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No. 1283

:y:

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
AT LOS ANGELES

FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

•

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS

FROM INDIA.

COMPILED IN THE

INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

DIVISION OF THE CHIEF OF THE STAFF

ARMY HEAD QUARTERS

INDIA

IN SIX VOLUMES

VOL. III.
BALUCHISTAN AND THE FIRST AFGHAN WAR.

CALCUTTA
SUPERINTENDENT GOVERNMENT PRINTING, INDIA

1910

CALCUTTA

SUPERINTENDENT GOVERNMENT PRINTING, INDIA
8, HASTINGS STREET

v,3

NOTE.

A SHORT narrative of the First Afghan War has been added to
this volume, as the main portion of the British Army invading
Afghanistan during that war passed through Baluchistan, and the
histories of the two countries at that period are thus closely
connected.

956

CONTENTS,

\/ . PART I.

Baluchistan.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY AND GEOGRAPHICAL.

Introductory — Origin of name Baluchistan — Derajat — British Baluchistan — >

Baluchistan Agency Territories — Dera Ismail Khan — Dera Ghazi ".

Khan — Administration of Native States — The forward policy — Inde-
pendent tribes — Boundaries — Scenery — Physical features — Mountain
ranges — Sulimans — Toba Kakar — Khojak and other passes — Central
Brahui range — Kirthar and Pab ranges — Makran — Kharan — Chagai — Page.

Rivers — Lakes — -Coast line — Rainfall — Climate — Communications . 1 — 12

CHAPTER II.

HISTORY AND ETHNOGRAPHY.

Early history — Rise of the Brahuis — Sikhs arrive in Derajat, 1819 — Treaty
between Ranjit Singh and Shah Shuja — Tripartite Treaty, 1838 —
Edwardes in Derajat — Derajat affairs during Sikh War — Annexation
1849 — Indigenous races — Distribution — Boundaries of Pathic and
Baluch — Male population — Pathans — Kakars — Tarins — Panis — Other
Pathan tribes — Origin of Baluohis and Brahuis — Baluohis — Baluch
migration — Mani groups of Baluchis — Baluchis in Dera Ghazi and Dera
Ismail Klian — Sulimans occupied by Baluchis — Brahui invasion —
Brahuis — Sara wan — Jhalawan — Language — Education^Character of
Pathan and Baluch — Result of British occupation — Appendix A :
Showing genealogically main divisions, locality, etc., of Afghans in
Baluchistan — Appendix B : Genealogical Tree showing connection of
various Baluch Tribes ......... 13 — 32

CHAPTER III.

KALAT.

Early history — Tribal service — Formation of Kalat State — Muhabbat
Khan — Acquisition of Kachi — Nasir Khan I — Kalat constitution — ■
Kalat in Nasir Khan's time — Mehrab Khan — Early intercourse
•with Kalat — Siege of Kalat — Subsequent affairs — Unrest in Kalat —
Rebels siezo Kalat — Capture of Lieutenant Loveday — General Nott
Vol, hi.

ii CONTENTS.

occupieK Kalat — Action at Dadar — Murder of Lieutenant Loveday —
Action at Kotra — Native account of the action— Colonel Stacy, special
envoy to Kalat— Treaty with Kalat, 1841— Tribal affairs, 1840-41—
John Jacob in Upper Sind — Methods of administration — Early arrange-
ments on Sind P^ontier — John Jacob and Kalat ahairs — Treaty with
Kalat, 1854— British Agent deputed to Kalat— Death of Nasir Khan
II — Accession of Khudadad — Rebellious chief — Harris submit to the
Khan— The Khan visits Makran -Khudadad deposed and reinstated —
Sir Robert Sandeman— State of the Baluch Frontier, 1866— Harrand
raid, 1867— The Sandeman system— The Mithankot conference— Pa^e.

Frontier affairs, 1871-75 33—60

CHAPTER IV.

THE OCCUPATION OF QUETTA.

Sandeman's First Mission, 1875— Sandeman's Second Mission, 1876 —
Mastung Durbar — Treaty with Kalat, 1876 — Quetta chosen as canton-
ment for escort — Sandeman appointed Agent, Governor-General,
Baluchistan — Quetta occupied, 1877 — Fanatical outrage — Conference
with Pathan tribes, 1878 — Affair at Haramzai — Our policy and its
results — Extracts from the District Gazetteer — Acquisition of land^
Soldiers' park and club ......... 61 — 69

CHAPTER V.

EASTERN BALUCH TRIBES.

Gurchanis — Mazaris — Marris — Bugtis — Khosas — Legharis — Khetrans —
First Expedition — Billamore's hill campaign, 1839 — Kahan occupied
by Captain Brown — Destruction of Lieutenant Clark's detachment —
Nafussak Pass — Captain Brown surrenders Kahan — Bugtis' fatal raid,
1847 — Raid on the Kasmor Post in 1849 — Affairs subsequent to
annexation of the Punjab — Raid by Marris and Gurchanis on the
Asni plain, 1857— Raid on Harrand in 1867 — Conduct of the Marris
and Bugtis subsequent to 1871 ....... 71 — 101

CHAPTER VI.

KASRANIS AND B0ZDAR8.

Expedition in 1853— 1853-57— Bozdars-Expedition against the Bozdars
in 1857 — Terms of submission — Conduct of the tribes from 1861 to
lg63 — Lieutenant Grey kidnapped by Kasranis — Kasranis blockaded,
1863— Subsequent conduct of the tribes— Appendix A : Composition
of force employed against Kasranis in April 1853 — Appendix B : Com-
position of force employed against Bozdara in March 1857 . . . 103 — 134

CHAPTER VII.

THE BALUCHISTAN AGENCY.

,Sibi and Pishin occupied — Treaty of Gandamak, 1879— The BaluMiistan
Agency— Events after the Treaty of Gandamak— Murder of Captain

CONTENTS. iii

Showers — Attack on Lieutenant Fuller's Camp — Panizai affairs —
Achakzal ailairs — Early history — Arambi Glen — Major Keene's move-
able column — Unrest, 1880 — General Baker's Expedition, 1880 — Rail-
way detachment escort attacked — ^Attack on Mai — Marris defeated by
Major Douglas — Marri Expedition, 1880 — Kahan reached — Submission
of Marris — Settlement with Marris, 1881 — Shorawak affairs — Aflair
at Sayyid Baz, 1879 — Shorawak occupied, 1880 — Shorawak evacuated,
18S1 — -^^outhern Afghan Field Force evacuates Baluchistan, 1881 —
Thai Chotiali Field Force, 1878 — Chari : moimtain — Affair at Baghao —
Vitakri cantonment — Bozdar Field Force — Baluchistan subsequent
to the Second Afghan War — Quetta leased, 1882 — Tribal levies — Troops
of \ative States — Las Bela forces — Kharan forces — Khojak tunnel —
Chaman — Las Bela, 1892 — Death of Sir Robert Sandeman — Khudadad
Khan deposed — LasTJela, 1896 — Sarawan troubles, 1897 — Jafir Khan — •
Arms traffic from Persian Gulf, 1907 — Appendix A : Distribution of Page.
Quetta Division, 1881 — Appendix B : Camel Transport in Baluchistan 135 — 165

CHAPTER VIII.

SHIRANI AND USTARANA TRIBES.

Shiranis — Ustaranas — Expedition against the Shiranis in 1853 — Conduct of
Shiranis from 1853 to 1882 — Blockade of the Shiranis in 1883 — Survey
Expedition to the Takht-i-SulLman mountain in 1883 — Troops with the
expedition — Affair near Peza' springs — Appendix : Composition of
Shirani Expeditionary Force, 1853 167—187

CHAPTER IX.

ZHOB AND BORI.

Zhob district — Jogizai family — Shah Jehan — Zhob Valley Expedition,
1884 — Affair near Ali Khel — Destruction of forts and villages — Settle,
ment with Zhobwals — Survey work — Withdrawal of expedition — Medi-
cal— Transport — Bori and Zhob Affairs, 1885-90 — Loralai occupied —
Gumbaz — Submission of Shah Jahan — Dost Muhammad and Banghal
Khan — Mina Bazar — Apozai — Zhobis under British protection — The
Gumal Pass — Shiranis troublesome — Fort Sandeman and Mir Ali
Khel — Expedition against the Khidarzai Shira,nis — The Zhob Field
Force 189—210

CHAPTER X.

ZHOB AND SHIRANI AFFAIRS.

The Zhob Field Force — Affair at D"azmd Zam — Domandi and Drazand
occupied — Submission of the Khidarzais — Namar Kalan occupied —
Ascent of the Takht-i-Suliman — Termination of the operations — Zhob
affairs subsequent tu 1890 — Afghans in Zhob — Dost Muhammad and
Bengal Khan — Shiranis — Mahsud Wazir Blockade — Administration of
Zhob 211—239

iv CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XI. ^

MAKRAN.

History- -Azad Khan — Sanacman's visit, 1884 — Result of pettlement —
Second visit— Aftairs in Kej— Tiie Gichki Sirdars— The Khan visits
Maki-an — The Khan's troops are introduced into Makran — The seeds
of rebellion remain — Nazim Diwan Udho Das — Events that led to the
expedition of 1898 — Captain Bum's camp attacked — Despatch of
troops to Blakran — Loyalty of Sirdars — Arrival at Unnara — Con-
cent ration of troops at Karachi — Pasni chosen as base — The march from
Pasni— Action of Gokh-Prusht — Demolition of Turbat and Charbuk
forts — Exncdition to Bolida — Demolition of Chib and Kbushk forts —
Expedition to Mand — Difficulties of transport— The Durbar — Tlie liist
of the rebels — Return of the expedition — The Tump detachment —
Paraon to rebel Sardars — Subsequent history of Makran — Muham-
mad Umar Khan— Border depredations — Tour of the Political Agent,
1891— Irafshan and Bampusht — Sib and Dizak— The Persian Sirtip's
Army — The Sirtip — Bairam Khan — Operations in Makrau, 1901-02 — Pa^je.
Capture of Nodiz Fort— Makran Levy 241—237

PART II.

The First Afghan War.
chronological table of events.

CHAPTER XII.

AFGHANISTAN—THE COUNTRY AND PEOPLE.

Geographical position — Mountains — Rivers — Climate— Kabul — The Kabul-
Pcshawar read — The Khaibar Pass — Kabul to Ghazni — Ghazni to
Kandahar — Kandahar — Herat — The people — Duranis — Ghilzais —
Non-Afghan tribes — Nomad tribes — Early history — Invaders of India
— The Durani Empire — Western designs on India .... 271 — ^284

CHAPTER XIII.

BURNES' MISSION TO KABUL.

Burnes' mission to Kabul — Travels in Afghanistan — Despatch of the mis-
sion—Kandahar politics — Friendly disposition of the Amir — Vikte-
vitch — Amir seeks mediation of England with Ranjit Singh — Depar-
ture of British and Russian missions from Kabul — Russian ascen-
dancy— Siege of Herat — Arrival of Simonieh — British action — Russian
intrigues — Policy of the Indian Government — Macnaghten's mission
to Lahore- — The Tripartite Treaty — Military preparations — Political
arrangements 285 — 303

CONTENta. ■*

CHAPTER XIV.

OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN.

Assembling of the Army of the Indus— Lino of march — The Sind Amirs —
March of the Bengal Division — Surrender of Karachi — An'ival at
Shikarpui* — The Bolan Pass — Arrival at Quetta — Burnes' mission to
Kalat— The Shah's and Bombay columns— Flight of the Kandahar
Sirdars— Arrival at Kandahar— Herat after the siege— Dost Muham-
mad's difSculties — Capture of Ghaziii — Dost Mohammad's opposition

Arrival at Kabul — Military problems — Arrival of Prince Timur —

The ganison of Afghanistan — Departure of the troops — The outlook —
Honours for the campaign — Contemporary politics — Russian designs^
Macnaghten's anxieties — Internal affairs of Afghanistan — Expedition Pije.
against the Ghilzais — Baluchistan ....... 305 — 324

CHAPTER XV.

MILITARY OPERATIONS.

Operations round Bamian — Escape of Dost Muhammad from Bokhara — ■
Turkistan — Attack on Bajgah — Engagement with Dost Muhammad
at Bamian — Attack on Julgah — Anxiety at Kabul — Encounter with
the Dost at Parwandarrah— Surrender of Dost Muhammad — Risings of
the Duranis and Ghilzais — The British officials at Kandahar — The with-
drawal of the mission from Herat — Aktar Khan — The Ghilzais — Action
near Kalat-i-Ghilzai — Wymer's action at Assiyai — Ilmi — Akbar Khan's
fight at the Helmund — Another action with Akbar Khan — Chambers'
expedition against the Ghilzais — Expedition to Tarin and Dehrawat —
Capture of Akram Khan — Situation at Kabul — The cantonment — The
Political aspect — Attack on Monteith at Butkhak — Affair in the Kliurd-
Kabul — March to Gandamak 325 — 341

CHAPTER XVI.

THE OUTBREAK OF INSURRECTION.

Storm warnings — Murder of Burnes — Military measures — The rebellion
spreads — The outposts — Capture of Muhammad Sharif's fort — Sup-
plies— Political developments — Shelton comes into cantonments-
Affair at the Rickabashi fort — Fight on the Bahmaru Hills — The
disaster at Charikar — Macnaghten's recommendations — Second fight
on the Bahmaru Hills — Akbar Khan's return — Distress of the garri-
son— Abandonment of Muhammad Sharif's fort — News from Jalal.
abad — Discussion of the treaty — Evacuation of the Bala Hissar —
Preparations to leave Kabul — Murder of Macnaghten — The capitu-
lation 343—367

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE KETREAT FROM KABUL.

Sale's Brigade — Rear-guard action — Plan of defence — First fight at Jalal-
abad— Second engagement — News of the Kabul disaster — Orders
for evacuation — Progress of the defences — Dr. Brydon's arrival — The
retreat from Kabul .........

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE AVENGING ARMY.

Efforts at retrieval — The despatch of reinforcements — Brigadier Wild at
Peshawar — Ali Mas j id — Inadequacy of the force — The defence of
Jalalabad — Situation at Jalalabad — The earthquake — The blockade —
The forcing of the Khaibar — Arrival at Jamrud — Arrangements for the
march — Action in the Khaibar — Occupation of Ali Masjid — Arrival at
Jalalabad — Action at Jalalabad .......

Page.
36a— 383

385—402

CHAPTER XIX.

KANDAHAR.

Last days of Shah Shuja — The British prisoners — Death of Shah Shuja —
ShahShuja — Affairs at Kandahar — Massacre at Saiyidabad — Maclaren's
brigade — Concentration at Kandahar — Mutiny of Janbay — Action on
the Arghandab — Situation at Kandahar — Orders for evacuation — Action
near Kandahar — Attack on Kandahar — Wjoner's action near Kandahar
— Capitulation of Ghazni ........

403-^16

CHAPTER XX.

POLLOCK'S ADVANCE.

The question of withdrawal from Kandahar — Failure of England's column —
Co-operation of Wymor with England — Government policy — Rawlin-
son's views — Pollock at Jalalabad — Affairs at Kabul — Akbar Khan
captures the Bala Hissar — The advance from Jalalabad — Transport —
Actions in the Shinwari valley — The prisoners — Action near Gandamak

Action of the Jagdalak Pass — March of the second division — Action

ofTazin

417—435

CHAPTER XXI.

FINAL OPERATIONS.

The advance from Kandahar — Defence of Kalat-i-Ghilzai— Actions near
Kandahar — Evacuation of Kandahar — Cavalry action — Action near
Ghoyen— Action at Ghazni — Somnath gates — Action at Saiyidabad

Re-occupation of Kabul — Action at Istalif — The return march —

Effect of the victories— Action of the Haft Kotal — M'Caskili's divi-
sion—Rawlinson's review of Afghan affairs— Arrival at Ferozepore —
Appendix I : Bengal and Bombay Armies— Appendix II : Composition
of Force which returned from Kabul— Appendix III : Note on Defen-
sive Works in Jalalabad.— Chronological Table of Events .

437—466

CONTENTS. '^"

LIST OF MAPS.

General map of Baluchistan In pocket.

The Bozdar country ..••••• "

The Marri country "

The Shirani country ..••••• "

General Map of Afghanistan

■r.1 r ^i, • . . To face page 314

Plan of Ghazni 336

plan of Kabul

The General Map of Afghanistan, which is not yet ready, will be sent to
all recipients of the book on publication.

PART I.

BALUCHISTAN.

CHAPTER I.

INTBODUCTORT AND GEOROBAPHiaAL.

This volume deals with the country now known as Baluchistan

and the Suliman Hills between that

Introductory. . i , i t-> • ,

province and the Derajat.
The Gomal marks the northern boundary of the region, the
Derajat and Sind the eastern, Persia and Afghanistan lie to the
west of it, and on the south is the Arabian Sea.

The Baluchis have given their name to Baluchistan, but in
^ . . , „ , , . reality that area contains comparatively

Origin of name Baluchistan c r i mi i

. lew 01 the race. There are only 80,000
Baluchis in the country, whereas the census of the Sind and
Punjab shows 950,000 in those provinces. The Brahuis are the
most numerous people in Baluchistan, numbering 300,000 ;
next come the Pathans with 200,000, and then the Baluchis.

Derajat means the "country of camps," and was so called

by the Sikhs after the "deras" of Ismail,
Fath, and Ghazi Khan.

Military expeditions in this area have been few, and we have
principally to deal with the history of the acquisition of a territory
considerably larger than the British Isles, ^ and inhabited by several
distinct races, speaking different languages — by means other than
conquest. Certain districts were obtained by treaty, others
taken over at the request of the inhabitants, and some are leased
from the Khan of Kalat.

1 Baluchistan and the Sulimans south of the Gomal have an approximate area of
135,000 square miles.

( 1 )
Vol. III. B

2 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Baluchistan may be divided into British Baluchistan and
the Baluchistan Agency (both administered by the Agent to the
Go vernor- General) .

British Baluchistan includes the territory ceded by the treaty
T. -f V, -D 1 I,- t of Gandamak in 1879, and formally

British Baluchistan. _ •'

declared part of British India in 1887.
It comprises Sibi, Duki, Pishin, Shorarud, and Chaman— an area
of 9,403 square miles. Also the "Administered Areas" of Thai,
Chagai, and Loralai (except Duki)— an area of 36,401 square
miles, and the territories leased from the Khan of Kalat, including
Quetta, the Bolan, Nushki, and Nasirabad. From these territories
the British authorities collect revenue.

The Baluchistan Agency includes the Native States of Kalat
„ , , and Las Bela — 79,382 square miles —

Baluchistan Agency Terri- , ,, cc ,t^ ■^ -, l 5? e .-, -n/r

tories. and the Tribal Area of the Mams,

Bugtis, and tribes east of the railway —
an area of 7,129 square miles.

The administration of the Suliman Hill country east of

Baluchistan is in the hands of the Punjab

Dera Ismail Khan. t xt ■ i itt -n , ■ t. • r-i

and JNorth-West rrontier Province Gov-
ernments. The Dera Ismail Khan district of the latter includes the
semi-independent area of the Shiranis, whose affairs are adminis-
tered by the Kulachi sub- division of the district.

The hill country south of this is included in the Dera Ghazi

Khan district of the Punjab, and the

Dera Gha.i Khau. ^^.^^^ ^g^.^^ ^^^ .^ ^j^^ ^^^^^ ^^ ^^^

Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan.

As regards Native States, Kalat is ^ now largely controlled by
Administration of Native the Political Agent, whose services are
States. Igj^t \)y the British Government. A native

official is lent to assist in the affairs of the Jhalawan country ; he
resides at Khuzdar. Makran is under the control of a Kalat
official, known as the Nazim. The rest of the country is divided
into niabats, administered by Kalat officials. Las Bela and Kharan
have become practically independent of the Khan and are not
subject to his interference. The chiefs of these States deal direct
with the Political Agent, Kalat, whose headquarters are at Mastung.

1 1907.

INTRODUCTORY AND GEOGRAPHICAL. 3

There was, until recently, a special political Agent for Southern
Baluchistan and Las Bela. Now, however, the direct British,
influence in the State is exercised by the Wazir, an official appointed
with the joint approval of the British authorities and the Jam
of Las Bela.

The conquest of Sind in 1843 and annexation of the Punjab in
1849 advanced our North- West Frontier
across the Indus to the hills bordering
Afghanistan and Kalat. In this connection one feature is
distinctly noticeable. Prior to , the Tripartite Treaty of 1838
the district of Harrand Dajal — including the Gurchanis,
Mazaris, and certain Harris — was claimed by the Khan of Kalat
By that treaty Britain adjudicated this territory to the Sikhs.

Ranjit Singh, however, never established

Independent tribes. ,. ,, ., ., i-,„,,

nis authority over it, and in 1849
we renounced our claim, and fixed our border so as to exclude
those tribes. They thus became independent, owning allegiance
neither to Sind, the Punjab, nor Kalat.

North of Sibi and Peshin the Pathan tribes of Bori and Zhob
were also to all intents and purposes independent, and the Baluch
tribes of the Suliman were entirely so. It will be shown in this
volume how this independent territory, as well as Kalat and
•certain Afghan districts, have gradually come under British
control, the outcome of what is known as the " Forward Policy."

Lord Roberts explained in his memorable speech in 1898 that
this ' ' Forward Policy' ' is the policy of endeavouring to extend
our influence over, and establish law and order in, that part of
the Border where anarchy, murder, and robbery up to the present
time have reigned supreme. Some forty years ago the "jDolicy of
non-interference" with the tribes, so long as they did not trouble
us, may have been wise and prudent — though selfish, and not alto-
gether worthy of a great civilising Power. During that time
circumstances have completelyjChanged, and what was wise and pru-
dent then is most unwise and imprudentnow. Atthattime Russia's
nearest outpost was one thousand miles away ; her presence in Asia
was unheeded by, if not unknown to, the people of India ; and we
had no powerful reason for anxiety as to whether the two hundred
thousand warriors on our Border would fight for us or against us.

4 FROyTIES AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

To-day Russia is our near neighbour ; her every movement
is watched with the keenest interest from Peshawar to Cape
Comorin ; and the chance of her being able to attack us is discussed
in every bazar in India.

For the defence of India it is evident that we must have com-
mand of the most important of the roads which run through the
mountains on our frontier, and, to use a favourite expression of
the Duke of Wellington, " we must be able to see the other side of
the hill." Unless we know for certain what is going on there,
it will be impossible to prevent an enemy from making use of the
passes, and debouching on the plains of India when and where he
pleases. Roads and railways cannot be made through a hostile
country, and we should do all in our power to enter into closer rela-
tions with the tribes through whose lands the roads and railways
would have to run.

In support of this statement Lord Roberts says : —
"Throughout the unusual frontier excitement of 1897 not a
shot was fired in Baluchistan, which is under our control, and where
our boundary has become practically coterminous with Afghanistan.

I trust you will not be persuaded to believe that

the tribesmen — in the event of a foreign invasion — would fight for
us, if left to themselves.

IVliy should they? They would have nothing to fear from us,,
and nothing to gain by siding with us, for we should have nothing
to offer them m return. On the contrary, they would probably be
induced to fight against us by the prestige which an advancing
army always carries with it, and by promises — which would be
freely given — that they should share in the plunder of the riches
of India."

The eastern boundaries of this area have been arrived at by
decisions of the Government of India
for administrative purposes, and the reader
isreferredto the map. In 1887itwasdecidedthat the Baluch tribes
resident in the hills, who had sections of the tribe in the Derajat,
should be administered by the Punjab Government. The Bozdars,
although entirely resident in the hills, were also placed under Punjab
administration, as their dealings were closer with the Derajat than
with the Pathan tribes on their western border. All the other Baluch
tribes of Baluchistan were included in the Baluchistan Agency.

INTRODUCTORY AND GEOGRAPHICAL. 5

With regard to other tribes on this border the Khetrans were included
in Baluchistan, and the Shiranis were divided ; the Bargha or High-
land Shiranis going to Baluchistan ; the Largha or Lowland Shiranis
remaining under the jurisdiction of the Punjab.

The northern and western boundaries, however, were not so
easily determined. The northern boimdary gradually advanced
from 1843, when it was that of Upper Sind, until 1881, when it was
the northern limits of Pishin. By the acquisition of Zhob, it be-
came coterminous with Afghanistan, and necessitated the Baluch-
Afghan Boundary Commission of 1895-96, when Captain McMahou^
brought to a successful conclusion the demircation of the Durand
Line from the Gomal to Koh-i-Malik-Siah.

Koh-i-Malik-Siah is^the so-called tri-junction of British India,
Afghanistan, and Persia. Southwards from this point to Kuhak
a boundary line between Baluchistan and Persia was proposed by
Sir Thomas Holdich in 1898, in consultation with a Persian Com-
missioner, but 'has not yet been demarcated. South of Kuhak to
Gwattar Bay the Perso-Baluch boundary was settled by the Gold-
smid Mission in 1871.

The country generally is barren, hill and vale alternating with
stony plain. Thin lines of cultivation along
. Leaery. ^^^ water-courses, and occasional tree-

clad mountains alone relieve the monotony of this inhospitable
land, which Sir Charles Napier described as "the place where God
threw the rubbish when he made the world." There are, however,
■within the mountains narrow glens whose rippling water-courses
are fringed in early summer by the brilliant green of carefully ter-
raced fields. Rows of willows, with festoons of vines, border the
clear water, and good crops of various kinds are raised.

The whole country is, as a rule, mountainous. From the west

the mountains run in an easterly direction,

Physical features. gradually curving northwards, and, on

approaching Sind, north and south.

The country slopes gradually from the Arabian Sea and Kharan
to the elevated plateau which extends from Kalat to Hindubagh.^
In this plateau are valleys varying in elevation from 4,500 to 7,000
feet, and mountains which reach 11,000 feet. From this tableland

1 Now (1907) Sir Henry McMahon, Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan.

2 Known locally as Khurasan.

6 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

the hills have again an eastern strike towards Zhob, and then diverge
into two branches running north and south, descending southwards
to Sibi and the Punjab Plains, and rising northwards to the Takht-i-
Suliman.

There are, further, two level strips o country — as Bela and
Kachi. These are both triangular in form, their apexes northwards
bounded east and west by rugged hills. The people of each of these
level strips differ in language from their highland neighbours and
— if not actually of a different race — are a mongrel people.

The Suliman range extends from the Gomal to the Indus south
Mountain Ranges. Suli- of Dera Ghazi Khan. It separates Baluch-
mans. istan from the Punjab. In the north it

attains a height of 11,000 feet, and slopes gradually imtil it is lost
in the plains in the south. In the south vegetation is scarce ; the
higher slopes on the northern hills are covered with pines ; in the
central portion the wild olive abounds.

The narrow gorges which cross the range at right angles form
its most remarkable feature. These clefts form the roadways between
Baluchistan and the Punjab. The principal routes are through
the Ghat, Zao, Chuhaikhel Dhana, Sakhi Sarwar, and Chachar passes.

There are two "hill stations" in the Sulimans — Shinghar,
thirty miles north-west of Fort Sandeman, and Fort Munro, distant
sixty miles from Dera Ghazi Khan.

The Toba Kakar range in Zhob and Pishin forms the boimdary

between Baluchistan and Afghanistan,.
Toba Kakar. ^^^ -^ ^^^ watershed between the Indus

and Helmand basins. This range is an offshoot of the Safed Koh,
and rises in three parallel ridges from the Gomal 6,000 feet in a.
south-westerly direction to the peaks of Sakir (10,000), Kand
(10,500), and Nigand (9,500) in the centre. Thence it descends
westwards to Chaman where it takes a sharp turn southwards and
continues as the Khwaja Amran to opposite Shorawak, where it is
known as the Sarlat Range. Eventually after a course of 300 miles
it merges into the centre Makran Range.

The country between the Gomal and Kand Peak, drained by
theJKundar and Zhob rivers, is known as Kakar Khorasan. West
of the Kand Peak is the Toba Plateau. The winter in these wind-
swept uplands is most severe, and they are usually deserted dur-
ing that season. Wood and cultivation are scarce. The country

■ " n-TRODVCTORY AND OEOORAPHICAL. 7

is covered with a low shrub called southernwood, which can be used
for fuelfand camel-grazing for the hill camel. The Sind camels,
it was found in the Afghan Wars, could not digest the herbage of
this country.

Several passes cross the Khwaja Amran from Baluchistan to
Afghanistan. The principal are the Bogra,

Khoiak and other Passes. ^^, . , -r^ , • -, r^ ^ t>

Khojak, Roghani, and Gwazha rasses.
The Khojak Pass is now a high road, and the Gwazha is practicable
for all arms, or could be quickly made so-l

The Central Brahui Range occupies the whole of the coimtry

between the Pishin, Lora, and Zhob rivers

ntra Brahui Range. ^^ ^^^ north and the Mula on the south.

Between the Mula and Quetta the hills run north and south
North of Quetta the strike changes to east and south-east to meet
the Sulimans. The highest peaks in this range are Zarghun (11,738
feet), Takatu (11,375 feet) and Chiltan, all near Quetta— and
Khalifat (11,440 feet) at the north-east end of the range near
Ziarat (8,400 feet) the summer head- quarters of the Baluchistan
Agency.

I The North-Western Railway traverses the Bolan and Harnai
Passes, the Chaman extension following the Pishin Valley from
Bostan. In the south, the Mula Pass connects Baluchistan and
Makran with Sind. This range in parts is comparatively well
clothed with vegetation, especially the Ziarat, Zarghun, and Harboi
mountains.

At its southern extremity the Central Brahui Range breaks
up and is continued southwards by the

Kirthar and Pab Ranges. ^.^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^^^^^^

A branch known as the Garr Hills leads off to the west and then

turns southwards, dividing Jhalawan from Kharan and Makran.

These mountains are all more or less barren.

From this short description of the mountain system of Balu-

cliistan, it is apparent that except in the southern Makran route
an invasion of India by land south of the Gumal would have to
traverse a gigantic gridiron of parallel mountain ranges, at right
angles to the advance, and parallel to the Indian Frontier. These
ranges, combined with the barren nature of the country, constitute
a series of obstacles of great difficulty.

8 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Makran, the area of which is about 26,500 square miles, lies
between the sea and the Siahan moun-
tain range. East of it is Las Bela, and
Persia lies to the west. Most of the country is mountainous. The
mountains run east and west in three parallel ranges — the Coast,
Central, and Siahan ranges. These mountains gradually increase
in height from the sea coast until, in the Siahan range, an elevation
of 7,000 feet is reached. Within these hills lie the cultivated
valleys and areas of Kulanch, Dasht, Nigwar, Kej, and Panjgur.
The Kej valley — well watered and fertile — forms a natural high-
way between India and Persia.

North of the Siahan Mountain Range extends the plain country
of Kharan, mostly desert, but containing
some cultivated areas at the foot of the
hills. The country, the area of which is 14,200 square miles, slopes
from an elevation of 2,500 feet on the east, where it touches on
Jhalawan, to 1,600 feet on the west or Persian frontier. It is
roughly quadrilateral in shape, and is separated from Chagai by
the Ras Koh Hills. The Ras Koh Range (highest peak 10,000 feet)
is 140 miles in length and is practically barren. Ibex abound
on it. The winter in Kharan is cold, the heat in summer great during
the day time. The nights, even in July and August, are cool.
Rain falls in small quantities during January and February.
Good grazing is often to be had in the spring.

North of Kharan across the Ras Koh Hills lies the Chagai Divi-
sion of the Baluchistan Agency. In this
district is included the country known
as Western Sinjrani, a tract of pebbly plains and sand hills which
is probably the most uninviting region in Baluchistan. The area
of the district is roughly 16,500 square miles and the estimated
population some 11,000. The people live an entirely pastoral
existence. The Sistan Trade Route runs through this district
from railhead at Nushki to Koh-i-Malik-Siah, where the British,
Afghan, and Persian boundaries meet.

The districts of Zhob, Bori, Sibi, and Pishin are dealt with more
fully in the chapters relating to the expeditions in those regions.
There are no large rivers in this country, carrying a perma-
nent flow of water. As a rule the beds
contain, at most, a shallow stream. After

INTRODUCTORY AND GEOGRAPHICAL. 9

leavy rains the rivers become raging torrents which subside as
quickly as they rise. The largest river in the country is the
Hingal in Makran. The north-eastern part of Baluchistan is
drained by the Zhob and Gomal on the east, and Pishin and Lora
on the west. Further south the Nari receives the drainage of the
Loralai and Sibi districts, and passes through Kachi.

The Jhalawan country is drained by the Mulla, Hub, and
Purali.

In Makran the Dasht river carries off the drainage to the south
and the Rukh Shan, which joins the Mashkel, that to the north.^

The water of all these rivers except in times of heavy flood is
absorbed in irrigation.

There are no lakes of importance. The Ha mun-i -Mashkel
and Hamun-i-Lora only fill after heavy
floods, and the same may be said of the
salt marshes or "Kaps" in Makran.

The coast line of Baluchistan is 472 miles in length. The

whole coast is barren, presenting a suc-
Coast Line. . --.t i- •. 1.-1

cession of and clay plams intersected
.with water-courses. The chief ports are Sonmiani, Pasni, and
Gwadar — all mere roadsteads where large ships must lie a long
way from the shore.

Baluchistan and the Sulimans lie outside the monsoon area,
and the rainfall is very variable and
scanty. Shahrig, which has the largest
rainfall, only boasts llf inches per annum. In the highlands the
greatest rainfall (including snow) is in winter, derived from the
shallow storms advancing from the Persian plateau.^ The plains
and lower hills, including Zhob, receive most of their rain in the
summer, July being the wettest month.

The climate in Baluchistan is one of extremes. In Makran,
„. , the Arabian Sea Coast, and Kachi the

Climate. . . ' i -i • j-i,

fiercest heat is experienced ; while m the
Kalat and Pishin highland districts the winters are most severe.
The Zhob and eastern border enjoy a somewhat more equable
climate. In the Quetta, Pishin, Kalat, and Bolan districts rain

* Universal Gazetteer, 1903.

2 The approach of these storms can be so well timed that 48 hours' notice of a
impending snowfall is generally received in Quetta.

10 mOXTIEU AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

and snow may be expected from December to March. The sum-
mer months throughout the whole country are practically dry.
Curiously enough, a larger rainfall is experienced in the summer
months in the Harnai and Zhob valleys than in the winter — the
exact opposite to the conditions prevalent in all other parts of
the province.

Quetta had formerly a bad reputation as regards climate »
This, however, was chiefly due to the fact that the troops were
camped on the low ground, now the civil lines, which was then
undrained. Since the formation of the cantonment the health:
of the station has steadily improved, and most people find the
climate excellent. Chills, however, are very common in a climate-
where the variation in temperature during twenty-four hours is so-
great — in spring and autumn as much as 70°.

This liability to chill is particularly trying to those who arrive
in Quetta already suffering from malaria, as exemplified in the-
following instance : — ■

A certain regiment had suffered severely from malarial fever
in the Ghorpari Barracks at Poona in 1879. They had benefited
greatly by a short stay in Hyderabad, Sind, after which they were
marched through the Bolan at the hottest time of the year. In the
pass they lost sixteen men from sunstroke, but were otherwise-
healthy until they reached Gulistan. Here the nights were very cold
compared to the days, the water was not good, and the clothing
was insufiicient for constitutions saturated with malaria. Diarrhoea,
broke out in the regiment, which continued its march to Southern
Afghanistan and was encamped in the Arghandab Valley.
The hardships of service and climate told on the men, already
enfeebled. Diarrhoea merged into dysentery, and between the 1st
October and 15th December forty-nine men were carried off, fifty
invalided to India, and the sick report showed 138 men in hospital
out of a total of 556.

As against this, the " bill of health " was excellent in the march
down the Bolan in 1881 when the troops had become inured to-
the climate and had learnt to avoid chills.

A glance at the communications in Baluchistan will be-
interesting, and make it easier to under-

Communications. ° . .n ,,

stand the geography oi the region. All the-
roads follow the watered and cultivated valleys as far as possible. *■

INTRODUCTORY AND OEOORAPHIOAL. 11

Of the railway little need be said. The map makes the route-
clear. The Maskaf-Bolan section from Sibi to Quetta follows
those passes on a high level above the river beds ; the ruling gradient
between Mach and the upper end of the Bolan is 1 in 25 — one oi
the steepest in the world. At Spezand the new line to Nushki
branches off to the south. Beyond Quetta — at Bostan — the
alternative route from Sibi by the Harnai Valley is met ; it is
not quite so steep a gradient as the Bolan route. From Bostan the
railway runs through the Pishin Valley to Chaman, piercing the
Khojak Range by a tunnel 2| miles long. The line from Killa
Abdulla to Chaman is double. After leaving the tunnel at Spinwana
the railway descends some 2,000 feet into the Kunchai plain,,
where the terminus at Chaman is on level ground.

The main roads are from Sibi to Quetta via the "Bolan — a
metalled cart road 95f miles long, with a rise from 495 feet to
5,500 feet. Thence to Chaman, over the Khojak Pass, is a similarly
good cart road 79 miles long : from it, at Yarn Karez and Saranan
metalled roads lead to Pishin. From Pishin the great frontier
road runs to Dera Ghazi Khan, 294 miles.

The other main roads are from Quetta via Gandak, Harnai, and
Loralai to Fort Sandeman : this is a metalled road from Harnai
to Fort Sandeman. From Pishin to Sibi there is a road in rear of
Takatu mountain by the Harnai Pass, fit for pack animals.
A good unmetalled road has been recently constructed from Fort
Sandeman to Dera Ismail Khan, 115 miles through the Chuhar
Khel Dhana via Draban.

Southwards from Quetta the only metalled road is that to
Kalat, 88 miles. From Kalat caravan routes lead to Sind, Makran,
and Kharan.

The Sistan trade route starts at Nushki and traverses the
practically desert country of Chagai, 376 miles, to Robat on the
frontier at Koh-i-Malik-Siah, Wells have been dug along the entire
route. It is essentially a caravan road, the camel being the sole
means of transport in the district.

The main highways running through Makran parallel to the
sea coast are clearly shown in the map. They are camel tracks
and the marches from water to water are usually long.

In concluding tliis chapter on geography it may be well to
repeat that the country is generally one of sultry deserts, barren.

12 FMONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

plains, or rugged mountains. Armies can only move along certain
well defined routes. Even in one of the best of these, the Sakhi
Sarwar Pass, the Emperor Babar found that his cavaby were
starving and was obliged to turn off from Bori to Ghazni.

CHAPTER II.

HISTORY AND ETHN0GRAF3Y,

All the early Western invasions of India, ^ prior to that of
Early History, 327 B. c. Alexander, are believed to have come

thiough Makran. The latter's return
from India led him through the same country, while a second
division under Crateros traversed the Mula Pass, and probably sent
a detachment through Quetta and Peshin. Nearchus sailed from
Tatta with the fleet and, passing Karachi and Sonmiani, followed
the coast line up the Persian Gulf. The accounts of the early
historians of Alexander's retreat point to the fact that the geo-
graphy and climatic conditions of the country traversed by his
armies, and the coast line followed by his fleet have undergone little
if any change, and Colonel Holdich deduces - the fact that the Arabs
were masters of the country in those days, and many of the descrip-
tions of the people and their habits tally with the conditions found
to-day.

In 635 A.D. Eai Chach, the Hindu ruler of Sind, had conquered
Makran, and appears to have extended his conquests northwards
towards the Helmund. His rule, however, was short, as Omar the
first Arab invader after the Hijra, reached Makran in 643 A.D.

It is unnecessary to describe the various invasions in detail
but that of Muhammad Kasim, sixth Khalif, is interesting from a
military point of view.

In 712 A.D. he passed through Makran from end to end with

,j2 ^ fo^^^ of 6' 000 cavalry, 6,000 camel

sowars, 3,000 infantry, and a large train. ^

Thenceforward for several centuries Makran remained a great
commercial highway. Ruins of large towns along its main route

1(1) Semiramis, 23r(i century B. C. (2) Sesostris. (3) Cyrus, 538 B.C. (4) Darius.

2 " Notes on Makran.'' — Holdich.

3 His siege train for the capture of Naringkot (modern Hyderabad), however^ came
round to the Indus by sea.

( 13 )

14 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

testify to its having been the connecting passage between east and
west, the " open sesame of India." These cities were well known
throughout the Arabic world, and quoted by Arabian writers.

In the early part of the 11th century Baluchistan fell into the
hands of the Ghaznivids from whom it passed to the Ghoiids. lu
1219 we find it included in the dominion of Sultan Muhammad
Khan of Khwarizm (Khiva).

In 1223 came Chengiz Khan's Mongol hordes, whose raids have
burned deep into the memory of Baluchistan. From Makran to
the Gomal the Mongol (locally known as Mughal), and his atrocities
are still a byeword in every household .

Henceforward the history of Baluchistan is intimately con-
•nected with Kandahar, whose rulers generally exercised suzerainty
over the whole of Baluchistan. The fourteenth and fifteenth cen-
turies are most important in Baluch history. During this period
the Baluchis'spread over Kalat and Kachi into the Punjab, and the
wars between Mir Chakar Rind and Gwahram Lashari, celebrated
in Baluch folklore, took place.

In 1485 A.D. the Arghuns from Kandahar invaded Kachi hj
way of the Bolan Pass.

About this same time the Brahuis were gaining power, and es-
tablished themselves in the neighbour-
Rise of the Brahuis. . ^ ,

hood 01 Kalat.
From 1556 to 1595 the country was under the Safavid dynasty,
after which it fell into the hands of the Mughal Emperors of Delhi.
In 1638 the Persians once more asserted their authority over Balu-
chistan.

In 1708 the Ghilzai'power became paramount in Baluchistan,

followed in turn by that of Nadir Shah and Ahmed Shah Durani.

Thenceforward until 1879 the north-eastern portion of the

■ country remained under the actual or nominal suzerainty of the

Sadozais and Barakzais, the south-western portion being consoli-

'dated into the Kalat confederacy.

In 1819 Ranjit Singh invaded the Derajat, and forced the
Afghan Governor to evacuate Dera Ghazi

Sikhs arrive in Derajat, 1819. _^,

Ivnan.
In 1827 the Nawab of Bhawalpur, on behalf of the Sikhs, from
•whom he farmed the Dera Ghazi Khan district, seized the Harrand
Dajal territory from the Khan of Kalat.

HISTORY AND ETHNOGRAPHY. 15

General Ventura, in Sikla employ, succeeded the Nawab of
Bhawalpur as Governor of the Derajat in 1830. He was succeed-
ed in 1832 by the able Diwan Sawan Mai. who held office until 1844.
During the period of the Sikh occupation the Baluch border tribes
■were perpetually in revolt. Mazaris, Gurchanis, Khetrans, and
Bozdars all gave trouble . The Sikh scheme was to play one tribe
■off against another. They were not successful, however. The
country was entirely lawless, and the Sikhs lived shut up in forts.
Revenue was only collected with the aid of a large force, or not
at all.

In 1833 Shah Shuja, the ex-monarch of Kabul, who was living

as a British pensioner at Ludhiana, re-
Treaty between Ranjit ^qI^^^ to make another effort to recover

Smgh and Shan Shuja.

his kingdom. In order to obtain the as-
sistance of Ranjit Singh, he made a treaty with him in 1834 by
which, in return for active assistance, he renounced all claim to
the countries bordeiing on the Indus. Ranjit Singh thus gained
the Dera Ismail and Dera Ghazi districts, provided Shah Shuja
proved successful. The Shah's expedition was a failure, and he
fled to Kalat for refuge. Here he was well treated by Mehrab Khan,
and given safe conduct to the Indus, whence he again returned
to his asylum in Ludhiana.

In 1838, however, the British Government, suspicious of the
intentions of the Russian and Persian Governments, made Shah
•Shuja their tool for establishing British influence in Kabul.

In order to obtain the friendship of the Sikhs in their efforts
„. ,., _ , ,„„„ *o place Shah Shuja on the throne of

Tripartite Treaty, 1838. tt ^ ^ ^ i

Kabul, the British Government in 1838,
at Lahore, ratified the treaty of 1834 between the Shah and the
Maharajah.

By this treaty Shah Shuja renounced his claim to all jurisdic-
tion over the province of Harrand Dajal, at that time still nomi-
nally in the Kalat Khanate.

The British Government also made him renounce all rights to
tribute from Sind, which was to become a sovereign state of the
Sind Mirs, allowing him, however, certain arreas. This paved the
way for the permanent occupation of Sind, shortly afterwards, by
■Sir Charles Napier.

16 FHONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Soon after Ranjit Singh's death in 1839. no one having been-
found fit to fill the place of that astute ruler, the whole of this part
of the country fell into a state of anarchy. The Kalat Sardars,
instigated, it is said, by the Khan, raided Harrand Dajal in
retaliation for the conduct of the Sikh Government, and in their
endeavour to recover the stolen province, all became anarchy and
confusion throughout the Dera Ghazi Khan district. During the
First Afghan War certain portions of Kalat territory and Pishin
were occupied by the British troops in charge of the line of com-
munications. After the conquest of Sind in 1843 the British
frontier became coterminous with Kalat territory, bordering the
Baluch tribe -i on the north and the Brahuis proper on the west.

In 1844 Diwan Sawan Mai was succeeded by his son JMulraj,
whose defiance of Sikh authority caused the outbreak at Multan.

Sir Herbert Edwardes was then in the Upper Derajat, his

services having been lent to the Sikh

Edwardes in Derajat. -pi -u -j-l, ■ 2. a i.- ii.i

Durbar with a view to ettecting a settle-
ment in that district. In 1848 came the news of Mulraj's re-
bellion, and the murder of Anderson and Vans Agnew at Mul-
tan. The British Resident in Lahore ordered Edwardes to
seize the Upper Derajat and endeavour to win over the Lower.
Having collected a large force from his own Multanis, and the

Derajat Affairs during Sikh tribes, Baluch and Pathan, Edwardes
War. marched south. He first advanced on

the Sikh fort at Mangrotha, which surrendered. He then moved
towards Dera Ghazi Khan which, however, had already fallen to
Van Cortland (an officer in the Sikh service) who had also collected
some Baluch levies. Harrand, the only remaining Sikh fortress,
also fell. The united forces of Edwardes and Van Cortland then
crossed th<^ Indus, defeated Mulraj at Kaneri and Saddozam, and
proceeded to aid General Whish in the reduction of Multan.

On the annexation of the Punjab in 1849 the Derajat was oc-
cupied, and two thousand of Edwardes' Irregulais were taken into
the service of the Government as Border Police. The faithful
sardars received pensions.

Britain thus became in 1849 heir to a district where the frontier

was a haphazard one, roughly defined by

the Sikhs but a few years before. The

contiguous tribes had, in most cases, sections living within the-

HISTORY AND ETHNOGRAPHY. 17

British Border. They were as follows, starting from the
north : —

[a) Pathan Tribes.

1. Shiranis — Entirely outside the Border.

2. Ustaranis — Partly within the Border.
Various Trans-Border Tribes.

(b) Baluch Tribes.

3. Kasranis — Partly within the Border.

4. Bozdars — Entirely outside the Border.

5. Khosas — Partly inside the Border.

6. Legharis — Partly inside the Border.

7. Gutchanis — Partly inside the Border.

8. Mazaris — Partly inside the Border.

Besides these, there were the Harris, Bugtis, and Khetrans,
the two former Baluch, the latter a mixed tribe, who, though not
exactly on the frontier, raided into our territory and were import-
ant factors in both Sind and Punjab frontier affairs.

In 1879 the Second Afghan War took place, when certain pro-
vinces of Baluchistan were acquired by Great Britain.

Between 1880 and 1890 pract'cal British influence was estab-
lished over the whole region treated of in this volume.

The principal indigenous tribes in this region are the Pathans,
r ^. Baluchis, and Brahuis. Besides these,

Inaigenous races.

there are a few scattered elements such
as the Khetrans ; the Jats, cultivators of the plains ; and
Dehwars, cultivators of the highlands.

The Pathans occupy the north-eastern portion of the country,
^ all of which is directly administered by

Distribution. , -r. i i • .

the Baluchistan Agency.
To the south of them, in the warmer parts of the province, are
the Baluchis of the Marri, Bugti, Duinki, Umrani, and Kaheri
countries, and the Kachi plain. In the highlands we have the
Brahuis, stretching through Chagai on the north, to meet the
Baluchis of Western Sinjrani. South and westwards, the Brahui
marches with the Las Bela State, and the Baluchis of Makran.
The small piece of Kachi occupied by the Brahuis is the only non-
mountainous part of their country : it was obtained from the

Vol. m. g

FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Boundaries of Pathan and
Baluch.

Kalhora dynasty of Sind in 1740 in compensation for the death of
the Khan of Kalat in a battle with the Sindians.^

In the Sulimans are the Baluch tribes extending north as far
as Vihoa, after which Pathan tribes are met with.

As a rough guide, a line drawn from Vihoa to Thai Chotiali,

thence to Sibi, and prolonged via Quetta
to the Gwazha Pass may be taken to
mark the northern boundary of the
Baluch (and Brahui). North of that line are the Pathans.

The male population of the various tribes and districts will

now be given. It is noteworthy that
throughout this country the female popu-
lation is usually from four to six per cent, less than the male — as is
usually the case in hilly and barren countries. Males capable of
bearing arms may generally be taken as one-fifth of the male popu-
lation.

Male population.

District or trib.e

Male popula-
tion.

Pathans 78 per cent.

Quetta and Fishin

....

68,000

Brahv

lis 8 per cent.

Loralai

38,000

Zhob

39,000

Chagai

11,000

Bolan

15,000

Sibi

40,000

Marris

11,000

Bugtis

10,000

Kalat — Sarawan

. 36,000

■J

Jhalawan

. 115,000

Kachi

. 34,000

> 308,000

Makran

. 35,000

Kharan

. 88,000

)

Las Bela

29,000

1 Baluchistan, total

569,000

Punjab administered

area of the Sulimans (estimated)

8,000

Grand totf

I'l '.'.

577,000
males.

1 The great Nadir Shah was the adjudicator of this compensation.

BiSTORy AND ETHNOOSAFBi. 19

A peculiar interest attaches to the Pathans in this area in that
the Zhob and Suliman district is by com-
mon Afghan tradition considered to be the
cradle of their race. Thence they are supposed by some authorities
to have spread north as far as Dir and Swat, and southwards and
westwards to Sibi, Pishin, Shorawak, and Kandahar. As Baluchis-
tan is not really named after the majority of its inhabitants, so Af-
ghanistan contains not more than half of the Afghan race, the re-
mainder, under the name of Pathan, reside on the Indian side of
the Durand line.

The most numerous and important indigenous Pathan tribes
in Baluchistan are the Kakars (105,000), Tarins (37,000), Panis
(20,000), and Shiranis (7,500).

Afghan genealogies, whatever be their value, all commence with
Qais Abdur Rashid, alleged to be the thirty-seventh in descent
from Malik Talut (King Saul). His home was, according to many
traditions, in the tract immediately to the west of the Takht-i-
Suliman, known to the Afghans as Khurasan, and to us as Kakar
Khurasan. From the three sons of Qais Abdur Rashid, Ghur-
ghusht, Sara ban, and Baitan, sprang the various Pathan tribes.^
The Kakars, who number over 100,000 souls, are to be found

principally in the Zhob, Quetta-Pishin,
and Loralai districts. By far the most
important section is the Sanzar Khel who number 64,000 persons.
Next in importance come the Snatia, Targhara, and Sargar sections.
The most important group of the Sanzar Khel is the Jogizai, the
most influential family in Zhob. The majority of the Snatias are
to be found in Pishin. A section of them hold the Hanna valley
near Quetta.

The Tarins, who number 37,000 souls, are second only to the
Kakars in numerical strength, and have
acquired further importance from their
connection with the rulers of Afghanistan — the Sadozais and Barak-
zais. More than half of the Tarins belong to the Bor Tarin or Abdal
section, almost the whole of whom again are Achakzais. The other
two sections are known as Spin Tarin and Tor Tarin.'^

1 Vide appendix A. to this chapter.

2 The Tarins are descended from three brothers— Bor Tarin, Tor Tarin, and
Spin Tarin. Bor Tarin was also known as Abdul by which name that seclion of the
Tarin is often known.

^0 rSONTIER AND OVEBSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The Achakzais will be dealt with fully in Chapter VII.

The Spin Tarins have migrated from Pishin, and live almost
entirely in the Shahrig and Duki Tahsils.

The Tor Tarins, who are twice as numerous as the Spin Tarins,
are almost equally distributed in the districts of Quetta-Pishin
and Loralai.

Although ethnically connected, the three sections of the Tarins
might be classed as separate tribes. They have no dealings with
one another.

Of the twenty thousand Panis resident in Baluchistan some

four thousand are to be found in the Sibi
and Loralai districts, the remainder in
Zhob. Included in the Panis are the Musa Khel who inhabit the
Tahsil of that name in Zhob.

The Mando Khel section of the Panis reside in the neighbour-
hood of Fort Sandeman, and should really be classed as Kakars.

The Panis of Sibi include the important sections of Barozais
and Khajaks. The former administered Sibi on behalf of the
Afghans during their rule.

There is no cohesion between the Musa Khels, Panis of Sibi,
and Panis of Zhob.

„^, „ , .^ The other Pathan tribes in this area are

Other Pathan tribes.

of no great miportance.
Regarding them, the reader is referred to the genealogical
table of Pathans — Appendix A to this chapter.

The Shiranis and Ustaranas are treated of in Chapter VIII.

The origin of the Baluchis and Brahuis is a much vexed ques-

Origin of Baiuch's and tion. Both claim an Axab Origin and to

Brahuis. have come from Aleppo in Northern

Arabia. A Persian origin is, however, most commonly assigned to

the Baluch race, and a Turkish or Kurdish origin to the Brahuis.

The Makran Baluch has very probably an Arab strain, and
there is every reason to believe that intercourse between the coast
of that country and Arabia existed many centuries before the Arab
invasion of Sind, which traversed Makran in 643 A.D,

For a discussion of the theories regarding the origin of these
races the reader is referred to the " Census of India," 1901 (Balu-
chistan), the Imperial Gazetteer, 1905, and " The Baluch Eace

» 1

BISTORT AND ETHNOORAPHY. 21

by Dames. Both races are now thorougUy mixed, and language
cannot be taken as proof of origin.

The names of the races also have given rise to much contro-
versy.

Baluch is said by some authorities to mean " wanderer," and
Braho to be a corrupt form of Ibrahim, and Brahui to mean descen-
dants of Braho. Another theory connects Brahui, which is also
called Barohi with Ba, and Rohi meaning "people of the hills."
The fact that " Uch " means desert might point to Baluch,
meaning " people of the desert," and Barohi or Brahui, meaning
people of the mountains — certainly a fair description of the races.

The Baluchis, wherever they may have come from originally,

have now to a large extent left Baluchis-
^^'^ '"' tan and moved into the Punjab and Sind.

There are roughly 80,000 of the race in Baluchistan as against
950,000 in the Punjab and Sind.

The important Baluch tribes in Baluchistan are the Harris,
Bugtis, Buledis, Dumkis, Magassis, and Rinds.

The Bozdars, Gurchanis, Legharis, Lunds, and Kasranis are
generally regarded as offshoots of larger tribes which are to be
found in the Punjab.

Unlike the Brahuis, the Baluchis never appear to have coalesced
into a homogeneous nation. Although several of their tribes
joined the Brahui confederacy from time to time, they appear to
have generally broken away from it again. Two of them, however,
the Rinds and Magassis, still maintain their connection with the
Brahuis.

A description of the important Baluch tribes will be found in
the various chapters treating of our dealings with them. The
genealogical tree given in Appendix B to this chapter is interest-
ing if not authentic. It is deduced from Baluch traditions.

The following is a short account of the Baluchis and their

^ , , ^ . wanderings, as traced from the various

Baluch Immigration. . .

authorities.

The name Baluch is mentioned in the Shahnama by Firdaosi
as being that of a people who formed part of the army of the great
Cyrus. This is, however, mythical, and the first mention of the
Baluch on which credence can be placed — in the poem above men-
tioned— shows the Baluch attacked by Naushirwan and afterwards

22 rSONTJES AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

forming part of his army. At this time they appear to have
been resident in Kirman, about 550 A.D., where the Arabs found
them in their invasion of that country in 636. It is noteworthy
that the province of Kirman at that time bordered Makran.
For the next 600 years the history of the Baluch is practically un-
traceable. There were some Baluchis in Sistan during the period,
and later they arrived in Makran. There were probably two
movements of the Baluch race during this period, each corre-
sponding with an inroad of northern invaders which greatly affected
this part of Asia. The abandonment of Kirman and the settle-
ment in Sistan and Western Makran corresponded with the Seljak
invasion. The second migration into Eastern Makran and Sind
corresponded with the invasions of Chengiz Khan.

From the arrival in Makran Baluch legends begin, and we hear
of their marching under one chief, Mir Jalal Khan, to fight the Arabs
of the coast. This Mir Jalal Khan had four sons and one daughter,
who gave their names to the various Baluch tribes — vide Appendix
B to this chapter. Doubtless the invaders mingled with the Jats
and Arabs then living in Makran.

At the end of the twelfth century a body of Baluchis
entered Sind and allied themselves with some of the local tribes.
During the thirteenth century the Baluchis were employed
against his enemies by Doda IV, the Somra ruler of Sind.

At the end of the thirteenth century the Somra rule in
Sind gave way to the Samma dynasty. A section of the Somras,
headed by their chief Doda, took refuge with the Baluchis, and were
gradually assimilated under the name of Dodai Baluch. The
Gurchanis, now the principle tribe of Dodai origin, are not looked
upon as pure Baluchis.

Longworth Dames described the Baluch nation as divided into

the following groups in the fifteeeth cen-

Main Groups of Baluchis. tury, on the eve of the invasion of

India : —

(1) the five main bodies of undoubted Baluch descent, viz., Rind, Lashari,

Hot, Korai, Jatai ;

(2) the groups afterwards formed in Makran, viz., — Buledhis, Ghazanis,

and Umaranis ;

(3) the Dodais ; and

(4) the servile tribes.

EISTORY AND ETBNOQBAPBY. 23

Since then the Gichkis in Makran and Jakranis in Sind seem
to have been assimilated in comparatively recent times.

Nothing more is heard of the Baluchis until the middle of the
fifteenth century when we again find them raiding in Northern Sind.
Here also the forward move of the Baluchis takes place at a time
of general unrest. The invasion of India by Temur then occupied
men's minds. The Tuglak monarchy of Delhi disappeared, and a
succession of feeble rulers allowed the Lodi Afghans to seize the
sovereignty, and opened a tempting prospect to needy adventurers
from across the border. Gradually the Baluchis worked up along
the line of hills, keeping to the west of the Indus, and pushing the
Pathan tribes north and west.^

About the year 1450 A.D., we hear of the ruler of Multan

Baluchis in Dera Ghazi Khan granting land across the Indus to Sohrab,

and Dera Ismail. 1450—1500 a Baluch Chief of the Dodai tribe, in re-

A D.

turn for aid in quieting the Trans-Indus

districts. Sohrab's son at this time founded Dera Ismail Khan,
and another member of the same Baluch tribe founded Dera
Ghazi Khan shortly afterwards. Gradually these towns became
the capitals of practically independent districts, Dera Ghazi Khan
becoming comparatively important under its Mirani rulers.

The movement of the Rinds under Mir Chakur to the Punjab
at this time is doubtless connected with the invasion of Kachi
by the Arghunsin 1485 A.D.

According to Baluch legends, the Rinds under Mir Chakur
enlisted the aid of the Turks (Arghuns) against the Lasharis
under Gwahram. Accounts are given of many years of fighting
culminating in the wholesale departure of the Rinds to the Punjab.*
On arriving in the Derajat the Rinds found the Dodai Baluchis
settled on the right bank of the Indus, and proceeded to Multan,
whose ruler gave them lands. The Baluch migration into the
Southern Punjab continued, and gradually they held most of the
Multan district. When the Arghuns — after taking Sind from the
Sammas in 1520 — attacked Multan, they were opposed by an army
composed mostly of Baluchis.

*A movement of the Pathans into the richer districts of Afghanistan is perhaps
the reason of the Baluchis establishing themselves in the Sulimans. Such a movement
d id occur consequent on the depopulation of Southern Afghanistan by the raids of the
Mongols.

2 The headquarters of the Rinds now remaining in Baluchistan is at Shoran in
Kachi.

24 rnONTJER AND OVESSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

In 1526 Babar arrived in India. With him, attracted by the

tales of wealth and plunder, came hordes
Suiimftns occupied by Baiu- of Baluchis from Sind and Makran. All

the Baluch tribes now occupying the
Dera Ghazi Khan frontier trace their settlement to this period. At
this time, too, they appear to have spread over the Southern and
Western Punjab. Holding the Suliman Hills, the Baluchis gradu-
ally overran the plains on the right bank of the Indus.

Before this great national migration of the Baluchis they
appear to have been in possession of the Kalat Highlands.

There is a common belief that a Hindu tribe called Sewa

was in possession of Kalat at the time,
Brahui Invasion. and called in the assistance of the Brahuis

against the Baluchis.

Where the Brahuis came from is, as already mentioned.
a much disputed question. It is noteworthy that the Arghuns,
a Mughal family claiming descent from Chengiz Khan, were very
active at this time. The Rinds invited their assistance, and lost
their territory to them. Why may not the same state of affairs
have existed in Kalat ? Be that as it may, however, the migration
of great numbers of the Baluchis gave the Brahuis their chance.
They extended down the highlands of Sara wan and Jhalawan,
driving a wedge between the Baluchis of Makran and the Sulimans,
and gradually establishing authority over those of the former
coimtry.

The Brahuis — whatever their origin — gradually constituted a

semi-military organisation. Consequently
Brahuia. , -^ <■ i i ^

homogeneity ot race was by no means

necessary for its formation.

Hutches Butler^ states that Khudadad Khan, the ex-Khan of
Kalat, gave him the following classification of the principal

tribes : —

o. Real Brahuis tracing their origin to Aleppo— Kambranis, Mirwanis,

Gurgnaris, and Kalandaris.-
b. Rind Baluch— Bangulzai, Langav, Lehri— who, the ex-Khan says,
were earlier inhabitants than the Brahuis.

* Census Report, Baluchistan, 1901.

2 A branch of which is the Ahmadzai, the ruling family.

Sarawan.

HISTORY AXD ETHNOGRAPHY. 25

r. Afghans or Patlians — Eaisanis, Sbahwanis, and Sarparras.

d. Persians — Kurds and Mamasanis.

e. Jats^— Bizanjo.Mengal, 8ajdi, and Zehri. The chief of the Zshri is,

however, said to be an Afghan.
/. Aboriginal Tribes — Muhammad Sh-.hi and Nichari, who were in the
coimtry before the Rinds arrived.
This classification by the ex-Khan is extremely interesting,
as the sequence given by him tallies exactly with the waves of
migration which have passed over the country.

The two main divisions of the Brahuis are the Sarawan or

Highlanders and Jhalawan or Low-
landers.

The principal sections of the Sarawan are the Lehris (5,400),
Bangalzais (9,000), Kurds (3,100), Shahwanis (6,300), Muhammad
Shahis (2,800), Raisanis (2,400), and Sarparras (900). All these
tribes are cultivators or flock-owners. In addition to these tribes
are theLangavs (17,000), an agricultural people, who cultivate the
Valley of Manguchar.

The Raisanis are the most influential section of the Sarawan,
their chief being also the Sarawan Sardar.

Most of the Sarawan tribes leave the mountains in winter,

and m.ake their wav to Kachi, where

barawan.

they live in blanket tents or mat huts,
and assist in cultivation.

Numbers of horses are bred in the district, and Manguchar
donkeys are renowned throughout Baluchistan.

The Jhalawan tribes comprise the Zehris (49,000), Mengal
(69,000), Muhammad Hasni (53,000),

Jhalawan. i -r.' ■ i • t

and Bizanjan (14,000), besides many
smaller sections. The ruling Sardar of Jhalawan belongs to the
Zarakzai clan of the Zehri tribe. The population is almost
entirely Brahui with, here and there, a sprinkling of Baluchis.

Agriculture and flock-owning are the only occupations of the
people, who live for the most part in blanket tents or mat
huts.

In winter cTTthe tent-living inhabitants migrate to Kachi and
Sind, where they engage in cutting the crops, returning to the

1 Scythian origin. Th" Scythian invasion reached Ba'.uchiil^in in 120 B.C.
Vol. III. c 2

26 FliONTIEM .4 Ail OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM ISDIA.

highlands in spring. The Jhalawan country is not so well cul-
tivated as the Sarawan.

In the Pab Range camel breeding is extensively carried on,
principally baggage camels. Horses are much less plentiful in
Jhalawan than in Sarawan.

A study of the numbers of the Jhalawan and Sarawan given,
above will show that they offer a fair field for recruiting for the
local Baluch and Balucbistan regiments.

The Pathans of Baluchistan and the Sulimans speak the soft

Pushtu spoken in Kandahar. In the

Language. „, • , ,-> • , i • t'- i •

Marn and Bugti country, and m Kachi,
as well as in the Southern Sulimans, Baluchi .is the principal
language. In these districts, however, a small portion of the
population speak the agricultural Jatki. In Makran and Kharan
the Baluchi dialect is the language usually spoken. Las Bela
has for its language Lasi — a corrupt form of Sindhi — and, on the
seacoast, Makrani- Baluchi. The Khetrans speak a distinct dialect
akin to Western Punjabi. Brahui is the principal language of
Sarawan, Jhalawan, and Chagai ; but Baluchi is also spoken ia
these districts.

A discussion of the various languages would be outside the scope
of this volume. Baluchi and Pushtu present no great difficulty
as to origin, but in the Brahui language the student is confronted
with a philological problem which has been much disputed.
Baluchi is for various reasons more popular than Brahui. In the
first place Baluchi is simpler, and those who speak Brahui as their
mother tongue, frequently learn Baluchi or Pushtu when living near
tribes speaking those languages. But other tribes and Europeans
experience great difiiculty in acquiring a knowledge of Brahui.

Brahui again has a very small vocabulary, and consequently
Baluchi, with its elastic substratum of Persian, is being rapidly
adopted to meet the new requirements of civilization. A third and
potent cause of tlie extended use of Baluchi is the fact that the
Khan of Kalat and Sarawan Sirdars marry into Baluch tribes^
Hence the rising generation in the ruling houses is more conversant
ith Baluchi than Brahui, as the mothers always give their
language to the race.

The Brahui language may be due to early intermarriage of tie
Brahuis with women of the aboriginal (Sewa) tribes whom they

HISTORY AND ETHNOGRAPHY. 27

displaced. For it is remarkable to find in Baluchistan a Dravidian
tongue surrounded on all sides by Aryan languages ; the nearest
country where it is again met being the Gond Hills of Central
India .^

Education is carefully fostered in the territories directly ad-
ministered by the Baluchistan Agency,
but in Kalat and tribal territories it is
almost entirely neglectetl. A few chiefs and influential families
employ mullas to teach their sons. Las Bela is an exception, and
has a school which is fairly well attended. At Mastung a school
has now been opened, intercourse with Quetta having impressed
on the Brahuis of that district the need of education.

The character and habits of the Pathan and Baluchis have
_ . ^ , been fully dealt with in the preface to

Character of Pathan and . . i • i

Baluch. Volume I of this series, to which the reader

is referred.

The Pathans of this district differ but little in character and
habits from those dealt with in Volumes I and II.

Having, however, been for many centuries in touch with the
strong governments of Persia, Kandahar, and Delhi, they are some-
what less rude than the tribes to the north. Moreover, their
country and that of the Baluchis and Brahuis is infinitely less
difficult. Again, they have no back door so long as there is a strong
Afghan Government in their rear.

Mere detachments have penetrated to the very heart of the
Marri country. It requires a corfs d^armee to enter the Tirah Hills
with a prospect of success.

In character the Baluch and Brahui are fairly similar, and
both are, on the whole, chivalrous and true.

When Walpole Clarke was killed near Kahan the Marris them-
selves sent us word how bravely he had died and how many of their
own number had fallen to his sabre. Of their own free-will they
erected a monument over his grave ; and, when Captain Brown
surrendered at Kahan in 1840, they not only strictly kept to the
terms of their agreement, but treated our troops with honour and
even kindness.

1 If Brahui is Driividiac,

28 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Lieutenant Lovedayis the only officer who has ever suffered
violence at the hands of a Baluch or Brahui except in case of open
strife. His case was exceptional. In addition to being personally dis-
liked by the people, he was the official instrument of an unpopular
policy, which the British Government afterwards saw fit to change.

Previous to British occupation Baluchistan, as has already been
Result of British oocupa- stated in Chapter I, was largely occupied
tion. by tribes more or less independent. The

State of Kalat was, of course, an exception.

In taking over the Derajat from the Sikhs we succeeded to an
inheritance of anarchy, the result of their mismanagement.

The whole country was studded with forts, each the head-
quarters of a robber chief. The revenue was collected by an
army — or not at all. Similarly in Sind the border was a happy
hunting ground for Marris and Bugtis. With the introduction of
English rule a change was at once apparent, and the border became
tranquil in comparison with its former condition. However,
expeditions were necessary to show the border tribes the strength
of the British Government, and the folly of resisting it by force of
arms.

The lesson once taught, no effort was spared to encourage friend-
ly feelings and show the trans-frontier people that all the British
Government insisted upon was the peace of its border. This ensured,
they were as free to come and go for trade or other purposes as our
own people. Gradually all these tribes, as well as the Pathan tribes
of Zhob and Bori, have come under British influence to their own
great advantage, as well as securing peace on our borders.

Among these small and badly organised frontier tribes —

" Independence, means bloodshed, desolation, risk, and danger in every
shape and form, and in the interests of peace and civilisation it is absolutely
essential that the turbulent tribes, should be brought under some paramount
power. The only title to independence they have is that of the pirate or high-
way robber, having cut themselves adrift from all wholesome governing
authoiity, thereby obtaining a license to cut throats, and murder and plunder
their neighbours.

There is a natural instinct in the minds of these men that this spurious
indepen dence is not permanent, and it is only the evil-doers, who make
phmder and bloodshed pay, who resist being brought again under a sovereigo.
power. If the Amir or the Khan of Kalat claim tribes as their own, they

HISTORY AND ETHNOGRAPRY. 29

should admit and act up to their responsibilities and keep them in order. If
they are under no rule, the sooner they are brought under one the better it
will be for themselves and all concerned.

The chiefs and men of position, who possess landed property and a share
in the country, look on the state of affairs as unwholesome, and regard the
intervention which restores the country to a healthy condition with gratitude.
Nothing has done more mischief than the encouragement of the theory that
these tribes are independent, or tends so much to keep them outside the pale
of civilisation." *

This was written in 1884. The Harris and Bugtis, who were par-
ticularly referred to, have now acquired a healthy independence,
and are a strength instead of a weakness to our frontier.

» The Forward Policy.— (fi. /. Bruce.)

C .3

APPENDIX A
Sh'Wing II •nmlogtr,)H<i Ihr ,„o<n n-iliirnl ,/hmio„j, l,-nitit<f. tie , "/ /A' Afghani •<• H<i)iifhis,

II I
% 1

&■'•

' s

u-t^J^-.!-.):

1 '

W«,t.»t_.fc.U,^.l

; 1

T^S'^'*^

: n

'• ?

■m--:---

^••l£>BBtimitr.

il of Uw qiiHU<I1-Ma

gn 'm QHiBk-n»u. i

Vol. ni.

to Tradition.

Jato (dauglite ).

Kbueagh

I
Hamal*

Khuta Tribe,

Shaitiak.

Bulo.

I
Bttkihi Trite.

Ali.

UbAzan.

GhazaniclaD
ot Marris,

Umar.

Umaranl ciaB

I resident amon^

Lunda, Khosas

aad Marris).

MJrchakar. Ham

Shahzad.

Shaibak.

Mahammad,

Mahmdaoi,

Dumkii.

Bra him.

Lundt,

Vol. m.

APPENDIX B.

Genealogical Trei showing the connection of the various Baluch Tribes according to Tradition.

MIfi JALAL EHAK.

^^<

Bind

SAtnuo.

Nau Vaxa Din.

AbmKd.

GUo.

Ealo.

Bahai.

Oishktuaris.

Ratrani Tri6«.

Karim.

Obauro,

Barkoidar,

Fath.

Shahkul.

Kaubat.

Lsgha

Shab AH-Bano.
Baao's widow
married Boidar.

Bozdar Triba

and

Hadiani

Legharis.

Nodhbandagli.

Qwaharam.

The L(uharit4

lak&r.

Eaisar Eban,

Tunmndar of

tbe Ma^ihassis

of JbaL

Jato (daugbte ).

BqIo.

Baledhi TribB.

Sahak.

. I

Hanul.

Khuia Tribi,

Mlro.

Tbd Jlsthaoi

Cbiofs of
Mankera,

Omaranl ciaii
(resident arooni;
Lands, Ebcuas

and Uarrb).

Maati.

Maituiehn.

Kalar.

Maiaris.

Ultobakar.

UahBmmad.

Mabrndaoi,

DumJcii.

Lundt.

Jlndani

Boabkali.

Syabpbadb.

Ourohanii.

Oyandar. Uit Hao.

( 32 )

Uais.

SaUani.

Bamal,

Uamalanis.

CHAPTER III.

KALAT AFFAIRS.

The authentic history of Kalat begius with the reign of the
„ , ^^, Brahui Khan Mir Ahmad I, about 1650.

Earlv History. .

Prior to this, what little is known has
been roughly sketched in Chapter II.

This Mir Ahmed is said to have been the twelfth descendant
in the direct line from Mir Ibrahim the first Khan, who, according
to some authorities, gave his name, in the corrupt form of Braho
for Ibrahim, to the governing class of Brahuis.

At that time Kalat was a very small and uninfluential State.
The Khans, therefore, gradually engaged
the assistance of the chiefs of their kindred
tribes in the neighbourhood by giving them fiefs in Kahit. In return
for these fiefs they were bound to furnish troops, in certain speci-
fied cases and numbers, for the aid of the Khan.

This is highly significant, as although primarily entirely in-
dependent in their own territories, these chiefs became, doubtless,
as regards these fiefs, quasi-feudal vassals of the Khan.

By means of the troops so raised, the territories of the Khan
were extended by conquest, such conquests being on behalf of the
Khan only, and not for the affiliated tribes.

Here it may be noted that until the reign of Nasir II no other
force beyond this tribal one was at the disposal of the Khans.
That prince first raised a standing army, with the money granted
by the British Government for the upkeep of tribal levies on the
trade routes.

Thus bound together, and finding mutual cohesion essential
against their powerful neighbours, Persia,

Formation of Kalat State. . ^ ^ • _l iajj.i. j.j. j. j. x

Afghanistan, and bmd, the petty state of

Kalat, the independent Baluch and Brahui tribes, and their

joint conquests gradually became amalgamated into one federal

f 33 )
Vol. III. D

84 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

State under the authority of the Khan. The conditions of this
arrangement, however, secured to the confederate chiefs practical
self-government in their own previously independent territory.

In the first half of the eighteenth century the ruler of Kalat
was one Muhabbat Khan. This ruler

Muhabbat Khan. ^^^ ^^le great aggraudiser of his line.

Adroitly joining Nadir Shah in his conquests in India, Muhabbat
Khan obtained from him Kach, Gandava, and other lowland dis-
tricts formerly appertaining to Sind.

In these newly acquired districts Muhabbat Khan assigned
r T^ ,.• fiefs to the Tribal Sardars, but established

Acquisition of Kachi. -kt -i

his own JMaibs or Lieutenants to govern
them, their headquarters being at Gandava, a walled town of
some importance, well situated on the Nari Kiver.

At a later period, however (1731), Muhabbat Khan incurred
the displeasure of Ahmad Shah Durani,
ruler at Kabul, and was by him removed
from the Khanship in favour of Nasir Khan I. His brother
Nasir Khan held the reins of government during the greater part
of the latter half of the eighteenth century. He was the great
organiser of his race, and consolidated the power of his family.

To his laws reference is made to-day. Tradition and the
accounts of early travellers such as Pottinger and Masson at-
tribute to Nasir Khan the regular systematising of the various
customs which immediate exigencies had, from time to time, called
into existence during the reigns of his predecessors. To him
were due rules regulating commerce, the administration of justice,
and treatment of Hindus and other foreigners and travellers. In
the time of Nasir Khan I there were two great provinces, Sarawan
and Jhalawan, meaning " highland " and "lowland." Over these
. . Sardarships, or Supreme Chiefships, had

been established. These Sardarships were
hereditary in the families of Raisani for the Sarawan and Zehri
for the Jhalawan.

These Sardars possessed an important authority in affairs of
State, though apparently rather consultative than executive.
They occupied chairs in durbar, the Sarawan on the right, the

KALAT AFFAIRS. 35

Jhalawan on the left, of the Khan. They were admitted to all
deliberations generally affecting the State.

Another curious arrangement was the hereditary office of
Wazir or Prime Minister in a family which, although converted to
Muhammadanism, was of Hindu origin. Breaking through this
rule of appointing the hereditary Wazir probably cost Mehrab
Khan his life in 1839.

It appears that, save as controlled by the consultative functions
of the two Supreme Chiefs and the Wazir, the power of the Khan
as regards external matters was supreme and absolute. He could
xnake peace or war on behalf of the State.

He could call out any or all of the tribal levies, and use them
for war or the maintenance of order. He could make treaties
binding on the State ; but if damaged thereby, any particular
chief could claim compensation. One point in this connection is
not clear. Doubtless, the petty chiefs had some share even in the
decision of external matters, but it is not known whether they gave
their opinions directly or through the two Supreme Chiefs as their
representatives. As regards internal authority, the Khan had
apparently power to a certain extent to make general laws for the
whole State. The administration of those laws, however, was not
his affair, subject to the reservation that a sentence of death required
his confirmation. He was the final arbitrator in disputes between
chiefs, especially in regard to boundary questions.

Within Kalat itself, and the conquered and annexed territories,
the Khan ruled directly through his Naibs or Lieutenants.

The chiefs were elected by the elders of the tribes, their election
being subject to confirmation^ by the Khan. This confirmation
once given, the chiefs were only bound to obey the Khan in external
matters, to submit to his orders when appeals were made to him,
to require his confirmation to death sentences, and furnish their
quota of troops when called upon. On the other hand, the
Khans were elected by the chiefs, the choice having to be made,
however, from members of the Ahmedzai family.

The chiefs jealously guarded the important agreement by
which the Khan was prohibited from having any armed force other
than the tribal levies.

iThis confirmatiop early became a matter of form.
Vol. III. D 2

36 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

From this it will be seen that the Kalat confederacy was
founded by a voluntary federation. There was but one feudal eleme nt
in the constitution, namely, tribal service of troops in return for
fiefs granted to certain of the chiefs by the Khan, out of their owrt
personal estate. This matter is important as furnishing, sub-
sequently, a bone of contention between the Sind and Punjab'
Governments, and leading to different policies being adopted for
many years by them towards certain Baluch tribes.

The proof of this " federal " idea came into prominence in'
1869. In that year the grievances of the chiefs were enquired intO'
by the Sind authorities, whose principal demand was that all
engagements with the British Government should be made not by"
the Khan personally, but by him as the head of the Confe-
deration.

The chiefs themselves were merely the elective heads of free
communities made up of sub- divisions of tribes, beneath whicb
again were villages ; each with its own elected head. The higher
the authority the more usual was the selection from one family,
which gradually became hereditarily that from which the headmaik
or chief was elected.

We have many examples in history of a similar conditions
of things in the early constitution of States which afterwards-
became absolute monarchies. This is generally due to the gradu-
ally increasing power and wealth of the sovereign, his ability
to keep a standing army, and, in consequence, to suppress re-
bellion.

We shall find later that the British subsidy to the Khan of
Kalat enabled him to pay a standing army, by the aid of which his
ambitions led him into armed conflict with the greater number
of his confederated chiefs.

However, although morally supported by the Sind Government
in considering himself a sovereign and the chiefs his vassals, he
failed to effect his object, and had finally, in 1876, to invite the
British Government to settle affairs between himself and his
Sardars.

In the time of Nasir Khan the territory of the Kalat State

was bounded on the north by the Afghan
Kalat in Nasir Khan's time, provinces of Pishin and Sibi and the

tribal territorv of the Kakar and Tarin Pathans. Sind bounded it

KALAT AFFAIRS. 37

■on the east, but the Kalat province of Harrand Dajal ^ reached
north of Sind to the Indus through the Marri and Bugti countries
which were tributary to Nasir Khan. Persia and the sea were its
western and southern boundaries. Makran and Kharan had been
-added to Kalat by conquest, Las Bela by treaty.

Before the time of Nasir Khan I, Las Bela was an independent
State, inhabited, as now, by a mongrel Sindi-Rajput race. Nasir
Khan determined to annex it, and made the then Jam,^Mian Khan,
his tributary. To cement the friendship of Mian Khan he gave
him his daughter in marriage.

Thus the State of Kalat was consolidated under the govern-
ment of Nasir Khan " The Grreat," who made himself not only the
political head, but also the spiritual leader of the confederation.
Assuming the role of a religious enthusiast he was, before his dp,ath,
esteemed the holiest man in Baluchistan, an example of his acumen
in dealing with a wild uneducated people.

Nasir Khan " The Great " was succeeded by his son Mah-

mud Khan, an indolent debauchee, who
Mehrab Khan. ^as in turn followed by Mehrab Khan

his son.

During the reigns of these two chiefs the power and influence of
the Khan rapidly declined. Travellers such as Pottinger in 1810,
Conolly in 1830, and Haji Abdul Nabi in 1838, tell us that the very
slightest bonds kept the confederacy together. Tribute to Kalat
was the exception, but military service against a common foe was
still recognised. In the days of Mehrab Khan the feudal army of
the Khanate, when called into the field, was composed of the two
great families of Sarawan and Jhalawan. The Sarawan formed the
right wing of the army, the Jhalawan the left.

The Marri, Bugti, and Gurchani clans were included in the
Sarawans, and in those days they not only rendered feudal service
to the State, but paid tribute to the Khan.

A regular organisation existed, the memory of which is still
• dearly cherished by the chiefs, and rendered the Kalat State
capable of holding her own against all comers, except the
British.

1 Harrand Dajal was given to Nasir Khan by Timur Shah in return for assist-
ance rendered by the former against the Mahrattas.

2 Local name for ruler — a corrupt form of Cham learnt from the Tartar invaders
'of India.

38 T RON TIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The first official intercourse between the British Government
_ , . ^ .., r^ , and Kalat was in 1838. In that year

Early intercourse with Kalat. . -^

Lieutenant Leech was deputed to the
Khan to arrange terms for the passage of British troops through
his territory on their way to Kandahar. His abortive mis-
sion, and the subsequent theft of the treaty from Sir Alex-
ander Burnes, are episodes in the history of the First Afghan War.
Briefly, the circumstances were these. Mehrab Khan, grandson
of the Great Nasir Khan, had removed the hereditary Wazir of
Kalat from office, and replaced him with a creature of his own.
The son of the deposed Wazir was Mulla Muhammad Hasan.
The latter harboured revenge against the Khan for the disgrace
to his family, and his opportunity occurred when Mehrab Khan,
himself repenting his breach of the constitutional custom, appoint-
ed him to the hereditary office.

Throughout the negotiations between the Khan and the British
6 overnment, Mulla Muhammad Hasan laboured to breed fear on
one side and distrust on the other. When in spite of his machi-
nations Sir Alexander Burnes brought matters to a satisfactory
conclusion, the Wazir caused him to be robbed of the treaty
shortly after he had left Kalat.

During their march towards Kandahar, the British troops were
much harassed by the tribesmen in Kachi and the Bolan, and
supplies were unobtainable. This state of affairs, Mulla Muham-
mad Hassan informed the British authorities, was due to the direct
instigation of the Khan. Too late, papers were discovered in
Kalat proving the entire innocence of Mehrab Khan. He paid
the penalty with his life in the capture of Kalat by General
Willshire, an act described by Malleson as " more than a grave
error, a crime. "

In consequence of the reported hostility of the Khan of Kalat
,,^,^ throughout the British advance to Kan-

Siege of Kalat. *= ...

dahar. General Willshire (afterwards Sir
Thomas Willshire), commanding the Bombay Column, on its return
to India, was ordered to proceed to Kalat from Quetta to depose
Mehrab Khan.

Owing to the want of public carriage, and the limited quantity
of Commissariat supplies at Quetta, as well as the reported want
of forage and water on the road to Kalat, General Willshire

KALAT ATTAIRS. 39

despatched to Gandava the whole of his cavalry and most of his
artillery.

With him to Kalat he took the troops detailed in the margin.

Two guns. Bombay Horse Only perfectly fit men were taken and

Artillery. Consequently the regiments mustered

Four guns, Shah's Artillery. , „^. ,

H. M's 2nd Foot. only some 300 each.

H. M's 17th Foot. The force numbered 65 officers, 12

31st Bengal Native In- ,• rv. ^ ■, -,r,A i l.^ i

fantry. native officers, and 1,184 oi other ranks

Bombay Engineer Detach- on the 13th November 1839, the date on
Two Squadrons, Irregular which Kalat was taken, exclusive of two
'^°^^^- squadrons of the Shah's (Bengal) Irregu-

lar Horse, who were left in charge of the baggage during the
action.

The troops marched from Quetta on the 4th November 1839.
The first seven marches, with one halt, via Mastung, were without
incident. Contrary to expectation water and forage were found
to be so abundant, and the road so good, that the whole force might
have proceeded to Kalat without difficulty.

On the 11th November, when the column was two marches
distant from Kalat, a letter of defiance was received from Mehrab
Khan, directing the immediate halt of the British troops pending
negotiations, and stating his intention of moving out from Kalat
with all his troops to meet the British force.

The force at command of the Khan was estimated at 2,000
fighting men, with five guns. Reinforcements under his son
were daily expected from Nushki. General Willshire proceeded
next day to Girani, a village eight miles from Kalat, hoping that
Mehrab Ivhan would advance and not shut himself up in the
fortress.

During the march to Girani some desultory skirmishing took
place between reconnoitring parties of the Irregular Horse and
the advanced Kalati scouts. The conduct of the Irregular Horse
was so unsatisfactory that they were left as a baggage guard on
the following day.

The night of the 12th and 13th November was spent under
arms, and every precaution was taken against a possible night
attack by the Khan's force, or the reinforcements from Nushki
expected in the rear. The night passed quietly however, and the
inarch was resumed on the 13th.

40 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

After proceeding about a mile, a body of Balucli Horse appeared
on the right of the column. Perceiving that the British force was
without cavalry, they became very bold, and for six miles kept up
a running fight with the advanced guard, the 17th Foot, under
Major Pennycuick, galloping up close to the column and dis-
charging their matchlocks from horseback.

Having marched seven miles, the British column surmounted a
small range of hills from which the town and fortress of Kalat,
about a mile distant, came into view.

Of the Kalat position Sir James Outram, who was with General
Willshire as aide-de-camp, thus writes : —

It was truly an imposing sight. Some small hills in front were crowned
with masses of soldiers, and the towering citadel which frowned above
them in their rear was completely clustered over with human beings, chiefly
ladies of the harem, who had assembled to witness the discomfiture of the
Feringhees, and the prowess of their lords, all of whom, with the Khan at
their head, had previously marched out to the heights, where they awaited
us in battle array.

As the British column topped the ridge, they came 'under fire
of five guns posted on the hills north of Kalat. The guns were
badly served, however, and inflicted no loss.

Seeing that determined resistance was to be expected. General
Willshire here halted the troops to give the baggage time to close
up. This was parked and committed to the charge of the Irregu-
lar Horse. Meanwhile, Captain Peak, Chief Engineer, was sent for-
ward to reconnoitre. It was discovered that three heights to the
north-west of the fort were strongly held with infantry, five guns
being in position. The whole hostile front was protected by small
parapet walls, turning each hill top into a redoubt. During this
delay two companies were sent to clear some gardens on the left
of the British position.

The following plan of assault was then communicated by the
General : —

Under cover of the artillery, the three redoubts on the heights are
first to be carried, four companies of each regiment being told off for this duty,
each regiment having a redoubt assigned to it.

Two companies are to advance through the gardens on our left.

The remaining ten companies will be held in reserve.

EALAT AFFAIRS. 41

The object of this attack on the redoubts was twofold.
In the first place th e British camp was commanded by artillery
fire from them, and, in the second, from these heights the British
artillery could shell Kalat.

The storming col umns were led by their commanding officers,
Major Carruthers of the Queen's, Lieutenant- Colonel Croker ol
Her Majesty's 17th Foot, and Major Western of the 31st Bengal
Native Infantry. The whole was under the command and direc-
-fcionof Brigadier Baumgardt. The reserve under General Willshire
moved in support, formed in three columns.

Brigadier Stevenson, commanding the artillery, moved his
guns forward into range, and quickly developed a destructive fire
on the hostile infantry and guns. Meanwhile the attacking
■columns advanced steadily, and began to ascend the heights.
They soon came under the fire of the enemy's guns which caused
some loss, but did not delay the advance.

The enemy, meanwhile, were suffering severely from our ar-
tillery, and, before the attacking columns reached their respective
summits, evacuated their position, endeavouring to take their
guns with them.

General Willshire, observing this, ordered the attacking column
of the Queen's, which was nearest the north gate of the fort, to
break off down the hill, pursue the enemy, and, if possible, enter
-the fort with them ; but, at all costs, to prevent the guns being
taken into the fortress. Captain Outram, who carried these orders
to the Queen's, reached that column before it arrived at the
redoubt C. The column rushed down the hill, but arrived too
late to enter the fort with the enemy, who, however, abandoned
their guns outside the gate.

This detachment then took up a position under cover of some
Tuim, marked E on the map.

General Willshire then despatched orders to the companies
at G under Major Pennycuick to advance, and take up a position
AS near the Kandahar gate as possible.

They took cover behind a wall at H within fifty yards of the
gate.

In taking up these positions at G and H the chief losses of
"the day occurred, the troops so engaged being exposed to an exceed-
ingly hot and well-directed fire from the walls.

42 TBONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The guns had meanwhile been dragged up on to the heights,
evacuated by the enemy, which were now occupied by our troops.
Four of the guns, from the point B B, were to play on the
towers commanding the gateway, whilst the other two were ordered
down to D for the purpose of battering the gate itself. From the
point D the two guns opened upon the gate, and a few rounds were
sufficient to throw down one half of it. Instantly, the parties
at E and H dashed into the gateway, led by Major Pennycuick.
They were closely followed by the remainder of the storming parties
which had been moved up in readiness.

These advances were much harassed by the enemy from the
walls, a heavy matchlock fire being sustained until our troops
had entered the fortress, when the Baluchis slowly retired to the
citadel, disputing every inch of ground.

The reserve was now brought up to the Northern Gate, and
General Willshire determined to take steps to prevent the escape-
of the enemy by the Southern Gate. For this purpose the troops-

1 Company, 17th Foot. detailed in the margin were despatched

2 Companies, 31st Bengal round the western side of the fortress to
Native Infantry. ^^j^^ ^^^ heights Under which the South-
ern angle is situated. Major Western, 3 1st Bengal Native Infantry,,
was in command of the whole detachment and Captain Darby of
the Company of the 17th.

Two companies of the 17th were sent round the eastern face
of the fortress under Major Dithon, accompanied by 2 guns of the
Shah's Artillery under Lieutenant Creed.

Major Western's detachment found the heights at K lightljr
held. He stormed the position, and had the good fortune to enter-
the Southern Gate with the fugitives. Here he was joined by Major
Dithon, and the tw detachments having united proceeded to-
fight their way up to the citadel, against which the northern
attacking force had not yet made any impression. The two guns
which had accompanied Major Dithon took up a position at N
and quickly effected a breach in the citadel. More troops were sent
from the reserve to co-operate, and in a few moments the British,
standards waved over the highest towers of Kalat.

A desperate resistance was made by the Chief, Mehrab Khan,,
who fell, sword in hand, with most of his principal nobles at the
entrance to the citadel. Desultory firing was kept up for soma-

KALAT AFFAIRS. 4*

time from__ detached buildings difficult of access, and it was not until
late in the afternoon that those who survived were induced to
Surrender on a promise of their lives being spared.
Sir James Outram who was present says : —

The soldiers displayed much greater forbearance than they usually do-
on such occasions. Quarter was never refused by them when craved by
cries of ' Aman,' ' Aman,' and before nightfall nearly two thousand prisoners
had been removed from the fort unharmed.

Four hundred of the garrison are computed to have fallen in
this affair, including the Khan and many of the principal Baluch
chieftains, every person of note having been either slain or captur-
ed. From prisoners it was afterwards ascertained that Mehrab
Khan had endeavoured to escape by the Southern Gate, but,
finding that our troops had occupied it, he returned to the citadel
where he was found among the slain.

Considering the small number of our troops — of whom not more
than one-half were actually engaged — our losses were heavy.
The killed numbered thirty-two, including Lieutenant Gravatt
of the Queen's, and wounded one hundred and seven, among them/
eight officers. The Queen's lost most severely, having sixty-nine
of all ranks killed and wounded : the 17th Foot had thirty-three,,
and the 31st Bengal Native Infantry twenty-two casualties. The
artillery had three men wounded, and the Engineers and Irregular
Horse one each.

Before the attack on Kalat, Mehrab Khan sent his son

(afterwards Mir Nasir Khan II) in
u sequen a airs. ^^^ charge of Darogah Gul Muham-

mad to Nushki. Lieutenant Loveday pursued him to that
place, and the young prince proceeded to Panjgur, and thence to
Kharan, where he was well received by Azad Khan Naushirwani.
Meanwhile the British authorities placed Shah Nawaz on the throne
of Kalat. Shah Nawaz belonged to another branch of the ruling
family of Kalat, and had been a pretender to the throne in the time of
Mehrab Khan, by whom he had been imprisoned. He managed
to escape and accompanied Shah Shuja on his march from India to
Kandahar. Before his death, Mehrab Khan reproached Shah Shuja
for befriending Shah Nawaz, reminding him of the hospitality he had.
received at Kalat when a fugitive in 1834.

44 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Shah Nawaz asked General Willshire to leave a British officer
at Kalat. Accordingly Lieutenant Love-

Lieutenant Loveday. j ■ i. j t> ■±- \ a j. •j.-l

•' day was appointed British Agent with

the Khan. Unfortunately, Nawaz Khan was disliked by all classes
in Baluchistan.

Moreover, as by right of conquest, the British Government
disposed of a oortion of the country, annexing parts of Sara wan,
Kachi, and Gandava to the Kabul Power, under the administration

of British officers. On completion of
Departure of British Force. ^^^^^ arrangements General Willshire

marched towards Sind via the Mulla Pass.

Unrest among the tribesmen became at once apparent on the

departure of the British force, and the

Unrest in Kalat. chiefs were enraged at the partition

of their country.

Lieutenant Loveday made himself unpopular with the Brahui

•Chiefs. Among other things he farmed the revenues of Mastung to

his munshi, whose oppressive measures caused the Sara wan Chief

to rebel against Shah Nawaz. Early in 1840 Muhammad Khan

Shawani headed the revolt and recalled Mehrab Khan's son from

Kliaran with intent to place him on the throne of Kalat. Azad

Khan himself escorted the young prince from Kharan to Mastung,

which immediately fell into the power of the rebels. The rebels

then made an unsuccessful attempt to take Quetta. They were,

however, allowed to assemble at Mastung, unmolested by the

British garrison at Quetta. Thence they proceeded, some 2,000

strong, to attack Kalat.

Shah Nawaz stood a siege for a few days, assisted by

Lieutenant Loveday and Mr. Masson,

Rebels seize Kalat. ,i , n -^i .i . r .^

the traveller, with the escort of 40
sepoys. After repulsing a few attacks, the Khan surrendered the
town and was permitted to depart to Sind. Most of the Political
Agent's escort were put to the sword, and Lieutenant Loveday
Capture of Lieutenant Love- and Mr. Masson were made prisoners,
day. The insurgents once more returned

to Mastung, and despatched Mr. Masson with letters of negoia-
tion to Captain Bean, Political Agent at Quetta. Though under
obligation to return, Mr. Masson was detained a prisoner by Captain
Bean who apparently, connected him with the disturbances in

KALAT AFFAIRS. 45-

Kalat. This erroneous assumption prolonged the rebellion,,
and probably cost Lieutenant Loveday his life, as we afterwards
acceded to all the requests of Mir Nasir Khan's party. At this,
juncture General Nott's Brigade arrived at Quetta en route to-
Kandahar, and he received orders to re-occupy Kalat. Having
obtained information of the intended move, the rebels marched to-
Kachi, taking with them Lieutenant Loveday. General Nott

found Kalat deserted on 3rd November

General Nott occupies Kalat. i - i ■, -.i ,,

and re-occupied it with a small
garrison. Finding that Dadur was held by a weak garrison, the
rebels attacked it on November 1st, but were repulsed by
Captain Watkins.

On November 3rd Major Boscawen collected a small force from
, ,. ,„ , the troops on the lines of communication

Action of Daclur. ^

and marched to the relief of Dadur. An
action took place outside that post in which the Baluchis were
signally defeated, and fled to the hills.

During the flight from the field Lieutenant Loveday, tied on
.. , ,T- . .T J camel, was left alone with his jailor

Murder of Lieutenant Loveday. ,-7- • — n i j - ^j.

Kaissu. 'ihe latter acknowledged at his
trial that he had killed Lieutenant Loveday on his own initiative
as he found that, otherwise, he would be rescued by the pursuing
British troops. Apparently he discussed the necessity of this
dastardly deed with the unfortunate officer, for he naively remarked
at his trial that, at the request of his prisoner, he endeavoured to
obtain the Khan's sanction to the murder, and that having failed to
find the Khan he determined to act on his own responsibility. He
was executed after trial at the Agency Camp in Quetta.

After their defeat at Dadur, the rebels marched southwards •

and took up a position in the hills near

Action at Kotra. ,

Kotra where they remained until the
battle of Kotra on November 30th.

During this interval Nasir Khan opened negotiations with Mr.
Ross-Bell, the Agent to the Governor-General in Upper Sind.
The published account of this affair at Kotra in Field Army Orders
by Major-General Brooks commanding the Forces in Upper Sind,
dated December 6th, 1840, is to this effect : —

The Major- General having received authentic intelligence that
Nasir Khan with the garrison of Kalat, about 4,000 men, had

46 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS rSOM INDIA.

■encamped in a strong position in the hills within eight miles of Kotra,

and that reinforcements to the extent of

2 Guns, under Lieutenant

Pruen. many thousands were on the road from

2nd Bombay Grenadiers, rpj^^jj ^^ --^^ them, directed Lieut.-
under Captain Bovd. '

21st Bombay Native Infantry, Colonel Marshall With troops as per
under Captain Ennis margin to proceed to attack the Khan

25th Bombay Native In- _ ° t-

fantry, under Captain Teas-dale, in his position. The despatch reached
60 'Irregular Horse, under Ljg t.-Colonel Marshall on November

Xiieutenant smith.

the 30th.

On December the 1st that officer with 900 bayonets, Native
Infantry, 60 Irregular Horse, and 2 guns delivered his attack. The
enemy were completely surprised. Nasir Khan with two followers
escaped on foot at the first alarm, but his chiefs and followers made
a long and desperate defence, and it was not until four of the prin-
cipal chiefs and upwards of 500 men lay dead on the field, and nearly
the whole of the force had been put to flight, that the enemy's
chief commander, Mir Bohir, with his son, six other chiefs, and 132
of their bravest followers surrendered as prisoners. The whole
of the enemy's baggage and a large quantity of arms fell into the
hands of the British in this " brilliant achievement."

There is, however, another side to this affair. In future rela-
^, . . , . tions with the British authorities pending

Native account ot the action. i • i -k • t-

the final instalment of Nasir Khan a year
later, the Brahuis and Baluchis showed the greatest distrust of British
sincerity, and perpetually cited the afiair of Kotra as a breach of faith.

Colonel Stacy states that he was informed on all sides by the
chiefs that they were in daily intercourse with the British autho-
rities and Lieut. -Colonel Marshall, when they were treacher-
ously attacked. Darogha Gul Muhammad stated to Colonel Stacy
that the Khan's envoys were actually in Colonel Marshall's camp
when tie attack was made, adding " it is not the custom to send
proposals of p ace and friendship in the evening, and next morning
make an attack. Who shall say how many men were killed, wound-
ed, and taken ; how much property was seized ; what was the extent
•of our misfortunes."

In December 1840, Colonel Stacy, commanding the 43rd
. , „ Bengal Native Infantry, was appointed

Colonel Stacy, Special Envoy *. " '■ ^

.to Kaiat. specially to proceed to Kalat to open up

negotiations with the young Khan who

KALAT AFFAIRS. 47

-was still in Kacli, and endeavour to induce him to disband his
army, and wait upon Mr. Bell, the Agent to the Governor- General
in Upper Sind.

Colonel Stacy proceeded forthwith to the Brahui Chiefs ac-
companied by a few attendants but without escort of any kind.
Thus from the start he gained their confidence, and the chiefs made
themselves responsible for his safety. His courteous treatment of the
Khan and his chiefs, a great contrast to what they had hitherto
received from the British representatives, gained for him a great
personal influence over them, and to this was largely due the
_ . ,„ . , „ , T', success of his mission. In July Nasir

Nasir Khan installed Khan ^ , "^

of Kaiat. Khan entered Kalat as the guest of the

British Government, and on the 6th
■October 1841. was installed as Khan of Kalat by Sir James
Outram, who had succeeded Mr. Ross-Bell as Agent of Upper
Sind and Baluchistan.

The provinces shorn from the Kalat State after the capture of
the capital in 1839 were restored, and a treaty was drawn up be-
tween that State and British India. The terms were as follows :

1. While recognising the Khan's vassalage to Shah Shuja (afterwards

annulled), the reigning chief at Kalat should
always be ruled by the British Resident.

2. British troops might occupy any position in Kalat territory in any
force.

3. The Khan's foreign relationships must be absolutely at the discretion
of the British Government.

4. The British Government guaranteed the Khan his dominions, and
undertook to assist him in preserving order.

While these affairs were happening at Kalat the tribes on the east
Tribal affairs, 1840-41. ^^ *^*^ Bolan had also been dealt with.

The Harris and Bugtis had been taught
a lesson by the force under Major Billamore which passed suc-
cessfully through their hills in 1839, defeating the Bugtis in
two engagements, and paying a visit to Kahan, the Marri capital.
These events are elsewhere related in detail.

After the treaty with the Khan, however, the safety of the
Bolan Pass had to be arranged for, and agreements were arranged
between the British Government and the Kakars, Marris, and
Bugtis at Mastung and Lehri. The Marris and Bugtis acknow-
ledged the supremacy of the Khan, as did the Dumkis and Jakranis

48 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Kachi. These treaties were arranged by Sir James Outram and
Colonel Stacy. During the years 1841 and 1842 the convoys
through the Bolan were protected by the Sind Horse under
Captain John Jacob.

When the troops returned from Afghanistan in 1842 all the
frontier troops were withdrawn to Sind. After the conquest of
Sind, however, in 1843, the frontier was again occupied. In the
interim the Dumkis and Jakranis had become much emboldened,
and the Khan lost all control over them. In consequence Sir
Charles Napier proceeded against them in 1845 with 7,000 men. In
this campaign the Harris aided the British troops, having been
won over by Captain John Jacob. The result of this expedition
was that the Dumkis and Jakranis were transported to Sind where
they were given land, thus ceasing to belong to the Kalat State.
Kachi now became the raiding ground of the Bugtis. An account
of their raids and gradual pacification will be found elsewhere.

On the 9th January 1847, John Jacob arrived on the Upper
Sind Frontier. His work and the doughty deeds of his Sind
Frontier Force pertain more to the history of Sind than of Balu-
chistan. But as his expeditions were made against the Baluch
tribes, his work being at first the pacification of the Baluch border,
and later the establishment of the authority of the Khan of Kalat^
a short resume may be of interest.

In February 1848, John Jacob was appointed to sole political
„. , power on the Upper Sind Frontier,

Jolm Jacob in Upper Sind. ^..,.^ ^ i . j- .1 tti

Military Commandant 01 the J^rontier
Force, and authorised to arrange with the Khan of Kalat all
questions relating to matters between the two Governments and
to tribes, beyond the frontier, subject to the Khan.

The system introduced and the principles followed by Jacob
cannot be better stated than in his own words, as given in a rough
memorandum drawn up by him in August 1854. They were
entirely offensive measures.

Extract from a rough memorandum by Major J. Jacob on Sind
Frontier Proceedings since 1846, dated 9th August 1854.

Entirely offensive measures on tlie part of the troops, the possibility
of attack by the marauders never being contemplated.

KALAT AFFAIRS. 49

No defensive works whatever allowed anywhere : existing ones destroyed
or abandoned : the troops always freely exposed, and obstacles to rapid
movement removed as much as possible : the people protected.

No distinction permitted between plundering and killing by private
persons — whether friend or foe. Robbery and murder treated as equally
criminal, whether the victim be a British subject or not, the plea of family
blood feud or retaliation, in such cases, considered as an aggravating cir-
cumstance— proving the most deliberate malice aforethought.

No private person allowed to bear arms, or possess them, without written
permission.

The highest moral ground always taken in all dealings with the predatory
tribes, treating them always as of an inferior nature so long as they persist
in their misdeeds : as mere vulgar, criminal, and disreputable persons with
whom it is a disgrace for right-minded people to have any dealings : and
whom all good men must, as a matter of course, look on as objects of pity,
not of dread — ^with hatred, perhaps, but never with fear.

As perfect information as possible of all movements, or intended move-
ments, of the plundering tribes residing beyond our border. Such information
acted on with the greatest activity, our knowledge of the nature and habits
of the Baluchi robbers being suG&cient to enable us in almost every single
instance to judge correctly of their probable proceedings, and effectually
to check and counteract them at a distance from the British boundary.

The feeling instilled into every soldier employed being that he was al-
together of a superior nature to the robber — a good man against a criminal,
the plunderers being always considered not as enemies, but as malefactors.

The strictest justice always acted on, and no success, or want of success,
■or any other circumstance whatever allowed to influence the terms offered to,
or the treatment of offenders — whether whole tribes or individuals. Vio-
lence, robbery, bloodshed held as equally disreputable in all men ; the aban-
donment of such practices and the adoption of peaceful and industrious
habits being considered as most honourable, and encouraged in every way.

A few words will sum up the whole system : —

At first, put down all violence with the strong hand. Then, your force
being known, felt, and respected, endeavour to excite men's better natures,
ti 11 all men, seeing that your obj ect is good, and of the greatest general benefit
to the community, join heart and hand to aid in putting down or preventing
violence. This is the essence of the whole business. The working of true
principles is now apparent here in almost total absence of open physical
force.

When we came to the Sind Frontier in 1847, the people had no idea of
any power but violence. The proceedings of the British authorities tended
to confirm this state of feeling.

Vol. III. E

50 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

When the men of Kachi plundered in Sind, the only remedy applied was
to recommend the Sindis to plunder in Kachi. Both parties then were-
equally guiltless or equally criminal ; no idea of moral superiority was thought
of. Such being the case, it was absolutely necessary in the first instance
to have recourse to violent measures, to show the predatory tribes, that we
possessed, in far greater degree than themselves, the only power which they
respected mere brute force. Our first year on the border (1847) was one of
enormous bodily labour. We had literally to lie down to rest with our
boots and swords on for many months together. We crushed the
robbers by main forte, and proved far superior to them, even in activity.
And it may be well to observe that at this time only one regiment of the
Sind Horse was or. the frontier.

When our frontier was in a disturbed state, I had my posts close to the
hills, esteeming tliis arrangement to be an advantage. Since quiet has been
established, I have withdrawn them, save as respects some Baluchi Guides.
Having by the use of force made ourselves feared and respected, we were able
to apply better means, and to appeal to higher motives than fear. This I
had in view from the very first. The barbarians now feel (which they
could not even imagine before) that strength, courage, and activity may be
possessed in the highest degree by those also influenced by gentle and
benevolent motives.

Under the influence of this growing feeling, the character of the border
plunderers has been changed ; whule tribes, within and without our border,
amountmg to more than 20,000 souls, have totally abandoned their
former predatory habits, and taken to peaceable pursuits. Our Jakranis
and Dumkis — formerly the wildest of the border raiders — are now the mast
honest, inaustrious people in all Sind. The Bugtis are practically settled
down.

Every man of the Sind Irregular Horse is looked on and treated as a
friend by all the country folk. In truth the moral power of their bold
and kindly bearing and proceeding has spread far and wide through the
country, and effected what no mere force would have done.

Even the Harris who have not felt our physical force much, are fast
coming under this influence, and are beginning to feel themselves
disreputable.

This somewhat lengthy description of Jacob's methods is

interesting in a work on Frontier

Methods of administration. . .

matters. To maintain proper and
wholesome influence over the wild spirits to be met with on
our Indian frontiers, firmness and consistency are necessary,
combined with kind and just treatment. The tribes must

KALAT AFFAIRS. 51

be taught to know and feel that the administration is working
for the public good, but that implicit obedience must be yielded.
That the British officers are their best friends, to be respected and
not thought lightly of. Palliative measures are not only ephem-
eral, but generally lead to greater complications, and are always
regarded as an exhibition of weakness. Win the confidence
of these people by proofs of superiority in all respects, by
showing a keen and thorough interest in their concerns, and a de-
termination to be obeyed, and force has seldom to be resorted to.

