rspott of proeeediogt, dftted the 19lh inttanty I 
Kvo IW h— or to onlMBlt, for their lonUhlpaP infomiAtion, a more dotailed oeooaot 
I tkt MtioB wUeh toolr place on the 11th, between the eqmidron ander my com- 
nd tho ibrti whieh defend Alezaadrin, then I woe enabled to fcurward at that 



% ii vfU be oaen by the Ineloeed older of battle, a copy of which was rapplied to 
ack ciftaia, I had decided to make two attache, one by the Boltan, Baperb, and 
Unmto en the north Ihce of Rae-el-Tin, eopportcd by the Are ftom the after tnr* 
Mtf thi Ingeslble, anchored off the entrance to the Corvette Pate, thne enfilading 
ihi Ugbt^Honee battcrlee ; the other, by the InTinclblc, Monareh, and Ptonclope ftom 
iMiiheieei^ aided by the fire of the Inllcxiblc'e forward tnrret and the Tcmeraire, 
■Hah took np a podtloa cicee to the Ihirway buoy of the Bogbaa or principal pan 
h M IH into AWzandria Harbor. The Helicon ami Coddor were detailed for dnty aa 
■pMagahlpo* and the Bea c on, Bittern, Cygnet, and Decoy were employed at directed 
k| riptl deriag the day. 

1 At 7 a. m. en the 11th I elgnaled Ihnn the InTincible to the Aleacandra to fire a 
Mtiic the iMently-armed earthworks termed the Hoepital Battery, and followed 
Ml ^ e arneral eignal to the fleet, '*Attack the enemy's batteriec," when immediate 
Mm f aned b e t wee n allthe ahipe, in the poeitione aaeigned to them, and the whole 
>f Iki fatta commanding the entrance to the harbor of Atozandria. A steady fire waa 
arisuiwd on aU sidsa nntll 10.30 a. m., wh«n the Sultan, Soperb, and Alexandra, 
*te bed been hitherto under way, anchored off the Light-Honee Fort, and by their 
vdUinvicd fire, snistrd by that of th^ Inflexililf% which weighed and Joinml them 
a hLD p. B., iiacce<>d«td io nilt* ncing most of the guns in the forts on Kas-el-Tiu ; still 
*■■» h»*rj guns in Fort Ada kept up a desultory fire. About 1.30 p. m. a shell ftom 
^ '^prrH, whose practice in the aft4*moon wss very giiod, blew up the magsxine 
■icsuNi the retreat of the remaining garrison, lln'fie ships then directed their 
■ivstion to Fort rharos, which was silenced with the assistance of the Temeraire, 
*^k joined them at 8.30 p. m., when a shot from the Indexible dismounted one of 
^ ^vj guns.* The Hospital Battery was well fonght throughout, and, alt bough 
^ w il Cor a time by a shell fh)m the Inflexible, it was not until 5 p. m. that the 
WiDfrrmen wrr« compelled to retire from their guns by the fire of the offubore 
^VidiMi sod the Inflexible. The Invincible, with my flag, supported by the Penel- 
"V'.^b chips being at anchor, the latter on oni' occasion shifting 1>ertb, and asninted 
^tW Xooarrb. under way inside the reefs, as w«*ll ns by the Intlfxible and Teni. 
*<tb» w the Bogbax and Corvette Chsunels, sticcfede<l, after an engagement of some 
W\m«lcoeiog and partially dent mj'ing the liatt«*rif« suil lines of Mex. F*ort 
i i t iait.Khanat was destroyed by the exploeion of the magsxine after half an hour's 
***>« «itb the Mnnsrrh. t 

AU«t:( |i. B., arcing that the gnnnem of the western lower bsttery of Mex boil aban- 
^■M ibrtr gnna, and that the snp|>ortii had pnilialily retired to theeitailel. I called in 
^Cts.TfMeUaiMl gnn-boata, ami under coverof their fin* lamli-<l a party of twelve vol- 
ssiler tbrcoDinand of Lieutenant B. U. Kradfonl. of thr Invincilile, arconi|ia- 



"T^maark is an enor. No ** heavy gun/ if b3* that is meant a rided gun, was 
^^■^•Uicd la Fort Pharos. 

Mt vm Mbesqoently diocovenMl that thr f*x/>I(»ston caused by the MimatcYCs ^t« waa 
^^^f^tgmM'COtUm tome diBtmnce in roar of the fort. The laUer waa uuVianaie^ 



34 BSmSH N&VAL -AMD HILlTABf OPBRATIONR IN E( 

Died hj Lientonatit Rlobaid Poore, of tbftt ship, LleDUDant tfae Honorat 
Lanil>UiD(myfl»Kli«atenaiit),MiiJorTiil]ucb, Welsh Re^ment, attached to 
Ht. Hardy, luidBhipman in charge of tho boat, who got on shore throDgh 
doBtrojred, nith chiui^of guD-cot toil, two lO-incli H. L.R. gnus, and ipike 
boie guDB in the right-liand water battery at Hei, and returned witboi 
beyond Ihe low of one of their boata (Bittern's dinghy) on the roclu. Th 
ardouB operation very well carried out.* Previous to tbis, aftur theactioi 
general, Commander Lord Charles bereaford, of the Condor, stationed 
ship, seeing the accuracy with which two 10-inch rifled Runs in Fort Hi 
playing upon the ahipa eni^aged off Fort Hei,Bteamed up to within raugt 
90-cwt. gun, and by his excellent practice won drew offtheflre.t I thee 
to be supported by the Beacon, Bittern, Cygnet, aud Decoy, tbe Cygnet 
engaged with tbeBas-el-Tin fortaduring tbe early part of the day. lam 
dariDg tbe action no casnalties happened to thoie veaaela, owing, in a gr 
to tbe able manner in which tbey were maneuvered, and their light drai 
them to take up their poaition on tbe weakest point of tbe batteries. Tt 
srally terminated BocoeBafuU; at 5.30 p. m., when the ahipa anchored fo 

4. The force opposed to us would bare been more formidable had ever? 
on the line of works been brought into action, bat in Ibe Eas-eLTiu bal 
tbe large amooth-boree and tbVer of the French 3ri-poundera, bought i 
Hehemet All, were manned, the Egyptians preferring to use the Engllab 10 
6-incb, and smaller mnizle-loading rided guns. Tbeae guns are precise! 
those which Her Majesty's sbipe carry, and no better muiile-loadiog 
found. They were abundautly, even lavishly, supplied with projectiles 
description, chilled shot, and the sighting of tbe guns was excellent. 1 
be said of the gnns in tbe Mex Linen, excepting that In them tbe 36-p< 
inor« nsed, and that one, if not two, 15-iDcb smooth-bores t were brought 
addition to tbe 10 -i nob, &- inch, andsmallerH. L. R. guns fired. Fort Mara 
two 10-incb U.L. R. gnnat into action at long range, shell after shell of 
np towards the iuahore sqnadtan in an esoelleut line, falling ftom ten U 
short. Not one shell fW>m the gana in the sonthoTD batteries burst i 
U^Jeety's ships dnring tbe day. 

&. I forward for their lordships' perusal tbe olBcial report of Capti 
HuDt-Gnbbe, C. B., A. D. C of Her Majesty's ship Hultau, who most abl. 




BRITISU NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 35 

iftrrvirilii dHarbed from my flag. The upper workn of tlic Invincible and Inflexible 
««r^ t irniiil dral knocked about, but no seriouH injury wa» inflicted. No damage was 
40bf til the Trmeraint or Monarch. 

It i«<]nitr impomtble for me to account for the very Hmall Iosh Hustainvd by Her 
lljjr«t\*« »hip« on thin ocraMion, couhidering the amount of Hholl and Hhot which 
Mncktb^m, and the iiiJurieN inflict<Ml on the hullHof the Sultan, Superb, and Alexan* 
to.And lu a Invwr degre«* on thiwe of th«* Invincible, Penelope, and Inflexible ; but I 
■ty Ure ripmis my derp regn*t th:.t Lieutenant Francis Jackaon and Mr. William 
ftftODno. rarprnter of the Inflexible, shouhl have fuUeu. The wounded, who when 
Im branl from were doing wt* 11, were sent to Malta in the Humber. 



I have, dec. 



T»tb^ blCSSTABT OP THE ADMIRALTY. 



F. BEAUCHAMP SEYMOUR, 
Admiral and Commander-in-Chief. 



Theflpediil work done by tho offHhore squadron in this deHcribed in 
tteofllcial report of its senior officer : 

July 14, 1882. 
In: 

1. In ciiDplianc^ with yoor memorandum of the lOth instant, I have great pleasure 
teitponing the succeMiful manner in which the ofliihore sfjuadron, under my per- 
■ul roBimaiHl.cooMating of, at tiret, the Sultan, Superb, and Alexandra, and after- 
*u^tbe Trmeraire and Iufli*xible, attacked and (tilenced the earthworks and bat- 
^v^'ii the llth inntant.couiprining Forts Phanmand Ada, the batteries at Hospital 
Nat. ih* new earthwork, which wai of formidalde nature, and the Light-House 
^■Ufnr« brariDg oo the harbor. 

i T:)" vtioii wa* ri)mrnetir«*d at f>.59 a. m., by the Alexandra flrin^ a shell at the 
'vi:.««trk u^AT Furt AdA, and a ffw niiuutcst aft«'r all the forts replied and tlie action 

- \' t...« tirn*- I w;iH r»traniiii^ in i-liiHf nrib'T, at alxmt \,7A\0 yards, pant the batter- 
^ 4 ! :» I* t"!r:n!i:: in •«Mi*i'«-Hsii.ii with a vi»*w tD anchor in tin* order pp'scribi-d by 
T<>: I' i,,!.,rf •tiiiii^j —I I a^aiu n'|ia"»N«*il. Kiiiiliii::, lin\v»'vrr, that thi* liattiTii's 
••'• • •■»j.'»T fli.iii w.i- aiiri«-ip.it«*i|, iiri-l til It th«' IC^ypti.in ;;iiiiii»t.h \v««ri» lar from 
^1- J- .• . !: (kiti;:. i[i«i< f'«!. vtTv ii*nn\ |»r.nt in-. I ib'<-iiir«i if a«lvi-al»l<' t(» uiii lior and 
t *■ "■• * ■• ■ \j' t rj:i;i»'. Till'* wan i'xim-:it«mI \\ iili ;;ri"at pfiMisiou liy till* H<jiiailn»M. and 
*• •■ I •• ^rt-tl tfi In" •lj'«rn.)iiiit iii:i tli«ir ^iiii-.* 

* ^ 1 ;* J. Ml. flif I.:;;hi lltm^i- ll.itr«*r>, uhi«li lii-l I n.rarluT in the day, 

*'»f»'i I.A 1 ll***! >iy ill** Inih'vilili", i-i'.i"!''*! to ri»turii i>ur tin', tlu'ir l.iit rilb-d ^nn 
*''<'• »a«-!*«t. ttiiMi^li iiiit lif'loit' it li.id ^ivfu ll^ innrli tio-.ilili'. 
j - A: 1«' r> ]>. in. thf* Ifiiit'iairi' and Intl<'\iMi- i >oii no liin;:«T n •(nirin^ tlii-ir hcrv- 
*"* '»a'. ii> aM>iRt 111 r>iir altarK. nlii llin;: Koit<^ I'liaion and Ada x%ith ^rt-at «-t]'«Tt. 
' b. t!i.« t!tiir tlif firi' \«ao f otisitli raM V 1*""*, \*\ii om* nlii-d ^iin t i»ri tin* Hospital 
I *v:i» .>^, V hi* )i ^« a« iiiip«iH<.iliif to •h'^iMoiint. In-in^ in\ iiiMi' f iniii tin- hltip. diil us 

I ' ^- t i.' p ;ii. i«:ifli from tln'Siprih li!i*\\ mm tin' iiia;^.i/ini« l»y I'oM Aila, ! and 
^'■■v.» t: I'll tri'<i v«*-ri- liurin-<II\ fx .n i.it*-!!. 

A" r i?i;« I !.•■ ciiruij. '•• ni iii;; • • .i-« «l, .iml i'li mir -;dt* . j! v« as i «iiitin«'i| tn dixlmlj*. 
'i ',-.'•,•% .,( ti •MI, T»|Mirf»-il fiotii ti;ii.- fo tinji" fi«i!ii ill*' lojiH a«» ri'a*«fu>riililiii^ in 
'*•■■'? •!.-r4j!L«..rkii. 



/ 



* M'-ri* apiM-araini' than i<Mlit>,.iH \\ill Im* afti*rw»rdf* nho^ftii. 
*A 7- lilt li Aniji»f/f'ij^' M. L. /»'. 



86 BKITISH NAVAL AND HILITABT 0PEBATI0N8 IN B 

D. The ahipi were bBDdled mnA foaght in » mknneT reflectlDg gTMtt c 
offlcen and ships' companies. 



W. HUHT.GB 

To Admiral Sir F. Bbauchamp Srymour, 0. C. B., 

Cammander-in -Chitf, 

The parts omitted above are perBooal mentions and recotni 

Id a dispatch of July 14, Admiral SirBeauchamp Seym 
Bays: 

On the morning of the l^h I ordered the Temeraire and Inflexiblo 1< 
Fharoo, and aft«r two or three shots had been flred a flag of trace « 
Fort Bas4l-Tin,* and I then sAot tny flag lientenant, the Honorable Hed 
ton, in to discover the reason, and, from hU report, there is no doabt it 
lose to gain time; mud as negotiations failed, ray demand being to i 
batteries commanding the Boghaz Channel, one shot waa Bred into the V 
Bath-ry earthwork, wlien a Hag of truce was again hoisted, I ihen sen 
and Cotmnander Morrivon into the liarbor in the Helicon, and on his gc 
the Khedive's yacht, the Mabroussa, he fauiid sbebDd been deserted, am 
on hia ntaru after dark his belief that tlie town bad been evaonat«d. 

To these ofBcial re[M>rt8 little need be added. The praci 
the main, excellent. The fire of the Inflexible and Temerair 
to the writer, who was not far from either at the befnniiiDf 
tion and during the forenoon, to be particularly good. Tbi 
seemed to nse her small 20'pdr8. as range finders, so as d< 
her valuable shot. A shrapnel bnrst prematurely inside of 
81 -ton guns, inflicting no damage, its scattering pieces being 
ible on the water. 

On board of the Superb the fire from her small guns was 
accoont of the smoke tbey occasioned. 




KAVKL AKO MILITARY OPBIUTI0N8 IK I \ i 

frtcmid bedtstiuctlv «««. Tboerror wan, BenpranyBpeakidK, canned 
bf tM Biieh vltrrntitMi. Ortalii of tlie (fans were p*iiiitP»J with "con- 
miiuit* ■km," tioubtjr otic 3(1 pdr. (1)^ mcli 8. B.) In tlio citixlel of Mvx, 
tbirii balled the Invlnoililv with iwrsisteiit accuracy. 

Ofth* fuzM niiwl by the Brilisii, tlic ttieatcr purt were thv "conoral- 
■rrin.- penniMlnn." Jt u tmpmnihU to ej-aggerat^ the mubcliaeior of 
iw.l^r VM (A« (xmaion i*/ fAr liomhtirilmcnt. Th« itiOHt ciireleiw wit- 
■Muf ibi* actlou ociultl not liel|> txitlviiiK tho fiti)iiciicy of preiiiHtiire 
aploHiiBa. and iiffullarfa to rx|)lo(ieHlHll. It tsuot beyond tlie limits 
rfhtT MtitnatMO to H>t dnwti the Dumber of tlie litttvr uti n'Mcblng m^t- 
«l biiDilivd, while mme Brilifib oQl<«rs think the pnipoiliou no It-wi 
tbn four (lf>b» of nil llnti. In wvirul iuKtaiicei) fiized were driven 
Mil; into Ibv buniiiifc-^ltHrge without <>X|ilodfiif; the »hell. Tlie ntout- 
MiI¥>to]tJat for thin fuzv. Drging thut it wuh di'sifrnuti tor anv HgHiUMt 
VMnd BhipM, and ihereforo Rivpti a retarded action, could neither ex- 
fM nor dfMire a morv violent impavt than in hIiowo by Ihi^ fiict to hitve 
Un place. Am a reniilt of llie unreliable tialnre of them> tiizen, it may 
hanHoned llist one of Ihti reiieh>|>e'it M-in«h Hhell van afterwanU 
IkVNl tyta)|! bomileKS in u magaziue eoDt»iniiig over four linndm) Ions 
rf pinrilfT. 

ObttiT two of lh«> Britinh ohelt were p])lit loDKitnilinally into two 
|B1^d*KibtlM«l>y iheforreof ihehluw they delirered. which waa,bow< 
9m, Ml nlBdf at to l^cnlti* Uie fnzv. 

It l« proper to imiark tbul the entire Knbjeet of fhzeit In novt beioft 
v^rhsnlnlin l-'ii^tand,jn re>ii)oiiHe totlic niiiveiNiil :tti(t toiidly expreMMHl 
^MliMitaetioo at their performance dnriug the bombaidmeot. 

It ku been already staled that the fire was onlered to be slow and 
Mbnate, vftb the object of hasbaiidiiig the sopply of ammanitioo. 
INIrally was rxiierienced in obtaining the exact ntiml>erof charges 
I, or indeed accurate particolars of many intereKling profes- 
il antters oonnected witb the bombardment, a spirit of mystery 
K to bare prevailed. The following figures may be relied D[ion 
■ tlipnxiBately eorrect : 

IWHooareh Bred as follows: 117 12-incbHliellfttim her turret guns; 
MSaad 7 Incfa shell fiom her Iww ami stem guns. 

1W Penelope Bred 157 common shi-ll, .IH shmpnel, 36 Palliner shell, 
A*mh1 1 20" time tbze, 114 10" time fkizen, and the remainder gea- 
■*«Trlee petvasxioo fiixes. 

AtSsperb flred 200 10 inch shell, mostly common, 10 lOinch shrap- 
*4aHl a few 2&poander shell. 

^ larfadble flred alvont 2:^0 shell of rariouK kinds, moMtly common 
1*1 iMiBgnidied from shrapnel). A few only were shrapnel and Pal- 
**<ML The ItaM* were chiefly percussinn. She exjiended between 
^u4 tbree tboaeand ronnds of Nordenfehlt ammonition. 

^ t^/ U rW ^M stoct o/ammwnilum tetu atrrentlv reported to ka«« bee» 
•*«i* * 49 kmttertmff ,luU at tke end of tkt (fay. 



38 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPEBATIONS IN E< 

As reffards the Sultan, the statement was made, and ci 
that "she could not have continued the action for more tht 
longer, as the ammunition teas nearly exhavstedJ" What is 
Soltsn is also donbtlesB true more or 1e88 of tbo other ' 
important point, tbat sbould be kept in miiul. 

The outside squadron, as will lie obsi-i veil, began tbe ac 
vay, at tbe minimum distance of about 1,500 yanis, anc 
after passing the batteries a second time, the advantage 
the range exactly prevailing over the increased risk of being h 
moved, from time to time, concentrating its fire on eacb w 
cession until tbe close of tbe day. 

lu tbe inubore squadron tbe flagship was anchored for th< 
at 1,300 .yards from Mez, a position from wbicli a clear vit 
bad, and was kept broadside to tlie wind on one side, and tl 
OD tbe other, by a kedge carried out to windward. Tbe M 
Penelope remained under way, patisiug and repiissing tbe 
Penelope adopted the plan of steaming out tbree-quai'ttrs o 
wards tbe reef and tten drifting in broadside on, until wi 
700 yards, while the Monarch appeared to keep more way on 
a line parallel with the shore. These ships exchanged a lew 
Fort Marabout, but at su great arauge that they cuuld ne 
nor receive much damage. Later in the dny, when the oSaI 
ron moved to the eastward to attack Fort Pharos, these twos 
inside the breakwater and shelled Saleh A(ia and the batte 
Saleb Aga and Oom-el Kabebe. Tht-y would have gone up 
had they not been recalled by signal. 

Machine gvn» were largely employed by the fleet. It is q 
sible to determine their exact value at Alexandria, fur no 
kept by the Egyptians of their losses. Tbe »p|M-arance of tli 




I VATAL AXD HIUTAST 0PEKATI0N8 IN KOTPT. 89 

k kM oa July 11 ia giTeii Id the fiillowlDg aQmmaiy : 



- il 


ubsai. 1 I 

r^hft « 

MdM a M 

*»-* " 1 4 

TWJ ♦ « 



The BupdaD forces st Alexandria wiere nnder the immMliate ooni* 
WriofTooltM Paaba. From the best aonrceaof information aooewl- 
Ui it b fathend that the defenaes ooutalned leas than 3,000 artilleriats. 
OTMutry and of civilian Tolnnteen there waa no taolc. The diapo- 
liaof tbflM) troops has not l>een positively aacertained. It ia known 
ttattha important post of Mez was oommanded by an adjntant-m^jor, 
*ha kad vlth bim one laptain, three IJeatenants, and ISO men. Uf thia 
■d toee one lienteuaot was mortally wounded, 50 men killed, and 
IvMnled. Another aoeoant ffivea the loss at very miioh less. In 
iii had it is bard to obtain the tratfa. 

<Wcl-Kabebp, as already mentioned, waa anttjecred to the Index- 
^1 Are daring the forenoon. Its garrison (insisted of 76 men, aided 
h * ronMiderable numtnT of Arab volunteers. Eichteen of theae were 
*oud«il by Mplintem of maoonry. In hII, along tlie iMiiitlierii or inside 
liar, from Saleh Aga to Marabout, 65 men were killed uud from l.'iO to 
Mvoanded. Among the latter were several offlceis. 

Ii the Dorlbera line of defenseH one officer was killetl in the Light- 
Bm« Fort and one in the Kaa-el-Tin Lined. In each of the foregoing, 
■d ia Fort Ada, one was vonnded. At least SO men were kille<l and 
U*>oandcd In llieae lines, bnl the ree^jnl in very vagnc. Stray pieoea 
*'iMl are reported by the chief of imlice to have killed nnd wounded 
Wvfctt 130 aud 300 cilizeuK, but tliis Htatemetit must be ac<:ept4.'xl only 
^vbstitis worth. 

It it iboagbt that in the interext of impartiality the nnti%'e Kgypiiao 
'**i«fleial rriMMt of this eiigiigefflerit slmulil be ^ven. The following, 
^^ from the liOndon Tinn-f, in a inuiHliition of the account of the 
""■iMnlment irablisheil in Kl Tiijf. »n Arabic tiewi()A|)«r, the organ of 
AnbipuOia: 

*U Xkw*.— On Tan-lay, 25 MliBlnii. I»UU. al lU oVIork id tbo moniinir (Jnly II. 
^■■Klb Eojcliuli nppnnl lirr »ii iho (iiTla of Atrxumlri* aiul wv tnlurnvil (lif Ar«. 

*t >«>■ m. u iron-lwl r.>iin.kr.il ■•iT Furl A.la. 

*>MMI«oTPi>rla wrr-Miiik WlVH-n Kurl I'hBrm and Fort A<l]<.>iiii. 
* '~ f fight gntn wM ■link. 



^'•t.». tkr bfg* I'^-'-l"! f 



iL'k l>y a nhfll fmni Fun ?\iho*, \'bp^l*XVnl 



40 BBIT18H NATAL AND MILITARY 0PEBAT10N8 IN EOTPT. 

was iiijuT«(1, aod a white fla)( wm immedialeljr huioted b; her as a sigoal to oeaae 
firing at lier, wbereu|)OD the Mag ceaiied nn both tides, having lanted for ten honn 
withont cesBntinu. Sume of lh» walln of tliu Inrta were detitroyKd, but the; were re- 
pairttd duriii)(the ui)(1it. ThesbotHuud sbelliidiHcliiirgrd fruni the two didee amonnted 
to about ti,(KK), and this is the Rret time that so lurge a Dumber of miwibB have been 
dischurgeil ia so short a time. 

At II a. Di> on WofliieHday the Eiiglieh aliips again opened fire and were replied 
to by the forlH, but after a uhurt time tbe tiring ceaaed on both eidrx, and a depntk' 
tiuu came froni Admiral Seymour and mode propositione to Tonlba Pasha, which ha 
could not accept 

No goldierti ever stood bo firmly to their poets under a heavy fire as did the Egyp- 
tious under the fire of twenty-vight ships during ten hours. 

At a. m. on Thursday an English uian-of-wur vaa seen to put a small screw in 
plA<:e of the larger one which she hail been usiug, and it was then known that her 
ecreiv bad been carried away by a shot from the forts. 

Ou eiaiuining other ships it was observwl that eight had been severely battered oo 
their sides and thai one had lost her funnel. 



V. 

TBE EFFECT VPOX THE SHIPS. 

Two of tbe armored sliipo, tbe Monarch auil the Teoieraire, were nat 
injured at all. This ioimuuity was due in the case of the former to her 
being kept coatiniially in motion; iu the latter, to the fact that she 
was very distant from tbe enemy's batteries all tbe forenoon, being 
brought witbin short range later in tbe day, after tbe Egyptian gnu- 
ners bad become demoralized under tbe severe fire of tlie fire preceding 
hours. 




BRITISH NATAL AND MILITART OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 41 

2. Shot-bole !n torpedo-lieutenant's cabin, damaging frames, edge-straps, bulk- 
bead of cabin, ftimitare, and engine-room coamings. 

3. Shot«hole tbrongh netting, after part of quarter-deck, port side, carrying away 
part of wardroom skylight, sashes, rails and stanchions of after-ladder, and stan- 
ebious of staodard compass started. 

4. Shot-bole through cabin of staff-commander, completely destroying some fnrni- 
iore and damaging more. 

' 5. One shot-hole in captain's cabin on port and one on starboard side, comi)letely 
destroying fnmitnre in bed-cabin and partially destroying furniture in sitting- 
cabin. 

6. Trunk of admiral's skylight completely destroyed. The shell, in falling, dam- 
aged captain's table in admiral's fore-cabin. 

7. Two shot-holes in commander's cabin, completely destroying cabin and all fur- 
nitare, shell bursting in cabin. 

d. Steam-pinnace, port quarter, utterly destroyed ; stem broken and bows shat- 
tered. 

9. Several loading-scuttles in upper and main batteries blown away and glasses 
broken, damaging chains, levers, &c, 

10. Sailing-pinnace: shell carried away starboard quarter and port gunwale. 

11. Lower part of ventilator to stoke-hole blown away. 

12. Fore and aft bridges blown away, and several ridge-stanchions damaged and 
blown away. 

U Several awning-stanchions broken and blown away, and stanchions in fore- 
CMtJe damaged, &c. 
li Two shot-holes in fore part of upper deck forward. 
1^> Sashes of chart-house broken and furniture damaged. 

16. Seven streaks of upper deck forward much shattered. 

17. Several water-olosets slightly damaged. 

18. Chock of naval-pipe forwanl slightly damaged. 

19- Main royal yard and foro top-gallant yard badly bruised. 
20. Shot-hole tbrongh starboard side of quarter-deck. 
*!• Three streaks of deck '\u staff-rouimauder's cabin badly shattered. 
«. Post-office and fittings damaged. 
*3. Caniag of soil-pipes, wardroom closets, blown away. 
*4. Several side-steps, port side, blown away. 

«!>. Several plates of crown of lower glacis rivet-heads blown oft* and jdates stjirted. 
**• Ontnide plating in wake of mess-shelves on mess deck, port side, broken. 
*<. Heel of fore-bitts damaged and iron safes in galley broken. 
*^ Several streaks of deck on mess deck shattered. 
*3. Plate under upper deck in torpedo-flat cracked. 
^. Several tubes through wings leaky. 

Twenty-foor shot and shell i)enetrated the ship above the armor-plating, causing a 
^iderable amouut of damage to lower deck, galley, cabins, &c.. Several shot and 
^^Hstnick the armor-plating without doing any appreciable damage, but one which 
^pinged on the upper edgeof armor-plating Just abaft mainmast, port side, indented 
**e plat^j and made some jagged marks and holes to the depth of from one-half to one 
^^b. Tlie foremost funnel was struck in three places, the standing rigging in eight, 
^d running rigging in twenty-one places. 

RICH'D T GRIGG, 
Carpenitr^ H, M. <S'. Alexandra, 



42 BBITI8H NAVA.L AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN E( 
Alkxakdria, J* 

LIST OF RIOfllNO BHOT AWAY. 

Fort rigging.— FouTt\i, fltfth, and giith Blironda shot uway on port sid 

Uaim rigging, — Sraond alimnil, |>ort. side, six rallinea np from tfarer- 
■broud, port side, tn'ent.v-ttin'e TRiiinog np frum uheer-pole; tbird «hroi 
•Ida, nine ratlines np from shivr-pole. 

ifiiHR rigging. — Kuunli shroud, Htsrboard side, nine ratlines op tt*» 
maiti top-gallant atay ; niuiu royHl atay. 

Kunning rigging. — Purt fure tack, topmaat atayMlt halliards, fore-tmM Ti 
trioiug linoB, foreaail laokle, maiiiaail tackle, niain-tnisa Tulla, naiu- 
linea, irhipa for main bnutlinra, main vangn, fore vanga, niiiien vanga 
lines, cruMi-JacIc lift, atarbuaid main topsail clewliuea, port boiit'ii pi 
fore and aft, wire, peodant, for placing boats. 

H. T. BUR 



No mention, of coarse, ia made of the fact that three of tli( 
badly scored by sliellH bursting witliiu tliem, and tliut in tn 
A tube was split. Tbese guns vrere carefully inspected alter ( 
and were used until Ilip end of the tictioii. Tlie toss of tit 
tliis euforced precaution might liavis proved extremely awki 
other circumstances and iu a more evenly-contested engageii 

All the reconled damage is snch as might naturally be e 
action, excejit, |>08sibly, No. 9 of the carpenter's i-eimrt. Ass 
this was due to concussion and not to the entrance of a liostil 
the Alexandra's casemate, an assumption warranted by the 
the report, it falls at ouce into the same category as the otli 

In DO rexpect were the Alexandra's powers aa a fightin 
impaired by the injuries slie received. 




BEITI8H NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 43 

rat so great, wheo the gaii8 were fired fore and aft, or uearly so, that 
evcral of her boat8 were badly hurt, the phuiking being toru bodily 
rom the frames. 

The following is the official report of the injury sustained by the 
loviucible. Being in a fixed position all day, her range was soon got- 
ten by the Egyptians, who hulled her repeatedly, lieference has been 
Bide to a certain 6J-inch S. 6. in Mex Citadel as particularly well 
•mred. On aocoant of its masked situation great difficulty was expe- 
moeed on board the Invincible in obtaining the range in return. A 

Ivge number of the hits recorded are due to this one gun. 

H. M. 8. Invinciblr. 

At Jlfxandria, July 21, 1882. 

LIST OF DAMAURH ItECKIVED IN ACTION JULY 11. 

{Commencing foncard and working aft,) 

\. AdvDt ID tbe donbliuf^-plati*. under hawse-piiH*, 2 inrhes in depth and 9 inches 
ii ciftimfrrvDoe ; the doiil>linj;-pIate ih f inch thick on sidt*. plating f inch. 

^ A paoctan* m»«le by a nhot striking; the head chute and hriii>;inj; up against the 
■••«•»»> of the mewi deck, alwut :J fe»'t 6 inchoA ahov»^ water. 

^ A Mr Biade by a shut paMiing throu;rh the Hhip*H Hide, gouging; the deck, carry- 
tif ivajr tbr locken and bulkhead of the chief petty <dlicerH* iu«^mh, tinally loilging 
h ibr firp-brartli. 

i A Ttry largf* drnt, alwnt W feet farth*?r uft and \\ feet above, Htarting the plate 
Wt Almvp, & fret (i incheM deep iK'twfon the franieH, Hhowing quitfe an angle where 
wfnjbr* arr nitnale^l from th<* outMde. 

«*• A bills ofi thr upper dt'ck, pansiiig through the nide, tearing away the wrHMlcQ 
•»trf.»4v mtl aiigl«*-in»u nf tin* giittor-way, htoppiiig on thf <»pp<»Hite hiilt*. nliglitly 
^J-i.- '.j: th»- *!»ot-ruik«« uixl "pirkrtiijg. 

^ A :ji»ir alHittt 1 foot aliiift, on a Ifvi*l with th«' nicrtM-dfrk portn, pasHiiig through 
«*•'!'. tarrying aw.iy a nn*Hn-Mh«'lf, a t:iM«* !«•;: (or iri>\s'M fo<»t », iron HtancIiioiiH. and 
*'*I«^;n Air-piiMMi, paiMiin^ on, Htrikiit;; a rni'Ks stool and lorkrrs, tinally Htop|N*d by 
•r-k L|{ t.ir iriifj plating, wtiirh \^ hulgi'd out «ni tin* f»tln"r si<l«'. 

*. A •\m»\ paiwiog through hiwrr half-poit. striking and gouging a pitM'e out of the 

■ A h«ilr on \\\** lowrr ib'fk jurtt Iwfori' th«* fijnn«*l racing, rau't^'d l»y a nliot which 
^••'•l l^ro'njli th#* •♦id**, carrying awav a UH-HM-slHlf. haninioi-k bar-*, two pump Htan- 
chwiii. %•),) th«* r.*«k in wliirh ttn-y wrn* KtuwtMJ. panning through string «d inui la<l- 
vr. ADii ^vrff ly damaging an in»n viMitil.itor. 

'^ Ab"lr jii%t iM-fort* thi* upprr liatft-ry, ranH'-d l»y a nliot paH«»in;; thri»u;;h Nide, ear- 
H-'i »««y 1 i«trrn-pi|M*of gnn-ronni ofhriMH* wat» r rlm^'t. Ion kiing up thr iron Imlk- 
"•''4 >i ♦!» tliM'k. nnia<«hing tlu* j.inih ot' t!i«' dooi w .iv and tlii> rat-hlnrk, and ttrikiug 
tt» jp-Tt fofrtiifint )iatt«TV door (aimor pl.it«'il i, ulinh \%asop4'n. 

•^ A ht»|p jti^t iM-fiir** tilt* hrnlg»», rau**« «l liy a ••h'»t pa'«'»Mi;j tliron^h tin* gla**!** plato 
•''^ •ii' •hip** widr. ami *:oii;;iiig ill** t«-.»k. \ iiM h tliii-k, and \v«mmI >\ at r-^^ay. 

*' A ).i<;r itt tht* (jptaitr** g.tlltN. appairnil\ < aiiM'd 1)\ a ro< k«>i m hplint«-r. jii«it 
aWt •*,» f.„^ . radwiNiil. 

*• Afcb.it *tnii k thf linh-davit. «arr\in:^ a\\a\ afi ir«»ii *<tani!iion and part .if the 
'■''■•••lift hr di:r. th«*h •lru«k tli«* Inn* liitt h.-ad. wliirlj it ■»jdiiit» ifd. 
•■* N'lM-ti^ «>n «tiirlH»ard f|iiart»*r iiijuinl ny shut or pii*« •• fifHlH'll. 
It. ^n»ral xt*\t* * aloft wfn- i ut a\%a> l»\ shot. 

Kon. H. M. Mvn.xsv.v ^;., 



-^.«. 




44 BRITISH NATiX AND HILITABT 0PEBATI0N8 IN 

The Penelope was linlled eifuht times during the action, 1 
damage was done. Her commanding ofllcer thoaght she n 
by the rifled shell. One 36-pound sliot entered the cabin 
extraordinary corkucrew journey. through store-rooms am 
until it finally came to rest. .rtf. 

The uinzzle of No. 2 gun ou the ^^^^^ 
port aide waa hit by il large I 
k round shot, which took off a > 
' tapered flake atraut six inches \ 
I long and six inches wide on the | 
outer end, without disabling | 
or indeed really damaging the 
gnn. (Figf). 42 and 4.3.) Un board of the Peuelope this bi 
posed to have been the work of a XV inch shell. 

Miiny ropes were cut atofr, and the main-yard was so ii 
had to be replaced. 

The following is the official ' report of damages snst 
BnlUu : 

H. U 

Of Jt«M*itria. 

1. Foar plates no ataTboant side in wake of alieet-Bnchor partly 
frame broke u, one fraaie twnt in, anil itiHiilo liu)n){ omMbmlin; ti 
anchor hroken ami part Hhot away ; siilceciiltle broken ; IitilklieMi ot 
abot away ; tbe fure I'm! of hanimock berlbing sliaken an<l »ipliDt«red 
pipn from upper battory di'ck Hhotanay; gnu-room water-uloaet 
broken and part shot an ay ; furo part of fore cbauqel, starboard lidt 
to biilboanl brukeo. 

2. Upper part of eoaminf^ to fore ladder- way shot away. 

3. Trausporting chock at kiiiiihlbeail, port siite, spUuterud and part 




^ BUTUa MATAL AKD MILITAKY OPEEATION8 IN KOVPT. .46 

& Wnn infiWMl bnu] ami niy*! tnick nbnt awajr. 
U, Fmt WmU lUttMcod by diell. 
ftoaalBg ricgfBK 'tt iltrtmcli by >hot *ri<t Hbull. 
AnproTMl. 

W. ItUKT-URUBBE, 

CapWfa. 
k Xka repcst nf thf Sii|H'-rtt'it wounds in qaotod below : 

r 

^H^^ |-taak plMlny eto«a brSor* tba bktt«t7 ou tfao |K>rt alila «hot tbronitk, Hkm 
|H^U* (■ KkiMcb di«ll} |iH«li>x Ihroajib all tbr frame* (t«u In nnmlMiT) totmivg 
%t itmm fmri uf 111* •aiW««ntv fnr Ibn l>atif ry port, atartiug tbe upper pMbi( 
•kM IWH fcwt in an ■p«wiIdirr«tioii,au<l nUrttiig tli« DuMid« plaliug, maklll( • 
Ml la Uw dda 10 Tort Uiag by 4 feet deep <li>ttii lu wltiiin 3 tret of tbo watv* 
W «t1Ud| tba BfmK plain awl buntUie. 

1 Tb* i-lncli yUtlDK a l«« fnt before Ibo Am torpedo-pott, pott aide of n«M AmI^ 
*Mibn>«xb abnai 4 fnt abwr* Iba walcr-Une, niaklnK a bola 10 liiiibtw In illaOMtM. 
i. n* ^'Uivli plalisj; cluaa abaH lh« balt«r; on port aldn «liot lbn>U)tb, caffTlBC 

1**>r tba b*M> angttwiron, ami niaklnt; a bol? lu tbo side 18 Inohm iu diaoiatar ft 
te ihiii tte »»lar-lla<i. Tbla ww a lO-inoh aolid Bbal, dow uu buard. 
i tWai««r iplatM wnra ■track id tira plaoea on Ibn port ^l<> nbout 4 fmt dwv* 
<k TtlM-llnah Ite oim indnnUnx tbe armor ninohea; in tbaotber iUl- mafk of th» 
a|W« arite abrt) la Tialble, and tbo pUto ia aUgbUy ■taned, breaklntf 14 lln*- 
hiha(lfca ptaUng bmlnit tba port lill. 
^ 1W iHiBwal w*a abtrt thrinigh, mftklog • IioU aboot 19 iDchM In dlaiuvlaraloM ' 






' allw bridCB abot a 



^twttfaigriwt thruugb in two plaeaa, oariTing Nway tbran TolcW'tobaa, 

& Im llMfeiC ■! lB««r pari of cDibnuniv port, uu port Bide, under Iba imnp, abot 
hi^riaala Um dfoji-liolt, lireaklng the jiott alll aud atartin^ tliv Inaido plating, 
buck In- |Hirt. 
■ fot ac<MiniinudslloU'ladd«r« abot away. 

AaaiUaf awd maajiij rigjiyif. 

0- Dm ft laab-viR abroad with iron ratUnea ibot away ; one t«p-|pillant and OIM 
V«M t^kalny abol away ; one foTM bnuw, fore top aail balliardii, niDUcrof Jl)»«ta7 
■lfa*g«y, fan tap-iallatit Rhret, fore top-aotl bnatlinea. and foro taj^ialUnt lift 
kMmy; Mte ahnrt, aflar-boom topping- lilt, and uiixon top-nuwt rope and eni^ 

THOMAS Lit H. WABU, 



1W Sapcrt/fl waand nnmbered I tn the foregoinji report wm U> the 
hvnr lk« BtMt BtrikiDK of bH in the fleet. In i-vun a modrraM flea 
^ Wl daMtrJbfd wcMild hnvebeen moat auaujrtng, resiMlingtMinporMy 
Mlniltinir *ftt«r Into an iiii|tortant oompartinenL 
of tbe tlniDugtMt Just dflalliHl wjw very ttttftlit. Viewed 
Id the circa mstancvM in wbicli lh« ll«>l wm iilweil, tbey wen 
BOthlOK. Not a gun wiw ruully dtaablvd, nor tbe fifciiting 
«f a aJosle ship affected. Tbe folIowinK day all were ready 
a«wa eager to raMime tbe enjEragemeot, which oooU hft\ft Vwib 
iimat #0 long MS tb» imwilvr and shell held oak 




BBIT18H SAVAL AND HILITABT OPEBATIOHS IH EC 



THE FORTIFICAFIOSS AND THE DAMAGE SUSTAINED BV 

Id tfais section tbe fortifications are described in detail and 
given of tbe part each took in tbe action, togetlier with tbe e 
it of the Are from the British fleet 

Reverting to Plate 1, it wi]] be seen that Port Silsileh ii 
eastern of the immediate sea defenses of Alexandria. It sti 
base of a long rocky spit vblvb shuts in the eaetern harbor, 
eraltf the New Port. The fort is a small work built aron 
martello tower. (Plate 2.) It comprises two oonoentric b 
the north face. The terreplein of the upper battery, it i 
served, has been widened and tbe parapet thickened fht>Di II 
feet. The proper embrasures have been cut, and two M. L. B 
8-inch and one 9-iDch, have been moaoted. These guna poi 
the mouth of the harbor, at which place their fire crosses witl 
the eastern face of Fort Pharos. Two X-inch shell gnns ar 
en harbette on tbe east face of Silsileb, and more woald bBv< 
into position had time allowed. A XI Il-iuch mortar complete 
mciit of tl.is ruct. wln.;Ii Is Hai.l lobavf fiml "a few wflldired 
at the Teuieraire when ebe came uround to sliell Fort Ph 
Tcuieraire made no reply, however, and the fort ia unacratcl 

The first fort in tbe northern lineofdefense is Pharos, admin 
to command tbe eastern harbor and the approaches from tb< 
north, ivhile the guns on its sontbeni face may be tniinetl dit 
the city il8p|f. It stiindH upon the sitf of the fauions ligl 
Ptoleniy I'hiladelphns.one of X.hf seven wonders of the 




BRITISH NAVAL AND MlfJTARY OPERATIONS IT EGYPT. 47 

8 were the 4<> pounder B. L. R. Armstronp: fjniia already mentioned. Of 
this caM^uiate it may be said that its walls, only 10 feet in thickness, 
coahl offer no adequate resistance to the heavy projectiles thrown at 
Uieou and that to work its ^nns under the fire of the British fleet re- 
quired izreat pluck and no prudence. 

The main strength of Fort Pharos lay in its upper battery. Here 
the thin walls of the old fortress have been thickened from 7 to 28 feet 
(llea^uI^•<l throufrh the base of the superior slope), and M. L. H. ^uns 
■ooDte<l — two 8-inch and one 10-inch on the northwest face, one Oinch 
OD the north face, and two inch on the northeast face. The last two 
vere not asetl during the bombanlment. Plate 7 gives a large-scale 
I pliD of this opper battery of ritled guns. Plate 8 shows the additional 
pfotfctioD provided for them. The methoil, so clearly shown here, was 
idopted in the case of the other and heavier guns not included in the 
pietaren. 

Tbe west face was anoed with four Xinch S. B. guns, of little or no 
^lof, even if they could have been brought to bear. 

Tbe sooth face mounte<l a formidable-looking battery of fourteen 6^- 
iidiS. B., liearing on the town. 

Poor Xlll-ineh mortars completed the armament. 

Tbe series of plates numbered 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, and 11 exhibit the gen- 
cnl condition of the masonry of Fort Pharos alter it had been subjected 
to tbe pounding of the British fleet. Particular attention is called to 
tbeiniple breaches made in the west face, sis seen in Plate 3. The one 
loiLe extreme left is doubtless due to several well directed and concur- 
v^ot Khe]ls«explo<ling with unwonted accuracy after being fairly buried. 
Ja^t t«» the lelt of the old castle or keep is another breach, through 
•iiKJi tlie Armstn»ng guns on the north w«\st face may be sern. Dif- 
frrriit viewM of tlir.M* breaches an* exhihiteil in lMat«'s S, 11, and 12. 
^*U\r II i.H a vii»w of the ditch betwern the fort proper and the outer 
F»Ilfr\.! As a n-siilt of the hirge !»n»iicli sliown nn»re clearly in Plato 
1*. thf platform under a Xinch S. 1>. gun is totally ruined, although 
tbr gun \\s4'\t is unliariiH'd. Uecurring to IM;itr .'», a still wider breach 
*»»rii til the parajH't of the west face, expoMii;;: a second X-iiM-h S. B. 
rnii. lilii-wii*e put horn (if combat. The mIhiI hole, just above the water, 
»l.ilrtt wide and 11 feet high. 

Tb»- nt-ATs on the northwest fac(% the ]>rinci]>a1 one engaged, are given 
*i» I'Ute 1. Foi the sake 4)f cl«»arness, tin* sketch, lig. 41, Plate <>, Is 
«bM a.it A ke\ . 

Hit N«i. 1 i.H due to two shots, i»ne abnve and to the light of the em* 
^^♦iire (No. ]] on plan of casemate, IMat«*.'>). tin* otiu*r at the letl lower 
^^'Hirr. Their efleet has Immmi t«) i»eel <»1V the 4»ut«*r I'oiir.M'j^ of inaMinry 
t^'thf d«^pth of 2 feet or so quite uiiiforujl\, and to Idnek the gun in- 
*^f tbe caHeniate bj* a large mass of splinter>. 

Hit No, 2 has kncMrked awjiy 7 fe«'t of the cordon, \mt V\AH\vAi\wo 
itnuQi effect 



48 BRITISH SA.VAL AND HILITAEY OPEKATIONS IN B< 

No. 3 api>ears to have been done by several hita in the i 
borbood. Of these, od« is worthy of special notice. The sti 
the masonry to the depth of aboat 3 feet and then burst, I 
a fine crater and making a hage pile of ddbria at tbe foot ol 

No. 4 is the result of two 10 incli Palliser shell, one si 
cheek of the embrasure, the other immediately beneath the i 
projectiles entered the casemate and wrecked tbe gun and c 
youd iiuagiuatiou. 

No. 5, a shell cut out a {>ortion of the cheek of tbe emh 
burst inside the casemate, disabling tbe gon by masonry spl 

No. 6 is a deep hole. The projectile is doubtless lodged 
burst. Tbe splinters of masonry falliug behind it have so f 
hole as to prevent probing. 

No. 7, a slice is cut out of the cheek of the embrasure. Tl 
probably not seriously affected by this shot, but it was total 
by tbe burstiug ol a shell underneath the carriage. 

Nos. 8 and % a aeries of surface wounds, due to several sb 

No. 10 shows what is left of an embrasure. The gun ai 
inside are hopelessly and shockingly wrecked. 

The remaining embrasure on the right exhibits no scar, I 
masonry has been knocked off the inner edges tu block the | 

The other casemate, Plate 5, in tbe nortlieast face, wds le 
not being subjected to so severe or so direct a hammeriug. 
embrasure, No. 17, in which no gun was mounted, was stmu 

These galleries were simply slangbter-houses, a large nnm 
being killed and wounded, mostly by splinters of stoue. Tl 
of its walls and the lightness of its ordnance have been 
marked npon. Nearly all of these guns were used. 

The condition of the casemate battery is given in the follon 




BSrnSH NATAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 49 

•«tly mooDled. In addition, tbe Bill of the embrasure was dislodged 
a well-bnrAt shell. The piTOt is uu8hipi>ed, but this could have been 
icklv remedieiL (Plate 13.) 

The fierfeet condition of the 8-inch guns to the westward is shown in 
•t«-M H, 9, and 12. 

riit? tl-inch icnos to the eastward, not being engaged, were unharmed. 
In the northwest angle of the fort were two X inch S. R. en barbettej 
iich were worked during the bonibanlnient. A well-placed shot has 
ertumed ohe of the two. (Plate 8.) This is probably the gun referred 

iu the Admirars report as having been dismounted by a shell from 
e Inlli-xible. Its neighlior, still standing, is said to have been the 
*t gun tlrwl by the Egyptians as the Inllexible steamed away at the 
we of the day. 

Of the four guns originally mounted on the west face, two are still 
r\*iivalile. 

The MnifMithlKires on the south front, which overlooks the eastern 
irlmr. were destitute of cover against a rear or enfilading tire. Two 

them, in ironseqnence, were disabltHl. (lun No. 8 of this battery, 
Hiuting fnun the eastward, was put horn de combat by the destnicticm 
r \\^ platform. (Plate 13.) The place of the gun adjoining is marked 
o tbr Kiaie plate by thi* ends of the brackets of the carriage standing 
a «nl The gnn itself n*<*eived a blow scpuire in the bn»ech, which 
tHM'kiHl it «mt of itA caiTiage and over the parapet. It i>asse<l through 
he nmf of the kitcli«*n iNMieath (Plate 5) and planted itself vertically, 
*!th 'li*- muz/h' diiwii. /Piatt* 14.) Tin* (lin»ct!iess of the bhiw is iiidi 
•tn| h\ th«* strai;:htii«*ss of tlic i»atli dcsciihed by tlic gun in its tiight 
»■*•'. :iif ai*<««*n<*«* of tin* cas<*alM*l. 

Flu- n-:ir 1;»<T and k«M*p .sli«»\v unmistakable traci»s <»f at li»ast twelvr 
'•■•"I hits t*;i«h, the rille gun batten eight, tlie h*tt or west fare eleven, 
>«'.iM-riiatf, us jndgetl from tlie insid**, eleviMi, from tlie outside, eight- 
■^''- Many ot tlirsr maiks may have been «lnplieat«*«i. tlie d«'strnetit>n 
'' Uif ri.asoiii\ ieiid(*ting an acenrate idtMititieatioii (piite inip(»ssible. 
^"tr.irt'M lit < tat ling or Nordent<'i(1t iMiIlets or ot'slirapnel eoiild be dis- 

l':»- |ir.i4*tiee on Fort Pharos, it will lie rem«*rnbered, was dn(* to the 
"'»ij»i:u-<l efforts of the tive lieavie.sl ships in the !i«*et. 

lL:Tt-«Mi blin«l shell Mere fonnd in I'liarosand Wwy hrokcn 11 iii(*h eom- 
■■"!» •'ht-Il. TIh* Herge bag> eoiitainin^' tin* bursting ehargi' wrn» white 
'I'N.in. The |M)\vder it>*'lt' was liani and eak«Ml. 

•"^uniiiitng up the tlamage dour to this toit, it is simmi — 

i*-. That one ritifd ^un, the lifa\iest ot all, was put hors tie rnmhnt. 
*'*rf< fount of the ]»roximity i»f the keeji, it 4*ouM not have be«'n perm.i- 
*"^i\\\ i^rvfd iit anv time. 

•^i. Th«it <»ne X in<*h S. H. gnn* in the upprr batt«*ry was dismounted. 



5U BBITISH NATAX AND MILITARY 0PEBATI0N8 IN B( 

3d. That Id the northweBt casemate aeveii ont of twelve 
more or leee disaljled. 

4tb. Tbat the ohl-fasbinned batteries, whether barbette oi 
affortled very iuadequate protectiou. 

Ou the other hand, it is also shown — 

l8t. Tbat five out of six, or, more justly, three out of four, 
were unharmed. 

2d. That one X-ioch 8. B. io the upper battery was still a 

3(1. That tbe four d^-inuh guns in the north casemate' 
jured. 

4th. That two B. L. B. 40-pdr8. and three ej-inch S. B. in 
wetit ciisemate, fire guns ont of twelve, were not hurt. 

5th. That tbe modem batteries with thickened parapets j 
protectiou against almost the heaviest guns now afloat. 

In Plate 8 a distent view may be had of Ada, the next fori 
in the northern line of defense. 

Like Fort Pharos, Ada is built ut>ou an outlying ledge of 
is connected with the mainland by a stone caaseway. It if 
lar four-sided work, so placed that its principal faces point 
and northwest, delivering cross-fires in fVont of Pharos on on 
of the Bas-el-Tin Lines on the other. The former face is lig 
with seven X-incb 8. B. guns. Back of tbe north angle of t 
cavalier, B, with a solid masonry scarp, mounting oneS-inc 
capable of a certain amount of train on either front, with a 2 
mounted on each side. In the northwest face lies the stren 
fort,a mwlem cavalier with thickened walls (28 feet), carrying 
and three 9-inch Armstrong M. L. K. Between this and tbe 
north angle is a low battery of X-inch 8. B. guns. Id addii 
r.ited, there are, as u.sua). j 




BRITISH NAVAL AND MIDTART OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 51 

Non. 10, 11, 12, and 13 resemble No. 1. 

No. 14 has burst ou the cordon and cut down the scaq) about 2 feet. 
Thin Keari* was pitted all over by shrapnel balls. No niacbinegun 
ballet marks were detected. 

The hits on the superior and exterior sloi)e8 are sketched on Plate 
16. 

No. 1 is the No. 14 jnst described. It made a good crater, blowing 
oot liehind it the material it di^kK]ged ou entering. 

No. 2. The shell struck the exterior 8lo|»e and burst well, making a 
large crater, which laps over n))on the superior slope, and blowing down 
a fiart of the cheek of the embrasure. The damage is more »p])arent 
Chan real. 

Nos. 3« 4, and 5 are fine craters of various sizes. None, however, are 
of A seiions nature. 

No. ti is the best of this series of hits, having been made by a plung- 
ing fdiof, which, if it had fallen a few feet either way, would have ruined 
a 9-iDcb M. L. K. This crater is 7 feet wide and 9 feet long. 

No. 7 resembles No. 3. 

Ou the soi^erior sh>i)e, near hit No. 5, was one of the Intlexible^s 16- 
ioch Palliser shell i>ointing straight out to seaward. Such a position 
woald seem to indicate that the shot had been tired at long range, had 
lirmme unsteady in its flight, had cii))sized as it struck, and that enough 
Tflocity of rotation was left to r(»ll it out of its IhmI up to the crest of 
the parapet. The general gcnxl behavior of these shell n»nders this case 
llit•*rl•^ting lN*eaii;<e exceptional. 

Thf itijiiiirs U'ceived by the soiiilieastern or slion* si<le of tliis fort 
from fflungiiig ^hot that had pa.s.sed over the batteries are show n ou 
r!.ir»- IH. 

There an* two j:<kx1 hits on the parapet of Cavalier H and ten on its 
ii«Tthwfst warp bark of the water l»attery. The latter shows two hits 
"i: ihr p.ir.i|H't. 

I'Lile VJ is H view of what was left of tlu* nia;:azine after its ex- 
pI«i*iion at l.-'VJ p.m. This eatastiopln', rendered po>Mli e by the ab- 
*ur«lly ifiMTun* poxiiion of the nia;i.i/ine, >ilenrrd tin* tort. Tlie ninn- 
^it-r if Willed and \iounded by tlii.s aerident eoiihl not br a.M'ertained, 
bat It muf^t hav«* in^en a fair proportion of the ;:arii><>n. The orcnrreiiee 
I'.f^U wa** a ina;:nitleent sperinirn of pN lotrrlmio, rf>rniblin;; tin* erup- 
tion of A v«»lr.ini». It is liaidly to be wondcriMl at that the tort was 
-iiMrTi»*dl\ evaenatiMl** bv the siirxivors. The hi;:h balterv .M*en on the 
nght in thi?* pl.iti- is Taxalier H. 

l*a«^*»ift;; to the ;:nns, it is found that the largest, a 10 ineh Ai iit>tion;r, 
«a* •ii"v;ible«l. A >hi>t had sti nek it on the niU//.ie. rai ried awaN the hojd- 
fA»?», and Un«M*k«'«l the slnle trurkN otV the tiarks. The erew were evi- 

drntl> making an attempt to ^et the ;:nn into po.sition a;:ain at the time 
of the expli>i»ion, lor the jurks iieie /on/id nn«.(»r llie ^\\de aWw V\w v^e- 
Tw>D. Tbf Miijomiii^ U iinh ^uti> we/e nnhai ined. 



62 BBITI8B NATAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN El 

In Cavalier B one X-iuch S. B. waa diMmoaoted by a shi 
fleet. (Plate 20.) 

In tlie lower sea battery one X-iucli S. B. was diHiuoaat<Ki 
ami a second was wrecked through the smashing of the elide 
iiig shot. 

Besides the shell from the 81-ton gun already mentioned, t 
were foniid uu burst, one 9-incli Piilliaer, one 10-inch Palliser, 
inch common shell. 

Summing up the damage done, we find — 

1st. That one 10-i'ich U. L. B. was put horg de combat by 
fire. 

2d. That of the smooth bores which could be brought to 
out of tteven were disabled, if not dismounted. 

3d. That the magazine was exploded, and the fort, in co 
abandoned. 

On the other band — 

lut. Four out of the live rifled guns were still serviceable. 

I'd. The disabled rifled guns could have been restored 
working order in a very short time. 

3d. The damage done to the walls and parapet was practi 
niflcant, and could have been repaired, where necessary, in a 

Immediately southeast of Fort Ada, lyiug between it and 
ros, and placed, so to 8[>eak, at the apex of the re-en t«riugai 
by the coast as it runs from one to the other, is a new work 
Fort Ada Lunette. (Plate 12.) It took uo part in the 
ment. 

Passing to the westward the coast recedes and assames 
of a narrow bight, about one thousand yards in leugtb, bei 
most part a shelving, sandy beach, unprovided with defens- 




BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KGYPT. 53 



foor X Vincb S. B., sixteen Xincli S. B. of various tyiies, eleven G^-inoh 

8. B. (or ri6-|MlrH.)9 au^ one XX-inch, seven Xlll-incli, and one Xiuch 

tnortiiiv. All of these ritled guns and most of the smooth-bores were 

forked. In addition were the 9 inch M. L. R. on a Moncrieff carriage, 

and the B. L. R. 40iMlr. Armstrong, on Kennon's lift-carriage, already 

Mentioned. This last gun is not shown on either plan. It stands about 

«>D»» handrp«l yanls to the eastward of the Light-IIouse Fort. The 

^•>unting of this piece is on a simple and ingenious plan, which may Ih^ 

*^f Mrribed in a few words. The gun, on an ordinary carriage, is borne on 

^ r-uiinteriioiseil platform capable of being raised and lowered in a deep 

'''t. (A gasometer will give a rough idea of the system of counter|H)ises.) 

4r tbf iMittom of the pit are the magazine and shell-room and theload- 

'''^r chamber. After filing, the gun is lowered for loading, then niised 

*'••! firwl over the bank. The cost of this system must l)e very great, 

^fi«l might find its justification in the case of a muzzle-loading gun in an 

*** ^^aifptionally exposed position. 

iTie RaselTin Lines were deficient in traverses, while the magazines 
'^='»v subject to the disadvantage of inadequate protection. In n?ar, at 
^'^C'ious |K>inta, were ample barracks, shell-houses, &c. Incidentally, 
***>*je served the purpose of defining, with extreme clearness, the target 
*^ *«^tsl at b^- the British gunners, to the detriment of the garrison. 

^Vbe details of the Hospital Battery are given in Plate 22. It was 

°^^ Quished at the time of the bombardment, so that its guns did not 

'f** >ny the full measure of protection which it was designed to give them. 

^^-1^ b.i(tt'i\ was v*-ry sevcn'ly liaiulhMl, the iiiasoiirv batterc«l in, and 

•Xa* ^nn> blocked. It is simply inipos.sibK' to note or even fairly est i- 

^* tTi- the iiunilH*r of hits. The left flank i-^ <"oiiiphM«ly Ineaelied an*! the 

^'•i«"f tlir n«'\v e\|H*ns4' nia;;aziiie derpiy sforeil by sln»lls. The wivek 

*«:•■ Mf th«* ii;:lit enibrastiic was eausiMi hy a HJineli PallisiT sIh'II. Tiie 

^•.i'frT\ mounted two 7 in«li M. L. U. Tlie ;:iins ihiMn-^elvts w«t«* un- 

^^;tirei|. SiibM'<|iientiy tliey wm* tr;in*»porte«l to Uamlcli and niountiMl 

%'r*' in ihr I»iiti>h lines nt' defrnse. Tjxm on<' of them no h»ss than 

4'* •»tirapn<*l nmrks wtic eonntetl, somr a.> deep a> halt* an ineh. This, 

a lo .iivh ••hrapnel, mn>t liavr l»ni>t diirrtly in front of* the niM/./Ie of* the 

ffnn and have intlieted teiiilde dania;;e npon the ;;nirs eiew. A sliell 

hii:^: iindtT tin* front tia«'k of thJN ;;nn, tme it np. an«l tsistril th«' left 

ffo'ii truek in it> MMk«t. In >pitf of all these di^a.^trrs, and of tin* 

L*'<»iy marhitu' gun fire to whieh it was siibjfiMed. tin* Hospital I>atlrry 

«.i« fiiU;;ht until '{ p. in., or for ei;:ht honis. This riieiMii>.tanef alont* 

Wii-lhl proV«' the stubbornness of tin* drl'rnsi*. I; Is proper ti» irr ill tin* 

««*rd.« of Captain Hunt (irnl)bf'> <»flieial rr|»ort : **()iir lilhd '^\u\ in the 

II«**pital e.irtliwotks, wliirh it was inipos>ib|i> to di.sni<Mint, bcin;; invis. 

ihU' from the nhip, did us grrat dannige.'' 

The smooth iNires to tin* westward of the Hospital r»attery uen* nearly 

a21 vurkiNl umrt* or h'ss. Onr X itirU gun, marked a o\\ V\.v\^» -\, '^aa 

ditituoanted hy a hlwll, anil sinntUrr, if, by its own leeoW, \\av\uvi. vv^Ava- 
bi^ been overcharged. 



54 BRITISH NATAL AKD HILITABY OPEBATIONS IN Et 

Tbe buildinga and walls in rear bear evidence of the uee 
feldt au<] GatlJDg gons by the fleet. 

Tlie large moderu work, called for tbe sake of cleameas t 
Battery, is drawn on Plate 33, where tlie principal ncartt on t 
are marked. Its relation to its neighbors appeurs on Plate ! 
fered very severely, receiving the full attention of tlie brondi 
in tbe offttbore squadron. 

No. 1 is a deep cot od the right cheek of the embrasure, 
practical damage. 

No. 1! is a similar wound on the other cfaeek. 

No. 3 is a good bit under tbe muzzle of the gun, wreckin 
fast. 

Nos. i and 5 are mere scores od tbe cheek, and may even 
8hrii[>itel. 

No. is a fine crater, 11 feet in diameter, made by a well- 
It cannot, however, be connidered as a serious wound. 

No. 7 is a trench feet long, i feet wide, and 1 foot de< 
out by a glancing shell. 

No. K is a severe wound in the sill of the embrasure, which 
wrecked. The revetment of the interior slope is gone betweei 
markfd d and e. 

No. is a scooped trench like No. 7. 

The 10 inch rifled gun was put completely hora de combat. 
fVont truck is gone. The compressors appe^ir to have fail 
gun has re^niletl violently and damagetl the buffers. Tbe 
the pivot biw been battenttl iit atul tbe «lid« trucks are neai 
tracks. The gun itself w»s struck uu the chase, and the 
Bplit 2 fi>et from tbe nuizzh-. 

Us i»inie<liale ueJKhlmr. n 9 inch .M. L. R., is uninjured. 




BRITIBH NAYAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 55 

No. 4. Several light hits on the superior slope. 
No. 5 is a crater about 9 feet across aud 3 feet deep, made by a shell 
wbieh burst after getting fairly buried. The end of the cheek of the 
embrasure is- destroyed, but the gun was not damaged and the resisting 
power of the battery was unaffected. 

No. 6 is a breach 10 feet wide in the parapet, and is shown in sec- 
tion on Plate 24. It did no harm to the guns. 

No. 7 is a large crater, 10 feet in width by 6 feet in length and 3 feet 
in depth, caused by a well-burst shell. 
No. 8. The right cheek of the embrasure is cut away. 
The 8-inch Armstrong M. L. R. on the right of the battery was struck 
under the chase, but was not injured. The right front truck of the 
top carriage was smashed, aud the left bracket was cut through by a 
splinter of masonry. The gun could have been used again. 

The other rifled gun was hopelessly wrecked. A shell had apparently 
&irly entered the embrasure, striking the chase and third coil, and, 
parsing underneath the gun, had exploded inside the carriage. The 
brackets were blown clean out and the gun permanently disabled. 

A portion of the Ras elTin palace buildings, erroneously termed the 
harem, was set on fire by shells which were directed against the Tower 
wd Central Batteries, but which overshot the mark and exploded inside 
tbi8 house. It is believed that this is the only building in Alexandria 
tims fired by British shells. 

In the Ras-el-Tin Lines the practice of the British fleet is seen to have 

W vastly more disastrous to the rifled guns than in either Pharos or 

Ada. Of the seven in all mounted, the 10 inch, one each of the 9 and 

^inch, and both 7-inch guns were disabled, the latter being blocked by 

^iiaiionry splinters. There were thus left but one 9-incli and one 8-inch 

§nn still serviceable. 

The parapets could all have been restored, temporarily at lea.st, in a 
^D|jle night, and the 10-inch, possibly the 9-inch, and both 7-inch guns 
^a<le capable of use in a very short time. 

The smooth -Dores suffered but two wrecks, both near the Hospital 
-^atterj'. The parapet here is so low that the crews could l)e readily 
driven from the guns by smaller pieces of onlnance, leaving the heavy 
^Dsof the fleet comparatively free to devote their entire attention to 
^he rifled guns. The smooth-bore, bowled ott* its carriage, was, how- 
^^er, struck by a heavy shell. In spite of 20 [)drs., Nordenfeldts, and 
Catlings, these old-fashioned guns were vigorously served, doing much 
damage to the ships. 

The Ras-el-Tin Lines terminate to the westward in a well-designed 
^tioned fort, surrounding the modern light-house of Alexandria. 
The |K)int on which the fort is situated is called Eunostos Point, and 
the fort itself has been termed variously as Eunostos, Ras-el-Tin, and 
the Light-House Fort. Plate 1 exhibits the general command of this 
work — northwest to seBwurd, west to seaward, in the directiou o? \Xi^ 



66 BBITISU NAVAL ASD MILITARY OPEBATIONB IS K( 

chaimela, across tlie liar, south and eoutlieast over the hai 
built ou 8i))i(l rock, the scarp rising abruptly frnni the level 
above wLich, at the height of 28 feet, is the terrepleiii. The 
sectiouB of the fort are given on i'latit 25, which also shows fl 
plan of the west or main sea fsice. The parapet of the origin 
been greatly thickened prior to the mounting of the luodeni 
at the time of the bombardment the process of farther iiic 
defennive qualities was still going on. 

A landing pier andsally-iwrtareon the south side. Thei 
zine is at b ou the plau, smaller expense magazines being iu 
dotted lines in most of the traverser. 

The eastern part of the walled invlosure is a fortified barra 
ing ample accommodation for a thousiind men. The land i 
to tlie fort are eomuianded by loop-holed chambers, throw 
Portions of the uortheni and southern walls are similarly 
mnsketry. 

The Light-House Fort mounted one 10incli,fonrO-inch,au(] 
Armstrong M. L. U. Of these the latter and one of the 9 
could nut be brought to bearou the British fleet. The westt 
rie<l two XV inch and two X-inch cast-iron 3. B. guns, which 
were not manned or fired on July 11. On the north frou 
more X-iuch S. B.guu8,audonthe south front a large battery 
one CJ-inch S. B. 

The four rifled guns on the west face were alone employeid 
of the bombardment. They were subjected to an extremely 
(practically from all five shijut of the otTsliore squadron), whi 
well-mariied traces. They were all, especially those iu the sou 
most indifferently protected, the parapet being dangerously 

On Plate 17, Fig. HI, is a sketch of the we>t lace of th 




BATAL AHD MIUTABT OPKBATION8 IN BGTPT. 57 

to the eortain pnapeti we find (see Plate 25) ut namber of. 
fiodbita. 

Ha ft is a i^*t^ well-fonned enter, eboat 9 feet in diameter, extend- 
iiff half «aj aevoas the parapet 

Ha 6 is a eat dear down to the oordon from 4 feet above the exterior 



Ho. 7 ia a traneh aoooped oat of the top of a traverse containing an 

The trenoh is 8^ feet long and 6 feet 9 inches 



Ba 8 ia a beaotifU braaohi made by a plunging shot, catting down 
tit west of the paiapet along a distance of 12 teet Fig. 63, PUte 
n, h a ssatisa thioagh the middle of the gap. The shell most have 
opMsd ae soon ae fisirly tmried. The mean thickness of the parapet 
hUlMt The path of the shot throngh it is 12 feet. 

Is. I is a piaetieable breach at the angle between the cartaiaand 
thsntthsra bastion 

l«.tt Is a good enter In the exterior slope, overlapping the snperior 



Isa 11, U, and IS. The corner is knocked down, bnt little real 



Is* 14 is a sear on tlie right cheek of the bastion. 

Si^ U. TIm sliell bant well, blowing away the outer comer of the 
Mckeek. 

^ M is a large, hot not serious, enter in the tnverse. 

Sos- 17 and 18 are good entern in the slopes running down over the 
swlun into the scari>* 

^<^ 19 wrecked the embrasure. 

Tlif" right fiioe of the south baMtion is 8hi»wn in Fif^. 50, Plate 17. 

Hit Xo. 1 is Che Maine hh Xo. 18, juMt (lc8crii>ed. 

^^ 2 IK a hole 3 feet deep, 3 feet inches hifi^h, and 2 feet 6 inches 
vide. 

^V 3 in iiiniiUr to No. 2. On the f^rouncl, G feet diMtant, lies a lOinch 
eiaaoo i«hill, |Miintinj; towanlM the hi>le. 

•V 4 in a hole into which a pn)j«H.*tile haH iM*netnite4l t4> the depth of 
U ifast H fe4*t« 

Xa 5 lMir»t on the conlon, making a pMxl crater 7 feet G inclieA lou^; 
•Bd 4 fctrt vide. 
Xo. 6 is similar to No. 2. 
Xa 7 in a near nia4le by a 10 inch common Hhell which burrit on ini- 
fstt, Healing oil' the wall over an area 7^ feet lon^ and 4 feet wnle to 
the drpth of a fooC 
5oSb H and 9 are two connectin^c <?niterA niaile by blind Mbell. 
PasaftBg to the inside of the northern bsMtion, and referring to Plate 
M, the daoMge sustained becomes evident at oiuw. 
Ito f-iaeh goa monnted in the capit4il of the bastion baa beeu t^ti* 
bjrexcoBMii'eaad improperly controlled teeoW. K «IUm\»t 



58 BB1TI6H NATAL AND UILITABT OPBBATION8 IN 

forelock throngrh the pivot would have restated the shea 
the saddeo bump with which the gun came in, would bar 
holdfasts in place and the gun in serriceable condition, 
its neighbor is the work of, perhiipa, the best shot of the d 
itself is deeply scored under the chase. Aft«r inflictii 
the shell probably passed inside the carriage and burst, 
gun over backwards on top of several of the crew, who 
that position on the following day. It is possible thatthi 
the trunnion band may have been due to anuther and pn 

In the left or soathern bastion the 10-inch M. L. B. gn 
to be silenced. It was this gnn that killed Lieutenant JacI 
the Inflexible. The gnn was bit on theA-tnbe, but not da 
eventually placed kora de combat by the wrecking of the t 

Its neighbor, a 9-iuvh' M. L. R., is said to have beei 
disabled. It is shown in Plate 27. The embrasure is mi 
gone, and the guu is on end. It is not impossible that tl 
have followed upon the knocking io of the sill of the emt 
is more likely to have been due to a weak pivot, aud thui 
duplication of the eiiterience in the northern bastion. 

The third gnn in this bastion, ad-inch M. L.U., wasnot i 
the engagement. It bore upon the harbor. Being well 
caped injury. 

The remnining rifled gun in the fort, an S-inch Armstr 
on the sonthern or inner face, was not worked. It is see 
It suffered badly from reverse fire. The left training trui 
the embrasure wrecked. 

The masonry iu the neighborhoo<I aud the walls of the I 
the impression of many Nordenf'eldt bullets, shrapnel bi 
biiililiiiKs wilbin IIk- fort arn JL-rribly hrvwrhoil niiii ih 





!Sa W&VAL AND MliaTAUV OPERATIONS IN EGTrT. .'/9 

^eBXB^ced wltli nolt>wi tliuit twenty -nix* guim, nf wliicb fit^een vrvm 
tUtft u tta« larpwt )t»ii lii tlie fort nnd t.br«e wero larger, the renult 
f tb« work done ctui be rciKllly fiiiik>n«tunil. 

Bm two gtms, uiM> lOtiich tind uuo O-iuvU M. L. U., euii be conmlilered 
apnmiHiDf iin immitliale periud of renewed usefulnewt. One iiieh 
n b ntiDeil bejood redemtttion and the other enii only be restored to 
larilini; contUttou At the e-t|H>nH« of miieli rime nnd labor. Throuffh the 
li*«r the Irei, three nul nf four Die ronderu^l unlit for emidoyment. 
lot, bowKTcr. twii of the four tfODit eould huve beeu gotten ready for 
Ighlibf tbr Dext ilay. 

TW Itw-a an the floatbem nhore of the buy befnii clone to the towu at 
hnS^h Atrn. (rinie» I iiud W.) 

TUiiaMi old work tipni (he Hhore, coti«ii«tinf[of a w»t«r bHtt^ry tind 
ttqnrt redoubt, the Utter ourronndcd by m dry ditch. Orte fnee of 
fetradanbl, noanltiiK fonr il^inch S. U., m deaigued to coinumnd the 
Am ■pprDadiM from the we«tvard. The other fiwjon bear iiimn the 
katior, ADd moant, in all, five X-ineh HOd twelve fl^-luch 8. R., with 
H* Xi iDf-h mnrtar. R«-ing an inner defcniu!, Soleh Aga wax not at- 
kcbd antfl late in ibe aftemooD of the day of the bombardnienl, bcins 
■is- tb« Orw uf tJie Monon-h and Penelope for a very Hhort tiine. The 
(■ipRti are iiraetically iiutoucbed. A flj-itiuh S. B. xun was dln- 
kVBtnl by the «ht|Ht. 

BtatbweM of tiateh Agm, niid dtHlUDt from it about 8U0 yanis, in an 
rti'flnhleaedtypeo batter)-, adjoininf; a tnartellotower.and mounlinKtwo 
XinrhS. U. and two «^ iud. S. K. giirio The imrapet sIiowh five or 
rii |aod Uta, mm] the scarp one more. None of them are at all serious. 
Ik ettroBW western gnn of the four, one of the smaller type, baa, 
■fiMtioosbly, been stntck by a shell. The gnn is cot in two, and the 
Mob portion thrown many yards to the front. It is difficult to t«C0D- 
A the iritnattea of this fragment with the evidence of the blow. 

At a sMond intervml of abont 800 yards fs a closed work, known aa 
^ OoB-d-Kabebe, in many respects one of the most interesting of 
ttt Dirts aboat Alexandria. It Htnnda back from the water on the 
^paratiTelf high gronnd, abont 80 feet in elevation, that lies between 
^ hirbor and Lake Hariont (ancient Maroeotis). Tbe fort commands 
^taaw harbor (see PUte 1), the Corvette and Bughaz Passeti. After 
**■)■( tlw bar aoy vessel would still be continually under its fire 
*Mfl it aetoally reaebed tbe city. Plate 31 is an interior view of this 
^ hwlrlBy cast, wttb the inner harbor as a background. On Plate 
Ilia fpiwral plan of the fort, a large irregular work, whose prin- 
1^ ftaaC la tamed towards tbe northwest. The soothem faoe is 
^MtBbadt toeonmaod the laud approaches from Mex. The east' 
I towatds the center, narrowing the work at this point. 

• IbUm opMBtioua Bgkiiui ib« Llght-HouM Foil vaftltMoa- 



60 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN 

PiACtically it consiBtsof twocounectingconrts, with barr 
baildingn in BHch, two sidefl of which mount guns, the wb< 
by a dry ilitoh ."JO feet iii width and of varying depth. A 
detached work at the easteru extremity vontaine a large < 
rackH. At one point of the principal face tbe old pan 
tbickened to about 27 feet, the terreplein widened, and tn 
strong M. L. H. mounted in embrasures. In addition U 
X'incb S. B. and ten ti^iucb 8. B., one Xlll-incb and tw« 
tars. Plate 33 is an interior view at the western end, n 
incidentally, the land between Oom-el-Kabel« and Mex. 

Tbe professional interest which this Ibrt offers is derive 
that, being engaged by the In tiesihle at the long range of 3 
Bbot stmck tbe work at a considerable angle of fall. Tb 
able of the wounds inflicted by this vessel are marked oi 

No. 1 is a fine breach in tbe counterscarp, 10 feet wide a 
The descent into the ditch, through this gap and over th 
bottom, wontd be very feasible. 

No. 2 is a small ticar on the cordon. Near it are threi 
tbe gorge of tbe work. 

No. 3 is a Sue bole in tbe retaining wall of tbe scarp, 
oat away for 10 feet along each face, making an almc 
breach. The shell has burst at exactly the right depth. 

Na 4, a small gonge out of tbe connterscarp, appears 
done by the same shell which inflicted wound No. 3, in it 

No. 5 is a fljdendid crater. The shell baa fallen at an 
angle, and burst when well buried, blowing oot the eart 
rior slope from a bole 17 feet long, 14 feet wide, and 5 fe< 

No. 6 is similar to the above, but a trifle smaller sup* 
inches shallower. 




MAWAL AMD MIUTART OPBBATI0H8 DT EOTPT. 61 

Vo^ IS is A deqi tnmgli plowed in the snperior dope, 7 teet wide At 
igneteeC bwdth and 12 fSset long. It reaches to the orest of the 
Mspsl, slsBg whidi it messores 3 feet 

wiD be made later to these oraters, whose extensive and 
kaiaeter shoold be remembered, 
lb the gam in Oon-el-Kabebe very little damage was done. The 
itoA riles weve nntooohed, although literally oovered with dost and 
gmvil tossed aboat lo' the shell as they landed. (The ii^ary to the 
of the gnn seen in Plate 35 was done by gnn-cottoo after the 
of the place by the British.) The Xinch S. B. on their right 
idnouted and thrown in rear of the terreplein (Plate 31), prob- 
it/ by its own recoil. The flrst 6^inoh 8. B. 6u their left* beyond the 
\nimm shown in tlie plan, Plate 32, has come to an extraordinary end. 
Ihe bieeeh of Um gnn is seen in Plate 34 lying in the middle of the 
imBra coart. It was, doubtless, knocked off its carriage and smashed 
ly a Pslliser sbdL The fhustnre, as inspected ou the spot, is not that 
rf a bsist. A portion of the mnssle went through the air over the roofh 
rf tke intcrTeniog buildings and lodged in a wall at a, at the western 
iii«f the fbrt (see plan). The guns seen in the various plates to be 
bhg sbngside of their slides were capsized by blue Jackets from the 
Im after Um bombardment 

Omi-d-Kabebe is stated to have been ^^ most troublesome.'' Its prac- 
tiM vat certainly good. 

A large aomber of blind shell were found here. 

The firing of the Inflexible against tbiH work, both as witnesHed from 
tkeoQter anchorage during the day and art neen in the renults enumer- 
aled, wan admirable. 

After all, but one gun wiui diHabhnl by the fleet, an<l the <Iamage to 
Ihe parapet could have lieen repaired in a vety nhort time. The para- 
pet itaelf vaa too low to give proper Hhelter ai^ainnt iniMlern projectiles. 

IkrcrtiDg to Plate «'}3, the catre beacon in the half dintance 18 one 
^ Ihe bading-markfi for entering the Bo^haz Panrt. Inime4liatel3' in 
^^ofit ia a small detaclieil work, known an Fort Knmaria, which 
*^ Ho part in the engagement. To the right in the outer harbor, 
^**adid lieyoud by the Hhouhler of land which teriniiiaten at Fort 
^4cati. Just over the right of Kumaria iH the uiartello t4)wer in the 
^^ which begins the Mex Lines. The lantet^n yanU lN*long to native 
^'^it Hex, the buildingrt of which pla4'e apiN*ar ehme to the lN*acon. 
'■^Bisarets are on an unflnisheil and long deHerte^l siinimer |mlac<^ of 
^ Khedive, to the left of whidi is Heen the eitadel of Mex. 

I^laie 1 shows that the .Mex Linen extend along the Mhore for a dis- 
of 2,000 yards, beginning with the Martello Tower liuttery, just 
'^'^tarl oat, and ending in Mex Fort and the land lines which stretch 
*^>^ the isthmus fh>m shore to shore. 

Aarrery vesael entering the harbor must approach Mex^ pass close 
^ i^ aad nmmia ffw u long time within easy range of vhis sie\V«a ol IfA- 



62 BRITISH NATAL AND HILITASY UPERATIONS IN 

tificatioDS, it naturally received great attention in the 01 
The couBtruction, having been eftected in the early part 
falls far below the requirementu of to-day. The gaas »r 
en barbette behind thin, old-fashioned walls in wretched o 

The trace of these lines is given on the conventional pi 

In the lines proper, not including the fort of Hex, 1 
fonr XV-inch 8. B., eleven X-inch 3. B., and eight fi^-incl 

Id the Martello Tower Battery, B 0, one X-inch gun 
over backwards by a shell, and one was dismounted by it 

Kear this, at O H, is a pair of XV-inch 8. B., intact, c 
carriages. They were- not served on July 11. 

The whole length of these lines was subjected to a very 
of machine guns throngbont the day, partionlarly after 
came inside. The walls bear testimony to the sharpness 

Back of the Mex Lines are two or three old forts, desif 
the land approaches. Que of them had ^een turned int 
where no less than 7,(HHl barrels of i>owder were stowed, 
lay the Penelope's nnesploded Bhell. 

To the eastward of the village of Mez the land projects 
the sea, aflbrding a site for a fort, whose only disadvant 
elevutioD. On Plate 37 is a general plan of the fortlflcatt 

The front is twice broken at a wide angle. The puraiie 
ern portion has been greatly thickened and heightened, en 
and substantial emplacements prepared fur two rifled gu 
38 the line of separation between the new and the old w 
tainiiig wall is clearly shown. 

To the left and rear of the new rifletl-gun battery is 1 
battery, facing in the same general direction. It can be 
39. The thinl battery of Fort Mex lies to the eastward 




\ BUnKU HIVAI. AXO UILITART OPEBATIONS IN 



w 

P^lllu pteparatJuiu were makiuj; Just linfore July 11 for tlio nicmnt- 

I t^^i two ti>or« lU-luc)i iut«l two iu»rt> 0-lucii AriiiHtrutifi; M. L. It., tbe 

I pi^ canf MMi *ik1 vUtltx b«iuf( in rvotliuVM ou tliv HjKfL. (I'latciii40 

nd 11.) Tilt* eaiu> iwIuhII.v in pluct- cumpriHM dii» lOiuch, otteO iucb, 

Mdtbne ^ineh U. L. U. guna, four X inch and five tij inch S. B. ^iin«, 

rilXIII itocb, two XI iuch, Rntl two X-inch niorturi). 

Tbe rtikf Mmnt on tti« riflfd-tnm battery are itkelvlietl iu on tbe plan 
I sTihr furl, riatu:);. 

K<L 1 U a iinial) tiviidi in tin- «U{>enur H)o)ie. 
'l Xu. J ia a larn^- bnl oniiaportiiut wound un thp augle. 

S«. .JU a d«w|i neitn In the ezti-rior til»|ie, due {irttlmbly to shmpntL 
I Snl I ta a ctaler about feot m diiuiieter and Hi iiiche» dfep. 

Sa. a ia a acriva of aniall Itila, kmntkiuK uQ' th« vrtMt o( tliu parapet 
■Dilcattinf away piecm of tbu interior slope. (i'l»le 39.) 

So. ia a amall trench like No. 1. 

Sa t ia a cut down tbe exterior f<Iope to the conlon, aud is n good 
Wtoaadabj a well-buntt tibell. 

X«h 8 la «0 t!XornenI ){h|i. [riulc 3#.) The Interior slope la knocked 
M^ fv a dialauv of t^ feel measured along Uie creitt. 

WSaad 10 are eratens made by rikkI biiritta. Tbe former it I'i 
fad loajc by 8^ feet wide, and in 2 feet ti iut-heu deep. 

Xa U u a lunit, <Im|i bnnch in (lie Jeit> like widl, rh« proIoiisatioD 
vfUKtcwp (but qtibiK-knl by eartli tilling). Tbe tiplinten) from thia 
"■iaail have prored^rery httriuwtiig to the |>«ople iu the fort. Tbe 
PVUkU extend* into tbe iican> of the fortification, which ih eut away 
f'ikn bdow tbe conlou. 

IkearfaMH eharaoter of tbe pieex-s of tdoiie biirUi) alKXil by tbe in- 
|M«f tk0afan*a''helL» can Ira l>et«t appreciated from an iiit>]H'ctlon of 
"Mm SB and 13. Tbe former abowH how cttmplele won the wreck of (b« 
tlnh ^Bli embraaaiv. 

^H$t»4tt la aeeo tbe dainaire HUMtitiiml liy the exHteni bniiery, and 
M PImm 3B, 411, and 41 llie nature of (be injuriex re4i4-ived by tbe boitd- 
^VithiD the enreiute. Theae were triRhtlillly batlereil to pietwa l»jr 
Mill that (laaoed np fntm the parajN^t or ovembot their murk. 

b tWv of ibe tramrDduuH Are to which Fort Mex waaHalilectnl,and 
^W|fUvely kbiirl niiiKw at wbtrh all the KJiipn, ttsn<pi tbe Teaie- 
***T[ w^nnl it. it is nImoHt tmpotuible to believe the furt that not a 
^■bfinhnvi waa di«moante<l or diaiibled ilnrini; the aoiou pmper. 
^Itlaeh and tbe U-tnub ridex (Piatefi HH and -i:i) weiv wn>cke<l with 
Waatiod. I'be Kimtb Run, Keen on Ibe Kroiiud lu Fhito 41, waa 
■■W oTer by tbe IViiel4»iH% lone after the f<irt had n-am^l Hriitgi 
^d frnn a di»liui<'e •tatr«l to l>e mImmii iJlKl yanU. Thi^ xiu^vfMfiil nbot 
**tbt thirtieth of thia aerien, and wii« ainied by the frtinuery Iwiiien- 
*L The gun iu |;oinii over hiM taken the lupcarriajte with It aud 
~ Um alUlis. The blow waa received aiider th« Ml aUn uC Un 



64 BBIT18H SAVAL AND HILITABT OPBEATIONB IN EGYPT. 

first coil, tearing oat a strip 2 feet loDg by nearly 5 inches wide, and 
starting the whole coil from the chase on the other side. The B-tabe 
has a well-marked transverse split alwut 33 iDclies fK>in the mnzzle. 

The 10-incb ritle bears two scars from shells on the coils on the left 
side and several marks of Nordeufeldt ballets. One of the latter has 
scooped out a flue track 4J inches long on the breech, and another has 
entered the breech-coil to the depth of half an inch. 

The 9 inch rifle was strack on the light side juat io front of the tmn- 
nions by a fragment of shell, and on the breech-coil by a shell, which 
made a furrow a foot long, 7 inches wide, and an inch and a qnarter deep, 
and then glanced off. (See Plate 42.) 

The carriage of the left X-inch S. B. in the lower battery was liit by 
a piece of shell, and the gna itself by many shrapnel balls, but neither 
was injured. 

Thu adjoining 8-incli rifled guns were struck by shrapnel balls, one 
showing twelve hits, the other nine. 

Mex was the only fort at Alexandria which conid not have resamed 
the action on the following day, for the party which landed from the 
luviucible, at the spot marked a on Plate .^7, completed the work of 
destruction bat just began by the fleet, ruining the carriages of the two 
heavy guns by exploding gun-cotton inside the bracket^), and spiking 
the remaining guns in the lower batteries. Except for this gallant and 
eminently successful exploit, the parapets might have been sufficiently 
repaired during the night by heavy gangs of natives to enable the gar- 
rison to reopen fire. The Egyptians here had lost so severely that only 
men of a high order of bravery could have been iudnced to expose them- 
selves to a repetition of the hammering they had endured oii Joly 11. 
The actual garrison was whipped, and thoroughly whipped, after a moajh 
creditable and determined resistance, but it is hardly to be doabt^^ 




BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 65 

vm foand three 9-iiich Arnistronfi: M. L. R., ready for raoaiitiii^r* The 
ort thiM Atreniftheiied would have been a formidable addition to the 
left^Diies of the Marabout Passage. The foit did not bear a scratch. 
Tvoof the X-inch fcuns had been, by tliis recoil, capsized. They were 
of the lightest pattern, and could not stand the heavy charges and solid 
•hot with which they had evidently been fire<l. 

Fort Marabout, the westernmost of the forts bearing on the bay, is 
OB (be rocky island of the same name. It is an old-fashioned work with 
titcep scarp. The tiace is long and narrow. (Plate 32.) Its north- 
mtem comer was prepared, in the same manner as elsewhere, for the 
rMfption of modem guns. It is well supplied with bamvcks, shell- 
iUiits,&c. 

In a were found large quantities of filled cartridges. As the build- 
iBf projected well above the crest of the parapet, the wonder is but 
ittanil that theee cartridges should have escai>e<l explosion. The room 
ierved as an exiiense magazine. 

^ ia a kitchen ; c a storehouse full of oil, in jars; d is the principal 
Rapiine, also well 8upplie<l with made cartri<lges ; e is a filling-room for 
MNKh-bore ahells ; / is a fuse storehouse ; in g were stores of timber ; 
i ii I fllling-room for shells; i is a stoie-room containing mortar imple- 
Mitsand stores; I and m are large and well-furnished stores of empty 
■Mill, both rifled and smooth-bore, together with onlnance stores of 
^«rj description. 

Tbe liberal scale of equipment observed in this fort is due to its re- 
KK'tf-nci^ fnnn the bam* at Alexandria and its insular position. 