Previous to the arrival of Jacob in Upper Sind, the

frontier had been held for five years by
Frontier *"*°^^°"'''*'' °° ^'"'^ a brigade consisting of a native cavalry

regiment, a field battery, a camel corps
500 strong, and two native infantry regiments.^ The head-
quarters were at Shikarpur, and various posts were established
along the frontier. Anarchy, however, prevailed. Depredations
by the border tribes were of daily occurrence, and the outposts
were confined to their entrenchments.

Major Jacob saw that the previous want of success was largely
due to the absence of trust between the officers and tribes generally.

The officers who had to serve on the frontier disliked the
locality and the work. The climate was bad, and the accommoda-
tion of a wretched description.

Jacob's position was peculiar. He made the frontier his

home and let the people know it. He

Jacob's methods. i i, i i i •-,

built a large house, laid out an estate
and endeavoured to establish a school of officers who would be
trained to fill the different positions in regular gradation; officers
who would become well acquainted with the people and their cir-
cumstances, and have a thorough interest in their work. This
system was at first adhered to, but gradually was changed to
provide appointments for senior officers from other parts of India.
In 1851, having entire charge of all Sind frontier matters,
, . , ^, , „ . military and civil, Jacob turned his at-

Jacob and Kalat aff airs. . *'

tention towards Kalat. Nasir Khan U
at this time was almost at open feud with his chiefs. His Wazir,,
Muhammad Hasan, had stirred up ill-feeling between the Khan

Alostly Bengal tioops

£2

52 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

and his nobles for his personal aggrandisement. He was only-
removed from his office when Jacob proved to the Khan in 1853
that he was actually plotting to depose him and assume the Khan-
ship. At this time, 1851, the Khan was powerless and at the
mercy of his chiefs. The northern tribes, particularly the Marris,
had thrown off all allegiance and raided everywhere ; claims for
redress against them on behalf of British subjects met with
evasive answers from Kalat.

In 1854, in view of the possibility of war between Britain

and Russia, it was determined to
Treaty with Kalat, 1854. strengthen the power of the Kalat State.

Accordingly a meeting took place at Jacobabad early in that year,
at which the Khan's authority was recognised south of Kalat to
the Arabian Sea, and west of Sind to Persia, including Las Bela.
In May of the same year, at Mastung, a treaty was drawn up be-
tween the Khan and the British Government, the text of which is
here given.

From this time to 1856 the Khan set about reducing his
rebellious Sardars, and raised a few regular troops, mostly ex-
soldiers of the Indian Army.

The Kalat Treaty of 1854.
Article 1. — The Treaty concluded by Major Outram between tbe British*
Government and Mir Nasir Khan, Chief of Kalat, on the 6th November 1841-
is hereby annulled.

Article 2. — -There shall be perpetual friendship between the British Gov-
ernment and Mir Nasir Khan, Chief of Kalat, his heirs, and successors.

Article 3. — Mir Nasir Khan binds himself, his heirs, and successors, to

oppose to ths utmost all the enemies of the British Government ; in all cases

to act in subordinate co-operation with that Government, and to enter into

no negotiation with other States without its consent ; the usual friendly

correspondence with neighbours being continued as before.

Article 4. — Should it be deemed necessary to station British troops in
any part of the territory of Kalat, they shall occupy such positions as may
be thought advisable by the British authorities.

Article 5. — Mir Nasir Khan binds himself, his heirs, and successors to
prevent all plundering or other outrage by his subjects within or near British
territory ; to protect the passage of merchants to and fro between the British
dominions and Afghanistan, whether by way of Sind or by the seaport of Son-
raiani or other seaports of Makran; and to permit no exactions to be made

KALAT AFFAIRS. 5g

beyond an equitable duty to be fixed by the British Government and Mir
Nasir Khan, the amount to be shewn in the schedule annexed to this Treaty.

Article 6. — To aid Mir Nasir Khan, his heirs, and successors in the ful-
filment of these obligations, and on condition of a faithful performance of
them year by year, the British Government binds itself to pay to Mir Nasir
Khan, his heirs, and successors an annual subsidy of half a lakh (50,000) of
Company's Rupees.

Article 7. — If during any year the conditions above mentioned shall not
be faithfully performed by the said Mir Nasir Khan, his heirs, or successors,
thentheannualsubsidyofRs. 50,000 will not be paid by the British Govern-
ment.

In 1856 Major (afterwards Sir Henry) Green was deputed a

British Agent to Kalat, chiefly to super-

^British Agent deputed to ^ise the expenditure of the Khan's

Death of Nasir Khan II. subsidy. He left shortly afterwards,

however, to proceed on the Persian
campaign. During his absence Nasir Khan II died in 1857, his
death being due, some said, to poison administered by the
Darogha, Gul Muhammad, who feared he was losing control over
the affairs of State.

The chiefs elected Khudadad Khan, half brother of Nasir

Khan, as their head. He was only 16

Accession of Khudadad. p , ,

yeais of age, and passed at once into
the power of the Darogha. The latter forth with embroiled the
young Khan with his chiefs by opening fire on them from the
walls of Kalat. They were encamped there having arrived,
headed by the Jam of Las Bela, to demand redress of the wrongs
they considered they had been labouring under during the
last years of Nasir Khan's reign. On this the chiefs at once
fled, and collecting their followers, rose in rebellion. Lieutenant
Macaulay, who was deputed to Kalat at this time, says, however,
„ , „. , that the maiority of the chiefs even then

Rebelhous Chiefs. , , . ,

sought nothmg beyond the removal of
their grievances, chief among which was the fact that the Khan had
surrounded himself with evil advisers and paid a small standing
army with the British subsidy, which they had expected to
share in keeping open the passes.

Azad Khan Naushirwani, Chief of Kharan, however, who
shortly afterwards assumed the lead of the movement, had more

54 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

ambitious views. Sir Bartle Frere and General John Jacob at-
tempted to arrange matters amicably but failed, the chiefs having
been led by Darogha Gul Muhammad to distrust the sincerity of
the British Government. At this juncture Khudadad dismissed
Gul Muhammad, and appointed as his Wazir Shahgassi Wall
Muhammad, who served him faithfully throughout. Meanwhile
the insurrection spread, and Azad Khan Naushirwani put forward
Fateh Khan, another member of the ruling family, as a claimant
to the throne.

Sir Henry Green, having returned to Kalat, endeavoured, at
the request of the Khan, to arrange matters with the chiefs, and
for a time induced them to return to their allegiance. He also
prevailed on them to drive away Azad Khan and his protege,
who both fled to Kandahar, and to quell a revolt which occurred in
Makran. Shortly after this, however, the chiefs again became es-
tranged from the Khan.

In 1858, Azad Khan having appealed to the Amir, an Afghan
envoy arrived at Kalat and threatened the Khan with Dost
Muhammad's displeasure if he violated the country of Kharan,
which he claimed to be tributary to Afghanistan. Sir Henry
Green, however, ridiculed the idea ot Kharan belonging to the
Kabul ruler, and the envoy left Kalat.

In 1859 Sir Henry Green induced the Khan to undertake a
„ . ^ .. , „ T-, campaign against the Marris. The Khan

Mams submit to the KJian ±00

was present in person, and the Marris
submitted to him.

In 1860 the Khan undertook an armed progress through
^ :,^, . .^ „ , Makran, during which he received the

The Khan visits Makran. , . .

submission of the Gichki Chiefs. Two
months sufficed to pacify the country ; all forts were destroyed ;
and the chiefs of Kej and Panjgur tendered their allegiance.

At this time also the Jam of Las Bela, who had been in re-
volt, came to terms with the Khan.

In the years 1859 and 1860 the British Government allowed
the Khan an extra Rs. 50,000 as an incentive to keep order in his
State, and as a reward for the efforts he was then making. The
history of the next few years is one of anarchy and rebellion. In
1862 the Khan chose to put a deliberate insult on Taj Muhammad,
the Jhalawan Sardar, by refusing to fulfil a marriage agreement

KALAT AFFAIRS. 55

into which he had entered with that chief. In 1863 a general

rebellion of the chiefs took place. The
insSe?'"'^ '^'^°'"^ """^ '" Khan was attacked and wounded,

during a conference, by his cousin Sherdil
Khan, and was forced to fly to Sind. He was followed by the
British Agent, Colonel Malcolm Green.

Sherdil Khan was elected Khan, but was murdered by the
commander of his mercenary guard within a few months of his
accession, Khudadad Khan was then replaced on the throne in
1864, the Jam of Las Bela alone dissenting.

Within a year of Khudadad's recall to the throne, the standard
of revolt was again raised by Taj Muhammad, the Jhala wan Chief.
He was defeated, however, and imprisoned in Kalat, where he
died two years later.

In July of the same year the Jam of Las Bela and Nur Din
the Mengal Chief, assisted by Azad Khan Naushirwani, raised a
revolt. They were defeated by the Wazir Wali Muhammad. The
two former were kept f jr some time in arrest at Kalat. Azad
Khan fled to Kandahar. Things did not improve much, and in
1869 the Political Agent of the Upper Sind frontier, Colonel
Phayre, gave an audience to representatives of the chiefs at
Jacobabad. Their grievances may be summarised in the one fact
that the Khan had exceeded his rights as the mere head of a
confederacy.

Nothing came of this assemblage, and a month later the Jam
and Nur Din, the Mengal Chief, were again in revolt. The Wazir
again defeated them, and the Jam fled to Sind to the protec-
tion of the British Government : he was shortly afterwards remoyed
to the Deccan ; Nur Din fled to Kandahar.

As this brings us to the arrival of Sir Robert Sandeman
on the scene, it will be necessary to turn for a short time
to the Punjab frontier and trace events up to the period of the
occupation of Quetta.

In 1866 Sir Robert (then Captain) Sandeman was appointed

Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi

vSir Robert Sandeman. __,

Khan.
In those days the state of affairs on the Dera Ghazi Khan
frontier was similar to that existing to-day on the border of most
of the Punjab Frontier districts.

56 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The country outside our own territory was a terra incognita
A British Officer's life was not safe a

^Jt^ateof the Baluch Frontier, ^^^ ^^jj^^ -j^g-^^ ^j^^ j^-^j^ . ^^ friendly

relations were maintained with the
hill tribes ; and on the principle of onine ignotum pro magnifico
the fighting strength of the tribes was immensely exaggerated.
The Harris and Bugtis were the terror of the country side, and
were only kept in comparative order by the fear of our military
strength, represented by the three regiments of Scinde Horse main-
tained at Jacobabad, with their numerous outposts along the
foot of the Bugti Hills, and the Punjab Frontier Force.

Trade through the passes had practically ceased. Long strings
of caravans used to assemble at Shikarpur waiting for safe con-
ducts which never came, and the whole Sind Border had been
kept for years in a more or less disturbed condition.

It is clear, therefore, that the two burning questions of the time,
when Sandeman arrived in Dera Ghazi Khan, were the best
methods by which to control the Marris and Bugtis, and the
policy most likely to introduce peace into Kalat.

On these questions the young Deputy Commissioner soon
, „ . , formed decided opinions. He very

Hairand Raid, 1867. ■,■,-,-, ■ ^ -, ■,■

shortly had an opportunity of dealing
with the tribes on the occurrence of the Harrand Raid, described
elsewhere.

After this raid, Sandeman applied to the Sind authorities to
obtain redress from the Khan of Kalat for the loss sustained by
British subjects at the hands of his tribesmen. The reply of Sir
Henry Green the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier,
is given Virhckim .- —

With regard to the raid, the Harris — being Baluchis — are certainly
nominally subject to the Khan of Kalat, and are held by him under the
same control as the Afridis of the hills surrounding the Peshawar Valley are
by the ruler of Kabul. Any complaint to the Khan of Kalat would be about
of as much use as the Commissioner of Peshawar's bringing to the notice of
the Amir the conduct of the said Afridis.

Sir Henry Green then acknowledged that the Punjab officers
must trust to their military posts to keep the tribes in order.

On receipt of Sir Henry Green's letter the Punjab Government
determined to deal direct with the Kalat tribesmen on its frontier.

KALAT AFFAIRS. 57

Sandeman threw himself into the work with characteristic
promptitude. He assembled a tribal conference at Mithankot
which the Marri Chief was obliged to attend, owing to the fact that
Sandeman held several of his tribesmen prisoners captured at
Harrand. The conference was thoroughly successful. The cis-
frontier and trans-frontier chiefs laid their grievances before
Sandeman. Feuds were amicably settled, and a small levy of the
trans-border tribesmen, principally Marris, was taken into our pay
and service. The money for this was obtained by farming a salt
tax on the Border. This was the commencement of Sir Eobert
Sande man's system of tribal service. It proved completely suc-
cessful, and thenceforward the peace of the Southern Punjab
Frontier was secured.

_, c , , Of Sir Robert Sanderoan's methods Lord

The Sandeman system- _

Curzon wrote;—

The system adopted by Sir Robert Sandeman consisted in reconciling con-
flicting local interests under the common cegis of Great Britain ; in employing tlie
tribes as custodians of the highways, and guardians of the peace in their own
territories ; in paying them for what they did well (and, conversely, in fining
them for transgression), in encouraging commerce and traffic by the lightening
or abolition of tolls, and the security of means of communication ; in the
protection, rather than diminution, of tribal and clan independence, subject
only to the overlordship of the British " Raj "; in a word, in a policy, not of
spasmodic and retributive interference, but of steady and unfaltering concilia-
tion.

This is not by any means a new principle. Edwardes advocated
it very strongly after the Sikh Wars. In his own words — "A newly
conquered population, to be pacified, must be employed." Lord
Dalhousie threw open the ranks of the native army to all the
people of the Punjab without distinction. Thus he prevented the
disbanded Sikh army, some eighty thousand men, from returning
to their homes, to which they had for years been remitting money,
to be an additional burden on the land.

All the great conquerors of all times have recognised the ne-
cessity of employing the military population of their conquests.
It is far easier than to destroy them ; their fidelity is secured at the
outset by severing them from their old associations. \\ hen Hannibal
prepared to invade Italy, Carthage poured her Africans into Spain,

Vol. in.

58 FRONTIER AXD OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

and defended Africa with Spaniards. In India the British have
often pacified countries by employing the indigenous tribes to
hold them ; for example, the Bhil Corps in Khandesh, the Mali
Corps, the Sylhet Local Infantry, and many others. Burning a
village will never pacify a tribe : but entertain some of their num-
ber, and the whole are satisfied. Employer and employed gain
respect.

One can readily imagine the hopelessness of, for example,
the Marris when suddenly deprived of the possibilities of plunder
and given no other means of making a livelihood. Their country
consists, for the most part, of rugged hills destitute of water or
verdure — an ideal robber stronghold, but impossible agricultural
country. A strong tribe like the Marris could have chosen better
land, had they intended to live peaceably. Now they are forced
to live peaceably, and not permitted to start that peaceful existence
by one final campaign to acquire a country suited to that form
of life. Hence the necessity of giving such tribes service,' and en-
deavouring to improve their status generally.

The unsatisfactory state of affairs in Kalat at this time, and
particularly with regard to the Marris, has been already referred to.

In September 1870, the Amir of Afghanistan brought to the
Ihe Mithankot Conference, notice of the British Government the bad
i^''^- treatment of the Sarawan Chief, MuUa

Muhammad, by the Khan of Kalat. This brought Kalat affairs
generally into prominence, and the Viceroy ordered a conference
to be held of the Sind and Punjab officials to discuss the means
best suited to deal with the circumstances.

The conference took place at Mithankot in February 1871.
There were present :— Sir H. Durand, Lieut.- Governor of the
Punjab ; Sir WilUam Merewether, Commissioner in Sind ; General
Keyes, Commanding the Punjab Frontier Force; Colonel Phayre,
Political Superintendent. Upper Sind Frontier ; Colonel Graham,
Commissioner of the Derajat ; and Captain Sandeman, Deputy
Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan.

At this conference it was decided that the dual control of the
various tribes on the border should cease, and their affairs were placed

1 The land question now (1907) is a difficulty in the Marri country. Their
<;ountry, under present conditions, is unsuitable for agriculture and other peaceful

pursuits.

KALAT AFFAIRS. 59

in tlie hands of the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier,
in subordination to whom, as regards the affairs of Kalat tribes-
men, was the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan.

Further, it was decided to give tribal service to the Harris and
Bugtis to the extent of Rs. 32,000 per annum, to ensure the tran-
quillity of Sind, the Punjab, and Kalat borders.

The tribal service, however, was not immediately put in force
by t'he Commissioner in Sind. Inteitribal irays ensued, and
the Harris looted caravans in the Bolan Pass.

Frontier affairs went from bad to worse. Colonel Phayre
aud Sandeman looked upon the

Frontier Affairs 1871 — 75. _ _ . i -n j ■ i- n • i

Harris and Bugtis as practically inde-
pendent of the Khan of Kalat, and held that the Kalat Sardars
in their rebellion against the Khan were " more sinned against than
sinning." The Commissioner in Sind held diametrically opposite
views.

In 1871 and 1872 the whole of Kachi was captured by the rebels.
Khudadad Khan, despairing of success, requested the Commissioner
in Sind, Sir William Herewether, to arrange an agreement between
himself and his chiefs. This Sir William Herewether endeavoured
to do in a conference at Jacobabad, but he pleased no one. He would
not support the Khan with troops, nor acknowledge the rights ol
the chiefs to a share in the Khan's councils. For a time things were
more settled, but in 1873 the state of Kalat was such that the Poli-
tical Agent, Hajor Harrison, was withdrawn, and the Khan's sub-
sidy suspended. From 1872 1o 1875 our relations with Kalat con-
tinued to grow worse, and more and

1872 to 1875. -, ? , ' . . ,

more detrimental to British interests.
Outrage followed outrage; the Bolan was closed; and no redress
could be obtained.

The state of affairs was so unsatisfactory that Sir William
Herewether recommended armed intervention in the Harri country
and the deposition of the ruler of Kalat.

The British Government, however, determined to make another
effort in the cause of peace by sending Hajor Sandeman into the
Harri Hills, under the orders of the Commissioner in Sind. His
regime on the Dera j at border had been so successful that he was
deputed to the Harris with a view to effect, if possible, a settlement
•of the troubles on our immediate frontier, and to provide for the

60 FSONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

safety oi the Bolan route. He was further instructed, should those
measures prove successful, to inform the Khan that the Britisk
Government would be willing to re-establish affairs on the old
friendly footing with the Kalat State, provided he expressed regret
for what had occurred, and guaranteed future good behaviour, and
the safety of trade through his country.

Prior to this in 1873 Major Sandeman had opened up relations
with the Marri Chief, Gazzan Khan, and had prevailed upon
him to visit the Political Superintendent, Colonel Loch, at Jacob-
abad.

CHAPTER IV.

THE OCCUPATION OF QUETTA.

On the 18th November 1875, Sandeman left Dera Ghazi Khao
Sandeman'3 First Mission, for a tour in the Marri country. He was
^^"^' accompanied by an escort of one troop,

1st Punjab Cavalry, and 150 rifles, 4th Sikhs, under Captain
Wylie, and by a large number of Baluch chiefs with a numerous
following. En route he was joined by several Marri Sardars and by
the Bugti and Ivhetran chiefs. On arriving at Kahan, the Marri
capital, he was welcomed by Gazzan Khan, the Chief. Thence he
proceeded to Sibi where he was joined by the Sarawan chiefs,
including Mulla Muhammad Raisani. Thence, at the request of
the Khan of Kalat's deputy in Kuchi, he proceeded to Dadur.
T^Tora Dadur he marched up the Bolan to Quetta and from there,
at the Khan's request, to Kalat.

Sandeman's methods of dealing with the tribesmen are thus
described by Sir Hugh Barnes : —

It was a useful lesson in frontier tribal management to watch Sir Robert
Sandeman in Durbar surrounded by an eager, noisy crowd of Baluch notables,
encouraging, threatening, and persuading in fluent Hindustani ; never losing
his temper, patient to hear all that was urged in reason, but his putting foot
down at once on all extravagant claims ; making the best terms he could for the
Government, while recognising the legitimate claims of the chiefs to fair and
generous treatment, and, finally, clinching the bargain by stirring appeals to
the loyalty and public feelings of the Sardars.

The results of this first mission of Sir Robert Sandeman to
Kalat were briefly as follows : —

Although the Khan would not make peace with the tribes
without reference to the British Government as to the policy
to be pursued, still he sent submissive letters to the Viceroy and
Lieutenant-Governor asking permission to represent his views.
The Marri and Brahui Sardars agreed to peace on certain terms

( 61 )

62 FliONTIEE AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

and professed a desire to protect trade. The Marri Chief agreed ta
prevent raids in Kachi.

The Government of India, commenting on the mission, after
remarking that it had been " by no means unsuccessful," added that
" it proved, if it did nothing more, that the advent of a British
Officer as a mediator was most welcome to the Kalat Chiefs^

Major Sandeman having been received by all parties in a spirit

of marked friendliness and respect."

During this first mission to Kalat, there was great friction

between Sir W. Merewether, Commissioner in Sind, and Sandeman.

The former indeed, at one time, sent Sandeman peremptory orders

to return to the Punjab. In consequence, the Government of

India placed Kalat afiairs in the hands of the Commissioner of

the Derajat Division, Colonel Munro.

In 1876 Government determined to continue the policy of

mediation between the Khan and his chiefs.

His Excellency in Council now desires that it should be clearly understood
that the political jurisdiction of the Commissioner of the Derajat Division
(Colonel Munro) extends through the whole length of the Kalat frontier from
Harrand to the sea. In short, the Government of India, having fuU con-
fidence in Colonel Munro and Major Sandeman, desire that the latter be
allowed, under the Commissioner's orders, full opportunity of effecting,
under the most favourable circumstances, a settlement of Kalat aSairs.

Several communications passed between the Indian Govern-
ment and the Khan, with the result

Sandeman's Second Mis.sion, .-ij.cii i ^ i ± i-,,

jgyg that bandeman was deputed to arbitrate

between him and his chiefs, and place
affairs on a satisfactory footing.

Accordingly Sandeman proceeded on his second mission to
Kalat, escorted by detachments of the Sind and Punjab Frontier
Forces, including 2 guns of the Jacobabad Mountain Battery,
under command of Captain Wylie, 1st Pvmjab Cavalry. A start
was made from Jacobabad early in April 1876.

As soon as the mission left Jacobabad hostilities m Kalat
were suspended, in anticipation of Sandeman's arrival at Quetta.
Large caravans were allowed to follow the mission unmolested
up the Bolan ; the Brahui and Baluch Sardars co-operating for
their protection. At Quetta on the 24th April arrangements were

THE OCCUPATION OF QUETTA. 63

made with Sandeman, by the various tribes on the route, to
foster trade in the Bolan.

On the 14th July 1876, a grand durbar of the Khan and
,. , T^ u "all the chiefs took place at Mastung.

Mastung Durbar. "^ ^ . &

The claims of the Khan, and grievances
of the chiefs were presented to Sir Robert Sandeman. This durbar
and settlement has been described as the " Magna Charta " of the
Kalat Confederacy.

Many of the chiefs declared to Sir Robert that the best solution
of the difficulty would be for the British Government to depose
the Khan, and openly assume the sovereignty of the whole Khanate,
an arrangement, however, never contemplated by the British
Government.

The result of the conference was that all disputes between
the chiefs and the Khan were arranged, except as regards the
Marris, the former submitting to the Khan, and the latter restoring
to them their ancient rights and privileges. Satisfactory ar-
rangements were made for keeping open the trade routes, respon-
sibility being fixed on certain chiefs and tribes.

A settlement having been arrived at between the Khan of
Kalat and his chiefs, the British mission was free to return
to India, and preparations were made for a movement down the
Bolan.

The Khan and chiefs, however, heard with dismay Sandeman's
proposal to withdraw from Kalat. His personal influence, and the
dignity lent to the conference by the presence of his escort, had
alone led to the happy issue of the durbar.

After deliberation, the Government of India determined

to retain Sandeman in Kalat territory.

Treaty with Kalat, 1876. w x i j i "A

and a formal treaty was concluded with
the Khan and his chiefs before the end of the same year —
1876.

The terms of that of 1854 were re-affirmed, whereby the Khan
agreed to oppose the enemies of Great Britain ; and act in subordi-
nate co-operation with that Power, and abstain from any negotia-
tions with other foreign States. By the 4th and 5th Articles of the
new treaty, a British Agent was to be established at the court of the
Khan, whose arbitration in disputes between the Khan and his
Sardars was to be considered final.

€4 mONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FEOil INDIA.

By the 6th Article, British troops were to be stationed in Kalat
territory. Provision was also made for the construction of railways
and telegraphs.

The 8th Article stipulated for freedom of trade, and the 9th
arranged for an annual subsidy to the Khan of Rs. 1,00,000 (£6,500),
and an additional sum of £1,400 for the establishment of certain
posts and the development of trade routes.

Terms were also arranged by which the ex-Jam of Las Bela,
Mir Khan, was released and replaced as Jam of that State on his
acknowledging the suzerainty of the Khan.

As regards the Marris and Bugtis, former transactions had so
conclusively proved the inability of the Khan of Kalat to keep
them in order that it was decided to deal with them indepen-
dently.

The tribal service already granted to them was continued,
and they were encouraged to take additional service under the
British Government.

Quetta was chosen for the location of the troops of the Agent's

escort on account of its strong military
Quetta chosen as canton- position, almost unassailable if occupied
™ ' by well armed troops. Further, it controls

the trade routes from Kandahar to Kalat and the Bolan Pass ;
also the routes via the Kakar Hills to Zhob, Bori, Thai Chotiali, and
the Punjab. Mitri was also garrisoned, but the Bolan Pass was
entirely handed over to the tribes, in order to interest them in the
protection of trade.

The garrison of Quetta was to be : —

1 Mountain Battery r In addition to 300 men of the 4th

1 Regiment Infantry i Sikhs already there as escort

1 Squadron Cavalry (, (under Captain Scott),
and that of Mitri at —

1 Mountain Battery.
1 Regiment of Cavalry.
1 Wing, Native Infantry.

Mitri was, however, found too hot for occupation in summer,
-and the force was withdrawn to Jacobabad, leaving a line of
•detachments to watch the hills.

THE OCCUPATION OF QUETTA. 65

An interesting point to notice here is a letter by Jacob in 1854
regarding a possible war with Russia. He writes : —

Quetta should be occupied with a well-found British force. There
should be a good road from that place through the Bolan to Dadur, and
thence through Kachi to the British frontier to connect with the roads in
Sind. The road from Dadur to the sea must, eventually, be a railway.

He dwelt on the superiority of the Bolan Pass over the
Khyber as a trade or army route from Herat and Central Asia, and
hence the necessity of holding its debouchure on Afghanistan.

His idea assumed shape in 1856 at the time of the Persian cam-
paign in which he took part. He writes : —

I hold a decided opinion that the expedition is a great error. It
appears to me that we could command success by another far more easy
and certain mode of proceeding.

He referred to the subjugation of Baluchistan, to be so success-
fully carried out by Sir Robert Sandeman.

John Jacob then proposed to Lord Canning to lease Quetta
from Kalat and place 5,000 British and Indian troops in it.
He worked out a scheme containing all the necessary details.
It received the earnest consideration of the Government of the day,
but was finally negatived by Lord Canning — chiefly on the question
of the supposed difficulty of supply.

Thus — ^twenty years before its actual occupation — Jacob saw
the advantage of the Quetta position, dominating the two most im-
portant trade and army routes from Central Asia to India, and
efiectually flanking the others to north and south.

On the occasion of the Khan's visit to Delhi in January 1877,

the Government of India finally decided
Baluchistan. ^^°"^ ^ ' ' " that " the charge of the Political relations

of the British Government with the Kalat
State and its dependencies should be vested in Major R. G. Sandeman,
C.S.I. , under the designation of " Agent to the Governor-General
far Baluchistan,"

A very important point then decided was that, " for the escort
of the Agent to the Governor-General, it was arranged that any
requisition from that officer for 160 infantry, 50 cavalry, and 2
mountain guns should be complied with, without his being compelled

Vol. hi. p

66 FllONTIEIi AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FR03I INDIA.

to furnish the jmrticulars required under the existing Army Rcgn-

lations." This greatly strengthened Sandeman's hand in a country

where prompt action was so necessary in dealing with the people.

Early in 1887 troops were marched up to Quetta, and buildiag

^ ^^ .,,„-„ operations were commenced on houses

Quetta occupied, 1877. r- i -i-, i- •

tor the Political and Military Omcers and
huts for the troops. The Quetta Fort — known as the Miri — was
retained in possession of the Khan's troops. At this time the Khan's
regular army consisted of 3,500 mercenary troops with 30 guns
and 500 cavalry.

On the 26th July 1877, a fanatical outbreak occurred which led
to our occupation of the Miri. Three
ou rage. local Kakar Pathans attacked lieute-

nants Hewson and Kunhardt, both of the Royal Engineers, who
were inspecting building operations at the Residency. The former
was killed and the latter wounded. A Sikh of the 4th (now 54th)
Sikhs rushed up and saved Lieutenant Kunhardt's life, but lost his
own. Captain Scott, who was drilling his men near by, then rushed
lip, followed by some of his men. He killed two of the murderers with
a bayonet (having seized a rifle with fixed bayonet from one of his
men), but was wounded by the third. ^ His men, however, arriving at
this moment, killed his assailant. The cause of this raid was the
im'irisonment of certain influential Bazai Pathans for the wanton
destruction of some Government camels. These Bazais had been
imprisoned in the Miri, and there the raid had been planned. In
consequence, Mr. R. I. Bruce, the Political Agent, determined to
seize the fort, which was effected by Captain Charles, commanding
the troops at Quetta, without opposition. Since then it has re-
mained in British possession and is now the Arsenal of Quetta ; the
Khan's troops evacuated the Quetta valley for ever.

In view of imminent hostilities with Afghanistan, in October
Conference with Pathan 1878, the Kakar Pathan tribes inhabiting
Tribes, 1875. the neighbouring country, and the

Dumars on the Bolan, were indted to a conference at Quetta. Ser-
vice was given to the headmen to the extent of Rs. 4,940 in return
ror promised assistance in case of an outbreak of hostilities. A
very important point in the negotiations was that the trans-border

'Cajtain Scott was awarded the Victoria Cross.

THE OCCUPATION OF QVETTA. 67

Kakars, especially those of the Lora Valley in Pishin, were
guaranteed from injury hereafter when peace should be concluded
with the Amir. This was absolutely necessary, as the reprisals by
Dost Muhammad on those of his subjects who had remained even
neutral during the First Afghan War had not been forgotten.
In October 1878, relations with Afghanistan were very'^strained
and news was received that a number

Afiate at Haramzai. ^j ^j^j^^^ jj^^^^ ^^^ Collected at

Haramzai, a Kalat village, two miles outside the border of Pishin,
and distant fourteen miles from Quetta, on which it was their
avowed intention to make a sudden raid. Next day at daybreak
Haramzai was surrounded by 300 infantry, 150 cavalry, and 4 guns,
under command of Colonel Morgan commanding the Quetta Garrison.
Sandeman had lost no time ; he was himself present and summon-
ed the headmen to submit. There were 310 horses in the village,
which Sandeman removed, and one Saiyid Kharan, said to be the
head of the movement, was made a prisoner.

Underlying our dealings with Kalat at this time there was,

doubtless, an ulterior motive. We wished

Own policy and its results. , ■, -, t o ^ • n p t> i

to exclude Afghan miluence from Balu-
chistan, to substitute our own, and to obtain a point of vantage for
•operating from the political or military side as might be required on
Southern Afghanistan. It was with this dual object that British
troops were stationed in Quetta. ~"'

After events proved the value of these transactions. The
possession of Quetta, the opening of the Bolan Pass, and our
friendly relations with the Khan of Kalat were of inestimable
benefit to the British Government during the Second Afghan
War. In this connection Sir George Pomeroy CoHey's views may
be quoted — written shortly before the advance from Quetta into
Afghanistan in the Second Afghan War. Writing on the whole
policy adopted during 1875-77 he says : —

We believed that an opportunity had presented itself of substituting a
friendly, peaceful, and prosperous rule for the utter anarchy and devastation
that had prevailed in Baluchistan for nearly twenty years, and^at the same
time of securing a position of enormous value strategically for the defence of our
southern border. Militarily speaking, Quetta covers five hundred miles of our
'Trans-Indus Frontier from Dera Ghazi Khan to the sea. The policy of the
.measure has been much disputed. Of its practical results, however, I can

68 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

personally speak. During the three years preceding Sandeman's missioa-
hardly a month passed without some raid on our borders, and the Bolan Pass-
was absolutely closed. During the two years following, there had not been a
single raid of any sort or kind. The Bolan Pass is perfectly safe, and has
been traversed by thousands of caravans. The tableland of Baluchistan,
which could then barely support Sandeman's small garrison of one thousand
men, is now able to furnish several months' supplies for the force of ten
thousand now being collected there. Were matters now in Baluchistan as
they were when Lord Lytton came out to India, so far from being prepared
to-morrow to commence our advance from Quetta, into Afghanistan, we
should still be collecting in the plains of Kachi, and preparing for the difficult
operation of forcing the Bolan Pass. I may add that not only have the Balucb
Sirdars enthusiastically supported Sandeman in all our complications with
the Amir, but that the Khan of Kalat has placed all his supplies at our dis-
posal, and that even the more distant ruler of Las Bela has offered his army
for service in Afghanistan if necessary.^

Quetta.

Quetta, which lies 'at the northern end of the valley of that-
name, has an elevation of 5,500 feet

Extracts from the District i i mi j_ ^■ ^

Gazetteer. above sea-level. ihe town lies beneath

the slopes of Murdar, the mountain
which bounds the Quetta valley on the east. To the noith closing
in the valley, are the long straight ridge of Zargun and the peaks
of Takatu. On the west is Chiltun. Through the gap thus left
in the north-west corner of the valley at Baleli the road and rail-
way pass into the Kuchlak valley, which again leads to Pishin-

Quetta consists of the native town in the south-east, the civil
lines on the south-west, and the cantonment on the north, the
first two being separated from the last by the Habib Nala
known to Europeans as " The Thames."

The land on which Quetta has been built was bought by

Government between 1878 and 1883.
Acquisition of land. ^j^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ purchased was 3,754 acres ,

of which 3,496 were in cantonments and 258 acres in the civil
town. The total amount paid for both the land and water
supply was Rs. 2,54,848, out of which Rs. 2,15,201 were for the
cantonment lands and Rs. 39,647 ^or the civil town. A large

Life of Sir George Poir eroy CoUey by Sir William F. Butler, K. C. B.

THE OCCUPATION OF QUETTA. 69

portion of the cantonment consisted of waste stony land of little
value, while the whole of the land in the civil station was valuable.

Since then the cantonments have been largely extended, and
now cover an area of fourteen square miles.

Prior to the British occupation, the only trees in Qaetta wer3
a few ancient mulberries, still to be seen in the Residency garden.
Now the whole of the civil lines and the lower portion of tha
cantonments have good gardens and fine avenues of trees.
The cantonment, however, has spread up the slopes of Murdar
whence the soil has been washed to form the fertile valley belovv-,
and as a whole is stony and dusty. The Staff College has recently
been built above the cantonments near the entrance to the Hanna
Pass. Mud is the building material of Qiietta. The officers'
quarters are owned by Government. The idea of a Soldiers' Park and

Club was initiated by Lieutenant- General
Soldiers' Park and Club. ^ ^ Smith-Dorrien, C.p., D.S.O., on his

arrival in Quetta in 1903. It was commenced by voluntary
labour from the troops. The grounds are terraced and provide
various playing fields and gardens. From the latter — mostly fruit
gardens — a good income is expected. In the park, which covers
sixty-seven acres, stands the club house which comprises supper,
billiard, reading, and recreation rooms.

CHAPTER V.

EASTERN BALVCBI8TAN TRIBES.

This chapter deals with the Baluch tribes east of Kalat territory
comprising Bugtis, Harris, Mazaris, Gurchanis, Khosas, and
Legharis, together with the mixed tribe of Khetrans. All were
practically independent prior to the establishment of British
authority. The Khan of Kalat claimed the allegiance of the Bugtis
and Harris, but failed to establish it.

The Gurchanis own the Hari and Dragal hills, the Sham plain
„ , . and half the Phailawar plain beyond our

Gurchanis. . ,.'■•'

frontier, and are also located m the Dera
Ghazi Khan district in the neighbourhood of Harrand. Beyond
the border they are bounded on the north by the Legharis and the
Khetrans, on the west by the Harris, and on the south by the
Bugtis and Hazaris. 1 '

They are divided into eleven clans, of which the chief are the
Durkani, Shekhani, Lashari, Petafi, Jiskani, and Sabzani. The
last four are true Baluchis ; the remainder are said to be descended
from Gorish (from whom they derive their name), a grandson of
Raja Bhimsen, of Hyderabad, who was adopted by the Baluchis,
and married among them. He^is said to have accompanied Humayuii
to Delhi, and on his return to have collected a Baluch following,
and ejected the Pa than holders from the present Gurchani territory.
The whole of the Durkani, and about half of the Lashari,
clans live beyond our border, and are independent, the remainder
of the tribe, being located in British territory. The Gurchanis
number some 5,000 all told.

In 1848, 'when Hulraj, the Governor of Hultan, rebelled.
Lieutenant H. B. Edwardes arrived in the Dera Ghazi Khan district
on his way to Multan, and sent a summons to Ghulam Haidar Khan,
the Gurchani Chief, to attend him. Ghulam Haidar Khan came
with 200 horsemen, and was with Lieutenant Ed wardes until Dera
Ghazi Khan was taken. The Gurchani Chief was then sent with

( 71 )

72 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Lieutenant Young against Harrand, but he afterwards again joined
Lieutenant Edwardes before Multan, where he remained until the
siege was over. After the conclusion cf the war he was made a
jemadar of horse, ten ha^girs m the militia were given to him, and he
was presented with a hhilat of Rs. 1,000 for his services. For the
first years after the annexation, the Gurchanis had an exceedingly
bad reputation as robbers and raiders and their border was always
disturbed.

The Mazaris are a Baluch tribe occupying the extreme south
of the Dera Ghazi Khan district, their
vvestern boundary being the hills, and their
eastern the river. Rojhan is their head-quarters. They formerly
occupied the hill country to the west now held by the Bugtis, but,
obtaining grants of land in the lowlands, gradually shifted east-
ward towards the river.

The tribe is divided into foiir clans — Rustamanl, Masidani,

Balacliani, and Sargani, of which the first

i azaris. ^^^ ^^^ ^^^q most numerous although the

chief is a Balachani. The majority of the tribe reside in British
territory, where they own a large number of villages, only a few
families being located beyond our border. In independent territory
they have the Gurchanis on the north and the Bugtis on the
west. For some years after the annexation, the Mazaris had perhaps
the worst reputation of any tribe on this border. Elphinstone,
in his History of India, mentions them as famous for their piracies
on the Indus, their robberies on the highway, and their depreda-
tions into the country of all their neighbours. They have, however,
now settled down peaceably as cultivators of the soil. Their total
population is now calculated at 5,500 persons, of whom less than
160 reside in the hills.

The Harris are a Baluch tribe of Rind origm, inhabiting
the hills to the west of the Gurchanis.
They are bounded on the north-east
by the Khetrans, on the east by the Gurchanis, on the south by the
Bugtis, on the west by the plains of Kachi, and on the north by
the Bori Pathans. They aie the most powerful and the most
troublesome of all the Baluch tribes.

They are divided into four clans — the GJiazani, Loliarani,
Mazarani. and Bijarani ; of which the Mazarani live beyond

EASTESN BALUCHISTAN TRIBES. 73

:Sibi and the Bolan, and are almost independent of the rest of the
tribe. The country inhabited by this tribe is for the most part
barren hill, but it contains some extensive valleys and fertile spots.
There are two main rivers, which rise to the east of the Marri country
and flow westward, emerging into the plains of Kachi at Tali and
Lehri respectively.

The Harris are rich in cattle of all kinds, and have a good
many horses. Their habits were formerly altogether predatory,
and they plundered their neighbours on all sides. There is con-
siderable traffic now through their hills, and the roads of late
years have been much improved.

The drainage of the Marri country runs east and west, between
very abrupt, impracticable hills, and the communications in this
direction are comparatively easy, while those from north to south
are very difficult. The whole country was, however, traversed by
our troops with artillery in 1880. Cultivation is very ^scanty,
and is cnly found near Kahan and on the banks of the streams ;
the rest of the country has a barren, desolate appearance, and
produces nothing. No suppb'es could be reckoned on in these
hills. Grass would probably be found after rain ; wood would be
scarce everywhere, and water only found at certain spots, which
it would always be necessary to ascertain beforehand.

The Harris are inveterate robbers. Their hand is against every
man, and every man's hand is against them. They lead a nomadic
Ufe, and have no villages except a few mud forts, and, with the
■exception of those members of the tribe who live about Mandai,
depend very little on agriculture. They are able, at the shortest
notice, to leave any particular tract and move ofi their herds and
encampments twenty miles. Their nominal allegiance to the Khan
of Kalat did not prevent them from committing constant raids
into his territories. The Harris are now under the management of
the Baluchistan Agency. They number 11,000 persons.

JDn&BugUs, like the Harris, are a Baluch tribe of Rind origin,

occupying the angle between the frontiers

of the Punjab and Upper Sind. They are

bounded on the north by the Harris, on the east by the Hazaris,

on the south by British territory (Sind), and on the west by Kachi.

The Bugtis are divided into six cians — Kahe'.a, Nuthani
Musuri, Kalpur, Phong and Shambani, or Klazai. The Bvgti

74 FWKTlEli AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Country is chiefly rugged and barren, but contains much goo^
pasture-land and some fertile valleys. The regular occupation-
to the tribe was, till lately, plundering, carried on systematically
and on a large scale. Every man of the tribe was a robber. The-
Khan of Kalat claimed sovereignty over them, but they paid'
revenue to no one, and, protected by their rocky fastnesses, main-
tained a stormy independence, usually at war with the Harris,,
and perpetually plundering their neighbours.

The wealth of the people consists in cattle, which they bring ;
down for sale to British territory. They carry on a direct trade-
with Rojhan, Ra'anpur, and Harrand in the Punjab, and with
Kashmor and Jacobabad in Sin d. In return for their cattld and
wood they take cloth, salt, gur, sugar, and grain ; a few of their
traders get cloth, etc., at Multan and Jhang. Although the tribe
is not dependent on British territory for subsistence or food,
a blockade would put them to great inconvenience. When their-
trflde is stopped, they are indirectly dependent either on Kalat or
on the Marris and Khetrans. A large number of Bugtis now
occupy land in British territory. They are, like the Marris,
under the political management of the Governor-Generars Agent
n Baluchistan. They number 10,000 persons.

The Khosas are a Baluch tribe occupying territory within and
beyond our border, having the Kasranis

Khosas. -^ , _ , ^' . '^ , ,

on the north, the Legharis on the south,,
and the Bozdars on the west. Their territory in the plains extends
from the foot of the hills nearly across to the river Indus. They
do not occupy all the land within these bounds, but are scattered
about in patches. A certain number of this tribe are settled*
in Bahawalpur, and they also hold extensive lands in Sind, which-
were granted to them by Humayun in return for military services.

The Khosas are divided into six clans, of which the Babclani
and the Isani are the most important. They are true Rinds, and
were formerly one of the most powerful and influential tribes on
this border. They are very independent of their chief, and are
among the bravest of the Baluchis. Many have done good service,
in the ranks of the British army. Their internal disputes have,
however, reduced them to political insignificance, although their
industrious habits make them one of the wealthiest tribes on this,
border.

EASTERN BALUCHISTAN TRIUMS 75-

The Khosas live almost wholly in the plains, and only the-
Halatis and the Jajelas — sections of the Isani clan — live beyond
the border. The lands of the tribe depend entirely on the water in
the mountain streams, with that collected in the different ponds,
and on occasional rain, for irrigation ; and in seasons of drought
the tribe deserts its own for other lands nearer to Dera Ghazi
Khan. Some of the tribe are graziers, and have numerous flocks..
Occasionally feuds break out between the Khosas and their neigh-
bours, the Bozdars and the Legharis ; but they are friendly with
the Khetrans. In 1848, when the Multan war broke out, Kaora
Khan, the chief of this tribe, besieged and took Dera Ghazi Khan
from the Sikhs, and handed it over to Lieutenant H. B. Edwardes.
He accompanied that officer, with about 300 of his clansmen,
to the siege of Multan, and behaved splendidly throughout. The
Khosas are a large tribe numbering 24,000 souls, but only about
1,000 reside in the hills.^

The Legharis are located on our border to the south of the

Khosas, extending as far as the Gurchani
limits, and are bounded on the west by
the Khetrans. They are a Baluch tribe of pure Rind origin, and
are divided into four sections, the Hadiani, Aliani, Boglani, and
Haibatani, of which the first inhabit the hills beyond our border
and the others are located within our territory. The Hadianis
are nomadic, and inveterate thieves. They are wild and difficult
to manage. The chief of the Leghari tribe belongs to the Aliani
clan. The famous shrine of Sakhi Sarwar is within the Leghari
limits. Their principal passes are the Sakhi Sarwar, Choti, and
Kura.

The Leghari and Khetran Chief's families have been for many

T , •. Ki t years connected by marriage ; for which

reason, among others, the Leghari Chief
possesses great influence with the Khetran tribe.

During the Sikh rule, the Legharis were greatly favoured by
Sawan Mai as a counterpoise to the Khosas and Gurchanis, and

1 General Pollock wrote of the Kiosas in 1859 : " It is rare to find a Khosa who
has not been in prison for cattle stealing or deserved to be. A Khosa who hag not com
mitted a murder, debauched his neighbour's wife, or destroyed h's neighbour's landmark
is a decidedly creditable specimen ; if, in addition, he be out of debt, he is a perfect,
marvel.

IQ FROXTIEE AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM IXDIA.

consequently, when the rebellion broke out in 1848, they were
arrayed against the British, and amongst the warmest supporters
of Mulraj until, finding his the losing side, they deserted him.

The Legharis number about 20,000, of whom some 2,000 are
resident in the hills.

The Khetrans are a mixed tribe, living beyond the Legharis.

They are bounded on the north by the

Luni Pathans, on the east by the Legharis

and Gurchanis, and on the south by the Harris. Their original

settlement was at Vihoa, in the country of the Kasranis, where

many of them still live and hold land between the Kasranis and

the river. But the Emperor Akbar drove out the main body,

and they took refuge in the hills where they are now located.

They are not pure Baluch, and are held by many to be Pathans,

with whom they in some cases intermarry. But they resemble

Baluchis in features, habits, and general appearance ; the names of

their subdivisions, moreover, have the Baluch termination, ani.

They speak a language of their own, akin to Sindi and the Jatki

dialect of the southern Punjab. They are divided into four clans,

Ganqura, Dariwal, Hasani, and Nahar. ^

The Khetrans are anything but a warlike tribe. They are all
engaged in the cultivation of the soil ; and the peculiar features
-of their country, which is a succession of large valleys lying between
parallel ranges of hills, the soil of which is most fertile, render their
occupation remunerative, and make them one of the wealthiest
tribes on the frontier. Grain is generally much cheaper with the
Khetrans than in British territory : the consequence is that the
neighbouring tribes buy from them ; and hence, although they some -
times have quarrels with them, they cannot afford to keep them up
long. The valleys in the Khetran country are dotted over with small
nr.ud forts, each the centre of a tract of cultivation ; and wheat
crops cover the surrounding country.

1 The Hasanis and Nahars are the remuants of old Baluchi clans which have
-now ceased to exist as distinct tribes. The Hasanis were destroyed by perpetual
wars with the Marris in the beginning of the last century. In the map accompanying
Pottinger's Travels in Baluchistan (1816) they are shown as occupying the northern
part of the country now held by the Marris and their ruined forts are still found there.
The Nahars formerly occupied the country about Harrand, but having quarrelled with
-Ghazi Klhan and the subsequent governors of Dera Ghazi Khan, they were at length
.defeated, and took refuge with the Khetrans where they have now settled down.

EASTEIiN BALUCHISTAN TRlIIEa. IT

The climate is considered good, being moderately hot and cold.

In the spring and autumn a considerable

" '^*"^' amount of rain falls, which insures an

ample supply of water for cultivation. Several streams run throuo-h

the Khetran country, most of which unite to form the Kaha, which

issues from the moim tains at Harrand.

They are not a plundering tribe, but are receivers of property
stolen in British territory ; and at one time, when there was a great
deal of raiding going on, it was foimd that stolen camels were selling
at Barkhan, or Haji Kot, their principal town, for Rs. 10 a head.
They also afford protection to absconded criminals and others
whom they are glad to allow to fight and plunder for them. But
the enforcement of pass responsibility on the Dera Ghazi Khan
frontier has tended to modify their conduct in these respects, and
they are now fairly well behaved. They have little or no intercourse
with Sind, and the only raid they ever engaged in on that frontier
was in conjunction with the Bugtis and Harris in the attack on
Kasmor in April, 1849.

The Khetrans, as already mentioned, are closely connected
with the Legharis, and they are also friendly with the Bugtis, but
their relations with the Harris, Bozdars, Husa Khel, and Luni
Pathans are not so good. They carry on a large trade with British
territory by the Sakhi Sarwar and Choti passes, and this, combined
with the fact that the country is completely open to the opera-
tions of troops, renders the coercion of the Khetrans an easy
matter.

Our relations with this tribe have been, since 1887, carried on
through the Governor-General's Agent in Baluchistan, the tribal'
country being located in the Sibi Division.

The total population of the Khetrans is 14,000 souls— includ-
ing 2,000 resident in Thai Chotiali.

The first occasion on which the British Government came into ■
contact with any of the tribes treated of in this cha23ter was
in 1839 when operations were undertaken against the Harri and
Bugti tribes to punish them for their predatory attacks on the Bri-
tish lines of communications.

In 1839, after Sir John Keane's Army had passed throuc^h the-
Bolan Pass, these attacks became so dangerous and frequent that -
steps had to be taken to put a stop to them.

■J8 F1.0NT1EB AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The first attempt to bring the tribes to order is noteworthy
only as an instance of what troops must sufier in Upper Sind during
the summer. On his advance from Sukkur, Sir John Keane had
left behind at that place about 150 European troops, men chosen
from every regiment of the army, Royal and Company's. Need-
less to say, they were the refuse of the army — the weedy, the
sick, the disorderly, the discontented.

It was decided to send an expedition against the Jakranis

and Dumkis in June 1839. John Jacob,

First Expedition. , t x ± e i.-ii

then a lieutenant of artillery, was given
command of the troops above mentioned, and ordered to form
a battery of artillery for service against the tribes in Kachi.

With forty men and Lieutenant Corry of H- M.'s 17th Regi-
ment, Jacob marched from Sukkur for Shikarpur on the 3rd June
— the guns being sent by water. Jacob himself says : —

The season was one of intense heat which has never since been equalled ;
the thermometer in the hospital shed at Shikarpur commonly stood at
130°, and on several days reached the astonishing height of 140°, — one
memorable day it touched 143°. Duststorms like a blast from a furnace
were common, sometimes accompanied (in Kachi) by the simoon — a poisonous
wind, which is equally destructive to animal and vegetable life. !

Such was the climate in which British soldiers were for the first
time to proceed against the wild tribes of Eastern Baluchistan.

Beyond Shikarpur the expedition never went. Though the de-
tachment marched at night and was never directly exposed to the
sun, the heat was too great for human nature to bear. It is three
very short marches from Sukkur to Shikarpur. The detachment
of two officers and forty men crawled into Shikarpur the third day
minus Lieutenant Corry and fifteen men, all struck dead by the
heat. No treatment appeared to have the smallest effect in check-
inc this mortality.

The authorities recognised the impossibility of proceeding with
the expedition until the summer heat had abated, and operations
were postponed until October. In that month a detachment of the

1st Bombay Grenadiers, one company,

Billamore's Hill Campaign, ^^, ^ i, -nt x- t x ^ . , •

1839. 5th Bombay JNative Infantry, two howit-

zers, a small detail of artillery, and
some Sappers and Miners, was sent under the command of Major
■ T. R. Billamore to punish the offending tribes and render the

EASTEltN BALUCHISTAN TlilUES. 79

Toad safe for .:he passage of convoys. This force marclied from
■Sukkur via Shikarpur to Pulaji {see Map) on tlie 20th of October
1839, and it was intended first to punish the Dumkis and Jakranis^
an the plains. They, however, fled to the Bugti Hills under their
leader Bejar Khan, abandoning aU their villages.

As an example of the Baluch character the following incident
is, perhaps, worth relating : —

During the earlier part of Billamore's " Hill Campagin,"
October, 1839, against the Dumkis and Jakranis, the British force
-after a long day's unsuccessful pursuit of the elusive hillmen arrived,
weary and disgusted, one evening at Uch springs.

Scarcely, however, had the horses had time to drink, when,
as if by magic, suddenly appeared, not half a mile ofi, opposite to
an opening in the hills, two noted Baluch Chiefs^ and a hundred
Baluch horse, drawn up in regular line, as if to charge the British
detachment. Instantly the men were in their saddles, and, ridino-
in, formed line against the enemy so fairly opposed to them. Janee
and his men drew their swords and advanced with a shout. Valiant
deeds appeared to be about to take place. The ground seemed
ideal for a "gentle passage of arms," a soft green meadow stretch-
ing between the combatants. Suddenly every horse of the British
detachment sunk into the earth, some planted over girth and
saddle flaps, all in hopeless confusion. The Baluchis had played a
huge practical joke. They had ■ lured their enemies into an
extensive quicksand. Their shouts of provocation were exchanged
for peals of laughter.

One ofiicer, however, John Jacob, being splendidly mounted
struggled out on the farther side. Alone, on his now utterly j aded
animal, he advanced against the Baluchis. Though Jacob was
absolutely at his mercy, Janee generously returned, at speed, into
the hills.

The campaign which followed is a striking example of what
British officers can accomplish when thrown on their own resources.
The country was a terra incognita. The scanty information derived

1 The Dumkis and Jakranis inhabit the eastern part of Kaohi. They were formerly
most active and formidable marauders, but are now je?ceful and well-behaved. The
Dumkis now occupy the land about Lehri, pnd the Jakranis cultivate the ground near
Shahpur. After Major-General Sir Charles Napier's campaign in 1845, a large numler

•■■of these tribes were removed to Sind.

2 Janee and Halimut.

80 IBISTIKH AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

from native sources showed nothing procurable save water and fuel
— and but little of eithpr. Nevertheless with a hastily arranged
commissariat the force advanced from Pulaji into the Bugti hills.
As the British troops approached the stronghold of Dera, the
Bugtis seemed at first submissive and friendly ; but the smallness
of the force tempted them to hostilities, and they attacked Major
Billamore with their whole strength. They were twice signally
defeated with great loss ; their chief, Bibrak, was captured and
sent a prisoner to Sind; the town of Dera was taken and plundered,
and great loss inflicted on the tribe generally. After punishing
the Bugtis, the force proceeded against Kahan, the Marri capital,
arriving before it on the 29th December 1839.^

The Harris deserted Kahan, and retired with all their families
and property to the northern part of their country, and a detach-
ment of 100 men of the 1st Bombay Grenadiers was left to garrison
it, under Ensign E. T. Peacocke. They once assembled in full force
to oppose us, but, being outmanoeuvred, changed their minds and
did not venture to engage in a struggle. They offered some slight
opposition to the work of making the road over the Naffusak Pass
(see Map), but did not seriously obstruct the troops marching
through their country. The British force left the hills iji Februaiy
1840, and in the month of April a detachment was sent, under
Captain L. Brown, 5th Bombay Infantry, to occupy Kahan perma-
nently.

This detachment assembled at Pulaji on the 8th of April 1840,,
Kahan occupied by Captain and consisted of 300 bayonets, 5th Bom-
BroTvn. bay Native Infantry, under Ensign W. W.

Taylor ; two 12-pounder howitzers, under Lieutenant D. Erskine ;
and 50 Sind Horse under Lieutenant W, H. Clarke ; besides 50
Pathan mounted levies. It was to convey 600 camels with four
months' supplies to Kahan, and Lieutenant Clarke was then to re-
turn with 80 infantry and 50 horse to escort supplies for another
four months. Owing to delays of the Commissariat Department,
the detachment did not start until the 2nd May.

On the 20th April Lieutenant Clarke made a raid into the hills
against a party of Kalpur Bugtis, who had been engaged in plunder-
ing excursions. The attempt failed, owing to the treachery of the

1 For an interesting account of Billamore's " Hil' Campaign, " gee " General John
.lecob," Chapter III, by G. I. Shand.

EASTERN BALUCHISTAN TRIBES. 81

guide, and the detachment, which consisted of 50 Scinde Horse and
100 Baluch levies, suffered terribly from heat and want of water
when crossing the desert on their return to Pulaji. The Baluch
levies alone left twenty-five men behind them, of whom three
died.

On the 27th April Captain Brown was ordered to send back the
guns and go on without them, but, hearing of the intention of the
Marris to oppose him at the Naffusak Pass, he took one gun.

On the 2nd May he started, leaving behind one gun and the
Pathan mounted levies, whom he did not trust ; he could, however,
march but slowly; the thermometer ranged to 116°, and the
gun kept them back.

On the 8th the force reached the Sartaf pass, about seven miles
from the Naffusak.^ The road up the pass was very steep, and the
gun was dragged up by the men. Here the Marris first showed
themselves, but did not offer opposition.

On the 10th the detachment crowned the Naffusak Pass. The
convoy took twelve hours "going up the pass, which is only a quar-
ter of a mile in length. They were attacked by the Marris, but
beat them off.

On the 11th the force descended into the Kahan plain, and
the Marris, seizing the summit of the

Destruction of Lieutenant , , , r' ,

Clarke's detachment. P^^^ .^* O'^^®' ^^P* "P ^ ^^^ ^^ ^ respect-

ful distance. Kahan was found desert-
ed, and was occupied without opposition. On the 16th Lieutenant
Clarke started for Pulaji with 160 bayonets, 5th Bombay Infantry,
and 50 sabres, Scinde Horse. Having surmounted the first hill, he
sent back 80 of the infantry and proceeded with the cavalry, and
the remaining 80 bayonets, and 700 unladen camels (100 having
been captured from the Marris a few days previously). On seeing
the last of the camels over the hill, Subadar Bagu Jadao, the native
officer in command of the detachment left behind, returned.
Half-way down the hill they fell into an ambush of 2,000 Marris,
and, though the men fought gallantly, the whole party was cut
up, only one doolie -bearer escaping.

Captain Brown was thus left with 140 bayonets and one gun
to defend the fort, which had 900 yards of wall.

' See Map.
7oi. III. G

82 FBONTIER AND OVEKSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA

Lieutenant Clarke, meanwhile, had made his way to the Sartaf
Pass, thirteen miles from Kahan, where he found the Marris assem-
bled in large numbers on the crest. After placing his convoy to the
best advantage, he advanced to drive them off with 30 bayonets,
but the task was too great ; there were 2,000 of the enemy against
him, with the command of ground in their favour, and so, after
fighting nobly for two hours, and expending his last cartridge,
the whole of the infantry were cut up with the exception of twelve
men. The cavalry escaped to Pulaji, and all the camels were
captured. The Marris lost 300 killed.^

On hearing of this disaster. Captain Brown quickly set to work
to put the fort in a state of defence. On the 4th of June he received
an express to say that no reinforcements could be sent him, but
that Captain J. D. D. Bean, the Political Agent at Quetta, had
been asked to send some Kakars to his assistance. This was not
of much use, however, for these very Kakars soon after attacked
Captain Bean himself.^

The Marris constantly hovered about, coming down on any
lielpless grass-cutters or followers who strayed too far ; but they
never attempted an assault. Bad water and food, and hard work
soon began to tell on the men, and on the 14th July Captain
Brown records that 90 out of his 140 men were unable to put
on their belts owing to ulcers.

He then commenced putting all his camp followers through a
course of drill. The Marris continued their respectful blockade,
stationing small picquets all roimd out of range, till about the 10th
August, when they became more energetic, upon which Lieutenant
Erskine dropped a shell in the middle of them, killing and wounding
fifteen. On this day, the garrison managed to capture three hun-
dred sheep and fifty-seven goats, which were grazing too near the

fort.

On the 12th of August, 1840, a detachment, consisting of 464
bayonets, 1st and 2nd Bombay Grenadiers,^ a detail of 34 gunners,
and three 12-pounder howitzers, marched for Kahan, under Major
T Clibborn.

1 Lieutenant Clarke, 1st Bombay Grenadiers, commanded the Irregular Horse in
Billamore's campaign, and performed many deeds of personal valour.

2 On June 23rd, 1S40, a force of 800 Panizais, under a leader by name Gafur, attack,
od Quetta. They were driven off in abaut three hours, leaving 22 dead on the field.
Tiu> British loss was 3 wounded.

Now lOlst and 102nd Grenadiers.

EASTERN BALUCHISTAN TRIBES. 83

It had been intended to send a detachment of Her Majesty's
40th Regiment, but for some reason this was countermanded.
The force had charge of 12,000 camels and 600 bullocks. At Pulaji
it was increased by 200 sabres, Poona Horse and Scinde Horse,
under Lieutenants "W. Loch and G. Malcolm, respectively. The
detachment entered the hills on the 24th, and reached the foot
of the Sartaf Pass in five marches. It took fourteen hours to get
the convoy and guns up this pass, and the troops suffered much
from the burning heat of an August sun. The night was passed on
the tableland on the summit, with no water nearer than the foot
of the pass. The men had little rest, as the picquets were much
harassed during the night. At 2 a.m., on the 31st August, the
march was continued to the Naffusak Pass {see Map). The road
was very bad, and it was 10 a.m. before the foot of the defile was
reached. The crest was seen to be crowded with the enemy. The
troops were wearied and exhausted, and the heat was fearfully op-
pressive. A letter from Captain Brown in Kahan on the 27th
reported that abundance of rain had fallen, and that no doubt a
sufiiciency of water would be found at the encamping ground below

the Naffusak Pass. It was found, how-
NafEusak Pass. e,Y&T, on arrival that there was no water,

and the supply with the troops was exhausted. In these circum-
stances it was evident that the whole force must perish from thirst,
unless the pass of Naffusak was carried. Beyond, water was
said to be procurable, and the fort of Kahan was distant only about
six miles. Major Clibborn waited anxiously till half-past one for
the rear-guard. At 2 a.m. the dispositions for attacking the
pass were concluded, and the storming party moved up the steep
face of the mountain. The road had been destroyed by the enemy,
and breastworks constructed at different points. These were sur-
mounted, and the crest almost gained, when tha enemy opened a
tremendous fire, and rushed down with a wild shout, sword in hand,
■on the advancing troops. Hundreds poured over the ridges of the
mountain, and, leaping into the midst of the men. bore all before
them. The attack of the Marris was carried out with such gallantry
and impetuosity that it was not until they arrived almost at
the muzzles of the guns that their advance was checked. Here,
being exposed to a brisk infantry fire, and to the fire of the howit-
zers, which were pouring grape into them, they were repvils(d with
Vol. III. G 2

6i FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

great slaughter, dispersing in all directions, and numbers falling
in the flight. The loss on the mountain side was now found to have
been very severe; nearly half the storming party had fallen, mclud-
ing their gallant commander, Captain C. B. Raitt, 1st Bombay
Grenadiers, and three other officers.

The enemy had been repulsed, and most of their influential
men were lying dead around; but the pass remained in their pos-
session, and their numbers were still very great. To follow up
9uch a success was impossible ; the heat was intense, and the suffer-
ings of the men and cattle from exhaustion and thirst were dread-
ful. The men grew clamorous for drink, and the cries of the wound-
ed and dying for water were increasing. The few bottles of beer
among the officers' baggage, given to allay the wants of the great-
est sufferers, gave rise to scenes of frenzy and despair. Men of all
castes rushed and struggled for them. The scene was agonizing to
behold. Parties were sent to search for water ; and, on receiving a
report that there was some in a ravine at some little distance, all the
pakhal camels and the hhisties were ordered there, under the escort
of the Irregular Horse, and were accompanied by the artillery horses
which were too exhausted to be fit for any work. The evening
was spent in collecting and bringing off the wounded, and about
sunset it was reported that no water had been found, and that the
whole party sent for it had been surrounded in a ravine, the greater
part cut to pieces, and the horses carried off. To add to the difficul-
ties of the situation, most of the camelmen and dcolie-bearers
had absconded after the action. In order to save the remainder
of the troops and followers, no course remained but to make a rapid
retreat to the water at Sartaf, abandoning the guns and stores,
and the garrison of Kahan.

Accordingly, at 11 o'clock, having spiked the guns, the detach-
ment moved off, the wounded men being carried on the few camels
that it was possible to take with them. Nearly everything else
was abandoned — guns, stores, camp equipage, etc., as there was
no means of removing them. The top of the Sartaf Pass was reach-
ed, fortunately, without opposition. Here all discipline was at an
end ; the men^ rushing down the hill, leaped into the pools of water
like mad men. The rear-guard was attacked by a large body of the
enemy, and the slaughter among the camp followers was immense.
As soon as the men could be got from the water, they were formed

EASTERN BALUCHISTAN TRIBES. 85

into square, as the enemy were reported on all sides, and daybreak
was awaited. When daylight broke it was found that the detach-
ment was without food, and nothing remained but to make a forced
march to Pulaji, distant more than fifty mUes. The suiierings of
all on this march from the intense heat is not to be described.

Captain A. C. Heighington, 1st Bombay Grenadiers, died the
day after the force reached Palaji, from the effects of the sun and
fatigue, and many of the men died on the march. Major Clibborn's
exertions were untiring, and his courage and self-possession through
these trying scenes were most conspicuous and were the admiration
of all. In his official despatch he deservedly noticed the gallant
bravery of Lieutenant W. Loch of the Poona Lregular Horse, and
Lieutenant G. Malcolm of the Sind Horse. The officers killed in the
disastrous attack on the pass were Captain C. B. Raitt, Lieutenant
R. R. Moore, Jemadar Jurakin Singh, 1st Grenadiers ; and Lieutenant
H. Franklin, Ensign A. Williams, and Subadar Guru Bakhsh, 2nd
Grenadiers; and of the non-commissioned officers and men, 179
were killed and 92 wounded, out of a force of about 650 men.

Referring to this affair Jacob says : —

Thus Major Clibborn gained a signal victory over, and with tremen-
dous loss to, the Marri tribe ; then appalled by the fearful heat and want of
water, unfortunately his victory was followed up by all the consequences
which usually attend on a disastrous defeat.

In the meantime the gallant little detachment at Kahan remain-
ed in suspense; they had witnessed the attack on the pass, but
it was not for seven days that they had the slightest idea that any
disaster had happened. They thought that Clibborn, finding the
Nafiusak too strong, had gone round by the Dera route.

On the 7th of September the truth was known and Captain Brown
accordingly began to make preparations for the worst. On the
17th a letter reached him from the Brigade -Major at Sukkur, in-
forming him of the disaster, and leaving him to his " own resources,
it being impossible to send any further relief."

The number of sick, and the weakly state of the rest of the
detachment, gave little chance of escape

^Captain Brown surrenders ^^ ^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^^ g^.^^ ^^^^^.^ g^^^^

put the best face on the matter, and,
making a calculation, found they could hold out until the 15th

86 ' FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

October on quarter rations and the gun bullocks ; he, therefore^,
decided on holding out unless he got honourable terms.

On the 22nd a messenger came from Doda, the Marri Chief,
to say that if Captain Brown would leave his fort, he was willing
to make terms. To this he received answer that his fort would
be given back to him on condition that he would give security for
the safe arrival of the detachment in the plains. These terms
were agreed to, and on the 28th September the garrison left the
fort, taking with them their guns. It is unnecessary to describe
the details of that return march ; suffice it so to say that, after over-
coming great difficulties and enduring much suffering, the little
band arrived at Pulaji on the 1st October, emaciated, ragged, hungry,
and destitute, yet bringing with them their gun and their honour.
The Baluchis kept to the terms of their treaty, showing honour and
even kindness to the garrison.

From the date of Captain Brown's leaving the Marri hills there
was little communication between the British Grovernment and this
tribe until Major-General Sir Charles Napier's expedition against
the Bugtis in 1845. It was then an object of great importance
to ] cut off the retreat of the latter tribe to the north, and Sir
Charles Napier, in a characteristic letter to Captain J. Jacob, then
in political charge of the frontier of Upper Sind, asked him to
undertake to gain over the Marris. Captain Jacob sent messengers
who found that the Marri Chief with all his people had deserted
Kahan, and had retreated to the next valley on the north, and
consequently there was considerable difficulty in gaining them round.
However, the chiefs were at last persuaded to wait on Captain Jacob
at Lehri, and having explained the wishes of the Major-General,.
he induced them to visit him at Dera and give the necessary
co-operation. This they did effectually and thus closed two lines
of retreat to the Bugtis. Sir Charles Napier treated the chiefs with
favour, and gave them handsome presents.

To turn now to the operations against the Bugtis. At the
beginning of 1845, provoked by repeated acts of lawlessness on the
part of the Dumkis, Jakranis, and Bugtis, Major-General Sir
Charles Napier, G.C.B., commanding in Sind, determined to under-
take a campaign, with a view to exterminating or capturing them
all. The force assembled consisted of four 9-pounder guns, nine-

EASTERN BALUCHISTAN TRIBES. 87

howitzers, three mortars, and a siege train of twenty-one pieces ;
2,000 cavalry,^ and 2,500 infantry,^ besides the forces of Amir
Ali Morad and other auxiliaries, amounting to 2,000 men and 10
guns. The plan of operations was to drive the enemy into the
hills in front of Pulaji, Uch, and Shahpur, and then advance from
Sind by Zarani, and, while the enemy was engaged in front, to send
a force from the left to cut them off from the Harris,

Before entering the Bugti hills, Sir Charles Napier issued a
proclamation to the neighbouring tribes, stating that his object
was to punish the Dumki, Jakrani, and Bugti robbers, who had
hitherto plundered, unchecked, in British territory. On the night
of the 15th of January 1845, an advanced column under Captain
Jacob surrounded the village of Shahpur, and captured sixty-
two Baluchis, three men being killed and three wounded on our
side.

At the same time a force was detached to Uch, to cut off the
retreat of the Bugtis ; this force came on the enemy in position*
700 strong, under Daria Khan, the Jakrani Chief, and immediately
charged and dispersed them, capturing 3,000 head of cattle.
In the meantime the levies had occupied Pulaji, the enemy retreat-
ing eastwards to the hills. A magazine was formed at Shahpur,
where supplies for fourteen days were collected.

A column was now ordered to advance from Pulaji on Bugti
Dera, a distance of seven marches ; and at the same time the Major-
General, with a second column, advanced by the passes to the south
of Dera. The enemy, however, alarmed by the movement in their
rear, did not wait to meet our troops, but abandoned their position
and escaped to the east. On the 30th January the force from
Pulaji reached Dera, which was occupied without opposition, and
the following day Sir Charles Napier opened communication with
this column.

The enemy having thus escaped to the east, the Major- General
halted and sent foraging parties to scour the country and bring in
cattle. These were more or less successful; but the enemy now
commenced to harass the communications, the post was twice
intercepted, sixty camels were carried off and several followers

1 9th Bengal Cavalry— Scinde Horse (dow 35th) Bundelkhand Legion.

2 2nd Bengal European Regiment— 4th Bombay Infantry (now 104th Rifles), 64th
Bengal Infantry.

88 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

murdered, and, a panic arising among the camelmen, they deserted
with five hvmdred camels from Shahpur.

Intelligence was now received that the confederate chieftains*
having ensconced themselves in a fastness only twenty miles distant,
were starving, and the next day a message was received to say that
their leader, Bijar Khan, the Dumki Chief, wished to surrender.
To this the Major-General replied: "Let the Khan lay down
his arms at my feet, and be prepared to emigrate with his followers
to a district which I will point out on the left bank of the Indus,
and he shall be pardoned. If he refuses these terms he shall be
pursued to the death."

On the 5th February a patrol discovered and killed several
armed hillmen between the passes. But famine now menaced the
army, owing to the difficulty in getting camels, and Sir Charles
Napier detached the Sind Camel Corps,^ which formed part of the
force, to fetch food from Shahpur. In one night, after a march
of fifty miles, they reached Shahpur, and, having loaded their
camels with forty-five thousand pounds of flour, they regained
camp on the morning of the 8th, having taken but two days and
three nights for the whole expedition.

On the very day this supply came, another message was
received to say that not Bijar Khan only, but all the chiefs, were
ready to surrender; but the following day a treacherous at-
tack was made on the post, and several men of the escort
were killed. Another attack was made on a small reconnoitring
party, which was, however, repulsed with a loss to the enemy.
Negotiations having failed, orders were given for active opera-
tions to be resumed, and the right of the force moved forward to
within a short distance of the Mazari frontier, the extreme left being
at Dera. At the same time the jMazaris were warned against giving
the Bugtis assistance. Fortunately, the latter, just before the com-
■ mencement of the campaign, had plundered some hill Mazaris,
and that, combined with the Major-General's warnings, induced
them to send in several chiefs with three hundred followers as
hostages for their good behaviour.

On the 18th news was brought in that the enemy's camp was at
a place on the Mazari frontier, about twenty miles distant, and it was

1 Transferred to the Bengal Presidency in 1849, and now the 59th Scinde Riflea.

EASTERN BALUCHISTAN TRIBES. "'" 89

-accordingly determined to surprise them. For this purpose the
troops marched on the 19th, but, by an accident, the enemy dis.
■ covered this intention, and fled from their position. A large
quantity of grain and a hundred and fifty loads of baggage were,
however, captured. The extreme fatigue of the troops, who had
been twenty-two hours under arms, prevented any attempt to
pursue the enemy.

The Bugtis and their allies had now retreated to the north-
east corner of the Bugti country, to the Khetran frontier ; but they
were refused an asylum in the Khetran and Sikh territories, and
were delivered over to the British operations. At last they took
refuge in Traki, a natural fortress to the north-east of Dera, where
they were surrounded by the British troops, and preparations were
made to storm their fastness. On the 4th March, however, Bijar
Khan, Dumki ; Islam Khan, Bugti ; and Daria Khan, Jakrani,
the principal chiefs of the enemy, came in to make their submission,
They demanded terms, and were told that these were— submissions
transportation from their hills, and settlement in the plains.

To these the chiefs would not agree ; so the Major-G-eneral
sent a number of small columns to scour the interior. Two brother,
of Bijar Khan were captured on the 7th, but the chief himself
eluded our troops till the 9th, when he surrendered, and was .trans-
ported to Sind. Islam Khan, Bugti, escaped to the Khetrans.
The campaign, after fifty-four days of incessant exertion, having
thus been brought to a conclusion, the force left the hills on the
15th March, and returned to Shikarpur, where it was broken up.
These operations against the Bugtis do not seem, however, to
bave had much effect, for, on the 8th August 1846, the Collector
cf Shikarpur issued the following proclamation : —

Know all men living in the British territories of Sind, that it has become
necessary to make arrangements for keeping off the Bugtis and other moun-
tain robbers, and putting a stop to their robberies. Therefore, it is hereby
ordered, that whoever] will seize any of the Bugti mountaineers, and de-
liver them to the British horsemen, shall receive a reward of Rs. 10 for each
man of the mountaineers so seized and delivered up.

That there was some reason for this proclamation was soon
■shown, for on the 10th December 1846, the Bugtis assembled a
Jforce of some 1,500 armed men, mostly on foot, and marched into

90 FEONTIER AND OVEBSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Sind ; they passed through the British outposts to within fifteen
miles of Shikarpur, remained twenty-four hours in British territory,
secured every head of cattle in the country round, and returned to
their hills, seventy-five miles, with all their booty — 15,000 head —
in safety. They conducted their proceedings with the greatest
coolness and system, bringing with them, besides the armed force,
nearly 500 unarmed followers to drive the cattle. This inroad
was thought to be in too great force for the detachments at the
outposts to attempt any resistance. Timely information reached-
the Shahpur post, but no troops moved out from it against the
invading Bugtis. A regiment of cavalry and 200 bayonets were
sent from Shikarpur to repel the invaders. The cavalry came on
them at Hudi, some forty-five miles from Shikarpur, their im-
armed attendants meanwhile continuing to drive the cattle towards
the hills. However, the British troops being ignorant of the ground,
and thinking the robbers too strong to be attacked, returned to
Shikarpur without attempting anything further. The Bugtis
ultimately reached their hills with all their prey, and without
the loss of a man.

Major Jacob was now ordered up to the frontier from Hyderabad
T> _.- w X , J ,o.- ■w^itt the Scinde Irregular Horse, and from

Bugtis' fatal raid, 1847. . . *. i

the date oi his arrival a new era com-
menced. The Bugtis found that their master had come on the
scene. Raids, however, did not cease at once, and several were
committed during 1847, and on the 1st October of that year
occurred the famous raid in which Lieutenant W. L. Merewether,
Scinde Irregular Horse, killed nearly 600 marauders.

In this affair, a large body of Bugtis having entered bhe plain
and attacked some villages. Lieutenant Merewether, with a party
of the Scinde Horse — 133 of all ranks — started in pursuit from
Shahpur at 1-30 a.m. on the 1st October. He came up with the
. enemy soon after daybreak. Lieutenant Merewether's accoimt
of this affair is interesting : — -

I was informed by a local Baluch guide that he beard loud shouting and'
much noise in the direction of Koonree. My detachment was marching
in column of troops ; I wheeled them into line and proceeded in the direction
of Koonree ; when near the jungle about that place, I saw the
nemy formed in a deep and long line to my left. They were making a-

EASTERN BALVCmSTAN TRIBES. 91

side movement towards the jungle. I therefore passed rapidly along their
front so as to head them away from the jungle in the plain. By this
time they had halted in some rough broken ground with sand hillocks
and bushes, but probably fancying from my galloping along their front
that I did not mean to attack them, they left their vantage ground
and rushed forward to attack me with much firing, loud shouts, and howls.
This at once gave me all I wished for, namely, a fair field.

Immediately I changed front to the left and charged. The charge was
made steadily, rapidly, and with irresistible efiect. The Bugti had formed
a solid mass to receive us, but were overthrown at the first onset with ter-
rible loss. They then moved off towards the hills — distant some three miles^
in disorder, but shouldering together as closely as they could. We continued
our attacks, killing numbers, until on le-crossing the Teemanee river they
made another short stand. They were again broken up and driven into
the open plain. The efiect of our little carbines, used in one hand at close
quarters, was quite terrible to behold. Every shot appeared to kill or
disable an enemy, who were often by reason of the bushes and broken
ground enabled to keep just out of swords' reach. They were now
approaching the low hills when Ressaidar Shaikh AH, very judiciously
getting some men in advance, cut them off from their place of refuge.
They then turned back towards Koonree.

Their numbers were now getting small. Repeated ofjers of quarter
were made to them, but they obstinately continued to fight until the destruc-
tion was so great that of their original 700 only some 120 remained fighting,
of whom many were wounded. They were then induced to throw down their
arms, and surrender. Not a single footman escaped death or capture. Two
horsemen alone escaped.^ From prisoners I learnt that the force was
700 strong including 25 horsemen.

Our own loss was only 9 killed and wounded. Nine horses were killed
and ten wounded.

The whole tribe, broken and disheartened, fled for refuge to
the Khetrans. The Bugti Chief, Islam Khan, was married to a
sister of Mir Haji, the Khetran Chief. These two tribes then united,
and attacked the Harris, and at first had some success, but
the Harris eventually defeated the Bugtis with trifling loss to them-
selves, but with a loss of 500 to their opponents.

Notwithstanding these losses, the Bugtis endeavoured to make
one more effort in Sind, but without success. Still the chief did
not surrender, and, to bring matters to a crisis. Major Jacob gave

1 Subsequent reports from native sources showed a considerably larger number.

"92 FltONTIER AND OVKRSEAB EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA .

out that he was going to Dera in person to seize Islam Khan.
When this intelligence reached that chief, he came into British
territory and gave himself up, and he and a number of the tribe,
who also made their submission, were located in British territory.
Islam Khan, however, shortly after decamped with his family,
and returned to the hills.

In spite of the severe lessons they had received, this border
continued to be harassed by parties of Bugtis.

With the Harris we had had little communication after 1845,
and although they carried on their depredations without check
over Kachi, as far south as Kanda, yet they took care to avoid
encroaching on British territory until 18-49, when, becoming bold
by long impunity, and instigated by the golden promises of
Diwan Mulraj of Multan, they commenced predatory incursions into
British territory, and on the 7th April of that year joined the Bugtis
and the Khetrans in an attack on the Kasmor post.

The detachment of the Scinde Irregular Horse (40 sabres) at
that place had been relieved by a similar party. The relieved party
under command of Naib-Risaldar Karam Ali Khan, marched from
Kasmor towards Kumbi about two o'clock on the morning of the 7th
April, and had only departed about one hour, when the party
at Kasmor, which had not yet gone into the lines, but was encamp-
ed outside, was surrounded and attacked on all sides. A duffadar
going his rounds first fell in with the enemy and was killed.
The hillmen, immensely outnumbering the men of the Scinde Horse,
rushed in among the horses, and a desperate hand-to-hand conflict
ensued, which ended in the enemy being beaten off with some
loss, leaving many of their number dead on the ground. On our
side the Scinde Horse had one duffadar and three sowars killed,
and four sowars severely wounded, and the Baluch Guides
had two sowars killed. When the attack commenced on the party
at Kasmor, Naib-Risaldar Karam Ali Khan was about four miles
•distant on the road to Kumbi ; but, hearing the firing in the direction
of Kasmor, he galloped back wath his party towards that place,
and, as he approached, he came on a body of 300 or 400 horsemen,
driving off 1,000 camels. He at once charged and dispersed them
with severe loss, and then, following them up for a considerable
distance, recovered and brought back the whole of the plunder.
He then returned to Kasmor.

EABTERU BALUGBIBTAN TRIBES. 93

The attacking party, it was afterwards ascertained, had assem-
bled in Bugti territory, and consisted of about 500 men of the Bugti,
Marri, and Khetran tribes. Their loss was forty killed, more than
that number wounded, and a great number of their mares killed,
wounded, and taken. The party was led by Mir Haji, the Khetran
Chief, and others.

This attack on the Kasmor post was merely a blind for a more
serious attempt to the westward, some 1,500 Harris having, at the
same time, entered the plain country by the Lehri river. Owing
to the activity of the troops on the frontier, this threatened raid
bd to nothing.

After the attack on Kasmor, two other raids were made by the
Bugtis during the year 1849, but in both of these the camels carried
off were recovered, although the raiders escaped.

On the 24th December, 1850, a party of Bugtis carried off
a number of camels from the jungle near Kand Kot. Durga Singh,
the native officer of the Kand Kot detachment of Scinde Horse,
started in pursuit, and, after a ride of sixty miles, arrived, with
only three men, in the face of the robbers, who numbered one hun-
dred. Notwithstanding, this officer gallantly charged and killed
a great number, losing, however, his own life and that of two of
his troopers. The place of his death is pointed out still with
unfeigned admiration by the Baluchis, and is known as Durga
Kushta.

After the annexation, the Mazaris and Gurchanis gave much

trouble on our border, and up to 1853'

Affairs subsequent to an- j ,■ rj.ix,„ j.- li

nexation of the Punjab. armed parties of the former contmued to

carry on their plundering expeditions in
British territory. About this time an Assistant Commissioner was
appointed to Mithankot, and thenceforward the reclamation of
the Mazaris commenced ; so that those once inveterate plunderers
are now peaceable and useful subjects. During the troubled
times of the Mutiny the chief of this tribe showed his loyalty by
doing good service for the Government.

The Gurchanis, however, after the Mazaris had settled down
into peaceful subjects, continued turbulent. The sections of the-
tribe which gave most trouble were the Petafis and Lasharis.
They were inveterate thieves, and their highway robberies in Har-
land, Dajal, and Fazilpur became notorious. The Lasharis lived.

34 FEONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

mostly in the hills, but they used to come down to graze their flocks
along the border, and had connections and accomplices in the plains.
Th ey also aided the Harris on several occasions in raiding on the
Punjab frontier.,

In January 1852, a severe shock of earthquake occurred at
Kahan. One side of the fort wall was thrown down, the remainder
much shattered, and the greater number of the houses inside were
overthrown, burying beneath the ruins many men, women, and
children, with some cattle, and a great deal of property.

At the same time another even more fearful calamity over-
took a portion of the tribe living with their cattle in a large cave
some little distance to the northward. The hill in which the cave
was, was violently shaken and fell, burying nearly every living
being at that time within it. The road by Naffusak to Kahan
was completely closed by the hill falling and filling up the pass ;
two hundred and sixty Musalmans, including women and children,
were killed, and upwards of eighty Hindus, with a large quantity
■of cattle.

On the 11th December, 1852, a large body of Harris, said to
have been the whole assembled tribe, horse and foot, suddenly
issued from the hills and attacked the town of Pulaji, occupied by
Kaihiris, a small Baluch tribe friendly to the British. The Harris
killed forty, chiefly unarmed cultivators and herdsmen, and wounded
many more, without apparently suffering any loss themselves.
'They then carried o£E all the cattle from the country round, and
returned to their hills. This raid was committed with the con-
nivance and assistance of some of the principal Kalat Sardars,
headed by the Wazir, Huhammad Hassan. Hajor Jacob accordingly
wrote a strong remonstrance to the Khan of Kalat.

On the 3rd April 1853, a party of Hari marauders carried off
some cattle from near Kasmor. Risaldar Shekh Karim, of the Sind
Horse, in command of the post, went in pursuit, and came on the
enemy, eighty horse and eighty foot, the latter strongly posted
on the hill. The troops at once attacked them, though they only
numbered thirty-two sabres. After a hard fight the enemy fled.
The loss of the Sind Horse was one native officer, seven sowars,
and nine horses killed, and two men wounded. A great many of
the enemy were killed, but in the darkness of the night the
.aumber could not be ascertained.

EASTERN BALUCHISTAN TRIBES. 95

On the 18th May 1853, 180 Harris and Lasharis attacked
a small detachment of the 4th Punjab Cavalry on the Dera
Ghazi Khan border, and cut up six grass cutters and five of the
-escort.

After this the Marris carried on their depredations chiefly
in Kachi, and avoided making attacks on Sind territory, although
their raids on the Punjab frontier did not altogether cease. They
were also engaged in a war with the Bugtis, which was carried on
■with varying fortunes.

From 1854 to 1857 the Gurchanis continued to give much
trouble, and in the latter year a party acted as guides to a large
body of Marris in a formidable attack on the Punjab frontier.
This raid was made on the 17th August by 220 horsemen.
The marauders, on emerging from the hills, divided into
two parties, one taking the road towards Drigi, and carrying
off all the cattle they could lay hands on, the other scourino
the plain in front of Muhammadpur and Fatehpur, and col-
lecting all the herds they could find ; the parties then united
on the plain opposite Fatehpur, and made for the hills. In the
meantime, Bijar Khan, the Drishak^ Chief and commandant of
Asni, who with about 60 horse and foot was patrolling in that
■direction, heard from a villager that the Marris were making for the
hills with their booty. The chief immediately sent notice to the
neighbouring posts, and being reinforced by 56 horse and foot, he
proceeded to attack the enemy ; but the latter were more than
■double the number of our levies, who were ultimately defeated with
great slaughter, the marauders making good their retreat with
immense booty. In this engagement, the chief, Bijar Khan, his
eldest son, and twenty-six of the party were killed, besides several
wounded, the loss being chiefly among the Drishak tribe, who rallied
round their chief, and fell fighting by his side ; of the twenty-six
killed, twenty-four were Drishaks, the other two being Buf^tis. The
loss of property was estimated at Rs. 6,000.

The success of this raid was principally due to the absence
of all regular troops from the Rajanpur frontier, owinw to
the 1st Punjab Cavalry having been withdrawn for service in
Hindustan.

1 A Baluch tribe of the Dera Ghazi Khan district whose head- quarters are
Asni. The tribe, however, is much scattered in the district.

96 FHONTIEB AND OVESSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

On the 28th March 1858, a party of 40 police and levies-
following up some stolen cattle into the hills, were attacked by a
party of 100 Marris, and defeated with some loss.

In addition to their raids on the Dera Ghazi Khan frontier,,
the Marris continued their inroads into Kachi, and their conduct
in that direction became so intolerable, that, in 1858-59, Khudadad
Khan, the young Khan of Kalat, on the advice of Brigadier-General
J. Jacob, C. B., the Political Superintendent, Upper Sind Frontier,
collected the whole forces of the Khanate to punish them. Just
at this time Brigadier-General Jacob died, and was succeeded by
Major W. H. R. Green, who accompanied the expedition with an
escort consisting of a squadron of the Scinde Irregular Horse,,
under Major Malcolm S. Green.

The forces of the Khan assembled at Bhag on the 21st January
1859, to the number of 4,000 horse and 4,000 foot, and marched
on the following day. Dera was reached on the 3rd February, and
Kahan was occupied without opposition on the 7th. The fort was
destroyed, and the force halted to await the arrival of a convoy
of provisions from Kachi. This convoy arrived on the 23rd, and on
the following day the force moved to the north, in which direction
the Marris had retreated.

On the 28th the Marri Chief came into camp with a number
of his followers, and tendered his submission to the Kiian of Kalat,
and begged for mercy for his tribe. Negotiations were accordingly
opened with the Marris, who professed their willingness to accede
to any terms offered, to acknowdedge the Khan as their lawful
prince, and to give hostages for future good behaviour,

To this arrangement Major W. H. R. Green was most averse,
for though there was little doubt that the tribe had met with most
severe punishment, their fields and forts having been destroyed,
their supplies of grain and 1,800 head of cattle captured, yet
his knowledge of their innate love of plunder made him fear that if
some very severe example was not made of them when within the
Khan's grasp, they would soon return to their old habits. How-
ever, His Highness considered they had been sufficiently punished,
and the same opinion appeared to prevail among many of the other
Chiefs. As the Khan had been the principal sufferer by the Marri
depredations, Major Green considered that it would not be proper
to force further hostilities. He, therefore, informed the Khan thnt

EASTERN BALUCHISTAN TRIBES. 97

he was at liberty to act as he pleased, but that he would be held
strictly responsible for any depredations made by this tribe on.
British territory at any future time.

Accordingly, having taken hostages for the future good con -
duct of the tribe, the force again marched for Kachi by the difficult
Chakar Pass, and re-entered the plains on the 14th March.

One result of this expedition was to prove to the Marris how
even their most inaccessible strongholds can be entered and de-
stroyed. Since the disaster which befell the detachment of British
troops under Major T. Clibborn in 1840, the Marris had regarded
themselves as invincible. This campaign completely destroyed their
prestige.

One of the guns lost by Major Clibborn in 1840 was recovered
during the expedition, and was sent to Jacobabad.

After the raid on the Asni plain in August 1857, already
narrated, the Lashari clan of the Gurchanis, who had acted as guides
to the Marris on that occasion, absconded to the hills, and the
greater part joined the Marris, with whom they continued to raid m
the plains. At last, in March 1858, Captain F. R. Pollock, Deputy
Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan, with the consent of Govern-
ment, determined, under cloak of an expedition by the Survey
Department to the Mari Hill, just beyond our border, to surprise
some Lashari villages in the vicinity. The attempt was not, how-
ever, successful, as the Lasharis, having obtained intelligence of the
intention, moved off to the mouth of a small pass within our terri-
tory, sending at the same time a party to follow and annoy the
surveyors.

It appears, however, that the spot to which the Lasharis had
removed was within a convenient distance of the Shambani Bugtis
and Mazaris, and these tribes — thinking the opportunity a good
one to punish their common foe and enrich themselves^made aa
attack on them, and carried off 2,000 cattle. In this affair sevea
Lasharis and two Bugtis were killed. The conduct of the Mazaris
and Bugtis was undoubtedly reprehensible, but there were several
circumstances of an extenuating character, and it was well known
that we desired to punish the Lasharis.

The first attempt to reclaim the Lasharis was made in 1860,
and although the process was slow, a change for the better gradually
took place.

Vol. III. H

98 FliONTlER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROil INDIA.

After the expedition against the Harris in 1859, there was a
long respite from raids till February 1862, when several raids were
committed on the Punjab border and on the Bugtis in their hills
The conduct of the latter with regard to the British, from 1852 to
1861, was most exemplary, but in that year, owing to internal
dissensions, the tribe became disorganised, and raids were again
commenced on the Sind Frontier. The offenders belonged chiefly
to the Kalpur and Musuri clans.

On the 26th January 1867, occurred the great raid on Harrand
lay 1,200 Harris, Bugtis, and Khetrans, under the leadership of
a noted freebooter, Ghulam Husain, Husuri Bugti, Timely informa-
tion of the intended raid was conveyed to Hajor W. H. Paget,
commanding at Rajanpur, by the Bugti Chief. On the morning
of the 26th the hillmen came out of a pass, about ten miles north
of Harrand, and their horsemen at once swept round to try and collect
the cattle, but met with little success, as these had been driven oS
to the rear on receipt of warning of the intended raid. The footmen
had, in the meantime, fired some of the hamlets, and the whole then
letired towards the hills.

The news of the raid immediately spread, and the Gurchanis,
numbering some 350 horse and foot, assembled under their tuman-
dur, Ghulam Haidar Khan. The detachment of the 5th Punjab
Cavalry,^ from Harrand, numbering 27 sabres, under Jemadar
Imam Khan, turned out most promptly. The burning of the ham-
lets showed the outposts the position of the raiders, and no time
■was lost in arriving on the scene of action. The force overtook
the enemy, who had formed a line close to the hills. The ground
■was very bad for cavalry, and Ghulam Haidar Khan wished to wait
ior reinforcements. The native officer, however, insisted that he
must advance, as the enemy would get into the hills and the cavalry
would be unable to act. Accordingly, the 5th Punjab Cavalry
detachment, followed by Ghulam Haidar Khan and the moimted
Gurchanis, broke into a trot. The sight of the cavalry thus ad-
vancing was too much for the raiders ; they moved forward for a
short distance, then wavered, and all attempts of Ghulam Husain
to rally them being futile, fled as soon as the cavalry got within
carbine range. They were followed by the Gurchani footmen

1 Now 25th Cavalry (Frontier Force).

" ■ EASTEBN BALUCHISTAN TRIBES. 99

up the hillside, and the pursuit was continued towards the Dragal
mountain, under which a body of twenty-three Harris and twelve
Musuri Bugtis were surrounded, and the latter, refusing to surrender,
were killed. The enemy's loss in this aifair was two hundred and
fifty-eight killed (ninety-three Bugtis, seventy Harris, and ninety-
"five Khetrans and Pathans) and twenty-four prisoners. Among
the killed were Ghulam Husain and several noted criminals.
The loss on our side was one dufiadar, two sowars, and about
fifty Gurchanis wounded.

For his gallant conduct on this occasion, Jemadar Iman
Khan received the Order of Herit. As a reward for his services,
"the grants which had previously been confiscated were restored
to Ghulam Haidar Khan, and also the privilege of collecting
his share in kind.

After this raid the Harris and the Bugtis refrained from molest-
ing the Punjab frontier, although the former continued to carry
on depredations in Kachi and in the Bolan Pass. In 1871, after con-
sultation between the Punjab and Sind authorities at Hithankot,^
a,rrangements were made for the better management of these tribes.
Allowances were granted to them to induce them to desist from
raiding on the British border in return for tribal service. The
system of policy towards these tribes on the Sind and Punjab
frontiers was at the same time made uniform, and since then their
management has been much simplified. The attitude of both the
Harris and the Bugtis, instead of being one of continued hostility,
became friendly, and their chiefs showed a readiness to assist the
British ofl&cers entrusted with the management of this border.

But, although they respected British territory, their inter-
tribal feuds continued. In 1873 the Harris raided in Kalat territory,
and in December of that year they made an attack, headed by their
chief in person, on the Khetrans, quite close to the British border
in front of Dera Ghazi Khan. The Khetrans lost seven killed,
and a number of cattle and sheep were carried off. The Harris
had two men killed. In January 1874, they made a similar attack
on the Husa Khel Pathans, sixteen of whom were killed, the loss
of the Harris being only two. In this case also a large amount of
booty was carried oS. In the beginning of 1874 the Commissioner

' See page 58.

100 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

of Sind proposed that the Harris should be punished by a blockade,
and, in the event of that failing, by a punitive expedition. This
course, however, was not sanctioned by the Government, and it
was decided to settle matters, if possible, without resorting to
coercive measures.

In the meantime fresh complications occurred. The Bugti
tribe, aided by some Harris, committed a serious outrage in Sind
territory, and carried off some 2,000 head of cattle. The effect
of this raid was to embroil the two tribes directly with the British
Government ; whereas previous to this occurrence there was no
complaint against the Bugtis, and the culpability of the Harris
consisted in the contumacious attitude assumed by the chief and
tribe towards their superior, the Khan of Kalat.

There is little doubt that the cause of the Harris assuming
this line of conduct was the facility of playing off the Sind
and Punjab authorities one against the other. Comparatively
tractable to the latter, they had justly rendered themselves
obnoxious to the former by violating openly and repeatedly their
nominal subjection to the Khan of Kalat. The Government
therefore determined to deal directly with the tribe in future so
as to render it impossible for them to evade their responsibilities.
Eventually, a satisfactory settlement was effected, both with the
Harris and Bugtis.

At the beginning of 1877 the Lashari section of the Gurchani
tribe showed a tendency to revert to their old marauding habits,
but measures were taken with much success to recover property
stolen by them, and to prevent a recurrence of such misdeeds.
In 1880 the Durkanis, one of the hill sections of the Gurchanis,
gave some trouble by their lawless behaviour. They became
involved in a feud with the Khetrans, and were joined by a few
of their brethren from British territory. In December 1880, this
feud had so spread as to threaten the whole border. The matter
was taken up by the local British authorities, who, in January
1881, succeeded in patching up a peace between the two tribes
at Harrand. The Durkanis, however, in Harch violated their
agreement, and committed a serious raid on the Khetrans. For
this offence a blockade was imposed, and shortly afterwards thev
made their submission, and the blockade was removed on the 29th
July 1881. They, however, did not cease to make reprisals, and

EASTERN BALUCHISTAN TRIBES. 101

plunder their neighbours in the hills beyond the border. The main
reason for their restlessness was the reduced condition of this clan,
many of whose members were in poor and straitened circumstances.
A grant of land was made to the Durkani headmen, on condition
of its being cultivated by their clansmen, in order to induce them
to take to more settled habits. The Lasharis, the other hill section
of the Gurchanis, have behaved fairly well since then.

The Gurchani tumandar, Sardar Ghulam Haidar Khan, who had
been the chief of the tribe since the annexation, died on the 23rd
March 1884. His son, Jalal Khan, succeeded him.

A feud broke out in 1889 between the Durkanis and the
Hodiani section of the Legharis, and the former were blockaded
ior some time.

CHAPTER VI.

KABRANI8 AND B0ZDAB8.

Op the Kasranis, about one-third reside now (1907) inthehilU
beyond the border, and are all under the political jurisdiction of
the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan. The northern
boundary of their territory is the Kaora Nala, which marks the'
dividing line on the Sulimans between Pathan and Baluch, the
Kasranis being the most northerly Baluch tribe.

The tribe is poor and the number of men in the hills capable
of bearing arms is probably less than 500.

The total population of the tribe is some 5,000.

EXPEDITION AGAINST THE KASRANIS, BY A FORCE UNDER BRIGADIER
J. S. HODGSON, IN APRIL 1853.

When the Multan outbreak took place in 1848, and Lieutenant

H. B. Edwardes took the field against
xp iionm o. Di^an Mulraj, Mita Khan, the Kasran

Chief, took possession of the fort of Mangrotha, and ejected the
DiwarCs deputy. He then cjuietly waited to see how events would
turn out, prepared to act his part accordingly. When he saw
the scale turning in favour of the British Government, he offered
his services to Lieutenant Edwardes.

On annexation, he was confirmed in the grants he had enjoyed
under former rulers of the Punjab, which he seems to have done
little to deserve ; for he winked at raids and petty robberies by the
hill portion of his tribe, and by his neighbours, the Bozdars.

The conduct of the Kasranis after the annexation continued to
be most unsatisfactory ; the country round Dera Fateh Khan was
continually harassed by them, and many hundred head M stolen
cattle were conveyed through their passes into the interior.

At last the conduct of the tribe became so bad that, early irt
1852, Major J. Nicholson,^ the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Isn ail

1 General Nir-holson of Mutiny fame.
( 103 ^

104 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Khan, suggested that the Kasranis in the plains should be held
responsible for the good conduct of their brethren in the hills.

Shortly after this, in March 1852, the Kasranis signalised them-
selves by a most audacious attack on Dera Fateh Khan. One of their
chiefs, Yusaf Khan, held a village in British territory. From this
village a subordinate (a fiscal emfloye) disappeared under suspicious
circumstances. Yusaf Khan was summoned to answer, but did not
appear. His brother was, however, found and sent in to the civil
officer, when, in trying to escape from custody, he fell from a wall,
i-nd received injuries from which he died. Yusaf Khan then organ-
ised an expedition against Dera Fateh Khan, about twenty miles
from the hills — a measure which had been once before adopted in
the Sikh time — and, on the evening of the 16th of March 1852, about
300 Kasrani foot, with 40 horse, started from the Kaora Pass,
and marching between the posts of Gurwali and Yihoa, arrived at
Dera Fateh Khan at early dawn on the 17th. The force at the
thana consisted of 14 horse and 19 foot, but it was not strong enough
to offer much opposition ; and the Kasranis plundered such portion
of the bazar as was not under fire from the thana, and then retired,
with the loss of three killed and one prisoner, but carrying off most of
the cattle of the village. Our loss was five killed and three wounded,
iind in addition three horses were killed and five wounded.

The Kasranis in their retreat took a more southerly direction
than in their advance, making for the road between Yihoa and
Thata ; to both of which posts, the most northerly of the Dera
Ghazi Khan district, news of the attack had been sent by the Thana-
' dar, who was following up the Kasranis, and collecting as many
of the people of the country as he could as he went along. About
seven miles south of Yihoa he was joined by the cavalry detach-
ments from these outposts, when the force altogether mustered
two native officers and forty-three sabres of the 4th Punjab
Cavalry^ and thirty-nine horse and sixty foot of the levies.

The Kasranis had taken up a strong position behind an em-
bankment, where they were out of fire. The Thanadar wanted to
attack with the foot levies first, but the cavalry native officer deter-
mined to charge at once, which was done in a most gallant manner,
although the attack was repulsed with the loss of one native officer

1 Afterwards disbanded.

KASRANIS AND BOZDARS. 105

■and three sowars killed, and six sowars wounded, besides three horses
'killed and nine wounded.

The enem.y, it was believed, had many casualties, but they
made good their retreat with their booty, except four baniahs they
were carrying ofi for ransom to the hills, who managed to escape
in the melee.

In the month of April following, the Kasranis assembled and
threatened British territory, but a force from Dera Ismail Khan,
consisting of the 5th Punjab Cavalry and Sind Camel Corps, moved
down during the night to Vihoa, where it was joined by a detach-
ment of the 4th Punjab Cavalry and 200 men of the Police Battalion
from Dera Ghazi Khan, and the enemy then dispersed.

The tribe, however, continued their depredations, and a block-
ade was accordingly imposed on the hill Kasranis.

Mita Khan, the chief, did not join in the attack upon Dera
Fateh Khan, because he had too much at stake in the plains to com-
mit himself openly against the Government ; but he did not exert
his influence to avert it, and he sent no intimation of the gathering
or intentions of his tribe to any of our frontier officers or posts.

On being taxed by Major Nicholson with his culpable neglect,
he attempted to deny that he possessed any influence among his
tribe, or knew anything of their intentions ; but on it being recalled
to his recollection that he had shown his influence a few years before
: by laying siege to Dera Fateh Khan at the head of his tribe,
and being told that he must either be with or against the Govern-
ment openly, he changed his tone, and next day, as an earnest
of his intentions, sent in two men he had had seized, and promised
to capture more.

Major Nicholson considered the infliction of summary punish-

; meut on the Kasranis desirable ; but he thought the chastisement

■ of such a poor hill tribe, thinly scattered over a very rugged country,

and without anything deserving the name of a village, extremely

' difficult.

In the meantime he considered that the posts of Vihoa and
Thata should be increased to 50 cavalry each with a sufficient num-
ber of foot to enable the whole of the cavalry to take the field in an
■emergency ; that a post should be established at Daulatwala of the
•same strength ; and that at least 100 infantry should be left at Dera
Fateh Khan, to reassure the people, who were much alarmed, and

V3L.. III.

106 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

inclined to forsake their homes for some place of greater security ._
Until Yusaf Khan was captured or killed, or heavy retribution
inflicted on the Kasrani tribe, he did not consider it safe to rekx
these precautionary measures.

In the spring of 1853, owing to Major Nicholson's representa-
tions, on the return of the expeditionary force from the Shirani
hills, the opportunity was taken to chastise the Kasranis. Accori-
^^ , , ,„ „ ., in"ly, a force (see Appendix A), consisting

Detachment, 4th Pi;njab , .11 t \^ ^ -,

Qa^j^iry. of 495 of all ranks, under the command

1st Punjab Infantry. of Brigadier J. S. Hodgson, commanding

6th Police Battalion. ^|^g Punjab Irregular Force, and accom-

panied by Major J. Nicholson, marched from Pehur towards the
Bati pass (thirteen miles) at 10 p.m., on the night of the 11th
of April 1853. The column reached the mouth of the pass
at daybreak the next morning, and found the enemy (who had
evidently received intelligence of the approach of the troops) in>.
position behind breastworks on the hills on both sides of the pass.

These hills were ascended and the breastworks taken by two
companies, 1st Punjab Infantry,^ under Lieutenant C. P. Keyes, and
two companies under Lieutenant E. J. Travers, whilst the remainder
of the force advanced up the pass for about a mile, when the village
of Bati, the head-quarters of the tribe, was reached ; it was defended
by a very high stockade erected on the crest of a precipitous ridge
above the village, the fire from which swept the gorge. As the right
flankers had difficulty in enfilading this position, it was carried by
a rush of the light company of the 6th Police Battalion and some
twenty men of the 1st Punjab Infantry, under Lieutenant Keyes,
supported by the remainder of the 6th Police Battalion. Bati con-
sisted of some eighty or ninety well and substantially built houses,
and it was, with two other hamlets, completely destroyed, with the
exception of the mosque and the houses of a malik and his son, wha
had held aloof from the misconduct of the tribe.

The enemy had not time to remove their property, of which
a great quantity was destroyed ; some of the Kasrani flocks were
captured by the skirmishers and two zamburaks,^ which the Kasranis
had captured from Sawan Mal,^ with a number of matchlocks, were

1 Now 55th Coke's Rifle-.

2 Smal' field guns used in the Sikh Army.

3 Si'ch Deputy in the Derajat previous to our occu^iation. _

K A SUA N IS AND BOZDARS. lOT

also taken. The troops then retired in the same formation as they
had advanced, and reached the mouth of the pass at 10 a.m., the
enemy ineffectually trying to harass the retirement. There was
no water between Pehur and the hills, and the force had therefore
to march back to its encampment at Pehur where it arrived at
2 P.M. ; the main body having marched thirty-four miles, whilst
the skirmishers had marched some forty miles in all.

Whilst the troops were employed in the pass, the police and
levies had destroyed the encampments of those portions of the tribe
in the plain who were known to have joined the enemy as the
troops approached, but two encampments in the neighbourhood,
the inhabitants of which remained peaceably in their homes, were
not molested. The 4th Punjab Cavalry, under Captain G. 0. Jacob,,
had patrolled between the Bati Pass and Vihoa during the opera-
tions. Our loss amounted to one killed and ten wounded ; that of
the enemy was not known ; they acknowledged to have had five
killed and wounded. The Indian medal, with a clasp for the
"North-West Frontier" was granted in 1869 to all survivors
of the troops engaged in these operations.

After this expedition, raids for the most part ceased, and

before the end of the year (1853), the
chief of the plain Kasranis, Mita.
Khan, who had previously been lukewarm, and who, when called
to account, had urged that he could not be responsible for the
control of his hill neighbours unless the 'ost rights of retaliation
were restored to him, engaged to guard the passes of the Kas-
rani hills, seven in number. He had formerly enjoyed perquisites
and privileges under Sikh rule, worth about Rs. 500 per annum*
These had been continued since the annexation. He was now to
receive Rs. 500 more in cash from the British Government in
return for the responsibility undertaken.

This arrangement was so far successful, that the authorities,
were enabled in 1854 to remove the prohibition against hill Kas-
ranis entering British territory. Soon after, Yusaf Khan died,
and his son was subsequently pardoned, and permitted to return
to his village.

In the operations against the Bozdars in 1857, Mita Khan, with
some of his tribe, were employed with the levies.

lOS FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The Baluchi tribe of Bozdars is, for the most j^art, resident
_ , in the hills. At first, after the annexa-

Bozdars. •pi

tion of the Derajat m 1849, this tribe
was guilty of many marauding expeditions into the plains. Their
■chief, however, was subsidised with a small assignment of land
revenue inside the British border, which rendered the tribe amen-
able for s:)me time. This assignment was resumed at the time of
the expedition in 1857, but re-granted shortly afterwards.

The tribe is entirely under the political jurisdiction of the
Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi Khan. The Bozdars have
ceased to give trouble, and serve readily in the Baluch Levy Corps
at Dera Ghazi and Fort Munro. A relative of the Bozdar Chief has
recently (1906) been given a direct commission in the 127th Balu-
chis, and an experiment is now being made in that regiment to
enlist the men of this tribe in the regular army. Living entirely
in the hills, the Bozdars are not big men. They are, however,
like all Baluchis — possessed of great endurance. They are of
Rind extraction and are said to be an offshoot of the Legharis.

They are divided into the Dulani, Ladwani, Ghulamani, Chak-
rani, Sihani, Shawani, Jalalani Jafirani, and Bustamani clans.
They fight with the matchlock rather than with the sword. ^
'They are more civilised than most of the trans-frontier tribes,
and are of all the Baluchis the strictest Muhammadans. They
are great graziers, and their name is said to be derived from
the Persian huz, a goat, as they were formerly famous for the
immense number of sheep and goats which they possessed. The
hill Bozdars number 5,000 souls. According to the last census,
there are about 3,000 Bozdars in British territory ; these live in
scattered villages about Rajanpur and among the Legharis,
and have no connection with the parent tribe.

The Bozdar country is entirely mountainous, being formed
of the outer spurs of the Suliman range. The main spurs run down
from the parent range with a direction generally easterly, and in-
stead of sinking gradually into the plains, they split into successive
ridges, running north and south, connected with each other by a dis-
tinct watershed, but having the appearance from the plains of form-
ing three separate ranges. These curious parallel and knife-edged

1 Unlike other Baluchis.

KASEANIS AND HOZDARS. 109-^

spurs are divided from each other by the main drainage lines^
of the country, which run east and west. These are called the
Drug, Lundi, Saunra, Sori, and Vidor passes, of which only the
Lundi extends beyond and to the west of the third range. The
main ravines have generally more or less water in them, but the
lesser ones seldom or never, except after rain. There is another
peculiarity in the Bozdar hills, which, however, is common to
the whole border from Sind to Bannu, namely, the narrow
defiles called tokhs, running north and south between what may
be described as enormous walls, so precipitously do the hills rise
on either side. By these tokhs there is communication from the
northernmost to the southernmost point of the Bozdar country,,
and it would be quite possible for a marauding band of northern
Bozdars to go by them and raid in the southernmost part of the
Khosa country without entering the plains at all in coming and
going ; but though continuous, the route is by no means direct, as
the road follows the ravines, though preserving a general direction^
north and south.

The greater portion of the tribe are situated between the
first and second ranges ; the Ghulamani section inhabit the Majvel
valley, north of, and contiguous to, the Khetran country. The
road between the Majvel and the main valley is through a very
narrow pass called Saunra.

The language, dress, and food of the Bozdars are the same as
of other Baluch tribes. Owing to their strictness with regard to their
religious observances, a large number of priests and Saiyids reside in
their lands, and consequently a few mosques, built of mud or
thatch, are to be seen here and there. They are, however, by no
means fanatical, nor do they seem to have any distaste for British
rule. The Bozdars are constantly at feud with their northern
neighbours, the Ustaranas, and also with the Khetrans on their
south.

In former times the Bozdars had always a turbulent character -,
and being so powerful, and living in such close proximity to the
border, previous Governments found it politic to bestow a yearly
allowance on the chiefs, in order to give them a certain hold over the
tribe. Thus it appears, as far back as the reign of Akbar, they receiv-
ed an allowance of eighty maunds of grain per annum. Under the
Sikh rule, they repeatedly carried fire and sword into the Der.i'-

110 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Ghazi Khan district. The Sikh ruler, Sawan Mai of Multan, in
vain endeavoured to repel them by force. Finally he built a fort
at Mangrotha and granted an allowance tothe BozdarChief, in
Teturn for which the chief agreed to guard the passes through
his country. The S'khs, however, were unable to enforce these
■conditions.

Bozdar Expeditions.

Expedition against the Bozdars, by a force under Brigadier N. B'
Chamberlain, in March 1857.

After the annexation of the Punjab, the allowances which had
been made to the Bozdar Chief by the Sikhs were continued by the
British Government ; but, by way of evading the conditions, he
•arranged that his followers should plunder in places distant as well
as near, and should carry their booty into the hills by passes other
than their own. In 1850 they committed one raid on Umarkot,
below Mithankot, far away to the south, the marauders being
■chiefly mounted ; and another on the Khosa village of Yaru, to the
north of Dera Ghazi Khan. Towards the close of the same year
a party of 120 raiders attacked Vidor, a place of some importance
on the frontier opposite Dera Ghazi Khan, but were stoutly
resisted by the villagers. In 1852 a party of ninety Bozdars,
having lifted the camels of the Bulani village, were pursued by a
detachment, 4th Punjab Cavalry, from the Mangrotha post, when
the camels were recovered, the detachment having one horse killed
by the fire from the hills.

In 1853 there were three forays by the tribe. Two of these
incursions were successful as regards spoil, but no life was
lost ; in the third, however, though well mounted, they were pursued
for many miles by a detachment, 4th Punjab Cavalry,^ and forced
to disgorge their booty at the mouth of the Mangrotha pass.
In 1853 it became necessary to prohibit any hill Bozdar from
visiting the plains under pain of imprisonment if seized. At the
beginning of 1854, the BozdarChief was confirmed in the grant of
his old allowances, amounting to Rs. 4,332 per annum, and the
proceeds of some rent free lands, amounted to Rs. 2,000 more,
■when he renewed his engagements to prevent plundering. For a

1 Since di^tbanded.

KASRANIS AND BOZDARS. Ill

time these pledges were kept. One of the Bozdar Chiefs visited
the camp of the Chief Commissioner in the winter of 1854. During
1854 no raids were reported ; but unfortunately during 1855,
the Bozdars returned to their bad habits, several raids occurred,
villages were plundered, and a large number of minor thefts were
committed — no less than seventy-four in six months. In order
partially to reimburse the sufferers a sum of Rs. 2,500 was deducted
from the allowances of the chief. Many robbers and murderers,
refugees from British territory, were also sheltered in the Bozdar
hills. The Bozdars crowned their misdeeds of 1855 by a serious raid
on the village of Kaleri, on the 1st December, carrying off spoil,
chiefly cattle, valued at Rs. 1,200 and murdering one man. The
marauders were 200 strong. AH the chiefs were then summoned,
under safe conduct, to answer for the misconduct of their tribe,
and to offer such explanations as they could.

But nothing satisfactory appears to have come of this, and in
March 1856, the Governor-General sanctioned the discontinuance
of the cash allowance of Rs. 4,332 to the tribe, who were to be
warned that on the occurrence of any further raids or forays their
rent-free lands would also be confiscated and a rigorous embargo
laid on them.

Up to the middle of 1856 no serious outrage was committed
by the Bozdars, although there were cases of cattle-stealing, high-
way robbery, etc., but in June of that year the outposts had to be
reinforced, as it was reported that the Bozdars were collecting for
an attack on Mangrotha, and from that time up to the close of the
year they made eleven forays into British territory, generally in
large parties of from 20 to 200 men. Most of these were attended
with bloodshed ; numerous others were planned, but were
baffled by the outposts. On two occasions (in the month of Decem-
ber) the detachments of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry and 4th Pun-
jab Infantry had skirmishes with the Bozdars on the hills near the
border ; in the latter of these (on the 27th of December) the enemy
were driven from four different positions, which they successively
occupied, our loss being one sepoy killed and two sowars wounded.

At the beginning of January 1857, the whole of the 2nd Punjab
-Cavalry^ was moved to the frontier. On the 17th January a

1 Now 22nd Cavalry, Frontier Force.

112

FliONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA

reconnoitring party of one non-commissioned officer and eight-
sowars of that regiment was surrounded bj^ a party of ISOBozdars,.
and lost two men in cutting their way through the enemy.

The Chief Commissioner, Sir John Lawrence, now strongly
urged that an expedition should be sent against them, as the only
effectual way of putting a stop to the harassing annoyances to which
the villages and posts were exposed. The Commissioner of Leiah,.
Lieutenant-Colonel D. Ross, had represented " that the Bozdars-
carried on these forays in the vain hope that they would lead
to the restoration of the money payment, which they had for-
feited through their own misconduct, and that it was evident,
they would not cease to give trouble until a force was sent to
chastise them, when the destruction of their crops vrould reduce
them to great straits, and bring about a state of things which
the mere interdiction of their intercourse with the plains liad:
failed to effect." Sanction for the despatch of an expedition
was therefore accorded in February 1857, and the confiscation oi
all the rent-free lands of the Bozdars was ordered.

The spring was considered the best time for punishing the tribe,,
when the crops were ripening. Accordingly, on the 6th March

1857, the troops
(see Appendix ).,
forming the ex-
peditionary
force, were as-
sembled fit
Taunsa,^ undcr
Brigadier N. B.

Chamberlain. Captain F. R. Pollock, Deputy Commissioner of
Dera Ghazi Khan, was to accompany the force as Political Officer.

Eight hundred levies were also collected, at Brigadier Chamber-
lain's request, from the district, to be used as guides and to keep,
open communications with the plains, and as foraging parties to
search for the grain and cattle which the enemy, it was reportcd,^
had hidden, or driven off to the higher hills.

Arrangements were made by the district officer for supplies
for ten days for man and beast. Four days' supplies were to Ve.

No. 1 Punjab Liglit Field Battery
No. 2 Punjab Light Field Battery
No. 3 Punjab L-ght Field Battery
2nd and 3rd Punjab Cavalry
Sappers and Miners
1st Sikh Infantry
3i-d Sikh Infantry
Ist Punjab Infantry
2nd Punjab Infantry
4th Punjab Infantry

4 field guns.

4 mountain

guns

. 4

f»

. 113 sabres.

. 58 bayonets.

.. 443

. 445

. 471

. 476

. 484

^ See Ma] I I in pocket.

EASRANIS AND BOZDARS. 113

carried regimentally, and six days' supplies for the whole force
by the civil authorities. Sick and weakly men were to be left
behind at Mangrotha as the troops advanced ; three doolies with
all the dandies and kahars^ and also kajawahs^ to accompany the
force. All superfluous baggage, camp followers, and animals were
to be left at Taunsa. Officers were to be restricted to one tent each,
and one mess tent per regiment. The whole of the bullock
ammunition boxes attached to regiments were to be carried on
mules and pack ponies. ^

There were three main passes by which the Bozdar country
might be entered from the plains, termed by the Baluchis, nais,
channels cut through the hills, at right angles to the strata, by the
mountain torrents. They are usually dry, except after rain.

These passes were: —

1st. The ViJioa/m frontof the village and military post of that name.
2nd. The Sangarh, opposite Taunsa, and immediately in front of the

fort of Mangrotha.
3rd. The Mahoi, twelve miles to the south of the Sangarh, and in front

of the Mahoi outpost.

The first mentioned was not only circuitous, but was reported
to be impracticable for guns ; and, in addition to the disadvantage
of its passing through the lands of other tribes, it entered the Bozdar
country at one corner near the Drug Valley, from which access
to other parts was very difficult.

The second was the principal entrance, and the only one in
ordinary use. It was practicable for wheeled carriages, and it was
stated that after the portion of the defile known as the Khan Band
was passed, the more open and cultivated lands were at once entered
upon, whence there was access to every part of the Bozdar country.

The third pass was difficult in the extreme, if not impracti-
cable when defended ; at one place the path skirted a precipice
commanded from above, along which a single horse had to be
led with care.

In these circumstances, the Sangarh Pass was in every way
best suited for the troops to enter by. The strong places where
the enemy were likely to make a stand were reported to he — first

1 Ambulaaoe bearers and hospital followera.

2 Rough camel panniers.

Vor,. Ill I

114 FSOyriEE and OVEBSEAS expeditions FSOM INDIA.

at the mouth of the Drug Nai or nala, where it was said a strong
breastwork of stones had been erected ; and, secondly, at the Khan
Band, about twelve miles from the mouth of the Sangarh Pass,
which, it was anticipated, would be the enemy's main position.
It was here that, in an attempt to force the passage in front,
Sawan Mai, in the time of the Sikhs, had met wit/i considerable
loss.

As no real advantage was to be gained by making a false attack
by the Mahoi Pass, thet Brigadier thought it best to let it become
generally known beforehand that he intended to enter by the
Sangarh defile ; for, whilst it could make no difference as to the
result of our attack whether there were a few more or less of the
enemy, there was no doubt that the value of success would be
greatly enhanced by encountering the tribe on its own ground
and thus not admitting of any excuse being afterwards made by the
Bozdars to explain away defeat. The example upon all the
neighbouring tribes would be also much more beneficial.

Having strengthened the frontier posts considerably, and pro-
vided for the safety of Dera Ghazi Khan, so as to give confidence to
the people during the absence of the troops. Brigadier Chamberlain
marched from Taunsa on the evening of the 6th March and after
proceeding across the plain for seven miles, reached the mouth
of the Sangarh Pass at daybreak. A few Bodzars were seen on the
heights but no attempt at opposition was made, and the shots
fired were evidently only intended as signals to announce the
arrival of the force.

The march was continued up the stony bed of the Sangarh
Nai (which was the only road) for about four miles, when a con-
venient place for encamping (Dedachi Kach) was reached, and
the force halted for the day.

. Towards noon a party of the enemy made some show of driving
in one of the picquets, but on its being supported by Captain
G. W. G. Green, commanding the 2nd Punjab Infantry,' they
retired. One sepoy was severely wounded.

In the afternoon a reconnaissance of the Khan Band {see sketch)
and the approaches to it was made by Brigadier Chamberlain, with
a force consisting of 300 . Jnen of the 3rd Sikh Infantry^ and 1st

1 Now 56th Punj;ibi Rifles.
- Now 53rd Sikhs.

KASRANIS AND BOZDARS. 1 15

Punjab Infantry.^ About eight miles from its moutli the Sangarh
Nai was joined by the Drug Nai, which flowed from a small valley
of that name some twenty miles to the north-west, in the Bozdar
country. From this point of junction to its opening out at the
Haranbore Kach, a distance of about three miles and a half, the
Sangarh Pass presented a formidable defile. Thence to the point
where the Sangarh Nai turned at right angles to the west, it
was bounded on either side by scarped hills of considerable
height, which completely commanded the road, a matchlock fired
from one hill reaching to the foot of the other. Beyond this again
the hills had to be passed at right angles to their strata, when,
instead of having one range' on either side to deal with, a series
of precipitous spurs, rising one after another in close succession,
had to be crossed, which completely commanded the road below.

It was to this particular portion of the defile that the term
Khan Band was generally applied, though, strictly speaking, the
name applied only to that one spot across which a mound of stones
and earth had at some former period been r?ised to add to the
natural defences, or hold water for agricultural purposes.

On arriving at the point where the defile turned to the west,
a view of the Khan Band was obtained, and the enemy were seen
clustered on every ridge and pinnacle commanding the defile. The
position was so strong that to carry it in front would be a very
doubtful operation, and one certainly not to be accomplished except
at a large sacrifice of life ; but it was possible to turn the position by
its left, and Brigadier Chamberlain therefore determined upon
attacking the Khan Band from that side, after assuring himself,
both by conversation with the guides and by observation, of the
practicability of the hills from the Drug Nala. During the re-
connaissance a dulfadar of the mounted police was killed, and one
man of the 1st Punjab Infantry wounded. By sunset the Brigadier
returned to camp, and the night passed undisturbed.

At daybreak on the 7th March, the force continued its ad-
vance up the Sangarh Nala, and by 7 a.m. halted in front of the
enemy's position. Some delay occurred in making arrangements
for the protection of the baggage and camp followers, and, this-
being accomplished, the troops moved to the attack.

1 Now 55th Coke's Rifles.
Vol. hi. i 2

116 FHOXTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The plan of attack was as follows : — The 4tli Punjab Infantry,*
under Captain A. T. Wilde, was to ascend (by its northern spur)
the hill which commanded the Sangarh Nala from the west,
covered by the fire of the four field guns of No. 1 Punjab Light
Field Battery and the four mountain guns of No. 3 Punjab Light
Field Battery. The 1st Punjab Infantry, under Major J. Coke,
with the four mountain guns of No. 2 Battery, to advance up the
Drug Nai, in the hope of finding a practicable spur by which to
ascend the heights south of the nala, in support of the 4th Punjab
Infantry, and to acquire possession of those heights, for this was
indispensable to success.

The 3rd Sikh Infantry and the 2nd Punjab Infantry were placed
in support at the junction of the two nalas, whilst a portion of the
1st Sikh Infantry,^ under Major G. Gordon, was sent to crown the
hill which closed in the Sangarh Nai to its east, with instructions
to move along its summit so as to keep parallel with the 4th Punjab
Infantry.

The enemy on the left of his position had failed to occupy the
spurs to the north side of the Drug Nai, and this was turned to
immediate account by3parties of Major Coke's men, who occupied
them as they advanced.

Becoming alive, however, to the object we had in view, the
Bozdars lost no time in strengthening their left flank, and numbers
at once crossed the Drug Nai and took up a strong position on its
northern side. A hill on the southern side of the nala was also
strongly held by the enemy, whilst the nala itself between these
positions was closed by a breastwork. The fire the Bozdars were
thus able to bring to bear from three sides was more than Major
Coke could hope successfully to oppose, more especially as the hills
were knife-edged, with the faces next the nala a steep wall, and
the Brigadier therefore supported Major Coke with the 2nd Punjab
Infantry, under Captain G. W. G. Green, and withdrew Lieutenant
Mecham's four guns from Captain Wilde, sending them to Major
Coke's assistance.

On the arrival of this support, the 1st and 2nd Punjab Infantry,
well aided by the fire of the eight mountain guns (against which the
enemy stood their groimd most determinedly), at once attacked

1 Now 57tb Wilde's Rifles.

2 Now 51st Sikhs.

KASRANia AND BOZDARS. 1 17

the position on the left of the Drug Nala, Captain Green advancing
against the right, and Major Coke against the left, of the position.
The gallantry displayed by officers and men of both regiments
was the admiration of all. In this attack almost the whole of our
casualties took place, and the Bozdars suffered most. Major Coke
received a severe wound in the shoulder, although he continued to
exercise his command throughout the day. His native adjutant, Mir
Jaffir, was wounded at his side, and received another bullet
through his shield and clothes.

The Bozdars, on being driven from this position, crossed to the
southern side of the Drug Nala, followed by the 2nd Punjab In-
fantry and a portion of the Ist Punjab Infantry. The remainder
of the latter regiment, with the mountain guns, had to move
up the bed of the stream, as the hills were too precipitous to admit
of the guns being taken up.

Whilst these events were passing on our right, Captain Wilde's
regiment had gradually ascended, and carried the enemy's position
on the left bank of the Sangarh near its junction with the Drug.
This had been done with little loss, under cover of the artillery,
and Captain Wilde then pressed along the ridge of the hill over-
looking the Sangarh Nai, his advance being greatly facilitated by
Lieutenant J. R. Sladen's field guns.

Major G. Gordon, with the 1st Sikh Infantry, had been
enabled in the meanwhile to crown the heights on the east of the
Sangarh Nala without loss, as the few Bozdars who had at the
outset occupied this range fell back without offering any
opposition.

The heights on both banks of the Sangarh having thus been
seized, the guns of No. 1 Punjab Light Field Battery, with the 3rd
Sikh Infantry and the detachment of cavalry, were enabled to
advance up the bed of the nala without opposition ;. and the
artillery, taking up successive positions, covered Captain Wilde's
advance along the left bank. As these troops reached the point
where the defile turned to the west, it became evident from the
movements of the enemy, who were holding the Khand Band, as
well as from the sound of 'firing on their left rear, that the Bozdars
were giving way, and that the time had come to threaten the Elhan
Band in front.

118 FBONTIEU .-iXD OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FHOM INDIA.

Whilst Lieutenant J. R. Sladen plied the enemy with shell,
Captain R. Renny, with a company of the 3rd Sikh Infantry, carried
the nearest ridge with a loss of only three men wounded, and
Captain J. P. W. Campbell, with two companies, moved on their
next breastwork. But by this time portions of the 1st and 2nd
Punjab Infantry, which had ascended from the Drug Nala, were
crossing the hills in pursuit of the Bozdars they had defeated ;
the Khan Band was thus threatened from the rear, and the flight
became general. To add to the enemy's embarrassment, the detach -
ment of cavalry under Captain S. J. Browne was ordered to dash
through the defile, and after reaching the more open ground, to go
on as far as the nature of the country permitted. Success was now
complete, and arrangements were made for pitching the camp at
Haranbore Each, at the western entrance of the Khand Band
defile.

Major J. Coke was the only British officer wounded in this
affair ; five men killed and three native officers and forty-five men
wounded (see Appendix D). The Bozdars, whose numbers were
estimated at 1,700 men, lost from twenty to thirty killed, and from
fifty to seventy wounded. Their chiefs afterwards admitted that
they had no doubt of their ability to hold the pass against
us. As our troops were advancing they had called to Brigadier
Chamberlain from the hills, asking, in a jeering manner, why we
did not come on ; and so far from expecting that their position
would be turned from the Drug Kai, the Bozdars stated that it
had been arranged that the body of men which had been in posi-
tion on the right of that nala was to have attacked the rear of
the column whilst the head of it was engaged at the Khan Band.

Nor was this self-reliance to be wondered at, for they had
seen General Ventura and Jemadar Khusial Singh, with a large
Sikh army, retire before this stronghold, and they claimed to
have killed, on another occasion, 1,200 of Diwan Sawan Mai's
soldiers, and plundered his baggage.

The conduct of the troops. Brigadier Chamberlain stated,
had been excellent ; they exhibited the highest spirit, and well
maintained the reputation of our arms. The services of Major
J. Coke, Lieutenant W. H. Lumsden, and Assistant Surgeon
J. R. Jackson, of the 1st Punjab Infantry, and of Captain G. W.
G. Green, Lieutenants T. Frankland, W. P. Fisher, and Assistant

KASRANIS AND BOZDARS. 119

Surgeon W. F. Clark, of the 2nd Punjab Infantry, together with
the native officers of both these regiments, called, Brigadier
Chamberlain said, for special mention, and he recommended
them to the favourable notice of Government.

The Brigadier added that the artillery which supported
Major Coke's attack had earned distinction ; and he brought to
notice the services of Lieutenants G. Maister and R. Mecham,
commanding Nos. 2 and 3 Punjab Light Field Batteries, and
the officers and men employed with the mountain guns.

On the march of the force from Taunsa, the levies had been
left at Mangrotha in charge of the reserve supplies, for it was an
object not to employ them in concert with the troops before our
ability to chastise the Bozdars without any other assistance had
been shown to all, and they were now ordered forward ; and to
Mita Khan and his Kasranis was assigned the task of occupying
the Khan Band, and keeping open the communications with
the plains.

After the troops had emerged from the Khan Band, it became
evident, from the ruggedness of the country, that there was little
chance of hemming in the tribe, or capturing their cattle, without
greater numbers ; and, in communication with the Deputy Com-
missioner, arrangements were made by Brigadier Chamberlain,
during the evening of the 7th, to invite the Ustarana tribe to come
down and plunder their enemies on the north, whilst the force
closed in upon them from the south.

The invitation was accepted with alacrity, and a portion of
the tribe, entering by the Drug Valley, had commenced to plunder
and lay waste, when they were stopped and ordered to return
home, in consequence of the submission of the Bozdars.

During the 8th the troops halted, to admit of the wounded
being sent to Mangrotha.

A detachment, consisting of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry and the
3rd Sikh Infantry, was employed during the day in reconnoitring
the Sangarh Nai as far as Bharti, and its course was marked by the
smoke of the huts and stacks of forage. The country was found
abandoned, and only a few Bozdars were seen on the summit of
the hills, apparently occupied with watching the movements of
the troops.

120 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

During the 9th the force halted, awaiting the return of the
ambulance party from Mangrotha, which arrived in the evening.
On this day a reconnoitring party was employed in penetrating
the country, and doing as much injury as possible.

On the 10th the force marched to Bharti, distant about six
miles. It was one of the principal places of the Bozdars, and
presented luxuriant vegetation, and with its clumps of date trees
resembled the scenery in the neighbourhood of Dera Ghazi Khan.
The road, as heretofore, was up the stony bed of the Sangarh
Nai, but during the march five or six cultivated spots were
passed. The house of Naorang Khan, the chief of one section of
the tribe, on the summit of a hil! near Bharti, was destroyed.

Reconnoitring and other parties were always accompanied
by some of the levies, who exhibited great skill in discovering
concealed property. When our sepoys failed to find anything
a Baluch ally would follow up the track of a man's or woman's
feet, and speedily return with plunder which had been hidden
in the hurry of flight.

During the 11th and 12th the force had to halt to enable
supplies to be brought up, for it was not considered prudent to
enter further into the hills without having ten days' supplies in
camp. On both days the country in advance, both to the right
and left, was patrolled by reconnoitring parties, and everything
was destroyed. The column of smoke which rose over a circum-
ference of some miles must have been a distressing spectacle to
the Bozdars ; but to have spared their crops and property would
have been to neutralize the object of the expedition, and to
withold the punishment most likely to have a lasting impression.

Of all the frontier tribes none were less deserving of considera-
tion, for plunder and murder had been their avocation for years
past, and, but for our military posts, the country in their front
must have been abandoned. Nor did they confine their raids to
the plains, for they plundered all their neighbours, and it may truly
be said that their hand was against]every man, and every man's
hand against them.

The secret of their success in plundering was attributable
to the inaccessibility of their country, for nature had made it
equally unapproachable on all four sides. "Within, it was found

KASRANIS AND BOZDARS. 121

to be a network of hills and ravines, unassailable except by dis-
ciplined bodies. The Bozdars had ample cultivation, were rich in
flocks, and well-to-do, and had, therefore, the less excuse for
living on their neighbours.

On the 13th the force continued its march up the Sangarh Nai
for about ten miles, and encamped in a well-cultivated hollow
at the entrance of the Saunra Pass, Just before descending into
the cultivation, a few horsemen and footmen were seen, but they
disappeared in the defile as the force approached. On this day's
march the enemy sustained much, loss in the destruction of
numbers of their hamlets and stock, and as they belonged to the
section of the tribe most given to plundering on our border, there
was the greater reason for not sparing anything.

The Saunra Pass, or, more properly speaking, defile, is to the
Bozdars on the west what the Khan Band is on the east. One
section — the Ghulamani — possesses lands to the west of the defile ;
and the tribe claim the country up to the hills which separate
them from the Luni Pathans on the west, and the Khetrans on the
south-west ; but when at feud with these tribes, and obliged to act
on the defensive, they retire, and hold the Saunra Pass, thereby
closing the only entrance from the west.

Brigadier Chamberlain had expected, from all that the guides
had stated, to find this defile difficult, for the natives had always
pronounced it impracticable for artillery, and had adverted to its
strength and the necessity for holding it if the force went beyond it
into the Ghulamani lands. But, although he had looked for a strong
position, it far exceeded his anticipations ; indeed, he said that he
had never yet seen in Afghanistan anything to be compared with it,
for it might be pronounced impregnable from the west, and, accord-
ing to the reports of trustworthy persons, was not to be turned on
the north nearer than by the Vihoa Pass, thirty miles off, or on
the south nearer than by the Vidor Pass, distant forty-five miles.
From the east side it was difficult but practicable, and the Bozdars,
having failed at the Khan Band, appeared to have thought it was
useless to defend it. Its inaccessibility from the west arose from
the mountain being scarped on that side, presenting at its summit
a precipice several hundred feet in height, which scarp was said
to run north and south as far as the Vihoa and Vidor Passes.

122 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

In the days of the Mughals, this road was used for keeping
open the communications bet\Yeen the Southern Punjab and
Kandahar; and when Shah Shuja was defeated by Dost Muham-
mad Khan at the latter place, a remnant of his followers returned
bj this route.

Late on the evening of the 13th two Bozdars came into camp,
stating that they had been sent by the chiefs, who wished to come
in and sue for terms, and begging that the work of destruction
might be stayed. The chiefs were ordered, in reply, to present
themselves in camp the next day, when our demands upon the
tribe would be made known ; but if they failed to attend within
the prescribed time, hostilities and the work of destruction
vrould recommence ; in the meantime the force would halt, and
cease to cut their crops and burn their property. On the fol-
lowing evening, Naorang Khan and Ashak Muhammad Khan,
the two chiefs of the tribe, made their appearance ; but it was
too late to transact business, and the meeting was deferred until
the next morning.

At a darbar held on the following day, the reasons for our

invasion, and the terms demanded were

Terms of submission. i t i -i ■, mi

publicly made known, ihese terms
were —
. 1st. Compensation at the rate of Rs. 125 for the life of every ma
killed or wounded in British territory during the previous year.

2nd. Restitution of, or compensation for, all cattle killed, or stolen, or in-
jured, or property carried off or destroyed during the previous
year, the restitution or compensation to be completed within two
months.

3rd. The immediate expulsion of all refugee criminals. Not to afiord an
asylum to refugees from British territory, or to harbour thieves
or bad characters of any tribe ; nor to allow anyone to pass
through their country, to plunder or commit acts of violence ; nor
to permit stolen cattle or property of any kind to be taken
through their passes.

4th. To pay a fine of 200 sheep in consideration of the remainder of
the crops being spared, with 100 additional sheep from the
Ghulamani Bozdars, whose country beyond the Saunra Pass had
escaped injury. The sheep were to be given to the troops.

5th. To give approved hostages, for twelve months, as security for good
conduct, and to have a vakil always at the Mangrotha tehsil.

KASEANIS AND BOZDASS. 123

A ready assent was given to every demand, and the demeanour
of the Bozdars was thoroughly subdued. Doubtless more might
have been demanded, and would have been acceded to, but it
seemed to the Brigadier and Deputy Commissioner that the future
peace of the frontier was more likely to be secured by dealing
leniently with them, and it was hoped that, having now felt our
ability to punish, the Bozdars, like the Shiranis and Kasranis,
would become peaceable neighbours. Had they not given in, they
would in all probability have suffered considerable loss in cattle, for
the Ustaranas had closed in upon them, and they could only have
escaped by finding refuge among the Pathan tribes further west.

After the afiair at the Khan Band, a detachment, detailed in
2nd Punjab Cavalry, 17 sabres, the margin, under Lieutenant G. A. P-
Srd Punjab Cavalry, 28 „ Youughusbaud, 5th Punjab Cavalry,^ had

5th Punjab Cavalry, 29 „ tip nr ii j_i tit i •

4tli Punjab Infantry, 66 proceeded from Mangrotha up the Mahoi
baoynets. Pass, destroying the cultivation there

without opposition, and orders were now sent to the officer com-
manding at Mangrotha to stop all further punitive operations.

On the 16th the force commenced to retrace its steps, a portion
returning by the road by which it had advanced, the remainder by
■the Lundi Nai. Both columns united on the 17th at Haranbore
Kach.

From the 18th to the 21st the troops halted, the sheep not
having been brought m, for the Brigadier felt that it was both just
and necessary to exact the fulfilment of this stipulation before reliev-
ing the tribe of our presence. The reason assigned by the chiefs for
the delay was the distance the flocks had been driven to avoid cap-
ture— an excuse Brigadier Chamberlain did not think reasonable,
and which was overcome as soon as the Bozdars understood the al-
ternative, and saw their crops decreasing ; for though they were
not wantonly destroyed, it was necessary to feed the cattle.

The required number of sheep having been completed on the
afternoon of the 21st, the force returned through the Khan Band on
the 22nd, and having encamped at Dedachi Kach, re-entered the
plains the following morning, after an absence of seventeen days.

The Indian medal, with a clasp for the " North- West Frontier,"
was granted in 1869 to all survivors of the troops engaged in
Ihese operations.

1 Now 25th Cavalry.

12i FEOyriEE ANO OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM lyDIA.

The Bozdars evidently profited by the lesson they had received

in 1857, and their conduct subsequent
Conduct of the tribes from j. ii. tj.- i t i i •

1861 to 1SC3. *o "^^^ expedition showed a marked im-

provement.
In January 1861, the Khetrans, Isots, Ustaranas, and Jafars,*
attacked their stronghold, the Khan Band, on the western side,
and drove them from their fastness. Their women and children
took refuge in the plains, bringing their cattle with them. Captain
C. J. Godby, commanding the 4th Punjab Cavalry, was at
Mangrotha at the time. Taking the detachment from the post
with him, he at once rode to the mouth of the pass, and met
messengers from the Khetrans, who professed that they had no in-
tention of following the Bozdars into British territory, but that^
having sufficiently punished the tribe, their camp would break up.
The Isots, Ustaranas, and Jafars accordingly returned home at once.
The Khetrans imprudently determined to return by the shortest
route past the Mahoi Pass, and encamped for the night. An old
Bozdar woman watched them, and gave information to the Chief,
Ashak Muhammad Khan, pointing out that the Bozdars might
easily invest a pass beyond Mahoi through which the Khetrans
would have to pass, and so obtain their revenge. The advice was
taken. Early next morning, when the Khetrans, quite unsuspicious-
of the trap laid for them, pursued their journey, they fell into the
ambuscade, and were routed with great loss, only effecting their
escape by rushing into the plains and making the best of their way
to the Sakhi Sarwar, and returning home through the Siri Pass.
On the 15th March 1861, the Bozdars, with some Hadianis,
etc., raided some flocks belonging to the Nasir Pomw(Za/js in British
territory, and carried off some 12,000 sheep and goats. The Nasirs
afterwards retaliated, and a fight took place, in which twenty-four
Bozdars and Legharis and twenty-two Nasirs were killed.

In 1862 a party of Bozdars, Legharis, Khosas, etc., carried
ofi a large herd of cattle belonging to the Powindahs, which were
grazing inside the passes opposite Chaudwan in the Dera Ismail
Khan district. The Powindahs, before returning, made arrange-
ments with the Ustaranas to attack the Bozdars. The latter retired
until a favourable opportunity occurred to make a night attack,
in which both the Bozdars and Ustaranas suffered slight loss, but the

1 A small and insignificant tribe living on the north-west of the Bozdar Hills.

KASRANIS AND BOZDABS. 125

Powindahs escaped. The following season the Powindahs were
informed that they would not be allowed to enter British terri-
tory except on condition that they would abstain from all hosti-
lities while within our border. This at once put a stop to the

feud.

On the 1st of June 1863, a small party of Bozdars lifted some
camels from British territory, but were pursued up the Mahoi Pass
by a detachment of cavalry. The detachment, 17 sabres, was
attacked on returning by 100 Bozdars ; but they charged, and got
out in safety.

In 1864 the Government sanctioned the restoration to the
Bozdar Chief of the rent-free wells which had been confiscated in
1857 ; he also received a certain number of balgirs in the frontier
militia.

In the autumn of 1868 Lieutenant L. J. H. Grey, Deputy

Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan, was

Lieutenant Grey kidnapped carried off into the hills by Kaora Khan,

by Kasranis. •/ '

a headman of the Kasranis. Lieutenant
Grey had gone down to Tibi by boat to enquire into a criminal
case. His escort having been detained by missing the proper
channel, Lieutenant Grey found himself practically alone. How-
ever, he proceeded to arrest Kaora Khan and made him over to
his orderlies. Kaora Khan's followers at once flocked to his rescue,
and Lieutenant Grey, in turn, became a prisoner. Kaora Khan
then fled to the hills, taking his prisoner with him. He was
pursued, but kept Lieutenant Grey in advance, and himself covered
the retreat, threatening, if brought to bay, to kill Lieutenant Grey
first, and then sell his own life dearly. This threat kept the
pursuers at a distance. Meanwhile Mehr Shah, a priest of the
Baluchis, had sent to the Bozdars to close the exit from the Kasrani
country.

Fazl Ali Khan, the Chief of the Kasranis (who had succeeded
his father, Mita Khan, in 1861), with the principal Kasranis of
Mangrotha and that neighbourhood, joined actively in the pursuit.
Kaora Khan with his party was at length brought to bay some
thirteen miles beyond Bati, where, after prolonged negotiations,
he released Lieutenant Grey. During the day that he was in
restraint. Lieutenant Grey was hard pressed for terms, but he suc-
ceeded in turning the matter off by expressing his conviction

126 FROyilER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

that the Commissioner would ra.tify no conditions that he
made, and Kaora Khan had to content himself with a promise
that all the grain then in his house should be sent to him,
and as he pressed it, that Government should be informed
of his contrition ; and, lastly, that if summoned, he should
have a safe conduct, or if Government refused, he should be in-
formed.

Meanwhile, on the news of this outrage reaching Dera Ismail

Khan, the 1st Punjab Cavalry, under Captain A. Vivian, ac-
companied by Mr. Beckett, Assistant Commissioner, at once
marched towards Vihoa, arriving at Mirau, thirty-three miles, by
the morning ; but before they could get further intelligence was
received that Lieutenant Grey had been given up, and except one
troop, which was ordered into Tibi, the regiment returned. The 1st
Punjab Infantry i\nder Captain F, J. Keen, and the 4th, under
Lieutenant-Colonel J. Cockburn-Hood, embarked in boats, and the
latter had started before the news of Lieutenant Grey's release

arrived.

Lieutenant Grey returned to Dera on the evening of the 13th>
and on the 14th he, in company with the Commissioner, Lieutenant-
Colonel S. F. Graham, and escorted by a company of infantry, went
down in boats to Tibi to take steps for the capture of Kaora Khan.
Sultan Muhammad of Vihoa was deputed to induce the chiefs of the
neighbouring tribes to refuse him an asylum; and an attempt
was made through the Ustaranas to cut off his retreat, but without
success. The Commissioner then sent a deputation to induce him to
come in. Kaora Khan received the deputation at the head of 100-
men. After a long conference, the deputies failed in their object.
The Commissioner then summoned the tribes to his assistance.
His call was readily responded to. From the north the Ustaranas
brought 500 men, and were placed under the Gandapur Chief, Kalu
Khan ; and there came also 120 Babar horse and foot and 120
Mian Khel ;^ and from the south the Bozdars came 1,000 strong

1 The Mian Khel are a Pathan tribe of the Dera Ismail Khan district. They hold
some 260 square miles of plain country between the Gundapur and Babar tribes.
The greater number still engage in the trans-Indus trade, and they are said to be
the richest of all the Puuindahs, dealing in the more costly descriptions of merchan-
dise. They are a peaceable people, more civilised than most of the Powindah tribes.
They seldom take military service, and cultivate but little, leaving the business of
agriculture to their Jat tenants.

K ASEAN IS AND BOZDARS. 127

followed by the Hadianis 700, and Lunds^ 400. To these forces
was entrusted the duty of blockading the hill Kasranis on the

north, south, and west. The principal

Kasranis blockaded, 1863. ... ,

plain Kasranis were also summoned, and
ordered to bring in the criminal under the following penalties :—lst,
forfeiture of allowances for guarding the hill passes ; 2nd, confisca-
tion of standing crops as a fine ; 3rd, deportation of the plain
chiefs to Dera Ghazi Khan ; 4th, blockade of the hill portion of
the tribe.

The chiefs at once took up their responsibilities, and collecting
their clansmen in the plains, entered the hills, and returned in a
few days with twenty-two families, including about forty women
and children belonging to the rebels.

The Kasranis were again despatched to the hills to bring in
Kaora Khan, and with them were associated, as advisers and sup-
porters on the part of Government, a chief of the Khosas with fifty
men, and one of the Gurchanis with the same number. They
returned after some days, with five of the principal rebels, but
with the intelligence that Kaora Khan, his son, and others, escorted
by about eighty of the hill Kasranis, had escaped, and sought
shelter with the Musa Khel.

To guard against such escape, or to make such shelter more
difiicult the Commissioner had proclaimed a reward of Rs. 10,000 on
the heads of the four principal offenders ; and to provide the
means of payment of the reward, of feeding the tribes who had
assembled, and of meeting the fines which would be inflicted on
the criminals, the moveable property of Kaora Khan, and a few of
his chief abettors, had been seized and sold, producing upwards
of Rs. 20,000.

Pressure being continued, Painda Khan, the Chief of the Musa
Khels, at last brought Kaora Khan into Mangrotha, and deli-
vered him up to Captain R. G. Sandeman on the 27th of Octo-
ber. A durbar was then held by the Commissioner, at which

1 The Lunds are a Baluch tribe (or rather two tribes) of the Dera Ghazi Khan
district. The Tibi Lunds oooupy a small area in the midst of the Gurohani country.
They are a compact, well -organised little tribe. They have always taken an active
and loyal part on the side of the British Government, and havs never given trouble
to the local authorities. The Sori Lunds are a small tribe, only lately risen to
importance. Their territory divides that of the Khosas into two parts and extends to
the bank of the Indus. They are not pure Baluchis.

128 [FRONTIER AND OVEBSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

he thanked the assembled chiefs, and distributed the following
rewards : —

Es.
To tlie Bozdars, who brought 1,000 fighting men, 2,500

2,000

1,000

700

„ 750

750

300

500

200

Hadianis,

700

Lunds,

400

Ustaranas,

500

Khosas,

Babars,

120

Mian Khels,

120

Isatos"

100

Gurchanis,

Nutakanis,^

) )

Gandapnrs,

3,130 10,000

At the same time hhilats were bestowed on the chiefs and

others who had given assistance. The
Subsequent conduct of the ^^Yii\cs\ expenses of these measures

amounted, m round numbers, to
Rs. 15,000 ; and this sum, as well as the Rs. 10,000 reward, was
charged to the criminals and to the Kasrani tribe generally, the
cost of the hhilats to the Government.

The Bozdars have always been at feud with the Ustaranas, and
in 1869 the latter formed an alliance with the Kasranis, and at-
tacked the Bozdars beyond the border. The Chiefs of the Kasranis
and Ustaranas were fined, and required to pay the Bozdars com-
pensation, while the Bozdars made amends for the injuries which
the Kasranis complained of, and the dispute was thus satisfactorily

adjusted.

"< In October 1871, a party of 100 Baluch marauders, said to be
Hadianis, committed a raid on twenty flocks of sheep and herds of
cattle grazing within the limits of the Shirani village of Drazand, in
independent territory, but belonging to Nasir Powindahs encamped

1 The Nulakanis are a Baluch tribe of the Dera Ghazi Khan district, holding a com-
pact territory stretching eastward to the Indus and between the Khosas and the
Kasranis. The tribe once enjoyed considerable influence and importance, but no
longer possesses a political organisation, having been crushed out of tribal existence
in the early days of Ranjit Singh's rule. But the event is so recent that tribal
coherence and race characteristics are still retained.

KASRANIS AND BOZDARS. 129

"within and on the confines of British territory, in the direction
■of the Gandapur and Babar villages of Zarakni and Chaudwan. Up-
wards of ten herdsmen were killed by the plunderers before they
secured their spoil. On news reaching the Nasirs in their camps,
they immediately started in pursuit, and overtaking the raiders
forced them to abandon possession of the plundered cattle and
sheep.

In 1874 the Bozdars were attacked by their northern neigh-
bours, the Ustaranas, but both parties abstained from molesting
British territory.

In December 1875, the Khetrans violated British territory, in
a quarrel with the Bozdars. On the evening of the 12th of that
month a large detachment of Khetran horsemen emerged by the
Sakhi Sarwar Pass and proceeded from Sakhi Sarwar, taking the
road along the foot of the nearest range of low hills by Vidor and
Matti (Khosa), to the mouth of the Mahoi Pass, which they appear
to have reached, by the light of the full moon, about dawn on the
13th. Their object was to take the Bozdars by surprise, and
secure as much spoil as possible. In the pass, just beyond the
British border, five Grhulamani Bozdars — returning to their hills
from Dera Ghazi Khan with ten camels laden with grain — had
passed the night ; and some Jats from the village of Mahoi, near the
outpost of that name, were engaged filling their donkey massahs ^ at
a well close by. The Ghulamanis, at once perceiving their tribal
enemies, managed to slip away into the hills, leaving their laden
animals a prey to the Khetrans, who at first stripped the Jats, and
were appropriating their animals, when being assured that these
Jats were Government subjects, they restored their pro-
perty, and set them all at liberty, with the remark that the
Khetrans were not at enmity with the Government, but with the
Bozdars.

Proceeding further into the pass, the Khetran horsemen were
seen by some Bozdar cultivators, who retired to their village to
give the alarm. Massu Khan, the Bozdar mukadam, probably un-
aware of the strength of the invading force, hastily got together
eventeen armed villagers on foot, whom he headed to meet the
Khetrans. The small body of Bozdars, finding the Khetran

1 Water-skins.
■Vol. III. K

130 FRONTIER AND OVER SEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

scattered in various directions, scouring the ravines and side valleys
for spoil, made some resistance, at a spot within the Mahoi Pass,
about three miles beyond the British boundary. The firing
attracted the main body of the Khetrans, who pursued the Bozdars
up the slope of a spur protruding into the pass, and cut them down,
one by one, without mercy, as they retreated, still fighting, to the
crest. Sixteen Bozdars, including their brave leader, Massu
Khan, were killed ; two only, one of whom was dangerously
wounded, escaping to the hamlet.

The Khetrans, having met with so bold a resistance, imme-
diately after their entrance into the pass, resolved to return with
their plunder by the same route carrying two dead and three or
four wounded men of their tribe with them. They were, however,
intercepted on their return by our troops and militia, and com-
pelled to disgorge their spoil, which was restored to the Bozdars,
and a fine was realized from them for their violation of British
territory.

Shortly after this, during the same month, the Bozdars simi-
larly misbehaved, on a smaller scale, in proceeding surreptitiously,
to the number of thirty-five or forty, via Hajipur, a British village,
to surprise a small party of Shambani Bugtis. The latter were
grazing their flocks, unauthorizedly, just within the British border
on the Rajanpur frontier. Two Bugtis were killed, the Bozdar
party returning without casualty to their hills. In consequence
of this outrage, the offending section of the Bozdars, the Chakranis,
were debarred from entering British territory, and the allowances
of the tribe were stopped. On the 30th August 1876, the tribe
came in to the district officer, and agreed to the Government de-
mands. They undertook to pay blood-money on the regulated
scale for the two Bugtis killed, to surrender unconditionally, within
six weeks, a notorious offender named Tangi of the Lashari (Gur-
chani) tribe, who had for some time obtained shelter in the Bozdar
hills, and who had been the guide in the raid against the Bugtis ;
and finally to make restitution in all cases of theft from British
limits then outstanding against them. The blockade against the
Chakrani section was then removed. Tangi, the man whose sur-
render had been promised, was, however, murdered by a Bozdar in
the hills, in pursuance of a private quarrel before the promise could
ba fulfilled.

KASRANI3 AND BOZDARS. 131

In 1876 a raid was made by Hadianis on a Khosa village, but
the raiders were followed up and full reparation obtained ; and in
August of that year a settlement of the disputes between the
Khosas and Hadianis on the one hand, and the Khetrans and the
Hadianis on the other, was efiected.

The Bozdars continued to give trouble by carrying off cattle
and other property from our border, and the Jalalani and Ladwani
sections of the tribe were especially guilty of acts of misconduct and
theft. Accordingly, at the end of January 1878, Mr. F. W. R.
Fryer, the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ghazi KJian, accompanied
by Mr. C. E. Gladstone, Assistant Commissioner of Rajanpur, visit-
ed the Bozdar hills. He was not very successful in obtaining
redress for past grievances of British subjects, until he declared
a temporary blockade of the tribe during a time of compara-
tive scarcity, which obliged the Bozdars to submit to the
terms in addition to restitution of all property stolen, or its
value.

In March 1879, the Musa Khel Pathans, who live beyond the
Bozdars, made a threatened demonstration against Vihoa at the
instigation, it is believed, of the Kasranis. Timely precautious
were taken, and the excitement did not lead to any overt act of
hostility. On their return, however, the Musa Elhel plundered
their old enemies the Bozdars, with whom they were angry for
having given information of the intended raid.

In December 1880, the Bozdars plundered two large trading
caravans beyond the border, in one of which twenty-seven Kakars
were killed ; in the other, Kakars and Khetrans were the sufferers.
In the latter case it was decided that the Khetrans should be com-
pensated for their losses. To enforce this a blockade was impos-
ed on the Bozdars, and in ten days the tribal representatives paid
Rs. 2,680, the compensation demanded. The Bozdars gave every
assistance, when, on the retirement of the British forces from
Kandahar, a column under Brigadier- General Wilkinson marched
through their hills, in December 1882, on its way to Dera Ghazi
Khan.

During that year also a satisfactory settlement was arrived
at with the Bugti tribe, with whom the Bozdars were at feud,
on the basis of a mutual renunciation of claims, at a meeting

132 F MONTIES AND OTEESEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

of the tribal leaders, in conjunction with the Deputy Commis-
sioner of Dera Ghazi Khan and the Assistant Agent of the
Governor-General, Baluchistan, under whose management the
Bugtis were.

APPENDIX A.

Composition of the force employed against the Kasranis in April 1853.

Brigadier J. S. Hodgson, Commanding.

Staff.
Captain W. R. Prout, Staff Officer.

Infantry.

1st Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant C. P. Keyea, Commanding.

6th Police Battalion, Lieutenant J. \V. Younghusband, Commanding.

Political Officer.
Major J. Nicholson, Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ismail Khan.

Detail of Troops.

Corps.

British
Officers.

Native
Officers.

Non-Com-

missioned

Officers.

Rank
and file.

Total.

Remabks.

Stag

Detachment, 4th Punjab

Cavalry . .
let Punjab Infantry . .
6th Police Battalion . .

7
13

30
400
400

456
462

Total

830

954

APPENDIX B.

Composition of the force employed against the Bozdars in March 1857.

Brigadier N. B. Chamberlain, Commanding.

Sta§.

Captain J. P. W. Campbell, Sta{! Officer.

Lieutenant J. G. Medley, Bengal Engineers, Field Engineer.

Artillery.
No. 1 Punjab Light Field Battery, Lieutenant J. R. Sladen, Commanding.
No. 2 Punjab Light Field Battery, Lieutenant G. Maister, Commanding.
No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery, Lieutenant R. Mecham, Commanding.

Cavalry.
Detachment, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, Captain S. J. Browne, Commanding.
Detachment, Srd Punjab Cavalry, Lieutenant J. Watson, Commanding.

Infantry.
1st Sikh Infantry, Major G. Gordon, Commanding.
3rd Sikh Infantry, Captain R. Renny, Commanding.
1st Punjab Infantry, Major J. Coke, Commanding.
2nd Punjab Infantry, Captain G. W. G. Green, Commanding.
4rth Punjab lafantry. Captain A. T. Wilde, Commanding.

Political Officer.
Captain F. E. Pollock, Deputy Commissioner, Dera Ghazi Khan.

Details of Troops.

Oednance.

Field.

Moun-
tain.

Corps.

■

KE-.IARKS.

S E

•o

•.3

^ IS

«r

w o

Stafi

This does not

No. 1 Punjab Light Field Battery

> •

include the

No. 2

detail, 5th

No. 3

Punjab Ca-

2nd and 3rd Punjab Cavalry

valry, or

Sappera and Miners

troops, left at

1st Sikh Infantry

378

Mangrotha

£rd ,,

«n

385

or in the out-

l»t Punjab ,,

421

, ,

posts.

2nd „ „

428

, ,

4th „ „

432

■•

Total

320

2,338

4, i

( 134 )

CHAPTER VI.

The Baluchistan Agency.

On the 21st November, war with Afghanistan was declared.
On the 23rd the district of Sibi was occupied by a British detach-
ment. "Much political inconvenience," Lord Lytton observed,
" had been caused by the interposition of this small Afghan district
J „. , . , in the midst of Baluch territory ; and

Sibi and Pishm occupied. ^ . ■' '

we had, therefore, determined upon its
permanent withdrawal from the jurisdiction of Kabul authority."

On the 1st December Sir Robert Sandeman accompanied Gen-
eral Biddulph into Pishin and established friendly relations with
the inhabitants. The Bombay Column had passed up the Bolan
to Quetta unmolested. The people of Pishin welcomed the advent
of the British, and the Achakzai tribe — who inhabit the Khwaja
Amran Range — offered their services to Sir Robert Sandeman
as guardians of the Khojak Pass, making allusion to the posts they
had occupied in that pass in 1839-42. This offer was accepted
by the Agent to the Grovernor-General.

During General Stewart's advance to, and occupation of,
Kandahar, the Baluch, Brahui, and Kahar tribes on the lines of
communication gave no trouble. They were kept well in hand by
Sir Robert Sandeman, who had also made suitable arrangements
for the civil administration of Sibi and Pishin. These districts

were ceded to Britain as " Assigned
Treatyof Gandamak, 1879. Districts" by the treaty of Gandamak in

May 1879. The meaning of the word " as-
signed " was that — while being administered by British officers —
any excess of revenue over expenditure was to be paid to the ruler
of Kabul. After the treaty had been signed, Sir Robert Sandeman
announced to the people that they had become British subjects.

Thus the conclusion of the first period of the Second Afghan
War left Great Britain in possession of the districts of Thai
Chotiali, Sibi, and Pishin. This, in addition to our occupation of

( l-'^5 )

136 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Quetta, placed us in a strong position covering the flank of the lino-
of communication with the Punjab and Sind, and enabled us to
obtain a hold over the Marri and Pathan tribes.

After the treaty of Gandamak the Baluchistan Agency assumed

The Baluchistan Agency, jurisdiction over a large territory. The

duties assigned to the Agency were : —

1. Those duties connected with the treaty of 1876. ^

2. The Administration of the " Assigned Districts."

3. The duties'at the court of the Khan of Kalat, including the aSairs of
South-Western Baluchistan.

4. The administration of the treasury at Quetta.

5. The affairs of the Marri and Bugti tribes.

' 6. The affahs of Las Bela and the Makran Coast.

7. The control of Baluch Guides, Tribal Levies, and Postal and Tele-
.wraph Sowars.

Political Officers were placed in charge of Kachi, Pishin, and
Quetta and Sibi. Dr. Duke was deputed to the Khan's court,
Mr. Dames in charge of Vitakri and Barkhan, and to Captain
Showers was entrusted the line of communications between Jacoba-
bad and Chaman. The last named officer had complete charge of
the Baluch Guides.

On the 3rd September 1879 the British envoy, Sir Louis

Events after the Treaty of Cavagnari, and his escort were attacked

Gandamak. ^^^ j^^^g^ ^^ ^^^ mutinous troops of the

Amir at Kabul. At first the ill-effects of this affair were not
noticeable in Baluchistan, but subsequently a general unrest
appeared, intensified when the following winter found Lord Roberts'
force shut up in Kabul.

At this time the Indian Government determined to build a
railway line from Sibi to Pishin and Quetta by the Harnai route.
Arrangements were made with the tribes along the route to establish
posts for the protection of the working parties and carriage of
mails, and were completed early in March 1880, at which time
work was proceeding in the Nari Gorge.

On the 24th March Captain Showers, escorted by a few Baluh

„ , , ^ ^ . „,. Guides, determined to explore a new

Murder of Captain Showers. ^

road through the Dumar country from
Harnai to Quetta. On the way he was ambushed by some Panizal

THE BALUCHISTAN AGENCY 137

Kakars and killed. The same tribe then proceeded to attack
Attack on Lieutenant Fuller'8 ^he camp of a railway survey party "under
Camp. Lieutenant Fuller, R.E., killing several

followers and wounding a European Sergeant and three sepoys.

The immediate sequel to this attack was rather unfortunate
A malik (headman) in British employ proceeded to the spot and
placed a few of his men under a jemadar as a guard over what
was left of the camp. Captain Humfrey with some men of the
10th Bombay Infantry, who was in the neighbourhood, marched
at once to the scene. Seeing some Pathans in charge, he opened
fire on them, only discovering they were " friendlies " when twa
men had been killed and one wounded.

The Panizais, however, were soon "brought to book" by
„ . . „ . Colonel Durand who, with a force of 80

Panizai affairs. .

cavalry and 300 infantry, advanced from
Shahrig to the Chapar Mountain. In an engagement on that
mountain the Panizais lost a few men and then dispersed. Their
head-quarters, the village of Dirgai, was destroyed and their
crops were used as fodder.

The Maiwand disaster occurred on the 27th July 1880, audits
effect on the tribes was immediate. It was found necessary to
stop work on the Harnai Railway, and to withdraw the troops on
duty there for service elsewhere. An account of this will be given
later, as also of the unrest among the Achakzai tribes round about
Toba and the Khojak Pass. Throughout this time the Khan of
Kalat remained staunch. Some of his Pathan troops mutinied, and
marched off via Shorawak to join Ayub Khan, besieging Kandahar.
He gave active assistance in the provision of camel transport, and
offered men and money.

The Achakzai tribe gave some trouble in 1879 and again in 1880.

Prior to the occupation of Pishin in 1878, the Achakzai were
, , , . „ . entirely Afghan subjects, and their affairs

Achakzai affairs. it

before that date are outside the scope of
this work. They are a large clan of Duranis inhabiting the western
portion of Pishin and the eastern portion of Kandahar. The
larger half of the tribe are now British subjects inhabiting princi-
pally the Chaman sub-district and Toba. The last census showed
19,000 persons of this tribe in British territory. Their language
is Pushtu ; their habits [are nomadic. Cultivation is on the

138 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

increase amongst the Achakzai. They are a remarkably fine race
physically, but are not enlisted in the regular army on account of
their reputation as professional thieves. Many of them used to serve
in the Baluch regiments before the introduction of "class com-
panies." The present head of the tribe in British territory is Khan
Bahadur Haji Ghulam Haidar Khan, who lives in Chaman.

They first came in touch with the British Government during

_ J , . J ^ the First Afghan War, when they formed

a body of horse for Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk.

Though nominally our allies, they were however, entirely hostile

to us when opportunity offered.

1 The Achakzai, undoubtedly, formed part of the forces opposed
to General England in the two battles of Ilaikalzai in 1842. Their
temporary success in the first, and complete defeat in the second
battle form episodes in the history of the First Afghan War.

No further contact with the Achakzai occurred until the Second
Afghan War. They early offered their services to keep the Khojak
Pass open, their offer being accepted by Sandeman.

When General Stewart advanced to Kandahar, he left in Pishin,
r, J- 1,1 • -L' to aid Sandeman in preserving order, a

Commanding, Major Keene. ^ . .

2 Mountain Guns. moveable column, strength as detailed in

calairy^'^''*'^'"''' '"" ^'°^^' ^^'^^ margin. This force furnished several
300 Rifles, 1st Punjab In- detachments in the district.

■fantry.

In January 1879, the Achakzais made a successful raid on a
commissariat guard in the Arambi Glen

Aram bi Glen. ^

near Kala AbduUa. They then attacked
Kala Abdulla itself, but were driven off by the garrison of the 1st
Punjab Infantry.^

News then reached Sir Robert Sandeman that some 2,000
Major Keene's moveab'e men, mostly Achakzai, with a few dis-
column. charged Afghan sepoys, had collected in

the Gwazha Pass near Gulistan. As this body threatened our line
of communications. Major Keene was ordered to use his moveable
column to disperse them. Reinforced by Major Crookshank with
100 Gurkhas, he commenced operations by a surprise visit to the
Arambi Glen, where he successfully recovered all the stolen Govern-
ment property and received the submission of several influential

1 Now ."5th Coke's Rifles.

THE BALUCHISTAN AQENCT. 139

Achakzai maliJcs (headmen). These prompt measures ca used the
immediate cessation of all hostilities for the time being.

In May 1879, Captain Wylie, Assistant Political Agent, accom-
P*^^^^^ ^y ^^® principal Achakzai headmen
of the district, made a tour through the
Toba plateau. With him went seven British Officers and a personal
escort of 230 rifles, 2nd Sikhs (now 52nd Sikhs), and 30 sabres,
Baluch Horse (now 37th Lancers). The troops were well received
Isy all the chiefs, Achakzai and Kakar of Toba, and much good
survey work was accomplished by the officers of the escort.

During the expedition a fanatical Kakar suddenly attacked the
advanced party of the escort, and wounded two sepoys with his
sword before he was shot. The Kakar Chiefs with Captain Wylie
were very indignant at this outrage, and were with difficulty
dissuaded from attacking the section to which the fanatic belonged .
This incident is interesting, as proving that the Muhammadans
themselves recognise tribal responsibility for religious maniacs
■erroneously dignified with the name of ghazi.

In 1880, when the British force was besieged in Kandahar by
,„„„ Ayub Khan, the Achakzais again became

Unrest, 1880. -^ . ' . .°

hostile. They seized the Khojak Pass, and
Old Chaman was for several days completely isolated. A British
force, however, drove them off the pass and occupied the crest.
Nevertheless, skirmishes were of frequent occurrence for several
weeks ; picquets were fired on by night, and parties and convoys
by day.

After the battle of Kandahar and defeat of Ayub Khan, the

Achakzais became perfectly friendly, but their behaviour was not to

pass unpunished. In September 1880, Lord Roberts and Sandeman

met at Gulistan, where they decided that an expedition should enter

Toba and the Achakzai country round the Khwaja Amran Range.

On the 21st September 1880, General Baker marched from Old

General Baker's Expedition, Chaman along the foot of the Khwaja

^880. Amran to the Bogra Pass. He had under

J^is command the following troops : —

3rd Bengal Cavalry, 80 sabres, under Captain G. T. Morris.

No. 2 Mountain Battery under Major G. Swinley.

72nd Highlanders under Major C. M. Stockwell.

2nd Sikhs under Lieut. -Colonel J. J. Boswell.

5th Gurkhas under Lieut.-Colonel A. Fitz Hugh.

UO '■ TRO^TIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA. ' "

The plan of operations was to march via the Bogra Pass up to
the Toba camp there, and proceed to Kala AbduUa by the Arambi
Glen.

In order to confine the Achakzai in Toba, the passes on the north
and westjsides were occupied by the 3rd Bengal Cavalry and
detachments of regiments sent to the Arambi Glen from Kala
AbduUa, viz. : —

Commanding — Colonel Chapman, 8th Bengal Cavalry.

8th Bengal Cavalry, 100 sabres.

1st Madras Light Cavalry, -il sabres.

Jacob's Horse, 10 sabres.

63rd Foot, 100 Rifles.

3rd Bengal Infantiy, 30 rifles.

The Bogra Pass is the most northerly of the practicable passes
which debouch from Pishin (Toba) on to the Kunchai Plain.
It presents (1907) little difficulty for pack transport and could easily
be made practicable for guns. From it issues the stream from which
water (500,000 gallons a day) is conveyed in a pipe line to the
mobilization camp at Chaman.

Baker's force took the precaution of crowning the heights
throughout the passage of this gorge, which is nine miles long, but
arrived without incident at the summit, where an extensive plateau
is reached, most of which lies at an elevation of from 6,000 to
8,000 feet. The Achakzai had, however, practically deserted their
country, and disappeared into Zhob. Few were seen, and these
were endeavouring to drive off their flocks.

The Cavalry scoured the country on either side, securing what
sheep and cattle remained in the district, and reconnoitring generally.
The infantry advan ced in a south-easterly direction. A few prisoners
were made, being found in possession of property stolen from the
British Government. In descending the Arambi Glen from Toba
some slight resistance was experienced from some armed Achakzais
who fired on the column from the hills overlooking the pass.
The flanking parties opened fire on and killed two of these snipers,,
causing their immediate disappearance. A sepoy of the 2nd Sikhs,
however, who strayed from the line of march, was murdered.
Parties were sent out in all directions to capture the murderer, but
were unsuccessful. As a lesson to the people, all the hamlets and

THE BALUCHISTAN AGENCY. 141

<;rops within a five-mile radius of the scene of the outrage were
destroyed.

The whole march only lasted four days^ and Kala Abdulla
was reached on the 24th September. From the Achakzais were
taken 2,300 sheep and goats, 49 camels, 28 bullocks, 10 donkeys.
After using what was required for the brigade, the other animals
were handed over to the commissariat at Kala Abdulla. The
tribe was, in addition, fined Rs. 600.

Expedition against the Marris by a force under Brigadier-
General C. M. MacGregor, C.B., C.S.I.. C.I.E., in 1880.

On the outbreak of the Afghan War in 1878, the Marris began
to commit petty outrages on the line of communications between
Dadarand Lehri ; but the tribe as a whole attempted no open
hostilities until August 1880.

On the receipt of the news of the disaster at Maiwand on the
27th July 1880, the troops on the line of communications were
ordered to concentrate at the points of strategical importance.
With this object, the detachments along the line of railway,
under construction between Sibi and Harnai, were directed to
fall back and concentrate at the former place for the protection
of the Bolan communications.'-'

On this portion of the railway there were employed at the end
of July some 5,000 or 6,000 coolies, guarded by detachments
principally drawn from the 23rd Bombay Infantry. At Spin
Tangi was a post of 75 men, under Lieutenant F. J. Tobin of that
regiment, strengthened to about 100 bayonets by a small detach-
ment which came in from an adjacent station. When it became
known that the works were to be abandoned, a panic took place
among thelabourers ; some 3,000 of them poured into Sibi at once,
while about 1,800 crowded into Spin Tangi, just as Lieutenant
Tobin's detachment, with treasure to the amount of a lakh and a

1 This route was followed in 1905 by one side of the Double Staff Ride undertaken
by the officers of the Quetta Division under General Smith-Dorriou. Few officers
present were aware that they were following the route taken by General Baker,
most of the reports issued on the affairs of ihat time hav-ng remained confidential,

2 This precipitate abandonment of the railway works doubtless afforded founda-
tion for wide'y spread reports that the military power of Great Britain had
received a blow equal to that dealt to it in 1841. The impression grew that we
were abandoning our Sibi possessions for ever, and tended further to disturb the
Marris who had witnessed our withdrawal from Vitakri at a critical period.

142 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

half, started on the 6th August on its retreat to Sibi. The road

was very difficult, and the mass of
Railway Betarhnient Escort ^^^.-^^ ^^^^^^ hampered the march as

well as the defensive power of the little
force, which was attacked by large bodies of Harris, who saw a good
opportunity for plunder, and it was only by abandoning the treasure
that the detachment could make its way to Sibi, with the loss of
its baggage and tents, several clerks and coolies being killed, and
Lieutenant Tobin himself being wounded. This raid was followed

up by depredations on the line of com-

Attack on Mai. ■ ^ . . , , ^.^ .

munications. An attack on Mai, near
Sibi, however, was very promptly dealt with by the troops on
the lines of communication. The Harris, having raided the dis-
trict and carried off 2,000 head of cattle, retired to their hills. They
were overtaken on the 28th August 1880, by the force detailed in
_ , ,,, the margin, and an engagement ensued

Major A. B. Douglas, 4th . ,. ° . , ,° *=. , .,, ,'

Bengal Native Infantry, Com- m which some forty Mams were killed,
manding. or wounded. Host of the stolen property

50 sabres, Sind Horse. ^. / . -^

150 rifles, 3rd and 4th Bengal was recovered, and no further raids into
Native Infantry. British territory occurred.

To punish the Harris for these outrages, and to place our poli-
tical relations with them on a sounder

Marri Expedition, 1880. ^^^.^^ .^ ^^^ ^^^.^^^ ^^ ^^^^ ^-^^^ ^^^

following terms, and, in the event of refusal, to send an expedi-
tion into their country : —

\st. Restitution of treasure and property plundered.

27id. Twenty thousand rupees fine.

3rd. Blood-money, according to tribal custom, for those killed.

ith. British troops to march through the Marri country by Kahan

to Harrand.
5th. Approved hostages to be given for future good conduct-

Tke command of the expedition was entrusted to Brigadier-
ii-9th Royal Artillery. General C. H. HacGregur, C.B., C.S.I.,,

2-6oth Rifles. C.I.E., and a force of 393 sabres and

3rd Punjab Cavalry. i ■ • n o n-r 4

2nd Sikh Infantry. 2,496 bayoucts, numbering lu ail 3,074

.3rd Sikh Infantry. ^j ^jj ranks, was placed at his disposal

4th Gurkha Regiment. ^ 1 a j.-ii

5th Gurkha Regiment. Of these troops, ll-9th Royal Artillery,

the 4th Gurkhas, and one company, 2-60th Rifles, were at Harnai,,

THE BALUCHISTAN A0EN07. 145

and the remainder, under Brigadier- General MacGregor, were
concentrated at Sibi. The whole force, after uniting, was to pro-
ceed in the first instance to Quat-Mandai there to await the result
of negotiations which were being carried on by the political
authorities with the chiefs of the Marri clan.

By the 13th October the force was concentrated at Babar
Kach, and on the following day marched eight miles and a half to
Quat-Mandai {see Map). Here the country was well watered and
fertile, and the standing crops furnished ample forage ; the villages
had been deserted, but no opposition was met with, although
the roads had been flooded by the Marris, who were reported to
have been joined by the Luni Pathans, and to have thrown o 2
the authority of their Chief, Mir Ulla Khan, who did not wish to
fight. It had been Brigadier-General MacGregor's intention to
march straight upon Kahan from Quat-Mandai, but as such a step
would have had the effect of driving the Marris to the hills, and
putting off all chance of an understanding with them, he now decid-
ed to cut in between them and their northern neighbours, the Lunis,
and, by heading the Marris themselves in the direction of Kolu,
inflict on them one crushing blow, and thus end the campaign.

During the 15th and 16th October the force halted at Quat-
Mandai, in order to allow a few days' grace to the Marri Chief.
Then, no intimation having been received of the result of the nego-
tiations, the Brigadier-General determined to advance, in accord-
ance with his original orders.

On the 17th the force marched to Dalujal (fourteen miles and
a half), leaving at Quat-Mandai the 2nd Sikhs, two guns, ll-9th
Royal Artillery, and one squadron, 3rd Punjab Cavalry, under
the command of Major W. C. Anderson, of the last-named regi-
ment. On the following day the force marched to Spin Kach, the
Spin Tangi being traversed without opposition, which was prob-
ably partly due to the movement being unexpected. Owing to the
difficulties of the road, the rear guard did rot reach camp until
twenty-four hours after the commencement of the march, which
No. 2, Bombay Mountain was five miles in length. At Spin Kach

Battery, 2 guns. , i , ^ i ■ .x, ■ j

2nd Bombay Ligbt Cavalry, the troops noted )n the margin, under
^"?=ffj'^^^' ^ 1VT X- T r Colonel G. S. Morris, which were destined

loth Bombay Native Infan-
try, 309 bayonets, to form the garrison of Thal-Chotiali,

joined Brigadier-General MacGregor's column, and the whole

144 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

force marched on the 19th to Kuriak (eight miles), and next
<lay to Kandi (eleven miles).

No opposition was met with, and the road was fairly good,
except in a few places where the 3,000 baggage animals had to
march in single file, on which account the rear-guard on the 20th
took ten hours to cover eleven miles. At 6 a.m. on the 21st. the
column marched for Sembar. The pass bearing this name
though affording the strongest possible defensible position, was
unoccupied by the enemy ; the road, however, presented formid-
able obstacles. At about ten miles from the start, Sembar (which
is nothing but a name) was reached.

Here there was scarcely any water, and the force was com-
pelled to push on over another kotal (4,000 feet), the road becom-
ing worse and worse. The Brigadier-General halted for some hours
near the crest, the advanced guard pressing on down the northern
slopes, and finally encamping at about 5 p.m. near a well in the Thai
plain, about two miles from its southern edge. Meanwhile, the
baggage and rear-guard was much delayed, but, fortunately,
the opposition was of the slightest, a few shots only having been
fired near the eastern end of the pass. It was not, however,
until 10 A.M. on the 22nd that the rear-guard reached the camping
ground, having been on the road, and almost without water, for
twenty-eight hours. The total distance was twenty miles, and
during the march 240 transport animals were lost.

On the following day a detachment of two squadrons of the
2nd Bombay Cavalry, which had been unable to catch up the
head-quarters of the regiment before, came through the pass, and
found four bodies of camp followers, who had been murdered on
the previous day. A few shots were fired at this detachment,
and one sowar was wounded.

On the 22nd the column marched to Thai (eight miles and
a half) across the plain. The effect of the adoption of this route
was now proved to meet the Brigadier-General's expectations, and
the Luni=^, alarmed for the safety of their own villages, thus
directly threatened, broke oS their alliance with the Harris, and
their headmen came into the British camp at Thai to offer their
services against their former allies.

The Brigadier-General was still without any intimation of
the results of the negotiations with the Marri Chiefs, and was thus

THE BALUCHISTAN AOENOT. 145

placed in a false position, being uncertain whether he was enter-
ing an enemy's country or not. As, however, any hesitation might
have a bad effect, he decided, after halting a day at Thai to fill up
his supplies, to push forward into the Marri country. To prevent
any mistake, however, he wrote to Mir UUa Khan, the Chief of the
Marris, as well as to Karam Khan of Kolu, the Chief of the Bijarani
(the most hostile) section, inviting them to come and hear the
terms of the British Government.

On the 25th, leaving all the sick and the surplus transport
at Thai, the force marched to Chotiali. From this place two
roads lead to Kolu — one by Burg, which was said to be bad and
waterless, and the other by Bala Dhaka, somewhat longer, but
easier. The route via Bala Dhaka was selected. From Chotiali it
was four marches by this route to Kolu, thence three more to
Mamand, and from there four to Kahan, a total of eleven marches.
Supplies were, therefore, taken for eleven days. Leaving the
troops under Colonel Morris to occupy the posts of Thai and Chotiali
the Bengal troops advanced on the 26th to Paniali. Here a final
message was sent to Mir Ulla Khan and Karam Khan, to the effect
that if they did not come in at once, Kolu, Mamand, and Kahan
would be treated as hostile districts. On the 27th the force marched
thirteen miles to Baniwali, and the following day continued its
march to Bala Dhaka and Gusra (nine miles).

At early dawn on the 29th, two regiments were sent on to
seize the Khuba Wanga Pass, leading to the Kolu Valley, with
orders to render the road practicable. This was effected by
10 A.M. The pass was found to be very difficult and the baggage
took all day to accomplish the march, the rear-guard not reaching
camp at Nikra until 10 p.m.

The Marris were now completely headed ; there was no longer
any fear of their joining the Lunis, or seeking an asylum in the
Khetran country, and unless they opposed the column, they must
withdraw to the westward. Karam Khan had already deserted
his fort in Kolu, and the force marched thither on the 30th. It
was at this time reported that one portion of the Marris advocated
a general assembly at Sawar, to the west, while others were in favor
of concentrating near Kahan, on the south-west. Brigadier-General
MacGregor's object was to prevent any tendency to assemble in
separate bodies, and as it appeared probable that they would make

Vol. hi. i.

146 FBONTIER AND OVEIiSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

their principal stand in tke Sawar direction, the Brigadier endeavour-
ed to manoeuvre so as to compel them to abandon the Kahan posi-
tion. This was effected by an announcement that he intended to
march direct on Kahan by the Dowla Wanga Pass ; the re-
sult being that the following day the enemy were reported to be
abandoning the Kahan position, and retreating towards the Chakar
Tangi and Nili with their flocks, women and children.

On this day (the 30th) Major Anderson was instructed to post-
pone the destruction of Mandai, which he had been ordered to carry
out on the 1st of November.

On the 31st the force advanced through the Dowla Wanga
Pass, twelve miles in the direction of Mamand. There were two or
three difficult places, and some delay occurred in the pass, so that
the rear-guard did not arrive in camp till 6-30 p.m. On this day the
JBrigadier-General received information that the .negotiations with
the Marris had been broken off, and that he was at liberty to enforce
the terms on the tribe. On the receipt of this message, Brigadier-
General MacGregor sent to inform the Marri Chief, MirUlla Khan,
that if he wished to come in he must do so at once. On the 1st
November the force marched sixteen miles to Kui. During the after-
noon, Mir Ulla Khan arrived in the British camp, and was informed
of the terms which the Government demanded, to which a straight-
forward answer must be given on the following day at Mamand.

The next day the march was continued to that place, and Mir
Ulla Khan and Karam Khan both came into camp. After recapi-
tulating the terms and explaining what he proposed to do in the
•event of their not being accepted, the Brigadier-General addressed
them as follows : — " I have now read to you the orders of Govern-
ment in regard to the terms which they have been pleased to require
from you. I have also told you what I propose to do, and I have
now only to say this : you must give me a straight answer — ' Yes
or * No' — in one hour. You must either fight or obey the orders
of Government. For myself I do not care much which you do ;
my troops will be very glad if you fight. Now go away and settle
matters." This short address had the desired effect, and within
the hour Mir Ulla Khan and Karam Khan gave their unreserved
submission. Brigadier-General MacGregor then demanded three
hostages — one from the Ghazani section, one from the Bijaranis^
iind one on the part of the Chief. He also demanded the immediate

TSB BALUCHISTAN AQKNOT. 147

payment of Rs. 50,000, and that Mandai should be held until the
rest of the fine was lealised. This was agreed to, and the Chiefs
consented to accompany the British troops to Kahan. On the 3rd
November, leaving Mamand on the left, the force marched
three miles to the westward, in order to profit as far as possible
by the standing crops.

The Brigadier-General's intention, in the event of the non-
•submission of the Marris, had been here to divide his force into two
columns, one to advance by Safed Tok to Nili (four marches),
the other to the Chakar Tangi. At the same time Major Anderson,
^t Mandai, was to advance towards Nili (where the principal body
of the enemy was assembled), and effect a junction with the Lunis
and the Thai Chotiali garrison from the north, and thus surround
the enemy.

On the 4th of November the column marched by the Ghora Dand

to Khanki (seven miles) en rowie to Kahan,

Kahan reached. , . , _, , ,t ^ j.- j

and on the 5th the advance was contmued
to Ghar Daf (fourteen miles), the Chief going on to Kahan, to en-
deavour to have the fine ready on the arrival of the British troops.
Kahan was reached on the 6th of November. About four miles from
the capital the Brigadier-General was met by Mir Ulla Khan,
Karam Khan, and other leading men of the Marris.

Mir Ulla Khan, acting as spokesman, asked for forgiveness
in the name of the tribe in most humble
Suhmission of Marris. terms; he promised on their behalf to
pay up the rest of the fins, and to fulfil all the other conditions, and
as an earnest of their intentions he brought with him Rs. 50,000
in cash and the hostages demanded. The Brigadier-General replied
in a few words, and said : — " I am glad you have the sense to see
that such a wretched baiid of robbers as you are cannot cope with
the British Government. I accept the money and the hostages
as a token of your real submission, and I shall therefore not
■destroy Kahan."

The troops then advanced and encamped on the west of the town.
Kahan lies in a magnificent plain, well watered, well wooded, and
highly cultivated. During the day arrangements were made for
the return of the expeditionary force to India.

The total fine and compensation was fixed at two lakhs, the
blood-money at Rs. 60,000, and the hostages were — a brother of

148 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Mir Ulla Khan, on behalf of the Sardars of the tribe generally -
Karam Khan, as the representative of the Bijarani ; and Mir Hazar
as that of the Ghazani section. The hostages were taken to Khanpur,
and then sent in charge of Lieutenant R. H. Jennings by rail
to Sibi.

The force halted near Kahan on the 7th November, but the town
was not entered by any of the troops, in deference to the feelings
of the inhabitants. On the 8th Brigadier-General MacGregor left
Kahan, and marched twenty miles over easy country to Suji Kach,
crossing the Marri eastern frontier.

On the 9th November the force marched from Suji Kach to
Ketchi Kot (four miles and a half), and on the following day to-
Chatt, by the Burzen Pass. On the 11th the march was continued to
Kalchas, and the next day Bet Bakshah, in British territory, was
reached. On arriving at Drigi the force was broken up.

The expedition had thus been brought to a successful issue
as regards the submission of the majority of the Harris ; but the
Mandai Harris had not been adequately dealt with. Consequently
on the 6th December following, Hajor Sir Robert Sandeman, the
Governor-General's Agent, Baluchistan, made a requisition on
the Brigadier-General in command of the communications for the
escort allowed him by Government, viz., 2 mountain guns, 1
troop of cavalry, and 160 bayonets, as he intended to move towards
the i\rarri country.

The troops detailed in the margin were accordingly placed at his

Settlement with Harris, 1881. disposal, and orders were received for

these to be increased by 250 bayonets of

lSJX^X'!n;olr- the 29th Bombay Native Infantry, the

29th Bombay Native Infantry, escort being under the command of

companies. Colonel 0. V. Tanner, of that regiment.

On the 18th December Hajor Sir R. G. Sandeman marched for

Handai, with the intention of entering the Harri hills for four or-

five marches, in order to support Sardar Hir Ulla Khan, who was

endeavouring to recover from the Mandai Harris their share of the

fine. Up to that time he had only succeeded in recovering from them

Rs. 25,000, and five cartloads of property looted during the outrage

on the 6th August. The escort was to be supported by the garrison

of Mandai, now consisting of two mountain guns, one regiment of

Bombay Infantry, and a squadron of Madras Cavalry, which had

THE BALUCHISTAN AGENCY. 149

relieved Major Anderson's detachment after the termination of
Brigadier-General MacGregor's operations.

The Mandai Harris were, however, overawed by this display
of force and tendered their submission to Sir Robert Sandeman,
.agreeing to pay in full the whole fine of Rs. 50,000.

On the 6th January, 1881, a final settlement was effected with^
the whole Marri tribe, by which it was stipulated, among other
things, that all roads through the Marri country should remain open
to traffic, that in the event of thefts or offences being committed
either in British territory or on the trade routes, the Chiefs should be
responsible for the restoration of the stolen property or for the pro-
duction of the actual offenders ; that when summoned by the
Political Officer the tumandar or any of the Chiefs should at once
.attend ; that approved hostages with one risaldar and ten sowars
should remain at Sibi ; and that the Marri tribe should not wage
war or attempt to inflict retribution on any other people or tribe
without the permission of the British Government.

Shorawak Affairs.

AVhen the British occupied Pishin, Sandeman was very anxious
to include Shorawak in its boundaries. He produced evidence of
its having belonged to the Pishin rather than to the Kandahar
District,- from which it is separated by 70 miles of the Registan
Desert. Shorawak is inhabited by a Pathan tribe, the Baraich,
and is fairly well cultivated.

In order to obtain information regarding this district, Major

Duke was directed in March, 1879, to march from Nushki via

„„ , , . r. . . r^ Shorawak to Pishin. With him as escort

30 sibies, 1st Punjab Ua-

-vairy. Went the troops detailed in the margin

176 Rifles, Jacob's Kifles. ^^^^^ command of Major F. Humfrey,

Jacob's Rifles.
On the 27th March 1879, this force was attacked near Saiyid
, „ Buz in Shorawak by a body of 1,600

Affair at Sayjnd Buz, 1879. . . . ■' •'

Baraich. The action lasted from 7-30 a.m.
till 2 P.M. and was fought in a blinding dust storm, which blew

1 The Baraich are a Pathan tribe akin to the Tarius. Those living in Baluchis-
tan are to be found principally in Chagai and Western Kalat. They were {oriutrly
.great wanderers and have left their mark in the Bombay Presidency, the town of
Baraich (Broach) being called after thein.

150 FBONTIER AND OVEBSEAS EXPEDITIONS FBOM INDIA.

in the enemy's face, and helped to conceal the movements and small
numbers of the British force.

The action started by the cavalry drawing the enemy to a
rapidly entrenched position taken up by Major Humfrey. The
enemy attacked the entrenchments, our cavalry clearing off to the-
right.

Major Humfrey advanced his left and swung it round against
the enemy's right which caused them to retire. They were at once
charged on the other flanlc by Major Duke at the head of the de-
tachment of the 1st Punjab Cavalry. The whole of the infantry
then left their entrenchments, and charged the retreating enemy
of whom ninety were killed, and many wounded.

They were completely defeated, and surrendered to Major
Duke next day. The British los^s was seven severely and several
slightly wounded. Major Humfrey was made Brevet-Lieute-
nant-Colonel for his success in this affair.

At the meeting of Lord Roberts with Sandeman a^

Gulistan in September 1880, it was decided to send a small force

into Shorawak. The inhabitants had remained quite friendly, and

„, , • J ,oon the object of the march was solelv to-

Shorawak occupied, 1880. .J -

obtain and send to Quetta supplies of

Colonel Robertson, Com- „rain and forage. Precautions had, of

manding. ° i i • r ■, •■,■

course, to be taken in case of hostility.

1 Squadron, 1st Madras Light The troops detailed for this duty were

2'guns, Jacobabad Mountain under command of Colonel Robertson,

Battery. 4th Bengal Infantry. Captain Wylie ac-

4th Bengal Infantry. • i i c- i- ■

companied the force as political agent.
Previous to the march of the force from Gulistan, the Gwazha
Pass was closed with dynamite to prevent the passage of any hostile
parties, and was only opened when the column was ready to
start.

On the 9th October a start was made. No opposition was met
with. A camp was formed at Mandozai near Nushki and arrange-
ments were made for the weekly despatch of supplies to Gulistan
for a period of one month.

In October of that year, a strong grazing and grass
pressing depot in Shorawak was established in view of the forage
difficulty on the line of communications from Sibi to Quetta and.

TBM BALUCHISTAN AQENCY. 151

Chaman. Theie, too, it was proposed to send all sick and weakly
transport animals and horses/

The column remained in Shorawak until March 1881, the 4th

Bengal Infantry having been relieved by the 5th Bombay Infantry.

The British Government then decided to give Shorawak back

„, , J. J iQQi to the Afjzhan Province of Kandahar,

Shorawak evacuated, 1881. '^ ^r t ■ i i '

and the troops at Mandozai marched to
Khushdil Khan, the former seat of Afghan Government in
Pishin, which was temporarily strengthened so as to overawe the
Kakars during the withdrawal of the British force from Kandahar.
On the 23rd May, 1881, Major- General Hume reported from
Southern Afghan Field Force Quetta that the last regiment for India
evacuates Baluchistan, 1881. had left Sibi. The Southern Afghanistan
Field Force became the Quetta Division^ and the Second Afghan
War was at an end.

Thal-Chotiali Field Force, 1878.

The want of a direct route from the Punjab to Quetta and Pishin
became very noticeable during the Second Afghan War. The length
and heat of the Sind-Bolan routs are apparent.

As early as 1875 the Government of India had endeavoured
unsuccessfully to come to an understanding with the Kabul Gov-
ernment regarding the old trade route via Thal-Chotiali to the
Derajat.

As the route is now (1907) a highway in our possession a short
description of its course and strategical value will be of interest.
Starting from Dera Ghazi Khan the route crosses the Suliman Moun-
tains via the Sakhi Sarwar Pass and Fort Munro ; thence through
the Barkhan valley over the Han Pass to Thai. The valley of Vitakri
is a continuation of the Barkhan valley which is entered from the
Rakni Plain, and troops — if there — would dominate the Khetrans,
Slarris, Bugtis, and the Tarin Pathan tribes of Thal-Chotiali. The
Barkhan Plain, too, is of strategical value, considered as a place
where troops could be cantoned in support of garrisons at Quetta
and Pishin. Thence direct routes lead to Dera Ismail Khan,
Dera Ghazi Khan, Rajanpur, and Jacobabad in one direction, and
Quetta, Pishin, and Kandahar in the other. These routes lie, for

1 This proposal was not carried out on account of the determination to restore
Kandahar and the province to Abdur Bahman.
i For details see Appendix A.

152

FWNTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

the most part, through an open easy country, and connect the valleys
of Khurasan with the plains of Punjab and Sind. In a northerly
direction the valleys flank all the passes leading from Afghanistan
into the Punjab as far as the Gomal, while to the south they flank
the Bolan Pass.

In 1»79, when the troops were returning from Kandahar, it was
decided to open up this route, and Sir Robert Sandeman was or-
dered to visit General Sir Donald Stewart at Kandahar and arrange
for certain troops to proceed to India by that route. Arrangements
i'or supply and political dealings with the tribes were placed in the
hands of the Agent to the Governor- General (Sandeman).

.Accordingly, a force was collected, strength as detailed in the

margin, at Khushdil Khan, near

the modern station of Pishin.
General Biddulph was in com-
mand with Sir Robert Sande-
man as Political Officer.

The force advanced in three
columns, marching from Khush-
dil Khan on March 11th, 21st, and
22nd, respectively. Sir Robert
Sandeman accompanied the First
Column to arrange for supplies
with the local tribes, and prevent
opposition to the march. General
Biddulph marched with the Second
Column. To the First Column,
naturally, fell the duty of clearing
the way. The force marched unop-
posed to Spiraragha Pass. Here
the Dumar Pathans made a show of
opposition, but were persuaded by
Sir Robert Sandeman of the peace-
ful intention of the march. Thence
the force marched via the Chari

Mountain where a single fanatic, sword in hand, barred the way

Char'M t " declaring that none should pass save over

his dead body. Hearing this, the Dumar

headmen, who had accompanied the column, advanced on his

Composition of Field Force.

1st Column.

Commanding, Major Keene.

4 Mountain guns.

1 Squadron, Jacob's Horse (36th)?

1 Squadron, 8th Bengal Cavalry.
4 Companies, 1st Punjab Infantry.

Approximate strength, 750 men.

2nd Column.

Commanding, Colonel Sale Hill.
15th Hussars.
4 ilountain guns.
32nd Pioneers.
1st GiirkhhS.

Approximate strength 1,350 men.

I 3rd Column.

Commanding, Major-General NuttaL

2 Mountain guns.
2 Squadrons, 8th Bengal Lancers.
6 Companies, 70th Foot (East Sur-
rey Regiment).

9th Company, Sappers and Miners.

Approximate strength, 870 men.

THE BALUCHISTAN AGENCY. 153

3)osition and, throwing their long shawls over him, brought him to the
.ground ; not, however, before he had severely wounded one of them

Next day the Column was fired on by a large body of Dumars.
Of this affair Sir Eobert Sandeman wrote the following account
to Lord Lytton : —

We had proceeded some seven or eight miles further when we ap-
proached a series of low hills, which we found occupied by Dumars. laud
Major Keene, with a party of Infantry and two guns, at once advanced
against the hill, which was pretty strongly held, and sent word to the
hillmen not to oppose our advance.

The guns were loaded, the hUlmeu refused to give way, apd a collision
Appeared inevitable. ,

At this juncture, to our great astonishment, the Roderick Dhu of the
•day before, who had attentively listened to the parley, suddenly broke loose
from those in charge of him, ascended the hillside rapidly aud, on reachmg
the top, fell upon his fellow clausmen calling out " I have surrendered ; who are
you to oppose the advance when I have submitted 1"

Curiously enough this caused the tribesmen to submit, and
€ighty of them were disarmed and brought into camp. A con-
ference with the headmen was then held and arrangements were
made for establishing posts along the route traversed to keep
open communications. The posts were to be held by the clans in
whose country they were established, and pay was given at Rs. 15
for a jemadar and Rs. 8 for each of 15 footmen per mensem.
This was fixed as the establishment for each post, of whch three
were formed. Satisfactory arrangements were made for supplying
the columns in rear with grain and forage.

The column then proceeded to Chinjan, Chinali, and Kach.
At the Kandil Pass the force was stopped by armed men of the
Aghbarg Mountain. These were dispersed by a few shells from
the guns, and the troops proceeded through the defile to the
Smalan Valley. At Sanjawi, Sir Robert Sandeman held another
conference, when arrangements for the establishment of posts was
made with the headmen of the tribes who had opposed the column
at the Kandil Pass.

At Baghao Major Keene's force was opposed by some 3,500
tribesmen of the Zhob and Bori Valleys

Affair at Baghao. , , n • oi i t i

under the command ot Shan Janan^
Chief of Zhob. The enemy suddenly appeared in front and

154 rnONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

on both flanks and advanced across open ground to attack thr
column. The guns opened fire and stopped this advance^ after
which Major Keene advanced and succeeded in putting the whole
force to flight with a loss of 200 killed and wounded. Major
Keene's loss was three killed and a few wounded. Shah Jahan
of Zhob sent in a written submission next day.

There was no further opposition, and the 1st Column pro-
ceeded via Thai and Chotiali to Vitakri in the Barkhan Plain^
where it was joined by the other two columns. These latter columns
had taken a slightly different route. They marched down theBori
Valley, where the cantonment of Loralai has since sprung up, and
through the Anambar Gap across the Chamalang river to Bala Dhaka
and Vitakri. Here also arrived from Multan the force detailed in
,^,, „ ,„ , the margin under Colonel Prendergast.

15th Bengal Cavalry. t c •

Detachment, 21st Madras It was to form the garrison of a post to-
^TtSment. 30th Madras Command all the passes leading through
Infantry. the Kakar country into Pishin, and yet

ConttgenT"'' ^''^^'^'P"'^ be within easy reach of the Indian

frontier.
Vitakri was found to fulfil these conditions, and there Prender-
,^.^ , . „ gast's column was established for the

Vitakri Cantonment. °

hot weather. The site proved very
unhealthy, and the cantonment was shortly afterwards aban-
doned when the force was broken up, part proceeding to Dera.
Ghazi via the Sakhi Sarwar Pass, and part to Mithankot by
the Chachar Pass. On the 1st May 1879, General Biddulph
reached Multan, and the Thal-Chotiali Field Force ceased to
exist.

The results of this march were valuable on account of the-
geographical information gained and survey work accomplish-
ed. It was also important in view of the relations estab-
lished between the Baluchistan Agency and the Kakar Pathau-
Tribes.

Bozdar Field Force.

Again, in November and December 1881, advantage was taken
of the troops returning from Kandahar to explore new territory
on our border, and orders were given to march the body of troops.

THE BALUCHISTAN AOENOT. IBS'

noted in the margin from the Hamai Valley to Dera Ghazi Khaa

via the Bozdar country and Saunra Pass..

Commauding Field Force. ^^^^^^^1 Wilkinson commanded the^

Brigadier-GTnTrliH.c.wi'. force, which left Quetta on November

kinson. 1 stand arrived at Thai on the 16th.

Here the column struck ofi to the north-
8th Mountain Battery. east through unknown country to the

4 Companies, 1st Battalion, s^ii^an Mountains, arriving at Dera

Manchester Regiment. ' °

1 Squadron, Jacob's Horse. Ghazi Khan vid the Vidor Pass ou tlie-
loll'h). ^"'"'"''^ ^'"'' ^°°'' nth December. This route crossed that

9th Bombay Infantry (now traversed by General Biddulph in 1879
^^^^^'>- in the Chamalang Valley. The march,

had important results in proving the possibility of feeding
large numbers of animals in the Chamalang Valley, where
grass was found to be abundant. Heliographic communication
was opened with India on the 26th November. A signalling
station had been established on the mountain of Ekbhai and
communication was first established from Dadar Mountain, 46
miles distant. No opposition was met with.

The further history of Baluchistan chiefly relates to adminis-

Baiuchistan subsequent to tration and Organisation. The strateg-
the Second Afghan War. i^al importance of the western and north-

eastern portions of the province were recognised, and expeditions
were made to Makran, Bori, and Zhob. The first to Makran was in
1883-84, when Sandeman adjusted the quarrel between the Khan
and the Naoshirwanis, the second in 1890-91, when the better
administration of Makran was taken up. Later — in 1898 and 1901 —
disturbances in Makran necessitated military expeditions being
despatched to that country, of which an account will be given in
chapter XI. The expeditions to the Bori and Zhob Valleys will
also be dealt with in separate chapters.

In 1882 arrangements were finally made with the Khan of
^ , , Kalat by which the Quetta District

Quetta leased, 1882. , „ -^ , t i ^.i, tj -x- u

and valley were rented by the British
Government forRs. 25,000 per annum, and the Bolan taken over
for Rs. 30,000. The considerations governing the sums fixed
depended on the average incomes derivable from the districts, after-
the expenses of administration had been deducted.

The next few years saw great developments in Baluchistan ;
careful division into districts, each with its own political ofiicers;-.

156 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

progress of the railway — a high level road up the Bolan Pass to
avoid " wash-outs " by flood, and the establishment of levy posts,
•etc.

After the close of the Afghan War there were numbers of iso-
„ ., , ^ . lated posts in Baluchistan, garrisoned,

Tribal Levies. r i • <■ ■,

for the protection of the country, by reg-
ular troops. In 1882 a committee sat to consider this situation,
ruinous to the discipline and efficiency of regular troops.

Gradually the posts were made over to tribal levies, and the
1st August 1884 saw the final policing of the country by its own
people established. The money for these levies was chiefly found
by the disbandment of the Baluch Guides. Raised in 1838 this
force, whose duties were those of political bodyguard, profession-
al spies, and Government messengers, had served in Sind until
1877. when it was transferred to the charge of the Agent to the
Governor-General in Quetta.

The strength of the forces to be kept up by Native States havf*

been fixed from time to time by the
Troops of Native States. ^ . , , . , , , , /-,

orders oi the Agent to the Governor -

General. The Khan of Kalat's army at present consists of 300 in-
fantry, 300 cavalry, and 90 gunners. The artillery consists of 29
obsolete pieces, of which nine are serviceable. Most of these troops
are stationed at Kalat ; detachments are located at Mastung,
Khuzdar, and in Kachi. The whole force is entirely irregular and
practically devoid of organisation or discipline.

A force of 104 Punjabi Muhammadan Military Police is main-
^ „ , ^ tained at Bela under the orders of the

Las Bela Forces.

Wazir : they are armed with Snider car-
bines. The State troops consist of 36 cavalry, 212 infantry, and
■5 field guns. Besides these troops, certain levies are maintained
under the district officials.

In Kharan 450 men, variously armed, are kept up for the

maintenance of order. Of this force

Kharan Forces. . . r-rvi. j.

170 men form the garrison oi Dehgwar to

prevent raids by the Damanis of the Persian border. Raghai and

Rakhshan are the other Municipal garrisons. The Chief possesses

three muzzle-loading cannons and a mortar. All the tribesmen are

liable to military service when called upon.

THE BALVCHISTAN AGENCY. 157

In 1887 it was decided to tunnel the Khwaja Amran Range be-
tween Kala Abdulla and Old Chaman,
and to make the terminus of the railway
in the Kunchai Plain at the northern entrance to the Khojak Pass.
The terminus was called Chaman, where the military station was
established.

Chaman lies 79 miles north-west of Quetta, from which place

there is a metalled cart road leading over
Chaman. ^^^ Khojak Pass. It is 4,400 feet above

sea-level and is much hotter in summer than Quetta, although the
winter is little less severe. The extremes of heat and cold are due
to the great Registan desert which begins a couple of miles west of
Chaman and over which the prevailing winds blow.

Troops marched into Chaman on the 1st August 1889, that
is to say they pitched their camp on a piece of the desert where it
had been decided to build the terminus of the railway. A glance
at the map will show that at the Gwazha Pass our boundary leaves
the Khwaja Amran Range and curves into the Kunchai Plain, at-
taining its furthest limit therein three miles west of Chaman : thence
it curves back to the hills, joining them north of the Bogra Pass.
A stretch of level country is thus enclosed, on which the railway
terminus and cantonment have been built. This inclusion of
part of the Kunchai Plain within our frontier was a very sore
point with the Amir, Abdur Rahman of Afghanistan.

In January 1888, Jam Mir Khan of Las Bela died. The suc-
cession was disputed. It will be re-
membered ^ that his eldest son Jam
Ali Khan ruled the state during his father's exile in India.
On his father's return Jam Ali Khan fell into disfavour. He found
that a younger son of the Jam by another wife, a Delhi lady, whom
he had married in exile was being pushed forward as the heir ap-
parent. In consequence, he took up arms against his father, and
was first exiled by the British authorities and afterwards detained^
practically a prisoner, in Quetta.

As the result of his former bad behaviour. Jam Ali Khan
was not looked upon with favour by the Indian Government.
Sandeman, however, considering the provocation which produced

1 Chapter III.

158 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Jam All's Insurrection, and the fact of his being a Brahui on
his mother's side, whereas the other claimant for the Jamship was
the offspring of a foreigner, decided to allow the succession of the
•eldest son. In January 1889, Jam Ali Khan was placed on the
•throne by Sir Robert Sandeman in public durbar.

In 1891 Kamal Khan, the Jam's eldest son, fell out with his
father, and fled to Quetta. It was chiefly to settle this dispute
that Sandeman proceeded to Las Bela,

On the 16th January 1892, he arrived at Sonmianl, whence he
Death of Sir Robert Sande- marched to Las Bela escorted by a
'»>ai- Company of the 1st Baluchls (now 127th).

Las Bela was reached on the 22nd, and next day Sir Robert
Sandeman was taken ill, and died on the 28th. During his illness
the Jam, who attributed his possession of the chiefshlp to
.Sandeman's efforts alone, had a service of picked horses along
the road to Karachi, 115 miles, to bring out medicines or any-
thing else required. Six months later he erected a handsome
dome over his patron's grave. Sir Robert Sandeman's funeral
took place on the 1st February, the coffin being carried by men
of the 1st Baluchls along a route lined with the Jam's retainers,
and followed by all the political officers. Lieutenant W. M.
Southey, 1st Baluchis, commanded the firing party : he had
marched in from Panjgur that morning.

As a curious Instance of Eastern ideas, the following- extract
from a letter of condolence written by the Khan of Kalat to Lady
Sandeman is interesting. After expressing his grief at Sandeman's
death, Mir Khudadad Khan wrote : — " The remains of Sir Robert
Sandeman should be buried either in his native home or in my
dominions ; and if the Las Bela Chief objects, I am prepared to
.send an army forcibly to convey the body to Quetta."

In March 1893, it was decided to depose the Khan of Kalat.

Khudadad Khan had caused the death

Khudadad Khan deposed. . i <.

of tour persons, whom he accused oi
treachery, and an attempt on his life.

The British authorities looked upon this action as murder,
.and decided to remove the Khan. Khudadad was then at Bagh
in Kachi. Two columns were formed. The Middlesex Regiment,
J-24th Baluchistan Infantry, Jacob's Horse, and a mountain
Tsattery occupied Kalat, and the treasury was removed.

THE BALUCHISTAN AGENCY. 159

The other force, commanded by Colonel Aitken, R.A., consist-
ed of the 37th Cavalry, 104th Rifles, and 2 mountain guns. This
column proceeded to Belpat on the railway in Kachi, and the Khan
was ordered to present himself there before the Agent to the Gov-
ernor-General. On arrival, he was received by Colonel Browne,
the Agent, in a square, three sides of which were troops, and the
fourth the railway train. The troops were facing outwards when
the Khan arrived. He entered the square, no salute was given,
the troops turned " about," and the Khan recognised that he was
a prisoner. He was taken by train to Quetta, where he abdicated
in favour of his son, the present Khan, Mir Mahmud. Khudadad
resided for some time in Loralai, and was in 1904 removed to Pishin.

In January 1896, Jam Ali Khan of Las Bela died, and was suc-
ceeded by his son Kamal Khan, the
present ruler. This Chief was not given
full powers at his succession, ^ a Wazir being appointed by the
British authorities to assist him in the government.

Intrigues at this time were known to be at work in Las Bela,
and reports were current of large quantities of arms being imported
from Kabul. In consequence the political Agent, Major M. A.
Tighe, was ordered to proceed to Las Bela with a strong escort,
commanded by Major J. 0. Mennie, consisting of 200 rifles, 130th
Baluchis, and a troop of the Sind Horse.

A start was made from Karachi on the 24th October 1896, and
Las Bela was reached on the 31st. The road followed leads
from Karachi to the Hab river and thence 101 miles to Las Bela.
On the 2nd November Major Tighe ordered the arrest of two of
the Jam's councillors who were known to have been intriguing.
On the same day Major Mennie occupied the magazine near
the palace. Here he found 100,000 rounds of ball cartridge,
a much larger amount than the Jam was authorised to keep-
Major Mennie removed this ammunition to his camp which had
been pitched some two miles from the city. The next day the
Political Agent released several men who had been imprisoned bv
the Jam. These measures caused some unrest in the town, and
Major Tighe considered it would be well to seize the gun ammuni-
tion.

, 1 Since 1902 his powers hare been somewhat increased.

160 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Accordingly on the afternoon of the 3rd of November Major
Mennie removed all the shells to the escort camp and destroyed
three thousand pounds of powder which was found in a magazine
about a mile from the city. The Political Agent now discovered
that there were many more men under arms than were authorised
for the Jam's army and ordered the surplus to be disbanded.

The Political Agent remained at Las Bela till the 24th Nov-
ember, when, with Major Mennie and fifty men of the 130th
Baluchis, he proceeded to Kanraj, where a survey party had been,
fired on in the previous year.

News was received on the 25th of an intended attack on the
escort by the Mengals at the Kanraj Kotal. Another 50 men
were, in consequence, despatched from Las Bela, and the kotal
was occupied during the Political Agent's stay at Kanraj. Various
disciplinary measures were taken in the district, and the escort
returned to Las Bela on the 4th December, where it remained
until the 14th March 1897, when it returned to Karachi.

The troubles in Kalat and Makran in 1897 have been ascribed
to various causes. One theory was that
Sarawan troubles, 1897. the wave of fanaticism, which swept
over the North- West Frontier in that year,
had spread southwards to Baluchistan. This may have helped,
indirectly, to cause a state of unrest. There is, however, every
reason to believe that the actual trouble was entirely due to in-
ternal friction in Kalat. The great Raisani family headed by
Mir MehruUa Khan, uncle of the Sardar, had by a long course
of systematic intrigue and oppression contrived to drive one Sardar
Alliyar Khan Rustomzai over the border, with most of his tribes-
men, the Rustomzai section of the Raisanis. This happened in
1895. In 1896 these Rustomzais returned to Baluchistan and the
British authorities determined to restore their rights. This, of
course, was regarded by the Raisa nis with extreme disfavour.

Mir MehruUa Khan, who had become all powerful among the
Sarawans, determined to use all his influence to thwart the au-
thorities. Matters were brought to a climax by the highway
robberies of Jafir Khan and his band, who took up their quarters
in the hills round Mastung. Orders were given for the arrest of
Jafir Khan, and then it became clear that he was backed up by
the Sarawan Sardars. Troops were sent out against Jafir, who-

THE BALUCHISTAN AGENCY 161

hi xl taken up a position across the Quetta-Mastung road. He fled
totly pursued, and escaped to Kandahar.^

Jafir Khan was sheltered for some time by the Tarasizai
Mengals of Chagai, who also gave some
trouble to the parties pursuing the outlaw.

For this contumacy, a portion of the troops made a forced
march at night on the headquarters of the clan, surprised their
village Chandan Khan Bund in the Nushki desert, and carried
it after some slight opposition. The chief of the clan was brought
into Quetta. In this desert march the newly raised Kalat State
Camel Corps (since disbanded) proved most viseful, each camel
sowar taking an infantryman of the 126th Baluchistan Infantry.

The Sarawan Sardars were promptly ordered to present them-
selves before the Agent to the Governor-G-eneral at Mastung,,
They refused, under the orders, it afterwards transpired, of
Mir Mehrulla Khan and Sardar Yar Muhammad, both Raisanis
These men were immediately seized, and placed in confine-
ment. The Raisani Sardar, Sir Ghaus Baksh, was also called
upon to give security for loyal behaviour. These arrests caused
much excitement in the country. The telegraph wires in the
Bolan and on the Quetta -Kalat line were cut ; the Bangalzai,
Lehri, and Langon Sardars fled to Afghanistan with several
influential members of the Raisani and Kurd clans. In October
1897, the Agent to the Governor-G-eneral in Baluchistan visited
the Khan at Kalat. Aiiairs were arranged satisfactorily, the chiefs
in confinement were released, and those who had fled returned.

Earlier in the year the Khan of Kalat had visited the Agent
to the Governor-General in Quetta to consult him on certain
important matters in connection with the settlement of the
Makran Sardars, notably Mir Baluch Khan Naoshirwani. After
the meeting, the Sardars returned to Makran nominally recon-
ciled.

In 1904 it became known that a considerable traffic in arms
^ ^ , . was taking place l»etween the Persian Gulf

Arms TrafEo from Persian ° '-

■Gulf, 1907. and Afghanistan. The caravans bearing

th se arms had to traverse Persia or
Chagai near the tri-junction at Koh-i-Malik Siah in order to enter

1 The pursui ig party, oonsistiag of detachments of iiativj civilry ani iataatry
from Quetta, was commanded by Major Alban. l'26th Baluchiatan Infantry.

Vol. III. ' X

1G2 FIIOXTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIOSS FROM INDIA.

Afghan territory. The British and Persian authorities determined
to take steps to put a stop to this illicit traffic.

Early in 1906 two companies of the 128th Pioneers proceeded
to Robat, at the western end of the Nushki trade route, on the
border, distant 376 miles from rail-head at Nushki. They were
relieved in February 1907, by two companies of the 127th
Baluchis under Captain W. 0. Grant and Lieutenant J. C. Tate.
Having obtained information of the possible passage of an
arms caravan through British territory, Captain Grant held the
various passes with detachments. On the 2nd May the car i van,
consisting of 53 camol?!, with an armed escort of some 50 Afghans,
appeared in the Ivacha Pass held by Jemadar Rajwali. and
34 men, 127th Baluch Light Infantry, who had marched 62 miles
in 22 hours to reach the position in time. The escort showed
fight, and after nine men had been killed and sixteen wounded,,
the ztmainder fled, and the whole convoy was captured. The
capture comprised 795 good rifles of various modern patterns,
and 70,000 rounds of ammunition, besides a few revolvers and
pistols.