< l<tM- to the entninre of the fort is a small landing pier. The anna- 
Bt^nt (^itmiHtiMl of the three 0-inch M. L. R., and of nine X inch S. H. and 
•utti-ii tij inch 8. H. guns. 

Fi\«* aililitional Armstrong M. L. K were found in the fort awaiting 
tbe prefmmtion of gun eniplarenients. These were one lOnieh, two 
'^loch, and two 7-inrh guns. At least two wouM have be<*n plaecd on 
^l^f;!^ front to command the Marabout ('hanii(*l. 

The n(irtlieii>tern corner leceive*! tin* tire of the roinlorand other gun- 
**t*. and th#» S4»nthea«terii a few shots from the inside tle«'t, notably 
^^ Monareh. The scarp of the former is well pitteil. It shows alHuit 
**^««t> hits in all. The damage is, however, all apparent, none n»al. 

n^nirk on whi<*h the fort is built in plastered up to a smo«ith surface, 
'^i* coating ot plaster, whieh is about a f(M>t tliiek, has peeled otl' t'reely 
"bj-r,. t|,|> i^iiot have htniek. A t;|-p(lr. shell, for iiistanee, ha*< made 
*bolf ;m feet in diameter in this .sh.im searp. One small buihliiig was 
*^^"ntjre, a nutable result in view ot the larue iiumlM*r of blind .shell 
^'unu 111 the fort. 

Tb«* ntfgular M*arpat the s<»iitheast eonier is natural. It has received 
'^^••ral hltJ», thought to Ih» due to the Monarch. 

Tl* gunii in this fort were nni/ijured. 

^^ the a^ighlwriti}: fort, Atljvmi, it is m«*relv iU'Ccs**'A\v U> sVaXv vXvaV 
li. Mim. 'J9 .5 



66 naiTisn naval a.nu hilitaby ori-:u\TioKa ix EarFJ^| 

it is commenced uii large scale. Uofiuialted aa it in, Ailjpuii dm 
tbree lO-incb, Uvpt !) iucti, nnil one T-indi ArnistroDg M. L. U. bcbtt 
a SO-foot parapet, wliile tlie inagazines, Itarracki*, &n., an" cxrvlhui : 
dei(i);D. Beiug qiiitR iiMes^ from iui position, AiUoiii was not vnftp 
on Jnly 11. A similar work iivar ttm uity vt uiilO buve proved a «enoi 
antagonist to the Uritisli tiL-ct. 

In cotisideriiiK tlie state of the HoutheriiUneof defennesof Alti^iandr 
after the bombardment, it is more tlian ever iit^emary todlstininib 
betvecii the real and tlie apptirent (lainii]:i.« durte to ttiem — liie I'unn 
being those wotuids wbidi imnie<tiatvl,v ntl'evted thdr llgliltnt! ipinUlit 
in tbe (limibbug of the gnuH, the fatal breuvhiiif! of the imrapfbi, ll 
wreckiuKof the gnu-pivots, or the destruction of vitally iDijiortaut bI 
of ammanition; the latter being shell markH on the parspetA, nol tu 
Harily fatal, however large, and es|)coially shot wounds and hol«i 
buildings within the enceinte. Self-inflicted barui on each Hidi 
oourHe excluded. 

Applying thii* tost and summing aptheit>jnrieiin'ceive<l by the 
cations of this line, one is amazed toflntlbow slight they wttrein nail 

Ineludin^ even the rilled guu in Mei, wbieb was disruonntM) ttfH 
Penelope at leisure after the fort had ceiised firing, the followinj 
lose of ot1'eu»ive [>uwer ocoasionetl ifii-eutly by (.be lleet: 

lu Saleh Aga, onu 0^-ineh 8. It. dismounted. 

In the nest battery, one \-ioch S. H. dismounte<l. 

In Oomel-Kal>el)e, one O^ineh S. B. dismounted. 

In Martello Towei' Battery, one X-inoh S. B. dismounted. 

In Mcx Fort, out; tS-incb M. L. li. dismounted. 

These make a total of but dve guus in the sea batteries ejitl 
from Saleh Aga to Marnael-Khanat. and including Iwtb works. ^ 

in tbti foregoing description of the effects on the fortiSvatioiis i 
exnndria of the bombardment by the vessels under Adminil Sir Bw 
cbamp Seymour, great prominence iJt given to the Inlk-xibte's priict| 
This ir* due partly to the magnitude of the wounds sbe intlirbi ~ 
partly also to the fact that the guns she carried were the wily < 
their type in the lleet, aud that ber projectiles were iu eouM 
readily recognized even when iu small tVagments. The siunc C 
tdentiliealiou wan ini|tossible iu the cases of the other shipA. Ah I 
inch shell, for e.\ample, if fonnd iu the notthero lims might haveort 
from either tbe Tcmerairc or the Alexandra. The oonfuaion is <tJ 
greater when tbe smaller shell arc cousideretl, for ll>-iacb gnus wfl 
nionnted by all the meml>erH of the otfshore squiidfou, aud 1> imUi gat 
were curried by several in l>oth stpiadrons. 

It is worthy of mention that thecreilit for liest shooting aeemiN] t«t 
dividetl between the Temeraire and Intlexible, the only 8hi|M iu wbK 
the guns wetv worked by hydraulic jxiwer. 

POSTSCBIFT. — Since the foregoing was wHtteu a very intc 
§tht0 bam t>eeu rend bcfurv t\u> V.'t\\l«0> ^t\-\i») \\\e»:\\NAjAflx Vj Q 



UIUISHC 

nolHM 
oImA 

tbelM 
intt^ll 
tMlby^ 
rincH 

e^tfl 

ks. S 

ous h9 

Sir Bw 

I's practl 



• 

XATAIi AKD MIUTART OPERATION^ IN EGYPT. 67 



Wallvi^ Bb Amf in whleh the ezpenditare of ammanitioD by the British 
ImI fa ifiyrma in detalL Vmrn OepUin Walford'H article the following 
fahiei an eztmeted : 



Tilted iMII. 



Ml 



n 



tfM 



7t 



I 

2 



5 

70 



91 



! 



1 

8 

S5 
U 

» 

u 

16 
11 



8 



' 4 



U 



■I 



*9 

A 



10 



87 : 

1 61 

81 



71 



Ml 



154 



m 



6.6 



4 
10 
IS 



8 
18 
18 



I 



«•••«•*• 



I 



487 

888 
4U 



101 



la 



8,168 



4.6 



At€ra§e nuwihfr of round» jtrr hearjf gnn. 



Wkip. 



a 



t 



a 



Gnn. 



o 
e 



a 






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i s 



34.00 



22.1 

17.12 

19.37 






22 



12.3 



20.25 24.00 

34.00 21.00 



28.0 



21 



22.4 

16.6 

10.3 

28.« 

28. 67 

27.5 

12.0 

22.0 



20.86 30.00 10.70 H.OO 



28.8 



21 



20.0 



68 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN E< 

Expenditure o/aMmMNi7ioN — thol and ikelt. 



I I 



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i 1 


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^1 



BEinSH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 69 



VII. 

GENERAL CONCLDSIONS, 

Such ail occurrence aa tbe bombardment of tbe fortiticHtionH at Alex- 
andria in so rare in recent naval annals that a proper consideration of 
iti results must yield valuable lessons for tbe guidance of all interested 
in either offensive or defensive methods of warfare. Certain points 
io;:ge«t themselves naturally and almost inevitably. In other cases the 
inference drawn may be erroneous, but the arguments advanced are 
believed to wamint the deductions. The term '*fort" is limited to the 
deffosive works designed to protect a harbor from the entrance of an 
inimical fleet. 

1. The command of a fort, or its height above the level of the sea, is 
of 4*Dannous importance. 

A difference of a few feet in this respect may so change the angle of 
^^U of a well directed shot sis to cause it to be received along the line 
or greatest instead of along the line of least resistaucte of the parai>et, 
V'liile, on tbe other band, it gives the defense an increased chance of 
i^tnming plunging shot that may strike a ship's deck, the part where 
ib«» enjoys a minimum of protection. 

A oomporisou of the damage done on the masonry of tbe upi>er and 
lo^wer batteries of Fort Pharos is instructive in this connection. In 
^ort Ada, again, tbe dismounted guns were all in tbe two lower bat- 
terirn; and at Fort Oomel-Kabehe, to contend against the unusually 
fSorid command on the part of the fort and to se<!ure a proper direction 
of (leM.*ent for tbe projectile, the fleet was obliged to engage it by power 
fttl ^uns at great range. Now, gri^at range is another expression for 
^•=**ened probability of successful practice. Lastly, can any reasonable 
'i^sibt l)e entertaine<l that the Light-liouse Fort suft'ered more severely 
tluu Fort Phan>s partly and largely, but not exchisively, because it 
^M fourteen feet lorert 
^ As to the requisite thickness of the ;)arapet. 

Tbe British have no gun afloat which can send a ]>rojectiIe through, 
oti^riously damage, a good earthen parapet M) feet in thickness at or- 
diiianl) pra<*ticable ranges. This statement may, it is thought, Ih» ex- 
^«>*l«i to embrace, as well, the 71 ton Krnpp steel H. L. It., with its 
^•'W) foottous of total energy, and even the 1(H) ton Armstrong M. L. 
^^hicb throws a shell having 41,CHKKfoot tons ofston»dup energy, the 
*^^Uioual 7,000 foot tons of energy not appearing to l)e suftieient to 
^<* \U shot dean through where the tirst faile<i so completely. 

^or the present, at least, M) feet of well packetl loam may be accepted 
** Tieldiug adequate protection. At the embrasure proper a small 
^^<>«it of baarj- armor might be advantageously avvi\ied/\uii^'^'i^>Ax%Xi 



TO BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONR IN E< 

n-oiild nnturally saggest themselroe To the military engioeer 
tliiis secure cheap and efficient protection. 

;i. The parallel must be high above the sill of the emt 
low, it may I* gradually cut down to a dangerous ext«ut, 
(Plate 38.) At Ooni-elKabebe, where the crest was of the s: 
(6 feet above the terreplein), a comparatively large percen 
garrison were wounded by masonry spliuters alone, and thi 
ered with dibria. The Light-Honse Port snffered badly t1 
same defect io design. The condition of theSinch gnnsiuF 
inoanted behind parapets 2 feet higher, may be instmctirelj 
Plates 8 and 9. With Hat trajectories more damage mast t 
from flying pieces of masonry than from the enemy's shell, 
of the former the horizontal motion of the shot is change 
tical motion, which is vastly more dangerous to the peopl< 
fort. 

4. In constructing a fortiiBcation nothing should be alIowe< 
above the crest of the parapet, and the latter should be ai 
line. 

If thin rule is not followed, tlie attack is furnished witli a 
target, or with means of readily identifying the ^tosition of i 
the battery, ami of concentrating its fire with ease upon i 
point. 

5. For this reason, among others, the system of niountii 
barbette should not be followed. !n fact, the barbette gu 
most nt Alexandria, being much more roughly treated than t 
brasures, thus proving practiciilly their theoretical deficien 
lon.s, therefore, would appear to be indispensable in the une 
teriea of any well-dosigned fortified work. 

fl. The Uritish guunerji were greatly aided in the ta^k of ] 
liaving the black uiu^.zleA of the Rgypfian guns I'learly defii 




BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 71 

which exporieuce has demonstrated may be incurred with itnpuuity, 
and claim, for instance, that a lOinch plate will resist a lOinch shot 
fired under all the likely or even remotely probable conditions of bat- 
tle?" For we see that battering shell of this caliber were freely used 
by the Egyptians, one actually stopping on board of the Inflexible; we 
know that all the ships of the fleet were exposed to their fire ; that in 
the Invincible and others they ha<l even a stationary target; that in no 
case was the armor of any of the ships pierced, although the range was 
not excessive, and the armor plates, in most instances, of about G inches 
in thickness. It cannot, of course, be affirmed that a 10-inch Palliser 
ihell struck and failed to penetrate a G-inch plate. Among the multi- 
tade of these projectiles fired it is fair to assume that some of them did 
itrike harmlessly upon the thinner plates carried by the older vessels of 
the fleet, in spite of the fact that their penetration at 1,500 yards may 
be justly set at 11 inches of iron, starting with a muzzle velocity of 1,360 
fcet per second and a penetration of 13^ inches of iron. It is certain 
that the 6 and 8 inch armor of the Alexandra, and the G-inch armor of 
the Saltan, were only dented to a slight extent by the heaviest blows 
they received. 

8. Recent high-powered guns are not adapted to bombarding earth- 
«forb. 

These guns i)ossess a flat trajectory and send their ))rojectiles along 

tie liDB of greatest resistance of the fortification. The best work done 

^t Alexandria was on the parapet of Fort Oom-el-Kabebe, which was 

^lelled by the Inflexible at nearly 4,000 yards. In this ease, the shell 

having a considerable angle of descent, biirie<l themselves well, and, in 

^Jtplodiug, blew out large craters, one of which was 17 feet long by over 

•^ feet deep. The great distance would forbid the plaeiug of a suliicient 

^niuber of these hits so close together as to breach the parapet, and the 

*iieof the ships was too slow to keep the crews entirely away from the 

^nns. 

If. however, in this sense, the best results from these modern weap- 
nsareonly to be obtained by indefinitely increasing the fighting dis- 
^^nce, the value of the high power and flat trajectory is unqnestion- 
^^bly negative. 

To the unprejudiced observer, the most striking characteristics of the 
^mhardment are, without doubt, the excessive apparent and the slight 
^**«al damage done to the fortifications. 

9. Asa corollary to the above, the batteries of ships mnst be com- 
l^te. Unless the ships themselves are to be armed for the j)urpose of 
Either engaging other ships or batteries exclusively, they should be pre- 
l^wed for both classes of work. 

If Admiral Seymour hadpoHsessvd a vessel carrying }>oth heavy modern 
^h^poKered guns and large howitzers^ or other shell-guns capable of great 
^fewctoji, and thus somewhat similar to the mortar in application^ she 
^^d have been of immense value, /or she could have run c\oae \Ti\,o XYl^ 



72 BRITISH NAVAL AND UILITABY OPERATIONS IK Kl 

forttt. With lier sbell and inacbiae guns otae could have 
Egyptians away from tbeir batteries, d I am Diluting tbe latlei 
pamtive ease at sbort miige witli her powerful ordnance. ^ 
Gatliiigs and Nonlenfehlta may be, under certain ciruumetai 
not be denied that they lack the moral eflect of well-biirat eb 
thing iipiirouching vertical lire must 1h> Recured for operati 
nature. 

A UritiHli nnval olUcov of Hlaudiug, jirejicnt at the engagcn 
that, in hit) opinion, an old line-of-battle ship, with her ii 
smalK-r, (funa, would havn been more effetire than the mc 
vbtch took part in the bonibanlineut. 

It may bo urged, in reply, that these recent guns possess 
to nse shmjint'l .md canister. Hut any one liuniltar with these 
must know that the former i« useful only when the range is 
known und tbe fuze is capableof adjnst men t within very iiar 
that the latter can only be employed at extremely close qua 
that, unless tired at high elevations aud with reduced charget 
difl'erent range tables and vast inconveniene^', the obje<Ttioii < 
flutnes.s of trajectory will still bohl ; nor do the guncarrUigea < 
to-day admit of an eleratiim aufficicat to tecure the daiired adct 

10. The necessity of a thorough detenninatiou of the poa 
vertical lire must be patent to the moat careless reader of 
It is liardly an exaggeration \o suggest that of all tbe direi 
tfl the development of ordnance, at tbe |>reHent time, thi* is 
most promising and important. 

The writer feels strongly the desirability, not to say iniiw 
gatiou, of working out thiK old problem under the new ce 
tbe moment, and unhesitatingly recommends it as worthy of ( 
flideration and practical iuvesttRation, 




IIRITISM NAVAL AND MILITARY ()I»KKATIONS IN KGYl'T. 73 

>i fiiilmirf. :ir will, till* snrroiin(liii«;s of tho iiKlividual point sf1iM;t4Ml 

A t.ii-;:ft. Tlii.H f(»iiiUtioii is ailiiiiraMv srruivd in open -top tnrrt'ts, 

ul UMi\ l»f lr^itlinati*ly urjr«*<l anionjr tlu* a(lvanta.ir<*s tlii'v ot!i»r. 

li. Tli«- ninjit* at whirli tin* tliH»t. i-n^a^^cil smiis to liavi* Iummi niM'il- 

••!\ L'n*at. Thr oiitsi«li» voss^'Is rould liav«*jrone towitliiii IJHM) vanls 

i Till- iiiirthwi\st siilr ot* tilt* Li>;lit-Ilonse Knrt ami •S<Ni yanls abrrast 

t- I! !*» ••l-'i'iii Liiii's; to within .VH) yanls of Kort Aihi an>l *JO(i yards 

Kiiit riianks. Alon;; the soiitlu-rn linr tlic sliips roiiM fasily liavo 

••♦I'li witliifi !«•<» yanls of all tlu* hattrrii's. This would hav«' pi^o- 

I'Tui »hi* 'IVintTair*' from slM-llin;^ .M<*x, l»m it is lM*li»'Vfd t)i:it tho 

:i. ^\ii'ii<i h.iM* niitiiahinn d Ihc loss. It v\\\ hardly 1m* douhtrd that 

•- tM.Mi:! >•. iif (his miiVi' would h:i\c hrcu irwanlcd l»y tl-t- spri'diri* 

! u.'tn- f\!i-!i>i\r di>finiuntiij;^ nf rh»* ;ruiis. which was conJi'sstHllj 

- I ^iii-l' nbji-i't of till' aifai'U. ShrapucI and raiiisti>r from a po;'tli>ii ot 

- «!j.|i*»* I'aftci-M-s. >uppl<'nit'nt('d hy tin* macliinc ;;nuN at a mon* ap- 

• [•ri.i?!' i:i7i:;i* than tint iiii;:inally ad<»it1cd. woidd liaxc prrvrntod 
<:r:i :\vr tmrn tht* slmiv. and tlii* rcinaindiM- muld have Ix'tMi mni't'ii- 
.-fii lilt i-Mi-h ;:un iii tht- fnits in surccssion until howled ovim*. Close 
)ji' and .1 <»?ahh* platform. liuwi'Vfr. arc lii-tTssary for such rctincaicnt 
I'Tl* :icr. 

[; riiu^t Im- iciiic:iili.Ti'd that the tar;;ct iu iMch case at Alexandria 
■ 4 rill* iTi II 77.1 e f>f a pin — «i mere pin*s head at the distance at whi«*h the 
:ps cniriirt'd — and that a successful hit meant either <;ood luck or jdie- 
T:.i-i!.itlv ;;tHHl *»liiMi!in''. 

I! 1-. 'I liML' ;iw.iy ••at Iniiir taw " w.k \i ly skilliu!, and. iii the md, 

i- ••• • r.ilil\ furtiMMtc, lint i( is certain that the leiiLTth of tin* ai'tioii, 

•If .1 -uhil.iutly !ii!e'*I;;iilnwed in Admii.il Seymnur's nnler t»f hattle, 

t« .1 <! »^ ip]Hi;ntiiieni to th'i.M- who expected .short work to l»e ni.iih* of 

• K/*. I'f nn-, uliili- it tirtiinri tin siuvK' of attntm^nlinn fn n tlan'ftrnusly 



• 'f'». 



1* 1 !.•• iiu'<*ii!c Hipiiiflron liavint: tri»'d holh modes of attack, umh'r 
V' 'I'd .it .inchor. ih'tinitely snl\ed one imi>oit:i!it proMern. Thrre 
^'i\n* n ' ju'Mhiffl* iinu},t thiit ships lutiitifinij t'urts ti*tt sujt*ri"r fn tin in in 
'"'■' 'Mm §Horf in nrrumnf ttf' fire h\f an*hurintf fhnn in i^ahti/ inf ktrpinff 
^'/•r ir./r/. 

A Jlri^ ate :iecounr of the homhariluient, wi itten on ho.ird of llie Invin- 

'-•*- «iiid pii!ili<«hed in tin* London Staiidai'd newspaper, re t'ii>: to the 
'"■lirih a> lUdivt-rin;: a les<« elfe<*tive tire, in conse«picnce ot keeping 
■ I'-r w.tN . ih.in her nei;:hhors. Ilerhest work was at .Marsa el Kh.inat, 
''* !hi- ;;uri eolti»n sht* iilew up there was hiintlreil.s i»f v.uhN in ie;ir ot 
'••• li'rl hIm- aime«l at. 

I' i* pni]MT, at tlii> place, to sii;:i;i'st that tin* sli^dit d.im.i;;c ihim* to 
'*' Ji^i'.i^ in the tori at .Me\ can iirohaMx he accounted for hv the t'ai't 
^•At llii- Invincihh*. altlitm;;li at :iiiehor. wa« too distant, ami the other 
'•■I'* wen- iiuilcr wjiy. 

IV \}tw fart which struvk r/icohst'rver in pasMU^: \\\To\\g\\VWVv\UA*.V 



74 BRITISH NA.VAL AND MILITARY 0PEBATI0K8 IN E( 

Alexandria, in the nortbeni line, jb the lessened injary ioflii 
shijts as they inared to the cnstward. 

The Light-HouseFurt was entirely disabled; the batteries 
el- Tin Lines were silenced, but not entirely put horade eoMbat. 
rifled gun was disabled in Fort Ada and one in Pharos, 
tacking squadron grew in utteugtb, as it advanced against t 
in the order named, tnul tm the itm tiad moved out of the gum 
shine more fully oh the target, aia explanation (not the only 
ever) is found in the fact that the steady northwest breeze < 
had gradnally raised a nUght siceU, making the afternoon pr 
eftective than that of the niorniug. This §ea can be beet 
as slight and short, bnt its intlueuoe upon the boiubardmen 
takable. 

16. It follows, as an inference from what boa just been a 
au adtlitioual advantage, not generally claimed for ve«seU wit 
fore aad aftjire, lies iu their ability to ride at anchor, head 
engage a fort, either ahead or astern, from a platform which 1 
as the circumstances can possibly [wrmit. 

17. Besides the hints which may be incidentally derives 
foregoing notes, it is well to add, for the guidance of officers 
ing \'eK8els asaiguetl to the task of demolishing fortifications 
can be but two targets at which it is worth while to direc 
Thejirat is the muxzle of any gun aetualty Berced ; the second i 
ini; Icttoicn or believed to be a magaziiie or nkellkome which 
above the parapet. 

All shot not placed in accordance with these rules are si 
away. They ni»y make deep holes in the parapet and wood 
of the giirrison by splinters, bnt tliey are without real efi 
powers of tlie work either for offense or ilefense. It is ad 




BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 75 

Qutil the fire slackens, cau then retaru it with interest, and continue it 
indefinitely, and absolutely at their own leisure. 

This disadvantage, and the obligation of assuming the initiative, 
ghoald be recognized and well weighed before commencing operations. 

19. These deductions in no way touch the question of the ability of 
fwU to stop the progress of modern ships. In this respect^ and unaided 
by other modes of defense, by obstructions, &c., the works at Alexandria 
would have been utterly powerless against the British fleets which need 
hardly have paid them the compliment of a passing shot. 

20. The success which attended the efibrts of the spiking party at 
Hex inspires the regret that similar work was not generally attempted 
by the fleet. 

It is easy to be wise after the event, and therefore it cannot now be 
doubted that, in this way, the^true state of the morale of the garrison 
woold^have been revealed, and x)ossibly such measures taken as might 
bave prevented the burning of the city. A few hundred men could 
bave seized and held the place on July 12, so great was the fear on the 
part of the Egyptians, both soldiers and citizens, caused by the bom- 
baidmeat — a fear not known, at the time, to the British commauder-iu- 
chiet In consequence of the lack of information, this memorable battle 
was followed by one of the most shocking, wanton, and deplorable ca- 
^trophes of the century. 

21. The forts at Alexandria were badly bruised, but the more modern 

IMmtpets were not seriously harmed. In the generality of cases the 

*^1 damage they sustained could have been easily repaired in a single 

^igbt. If the bombardment was directed against the forts in this, their 

^l^feasive capacity, it must be pronounced a failure. If its object was 

^ke dismounting of the new rilled guns, it muvst be conceded that such 

**^Qlt8 as attended the work of the inshore sciuadron (only one gun of 

^fcis type being seriously affected), or even such as were achieved by 

^te offshore squadron (less than one-half being permanently disabled), 

'^onot justify the verdict of success. 

In the wider sense of having driven the garrison from their batteries, 

^Bd having silenced the forts, the tleet was unquestionably victorious. 

Into this product, however, enters the important element of morale. 

-^(British J while surprised by the tenacity of their opponents^ were the 

^^t to confess that men of a stamp at all similar to their oxen would have 

^^^ted the gage thrown doicn the next day^ and have renewed the fight, 

^ith a heavier sea running to ren<ier the tire of the tieet less accurate, 
^d to embarrass the operation of rei)lenishing its almost empty maga- 
*^^ and shell-rooms from the ammunition vessels in the outer road- 
•tead, can any doubt be reasonably entertained that the struggle would 
**^e been vastly prolonged, even if the final result had been unaltered? 



I»^KT II. 



THE WAR IN EGYPT. 



77 



111^ 



'l« 




VIII 

*H UKATIoys BY THE BRlTISn NAVY AT ALEXASDRIA SUBSEQIEST TO 

THE IIOMBARDMEST 

The evento of the day inime<liately following: the bombardmeut have 
Wn already briefly referred to (p. 30). To ^ive a clear idea of the de- 
iDiDdM of Admiral St*ynioar, and of the policy adopted by the Egyp- 
turns the following letter is quoted at length. It is the rei>ort, to the 
idmiraU of the oflicer sent to communicate' with the military authorities 
Mhore in rei}iK>nse to their hoisting a flag of truce on the LightHouse 
Fort: 

H. M. S. IXVIXCIHLK, 
Off Alexandria, July 1*2, Irtdi. 

SiK: 1 bftTe tbe honor to iufomi you that on arriving on boanl the Kgyptian yacht 
MAbruotta I infonue<l the captain that I had your onlen* to communicate with the 
uliUrj i^T«*ruor of Alexandria. 

HHfxrcUfDcj Tonllia PaHha, military governor, jUMt then came alongside in a steam- 
^A^u^H. He told me he was on the |M>int of going out to the BritiHh admiral. 

I told him yoa could not hold any comninnicatiou with him until, aa a prelimiuary, 
M»x batterieaaud Adjemi were BUiTendere<1, the former to be temporarily occupied by 
)*v forcct, the offensive defemiHA of the latter to be destroyed. 

IfAn-fally jtointMl out to the Panha that thete positions were practically in your 
f"**:. that ymi did not intend to hoist the British flag or do anythini: to hurt the 
•''•**'f»t:liilitir» of tin* K;(yptian iiiktioii, but you required the peaceful MnrrfudtT as a 

* ■» .»riti»- iif ^immI faitli. 
* ' l'a*hu. :it"t*T a «lt:il tif teiiifiori/in;^ »n<l begging the cpioqtion. n.i\t\ In- had not 

•b* »u!r»iirity to romply ^iili \Miir <leuiaii(lN, but mimt eoniuiiinicat** with the Klie- 
*• •• «t iJ4«iileh paljrf. foui or five niili's diNtaiit. I a»*k«'«l liitii to <]•> ho ]»>■ t^'Ii'graiii. 
I*' ■• i». ril, •• I bt'tf i« no t«'l<*;;ra|»li nin*"— a !iii«*tak«' on Iii-* jjart. I tln'U {nX TutMily 
*-'••*•* I. *«t \'i > uit'«irinr><l tlif Pa^liji In* nifiHi ijivt* \\ritli*n •«iirn'n«li'r by *J p. in. Ht« 
"im'u U.i .; |, III., |M»ititiiig ioif tl)«' jibN^i'-al inipossibility of ronnminicatin^ with 
'** "• ■ iif.<!ir that tniit*. I inf«>rin*Ml bini that I oonM not aIt<T the tinn*. and riMiIii-d 
' ■'^* ''If •- ni'nl that lie. th«* iiallanf «b"f»Mnl«T of .\l»'xaii«lria, liad th*- p^iwi-r to ^nr- 
r»:...rj ., I jj n an r»'«|iiir»*d. fMnntinu out to him tliat thi» fort-* jr. i|ti«>4tion had bot-n 

* "'"^l li\ tmr Mill |i»t ami ^^^*'^*^ iio lon^i-r in a )»ohiiioii to ofb-r any n-xi-^ta'M ••. H»' 
^•^'- »»knl. •• What ^ill till* Kn^li!»h adiniial doit' \vr rannot arrfpt bin tfrni* ?" I 

* f ' ♦«!, '• I>«'F»tniy tbf who!*' of tin* fortitications." 
"•tl.ni ».ial, "Thfti' will Ih* no ni«'n in fhfni," to which 1 r»'piii'i|. ** Voii wimM bf 

'*'*t*^l to he.ir that, a«» yoiir ohjiTt \%a'» the dcinolitioii of thi' fort.H. i;ot tin- «b'*f rnr- 
*-'''f nj^n." 

*-' 'titrr\t**« tht'fi endiMl. tin* Panlm o«ti ii^ihlN hnrrylni; to Katiileh to r'in<«Mit 

^f'liiw. Tlif HitttTii wfiijlnMl at M \i. ni. I ri'lnrn»Ml to iln- MahroiiH<%a. « oni- 

' "* **trb»-* with tbf raiiiaiii {'2.\'i p. in. ». and iiifortnfil hini, an tinii* wa-* nn and 

'••■r to \tMii «i«*ni.in(l had arrivrd, >oii wonld r«MoiMiiiiMiri* firi* at '.l.'A*^ p. in. 



***»-d ii»r t<» wait a litth* loii'4»T, an thr an'»wi-r uoiiM timn- diiertly. I t«»id him 
'^*'< «Ait on iNtard tin* Mabiou'i.Ha till *J.'.{<> p. ni., bat bad not tin- anth«>iitv tn 

A* ■ 

,,**" 't^ tiii»r 1m| rtMiitiiiiifin iiig ihf ttW on tin* foit». \ i/. '.\.'A*t p. in. 
'•* t , . • . 

**rTif«l a^bort- ti> inform Admiial Kami] l\'i<«ha . '»ii\» in\u\^l«*t o{ uwiwu* 



":\^ 



80 BKITISH 2<AVAL AND HILITABT OPERATIONS IN E( 

At S.W p. m., sei'iDfc my linat alongsiilc, be Ti-turQO<I a&il wiabed for f 
wbkb I declinetl, anil rctnmed to tbc Bittnrn. 

lu my opiiiioD Ibc sole objt^ct wai to guin time to suable tlio aoldiery i 
pillage aD<t bum tbu towu ivitboat the danger uf a atra.T abell diatarltii 

CommaDder Brand, of tbe BitterD, informi^d me at leant 500 troopa Id ti 
ii)g onler bntl evacuated RaH-el-Tin while I was on board the Mahroaaai 
1 have, &.C., 

HEDWOBTH LAM 

To 

Admiral Sir F. Bkauchamp Bkymour, 

Commandtr-in~ Clue/. 

Tho fotlowing extraute are from Admiral Seyinoor's official 
of the dates tnentiooed : 

[or Joir 1*1 

Aa Drgotiallooa failed, • • * uDeahot waaflredintotbeHei Barr 
•arthwork, * when a flag of trace was again boiated. I tbeo sent Livnteni 
nander HarriiOD ioto the harbor in tbe Helicon, and on hia going on bo 
dlTe'a;acbl,the MahroDua, be fonndabebad been deaert«d, and be repoi 
hia return after dark, hia belief that tbe towa had been eTaonated. 

This belief was qaite correct. Under cover of the white : 
succeeded iu getting his troops safely out of tbe city, which 
over to the mob for pillage and bnrniDg. Some smoke ba 
served rising from the place before snnset, but after dark 
were bnt too apparent. Alexandria had been fired iu at leas 
ters. 

|0r July !>-] 

At daylight [ut the 13thJ tbe [Inshore] iquadron was nnder way, and 
up the harbor and fonnd that tbe town waa on flre in aeveral plaoca, Ibi 
of tbe Kas-el-TiD palace waa burning, and that tbe fucte were eraonated 

Aa by tho iiioiit njlLabk' ■.utli.irit)- 1 li-iLfin-d thnt tbr f.ircc ol Arabi Pa 




BSmsa KAVAL AND MILITABV OI'EKATIOKS ]R J 

K« Ibo oiratnc [at ibo IStfa) a pan; of blur-jBckcIa UniUd with • 0*>liB|| 
ft da*r»d III* alrMtU af tti" Arab*, nho vfini tflttlDic Sm in utd [iUUkIii^ tJia I 

t^ lb» ■*«i»lti|| [nfilMi 13th] w* landed nil the marinrii fWim thn ofTabriru aqRwInni 
A fMBMMll {Mltal luUillMi*lr<H)tii.lint th^v wrn^ of llUin htvIck. 

Ab rxpUD«tor]r or Ibew brivf iioliceo. it is proper tu sute than the 
rvt iwrty wbicb ImidccI Trum th« sliips wan cnaipnsed of IGO marines 
,m1 'iM blue JMckeU from Ike Moiiair.b, InriDdble, and Penrbipp, under 
ibe eoamaml of ('oinm»iiil«T llanimill, of tbo AlotmnOi. Tlicy reacbed 
tbr KAiM>l-Tin palocv al lUJW a. m., svisftl Ibi- wwtvrn vud of Ibt* pen- 
tnmla. ukI tkrvw iiat a line of ttentrips riortb and Huutb esteadiDj; from 
ika»io»bure. At half jiast twelve a ainall parly of mariucH and a 
Gatbnic eun** o-ew fhim tbi4 Monarcb pushed ou lonrarda tlw town, 
■ani)kl<rd the ar>4'unl, and giiiird^d tbe tttrwlH in the Imincillarc noigb- 
Mwoil, makini; pri»oiipr» of tbo natives wbo were awn looting juat 
■■Mtoof the RStea, and firing apon tbose mora remote. Tbe araenal 
Anhrane » point of rf'fbge for tbe Europeans Mill lelt alive In tbe 
iMr,«becBnedu»u,MiDi> ttevtMily in numbvr, to M;«k protection. Tbo 
Quttftl Koo wu plantol to command tbe prinvipal strevt lending to 
1h**ater-bQnt tbniagb tfaia part of the place, wbere Ibere were many 
Mdfiipibamiuj; and in niinR. 

ihiiaf thn an«ni»on tbe bluejackets wore rt*-em barked, and tbo ra*- 
inntof (tie Haperb, Inflexible, and Temeraire lauded in tboir atoad. 

Thf patroltina of tbe city wan t>e^n, a com)>sn,v of Royal Marine 
Arullcrjiiifn, armed »a Infantry, marcliing tbroUKh tbe Arab and Enro- 
^n qtutrtifs of Aiesandria. Tbey Hhot one or two natives caught in 
l^tetiif ■w'ltinK Hrr tobont>e«, and theytibot three of the native |ioUce 
*fe«vn> ptl1a|[ini;a bou<u> afier buviog cruelly maltreated tbe door- 
l>'fptr,aa Arab [aitbfiil amonc tbe fallblcMi. 

1b the ereninic the marineii were alMi landeil from tbe Avblllea and 
autia. 

Th lafldible, Temerairt', and Ibe Aebillcx, an armorvd «bip which 
■rt(«4oa tb« 13tb, wete mationed ofT Hamleh to command tbe land 
if^Mdiea to Alexandria from tbe HoutbwanI and eastward. 

OftfceeveaUofJuly 14, Admiral Seymonrdaya: 

^1 h j «< JwlJiK ikitwlMlenf tlirila;1>iullnKMuauTinpD w wnnmlit (par* ftoa 
*^M4nB, aad Itji rronlliK ■>■ t>*<t oc«u|ilr<l lb» mniit linporlk&l [uml I Ian*. 

%ilaM CapUin Jvhn A. Fl*liar lo t*kn >-h»n(* at tbn naval liiiiciuU. 

IWftm bad ooeaabiued enormona damage in tbe Enmpean i|iiarter, 
*^*n kad funnerly aloud many fine ImildingH, for tbe moMt |i*rt of 
'f^ and Italian atylea of arcbiU'Cture. Tbe lucmdariHiu wna Mill 
V^m. 5ot K street here was payable for any dintanee, all Iteing 
*">BileH Mucked by tbe smoking rutus of tbe fallen bouaea; walla 
*''**tiU tambllng down, and the hot air was opiu|(ie with time, doitf 



82 BBITIBB NAVAL AND HILITABT 0PEBATI0N8 IH E< 

Several ships of the ChaDDel squadron haviog arrived, tb< 
were at once landed. The entire city was now occupied. 

Alexandria being a walled town, the distribution of the fo 
tain Fisher's disposal was naturally governed by this fact 
practically as follows: 

At the Kamleh gate were marines from the Monarch. 

At the Rosetta gate were marines &om the Temeraire. 

At the Moharem Bey gate was marines from the Alei 
Inflexible. 

At the Fort Enm el-Dik gat« were marines from the Suite 

At the Pompey's Pillar gate and Dead gate were marim 
Snperb. 

At the Caracol (B. on map] gate were marines from the A 

At the Oabarri railway station were marines and blne-jf 
Gatlings from the Alexandra. 

At the Zaptieh (A. on map) and the arsenal were marim 
Invincible. 

It was on this day that an armed force from the United 8 
Lancaster, Nipsio, and Qninuebaug, composed of a Gatlini 
crew, a 3-inch B. L. B. and crew, and a company of marines, 
nnder the command of Lieatenant-Commaoder Goodrich, lai 
pied the United States consulate, and patrolled a large sec 
Enropt-an quarter of the town, extending to the Bamleh gat4 
tails of this service, and of the later service performed by 
Hatebins, are the subject of other official reports. 

On July 15, in view of a rumor that Arab! meant to attac 
a large number of blue-jackets and marines with Gatlings « 
from the British ships, each, as a rnle, reinforcing ite own c 
afibore. The Minotaur's mariiios atrfnelbened the i. 




BUmH VATAIi AVD lOLITART 0PERATI098 IV BGTPT. 8S 

ibin BifUBeDt (late 88th Ibot), 800 strong, ander Lieatenant-Coloiiel 

TbaAwdl, wUoh bad oome ttom Malta, arrived in H. M. 8. Northnmber* 

laad and wen laodad. The fbrmer went to Mlniet-el-Baaoal and began 

it oDee the work of improring and repairing the existing defenses. The 

Isehsical details will be fonnd in the section treating of the work done 

tagr tiM Rojal Engineers. 

Ike SSth sarahed to the Moharem Bey gate and relieved the marine 
KBtriM bet ween Pompey's Pillar gate and the Bamleh gate. This relief 
vss asdiy needed, fbr the men were nearly tired out. No small part of 
flMr physleal nhaostion was doe to the attacks of insects, fleas and 
■laqaMoes, which deprived them of proper sleep. Up to this time a 
liv kssdied sMn had held the city against a force estimated to be ten 
tiMB ss Btmig, and in the presence of an inimical and violent popnla- 
tkm. 

Tke troop-ahip Tamar arrived at 2 a. m. of this day, having <m board 
tts Mrlne battalions, 000 Boyal Marine Light Infiintry under Uenten* 
istCokmel Ley, and 300 Koytil Marine Artillery nnder Lientenant-Odl- 
isil IWhnl In the afternoon these troops were landed at Miniet-d* 
lasMl aad took immediate charge of the western lines ; that is, from 
f^PV^ PDlar gate to the Mahmondieh GanaL 

Thms battalioos Ibrmeil the advance of the British expeditionary 
kiss, and Major-Oeneral Sir Archibald Alison, K. O. B., had arrived 
^ soadoei their operations. 

Os Jaiy 18 the 3d battalion of the King^ Boyal Bifle Corps (late 
^h fool), OOOodd men, which had reached the outer roads the day 
^<4bf« in the Aginoourt, were landnl from that nhip in a Hmaller trana- 
Pivt, the Kehssa, by the Hamn metho<l as was employe^l in the disem- 
^srkation of the 38th. The (HUh went to Mobareiii Hey gate, relieving 
^ posts of the 38thf which concentrated at the RoHetta gate. 

The bnd defeniie of the city wum how defliiitely aMMiinie<l by the army, 
'■■ittcd at the Ranileh gate by the muritieM fmin the Aleiaiidra, Su- 
P*t(i, and Temeraire, and elHewhrre by the bhie-jackets and their Gat. 
^t gana. The other lKMlie8 of niarinefl landed fnim the HhipH were 
^piojred in patrolling and {Nilicing the town, being stationed as fol- 

Hss^ Tin palace, half of Agincourt^H party. 
Cosst-gnard station,* Sultan^H party. 
Zsptiefa, Monarch's party. 
Tnbonalff Minotaui^H party. 
Cwseoi (C. on map), half of AginiMmrt'H party. 
f^Siaeol (B. on map), AchiUcH' party. 
Qthatri sUtk>n, Infleiihle^n party. 

The whole of the marines now anhore were under the command of 
^hsu nsutOolonel F. O. Legrand, K. M. L. I., who had come out from 



ftMa^mtmily setom the street from the American oousiiVata* 



84 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 

England for this pur|>08e. Tliese carried on the duty of. constables, 
eases being tried at the Tribunal and Zaptieh, in the Rue Franque, and 
then sent to the arsenal for punishment. Strong measures had to be 
resorted to to keep the large population in order, est>ecially in view of 
the great temptations aud opportunity for looting. 

Efforts were, however, made to secure a native police force as a sub- 
stitute, but the unsettled condition of things and the difficulty of getting 
trustworthj' Egyptians rendered this a long and tedious process. 

It is impossible to give more than a general account of the work of 
the navy done ashore in and about Alexandria, for the number of men 
lauded varied fmra day to day with the actual necessity or iu accord- 
ance with the anticipation of offensive operations by the Egyptians. 
The terra "naval brigade," as meaning a fixed organization, is, there- 
fore, incorrect in this instance. 

The matter of rationing these bodies of seamen aud marines serving 
on shore was only difficult in the early days of the occupation, wbea 
wheeled and other transport was not easy to obtain and when the streets 
were blocked by dibris. Each ship, therefore, at the outset kept its own 
landing party supplied with food, the task being performed by those 
still on board. 

When the necessity of a more permauuut and methodical arrangement 
became evident, a depot of supplies was established on shore, to which 
each ship contributed its quota. At this store, rations, as needed, were 
drawn by the several parties. The grog ration was maintained, and 
OD occasion, after hard work, an extra " tot" whs served out. It seemed, 
however, to be the experience of those officers best placed to judge, 
that an extra ration of cocoa was of more practical benefit than an 
estra ration of rum. 

riginal landing partii'w carried two dayft' supplies ni thiir 




BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 85 

of the Inflexible were seut oat to assist in mounting and working the 
gans there. 

Between Jaly 18 and 2G the blue-jackets ashore were stationed at the 
Pompej's Pillar, Moharem Bey, and Eosetta gates, the Alexandra's de- 
tachment occupying the Ras-elTin peninsula. 

On July 26 the seamen from the Alexandra, Monarch, Saltan, and Su- 
perb went out to Bamleh, planting and manning six 9 pdrs., two 7 pdrs., 
and four Gatliugs. This large detachment was under Commander 
Thomas, of the Alexandra, who was relieved a few days later by Com- 
mander Hammill, of the Monarch. 

On July 20 all the marines were withdrawn to their ships, but three 
days afterwards about 200 were again landed from the Alexandra and 
Superb. They were placed at Mex, under Lieutenant-Colonel Legrand, 
to gnard that important outpost. On August 12 they were relieved by 
a company of the Royal Marine Artillery battalion. 

Immediately after the bombardment, the work of destroying the offen- 
sive capacity of the fortiftcations bearing on the sea was begun. Par- 
ties of men, mainly from the Hecla (torxuHlo-suppl^- ship) and the Con- 
dor, destroyed the ammunition in the forts, throwing the powder and 
sbell into the sea. Torpedo detachments from various shij)s wrecked 
the guns, all of which were thoroughly spiked. The light guns (OJ-inch 
8. B.) were hove off their carriages and the rifled guns treated with gun- 
cotton. If the various plates giving views of these guns are studied, it 
^ill be seen that every one of the latter exhibits a slight bulge near the 
mnzzle. The official report on this subject is, unfortunately, a confi- 
<^ential document, but it is believed that no gun resisted the detonation 
oU pound of gun-cotton i)laced about 18 inches inside the bore. The 
result is a distortion sufficient to prevent the introduction of the shell, 
^hile the external appearance is only altered to the eye of the close pro- 
fessional observer. A much larger charge than usual must have been 
employed in the Sinch gun at Oomel-Kabebe, whose muzzle is abso- 
^iitely blown off. 

Bundreils of tons of gunpowder were ruined, and scores of valuable 
^^8 rendered useless. The objector necessity of this destruction is 
^anlly evident. 

fheTor[>edo stores at Mex received a similar treatment. The cases 
'^^fe punctured freely with pickaxes. 

On about August 20 the defenses of Ranileh were strengthened by 
^*^^ mounting of three 7-inch Armstrong M. L. K. Two were taken from 
^^^ Hospital Battery, and the thinl was found unmounted near Mex. 
*"^ir position is given on Plate 45, at j>. They were conveyed to 
^*^^ir site bv rail from the railwav station at Moharem Bev, and skided 
^^fo place, the parbuckles being haulrd on by a locomotive. The gun- 
P'atfonns were constructed of heavy balks of timber, sided 8 inches 
"J' 10 inches, laid longitudinally and transversely. An auc\\OT ^v>v Wi^ 
pivot-bolt was improvised by sinking a smooth-bore guu, mv\7.T.\^ wv^m 



I>^RT II. 



riT 



THE WAR IN EGYPT. 



77 



t I in/' 



■ I , I ' // I 




■▲TAIi AVD mLITART OPERATIONS IN EOTPT. B9 



pwIM to lb« wm, tana off At right angles inland towards Arabics 
iUmm, Tko koj of thia ildgo la tbo tower of the Bamleh water- works, a strong, 
lUs >«imf ■ I oasnpisd this position at once with the Riflea, nnder Ashbnm* 
aoi, aad !!■■% aad astabllshed ontposts at the railway bridge and in front of the 
attal bead. Bbnrtly after wo were In position, a small force of Arabi's carairy, foU 
MTod by faifintryy aidvaaoed towards the railway bridge, within fonr bnndred yarda 
i tbo R l isa. After oaebaoging abots for some time, the caralry retired rapidly on 
ba Mabawadioh CanaL Tbo enemy's advance was more decided ; considerable Ibree 
i cavaliyv wHh two hotas artillery gnns, poshed on rapidly, the gnns coming into 
brlahly ; taflMtiy followed, and the moTements of a considerable body of troops 
vpOD the high ground behind. Arabi's attack was not pnilied home, 
md the flra of bis gWMp brisk for some time, gradually died away. Firing ceased. 
rWfo vsfa ■• oaaaalcles on onr side. 

This MoodlaM operation was the first encoanter between the land 
knm om the two sides. 

The work of fbrtif^ng Ramleh was begnn at onoe and prosecuted 
with rigor, flir the fiorce opposed to the British far outnumbered the 
letter at all times, and tlie need of the moment was to hold on nntil the 
STBy eorps nnder General Wolseley, definitely ordered to Egypt on 
Jsly 21f ooald be cnllected and transported to Alexandria. 

The m ea a ar c is taken to strengthen the |)osition already seized at 
Kaaleh can be readily comprehended by the aid of Plate 45. It ma^^ 
k veil to mention that Bamleh is not a villnge or town, but a species 
<f laBBer resort for the European residents of Alexandria, who have 
^ilt houses and villas n|M>n the sandy neck of lowland lying between 
lakes MarioQt and Aboukir on the one hand and the Me<literranean on 
1^ other. These houseM are diHtributod over a length of sc^^ieral miles, 
*>^1 anp mostly surronndeil by high-walled itidoHures, where with much 
^vrt in the direction of irrigation a few shrubs are maile to grow. Be- 
(VcfD thetie scattf^red eoiintry plaeeH the kaihI lies every where ankle 
^p. There is an oc<*aMional pretense of a road, like that, for iuHtance, 
l^ing to Bosetta, but, generally Ki)eakitig, comniunieatiou between 
tsr two |iolnts is In the straightest poM8il>le lino and througii the sand. 

To supply the neede<l transit to and from the city a private com- 
Pisy has built the Bamleh Railway. This lias no eonneetion, material 
orotberwiHe« with the Egyptian Government lineM. An incidental a<l* 
Outage due to the occupation of Ramleh wa8 tlie protection enjoyed 
by the Bamleh Bail way and by the other owners of pro|HTty in this quar- 
ter. 

The waterworks contain the pumping engines which deliver the fresh 
vstcT for distribution fn)m the Mahmoudieli Canal to the tower and 
vttenroir just baek of them, on higher ground. These two ]Niints, the 
vsirr-works and the water tower, were the (renter of the di-fense. A 

MroiiK detachment was always maintained at the former, while the 

^*adqiijirt#*ni were establishinl at thi* latter. An elevation immediately 

^ rmr of the tower was strengthened, a tn*neli dug, and a numlHT of 
f»ii» monnte<l, vix, five U. L. R. 4» pdrs. and two VI \Mln^. Tl\e iwavla- 
»*# Moak Mt m (Plati* 4.1). ^Vt Hrst, working \vatV.Wa taw w AwAv^x 



90 BEITIBH NATAL AND HILITABT OPERATIONS IM EC 

trench along the crest of the rising ground, and this wu 
converted into a mnsketrj- parapet 4 j feet high. Emplacemt 
40-]>dr. and other guns were made, the platforms being 
slfepers, and the para{)et8 strongly revetted with sand-bags 
Small muttketry redoubts were thrown ap on the flanbs of tt 

To the east and west, at « and (, were intrenched infantry ca 
Dnval detachment was eucamped at u. Their two 9 pdrs. wei 
in the adjoining earthwork, while their 7-inoh Armstrong U. 
at p, near the water-tower. 

The extreme eastern picket was io a fortified house a mile 
distant. Its object was to act as a feeler in the directioD o 
It is not shown on Plate 45. Other pickets were establit 
dicated on the 'plan, where I I are sheltered trenches, j a sm 
for musketry, and k the chief battery, nionnting the guns a 
merated. 

The Egyptians could advance ftx>m King Usman either I 
on the canal bunk or that on the railway embankment. 1 
on the former line was called, and is marked on the plate, V 
Picket; on the latter no regular picket was maintained ta 
iron railway bridgeover the Mabmoudieh Canal, altfaongh rei 
constantly thrown oat in the direction of Mellaha Junction. 

As a barrier against a movement along the southern bra 
railway, that coming from the Oa'iarri station, a strong fo 
tablisbed at the Villa Antnniadea on the canal, with stric 
hold on, in tbe event of attack, whether reinforced or not. 

On Plate 45 is an enlargetl view of this outpost, giving ih 
the means employed to streirgthen it. As a good piece of ex 
defense these means merit 8|>eciul mentiou. 

Tbi' men's (ents were pitcljed on the roa<lway along the M 




X&TlXi an> MILIXABT OPBRiiTIOMS IN EQTPT. 91 

n pHed MBd-lMfi flir a breattwork, with a higher tier in rear to pro- 

Bt the BiB against aeddental reverae Are from the sharpshooters on 

pof the hoaaa a in the oomer of the garden, g was au oatlying hoasoy 

noa^ly laopholcd and strengthened ; A A are sheltered trenches, and 

\ ledoobl wkeie two 12-pdrs. were mounted daring the day-time. 

■n gaaa wcvs withdrawn to the other side of the canal at nightfiill 

d pot al «! beside the 40-pdrs. 

nis gantson at this point were composed of five companies of the 

Vsl Hossn Beginenti 1st battalion (late 35th foot), under Lieutenant- 

ImmI HaduMi and about 75 artillerymen. They managed their own 

aspocti haviag a lot of Oypms mules under their control, had good 

isUag-water from a well near by, and were able to supplement the 

mj ratkm with milk, fruity and vegetables brought in daily by natives. 

licr the siiade of the trees on the bank of the canal, which ftimished 

ns with fresh water for washing and cooking, they were as comforta- 

s ss the flies and mosquitoes would permit, except for an occasional 

eO sent from King Otaian by the largest Krupp gun, at a range of 

Myaids^ 

Ke geDcial defense profltctl by the presence of the Mahmoudieh 

aai, with its high banks, and by the railway embankment, which 

etched from the Antoniailes gimlcn towards Bamleh. 

Per sight work an electric light was placed on the roof of a house at 

Bmiag StatioD, so as to illuuiitiste the approaches from Aboukir and 

ifrDowar. 

Fhe following notes are by Ciiptaiu K. Wood, commanding the 17th 

npany Koyal Engineers: 

"W advaiiced pc«tii were pot iu a Mate of di^fenws In HOiue canes well-sitnati^d 
MN wrrr iirlecf««l ; in oth^n hiVMMt w«»rkH werv coiiHtnictod. FaHGlDM of long reeds, 
k«lc4 down with ribs of palm l«*avfii, w«*ro tii^d for revetting the interior iilopea. 
koffton tah«* wrIU were driTen, and when^vor gfM>d wat4«r waH found, wells from 
s 5 Incbrs id diameter w«*n* Mink to dopthn varying from 8 to *iQ feet. Lig^t 
BfDnal woodsn rarha wer« hmmI, behind which Hhceting was driven. 
i% inianuy brids« 1;M) feet long was thn>wn over the Fresh- Water Canal one day. 
' vairr was nnlj 3 fc«t deep, bnt the mud was mi so A that a rod was ea^ilj 
dkd 6 fret iato it. Some old iMianled nxiting was cut into squares nf 6 feet. 
iWap stool Imtlfis were dxnX, the wide bases preventing the piem ninking into 
' Mad wbm tb«» load came on. The whore pient were ftiniied of tahleH found in 
(hhonng eottagns; palm-tree logn were laid on the mud, the legs of the tables put 
ri4e of ibrm and driven well home. 

«igbt poptoos of raavas over fruniiiig of inch htuff wen* iniule, and a H|»erial NU|ier* 
Mare «ilh projer ting ends, Mtnmglv hraee^l, f(»r rnlHing. wnn provided to unit the 
'ls« aiiiddj sides of the ranal. The intention was to '* track** the raft up the crn- 
of Ibe canal by ro|M>a on each bank, mo a^ to ime it us a floating bridge, or to 
>plr<# the bridge from bank to bank by means 4if light com|MNiite In'sium (made by 
sappers) thrown from idiore piem; the materials for these piers wouhl l»e carried 
"•cb bttnk by cart or otherwise. 

be rompnny was moved lief<in* thi« Kcheine could be tried, but the want of it had 
I sUwigly ftdt when a reconnaissance agaiuHt the enemy had been pushed on Iwth 
kaoTlha 



92 BBITISH NATAL AND HILITIRY 0PEBATI0N8 IN 

Passing to the inner line of defense, the gat«8of the towi 
by strong parties, and the 6J-iiicb 8. ^., mounted on the 
there, were manned, aa well as tlie Oatlings. At the 
draw-1irid(;es over the dry ditch were fitted and the app 
The mines of gun{>owder were made of suitable metal c; 
provided with electric fuses, from which the wires, com 
inside the walls to a battery and firiug-key, 

Inside the town are two small old forts, Rumel Dik 
(Plate 1.) These were garrlHoned. The former comman 
approaches to the city, and mounts twelve 6j-inob S. B. 
adilitiou were the three naval M. L. K. 9-pdr8. already an 

Fort Napoleon is place<l to overlook the directions n 
westward from the city, as well as the harbor. It monn 
guns en barbette. It was of most value as a signal static 
and elevation rendering it useful for speedy communicatic 
fleet and the troops on shore. 

These interior works ^applemenled the defense of ( 
which the walls are high and bold. Outside of them mi 
20 to 40 feet wide ami half as deep. At the different ( 
are thickened and guns mounted lo nweep the roa<l, whi 
advanced works on a large scale. 

Within the town, at the principal street-corners, were | 
signboards indicating, in Biigli»h, the name of the mtreel 
or quarter to which it le<l ; and towards the sonthweste 
city, where walls are lacking, the streets were strungi 
Tbti barricades in the principal thoroughfares were so 
passage through them was [wssible at will. The bridg< 
Mahinondieh UhiihI at Miniet-elBassal was particularly 
barrier here being of iron plates with-stone backing. . 




BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITAKY OPERATIONS IN KGYPF. 93 

bo uioiiotony of .the defense was broken by the arrival of new re^i^i- 
tif*. by oc4Msional Hli^btHkirminheM, barren of results, and by sorties 
III* ariuort*^! train. 

'(I An^iiM ii^ however, a reconnaissanre in force was made towards 
;: UMnan. The otHcial tele^rraphic report by Major-General zVlison 

Alkxani>i<ia, Antjuat — X.X* a. iii. 

r«i«r«ni nati%i- rfportHexiHtin^ for the InM two ilayn that Arahi wan r4*tiriii^fmin 
' {••iM.ir ii|Niii iMiiianhoiir, I lietiTiiiintMl to iiiaki' a rt'coiniaiHsaniM* which wtmhl 
ruirii-!r»rl\ wlirtlitT Arahi htiU hi'hl hi.M ori^^iiial {umit ion strongly. Tor this]>iir. 
I diffi (ffti a hair hattahon of rht* Diikt^ of C«irii\vall Li;;ht Infantry and a half 
ih<in (if th** South StaflfonUhin* Kf^inuMit, with on«* D-pilr. «;nn and th«* whole of 
iuoiiiif.-«i itiiantry, to atlvance alon^ tho cast hank «>f tin* Mahnioudlidi Canal, 
M'lb Kidra, withoDi* U-pdr. y^\xi\^ w«*re U% advance alon^ thu w(>Ht hank. Thi'ae 
kiitntril njy Irfi attark. They were to folhiw the line of the canal till they reached 
ic^- in a ^iive of trees towardn the point whcic the railway coming; from Cairo 
r*achr« {.rarest to the canal. Alon^ thiH lin«' i»f rail a Htn>iiK hattulion of niarinea 
ttir«»nir \\\t in a train to Mellaha .Inncticui, preciMhMl hy the naval armored train 
Time ont- 4il-p«lr. and twoD-pdr. gnns a Nordenfeldt and two Oatlin«!H. The train 
to Kt<*p at the Mellaha Jnnction. Tlie niarine.M wore to il«*train then' and a«lvanco 
tip r^:I\«a\ line. Mi'c«»nipanif'd \ty the t wi»'J-]>dr»4. and c«>vered hy the tire of the 40- 
in* 1. ihr tidiin. Thr left column coiniiicnc«'d itH adva 'cc at a qnarter to r> in the 
.".•4<n from the ont-pirket station of tht^ Kanilch lin**H, inovin;; hy hoth hanks of 
•-41^]. It MMkn rame into action with the enemy, who wen- Htri>nu1y ]>oHt4*d in a 
\Y**i palm trreAon the fantern Mi«le and a ntron^ detVn.silde h«Mi!M> and ^ardenn upon 
•tftKf. Tht-ae pfihitiona wrre carriiMl. At thi.Htime Lienteiiatit Howard VyM^, of 
K:ri>ii. 4tta<b*ii tt» the inf»iintc<l infantry, and a Noidicr of th«' corph, wcrt* kille«l. 
'^•.'■:\,\ ;h«-n t'l'ik lip a t-cond (Ninition half a mile in ri*ar of thr first. ii]Min thcca.Ht 
i ■ f tV*- > .ir:.i7. ntncm;; hi;;li f ri»pN and hoiistvi and hchind tli«' it rc^^til.ir hank'* of* the 
I \ ri>'i: thi« fMi«itiiiii. alsfi, the eni'iiiy wan diivcii with i;rrat !o'**«. 

i - »-. •d tlif r';;}lt cnillllill IllV-cit'. whii'll fniitiWril v\ li.it \\;i<. tin- rliolil nl'tllC 

> :. ii rli* ',* \\ 'oliiiiiii '.«a*« iiin\ liiu. I placrii llii* ni;iMi.r<« :\\n\ tl,* '.•-|<di. 
«*''l '"^ l-'ii-' i.i« k(-t*«. til till" Wf»t ot and iiimIi'I invjifl !ln i.i<iua\ •ni- 

• ■ :. .%:.t\ ;t «»vi il iIm'Mi ft'iAai'i a-* T.ipii'l* a-* p«»"vi''I' , .ii.<l i).:ri n'll i»t "ii^ht of 

■ • ■ iT.i^t d u itIi « "iilciii* 1 'I li.ii k \vi !). \\ It li a \ n ^\ "t « i:' : i* _• ntl f ! i ii it f n .it. 
■ . • ' • •f.f 11 l«^ t-iie'it w a* p«*fr«*i\»il ; Jli»- ci-i my njn i.i i| iijim t;s \\\\\\ aitilliiv 
- • •! "ij i« r.k;':di> .t^ pi>'»<«ihli> till [ « arii<- to tin* poiiit u li<'ii* t In- i atlw .i\ a]>'.<in.{i !,« n 
:••' to rh** Mahiii«iii(Jit-h ( ',in:il. I thi-iii»p«-ii* •! tin- w il li iiiit^kt ti> l!i>iii iIm r.nluav 

• • * ;spi>i. till- i-n*-iiiv iMiirt:^ t]i« lianK"! ot tli** M.d.Mi-- .ijii !i i .r...%' . I iii* tun 
-• «. r* ''•r.ft.;^t*<i •ip ••ii In iIk* «'iiili.ii.k.n!«*tit ai <! • iiii' n.;<i .h tii<i. ,i:^ i ■ "f tin- 

•^ :.«. tIi»' I'^ pilr tiritj;* tf\ i-i ••■ir IhmiN a^a:n>«t tli-- )n'iii* \%|i|t \\.* •■iiiiii\*< 
-«i.r» > I i^Miitiiii; t<* a}>pf*ar. Iiviiii; ni\ ii::lit iijinn Itoth «ii]fi i>t t Im • :Mf>a'<K 
' ! n ttiTi-u fiifM arti tw i» • urn pall :•■•* til « .ti i \ .i !■'■•'•*. \ * .w \\ .i . .i: t] tiil- 

■; ,■ ! ■ * 'iji\ •'•jii I, f li\ t lir«»'A . II;; '•I'MM In 1 1 I ••til ■ 'aiii* ■' ••' 1 I •! • ! •• ■. . .■ I ■ I j'f li 

. . • ■ f at ■! I- iit-r. I hi' I aiiai . I lia'l i "'^ at f .t ::t •', ; i ■ j.. - t ••'. | ■ ... :t: i| 

• »^.:. i! Im*' .!■ rti'»'. lint I. 1 1 ■■ I '..iI .1 :i'l 1 1.1 i i :! ■ . . . I f.- • : ■ . !■ ! t> i I. 

■ '• :• -J-. I iif \\r*- iif f !.• •» 7 !•■! t *. i >,,' '.» ::'::.'. ^ ! . * r 1 • ■. - . ■ • . ■ • . i 

^ .' • ?«• .4rf iiiTi. w |«i 4pi-«<i||\ 'ji-r ■!'. Ii I |i\ r li>- I |i i>t I- \ il * ;!l" I ■ I 1,1 ■■ i> ' . f 

• • I %«.i*i< • •■»! iii\ |>.ii t u .!■« a' '.i.'.i i{ I »• -■ J .11^ 111 , .| I :■ __■ t 'it 1 ! I .■. ■, 'ii I i 
;■-•:'., {Mf\« ff h*-tii|i' u itliiii .i'A :: ^. I in !•! : . [•• — : ,iii tui .ilm.-T i |.:t . .^ ir ' • i - 

". if. I . dii*K w a* i.ip.ii" \ lii.i \\ ii J ■■:■. I i.- 'i i ii ." ■ ■! i '•■■* i.. » :;■.:; t ■• 
' !■ •".• lit w 4* • arrii il •• tt w .til tin- nil -T j.i-: !• . r it-i;..; ii .: . ,i'iii j.|. . . ■■ i -. ! ' • 

•• I':k!f4l;'in nrnl«-/ I #»/♦»/!*•/ 'In-,i\. I'ln \ ji- | Ii.h ',, \i\ a^'itii.\\«* « «''.\ \' %'. '.» " *• *.V 
^'^j.'artn t»t » tivhl tlay h.wry aff« rnjif ••! tin- rin mi, tn 4i\\.k\iii- >mv- Mv.«»\\' .\\»\ 



94 BEITI8H NAVAL AND MILITARY OPEBATION8 IN 

the beautiful precision of the 40-pdr. and the steadj Are of nhe 9- 
ThB 1nMe« of th« enemy geem to have been very great, and they » 
tbat, ooDtrary to tbu QHiial practice of Aitiatiuii, they made do atlen 
T wUliilrawal. The gunH and troopa were quietly entrained at tl 
M Aleiandriu. At the nanie time, the 
tl to tbe Rainleb lines iiturolented. 
\a of the move waa all I could wish. 
loaa has been aomewbat heavy. It waa e* 
n nnilor my immediate dJrectioD, who, I fi 
e twenty woondi'd. Id the left attack, aa far aa I 
there have becu oue officer aud uuo private billeil and nil or M'ven p 
Tbp ofBcer, I grieve to state, is Lienleuant Howard Vy>*, of the Bil 
of the niontproiniaiiig officcnl bavo ever met. Detailed list of the kil 
will 1)0 telegraphed aa soon aa received. 
The foUowiug table ^ves the British loss Iq tliig en^g 



n and Hlonly itflamed back U 

drew along the banks of the ci 

As a reconnai usance, the an* 

I regret to state that »i 

marine battalion aud scai 

nan kiUe<l aud » 



Total... 



On the aitle of the defense, nunors were received after< 
losses had been very heavy, A Circa^tsian, who made 
Arabi's camp to Alexandria on August 9, staled that tbr 
Beventysix men were killed and a large number woundec 
eion. 

Beyond Mellaha Junction {see Plate 144) the gmnnd 
canal and railway is occupied by native honneB and g 




BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 95 

mtjongy oommanded by Lieatenant-ColoDel Tuson, B. M. A. The blae- 
Jacketo nnmbered in all 200 men. 

In unofficial acoonnts of the action reference is made to the inacca- 
rate Are of the BgyptianSy the majority of whose bullets passed harm- 
less overhead. This fanlt marks the Egyptian practice throughout the 
campaign. 

There appear to have been at least two distinct charges, one by the 
advance of the Rifles and the other by the Marines. In both cases the 
^Igyptians broke and ran, although enjoying excellent protection. In 
^Doonnters with semi-civilized troops cold steel has uot yet lost ita 
"prestige. 

The tactics employed were the usual British formation for attack — 
mbout a third of each battalion being deployed in line at intervals of 
three paces, a second third 300 yanls in rear as a support, and the 
xemainder about the same distance again behind in reserve. 

The left wing had orders to seize a certain white house on the canal, 
lot its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Thackwell, of the 3dth, mis- 
look the first white house reached for the one designated. In con- 
seqaence, the left of the marines was uncovered, and the substantial 
benefits of the fight lost. Uad the two wings joined, many prisoners 
iroald have been secured and two guns, if not more, captured. Signals 
irere made to the lefD wing to advance, but the smoke of the battle and 
the iiEuling light prevented their being read. 

The skill with which the blue-jackets did their part of the work is 
xecorded in the official report quoted above. Tlieir plnck is seen in the 
oomber of their losses, one being killed and four wounded out of 200 
men engaged. Their 9-pdrs., it must be remembered, were worked 
<ni the canal banks and railway embankment, and was entirely unpro- 
tected. 

It seems more than probable that Sir Archibald Alison could have 
QontiDued the advance, headed by the marines, up to the main line at 
Sing Osman, had he been so desirous, for the Egyptians had refused 
to meet his men at short range, and had receded from ])oint to point 
^th alacrity. When the order was given to return, a battalion about 
300 or 400 strong, in front of the marines, was seen holding up a white 
% in token of submission, but no time was left to take tliem as prison . 
erg. 

Beyond the moral effect on the attacking force of a successful brush 
^th the enemy, the reconnaissance in force was barren of results. The 
■^ngth of the Egyptians was neither developed nor ascertained, iior 
^88 the position held from which they had been driven. The balance 
of advantages seems to be negative ; valuable lives were sacrificed, and 
tte enemy regained the ground he had lost without suffering severely 
^ngh to be seriously affected. 

At this time, it is believed, the Egyptian force at Rafr Dowar and 
King Osman was mada ap of four regiments of infantry , on^ oi eabX^v^ 



96 BBITISH NAVAL AND UILITAUY OPEBATIONS IN E< 

and several batteries of artillery, l>etweeu 12,000 and 15,000 
outnumberine the garrison of Alexandria at least four to ot 

To increase the defensive streiigtli of the vity an effort w 
flood Lake Maiiout, whose bed is sligiitly Ik'Iow the level 
by cutting a canal at Mex across the istlimux. The details 
in another report already made to Ihe Depart aient. The t 
suited in failure. 

In other parts of Egypt little was done during the six we 
lug the bouibarduieut, exeept to gather u strong uaval foi 
end of the Suez Canal. At Suez, Uear- Admiral Sir Willia: 
V. C, com manderi II chief of the British tupiudron in the E 
lauded a foree of 450 sailors and marines on August 2, : 
towu and proteeting the valuable docks and the pro[>erly c 
iusalar and Oriental Steam Navigation Company. Be e 
no opposition, the place having been abandoned by the 
although in greatly superior force. His fleet there present 
the Euryalus (flagship), a wooden -sbeathetl iroii corvette 
and 400 men ; the Eclipse, wooden corvette, 12 guns and 201 
Uuby, composite sloop, 12 guns and ^8^ men ; the Dragop, »]• 
and 140 men; the Mosquito, guu-boiit, 4 guns and 00 men. 

The Penelope, ou board of which Itear-Admiral Uoskius 1 
bis tlug immediately after the bombardment, had gone to 
where was al»o accumulating a considerable fleet. On Aii 
Aginconrt, Monarch, and Northumberland, armored ships 
maliue and Carysfort, wooden sloo|>n, the Keady and Be 
vessels, &c., were at the northern end of the canal. Thi 
Dee, iron river gun-boats, arrived a few days later. The pow 
dranght ironclad the Orion, moantiiiK four lioton guns, n 
Isniailia on July -i>. where she was joined subseqt^entiy by 




BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 97 

an immediate advance npou Kini^: Osman and Kafr Dowar. It had, 
however, been determined, loDg before, to seek a base in another quar- 
ter, and Alexandria soon reverted to its previous condition of qaiet 
waiting, in which it was only disturbed by occasional night attempts 
by BetloQins to spike the British guns, and by infrequent and result- 
less skirmishes. 



THB COMPOSITION OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. 

The troo[)s dispatched to Egypt by England formed an army corps 
of two divisions. 

Each division was composed of two brigades of infantry (four battal- 
ions each), besides certain other detachments from various corps which 
went under the general designation of *^ divisional troops." The divis- 
ional troops arennderthe immediate control of the division commander, 
sod are intended to make the division an independent military nnit in 
tlie event of separate action. In this case they included two squadrons 
of cavalry, a spare battalion of infantry, two field batteries of artillery, 
a company of royal engineers, a commissariat and transport company, 
one-half of a bearer company (aids to the wounded), a field hospital, a 
Held post-office, and a veterinary department. 

Besides the two divisions are various other bodies of men known col- 
lectively as " corps troops," under the direct orders of the commander- 
in-chief or his chief of staff. These consisted of a cavalry brigade, with 
it8 battery of horse artillery, its commissariat and transport company, 
its half of a bearer company, and its field post-ofiice ; of the corps artil- 
^«ry, two field and one horse batteries and the ammunition column ; of 
the siege train, of the ordnance-store department, of the royal engi- 
^^rs, of the military police, of the veterinary department, of the com- 
^'fisariat and transport corps, of one-half of a bearer company, of four 
^^1(1 hospitals, and of the general post-oflBce. 

I'wo additional battalions of infantry and a battery of artillerj' were 
^Ot out for garrison duty at Alexandria. 

I^ese troops were reinforced in the field by the Indian Contingent, 
^ the two battalions of marines, and by various detachments of sea- 
^^U from the fleet. 

^ Oonveuient depots were established at Malta and Cyprus, where 
^^^ assembled various bodies of the different corps, to be drawn upon 
occasion demanded. 
A.t G020, the island adjoining Malta, and at Cyprus, large and com- 
^^H3iou8 hospitals were formed. 

1*he details of this disposition are shown in the accompanying tables. 

It must be borne in mind, however, that the troops thuadesmVMiA 

^^6 not used together ii? accordance with the plan given oii\vaY>viT,\iw\. 



B.Mia.2» 7 



98 BRITISH NATAL AND mUTABT OPERATIONS IN » 

were distribnted according to circamstances by the commaD^ 
TliQR, for instance, tbe 4tb biigiide, under Major General I 
Wood, was left at Alexandria when tbe base was clianceil t 
and its place filletl at Tel el-Kebir by a scratch brigade n 
teuant-ColoDel ARUbaniham. 

It iu)i,v lu- remarked, in explanation, that in the British ar 
piling of fora^re au<l mtions frills lo the (Jommissariut and 
Coii'h; that of all uiililary ftores to tb<i Ordnance Store D 

Tbe following were the |iriijci{»il offlwrs in the exiteditio 

General commandinginckief. — Ueueral Sir Garnet J. Woli 
B., G. C. M. G. 

Chief uf ike if/nj/"-— General Sir Ji.bn M. Adye, K. C. B., I 

Officer eommandiag Royal Artillery. — Brigadier- General \\ 
enonch, U. A. 

Officer commanding Royal Engineers. — Brigadier-General C 
Nugent, C. B., K. E. 

I'r'>co»t J/ai-g An/.— -Colonel H. G. Moore, V. 0. 

Senior Cfntmismriat Officer. — Conitninsary General E. Mi 

Senior Ordname Store O^er.— Com oiissary -General of O 
A. Busaell. 

Principal Medical Officer. — Surgeon-General J. A. Hanb 
O.B. 

Command of bate and lines of communication. — Major-Geaen 
C. S. I. 

l8T Division. — Lieutenant General G. H. S. Willis, C. B. 

lut brigade. — Majur-Gencml □. R. El. the Diiki>of Ooiinaug 

2d ftrijjorfe.— Major General G. Gniliam, V. C, 0. B., B. E. 

2d Division. — Lieuteuau^ General Sir Edward B. Haiule 
G., C. B., It. A. 




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104 B&1TI8H NATAL AND UILITAST OPEfiATlONS IN BOTPT. 





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BSITI8H NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 105 

If to these is added the reiuforcemeut of the iDdian Ck)ntiDgeDt, the 
wLole namber of men laoded in Egypt is found to be iu the ueiglibor- 
homl of 35,000, while about 6,000 more were on their way or iu reserve 
at Dear points. 



XI. 

THK SEIZURE OF THE SUEZ CANAL AND THE CHANGE OF BASE. 

Tbe Britiah operations in Egypt were formally legitimized through 
tke imsage by Parliament, on July 28, of the bill grantiug £2,300,000 
•terliiig for the expense of the expedition. At the moment of which 
thu re|>ort now treats the state of affairs may be briefly summarized 
u follows : 

Tbe BntiMh had a foothold at Alcxamlria and at Suez, besides strong 
uvil forces at Port Said and Ismail ia. The Suez Canal was still 
opro to traffic, vessels coming and going through it as usual, unmo- 
k»trd. Egyptian detachments held Port Said and Ismallia, in the in- 
tnY»t of Arabi Pasha, who had been declared a rebel by the Khedive. 
TfaiKe two ports were the only maritime places of ini}>ortance to the 
Attjk-k. With the exception of Suez and Alexandria, the whole of Egypt 
lit in the poHsession of Arabi and his followers. It was known tbat 
tb«Nf amonuted to between 50,000 and 00,000 regulars, including the 
t<N«*rTe(i, beaides numberless volunteers generally S|)okeu of vaguely as 
Bfiiouinh. 

The eniU which ^lentTiil \Vols4»li*y had to accomplish were tlirei^ in 
DuriiU-r: firnt, to crush Arabi's forces; second, to seize (/airo and save 
it friiiii the f.ite wliicli had befanen Alexandria; tliinl, to re-establish 
^b** Kbi^live*H authority. The last, while politically embracing t!ie two 
fwrnwr, «as. in a military s«m)s4», their necessary outcome. 

iM-ft-rnng to the map of I>ower K^ypt, IMat** 47, it will Ik» si»en that 
*^»ri»it4 at the a|H»x of the delta, a ili.strii't rou^lily 110 miles on each 
Mr(.f ti,^ tiiangle which it forms. Throii;;h this district run tlie two 
r*niiri|,a| tiranches of the Nile, whicli separate a few miles below ('airo, 
••"'I «hich MTve as the main arteries ot trade an4l of a vast system of 
^rnfT^tion canaU ainl ditches. The banks of these canals and the rail- 
**> fitihanUmentsai-e the roads of this country, w here wheeled vehii'les 

ft * 

^ pnietically unknown outside of the lar^^er towns. TIm*h4» eiDbank* 
^ntA ronhl have lK*eii readily utilized as formidable intienchnients. 
*''i*U*»;:e Anibi in the delta wonhl have Ikm'Ii folly. TossesNing an 
Uiliamtf knowledge of this network of (likes and water c4)nrM's, he 
^"1 hdve avoided or sought battle at his own convenience, se«>nring 
"'T bimmdf the most uilvaiitageons 4'on<Iitioiis, and, if defeat«*4l. could 
^^^ct-ither nftire<l to other aii<l siinilar positions, or haye (tarrit-d on a 
|*'*»*«uj;eil and harassing guerrilla warlare, trusting; to l\\\5 U\\;U ^aU*! 
*** the 5ik!v now rupidly rising, to flooil the ground \u troul ot V\vv VSwV- 



106 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITABT OPERATIONS IN ZOTPT. 

Isl), and to (lefeiit lliom by the malflrial fevon* \Fhiuh are ttie Rnnor^ ^-^nm 
tJiiit of llie overflow. He could thus linve retreated nt companiti « ^Hii 
leisure, destroying all Eiiro)ieiin property as lie witlidrew, and, if foroc:»— ^^ 
lip tlie 2>ilc Viille.v, leaving lieLiiid Lim a uiasa of BUiokiug raius ^^ gj 
miiik tlie site of Ciiiro. 

The French nnder Bonaparte in 179S bad marvlied from AlesandH' K'_3]fi^ 
to Diimanliunr and up the left bank of tlie western or lEoHtttta bran «^ w ticb 
of tlw Nile to Cairo; Imt thiu route coaW only liBve been r«U««e(l m by 
Oi'rierikl Wolneluy artar taking or turning the fortiHtMl llnea Jit Ki-.= ~.'ifr 
Duwar; and it was open to the further olijections that along it An^ — ~,[jj- 
c'»nld not be forced to flpht in the open, and that a wide, deep, sw^aaod 
Bwift river, almost devoid of Uridges, lay between it and Cairo. 

The clianees and probable results of a direct advance from Alesand^ziria 
had been fully considered, and even before he left London Oeiu^^wml 
Wolseley had determined npon hin plan olcampnign, which invidved ibe 
use of Ismaili i, ou the 9uez Canal, as a bj,aB of operations. He ho jied 
to be able to indnce Arabi to fight a decisive battle at sornepoint in the 
desert wJjere the Egyptians could be absolutely crushed, and the^K- 1 to 
push on from that point, whatever it might be, and occupy Oiro. IZM'big 
probability ofa fair fight in the o|)euwnsin faet the main object tube ^^[il>- 
served by the seleciion of this route. As secondary advantagea, Ij^or- 
ever, were, first, the relative proximity to Caini of the base, 90 miles, tiis- 
taut by rail over this line, as compared with I'Jl miles from Alesand "a; 
Hecoud, the existence of a rsihvay susceptible of easy defense, for- "la 
traus])ortation of supplies from the base; third the greater saUiL^rilJ 
of the deeert region ; fourth, tlio posae«Hiou of a well-sheltered iiiT "oi 
baibor, where the operation of disembarking could be conducted wilUoot 
interference from gales of wind or heavy surf. 

The iirecantions taken to keep the plan a military secret were trlior- 



BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 107 

Ken: Ke;:inH*iit (late 5iHh loot) liavinp sirrived. This deficiency was 
nwiiU* u(mm| h^* the iiianiie battalions and th ^nl battalion of tho TifleR. 
On S:itiinla\, An^nst ]*J, the various transpoits moved t(» the eastward 
in :i ttrct, i'si-4irt<*d by the Inflexible, Minotaur, Superb, and Tenieraire, 
ami :iiieh4irvil in n*f;uhir lines, accord in^:: to a prearranged plan, in Abou- 
lir iJiiy.sit .*i,.'iO p ni., tlie nuMi-of-war) ein^ nearest the bea<*h. The tn»op. 
^Iit|t Kiiphiati'S, with the Duke of Cornwairs Li*;ht Infiintry, the Kho- 
Mii;i, niih ihr Ko^al Marine Li^ht Infantry battalion, and the Nerissa, 
villi the iCitlcH and the Hoyal Marine Artillery biittali<»n, pushed on to 
V**rx i^Hid. These transports exprhenced singularly bad luck, the last 
till lin*:i kin;; down t-n mute. The delay resulting:: was not serious, for 
tbciri'M'urt, the Alexandra, towed the Nerissa at the rrputed rate of 
tvHve knots an hour, while the Euphrates helped the Khosiini. A Her 
dark the>e vesiM^ls were foHoweil by tlie other transports, which left 
Anihi an«l Al>uiikir, in a military sense, dann rair. On arriving; at 
I'urt Siiid the next morning they found the entire Maritime Canal in 
tlsf b;iiHU ot the liritihh navy. 
Tbe uflicial rei>orts descrii>tive of this operation arc quoted at length : 

H. M. 8. Pknklopk, 

^IR: I have the bounr to mako tb«* following; n*]iort of my pnif-etHliupt aftor I left 
Alriaiifirin in the Irin, on tin* f\ filing of tlie Kiih instant, with the jilun of opera t ion h 
■l^filun l»rtiie<»ii Sii Ganii-t Woliieiey aud voiirself: 

^ I ftm\ed at Port Said the next morniii^ (ThiirMla>) at 10 o'cloek, and iinniodi- 
Vr'\ wiji fhr N\uri2a, ciindenmT Mteaiiier, wiiii i«>ntN, ]»rovi*«if>iis, and ItK) men of tho 
N 'r'.'i i^u'i-ri^:! 1, ti> li.ii.iilia. ui a rfii)r>ri*««tnrut to LViptain Fit/. Ki»y. 

^ <iu ('rii].i\ moinin^, tlir ]-ih instant, Citptain Trt/ K'oy join*d nn* from iNinailia, 
«?'! i!!tr i! - iiH«iiin v^itli linn I j;avt« him tin* a<'r(im|»unyin^ oidi-fr* with n-ftTrnee to 
t}.» i«. i|| :^iiiin lif (hat plat***. 

< I ai«fi arran^i-il fi»r ihe m'l npation of Purt Said I»y (*a|>tain Henr}* Fairfax, of 
" M >. Ml uari h, !«» wlinni 1 k'*^** the inhtirictionN appfiidi'd. 

" ''ij Kri«;»> e\i-nit!^ I himi^ht in two i'tini|*anirN nt thi* liattaliitii nf Marini*H l'r<»ui 
^'' N- rll. ill. !•• rial il and pl.n «-d iht-ni nn lioard i»t'th«' MniMifh and In**. 

*■ M. v.. (kf dt' L«'*>ii>-p% w lilt in t li«> wol'kin^ hf.-iti of fill' ranal rutnpany at Nmailia, 
r*.i r ,.|. '.t.^iri! fill (hi* ITrh iiiNtaiit uiid ciitcri-d iiit<» a 1<mi;; di-«rn*>'*H«i:. prfHiMiliii;; a 
^''i*^ I't ^rj^iiii rnfi* u^aii-*>t nri\ poHsiMi* iiiifntinn on mir pari to di'«>'iiii»aik in tlio 
'*''-<. ;i: (t fi.npiit.ii^ I h*' ^roiiiHln of my iniiiiialiiiii tiiat I «i>if*i<ii-ii'il Niitriil:,!, huth 
" '*'• k' '. p««r:. :«i Im* K;;\ )iUan. Iff U f t w ith tin- « mix hTmn. I !• i-I -nit . t.n |i:h pail, 
■n«, «iMii.i r «ir lat«-r. >*liiMiii| ii'<i- llif ranal inr a i::ilit;ir> i>mi|mi<.i*, \\Iii!i> I had 
'••: 1 •••!<% ti (i<>ii that n«« n-nnni'-triiM'-i' on mir pait would :»ii!iiii« I'liiin' KiTrli- 

* ' '*•■ L'-H'.i'pii to w illiii;^l\ ai'iTpt rip' )»oxition and withdiaM lii>* «»pp'»'«iii"n to 'nir 
- ".:•'. 

■ I 'I :i*;i!i rnl, ihfr»*f«iri'. that !•• in»«iir«* tl.r s.ifi- p.i'»*.a;i»* •»f"i»'ir ti"«']«'^ ii \\:i^ t\t'*n- 
*'■'■• I r. t •w-ai • rli.it thf liai,^*'«aiid di* d;;?*-*, A i., '<!i«iUii| In- i>i i ii }>i«-(l .il'ini; iln' u lii'I*' 

''('.:.• 1 .1-. .! til I-Mi.iil .1 ; :«i.i!, t'lir li'-i, tli:i! it \% .i*i ir.ii<>t di-N i.iNli- rt .it iIm- Ki>>rara 
■'".'•i;' -•.V'ln «li«iiili| III- "t'iftil ;iiii| iiiir tliinii^li r« !i'^r;i |il..< i ••'nni'inEia' I'lri li»» 
'■ -1. «* li •• Ax ilfi'^ ' «iiiii|ii.iiii .i; I 1,1 w ;t li >\ f i -liiiisid lii- ^''Hi, •■•!. 

* K.rilii. ili.ry I •idii-r.d r.i:ii!i..it.di r II. II. I'.dw mmN. m II. M. >. i:iad> . a« an 
' *r tl.<iri*ii;;hly c'iMi\f r««uiiT \\\'.\t tin* i-an.ii. antl iii \\ Iiom- j .d;;uv« lit I h.Atl i nuli- 

■' /A- m'Mrr^iJ At " p. in. "ti S.if /irday 'i in if;:;, thf I'.Mh inMaiii . \aV\x\vL \W^*»"* ••«sm^ti 
^hr^bimu, mati left thf /la/zir, foi«i off f..r i-a. li ponl aH \\v ^a^^'A \\y. 



108 BRITISH HATAL AND UILITAST OPERATIONS IN BUx. .. 

10. At the same time 1 bn>iif[ht in the remaining three companies of the battaZ .^^ 
orMuriix-8, uiid<-rLieutonnut-Co)uiiHlGr»liani, Truiii thetforibumbeTl&nd, and towi^K. - 
day1i;;hl Iratiaferrcil them to the Reaii.v and Deo, with two laanchea from tbePenel^^ J 
to favililale ttit-ir landing on arrival at lamatlis. 

11. The Fulcoo, nbicb bail Jiint arrived from Alexandria, was sent an bonr bek ^b 
■nnaot on tbo liHb to an ancborage off tbe coait balfway between Port Said and CE^B 
ail, and the Nortbamberland aochored during the night off Ghemil Fort, th« ob_g^:i] 
bt>ing to uheolc im eiodua of tbe Aral> coitlheAvera from Port Said, and to creat^»>,^ 
imiireuiioii ibnl i>Dr iiiteution waa to attack tbat work. 

1:2. Abuiit 4 o'clock u. in. on the 20th tbe tuorement vaa «xeeat«(I aimaltaneor -^ 
along the line with complete anccem, tbe rebels bein;; completely taken by annii^^ 
telegraphic communication waa reatored lieiwmn Ismailia, Eantara, and Port t* * 
and tbu Syrian telegraph was under onr control. It waa found, however, llnl i | 
latter bad been previoiioly ditconnect^l. 

13. On your arrival in the Helicon, about S a. m. on tbe 20tli, I had intended to i 
ceed at once to Ismallia to reinforce Captain Fits Roy, who waa espoeed to tbe {^i^bin 
bility of attack by a large force of enemy mo*lng down on him b; rail. 

14. Ci ream Stan cea, bowever, a* yon are aware, neceaaiialed my remaining at Po 
Said to see the let Dtviaion of Tranaporta into the canal, and by their eater ~^a; 
waa precluded from going on for some time in my flagabip. Wben night fell, tl^b«n 
fore. I went np to lamailia in a picket-boat, and arrived abnnt 4 a. m. 

13. 1 immediately landed and joined Captain Fiti Roy and inspected the po^Jlioa 
he had taken up. It appeared to me to have been admirably cboeen, and the nf crki 
thrown up for the protection of nnr men liy Captain StepbemMn'a party, witba tbe 
adrantagu of Major Froiter'ii, R. E., advioe, to have been tboronghlp aatiafaotory - 

16. It is known that three traina full of soldi-ia were moved down by the rebel geKKnl 
from Tel-el Eebir with the view to attempt to retake the place, but be was det^>'*' 
thim making an attack, prubably by the shell- 8 re on tbe Neficheatntion, and »"« 
some time apeut in observation of our position tbe traiDS ran back in the direo''^ 
from whence they came. 

17. I would hire drawyonr particnlor attention to tbe eCTeclive fire naintaiupd by 
the Orion and Carysfurt on a position which could only be seen from the raaat lie*^ 
of the Iatt4-rutovHr4.(M)0 yards' distance-afire by wbicb a train standing on tbe rail" 

Frtirfin ami Fill Roy and Comnmnder Edwir*** 

Aoii, and desire to expretiN my senne of Ibojud^ 

of tbt <I>fflcult and deliclO 




SATIL iMD MILITABT OPBBATIOm HT VQTPT. 109 
itiMi wlil yM am miafiweedy whiAh will prolMbly be»l the latert witkln 



It k cf Um fMtMt topottanoo that Um telegraph oflloe, both of the eanal oorapaa j 
4 the KgfpliaB OovacBBMut, ahoald be eeiaed at onoe and all telegraoM jkerented 



Tte waele-wHrto Ihm w ea t w ai d of the apperlook should also be aelied at oaee, aod 
tli, if paariUa, anttt the troopa arrlTo. Aa this is under the lire of the gnns at 
lirhs, latwashwaate ahoald be thrown np as soon as possible to eorer the men. 
Tfs ars to aas joar own dlsersllon as to supporting this movement with the firs of 
MiUp^ baft jaawiU bear in mind that It Is most desirable that no ii^nry whaterer 
nali be dsaa to the town of Ismailla or Its Inhabitants by any measores whieh yon 
ii|lyeaiisll^ aad yoa should use OTery means In yonr power to prsTont It on the 



nf the Orion should be ready to place any ship arrWing with 

rMpi la ftha boat bertha Ibr them to occupy, with a view to the disembarkation and 

Mr taagbftaf water. 

fttm Cbs vsrbal eoanaaaleatlon we have had, the support yon may expect ftom 

VmV sadfllr WUtiaa Hewett Is made fhlly known te yon. 

h the event of yonr balBg attacked by a superior fbrceof the enemy, you are to nes 

«re«B diaersCtea aa to fiUling back upon the ships. 