APPENDIX A.

Composition and Distribution of Quetta Division, May 1881.

Old Chaman

Kala Abdulla
Gulistan
Khushdil Khan

Segi and Dinar Karez

Kach

Chapar

Sharig
Harnai
Spin Tangi

Ganda Kin Daf ")
Nari Gorge J

Thai Chotiali

Bolan Pass

Sibi and neighbourhood.

2 guns, 5-8th R. A.

No. 3 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.
I 7th Bengal Cavalry, 1 squadron.
{^3rd Bengal Infantry, 4 companies.
4guns,5-8thR. A.
fTth Bengal Cavalry, 2 squadrons.
I Jacob's Horse, 1 squadron.
- 63rd Foot, 4 companies.
3rd Bengal Infantry (wing).
9th Bombay Infantry (wing),
f Jacob's Horse, detachment.
(I3th Bombay Infantiy, detachment.
Jacob's Horse, detachment.
4th Bombay Rifles, 6 companies.
4th Bombay Rifles, 2 companies.
'Scinde Horse, 1 squadron.
Jacobabad Mountain Battery, 2 guns.
24th Bombay Infantry.
_ rScinde Horse, 1 squadron.
(Jacobabad Mountain Battery, 2 guns.
rJacobabad Mountain Battery, 2 guns.
•iScinde Horse, 1 squadron.
i^l5th Bombay Infantry.
8th Bombay Infantry, 2 companies.
13th Bombay Infantry, detachment.
rSoinde Horse, Head-quarters.
(8th Bombay Infantry, 6 compaaies.

1 The cantonment of Pislun was afterwards built near the old Afghan fortress
of Khushdil Khan. Till 1903 a garrison of one native infantry regiment was sta.
tioned there. It was never a healthy station, the water being bad, and ceased
to be necessary strategically when Loralai and Fort Sandeman were occupied.
It lies six miles distant from the railway station of Jam Karez.

164

FSONTIEK AND OV FUSE AS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Quetta and neighbourhood

'A-4 R. A.
15-9 R. A.

No. 4 company, Bombay Sappeis and Miners.
13th Hussars.

Jacob's Horse, Head-quarters.
61st Foot.
63rd Fooi (wing).
9th Bombay Infantry (wing).
13th Bombay Infantry (wing).
In all an approximate total of 8,000 to 8,500 of all ranks.

APPENDIX B.

Camel Transport in Baluchistan during the 2nd Afghan War.

■' Early in the Second Afghan War it was recognised that the control of
camel transport was very difficult for the Commissariat Department, whose
complicated systems were utterly unsuitable for a half wild people.

Sandeman was invited to arrange matters with the tribesmen, and did so
with great success. His methods are worthy of note. He insisted on having
his own officers, who knew the people and their language, for control,
arrangements, and payment. He entirely deprecated attachment to corps.

Four hundred and fifty tons of goods left railhead daily. Payment was
made at so much per stage. The camelman at Eindli received a " way
bill " from the commissariat official, showing the number of maunds his
camel was carrying. At the end of the stage, the official of the same
department there signed the " way bill " and took charge of the goods.
The camelman forthwith took this receipt to the Political Officer at tte
post who paid him on the spot. With the prospect of prompt payment
at the end of his day's journey, the camelman lost no time on the road, and
those in possession of good camels often did double marches.

( 165

CHAPTER Vlil.

Shirani and Ustarana Tribes.

The Shiranis are a tribe of Pathans occupying the principal por-
tion of the mountain known as the Takht-
i-Suliman,^ and the country thence east-
ward down to the bor.ler of the Dera Ismail Khan district. To the
north, beyond the Gomal Pass, their neighbours are the Mahsud
Wazirs ; on the south they march with the Ustaranas and Zmarais f
and to the west they are bounded, beyond the watershed of the
Takht-i-Suliman, by theKakars. Between the Takht and our
border lie several insignificant ridges, running north and south,
in the valleys between which the lowland Shiranis^ have their villages.
Almost all these villages are easily accessible, and within a day's
march from one or other of the three chief passes leading into the
country, namely, the Zarakni or Shekh Haidar, the Daralan and the
Chaudwan. Adjoining each village is a leach, or stretch of alluvial
soil, irrigated generally by perennial water, and fairly well culti-
vated. Above the lowland Shiranis are the Bargha Shiranis'' who
occupy the higher slopes of the Takht and the western slopes of the
Suliman Range, and lead a pastoral life.

1 The Takht-i-Sulimaii is held in great reverence, and resorted to as a place of
pilgrimage. The shrine is about two miles north of the true Takht or southern-
most peak visible from the plains. To approach it the pilgrim has to ascend in
one place by the aid of a rope. The legend goes that Solomon visited Hindu-
stan to marry one Balkis, and that, as the happy pair were returning through
■ube air, seated on a throne supported by genii, the weeping bride implored the

bridegroom to give her a chance of looking back for a few moments on her be-
loved land. Solomon assented, and, as they had then very opportunely arrived
just over the Takht-i-Suliman. he directed the genii to scoop out a stand for his
throne. This was done, and the throne place-l upon the stand, and Ba'kis ob-
tained the glance at the sultry plains below which she so much loved.

It is probable, however, that we musi look more to a Hindu than to a Musal'
man origin for the sanctity of the place. It is noteworthy that, until it became
too unsafe, the Takht-i-Suliman was far more visited by Hindus than by Musalmans.

2 The Zmarais are a small and insignificant Pathan tribe. They occupy
the whole crest of the Misri Koh (Zmarai ghar) mountain and its western slopes
They are not extensive traders in British territory, but at the same time they ar j

lo a certain extent dependent on this trade for their prosp;rity.
3 Larg'ia Shiranis, under Punjab Administration.
•* Under Zhob Agency.

( 167 )

168 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The Shiranis are divided into three main clans, viz., Chuhar
Khel living in the vicinity of the new Zhob Road ; the Uba Khel
in the country east of the Tahht-i-Suliman ; the Hasan Khel
north of the Uba Khel as far as the Zao. The country of the latter
clan really extends to the Shirana Nala, but Wazir raids have
caused the northern portion of their territory to be abandoned.

During the summer, the flocks from all three sections are
pastured more or less promiscuously on the higher slopes and
plateau of the Takht-i-Suliman.

The tribe is divided into those who occupy fixed homesteads
and those who are unsettled or nomadic. The former largely
outnumber the latter, and may all be regarded as well disposed to
the British Government — much more so than their nomadic
brethern.

Tribal cohesion among the Shiranis is weak ; the different
sections have at times endeavoured to escape joint responsibility,
with the result that the unruly individuals in the clan have, from time
to time, indulged their predatory tastes at the expense of the tribe,
and it has repeatedly been necessary to compel the Shiranis to
control as a body their individual sections or clansmen.

The Shiranis are generally of middle stature, thin, but hardy
and active. They have bold features, high cheek-bones, and
their general appearance is wild and manly. Their usual food
is bre^d made of Indian corn and butter. Wheaten bread is
only prdduced at festivals. The flesh principally used is mutton.
They eat wild olives fresh from the tree, and dried olives, which
they are obliged to boil. They also eat v-ild pomegranates (though
they are very sour and harsh), the seed of the chalghozah pine
and several sorts of berries which grow wild on their mountains.

The principal employment of the Shiranis is agriculture, which
is carried on in the valleys. Some places under the hills produce
grain without watering, but all the rest of their lands are irrigat-
ed by means of dams thrown across the hill streams. They have
two harvests, one of rice, Indian corn, and tobacco. It is sown
in summer and reaped in autumn. When it is off the ground^
they sow wheat and barley, which is cut in the beginning of
summer. Their common stock consists of small, black bullocks.
They have a few goats and some donkeys ; but no mules,
buffaloes, or camels. There are very few horses in the country.

SHIRANI AND USTAHANA TRIBES. 16&

There is p., muUa in every village, who receives a tithe of the
produce of its lands and flocks. A great many of the Shiranis
learn to read the Koran, although none but muUas learn to read
Pushtu and none Per&ian. They are very punctual in their
prayers, but apparently have little real devotion.

The Shiranis inhabiting the higher slopes of the mountains
live in villages of from twenty to forty houses. T'Ley cut out the
sites of their houses in the slopes of the hills, so that on three sides
the earth forms the lower part of the wall. Each cottage contains
but one room, and has only one entrance, which is closed at night
with a branch of a thorny tree. Even in winter they have nothing
to shut out the cold, but sleep on black carpets round the fire,
wrapped up in sheep- skin cloaks. Their forests furnish them with
firewood, and their houses are lighted with branches of a particular
sort of fir, which burns like a torch. In the valleys bordering on
British territory the villages are larger than elsewhere, and Drazand
contains a hundred and fifty houses, or more.

Although their chief occupation is agriculture, this tribe carries
on an extensive trade in the autumn months in the Dera Ismail
Khan district. Numbers of the tribe cultivate land to a considerable
extent within British territory, and more than three hundred
families arc located as cultivators at Musazai, Daraban, and
Chaudwan. They are dependent chiefly on their intercourse with
British territory for their food supply and cloth goods, in ex-
change for the produce of their hills.

The Shirani male population, as shown by the census of 1901,
is roughly 7,090.

Males in Zhob— 3,689—

,, ,, tribal country (Dera Ismail Khan) 2,843.
I ■ ,, ,, Dera Ismail Khan District 541.

The Ustaranas are a Pathan tribe inhabiting the outer hills

opposite the extreme south portion of

the Dera Ismail Khan district. They

are the desccKdants of one Ustarana, a >§«?'</ id, who settled among

and married into the Shiranis. They are bounded on the north

by the Shiranis, on the south by the Kasranis and Bozdars, and

on the west by the Zmarais, Isots, and Musa Khel.

Vol III.

170 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Until about a century ae;o the Ustaranas were entirely a
pastoral and Pounndah tribe. But a quarrel with their neighbours,
the Musa Khel. put a stop to their annual westward migration,
■and they were forced to take to agriculture, and subsequently
acquired a good deal of the country below the hills. They still
own a large tract of hill country, in which most of theai live,
oultivating land immediately under the hills, and pasturing their
(locks beyond the border. Their territory only includes the
•eastern slopes of the Suliman mountains, the crest of the range
being held by th^ Musa Khel, Isots, and Zniarais.

They are divided into main clans, the Ahmadzai and Gagalzai,
and these again into numerous sections. There is a blood-feud of
long standing between the Ahmadzais and Gagalzais. The former
wear the hair in long ringlets, like the Baluch tribes ; the latter
wear it short. Their land in the plains is very barren and
sandy, and is entirely dependent on rain water for cultivation.
Their chief village is Kui Bhara, about three miles beyond
the border up the Rammak Pass. It is a fine, well-built village of
about 360 houses, and has numerous cJiauks and a few Hindu
shops. The Ustaranas are venturesome traders, and take goods
to Bengal and Kandahar.

The members of the tribe living beyo id British territory are
largely engaged in trade, and those within British territory are both
agriculturists and traders. Their trade is carried on chiefly with the
towns of Chaudwan and Vihoa. This tribe is completely at our
mercy, as they own a large tract of country within our territory
.and their principal villages, though beyoad the border, might
be destroyed in a day.

The Ustaranas are a fine, manly race ; they are quiet and
well behaved, and many of them are in our army and police. A
few of them are still Poi<;m(?a7is. They are ail Suni Muhammadans.
They are constantly at war with their neighbours, the Bozdars,
by whom they are much harassed.

On the outbreak of the Sikh Rebellion in 1848, 200 infantry
of these Ustaranas, under Fateh Khan, the chief of the Gagalzai
clan, followed Lieutenant H. B. Edwardes to Multan. They
have always been friendly to us, and have never given any serious
trouble. The tribe numbers 2,000 males, of whom 900 live
in Shirani territory.

SHIRAN I AND VST ARAN A TRIBES. 171

Expedition against the Shiranis by a Force under Brigadier J. S.

Hodgson in 1853.

Previous to our annexation of the Punjab, the Shiranis had
made themselves the terroi of the border. They used to carry
off not only cattle, but p.en and women, whom they never released
except for a rich ransom. They once sacked the town of Daraban,
although defended by a small Sikh garrison. In 1848 the border
was laid waste for miles by their depredations, or deserted tlrrough
fear of their attacks.

The men of the plains made reprisals, and thus the feud was
inflamed. The Shiranis were so much feared that the arable
lands skirting the base of the hills were left untilled, and the
neighbouring plain villages regularly paid them one-fourth of
their produce, to buy off their depredations.

After the annexation, efforts were made by the Deputy Com-
missioner of Dera Ismail Khan to conciliite them. But from
the first they made war on our subjects. In 1849 they attacked a
village on the Kulachi border, when one of their leaders was slain.

Again, in 1851,Katal Khan, the Shirani Chief, raided British
territory near Daraban. The Shiranis, who had entered the plains
during the night, were cut off by a detachment of the 5th Punjab
Cavalry and some mounted police, under Jemadar Ghulam Ali
Khan. The Shirani Chief and two of his sons and a nephew were
slain, and the native officer also lost his life. The third remaining
son of Katal Khan after this applied for service in the military
police. The application was granted ; but the man eventually pre-
ferred to remain with his tribe and to plunder in British territory.

In 1852 a large body of Shiranis entered the plains near

Daraban and were driven back by a

5th Punjab Cavalry, 84 ^ , , , ,. , t rn 1. •

eabres. detachment of troops, under Captain

rani?"'' ^""^"^ *^°'^'''' "^ °^ "*" ^- Fitzgerald, 5th Punjab Cavalry, who
Mounted police, a few was in camp at that place, covering the
^^^^^^- building of the outposts and the con-

struction of the frontier road. The ground was impractcable for

1 The Sind Camel Corps was transferred from the Bombay to the Bengal
Presidency in 1849. It consisted at this time, in add tion to European officers,
laf 5 subadars, 5 jemadars, 5 colour-liavildars, 25 havildars, 30 naik«, 10 buglers,
tind 450 sepoys. The camel establishment was 1 jemadar-major, 25 jemadars, 42
duffadars, and 477 sowars. lis designation shortly after this was changed to the
Sind Rifle Corps, and it is now the 59th Scinde Rifles.

172 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

cavalry. The enen.y had seven killed and several wounded.
Our loss was one non-commissioned officer of the 5th Punjab
Cavalry and one sowar of the mounted police killed.

Besides this attack, the Shiranis made several unsuccessful
attempts on Daraban, probably in revenge for the death of Katal
Khan. '

Major J. Nicholson, who was then Deputy Commissioner of Dera
Ismail Khan, wrote in 1853, "the Shiranis have regularly plundered
and taken blackmail from this border since it came into our pos-
session."

About the beginning of 1853 the Shiranis attacked and burnt
a village of the Dera Ismail Khan district. In February 1853, they
again plundered and burnt a village near Daraban. These attacks
becoming intolerable, troops were assembled. On the 10th of March
a body of Shiranis, aided, it was believed, by the Nasirs (a Powin-
daJi tribe), numbering 700 foot and 70 horse in all, entered the plains.
They were driven back after a long skirmish by the Daraban post,
consisting of 35 sabres, 5th Punjab Cavalry,^ and 47 bayonets
of the Sind Camel Corps, under a Native Officer of the 5th Punjab
Cavalry, leaving one dead, and having many wounded. Two men
ox the Sind Camel Corps were wounded.

Owing to their hostile attitude and conduct, a small force
„ ., „ , was now encamped at Daraban. On the

5th Punjab Cavalry, 64 . ^ • ii-

Eibres. morning of the 14th March mtelligerce

Sind Camel Corps (2 British ^^s received that the Shiranis had

officers, 2 native officers, and . . .

123 bayonets, with their camel descended in force into the plains

"'MointTpoiice, 5 sabres. '^"^ advanced about two miles from

their position in the Drazand Zam to at-
tack a reconnoitring party from the Daraban outpost. Captain
F. F. Bruce, Sind Camel Corps, who was commanding at that
place, at once marched the troops, detailed in the margin, towards
the Drazand Pass, a distance of seven or eight miles. On seeing
the approach of this detachment the enemy retreated and took
up a strong position some little distance up the pass.

This position was strengthened by a stone breastwork, behin d
which the greater number were concealed. As the force advanced
up the pass, a picquet on the left opened fire, but from too great a

1 Now 25tb Cavalry

SHJRANI AND USTARANA TRIBES. 173

distance to do any harm. After placing a flanking party on the
lower hills Captain Bruce attacked the position. On arriving at
the foot of the hill held by the enemy, the breastworks were stormed
in gallant style by Ensign C. H. Palliser, Sind Camel Corps, who
with his men, dashed up in the most daring manner, carrying
all before them, and killing and wounding numbers of the
enemy.

Among the killed were three chiefs and Mulla Gimdah Khan,
whose advice carried much weight among the Shiranis. The enemy
was dislodged at the point of the bayonet, leaving five dead within
their entrenchment, and fled in confusion over the hills. Their
exact strength could not be ascertained, but, from the heavy
matchlock fire kept up, their numbers must have been consider-
able. The detachment returned to Daraban without molestation.

Our loss in this affair was 5 killed and 17 wounded, but
owing to the strength of the enemy's position this was to be
expected. The enemy's loss was subsequently ascertained to have
been seventeen killed and thirty-nine wounded.

After this affair it was resolved to follow the Shiranis into their
own hills, and punish them severely. Orders were accordingly issued,
and a force of 2,795 of all ranks, under Brigadier J. S. Hodgson,

commanding the Punjab Irregular Force,

No. 2, Punjab Light Field i,i j j. -rv i, i ^i

Battery. ^^^ assembled at Daraban on the morn-

Detachment, Garrison Artii- ing of the 30th of March. No time was

lerv. ,

5th Punjab Cavalry. lost in arranging for an immediate ad-

«nd Camel Corps vauce. The oth Punjab Cavalry had

Wing, 1st Punjab Infantry. •* y ^

Wing, 3rd Punjab Infantry, been Sent out to the frontier previously,

6th Pot: B:tul;on: ^^^^ ^^'^e^^ to patrol day and night in

front of the Shirani country, to prevent
the enemy having any knowledge of our movements.

The cavalry and artillery were to make their own arrangements
for the carriage of grain for three days. The supplies for the men
of the infantry regiments, etc., were carried under arrangements
made by the civil officers, regimental bazar establishments beino-
employed for issue. No camp followers except those absolutely
necessary were to accompany the column One camel and one
servant was allowed for every two ofiicers

1 See map accompanying Chaptar XV III.

m FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The fiorhtins; streno;th of 'the Shirani tribe was at this time
believed to be fron four to five thousand inen,^ and it became a
matter of serious importance to divide and distract it by threaten-
ing several passes at the same time, and occupying the attention
of those collected to the southward, while arrangements were made
to eater the country by the ShekhHaidar Pass, some twelve miles to
thenorthof the DrazandZam. This was s iccessfuUy accomplished
by encampin'5 the whole force on the 30th opposite the Drazand
Pass, and making demonstrations before it andtheChaudwan Pass,
twelve miles to the south, where a bo;ly of the enemy had collected
to oppose our entrance.

At midnight on the 30th Brigadier Hodgson moved on the Shekh
Haidar Pass, leaving the camp standing, under Ensign W. H. Paget,
with a detachment of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, and of the 2nd Police
Battalion, with guards from the different regiments. The column
entered the pass a little after daybreak on the 31st March. The
.heights on either side of the defile were at once crowned by four
companies of the 1st Punjab Infantry, without opposition, and
the column then advanced. Wherever the route of the column
was commanded by heights, they were immediately crowned by
infantry. Adopting these precautions, the force steadily progressed
and reached the village of Drazand, un;nolested, at 5 p.m. The
villafe was found to be deserted, a^d was taken possession of, the
troops bivouacking in its neighbourhood

Shortly after leaving Drazand heavy rain fell, continuing for
five hours, and it was doubtful at one time if the troops could move
up the pass on account of the torrent. Great difficulties were en-
countered, and the whole march, a distance of twenty-five miles,
took seventeen hours to accomplish ; if the enemy had offered any
opposition much loss must have occurred. The absence of opposi-
tion can only be accounted for on the supposition that the enemy
expected the force to enter by the Drazand or by the Chaudwan
Pass, and were thus unprepared to oppose the entrance so much
to the north. To conceal our intentions to the last, a demonstration
in front of the Drazand Zam had been made at daylight on
the 31st.

1 The whole male population is onlj- 7,000, so that the lighting strength w.i,s
probably not more than 1,.500 msn.

HHIRANI AND VST A RAH A TRIBES. 175

Drazand was found to be very strong, surrounded by a breast-
work, defended by eleven towers, and containing ;J00 substantial
houses, which gave shelter to l,2(i0 inhabitants.

The following day, the 1st of April, the 3rd Punjab Infantry
moved to the Drazand Pass to hold it, and to improve the road for
the passage of artillery as wall as to open communications with
Daraban. At the sami tim^ the troops were employed in destroying
the Shiraui villages within a circumference of eight miles of

Drazand, strict injunctions being

\st Column. • , , ,

given to respect women and

oth Punjab Cavalry .. 20 sabres. i, -i i j n i

Sind Camel Corps .. .. 100 bayonets. Children and all m.osques and

1st Punjab Infantry . . 100 ., shrineS

6th Police Battalion .. 200 „ m, /?" , i

ine hrst column under Captain

2nd Column. F. y. Bruce, Sind Camel Corps,

(ith Police Battalion .. 100 bayonets, destroyed the villages of Wazir

ird Column. Kot, Murga, and the hamlets of

4th and 5th Punjab Cavalry, 20 sabres. Landai.

Lieutenant J. W. lounghus-
band, of the Police, demolished the village of Zar Shahr.

The third column, under the command of the Brigadier, de-
stroyed Dag, situated to the south of Drazand.

These detachments rejoined the main column at Drazand
before nightfall, when a report was received that the road over the
Drazand Pass had been rendered practicable for guns. This, besides
opening communications direct with the Daraban post, ensured
an easy and safe return for the force.

At 5 A.M. on the 2nd April Brigadier Hodgson proceedrd in
^^, „ . , „ , ,^„ , command of the troops, dutiiikd

5th Punjab Cavalry .. 100 sabres. . . ^

Sind Camel Corps .. .. 100 bayonets, lu th ; margin, to destroy the
i3t Punjab Infantry ..300 „ villages to the extreme south of

oth Pohoe Battalion .. 410 ,, ° . _ ". v^^

the Shirani country and situated
to the westward of the Chaudwan Pass. The column arrived on the
crest of the ridge, facing Landi, the village and stronghold of
Rahmat Khan, a Shirani Chief, about 9 a.m. This was immediately
taken possession of by a detachment of thu Sind Camel Corps, and
set on fire.

Detachments under the command, respectively, of Lieutenants
C. P. Keyes and E. J. Travers, 1st Punjab Infantry, and Akbar

176 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Shah, 6th Police Battalion, were directed upon the villages of Spin
Tangi, China, and Shekh Mela, which were taken with scarcely
any opposition, and entirely destroyed. Small parties of the
•enemy fired long shots. As the troops retired, they attempted
to harass the column, but were held in check by the rear-
ofuard, under Lieutenant Keyes, and suffered some loss without
inflicting any on the troops. The column arrived at Drazand
before nightfall, having marched two and twenty miles during the
day.

Simultaneously with these operations, one hundred and fifty
men, all of the Babar ^ tribe, and British subjects, under their
chiefs Dado and Muhammad Gul, entered the Chaudwan Pass, and,
by direction of the Deputy Commissioner, co-operated by destroy-
ing the village of Said-al, situated abaut eight miles within the
pass. They bivouacked that night within the Shirani country,
and the next morning returned to Chaudwan.

During the 2nd the troops left at Drazand had mined and blown
up the towers, and, with the exception of one solitary building
(a mosque), had razed the village to the ground. The following
day the troops returned to Daraban by the pass of that name,
and, although a few of the enemy showed themselves, not a shot
was fired.

Although the force had been three days in the enemy's country
it returned after having accomplished the object of the expedition
without the loss of a single soldier or camp follower. Although
the Shiranis had time to drive their herds into the interior before the
approach of the troops, and no captures were made, the punish-
ment of the tribe was complete ; their country had been over-
run, and their principal villages destroyed. The extraordinary
absence of all opposition was attributed by Major Nicholson to a
jealousy between the northern and southern divisions of the
tribe, which prevented combination.

1 The Bahars are a tribe of Shirani stock, though now quite separate from the
Shiranis proper. They are divided into two sections, one living wholly within our
"border, the of er ho ding the hi. 1 country opposite, but on t e other side of the Suli-
man range. The two 1 ave cow little connection with each other. The Babars
of the plain hold some 180 square miles in the Dera Ismail Khan district, Chaud-
wan beirg tl e r chief town. They are a civilised tribe, much addicted to commerce,
being one of the richest, quietest and most honest tribes of the sub-Sulimau
plains. They number about 500 men fit for army service, a few of them serve in
■the cavalry. Their language is Pushtu.

SBIRANI AND VSTARANA TRIBES. 17T

The Indian medal, with a clasp for the " North-West Frontier,"

G.G.O.No.8l2ofl869. ^^^ g'^^*"^ ^^ ^869 to alf survivors
of the troops engagd in the operations
against the Shiranis under Brigadier J. S. Hodgson.

After this expedition, the conduct of the Shiranis occasioned
,. , , , , c., ■ . r comparatively little trouble and Katal

Conduct ot the bhuanis trom -^ » • i

1853 to 1882. Khan s son Azim became anxious to-

ingratiate himself with the Government.
He undertook to prevent any small expeditions being organised
in his portion of the tribe, and not to allow any marauders to
pass through his country. On one occasion he joined in the
pursuit of a party of raiders who had carried off cattle near
Chaudwan and assisted in recovering the booty.

The Shirani tribe, however, continued systematically to give-
shelter to criminal refugees from British territory, and, although
professing to be on friendly terms with the Government, allowed
these outlaws, together with bad characters of their own tribe,,
to commit depredations on British territory, and more especially on
the Gandapur^ border.

In the early part of 1873, the Gandapur Chief, Muhammad
Guldad Khan, was called upon by the Government to act up to his
border responsibilities, and was informed that the Government
would look to him for their fulfilment in future. This chief succeeded
in bringing such influence to bear on one of the branches of the
Shiranis, the Sen Khel, that they went in force and brought back
from the Khidarzais, a small but troublesome section of the Uba
Khel branch, three Hindus who had been kidnapped from British
territory by outlaws and carried off to the Shirani hills.

Efforts were at the same time made to break up the band
of outlaws, the leaders of which were principally Gandapurs. These
efforts were successful, and the headman of this band surrendered
unconditionally to the Deputy Commissioner, and was fined
Rs. 3,000. The party'opposed to the Gandapur Chief were, however,
making secret but strenuous efforts to keep up the old state of

1 The Gandapurs are a Saiyid tribe of Ustarana stock settled in British territory.
They hold the whole of the north-western part of trans-Indus, Dera Ismail Khan,
east and south of Tank, comprising an area of 460 square miles abutting on the Suli-
man range on the west. The town o. Kulachi is their head- quarters. Theywerj
originally a poor Powindah and pastoral tribe, but they now cultivate more exten-
sively than any of the other Dera Ismail Khan tribes. They still engage in th»
Powindah traffic.

Vol IIL H

178 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

excitement on this border. As members of both, the Sen Khel and
Uba Khel Shiranis had openly violated British territory, it became
necessary to enforce the principle that it is by means of the majority
of the tribe that visit the plains that the plundering minority in
the hills is controlled by Government. Accordingly, in September,
1874, a large Sen Khel convoy was seized at Kulachi, and fifty-
fom: members of this branch were taken prisoners and lodged in
the jail at Dera Ismail Khan. The value of their convoy amounted
to Rs. 3,000. At the same time seventeen Uba Khel with their
property were seized at Daraban, and lodged in the jail at Dera.

The jirgas of the two branches came in at once, and soon came
to terms. A fine of Rs. 1,500 was imposed on the Sen Khel
for the abduction of a Hindu child from Kulachi, and the Uba
Khel were fined Rs. 1,000 for the Daraban crime. Both branches
were required to acknowledge their responsibility in future for all
■crimes committed in British territory by members of their tribe,
or by anyone dwelling in their hills. The Uba Khel especially under-
took to be responsible for the future good conduct of the Khid-
arzai section of their branch. This agreement was ratified on the
11th of November 1874, in the presence of the jirgas of both
b)ranches of the tribe.

In March 1875, the Gandapur Chief, Muhammad Guldad Khan,
taking advantage of the confidence reposed in him by the British
authorities, to prosecute schemes of his own within the Shirani
hills, endeavoured to erect a fort in Shirani territory and annex
lands. His misconduct brought down upon his dependents,
thus employed, a grievous retaliation and the loss of fifteen lives •
The Shiranis in a large body attacked the Gandapur workmen
at daybreak on the 22nd_of March 1875, and prevented any further
prosecution of Muhammad Guldad Khan's unauthorised pro-
jects. Severe punishment followed in the deposition of the chief,
m pecuniary reparation to the families of the slain from his allow-
ances, and in the suspension of several native officials in Govern-
ment employ who neglected to report, or secretly connived at,
the chief's reckless schemings. In consequence of the unfriendly
attitude of the Shiranis in this afiair, more especially in not having
informed the Deputy Commissioner of the state of things before
taking the law into their own hands, the tribe was prohibited from
entering British territory. No attempt was made by them to molest

SHIRANI AND V8TARANA TRIBES. , 179

"the border in retaliation, and in December 1875, it was considered
that the tribe, which had acted under grave provocation, had been
sufficiently punished, and they were accordingiy re-admitted to
friendly relations with Government,

From 1875 to 1882 the behaviour of the Shiranis continued
:^ood, and they gave no^trouble on our border. Throughout the year
1882, however, their conduct was not so satisfactory. During that
year, men belonging to the tribe committed numerous offences
against British subjects, principally acts of the normal character
of border crime, such as thefts, and robberies of cattle. More serious
misdeeds were the murder of a Hindu wo man and the mischievous
destruction of a water-mill and an irrigation dam. In October

1882, the account for compensation due from the tribe, after deduct-
ing the value of the property recovered, amounted to Rs. 2,265.
A settlement of the account was demanded in that month ; the
Sen Khel and Uba Khel met the demand by professions of
inability to coerce the offenders, while the Chuhar Khel section
refused to send their representatives to confer with the British
authorities. The only course was, therefore, to put pressure on
the tribe.

Accordingly, a blockade was declared from the 1st of January

1883. Simultaneously the military frontier post of Daraban
was slightly strengthened, and the post at Shah Alam, situated
half-way between Daraban and the large village of Chaudwan,
and hitherto held by border police and militia, was occupied by
regular troops. Their exclusion from British territory, and
deprivation of trade with the Dera Ismail Khan district, soon began
to be felt by the Shiranis, who throughout the six months of the
blockade, with few exceptions, refrained from retaliatory in-
cursions, and bore their punishment quietly. The Commis-
sioner had been authorised to accept the submission of the
tribe on the basis of payment of the compensation due at
the date of submission, and of unreserved acceptance of full
and joint tribal responsibility ; the compensation payable was
the sum due on the date of the imposition of the blockade, and such
additional compensation as accrued for offences committed during
the time the tnbewas excluded from British territory. As the main
object of coercive measures was to enforce and signalise tribal res-
ponsibility, the Lieutenant-Governor considered that a fine, in

N 2

180 FRONTIBR AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

addition to compensation for past offences, was unnecessary,,
provided the purpose of the blockade was attained.

On the 15th July, 1883, the Shirani jirga came into Dera
Ismail Khan. They agreed in writing to the following conditions :—

1st. To pay Rs. 2,530-3-0 due on account of compensation for offences
committed by the tribe. Any stolen property that could be pro-
duced to be handed over in lieu of so much of this sum as re-
presented its value.

2nd. To repair the Chaudwan dam and the water-mill which were
buint and destroyed by the tribe.

3rd. As regards future ofEences, to restore the property stolen, or to-
point out the offenders or the property when they came down
to the plains, and make them over to Government within three-
months from the date of the offence.

ith. To expel outlaws who, having committed offences in British ter-
ritory, sought refuge in the Shirani country.

5th. To accept the principle of joint responsibility in such matters.

The terms were considered to satisfy the requirements of
Government ; the blockade was raised, and the tribe again admitted,
into friendly relations.

Survey expedition to the Takht-i-Suliman mountain in 1883.

^ The desirability of exploring and surveying the Takht-i-Suli-
man mountain had long been recognised by the British Government,
and as far back as 1877 it was recorded that the Governor-General
in Council was prepared to sanction its exploration whenever
the local authorities might consider that this could be effected
without undue risk.

In 1882 the Surveyor- General of India represented to the
Punjab Government the desirability of an officer of the Survey
Department being permitted to visit this country for the purpose
of taking observations, urging that the summit of the peaks of
the Takht commanded a view of the country to the west for a very
considerable distance up to the hill range in the vicinity of the road
from Quetta to Kandahar, and stating that very little was known
of the coimtry, which was usually represented in the latest and
best maps of Afghanistan as a terra incognita.

The Government of the Punjab, in reply, intimated that if the-
expedition could be undertaken with reasonable safety, it would be-

SBIBANI AND VSTARANA TRIBES. 181

sanctioned ; and Major Holdich, in communication with the Deputy
Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan, submitted proposals, approved
by the Commissioner of the Derajat, but, owing to the Shirani
tribe being then under blockade, it was considered desirable
to postpone the expedition until matters were settled with the

tribe.

After the submission of the Shiranis, the question of the
exploration of the Takht was again considered, and the Lieutenant-
Governor strongly recommended that the expedition should be
carried out on two conditions —

1st. That the tribe should give their consent.

2nd. That they should give hostages for maintaining a quiet attitude
while the exploration was being carried out.

The Lieutenant-Governor considered that, in order to provide

against possible contingencies, a strong
roops -ni e xpe 1 ion. -^Q^y. q£ troops should go with the expe-
dition, an escort from which should accompany the surveyors, a
■considerable reserve being detained at the foot of the hills. The
strength of this force was one mountain battery, 1,500 bayonets,
-and 100 sabres (if fodder was plentiful). The best time of the
year for the expedition was considered to be from the 15th of
October to the 15th of November, as there would be less fear of
snow than at a later date.

These recommendations and proposals were sanctioned by
Oovernment, but it was not until the middle of November that
the force was ready to enter the hills. It was decided to adopt
the more circuitous route by the Shekh Haidar Pass, in preference
to the direct road by the Daraban Zam, and to make the ascent
of the Takht-i-Suliman from its western base by a pathway up a
spur known as the Pazai path. This route presented only one known
difficulty, at a point where the Zao Pass was partially blocked by a
great fallen rock. Powindah camels surmounted this obstacle
annually, and the route was said to be practicable for laden hill
camels. The civil authorities had succeeded in making satisfactory
arrangements with the Shiranis, who had given hostages, as de-
manded, for the quiet behaviour of the tribe during the expedition.
The only section which had failed to attend when summoned
"was the Khidarzai.

182 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

This troublesome section belongs properly to the Uba Khel
branch of the tribe, but they are located among the Chuhar Khel,.
and are practically more connected with them than with the
former.

Of the hostages given (one hundred in number) half were
to remain at Daraban and the other half were to be mth the
expeditionary force.

On the 15th of November the troops to accompany the survey

party marched from Dera Ismail Khan and reached Daraban in

three marches. On the 18th the force, strength as per margin,.

No. 4 (Hazara) Mountain Battery. under Brigadier-General T. G..

1st Punjab Cavalry 42 sabres. Kennedy, C.B., crossed the

1st Sikh Infantry, 500 bayonets. r •

4th Punjab Infantry, 500 bayonets. frontier and encamped at Kot

5th Punjab Infantry, 496 bayonets. Guldad (see Map No. II in

pocket). Mr. S. S. Thorburn, c.s., the Deputy Commissioner of
Dera Ismail Khan, was Political Officer and Major T. H. Holdich,
Royal Engineers, was in charge of the survey operations. The
expedition was equipped with mule transport only, but fifteen
days' supplies were carried from Daraban on hill camels ^ hired
from Powindahs of the Nasir tribe.

On the 19th the force marched to Gandari Kach, seventeen
miles beyond our border at the eastern end of the Zao Pass, in
which was the obstruction already referred to. The following day
was spent in making the road through the pass, which was fovmd to
be more formidable than had been expected. The Dabarra rock
appeared at first an almost insurmountable obstacle, but before
nightfall the road had been made practicable for mules, but
it took the whole of the following day to get the laden camels
through ; most of them had to be unloaded and reloaded on either
side of the rock.* On the 22nd the force moved through the defile,
which is four miles long, and encamped at its further or western
end, and the following day marched fourteen miles to Kach Mazrai.
Here it was reported that there would probably be opposition at
the Pezai Kotal, and that a body of Shiranis, about 300 in number,

1 These camels were well adapted for this kind of work . Mr. Thorburn says that
they went over the bad ground like goats. - The difficulty here experienced'
was due chiefly to the large space (nearly eight feet) required by the camels loaded
with uncompressed bhusa. For a hilJ expedition where narrow defiles have to bo
passed, compressed 6 Amso only should be carried. JS/smm is chopped straw of wheat.
or barley.

SHIRANl AND USTARANA TRIBES. 183

composed chiefly of Khidarzais, had assembled to dispute the

passage.

On the 24th the column moved to Wazdana, and next day

reached the Pezai springs, situated about

Affair near Pezai springs. midway between the plain to the west

of the Takht and a kotal ^ of the range,
at the north end of which is the Kaisarghar, the highest peak
of the Takht-i-Suliman range. This kotal, over which the road
to the Takht lay, was found to be held, and to be a formidable
position. The following dispositions were made to dislodge the
enemy. A flank attack under Colonel H. C. P. Kice, 1st Sikhs,

with 540 bayonets, was ordered
J^rpSljaSaLy :; Ifo'T^'^" to Icavc camp at 2-30 A. M. on the
5th Punjab Infantry . . 180 „ 26th, to turn the enemy's left,

Hazara Mountain Battery. if ij.ii ini i

1st Sikh Infantry . . . . 180 bayonets, and a front attack, under Colonel
4th Punjab Infantry ..180 „ C. S. Maclean, C.B., Ist Punjab

5th Punjab Infantry . . 180 „ -^ i -^i ^ i r^o

Cavalry, with 4 guns and 540
bayonets, was to leave camp at 6 a.m. The reserve of both
attacks, 160 bayonets, under Major C. K. Mackinnon, 5th Punjab
Infantry, was to remain with the Brigadier-General in camp, from
which both attacks would be to a great extent visible.

These operations were carried out on the 26th of November.
The turning movement, extending over a circuit of about six miles,
was admirably executed by Colonel Rice. The front attack carried
the advanced positions of the enemy after slight opposition, and,
as their last and almost inaccessible position was reached, Colonel
Rice appeared on the heights above and on the left rear of it.
The enemy at once abandoned the position and the front attack
pushing through it, the kotal was taken. The enemy was followed
up in different directions by both columns until nothing more
could be seen of them, and then Colonel Maclean returned to
bivouac at the kotal. Colonel Rice retiring to the camp. The only
casualties on our side were two men of the 4th Punjab Infantry
slightly wounded. The enemy were said to have numbered between
300 and 400, and their loss was estimated at about fifteen killed and
wounded, among the former being two Khidarzai Chiefs of note.

From the kotal Colonel Maclean with his column was entrusted
with the actual escort of the survey operations. The remainder

1 By Kotal is generally meant the saddle of a ridge over which a road passes.

184 FRONTIER AND OV ESSE AS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

•of the troops were in reserve in camp at the Pezai springs, and a
picquet for the protection of the road was placed half-way between
the two positions, and was visible from both.

The height of the camp at Pezai was 5,750 feet, and of the
bivouac on the hotal, which was three miles distant, 8,600 feet.
The ascent was steep, and the last part of it very rough. The
upper position was dependent on the camp for its water supply
which was sent up on mules.

The mountain known as the Takht-i-Suliman was found
to consist of two parallel ridges, running roughly north and south,
the southern end of the eastern ridge culminating in a point 11,070
feet high, which is the Takht proper, and the western ridge cul-
minating at its northern end in a point 11,300 feet, known
as Kaisarghar. Between these two ridges is the maidan, a level
tableland about 9,000 feet above the level of the sea. Both
this maidan and the interior slopes of the ridge are, except where
too precipitous, covered with pine forests. As the mountain is of
hard limestone formation, the soil is not retentive of moisture,
and owing to this, and to a long continued drought, no water
could be discovered, which added very greatly to the difficulties
of the survey, as all water had to be brought up from the camp
at Pezai.

On the 27th a reconnaissance towards the northern peak
(the Kaisarghar) was made, and proved the road to be impracticable
for mules, so that all requirements for any advance beyond the
Jcotal had to be carried by men.

Major Holdich decided that it would be sufficient for the survey
party to ascend the northern peak only, as the fixed survey point
on the Takht proper was inaccessible, and a good substitute for
that point could be found without ascending that peak.

On the 28th November, leaving 100 bayonets to hold the
Pezai kotal, a detachment of 200 bayonets for the ascent of the
northern peak, carrying one day's food and water, and a second
party of 200 men, carrying another day's food and water for their
comrades, moved out seven miles towards the northern peak
and bivouacked there, the carriers returning to camp.

On the 29th the advanced party marched four miles, and then
climbing 2,300 feet, crowned the northern peak, and — the survey
therefrom completed — returned and bivouacked at its foot.

BHIRANI AND VSTARANA TRIBES. 185

On the following day this party returned to the camp, Colonel
Maclean remaining at the kotal to organise a further survey escort
ior the neighbouring heights from a fresh detachment of 200
bayonets of the 5th Punjab Infantry.

On the 1st of December, the whole of the survey requirements
having been satisfied during the day, the troops returned to the
camp at Pezai by sunset. During this day reports were received
that reinforcements were being sent to the hostile Shiranis by the
Kakar and Mandu Khel tribes, and accordingly the 4th Punjab
Infantry, under Major A. J. D. Hawes, was detached to meet a
convoy of four days' supplies then on its way, with orders to remain
at Kach Mazrai until the arrival of the rest of the troops on the
following day. By that time it was reported that the reinforce-
ments had dispersed, hearing that the Shiranis themselves were
no longer opposing us.

On the 2nd of December the return march was commenced,
and on the 6th the frontier was re -crossed. It was necessary
for the force to return bv the same route as it advanced, to meet
the additional supplies which had been sent out, as owing to the
advance having been delayed at the Zao Pass, the fifteen days'
supplies taken had been exhausted. On the 8th the force arrived
at Dera Ismail Khan, and was at once broken up, and thus ended
a very successful, but extremely arduous, expedition.

APPENDIX

Composition of the force employed in the operations against the Shiranis in 1853»
Brigadier J. S. Hodgson commanding.

Staff.
Captain W. R. Prout, Staff Officer.

Artillery.
No. 2 Punjab Light Field Battery, Captain H. Hammond commanding.
Detachment, Garrison Artillery, Lieutenant S. W. Stokes commanding.

Cavalry.
5th Punjab Cavalry, Lieutenant H. Bruce commanding.

Infantry.
Siiad Camel Corps, Captain F. F. Bruce commanding.
Wing, 1st Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant C. P. Ke^es commanding.
Wing, 3rd Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant B, Henderson commanding.
2nd and 6th Police Battalion, Lieutenant J. W. Younghuaband com-
manding.

Political Officers.

Major J. Nicholson, Deputy Commissioner.
Lieutenant A. L. Busk, Assistant Commissioner.

Detail of troops.

**-<

Ordnance

4)
V

>
'■+3

12;

6 g

c5
0
1

Total number
fighting men.

Corpa.

3
60

Rem-ibkb.

Staff ..

, ,

No. 2 Punjab Light Field

Battery
Detachment, Garrison Artil-

lery
5th Punjab Cavalry
Sind Camel Carps

1
8
6

1
14
81

98
573

14
121
663

Wing, lat Punjab Infantry
Wing, 3rd Punjab Infantry
3rd Police Battalion

47
48
40

374
386
308

431
443

360

6th PoUce Battalion

603

691

Brigadier's escort, 4th Pun-
jab Cavalry . .

• •

Total

308

2,412

2,795

( 187 )

CHAPTER IX.

ZHOB AND BORI.

Zhob, situated in the north-east corner of Baluchistan, has an

area of 9,626 square miles. The greater

Zhob District. . r , i ^ •

part 01 the country is mountainous,,
but it is intersected on the southern side by the Zhob Valley and on
the north by the valley of the Kundar and its tributaries.

In the middle of the 18th century Ahmad Shah conferred the
title of " Ruler of Zhob " on the head of
the Jogizai family of Kakars, in which
the principal authority has continued up to this day.

There is no organisation among the tribes in Zhob which can
be called in any sense military. They are all badly armed, and with
the exception of the maliks, who own a few Martini or Snider rifles,
there is not a rifle among them. The majority are armed with
swords and an occasional jezail is seen. There has never been any
combination amongst the tribes as a whole, partly owing to the vast
area of Zhob, and chiefly to there being no man who could rally a
sufficiently large number to form a really formidable opposition.
History shows how few opposed us when Zhob was first taken over
by the British Government, in comparison with the strength of the
people as revealed in the last census. This lack of organisation
enables us to hold so large a tract of country with so few soldiers.
The large trade in rifles, which are smuggled into Afghanistan from
the Persian Gulf, has not as yet touched Zhob. It is doubtful
whether they could afford to buy such weapons. Certainly ammu-
nition would be the difficulty if they did get rifles, as it is very
scarce and, when procured, is used up at once in shilcar.

Before the British took over the district, the different tribes
raided each other continually. But this has practically ceased,
and cultivation has increased accordingly. There are, however, .
certain points to be considered in case we should ever be in-

( 189 )

190 FRONTIER ASD OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

(liflBculties in Afghanistan or driven back on our own defences.
The Kakar does not love the British bi^t puts up with us,
as he is powerless to do otherwise, but were he to get an opening
by which he could harass us in the time of adversity he would
certainly take the opportunity. B.oads would become unsafe,
•convoys looted, and tohsils burnt. A powerful invader might
use the route from Kandahar or Ghazni through Zhob to turn oiu*
defences at Quetta. He would be sure of assistance from the
inhabitants.

In the " Militaiy Report on Zhob, 190G " Colonel Jacob
states that the Kakars would make good material for the ranks of
the Indian Army. His opinion of the Shiranis and Mando Khel
is the poorest.

From the outbreak of the Afghan War in 1878, Avhcn the at-
titude of the Kakars of Zhob first

187^

became a matter of any importance to
us, to the year 18S4, the chief authority over them and over the
Kakars of the Bori Valley and the adjoining districts of Kach
and Khawas was exercised by the Jogizai Family of Zhob Kakars.
The most notable member of this family was Shah Jahan, and in

his hands rested almost the whole power^

though his cousin. Dost Muhammad,
■constantly endeavoured to head a separate faction. Shah Jahan,
by means of his natural strength of character and reputation as
^ fakir and miracle worker, not only obtained the chief authority
over all the numerous sections of the Sanzar Khel Kakars, but
succeeded in extending his influence among the Sanatia Kakar
tribes, such as the Sarangzais and Panezais, so that he could
count on their support in any line of policy he adopted.

It became known very early in the course of the Afghan War
„g that Shah Jahan was hostile towards the

British, and wovdd give trouble on our
line of communications when opportunity oifered. This was
proved by the occasional opposition of small bands of Pathans to
the first of the columns ordered to return to India by the Thai
Chotiali route in 1879, culminating in the action at Baghao,
already described.^

' See page 153.

ZHOB AND BORl. l9l

The murder of the British envoy at Kabul, however, and the
abdication of Yakub Khan gave rise
to further excitement among the Kakars,
.and, early in 1880, Captain Showers, Superintendent of Levies,
was murdered on the Uzdapagha Pass, the perpetrators belonging to
■the Panizai section of Sanatias.* Some 200 Pathans also attacked
and looted the camp of Lieutenant Fuller.* This was followed in
the autumn of the same year by an attack on the military post
at Kach by Zhobis, Sarangzais, and Panizais, instigated by Shah
Jahan, in which they were defeated.

The termination of the Afghan War brought the district of Thai
Chotiali under our rule in accordance

1881-84

with the terms of the Gandamak Treaty
with Amir Yakub Khan. But as this part of the country was only
separated from the Bori Valley by a low range of hills. Shah Jahan
and his Bori friends, the Hamzazais, Utman Khel, Kibzais, etc.,
found it easy to harass the district by outrages on employes of the
Government. A series of these outrages ensued, culminating in
the attack upon a large number of coolies employed in building
^t Duki. It was felt that the frontier could never be safe and the
railway and the other works never free from danger until Shah
Jahan was finally settled with and hostages taken from him for his
and the Boriwals' future good behaviour. The- matter was referred
to Government and sanction obtained to the despatch of a military
expedition into Zhob against Shah Jahan. The news of the proposed
advance caused a great sensation amongst the people of Zhob, and
■eeveral of them contemplated making their submission to Sir Robert
Sandeman. Dost Muhammad, who was not on good terms with
Shah Jahan, is said to have actually started from his house with
this object, but was pursued and broughtback by Shah Jahan' s
orders.

The Zhob Valley Expedition, 1884.
In April, 1884, orders were issued for the movement of troops
into the Zhob Valley. At that time the difficulties of procuring
food and carriage in the country through which the troops would
have to pass were such that it was decided to postpone the expedi-
tion until autumn.

1 See page 130.
' See page 137.

192 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Artillery.

9-Ist Northern Division, R.A.
(Mountain Battery) (Lieute-
nant-Colonel Graham) . . 6 guns.

No. 1 Mountain Battery (Native)
Bombay (Captain Keene) 4 guns.
Cavalry.

6th Punjab Cavalry, Squadron

(Major Carr) .. .. 185 sabres,

10th Bengal Lancers, Squadron

(Lieut. -Colonel O. Barnes) 161 „

1st Bombay Lancers, Squadron
(Major Heyland). . .. 215 „

Infantry.

1st Worcestershire Regiment

On the 4th October, 1884, a
force, as per margin, had assem-
bled about Thai Chotiali ready
to cross the frontier under com-
mand of Brigadier- General Sir
0. V. Tanner, K.C.B. Two
months' supplies of all kinds
had been collected by the Com-
missariat at Thai Chotiali. An

(29th) (Lt.-Col. Douglas) 325 bayonets J j t -, ' ,■

2nd North Staffordshire Regt. advanced torce, Composed of one

(98th) (Colonel Simpson) 550 ' ^

1st North Lancashire Regiment,

wing (Lieut. -Colonel North) 358 „
Nos. 4 and 10 Companies, Bengal
S. and M. (Captain Collie and
Lieutenant Maxwell) . . 207 „
4th Punjab Infantry (Major

Hawes) .. .. 700 „

45th Sikhs (Colonel Armstrong) 696 „
1st Bengal N. I. (Lieutenant-
Colonel Atkins) . . . . 671
2nd Bombay N. I. (Lieutenant-
Colonel James) . . . . 551
Detachment, 1st Madras Pioneers
(Lieutenant-Colonel Eyre) 164 „

Total

(

10 guns.
< - 561 sabres.
(. 4,220 bayonets.

squadron, 1st Bombay Lancers,*
six companies, 2nd Bombay
Native Infantry, 2 two companies,
Bombay Sappers and Miners,
had marched on the 26th from
Thai Chotiali to Smalan, where
they halted until the arrival bf
the head-quarters of the force.
One squadron, 10th Bengal
Lancers, and the 1st Bengal
Infantry moved up to Smalan
on the 30th in order to watch
the pass leading past Trigunis
to Kats and Shah Jahan during
the passage of the convoy and
baggage train.

Staff.
Major Gaselee, A.Q.M.G.
Captain Walker, D.A.A.G.
Lieutenant Chase, V.C, D. A.Q.M.G.
Brigade-Surgeon Bradshaw, P. M. 0.
Major Tomkins, R. E., Conmianding
Royal Engineer.

Lieut O'Donnel, Intelligence Officer.

On tlie 5th October the force detailed in the margin, mider the

No. 1 Mountain Battery. Command of Lieutenant-Colonel Barnes,

Lance^rr""^'""' '''' Bombay jq^j^ Bengal Lancers, was despatched to

2 Companies, Bengal Sappers. Anambar with orders to reconnoitre

t^q^uTit'tr^-Lmbay '^^^^S^ '^^ Anambar Pass )nto Bori,

Lancers. and to make the road practicable for the

2nd Bombay Native Infantry, j^arch of troops. This force arrived at

Lakhi on the 6th, and on the 7th Lieut. -Colonel Barrow, with

1 31st Lancers.
2 l02nd Grenadiers,

ZHOB AND BOH I. 193

50 sowars, lOtli Bengal Lancers, 50 sowars, 1st Bombay Lancers,
and 50 rifles, 4tli Punjab Lifantry, reconnoitred through the Anam-
bar Pass up the right bank of the river, to the villages of Anambar.
The infantry had been left to hold the kotal while the cavalry
proceeded up the valley. The maliks of the neighbouring villages
Avent out to meet the cavalry and announced their intention of
coming in to pay their respects to the British Government and
promised to supply grain and flour. The reconnoitring force return-
ed the same day to Lakhi.

Heliographic communication was established between Duki
and Lakhi, and on the 8th, Colonel Barnes, leaving the 2nd Bom-
bay Infantry at Lakhi, marched with the remainder of the advanced
force to Anambar.

On the 9th Major Shepherd, 4th Punjab Infantry, made a
reconnaissance towards Nalai, and on the same day Major Gaselee,
4th Punjab Infantry, reconnoitred as far as Labor in the Bori
valley. Three hundred loads of grain and flour were sent in from
the village of Sanatia.

On the 11th the Brigadier-General arrived at Anambar
with —

9-1 Royal Artillery.
5th Punjab Cavalry.
2nd Bo. (Grenadiers) N. I.

The 2nd North Staffordshire Regiment, 45th Sikhs, and detach-
ment of Madras Pioneers had been left at Lakhi.

On the 10th October Sir Robert Sandeman received the whole
of the Bori Chiefs in public durbar at the entrance of the Bori
Valley. They made full submission, and were informed that they
must pay compensation for the losses caused by them and give
hostages for the security of the country ; on which condition
the terms of the proclamation would be extended to them. The
only tribes not represented at the durbar were the Musa Khel,
Kibzai, and Zhob.

It was now decided before marching into Zhob to form
a standing camp in Bori, to protect the Duki cantonment, and pre-
vent any risk of disturbances arising in rear of the expedition.
From this camp as a base, flying columns were to be sent against

Vol. III. P

194 FROJiTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

the refractory tribes. Accordingly ou the 12th October the head-
quarters of the force, with —

9-1 Royal Artillery,

1 Squadron, 5tli Punjab Cavalry,

1 Squadron, 1st Bombay Lancers,

2nd Bombay Native Infantry,

Nos. 4 and 10 Companies, Bengal Sappers,

inarched to Dulai, between which place and Lahor a standing
camp had previously been determined on, water being good
and supplies procurable.

It had been intended to move on the Kibzai and Musa Kliel
tribes before marching into Zhob, in order to prevent their joining
Shah Jahan and perhaps affording him a place of refuge in their
country. Shah Jahan, however, accepted the Government terms, and
announced his intention of joining the camp of the Political Officer
and making full submission. The Kibzai and Musa Khel tribes
were also expected to submit. In consideration of this change
in the aspect of affairs, Sir Robert Sandeman gave his concurrence
to Brigadier- General Sir 0. V. Tanner's proposal of marching
direct for the head-quarters of Shah Jahan. The Brigadier-General
considered it advisable to reach the main object of the expedition
whilst the troops and transport animals were fresh.

On the 15th October the force at Lakhi was moved to Anambar,
and the sick and spare ammunition were sent on to camp Dulai.
A reconnaissance was made up the Torkhezi and Marai Passes and
a post was formed at Sinjawi, on the line of communication with
Duki, and garrisoned by a small detachment, 10th Bengal Lancers,
and two companies, 1st Bengal Native Infantry.

On the 16th October Lieut. -Colonel Atkins, Commanding
1st Bengal Infantry, was appointed to command the standing
camp at Dulai, with —

9-1 Royal Artillery.

1 Squadron, Sth Punjab Cavalry.

1 Squadron, 1st Bombay Lancers.

2nd Bombay Native Infantry.

Nos. 4 and 10 Companies, Bengal Sappers.

The head-quarters and remaining troops under Lieut.-
Colonel Graham, R.A., marched to Anambar on the 17th.

ZHOB AND BORI. 195

That evening Sardar Bahi Khan, Sarangzai, a Kakar, who had
been sent by Sir Kobert Sandeman to bring in Shah Jahan, return-
ed to camp and reported that Shah Jahan was merely endeavouring
to gain time to remove his family and had no intention of coming in.
Notice was also sent in by the Musa Khel and Kibzais that they
had changed their minds and were not coming in. For the time
therefore negotiations were at an end.

1 Troop, 5th Punjab Cavalry. , ^ . i j.i t> ■ T

9-1 Squadron. 1st Bombay On the 18th October the Brigadier-
^""n?^^' , wn General marched with the force as per

9-1 Royal Artillery. , .

2nd North Staffordshire Re. margin to the entrance 01 Marai Jfass. ■

giment.

45th Sikhs.

2nd Bombay Grenadiers.

An advanced force composed of : — \

1 Squadron, 10th Bengal Lancers,
10th Company, Bengal Sappers,
4th Punjab Infantry,
under the command of Lieut. -Colonel Barnes, 10th Bengal
Lancers, preceded the main body and marched through the pass
to Serbara.

The force reached Akhtarzai on the 21st, and on the following
day the fort of Shah Jahan, six miles to the north-west, was oc-
cupied by a wing of the 4th Punjab Infantry.

During the march all supplies were paid for by the Commis-
sariat and until All Khel was reached the people were friendly. On
nearing the part of the valley inhabited by Shah Jahan's im-
mediate adherents, a gradual change took place in the behaviour
of the people. The hamlets and small forts were almost deserted.
Sir Robert Sandeman had an unsatisfactory interview with Maliks
Hanif and Haidar. The latter, a personal friend of Shah Jahan,
said that the attack on the coolie camp was made under Shah
Jahan's orders, and that he was too holy a man even to "salam"
to the British. He said that Shahbaz Khan, one of the chiefs
of Zhob, was still at Vela, and that if fovir days were allowed he
might perhaps submit. This statement was untrue, as all the
forts of the valley were found deserted.

The Political Officer now considered coercive measures neces-
sary, and it was decided to seize flocks and to blow up the towers
or small forts of the absent chiefs. Accordingly, a number of

l9G FROSTIER AXD OVERSEAS ESPEDITIOSS FROM IXDIA.

camels, sheep, etc., were brought in by the Baluch Guides and
large quantity of wheat was collected.

On the 23rd October a party of the 10th Bengal Lancers,
tinder Lieut. -Colonel Barrow, reconnoitred the country about
sixteen miles up the valley, which was found to be well cultivated,
with large supplies of wheat and bhusa stored for the winter.

A detachment, 1st Bombay Lancers, under Major Heyland,
reconnoitred the country across the valley to the hills north of
camp and reported having met there about 100 armed men,
who seemed anxious to fight.

As the ground occupied by the enemy was unsuited for cavalry,
Major Heyland was ordered by heliograph not to engage, but to
observe their position and return to camp. Two companies, 4th
Punjab Infantry, were withdrawn from Shah Jahan's fort, two
companies remaining there under Lieutenant Daniell.

Sir Oriel Tanner, with troops as in tlie margin, left camp

early on the morning of the 24th
Afifair near Ali Khel. ^^^j^ ^j^g intention of attacking

Artillery. ,, rri t i

^ , „ , . ..„ c T. .. , i^lie enemy. Ihe cavalry ad-

9-1 Eoyal Artillery, Screw Battery, under -^ . •'

Lieut. -Colonel Graham. vanced to reconnoitre, and the

„ whole force halted within a mile

C AVALBY.

Under Lieut. -Colonel Barnes, 10th of the hills for breakfast.
Bengal Lancers. ^t 9 A.M. the attack COm-

5th Punjab Cavalry, 1 troop (Major Carr). ^j_i -r> • i t

10th Bengal Lancers, 1 troop (Captain menced. Ihe 4th Tunjab In-

^°°^''t, , t , ,,r . fantry were to turn the enemy's

1st Bombay Lancers, 1 troop (iLijor •' .,11?

tieyland). left, half 9-1 R. A., With half

ixFANTRY. company, native infantry, as

fnder Colonel Armstrong, C.B. , ■■ • ,, i. i j.

200 ritles, 2nd Battalion, North Stafford- eSCOrt, being well posted to

shire Regiment (Colonel Simpson). command the main position. '

Half battalion, Bombay Grenadiers. . j; 1 i

Native Infantry, (Lieut. -Colonel .James). A trOOp Ot Cavalry under

Half battalion. 4th Punjab Infantry Major Hevlaud was detached to

(Major Hawes). , 1 p n^ ■,

Half battalion, 45th Sikhs (Major Walker). the left tO CUt oft the retreat On

Detachment. lOtli Company Bengal ^^^^^ gj^jg^ rpj^^ remainder of
Sappers and Miners (Lieutenant Maxwell).

the troops were kept in reserve
at the mouth of the pass leading to the position.

The 4th Punjab Infantry, under Major Hawes, swept the
hills on the right in dashing style, having several hand-to-
hand encounters with the fanatics, of whom they killed a great
number.

ZHOB AND BORI. 197

The two companies under Colonel Simpson engaged the enemy
on the left, and the half battery under Captain Cunningham, which
had come into action from a commanding position, did great execu-
tion on the centre. In two hours the enemy's position was
captured, their loss being upwards of fifty killed and soma
prisoners ; our loss was only five wounded. The enemy numbered
from four to five hundred, but they were badly armed, having
very few fire-arms. Tlie troops returned to camp that evening.

On the 25th—

1 troop, 5tli Punjab Cavalry,

6 companies, 4th Punjab Infantry,

2 companies, 2nd Bombay Grenadiers,

were sent to join the two companies of the 4th Punjab Infantry
at Kala Shah Jahan.

The following day the whole force marched to Kala Saifulla
Destruction of Forts and Khan the towers of which, as well as of
villages. ^j^g villages of Shah Jahan and Dost

Muhammad, were blown up. On the 29th they marched over a
bare open plain to Kazha, which had been previously reconnoi-
tred.

Most of the chiefs and headmen, including Shahbaz Khan, had
now tendered their submission to the Political Agent.

A few headmen of the Khoedadzai section of the Sarau
Kakars in the direction of Hindu Bagh had not submitted, and
Colonel Armstrong, c.b., was sent against them with the following
force : —

Troop, 5th Punjab Cavalry.
Half battery, 9-1 Royal Artillery.
I 1 company, 2nd Battalion, Xorth Staffordshire Regiment.

45th Sikhs.
Detachment, No. 10 Company, Sappers and Miners.

The force halted the first day within two miles of the deserted
village of Chikola, which was destroyed. The maliks of Chikola
came in that evening.

The following day the cavalry under Major Carr reconnoitred
' up to the villages of Hindu Bagh, and the surveyors accompany-
ing the force completed the survey of the valley. Mr. Bruce, who

19S FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

accompanied the force, came to an understanding with the head-
men of the villages of that region. The cavalry rejoined the camp
that evening, having covered from thirty-six to forty miles, and the
force marched back to Kazha on the Ist November, having blown
up the fort and burnt the village of Bisharat. At the same time a
small force under Major Hawes, 4th Punjab Infantry, had been
despatched into the hills to the north of the camp as escort to Lieu-
tenant "Wahab, R.E., and Mr. Scott of the Survey Department.
Bisharat, son-in-law of Shah Jahan, was captured by the cavalry
of this force.

On the 2nd November Sir Robert Sandeman came to a satis-
factory settlement with the Zhobwals,

Settlement v itb Zhobwals. t ."i r i i i . i

and the force proceeded down the

valley towards Mini.

It was at first intended to march down the left bank of the

river, but reconnaissances made on the 30th October by the 1st

Bomba}' Lancers as far as Kushnob, about twenty miles east of

Kazha. showed this to be impracticable owing to want of supplies

and water. It was, therefore, necessary to follow the road through

the better cultivated district along the right bank of the river.

A small advanced force under Colonel Barnes preceded the

2 squadrons, Cavalry. main body to reconnoitre the Badzai

4th Punjab Infantry. Taugi. No hostile gathering was found

in that direction.
The head-quarters and main column reached Ali Khel on the
6th November. From here the sick were sent under escort to
Dulai. It had been the General's intention to send the North
Stafiordshire Regiment to Dulai, but owing to rumours of hostile
gatherings down the valley it was decided to keep them with the
force. The advanced force marched through the Badzai Tangi
without any opposition and was joined by the main body at
Ism.ailizai on the 8th November.

On the 9th November the Brigadier-General marched to
Survey Work. Miua Bazar with —

Troop, 5tli Punjab Cavalry. i battery, 9-1 Royal Artillery.
„ 1st Bombay Lancers. 4th Sikhs.
2nd Bombav Grenadisrs.

The remainder of the force halted at Ismailz li.

ZHOB AND BORI. 199

The survey of the main Zhob valley from Chari Melitarzai to
Mina being completed, it was not thought advisable to advance
"further east along the Zhob valley, lest it should lead to complica-
tions with tribes outside the present operations. Consequently
it was decided to march through the Kibzai and Musa Khel
countries, the two columns marching from Mina and Ismailzai,
converging again at Tangai. This march was undertaken on the
11th November and on the 12th the whole force advanced through
the pass to Kakhao (eleven miles), twenty-seven miles from Ismail-
zai in Zhob to Kakhao in the Kibzai country. This is by far
the best pass into Zhob.

On the 15th November the Brigadier-General proceeded
with the following force to Murgha Kibzai, the remainder under
Colonel Simpson, 2nd North Staffordshire Regiment, returning to
Dulai : —

9-lst Northeiii Division, Royal Artillery — 2 guns.

lOtli Bengal Lancers — squadron.

5tli Punjab Cavalry — troop.

2nd Bombay Infantry.

4th Punjab Infantry.

45th Sikhs.

10th Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.

All the Kibzai headmen having submitted, the column march-
ed to Sahra, Musa Khel Bazar, three marches from Murgha,
arriving there on the IGth November. The road led throU:i;h a
difficult pass, which was made practicable, with much labour.
The Musa Khel all submitted, and the force marched back to Bori
valley in three long marches, passing through a country covered
with grass, and arrived at Nulai, near Mekhtar, on the 19th
November.

Sir Robert Sandeman now declared the objects of the expe-

,v., , , . t:, j., ■ dition satisfactorily accomplished, and

U ithdrawal of Expedition. ■^ r ' ,

the following arrangements were made
for the withdrawal to British territory of the troops compos-

ing it

(o) The Quetta Garrison : — 1st Bombay Lancers, 9-lst (Mountain)
Royal Artillery, 2nd North Staffordshire Regiment, 2nd Bombay
Native Infantry, to march via Sinjawi and Khawas to Quetta.

200 FmXTIElt AND OVEliSEAS EXPEDltlOXS FROM INDIA.

(b) The 4tli Punjab Infantry to return to the Punjab via Han Pass atid

Fort Munro.

Xos. -4 and 10 Companies, Bengal Sapi^ers and Miners, Detach-
ment, 1st Madras Pioneers, to march to Sibi ; thence by rail.
{d) No. 1 Mountain Battery, 10th Bengal Lancers (squadron), 5th Punjab
Cavalrj- (squadron), to return to garrison Thai Chotiali.

The wing, North Lancashire Regiment, was retained at ThaJ
Chotiali for a time, this being recommended by the Principal Me-
dical Officer as the barracks at Quetta were not completed and it
was still unhealthy.

The Brigadier-General, accompanied by Major Gaselee,
A.Q. M.G., and Lieutenant Chase, v.c, D.A.Q.M.G., proceeded
to Thai Chotiali, and leaving the former officer there to complete
arrangements, proceeded to Sibi via the Harand Pass, by which
road it was proposed to march the troops for Sibi, avoiding
the Harnai road as cholera had broken out on that line.

On the 22nd November all arrangements for the withdrawal
of the troops were completed. In his final despatch, Brigadier-
General Sir 0. V. Tanner brought to the notice of Government the
admirable conduct of the troops during the expedition. All had
had hard marching (though not much fighting), the infantry
having covered some 700 miles.

There was a good deal of s'ckness amongst the troops owing

to the unhealthiness of the Quetta
District during the autumn ; ths spe-
cially affected the 2nd North Staffordshire Regiment and the
45th Sikhs. Of the former regiment fifty men had to be sent back
to Quetta on account of their weakly condition after the third
march. The Sikhs, having been quartered in Quetta four months '
before the expedition started, were tainted with the prevalent
fever. The 4th Punjab Infantry were also affected by it on their
march to Thai Chotiali.

Transport. The transport used in these operations

was of three kinds, viz : —

1st. — Army transport pack mules.
2Mrf.— Government camels.
3)d. — Hired camels.

ZHOB AND BORI. 120

'Class 1. — There were 2,094 mules employed, more than half of
Avhich belonged to the Quetta district. The remainder were brought
from the Bangal Presidency with regiments. The regimental
transport system was employed and worked well. There were
-twenty deaths among the mules during the operations. During
the f ''st six weeks the mules nearly always received full rations,
and owing to their capital condition the percentage of sore-backs
was almost infinitesimal. During the last fortnight a portion of
the force marched about 140 miles in very difficult country.
Forage and grain being exceedingly scarce, the mules fell off
considerably in condition, and sore-backs began to appear.

Class 2. — Government camels may be sub-divided into two
classes, viz., seventeen Quetta transport camels and seventy-seven
Government camels, with 4th Punjab Infantry.

The seventeen Quetta camels were all bought in Pishin. They
did excellent work throughout. None of them died, and there was
only one sore-back.

The seventy-seven Government camels with the 4th Punjab
Infantry were all Punjab camels. Twenty-two of them were dead
on the date the force broke up, and a number were very sickly.
These were a splendid batch of camels when they joined the
force, and, in their own country would no doubt have done
excellent service. In a cold and mountainous region such as they
had to work in, they were useless, as was proved by the high rate
of mortality. This confirms the experience gained from the
Afghan War, that Punjab and Sind camels are not able to bear
the hardship of a campaign in a cold, mountainous country until
acclimatised.

The camels of the plains do not know what to eat and what to
avoid in a hill country. There were two poisonous plants in the
Zhob valley that the hill camels always avoided — one, the wild
Oleander bush, and the other a bush with a very small dark green
leaf called by the natives of the country peepul. The plains camels
invariably ate these, and the result was certain deaths

Class 3. — Hired camels.

1 The 57th Camel Corps marched through the Salimans from Dera Cihazi Khan to
Loralai and back in February 190.S, the camels retaining excellent condition
throughout. Bhusa was provided for them at various places by the political
authorities : it was only used when the local grazing was bad. The hill camel will live
on the country.

202 FEONTIEJi ASD OVERSEAS EXPEDITWSS FROil INDIA.

There were 1,628 of these camels employed ou the expedition,
all of which were Pathan or Brahui camels. There were 67 deaths
among this class. Considering the amount of work they did, this
•class of transport proved a decided success.

Bori and Zhob Affairs, 1885-1890.

As a result of the Zhob Valley Expedition Shahbaz Khan was

nominated as the Sardar and ruler of

1 88o.

Zhob. All the leading men, with the ex-
ception of the fugitive Shah Jahan and his family, and one or two
oiher motalirs, promised to assist him in his work, and to put a
stop to further raids on the Thai Chotiali district, and hostages
■were given to secure this object.

The settlement with the Kakars, besides imposing a heavy fine,

included an agreement that the Gov-
ernment of India should be at liberty to
occupy the Bori valley, should it be deemed advisable, and the fol-
lowing year, when it was decided that a
Loraiai occupied. frontier road should be constructed from

'Dera Ghazi Khan to Pishin, the Bori valley was occupied, and the
cantonment from Duki was moved forward in 1886 to Loraiai and
a military post stationed at Sinjavi.

Loraiai, in the Bori valley, is 4,700 f eet above sea level, is dis-
tant 154 miles from Quetta by road and 57 from the railway at
Harnai, and is named from the Loraiai^ river near which it is built

Gumbaz, forty miles distant from Lora-
iai, on the borders of Pathan and Baluch,
is garrisoned from Loraiai. It dominates the Thai Choliali valley.

Previous to the British occupation of Loraiai a private quar-
rel broke out among the Jogizais which eventually led to the for-
mal submission of Shah Jahan and his family, and to their conver-
:sion from enemies into friends of Government. In the month of
August, 1885, Shahmar Khan, brother of Shahbaz Khan, who,
with Bangal Khan, son of Dost Muhammad, were among the

^ lora is a common name for river in tliMO p^rts, aud Lai is the name
of the tamarisk which abounds in the river beds.

The account of Zhob affairs in the suooseding chapters is from Colonel Jacob's
Military Report 0:1 Zhob, to which the reader is referred for all informatioa oa
Zhob matters.

ZHOB AND BOIil. 203

iiostaces given by the Jogizai Sardars, was sent with Bangal Khan
to Sinjavi in connection with a tribal case. Bangal Khan, looking
upon Shahmar Khan as the only strong mm on the side of Shah-
baz Khan, as indeed he was, murdered him during the night and
fled to Zhob, intending to murder Shahbaz Khan also and
usurp the chief power in Zhob. Fortunately the Duki Native
Assistant to the Agent to the Governor- General, Khan Bihadur
Hak Nawaz Khan, warned Sardar Shahbaz Khan in time, and
Bangal Khan was obliged to flee to the hills north of Zhob. Sar-
dar Shahbaz Khan seized this opportu-

1 QQ'7 ^

„ , . . /c, , T , nity to make overtures to Shah Jahan

buDmission of Shah Jahan. -^ .

and his son ohmgal Khan, who were hos-
tile to Dost Muhammad and Bangal Khan, and shortly afterwards
Shingal Khan tendered his submission to the Agent to the Gover-
nor-General at Quetta. Shah Jahan himself paid his respscts to
Sir Robert Sandeman at Sibi and promised to act for the future as
a loyal ally of the British Government.

In the meantime Dost Muhammad, a dissipated and violent
tempered person, collected a band of followers from Zhob and Bori
and commenced a life of plunder and outrage. At first Dost Mu-
hammad's attacks were confined chiefly to Zhob, bat afterwards,
with the assistance of Sultan Muhammad, one of the maliks of
Mina Bazar, he established himself there, thus being enabled to ex-
tend his operations into the Bori valley, and even beyond it. Young
men of fanatical spirit, or those who had grievances against
their chiefs, left their homes and joined the robber band, and the well
disposed people of Zhob were unable to check their unlawful pro-
ceedings. The construction of the frontier road through the Bori
valley and the consequent influx of Hindustani and Punjabi

coolies gave opportunities to the fol-
Dost Muha.mmad and Bangal lowers of Dost Muhammad, and many

outrages were committed. Towards the
close of 1887 Dost Muhammad commenced plundering the
Mando Khels and tribes in the neighbourhood of Mina Bazar.
They appealed to Umar Khan, the chief malik of the large
AbduUazai section of Kakars and the most influential man in
Lower Zhob. He assembled a force, and compelled the Pakhezais
of Mina Bazar to turn Dost Muhammad out of that place. Dost
JMuhammad retired to the hills to the north, where his son Bangal

204 FEONTIER AXD OVEBSEaS EXPEDITIOXS FUOil ISDIA.

had remained since his flight. Sultan Muhammad, however, remain-
ed in Mina Bazar with his followers, and the outrages in Bori con-
tinued, Umar Khan concerning himself only with the protection of
his own interests, until Sultan Muhammad, venturing into Murgha,
was seized by the Kibzai chiefs and handed over to the authorities
at Loralai. Even this did not put a stop to the bad conduct of the
Mina Bazar people, and it was determined to punish those guilty
and obtain security for good conduct in future.

Accordingly Sir Robert Sandeman, after accompanying the
iggg, Commander-in-Chief along the new fron-

Mina Bazar. tier road in 1888, marched, with his

escort slightly strengthened, towards Murghab through the Musa
Khel country, and thence to Mina Bazar, when all the AbduUazai
and Pakherzai maliks tendered their submission with the exception
of the Chief, Umar Khan, who held aloof. Packing up his goods,
Umar Khan fled towards the northern hills, but was pursued by
the Political Agent and captured with all his family after an excit-
ing chase. With this capture the success of the Mission was secured.

"WTiile the Agency camp was at Mina Bazar, the Mando Khel

Chief, Malik Kanan Khan, came in to

ApOZai. n- -r-. 1 n T

pay his respects to Sir Robert Sande-
man, and invited him to visit one of their chief villages — Apozai.
The camp accordingly moved to Apozai, about twenty -five miles
from Mina Bazar, and halted there for three days, when the country
about the Zhob river was explored to within twenty-five miles of its
junction with the Gonial river. Sir Robert Sandeman held a durbar
at Apozai, in which he explained the objects of the Mission and
announced the penalty inflicted upon the guilty. This included
a fine on sections that had been, hostile, which was awarded as com-
pensation, for losses sustained, to sufferers from the raids from
Mina Bazar. The Mando Khels here presented a petition to be

taken under British protection and

Zhobis under British protection. jv i , i.- i. • ij-

oftered to pay any revenue which might
be decided upon. The objects of the Mission having been
attained. Sir Robert Sandeman returned by the Central Zhob route
and was met at Gwal Haidarzai, by his old enemy and friend Shah
Jahan with all his family. Here Shah Jahan and the leading
maliks also presented a petition, praying that, as they were unable
to keep peace and maintain order, the British Government might

ZHOB AND BO El. 205

take them under its protection, in return for which they were
willing to pay revenue.

This is a good example of the impossibility of turbulent tribes
remaining independent on the frontier of a civilized power.

Hitherto our dealings with the Zhobis had been carried out
with the sole desire of keeping order on the frontier, but the visit
to Apozai convinced the authorities of the great importance of the
Zhob valley from a military point of view. It not only turned the
whole of the difficult country aboiit the Takht-i-Suliman and do-
minated the tribes occupying this range and the numerous passes
through it to the south, but flanked the great Gomal caravan
route to Ghazni and Kandahar. Moreover it was becoming more
and more evident that the half-measures hitherto adopted were
insufficient to ensure the tranquillity of our frontier.

In the summer of 1889 an old quarrel broke out between
two of the most important tribes of Upper Zhob, which, if left to
itself, would have led to fresh complications. The Officiating Agent
to the Governor- General, Sir H. N. D. Prendergast, marched to
the spot, and after considerable trouble the feud was settled.

It was now evident that, without some central authority on
the spot to enforce obedience to law, the quarrels of the Zhobis would
lead to perpetual disturbances, which must injuriously affect our
frontier district and military communications. It was. therefore
decided to occupy Zhob, and at the same time to open the Gomal
route, which had so long defied the efforts of the Derajat officials
and render it practicable for communication with Afghanistan.

Up to 1889 knowledge of the Gomal Pass and its communica-
T,, r' 1 *^-^"^ ^it'li Zhob and Afghanistan was

The Gomal pass. . '^ ""^

incomplete, and rested almost entirely on
native sources. It was known that this was the great highwav
of Afghan traders {powindahs) between Central Asia and Hindustan
and its importance as a military line of communication had long been
recognised. Lieutenant Broadfoot in 1839 traversed it from
Ghazni with a caravan of pnwindahs. In 1878 the Deputy Commis-
sioner of Dera Ismail Khan (Major Macaulay) went some thirtv miles
up the pass and opened negotiations for its pacification. These
were unfortunately closed by the Mahsud raid on Tank in 1879
which led to the Mahsud Waziri Expedition in 1881. In 1883
arrangements wereXmade for the exploration of the pass under

206 Fr.oyrii:ii and overseas expeditions fugm india.

tribal escort ; and this was successfully carried out by a native
surveyor (Yusaf Sharif) who succeeded in making a good survey
up to the junction of the Zhob and Gomal streams, about twenty-
four miles beyond our border. At the time of the Zhob Expedition
in 1884 it was proposed to make a simultaneous exploration of the-
Gomal. but this proposal was negatived by Government.

In 1887 the subject was again brought forward, and it

was decided to undertake a complete
Faiiureofthe Gomal Survey examination of the route, as far as

Expedition, February 1888. ...

Domandi, the junction of the Kundar
and Gomal rivers, in the course of the following cold weather.
For reasons not necessary to enter into here (as belonging to the
country treated of in Volume III this expedition was not successful.
During the summer of 1889, Sir Rohert Sandeman was invited
to submit proposals for extending a British protectorate over
Zhob and the country between the Gomal and Pishin. The
Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab was at the same time asked to
co-operate from the eastern side in the important work of opening
up the Gomal Pass. Advantage was taken of the Viceroy's tour
on the North- West Frontier in the autumn of 1889 to discuss the
whole question with the Commander-in-Chief, the Lieutenant-
Governor of the Punjab, and the Governor-General's Agent in
Bxluchistan. It was decided that Sir Robert Sandeman should
proceed, as soon as possible, on a tour through the Zhob valley,
and explore the country of the Mando Khel tribe down to the junc-
tion of the Zhob and Gomal rivers. It was also determined to use
the opportunity to try and come to some arrangement with the
Waziri tribe for the opening of the Gomal Pass and to effect a
satisfactory settlement with the Shiranis, who live on the Punjab
frontier to the south of the Gomal.

The troops named in the margin, under the command of Colonel

Sir Robert Sandeman's tour ^- M- Jennings, 6th Bengal Cavalry, were

through the Zhob and Gomal detailed to accompany the Governor-

''Sr'Blnga'r Cavalry- 470 General's Agent as escort. Mr. R. I.

sabres. Bruce, C.I.E., Deputy Commissioner of

No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain t-. t -i t^i_ • j c,"„

g^^^g ._ ' Dera Ismail Khan, accompanied bir

•23rd Bengal Infantry, Robert Sandeman, as the representative
(Pioneers)— 500 rifles. t, i /-, . j.

of the Punjab Government, to carry

out the negotiations with the Shirani and Wazir tribes.

ZHOD AND BORl. 207

On the 19th December the troops forming the escort started!
from Loralai. In addition to the military escort a considerable
number of levies, chiefly from the Thai Chotiali district, accom-
panied Sir Robert Sandeman.

Proceeding tlirough Bori in four marches, the expedition reach-
ed Murgha on the 22nd, and on the following day entered the Gosha
plain, marching some twenty miles to the Kibzai village of Laka-
band. Gosha was found to be a high plateau of about the same-
elevation as Quetta. It possesses a fair supply of water and
cultivation, and there are stone-built villages inhabited by
Kibzais and Khwastais dotted about the plain and at the foot of the-
surrounding hills. On the 24th the expedition halted at Lakaband,
continuing the march the following day across Gosha to Garda.
(seventeen miles), the chief village of the Babar tribe. The Babar
headmen here came in to pay their respects, and the force on the 26th
marched down the Siliaza Nala into Apozai, about eighteen miles.
Here Sir Robert Sandeman was met by a deputation of the Mando'
Khel chiefs and by Umar Khan, the chief of the Abdullazai. At
Apozai a darbar was held which was attended by all the principal
Zhob maliks, and the objects and intentions of the British Govern-
ment were explained.

Some time was spent here in securing the attendance of the-
various jirgas and making the necessary arrangements with them.
After the negotiations had been brought to a successful issue, the-
jirgas of the Mahsuds, Zalli Khel, Dotanis, and the Bargha division^'
of the Shiranis entered into an agreement with Government..
Service grants and emoluments were allotted to them, on condition
o. . . ^ , , that they should be responsible for the

bniranis troublesome. -^ '■

safety of the Gomal Pass, and keep it
and the Zhob route open to traffic. The Largha division^ of the
Shiranis, or an influential portion of them, including the Khidarzai
section, alone refused to come in and were apparently unfriendly.
A party of cavalry under Colonel Jennings, while patrolling in
Kapip, were fired on by a band of Khidarzais under a notorious thief,
named Ranagul. It was, therefore, decided to leave the Larghawals
out of the pacific arrangements, and to conclude a separate

1 Highland Shiranis of Baluchistan.

^ The Largha or lowland Shiranis belong to the Derajat.

208 FBONTIER AXn OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM IXDIA.

settlemeit with the Bargha division, who were to be made over to
the charge of the Political Agent, Zhob, until the whole tribe
should be dealt with.

The negotiations with the tribes being completed and the

agreements ratified, Sir Robert Sandeman, leaving at Apozai

J j^ Captain I. Maclvor, Political Agent,

6th Bengal Cavaiiy— 160 with an escort Started for the Gomal

'"So!" 3 (Peshawar) Mountain ^i^li the remainder of the troops. The

Battery— 2 guns. Toad had been made roughly by the 23rd

■ r . .( loneer) n e^-. pjQjjggj.g and Wazir labourers, and this

facilitated the march of the troops. Kajuri Kach, at the
junction of the Zhob and Gumal rivers, was reached on the 25th
January 1890, and here a halt of two days was ordered to allow
of the road over the Gwaleri kotal being improved. On the 28th
January the camp moved to Nili Kach, all the transport, consisting
of 400 mules and 643 camels, being safely passed over the lotal.
A havildar of the 23rd Pioneers was murdered at Kajuri Kach
on the morning of the 28th. This was said to have been the work
of the Suliman Khel who were hanging about the outskirts of the
camp, the havildar having wandered in the dark beyond camp
bounds. With this exception the march from Loralai to Tank was
accomplished without misadventure. The night at Nili Kach passed
without incident, and Sir Robert Sandeman marched the following
day into Tank. Here a farewell f/;«rc)rtr was held, and in considera-
tion of the loyal conduct of the Mahsud Wazir Maliks, Sir Robert
Sande iian was authorized to announce the immediate suspen-
sion of the tax — which was then being levied as a fine for former
bad conduct — on their imports into British territory.

After the successful issue of the expedition, the head-quarters
of the Political Agent, Zhob, were permanently established at
Apozai which was named Fort Sandeman, and arrangements were
made for the location there of a small force. Orders were also
given for posts, garrisoned by local levies, to be established to
protect the road, and for a military post to be built at Mir Ali
Fort Sandeman and Mir Ai Klicl to link Fort Sandeman with the
^"^'^^'- Gomal. Fort Sandeman is distant 169

miles from the railway at Harnai. It lies 4,500 feet above sea
level. It is entirely dependent for water on a piped supply from
Kapip, nine miles off. It is the head-quarters of the Zhob Levy,

ZHOB AND BOB!. 209

an efficient force of 626 cavalry and 631 infantry which supplies
various detachments throughout Zhob. The garrison of regular
troops now consists of one native infantry regiment.

During the latter part of March 1890, a body of malcontents
of the Darwesh Khel Wazirs attacked the Kajuri Kach post,
which was held by friendly Mahsuds. The attack was beaten off,
the raiders losing fourteen of their number killed. The affair was
not considered serious and was subsequently satisfactorily settled.
On the 22nd April 1890, Sir Robert Sandeman submitted pro-
„ .,. ,. . . ^ posals to Government for the punishment

Punitive expedition against '■ ^ . . . '-

the Khidarzai Sliiranis. of the Khidarzai Section of the Shirani

tribe. This section, as already shown,
lad refused to come in during the pr evi ous January, and had accord-
ingly been left out of the arrangements then entered into with the
other tribes. Although numerically a small section, numbering
not more than 250 or 300 fighting men, they had for many years
adopted a defiant attitude towards the British Government. During
the survey expedition to the Takht-i Suliman in 1883, they opposed
the escort to the number of some 1,500 men at the Ixotal above the
Pazai springs, but were routed with a loss of 15 killed and wounded.
No settlement was, however, effected at that time, and they con-
tinued to behave in a contumacious manner. Besides firing on
Colonel Jennings' party in the Kapip valley they were concerned in
a raid at the end of March 1890, which led to the death of Saku, one
of the principal Bargha Shiraui Maliks and a faithful servant of the
British Government. ^

On the 9th July 1890, Sir Robert Sandeman submitted a
second letter to Government, in which he recommended that ad-
vantage should be taken of the collectionof a force for the proposed
settlement with the Khidarzais, to visit en route the northern Kakar
country on the upper Kundar, and put an end to the feeling of un-
certainty caused by the presence in that neighbourhood of the out-
law Dost Muhammad, and his son, and their following. Should a
force not be sent to settle with the Khidarzais, Sir Robert Sande-
man was of opinion that it was necessary for the peace of Zhob and
the frontier generally, that the troops should be told off to expel
Dost Muhammad and his following from the country under British
protection. With this letter the Governor-General's Agent for-
warded a memorandum, in which he proposed that the force should

Vol. III. O

210 Frontier and overseas expeditions ^rom india.

assemble at Hindu Bagh in the Zhob valley at the beginning of
October, and march in the direction of Dost Muhammad's head-
quarters. After having captured that outlaw, or expelled him from
the Kakar country, the expedition was to march along the Kundar
river to Domandi at the junction of the Kundar and Gomal streams,
examining the country of the Zhob Kakars and the Mando Khel.
From Domandi the column would proceed to Apozai, and thence
to the Khidarzai Shirani country.

The Government sanctioned the expedition against the Khidar-

Panitive expedition against zai Shiranis, to be Carried out by troops

the Khidarzai Shiranis. ^^^^ q^^^^^ ^^ proposed by Sir Robert

Sandeman. That officer was directed to arrange all details with
Major-General Sir George White, commanding the Quetta district,
to whom the conduct of the operations was entrusted, Sir Robert
Sandeman accompanying the column as Chief Political Officer.

With regard to the Shiranis, the question of political control,,
whether this should be from Fort Sandeman or from Dera Ismail
Khan, was reserved until the results of the expedition were known
f nd the country had been thoroughly explored.

Arrangements were made for Mr. Bruce, the Commissioner of
theDerajat, to join Sir Robert Sandeman in the Khidarzai country,,
so that all cases outstanding against that section of the tribe,
whether connected with the Punjab or Zhob, might be satisfac-
torily settled, and the Government hoped that an agreement bet-
ween the Baluchistan and Punjab officers might be effected relative
to the boundary on this part of the border between the two
jurisdictions.

In order to prevent any misleading rumours reaching the
Amir, the objects of the expedition and the orders issued to our
officers were explained to His Highness by the Viceroy, in a
letter dated the 21st September.

At the end of August, orders were issued for the formation of
„ „, , ^. , , „ the expeditionary force which was styled

The Zlaob Fitld Force. ,,.„,,-„., "l ^ ,,

the " Zhob Field Force."

:r' CHAPTER X.

ZHOB AND SHIRANI AFFAIRS.
. _ ,, ^ The Zhob Field Force consisted of the

The Zhob Field Force.

loUowing troops : —

No. 7 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.

2nd Battalion, King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry.

1 18th Bengal Lancers (head-quarters and two squadrons).
No. 1 Company, Bombay Sappers and Miners.

2 29th Bombay Infantry (2nd Baluch Battalion). -'-■••• .-"■
^ 30th Bombay Infantry (3rd Baluch Battalion).

Two sections, 23rd British Field Hospital, with two sections
24th and three sections 25th Native Field Hospitals, accompanied
the force.

The British infantry battalion was ordered to move into the
field 500 strong, and the native infantry battalions each 550 strong.

Concentration was to take place at Hindu Bagh by the 1st
October.

The staff were as follows : —

Detail of Staffs.

Major-General Sir G. S. White, K.C.B., Commanding the force.

K.C.I.E., V.C.
Lieut. -Colonel P. D. Jeffreys .. .. Assistant Adjutant General.

Captain A. H. Mason, R.E. . . . . Deputy Assistant Quarter Master

General for Intelligence.
Major J. F. Garwood, R.E. .. .. Commanding Engineer.

... . . Assistant Superintendent, Armj?

Signalling.
Deputy Surgeon-General S.A. Lithgow,
M.D., C.B., D.S.O. . . . . . . Principal Medical Officer.

Lieut. -Colonel J. R. Burlton-Bennett . . Chief Commissariat Officer.
Lieut.-Colonel T. H. Holdich, R. E. . . Survey Officer.

1 18th Tiwana Lancers.

2 129th D. C. 0. Baluchis.

3 130th P. W. 0. Baluchia.

( 211 ) 0

212 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The troops were equipped on Field Service scale.

One hundred thousand rounds of Martini-Henry rifle, and 10,000
rounds of carbine ammunition was held in reserve at Apozai.

Supplies. — Supplies for the whole force for 2| months were
collected. Depots were formed at Kazhe and at Apozai in the Zhob
valley.

An extra allowance of five lbs. a man was allowed for warm kit
on account of the severe cold expected.
„. ^ , , , The operations of the Zhob Field Force

H irat phase of the operations. n t • i i •

were naturally divided into two phases : —

1st. — The march from the Zhob valley into the valleys of the Kundar

and Gomal rivers and thence to Apozai.^
2nd. — The operations against the Khidarzai and other sections of the

Shirani tribe. "

The troops which took part in the expedition were all stationed
ftt Quetta,with the exception of the 18th Bengal Lancers and the 2nd
Baluchis - at Loralai, and the 3rd Baluchis ^ at Hyderabad in Sind.
The last named regiment was to be railed up so as to arrive at
Khanai on the 28th September, and the regiments at Loralai were
to march from that station and join the force in the Zhob valley.

The troops from Quetta were under orders to move on the
25th September, but owing to a sufficient number of camels not
being forthcoming at the last moment, it was not until the 27th
that they marched from Quetta.

On the 30th September the troops, as in the margin, with
the field hospitals, were concentrated

No. 7 Mountain Battery, „, . „ ; i j. j a. ht •
Royal Artillery. ^'J JvhanOZai. On that date Major-
Kings Own Yorkshire Light General Sir George White assumed com-
No. 1 Company, Bombay mand of the force. Sir Robert Sandeman
Sappers and Miners. joined the expedition at Khanozai on

3rd Baluch Battalion. •" , ^ , ^ i , p

the 30th. On the 1st October the force'
marched to Murgha (fifteen miles) and on the following day to
Hindu Bagh in the Zhob valley (thirteen miles).

The original plan proposed for the operations had been to try
and cut off the retreat into Afghan territory of Dost Muhammad
and his following, who were known to be on or near the Kundar.

1 Now Fort Sandeman.

2 Now 129th D. C. 0. Baluchis.

s Now 130th P. W. O. Baluchis.

ZHOB AND 8HIRANI AFFAIRS. 213

With this in view, Sir Robert Sandeman was to move by the most
westerly route from upper Zhob to Tirwah, leaving the Rud valley
near its head and skirting the Afghan frontier thence north — by
Mian Khel Karez and Palezgir — to Tirwah. Meanwhile the main
force under Sir George White was to advance on Thanishpa from the
south, and the outlaws, finding themselves thus surrounded, would,
it was believed, recognise the uselessness of resistance and submit.
The Government of India, however, considering that any movement
in the direction of Tirwah would be likely to raise suspicions in the
mind of the Amir, directed that the operations should be limited
to the country south of the Kundar river. These orders neces-
sitated an alteration in the plan of campaign, rendering impossible
the proposed turning movement, and making necessary a direct
advance from Zhob.

With a view to learning as much geography as possible and ex-
,, , ., vu u tending our political influence as widely

Advance from the Zhob . . "^

valley to Thanishpa in three aS opportunities WOuld admit, it Was

°°'"'^°^- decided that the march from the Zhob

valley across the hills which form its northern boundry should be
carried out in three columns, the objective being Thanishpa. No. 1
(head-quarters) Column under the personal command of Sir George
White was to march by the Toi river route. No. 2 Column under the
command of Colonel M. H. Nicolson, 3rd Baluch Battalion, and ac-
companied by Sir Robert Sandeman, was to move via Maidan Kach
and Baraksia across the Khaisar valley on Thanishpa. No. 3 was a
small column under the command of Captain A. H. Mason, Deputy
Assistant Quarter Master General for Intelligence, with whom
went Captain R. J. H. L. Mackenzie, R.E., of the Survey Depart-
ment. This column was to cross the Dhana pass into the Rud valley
and thence to gain the head of the Khaisar valley and march down
it, rejoining head quarters at Thanishpa.

These three columns started on the 3rd October, 1890, and
reached Thanishpa on the 10th. Dost Muhammad and his son
Bangal Khan had, however, fled that morning, and, notwithstand-
ing a vigorous pursuit by a detachment of the 18th Bengal Lancer.i
under Lieutenant K. Chesney — accompanied by Captain I. Maclvor
and Lieutenant C. Archer with a strong force of levies — made good
their escape, abandoning a quantity of property which was cap-
tured by the pursuers. The force halted at Thanishpa from the

214 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

11th to 16th October to enable supplies to be brought up, and
advantage was taken to come to an understanding with the Shahizai
and other Jalazai sections inhabiting Thanishpa and its neighbour-
hood, and with the Maidanzai Kakars of Khaisar.

As it was reported that the onward march from Thanishpa
presented great difficulties in the matter

Thanishpa to Apozai. , , . n , i , p p i i

oi supplies and that forage for horses and
mules would have to be carried on camels, General White issued

orders that all details not actually requir-

Eead-quarters column. ^^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^^]^ ^^ ApOZai. A re-

No. 7 Mountain Battery, t . -i .• j- o^i c • j_ ^ i

Eoyai Artillery— 2 guns. distribution of the lorce mto two columns

King's Own Yorkshire Light •^ras accordingly made, and the remainder

Infantry— 400 rifles. . ^, , , t • ^ ^ i

18th Bengal Lancers— 1 troop, of the troops Under Lieut.-Colonel
No. 1 Company, Bombay Morgan, R.A., with all spare stores, were

Sappers and Mmers — 25 rmes. ° -^ .

2nd Baiuoh Battalion— 400 ordered to march down the Toi and
'^'^^^', ,17-7 > 7 thence via the Zhob valley to Apozai,

Colonel Nicolson s column. . j r '

18th Bengal Lancers— 1 there to await further orders. Both the
*'no: 1 Company Bombay columns moved as light as possible.

Sappers and Miners— 50 rifles. Colonel Nicolson's columnmoved from

3rd Baluch Battalion — 400 -^j. • " it. /^i i i oi

,.jggg_ JNigange via the Chukan and bharan

routes to Gustoi War, crossing the
Sharan or Narai kotal carrying nine days' supplies. The head-
quarters column marched to Nigange and thence down the Kundar
valley : this column carried with it eight days' supplies.

The advance of both columns was uneventful and the junction
at Gustoi was carried out. From Gustoi War the combined
force marched to Husain Nika Ziarat.

From Husain Ziarat the force marched in two columns by
18th Bengal Lancers-20 separate routes to Apozai. Sir George
lances. White, taking with him a lightly equip-

riflet ^^'"''' 2^"''"°°-2^° ped column, strength as in the margin,
3rd Baluch Battalion— 20 as an escort, marched via Domandi and
" ®®" the Gomal, while Colonel Nicolson with

the remainder of the force, and accompanied by Sir Robert Sande-
man, followed the. direct route to Apozai. Each column carried
four days' rations.

On the 28th October the whole of the Zhob Field Force was
concentrated at Apozai (Fort Sandeman).

ZEOB AND SB IRAN I AFFAIRS. 216

The column under Lieut. -Colonel Morgan had arrived
•several days earlier from Kuria Wasta via the Zhob valley, and the
escort of the 2nd Baluch Battalion, with Sub- Surveyor Asgar Ali,
had arrived safely by the Shaighali route, the survey work having
been satisfactorily carried out.

Throughout the march from Thanishpa onwards, the disposition
of the people on both lines was friendly. The Chakan route
led through country occupied by Mardanzais, Babars, and Mando
Khel, who rendered all assistance in their power. Along the
Kundar route, Lowanas, Zhamrianis, and Safis (a widely spread
nomad tribe) were chiefly met with, and proved of much use
in the collection of supplies. Indeed, a number of Safis attached
themselves to both columns and drove a brisk trade in sheep and
goats. On arrival at Gustoi War a considerable number of
Suliman Khel flock-owners were found in the neighbourhood, as
also near Domandi and Gul Kach and on the Gardao plain
They furnished useful assistance in guides, supplies, etc., under the
direction of their headman, Haidar Khan. Slight hostility was dis
played on two or three occasions, but on the whole it is remarkable
that the passage of so large a number of alien troops and followers
with a considerable baggage train, over a route hitherto un-
explored, and inhabited by wild and fanatical tribes, should have
been accomplished with so little opposition.

On the 30th October a parade of the troops of the Zhob Field
Force and the local garrison was held at Apozai, which was attended
by Sir Robert Sandeman, the political staff, and many of the maliks,
followed by a darbar at which Sir Robert distributed rewards to
the chiefs of Zhob headed by Sardar Shingal Khan, who had
heartily co-operated in our arrangements, and took the opportunity
of congratulating the Sardars on the general good behaviour of the
people of the valley since the establishment of the British protec-
torate.

On the whole it must be considered that the objects of the march
were attained. It is to be regretted that Dost Muhammad and
his son Bangal Khan were able to escape across the frontier.
The very fact, however, of their flight was a heavy blow to
their prestige, and it was hoped that the security taken from the
northern Jallalzais and Mardanzais would be sufficient to ensure
the active combination of the well-disposed among those tribes to

216 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

prevent the return of the outlaws. In addition to these results,
a very large tract of hitherto unknown country was explored, in-
cluding several of the best used caravan routes leading from India to
Southern Afghanistan, and the limits of the Kakar country were
determined with accuracy.

With the parade of troops and the darbar held at Apozai on
the 30th October the first phase of the operations of the Zhob Field
Force closed.

The second phase of the expedition comprised the operations
Second phase of the opera- against the Khidarzai and other sections-
*'°°^- of the Shirani tribe.

In his letter to Government, dated the 22nd April, 1890, Sir
Robert Sandeman had proposed that two forces of equal strength,
one from the Punjab and the other from Apozai, should be sent
against the Khidarzais ; the two to join hands in the Shirani country
The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, however, considered that
on account of the geographical position of the Khidarzais and the
greater facilities for supplying the troops from the Punjab side, as
well as for other reasons, the best plan of campaign would be for
the main force to go from the Punjab, and a smaller column from the
Apozai side. The Government of India, as has been seen, decided
that the force should proceed from Quetta, and did not consider
it necessary to send any troops from the Punjab. They directed
that Mr. Bruce, the Commissioner of the Derajat, should join
Sir Robert Sandeman in the Khidarzai coimtry to facilitate a
satisfactory and simultaneous settlement of all cases, both from the
Punjab and Baluchistan, pending against the tribe. Subsequent-
ly, it was strongly urged both by Sir
IstPunjabCavalry—l troop George White and the Punjab Go vern-

3rd Punjab Cavalry -1 , . , . . i, u l, 4. • f

Squadron. ment that a force should be sent m from

No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain the Punjab side; and it was finally de-
Battery— 4 guns. 1 1 1 , -1 •

No. 7 (Bengal) Mountain cided that the troops, as m the margin,

2^"*,7r:/?.'''- , . CM . T belonging to the Punjab Frontier Force,

Half battahon, 1st Sikli In- o o J <■ a-

fantry. should be placed under the orders of Sir

fan^r^y! ^''*'^"°"' ""'^ ^"^ ^" George White to act against the Shiranis
Half battalion, 2nd Punjab from the east, based on the Derajat. This
^"mal-i.esi of all ranks. fo^ce was under command of Colone

A. G. Ross, C.B., 1st Sikh Infantry. ^

1 51st Bikbs.

ZBOB AND SEIRANI AFFAIRS. 217

As has already been mentioned no settlement had been come to
with tlie Largha division of the Shiranis during Sir Robert Sande-
man's tour through the Zhob valley in 1889-90, owing to the contuma-
cious conduct of the Khidarzai section. After the termination of that
expedition the Largha Maliks with the exception of the Khidarzai
came into Dera Ismail Khan in February 1890, and a settlement
was made with them on the condition that they should put pres-
sure on the Khidarzais and force them to submit uncondition-
ally within six months. If they failed to carry out this con-
dition within that period the engagements would be considered
cancelled.

At the time it was anticipated that these measures would suc-
ceed, but it soon became doubtful if the other sections of the Largha
Shiranis would be able to carry out their part of the agreement.
In June a deputation of most of the leading maliks of the Khidarzai
section waited upon the Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan
at Sheikh Budin, but they were not accompanied by Murtaza
Khan nor were they prepared to agree to the unconditional surrender
of the refugees, four in number, accused of murder, who had
obtained an asylum with them. The deputation was accordingly
dismissed and the situation remained unchanged up to the time
the force arrived at Apozai.

On the 26th October, Mr. Bruce, the Commissioner of the
Derajat, had met Sir Robert Sandeman at Sapai (having come
through the Gomal pass under a tribal escort) and h ad accompanied
him to Apozai. From here an ultimatum (see Appendix B) was
sent to Murtaza Khan and the other Khidarzai headmen, calling on
them to make immediate submission. It may be mentioned that
subsequent to the march of the expedition from Quetta two serious
outrages had been committed within a short distance of Apozai.
In one of these two sowars of the 12th Bengal Cavalry were murdered
near Babar, and in the other three traders were robbed and wounded
between Babar and Apozai. Both these outrages were eventually
brought home to the Khidarzais, and to the refugees harboured
by them. The only reply received to the ultimatum was a request
from Murtaza Khan for a month's grace to consider its terms.
Sir Robert Sandeman immediately informed General White that
further delay was useless, and that it would be necessary to compel
the Khidarzais to submit by force of arms.

218 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Orders were accordingly issued for an advance into the Shirani
Advance into the Shirani countiy. The force was divided into
country. ^^q columns, One, under the personal

command of Sir George White, was to march by Wala over the
Maramazh range direct to the Khidarzai head-quarters of Nomar
Kalan, while the other under the command of Colonel Nicolson was
to proceed via the Chuhar Khel Dhana to Mogal Kot. At the same
time Sir George White directed Colonel Ross to occupy Drazand,
the largest village of the Largha Shiranis. This was done with the
two -fold purpose of containing the other sections of the tribe in
a military sense, and also of aifording them the plea of force majeure
against the tribal obligation of making common cause against the
advance of the British.

A return of the strength of the Zhob Field Force previous to
the advance into the Shirani country is given in Appendix B.

On the 30th October, a cavalry party tmder Captain Unwin

1st Punjab Cavalry, sent from Daraban,

Affair at Drazand Zam. . -^ii jip,it-> i

to reconnoitre the mouth ot the Drazand
. Zam, was fired on by a Shirani picquet, which then withdrew to
a sangar on the hill above. The enemy consisted of some twenty or
thirty men from the Uba Khel village of Maidan. The cavalry were
ordered to dismount and dislodge the enemy from their position,
which they did, killing two and wounding three without any loss
to themselves. Captain Unwin proceeded some way up the pass,
meeting with no further opposition, and then returned to camp
at Daraban. On the 1st November, Colonel Ross, accompanied by
Mr. L. W. King, Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan, as
3rdPuniabCavairy—i squad- Political Officer, occupied Drazand with

'°No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Bat- *^^ ^.^^^P^' ^^ ^^ ^^^ margin, without op-

tery— 2 guns. position. The Uba Khel and Chuhar

No. 7 (Bengal) Mountain Bat- tj-, i .. v j i j • ■u j. j.-l.

^ _o Lqs Khel jirgas had already come m, but the

Half battalion, 1st Sikh In- Hasan Khel steadily ignored all sum-

^* IlLTf 1 attaiion, 2nd Sikh In- monses to attend, and it was not until
Gantry. the 3rd November that their jirga — in

consequence of a peremptory order, sent by Mr. King to attend at
once on pain of being considered enemies — arrived in camp at
Drazand. The ultimatum sent to the Khidarzais by Sir Robert
Sandemanwas read to all the jirgas, and a deputation from each
-of them was directed to proceed to the Khidarzai country, and

ZBOB AND SHI RANI AFFAIRS. 219

endeavour to compel the more important mallks to come in with

the refugees. They do not appear,

ijt'lXL'^MouVJiS: liowever, to have done much in this

tery— 2 guns. direction. On the 4th November Lieut.-

inSntry"'"'"""' '"'^ ^"°'''' Coloucl A. H. Tumcr, commanding 2nd
Domandi and Drazand occu- Punjab Infantry, cccupied Domandi
P'°'^' with the troops detailed in the margin.

This is an important strategical position at the junction of the
Khidarzai with the Chuhar Khel Dhana, and marked approximately
the south-east angle of the theatre of operations, Drazand being at
the north-east angle. Having established these two forces as
"stops" at the eastern outlets of the Shirani country, the
advance was continued from the west.

Nmar Kalan, the stronghold of the Khidarzai section, lies at
the foot of, and between three and four thousand feet below, the
Maramazh heights. These heights tower almost perpendicularly
above Nmar Kalan, and cover it with a back wall most difficult to
scale. From information received it appeared to Sir George White
that the defiant attitude of the Khidarzais was based upon the
idea that this higher approach to their capital was inaccessible
to a British force, and that, consequently, they could retire unmo-
lested with their flocks and herds to these heights and adjoining
grazing grounds on the precipitous spurs of the Takht-i-Suliman be-
fore our advance from the easier or eastern line of approach. The
Genera' Officer Commanding determined therefore to march a small
but picked f((rceover the heights and descend upon Nmar Kalan,
while Colonel Nicolson was making a practicable road through the
Chuhar Khel Dhana, a very direct pass from Baluchistan to the
Eerajat, which had been closed for some years by landslips and
large boulders blocking the river-bed at some of its narrowest parts.
„„„,.„,, On the,31st October Colonel Nicolson's

No. 7 Mountain Battery, ^ , ci- n i

Royal Artillery— 2 guns. column, accompanied by Sir Robert

InSy-°^ToSanief ''''''' Saudcmau and Mr. Bruce marched from

18th Bengal Lancers— 1 troop. Apozai towards the Chuhar Khel Dhana.

Head-quarters No. 1 Com- r-. i j • ■ i • ■

pany. Bombay Sappers and ^our days rations were carried m regi-
Miners. mental charge and six days in commi?-

3rd Baluch Battalion. • , i

sariat charge.
On the 31st Colonel Nicolson marched to Kapip Kach (8| miles)
on the left bank of the Siliaza nala, and the following day to Mani

220 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Khwa (fifteen miles) crossing en. ro?^<e the easy Atsu Kotal (5,750')-
dividing the Ujasar plainlrom Spasta. On the 2nd November the
march was continued to Sargasa Wasta'(seven miles), a bad road for
camels, and on the following day to Dhana Sar (sixteen and a half
miles) where the stream enters the gorge, which at its entrance looks
like a mere fissure in the hills. Colonel Nicolson and a small escort
proceeded five miles down the Chuhar Khel Dhana to inspect the
practicability of the route for transport animals. It was found
that no road or track existed, the bed of the stream had to be fol-
lowed, and it was necessary to climb over boulders and rocks.
The stream, varying from six inches to more than two feet in depth, .
flows through this gorge with great velocity, and the pass gradu-
ally narrows to twenty yards and in some place; to a few feet,,
with cliffs on either side rising perpendicularly to 2,000 feet.
The Commanding Royal Engineer reported that it would be im-
possible to make a road through it pass ible for camels in less
than four days. All available men of the King's Own Yorkshire
Light Infantry and of the 3rd Baluch Battalion were accordingly
placed at the disposal of the Commanding Royal Engineer for
employment as working-parties on the road.

Meanwhile, Sir George White with the remainder of the force,
carrying ten days rations, and accompanied by Captain Madvor
and Mr.^Donaldas Political Officers, had marched from Apozai to-
Kapip Kach on the 1st November ; an I the following day to Mani
Khwa. From this camp a reconnoitring party was sent on to the
Usha kotal, about seven miles, and it was reported that the road up
to this point was practicable for camel transport. Nothing, how-
ever, was known of the road beyond, except from native reports.

At 1-15 A.M. on the 3rd, the General OSicer Commanding
.,,„,, ,. „ ,, marched with a flying column, strength as

' No- 7 Mountain Battery, . . . -,

Royal Artillery— 2 guns. lathe margin, from the camp at Mani

Kings Own Yorkshire Light j^^^^ leaving the remainder of the

Infantry — 1 company. °

18th Bengal Lancers— 1 troop, column Under Lieut.-Colouel MoTgaii,

SaSers^nSrfl^rflef with the baggage to foUow later. The

2nd Baluch Battalion— '200 progress at first was slow owing to the

darkness. After passing the Usha kotal
the road became very bad, and it was soon seen that it would be
quite impracticable for laden camels. Orders were accordingly sent
back to Lieut.-Colonel Morgan to proceed to Sargasa Wasta instead-

ZHOB AND SH IRANI AFFAIRS. 221

■of following the road taken by the General Officer Commanding.
J'rom Sargasa Wasta he was directed to send three days' supplies
to meet the flying column at Wala. In the meantime that column
had made slow progress owing to the difficulties of the road, which
was barely passable for mules, and a halt of several hours had to
be made two miles short of Wala, to enable the rear-guard to
close up. The village of Wala was found deserted and here the
troops bivouacked for the night. The rear-guard did not arrive
.until 6 P.M., having been nearly eighteen hours under arms,
although the actual distance was not more than twelve miles.

At Wala information was received that the Khidarzais, aided
■by some members of other sections, intended to oppose the ad-
vance at the crest of the Maramazh range. Accordingly Sir George
White advanced in fighting order from Wala early on the morning
•of the 4th November to attack this position and to reconnoitre or
Submission of the Khidar- occupy Nmar Kalan as circumstances
zai Shiranis. permitted. While the force was in full

Submission of the Khidarzais. , ^ , i • i , i , , • i-

march on these heights, a deputation oi
Khidarzai Maliks headed by Baluch Khan, a man of importance in
•the tribe, met the column on the road and laying down their arms
made their submission. They reported that Murtaza Khan
had fled, and that no opposition would be offered. Taking these
maliks with him as prisoners at large, the General Officer
-Commanding reconnoitred to the crest of Maramazh, height
8,310 feet. From here there is a magnificent view of the whole
country to the east. On the north the view is shut in by the
gigantic mass of rock forming the Takht-i-Suliman. Sheikh Budin
and the Indus are seen in the distance, the latter winding like
a silver thread along the whole front of the picture. Immediately
b3low lay the Khidarzai country in panorama. From here helio-
graphic communication was opened with Colonel Nicolson's column
at Dhana Sar and with Colonel Ro.ss at Drazand. This bird's eye
view of the whole situation, and the heliographic communication
■established between the forces occupying the opposite corners of the
Shirani country, brought home to the maliks very graphically the
manner in which they were surrounded, and impressed them much.
From the crest a party reconnoitred the path leading down toNmar
Kalan and reported it impracticable for laden mules. After ins-
pecting the country the General returned to the bivouac at Wala.

222 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

On the 5th General White and stafi with 130 men of the King's-
Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, under Major H. C. Symons, and 170
of the 2nd Baluch Battalion under Major O'Moore Creagh, v.c.,'
moved to Ghawar Ghar (four miles) at the foot of Maramazh, pre-
paratory to an advance to Nmar Kalan over the range on the fol-
lowing day. Major Richardson, 18th Bengal Lancers, was left at
Wala with orders to take the remainder of the troops composing
the flying column with all the animals back on the 6th to join
Lieutenant-Colonel Morgan's column at Sargasa Wasta.

At 6 A.M. on the 6th the ascent of Maramazh was commenced.
^^ , The men, besides their rifles and forty

Occupation of Nmar Kalan. ■■,,■,■ -i n

rounds oi ammunition, carried their bed-
ding, three days rations and their cooking pots. The ascent was
l,700feet and very steep in places, and the rear-guard did not get
up till 1-30 P.M. From the crest the descent to Nmar Kalan was
about 3,600 feet, and the path extremely steep. Nmar Kalan was
found deserted. The village consists of scattered hamlets, each
owned by a malik, situated in a basin from which the water has nO'
outlet and soaks into the ground. On three sides it is surrounded
by lofty mountains which in parts are covered with oak trees.
There is a good deal of cultivation and the soil is excellent. No
opposition was met with throughout the day, but the march was
very trying. The rear-guard did not reach Nmar Kalan until 10-45
P.M., having been nearly seventeen hours under arms, the actual

distance not being more than six miles.

Nmar Kalan occupied. _,. ^ .. -x • i • i j. i_

Sir George White m his despatch says
that none but willing men in high training could have accomplished
such a march.

During the day a hehographic message was sent to Colonel
Ross at Drazand, to move up the Khidarzai Dhana on the following
day to meet the General.

Accordingly, on the evening of the 6th Colonel Eoss, with thp

3rd .Punjab Cavalry -20 ^^oops, as in the margin, marched from

sabres. ' Drazand to China, situated on the right

ter^" J ^g^'un's''^ ''""''"''''■ bankof the Shingao nala (Khidarzai
2nd Sikh Infantry— 280 rifles. Dhana), where the Camp was pitched.
Early the following morning the march was continued up the bed
of the Shingao to Karam, which was reached at 9 a.m.
1 Now General Sir O'Moore Creagh, v.c.

ZBOB AND BBIRANl AFFAIRS. 22Si

Leaving the camp here Colonel Ross pushed on up the ytala,
and after passing the small village of Ambar the narrow part of
the Khidarzai Dhana was entered, the clifis on either side rising
to a considerable height. Here a halt had to be a made to allow

the men to construct a ramp up a huge

In the Khidarzai Dhana. , i.- i t_i i i j.i i mi i

rock which blocked the road. The ad-
vanced guard had just begun to move forward again when
several shots were fired in rapid succession, and on turning a
corner near the village of Khushbina a sepoy of the 2nd Sikh In-
fantry was shot dead. Firing then continued from both sides of the
nala, but no further loss was suffered, and the advanced guard
occupied the village of Khushbina without further opposition. This
village was situated in a position of great natural strength, com-
pletely commanding the approach from the east. Here the column
was met by Sir George White, who with Lieut.-Colonel Jeffreys,
Assistant Adjutant General, and Mr. Donald, Polit'cal Officer,,,
and an escort of sixty rifles, had come from Nmar Kalan.
After a short conversation with Colonel Ross, General "White re-
turned to camp, taking with him seven Khidarzai Maliks who
had surrendered after the skirmish above described. On approach-
ing Nmar Kalan, Baluch Khan, the Khidarzai Malik, who
was then in camp, made his escape. Men of the 2nd Baluch
Battalion gave chase and fired, but he escaped into the hills. His
compan on Yarak Khan who ran away at the same time was,
however, shot. In the morning Baluch Khan had stated positively
that no opposition would be offered to the troops and it is prob-
able that, hearing of the firing, he had anticipated evil conse-
quences to himself. On the 10th November he gave himself up.
In accordance with the orders he had received from the
General, Colonel Ross occupied Nishpa on the left bank of the
Khidarzai Dhana opposite Khushbina, and held both those villages
for the night, which passed quietly.

On the same diW (7th November) a squadron of the 18th Bengal
Lancers and 100 rifles of the 3rd Baluch Battalion proceeded
to Mogal Kot through the Chuhar Khel Dhana from Dhana Sar.
The cavalry received orders to reconnoitre and open up com-
munication with Lieut.-Colonel Turner at Domandi, and the
nfantry were to assist in making the road from the Mogal Kot
end of the pass.

^24 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

On the morning of the 8th Major O'Moore Creagh, v.c, with 100
rifles, 2nd Baliich Battalion, marched from Nmar Kalan to Nishpa,
where he relieved Colonel Ross. That officer, leaving behind fifty
rifles, 2nd Sikh Infantrv% with Major O'Moore Creagh, returned to his
camp at Karam. The village of Khushbina was destroyed this day as
a punishment for the opposition offered to Colonel Rcss' advance.

On the same day Captain Mayne, taking with him fifty rifles
of the 2nd Baluch Battalion, ascended the hills to the north-east
of Nmar Kalan to try and capture some flocks belonging to the
Khidarzais, which had been seen the previous day. His party was
fired on but sustained no loss, and Captain Mayne brought back to
■camp 199 bullocks, sheep, and goats.

On this day the road through tlie Chuhar Khel Dhana was
reported practicable for camels, and Sir Robert Sandeman, escorted
by two guns. No. 7 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, two
companies. King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, and 100 rifles,
3rd Baluch Battalion, marched from Dhana Sar to Mogal Kot.
Here news was received of the firing on Colonel Ross's party at
'Khushbina on the previous day and of the flight of Baluch Khan.
Sir Robert Sandeman accordingly on the following morning
assembled in darbar the Shirani headmen, including all the
Khidarzais in camp, and explained to them that as, after the
Khidarzai headmen had come m and professed submission, they
'had treacherously and without excuse fired on the Government
troops, it was no longer possible to place any confidence in their
professions or to accept their submission as genuine. He was
therefore compelled to place the Khidarzai Maliks, who according
to universal tribal custom were responsible for their tribesmen's
action, in confinement, which was accordingly done.

On the 9th the General, accompanied by Captain Maclvor,
Political Officer, started via the Walwasta route for Mogal Kot to
confer with Sir Robert Sandeman, taking with liim the Khidarzai
prisoners. The night was spent at Dhana War (nine miles), and the
following morning the march was continued down the Chuhar Khel
Dhana for five miles to Mogal Kot, which was reached at 9 a.m.
About three and a half miles from Dhana War some petroleum
springs were passed in the bed of the nala. The quality of the oil
in these springs is pure, but tie supply is scanty. After Sir George
White had conferred with Sir Robert Sandeman as to future

ZHOB AND SHIRANI AFFAIRS. 225

movements, the latter, accompanied by an escort, marched to
Parwara (eight miles) en route to Karam.

Colonel Nicolson with the remainder of his column arrived at
Mogal Kot on the 10th from Dhana Sar. The first five miles of the
road was still very difiicult for camels. The column under Lieut. -
Colonel Morgan moved up from Sargasa Wasta to Dhana Sar to
take the place of Colonel Nicolson' s column.

Colonel Ross, on this day, made a reconnaissance from Karam,
visiting the villages of Torkhanai and Bohari. All the firearms
that could be collected were brought away. The villages were
almost deserted, but the people were beginning to return.

On the 11th the General and stafi returned from Mogal Kot
via Warghari (ten miles). Sir Robert Sand eman and Mr. Bruce
on the same day arrived at Karam, and a darbar was held in the
afternoon when the whole Shirani jlrga was received. Colonel
Nicolson' s column marched this day from Mogal Kot to Parwara,
and on the following day Lieut.-Colonel Turner moved from
Domandi and occupied Mogal Kot with one troop, 1st Punjab
Cavalry, two guns. No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery, and a wing
of the 2nd Punjab Infantry.

Colonel Nicolson' s column halted at Parwara on the 12th to
rest the camels, and marched to Karam on the 13th, relieving the
troops under Colonel Ross which were under orders to return to
Drazand.

In the meantime. Major Creagh at Nishpa had not been idle.
With the detachment under his command he had scoured the slopes
of the Takht and collected 80 cows, 14 donkeys, 62 goats, 114
sheep, and 20 maunds of Indian corn, which were handed over to
the political authorities. Some of these on enquiry were found to
belong to the Atal KhanKaholand other friendly sections and were
restored to the owners ; those belonging to the Khidarzais were
retained.

During the so-called Takht-i-Suliman expedition in 1883 our

troops visited the western or Kaisa rghar
Saliman.'"'°* "^ *''' ^^''^*''' ridge of the great mountain mass situated

between the Gat and Khidarzai Dhana,
but the eastern ridge, which culminates in the celebrated Takht-
i-Suliman, was not visited. Sir George White, therefore, determin-
ed to march troops to the top of this range, and to ascend by its-

Vol. III. 1 F.

226 FUONTIER AND OVESSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

precipitous eastern face, thus showing the people that even the
rugged path up the face of the Takht, though impassable for
mountain cattle and sheep, could be traversed bv British troops.
Accordingly on the 12th November General White, and fifty-
rifles, King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, under Captain Mil-
ton, marched from Nmar Kalan to Nishpa ; thence taking Major
Creagh, V.C., with fifty rifles, 2nd Baluch Battalion, and
Mr. Donald, Political Officer, he started for the Takht. At sunset
the Sultanzai village of Zindawar was reached. The distance
from Nishpa was only six miles, but the road was very bad for
mules, there being an ascent of 2,000 feet, and a descent of nearly
1,700 feet. The General bivouacked at Zindawar, the villagers
being friendly. The baggage did not arrive before dark and had
to remain out all night, the baggage guard with Captain Milton
bivouacking on the road. The night was one of discomfort as
there were six degrees of frost, and many of the men had not got
their kits, nor could they obtain water to drink. At 8 a.m., on
the 13th, the baggage arrived, and, after breakfast the whole
party advanced to Tora Tizha (three miles). Here the mules were
left behind and officers and men went on with their great-coat
and blankets and one day's cooked rations. From Tora Tizha
the path zigzagged for two miles up to the foot of the final
ascent to the crest of the Takht, .where the party bivouacked
for the night near the Sighrai spring (7,400'). The ascent this day
was 3,500 feet. The night spent at Sighrai was trying owing to
the intense cold and the small amount of clothing it had been
possible to carry. At 6 a.m. the ascent to the crest was com-
menced, and, after about 2h hours of steady climbing, the summit
of the Manzalara kotal was reached. As it would have taken too
long to go to the shrine, it was decided not to attempt it,^ and
after opening up heliographic communication with Daraban and
Nmar Kalan, the force descended to Tora Tizha and bivouacked.
The ascent to the crest of the Takht-i-Suliman was very difficulty
in places, and here and there the men had to climb on their hands
and knees. From the top of the Takht a grand view was obtained
over the plains of India to the east, and to the west the high

1 Captain Mad vor and Lieutenant McMahon visited the shrine at the end of June
1891. They ascended the range from the Pazai springs and bivouacked on the
crest returning to the Pazai springs on tha following day.

ZHOB AND SniRANI AFFAIRS. 227

plateau of Maidan, covered with pine forest with the Kaisarghar
range on the other side, was seen. In his despatch Sir George
White says : — " The ascent of the Takht-i-Suliman was by far the
most difficult operation, from a physical point of view, I have ever
called upon soldiers to perform, and the fact that British soldiers
and Baluch sepoys, fully accoutred, scaled these dangerous heights,
will not be lost on the Shi -anis." On the 15th November the
General marched from Tora Tizha to Karam (sixteen miles) passing
through the Sultanzai villages of Jat Aghbazai and Raghasar.

The descent from Tora Tizha to the Wagarai nala was steep,
but practicable for mules. From there the road to Karam Hezai
presented no difficulties. This route is much easier than that
from Nishpa via Zindawar.

On the 14th November Captain Maclvor, Political Officer,
with an escort of 150 rifles, 3rd Baluch Battalion, accompanied by
Lieutenant Southey, Field Intelligence Officer, and Captain
Mackenzie, Assistant Survey Officer, left Karam to explore the
Khidarzai Dhana, and returned on the 16th, having visited Karim
Kach. They reported the road easier than that over Maramazh
to Nmar Kalan. In the meantime working parties were employed
in improving the roads through the Shirani country, the important
points of which, Karam, Drazand, Nishpa, Nmar Kalan, Moga
Kot, and Dhana Sar were all occupied by British troops.

On the 17th November the cases against the Khidarzais and
other Shiranis were brought up before a committee assembled
at Karam, composed of Sir Robert Sandeman, Mr. Bruce, Captain
Maclvor, and Lieutenant McMahon. The circumstances of each
case were considered and orders passed for their settlement. The
fine to be imposed upon the L argha Shiranis was fixed at Rs. 5,000,
■divided as follows : — Uba Khel (including the Khidarzai
sub-section), Rs. 2,500, Hassan Khel, Rs. 1,500, Chuhar Khel,
Rs. 1,000.

On the 18th Sir Robert Sandeman held a final clarhar at
Karam, at which he announced the results

Terms imposed on the . • . .r t^i • i

Shirani tribe. 01 the Operations against the Khidarzais

and also the terms imposed upon the
Shirani tribe as a whole ; kliilats were at the same time bestowed
on some of the headmen of Bargha and Zhob who had rendered
good service during the expedition.

2f2

228 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FORM INDIA.

The terms were briefly : —

1st. — That Murtaza Khan and the refugees, if in the Shirani country-
should be surrendered, or, in the event of their having left the
country as had been reported, should not be permitted ta
retuiQ.

2nd. — A fine of Rs. 6,000 was imposed upon the tribe, including Rs. 1,000 j
inflicted on individuals for oflences committed in Dera Ismail
Khan and Zhob.

3rd. — The Khidarzai Maliks and other refractory members of the tribe
who had surrendered or been taken prisoners to be detained as
hostages until the terms had been fulfilled.

The objects for which the Zhob Field Force had been orga-
nized having thus been accomplished,
tions ™"°^"''° ° e opera- (>Qj.ps were Sent to their destinations,

and their return marches were utilized
to open out as many lines of communication as possible between
the Derajat and Baluchistan.

As a result of the expedition and the knowledge that had
been gained of the country, Government approved and confirmed
the arrangement arrived at after Sir Eobert Sandeman's expedition
of 1889-90, in accordance with which the Bargha section of the
tribe on the west of the Suliman range was placed under the
control of the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan,
while the Larghawals, on the east of the range, were to continue
to be managed by the Punjab Government.

The terms of the final settlement made with the Largha
Shiranis were briefly as follows :—

(1) The Zao, Khidarzai, and Chuhar Khel passes to be kept open and

the tribe to be responsible for the safety of caravans and travel-
lers using these passes.

(2) British officers and other Government servants to be at Hberty to

travel in any part of the Shirani count^}^ The tribe to be
responsible for their safety.

(3) All arrangements with the tribe to be carried out through its head-

men, and if Government orders should be disobeyed or dis-
regarded, the Government to be at liberty to re-occupy the
country.

(4) The taking of selected hostages for the future good faith of the tribe.

(5) The tribe to be responsible for the acts of its individual members.

ZnOB AND SHJBANJ AFFAIES. 229

(6) The restoration and redistribution of service, pay and allowances

of the Larghawals.

(7) The establishment of levy posts at Mogal Kot, Nishpa Atal Khan

(Kahol), Gandari Kach, Darazand, and Domandi.

Since the Zhob campaign of 1890 there have been no

military expeditions in Zhob, but the

^^Zhob affairs subsequent to country remained for some time very

unsettled owing to various causes. Dost
Muhammad and Bangal Khan were still outlaws and liable to
return at any time ; the northern limits of Zhob were undefined,
and this gave the Amir's officials opportunities to encroach, of
which they fully availed themselves. The north- east of Zhob was
continually harried by Wazirs, Suliman Khel and others.

In 1891, the first year after the settlement, the conduct of the
.g tribes in the Agency was good. The

Bargha Shiranis, Isots, Murgzans, Jafars,
and Kharsins were called upon to pay revenue for the first time,
and their conduct was exemplary. Very little crime occurred
among these tribes and no outrage against any official or employe
of Government. TheWazirs, however, constantly raided into Zhob
and were responsible for forty-one reported cases of murder, cattle-
lifting, etc. The celebrated outlaw Dost Muhammad visited
Kabul and was well received by the Amir, who permitted him
to return after giving him presents of some value.

On the 3 1st January 1892, SaifuUa Khan, Governor of Katawaz,

and Munsur Khan, Governor of Mukur,
with some 120 Afghan sowars and

Afghans in Zhob. , •, , . -, •,i .

khasadars, arrived without warning
at Gul Kach, having marched from Katawaz down the Gomal
river. The two Governors quickly visited W ana. Spin, Girdao,
and Siritoi ; and then marched via the Kundar and Kandil
route through Tirwah to Mukur and Kabul, taking with them
as many of the headmen of the Suliman Khel, Wazir, and other
tribes as they could induce to accompany them.

They left a small post aV Gul Kach on the north of the Gomal
river, subsequently relieved by about fifty khasadars under Yusuf
Ali Khan, a brother of Munsur Khan.

In view of these proceedings it was decided to hasten the in-
tended British occupation of Gul Kach on the south of the Gomal,

230 FSONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

and about 100 of the ZhobLevy Corps were despatched and reach-
ed that post on the 15th of March. There was no friction with
the Amir's men on the other side of the river : friendly visits
were received, and returned.

Both Dost Muhammad and Bangal Khan met the Afghan
officials and visited Gul Kach on their return from Kabul, and
assisted the latter on their march up the Kandil.

The Amir also sent troops to Wano andZarmelan on the ex-
treme north-east edge of the district, during the early part of the
year, and they remained there until September. Their presence
in the neighbourhood, and the exaggerated rumours which spread
about Zhob relative to the Amir's intentions towards the British
Government, caused very unwholesome excitement in the minds
of the tribes. This feeling was further increased by the move-
ment of a small party of the Amir's men to Gustoi in the begin-
ning of July. Sardar Gul Muhammad at the same time wrote
to Major Maclvor, the Political Agent, stating that the people
of Gustoi were the Amir's subjects, and requested him not to inter
fere with them. With the permission of the Agent to the Governor-
General, Major Maclvor proceeded to take immediate measures to
turn this party out of Gustoi, and, with that object, proceeded there
on the 13th July with a small party of troops and levies. On his ap-
proach the Amir's men left Gustoi and retired to their own territory.
This action had a salutary effect on the minds of the people, and the
excitement began to calm down, ceasing altogther on the withdrawal
of the Amir's troops from Wano and Zarmelan. While the excite-
ment lasted, however, certain headmen of the district were in-
judicious enough to commit themselves by absconding to Kandahar.
They returned the following year.

The Wazirs were again particularly active during 1892 in
depredations in the Zhob district. The most serious of their
offences were attacks on sentries and escorts between Mir Ali
Khel, Khajuri Kach, and Gul Kach. All these raids were successful,
and resulted in much loss of life, and of a certam number of rifles.

Dost Muhammad and Bangal Ivhan continued to give serious

trouble. From their strongholds, trans-
Dost Muhammad and Bangal Kundar, their followers made repeated

raids into Zhob and harassed not only
Government subjects, the Nasirs and other Ghilzais in the
neighbourhood.

ZEOB AND SHIRANl AFFAIRS. 231

It was evident that as long as these men were allowed to
remain in Kakar territory, even though it were trans-Kundar,
they would be able to terrify the neighbouring Kakar sections into
allowing them a safe conduct through their limits, and assisting
them in other ways ; while it would be impossible for us to check
their depredations. With the object of making another attempt to
capture Bangal Khan and his father, and, failing that, to drive them
out of Kakar limits, Major Maclvor with his full escort of regulars
and levies visited trans-Kundar country in September. He failed
to capture Bangal Khan, who fled across the Kakar border to a
Ghilzai village a few miles within the Amir's territory. Dost
Muhammad Khan, however, with two younger sons, came in
and gave himself up to the Political Agent on the 20th Sep-
tember.

Notwithstanding the failure to capture Bangal Khan, Major
Maclvor's mission had important political results. Bangal Khan
and his gang were driven out of Kakar limits, and the Kakar
sections, trans-Kundar, were encouraged by the visit of troops to
their country to stand up against his depredations. Heavy securities
were taken from them to prevent Bangal Khan's men from pass-
ing through their limits.

In addition to this, important results were obtained by our
official recognition for the first time of the old long-standing Kakar
boundary line between them and the Ghilzais.

The good effects of these arrangements were proved by the
freedom enjoyed from depredations in Zhob and by the capture
by the Mardanzais of the notorious outlaw Gola and four othe^^
badmashes of Bangal's gang in March 1893.

Sardar Shah Jahan died in the summer of 1892 and his death
was soon followed by that of his son, Sardar Shingal Khan, under
the most melancholy circumstances.

The opportunity of Sardar Dost Muhammad Khan's return
was taken to settle the long-standing case of the murder of Sardar
Shahmar Khan by Bangal Khan in 1885. The matter was placed
before an influential and representative Jirga at Fort Sandeman
and settled on the 18th November 1892. The settlement gave
satisfaction to both parties and was approved by Dinak, Shah-
mar's eldest son. To celebrate the close of this long-standing
feud, the Political Agent gave the jirga and parties present a feast

232 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

of sheep on the evening of the day the settlement was arrived at.
During the feast Dinak suddenly rose up, and with his father's
sword, a weapon of well-known history, which only that day had
been restored to him as part settlement of the case, struck Shingal
two heavy blows nearly severing his arm. Sardar Shingal Khan
died from the effects of his injuries on the 8th December. No
sufficient reason could be attributed for such animosity on Dinak's
part ; and as he was known to be a youth of weak intellect, it was
suspected that he had been the tool of some designing person.
Suspicion fell upon Sardar Dost Muhammad Khan and Sultan
Muhammad Pakhizai, who were placed before the Sibi jirga in
February 1893. No actual proof was found of their instigation
of the murder, but the jirga considered the grounds of suspicion
so strong that they were ordered to be kept under surveillance at
Quetta until further orders.

The tribes in the district were perfectly quiet during this
year, but the Wazirs were as active as
ever and committed no less than thirty-
seven raids and other offences within the Zhob limits. The scene
of most of these outrages was the Kajuri Kach-Mogal Kot road,
which was rendered so unsafe that special measures hard to be
taken for the protection of travellers.

Bangal Khan was still living in the Amir's territory, but the
capture of Gola and the four men mentioned above, no doubt
produced a strong effect on his and his followers' minds. It showed
them that the system of plunder by which they existed would not be
tolerated any longer and that there was no hope of their being
allowed to re-establish themselves in Kakar limits. On the other
hand Bangal's position in Afghanistan was rapidly becoming unten-
able. He had received two orders from the Amir either to come to
him or to leave his territory. He was thus compelled to choose
between throwing himself on the mercy of the British Government
or trying his fortune as an exile in Afghanistan. The death of
Sardar Shingal in November 1892 and of Sardar Shahbaz Khan and
Muhammad Nur in April and May, 1893, may have had some
effect in determining Bangal's decision. For some time he hesitated,
but finally recognised that his wisest course was unconditional sub-
mission. He crossed the Kand river, and, leaving his family
within British territory, set out for Zhob, where he surrendered

ZBOB AND SHISANI AFFAIRS. 233

timself with eighteen followers to the Political Agent at Hindu
Bagh on the 24th June. His family and the remainder of his
followers were brought in soon after.

There was no doubt that Bangal's offences rendered him
liable to be severely dealt with, as indeed he himself admitted.
There were, however, a number of extenuating circumstances.
Although sharing in the booty obtained by his followers' depreda-
tions, on which, ever since his first false step, he may almost be said
to have been dependent for subsistence, he had taken a personal
jpart in very few of these outrages. Moreover, it was shown that he
had never encouraged offences directly aimed at the British Govern-
ment, and had discouraged gliaza^ so far as was in his power, though
unable to control at all times the more desperate members of his
gang. Further, the evident good faith of his surrender and the
openness of his behaviour afterwards tended to show the possibility
and desirability of converting him, as had been done in the case
of Shah Jahan, a much more determined opponent of the British
Government, from an antagonist into a faithful and valuable
servant. On these grounds it was decided to deal leniently with
Bangal's past offences, while taking precautions to render him
powerless for evil in future. On the 5th August 1893 the Agent to
the Governor- General received Bangal's submission in darbar
at Ziarat, and accorded him forgiveness for his past offences.
Security to the amount of Rs. 10,000 was furnished by both Dost
Muhammad and Bangal Khan for their future good behaviour,
and non-interference in the affairs of the Jogizai family and the
Zhob chieftainship. The Zhob Sardar, Muhammad Akbar Khan
also furnished a similar security for the prevention of further acts
of hostility between his own and Bangal's branches of the Jogizai
family.

To provide for the maintenance of Dost Muhammad, Bangal
Kban and the rest of his family, a re-distribution of the cash allow-
ances and grain jagir granted to the Jogizai family was arranged
with the concurrence of all concerned. Dost Muhammad, who
was in confinement in Quetta, was released at the same time and
allowed to reside there at liberty. Bangal Khan was ordered to
reside with his family at Dirgi near Loralai.

^Murders dignified with the name of "fanatical outrages."
Vol. III.

234 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

In January 1894, Bangal Khan and other Sardars were taken a
tour round India, and visited among other

1894.

places, Lahore, Calcutta, Bombay and
Karachi. The tour was very successful and had a salutary effect
on the minds of the chiefs.

It was during this year that the Baluch-Afghan Boundary
Commission demarcated the boundary between Zhob and Afghan-
istan, from Domandi to Chaman,

Towards the end of the year, some trouble was caused by
Malik Shahabuddin, the chief of the Khoedad Khel Suliman KheV
who appeared on the north bank of the Kundar river opposite
Husain Nika with sixty sowars. In spite of the fact the Boundary
Commission had fixed the waterway of Kundar as the boundary at
this part, Shahabuddin still pretended ignorance of the settlement,
and was inclined to maintain antequated and unfounded claims
on Chachoba and Husain Nika and certain tracts of country south
of the Kundar. Before the arrival of the Political Agent, Shaha-
buddin, however, had returned to his home.

The Shiranis, who had kept quiet since the Zhob Field Force

Shiranis, 1895. invaded their country in 1890, now began

to give trouble. It began with a quarrel

between the Bargha and Largha Shiranis over a case of abduction.

The Largha Shiranis being under the Deputy Commissioner,.
Dera Ismail Khan, and the Bargha Shiranis under the Political
Agent, Zhob, a great deal of delay occurred in settling this case
owing to references having to be made from one district to the other.
The jirga before which the case was sent were unable to agree.

In March 1895, the matter was again placed before a jirga

at Mo gal Kot in Largha. The majority

^^^^' of the jirga found that the abducted

woman should be given back, and the case was submitted for the

orders of the Government of India.

The long delay in settling the case wore out the patience of
the Chuhar Khel and they began to despair of obtaining redress.
Meanwhile they were exposed to the taunts of their neighbours
and rivals reproaching them with having lost their woman and
done nothing to vindicate their honour.

On the 6th June 1895, a small party of the Chuhar Khel
surprised the camp of Lieutenant Hume, R.E., who was in charge

ZUOB AND SHIEANI AFFAIRS. 235

of the construction of the road. The camp-guard of six men of
the Zhob Levy had three men killed, and lost all their rifles and
ammunition.

The raiders then proceeded down the road towards Dhana
Sar. Meeting Lieutenant Hume on the road, they killed him, and
his horse, butler, and the camel he was riding. They continued
doing further wanton damage. Pursuit parties from Fort Sandeman
and Shingarh were quickly on their tracks. Captain McConaghey,
the Political Agent, came up with the party on the 9th June between
Loara and Dhana Sar. Shots were exchanged, a sepoy of the 40th
Pathans was killed, and the leader of the robber gang, Shikari
Khan, was wounded. The party escaped, however, to the Suliman
Khel country, and eventually to Kandahar. Various fines were
imposed on the Bargha Shirani tribes for proved complicity in this
affair.

One of the murderers, of whom there were seven in all, was
apprehended in 1897 and hanged.

From 1895 to 1897 the affairs in the Bargha-Largha Shirani
country remained unsatisfactory. Nothing was done on the
Punjab side towards controlling the Largha Shiranis, who openly
defied all jirga decisions.

The Larghawals levied toll from all travellers and in many cases
looted their property. On one occasion
they stole the property of two British
ofl&cers and a lady travelling through the pass accompanied by a
guard of regular cavalry. They also carried off three of the Public
Works Department sub-contractors employed on the road, but
afterwards leleased them. Another band of fifty men seized and
carried off another sub-contractor close to Dhana Sar. They
were pursued by a detachment of troc^ps and levies, and after some
resistance the prisoner was released, but not until shots had been
exchanged, in which one cooly, who was with the troops, was killed
and one Shirani wounded ; nmeteen Shiranis were taken prisoners.
Another party raided as far as Toi Sar in Musa Khel and broke
into a house, ill-treated the owner and his wife and abducted the
daughter.

There were certain petty disturbances between the Afghans
and our subjects on the Khurasan border, but all were satisfactorily
settled.

236 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The Wazirs on the 2oth May 1899, attacked a party of five

Zhob Levy Corps sowars between Mir Ali

Khel and Girdao. One sowar was killed,

another wounded and their rifles with accoutrements were taken

away by the raiders.

On the '20th January in the very early morning, Fazil and
J90O. Shikari (who took a leading part in the

Dhana outrage of 1895) and a third person,
armed with swords, pistols, and rifles entered a house in Sam Khel
near Hindu Bagh, where Duffadar Sobha Khan and Sowar Ghajjar
of the Zhob Levy Corps had encamped with five horses. Taking
advantage of their being asleep and unarmed the thieves secured
them, and after divesting them of what they had, hamstrung two
horses and rode off with the remaining three. The report of this
reached Hindu Bagh at 4 a.m., when Eessaidar Diwana Khan,
the commander of the Zhob Levj^ Corps post there, at once started
ofi with a party in pursuit ind Sam Khel, at the same time sending
another party under a duffadar via Shamshobi. The Eessaidar
caught up the raiders and secured one of them and one of the
horses. The pursuit was continued, when Shikari was nearly
caught, but he dismounted and took to the hills, leaving his horse
behind. Owing to darkness and the deep snow, the rest escaped,
but the horses and stolen property were recovered.

In December 1900, the Mahsud Wazir Blockade commenced

Mahsud Wazir blockade ^^^ Continued until March 1902. The

Zhob section of the blockade is the only
one with which this volume deals.

In November 1900, a detachment of the 6th Bombay Cavalry,

a wing of the 24th Baluchistan Infantry,

The Mahsud Waziri the 23rd Bombay Rifles, and the Zhob

Blockade, Zhob Section. -, ^ ^ ^ t t c j i

Levy Corps Cavalry and Infantry, were al-
lotted for blockade duty under the command of Lieut. -Colonel
R. L Scallon, CLE., D.S.O., of the 23rd Bombay Rifles. The bound-
ary of the Zhob district to be watched was roughly a line which starts
from Gustoi to the south-west and follows the Kundar river up to
its junction with the Gomal at Domandi. From this point the
boundary continues along the Gonial to Toi Khula (where the
Wana Toi joins the main stream), it then passes over the hills in a
south-east direction to the Gliazamanda nala and thence across the

ZUOB AND SHIRANI AFFAIBS. 237

Zliob river up to Kuchbina nala for about four miles, when it turns
eastward into the Zao pass through the Suliman mountains, a
distance of about fifty-five miles.

The troops were distributed with instructions to capture and
hand over to the Political authorities any Mahsuds who might be
discovered beyond the limits of their own district ; to prevent any
supplies of food or clothing from passing into the Mahsud country ;
to protect the persons and property both of the inhabitants of
Zhob and of the powindahs and Nasirs who twice yearly pass
olong the Gumal valley to and from the Punjab ; and for these
purposes to co-operate with the troops and levies employed in
Waziristan.

The Commissioner of the Derajat computed that during the
foivindah migration some 50,000 persons and 150,000 animals
traverse the Gomal.

A large camping ground was selected on the left of the Gomal
opposite Gul Kach, under the lee of an isolated hill which was occu-
pied by a strong party of the 23rd Bombay Rifles. The kafilas were
met as they crossed the Afghan border and conveyed by parties of
the Zhob Levy Corps to the assigned canping-ground. Hence they
were passed on in such numbers as could ensure no block taking place
anywhere along the road toKhajuriKach, escorted by parties of the
23rd Bombay Rifles as far as Toi Khula, when they were handed over
to the Southern Waziristan Militia. Other parties using the Zhob
valley were protected by detachments from Mogal Kot, Mir Ali
Khel, Girdao, and Husain Nika.

The result of these arrangements was that the powinrlahs suf-
fered no loss in person or property in Zhob or in the Gomal.

Several petty raids were attempted by the Wazirs, but as a rule
the raiding parties which managed to enter Zhob returned with diffi-
culty, and empty-handed.

The troops employed on this duty made many roads and tracks,
the most important being a camel road from Mir Ali Khel in Zhob
via Waziri Bagh to Gul Kach on the Gomal, twenty-three miles
long and nine feet wide, which cost only Rs. 2,500, including explo-
sives and tools.

The Blockade ended in March 1902, and was no sooner over
than the Largha Shiranis again began to give trouble, by murdering

238 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Arbab Farid Khan, Extra Assistant Commissioner, Punjab Sliiranis,
The murderer, Ahmad Khan, a Shirani of some local importance,
escaped, notwithstanding the parties of troops that were out, both
from Zhob and the Dera Ismail Khan side, searching for him and
blocking the outlets. He appeared to have escaped to Afghanistan
through Punjab territory east of the Takht-i-Suliman and via AVazir-
istan. The result of this outbreak caused a good deal of incon-
venience to Zhob, because the road through the Dhana, which is the
main trade route between the Punjab and Zhob, was blocked for
some time and rendered unsafe for travellers. At the same time a
band of Shiranis, numbering about tlurteen, shot tlie hania at the
Dhana bungalow and burnt his shop, but the whole gang was
shortly afterwards destroyed by a party of the 23rd Bombay
Eifles.

From 1902 till 1906 affairs in Zhob were quiet. The Kakars
througohut have given no trouble. In 1906, however, the Shiranis
burnt the Political Agency house at Shingarh, as a demonstration
against certain new forest rules regarding cutting of wood in their

hills.

Several outrages have been committed in the Shirani country
during the present year (1907) including the murder of a party of
travellers and a road- contractor.

The whole of Zhob is administered by the British Government.
, , The administration is in charge of a Politi-

Administration of Zhob. , . ^ . ^ , r. -,■ . j

cal Agent who is durectly subordinate to
the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan. His head-
quarters are at Fort Sandeman, and he is assisted by an Assistant
Political Agent, an Extra Assistant Commissioner, Tahsildar, Naib
Tahsildar, etc., all at Fort Sandeman ; an Extra Assistant Com-
missioner, Tahsildar, Naib Tahsildar, etc., at Hindu Bagh ; and a
Tahsildar and Naib Tahsildar at Kala Saifulla. His authority is
supported by a Native Infantry regiment at Fort Sandeman with
detachments at Mani Khwa and Mir Ali Khel ; and the Zhob Levy
Corps, with head-quarters at Fort Sandeman and posts scattered at
intervals all along the Afghan border. There are also detachments
of regular troops at Kala Saifulla and Hindu Bagh.

Revenue is taken from all the tribes in the district and grazing
taxes from the nomads in the summer months.

ZEOB AND 8HIRANI AFFAIRS. 239

Eacli section and sub-section of the various tribes is directly
lander the control of the maliks or headmen, who are held respon-
sible for the good behaviour of their followers. In return they
receive allowances ; but in addition to good behaviour they have
to keep up certain numbers of country levies, mounted and foot-
men. It is through these maiiks and their levies that the work
of the district is carried on. The system is well suited to the needs
•of the country.

CHAPTER XI.

MAKRAX.

About the middle of the last century the whole of Makran,
as well as Kharan and Mashkhel, was
conquered by Nasir Khan the Great, of
Kalat, and annexed to his dominions. He instituted a liberal
system of government by which the administration was carried
on jointly by a Naib, representing the Khan, and the local Gichki
Sardar, between whom the revenues were divided in certain
fixed shares.

This arrangement seems to have worked satisfactorily until
the Gichkis began to degenerate and the Naoshirwanis began to
oust them by intrigues of every description.

The Noashirwanis who occupy Kharan are of pure Persian
stock. Kharan stretches from the Jhalawan hills to the Persian
border, a country of long sandy valleys with but little cultivation ;
its inhabitants a fighting, raiding, restless clan whose life was de-
pendent on successful forays against the more settled countries
of their neighbours.

Sprung from a bold and determined race, filled with the sense
of their own importance, and possessed of a much higher order of
intelligence than the other ruling races in Makran, the younger
members of the Naoshirwanis, as they found their shares in
the ancestral property insufiicient for their wants, have
endeavoured to carve out for themselves fortunes from the
property of their less energetic neighbours. But they differ
from the Arab conquerors of the country in that whereas the
Arab converted the land from desert to oasis, th'^ Naoshirwani
reduces oases to deserts.

In 1888, led by Naoroz Khan, the Naoshirwanis raided
Panjgur, and slew Mir Gajian, the Gichki Sardar, who was also

( 241 )

Vol. III. 2B

242 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

the Khan's 7unb. At this time Azad Khan was still head of the-
Naoshirwanis. Sandeman thus describes him: —

"In spite of his great age Azad Khan retains his mental faculties-
Azad Khan uninij^aired. Bowed by age, he is unable

to mount a horse without assistance, but,
once in the saddle, his endurance is greater than that of many a
younger man. Possessed of unflinching resolution, impatient of
wrong, generous to reward, stern and relentless in punishment,
Sardar Azad Khan has above all things enjoyed a reputation
for unswerving honesty. He is never known to depart from his
word once given, and has a sincere contempt for chicanery or
falsehood."

Sandeman visited the country in 1884. Disputes between
the Naoshirwanis and the Khan of

Sandeman's visit, 1884. t' j. t , i i i i- •, •

ivat were adjusted, and before his
death three years later, at the age of 101, the veteran chief
had shown his friendship for the British Government by render-
ing valuable assistance in the matter of transport to the Russo-
Afghan Boundary Commission. He had also arranged, in co-
operation with our officers, for the protection of trade routes.
The Khan of Kalat, owing to his dislike of the Naoshirwanis,
„ ,^ . ^, was displeased with the settlement ; he

Result of settlement. . ^ , . .

wished rather to establish his own power
in an absolute form in Panjgur ; therefore in order to get the
Naoshirwanis into trouble he countenanced disturbances.

Muhammad Hasan, Gichki, of Sami claimed the sardarship
of Panjgur. He was aided by the Noshirwanis under
Baluch Khan, and was enabled to keep the whole country-
side in a distracted condition, causing damage to the resources
of Panjgur, estimated at several lakhs, and reducing the unfor-
tunate people to the extremity of wretchedness.

In 1890-91 Sir Robert Sandeman again visited Panjgur, which
, . . was in a state of almost complete

Second visit. . -, t t t

anarchy. Peace was introduced by the
occupation of Panjgur by British Indian troops, but after their
withdrawal in 1893, complaints were received of the mis-
behaviour of Muhammad AH, the Khan's naih, and in 1896 he was
replaced by Kaoda Muhammad Khan, an influential and capable
Baluch headman.

JilAKBAN. 243

The state of Kej was somewhat less disturbed, owing chiefly to
the high character ci the Gichki Sardar,
^ ^' Bhai Khan, and his influence with the

tribes. But as the Sardar grew feeble with age the Khan's Naoshir-
wani Naib, Mir Shahdad, raised feuds in order to increase his power
and lessen that of the Gichkis, great destruction of property and loss
of life ensued, and the ruling power was brought into contempt.

The attempt to manage the Rinds of Mand through the Naib
and Sardar of Kej was also far from successful. They looted the
caravans carrying the Persian trade, and it was impossible to exact
from them any reparation for the damage caused by their raids.
Mir Shahdad was replaced shortly afterwards by Abdul Karim,
Gichki. In revenge for his supersession in the uaibship, Mir
Shahdad attacked and severely wounded a British officer, and
then fled the country.

So low had our influence in those parts sunk that, in 1890, Sher

„, ^,. ,,.., , Muhammad, a nephew of Sardar Bhai

The Gichki bardars. ' tr

Khan, openly defied the British Agent,
and fired upon his camp from the stronghold of Nasirabad in Kej.

Nasirabad had been held by one Mehrab Khan, who was ex-
pelled by Sher Muhammad. The two men were relations and
disputed the right of ownership. In 1891, Sir Robert Sandeman
decided in favour of Mehrab Khan, but required him to
pay Sher Muhammad Rs. 100 per annum compensation.

In 1893 the latter forced Mehrab Khan to sell the fort to him
for Rs. 1,300 or about a quarter of its value.

In 1896 the Khan of Kalat made a tour in the Makran coun-
try, accompanied by Lieutenant E.

18%.' ^^'^ ^'''*' ^^^'^^°' LeMesurier, Officiating Political Agent

m Kalat, and by Mir Yakub Khan, eldest
son of Sardar Sir Naoroz Khan^ and by several leading men of
the Sar awan and Jalawan tribes.

The principal incidents of the tour were : —

(a) The sxtrreader of the Nag fort in Kolwa by the sons of Baluch

Khan, Naoshirwani.
(6) The surrender of the Nasirabad fort near Kej by Sher Muhammad,

Gichki.

1 Who succeeded Azad Khan as head of the Naoshirwanis in 1887.

2H2

244 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

(c) The arrangements initiated for the future administration, under
the Khan's orders of the districts of Kej (including Bolida, Kolwa,
and Panjgur).

At Nasirabad a jirga was assembled and, on their finding,
Sher Muhammad was confirmed in possession of the fort on a pay-
ment of Rs. 100 per annum to Mir Mehrab Khan.

Having regard to Sher Muhammad's turbulence in the past^
the Nasirabad fort was garrisoned by

The Khan's troops are in- , £„ tt- i j. t> • i

troducedintoMakran. seventy-five Kalat sepoys, Panjgur also

was garrisoned by twenty-five of the
Khan's troops, and the Nag fort was held by twenty levies. The
Nazim was provided with an escort of twenty levy camel sowars.

Afterwards Baluch Khan's grandson, Muhammad Umar
Khan, was made Naib of Kolwa, and was living with Baluch Khan
at Hor Kalat, in 1898.

Thus tranquility was introduced into this wretched country.

Yet in Panjgur, Kej and Kolwa the

^o^oir,'' ^^^ ^ ° re e on elements of disturbance still remained.

rcnia,lll.

In Panjgur the fear- of Naoshirwani ag.
gression, in Kej also Naoshirwani intrigue, and smouldering feuds
and animosities amongst the Gichkis, and in Kolwa the notorious
ireebooter Baluch Khan left in power to oppress and to rebel ;
and moreover the universal dislike of a Muhammadan people
to a Hindu Nazim,^ were sparks to be fanned by the first breath
of opportunity into a conflagration.

It would indeed appear, from a study of after events, that
this pacification of the country resulted in gradually combining
all the ruling Sardars in common cause against the paramount
power, thus putting a temporary end to internal feuds. The
troubles in northern Baluchistan, and the outbreak in Persian
Makran, where Mr. Graves of the Telegraph Department "was murder-
ed, caused a certain amount of unrest throughout the country.

Baluch Khan, Mehrab Khan Gichki, and a large number
of other Sardars of Kej all attributed their
Nazim Diwan Udho Das. ^^^ discontent and rebellion to the ap-
pointment of, and alleged oppression and tyranny of Diwan Udho
Das. It may be here stated that in the final settlement an
enquiry was held into these allegations, and the Kej moti-

1 Diwan Udiio Das.

MAKRAN. '~ 245

bars signed a paper saying they had no cause for complaiat
against Udho Das, and no complaints against him were sub-
stantiated. Nevertheless, this probably was the cause ol the
outbreak.

On the 6th January 1898, Mehrab Khan, Gichki, attacked
the Nazim Diwan Udho Das, looted his

Events that led to the ex- , ij.ii.- • i_ j.

pedition of 1898. treasury and took him prisoner ; but on

the representation of his elder brother
he was set at liberty and shut up in Kalatuk, in Kej, under
protection of Abdul Karim, Naib of Kej. Mehrab Khan then
sent a messenger to Baluch Khan, telling him what he had done.
It appears probable that the country at this time was in a state
of unusual internal quiescence, and that no outbreak was suspected,
because four officers of the Survey Department, with a large
unarmed following of lascars, etc., and a very small escort of
local levies, were sent to undertake survey operations m the
Kolwa and Kej valleys.

On the 9th January at daybreak the camp of Captain Burn,
Captain Burn's Camp at- ^-E-, at Murghi Hor village was attacked
tacked. and looted ; six lascars and ten Punjabis

, were slaughtered in cold blood. The fifteen

men, local escort— under the command of Rustam Khan, brother
of Mehrab Khan, Gichki — offered no resistance. Amongst other
things Rs. 15,000 and some thirty-five rifles were stolen. Captain
Burn, who was sleeping out of camp on a hill about three miles away,
was informed of the raid by one of his men who escaped from the
camp. He at once started off on foot twenty -five miles to Balor.
Here he sent off messengers to warn Lieutenant Turner, R.E., and
Messrs. Hickie and Prunty who were engaged on survey work at
various places between forty and ninety miles away. Burn then
obtained a camel and proceeded to Urmara whence he telegraphed
the circumstances to the Officer Commanding Sind District, on
the 11th January.

This attack really arose from no feeling of hostility towards
the surveyors. It was merely the first act in a campaign of resis-
tance against the paramount power, and a demonstration of de-
termined lawlessness. The answer wasprompt. A small force was
despatched from Karachi under Colonel Mayne.

•246 FFOyriER ASD OVEBSEAS expeditions from IXDfA.

Within two hours of the receipt of the telegram from Captain
Burn, 250 men of the 30th Baluchis

Despatch of troops to Makran. ^^^^^ 3 gj.j^-gj^ ^^^^^^^ j Medical Officer

and 400 romids per rifle, all under the command of Colonel
Mayne, were despatched from Karachi on board the tug Hichmond
Crawford, which towed behind it a native craft carrying followers,
baggage, and one month's rations. On the evening of the 9th
January, 100 rifles, iilst Bombay Infantry, under Lieutenant
Creagh had left Bombay for Charbar, and 50 under Lieutenant
Waller for Jask to protect the telegraph officers at those places.
In the meantime Sardar Muhammad Hassan of Sami was

escorting JMessrs. Hickie and Prunty iu

Loyalty of Sardars. x j- i. tt • ■ j.i ^.t.

•^ •' safety to Urmara, arrivmg there on the

18th instant, and Sardar Mir Dura Khan, cousin of Mehrab Khan,

brought in Lieutenant Turner on the 15th ; Ghulam Jan of Balor

also assisted him. Muhammad Umar, Naib of Kolwa, hurried

him away, being anxious to get rid of him, probably in order

that he himself might not be implicated and lose his Naibship.

He asserted that Baluch Khan was going to attack at once, and

that he himself must return to defend Nag fort against his

grandfather's attack. When Lieutenant Turner had gone this

Naib looted his belongings.

On arrival at Urmara, Colonel Mayne found that the landing

for troops by local hunder -ho&t^ was easy;

Arrival at Urmara. , 111111-771^

horses could be landed m bunder -hoat°>
which were careened over and the animals forced over-board into
four feet of water. The water-supply at Urmara was found to be
sufficient for 500 men, but brackish. No supj^lies or food were
available nearer than Kej valley ; firewood was scanty, and only
twenty-four camels in poor condition could be hired for transport
purposes. He therefore decided to leave fifty men at Urmara and
to move the remainder of his force to Basol, twenty miles north,
covering the Pasni and Balor roads, where good water is abundant
and firewood and camel grazing plentiful.

Orders were issued for the concentration of a force at Karachi

consisting of 250 men, 30th Baluchis ;

Concentration of troops at ° „, 1 -n 1 /-< i

Karachi. half a Squadron, 6th Bombay Cavalry,

and a section of No. 4 Hazara Mountain
Battery. Two months' supplies were also collected there. The

MAKB.iy. 247

Lieutenant-General Commanding the Forces, Bombay, was directed
to settle all further arrangements, dispositions, operations, and
despatch of troops to Makran, in direct communication with the
Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan.

It was reported that at Pasni no supplies, and probably no
transport, would be procurable whilst the country was in a state of
disturbance ; but that at Gwadur plenty of supplies and 100 to 200
camels might be collected in a week or ten days. Also that plenty
of supplies of all kinds, and fodder, were procurable in the Kej
valley.

On the 16th January 150 men of the 30th Balchuis were sent
to Pasni, also warm clothing for the troops already at Urmara.
On the 19th January, Colonel Mayne, having collected 190
v.'eakly camels and 65 donkeys, left Urmara to march along the line
of telegraph, repairing it as he went, to Pasni, a 100-mile march,
which was found difficult owing to scanty water and heat and
deaths amongst the camels.

On the 25th January the position and strength of the Makran
force were as follows : — At Pasni, 400 rifles, 30th Baluchis, 2 guns,
No. 4 Hazara Mountain Battery, and 88 transport mules, under
Lieut. -Colonel Mayne, 30th Baluchis. There were also at
Karachi, to leave for Pasni on the 27th in I. M. S. Canning, J
squadron, 6th Cavalry,^ eighty rifles, 30th Baluchis, one British
officer, one Native officer and twelve men, Bombay Sappers and
Miners, "C" and "D" Sections, No. 42 Native Field Hospital
and twelve transport mules.

The orders issued in connection with the operations in the Kej
valley were, " Force now under Lieut.-Colonel Mayne at Pasni
will push on at once via Turbat to relieve Khan of Kalat's Nazim,
who is shut up in Kalatak fort, and to restore his authority.
Force leaving Karachi on 27th instant in Canning for Pasni will
join Lieut.-Colonel Mayne's force as soon as possible, except
the eighty rifles which are intended to afford protection to tele,
graph working parties at Urmara, Pasni and Gwadar."

A messenger who left Turbat on the morning of the 22nd
January reported, on the 25th, through Mir Dura Khan to the
Political Agent, Kalat, who was at Pasni, that Baluch Khan and

1 Jacob's Horse.

248 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Mir Rustam Khan joined Mehrab Khan, Gichki, at Turbat on the
l7th January, and that they had closed all roads to Turbat. That
they had been joined there by Mir Murad and Mir ShukhruUah,
Gichkis of Tump ; by Mir Ashraf of Mand, the most powerful
Rind chief ; by Mehrab Khan and Mohim Khan, brother Nao-
shirwanis from Bolida ; also by the Kulanch Sardars Mobarik and
Haji Murad. Sher Muhammad, Gichki, was also leported to be
strengthening the Nasirabad fort. The enemy were reported
to number about 2,000 men armed chiefly in country fashion.
' At this time Panjgur seemed quiet. Baluch Khan made it
known that he would oppose the troops en route to Turbat. No
fighting had taken place at Kalatak, though the rebels were
threatening to fight Abdul Karim if he protected the Nazim any
longer. The Nazim, however, appeared to be quite safe for the
present in Kalatak fort.

Pasni was chosen as the base of operations because the

route thence to Mehrab Khan's fort at

Pasni chosen as base of Xurbat is the shortest, and lies over un-

operations.

dulating country ; also because it is the
nearest point from which to support troops in the Kej valley
near • Sami. Sir Robert Sandeman always recommended it
as a port of embarkation, and officers who were with him
report that the beach is sandy and shelving, and that sixty
horses were embarked there without difficulty. On the 26th
January the guns and 159 of the 30th Baluchis were despatched
five miles inland, on account of the difficulty of procuring
sufficient water and grazing at Pasni, which were to be had in
abundance higher up the Shadi river.

On the 27th January Colonel Mayne left Pasni at 6 a.m.,
_,, , , „ . joining the guns at 8 A.M. The whole force

The march from Pasni. j o o

then proceeded fifteen miles from Pasni
up the Shadi Kor valley. Owing to difficulties in transport,
and the feebleness of such camels as were obtained, due to
the recent famine and drought, the force would have been unable
to move unless baggage had been reduced to a minimum. Con-
sequently, tents were not carried, and the troops moved on a kit
allowance of twelve pounds per man.

The heat by day was great, and there was no shade in the sandy
desert. Iiow rolling hills broke the monotony of stretches of sand.

MAKRAN. 249

and pools of fresh water in the otherwise dry river-bed enabled the
column to slake their thirst at intervals ; while the mimosa and
tamarisk shrub relieved the hunger of the camels.

Report said that Mehrab Khan and Baluch Khan with
1.200 men were coming to attack the column, probably at
night. Consequently on the nights of the 29th and 30th all were
alert, and the officers fully accoutred slept with their men. On
January 31st the column set out at 7 a.m. for Turbat. At 7-30 a.m.
the advanced guard sighted the enemy.

On this day the road lay for the first four miles from camp, at
Basol Kor, over a level plain, then for 7 miles through a long and
very narrow defile finally debouching into a broad open stony
plain, stretching four miles to Turbat.

The Baluch Sardars fortunately elected to hold the mouth
A .• r /^ , ,. T, ,-. of tli6 defile, and took up a position half a

Action of Gokh-Prusht. ^ ^

mile long on some steep hills command-
ing the entrance. The enemy exposed almost their whole posi-
tion at a distance of about 4,000 yards, by appearing on the
tops of the ridges ; their strength was estimated at about 1,500.
When the advanced guard arrived within 900 yards of the
enemy the latter fired with their breech loaders, of which they
had a fair number. At 8-30 a.m., the guns and infantry opened
fire from a hill on the left of the road. Captain Jacob was
sent with fifty men to occupy a high hill on enemy's left, and
Captain Southey with twenty-five men was presently directed to
tarn their right.

As the turning movement developed, the guns took up an
advanced position from which an oblique fire was brought to bear
with such telling eft'ect that the enemy's right was broken and
rolled back on their centre. At this time, 9 a.m., fifty sabres of the
6th Cavalry, under Lieutenant Naylor, appeared on the scene.
This detachment had arrived at Pasni two days after the column
had left, and had followed by double marches. Hearing the
sound of the guns from their camp about seven miles in rear
of Basol Kor, Lieutenant Naylor had pressed on. Lieut. -
Colonel Mayne despatched the cavalry to assist in turning the
enemy's right with dismounted fire. As the flank attacks deve-
loped, enfilading the enemy and commanding his line of retreat,
the remainder of the infantry advanced to attack the entrance

250 FWyTIER AND OVEKSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROil INDIA.

of the defile. The guns firing on this portion with great precision
•caused considerable loss : they were then brought up alongside
the firing line, and opened with case at 300 yards. The enemy
broke and fled in great disorder, leaving their dead on the ground.
Anumberof camels and horses fell into our hands.

All seemed over, when, suddenly, a band of ghazis headed
by Baluch Khan himself rushed out from behind a rock where they
had been concealed. Flinging away their rifles they drew their
swords, and, with cries of "Allah !" "Allah !" charged straight at
Captain Jacob and his men. They were all shot down, some get-
ting within twenty paces. So near did they come that Captain
Jacob himself shot Baluch Khan with his revolver.

The attack, which lasted two hours, was completely success-
ful. From 200 to 250 of the enemy were dead on the field,
amongst them Sardars Baluch Khan, Naoshirwani of Kolwa, Meh-
rab Khan, Naoshirwani of Bolida, ShakhruUah Khan, Gichki of
Tump, Haiatan Khau, Rind of Wakhai, Gul Muhammad Khan>
Naoshirwani of Bolida, and other minor chiefs.

Our casualties were : —

Killed. Wounded.

Gth Cavalry (Jacob's Horse) . . 1 1

No. 4 Hazara Mountain Battery . . 1 1

30tli Baluchis .. .. ..2 10

This ended the engagement of Gokh-Prusht, which maybe
translated " the breaking of the bullock's back." The extract
from the Gazette of India will be found in Appendix I.

The force at once advanced on Turbat and six shells were
fired into the fort to put an end to the garrison's long range firing.
Mehrab Khan Gichki refused the terms offered, and determined to
face a siege.

On February 1st and 2nd the troops were given a rest pending
the arrival of Lieutenant Bovet with de-

charTu°k forts °^ ^"'^''* ''"''* tachmcut of Bombay Sappers and Miners

with guncotton, etc., to blow up the fort.
He arrived at 6 p.m., having marched forty miles in thirteen
hours. Next morning, 3rd February, it was discovered that
Mehrab Khan and his garrison had fled in the night, evading
the patrols.

MAKRAN. 251

About noon the same day information was received that he
had fled to Charbuk about thirty miles away, and taken refuge with
Sher Muhammad. About 5 p.m. the cavalry started to surround
the place. They were followed, at 8 p.m., by forty-six infantry
mounted on ponies and camels, and later on at 10 p.m., the re-
mainder started. The cavalry arrived about midnight and sur-
rounded the fort, the mounted infantry being only about four
hours behind them, and at 10 a.m., the guns and main body
arrived, having marched all night except for a halt of one hour.
Sher Muhammad agreed to surrender the forts, the great towers
of which were blown down by Lieutenant Bovet in the afternoon.
At the commencement of the rising Sher Muhammad did not
openly side either with the Nazim or with the rebels. The
humiliation to which he was subjected was a cause of great joy
to the ryots of his village, who lived in terror of him, but, so long
a.<J he had a fort, were compelled to obey his behests. Neither
Mehrab Khan, nor any of his wives, or property were found in
the fort.

The whole force now reassembled at Turbat, awaiting the

arrival of supplies of food, forage, tents, kits, etc., from Pasni.

The villagers were much pleased to have troops in their vicinity,

as they found a ready market for their produce, and supplies were

plentiful.

On the 16th February the heavy baggage arrived, and on the
Expedition to Bolida. ^ '^l^ ^ column of 2 guns, Hazara Mountain

Demolition of Chib and Battery, 150 rifles, and the detachment of
Khushk forts. Sappers and Miners was despatched, under

•commandof Major Evan, to the Bolida valley, where the inhabit-
ants were anxious to please, and supplies plentiful. The forts of
Chib and Khushk were demolished. They belonged to Mehrab
Khan, Naoshirwani, who was killed at Gokh-Prusht. Bolida is
1,000 feet higher than Kej and the climate more temperate. The
march was forty miles ; in the second march a wonderful tangi, the
Garok gorge, is traversed, about six miles in length with good clear
water flowing the whole way. It is in places only four feet wide and
the precipices on either side rise to a height of several hundred feet.
The Bir fort in the Bolida valley was occupied. This fort is
perched on a rocky promontory overhanging the left bank of the
Ohish Kor. The houses of the village are built into the rock.

252 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The colurcn left the Bolida valley on the 21st February and
^ , . , marched to Kalatak. Onthe24thFebru-

Expedition of JIand. t • i_ /-. i i -.r i i

ary, Lieut.-Colonel Mayne proceeded
with 100 rifles to Mand, picking up Major Even's detachment at
Kalatak en route. Lieutenant Knox, Political Agent, interview-
ed the various headmen and Chiefs of Mand, who signed an
ikrarnama in which they acknowledged themselves to be the Khan's
subjects and that remission of revenue would be a favour. They
returned to Turbat on March the 8th, 189S.

The chief difficulty the Makran expedition had to encounter was
the want of proper transport.- The three

Difficulties of transport. . i i i i j • i

previous years had been almost ramiess,
and the camel-grazing had deteriorated in consec|uence. The camels,
cattle and flocks were all thin and mangy ; and there were few
camels able to carry a load of more than four maunds ; the majority
could not carry more than three. A considerable number died
during the various marches, although the strain was not excessive.

Arrangements were made to return all Government trans-
port with the cavalry, guns, and 100 rifles with 1 British officer,
as an escort to the Political Agent, to Quetta via Kalat, the re-
mainder ( f the force with all surplus stores and details to
march back to Urmara and return by steamer to Karachi.

Before leaving Turbat Lieutenant Knox, the Political Agent,
„, _ , held a Darbar which was attended by

The Darbar. c • -, t,, , n

headmen of Kej and Makran generally.
He rewarded with hlnlats those who had been loyal, and addressed
the assembly, inviting them to submit petitions against any recent
bad government, and promising to return in six months and give
petitioners their rights ; he also warned all Baluchis that they
were expected to assist Government officials in securing peace.
He inflicted on rebels fines amounting to about half a lakh of
rupees, and was assured that the fines would be realised within
three years. The justice of the punishment was generally acknow-
ledged by the guilty. These fines were inflicted and everything
was done on behalf o! the Khan of Kalat.

At this time Shah Nawaz Khan, son of the late Baluch Khan,

havino- looted twentv-two Martini-Henry
Tlie last of the rebels. ^^^^^ ^^ French manufacture from three

Pathans who were arrested by Captain Tighe at Urmara, was plotting

JIAKRAN. 253

a raid on Bolida. He had with him only fifty rifles ; it was therefore
decided to leave sixty rifles of the 30th Baluchis at Tump under
Subadar Ahmad Khan.

These arrangements having been made, the Quetta column

under command of Captain Jacob, con-

Retum of the Expedition. g^g^jj^g ^f j^jj^^^y ^.^fl^g ^f ^j^^ ^^^^ g^^_

bay Infantry, the detachment of Bombay Sappers and Miners,
the two guns of the Hazara Mountain Battery and the half
squadron, 6th Bombay Cavalry, started for Quetta on the 12th
March 1898. The remainder of the force followed next day,
marching via Sharak, Sami, Sohrabih Bet, Ragiwara, Kil Kaur ;
here the Quetta column branched off to Kolwa ; the remainder
proceeded by Marestan, Balor, Garm-i-Bent, Dedari Sunt, Dra]
Bent, Basul Kor, Kandelag to Urmara. Here the baggage was
carried in t07iis to haggalows which were towed to the I. M. S
Canning, on the 29th March 1898.

The Quetta column having blown up the forts of Sharak, Nac,

Ser, and Hor Kalat, arrived at Kalat on the 7th and 9th April 1898.

The Tump Detachment was detained in Makran for some

time by the Naib of Kej, who feared that

The Tump Detachment. • i i j_j_ i i i

he might be attacked by Mehrab Khan
Gichki, who had escaped into Persia, and by Shah Nawaz, Naoshir-
wani. However, the Naib of Ke] concluded a treaty with these
men, by which they agreed to return to their respective places,
presumably Pishin and Kharan, and on the 31st May the Tump
detachment marched, arriving in Karachi on the 18th June 1898.
The troops of the Khan of Kalat were left to police the country.

With regard to this expedition Colonel Holdich says : —

A small force was despatched under Colonel Mayne, which for the re-
.markably prompt and effective manner in which (making light of really for-
midable difficulties) it settled the dispute and dealt out even-handed
justice to the leaders of the attack on the survey camp, deserved far more
credit than many a frontier expedition which has made more noise in the
world.

In January 1899, a pardon was granted to Mir Mehrab Khan,
Pardon to rebel Sardars. Gichki, Mir Shah Nawaz, Naoshirvvani,

and Mir Isa Khan, Naoshirwani, for the
part they had taken in the rebellion. Kaoda Muhammad Khan,

254: FRONTIER ASD OVUSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM ISDIA.

late Naibof Panjgur, and Muhammad Umar Khan. Baluch Khan's
grandson, who were among the refugees, were also induced to return
and make their submission.

After the recall of the troops it was decided to inaugurate in
Makran the Brahui form of government.

MaK'^'""'' ''''*°'^ °^ ^'^^^"^ Ut^^o ^^^ ^as therefore recaUed,

and Sardar Mir Mehrulla Khan, Raisani,
took over the new administration at the end of the j^ear 1898.

The first act of Mir Mehrulla Khan was to make terms with the
refugees of the late rebellion. He placed most of the power in Makra n
in the hands of Mir Melirab Khan, Gichki, and recommended ]Muhani-
mad Umar Khan, Baluch Khan's grandson, to be made Naib of
Mashkai, which is the upper part of the Kolwa valley. On the
other hand the principal Naoshirwanis of Kolwa and Bolida signed
an agreement that they would not acquire fresh landed property in
Kej -Makran without the consent of the Khan's representative.
The repentant Sardars all signed agreements to remain faithful to
the Government, and to create no more disturbances or sedition in
the country. Appendix II gives a translation of the bonds signed
by them.

It will be remembered that Mir Mehrulla Khan, on taking

over the Nazimship, went out of his way

Muhammad Umar Ivlian. ^ ht i i tt t-i tvt '

to treat Muhammad Umar Khan, JNao-
shirwani, well. He recommended him for a Xaibship, and though
apparently this recommendation was not carried out, he gave him
an allowance of Rs. 50 a month, with the service of two sowars
at Rs. 40 a month more, or Rs. 90 in all.

For a year or more all went well, but in April 1900, in
direct opposition to the Nazim's wishes, Mir Muhammad Umar,
Naoshirwani, married one of Sher Muhammad, Gichki's daugh-
ters. He then, for a time, took up his abode at Nasirabad, where
. he joined Sher Muhammad in his unlawful proceedings, and
assumed towards the people of the surrounding country the posi-
tion of an official or chief over them. He was therefore sent
back to Kolwa by the Nazim.

In July 1900, Sher Muhammad was killed,^ and Muhammad
Umar with his brother Muhammad Ali and his' cousins Naoshir-

1 By Mehrab Khan acting under the orders of the Nazim.

MAKEAN. 255-

wan and Dur Muhammad (sons of Shahbaz Khan, the fourth son
of Baluch Khan) fled via Bolida to Kuhak in Persia.

He apparently misconceived his position, and imagined that it
was incumbent on him, as a son-in-law, to avenge Sher Muham-
mad ; or else he thought that by giving trouble to the author-
ities he might win his way to favour and preferment. It is not
impossible that, putting a wrong construction on the leniency
shown to the rebels concerned in the 1898 rising, and noting in
particular the greatly increased power and influence lately ac-
quired by Mir Mehrab Khan, Grichki, the only surviving leader of
the rising, Muhammad Umar may have entertained some such
idea.

At the same time he had a dispute pending with Mir Shah-
nawaz Khan, the eldest son of Baluch Khan. It also appears that,
in accordance with traditional Naoshirwani procedure, he now
lays claim to Nasirabad fort and lands. Judging, moreover, from
the promptitude with which the Persian tribes, inhabiting a long
stretch of countrj' extending from Irafshan to Sarhad, joined
forces with Muhammad Umar, it appears more than probable
that some preconcerted arrangement had been made for this
rising, and that the reported intention of Sher Muhammad to flv
to the hills and there commit further mischief was something
more than idle rumour.

Having fled to Persian territory Muhammad Umar collected

Border depredations. ^ following of Persian tribesmen, and
embarked on a course of border depre-
dations. These culminated in December 1900, in the attack on
and plunder of the large village of Kantdar in the Dasht district
which forms a part of, and lies to the south of, Kej. He had with
him over 600 men, and carried off property to the estimated value
of Rs. 71,583. In the defence of their village ten of the Kantdar
people were killed, and eight wounded. The Nazim of Makran,
who had collected a force of 1,500 Makran tribesmen, went in pursuit
of Muhammad Umar, and had one or two encounters with him,
the results being inconclusive, as Muhammad Umar would not hold
his ground. The Nazim meantime had been in communication
with Ali Hasham Khan, the Sartip of Bampur, and it had been ar-
ranged that the Nazim with his force should join the Sartip at Dizak,
and co-operate with him there in effecting the capture of Muhammad

256 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Umar and the punishment of such Persian subjects as had taken part

with him in his raids. As the situation
loJr' °^ ^^^ ■^"""'^^ ^^"'*' t^emanded the presence in Makran of a

British officer, Captain H. L. Showers,
Political Agent, Kalat, was despatched accompanied by five
Baluch Sardars with twelve mounted followers, and an escort of two
British officers (Lieutenants W. 0. Grant and A. B. Merriman)
and 200 men, 1st Baluchis^ and a Duffadar and 9 men of the Sind
Horse.

The whole party sailed from Karachi on the 13th January and
reached Gwadur next day. At Gwadur they were met by Mir
Mehrulla Khan, the Nazim, Mir Mehrab, Gichki, and other Kej
Sardars. The Nazim had been on the point o' starting for Dizak,
but, on receiving the news of the intended tour of the Political
Agent, he dismissed his lashkar and went to Gwadur. Baggage
and horses took nine hours to unload. Camel transport was pro-
cured from Tiirbat through the Nazim, who can at short notice
have 1,000 camels available and ready for troops at Gwadur. The
hire of a camel was eight annas a day.

It was reported that Muhammad Umar was residing in the
local fort with his friend Mir Azam Khan, the chief of the Iraf-
shan district. But the Sartip requested the Political Agent to
meet him at Dizak. Accordingly he left Tump on the 14th Feb-
ruary and marched by the Nihing and Shahri Kor route. The first
33 miles in our territory, the remaining one 130 in Persia. The
country passed through included the Persian districts of Irafshan,
Bampusht, Sib and Dizak.

Irafshan and Bampusht are mountainous regions with few
, ^ , villages and a scanty population. The

Irafshan and Bampusht. . . ... • , i

inhabitants joined to a man in the
Kantdar raid, and fearful of consequences they invariably fled
at the approach of the party. The fairly large village of Hong
was found completely deserted. The march through this country
has had an excellent effect. The furdah has been lifted from
it, and the confidence of the people in the security of their
mountain fastnesses has been rudely shaken. At the same time
it is necessary to recognise that the pursuit and capture of

1 Now 127th Baluchis.

MAKRAN. 257

a small band of fugitives, in such a tract, would be a matter
of much difficulty, and could only be accomplished if under-
taken by at least half a dozen small and very mobile parties
of, say, thirty men each. The local Persian officials are mani-
festly powerless to help us. Their control over the tribes is ai
the weakest ; and if they succeed in recovering from time to
time some portion of the revenue, they do not bother their heads
about much else. Thus the region forms a veritable Alsatia for the
border outlaw, and if the peace of Kalati Makranisnot to be con-
tinually disturbed by absconding malcontents, some means must
be employed to deprive the neighbourhood of the security it affords.
The country round Sib and Dizak is much more open. The local
chiefs too, like Sardar Ghulam Rasul of Sib and Sardar Abdullah
Khan of Dizak, are men of respectability and importance, who,.

«!-v>- H n- ir ^^ made responsible, should be able to

exclude unauthorised persons from finding
refuge in their country. Sardar Abdullah Khan is nominally the
chief of all the Persian districts, from Jalk to Irafshan, that border
on Makran. But the Bampusht, Irafshan, Magas, and Kuhak
people are practically independent of him.

The Political Agent and his party arrived at Dizak on the
27th February, and found the Sartip endeavouring to subdue three
forts, viz., Surjo and Shastun held by Mir Ali Muhammad and
his brother Mir Bairam Khan, and Bakshan held by their con-
federate Ghulam Muhammad. The three forts between them'
could muster some 300 fighting men, and the defenders were in
possession of sixteen B. L. rifles, several M. L. rifles and smooth
bores of obsolete military pattern, and a large number of match-
locks. Surjo and Shastun are half a mile apart. Bakshan
stands by itself a mile and a half away. Round about each fort
there is a village, in which the inhabitants of the neighbouring
date-groves had fortified themselves, and were making common
cause with the rebel Sardars.

Ali Muhammad and Bairam are Baranzais, a small tribe of
Afghan origin. They are connected by marriage with the Nao-
shirwanis, and though not as powerful as Sardars Abdullah Khan
and Ghulam Rasul, they hold a position of some importance in
Persian Makran. They have a younger brother, named Muhammad
Amin, who with several of their men took part in the Kantdar
Vol. III. 2 k

258 rnONTIEIi AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

laid, and received a share of the plunder. It was also ascertained
that the property plundered from a Panjgur A:aj^Za in November
1900 had been brought to Surjo, and there divided, the three
brothers receiving a share.

Thus the subjugation of these men was certainly a matter
of importance, and one in which we

The Persian Sartip's army. . , , . t. , • ,

were interested. But it was very soon
apparent that the Sartip's promises of a full settlement of all
our claims were, to say the least of it, a little premature.
In the first place his force was too weak to effect the reduction
■of the forts. He had with him two guns, one an obsolete and
useless muzzle-loader, the other a B. L. piece of small calibre,
and about 240 so-called regular troops. To these were added an
unorganized and practically useless rabble of tribesmen furnished
by Sardar Abdullah Khan. This force had been before Surjo
forty days and had effected nothing. It was indeed far more
Mlaband than were Ali Muhammad and Bairam Khan. The
latter moved about as they liked, collecting supplies and keeping
up free communication between the three forts. The Sartip's
men, on the other hand, were all huddled together among the
walls of an old ruined village half a mile from Surjo. Nearer
the forts they had constructed some advanced posts, from
behind the walls of which they kept up a desultory and harmless
cannon and small-arm fire. Secondly it was practically certain
that Muhammad Umar had neither been recently, nor was now,
with Bairam Khan ; and thirdly, Bairam Khan, however im-
„, „ . portant, was only one of several leaders

The Sartip. '^ . •'

who had assisted Muhammad Umar, and
if his subjugation was a matter of so much difficulty to the
Sartip, there would be small hope of his bringing the others
to account, and making them disgorge their share of plunder
within any reasonable time. Had the Sartip been strong and able
to subdue Bairam Khan, it may be assumed that other chiefs,
like those of Irafshan and Magas, would either have joined
him at Dizak or made some attempt to meet the claims for the
Kantdar raid. But none of them were present at Dizak, and the
Sartip had no power to command their attendance. Emboldened
by Bairam Khan's success, they had shut themelves up in their
forts, and nothing but a siege would bring them to submission.

MAKRAN. 259

For the credit of our good name on the border it was im-
possible to depart again from Dizak leaving Bairam Khan
unsubdued. Accordingly after reconnoitring the forts, and
visiting the Sartip's outposts, additional posts were established,
which would have the effect of confining Bairam Khan more
closely to his forts, and of preventing communication between
one fort and another. At the same time the troops began
the construction of scaling ladders, as, having no guns, it was
only by assault that the forts could be taken.

But before letting our men take an active part in the proceed-
ings, the Political Agent deemed it advis-

Bairam Khan. ,-, • ^r^ i n j.

able to hear what Bairam Khan had to say,

and with the Sartip's consent he opened communications with him.

Negotiations continued for two or three days, but on the fourth day

Ali Muhammad, Bairam Khan's elder brother, came under

guarantee for his safe return, to make his salaam. This was

followed by a long discussion, and finally the terms of a

thoroughly satisfactory settlement were arranged, a result for

which great credit is due to Mir Mehrulla Khan and other

Sardars. The main terms are, (1) that Bairam Khan and Ali

Muhammad would never again shelter or assist Muhammad

Umar, or any other person absconding from Makran ; (2) that

they were to take oath on the Koran as to the nature and extent

of the property carried off by Muhammad Amin and their men,

engaging at the same time to restore at once such articles as were

now in Dizak, and to make good the remainder within three months,

it being in the possession of various adherents scattered about the

district. When the Sartip came into camp, and Ali Muhammad

made his submission, it was also agreed, verbally, that Bakshan

fort should be handed over to the Sartip, a rider to the compact

being that if Ghulam Muhammad, the owner of Bakshan, refused

to abide by the arrangement, Ali Muhammad and Bairam Khan

were to stand aloof while the Sartip took forcible possession of the

place. All this the Sartip fully agreed to.

Next day Bairam Khan came to make his salaam. So
fearful were the two brothers of treachery, although the distrust
was not of us, that nothing would induce them both to leave their
fort at the same time. However, Bairam Khan was at once taken

2K2

260 FBONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FliOM INDIA.

over to the Sartip, to whom he made full submission and wa»-
granted in return a written pardon.

The negotiations at Surjo were not concluded until the 10th
March, and, with a 480-mile march to Quetta, it was necessary to
return, leaving the chief offenders still at large. The Political
Agent, however, proposed to meet the Sartip again earlier in the
cold season at Sarbaz, where Sardar Husain Khan lives, whence
Iraf shan, Magas, and other places, occupied by those concerned in
the offences, are within easy striking distance.

Regarding the internal state of affairs in Makran, the Political
Makran 1901. Agent found that the Nazim's adminis-

tration had, on the whole, been satisfac-
tory. The various chiefs were, outwardly at least, loyal to the
Nazim's administration, and prepared to assist him.

The crisis manufactured by Muhammad Umar was of course
important for Mir Jlehrulla Khan, being the first of any moment he
had encountered in the two years of his administration.

The present administration has to face certain dangers. Mir
Mehrulla is both feared and respected, but the feature of , his
administration is the prominent place occupied by Mir Mehrab,
Gichki. His influence is not confined to Kej proper, but extends
to Tump and Mand, and in a lesser degree to Kolwa, Bolida and
Panjgur. He is a 'persona grata with Sardar Husain Khan of
Sarbaz and is closely related by marriage to Sardar Ghulam
Rasul of Sib. He is thirty-throe years of age.

The second cause for apprehension lies in the inevitable exclu-
sion from a share in the administration of other men of importance
like Mir Abdul Karim, late Naib of Kej, and Khan Bahadur
Muhammad Husain Khan of Sami ; Mir Shaikh Umar, the Gichki
Sardar, too, is of course dissatisfied at the final triumph of his
younger brother, and feels keenly the stoppage of his share,
Rs. 2,260 a year, of the telegraph subsidy, which was suddenly
transferred from him to Mehrab Khan in 1899.

Another danger is, that three forts are still in the hands of
their owners, and are a temptation to set the Nazim's authority
at defiance. Again there is a dispute pending between Sardar
Shaikh Umar and Mir JMehrab Khan as to the division of the
Gichki Sardari rights. The younger brothers Sarfaraz Khan and

MAKEAN. 261

Rustam Khan are supported by Mehrab Khan in their claim for
a share of the Gichkigari, or dues tor maintenance.

Mir Rustam Khan, who commanded Captain Burn's levy
escort in 1898, is of a restless and uncertain disposition. At
Kolwa, Mir Muhammad Akbar, Naoshirwani, a younger son
of Mir Baluch Khan, is Naib, and is doing good work.

Mir Shah Nawaz Khan, who also lives in Kolwa, and who may
be considered the chief of the Kolwa branch of the Naoshirwanis,
is thoroughly with the Nazim, and is also warmly attached to his
younger brother Muhammad Akbar.

At Tump the old Gichki Sardar, Mir Murad Khan, is well mean-
ing but without power or influence. There is in Tump, which
includes Nasirabad, no man of particular prominence. A good
many Rinds from Mand have acquired possessions in Mand
Revenue is collected from them with some difficulty.

The Mand Rinds are now well behaved and contented, except
as regards some complaints against their Pishin neighbours. The
two leading and most useful men in Mand, now, are Mirs Ashraf
and Nur Muhammad, Rinds. They get each Rs. 50 a month
from the Nazim's administration.

The present head of the Bolida branch of the Naoshirwanis
is Isa Khan, the son of Mehrab Khan who was killed at Ghokh
Prusht He is a well disposed and very promising youth of twenty
years of age. He lives with Mir Sarfaraz Khan, a brother of
Baluch Khan, a straightforward and respectable man.

Kaoda Muhammad Khan died in 1900, and the Gichki Sardars
Mir Abdulla Khan and Muhammad Ali are now fast frimds and
allies. These two Sardars have two vakils whom they use to give
trouble, and the I'aAi^s are disposed to slight the authority of the
Nazim's Naib Mir Wahid Bakhsh, Raisani, late a Risaldar in the
Kalat State Camel Corps, and a smart, intelligent and energetic
man. Abdulla Khan, who is twenty years old, takes little or no
interest in the affairs of his chiefship.

At Kharan, Sir Naoroz Khan, showed the Political Agent over
his fort. This stronghold, though often assailed, has never suc-
cumbed to an enemy, and its reputation for strength is unrivalled
among the forts of Baluchistan.

On the 23rd April 1901 the Nazim had a successful encounter
•with Muhammad Umar and killed eight of his followers. He met

Infantry

.. 300

Cavalry-

.. 50

Sappers

.. 20

Mountain guns

262 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

him at Zamran, and Muhammad Umar and the remainder of his
following fled into Persian territory.

In August the Xazim reported that Muhammad Umar's men
raided Dasht (Panjgur), and in October information was received
that a caravan of twenty camels laden with merchandise had been
looted by the same party on the road between Kolwa and Panjguri
Dasht.

The Persian Government readily consented to a proposal that

Operations in Makran, 1901- *^6 British and Persian forces should act in

1902. co-operation on the border during the cold

weather of 1901-02.

' To this end Captain (now local Lieut. -

Colonel) Showers proceeded, in November
1901, with an escort as detailed in the
margin, under the command of Major
Tighe, D.S.O., 27th Baluchis.
In the meantime, unaware of the intended tour of the Political
Officer, Muhammad Umar Khan, early in November, again planned
the invasion of Makran. He himself went north to meet Jhiand Khan,
the Damani Chief, who had been one of his principal Persian sup-
porters in his attack on Kuntdar, and from whom he hoped to col-
lect additional recruits for his gang, while his brother, Muhammad
Ali Khan, made a sudden raid into Kej and occupied the fort of
Nodiz. The fort was at once invested by the Nazim and his local
forces, and when Colonel Yate, Agent to the Governor- General in
Baluchistan, who had proceeded by sea to Makran to meet Colonel
Showers, arrived in Turbat, he found that the Nodiz fort had been
besieged by the Nazim for 53 days with a force of 985 men, but
that Mehrulla Khan had failed to make any impression on the occu-
pants, and despaired of taking the fort without the aid of guns. .
In these circumstances, the Nazim appealed to Colonel Yate for as-
sistance, and on the arrival of Colonel Showers and his escort a
few days later, it was decided to give him the help he needed.
On the 18th December, 1901, Major Tighe moved his camp to
within two miles of Nodiz Fort. With him ■.

Capture of Nodiz fort.

were : —

250 Rifles, 27th Balu(ih Light Infantry under Captain Hulseberg.
20 Sappers and Miners under Lieutenant Corry, R.E.

Colonel Showers, Political Agent, also accompanied him.

Captain G. E. Stewart, I.M.S., 27th Baluch Light Infantry
was Medical Officer to the force.

On that day at 7 p.m. the Scinde Horse detachment under
Lieutenant Maunsell arrived, accompanied by Lieutenant Orton>
Intelligence Officer : this detachment had marched sixty-five miles
in thirty-six hours.

On the 20th at 9 a.m., the two guns, Murree Mountain Batteryr
under Lieutenant E. G. Hart, R.A., with the escort of fifty rifles*
27th Baluchis, arrived : they had marched fifty-nine miles between
7 A.M. on the 18th and 9 a.m. on the 20th December. Major Tighe
gave these last troops a rest of one hour and a half and then
marched into action.

The following is an extract of Major Tighe's orders for the

attack on this fort : —

* * * * * ■ *^

EXTRACT OF ORDERS.

Nodiz, 20th December, 1901.

The orders for the attack are as under : —

(i) A guard of forty rifles, 27th Baluchis, will be detailed to guard
the camp. Particular attention should be paid to the
karez^west of the camp,
(ii) The Nazim's levies will occupy their present sangars^ round the

fort and on no account leave them,
(iii) The guns, with an escort of ten rifles, 27th Baluchis, will take
up a position to the south-east of Nodiz fort. Their objec-
tives will be —

1st — The loopholed tops of the west flank towers.
2nd — The top of the main tower.
(iv) When the tops of the west flank towers have been demolished, the
commander of the guns will sound his " Battery call." This will
be the signal that the gun fire has been turned from the west
flank towers to the main tower,
(v) The lafantry will be disposed as mider —

(a) Storming partij. — -Forty rifles, 27th Baluchis, under Lieutenant
Grant ; Sappers and Miners under Lieutenant Corry, R.E.

1 Underground water channels.
2 Stone breastworks.

2G4 FRONTIER AXD OVERSEAS EXPEDITIOXS FROM INDIA.

Supports. — Fifty rifles, 27th Baluchis, all under Captain Hulse-

berg, 27tli Baluchis.
Reserve. — Eighty rifles, 27th Baluchis, at the disposal of the Officer
Commanding.
This will form the main infantry attack, which will be directed on the
south-west bastion of the fort through the date groves.

(6) Fifty rifles, 27th Baluchis, under Lieutenant Orton will push

their way to the east side of the fort and occupy the mosquo

which is outside the fort, and take up a position there to

prevent the escape of the enemy.

(vi) The cavalry will take up a position in rear of the guns, ready for

pursuit.
(vii) The Hospital and reserve ammunition will be stationed with the

reserve,
(viii) The Officer Commanding will be with the supports.

The various parties were timed to leave camp so as to arrive
at their respective positions round the fort simultaneously. The
direction of the attack was kept secret until the last moment.

The guns opened fire at 11-20 a.m., from a position 600 yards
from the fort. The position was within rifle range of the fort, but
no other could be found whence the battlements of the south
west flanking defences could be properly shelled.

The gims came under rifle fire directly they appeared in sight,
but the enemy's fire was high, and the surrounding scrub afforded
shelter from view. The pack animals were protected in a dry
watercourse.

As soon as the guns opened fire. Lieutenants Grant and Corry
with their parties advanced rapidly through the date groves to the
south-west of the fort, and coming under fire " trickled " up to a
karez and some cotton fields within 200 yards of the walls. Here
they found good cover, and opened fire on the loop holes. Only
two casualties occurred in this advance. Meanwhile Lieutenant
Orton had also moved up to within short range of the fort on the
eastern side.

Lieutenant Hart continued to fire on the flank defences, and
demolished all the loopholed battlements on the towers. The walls
were not fired on, being too thick to be affected by small shells.
He then gave the pre-arranged signal ; and concentrated his guns on
to the main tower.

MAKKAN. 265

The enemy, who had deserted the loopholes when shelled, now
returned and reopened fire from them. However, the assaulting
party had now crept close up to the walls, and Lieutenant Corry,
R.E., was ordered to breach the wall of the fort with gun cotton. He
advanced with a mining party, Lieutenant Grant covering the loop-
holes with rapid fire. ^^Finding, however, that the wall near the south-
west tower had been sufficiently breached. Lieutenant Corry sent
back information. The guns ceased firing, the " charge " was sound-
ed, and the storming party of Baluchis and Sappers and Miners,
headed by Lieutenants Grant and Corry, dashed tough the breach.
•Colonel Showers accompanying them. The storming party was
met by a furious fusilade from the " keep " as it entered the breach.
Lieutenant Grant was the first to fall, shot through the neck.''
Several men were killed and wounded, and Lieutenant Corry was shot
through the shoulder. The garrison then dashed out of the keep,
sword in hand. A fierce melee ensued in the enclosed space, during
which Lieutenant Corry had his hand almost cut off while defending
himself against several assailants. Fortunately reinforcements
were at hand. Captain Hulseberg, at the head of the supports,
was quickly on the scene and drove the swordsmen back to cover.

The guns were advanced to effect a more practicabls breach
and the reserves were sent in. The enemy then fled from all but
the western redoubt, and surrendered to Lieutenant Orton. The
western redoubt still held out. It was shelled and the top blown
in. The " cease fire " was then sounded and the troops with Captain
Hulseberg swarmed in to the assault. Seeing the futility of
further resistance, however, the garrison threw down their arms and
surrendered.

It was then 1-30 p.m., the action having lasted a little more
than two hours. Our losses were four killed and eight severely
wounded, including the two officers mentioned above ; .there were
also several men slightly wounded. Tlie enemy had fourteen killed
and thirteen wounded. Among the killed were Mahammad Ali
(the leader of the gang), and Murad Khan, the owner of the fort.
Muhammad All's brother and cousin — Dur Muhammad and Bahadur
Khan — were both wounded. The rest of the garrison, sixty-three in

* His wound, though serious, did not prevent his proceeding ivith the force in
its subsequent marches.

SfiO FRONT I EB AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

number, were taken prisoners. They were subsequently tried by
a tribal conference (jirga) and sentenced to various terms of im-
prisonment.

Of the sixty-three prisoners taken, thirty were Persian subjects,,
residents of Sib and Dizak ; the remainder were mostly outlaws
from Makran. Some twenty-five Martinis and ten Sniders were
taken, and a considerable number of cartridges, apparently
obtained from Maskat, besides twelve muzzle-loading rifles and
numerous jezails.

After the affair at Nodiz, the Political Agent proceeded with
his escort to meet the Sartip of Bampur on the Persian border.

Up to the present time there is nothing more to relate of

military nature regarding Makran. The Khan's troops having been

proved unfit to keep order in the country, a corps has been formed

,, , T ^ called the Makran Levy Corps commanded

Makran Levy Corps. . .

by the Assistant Political Agent. The
strength of this force is 137 Cavalry and 203 Infantry.

The head-quarters of the corps is at Panjgur (180 men) and
there are detachments at Diz, Parom, Mand, Suntzar, and Jiwani.
The corps was raised by Captain McConaghey in 1904, and is now
commanded by Mr. T. 0. Hughes. The expenses of this corps are
borne by Imperial funds.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Bhte Boohs—

Military Operations in Afghanistan .. .. .. .. 1843

Scinde Administration . . . . . . . . . . 1848

Baluchistan 1, 2, and 3 .. .. .. .. .. 1876-

Southern Afghanistan .. .. .. .. ..1878-80

Reorganisation of the Western and North -Western Frontier of 1878-
India.

Official Publications—

Imperial Gazetteer, Baluchistan .. .. .. .. 1903

Gazetteer of Dera Ghazi Khan . . . . . . . . 1897

Gazetteer of North- West Frontier.

Gazetteer of North-West Baluchistan.

Census Report, Punjab .. .. •• •• •• ^881

Census Report, Punjab .. .. .. •• •• 1901i

MAKRAN.

267

Census Report, Baluchistan

Gazetteer of the Province of Sind.

Administration Reports, Sind.

Administration Reports, Baluchistan.

Second Afghan War.

Zhob Valley Expedition.

Zhob Field Force.

Zhob Military Report

Makran Expedition

Makran Blilitary Report

Notes on Dera Ghazi Khan Tribes (Bruce).

Derajat Military Report.

Notes on Makran (Holdich).

Kalat. A memoir. (Tate.)

Thai Chotiali and Harnai. (Duke.^

Central Asia, Part III.

Macgregor's Gazetteers.

1901,

1906
1901
1901

Non-Official —

Rough Notes, 18.38-39 .. .. .. Outram.

James Outram . . . . . • . . Goldsmid.

Memorials of Afghanistan . . . . . . Stocqueler.

Afghanistan, 1839 . . . . . . . . Hough.

Afghan War . . . . . . . . Kaye.

Service in Baluchistan, 1840-42 . . . . Stacy.

Travels in Baluchistan, 1810 .. .. .. Pottinger.

Diary of a march through Sind and Afghanistan,

1839-40 . . . . . . . . Revd. Allan.

History of British India . . . . . . Murray.

History of British India . . . . . . Thornton.

Invasions of India from Central Asia.

Administration of Sind . . . . . . Sir W. Napier.

Views and Opinions . . . . . . John Jacob

Records of the Sind Horse . . . . . . John Jacob.

General John Jacob . . . . . . Shand.

Sir Robert Sandeman . . . . . . Thornton.

The Forward Policy and its Results . . . . Bruce.

Indian Frontier Policy . . . . . . Adye.

Indian Border-land . , . . . . Holdich.

Baluch Race . . , . . . . . Dames,

PART II.

THE FIRST AFGHAN WAR.

CHAPTER XII.

AFGHANISTAN.— TRE COUNTRY AND PEOPLE.

At the time of the first Afghan War the frontiers of Afghan-
istan, which lay between the Indus and the Oxus, were
Geographical position. ^ot clearly defined as they are in our
day. The great powers moving forward from the east and
north-west, which have since closed in on the north also, had not
then impinged on the Kingdom of Kabul. The frontiers of British
India were still remote, and between them and the present border-
land lay an independent Punjab ruled by Ranjit Singh; and the
country of the Amirs of Sind. On the north stretched the un-
known regions of the Pamirs, while on the north-west the advanced
• guard of Cossacks had not yet appeared within many marches of
the Afghan border, where the country was occupied by independent
or semi-independent tribes. Persian territory lay, as now, upon
the west, and Afghan dominion extended into Baluchistan.

It will thus be understood that the pohtical and geographical
'limits of the Afghanistan of seventy years ago cannot be defined.
The country, although a few Europeans had visited it, was practi-
cally a terra incognita, lying on either side far from the borders of
western civilization. A land of rocks and stones, bounded on the
north and east by great mountaia ranges, and on the south and
south-west by vast sandy deserts, it possessed but little attraction
to the traveller ; whilst its people, as wild and inhospitable as
their country, were no less forbidding.

But the want of physical attractions in Afghanistan has ever
been compensated for by the political importance of its geographical
situation on the frontiers between the Western world and the rich
■Empire of Hindustan.

272 ' FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Afghanistan has been well described as " consisting of a star
^ ^ of valleys radiating round the stupendous

peak of the Koh-i-Baba, and everywhere
surrounded by mountains of a rugged and difficult nature." The
whole country is traversed from east to west by the Hindu Kush,
a range stretching from the Pamirs, and taking north-west of Kabul
the name of Koh-i-Baba. Westward again the great moimtain
barrier splits into three ranges — the Band-i-Turkistan, Band-i-
Baba, and Band-i-Baian.

The north-eastern section of the Hindu Kush, rising to a height
of 28,000 feet in its loftiest peaks, presents a formidable barrier.
From the north of Kabul, where it is crossed by several passes —
the most important the Khawak and Chahardar, 10,560 and 13,900
feet in height respectively — it is practically impassable, until the
range is tiu-ned in the direction of Herat.

The Koh-i-Baba, which is lower, is traversed by the pass of
Hajigak, connecting Kabul and Bamian.

The principal rivers of Afghanistan are the Kabul, Helmund,

Hari-rud, Logar, Murghab, and Arghandab,

while the Oxus now forms a portion of the

northern boundary. The Murghab, a mountain stream, rises at

the junction of the Band-i-Baba and the Band-i-Turkistan, flows

past Bala-Murghab and ends in a lake in the desert north of Merv.

The Hari-rud, rising where the Koh-i-Baba divides, runs west
to Herat. Thence flowing north-west to the Perso-Afghan border,
it turns north to Zulfikar, and ultimately dividing into two branches
is lost in the Tejend swamp. The valley of Herat is irrigated by
canals drawn ti-om this river, which is generally fordable.

The Helmund rises in the south-eastern slopes of the Koh-i-
Baba, 30 miles west of Kabul, and flows through Hazarajat to
Girishk ; it then runs through Registan, and is finally lost in the
famous Hamun of Sistan, a province which is rendered fertile by its
waters.

The Kabul river rises west of the city, then flows through the
Tangi Gharu gorge, and after being joined by the Panjshir, which
comes down from Ghorband, takes a south-easterly direction.
Above Jalalabad it is joined by the Sm-khab from the south, and a few
miles farther on by the Kunar from the north, the united streams

AFGHANISTAN— THE COUNTRY AND PEOPLE. 273

being nearly a mile in breadth. Passing Dakka and Lalpura, some
40 miles below Jalalabad, the river tends northwards and flow-
ing rapidly through a narrow gorge in the Mohmand hills, enters
the Peshawar Valley near Michni, and joins the Indus at Attock.
It is generally unfordable below Kabul.

A country varying from snow-clad mountains to fertile and

well-watered valleys and sandy and arid
Climate. ^ „ •' -^ ,. .^

deserts, naturally possesses a great diversity

of climate. Kabul itself, with an elevation of 5,900 feet, possesses

a bracing climate which would be more salubrious were it not for the

absolute disregard of sanitation that is to be observed in all Afghan

cities. Kandahar (3,342'), Herat (3,062') and Haibak in (3,511') can

all be unpleasantly hot during two months in midsummer, but on the

whole possess a better climate than is to be obtained m the plains of

India. In winter snow often lies for two or three months in Kabul.

Near Jalalabad (1,850') and along the Kabul river valley below

Jalalabad, the heat is extremely trying during the summer months-

The monsoon, which brings relief from the extreme heat to India, has

little effect west of the Suliman range, so that the heat in the

low-lying valleys is aggravated by frequent dust-storms and only

alleviated by occasional thunder-storms.

Afghanistan may be properly divided into its eastern and

western regions ; the former having the towns of Kabul and Ghazni

and the great valley of the Kabul river ; the latter containing

Kandahar and Herat.

The city of Kabul, 5,900 feet above the level of the sea, lies in a

triangular gorge formed by two ranges of

high and steep hills which encompass it

on three sides. It is approached from the west by a restricted

entrance traversed by the Kabul river and the road from Ghazni.

On the southern side there is only a narrow path between the city

wall and the base of the hills, which are steep, bare and rocky,

crowned by a wall with round towers at intervals. This wall is

carried along the hills and across the narrow entrance which lies

between them. At the period of this narrative the city extended

about a mile from east to west, and about half a mile from north

to south. It was surrounded by a mud wall. On the summit

of a rocky eminence east of the town and separated from it by a.

53 I. B. 2 M

274 FRONTIER AXD OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

ditch, stood the Bala Hissar, having on its slopes the royal palace
and gardens, with an extensive bazar, the whole surrounded by a
wall and ditch. The chief bazars in the city run east and west.
The largest bazar consisted of a broad street of two-storied houses
with flat roofs which extended between their tops. This street
had several small squares, with alleys leading into the adjoining
streets. The rest of the city was formed of narrow and irregular
streets with houses of sunburnt bricks. The population was
computed by Bumes at 60,000.

The Kabul river runs close under the northern wall ; it is a
small brook from August to October, but swollen to large dimen-
sions at times by the melting of the snow in the mountains where
it takes its rise.

East of Kabul the country is more open ; the road to Peshawar
running nearly due east between the two ranges of hills, which
form a broad valley. The valley runs east for 25 miles, when it
meets a chain of rugged hills crossed by a difficult path over the
Lata Band Pass. The valley is about 10 miles broad, but at a short
distance from the town a low rocky and barren ridge runs for
about 3 miles east and west, dividing it into two nearly equal
portions.

On the northern side of the valley the Kabul river runs through
fertile country, and leaves the valley, after being joined by the
Logar, 5 miles east of the city, passing out through a gorge in the
Lata Band, The tracts on the banks of the Logar on the south
side are low, marshy and fertile. But the centre of the valley,
traversed by the rocky range, is dry and barren. To the west
of Kabul lies a broad plain, entered by a narrow pass through the
hills, and forming a spacious amphitheatre about 8 miles
broad and 12 long. From this plain, which is highly cultivated
and fertile, watered by streams from the Kabul river, the hills
rise in a succession of ascending heights to the summits of the
Hindu Kush. The river, having trees, villages, and forts upon
its banks, runs through this plain. The surrounding country
is fertile and productive of grain and fruit.

From Kabul to India the main road then ran due east down
The Kabul-Peshawar road, the Kabul valley for 10 miles ; it then

turned southwards between lofty and barren

AFGHANISTAN— COUNTRY AND PEOPLE. 275

Mis, through a narrow defile only a few yards in breadth ; this pass,
the Khurd Kabul, rises to a height of 7,500 feet above sea-level.
Ten miles beyond the pass rise the Tezin hills (8,200 feet), whence
there is a descent of 1,800 feet into the valley of Tezin. Twenty-two
miles beyond this valley, the road entered the Jagdalak Pass.
From Jagdalak to Gandamak the road passed through a broad and
barren waste encompassed by inaccessible mountains, and pass-
ing over rocky ridges and through narrow defiles.

Gandamak, 4,600 feet above the sea, forms an oasis in this desert
and cultivation begins again in the valley of Fatehabad, 18 miles
from Gandamak. After another 17 miles, the last five over a
level and inhabited country, the road reached Jalalabad, distant
105 miles from Kabul and 91 miles from Peshawar, standing in the
centre of a plain extending about 22 miles from east to west, and
with a breadth of ten or twelve miles. Here the river is broad,
•clear, and rapid, with numerous villages on its highly-cultivated
banks. Jalalabad was at the period of this history a town of some
300 or 400 houses, surrounded by an irregular mud- wall, and
by gardens, buildings and ruins, with a population of about 2,000.

From Jalalabad the road ran 42 miles to Dakka across a hilly
tract between two ranges of mountains which are barren and stony,
and slope from north to south. The Kabul river here runs along the
northern edge of the plain, flowing frequently through narrow
passages in the rocks. About 44 miles from Jalalabad, high hills
rise between the Safed Koh and the secondary ranges of the Hima-
ilayas, blocking the valley of the Kabul for 30 miles. The
iriver runs through narrow gorges, while the road penetrated the
high hills by the Landi Khana defile, where it entered the Khaibar
pass.

The following description of the celebrated pass was written
by an ofl&cer who traversed it from west to
east in 1840: — Landi Khana, 8j miles. We
traversed for some two miles a stony plain, and then entered the
mouth of the Khaibar Pass. Just before emerging among the hills
the Safed Koh became again visible, but was soon shut out from
view. The defile into which we entered was by no means narrow
(never less than fifty yards in breadth), and the hills neither steep
nor difiicult, but at nearly every point accessible by infantry. After

2m 2

276 FEONTIEB AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

about two miles of defile, the passage widened considerably at about
s ix hundred yards, and here in the centre we passed an isolated emi-
nence, on the summit of which we passed a small fort or breast-work
Constructed of loose stones, and garrisoned by a company of Jazail-
cjiis. After this the pass narrowed again. We ascended consi-
derably, but the road was by no means difficult, though everywhere
stony. Stunted trees and bushes throughout the defile. Encamped
on uneven ground close to the foot of the ghaut, leading over the
summit of the pass, some cultivated land rising in terraces to the
summit of the hills to the south, and some rude fortifications, now
dilapidated, are to be seen on the same side of the defile. Looking
back, the summits of many mountains visible to the north-west the
most distant partially covered with snow. We travelled towards
the south-east to-day.

From Landi Khana the road led up the side of the hiU to the left,
passing round two shoulders. The ascent not steep, but the road
wound in and out, occasioned by various fissures, or water channels,
in the face of the mountain. After roimding the second shoulder
we descended gently into the bed of the stream, which was
previously too confined and rocky to allow of gims passing. The
was the case again occasionally, necessitating the road to pass,
over parts of the hill, the ascents on these occasions, though short
and not very steep, difiicult on account of awkward bends occur-
ring at the very foot. Most of the carriages had to be unlimbered
on this accoimt at three of the ascents. After about four miles we
reached the summit of the pass ; the hills seceded right and left
and we entered on a broad extensive tableland, sloping gently
towards the east, well-cultivated and sprinkled with forts, hills on all
sides, but not very lofty, also a few insulated eminences. The plain
sometimes stretched miles across, and here and there valleys branch-
ing off to the right and left. After about five miles the valley nar-
rowed, and the descent became more sensible ; and as we approach-
ed Ali Masjid we entered into a narrow defile, enclosed by precipi-
tous rocks ; this, however, only continued for about half a mile, when
we passed close under the fort of Ali Masjid, and encamped about a
mile lower down the glen. Distance marched to-day, 14 miles.

The Khaibar hills, and the defile through which we passed,
are tolerably well wooded, but the trees are stunted, indeed, scarcely

AFGHANISTAN— THE COUNTRY AND PEOPLE. " • ' 277

anything more than bushes. On the open land, at the most
■elevated part of the pass, there are many forts, and much culti-
vation ^Iso in the valleys branching off on either side ; but the
forts are the worst I have met with. They have only one tower
each, and that very weak. The fort of Ali Masjid is better built
and designed, but its strength consists in its situation, it beirg
on the summit of a lofty hill, insulated and difficult of access
to the south-west of the road. The mosque is in the valley below.
Immediately after passing Ali Masjid, the hills decrease in altitude
and steepness. Our direction of march tortuous to-day, but gene-
rally south-east.