Asy pvasaa atlaiptlHg to set flrs to tlie honsss should be at once shot. 

A« H. HOSKINS, 

ifsar-Jdniral. 
IWCbftete S. (ra. Fns Bot, 

Ihaaidan to Cftplaina Fairfiaz and Seymonr, charged with aimilar 
Mc al Port Said, the ezecotion of which would ooour in the preaenoe 
'Bear- Admiral Hoaldna, were more detailed : 

Pbnkix>pk, at P4>rt Said, 

Augu9t 19, IdtS. 

AtS.90s.m. on Sunday next, thn 90tb Inntant, Port Said in to be f)cciipi«*d in the 
*Oe»la| maanrr : 

^ Tbi direction of operations will be nnder Captain Fairfax, of H. M. S. Monarch. 

^ Tbi laadiag party will consliit of— 

'^ H. IL a. Monansh, 100 seamen, small -arm men, IH [a] Oatling irun'ii crew, 48 
^*1 Marine^ I Ootling gnn. 

^"^ H. M. 8. Iris, 80 seamen, nmall-orm men, IS [a] rSatlitiff f(iin*8 crew, SIH Royal 
^Mt. I Oatliiig gan. 

^^Hi H. »l. 8. Northamberland, battalion ^00 Koyal Mariiips. 

^•Ul, |«<Q ■samcn, small-arm men, 3(i Gatliug-Knu riTWfi,tf7() Royal Mariiim, !lGat- 

Titsluieogth, 499 nif*n and 9 Qatling gnnn. 

^TW Irii^ asamen and niarincii will at ouce prociM*d to the ontiikirtA of th# town 
9tWQ««y Eugenie (Plate LII), and tak«* th« rij(ht of tin* line, to «*xt«*iMl fVi>m the 
"^I^Lake Meaialrb, between the European ami Arab townn, i, e., from th<* right of 
^ ft«t de XoH to the beach. 

^ TWj will be followed immediately by thn company of the Battalion of Marines 
^(W Irior who will torn to the left at the Rue di« TAnenal and ftnin round the 
^^ ■agte of the borrackii. 

^ TW Monnreh's seamen and marines will form on the whai f up polite tbr »hi|» und 
kf the Sae du Nord to the Consulate, which the niariu«*A will tjiko cbargi* of. 
The bloe-Jaokets will continue on the name line of alivvV, wA t^\ck 
1^^ Maf IW Mmmva, extondin/( to Lake Menxaleh, and deiaobina a v*^tV| Va 

ita aeigbborbood. 



110 BBITISH NAVAL AKD MILITABY OPEKATIOHS IN £1 

7. The BHtMlioa Comtiao; of the Royal Marioea of the UoDMvh wil 
left of the above uu the wburf and niarvli after the ailvuiice to the Ninth 
UurrufkH, tukiiiK caie not to exieud into thu Riiu de TAnteiiul, ao oa no 
way of I he Kra of the Irin' ddocliiiieDt. The E|{yiitiun iruupsuv tobe 
la; down their arms and tlieD luart'.hed down ro tbu whiU'f. 

e. One Galling gnu will iccoinpaii}- the athauce of tliu Iri>, and ibe i 
tiue Uatraliou Cunipoiiy of the Moiiuruh to iLe eutrauce of the barracki 

9 A aergeaiit'H party Ih to be kc|>t on tbe wburf tu pruveut auy atletui 
to flre tUe uiiBtom-huniw, ronud wbioh iKntrieii are Ut bo ponted. 

Id. The Kbedive'ii Ooveruor, now iu the Poona, will he on boanl the I 
land directly the f>ocupatiou ie effectwd, and aid id the maiuteuauoe of o 
police nbo are kuuwu Iu be luyol, 

lUa. Arruiigeniuiitii are to be mode lo aead the breakfaata on abore, « 
eli-e tbut may he wauled, at about 7 a. ni. The men are lo hare ■ meal 
fore landing. 

II. Can is to be taken that men do not land niib Inadeil riflra or 
order*, and it is tti be inijiresaed on ail the landiufdwrty that nu Uring ia 
without urders, and thacitisof tbegieat^^it impurimioetupreaerveaiulci 
both wilb the white iububltaula of all uutiuus and also wiili the Arab*, 
are dt^iKDUent for the coalinit of the abipi. 

V2. A gnurd ninat he placed by the Iris over the Govemor'a house a 
oppnrlnuity. Arxbi'a QoTeraor, Hoacbdy Poaha, is to be iwceived at i 
•urreoder biuiaelf. 

13, It U very dcairable to aecnre tbe Bimbasbi,* if pooaible, and Ui 
with au ini«q>Teter ami a amall party of jiicked men, will endeavor 
Prisoners sbnnid be put «ii board tbe IrU wben the Ooverour baa been et 
wbo should be rrleaaed and who rftainrtt as aaoh. 

U. Uarlure will IhdiI in bine with helmets, aeamro in blae wltb whit 
As soon as ]K>t>iib1e a change of white clotbiug ami bats for the seam 
•ant uu aliore, aud alritt attcutioD ia to l>e paid lo their appearance o: 
their general tone aud bcariug. Alt defaulten are tu be nentatonce 
Uonarcb. 

A jutrol of tmatworthy men nnder an offloerla to be loldolF atone* 
teuBiice uf discipline amongst onr own men, and anch pstmla as may be 
anpport the Ggjiptian poliiv moat be forthcoming immailiaiely the oc 




BRITISH KAYAL AND MILITABY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. Ill 

He 18 first to oceopy the dredi^es, patting ou board of each an officer and 15 men, to 
»xw<*nf any commnnication with the shore and to insure each dredge b iug kept close 
o the bank, ont of the way of passing ships. Four days' provieious are to be put on 
^dard with each party. 

Having done this and given his onlers to the officers, he is to proceed to Kantara 
,vid aeizM the telegraph office and both the.E^yptiau and Canal Company's wires, and 
kllow no message to pass through till he is certain it is made either by us or in our 
Dtereat. 

Having done this, he is to take steps to insure all the ships in the canal between 
^'ort Said and Lake Timsah bound north, t. e., t<> Port Said, beiug gared.^ 

Sir William Hewett, at Suez, has been instructed to allow no ship to enter the canal 
pTM Satnixlay ; therefore it may be assumed that there will be found no ships on the 
^^lier aide of Lake Timsah. 

DETAILS OF OPERATION. 

The following force will leave Port Said soon after nightfall, under Commander 
B. H. Eilwanls, who will have charge of the operations, viz : 3 officers and :i5 men 
of H. M. S. Northumberland ; 4 officers and 56 men of U. M. S. Penelope ; total, 7 officerg 
Kod i>l men. 

On proceeding up the canal 1 officer and 15 men are to be placed on board of each 
dr^gf) met with, with orders to get her in to the bank -as close as possible, or, if close, 
not to allow her to be movi^d. 

The officiT* and men of the Northumberland are to be landed at Kant>ara, with the 
telegraph clerks, who will accompany them and carry out the instroctions given 

The remaining officers and men of the Penelope are to bo kept rea<ly to occupy any 
#•»• which may reqnire it. 

^1 steamers met with bound northward, if gared, are to be ordered to remain so. 
'^ aoder way or seonre<l to the bank of the canal, to make fiist immediately in the 
'^^xt irore. At the same time a dispatch boat is to be sent back pant the next gare to 
^^m following vemiels not to pans the gare. Uutil the vessel going north has gared 
^^«y should make fast to the bank. 

Thf party of 1 officer and 10 men to be sent in a boat to occupy the gare station 
^^fttil this has been done, returning in the bout. 

Yor this service, a picket boat (Northumberland'H), a torpedo boat (Iris), a steam> 
-YB.tter (Toormaline's), and steam-pinnace (Monarch's) will be appropriated. 

A. H. HOSKINS, 

Hear- Admiral, 

In oY)edience to these orders just quoted, the whole lenp;th of the 
oanal was secured by the British. 

Tbe occurrences at Port Said are thus described in an official report 
^y Oaptaiu Fairfax^ of the Mouarch : 

H. M. S. Monarch, 

Port Said, Augunl 21, 1^82. 

^H: lo pnrsnance of your orders dated the 19th instant, that at :<.30 a. m. on the 

•'th I wa**, with the fi»rce named in the margin, t to occupy the town of Port Ssiid, and, 

^ poiMible, to surprise and CHpture the soliiiers, whilst in tho barracks and before 

^Whwl any time to commit any acts of incendiarism, I made the following disposi- 

noQof the force under my comma nd : 

"Hie canal is, so to speak, a single-track road. The garta are the turnouts or 
^^^9!^ where the floor of the canal is widened so that ships may pass each other. 
^^QK in the operation of hauling ont of the fairway, which is thus left cV^at. 
^Already detailed in Uear-Adwiral HoakiuB^ orders. 



112 BBITISH NATAL AND HILITABT OPESATIONB IN E 

1. LiRDtenantA. Cook, B. N., with Iri** naval hrigaile, a Oat1iii!(gan,a 
of Ibe Royal Marine battalion, n oiler tho com mnnd of Captain R. P. CoIBi 
were to land abreantof the IriH and doiilile ilon-n the beach, the coi 
riiits tiiniiiif; down the slreat in irliich tbe liarrautis nre aitnatcd, and t 
diately oppoHile them, tbe men from H, M. S. Irix advancinf; along the b 
reached ihe oaiTOwneck of land which HeparnttH the Enropeon from the 
there to ))la>'o sell tries acmmfrom Ibnnea to tbe mad that pauea down tl 

3. C'limmanderT. F. Hammill, with two cnmpuniea of aeamen from 
was ordered to laml abreagt of tbe ibip, and, donhUng throngh the aoi 
the town (leaving half a compsn; to protect the block of building* 
Briliah consulate la attaateil), to posh on to tbe nrck of land and form 
triea fVom Lake Uenzaleh to tbe road, tbiie completing with the Irlf ni 
aentriee right acro«s from the lake to Che si-a, and barring esoape from t 

3. The company of tbe Marine battalion, under Captain F. U. Eden, R. 
a Oatling from IhuMonarcb, under Lieutenant Charles Windham, R,N.,w 
Dp tbe center of the town and halt on tbe other aide of the banacka lo i 
by the other oiimpaDy of marines. 

4. Arrangements were made that the force shonid fall In with tbe 
uoiiw,so a« not to alarm the aeniriM on the qnay. A lighter was ploul 
after dark placed alongside the ahlp ; Ibis a few miiiat«B iMfure landing i 
the abore, and with the launch formed afloaticg bridge over which then 

5. Tbe Khedlre's Ooveruor, who hod been living on board the P. & O. i 
on boani the Monarch at 3 a. ui. and landed wilh me. 

, .6. Major Tulloch, of the Bojal Welsh Fnsilien (who gave me mach vi 
malion and asaistance), landed with six marines and secored three out ol 
on the quay. 

7. Ai 3.30 cammenced landing, and sneceeded in getting on ahor* w 
vation, and all the arrangements made were carried out in ever; partii 
accompanied by Major James W. Scott, R. H. L. I., commanding the t* 
of Ibe Royal Marine battalion, who poeted his men in soch a waj tba 
the barracks was impossible. 

H. Tbe soldieiB, who when we arrived appeared to be asleep, were ot 
render. Shortly after 1130 fell in and laid down their urma. 




BBITI8H NAYAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EQTPT. 113 

t may be well to add here that the Monarch had been so moored in 
i-anal, off the towu, that her forward turret guns commanded the 
in strv<*t leading to tlie quay, while the Iris was to seaward of the 
rMn'li, where ahe could shell the beach and the Arab town. At 11 
II. Siltunlay night the ship^s company were called on deck and warned 
It tlifV would be lande<l at 3 a. m. Strict silencM^ was eiijoine<l. This 
l«*r w;is KG c»rri*^l out that the peoj>Ie on board of the French iron- 
d Li (ialiiiKoniere, moored astern of the Monarch and to the same 
OY, kiifw nothing of what was going on. 

>f the amis surrendered by the garrison of Port Said but one piece 
j«l4»a4le«l. The military commandant was absent and all the Egyptian 
itrifM were asleep at their i>osts. The place was held by the shipn' 
irines and blue jackets until Sejiteinber 10, when they were relieved 
JiNi Uuy al Marine Light Infantry and KM) Uoyal Marine Artillery 
>•» cauitf out fn>ui Hngland. 

Fbi* work done in the canal iN^tween Port Said and Lake Timsah is 
»* ilitaile^i by Commander Kclwanls : 

H. M. 8. Krady, at Ihmailia, 

AugMMt :i2, \!*^2. 

in- I liav«' ihi' hoimr tr» n'port my ]»r(x-fMMliii<rH in rnrryin^ nut your onl«TH dati'd 
w Aiii:ti*f. ill r(iiiri«Ttioii witli tin* (MTii|):itii>ii of ctTtiiiii poiiitH on tlu* Sue/, Caiiul. 
■nll^^ Uiaf if waH wry ini|H)rtHTit tliat tlit* ilrt'djxtT KtiitioiifMl at tht* ninth niili* 
'■.:.l U- «a-iMirf«t. I ]ilai-tf-(1 LiiMitiMiiiiit I)avi«'N, of tin- Pi-ih'Iojh'. with '^hnt'ii, in char^i* 
'■■•r. F*r<M •-•'•I M^ up tijf ranal. I inforint'd all v«'h>m*1m hound to |*i»rt Said, nlHo tli** 
r^*r;.t-r«. t!i:»T It \%oiilii \f iHT«*HN:iry for tho shipn to r«'inaiii in gare uxitW t\w\ 

■•• : ? .iMi.r iii>triii fiiiUM. I ihtitrhfil Suh-IJi'Ut«*nant IU<tniti«'I<l in Tmirinalinr''* 
•■ ■ •?• -. .*j?h '•ix aiMirifinal han<N, In iii"»nn» th** aluivi- iiisrrui'rioiiM hi-in;; rom- 
" * rl.. *. 4»«- pr«\ hmih1\ iilitaitiiMl a jniMni"**' from tIm- Kii^IJMh shipiiij|Hft'r«« that 
.'>\ .■■•••\ tli»-ni. Affi'r iM rnp\ III;; Kaiita'a an iiiHriurrcil, I dt'tarlifd I.i«'iitiiiant 
'■ •• l..%n'i III •• ill Ii i-* t««rpt'ili» hnaT tn in-iuri' tin* raiial l»«iiit; krpt ili»;ir. !{•• H'pi»i I •» 
'* ■ ]..• f" 'urn t«» t]i»' »/»ifr at KilonutiT Nn. !il. hi- foiiml thr M«v«.a;jrrn-« Mantinn-t 
'■ r M< !U*iirTif IiMvni;^. and fliat «iii irmnii'^t latiiii; witii hi-r raptain hi- wji-^ in- 

"! !Vit ;lit •»t«aiiiiT Nhiiiild otilv >»i> st4i]i]ii>d hy ariii<-d fiiM-«-. and that tht* tiist man 
'■.' •': Ui.ird i«i>nlil l>c thf •«i;{nal I** h-t ^o th«* anrhur and It-avi- thi- nhip in hi** 

• * •'• . »?iT H.irn»*^-I,aiiri'iH-«', not nin^idi-riii;; tliat hi^ iii<>Triirtinn'« wairanti'd thi- 

■' ;• • . !t IT t'l rrpiiit !«• nil-, and ^cnt tin* rioirmalini''>« -team rutt«T t«t v« arimhipN 
: ;• fftitii I'ori Sai«l. 
'*.-. i'.tiT l»a\iii;i. \i*- idi«.«rv»d tin* nnti-.h Ht^^anHiH Kn^^ sliirt- and ('•tnti*|.IInr 

• «".d fi'.l" * Th»- >!• '•-a;;tMii-<«stfanM'r, npuM w IimIi he iha-o-d tlit-ui arid •-«>iiip*-nfd 
^ *' ! .Ii! :iiT«i th»- ni-M v"rr. iin<l lia\ in:; «aMtiii!H'd tin- inaHTi-r*. w ln» n-ittrati-ij thi-ir 

'* I.' I* ft t«) r**)<>iii rill*. Mr. I'lmntii-lil itifoi ini'il nif on hi» ri-lntn thai «lirt'itlv 

*• • t<>r['^)<> h"at watmiti»t' '»i;:ht iIm- l'n;;li-li hhipn a]»p<Mr ti> lia\«'a:*ain Ifft 

■''* 4- h*- fn>-i Thi-ni nl«-aniinL; d<i\vn tli«> i-aital at a pmnt \\ Ihtv it \va« noi-li-*** t<i 

"•:i; lilt- t'tlwr •lutit"»a*'»i,;ii«-«l ti» tin- parl.x iiinlt-i nj\ i-nfiirnai.il w.-it- all |iiint - 

-!'• iftd. and iin Siindax , tin- Vfoth instant, all u lin r>iij]il h*- Np iri d Mt-rt-ini- 
"'• ■ iii.f' liMij; th«' dfi'aiin-r Kait«-iir. a^iiHiiiil in thr lanal. hut n\ uM imt Im- 

■m' 

' '«<:r ;n*-'in. I Im-^ tn fXpri'*«-« ni\ thank-* tu all !h«- •illiitT-. •■•»pfi ial!> l.iiiiti nant 
■•••-I-airi-f !«■••. of th«* Iri-i. Snhl.iiiit*'ii:tnt \i. ii. M. Uhmit^* \A, «i\ \\\f V*»ut\\\A\\\\v . 



114 BBinSH NATAL AND MILITABY OFEBATION8 DT E< 

and Ur. A. H. Freeman, midshipman, of tbe Uonaroh, for Ibefr cealooi 
m; ordetB, alio m; great laturaotion wicb tbe behavior of the men dui 
hours of coDtiDaoDfl hard work. 

I hare, Sus,, 

H. H. EDW 



Tbe most important pltice to be seized waa Ismailia, wbile 
imity of a large armed force of Egyptians rendered the task 
iu tbe extreme. As elsewhere, tbe landing of tbe British 
pletely unexpected and almost unresisted. The operations a 
are given in Captain Fitz Boy's official report, as follows : 

Oriok, Lake T 

Sir: I have tbe hoaor to report that Id accordance with yoar aecret i 
18th inslant I took pooaeaaioD of lamsilia, the Arab towo, and advance 
towartlH Neflche to cover the weir. 

The furce landed conelsted of 565 offli^era and men, compriaing 40 
S-pounder gaa'i orew, one Qatling, a torpedo engineer party, and 12 I 
Orioti, oue Qatling and one rifle company from Northumberland, and oi 
gnn, <.:oqnette'a landing party, with 'i\ Royal Marine Artiller)' of Nori 
and Caryefort, aoder Captain Sieplienaon, C. B., inclnding a com|iaD 
under Captain Qore ; also 100 seamen and marinea from the Nyania, troop- 
ing to the NortbnmberUnd. 

The enemy were known to have a strong picket at Arab town, aeveral 
a guHrd at lamailia, about 2,01X1 men and aiz gnn* encamped at Neflch 
sideralile number of Bedonins in the neighborhood. 

At 3 a. m., in perfect atlence, the Orion% and Coqaette's men landei 
fort's uhortly followiUK, and advanced. The silence was ao perfect that 
Ka[io onrronnded tbe lock gnard before we were discovered. The lock 
their riQea and ao did oar men, and here Commander Kane was v 
u tbo li'ft i.-beck. 




KATAL AMD MILITAST OPBRAT10N8 Df BGTPT. 115 



IqrnnRiMl. This WM BiMt wtitfiMloiy. TIm aqnadton 

Moorai U^ntMuuii Bi^yds.luiTliig «liftrge of ilie Cmiytfiirt 

CoauBudsr MooN^i orden. Her nuut-headB were th« leeonool- 

I aad IfMteoi fliew. The bomlmidBie&t then eeewd antll lOp. m., Alter which 

I ««fe Ini •! Meflehe, at interrAle of half mi hoar, antil daylight, to proTent 

illwaj heiag eleered and to eheek troope coming bj train ftom the west. Mj 

ian waa aCiU an anxlona one. At 6 p. m. 340 marinec arriTod ; SOO reinforced 

aender Kane, 140 Captain Stepheneon, who had, with the anistanee of imor 

IT, iatianehud Mnmlf In adTanoe of Arab town . Lientenan t Mapier had eeonrad 

4aifmUa paction In the KhedlTe^a palace, and I reinforced him with M) ceamen 

ofthaaheriand and an offloer. I ha^e einoe heard that on this aflemoon Arabi, 

S^idO HMn in thine traine, did adTanoe to within a few miles of Neflche, hnt re- 

. igaln. Daring the night the eearch lights were worked aan ec ec aa ry. 

10L30 p. ni. OoBaral Qrahaa arriTcd with the adyance gnard of the army, rein- 

4 the diffHwat posltM^ and aaenraed military command. 

rm directed to retain command iu Ismailia an til 4 p. m. the 91et Angnit, 188B, 

i fir Garnet Woleeley lelleTed my gnarde. 

9 a. m. tc»-day I aent aOatliug gnn and crew, nnder Lieutenant Adair and Lien- 

■t King-Harman, torpedo engineer party, with Qeneral Qraliam, fo ooenpy Na> 

V vbem they now remain. I tiare aleo a eteam-cntter and the Jolly-boat work- 

m iht Preah-Watar Canal to Nefiche. 

li saw IB and «ca did their work perfectly. I hare to thank Captain Stepheneon , 

■eaiirr Kaaap Ceoiinander Moore, Ifijor Fraaer, R. E., Lientenanta Napier, Rojrda 

Uag-HanBaa (who deatioyed the railway approaohee to my weat front In two 

lamd pualUona) ; aleo my flrat lien tenant, Croee, who had, with a gun, charge of 

eual hridga and town approachce specially. 

"vm pr ls one ia , Arabl*a soldiers, were taken near lock bridge and Arab town, eeni 

Msri Oriim for two days, and, being disarmed, were allowed to proceed on shore. 

bil crvry reaenn, on theerening of Che 20th Aagnst, 18^ to expect a night attack 

•vcr, ■!> I placed thr Really and the Lc«*, that ba<l arrived with the murines, close 

'icr iu puMitioQ that would cover a rt*trejit on our part through the town. 

'pfiin Kirpbeninn brings to my luiiice the HcrviceH (»f Liou tenant Langley. the 

'^ lira tenant of the Carysfort, with thi* landing party. I have great pleasure 

In ■pccislly mentioning thisofflcer to you. Captain Stephenson forwards a letter 

I li4j»r Prasrr, ft. K. 

kar^ ihr honur to inrlose herewith a report from Captain Stephenson. 

^r Fraeer's report will follow. 

I have, &c., 

ROBT. O'B. KITZ ROY. 

Ceploia. 
B Ki^rAdmiral AsrruosiY H. Hoskin'h, C. B., 

Senior Officer, 

'>»ptatii StepbeiuK>n thuH deHcribod hiA particular share in the land- 

(*ARYhrOBT, AT ISMAIIJA. 

^'' laaceordaocr with your confidcrntisl memorandum. I landed with thf force aa 
^Wgin* at 3.110 a. m. of the ^'th, liMiving Lieutt*iisnl Thomas, II. M. S. Ncirth- 
tlsiid, with 13 ■mall-ami mrn, in charge of thr telrgraph station on the pirr. 
*ssm| with a »tniug advanrr«l gusnl in skinuiiihiiig onirr, undi*r Captain Oore, 
(•LI., over tbecanal bridgf, through European, native, and Arab towns, meet- 



^taty.fonr smajl-ajw men; I BrUl gun's cn*w, lUmen; I Ga\Un|^ ^v^^a ct«w , 

dke., 74 mMrioem, :; captaiua, andaid-4e-camp; UAa\,'A\. 



116 BRITISH NAVIL AKD MILITARY OPERATIONS IN El 

S. Having t»kaD poHseuion of Arab tovn, I immedifttoly loopholad it i 
iDtrenchmeDtti, ander the guiilADCe of M^|o^ Fraser, B. E. 

The KKJ'P'i^u picket retiring was fired upon by the Oatling and 9-pi 
Two of the piclcet were kille<[, one earring a Betuiagton rifle, bat do am 

:l. About 1 A. 10. three EK;pliau tuonat^d ufUcers galloped toward* ■ 
Dieots from Nefluhe, waving a Hag of truce. They stated that the; c 
thoiuHplvcs under my protection, and. raceivinK their awords and boraea, 
uiiii.T .■«■!..( lo y..ii. ,111-1 Tn.«- r.iru:ir.| I ii.'ir «w.,ran. 

4. About In p. ui. Gemiral Gralidiu, C. B., V. L'., arrived i.ith 300 of U 
tueot, under Colouel TjUr, whoin br placed under my oomntand tor the d 
outpost. 

a. About ^ a. m. of the -Jlat, 1 advanced with the force under Mi^i>r-< 
bam, with two Gatliug giins, ou NeGchu, which nae occupied withoui 
leaving tbe Oatliugs fui the defe^Q«e of the railway bridge. I tben retui 
ilia, and embarked two suiall-ana ouiupuoivB and the 9-|>ouuder field gu 
auce with your orders. 

G, In refprring to this service it is uiy pleasing duty to report tbe Hittlsfii 
ior of hII uuUer my command. Intrenching the outpost Dodtr a bum 
most trying, and I regret the desth of A. Wager, ordinarj- seaman, fronr 

I wuiild osjMHilally like lo mention the name of Mi^jur Friuter, R. E. 
great nsdlBtniice in fortifying iLie Arab Iowd ; Captain Gnre, R. M. L. 
to H. M. 8. North nnibcrl and, and Lieutenant Laugley, senior and gunnx 
of this ahip, nhosa untiring xeal and energy deserve my beat tbanks. 

I iiiulone a rt-port and iketeh of tb^ position from Mi^or Fraaer, R. E. 
I bare, Ac, 

H. F. 8TEPHE 

To Captain R. O'B. Fiti Kot, 

Sftiior OJfiaer, Iimailia. 

The engineer officer wbo bad been eeut to act uiitler thi 
Captaiti Pitz Roy was the brigade major of the Corps Engii 
acconnt is of value au fnrtUer elucidating tlie aituatiou, and 
ing tbe techuical measures talieu to improve tbe defenses ( 
It is proper to state that ff bere the town eads tbe desert of 




BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 117 

1 oopholed ao as to give a doable tier of fire, and the ends of sti^ets were closed by 
^li«]ter trenches. The gon and Qatliog were intrenched with sand or snn-dried brick 
j9^n]>etB, and platforms were made of doors. The spirit bottles were smashed in the 
jxx-«g shops, and the windows made defensible by filling np with boxes of wood con- 
"Cxft iiung sand. The sailors' cntlasses ])roYed most useful for loopholing walls, and the 
s.lKoyels we took out enabled us in an hour or two to be in a stuto to resist serious at- 
'T.sack. After some honrs' labor we could let the men rest and feed. 

Before sunrise, Arabi Pasha must have learned of our landing by telegraph from 
^*«*fiche. 

Oar information from all sources made it appear probable that an attack in forco 
WK- onld be made before we could be reinforced ; it was therefore desirable to induce the 
Arabs to postpone the attack. 

Finding telegrams arriving irom Cairo to the traffic manager, Isniailia, in ignorance 
of oiir arrival, I telegraphed in his name to the war minister at Cairo to say r),000 £ng- 
lisli were already on shore, and asked him to inform the authorities. He acknowledged 
:eipt and said he had done so. 

Aq oflScer, stating himself to be the chief of stalf of Arabics forces in the district, 

kTing come in to surrender, strongly advised the bombardment of Neficbe by the 

ftliipBto prevent attack. This was done, and the efifect was to cause the retreat of 

^bree trains of troops that approached Netiche and the abandonment of a fort at 

Keficbe, a very remarkable result, considering the ])lace was only seen from the tops 

and the range was 4,000 yards. 

In the afternoon I opened communication by placing two canal boats across the Sweet 
Wat«r Canal, stem to stern. 

In the fighting line itself a party of Royal Marine Light Infantry held the shelter 
trench by the canal, where also was the signaling station. The marines also held the 
group of houses by the railway, and the blue jackets held the remainder. 

Inthe evening, having been reinforced by some 140 marines (Royal Marine Artillery), 
*hty wen; posted along the high canal banks as a support for our fighting line. 

At night we posted sentries 300 to 400 yards to our front and went ronnds, and 
^^ the early momi ng Major-General Graham came in with part of his brigade and 
hivonaoked in our rear. 

In conclusion I would draw your attention to the very efficient and willing inan- 
'**'^ in which all of your party did the work of intrencbiug, and the aptitude rhoy 
•bowwl for such work. 

I have, &C., 

T. FRASER, 

AfaJoj\ Brirjade Major U, E. 
AoCapt. 11. F. Stephkxsox, C. B., 

Commanding H. M. S. Carysfort, 

It is well to add, as a matter of professional detail, that the eighteen 

^^n coraposiug the Gatling gun's crew of the Orion were armed with 

^Uellartiui-llenry rifle; that they carried two days' provisions in their 

l^'^versacks, and 120 rounds of ammunition, distributed as follows: One 

^I'Re pouch or ball bag with 40 loose rounds, and two small pouches 

^^■h coDtainiug 40 cartridges in package. The dress was blue serge 

^ith 8traw hats and regulation leggings. Later on, the men improvised 

^^eries. They had no tents. The other Gatling guns' crews were 

^^led according to rule with cutlasses and revolvers. These and the 

P^r. guns' crews (of eighteen men usually) carried 30 rounds of pistol 

^iDmunition. In the gun limbers were eight shell, twelve shrapnel, 

^nd four case-shot. This supply was subsequently iucreased to 15 

^^nmds, of pistol CArtndgea^ all toldj by additiou sent to ttie froiit, ^'\iW^ 



118 BBITIBH NATUi AND MILITABT OPEBATIOVS IN EQTPT. 

the Gatlings had each 1,200 i-ounds, with two spare cases of 6S0 c^' 
tridges each ander the limbera. With each party went four stretcb^''' 
men armed with swords, eight spare-ammunition men similarly arm^^T 
two signal-meu with kit, armed with swoids and revolvers, an armor^' 
with gword, pistol, and sack of tools, and two pioneers, one carrjiuf * 
shovel slang over the left shoulder, a pick-ax iu hand; the other^ ^ 
saw, file, and haud-ax slnng over the shoulder, and a felting-ai :S- ^^ 
baud. Each pioneer was armed with a bill-hook, saw-backed swortfi^i 
and revolver. 

The landing was eS'ected at the central wharf. A large lighter h^ "1 
beeu secured aud on it were placed the North am berland's and a i>ortiffl^"n 
of the Orion's party, about 250 in all. They seized the wharf and iDU^=a 
avenue up to the canal lock. The first lighter wais followed by a small^^:^ 
one with the balance of the Orion's men. 

The " torpedo paity," under Lieutenant King Harman, was compo8^^=d 
of ten blwe-JHckete and nine artifiwrB. They carried with them ^ — "i- 
cotton disks aud the net^cssary electrical iipp»ratus for their detoiiali» ^. 
This party pushed on in the darkness, covered by a company from tKae 
JTortliuuiberlaDd, and blew up the railway jn.st behind the " canal ^S» 
ceinlure," about 500 yards tram the station, using two flounce disks «3f 
gun cotton flred by a platinum wire bridge fuze (S5 grains of fulniiua.** 
of mercury), insulated wicks, aud a portable battery of three Leclancl** 
elementM. This done, aud railway access to Isiuaitia being preventfr*3, 
they retired to the town again. 

The shelling of Noiiche was a case of firing at a target invisible frw k" 
the gun. As described by Licuteniint Laugford, It. N., who liirei-t*^'' 
the ojwration on board the Orion, under (Jonimauder Moore, the nielli*^^ 
appears to have been very simple. From the masthead an angle w — *^ 
a theship'a bend aud NeBche station, just visible, ami tt-^^ 




BSinBH NAYAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 119 

tthey had been previoasly quartered. The following is the report of 
Xear-Admiral Sir William Hewett, the commanderin-chief of H. M. 
■laval forces in the East Indies, the bulk of whose squadron had ren- 
tfiezvooaed at the southern end of the Maritime Canal : 

EuRYALUS, at Suez, AuguH 21, 1882. 

Sir : On Friday last, the 18th instant, I had the honor of receiving, throngh Bear- 
admiral Hoskins, C. B, a copy of the plan of operations in the Suez Canal, agreed to 
tMtween yourself and Sir Garnet Wolseley, and your telegram of the 17th instant gave 
cue authority to act on it. 

2. Immediately put in train the work to be carried out at Suez, and telegraphed to 
yoo that yoar instrnctions had been received and would be complied with. 

3. In the coarse of the same aftcmoou the rebels were observed intrenching them- 
selves in onr front, and movements of Bedouins on our loft flank also called for atten- 
tion. I consulted with Brigadier-General Tanner, C. B., who commanded the troops, 

and we agreed that the Naval Brigade would be too weak to hold the place by it«(df 
if attacked by a large force, aipch as we knew to be in our viciuity. I therefore, with 
the coDcurrence of the brigadier-generul, telegraphed to you that 100 of the Seaforth 
Highlanders would be detained at Suez until the arrival of the troops from India. 

4. Later on, Captain Hastings, whom I had sent in the Seagull to reconnoitor the 
hanks of the canal, returned with a report that showed the information sent me Irom 
time to time by Captain Fitz Roy of the movements of the enemy in our direction to 
he fairly correct ; and the Brigadier-General then agreed with me that it would not 
^ prudent to send any of the Highlanders away without previously reconnoiteriug 
the neighborhood, for, as I have already stated iu my telegram, the collection of mili- 
tary stores at Suez represented a considerable value, and a matter of still more serious 
conseqneiice was the fact that the town had recently become crowded with women and 
children, Copt Christians, who had sought refuge at Suez from the brutalities of the 
wrrounding Bedouins. 

5- On Friday night I caused the telegraph wiros to be cut between Suez and the 

°^ canal station, and on Saturday morning notices were iHsiied that from that date, 

tn« 19th iu8tant, until the i>i()hibiti<>u was formally roinoved, no Hliips <»r boats would 

Iw allowed to pass into the canal from the Suez wide without \\\y special permisiiion. 

^* damage to the wire on the above occasion was soon repaired, but on the following 

uifjht I caubed the poles wliich conveyed the line across tht* creek close to the coni- 

P^iy's ot!ices to be cut down, and placed a guard over them t«) prevent their being 
rtHtored. 

At the time when it was decided to retain the Hij^hlanders the regiment was already 
®fi I)oard the Bancoora. This was on Saturday ni<»ht, and their disembarkation on 
cQnday must have had a very puzzliug etl'ect upon the oOicials of thv canal company 
and others who were interested in our inovtMuents. It must also have had the happy 
*^ffM of quayfying any reports that may have reached the rebels that our troops were 
*wnt to enter the canal. 

^' On Sunday morning at daylight 400 Highlanders, under Lieutenant-Colonel 
^tockwell, were disembarked from the transport and marched 8 miles in the direction 
^' ^'halouf, to muke a feint attack in our front. Brigadier-General Tanner, C. H.. 
*^f»nipaiiied this force, and at the same tinui I sent my Hag eaptain, Captain A. P. 
^^tin^, in the SeJigull, with the Mosfjuito in com))anN , and *200 of the Seaforth High- 
^<ler8, to Chalouf, by the Maritime Canal. 

'• The party under Lieutenant-Colonel Stockwell returned to Suez at about 4 p. m., 
^Uhout having touched the enemy ; but later in the day Cai)tain Hastings returned 
*^*«team« pinnace to report very succtcBsfnl ojierations from the gun-vessels. Itappears 
^•^t the first that was ween of the enemy along the canal was a small cavalry patrol 
•"ont3ini]c« this side of Chalouf, and on arrival at Chalouf his pTee>*M\cfe\\\WcftV{«A 
^y diseoyered \>y Bfew beads appearing over the railway embankxuetxt ovi Wie o\.\\«t 



120 BBITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPEBATIONB IN E< 

side of tbe Sweet Water Canal, this finbaukinent fonniog » DKtiirml ii 
behiixl which it wbh afterwards diacuvereil there wan Home 600 iufiuitr; i 
our ailvHDce. Tbese men were extrcmfly well ariueil slid iiccout«r«d, km 
tiful supply or ammiinitioii with them. 

8. The uianticr in which the ponition was tuhen reflects the highest ci 
tain Hastings, and 1 R;ci>inui«nilt»d liiiii lu your faviirnble notice. 

S. The cuiiluosB and dash of the Highlamlers ami the excellent Are fr 
tops seem to have been the chief causes of success, and the conduct of i 
appears to have tieou in every way creditable, 

10. I consider that credit ninst be k'"'" to Lieut«nant-CoIoiiel H. He 
R. E., for Ihe fact of there now lieiug frrsh water at Suez. Oi>eaiDg tl 
above the point occupied kept the canal below full, uutwithataDding the 
toob place through a breach made by tbe enemy in the bauksof the cam 
since, however, been repaired by a cumpany of thu Madras Sappers. 

11. I am in hopes that the action taken at Chalonf will do much to bpti 
of the canal, and as tbe Indian forces are now arriving, tbe Highlandi 
Serapeuui to-morrow. 

12. I beg to recommend to your favorable notice the ofBcera inentione< 
Hastings in the accompanying letter. 

I have, &.»., 

W. HE\ 
Itetir-Atlmiral and Conmander-iH-Chuf on Ihe Eatt Int 
To Admiral Sir P. Bkavckahp tievMOtiR. G. C. B., 

CoMmanivrAm-Ckief in tkt MtdiUrrantan. 

Captain Hastings' ncconot of the occnirenws iu the Marii 
on August 2 is as follows : 

H. M. 8. Sragili., 
At CkatoK/, Aanu 
Sir: I have the honor to submit the following ritport of my pnMAediuga 
of the force* (as per margin) dispatched this day from Suez to seen 
Water lock at Chalouf. 

a. On mj arrival ofl' the place, which is dislunt I'l mit«i froiu Suet, on t 
i.f the Maritime Canal, there were nt first hut fewNignaof thecueiuy'sppe 




BBITI8H NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 121 

Had this not been done, it is needless to say that the canal would have soon emptied 
itself. 

Major Gamett's company and the men of the Mosquito now Hoarchcd the village 

between the Fresh Water and Maritime Canals, where the firiug was coming from, 

the advance of this party being protected by the small-arm companies of the Seagull 

and the remaining companies of the Highlanders, under Brevet Major Fergusson and 

Captain Hoghes-Hallet. 

Previous t^) this the skiif of the Mosquito had been transported to the Fresh Water 
Caual, and I sent Lientenaut E. Rae, of H. M. S. Seagull, to the opposite bank, in her, 
to examine the enemy's movements. 

By this time Major Garnett had passed the village, which was found to be deserted, 
and had pushed his men across the canal by moans of a boat obtained by Lieutenant 
H. 0. Laog, of the Highlanders, who in a very plucky manner swam the canal and in 
the fioe of a hot fire procured it from under the opposite embankment. 

Sab-Lieo tenant W. O. Story and the men of the Mosquito accompanied the High- 
Unders, and the fire from this party was now so hot that the enemy was soon dis- 
lodged from his position. 

Another boat having been procured by Assistant Paymaster Thomas R. B. Rogersy 
of U. M. 8. Seagull, from the lock end of the canal, the remainder of th« 8hii)s' land- 
ing party and the Highlanders were likewise crossed over the water and the enemy 
WS8 loon in full retreat. 
Lientenant-Colonel Jones, R. E., accompanied me with his party. 
Some of the fugitives took the line of the railway, others went straight into the 
desert, while a few tied to a hill to the rear of their Hue, where they were eventually 
■onoonded by Captain Hughes-Hallet and made prisoners of. 

At this point was captured a 7-ponnder brass field piece of French make, from 
which two ronnds ba<l been fired before being seized. We now ceased firing and 
pwceeded to embark our prisoners. The enemy's loss was about 100 killed (iuclud- 
ttg three officers, one of whom was the officer in command) and 62 prisoners, out of 
*hich27are wounded, and we have captured a large number of Remington rifles, 
*ilk quantities of amniuuition and stores. 

Th* enemy fought with bravery, but their shooting was most inferior, and, owing 
to this latter defect, I am happy to wiy there are only two casualties on our side, 
^12, Benjamin Davis, A. B., Enryalns, one of mj' boat's crew who accompanic«l n»e, 
wightly wounded, and Joseph Fernandez, wardroom steward of the Seajjnll, one of 
the stitcher party, severely wounded. Bt'sides the above, I regret to say Corjioral 
Hiod and Private Reeves, of the Highlanders, were drowned in trying to cross the 
Woal. The wounded men are receiving every possible artentir)n from Surgeons A. 
McKinley, of the Mosqnilo, and L. W. Vasoy, of the Seagull, who were attached to 
"*^ landing parties of their resjiective ships. 
^<^ conduct of the sea^ien and marines under fire was everything that could be 
**^1, and I would wish to express my admiration for the coolness and gallantry of 
the Highlanders, to which, with the excellent fire from the ships, the success of the 
^*J muHt l>€ attributed. 

Ihave to thank Commander Mather Byles, of the Seagull, Lientenanr-Colonel H. 

"^kham Jones, R. E., Lieutenant an<l Conmiander the Honorable F. R. Sandilands, 

^'^O'M. S. Mosquito, and Major W. F. Kelsey, of the Seafovth Highlanders for their 

*lnible co-operation and assistance ; and I beg to bring to favorable notice the serv- 

^« of Lieutenant E. Rae, who commanded the landing party from the Seagull ; Snb- 

'^otenant W. O. Storj', who commanded the lauding party from the Mosquito ; Sub- 

*^ntenant E, J. Cams Wilson, who worked the Gatling gun in the maintop of the 

j|v *'?QI1; Mr. Greorge Peavitt, gunner, who worked the 7-pounder in foretop of the 

/^•(n»n; Mr. O. Gore Browne, midshipman, my aid-de-camp, who was most useful to 

^; and Mr. T. R. B. Rogers, assistant paymaster in charge, of the Seagull, who 

^^dttsd good servioe by bringing the boat from the lock. 



122 BBITIBH NATAL AND UIUTABT OPESATION8 IK 

Isttaoli » plan of thupMttioD, dnwn by KaTigatiogLiMiteiuwtBI 
of H. M. S. SeagDll. 
I h&ve, &o., 

ALICK P. H 

To Bwr-Adroini Sir W. If. W. Hiwbtt, K. C. B., T. C, 

Commander-in-Cki^, fiMl/adiM. 

The Dext report U by Major Keloey, commandiag th^ 
the Seafortb Higblanders engaged ia the action at Cbalo 
dred to Captain Hastings : 

CrULOL'F, J 

Sir : I have the boDor t« r«port for your infonii»tioii that on Isndi 
the SOtb Amgiut, 18a2, I found two oompaniea, each coupan; 50 rifle 
order, lupported by two others, total MMi ride«. 

OuarrtviugoD thebunlnof the Fretib Water Cuual, tbeeaeniyiibuw 
flre aboat 1 1.3U a. m. ; at the same time 1 seot Captain Leudram wii 
onder the direction of Colonel Jones, R. E., to bold the lock about 
right. 

About tn en ty m inn tes after the action commenced, I sent a company 
of Major Ganiett, to work round through some houses on our extreii 
pany was supported by a party of blue-jAaketn and marines frum H. 
under command of Snb- Lieu tenant Story, R. N. ; the houses were «< 
Oanii^tt, Bod 1 reinfurced him with half another company of 8<-iifo 
under command of Lieutenant Lanj;. The houwa wrf^ [loxned t liroi 
of the Fn-sb Water Caual lined. Major Oarnetl's party wus bete ( 
tirae until a boat waspiucun-d by Lieuteuant Langswimmingover 
under the enemy's fire, and bringing it back. Snb-Liciilenaut Stt 
party of Ulue-jackela Iben cn)S8ed and held ft bouse uutil reinforcci 
Higblaiidtnt, then advauci-d and took tliu enemy la flunk, who then t 

About * p. m. Captain Hugbcs-Hallclt rook bis compiiuy across tb 
««nt U) mo by Captain Lendruiu from the lock he was occupying. Tbi 
up by a couple of men of his conipHuy. under the ilirccliou of Payuia.' 
H. M. S. Seagull. As Mion us Captain Kugbes-HHllctl's com|>any 







BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 123 

to anklets, were of iron, and weighed about 10 pounds. With such troops 
it is hardly to be wondered at that the aim should have been indifferent. 
They held their pieces at arm's length above the head and discharged 
them vaguely over the embankments behind which they had taken shel- 
ter. Even chance shots are neither safe nor welcome, so that the opera- 
tion was not free from danger, especially in the rear of the lines. To 
tbis shooting. over may be attributed the slight damage done to the 
standing and running rigging of the gun-boats in the Maritime Canal. 
The crossing of the Fresh Water Canal should have been almost im • 
possible, the boats being so small as to convey but seven or eight at a 
time, and the canal being so full of reeds as to render swimming difficult 
and {lerilous. The dash of the British more than counterbalanced the 
disadvantages of numbers and of an attack on a position of much nat- 
fii'al strength. 

With the exception of the Serapeum stretch, between Lake Timsah 
and the Bitter Lakes, where no great annoyance or interruptioii of 
tiaffic was expected, the whole of the Maritime Canal was in the pos- 
session of the British navy by nightfall of August 20. 

On the following day, the Tourmaline and the Don moored perma- 
nently at Kantara, where the caravan road to Syria cros>es the canal, 
wid there established a strongly defended post, while the gun-boats in 
the sonthem half completed the link which perfected the chain from 
Port ISaid to Suez. 

Having seized the canal, the navy prepared to protect it. Between 
Ismailia and Suez this was eftected by the Mosquito and Seagull, whiirh 
l>atrolled it constantly, no force being permanently lauded. In the 
northern half, the Tourmaline and Don held Kan ara and the (furcH 
adjoining on either side. Strong detachments of sailors from the lii*et 
it Port Said, with Gatlin«:;s, were landed at the other //art .», breastworks 
*ere thrown up and regular camps established, each in command of 
* lieutenant. At Port Saitl a cainj) was ])iteh«»ri [)etween the European 
ind Arab towns, where never less than 500 bluejackets and marines 
Were kept. Intivnchments were thrown up across the islhnius from 
I^ke Menzahfh to the Medit(4Tanean, and iield pieces nion?ited. In 
tlie canal itself, steam picket-boats, launches, v^e., witli armed crews, 
^OMised as patrols. The fast Thorneyerolt torjxMlo lannclies of the 
'•"iHand flecla were employed as disimteh boats, niakinfc the passage 
l>etween Port Said and Ismailia in about four hours and a half, their 
^I»ee(l not being allowed to ex(;eed ten knots 

Sunday, August 20, was a busy day. The transport lleet arrived at 
^ortSaid from Alexandria and Aboukir early in tlie forenoon. Had it 
'^^tljeen for the action of the master of the French steamer Melbourne, 
'^^tntioiied in the report of Connnander Ed war. Is, the transports could 
^^e poshed on at once into the canal and towards Ismailia. As it was 
^y were obliged to wait until the way was clear. During this delay^ 
ttd iu anticipation of possiWe trouble, 300 of the York auv\ \a'a.\\e.\aiAXfeT 



I::i4 BRITISH NAVAL ASD MILITARY 0PEBAT10N8 IN EGYPT. 

K('t;iiiieiit woro put on boanl H. 51, S. Falcon (liglit-draaglit ^nn -boat..-^ .v^t^ 
ami .1 Nitniliii' number of the We»t Kent RcRiaiouC on board H. M. ^ . S 
}>i'acon, to form the lulvance. Tliese vcs^tels tirrired at Ismailia in thfiff ^^ ^'\ 
evening! oftlie mime ilHy. 

Tho Si'msn led tlie tninaport fleet, followed by the KLosiun, thcj".^ ) 
ti'onp-Hliiii RuiiliniteH, and others. Isinailm was reached that night aocx..^ a 
the next moniiriff, the only accident beintr the gronndinf; of the Oat*^,^ ^^ 
liniia, with the balance of the West Kent Hegimenton board. She toao«:>,^^ 
ajruinst the wcft bank at the distance of 7 miles from Lake TiiDsar.^.e2 ^^ 
but did not seriously interrupt the passage of other Teasels. 

The adniinistriitioii of the Suez Canal was in the hands of the 'BntiUMz^_Stk 
dining Sunday, Monday, and pait of Tuesday, the company's em ploy "^ *~M-d 
having: onlers IVomOount Fer<)in:ind de Lcsseps, the preaideot. to abu^m^jlb^j^ 
dou their work. When it was fouml that the British could manage t-:» , f^^ 
traffic without the assistance of the French servants of the company^^ *'.r--, 
the iartje fleet that went through til Iitmailia at thig time being pilott^ ^k^ ^u 
Enqlieh naval officers — the company became anjious to resume its fu _^jno. 
t'ons Even obstacle had l>een thrown in the way of the use of r- tbe^ 
canal on the pdrt of the British : its neutrality bad been invoked, m. jmiid 
Count de Lesseps had attempted to carry otf all the employes ft 
Isniiilia, deberting the administration completely. This move was 
tiated h\ a refusal by the British senior naval officer to permit then^^ju to 
leave Lake Tinisah, a fast torpedo launch barring their entrance i ^:uto 
the canal. Connt de LessejW finally yielded to the convincing 
ment of facts, and a modwt Vivendi was agreed to. Prior t« this ti— 
bis expressions had been characterized by the moat open hostilitj* 
the English ; he had entertained Arab! at Ismailia, and had imb 
that Oriental with his own notion that they would not dare to m 
use of the canal as a base of militiiry action on account of the iuvi 




HRITI^H NAVAL ASh MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 125 

V^r; ..t t):v r;iiiul nv it-t ilHjH'iiiltMU'irs. ni> one. I'VtMi with the SiiU:iiiV .'lutlinri/iitioii, 
«i •i.i:/>irf>t«ri. wiihoui thiit iiiif hori/atimi. hnviii^ii ri^ht to (liMiirh thi* ooiiipaiiy in 
*■■• tr^t juil )i«-ui'ftul i'lijoyiiii'iit dt' ith i'uii(*i*N8iiiii. 

Th* inurtHfi- tu AmvricauH \h obviouM that the nrutraUttf of any canal 
i'»iniM#/ rht tratcrs of' the Attantiv anil Pacific tkrans iriU he maintained. 
i/iif til!, hy the nation trhich can place and keep the stronrfent nhipn at each 
'lUrmifi/, 

Therxiii-t t'iMitiii;; «»f tht* ISritisli is tictiiied by the following proc^laina- 
7iHii^ilM* first liy tli<* MMiior naval otlirer ]ii'4*s<Mit in that ]>ari of Kif.vpt, 
:hi' Si-Ill. i] iiv till' rtMniiiundrr in-i*hi<*t' oftlie exiKMlitionarv ibn'o: 

rKiH-LAMAIInN. 

H > !{i^]iiM«» flii* K'niiivf ha villi; ^i\(ii thi* A«lMiiriiI ciMMiiiaiMliiiu the liritiMh ih^'t 

A '■•■ :i!> III Tak« f'li.ir^f ••tall phu-t-'* in m* m-ar thf Maritime Canal in* may hi* iircoH- 

»ir-> : -r '•|i»T.iTii>rio .ij.iiiih: Hn* n-hrU, K*i>ar-Admiral n«>»kiM'<. rnmmaiiiliii^ tin' M^iti^1l 

'"^.'•iij thf M.iiiriiii*' (aii.tl. imw takfH |Mi*>M'h<«iiiiMit' Port Saitltor thr piiriMiHi* iiidi- 

-•'■•- . iii'l triiif* Th I' ail thi* inhiihifii:its will at-tiM him, a<« faraslifs in th«'iriMiwiT, 

'■ • '.T.iiiiiii;: np!>r a>iil |irM(tftiii^ litc ami |ir«i|»trt,\. 

.'• •fi>\»nitir. Niiia*-i I'a^li.i Ilani<ly, uppointi-tl hy lli<« Hi^hnfMH tht* Kh<Mliv«*, will 
'•• •: • ).ii iirti* !• .iih! ••Mniiirf hi.'^ tliiiii's a^ I'mnirrly. 

^'■' < rfptiiin •it'll M. M. >. Miiiiarch will a<-t :i<« iiiilifar\ r-(imiii:iii<lant **f tin- ;;ai'* 
T * !j. .ir.ii Ih r>-»|H'i.!"iiih' I'nr thf ih-ffiiNi- ni' ihi- town a::aiii«»t tin* P'Im'Ih, ami tin* siip- 

■ ''•■'ilir Kliffli\t-'-i iiv il autlmritifs H;;aiii<«t any altfiiiiit that may hi* inaile:i;;ain!*t 

■ '• 'T |rti|it-ri\ . 

I:.r*Mil)ii- |i4iri>I«, \^ hii h imII r<iiisi<<t i>t' I-jii']i'«h vlilii't-'i and K;;y]itiaii iMilici*. u ill 
*'••■■' .irii-»! .ill iHTHitiioi-.tii^iM;: •li-tiii h:inrt'<«; nii«n' •«''i'i<iU'« crinifH hiMii<; ih'rilt with 

■■■ '^^-i': -li :.iw. 

•• I-' jr Adnnr.ii »rn'»T». tliat all I'li-im-s^ uill In- «nn«lii«t»'«l ami the alia ii- of' tin* 
' ' ..■ ■■'. iTiTi.! ••iiini.ii> < oiii"! . nii<li-i (li«- I iilf <it' ili-^ 1 Ari-i|i-iii y t 111* (fii\ I'Miiir. 

A 11. Hn>KIN>. 
/.Viir- ./I'liiMrt/ t li.'tiiiiiii.linii II. ll. M. S' iiif m 1.,i Miirtlnm f timil. 

\\\ Ariiiiii:iiv «iK nil. KiiKhn K. 
r):«i« I vM \ ihiN" Til 11(1 ^■.l,^ rii W". 

' ■'"'•r.ii :!. * ■•«l..lii.i:i'l »»t" ; 111 Hi ili»«li l'"lii ^ w i^l.i - In inai.i i-.i-iv\ ll tli.it 1 111- iiliiri-l 
■'• * M i-.-*? \ '- < fi>\ • I iiiiii-iil 111 '•• iiiliiii: Tliiiiii- 111 ; i.:^ i iitiiil I \ !-» Ill ii'-i xl.itiiloli ihi* 
■ t '.'..» K ?!• '! r» • . I ii»* ll iii\ i". 1 1 I'll li'ji . ni.lx l!_'lii if,:; ;i '.i; n-T i Ijn-*- w 1h» an* 
••■■ • ij , ■ -• H.« M:-hiii '.-.. 

' ' ':* •■ < .1 '.• ::iii.iliiT.ilil« A • :i li< 1 1 •■ati-il ^^ 1 1 li k ' • li im"*-. .iIhI Im \ in. rhi •■ \\ i!i hf 

• •■I'.; Jiii.i ll 'i^iii' . ii,"-niii"<. ?a:> '.]»•'. .iin! |':«'|iiil\ w i'A l«i- 1 1 -jm • ii •!. 

ij. ■ <• -A ;,:■ }| M .!! !■• |i->|M !• •; w ilMu- |<.i.<' |i>i . t :,ii r !.•• iiili.iliii.iiil- .iii ;ii'. ilfii 

■ • ■ _ 

i.»-:r. 
'■■■'"■■.• f.i. i:i 1 •iiiiiiiaiiil \* ill lif ::l.i'l tn |i-' •!■• • ■■ -..!■>■ tj -•■n ! ?.i i }i;i I- \» I ■• .i" • .'••.]]• 
" ■■••*-',:. l.;-l •■-■.■. iiji t!i»" M !i«-lini|i a;:. iiii-l I i« Kin di ^ i . i Ij^ i.i'.\ f -i' 1 'iN r «i1 I t:> pt 
■* ■''■'. :■• ri.. ''h;:..!!. 



XII. 

n/r t .1 Ml' \it..s. 

*^«*' riiijufrv In-!i\«-«mi N»ii.iii/j ;iriti tlii*«lrll.i is >(Mu»uui\ouvn\-»\\\A\ V\\\ 

***rtj/t of ijf.'^rn'jttittn a n' /in •« in J l n ;: i V r il I w »\ \\ »li » A' \\ > v\\\Vt Av*\v\ • 



126 BBITISH NATAL AND MILITARY OPEBATIONB IN « 

It iB a desert of aand, across which run the Fresh (or Swi 
Canal and the railway, side by side. To the uorttiward of 
the ground is, as a rale, somewhat higher, sloping in a sontl 
tion past the canal. The surface is slightly divemified by 
low hnmniocks and mounds, and is dotted at great intervt 
of "camel grass." The soil is a deep, light, shifting sand nei 
hut it gradually increases in firmness towanis the westwan!, 
el-Kebir, especially ou the upper cresta of the bills, is a fair 
gravel, over which progress is comparatively easy. The i 
rarely clundy, so that the suu beats down with full force durii 
while at night the radiation is so great that the air becomt 
almost chilly. Shelter is i: ceded against the sun iu the da^ 
night a good blanket is iudispeusable, both on account of 
t«mpentare and the dews. 

On accoaut of the absence of rain and the (Iryness of the 
of all kinds were finely pileil up, uncovered, wherever nccdt 
fear of injury. The Sweet Water Canal furnished the neoest 
UBQally of good qnnlity afrer flUmng to get riil of the mml I 
pvusion. Theextretiitr la-iit fiotn ubout 9 a. ui. to 4 p. m. reuc 
of nil kinds imprudent. 

The Egyptian files, the worst of their species, make life 
bearable through their countless swarms and their loaths< 
ness. They disappear with the sun, beiug[relieved by an eq 
getic and numerous pest, the mos()uito. 

No time was lost in pushing ou the work beguu at Ism. 
advance was instituted on the day following thu oceujtatii 
a. m. Major Genenil Graham started from the town with St 
a small naval contingent, under Captain Ste|>henHon, of the 
and marched across the henvj sand, arriving at l.'M p. m. 




BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EOYPT. 127 

rhe operationn of the 34th are best described in the official report 
(»t«Hl at leiifTth below : 

IsMiilLiA, AuguMt 26, 1893. 

tin: I liavr th«* 1i«»nor to mipplfinent my telpgrapbic diHpatch of the24tli instant 
lb 1 il«-tAiIeil n-fMirt fif the «'V4*i)tH which took plHc<» on that date in tho neiji^hbor- 
•"1 'if Abu Suer and uf T«*l-el-Mahuta, on the Swi*et Wat4*r Canal, about 9 miles west 

Wmailia. 

Acnilual bnt rontiiiuous derreafle of lev<*l in the canal determined me to puHh 
rvipl ni% Availabl** ravairr and artillerv (very little of which had landed as vet), 
^^hvt with ibr two infantry battaliouR, whi<:1i I had a^lvanced toNefiche Junction 
3tb*-tflfti iaMAnt with the objrct of seizinf; and (Krcupyini; a pcmition on the canal 
Mlnilway ubicb w«»iiid M*run* poHHOttsion of that ]»art of the water supply of the 
•^rt UiuK lH*twefn iHinuilia and the tirnt cultivate<l ]iortion of the delt.*^, which I 
a«i riftMin in b««Iii*vf was thi* m<»Ht vulnerable to dania^;*' at the hands of the enemy. 

Thf jiarjmtiunl im|M>rtanee of this object, uh affecting all my future o|»erationSy 
hta.tilnir to ri^^k a cavalry movfuient with horses which had b<NMi less than two 
«>••■» «b<in ttftfr a I<»n^ Hea vitya^e. an<l also neutralized the objections, which I 
n«t ••th«-rwi«« havr enlertaineil. to placing the strain of a forward moveni«*nt upon 
Uiv^mi ami partially or^aiiiziMl supply Kervice. 

A>.i<rilii)):Iy. at 4 a. m. on tli** 'J 1th, I advanced with th(> tn»o]>8 marginally noted,* 
'^-ifirn 1 |tlacffil fur the day under the command of Lieut enaut-(s«*nerul Willis, C H., 
*'iaai)i:ii!ii|{; l«t divinion. n^ached Nefiche at daybn'uk, and, following the general 
■■^«if (tr railway. arrive<1 at 7.'Mi a. m. on the north side of the canal, at a ]ioint 
>'"Mii mill way iN-tween the spot marked El-Magfar on the map and the village of 
f^'i *1-M ahiJta 

Ai !.•.■• {loint thr> enemy had oonstructtNl his tirst dam across the canal, and after 
"*»' *L.ruiii»liing with hiN MiHitM ami light troopH, in which t wo sipiadrons of MouNe- 
''*•l^■n^lry • harmed very g.ill:intly, I took |M>s«*«»MMion of it. 

*'•?' :'.j« jmirit ibi" eiii'iiiy riuild lie nbM-rviMl in forre about one and a half miles 

'" • ■•• . li> \««lrtl»-» liiiMi'ii; A liiii" extiMiilJMg ;iiT»ivs the eanal, linintj iIm* rre«*t nf 
'^ -Z ^Ati:i !. iiirvitl ro'iinl to my ri^ht ll:ink at a general «!i>«tanri> of about *J,tH^ 

•■ ••■••. iit\ lri»nt. Tin- rar-al ami railway at 'r«'I-«*l-Maliiita aie eIo«M' to^^i't hiT, 

■ ■ "'i. aft r ..i-rf < .iiri«'i| r tiiiHi^h flii-p ( iittiiig'*, wiili inniiniN nf Maud and earth on 
•!■•':. *iif t)i> ill Till""- \\i*re fttriiu^lv mtuMiilii-d, and rr^iwil-. nl" uhmi riyiM Im> 
'' i**»>;k :liir«-. At M.ilrita th«- iMo-my had ••••n'^'i tift«-«l a M-r_\ lar^i- enibankiinMil 
**''«' r-.r r.ii' •« :i\ aiitl a \< pb' .irid 'Milid dam a«T(»>«^ t In* ciinal. w lix ti atl'iiidi-d liini «-a*«v 

:: ■■• '.iT.'i!. ffiim nm- "iidf :«i iIh- ntlu-r. 
'*' I. ••• •:.it.-rnt Jit ••! ^..iiii- priHoni'i'H fak»'ii l»\ flif nii>nnl'il irMii)!-, a*« wi'll a-* bv 
* ''■j'ljof }r<'r.r invritd h\ tli*- *-M'-ni\ . it wa*< .i;ipai< tit tb-tt In- wan in toin* at 

'**■'■'■> aTid I 'Oili'i M-*- li\ TJii* sliiiike of hi-* li>i ninnm i**. wli:ib kt J'f • iiliSlaiillv 

'*'■',; 111* |ri»-iTit»i» thri>ri^hiiiit tin" lorennnn. tliat Ip- \\a-« ln-in:; l.tiL:i-i\ n-inf'iii i-il 
- !• . «*1 K'-Nir I •-•inlil pi-Mi ivi> tb.4i tin- <M!eiiiv'*« t«>iii- in iny iniiiJ«-i!:.tte hunt 

'*• ,fj, ; J »-«:i'ii.iTfi| ;t .IT h'.ooo ii|,.n jitiil TrTi uni!"*.!!!!? 1 hi\»- -;r.ir t-niriil that it 

• ••'•i I'f iti.i p-^niii lit nf I a^ slrx . niio- ballaiii'M-. ""f inl".i!itiy .il-mif 7. ••*'«» ii,»'n ', 

■• ^» J';:.*. :4i.d a '.ifi;** lnir inib'tinitf iniinlMr nf M«-ilniiiii«.. Altl.nM^h | had but 

■ '•• *; .A'\:**um *tf t\\ ii\T\ ,t\\f u;nn«». a!i<I almuT I.ih n n.t.iiiii \ . 1 till i* wmiM i.i.» In- 

' •*■!.*! t , VI irb ')i* f I. id I til III •• t*t \\i-T Ma)i--t \ '•• aiin\ I h it u i- •^hmiiil fi t ir. . t-\ ■ n 

" ■"-'4;:.. . (•• fur r.i:> )if Mil TriNi|i-, III! nialii-r \\ h.i! I hi 11 ihiU'Im i>« niiL^hl !»• . I ^ii • .•!• d, 

-'*''■ fi I >iij hi.Iilm^ iii\ irrnrihil iiMtil • *. •niiiu. h\ w Ln h l ri:i I kin \\ tl.at lin- lein- 

■■i.'it«| h.iil m f.T fur !•» Ni'Iii lie aiii! I-iiiiati:.i wiujM ti .n ]i in**. I • or.^t-niii nr I v 
• . ' ■ 

■"■* 'i' * pK-ifion •mt'tl to thf nmiibiT'* at ni\ di-pni^l. with u»\ lefl p -in,;; mi flu* 

'•'"••»„,;, J ('a\.ilr\ : Mn'iniid li.f:i'itr\ : v! ;;iiij'. h.iMiTx N -A :N b.ait i\ , X lnv- 
'**•' h. II. A.: York utjtl L:inrnmt*'r ; .\f.iriiieH. 



128 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITAST OPERATIONS IN EQTPT. 

oAptared dam over the canal, aod the cavkliy and ntuunted infantiy eoverin^C 1^ 
riRlit. 

It was now !) o'clouk a. m. The eiipmy hiid kept gradaaJly reinforcing hia l*fV, 

sliowiDK cnuHiderable nkill io the method with which he swung round his left, ^hdidv. 
ing along the reveme iilopo of his position, and showing onlj bid light troops npo^=3 tht 

The two guns of N battery, A brigade, Royal Horse Artillery, only reached irr^^e u 
9 a. in., althongh the ufflctr in comniand had made every effort to push bis w^^^j u 
rapidly as possible throu;ch the deep sand over which our ronte lay. They took npa 

good (KHiitioii on a aaudy hillock near the railway euibankm^Dt, l^oni which a jcood 
view of the epeiny's posit ioa was to be obtained. By this time the enemy had op^^-^aej 
a heavy nrtillery Are upon us, and his infantry advanced in very regular attac k-^ for. 
rnatlon, halting and forming a line of Bbelt«r trouches aboot 1,000 yards froiEZ^M our 
position. On my left he had pushed hiH iufuntry along tbe canal to within abou^ tSOO 
yards of the dam held by the York and Lancaster Regiment, bat the steady and ~wsjl. 
<lirecti'd Hre of this battalion easily checked his movement upon that side. 

From to to 11 o'clock the enemy continued to develop his attack npon my c ^9itl«r 
and right. His guns were Herveii with coiifiiderubiK skill, ilie shells buntling- nfll 
among ns. Fortunately they were common sbrlls with porcnssinu tuzes. which eaclr 
BO deep in the very soft sand before bomting that few splinters flew upwards : 'vrboi 
he did nse nhrapnel the timc-fuKcs were badly cut. 

Feeling oompleto oonfldenoe in my ability to drive back any close allaok theensmr 
might make, I did not allow our guns to open Hre for some timeartor they were jplaorf 
in position, hoping he Plight thereby be the more readily indnoed to ailvanee to «1«" 
quarters, under the notion that we bad no artillery with us When, bawev^ili* 
bronght twelve guns into action, U> relieve the HouHchold Cavalry, into whose x^ott 
and those of the Monnted lufautry he was throwing his shell with great accai"Jr 
onr two gnns opened npou his twelve gnus with marked effect, our practice l»™8 
very go<"l. 

The Hoiisohold Cavalry and Mounted Infantry wereakilirully manenveredhyfc*")"^ 
fieneral Driiry-Lowe on the extreme right, to check the enemy's ailvaiicoon thn*- '"'' 
but the horsea, just landed from a long sea voyage and faligned by their march ^»-ct(M 
n ilesert deep in sand, were in no condition to charge. 

Major-General Drury-Lowe spoke in the highest terms of the manner in whio *•'''" 
ted Infantry were handled throughout the nnluoiiH fighting that fell ti 




BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY 0PKRATI0N8 IN EGYPT. 129 

A * v:!!!]!. m.. ih«* Ili»iiiw*1iol(l Cavalry, iiii(1i*r Gencrnl Lowo, and the Mdii.iii il Infantry 
ajA I. iiifvr^l fi»r«anl un my riKht,cauHiu); tlie«Mieiny to imrtially w iilidniw hiHiittaek 
1.*. T :.ai liztFik. 

A< I |> m.. ilif *i«i Iialtaliitn of tli«« Uukt* of (.'oniwiill'd Li);lit Infuiitry had arrived 

ftfi: N«ti» \f'. 

.\UinT .'•. I'l {1. III., I In* iMicniy a>;ain ndvanood his h'ft, pushing funr ^iihh arrons tho 
x'A^r .ifjd moving hir«ravalry with a ronNidrraldr forc>' o!' infantry BoniodlHtanrf dnwn 
iL*- -IxiM*. I>iit uttt iii'ar i-non^h in Cdiuo within I'lh-ctivo infantrt' or (iallin-4 fiii*. 

Ai tiiLo iiiiji* iinr ft infiircniitMits hc);aii fn arrive rapully. L'oli'iit 1 Sir liakiM- Kiism*!! 
vt'.L ?•*'• ^Intn iif thf -Ifh and 7th Dragoon (.itiardM rt-arhi'd thr li<'hl, and at (i |i. 111. 
ibr liriij^lr uf (iiiarilM, nnd«T IIih Royal IIii;hnt*HM thi' l)nk«* nf (.'<iiinaii;;hr, arrivi>d. 
It 4 i* i.iiH ti<«i latf tit hc;;iii an otVrn«<ivc inoviMn«'nt ; tiit- (nHips I had wiili un* w«'ii« 
tifr^i )•> iht-ir t\i*ri imm dnrin;r thf rarly part of thr day, aii«l tlit* bri^adf 4it' (fiiardrt 
*i<< ii iitid niiivid I'unn Nniaiha at l.ldi p. ni. ha<l hnrirrcd niiitdi fmni the ^n-at hi-al 
uf Till ilrwrt Uiandi. 

•'^^•trily jfirr tuiiMft, thr fniin* t'orcc hivouarki*<1 on the tiidd whii'h thi-y Iiad ho 
ir!.a* .•■ii«I V held all ilay, ami \Uv t-ni'my witlidi«'W acniHS thi* rti!;;^ to hit piiNiiimi at 

1 !•»%•' «V'Ty ri-UMMi t«i 1h* i^atisfifil with tin' nuidni't uf tli«* nitMi vn^a^rd and with 

ibr txr-rtuin* niaf!c hy the Curnwall Li^ht Infantry and thi* hri;;ade of tSnarda to 

t^A'l. ilii Liiil in time to shale in i»nr 4i]>er.itionH. 

I ha\f. Ac, 

<;. J. WOLSKLKV, 

At rii;rljtf;ill tli«^ <liiiii arross tlio cjiiuil was strongly hvU\ by tin* York 
^•1 I<;iiir;ij^t**r 1^-^ihieiit. From this point tlu* line cxtiMMlcMi to tlit^ 
D<'rtli\4;ir(I. tin- ri;rlit l»fin>; n*fiisiMl. Tin* ti'tNip.s rrsttMl in tli«Mr phnM's. 

I'liniti; thf ni;;lit nMntotccnKMits contiinKMl aiTivin;;, aiit! at ilayhrrak 
' •»' ••7 hattif w.is tiiiiiii*it in thr fnllnwiii;^ nianni'i': 

^'•♦•..Mitjiii;: nh iIm' Irfl w:is <ii;ili;iiir> l»rt»;ailt». or ralht'T Nin-li n|' its 

•"'i^i.'.eli' jMlt-* il-* 1l.nl IrailH'il IIh' fliinl. it rilMsi>tlMl Mk'II i'l' lllf 

^"i*aiii| i..uir.i^t<*i- i»*«-;:iinriit. tlir 1 )iikr »if ( 'nin\\air> Li;:);l Iiilaiiliy, 
^'■'l Mie M.iniif UiittaliiHi. TUvu rami' lour ;:mis nf hattfiy A. I, thm 
'^••" ^iii.inl'i Nr-;r.i«l«', th«'ii si\ i;miN N. A., fhi'ii Mm- imv ilry. -Ilh anil 7lh 
I*r.ij,„,,, t Iti.iiiU, ilifii t\vi»;:iiiis nt K.iTti'ix A. 1. iIhii ihi* iloiisi'ho|«l 
' ■**'*'r'.. .iinl l.ii^llv tin- .Mo:4nii-<l liit-iiin\. 

'•*-;er> N. A. w.i> sirfii;:th«'nr<l l»\ two -iirj^ imi-Ii ■»!' N. J. K. A., and 
''•'■■•r, I,. 1:. i:. II. A., llial iMiiH' np ilniiiiu llir .hI'. ii.i-". 

" : Aii;:ii>t lTi iinothcr >hi»rt snlvanrr u;!** ni.iili- ;.'nl lii • I M.\. 'i . 
'" ('•'■-!. 1 h«' tidlow in;: i'i tlir oi]ii'i;»l ii|Mir: : 

I ■ \! \ : ; : \ ^ ;? ' - - ; 

I ■ ■ ■ : '..I* .■■!i i>l m;. ili-p.it' li N" - ■■• ■ ■: ■ ; : 1 ■ ■ i "• 1 . ■ " ■ . • ■ 

■ : ' ?.• ■ . • :iT- \\ !iii !i TiX'l. p.t' ■ «':.::. J ' *■ i" " ' ■ ■ • . ■ 

■ ^* . • .. .41 .1 liii li.- I .1 ;■■;■,: l! • i ■ • •■■ : !.■ ■ 1 1 ■ ' : ■ ■■ ■ ■ • ■ ' ■ • ■ ' 



f 
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130 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITAKY OPEBATIONS IN EGYPT. 

tlio jin'vioiiii dny. Ttie iBt clWiHiim, JDclniling tlie trooim marginally noted,* hifa ^ 
^y tliiii lioiir iiTiitlcd tbttlr bivuuac aod bad ndvaiicnl towanin the enemy's poaitio: m:^ 
ill till' tolltitviiiKonk-r: Tim cavalry and mnniilvd iufalltry furmoil tlip oitrems right- ,«^ 
thriiivii wdt fiirwunl ii)ioti the (liwert rlilgcH ovor nrliivh the eni>iiiy had on the pr^r-^- 
vioiiK diiy curried out hlH tlaiik innvonu^iit. Tbo aitiUcry movvA on tbe leR of tlc«- 3 
eavnlry, towanlii Ihe Hiiiiiiitit <if tbo high groiiud ovHrluoking the lioe of railway b» ^_g - 
twtf 11 Itamwa and tbe Mabaamch Htation. Tbe Infantry, on Ihe left of the arti IlerT— -^ 
advaiii'ifl 111 tchrlon tram the right upon Mahiito, the brigade nf tinardH leading. 

Wlii'ii th« Hiimniit of the ridge was gained, the eneiuy wosubterved to be abaodo^c^jog. 
mg \iis earthwDrhA at tbe last-namitd placB, anfl to 1» letiiiwg iiia Iotpm Along tr^::^- ^^ 
cnual banks and tbo railway line toward* MBbmiineb. Hia miJwsy tmina were *-1K~.^^ig. 
to be si^on in motion towurds tbe same place. 

At 6.-£> a. 01. onr artillery cnme inlo action against tb« enemy's infantry and |iii ^ d^ 
wliii'h wrie podt^'d ou the canal bauk to Ibn west of Mahnta. 

As it WHH uf givat importance to obtAiii poasesHioti, if possible, of some of ^^— |^ 
enemy's locomatives, I ordered tlio eavalry to push forward with all sptwl and Mt- 

teupt to cut olf the retreating trains. The cavalry nnd cigbt guns moved as rapi-^Bdlf 
08 their liurses, which were in no condition for hard work, wiiali) permit. The gra^^^moi 
WBB much better and harder than that moved over yesterday. 

The enemy offered comiiderable resistunee in the ueighliorbood of Mahsumeh, bo 
nothing could stop the advauce of onr monuted troopa, tired even sa tbeir bo '^na 
were, Mahi4iinub, with its very extensive camp left standing by tbe enemy, was uw nea 
la our jiosBcssion. Seven Erupp gnus, groat quantities of ammunition, two I^^t^s 
trainK of railway wagons loaded with proviHtons, and vast supplied of various kS. xida 
fell iiitu Dur bauds. The enemy tied along tbu railway aud canal banks, throiv in; 
Kwu.v iheir arms and equipnients and showing every sign of demoralization. Ui^.-'iir- 
tnnnti-ly there was not at this time in the whole cavalry brigade a troop tbat ckiviiM 
gallop, their ttmg march and rapid advanuo liavlng completely exhausted the hox'^M. 
who were not yc-t lit for bard work after their long voyage from England. 

The results of the operations, extending over two days, have been most aatisfact'O'J' 
Tbe enemy has been completely driven from tbe position at Ttl-el-MahuCa, whicb lie 
bad taken such paios to fortify, and upon which he bad, by force, com^M-lled Tjlfl 



The 



o lalio 



8 been eleart'd for more than hnlf the distance iut<'rvoniug oet'W«"*w 



BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITABIT OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 131 

^in#* \i%i\ Iw^'ii repain*<U or llu» canal cleared of nl>Htrnctiiiii% or any ropnlar HyHtcmof 

tr:kTi»«Mirt hvl Ikm'h efTi'Ctivfly or^^auized. coDHitlerablo oxposiiro without tcnti*. aiul 

*^^»-rr ;>ri\atiiiim a<« ri';;ar(I.>« fn(Nl, liavo Immmi iiiipoHi-il ui>on all ranks. ThoM- lianl- 

•l"!'- »i 4vr, li#iWfv»T. lit-rn fhrrrfiilly Itorno, ami tbe conduct of the tn»i>|iH han been 

**»-r\ ^iini: I r<»ulil Willi. 

1! (■ iriMiiK f ric.i;;i'd wore, njion h<itli the *J-lth and *Joth instant, under the ininicdiate 

e<^ni'i:4!Hl of I.ifiiTc'nant-fHMH'ral Willis, <;. H., who rarrird out my virwN iu a most 

fti:i<:'i'lfry mi:i!iii*t. My atlvanrcil tnutpM, under Maji»r-(i('nrral Ctrahani, now hold 

'!■• k.i«j»:i«*iiM liM-k. 

1 • I' iK-t )»rafM' tf»n lii;!hly the ninnmT in whieh the eavalry, horse artillery, and 

m«..Tii! ififintry witi> hamllcd hy Ma{nr*(i«*neral Drury-Lowe, who N]»fakH in tho 

h. ;;!;•»: :i-ft;«» iif tht' :iH>i.stanci' n'niltT«-«l him hy HrijjadiiT CJiMHTal Sir Hakrr liiiHsrll, 

Lir::t.-<,j{:t.( ••|i»iifl Stt'wart, as-siMaut ailJutant-pMicral. and Lieuti'nant-Cohuii'I Mc- 

Ci^ "i.T. l>r<;;.iiif niajtir of the l.st cavalry hri;;ade. He also hef^H mr t(» im-ntioii 

k:" :k:i;>rt-«;.kii«»u of tlii* ila««h and skill with which the mounted infantry were coni- 

B:*!.'!'!', liy r.-iptaiii I'iifuTt, of the Kiii;;*s Koval Kilh'.'*. 

I am, Ac.. 

(;. J. WOLSEI.KY, 

(irHvral. 

Toihf ri»n*;;i)in^ urroimt it may ho well to ;ul(l tliat a Kiiiall naval 
^<t<tt liiiii'iit tiNik part in tli<Mi]K'ratinnsor thcday. It was (!oin]ios<'<l of 
<^o(;.itl;ii;:s anil 70 niarint's from tlierarystort anil Orion, and was com- 
ttiininl liy C'lptain Filz Hoy, of tho lattrr v<»<st»I. 

TiieM.iiiiir Infantry )»attalion, nndcr LiiMitenant-('oh»n«'1 llowanl 8. 
•'"i:<-^. hail ]c-ft Isniaih'a at 4 p. m. thiMlay ]irrvions, and iiad roaolicd KI 
Ma;::.ir:ir l..'(Oa. m. (»f the LCitli. It starti'd a;;ain at 4 a. m. with tlie 
i>''i:'".i! .idvani'i*. aiifl at .'i p. m. was ahlr tn marrli into the K;ryptian 
•■'!:j'.i' M;ili«».iMii'li. wliiih had luu-n si-i/ril hv tin* ravalrv in tin* mom- 
.'.»'. >ii i^'ihmI a piiM'i* lit wnik di'si-rvcN i«*cnril. 

1-1- » xtiffiir M;:lit of till' \U iti.>li lini' w iin i»m a i iil;:r ahiiiii a niili* and 
•* ''i.I tsuiii tlif (I'liti r. WIm-ii Mali>:iiiirli .st:itinii was in pl.iin sj;;lit 
*■'■• ' vo ;:n:i«» of halTi'iy A. 1 rainr iiilo action and >lM-lli'd the lii;iilivi»s, 
■=' M\.ilr> aiid inoiiiitfd intanti\ 4la>liin;: in ai:d fa]>tiii in^'' ihc ranip, 
^-•••:i r(i«'\ iM'cnpiid pi'iTiijhi-Titlv iiniil tin* ad\:iii(<' on T< 1 i] i\«-iiir. 

I;..' Kt.M'k of pio\isiuii> (aptiiird w;i.s a nio^t wrlrtinii- addition to 
'••• ^''1,'^ HI hand. and. in paiticnlai, thi* ui:iin li-tl i»n tin- L'KMind in 

■ 

**'"■' ',i: inririi-'* ua> inxalii.iMi', li»r I 1m- 1ioi.-i> Imd Itiii U*i m vi-iai ilavs 
•'■ •*u i\:i»-inily .slmit alltiwatii'i- of t'oiaL^i". 

^' ^^: I :••• p4'ifiiM-d tli.it till- ojii'ialioiiv ut tin- da\ did iio: icarh tin* 
'•**';• i-f .til i-lr;.'ai;i*nitnT. till- !!;:> pti.tli^ otlrl ili;: purl ;i .ill\ im iiN>t- 
•*■'•■. l«:i? falliti;: hai-k oti 'I'rl il Krliii , w In-i »• a lar^i' t'.iin]' li.oi linn 
•"''■ii-i^iM-d latrtli itf tin* lailu.ix . and n\ liin- f\t.ii^i\ «• iniii-rHlitin-nTs 
*'■■•■ !hv'mii al'Ti;: llir <*t«->l of a i.nii:<- oi luIN lunnini: imiiiIi .ttiil "iMilli 

'*■• Aij;:n.-l 'J * A >mall t'on-i- «'t tin- Ttli Ihai^ouns mrnpnil Tin* !«Mk 
■•• 'i.' I :t xji W.itiT <'an:il ;il l\a>'>ia'«'»iir uitliiMii oj>pMN; t inii. lli'* M.it 
•» :;i..*f p:iiiiirtafit >f»-l». -jnrr llir iio>^»-^xi.»n **{' tin- lork ''a\** lii-m-ial 

" N-iij, mutinl id' till' u.iti-i in tlit- nppi'i ira* ii ni tin* i-.m.d. 1 it.ii il 

'^"'M il.i\r IwiMl ai-ro//i/i//syir«y su jiMiiiJ\ is liiH a\\o;\ir\ \\\AwA\\vA\ *A vW 

*i'*"niuvv ur Im In t iin i ran-lrrs'-nt'.s?, i » f i h i ■ 1 ". n \ \ • \ \ a \\ ^ . 



132 BBITIBH KAYAL AND HILITABY 0PEBATJ0K8 IV El 

Lancaster Regiment, and the Boya! Marine Artillery marc! 
established themselves at this point, the cavalry witbdrawi 
sameh, a mile and a half to tbe eastward. 

The forcf had now completely outran its commissariat, a 
days the men hod lived from band to month. On the thi 
navy succeeded in getting a few stores to tbe front by the Si 
Canal, but tbe prospectn were, to say the least, gloomy. 

On Aagust 27, tbe distribution of tbe troops was appro] 
follows : 

At Kassassin lock were a sqnadroD of the 19tb Hnssitn 
and Lancaster Regiment, the Diike of Cornwall's Light In 
Royal Marine Artillery battalion, and two guns ot battery ^ 

At Mabsameh, the Household Cavalry, the 4tb and 7tl 
Gaards, the 2nd Bengal Cavalry and 13tb Bengal Iiancers, tl 
Infantrj', and the Royal >farine Liglit Infantrj' battalion. 

At Tel-el-Mabuta, tbe Ist brigade (Guards), the Rifles, tbi 
pany Royal Engineers, and battery A. 1, R. A, 

At Neflclie, tbe West Kent Regiment. 

At Ismailia, the 7th, 8tb, and IStb companies of Royal 
besides many other coq>8 landing from the transports. 

On Augoat 28, tbe Egyptians made an effort to regain 
ground by a serions attack on General Graham's force at 
as narrated in the ofiBcial reports given herewith. The t 
Migor-General Orsbam. to General Wolseley : 

Kaasabsin, Aufu 

Sir: I have Itip honor to rrport that an important eagagempot wi 

took ]ilace here jMtonlay, tho ^th inat«ut, in whicli. thoaifh attacks! 

•□perior forte nnmeTically, trieil serioimly b; ex|>oanro to the inn aod pr 

tir>nN,th« troops I have the honor to commanct tloally drove Itackthe i 




VATAL AMD WLITABT OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. HS 

miwfdrf and mmiiled Infiiiiilry (60) being fhiown oat on the flanks 
ito while I nwnlled the deTelopment of his nttnek. 
r M wyiMtid that a laiga force of oaTahji inihntiy, and artiUoij 
t««ad to w aid a onr right, behind the ridge. At IS the enemy opened 
Mvy gnnaon onr left ftont^ at leaet 4,000 jrardaol^ theahotftom whlehftU 




ly^ nttnok wmad to langnlah, and about 3 p. m* the oflloer eominandtng 
d Inflntffy wpei ti d the enemy retiring. 

had bean anCiring Tory mnoh ftom their long ezpoenre to the heat of the 
t flMd» ao I oideied them baek to their eampe. imor-Oeneral Drary-Lowa 
wigada of ealYaiy within 8 or 3 miles of the camp, and abont 3 p. m. with* 
to Mahsameh, as I had previoosly requested him not to engage tliem ws- 




y adTaneed his infhntry in great force, displaying a line of 
a mile u length, with which he sought to overiap my front 
by * hesTy and well-directed fire of artillery, wiUi whieh ha 
\pf wounding a sick oiBcer in the house where I had established my 
n, bnt whieh, as the best building, was now given up aa a hospitaL Hy 
I to meet this attack were aa follows: On the left tiie Marine ArtUlscy 
■d to take ap a position on the south bank of the canal, where (ssenrs 
taiBsd thsmsslyes, ths canal being 5 to 6 f«et deep) they could thmik the 
ranee by a flank flra (the Royal Marine Artillery, therefore, gare fire to 
vthweat). 

inter the fld battalion, Duke of Comwairs Light Infantry, eslended a 
• of three eempanies, feeing west by north, about 800 yards to the right 
offtheaat) of the Royal Marine Artillery. The supports and reser r ee of the 
ornwall's light Infontry were under cover of the railway embankment^ 
h« The fld battalion York and Lancaster cj^tended the fighting line of 
r Cornwall's Light Infontry with two and a lialf companies, keeping the 
a support and reserve. 

Ion of the infantry wan, tberofoit*. an Imjunlar echelon fT\g,ht thrown back. 
*f the 7(b Drajcoon Gnanin wea k«*pt on thia Hank, and the two 13-pdrs., 
^eed by two othem, took up a |MM«itioii on the rii\gp, Unfortuustely, these 
nly got their amuiuoition in tb«ir liiulieni, and had mnmi to c^tum tiring for 
lit tier euppiy, though tlu^y did K<>^i w^rvic«> wbilo it lantfNl. The Mounted 
id drtachnit*ni of 4th l>raKO<Mi (tuardii ocru|»i('«l a |M>rtion of tli« gap be* 
tvyai Marine Artillery and Duk«* of Cornwairii Light Infantry, and all the 
fforts of the enemy t4i l»rt*uk thn>ii);h at thin |M)int wt*n* unavailing, owing 
ly firp of tlie Royal Marine Artillery and the KuHuiit ntiiNtuncfof the little 
tnted Inlkatry and detach niuut of 4th Dragoon (fuanln dinniouuted and 
■ infantry. The f*neniy niaih* ^^nMit ('flfortii t4i oven'omv thin reMiMance, put* 
ibrrof men acmw thr ranal ; and ihriM* tiiiH'H Inn f^iniH fr«*iT krpt from 
by thmr hoineii and U(*n lN?iiiK Khi»t when trying to pivtw pant. In ortler to 
IrflK, tlie ccNnpanicii on tht* Irft t>f tht* Duke of Cornwall'ii Li^eht Infantry, 
ti, wrre aprrml out along iht^ lint* of th« railway i*nilmnkiui*nt, ami a frrah 
am tlie right half l>attali<»n wum nioviMl to th^ li-f> to |indfing tht* Hni*. 
eeufv on my left, I turni*«l my att«*ntion to th« riKht tlank. On the flnt 
be attack (4.30 p.m.) I Npnt a mr^Hayci* to Major-Ctemrral Ix>wr, hyhrlio- 
by a monnted officer to Mahiiainf h, 3 and 4 roilra distant, re«|nmiting him 
the cavalry briga«le to cuver my right tiank, and to iwud forward the 
oe Light Infantry. 

., thinking I aaw the cavalry ailvancing. I ii^nt an onler to M^or-Gfueral 
» to bring round hia cavalry, undrr (N»v«*r of th«* hill, fall uiion the left 
r enemy's skirmiahi^rs, and roll up hm lini*. Thia onWr waa rvreWcd and. 
■sealed. For ma mceount of this part of the action 1 \icg lo t«(ck \o^a^« 
uj'Laww^ own report. 



134 BBITI8H NAVAL AND UILITARY OPERATIONS IN E 

At & p. m. I observed refnforeenieDts coining to the eneraj bj tnln, 
«liargeof cavalry on our exposed right, directed tlie otBcer oummBndJD 
compan; uf the York and Lancaster to prepare to receive tfaem Id U 
light of oar position, on the line of railway, a Kmpp gon, taken from 
Uabsameh, bad been nionnted on a railway track^and was beins worked 
tacbmeat of tbe Royol tlarine ArlilliTf, under Captain Tucker. This 
mirably served, and did great execution among the enemir. As the othe 
oease Itriiig fur want of aiumaoition, Captain Tucker's gun became the 
enemy's artillery, and 1 counted sulvoes of fonr gana opening on him 
•hell and shrapnel; bat although everything aronnd or in line wan hit, 
the gun detaehment was touched, and (bia gun continued to fire to the 
■Dg 93 rounds. 

At 6.45 p. m. I ordered an advance, with the object of cI<i8iiif;on thee 
try about the tinie of the expected cavalri' charge. The advance wi 
ateadity.by the fighting linr, in rehrlon from the left, about GOO yart 
front, when the line fired volleys by comi>aDii-B, the reserves following i 
railway embankineut. 

On arriving at tlie point held by the Mounted Infantry, aroessageres 
the Royal Marine Light Infantry bad romo on to thogruuud on ouirij 
loping back, I at once directeil tfaem to advance in order of attaok. ' 
was continued for about S or J miles, snpportiMl by the Diiko of Cumwi 
fantryontbe left, the York and Luncastrr beii]g left bi-biud in team 
falling linck, only unc attemjit being umde at a staiiil on our left, which 
flrwt volley of the Royal Marines. 

At about 8.15 p. m. I first heard of the cavalry charge fhnn an offl 
Life Guards who had lost his way. 

We had now been advancing for an honr and a half in the moon 1 
two aids-de-camp bad bad narrow escupes in mistaking detachi'd boilti-H 
for our own troops. Fearing some mistake might be made, and seriu 
chance of co-op<'Tation willi tho cavalry, I ordered the marines and L 
wall's Light Infantry to retire at &4!> p. m. On approaching Ibe can 
the other troopa. 

The nrpfimpnnyina i^'irIi Bketi'ViBVio'WBiii'pTrixlTnMBly ilia imsitiim bi 




BBIT18H NAVAL AND MILITARY OPBBATIONS IN EGYPT. 135 

SiwilonMSy LiQntenMiU Pym and Talbot, and of Captain and Adjutant Noblo, whose 

bom was killed under him. The Mounted Infantry also suffered heavily, aiul, early 

in the action, were deprived of the service of their gallant leader, Lientciiaut Pig- 

gott, an officer who deserves special mention. Another valuable officer of this corps, 

Lieotenant Edwards, was also wounded. The services of the Mounted Infantry have 

been invaluable to me in the absence of a sufficient force of cavalry. I have also to 

bring to your notice the admirable steadiness of the *2i\ battalion Duko of Cornwall's 

Light Infantry under fire, and during their advance under Colonel Richardson. This 

officer mentions Lieutenant-Colonel John, Mnjor Grieve, Lieutenant and Adjutant 

Aibby, and Lieutenant Falls as being indefatigable in their exertions. The 2d Duke 

of Cornwall's Light Infantry were effectively supported byjtlie 2d York and Lancaster, 

BDder Colonel Wilson, to whose careful personal leading, ably nupportcd by the offi* 

ttn under him, much cre<lit is d:ie. The Koyal Marino Light Infantry, although 

Uey arrived too late to take any deciHive share in the action, showed by the prompt- 

itiifleof their march to the field, and the steadiness of their advance, under Cohmel 

•'ones, that they are well cspable of sustaining the high character of their corps. 

In general, I cannot too highly express my opinion of the steadiness of the troops 
■Wilder fire, and the ready alacrity with which they carried out my onlers. Although 
Exposed for two hours to a heavy fire of artillery, the lines I advanced were full of 
eli«^cifiil confidence and eager to close with the enemy. I may also inonti<m that 
^^o five hours' exposure to the sun in the morning, expecting an attack, hud been 
"^oct trying to the men, and that the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry had not liad 
^'X3e to eat their dinners before they were ordenMl out to meet the enemy. 
I estimate the enemy's force at 1,000 eavalrj',H,00O infantry, and twelve gnus. 
I beg to bring to your notice Mnjor Ilart, V. (/., li. E., who showed the utmost de- 
' o t. ion on this as on other occasions. 

Xjieutenant Pine, 4th Drsgoon Guards, was attached to me as extra aid-de-ramp, 
^"Ki*! rendered invaluable service in carrying my orders to Major-CJeneral Drnry-Lowe 
t-o <;harge. At the time I imagined tlie brigade to be near at hand, and Liiuti'nant 
'^>X"ie galloped on until his horse dropi)ed, fortunafoly near to a battery of l?<\val Artil- 
*^^, where he got another horse and continued bis gallop till ho rcai-lnd (ieneral 
^rury-Lowe. 

Captain Hare, my Brigade Major, also rend<?n'd good service in carrying nicssag<'a 
•^d by his cheerful readiness to do any service required in the fighiing line. 

I have, &,v.f 

CJKKALD (iHAHAM, 
Major-Gemral Commanding Adramed llrigade. 

The next report is on the special operations of tlie Cavalry Divi.sion, 
'inder MajorGenenil Drury-Lowe, and is submitted by that officer to 
Lieutenant General Willis, C. B. Its text is as follows : 

Maiisamkii, Aufjuht'JfJj 18H2. 

Sir: Having received information from Major-Gencial (Jraliani, at Kassnssin, that 

^heenemy were advancing on his position, and having Ix'cn t(»ld by (Ndoncl Keyser 

^att his signalers had been withdrawn, I tnrncMl out the following troops of the 1st 

^valry brigatle, under Brigadier-General Sir Baker Kns»('ll, viz, IIonschoNl Cavalry, 

•th Draj;oon Guards, and lour guns N battery, A brigade, Koyal Horse Artillery, 

•i»rt advanced towards the enemy's left. A dintant and incflfcctivc artillery fire was 

o«ing directed against General Graham's position, bnt beyond this nothing was tak- 

^KpUce. I remained some hours, conunuuicated with General Graham, and with- 

^^ mj brigade about 4.30 p. m. 

«tbont 5.30 Mi^or Molyneux arrived from Kansassin and gave mo a message from 
^D«ril Graham that the enemy were advancing in forci^; I again, at 5.30 p. m., 
^^'^•d out the brigade, and moved to the sonnd of the heavy firing Uiul wa^ucvw \.«bV 



136 BBITI8H NATAL AND HII.ITABT <^PBRATI0N8 IN El 

lug place. En route, m galloper reached me fh>iii General Urahsm, wb 
thegeneral di-sired bim to say that "he was only Just able to hold hUo 
he wished me to attack the left of the enuniy'i infaotry ekirmiehen." 
noir set, aud a bright moon waa shining. The ligLt, however, was not 
to the haze, and we weregnided by the flash of gnos and mvaketry. I 
circtiit to tnrn ths ratmy's left, aM \ht brigade arrt^rf wttboRt being 
this purtiuD of their line. As we approached, a heavy 6re of shell* and i 
opened apon uh, which waa practically harmless, ns it was Trry liigh. 
front of our giiDB by a retiruiuent of the Urst line, whilst the Houspholi 
tbeir right, funned line. 

, After a few roandsfrom our gnns. Sir Baker Russell led a charge of t 
Cavalry, under Colonel £v art, against the eoeii.y'it iofuntry, nbichhft 
to advance. MovioK most steadily towards tbn Saab of the rifles, thi 
right gallantly led and executed. The enemy's infantry was complet 
and our cavalry swept throngh a battery of seven or nine ganii, whic 
most have been captured, but, unfortunately, their exact position could 
afterwards, and tber were uo doubt removed during the nigbl, after oi 
The enemy's loss was heavy, the ground being thickly strewn with the 
quantities of ammunition, Ac. I beg to altnch a list of casnalliea* sn 
brigade, which, eonslderitig the nature of the attack, was not heavy, 
praise is due to the Household Cavulry for their behavior tbrooghoul, i 
thank Brigadier- General Sir Baker Bubs^H und the officers aud men ol 
for their gallant condDOt. 

1 have, Ac, 

DRCRY-1 
Uajor-Gtneral Con Mondin; Cnrof 

The reoAou of the lack of ammunition for the British ar 
the lieavinose of the roiid from the base to the lulvsnce 
Efforts were made to get up » projier supply, but the wago 
the sand aud were late in arriving. 

The immanity of the detachment of Royal Mariue Aitillei 
the S"" Krnpp gnu on the niilway wagou, was thought 
Tucker to be due to constant shitting of itsnosition o 






BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IX EGYPT. 137 

Iry advanced, the 4th Dragoon Giianls on the left, the Ilonaehold 
Cavalry on the right, and the four guns of battery N. A., Royal Horse 

rtillerj', in tear of the former. Approaching within 50<) or GOO yards 
:f the Egyptians, the guns were unmasked by the cavalry and brought 
aickly into action, ceasing fire when the UousehoUl Cavalry crossed in 
!Kt>nt to ride down the enemy. This moonlight charge was the most 
ramatic ss it was one of the most gallant episodes of the eam[)aign. 
X ended the battle in a brilliant and novel manner. 

The following telegrams from Arabi Pasha, ])ubli8hed in the then 
:fficial paper, give his view of this action. The translation is taken from 

e London Times newspai)er: 

Amgutt 28. — Our victorious troops have worsted the oneiuy and mado liiin nrtreat to 
ahsameb, by the strength and ]>owerof (vod. At the ])reseiit iiiomciit th(^ two armies 
faciDg each other at a distance of about 5,000 inuterH from AI-MahHauieh, and after 
little rest, and when the horses have been watered, there will b<.> a charge, ]>leaHe 
v-od. Give U8 the aid of your pure prayers in asking for snceor from the Lord AI- 
ighty. 

Auyiut 2i?, 7.40 p. m. — The ii^hting has be^un a^ain. Cannon have been tiring 
«- ace 4 p. lu. till 7.IMp. m., and still continue. I pray (!od for help against His enemies. 
•y Go<l to help His true believers. 

Till this hour the fighting continues with canntm and mnsketry. I thank Ciod for 
e endurance He has given us, and ]»ray for perfect help and victory. Vmy to Him 
t He may help His servants, the true believers, and disappoint our trencli«>rous 
*^emies. It is now twenty minutes jmst eight in the evening. 

Augu9t^, 11.15 p. m.— Thanks be to (;od, the tighting has erased on both Hides, 
ter a serioiia engagement with musketry and cannon, followed by a (■har<{e by our 
valry on that of the enemy, when tlnry were in a melee and used thrir swords a;;ain«t 
:h other, after which they separated. <iod is the ln*Ht i>rot<'ctor. 

The results of this tight were of the greatest po.ssible iinportantte, 
xmall as was the force employed. It became evidcMit, in the first place, 
fcat Arabi felt himself to be stron*^ eiiou^^h to assume the otfeiisive And 
U.S attempt to regain the prestige \vhi<*h he had lost at Magfar ami 
elel-Mahuta. In the second phu^e, it showed the Hiitisli that the 
-iisk they had undertaken was likely to prove more than a jjanale across 
desert, and that their enemy was willing to come within range and 
o-oldhisown for hours together; but it also showed that he would not 
■^"tand an attack at close quarters, and that, unh»ss in greatly suj)erior 
'^ umbers, he might be expected to give way if resolutely assailed. 

The value of the action in its iulluence on the morale of the British 
^*>»op8, and especially of the younger re<Tuits, was iucalculal)le. It gave 
t.lum that self-reliance which can oidy be obtained through actual and 
•^'Jccessful contact with the enemv. 

The British left being well su])ported by tht^ (?anal and its banks, tlie 
**3o,Ht obvious move on the part of the attack was to dcMible up their 
^'phtaiid force them back into the canal, cutting off <'oiumuuication 
^ith their rear. The Egyjitians had no commander caj)able of realizing 
*^e importance of this object, and in consecpience the main attack was 
^^fMnt, and the flanking movement half-hearted and uusvicees^sfvvU 



138 BBinaH natal and uiutabt operations in 

The bnrjinR parties next morDing foDnd that many of t 
been Hhookiogly mutilated daring the night The circao 
been spared. The persons committing these outrages fo 
pl:iii wLicli Ihc.v ii|inlii.Hl lo tlie iitifir(;iiincist.'il coqisos ol 
Uf these they hiiil lopped oS' the tect, hands, and geni 
deeply gashed the abdomen and the upi>er part of the foi 

With ihis battle ends the tlntt part of the campaign. < 
Ismailia wns seized, on tbe 2tith Kassassin Lock occupi« 
28th its possession seenred to the British advance aft 
eSbrt at dislodgment by the Egyjitians. 

The actual distance covered, a matter of 20 miles, is 
the result achieved. It must be home in iniud that in s 
favorable conditions, of which abttencc of rain was tbe 
advance was beset with many real difficulties. The railwi 
ia several places and blocked at others. There were no 1 
haul thu trucks conveying stores from the base to the 
army transport had completely broken down. The dra 
were few and in poor cundition, puck-mules were lackiu 
nnuibers, and <»imels were, practically, entirely vrnnting 
army carts, suitable for use on harri Huropeau roads, n 
as to stick hopelessly in the sand by their own weight. 1 
designed for two horses iiot less than six were im[>er»tivel 
the more that conld bo hitched ou the better. The navy 
it could to assist in getting supplies foiwanl by the Sweet 
(and its aid was of vital im]ioitance at this juncture), 
ment it seemed doubtful whether even the few troops al 
ahead could be maintaini^d, and every efi'ort wa» made U>\ 
them furnished with the foml requisite to enable them tc 
the crisis. To their excellent behavior, under the trying l 




BBITI8H VATAL, AHD HILITABT OPERATIONS IK EGTPT. 139 

In addition to this discomfort was the ever-present possibility of cut- 
ting the railway in rear, or of interrapting the canal traffic by strong^ 
raiding parties. Either of these contingencies would have seriously 
imperiled the troops at the front. 

Fears that these contiugencies might be realized, combined with short 
rations, bad water, excessive heat, flies, mosquitoes, hnnl work, inade- 
quate shelter, snn-stroke, dysentery, and fever, rendered the advance 
more honorable than either safe or pleasant. 

The exertions made to meet the exigencies of the case arc detailed 
nnder their appropriate heads. It is sufficient here to remark that the 
light during the second part of the campaign was for adequate trans- 
port and for a sufficiency of the bare necessaries of life for the troops 
thready thrown to the front. 

In the mean time the 3d brigade, 2d division, composed of High- 
huiders, had arrived at Ismaiiia. It was not landed at first, but was 
retained on the transports in the harbor, x)ending the solution of the 
transportation problem. 

On (September 1 General Wolseley telegraphs to the Secretary of 
Btate for War, in London : 

IsMAiMA, September 1. 

In reply to yonr iuqniry of 29th ultimo, circuinHtauccH have forcinl me ah<>iid of 
^tntport, bat it is rapidly becoming cflicient. 

The necessity of securing a Huflicieut Hiipply of frcHb water in the canal rendered it 
''Kiperative to push ou as quickly an po.s8ible. 

Uy BDceess on the 24th and *2r)th, and retreat of the enemy, have enabled me to- 
^ize [the] two important positions on the cnnal of Kl M»;;far and Ka^'Hassi^ Lock, 
'oe latter about 20 miles from this place. lam, therefon*, in a more forward and 
^^Tomble position generally than I had antieipat<>d, an<l am only now waitin-^ till 
^7 transport arrangements are more comjilete, to enable me to make a further move- 
ment. 

In the absence of roads I had always calculated on partially UHing the eanal and 
^5iilway in sending supplies to the front, but the enemy having bloek<'d the former 
^J two large dams, and the latter by an embankment and tli*^ pariial removal of 



ilii, it has been necessary to get these obstrnetlonH removed. I have one engine on 
^ %c line, and expect a second from Suez to-night, and am pn'iiariiig the land trans- 
port companies, some of which are now landing, to NU])pU'ment the other meauH abovo 
^-^dicated. 

A supply of mules has arrived from Cyprus. I expect 4(>() nion? from Malt<i and 
* tsly to-morrow ; and the large supply collected at Smyrna and J^*yn)nt, at last ro- 
^■•Med by Ottoman Goverument, are on their way. 

In a desert country like this part of Kgypt it takes time to (>rganize the lin<'.s of 
^^wnmnn icat ion . 

The above k*leffram will make abundantly clear the state of iift'iiirs 
during this phase of the cam])ai^n. 

By September 2 the whole of the Indian Contingent bad reached Suez 
Except the 6th Bengal Cavalry, and many of its troops had gone to the 

Except for an occasional reconnaissance, bringing about the inter- 
^^ge of a few shots, and for one real assault, this period ^*a& o\\^ ot 



140 BHITI8H NAVAL AND UILITABY OPEBATJOHS IN 

quiet preparatioD for a further advance, stores first, and 
ing slowly accamulated at KasHasflii]. 

On September 6 the distribution of the forces was as is 
following table: 






*^"Sli,™„ 

InfliDtiy ; 

Raykl Irt»h Fadliert 

Ronl UariDs Uiht InfUtry 

Soir*l Artlllerv ; 

C battui. ad bHjtbls (C. >) 

J buttery, 3d blind* (J. 3) 

KbMtet7. lKtbrr|{iidfl(f. 1). 

SbaUsry, lit briitMie. Sooltiah diTlilMi... 
Bajal Enrliwera : 



H»lf of A troop 

"ilfo/C Moot 

laurlti and Ynnipon: 
M. Hlh. lltkud i;tli fKunpuda 
MrdD-um Stun DupurtnieM. - 
Amy HoipiUlCoiiM 

Mtli'iPaiJuibl*H>UiraIiibot^ 
Miulrat &ipp«ra 






Id battalion Gimad 

Zdb»tUII»uCald*trL. .. 

lalbatUilioBSoDtaOBardi 

BoyalArtlllacy: 

J batlety. Sd bricade (anc-haU) (J. 3 

N batUry. »l briEHlg (X. 3} 

I han«y, Bd brigada (I. I' 

SbaUvry, lat brigade, Sc 
B«iy>l>Eoein«>ia: 



madlar Gnanla . _ 



a, Scottlah dlTlakn. . 




KATII/ AMD lOUTABT OVEMAXlOm IS SQTFT. 141 




IN 

m 



M7 



1» 



1* 



•>kitoA gwM OB tb« bftcki oCboIm.) 

smber 9 the BgyptiaDs made a desperate eflbrt to crash the 
Be at KaaaaMiii. The following is the ofBcial report of the 
It: 

Camp Kabsassim, Sipt e mh e r 10, 186B. 

tlM boDor to fteqaftint 70a that the enemy made a oombined aUaek yea- 
OK ■poD this poMtlon, one oolomn advancing fkom tlie norHi from tho 
etioB, tlM other from Tel-ol-Kebir. ArabI Paeha wae on the gtoond, bat 

1 taopa were oommaoded by Ali Fehmi Paaha, Raahid Paaba beiag, tt 
f pttoooofSi is dJ^graoe for having loet hie camp and gone in the flght of 
imo, St MahMBMh atatlon. Tlie enemy's foroe wae abont thirty gWMr 

took four, and aerenteen battalions of iufinntry, eevenU sqaadnma of 
a fow thonaand Bedonlna. 

nfermation I have obtained from prieonen, it would seem that the enemy 
saay victofy, thinking the force here wan only a wealc advance gaard. 
in camp, when the attack began, were, as l>elow, under the command of 
vooeral Willis, coinmandiug 1st division. With tfat'se he immediately 
ttarkrd and drove back tho enomy, who rotroatinl with loss within their 
at Tel-el-Kcbir, from which tlioy opened an nngry but harmless fire upon 
hieh had been halted 1>eyond the range of their guns. 
moved with great steadiness, and Mi^or-Oon«*ral Graham has especially 
ly notice the dashing mauiier in which two Knipp guns were taken by 
( of Kuyal Marine Light Infantry, and the excellent manner in which 
Q was handleil by its com in and in;; oMIcer, Lieutenant-Colonel Jones. 
li<M were 3 men killed and '2 oflircrh and 7^ ni«Mi wounde<l. Lieutenant 
. M. A. Penelope, is aniongnt thowe who wen* m*vfrely woundwl. He 
land of the naval detai'hnient that wan serving the 40.|Hlr., whir*h is 
a railway tmck. He is a very goml officer, and I have to regret very 
• of bis valuable sorvir«*M with thin umiy. With the exception of five 
) severely iujuml to 1»e moved by railway, all the woundeil were sent to 
night, and those five were wMit there thin evening liy the Fresh Water 

I have, Ac, 

O. J. WOI-SKLEY, 

Comwkandfr-iH'Chie/ of the JirilUk Forces im i'^gpi^ 

ips engaged were t1u>Re enumemtocl in table (p. 140) as at 
with ceitaio changes. Thus the delac\\ml^ul ot 4iVi\ Wt%- 



142 BRITISH NAVAL AND HILITABT OPEHATIOH8 IN 

rtls and tlie Monnted Iiifantry had joined the c 
sameh ; of the Engineers, A and C troops and the 17tt 
not iuvladed amouK those tbat took part in the action, na 
missariat and Transport companies. B attery K. A, Boyi 
lery, worked with tbe Indian cavalry, while half of Battel 
ilivi»ion, had come up and established three L'5-pdr8. for 
defeiiBe of the pomtion, Tbese were behind breastwork 
bh\« of the canal, close to tbe lock. 

The uamp was situated near tbis lock, between the ra 
menl and tbe canal, in a plain surrounded by hills on tl 
and cast. 

Two batteries of field artillery, A and D. 1, were in gn 
the camp, facing to tbe westward, tbe left of D. I restii 
■way. Upon the latter were the captured Krupp 8""» g 
Captain Tucker's detachment of Boyal Marine Artillery 
tioued, and a B. L. K. 40-]Hlr. on an armored truck, m: 
iackcts from II. M. 8. Penelope, descrilied elsewhere. 

The Egyptian attack was meant to be from two sidci 
by a sortie of the Tel-el-Eebir garrison, and on the noi 
Irom Salibieb, variously estimatMl at from 1,5(>0 to5,0(K 

There appears to be little doubt that the British ca 
surprised. Early iu the morning Colonel Pennington, oft 
Lancers, going out to the westwanl to post vedettes, fo 
tiaus advancing in force. Although but 50 men were 
dismounted tbeoi behind a ridge, and delit>erate!y ope 
advancing enemy, and, when hard pushed, charged flvi 
cavalry, killing ten men and capturing Ave horses. I 
timely warning of tbe impending danger was thus given to 




BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 143 

anal, uiid tliPii advanced to within 1,2(H) yards. A few of hi8 troops 
rtfrt' <iMirh of the ranal. 

Tin- ti'^tiniony to the accuraey of the K^xyptian artillery practice is very 
,f i.iT.d. >hot after shot falling admirably into the camp and lines. The 
»\mIN, liowever, hurst wi iiiditt'erently as to neutralize the excellence of 
tW :iiiii. 

Uaitcries A. 1 and I). 1, partly on account of the enemy's fire and 

li.inly biM-ause of some uiu^ven ground in their front, soon left the pits 

ami advanced sli;;litly. These batteries, aided by (i. U. and 7. 1 on tlic 

n;:iiJ and the railway p:unsoii the left, replied vi;;orousIy witiisliell and 

••lira^Mnl. The L*.") pdrs. did excellent work on the enemy's ri;rht on 

Uitli !»idi*s (if the caind, sending; their ]»rojectiles over tlie heads of the 

hr\u^\i infantry until the advance was be;;un. ISatteries A. I and I>. 1 

ihdt iliiwn the detacliments of two of the captured ^uns, which were 

M-srfil bv the lini* as it advanced. Tlir other two wen* carried bv a 

''hur;:** «if the marines in their forward mareh. The battalion, in re;rn- 

Ur tnriii.itiiin for attack, came upon a battery of four ;;uns whicli was 

|ilj>iiiu' briskh u|Hin it at thedistance of 1,100 yards. Without return- 

insraflmt, the marines kept on until they were 100 yards away, when 

lhr\ lH';:iftn liriii;: volleys by half companies, still continuin;; the march. 

TiiN <«tcady work proved too severe for the K^^yptians, \iho broke and 

rail. li-.ftvin^ two of the four ^nins behind. 

liie infantry, also en;;a^ed, held its ^^round for an hour and a Ii:df, a 
forward movement not beiii;; ]H>rmitted until it should be deiiiiitely 
^iMH'i tint no dan;;er was to bi* apprehended from the noriii. At >.;><> 
it -«.i« ili'fiiii'd pi udeiit to a<«sume tiie (»tb'n<«ive. and liie line was onliTed 
^" .»:\ .iijri', till* i-\f n-nie n;:ht lieili;:. iio\\i'\ it. kept refiiM-d. 'flu* iii- 
^■|^■:\ .itnl tlie t'liiir batteries ot'aitilleiv <in its li'^lit iiinxfd t'orward 
*■■••;• a Tleiu-aiid .\ard>. and re i-nu:i;:ei| the tinniy. w ho liail letiH'd. 
•V"' ".'I •i.r .id\ anii* \\a»* h-numm-iI. and the li^N pti.ihN utii- nIhw |\ dri\iii 
' <• li .Mil tlieir intieiirliiiii'iit> at Tf'l el I\«'Iiir. 'riii-*«i' loititiiMiiniis 
^' :• i|>p:ii.i< hetl t(» wiHiiii .'ijMMl m ij.oiio \ aiiU. imni- t«»i tin- pin posr of 
'■ -. r\ .i"i«»n tliaii f»l' a*«s;i!ilt. At rj..{<» the Hi iiinIi NT.iifiil iMntmnto 

I:, ''i.^ .!< tion the l!ritis|i aitil]t-i\ piii\rd it^ \.iliie, :itii| ir<-ri\iil 
:••;.: :"i the manner mi wliieli ii was Ii.iikIIiiI. 'i'iir inl.uitix li.tJ Ii'ns 
Ij-rr Miit.x iit' «lis!iii;:ui>liin;; itseji, ini rlo- i;;:\piiaiiN win* unwslliii:; 
■ • _* »«'•• at ^liorl r.in;:e. 

I ..« !• p'ii'*** ihd nut lake t lit* fm m ut a imim. .iltlmnL'h liilji* diHiltr i m 
■t . : *••;;. liiinl that the iftii-at iii;: ai in,\ uniijil init li.i\<- ^I<>p|iril .it Ii 1- 
• -K* •.! h.id a viL'omuN a^^aiilt lii-i-n ,ir i«-iiipii'd. In i.mI. tin- IW ?i«li 
r.»»'p*. Iwitli ••llii'ei> and nii-n. wi-ir r\tii'hi«'l\ .inxi'HiN \»t i'nhfi.::ti- tin* 
k»!.. •!£•••; ^M-neral WnNelev, lM»\\t\ir. utmlil nni -ivi- Ij:n ri«!i-.i'f;'. !i;it 
.ftli-ri-d the withdrawal t»» Ka^^a-^'^in. nieii-l^ ni»Hi i \ in^' lU.i: ln-wi^ imt 
•-.1*1 \ . 

I lit- >,^ihn'h c'»ntin^fiit h.js /.if,- m am\ in^: »»u \\\*' -vru*- *A a»v.»a\, 



144 BSITI8H NATAL AKD MILITARY OPERATIONS IN Et 

It failed to unite witb the troops from Tel-el- Kebir, aad it i 
the cavalry divisioD, nnder M^or-Generol Drui^-Lowe, in 
north of the lines. Seeiog the impoasibilitj' of Joininf; Ai 
face of the force nuexpectedly found ready to receive bit 
mauder withdrew belore General Drury-Lowe's advauce, loi 
gun in his retreat. There was do fightiug at this point. 

The failura of the movement waa attributed by the Bgyptii 
having kept too far to the eastward. 

The Egyptian version of the afl'air is worth reading. It i 
lows, and is from a telegrnm sent by Arabi to the miniatrj 
Cairo: 

Seplfmbrr 9. — L>«t Diebt suDie monated AntbH of llie prOTioceufSbark 
ini; to tlis trjbu of Maklal. Tninailat, Ajod, aad Hsim. rode out lowani 
*t 'it a. m , nnder the cumtiiaiid of AH Bny lamet, BUporinlendeol of tli 
with them Captain Abdnl Humid Effeiidi Hanid}- and 40 car air; wild i en 
forwiLrd as far an the enemy's onlposts, rode at tbem, and flrrd a volley, 
thtim retire, anil then the Arabs UiaaA furty.flve oxen grazing [»icj, whi 
off. while some of tbe parly remained to keep back the tmi-my. At aunri 
came out with iofaiitry, cavnlr;. and artillery, and llrioK began, and 
botb sides for about an hour. Then the Arabs ohargi^ like lious, diipli 
»ge and bravpry Tiliich enabletl tbem to drive back the enemy, who wet 
onnieroiiH than IhenmeliMi, Th«u they followed the enemy, driving tiM 
had billed abonl 100 of Ihem, atid diaperaed The real, drivini; tham b«i 
l«ntB. Tbe AralM captured th« oxen, altoiit 500 inet«Ta of torpedo wi) 
military atorps, and they returned ti> their poats victoriona This enf 
elndio)! the attnuk and pursuit, lafll«il about six bourn. • • • Tbaal 
not one of tbe Arabs Dor of the soldiern was woondeil. Give this news l 

Also a second telegram, tlated September lU (Arabic): 
On this day, September 9, on eugagemenl took place with tbe enen 
Onr fori'e tvim cum p. mil of iiiniiilry. I'avulry, iiud artillery, iti tbn t«.- 




BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 145 

1 m^n, martyrized, and I'lO wrr«<' Hlighfly, not dangeronsly, wonudcd, acconling to 
bi* ikfBcial rrtnrnti pre«ut«d by the varions ra«(iiiiiMitM wirli greiit oxacriit*iii and pre> 
iHon. It h«fl lieen thonf^ht that ouroaHuahicH wou'd have boon double that niinil>er, 
win;* to chr nrrionnaeMii nf tb<* <'nf]^a);emi«nt and itM \ni\fr duration. Mitn'over, from 
nw olMprrati(»D it baa been |>rove«l to uh that the nnnilMsr of the eueuiy killed and 
vm 41 (ling on the Ac^hl of battle is about 2,500, and their carts were ioautlicieot for 
iirrxMije (iir the wounded. • • • 

Id the writiug of digpatebes, if iu nothing else, Arabi was truly Na- 
N>U*oni(*. 

On September the Iligliland brigade, nnder Major-Geueral Alison, 
V. <\ li., Htarted fn>m iHmailia for the front. 

Th<* 10th« lltli, and I2th were occupied ii\ bringing up the troops to 
^aiWHhiu ami in making preparations for a general advatice. 

Dnring tbe latter part of tliirt Heeond or quiescent iH*riod of the cam- 
pai|;n, reconnaiaHanceM were made daily in the direct ion of Tel-el Kebir, 
but HeriouH eugagementa were strictly foHiidden. The military habits 
oCtbe Egyptians were carefully studied. On one occasion Colonel BuIUTi 
V. C C. B., C. M. (r.. of tbe Intelligence Department, managed to get 
iround tbe enemy's dank as far as Karaini, and to ascertain tbat bis 
Mtpnsji at uigbt were withdrawn to very near the trenches. 

Tbe tniUH|M>rt question, tbe only obstacle in tbe wny of furtber oflEeo- 
Art oiiemtions on tbe part of General Wolseley, bad received a so- 
lution wbicb, if not complete, was measurably satisfactory. The rail- 
vaj service bad Uh'II develope<l to an extent suflicient to permit tbe 
iorninnlation of supplies U*y«md the needs of daily consumption, and 
tlie anxiety which bad been experienced in the eailier stages of the 
carii|uign bad given place to impatinirt* to resume the march to Cairo. 
Thi- w.ir ntiw p.iss«*s into its last pi'riod. 

Thf folli>\\ing table gives the disposition and a faiily trustworthy 
^QtuiiiTiitiiMi of the* Egyptian foicrs at this time. 







|lu 


1 
f^iitr.v. 


Ai 


1 
rl:l!.ry. 


c 


1 
ftvalry. 

I 






Pl*e«. 


In command. 


C 


1 

1 

1 






• 




a 

M 








• 

B 


1 

a 

j 


a 




B 

9^ 


Z 


• 


• 

% 

H 


T««lK»btf 


AraU l*a-hA. All Jlu 


ri 


. \ii 0.1 


(4* 


1 wo 


'J 


1.01.0 


2.i«-*» 


U.iJ$ 


^'^^•^••r 


Us V.»m\.n 












I 






To lU*. I'rf.hA 


•1 

* 


b. iiOU 


Au 


fM-0 






6. iMW 


\ .WO 


».■ .t 


ff III KK'iiol 






. • 


.^■-» 




'20(\ ' 


f. Oitj 


'. -/K) 


^ * •» r feOM UuwII*. 


K'lii tall i| l'ii«ha 


3 


'l !•• 


1 * 


i -■ 




•Jvo 


'> IHlit 


14 '.4 


^-'% . 


||«Milt0..i| ^k.lll|^ I'll 






1 


•J...> 






'.. l-VO 


1, -.xfO 


!*•• #tu 


AUliti .\l Taiilii 




• • •.. ■■■ 




1 








', '--0 


*-*■•■ 


> • • * • 


1 


I J 1 1.-' 




... 




■ ■ ■ • 


k « I 


i;:. '^ 



• •U» i»-t|'j|f .^ »j,^ 6*.i)0J. t«-lal II ri ^ii-i*, n *} , .14. "tO jrrjinl tii'A , Al'uiil M iX^O uiiu. 

H. .Mii. ITJ 10 



H6 UBITISH NATAL AKD UILITAKr OPEBATIOHB DT ■ 



ZIIZ. 

TBB BATTLE OF TBL-EI^KEBIR ASD TBS CONCLUaWS 01 

To remain Iwhind atut giiaril the lino of commnnicntion 
forwiinl movement now to Ue uuUertukco, tUe following de 
was mutle : 



riu*. 


BrttUb troop.. 


iBdIu CwUva 


T_dll 


■Mof h W h R «1 t 


MO rl I (ulr* 




i0..fth-W.-MK-„tKwi1'nrM 

Iwl»r llfB Wot Ki-'lH*«tu.at 

lnOnrihi>U-.«(K<-nl Rgiiini^nt 


I9» Dollre liininio 


i^EE. 










pu J J 



At 2 p. m. on September 12, tbe nrmy having concentnit< 
SASfiii, Ibe Ro,viil Irish FnHilifra t>eing the last battalion to 
diiya' rutioiis were servt-d out for man and beaKf. At S p. n 
valiM>8(nBW patieniof kiinpsaek), lilanketH, anit alt b»ggai;e vt 
beside tlie railway, and a n<Hi ■uomiuiiwiuned officer and two ni 
from ench twmpuiiy to stay by them. Afterannaet no baffles w 
to Ite BOiimled. The camp was to be left nnder the command 
Knxent, K. E. 

Tlie rcgiiiieninl transport was onlered to carry cooking ol 
days' nitiotis, one day's fuel, butcherx' tooln, and signaling ii 
togethiT with i b many ovemtuts or blankets as conld tie tal 
overloading ; to be brigaded at dayligbt of tbe next day, an 
along the northirn side of the ciiiial. With each battalion 
the usual water-carts anil strtttcliermen (four to (•ach ci>hi]i 




BRITISH NAVAL AKD MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 147 

point, was to follow a line of telegraph polea, 100 yards apart, whirh had 
been planted the evening? before by tbe Te1e|ifra]>li Troon, and when these 
eml«Hl waa to be directed by Lieutenant Wyatt Kawson, R. N., naval 
aidilt^ciimp to General Wolseley. The vacant space in tlie front line 
waa covere<l by a snccession of infantry Qles at intervals of ten paces. 
Similar files maintained the distance and coinnmnication between the 
leadinj? and snpiKirtin^ brigailes in esich division, while the intervals be- 
tw(*fn the artillery and the neighboring infantry brigades were bridged 
overhy nionnted non-commissioned of!icers. The attack on the intrench- 
xnentsof Tel el-Kebir was to be nuule at the point of the bayonet, in 
theaaiDe formation, without change except in deploying the rear com- 
panies. 

During the march several halts were ma4le to rest the troops, one, 
towunls 3 a. m., being nearly an hour in length. D.iybreak was the 
time fixcHl for arrival at the fortitied lines, and it would have been as 
^D(le8irable to reach them t 'O soon as too late. 

Tlie iKMition selected by the Egyptians for a final stand was by nature 

theKtnmgest it was |K>ssibIe to find in that flat section of country. Near 

theKtatiou of Tel-el-Kebir there is a general and gradual rise of the ground 

towards the west, culminating in a range of hills that stretch from a point 

<3n the railway, about a mile and a half east of the stiition, northward to 

^lihieh. Roughly parallel to the Sweet Water Canal is a se(M)nd series 

^f kills intersecting the first about two nii<es distant from the railway 

CatQ ou Plate 50). Viewed from the railway this east and west range 

^PiH^ars as a moderate hill. Its real character, however, is that of a 

^Mbledand sloping away to the northward, with a rather steeper descent. 

'towards the south. The generally even natun) of the ground is seen ia 

^late 51, together with its extreme barrenness, amounting to desola^ 

lioii. 

!riie Egyptian intrenchments were laid out along the crests of these 
^wo ranges, the north atid south lines being prolonged over two miles 
1)e}-oiid the intersection. 

The plan included an ample dry ditch, fVom 8 to 12 feet wide and 

^roin 5 to 9 feet deep, in front of a breastwork from 4 to G feet high, 

^idi a l)an<)uette in rear. The trace was broken by orcasional salients 

^beie were placed well-designe<l redoubts possessing a wide coinniand 

^n (*ither fiank. The sides of these re<lonbts are m rked on IMate 50. 

in n-ar were frequent shelter trenches irrejularly spaced. Pa-isages 

"^bruujih the parapet for tiehl pieces anil vehicles were provided in va- 

''"nn places, and were guarded by outying traverses and breastwork'-'. 

?he revetment ditfered nniinly in the car* wliieh had lu»en bestowed 

^l>»>n It, and consisted mostly of reeds, grass, &t;. The interior slopes 

^«iv the only ones thus treated. (See PI itc 52.) 

Ilie southern ]K)rtion of the defenses was practically comideted at 
*k«'tinieuf the battle. Here the revetment was neatly ftulslwd^ w^ vw. 
^'*te64. Work w>w in pro^reas on tlic northern and we^Vetu Vvu^^, 
^exUwaitles being ticHrcely mure than laid out. 



148 BBITIBH NAVAL AMD UILITABT OPERATIONS IN H 

The extent of tbesA defensive works, which is enonnnas i 
son with the number of tro«)])8 at Arabi's liirtimmil, would set 
an inordinate reliiiiJvu uiiou mere dituhes iiiid breastworkg ( 
an eiieinj', however vi^orousi. It led, us a necfHsary voii»ec)ai 
excessive epi'eading out of ttie defenders, and the fittHl weakv 
force whiuheoiihl be gathered at any given pDint. Hiwl theHii 
of labor l)eeii expended in several coneeulriv lines it wonlil hu 
in a pcwitioii of great xtreugth, permittini; the retiring, if iiee< 
one line to the tiext, and an almost i idf*fluite pn>loi)giug of i 

At the southern end of the line (see Plate 50) there wer 
built redoubts, oue on eacb bank of the canal, mounting thre 
view of theso redoubts is given on Plate 54, while seutioi 
plan of that on the northern batik are seen on Plate 55. < 
the two, and stopjiing the How of water in the Sweet Water 
a stoat dam. 

The section of the pnrapet between the canal and the railw 
at B, Plate 53. In rear ot this line were various slielters, soi 
are giveu in section at C, D, and F of the same plate. 

On eacb side of the railway wa« one gun. The furm of ti 
placement is shown at E. 

Plate 60, A> H is a section tbroagh the gap and ita del 
E are sections of the parapet and skelters a^joiuing. A tI 
given on PlatA 02. 

Ill froiitof thi^imrtionof the lines, and distant aboaC 1,100 
a fitrrnidiibtp oulwuik niurked M on PItite 50, and given i 
section on Phite 50. This was n [Hilyiconal I y -shaped r^on 
lacking in protection agniOKt reverse fire. It was providi 
envelope iu front and ou < ither flank. It mounleil eight ^i 
an insiH-ctiou of the soution, it is geeu that the battery i 




BEITISH HATAL AND HILITABY OPERATIONS IN EQTPT. 149 

The lines ailjotniofr a« far as Y were carried by the Hifj^hland brifjrnde. 
rbe forms of the (>arai>et are given in Plate 57, where thej are marked 
B S, S T« T V, respectively. They are mnch \e»s efi'ective as defenses 
hao those to the southwanl, aud, as the event prove<l, wore incapable 
rf licf iiiic as serious obstacles to resolnte men. 

Battery V, Plate S8, was a formidable work within a spacious en« 
relo|ie, and moanted five gnns. The work itself was completed, but 
Mrts of the accessory defenses were still unfinished. It was turned by 
Jie Ilighlanderai who passed to the southward. 

The attack of the 2d bri^^ade took place in next line of trenches as 
Bar as W. The ditch, as seen by the section at V, Plate 59, was of the 
same general character as that encountered by the Highlanders, but 
«M a trifle larger in its dimensions. It varied, however, not being a 
eosipleted work. 

Tbe redoubts W and Y are shown both in plan and section on the 
■aoie phite. As indicated, this part of the line was hanlly begun. 

Ab regards the east and west line, from A' and E' to O^ enongh of 
tbe cietnils are shown on Plate GO to make its character clear. It was 
ibM»lniely useless in the battle, being taken by the Highlanders in rear 
^ hy the second brigade in the flank. 

The mil at Tel el Kebir is sand and gravel, easily worked, but as 
•a^iij displaced. The interior slopes were revetted with tufts of grass, 
^« « bde the exterior hIo|h*8 were allowed to assume their natural talus. 
Tlif ground ishanl enongh to retain, appn>?Limately, the shafM) imlicateil 
'n th»* ditch sect ion M, but the pusHa;:e of the first few men inv:iriably 
bnikf down the sideH of the ditch, making a causeway for those who ciinie 
Wbiiid. 

A ili*A-ct of dcMign in the redonbts is the lack of snfiirient depres- 
iioii to the Moles of the eiiihrasiires. In <M)ns(M)iirii(*e, the pn»)tH?tiies 
Wen* harmless at close qnarters, passing w«ll over the heatls of the 
Brirish. 

Tlif account of the battle of Tel el Ki»bir, contaiiUMl in (Jenenil 
fcViil<««-lr\\ reiM>rt, is given below at full len;;tli. The omitted p.ira- 
rriiphji nrUtc to events substM|uent to the aetion, and an* quoteil else- 
»hfrr: 

Caiw*, Sfjitrmher 111. l-'-'J. 

8iK: 1 bAV« a]r**a<Iy liad tlif* liotmr (if nportii)^ to mui \t\ t< l<-;^riipli th:it I iiit.n kfft 
b^ ii.trrucb*-<l |Mi»iti«iii iif Ti*l-«*1- Ki'liir ;i liiili* liffmi* •<iiiiiiM nii tin' iii<iriiiii^ nf itm 
Z^h iri^laijC. r«»iii|iU*trly flcfiMtiii^ th(> ciiriiiy, with v«ry ;;r>'.it lo*i'«. :iim1 « -.iptii in;; 
if'v r.ibr lirlil |;uii!«, vait qiiuutiti«f of aiiiintiintKMi, military Ntnn"*, aiitl niipiihi-^ of 



Fn^fB thr dmily rrconnaiHtnurp of tin* poiition at T«-l«-]-K<'liir iiia«l** frnm our niinp 
it K«aMai*ia. ra|ir(inll> fnuii r)M* ^immI view I o^tan i*«| of tlu* tiiciii\'H w<»rk4 on thfi 
t-h .i.«rjuil, «b«-n our tnMt|»<i ilrnvt* Ihm k within the iiitn*tH'tirii»-iitn tin* fori-i* «•! Itiir- 
nrn IjAti^IioiiB, five* iM|ini<lroii!«. timl i*i;;ht«*«'ii ^nn<« th.it hid .iit ickisl tmr « uu\yi it\ tl\« 
»><iaif.K, it WJM evifJrii/ ib»t thrir wttrku wori* of ^ri'al ext«ni\ ikwA ot i^ totuwAxXA^ 
AJJ tbe ioforataiion obtainni fnnn njiirji ami |tn«ourT« \«h\ \u^ V> Vw\\r^% 



150 BBITISn KAVAL AND MILITABY 0PEBATI0N8 IN E< 

that tlie «nemy'a r«rc« »t TrI-«)-Kebir ci>ii«lt>to<l of from aixty lanTentj 
irhich were luiwtly diHtrilMilcil nlniiK their linn nf workx, of tnro tnfui 
(ttvuiity fiiiir bHttaliiiiiH) of hImiiiI ail.liOll nn-n, anil llin-e r<'i:in:eTitii o< 
ftetlitr with nliiiiit liiCUU Ik-ilmiiiiH unci irn'ifiiliini, betnlrv a tuTce of alM 
with twruly-foiir i!"""! n' SuliliJi-h, hII iiiider the iiiiii<('<liiite cmimand ul 
I Imve siiicu bit-n nl)lo In verily throe iiiinibrtT, wbich are certainly □< 
except an rcgunli the ntiml>rr nf kiidh hI Tut-('l-Ki*bir, which I liellcve 
filty-ikinc, ttia DuniUur vro Inuk in the wnrka ami iluriiit; tlin piiniiiit. 

Owii,,; to thu uiinii'niiiH(1vIa<.hnii-iiti.I na-oMi^i'd tnaiakefiiTthei 
long liua of cominnuicalioiiH Iniiii Snot t« ItuiiHlllH, nnd tlionceoD to B 
on'iug lu lllu luHxes iuciirnil in prBvimiH Bctionfi, 1 (Kmldonlf place lu l(tl< 
bayiinctH, 2,00U Mbrni. anil six y H<']il K'inib 

The tMii'Di) '<> iiositiou was a BtnntK one. There ivaa no cover of any ki 
ert lying between my camp Ht KiUMmHiu and lli« rncmy's worhn north 
Thrsu M'urka uxleudrd frnui a ]<oiut uu the vnna] H niilea eaitt of the ra 
of Tet-el-Kobtr for a distaiice Mlin«tit due nonh of aliont H miles. 

The geuerul character of tile groni") uhicb I'liriiiH Ihe northern bonndi 
ley throngb iTliich the liimuilia C'idhI and railfray ran is Ihut of gentl 
and rounded Hlopea, which riiw graitiinlly to a tirio open [dalean from 
aliovu the valley. The soullii-ru extremity of this plateau it aWot a 
railway, and ia nearly parallel to it. To have niarrhrd over thla plal 
enemy's jHieitioti by daylight our troopa would have had to advance ovei 
•lope in full view of ihe enemy, and nuiltr the fire of bin well-twrvrd 
alxmt t> mili'ii. Bnch an operation wunld have ontalteileDormollalOMFa fi 
with gnna and men well protected by intrenchinrnts fnini any artillery 
liave brungbt to bear upou theui. To have tnrued the enemy's poHitlon 
right or left WBB ■□ uiwratiiin that would have eiitaileil a very wide t 
mrgt, and IberefoTe a lonf;. dilDcnll, and fatiguing maroh, and, what i 
portance, it wonld not have accomplinbed the object 1 bad in viaw, nanM 
with the enemy at ancb close qnartvn I hat be should not l>e able to shak 
from onr clutches eicupt by a general fight of all hia army. I wi«hei 
battle a final one; wb«rpa«a wide turning inovement wonld probably ba' 
biui to retreat, and wonbl have left bim (rvu to have moved bia truu|« in 
•onie olbtY position farther back. My desire was to ligbt faiiu drciait 






KAVAI. ASD MILITARV OPERATIONS m EOTPT. ISf 
111 UwodliMnnf tlic ■tAlT gee c roll j-, tbU dilBcally inMoffcatnallf d*i 



n* iBdUa Ci>uhnic«i>t_7. 1 , K. A. (uiuimliati liattpry ], l>t listtitlioii SfufoHli Higb- 
Iwiiifii U liallalian Katlve luruntry, made npof ilpkiMliiiirata of Ttli Unngal HaLivo | 
iMbnlr;, XHb Pu^jaub tntantrj, and SOth (llcilrH)clirf<a}~iiudor Mojur-Geuvral Sir IL 
Maf^Mmm, tml iha Kara! Bri|[rule, nndi-r Captain Piu Roy, R. H., did not iiii)*« 
tuilil UPk. m. Ta taavB moved them Rarlliir nniitd have givtn tho alarm to Iba 
•g*W7, owikf t« U« nnntMr if Tillaicea lu thH nnlllTatail land HOUlh of the canal. 

TBl»KfB|ttile eommunkaUnn by mnan* of an lu«nlated uabi* na« k«|>t op tbrongh 
Ka^aaain all ttiroagh th» night bnlwiNiD th« Indian Coutiugeitt. ua (he ouiith of tha i 
can*), abd Uia Soyal Marine Arlillvry. with whlob I niuvtHi, in rcnr of the Sd divlnion. 
In mo*iii( BTvr Iba deaatt at night tlicre arr no lamlmark* to gaidn nao'a lucrvB- 
Msta. We had, DouBqamtly, to direct our ct«nnH> by tlm Ntan. Tbiit wua i*1>ll and 
innnctly rllWvlwt, and Ihalaaalhig brl|{ad<-*iif iftch lUvlfllon bnlli reacliml (h« uniiiny'a 
n«ki viiliiu a eoapla »f mlniitm of nacb otlivr. 

Tba » M wy wrrm oa«n|>liit4i|y aiiri>rlMd, aiiil it wan nut until »uh or two of tlinlr mI- 
naaadacBUiaaflnd thoirrillea thai Ihey realiz«il onroluwi proximity to thojr work*, i 
ItMi wan^ bowavH', very i]iiiak)y lined with infantry, who opouod a deafen 
■■katof An, and Ouir gnoMetaiv into action Iminnillitlnly. Our troops ail van oad ■ 
riMUy wlUiMn ttriag aahot, iuolx^Ilonna to thoonUn thny had n<oclv«iil, and, whan 
•hwin tba ««riUk v«Bl «tralxhl for thnni, cfaarKinK with a ringing obovr. 

M^|w-<ll«ral Qmham retwrta; "Tba atvaillneMiur the advance of the Vd briKada 
<li Btjal UiA BoBimail, Buyal Marine Light tufiiulry, iid battalion Vork and 
I^MMlar Bag! ail t, lat battalion Royal Iriah FnalDent), nndor what appeared to ba 
■ MwrvhriMlait Uniaf uiii^rlry anil arlillrry, will reuialci a pmnd mnninbrancw.' 
1W M hriJtada waa wall •upputtiid by thu brigade uf Giianli, nudar Uli R«yal Illgb- 
^ thr Vnk' of CnuDaaKhL 

-ttli tllgbland brisa<l» (Ut battalion Royal HiKhlunilnra, l«t battalion { 
.i..!«n, I*t bailallun Caowmii Hlgblonilerv, -M Uattallon Hijihland ] 
. aixlnr MiO<'r'0'H"r^ Sir A. AIImid. had rcocbiHl the worka a 

— , .,t llir 'U brigade had dona m>, and In ■ daaiiiug nianuer aloruifid tbas) | 

*' liw puimt ai the bayonet, witbont flrlOK a ibot until w^itbin the enemy'* linoiL 1 
'^y varawoDmippartodby (hi- Dnkauf Corn wall'* I. Ighl Infantry and tlw3d Rayat j 
"'iH haAh wmIm' tbv ciimniand of CoIodoI Aabbtiriiliani, nf thn hut-named carpi 

Btopwu Ihnw two atLaek*, niariliHl wvoii bati4Tliu of artlllHry, 
liuo, undrr the command of Hrigwlirr-Gcnnral Ciiiodvnungh, and ] 
'^^VtW aapfarw af tlie rneuiy'a worlu apveral of these balteriva did good Mrvioe, 
I*' iailelad awoatdarable )o«b agion the enemy, in eatne initancea firing naniatflr ak J 
■^VnrancM. 

0« tba aiUas* laA tiia Indian Contingent and the Naval Brigailn. nndiir the a 
^»d <4 M^Jur-Oattaral Sir II. Macpbaraon. V. C, advancMl i<t<ia.lll> and In ailoooa, ^ 
Ihelaabiclh Hlg blaMlm laadiag uutllaiia>lvauocil battery of the enemy <raa not* 
(blaMit alMTWM In eketcb A], when it waa moat gallantly atumied l-j Ibe HigliUuidai«, 
■f^Ud ky Um Xatlve Inbatry battaliona. 

Tta afudrwi of Umi fith Bengal Caialry, attaobal teni|>uniflly tn GnwtsI Mm- 
lkmmm.dU gaad Mwvkw In pnraaljig tht> "ueniy through Ihi- vltlag" <if Tcl-et-RalAr. 
Th* IndiaACmrtingiBaltrvrckly l«»la inaui a happy iriiL-uaulanca, whieli I allrlUula 
H Ika aseaUeal •nan^pnant* mwbi by General Macphemn, and to Ibe fart thai, Mmru 
fa( «•• knar latar tlian Iha IM aad 9d diviiinna, the miataoce of tha eoMuy waa ao 
■iaka» by lb* eailtar allaiika Mirth of tbe canal that hn toon gave way babr* Iba Im- 
fttmom OMlanght of tfaa SMfatth lligblanderv 
TWC%*«lry dlvialOD, en I|m> exlnnie rigtit of the Una, awapt maad iIm dmIWh 
ity «f tha aoMaif '■ wMka, charglag llie eneuij '* iroofia aa Ibey Mtdaavotcd M 
I ofilie enptny, bowcer, Ibraw away Ibrlr anoa, atnl, bngc'ilC 1"' many, 
tml ^f atir mva. To liaTe maile Ihrm |nlaoBaT» w™>\A \ia^«\*V"*'*V 



* onrlt 



152 BRITISH KAVAL AND MILITABr OPERATIONS Iff EOTFT. 

Sacli U A geDPnJ ontline of rhe battle of Tpl-el-Kel>ir. All tjie previoiu adiMW rf 

^(■ohort rnnipalgii viero cbirfly cavalrf noil artillery ftffuir*; but lliMt of Urn Udi 

nrially an iiifHiilrybkttle, and wu oon that, fVom Uid time weMarta4, 

ilil overly •. in., whrn it was pTactJually over, km peculiarly tai- 

lUtnl K) ti^Ht, Id tli« must crnclal maitDer, the quality and the fighting dtadpliM tt 

I do out btflinvo Dint nt any previons perioil of our military hiat«iT ha* tb* BriUA 
infantry dial log nlsbi-'d Itoi^if aioni ihao upon thia ooeasion. 

1 have hrard it said nt our pmient lofaiitry regimenla that the tD«Q arv too yMWf.,- 
aad their trniiiinfc f'lf niaoeiiTeriiig and for flghtlug aud their povrcri of endonat^^ 
are not mink-iMit for th« rvi]nir«iiii>nte of niud«ini war. After a trial at an eiceptio^^ 
ally wivi-ri> kind, both in niovenieiit and attack, I can aay euipbatlcally thai I dit^^ 
Viitb ti> have uuiler my orders Iwtter infiintry battaliuna than thoMwhom 1 aui proi^ 
to have communded at Tel-elKi-bir. 

Our (MuunltivB bavo iieea nnnieroiin, but not mi many aa 1 had autlclpatid. Ilw 
Hi^eaty liaH lo deplore the loes of many gallant men, who died u beoame the mtidlta 
of ail army that it prniid of the glorious tradilionait ban inliMilcd. 

It would be imiHiMihlfi In tb1« dispatch to briDK to yournotice tbo*nrTien<orth«i 
oKcerti wlioni I cuueiilir cHt^vially worthy of meutiou. I aball doao in a lahHqiiMl 
dis[iatch, bnt 1 cannot oloee thiH without placing on record how uacb I ani lnd«btel 
lot be following oEHcers who took purt in the bottle of Tel-el- Kebir, and who, bjli* 
seal attd ability, cotilrlbuled >o largely to Ita aucceas : 

General Sir John Adye, K. 0. B., rhief of the utaff ; Linntnnanl-Genorala WilUi ui 
Sir E. llMinleyi MNj.ir-Crnt'raUSIr A. Allnon. Hin Ruyal HIgbiicM the Duke of do- 
naught, Dniry-Luwe, Sir U. Uucpberson, and Graham; Brigadler-Oenenla OMi- 
enough, R. A., Sir Baker Huawll, (he Honorable J. Dormer; Drpniy Ailjiitsut-ti«nn> 
Taunrr, anil Colonel Aahhumlinni, who temporarily command eil a lirigad« diitlB|lk( 
action ; and lo Captain FIIe Roy, who roinoiaiided the Naval Brlgada. 

Bi'igadiei-I.'ioneral Nugent, K. E., rvmaiued daring th» action In oommandnf Ik 
camp left at KaHSRiwlD, to cover Ibe rear uf the army operating In his Immediate fteA 
and lo protect Ibat pueilion, with all ite etorea and depots, fh>m any pomtble aUKk 
from Ibe rueiiiy's foroe at Salihieb. lie n^oiued we in the evooiDg at Tel-el-K^ 
baviug carried ont the orders he had received. 

The iiiedicul ammgeineiita were all tbey Rhould have bc«ii, and reilect the blcM 
credit u]M)n Surgmn- General Ilnnbury. 

tn lliu removal of the wonntleil ou lbel3lh aiid 14th InsUnt to li.n>allla. thecal^ 
boat wn ice, worked by the Ku.vnl Navy, under Commander Houre, R. N., did oh) 
icel1t<ut work. aud the army in ileoply indebted to that oRlcor and to those iiDiUrU 
maud fur the aid he afforded ibe n-oanded, and for the Mtisfitetory manoff H 
ch he moved m large nnmlter of them t>y water to lumallio. 
n exnrtiaa hai lieon apamil nn tb<i ]>art of M^or-Oeneral EariB, oommandlag lU 
of nonimunletiinn*, and oF Commlmarj-Ooiienl Morris, tn supply all thavoik 
lis army durlTig lt« advarico from Itmailio. 

} the h«adi|iiarlurH atair, aud to ofllcflra oumpoaing the ■lafl' of each divtalini ■! 
ihanke are due fur the able maaner lu which they performed their doty, 
conelueiou 1 wish lo exprea* my deep *otiao of the high military ajilrit dltplap' 
ighoiit tlie l>attle of Tel-el-Kel>lr, and during all nir prnvloai engagenwoU. 4 
tianilliig otltcvn, by all regimental offlcnrt, and by every non-eoromltMouHl oflt^ 
prlvalo now aorvlng in Egypt. I have also the honor to liicloa* « roll of li* 
laltiea which occurred at tlie battJe of Tel-el-Kebir. 

li^Jor George Fiti Oeorge.SOIb Huiura, theaenlor member of my peiaooal ctaft' 
bearer nf this dlapateh, and I have the honor to recommend bltn toyonr bvaoM 
lidenulon. 

I havo, &n., 

ft. 3 . ^OXSSAX.X , «••««£. 
C«»M«dsr-te-CM«ir«J B<i M<>}«M T«n«tat<n^ 



BSITJ8H NAVAL AHD HILITAKT 0PEBATI0H8 IN EOTPT. 163 

t^tka kOUd, woanitd, and miMtug i» fA« balOt </ Trld-Eebir. 





Silled. 


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ii 



The fullness of General Wolseley's official re|M)rt renders extensive 
commrnt unnecessary ; iicvertlieless ii few wonis may be added to make 
tbe iiidividaal parts uf tlie battle more distinct. 

It nia.v lie observed, priMtm, tbat tlio ni^'lit marcli offered two crest 
advautiifies : avoidance of the heat uf day time and a period of fourleeu 
houru' It;fbt for pursuit of tbe Egyptiiins if dcleated. 

Practically there were tbree separate but nearly 8imaUaneons in- 
&nlry attacks: by tbe Int division, under General Willin; by tbe 'id 
divixion, under General U;)niley ; and away on tlio extreme left, Houlh 
of the canal, by the Indian Uuntingcut, under (ienenil Macpberson. In 
point of time, General Ilaniley's was somewhat earlier tbau tbe others, 
ftod General Mscpberson's tbe laat of tbe tbn-e. 

^Vben tbe action I)e(i;aii, at early dawn, General Willin' leodiu); bri- 
gule, vommanded by Majot-General Grabain, watt about 000 yanls from 
tUeiutreuebmeuts. Partly owiutc to the difllvnity of kecpin;; a proper 
alifHiDieHt during tbe uigbt march, partly to tlie fact that Iho line of 
narcb was not normal to tbe line of the eartUworkft, and partly to tbe 
ooiiAiMHm eirated by an Egyptian scont who galloiieil into his lines, 
Oeuersl Witlis wa» obliged to form auaiii under heavy fire, cliauging 
front forTard on the left comjiany before n»r(aHlliii(!, odoptiu;; tbe reg- 
ular attack formation. At 300 ynnta'dixtaucu a volley was tired by tbe 
Britinb, after which thej mshed up to 150 yards' distance, fired , a second 



154 BHITISH NAVAL AHD MILITABT OPERATIONS IN BOTPT. 

rnlle.v, niid then reached the ditch. Hero the fi^htine line wan joined 
b.v the sn]i|)ortK, a Inatvollf.v delivered, theditch jumped, and the works 
clfiirwl at the )ioint of the hayi'iiet. Ah scwm as tlie lirii;iide reached 
the puinpet, tlieE(!y|>tiaiia brol<e and lan, fionie f>tn]ipinf!oc-caHici[ially 
to lire b)iek at tlietr purtiuor!«, who clia»ed them tor upwards of a mle, 
only halting tvlieii tlie artillery bad gotteu iusidu the works aud bad 
begun shelling the fn^itives. 

Tl]i8 hri(;H<le struck tbe trenches not 100 yards from the point aimed 
at. It wim longer esiwsed to the Egyptian fire than were (be Migb- 
laiidern, whose attack had begun a few niinntes previoufi and had fully 
arouNed the wiiule line of the defense, which had been sleeping on their 
arms Itehind the paraiiets. 

To tbe lligbland brigade, led by Major-General Alison, fell the task 
of carrying the lines to tbe left. The flrst shots were flnil at tbem 
at 4.55 a. m. from a picket of abont 30 men pOHted 160 yard» hi front 
of the intrenehments, then 3(10 yards distant from the Highlanders. 
Iiiiinediately afterwards the enemy ojtened with artillery and Ibcn with 
nuiiiketry. Without returning this fire the brigatle advanced Htead- 
ily for abont lUO y'anls further, when (he fire became a perfect blHZ& 
At ]5li yards bayonets were onlereit to lie fixed, and the bugle soonded 
the advance, when, with a yell, the men charged in tbe dim light 
through the smoke, carrying the lines in fine style in tbe lace of de- 
termined opposition. The enemy did not run far, but halted at abont 
CO yards iu rear and delivered a heavy cross-fire. The left battalioa, 
tbe Highland Light Infantry, strnck Ike strong redoubt (Q, Plate 60) 
with a high scarp, wbit-h held the t-euter conijianics for a moment, bot 
the flank cumjiHiiies got around it and took it. Tbe rest of tbe brigade 
pnKlied Pteadiiy on, driving tbe enemy before it, and capturing three 
battt'ries of flebl gnna. The advance was continued, an') Arabi'd head- 




BRITISH KAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 155 

laiirlersy who were leading, deployed for attack. The first ohstncio en- 
countered was in the shape of a battery of 7-pdr. Liihitte howitzers 
in gnnpits, barring the way. This was first opened on with case by the 
mule batter>', and then carried gallantly by the Seafoilh IIi;:hlan(lers, 
with a rush, at the jKiint of the bayonet. In continuation of this line 
of gun-pits was a long shelter trench, which was at once evacuated, the 
Egyptians retreating into some villages near by, whence they were 
driven by the native Indian troops. 

On rhe other side of the canal the Naval GatMngs were busily employed 
firing on the Egyptian lines in front and on either hand. 

The British advance wasuot checked lor an instant, but was continued 
rapidly into and past the intrenchnients and on to the br-dge and rail- 
wa3* station. One squadron of the 6th Bengal Cavalry, which had 
reiuained with General Macpherson, charged the fugitives on the ex- 
treme left across the cultivated ground. 

The oi>eratious of the Artillery brigade are given in the following 
note by Captain Martin, B. A., aid-de camp to the general commanding : 

Seven batteries were formed up in line at fuU intervals between the 4th brigade 
and the Qaanls bri}(ade. There weiv intervaU of 150 yards on either tlnnk l>etween 
tb« ffuna aud the infantry. Qer.cral Goodenongh commanded the fort,v-two guns in 
pennnp and directed their march from the left of the line, keeping up the touch to 
either flank dnring the night march. 

At 4.56 a. m. the firat abot was fiied by the enemy. About two minutes afterwanls 
the enemy opened fire all along the iutn^nchmonts and from his guns. At Ihin time 
the Une of gnns waa some SOO yards from the intrenchments. It was too dark to lay 
gnuB, aud, moreover, the Highland brigade overlapped the front of four baiteries, so 
General Goodenongh awaited the development of the attack and halted. In five or 
aix minuttds, seeiug from the flashes that the attack was gaining ground, ho ordered 
an advance ftom the center in e^hehn, thus : 

N. 2 and I. 2. 
H. 1, J. 3; C. 3. A. I and D. 1. 

In thia order, favored by the darkness, and on the left by smoke, tho leading di- 
vision, N. 2 and I. 2, approached the trenches to about 3UU yards. General 0(»<Klenongh 
then halted the guns, rode forward into the iutrHUchuientM, and tiiiding the attack 
■ncceiwful, d reeled the leading division to enter. N. 2 led the way in coluinn of route. 
The first gun cantered into the ditch and over the para[)et Hoinclifiw, bringing d<iwn 
tome of the earthwork and making some Hort of a way for the other giinH. N. *J, fol* 
lomed by I. 2, rushed through the infantry and came into action beyond them, firing 
wert and northwest at groups of the enemy, who were falling back, lighting. It be" 
came daylight suddenly, Just before the guns entered the workH— time about 5.10 a. m* 
AbontG.lii (as I Judge it) Graham's attack approached, and about fi/JO a nwarni of 
fagi lives came rushiug back from his diivctiou (the right attack). About 5.2.'), N. 2 
was ordered to cease firing, and work down the ri<lge run n in;; Hoiit Invent to the camp 
tnd railway station. This was done, the battery roming into action fi'«>i]niMitly at 
close ranges, and keeping the maHses of fugitives on the move. I. 2 was directed, a 
few minutes later, to foHow N. 2. The ridge ended some live or six hundred yards 
frnm the station. N. 2 reached this point and openc<i fire at trains moving off and 
the higitives retiring by the railway embankment. I. 2 arrived here junt an the tiring 
ended, at 6.40 a m. 

A. 1 and D. 1, seeing the leading division enter the works, and tlicir front not beliv^ 
coTerad by Infantry, trotted forward and came into action at 200 yatdn (toici Wi^vvL 



156 BSITISH HAVAL AND HILITABT 0PEBATI0K8 IIT K 

trenr.hinciita Bud opened fire vith cam and sfanpnel. Wben tfa« parape 
swdiHtu fraut wiM BilenctMl, tbi'y BKkia ailvanctMl, awiing furwanl the I 
luileil (bo lino nr [iitrajHiii) northwnriU. TIiIh wkh (d a«i»t aitiittral UrtI 
Oil this oiicceeiling, thoy were onluroil i>ui]thffanl to silunee the ontwo 
LIV), i«b<ch had i>eeii mlHaed by the Hijchlaud hrifpide in the dark, 
gnrgir a|Min, thry went for it and arttled (ba matter witb a few ruimda ■ 
EgypiiaiiagM a gUD ur twotvund lo me«t tbeiu.but b«futw thnjoonid d 
were nhot dvwn. A. 1 and D. I ILun uiude fur the camp, brini^iug ta tb 
the outwork wltb thrin. 

C. D, J. 3, anil H. I, Htiding tbe Highland attack ■nrcewTnl, advanced U 
elearrd a way througli It, and entered. They came Into action aiieccOT 
the iufantr)', and Brrd a few ronntla at the enemy falling lack. B«rinf( 
down the ridge toward* tl^e camp auil datiou, C. 3, aud aubaMiuBnrij J 
followed la that dim-tlon. C. 3 came into arti'iu at the end of the rid|{i 
tbelrniuaniuviugoffand the fuf;itiveH utrar the bridge and et at lun. It 
e,Ma.m. J.3audU.l werearrlvlngat thlslinie. H. 1 waa balt«^ a fei 
til the Indian Coutingt-nteame np tu tbe bridge over the caDa). It waa 
to Join thai body, and went ou to Zagaxig. 

On the extreme right, tUe Cavalry dlriaioD, nnder Haj 
Drary-Love, iras deaifnitHlly late in arriving, being folly 3 
taut wben tbe Brol abot waa fiirfd at tbo Iligblandera. B 
loaiid, it qiiickeiietl its paire, reaching the )n trench inents in t 
mititstwohorKebiitterieB H.A.atid G. IJ. to take in reverse a 
the liiieH north of Genenil Graham's aasnult, white the caval 
the imreuitof Ibe runaway u, an dottcribed in the official re|K>i 
lo{)ed to tbe railway station, captnring neveral traina and lo 
Tbe whole dirinion, eavulry and artillery, niiited shortly afl 
tbe bridge over tho canal, prior to advancing towurda Cairo. 

The Egyptiana were aleeping iu the trencbea wben the 
oiade, and although, in one Kentw;, surprimnl, were nevertb 
ready. General Uaiuley thinks tbe ulitrni was given by moiti 
who were tnet on the march. Yet Arabi and bis second in 




BBITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. If)? 

bajoneted, and the ground in roar, as far as the raihray station, was dot- 
ted with the bodies of those shot down in retreat. Tlie British (cavalry, 
8ivee|iiiig around the northern end of the intrenchinunts, cut down the 
fu;^itives by scores, until it become evident that the roue was complete. 
After that all were 8|iared who had thrown away their arms and who 
offered no resistance. Most of the biMlies were observed to l>e Iviiii^: on 
their backs facing the trenches, as if the men had stopped to liave a 
parting shot at their pursuers. 

The Egypti«in loss in killed alone was not far from 2,000. Thore was 
noretnru of their wounded, the army organization having disappeared, 
but 5; VI were treated at Telel-Kebir during the four days suc4'eeding 
the battle, 27 capital operations being x)erformed. Of these wounded 
202 were soon able to go to their own homes, while the balanct^ were senc 
to Cairo in charge of Egyptian surgeons. The British medical author* 
ities did all in their power to allevinte the sufferings of these poor 
wretches, and furnished tins of meat, bottles of brandy, ami nkins of 
water to the railway trucks conveying them away. Many more who 
were slightly wounded must have managed to get to the neighboring 
Tillages and eventually to their homes, and thus have escapetl enume- 
ration. It may be remarkeil, itpropof^ that the Egyptian hospital ar- 
rangements were of the most meager descri[>tion. 

It is stated, and the statement bears the stamp of credibility, that 
extremely few 8ut>erior offitM^rs were killed or wounded, and, as has been 
alreaily mentioned, the two in chief command were the first, to escape. 
Arabi himself mounted his horse and rode rapidly towards Belbeis. 
There api^ears to be no doubt that i)roper leaders, in every si'iise o\ the 
woni, were wanting on the Egyptian side, and that the ot!1ceis set a 
shocking example to the men. It has been liumorously, and more or less 
truthfully, remarked that each officer knew that he would run but hoped 
his neighbor would stay. 

The men displayed real courage at Telel-Kebir, as the desperate strug- 
frle in the trenches and their heavy loss in killed abundantly prove. 
The black regiments, composed of negroes from the Soudan, were espe- 
cially noticeable for their pluck, fighting bravely, hand to hand, with the 
Britihh. More intelligence and less downright coward iee in the u]>per 
grades might have converted these men into a formidable army. 

So man\' cases are authenticated of the virulence displayed by the 
Egyptian wounded, that it is demonstrated beyond questi<»n that many of 
these fellows not only shot at the stre chermen engaged in carrying otf 
the injured, but in some cases actually killed the very Knglishnien who 
had stop])ed to give them water or to bind their wounds. 

The Egyptian guns were 8*^™ and 0<^"' Krupp steel H L. K. of the old 
JMitteru (1808), all mounted on field carriages. The small arms were of 
the well known liemington makt*. These showed a defect in deniyn^ break- 
ing readiiy at the 9mall of the stock. 
In the previous encvvutej-s between the British and l\ie TL^^vvX^yv^^ 



158 BRITISH NATAL AND HILITART OPERATIONS IN EQTPT. 

the iirtillory and ciivnlry l)a<l bonie tlie brunt of the figlitinf; and bft^^.^^ 
CiirrJoil off llie lionorH, but tbo Itattle of Tel>e1-Keblr was, aa Oeiienit r^-^ 
\V<i]si'l<',v sluten, nil iiifiiiitry action. Tlie tHuticH employed, a (lirpcft'-:^.^ 
iitmatilt without flank morem«nta of uiiy kind, wvro ot the aim|)leiit ^..^ 
(I<:>Hci'i)>ltun. Tlif object, to get nt cliMts qimrter^ witli tlie enemy an(E> « ,^ 
crush bill), va» uccoinpliHlivd. After tliu attHuk, Arabi'it army crtuteil t»3- £ 
exist. In scattered cmuiw it mi(;bt be found nil over Egypt, but as ar^^ 
oriiiiiiizatioii it may be tiaid to have been aiituliilaled. 

lu view of tlie deci^iveileH8 of the vicloo', comment appears ttnnea-^^-^ 
CBHiiry. It may be allet^d that the modeof attavkudoptetl wa8hazarr»-v.«i 
OILS to the df^'ree of impradi'iice ; that no cuiiimaiider wonUI dare to etm-m ^»e 
ploy Knell tactile on Enropeau tenitory ; that a uitiTht march of 9 milt* W M if, 
could oidy be fulhiwed by a pro|ierlj (lioposed nndimmediate atuwiLa-.v ^(,i 
uudcrciicuriistauceKHOcxceiitioiial aMiube providential. Itninut, lio^' «_»(,,, 
ever, be lemenibered that General Wolstdey underijlood Iiim enemy, kn^^ * len 
hiH military habits and iiiiniberH, aa well as the ground intervening, he « Mia,} 
a fairly f^ood idea of his in trench ment^, a Jnul appreciation of hid m^ ^K-vor. 
ale, a strung couvielion as to the pniper manner of engaging him, ar .^r^„fi 
coiilideiit-e in the officers and men of hia own command. What he 

wonld tiave done had the enemy been uf a diQerent characler — js 
anolherqueittiun. wliodecoiisiilemtioudoesnot come within the provir ^^tee 
of tliis report. Itueemsa anllinient answer to such ciiticittms as i^ are 
briefly referred to above lo ri'mark tiiat ihe means were adjusted to ^^rtlie 
end lo be reached, and that the JiistiQuation (if any be needed) uf ^r^ the 
risks incnrred liea in the Nuucesa which attended them, a success as r=- ^are 
an it watt Complete. 

No time was lost in reaping the frnita of the morning's work. ^^SA.A- 
VHiiees were at once ordered iu two direetiims, the one along the i "'>il* 
way lo the iin|H)rta II trail way center of Zapizig, whence a double- trael- 




BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IS EGYPT. 159 

Tbr rr»aU of thit bat tie of Trl-el-Kfbir Iiam been the «Mitire cf)ll»iiiiH of iho rvbtrllion. 
jr iiii)> |*l:»r« that liiM ui»t, a» Vft, MiiTi-inUTetl, 14 Daiiiirttii, ainl itd rjiptiiro or Hiir- 
•uArt rail Im* raiiilv •'fl't>ctr<l at utir leiHiin*. 

T r iiirii of tb-* n*bi*l army biiviii>( laid down or thrown awny their arnm in thoir 
lijzbi. lia%'e now diAppnrd to tbt*ir lioini*H, and thi* country i."* wi rapidly n'tnriiiii;; to 
UoMiti jnr c*t*iiiIilioii nf imshci* (bat I ain able to n*]iort tho war to bo at an end, and 
h»x tlir •»i<j>-«-t fiif which thib |i(»rtiuu of IIlt Majesty'H army wa» mnit tu K>;y|ii haa 
trrii fi;i \ aironiiilinhrd. 

The MMziire uf Zag.izi^ was cllVcU'd in tho (hisliiii;^ tiiaiiiier peculiar 
to all lilt* iiieiileiittt of ibe tlay, aiul HJiows what may he tioiiu by a few 
bulil uirii. 

Thi* M|iiailrou of tlie (ith Hnipil Cavalry left with the Iiiflian Con- 
linei'ht Itil the way, uiul when witliin ahtiiit 5 inMes of tlie town 
bruki- intii m K^'llop. The hoiKeH t)ein;{ Koinewhat faii^ued by the lianl 
vork iif thi- im^'eilin^ twenty lioni;*, were not in a ei>ntlition to keep ro- 
ITHbrr, anil« us u eiiiiMMpiiMice, the lH*st p)t to the fnnil anti the others 
dnipi'i'il III the rear. The ailvaiiee of the stpiadron was, theiefuie, rtini- 
hiM^l iif M.ijur K. M. t)eniiin;;s, Lirutenant l>ni'nsMuril<»ek, 1!. K., and 
ButuUive half a dt>7.en tro4>)»crH. These pnshetl li^ht iiit4) the raili\ay 
M-itiiia, ulirre wen* tlve trams lilhMl with .siihlier.s,an«l Kev<*n loeoniotivrs. 
Altiu*hi;:lit of this hainlfnl of inm, tlie en^int'-di ivers either snrien- 
(k'trd or r.iii away, exempt ime who be^.in openin;; Iiih throtlh*, and w.ih 
■but b\ Lu'iitiMiant Biini.s-MiiriliM*h, whde the K;;\pti.in M<ihiiers, linu- 
dMn Ml niUhtMT ami t(»o deinoiaiiziMl tti think of re.sistaniH', threw away 
tLrir.iiihs, left the ears, ami ran otl'as rapidly as p«)s.sible. Uy U p. ni. 
lU'ih!]!!' tiiree nndrr (iiMiri.il ISLicpliersiin had riMchetl Za;;azi^, m»t a 
Kii^iiavin^ fallen not bv tin* w.iv. 

lii ihi* iithrr <liit't'tii»n >inii]ar ener;:y was «li>playi-d. The (\i\aliy 
'livioiiMi cTii'>>«*d liic Swi'l't WatiT (\um1 at Ttl v\ Kebir, and fnllouin^ 
t^''r.«::.i! )*iiik ])nN'ffiitMl with all practiralih* >piM'iI, krr)»in;: np a inn- 
A'li,: ti^iit with Ar.difs riMT ;:uaid. It MMclu-d Ih lliri^ that hi;:ht and 
^'•'••ri II ;^i*,l. Making an furly >tait tin* m-xt inniiiiii;: (S«')iiiiiiiit r M), 
«iiil ii-.i\ Mi;: thf cnhivattil ^imind a tciv iiiilis sniiili id Kli.iiikah, to 
*''>M- .h-fii«> {hi'dcx'ii intri M'liiii;:, i; rt:i('lit'd Cjiinal •l.l-'i p. iii. 

li.i- ;:.iM ^f»n (d till' i-it,\ UiiH di\ iili'il iiidi I \\(i p.ii t.s : oHi . lioiii ti.OtIO 
'mT.inhi Htifiii;:. at AMi.i**ii'li ; t in- id In-I. «>t li .'iii .IJMHi Tn t.noo imn, at 
^•'*'t-(!.iilil 'III a lil;:il lull II KJIMI tin rily. Mn- lurilirl Ikix m j '*ill irlnicliMl 
>' «>l;ir til (irllt't.d Mllil\ LmU«*, ll|t' MtMllirni Illt.ili(l,\ .llhi t U n >• j II. d- 

*"'|^ iif till* tth Iha;;iMiii (in. mis wen- iiiiMicdi.iti Is ^rnt l<» ili ii>.iiid 
^•'' ••iirfiii|i*r id' till' l.i(><*i. 1 III* !!;:> p:;aii> lu'ii, xMliiniil In -^ir.i mp, 

*Q*f 1.1 "1 1 1 tif a (iiIi'C ni»t olii* Iriltll id' I III- 1 [ u\Ml lilllhlirl. IhiIIi ^.ii I -I. I IS 

*''!i' iii'-ii-Iv i-altrd nptiii To |.i\ diiwM ihiii aini^ .iinl .ii'(*iiii;ii in< iir-*. !•» 
^"*i'-j<'ii liomi"^, and kirpiiir pr.icr, riMiilinun** uiiirh tlif V at-i-i [•ti-d 
•**'i • Iiifif'd priiinp'ni-^«». 

Itir if lih-r iif till- ii- 11 iiiiiii had (■aii;:lir a tiaJn at ]I«'!iii-i^ thi* d.i in*- 
^'"•'.<i:d hid ;:i*iir til t 'a m. \\ hi ii* lir iptu kl,\ In ;:.th pi«-(Miat i«iii'> :<•: :iie 
^^^ltUi:ll*tll tPi thv rill. lii. tw 111^ U^i iifl I'Lllmi.llr \AaU \nV A \^Vv \V»\vA\ 



160 BBITISH KATAL AND HILITABY OPBBATI0K8 JH BC 

of tlie Alexandria onlrage. Acconlini^ to this scheme, tlie 
divUled into a iiiiml>(>r of districts, Hud fire was to 'be siini 
api'lit'd, on tiieiml, to ct'i-taiu bouses indiuatud. 

TUc rigor diKplajed by Ueiicral Drury-Ix>we in this man 
audHi;it.\ in eiacting tlie yielding of a force securely ptaced i 
of immense natural and artifldal strengtli, and many times 
number, were attended tiy results of incxtimuble value. A 
of revenge was defeated, and Oairo saved fr»)m ruin, while 
was lodged in prison, and the only body of Ida followers i 
Serious harm could have l>ei'u anticipated were hurrying li 
lagesin nil iKwsible directions, glad of a return to peaceful am 
occupations. 

With the successful Issue of the attack on Tel-el-Kebir, I 
Commander-inChief BC(;oni])Mshed the first of his alms, the < 
theforocin armed relwllton against the Khnlivc. Through 
of his lieutenant, Genenfl Drury-Lowe, the second was achjc 
salvation of Cairo ftom deHtniction. 

So carefiilly had General Wolseley matured his plana befo 
England, that he had predicted bin arrival in Cairo on Sep 
Under the circumstances, an error of one day on his part u 
doned; he entered the city with the Guards brigade, by i 
morning of the ISth. 

The submission ofthe Egyptian troops in rarions other qua 
Powar, Aboukir, Kosetta, Tantah, &c., followed in mpid 
Damietta, the last fortress to bold out, was evacuated withoni 
on tlie approach of a IlriliHh force dispatched from Alcxand 
sniijeution, nuder Major-Geueral Sir Evelyn Wootl, on the 
moiitli, when its comuinuder, Abdul Al, from whom resiatanc 
exi>ei:t('d, gave himself up unconditionally. 




■4TAL AMD KSUtAXf OnMLTlOim JB SOTPT. 161 

I ia ao— immI aft Afanndiiai Ifi^or^Omieral O. B. HannMi 



Eke tmablai witti whioh the Khedtve had now to oontond were puelj 
Wed. Iheiraohitloo hide lUr, in point of time, to contraatstnmgly 
h ftafcaffliaiaDttaiydimenltieeaoieeoIately grappled by the Britiah 



fnm tka int gsn of tka bombardment until tiie oooapation of Oairo 
t riily-afz dagra wave eonanmed, the campaign proper taking twentgr- 
lia alL The laplditj with whioh the blow was prepared waa the 
iBoma ofMiglaiid^ maritime anprema^, bat the foroe with whioh it 
idallfawd waa drawn fkom akill in plan Joined to Tigor, oonrage^ 
I adfeoBSdanea in eseention* 
H.]fis.» U 



MISCELLAlirEOTJS. 



XIV. 

THE WORKING OF THE NAVAL TRANSPORT SERVICE. 

The entire British sea transport is managcnl by the Eoyal Navy, and 
is presided over by a naval officer at the Admiralty, entitled the Di- 
rector of Transports. The present incumbent is Admiral W. K. Mends. 
At each principal port at borne and abroad, in the colonies, is a Trans- 
port Officer, in charge of the transport operations at that point. To him 
all Masters of transports are directly responsible, reporting to him on 
arrival and every morning afterwards for instructions. 

The army is represented in this connection by a Military Landing 
Officer, through whom the commanding military officer transacts all 
business relating to the sea transport of troops, animals, and material. 
Practically, the Army states the namber or quantity of the latter to be 
moved and the Navy fhrnishes the means. The responsibility of the 
Navy begins at the water-line on embarking or loading, and ends at 
the water-line on disembarking or unloading. 

A naval officer may be or may not be sent in each hired transport as 
Transport Officer. His duties are mainly those of superintendence, 
the Master not being relieved of his responsibility in any way. He 
examines and signs all the Master's reports, and ascertains the latitude 
and longitude daily by observation. It would appear as though the 
Transport Officer is only really needed on board of a ship commanded 
by a stnpid or malicious Master. 

The ships employed by Great Britain to convey troops and munitions 
of war fall under three categories : First, private vessels, belonging to 
established lines, making regular trii>8 over a fixed route, on board of 
which passage and freight are secured ; second. Her Majesty's troopers^ 
third, hired transports. 

The steamers of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Com- 
pany were, during the campaign, tlie principal represe itatives of the 
first category. In addition to their usual accommodations, these steam- 
ers were obliged to provide fittings, actcording to the Government regu- 
lations, in proportion to the troops carried. 

The vessels of the second category suffice for the ordinary needs of 
the army, in times of peace, in exchanging battalions, bringing home 
invalided soldiers, &c. 



166 BBmSB KAVAL AND MILTTABT OPEBATIONB DT B 
The foUowJDg table is snfflciently desoripUve of them : 




The five flist named are of one class, large " Indian troopei 
of their maintenanoe being at the charge of the Indian G 
The soldier^ wives lire apart at the forward end of the 
where they are bolkfaeaded off. Their qoarters include 
hospital and a wash-room, && The bonks here are in t 
galvanised iron frames. 

The accompanying series of deck plans of the Jnmna (PI 
43, 64, 65) exhil)it the internal arrangements of this t^pe n 
than a written desoription. 

The entire equipment of hammocks and mess gear is mai 
board, so that the troops have everything ready on their arr 
keep clean and in order the parts of the ship devoted to then 
men go to a mess. 

These steamers can make from 10 to 12 knots oonttnoo 
peculiarity of their construction in not eviUaut from the plaim 





V4T1L AMD mUTABT OPBRATIOm JB SOTFT. 16T 

iaf9 Bide aft l0Mt«i6 long Togrige. Whn not intended exoliulviely m 
height eUps Oflf Bost be not leei tban 6 fcet high between deek% 
ftaNi deek to beMn, end the higher the better. If it ii eon- 
iplated to mnj hoiaee in tiie hold| the height of the latter mnat be 
IS feet or ofer. Tiie oharter ii baaed npon the groas tonnage,ao mneh 
par ton par BMnth being paid. For the oampalgnjnat ended, thei»ioea 
pari Tarled aoeording to dronmatanceai the aiae, natore, and conditton 
af the ihipi tke aaioont of internal fitting needed, Ac For the imperial 
Inaipofftai tkoae bringing troc^ ont trom England, the average waa 
llkSdi par ton. Tha Indian tranaporta were more ezpenaive, ooating 
•boat half aa aineh againi a fhet dne to the aoardtji at the timoi of 
rnttaUe ataMMBB in the porta of India. 

He ■teaifr oflared for hire ia anljected to a rigid inapeoticm Inaide 
Mi oit bj Haval Tkanaport Oflloera, who may cauae theowner to dook 
Ua Ofwn axpaoae. The mginea and bcrilera are examined by Va- 
A trial trip at the dook or nnder way may be exacted. 
the rate of hire repreaenta the eharge fbr her nae aa a 
in an reapeeia and ready for aea. She can be employed 
that nmj be ordered, to cany troopa, animala, or atoraai 
aa a hoapital ahip. She carriea a bine pendant and the bine 
eoalgny with a yellow anchor in the fly. She ia given 
r, by which aha ia known and reglatered. The number ia painted 
bow and quarter In llgnrea 3 feet long. The Britiah tranaporta 
k the EgypCiaa campaign were all painted black, and carried their nnm- 
Iwt la Hack on a white rectangular ground. Thoae which brought the 
laAaa Contingent were lead-colored, and had their numbera painted 
ia lad flgurea. On each a war risk is assumed by the Govemmeut 
to her value. The owners must cut the decks for increaaed ven- 
and hatchway aooommodation where ordered, take down or re- 
Miage eabina or bulkheads, and they have no claim for compensation 
fc lay mnk alteration or for any restoration at the termination of the 
Onise. All apodal fittings required for the particular duty on which 
iW iUp may be employed are put in at the expeuse of the Government. 
Ihms fittings are Government property and can be altered or removed 
tihe pleaanre of the Admiralty during the charter, but all left stand- 
^at Ita expiration become the property of the ship-owner. 

Ike Goremment ftamishes all provisions, medical comforts, forage, 
M bedding needed for the troops and animals, or else they are pro- 
*iiel by the owners according to a fixed scale of compensation. The 
provide, on an established schedule, table utensils and 
for nae on troop decks, for cooking, distilling, baking, Ac, 
articlea employe<l about horses and mules, receiving a 
per man or animal of the number fitted for, and a per 
te the number actually carried. 
hf b^glna the day the fittings are completed, provided lh» ikV^ Vi^ 
h al jHpnaar imdjr for aea. Should the Govemmeut t&o^ \A v^x u^ 
ii km tbe right to ten dnya without pmymeut. 



m 



168 BBITISH MAYAL AND MILITARY OPEHATIONS IN EOTPT. 

The Government sapplies all coal, except, that brirned In tb« t^.0^ 
galle.v for her own crew and for first and second cla6« paMungen. 

The entire clinrge fur wagen, food, or otiier expeuHeit of any aort ^^ 
officers, urew, or otlier ciriliau ]>ersuQH is ttorae by the ovnera. ll»* 
latter must keep the ressol in repair and in readiness to move wb04l 
desired. If thrnogh derangementof hull ur machinery she i» niiabt«ft« 
sail when ordered, the owner furfeit^ a certain pro|)ortiou of the htrs. 

The crew must be at least three men tu every 100 tons up to 1,DOO 
tons, and three to every 200 udditiunul toQN. They must be pbymealfjr 
satisfactory, aud may if desired be ins|R'cted by a medical oRleer oft^ 
navy. 