16. Jamrud, 7 miles. From our last groimd we ascended
the hill-side on our left by a steep, tortuous road ; there was
another road to the left, but we did not know of it, exceedingly
easy, so we pulled the guns up the ascent ; after which we pro-
ceeded for some distance over undulating groimd, an elevated
table-land, and passed over one narrow defile by a well-built bridge.
We then descended into the bed of a stream by a good road cut
in the side of the hill. The remainder of the march lay through
low hills, imtil we debouched into the plain near Jamrud.

The road from Kabul to Ghazni runs for six or seven miles
through a highly cultivated tract until
it ascends the high ground on leaving the
Kabul valley. There is then a descent of three miles to Arghandi.
It is then hilly and difficult along the ridge of the Maidan valley for
twenty miles to Maidan, four miles beyond which the Kabul river
is crossed. From Shekhabad it descends to the valley of the Logar,
and passes through a defile, emerging in the vicinity of Haidar Khel.
The last fourteen miles to Grhazni there is a steady ascent for three
miles at first to the Sherd ahan, a formidable pass at an elevation
of 9,000 feet. The road then descends to a plateau which stretches
to Ghazni. In winter the pass is blocked with snow and impassable.

The town of Ghazni lies some 7,800 feet above sea-level and

Ghazni. ninety miles south-west of Kabul on the

road to Kandahar, from which it is distant

222 miles. It is built upon an isolated ridge, with the citadel in

the centre on the highest point. The outer wall winds round

the hiU with a circuit of about a mile and a quarter. The houses,

278 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

which were loop-holed, had flat roofs. The streets are narrow.

The citadel contained the houses of the sardars. The town is

commanded by a low hill near its north-western angle. The

town contained at this period some 3,500 mud houses. The

surrounding country is fertile.

From Ghazni to Kandahar is a distance of 222 miles, Kala-i-

Ghazni to Kandahar. Ghazni being reached after a gradual

descent of 138 miles, as the road approaches

Kandahar, after traversing the narrow Tarnak defile, the valley

expands to a width of some thirty miles. The open portions of the

valley are populous and well-cultivated, the hills rising from the

banks of the Tarnak, being imdulating and barren.

The town of Kandahar is separated from the Tarnak river

-^ , , by the Tarkani range of hills, and is sur-

Kandahar. - • n i

rounded on three sides by lofty and rocky

mountains, which rise abruptly from the plain. The open side

leads to the city from the valley of the Tarnak. The plain of

Kandahar is fertile and well cultivated, watered by numerous

canals from the Arghandab, a tributary of the Helmund. A few

miles to the east, however, is a bare and sterile desert.

The town is situated on the north side of an extensive plain,
about two miles from the Baba Wali mountain. It is surrounded
by a wall, thirty feet in height, having numerous bastions, in the
form of a quadrilateral 1,600 by 2,000 yards in extent. The four
principal bazars lead from a gateway which opens nearly in the '
centre of each side, and meet in a large market place in the centre.
The rest of the town is traversed by narrow lanes between lofty
houses. It is noteworthy that the present to^\Ti was founded by
Nadir Shah, when he besieged old Kandahar in 1738.

Herat lies 400 miles north-west of Kandahar, and 500 miles
by the direct road from Kabul. Known as
^"^^' the "Gate of India," from its being the

main route of invading armies, it possesses more strategical impor-
tance than, perhaps, any other point in Asia. From Kandahar it
is reached by way of Girisk, Farah, and Sabzawar; the first
named being a fort commanding the passage of the Helmimd..

Herat lies in an expanse of fertile plain, and all the great
roads leading on India converge within the limits of its territory.

AFGHANISTAN— COVNTRY AND PEOPLE. 27&

By this way alone could a well-equipped modern army make its
way to the frontiers of India. Both the nature and resources
of the country are such as to favour the success of an invader.
All the materials necessary for the organisation of a great army
are to be found in the neighbourhood of Herat. The extraordinary
fertility of the plain has entitled it to be called the " Granary of
Central Asia." Its mines supply lead, iron, and sulphur ; the
surface of the country is laden with saltpetre ; and upon the posses-
sion of such a country would depend, in great measure, the success
of operations for the invasion of India.

The city of Herat in 1837 stood within solid earthen walls,
surroimded by a wet ditch. The four sides were each about a mile
in length, facing towards the points of the compass. The town
sloped from its most elevated quarter in the north-east to the
south-west. The real defences of the place were two covered ways
on the exterior slope of the embankments, one within and the other
without the ditch. The lower one was on a level with the surround-
ing country, its parapet partly covered by a mound of earth on the
counter-scarp, the accumulations from the cleansings on the ditch.

On the northern side the citadel overlooked the city. Built
entirely of masonry, with lofty ramparts and numerous towers it
was a place of considerable strength ; but its defences were in a
state of disrepair, and crumbling into decay, when news was
received of the approach of the Persian invading army in 1837.

The interior of the city was divided into four nearly equal
divisions by two streets which crossed each other at right angles
in the centre. The inhabitants numbered about 45,000, the
majority Shiah Muhammadans.

This wild and inhospitable country is naturally inhabited by
a hardy and warlike people. It is not

The people. •' , i •, .1 1

necessary here to describe the general
character of the Afghans or Pathans, which has been sufficiently
set forth in the Introduction to this series, while it is also dis-
played in the events recorded in this narrative.

Only about half the various races inhabiting the country are
true Afghans or Pathans. The people have no common bond, save
that to be foimd at times in common subjection to a strong ruler.
Even in religion they are divided into the Sunni and Shiah sects.

280 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The Duranis, who have been the ruling race for the last 160 years,

number about 1,200,000 ; and it should be

noted that of two of the principal figures of

this history, Shah Shuja was a Saddozai and Dost Muhammad a

Barakzai of this tribe.

The Duranis are divided into sections : —

(a) Barakzai live round Kandakar and have a colony at Herat, inhabit the

most fertile parts of Afghanistan and hold the chief appointments.

(b) Ackakzai — Kandakar and Quetta.

tke kills nortk of Kandahar and kave a colony in Derajat
wkick supplies recruits to tke 15tk Bengal Lancers.

(d) Alikozai. a small scattered tribe.

(e) Nurzai, in tke valley between Quetta and Kandakar; also at

Gririskk, Sabzawar, and Herat.
(/) Iskakzai, on tke banks of tke Helmund as far as Sistan and near Giriskk.
((/) Alizai, Zamindwar, nortk of Giriskk.
{h) Kkugianis on tke skirts of tke Safed Kok.

(t) Tke Mokmands, partly in Afgkanistan, partly in Britisk territory.
Their country is enclosed by the Kunar, Kabul, and Swat rivers.
There are eight principal clans of Ghilzais. They are essentially
„, , ., a nomadic people. Their boundaries are

The Ghilzais. ^^ ■, , -, t -r ^

Kabul and the Laghman valley on the
north to Kalat-i-Ghilzai and Zhob on the south ; the Paghman
and Sanglakh ranges on the west, to the Kabul province. They
are also foimd in Herat. Their numbers are 1,000,000.
Other Pathan tribes —

(a) Sliinwaris, Jalalabad Valley.
(6) Jadrans, south of Kkost.

(f) Jajir, between tke Paiwar Kotal and the Skuturgardan and

Northern Khost.
I {d) Mangals, Upper Kurra,ni Valley,

(e) Khostwal, Kho.st.
(/) Wazirs, Upper Tochi. They are all Darwesk Khel.

(g) Makbils.

(h) Chamkannis.
(i) Tanis.
(/) Kakars.

(k) Barechis, connected with the Duranis. West of Quetta and south-
east of the Registan.

AFGHANISTAN— COUNTRY AND PEOPLE. 281

The Hazaras — of Tartar origin. They inhabit the country
north of the Kandahar-Ghazni road and

Non-Afghan tribes. , . ^^i ■■ , . j. j. i. p.

their northern boundaries stretch from
Daulat Yar to Haibak. They speak Persian and are Shias ;
their trade is that of shepherds, and, having great powers of en-
durance, they make excellent labourers and furnish the material
for the 106th Pioneers. They number about 500,000.

The Tajiks (or Parsiwans) are of Arab descent. They speak
Persian and are mostly Sunnis. They are scattered throughout
Afghanistan and number 1,500,000.

The Uzbaks are of Turkoman origin and are chiefly found
in Badakhshan and Afghan Turkistan. They are principally
zamindars. They number 750,000.

The Kazilbashis are of Persian origin and are settled at Kabul.
They mostly speak Persian and are Shiahs. They are wejl educated
and make good soldiers. They are well-disposed to the British,
and number 100,000.

(1) Jamshedis. Inhabit the country north of
Herat. Are Sunnis, speak Persian, and are a

. pastoral people. Numbers 20,000.

(2) Firozkohis. Sunnis ; language Persian.
The Chahar Aimak— Numbers 50,000.

-Nomad tribes. (3) Taimanis. Inhabit the Upper Farah Eud

Valley. Shepherds and cultivators ; Sunnis ;
speak Persian ; numbers 160,000.

(4) Taimuris. Of Arab descent. Inhabit the
Perso-Afghan frontier. Numbers 150,000.

There are in addition the Brahuis, on the Helmimd and in Registan,
and the Balochis, inhabiting the Helmund Valley and Afghan Sistan.
Kafiristan is peopled by an aboriginal tribe, the Kafirs, of whom
-little is known.

The history of the various dynasties which have ruled over
Afghanistan is largely the historv of the

Early History. . . ^ -, ^ tt- n <■ i '

invaders of Hindustan ; lor the existing
frontier of British India has never presented a serious obstacle to
invading hordes, and the natural frontier of India would appear to
be on the Hindu Kush. In the dawn of history we find the country
from Kabul to the Hydaspes ( Jhelum) under one ruler, a satrap of

282 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Darins ; so that the army of Alexander the Great, having conquered'
the region which is now Afghanistan, met with no opposition on
the direct route through the Khaibar Pass.^

It is foreign to this work to enter into a description of the
dynasties of Mahmud of Ghazni, Muhammad Ghori. the Mughals,
who overran the whole of Central Asia and the Ghilzais. They
are ancient history." It is, however, interesting to note that in
977 A.D., Sabaktagin of Ghazni invaded India by way of the Khaibar

Pass while his successor, Mahmud, made

Invaders of India . . , , ,

many mvasions between the years 1001 and
1024, bv way of the Khaibar, the Gomal, and the Tochi Valleys.

After a contest with Ghazni, the house of Ghor prevailed,
and established their rule in Afghanistan ; and Muhammad Ghori
invaded India more than once. These invaders were followed by
Tairaur, the descendant of Changiz Khan, who established Mughal
rule in Afghanistan, and by Babar, the founder of the Mughal
Empire in India.

In 1737 Nadir Shah of Persia conquered Kandahar and Kabul
on his way to India. He was murdered on his return to Persia in
1747. He had in his army a contingent of Abdalis under Ahmad,

a Saddozai Chief. The Abdalis seized the
The Durani Empire. treasure of the dead Shah, and marched to
Kandahar, where Ahmad was proclaimed Shah, and established
the Durani Empire.

Like his predecessors, Ahmad Shah invaded Hindustan, entering
by the Khaibar with 12,000 men in 1748, and coming again through
the Bolan on two occasions in 1756 and 1758. His son, Taimur,
married a daughter of the Emperor of Delhi, who brought the
Punjab as her dowry. Ahmad Shah died in 1773, and was succeed-
ed by Taimur, on whose death the five provinces of Kabul. Kanda-
har, Herat, Peshawar, and Kashmir were held by five of his sons ; and
a struggle for the supreme succession ensued.

The Barakzais now come on the scene. Their most powerful
Chief, Sirdar Painda Khan, supported Zaman and proclaimed him
Shah. Rebellions followed, and after one of these Ranjit Singh

1 While Alexander entered the Punjab by way of Swat and Bajaur.his Lieutenant
ephpestion marched through the Khaibar Pass, accompanied by Tasiles, King of the-

country between Kabul and the Jhelum.

2 See The History oj Afghanistan by Colonel G. B. Malleson. C.S.I.

AFOHANISTAN—THE COUNTMT AND PEOPLE. 283:

was appointed Governor of the Sikhs in the Punjab. Later, Painda
Khan was put to death by Zaman Shah ; and his son, Fateh Khan,
fled for refuge to Mahmud, brother of the Shah, and assisted the
latter to defeat Zaman and proclaim himself King of Kabul.

In 1803 Shuja-ul-Mulk imprisoned his brother, Mahmud, as-
sumed the sovereignty, and appointed Fateh Khan his Wazir.
Both French and Russian influence were early active in Persia,
with a view to encroachments into Afghan-
es ern esigns on - jg^g^jj qj^ ^}^g jQg^^j ^q India. Already when

gnamstan and India. "^

in Egyjit in 1799 we find Napoleon Bona-
parte contemplating the invasion of India and corresponding with
Tipu Sultan, the inveterate enemy of the British in Mysore. At
this time Bonaparte wrote to the Directory — " Mistress of Egypt,
France will by and by be the Mistress of India." A mission was
then sent under Captain (afterwards Sir John) Malcolm to coun-
teract French influence in Persia. Again in January 1805, when
preparing for the invasion of England, Napoleon proposed to attack
the East Indies with the Brest squadron and 30,000 men ; and in
1807 he concluded a treaty with the Shah, under the terms of which
" France promised to drive Russia from Georgia, and to supply
Persia with artillery ; in return the Shah was to break with
England, confiscate British property, instigate the peoples of Afgha-
nistan to rebellion {sic), set on foot an army to invade India,
and in case the French should also despatch a land force against
India, he was to give them a free passage along a line of march to
be subsequently laid out, together with means of sustenance."

The favourite project of the invasion of India was discussed
by Napoleon with Alexander of Russia at Tilsit, where it was
suggested that an expedition to Egypt should sail from Corfu,
while the united armies of Russia, France, and Austria were to
march on India.

It will thus be understood that the designs of European powers
to wrest the Empire of Hindustan from the grasp of the British
by means of an invasion from the north-west, date back to the earlier
times of our hold on India. And it was inevitable that not only
Persia but Afghanistan should in course of time come within our
political purview.

1 Sloane's Life of Napoleon Bonaparle.

584: FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FR02I INDIA.

The Britisli first had dealings with the Afghans in 1808-09,
when Elphinstone was sent to establish friendly relations with
Shah Shuja/ Shortly after this Shah Shuja deprived Fateh Khan
of his offices, and the latter with his brother, Dost Muhammad>
raised a force of Barakzais, defeated Shah Shuja, who fled to
Ludhiana, and replaced Mahmud on the throne. Fateh Khan
now became the virtual ruler, but the jealousy of the King's son
compassed his downfall ; he was first blinded and afterwards put
to death.

The Barakzais then rebelled, and Dost Muhammad
defeated Mahmud and established himself at Kabul. Mean-
while Peshawar and Kashmir had fallen into the hands of the Sikhs,
with whom Dost Muhammad was at war when this history opens.

In 1834 Shah Shuja left his asylum at Ludhiana and entered
Afghanistan with an army by way of the Bolan Pass. Dost Muham-
mad defeated him at Kandahar ; and consolid ated his power at that
place, and at Kabul, Ghazni and Jalalabad.

1 The treaty concluded with the Shah by Mountstuait Elphinstone was to counteract
the designs of the French and Persians, who had enU-^ed into a compact to invade the
■dominions of the King of the Duranis.

CHAPTER XIII.

BVRNES MISSION TO KABUL.

In the autumn of 1835 Lord Auckland was appointed Gover-
nor-General of India ; the Whig Government, which had just
been returned to power, having cancelled the appointment of Lord
Heytesbury. The new appointment occasioned some surprise.
India was in a state of profound tranquility, and the work
demanded of the new Governor- General promised to be of a tran-
quU order. Nor did the early days of his Government disappoint
popular expectation ; although he probably did not disregard the
menaces of Persia nor the intrigues of Russia. The reports
of the British Minister at the Persian Court were, however,
probably read with a vague interest, but the prospects of a British.
Army being encamped before the capital of Afghanistan were cer-
tainly little anticipated. It was necessary, however, to collect in-
formation about the countries lying between the Indian frontier and
the eastern boundaries of the Russian Empire, and the conclusion
arrived at from the study was that although Russia might not
be advancing she was at any rate urging Per.tia in an easterly
direction.

In the spring of 1836 Dost Muhammad wrote a letter of congra-
tulation to Lord Auckland, in which the following prophetic words
occurred "I hope that your lordship will consider me and my
comitry as your own." In his reply the Governor-General alluded
to the possibility of a commercial mission to Kabul, and reminded
the Amir that it was not the British Government's policy to inter-
fere with the affairs of independent States.

The project of a commercial mission had been before suggested.
and Lord Auckland probably thought ihat information not
of a commercial character might be obtained at the same time,,
for the aspect of trans-frontier affairs caused him some-
uneasiness.

(285 )

^86 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Lord Wellesley^ had been disturbed by the thought of Afghan

invasion, and much had been learnt con-
Traveis in Afghanistan. cerning the Countries between the Indus
and Oxus. Before the close of the eighteenth century Forster had
travelled vu2 Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat to the Caspian. El-
phinstone, although he had seen little of Afghanistan, had written
a standard work on the history and geography of the Durani empire.
Moorcroft under the eegis of Sir Charles Metcalfe, but with
no encouragement from Government, had spent the last six
years of his life in exploring Ladakh, Kashmir, Afghanis-
tan, Balkh, and Bokhara. In 1828 Stirling returned from fur-
lough via Afghanistan and, so little did the Government appre-
ciate his efforts, he was penalised for overstaying his leave of
absence. No interest whatever was taken in Trans-Indus affairs.
ConoUy, however, met with a kinder fate when he returned to
India via Persia and Kandahar. The delay in the pubhcation
of the results of his journey, however, deprived him of the
■credit which was his due. In 1830 Alexander Burnes traversed
Sind mt the Indus and visited Lahore, where Shuja-ul-Mulk ex-
pressed his longing to see an Englishman at Kabul, and the
road between India and Europe opened. At Simla he
succeeded in firing Lord William Bentinck with some of his own
enthusiasm and obtained his countenance to a journey to England
via Central Asia. He was hospitably received at Kabul by Dost
Muhammad, of whom he formed a very favourable opinion. He
visited Meshed, Tehran, Isfahan, and Shiraz, making the
acquaintance of the Shah, and reported the result of his travels
to the Governor-General before proceeding to England. While
at home he urged upon the Court of Directors the desirability
of a commercial mission to Kabul, but it was feared that politics
would soon intrude themselves and that difficulties would arise,
and his proposal was negatived. On his return to India, however,

the Govern ment of India decided to des-
Despatch of the Mission. ^^^^^ ^^^ ^^ ^ Commercial mission to

Afghanistan, and at the close of 1836 he, with his party, set out
" to work out the policy of opening the River Indus to commerce."
Visiting Haidarabad, Bahawalpur, and Dera Ghazi Khan, the

** 1 Governor-General from 1798 to 1805.

BVRNES inSSION TO KABUL. ' 287

Tnission reached Peshawar, and passing safely through the Khaibar
Pass reached Kabul on the 20th September 1837. Their reception
was all that could have been desired, and on the following day Dost
Muhammad formally received the mission. In spite of the name by
which it was designated, the Commercial Mission at once developed
into a political one. Two days later a long conversation took place,
the war with the Sikhs furnishing the chief topic. At subsequent
interviews the Amir frankly placed politics in the forefront, and a
correspondence then commenced between Burnes and Mr. Mac-
naghten, the Foreign Secretary.

Kandahar at this time was bent on a Persian alliance, and had

sent presents to the Shah and the Russian

Kandahar politics. embassy ; this was largely due to the

belief that the Kabul Chief was entering into an arrangement with

the British to their exclusion. Burnes stated his belief that but for

the timely arrival of the mission the Russians and Persians would

have had agents at Kabul. Burnes now wrote to Mr. Macnaghten

that the British position at Kabul was
Friendly disposition of Amir. ^^^^ satisfactory, and alluded to the

substantial offers of Russia, Persia, Bokhara and other States,
to all or any of which the Kabul Chief preferred the sympathy
and friendly offices of the British. Before he entered Afghanistan,
Burnes had written to the British Minister in Persia to use his
utmost endeavours to stop the intercourse of the Kandahar
Chiefs Pur Dil Khan and Kohan Dil Khan, with the Rus-
sian Mission. Earlier he had warned Kohan Dil Khan of the dis-
pleasure of the British Government if he continued his intrigues ;
the latter promised compliance with his wishes, and Lieutenant
Leech, with full instructions, was sent to Kandahar ; Burnes hoping
thereby to keep the Persians in check and, at any rate, obtain early
information which would enable him to act promptly. He was
severely censured by Government for exceeding his instructions, and
informed that, were it not through the fear of weakening his posi-
tion, the promises he had made would have been cancelled. Lord
Auckland subsequently confessed that Burnes had acted in the
best way possible. The Kandahar Chiefs now embraced the
Persian alliance and entered into a formal treaty with the Shah
under a Russian guarantee.

288 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA .

On the 19tli December a Russian officer, named Viktevitch,.

arrived at Kabul, to act as agent for
the Russian Government. An account of
his reception was at once reported by Burnes to the Indian Govern-
ment. On the arrival of this fresh mission the Amir sought Burnes'
advice, offering to dismiss the Russian forthwith, should that course
commend itself to him. Burnes was, however, for some time doubtful
as to his real character and the value of his credentials. A month
later he reported that he had as yet no further information to shake
his bond fides and that Viktevitch's reception had been the reverse of

encouraging. Dost Muhammad still pre-

The Amir seeks mediation r j i i x -17 i 1 xi c

of England uith Ranjit Singh, ^^rred help from England than from any

other State ; his hopes were shortly rudely
shattered. Burnes, tied by his instructions, was unable to hold out
any prospect of the mediation of the British Government between
the Amir and Ranjit Singh. He recommended Dost Muhammad
to waive all claim to Peshawar and to be content with such arrange-
ments as could be made by his brother. Sultan Muhammad, with
Ranjit Singh. The Amir protested that he would rather Peshawar
should remain in the hands of the Sikhs. In March, Burnes was
forced to repeat his inability to help. The British Government
called upon Dost Muhammad to abstain from connecting himself
with any other State, and in return promised to restrain Ranjit
Singh from attacking him ; more they would not offer.

A few days later Jabbar Khan, brother of the Amir, again
appeared before Burnes with the Amir's demands, viz., pro-
tection from Persia ; the surrender by Ranjit Singh of Pesha-
war, and several other proposals. Burnes replied that he could
accede to none of these propositions, and wrote a letter request-
ing permission to depart. In spite of what had taken place,
the Amir invited Burnes to a further conference at the Bala
Hissar, but though the meeting ended amicably it produced no
results.

On the 21st March the Amir wrote a friendly letter to Lord
Auckland as a last despairing effort, but it failed in its object.
Other meetings with Buines took place, but he had no hope of
bringing matters to a favourable issue. British policy had now
done its work ; one of the Kandahar Sardars arrived at Kabul to-

BVRNES MISSION TO KABUL. 289

win over the Amir to the Persian alliance, and Viktevitch was sent

Departure of British and ^r f^^^ paraded through the streets.

Russian Missions from Kabul. Burnes left Kabul On the 26th April,

Viktevitch soon afterwards left for
Herat, having promised all Dust Muhammad wanted, money to
the Barakzai Chiefs, and the propitiation of Ranjit Singh, to whom
he had already made overturas. British influence, however, was at
this time strong at Lahore. Mackeson managed the business of
counteracting Russia's designs with skill, and won a promise from
the Maharaja to have nothing to do with her agent. The know-
ledge of these advances, however, made Government specially
-desirous of conciliating the M iharaj a,

Russian promises now began to carry everything before them.

The Russian Ambassador wrote to the

Russian ascendancy. ji i hit i n rn i i n

tSardars that Muhammad hhah had pro-
mised to restore Herat and that he himself would also obtain for
them Ghorian. This letter did not bring an equal amount of satis-
faction to the Amir. The Russian alliance was unpopular at Kabul,
and the dissolution of the friendship with the British was deplored-
The Persian army was rushing on failure and other tidings came
to alarm him. The Russian game was nearly played out and the
resentment of the British was about to break forth. He saw that
the Russo-Persian alliance was built upon a foundation of sand
!and that a British subaltern within the walls of Herat was setting
his new friends at defiance.

It is now necessary to describe briefly the events which at
^, „. I TT ^ this period were taking place at Herat.

The Siege of Herat. '^ ^ ^

A son of Yar Muhammad Khan, the
Wazir, was governor of the city ; as his salary was insignificant he
supplemented it by plunder and the sale of the inhabitants into
slavery. This tyranny incited the people against their Afghan
masters, and many looked forward to emancipation at the hands of
the Persian King.

Such was the last remnant of the old Afghan monarchy in the
hands of Shah Kamran ; his government was one only in name and
he himself was weak and broken down by a life of debauchery. His
Wazir, Yar Muhammad, was an even less attractive personality.
Although courageous he was absolutely unscrupulous, and bore the
unenviable reputation of being the worst man in Central Asia.

290 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM IND!A.'

In the summer of 1837 rumours of tte movements of the-
royal army were pstir in the city. The King and his Wazir were
campaigning in Sistan, where the attempted reduction of the
fortress of Juwain had crippled their military resources, for which
they soon had cause to lament. After events showed that the
cavalry, thus frittered away, would have sufficed to prevent
the Persian" Army from leaving its own frontier.

News'of the projected return of the army speedily reached
Herat. Orders for the collection of grain and the repair of the de-
fences were daily coming in. The reasons were clear. An Am-
bassador had been sent to Muhammad Shah to solicit his assistance
in the recovery of Kandahar and Kabul ; the reply was couched in
no vague terms. The Persian monarch claimed both principalities
for himself, and, as the first step in the operations to make good his
claim, intended to take possession of Herat. It was said that
the Shah-in-Shah proposed to the Amir his submission as the
price of assistance in a religious war against the Sikhs. Herat
was to be reduced and Kamran deprived of his titles; coins
were to be struck in the name of the Persian King, and a Persian
force was to garrison the city. Shah Kamran indignantly rejected
these terms.

The greatest excitement now prevailed in Herat. The Shiahs
hailed the coming of the Persian monarch with enthusiasm, and
predicted the success of the enterprise, while the Sunnis were firm
in their intention to resist the invader to the last drop of their
blood. ■

On the 17th September the King returned to Herat. Among
the many who went out to witness his entrance was Eldred Pot-
tinger, a Lieutenant of the Bombay Artillery, who had reached
Herat from Kabul a month before. He had been travelling
unofficially to gather information concerning Afghanistan,
Although very slightly acquainted with the Persian language,
and ignorant of Muhammadan ritual, he had passed on his way
almost unquestioned. When challenged on the score of hi&-
apparent ignorance he allayed suspicion by quoting Indian usage.

He sent a message to the Wazir offering to meet him, and,
to his surprise, Yar Muhammad at once consented to receive him.
A few days later he was received by the King. He was &\l

BVIiNBS MISSION TO KABUL. 291

eagerness to share in the coming struggle, convinced that his
duty to his country demanded all his energies in the arrest of a
movement which not only threatened the independence of Herat,
but the stability of the British Empire in the East.

An order was now issued that all grain and forage should be
brought from the surrounding villages into the city ; and that
the villagers themselves should live within its walls. On intelligenca
reaching Herat at the close of October that the Persian army
had arrived at Turbat, further orders were given for the entire
destruction of all remaining supplies, and the soldiers were let loose,
upon the country to give effect to the decree. While these measures:
kept the grain, firewood, and forage from falling into the enemy's;
hands, it had the undesired effect of destroying the little discipline;
which the soldiers possessed. Henceforth it was impossible to
control them.

It was ascertained that the Persians were advancing in three
bodies, the advanced party, some 10,000 men, being under
the command of Alayah Khan, better known as the Asaf-ud-
Daul h. Their movement in compact bodies nonplussed the
Afghans, who could make but few captures, and who ascribed
their formations to fear.

Promises of a hard winter, a prediction cruelly falsified, buoyed
up the hopes of the Heratis. It had also been expected that the
invaders, as on a previous occasion, would content themselves
with masking Ghorian, reputed even stronger than Herat. It was,
however, besieged, and its fall announced on the 15th November.
Yar Muhammad attributed its capitulation to the cowardice
or treachery of his brother, Sher Muhammad Khan ; but, at the
time of its surrender, Colonel Stoddart pronounced it to be un-
tenable. Arrangements for the defence of Herat were now carried
on with redoubled energy. No one was permitted to leave the city,
and the people from the surrounding country crowded in. Ex-
citement and alarm were general. Many suspected of infidelity
were imprisoned and their property was confiscated. The Shiah
MuUas were arrested and confined lest they should foster disaffec-
tion. Work upon the fortifications went on incessantly, and troopers
scoured the country to cut off stragglers. Still the Persian army
advanced, and on the 22nd November the advanced guard took

2 02

192 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Tip a position to the north-west of the city. The Afghans charged
the Persian cavalry with success, but the infantry beat them off.
The Persian field guns opened, and were replied to from the
city. Afghan horsemen, dismounting, and taking advantage
of cover, fired upon the Persian gunners, but were driven
back by the enemy's skirmishers. The contest had now fairly
commenced.

The following day, the 23rd November, the siege commenced,
one of the most remarkable in history,

lege o era . alike from its protracted nature, the gal-

lantry of the chief actors, and the magnitude of the political
results. The Persians established themselves to the west of the
city, and although the Afghans disputed every incli of ground
they were driven within the walls. Two facts were to be deduced
from the preliminary operations. First that little reliance could be
placed upon the strength of the defences ; secondly, that the wa^^
would be carried on with hatred and inhumanity to supply defi-
ciencies of science and courage. The Heratis bent their attention
to the strengthening of their defences, while the Persians entrench-
ed themselves and threw up batteries. The rockets struck terror
into the hearts of the besieged, though the practice was too wild
to be efficaciou?. In this way the siege continued throughout the
months of November and December, without any success to the
Persians, and the besieged gathered new courage. Three of the
five gates were kept open, and the communications with the sur-
rounding country preserved ; the cattle were sent out to graze, and
firewood and other necessaries brought into the city. Nightly
sallies were made by the garrison with much loss and destruc-
tion to the besiegers. The prisoners captured by either force
■were barbarously maltreated. A breach having been effecte 1 an
assault was attempted, but driven back with loss, among the slain
being a deserter from Herat, named Muhammad Sharif, who was
much dreaded, and whose death brought delight to Kamran, who
looked upon it as a fatal blow to the Persian hopes of success.

The siege operations continued with but little access of vigour,
albeit the garrison was prone to exaggerate the danger. On
the 18th January Yar Muhammad arranged that Pottinger should
proceed as an envoy to the Persian camp, and the following day

BURNES MISSION TO KABUL. ^93

he was conducted to the residence of the Shah. The message
he was commissioned to carry was, that on condition that the
Persians raised the siege, Herat would be given up, when, with-
Persian assistance, ne" 'snould have regained his kingdom:,^
Kamran decided that, before his message was despatched,
an important blow should be struck. The projected night attack,
however, proved a failure, and policy dictated that Pottinger's de-
parture should be delayed. On the 26th January it was determined
that the cavalry [^and infantry should sally outandbring thePersians
to action. At first the Afghan charge was successful, the Persians
evacuated their posts, and after a protracted struggle the besieged
were left in possession of the field.

On the 8th Febjnjary Pottioger left for the Persian camp
with an escort ; this, however, he sent back and proceeded with^
a single attendant. He was taken to the Russian General Samson's
quarters, and received with much courtesy and sent in safety to
the Persian camp, where he was graciously received by the AVazir
who granted him permission to deliver the Government of India's
letter to Colonel Stoddart.

He then proceeded to deliver Kamran's message to theShah,
who denounced the Afghan as a treacherous liar and declared that he
would not rest satisfied until a Persian garrison was in the citadel
of Herat. On the 10th February Pottingej returned j^ the city,^
The siege now continued^ without intermission, the Persians haying
twice, during February, sent an emissary to state that if the Afghans
would acknowledge the Shah's sovereignty, operations should cease
The negotiations produced no result. The siege continued to the
distress of the garrison, who were suffering from the inclement
weather and want of food. On the 8th March the Persians gained
possession of a fortified post 300 yards from the north-east angle
of the fort. Towards the end of March the Asaf-ud-Daula
offered to be the mediator for a suspension of hostilities, but
the subsequent negotiations proved fruitless. On the 6th April
Mr. M^eill, the British Minister at the Persian Court, arrived in the
Shah's_camPibu^met_with aj3old_rece^timi ; but his tact gradual-
ly smoothed down the irritation at first engendered. The Russian
Minister, Count Simonich, was, however, on his way from Teheran,
and Mr. M'Neill felt that his approach might prove fatal to his

294 FROyriER AXD overseas EXPEDiriOyS from INDIA.

success. On the 13th April he had an audience withthe Shah and
pointed out that his proceedings in Afghanistan were a violation of
JiEe treaty between Great Britain and Persia, and that the former
would be justified in taking measures to compel the withdrawal of
the Persian ami:^ from Herat. The Shah protested that he never
meditated anything injurious to the interests of Great Britain and
consented to accept the liiediation of the British missTon.

'rhe_J,8tIi„Apiil was one of the most memorable days of the
siege. The Persian batteries redoubled their activity, and by evening
two of the breaches were practicable. The Afghans made a counter-
attack, but were repulsed by the Persians. It was now announced
that an Englishman sought admittance, but the statement was
received with incredulity. On the following morning Major Todd,
an officer of the Bengal Artillery, made his appearance. He an-
nounced that the Persian sovereign was willing to accept the me-
diation of the British Government. He was received with courtesy
by Shah Kamran, and returned to the Persian camp with assurances
of Kamran's desire to accept the mediation.

Hostilities were not, however, suspended, and that evening the
aspect of affairs was more warlike than ever. On the 21st April
Mr. M'Neill arrived to negotiate, and the Shah professed himself
willing to agree toany terms proposed by that officer. On the 23rd
April, however, Ma4or_Todd brought the information that Muham-
mad Shah had changed his mind, and re-
fused to submit to arbitration. The siege
recommenced. Count Simonich, who had arrived on the 21st April,
freely assisting with advice and mon^y. The Heratis now began to_
consider the expediency of throwing themselves into the arms of
Kussia, and it was proposed to send an envoy to the Russian Am-
bassador, acknowledging the dependence of Herat upon his country.
]S*ews of the energetic course pursued by Mr. M'Neill threatening
British hostilities if Herat should fall into Persian hands, however,
altered the complexion of affairs, and the idea of a Russian alliance
was abandoned. Pottinger did his best to i ounteract Russian
influence, by expressing the conviction that Britain would come
to the help of Herat, but was embarrassed by injunctions from
Mr, M'Neill that he was on no account to commit the British
Government to any line of policy.

BURNES MISSION TO KABUL. ' 295

Exasperated by this announcement, the chiefs broke out into
•violent reproaches against Pottinger, M'Neill, and the whole
"British nation, and began to discuss the advantages of a Russian
-alUance. Pottinger exercised great tact, and on his promising to
make a further representation to Mr. M'Neill the chiefs resolved to
: await the results of the reference.

The influence of Mr. M'Neill at the Persian Court was, however,
rapidly declining, and the Russians were correspondingly

• exalted. On the 7th June the British mission left the Persian
^ camp and the British-Persian alliance ended.

The Herat garrison had meanwhile been undergoing much
suffering, and the Persians, under Russian direction, continued to
prosecute the siege with increased vigour, and the lines of invest-
ment were drawn closer. Two ineffectual assaults were made, and
a third followed on the 24th June. The defenders were off their
guard, when suddenly a heavy fire betrayed the intentions of the
besiegers. Simultaneous assaults were made at five points ; four
of these were repulsed ; the fifth, and more determined one, was at

• first successful, audit was only the indomitable courage and master,
fulness of Pottinger which saved the situation and Herat. Both
sides were equally dispirited and a week of inaction supervened.
Th§__siege began to assume_th^character_pXaJblockade_^

.and the besiegers were comparatively^ inactive.

But in the meantime, far from Herat, events were taking

place which were to affect the issue of the

British action. j_j_Tn«iiii ■ -,

contest. Lord Auckland determined to
■despatch an expedition to the Persian Gulf, to be employed with a
view to maintain British interests in Persia. The demonstration
terrified the Persians, and Mr. M'Neill seized the opportunity to
make another effort to secure the withdrawal of the Persian army
and re-establish British ascendancy at the Persian Court. Colonel
Stoddart was despatched to the Shah with a message that the
occupation of Herat, or any part of Afghanistan, would be viewed
in the light of a hostile demonstration against England. Muhammad

Shah promised to comply with the

Russian intrigues. -i i mi t-> • • , i

^ demands, i he Russian envoy was m the

meantime persuading Kamran to come out of Herat, and make
iis obeisance to the Shah-in-Shah, as a preliminary to the with

£96 FJ^OHTIER AND OVESSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

drawal of the Persian army ; with the idea of giving a colour of
victory to the latter's retirement, and to enable Russia to claim
a diplomatic success.

The struggle was now nearly at an end, though the movements
in the Persian camp were imperfectly known in Herat. In September,
however, there was no longer any doubt that the Persians were
breaking up their camp.^ Before the 9th, the Pers'an army had
commenced its retrograde march to Tehran. Pottinger afterward^
expressed the deliberate opinion that Herat might have been taken
by assault within tweniy-igur hours of Muhammad. Shah^s appear-
ance before its walls, had his troops been efficiejitly commanded.

Something must now be said about the intrigues of Russia..
There is no doubt that she egged on Muhammad Shah to undertake
the expedition against Herat, and that Russian officers aided
in the siege operations. She thereby placed her.?elf in direct
antagonism to Great Britain. English advice was systemati-
cally opposed by the Russian Ambassador. When called upon
for an explanation Russia replied that if Simonich had realiy
acted as alleged, he had exceeded his instructions, Russia, how-
ever, had been playing a successful and safe game. However the
expedition terminated, she would carry an important point. Had
Herat fallen, Kandahar and Kabul would have made their sub-
mission, and Russian influence would have impinged upon India-
If England interfered to save Herat, on the other hand, she was
compromised with Persia as a nation.

Whilst the Persians were laying siege to Herat, under the
ThepoUcy of the Indian ^^gis of Russia, the English in India,
Government. on account of these movements across

the border, were turning their attention to the safeguarding of their •
own frontier. The danger was believed to be great and imminent.
The Native States on our own borders were evincing symptoms of
unrest. From Nepal and Burma came threatenings of invasion ;
even our own provinces were in a state of disquiet. To the Mus-
salmans the movement beyond the Afghan Frontier presaged a
Muhammadan invasion, and rumour had it that the Company's
Raj was almost at an end.

The British expfd'.ton to Karrak, described in Vo!. Vf, was an imiortant factor in-,
causing the Persians to raise the seige of Herat.

BURNES MISSION TO KABUL. 297

Ignorance magnified the danger. That Herat would lall ap-
peared certain, and it was believed that Muhammad Shah would
not remain content with this success ; Kandahar and Kabul would
follow suit, and Persia, with her ally, Russia, would secure
Afghanistan as a base for future operations.

To secure the independence of Afghanistan was plainly the
policy of the British Government. Before the advance upon
Herat, their Minister at Tehran had advocated the expediency of
a counteracting movement in the country between Persia and India,
and had written to Burnes, setting forth the advantages of subsidis-
ing the Amir, and placing both Kandahar and Herat under his
rule. He suggested that a British loan would be sufficient to
effect this purpose, and that as a condition Afghan foreign policy
should be directed through the British Agent. In the Kandahar
Sardars he had no faith.

Captain Wade, however, who was conversant with the politics
of Central Asia, was strongly opposed to the consolidation of
Afghanistan under Dost Muhammad. He advocated the preserva-
tion of the different Governments as they stood, and the use of
our influence in keeping the peace.

So far as Herat was concerned, Kamran was playing the game
which best suited British interests ; it was acting as a barrier against
Russo-Persian invasion, and fighting single-handed the first battle
of resistance at the gates of Afghanistan.

Mr. M'Neill's project for the consolidation of the Afghan
empire found little favour with Indian statesmen, but many were of
opinion that, by means of small offers of assistance, the de facto rulers
of Afghanistan would co-operate in resisting invasion from the west
Captain Burnes, however, had no power to offer this assistance.-
He was tied hand and foot, and was impotent to treat with Dost
Muhammad. He coiild make demands, but could offer no quid pro
quo. The Amir, although obviously desirous of a British alliance
could obtain not even the glimmer of a guarantee, and was at last
naturally compelled to turn his eyes in another direction. Russia
came forward with tangible offers of money and assistance, and
the Amir had no course but to accept the situation.

Tore-establish Sultan Muhammad at Peshawar would have
paved the way for the march of Ranjit Singh's army to Kabul ;

•298 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

it was better to have a single enemy in the person of the Maharaja.
'Sultan Muhammad had by his treachery lost Peshawar, and, as he
was unable to hold his own, better arrangements should be aimed at
to preserve the integrity of the frontier. So reasoned Dost Muham-
mad. Primarily he desired Peshawar on his own account ; failing
this, a tenancy, conjointly with Sultan Muhammad, in vassalage to
Ranjit Singh. It is probable that had the British Government
coQie forward with something more substantial than sympathy^
the Amir would have proved a faithful ally.

It was, however, decreed that Dost Muhammad should be a
hostile Chief ; and British policy soon made him one. Had Burnes
been permitted to follow his own convictions, the Kandahar Sardars,
with the Kabul Amir, would have interposed as an effective barrier
to Persian invasion, backed by Russian intrigue. The policy actually
pursued created the difficulties which led to the First Afghan War.

Lord Auckland was essentially a man of peace, but he saw
the necessity of establishing British influence in Afghanistan as a
barrier to invasion. He had abandoned all desire to propitiat<-
Dost Muhammad and the Barakzai Chiefs, and his thoughts turned
to Shah Shuja,^ who had made so many fruitless efforts to seat
himself on the Durani throne. His idea was confined to an expedi-
tion by Shah Shuja and Ranjit Singh, accompanied by a British
agent, subsidised by the British Government and assisted by British
ofl&cers.

Of the three alternative schemes for the defence of the frontier,
that of adopting the Indus as our boundary, and leaving Afghan-
istan to its fate, was abandoned without consideration, as playing
directly into the hands of Persia and Russia. The second scheme,
the attempt to save Afghanistan by succouring the existing
chiefs at Kandahar and Kabul, would only strengthen their hands
against the Sikhs. The third was the Shah Shuja-Ranjit Singh
alliance above referred to.

Macnaghten was sent to Lahore to sound Ranjit Singh on the

Macnaghten's Mission to Subject of the proposed confederation.

^^°^^- The only mention of the employment of

British troops till now had been the demonstration of a Division

1 It must bs b srne In mind that Siiah Sjuja was a Saiio:ii. Tae Bira'ijai
■Chiefs were brothers of Dost Muhammad.

BUBNES MISSION TO KABUL. " 299

■•-■at Shikarpur. The mission was received by the Maharaja on the
■31st May, the proposal was unfolded, and it was explained that the
. alternatives were to act independently or in concert with the British
■Government. Eanjit immediately elected for the latter. He was
enthusig.stic p.t the suggestion of the English joining in the tripartite
treaty with himself and Shah Shuja. Macnaghten thereupon ex-
plained the Governor- General's views — that the Shah should advance
by the Kandahar route and the Sikhs move upon Kabul via the
Khaibar, while the British Government sent a force down the Indus
to repel any threat of aggression in that direction. Ranjit Singh
. declined to have anything to say to an independent expedition on
Jiis own account.

It now remained to settle the details, and so little was it con-
templated that a British force should take part in the expedition, that
Ranjit Singh, who was by no means confident of success, asked
:if in the event of a reverse the British Government was prepared to
support them. Although Macnaghten replied in the affirmative,
Ranjit Singh evidently wished that British troops should play a
more prominent part in the ex-pedition. The treaty was, however,
prepared and formally signed by the Maharaja on the 26th June.
-Briefly the contents were as follows: —

1. Shuja-ul-Mulk disclaimed all title to the Maharaja's possessions

The Tripartite Treaty on either bank of the Indus.

2. None of the people beyond the Ehaibar should trespass on the eastern
:;3ide.

3. No one to cross from the left to the right bank of the Sutlej, without
■ a passport from the Maharaja, and similarly no one should be allowed to
•cross the Indus.

i. Shikarpur and the Trans-Indus territory to be the subject of arbitra-
tion between the British Government and the Maharaja.

5. Details of the annual tribute to be paid by the Shah to the Maharaja
•when re-possessed of Kabul and Kandahar.

6. The etiquette to be observed.

7. Pree passage to merchants of either country.

3. Tokens of friendship to be sent annually by the Maharaja to the Shah.

9. Facilities to be granted to traders.

10. Prohibition of the slaughter of kine when the two armies shall be
assembled together.

11. The division of spoil.

300 FBONTIER AND OVEUSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

12. A constant exchange of missions.

13. Mutual aid.

14. The friends or enemies of one party to be the friends or enemies of alL

15. Relinquishment by the Shah of arrears of tribute from the Amirs of"
Sind.

16. Subsidy to be paid by Shah Shuja to the Maharaja.

17. The ruler of Herat to be left in possession of his territories.

18. The Afghans to negotiate with foreign powers through the British
and Sikh Government. *

This treaty was sent to Lord Auckland for signature, but he
declined to sign it until approved and signed by Shah Shuia.

When the news of the British designs reached his ears, Shah
Shuja already saw himself en route for the Bala Hissar, but he was
suspicious of both the British and Sikhs. After considerable
discussion the terms were agreed to, and the treaty signed, and he
was all eagerness to commence operations without delay.

Meanwhile Lord Auckland's advisers had urged that the ex-
pedition, as arranged, must prove a disastrous failure, and strongly
advocated the employment of a British force. Burnes' opinion
was now invited, and he advised that the case of Dost Muhammad
should be reconsidered, and that Government should act with and
not against him. However, if Dost Muham.med wi.s to be counter-
acted, the restoration of Shah Shuja was more feasible than the
establishment of Sikh influence at Kabul.

Captain Wade, although he did not entertain a favourable
opinion of Dost Muhammad, insisted that the wisest policy was to
support the existing rulers.

The Simla Council discussed the several projects ; whether the
first scheme were feasible, or whether a few regiments of British,
troops would suffice to escort the Shah's army. Neither of these
plans was followed.

Sir Henry Fane, the Commander-in-Chief, is believed to have-
disapproved of interferenoe in Afghan affairs, but argued that
if interference was settled upon, it should be done in such a
manner as to command success.

By nature inclined towards moderate measures, Lord Auckland

yielded to the judgment of others, and

Military preparations. ., , c it ,i

the order for assembling the army on
the frontier, early in the cold weather, to march upon Kandahar

SUBNES MISSION TO KABUL. 301

-was issued. The proposed expedition was the one topic of
•conversation ; many officers gave up staff appointments to join
the force, and at the worst season of the year corps were set in
motion for Karnal from stations as remote as Benares.

The strength of the force warned for service was one brigade
■of artillery, a cavalry brigade, and five brigades of infantry. The
Divisions were to be commanded by Sir Willoughby Cotton and
JMajor-Greneral Duncan.

h, e regiments selected were ^ : —

Her Majesty's 16th Lancers.

Her Majesty's 13th infantry.

Her Majesty's 3rd Bufis.

The Company's Bengal European Regiment.

2 Regiments of Native Light Cavalry.

2 Troops of Horse Artillery.

3 Companies of Foot Artillery. '
Some Sappers ana Miners.

2nd

5th

16th
:27th
.28th

31st

35tti Regiments, Bengal Native Infantry.

37th

42nd

i3rd

tSth

.53rd

While the Bengal Army was assembling on the northern frontier
vunder the personal command of Sir Henry Fane, the following force
■was being collected in Bombay under Sir John Keane, with Major.
^"General Thackwell as Cavalry Commander, Colonel Stevenson, Com-
manding Artillery, and Major-General Willshire, the Infantry,

Cavalry Brigade (including Her Majesty's 4th Dragoons;.

Artillery Brigade.

Her Majesty's 2 ad Queen's -\

Her Majesty's 17th Foot f Infantry Brigade. i

1 Native Infantry Regiment J

1 For detaiU of the force, see Apjeadix I,

302 FROSTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

A third force, to be led by Shall Shuja, was being raised for ser-
vice across the Indus in the Company's territories, commanded by
the Company's officers, and paid by the Company. This had origi-
nally figured as the principal foice, but now the disciplined troops
of the Indian Army were to bear the brunt of the campaign. Re-
cruiting for the Shah's force progressed rapidly ; he himself watching
its growth with pride, and fearful lest the assumption of control by
the British officers should deprive him of the eclat of independence.
Captain Wade had a difficult position to fill in managing Shah
Shuja ; the transition from pensioner at Ludhiana to an indepen-
dent chief, a maker of treaties, a commander of armies, had been
very rapid, and he was desirous of spurring forward on his new
enterprise.

The political management of the campaign now com-
manded Lord Auckland's attention. Cap-
Political arrangements. ^ • ,,t n i ^ i . xi

tain Wade was selected to accompany the-

Sikh troops through the Khaibar. The name of Burnes naturally
occurred to the Governor- General as the fittest person to guide Shah
Shuja. He appreciated his talents but mistrusted his discretion?
so he finally fixed upon Mr. Macnaghten for the appointment, and
he was duly gazetted as " Envoy and Minister on the part of the
Government of India at the Court of Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk." Burnes
was to be employed under him as " Envoy to the Chief of Kalat
and other States." It was believed that when Shah Shuja had
been seated on his throne, the former would return to India, leaving
Burnes at Kabul ; and this reconciled the latter to his present subor-
dinate post. He was sent forward to smooth the way for the pro-
gress of the Shah through Sind, whilst Macnaghten remained at
Simla to assist in the preparation of the manifesto, which was to
declare the grounds upon which the British Government had
determined to destroy the power of the Barakzai Sardars, and to
restore Shuja-ul-Mulk to the throne of his ancestors.

The manifesto provoked much criticism and found very few
supporters. Had the relief of Herat been the object of the expedi-
tion, it would have been generally approved. It was not, however*
clear that because Muhammad Shah made war upon Herat, Eng-
land was justified in making war upon Dost Muhammad. In
t'le summer of 1838 there was an undoubted causa belli, but it wr g-.

BDBNES MJSSlOX TO KALIL. 20S^

largely traceable to our policy in connection with the Baraiczai
Sardars.

The most experienced Indian politicians foretold disaster to the
expedition at the outset ; among them were the Du ke of Wellington
(Lord Wellesley) Sir Charles Metcalfe, Mr. Edmonstone, Mount-
Stuart Elphinstone, Sir Henry Willock, and Mr. Tucker. The Duke
of Wellington prophesied that our difficulties would commence
where military success ended ; and that to settle a government
in Afghanistan would mean a perennial march into that country
Sir Charles Metcalfe stated that to cross the Indus and meddle
with the countries beyond was the surest \;u.j of bringing Russia
down upon us. Elphinstone, while not doubtful of military
success, anticipated that it was a hopeless task to attempt to keep
our nominee on his throne. The Court of Directors were strongly
opposed to the war.

In spite of the raising of the siege of Herat the Governor-
General, on the 8th November, published an order that the expe..
tlition would not be abandoned.

CHAPTER XIV.

OCCVPATION OF AFGHANISTAN.

The army intended for the occupation of Afghanistan assem-
Asspmbiing of the Army of ^led at Ferozepore at the end of Nov-
the Indus. ember. The Governor-General arrived

On the 27th. The concentration had been effected with rapidity.^
On the 29th the first meeting between Lord Auckland and Ranjit
Singh took place. On the day following the Governor- General
returned the visit. Next followed manoeuvres by the British
and Sikh forces. Ranjit Singh returned to Lahore, followed
by Lord Auckland, and the British troops prepared to cross the
frontier. There was now, however, no Persian Army at Herat,
aided by a Russian force in the back-ground, so the force had been
reduced in strength, and the enthusiasm of the troops had waned.
Sir Henry Fane selected the most efficient of the troops for the ex-
pedition. The Bengal Army consisted of one Division under Sir
Willoughby Cotton. Sir John Keane, coming round from Bombay
with his Division, was eventually to take the chief command.

The Bengal Army at Ferozepore numbered 9,500 men of all
arms. The force for the service of Shah Shuja was passing
through, and was composed of two regiments of cavalry and four
of infantry, with a troop of Horse Artillery — 6,000 men in all — and
was to cross the frontier on the 2nd December. On the 10th the
Bengal Division was to leave Ferozepore.

The invading army's line of march ran in a south-westerly
Line of march. direction, through Bahawalpur, and

crossed the Sind Frontier near Sabzalkot,
to tbe banks of the Indus, which was to be crossed at Sukkur.
Thence in a north-westerly direction via Shikarpur, Bhag, and
Dadar, to the Bolan Pass, and, passing that, to Quetta and via
the Khojak to Kandahar. This roundabout route was dictated
by political considerations

1 No worse season could, however, have been chosen for the movement of troops.
Vol. III. ( 305 ) X

06 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Twenty-five thousand rupees had been fixed as the ransom

money to be paid by the Amirs of Sind
'"^ ^' for Shikarpur. Pottinger considered

the demand unjust, and he represented this to the Government
of India. He was informed in reply that circumstances alter
cases, and that the paragraph in the existing treaty, prohibiting
the use of the Indus for the carriage of military stores, must be
ignored at the present time. The Khan of Bahawalpur and the
Sind Amirs were ordered to facilitate the passage of the troops
by the collection of supplies and transport, at their peril.

Sir Alexander Burnes was sent to treat with the Sind
Amirs, and to obtain the temporary cession of the island at Bhak-
kar. The Amirs of Khairpur stipulated that the forts on either
bank should remain untouched.

The Trtlpur Amirs now began to feel alarm, for the British
Government, besides assisting Shah Shuja to regain his throne,
had encouraged him to assert old claims, had announced the inten-
tion of stationing a subsidiary forc^ in Sind for which the Amirs
were to pay ; and of treating Sind and Baluchistan as if they were
principalities of India. The Amirs felt their helplessness in the
face of the Government's determination, and apparently abandoned
all thought of resistance .

The Bengal Army moved parallel with the river, availing it-
self of the waterway. The force consist-
March of the Bengal Division* ^r■rvr•/^/^ nc^ r^r^r. ill

ed of 9,500 men, 38,000 camp followers,
30,000 camels. When the army entered Bahawalpur all seemed
favourable to the expedition. The country was open, the road,
280 miles in length, had been previously prepared for the march,
and was in good order, and supplies were plentiful.

Desertion among the camp followers was now, however, rife,
the cattle were falling sick and dying by the wayside, and'it was soon
evident that the questions of transport and supply would prove
formidable.

On the 29th the capital of Baliwal Khan's country was reached
and on the 14th January, 1839, the Army of the Indus entered
Sind territory near Sabzalkot. Sir Alexander Burnes had joined
the British' camp on the preceding day ; his report of the feel
iiigs of the people of Sind was not encouraging, and it shortly-

OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN. 307

appeared probable that some of the Talpur princes ''would
give trouble. The Haidarabad Amirs had insulted Colonel
Pottinger, and were collecting troops for the defence of their
capital. Sir John Keane had landed at Vikkur at the end of Nov-
ember, and thence had proceeded to Tatta. He had no car-
riage, and the Sind rulers were rather inclined to oppose than to
assist him. He, therefore, remained inactive until the 24th
December. Opportunely a certain amount of carriage arriving
from Kach, the column then commenced its march into Sind, and
proceeding along the right bank of the Indus to Tarrak, there
waited the result of the negotiations at Haidarabad.

Shah Shuja with his contingent had preceded the Bengal
•column, and crossing the Indus during the third week in January,
encamped at Shikarpur, where he was joined by the British envoy.

Cotton was to have crossed the Indus at Rohri opposite
Bhakkar,but some delay took place in connection with the cession
of the fortress, and it was not until the 29th of January that the
British flag waved from its ramparts.

The military authorities now determined that the bulk of the

Bad intelligence. Bengal column should proceed down the

left bank of the Indus to co-operate with Sir John Keane against
Haidarabad. The two columns were entirely ignorant of each
other's operations^ in the absence of an Intelligence Department,
a want which continued to be felt until the close of the war.
Mr. Macnaghten did not approve of this diversion, believing that
it involved the sacrifice of the legitimate objects of the campaign ;
he therefore took upon himself the responsibility of preventing the
march. The military and political authorities were brought
into a state of undisguised antagonism. The Amirs, however,
consented to the terms of the treaty, and the necessity for the
advance on Haidarabad was obviated.

1 Stacy, page 142. " After pointing out the difficulties attending the procuring
an dconveying supplies between Quetta and Kandahar since the affair at Haikalzai
which dispelled the illusion that we could obtain supplies in the Pishin valley, I
observed that that affair, however unfortunate, had not been wholly without use,
in showing how imperfect were our means of information. The existence of a forti-
fied position, which, it appeared, the enemy had been employed upon for the preceding
two months was utterly unknown to us, nor should we have learned that similar
works had been prepared in the Khojak but for our advance on Haikalzai : our
ignorance of this intrenched position proved no less our want of common information
beyond our picquets, than the unanimity of the people around vs>-"

308 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The Bombay troops which had halted opposite Haidarabad
now heard of the arrival of the Reserve

Surrender of Kaiachi. ... i t r, i

at Karachi, which surrendered after a show
of resistance.

On the 20th Februaiy Sir Willoughby Cotton arrived at

Shikarpur, where he had a stormy dis-

ArrivaiatShikarpur. cussion with the Envoy, each considering

that the other was trenching upon his province. That evening^
however, despatches were received from the Governor- General,
read and discussed, and that night the General and the Envoy
parted good friends.

On the 23rd Cotton again put his force in motion, but, owing
to the insufi&ciency of carriage, Shah Shuja's contingent remained
halted at Shikarpur.

The difficulties of the march now began. Between Sukkur and
Sliikarpur the camels had dropped dead by scores ; but there
was a worse tract of country in advance. The distance to Dadar
from Shikarpur is 146 miles, and it was accomplished by the
Bengal column in sixteen painful marches. Water and forage were
very scarce ; numbers of camels died,'' and, further on, the Baluchi

robbers carried them cfi with appalling

dexterity. On the 10th of March the

column reached Dadar at the mouth of the Bolan Pass.^ Major

Leech, who had been endeavouring to collect supplies,' had signrilly

1 Hough, Appendix 79. The total loss of public camels in the Bengal Column of
the Army of the Indus in 14 months was 20,000.

Hough, page 9. There must have been from 25,000 to 30,000 camels with the army,
and so early as December it was found necessary to allow them to quit camp some
hours |before the troops, as they fell off in condition, owing to their arriving late
in camp and being unable early enough to get forage or to graze.

2 Havelock, Vol. I, 274. " The patience with which for three months and a half
the native soldiers and mustered followers of the Bengal force bore their privations,
when their ration was reduced to a full moiety, and in truth did not suffice to satisfy
the cravings of hunger, ought ever to be remembered to their credit by the Govern-
ment which they were serving."

' Outram. page 61. 9th April. "Marched with the Artillery Brigade eleven and a
half miles into the pass along the bed of the Bolan river, the channel of which is the
only road ; a stream of clear water from thirty to forty feet broad, and from one
to three in depth, crossing the road six times. During the floods the stream, which
is in some places confined between perpendicular precipices, within a channel sixty
or eighty feet wide, would preclude the possibility of escape to an army caught in the
torrent. The mountains on every side are the most abrupt, sterile, and inhospitable
I ever beheld — not a blade of vegetation of any kind being found, save in the bed of
the stream, where there is some coarse grass on which horses and camels pick a
scanty subsistence. The mountains are as repulsive in appearance as they are barren
in reality, being everywhere of a dull and uniform brown colour."

OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN. 309

iailed ; and the prospects of the^ force, with only one month's
supply in hand, were anything but encouraging. Cotton determined
to push on at once, and resumed his march on the 16th. Burnes,
aided by the Baluchi authorities, who had preceded the column,
•secured its safe passage. The baggage animals were, however,
dying in numbers and the horses of the artillery were much dis-
tressed.'' The Baluchi free booters cut ofi stragglers and carried off
baggage and cattle. ^The road through the pass, which is sixty miles
in length, was execrable, and it took six days to effect the passage.
On emerging, however, the clear, crisp climate braced the
European frame and the prospect delighted the eye. On the
26th March Quetta was reached, and here, with starvation
staring him in the face. Cotton was to await further orders. The
prospect was perplexing. To stand still or to move forward ap-
peared equally impossible. To push on to Kandahar on very
reduced rations would leave him on arrival with only a few days'
supply in hand ; to remain halted would only aggravate the
-evil. The supplies available in the Quetta district would only
suffice for a few days. He, therefore, despatched his Adjutant-
General to Sir John Keane for orders, while Burnes proceeded to
Kalat to work upon the fears or cupidity of Mehrab Khan and
the troops were placed upon a reduced scale of rations. The
sufferings of the whole force were rapidly aggravated.^

Burnes was courteously received by Mehrab Khan, who,

however, prophesied evil for the ex-

Burnes' Mission to Kalat, pedition. Complained of the devastation

caused by the march of the troops, and hoped that his claims

1 Outram, page 77. " It is a fact now fully proved, and admitted by all parties
that the Arab and Persian horses stand their work and privations infinitely better than
stud and country-breds ; the latter, although younger, stronger and in far better condi-
tion at starting, have invariably been the first to give in, while they seldom rallied
afterwa-'ds. A few Cape horses lately imported to the Bombay Army have also proved
themselves superior to our ^tud-breds."

Hough, page 96. Afghan horses eat green forage in great quantities and seldom
get any grain. The Turkomans prefer dry food —barley flour made into balls with the
fat of the dhumba sheep.

" Atkinson, 179. " The sick being still numerous it became of consequence to
provide against the chance of having more to carry, when the army was ordered to
move, than our existing means, extensive as they were, could supply. With this
view I drew the attention of the Commander-in-Chief to the expedi ncy of employing
camels, each furnished with a pair of Kajau-ahs, or panniers, a mode of conveyance
common throughout Upper Asia, and always used in travelling for the females of
a family. * * « These resources being most ample, and sufficient for about
five hundred patients not the smallest inconvenience attended our forward movement
■to Ghazni."

310 FBONTIER AND OVEBSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

would command attenticn, and that he would be relieved of the
mastery of the Saddozai Kings. He spoke freely of our British policy
in Central Asia, and complained that while he might have allied
himself with Persia and Russia, he had safeguarded the force in
their passage through the Bolan and yet remained unrewarded.

Burnes had brought with him a draft treaty. As a condition of
peaceable negotiation it stipulated for a visit to Shah Shuja inhis
camp, to which Mehrab Khan took exception, and pleaded sickness.
To secure the acknowledgment of the supremacy of Shah Shuja, the
Government agreed to pay Mehrab Khan one and a half lakhs of
rupees annually ; in return he was to collect and protect supplies.
Mehrab Klian affixed his seal, but none the less disliked the bargain.
He, however, promised to collect what provisions he could from
the already poverty-stricken country.

In the meantime the Shah's Contingent and the Bombay Divi-
The Shah's and Bombay siou Were making their way through Sind,
'^^"■"°^- much hampered by want of transport. More

and more sensible, after every march, of the miserable country and
the difficulties which beset the expedition, Macnaghten was anxious
to push on, but Sir John Keane recommended a halt while the
possibilities of supply in the Bolan were being investigated. On
the 4th April he met Sir Willoughby Cotton, who had ridden out
from Quetta, and the tidings he received were of the gloomiest.
On the 6th April Sir John Keane assumed command of the Army
at Quetta, and determined to push on to Kandahar.

On the 7th April the army resumed its march ; and on the
9th was at Haikalzai. The army of the Indus surmounted the
Khojak Pass in safety, the Shah leading the way, joined by many
of the chiefs and people of Western Afghanistan. Macnaghten
Flight of the Kandahar Sar- received intelligence that Kohan-dil-Klian
•^ws. and his brothers had fled from Kandahar,

that there was no union amcng the Barakzai brothers, and that if
a stand were to be made it would probably be nearer the northern
capital. The Shah, therefore, pushed on. The Afghans had begun
to discover that the supply of British gold was imfailing and,
as Macnaghten had prophesied, their cupidity would not be proof
against it. The Envoy now opened the treasure-chest ungrudg-
ingly, which in the end caused the ruin of his policy.

" • OCCUPATION OF AFGHAyiSTAN. 311

On the 25th April, Shah Shuja-ul-Mulk re-entered Kandahar

and was received with a mixture of curios-
Arrival at Kandahar. . . mi r ,

ity and enthusiasm. ihe tuture ap-
peared to be unclouded, and it seemed that Dost Muhammad would
imitate his brother's example'and fly. The 8th May was fixed for
the public recognition of the restored sovereign. Both the British
columns had now arrived and marched past before the reinstated
monarch. Popular enthusiasm had, however, abated, and the affair
was a painful failure. The Durani tribes were spiritless, and they
viewed with apprehension the arrival of the British army. They
pressed upon the Shah their claims for the restoration of old pri-
vileges, which it was plain the King could not recognize. He had
established himself at Kandahar, the brothers had fled into Persia
where they remained as guests of Muhammad Shah, until the with-
drawal of the British from Afghanistan. Dost Muhammad was,
however, still dominant at Kabul. The Shah, therefore, was obliged
to conciliate the Duranis, and granted much but not all they asked.
The latter were prepared to welcome the grandson of Ahmad Shah
as the enemy of the Barakzai Sardars ; but they regarded the move-
ment for restoration in the light of a foreign invasion.

The halt of the Army of the Indus at Kandahar was long and
weary. Provisions were scarce, and it was necessary to await the
ripening of the crops. The city itself disappointed expectation, al-
though its surroundings were pleasant to the eye, but there was
little to break the monotony, and when, on the 9th May, a brigade
under Colonel Sale was despatched to Girishk, seventy-five miles
west of Kandahar, in pursuit of the fugitive Sardars, there were
few officers who did not long to accompany it. The short cam-
paign was, however, inglorious, and Sale returned to Kandahar on
finding that the princes had fled. But Dost Muhammad was muster-
ing his fighting men in the north to defend his capital. Mis.
understanding the causes of the halt at Kandahar, Dost Muham-
mad thought that a movement upon Herat was contemplated,
and that operations against Kabul would be deferred to the follow-
ing year. He,therefore, turned his attention to the defence of the
eastern line of road. It had been arranged that Prince Timur, the
eldest son of Shah Shuja, should advance upon Kabul via Jalalabad
and Jagdalak; his force was now advancing, and Dost Muhammad

312 FSONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

sent some of his best fighting men against it, under his favourite
son Akbar Khan. Macnaghten had, however, no intention of
moving upon Herat, so long as the desired results might be attained
by less costly and hazardous means. Muhammad Shah was unlikely
to re-invest Herat, so it was determined to send only a few en-
gineer and artillery officers to improve the defences at the expense
of a few lakhs of rupees.

In September, 1838, Muhammad Shah turned his face towards

his own capital, and Eldred Pottinger,

Herat after the siege .^-j^^^ ^^ Stoddart, began to repair the

ravages caused by the protracted siege. The Wazir, however,
did not approve of their measures ; they had played their part,
and he desired no interference with his methods of oppression.
Within two months of the conclusion of^ the siege they were
insultingly ordered to withdraw from Herat territory. Stoddart^
proceeded to Bokhara, but Pottinger remained and the hostile
temper of the Wazir became more apparent. News of Shah
Shuja's advance had reached Herat, and Yar Muhammad began
to intrigue with the Persian court and the Kandahar Sardars ; and
endeavoured to form a confederacy for the expulsion of the Shah
and his allies from Afghanistan. The Persian Court would not
commit itself, and there was no prospect of organized opposition.
Yar Muhammad, therefore, sent a friendly mission to the British
camp and congratulations to the Shah. Macnaghten now deter-
mined to attempt to negotiate a friendly treaty with Shah Kam-
ran, and Major Todd was despatched on the errand, accompanied
by James Abbott and Richmond Shakespear of the Bengal Artillery,
and Sanders of the Engineers.

The force, which had remained halted at Kandahar from the
25th April to the 27th June, recommenced its march a few days
after the departure of the mission. During their stay the harvest
had ripened and the transport animals had recovered their strength.
Sickness," however, had broken out among the troops, due largely
to the excessive heat under canvas, and fever, dysentery, and

' Colonel Stoddart was despatched to Bokhara to try and obtain the liberation of
Russian prisoners. He -wa," confined by tho .Amir and executed in June 1S42.

2 Havelock, II, 33. The Bombay troops continued healthy, but sickness amongst
the European soldiers from Bengal had increased to a fearful degree.

OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN. 313

jaundice claimed many victims ; money was scarce, and Macnagliten
was unable to negotiate a loan. The Afghans regarded the intrusion
of the British with hatred, and stragglers were assassinated. The
Ghilzais were disinclined to the Saddozai yoke and rejected all
overtures. The supplies had now come into camp, although the ab-
sence of transport would probably render its carriage on the march to
Kabul difficult ; 20,000 maunds of grain were available, but through
fear of the vengeance of Dost Muhammad, the camel-drivers re-
fused to proceed ; it was therefore stored at Kandahar. However,
on the 27th of June, the British Army resumed its march and reach-
ed Ghazni on the 21st of July.

The disunion of the Barakzai brothers lost Afghanistan bo
Dost Muhammad's difficui. the Sardars. The fall of Kandahar did
*"^®' not astonish Dost Muhammad. Had

he and the Kandahar Sardars banded themselves together and pro-
claimed a religious war, and by their example encouraged Mehrab
Khan of Kalat to oppose our passage through the Bolan and
Khojak Passes, they might have given a check to our famine-
stricken army, from which it would not soon have recovered.
Dost Muhammad now beheld his countrymen either flying from
or bowing down before the invaders, with feelings of bitterness and
mortification. He was not confident of being able to offer effectual
resistance, and the dual advance upon Kabul compelled him to
divide his forces. Nearer home Kohistan was in rebellion, and the
Kizilbashis were opposed to him. His national defences were
crumbling before his eyes. He could only place reliance upon
his sons. Akbar Khan had been sent to oppose the Sikhs ; Haidar
Khan commanded at Ghazni, and Afzal Khan with some cavalry
was in the neighbourhood of that fortress, with orders to operate
upon the flank ■; of the British army as it traversed the open country.
The Amir himself awaited events at the capital. His information
as to our movements appears to have been very imperfect. Our
plan 6f campaign was at first supposed to be a march upon Herat ;
now the masking of Ghazni and a move against the capital.

His plan, formed upon this idea, was to allow the British
force to march some distance beyond Ghazni, when Afzal Khan
and Haidar Khan would fall upon its rear, while he himself
•opposed it in front.

314 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The s'rength of Ghazni was the boast of the Afghans, while

Sir John Keai.e underrated its defences.

Capture of Ghazni. ,,.... , ,

and, leaving his siege guns at Kandahar
advanced without them. His resolution promised disaster. The
fortress lies 230 miles from Kandahar and 90 from Kabul. The
country to be passed through offered no obstacles to the advance of
an army, being open and level. As a city it was of less importance
than either Kandahar or Kabul, but its strength had long been
famous, and the 9 and 6-pounder guns accompanying the force
would prove powerless against it.

Haidar Khan watched the approach of the British Column from
the fortifications. External defence had been but ill-provided for, a
few parties only being stationed in the surrounding villages and
gardens, and these were soon dislodged.^ The morning was spent
in skirmishing, the range of the enemy's guns were tried, and the en-
gineers reconnoitred the fort. It was determined to camp on the
Kabul side, whence Dost Muhammad was reported to be advancing,
and to cut off his communications with the fort. The pitching of the
camp presented an opportunity to Afzal Khan of which he did
not avail himself.

At daybreak on the 22nd of July, Sir John Keane with Cotton
and the engineers reconnoitred the fortress, which he had deter-
mined tocarry by assault. The King, in the absence of siege guns
had recommended that it should be left alone, and the advance on
Kabul continued. However, though it might be impossible to break
the walls, it was practicable to blow in one of the gates. This
was the Kabul one, which alone had not been built up. For this
information Sir John Keane was indebted to Abdul Rashid Khan,
a nephew of Dost Muhammad, who had deserted the Barakzais,
and whose reports proved of the utmost value.

Keane now issued orders for the assault, which was to take
place at daybreak on the following morning.^ On this day the

Ijidging from my limited military exjferience, I am of opinion that the opposi-
tion offered by the Afghans was highly creditable. Outram, page 93.

2 Kennedy, II, 46. «' On the evening before the storm my duty led me to prepare
the field [hospitals, etc., and to arrange for the expected casualties. On visiting the
hospital tents of Her Majesty's 2nd and 1/th Regiments I was surprised to find them,
cleared of sick ! The gallant fellows had all but risen in mutiny upon their Surgeons,
and insisted on joining with their comrades ! None remained in hospital but the
hopelessly bed-ridden, who literally could not crawl ; and even of these, a portion,
who could just stand and walk, were dressed, and made to look like soldiers, to tak ■
the hospital guard : no effective man could be kept away ! '"

■iL*?J!.L iT^s»

.1-151^.1^ .oH

AWNHOMlMBxM^Kto^ta-

- B Tope Dy. No. 7 -jyH.
K«i C J. i. M.y 1908

No. 4.451-1.. 1908.

OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN. 315

character of the fanatics, named Ghazis, was to be first disclosed.
A party of these men was assembled near Ghazni ; and had
determined to rid the country of a King restored to power on
the shoulders of infidels. Their rush was checked by a gallant
charge of the Shah's horse, led by Peter Nicholson, and Outram
following them to the heights, whither they had been driven
captured fifty prisoners who were shortly afterwards massacred
hy the King's orders.

A gusty night had heralded a gusty morning when Keane
inwardly bewailing the absence of his heavy guns, planted his
light artillery on the heights opposite the citadel, and posted his
musketeers in the gardens near the city walls. All was quiet
within the fortress as the engineers carried their powder-bags
to the gates. The advance was under Colonel Dennie of the 13th
Light Infantry, and the main column under Sale. At 3 a.m.
all was ready for the assault.

Keane now ordered his field guns to open fire as a demonstra-
tion, whicli was responded to by the enemy. Blue lights on the
walls illuminated the fortress. The enemy, misled by the can-
nonade, concentrated their attention upon the guns, while the
British engineers were engaged in piling their powder-bags at the
Kabul gate. Their work was quickly efiected, though the noise of
the wind dulled the report of the explosion, and heavy masses
of masonry and timbers collapsed in ruin and confusion.

The bugles sounded the advance ; Dennie with his stormers
rushed forward through the aperture, and the leading soldiers
were soon within the fortress. Sale pushed on to support the
advanced party, but was informed by an engineer officer that the
passage was choked, and that Dennie had been unable to force
an entrance.

Sale thereupon sounded the retreat and the column halted
in doubt and anxiety, to be shortly cheered by the sound of the
"advance." A report had been received that Dennie had after
all made good his entrance. The enemy had, h'owever, profited
by the check, and a resolute opposition was met with at the gate-
way. Afghans crowded at the gate, some for purposes of defence,
others to escape from the hail of bullets which Dennie's party
was showering upon them. There was a sturdy conflict and Sale

316 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

himself was cut down and with difficulty regained his feet.
Colonel Croker's support now pushed forward, followed by the
reserve, and the capture of Ghazai was complete.

There remained, however, much hard fighting within the walls,
and the Afghans rushed upon the stormers, to meet their death
by bullet or bayonet. There was dreadful confusion and carnage,
many wounded being burned to death by the blazing timbers.
Some were bayonetted on the ground, others were hunted and shot
down with curses upon their lips. The British soldier was, as ever,
merciful in the hour of victory and never failed to give quarter.

When resistance was over, the Commander-in-Chief and the
Envoy entered the captured fortress, bringing Shah Shuja with
them ; Haidar Khan's zenana was located in a building under the
protection of Munshi Mohan Lai. Haidur Khan was discovered
in a house near the Kandahar gate, and threw himself upon the
mercy of his captors ; he was placed in the charge of Sir Alexander
Burnes and conducted to Shah Shuja, who received him with
courtesy and, declaring his forgiveness, told him to go in peace.

Ghazni was handed over to Shah Shuja. Its capture had been
effected with a loss of 17 killed and 165 wounded.^ Of the gar-
rison, 500 were buried by the besiegers, many more are supposed
to havj been killed outside the walls by the British cavalry, and
1,600 prisoners, with a large number of horses and arms, were
captured by the British force. ^

^ " The European portion of our force has now for five days marched without the aid
of their spirit ration, the commissariat stores of rum having at length been completely
exhausted. The sudden withdrawal of this species of stimulant is certainly a trial to
the human constitution at a period when unwonted labour and exertion, the want
of a good vegetable diet and wholesome farinaceous food, and of pure water, form
a combination of circumstances peculiarly unfavourable to a healthy state of the
digestive organs. But I am fully persuaded that when the soldier has by a few
weeks' use ..become habituated to the change, his physical powers will gain strength,
whilst his discipline improves, under this system of constrained abstinence, and the
troops will enjoy an immunity from disease which will delight those who are interested
in their welfare." — Havelock, II, 52

- Referring to the wounded — " All the sword-cuts, which were very numerous,
and many of them very deep, united in the most satisfactory manner, which we deci-
dedly attributed to the men having b?en without rum for the previous six
weeks." — Atkinson, 209.

The booty found in Ghazni was great, but perhaps the most valuable portion
of it came into the hands of the commissariat in the shape of horses and other
beasts of burthen. The cavalry and artillery, which had become well nigh inefficient,
received, in consequence, a considerable remount ; and the commissariat, as well
as individuals, experienced much relief in the supply of fresh baggage animals, whicjj
they were thus enabled to purchase. — Gleig, page 41.

OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN. 317

Tte fall of Ghazni struck terror into the heart of Dost Mu-
hammad and his sons. Afzal Khan, when

Dost Muhammad's opposi- , j_-l -r> -i- i, 1 a • j: .1

tjpjj ^^ he saw the British colours flying from the

citadel, fled to Kabul, abandoning all his
elephants and camp equipage. His father refused to receive
him.

The news of the fall of Ghazni reached the Amir in twenty-
four hours ; he assembled his chiefs and, complaining of
the defection of some of his subjects, declared his conviction
that, without the aid of treachery, the fortress would not have
fallen.

He begged all waverers to leave him at once, but all professed
their fidelity. A council of war was held, and Jabbar Khan was
despatched to the British camp to treat with the alios. Moha,n
Lai went out to meet him some miles beyond the camp, and Burnes
received him at the picquets ; a tent was pitched for him near
the Envoy's, and he was well received by the British Mission, and
courteously by Shah Shuja. He tendered the Amir's submission,
but claimed on behalf of the brother of Fateh Khan the hereditary
office of Wazir. The claim was rejected, and an asylum in the
British dominions offered in its stead. Jabbar Khan plainly said
that, even had his cause been far more hopeless, Dost Muham-
mad would rather fling himself upon the British bayonets, and
returned to Kabul.

Dost Muhammad now marched out to dispute the progress of
the invaders, and drew up his troops at Arghandeh ; it was not
upon this ground that he had determined to give battle ; but at
Maidan upon the Kabul river. The action was, however,
never fought. At Arghandeh treachery manifested itself; the
Kizilbashes were fast deserting the Dost's standard ; Haji Khan
Kakar had long gone over to the enemy, and scarcely one
true man remained in his ranks. The Amir made a last appeal
to his followers, but in vain. He then dismissed all who were
inclined to purchase safety by tendering allegiance to the Shah,
and with a small handful of followers, leaving his guns in position,
turned his horse's head towards the Hindu Kush. This event
occurred on the 2nd of August, and the news reached the British

318 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

army on the following day. The pursuit of the Amir was at once
undertaken, but a traitor was in the camp in the person of Haji
Khan Kakar ; he had once been Governor of Bamian, and knew
the country through which the Amir had taken flight ; so
appeared to be the very man to lead the expedition. He had
for some fcitne been in treasonable correspondence with Dost Mu-
hammad and, under various pretences, delayed the column as
much as possible. When Outram seemed almost to have the
quarry in his grasp his guide thwarted him.

On the 9th of August, Bamian was reached, where the Haji
declared that the fugitive would halt ; he was, however, thirty
miles in advance. Further pursuit was hopeless, the cavalry was
exhausted and the game was' up. Outram reported Haji Khan
Kakar's behaviour on his return ; evidence of treason was
readily forthcoming, and he was sent as a state prisoner to
Chunar.

On the 7th of August Shah Shuja entered Kabul, after
. , ^. , , an exile of thirty years. There was no

Arrival at Kabul. . .

popular enthusiasm, and the voice of
welcome was still. The objects of the Simla manifesto had been
seemingly accomplished, and the originators of the British policy
were filled with exultation. Now that Shah Shuja was restored
to his throne he was still dissatisfied, finding how much his
kingdom had been curtailed. It was, however, larger than he
could govern.

The British Government had fulfilled its undertaking,
and the time had arrived for the with-

Miiitary problems. , i .• ,i t j -^ , .

drawal oi the army ; but it was obvious
that the measure was at present premature ; the experiment of
leaving Shah Shuja to himself was not to be lightly tried. Both
parties would have been pleased at the withdrawal of the troops,
but the reception of the restored Amir was not sufficiently
enthusiastic to inspire confidence.

The Governor-General considered that half a dozen regi-
ments would suffice to keep Shah Shuja on his throne ; and issued
orders for the withdrawal of the Bombay army via the Bolaii, and
part of the Bengal Army via the Khaibar. Posts were to be

OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN. 319

established at Kabul, Kandahar, Ghazni, Quetta, Jalalabad and
Ali Masjid. Sir John Keane had accurately anticipated these
Orders. Sale with a brigade was to remain in Afghanistan. Sir
John Keane was to accompany the Bengal force, and General Will-
shire the Bombay troops.

On the 3rd of September, prince Timur arrived at Kabul, skil.
. . , , . ^. fully pioneered by Wade. At Ali Masiid

Arrival of prince Timur. , j. , ■ ^ i-

the force had met with a show of resis-
tance, but the place was captured on the 26th of July. It was
in a large measure due to Wade's force that Keane's army had
met with such slight opposition. Through his diplomacy the
Kohistanis had been induced to rise against the Amir, but the
whole affair was an illustration of the lukewarmness of our Sikh
allies.

September passed pleasantly^ and the officers were happy in
the belief that they were to turn their backs upon Afghanistan
for ever. On the 18th the Bombay column commenced its return
march. On the 2nd of October an order arrived for the main part
of the Bengal force to remain in Afghanistan, under Sir Wilough-
by Cotton; only a small portion was to return with Sir John
Keane.

1 " Wherever Englishmen go, they sooner or later introduce among the people whom
they visit a taste for manly sports. Horse racing and cricket were both got up in the
vicinity of Kabul ; and in both the chiefs and people soon learned to take a lively
interest. Shah Shiija himself gave a valuable sword to be run for, which Major Daly,
of the 4th Light Dragoons, had the good fortune to win ; and so infectious became
tlie habit that .several of the native gentry entered their horses, with what success no
record seems to have been preserved. The game of cricket was not, however, so con-
genial to the taste of the Afghans. Being great gamblers in their own way, they
bonked on with astonishment at the bowling, batting, and fagging out of the English
players ; but it does not appear that they were ever tempted to lay aside their flow-
ing robes and hiige turbans and enter the field as competitors. On the] other hand,
our countrymen attended them to their mains of cocks, quails, and other fighting
animals, and, betting freely, lost or won their rupees in the best possible humour.
]n like manner our people indulged them from time to time in trials of strength
and feats of agihty on which they much pride themselves and to their own exceeding
delight, though very much to the astonishment of their new friends, they in every
instance threw the most noted of the Kabul wrestlers. The result of this frankness
was to create among the Afghans a good deal of personal liking for their conquerors." —
G'.eig, page 60.

"The 13th Light Infantry could boast of a very ingenious individual among it^
officers. Mr. Sinclair possessed a great mechanical genius, which he now applied to
the construction of a boat, which he succeeded in rendering comp ete in al respects
during the interval of the rains. Carriages being provided it was conveyed with
its oars, mats, and sails to the lake, and there launched. Now there had never
been seen in Afghanistan before that moment such a thing as a hoat of any
■tlescription." — Gletg, page 72.

320 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The garrison of Afghanis- _ The garrison of Afghanistan was to b&
tan. distributed as under : —

At Kabul — '

His Majesty's 13th Light Infantry.

3 guns, No. 6 Light Field Battery.

35th Native Infantry.
At Jalalabad —

48th Native Infantry, ith Brigade.

Detachment, Sappers and Miners.

2nd Cavalry aad a risala of Skinner's Horse.
At Gliazni —

16th Native Infantry.

A risala of Slcinner's Horse, some of Shah Shuja's troops.
At Kandahar —

42Qd Native Infantry.

43rd „

4th Company, 2nd Battalion, A.rtillery.

A risala of the 4th Local Horse.

Details of Shah Shuja's troops.

To prevent the return of Dost Muhammad a detachment
the Shah's troops with some artillery was sent to Bamian.

The problem of housing the troops was no easy one. The
winter was approaching, and they could not remain camped on
the plain ; they were therefore located in the Bala Hissar,
which stood on a hill overlooking the city, the houses of which
were flat-roofed, and the streets narrow and tortuous. The most
important feature was the great bazar.

On the 18th of October the Bombay force, and on the 15th
that for Bengal, set out on their march.

Departure of the troops. , ,i m i

Macnaghten was to accompany the bhah
who wished to escape the rigour of the winter, to Jalalabad.

1 Gleifj, page 75. The men's arms were for the most part of an inferior descrip-
tion. Old flint and steel muskets had become, through much use, so imperfect in
their hands that numbers were in the habit of missing fire continually, and the best
and most serviceable in the whole brigade was just as likely to carry its ball wide of
the mark as in a straight line towards it. Sir Robert Sale, who knaw the mport-
ance and value of effective weapons, stated these facts at head-quarters. He reminded
the authorities that there were in store four thousand muskets, constructed on the
detonating principle, perfectly new, and never likely, at least with the present force
to be Bullied by using, but he begged permission to arm his regiment from that heap.
♦ * * * but General Elphinstone would not listen to the proposal.

OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN. 321

while Burnes remained at Kabul. The state of affairs, both at
Kabul and Kandahar, was unsatisfactory ; and unpopular and
unscrupulous Afghan agents were already acting in a very different
manner from those of the British. Macnaghten does not appear
to have noticed the sowing of the seed of sedition, and have no
forebodings of evil:

However, in the west, the Ghilzais were demonstrating their
unruly nature, and in the east the Khai-

The outlook. , -^ , • ,- • , , •,

bar was bristling with hostile tribes.
They rose against the detachments which Wade had left between
Peshawar and Jalalabad ; AH Masjid was attacked, and a bat-
talion of Najibs, encamped near the fort, was cut up. The ap-
pearance of Sir John Keane quieted the tribes for a time, but when
he had quitted the pass they harassed the detachments sent to the
relief of Ali Masjid ; and a force under Colonel Wheeler was sent
from Jalalabad to overawe them. His baggage was attacked, but
his operations were for a time successful. Not until Macnaghten
conciliated them with bribes did they sink into temporary quies-
cence.

Sir John Keane and General Willshire returned to India and
the Army of the Indus was broken up.

Honours for the campaign. i » i i i i

Lord Auckland was created an Earl ;

Sir John Keane a Baron ; Mr. Macnaghten a Baronet ; Colonel

Wade was knighted, and a shower of lesser distinctions descended

upon the subordinate officers.

The King and the Envoy spent the winter at Jalalabad, and

_ ^ ... theie was something like a lull in Afghan-

Contemporary politics. . 1 • • T 1

istan. Macnaghten investigated the state

of internal affairs, and found them unsatisfactory. Help from

India was asked for, but our foreign relations distracted the

thoughts of the Government.

The Russian question was now forcing itself into notice, and a

„ . , . Russian force was reported to be on the

Russian designs.

eve of departure from Orenburg into
Central Asia, with a view to threaten the State of Khiva, which
had been throwing obstacles in the way of Russian commerce. It.
was believed, however, that Russia had other objects in view ; and
that if the British Army had not occupied Afghanistan, the-

Vol. III. V

322 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Czar's manifesto detailing the objects of the expedition to Khiva
would have remained unissued. The expedition was the one
subject of discussion in the winter of 1839-1840; matters nearer
home, however, troubled Macnaghten. At Herat, Yar Muham-
mad was playing a game of treachery ; in Central Asia, a British
Envoy was groaning under the tyranny of the Amir of Bokhara.
At Kandahar the Duranis were chafing under the exactions of
unpopular revenue officials. The Kohistanis were already sighing
for the retiirn of Dost Muhammad. Mehrab Khan's country
was breaking out into rebellion against our newly established
authority, and the Sikhs were intriguing against us.

Shah Shuja was averse from granting an asylum to Dost
Muhammad's family, in spite of the recommendations of Mac-
naghten, and would not contribute a rupee towards their support.

The court remained at Jalalabad until the third week in April.
It was now certain that a Russian Army was advancing upon
Khiva. Dost Muhammad's adherents were inciting the Usbegs
against us. The petty chiefs were in a state of doubtful vassalage,
and the despatch of a strong brigade to Baniian was strongly
advocated by the Envoy, As the month advanced Macnaghten
began to think that the Russian expedition was a greater danger
than he had believed.

On the 13th of March news was received of the failure of the
Russian expedition, and one source of disquietude was re-
moved. During the spring and summer, however, two subjects

engaged the Envoy's attention. One was
the conduct oi the Sikhs; the other the
state of affairs at Herat. Since the death of Ranjit Singh the
Envoy was convinced that decisive measures alone would bring
our allies to regard the terms of the treaty. They had rendered no
effectual aid to Prince Timur ; were making light of the obligation
to maintain a force on the frontier, and were engaged in treason-
able correspondence with our enemies in Afghanistan ; and
they were harbouring the rebel Ghilzai Chiefs at the frontier
stations. A question had, moreover, arisen concerning the passage
of our troops and convoys through the Latore dominions.
Without this it would be impossible to maintain our force in
A fghanistan.

OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN. 323

The authorities at Calcutta began to think that a war with
the Sikhs was not an improbable event.

Meanwhile the British Government were lavishing treasui'e
upon Herat, while the chief minister was insulting the British
officers and intriguing with the Persian Court. He was playing
■off one Government against the other. He hated the interference
of the British officers, but bore with them for the sake of the
money which they brought him. Macnaghten recommended the
annexation of Herat to Shah Shuja's dominions, but Lord
Auckland was disinclined to embrace the proposal ; so, instead of
an army, further supplies of money were sent, and Yar Muhammad
continued his intrigues. Sir Jasper Nicolls,^ who had been averse
to the Afghan expedition, viewed with suspicion any proposal
to despatch yet more troops from India ; and Lord Auckland
received in consequence no warlike promptings from the military
side. Nevertheless the burden of Macnaghten's letters still re-
mained the same : nothing could be done until Yar Muhammad
and the Sikhs had been chastised, and Herat and Peshawar re-
annexed to the Durani Empire.

In the meantime in the dominions of Shah Shuja everything
T , , ^ . - ,. , was amiss. Macnaghten was unwillino;

laternal affairs of Afghan- . ° . °

istm. to admit that the people were in a dis-

turbed condition, but awkward evidence
to the contrary was periodically forthcoming. The Ghilzais were
again in rebellion and their chiefs had returned from Peshawar,
probably with Sikh gold. In April our communications between
Kabul and Kandahar were cut. General Nott, who was in command
at the latter place, underestimated the strength of the rebels, and

sent out a detachment of 200 horse to

Rspedition against the i ,i i t-> • n

Ghilzais. Clear the road. Kemlorcements were

found to be necessary and on the 7rh of
May Captain Anderson marched with a regiment of foot, 4 guns,
and 300 horsemen and came up with tie first detachment
near the Tarnak river. The Ghilzais were eight miles distant,
and, as his cattle were exhausted, Anderson halted and opened
negotiations. The enemy replied that they would fight, and

' Commander-in-Chief iu India,

Z 2

324 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Anderson prepared to attack them. Sending his cavalry to the
flanks he marched with his infantry and guns on the 16th, and
found the enemy occupying some hills on his front. Twice the-
enemy charged ; the first attack was repelled by the guns, and the
second by the bayonets of the infantry. Anderson had sent back
the greater part of his cavalry, having heard news of the
enemy's retirement ; nevertheless his victory was complete, and
the enemy fled to their mountain fastnesses, while Anderson
reformed his troops and occupied a position near Olan Robat.
The enmity of the Ghilzais was. however, only increased by these
operations.

Meanwhile affairs had not been progressing favourably in
„ , , . , Baluchistan ; but an account of the

calucnistan. _

troubles there will be found in the
part dealing with that country, and will not be alluded to here.

Colonel Dennie was now about to march with the 35th Kative
Infantry to reinforce the Bamian detachment, and take command
of all the troops upon the northern frontier.

CHAPTER XV.

MILITARY OPERATIONS.

The small force whicli had been sent to Bamian, in the autumn
„ ^. , T, ■ of 1839, was, in the coming spring;, re-

. Operations round Bamian. . ,

leased from inactivity. Jabbar Khan
"was with Dost Muhammad at Khulm. Early in June a party
was sent out, under Captain Garbett, ostensibly to reconnoitre
the passes to the north. It was also believed that the move-
ment would decide Jabbar Khan to seek the hospitality of the
British. He came into Bamian, and the fortress of Bajgah being
found deserted, one of the Shah's regiments was sent to garrison
it. The post was found to be unsuitable, and the temper of
the surrounding tribes hostile. Captain Hay, the only officer
present, fell sick, and on the 2nd of August Lieutenant Golding,
with two companies, arrived to reinforce him. The chief received
his party with a show of friendliness, but on its return to
Bajgah it was fired upon. Two companies of Gurkhas coming
up rescued them, and the force returned to Bajgah. The tidings
of this disaster reached Kabul and the Envoy's anxiety* was in-
creased. In the middle of August sedition reared its head in the
vicinity of the capital, and it was made evident that Sikh
intrigue was at work for the restoration of Dost Muhammad. He,
with his sons Afzal Khan and Alibar Khan, had tasted the bitterness
of confinement at Bokhara. Once the former narrowly escaped
being murdered. Their condition was somewhat bettered through
the intervention of the Shah of Persia, and availing themselves
Escape of Dost JMuhammad of the greater freedom allowed them,
from Bokhara. they effected their escape, and the ex-

Amir was received with open arms by
the Wall of Khulm. He soon found himself at the head of a con-
siderable force. The Usbegs flocked to him, and he determined to
strike a vigorous blow for the recovery of his kingdom. Early in
. September he advanced upon Bamian with about 7,000 men.
In September the Envoy wrote that Turkistan was in arms
Turkistan against US, and that Haibak had fallen

to the Dost.

( 325 )

32 G FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

On the 30th August the Usbegs had attacked Bajgah and^

Codrington's Gurkhas, aided by Rat-
Attack on Bajgah. ^j,^y,g ^fgi^an Horse, had driven them

back ; but the post was no longer tenable, and the garrison retired
to Saighan.^ This post, also, was too weak to hold against a

1 One of the greatest errors committed by the British authorities in Afghanistan
was the splitting up of the disposable forces into small detachments.

In this connection and with regard to aii'airs in general, the following extract
from a letter published in the East India Army Magazine for 1853 is interesting and
instructive : —

" During my residence in Kabul I had opportunities of seeing many papers and
letters connected with the earlier occurrences of the British occupation, and I am
persuaded that had the advice of Brigadier Roberts, who then commanded the Shah's
force, been followed, the later disasters would never have taken place ; but Sir W.
]\Iacnaghten was so wedded to his ov^ti opinion, and so little aware of the true nature
of the people he had to deal with, that whilst he rejected aU advice that militated against
his own fixed notions and preconceived ideas, at the same time he either irritated the
Afghans by his arbitrary conduct, or alienated them by his coldness. Even in the
summer of 1840 Sir William showed how little he was able to understand the nature
of the opposition he might be called upon to encounter, when he quarrelled with
Captain Hay about the unfortunate affair' at Bajgah, though in the opinion of those
best able to judge. Captain Hay did all in his power to prevent the lamentable reti-eat
that then occurred, by making a full report of the state of Bajgah, and the impossibi-
lity of defending it. I know Brigadier Roberts deemed it of such importance, that he
went at night to Sir WiUiam to lieg that the troops might be recalled before the
people of the country could have time (o assemble. Sir William, however, would
not listen to him, but said that Dr. Lord had ordered the troops to advance, and
there they should remain until the Doctor reached Kabul. Immediately this hap-
pened, I believe the Brigadier wTOte officially to the Envoy, pointmg out what
was likely to occur, but still the detached column was not recalled, and was eventually
forced to retreat from the advanced posts of Saighan and Bajgah, a proceeding most
prejudicial to our interests. Lieutenant Sturt of the Enghieers had previously
pronounced those places untenable, but to no purpose, and the fault was most
unjustly visited upon Hay, who was deprived of his regiment shortly afterwards.

"Both Brigadier Roberts and General Nott saw the true state of affairs, and
did all they could for the preservation of the country, but it was the wish of
the Envoy to remove both, and he succeeded with the former, who was most
anxious to remain. It is well known that Brigadier Roberts strongly pro-
tested agamst the site and plan of the cantonments, and pointed out that they
were on too extended a scale, besides being commanded and having a river
between them and the Bala Hissar.

C6 I can well remember that he recommended that forts should be built in echelon
for wings or regiments, which, with mere parapet walls, could be defended by few
men, and that the Bala Hissar should be put in a state of defence, with guns
mounted and troops quartered in it. But those were truly times when wisdom
cried aloud in the streets, and no man regarded her. It was I think at this
period that the Brigadier had store-rooms erected in the Bala Hissar in
which the commissariat stored grain sufficient for the supply of the Shah's-
force for some months, and removed the treasure from the house of Sir A. Burnes
in the city to the Bala Hissar ; yet it is a matter of history that soon after the
Brigadier's return to the provinces the treasure was again removed to its in-
secure position in the heart of the city ; and fell into the hands of the Afghans,
on the breaking out of the rebellion, whilst the Envoy was left without a
rupee .... there is little doubt that had the advice of such men as Nott and
Roberts been followed from the first, the retreat, with its disasters and dishonour, would
never hava occurred, and the British might still have been in possession of Kabal."

MILITARY OPERATIONS. 327

considerable force, and they fell back upon Bamian. A recently
raised regiment of Afghan infantry, under Salah Muhammad,
deserted, and a number joined the enemy.

Day by day the cloud over Kabul grew darker ; an open
enemy was in the field, and the Sikhs were pushing their intrigues
to the very gates of the Bala Hissar. Macnaghten wrote to the
Governor-General, describing the state of affairs, and quoted
a note from Cotton, in which he said there was now no Afghan
army, and that unless the Bengal troops were strengthened the
country could not be held. He himself reiterated his oft-express-
ed opinion that another brigade should be sent.

The 18th September was the turning-point of our fortunes in
. , ^ ,, Afghanistan. On the 14th reinforcements

Engagement with Dost Jlu- . .

hammad at Bamian. Under Dennie, had reached Bamian. H's

first measure was to disarm the Afghan
corps ; he then began to think of marching to Saighan to meet the
Amir's advancing troops, but the enemy were nearer than he antici-
pated. On the 17th he received information that bodies of cavalry
were entering the valley six miles from Bamian, and on the follow-
ing morning they attacked a friendly village. On the 18th a detach-
ment was ordered out to drive the enemy from the valley ; the
force consisted of 2 horse artillery guns, 2 companies, 35th Native-
Infantry, 2 companies of Gurkhas, and 400 Afghan Horse, sup-
ported shortly afterwards by Dennie himself, with 2 more com-
' panics each of the 35th and Gurkhas. Instead of an advanced
guard he found an army in front of him. He, however, never
hesitated, and Mackenzie's guns opened fire. The Usbegs fell back,
followed by the guns. They fled, pursued by the cavalry, who cut
down numbers, and dispersed the remainder in all directions.
Dost Muhammad himself owed his life to the fleetness of his horse.
The intelligence caused the spirits of the British Resident at Kabul
to rise at once. Never was victory so much needed and never
did one promise so many results. Handsome terms were
offered to Mir Muhammad Beg, the Wali of Khulm, which
detached him from his alliance with Dost Muhammad. The fight
at Bamian showed him the futility of resistance. The country
south of Saighan was coded to Shah Shuja, that to the north to
the AVali.

328 FJIUNTIEB AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

These favourable results were, however, only local, and Dost
Muhammad re-appeared in Kohistan, where disaffection was rife.
Sir Robert Sale was ordered to take the field, accompanied by
Burnes. On the 29th September Sale invested the enemy's position
at Tutam Tarra, at the entrance of the Ghorband Pass, and met
with very slight resistance.

On the 3rd October Sale attacked Julgah, a very strong posi-
tion. The guns were light and the

Attack on Julgah. -l , i • i . i jv

ladders short, while the enemy offer-
ed a determined resistance. The storming party of the 13th
Light Infantry made an ineffectual attempt to effect a lodgment ;
but their gallantry was in vain and the column was withdrawn.
The enemy, however, withdrew, and the works were destroyed.
During October Dost Muhammad was flitting from place to
. . ,, , , place with no settled plan of action. On

Anxiety at Kabul. \ i /-v i t

the 11th October he was at Ghorband,
some fifty miles from Kabul, and Macnaghten grew very anxious.
The prospects of a siege of Kabul were anticipated by the politi-
cal chiefs ; guns were mounted on the citadel to overawe the town ;
the guards were increased ; the Bamian detachment was ordered to
return to the capital. Shah Shuja placed an intercepted
letter in Macnaghten's hands, addressed to Sultan Muhammad, pro-
posing that, with his aid and that of the Sikhs, Shah Zeman
should be placed on the throne. The letter bore the seal of the old
blind king himself, and the envoy wrote to the Governor-General'
recommending that no mercy should be shown to the Dost.

The force under Sir Robert Sale pursu d the Amir into the Nijrao
country; on the 18th October they were encamped at Kardarah,
and on the 20th were meditating an attack on the place. On the
21st it was discovered that the enemy had left their exceeding-
ly strong position without an effort to defend it.

On the 27th October Dost Muhammad moved towards the

capital. News of his approach hav-
Encounter with the Dost at ^ reached the British camp at Bagh

Parwandarah. ° j. o

Alam on the 29th, the troops moved out
to meet him. The two following days were occupied in reconnoi-
tring and surveying the surrounding country, and on the 1st
November the force encamped before Mir Musjidi's fort.

MILITARY OPERATIONS. 329

Here it was ascertained that they were in the neighbourhood
of the enemy, and preparations for battle were begun. On the 2nd
November the force came in sight of the enemy posted in the valle^
of Parwandarali. The Nijrao hills were bristling with the armed
population of a hostile country. Dost Muhammad was unprepared
to fight on this day, but an unexp ected movement precipitated the
collision. On the first appearance of the British he began to eva-
cuate his positions, and, at Dr. Lord's^ sug gestion, the British cav-
alry moved forward to outflank the Afghan Horse. The Afghans
were on the hills skirting one side of the pass, the British troops
were on the opposite side. When he saw the cavalry advance, Dost
Muhammad relinquished all idea of retreat. He himself led his
cavalry to the attack. The English officers, who led our cavalry,
covered themselves with glcry, but the native troopers fled like
sheep. The Afghans charged right up to the British position. Lieu-
tenants Broadfoot and Crispin were cut to pieces ; Lord was
stabbed to death, and Captains Fraser and Ponsonby were
severely wounded. Flaunting their national standard in front of
our columns, the Afghans stood for some time masters of the field,
and withdrew from the scene of battle when the infantry came up.
Burnes wrote to Macnaghten that there was no alternative but
for the force to fall back upon Kabul, and begged him to con-
centrate all our troops there. Dost Muhammad, on the other hand,
in the very hour of victory, felt that it was hopeless to contend
against the British. He knew that his success would lead them to
redouble their exertions, and entertained no bright visions of the
future ; however, he had fought a good fight and might now retire
-from the contest without a blot upon his name.

The British neither knew his thoughts nor whither he had

Surrender of Dost Muham- §°^®- ^^ ^^® ^^^ following his victory he

oaad. was before the walls of Kabul, attended

by a single horseman. He told the Envoy
he had come to claim his protection, and offered his sword, which
was returned. He wrote to his sons and coimselled them to follow
his example. A few days later his eldest son, Afzal Khan, came
into camp. Dost Muhammad remained ten days in the camp,

1 Dr. Pereival Lord, a medical officer of rare accomplishments accompanied as
.political officer, the force sent to Bamian.

330 FBONTIER AND OVESSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

but Shah Shiija refused to see him. On the 12th of November 1840,,
escorted by the Company's European regiment, joined by the 48th
Native Infantry at Jalalabad, he commenced his journey towards
India. Macnaghten wrote that he hoped the Dost would be treated
with liberality. The Shah had no claim upon us, whereas we had
deprived Dost Muhammad of his kingdom, in support of our
policy, of which he was the victim. Lord Auckland received the
deposed Prince with becoming hospitality and respect, and allot-
ted him a pension of two lakhs of rupees.

The remainder of November was peaceful. Macnaghten now
Risings of the Duranis and strongly recommended the stationing of a
'^*'^* subsidiary force in the Punjab and the

cession of the districts to the west of the Indus.

The court proceeded to their winter quarters at Jalalabad,
where the Envoy found Cotton anxious to depart, andMacgregor,
the Political Agent, regarded as a father by the district chiefs. Very
little leisure was, however, granted to Macnaghten. The Ghilzais
and Kohistanis had already risen against the Shah, and now the
Duranis were in revolt. They had looked for much from the res-
toration of the Shah Shuja, but were disappointed ; his imperfect
liberality irritated them.

In Zamindawar to the north-west of Kandahar, symptoms of

disquiet began to evince themselves at
Ka^dahan'*^''' °'^°''''' "' ^^e end of 1840. Affairs at Kandahar

were at this time under the superintend-
ence of an able officer, Major Rawlinson, who had superseded Leech.
Major-General Nott, a capable officer of rather irritable tempera-
ment, commanded the troops. Such were the men upon whom,
at the beginning of 1841, devolved the duty of facing the Dur„ni
outbreak. Nott's task was the easier of the two ; to defeat the
enemy in the field. The Zamindawar insurgents had beaten a party
of the Shah's horse, and a detachment, under Captam Farrington^
was sent against them. On the 3rd of January they came up with
theDurani Horse, some 1,500 strong, who showed a bold front, but
the file of Hawkins' guns soon shook them and the infantry com-
pleted their dispersal.

Rawlinson, on the other hand, had to ascertain the causes
of the Duranis' dissatisfaction ; but his views were at variance witk

MILITARY OPERATIONS. 331

Macnaghten's. The latter did not believe in any general discontent,
or that the presence of strangers was hateful to the people, and still
less that the King who himself was said to be desirous of seeing
the last of the white faces was unpopular. He suspected that
the disaffection of the Duranis had been engineered by Yar Muham-
mad, and proofs were shortly forthcoming to substantiate his
theory. The Wazir had long been accommodating his demands to
every change in the political barometer. The disaster of Major
Clibborn, the fall of Kalat, and Dost Muhammad's progress in
the Hindu Khush, encouraged him to raise his demands. At one
time he contemplated a descent upon Kandahar, but Dost Muham-
mad's surrender led him to change his mind. The Zamindawar
outbreak caused the project to be revived, and he fomented the
spirit of revolt, at the same time asking for pecuniary assistance
from Persia, the expulsion of the mission from Herat being the price
offered ; and urged an united attack upon Kandahar while com-
munications between Herat and Kabul were blocked by the snow.
Todd determined to retalitae, and suspended the payment of his
allowance. Yar Muhammad, however, believed that his mission to
Mashad had been favourably received ; that the Duranis were rife
for rebellion ; and that the British Government would forbear and
yet forbear. He, therefore, increased his demands. Todd replied
that he would require some guarantee that the concessions, if
made, should not be thrown away ; and proposed the location of
a British garrison at Herat. Yar Muhammad agreed to a force being
cantoned in the valley on the payment of two lakhs of rupees, with-
out, however, the slightest intention of fulfilling his part of the con-
tract. Todd demanded that his son should be sent to Girishk to
await Government's reply and escort the British force should tie
measure be approved. Yar Muhammad refused, and demanded
either the payment of the money, or the withdrawal of the mission.
The British Agent, therefore, turned his back upon Herat, a
proceeding of which Lord Auckland disapproved, and Todd was
relegated to regimental duty.

In one sense the Herat mission had failed, but some of
„, .,, , , . , Todd's measures were successful ; he had

The withdrawal of the

mission from Herat. despatched, with advantage, Abbott and

Shakespearto Khiva, substantial benefits

332 FRONTIER AXD OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM IXDIA.

tad accrued to the people of Herat, still remembered with gratitude,
the behaviour of the mission had raised the character of the British
nation. His departure, however, was inopportune, as a settlement
with Persia was on the point of being arrived at, and Lord Auckland
never forgave the diplomatic failure. Todd, however, was igno-
rant of this fact or would undoubtedly have remained at Herat.

On receiving intelligence of Todd's departure, Macnaghten
meditated a demonstration in the direction of Herat, beating up the
rebels on the Helmund and crushing Akhtar Khan on the way to the
western frontier ; and wrote to Rawlinson to prepare for the siege
of Herat. Against an armed interference with Herat, however,
Lord Auckland had always set his face ; believing that it was
necessary first that we should establish ourselves in Afghanistan.
Macnaghten's opinion was exactly the opposite. His instructions,
however, were imperative.

It was manifest at Kandahar that the aggressive designs of Yar
Muhammad, who contemplated the seizure of Girishk, and the hosti-
lity of the Duranis in the western districts rendered immediate

operations necessary. A force was, therefore,

Akhtar Khan. -^ "^

sent to the Zammdawar country to beat up
Akhtar Khan's quarters, or intercept his advance. The political
conduct of the expedition was entrusted to Elliot, Eawlinson's
assistant, and he did his duty well. It was not our policy to fight
but to obtain Akhtar Khan's submission and, as his force was insigni-
ficant, it was expected that he would come to terms. The hope
was justified by the event, and at an interview a conditional pardon
was granted, some concessions made, and a dress of honour con-
ferred upon him. The most important condition was the disband-
ment of his followers, and the hope was entertained that the country
would be tranquil Used without further shedding of blood. Raw-
linson was not so optimistic, and foresaw only a temporary
cessation of hostilities, and still considered that, when opportu-
nity should serve, the rights of Her Majesty's Government should
be asserted in a strong and dignified manner.

The Ghilzais, also, were in the spring and summer of

1841 in revolt against Shah Shuja and

his allies. Lieutenant Lynch, of the

Bombay Army, was in political charge of Kalat-i-Ghilzai.

MILITARY OPERATIONS. 333

He attributed the restlessness of the tribes to the fact that
the families of some of their chiefs, who, after the operations
of 1839 had fled to the Sikh frontier, had, at the instigation of the
British Envoy, been east into captivity. However this n ay have
been, the rebuilding by the English, in the spring of 1841, of the-
fortress of Kalat-i-Ghilzai, between Kandahar and Kabul, with the
idea of posting a strong garrison there to overawe the tribes, was
the proximate source of irritation. The proceeding was viewed
with jealousy by the Ghilzais ; and those in the neighbourhood
,, , ,.^^., . assumed an insolent and defiant attitude.

Action near Kalat-i-Gnuzai.

About two miles away was a fort bristling
with armed men, and these grossly insulted Lynch as he was
riding past. To discourage such acts of aggression the troops at
Kalat-i-Ghilzai were summoned to attack the fort. Aided by
Captain Sandeis of the Engineers, Captain Macan, who commanded
one of the regiments of Shah Shuja's force, led his Hindustanis
against the stronghold, and captured it after a brave resistance..
The chief and many of his followers were slain, and the irrit?,-
tion of the Ghilzais was greater than before.

It was a gallant exploit but a great misfortune, condemned
alike at Kabul and Calcutta. Lynch was removed from office,
although, when the circumstances became more fully known,
Burnes took a more lenient view of the matter. It was expected
that the whole country would rise against Macau's detachment, sa
reinforcements were called for from Kandahar. Nott was unwill-
ing to expose his troops during the hot weather, but the political
necessity was great, Macan was in danger, and troops could not be ,
spared from Kabul.

Colonel Wymer, therefore, with 400 of the 38th Native

Wymer's action at Assiya- Infantry, 4 horse artillery guns, and
i-limi. some of Christie's Horse, took the field

in May. The Ghilzais, eager for the fray,
moved down to meet the troops and on the 19th gave them battle.
Night was coming no as they neared Wymer's camp at Assiya -i-Ilmi»
They came on gallantly, but were met with a heavy fire from
Hawkins' guns, which created much havoc. The Ghilzais now divided

into three columns to fall upon the front and flanks, and charged
sword in hand. Wymer was hampered by his extensive convoy, and

lEE AND OrEBSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

his movements being thereby crippled he was compelled to assume
the defensive, but the grape from the guns and the steady musketry
of the sepoys drove them back again and again. For five hours the
fight continued, and then the Ghilzais gave way, leaving many dead
on the field, and during the night the moving lights s howed thatmany
more, both of killed and wounded, were being carried off to their
camp.

At this period the proceedings of Akhtar Khan^ and the Duranis
were again exciting the apprehensions of the Envoy. The Chief
had tendered his allegiance to the King ; the hated revenue officers
had been removed ; Usman Khan had succeeded the old minister ;
and Macnaghten was contemplating other reforms ; but their dis-
affection was more deeply rooted. The whole system of Govern-
ment was offensive and the presence of the British hateful.

May found Alclitar Khan, our implacable enemy, collecting
his forces, and the Duranis were again to be corrected. At the
end of June the Khan with 3,000 men was still before Girishlc
and it was necessary to strike a blow.

Woodburn, who commanded one of the Shah's regiments, was
sent against him with the 5th Infantry,

Akhtar Khan's fight on the j, -i xXaxi, tt t

Heimund. two detachments of Afghan Horse, and

a some of the Shah's Horse Artillery. On

the 3rd of July he found 6.000 of the enemy, formed in six divisions,
on the other side of the Heimund. The fords in the vicinity were
reported impassable. At 4 p.m. the enemy struck their camp and
began the passage of the river. The Duranis made a spiritod attack,
but Woodburn's infantry, supported by Cooper's guns, damped
their ardour. The Afghan Horse did not distinguish themselves.

It was a busy night. The enemy far outnumbered ^^'ood-
burn, but the steady gallantry of his troops achieved the success
they deserved. • Before daybreak the enemy had withdrawn.
A pursuit was out of the question, as the cavalry was unreliable,
and the whole country up in arms. Woodburn, therefore, wrote
for reinforcements and pushed on to Girishk, whence he reported
the rebellion to be more extensive than had been supposed, and
that the rebels at Kandahar and the Heimund were equally dis-
affected.

1 Akhtar Khan was a son of Dost Muhammad.

MILITARY OPERATIONS.

335

August found the Envoy still sanguine and cheerful, but
Rawlinson took a more serious view of the situation. More chas-
tisement was, however, necessary for the Euranis. Srcall detach-
n ents had gained small victories, but the enemy's strength was not
broken. Akram Khan had now joined Akhtar Khan, inspired
with the same bitter hatred.

A force under Captain Griffin, who had been sent to reinforce

Another action with ^^''■^odburn, strong in cavalry, was Sent out
Akhtar Akhtar ichan. agamst them. His troops Consisted of 800

sabres, 350 bayonets, and four 6-pounders,
On the 17th August he came up with the enemy. The Afghan
Horse had not won the confidence of their British officers, and it
was a moment of some anxiety. Here, however, they were associat-
ed with some of the King's regular cavalry and may have felt the
danger of detection. Whatever the cause , they did not shrink from
the encounter. The enemy were strongly posted in a succession of
walled gardens and small forts, whence they opened a heavy
fusillade ; but the fire of our guns and musketry drove them from
the enclosures, and the cavalry, led by Prince Safdar Jang, charg.
ing with terrific efiect, routed the Duranis.

The Ghilzais, too, had received another check. Early in

^, , , , August, Colonel Chambers had taken against

Chamber s expedition °

against the Ghilzais. them part of the 5th Light Cavalry, the

16th and 43rd Native Infantry, and some
Irregular Horse. He came up with the enemy on the 5th, and the
cavalry immediately scattered them in disastrous flight.

Macnaghten's confidence now rose higher, and the only circum-
stance which caused him any disquietude was the fact that Akhtar
Khan, Dost Muhammad's favourite son, was hovering about
Expedition to Tarin and Khulin. He was, however, at this very time
Derawat. arranging for the despatch from Kandahar

of a large force to the Tarin and Derawat
country, to break up the rebellion there. By the end of the first
week in Septemlfer the force was ready for its difficult march. It
was in good condition, well equipped, and took a month's supplies.
It was composed of the 2nd and 38th Native Infantry, a regiment
of the Shah's Cavalry, two of the Shah's Horse Artillery Guns, a
company of European Artillery with two iS-pounders, and a

336 mONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

detachirent of Sappers. It was commanded by Colonel Wymer,
much to the disgust of Nott who had been ordered not to leave
Kandahar. These restrictions were now, however, removed,
and he followed the force. Elliot went in political charge. Al-
though every effort had been rcade to obtain reliable inforn ation,
the want of local knowledge was severely felt, and the difficulties
met with were greater than had been anticipated. Nott joined the
colunm on the 23rd September, and it entered the Derawat country.
Dismayed by this formidable display of force, n any of the-
principal Durani Chiefs came into camp early in October, and
professed their willingness to proceed to Kabul and make their
submission to the Shah.

Akram Khan, however, refused to submit, and it was deter-
m'ned to capture him. One of his own.
Capture o -ram an. countrymen undertook to betray him ; and
although his good faith was doubted, Elliot grasped at the proposal,
and obtained the permission of the General to send a regiment of
Irregular Cavalry, under John ConoUy, to beat him up. A rapid
march brought them to a small fort, where the chief was preparing
to take to the hills. Within 36 hours he was a prisoner in Nott's
camp, and was eventually blown from a gun at Kandahar by
Prince Timur's orders. Before the end of October, Nottwasback
at Kandahar with the greater part of his force, and Lieutenant
Crawford had been despatched to Kabul with the Durani Chiefs-
who had tendered their submission. There were now prospects
of tranquillity in Western Afghanistan, for the Ghilzai and Durani
confederacies had been crushed, and the facility with which
we had moved our regular troops and heavy guns about the
difficult country had produced a good iioral effect upon the people,
who had heretofore only known us by report.

The King was in the Bala Hissar in September 1841, discon-
tented and complaining that he had no-
Situation at Kabul. ^T ■, 1. . J.1 i. -J. r J I, 1
authority, but that it had been usurped

by his allies. He watched with satisfaction the growth of their
difficulties, hoping it would hasten their departure. His health
was also failing, and he was nervous and irritable.

Macnaghten had just been appointed Governor of Bombay^
and was looking forward to a speedy departure.

PLAN OF
BRITISH CANTONMENT AT KABUL

AND ENVIRONS

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Topographical detail from modern Surveys, other detail from a Sketch
6y Lieut Vincent Eyre. R. A

I B Topo. Dy. Wo. 7.2»J. JJq. 4.450-L. 1908.

Bxd, C. J A. M»v 1<«)S.

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MILITARY OPERATIONS 337

Burnes was also at Kabul, in a nondescript situation ; Mac-
naghten disagreed with his views, and treated them with contemp-
tuous dissent ; however in a few weeks Burnes' ambition would be
gratified, and he would be supreme at Kabul.

General Elphinstone^ was in command of the troops, a situ-
ation for which his physical disabilities and ignorance of India
ill-fitted him. Sir Jasper NicoUs would have placed Nott in com-
mand, but he was not a persona grata. Next in rank to Elphin-
stone were Sir Eobert Sale and Brigadier Shelton, both officers of
long Indian experience. The Shah's troops were commanded by
Brigadier Anquetil, who succeeded Roberts, who had been removed
because, divining the danger more clearly, his opinions clashed
with those of Macnaghten.^

The main body of the British troops were in the new canton-
ments. These had been built in the pre-
onmen . ceding year, and were situated on low

ground, open to the Kohistan road. They were nearly one mile in
extent, with contemptible defences. Near by was the mission house,
surrounded by buildings belonging to the officers and retainers
of the mission ; and the defences were very weak. The whole were
commanded from all sides, and surrounded by villages, forts, and
gardens, which would give cover to an enemy. The supplies were
stored in a small fort beyond the cantonments, and the communi-
cation between the two places was commanded by an empty fort
and a walled garden.

The engineers had urged upon the Envoy that the troops
should be located in the Bala Hissar ; which was , however, afterwards

1 Vincent EjTe, page 29.

" I might add that, during the siege, no one exposed his person more fearlessly
or frequently to the enemy's fire than General Elphinstone ; his gallantry was never
doubted."

Vincent Eyre, page 46.

" Let me here, however, pay a just tribute to the memory of two of his staff officers
now, alas ! no more. Few men have ever combined all the excellent qualities
which constitute the good soldier and the good man more remarkably than did
Major Thain of Her Majesty's 21st Fusiliers, Aide-de-Camp to General E;phinstone,
while of Captain Paton, Deputy Quarter Master General, it may be safely
affirmed, that in solid practical sense and genuineness of heart he was never
surpassed. Would that all, to whom the General was in the habit of deferring, had
been equally wise to counsel and prompt to execute with the two above-named gallant
men ! ''

2 See note on page 112. Divided coimsels, friction between the civil and military
power, and the want of a proper adjustment of the functions of each, were, in this case,
as they have been before and since, a fruitful cause of disaster.— Editor.

Vol. UI. «

888 FBONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIOUS FROM INDIA.

given up for the accommodation of the Shah's harem. Sturt, who
succeeded Durand as engineer, had recommended that the
Bala Hissar should be re-occupied and placed in a state of defence.
Roberts objected to the cantonment plan, but the Envoy was
firm and put aside all objections.

The English quickly accommodated themselves to the new
conditions. Lady Sale, Lady Macnaghten, and other English women
took up their abode in the cantonments ; and games and entertain-
ments were the order of the day. Politically Macnaghten con-
sidered that all was well. The Duranis
were subdued ; the Ghilzai Chiefs wen
at Kabul, apparently contented. It is true that Pottinger's re-
ports from Kohistan and Nijrao were not too favourable ; but
Macnaghten made light of them. A small expedition was indeed
to proceed to Zao to reduce some turbulent tribes, but as even
ladies were talking of joining it, this could not be looked upon as a
very serious effort. Xo opposition was met with, and the forts
were destroyed ; but the result was said by Pottinger to be likely
to be unfavourable to us. The Kohistanis exaggerated our diffi-
culties. During the early part of October they remained quiet, but
Pottinger reported the brewing of an extensive conspiracy. Neither
Macnaghten nor Burnes, however, could perceive any grounds
' for suspicion. The Eastern Ghilzais were also breaking out into
revolt, and Pottinger was of opinion that the two were leagued
with the Duranis.

The expenses of the occupation had been draining the revenues
of India to the extent of over one million sterling per annum.
The Board of Control recommended the abandonment of the
country and a frank confession of failure ; nor did the surrender of
Dost Muhammad alter their views. Lord Auckland, however,
decided in favour of continued occupation.

Great Britain was on the eve of a change of ministry, and the
Conservatives had always been hostile to the policy of the expedi-
tion. Macnaghten's opinion was strong for the continued support
of the Shah ; and, fearing the abandonment of this policy, he deter-
mined to practise a system of economy ; and, dangerous though he
tnew the measure to be, commenced by reducing the subsidies
paid to the chiefs. These held secret meetings, and bound them.

MILITARY OPERATIONS. 339

selves by oaths to support one another in their attempts
to recover what they had lost, or to subvert the system
whence these proceedings had arisen. The Eastern Ghilzais were
the first to throw o£E the mask. They quitted Kabul ; occupied the
passes on the road to Jalalabad ; plundered a valuable kafila ;
and cut off our communications with India.

Hamza Khan, the Governor of the Ghilzais, who was at the
Tjottom of the whole conspiracy, was sent by the Shah to recall
them to their allegiance, and to quell the disturbance which he him-
self had fathered. Macnaghten at first made light of the matter,
but in a few days changed his opinion, urging Macgregor to
return to accompany the proposed expedition; but wrote to
Rawlinson that he expected the rebellion would be easily quelled.

Sale's brigade, which was returning to the provinces, was to
stifle the insurrection en route, to Jalalabad. Macnaghten, to
strengthen the force, with a view to the operations against the
Ghilzais, wrote to Trevor, who, pending Macgregor's arrival, was
negotiating with the enemy, that he believed the force would con-
sist of two 8 -inch mortars, two 9-pounders, Abbott's battery,
the 5th Cavalry and Sappers and Miners with Her Majesty's
13th Light Infantry, 35th and 37th Native Infantry.

On the 9th October Colonel Monteith marched from Kabul

,„ . , T>., L, with the 35th Native Infantry, a squad-

Affair at Butkhak. p i T

ron of the 5th Cavalry, two of Abbott's

guns and Broadfoot's Sappers and Miners. That night his camp

was attacked at Butkhak, the first march on the Jalalabad road.

On the 10th, therefore, Sale received orders to march at once with

the 13th Light Infantry, and on the following day he started to

clear the passes. On the 12th he entered the Khurd-Kabul defile.*

Affair in the Khurd-Kabul. ^.^« ^^^"^^^ OCCUpied the heights in Con-

siderable force, and opened a galling fire
upon the advancing column. Sale was wounded at the first

1 Lady Sale, page 11. The Khurd-Kabul is a narrow defile, enclosed by high and
rugged rocks ; it is said that the number of the enemy did not exceed 60 men, but
they possessed considerable advantage over our troops in their knowledge of the
country and in the positions they took up ; for until they commenced firing, not a
man was known to be there. They were concealed behind rocks and stones, and
by a stone breast-work that they had hastily thrown up, behind which, on our troops
entering the pass, [they laid in wait, and appeared to pick off the officers in
particular.

Z 2

840 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

onset, and the command devolved upon Dennie. The 13th Light
Infantry, largely composed of young soldiers, ascended the almost
precipitous heights with great gallantry, rivalled and equalled in
steadiness by the sepoys of the 35th. The pass was cleared, and the
13th returned to Butkhak, leaving Monteith, with the 35th and
other details, encamped in the valley. Macgregor, who had reached
Kabul on the 11th of October, at once joined the camp.
Macnaghten believed that the outbreak was purely local, but Pot-
tinger clearly saw that a storm was brewing. As October advanced
the attitude of the Kohistanis and Nijrawis became more threaten-
ing. Pottinger demanded hostages from the Kohistani Chiefs,
and to this the Envoy consented with reluctance. Mir Musjidi,.
the Nijraf ■ Chief, had now openly raised the standard of revolt,
and his people were gathering round it.

In the meantime Monteith in his .isolated post was subjected
to frequent night attacks. Aided by the treachery of the Afghan
horsemen the rebels were admitted within the lines. An officer-
and several sepoys were killed, and a number of camels carried
o£E. Monteith reported this treachery, but Macnaghten resented
his suspicions. Sale, however, now reinforced him with two regi-
ments of infantry, more guns, and more sabres, and, after a brief
halt, due to want of carriage, the force moved on to Tezin, where
it halted for some days,^ while Macgregor negotiated with the
enemy. The Ghilzais demanded that their former salaries should
be restored, and that they should not be held responsible for
robberies committed beyond their boundaries. Macgregor con-
sented, and the affair appeared to have been settled. -

Macgregor soon learned the value of his treaty. From Tezin

to Gandamak the Ghilzai agents were

March to Gandamak. . .

in our camp ; but there was some nard
fighting for the brigade. The enemy mustered in force and
attacked the column, and the chiefs confessed their inability to-

1 Gleig, page 95. The same caution which had marked the whole of Sir Robert
Sale's proceedings from the outset was manifested in the arrangement of his
Camp in the valley of Tezin. Strong piquets were planted on every side, and not
they alone, but the advanced sentries, were ordered to construct sangars for their own-
protection.

2 The principle may here be enunciated that in Asiatic warfare no terms should be made-
with an unbeaten enemy. It will be illustrated again in the cojrse of this narrative. —
Editor.

MILITARY OPERATIONS. 341

•control the tribes. The baggage-encumbered column found great
difficulty in forcing their way, but Jagdallak was gained with little
opposition. During the next march, however, the heights were
crowded with armed men, and from every coign of vantage a heavy
fire was poured in. Sale threw out flanking parties,^ and^he skir-
mishers dislodged the enemy from the hill sides ; and Captain Wil-
kinson, pushing through the defile, found that the passage was clear.
The march was resumed, but the enemy were not yet done with.
They fell upon the rear-guard and created terrible disorder. The
officers soon restored the young soldiers' confidence, however, and
Broadfoot, Backhouse, and Rennick rallied and re-animated them.
Our loss was heavy ; more than 100 men were killed or
wounded ; Captain Wyndham of the 35th being among the slain.^
Sale halted at Gandamak. Macnaghten, when he heard of
the losses, expressed the belief that it was the enemy's last effort,
and wrote to congratulate Rawlinson on the tranquil appearance
of affairs at Kandahar. On this very day he had decided to leave
Kabul, and did not doubt but that his emancipation was close at
hand.

1 G'ei?, page 105. The usual distribution of the force into advance, main body,
and rear.guard, was of course made ; and the companies allotted for the latter ser-
vice being ordered upon piquet at sunset were in their places and ready to cover
the march of the baggage after the column had moved on. Protection, how-
ever, was required this day for the column itself, as well as for the baggage, and flank-
ing parties were in consequence thrown out to clear the nearest hills.

" Wyndham, who was lame, dismounted from his horse to help a wounded soldier,
and being unable to keep up, was killed when the rear-guard broke before the C4hilzai
. charge.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE OUTBREAK OF INSURRECTION.

November dawned brightly and the Envoy and Burnes were,

from different causes, looking forward to
Stonn warnings. ^j.^ former's departure ; and both were

confident for the future. Others, however, viewed the gathering
portents in a different light. Captain Colin Mackenzie had
told Macnaghten at the end of October that Akhtar Khan
had arrived at Bamian from Bokhara and meant mischief ;
but the Envoy disbelieved the news. John ConoUy also warned
him of a medi'ated rising in the city. The Munshi Mohan Lai,
who had returned from Sale's Camp, declared his opinion that
a conspiracy was brewing and that, if not promptly crushed,
it would become too strong to be easily suppressed. Burnes
promised to act on Macnaghten's departure, and to raise the
allowances of the Ghilzais and Kohistanis to their former amounts.
On the 1st of November, the Munshi reiterated his warning.
On that very evening the hostile chiefs held a meeting to plan
the overthrow of the British. It took place at the house
of Sardar Khan, Alakozai. Foremost among the chiefs was
AbduUa Khan, who was writhing under an insult received from
Burnes. It was determined to attack the latter' s house on the
morrow.

Day had scarcely dawned when rumours of a d'sturbance
in the city reached the cantonment. ConoUy conveyed the intel-
ligence to Macnaghten, who received it with composure. Now a

note came from Burnes, who, while

Murder of Burnes. ,•!• i j-.i ^■ i ^

speakmg slightingly oi the disturbance,
asked for military support. The Envoy proceeded to the General's

(343)

344 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

quarters ; but before assistance was sent Burnes had been cut to
pieces.^

The houses of the latter and Captain Johnson were contiguous.
The latter had spent the previous night in cantonments.
With Burnes were his brother Charles and Lieutenant William
Broadfoot. Before daylight on that fateful morning a friendly
Afghan sought admittance to warn Burnes of his danger ; but his
words were received incredulously. Usman Khan, the Wazir, now
came with the same intelligence, and there was no longer room for
scepticism. The excited populace was assembling beneath the
windows, and the Englishman turned to face the fuiy of the
mob. He sent to the Envoy for support, and messengers to Abdulla
Khan, assuring him, that if he would restrain the crowd, every
effort would be made to adjust all grievances. In vain Burnes,
with the other two officers beside him, harangued the crowd, some
of whom were thirsting for blood ; others greedy for plunder. His
address was of no avail.

Broadfoot was the first to fall, shot in the chest. The crowd
had now become a multitude. A party set fire to Burnes' stables,
and forced their way into the garden, calling him to come down.
He offered large sums of money in exchange for life ; but
they repeated their demand. Charles Burnes and son e chuprassis
were now firing on the mob, when a Kashmiri Musalman, who
had entered the house, swore that he would convey Burnes and
his brother to the Kizilbash Fort ; but disguised as a native, he
no sooner stepped into the garden than he was denounced
by his guide, and the brothers were cut to pieces. The crowd
wreaked vengeance, murdering and plundering to their heart's
content.

1 Troops in Kabul on the date of Burnes' One risala, 4th Irregular Cavalry.

murder. 2nd Regiment of Cavalry, Shah Shuja's

1st Troop, 1st Brigade, Bengal Horse Force.

Artillery. Her Majesty's 44th Foot.

A battery of Artillery, Shah Shuja's 5th Bengal Native Infantry.

Force. 54th Bengal Native Infantry.

Detachment, Bengal Sappers and Miners. The Envoy's Body-Guard.

Detachment of Sappers. Shah Shuja's 6th Infantry Regiment, Shah Shu-
Force (3 companies). ja's Force.

Two squadrons, 6th Bengal Light Cav- On 3rd November, in addition, 37th

ftlry. Bengal Native Infantry.

One risala, Ist Irregular Cavalry. )

THE OUTBREAK OF INSURRECTION. 345

The only movement to crush the insurrection at its birth was
Military measures. ^et on foot by Shah Shuja, who had

been looking down on the disturbance
"from the Bala Hissar. He sent out a regiment of Hindus-
tanis, with Fateh Jang and the Wazir, but it was soon dispersed.

In the meantime Brigadier Shelton, with some infantry and
artillery, arrived at the Bala Hissar, in time to cover the retreat ;
but on that day nothing else was done. Shah Shuja sank
into a state of dejection, and Elphinstone vacillated. The Afghans
themselves admitted that, had steps been taken in time, the insur-
rection would have been at once put down.

Shelton, in his narrative, says that much valuable time was .
wasted at the outset. His report is as follows : — '' On the morn-
ing of the 2nd November I passed under the city wall about seven
o'clock, when the cavalry grass-cutters, who were in the habit of
going through the town for their grass, told me that the city gate
was shut, and they could not get in. All was quiet at this time,
and I rode home, thinking son e robbery might have taken place,
and that the gate might have been shut to prevent the escape of
the thieves. About 8 or 9 o'clock various reports were in circula-
tion, and between nine and ten I got a note from General Elphin-
stone, reporting a disturbance in the city, and desiring m_e to prepare
to march into the Bala Hissar, with three companies, 54th Native
Infantry, the Shah's 6th Infantry, and four guns, all I had in
camp (the remainder of my brigade having been called into canton-
ments). I soon after got another, telling me not to go, as the
King objected to it. I replied to this note that, if there was an
insurrection in the city, it was not a moment for indecision, and re-
commended him at once to decide upon what measures he would
adopt. The answer to this was, to march immediately into the
Bala Hissar, where I would receive other instructions from the En-
voy's Military Secretary, whom I should find there. Just as I
was marching off, a note came from the latter person to halt for
further orders. I then sent in the engineer officer to see the cause;
but he was cut down by an Afghan, in dismounting from his horse,
just outside the square, where His Majesty was sitting. Soon
after this the Secretary himself came with orders to proceed.

346 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

then marclied in, when the King asked me, as well as I could under-
stand, "who sent me, and what I came there for." He was not
allowed to operate upon the disturbed city, and could only cover
the retreat of the Shah's Hindustanis. Shelton was not, therefore,
to blame, but neither the Envoy nor the General appears to have-
recognized the necessity for prompt measures. The wishes of
the Shah seem to have been the preponderating influence.

Next morning all was bustle in the cantonment. Intelligence-
The rebellion spreads. ^^^d been brought that a large body of

men, thought to be enemies, were march-
ing over the Siah Sang hills. It proved to be the 37th Native In-
fantry who had been sent for on the previous day.

A movement was made upon the city at about 3 p.m. By
this time the enemy had much increased in numbers, joined by
the neighbouring villagers. The road between the cantonment
and the city was alive with them. The party, under Major Swayne,
consisted of one company. Her Majesty's 44th, two companies, 5th
Native Infantry, and two Horse Artillery guns. Such a force could
do nothing, and was fortunately able to withdraw in good time.
By some misunderstanding no troops had been detailed to co-
operate from the Bala Hissar ; and even had they been sent they
would have been cut to pieces. The Envoy had withdrawn to the
cantonment and an attempt was made to put the place into a state
of defence. Every available gun was placed in position ; but
there was an insufficiency of artillery. Macnaghten wrote to
Macgregor to recall Sale's force, and to Kandahar to stop the troops-
which were returning to India, and send them to his relief. Neither
of these orders was carried out.

Next day the subaltern's guard of eighty men over the com-
missariat stores was threatened ; and another fort nearer the can-
tonments was in the enemy's possession. The proposal to gar-
rison it had been disapproved by Macnaghten. The King's
Gardens were swarming with insurgents. The communications
between the cantonment and the fort were thus cut, and the
enemy besieging the latter began to mine the walls. Lieutenant-
Warren reported his position, and two companies of the 44th
were sent to reinforce him. However, the enemy attacked them.

THE OUTBREAK OF INSUBRECTIONS. 34T"

in strength, killing Captains Swayne and Eobinson and wounding:
other officers ; and the companies were compelled to retire. A
second party, consisting mostly of cavalry, was sent out, with even-
more disastrous results.

It now became known to the Commissariat officers that the-
General contemplated the abandonment of the fort, with all our
grain and hospital stores. Captain Boyd at once went to the
General, and prayed him to alter his decision and reinforce the
guard. He agreed ; no reinforcement being sent, another appeal
was made. The General, however, was talked over by other officers,
and wavered in his decision. Another urgent letter came from
Warren, and the General promised to send reinforcements after
midnight. The march, however, was postponed until the follow-
ing morning ; but the guard had abandoned the post, and returned
to cantonments. Nor was this our only loss. Shah Shuja's sup-
plies were stored on the outskirts of the city; they consisted of
8,000 maunds of atta. Captain Mackenzie was in charge of
the fort, which was attacked on the morning of the 2nd
November by the armed population of Deh-Afghan. The gar-
rison defended the post throughout the day. Water and ammu-
nition were scarce. They were hampered by baggage, womeiL
and children. Reinforcements were in vain called for. A demons-
tration from the cantonments would have saved them. " On the
3rd November at midday the enemy got possession of Trevor's
house, and it soon became certain that not for much longer cou Id-
Mackenzie hold his post. At last, after a difficult and dangerous-
march, abandoning their post, the detachment fought their way
to the cantonments.

The abandonment of the stores not only threatened the British-
force with starvation, but this evidence of our weakness encour-
aged the waverers among the enemy, who now openly declared
against us. By noon thousands had assembled to share in the
booty, and the troops clamoured to be led against the Afghans.
Lieutenant Eyre^ urged the General to permit him to lead a
party for the capture of Muhammad Sharif's fort ; and he reluc-
tantly agreed to send out 50 of Her Majesty's 44th and 200 native

1 Afterwards Sir Vincent Eyre.

-■348 rRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

infantry. The party under Major Swayne, instead of acting
promptly, wavered ; the opportunity was lost and the General
ordered a withdrawal. The sepoys of the 37th were enraged
and disappointed at being held back, and the confidence of the
enemy increased.

It soon became clear that the insurrection was no mere local
The outposts. outburst ; and our outposts were exposed

to imminent danger. At Kah Darra, Lieute-
nant Maule, of the Bengal Artillery, with his Adjutant and
Sergeant Major, had been cut to pieces by the men of his own Ko-
histani Regiment ; and intelligence now arrived that the Gurkha
Regiment at Charikar, in the Kohistan, where Eldred Pottinger
was Political Agent, was threatened with annihilation. Captain
Codrington, the Commandant, and other officers had been killed ;
and water was becoming very scarce. The General suggested that
a bribe be offered to buy off the Kohistan Chiefs.

On the 6th of November a success attended our efforts. A

party of the 37th Native Infantry, under

Capture of Muhammad i,.^.^,, , -.mi

Sharif's fort. Major Griffiths, was sent against Muham-

mad Sharif's fort, which was captured with
eclat. The garrison fled to the hills, whence they were driven by
Anderson's horse. The rest of the day was spent in skirmishing,
but there was no cohesion ; the several branches of the service acting
independently. Had a general action been undertaken the British
force, in their then temper, could have overcome five times the
number.

The Commissariat ofiicers. Captains Boyd and Johnson, began
to exert themselves to collect supplies from the surrounding vil-
lages ; and were more successful than could have been anticipated.
The villagers sold their grain at fairly reasonable rates and, al-
though the troops were placed upon half rations; there was no
immediate danger of starvation.

Ammunition was, however, now running short, in the General's
opinion ; though in reality there was an ample supply in store. The
Envoy feared that any military measures under a weak commander

Political developments. ^^'^^^ hopeless, and began to tempt the

cupidity of the chiefs. Mohan Lai, who was
residing in Kabul, was the agent he employed ; and his first attempt

THE OUTBREAK OF INSURRECTJOM. M9-

was to bribe the Ghilzais. Two lakhs of rupees were mentioned'
but before the bargain was completed the Envoy withdrew his offer,
which naturally offended the Ghilzais. On the 7th November,
Macnaghten wrote to Mohan Lai to offer bribes to Khan Sharin
Khan, and Muhammad Kumayi, and to assure them that the rebels
would be beaten in the long run. He counselled the encourage-
ment of Muhammad Yar Khan, Amin-ullah's rival ; and altogether
guaranteed 5,00,000 of rupees.

News now reached Kabul that Muhammad Akbar Khan, Dost
Muhammad's second son, had arrived at Bamian from Turkistan.
Mohan Lai suggested the advisability of attempting to bribe him,
but Macnaghten thought it useless, and had more hopes from the
Kizilbash chief and others on the spot ; but stipulated that not
more than half a lakh should be distributed until some return
should have been obtained for the money. Th^ time had, however,
passed when the mere distribution of money could avail.

The insurrection had now been raging for a week, and the
enemy had increased in numbers and daring. The British troops
were disheartened, and the General began to write about negoti-
ation.

General Elphinstone's health had now completely broken down,
Shelton comes into canton- and Macnaghten advised the recall of
"^°*- Shelton from the Bala Hissar. Taking only

one of the Shah's regiments and a single gun with him, the Briga-
dier reached the cantonment on the 9th November in broad day-
light without interruption. Although he was not popular with
either officers or men, he was held to possess sturdy qualities and
never to shrink from a fight ; he was accordingly hailed by the
garrison as a deliverer. He at once inspected the defences, and
saw what a large force was required. The men were spiritless,,
and the outlook was far from promising. It was evident that he
and the General could never pull together, and, through the
absence of a right understanding between them, nearly all their
enterprises were unsuccessful.

The Envoy was now anxiously looking for the return of
Sale's brigade from Gandamak, not expecting that they would
meet with serious difficulties. But no assistance was to come
from that quarter ; the force was moving in another direction.

:S50 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

On the 10th of November the enemy mustered in iorce on the
heights commanding the cantonment, with shouts of defiance. They
posted themselves in several small forts near the walls, and harassed
the soldiers on the works. On the urgent representation of the
Envoy, a party was to be sent to capture the Rika Bashi fort, and

Shelton with two Horse Artillery guns, one
Affair at the Rika Bashi- jj^o^j^tain gun, Walker's Horse, Her Majes-
ty's 44th Foot, the 37th Native Infantryi
and the Shah's 6th Regiment, some 2,000 men, were held
in readiness. The General, however, thought the expedition too
dangerous, and it was abandoned, to the Brigadier's disgust. The
scruples of the General were now overruled, but the enemy had
profited by the delay and the result of the movement was a
doubtful success. The fort was indeed taken on that day, but in
a disastrous and calamitous manner. It was determined to blow
in the gate, and Captain Bellew, the Assistant Quartermaster-
• General, undertook the work. It was, however, incompletely done
and the storming party could with difficulty force their way
through the narrow opening. After heavy losses a few managed
to effect an entrance ; this was enough for the enemy, who im-
mediately evacuated the fort. The storming party was now charged
by the Afghan Horse, and Europeans and natives turned and fled.
Shelton with much difficulty succeeded in rallying them, but again
they gave way before the Afghan cavalry, to be once again brought
back by Shelton. The heavy guns from cantonments were now
playing upon the horsemen and the Brigadier led his men to the
capture of the fort. In the meantime the garrison, finding how
few of their assailants had gained an entrance, returned with new
courage. The Englishmen had endeavoured to shut the gate, secur-
ing the chain with a bayonet ; but the enemy forced the obstacle
and rushed in. When the storming party entered they found
Colonel Mackerell fearfully wounded ; he died shortly after he had
been conveyed to the Cantonment. Lieutenant Bird and two sepoys
of the 37th Native Infantry had barricaded a stable, and were
found uninjured with thirty of the enemy lying dead around them.

1 The conduct of the 37th is highly spokea of. They drove the enemy (who had
got on top of a bastion) with their bayonets clean over the side, where they were
'.received on the bayonets of the 44th. — Lady Sale, page 90.

THE OUTBREAK OF INSURRECTION. 351

On the fall of this fort others were abandoned by the enemy,

who were threatened by Shelton in the position they had taken up

•on the Siah Sang hills ; but there was no attempt to bring on a

■general action. Had there been a reserve and a stronger body of

horse, the infantry would have been more confident and greater

results would probably have been obtained. The capture of

the fort, however, was not without its effect. Supplies were

•obtained and a retreat averted. The Afghans quieted down for a

time, and negotiations with the Ghilzais were resumed. The

Envoy, through his agent Mohan Lai, redoubled his efforts to

set the chiefs by the ears ; and rewards were offered for the

apprehension of Amin-ullah Khan and the other rebel Durani

•chiefs. He followed this dubious course as there appeared to

be so little to hope for from the military commanders ; but

had there been any prospect of successful honest fighting, he would

have preferred that alternative. Capitulation stared him in the

face ; a disgrace of all others which he was intent upon averting.

On the 13th November the enemy, in great strength, occupied

the Bemaru hills. The question of dislodg-
Fighfc oa the Bemaru hills. ing them was the Subject of much discussion

between the Envoy and the Generals :
finally, the former had his way, and a force under Shelton was
ordered out for service. It was composed of —

2 squadrons, 5th Light Cavalry (Colonel Chambers),
1 squadron, Shah's Horse (Lieutenant LeGeyt),
1 troop. Skinner's Horse (Lieutenant Walker),
6 companies, Her Majesty's 44th (Major Scott),
6 „ 37th Native Infantry (Major Grifl&th),

i „ Shah's 6th Infantry (Captain Hopkins),

1 Horse Artillery and 1 Mountain Gun (Lieutenant Eyre), escorted by
a company of the Shah's 6th Infantry under Captain Marshall.

It was nearly 4 P.M. before the troops were ready to take the
field. They marched rapidly, in three columns by di fferent routes,
to the foot of the hills. The guns were delayed ; and our musketry
was wild ev3n at the closest range. Emboldened by the absence of
loss the Afghan horse charged down with irresistible force upon the
British bayonets, and for a while all was panic and confusion, while
the enemy charged through and through the ranks and entirely

352 FKONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

routed them. They soon, however, rallied behind the reserve,,
and under cover of the guns again advanced to the attack ; and
Anderson's Horse drove the enemy up the slopes. The infantry
following carried the heights, and the enemy, abandoning their-
guns, fled along the ridge. Night was closing in, but it was deemed
imperative to remove the abandoned guns. The Shah's 6th Infan-
try easily withdrew one, but the other gun could not be removed-
It was therefore spiked, and Shelton's force returned to their
quarters at 8 o'clock, hampered by the enemy who were, however,
beaten off by Mackenzie's jezailchis. Many on both sides had
fallen in the action of the afternoon.^

For some days the enemy remained comparatively inactive.
The Envoy sent repeated letters for the return of Sale's brigade,
and gave Macgregor very gloomy reports of the situation at Kabul.

On the 15th of November, Pottinger and Lieutenant Haughton
^ ,. , ^ /^u I came in wounded from Charikar, and

The disaster at Chankar.

reported that, after a gallant resistance,
the Gurkhas had been cut to pieces. They gave the following
account of the affair.

Before the end of October the Kohistanis and Nijrawis were in
open revolt ; and, on the 1st of November, Mir Masjidi with a strong
force took up a position at Ak Sarai, cutting off communications
with Kabul. Pottinger was living at Lughmani, two miles from
Charikar, where the Gurkhas occupied semi-fortified barracks.
Reconnoitring parties were sent out to ascertain the exact disposi-
tion of the enemy. Encumbered with baggage, women and children,
it appeared impossible to move the Gurkhas from Charikar, and
Pottinger, sending for help to Kabul, began to strengthen the de-
fences. Many Kohistani and Nijrawi chiefs protested their friend-
ship, but their refusal to co-operate for the suppression of the
insurrection belied their professions. On the morning of the 3rd
the insurgents round the Residency increased in numbers. At
noon the more powerful chiefs were accorded an interview.
Mischief was, however, brewing ; Rattray was shot down and
Pottinger escaped into the castle, where he was soon invested.
Haughton now moved down to the relief, and Codrington, making

1" The Afghans have many advantages over our troops : one consists in dropping
their men fresh for combat ; each horseman takes a foot soldier up behind him, and
drops him when he has arrived at the spot e is required to fire from." — Lady Sale,,
page 64.

THE OUTBREAK OF INSURRECTION. 353

a sortie, united with his force. The enemy were driven from the
garden with loss. As evening was closing in, Codrington, leaving a
detachment, returned to his barracks. On the following day he
came back with four companies to relieve Pottinger's guard and
bring more ammunition. The column, however, met with a check,
and was compelled to fall back with Lieutenant Salisbury mortally
wounded. Many of the Gurkhas fell in the retreat. Seeing little
prospect of relief, and having only a few rounds left, Pottinger
determined after nightfall to move to Charikar.

Disguising his intentions by collecting grain during the day,
he mustered his Hindustanis outside the gate, upon the pretext of
making a sortie, and, avoiding the main road, marched to
barracks.

On the morning of the 5th November numbers of the enemy
assembled round the barracks, and closely invested them.
Pottinger took charge of the gans ; and, moving out to support the
skirmishers, was wounded in the leg. The G-arkhas were driven
from the huts ; Codrington was mortally wounded, and the Adju-
tant, Haughton, assumed the command. The enemy were driven
back from the gardens, but the Afghans renewed the attack again
and again ; the Gurkhas, however, held their ground until night
put an end to the conflict. The unequal contest was continued on
the following days. Three hundred yards from the barracks was a
castle which commanded them, and which it was found necessary to
occupy with a garrison of fifty men, but, through the treachery of
the regimental Munshi, it was induced to surrender. The garrison
had now been reduced to half their original strength ; water was
scarce ; the enemy had increased in numbers and fury ; to shut
themselves up in the barracks was to die of thirst ; to attempt
to fight their way out meant to be cut to pieces.

On the 8th the enemy offered terms ; the condition being
that they should become Muhammadans. On the 10th half a wine
glass of water was served out. On the 11th there was not sufficient
to go round.

At night they stole out to obtain a few drops from a neigh-
bouring spring, but the enemy discovered the practice and shot
them down. Every attempt to obtain water failed ; the men
leaving the ranks in the madness of their thirst, and all discipline
being at an end, they were shot down by the enemy. A Gurkha

•2 A

354 FSONTIEli AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM lyDIA.

liavildar related that the officers gave their men some sheep, and
they sucked the raw flesh to extract some moisture from the
stomachs of the slaughtered animals. It was difficult to load the
muskets, fouled by constant use ; the men's lips became swollen
and bloody, and their tongues clave to the palate. All hope was
now at an end. Two hundred men with thirty rounds apiece alone
remained ; and many were dying of thirst. Pottinger and Haughton
determined on a rapid and unencumbered march to Kabul. Accord-
ingly on the evening of the 13th Charikar was evacuated. Pottinger
'ed the advance. Haughton had been wounded by a ■ abre and
could hardly sit his horse ; Grant (a n edical officer) spiked the
guns and led out the main body, whilst ensign Rose brought up
the rear. The force soon became a disorderly rabble, and it was
impossible to lead them to the capital. Pottinger and Haughton,
exhausted by the pain of their wounds, their services being no
longer of avail, pushed on with a single sepoy and two followers.
The road was unknown, and they had no guide. They readied,
however, the neighbourhood of Kabul, where their dangers in-
creased. Mi-sing their way they found themselves among the
enemy's sentinels and made for Deh-Afghan ; but being challenged
by the sentries, were obliged to enter the city, through which they
eventually made their way to the cantonments. The remainder
of the column was cut up ; Grant being killed within three miles of
the cantonment.^

Macnaghten now learned that Sale's brigade had marched
f^r Jalalabad ; he, however, wrote to Macgregor in the hope of
recalling it. He soon heard from the latter that it was impossible ;
be then asked Macgregor to apply to Mackeson for Sikh
assistance.

The military authorities now represented to the Envoy the

Macnaghten's reoommen- futility of further resistance, but he still

dation. hoped On. On the 18th November he

wrote to the General recommending holding out, and representing

1 It was providential that Major Pottinger had, from his habits as a traveller
through unknown and difficult regions, accustomed himself to ascertain and re-
memb.T the bearings of the most conspicuous landmarks of the countries he
traversed ; it was, therefore, comparatively easy for him to pave the way over the
steep and rugged peaks. — Vincent Ei/re,page 8i. Greenivood, page 202.

THE OUTBREAK OF INSURRECTION. 355

that there was plenty of wood and water, and giving his opinion
that the position was impregnable. A retreat to Jalalabad would
entail the sacrifice of valuable Government property and of the
Shah ; the troops would find no shelter there and perhaps no pro-
visions ; few of the camp followers would survive the march. He
suggested a retreat to the Bala Hissar as a possible alternative, but
with serious drawbacks. He thought it possible that help might
come from Kandahar, when the cold weather caused the enemy to
disperse, and ended up by saying that if provisions could be
obtained he would not entertain a thought of relinquishing the
•cantonment.

There had been many discussions as to the advisability of
withdrawing to the Bala Hissar. It had been recommended by
Start and others soon after the first outbreak. The General had
formed no opinion on the subject and the Brigadier was opposed
to it. It would appear, however, to have been the soundest
course to adopt. Shah Shuja had been watching events with
profound anxiety and alarm. Danger threatened him, real or
imaginary, on every side ; and the small garrison of the Bala
Hissar, under Major Ewart, only consisted of the 54th Native In-
fantry, part of a Horse Artillery troop under Captain Nicoll, and
some details of irregular troops.

At the end of November the enemy had reappeared on the
Second fight on the Be- Bemaiu hiUs, and began to raid the villages
main hills. which had supplied our Commissariat officers

with grain. On the 22n 1 a weak detachment under Major Swayne
had been sent against them without result ; and a council of war
was held. Shelton recommended a simultaneous attack upon the
hills and the village, but was overruled. At daybreak on the
23rd the force enumerated below took possession of the hill.

5 companies, Her Majesty's 44th (Captain Leighton).

6 companies, 5th Native Infantry (Lieut.-Colonel Oliver).
6 companies, 37th Native Infantry (Captain Kershaw).

1 squadron, 5th Cavalry (Captain Bott).

1 squadron, Irregular Horse (Lieutenant "Walker).

100 of Anderson's Horse.

1 Horse Artillery gun.

100 Sappers (Lieutenant Laing, 27th Native Infaatry).

•2 A 2

356 FliONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The solitary gun w;'S placed to command :in enclosure in the
village, where many of the enemy were collected. These sprang
up under the salute of a shower of grape, and, firing a vclley from
their jezails, sought the shelter of buildings and thence kept up
an ineffective fire. As day dawned it was seen that the enem.'
were abandoning the village, and it was determined to carry
it by assault. Major Swayne made a vain atteiipt and was-
recalled.

The movements of the British troops had been seen from th'^ city,
and soon large bodies of the enemy moved across the plain. The
firefrom the enemy's hill, separated by a narrow gorge from that
upon which our own troops were posted, soon became galling.
Leaving fi\ e companies at the extremity of the hill above the vil-
lage, Shelton look the remainder of his force, with the gun, across-
the gorge to a position near the brow of that hill, upon which most of
the enemy were assembling. Here he formed his infantry into twO'
squares, with the cavalry massed in rear. The solitary gun for a
time told with great effect upon the Afghans ; but from repeated
rapid firing soon became unserviieable. The enemy now poured
a destructive fire into the squares, the bulle^:s from which did not
reach them,^ the advantage therefore being altogether with the
Afghans.

Between the British troops and tie brow of the hill there was
some rising ground, which hid the enemy's movements from
Shelton. Those in the cantonments, however, could see a party of
Afghans climbing up the hillside from the gorge and rushing up

lit is astonishing at what an enormous distance the firefrom their long heavy-
rifles is effective. Our men -svere continually struck by the Afghan bullets, when
we could reach the enemy with nothing under a six-pounder. Our muskets were
useless when playing at long bowls. The fact is our muskets are about as bad
specimens of firearms as can be manufactured. The triggers are so stiff that
pulling them completely destroys any aim the soldier may take ; and, when
the machine does go off, the recoil is almost enough to knock a man backwards.
Again the ball is so much smaller than the bore of the barrel that accuracy in its
flight, at any considerable distance, is impossible. The clumsy flint looks also are
constantly missing fire.

" Terrors —

(1) Taking only a single gun.

(2) Failure to gain advantage of the enemy's panic.

(3) Not utiUsing Sappors to build a samjar.

(4) Forming squares against distant fire.

(5) Oavalrj' hemmed in by inf;intry.

(6) Delay in retreating until troops exhausted."
Vincent Eyre, page 113.

THE OUTBREAK OF INSURHECTION. 357

on our infantry. The troops turned and fled. Shelton in the thickest
ol the fire vainly called upon his men to charge. The officers
stood up like brave men and huiled stones upon the enemy.
Captain Mackintosh and Lieutenant Laing and Captains
Mackenzie, Troup, and Leighton were killed. Nothing could infuse
courage into our panic-stricken troops. The cavalry, when called
upon to charge, refused to follow their officers. The artillery-
men stood tri their gun and were cut down. Q'^he field piece was
lost, and the disheartened regiments fled. Shelton, however,
sounding the "halt " stopped them, and they again faced the
enemy ; and the Ghazis taking the horses and limber, but abandon-
ing the gun, fled in their turn. The eiieaiy's cavalry on the plain
had been thrown into confusion by the fall of their leader,
AbduUa Khan, and they fled towards the city. I;i spite of the
representations of Macnaghten, who with Elphinstone was watch-
ing from the cantonment, no pursuit was made. Now was
Shelton' s opportunity to withdraw ; but the moment passed.
The enemy returned to the attack with fresh recruits, and a
.second gun which had been sent out flred on them with effect.
The Afghans' musketry, however, again got the upper hand of
■ours ; the artillerymen were falling fast, and Shelton withdrew the
gun to a safer position. Emboldened by this the enemy redoubled
their efforts, and again the British troops began to waver.

A party of the enemy, headed by a band of furious Ghazis,
againcrawledupthehill, and the last spark of courage that remained
to the British troops was extinguiyhed. Shelton turned to give
some orders, and the front rank gave way ; in a moment the
whole force was flying down the slopes of the hill. The Afghan
horse, seizing their opportunity, dashed upon them, and all was
confusion. The artillerymen made a desperate effort to Sive
their gun, but in vain. Fortunately the enemy did not pursue,
and the disorganized mass gained the cantonment. All was
now chaos, and fighting was to be no more thought of ; the
•enemy destroying the bridge over the Kabul river at their
leisure.^

1 Vincent Eijre, faqe 66. " Our infantry soldiers, both Euroijean and native, might

have taken a salutary lesson from the Afghans in the use of their fire-arms ; the latter

'invariably taking steady deliberate aim, and seldom throwing away a single shot ;
iwhereas our men seemed to fire entirely at random, without any aim at all."

358 FBONTIER AXD OVEESEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Only two courses now remained open ; and the political and
military chiefs began to take counsel. The question of concen-
tration in the Bala Hissar was negatived by the military, and the
envoy began to consider about negotiating. Elphinstone strongly
recommended this course. On the 25th of November, Macnaghten
sent to meet at the bridge the chiefs— Sultan Muhammad Khan,
Barakzai, and Mirza Ahmed Ali, Kazilbash.

Captains Lawrence and Trevor went out to interview them,
and the conference lasted two hours. Sultan Muhammad Khan's
tone was insolent and his terms impossible and the party pro-
ceeded to Macnaghten in cantonments.

The discussion was long and animated ; Muhammad insisting
that as conquerors the Afghans should dictate the terms. These
were that the British should surrender at discretion, as prisoners of
war, and give up their arms, ammunition, and treasure. The terms
were resolutely rejected. " We shall meet then on the field of bat-
tle," said Sultan Muhammad. " At all events we shall meet at the
day of judgment," replied Macnaghten. And so the conference
ended. Thus ended the first attempt to secure, by negotiation, the
safety of our discomfited troops. While this movement was in pro-
gress a strange sight might have been seen ontheramparts of the
British cantonment. Over the low walls the European soldiers
were conversing with their Afghan enemies. The Afghans, armed
to the teeth, came clustering round ; many of our soldiers went out
unarmed amongst them, and were to be seen familiarly shaking
hands with those whom the day before thev had met on the field
of battle. The Afghans were giving vegetables to the men of the
44th Regiment, and declaring that everything had been amicably
settled between the two contending armies.

The advent of Muhammad Akbar Khan had for some time
been expected. During October he was at

Akbar Khan's return. . ^ ^ ■ ^ t

Bamian, watching the progress oi events.
His presence undoubtedly encouraged the Afghans, though
there is no proof that he played an active part in the early days
of the insurrection. His appearance at the capital was hailed with
delight by the insurgents. The British, on the other hand, did not
fear that his presence would add to their embarrassments,
the fact that so many of his family were prisoners in our hand

THE OUTBREAK OF INSURRECTION 359

being considered a guarantee for his behaviour. Akbar Khan did
not at once assume the direction of affairs ; Muhammad Ziman
Khan, a humane and honourable man, a cousin of Dost
Muhammad, having already been proclaimed King. His nephew,
Usman Khan, of whom Macnaghten entertained a high opinion,
was deputed to negotiate with the British Minister. The
negotiations dragged on, and the supplies of the Army
were dwindling ; this appeared to Akbar Khan his strong-
est weapon, and he threatened with death any who should
assist the British with provision^'. The Envoy was, however, as
hopeful as the General was pessimistic. The former, through the
medium of Mohan Lai. was attempting to secure the assistance of
the hostile tribes by bribery, knowing the avaricious nature
of the Afghan. Th's would have been a comparatively simple
matter had all been unanimous, but one tribe bid against another
and the difficulties of the situation were only increased.

On the first of December supplies for barely eight days
remained in store. The camp followers

Distress ill the girri5on. . . i i if i r

were recaivmg only naii a pound oi
ner diem, and the cattle were without proveider, and
had to be fed up on twigs and the bark of trees. Both Elphin-
stone and Johnson represented the seriousness of the situa-
tion ; and the latter urged the necessity of an early retreat to
Jalalabad ; Init Macnaghten still temporised. Both the General
and the Envoy knew that the troops were not to be trusted, but the
Envoy, jealous of his country's honour, wasloth to throw away the
chance that a turn of the wheel of fortune might bring. On the.
5th of December the enemy completed the destruction of the bridge-
over the Kabul jiver. The river was now fordable, but it was a
disgrace that the enemy should have been enabled to destroy it in
the face of 5,000 troops. A small number of the enemy, too, on the
Abandonmeat of Muham- 6th of December, climbed the walls of
mad Sharif's fort. Muhammad Sharif's fort,^ and the garri-

son abandoned it at once, and no efiort was made to re-capture

1 Lady Sale, page 77. "I often hear the Afghans designated as cowards : they are a
fine manly looking set, and I can only suppose it varies from the British idea
among civilized people that assassination is a cowardly act. The Afghan
never scruple to use their long knives for that purpose, ergo they are cowards ; but
they show no cowardice in standing as they do against guns without using any
themselves, and in escaliding and taking forts which we cannot retake."

SCO FnONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

it. The troops were becoming daily more and more demoralized.*
The Envoy and the General were now in constant correspondence
astothebest way to preserve the army and British honour. The
former counselled a withdrawal to the Bala Hissar. declaring a
retreat to Jalalabad without terms to be impracticable. He also
suggested that provisions might be obtain -cl by means of night
attacks ; but the General would have none of it.

On the 8th of December Macnaghten wrote to the General
a sking him if it was his opinion that a retreat upon the most favour-
able terms was the best and only policy to pursue. The General
replied that he considered this the only thing to be done ; and
tliis view was concurred in by Brigadiers Shelton and Anquetil and
Colonel Chambers. In spite of this the Envoy sought an interview
and persuaded Elphinstone to make one more attempt to obtain
supplies, and it was determined to send a party the next morning,
with Captain Johnson, to the village of Khoja Eiwash, four miles
from cantonments, where it was believed that a considerable
quantity of grain was stored. Preparations were to be made for a
start at 2 A.M. Eventually the enteiprise was abandoned.

Cheering intelligence now arrived from Jalalabad. Sale's little
garrison had sallied out and defeated thii

News from Jalalabad. i i i

enemy ; and the Envoy hoped that the
example would stimulate the efforts of the military at Kabul ;
but his hopes were soon dissipated. The General only saw another
reason for entering into terms with the enemy. The hope of rein-
forcements from Kandahar was rapidly waning, Maclaren's
brigade having met with insuperable difficulties. On the 11th one
day's food remained for the fighting troops, and the followers were
starving. Food could not be purchased, as the villagers would
not sell; nor could it be obtained by force, for the soldiers would
not fight. Macnaghten had done his best but now despaired of mili-
tary success. Nothing remained but negotiat'on or death by

starvation ; so he drew the rough draft

Discussion of the treaty. <• . i . ^ i ^, ■ r ■

01 a treaty, and met the Aighan Chiefs in
conference. The meeting took place on the banks of the river.

' Lad;/ Sate, page 116. It is more than shocking, it is shamoful, to liear the wav
tha officers go on croiljing before the men is sufficient to dispirit them, and
prevent their fighting for us.''

THE OUTBREAK OF INSURRECTION. 361

about one mile from cantonments. Captains Lawrence, Trevor,
and Mackenzie, with a few troopers, accompanied tlie Envoy. The
Chiefs of all the principal tribes in the country were present. The
proposed treaty, in brief, was as follows : —

(I) The Kabul force to retire to India via Peshawar.

*(2) The Sardars to safeguard the journey and provide provisions
and carriage.

(3) The Jalalabad garrison to retire to Peshawar as soon as the Envoy
should be satisfied that their progress would be uninterrupted.

(4) The Ghazni garrison also to withdraw.

(5) The Kandahar troops to march as soon as arrangements could be
made and the season should permit.

(6) The restoration of Dost Muhammad's property.

(7) The property of British officers to be sent to India so soon as oppor-
tunity offered.

(8) Shah Shuja to remain in Afghanistan with a pension of one lakh of
rupees or to accompany the force to India.

(9) Should the Shah accompany the British, such of his family as
could not accompany him to remain in the Bala Hissar.

(II) When Dost Muhammad should return, Shah Shuja's family to pro-
ceed to India.

(12) Four British officers to be left as hostages for the fulfilment of the
above conditions.

(13) Influential chiefs to accompany the column.

(14) Afghanistan to treat with foreign powers through the British
Government.

(15) Should the Afghans desire it, a British Resident to be posted to
Kabul.

(16) No one to be molested for the part he took in the war.

(17) From date of signing, provisions to be supplied on payment.

(18) British troops which cannot leave with the returning column to
be well treated.

The conference lasted two hours ; the terms of the treaty were
discussed with comparative calmness and moderation, and
the main points agreed to by the Chiefs. It was resolved
"that the British troops should evacuate their cantonments within
three days, and that the Chiefs should send in provisions for their
use. Captain Trevor accompanied the Khans to the city " as
a hostage for the sincerity of the Envoy."

362 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The Envoy justified his conduct in the following; words : " The
whole country, as far as we could learn, had risen in rebellion; our
communications on all sides were cut oS ; almost every public offi-
cer, whether paid by ourselves or His Majesty, had declared for the
new governor, and by far the greater number even of His Majesty's
domestic servants had deserted him. We had been fighting; forty
days against very superior numbers, under most disadvantigeous
circumstances, with a deplorableloss of valuable lives ; in a day or
two we must have perished from hun'^er, to sw nothing of the ad-
vanced season of the year and the extreme cold, from the effects of
which our native troops were suffering severely. I had been re-
peatedly apprised by the military authorities that nothing could
be done with our troops ; and I regret to add that des ^rtions to the
enemy were becoming of frequent occurrence among our troops.
The terms I secured were the best obtainable, and the destruction of
15,000 human beings would little have benefited our country, whilst
the Government would have been almost compelled to avenge our
fate at whatever cost. We shall part with the Afghans as friends,
and I feel satisfied than any government which may be established
hereafter will always be disposed to cultivate a good understanding
with us. A retreat, without terms would have been impracticable.

It is true that, by entering into terms, we are prevented from
undertaking the conquest of the entire country — a measure which,
from my knowledge of the views of Government, I feel convinced
would never be resorted to, even were the means at hand. But such
a project, in the present state of our Indian finances, and the requisition
for troops in various quarters, I knew could not be entertained."

Orders were sent for the evacuation of the Bala Hissar, and it
was advertised that the retreat would commence in two days.
The chiefs withheld the promised supplies, but small quantities of
grain were procured from the Bala Hissar. New arms and accou-
trements were obtained by the soldiers from the stores, and the
camp-followers were supplied with ammunition.

The Bala Hissar was evacuated by the British troops on the

Evacuation of the Bala 13th of December ; Akbar Khan having

^'^^^'■- promised a safe passage to cantonments.

The packing and loading of 1,600 maunds of wheat occupied

twenty -four hours of precious time, and the force was compelled

TBE OUTBREAK OF INSURRECTION. 363

to withdraw before all had been loaded up. It was 6 o'clock,
dark and bitterly cold, when the force began to march slowly
out of the Bala Hissar. It was now whispered that a trap had
been laid for the destruction of the force. Scarcely had it
cleared the gate when a rush was made to enter the Bala
Hissar. The gates were immediately closed, and the King's troops
on the walls commenced an indiscriminate fire upon friend and
foe. The Siah Sang Hills were bristling with armed tribesmen, and
Akbar Khan stated that the force must halt till the morrow. The
miseries of the night were succeeded by the perils of the dawn.
The force was only 600 strong, and the enemy mustered in his
thousands on the road. Happily Akbar Khan was true to his
word. The rear-guard was attacked, but the chief himself inter-
vened, and at 10 o'clock cantonments were reached. The British
authorities called upon the chiefs to send in the provisions which
they had promised ; the atter demanded the cession of the forts
in the vicinity of the cantonments ; this was agreed to. Provisions
commenced to come in slowly, but no carriage was supplied.
Outrages were committed under ' e noses of the guards, but not
a shot was fired upon the plunderers. Nothing in fact was to be
done to hurt the feelings of " our new allies." Both parties were
r.nxious to postpone the day of departure, and each suspected the
good faith of the other. Macnaghten still hoped for the arriviil
of Maclaren's brigade from Kandahar ; not knowing that it had
retraced its steps. •

Snow began to fall on the 18th of December, and the force
Preparations to leave looked upon this new peril with dismay.
Kabul. The 22nd was now fixed upon as the

day of departure, and orders were sent for the evacuation of
Ghazni, Kandahar, and Jalalabad. Money wa> paid to the
chiefs for cattle which were never received; and it was
beheved that Muhammad Khan was employing the funds so
obtained for our destruction. Macnaghten now heard of the re-
treat of Maclaren's brigade, and relinquished all hope of beating
the enemy in the field. Diplomacy alone re nained. While
treating with the Barakzais, offers were also being made to the
Ghilzais and Kizilbashis. Meanwhile the demands of the Sardars
were increasing. They called upon us to deliver up our arms

3C4 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

•and ammunition, and to surrender the married families as hostages,
for the fulfilment of the conditions of the treaty. Shelton was
demanded as a hostage, but the proposal was declined. On the
21st of December Lieutenants Conolly and Airey were handed over.
On the following day Lieutenant Eyre, the Commissar}- of Ordnance,
Mas ordered to conduct Zaman Khan over the magazine and allow
him to take what he fancied. The Envoy sent his carriage and horses
as a present to Akbar Khan. He began to despair of the Ghilzais,
■and to doubt t^ie wisdom of his policy. On the 22nd Akbar Kh".n
sent Captain ^•^kinner with a string of fresh proposals. It was sug-
gested that on the following day Akbar Khan and the Ghilzais
should unite with the British troops outside cantonments, attack
Mahmud Khan's fort, and seize Aminullah Khan ; and finally
an offer of the latter 's head was made for a consideration.
Macnaghten sccrnfully rejected the offer. Other proposals were
that the English should remain in Afghanistan until the spring and
then withdraw as if of their own free will. Shah Shuja was to
remain as King with Akbar Khan as Ins Wazir. The price, an
annuity of four lakhs and a bonus of thirty lakhs for Akbar
Khan.

The Envoy accepted these proposals and the delegates returned
to the city. The next day Macnaghten was restless and excited, and
sent for the General to acquaint him with the proposals. The latter
was startled, and asked the Envoy if he did not suspect treachery ;
and in spite of his assurances recommendedhim to consider before
lie committed himself to such a perilous cour e. His warnings
fell upon deaf ears. On his return to his quarter j he wrote a letter,
againpointing out the dangers; but it never reached its destination.

At noon Macnaghten, Lawrence, Trevor, Mackenzie, and a
f LW horsemen set out on their ill-omened
Murder of Macnaghten. e^.p^dition. Shelton was otherwise em-
ployed and was unable to attend them. The troops v\-ere not
ready, and Macnaghten bitterly complained of the military ar-
rangements. Mackenzie was sent back for an Arab horse which
Akbar Khan had coveted, and Lawrence was ordered to hold him-
self in readiness to communicate with the King. Suspicious ap-
pearances roused the apprehensions of all except the Envoy.
Midway between Mahmud Khan's fort and the bridge, about 600
yards from the cantonment, were some small hillocks, on which

THE OUTBREAK OF INSURRECTION. 365-

jhocls had been spread by some of Akbar Khan's servants. The
party dismounted and sat down, and the business of the confer-
ence opened. Akbar Khan asked the Envoy if he was prepared
to carry out the proposals of the previous evening ; Macnaghten
assented. Afghans were now gathering round, and Lawrence and
Mackenzie suggested that the intruders should be removed. Akbar
Khan, however, said that their presence was of no consequence.
Scarcely were the words uttered when the Envoy and his compa-
nions were violently seized from behind. There was a scene of
terrible confusion. The officers of the staff were dragged away,
and each compelled to mount a horse ridden by an Afghan Chief.
Soon they were running the gauntlet through a crowd of (7A^'^^■s,
who struck at them as they passed. Trevor slipped from his seat
and was cut to pieces ; Lawrence and Mackenzie, more fortunate,
reached Mahmud Khan's fort alive. Meanwhile the Envoy was
struggling on the ground with Akbar Khan. Exasperated by
the resistance of his victim the latter drew a pistol and shot
Macnaghten through the body, which was hacked in pieces by the-
knives of fanatics.

The capitu'ation.

No attempt was made to avenge the Envoy's death which
was not generally known until the next
day ; but the on-lookers must have been
aware that some violence had been committed. General Elphin-
stone ordered that the safety of the Envoy should be an-
nour.ced to the troops. The day had been one of intense anxiety.
The Afghans in the cantonment had been evited, and a lull
supervened. As the evening advanced, however, the confu-
sion in the city was such that the troops manned the canton-
ment works in anticipation of coming danger. The Ghnzis had
expected that the troops would avenge the Envoy's death ; but
no such idea was entertained. A letter from Captain Lawrence
on the 24th of December confirmed the runour of the murder ;
and stated that the chiefs wished to continue nego iations, on the
lines of the treaty initiated by Macnaghten. Maj r Pottinger
was selected as the fittest person to deal with the situation..
In the evening he met the four senior military officers. A letter
had been received from the principal chiefs, with a memorandum.
of their terms for the safe conduct of the army to Peshawar..

366 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

The main features were the immediate evacuation of Ghazni,
Kandahar, Kabul, and JalaUibad; the restoration of Dost Muham-
mad ; and that Shah Shuja should be allowed to follow the bent of
his own inclinations. A certain number of English gentlemen
were to be left as hostages, and Afghan Chiefs, by their presence,
were to guarantee the safe passage of the troops to the frontier.
Large sums of money were of course, in addition, to change hands.
Had Pottinger received the least encouragement from the m'litary
chiefs he would have rejected the terms; but, under the circum-
stances, the treaty was agreed to. Needless to say, the Afghans
very shortly made further demands.

On the 26th of December encouraging letters were received
from Macgregor at Jalalabad, and from Mackeson at Peshawar,
announcing that reinforcements were on their way from India,
and urging the authorities to hold out to the last. Again,
Pottinger urged resistance, but the Council of War would not
hear of it, and diplomatic intercourse with the enemy was re-
newed. On the 27th of December fourteen lakhs of rupees were
signed away. All but six field pieces were to be given up to the
Afghans. The soldiers chafed under the indignity, but the
chiefs could not bring themselves to risk a renewal of the con-
flict, by openly refusing to accede to the demand. Pottinger
determined to procrastinate and gave up the Shah's guns in
pairs on successive days. From day to day guns, wagons,
small arms and ammunition were surrendered. The hostages
were given up ; and Captains Walsh and Drummond with
Lieutenants Warburton and Webb were sent to join ConoUy
and Airey. They were all well treated by the chiefs. The
officers would not allow their wives to fall into such treacherous
hands, though the Afghan were particularly anxious to obtain
them also as hostages. On the 29th the sick and wounded were
sent into the city, in charge of Drs. Berwick and Campbell. On
the 1st of January, 1842, the ratified treaty was sent in, bearing
the seals of eighteen Afghan Sardars. There were other causes of
humiliation. The Ghazis were insulting our people at their very
gates, and bearding theai at the muzzles of their guns. They drove
off the purchased cattle and ill-treated their attendants; and the
British authorities ordered that the Ghazis should not be molested.

THE OUTBREAK OF INSURRECTION. {J67

The Afghans had triumphed so long with impunity that they
now believed the English sunk into hopeless cowardice, and as
patient of insult and injury as a herd of broken-spirited
slaves. Rumours of the dangers threatening the retreat were re-
ceived from the city, and that treachery menaced our wretched
iorce. Mohan Lai sent repeated warnings that the chiefs were not
to be trusted, and that the troops would be attacked so soon as
they quitted cantonments. ' Other warning notes of a still more
ominous character were sounded at this time. Worse than all, the
snow had been falling heavily and winter had set in with great
severity. All preparations for the march had been made. The
officers had collected such of their property as they could carry
with them, and destroyed the remainder. On the evening of the 5th
of January the engineers received orders to cut passages through
the walls to facilitate the egress of the troops ; and on the following
day the British force commenced its ill-fated retreat.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE RETREAT FROM KABUL.

While Elphinstone was ensnared at Kabul, Sale was holding out
„ , , . , manfully at Jalalabad. Whether he

■Sale s Brigade. , i n V i t^ i i

should have returned to Kabul or main-
tained his ground at Gandamak is a problem inviting discussion.
Probably the presence of the brigade would have saved Kabul ;
but General Sale did not consider that he could reach it. He would
iave been obliged to leave 300 sick under a guard which he could
not trust ; he had insufficient transport ; and was short of am-
munition. At Gandamak he could not command a day's provisions
or water ; and would have been hemmed in by hostile tribes which
could either have burnt Jalalabad or, holding it, have left no alter-
native but a retreat to Peshawar. On the 10th of November news
of the outbreak at Kabul had been received, and a requisition for
Sale's brigade. The military objections above enumerated, written
by Sale five months' subsequently, were not then existent in their
entirety. The irregulars were not then known to be treasonable,
nor the surrounding country hostile. Food was procurable, and
the valley of Gandamak fertile. The prospects were encouraging ;
provisions Vere coming in and the Ghilzai Chiefs making their
submission. Mir Afzal Khan, however, possessed a fort two
miles from the camp and was beginning to molest us. It had been
suggested that the fort should be taken, but Sale would not agree
to this course. However, Havelock resumed his arguments and
was partially successful, to the delight of Broadfoot and Back-
house. Not, however, until 5 p.m., were orders issued for the
.attack. The enemy fled and some of the Shah's troops under
Captain Gerard were installed as garrison. The spirits of the troops
rose and the enemy were awakened from their belief that Sale was
.afraid to attack them.

A council of war was now held ; the majority decided against
the proposed relief of Elphinstone's force, and it was det •<

( 369 )

Vol. III.

370 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXi:' EDITIONS FROM INDIA.

that the Brigade should throw itself into Jalalabad. The proposal
for the retention of Gandamak found no favour.

On the 11th of November the force commenced its march, with
as little baggage as possible, most of the transport animals having
been looted when out grazing. The property left at Gandamak
was entrusted to the care of the Shah's Irregulars ; and, as soon as
Sale's brigade left, the cantonment was attacked, the Janbaz,
true to their character, deserting to the enemy, the property was
looted, the cantonment burnt to the ground, and the surrounding
country rose in open revolt.

The march to Jalalabad was accomplished without any serious
difficulty. On the morning of the 12th, however, the tribes attacked
the rear-guard and attempted to carry off the baggage. A

running skirmish for a distance of some

Eear-guard action. -i i i in i-j.- ^

miles brought out the fine qualities oi our
troops, their admirable discipline and steadiness under fire,
and the rapidity of their movements. The depredators were dis-
persed, and the remainder of the march was undisturbed. Dennie
skilfully drew the enemy into his toils, and exacted heavy retribu-
tion. Placing the cavalry in ambush, the infantry attacked ;
then simulated a retreat ; when the enemy, making a headlong pur-
suit, were drawn into open ground where the cavalry charged and
cut them up, until their right arms were weary from the- blows-
which they struck. The Afghans, thinking that the brigade was
making the best of its way to India, fled as it unexpectedly entered
Jalalabad, which was occupied without a shot being fired. The
town, however, was soon surrounded by rebels, who threatened
death to the infidels if they did not at once quit it. The place
lacked effective defences, and the troops were almost as much
exposed as they would have been in the open. Guards were posted
at the gates and an inlying piquet told off ; the remainder lay down
to rest, with their officers beside them, and Sale summoned the
Commanders to a Council of War.

It was debated whether it would be expedient to abandon
T,, , J , the town, the extent of which rendered

Plan of defence. ■, -i-m i. j i r t i , ■ i ■■

it diiiicuit to defend, and to withdraw
to the Bala Hissar, which was surrounded by a wall, and offered
sufficient accommodation for the brigade, or to hold the former,

THE METRE AT FROM KABUL. 371

Dennie and others considered that the abandonment of the town
would be interpreted as a confession of weakness, and it was decided
to continue to hold it. Its defences now called for earnest attention.

The perimeter was upwards of 2,300 yards, the trace was vi-
cious ; it had only a few hundred yards of parapet two feet high,
the population was disaffected, and there was ample cover for an
enemy in the shape of ruined forts, mosques, and gardens within
thirty yards of the walls. Captain Broadfoot and other officers
mspected the existing works with difSculty. On the north side the
wall rose to a great height towards the town, but sloped to the
exterior, where heaps of rubbish made it everywhere accessible.
The surrounding ruins were occupied by the enemy, and the posts
held by the troops were untenable. Had the enemy attacked, the
fight would have developed into a street combat.

The engineers, aided with a will by the troops in garrison, at
once set to work. Wood and iron had to be collected, for there
were no supplies of either. The former was obtained from ruined
houses, and the latter from the surrounding country. Difficulties
were made to be overcome, and there were no such things as im-
possibilities at Jalalabad.^ Before, however, the work coidd be
put in hand, it was necessary to give the enemy a taste of our quality.

First fi ht t T 1 1 b d "^^'^ ^^^ ^^ November was fixed for the

purpose. Monteith of the 35th Bengal

Infantry was to give the enemy battle with a force of 1,100 men;

At early dawn he ascended one of the most commanding edifices

in the city, and examined the ground and the enemy's depositions.

Some 5,000 of the latter were gathered on the hill-sides and in

enclosures on the plain ; they appeared to have little discipline, but

were sturdy and well-armed. Monteith, having concluded his

inspection, placed himself at the head of his men. The little force

was well-composed and well-commanded. The guns not

taken, covered the advance from the ramparts. What the

1 Olcig, page 144. In Jalalal ad a more important field of usefulness was afforded
to him. (Major Sinclair, see aiite.) Tliere -B't s not a mill in the place, and hence the
corn which the foragers brought in, howevtr acceptable it might be to the horsep,
could not by the men of the garrison be converted into bread. Major Sinclair took
tlie matter up, and in due time produced as many hand mills as sufficed to grind
from day to day the quantity of flour that was required * * * * cakes
baked upon the coals, or cooked over heated stones, now took the place cf
parched com, and the change was felt by all to whom it ai^pliod as a serious improve-
ment in their physical condition.

\ el. in. 2 B 2

•372 FEOHTIEB AKD OVEHSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

artilk ly ccmmenced, the infantry followed up, and the cavalry com-
pleted. The enemy were beaten at all points. The faithless Jan-
haz now met the 5th Cavalry in fair fight, and were remorselessly
,hewn down. In a short time the panic-stricken Afghans fled, pur-
sued and cut down by the British horsemen. The bugles soimded
the recall, and the force, flushed with success, returned to the city.
'The Afghans for many a day remained quietly in their homes.

Broadfoot now proceeded with the work of defence. Abbott
•got his guns into position, and made up ammunition, as best he
could, from the materials at hand. Macgregor, bringing his poli-
tical influence to bear, busied himself with obtaining supplies ; with
such good efiect that sufficient for one month were soon in hand.
Although the men were on half rations they worked with a will.

Not again till the 1st of December was the mettle of Sale's
men tried in the field. For some days

Second engagement. in, ,

betore the enemy had been hovermg
round and threatening the garrison, who, chary of their am-
munition, did not reply to the Afghan fire. On this day, how-
ever, their numbers increased and they became more menacing,
and Sale could no longer neglect their attentions. Dennie was
chosen to command on this occasion, and sallied out at midday
with his men against the besiegers. Two guns of Abbott's battery
poured grape upon the discomfited mass. They, who had hitherto
been so bold and defiant, were charged by the cavalry, who drove
them across the plain into the river, whilst the infantry pursued
them up the hill sides, and fell upon them with the bayonet. With-
out the loss of a single man Dennie dispersed the investing force. ^
The defences now began to grow rapidly. The men were in

,^, ^, , , ,. ^ good health, good spirits and in an ad-
News of the Kabul disaster. ^ . ... _

mirable state of disciplme. But the worst
rumours were coming in from Kabul. The defenders of Jalalabad
could not understand how it was that Elphinstone's force was meet-

1 Gleig, page 123. Meanwhile the infantry, passing through the Kabul gate, advanced
towards the hills. They were thronged with defenders, who kept up a heavy, but not
very effective, fire ; and among them was a piper who ceased not to play on his most
unmusical instrument, regardless of the shower of balls that whizzed past him. As
a matter of course, the piper became the subject of many a rude joke among the men
■of the 13th. They laughed while they took deliberate aim at him, showing, however,
thig much of respect to his acknowledged bravery, that in honour of him they forth-
with denominated the heights " The Piper's Hill. * * * ". The piper
•escaped unhurt.

THE RETREAT FROM KABUL. 373

ingwith such disastrous defeats. The want of provisions could
hardly account for it ; for they themselves had been in similar
straits. The defences at Kabul, too, were superior to those
they had found at Jalalabad. They themselves had managed
to create fortifications and collect provisions ; and the Kabul gar-
rison out-numbered them by nearly four to one.

Midway through December rumours reached them that the
Kabul force had capitulated ; they could not believe their ears.
Sale and Macgregor knew how things had been mismanaged, but
kept their information to themselves. The news of Macnaghten's
murder brought fresh consternation. It seemed hardly credible,
but a letter from Pottinger soon confirmed their worst fears.
Elphinstone's retreat was discussed, and they could hardly conceal
from themselves the probability of his fate. In spite of all this
there was no Thersites at Jalalabad, and the men continued their
work as cheerfully as before.

The first week of January passed ; days of anxiety to Sale
and Macgregor. No good news came to them from Kabul, and on
the 8th of January a letter from Pottinger, written in French,
told them that the position of the British force at Kabul was
becoming more and more perilous ; that the late Envoy's treaty
was still being negotiated ; but that the delay on the part of the
Afghans in supplying carriage and provisions was delaying the
march ; and that it was more than probable that the force would
be obliged to fight its way to Jalalabad. In conclusion Pottinger
spoke of orders for the evacuation of Jalalabad that had been
despatched by Macnaghten, but urged Macgregor to stand fast
until the receipt of further orders from Kabul.

On the following day these further orders arrived. Macgre-
gor laid the letter before Sale, and a

Proposals for evacuation. ° . , n -.tt i i i m

Council of War was held. There appear
to have been few doubts and misgivings, and each asked
the other whether they should further degrade their country's
honour by abandoning their post, and flinging themselves into
the snares of the enemy ; for few doubted that a bait had been
laid for their destruction. Macgregor knew that Akbar Khan had
issued a proclamation to the chiefs, calling upon them to annihilate
the English while on the march ; he was all for the retention of the

374 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

post ; and the military chiefs were of the same temper. Sale
and Macgregor, therefore, wrote to Pottinger and Elphinstone
as follows : —

Jalalabad, January 9th, 1842.

Sirs,

"We have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter
of the 29th ultimo, which you therein state was to te delivered
to us by Abdul Ghafur Khan, appointed governor of this place
by the existing powers at Kabul. That communication was not
delivered to us by him, but by a messenger of his ; and though
dated 29th of December, 1841, has only this moment reached us.
I have, at the same time, positive information that Muhammad
Akbar Khan has sent a proclamation to all the chiefs in the neigh-
bourhood, urging them to raise their followers for the purpose of
intercepting and destroying the forces now at Jalalabad. Under
these circumstances we have deemed it our duty to await a further
communication from you, which we desire may point out the
security which may be given for oux safe march to Peshawar.

We have the honour to be, &c.,
R. SALE, Major-General,

G. H. MACGREGOR,
Political Agent.

•In explanation of the above letter Macgregor subsequently
stated that he had good information of the intentions of Akbar
Khan ; and that the retention of Jalalabad would, in the circum-
stances, have proved of inestimable advantage to the retreating
force ; should it succeed in reaching that place a stand might be
made, pending the receipt of re-inforcements for the recapture of
Kabul. By the time the letter reached Jalalabad the Kabul force
would already have been three days on the march, and their fate
sealed ; the rendition of Jalalabad would have entailed the destruc-
tion of the garrison, and increased the difficulty of re-establishing
British authority in the country ; a course which national honour
and the safety of India alike rendered of paramount necesssity .

THE RETREAT FROM KABUL. 375

General Sale stated that, in the absence of instructions from India,
he apprehended that he was at liberty to consider himself btund
by the treaty or not as he thought best, a treaty which was forced,
moreover, knife at throat; that he had provisions sufficient to
last until reinforcements should arrive from Peshawar, and that he
proposed to hold on until ordered by Government to withdraw.
He stated that the Afghans respected his strength, and that he
would have compromised the safety of the Kabul force had he
evacuated Jalalabad before it arrived,

A season of suspense and anxiety followed the receipt of Pottin-
ger's letter ; but the arrival of money from

ProsrrGSS of tlic ciciGiic63«

Mackeson, through the agency of Torabaz
Khan, the legal chief of Lalpura, which was badly wanted, raised
their spirits. The defence, too, had proceeded apace, and by the
middle of January the parapet was nowhere less than six feet high.
The gates were repaired and strengthened by buttresses, and roads
were niade where most needed. The scarcity of ammunition alone
rendered the garrison apprehensive on their own account ; but
every day made them more anxious concerning the fate of their
countrymen.

At last, on the 13th of January, when the garrison were busy
^ -„ , , . , on the works, a sentry looking towards

Ir. Brydon s arrival. . .

Kabul saw a solitary white-faced horse-
man struggling on towards the fort. The ramparts were lined
with officers looking out, with throbbing hearts, through unsteady
telescopes. Clinging round the neck of his wretched pony rode
an Englishman. A shudder ran through the garrison as they
watched the messenger of death.

Colonel Dennie had predicted that only one man would bring
the news of the destruction of the remainder, and now he exclaimed :
" Did I not say so — here comes the messenger." A party of cavalry
was sent out to succour him and brought him in wounded, exhausted,
half dead. The messenger was Dr. Brydon^; and he now reported

1 Oreenivovd, page '252. Dr. Brydon himself owed his life to the generosity of a
native of Hindustan. His horse had been shot under him, and at the time of the
utter disorganization of the force, he was making the best of his way on footalong
the road, when he was accosted by an old Subadar who was bleeding by the side of
the path, but with one hand holding the bridle of his horse which stood
beside him. " Sahib," said this noble fellow, " my hour has come : I am wounded
to death and can ride no longer. You, however, still have a chance, take my horse
which is now useless to me, and God send you may get into Jalalabad in safety."

376 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

his belief that he was the sole survivor of an army of some sixteen
thousand men.

Dr. Brydon's story has few parallels in history. A
,, , , British army of 4,000 fighting men, with

The retreat from Kabul. / or- 7

12,000 followers, had disappeared m
the course of a few days. Some had perished in the snow;
others had fallen victims to a savage enemy; a few had been
carried into captivity.

On the 6th January 1842 General Elphinstone's army, after
sixty-five days' humiliation, evacuated their position. It was
a clear, frosty morning when they marched out ; the cold was
intense, and the snow lying thick upon the ground. It was
8 o'clock before the baggage was ready to move. At 9-30 a.m. the
advanced guard, consisting of the 44th, 4th Irregular Horse, Skin-
ner's Horse, two 6-pounder guns. Sappers and Miners, Mountain
train and the late Envoy's escort, moved out of cantonment with
the English ladies and children.

The main body included the 5th and 37th Native Infantry;
the latter in charge of the treasure, Anderson's Horse, the Shah's.
6th Hegiment and two six-pounder Horse Artillery guns.

The rearguard was composed of the 54th Native Infantry,
5th Cavalry, and the remaining two Horse Artillery guns.

It had been agreed that the chiefs should supply a strong
Afghan escort ; but the army commenced its march without it, and
Nawab Ziman Khan, whose good faith was beyond suspicion, warned
Pottinger of the danger of leaving without it. But it was
now too late to stand still. The mission premises had
already fallen into the enemy's hands ; and it was considered im-
prudent to recover it by force. Ziman Khan admitted the
potency of Pottinger's arguments and promised to do his
best to protect the retreating force. He fulfilled his promises,
so far as was possible, but lacked the power to control the lawless-
ness of the pei^ple. Everything seemed to favour delay where
expedition was of the first importance. Shelton's MS. contains
the following passage : "I knew nothing of the arrangements for
the retreat till they were published the evening before. The
order was for the baggage to assemble at 8 a.m. At that hour
I went to Elphinstone's quarters, to beg that he would let the-

rnE RETREAT FROM KABUL. 37T

carriages of the gun -wagons go out that were to form a foot bridge
for the infantry over the Kabul river, about 300 yards from the
cantonments, and got offended for my trouble. He was just sittmg
down to breakfast. They did not go out till between nine and ten,
and having to be dragged through a canal caused further delay,
so that the bridge was not completed for the advanced guard till
past twelve." The river was, however, fordable at many places.
Had the army crossed before noon, and pushed on to Khurd-Kabul,
it might have been saved ; but the delays sealed the fate of the
unhappy force. Colin Mackenzie urged the General either to
expedite the advance, or to recall the force to expel the intruding
Afghans. A reluctant assent was wrung from the General, and
Mackenzie galloped back to communicate the orders to Shelton.
The advanced guard moved out with some order and steadiness, but
the rush of camp followers soon threw all into confusion. It was
vain to endeavour to control this mass of lawless and suffering
humanity.

The main body, under Shelton, with innumerable transport
animals, was moving out of cantonments during the greater part of
the day. The rear-guard manned the walls, and looked down upon
a scene of indescribable confusion. The enemy began to turn their
attention to plunder, and cutting down the hapless camp followers
carried off whatever they could seize. At the bridge there was a
fearful crush, and a babel of noises, above which rose the savage
yells of the Ghazis. The rear -guard did not move out until 6 p.m.
and the Afghans poured in to plunder. All the buildings were
soon in a blaze ; and the British army scattered between Kabul
and Bigrami looked through the frosty night at the great confla-
gration which lit up the country for miles round. The rear -guard
did not reach its camping ground until 2 a.m., having been under
arms since 8 o'clock in the morning, and having been savagely at-
tacked on leaving cantonments ; fifty being slain and their guns lost^
They had now only accomplished five or six miles of their journey,
and had seen enough to fill them with forebodings of their fate. The
road was strewn with wretches smitten by the cold ; even the
sepoys were sinking down and quietly awaiting death. The night
was one of suffering and horror ; all was chaos ; the regiments en-
camping anywhere. Soldiers, camp followers, horses, camels, and

Vol. III.

"378 FBO^'TIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

baggage ponies were mixed up in confusion. The weary wretches
lay down to sleep ; some never rose again, and some were crippled
for life by the biting frost, Pottinger had recommended that the
old horse jhools should be cut into strips to form leg bandages for
the men, but his advice was not heeded.

Morning dawned ; and without orders or any attempt at
restraint the camp-followers and baggage struggled on ahead, many
of the sepoys going with them. Discipline was fast disappearing
and regiments were dwindling to the merest skeletons. The enemy
pressed on the rear, capturing guns and baggage and cutting up
all in their way. The soldiers, weary, feeble and frost-bitten, could
make no stand against the fierce charges of the Afghan horsemen.
It seemed as if the rear-guard would be speedily cut off. All thoughts
of effectual resistance were at an end ; there was nothing now to be
hoped for, but from the forbearance of the Afghan Chiefs.

Ziman Khan wrote to Pottinger urging that the force should
halt, and promising to send supplies of food and fuel, and to dis-
perse the fanatic bands, which were hovering on the flanks. The
General consented to the halt ; but Shelton was eager for an ad-
vance. He pressed his recommendations upon Elphinstone but
without effect ; and the doomed army halted at But-khak.

Akbar Khan now rode up with 600 horsemen. Captain Skinner
was despatched with a flag of truce to communicate with him,
and brought back a friendly message, reproaching the British for
their hasty movement on the previous morning, and stating that
he had come to protect them from the Ghazis. His instructions
were to demand other hostages, as security for the evacuation of
Jalalabad ; until that had been effected the force was to halt, being
supplied with all it required. The army, therefore, spent another
night of inactivity and suffering in the snow. The con-
• fusion far exceeded that of the preceding night. There was
no shelter, firewood, nor food. The sepoys burnt their caps
and accoutrements to obtain a little warmth ; then all huddled to-
gether and lay down to sleep. Next morning the paramount desire
to escape death held possession of that wretched multitude; and
a crowd of soldiers and camp-followers began to push to the front
-at an early hour. Skinner again went out to meet Akbar Khan.
It was proposed chat the army should halt where it was, or push

THk RETREAT FROM KABUL. 379

■on to Tazin ; there to await news of the evacuation of Jalalabad. The
-Sardar declared himself willing to receive three hostages— Major
Pottinger, Captain Lawrence, and a third to be selected by the
iormer. Colin Mackenzie was named.

The force now set out for Tazin ; before it lay the formidable
pass of Khurd-Kabul. For five miles it runs between precipitous
mountain ranges so narrow that the sun rarely penetrates it. Down
the centre dashed a mountain torient, now partly frozen, which
the force had to cross and re-cross eight and twenty times, ill
was confusion. In vain did Akbar Khan issue his orders ; in vain
did his adherents attempt to control the hordes of Ghazis. The
wretched fugitives fell an easy prey to the Ghilzai marksmen, who
shot them down from the hill -sides. Baggage and ammunition were
abandoned ; and even the firelocks were taken from the sepoys'
hands. On leaving Kabul each sepoy had 40 rounds of ammunition ;
there were 60 camel loads per regiment and 100 spare loads. On
January, the 8th, three camel loads remained.

In the Khurd-Kabul Pass 3,000 men are said to have perished
by the fire of the enemy and Afghan knives. In ^the midst of this
carnage rode English ladies, trying to keep their children in sight
in the confusion and bewilderment of the march. Many European
officers perished in the pass ; among them Captain Paton, the Assist-
ant Adjutant-General, and Lieutenant Sturt of the Engineers, who
had exerted himself with unfailing activity, and had invariably
sided with those who advocated the more manly and courageous
course ; his wife was the daughter of Sir Robert Sale. Another night
in the snow, now deeper, succeeded. The same suffering, the same
death, the same starvation marked it. At early morn there was
another rush of camp-followers and sepoys to the front ; but the
inarch was countermanded by the General. This course was recom-
mended by Akbar Khan, who promised a supply of provisions
and his protection. There was an unanimous opinion against
the delay, but nothing would move Elphinstone from his purpose.
The native troops begj.n to think of deserting to the enemy. The
General had paraded the wreck of his regiments to repel an an-
ticipated attack ; and Captain Grant explained to them that
Akbar Khan had threatened instant death to any who deserted
.to hira. The contagion was, however, fast spreading ; and nothing

380 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

could stop the progress of the disease. The Shah's 2nd Cavalry-
had gone over nearly to a man.^

Major Pottinger "was now in communication with Akbar Khan ;
Captain Skinner acting as the vehicle of communication between
him and Army Head-quarters. The Sardar proposed that the English
ladies should be placed under his charge for conveyance to Peshawar.
Pottinger, remembering that Akbar Khan's families were pri-
soners in British hands, and believing he was sincere in his anxiety
for the safety of the women and children, sanctioned the proposal ;.
and Skinner was sent to obtain the General's consent. Elphinstone
agreed to the arrangement, and Lady Sale, Lady Macnaghten, and
the other widows and wives of the British officers, with the married
men, conducted by an escort of Afghan Horse, placed themselves
under the protection of Akbar E[han. The men joined the party
with Elphinstone's sanction ; though it is improbable that either
Akbar Khan or Pottinger contemplated this extension of the invita-
tion.

The remnant of the force resumed its march on the 10th of
January, in the same miserable state of confusion as before. The
sepoys threw down their arms and mixed with the camp-followers,
fiost-bitten, paralysed, and panic-struck ; the Afghans, watching
their opportunity, came down with their long knives and slaughtered
them like sheep. The dead and dying choked the defile, and there
was soon not a sepoy left. All the baggage had been looted ; and
fifty horse artillerymen, 250 of the 44th, and 150 cavalry troopers
now composed the entire force.

Hovering on the flanks, Akbar Khan watched the butchery
which was going on below, and declared that he was powerless to
restrain the Ghilzais. He proposed that the remainder of the
force should throw do-mi their arms and rely upon his protection ;
but Elphinstone declined. The wreck of the British force made
its way down the steep descents of the Haft Kotal into a narrow
defile, choked with the bodies of camp-followers who had preceded

1 Vincent Eyre, -page 212. These men had hitherto behaved remarkably well '
notwithstanding the numerous efforts which had been made to retract them
from their duty ; and, if their fealty at last gave way to the instinct of self-pieserva.
tion, be it remembered in their favour that it was not until the position of the
f rce. of which they formed a part, had become altogether desperate beyond the'
reach of cure.

THE RETREAT FROM KABUL. 381

it. The enemy opened a destructive fire upon their rear, com-
manded by Shelton, who, with a handful of Europeans, repulsed their
.-attacks ; though they were obliged carefully to husband their ammu-
nition. The gallantry of these few men was for a time the salvation of
the whole. After another futile attempt at negotiation it was deter-
mined, at Shelton's suggestion, to make a desperate effort to reach
Jagdalak by a rapid night march. Despair had given the en-
feebled soldiers renewed strength ; and when the order was given,
having spiked their remaining gun, they moved ofi quietly, hoping
that, under cover of darkness, they might shake off their incubus of
-camp-followers. As soon as they began to? move, however, the
tentacles closed round them again and paralysed the movements
•of the force

The night was bright and frosty ; and for some miles they pro-
•ceeded unmolested. At Seh-Baba, however, the enemy again opened
fire upon their rear, and the camp-followers rushed to the front
■only to struggle back again when firing was heard at the head of
the column. They overwhelmed the handful of soldiers who
were still able and willing to show a bold front, blocked the road,
-and presented a splendid target to the enemy. Soon after day-break
the advance reached Kata-Sang, and they were still ten miles from
Jagdalak. Halting till the rear-guard closed up they then pushed
on ; but it was now too late ; the enemy were crowning the heights,
and there remained no hope of escape. Shelton with the rear-guard
faced the overwhelming crowd of Afghans with a courage worthy
•of British soldiers ; and fought his way to Jagdalak, contesting
every inch of the ground. At last they reached the spot where the
advance had halted behind some ruined walls on a height by the
road side Scarcely any of the advance now remained, and some
twenty British officers formed line and showed a front. The enemy
who had followed the rear-guard increased in numbers and crowned
the heights commanding the position of their victims. The British,
now withdrawn from the excitement of the actual conflict, began
to suffer the agonies of hunger and thirst. The snow which they
■devoured only increased their torments, and they could not ap-
proach the stream hard by without being struck down by the fire of
the enemy. Behind the walls they tried to snatch a hasty meal : three
bullocks had been found among the camp-followers and these were

382 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

hastily killed and devoured raw. The respite was of brief duration*.
A party of horse appeared, said to be commanded by Akbar
Khan Skinner went to remonstrate with him against the con-
tinued attacks ; but he had scarcely set out ere the firing was-
resumed. Volley after volley poured upon the men, who had lain
down, and they and the camp-followers were compelled to quit the
enclosure in which they had bivouacked. A handful of the 44th
made a gallant rush and cleared the ground in front of them. Think-
ing that the whole force would follow, the Afghans fled in dismay. ,
But the little party was soon recalled, and the whole sought the
refuge of the ruins ; when the enemy returned and continued their
fire.

That night and the following day the force remained halted at
Jagdalak, while Akbar Khan communicated with the British Chiefs.
He entertained them kindly and gave them a much-needed meal.
The Sardar promised to send provisions for the famished troops,,
but insisted on the retention of the General, Shelton, and Johnson
as hostacfes for the evacuation of Jalalabad. The conference was-
resumed next day ; and the English officers implored the Sardar to
save the remnants of the force ; he promised to do his best, but the-
tribes were uncontrollable. They loudly declared that they only
wantedthebloodof the Englishmen, and in vain Akbar Khan tried
to dissuade them. In vain he urged that his family were the prisoners
of the British Government ; vain was the offer of large sums of
money for a safe conduct to Jalalabad. Johnson, who under-
stood their language, gathered that their one desire was for blood.
Two lakhs of rupees were offered for a safeguard to Jalalabad ;;
and at length a grudging consent was given. Hardly was the bargain
concluded when heavy firing was heard in the direction of the
bivouac. At about 8 p.m. the remainder of the force, now number-
ing barely 200, prepared to resume their march. The rabble
a^ain hampered the fighting men, and the Afghans again resumed
their butchery. The soldiers turned and bayoneted the plunderers, .
and fouo-ht their way bravely on. They struggled through the
Jagdalak Pass, when they were suddenly brought up by a
barricade erected across it. The soldiers, in spite of the camp-
followers, fought with desperate valour; but the Afghans, who
had been waiting for this moment, were soon at work with

THE RETREAT FROM KABUL. 383

their knives and jazails. The massacre was terrible to contemplate, ,
Officers, soldiers, and camp-followers were stricken down at the foot
of the barricade. A few managed to struggle through it ; but all
hope was at an end. The British army had ceased to exist. ^

Twelve British officers fell at the barrier ; among them Briga-
dier Anquetil and Captain Nichol of the Horse Artillery. The
artillery had borne themselves as gallantly as the best of English
soldiers in anyplace and at any period of history ; and the enemy
looked upon them with mingled admiration and awe. A few
struggled on towards Gandamak ; and at daybreak twenty officers
and forty-five European soldiers were assembled there. The enemy
were mustering round them, and not more than two rounds of am-
munition per man remained. They refused to surrender and de-
cided to sell their lives dearly. With the exception of Captain
Souter of the 44th, who had wrapped the regimental colour round
his waist, and a few privates, who were taken prisoners,, all were
killed.

A few, however, had pushed on from Surkhab, between Jagdalak
and Gandamak, in advance of the column. One by one they fell
by the way until the number was reduced to six. Captains Bellew,
CoUyer and Hopkins, Lieutenant Bird and Drs. Harpur and Brydon
reached Fatehabad, sixteen miles from Jalalabad, alive. As above
related, Brydon was the only one to reach his destination. -

1 This formidable defile is about two miles long, exceedingly narrow, and
closed in by lofty preoipitous*heights. The road has a considerable slope up-
wards, and, on nearing the summit, further progress was* found to be ob.
struoted by two strong barriers formed of branches of the prickly holly-oak,
stretching completely across the defile. — Vincent Eyre, page 22-1.

2 This ha- always been the ^opiilarly-a'-cepted vert^ion u;-:o-date. Recmt co--
r6?pondence, however, published in the Journal o'' the Ra\al Ar'.illery for Novem-
ber, 1906, sliows that at lean two other Europeans (Serjeaiit-Majnr Lisant, 37th
Native Infantry, and Mr. Barnes, a merchant), an! a iinod nuinbor of native-,
managed to reach Ja'alabad alive during the month of Ja-iuary 1842.

CHAPTER XVIII.

TUE AVIlXGiya ARMY.

Lord Auckland was on the horns of a dilemma when tidings
, , . , of the disaster reached him. He had

Efforts at retrieval. i ,. i i • i • i

long ago repented of the policy which
tad embroiled us with the Afghans, and the Court of Directors
had ever been opposed to it. The Conservatives, too, had now come
into office ; and they were opposed to the policy which had been
pursued. Lord Ellenborough had been nominated Governor-
General ; and Lord Auckland had fondly hoped to lay aside the reins
of government during a period of profound peace. . He began
to despond, and steadfastly set his face against any measures of
military re-establishment. When on the 25th of November he re-
ceived letters from Mr. Clerk and Captain Mackeson, confirming
the news of the disaster, he wrote to Sir Jasper NicoUs deprecating
any idea of reconquest. The Commander-in-Chief had been con-
sistently opposed to the scheme of Afghan invasion. He had dis-
played much political sagacity, and gave as his opinion at this
juncture that it would be impossible to keep an adequate force in
Afghanistan, without unduly weakening the garrison of India.
There was, however, something more than the restoration of the
Saddozai dynasty to be accomplished. The supremacy of Britain
in Central Asia was at stake.

In opposition to the opinions of the Governor- General and the
Commander-in-Chief, there were those nearer the scene of action
in whose judgment a course of energetic procedure was demanded.
Mr. Kobertson, the Lieutenant-Governor of the North- West
Provinces, and Mr. George Clerk, the Agent on the North -West
Frontier, recognized the necessity of pushing on troops to Peshawar
with the utmost despatch. On the 16th of November the latter
wrote to Colonel ^\'ild. Commanding at Ferozepore, and to Colonel
Rich at Ludhiana, urging them to send on the 30th, 53rd, 60th,
and 64th Native Regiments to Peshawar. Having expedited the

( 385 )

Vol. III. 2 0

38G "■ FBONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

movements of these regiments, Mr. Clerk wrote to General Boyd
at Sirhind for the despatch of another brigade. He informed the
Court of Lahore of the intended march of the regiments ; asking
for boats to transport them across theSntlej, and requesting that
6, COO of the best Sikh troops under Kunwar Partab Singh might be
ordered to march from Chach Hazara. Mackeson had already
applied to the Sikh authorities at Peshawar for 6,000 men to march
on Jalalabad ; but General Avitabile had replied that he needed all
his troops for the protection of Sikh territory. Lord Auckland wag
strongly opposed to the advance of the second brigade, represent-
ing that the single brigade with artillery would be sufficient to force
the Khaibar. Even this brigade, however, never went to Peshawar.
The Native Infantry crossed the Punjab with Wild, and some Ax til -
lerv went with them ; but there were no guns. It was hoped that the
Sikhs would provide these. The Sikh artillerymen were, however,,
disinclined to hand them over to the British and their value was
doubtful. Wild declined to push on without guns ; and the force
halted at Peshawar. On the 3rd of January, however, four rickety
guns were handed over, and the limbers breaking at once, they had
to be replaced. The camel men were deserting ; the Afridi Maliks
had not yet been bribed into submission by Mackeson, and the
loyalty of the Sikhs was doubtful. The sepoys were at first eager to
advance, but the Sikhs tampered with their loyalty and played
upon their bears.

Active preparations for the despatch of reinforcements to
The despatch of reinforce- Peshawar were going on in the North-
ments. West Provinces. Lord Auckland

did not wish to interfere with Mr. Clerk, although he disap-
proved of sending a second brigade. The 9th Foot was ordered
to be in readiness, and the 26th Native Infantry, some Irregular
Horse, two 9-pounders, and a howitzer were to accompany it. The
loth Cavalry were subsequently added ; and on the 4th of January
the brigade, consisting of 3,000 fighting men, crossed the Sutlej.

It was now necessary to select a Commander for the whole
force ; and finally the choice rested upon General George Pollock,
Commanding at Agra. He had entered the Indian Army as a
Lieutenant of Artillery in 1803, and had a distinguished record of
service. He was unassuming and averse from personal display.

THE AVENGING ARMY. 287

but was sagacious and firm ; equable and temperate. Possibly
a more suitable man could not have been chosen. On the 22nd o
January the Commander-in-Chief met Mr. Clerk at Tanesar, near
Karnal. Sir Jasper Nicolls considered that the troops remaining
in Afghanistan should retire beyond the Indus. Mr. Clerk was all
for a forward movement.

He argued that the safety and honour of the nation demanded
the retention of Jalalabad ; and that, when reinforced, the garrison,
with that of Kandahar, should first chastise the Afghans and then
withdraw with dignity and honour from the country. Mr. Clerk
persuaded the Chief to order the 6th and 55th Native Infantry to
hold themselves in readiness to proceed to Peshawar. He, however,
resisted the demand for a detachment of British Eragoons ; and the
question was referred to Calcutta. Cjovernment had now received
intelligence of the massacre of Elphinstone's army, and replied that
it was necessary that a commanding force should assemble at Pesha-
war ; that it was important that it should be effective in cavalry and
artillery, and that at all events two squadrons of Dragoons should
be pushed on. The 1st Eegiment of Native Cavalry and a troop
of Horse Artillery were subsequently added to the third brigade.

On the 10th of February the Governor- General in Council wrote
to the Commander-in-Chief instructing him to inform General
Pollock that the main inducement lor maintaining a post at Jalal-
abad having passed away, he should, unless favourable conditions
appeared, confine himself to the withdrawal of the garrison and
concentrate at Peshawar.

Brigadier Wild's position at Peshawar was not a very hope-
ful one. His difficulties were formidable

Brigadier \^ ild at Peshawar. . . , - tt- r tvt •

and his means slender. His four Native
Infantry Regiments contained a larg« number of young soldiers
whom the Sikhs had done their best to discourage. He had only
one troop of Irregular Horse and four indifferent pieces of artillery.
Ammunition was scarce and carriage was beginning to fail alto-
gether ; ihe camel-owners refusing to proceed further than Peshawar.
The intelligence from Afghanistan was most dispiriting. Sale and
Macgregor were urging the immediate advance of the brigade and
Avitabile was warning the Brigadier of the danger of entering'
the Khaibar with his present force. There appeared to be a very

388 FBONTIER AND OVEBSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

faint possibility of the co-operation of the Sikhs, who were on
the verge of mutiny. The negotiations with the Afridis were not
proceeding favourably ; and there appeared to be every prospect
■of heavy opposition in the pass.

He did not, however, remain long in doubt and inactivity. The
fortress of Ali Mas j id lies five miles within the Khaibar Pass and
twenty-five miles from Peshawar. It consisted of two small forts
connected by an insignificant wall and standing upon a rock, com-
manded on the south and west by two lofty hills; it was important
that this " Key of the Khaibar " should be held by British troops or
their i.llies. It was at this time held by Yusufzais, who had gallantly
resisted the attacks of the Afridis. There was now, however, every
chance of its falling into the enemy's hands ; and it was resolved
to push forward half the brigade and seize and garrison the post.
Accordingly, on the loth of January, Colonel Moseley, with
the 53rd and 64th Native Infantry, ac-
companied by Mackeson, started at night
and reached their destination the next morning. Captain Mackeson
now discovered to his dismay that instead of 350 bullocks only fifty
or sixty were with the rear-guard. The two regiments were there-
fore without provisions. The only hope of extrication from this
dilemma lay in the advance of the two other regiments, with the
Sikh ouns and Sikh allies. Reinforcements, however, did not come,
and Wild was frustrated in his attempts to throw supplies into Ali
Masiid. He had intended to move forward on the 19th of January ;
but the Sikh troops mutinied to a man. At 7 o'clock the 30th and
60th Native Infantry, with the Sikh guns, commenced their march ;
but the enemy met them with the fire of their jazails. The
sepoys wavered, stood still, and fired aimlessly. The ofiicers
moved forward, but the regiments did not follow them. In vain
the Brigadier and his stafi called upon them to advance ; but they
only huddled together in confusion. The Sikh guns broke down
one after another, and the sepoys lost all heart. Lawrence exerted
himself to save the guns, but the men would not help him ; and
one was finally abandoned. There was nothing for it but to fall
back. The Brigadier and several ofiicers were wounded, and the
loss among the sepoys was severe. The column retreated to
Jamrud, and Ali Masjid remained unrelieved.

THE AVENGING ARMY. 389

It is not easy to explain how this disaster happened. Exao-«
gerated reports of the enemy's strength had been in circulation,
and the men were unnerved by the rumours. The news from Kabul,
and still more the lies disseminated by the Sikhs, had alarmed them.
But the opposition was not strenuous and troops in good heart
would easily have beaten it back. The men, however, had never
evinced a keenness to advance ; the defection of the Sikhs and the
l^reakdown of the guns had still further damped their ardour ; the
battle was lost before it had been fought.