The carrying capacity is determined by a coiripeleut tus|>euIor,aadk 
based upon the following conditions: 

First'Claiw passengers (i>(tlc<-rs, &c.) have separate cabim of at 
SO superticini feet of floor ; if two are in one room, the;i of 42 saper 
feet. 

Secoud-clHSi4 paMsengers hiive such standing l>ertbB or otlier 
class acconimoilations as the ship aB'ords. These pa«sengcra an ' 
rant officers and their families, staff sergeant«>, and the liktf. 

Third-class passengers (tinoptt) are appoitiouol to the avaihiblel 
iug space, eucli hammock occupying H feet by 16 inche«i. Cue- 
more than ttie nnnilver which can be awuug iu hammocks at a tinei 
be embark e<l. 

The uuuiher of borse-stalls that can l>e erected is equal to the 
length of the space chosen, iu inches, divided by 27, the width of 
stall. 

It may be fairly estimated that each man ocvnpiea 52 an*] each bu 
126 cubic feet. Roughly speaking, each niau conveyed rv<iuiivs fni 
to 4 tons aiul each horse from 8 to 10 tons of gross tuunnge. T 
mode of looking at the <)uestion gives a notion of the magnitude of i 
task of traiiS[>orting any large bo<ly of troops. 

The transport is thoroughly inspected before the embarkatioD of I 
troops by a board compoaetl of two naval officers, one mllitaiy ataSt 
cer, an<l one military officer not under the rank of captain. The asi 
military medical officer of the station and the surgeon in medical 
of the troops to be embarked accompany the Iroard and exp.eai 
opinion aa to the sanitary arraogenieuts. The eniburkuliou fom 
given ou page Ii.'i. 

After tlie nohliera ak ou boanl a final Inspecttou is held Wfure t' 
ship puts to sea, hy two naval oOlcers, one army Held o{llcer(uoi Im-K 
ing to the coriM embarked), and one army officer not under tbe 
captain. An army niediual officer, not in medical charge of iIm 
fiml)arke«l, expresses his opinion as to the sanitary iirrangi*meott. 

The slandanl of messing for flrst-class passengers ami the : 
meals served are the same as on VmaiA Unttelass passenger 
AlCf beer, wine^ aud ajiiriia aru oii\s tuti;\m\\««S, «\>. \iVk'3va<wo,\. T!»ifc< 




BRITISH KAVAL ANU MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 169 



J^'^ss. 



iH -claM paasengera have ^^ a good, respectable table," and receive a 
n c of beer or ale daily. Third-class passengers (troops) have the army 
ktion. 

When more than 5(1 men disembark a report is made out by the mil- 
iary commanding officer u|>on the mess and other arrangements, the 
leanlinens of the ship, &c. This rei>ort is evidence of the way in which 
ihe i*ontnirt has been discharged. 

Tlif Trausfiort Officer furnishes the Master of the hired tninsport with 
t monthly certificate of efficiency, which foniis the basis of claim for 
compensation. For short terms, one month's hire is paid in advance. 
The fliial act*ount is not settled until all possible bills have been audited. 
The (l(N*nmeut reqnireil to obtain a first advance is the embarkation re- 

(nrii. Th«- balance of hire is not paid until the n*port by the military 

coniiiiHnding officer has lieen received. The oinim for allowance on the 

•eomif mess is Imsed on the mess certificate, and in the case of troops 

rapjiheil on a siindar certitie^ite. 
The foUowing notes are relative to the fittings necessary to the con- 

TeniMHi of a vessel into a tninsiK)rt: 
Niiii-4-<»mmissioned officers are aMowcHl 20 inches hammock drift. All 

UlftM are clearly numlM're<l and ashigned. Tlie head and fcM>t hooks 

in* 9 feet apart, and the hamnio<!ks overlap 

IS iDchi-a at each end. When the height 

fnwi deck to lieam exceeds 7 feet, hammock 

bninii are ran athwartships at G feet inches 

Ahnve the deck. 
Fig. 55 shows the mess table and benrhes 

M amiDged along the hhij/s side. A batten 

uniii|i»re ami aft at the side. IJ|nmi this the 

OQiUiiAnl end is phiceil, the inner resiing on 

* tVYMle. Underneath the table is a shelf 1) 

»n*be!i hnrad. 
Mm^ the side of the trcKip deek and over 

^b** niii^ tables a long batten is run, with 

P^lf» tiir 4-loihing and aeeiniterinents, tlirri» 

fur imii nian. 
'^nii THc-k?* tif the riMiiMinn |i:tttei-ii are pl.h'nl as iiimmIimI. '\\\i\ l»i'i>ad 

hiiri7iii|t,|| |ii,.,.|.^ are >e<'iin*i] to a iHilUlitMil. ilir upper pt-rtnrateil for 

'"*' llir|//|,.s of tlie litit>, !)ir liiWi'l M'lilct! \\\ lii'iivi* till- lHltt>. 

'''t>ilNii;ii\ lati'ti>i'> are luiilt i»ii ilrrk. at liii* lalc •)( •'• per ciiil. uf the 
"•'•^' :iilr,l lor. Ill roVfinl Imhi^i-^ li li-il lii'jli in th*' 
****•"■ I ;i:. Vi. 'rill* tntii;:li i^ iihitl \\i:ii li.ul, and a 

^''^^'t .[1.1, Mill pipe is rai 1 M'd lUiW II nll1>Mli ••! t iii- .•'lllp. 

Ani)t|«. |i.ii,.|.^i)|ip)Y till iiii*«hMi;.' > ii)*>i'^ri-4t iipitii. A 
'■""'tiirLihlr Ntrp, a 1hii;:<mI M*at. and a -raliii;: imttuni 
*'«* i*t^,.|p,|^ 111 ailditmii. aN ;fja;i,\ iiniialNaN \\\\\\ \h' 
^**9Hfi necfMHurv ;ire hu ill of \vi hhI, J i i i ei 1 \\\X\\ \eud * 



r^ r% r^ -> ^ ^,-r ,N 




\.^ \ 

^ 1 BK. W*^ —m 



00 BBtTISU NAVAL AND HILITAET OPEBATI0N8 IN BOTPT. 

A liuu«i', UHiiully butide tbv latriii««, is bniU tin ilMk for waterpi 
coats iind vapn, aud must bu large enna);!) to uontaiu uue third of (1 
bcloniiiiig to llie troops to l»e Hnibarked. T!ie BtdeaHre fitted witli p 
and tbe ceiling with bookn. Thin "cuat room" 1h iq iibaige of it • 
oommiHHioiietl officer. 

Tb» trno)! bOH[iital ix a proper »\imx be-low, iicrrvtivd off by ctit* 
Tbo»o iscreuns can bo rullvtland HtDpiwdup. Staiidiugbaoksdfeet k 
and 27 iiicticH widu, iu otiu or two tittrs, as directed, are built. Tbe t 
ia of wood, but tbe bottom of iron nettiug, 4-iDeh ntcsb. In<tde tb^ 
bo8]iital is a diaitensai'y, with drawers or cupb«)ards, work-table, bn1tl» 
mcks, waHbstaud, &c., all simply but solidly couittriicted. 

Ttie vculilution in e^refully attended lo, tlui ileckK bring cut and ai^- 
pipee put in wbere ordered. A simple plan Ibrexbausting tbe fool a 
waa fitted to tbe transports daring this vampaigu, A steaui jvtis ii 
duoed into an iron ventilator. Tulies and wooden truukH rtiu Uin 
and from all tlie borse and troop decks, to connect wilU tbu leoti 
and are iierl'oraled wbere tbey are dei^ignet) Ut be effectire. Tbe m 
jet draws the foul air fn)ni below tbrongb tli» air trunks au<l dia 
it overboard. When not iu use as an aspirator, tbe steam being al 
off, tbe ventilator cowl in turned to tbe wind, and the apparatus a 
tbe pur]K>seof an inspirator. 

The magazine is built of two tiura of crossed deal boiinU, I 
with copper nails. It must be large enough to bold ooebuudrtidn 
|»er rifle. 

Oib«>r special rooms are also built, iucluding bread rooms, a 
room, a belinet room, a baggiigeroom, &ti., all provided with p 
locks or boltfl and padlocks. 

The bammocka are stowed in temporary bina built wbrr« ord 
preferably in covered bouses on tbe upper deok. 

Tbe prison is desiffueil for four men, is fi feet 6 iucbes wide, aid L^ 
feet <i inches long in the clear. It ia Utted with three tnsido r 
bulkbends, so as to be divided into four separate colls. The ftmineifl 
4 inches Hqnure and 2 feet apart, well dented, top and bottom. Hied 
and sides are of two layers of jj-inch twartls crosM-d and uailed. A 6-14 
space is left at the Itottom of the bulkhead and another IS iDcbea V 
at/he top, for ventilation. Iron t>ars| inch in diameter and 3 ii 
apart fill up tboapnce. Each of the four cells into which the iocl 
may l>e divided has a lH>iicb, and a stout iron juckstay in the deek|tl 
which violent men may be shackled. 

Tbe troop galley and bakery are always built on tbe upper desk 
They are simply slont wo«xlen houses of tbe ueoeaitary oapacitr. IV 
aides and deck are lined with tin or sheet-iron. Tbe Iloor is paved «itl 
tiles laid iu ctmient. The coppers must hold three pints per man iM 
be dtlcd with proj»er apimratus. 

Tbti BttitigH lor Ihe acconimwlation of troope are such as would dsI 
antlly Huggeet theroselvea to au \u\*\\\feftut cit&o»a.,wa'\ vbnrafore bar 



VATAL AMD MILITilST OFBSATIOm 19 ■GTPT. 171 




. to duui minatdy detoribed. The hacae-staJISi how- 
mptdUtty the cetoome of long experience. 

of pleteei 66 to TO, give the details of fhe present plea, 
ave 00 derigned that by lowering the 'breast lail, parting 
hantoh rail they may be nsed for pack horses and moles. 
qp the fltall an extra pleoe 4 inches thick is provided and 
to the inside of tlie regnlar hannch raiL Each deck or corn- 
Is fcmlshed with one pnmp (qr more if required), to bring 
the hold. When not practicable to have scuppers to 
the ailDa ovsfboaid, it is flrst collected in tanks below and then 
into the aea. One or two loose bex-stalls are provided for sick 
5 per esntk of the stalls are 6 inches longer and 2 inches 
the olhsn* But nine-tenths of Uie stalls are ever occupied, 
Mill being for shifting the horses. A large number of these 
alwaya kepton hand, ready for use. Theanimals are usually 
by a steam-winch, in stout slings, and are discharged 
But fow of the transporto had loading porta large 
to admit a iMNme. 

of the roles in all hired transporta that there shall be no 
twlsw the spar dedc. This rule is most imperative, 
ne dise^iiae of the troops embarked is in the hands of the military 




Wm ssaitaiy porpooeo, sawdust (for use about horses particulariy), 
MasPoogalBs disinfteting powder, chloride of lime, and carbolic add 
an fres^ aaedi The men are only allowed beloif during meal hours 
OBl St night. 

The Master of the transport muht obey tlic orders of the Transport 
USesr CD board, the Transport Officer ashore, or of the Senior Naval Offl- 
*w presait. Should there be no naval officer at hand, he must obey 
te ordera of the military or other Government authority. 
Bthsr the Master or the flrst officer must sleep on board. The crew 
be exercised in lowering and getting l>oata out and in. In the log- 
Most be kept a complete record of all that relates to the troops 
^Oofemment profierty on boanl. The log is inspected daily by the 
l^vaspoct (NBoer in charge. 
^ ia tlie Government service, the Master is liable to punishment for 
the Senior Naval Officer at the flrst port touched having 
to suspend him from his duties. The Flag Officer of the 
can, if necessary, remove him fyom his ship. 
'^ the Maatei^ guidance a set of instructions is ftimished him which 
'''^ kiodotiesaod responsibilities very minutely, es|)ecially in regard 
^^ e sp e n diture of the Oovemment stores with which he is instructed. 
^ latkNiing of the troops and animals emiiarked is his particular 
**^|s, and be always keeps or should keepon hand asuffldeut amount 
^^Hfs, piDvisioo% bedding, &c. He is subjected to a ver; t\c^&ks%\m&l 
^ qmmHeiif mnd otbet returns. By the torma ^ V\k« ^\Aa^Ux - 

mn peeanlatly responsible for any \oaa eS ot 4AnM|^ 




172 BRITISH NATAL AITD HIUTAKT OPERATIONS IN B 

to the Government stores arising oat of incapacity or ne^lig 
part of tbe perionn^ of the transport. He is responsible for 
good order and condition of the ship, althoogh the troops 
the horse and troop decks, &c. The Master Is therefore 
co-oi>erate to the foil extent of bis power with the military 
ing officer on board to secure this end. The precantiooH t 
againat fire are very clearly set forth in orders, and tbe 1 
to a strict observance. These precaationa are of tbe nsual i 
mon to all naval vessels. 

The crew of the transport and her boats are at all times a 
the public service in any desired way. Tbe men are not < 
work more tbau ten honrs in this conaection any day in por 
exceptional duty on Sunday. If so exceptionally employ 
ceive extra compensation according to a fixed scale as show 

The landingof troops or stores is simple and effective. A | 
is sent in charge with every lighter or boat load, and is provi 
list of tbe troops, animals, or stores contained therein. Thit 
the "landing note" (see pa^e 174}, is signed by the mat 
haudeil by the petty officer incbargeof tbe lighter Co tbe Mil 
ing Officer. A stab copy is retaine*! on boanl the transp 
these stubs a report is made tbe following day to the Trans 
on shore. The appended form is not in the " Itegulatioos i 
jesty's Transport," and the other following it is a new form 
for the old one: 




BUTUH KAVAI. AND MILITART OPKBATIONS IN EGYPT. 173 



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174 BBTnSB HATAL AND UILITABY OPERATIONS IN H 

IOd th« MTOn* lUe.) 

Nombtal IM of ofiotr* and tMr/amaUt. 




I 



Lamdiko None— Transport No. - 



FASSEXaEBS OB B0BSB8. 




mkTMMs AMD lOUTABT 0PBSATI0H8 IH BOTPT. 175 

*9t the oMBpaigB In Egypt the entire looel oontrol of the tnuuporti 
\ giwn to Gtaptafn Henj H. Baweon, S. N., with the title of «< Prln- 
ilTnaepoitOflleer.'' This officer had, foar yean previoaslyi been In 
rge of the dioonibarfcation of troops and stores at Oypms, where his 
I and eaeentivie aUII^ won him oommendation. Profiting by his 
erieneei he auitaied his plans before leaving Bughind« and had dab- 
ted then so thoroughly that, as far as be was concerned, it may be 
I that no point was neglected aud no precaoHon omitted which oonld 
litate the Important dnty that fell to his lot 
'Oweeeing the difficulty he might have to encounter if dependent on 
naval vessels In port for assistance in the shape of men and boatS| 
rocoeeded In obtaining H. M. S. Tbalia for the special needs of dls- 
Iwrkation. The commanding officer of this vessel^ Oap.tain J. W. 
ickenhuiy, was, so to speak. Captain Bawson's second in command, 
assumed the title and functions of ** Disembarkation Office.^ 
riie Thalia, 2,240 tons displacement and 1,GOO indicated horse-power, 
bsically known as an *^ armed trooper," isanold wooden corvette with 
ght spar deck added. On tb is deck are a few 64-pdrs«, with Ghitlings, 
rdenfeldta, and 7-pdr. and 0-pdr. boat-guns. The main deck is usn- 
y devoted to troops, of whom she can readily carry a few hundred, 
this case ahe brought out no soldiers. She was given an abnormally 
ft enw, 430 in number, particularly strong in mechanics of all sorts, 
I ao extra supply of boats, one 37- foot steam-pinuaoe, two 25-foot 
im-cutters, besides three pulling cutters and five gigs. She was 
jeet to the immediate orders of the Princiimi TraDspori Officer. An 
trie light for night oi^eratious was placed on board of her. 
t Ismailia, where the greater part of the work was done, Captain 
rson established his office on boanl the hire<l transport Nevada (of 
Williams and Onion Line), close to the Central Wharf, maiutaiuing 
aiunieation with the Thalia, the Central Wharf, and the Military 
idquarters on shore by means of semaphore and flag signals, 
very transport that came out from England brought horse*boats 
**ilals,^ so that as the troops arrived at Ismailia the means of land- 
them were always on hand in more than adequate quantity. In allt 
^his place, there were no lesH than GO horse boats and flats, and 20 
ti lighten of various sizes and patterns. The lighten were gotten 
Mslta, Alexandria, Port Said, and elsewhere, and were collected at 



'i|r.57 represents a horse-lKmt. Theliow may lie either square or sharp. 
e« boats could land ten nnimalA, or j^ivr 

> Held guns with their 1iml»erM. The 
■ibrsces are hingetl and pinneii. The 
P at the stern lowen< to form » ptng- 
^k, which is useful in liuidiuK vehicles 
•ell as animals. The ''tiaCM** are 
UgtUn decked over. 





76 BRITISH NAVAL. AND MILITABT OPERATIONS IK EOYFT. 

The pontoun-raft^ carried by the ludiau tnK>[>«n* (Jumna aod daai. 
to wbicb refereoce has been alrcadj' niailu, were moRt naerul at ImiMiiu 
on aeconnt of llieir fcrrai i-aiiK- 
itj-, uaeb uaroiux ant uiauyMfi 
boDtes ata time. Fipt. 58«nd<0 
reiircHt^nt mugbly tbvaa nfUw 
seen when put togetlipr. Intbt 
top of each )K)iit«M>ii are jop tor 
reiipiviiigfourcn»8* pi«:?«,»liki 
are lashed m place to ri iiglMita. 
Upon the chcKHtw or vroM-jiiMM 
it laid a suitable platform. Each 
IK>ntoon 18 of irun, 3G feet long and H feet hi diameter. 

Powerful tugs, nine i n number, five screw and four paddle, wt^re b<>ti{U 
or hired and sent to I^ake Tini^ah. The largest wan the Bturin OrA, 
included in the liat of hired transportfl. The lighten) were IwnlM 
mainly by working parties fKim the Thalia, who were buny dny m' 
night. As a rule, a xteam-lanneh was placed between two lijjlitttt 
The diMembarkftlion of thelroopa, being conducted on both niiletoflte 
ship at unoe, was rapidly effected without coufuaiou. By pultin;; Ite 
men directly on the large tugs, and using both gangways atonoe,nbit- 
talion of infantry' could be landed in a very ahort time. The twn IrM 
regiment)*, theRuyal Irish and the Itoyal Irish Puiiilient, werelsmli^Bt 
night, with their baggage, in two hours, and the Uiglilaud brigwle,)^ 
tween 3,000 and 4,000 strong, in three hours, bat without boggagr. 
When the articles to l>e landed were heavy and the tagB very I* 
the lighten* were placed nluugside the transport, and, after r 
the ft^eight, the Thalia's men in charge laid nut lines, and. i 
the soldiers, war)»ed themselves ashore. The*artillery wasobiefl.T U 
fn this way on the boach, which is of shelving sand. The other ■ 
vessels in imrt aided to some extent, mainly in fumiahiag a 
I and lanucbes. 

On board the Thalia the working gangs were detailed 1 
art of the ship," mo us to kvep the men umler the petty otHcvTs to <ff 
(hey were accustomed. Allhongh the labor was arduous and inot 
fee men ei^joyed excellent health throughout. This is attribatedk 
laptaiu Brackenbury to his rule never to permit a party to befin 
X any hour of the day or night without tlrst having h^l ai le«at k 
nit and a cup of hot pocoa. This lievcrago was n-ady in thu galley i 
Hoies. As soon as the men roturucil to the Hhip another ratloiiil 
TCtl out. 

To attend to the work ashore, a naval oftlt^er wn« kept at en 
I irho worke<i in conjunction with the " Militjiry [.anding *>nic#r." 
)^be remarked that wherever the army and navy came 
his CMmpaigu they pulled toBtther with great harmoajQ 
While this clr(!iuiiKlauo(^la\atge\v A\i«\otV«f»R>tt>x«X^tAtt 




BRITISH NAVAJ. AND MILITART OPERAllONS IN EGYPT. 177 

are Mharpli^ and dearly defined^ so that no doubt can exist as to where the 
pravinee of the one b^ns and the other ends^ the spirit of mutaal accom- 
modation and good will which marked the relations of the two services 
^nras the ultimate cause of this satisfactory result. 

The task of landing at the base at Ismuilia wa« accomplished rapidly, 
^thont a hitch of any sort, and without damage to a man or an animal. 
The conditions were most favorable — smooth water, norain, and an unva- 
rying breeze ; bat to profit by these favorable conditions, energy and fore- 
thought were indisi>en8able. 

The 8i>eed and ease with which large boilies of men can be conveyed 
in these days of steam render possible to a great maritime power like 
SDgland the landing of an army at a great distance from home in com- 
paratively little time. The attack is vastly more independent note than 
ybrmerly^ and can select its point of debarkation without regard to contrary 
teinds and perverse currents. These considerations entail the necessity 
of efficient defense, no matter how remote the coast may be from powers 
tliat are to be dreaded, and are of es|>ecial value in counection with our 
own isolated but not unattackable position. 

The transports which brought the British troops from England to 
Egypt accomplished their journey, on the average, in a little more than 
one-third of the time consumed by Bonaparte's flotilla in 1798 in the pas- 
sage from Toulon to Alexandria, over a distance less than half as great. 
The details of the imperial transports are given in the accompanying 
table, together with the duty they pertbrmed. 
H. Mis. 29 12 



178 BBlTtSB NATAL AND MILITARY OPEBATIOM8 IN El 



.'III I 
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PUm ot port Bl 



;m! » III 'J.lal.r iMTullcdKlusdMn... 

Ult,l,OM, !ao S 23 t.Jnlj Ji London 

i\x 31 Unlird KiBCilon . 




[ utriL JOB muTin opiUTiom n ■em. 179 



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Anf. IAdk. lTCbntoraM«4.a 




180 BB1TI8H NATAL AND HILTTABT OPERATIONS IN EQTPT. 







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13 a July 81 


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MBritishPrtDoe.... 


i.H81.4MiS.S73 


asa: la 4ii >;J-uiy 31 


....do 


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."i."'teS 




W»tl-a»'«- 














,sts-ssLst 




.-.-|U..|Jalj 1 














































SiS 




....1 la,.. Aug. 1 








1,W 













































1 1 


PortS;riU. 


( 


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mtmt, UD loLiuBT opiuTiain a wtm. Ml 





182 BBITI8H NAVAL AND UILITABT OPERATIONS IN E( 

It iriay be pointed oat that tlio embarkation of trooiia waf 
Bimiiltaneoiisl.v at Liverpool, LoikIou, Fortsmoutk, Woolwich, 
aiiiptoti ill EuglnQd,aDd at KingHtowD ami Qtieenstowii in Ire 
first body of troops to sail from England io the hired traiispo 
the Scot« Oaarda in the Orient, and the la^t of the fighting 
tery, 3rd brigade, Royal Artillery, followed two weeks later. 

The grostt tonnage of the fleet was thns distributed : 



OiiT»Irj 

ArUllnj 

Boral asiiliMwr* 

Oriouiw^tan DcMrtacnt . 
Coinnlauriiit M>d Tnoipun 

Atmj Hoaplul Carpa 

BoiplUlihlp* 

UiiDcUkneoiu 



t ahuvd -with the dunml 



XV. 

TBS ABMED TRAINS. 

Two armed railway trains were employed during tbe iat4 
in Egypt, one at Alexandria and tbe other on the Ismailia i 
Kebir Line. Both were rigged and openited by seanieu froi 
ish fleet. The former has been described by Lieutenant Bai 




BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EQYPT. 183 

car is unamiored, except at the front end, where, inside the wooden end wall, is an 
iron plate ^g of an inch in thickness, inclosing on three sides a wooden box 3 feet in 
thickness, and as high as will permit thu free working of the gun, the box being filled 
'with bagH of sand and a few others hanging from the plates on the sides. At the rear 
end of the car is a wooden wall some 3 feet high, on which arc hung the implement-s 
lor serving the gnn. On the floor near by are carried a few nmndH of animnnition. 

Thinl. The locomoCive. This is protected on each side by throe bars of railroad 
iron hung with wire partly covering the boiler, and an inch plate of iron about 2 feet 
by 4 covering the cylinder, the pistDU rod, and its connections. The caboose is pro- 
tected by iron plat4*s i\^ of an inch in thickness, backed with bags of sand. Although 
the mobt vita], this is the weakest part of the train. A large part of the boiler and 
couaiderable machinery are exposed, but can hardly be better protected, as the springs 
will hardly sostain any additional weight. Its armor is the heaviest, but it is not 
complete. I think lighter armor more completely shielding the locomotive would be 
preferable, for the train can hardly expect to withstand even the fire of field guns 
nnlesa at long range, and the rest of the train is designed to be proof only against 
mnaketry. 

Fourth. A platform car protected on all sides by a movable wooden wall 2 inches 
thick, backed with iron plates ^ of an inch thick, and sand-bags, the sides of a 
liioight convenient for firing over by men kneeling upon the lower tier of sand-bags . 
Around the walls hang a supply of intrenching tools, such as picks and shovels, and 
*t one end lies a pile of a dozen stretchers. On each side outside is lashed a small 
*P«r, a handspike, and several looms of oars or similar small pieces of wood, with 
*bort pieces laahed across their ends. These are designed for carrying the gnn in 
^Atte of need. By lashing one of the spars on top of the gun and crossing the other 
pieces under it, the latter, with the short pieces at their ends, will permit fifty men to 
S^t a good hold without crowding. This car is intended to carry a force armed with 

Fifth. A car similar to the one just described and protected in the same way, armed 
^^th a Catling in front and a Nordenfeldt in rear, between which is carried a supply o f 
^*>Hnunition— 5,000 rounds for the former and 12,000 for the latter. This car also 
^•rries intrenching tools. 

Bixth. A platform car protected in the same way as the last two, cariying two 9- 
I*^f. R. H., with a small supply of ammunition. They are intended principally for 
••J'vice off the train, and heavy skids are carried for convenience in putting them off 
^^ taking them on the car. 

At times another car is carried protected like the rest, except that the rear wall is 
^^^ber and has a port where a Catling is mounted. 

A number of drag ropes are carried, so that in case of any accident disabling the 
*^Hiomotive the men may man them on the side away from the enemy and thus draw 
**^e train while retreating. 

One of the cars usually carries a tripod of small spars surmounted by a platform, 
^^niing a hntkont elevated 20 feet above the train, which commands a good view 
. * the country and makes it difiicnlt for tlie eneu'v to conceal his men behind small 
*^^gularities of tiie ground. 

A second train closely follows the first as a Hn]>i>ly and relief train. 

t'he front end of its advance car carricH a Hteani-denick intended for use in clear- 

*^g away wnicks. If a car of the lighting train biiould be rleniolislied by the enemy's 

^*^, or from any cause, the relief train would draw away the cai-M in n-ar ot it to the 

^^^rest switch (aud there is one near the point of oi)erati<ms), then return, and, 

^Uh the derrick, dump the wreck clear of the track, after which it would draw away 

*^e rest of the train. 

This train carries tools and materials for repairing the track, or even laying a new 
^Ue should it be cut or torn up in their rear ; alho gun-cotton, t«)r[»edoe«, an4l an elec- 



184 BBITISH NA7AL AND UILITABT 0PBRATI0H8 IN El 

trie bftttery »nd irlra for deatrofiug by esplosivea whatever ft majbe » 
t u get out of the way. 

The moet iDterettiog and elaborate featore of the eupply traio i« a m* 
platform car protected by woodeo trail* and iron platee like thoae ic 
train. The magaziofl ia Id fruut aud further protected by a aulid woodi 
IS ioches oa all sides, except Id rear, whem it is open. Li^aving a space 
for a powder tank, it ia covered with a half-inch iron plate, liare of raih 
close together, and above all bags of sand. The rear half of the car 
pieces of plank laid ucrose into compartments, in which are atowed eh 
and canister for both 40-pcIr. and the O-pdrs. The animiinitloD is cai 
from the magazine car to the Sghtiog train, the men running along the r 
the shelter of ita embankment. 

The supply train also carries a few pasaeager cars, nscd as quarters fo 
men, anil two box cars for tlioir cooking and messing arraDgenients : 
never taken t>cyoud the Junction, rem the Euglish lines, at Rainleh. 

At present these trains paRs the duy at tbe freight de|Kit In this city, I 
go out, pass the night recouiioitering between the English and Egypt 
at 6 a. ni. return tci the city. 

For a time it was claimed that Che armored train did excellent work, 
learn Ihiit it wa.t used except as auxiliary to reoon nolle ring parties. I i 
it as of much military value, for its o|>eratiouh are limited to one trac 
be easily avoided or 8ucceB«fnlly opposed by heavy j;unH mounted d»i 
Arnbi Pasha has adojitetl thu latter meaus, and with hit 7-inch rifles has 
gerouH for the train to approach nearer than 6,000 yards to his fortiflci 
is about the distance of the English liues. The train is annoreil only i 
withstand rille lire, nor eari it well W prolertutl aKiiinst the llru »f auyg 
as It carries. As Arabi's guns are effective at ti.l'OO yards, and th« li 
train nl not more than :t,!J0O, it is ubvioiiB that ut pruM-ut it is of Utile 
intended t» incri'Siw Its cIDrieney by mounting upon it a 9-ini'b ride. 

It was at Urst tntendi-d to advance to the attack supported by a skin 
tbat plan has been abandoned, and the force, originally two hundred ni 
diited lo fifty. Its first use was attended with eoUBideralile lighting, 
through uni< pTolungHil eugageiueiil, hut its operations are now limiteil 
I with ilH heaviest gun, which accomplislies little. The ir 




BSITI8H VATAL AHD lOLITART OPEBATIONS IN EQTPT. 185 

3o saHsfSMStory were the results of the trip, and so promising was 
Ji mode of warfore, that on the next day the train was made up on 
arger acftley as shown below. 

In the gao-tmck were rails and pot sleepers for repairing the line 
lere oeoesaary. 



t 

i 



f*i 



:. » i . 



< 



IH 



■I 






J 



i 



I 

t 




3 




5' 



s% 









4" It 



9 



• A 



5.2 







,t- 



i 






V 

I- 




I 

4 



:'!' 



^'V«-ii \\i\n pxt4*iisioii s(mmihm1 ina<ltM|uat<s ami on .\ii;:ii<«t I tlu* train 
^ '■ ■nilM»K*Ml fif* in> If*s.s f)/.i/i ;ii/jr Uiirk.s lM*si<lr> lUv \m'vm\\A\\v^ A\\v\ 
^ MfraagetJ hh He4*n in Fi^, ti'J, 



186 BRirUH NATAL AND UILITABT OPBBATIOlfa IK 

The train as tbna formed took part in the reoonnaiaaa 
that day, described on page 166. 

The cara in front of the Bteam-crane vere poshed foi 
coupled, Ili« locomotive then backing down out of range 
ance of Ute train. General Alison bearH witness to the < 
tice of the lU-pdi-s. than mounted on that occasioD. 

Tlie aimed train, which had reached the uuwieldy de\ 
movable cita4lel, van after this divided into two parts — 
and a reserve, so to speak. The composition of these pai 
the accoinpaiij'ing diagram. 

The i-eserve train was to be kept out of range. In this s 
did service during the remainder of the month of Aug 
teuiber 3 it was definitely devoted to outpost duty, as desc 
tenant Barnes, the reserve traiu being lelt at Oabarrt. 
train after this dale wan made up as shown in Fig. 04. 



"t 



Jrmtd Tivtn afUrS^.U.. 



The j>er«>nN0l was distributed as follows : 

To the 4D-pdr 

To the (iatlibg 

To thti Nordenhlttt 

To the lufmntrj Conipuuf - 

Tolal Sffbtiiii; men 




BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 187 

The valae of this train was impaired by the superior range and power 
of the Krapp gnn which the Egyptians mounted, after a short while, in 
the King Osman lines. Its gunners succeeded in obtaining great accu. 
racy of practice and in frequently placing its 84- pound shell in danger- 
ous proximity to the armed train. 

The 9-inch 12-ton M. L. B. which Lieutenant Barnes speaks of as about 
to be mounted on a railway truck and used against the Krupp just 
mentioned, was only ready for service t he day after the battle of Tel- 
el-Kebir. A few experiments were made, first with 15 pounds of pow- 
der and no shot, then with 30 pounds of powder and a common shell 
^veighing 230 pounds, and lastly with 50 i)ounds of powder and a 255- 
ponud chilled shell. The truck was left free on the rails, the recoil of 
the gun being thus converted into retrograde motion of the truck. The 
X'esalts of these trials were considered to be satisfactory. It is, however, 
open to grave doubt whether so heavy a gun could be permanently or 
even fi^uently used on an ordinary line and on a car not specially con- 
structed to carry so great a weight and to resist so violent a shock. 

The other armed train employed in Egypt was prepared and manned 
from H. M. S. Penelope. 

Upon a four-wheeled open truck a platform was laid of 3-inch planks 
fore and aft. These planks were bolted through the floor of the truck. 
^n the sides of the truck were placed half-inch steel plates, riveted to 
the angle-iron frame of the truck. These plates being 6 feet long by 3 
^de, and standing on their edges, formed a low breastwork that was 




BreastrwarK] FenelapJs 
Train. 

^Uix'iy bullet-proof. The top edges of these plates were connected by 
'^'^^all lap plates, 6 by 3 inches, bolted with lialf-iuch bolt^. 

Outride of all were awning stanchions bolted to the side of the truck* 
"^^ awning was fitted to the cars, and from the ridge-rope were sus- 
t^Hded the belts of the gun's crew. Sand- 
^^gs were hung around the car outside of 
^^e steel plates. 

A breast-piece was built up at the front 

^M of the truck, of timber 8 inches square, 

^d was secured firmly to the bottom frame 

*^ five 2^-iDch stay bolts, as seen in the ac- 

^mpanying sketch. Fig. ^. 




Breast piece , Armed Traim 



178 BBITIBH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IK E( 



■ Oditate . 

jBSSi" 



ID CItjr nr Vn 



1 11 if 



PlwM or p«t at 
I wMsh M ba dl» 



,W; 200 V> n :!,tal; ISDulltdKlagitimi--. 
UHiLOM. !Bli f' 3i IJiily llLoBdoB- 



L««t1.aH&,X.Mi: Sun »i *4 vJul.v til 

BWl fvrxm' IM, W M| IjJnly lAi 

I ; I ' I I I 

,ll»|4,na< UNi II «•: nJal]' »! 

M-|t»K«' 2W a;...| liJaljr Mi. 

I.US;I.M1JS,<IB, 4Kl| til H IJdIj Mj 

HO I0| N UdIj »:' 

I, sTtji. Ii8i3, eiai w^i It! tt UdIj 3S 

l,Tta]I,01Ul,Tn' 40b| ui 4A xpajy M 

MOI IT W IJulj >«| 



XnM MO IT W^lJulj 

t, M4 iiK II m i,jiiir 

f.&.Vll 4IU1' la M' £>raly _. 

I.M»i (UO IB M £jtllj »i 

I,BO!t! tttj » » iJnljr bi. 

HJUoBtnal ll,imi,10iI,WII mj 11 «! IiJbIj MJ 

l^UyofParia l.Na l.m3,Ci«| «Wi W 41) l^Jaly Mi 




HTISR VATU. AHD HIUTABT 0PERATI01)8 IN BOTFT. 179 



i 
1 



fott of em- ; 



I I 



■• >H 3it HowhoM Canlrj 

u sun* *• 

. . 'TomBUMrUt .um 

• tlllllTIBhOo. Kajtt tlag}»r»n 

1« in 171 N. A. ^1 



Artll- HoDthiBploi 
I Srld LdBdoB 



1 iMMlv^t^i roiupi 

II I (TT UU BrinriF utalTj 2il Bait Mirrpool 

Yorf aod LaDcuur. Klnciluwo 
IT IVIMPbtI nt 4th DnKooD Houiliamplu 



..Auk. *A»lt. " 

.. Adjc- 4 Ann. laTvlnatrrw... 

. Au(. 3Aa(. 17 



!!„. 



IRIS* A I. Huial ArtllbiiT Pnnaainitl 

?«l MMB^I.(iniiadt«nurdii. Qiirrnaros 
!J«3tI r.r> .rf III l>r.«noB *.iithaii.iit 








•lowr ,. 


-KM Part "f Ttl. Itraa-o,. [^.n. 

irnlMC 1. Knval Artl1lFt> ... S-mt 
MCl-*I!,K..j.lAnlli«, ,, [-.Brt 


10 .. .. 


1T7I7SIJ Knyal llnrar AiiiU-n l-'i" 


month ,. 


1774 MM llaltailnn IIIaiiUi»< IWl 
I.ilhl Inranlry Kiall M 
line*.!-, 

iSdanli 


..«,....« 


4M l» ■'■•Bi'>n aail ] ^l-LTa|>1i I.-m 


""■ ■ 






KMIWM ItatI W«l K-nt 411. I'.Ti 
Hniail- *!■« 





190 BRITISH NATAL AND HILITABV Ol'BRATlOlfS IH » 



THB BOAT TBAH8F0BT IS THE SWEET WATER CAN. 

Tbe selection of the line of the railway from lamailia to Za, 
the Fresh Water Canal for the advance, secured to the Brit 
tionary force in Egypt the atldldoDal advanta^ of water tr 
tween the base and the front. The impiMtaiice of this partii 
portatioD is shown by the fact that it was the first establish' 

Oh of Angnst 21, the day after the seizure of IsmailfSf 
era) Qraham was at Neflche with the advance. To retain 
of tbe railway Junction and canal louk at that point was a i 
cessity, unless the campaign was to be conducted on the 
Orabam bad to be supported both byreinforcementa and ma 
get tbe latter to him was do easy matter, for the railway < 
down and wheeled transport absolutely nseleas. There reii 
the Sweet Water Canal as an available channel. 

Admiral Seymour, who had come around from Alezam 
Helicon to Lalie Timsab, when addressed on the subject, 
was to have been expected, put tbe thing on a permane 
The service was inaugurated that afternoon, when two stea 
and two cutters, from H. M. 8. Orion, entered the canal tl 
locks of Ismailla (Plate 48) and took provisiouB to Neflcbf 
ing at once to Ismailia, their trips were then continued day 
as rapidly as possible, for tbe next seventy-two hours, fo 
the army in its march to Magfar. Here was encountered i 
of tbe most serious nature, a dam across tbe canal, which 




I amL us inuTAsr opmtion n laiR. Ul 




IS!!i.,.i,i. 



. Ball<rB:r nMvrial tnim.. 



192 BBITISH NAVAL AND HILITART OPERATIONS IN EOTFT. 

Six horse-boats belonging to the naval traoBport serrioe, luid all thai 
steam -taonches which the fleet conltl spare, were also admitted Into the 
canal. The latter boats oomprised sis. steam-pionaces, eaoh from 35 tQ 
37 feet long, and a 12-foot picket-boat ttom the Alexandra, whicb, hom 
ever, drew toe much water to be of any nse. These were employed t^ 
tow the other bfiats, lighters, &c., and were in charge of 8Db-lieateDaD% 
or other junior officers. 

The larger steamers drew 39 inches of water and the smaller 33. Coxn. 
mander Moore asked for a minimum depth of 42 inches tbroughont, after 
the lock at Kassassiu bad passed into the possession of the advuioe. 
The reach of the canal above this lock was tolerably well filled to tba 
depth of 5 feet 6 iucfaes. It was not, however, deemed pradent to dnr 
upon this supply of water, so greatly needed at the front, by allowiaf 
enough of it to tiow into the Kassassiii-lsniailia reach to secure the 
depth Comiuaiider Moore desired. 

The first two steam -pinnaces bad been thoroughly equipped forcunCiii- 
gent action with tlie enemy, one carrying a Nordenfeldt, with its miu- 
ketry shield, the other a Galling gun. The subsequent necessity oCN' 
dnciug the draught as much as possible caused Commander Moore W 
remove this armament, as well as such other weights a^ could be dis- 
pensed with from all the boats in his little fii'et. 

The crews were comjiosed of one cosNwain, two seamen, two leading 
stolters or artificers, and two stokers. The cosHwain was armed with a 
revolver, the rest with rifies. Each mau i-arried-60 rounils of aiumnni- 
tiim. The kit« cousisted of oni- spare suit of blue, a blanket, a vaI«^ 
bottle, haveroack, and the usual ]iot, pannikin, &c. 

There were many drawbacks and hitches, owing for the mostiurlW 
insufQcient wat«r in the canal, but no serious injury or avoidable intff- 
rnptiou of the traffic. Among the |>etty source.^ of iiiconvenienw and 




BBITISn NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 193 

i>re flaniH^e. In this res]RH;t the newer tyi)e of boats woh preferable, 
iiiK «*Mmpuratively niHselcss, while the older made » noiAe which coald 
hi'anl miled away.* 

Ciuniiia rider Mimuv (established a species of headquarters at Kl Maf^far, 
II IV hi* kept a full siinrk of rations for his men. Throe days' supplies 
•n-dniwn at a time from the Orion anil taken for issue to this place. 
Till' iTfWs of tln*M» boats, with but few (exceptions, were unchanged 
ri»ii;!}iuut the operations, yet this work was severe in the extreme^ 
nil* lift* was rendered alnu»st iiitolcrable by the swarms of tlies during 
»* «lii\ and thi' m«»sipiit(N\s at ni;;ht. T(» do justice to these pests re- 
iiivH ii fund of objurgation nut at the command of the average mortal, 
f the iii«*n sent back to tin* ship all wciv on acc.imnt ol sickness, four 
tlic iiumlN^r lH*iiig disabled by inosipiiti» bites. 

l-'.:ii'li iNiiit e^irried a li;;lit in the b4»\\, wliicii was eti'ectually sciveiied 
>rii iiliftervation from the land by the hi^h canal banks on either hand. 
riitil S«*ptenil>er 2 the hirger boats did the towin^^ up to Kl Magfar, 
•' smaller ones lM\\onil. rnn'tii'ally the actual towing never extended 
i>t Tel-el- Mahuta. on account of the lack of water in the upper part 
the reai'h. From Tel-el-Mahuta to Kassassin the lighters and cargo 
•aiM were hauled by mules or Inuses. 

It was on this section that Comnninder AbioivV servitre was supple- 
'11 (cd by the Koyal Kngineers with tluMr pontiMMis and special rafts, 
'ifilit U'ing shifted to them at TelelMaiinta when necessary. 
A MTund dam whs tniiiifl at Tel «•! Maliuta, lar;fer but less carefully 
ii^riiH-rcd than that at Kl Mai:t'ar. 

Ill* (iintMiiied louciiii;: i>f uatei m the canal iiMiilered useless the 
•iv\ li.if iv«* boats and the li^}it(*i>. tin- t'oinn-r re4|uiiini^ .'{ t'ei*t of water 
••iM\ a iiaving load. It had now ci»rii«* \n a puiiit when every inch 
»t ^.L«» I if va>t importance. An a substitute Inr tin* heavier craft, 
'Mitii,inili*r M<Mire obtained ei^hf ship's |ml!in^bi»ats U^lonuin;; to the 
'^-tl iran.'«|Hirts in I^jike Timsah. Tiein;; tA li;:litei tliau;:ht and carry- 
>: !»mall loads, thesi* boats were handler than the Ii;^liters and more 
Mb gotten afloat after grounding. Their eiiipln> m<-nt bi*gan on »S4*p- 
nlHT •'i. Hy exercisin^r great can* th«\v eoiilil Ih> worked to within a 
l»-nf the cavalry camp Ui-ar KasNas.sin. 

lU-tArt'ii Ismaili«i ami Kassa»iii the water shoals .'Meet and t inches. 
'=«*. nn Autrust "Js tlii*re was a depth ot ."i t'eet - iinhcM at thi* fonner. 

•1 *»ti September - but I fee! S im-|n«s, with eniiesptUlding de|iths of 1 

'* li» ineli*-** aiifi 1 tiMiT it nii'lie*" .it tin* latter plaee. The aviTai:e 

I'Mi ^t-t^\e«•n K:i<isas>il) :ilii| iejel M.ihilt a v iis J teet I llH'lie.N. and 
"'* Tel fl MallUTa '5 tii T I imln"*. Ilil'* lii«*< nl (i mm lies :|ili'\l nut 

*' ;i-,i\ii-r iNi.tf^, as luimr ii:«Mif i«iiie*]. iumI in.tti-i ;all> r«-«iiieeil the 
•yV' . lU'UiTf then tii>!ii (io ii» 7ti ;*>[tH m! ni,].].!ii ^ Ufiit iI.iiIn b\ the 
'' «L .Hill the Uiar** III ii- III iiiii:: lo'iii-ii- Imi k ^\*-n a\i*\ xMnitnleil, fm 
"'ii tills TfMHle m!" ti.ii.s : \\,|N i-.j,i I I il", lif ^ I »l''n'. 

"■/ A •■■.'•■_'• - ■ ■ ; . - ■ ■ I : ■ . . ■ . . T ^. ; , .. .' 

//. .V;.-. 1'.'' / ; 



late 

^^H Bin 

mri 






994 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITAST OPERATIONS IN EGTIT 

Bjr September then? luwl beeu sppt by tbe canal from 
Tel-«l'Mahiitu 050 tons of proviaioiifl. Tbe ImihI service th«o stood m 
follows: Bteam launcb and pinnace of tbe Orient; steam i^nnaos of 
theOrioD, Faluon, Garystort, Thalia, ami Euphrates. Thm* UnirliMU 
were thrown out of ut«e bj the lack of wal«r. 

With tliiH diminitfhnl tiwt, aided by tliu iwittoona of tbe Koyal lk|i 
oeers, the work wa«t nr^«d aheatl, iu the feeliuuthat tbe mure dunetW 
quicker eud<!d. Thu renutt reached may ^^e gaaged by tbe fact uf lb 
delivery at KaMsaxain of 48 toua of 8toi-eH on iSfpteniber 7 atid tJUM 
on Septeiuber 8 — a great falling u&' from the original tKtlo lU lotudiUr, 
bat still yielding an addition of aiippliCH to the reserve de|>ot well oonl 
the tronblfl and vexation incurrud. In this way llie caual service wm 
maiDtatned, the army cu-opcmtiag with the iiavy nnljl the marditi 
Tel-el-Kebir. 

On 8epteml>er 1(1 Commander Moore began to prv-pare Mome of Hi 
boat« for the tt|)e<iial trtinsjiortatioii of the wonnded from the Held of tb( 
im pending battle. 

Water transport for men suH'ering either from paitilbl wumiiUcr 
diaeaees involving local inttammatiouH or nlverated tiaaaeB )& fuffl'- 
erable, there being no noise or jolting; on tbe contrary, steady, alac 
late motion, with relative rest. It was presHmnl that llio liiAseatDlhl 
next encounter with the Kgyptiann would be heavy, and it wa« ikW- 
Binetl that there should be no ground for complaint as to the tfiafW* 

tbe wounded in purtieulur or any branch of thearmy meUiGsld«)M(l' 
t-nent in general. In coneequonce tbe arranKements were on a Ubail 

.le and the tletails carefully worked out. 

Tbe l>oats selected for the pnriHwte were two home aiMl «tivrtt Mf/* 
'Iwats, onliiiary elinker-built cutterR, belonging to tbe lilretl-umupirt 
fieei. These were taken tlirongh the lock at KasstMSin into tbe afifV 
reach of the canal, where they were fitted. Pine bikards I iueb tkA 
and 1'2 inches wide weie laid fore and afl a|K>n tbe lliwarta, lo fora* 
even platform the whole length of the tK)at. U|>on this pUtiorui a tkiA 
bedding of lo<»so hay was spread. Awuiugti were rigged ajid avvto| 
curtains were gotten up. Kiich bwti whs provided with two breakM 
of water and tin cups, and had a blur-Jacket to steer it. A nurae n* 
detailed for the care of tbe wounded. 

On tieptenilter Vi the l>oats were divided into four Mctiuna, thrweuf t«* 
boats each and one of Ibriw boata, eMeh section belug an indepeadwl 
low, with n naval lientenuiil In charge of every two wvtiiin*. Tkl 
tracking was done by sixteen mnlcN, accom|>auied by tbe awxmUJ 
drivers. The hoata followed in rear of the Indian Continiceut, b4(» 
with the appliances for tbe estahtlsbineut of Held statiou* for tbe »■ 
porary dressing of wounds. Tbe latter were located on the eanal buk 
r the Kgytxian iutrrnehments. The work begau at U a. ui. Pna 
dresHiug sialiouH the wuuude\V wei-e (tut into the boats. AxtoM 

wct/oii waa flUeditwtw tieuloft \o^*R*a«e\tt.\»4'AwCTXfc«va*''*'' 



KBITI8H NAVAL AND MILITARY OPKRATION8 JN KOYPT. 195 

to the genenil field lio«pital. These disposiHl of, tlie 8ectioii would re- 
turn ai4 ni|iid1y as iMHisible to Telel-Kebir for another load. 

At fir8t it miKht apitear that nine lK)at8 were inHufticient for the work, 
but it lUDHt he rememlieriHl that each ease had to he examined and the 
wiiiind iNiund liefore the MiittertM* could be safely transfiorted ovei' even 
hOriliKlit a diKtaiiee an that whieh intervened betwtHMi T<*I-elKebirand 
KaMuiMKin. Owinj^ to this rire-nnistanee, and to Connnaiider M<M)rt'i^8 
nriranizatiiin and MUperintendenee, the provision proved ample. 1 >eputy 
Sar|!M)n (ieneral Marston, wlio had rhar^e of the work at the «ln*8Nin^ 
station, MtateH that ^*the tran.'(iN)rt down the canal was excellent.'' 

Till* li^hti^t eases were, as a rule, most quickly disposed ot\ tlu* nii>re 
MTiriiiH needin(rl»U|?<'r time and ;rreater attention : and in the tirst trips 
of tlif Imats the majority of the woundetl conveyed were but slightly 
burt. Tlie two horse-lniats alone t4H>k ilown no less than tit^y seven. 
After this the niimlM*r in each lM)at was decn^ased to alN)ut nine severe 
^nd »\x mi hi cases. 

Tttf) Trips wen* made by each secti4»n during the day of the battle at 
TfielKcbir. Commander MiM»re j^ays that upwanls of LMK) men were 
l*niii^r|it down to K assassin. The last enibarke<l at \^ p. m., twelve 
h^iirx After the iM'pnnin^ <»f the work. The embarkin;; anil landinf^ 
<'f IlifM' suflfereni was very «listn*ssin|;, the stei'p miuldy banks of the 
I'^iul rtMiderin); the o])«*ration ni«»st painful in spite nf every can*. 

Tlic military events of this ila\, resulting in the completion of the 
<^^ni|iiiipi and the ilisti-ibiiti«)n of the Hritish trcN^ps ov4'r new Iini*s, ren- 
'l**rHl tlie breaking up of all staticuis in the desert possible and ih'sira* 
^'t**- The emptvin;; of the ticld hospital at Kassa.Hsiu w:i.s therefore im- 
QtHliati-Iy U*;;un. Durin;; the t wo da\s followin;^. roininaiider M(N>re*H 
^^•^l was miploved in n*movin;; the wonndi'd from Kassassin. The seri- 
ous raM'^t. for wluim \*ater transport w;is so essential, w«Tf all moved in 
thih Vii\. The iNiats uen* passi'il throu;;h the l.sinailia Iih-Kh into Lake 
^■niMh and taken aloii;;si«l«* the hi»pital h1ij|i < 'artlia^i* v\ ithont 4'lian^e. 
^^•'iit\ six casi's iin Septenilier 14 and tuciitv on thf l.'itli pmtite^i by 
*hK fi,(||tii|t;||ii|. iiHNle «»f ronvc\ance. 

Thi' water had ni>t >et ('•»iiie down fn»iM abo\t* to i.iisc ilu* IfVel rn the 
''•in:il. There unv still but Ift inches at Kasssissm. To obtain a start 
**^ tliiK iMiinl. \\hen e\ei>thni;; \\as in reailim-ss. the ifN'k ^ates were 
*''Klitly o|N*ne<L ;;i^ in^ a rush of the water into thr IoWit reach, which 
''<UTiiHi the lMiat> into deepi-r water, where the anniiaU rould tow them 
^" Midiuta. At Mahuta the .strain-!. innches wfrc in w:iitin;: to take 
'^**ni to Ismailia. 

1 lu!4 <%ad lalNir comph'tt'd. tin' I'anal >ci\ic«*. no ion;:i*i i-iiib.iri.ivsfd 
"T 'lt-tii-ienc\ of water, wa** coirtinued for the pur]Mi7<f ot aiijin;^ in i-hsir 
"*K (III! the «*t,itn>nn iH'twiM'ii Isniailia and T(*l «'l Ki-bir. tin* twn point/t 
** *hnh [hf stiM'CN hitherto .Npn-ad o\ rr the line ji-io*.^ tin* desi-it weri* 
'"'* U'liij: coJliM'titl. This nlijert was acconip\is\\ed o\\ Se\»\%»\\\\H«\ '1*1. 

"*"*/ rht' mt'N itil*/ fHt;it.- M#/e /fruintfl to tbeW lesyieeVWr AvNys. 



196 BRITISH NATAL AND UILITABT OPEBATIOHTS IN B< 

The Sweet Water Canal service commaaded th« ajmpstl 
wbo were in a position to wat«ta its hard and sncoeseftil stmg 
disheartening circnmatances. It received the commendatio 
in aathority for having achieved all that was humanly pa 
time when eomparatively small aehievementt were of great vah 



THE SATAL BBIQADE AT TEL-EL-KEBIB. 

The equipment of men Umd^ from British thip* of war j 
operationt is not a matter of individual taste or caprice, but 
and effici^tt. As a consequence it is possible to assemble aqu 
nics, or guns' crews from a number of vessels^ meeting for e\ 
Hme, into a homogeneous military organization which is not oj 
ciam as a laughable combination of heterogeneous elements. 

The drees ia always understood to be blue, unless otherwi 

The white cap-cover is fitted behind, in warm climates, with 
or cape, falling npon the shoulders and extending to the tem 
side. The men themselves prefer the straw Uat, as lighter 
and affording shade to the eyes. In Egypt, after tbeoccnpati 
andria, this was the head dress babitaally worn. 

To carry his kit each man nses bis blanket, which is made 
roll of aniform pattern, containing shifts of clothes (as ordi 
towel, &c, and is carried with the bight over the left should 
meeting under the right arm. The leggins areprovided by i 




AMD mUTAKT OFUUHOIIS IN KOTPT. 187 



Tkm bdl !■ of oMolorad iMiheri and well designed fiir work. The 
wt—ihlp ii mn honeit epeeiniea of the saddler's art The metal 
parts an of teasSi Ife naj be best desoribed as a waist-belt supported 
bj str^a wUeli go orer the shoulder and cross behind. Figs. 73 and 

J4 give Ikottt and tear Tiews of the belt in use. It appears at first 

^ • 





i%ht to kave an enomons number of bueklesv but these serve the pur- 
Ptis of a^faatsMot in all direotions, so taht when onoe fitted the man 
•V wr tt Witt great comfort The 8 hook in firpnt pennlts ready 
■Maspiag: When even momentarily halted, the wearer may relieve 
^ stnin on the waisti the entire weight then swinging clear of the 
>id« by the sboolderstraps. On the latter, in front, are two studs to 
*kieh the haversack may be attached, while behind they button to- 
other at the cross. 

Ike baU^pooch is of soft black leather, carried behind. Fig. 1-L Other 
■ttircartiUgo-boxes, similar to those iu our own service, are strung on the 
^aa needed. 

Iho bayooet-lkog is on the left side, as usual. Its only peculiarity is 



-#i^«t 



sihort strap by which the bayonet may be huckied 
in.* 

The haversack, Fig. 75, is a simple flax caiivaK bag 
with a canvas strap to go over the shoulder. Two 
loopa are stitched to the strap near the haversack. 
When worn by riflemen this is carrie<l at the back, the 
passing o%*er the shoulders and buttoning to the 
already mentioned on the supports of the waist- 
belt. If worn by a cutlassman, the havenuick im nn- 
der the left arm. 

The wator-bottle is a small (;ooj)ert*d Imrrel, hLowh 
in FIga. 77, 78, and 79. It in of Italian manufarture, 
nppHod by Onglielminetti Brothers, Turin, and is 

by both branches of the militar>' nervice. In the navy, riflemen 
it on the belt and cutlassmon under the right arm. The latest 




t woahl hanlly cont m uiiu !i an t\ie l>a>'«%i\r\» me Vma ^au^mSX^ 
mtog bomim. 



198 BBITMH NAVAL AND HILITABT 0PBBATI0H8 IN BC 




A"i 



pattern is covered with gray felt. Its oapooit? is one qi 
stoat, withetaods rou^h usage, and is cheap, bat It Is hei 
parison vitb the water it ooDtains. The bands and stopper 
vanised iron. The top view. Fig. 78, gives the shape of t 
The stopper is only removed for filling, the drinkiag-hole 




HATAL AHD HIUTABY OPBRATI(»I8 IN EOTPT. 199 




200 BBITI8H NAVAL AND UILITAKY OPEBATIONS IN B< 



On September 8 two Gatlinggiin limbers were taken 
lamiiilia and fitted for male draagbt. It may be remarked 



fi9.Sl. 



the bowitzerH and machine gnns i 
isb navy wliich are Bent on boat 
contingent use on shore are all pr 
limhtrn. Fig. 80 is a view of the C 
and its limber as ordinarily flirnii 
Fig. 81 shows how single-trees, 
adapted to the ones in qnestion to i 
E males to be hitched to each gun. 
ArranKemencs were made for 
sary animals and the transjiort I 
terj'. 

On Septem'^er 9 the Humber arrived in Lake Timsafa witi 
Oatlings and their crews, drawn from the Mediterranean 
following table gives the compositi'U of the battery ; each r1 
own Oatliug: 



Ofiov oommuidix^. 




Canifort. 
Hawu-*- 

Ortem 



LlwiiJ.S.BIoiIuid... 




maam utal iid wlitast opbratioms nr sotpt. 201 

UttlM to OsN paok and dnaght udmali were three hones, one 
I eammtm^Mg oOev, one fiir Oonnnaader Euie, and one fin the 

Bt 

goM aad ■« TOO lauded at 6.10 a. m. on Beptember 10 at Is- 
, Proeeedlog to the railway station, they were oooveyed by train 
wma^ta, airiTiog at 6 p. m. Here the tents, males, &c., whloh 
■Ml ■■niliod biy the onny were in readiness. Camp was at onoe 
I the railw^ and the oanal, aooordlng to the plan in 
1, Fig. 83. 



'a. 

A. 

A. 

A. 

lA. 

'a. 



»*s^ 


1 


•< 



^1 

A.^ 
A. 

A> 

A.| 

A-^ 



A. 



A.A-^ A.A.A> 



k I 



£' 



A. 



JMtiBm mtn tiatple treocbea 12 feet long and 3 IwV Aw^^ % ^"•'^ 
' tke tap mad 18 inche« wide at the \iottom— P\s !«* vhIV 



20*2 BRITISH NAVAL AND HILITABT OPBBATION8 IN El 

For the officers the more elaborate ticooinmodation w»b nnp\ 
is sketched in Fig. 76 e. Into these latrines loose earth and 
shoveled twice a day by men detailed for the i>ar[>oee. 




The ^ns' orews took tnms in forming goard and in doi 
dn^, one orew t>etng told off every day for each of these tai 
were thus, so to speak, in three watches. 
The following routine was established : 

Bounmc OF the naval battkry. 

3.30 >. m. Cooka called by the cMnpHwntrj ; flras Itgbted. 

4.30 >. m. ReTfllll* bjr bngla. 

4.45 %. m. Bogle-okll "ooolu." 

5.00 A. m. BnakraBt. 

&.4G %. m. LkliiDe puty fkll Id. 

7.30 *. m. Ballef gnard ; lUl In btigaa party ; old goard waab and eli 

8.00 a. m. Cloan arme and gnus. 

8.30 a. m. Dnai bagl« ; al«an np oamp ; triee op tent cnrtaint ; put oi 

9.00 a. m. BDgl»«aU "adTan(M"j pande ; onws Gkll Id Id ttwA of g« 
hiBpected; pra7«n; diamiM. 

11.45 a. m. Bagle-oall "cooks." 

18.00 Di. Dlirner. 




X4TAL ASD mUTAKT QPUUTIOm IV BOTTT. 208 



IS amp was slniA at <LSO p. nu, and all pieiMurationa 
Am aHMsh. Flour w^mk weia detailed to look oat for the teote* 
^Bge that wwe to be left behind at Kawaggip, Two dayaP 
era eaiffied in the havenaeks, and 90 rounds of emall-ani j [ 
M to the pooehea. Byerjrthing not eaaential to actaalllgbting | 
rded. 

Ulh| aft L80 a. m^ the battery limbered ap and formed on the 
k hi eohimn of aeetiona. At 2 a. m. it started towarda Tel-el- I 
ha %vpMaM opened fire at 4Jt5 a. m. wita ahell all along tibe \ 
■ed bj heavy araaketiy fire on the right of the battery. The 
age weva deployed and a briak fire begnn at onee ; first, on 
pHaa eavalry who were in front of the works, and then on the 
lenta theaiaelvea. On n^aching the lines they were found de- 
le eneaqr had iled. 

tlingaP erewB anfltared no loaaea, being, in fiust, little expoaed, 
ibeD-Ira, whieh waa ordinarily in this oampaign oomparatively 
The enemy aeemed to have conoentrated hia gone on eertain 
lined pointa on the line of the advance, for in plaoea the ahella 
and fhat By exeroiaing a little care in avoiding theae sonea 
oineh loaa waa apared. 

kval Battery apent the A%y at Tel-el-Kebir bringing in the 
aad buying the dead. Late in the afternoon it started Ibr 
Mvooa^ng on the road. On the 17th it returned by rail to 
where it re^mbarked. 

omiaaariat waa particularly well care<l for. It must be borne 
lat when the battery joine<l the army this branch of the serv- 
aumed sQeh a development as to enable Captain Fits Roy to 
s it Ibr supplies. A change was msUie in the hour for serving 
habitual on boanl ship. The earlieT parties had adhered to 
practice, and had received their tot at noon. The men under 
its Boy drew it after supfier, when the work of the day was 
ompleted. The wimlom of this arraiifi^emeut wiis evident in 
ised enjoyment it yielded the men, as well iih in a marked 
ent in the afternoon's work. 

Jth of the battery during th<Mr short term of siTvicc^ on shorn 
lent. But one serious case of illness oceurred. On the march 
' men were ohlige^l to fall oat. 

N^ls of the Gatling c*arri»i;e ami linilN*r were to^t nmnll and the 
uirrow for efficient UKe in hucIi a sandy (;onnti'y. In many 
' entire gun's erew had tn ansist the draught niiilcH. 
anixtttioii and the inonile of the battery were mon* than witis- 
IfH work at Tel el-Kel»ir was of little real ini|N»rtance, hh its 
lowed after that of the Highlanders at a suftieieutly great in- 
dlow it to profit by the general demoralisation of the defense. 
Ban be entertaineil that it would have remlereil w v>hhI «»»WLVi\i 
hI iie tlefentte Ihh*ii fiiore stuhlNirn. 



204 BBITISH NAVUi AND HILITABY 0PEEATI0N8 IN 



TBB MARINE BATTALIONS. 
1. Ths RoYix Marine Light Infantry. 

Several reasons combined to attract 8[>e<:inl attentiou t 
meu, tlie largest, siugle battalion in tb^ expe<1i1ionary forct 
"loug-service" meu ; tbey ware ueitber of the army entirel; 
they sailors. Tbeir recoril duriog tbe cauipaigu wafl uot on 
able but in every way honorable, and it was known that 
bad asked to hare tbem placed nnder his coDiniaiid with tl 
gade. Their connection with the naval branch of tbe st 
cieut warrant for the separate mention they receive in tbi 

The ininiuium stttture of recruits is 5 feet 6J inches, an 
enlistment twelve years. At tbe expiration of this i»erio< 
if a desirable person, is offered the opportunity of rc-engi 
years more. In tbe majority of iostJinces this opportuuit, 
the full length of twenty -one years comptete<l, and the goo 
nion securetl. The men who served in Bgj'pt averaged 1: 
and nine years' service and twenty-seven years of age. 

The battalion was composed, at the outset, of Ave com 
from the principal barracks in England. Portsmonth 
each frirnished 150 privates, and Plymouth 250. Those 
formed iuto a battaliou at home, but were hastly collectei 




VATAL ASD mUTAKT OPIBATIOHS Df SOTPT. 805 

MflbiBf iMT dMtbiatioii, tlM TMnar tband pressing orders to come 
I to AfcnrMMJria, where she erriyed at2 m. m. of July 7. At dagj^- 
he went aloiigride the mole in the inner harbor, end after noon 
irines wws disembarked. The latter marched on immediately to 
i (see Plato 1), broke open some warehonses, in which the men 
(iUeled, andi without delay, began the guarding of that portion 
sity where liie existing defenses were weakest 
combined marine battalions, the Boyal Marine Light Infiauiticy 
e Royal Xaiine Artillery, nnder Lieatenant-Goloud Toson, of the 
Miqia, took a ^ominent and honorable part in the reconnaissance 
b of Angosfe S, described on page 93 et Mg., their behavior receiy- 
efad praisOi 

eood detaehment of firar companies came out in the Dacca, which 
d aft Alexandria on August 8, landing Lieutenant-Colonel Howard 
BS, who leUered lieutenant-Colonel Ley, invalided. The Dacca 
opt OB to Port Said, the detachment, under the command of 
iant*Ocloiiel 8. J. Oridiam, being there transferred to H. M. 8. 
imberiand. Two of these companies were landed at Port Said 
inat 90, nnder Hiyor J. W. Scott, to seiase the place, as described on 
17, whfle the balance, under Colonel Graham, were sent to Ismailia 
1. 8. Beady and Dace, and were the first troops to arrive at the 
se, bj that time in the possession of the navy. The following day 
iltt body, nnder Colonel Jones, reached Ismailia from Alexandria 
fthoaina,and later H^jor Scott's detachment was brought up from 
lid^ making a strong battalion of nine companies. 
kognst 25 Company D, under Captain R. W. Heathcote, was de- 
is General Wolseley's body-guard. 

Rojwl Marine Light Infantry battalion did good work in the ac- 

August 25, at Td-el-Mahata and Mahsanieh, after a hard night 

In this engagement the two marine battalions were the only 

hat kept up with the cavalry and reached the Egyptian camp 

isaweh. 

be SSth the B<^yal Marine Light Infantry battalion was called up to 
■in from ito camp at Mahsameh, but too lato to be of real service, 
actively engaged on September 0, capturing two Egyptian field 
by a brilliant charge. In this affair it lost 27 men wounded, some 

U-el-Kebir the battalion was on the left of Graham's brigade, in 
at Hne of the attack. ItM behavior on this occasion, characteriied 
ioeustomed coolnens and HteailinesA, received well-earned praise. 
I in this battle was only exceeded by those of two other battalions 
«e 153). 



206 BRITISH NAVAL AND HILITABY OPERATIONS IN 

The followiug table exhibits the strength of the two d( 
orifrinally seut out : 



mton 

CkpUitD* (of compuiMj 

AdJuUot (o^rtAtB) 

Pajmuwr 

qn»rt«niiuiw louMn) 

SUff (irapl^Dl 

UfUlVDUU 






ToUliukWdBle-.. 
Onod total MVt .... 



The entire lostt dariiig the cainiMigu from all causm, d 
and disease, np to October 14, was 13 officerti uud 220 men. 
are stat«<l by the »dJRtant, Captain A. St. Ijeger Bmrowe* 
obiedy Irom among the yoniiger members of the battalion 
and men. 

No regular transi>ort was faruisUeil the marines, bnt ti' 
Maltese carts were "pieked up" at Ismaiiia. Tliette wer 
to carry one-<iuart«r of the etguipment. The water-eartt 
the sand near XeOcbe early in the march, bnt this inishup 
to some extent by the fortunate capture of seven camelfi 




BT1TI8H MAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KGYPT. 207 

do with the fighting of the Hhip. They have been i^radiially ie])hiecil 
by Mtam^m^ whuHi* increased intelligence and careful training have ren- 
derMl them c<)iniM>tent to handle witli skill the various kindn of ord- 
nance in the Bhtirth He«t. That the Koyal Marine Artillery \h not yet 
1 thinf; «if the past is s(*en in the fact that t4)day it nnins one half of 
the lnflexible*s 81 -ton pins. Thes4* artiUerists are, in addition, thor- 
oa{;hly drille«l sia infantry. 

In the H;iine transiNirts with the Koyal Marine 1 j^ht Infantry bat- 
tj&lion, the ()ronte« and Taniar, a detaithnient of Koyal Marine Artillery, 
.10i> in nnnilier, wsi8 stMit to K;;ypt. It was orpinize<l as an infantry 
hattalion and was i^ninianded by Lieutenant! 'ohmel II. K. Tuson. At 
Alfxandria it wa^ asiiCH'iated with the Koyal Marine Li^i^ht Infantry. 
On Au^st ri the two battalions weiv combined under Lieutenant- 
I'filoiiel TuHun, and did the extremely ^nnI si^rvici* already narrated. 

On August 10, when the base was chanpMl. this battalion was em- 
Karke«l in the NerisMa, the first of the hired transports to arrive at Is- 
mailia. The force was strenphened at Port Said by HM) men who had 
he^D sent from England in the Dacca to All viicancies. Landing at 
Umailia at 2 a. m. of August 21, the battalion, now numliering lietween 
3UU and -MiO men, took part in the first advance, that in which Neficbe 
vaK fKM'Upied, marching out with two daysM'utions in their haversacks 
aod IINI rounda of ammunition in their pouches. It t(K)k part in the 
affair of August 124 at El Magfar, when a small party relieved the 
wom-«»ut K(»yal Artillerymen at their L'^IKl^s., rendering highly efficient 
and wfK^ome assistance. The following day it did further goisl service, 
a«lvanring with the whole line. At 4 p. m. it ]uished on to Mahsameh, 
where it (MTupied tlie enemy's deserted camp, and found mur1i-ni*e(l<Hl 
proviKions. The battali<m had been without ffN)d all day. 

The few days imme<liately suc4*eeding weiv nnirked rather by im^l 
^uary of rations than by the perihuM nature <if tlie work on hand. The 
men liv«il, for the tinie being, mostly on biscuits and r«ueh pr«»v<*nder as 
the Kg>'ptians hail left 1>eliiiid in their retreat. 

tin the l!Hth the battalion reaehed Ka.ssassin. It tinik an hcuiorablo 
|iart in the engagement of August '2^, and was eomplimenteil liy the gen 
eral in c«»mmand, Major-lieneral (frahain, tbr its gallant behavior under 
mmultaneous dinnrt anil entila<ling tire. It o|MM'ated im the southern 
l»ank of the Sweet Water i'anal in an expostnl and iiii|Kirtant |N»sitiiin. 
As has lie#Mi alreiuly mentioned, a detachnuMit untler Taptain Tucker 
hail mirunte^t a captured H'"< Krupp gun on a railway truck ami they 
worktffl it .'skillfully throughout the day. This gun subseipiently pushed 
r.ri with the naval 40-]Mlr. to T«*] el-Kebir. ami then tf» /.a;:a/i|.^ ISenha. 
ant| Tantah. 

On SeptemlM'r M the Ko>al Marine Artillery wa>ag.ini on the I'Xtn'Uie 
l»-ft. It reiielled a sKght attack on the snuthern ^idi- ni'the i-anal. dc 
frmling the bridge at K assassin. 



208 BRITISH NAVAL AND HILITABY OPEfUTIONS IN El 

At Tel-el- Eebir the battalion started off 600 yards in rear o 
(in the 4tli brigade), bnt daring the niglit was ordered to fo 
Wolselej's escort. It took, therefore, do active part in t 
although subjected to distant shelt-flre, priucipalty from th< 
redoubt. (M, Plate 50.) 

The Boval Marine Artillery, being less iiumerons, was leai 
to comment than the Koyal Marine Light In5iutry battalic 
the majority of casual readers of accounts of the campaign b 
of the existence of such a corps; but its work was charactei 
same quiet efficiency, and it wm\\^ a proportifmate aud 
meed of praise. 



TBE LINES OF rOMUVSICATION. 

The British army has been so often eugaged in operations 
"beyond the seas" that it« practice has developed a regul 
governing every step of the work of embarking, trausport 
bane, disembarking, and forwarding to the front of troops, a 
and supplies of every sort. Au important link in this chai 
officially the " Base and Lines of Communication." which 
and made a separate command, under au officer cloUiexI % 
Hutl,ority. The ])roi>er performance of this arduous and ui 
tive service, as may be presupposed, calls for great euerg; 
of character, coupled with udministrative ability of a very 

The province of this ofilcer includes the base and what u 
"advauced dejiot," together with all the means of transjio: 




ntIB IC&TAL kSD MILITART OPERATIONS XH EOVPT. 209 

of tneo, their ontfit« und Kupp1ii>H, wus v^ty simple. 
lai dockH at AlvxatiUria wi-re nn admirable taudine {dnoe, 
troflpfl were tnarrhod at once over good madn to their rampH, 
remott* of which wat* only u ffw iiiileHdistnnu For the meu's 
MtK &n<l rjtni|i rqiiijiNtiri* and tlir nffivem' liagfC'*}!^ ^^*' regimental and 
otbrr army imiiApiirl oitht^r sntHcid or I'miiid n.'Ady soppluDieut Jn hired 
carts and thi> loi-ai nulwaj-». The priacipal nf the latter haa a branch 
tradiUK Id thu wharvfH, while auolher, the Itamleh Railway (owDed by 
a private citrjKiraUon ), ImdH direrlly to the )K>i«ilioii uf the nmiri uump 
mt Rantlvb. The Uil(«^r railway wuh tiKcd for rhi.' noiivcyuiice of both 
trooiM aod Hioro«. 

(iptienl Karle'a Ubont lN>(ran In t>arnBHt with The change of base from 
Alrxandha to laiuatlia. He reached the latter plaee at 10 p. m. of 
Aopnal 'M, and iiiMiOili^l his preF*» ratio iik and nirangernt-DlH at oiici<w 
Ob Ibr dJiy foltowinfi, Anfnixl -l| MHJor-UeiiiTuI ftruhnni wan sit Nefidie, 
i« rmDniand uf the advaim- of the army, a small t)ody of abont SIIO men. 
AUhimKh rf>ry Dear Ifuiiailia In jiniut nf diftlaitoe, the break in the i«[l> 
«sy |irevriirMl Ibeane orinickafor hanliiij; iit^irea to Nefiehe, while tb« 
«u»d of tbi- dfJM-rt ititen-enlojii heavier heiv than anywhere eUe oti the 
vtol» line uf mnrrfa, r^^dennl the ver>' Hmull amount of tranH]H)rt then 
M band totally itiadiN]uate. To mipply Ihitu deOdciicy a boat Derrice on 
the Sweet Water Canal wna tmmeiliately started by Adndral Seymour, 
faor )>oat'lo«uU of prortsloos bclti(; utnt (o (ieneral (SrHham on the first 
ar ofM-rmiic inp. ThU organisallmi, whieh im detniletl in Section KVI, 
w^firkrfl in rfinjnnrtion with the other meann of iraiixport na ilevelojHHl, 
<'<( to the eootrol of the neueral commanding; the Line 
iriiinii. 

- and the next two dayit, AiigUMt 21. 22, and 2^, (he baae 

• ''hartK-terfxtlc appeaninw. The diflrn-nt battalions and 

Undine with all pmctieable npeed. were aiiaiKned their n>- 

ounpioe croiindR, and were triven aplaoe to Hlor« Hueb aitidc* 

ktta. hasjMire, and Alomt aa would not lie Immediately rcqaitwd 

irrh a<To*H the de«ert. The bent metbrni* of lunding borMS, 

leo, and niHterinlA wen? Ivring workail out practti-nlly, and means 

Incnpsise the landing farditiea. The punt and teleKiaph olBoM 

iblUhecl (operated by rolonteeni nntil the reRi'Iar army troopi 

wllh tht>M> duliea t->onld arrive), am) prepai'ationH were made 

m railway by moans of bonuNl trne-ka- The Khnllve^i 

aity hullditifr, wan occupietl h* the base hoepital, and 

boaae aa the headiiuartern of the (_'ommanderin-Obief. 

"^rrtf of Kiipptiea. the sick-horwe hoHpilal, and re- 

/mI nndi-r (he Itoynl KDRineer, Onl nance- SI ore, 
■■'■•*, the Snrgeon and Veterinary Sorftmn no the 

:..l.int of the ItatO-a." 

of Umailia, ['late IS. Rives the senenit reatoree »f the ba«6. 
MeiMud thf nnljr laoiliag fadHttt» It yosMaMiV it«R> %X \te 




BIO BBlTtSH NAVAL AMD UILITABV OPEKATIONB IN EOTFT. 

•Central Wliarf,a rectant;ular pier-head, with aboat CO ft-el of WHWfrow 
and 25 feet wide, built on piles out into 2 fatUoms of water. A «boil 
narrow gangway uoiinect^^d tbia pier-liead iriih n stoito wharf, tl]«<nw- 
tinaatioii of the broad aveimt; which leadi^ rtireclly from the railvay m 
tioii. '£bi» aveune is a Sue siiecimeti of macniliiRi. It witliittaol tb( 
coutiiiucd heavy traffic thrown upon it by its sHcclion ns the tiTiuisM 
of a uiililary routo without ^igos of deterioration, and it iiroviil « ital 
blesfling to the British. 

The harbor of Isniailla was formed, as is well known, by dnNtjnv 
out tbe shallow bed of Lake Tinisah, and uavigable water appmsdili 
the town waa only Necured at thin one point, tiie Central WrliarC li 
consequunce, the greater part of all heavy artiulvs and stores, men ut 
horses, were landed from here from lighlera or from togs whiehl 
depth of water permitted alongside tbe pier. To relieve tlie . 
this sole place of disembarkation, additional acoommodatiOD 
taJDwl west of the Central Wharf. Tbe South Wharf, o 
and nell built. The pier-head is 22 feet long and 14 feet widv, 
pier itself a straight jetty 15ii feet long and 9 feet wide. Tli 
here is too shallow to allow the presence of tngs, but uatin 
ships' cutters, and lighters can ruit alongside with ease. On tbe 
near by the greater part of the field piece* were liindud. 

At the South Wharf the commissariat began also the work 
embarking their stores until the branch railway ft-om the st 
tbe mouth of the ijweet Water Canal was sufBoieutly lulva 
shifted their ojierations to this more convenient locitlity on 
The dock tbey made use of was a platform about 'i feet above 
of the water, G U-et wide, and 75 feet long, built of wood, and i 
piles, in two parts, separated by a balcony, which had b«fii en 
long before by the Suez Canal Com)iany. The milwuy waa |j 
I «iubankn)ent 12 feet above the landing slage, the slope being 
j by Bterw and inclined planes, the latter for parbuckling be«ry 
I Atid very useful in breaking up the base. (Fig. 83.) While 

JTf^SJ. 



Teoienee of this wharf was of much imimrtanoe, a Airther and « 
I advantngo was found in the Iraiisfer of such lorgv q 
Uhv»,hI\ coming; nnder ouei\K\mt\,n\vtv\\,A<>«kVlaoebytl 
r Uio other laodios &uUli\e& x.q ^« >ui^\&'uwf4 



rSinSH HAVAL AND MILITARY Oi ERATIONrt IN EQYPT. 211 



n the iDdian Contingent arrived, it began at onco, with tbat in- 
lenoe of action which marked all its operatioDA, to provide for 
D diaeoibarkation, the Madras Sappers constructing a separate 
The siiot selected was l>etween the Central and South Wharves. 
iber of low four-wheeled tmeks were used as the support of a 
tmctorei shown in plan in the accompanying diagram (Fig. 84). 



1 • 

1 






!^ 




3S/k 


I 




T 

9Jt, 

-,. « 



$4/t. 



I- 



-JJ/f:— 1 



Temporary landing pitr of ike Indian Contingent at Innailia, 

atfonn was roughly ma<1e of planks, resting on fore-and-aft scant- 
The depth of wator secnrod was only a little less than 3 feet, 
er was certainly light; indeed, everything conuecte<l with the 
I Contingent was light; but it nerved the puriK)8e of its design — 
itiug. 

ti wharf was under the charge of an oflicer of General Karle's 
iliOKC duty it was t4) superiiittMid the W(»rk and start everything 
right direction as H<M)n as landed. This uflirer 1>ort* tlio title of 
ar}' Landing Officer." That this duty was well ]M'rfonii«'d is shown 
fact that blocks never mvurred, even on the Central Wharf, which 
Iways the most cn)wde(L A regular system wan ailopted and 
d to, so that the difu^mbarkatiou wasefi<*cted with a minimum of 
ion. The cattle and many of the mules were put into the water 
be transports and made to swim ashons while the horses were 
ded in the boats de8<!rib«Nl on page 175, or on flats, each horse 
sooompanied by his own harness or saddlery and other equip- 
. The latter being landiMl tlrst and carried well up the wharf by 
»particfl; the horses were run ashore to their trappings, were bar- 
lor aaddJac?, Bad leil at once to their appropriate p\acna \ii ca^m^i 



212 BRITISH NAVAL AND UILITARY OPKBATIUHS IN EGYPT. 

The valae of making baste slowly was shown iu the matter of get- 
ting wheeled vehicles ashore. These, at the outset, were pot together 
on board of the trausports, and were ofteu loaded in the lighters ^ong- 
Bide,buCit was quickly foumi thatthespeedaought was really lost, ind 
the process resorted to of lauding the carts aud wagons empty, orevea 
in eases taken to pieces. 

Tln_' work at tin.' Cetitnil Wharf Wiis superintendt'd by Major EG. 
MacGregor until September I, when he was relieved by Major B.H, 
SartoriuH, of the East Lancashire Begirueut. The ditigeuce aud abil- 
ity of tiie^e officers received weU-meriU'd coiumeudatiou in official dis- 
patches. 

To help matters at the main landiug place, a bmncU railway wa« laid 
to it direct from the railw.iy station, so that ihe storea needed at ttie 
front could Ije pat at once into ears and sent off, thus saving one lianil- 
liug, mncb lime, aud, what was at least as important, avoiding the piling 
up of material in the very restricted spiMJC on the wharf. 

The scarcity, amouuting almost to a dearth, of native labor, thre*, 
practically, the entire work of rooviug the stores upon fatigue partiet 
detailed from the different battalions. These fatigue parties* weremiiDj 
and large, aud kept every one busily employed, with little rest oriDtfl^ 
mission. It is satisfactory to hear, iu the words of General Earle, tbe 
officer most interested, that " the troops worked well." 

The base at Ismailia was under the immediate command of Coloud 
Sir W. O. Lanyou, K. 0. M. G., C. B., i'd West India Regiment, with 
the title of " Commandant of the Base," The onier which prevailed 
here after affairs had hail a chance to settle down to a somewhat pc^ 
mauent status was admirable. The 1st battalion of the Mnuchestffi 
Eegiment (late 63d foot) had come from India, and had been detailed 
for duty at the base, where it reumiue<l until the end of the campaign- 




^^^pTMU MAVAi. AND MILITABY OPKRATI0N8 IN KUYIT. 'ilS 

MHft|Hi the Btatioii OominandnDlH next to liim on either hJUu iiirornieid 
tribe novcmrntMuf tntofia apd t^onvoytt, ho thiit tnt>ii,nnliiml8, ami mu- 
titiiil cauuot nrrivp wiUiimt Omliii}[ evi>r,vrliiti(; in rendiiiuwt for lliutr 
lNr|i(ion. Fir btw » ntufl to uid blui in vxvttiiting Lin duty, as, fur iu- 
tfMiv.a lt«ilvr».vOffiri-r,atiEiigiDe«rOtIi(HT,aCiimt»ieHariHt»ndTrttUB' 
^URln-r, un UrdniinM'-HtoreOtttder, aSurKeon, aiida Vet^u-inarj' Snr- 
fNH, nr lu many at tht-m hk tlio (^ircunll<tJlm!^i* of Ilie nasi; iniiy ri'qniro. 
Bvoiiut |in*vfnt dliwnU-n* nud exveitwx In lili« diKtrtvt, and liburand 
iit^lipitv all cwmidaititM iua4lu by nativM. Ho n>(;ul)ite8 tlie d^|tnrt- 
m of ail coDvuyH or (leiHCliDit-nta, Riviiii; writteu orders to the aOlr«r 
L (rKiDiwDiniiiMioned ollli'^ar in cliar^e. 

Tbe work at tlieae alalioim, and )mrtlenlnrly M Ilie )u.lviinv«d depot, 

«M tw^- bt»i%'y. Ttifr inaniial jiart whk inTfurmwi, a« at tb« baiw, by 

iui(iwpanin*of (tcihlierH,oflfiinnniberi)i}!n]iwaril)(»t'2(IO. Tbi' limited 

IWMiil or oitlrng HliM'k and tb« rarity of railway MidiuKS n-iidered it 

ttntmary to Idm! no tiiiii' in nuloailiiiR stores sent by train. Tbe tinaii- 

Itt; iMl uatare of ttie dldiiineiit traitif; tele^crapUed Hbead in every in- 

Mukt, Dieu and auimala in HnfUutent niiHil>era were alwayfi in waiting 

ktkar U«i au» wtllioul delay. Tlie c»n< wfUi atorea for tin* cavalry 

'iMt mieiMplHi at MaliMameh and left by tlie trainx on tbvir way out 

bKBMaaain, to be picbiHl up on tlie return trip. 

Tlr (Hi.h )>r tbe advance alone tbe railway to tbe westward, which 

>u-ly afUir tbe M>li:nre of Ismailia, conllnanl, with iiiHig- 

-ltd Kajiaauln v»n occupied, on AuftUKt 2H, Each moi's, 

limtaiiM* fr^iui tbe ba«e and Involving tbe eMtabliahment 

'•>«i;<t.:>..ii:<i i-iinipa to be niaiutnined, rendered tbe diHlribiilion of aiip- 

1 1^ mire mmplex. General Earle, Hpeakine of afl'airn at tbia {wriod, 

' •*•■ "Tbi- tmn»port of proviMuuH waa thi* dilllcully of the moment." 

■1 traiiH|)ort bud omnplelely brtikeu down. Tbe railway 

M-". Tbe boat Kerviw* In the Swwt Water Canal waa 

I'-nce, and thai wna Ibruatened by thi? nteatly lowering 

. ■ 1. Luckily, the euptare of a large stock of pruviaiona 

ive tbe nadly nlrained iinesi of wtnmanication a slight 

ii-ved t«in|>orarily the preaaing nee^U of tbe troopa of 

— -i.,.iii.-. I'iie telegraph waa it^imlreO and operalinl by volnnteora 

I N bf M Tel el Mahuta. Tlie tide did not fairly l>irii. bowevrr, nntil 

I ■'KaUr Irvinn wen> rAldbllnbi'd on tbe railway, after the n-crlpl of lb* 

""' ~" -' Augnnl Ui. It woa » rritie^l time, fur tbe rapid falling 

liie Saeel Water f'anal bud reiloiwl tbe lioat trallio by 
I lie ohtaerproocMi of tntrkiiig bavliii; tnhe resorted tii, 
'(itiMtiin ftuliatiluted for the qnieker but decjH'r boala, 
' until SeplemWr 3 (hat the (.'oniRiiaaariat und Trjua- 
" .1 ttji amt pieee of work on the IJnnt of O'OmBinuiraUtm. 

, iiiAt date. h'lO niulra, with ^utta, badly hwde<l fiuni waot 

I afaiiMricnuc, siartedfrviu Isuiailia, rejiching Tel-ul-Mabuta the (utlo«- 



214 BHITISII NAVAL ANl> UIMTAKY OPEBATIOIIB IN BOTFT. 

icotiruKf tlie liopes of ttiose in antbont.v, iinil on September SGn 
ernl Karle cunseil cnlcalatimia to be made of the supiiUen iteviled f* 
form a working reserve iit KassasRin for l<i,OOU men iind ',00(t animih. 
It was foniid that at leant forty railvay trucks dally won Id be reqoind, 
each track carryiufr flv« tons net. The distribution uf the«e tnuli 
would be nx follows: 
ImpFrial i.niU|i«: Airik 

To provide for ilaily roDxiiniption ................ .......•.......»> 9 

TooroMe a rwiervo ,„.. B 

Indikn Contuigeiit : 

To pruvldi- fur daily conau nipt ion 



Tool 
I Indian C 

^^ 

^H Toe. 

^^^B Ordnancf 
^^^f Arm; H« 
I HoyalAr 



t^tore Dopurtrneut 

Arm; Heilical Department 

Royal Artillery 

Royal EnKLoeen. 

ReginieDlnl uiid slafr laggage, &c 



Toiul . . 



Od September 6 General Earle issned an order to hts Htalfeorsrii 
point. He directed that " th<^ cauul trnOio and all lrftti8|>ort by a 
[ Vill b« exulUHively devoted to tlit^ re8i>n,-e, and Lhu railway will » 
lliu current wants ami do as much as it (lan for the reserve aa weft.' 
Ihe oliject of thcae fAlculationH and instrnntions wan to accanoM* \ 
t Kaesattsin mtionr. for 10,000 men for thirty days. 
A second estimate wiia mud« of the earring niquin.-d for IvnU II0 
Vther camp cquipu^t-, men's VHliMcs. oIVclts' liiiht bai;ga^<, Ac., vbrBlb* 
ribrce nhonld move forward. As throwing liRhr on the HbenU aoaltitf 
I transport allowed in the British army, thif estimate is given at leiiftt> 



I IfilMttaliuuaoriuruiiIr]-, Seuch 

4,rc|{)iiUMiU ofeovolry, 3 r«cii 

^SlialtorftMiirariiUery, 1 each 

iro and tronpR Royal Engineen, 1 (Mcb.. 

Held buspiial and boanr eatnpaDioa 



r, *o.. 



That is to May, iiuvcu railway trainti, averaging (•leven i-ar^ rjr& 
UD addition to these, provision would have to be made for repiacincS* 
ISmmunition expended in action. 

The end aimed at began to be approached imroediately, bnt It ■• 
mly on September 9 that it seemed to be reasonably clo«e at bai^ 
Dii that day no less than 330 tons of stores went by rait to Ka-'iw* 
D excess of 30 tons over the desired amount estimated for <iii ih 
kth, and in addition to the delivery by the canal and t>y \>»ek ■» 
Rials. The work, thus pushed ahead, bore spiHMly fhiit, remb-rinc P* 
's/We the advance of September I.^, which terminated thi* - - '~ 
At that time 70,000 of the 3W),«W>MW:r\*;MA\ttti*Wd brcn 
iCttMiuHuo for the lmperia\1roos»i^o'^-^^*^''''^^'**^^^^'^'^'''f ' 



ittttttas 



I KATAb AXD MILITARY OPERATIOSa IN ECrPT. 215 

^ intf rrcning railway Kyst«in8 «xt«mled 
''•eojw i>f ttif Lino of Comiiiiiiiiuiliuns witbont, niAterially JDcrcasing 
kUtr. Thv wbt<tw Kgyiitinii i-quipniPiit uf rulliiig stock uuw bvcame 
lUsblr, >o tliat tbi! sa|t|>ly »f liloreM mid provJmoDH for tbe VHrions 
nsoas ooald be readtly loAiDtained unmolested by rail. 
\e b>ue was cbaDK^.'d on rHptdly ok po8Kibl« to Alexandria, and by 
llb^l faitnll}- ttiiy »igU8 of iu> temporary warlike importanef wert> 
^KlsaiAllis. 



TBR COitiltaSARUT AKD TBASRPORT COUPS. 



V lmt>»rl«Dt qtii'^lioi), in tlie military art, of land transport, ItM r»> 
Tf<l in Rntitaod n tuilinioo nlilcb muHt lie rt'Kanleil as abnormal. The 
iiMiio); of fixfi and tran)<]>ortnlion Ih liit' <luly of tbi; Coiinniwtariat 
I (hp Tmuiiitort CnrpH. u civil brnncbof tbr army. Tbu latter aurv ice 
|iIui>m]. to itli u|iprantnfleK, forixtDleuiplated operationa in Earoi>e or 
>tlir[ fii::liiT<-tv'iliit<-tlpartMoftUe world nbittii are traverse*! by ample 
lit cottHtruotitm. 

.1 Kill bad bvrn rrulir.pd, tbe valncof the trHimpurl'scbvme 

1 1 (vHiml lonp Mgo andi-r tbe roaditioos for which it wiw 

M'^il, loit A-> Ktipluiid biui had no troops on tbe Continent either dn^ 

[ Iliv forty yrar» iiilrrvMitwK lM-twe«n Waterloo and Solwstopol or the 

nj ji-ant, ni-«rly, llmt havi? t'lnpwil since tbo Orim«an War, and vrith 

*MiH cKwptiiKi bsA oDndurrml bvr military DperationH of tbc lut 

•»qtiat1f>f* nf Ik ceniary in n-mole nnd Rencrally navuRe eoau(rie«, tbe 

l^Brri^ inevitable ibut the wiHb to be prepared for a HeriouH altlioogU 

■ ii. V hoH involvi-d tbi' Maeriliott of many impurtant aad 

i-idonttions, and bat prevent«d her army fntni having 

i'ort BcrTicv> ready at the uHtaetof her nnoieroua and 

' >'>n of the corp« in (;oo«l. Tbe plan of its equipment ia, 
:> la«king in elaatlcity, in adaptability to the different 
: nblrh II 18 constantly raillfil u|M>n to work ; while iti 

. iind cnmbt-ntomu to anch an exU-nt aa to seriooaly Ini' 

ui iii»><-ui>-i>ti5 the wngous are conwderwl first. 
begtoenUHKrvlcewaicon isMmng and solidly L-onntrncteil; il weighs, 
it7. Abvui II ton. When lurrying ila fall a1lnwanc4> of a ton and a 
•'' <"-'< " -•-•iitinM an extrvoivly eoo<I n>a4l and nix jiowerful horwea 
litlou for ila locomotion. Vet upon Ihiwo wnRoua de- 
\\ worknl out Kyitit'm of rt-gimonlal intnviMirt and tbe 

'li-iii Tbe moment other oiodeH of u>uvi-yNticvare 

ftr-i 1 •111 ion of iho mcKN equipment, &<*., munt be 

^m*l- ' '■-■Iconrnaion and dtHctiDVuul. Vnftv^^*^^^ 

liiiiiilMililiiHiMilii 



216 BRITISH NAVAL AND HILITABY 0PKBATI0N6 IN EGYPT. 

the trauai>ort corps will coutinne to adhere to this impracticable s^nd 

im perish able vehicle. 

The two-wheeled carts, npon which most reliflDce waa placed, wer^ ot 

Mg.a4^ the Maltese patteru, Fif;. Si 

The principal dinieusioDS ^^n 

aa follows : Diameter of 

wlieels,5feet; leogthofsh^^t, 

10 feet; sizeof8haft,2^JDC~Siei 

sqnare ; width of platfonc^ at 

back, 3 feet; width betw -^neD 

shafts, IS inches; oet l(^»ad, 

aboat 8 cwt. 

Somewhat different f^Erom 
- the foregoing was a be^eibU 
hand-cart which could be fitted for mate or donkey draught by the n-^cJiii- 
Fi-^H, *■'*•" "f removable shafts of bamboo. The ends and sid^-a fA 
this cart can be lifted off either for stowaire or use.. "!!rbc 
principal peculiarity was tbe wheel, the spokes being |-i »ioli 
iroD ro<ls radiating from a heavy cyliiidriciil hub termi saut- 
ing iu iron plates. Tbe e|wkes puss tlirough tbese plxBlt* 
and are set up with a nut inside. Fig. 85 gives one siYAte 
and shows the hub of this wheel. 

Tbe water-cart is simply a large cask capable of bolcii'ig 
109 gallons, mounted on wheels, and drawn ordinarilv bj 

TIp-OATt hub vicl D 7 

■pokF. one horse. It may be broadly stated that none of tb^^ 
wagons were of use except for tbe local distribution of supplies. 

In general terms, tbe trausport of tbe British force in Egypt was •* 
follows: 

Each battalion bad tbe Maltese carts, two water-carts, liti drau^*' 





BRITIBH a AY Ah AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 217 

laipment ooropriiied 14 ridiuii: horaea, 180 draught horsos, 74 wagons 
arts, 4 water-carts, and 3 forge-carts. This, technically known as 
Divisioual or Departmental Transport,'' was designed to carry the 
age of the divisional and brigage staflfH, the butcheries and baker- 
the two brigades, and one day's supply of groceries, provisions, and 
[»r the whole division. With the exception of certain modifications 
J«d !• better suit the needs of this particular case, this is the trans- 
labitnally assigned to a division on a war footing. A similar corn- 
was attached to the Cavalry brigade. 

»pt daring an advance, the Departmental Transport is supi>osed 
emplo3'ed in bringing up supplies from the base to the advance 

■ 

ides these Oomniis-sariat and Trans]H)rt Companies there were thret^ 
iliar3' Companies," whose duty during an advance wsis to carry the 
kits, &c., of the two divisions, and during a halt to o]>erate along 
le of communications. As a permanent force engaged on the lat- 
eeiul work, two strong companies were sent out, supplemented by 
tt'ams and |mck animals. The majority of the teamsters were 
ae, and art* desiTibed as '^ a very bad lot." 

I oomi>osition of an Auxiliary Company, as authorized for the cam- 
in Egypt, is given Inflow: 



lUnk. Scv. 



s a 

* o 



•» •• ^ •• 

a ,3 - ,3 

Coninii4«Arl.it an*! Trjniipi'rtrnrfi*. 

rapTAiii I 1 

(j ■■itt'tiiiAiitcr 1 i 

Siihalt«'niii ... .... 1 t . 4 

Stuff iirri:<-aiitii 1! 'J 

S«r;:iant« I 4 1 

TuriMiraU ... 1 I 1 
Wht-»JiT« 111.*. 

I'olUt malf r . . i I 

Fitrif^T aikI 1 Hii..ii:«- «inii)i I ] 

lt«ij'.i»« 1 4 . I 

l*ri«.it<-4 4 111 

Artin-i;!* I :■ • 

S ilill< rn . . 11 4 

*«li<M luj: aihl t-rtiTia^i* Mill [III ■• IJ IJ 

NaMvm 

Init rr'T'-t- rn : t 1 '# 

l»il*»-l» .".4 L'lli •"' ■.'.'.' 

Tift.il ai: t iiiL^ 

Aniiti i!« 

»:;.l!ii^ -f, Jl •- 

I'Af k 4<- ]••■ :• 

Iirs'i^iii I-" .1 ■ 4 * ( 

^fiari- I-t (.1 I . 

T-.'Ul ]]•; 4» 4 :. 4?. 

«'»C b<>r«» t «i i. f<ii tlii- -nlm.tt III M'r>:iM!.' «iii|Mit.i'. aint :iiCi-|<*i :• r two inlim; li<tr«r« fnr 
'^Btrail^Sta tot J I m:i 



*218 BBITiaH NAVAL AND UILITAHT OPEBATIOM8 IN EGTFT. 
The compauy eqaipment was as follows : 



Kldfng 

P«c» 

Draut hvncN (dngloMW.. 
TooUhFsU: 

BbHtnguid duriam (iiillh*. 

ColLkrand hirnfH miken... 

WhHlan 

ImplemuiU tot Ckrta : 

IS':;;;;;:::;":::;:;:::: 

UniDg-jKrlu 



The forge and water carts and one cart were for the use of the eeoC^o" 
to which they were aHsigoed, leaving a« the working strength of e^^^^ 
section 40 pack animuls and 27 two-wLeeled carts, and of the en*^'* 
company 160 pack animals and 108 two-wheeled carts. It is to tl» *" 
Auxiliary Companies that the bulk of the work on the Line of Cc^"" 
munications should have fallen until the establishment of the 1^11^**7 
service. 

As will be seen from the above table, the company was divided i-KS*** 
four parts, each of which could be used na an independent anit, ^»^ 
this rule, it may be observed, characterizes the composition of all Ho-* 




BBtnen saval and military opepations in kotpt. 219 

kla atiliK«d by tlip K<»yal Engint'crs in baiilinK ttm-ks tm the railway 
d pontnoDx and Imau on tbe Swetit Wnter ('rntal. Alrhough the 
ny began lunding at Inmailia on Angu^t '21, it van not antil Septem- 
r 3 tbat tb« CotumiBsnriat nriil TrniiKport bo^nii cuiiveyfuft supplies 

the ttaat {tet pngv ^13), hiuI it only nsBtimed itt) lug:itmat« fiitictionii 
«r the b»ttl« of TpI-HKebir. 

Fo tbu deparltneot ordinarily fallf) the task of haudlioi; th« storea 
Hied at the ba»e, in order that tb« troops may be fVenb for active mili- 
"7 operations. Hrre again it failed. Numbering in all about 1,400 
ts. di«tjllnile<) whf reviT Ibi're were campi*, frou Alexandria to Ka«< 
M 1, too Bmall a forc« remained at Isinailiu to exeeute this part of iia 
wk. CoaimiMary General Morria, the Henior ConimmBariat < Officer of 
K ezpeditinn, baving in rain aaked iu advaocfl for a corps of hired 
aonrs, too Btninc, to supply this deflcionoy, waa obliged to seek relief 

large foliKue parties of soldiers, who were thus diverted from their 
D|i«r ■pbcn> of UKehiluetifl. 

Aoulber resiwtiKibility of tliiii department is the retailing of the army. 
Tlie followins table ia of interest as giving the composition of the 
ki]y rotJOD at three different periods. The ftrst column contaioa the 
tfon aa aaoally anpplied ; the aecond, that ortlered after reaching la- 
i the Ibini, that iHKued after reaching Cairo. 




I. 


n. 


in. 


xk. at. 

1 


ii 


t u 

1 w 

« 1 

■■*■■»■ 


(,ui: " 


riita. 



rh« principal changi'n are in the amonnt of bread or the equivalent 
icuit, leu tvinx n-r)Hired after the hard work of the eampnign waa 
■r; in tbe tea, of nbieh the nllowanee waRtrebletl; in tlie time juioe, 
kteb waa nuule a «leady luxlntd of an ullemative Itnue; In the ftnati 
IBBtablca, of wlileh half wax curtailed and llltentl welgbta of rice and 
batoaa aobatiinied ; and in Tbe rum, the rutioa tteing Antt itreally r»- 
Bcd Mid Ibeo atoppvd entirely. 
Eba bygjonlo value of tbeav modifictttutM la ael(«vML«ttl- la ^b« 



^^^ 001 



20 HK1TI3H NAVAL AND MILITARY OPEEATIONS IN KOfPT. 

ease of tbe grog, it vas fuund tlmi the lruop« not only needeit no din 
niHut ill tliat hot uliiiiHte, but wi;n* actually iH'ttnr off wilhoat iL 

Tliei mtiun was tibaiigetl by ttie Cummunder-iti Oliicl'tt onlrr, btutdaa 
the recommcnilation of tliu Principal MtMlival Offlwr. 

The coiupoueut parts of the ration arc put up as followa, tu: lb 
preturreU meat in boxes of uO pounds ; the bread In bajiH of tlHi pnsub; 
the tea In U-puiuid tin caiii»ter8; t\n.^ coffoeln scpiarc tins, twuinabdi, 
whose gTOsx weiglit in 100 pountU; the sngur, parked liku the ooBtc^ 
in 60-ponud u:LNe(i ; tbcsalt in 13-poiuidcHntst«r»; the mm in lO-p^lgii 
ken», weighing 11!) imnnds ; the pepper in vaaea of six 20 pouD<t r4itl» 
tere, weighing Vi3 pounds gross. 

The packages vary immensely in W4>igbt, and heu(!e intro(Iucr|[ntt 
complexity in the oi>eratiou of packing for tranH[>orT on the 
animals, whose loatls on both side-siniist, of cotirsv, balance. TweJ 
form gross weights for all commissariat parcels, oni> of r>0 nod the ' 
of 100 imunds, would yield much convenienr^ and save time and 
in the field. 

The commissariat nuimals stood the work very well in the 
few bt'ing used up by the heat and heavy labor, and no s|M>niiil dii 
being devulojied. This result is attributed to liberal furtllng, the i 

ition being suppleineuted by extra allowances. Itoughly 
'■when actively employed these animals were given all the foi 
oould consume. It must be roinemlicred, however, that, unlike tb*^ 
Rlr>', they were never beyond the reach of abundant supplirs, ai 
campaign was very short. 

Not ouly was the transport servit^ the weakest point in thC' 
dittonary tbree, but it is not an exaggeration to say that tl failedl 
pletely. In the rapid advance to KnssasKln the troops werv or 
occ-asions entirely without adequate supplier. The u)ipurtuoe 
oft u slock of provisions at Mahaamch alone enabled them to 
ground they had seized, and saved the cavalr^i- and artilleiy 
from actual want. The army is stated by its commander to lui 
tirely "outrun its tranxport," bnt such a state of affairs ouf;ht 
have existed at 20 miles from the base. Upon the propt-r pli 
I Uie respousibility for this failure dejieuds thecbauc^of gnunlingai 
UtH re<^'iirrenc<> in tho future. For a report of this nahiiv it is iiii| 
nie tu obtain the fact« necessary to a complete detenninsttoD of tit 
■Banses that produced so lamentable a result. Certain consideratieH 
however, are not out of place. 

■ The wagon must be light and strong, aud be fitted with binketi. Cm- 
niissary-General Morris prefers the American type, which, with «i^ 
Ejonlos, can haul a load of from one to two tons, This wagun was niiA 
fiued at the Uapv of Uood Hope, and gave satisfaction, 
tlbonld never ride, but Hhoiild walk beside their ho^es. 

An to harness, Genera\ VToWW^ udcocates the ase of both 
strafu and collars, so that & cUalVti mwtovA tow; V; ■aVx^^Si Itftm. 
tfte other, and bia iwvieeB not \(»V Attt\tt& eaOT<iiMMOi»gfc -^ 



ISR KAVAL AHD MILITABV OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 'HI 

rilriltt.r Ibnc wlieeleil triiii8]>ort iimy tw impracticable Rliould 
toivpvr funtiH of jiiick-Kiuldlts stiuuld bt.^ tidopttKl, uud u wvll- 
tpatckiog drill devised in comicction with their use, 
fcief rraaoti for Ibe break dowu iiitbe transport waN andoiibtcdly 

ITstteinptnl adbereace to a Hgid RjKlem, nbHoltilf ly iiiii4iiiled to tli« 
Mfllr)' i» wliiffli Ibp ojwrations wer« to Iw condiirtod. Tlie nntix'e iu- 
ubilantA mny bn geai-mlly luiBained to iiudt-'ratiind fiiirly well thvir own 
«rdft ID this iiarticular. In Egypt frntn tiniL' imnieniorinl tbey bare 
md pack an imnla (exclusively. Had tb^ BritiRL tranttpnrtL-orpa lauded 
^nuilia wirb an udeqDate and wt-IIorganlEed niulf* train, ttit^ heavy 
^^utwl the inUTminiotm in ilu' railways vuiild have faili>d to check 
^^^b of Mi|>|>Uoti to the front, and the army would have b^n Hiiared 
^^^Djancv of si-pmiDi: to eaffpr almost witUio sight of tho buMs 
'When thv frv(|Deocy of Un^'laod'a ward is remembenid, it seunia hard 

Wli«<re that lli« outbreak of each fthoiild find thin imiMirtant depart- 
•MiHthoal tb4> untmaJa nnd drivern ueceMutry to the pmjior placing 
^^hut oDv army corps in tbf field. 

^^^Bilvnys in t^uglatid are so ninth more economiual carriers of 
^^^that the transport coijii>anieaexiHt during peace maiuly as cWre*. 
■■gall Id activu niililAry preparation nii'Hnn the hurried purobaae of 
M«HUtl9 of aniualsat ejiortiitant prices, and the engaging of hundreds 
r Duknown (minsters at high «'age«. The money which wouhl b« 
*!«le<l for Uw inaintenHnoc, on a war footing, of the eight Comtnissariat 
M Tnuuport Cuoipaniea that ordinarily accoiii)uiny an army corps, is 
kaauoed in the enforceu hasto of niobiluation, while the resnlt la seen 
I «a nntlrilled moti, often quil« an capable of harm as good. 

Oaring the Kgypiiiin oaupalgD tb« Oovernatent pnrchaKed 10,000 
laliM. A large pro(fort Ion of these animals vurv sold immmltatt-ly after- 
Mib M bnt a froirtiun of their cost The loss incnrrvd by the differ- 
■oebetwai'i) ibe ovlliug and tht* buying prices woaldbave malutaiued 
W bits for uany inonthn, and in some coses years. 

Wv im «z|ieiwlve at the be«t, and nations that are liable to l>e called 
|MNi to tak« |nut in It Hud It chea|HMt in tlie end, as it Is wiseitt, to be 

U^gnsmnd. 



TRK TBOOl'S. 

I.— THK OATALBV. 

n fnicD curb of tho Ihm^ regiments, the Ist Life tSnnrda, 
p Ouatrls, and the Ituyal iIor»e ttuanls ("the Hlut**)"), which 
rise the Hoosehold Cavalry, was wnt In tlgjpt and fiinmMl 
t about AM stniug. 

■*. uoiii) Ifnuf than six frel in V«iv,\it^ iiva 



222 BBITI8U NAVAL AND MILITABT 0FEBATIQH8 IN 

of the climate caused tbe abaudoDiog of this beavy eqo 
great comfort of tlie wearers. The cuirass was laid ask 
met was substituted for the ateel helmet, and, instead of 1 
serge (techuically known by the Indian name of puttees) 
about the calves of the legs. 

Theothercavalryregimeots, the4th DragooD Guards, tt 
Qaards, and tbe 19th Hussars, each about GOO strong, 
diessed. 

The organization of a British cavalry regiment on a ' 
given in the following table : 




BRITISH NAVAL AND UlLITABY OPKBATIONS IN BOTPT. 223 

The regiment is divided into four squadrons, three of which are com- 
ooanded by majOTB, the fourth b; a captain. The estAbliahmeot of the 
aqnadrott is given in the following table: 



.„. 




— 1 


1 

1 




1 


! 




120 


4 
11 
















UO 


i 














T Ul 










lao 


' 


. 







The equipment of the trooper consisted of swofd and Martini- Henry 
Bttrbine. ^e latter is carried in a leather backet at the right side of 
t^e saddle The Hoosehold Cavalry carried revolvers in addition and 
^ beavler pattern of sword. All the metal trappings were allowed to 
*'<i8t, in order to avoid reflecting the sunlight. 

The following tables give the weights carried by the cavalry soldier 
ia marching order : 

ON THK BADDUt. 

LU. Ot. 

Hoof-pick » 

No«e-bag 1 1 

Heel rope and shackle 1 3 

Picket) Dg peg 12* 

Mess-tin 1 3i 

Carbiue bucket 2 



B«lniet 

Tunic 

^^•niMtl shirt .. 

X>'»w.» 

Twn^n, , 

^*»oe« , 

Books 






Lhfc 


Oi. 





15 


3 





1 


1* 





121 


2 


6 





4 





ii 


3 


:t 





m 



Total . 



BADDLXBT. 



Mils 

**«* 



hirofMdd]e-bi«a. 



__ 


■>* 


13 


&i 


33 





4 





I 


3 





12 


2 


12* 





15 


5 


13 


3 


13 


40 


3* 



IK FIIONT OP THE SADDLB. 

Pair ankle boot* 4 

Forage cap 5 

Cape 2 13 

Total 7 1 



ARMS, ETC. 

Sword and belt, &.C 5 IS 

Haversack B* 

Waterbottle 2 9 

Pooket-knife % ^ 

Pouch-belt ^ » 



124 BHITlSn NAVAL AND HI[.ITARV 0PBBATION8 IN BOTPT. 



Ahms, Etu. — Cuutiunml. 



ir for HouiH-bolil Cav- 



ToUl '£\ 

IN SAOULK-BAOfl. 

1 flkunelahiit I 

Ipalrrtrawem 

1 bold-all, cnnlainlDg «i>M>n, 

4ub, *o 1 

fuittookt 

rsl 0, 



In BAlWLK-BAOa— CoMllWNi I 

1 Uaofgtfw»n ' 

1 bone-liruab ...,.,,.,..... 

I cnrrj-eomb 

1 bornn-nibbnc 

1 Btablo-Bponge 

oil-butUo 

Pipiwlkf, Ae 

Tolal 



C'lo»k 

TrouBWn l| 

Com-iMrk 

PioketiuK p<:^g Sfl 

TclBl 



wriKbt nrtronpar'aMitfra pi]uipiDnnl .. 
■ in HauNcbuld CnvaJrr 

The equipment of cflmit ntenaiU, i»;.(:., iuiicinliinjj Umlpi and I 
ments, signnlinf; inntrnnients, &c,., varied Troni the rojiiiIiU' < 
ment in but iiisi^'nilfcntit particulars, cmmmnjouoiI b; tlie pxiiceDoh 
the climate and tlie ilexire to have uo more imiwilimctita tiamM 
iie«esHary. 

The helmetd, ordimtrily white, icgre stained a light brote* wUhk 
Htuber to render tketit lets vmblc in tJte bright Ugkt. Bine ((Ofcsia 
veils were is8ue<l (or the men, and eje-frliiKCw Tor the horoeit. Tbell 
were most usefnl on a«»ionnt of the flies that «wftrm in Bfzypt, b 
former were very genernlly discarded by the men, the veil* onljh 
habitually used during Hieep. 

The forage ration is 12 poauda of hay and 13 poandn of oata. U^ 
not very strictly adhered to, the supply bein^r too scant at flnl. 
wards fomge wajt isttnetl very liberally and the horses allowMl u ■ 
fts they eould eAt. 

A coinprvMsed gniin cnke, o(im|>osed mainly of o«t8. with m 
■ portions of beans, bay, and crusbetl linseed, was tried and foand I 
^wer the purpose very well. 

It is proi>er to state that Ibe veterinary arrangements were c 
ordered iind Ihe veterinary stalf etncleiit, every thinfc beinK doiM (i 
anitnals which tliu eireiimMtJinens purmiEted. 

The eavalry did excellent aerviw all throuffh tUecampai^,a 
fllsewhera in ofUcial re|turts. The horses »U>oi\ the work wcJl, a 
being lost Ooui all eausea up to the end of September, uotwitli 
that they were seiitont from Umailia immediately aftei* iMiding I 
Ufag sen voyage, and that they were at times almost Ktarvad. 
TenernI Dniry-Ijowe aliributCB flx\* tccwriS. \o ftv«> IvtKxrMattbc I 



pniH SAVAL AMD UILITABr OPKRATIONS IN RQYPT. 22& 

I vrrj rauvftilly sirletiUMt uiid Hone wero itndprbrAd. lie ttilDks 
il lionws «-ii(ilil nut hiiro pnlled throiiKb. 

Tbe nlatirc ralitc of Irgbt und lit-»v,v cariilr>' wan not XeMni during 
Ifca nar. Tbe onoutry was not ndttplitd to nipid movfiinculi*, and the 
Bo-[rtistu w«n>al«n.viiiiidMposiNl loallotr Ih^Uritish Umpproncli near 
HMNigli to chnrttf. On tbe othc^r liand, tbe Hniiseliold Cavalry, in Hpite 
iflbeir wt^iftlit, lit^ld Ibrlr iiwn Hi atl combined morenieiitH, and Innt notlt- 
)a| in cooimrUuMi witb flit-ir tighter oolleaguoj*. 

Thia arm or th« Mnioe avbivveil tlii^i two moat brilllnnt and drauiHtic 
■trohMof the aunpni{;» — tbt> moonligbt ubargv of Aiignst 28, and tbe 
minre of </airo. An to tbe first epinode, i t may bo fairly doabtinl wbfthnr 
Uw EopltaoK would bavo Htooil to their kuuh io broad daylight. Tbo 
v*lBe i>f thflr |fr«M^noe on Sept«nil>er U ou the oxtremo right of tbo 
BrltMi lino KM nbonn fn the failnre of Arabl to »tt«mpt a tnrnlag 
AomnvDt bj- tbi! TrI-rl-Kfbir force.. After tbn experience of the pre- 
kadinit vagaevment hin men cuoL-vived a rval divad uf tfan Krititdt cav- 
klrj, wkow pbyHJral t-Olriency wan ptYipnriionately enbant^ by tbia 
tkcreubml moral pmslige. 

Jwlgwl by iu re«»rd, the efficiency of tbe Britti«li cavalry In Ugypt 
Msaw to loATv llltio to b« desired. That the result wiw readied by a 
feMwa) departure, in some mM-s, from the staudanl etpiipmnnt Is a fact 
kUah abooM be full of meaniDg. 

n. — m^ MOt^NTKU INKANTBV. 

Ate corp« «raJi organised by Captain 11. HallamParr, C. M. O^ 
nmcnetjtbire Light Infaiilry, fntin volnnteerM from ditTen-iil regimenla, 
Moatly thow in the Deld. It was actirvly employed at Alexandria, where 
■a regolor cAf^alry whs prvnent, and in all the DDgMgeuientM of the coid- 
laiga rrmn lamailia to Cairn. 

At tbe onlaet it wba comitoset) of 100 men, selected mainly with ref- 
i Wu. to their skill lut marksmen. The other ccmdltions were good 
mdoetand fairborwmanship. Thejie men were providetl witb borsea, 
iad wbatover was necusiiary to their maintenance as a mounted corps, 
bat great exactonss of cavalry drill was avoide*), aud ibey wore strictly 
kapt to tbe (Miginal idea of b^ing mobile shariiahootors. Tbey were 
ragmged in the reennnsiHsaut-e in force of August 0, loading the lefk 
lUack with vigiir, being honorably menllonMl by (ieneral Alison In bis 
tMcial dispatch on that oeoAMion. 

Tbey were brigaded with the cavalt:)' after rt-au'-bing Ixmailia. By 
roonds nr duiease they had fallen oflT to about V.} in namtier at KI Hag- 
Iwaod TeleJ-Mahntji. Prior toTel-el Kebir tlioir ranks wen'iucmnoed 
mlBO. 

Their aen'toe* tlinmghoot the euuipalgu are constantly spoken uf In 
fM.trts IK t.rinB of euinmeiidation. Tlit'ir ndlug was criticiiml to tbeir 
■IT tbe average Knglishmuu is eXKClinK in ibis nK^^ucX^ 
' r tbfj- managed to keep op at M «\tb t\iA c»<nt\r$ \it Om 



» 



226 BKITISU N'AVAL AND UIUTARY (tPEBATIONS IN KOTPT. 

two du,VH' forc«d tiiurcU Trom Miihiiiim(>ti to Cnim provod llieircMhu 
anceonliorHebuok, altUougliitmustbccMJDri.'ss))*! Uit-y arrived soawwbt 
the worse for tliejouriiey. 

The i«hai-i)npss of tlieir work is aoen in the diRiiro]mrtioiiat«l5' beary 
loi«8 tht'y BUBtauicd. As an iustjince it iimy be iiotctl rhnt every oBerf, 
with one excvpttou, wm eitht5r killod or wounded iK-foro SiiptrmW 11 

Their vnliie was concodL-d on evL-ry hnm), and the ilMimbtlitf W 
such a force in all military o)>orationH universally ackuowMned. Ai 
dincuMned by those interested, the question atisumed the followiuKHlupe; 
Is it advii<ahle to crystallize the corps into a iH>rnianent orsnnlxation t 
Tbi" ofHuion Meemed to be general that it wonld Iwst sen-e Ibe |iur{MiM 
of its cre>atiou by retaining lt« iiuasi-vobinteer character, and by oBff 
inffto men in regiments serxing at homu, as a Hpecius or reward lilt 
good e^nductand markstnausliip, Iheopportnoity of active a«»rvi(je id Ihi 
field. The friends of the troop were verj- positive in the expr«iMiM of 
their lielief that the main object of its formation wonld be lost if ps 
manently organized, and that it wonld inevitably grow into » eavaliT 
company, pet^nliarly armed, to be aure, bnt atill a cavniry compHj 
etrictly speaking, the time and thought of the men being diverted fttm 
sharpshootiog to precision of moanted maneRVcrs and overaucH 
maintenance of horse trappings. 

It may be safely taken for granted that In her next war Jln^iaai 
will not fail to have a comparatively large force of mounted influitT; to 
supplement her cavalry, its general plan being as dimple as lliat of tb* 
hundred or so who diti such satisfactori' work In Egypt. 



III. — THE INPANTHV. 



The basis of urgauiKiition in this branch i» the butlallou, and, in |^- 
oral terms, the scheme is as follow;); 

The battalions are assembled into regiments, bearing, as a rale, MWf 
name i)eculiar to the county where the headquarters nree8t»bli«bcdaa4 
fhim which reeniits are meant to be drawn. Two battalions are nga- 
lam, and two belong to thocounty militia. In addition are sncb rohii- 
teer infantry corps as the district possesses. The whole is umler am 
or more titnlar colonels, who never serve in the cajiacity of n-gimMitftl : 
commanders, but whosit position in ordinarily that of a gviieral ottctr. 
A colonelcy, by the way, is a HubstHntint reward for a distiiiL-ut.->hid 
military record or an honor acoonlol to ]>erKons high in r« ' 
That the honor is considered mntuul is shown by the fa«t t ij i ' 
the Uukeof Cambridge, the Field Marshal Oommauder-in <". 
lar colonel of two cavalry regiments, of threi' infantry regim. . 
the regiments of Iloyal Artillery and the corps of ICoyat f 
while H. K. U. tlie Prince of Wales is colonel of the threv n-t . 
Household Cavalry, of the Tenth Hussars, and tlie Itflle bii^.t<k' 
Of the ifgiilar infanlrs' VmUvi\Wvwo\\«\*%v\vvwMA\»«tve »t lw»i 



BSlTIfiU NAVAL AND MILITARY OPKBATIONS IN EGYPT. 227 

while the other to abroad. The iutroduction of this plan, with it8 ^* ter- 
ricorial desitgnatioiis," Hotiie twelve ye^irs niDce, was attended by the 
breakini? np of the old regimental system and the suppression of 
nomericftl titles. 

EMch battalion, the practical working unit (for the regiment as a 
whole is never united), is under a lieutenant-colonel. The war estab- 
lishnieut is as follows: 



Uoi-MA. 




t 



lUnk. ; ti 

6 

9 
>5 

LtratrBMit ettlonrN 'J 

Mi^|oiti .... ..... 4 

CapCalBs 4 

UvatonaBU. Ac 16 

A4|aiMit 1 

tttT ........ ... 1 

1 

»r 1 

»r MricfADt . . 1 

BamAm m m n l 1 

Dra»«MUor 1 

Ordarlj room-cWk 1 

AnMMvr •erffCADt 1 

^jrw— tw M-rgeaot 1 

TnHMpott aerxMot 1 

8M-|MBtcook 1 

PloBcar wrsMUil 1 

Color mnmmtM (orderly ) . . S 

SrrirnMit* 32 

Itafk-n 10 

I .orpnTBifl 41 

Pj»B««ra mhI Brtiflririii . ■ 13 

RMd 'JO 

PrivatM WM 

l»rlTm -JJ 

Total ~.. 



•-! \ 



§ 



30 



40 
18 



I.OW 



4 ".'.' 



10 ■{ 



1 I 

M.ooo .j 
I ( 



1 
1 
I 



8 



44 



44 



The iHfmonal <M|uipment of thr f(M>t s(>lili«T is shown in the table sub 
joiufd : 



AB«I •rccialrrmrau. 



M 



.\rti(l**(i woiii li\ I III* ^ 
^•Idiii. T 



V.iline. Mill artirleM r^r 
ri«il in It. 






Lb. nz 



Mt %mA frnc 

of MBmOBltftOIl 



' " . fuU 



H««i 



Total 



1 


7 

1 


u 

I 



00 

i:i 

13 

14 
h 
D 

tf 



» : 



Hrhiii-I . ... 
Kf«k .. 
KUdoi-I Mliiit 
'J'rnuiMTM ... 
Urai !•• 
SM'ki* 

lltMltH 

Ti»lJi 



Lb. O: 

«i l.'p 

'J ii 

I !• 



II 




4 

11 i:i 
3 :i 

11 '.I 



0--i-riti4t ami i'ift}M* 
Sinn 

Nm kn 

1 iiWrl 

('iilii)i 

SplMltl 

Puliainni: Imiiih 
Tin "f »:n".i»r 

SfNiniif 
1 tiiii«f t • 

\\ Nit* 

V«li« .11.1. •(i«p4 



l.t* Ot 





1 

u 



u 
u 
II 
(I 



•» 

3 
II 
u 
4 



10 

•t 

M 

m 


4 

3 
4 



•i*y 11| 



The wBist'btfii ami hntrvn of the I'tHit so\d\ov \\\W't \\\aV\^ua\\\ \\v\tfik 
afaeutuifu iHmUul for (i/irr:i(ioii> asluav. lu aw^'^^*'^^^^*^* ^^^^*'^ wfi««\ 



B8 BRITISH NAVA.L AND MILITARY OrEBATIONS IN kUVrT. 

I nnneccssaill.v womiiUcnltil «rrangonient of Hiraiifl and bntikles,! 
apoi) aiialyBis thi>j- ivri> rotitid to be u wetl-o^uxiOor^l t(oliemu,tiariD|t f oi f 
itti aim tbe attiicliing of ttiu wvigbtM vurried iit murcbiiig ho us to tfcmvr 
tbe ttriiiu «ikiu tbe sUouUIerB atiil to rclievB thu bips. Th« old-fluA- 
ioued knapoack b:ia given ]ilac« t»B Hoft leather " valine," wliirli Ixwon 
at tlie l>Hcik below I be waist. 

All parts of lUtf boll anil Hnspenslou are provided willi back] 
tbe piir]i(>)ii> uf a<lju8tiiieiit to tbe size andsbniw of tbe man. Tbe a 
fittiut^s an' uf brass, and tbv leather is andn.'H«ed. Iti garriiKMi tl 

r iH pipeclayed. 
I Tbe waist-bell, Fit;. tW, liHH8ta)ile8on ei'lbnr side of lire daop, tow 




|- be liiiekbHl the HDsiwuHiori «tnipii from tbe sbouldor bracm. 
» are clipped ib« Iwll bag and cartridge itouoh. 

Tbe braces mic broad itlrapn passing over each oUouUltr ftwn tk» 
optKwile upper cor»fr of ibc valise. From tb« ring at tbe fKiiii eod of 
e-ach bra<« are three Blraps, Fig. 87, mie going to the bottom and ww 
to the top of Ibo vttlisc, which ia (htin prevented from tliippiuK. Tbi 
Uilni takea Ibc weight of tbe articicii strung on the bi-It. Tbe fmat 
tuid back lOHds are llins made to balance, miigbly. Another Mt«p)» 
Hf tacbvd Hi will lu eacb brace A>>- a \ouv<a.ii>l.\a f«r tbe pnr[)ow of o 
ioif tbe overcoat, properly roWe"! av, V»W«*stt tW Ako^jX^vx^. 



, ASU MiLlTAHV OPERATIONS IN KtlYlM*. 2i'J 




RBITISn NAVAL AND MII.ITAKY OPKRATIONS IN KOYPT. 



preseiiM tlieappi 



In 



Tlie mesH eqnipmeut is worn on top of tlie vulj 

When in bvavy tnnrcliiiig order the HoI'li 

mlicatt'd in Fig«. W*. 89, tH». 

In Ef^yp't the cork helmot wiiu thu heud dru«s for nil coriw. 

The inesH'liii is nhown in Fig. 01. Its priiicipnl dimenBions ur ^l^ 

iuches !)>' i tnehea by 4 inches. Tlio handle in of hrafla. The cov-^^ 

en as n coffeo-jtot, iind \ia» n bnuw handle, which foldn down ttuida 

he cover. Itx nppeanince iu given in Fig. 02. | 

It may be renmrked thiit, prnvtic^lly, ull the battalion* were uved 

Id equipped alike, the designations "light infantry," "rifles," "fUK- 

ierfi," &c., being distinctions without differences. 

The service arm is the Martini-Henry rifle, oaliber 0.45 inch. It ha^ 
seven grooves. The bull weighs 480 grains, and the itowdcr cbarp h> 
85 grniiiB. The piece is uighted up to 1,450 yardt, but has nn effeclire 
range twice as great. 



^^Th^ld 



IHt: ROYAK ABTiLLBHr. 



IbylKin^H 
tier?" wh^M 



3 artillery of the British amiy is known ax " MouDUUa J 
lerj-" when the pieces and airriagen are trauaportiMl mi tin* 1 
pack animals; im" Field Artillery" when the pieces are haulwl by h 
the crew being for the most part on foot; and aa"nor»e Artillery" 
the pieces are hauled by homes and none of the crew are on foot. 

All three cIahsos of this branch of the service were reprcsenteil in tto^* 
R^ptiancampaign.aswillbeseen tVominaitectionof the following UU^^~ 
which gives the general details of each battery of six gnna. 

The natnre of any battery is snllicicntly indicated by itH ftbbrvri 
title, the brigadoH of horse artillery lieiug lettered, and Ihn* 
and garrisoa artillery being numbered, while the indinduol liatt 
of both horHe and field artillery are letteretl, and thorns of garriw 
tiltery are numbered. (Garrison artillery is also di^triltut^ wi 
ally into Northeni, Scottish, [jondon, &e., divisious.) In eoiiseqoi 
a battery si>oken of by two letters, as N.A., is of hon»e artillery ; 
letter and a number, as J.3, is of field arttller>' ; and by two n 
5.1, Seottish, is of garrison artillery. No matli'r the eor|M tn \ 
temporiirity auslgnetl, the batterie-s always ri'l^iin Mi 
iicli an artillery briKa4lc. 



• IHH NAVAL AND UILITABY OPEBATIONS IK EGTPT. 231 



■'III 



:ll iii 



t U.LR.l»pdr 



' li » <: 
lie' 



H*i 



:l ill 



N A U.I,.K.nj)dr. 



I 



I. [JJ 



The foregoiDg are "Imperial Troops." There came from lodia with 
the Indiao Contingent tnro batteries, viz, H.l, fleld artillery', with the 
tiow obsolete 9-pdr. gno, and the 7.1, yorthern division of garrison ar- 
tilleiy, eqcipped as a moautaiu battery itnd carrying the 7-pdr. screw- 
jointed guns, which will be fonnd described at length in the section 
treating of the Indian Contingent. 

It will be observed that here were fonr distinct calibers to be sap* 
plied. It may also be remarked that all the pieces, without exception, 
*eret(f the mnzzle-loading type. 

In addition to the batteries mentioned alwve, a siege train, based on 
vhat is known as the "light nnit," watt sent to Isniailia, arriving on 
September 6. It was partially landed, but not useil. Its comitosition 
wag ten 40-pdr. M. L. E. of 35 cwt.; ten 25 pdr. M. L. R. of 18 cwt.; ten 
^3 inch M. L. R. howitzers of 18 cwt. With it, to work the gnns, were 
toor batteries, numbering 16 officers and 550 men, drawn from the 1st 
I'OndoQ and lat Scottish divisions of garrison artillery, and enumerated 
'U the table on p. 102. It was brought out for fxintineent nse against 
Cairo. The gunners, howevei, remamed on bourd the transport Teviot, 
&t Ismailia, returning to England after the issue of the war was decided, 
'heir services haiipily noc being required in Egypt. 

Six 26-pdr. siege gnns, sent trom Malta, were planted on the Is- 
mailia line: three at Kassassin, one at Tel-el-Mahuta, oneat Mahsameh, 
tad one ai S'efiche, for the defense of the camps at these [Xtints. Those 
• Kasaaaain were the only ones used, and they to but a slight extent, 
t September 0, wlKn they were manned by the 6.1 Scottish division. 
It is thought well to describe briefly the 16 and 13 pdr. gnns, as they 
ra chiefly employed during the campaign, and represent the stand- 
ann of the British field batteries of to-day. The former is repre- 
'«d in Figs. 03, 9i, 95, iind 96. 



232 BBIT18U SJL.YA.L. AND HILITABY OFEBATION8 IN E( 




B HAYAL AND IIILITABY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 233 

eU description is as follows : 

Wrought iron. 

8te«l. 

IncbeSy 78. 

Poands, 1,344. 

Pounds, 7.r>. 

luchoH, 3.G. 

Inches, 68.4. 

Cnbic inchcH, 706. 

Woolwich. 

Inches, .'VH.W. 

r 3. 

Inch. O.ll. 

Inch, 0.8(>. 

copper Inch, 0.6 from the bottom of the bore. 

Hidesichtecl only. The sights are set at a permanent angle 
16 left to correct drift. The tangent scale is fonr-sided and 

leaf for deflection arising from the wind or other irregu- 
iides are marked as follows : 1st, in degrees; 2d, in tenths of 
ponding ranges; 34l, in >ards; 4th, blank. A table contain- 
data is attacheil to the top of the right cairiage bracket. 
tileA used with the 10])dr. are shell, shrapnel, and C4in- 
ic^ll weighs 15 ponnds empty, and 10 pounds .S ounces when 
ed. It is shown in section in Figs. 97 and DS. 
lel contain 12 iron bullets of IS to the pound, and 5<> of 84 
, 128 in all. The bursting cluuge is U ounces of powder, 

weight of the projectile when i*'ady for (iring is 17 pounds 

(Figs. <td and KM).) 

^r contains 170 iron balls of lOA to the pound, lillcd in with 
il. It weighs 15 [)ounds .'5 ounces. (Figs. 101 and 102.) 
• charge for the gun is three pounds K. L. it. powder, giving 
LK:ity of l,.'i55 feet per se<'ond. 

are either U. L. pereussion or the u>ual Boxer time fuze, 
•s of the former are shown in Figs. lo;{ and 104, and re- 
anation. 



234 BBITISH NATAL AND HIUTABY OPERATIONS IN 




HJLTAL AKD MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EOTPT. 236 







236 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITAKY OPERATIOMS IN ! 

The Boxor fiize U now always sapplieil of tho 15» 
shown in Pig. t05, »□<!, like tbe percu8Hion fuzeti, la too well | 
need description. 

. These time and percuseiou fuzes are commou toallealibi 
being tapped to a uniform gati{;o. 

Fig. 101. 
Apmvga Wmj^~lJUa.3«m. t9m. 

TiT' 



^L AND UIMTAKV Ol-KRATIONS IN KUTPT. 237 

a lO-pdr. Ik of iron, uioiintnl on coid|)08U« wh««lB. 
I liitv« giianl-iroiiH iiiid foot-ri'inls, so tiiat ttiu.v may 
v<e far wala. Kuch box vontniiiii two rotiiids of ammuuitioii. 
rba timber in also of iron aud of tli« usiiiil form. The shafTit arc 
lar Mt'l oif^ {that in, tbt> uear shaft is in tli« renter of the llinbur), 
I an Bttnl for ninicte, doubln, treble, or bullock dmiight. Tlivro are 
M UmberbnxHi, tbe near and oil', eavh r»iT,ving 12 projcotilea and 
Ban; outiidgtw. Tb» projcctitun nn- v'«^'k*'(i on fsnd around the 




• box, Uie apace witbin Ueiuc resrrvtM] Tor Uio cartridBM^jl 
nt dmiiciiM to ]trolect tlin latter fn tlie ereat of tbe IbaKl 
Ett in tctiao. 

IW oenter box, wblcli In Bnialk-r than tb«' otben, uoataltia an aaaort- 
•tof ftiKaa, friction pmovrs, tools, gretue, Jto. 

IW workinff limit of thin Kun is nl about -1,000 .varda. At that raage 
I pttjt e l i kt bMM Mti 4 ogln of tlenixiil of I'l'^ W and ft ttmaluVibi t^b»- 
iSht Is 14 « 



I 



238 BBITI8H NAVAL AND MILITAUV OPKRATIUNH IN BOV)^^! 

TLe 16']i(lr. iireavutH HOin« |>oiiito well wortby nf aualysis. ItaflS 
ia 84 tiiufta tbat nf tbe |irq)ectile, it« length of bore 1!) culitMa;! 
system of rtfiing ia niitiqtiated, iU imwdor oliar^ IfAH tliiui one-UI 
tbe weight uf th« sbell, its ratige stiinll, mid its itimiUiiiiig vvlocttjr in 
Thesu particniars iirv not in u<M;oril with thi^ tvudcuey of noden «n 
tutaoe, ami ia tioiise()U(!tici] the gun is being replaced hjr tbe neww S 
I>dr., Bu excelleut weupuu of its type. Un acooant of its htiof H 
latest outcome of British experience and thought, a rather detailiilll 
count of tin; gun ami itt< apiinrteuanccs i8 (leciiiiHl iu plac«-. 

The geiieml a]Ji>e<miiicc of the mpdr., I'littu 73, is not unlike thill 
its prodeoessor, and its mode of coustructiou is the sanii*— a sted Idl 
and wrought'iran breecb coil. Jt varies, however, mainly tn tbe rtt| 
in being longer aud narrower, and in having a chamber. m 

The principal dimensions, &c., are as fcdlows: ^^| 

Hnterial ^^U 

Eit^tior Wra«||kll^H 

Tobe (XML _^^ 

Leugtb, tutsl likaki%II^^H 

Welsht Fo«<i,I^H 

Bora: ^^1 

Cklibet laehMb&^^l 

Lengtli laehwfll^^H 

Tout oapaciiy CnUaM^^I 

ToMl aieanfMctiou Sqnacsii^^H 

Diwnpter Icolia^ '■^^^l 

Cbsmber : ^^H 

Iiengtli I»cIm% l^^^l 

- Cspmoit; CntitobMi^^H 

KIBing ^^M 

SyMem. ModMa y^^H 

Tw)b1 ...Dolfonnly inon*tlDg tioiu on* tarn tu [00 cAllben to oh ^^^| 

callbeni at 9 incbe* from llie niniiln, tliiinc« BulfanD. ^^H 

Letigth luebw^ A. ^^1 

Number 10. ^^M 

Itoptb lanh, (LOK. ^H 

Width Iiicfa,dMI^H 

Utwu* uf rutstiuD Copper baae otpM^^H 

Tent, lutnleni^d copper 7 Inchni fhim thi' Itutton of^^H 

The gun is Ctintur-sightcd only. The sights arc svt >itftpa^^^| 
angle of 1° 30* to the lelt tu cornMst ilrlft. The brm-ch sight bl^^| 
iDg I«af. In tbe upper edge of this leaf is a notch li.U6 iooh dl^H 
Ti^Ma. below it a hole O.lU inch io d^^| 

"^'"' (Figs. lUC and 107.) Tbi«eoon^H 
the cxinica] point aud the idglitfl^^| 
dow, fltte<I wiUi vrusf-bainiof tk^^H 
a*^rmm4frmitghl;\^p<„»d» «'l{'lt- t"'*! »« U«^ for roUf^ ^H 

■V. £>■ H. sighting n:s|>C4:Uvcly. Tbe fimt^H 

a rcinornhle block of Virouxv, tttUk^vA \\v \\& »«»x ^% «i|bt >bm^^| 




BRITIBH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 239 

The breech sight is marked to degrees only, a brass range table on 
tlie bracket giving other information as desired. 

In front of the chamber the bore of the gun is reduced by a choke to 
» diameter of 2.93 inches. This choke prevents the projectiles from 
entering the chamber and seats them all uniformly. 

The projectiles used with this gun are of the usual three types, shell 

Bhrapuel, and canister. In design they are similar to those for the 16- 

pdr. shown in Figs. 90 to 95, but differ from them in the substitution 

of a base ring called the '^ gas check,'' which is made of 100 parts of 

copper to 3 of zinc, and which presents no peculiarity. The service 

charge is 3 pounds 2 ounces of B. L. G. 2 powder, giving an initial 

velocity of 1,595 feet per second. The fuzes are identical with those 

described already. The shell is of cast iron. The base for half an inch 

is reduced to 1.87 inches in diameter and cast with a circular groove for 

Attaching the gas check, and with twenty radial grooves by which the 

ring imparts rotation to the shell. The head is struck with a radius of 

one and a half diameters, the point truncated, bored out, and tapi>ed to 

receive the fnze. The interior is lacquered with a comi>osition of 12 

parts of re^iu, 2 of Spanish brown, and 1 of plaster of Paris thinned with 

turpentine. The length of the shell is 10.57 inches. The bursting charge 

is 10 ounces. When empty the shell weighs 12 i)ounds, and when filled 

, ind fuzed 13 ]K>nnds 6 ounces. 

i The shrapnel is in two parts, the body and the head. The former is 
tiqrlinder of cast iron, fitted like the shell with a base ring. The head 
isof thin charcoal iron 0.148 inch thick, struck with a radius of 1.2 diam- 
^en, the point being tnmcated to receive a gun-metal bouchiug tapped 
to the fuze-gauge and soldered to the head. Within the head is a wooden 
Uook or former. The head is attache<l to the body by four steel screws. 
It contains 116 bullets at 34 to the pound, the interstices being filled in 
^th resin. The total weight when ready for use is 13 pounds 2 ounces. 
A reference to Fig. 94 will make this descrijition clear. 

The side of the case-shot is made of heavy tin. The top is of sheet- 
won, Xo. 18 B. W. G., and is fixed to the case by turning over and sol- 
dering the notched ends of the caj*e. A base ring of sheet-iron. No. 12 
fi* W. G., is riveted to the bottom of the case. There is an inside lin- 

■ 

•ngof sheet-iron, No. 14 B. W. G. The contents are 340 mixed metal 
filets of 34 to the pound. The length is 9 inches, and the total weight 
h 13 pounds 7 ounces. (See Fig. 1)2.) 

The carriage is of steel. Its general design is made evident in Plate 
'I The elevating apparatus (see Plates 73 and 77, Fig. 109) is worthy 
tf eipecial attention. There are no axletree boxes. The bed on each 
tide is fitted as a seat (see Plate 77, Fig. 108), mounted on springs and 
baving guard-irons and a sliding foot-rest. Leather cases (see Plate 73) 
^fitted outside each bracket to carry two case-shot and two cartridges. 
An especial feature is the grease chamber in the front flange of the 
vbeel. (See Plate 79, Figs. 107, 108. ) 



240 BsrrisH natal and hilitabt opebationb in 

Both steel and irou eater iDto the conatrnction of the lin 
76), which has bat two boxes. The projectiles, assorte 
in steel trays (see Plate 78), which are placed at the sidet 
near the wheels, the inside compartment of each box servi 
tacle for cartridges. These trays are too light. Thej ha 
to poand out of shape in a hard march, and give mach tr 
drawal. The artillery offlcers prefer the old plan adopted 
boxes of the l&pdrs. 

The shaft* are "near and off," and the limber is ftt1 
doable, or treble draught. 

The general dimenflione of the carnage and timber are i 

Height of center of ffnti 

Length: 

Carriage : 

WUL whMlB 

W it hont wheels 

Axletroee 

AutflP of trail 

UnxinnimolerstloD 

Ilasimam dept«Mi(» ., 

Wheelfi: 

Tnwk 

Diameter 

Plata 76 represents the ammiiuition wagon. The fron 
seventeen assorteil prujeutiles, atowed vertically aboat a < 
eoatainiiig as many filled cartridges. The other wago 
eighteen projectiles and tbeir charges. 

The following diagrams give the distribution of th< 
which habitnally accom)»auiti8 the guns, together with I 
stores. 




HArAL AKP MtLITABT OPB&ATIONB IN EOYPT. 241 
lat GVK A.^n t.IMTtKR. 

DM sen. 

OH FOOTMARO. 

. IpalrJnfnpm. 



rS^ 



l^SlMak 



A 




/a 

ocMmnA 


B 


"SS* 




.-^ 


«MnOH»l. 


fMHtM. 


.--P-. 


.-«^ 


ImmMM. 



:w 



COMTAINIMS ffl -i 1), 

u--— ,.-.-1 < U| 



TIAV CONTAININO 
•upin Am a. £. In Kb tM 
•D/luw. Him IKK 
IthantanfHttlalil • 







ON TOV or tIAT. 



242 BRITTSH NAVAL AND UILITARV OPERAtTOSS" I 
sa -wACioy! and r.iMBs:R. 

LtMSSR. 

ON FOOT BO AH O. 

I*H<iif|Wna Imai'tiiM. tUUMIravt. 
1 Ami. iHiilfr. t mpatt. 1 

j^uiiu«t. Swim. 

tfltHtifiam. 1 iMUf tarrSofit If mi^> 

NEAR GOX l|>Ki»aB.»frir. OPP BOX 



!d4''6«>. 



That contaihin* 



JMok 




.., -•ip3s^sp»'5jr**- 

SinKngtcliiUi. IliMViird*. \ IttHfXpliL HAama^tn 



'«! 



E 


18 

In 


IB 


F 


Srt«p«t 


»hnv«L 


»An>pn*I. 


#.k,«r«L 


J2:;u 


t>).ft,r^ 


irfnrp«l. 


1* .*r.T-* 



M.4r«naKl!r*K<KHm^)a«wbnM>«iiar. I aUfM« and I iMK sZlSLatl 

E F 

THAT COttTAlNlNO THAV CO' 

fAMbwaidM ; (Ma II«>n»n> KiW. IfaMAbUr. 

I M«y«M w<M ((rq. I/iiwpa*M«Uh)>MkW« 1 •™^-; 

■ />iv dMttMi, K«k I. ». and > saB*M. 




BRITI8U NATAL AND MILITARY 0PEEATI0N8 IN EQTPT. 243 

lie total supply of ammanition with each gun is therefore — 

ipnel 108 

II 30 

i«4«»r 4 

T«Ul ; 142 

tri«l|srs 142 

iion tiilw* '. 175 

ToUl :U7 

If fiues 140 

rniwioii fnzeii 72 

Total 212 

The carriaj:e8 of G^ were of a different desiji^u and hail longer trails, 

ile the animunitioa was carried on end in top lid l>oxes, as with the 

pdr. 

Phe other batteries found that the short trail and its great angle were 

ended by the disadvantage that in soft soil the trail buni\s itself at 

h discharge, necessitating constant change of elevations, and threat- 

og accident iu some cases by excessive jumping. 

rhe 13-pdr. has a working range of about <»,000 yards. For use at 

t distance the gun has an elevation of LIP (Mi'; the time of tlight of 

I»n>jeotile is 23.7 seconds ; its angle of descent 30^ 42' ; its remaining 

writy Mi feet iHsr second. 

i c«mip;irisou of the new and the old field pieces shows deoroase^l 

IMtrtiitnal weight of gun to project ih», with greater velo<!ity. Tlieir 

Wive acrcnraciy may l)e gathere<l from the following figures, which 

4 godl at the distance of 4,(M)0 yards: 

With th« With thfi 
lC-)Miuiidi*r in piitiDiler. 

^ rrpt of nmnd* aboulU f.ftll within— 

k IfWiTlh nf 

k w tilth f if 

k ttri^ht uf 



Farrit. 


Yards, 


4" 4 


W.i 




2 W 


I : M 


!•> 40 



heMp fHAultrt are obtained by givati-r length of l)ore, MA inches in 
10|Nlr. and S-1 hiche.i in the l.'tpdr., an inereas** of !• ealibt^rs; by 
use fif a chanilNT; by the adoption of a gas eheek or exp.niHitin 
r. and by the heavier ratrs of eliar;;e to projretile. In the new gun 
charge is nearly one.<piart«*r of the w«*iglit of the projeetile. 
t in worthy of remark that the ust» t»f wet spon;res in lorbidd«*n with 
^ uniu on the ground of inerca^ted n^siduuin in tin* ehanitMT. after fir- 
, whii'h is diflleult to remov** on aeeount of tin* ♦•i-hoke." iSreat care 
^|Minging is, howeviT, stn>n;;lv urged. It would strike tme aivus- 
i«d to hberal amoitiit.H o/' wafer in thi** eonueetiou X\u\\ \\w vv\w x^^ 



■244 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS lS"*SfM 

ominended would he more in place in tlie nnhseqiieiit Inadinu 
l>nt fair to any that no ill eft'ectJi wui-e experivnced through thft nifl 
ofthiHruk*. 1 

Ah was the ciwe with everything tise on wheels, the ccmutiy | 
too heavy for the gnns, or the gnus too heavy for the cxtontry, ni 
nil movements to a rIow and paiiil^i) drag. Six borsm wereoffl| 
assigned to each gun, hut it was foiiud necessary to iiicreaiw th| 
ber to teu, fonrteeu, in fact iudefinitoly, the war Hchcdulc of aOi 
being a mere estimate of probable uevda, J 

The battery drivers carried revolvers only, a 8|iecial issue for ti 
paign, the other men being armed for the most part witli can 
hers or sword-bayouets, according to the nature of the battuiy, i| 
horse or field. Each battery has 24 Martini-Henrj' carblntwi. fl 
slung Du each limber (gun and wagon), on the ammDoition boxm 
the foot board. j 

The ammunition column, F.l, was deaigued to oonvey 30 spam 
per gnu iu addition to the assorted projectiles and chargm in tli»| 
and wagons, besides 360,000 rou uds of ritle ammanitioD, 4O,00fll 
of carbine ammunition, &c. It was a reserve iu all respects excJ 
it brought out no guns. Pour spare gnn carriages were nnionKita 
It was ex|)ect«d that the column would serve an a distributor afl 
nttion of all kinds from the advance depot to the batt«rivs aad'i 
ions at the front, the advance depot being in its torn suppli«a 
railway. I'he meu and horses received the same special Imaos m 
DientioneKl aprojios of the cavalry. I 

As regards me«s arrangements, each battery has oue cookf] 
rarely changed. Kach subdivision (gun's crew} is served by ani 
detailed for the day. This man draws the rations and givrs M 
the battery cook, receives the cooked fooil when rtia4ty, and ■ 
generally to all the mess interests. I 

The variuns detachments of thv Itoyal Artillery eDiborked ■ 

August 3 and 9 nt Port-tmouth, Southampton, and Loodoo. 19 

I to arrive at Alemiudria was the lield battery A.l, by tJie Pal J 

the 14th, and the last the ammunition column, by Uie TexM^ j 

S5th of the same month. 1 

The artillery of the ox|>udition was under the general oooJ 

Uolonel W. H.Goodenougb, K. A., who was given theloaJ taak J 

t dier-General The artillery of the Istdivision was oommMldadfl 

tenant-Colonel H. V. Sohreib&r, E. A., that of the 2d by Lieabeu 

I onel P. 0. Elton, B. A., aud the Horse Artillery by LientenuiM 

0. li. NaimeM, It. A. | 

The artillery took no part in the preliminai-y o|>eratJotui abooi 
andria. 1 

The disembarkation was begim at Isuiiulia on August 32, m 

puolied with all speeil. J 

Tlie flrat engagBmenl wW-b t.\\fc ^s-sv^*ft» ^^ m<a. >Jtt.% Mrtflh^ 



KAVAL kSB MIUTAIIT 0PERATIOK8 IN KOYPT. 245 

MVM tbat of AuROSt 24, noftr Kl Miigfnr. At 5 a. iii. of tlint tiny 
> tS-pdra. of X.A. Kojal Horse Artillerv, imder LieuU>utitit 8. 0. 
kkiMa, fttarwtl from Imnallia to join <l<>neral (Hmhiiru'i* fni'ce, then 
dend Ui ailrBniai fntm Nellchf. Tliey ])[it«lioi) on At otioc |)iuit yeflcbe 
tSXUrngtiu; whI oainii intoactiou on llii- right ut'thu iiifnatry, Iwltlnd 
Me low oMMindii, ktwpioK Qf ^^ imeqiml artillury duel nil day, the 
DP*i*>)'> luiViuK twvlre (hidh to lUHiiHt tblH nttank. At 5.45 p. m. (he 
■aiain^ ftrar gutm of the bntlery anivM] tVoni Inmailin, which tbey 
idltlt al 3 |t. m., mid tlit< uiiitttt biitlt^ry huuu Hileiic«d tht^ ng)'|>tiiiii 
tdloryrthv t*agv being from 2,IhK> to 2,tIU0 yanlit. lf»tuf Uk-ii «bift«d 
I Ike otber lUnk near the uitiul, Htid an iiiterchuiige of nhull bf guu 
Hb ibp p(ew «i i nn Die Hgyptiaa rtRht, which laiited antil dark. By 
' '■ -r- riiint Hickman's division bad expended almiit one bun- 
1. nioHtly shrapnel. 

' ' iiblain miunu* dutailn of thu ulftM;t of the Urtlinh shell 
•»rt iiiiiiMti iJiit or the aubfieqoenl enKagemonts of the oaro|>)iitin. 
Bdcr the nnruBiBtaueeH, it IB neoeftnary to attcept the main t-Mit, that lliv 
*By'« irune wen* Kileoced in twenty minutes. On the otlier hand 
ifiaa the teetJBMiuy, whieh is rt'iM-ated on every occaaion, that the 
|niCi>iHi eerved tbeirown triniH with nnexpot^ted skill. "The enemy 
itfw imnxe, nod bamt his NhellH, ah a rule, fairly well." li miist 1)o 
bie \a mind that the alnonphtriv phtmmena ptcvltnr in Ihat region 
Ifcw w a itmd unitrntvod bg the native, irhile dialreaiing nad mi»l«adimg 
tkt/iirriffmrr, irAo, on Ihiji oewiMtoa, had the nun fairly in Aut eye* after 

«•»■ 

Xtm rvBolt ofthi) o|>enitio»H of AuKUSt34 wait the demon«tra(iuu that 

k •keeled vebiidev ^iipplhil wen.- almost iitieleM in the dcwert acmas 

ii'li Mk' .irrL-L wu«now toadvance. Kxcept in Lieutenant llickman'a 

iiaaoiliou wauontt had be«n left l>i^liiiid,"liavin9 ntnck 

•■ Ihoy remained over the following; day," To irel thr 

' .tlong wiut ntHMtt all, the tmttery horftea eoahl nocom- 

ab ie\KH ultfit i.-ierlinj! their grvatest efTortH. 

IW ailvann- wiw stn^uKthvned dnrinc ihe uight of Aatcnal 2i and 

)'i thr- onunl, anHing iilber eorpo, of battery A.I, and, aoiDCwhat 

>- each iif battery NJi and tMitterj' <i.B. I ii the mareJi 

> rtdnif uv«r)ookin)C TVI-el-MabnIa waa rraobed, (h>in 

Mioiin eonld bu aeen at Work on their intrench men ta. 

'Ihit puitii the artilh'ry on both »u\*-* birgan (IrUitf, but thn duel waa 

■hnndaraliaii, aa thecAValr)' and borne nrlillery aiMl twugnnn of A.I 

l%eil tbf h-ft flnnk of Ihe KgyplianM, who retreiiled t» MahoainKli, 

kt nil, ai-iyintermentft, and everyihlitg In ibeir llighl. The 

' <■_. the caviilry nml arllMery did nol ireaae hen-, bat wua 

: -lid At Mahsameh. ^Vhco nllhiu mugn of Ihe camp 

n. ;bv >;iiii* wfiiub hiul at^MnipaJiied the cavalry opened iiu the itamp 

I niiway ataUuu, vbk-U wen- HjmHJily ovavanttMl, lUie nw>tttt\*A\twi^ 



I 246 BRITISH KAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EOTFJ 

I The artillery work uii AngiiBl 28 i» dc«ci-ib<^<l tVom nolcs o 

I engDgpineiit by Captaiu G. B. Martin, R. A. (aid-df-camp lo O 

I Goodeuougb), to wbom iieArly everytbicg tbat is of interest i 

section is dne. i 

Two KiiiiH of K.A arrived from MuliMincti at KiimaMin ftliaiit 11 a. n. ( 

Krupp t'liii had lieeu itiouDt«id ou a truok and t>i'"t»ct«<<l l)j •anil-baK> and diH 

ttom Maliwminli. 1'his giin eontiDued In iwtian tkmuehuiit tli« da}-, and ■« 

the men, tbn Roynl Hariue Arlilicry, iK^conic ncqnaintpd wiib thn lUvIalM 

tangent eenle it rrudnrril cffiiftivn BrrviMi.} Tbo two gui<s N.A wen- |[i antiM 

rigbt of tlio railwa; for an limir, and tlipii had Ij> Tctirf for iraut nf aminut^ll 

I ammitnltion-WAf^D, nliicli had )im>ti w^nt alter ihc two giinn «tnck in ihea 

I not arrive niititlatH ill the ijay. I 

I Tlio remalLing four gaiiB of N.X advanced fruin Muliaaiiiuh with tfa* miTall 

I aftarnouu. aiul r«auti«d the plnfruii nortli of Kawaaaiu nbuutS p. m. I 

I Tbc«o giiiis begftti tbe (lrii]g, wbich was succeeded by the bbM 

I ubarge of the Hootiebuld Cavalry. I 

I The artillery engaged in the affair of September D, at K usu s w i 

I as follows : 1 

I N.A, Boyal Horse Artillery, I 

I G.B, Koyal Horsu Artillury. J 

I A.1, Itoyiil Artilterj', ■ 

I D.l, Koyal Artillery. I 

I 7.1, Nortlieru division, luiilo battery, I 

I 5.1, Scottiiih division, 3 25-pdr. M. L. B. I 

I Boyal Marine Artillery, 1 8"" Krupp B. L. R. I 

I Koyal Navy, 1 40pdr. B. L. R. I 

I The last two were moiitited oh railway trucks. I 

I Oaptniti Martin goi\8 on to suy : I 

I Th^rf" Kru]>i> was in front ofthe 4D-iidr. Them being no aidiim at U 
I thia oonld not Ih- r^nn-dicHl. Tlie t^*" gan made good praelim at tnUna brid 
I the cnotnj'a Iroopa Tbi> 4U-pdr., being maiiked, eaiilil only II n nfCMhiSlM 
I tlieae gnns had no motive ]>ower. Had iber« 1>Miii any thr.v would hanil 
iramel; nwifiil. The Krupp Dpeoed &tv al T.30 a. m., lii n-ply 1« wMno dt— M^ 
of the uneiti.v, I 

Of A.1 and D.l be nays: J 

Theoo liattDiiMH mvi* north of lh» oanip, anil lired at tbe euemy'a gona {iM 
off] and at Infanlr; (about I.liOO yanli off). The cnomy'B gtinn were plaoadl 
Hill, their lefl exUnding beynad the Britlih front and their right nsMsl 
eanal, with n few troopuMintli of the canal. TheKgyptiaDflreonlbagnn-pIld 
good. ' ' * A.lanitO tInftthngun-ptlsandailvanenlHboal tODy*rda. I 
ttma lieni at an Egyptian battery, A.1 at t<r« batturlM ami Infatilry In rfgH 
Ahont h.3U a. m., A.1 and U.l advanced again, tbla (Imn t.OOO yatda la ■ 
ftvut, BUd eoiitluuml driug for an boar or xo. The 0DaDiy'« infanlcy inoM 
bat at lliia time thoirgnn-fln bcoanio alBokor. * * ■ Onr tri<o|H woraM 
adranm and drive bark the Rgyptiaus. A.1 and D. 1 thernforp odvaDoad ■ 
cntly for two miles nud a half or so, flriag at varlnno nuigeL Thnf abolfl 
<)ota<-bnK'iil4> of two Eg^fitUu j^wm, vhlrh werr taken pomnutim nf by OTMn 
Sdrancotl. About 3 aiWn- ttoroteVcVKcWT fcVkW ^fcumaftis^Wuw artHH 



BRITISH NAVAL AKD MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 247 

ratiied into their intrenchments. A final advance of 1,000 yards or bo was made by 
our side to see the intrenchments and get an idea of them. At that time we were 
^000 yards or so from them. The action ended at 12.30, and the trooi>8 returned to 
KussflBin. 

NA was with the cavalry division on plateau north of camp. • • « This flank 
was kept refused thronghont the day. 

6.B about 7.30 a. m. was formed up some 1,500 yardH to the right of A.l, on the 
north ride of the camp. Their fire was directed chiefly t-owards the enemy's center. 
They advanced about 9.30 a. m., when A.1 and D.l did, their movcmeuts conforming 
gCDerally to those of the troops in our center. 

7.1 came into the space between A.l and G.B about 8.30 a. m. * * * They 
vere also directed by the movements from our center. 

Additional technical notes on this action, the priucipiil artillery affair 
of the campaign, are quoted as of extreme intiu'est. They were made 
by Lieutenant Apsley Smith, R. A., aidde-cam]) to Lieutenant-Colonel 
Naimes, B. A., who directed the artillery on this occasion. 

The enemy stuck to their guns, and both thoir clevution and direction wore good, 
hottber nsed chiefly common 'shell, and with ho small u charg*^ (about one pound) 
the shells dropped at a very high angle, sinking deop, and, though exploding, doing 
hardly any damage. Except at first against the camp and gun-pits, their fire was not 
^ODceutratedy but seemed to be directed against whatever battery of ours happened 
to be firing at or near them. They appeared to make good use of any cover aflbrded 
V the ground, and in one case the position of a battery, as hIiowu by the wheel 
tneks, was remarkably good. I believe thtMr auiniunit ion- wagons wei*e kept well in 
<W, more so than is usual in our own service. One or two of their shrapnel burst on 
pfa»f the bnllets ricochetting harmleHsly along the ground, but I do not remember 
*^Dg any time-shrapnel bursts in air. 

On our side the batteries worked independently as far as the nature of ammunition, 
^iige, and object aimed at permitted, though no advance of any extent was made 
^thont orders. 

At first our shells, especially the 7 * and 13 pdrs., burst nliort and high, but for 
*iUDe time previous to the advance one could see the time-shrapnel, especially on our 
■flft front, causing considerable disturbance among the enemy. 

Although the batteries tired independently, each battery of six guns fired at the 
>MDe or about the same object. 

When once our artillery was fairly in action, and our infantry in position, the 
*Demy never advanced another yard, and soon showed signs of wavering. But just 
^ first his fire was so quick and accurate that I thought ])ersonally we had more 
RODS opposing Qs than we really bad. Tlie light was good, the huu being behind ns, 
*^t, probably fh>m want of a well-defined object to lay on, I did not hear, except in 
^case, of any Watkins range-finders being of use. 

The wagons of our field battericH remained near thcni and were a good deal exposed. 

In the advance the batteries hnnlly worked together snlliciently, the ones in front 
Wngnp their position without much regard to a batt<>ry perhaps still in action 
^^d and to their fiank. 

I heard it remarked, with reference to this and other artions, that in ground like 
^desert it was a mistake to come into action ju^t behind tbi^ crests of ridges, on 
*<6onntof the labor and delay of running u]) after each nnind. 

The two gnna on the railway, and the three 25-]MlrH., 1 saw nothing of, but they ex- 
ploded a lot of ammunition, and I heard made good prnetice. The 'i5-pdrN. tired over 
^heads of our infantry .advancing along the railway and canal banks. The 40-pdr. 
WMhandicapiied by the Krupp in front, and o.ould only fire to its right front. 

* Of the mnle battery, 7.1, Northern division. 



B48 BaiTIBU NAVAL AMD MIUTABY OPEBATIOHS Of EOTFT. 

* The [wrformauoe of the artillery at TeI-el-K«bir, twing but » jAim 

of the battle and not the principal part of it, is given In tfav NrotiM 

treating of that actioD. 

_ The experience in Egypt with even the Ilglit I3-pdr. ahuvn tiie at- 

biage (or iadeed nity carnage) t«o heavy for uue In such n oountr}'. Il 

■l^otild seem deuimblo, for service over light eaiidy soils, Ui d^vit* mmf 

M^ort of broad tire capable of ready application to thr trheeU of ail reUcte. 

There were no instances of breakdowiiH fhim Bltgbtne«H of constmetfiw; 

all the mishaps arose fVom sheer inability to get the weighla acnaa tk 

desert with any speed nppmacliing siitisfaction. 8ueh a lir* would hart 

proved of value, mid its design appenra to present no insuperable illft- 

cnlty. An iilt^rniite solution of the question might he fonml in a nooib* 

track, in pieces, which could he shifted fVom rear to front by hand, wile 

wheels left< them. Under the actual circnntstaDces the dmucht powv 

bad to be increased enormou'tly to obtain even the HUail like ■{■cd 

achieved. 

It is imiMHSibk- to avoid instituliug a eonipurison betwevn the wfaetM 
and the uiouutuin batteries employed during the campaign, to the aL 
vantage of the latter. The former threw heavier shell, bnt in nufi 
the latter was at least eqa»l to the ICpdr., while its greater mobOltj, 
the facility with which it conld go anywhere and everywhrre, BOM 
the desert or even ahmg the narrow banks of the irrigation ran^il^ uhkt 
cover the cultivated portion of Egypt aa with a net-work. r. i 
most valuable, and in the event of ope^-ations in the interior - 
would have made it invahmhle. The gist of this critieJM'i 
that Kgypt is best suited to the employment of mule b»((eni:». 

The testimony is unanimous as to the value of shrapnel vbaa 
ftize is pmperly cut. The Egyptians did not ase this proie^-lile, i 
bale, and their shell-lire occjisioned more contempt than uu-.-u--. 
^British becoming accustomed to it and ccHKing to dread i(. 
Hidi artillery, employing fhrnpntl nlmo»t cj^clvrirrli/, a>a» more • :' < 
^My«iVaf/j/ and morally. The part the two 13-pdrs. took at Ki .M.ii;lir » J 
Bepelling the attack was iis mu<'hdueto8uiH>rtoHty pn>jeotile as to nn* 
^vble management. 

yo step wits miule in this campaign towards solving ibe qaestionrf 

the muzzle-loader reriun the breecbloader fur u Held piecv. The Hit" 

Uh had none of the latter type to pit in technieal rivalry against tMr 

new and admirable l.t pdr., while the Krupp gnns of the Kgyptiaiui m« 

of the old piittern of 18fiH, burning too little ]n>wder to make them eqoil 

to their ttrillsh comj>etitors at any bnt short ranges. 

_ Tlie skill, intelligence, and vigor which ollieial dispatches ultribol^tB 

■Ifte artillery operalions of the uanipaigu testify to admtrnbte orgsati* 

Blon, careful equipment, and thorough training, and retlert iTedit ^ 

^BOfle immediately chargeil in the field with the directiou of thU bo^j 

Hr (bo British military aervtce. ^M 



r.\ 



IP 



BBmSH RATAL AKI> yiLHABV OPERATIONS IN EGTPT. 249 



THE BOTAL KXGtXSERS. 



» 

^^KHBipOMd »r lix comiNuiies, two troop«, auil a fleld park, the wbole 
Emdm- tbt- voaitnaDd of Colonel C. B. P. N. H. Nugent, C. B., K. B., to 
wham wiu givfo ttic lociU rnuk of BrigadR^r-GcueruL 

Tbe coiup*Dic«, Aoconliug to thvir corps immbem, wora ttiu &th, 17tb, 
IStb. 2liit, 24Ui, ADt) 'JSth, and th« troops were A and C. 
The 8th company receives special meutioa in Section XXIV of this 
iport, au<)«r tlie liil« of "111© RoIIwm.v Company," and troop in Sec- 
OD XXV, which In-MlM of "the TelegrHpti Troop." 
Tbc 17th iwnipuny.nnder Captain Elliott Woutt, li. K.,nppeani tofaftve 
tea a sort of nioiit of all work. ItA per»onnel was composivd of ^ cap- 
ifaM, 3 ileutcntiiits, H5 uou-ooiuuiirtaioitcd otQtient and men, a total of 89. 
TIm eompAiiy wiwumicd with Marliui-Heiiry rifles and swonl-bayo- 
Its. ll cwnc from Malta in II. M. H. Northumberland, arriving at 
■Inly 17, and was the pioneer of its corps in Ggypt. It 
oe to Oatmrri, each man carrying a tool of some kiad« 
nadf to repair the dcfeniwfl of tJte placK The men and offlcora slept in 
k bwKD uotton storvhonse dnrini; their ttuy in Altjxanilria. 
Tbe folhiwinK paraifraphs ar« taken from notes kindly funiixhtnl by 
lu Wiml : 

»«uaMIII« uf «ti>n>*, tiKbhliajt ■'•<>>UOtt wixI-Iiakh urn 
ftwitb tk« •Hspwiy, mnil warn Car lu axiKwi iit wliitt w 

■|iur had atArtHl at n few lioun' nutiui rrum U>lla, ami iU traut|>an ImiI 
BiBti^j w(Htiuil, M driven, cvan, did not exini. Tills ■■■ Kt (mc« taluM In 
I, obta iWWmUk vi-tlu won foalitul wUb nil dUpntrli. 
m tnwJiIri Id mpoiriui nr rrtroncLIng old bmsetui«ln Ibn nncalnU, oaa MBfaf 
ilj pvtUnf tliedra»-brMli[W* iu wiirklUKonliir, iMfluK (onoiWMa, mvoIIbc 
m InuricBdaB. ikv., <m ■ liitli wurklug |>arlitt*uf ullwr rvrp* atid Afab* wn* ' 
■plsfvd, iMiIvr th» Uujnl hti):inii>r*. 
; TW hiMua fi>r lb* H4|i|ii<r* nxin iw ftillxwa: A(Wr brenkfMt of ruffiw •od bUcait, 
I ai 4.30 k. OL ; U (•> '^ V' ">- dinnar. ramkail at tbn w««ki: ratnm la 
u I> ta<LaO]i. w. 

It lliMtb >n>l I 
i iHjnIHl MnlUb* Jlinrlia 

WHS coDilurtect nmler Ore fWim the riwiny. 
half the oompany, nniler Captain WootI, aacoaip«il«tl tb« 
ihire Bet^menc and the 34 batulion of the Blllaa in the 
Bamleh, and b«>Ran at nnc« pullinit the wuter-wurks and 
a slule of defence, as detailed on p. 1A8. 



4 




r. ibvUl^t <»>«|iiuiy, Rii]i*\ KniilDHn, Isuilvd, *o thai iha lutlf ' 
i»17(blHn>( AlriauiltU>BalTb''rl tiiUaailnli, havlittttHwa tM\lw<lMiMi «l 

w an ihr 'IrfrumK, r<i(ia(nirtill|( atoll* bWh-lvin<**> *ioklUm ««W, Il< 



MMupMf ^m 



350 BBITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPEBATIDNS IK EGYPT. 

Tbe s|)ecial Herviccn rendered hy this cotnpatiy mny be brieUy nm- 
tioned tlins : 

On July 20. G»i>tain Uyalop and 20 sappera, wttli a stronfT ooigetiBf 
party, Itft, l)y uiglit, in a train from Galmrri, while Lieotenaut TboOMn 
Btarlt-il with a i^iiiiilur party from Ramleb. Tlie two d«tacliBieiit« net 
at MvlUtliii Jiiiicliun, repaired the lines at that point, and bniiijihl wme 
rolliiigxtouk aruttud from Gabarri to Lfao Muharem tley lifnp, whs* it 
rfta much needed. 

iiiothtir occMioii, rrportH nf an iDt^ndnl tluik Btlsck b; AnM RMurdthaUl 
tnpuiiy itt KMntph lo hv audilonly ontxrril ontiitmiiliiiglit to lUiair gji ■ j^atmM^ 
» tliv line lowHnlii tlnllulia Jiiuvlioii, 

I A covering party waa thrown forwanls as far lu the JuDvtioD, udi 
Iror&ing party from a line battalion assJHted on the breastwork, m tk« 
ft para!>et revetted solidly with railway iron and aand-bagx Wjui Uinn 
op and the party quietly withdrawn. 
Other technical operations were uoiidncted at Itamleh, some of tlM> 
exposed situations almost inviting attaek. 
Ou tlie afttniuoDuf AuKii»tlTiaiionlurvrAB);iviiu tui'niliKtk Bt Alex>tidrU,aBlttll 
^niiig hnlf Ihc oi>iniiBiiy, nitb 'J4 rnrta anil six pock nniuiMla carrftnK ujaifnMli 
ivhlle the reniaimleT uiadn au I'arl; march iicxt iIhiTi nntl Ihe noipliM •>*■* 
o in bj- Iraiu. These coosiKted ttf Urge quaitt.ltic* of iuii(t-liBg<^ tooU. •■i4 poi^l 
Ml nnit AbyHsiulan or " Nortoua"}, 

B traii«port Nuriwa, canyiog the 17t1i company aiiit ths Riijial llAriiM Anflbiji 

Kt the flrHt in the SneE CadbI, but evonliiall)'' itiick hard Bcd fiut atiant Uin* aikl 

B pier Bt iHmnlliu, an Ibat it woa lint nutil S a. m. on tbr 'Hat that a imttf 

a cffeotnl in Mipport i>( Ihn siiiall force hnUling tbo plarn. Tbe Roj'bI £iiflMM 

^vouacked iii a «tru«t, unit wer« early at wurk iHrxliiiKSlurtw, laiproriiij; wi<i{tr 

D landed with a tuul). and niiktrit; airuugi'mptits for watfriog-pIacaB. 

i Royal Engineer park waa started, the railwa; toiriudH Nc^icbr nrpAlnJ, to 

msiuD of the line ftuni the Blvtiou lo tbe pior commetmed, »nd tbu tcWj[T«ph <Hl 

r tu the Frpsh Wat«r Canal wan linibandeil by nlappiag tlio l«aka U ■* 
■ and raiaing Ibe oTorSow of the lower look. Till* hail to b* don* aftrah wk^ 
boal« were pa«aeil np into the canal for watvr tranapurt 

^atS4, Liertt«nant H«at)i, with aix tapper*, lhrwirart«,Mi(la«cirkinK|i*nyifB 
B York and Lliicaater Ke|;lmeiit. aemnipaiiied the advance of Uenival QnhMrt 
rce beyoud NeDche, repaired the mitnay nndur dutant ■hflll-flre, reaebrd tbeiia 
e canal at El Magfar, and ooinmoncod hasty drfcuaca. 
1 carta, rurrying two of thn pontoons hrongbt traai Ranileb, drew a heavy «bift- 

it tlie sheila, an u»iial, lining badly fiiMNl, did nadanagv. Tbaae pimtoanawiB' 

d on tbe rana] above th» ilam and carried raliuna on tu the oavaJry wbM ImA 

nut keep np owing lo deep nandii. 

u Augustus, tbe removal uf the doni wba cuuiineueeil, and alNiat inldiiiBbt «■ ■* 

ti Captain Wood and 'M Mppen arrived by boat and net to work, to ili«t tiy tJi 

be itTtli, a passage for stKain-cntter* wur Jnst pracllrahlp. 

I dam is met with in all ae<M>nnt8 of the advaoco to KaiwiutB. 

It received the united attention of both arms of the serried, fur lica- 

tenant Klngnarman, K. K., was left, behind from t]ie Kaval lUttoiy, 

8 lunrch r>f the ^tb, and waa lold to do Ids bust to blow Dp theab- 

■uolioii. He bad with h\in a wtiaW van's v>^ ftVVWi^ vmu., chargM «( 

oil, f nze«, &c. Ub UioA l\ui tlSwA. *A litta «s.iJ«]««<t 



^^m BBITtBB KATAL AND MILITARY OPEBATIONS IN GQTFr. 251 

^^Hybc tbe moditiotut vatih timf<, in tbe bope of succuhs. Tho lienvlest J 
cxplnvioD vu of a nerieJi of olmrgcs plauted in two paraUtrl liuea S feet S I 
Isditw a|Mirt, S3 pouuiltt of giin-oottoii in all. The effect was to cut a I 
beiKh throoxh tlio dnni HUtl {lile u\> tlie mud wb'wb had lieeu diHplficed I 
•t «B^ end of tbe treucb. Liciiti'iiant Kitig-Oarnian c^lU it '^a vile] 
* and MjB tliBt tbe mvans iidojited proved iuadi3(]unt«. It was I 
j; to resort to the olower process of rvniovul b,v band, I 
ronp particA of tbe Uuanls brigade kept at work on it until a ] 
1 eliannd wo* made tbrongb ll. Oapt-ain Woml continaea : I 

il iutr> workiug »nl«r and jmBlitHt lhri>ii);lit ncit d«y for 9 
■ith l.ieulenaut tlealti'n [lartjr. I 

WMlniclBiI DrwitHl on];, kbuiit KO hi<t tUiuk uii>1 U feot Iiiith atiorel 
• liciv itliout TV ffnt K-ldc. Till! rlnm bl EI MHgfkr, ho«e««r,il 
wa* formal at long, Mtrnii|t rciMla, Uml niiil luatted to-l 
and ««IUII; nomiinnNimt l>,v tin- Biijwriiiriniiboiit wKl){lit, »o tlmt iixltlior ptniM,,! 
S aiHBUIIy niMtH liiHui, iiHr rakm ixiulit niak* aijy iiu]irK>uiiuii i>ii lhi> part bnloir I 
Tpti>|p«|ik t*«U, tiril to^Ptlicr with wlru, wen lit^ileil lii il nnd |illr« aUo4 
Gnn-cnltoD In poOei- and liiaiMiit linn, Iioldiug fruai 3 to 10 iiuiiudH, waa re- ^ 
d lii, tnl tba wnrk wm pnotluually (tilFrmptcd in nitlnr lo haul liuata tliniiif;1i, I 
aad lh» Ib**1 of thr walPT naa rimtlnaallf falling, itn that tbn work wu hoory and i 

On Ik* avaalBg of Anffnit 31 the cnnipAuy olarlail for K*iwui>tn, marclilng nlna I 
■daa ■■»■ 1^ daaart In ttiiM linur*, ilip vrnalt pack-iiialM carrylnjt IOC imnoda, th* ] 
tag* Wilaa dnolni 400 ponnila, and a roupin of H]>art> niiitM, with Inail traMS, b«lng 1 
nadf- to Iwot m )■ «*w uf • iliaicnlt; ; thi> lii-aTiivt aturM. norli aa luiltli'a furgt^, 
•■•l.lanl««ti,Aa.,eamitt|[ b> walcron Ihi' poiitun rafla. 

with carta aniiiiid. an an allack li; Kndonlnn liail brcn n'ported 
il nionilnic Kaaaaaalu woa mtrhi-il. Here ilafinwlvD and olbar j 
Mlllri wail fiiriund Into raaciiiri.aoil NtronKrcTct- ' 
by ilrivloK lh» hutu uf alalka into twcb row and bendinie Ihc Uipt OTvr | 
IBM ikai |«rap^ bjr which tb« (aK^lniM wers aBciml; iiticlii>m>l. Tha falling of Iba 
■ ■lig is tha naaal randntnl it neiusaaary to aoud IhiIIi auliBllRrna ttack, c*efa with 
tvwaU aailniaw. tn l)i* two ilanw, in wlitnu and dtwpcn Ihn chunTirla. 

1W« K[N!at49d labor on tbe obntruotiona in tbe Sweet Water Caaal 
Captain Wood'* command the equivtxial title of " the dain 




Tbe ooaip«o.v wait oxpom-d on 8<ipteniber U to the aliell-flre of tbe 
Kgyptiao attack, and lost some of iU ttuimalH. 

Oa iba laifc at B^OmmhtiT tUr. roiiipany aimi^k ramp at It a. m., bad Mrfloa, and 
Martad Willi tkt fallowing ■'((ulpiui'iit, liavInK ordnn lo Roafam to Iha OMWOiaBta 
«f Um tirmj and l» vpoii a pmaan" thniugh Itin dam n»*r T»I-rl-K*tiir : 

Rich! park-mnlaa, ranr'aK twil-i'Iivala and al»)V«]n(30 In a load wdgk tW puanda), 
add 1& raria, (anyia^, •■ aaiial, Hrii Aaj*' forage, rativua. vallate toola, drmullllMi 
aauna. rupr. wltr. aaiid-liacii, tnarrrr aniinanitiim, slrvtobBra, \c. Oua ran «■• m 
a^M wbiwllai pluiha, rarrflnii on It th> i'oiiii>n«li4- Waiiia aiid wharjlwnvwa. Tw« | 
nO^ ftinaad vach af imi (MWdMia, aii*l mio ■liijtU (•oiil'xi, i-arryluit pmnpa and htmrn, 1 
hr^ flt r^l- a<iTl1. xmllh'* InnU, hiiUui; Iarl<l><n, ■.-iiiil l-nga, (tno-ciHtuu, 

n4knr almM. Tirtal u hrr of ahnrrla. «Wi (ifaattd-baiK 3,000. AlMB- 

at liill-hmka, xaliioa knltra, fln^ w)» and afiun-j'arD fnr rntlinx and ■uktnf 
lata fWrln^ waa Earritid- Tlii-ra/la wan)Bltactir4nBBinn*tnl\lwcAW«.*«A 
lb mfamha h^mnmrA og tUbtl bafilt, M M Ui Vm^ Uk£ Tal\k tMR. |i|ifli \u \Vi» 



I 



^B&2 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITAHY OPKRATIOKS IN BOTPT. ^H 

^BUdtlln itf the MtrniiDi unil to keep lliem Ko'i'f! 'vlien recU-i or uujIlilDg oIm littoMlH 
^^Bltli Ihti I'raclloii on una atdc. 

^^VTb* uompaiiyoinie miller Hhnll-ltrc, pitched coiiip at llinUnm, vrblchwaa in iIwUmi 
^HTot-ol-Keblr, anilcuuiiuoDoeil to reiiiDvo Ufnnhwith. It wm M feet tlikliallfa 
^^nwr Kne, l>ut orHiiiuIl h4^i);ll<• >niliTaaunlyouUHtruot«il wtthtwnti, M>tliai In t«*KtT> 
^Hnr hoiini it wu praottually rmuoviMl, tliD ITCh twiupsay Iielii){ rf>ll«<rKtl tiy lb NA 
^Htod S6tta eaitip»ntoH, Doyul Eugmwrii. 

^^ Kext iluy thu I7th outupaiiy [cfl Itn camp for Calm.^ThD triWMpnrt, wilh ligblha^ 
tnbrdiing nliing tbr< roilivny, rnnnbnl Uniihn (4'J oiIIm) ill twnilsy*. 

This company sttli remaiuB in Egypt and ia stHliuDiHl al rairo. Tht 

rather Ifingtby account of its work is vntrrantod by tbu |ironiint<ot put 

ILit took in all tbe operations of the campaign ami by tUe light it thniwi 

KoD the diffloullies eiicoiiiit^reil iti E)rypt nntl llie ineiuinres chnsea to 

" OvercotiiH thi'in. 

Tho 18th company of SappiTS, 100 strong, nndt-r MKjor W. SnltDiiid, 
K. E., remained at Ismailia as a reserve at the base, eMtabliahlng iha 
engineer park, aud handling and forwanling as neoesHary the Ht4)ra 
coming under that department. , 

The 21ttt company, under Captain A. B. Pnzy, CAine from rjrprw H . 
Alexandria on August 8. It iinniberedaiubalteni and 54 mon. ItcM' ' 
tinuMl and couchtded the work begun by its predecessor, m wpU asiuA 
tribatiug to the defeni^e of the place in other ways. It remaiiu n 
Egypt as part of the tjarrirton of Ah>xandria. ■ 

The li4th company, ntuler Captain C. de B. Carey, U. E., ww Bttld^H 
to the iHt division, forming a portion of the divisional troopfl. 1UI^^| 
tonnel was 2 cftptaiiis, 3 lieutenants, 1 Kiirgeou, and 135 iion-ooa^^| 
aioued oQloerH and men, a lotal uf 191. It liud 37 horatui and 10 rartft^^| 
joined the 1st division, nudt-rGeneml Willis, at Tol-Kl-Mnhnta,oDAB^^H 
2A. At this point, aided by fatigue part.ieM from variolic linp bettsU^^H 
it shared with Mm 17lh company Ihe labor of removing the ilan >^^H 
Sweet Water raiial. ^^H 

Ud September -1 this iT(>m|iany miidc nu attempt to oblnin « Bapfl^^l 
drinking water by sinking tube wells. The blocking of th« wat«r aM^^| 
and its cufurce^l retention btitween the locks ai Kassassin and Isw^^H 
had made it stagnant, the constant traffic through the canal bad 1^^| 
the mud Htirred up, while the dead bodiei<i in (he canal, wlteflter d^^H 
by accident or design, hatl vitiutcd the watvr Ui an alnnuiDg ">t^^| 
The attenijit (o obtain potable wat«ir elnewhero woa nut urawgcd *^^| 
sncwfts. RnickiMti water wa«i found at five f<(M>t below thi* snrAH9e,d^^| 
although the tubes were driven ten feet farther, no imprnvemeotla^^l 
quality of the water was deti^cted. The army therefore ooutinuM^H 
make use of the canal water, and, happily, willi«ut expertuocuic U^^l 
aalta. In other re8|>ectH the history of this c^mtmny in the biiil0l^^| 
the 1st division. ^^H 

The 2(Ith company, under the command of Major B. Blood, B. B.f^^| 
dtbtohed to the 2d division ASftAcVdcovaimuv. InorganizatiuDf ou^^^l 
aatl uguipment it va» simUar lo l\\« ^V\i vomv^'n.-s. '^cr ^a^^^H 



BSH KAVAI. AlfD Mri.lTAKY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 253 



|bi9 (oUtiirlug table U added, as giving tlie eatablialiec) i>igaD- 
ft field MMniMmy of Boyal BogluMrs : 




rhl naobing the front than its uolleagneH in the Iflt 
f anlTlng M Kiuwiusin a fun days before the battle tif Tul- 
^ Jtt took part fai tbifl action, being cxikmmI tn heavy fire ou the 
r the canal bank. After the works were carried, the 
■7 «a> WBt to reuiuve h bunier which had bevu built acroMi the 
jTMpvtof the general lines of Tel-cl-Kebir, and to dig away the 
I tb* Smet Water Canal. Tlieae proved no v«>ry oeriouH obsta- 
nd dkaniMMd after two or three hourtt' work. The company 
roiihed on to Beiiha. It in now lu CiUn> an [wrt of the army of 

itiOD. 

riinU)on Troop A, ouianianilod by Miyor It. J. Uond, was not up 
HandarU orfiauization iui-JtbernienoreqaipaienL H» ficr*oHm«l 
tu^or, I caplatn, li Iieult>uautii, I nnrseon, 1 reterfnarj' aurgeou, 7 
I, and IM uoneouituiAsioiieiluflli^^trK and mrji, instead ofl major, 
yn, 4 lieateoantit, [ mirgvon, I votehnary surgeuri. 1 tiiutrtvrniaa- 
irfHocn, and 3W nou-commlcwioiiwl ofHeent and men. 
Mjalpmciit waa CI boniea, 10 pontoon wngou«, and 'M carl* (inateud 
iMnn, SO pontoon wagona, 1 trentle wagons, 6 store wa^onii), and 
kMrt^basMM Bertl)0D*H coHapNible boat* and ItlaoRbanl^A pon- 
krSMdgaseaelt. 

pnatooB bridge fa funued uf iHmtoonH kepi nl 1^ fiwt n^nt^aI In- 
|1^ balka tttling nn to naddli-n rvMing on evntnd Muddls-bMuna. 
■amber nf balka iiw<l in 6vo for the advanwd bridge and nine 
> hmvry bridge for siege artillery; they Rup)tort oheaatw, whlofa 
pt in poaitlon by a ritMnd on va<-h nidr. rm-kt-d down by rack- 
Ka to tJw Mfler iMlk, luid IiAving a cltnt roaAwb^' ot ^ tic^. 

#ilti<<lwjiaaoonaahoaV<lnotbe\MiMWi4Vaifnaiiw>., j 



254 BRITISH NA7AL AND MIUTABT 0PEBATI0N8 IN » 



1 fiwt from the topB of their coamioga when canTing the! 
loads of infontry, in marchiDg order, in foare crowded at a cli 




BAVAL ABP lOLlTART OPERATIONS IN GQYPT. 2&5 

akaga when iitn^'ing uxtraurdiiiiiry IoiuIh, Much ns ilisorgan- 
intry, or wMgliln sncli aa tlio ({4-pilr. gnD, wi'igliiDg SHIj cwt . 
B pimtCMiD (l-'i};. 1 Ml ft KCfj.) is a Iwat with Huiilar ilfcked t'lida, and 
rtly deckiid al the sideH, where eigbt ronlot^k blnukfi are fixed; 
u Hint* a rowlock nt each end fnr a steering oar. The undwkod 
Ml or llto poiitooD U 14 fw^t Hj iiichL's by 4 feel 1^ iiich^, and Is 
uiid«d by coamitigH 5 incboit high ubuve tb» dc-vk. The extreme 
b of the boat U l!t feet 7 iuche«, ixn extreme bi-eadth ih 5 feet .3 
jt, and itii depth niuidHhips, Jiichidiiig the eoaiujuKi*, ii - foet 8 
«. TbK pontoon vdghn (dry) from 750 lo rtWi iinmids (say 7 owt.), 
lra«B wht^D tluaiiiig i-inpty 2J iuchuH, aiid when in bridge G inches. 
:faly speaking, every inch of immemioD gives 000 jioinidH of buoy- 



e pontoon oonelsts of six sets of framed ribs coiinectud by a deep 
IB, two Btde-atrvaks, and tht«« bottom -streaks. The sides and 
nn are of thin yellow pine, with omivas secarcd to both surfaces 
ldi»-nibber Holntioti ; the cauvn« in coated nntaido with two coata 
KIM glHft. 

I Inm ring Is att«chvd to the fhimework at each end, and cotine«t«d 
tin kelaoo by nii iron rod. There Is a deal for Kernring the cable* 
le deck at each end. 

e bottom is provided with two ptng-holei to Imt water onl; it ia 
lolcil oataide by five longitudinal battens. On each side of the 
tbere is a side-rail, to which are seciiretl eight haudlcx, by which 
Hmtooo eao be carried by hand. The second handle from each 
M attached by wire rope, the remainder by hemp rope. 
ere are foar thwarts, which sapport a Ha<ldlo-l>eam, which can be 
4 wb«n tbe pontoon la to be uM>d for ferrjiiic tnmiw; the saddle- 
1 to the Ihwarts by Iron pins golnK ihroiigh tlie »eat and 



ts hollow, 10 feet 1 inch long at bottom and feet 

incbea deep, and 4 inches wide ; it can be eaRily 

Mcored by the fonr Iron pins before dewjibed. 

rest of Baltic fir. The weight nf the Kiddle t>eani 

are abto re<|uire<l for the far and near 




f%0tM. 



3tsai »*-•«- 



„-. 124), failing which they can be improvised from ft 
i'i:Ihw by 4) inches by 3 Inches, laid Unt, and with nine 

i liiolirfi high and IJ inches apart Inr the Ave nrdlnaij 
ika. 

tola ■ fraoilox of 10 fevt I liKibMVwtK,%^\Q«itMAVncAA^ 
, witieh au ov«r tbe MUUto-bWBu 'SSwb vkfitS^ . 



256 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITAltY OPERATIONS IS ] 



litui five B«tti of carved cleats lOJ iucltea by 2 iudiM, at equal dirf 
to receive the ends of the balks. Tliere are four olJier oets ofl 




with wjuaro eiida, placed VBtJ6rm«AYaUi\^A*>^«««*'''i''^o»'«*»*' 
tJonal balka neoeasai? f <JLflMt MBSM !^ **^ *''*'^ ^^* **"* 



BRITISH NAVAL AKD MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 257 

There are handles at each end to enable the saddle to be lifted. The 
side-railBy 10 feet 7 inches by 2 J inches by 2J inches, are of Baltic fir^ 
and the remainder of American elm. The saddle weighs 41 pounds. 

The balks are of Canada red or Kawrie ])ine, the length being 15 
feet 9 inches, breadth 3^ inches, and depth 6 inches. The ends of the 
balks iire halved, bnt they are there strengthened by iron plates at 
top and bottom ; the bottom plates are made with two claws, to prevent 
the balk slipping off its saddle. A balk weighs, dry, 73 pounds ; wet, 
75 pounds. 

The chesses are single planks of Kawrie pine, the length being 10 
feet, the breadth 1 foot, and the depth 1^ inches } the breadth at each 
end is diminished to enable the rack-lashing to be passed between two 
adjoining chesses. A chess weighs, dry, 50^ pounds ; wet, 52^ pounds. 

The ribands are of Canada red pine, 15 feet 9 inches by 3j^ inches by 
6 inches, halved ^at each end, with 14 buttons, the first 1 foot 4^ inches 
from the end, and the remainder 12 inches from center to center. The 
distances from center to center of the buttons are painted alternately 
black and white. 

The buoyancy of the pontoon bridge is suificient to admit of the ]>as- 
sage of siege artillery and steam sappers. 

Berthon's collapsible boats are of waterproofed canvas over a folding 

frame of wood, the gunwales doubling down in the plane of the keel. 

The length is 9 feet and the width 4 feet ; w^hen opened the boat is retained 

in shape by the thwarts. When used in building bridges, a siuldle or 

two-legged trestle is placed in cleats on the bottom boaixls of the boat, 

and held in i)osition by wire guys extending from the gunwales of the 

boat to the saddle. On these saddles the superstructure is laid. It is 

made of four longitudinals, ta]>ering from 3 inches in depth in the cen. 

ter to 1^ inches at each end, placed on edge and connected by wooden 

pinB. On top of this ginler is laid a platform 18 inches wide and 8 feet 

long. 

Two men can carry a boat, 109 pounds, slung on a pole, and two more 
^trestle, 8Ui>er8tructure, anchor, and guys, 97 pounds, or a complete 
Quit may be conveyed on one horse or mule. 

The pontoon troop also had Blanchard pontoons, cylinders of tin with 
l^mispherical ends, 22 feet 3 inches in length and 2 feet 8 inches in 
^meter, weighing 476 pounds, and having a disphicemeut of 0,735 
poinds. Two pontoons with their superstructure form one raft, which, 
^ith the^roadway between it and the next raft, is carried on one wagon. 

The troop was landed at Ismailia on August 29, and the pontoons at 
®Hce utilized for transport on the Sweet Water Canal. The service 
P<>utoou8, drawing but 18 inches of water when su[)porting two tons of 
^^ in pairs, were, as may be supposed, very useful in this connection. 

Un September 2 the troop wa« placed temponirily at the disposal 
^the general commanding the line of communications, for the pur- 
pose of working between Te]-ei-3Iahuta and KaasaBa\i\, xei^rnvw^ *^w^ 
H. Mis. 29 17 



25d BRITISH NATAL AND UILITARY OPERA'noNS IN 

I forwardint; at the former poiut the storee broQglit up by the d 
I boat semc« nnder, CommiMKler Moore. 

la additiou to the {lontoon eguipmeDt, a siinplu tlut-b< 
1 devined by Captain Wood, R, E., was tried in tbc ( 
I and 128.) 

Thtt gauwalti and bilge [>iecc-s are identical iu form, and are o 
J by stuuctiions, all buiog suwed out of Incb stufT. The I 
I covered witb two thickne^es of well-paiul«d «aovafi. 




1 




Inproriitd •mw. 

Tbe only real pontoon work done by the troop was tb« o 
\ ofpoutoou bridges at Tel-el Mnbiita and KassBAtiin to i 
I vampa establiehiMl ou opposite sides of tbe tSwe«t Water Canal, 
The Field Park, nnder Oaptain C A. Roch fort- Boyd, vas ( 
of 33 non-commissiouod officers and tnen, and had as it« eqaipi 
horRes, 9 carts, and a printing wagon. It followed in rvnr of t 
as far as Kattsassiti, carrying supplien of tools and materia! for 4 
I Bible wants in the way of intn^ncbing, &v. Hm pnninve wan Ia m 
reMTTH to the other companies regnlariy attaclied to tbe fi^tlj 



THE «,!//. ir.ir lOMI'JSr. 

Of the six companies of the BoyiU Kngineent, uue* b 

J 8tb, was organ[»Kl and preparetl for the work of buildinx a 

fatiug railways. It Is uol, \»o^6';w, 8.'^^v«"'"""'"t railway i 

'jidtmt, thoru seemB to be no Rucih wtvR. 'Y\w w\ *A tvScvivs « 



h«H NAVAL AND MILITARY orKRATlONS IN EOVPT. 259 

[viD«nt Is tttiigtil lit tho HcLool of Military Uugiueerinc. 
m llaiitMl lunoUDt of pruvticv is Itail with tht> railwayn about th« 
ramnMit workBbopit »t Cbatbam au<l Woolwich. 
1u tioTeniineni tloeH uot own the railways in (ii-ent BritaiD, utiil 
M is dftlMiTc^l fhiin iitlhzing them att n nuhool ot t'xurciiu! for )ui|i- 
k A« mliilil btiw XtvvD i'specto^l, tim luttur (liapln^'ml uccaMioiially 
laAriil n lack uf fuiuUiarity with the minor detaiU of railway work, 
^^■Wvd them to be amat«arH, :in wiih f\irth(!r proveil by tho iin- 
^Hat in tb« niiiiiin^c of the railway out of iKinnilin lut tiniv vlnpftMl 

not tke Mi»dlti(t of tt foroe tt> Kjiy)it bccuuu- probabk-, No. 8 coin- 
i; ma filled op by inochiuiiot of tht* vuriouH kimU dwDtetl (lexlr- 
■ for nilway work. Brought togt'thur uarly in .luly, they gained 
u seiiDaiDtance was feaHible with the dntiex Iwfore them by voIud- 
rUboron tho liD«M of the SouthweHtern and liie Ix»idou, Chatham 
I tkntt Kailwayis tlie«t.- corpomliouH affonlin^; thmn t>very fai;ility 
l|»Ub)» with Uteir r«^iilar Iratii )wrvie(«. In tliiif way they gained 
■lleat praclira in laying lintw, pnttiug down pointfi and croMiugH, 
niiqt aign^bi, &€. The euipiieni oBpmally Helect«d an engjne-drivvra 

V prratJttMl t>y tlif Ixindou, Chatham and Dover Railway to rid<? on 
liH-oinotivrf luid w-awiioiially to handle them, while the fiteilttioH of 
Cbathim Mation were noviired for the vxiteHt^ntw of guards (coudnot- 
), iiaiian-nuuit«r«, nhnntem. pointamon, signal wen, &c. A v«r>' 
lied and inadequitti- training, »er(alnly, but Iwtt^r than none at alL 

V orgaaliutiot] of tbo eomtiany oouKJAtcil of .1 lieuUnuantK, 1 sar- 
% I wwTBDt oOtcur. and 1(>3 non-oommiiwioU4Ml oflieem and men, 
Itr the uommand of C'uptJiiu Sidney Smith, U. K. In addition, M^or 
A. J. WaUww, K. E., went out as director of milwaya, with a Rtaff 
Pn oflbCTS mtul Uiree men. Aft4>rwar<U, Major ,1. (J. Ardagh, C. B., 
L, WM Umpofmrlly awMxuated witli ^l^or Walla<^e. 

%■ oatSt eonprtoed enough 72iionnd nteel raiU for A milex of ruad, 
Mn A MuM qtuuitity of light 3(!-i)Oiind railtt, with the reqaisttc 
fOT^a point* and crossings, four tank-engines, with eumpU^te aets 
tMk, two heavy onineft mouut«l on railway earrisgea, two brealc- 
n T»a« floatainlng all poMible applian^m for eleariag away wm-kod 
Im^mmA aajacka, iHtnt, ebaiiix, hIhhw for geiriug earx linek un the 
I, Ihnii or four poMwnger ciuringes of I'lU'h cIiim (llrst, wiviod, and 
4), Mttl»-auv and traeks, and brake-vans. All llir rolling sinck 
iWUmudbI Buglifih pa(l*-ni. 

iMfbv <n|>emuo(ui to mention that iu l^nglnud a hKMRiotire is 
ti tm «iffiD« } |MUi»etig«r cant, earriagvs ; iwrm-d fti-ogfat cam are 
di TaDi,iilid plstfonn cars are trucks. 

hr Hfbl TtM was d49sign«<l for temiuirary repaire mly. The expvri- 
I bad with it showed that It was totally onflUed for the pHrpoae, 
Ibat time would have been saved by at out» t««ottiiis to Uw h«tv. 



26D BUITISII NAVAL AXD HILITAKY OPERATIONS IK EGYPT. 

Tbo sleciiers, repreeeiited iu the Hcccitiii)aD>iug Bketubes not to »aib, 
ure .siiiii)l,v iron platt^ aboat S feet long by 18 hiebes iu wititb, dished in 
the center. Th(t chairs, of the usual fortii, are bolted to the convex tiidt 
ollho sleeper. 



I Si 



^~1 




Troujikl-iraR Bleepen and chain. 

Iu luyiug tbe rails tbe sleeper is worked down iuto the .saud lotbt 
pruiiei' level, aud the mil Bbpped iu and keyed. Intended for awin 
light soils and in dry climates, the sleepers prove<l both eonveuient aoi 
eSicteut. Their natural teudeucy is to settle steadily and rapidly Ul 
l>er;uanent bed. At^er this is reached tbe line is as solid na can betl^- 
sired. 

This sleeper is lighter than the wooden sleeper, and if separated ftm 
the chairs is much less bulky, stowing spoon-fashion. With the 
attjiched it makes rather awkward stowage. 

Tbe key employed bas long been in use in India, whore the ravagu of 
the white ant are tbe occasion of the substitution of metal for wood 
wherever economically possible. This key, therefore, while no noveltf 
abixJiul, may be of interest at borne. It is made of steel ribbon about » 
quarter of an inch sgnare, wound 




nsn SAVAL *sp military (ipkraiiun!* in EGVPT 2lit 

llvr cnpaclt^, originjillv small, was iiivrvHK<^<l by tlio ftnpmviit- 

nijarii Uiider, » |>1ntf<)rni car or track with foai atiiHll titnkiii vitpable 

<rM4lin* Mt* to Mi gallnitfi i;ach. A haiidpump was risttPd in tlie 

' ' I iIm' vmm wat<T tbmiipli a hose into the piigiiie tiink 

ril«r. Ttio clr«iiian »8Alt)tanr liiul, im n rule Ami wlllioiit 

r work tiix p«iMUigt< pv(*ry Iriji, so ctitisliiiit whk IIh- nm- 

ii.-it.i>i< til niiF. |iDtn|). 

ne BclireikMi iif lliU lieht lyiie wan governed by tbe pnibnblp iliffl- 
WlQ nf gtKtii)|; Uir cii|E;iiieA OKliore fii Iitniadin ; bnt, Juil^eil by tbe 
iniM. II <*i»K r«);n'ltitbl<-. All tJie engiut'!< iiwil between ihv base mid 
tWfrMt prior to tliv battlnori>l-i-l-Ki-bir, tbat li, dnriiig tliv whole of 
IhtMTtoal «ampatfm, wvre landed at 8uok, where the fhcilttics wi'rt> ho 
pMt H (o iwmit thft laudiuf; nt largo ba well an ainall i>n(tini>s. There 
■«, norMivrr, iinvor any railway (Ipinniid for lite latter in proferenoe 
l^llif rormrr. An thv imdlv wa« alwayi* heavy, and th« lijflit cnglneB 
Mlh ibcir mvaKiT trniiiN blocknl Ihe iiin|>lL< track to the front af> com- 
ll«elj a4 ihc larf^eroiieA. The haaliugcaprntily of tbeM small i-nginea 
'MIn tbr nciirbtHirluHMl of ten trnRkn, carrying each from 5 to tona 
i-i. >in!.' Tii.ii of tbr latfcer en|ciue« n>«iially workiiiit on the KuyptJan 
' i«t Wl per wnt. greater, 
oinpany emlmrked at Woolwich on board of the trans- 
"II Angnst 8. On the way ont from Knglnnd the men 
im- iiilil <HI ftir, and instnicted theoretically iii, thv rariona diitic* 
h*) Koiitd have lit perform, im slation-mnfiters, assistant atation-moA- 
<■», Mtorvkeri»era, emrine-drirpra, RosnlH, plate-layprs, gangers. Ac, 
Ibltut M«b knew what hbi nwn work was to be before arriving in the 

m. 

' 1V Mmtner anHvHl at Ismailta on Angnst 33, anil the c:oin|Miiiy l>egaa 
■MifTK at oiMif. 

lVr» were two br«aks in the line held at this moment by the British 

r<>'|kv .in ii.^i^'nlHcant gap of two patra of rails, nhicb bad Iteeu blown 

iiiT King-llaminii, It. N., on the '2ist, ItetweitD IsraaittH 

I'lher a »ior^ <tiT)oii8 tntemiption, 'TM yanitt In knjrlh, 

'. tnaile by the Kgyptians in thefr retreat. Ni«r by the 

•tti-T .t »n>n'l and virry anno^ving obstacle wan dincovcret], where a 

>il*ay iruttini; fhiai ten in fifteen rt>et deep had been fliled in witli 

Wm! Pir tli.^ ili4(anre of twenty-Hre yanU. The removal of this ob- 

iriMil rhegrvater part orfonrdays,ow)ng to theltgblneiH 

'i' ini|K>»t«lbrllty of intm-iiMng the fone nt work beyond 

I imnitHT of men. 

' ik tM>ar Neltclie was immediately rriuiiml, and tralSc 

•<f liJilf a dozen i>f nome thirty trni:ks that fainl been 

' < <<>' hyGeneral (iraliam on Angnst lil. titinxm were em ■ 

fin lilt n) itieearKas far as the gup at HI Mngfir, Arabi having mn 

K lonomntivrs on this |knrt of the Kgyptinii rat\w;i; «k^«\tta. Vik 



262 BEITI8H NAVAL AND MILITARY 0PEEATI0K8 IN EGYPT. 

some Egyptian locomotives fVoro Ifgbters towed around from Alex^h-i 
dria, as well as the English locomotives already mentioned. 

At 9nez, there being deep wat«r close to the docks, the oi>eratioQ oj 
getting the engines ashore was comparatively simple, while at Ism&ilia 
it woold have been extremely difflcnlt and attended with great risk. 
Work was also being pushed ahead at Ismailia, and a branch line laid 
with light rails fh>m the station to the Central Wharf (see Plate 48). 
The Arab labor for this most valaable a^jnnct was secured by contract 
at heavy rat«s. This line was completed by Aagust 26. By the same 
day tlie gap at El Magfar had been repaired. 

The railway was now in good condition as far as the advance at Hali- 
sameh and Kassassin, only lacking locomotives to begin a steam serricc 
at once, the amount of rolling stock having been increased by the capt- 
ure of forty-five trucks in the engagement of the previous day 9^ 
Mahsameh. The engines with them had uncoupled and escaped nptk>* 
line, to the great chagrin of the British. 

The wheeled and other land transports bad not been able to keep nF 
witli the rapid advance of the fighting line, and the latter had aliesAJ 
begun to suffer through want of supplies. 

The first locomotive arrived from Snez in charge of Major Wallaoe^' 
;j.30 p. m. August 27, and was received with a greeting which bordered 
on joy. A traio service was begun on the following day. This engiiB^ 
belonged to the Egyptian State Railways, and had come around ftoK* 
Alexandria. 

The speed attained between Ismailia and Kassassin, the point novr 
occupied by the advance, was always, and of necessity, slow. Ttt^ 
heavy engines bronght up Ax)m Sues were in indifferent order, as mifi*'' 
have been expected of complex mechanism which had been in the buA' 
of semi civilized people. In addition, the permanent way had beoV 
iiijiirod by the eouatunt passage ovlt it of uninials and wheeled vehicle*' 




BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 263 



?ry.JM 






Pot-^ltepern^ Egtfptiam permanent waif. 

ptrticQlar semoe was in the hands of the Commi8»ariat and Trannport 
CoriM. 

On August 31 two more figyptiau locoinotivea arrived from Suez, 
■iking three iu all. Of these, one was large, capable of hauling 
tan ftfleen to twenty trucks loado<l to five tons each, and two were 
Miller ones, only able to haul from ten to twelve trucks each. The 
Bnmber of trains was at once doublinl. The time-table was b3' no means 
bed, but was subJMst to daily moditictations a<Tonling to necessity, 
iBd|WaM established by the genenil incoinmandof the Lineof Commiiiii- 
Wions. As a rule, at eight oVIiH^k in the morning a train h^ft Ismaili:! 
teKassassin direct, with NUpplies for this advan(M*d post, toHowtMl at 
ikvrno^clock by a mixed train, which stopped wherever niMNled. lioth 
i^rned iu the evening. Th4* round trips iiHiially iN-rupird alNiut rleven 
fcooni. 

With this increase<l traffic the want of additional sidin;;s lMM*ami* more 

ipparpnt, there being but one turn-ont, tliat :it Miihsanirh, )M'tw(MMi Nr- 

'<^lif and KasMiissin, and originallv nom* :it all at the latter plan*. As 

"oon SM the ccmcentration of tlic* armv at this ]M>sitit»n was di'tcTniiniMl 

^pon, a siding was constructed l^.'Ui yards in ItMigtli, with points having 

i lead of one in tiMi. \Vat«Ting stations wrriMniprovist'd at Tf*I rl-Maliuta 

^od KuMiassin. UKing tanks similar to those tit ted in tin* jniy tenders. 

t^u keep up thi* supply of water for tin* lo<*ornot Ives the regimental water- 

Sairts were employed, lN*ing tilled at the Sweet Water r:iiial and emptied 

ntfi thi* tanks. It nNpiiretl the constant services of at least t\M» i»t these* 

sartA at e:M*h station, with large tati;;n(* parti(*s troni iheramp*^. t4i ni«*et 

iir demami for steaming water. From tin- (ank^ jt was pumped by 

land into the tcMider. The railway t'nrther nefdi'd the dail> !.ibor<« i*l' 

iCbfj' df tachments of men to 4*l4*ar the .sand away trom tin* i.iils a> ii 

^radaaJi.v UL-cunmUitod, dr/ven by the prev.\\\\\\';. \uiv\Wt\\ >n\\\v\ a\\v\ 



^ 



S4 BkiTiau ifXVAL ANt) Military opera tioN's m bo#ft. 

licked lip by the mon and animals that nseil tlio raJIraod hRtritmlljii 
higtiway. 

Eiiuli train tind au eu)rine-UrivHr ami flrviimu ou ttiu «ngin« iul • 
urd or oondnctor in vliurt;;^ of tbu train, betiidiM a brakenman ud m 
armed escort, Thw trucks atid vans carrying stored bnre wriHeo liA 
nftbeircont«ntH and dctitiui)tinna,tliegaftrd being runiinbed witlisnj- 
bill. No niie, oOlcer or man, was nlloweti to rido on tlip train witlw M^ 
pastf rroiii the Railway Staff Officer at tbe Mtatiou of deiuirture, xfl^H 
animalfi wt-rv e^'er transported by rail, ^H 

Tbe hiatorj' of thn lailway during tbe early days of B<<[>t«tBl^H 
made up of a series of small misbapa : naod pileil up on the raf^H 
foot travel bigb eiiougli to tlirow trains oIT the track ; ]>etty acei^^^ 
to locoRiotivp!^; blocks on tbe tine; iuanfticient water, and that^H 
dirty; trucks left at tlie wrong i)l)i<'« or carried past tliL-lr destiuoH 
trains not property made u[), &c. ; none serious, but some of safll^H 
ini]>ortauve to iutert'cre nitb and retard tbe traflic. On Scptent^H 
for tustauce, the numjier of trains each way was re^luced tu one. fl 
80 insufficient was the motive power that barely enoufih «tom^| 
daily consumption could be bauled to the fi'Dnt> Tbe inability hii^^l 
taitlate supplies involved ihe consequent inability to make an adl^H 
It was at this time und for this reason that tbe pnM]M-ct« of tbe ei|^| 
tion seemed least bright. ^M 

The accession of two more English engines from Snei, on SepH^H 
'■), relieved the pressure, particularly in permitting the extunmnM^| 
steuni power in shunting. Tlie next day two more un{;ttH» iaaM^| 
and the railway was now fairly well eqaippcd. In all there were llH 
locomotives in use, the eighth, a large one, not arriving nutil 8epM^| 
!). Tbe larger engines were lu very uiditfereut condition, hM^H 
and tJie smaller ones were too weak, so that a full devvlopaiHi^H 
niol obtained ; still it beeunie possible to run three traina to Uw^H 
wvery day aud to begin the aecumidation of provisiona and Am^^I 
uEunsassin, in addition to keeping p»cc with tbe current detnai>di.^| 
[ Every effort was made by Major Wallace and his ooUea^i^iui W ItT 
[pedite tbe work. The actual dispatching of trains was (drnple enodfkt 
hut Ibe railway company was dellcieiit in one e««entiid poiut. lyflj 
hio mau familiar with " yard work "; that is, tbe making up of Uaifl^H 
itlie distributing of cam, that ceaseless backing and Qlliug of the«^H 
ling engine at eveiy im[>ortant station, which seems ta the looktfr>^i^^| 
u misdirection of energy. The ability to carry on this oj>«nit*Mi,^^| 
[large scale, without undue loss of tiuie^ involves an exIivnialy^H 
intelligence, sbarjieiiet) by long ex|>erience. The result ia tin ^H 
oom)>osiliou of the train, so that tbe e4Lrs desttuci) Ijt ga to tk^^H 
distant point are ncun.'st tbe locomotive, those for tbe nenroit ^H 
Ing up tbe rear, where tbey cau be rea4lily dropi>ed. With Engli^^| 
that have, as a rule, no brakes, each train concludes witli a o^H 
Mr fitted with brakes, and c^WeA » \tt%V.« nwv. \\\ «« m\iM to^H 



SAVAL AK0 MILITARY OPEBATIONS IN EGYPT. 265 

taaic nf tfame hrahu vann, wliuthi>r on» ur murtf timii onv In 
Iter, iDlriMlnivs fiirtber noniptiRation iiiti> yani work. 
lalnwaltA vers, ornHinif, reached at iBmailm, bnt »t t)it« vspend- 
I wt more tfiue aoil troulit)' tbaa could wvli bo afforded at the inu- 
U Tke Hotriuo-drlveni, too, were anitkiDful at flrnt, although ZBalons 
ratirifli;. lu the wonla of an olUr^r dependent ui>ou the rail- 
ftr the elBdMil discbargv of hit own duty, "Thv mipitem did ex- 
elj well, trat wore not professional drivent." In fiMt, all th<^ rail- 
dntiea were performed with ftreat wal anil in a raann«r generally 
hetaty, retrnrd Iieing bad to'thn Rin;iim8t»inceii of the rjuie. The 
: WAH not aliray* ttve from rink, althongti the RgyptianH never mo> 
d tbfp ti*tm. Nouomplfilnt wh)« huani against tbeir faiilifnlnenii and 
nr In all bf«nchm trt* thmr newrending dnty. 
bh tbe aeimrfi nf the Bg>'ptittn Hystems betWMMi Tel-el KeMr and 
islf. Zapuig and Itenba, Henba and t;»iro, Henba and Alexandria, 
' the battle of Tel el-Kebir, the reHponfiihilitieH of the railway coro- 
■ were nulilenly enormonitly increased tor a brief time. The Egyji- 
njlvayoindabt w«ns however, atotiw rentored totheirold |Hitiition8 
tlw MrTJce and material turned over to tbem with all [NMisible speed. 
IIm Snil frw days the Britmh Itailway Staff Officers exerctMeil a gen- 
eoDtrol ov«r the arrival and departure of trainH, Irnt even this 
iN*«ient WM M>on aliunduni^l, the KKypllnnx r\>j«nming foil nway, 
roC only u* nomiinRMl nM|ntfiitionn for Hperial or extra wrvict> fVom 
ilritiiih military nDthtpn'tit!e. 

oofwJdtiriuK the IuImitk of the .Hth eompaiiy, Itoyal Kngtiieers, ft in 
^Mb iu avoid lieioK stntck by the very Hltgbt mttiire of tbn dam- 
HBIo tb« nillwny by Uie retrealing Egyptians, lite expbiiia- 
^HpoaalMy be found in the faet that the war was seen to assume 
^Kfeto point a character very different from that which their in- 
^HmIuwI eaiue<l them toeipi>et. Their lewlem must have known, 
^^^ than to liare poMea.«t-il a mofli<;nm of intetligetire, and M>me 
jj^Kwaranlly elevermeii, that reNiHtnnt-eto the Itntlnh foree wonUI 
MHfljr Involve lianl work and hotly ootiteitled fngageinenix, with a 
na, rMBota if thi^* would, yet still a rhanre worth oonsidering, of 
DIE In ratraat. It wum Uiis i-bance wtaieh L-rystalllKeil into the e^ent, 
iron tben In have infliflte<I Heriiiux injnry (o the railway would have 
I taa0ble proof to tbe rank and ftlti that the iMHiie of the war waa 
•la^ atronsly agaiuNt them, and have tende*! to weaken that belief 
•Irova iDvlndbiliiy wbivh alone held tliem together. 
lii blind belief artMl in the matter of the railway, aa il did InotlMfa, 
poaitive help to the Britiiib. A vlvili/ed enemy in the |MMition ct 
lltJlHiana wonld have torn np tlte railway an be reireait>d, and dur- 
rta lialta hare lieni bis energies to rotting the eommnniration witb 
HMa bjr raUIng in n«r of the attacking firm-. The severing oT tbia 
I attrrr of nippllMi might bare tieen elfeetrd with compamttve ease, 
min MUtvnptA mt if wouh) have pntveil (raVtfnA u\ vraXvuruwnvmX. 



■ The 



BRITISH NAVAL AND HILITABV OFEBATIONB tS BOYFT. 

'I'tm atapidity of the detuuse is nowhere mure clunrlf Hhown UikU it tf 
neglect. As eloewliere, this otupidity was reuognized in sdraaci^l 
was relieil npoii with perfect reaaon as a factor iu the general pro' 
The toctioa of the campaJgD woald have been very differant if both |j 
I posseestil fairly e<]Uiil iutelligeucc. 



THE TELEGRAFn TIIOQP. 



I mer 

l_ wen 

^^^.advi 

w», 
qaj 
tb« 
Ev 

1 P" 

i foci 



The iroiMrtance of rapid and truutwortby eommunicatiMi 
headquarters of tbe CoiumaQder'iu-<Jhief and the varioim subsidimtjl 
ters of an army in Mie fletd is so ^i^at that in every military 
the development of means to this end has reeeired careful Ihouglili 
elaborate experiment. The oldest mo<le of conveying inlelligeuM 
messages, verbal or vnitten, carried by men either moanted or <ra 
a seoond method is by visual signals, oousidered elsenbere ; and a 
ia by the use of the electric telegraph. The atlvaut«gea of lh» 
are rapid, nnobserred, and accurate working, yielding, If dealred. l' 
manent record. Although requiring, when once laid, a eomparatln^ 
small working staif, it still involves a costly and rutbor cambcoon 
plant, and hence its use is generally restricted to maintaituiif MB- 
mnnication with the base of operations, and between llie winfB aA 
headquarters. Being wholly within tbe line«, all its delicate |Mrti ft- 
oeive the l>eneflt« of the general defense. 

Daring the campaign in Egypt the Held telegraph waa oumpantiralj 
little used, owing tn tbe fact that the advance of the army wasalooga 
route supplied with thi-ee permanent telegraph line*, whtoli bad bam 
merely damaged but not destroyed by the retreating euemy, ao<l wUck 
were utilized for keeping up commuulcAtiuu between lamailia and It* 
.advanced depot. An account of the hislory and organixatioa of th> 
igraph companies and of what is known as (' troop, Boyal Bi(k 
in, will not )>e withont interest. 

It should be borne in mind that in England the ejttiri- t«leiRapfe 
Kj-stem, being partof the Post-Ofllce l>epArtment, otfers facihthw iu tto 
way of instrucition and practice to other branches of lbi> (JuvFrnmenl n- 
quiring them which are not attainable in a country tike uur on n. vlim 
the telegraphs are in the bands of private individuals or C" 
Even in England unieb opposition wait experieneed by th'- 
ginvera iu obtaining access tu the telegraph ollices of tli> 
(It is due to the long-continued exertion); of Lieutenant-Ci ' - 

'either, R. E., an electrician of high standing, now prer.;! 
Society of Telegraph Engineent, that the poHt-ollice autboi 
fotlijcefl tuagree to llievlau in oiwration at present. By ihU pUu tl" 
meaiben of the two TeVeRvapU V^o«\v^vu\«», x\i«Sl4 wA. "iW* Ki>>al ■»■ 



»n N4VAL ANli UlUTARV OPKRATIONS IN EQTPT. ^67 

b »rp admitted Into the [>OHtal telegraph department, where they 
M jMmanatitlj cni)>l()yed daring peAoe in the oonstruotinn and main- 
wancv of nil Ihi- Hned in Ihe Minthem oniinties nf England. 
Tbr n«niits (m thivte oumpanicA ftr« e»l)!<t«<l not iind^r eighteen 
iftn of age. Id additinn to the uBual qniilifleutions the^' niUBt be ftp- 
amed by the I'ofltniaater-Uenvral, through his itisiR'OturM, aa thorough 
efnpb op«ntora. They are at once sent to the Sehtml of Military 
iS^iM^og st Chatluuu, where they paso eighteen months under in- 
'VKtion Mfloldlen nnd 8up|ier«. From the Mchoot the recruit is sent 
QMoroUwrofthotwoTelegntph Compauiea, rate<l tut "Indoor Teleg- 
Ikbist" or "Outdoor Telcgriiphist," iiccordiug to his proUcittucy. It 
11 be noted that the latter position calls for wider knowledge of the 
t, iDclndittfi, tut it does, an a<»|uaiulanra with all that relates to butter- 
B mmI olBoe inntmmejitA in addition to experience in line work, with it« 
tnliar ftioctiotui in the matter of faultii of all kinds, and the practical 
•otiOB irf wires. 

ne coldier telegraphiift then nsuallj settles into the place of "line- 
■•t^Beiiior lele^craph clerk (oiierator), or other position of reH]Kmaibility 
ilbe^ott-Uflioct. Fornix .warn be ix cnnlittsl with active aevviee^aDd 

ifint line of the army. After that time he paMite« iitio 
lining in most eases in the Post-Unice hh a civil employ^. 

frabout 400 of these Military Telegraphists in the Active 
■, lifthle to Ite oalted npon to join the Koyal Kngineer 
ilegrsph Compuiius when war breaks ont, and the nnmUer, throngh 
• opCTStioo of ttaiii admirable system, is oonstHDily iueruasing. 
ADotber rrsnil is attained in tbe stea^ly Hupjily of telegraphislH for 
idian and minuial servtoe., for tbe I'erslau Oovemuent telegraphs, 
lUiary tHrgraphs at I'ariuuf- home and forviign military stations, and 
r tlHT torpedo wnk'v (snbmarine mining). 

Aa a body of men, subject to military discipline and accustomed to 
iqaoMtloamgobedieiice.these engineer telegmphist«are most valnabl« 
I oecasiooa of tndden emergency. In 1872, when a strike arose amoag 
e ciTil employes of the Poxt;^! Telegiaph, forlyUve of these engineers 
nnl to Ireland at a few htmnt' notice and took entire charge of iheliOM 
Unbltn and C^ork. The rapid nwtorntiun of Ibc Idegntph wrvloe at 
is jnnrtuir hnd n salutari* influence upon the strikera. 
Tb^ PiMi ( lllin! orfiiinizatioo was BrBt*t«stM) dnring the Asbantee war, 
1873. At fort} -eight hoars' warning, a complete foree of ndlcejv and 
ra IraJniNt in the |>oHtal telegraph Her^lce wax HenI ont, wjih slorea, 
■Iraniriits. batterieM. &c^ all drawn fhmi the rost-ORIoc. Tbe suemaa 
iich tbic IxMly of experts aehievnl wim Mgiial, and it rtHM'lved well- 
[Titcd approbation. 

Beaidea (beae two Telegraph (lonipaniea, there isa Ibird ctrrpo of Koyal 
Dgiiaeers, known as (' troop, charged with the s|>eclal work of udag- 
pby. Thv braalqnarters of rbln tnmp are onlinarily at Ahlerabnl, 
IMTB it t^ fierrimtl in pravlival Aehl wntk, \ayinK t:inai\& t»Vh*«t\nv- 



B8 BRITISH NAVAL AND MU.ITABV OPERATIONS IN EOTPT. 



inert ] 

> typ«< 
worl 
nipl 
■ni^l 
ticu 

I Wft8 



iFor many yearn tlie equipment of C trttop whs in iintiahon of lit 

German niitfil, conatsting ntAiiily of a grouiul c^uble workt-il wilU polir 

ixed MopNt^ recortl<^n*oiiaolo8ei1i!ii-cnil. ItiwcniKtohftvebm-Dtaknii* 

raiit«il that tio btitter int^thoilof riiuuiiig » liu» could )te foaDilltsab; 

ijing out an iiisiilaltMl ciible on llm gioiitu). The fa<'i thai sniA t 

tbie would be greatly ex[>oifvd to iwvideiital dnmagu wiw r^sw^liid, 

bd it was tu reditfu- the ill-effevts of this tlumiige to a minimum Ihiil Ibii 

typftof r(<c«ivingfuHtrumentwasiulopte<l. Tbepolamedarmatnrebdnj 

worked by feeble current*, permits cotmiUerable leakagx without int«- 

niptiou of the service, bnt the instrument itt delicate and complex. Aj 

■night have l>eeii foreM^en, much ditDoiilty was e\perienre<l in th^ pnr- 

tieal working of tills e<iuipmi-nt'. Tlie uondltiun of iht? troop iu« a vbolt 

was not as satiafactory as it« fi-iends conld have wiMit^il ilnring a [wriol 

t several years. 

I In 1871 the dinsatisroctinn with the outfit bore fniil iu thv adi^)tMi 

1» new ei|uipineut, notably of an overluuul air Urn- in aUtlltion lolhe 

cable, aud simpler forms of iiistruuiuntM. Sin(50 then th« (H^alpuiNil htt 
nudergone coastaut improvement. 

The members of C troop, while intelligent and well infltnietwl, uvh* 
^^■liecesBarity professional telegraphist^!. The backward eonditiou of lh» 
^^^feoop for 80 ninnv years was donbtleHS tine to the fHt-l. that dnnDK Ihii 
^^Bhne no practical telegraphiHt, oHieer or man, watt apjioinltHl in it. It k 
^^^kw, however, io more ettt.:ient eoJdtlion, having abamlonfsit with pmlt 
^^^■i ligid eonservatisin. 

^^^P The old organixatiou wns t4iibjecfe<l to a severe trial darint: the ?in)n 
^^irar, when, streugthened by alwut twenty I'ost-OtBcc olerk.-. ' 
went to the front. On arriving at Xatul the equipment provi-il ■ 
and the l>e9t work was by the I'oflt-OtHce clerks, who tuokov- : 
nial telegraphs and worked them lor military purposes. The fiiid Iid™ 
were at fiiult because too tightly put np. Allogether lliiR expedtin* 
was not very soecensflil. 

After the Natal experience a mixed pmontul went oot nmfi ' ■ "t"* 
oiighly experienced offlter, trained in the iiost-ofHee. The . • 
included a light overheaii wire. The work was well dime in i ■ 
The eoinbiiiation of generally traine'l intelligence with Hpe<-i.>i •■•■r 
nesi* eould not fail to produce g.>od results. 

The otH'Uireuees just referred to were among the catiMM whi< I l": :■ 
the forming in 18.S1 of a boartl of ofHcent at Aldershot, pr\'-ri* ■' 
by Lieutenant Colonel Richard Ilarrisou, <■. B., R. E., for tht , 
tion of the subject of Held telegraph organ I nation and equipiti. 
iKianI ree^iHimendeil a complete auialgMmation, in tinieof wai.ni ' :: ■ , 
and the two telegraph compauieA, 22*1 and 34th. In the mmo limtH 
secure^l marked improvements in poles, wire, insulutura, and inrtn- 
fnenta. 

L T!je oulflt at present in chiefly m, follows: 
FTiio jn^iind cable \* \mivnv]it*eA.MveCi \i^ ■%«!»««!.. *\«\wn«, Bmthen^ << 



870 BRITISH \AVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IS EGYPT. 

D for winding up the wire on the rear i-eel. It consiHtA of » 
(Inim tlxei) iiitou the back of the hind wheel of the wagon and 
trit! with it. From this an ludia-ntbber band paAneft over a ama 
wheel held in an iron bracket on the (tide of th« wa^coii. The 
this band are fitted with cliiis, and may be ditii»)nnect«d at wi 
axis of the battd-wheel lies in the prolongation of tho spindle 
wire-dram, and has upon its inner side a nlatcfa. Correspondii 
this id another clutch on the spindle of the drum. Thece olQteb« 
be thrown in or ont of gear as desired. When in gear, aud wbentto 
carriage moves fnrwar^l, the wii-e iit wound up. 

The three boxen on the front part of the wagon frame may Iw oponl 
and formed into a Held office. Inside the near box are iustnuMMi 
and terminals, with wires running to the l>earing8 of the <lram's«piiid)M, 
Tlie terminal on the drum is also connected with the spludle b; neut 
of a plate, so that the wire n-nm each dnim ma; be coupled u itdnt 
in the Held office. " Earth * is obtained by wires rnnning from Ik 
naves of the wheels alone the spokes to the iron tires. 

The weight of the cable wagon when empty is 1,"&S pouoda. 

rin the longitudinal space between tho drums twenty light Itvatfi^ 
>pic poles are generally carried. 



J^JM. 







Jfllilonr Mont Tteorder. 

The overhead lino is a strand of threi^ galvanized- iron 
ETo. 18 B. W. G., having a resii^ianee of 'Mi> Ions and •*■ 
nnndit to the mile, very |>liab1e and strong, carried on 

mboo itt the material Hcleclcd), 14 fcft long, cappe«l with i^imptc 
> fn«alatoni. 



I 



BSITISH NATAL AND MILITAEY OPERATIONS IN EOTPT. 271 

The instmmentB employed were military Morse recorders, of which a 
top view, with the ooDDections, is given in Fig. 138. This instrametit 
can be used m a direct inker on a closed circuit, or as a local inker 
with either single or doable carrent. This instrameiit is smal], com- 
pact, simple, and efficient. It is made by Siemens Brothers. 

It has been proposed to nee the telephone for hasty field work, and 
seta of receiving and transmitting instrn- 
ments, based on this principle, were issued 
to C t.roop for experiment and trial. The 
tniDsmitter is represented in Fig. 139. 
1^ When the key is down the current passes 
'' through the coils of the electro-magnet 
and through the armatnre as well. The 
latter being attracted leaves a stop-screw 
on the standard and tbe carrent is broken. 
As the armatore is carried by a spring, 
tbe making and breaking of tbe curient, 
which now takes place, is very rapid, oc- 
ig a bnczing sound, that is transmitted through the line wiro to 




\ 




\ ''Ar., 



UH telephones of all the stations. The special I'oriu of telephone em- 
piojaj is shown in Fig. 140, while Fig. 141 is a couveutionul diagram 
<^tiie electrieal connections of tbe stations in circuit. 



Lee 

I in 

Wt 



I nn 



P72 BHITI8H NAVAL AND MILITAKY OPEKATI0X8 IN EOTPT. 

Coucoriiiiif; tlit; vitliie of tli» ii)>[mnUui<i, ilillurvnt ophilonx vrra 

luutvrcd. LioRteiiiuit -Colonel Weblwr tbiiiks tli*! T.vler sotindvr a lojt. 

1(1 stftUM tliiit t.lie uoiitiuite nru very upt Ui foul, while Mnjor A\t At- 

,nr Alackwortli «xpi<ri^ti(;»(l uo fault iu ite working; iu tliu fldit, urf 
foiiutl its lH<liavior sHtimfactory even wbeii wndiuf! piwuiafiM over « 
tiwky cablD, 

Tbv bfttterJeH that liiitereil iiiUi tbe otilJlt of (' troup wen bimII 
Leclaiioh6 eleiiiieiiti*, iti nqiiui-e vulcanite .jarH, tea iii a tH>s, ami cwipM 
in ecrifts. Tbuy wuru nil ivmiy for uimj, i^xcviit that wat4M- biul lo bt 
juldefl tbrontih a plug^oxl liole wbeu uw<)ed. Tbe tops of the alb 
Ht^leil witb u bituniinouH composition, whicb in tbe bot cliwW 
Egypt meltf^l an<l Hooded tlie batteries, rendering many of tbcnnr- i 
The Leclanch^ elenienc in not adapted to oonliniiODH wori M 

oloM^l oircuit, and bt^nuo tbe advisability of its enipIoytn«Dt villi tk* 

[otse reconlen is open to question. 

For tield work, the ordinary piHit-affiuu det«ctnr galvaoomelvr 
isBued. This has a vertical needle and two resistance coils, and 
}r«od iostrument for rongh purjmses. 

Eatth unit or section was provided with an " olHee tmx," eoai 
C!Ouiplet« equipment of stationery, sjtare partji of instruments, 
teries, tools, &c. These boxos were found to be too hoa\'}' for tni 
tation from Ismailia. They were therefore oi>ened and the 
articles taken out for use and forwanled to tbe front, 

A portion of tbe equipment was arranged for conveyance ub 
saddles, snititlile boxed being niiule to contain sparw parts, tools, 
yarn, f;uttu-]>ercha, covered wire, t&o. 

As an ont^^ome of the report by Lieuteuant-Colonol Harrison's 
when the exjii'dition to Kg^iit waH resolved uimn, Ibe monottfd 
of C troop und sixty men from the Postal Telefirrnph L'<Mn|)Mi 
formed into a Telegntpb Corps, under tbe old designation of O 
command being given to Mii^jor Sir Arthur Maekworth, K. E., 
and energetic ofllcer, not a postofiioe trained telographUL A 
witb hi)n were one tnptain and five lieutenants. Tbe ntQlc 
nnmbere<] 184 men. The transport conslste*! of (M! horsea, 111 
iVagons. li Maltese carts, 4 water-carts, and a forge wagon, and 
leant tu carry tbe stores uuedcd at the front, other modes of 

ice being looked for after landing, for tbe outfit comprised 

wlr« to reach from ismailia to Cairo, and weigbeil ItetweMi 

toiia. It WHH found Ibat tbe heaviness of the country prevratcd 

of all tlie vehicles brought out. Tbe horses could never UOTC 

itiittu IU wagons and a few two-wbueliil carto. The drivers and n< 

en were armed witb revolvers, and the others witb earbim^ 

The tr*M>[) asaembled at Aldersbot anil inarched with bnrBtat isi 

'SgoDs U> London, where It embarked on August It on board tbe Uni 

is/KirtOxenholmeJsWB^uttifeftuttlU West Indiadocks. In theisiM 

i 



BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 273 

me tbe entire eqnipment, providing against every possible want, had 
o sent from the Woolwich Arsenal and pnton board the ship. Un- 
rtanately, those most interested had not superintended the stowage 
the cargo, and, as a natnral consequence, what ought to have been 
top was at the bottom, an arrangement very fertile in subsequent 
^ cnbarrassment. 

The importance of the prompt arrival of so valuable a corps as the 

^I7«legraph Troop wonld seem to have been obvious, and yet the Oxen- 

tiolme, selected to bring it out, together with the Pontoon Troop and the 

f*ield Park, was one of the slowest of the transport fleet. Sailing from 

Uondon on August 9, she only reached Alexandria on tlie 2Gth and 

T^mailia on the 28th of the month, when the advance of the army had 

already arrived at Kassassin. The inconvenience of stowage, already 

K-«^ferred to, was experienced at once ; the whole equipment had to be 

t>Tt>ken out and reasserted in order to select the two or three tons re- 

ex «3ired for immediate use. The outfit of stores, material, tools, &c., was 

have been divided into five portions, each article or set of articles 

in qaintnplicate. One portion was designed for a reserve at the 

Be, and the others for use with the four independent sections which 

mposed the troop. Owing to the Oxenholme's late arrival at Ismailia, 

d to the time taken in reasserting the ill-stowed cargo, the scheme 

nld not be carried out. 




Sen and wagooA were landed and pUHh<^d on at once, witJiout proper material, tools, 
^ * * * It was found too late that the work on liaud diflcred from the drill at 
^^lenhot, and that, as practical teIo>;ra]>hi8ts, tlio first thin;; to ho done was to n'store 
qaickly as possihle the Egyptian system, which had hoen hrokon down. 

It has been mentioned that there were three wires along the railway 

Vm Ismailia to Zagazig. In addition to these were two through wires 

longing to the Eastern Telegraph Company, and haviug no connection 

Sth the Egyptian office en route. The first three were Egyptian Govern- 

<nt lines, with stations originally at Ismailia, Nefiche, and Mahsameh. 

11 of these wires were more or less damaged, the Iiiastern Company's 

^ving especially suffered. Many of the latter's poles, which are of iron, 

ere thrown down. This group of wires was not repaired or used by 

e Telegraph Troop. 

As General Oraham, who commanded the advance post, had been 

^^^yond the reach of the telegmphs for four days prior to the arrival of 

^^e Ozenholme, Major Mackworth had at once to establish the desired 

^^^^munication as well as to get his men and material ashore. 

The disembarkation was completed, as far as necessary, by 11.30 p. m. 

^* August 30, the troop marching at once to Tel-el-Mahuta,'ten miles dis- 

tfrom Ismailia, where it. arrived at 4.30 a. m. of the 31st and rested 

r a short time. August 31 was spent in labor on the broken Egyptian 

^*ltem. By 4^ p. m. the line was " through " from Kassassin to Tel-el- 

^^JAata, and by 9 a. m. of the following day was "through" to Ismailia. 

H. HiB. 29 18 



274 BRITJSn NATAL AND MILITAKY OPKKATIONB IN EG' 

This waa efl'ected by jiasainc acrona th« bn'tiku froip one to ao 
expodfi^iit yioUliti^ temporary rucvoiw, but lutidi subsviiueDt t 
ietice, lliu "b^uils" bciiif; bui\l.r iiitermiii;;Ie<l. 

Tbe next few days were occnitied in n'i)aicinR ami re-Mtahll 
old lilies and in fonniug »ii advancetl field -telpjrnvph pojj( ■( I 
By tlie nioriHU^,' or Septpinber 7 MAJor Mni^kwortb describe* 1 
"pretty well off." 

Of Ute Ilireo IJnei« tliiit bad bcvii rcston-d, odo whs a t 
nst'd mainly by Ufneral Wolseley for his dispatchea to (be 
to England ; thu xecond paniieil through itll Htatloiiti ; nnil ihv 
reserved exclnaively for the railwny inAinigfi>i4>nt. On SrpI 
there were two telegraph ofllcefi at Utnatlin, ono at the nvllw 
and the other tinder n tent in the yard udjoining thu htu 
of the hanK couiiiiiitidant, Une station was at Neficlie, one a 
meb, buHitlea the railway and ntntf offices at KiuiHas 
abont thu time Major Macknorlh api>e!)nt to have gjveu Qp 
the i>ermanent Uneit from the H-ont at Kii«»aiMlu to the bue I 
to Lieutenant-Colonel Webber, and to have (wntined bU att 
thv o]ii'nition!i of thu Held tetegrnph. 

During a reconnaissnnce on September 8 a sniiill delaebmeni 
up Oenerul Graham, and maintnined communicntion wllb Gca 
lis' heinhimirters at KnttsaHsin by niouns of » gnmnd cublu. 

The Egyptians apiwaring in superior force, Uraliain wua 
retire mure rapidly than was compiUiblo with reeling up the wii 
Mack worth uaed every exeTtion, holdiuH on nutil the unvray v 
600 ynnU of him heforo cutting the cable, about half u drnn 
wait lost. ThU wax the '^ toi'peilo wire" which Arabi spcakaof i 
captured. (See p. 144.) 

September 12 the plans for the gener.il iidrsiiioe of tbfti)CdEC< 
Arabt's positiou at Tel el Kebir were elaborated. It wiwiIm 
a portion of O troop shoutd run a ground cable iVoni Kamaj 
Oommiinder-in-OIiluf B heiubiuarlvrn in thu Held, on tliu noiibe 
tbe cunal, while General MHCpberaon, commanding the India 
gent, waa bo be kept in commnnicatiou with the Hunio |mitit, w 
with Onieral Wolseley, by meaiiit of an overheat] line to be r 
Indian Sapjter Telegniph Trniu. In additlou. Major Miuikwort 
a row of telugnipb pule:*, '2i miles lung, at intervals of 150 y 
tbe direction of tbu uight march. LientenantColonel Wvbber i 
tenant U. \V*. Austruther, U, B., with another detachment of 
were to follow up nud repair the Kgyptlan ))ennanent wires i 
railway. 

Thu army marched from Ka.'titaaitin during the nigbt oC 
ber VJ-Vi, the two wings being iii constant lelegrupblo o 
DDtll 2.30 a. m. of the 13lb, when tbe Indian CoutingeDt'a iina 
the canal waa intcn-nptcA. \t iittR aft.«tw M\\%»s«a!ruintsd Uut t 



I '5 
I 

I 




BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 275 

^was cansed by a pontoon wagon, which accidentally struck and tore down 
the overhead wire. Oeneral Wolseley, however, was always in con- 
nection with Kassassin, although the actual telegraph work jng.t4a;- 
involved stoppiug from time to time to make "eiirth." The ^^^y\^ 
dry, sandy nature of the soil necessitated a special apparatus i 
for this oi)eration, a pointed and perforated galvanized-iron ■ ^ 
pipe, 3 feet long, which was driven into the groun<l. Water 
was then poured in, the end of the cable conne(;ted with the 
pipe, and " earth " obtained at once. 

During the battle of Tel elKebir, General Wolseli\v sent 
three messages over the field cable, and received several in 
return. When the fight was ended Major Mack wort li puslied 
on as rapidly as possible to Tel-el-Kebir railway station, pay- 
ing out his cable as he went. The last three miles were laid 
in thirty minutes, ten in all being run. At 8.30 a. ni. he re- 
ceived messages to the Queen and to the Si*eretary of State 
for War. He got them off at 8.41, and at 9.15 ller Majesty's 
reply was received. 

Tbeend of Major Mackworth's fichl cable was connected with one of 
theEg>'ptian wires two miles west of Kassassin. As tendin|2f to intro- 
duceconfusion into the subsequent regular telegraph service, this would 
ap|)ear to have been a mistaken economy of time and material. Not- 
withstanding the fact that men were immediately dispatched back along 
therailway to meet Lieutenant-Colonel Webber, it was not until (> p. 
n. that the latter wjis able to send word to Major Mack worth to vsliift on 
to the (permanent lines an<l to pick u]) his cable. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Webber, who, as has been stated, was to follow up 
the Egyptian wires along the railway, found Xus. 1 and ^ gone in sev- 
eral places, but No. 2 was still on the jmles tlirongliout, although <lam- 
aged here and there. He passed the intreiichments with General Mae- 
pherson and reached Tel-el-Kebir railway and telegraph station at 7 
a. m., finding one wire " through " to Cairo, lie was trying in vain 
to communicate in English, when in came the superintendent of Egyp- 
tian telegraphs, an Englishman named Clark, who immediately began 
conversing in Arabic, as if he were a friend in Arabf s camp, but not 
revealing the exact state of atfairs. The const^jucnt lack in Cairo of 
• trustworthy information had iloubtless something to do with the irres- 
olution of Arabics party there, and may have helped to save the city. 
On the other hand, Mr. Clark sent the news of the battle to the opera- 
tor at Zagazig, assuring him that, if his behavior was satisfactory, the 
English would spare his life. In this way the integrity of the lines was 
aecared from Tel-el-Kebir to Cairo, leaving the sole gap between the 
army and its base in the Tel-el-Kebir-Kassassin section. To restore 
this link to proper working order, two valuable days were consumed at 
A critical moment, the officer specially charged with the WQYk\mvi^<e\v\- 
den^ ordered aw»j and on to the front. 



» 



I 



276 BBITISn NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN BOVP^H 

U«tiuls ijf Utiviut^iii and uperHtora were ucot ou with tbe ndvialH 
I both diructiuus. U'bo ufti(%at Zngazig was Beieeil that aflfrDiMin. in 
I by n..30 B. III., September 15, tht> other stations on the ntilwtiv at Bt-iik 
[ Bell>eif>, Calioub, ami Onii'o were ot'.fiiipied. Thoy wt-ix' huld until U 
f £^yptJaaGovurnm«utoflioiali«crvicen'n8e«tAbIish«tl — itu oitcratiiNi n| 
I idly eSiiclt-d. 

I Thit pi'tiulinr nature ui thu soil is a sufliciuiit (tspliiuatiuu of tbnu 
ninttily from acciduut ot^oyed by M»j»r Mackworth'n j^-ound cable, «k^ 
wbioh III] 111 tier I esH waKous of all kiiidn piuiHed freely froat t»idu)j|:lit M 
sundowit September 13. 

It is not out of place torecortl the geiivral g'x>d uoudtict nnd jierfin 
ancu ui' <J troop. Tho office work wtw particularly m;rt>n) and «ImN 
utt remittent, giving little rest to the oiwralors, who wvrp Qi*urly wm 
out by the conHtaut atrain. Their cflbrtA to keep at Ihvir dvskM vlH 
ovei-come by fatigue and loss of sleep were most (trcditablf. 

A regular order of iirecrdence in the forwDnlmg of dtepatiA MM 

1 maintaiot'd. The general features were ax follows, vix ; ^^| 

Ut. IViRpatchea to or from the CoiDmaudor-iu Chief. ^H 

3d. Hallway diBpattjhets. ^H 

3d. Ufficial diRpatcbeH relating to the sick or wouudetl. ^^M 

4th. Other olllcial dispatches in order of receipt^ tnileHsmiule^a^H 

by proper antbority. ^H 

5th. Private dispatcbeft relating to the sick or wounded. ^H 

(fth. Other private and presH dispatches In the order i>f tbeir ^^H 

For classes Si and ti payment was exacted according tu a reggli^^H 

As might be presupimsed, the loudest expressionH of dlM»ntB^^| 

the telegraph service came from newspaper eorrt-siwndciita, <rt^^| 

nut always reasonable in tbeir demands, and who foiled at ti^^| 

anderstanil how official dispatches eould be of greater iui|tot1ui^^H 

their own. It must be remeiuberctt, however, tbnt uveti so conwi^H 

n l>o<1y of men as unny ofllcers cannot be entirely eseuipt from ^ll^H 

«nee of ihe tendency of to-day to substitute the telegram for the ^^| 

letter, that a large proportion of tbe dispatches markeil "^olDfilal^H 

not necessarily have been argent, and therefore the busjnoss U>^^H 

designed to transact would have tost nothing by a slower |in^^| 

transmission. From various causes rberv arose at times heavy ^^| 

in tbe telegraph lines, in spite of the unusual uitvautage of Uite^^| 

It was during one of these blocks that a distinguished ofllecr *^^| 

to say, buiuorously but truthfully, that be bad seat three simiilt^^l 

dispatches fntm Isniailia to Kassassin : one by boat on the 8wMl^^| 

Canal, the secoud by railway, and the third by telegtvpb, w^^| 

they arrived at their destination m the exact onler given. ^^M 

It is only fair to remark that tlie Intetiess of tbe arrival of Ih^^l 

St tbe bane and tbe extreme brevity of the campaign )>rwTeaU4^^| 

(Ifng down tuan orgamievi TonVwe &uJi^vu au appearaDCBorai^^l 

which was tosomewslenlunaNftViiaSAR. T\\% ■wwi^.-^wc^&^iX^ata^M 



BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITAUT OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 277 

Ixave been better done had the abaolately distinct parts of tho troop 
1>een occasionally associated for joint practice prior to amalgamation. 
Military telegraphy cannot be an amateur's toy. It is valueless nn- 
I^«s tmstworthy in its material and managed by o^ipable persons. The 
simplest and best instmments are required, in conjunction with a well- 
i nsnlated line, either ground or overliead. If the latti^r, it is not enough 
bring the ends of the wire into the terminal stations. Tlie inter- 
cdiate points must be out of the reach of accidental mechanical injury 
reaaonably free from electrical faults. A little more time and trouble 
spent in setting the poles, in making electriciill3' sound joints, and in 
shearing good insulation will, in the end, be found to be time saved. 

The result of the practical comparative experiment on ISe])tember 13, 
"^ith a gronnd cable on one hand and an overhea^l line on the other, 
OTily emphasizes the necessity of thorough work, without deei<ling the 
r>elative merits of the two methods. Each has its own province, the 
A^rmer in supplying, in a rapid advance, a communication which is only 
meant to be tem]K>rary, while the latter is more or less i)ermanent accord- 
ing to the circumstances of the case. It follows that both kinds of 
conductor should, enter into the outfit. But above and beyond mere 
uiechanical appliances is the importance of a thorourrhly-trained pcrnon- 
••«l, one part familiar with the press of oflice work conducted amid noise 
And confusion, the other with the conditions and phenomena of engineer- 
ing and line work, and both parts accustomed to action in concert. The 
<H>mbiuation of these elements, directed by clever and energetic otiicers, 
^"ili alone produce such resultij as will justify the hoavy expenditure of 
naen and money in making the army telegraph a valuable adjunct, not 
A delosion and a snare. 



XXVI. 

THK con PS OF SJOXALEnS. 

Tlie earliest mode of transmitting iutdligence, tlie written or ver- 
^ message, possesses certain great advantages. Written dispatches 
^troy all chance of error, and hence are rcsortcMl to wIkmi tinie per- 
mits and the importance of their contents demands tliis a<lditional 
Pi^ecantion. Besides being slow, the system i)i'(?seuts the ilrawbacjk of 
^n^ excessively cumbersome, re<iuiring a man antl a horse, or a man 
•Iwie, for each message, and, over great distances, tor each stage of the 
J^^rney accomplished. 

Visual signaling, the secon<l method, historically sjieaking, possesses 
^merits of cheap and simple equipment, a personnel not very highly 
iji r J ^ned except in one direction, the ability to be;j;in work the instant the 
^tfttions arc reached, while its great mobility enables it to be used at 
:>isM tud among tho extreme outposts. On the otiier hand, these stations 
^It • Hunt always be selected with reference to the faeAWty oV M'^\\^\\\\v; ^t^\cv 









278 BRITISH NAVAL AND HILITABY 0PEBAT10H8 IN E( 

oiiu to tbe otlier, aud not to tbe conrenieuce of tbe Cotnmanil 
while cacli obstacle interreiiiiig in tbe line of night introdiict 
iug station, with it^ coDseqneut cbanceof error. Again, tb 
depending for itB successful employment upon an unobstruci 
at tbe mercy of tbe weather. Five minutes of fog may impe 
cess of an important uiililary nioremeut. It finds its nios 
scojie in billy countries, where the snn is rarely obscured. I. 
conditions, its range, so to speali, baa almost uo bounds. T 
extreme case, it is known that in the triaugulation uurrit-d 
liocky Mountains observations have been taken between 
hundred and fifty miles apart, mirrors being naed toreflet-l t 
from one to tbe other. Messages might have been and po: 
exchanged between these points by Hashing the reflected lif 
Vi8U:il signaling iu the British army is based on "fiusbes 
short. The code, composed of dots and dashes, aud being wh: 
among telegraphers as the "Morse Continental," i^ given b( 

T — 
U .-- 



A - — 

B 

C 

D 

B - 

r 

G 




H 

I -- 

K 

I, 

M 


N -■ 

O 




Q 

E 

S ■■ 


Comniii - — - - 

Period 

Prupiirative and 

Stop 

General auswer 


- ■ — 




-m 






BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 279 

made loDg.and short, affording a means of tniusmittincf intelligence. 
It involres bat the one notion of time ; that is, of one thing lasting longer 
than another. As practiced, it is entirely devoid of direction of motion, 
the fnndamental principle of the Myer code, as it is of the relative po- 
sition of objects, the key to the somnphore, that ra])id method of sig- 
naling employed in the British navy. 

Daring the day army sij^nals are made either by the holiograpli or 
by flags. The latter are white or blue, according to the nature of the 
backgroand, and are of two sizes, 3 feet sqnare, monnt<»d on a staff 5 feet 
6 incbes long, 1 inch in diameter at the butt, ta])ering to A inch at the 
top, and 2 feet square, mounted on a stick 3 feet G inches long. The 
Bignalman stands so that the motions of the tlag are in a i)lane at right 
angles to the line of sight. The normal position of the staff is \ir}^ from 
the vertical. If the wind serves, the motions are made to windward. 

The dot, or short flash, is made by waving the Hag from the normal 
position to a corresponding position on the opposite side of the vertical, 
uid immediately back again to the normal ])osition. The dash, or long 
^h, equivalent in length to three dots, is made by waving the flag from 
thottomial position antil the jiole almost t(mches the ground on theop- 
IHWite side of the vertical, then, after a short pause, hiutk again to the 
normal position. The various letters and signs are made by combining 
^dots and dashes according to the code, a pause equal in length to a 
to intervening after each letter of a word. At the end of the word 
^ flag is lowered or gathered in, when the receiving station makes 
* dash to indicate that the word is understood, " Right'' (It T) is the 
Snal answer at the end of a message. 

The station sign (P) followed by a letter calls the station to which 
^kat letter has been given, the called station responding by ''right,'' 
*Dd the letter of the csiliing station, as for instance P B and K T A, 
^hen station A calls station B and the latter signifies its readiness to 
proceed with the reception of the message. Tlie station sign is also 
^^ to indicate the completion of the message. 

The digits are indicated by the first ten letters of the alphabet in 
®rter, J being omitted and K substituted in its ])lace. When the 
'^'iDJeral sign (Z) is followed by a letter or series of letters, the combi- 
'^atjon is to be read as a number; thus Z C 11 would be .'VS. 

The "signalers' indicator" precinles din-c^tions intended solely for the 
^gnalers, and not forming part of the message, abbreviated thus: 

f^«h reading G Q 

^•n G 

rj^vetoyourri^bt U 

JJ^retoyonrleft L 

^ve higher up 11 

^wre lower down O 

^Uy where you are S K 

'^mte your flags S F 

^pfldal message SMts. 



) BRITISH NATAL AND HILITABT OPEBATIONB IN Ei 

bine flag . .. .. 

I wbiteflag 

>1argr> dag 

e HiDBllflaji 

lur light U bad 

,im off extru light 

f»it 

L B and TEL bave reference to the heliograph. The " t 
iiinuls what precedes and is answei'od by tli» oblitenitor. 

Time is signaled in code and is followed by a. m. or p. m., 
may be. Fig. 143 is a clock-dial, lettered according to the 




rvffj4*. 



BBrnSH KAVAIj AHD military OPKRATIOIfS IN EGYPT. 281 

^^'liat, for clearness, may be called a telegraph key, by means of lugs 

and a pin. Depressing tbe key turns tbe mirror tbrougb a small angle, 

and, if tlie instrumeat is adjusted, throws tbe flash of ligbt on the 
- recviring station. This flash is a dot or dash of tbe Morse code, accord- 
ing to its daration. When tbe key is released, a spring returns tbe 

Tnirror to the original poei- ^ 

tioD, and the light is no 

longer seen by tbe other 

station. A hole tbrongh 

tlie center of the mirror ts 

for directing the belio 

Sraph. The arm b carries 

u fore-sigbt in the shape 

ofa rer^' small wbite-metal 

disk. When the distant 

Hta>tion and this index are 

in one line, as seen bj the 

e5'« placed at the back of 

the mirror, the iustrnmeut 

*s properly pointed. Tbe 

■Mirror is now moved im 

'til the sun's reflected mv 

falls full opon tbe disk 

^hen the key is down. In 

the very center of tbe mir 

'^i' II small circle is lelt 

"Ug^tozed. The reflection 

''*>!« the mirror sbows tbis m \ bitck >.j»ot on a bright ground. 

^>is spot must be brought iiUu tbe CLUter <>l tbt lorc-siglit di^k. Tlic 

'I'Hli iu then tnmed in its swket soaK to]iitst nt itsed^v to tbo beam of 

"Rlit, and the signaling may Im( proeet'dud with. As llu' snn sbifts its 

P**sition tbe beliofn^ph must l>e constantly ivudJn.sU'd, but tbeopcni- 

''^vi is merely a slight correction of the oiiginal iuliuKtmcnt. 

If tbe sun is behind tbe Kendin;; Ktutiou iis seen from tbe receiving 
*t*tioii, a second circular mirror is snbsfituU'd lor tln^ triie-aight, Tbo 
'^Urse of the beam of ligbt is tbeii us sfoti in Fig. 14.j. 

The heliograph was invented by Mr. <i. It. Miuice, of the Indian tul- 
'Srraph seri'ice, who received £l,(Kl(i stt'rlin;^ from tbo liidinu Govern- 
■*«nt as a reward. (Mr. Manct-'n niimo is identitied witli a wHl-knowu 
'■*>d veiy clever method of ineiiKurin;; tbe internal rcfiistinico of an elec- 
trical battery.) It was first employod in tbe Kiilllr r-iunpuigu, in 1877. 
"Oring the last Afghan war it w;is conistaiitly umnl to great advantage, 
Ui« conditions meutioneil in tbe ojieiiing pariiifi-apli.'t of this section 
t ftn^ing B complete fnlflllment. It iniiy be rcnicmbeivd tliat the tlrst 
I 'ntliution of tbe approach of the ni'niy under MDJor-Gent'nil ^ir F. S. 
■ . Ittbetti, which marched to tbe relief of Kandahar ml%)IM.,'«u»Vi-^-at«'a,vi9. 




^i 



> 



282 BHITIBH NATAL AND HILITABY OPEBATIONS IN EGYPT. 

oftbig iostnimeiit, wben at the dintance otfortyeight milex from the town. 
As no previously concerted jilan had been agreed upon, thia faet suffi- 
ciently indicates the ease \rith which one station may 
-0 attract the attention of another, the brilliant spot of 
steady reflected lifxlit being unmistakable. 

The range of 58 miles between Kandahar and the 
station at the snuiniit of the Maiwan Pass was habitu- 
ally covered, while, iu the same couutry, it was occnsion- 
nlly euiploycd between parties 70 miles apart. In the 
Transvaal, in 18S1, Lieutenant Davidson, of the King's 
Eoyal Rifle Corps, maintained communication over a 
line 200 miles in length, using but four intermediate 
stations. These facts give an idea of the giTat value 
of the heliograph under fuvomble circum stances. 

The heliograph may, of course, be used with any 
source of illumination, its range depending ujton the 
strength of the light, and indeed it is so convenient an 
instrument that its employment at night for flashing 
signals has grown into great favor with signalers. 
During this campaign it was used between Kassassiu 
and Mabsameh for signaling with the light of the moon 
at its full. 

The " call " with the heliograph is most simple. Turn 
the spot of light upon the other station, and wait until 
it answers by showing its light in return. 

The request for the adjustment of the heliograph at 
another station during the transmission of a message is 
effected by merely keeping the light turned on. When 
the latter')! light ia ad.iusted to shine fnU and clear, the 




UTI8H NAVAL AND MI^TART OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 283 



w of the exterior, with dimensions, is giren in Fig. 147. The 
operating the shatter is conveniently placed at the top of the 
Both forms of lantern are supplied by J. I)e Fries & Sons, 
• 

c4ivalry regiment in the British army has four non-commissioned 
and eight men in their signal corps, or four complete '* stations" 
* men each. Each infantry battalion has two non-commissioned 
iind four men, or two " stations." In additicm, each cavalry troop 
intry company has a 8Ui)ernumorary trained si;;naliiian. 
mitruction and practice necessary to keep the si<rnalmon and 



A 

I 



//*-l/i 




^ 



^ 



imeraries up to tlieir work is conduct ed l»y a s|>eciiilly seleeleil 
)f the re;;iment or b«itt.tlioii, iiiid ainoiiuis to tlirt*e d:i\H per 
r the former and one day for the latter. A (|iiart«*rly return is 
i the lieutenant (ioloiicl Ci>Miiii iiidin;; by this ot1ic4*r, ;;iviii;; the 
iud prolicieney of the inci> under his instruct i<»ii. One column 
vturn calls for the *M-at«* of sending,** as a compar.itive test. 
lecn found that if tin* letters ot* tin* alphaliet bi* repeated thii^tf 
lixwl together, nml thru separ.itetl into lwe\\\\ vLt^^wv^ v\^ \\\\ 
v^ti, thetimt'tn'rupitul in tlieir transmissKmis V\\o *a\uv* v\^V\v\\. 



284 BRITISH KATAL AND HILITAEY OPEBATIOH8 IN E( 

required for a message of Iwoaty words of different lenetht 
five letters to tlie word. The time spent iu seuding this 
tfaen reduced to " words per miuate." Ten is considered fai 
witb large dags, but higher liites are reached with the small 
aDdbeliograiili. 

The sigDal officers aud men of the regimeots and battalio 
to the Gamp of Manenver at Aldershott, where they receive 





vn, 


n9.14Z 




b-J 




u ' 


1 I 




BRITISH NAVAL. AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN P:GYPT. 285 

t'wo flags (one large and one small), with the requisite poles, one helio- 
Sx^ph and stand, one hand lantern, one lime light and stand, with the 
Aftccompanying gas and pressure bags, retort and chemicals for generat- 
lugr ox3'gen (chlorate of potash and binoxide of manganese), together 
^'vith printed blank forms in blocks — one set as a record of dispatches 
^«nt, the other of dispatches received. 

Generally speaking, in the late campaign 'the transport of one party 
comprised three mules, one for provisions sind signal apparatus, packed 
i i-i convenient boxes, the second for the niou's kit8 and camp kettles, the 
t:liird for the tents, &c. A fourth man is usually' abided to the group of 
tilir^e, for cookingi &c., and a relief iu case of need. Cavalry signalers, 
'^ot being designed to form permancut stations, carry only flags and 
heliographs, in leather buckets strapped to the sadtlle. 

Xhe Corps of Signalers in this campaign was composed of 1 captain, 
^ lieutenants, and 90 men, volunteers from vivrious regiments, under the 
Command of Lieutenant Colonel F. C. Keyser, of the Eoyal Fusiliers, an 
officer of exx>erience in the late Afghan war. Tliis corps was for duty 
"^^i*<ler the Chief of Staff, and had no connection with the regimental 
^^Kiialers. 

The men appear to have been selected solely witli reference to tlieir 
i"oficiency as signalers, without regard to other desirable qualities. 
cir behavior was not what should have been ex])eeted from persons 
^^Aiiirged with such responsible duties. 

The work they did in Egypt was not of very much importance. The 
**^t,nes8 of the country and the frequent mirage greatly restricted the 
of the heliograph, their moHt powerful instrument. 
line of four stations was maintained between Isrnailia and Kassas- 
^^*i, a distance of twenty miles, and was worked by heliographs, flags, 
lime light, as occasion demanded. These stations would have suf- 
, but an extra one was kept up at Telel-Mahuta to control the canal 
c 

TChe first warning of the a])proach of the Egyjjtians in the action of 

"^Vigiist 28 was conveyed by heliograph from Major-General Graham, at 

■*^^S8assin, to Major-General Drury-Lowe, conunandiiig the cavalry en- 

^^mped at Mahsumeh. The s(»nding instrument was advantageously 

t^laced on a small house at the former ])lace, and was doing excellent 

^"^ork when one of the Egyptian shells struck the building, and tlie sig- 

^^lers, to use Colonel Keyser's expression, "incontinently bolted," de- 

**^rting their post at a most critical moment and leaving General Drury- 

^-•owe without information of the occurrences at the I'ront. The absence 

^f an officer at so important a station seems odd, to say the least. 

The Corps of Signalers starte<l out with a full supply- of wheelc<l trans- 

I^rt, which, as usual, broke down on the first march out from Ismailia. 

-^U spare carriages and store- wagons had to be left behind and recourse 

^ad to mules. One aninml then carried two complete sets of day and 

i Uight apparatus in panniers, the heavy boxes of spare aTl\c^vi^^Si^,^\^^\\\^l, 

i ^^tWMided by train. 



|5!86 BRiTiaii NAVAu and military operations in EOTPT. 

The filial labors or the signalera were ill Cairo, aft«r tt? .r- -7- 
wliere they maintained lieliographic and lime-Iij;lit coaiinin 
VtlieroofoftheAbdin palace, tliolieatlquarlerHoftheComiiiani:' 
* to the citail«?l, wliiuli, from its coriimni)ding jtuititioii, was u-.-.. ■•> 
repenting stutiou to Mie cavniry cniiip at AbbiiKieb, tti<* infaulfje 
across Um Nilu, utUiiezireh, and ttiB barrncks at KuHrel Ntd. Tbu« 

Ike WiiH 8()on replaced by tolephoues, and Colonel Keyiiei's men 
to Englan<l. 
■ 



xzvzz. 



run iiiLiTAin' foLict:. 



I 



TheproviHion made for the inaiiitnuHtieuofonlcr in tim various J 
uid oulHide the camps, in tbo towns and vtllitgus wbera portions fl 
[Array were quartered, included a Provost- Marshal, Colonel H. U. I 
■V. C., Argrylo nnd Sutherland tligblanderfi, as adininiatralor, i 
ly a corps of Militury Pultce, itorae monnted and mme on foot; t 
otHcera and 138 men. 

Of the monnted police, 3!) were dniwn from the renular extAblU 
of the permanent camp of instrnctiou at AldenUolu n.nd 3i wei«4 
teers fiwn variouH cavali-y regiments, especially recnmmeude«l li 
commanding olUcers for Hobriety, good liebavior, InU'Iligviic^, aiM 
of character. They were assembled at Aldershott fur orgnnizatid 
equipment. Thcywere armed with iiworda and revolvem, ani 
given a light ontflt of transport, a Maltose cart nnd a wal«rM 
nso wben marching an an independent military nnit, aa at Tel-«lJ 

Of the foot police, 5!i were volniiteers from the London MHn 

Police, selected on account of their zchI and capacity and of tliiiiri 

farity with the habits of criminals, whil(< the romainder, 10 in nq 

were volunteers from regiments at home who hud bei^n named I! 

and good conduct by their su{)erior ofBcers. This detavliment 1 

similar amount of eqnipmetit to that given thuir mouutrd c 

Tbo men caniiid revolvers and swuni bayonets. 

All the mi-mbers of the Military Police Corps wvrc mado ji 
or acting non coiuniissioned officers, in order U> giro them that tinfl 
over delinquents which is derived A-om higher rank. To dil 
tboni, each man wore on his left arm a broad white canvi 
H. P. in large black Iclten« stamped npon It. 

In former times the provost- mnrshnl had (lie powrr ofaunnnarrpt 
Isbmcnt, and could indict un any offender lashes not to rr:- ' '-" 
number. Hinco the abulittou of dogging, in 1881, this n>]M 
of a 8Core Is no longer possible, and the provostmafwhar- 
eoDfiniHl to the urn'Mting nf delinquents and the reportini; < 
[of the case to the cotnmandVug ot&wv t>V v\i« 'K^ltneut or cor|w 10 1 
le deliii(]uent is atlaobM. 
Jlilitary Police are o\\iu 




^^■feKITIttH NAVAI. AN1> MIl.ITAia Ol>KKAriONS IN UUvn'. 287 i 

[oIBp or tiiwH, afl dintiueiimlioi] frnin thatof the H]M>ciiil nncampnieiit of | 
» (HUtiMilar iroo|i or l>att)tllnn, iiiitraUing tli(t whole uciglibortioott day 
khI ujglit. (-'iiilnr thu iiiilitury cuiuuiuiulitiit, a gunnl-bouse in exUtti- | 
lishnl, wbrrp nil 8tragjj>liiigHiiiI<lruuk(;ii«oltlicrsareconfiii<.'(l, unwell uh 
•II cansbt breaking the peact! iu aDy wny. The iirUooera are sent back | 
to tbeir own quartern ever; morning, and tUe cliai'KCA agaiast each am 
beanl antl llit> punUbnitiut anardeil fU^oonUng to tliu Army Act tii force. J 
Tbt' iiMtnictirJiiH f^iveriiiHi; the Military Police are very dear: ] 

Tbcj siv to preinil Hildiirra fnmi roiuniiltMii;iiulru|;(<atiu vlvHiaiiH ; to {iruloct tbeir I 

invpartjr (ni« trv^aH>D(lileprviUtiou; to aiijicvbi-nil nuldicn whourobpyuoilbounda J 

witbml pHHSa, or whn, havlnnpnim. may bghftvn JnipropBriy, or whonrtinot drpurt I 

■fwtlag la ngaUtluna. Tbry aro ta I'xumiiip Ibe jiawu of kII r«Dlu bvlux ifaat of I 

^^ant. In F^rrylnic oat tbcit unlorn Ibej muil be purtiualar uol toglve lanMi Tor I 

{trotii|it anil ilBi'i<le<l. Iiut dvil uiiil tpitiiwrato nn nil i>rRaHli<n« In tli* j 

■ I'tt iIdij. Thi-y luiiht Iik i-lonii anil Kiiiart iii tbvir iipiMitT.iiirf- and a 

-•blinn. 

. - Aiici-, and partieularly after an engagement, the muDDtcil J 

fmniwu uf the Military Pulico are onlered to keep well to the front, fn j 
onlrr to prerent pillaj^, rart^bing, aikI other crimes likely to bi* com- I 
■ittnl in thr heal nf rxciieinciit. 1 

Tb» pniru«t-iDar«hal iMaeJi lieenxoH to Hhoji-keeperii to iijieu r«fre8b- 
D«^t aalwOA. where lieer ur light wiuH is alluwed to be sold to the tro»]w. 
In Bgyptf alt )M<rsiion delected iu the act of iwlling atrotig npirit» to the 
■oldters wTv tlof^gMl by the tiiitlve uuthoritie^ (the lu8h(>8 not exceed- I 
tns ;tUQ in nnmlM-r), and tbdr liquor wait vonflsaitcd and destroyed. 

Tbo Military Tolice were latu in joining the army, only arriving at ' 
Uinailia St'ptember 'J. Tbeir presence, wbicb was much uevded on 
ftcconnt of nrtaiii irregularitlea timl bad tnauireiiled tlieniwlreit, muod ' 
broaptit alMtiit an imjintvement in diiM^lplIiie. It may be remwrkr>d that ' 
Ibey bf)d, ■« a whole, atwolutely do sflilintions with tlic Irmipn, weio ' 
m body of aien with tuitirtfly diH'ereiit traditionM and niuoviutioiN, and ' 
luid nolhinif ill eoninion with the Holdlern whotteinfractknisof dhu:iplln« ' 
UH>y wfn- M|¥H'iiilly denlgued to check. 

Tb« iwlice work la Ibe di-sert wiu very light, »» might have been j 
sxpevted, but It incrcafte<l greatly after renobiug Cairo. The good be- 
havior of the lroo|m on the wbolo was a matter of ooDntiint remark. 
Tbe writer of tbia report liikefi pleanure in reconting,aalhereHnltof bin 
owt) olMi-rvatlou, rAtemling over many weeks, the ntrlty of eawa of In- \ 
l<ni4«tion or other miiwleineanor, the Rohlierty U-.tring, neat ap]>eara»oc, 
aad gco(-raIly giKxl Ivehnvlor of the Itrilixh trun[M in Kgjpt. 

Kiceptiona lo this rale did occnr, as a mutter uf eonnte, one Wing of 
• •crltMia and diagran-ful oatnre. Two men of the Royal Irish Begiiaeol 
«otnnUled a gravn rrime iti the village of Tel-el-Kebir, Just uAer Uie 
battle, and roceiveil in punisbmcnl seven years' i>«nal servitude. 

Great diMatinfottion was felt on the |>urt of the Dritinh officers with the 
tack of a mejins of itmumary jtuuisbuieitt to take tlie. \tlacv. of flog^f^uv 
^ namiiiH now, praclicatly, Uiu iyo\e iaQ*\b ot v^\)!uA>miu^ 
tar /fW^Acr iHro/PM (A« labor o/ at UttrtlagattHgfl 



BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITABV 0P».BAT10S8 IN ECrpr. 

le Herritrn arc lout in more u»f/ul iraj/n, trkUe Ihe prisoner kimt^ » 
llimed of dUaffreeablr., painful, and at (»»«■» perilous ilntf, U irMlikH- 
trad, well fed, and otkertcine scrupuloiuly oared for. 
Diiriii}; tlie i;arii|in!};ii, nicii ttcnU^udfit loitii[)H»oiiment of tt'iutliuitt 
weeks wi-rv ruttitiicd with tlieir re^imeiitit or corim; if inon; tbaaui 
wi^eks mill k>K» ttiun »ix tiiuiitliM, IIk;}* wi-rv 8i-iit tu h Iiimu prison at A\a- 
andria, aud if of mure Ifaau six mutitlis, tlmy wduI Iiiutk (u Cri;:hii:>l. 

Tlio bauds of the Provost- Marolial were greatl.v sirenjtti]" i. 
w>-oi»firatioii of the native uiajcr intra tea, who might Iw traslf>l ■ 
_» ftill measure of .|ii8ti«e to iidiabilantH »in>t-iiheiided in iu't.>» i ; • ; ! h i*i 
D the good onler of the troo{)» or to tbi" in-acu of th« ufj^titwiH 
Dlidvr oth(.-t' uud ordiuary uirt^umstaiKMM the Military Potioo itMilffl 
IHVB liad cof^niKHnce of and jiiriwliction in all sath ca^en. 

The plan of hax'ing a iteparate corpK, clothed nitb !tp4i;ial {mwet^ 

look after Instancea of disonler among the troopH, derirtw I'urlher wu 

rant tu careful consideration botu the suceetut which atlendtMl iu in* 

~Wce during!; tiiis rampuigii. ~ 



tuf: umiWdL hkvartmkst. 

. Tliis section is rather » collection of note«, which may serve to A 

lio arrangements and methods adopted in Egypt reat<onabl; (.'IvitrJ 

i treatise on Ibe subject of army hospitals and hospital |irai-tjcv li| 

"^eral. 

The Medical Departuient of the Uritish army ha^ uudcrcotM n 
the last llftceii years im]>ortaiit and wide-reaching changeif. Foi 
the Surgeon was an oQlcer legnlarly attached to a regiment a 
and he «ei'V<Hl with it until pronioleil to wider flehU i 
Iduntitled with the fortunes of the regiment and Intiaiately aeqai 
witb the physical history of tho men, his imlne won great if hit fl{ 
wan somewhat n-stricted, 

The withdrawal of the Surgeons from the direct authority of tl 
cipal MedicAl UQicer uf the station or district, which was Involil 
their being made subject to their immediate military sii|)eriar« If 
corps to whiirli they were gazetted, was regarded with disfavor, wM 
system known as ^-uniflcalioa" was intro<Iiii-4?<l. Aex-oniing lo tl 
Sorgeon la assignetl to tcmiHirary duty with a particular Uidy o 
after tbny reaub their de«tinHtioii. Thus a battalion proooiMling h 
~\e>A IndiiM would lenru Knglund either with its former Medii:al (. 
(ftaiuetl for the voyage out or with one detailed fur tJie timo beiBj[.1 
UrivBl at ita post, the local Principal Medical UOlcer would onfairq 

n subordinates to core for the wants of it^ aiemhers. 
\ Tbi» uu jAoalioii is a hotlj-deltated poiut, much being atlvunoed id 
farjciinient on each suW. Vii VU U\m *vb vaiesA^tRow i" 



; NAVAI. AKD MILITARY OPEBATIOsa IN EGYPT. 289 

sn mnpo from noo profeiMionul mililarj' control, mmpUfication 
(iltnl wrrW, aud increaHPd licoiioin.v. A};niiif(t it mity be put 
tiD4tuv of iiidlviiliial I'cprRseutativea of tb« mcdiuil v^n'St '<> tl'« 
iwt Ihu j*ouii(;(<r oBivcm are not oo deairalilo auciiilly now 08 
: tbttt tbosurfCfori no longer knowR hif paticniH, lIidh reodirr- 
nserinji mncti toon- mik.v than previmisl.v-, tbnt [lie medical 
ut> too anxiouH for militAry diHtiuvtJon, pn'ssinjc to tliti front to 
i* iWjrU'ct of ilwlr own dnly, &c. Wlit'ii dtMtors dittaBreo, who Rhall 

(rn«reMnltuitli(<niuct)UlnUio»orpow(trandreKpnafiibilityintbehnDds 
tbe rriDciital Medical Oflk'cr of tlm Porci.^ or Uixlrict. He exercises 
imiunl over all officers aod men of the Mitlical Oepartineiit proper 
tbr Ai-Biy IIiHtpital (.'orpa, and inodical snpcrvisioti and itupt^riiKeud- 

rr all bmpiuiln. 

thrut rwpoiwlbl** duties wi're piirforme<i in BfOpt by Dcpnty Sor- 
Gcoerul J. A. Ilanbarj*, M. B., C. R., with the local rank of Snr- 
ftoa (teneral. 

A» bi« ohiefaasiatanl, under the title of " Sanitary Officer," wa« Bri- 
k> Surseon J. A. Mantlon, M. 1>., with the temporary mnk of Depatj 
Barst«n-(trnnnU. 

It may Iw well to nminrk that In BngUind a special corps, the Annj 
Huapitid (.TnriM, is organia-d to carr>' on tlie hospital service and to dt- 
net the "beanr colamas" rbureetl with Hie vullvction of tli« woiinded 
•fter a battk. mid their traniipon. to the stiLtious where the wounds ftro 
iMnporarily dirssed, prior to removal to the established hospitals. Tbla 
eorp* may be de«cribetl om a sort of lay handmaid to the Me«Iicul I>epart- 
Ils officers are "CaptaliiK orOnl«rties''and " Lieutenants of Or- 
derikA," and it is mostly recnitted from the ranks of the army. 

For the wnood serAice mentioDiMl in the foregoing parutcrhph, the 
kandling of ihe wouutled, what are known as " tx-'aror compatiius" ar« 
tbrmetl, the profewiiunAl jM^mtnnet and ef)Hipnient being drawn from tbo 
jknny MMlical Department and the Army floapitat Ooriw, while tfaa 
animals anil drivera are furnished by the Commisaanst and 
irl l-'orpa. 
pt, eafh liearer compsoy was organtxed as shown In the Mt- 



< 




290 BRITISH NATAL AND MILITARY OPEBATIOSS 1^ Iflfi 



I cacoleta i 



The muIi's were inuinly to tarry 2U litters aud ( 
A cacolet U a franie for tmnsporting a man in a uittiiig jMWture 
I ol armebair at ttie side of a mule. 

Eacb boarer compniiy bas two 0[tt>ratiuK t«.>utH niiil » fall mii 
I of materials for cstablittbing (he^sitig Hlationn. 

Sick-carriage is v«>vitleil at the nite of Id p«r rent, of the fora 

Dressiugututious are pitched aa near tlie bnttle-tlclil tut pnwt 

aud are indicated by the Geneva Cross. 

The two bearer companies were divided into half conipnnics. 
latter were dislributed as follows : 
Right half of Ko. 1 Gompnny, let divisjon. 
I#ft half of Xo. I Ooiiipau.^', 2d division, 
liiglit half of So. 2 CompHny, cavalry division. 
Left half uf So. 2 Company was li.'ft at Alexandria, fi>r use tli4 
I at Kamleb. 

> The Held hospital ia planned to aecommodate 200 patientH, 
arranged in four 8e<;tious. The establish nieut is as fallows: Soi 
injyor, 3; Surgeons, 4; Captain of Orderliea, 1. Total offlR^r9,8 
commiasioned officers aud men, 37. 

The fleld-bORpital tent is of the Bell patt«ni, double lly, and 
taiu four paiieuts. Of these there are fifty, iKWides ten Dperatioff 
aud tenta for the pertonnel. 
I The field hospitals were eight in number, dixtributMl ii8 follu< 
Xo. 1 at Alexandria. 

No. 2 was stationed at Tel-el-Mahnta, afterwards nt Ki 
' was attached to tbe Ist division. It was closed at Ismailiaon 
ber 21. 

So. 3 acted as a base hospital at Ismailia for a few tlayft. II 
ward proceeded by rail to Kassassin, and finally to (Viro. 

No. i remained at Ismailia aa part of the base hospiuU luitil 
to Cairo, after tlie occupation. 
No. 5 at Ramleh. 

So. tl. Uf tbis, oue-h»lf remained al Ismailia with the bue hi 
the otber at Mahsameb, at the cavalry camp. The two were I 
[ mated after Tel-el KeDir and brought to Cairo. 

No. 7 acted as i>art of the base hos[)itaI at Ismailia, and 
was transferred to Cairo. 
I No. 8 at Ismailia. 

Bach field hospital ha«l a c/irper carpenter, capable of mokiae 
Bired form of splint. 
The mattreBse.'' supplied nre ia fuur partu (divided transven 
' that any portion may be removetl fr^ttn under a patient for itnq 
inspection or operation. 
Two base hospitals wen* formed. 

Ont^ at Alexandria, adiuiutatered by So. 1 field hosiiital, was n 
Urith cots from home. Us w^vft^^^y '"»» T*» V4.%. K <£ouaii wu 



BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 291 

was appropriated for this purpose — a large, airy biiilding, well adapted 
to such nae. 

At Ismailia, b» already mentioned elsewhere, the KhetlivVs palace 
waa utilized as the principal base hospital. This Is a large two-storied 
edifice, in the Italian style, with ample wings and high ceilings. It was 
most valnable in this connection, the walls being thick enough to resist 
the rays of the snn, while the window-shutters perniitted the keeping 
out of the brilliant light, and, what was of even more importance, the 
persistent Egyptian fly. 

The principal want in. this hospital was a suftlcient distribution of 
water. The latrines were even here in shocking condition and of a type 
not known in Christian countries. Earth-clj)8ets were soon provided and 
the latrines closed. 

The aiccommodation afforded by the palace was sup[)Iemented as 
needed by tents. The pernonnel was drawn from No. 4, a portion of No. 
^j and the medical staff of No. 7 and of No. 8 field hospitals. 

Reserve hospitals were established at Cyprus and (tozo. The former 
had 400 beds, with a staff of 8 medical otiicers, one otiicer of orderlies, 
&Qd 20 non-commissioned officers and men ; the latter, 200 beds, with 4 
niedical officers, one officer of onlerlies, and 12 non-commisHione<l offi. 
^^ra and men. 

Two hospital ships were stationed at Ismailia — the Carthage, a fine, 
large, new mail steamer of the Peninsular and Oriental Line, and the 
^onrland^designcd primarily for wounded and bad cases. Theircapacity 
^aa 270 beds, and their personnel was 8 medical oflicers, 1 ofiicer of 
Orderlies, and 26 non commissioned officers and men. 

The messing for sick or wounded was at the rate of 3h. M. per diem? 
*nd was undertaken by the owners. 

These vessels were supplemented by five auxiliary hospital slii[)s, the 
^rentos, Tamar, Iberia, Lusitania, and Nepaul, whose services could be 
utilized as desired. Each was capable of making up, on the average, 
^Wl beds, with a due proportion of medical otTicers and hospital order- 

To supply ice, that essential in medical or surgical practice in hot 
^^Untries, /owr large icemachincH were sent out One was mounted at 
^^iJiailia, at the mouth of the Sweet Wjiter Canal, and one at Alexan- 
^^'ia. Two others were brought out in the Carthage, but never set up. 
■*^i ve cwt. of the article was sent daily to the front. 

As volunteer aids, 23 female nurses and 2 superintendents came from 
^Ugland, members of the Netle.\ National Aid Society. These good 
^Omen and invaluable assistants were distributed as follows: 

I^oar nurses on board the hosi)ital ship Carthage. 

I>'oiir nurses at base hospital, Alexandria. 

Seven nurses at base hospital, Ismailia. 

One saperintendent and four nurses at Gozo. 

One superintendent and four nurses at Cyprus. 



292 BRITISH NAVAI, AND MtLITAEY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 

Tlie medical coniforta ware provided ou a liberal 8L-ale. Thej confliated 
of brnndy, champagne, other wines of varioaa kiodx, soapB, beer, milk, 
arrowroot, jelly, ice, &c. They were distribnted (imoiiir the base and 
field hospitals for nsv, besides a lar^c supply at the adi'aiiced depotat 
KasHaBsiu. 

The hoMpital diet waa the army ration supplemented bysnch medical 
comforts as were deemed necessary. 

The men Tcho became ineffective were shipped as fast as jKHsibla 
to Eliigland, Malts, &c. It waa thoa^lit best to keep the hoapicalsiii 
Egypt free, as well as to give the sufferers the increased chance afforded 
by cooler climate and more favorable surroundings. The qaestion of 
temporary or i>ermanent invaliding was decided later, according to th* 
merits of each case. 

The diseases mostly encountered were dysentery, diarrbcea, heat »p">- 
ple.xy, fever, and a small amount of ophthalmia towards the end of tb 
campaign. The number of cases, percentage, itc, could not bedetw- 
mined. 

The Sweet Water Canal, whose condition has been frequently referred 
to in this report, did not, as was feared, give rise to diseii8e,orif it "» 
instrumental in producing, for iustance, diarrbc^a, it could only ha™ 
heen to a very slight extent, for this class of malady was found even 
among men who drank distilled water excluaively. The iDuddiness of 
this particular water was of small moment, as pocket fillers were issued 
to the troops at the rate of one to about every fifteen men ; and lacking 
these, filters could be readily improvised from tin cans, &c., or theaedi- 
meat could be precipitated by the addition of a small quantity of alnu- 
It must rather be accepted as a fact that the dysenteric troubles foaod 
their cause in the heat and exposure to which the soldiers were sob* 




tlH MAVAL AND HIUTABY OPERATIONS IN EGKPT. 293 
riy comrortable an pOH»ible, atiduoald await M-itbout uikmuu- 

L Examiiiiition »f (he wuiiml. 
h. SocJi opvnittaii us wiu utKwliito1.v iii^cesHui'.v. 
b. Tnuport dowu tbw caoal lo KiissiutKin, the siiQorpr being thor- 
hljr norMil and nouriaheil. A medical ofBcrr ivncompatiieil eacti tow. 
bne Rjnri'li'"' lunlJit wuro iilllize<1 at lVI-pl-K«l)ir. Two ampnta- 
I wen nuid« ntid nunibt'rlvHit other o))orationH. In all, 18<) l^iiru- 
H were treated nnd nnnmbed at thifi ntatimi. 

M foUuvinj; iMinttfrupliH are f^m iioteH of a coiiverantiou with Dep- 
Sqr g ww OftienU Mnretou, and (wntaiu Hoin^ of the Hiiggestioim of 
ixperivncp. Tlu' lHii)(tinge i» not bin. 

■M bnuUle la idotp a wordiIciI idid If aconHnrj'. Do not inure bim frani tbe 
Aar he >• Da ttalMit ii«iww»ry. It i* far bettnr to movo tbo woandnl tbio bare 

■■• u* I— iilljt bm tBA^iy paraiihnrtiallk abonl > hospital and too uinch meclloinn. 
WilUini ikfnM b« pot ■!]> la lis mod ouiiipwt ami iMitiiH'iitratMl forui- Tbo 
mmrj lulation oan In* mailp va tlic aput. 

■ &nt drBMiait of ■ wound ou tbe battln-tlHd Bbonld bt> aiiimplca* puaaiblp, fur 
^ IkM* ia MM lliBo to do thi- worli well. It aboalil t>T> a kiubII bandage UKbtly 

• lb* lleibawntU aboTr and tfaloir and givta pain to lliFpatinatand 

laar aMd Bi*b ahnntd li« labelMl In -(iiiiif slinpla and mv-rtlTn waf fat 
a If UUxd, oc wonndMl lieyaad tbe power of bih«cIi. 

■ tnMag I iadi (o dlametnr etn Im taahloiuid bj au ofiUnarily good amilb iato a 
I TMritly of dmAiI appllanPMi. 

PWyita|tl*]ra4*ill)(Tl«nt mudruf n-llovlnga wniiml from prMnnrn I* by mnaaa of a 
IMliaMMikaf IbraKwiHMlrD batten* lomt Into nhapr, piubed nndnr llie bcd-clotlwa. 
fm ««• Mftnil •(lb nHMi|iil(« ii«><(lri|; may Ix- iiml to knxp out Iitiiei.-Cii. Oq tba 
»atlkalapalwMit(Uptac«iI, t<>whiahi*biiiigabi>tili>c<iiit«iiiingiintiM-pll<ilolioii, 

* «aMara^tr bniah In tlip mnulb iif tbr butllr. The pativni. If strung oiiuuiih, 
lar«4 lo mar IhU «a fcU wound or banUaKr frcqni'iiUy (tbu* jtiviug bim an o«ea- 
n>, ani lu Uirow II Into tbx lira wbru tb« wound U liealol. 

a 'iHa|—dU«ai of ii<ral la an Important jiulnt. If a harbor U at banil, an NMy 
•4 iatiT>lliB|t ttia witidpljiniof ■lau|ctiti>r(itlaiilniaUwitb aand am) aliikiiijt than 
awm. O«abiwr,<lcailaniinala»houli| lrahiirl«il(olMjWBnl of niuiinilaoriutiidUIIU, 
I wfc— f] Ui tha |ireratilni; wind. It wna fonnd In Eityp* that if horiMl to 
Iww4tbaj WKTaBMia nnooTarm]. (fit la not poaalblf to bury aniiuala, Ibiiy ahoald 
tpfad mf ftB4 tbo *!»««» tntarmi and flm appllad to tba ioaide of tba Imdy. 
iT'lTavn Ui** bo Inipnclleablr, aUb Uio body all over; It will mondnr up and 
tWaar no iri fcna t . 

• df7-*artli >]>I>'ii. iirUtnon, If wallloolied to, loavaw n«lbinK Im bv dvair«4. An 
■afM.i r ihauld bo added l4> r'ory r«w pouu<U»f>'atth. Ifdoun 
tn>l' xUatioD* maybe luada wilhoul (ipar. Tlia ■toolaalianld 
knt, .1 fall. 

f9j •: I : l<'un<ua alionl nntaancn bari*>l will prodai-n nu bam, 

Ua wratti'i i>'. tniUi il laimpioslblnio takaUmitrcat prarantloaa InlkUtuattar. 
■■eiiJUia of aboapital may Iw arrangiHl In ibr follow Inn onkr of im porta nan ; 



Itagtlltg aiid etalhi 



>lat.n 



294 BBITISH NAVA.L.AND HILITABY 0PEBATI0N8 IN EGYPT. 

Id selecting a building fur temporary ane a* a hoapital. the tint tbiag to atteud Co u 
aiiipla movement of air. Knock out window- Basbes, make holes Id ceilings aad in 
gnble ends, lint be sure to get frMK air in abundance. 

TooU, luaterialH, and other acceiiMdea are of secondury iiii>orta :ce. A very few 
apjiIianceB will suffice, but the men must be well truiiieil. 

Tbe practical good Beose of the foregoiug remarks U obvious, and 
hUouM be of value to the layman as well as to the professioDal man- 

The temperature ia Egypt was the only tueteorological pbenomonon 
fiubj<!ct to much change. The wiud was couatant from the northvard 
and the sky rarely clouded. Of rain there was none. 

The thermometer ranged in the daytime from 90° to nearly liXP 
Fwhreuheit. A few observations ou this score luiiy be t|iioted : 

August ^7, 1 p. m., 94°; August 31, 96^; September 1, eveuing, 3<K*! 
Beptember 11, 11 a. m., 93°, with fresh breeze blowing at the time. 

Each mau carried ou his portion a stii>ply of lint and bandages tar 
preliminarj* dreosiugs. 

The medical comforts issued at Kassassin on September 9 included 
such unwonted detieaciea us iced champagne. 

Although no pains had beeu spared by tlie authorities to provide fi" 
the proper treatmeut of the sick and wouuded, it would appear that tbe 
details were not always carried out with the same scrupulousness, and 
jiiHch discontent was felt and expressed. One oifieer who was sent 
wounded to the Carthage found the food provided scaut in quantity 
and indifl'erent in quality, while the uiedieal officers on board hved »P 
comparative luxury. His indigunnt complaint was attended by an iW' 
provement in fare. He exonerated the medical authorities from blam*i 
attributing the faults to the steamer people, "who had to make tW** 
shillings and sixpence worth of food do for one person." But should • 
wouuded officer bo obliged to protest against such treatment in a b*'*' 




e 



IH NAVAI. AND HII.ITARV OPERATIONS IN EGYPT, 295 



THB ABUT POST-OFFICE. 

ittm were provided for the arniy iu the field bv tUa outy 

I in Be>'pt which eontaloed do rrgulnr trongtn, but w»h ooin- 

iloDteeni pxcIu ji^j^a 

merobefB were 
tfa» »lb Mid 

[ilDODl, of th^ 

jteer foroc. h 
fbrmed ol pin- 

oOeialK [□ the 
Fottt Uffiof, ill 

couisted of , 

n. Stur^eoiii 

1 staff Bergeanl, 

i onrpornis, 

■II of wkom 

for tills am- 

bad all 

■.n nt fftri. 

oOlcrft. DiiriDB 

I* (liry iri-n> ([muted » coQtiiiaaDC« nf tb<>ir (uilnrim ftmu the 

•od, in ndditioD, remreil iirni.v pay ; that ik, xerfct^ntM 2*. 

I* la. nd,, aiii) privHtiw 1«. |>o.r dk-m. Thu iti(U'430Rirnis«ione4l 

9 iwonlH uiid rvvolvors, tlio privattM »word)« only. 

ite and light tivtd e<|ui[>iueut was providwl, twme pointaof 

ition as being ntTviceable and convenient. 
la shown in Fij;. US. Tlie fmiit» Is of round woodrn |k>Im, 
a( the middlit, about '2] iiirbeK in diameter. Tb« uprights 
are sill iileres, nl.tn Iu two pnrtx, pinned togtttber. Tfa« cor- 
M ar« slivlclii-il rouchly in Fig. 14(1. Tim trabte«nds orv 
\ga pnlen, « liicti projerl beyonil the roof and carry a second 
wUf:li a iie<'ODd rouf nr fly may bo drawn tiurkwanis or 
Tho rvar niny lie raimKl to make a mirt of booth 
spaf^' nntliT over. The protind dimensions are 10 
flprlgktB are sevurrd by rofH' gii)-s, which ran from llu> 
iltiN and are made fast to the sill piccwi. The total wed|fhl 

|ip*per Korting boi is shown in Fift. ISO. The back ia of 
f witbdravlDit the rvtaininf; knyn a n ihi* altim nan Iw fold*-*! 
■ ttw top anit Uittom, to whidt Uiey fttet««^i!cU\ft\\\i\Ti^jfA. 




^,J.It& 



"296 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN BdTffn 

Tbe biDgee at the corners of the pigeon-UoleH pt^rmit Ui« hIiuIvm 
I together, and the whole aAiiir mnkes :i compact package, 4 fwt 9 
by 1 foot by 10 iuchcs. 

Tbu sortitif: liox for lettera in 
. ill ilesi^u, but HUinllor, being 3 ft 
by 2 tivi wide uuil 8 inches dec|k 
forty pigeon-holes. 
> A very bandy sorting |MMieb, 
canvas and usetl at teinpornry 
is shown in Fig. ITiI. It nan be 
' to the ridge poll' or eaves piuct 
tent. 
The portable table bus » deal 
' which a stamping pad is 
fold lip iiudemeatb, or 

and hooked in place, a« di 

The sorting boxe« are tranHport«d in a large canvas ba^f 
with the table. 



1^ 



-If..- 




BRITUH NATAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 297 

mail for each battaliou or corps wa8 put into a bag by itnelf and 
: to the front Field oflBces were maintained at Mahuta, Malisauieh, 
KaasasiiiDi and a daily service kept up after August 27. Tlie liouie 
Is were three in number weekly, each way. These post-oflicos af- 
led the same facilities for trauHinitting small amounts of money as 
offered by thoee of the United Kingdom. 

he nerrioe was carried on to the satisfaction of those in the iiold, and 
»mplaint8 were heard. 



zzz. 

THR ISUIAN COSTING KST. 

lie soldiers from the United Kingdom, si)oken of collectively as '^ im- 
isl Troops,^ were in large mfyority in the British expeditionary force 
Bjcypt* They were the earliest to arrive, and some of them still re- 
in supporting the Khedive's authority. They were the first in indi- 
nsl importance to the |>eople at home ; they received constant and 
dly notice at the hands of the newspaper press; they were massed 
Hher at Tel-«1-Kebir, and they won the princ^ipal part of the honors 
ibat day. Bnt the^* were not alone in their work. 8<M)n atter reach - 
Kjuwassin they were joined by a strong detacrhment of Her Majesty's 
lian subjects, known as the ^^ Indian Oontingent,'' a b«Hly so {MMUiliar 
til rpupectii as to requin^ notice apart, the <lifT<*nMi(!<'s in organization 
I tH]nipment between it and tho Imperial Tn>oi)H hoing t4M> great t4) 
mit of joint treatment, 
lie approximate strength of the routingent was to be as follows : 

>p^aii tmi»|M •i.O^H* 

* ^ Kf^Optt ,...■••••■•■••••■••• ■■■••■■•. all •" ^ * 



Intal «iffiM*tivi* :i.'K)i» 

wliirh Abouhl Imy addtsl- 
r#i fiillfiwrni •». IW 



1 UUftJ •••••■■*••■•-■««•-■-'■ ■.■■■.■••■- -■•• ■-->-■■•• -■■• 1^. ■■" ^ ' 



I INNI 



he fonre waM to bo rom posed \\\ — 

ni- battery of field artilh-ry. 

ue batterv of mountain iirtiller>. 

wii irompanieN of sappers iuhI itiiiu*i>. 

iiree regiuivnts of cavalry. 

wu battalions of British intanirv. 

hn-tr T^gimeutH ot niidvr Infantry. 



298 BBITISH NATAL AND MILITARY OPEBATIOKS IH 
It was orgaoiKed as follows : 



Lieateoant-ColoDel T. Van Straubenzbk, B. A., oomiiMi 

H B>ttei7, lit brigade, Beld b&tt«r>-. 

Tth Battery, lat brigade, Northem diviaion, Dwnntain bi 



i HIKERS. 

Coloael J. Bhowke, C. S. I., B. E., eominaudiog eoginee. 
A Company, Madras Bappen Wid Uioen. 
I CompMij, Hadma Sappera aod Miners. 

CAVALRY BRIGADK. 

Brigadier-Oeneral H. C. Wilkinson commaDdiug. 
Sd Begimeat Beagnl Car airy. 
6tb Regiment Bengal Cavalry. 
13th Begiment Bengal Lancers. 

IKPANTRY BRIOADK. 

Btigadier-Geoeral O. V. Tanker, C. B., coinmandlDg. 

lat Battalion Seafocth Highlandem. 

7th Regiment Bengal Native Infantry. 

SOtb Regiment Bengal Native Infantry (I'linjaub). 

39th Begiment Bombay Native Infantry (BeloochoM). 



lat BattalioD MaucheaMr Begiment. 

A reeerre to this force was established at Aden, which 
uot geographically, a portion of India, com|>osed of twonal 
the 4th and Slst Madras Native Infantry. 

Jpprtilmale eonttmplalei ttrewglti, •(-«., o/tk«iai{iaa Conii 




BBITISH NATAL AND HILITAHT OPEBATIONS VS EQYFT. 299 
Jpprtflamie cM(Mq>taM tlnmsth, ^, of the Indian CaiittHff«iil— CoDtiiia«d. 





1 

10 
19 


1 


3 

1 

3 


1 

mi 


6 

f 

Tffl 

tafl 


— 


1 


i 








Hnlea 






3M 


!! 

IS 


1 


IXFtiiTBT-Contioued. 

Tth Bcnoiil Birtiv. Inr.otry.-.. 
»tb Benml HuS't InEuitry. . . . 
Mth Bombay NcUtc iDhulry . 
Ijt IbtlaUon Uucfa«t(r Reg- 

MiBCKLUuraora. 


1 




J. 


I!? 


"mo' 

100 








S 












1 






















1 






* 




1 
























10 


a 


I 






1! 


" 


a.Bua 


.. 




lURn UIBBKVEI-. 

4(h UadTM KaUre Infutry . . . . 
Slat lladna KatlTa Infaalr; . . . 





















A portion of thia reserve, tLe Slst Begiiiient of Madras Native lufau- 
try and a Bmall detaoliment of others, iiumberiiif; leas tlian 100, were 
dispatched from Aden a day or two bufore the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, 
bat were turned back when the news of the fight could be given tbeni. 

The total of the force actually embarked for Kgypt is a? follows : 

Britidi ufflcera IIW 

W»iTBnt officers... 13a 

firitlib DOD-coniiuisuoued offlciTs aiul uieu I,T2T 

I "MiTe Daii-comiiiis8ioTie<1 ofitc^rH and men 4,677 

^«»l«ffectire 6,720 

^"''l followers 6.740 

Grand toml 13,469 

'^f animals embarked the account stands thus : 

^"'^ 1,"5 

r°nie. 775 

^"Jft, 4,742 

g!*«»ehtor cattle 228 

"Qghtor ahoep 1,000 

Total 8.5211 



300 BEITI8H NA7AL AHD HILITAUY 0PEBATI0N8 IN E 



The table subjoined gives the details of each corps as it we 
the transporta, and shows iucidentally the plan of sea transpo 



Ceij* 


Hyd-^pe. 


Iteteor 
■rrtral 
U8n«. 

ADS.U 
Abb. « 
S^i. 4 

Aug-n 
Aot.n 


Brltl* 

11 

U .- 

""t "i 


1 


« 


BrlpullerOuiOTtl WUktown 






H Bttttrj, uibtigia^'.'.'.... ■ .. 




... 1.. 








"ii^'a^-""- '""■■ 


, 


; 


w 




A enU 


M 
















— 










M 

at 

M 

n 






T>a»»rii« 


Aattt 




- 




MBeogKlCanlTT, .. 


1 


::: 


w 




■i 




»o 










T 


I 


^ 


90 
H 

M 

M 




Mb Bcngm] C»alr; 






= 




















KSsr.;:::: 


«■ 
m 


ToUl 






u 


=i= 


— 1 






Abs-ZO 
Ad£» 


= =< 




HooWu. 




M » 


■ 



irnSH NAVAL AND MILITABY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 301 



British. Native. 



AnimalA. 



CorfM. 



Name of trannport. 



Dat« of 

arrival 

at Soez. 



E 

£ 

C 



Of 

€ 



B 
c 

s 

c 
a 

d 



• 1. 









O 



Pi 



puij. ICadraa Sap- Ithandara Aug. 23 



uiv.XidrM8app«ni Malda .. 
•Wkrapb train Kerbela 



Auk. ^ 
Sipt. 1 



•rk 



iKrpairtBirat 



,1 HTdaap^M Auj:. 'JI 

: WUtow Hall A iiu. '27 

Locinda Sept. 1 



3 
5 



K 



.. 121 

4 121 
2 22 



49 

74 
25 



3 
4 



10 . 



1 



WiiitowHall Au»r. 27 1 .. ....^.. 

Kirbrla S«'|if. 1 1 ... 

4;aiub4Miia Stpt. 1 1 

Darien SepL 7 I 



■I 



M 

71 



16 



2 
•» 



1 

1 i 
I 

1 

3 , 



Uit IVparUD«iit. 



P«Mhwa* .Aug. 9 

Hydaapea Aiij;. 21 

Zanilieal Auj^. 23 

Khiva Aitu. 2:> 

Cbanda Auje 27 

Krrbrla St-pi . 1 

B4iiikeuDa Ilay S«|it. 7 

Kliandala . . .' S«*pt. 9 



I>rtMU^ai««t C'lianda A ng. 27 

■ ' " 3U 

:ti 
1 
1 

4 



l*rini-ipla 
Iiii-hnu>riii«th. 
Krrl>«-la . .. 
(rrfiiilHMiiji ... 
('uloa .... 
ll«N»krnna limy 
lUrlrn . 
St. <-oltimlia . . 
KliandaJa .... 

Ilar.ara Sfj>t. 

Curiiith S«'i»t. 

iM'hla S4«pi. 

Siidhaua: 

Mtiharuiirl): 

Afrira: 

KjtImti: 

<h»lWat 



AuK- 
Aiitf. 
S<«|»f. 
S*-|.t. 
S.-pt. 
Sfpt. 
S.pf. 
Sipi. 
S«'pl. 



I 

9 

9 

i:t 
i:i 



MUbmeot linliitu 

V \Vut.»H Hull 



'•L»Hli*hrornt 



■pttrlm#fit . 



|iliai)il.«r.i 
Wui<>« Hall 



KhivB 

<'lliU<l« Afll 

lrt« 

< '.tll.'MMh.l 

I Vt 4 AH 

I'jr I* n 

S| i'«i!iini1ii 



Vui: 27 

All;: 2't 
All*:. 27 



Ail- 
All.: 
S« pt 

S. pf 

s#pr 

S.pi 

»»fpt 

*v pi 



* p ^ 

* 

■:l 
1 
1 
4 



> • 




1 


• • 


30 . 




2 


3r» . 




• • • 


' i ' ' 




■ • 


4 








2 




o 


. 


2 


72 . 


3 




1 




, 


1 


. 


i 


1 





1 1 



All I*. ".•-•. 1 



II 



r, 
1 



•» 



211 
2« 

3X0 
53 



1 




114 
147 

i> 

H 

hh 
l.J 

n 

Jim 

'.Ml 

9- 

li'l 

n», 



f.'.: 



:< 
I 

4 
1 



3 



M 



3 , 879 7 

fie 
2<;< 



. . \ 



bmr r m am4 1. 000 ah»^p 

• umamport hrokB dowa bet^'^u I'omhmx and Adi^n ikn«\ wmt Um«A \^«&'^ \o\iA\ak. 
iJ. 



lU 

1K5 

190 

230 

344 

3« 

N) 

30« 

14 

19U 

3« 

24 

440 

19ft 

23« 

2U0 
171 



3.2« 



aiUTISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPBBATIONe IX BUTFTI 



Brttlah. XMti« 



Aug. M 

'.' Sopt! T 



fPaiUil DvpKitmcat. . . 



1°' ^^ 



IJ^^^^ 



■ARpr 8«p\t>nil>« U, 

Tbe forc«, it will be observed, wiis coiiiposi&l of About, odo-ttiird 1 
[ troops stirviug in India and two-tbirds " natives." Tbo formerd 

ive the extra i>ay allowed by tbe Indian Oovernmrut sfterfl 
I Ing Aden, which is nudcr tlic Bombay pretiidcney, and tvcfaaita 
I Western limit of India. 

The pociiliaritivs of organization are soiniiny andso great, tbatfl 
I only hiy possible, in the limits of this rvport, to mention ifae niovt ittii 
Takio}; tbe British soldier flrat In order, it may be broadly ll 
that when employed under the Indian Government every ciTort f*f 
to render him a mere fighting machine, by relieving him as far a 
ble of the cares and routine duties generally ineident to camp liteM 
has a native cook to prepare his food for him ; a " dhoWe" or t 
man to keep his lineu clean ; water- carriero, scavengeni, aweeiwr^ 
diggerx. nin shoes are brushed for him, and, at night, in tin 
U insured cool and refreshing sleep by the fanning of " piiukabs* 
by nattveH. If a mounted man, his horw is groomed and fed I 
This extraordinary cousidenitiou is a legacy from earlier daya, i 
it« jnstificatiun in the necessity of maintniulng in India tJie pn 
the European as a snperior lieing. 

The number of nonoombatant natives Hs.sociat4>d with the 1 
troops in these and other capacitieM, ander the term "rullow 
made the larger through the operation of that singular and i 
ineradi<:able institution '* caste," which limits every man*» i 
m^ one thing and no more. In garrition, for instanee, wfaere Utffl 
^ucfes of actual cam^igmueOio not Mx.wx^vb« number of svtrulll 



304 BSITISB KATAL AND HILITABY OPEBATION8 IH » 




tnSH NATAL AMD MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EOTPT. 305 






a 

U 

«3 



I 



8 



a 
?S2 



■ • ■ 
• ■ ■ 




• • ■ 








a 

S.S. 

lis 



' i : ° 
: I. i 8. 

• o ! 8 



ll I 
II I 

99 » 



flaAoeMa ■» 



?• J ••: s c »r r s rf". 



scssseasa 
^sassassa 

f'iiiiiifi.SL 



2 a 

si 



a 

i : 



5^ 
3 



« « 



£.£. 



ri Ti 



nn 



c* 



■c-g 
a a 

It 

2S. 



'X30 M 



a 

if 

-a 

*5 

e 

9 

•a 

e 



• • « 



— « 



a 



fi : i 



ri — 



« > 



.62*: *- • 



« 2 



e 



■ = * rf 



■ --5 T ■- . 



B 
S 




» r 






? ^ 



s > 



■ •! 



f 



f 



" » 






f « 



•I 






.Vi>.. l'?^. 



1'^' 



806 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPKRATIONR IN EGYiT. 



IT 





KaM ti-alt nf/oUowar,. 


J 


F<dl»«ai.*e. 


i 




11 ftp 










tbw'flUcr., 


«, 1 -;j^S-rh 




auimm 


*'■■ <U>I «fMk 








i'.M .^ I ii^'-^ ■£■ 


at UvaAfoaj 



A*iwrlviulklk>i<. 

IjM rvn. OB all 
nimmuaiHfafllr 



'Utitb. u b> hIi 



iiiiii?F:l'E-;;.v:: 



aFarTparMnt.atti«ap*Md9]iarMnt Drni'Dwm. 
> For a p«r Brat, ot txaat/a ubiI I par aatX. of hillawitr*. 
c P«r niiaiiuiy. 



( DrlTar* nf park u 



I tu do \ba <lir(» w 



praklM (pseVaW I^Jj 



IL ladi 

^^^H It is iu the ()rgniii/,Htioii of Die cavitlo' tliut ihp et^^lMt diA 

^^^KArc to Iw fouud 1)vtwccii the I^tirupeHii uu<! Indian rr^nmcnin- 

^^^KrutMWii the cavalry is more minutely de«ciibed \\vtv than Iht- oikerl 

^^^1 It must b« remcmlien'd that, in the tlmt jilnci-, tn-ery uutive n>gi 

^^^■f]iotinledornnu)Otiiited,i8«citiiii)aiHlHl by n Hrilioh ufUcvr, knotra ^ 

^^^^Kis the Commandant, with a eccoiid in couimiiiid. Hrery iw|ai 

^^^B-«avnlry and pach wing of an infantry battaliun ba8 a BritlHli OiuM 

^^^f and u Kritittb Bubaltcrn on probation. Kach regiment uf oit4)flr ll 

IT^^ \\»» n BriliBli adjutant, a surgeon, and two iiiobatiimers, TbeHed 

beUinK to the 8tuCt' corps of one or other of tlie three ludinn pre 

Benpil, Madrai), and Bombay, each of which nmintaina ita otbJ 

aubjei-t to the coutrol of the ceutraJ Government nf India. 

list titles and the rank and precedouoe of theae odleent are ain 

those of the tui))erial Officers ; but the pay 18 nincti greater, beiof I 

«iiongh to livo on. They take preceiltiucu over all native u 

I are never allowed to rise beyond IJie cummand of a cavalry l 

I Infantry company. 

The Indian cavalry regimenia conaist of sis tron|M. TbBfl 
•eagth tH 550 uf all ranV^. 't\\«^ «kT«&vuitid with the SiiUler 4 



■ ive 



■08 BRtTISH NAVAI. AND MILITARY OPEBATln.SS IN KOYPT. ^1 

' TfaiRnrrougeiiietititH not without it«(ti8aUvaD!aKc>*tbow4'TiT,caid4l^| 
prejiitliue l>niit:iiig great complexity into tlio internal rcnuaiuj' of^H 
camp, nn to rooking, &ti., nnil particulnrly an t^> latrinett. ^M 

Thu poweru ot piiiiiRliiiiout loilfctnl in tliu hnuils of the <.'••»■ nuui^H 
are very extt;imive, incliuiiiig iiupmonment up to two .v^n*, dlKoii^H 
and the minur inL-thods uiiiverfial iti milittiry svrvic«». f luggiiitt fs^H 
permitted, itsabolitiuniii till.' British Hriiiynothavtn^ttlfi-ctt><l tb«lil^| 
troopa. Ttie ofl'cuseH are uhuhII.v of a mild vlianicter, for tb(< md^H 
very docile. They reijiiiiv, however, a sixTJal treatment on Ihe pii^H 
tbeir ulliveit*, iriany small imintH of diseipllu<' ettdeiitial tvitli Kiirop^H 
being entirely nnd pnrpoi^ely overlooked with tlioni, while io othl^H 
Mpi^ctR they Are subjected ton very tiiut rein. ^H 

The Comnintidantr bolils A oiwciea of pnlie^; conrt twice n VMik, ifl| 
all the officers, British, native, uud mm commissioned, that can be spmcP 
from duty are preBCiit. Here breaches of discipline are adjudged. i«i>. 
pluintH, retiiicMM, &c., heard and iittendHl to. Much of llio gixxt fnti- 

ig in these composite bodies deiK'ndH npnn the publicity of tbesr "dir 

,h8," every effort being made to ctillivntc respect for ami cttnOdcM* 

the justice and probity of the superior ntllceni. As the nnirnrm >iii'i 

its are generally maintained by the natives themitelves, all k- 
■nditures involving them directly or indirectly ar* di-. i 

lese occu8ions,ninterialsandmunufiw!tur»d articles ticingpiin' 
oontract in open boanl, where every one has the right of Hp«t><-li. 

Bach man payR l!ru|ieesa month into a regimebtal remount ri>iiiii|,*rhirk 
Is used t« replace horses worn nut in onlinnry service.. The tJiwcrtimeM 
furnishes substitnt«s for »iiinial» that are killed or disable*! <*itb«rta 
action or through fatigue incurred in long marches or through exoR* 
ive exposure, 

(}i-eat attontiou is paid by the commamtant tophysicxl e<lii< >: << < 
huical s)K>rts, such as ttmt-)>eggiiig, mounted swonl exer> < 
ifngjiarades across rivers on horneback, steeplechases Willi |i 

The drill is ncoonling to the Briri.-<ti tactics, even thv Kngli>.ti H>.nla 
of command biiing retained, but very rigid adherence Ui tbedetjilbh 
neither exacted nor expected. 

The principles above mentioned for the cavalry buhl as well 
infantry, being modified in application tosuit thea]tere«lcircai 
of the case. 

The fiHilKohlier receives lesitpay, almutjCl sterling itcrmontJi, 
ex|ienHcs arc pniportionatcly less. lie hiw no horse or pouy to In 
his tentage and other camp e<|uipage are snppUed and tmiit 

On enllntment he receives a bounty otMO ruiMses, mid nftiv ■ 
moDtiis' Rervice he is mIIownI -1 ru|tecs atinnally for olothlnn. 

The c;ompu»iU<m of an Infantry regiment in Indiit is sttntlnr la] 

tt British battalion, viz, eight e^^mpauies. The war strength 
r, nrjcb less. For tbe V^g>-vUi>>iU cAmviuign tbo lotal «l 



^^^piUTISH XAVAL AKH MIUTAKV OfKKATION'r^ IN VXiXl'V. 30!) 

^^^leu till* cUfllritlt.v of liviiiK fairly wHl iirid paltiii;; a!tiii« for a rainy 
Uav 111 M coiintr}- ni> \HWT a» IniHu is ooliitiilvrctl, l/i^cc (Iter wlUt the prua- 
titrr i-iijujiil bv thv Holdifr ax belonging to ibi; Qucvii'it senit-v. th<< cvr- 
Uiiil V of bviiiK above want, the probability nf i-stirintr wilb u gooil (ten- 
Mon, Aiitl tb« vomitaralively hi);)i nih-juI duflu fi-ora which the r»cruita i 
arc ilntwit, li i« >mii fo bf woiiiliTcil Hi that Her MuJoHty'H iinlivn lu- 
dmii in>>i|t« Ahiinltl In- n Rni- M-t of iiu-n. In fHct, llicy exhibit tlieir J 
pn<lf mill MrirrvH[wnt iu a MiiKitUrly ilignitled buurliif! iiitd in a inili- 1 
Uiry n'Oinl uf iiiqcU mvril. XiithiiiB conlil Kurpana the graco with I 
wbivli llirwi lui'ii walknl their \m*tt* ma i^Mitrics or exeoiitfi*! their lua* I 
nenvem. wlitlc tht'tr «unli*iiriti lirill is pivriKc utii) forninl to th<^ verge I 
orMtlrmuity. I 

1).. ..,.(,....(« iheciiviilryitien iire peculiarly valuablB. They uro very I 
]. .lien, Hiid Hiive to their reHiioiinibllily. I 

i.iiilt Ihene iriHijia i-x)iibit im an ubsoliile inrjipadty tn nil- 1 

u.it iiiiyiblii^ vriinifil by (lie Qiieeri'i M>l(llian should not be 1 

*nn^l at fitin* nuil ha n mntli-r iif colinne. Till': fiiniiMlily of n'^iliHJtlOQ I 
Btiil |Myitu-nL prmliK-rx in llii-ir iiiiDilii a fei-linj; uf ;;iH)d-hntnnrMl con* I 
lr«n|il. HnrftiK the luiKhl* Ibey marvel nt nut beiii)i pennitled to ex> I 
trtiU 1 

Tbto eOKineu* (Njai]iiiient wna partirularly utrouf: fti Hatid-ba;;ii and I 
watrr-lronicbB fitolh iroii ami wiknI), atid about Ave nillen nf Hteel rails I 
werf ovnt out, with all of tbeir fttllii^N. In the railway work done by I 
Ibe Indian wpiiem at iHtnnilin the pUuit from Kiif;l»nd waa iittcd. I 

Tbe telet;n>|tb nulflt wa«i of a light overhead wire. I 

Tbe artillery waa fliied out with AIM) ronods ikt Ran and .100 round* 1 
pert'mrbiiivi the inlantry with ■'<><J roiindai>crritle; the cavalry with 300 I 
|ipr rjirbine. 
tbe iwo ballenva in tbe hididti CotiliiiKinil, one of 9 pilni. was 
■a II iMtleri*, lat brigade. Ita ofliiM^-rH wi-rv a mnjur, a luptain, 
iree I list ten a nbt, Iteaidea a nurgeciH and a veterinary Aiirgfon. 
T%K tt-|>Ir. Kan in being replai^tl by newer and more [MtwerfDl piecea. 
It may, Ibereforv, Im* dumiiaaed with but few worda of deaeripljon. Id \ 
fnrai it rrAeinblm the l^jHlr. Ita rali'mr ih ^1 incben, ita lenetb of t: 
la AH iwbiM. It hni but tbn-e groovea, and it thrown studdnl projectllM I 
(■iniDar to tbe l<t-|Hlr.)or tbe iinnal Ivjie. 
II. I waaouly engaued ot Tel el-Kebir. 
The otber battery, iei-bni«iilly 7.1, Northern diviaon, eouMnted of] 
ati 7 pdr. aerew-Jointed nteel gona, Fig. 153, designetl and made by Sir I 
Wtlbam C ArBtatmng & Co. TItfM* Kui)>« are in two piirta, each weixb- 
><1n^ |Hiunda, a praetlrable load for a paek animal. TIm I 
lily tnlended aa a nnninliiln howitzer of high ixtWi-r. It I 
ii the n-nnllN of praclirtii ejc|HTien<'>- bad wilb thew gnna 1 
ittrtailnl ai-eaunt of Ibeir ronnlniction, ef)ni)>nienl, and {wr- 1 



[rfeSW9ra(rt/ iutv twvxM)rtiotuiuulexuc«)LV!te\xwa,Ti^\i 



I 



I BKITlflH NAVAL AXD IIILITAKY OPKKATtONN l.V KUVPT. 3)1 

fefoitowitig aigblA an> Mti|iplie(l with Ui« gun: Que tatijicpiit H4-nl»J 
Ml, itnutiuttwl ill (It'invf^ from lV> to la°. TIk- bciul u( tliu scalo I 
^aloW'tnulioti iimiiigviiivDt for rvuding tu iniuaU's, aiul » deSecIton I 




812 BKITISH N4VAL AND MIHTABT OPERATIOS8 IN EOtr 
fig. 1S9. 




I 



Gun unoonplad. 

Oil service, the trunnion ia always attnclieil tH tlio cbaiu-, tmi iHiU 
ily on it, being prevented from ooming nff by tlie ftir*' >.. I 

To insure the breecbpiece and uhose votnuig Mgethi-r 
[key ia fixed on the end of the chase, and thin key enters a <•< 

le corresjKjnding end of the breecU j>i«ce. 

A Bte«l gas-obock ia fitted into the joint, bat tbin Ras-cbnct: nmla 
ipennanently in the breech -piece, and it ia not neceHsary to removdi 

When the breech and chOHC ends of thi- fi;»n8 att^ |i1rc«j1 lutfcUM 

lUiey are firmly connected, simply by acreving the tranniun, whiuliiu) 

reganled as a counecting nnt, until tbi* lines ou the tranijinD iH 

ich-piece correspond, or nearly so. The band in run ap by hanitw 

,r AS possible, then a [irotecting -ring of iron ia init over nat* tmnniM 
ind atnick aliarply with a idwlge, which is onjinarily earrie*! dooEsilt 
of tbc trail of the^iun. In thejoiuingoflhe two parts thegunisuln^ 
placed vertically, the breech sitting nj an iron block plucfd in iittVr 
p[aU' of tbe trail, and aliaix^d to receive the caAcabel, thnnigh th« lai 
of which an iron bar is paaaetl. (Figs, nm, 156. IA7.) Ity thin nxu* 
,tlie breech is preveuled from turning through the effect of tbe hlu*. 

The trunnions are stam|)ed T and 9, re^iiectively, to indii-att: irtutt 
is to be stnick to tighten and which to slacken. 

1'he projectiles are shown in tbe flgnren KtO, 101, 1(>2, and UO. 

The v,am shot haa 78 bullets of ItiA to the pound, fillet) tti with li^ 
ftnd sand. (Fig. 100.) 

The abull (Pig. 1(11), weighs, empty, 6 pounds 12 ounnw; whentti 
«nd fnzed its weight is T pounds G ounces. Tbe bumting citufck^ 
«unces of powder. 

Tbe shnipnel are of two patterns, as shown in Pign. 163 nod 1 
'eighing 7 jionnda ti uiiiiees. 

The old pattern (lontaiuH 40 bnllcta at 55 to the ifound, and 
per pound ; tbe new has .50 bullets at 26 to the iHiund, and 18 bi 
33 to the pound, and II) segments. In both, the bnrstinic cbarp 
linlf ounce powder. 

The lime fuzocmpluyedbasulreHdy iK^eu de«cribe4l(see pago 10)' 
;uHHion fuae is given in section in Pig, 1IJ4. 

The charge is 1 pound 8 ounceH of K. L. (i. powder, in a 

Alt the umniuuitlou \f> of Miwi^trau^ti make, that tioune M] 
bHltary complete In every A«eU\\ wx.«e\A vi\mv «a\ >»'a\m. 



8«ITI8I1 NAVAL AND MI1.ITARY Ol'KICATIltS'iS IN KGYIT. 313 




TbtmrriKgeiii formed uftwalnwiketiii'leH of |>Ut« utrcl. tli« wlgMof 
tiflk ara llju)fr«1 outwiinl l» give the rJiriilUf of niiKlv irotui, «itli Icm 
^flit. Thmte bniak<>t nulett urp cnnixtTieil by ilirfe nlpel trnniioins and 
tfeel Uie-plutv, ftnil on^ formi^d to rvooivv tb** iruit truiitiionn and st«el 
IcUrcn. A bruM mniilithtf; fi>llo<«il)i; (lit- funti of bmcki^t Mn Hiid of 
■ankni ami iiili<ln.-i> in (lllml to micIi bnu'kt-t, to givr utiiriivm and I>e«r- 
f rarfaoR. Tlif axb>UvtM ans ma»vable Tor [mrpo«(<H n( tmnRpxri. 
TIm wlie«U an! :i fiwl in dtumvU-r. ihKHjiukfaaud felbwa tif wiml, tlit 
« of ^n, and the iiuvn ituniuflal. 

nveaniaip! U flltMl wiili a atiNillml nf Tinin, llic Iront tif wbicb 
oka luoanly u|m>d a vnMabMr variiHl b,v ibc Imickfl xidt'-i, and at tb« 
ar k«a a c^nw-har, tli<^ rndx of wbicli n-Ai in ij>it<'lif<il T*vk» Hvi^ImI to 
r bntckvta. A «li<liri(C tir»AS quoin ix altiH^livd to tbo Nlif/l-brtl by cli|U. 
MtqaoiD U Norknl, m requini), by » baitdubi-cl wbii:h tnniK a acrsw 
~ (fai Ibr «nil of tbu atoul-bt-ii and wurkinj; tbrvngb a acrvwwl |>art 
A iu>|> of ir>>oi] in laid uu iht> Uiw of ibr «|nain tu coahioii 
(IprvtX'iir i»(l(ti>(4tiou of till! aiiirfavf. 




304 BKinSH KA.VAL AHD HILITASY OPEBATIOKB IN 




TI8H NAVAL AMD MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 305 



Ufiii 



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.ViN. LV 



316 BBITIBH NAVAL AND MILITARY orEBATlONS IN EOrPn 



WliirelK 

El^valln;; nrrntigeinent 

Dintuoniitlng block and trannioii coltar .. 



The parte of llii' fpiii anil aarringo, Miu vqnlpiiH^nu itml :i i 
all carried on llio buuks of inalim, hi Kpitiiiilly-dcKigtn-il 
The projectiles atiri chargos stow in Htrong Ivattmr c. 
uccumimii) itig <1raniii{:!i. Fins. KiO iiml ir.T. Each Kim iitijiiD^ 



^yMtf 



SeHien en AB, 



nrnlefi for tbe first lino, tin- loads bdng disli-ilmt(.-d utiiODg tbm 
lows : 

UuzkIu [lorliuD 

Brwab porUou 

Canfagu 

Axlo, ooupliug blooli, 

WhMis 

B •nmiDiiitioti boXM.. 



giwrd, sUvatfitK gMr, wd *v« 



III eacli boi were Ave shrapnH, two sbell, and one c 
cbargvs, miikiiig, witli tliosL' rarmd on fourth mulf, fifty-twv 
with the piece. 

In actiou «ac)i gun ia attmidetl by a (tecond liuo of Ave a. 
lis reliefs to the first five euuini'riited abovtt, of tbrvu tuun nnta 
iuf; a reserve of forty eiglitntnndis of ai»uiuuilioii,iiud fours] 
OQe of wbiob \» saddled »n a Himrt-iiianiutiitioti mule. AllO) 
guii requires ei^ht^^'o iniiloa in tbe flgbtJui; linea. 

A pioneer mule accatnp»uiPH ea<'b Hubdivitdon ({Miir) of gntia^W 
otbers are loaded with looh) of various kinds. 




318 BBinSH NAVAL AND MILITABY OPEBaTIONS IN 





u o 






lU^'^'' 




322 BRITISH NATAL AND Mir.ITAHT 0PEBATI0H8 IH 




PLATK (i, 



TORT FUAR08. 



Fi«.44 




SkITCN or 9CARP N.W f ACC 



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BH BRITISH NAVAL AMI MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EOTFT. | 

Tht< fentUer-niurks on tbe outxide of tlie jiiiti, lo iiiilfcalu tliat IIm 
Is properly iiiativ, aru i-suct only wLieii tbii t;uii loaves tlie makvr'alM 
In pmclico it i^ fotind tbut i-ncb {;iin rt-qtiires ttvpiirate ailJualmM 
tliut it bi'couifs liinl'ly ueccasary (or every new lo know its owii| 
not only tu onli-r to bave no leakage of {^hh, but also to make lb«alki» 
^ aiiw ill sigbtirig occii8ioiie<l liy tlie rolntiuu of tbe t>rt!C-vU jwrtioti a«if 

^^^^roiu tbi> tiornml poititioti in one iliri'ctiuii ur Mic otbiT. 
^^^H The Tetit projects beyond tlie siirfucc of Ibe gun, uh twcn 1» Fig. 133, 
^^^^mt order to give tbe necesNary length of xocket for ttie friction tub«. 
^^^B Gr^at care lias l>eea taken that no nCeident to tbe vent sfaonM «ii 
n^ from tbis pecnliarity of const nieliou. It would appear, hoirrvertiM 
{ able Lo devise some other equivalent niAbenie. 

^^^^ Tbe reuoil is very heavy, owing to tbe ligbtnesn of the gun anittl 
^^^Hilage, but ibisdimulvantage is uuavoidablc. 
^^^^v The outcabel bole and bearer are Inconveuieiit in practiee. 
^^^B ant H. II. KogeiH, H. A., one of lli« oQlcent of tli'- 

^^^H '' suggctttH Ibat the knob be Nbnped a» ahowu In ' 

^^^B I I Btruighl bur to flU into the diNUionnliMg bloek [i 

P^^K V ^ '" ''^'^''"lOi Olid thus hoUIUig I be breech againiit -i 
P ^ ^ place of tbe iron bearer hu would Kubslitute a 6loul om 

bar. with an iron devil'M claw. 
('orni''o?'ra»- ■^ wooden bearer through the trunnion hoW i-. 
foMkiiob. handling tbe carnage. If this i» not placed ttrid i 
fairly, au ankwanl lift reiiult» during the oi>er»tion of pa< 
mule. It would be wetl,uH HuggcKted, to do away with Ibi- i 
replace it by a jHiir of short iron ieverw, 14 inches long, iiei; 
hinged to each bracket. When not in use, they would bo dune in^ 

m carriage ; when in use, they would otaud at right aiiglea to it. 

^^^B Tbe |>ioof of tbe practicability of jointed guns is fonud hi tt 
^^^^phat th« constriictiou of others in three pieces lA t»erionsly ccntcnj 
^^^Hn ofilcial circIcB. It is probable that tbe iulermpted aerew will U 
■ in tbia connection an an ex)>erimental anbfttilnLe for Anaatrong^ 

liug. 

Against tbe diaiul vantages of the 7 -pdr., »omo of whioli am en 
ated nbure (a portion remediable, the others iubexent in the»yM()Bi> 
be weighed tbe eoiupiirativcly high |>owerd in this Km earliest ezp« 
bnmiug moro thuu oue-Sflh of the weight of itA projectile iu p* 
giving a goo<l muzzle velocity {1,440 ftMtt perflecond),iii)d workinf i 
of 4,000 yards; itslightuefisand triuisportability ; tbeeaaviu)dfi| 
__ of coming in action, tbe evoluliou ri^puriugonly 35 seconds; itBi^ 
I^HHto go wherever a mule can find fooling; the uccurnoy of it« lln<,ia 
^^^■Hxe of tbe shell it throws. The piece and equipment weruflpokH 
^^^Htfgb terms by the officers of the bnltery after nevoral ytnnfaeif 
^^^Hlnoe and experience with it, these terms amounting to po^tlr* fl 



^•>»i iky 



lua^sitil 



^^^HtmSU NiVAL AND HIMTARY OPEBATI'JNH IN KQrPT. 325 

^^^^■•ttiT>' Xftt Bomtmy on August 9 and iviirliH Siiex on llio 22(1, 
^^^Bl iTiDHlncd Hrvpnil iliiys loaullve. It nrrivinl at limailfft on St^p- 
^^^^Ps. Oh Uic luorning of thi* 4tt] it BtartiNl Tor tbu front, roiidiing 
^HBbio 'h*! tiest iDorninjf, having birouactied at Tel-el-Mabnta. At 
'9 k. m. It <raH nnuly for work, having wilb it all the camp equl])ngf^ and 
ifdayn* providiuiis for man atid t>e»>tt. 

(Tlir iiiuial rutc! of progress of u mulr battorj is Homcwhat over 4 milM 
, BO lionr on a good txnuI.) 

Tbf '-[MlriL look part In the flgbt of Beptcmber D, Iwing at guu-drill 
whrn rli# KgyplfanM made tlioir appcaranci'. Tbe.v flrod between 50 and 
rociiidH ln-fof* tbe enumy witlnlrew. The Riin» were limbered up, 
iQiihrtl alirttit, and brotiglil Into action again at 2,KO0 yartU, tli« Kgyp- 
( *■ running iik*> hares." A second advance was made and the 
ngugnl fur a third and last time, the totiil expimditure of am- 
ID living 9*1 mnnds jkt gun. The practiiie was excellent. One 
'1 aloire ii credibly reported to have killitl ten Kgyptiana — good 
for ao light a piece nt nucit long range. 
At Tel-et Krl>ir the iMtterii'acjwnijiaDied the ln<li:inOoutingeut along 
Ike aoulli Inuk of the Sweet Water Oanal, coming into action in echelon 
4irt>tions right and left, engaging a battery of anvon Lahitte howitzera 
la gnnpiln on the ranal l>ank, (n adTnni*e of the main tine of defenoos, 
well u Ihf ginis In the reilonbts on cither nide of the canftl. For a 
few ininDles Ike Ore was wry hoL After the lines nere carried by Ihv 
BMfonh nighlundera, the 7'|Hlni. shelled the native village lying aootb 
•f tbe Intn-nrhmetiis^ A heavy redoubt on the oilier side of Die canal, 
•boat ljv>0 jards distant, was still giving innch tronble with its erosa- 
llv oo the advuncing trooiw, when the screw-gan!. eoiieentralwl their 
■» on it and blew up its magazine.* After thin Ihe battery sbellMl (he 
S|[>pli«ns, who were rnnnlng away fi'om all |>olnts, and advanoni past 
tW Intteiichmenis, tiring at the main ojimp and tbe railway ataliou. 

Blialtrr> Iheu r^nsetl its flrv, having expended almat tH) ninnd* o4 
htlUcH), moatly shnipnel, daring tlie action. 
|p tbe Iwlaitee of the Indian Contingent it went to Ziigazig, raak' 
pllw Man an awkwartl mistake In maruhing two mile* np the 
■■K aide of the ennal and having to rrtraeff Its steps to the brklge 
Te)*l Kebir. From Kngazig It proceedwl with tbe Contingent to 
BHbeis. Kbankah, and Calm, the only oorpa of llrilisb troops that 
■rehed (be entire distanoe fmm Ismailht. 

Fnni llie time of leaving Its ]>ost on the itorlhwt-Mt frontier of Indlft, 
arAblHjtijibiil, nnlil it reachei] Cairo, not aslngle animal was lost, and 
• men enjoyed nniiHiially goml health. 

Befttre tbe Indian Contingent leH Boinlmy three months* ailvauee paj 
(^ren to every tinin and ollieer desiring l(, and armiifeDients for n- 



■■MalHMMl tSMIMtOfn 



lbs aathnrtiy Mf IJ>aM«Mi U-i. 



318 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITABY OPERaTIOHS IN 




320 BBITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPEBATIONB IN EC 




i 



HITIBU XATAL AMI) UII.ITABV OPERATIONS IH EOyPT. 329 






tbe coniBiUfiaritit and tnuRport of tbia conUnfrcDt vrr« nimply per- 
frrl.* 

Tbc nwdiml amtii^fiiientR were haneti on a bospjUil prondion for 15 

of Miric i>f tliv t!8tltnul(><] elTenlive ntreiigtli nf tlie force, hikI for 

WDt. or the eKtiitmtt'd iiuinl>er of fiillowera; lliat ik, for 815 sick, 

il Mdj; ncc»mniodiitod in Held boKpiUtle ami tiro tbinls In geti- 

ipitKlB. A baM^ boApital was etttubbsbed at Suez. 

Tbe old ii>'M«ni of rejnint'iital boHpitaU ban b<t>n abaiidoniMl. Under 

tbc ftr«*ent rigimv tbe nurceoii attacbe<i to any corps in nnpitoscd to 

mMln- finly endi lemporary ft»8l«tani;e a» may be rt-tiiiii-ed in camp, on 

1^ manih, ttr ilurinf; an notion, ncndlng ivll vanyii tieeillnji; treatment for 

■ore than twruly-faiirbanriilu ihuHcbl boMpilul.if Ilicreb«on«Ht band, 

Ib ai^tbiQ tbev apply tml tbe 6nt drc'SHinga to wounds, and ara not to 

■ndertalif on) mtIooh Hnrinml oiieration. Field dreiuint^ were nap* 

pliMl in iwrkujres of uiiironn [tatteru. "Htey werei coiniioaed of pieces 

bj^dtvMlnp (simple ointineJit with '2 |K-r rent, carliolic acid apread on 

^^^blni}, a |iieo- of |!ulia-|>crchu Uhkuc, utid »onie pliin. 

^^^Bk field boApitals vrort> eqnii>|Ktd lor KNt bi-drt envb, and were In four 

^^BpmWi, eavb a working nuit by itself. The pertonnet (.-onitisted of 1 

^■■Biar annrron, or aorKeoa-maior, in cbartre, 4 aHsiHtanls, 7 apotbecoriea, 

tir other tDMliral aubonliaalea, and 2U ward Hervanta (nnraex). In tbe 

Wknlm for (he Dative troopii It wa« neoeasary lo have Ibe nnntex of proper 

easte, iiul nf mi]iert to relif^onn prejudiw. ItenideK, tburv was a lonj; 

liat of rooka, water ainiera, aweeiiera, acavenRern, writera, atorekeeiwra, 

earpenlera, a cntler, tailora, waalierrnen, &a., in all 8(1 men. 

Til* onilll of arorew waa an eailmnled aupply for thre4* monihA. Tbe 
Inalnitui'tita, auricical apjutmiUM, and tHirary of profoMaional botiku were 
Mlroled. Under the head of •medical t-onforta" were mirb urticlea aa 
brandy ^^ doi«n), Tarraf;ona wine (G dozen), line jaioe, aago, arrowroot 
•ad barley, eilraci of beef, condeiined nitlk, coueenlmted soapa, pre- 
•M-red polalon, rotnpn-aaei) rejielabliw, Ac. 

For the European nick the nsnal fiehl rnlion waa aup]dementpd by 
•oeb medical ecHnforta aa were neceaanr^'. 

Tbe diet fur Ibe native aiek eonataleal nf ancb paria i<f Ibe ration oa tbey 
OooJd ouuaume, with oue-balf ouucv teai and Ifaree-foortba uuneo angar 
(for tea), "i uuttcea rice, and 1 oanee auftar (fur nee), with medical eom- 
Ibrta. 

*■ ■ ' - n totheroreKoiuearticlea were fullaetaof toilet and klteliea 
' 111 rlothlHR. beddiue, lanipa, 6x. Kitch field hoapilal flew 
' :lk«a. 
KM- ..-N>..t:<- waa on a lilwml MNile— 'JO donble Hy and Slainslelly 
Icola (tbe rnnner I^ by 8 feel and Ibe Inlter I'Jj bi 10 feet) lo each field | 
baa|<lial. 

Ill providiuj; for tbe carriage of Ibe aiek all ambalnnemwrredloeanlMt I 
•Bd mily litter* eni|diiye«l. i» theM> there were SlHr In all, IM d»oIlt« J 
UtienJ anil TJ3 dandier, w|(h Ibe rMvo^aWe \w»t*vK TOaXea^ * 



\ 



BBITI8H NATAL AND HII.ITART 0PEBATI0N8 IN 




UTlSn tiATAL AND HlLITAEr orKKATlONS IK EUTPT. 331 



F 

fhr tbri'mburkatiuanf itA|H)niot] oniiefunK*, iiltliougli, tccliiiiiTnUy, tlio 
oi>-u|MTiti)i»u of IiHliau Irmpa voh only aDlliorizeil on tbe Slot, whcu h 
n-Milutiou «&« oltfTviI ill itte lowrr liousc af I'arltKiut'Ut, aud pUHWril by 
btth bniucli4r«,iuilliorlxiuictlivdJvfrHinuuf t'Doiifiliuf IlieliidiaD revenae 
to ouver llir tiircrwtarr oiitiiiy. Tliix huui waAKuIiNtfiiu'iitly (■Mimated to 
nt jCI,)WO.(NN>»tt-r)iiig. 

)kujm«t >>r ibf udvaoce of tbe tiow nvll-kiiuHn liidiitii Couliiiflifiit, 

ouerCotHi»aiiy QrSitpppnt and Miners aud lbi> Ut tuttalion 

kaftinli IliKliIandH (late T'JiI foot), airivcd from Adfi) at Huee, 

it bud been {trcvlouHly occujilcd by Itrfii-tb Muf-Jackclit aud inaHiiea 

I Kam litdtii Miiioilrun, under ilcHr-Admiral Il«w*-tt. ni-n> tliA 

Bjusi iiuuivd h-niaiiii-d uiilil AngiiKt 'Jlf, ibc ilft> itn-vioiiHly agtved 

~~ p M-isurp uf tbi* Sitt'Z Catml, wiii-ti 4U0 of llit-m luarvlied 8 

9 Ibv oiirtbward UtvanU Cbalunf, reluniiiif; at 4 |t. lu. witbuut 

|| pooiautpn^l llin I'ucitiy. Tlicy HulfiTed (wveiv ly ('ri)m Ilie lieat> 

e luiiti^l out ill lieavy tinlor, tiiidiT tbvloiTilile suii.ovit Ilitt luiudfl 

«f lljvdratrtt. Tbt' loiliiuccor Ilic l<allatioii took )iart in (be oiu-nittmig 

Kilii>', UK detailed iu Snctiou XI of tbis tvjiorl, wbicli trvalt uf llie 
I of (be CMIIUI. 
ftny rollowins, Aii^fuot -I, llie main body camn up rlie canal Id 
kliiX, a «innll hlnnl KU-»nifr, wbli-ti Jidm-d tliPK><i<^Mints Mosquito 
^KbII at i'bnlxuf. (Svi> I'lxti- 47.) Tlie billi-r, willi tivo c«Miii>ii- 
lUM (if tb« Aaini' balluHiMi, rf luaiiicd at i'linluuf tu Kiiurd Ibat piTtiiiu 
of tbtf eaual, nlilla- 1li« UHHfiuito, «itli tbt^ Sjiliiux fnlluMiiii;, punbed 
•a akxnty to tb« iim-diwiinl, lauding Crt'in liuii' (<• time I<t n-vuiiuuiii?r, 
ITbr rr*ull« men only ncgMtivc. Hear tliv Miutbt-ru t-iul uf the Littb) 
Bttler balif ia a lock iit tlip Hvvvt Water Cunul, wlit-ru it «vuh Viiuwu 
thmt tbe KfjyptUiiH liai) Imtii enaimpctl. Tlie eun-buat obelk-d tliis 
place OB upitranrliine, (iitor lu Ibv laiiditif; of a piiily of tbe Illcbluiid- 
J& The camp wnt luuiid dt-wrlinl hiidii nIuin-tiAie in tliriiiital ojir-u, 
HJHMb oblcb tbi> uaier «-»» iitiniinR frwly iiilo ibo livM-rt. Tbe gate 
^^^^■•etl, tbe tclft;ni]>b line tlfiilrnyod (M-veriiiit uouiiiiuniciitioii be- 
^^^HVeBdie and tbeKlatinn*^ iicur Hih-k), iiud Ibf dt-lacbiot-ut telurnvd 
^^^^bblpH, litt^iufi Dml ul a KUiall jiarty uf E};>'[iiiaiiii., wbii (ouk Iw 
^^^^heU at uun>. 

^^^HyoMiuilu and H|tbiiix now > runwed Ibc- Ililter ijiiin luul |«iumk1 
^^^^■kbort Nttrli-b uf 7 niib's iutervcniii]! betwvvu lb"iD and Imke 
^^^B. Al ri«nitH.'uin, :JJ miles fnim tbe Uiller L'lkes, Ibe luiid la 
^^^BtliAd ut Kuy otber-|>oint iu tbe Knuibeni bnlf uf tbe canal, witb a 
^^^Bnbctniiun), funiiiibiiiK an adoiiralile |Hwlltoii for tbe defenM or 
^^^^py ofthecauol. It wan AuiijHtMHitbul tbe Kfm>liani>«toubl umka 
^^^B hm. For tbU rcHudi Ibv plnec «iu Bbi-tU-d from a di'laiioft. 
^^^^Briag no r<-«i>onw to Ibe Bn; tiiC St*aforlb IlixlilnnderB UiidifL 
^^^^Hooaeiif the eueiuy lu Bisbl, they niarcbed a mile inlaud tocluae 
^^^K^med look lo tbv Frv»U Water Canal. Tb'ta Aoue l\»r> t«Vaxx»i\ 



I meri 



BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITABT OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 

to Serspenin, where tlicy encamped for sereral days. 8erap«Hiiii «■ 
the otity i>oirit on (lie canal ereu tem])orarny guarded by the army. 

TLfy tr'00|)8 from Iiiclift proper began to arrive at Sum on Anput 31, 
the 7lli Begtmeut of Bengal Native Infantry preiwdlnfr- On tbellil 
HaJorGtiticral Macpberaon arrived in the Dydasti^* and aMnnied fw- 
oral command. 

Tbe impression wbicb bad oripnally prevailed timt tbe ludian 0» 
tingent wouUl ojierate independently from Suez, as a baa«% towvdi 
Cairo, as an objeetive point, now gave place 10 tlie rertainlj ofjcnl 
action witb tlie Biitisli troops aloug Ibe I»mailia-Zuga/.i^ Uiir. 
from tbe Contingent were edtabiiiilicd at tbe vnrionM railway nV 
between Snez and NeRobe, at Serapeiim, Fazoid, Oencffi", and CI 
to protect (be railway, wbtch afTorded tbe only meaiis of gvttinc 
iuotivo«to Ixmiiilia. 

Tlie 13tl] Bengal Lancers were tbe first to reacli tbe front, a 
ment arriving at Ismailia on Anguat 25 and pnubiiig on immediati 
Muhsnmeb. Two days later tbe Cavaliy Division, nnder .Major Gw 
Dniry Ijowe, bad l)een strengthened by portions of tbe 2d BpiiRal t'avilfj 
and l.ttli Bengal Lanwre. Ontlio2fltli tlic Bwifortb nigblaridpraWI 
8erHi)eam for Ismailla, and witb nil convenient s[>eed Ilie Coiilingirat m 
coneculraled at KaHsassin. Its military uiJcratiouH from this tiiM N 
merge into those of the army as a whole. 

Instead of acting as an independent nnit at Tel-el Keblr, lU W| 

cavalry joined Oeueral Drury Lowe, and one of it« two badoric* 
attached to the Artillery Brigade, under Brigadier Genvml 
«nongb, II. A. Tbei-e was thns left but a eomparalivelysmallforoei 
General .Maepberson's inimedinte command. This force waa 
of tbe Seaforlh Iliglilanders, such portions of the three native inl 
regiments an were left after snjiplying entire guards from Saci 
mailia and parts of tbe guards from Ismailia (o Eaiwassln, a sq 
of the 6(h Bengal Cavalry, and a company of Miulrat Sitppore. 
dated with it on the other side of the canal, and acting nnder 
Maepberson's orders, were (be Xaval Light Battery, the Naral 
railway gun, and the eAptnred 8 centimeters Knipp, also ud a 
truck. 

Bsoellent wurk wat done in thH p.krt of tho bitttl-^ Held, nnd t««Iff 
guns were captured. Tbe dasit displayed by the Indian ContinevM 
rivaled that shown by the 'id and iligbland brlgaden, on ttv •■'■'^■' 'J 
tbe line. The details of the fight are given elsewhere, Xf. 
tbe high praiNe awarded The Contingent by the Commaiidt'i 

One instance may be permilled to show the ftlauilna of lij. . . — 
[iper and \\\% horse. The Inst detaehment of tbe Cuniiiigent i« arm* 
Imu for the light wiw a troop of tbe (ItU Bengal Cavalry. Aftri • 
voyage of six(een days, it landed at Ismatlia at 8 p. m. on S, .irrte 
II. At II \\. m. U RtartvAtot K'4K»ii«s.vn, which ft rearli. 
Irjnfi nllenioon. U JomeA l.\w vavR\\'s Xwwwnv, ww«V .~ 



BB1TI8II NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN EGYPT. 333 

ray during the three Aaja of forced marchiu^^. Cavalry capable of such 
k performaDce is not civalry to be thoa^ht lightly of. 

A« a bauitj review of the work done by the ludmn Gontiu^ent, it may 
>e broadly atated that whatever duty it was called upon to execute 
vail accoinplisbetl rapidly, quietly, and well. A lon^ canipai<;n nii^ht 
lave developed defecta in organization, administration, or morale not 
Banif«iit dnriug the Hcant fortnight of its share in tUi^ war in l'j;;ypt. 
[>u thiti iKiint speculation is open to all. But taking the Contingent upon 
Us record, one is forced to the conclusion that Lord Beaconstiehrs so- 
sailed ^*coup de ih&itre^ in 1878, when Indian troops wore brought to 
Malca as a reserve iu the event of hostilities with Russia, was a resil 
neoace, whose complete meaning was only made clear four years later. 
rbeiw oriental soldiers of the British Empire can be brought on any 
Aeld of action by the scores of thousands (there are about 17,000 cav- 
alry <^ud 100,000 infantry habitually underarms); indeed, the number 
has hardly any limit. Thait the practice, once begun, of drawing upon 
Ihia reserve will ever bo abandoned, should futurti complications require 
a sudden reinforcement of her military strength, cannot be hoped for 
bj any iMMsible enemy of Kngland. It must, on the contrary, be taken 
lato account in the problem iis a factor capable of almost indefinite ex- 
pansiiin. 

The recovery of Great BritainVs formiT military prestige was merely 
a question of time and opportunity, but it is inipos>iblc not to believe 
tlMt for this recovery she is indebted, to a certain extent, to the real 
worth and unboundetl posMbilities of her Indian Contiiig«Mit. 



ZZXI. 

In this section are gathered sueh it(*ms and eoneluNJons as are of in- 
lereaC, either technical or general, but which d(» not find a proper place 
(b the preceiluig sulxlivisions of the report. 

AKAH MAKES. 

1. It was reniark4>il as a slngnlar ami .su;:g(*.siive fact tliat anions tlie 
hunies captured from the Kgypti.iiis or Inniid in various part<^ nf the 
oountry as oceupieil there were nn Aiali mari's. The.se valualili* and 
aaually unpnreha.sabio animals niii^t have lieni very e.iret'ull\ li;d<ieii, 
in the fear that they might possibly lall into tht* lianils or' the ririti<»li. 

FOIL.NKSS liV LAKI-: IIMSAU. 

3. The spee<ly return ot the base to Ahvxandiia after the hattli* of Tel 
cl-Kebir was further advisable on areount of the <-on«litiou of Lake 
Tiat^Mh, There in no tUlv in this harbor, oid\ ;\ >\\vl\\V v.vnw\a\ svV vA 



334 BRITISH NATAL AND MILITAKY OPEfiATIONS IH E( 

tbe valor tit tlio Suez Canal accnnlinj! to tbe season. The 
BO miiiiy ships imeked dosMy lojictWr w tbft small basin li 
in tlie Hc'i'iimulation uiiilemeiitii them or nil snrls of Altb, ml 
&c,, thrown overhoanl. Tliroupb the lat-k of » etroiij; cIp 
rent, Ibu water had no fliiinrc of itduqiiatv renewal, iind hL-tii 
fonl, wliito tli« iKittom, as foanil on lieavinp up an an>:tior, v 
anil noisome. 

ItEBTHING CAPACITY OP LAEB T1»»A1I. 

3. Tbo norn]»l capacity of Lake Titnsali as a harbor was 
banted liy tbe fact that lbt< winil wan consluni in ilirection. 
<ineiicc the transiwrts coiilil be nnuhorcd in lines abreast, cI 
oilier, without regard to the orciiDury ueceiwity of "awinginj 

The berthing of tbe arriving ships was in charge of Staff C 
Patch, R. N., of tbe Orion, who waa appointed Harbor Ma£te 
was this duty performed that the port, whit-h had been proi 
tho president of Iho ISuez Canal Company barely sufficient f 
selH, WDM made to iK>iiIatn no leas than 10^ at ono Uuiit. 

TUK DELL lliNT. 

4, Thtt regulation army teut is of the Bell paltem, 10 fei 
12 feet C inches in diameter at the base. There are two tliea 
out, with ventilating holes at tbe top. It is intended to ao 
15 men. At the bottom is a deep flup, which can bo buttuuc 
mit air. The pole is 2 inches in diameter, in two parts (for o 
of transport and atflrage), connected by a socket joiut. 

COraClDKKCK OF TUG TEUMINATION OK THE (JAJIPAIOK ' 
NILR man WATER. 




BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITARY OPK RATIONS IN EGYPT. 335 
INCKEASED PROBABILITY OF ATTACK AT DAWN IN THE Fl'TlKK. 

7. On the other hand, Ueiieral Wolselcy has proved 1\v the l4};;io of 
events the eflScsicy of the strate^ry involved in an attack at early dawn, 
m |*uint iilways urged by him as the ontconie of the iin[»rovenient in 
mmlem wea|M)ns, lu future wars it nia.v be saft^ly pretlieted that tlio 
dfflense will be fn*quently Mibjected toassanlt.s at this inonii-nt, and \\ ill 
lie forced to increased vij^ihince and sln»n;;er ont[>()sts towards th(* end 
of the night to reinl the enemy or keep him at a di>tanre until tlie day 
has completely broken. 

The campaign was fruitful in at least tmc strategical lesson ol* ^reat 
ini|iorrance. 

CONCKRNINa INIFORM. 

4. Contrary to generally received ideas, the red co.its of the l*iitisli 
were lesa conspicuous than the white or l»Iiu* nniturins worn Ity tin'* 
Egyptians. Visibility is merely a matter of back^ronml, alter all, and 
the sand ami glaring light of the dcsi-rt were relatively worse lor the 
latter than the former. 

Tow.iids the end of Septemlier, a gray serge tunic was issued for trial 
to (he tr(N)ps in Kgypt. It looketl much cooler than the ^arnicnt it rc- 
pUceil, and it would certainly stand the U4*ar an«l tear of a canipai;:n 
far iMftter. The appearance of most 4>f the liritish co.its was very bul. 
They were stained with | erspiration, spotttnl with dirt and Lire.isc. and 
were altogether far from crei 11 table, althongh the maiks weie :in un- 
a%'iMdable sequence 4>f hard work and ron;:h campaigning, 'iin ,\ w«i(* 
in marked contrast with the **khaklii** diess of the Intli.m r4iiiiiii;:iiit. 
A dralirolor, w ilh which the r«ittoii drilling used in the li«it se.iMHi iii Jnilia 
If* d\eil. Absolutely, ot' conise, one was as clean as llieoiliri, Inil irl.i- 
Tively the khaklii Ii>oked fiesli and neat, while the iid sri;:r w.o \u*\tr- 
les^ly lH*g rimed. 

The irailitions ot' an aiiiiv are not Ii;:lit]N to !m ii«;:lert(d. I!ii;:l.iiiirs 
Kddiers in aii\ other color but the iniiiK-iiini jj| <«i.ii]ri i.iii lr.iMl!\ i>i^ 
c«»i:ceived, but a snitalde attire for activr >ii\:«i' r.i lii.( I'l.i'i.iii-s w.is 
grtMtly m-edeil by them whrii in K;:,\pt. Surli :im iiUiii- ri'iiM « .i<« ly 
be fonnd 111 the color and iiiali-iiiil whirh li.i\4- ^;. ml rl.i* 'i-*\ nt ItitiMit 
caDip.iigning. 

IIIK IM.SI Ul t'l ION nl" l.i;^l'll\> \'\\\\ Mlli.N. 
'.*. I he e\pelielirr .it A li'\iti:ill i I ;iM» I :\\ - i mi1:ii;» , \Ii:, il 

ainiiiniiitioii t'ouiiil in the l!;:,\ pii.tn lu.i^ ..- i.- .v.i- >li^::<i '. ^ !^ .• 
|H-ati d at Tel I I KiMi on .i -^iinil.ii \\ l.i: ^^i- -• .!'i-. 

A'* Aia!ir> .iriiiV ii.id iii'*.i|.iM .ii« •!. .;;. !. i.j.i ■ '!', . "n * .'. .i|" 

linWiT I!j^\ pt W,i> ,!i I 111- li jluN <»i 1 i I Hi .■ : ■ . ,'. .. J ,i : ■•. ; .■< . . : ■• 

latter w etc artiii;^ ::i liii- ii.m.i- ••( i',i-l\'i. i.i '. n r^:.i- .- .: 

thorit\. then* \\\i> * * ii:ini]\ ii" Jiiit*> :\ '.• i *.,.-. ..* a^.w*-. \\^ » .vxv\ 



336 BRITISH NAVAL AND MILITABY OPERATIONS IV E( 



MILITARY BARRACKS AT ABBASIKn. 

10. The military establish men t ac Abbasieh is on tlie e 
desert to the north and east of Cuiro, and was intended Tor 
instruction. The bnrrac-ks are targe and well plannetl in a 
are provided with am[»le wash-roomie, &e. A mortar battery 
siege gnns were mounted on the desert side. Accotnmodatioi 
able here for about 5,000 wen. 

Tbe condition of tbese barracks when tbe Egyptians ni 
was flltby beyond words. Sleeping apartments and corridoi 
used as latrines, and the walls were infested with vermin. 

EGYPTIAN FIELD PIECES. 

11. The field gnns employed by the Egyptians were of tl 
9 and 8™ Kmpp steel B. L. H., and Lahitte £)•■ M. L. R. h 
bronze. Lettering tbese types A, K, and C, the following is 
of artillery captured during the campaign on tbe Ismailia 
Kebir line; 

DkU. I FUcs. .TfpaJ Mo. | 



The principal particulars of tbese guns are given In tbe ne: 




BUnSB NATAL AND UI1.ITASY OPKSATIONS IN EQTPT. 337 

1,(150 rmpumlrd tt* thtt call. Of tbe balance, the abauuce of 136 could 
* Mitisfafitirity oocuuDtod for. About 1,500 joined varion« regiments 
id I.'i.uuo mill reiRiiiDed at bome. Ab tlie first real t<-8l of the new army 
'•tetn, ibijt irsult is certainly enciournging. This new »j8t^ui ban for 
■ object the lutssfng of » large number of men anuimlly tlirougb the 
:tlvt* line, lu order that a numcrons and wcll-truinod resi'rre may be 
mnvd. It ia in this way that England puriiOBes building np a large 
■pnlitr forre ready for mobilization, tmsting to the militia and volnn- 
ten for vRwtlvesQpplement. 



14. Tfaia rt'port would bu In complete) without munlion of tin.'' ehuract«r 
if Um Briliali afllDcre ana body. 

Tbv most iodifferent obnerrer could not fail to notice on tbetr part a 
Imih* Itt be in the midat of the work, whether campaigning or fighting; 
idircrfiil manner under wen the mottt lr>'lug c!rcunistuuct-« ; and a 
Buncoduble §pirit of good- folio wshl p. Their great object wan to iwcure 
lioopiiortuuiiy of distinction and to profit by it when iiecured. If for 
kniif) in ihiH rmpect, the troubles and bardHbipa incident to their life 
'nv Ah uolhinf;. Tlie Commander' in-Chief wan supported by n »vt of 
Hcrr» who only ns]ulred [wrmiiwion to go ahead and do their duty — 
>• (•lecniion followed at once, and was marked by intelligence, zeal, 
*<I Ijcnurveranoe. 

It I* im|Mw«lble not to attribute this morale to the fact that their pro- 
^titm u altmy* by ifteelion, eaptaitu retiring at /orljf f/earB o/a^e, tnajort 
K/9rtfJlre, dx. This is not the place to discuss the general iinvction 
' how the flow of odrauccmcnt should be n>gulaled, but none the lesa 

It m duty to record the convlotion that the plan adopted in the British 
^y (while not free from abuse or gross faroritifim} pro<luc«tl, in the 
*ij of olltoprs who controlled and carried ont the operations in Bgypt, 
■Hrpi of noung, aetlre, tealouM, and capable men, of whom no tier\ne(, 
>Wvwr hi]fh it* stoDtlard, need lie ashamed. 

TBK PBACnOB OP MENTtOMTCU Jt':«inBS IN DIKTATOUBS. 

1&. To this etroonuitttuoe is due one of tbe uo«t marked featnns of 
I iht oflloial Kports, whether na\-al or military. 

ttt w rjf cfletf'i rtcord i§ baaed maMjf on th« eommtndation he roerire* 
^ Ait nperion oa oftciatltf exprtuod. The jtnictiee is an inherent 
1k% of ooTTMpondi'nce relating to deputed work, and U unsparingly 
tlMtcd Ui when the cam seems to warrant ii. The mm* of duty teeU 
]fim wt»t k «il CM agieer Aoa a right to axp*vt, bml mtttit AnaMa matmrt 
^lm0K mtUrtlf, nvii the mo$t eoiuei*tttioiu perron leiil not /ail to find a 
bjMfai *n MS frmter eiertimtM- in tlu JUtd or atore prolonged and eamml 
W* ta the cnbintt in (A« OoafU Iknt hia effmi*, (^nMSBf/U, »m t»- 
U. Mia. S9S2 



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340 BBITISH NATAL AND HIUTABT OPERATIOHS IN St 

stitate in their ateod homogmeoiu " landing parUei," oapal 
aapportiog and BostaiDed aotioa in the field at Bome little dii 
the base, and of indefinite oombination at will Into efflcieni 
gsdes. 

The details of snoh a Bcheme mnst be worked oat by a centra 
and their obserranoe be uimM apon as a better criterion th 
popnlar and {eon rttpetto) lua-iatque drett-paradt. 





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ncuuAn FiATUMS or it n. iquipiiint. 




PLA.TE 7a 



MeUUAR rCATUftlS or M M. CQUIMINT. 

BOX FOR GUN AND WAGON LIMBER 
AND HIND WAGON. 



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Thm book should bo i 
tho Library on or bororo tl 
■tamped below. 

A flno of flvo ccntH a day 
by rotaining it boyond ih 
time. 

PloaBO return promptly. 



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APR 2 / 'f^V H 
MAY 12'62H 



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