The regiments at Ali Masjid were now in a parlous condition ;
there was a lamentable scarcity of provisions ; the water seemed to
disagree with them ; there was neither bedding nor tents ; and ever
on the alert in a trying climate under depressmg conditions the
health and spirits of the men were breaking down. The hospital
soon became crowded and there was no promise of relief. On the
23rd of January, therefore, Colonel Moseley determined to evacu-
ate the fort and cut his way through to Jamrud.

Mackeson saw clearly that anything was better than the aban-
donment of the post. A small party might hold it and could be
led. Captain Burt, of the 64th, offered to hold it ; but none of his
men would volunteer. Captain Thomas next volunteered to re-
main with 150 Yusufzais ; but the latter's fidelity broke down, and
on the 2ith the fort was abandoned to the Afridis.

The communications between the two detachments had been
cut off, and up to the evening of the 22nd they had failed to re-
establish them. On the 23rd the two regiments under Colonel
TuUoch, with the two serviceable guns, moved forward to line the
pass and cover the retirement of Moseley's regiments ; but, seeing
no signs of the column, they returned to camp, moving out again
next morning. Moseley was making the best of his way to Jamrud,
and the sepoys doing their duty well the regiments made good the
passage. Two officers were killed, some baggage was lost, and some
of the sick and wounded abandoned ;^ but when the four regiments

'^Greenwood, page 161. During the retreat from Ali Masjid a young officer of the
64th was disabled by a wound and fell behind. Calling out to a sepoy, who was passing,
the latter shot one Afridi and bayoneted another. He then expressed his regret
that he could not carry the officer out of the pass, but that as he had a few rounds
left he would rem lin with him and they could, at any rate, die together.

390 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

were once more assembled at Jamrud a general feeling of relief

was experienced, and congratulations were exclianged that it had

been no worse. There was now nothing for it but to await the

^ , , , , arrival of General Pollock with reinforce -

Inadequacy of the force. i -r. •

ments from the Punjab. It was obvious
that with neither cavalry nor guns the relief of Jalalabad was
out of the question. Artillery was the first, second, and last
great need ; and it is astonishing that its provision had not
demanded more serious attention. Had guns accompanied the
force to Ali Masjid, events would in all probability have turned out
very differently. In the first instance expedition was of the first
importance ; and to wait for artillery would have caused very con-
siderable delay. Mackeson, Lawrence, and Clerk had all pressed
upon Sir Jasper Nicolls the expediency of forwarding some guns ;
but the fact of the matter is that the regiments had crossed the
Sutlej before the Commander-in-Chief heard anything of the move ;
it is plain, therefore, that no odium attaches to any one for not for-
warding guns with Wild's Brigade. Mr. Clerk had written to Gene-
ral Boyd on the 27th of November. " Though I have not yet heard
that any artillery is ordered up to the frontier, I would beg leave to
recommend, in anticipation of the speedy arrival of reinforce-
ments so necessaiy on the Sutlej, that artillery should move for-
ward from hence. I shall transmit a copy of this letter to Lieute-
nant-Colonel Wild, in case he may think proper to halt one of the
regiments under his command, until the arrival of such artillery
as you consider can best be spared fromLudhiana or Ferozepore ;
but the latter is, I believe, from want of horses, incapable of
moving ; and this leaves an insufficiency for the due protection
of the border, during an unsettled state of parties at Lahore."
He asked Captain Alexander, with his guns, to move on in
anticipation of sanction ; but a few days afterwards Sir Jasper
Nicolls prohibited the despatch of the Horse Artillery, ard
half a battery of Foot Artillery proceeded with M'Caskill's
brigade, which did not reach Peshawar till February. Mean-
while Wild had been beaten in the Khaibar, and Ali Masjid had
fallen to the Afridis.

Sickness attacked Wild's troops during their enforced halt
at Peshawar ; the men crowded into the hospitals, and a mutinous

THE AVENGING ARMY. 391

spirit was engendered. Many, under the influence of the Sikh
:soldiers, deserted ; and others declared that nothing would induce
them to face the Khaibar again. Pollock heard of the state of
affairs at Peshawar, as he was advancing through the Punjab ;
^nd he was moreover compelled to take notice of the unguarded
language used by officers of the regiments. When he arrived at
his destination he found nearly 2,000 men in hospital, so, even
with the new brigade which quickly followed him, he was not
much better off in point of numbers than Wild had been in the
first instance.

A good deal had to be done before the Khaibar could be forced
and Jalalabad relieved. The General visited the hospitals, en-
deavoured to trace the source of the sickness, and tried to put fresh
spirit into the patients. There was much to be done outside the
hospitals also. The soldierly qualities of the troops were at a
very low ebb. Four of the five regiments openly refused to ad-
vance. An officer of the 26th Native Infantry which came up with
M'CaskiU's Brigade wrote : " In less than 48 hours after our arrival,
active emissaries, particularly from the 53rd and 60th Regiments,
were in our camp, using every effort to induce our men to desert,
and to refuse to enter the Khaibar ; and had actually gone the
length of sending Brahmans with the Ganga Jul to swear them in
not to advance ; and did not desist until orders were given to seize
the first man caught in the lines under suspicious circumstances.
'This information was several times communicated to me by old
sepoys and non-commissioned officers, and the fact of the attempts
made to seduce the men from their allegiance is too well known
i;o the officers of the 26th to admit of a moment's doubt."

It was a difficult task which Pollock had before him ; but with
tact and sagacity he set to work to re-animate and re-assure the
troops. He taught them to recognize in him a father, and one,
moreover, who would never call upon them for an effort which
he was not prepared to make himself. The soldiers soon learnt
to place in him a child-like faith ; and when the hour of trial came
they were not found wanting.

The force remained inactive at Peshawar during February
and March. Sale and Macgreg )r called for an early advance,
^ut it was Pollock's duty to wait. The sepoys were gradually

3P2 FBONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

recovering their health and spirits ; reinforcements with British
Dragoons and Horse Artillery were coming up ; and a hurried
advance without fresh troops would be only too likely to entail
disaster. Surely Pollock's position was one which demanded
resolution and strength of mind.

On hearing Dr. Brydon's account of the disaster to
„, , , , ^ , , , Elphinstone's force, horsemen were sent

The defence of Jalalabad- f t i i t

from Jalalabad to search the surrounding
country and to bring in the bodies of any dead that should be
found. There were faint hopes, too, that some survivors might be
rescued, and every effort was made to attract the attention of
such, should there be any. Bugles were sounded at night from
the walls to guide the footsteps of any wanderer. No success-
met these efforts, however, for the few who had escaped the
massacre were captives, and it was questionable, in the light of
experience of the savage nature of the Afghans, if their lot was
the more happy one.

Work is ever the best salve of sorrow ; and plenty of the
former lay ready to their hand. It was anticipated that, when
satiated with plunder, the Afghan hordes would come down upon,
the garrison, eager to repeat their devilish orgie. It was rumaured
that the Sardar was collecting an army at Lughman; it behoved
them therefore to be prepared. Thanks to Broadfoot's exertions,,
the defences were fast becoming really formidable ; and the gar-
rison was confident that nothing but a failure of provisions or am-
munition would enable the position to be captured. The fighting
men being insufficient in number to man the defences, Sale-
embodied the camp-followers, and freed his effective troops for
service beyond the walls. Large supplies of firewood and grass-
were brought in by the foraging parties in view of a speedy
investment, and 200 of Ferris' Jazailchi Eegiments, who were
believed to be untrustworthy, were expelled.

The younger spirits heard of Wild's failure undismayed;
they had expected little from it. The probable delay in Pollock's-
advance was a more serious question. But as it was only now
January, and they were confident of being able to hold out till
May, the relieving force had three clear months in which to effect,
their object. The soberer minds, however, began to debate
whether Government reallv concerned themselves about their

THE AVENdiNO ARMY. 395

salvation ; all that they had heard of Lord Auckland's views
led them to suppose that they were to be abandoned to their fate.
In the meantime, in addition to the Sardar's army, it was reported
that Shah Shuja, possibly under compulsion, was intent on expel-
ling the garrison of Ghazni also. Macgregor received a letter from
the Shah on the 21st of January, reproaching us with not having
acted upon his advice, and stating that money was now what he
wanted, not men. A further letter called attention to our stipula-
tion to leave the country ; and inquired when Jalalabad would
be evacuated.

Both Sale and Macgregor were much perplexed. The crisis

was not less serious than theresponsibi-

Situation at Jalalabad. ... „, ^ ,. ttiit-J

lity. The retention of Jalalabad was
evidently of no service to their countrymen in Afghanistan, for
the Kabul force had been destroyed, and the line of retreat for
the remaining garrisons lay through Sind. The Shah himself
had freed them from the duty of personal service, and the safety
of the prisoners would probably be more certain should the
force withdraw, which it was also more than probable would aid
the Calcutta policy. Sale convened a council of war on the
26th of January. Those present, in addition to himself and
Macgregor, were : Colonel Dennie, commanding the 13th Light
Infantry ; Colonel Monteith, commanding the 35th ; Colonel
Oldfleld, commanding the Cavalry ; Captain Abbott, the Com-
pany's Artillery ; Captain^Backhouse, the Shah's Artillery ; and
Captain George Broadfoot, Sappers and Miners. Macgregor, hav-
ing explained the circumstances which had brought them together
and having read all the documents bearing upon the question,
expressed his opinion that there was little hope of relief ; and
that they must rely upon themselves. Were the other members-
of the same mind as himself and Sale, viz., that it was their duty
to treat with the Shah for the evacuation of the country ? The
terms upon which the garrison would consent to the evacuatioa
were as follows : — Four hostages to be given as a proof of their
sincerity ; that the King should send a force to conduct them
to Peshawar, to be commanded by one of his sons ; that carriage
and supplies should jbe supplied to the garrison for the march ;
Akbar Khan and his force to be withdrawn before the troops

394 FBONTIfCR AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

^^uitted Jalalabad ; and that Afghan hostages should accom-
pany the British force to Peshawar, there to be exchanged for
our own hostages and prisoners ; the Afghan hostages were
specified by name.

An excited debate followed; popular opinion veered towards
self-preservation, irrespective of the interests of Government.
Broadfoot was strongly against capitulation, and threw the paper
of terms upon the ground. He pointed out to his comrades that
a new Governor-General was on the point of arriving, and that
the Duke of Wellington was in power at home. His very
violence handicapped his cause. He was, however, so far success-
ful that he obtained an adjournment of the council. When
they met again the next day it was obvious that the majority
was in favour of capitulation. Broadfoot persisted in his line of
argument ; and produced in its support the written criticism of
Henry Havelock. He then took the sense of the meeting, as to
the propriety of any negotiation at all ; and then, one by one, he
argued the several items of the proposed treaty. All but two,
however, were against him. Finally, the terms were carried, with
the exception of the question of hostages, and the phraseology
being slightly altered, the letter was prepared for transmission to
the Shah. When his answer was received another Council of War
washeld ; and, after warm discussion, was again adjourned. The
result was a letter more or less on the lines suggested by Broad-
foot and Backhouse, but it was not a renewal of the negotiation.
It happily left them free to act as they considered best ; for
the very next day news was received that their relief was to be
attempted. It was now plainly their duty to hold out till the
last ; and there was no longer any talk of withdrawal.

On this date, the 13th of February, the garrison was in good
heart and the fortifications were growing rapidly. In spite of op-
position Broadfoot had taken with him from Kabul a good supply
of working tools ; and had subsequently submitted an indent
for others. The wisdom of his policy now appeared. A great
■calamity befell the garrison on the 19th of February. The men
were working with a will at the fortifications, which were now
very different from those which Sale found on his arrival ; and
it seemed as if athe defences were on the point of completion.

THE AVENOiyo ARMY. 395

a time when they would be most needed. Every day an attack by

Akbar Khan was expected. Suddenly

The earthqviake. .■, , i i i ii ^.t.

an earthquake shook down ail the
parapets upon which so much labour had been expended. The
Kabul gate, with its adjoining bastions and part of a new bastion
which flanked it, were thrown down ; and several large breaches
were made in the curtain. Thus, in a moment, the result of three
months' labour was in a great measure destroyed. The garrison,
by no means dismayed, at once set to work to repair the damage ;
andbeforenight the breaches had been filled up. By the end of
s, month the defences were re-established, and the enemy, seeing
that no traces of the damage remained, attributed the result to
witchcraft ; for they thought that Jalalabad was the only place
which had escaped the earthquake. If Akbar Khan had known
how the defences had been weakened, he acted with strange
supineness in not seizing the opportunity to attack. The garrison
had fully made up their minds to an encounter.

Sale published the Government of India's manifesto, anent
the relief, in orders ; and the hearts of the defenders leaped with
hope and exultation ; they actually rather regretted that the
Barakzais showed no inclination to give them battle. The Afghans,
indeed, appear to have entertained a marked respect for Sale's
-soldiers ; and one cannot help speculating on the results had a

similar enterprizing spirit pervaded the

The blockade. tt i, i • ?i i, T^r, -j

Kabul garrison. Akbar Khan, consider-
ing discretion to be the better part of valour, decided upon
a blockade. His troops were moved nearer and nearer to the
walls, in the hopes that starvation would destroy the indomitable
spirit of the garrison. The foraging parties and the grasscutters'
escorts were freely attacked ; but not until the 11th of March
was there any skirmishing worthy of record. It was then reported
that the enemy intended to resort to mining. Sangars had been
thrown up on the previous evening, from which the enemy
began to fire briskly. It was plain that mischief was brewing,
so Sale, keeping the artillery at their guns on the ramparts, sent
out Dennie with a strong party of cavalry and infantry and two
hundred of Broadfoot's Sappers. Akbar Khan at first seemed
inclined to give battle ; but the guns drove the enemy back as fast

396 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

as they advanced, and the skirmishers rapidly destroyed their
sangars. The mine was found to be a fable and the recall was
sounded. The enemy emboldened fell upon the retreating column,
but on its facing about turned and fled. The carnage was all
among the enemy, but unfortunately Broadfoot was wounded.

The remainder of the month passed quietly ; but provisions
had become scarce, ammunition was running short, and forage for
the horses could not be obtained. The relieving force was
anxiously looked for, and Sale and Macgregor were justified in
their applications for its expedition.

Pollock was, however, much handicapped. The cavalry
was delayed, taking five days to cross the Ravi — the Hindus at
one time did not hesitate to refuse to go forward, and were evidently
suffering from a severe attack of nerves. He, however, wrote to
Sale hoping to be with him by about the 7th ; the date being-
dependent upon the fall of Ali Masjid. The dragoons reached his
camp on the 30th, and on the following day the forward move-
ment began.

General Pollock's difficulties were largely accentuated by the
TT. t ■ f ii, ITT, -u reluctance of our Sikh allies to face the

The forcing of the Khaibar.

Khaibar. Lawrence was of opinion that
the fact of Mehtab Singh having admitted Afridis to his camp
was sufiicient justification for the dismissal of him and his troops
with disgrace. But Gulab Singh was bringing with him a
different class of men ; and his influence over the hill levies was
so great that it was hoped that a new order of things would soon,
be established in Pollock's camp. These hopes were, however, soon
dissipated. Gulab Singh was not able to put his heart into the
work before him.' He had neither confidence in his troops nor
any inducement to exert himself. The bribe of Jalalabad was-
thought of, but as quickly dismissed ; and Mr. Clerk proceeded
to Amritsar to use his influence with the Sikh Court. As a
result of his mission the Maharaja sent orders to Gulab Singh
to co-operate to the best of his ability ; but it was plain that fear
of an open rupture with the British Government was the leading
thought which guided him. The Sikh soldiers at Peshawar now
settled down and made up their minds to penetrate the Ivliaibar
Pass.

THE AVENGING ARMY. 397

Lawrence and Pollock had exercised their powers of persuasion
-with the best results ; and the arrival of more European troops
increased the confidence of the Khalsa, who, when the hour of
trial came, rendered more effective service than the British
■ofiicers had dared to expect.

On the 31st of March Pollock pitched i is camp at Jamrud

in the expectation oi an advance on the

Arrival at Jumrud. ,■ n ■ • mi i i •

loUowmg morning. ihe camel-drivers
were, however, deserting ; and Gulab Singh had not come up ;
while the rain was descending in floods. To move forward at
such a time was impossible. In spite of Pollock's efforts the
proportion of baggage was enormous ; and desertions among
the camel-drivers had rendered the carriage, even for the am-
munition, insufficient. The 33rd Regiment could not come up
from Peshawar for want of transport ; and another day's halt
was imperative. The sepoys of Wild's brigade were deserting ;
and the purchase of a passage through the Khaibar from the Afridi
Maliks had not been effected. The halt, however, was not without
its advantages ; as it gave the Sikhs leisure to prepare themselves
for co-operation in the combined movement.

The details of the march were now
Arrangements for the march, published and carefully studied by the

Commanding Officers.
Brigadier Wild was detailed to command the advanced guard
and M'Caskill the rearguard. The Grenadier Company of Her
Majesty's 9 th Regiment, one company of the 26th Native
lufantrvj three companies of the 30th Native Infantry, and two
■companies of the 33rd Native Infantry, the whole under Major
Barnewell of the 9th, were to head the column. These were to
Tdc followed by the Sapper? and Miners, nine pieces of artillery, and
two squadrons of the 3rd Dragoons. Thenwere to come the treasure
and ammunition camels, followed by a squadron of the 1st Native
Cavalry. Next the commissariat stores, escorted by two companies
of the 53rd Native Infantry, with a squadron of the 1st cavalry.
After them the baggage and camp-followers escorted by a risala
•of Irregular Horse, and a squadron of the 1st Native Cavalry,
with more ammunition, litters, and camel panniers for the sick.
The rearguard was to consist of two foot-artillery guns, the
10th Light Cavalry, two risalas of Irregular Horse, two

398 FBOKTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

squadrons, 3rd Dragoons, two Horse Artillery guns, three com-
panies of the 60th Native Infantry, one company, 6th Native
Infantry, and one company of Her Majesty's 9th Foot.

Two other columns were told ofE to crown the heights. That
on the right comprised two companies of the 9th Foot, four com-
panies, 26th Native Infantry, with four hundred Jazailchis : all
under Colonel Taylor of the 9th Foot.

Seven companies of the 30th Native Infantry, under Major
Payne ; three companies, 60th Native Infantry, under Captain
Riddle ; four companies, 64th Native Infantry, under Major
Anderson, with some details of Broadfoot's Sappers, and one and
a half companies of the 9th Foot : all under Major Davis of the
9th Foot.

The left column consisted of two companies. Her Majesty'^
9th Foot ; four companies, 26th Native Infantry, and 200 Jazailchis,
under Major Huish, 26th Native Infantry; seven companies, 53rd
Native Infantry, under Major Hoggan ; three companies of the
60th Native Infantry under Captain Napleton ; and four and
a half companies, 64th Native Infantry, and one and a half com-
panies, 9th Foot, under Colonel Moseley of the 64th.

The flanking columns were to advance in detachments of
two companies at 500 yards interval.

Pollock marched his force to Jamrud, and on the 4th of
April he issued further orders for the following morning, per-
sonally ascertaining from the commanding officers that they
understood them, and assuring himself of the temper of the men^
which had vastly improved.

At 3 A.M. on the 5th of April the force marched without
noise ; and the flanking columns quietly
Action in the Khaibar. crowncd the heights which Were occupied
by the enemy, who, taken by surprise
at this novel manoeuvre, were not aware of the advance until
the flankers had made considerable progress ; when the light re-
vealed the opposing bodies to one another the struggle commenced.
A formidable barrier of stones and trees had been built across-
the mouth of the pass. As soon as the flankers had cleared the
hills this was easily removed. Nothing could have been better thart
the General's arrangements, and his orders were carried out with
intellio-ence. The lef 6 column soon effectually performed its part.

THE AVENGING ARMY. 399

of the programme. Tlie nature of the ground on the right was
more difficult, but Taylor circumvented the base of the mountain
and found a jjracticable ascent. The British troops fought ad-
mirably under the novel conditions, and everywhere the Khaibaris-
were seen flying across the hills. When the flankers had turned
the enemy's position the main column began its advance into the
pass. The remaining difficulties were chiefly in connection with
the long line of transport. Besides the supplies for his own force
Pollock was conveying food and ammunition for Sale ; the ad-
vance was, therefore, necessarily slow ; but it was skilfully conducted.
The greater part of the day, which was intensely hot, was occupied
iu reaching Ali Masjid. The sei^oys had fairly won back their

reputation, and Pollock wrote of the day's work as follows : •

" The Sepoys behaved nobly. They merely required a trial in which
they should find they were not sacrificed. There were, however,
many desertions before we advanced. Now they are in the highest
spirits, and have a thorough contempt for the enemy. This is a
great point gained. * * * * q,^^ Sikhs are en-

camped near us, and are much more respectful and civil since
our operations of yesterday."

Ferris' Jazailchis garrisoned Ali Masjid, which had been eva-

occupationof Ali Masjid. '"''*''^ ^^ ^^'^ morning ; and a part of

Pollock's force, with the head-quarters,
bivouacked close by. Parties crowned the heights throughout the
night, which was bitterly cold; and the enemy, who were
hovering round, indulged in a good deal of sniping. During
the day they lost about one thousand killed and wounded. The
Sikhs, who it had been arranged should occupy the pass until
the 5th of June, had moved forward by the Shadi-Bagiari Pass ;
as Pollock distrusted them too much to have them near his own
troops. That they were untrustworthy is proved by the sequel ;
for, bargaining with the Afridis to keep open the pass for a fixed
time, thereby giving away valuable information, they, early in May
quitted Ali Masjid and returned to Jamrud, unloading some of
our transport animals and placing upon them their own propertv
The Sikhs acted under instructions from their own authorities ;
but, although four of our regiments were in the neighbourhood,
gave no notice of their intention.

400 FHONTIEU and overseas expeditions from INDIA.

In the meantime Pollock had reached Jalalabad. He wrote
. . , T , , , , to a fiiend ;is follows : — " AVe found the

Arrival at Jalalabad. .

lort strong ; the garrison healthy ; and
■except for wine and beer better off than we are. They were, of
course, delighted to see us. We gave three cheers as we passed
the colours ; and the band of each regiment played as it came
up. It was a sight worth seeing. All appeared happy."

Welcome, indeed, was the arrival of Pollock to Sale's force,
which ' had been shut up for five months. The two Generals had
much to relate of each other's doings. On the 1st of April the
garrison had made a sortie and captured 500 sheep and goats,
which were divided among the troops. The 25th Native Infantry
declined to accept their share, requesting that it might be given
to the Europeans, wlio stood more in need of it. Thenceforward
a close friendship sprang up between them and the 13th Light
Infantry.

On the 5th of April Macgregor's spies brought tidings from
Akbar Khan's camp that Pollock had been defeated in the pass
with heavy loss ; and on the 6th the Sardar's guns fired a salute
in honour of the reputed victory. Other rumours spoke of a fresh
revolution at Kabul, and that the Sardar was about to break np
his camp and proceed to the capital. In any event the moment ap-
peared to have arrived when a blow should be struck ; and a council
of war was assembled, which, contrary to tradition,^ decided to fight
on the following morning. Havelock persuaded Sale to take
this course. The force was divided into three columns; Her

Majesty's 13th, five hundred strong,

Action at Jalalabad. ^ -r^ ■ • , i , , i , ?

under Dennie, m the centre ; the left
column was under Lieutenant-Colonel Monteith ; and the right
under Havelock. These were to be supported by the Light Field
Battery and the whole of the small force of cavalry. They left the
western gate at daybreak, and found Akbar Khan on the qui vive,
his right rested on a fort and bis left on the Kabul river ; his force
numbered six thousand. Dennie was ordered to attack a small fort
some hundred yards to the right, which was strongly occupied.

1 It was Clive who said " a Council of War never fights ;'' and he related that the
only occasion on which he called such a council was prior to the battle of Plassey,
when, however, he did not abide by their decision.

TBE AVENOINO ARMY. 401

The attack penetrated the outer wall, but found itself exposed to
a heavy fire from the keep. Here the gallant Dennie received his
death wound. While the force was thus divided the Afghan
Horse came down upon Havelock's small column of less than four
hundred men, and Sale recalled the 13th at his suggestion. A
general attack was now made upon the Sardar's camp with an
impetuosity worthy of the garrison. The action is thus described by
the General : — " The artillery advanced at the gallop, and directed
a heavy fire upon the Afghan centre, whilst two of the columns of
infantry penetrated the line near the same point, and the third
forced back its left from its support on the river, into the streani
of which some of his horse and foot were driven. The Afghans
made repeated attempts to check our advance by a smart fire of
musketry, by throwing forward heavy bodies of horse, which twice
threatened the detachments of foot under Captain Havelock, and by
opening upon us three guns from a battery screened by a garden wall,
and said to have been served under the personal superintendence
of the Sardar. But in a short time they were dislodged from every
point in their position, their cannon taken, and their camp involved
in a general conflagration. The battle was over ; and the enemy
in full retreat in the direction of Lughman by about 7 a.m. We
have made ourselves masters of two cavalry standards, re-captured
four guns lost by the Kabul and Gandamak forces, the restoration
of which, to our Government, is matter of much honest exultation
among our troops ; seized and destroyed a great quantity of material
and ordnance stores, and burnt the whole of the enemy's tents.
In short, the defeat of Muhammad Akbar in open field, by the
troops whom he had boasted of blockading, has been complete
and signal." The loss on the British side was ten killed and three
officers and about fifty men wounded.

The news of the victories of Sale and Pollock were received
with joy throughout India. Lord Ellenborough wrote in enthusias-
tic terms ; and in a proclamation issued at Benares dubbed the
former's force " The illustrious Garrison." Sale now ceased to com-
mand at Jalalabad, and Macgregor no longer exercised political
functions. In Pollock and Nott had been invested the supreme
authority. Macgregor became aide-de-camp to the former, and
Shakespear was his Military Secretary ; and their Chief turned
Vol. ni. D 2

402 FHONTIEB AND OVESSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

the experience of both to account. Lord Ellenbo rough, however,
had ordained that there should be no more " Politicals." The Gov-
ernor-General did well in trusting Pollock and Nott ; but there was
something to be said upon the other side also. These ofl&cers had
ever a difficult task to perform ; and, although Nott was very bitter
on the subject, the services of Pottinger, Macgregor, H. Lawrence,
Mackeson, Broadfoot, Outram and others cannot be lost sight of.

CHAPTER XIX.

KANDAHAR.

The rumour had spread throughout India that the Kabul insur-
The last days of Shah Shuja. section was directed against the English and

the King, but, since the departure of the
former, the King had been regarded as the supreme authority.
His power was, however, merely nominal. The chiefs recognized
in him a i-uitable puppet to act as a buffer between them and
the vengeance of the British nation. Coins were struck in the
name of Nawab Ziman Khan who, however, cheerfully reverted
to the position of Wazir. There was, in spite of outward show,
no real union between the King and the chiefs. He and the
Barakzais were mutually distrustful of each other. Amin-
uUah Khan held the balance between them, and was, in every-
thing but name, the true ruling power. Funds were, as ever, the
great difficulty ; and no one would move without pay, which was
not forthcoming ; so Akbar Khan looked in vain for reinforcements.
All parties were jealous of each other and of the Sardar's rising star.
The elder chiefs spoke of raising an army to obstruct the march of
the relieving force through the Khaibar ; but the want of money
prevented the execution of the design. The Shah, while speaking
of embarking on a jihad himself, assured the British authorities
that he was heart and soul with them ; and clamoured for money.
In the meantime Muhammad Ziman Khan treated the British
The British prisoners. prisoners with the greatest kindness and

consideration. Ever faithful, he resolved
to defend them at all risks, and never wavered for an instant.
There was no one more patriotic ; but he never entertained hatred
for the British, nor would he stain his name with the foul crimes
which were so prevalent elsewhere. He abhorred the actions of
his fellow-countrymen, and did all he could to atone for their
.cruelty. No father could have been kinder to his own childreu

( 403 )
Vol. III. 3 D 2

404 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

than he to his captives. There was need, however, for more than,
mere kindness, at a time when feeling ran so high. He raised an
army of his own for their protection, and spent his money freely
with that object. He raised 1,000 footmen armed with English
bayonets, a thousand horse, and as many Jazailchis. He refused,
moreover, to yield up the English guns to the Shah.

The King mistrusted him, and there was no love lost between
them. At last the Shah bribed his followers to desert, and they
went over to the Bala Hissar. This event threw Kabul into a
ferment ; the shops were closed and the people began to arm.
The Nawab demanded the restoration of his troops ; but the King
only yielded a conditional assent ; the terms being the rendition of
the prisoners. The Nawab refused, and the hostages nearly for-
feited their lives. ConoUy's suspicions as to the fidelity of Shah
Shuja were now strengthened.

It now appeared as if Kabul was to become the scene of
internecine strife. The Shah never ventured beyond the Bala
Hissar. The chiefs were all mustering retainers, and the Nawab
and the King were casting aspersions upon one another. The
Popalzai leaders clustered round the monarch ; but he was
neither popular nor powerful. He had money, but held it close,
and his parsimony was abused. He called upon the British to
supply him with funds to further their cause ; but they turned
a deaf ear.

His days were, however, numbered ; the excitement in Kabul
was increasing, and the enmity of the chiefs grew more bitter.
His incrnsistency estranged both the English and his own country-
men ; and by either road he was rushing upon his destruction.
The chiefs at length called upon him to lead them to Jalalabad,
and he yielded a reluctant consent, and advertised his departure
for the 31st of March. Dissension and want of money, however,
postponed the undertaking. Akbar Khan in vain called for re-in-
forcement-, and inveighed against the dissensions which prevented
them from making common cause against the English.

After a few days the King again consented to set out, but
his suspicion of the Barakzais, which was

Death of Shah Shuja. , •,,,!• -, , • , -i

not without foundation, was not easily
allayed. Impartial critics prophesied his death at their hands. The

KANDAHAR. 405

J^awab sent liis wife to assure him by an oath on the Koran of their
fidelity ; and, fortified by this assurance, he moved out of the Bala
Hissar on the 4th of April, only to return before nightfall. On the
5th he proceeded towards his camp on the Siah-Sang, accompanied
by a small party of Hindustanis. But the Nawab's son had laid
an ambush for him ; and on their way the party was fired upon
and the King killed, and his body was stripped and thrown into
a ditch. The news quickly spread, and caused great consternation.
The King's second son, Fateh Jang, fled to the Bala Hissar, but
found the gates closed against him. He was, however, restored to
the palace by Muhammad Khan, who held the Bala Hissar with
Aminullah, and proclaimed King. The old Nawab viewed the
.murder with horror and swore never to see his son again.

The fidelity, or otherwise, of the Shah will ever be shrouded
in obscurity. He defended himself against

Shah Shuia. , , . , ...

the aspersions cast upon him m a series
of letters to the British authorities ; but in the circumstances
they failed to carry conviction. His main object appears to have
been to extract money, without which he professed himself power-
less. Over twenty lakhs were, however, found in his possession
after his death.

An atmosphere of doubt and suspicion must always have
surrounded him. A forged and inflammatory document, which was
used by the chiefs in his name, was proved not to be genuine,
and it is unlikely he would have allowed such evidence of his
guilt to become available. He would undoubtedly have rejoiced
to be freed from the English alliance, and possibly, therefore,
viewed the progress of events with satisfaction ; but he was not
proved to have taken an active part in them. It was his policy to
run with the hare and hunt with the hounds ; he knew, however,
that his political existence depended upon the wfll of the British
Government ; but he was wholly unprepared for the defeat of his
allies. Mackeson was of opinion that he engineered the Kabul in-
surrection ;Macgregor in the main agreed with him. Rawlinson
thought that he was well- inclined to us. Mackenzie credited Shah
Shuja with friendliness for Macnaghten and an equal amount of
hatred for Burnes, and consideied that, although he was aware of
the plot in the first instance, he subsequently exerted his influence

406 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

to subdue the insurrection. Conolly, who was probably in the best
position to judge, at first thought that the Shah was favourable
to us ; but gradually his faith was shaken and he eventually
formed the belief that he was implicated in the insurrection. As
the Afghan proverb has it, he was like grain between two millstones.

To sum up, it is fairly evident that Shah Shuja was faithful
neither to his allies nor to his own countrymen. He was a poor
creature, with few good qualities, placed in a very difficult position.
He soon tired of being a puppet, and longed to be a King ; or to
return to his peaceful captivity at Ludhiana. All men suspected
and none loved him. Shah Shuja was not a hero, nor did he play
a heroic part. He was picked up from the dust of Ludhiana for
the convenience of the British Government, and it is not surprising,
perhaps, that he considered his own convenience as well as theirs.
He could hardly be expected to develop all at once from a figure-
head into a powerful reigning monarch.

The troops at Kandahar consisted of Her Majesty's 40th

Regiment ; the 2nd, 16th, 38th, 42nd and

Affairs at Kandahar. ^^^^ Bengal Native Infantry; Captain

Blood's battery of Bombay Artillery ; the Shah's Horse Artillery,
under Captain Anderson ; some regiments of the Shah's infantry ;
and detachments of the Shah's and Skinner's Horse. The
country appeared tranquil ; and, to diminish the strength of the
brigade, the 16th, 42nd, and 43rd Regiments commenced their
return march to India on the 7th of November ; but that evening
startling news reached Kandahar.

A detachment of 130 men, under Captain Woodburn, was
proceeding from Kandahar to Kabul when
aiyi a a . ^-^^^ were attacked near Ghazni by a
party of Afghans. Woodburn fought his way to the fort
of Saiyidabad, occupied by a man of the postal depart-
ment, supposed to be friendly. But the fort, which he
defended for a day and a night, gave no protection ; ammunition
fell short, and tidings came of the Kabul insurrection. The Chief
now admitted parties of Afghans into the towers of his harem,
which overlooked the courtyard in which the sepoys were quartered,
and a massacre took place. Many were killed on the spot ; others
threw themselves over the walls and were cut up. Woodburn

KANDAHAR. 407

with a few men defended himself in a tower for several hours ;

but the enemy burnt them out and killed them almost to a man.

Rawlinson at once recommended the halt of Maclaren's brigade,

and it returned to Kandahar. A week pass-

Maclaren's Brigade. ^^ -^ ^^^^^ ^^^ anxiety. Letters came

from Macnaghten and Elphinstone, reporting the insurrection
and calling for Maclaren's brigade. Endorsements by Palmer at
Ghazni and by Leech at Kalat-i-Ghilzai gave warning of the coming
storm. On the 17th of November the tliree regiments, with a troop
of Horse Artillery, commenced their march northward. Rawlin-
son, fearing that some evil might arise from the presence of Saf dar
Jang, persuaded him to follow Maclaren's brigade with Captain
Hart's Janbaz regiment. Rawlinson was glad to be quit of both
parties, whose fidelity he doubted.

During November Kandahar remained tranquil ; but it was
obvious that the tide of insurrection was setting towards the west.
The road to the capital was infested by the insurgents. Crawford
had been attacked near Ghazni, and lost the Durani prisoners
whom he was escorting to Kabul, together with a number of his
horses and men.

On the 8th of December Maclaren's force returned to Kandahar;
the reasons for this retrograde movement are not clear, for it appears
that the force might have reached Kabul. The relief of Ghazni
alone would have been a gain. Nott never wished them, however,
to leave Kandahar ; and possibly Maclaren, knowing this, took
the first excusable opportunity to return. Had the real state of
affairs at Kabul been understood, there is little doubt, but that
the effort to reach that place would have been a more determined
one.

Disquiet soon manifested itself at Kandahar. Muham-
mad Attar Khan had been sent from Kabul expressly to foment it.
Major Rawlinson soon perceived the necessity of suppressing the
disorder ; at first by the exercise of tact.

Concentration at Kandahar. . ... i-ii

With this object he withdrew ail detach-
ments and concentrated them at Kandahar, leaving only a small
party of Janbaz a^t Tezin. He next exerted himself to caus:" a
Durani movement in our favour,binding the chiefs by a sacred bond
ratified by the priesthood. The chiefs were sent to the eastern

408 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

frontier to raise the tribes against the Barakzais and Ghilzais,
while the British remained at Kandahar as spectators, hoping that
the contest would resolve itself into a trial of strength between the
Sadozais and Barakzais. Rawlinson's objects were, however,
only partially attainer" although he succeeded in gainijig
time. When the Dr . uis heard that Shah Shuja was also
our enemy, they anged their tune, and fell away from
us, though they d. not at once profess open hostility. The
new year came in with a crowd of fresh embarrassments. Safdar
Jang had returned to Kandahar, declaring that he could not trust
the Janbaz. The latter, who laccompanied him, soon threw off all
disguise and openly sided against us. They were to have com-
, , , menced their march to Girishk on the

. Mutiny ot Janbaz. • n i t •

27th of December ; 400 m all under Lieu-
tenants Golding and Wilson with Lieutenant Pattinson in poli-
tical charge. The object of the move was to escort treasure, and,
at the same time, to rid Kandahar of their presence. Owing to
unforeseen difficulties the march was postponed, to the surprise
of the men, who had intended to mutiny and desert when on the
march. They now decided to do so at once ; and proceeding to
their officers' tents attacked them, and when they thought they
had accomplished their purpose mounted their horses and fled,
Pattinson was only stunned and, though wounded in seven places,
mounted a horse and escaped, only to die in the following March.
Golding fled on foot towards the cantonments, but was cut down
by the Janh.iz. A party of the Shah's Plorse and a detachment
of Wilson's Janhaz, who had remained true, sent in pursuit,
caught up the fugitives twelve miles from Kandahar, and dis-
persed them after a hand to hand struggle ; thirty of the
enemy were killed, more wounded, and the remainder fled to
Attar Muhammad's camp. Two days later Safdar Jang fled and
joine i Attar Muhammad. The Sardar had fixed his head-quarters
at Delhi, 40 miles from Kandahar, and Rawlinson was eager to
attack him early in January, perceiving the expediency of crush-
ing the insurrection in the bud, as fresh adherents were daily
going over to the enemy. Nott, however, was unwilling to divide
his force by sending a brigade to Delhi. The former took a poli-
tical and the latter a military view of the situation. Nott argued

KANDAHAR. ~ ' 409

that to detach a brigade, far from support, at sucli a season of the
year, would result in the destruction of his men in the field, and
"the exposure of the city to attack. He wrote toRawlinson: " I
have no right to interfere with the afiairs of the Government of this
■country, and I never do ; but in reference to that part of your note
where you speak of political influence, I will candidly tell you that
these are not the times for mere ceremony, and that under present
circumstances, and at a distance of 2,000 miles from the seat of the
Supreme Government, I throw responsibility to the winds, and tell
you that, in my opinion, you have not had for some time past,
nor have you at present, one particle of political influence in this
country."

However, the point in dispute was soon settled ; for the enemy
quietly moved down the valley of the Arghandab, and on the
12th of January established themselves on the river, five miles
west of Kandahar.

General Nott now promptly moved out to attack them. Tak-
, ing five and a half regiments of infantry,

Action of the Arghandab. ,, , , r r., ■

the fehah s 1st Cavalry, a party oi Skin-
ner's Horse and sixteen guns, a force weak only in the mounted
branch, after a march of four hours over a very difficult country,
he came in sight of the rebel army, from fifteen to twenty thousand
men, drawn up in a strong position on the banks of the Arghandab.
The British troops crossed the river and at once advanced to the
attack in column of battalions, flanked by the artillery and
cavalry. At the end of twenty minutes, during which our guns
and musketry, telling with deadly effect upon the dense masses
of the enemy, were answered by a wild and ineffective fire, the
rebel army was in full flight. The Ghilzais fled in one direction,
the Janbaz in another, and the villagers returned to their own
homes. Attar Muhammad attempted to make a stand ; but
our troops moving forward carried the village of Kala-Chak by
storm, killing all within the walls. Line was then re-formed ; and
^ Attar Muhammad prepared to meet a second attack, but the cavalry
charging, the enemy fled in dismay.

The Durani Chiefs were not in time to take part in the action,
and only arrived to see their countrymen in flight. Safdar Jang,

Attar Muhammad, and the other rebel chiefs sought an asylum in
Vol. m.

410 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

the Durani camp ; and our quondam friends became our open
enemies. From the 20th of January until the end of Feb-
ruary the Duranis remained" encamped in the neighbourhood
of Kandahar. The' winter was severe, and Nott was un-
willing to expose his troops ; while the enemy appeared
to be equally disinclined for action. During this mutual
truce the occupations and feelings of the two forces were

Situation at Kandahar. very different. Nott's force, conscious-

of their strength, were neither despond-
ent nor anxious, officers and men fell back into the ordinary
routine of cantonment life, and indulged in steeplechases and
other amusements. The enemy, however, were in a continued state
of restlessness. Mirza Ahmad saw the danger of allowing the
Durani Chiefs to dwell too much on the embarrassments of the
situa tion, and kept them both from a premature engagement
with the British and from breaking out into internal dissensions^
He alone could have played the part so well.

However, the garrison was by no means without anxieties.
Provisions were scarce, and fodder scarcer. The horses were be-
coming unserviceable from lack of food ; the sheep were so thin
as to be hardly worth killing. It was bitterly cold, and fuel was
BO scanty that even the sick had to do without fires ; there were
patientsin the hospitals, but no medicines. Above all. money was
becoming very scarce. The arrival of a convoy from the southward
was looked for with an anxiety which can only be imagined.

While the hopes of the garrison were directed towards the

^ , , south, their thoughts and fears turned

Orders for evacuation.

to the north. On the 21st of February
the order came for the evacuation of Kandahar and Kalat-i-Ghil-
zai. Rawlinson, while recognizing the genuineness of the docu-
ment, which was a copy of the original, did not for a moment con-
sider himself bound by it. Still the change in Kabul affairs placed
him in a peculiar position. Shah Shuja was now the reci gnized
sovereign ; and it could not be said that British troops were any
longer necessary. The Durani Chiefs also grasped the situation,
and resorted to argument instead of force, to expel the British
from Kandahar. A letter was received from the Durani csmp on
the 23rd of February. In it Safdar Jang and the chiefs

KANDAHAR. 411

represented that the British had played their part, and had no
longer any excuse for remaining. Two alternatives lay before
them ; either they could retire unmolested to Quetta or remain
to share the fate of the Kabul garrison. Mirza Ahmad, in a
private letter, begged Rawlinson to retire before the Durani
nation should rise en masse. A letter from Shah Shuja to
Prince Timur, which arrived at this time, was, perhaps, the
most important incident. The purport of it was that the con-
test had now resolved itself into one between the Prophet's follow-
ers and the unbelievers. That he himself had been unanimously
recognized as King, and that he wished to be kept informed of all
Kandahar proceedings. Timur protested that the document was
a forgery, while Rawlinson well knew that it was genuine. He
and the General now took counsel as to what reply should be dis-
patched. Both decided to maintain their position at all risks. Their
answer to the Duranis pointed out that there was every reason
to believe that Shah Shuja was acting under compulsion, and de-
sired the support of the British, who would not, therefore, retire
before a final explanation had been entered upon with him. The
position at Kandahar was explained to be by no means on all fours
with that at Kabul ; that the British had no hankerings after
Afghanistan, but could not move until more specific instructions
should be received. A postscript was added, stating that later
information had been received, which proved that the estimate
formed of Shah Shuja's position was a true one, and that an aveng-
ing force was on the march from India.

Rawlinson exerted himself successfully to detach different
tribes from the rebel cause. In spite, however, of this and other
favourable indications, both the military and political Chiefs con-
sidered it desirable to strike a blow for the suppression of the in-
surrection and their own security. So Nott determined to attack
the enemy, and Rawlinson to expel the Afghans from the city. The
latter justified this, at the first sight, harsh measure in the
following passage from his Journal : — " March 1. — The General
has now made up his mind to take the field ; and, after consider-
ing the case fully, I have determined that the Afghans must be
turned out of the city. It is not as if the present afiair were a mere
transient disturbance. We are engaged in a regular national war,.

412 FWNTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

and Outram does not anticipate that we shall be able to take the
field in sufficient force to put down all opposition before next
winter. We must, therefore, look forward to a protracted struggle
at Kandahar all through the summer, and the security of the
city appears to me, under such circumstances, indispensable." A
letter from the Government of India spoke of the continued
■occupation of Kandahar as conducive to the interests of the State.
Nott and Rawlinson had, therefore, anticipated Government's
wishes. A census was made of the inhabitants, and retaining some
merchants, mechanics, and priests, the remainder, consisting of
about 1,000 families, were expelled without opposition. The
property which they were unable to carry with them was safe-
guarded, and all grain taken over and paid for by the
commissariat.

Nott took the field on the 7th of March with the 40th Queen's,
,, , , 16th, 38th, 42nd, and 43rd Native Infan-

Action near Kandahar.

try, a wing of one of the Shah's regi-
ments, the whole of the available cavalry and sixteen guns, leav-
ing in the city a garrison of the ind Native Infantry and two and
a half of the Shah's regiments of foot. Most of the gates were
barricaded, and the place was considered secure against any
possible assault by the Duranis.

The enemy in the vicinity of Kandahar retired before Nott's
advance ; and he crossed the Tarnak and advanced upon the
Arghandab in pursuit, but they fought shy of the guns and
bayonets, their dislike of the former being enhanced by the shells
fired into their dense masses. On the 9th, however, the enemy
seemed inclined to make a stand, and opened fire from a range
of hills, upon which their infantry were posted. The light com-
panies of the Queen's regiment and 16th Native Infantry were sent
to storm the hills on the right, and the Grenadiers of the 40th those
on the left ; and the enemy was soon driven off. The cavalry^ were
now seen drawn up in front of our columns, their right resting upon
high ground and their left on a fort built upon a high scarped
mound. Hoping to draw them on the guns remained silent ; but

1 Howgh, page 134. The Kandahar horse of the present day is far inferior to that so
■well known in the history on former Indian warfare ; the horses we saw were small
and indifferent.

KANDAHAR. . 4] 3

they were planning another game. The enemy retired before the
^^ , , advancing battalion, spreading a report

Attack on Kandahar. ... , ? ^

that they intended to make a night attack
upon Nott's camp, re-crossed the river, and doubled back upon
Kandahar. This stratagem was attributable to Mirza Ahmad.
On the morning of the lOth it was seen that a number of footmen
had taken possession of old Kandahar, and appeared intent upon
an attack on the city. This information was at once transmitted
to Nott. The scouts brought news, moreover, that the Durani
army was to concentrate before Kandahar during the day, and
make a night attack. During the day the enemy increased in
numbers ; and at su' set Safdar Jang and Mirza Ahmad arrived and
posted themselves in the cantonments. The night was dark and
the garrison could not trace the movements of the enemy ; there
were no blue lights, or other means of illuminating the ground be-
yond the defences. At 8 o'clock the Ghazis commenced the attack,
setting fire to faggots, which they had previously deposited at the
Herat gate, which burned like tinder, and showed up the crowd of
Afghans. The resistance was as steady as the attack was desperate.
A gun poured grape and the guard kept up a heavy fire upon the
besiegers. The Ghazis, however, encouragedby the success of their
first move, pressed on with desperate resolution, tearing down the
burning planks with their hands and, intoxicated with hhang, rush-
ing upon their death. Major Lane, who commanded the garrison,
and who was ably seconded by Rawlinson, brought the gun down
from the bastion, and planted it in the gateway, another was brought
from the citadel, and the infantry was reinforced at the point of
assault, while the bJiisties were engaged in extinguishing the flames,
and commissariat grain bags were piled against the burning gate.
At nine o'clock the gate fell and the Ghazis surmounted the grain
bags, many falling dead or wounded beneath the fire of the defen-
ders. During three hours the Ghazis made assault after as -ault, but
at midnight drew off in despair of effecting an entrance. Simultane-
ously attacks were made upon the Shikarpur and Kabul gates, but
the brushwood would not ignite, and the garrison were on the alert.
When the attacks had failed Mirza Ahmad called a ( ouncil of war.
The attackers, irritated beyond measure at their failure, laid the
blame at his door ; and were with difl&culty restrained from

414 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

laying violent hands on him. The Ghazis are said to have lost 600
during the four hours' fighting, and were busy until daybreak in
carrying off their dead. Had Kandahar fallen the consequences
might have proved serious ; for the force in the field had no tents
and little ammunition, and it would have proved no easy matter
to recapture the city. The General was obviously outmancsuvred ;
but he fully believed the garrison he had left sufficient for the de-
fence. He appears, however, to have been very badly supplied
with information.

Nott re-entered Kandahar on the 12th of March. The repulse
had given a decided set-back to the rebel plans, brought disunion
in its train, and caused the Ghazis to denounce their chiefs. The
rayats resumed their peaceful avocations, and Rawlinson exerted
himself to reassure the public mind, and to restore the peace and
prosperity of the surrounding villages.

The Duranis, however, soon re?overed and by the third
week in March were on the move. On the 24th they were near
Kala-Chak, where they had met with their former reverse, and the
Par siwan Jflw&« 2 attempted to open negotiations, agreeing to go
to Kabul if the expense of their march should be defrayed. Nott
told Rawlinson he would not only not give them a rupee, but
would exterminate them if he could come up with them.

On the 25th Colonel Wymer was sent out with three regiments
Wymer's action near of infantry, a troop of Horse Artillery,
Kandahar. and 400 mounted men to clear the country

on the Kandahar side of the Arghandab of the Durani Horse which
were then thieatenine our position, and to protect the animals sent
out to graze. The Duranis advanced to the attack which Wymer
prepared to meet, at the same time informing the General of his situ-
ation. The Hindustani Cavalry were driven back by the Duranis
who bravely charged our squares. The guns and musketry, however,
soon checked them and the aifair resolved itself into a series of skir-
.mishes. Nott, in the meantime, hearing the firing, moved out in
support. He found our infantry formed in a hollow square protecting
the camels ; the Horse Artillery were playing upon the enemy's
cavalry, which was thus kept at a distance. Under cover of this fire
Lieutenant Chamberlain, at the head of a small party, charged
them, but was driven back, and re-formed behind the infantry. As

KANDAHAR. 415

the reinforcements approached, the enemy retired, unmolested
owing to the paucity of our cavalry. Nott wished to attack
the Durani camp, which had been left standing, but it was difficult
to move the gvms down to the banks of the river, which was prac-
tically unfordable. Leaving Wymer in position, he, therefore,
withdrew to Kandahar.

On the 26th Nott again moved out with his brigade, but the
enemy had struck their camp during the night, and the Durani
Horse moved off and dispersed as soon as day broke. The General,
therefore, withdrew, Wymer remained out to protect the cattle,
and Rawlinson stayed in the valley, attempting to restore the con-
fidence of the villagers, who were loud in their complaints of the
depredations of the Ghazis,

The disunion in the Durani camp broke out anew ; each chief
abused the others, and all Mirza Ahmad. Reassuring tidings
began to come to them from north and south, and the news of
the capitulation of Ghazni served to re-animate them. It had
held out for some weeks in the face of an overwhelming force,
but had fallen before the receipt of orders for its evacuation from
Kabul.

The fortress, captured with so much difficulty, was now in the
hands of the enemy, who had appeared

Capitulation of Gliazni. •' '- '■

before it on the 20th of JSlovember ; on
which day snow began to fall. Hearing of the advance of Maclaren,
the investing force drew off, but soon re-assembled. The garrison
was now completely surrounded. The city, indeed, was in their
possession ; but they could not stir beyond it. The inhabitants un-
dermined the walls and admitted the enemy. The city was
no longer tenable, and the garrison withdrew to the citadel.
Winter set in and the sepoys, kept on the qui vive, sank beneath
the paralysing cold. Men bred on the plains of India were obliged
to break the ice before they could allay their thirst. Only a seer
of wood was available for each man to cook his meal and obtain
warmth. All were on half rations of an extremely poor' quality,
and numbers were taken to hospital severely frost-bitten. The
Afghans fired when any showed their heads, and this state of
affairs continued until the middle of January, Then the news
from Kabul caused some suspension^of hostilities. It was under-

416 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

stood that a treaty had been effected, and that Shamshuddin Khan
would shortly arrive as Governor. About the middle of February
he came and summoned Palmer to surrender. The English ofl&cer,.
unwilling to submit to this demand, and yet hopeless of being able
to make an effective resistance, temporised until the beginning of
March. At last the patience of the chiefs was exhausted, and they
threatened a resumption of hostilities, if the citadel were not
instantly surrendered. On the 6th of March Palmer, under the
promise of a safe conduct to Peshawar, marched out with his men.
The British troops had hardly taken up the quarters assigned
to them when the Afghan Chiefs threw off the mask. The next day
when the troops were at their meal the Ghazis rushed with fury
upon the lines. Three terrible days followed. House after house was
attacked by the infuriated enemy, and fire, famine, and slaughter
worked together for the destruction of the unhappy men. At last
only two houses, crowded to suffocation, remained. The gims of the
citadel, which none of the garrison had been able to work, sent shells
crashing through the walls ; and the Afghans only seemed to defer
the final massacre to accentuate the misery of the sufferers.
Shamshuddin Khan had, however, begun to relent, and was prepared
to admit his victims to terms. The remnants of the garrison even-
tually surrendered on a promise of a safe conduct to Kabul. The
sepoys, who had resolved to take their way to Peshawar at all
costs, wandered about the fields, helpless and bewildered. Many
were cut down or made prisoners, and a season of intense suffering
now commenced for all the survivors alike.

John Nicholson was at Ghazni when the enemy entered, and
drove them thrice beyond the walls at the point of the bayonet
before he would comply with the order that his company should
lay down their arms. He at length obeyed and gave up his sword
with tears, to accompany his comrades to an almost hopeless
imprisonment.

CHAPTER XX.

POLLOCK'S ADVANCE.

Meanwhile Kalat-i-Ghilzai was bravely holding out.
The fortress stands upon a barren eminence,

The question of with- . ., „ ^ ., .

drawai from Kandahar. Some eighty miles Irom Kandahar, and is

one of the most dreary and exposed spots in
Afghanistan. The garrison consisted of the Shah's 3rd Infantry
Regiment, 40 European Artillerymen, some Sappers and Miners,
and 250 of the 43rd Regiment, under the command of Captain J. H.
Craigie, of the Shah's service. For months the cold was a worse
foe than the enemy. The barracks were unfinished, and had
neither doors nor windows ; and fuel was scarce. There was plenty
of grain, but it could not be ground owing to the hostility of the
surrounding country, and it was two months before serviceable
hand-mills were constructed. The Europeans often lived for days
upon bread and water, but there was no grumbling. During the
winter the enemy were inactive ; but with the spring came the
renewal of hostilities. The garrison employed themselves in
strengthening the defences while the enemy, ever growing more
numerous, drew the cordon closer. By degrees they made trenches,
to the fire from which the defenders could not give an effective
reply. Craigie and his men never thought of surrender, and thank-
fully took their few opportunities of getting in a shot.^

At this time news reached Nott of the failure of General Eng-
Failure of England's ^^nd to get through from Quetta with the
column. much needed supplies, and of the unfortu-

nate action of Haikalzai. (Part I of this volume.)

Brigadier England reached Quetta on the 16th of March. The
' , „ , next day he wrote to Lieutenant Ham-

England s cohimn. "^

mersley, Political Agent at that place, pro-
posing to move to Haikalzai on the 24th, and there to await

1 The sword, in my opinion, is not the weapon for a trooper in Asia ; had our men
been armed with lances, they would have killed many more and suffered less. —
Stacy, page 152.

( 417 )
Vol. iir. 3 G

418 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

intelligence from the north of the Khojak Pass. On the following
day he wrote to say that he intended to halt in the Pishin VaUey
unless Nott's regiments had arrived at the Khojak. There were
not wanting those who prophesied disaster between Quetta and
the Khojak.

On the 26th of March the Brigadier moved on the Pishin Val-
ley, with five companies of Her Majesty's 41st Regiment, six com-
panies Bombay Native Infantry, a troop, 3rd Bombay Cavalry,
fifty Poona Horse, and four Horse Artillery guns. On the 28tli
the force arrived at the entrance of a defile which leads to the
village of Haikalzai, where England intended to await the arrival
of the remainder of the brigade. It was evident that no re-
inforcements were to be expected from Nott, although Rewlinson
had strongly advocated their despatch. Wymer's brigade was
out to the south of Kandahar, it was believed with the object of
holding out a helping hand to England' s column ; however, it was
withdrawn, and the enemy interpreted this move as a confession
that the opening up of communications with the troops below
was hopeless. It would have been well had England, in these cir-
cumstances, awaited the arrival of reinforcements from the south ;
forhe nowfound himself in an absolutely strange country without
any idea as to the movements of the enemy. Colonel Stacy, who
was in political charge, had warned the General that he might
expect to meet with opposition at Haikalzai ; but it was not
until England was close upon them that he became aware of
the enemy's presence. Muhammad Sadiq had determined to
oppose our advance and had posted his troops behind sangars
on the heights.

The British force halted and England rode forward to
reconnoitre. In about a quarter of an hour the order was given
to advance. The Horse Artillery opened fire on the hills to the
left, and the light battalion, under Major Ap thorp, was ordered to
storm those on the right. The battery performed its part admir-
ably, but the infantry were disastrously repulsed. Major Ap thorp
was wounded, Captain Maj', of the 41st shot, and nearly twenty-
five per cent, of the force were either killed or wounded. The enemy
fought with much gallantry, and many were shot, or bayoneted
on the hill.

POLLOCK'S ADVANCE. 419

In spite of their failure the men soon rallied and asked to be
again led forward. Stacy volunteered to carry the position with
100 men, and three times repeated the offer, but the General had
fully made up his mind to retreat, believing that at least a
brigade with mortars was requisite to carry the heights. He sent
to Nott for reinforcements, and fell back to Quetta.

It would appear that England believed the defences to be
stronger than the facts warranted. Lieutenant Evans, of the
41st, who had seen them, reported that there were no breast-
works, but merely a four- foot ditch filled with brushwood.
The strength of the enemy also appears to have been over-
estimated. The General reported that they were one hundred
times as numerous as had been expected ; while in effect there
were little more than one thousand all told.

The Duranis were dispirited by their want of success
in the neighbourhood of Kandahar, and were only too pleased to
accede to Muhammad Sadiq's request for help, seeing an opportu-
nity for revenging themselves for their defeats. However, there
was no need for their assistance, as Encrland had been driven back
"before they arrived. It was as well that they were not needed
for, Afghan-like, they fell out by the way, an 1 only a small portion
of their force continued the march.

England, in contrast to Nott, seems to have had little faith
in the value of his native troops. Anent this Outram writes : " If
he is ever heard to libel our sepoys in that manner, surely ib will
be noticed by our officers." It would appear that England should
either have waited for reinforcements at Quetta, considering his
known views of the insufficiency of his force, or have made
strenuous efforts to force the pass ; half measures were worse
than useless.

Nott was more than annoyed at this failure, and still more
disgusted that England declined to redeem it by a strong forward
movement. He was crying out for cavalry, ammunition, stores,
medicines, and mouey, and they seemed as far off as ever.
Had he had these, especially the former, he would already have
been on his way to Kabul. So far from England dreaming of
putting his force again in motion he wrote to Nott that " when-
ever it so happens that you retire bodily in this direction, and

3 G 2

420 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

that I am informed of it, I feel assured that I shall be able
to make an advantageous diversion in your favour."

This was too much for the fiery Nott, who at once wrote a letter,
saying that he had well considered England's position, that he
knew the country well, and that he was determined to uphold
English honour ; and finally that lie must have the supplies from
Quetta. He concluded : — " I am well aware that war cannot be
made without loss ; but yet, perhaps, the British troops can
oppose Asiatic armies without defeat."

There was no resisting this appeal and England's brigade now
prepared to move. This decision took the troops by surprise,
no forward move having entered into the calculations of the
garrison ; indeed the officers had been buying houses and settling
down to the routine of cantonment life.

Exactly one month after his previous failure England was
again before Haikalzai. The enemy were posted on precisely the
same ground as before, and probably expected an equally easy suc-
cess : but this was not to be. The British troops were told off into
three parties, one, under Major Simmons, to storm the hills to the
left ; another, under Captain Woodburn to attack the hill on the
right, the scene of the former disaster ; and a third, under Major
Browne, in reserve. As before, Leslie' s guns opened the fight ; then
the infantry advanced with loud cheers. There was no mistaking
who were to be the winners this time ; the enemy broke and fled,
pursued by Delamain's Cavalry, and Haikalzai was captured.

On the morning of the 30th the column entered the Khojak,
... „, and, in spite of Colonel Stacy's representa-

uo-operation of v\ ymer. ' r j c

tions that all the laurels would fall to the
Kandahar troops, who were entering from the other side, General
England halted them. Wymer meanwhile crowned the heights
and opened the way for the Bombay Force.

The united Brigades entered the city on the 10th of May, to find
that the enemy had broken up and dispersed. The Durani Chiefs,
although disunited, were not inactive ; but their objects were hard
to determine. Spring heralded a more cheerful state of affairs than
had existed since the outbreak of the insurrection. The chiefs were
scattered, some wounded and dying, others eager to come to terms.
Mirza Ahmad and Safdar Jang contemplated a withdrawal across

POLLOCK'S ADVANCE. 421

the frontier, and the latter communicated to the British Agent his
■desire to return to our camp. The Kabul Janbaz had deserted,
and the village headmen offered to follow suit, on a guarantee of
immunity from depredation by our troops. The relief of Jalal-
abad by Pollock, and his determination to march upon Kabul, was
the signal for a royal salute ; and as the English barometer rose that
of the Afghans correspondingly fell.

With Mirza Ahmad and Attar Muhammad still restless, there
was no prospect of permanent peace. The former was raising
money in the name of the Government, and employing it for
tarrying on the war. Nott, therefore, proposed the issue of a
proclamation warning the people not to pay the taxes ; but he went
beyond this, and wished that a reward should be offered for the
apprehension of the two chieftains. A lengthy argument as to the
propriety of the latter measure ensued between Rawlinson and
Nott; and in the end the former prevailed. The ex-chief of
Kandahar, Kohan-dil Khan, who had all this time been quietly
living in Persia, now began to intrigue for the recovery of his lost
dominions. The anxiety thus caused was, however, short-lived,
as the Persian Government was understood to have agreed to
restrain him from crossing the frontier. Now, however, the heav-
iest blow of all, from the supreme Government itself, was to fall.

Pollock and Nott were both eager to advance. Their position
„ , ,. was favourable for the maintenance of

Government policy.

a bold front, and to overawe the sur-
rounding country. The public placed complete confidence in the
two Generals and their forces were in high spirits. Everybody
looked forward to a speedy re -establishment of the national
•honour. The Governor-General, however, viewed matters in a
different light. Lord EUenborough landed at Calcutta on the 28th
of February, with the situation at his fingers' ends, and was only
ignorant of his predecessor's plans for the extrication of Indian
affairs from their state of entanglement. The reader will re-
member that those plans were dictated by the policy of with-
drawal. Everyone was waiting to see whether the new Governor-
General would approve of these measures.

His first document of importance was a letter to the Com-
jnander-in-Chief, which contained an able review of the position.

422 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

He recognised that we owed nothing further to Shah Shuja, and
that purely military considerations would dictate our future
policy. Of first importance was the security of the troops and
the last act should be a blow at the Afghans, which would prove
that the British nation was not weak and pusillanimous as they
supposed ; but fully capable of exacting retribution for Afghan
treachery and Afghan barbarity. This was the policy of Clerk
and Robertson, of Pollock and Nott ; and the policy which the
public of British India was prepared to back. Lord EUenborough's
opinion, however, soon underwent a change. During his journey
to Benares he heard of England's defeat at Haikalzai, and he
was now air for evacuation.

Sir Jasper NicoUs was only too glad to comply with the order
to withdraw ; and informed Pollock that only three conditions
would permit him to delay : Istly, that the safety of the captives
should not be endangered ; 2ndly, that a lightly equipped force
should be sent for their rescue ; 3rdly, that should the Afghans
attempt an attack, which appeared improbable, he might strike
such a blow as to cause them to remember him.

At the end of April the Chief Secretary wrote that should
Pollock have advanced upon Kabul, he was not to understand that
Government's view had changed as regards the withdrawal. The
General replied in the following terms : — He opines that his instruc-
tions leave him a measure of discretion in the matter of a short
delay, which has been caused by a paucity of cattle ; that the state
of affairs at Kabul is such that a precipitate retreat would compro-
mise our reputation ; that a retirement, before the release] of the
captives had been accomplished, would be construed as a panic ;
that the season is unfavourable for a retreat ; and that the
health of his troops need cause no anxiety ; he regrets that Nott
should have been ordered to retire, as a combined advance upon
Kabul would meet with undoubted success. In the meantime he
will procure cattle if possible to carry out his orders ; whether they
be for a forward or retrograde movement.

By this time the announcement of the Governor-General's in-
tention to withdraw the troops had reached Kandahar, Nott had
his own opinion as to the wisdom of this measure, but placed obe-
dience, to orders above all other considerations, and expressed his

POLLOCK'' S ADVANCE. 423

readiness to comply with, his instructions. The following extract

from Rawlinson's correspondence will,

Rawlinson's views. ,, , • ^^ ^

however, show that it was gall and worm-
wood to all concerned : " The peremptory order to retire has come
upon us like a thunder-clap. No one at Kandahar is aware of such an
order having been received, except the General and myself, and we
must preserve a profound secrecy as long as possible. The withdraw-
al of the garrison from Kalat-i-Ghilzai and the destruction of the
fortifications at that place must, I fancy, however, expose our policy
and our situation will then be one of considerable embarrassment.

General Nott intends, I believe, to order all the carriage at
Quetta to be sent on to Kandahar. * * *

It must be our object to collect carriage, on the pretext of an advance
on Kabul ; but how long the secret can be kept it is impossible to say.
When our intended retirement is once known, we must expect to have
the whole country up in arms, and to obtain no cattle except such
as we can violently lay hands on. *****
Should the Barakzais triumph at Kabul, and should we no longer
oppose the return of Kohan-dil, he will be the most likely chief to
succeed ; but the natural consequence of his return, and of our
determined non-interference with the affairs in this quarter, will be
of course to render Persian influence paramount at Herat and
Kandahar ; and with the prospect of a Russian fleet at Astarabad,
and a Persian army at Merv it is by no means impossible that
the designs which threatened us in 1838 may at last be directly
accomplished. Strong measures of intimidation, both against
Russia and Persia, will be our best protection."

A brigade, consisting of the2Qd, 16th, and 38th Native Infantry,
under Colonel Wymer, was sent off on the 19th of May to withdraw
the garrison and destroy the defences of Kalat-i-Ghilzai. With them
went Her Majesty's 40th Regiment, Leslie's troop of Horse Artil-
lery, four guns of Blood's battery, the Bombay Cavalry details, and
the Shah'sl st Regiment of Horse, together with a few of Haldane's
troopers, some details of Bengal Artillery, and Madras Sappers.

Thus at the end of May Pollock was holding on at Jalalabad,
,,,, hoping for orders to march on Kabul, and

Pollock at Jalalabad. jt o

rejoicing that want of transport pre-
sented him with an excuse for not immediately withdrawing.

'424 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Nott, much against his will, was preparing to obey the Governor-
General's injunctions, while the latter was exhorting them both to
keep his intentions secret— no easy matter when copies of official
correspondence were supplied to many individuals in different
places. Theplansfor the future were soon the subject of common
gossip ; and bets were actually made as to the probable date of
withdrawal. Pollock did his best to mystify, and went the
length of having a camp marked out in the Kabul direction,
while he instituted enquiries about supplies for a forward move-
ment. On the 1st of June the Governor-General intimated that
since circumstances pointed to the impos ability of the troopsbeing
withdrawn before October, it would be as well to lure the enemy
into a situation in which an effective blow might be struck.

This was a pleasant surprise to Pollock. He had, in accordance
with his instructions, collected a considerable amount of carriage,
which would be available for a movement on Kabul ; and eagerly
looked forward to the autumn to provide the opportunity. Mean-
while he occupied his leisure in doing his best for the relief of the cap-
tives. Akbar Khan endeavoured to obtain good terms for himself ;
but Pollock wrote to Government that his peculiar position disquali-
fied him from being placed upon the same looting as other
chiefs, and received the following reply : " It is not consistent
with the honour of the British Government to enter into any terms
for the making of a provision for so great a criminal. We might
engage to spare his life if he were to fall into our hands, because
it would be difficult so to bring him to trial as to protect the
Government from a colourable charge of violently prosecuting
an unworthy revenge ; but no more than this can be done, and this
only, if he should promptly do all he can to repair the crimes he
has committed." The negotiations had no result, but Mackenzie,
who acted as intermediary, was the bearer of much valuable in-
formation, and gave Pollock many important documents. The
General had wished for information as to the causes and progress
of the insurrection at Kabul ; and obtained much which threw
light on the dark points of recent history.

A Civil War broke out at Kabul on the death of Shah Shuja.

Affairs at Kabul. ^^^^^ ^^^g' ^^^ secoud SOU, was proclaimed

King. He was of infamous character, and

POLLOCK'' S ADVANCE. 425

Tather deficient in intellect ; but was reputed to be friendly to the
English, and was hated and feared by the Barakzais. Aminullah
Khan, however, knowing where the treasure lay, sided with the
Prince; and by his influence balanced affairs. Fateh Jang had no
love for his position, but was astute enough to see which way the
wind blew, and anticipated the speedy re-establishment of British
supremacy. He, therefore, wrote to Macgregor at Jalalabad
protesting his loyalty to the English, and begging for advice.

The Barakzais proclaimed Ziman Khan King, and defied the
Sadozai power ; and soon the two parties broke out into open hosti-
lities. Aminullah Khan was the first to draw the sword, and on the
1st of May general fighting began in the city. The following day,
to dishearten the Barakzais, Aminullah Khan seized the chief
Mullah. The effect, however, of this was the opposite of what he
had expected. Nearly all the neutrals, joined by the Kohi&tanis,
rose to avenge the insult. The Mullah was released, but popular
feeling still ran high; Aminullah Khan's house was burnt, and he
threw himself into the Bala Hissar. The Prince made a show of
welcoming him ; but secretly proposed to hand him over to the
British if Pollock should march upon Kabul.

The contest now increased in violence; the guns in the
Bala Hissar opened upon the city ; and many of the in-
habitants fled. There were 5,000 men in the citadel, amply pro-
visioned. The Prince had plenty of money, which he distributed
ireely among his followers ; while the Barakzais were very badly
ofi in this respect.

Akbar Khan did not regard these proceedings at the capital
with unconcern. He only awaited the return of his mission from
Jalalabad to proceed to the scene of strife himself ; and on the
3rd of May, taking Pottinger and Troop with him, he set out.

Arrived there he encouraged the belief that he had been in

treaty with General Pollock, who, it was

Akbar Ivhan captures Ihe , . , , . .1 •.

Bala Hissar. rumoured, recognized his authority ;

thus enhancing his own importance, and
creating division among the followers of Fateh Jang. Many of xhe
neutrals joined him, and the Kizilbashis promised him their support.
There was a good deal of fighting which favoured the Barakzais,
The works round the Bala Hissar were soon carried, partly by

426 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

treachery ; but Pottinger stated that the fighting was beneath con-
tempt. Fateh Jang, fearful that the Bala Hissar would fall, wrote
to Jalalabad urging the necessity of a speedy advance, and Mohan
Lai seconded his efforts, representing that the Barakzai position
would be much strengthened should they obtain the treasure,
which would fall into their hands if they captured the citadel.

On the 12th of May three holy men presented themselves with
overtures of peace from the Sardar. Fateh Jang sent for several
Korans, covered with seals, and asked if they thought that after
the experience which these books attested he could be expected
to rely upon Afghan oaths. The Saiyids were dismissed, after a
fruitless visit, and now Muhammad Shah Khan was sent to try
his fortune. The proposals he had to make were that Fateh Jang
should be acknowledged as King and Akbar Khan be appointed
State Minister, with Aminullah Khan as his deputy. The two
latter were then to raise an army and march against the English,,
but the King was to accompany them. A war with the Barak-
zais was to follow ; and the King was to be free to go where he liked,
taking his father's family with him. ^^'ith this alluring prospect
before him he was the more anxious for the British advance.
Nevertheless in the circumstances of the case he felt bound to ac-
cede to the demands. Muhammad Ziman Khan was not at all
pleased that these arrangements should have been made without
consulting him.

The Nawab now attacked the Bala Hissar, but was repulsed
with heavy loss. The Barakzais resumed the siege with renewed
vigour, believing that it was only held for the English ; but the weak
garrison successfully held out. An attempt was made to mine
the walls, but the art of engineering was not a strong point with
the Barakzais ; and the explosion caused considerable loss to the
besiegers and had no effect upon the fortifications.

Next day, however, heavy guns were brought into action against
the citadel, and the defenders lost heart. The garrison deserted
the Prince who had no alternative but to surrender the fortress.
Akbar Khan pronounced himself to be the servant of the Sado-
zais, simulated extreme humility, and attempted to patch up
his quarrel with Muhammad Ziman Khan. But the difiiculties
only increased. The Nawab declared that he was King, that Akbar

POLLOCK'S ADVANCE. 42T

Khan was at liberty to be Commander-in-Chief, but that the office
of Wazir was reserved for^Usman Khan. The Sardar was now gain-
ing over the Kohistanis to his^side,'in view of the coming conflict.
The Kizilbashis, on the other hand, proclaimed their intention
of joining the British. The Nawab, seeing that all hope of recon-
ciliation was past, prayed for the speedy advance of the British ;
so that he and Akbar Khan might fly before the dreaded civil
war should break out.

Nor was Akbar behindhand in his efforts to avert strife.
On the 21st of June, however, the two factions came into
collision. The battle lasted for some hours, and Ziman Khan was
defeated. The Prince was enthroned on the 29th of June, but all
the power was vested in the Sardar. He longed to get the British
captives into his hands, and importuned Mir Haji, in whose charge
they were, to send them to the Bala Hissar. The latter was very
avaricious, and, for a bribe of four thousand rupees, handed them
over, and the Munshi Mohan Lai was seized and tortured.

The summer passed ; and still Pollock and Nott were at Jalal-
abad and Kandahar. No one knew

The advance from Jalalabad. i i i ,-, /~,

whether the (jrovernor-General mtended
an advance or a retirement. Public opinion was loud in its de-
mands for the redemption of our honour. Pollock, Nott, Robertson,
Clerk, Rawlinson, Gutram, Macgregor, Mackeson and others
were unanimous for a forward movement and however much Lord
Ellenborough might affect to despise public opinion, he was bound
to be influenced by the views of such men as these. From
England, too, he learned that a retrograde movement would find no
favour either with the Government or the people. He accordingly
instigated Pollock and Nott to advance as a prelude to retirement.
He had maintained that the true policy of Government was to
bring back the armies to India, and that the re-establishment of our
reputation in Afghanistan was immaterial, but public opinion
made it necessary to push further into Afghanistan. To enable
both games to be played he wrote letters to Pollock and Nott,
stating that, althoughihis opinions had undergone no change, it was
possible that Nott might feel disposed to retire from Kandahar via.
Ghazni, Kabul, and Jalalabad ; and, that to lend him a helping
hand, it might be advisable for Pollock to advance to Kabul.

428 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROif INDIA.

The great obstacle to a retirement or to an advance had been

the scarcity of carriage. But during the
summer the authorities in Upper India
had been making strenuous efforts to procure a supply. Lord
Ellenborough had been giving the matter his attention ; but
more than anyone Mr. Eobertson, the Lieutenant-Governor of
the North- West Provinces, had been unremitting in his exertions.
He does not appear to have obtained full credit for his work, but
General Pollock never lost an opportunity of thanking him for
his assistance. There was, therefore, before the end of June, a
sufficiency of cattle at Pollock's disposal ; and he reported that
he was in a position to make a demonstration in the neighbour-
hood of Jalalabad. The Governor- General fell in with the
proposal ; but warned him that his resolution to withdraw was
as strong as ever.

On the same date, the 4th of July, two letters were sent to
Nott with a copy of Pollock's instructions, giving him a free choice
as to his line of withdrawal — Quetta and Sukkur, or the more
noitherly route, whichever he preferred ; he, too, was ever to keep
in mind that any movement was preparatory to withdrawal.

Their instructions appeared to throw all responsibility upon
the Generals, but they were the very men for the situation ; and
unlikely to be fettered in their actions by fear.

Pollock expressed his opinions thus : — " If I have not lived long
enough to judge of the propriety of an act for which I alone am
responsible, the sooner I resign the Command as unfit the better.
I assure you that I feel the full benefit of being unshackled and al-
lowed to judge for myself."

The Generals had now obtained all they wanted. They fully
trusted their troops, and transport was either available or in course
of supply. It was only necessary that their operations should
be combined, and that the blow at Kabul should be struck in
unison. To establish communication between Jalalabad and
Kandahar was no easy matter. Five messengers were despatched
at intervals to Nott's camp, but not until the middle of August
did Pollock hear of his intention to march upon Kabul. Akbar
Khan himself was employed as an unwitting means of commimi-
cation. Troup took him a letter with a request that it might be

POLLOCK'S ADVANCE. 429

forwarded to Nott. A few unimportant lines were written
in ink, and a great deal of important matter in rice-water
which could be brought out by the application of iodine
Pollock had feared that Nott might already have commenced
his retirement by the southern route ; but all doubts were now
set at rest.

Meanwhile, at Jalalabad, Pollock had been making demon-
strations against some hostile tribes, and

Actions in the Shinwari j_- _l- i- j_i i r j_i ti •.- i

Yjjligy negotiatmg tor the release oi the Jiritish

prisoners. He sent Monteith into the
Shinwari Valley, the tribes of which had possessed themselves of
some of the plundered property and one of our guns. These they
were to disgorge, of their own free will, or, failing that, at the point
of the bayonet. Monteith descended into the valley in the middle
of June, with a mixed European and Indian brigade and a
proportion of guns. The troops were all keenness ; and the sight
of some of the plundered property at Ali Bughan maddened them
past control. * Monteith and Macgregor were obliged to interfere
when they began to fire the houses and plunder the inhabitants.

The report of these proceedings soon spread throughout the
surrounding country, and the villagers began to fly with their
property, but regained confidence and returned to their
homes on Macgregor explaining the real designs of Government.
It soon became evident, however, that the object of the ex-
pedition would not be effected by peaceful means alone. The
gun and property had to be recovered, and it was known
that the chiefs at Gnlai were in possession of a portion. It had
also been ascertained that the gun was at Deh-Sarrak ; so it was
determined that the brigade should move against those places.
Gulai was the first to receive attention. It was a flourishing
settlement, and the inhabitants had only had time to carry
away a portion of their grain. Monteith pitched his camp on
some rising ground near the village, and demanded the resti-
tution of the plundered property. Evasive answers being re-
turned the village was destroyed. Of all their property the
Afghans probably value their trees the most ; and as the heaviest
penalty which could be inflicted they were destroyed by " ring-
ing." The work of destruction continued for several days and

430 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

as the gun was given up and the value of about half the property
and a good number of supplies having been appropriated, the
brigade's object appeared to have been attained. But the
Shinwaris, always refractory, had not been thoroughly coerced,
and a severer lesson was considered necessary. Monteith,
therefore, marched through their valley, burning the forts and
shooting the tribesmen down in their places of refuge. At
one time thirty-five forts were in flames simultaneously. At
Mazinathetribesmadeashowof resistance, but it availed nothing
against Her Majesty's 31st Regiment and their Indian comrades.
On the 26th of July the work of the brigade was accomplished,
and on the 3rd of August they were back at Jalalabad. Since
the 7th of June the force had subsisted on the country, and the
cattle having improved with good fodder, the expedition was
entirely satisfactory.

In the meantime Pollock was engaged in negotiations for the

relief of the prisoners ; and matters ap-

The prisoners. i , i. * • j.' { j. ■^

peared to be progressmg satisfactorily.
He sent a verbal message to Akbar Khan, demanding all the
guns and trophies in the enemy's possession ; but the Sardar was
not satisfied with this, and consulted Pottinger and Troup. They
advised him to send the prisoners to Jalalabad, as a proof of his
sincerity, pointing out that if there was any delay the army would
commence its march upon Kabul. Akbar Khan demanded a
written promise of withdrawal as the condition of their release,
and threatened, in the event of an advance, to distribute the
prisoners throughout Turkistan.

Pollock did not attach any value to these threats, and was
still less inclined to promise to withdraw. He had already moved
a brigade to Fatehabad, two marches in front of his old position,
under Sale, who had described it as a good place for a fight.
Pollock would, therefore, only promise not to advance further for
a certain number of days. The General, eager to push his
battalions into the heart of the country, saw that the negotiations
could not be brought to a successful conclusion. He now only
awaited news of the movements of the Kandahar force, and was
not left long in doubt ; for in the middle of August he received
the following letter from Nott : —

POLLOCK'S ADVANCE. 431

"Kandahar, July 27th, 1842.

My dear General, — You will have received a copy of a letter
from the Governor-General under date the 4th instant, to my
r.ddress, giving me the option of retiring a part of my force
to India via Kabul and Jalalabad. I have determined to take
that route, and will write to you fully on the subject as soon as
I have arranged for carriage and supplies.

Yours truly,
W. NOTT."

On the 20th of August, Pollock set out from Jalalabad, the
advanced guard, with the General, reaching Sultanpur on its way
to Gandamak. Here he intended to assemble the following troops,
in all about 8,000 men, to accompany him to Kabul : —

3rd Dragoons ; 1st Native Cavalry ; a squadron of the 5th and
10th Native Cavalry; 600 of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry ; Her
Majesty's 31st Kegiment ; 33rd Native Infantry ; the whole of
Sir Robert Sale's and Colonel Tulloch's Brigades ; 17 guns, a com-
pany of Sappers and Miners; and a regiment of Bildars under Mr.
, , Mackeson.i On the 23rd Pollock, with

Action near Gandamak. t -, r-, t t m

the advance, reached Gandamak. Two
miles from this place is the village of Mamu Khel, where a
strong body of tribesmen were in position ; and determining to
dislodge them, Broadfoot's Sappers and a squadron of Dragoons
were ordered up from Sale's camp. Next morning as the bri-
gade advanced the enemy retired. Pollock divided his force
into two columns, each headed by a wing of the 9th Foot, and
entered the village, which the enemy had abandoned, as also
Kuchli Khel. They, however, rallied, and took up a position on
the heights near the latter village ; whence they opened fire on
our forces. Colonel Taylor attacked them on one side and Broad-

1 Greenwood, page 158. Before the war Mackeson was employed on a survey
of the Khaibar and captured A!i Masjid by a coup de n,ain, and with a few
tribesmen in English pay held it against the Khaibaris. The garrison was hard put
to it for water over which the besiegers kept a vigilant watch. Mackeson's fertil,!
imagination hit upon a plan of obtaining supplies. The Afghans are very keen upon
getting possession of the bodies of their dead. Mackeson, therefore, brought in the
bodies whenever he repulsed an attack, and fixed the price of redemption at two
massaks of water per corpse.

432 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

foot, "nith his Sappers, on the other, and carried the heights ;
when the enemy dispersed and the villages were burned. Our
losses in this after were seven killed and about fifty wounded.
This attack being merely a diversion, Pollock returned to Ganda-
mak to assemble his force, and make sure of his supplies.

The army was all eagerness for the advance ; and in their
keenness prepared to march as light as possible, sending back
all superfluous baggage. The General was anxiously waiting for
a reply from Nott, to whom he had sent ten messengers,
but it was not until midnight of the 6th of September that
it arrived. Supplies were coming in freely, and the troops were
living upon th^ fat of the land. The neighbouring chiefs were
coming in and making their submission ; and it was evident that
the news of the projected advance had struck terror into the
hearts of the Afghans.

On the 1st of September, Fateh Jang, in miserable plight,
rode into camp and was kindly received and suitably accommo-
dated. His existence at Kabul had not been a happy one. He
had been only a puppet in the hands of Akbar Khan, who did with
him what he would. He determined therefore to seek British hos-
pitality ; and with some difficulty escaped.

On the 7th of September, General Pollock with Sir Robert Sale
and the 1st Division commenced their march, leaving two squad-
rons, two guns, and eight companies to garrison Gandamak. The
2nd Division, under General M'Caskill, marched the following
day. A party of the Sikh Contingent, under Captain Lawrence,
accompanied this division ; the remainder occupied positions at
Nimlah and Gandamak.

When the Jagdalak Pass was reached on the 8th of Septem-
, , T, ter, the hills which commanded the

Action of the Jagda'ak Pass. i . i • t i ,

road were round to be occupied by the
enemy. The guns made excellent practice ; but the Ghilzais
held their ground. The infantry were, therefore, launched to the
attack. On one side Broadfoot led his Sappers ; on the other,
Taylor led the 9th Foot against the enemy in position, horse and
foot, behind a ruined fort ; Wilkinson pushed up in the centre
against the key of the position with the 13th. It was plain that
the British were not to be denied, as tEey pushed on with impetu-

POILOOR'S ADVANOE. 433

■ous gallantry. The best of the Ghilzai tribes were their oppo-
nents, but they had to deal with different men under new leaders.
They became panic-stricken and fled before the bayonets,^ pursued
by the Dragoons; and only escaped annihilation owing to the
unsuitability of the ground for cavalry. All was not yet over,
for a considerable body had retired to an apparently inaccessible
height, where they planted their standards and bid defiance to the
troops. Broadfoot and Wilkinson again advanced under cover of
the guns ; the rush was arduous, but the troops were equal to it.
The Ghilzais watched their progress with astonishment and dismay,,
then lowered their standards and finally fled in confusion. The
victory, which was complete, was mainly achieved by the oldl
Jalalabad garrison. Sale himsslf, ever in the thickest of the fight,
being wounded.

The 2nd Division arrived at Surkhab at about 3 p.m. with-
out opposition. At this hour the 1st
March of the Second Division. _,^... -,. .i,...

Division rear-guard had not left its

camping-ground. Many Afghans crowned the heights, but except
for a little sniping at night gave no trouble. The next morning
the force moved to Jagdalak. General M'Caskill was too ill to sit
a horse and the command devolved upon Brigadier Monteith. The
route was very difficult, eight miles of it through a formidable pass,
and the Ghilzais kept up a running fight the whole way. At the
mouth of the pass is a small plateau, and as the rear -guard was
having hard work, and it was getting late, the Brigadier determined
to halt here. The baggage followed the advanced guard into the pass
and two sangars on the right and left of the road were occupied
to assist the rear -guard while the baggage was moving into camp.
Swarms of Ghilzais followed the rear -guard, firing continuously.
Frequent counter-attacks were made which sent the enemy flying,
but as soon as the pursuit was discontinued, they returned to the
attack. It was two hours before the baggage was in, followed by
the rear-guard which had suffered sev.rely. The march was now
resumed and half way through the pass a number of Ghilzais,
who had again collected on the heighis, fired a volley and dropped

1 Greeniwod, page 215. There is no weapon like the bayonet in the hands of a British
Foldier. The Afghans would stand like swarms againit firing, but th sight of the
bristling line of cold steel they could not endure. The bayonet has decided num^-roua
conflict^ in all quarters of the globe, and, I doubt not. will decide many more.

Vol. IIL 2 F

434 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

several men. A furious action followed, but the Afghans soon had
enough and subsequently contented themselves with a few long
shots. Next morning the march was continued towards Kutta-
sang, the enemy firing upon the column from the heights ; but,
with the exception of a few attacks on the baggage, which were
■easily repulsed, the enemy attempted nothing during this march.
Next morning orders arrived from General Pollock that the di-
vision was to make a double march and join him at Tezin. This
Was difficult and fatiguing. The artillery horses were exhausted
and the men had to drag the guns. The enemy disputed
every inch of ground, and made several attacks on the bag-
gage ; and camp was not reached until long after dark ; the force
quite knocked up, and minus over one hundred transport animals
destroyed with their loads on account of their exhaustion. Here
was found a pile of 1,500 dead bodies of Elphinstone's sepoys and
camp-followers, who had been stripped by the enemy and left to
jdie in the snow.^ Nothing was gained by this forced march as the
"division was so exhausted that the whole force was obliged to halt
ioT a day ; moreover a great quantity of stores had been lost. On
the 12th of September it was evident that the enemy was close at
h.and, and that a great struggle was approaching. Akbar Khan,
true to his word, had sent the bulk of the prisoners to the Hindu
Kush, and was preparing to meet our army.

On the 13th the two forces met on ground particularly favour-
, ^ . able to the Afghans. The valley of Tezin

Action of Tezin. . j j u i J^x t--ii l" l,

is commanded by loityhiils whicn were
crowned by Jazailchis ; in fact the camp was surrounded by
them. There was evidently a day of hard work before the troops,
but they were a splendid body in fine condition and ready for any-
thing. All arms were to have their opportunity ; the plain for the
cavalry, the hills for the infantry, and the guns everywhere.

1 Oreemvood, page 176. There is a ferocity about the Afghans which they seem to
mbibe with their mother's milk. In storming one of the heights a colour sergeant
■was killed, and from some cause or other his body was left where it fell. A soldier
of the same corps happening to pass by the same spot some time after, saw a
Khaibari boy apparently about six years of age with a large knife which his puny
arm had scarcely sufficient strength to wield, engaged in an attempt to hack oil
ihe head of the dead sergeant. The young urchin was so completely absorbed in his
savage task, that he heeded not the near approach of the soldier, who coolly took him
upon his bayonet and threw him over the cliff.

POLLOCK'S ADVANCE. 435

fortunately the baggage acted as a bait and drew the enemy's
horsemen into the valley. The Dragoon's opportunity was at hand,
and a squadron, led by Unett, was let loose upon them. A bril-
liant charge dispersed the enemy, who fled, pursued by our cavalry
who cut up many.

The infantry gallantly climbed the heights, and the Afghans
as gallantly advanced to meet them. The 1.3th Light Infantry
took the hills to the right, and the 9th Foot and 31st those on the
left, and as they ascended a hail of bullets rained upon them from
the jazails. At the top the men fixed bayonets and charged ; down
went the Afghan marksmen and, awed by their comrades' fall, the
remainder fled. The fighting was, however, not yet over. All
through the day the skirmish on the hills continued. The Afghans,
firing from cover, avoided coming to close quarters. The sepoys
vied with their European comrades in gallantry, Broadfoot's Sap-
pers, especially, driving the stalwart Afghans before them.
Desperate efforts were made to prevent the British from clearing
the heights of the Haft Kotal, but loud cheers announced the at-
tainment of their object.

The Afghans had brought the best of their troops to a field,
peculiarly suited to their tactics. They could, however, offer
no effectual resistance to Pollock's force, and were fairly beaten
on their own ground by their own tactics. The scenes that met
the sight of the soldiers on the march may have maddened them,
but the temper of the men was such that they needed no such sti-
mulus to their efforts.^

Akbar Khan recognized that the game was ' up, and taking
Captain Bygrave with him fled to the Ghorband Valley. The
warriors hurried homewards by the mountain paths, seeking safety
from the avenging army ; whilst Pollock resumed his march and
encamped on the Kabul race-course on the 15th of September.

'^Greenwood, page 221. A dragoon had his horse shot under him while riding at a
chief. He quiclily disengaged himself, slew his opponent, and mounting his horse
continued the charge with his comrades.

The Risaldar of Tait's Horse also performed a gallant action. Finding a large
ravine intervening between his men and the enemy, being well mounted, he leajjt his
horse over the obstruction, cut through the enemy, and back again, killing five and
again taking the leap, rejoined his men. He was rewarded with the Order of Britisii
India.

Vo!. III. o p 2

CHAPTER XXI.

FINAL OPERATIONS.

While Pollock's force was marching Nott was moving towards
„, , , r^ , ^ tlie same goal from the west. But before

llie advance from Kandahar. " .

recording his progress the circumstances
preceding the evacuation of Kandahar must be recounted.

On the 19th of May, Wymer's forces started for the relief of

Defence of Kaiat-i-Ghiizai. Kalat-i-Ghilzai. The enemy, hearing of

his coming, decided to make a desperate
.assault on the place. They, therefore, prepared ladders and prac-
tised escalading. In the early mornrng of the 21st of May they
advanced in two columns of 2,000 strong each. Placing their lad-
ders they gallantly mounted to the assault. Three times they were
repulsed by Craigie and his men; the heivy showers of shot and
grape did not, however, turn them from their purpose, and
they advanced again and again to be bayoneted on the walls.
The struggle had lasted upwards of an hour before they abandon-
ed the assault, with a loss of nearly five hundred, while the
defenders escaped scatheless. On Colonel Wymer's arrival
nothing remained to be done but the withdrawal of the garrison.
Before his return, however, the Duranis had again been beaten
in the field.

Early on the morning of the 29th of May the enemy began

to appear in the neighbourhood of

Actions near Kandahar. tt- j i, i • j a -u

Kandahar, and carried on some baggagj
•cattle. The General believed that they were only reconnoitring
the position and were not intent on giving battle. Under this im-
pression he sent out Colonel Stiacy with two regiments and four
guns to brush them away. The Ghazis, believing he was retiring,
pushed forward, and occupying some heights west of the canton-
ments opened fire. Nott now sent out Her Majesty's 41st and
eight guns, and at 1 p.m. mounted his horse and, accompanied by

( 437 )

438 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA

Rawlinson, rode out to take command. Covered by the fire of the-
guns the light companies were ordered to take the heights ; and
the work was rapidly done. Chamberlain's Horse swept round
the hills and cut the enemy up with heavy slaughter. Rawlinson,
with the Parsiwan Horse, and supported by Tait, proceeded to-
the jighi to clear the hillocks. The ground was difficult, and
the enemy made for the mouth of the Baba-Wali Pass. Rawlinson
followed in hot pursuit; but, attracted by a party of the enemy's
horse, missed the outlet and nearly captured Muhammad Attar
himself. The rout was nearly complete, and would have been
moi e so, had not the movements of our troops been so slow.

On the following day Stracy went out with a brigade, and
Rawlinson took the Parsiwan Horse to the banks of the river ; but
the enemy's cavalry were disinclined for more fighting and crossed
to the other side. Safdar Jang surrendered on the 19th of June.

The first three weeks of July passed away, and Nott was pre-
paring for his retirement from Afghanistan. At the end of June
a convoy of camels arrived from Quetta, and sufficient carriage and
provisions were now in hand. The Governor-General's letter
reached him at this time and he replied that he had decided to
withdi'aw a portion of his army via Ghazni and Kabul.

The Kandahar force was now to be divided. General England
was to take part via Quetta and Sukkur, and the remainder were to
move with Nott. England was to take the heavy guns and s:x
pieces of the Shah's Artillery, the Bombay Infantry, two companies
of Bengal Artillery, three regiments of the late Shah's force, and
some Irregular Cavalry. Nott's route was not yet made public.
Some even thought he would march via Dera Ismail Khan.
Before starting, however, the question of the disposal of the Prince
had to be decided. Timur wished to accompany the force ;.
but this was vetoed by the Governor-General, nor was he to be
permitted to remain at Kandahar. It was decided to send
him to India via Sind, a determination which was by no means
agreeable to the Prince.

On the 7th of August the British force quietly evacuated

Kandahar, without any demonstration

Evacuation of Kandahar. , , , • i t.-^ a.

of ill-wiU on the part of the inhabitants,
Safdar Jang being left in possession. The following day was

FINAL OPERATIONS. 439

spent in completing the commissariat arrangements, and on the 9th
the columns started on their several ways ; England by no means
pleased that he was not to take an European regiment. The
march as far as Mukkur, 160 miles from Kandahar, was uneventful,
and was completed by the 27th of August. Now, however, it
seemed as if active work was i i store for the troops. Some days
previously Shamshuddin Khan had moved out from Ghazni, with
500 horte and two guns, to collect revenue. When he heard of the
British advance he prepared to contest it, and commenced to
raise the country with a view to making a stand at the source of
the Tarnak, where was the most formidable position between Kan-
'dahar and Kabul. The force had hardly left Mukkur on the
28th before the enemy came down upon the rear-guard. The
cavalry was ordered out, and only the presence of a ravine saved
^ , . the Afghans from destruction. Without

Cavalry action. • i i •

further molestation the force reached its
halting -place. Shamshuddin Khan was known to be somewhere in
the neighbourhood, but the thick haze screened his movements.
The camels were sent out to graze and the grass-cutters in
quest of forage ; at 11 a.m. a report came in that the latter were
being cut up, Delamain at once took out all his cavalry,
but found the alarm to be false. However, he proceeded
to reconnoitre three miles from camp, and came up with
a party of the enemy's footmen, some twenty of whom the
troopers cut down. Delamain followed the remainder, and,
turning the shoulder of a range of hills, found the heights
occupied by the enemy in considerable strength, and fell
back on their opening fire upon him. While retreating, a body
of the enemy's horse, about 150 strong, showed themselves on
the ridge of a hill, flaunting a white standard. Delamain at once
determined to attack. A squadron of the 3rd Bombay Cavalry
charged up the hill, but they were taken in flank by a heavy fire
from the Jazailcliis, and the enemy's horse charged down upon them
with t] emendous effect. Captains Reeves and Bury and Lieutenant
Mackenzie were shot or cut down, and the troops, seeing their
officers fall, turned and fled down the hill ; their companions at
the foot caught the contagion, and the whole were soon in dis-
astrous flight, and were not easily rallied. Two officers were

440 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

killed and three wounded, and fifty-six troopers were either
killed or disabled.

Exaggerated stories of the disaster had spread through the
camp ; and twice Nott sent out instructions for the troops to return.
At last it was reported that the enemy was about 7,000 strong and
that Delamain's position was precarious. Nott, therefore, moved
out with his army, but, when he arrived, he found that the enemy
had gone ofi. There were, however, some fortified villages in the vi-
cinity, from which shots were said to have been fired. The inhabi-
tants begged for mercy which was granted. A company of the
40th Foot, which had been sent to search the houses for
plunder, was, however, fired upon, and a terrible retribution was
exacted. Meanwhile the cavalry were collecting their dead. On
the 30th the division engaged the enemy with better success.
Shamshuddin Khan had taken post on the hills to the right of
the camp, and it was believed that an attack was intended. On
. . „, the morrow Nott marched to Ghoven, the

Action near Ghoyen. . r i ' n

Afghans movmg parallel to him, and
again taking up a position on the hills with the object of waiting
for reinforcements. Near the camping-ground the enemy held a
fort which Nott determined to attack ; but as the troops were weary,
he postponed the operation for a few hours. At 3 p.m. the General
went out with the 4Gth Foot, the 16th and 38th Native Infantry,
all the cavalry details, Anderson's Horse Artillery, and four other
guns. The ground between the camp and the fort was difficult,
and some time elapsed before the guns could be brought within
range, and when they did open fire it was with so little effect that
the chiefs persuaded Shamshuddin to move to the attack at once.
Sending his horsemen to outflank the British, he moved down
with the main body of his infantry and guns. The latter,
posted on the nearest height, opened a rapid and well-aimed fire
on the British columns, but, on account of the bright from which
ihey were fired, the shot did not ricochet and was comparatively
hawnless. Nott now relinquished his attack on the fort, and
moved in column to the right, flanked by Anderson's guns and
Christie's Horse, upon the enemy's main body. The Afghans
crowned the other flank, while keeping up a heavy fire. Nott there-
upon changed front to the left, deplo} ed, threw out skirmishers

FINAL OPERATIONS. ' ' " 441

sand advanced in line, supported by the guns. As the troops came to
the charge their opponents turned and fled. One of their guns
~4)roke down, and was captured, and ChriStie sailed the drivers and
•carried off the other. Shamshuddin's camp equipage and stores were
found scattered over the plain ; he himself fled to Ghazni, and the
tribes dispersed to their homes.

Xott resumed his march on the 1st of September ; and on the
Action at Ghazni. ^^^ reached Ghazui, where the day was
spent in desultory fighting. Shams, ^uddin,
who had been reinforced from Kabul by Sultan Jan, occupied some
heights to the north-east of the fortress. The gardens, ravines and
water-courses were filled With. J azailchis ; and the ciy seemed
to be swarming with men. Before camping Nott determined to
clear the heights. The troops went up in splendid style ai d drove
the enemy before them, until every point was gained. Two infantry
regiments with two guns were left to occupy the heights, and the
remainder of the force was withdrawn to camp. The site was,
however, found to be within range of the big Ghazni gun, "Zabbar
Jang " ; and, after fourteen shots had fallen into it, the camp
was moved to the village of Koza, two miles off. An active and
spirited enemy might have seized this favourable opportunity, but
a little cavaky skirmishing was all that occurred.

Sanders now began to make his arrangements for the siege :
not that it was believed that there would be a a igorous defence
The tribes, who had been summoned with that object, began t j
lose heart, and Shamshuddin, on the plea of the necessity of forage
f I r his horses, could not be induced to come inside the walls.
During the night the would-be defenders quietly c,uitted the for-
tress, and took to the hills ; and Shamshuddin, seeing that all
was over, fled with a few followers to Kabul.

■ The engineers worked steadily throughout the night ; but the
stillness within the walls aroused their suspicions. At early dawn
a small party went down to reconnoitre, and seeing that the city
was apparently abandoned, sent intelligence to the party on the hill,
and the 1 6th Regiment was sent down to occupy it. A few Hindus
;and some sepoys of the 27th were the only occupants, Colonel
Palmer and the other British officers having been taken to Kabul.
"The British flag soon floated from the highest tower, and a salutf

442 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

was fired with Shamshuddin's artillery. The General rode out
to inspect the place and make arrangements for its destruction^
He found the citj a mass of ruins. The citadel was in good repair^
however, and those who inspected it wondered why Palmer had giveit
it up. The guns were burst and the fortifications blown up,
and the town and citadel were fired ; and throughout the night
the flames lit up the sky.

The engineer officers sounded the well in the citadel and found
fifty-one feet of water in it. The bottom being below the river
level it could not be drained and the well might have been secured
by constructing a covered way and protecting it with guns.

In accordance with the orders of the Governor-General, the
Somnathgate. g^^^^^ of the Sultan Mahmud's tomb,,
said to be those of the Temple of Somnath,^'
were removed by a party of English soldiers. Rawlinson was of
opinion that the gates were not what they were represented to be, but
that it fitted in with the interests of the Mullahs to assume that
they were. He did not think either that the Afghans cared about
their removal and that a little religious excitement was all that
need be feared.

On the 12th Nott was before Saiyidabad, where Woodburn and
, ^. ^ c ■ -J 1- J his men had been massacred. The fort was.

Action at Sai5adabad.

destroyed and another burnt by the camp-
followers. It was Rawlinson's opinion that these half-measures
were not good policy, and only exasperated the Afghans without
intimidating them. The enemy crowned the hills, and on the 14th
Nott attacked them. The Afghans had thrown up breastworks
at the gorge of the hills stretching towards Maidan. Nott, however,
hastened on the fight and carried the heights, but did not occupy
them. Rawlinson writes in this connection : " The attack upon the-
heights and their subsequent abandonment might have led to un-
pleasant consequences, had not the news of Akbar's defeat arrived
just in time to prevent Shamshuddin from availing himself of this
advantage." The enemy, however, moved off to Arghandeli, a few
miles nearer the capital. On the following day the work at the pass-
was found to have been abandoned, but the tribes harassed the-

1 These gatep were carried off by Mahmud of Ghazni when he sacked Somnath during,
his invasion of India in 1024 a. d.

FINAL OPERATIONS. iVi'-

force througliout the march ; the breakdown of one of the guns handi-
capping our movements. The artillery did excellent work, the
infantry fought with their usual gallantry, and the cavalry made
the most of their opportunities.' The Maidanis now craved the
General's protection, but Nott was relentless. By the evening
twenty-six of their forts were in flames. On the 16th Arghan-
deh was passed, and on the 19th the force halted a few miles
from the city, which they found already in the possession of the-
British.

The day after his arrival Pollock prepared to take formal
possession of the Bala Hissar ; and a mixed force was detailed
for the ceremony. Pollock and Macgregor thought it proper
that some sort of rule should exist while the British remained at
Kabul, so Prince Fateh Jang headed the procession. In the palace
the ceremony of appointing officers of State was gone through, and"
the British officers then left the King with his ministers, and went
about their own work. The British colours were planted upon the
highest point of the Bala Hissar, under a salute from the guns
and to the accompaniment of the National Anthem. In case
Fateh Jang should be under the impression that he was still to be
under the aegis of the British Government, Macgregor was sent to
explain the situation. He was clearly told that neither men, money,
nor arms were to be expected ; and that he had better do his
best on his own account.

Pollock was now anxious as to the fate of the British prisoners.
Immediately on his arrival Sir Richmond Shakespear, with 600
Kizilbash Horse, had set out to overtake them and their escort.
Sultan Jan was said to be on the move to cutoff the party. It
was advisable, therefore, that a substantial backing should be given
to the enterprise. Nott rather ungraciously declined to have
anything to do with the rescue ; so Pollock detailed Sale, with a
brigade of the Jalalabad garrison, to carry out the duty. Mean-
while, however, the prisoners had accomplished their own libertion.

The minister had been anxious to pay his respects to Nott
but had been refused an audience. The latter believed that Lord
Ellenborough desired that no Afghan Government should be recog-
nized ; and acted on that supposition. As Pollock had different
views, it followed that suspicion was entertained as to the sincerity

444 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

■of our proceedings. Nott, however, was not in the humour to
be courteous to anyone. In his opinion the army ought oven
now to have been en route for Jalalabad, and he was sore that
Pollock had not supplies ready for the march. Had he been in
command he would have burnt the Bala Hissar and destroyed the
city.

He declared that it would be necessary for him to make

military requisitions, to rescue his troops from starvation ; and

dt nounced Fateh Jang and his new ministers as enemies. Pollock

was, however, inclined to discriminate between friend and foe.

While supplies were accumulating he favoured the striking of

another blow at the hostile chiefs. AminuUah Khan was reported

lo be in Kohistan gathering up the remnants of the Bar kzai

force. It was anticipated that he would interfere with the British

■ on their march to India, and that it was therefore cxpediient to

break up his force, and punish that part of the country which

had supplied the bulk of the insurgents. A force, taken from the

two divisions under M'Casksill, was, therefore, despatched to

scatter the enemy collected at Istalif, and to destroy the place. It

was, moreovt^r, thought not unlikealy that, dreading retribution,

AminuUah Khan might give up Muhammad Akbar Khan, if he

■Could get him into his keeping. The Sardar had sent his family

into Turkistan, and was watching the progress of events in the

Ghorband Pass, ready to follow his belongings on a threat of

pursuit.

The hostile chiefs were now at the end of their tether, and'
with AminuUah Khan, were anxious to conciliate the British.
Akbar Khan, with a similar object in view, sent in his last prisoner.
Captain Bygrave.

Already Fateh Jang wa=i beginnmg to acknowledge his inability
to stand alone. The English would not help him, and he had made
eternal enemies of tie Barakzais by the destruction of their pro-
perty. Ziman Khan, who had so faithfully protected the hostages,
was one of the sufferer-?. Usman Khan and Jabbar Khan also shared
his fate. The Prince thought thus to prevent an alliance between
his foUowers and the Baiakzais, and, anxiously watching the result
■of the Kohistan expedition, deferred h s final decision until its
r-eturn.

FINAL OPERATIONS. ^^k:.

With the valuable aid of Havelock, M'Caskill, making a
Action at istaiif. ^ap id march, took the enemy at Istalif by

surprise. The town is built in terraces on
•jwo ridges of the spur of the Hindu Kush, which bounds the Kohis-
.an Valley on the west. The Afghans were so confident of their
security that they had made practically no military dispositions.
From intelligence received, M'Caskill determined to assault the
right face of the city. Early on the 29tli of September the force-
was in motion, and the enemy, believing that the columns were in
retreat, opened a sharp fire. Growing more and more bold the
Afghans pressed closely upon the covering party, and Broadfoot's
Sappers soon found themselves in collision with a large body of the
enemy, posted in a walled garden. The Sappers pushed the Afghans ■
up the slopes in the direction of the city. Havelock and Mayne now
pointed out the necessity for supporting Broadfoot's men ; and
M'Caskill gave the order to advance upon the city. The 9th Foot
and 26th Native Infantry, each striving to outdo the other
raced across the intervening space ; whilst the 41st, 42nd, and 43rd'
Bengal Infantry stormed the village and vineyard to the left.
The Afghans fled, and were pursued up the slopes. It was no-
longer a case of defence but the salvation of their women and pro-
perty. AminuUah Khan was the first to run ; and as the troops ■
entered the town, the hill beyond was seen to be covered with
laden baggage cattle and streams of women, seeking a ph^ce
of safety. Much booty was taken and the town partially
burned ; and M'Caskill proceeding to the hills without opposition,,
destroyed Charikar, the scene of the Gurkhas' gallant defence,
and some other fortified places, and returned to Kabul on the 7th
of October.

It was now time to think of withdrawing, for already Pollock
had transgressed the limits of his orders ; there still remained^
however, work to be done. "Willing to spare the city and Bala
Hissar for the sake of a friendly government. Pollock had sent
Shakespear to interview Khan Shirin Khan and the other chiefs of
the Persian party. They proposed that Prince Shahpur should
be set up in place of his brother. A general meeting of the chiefs
wt. s held in Kabul, which unanimously upheld this recommendation-
The Prince, a high spirited youth, accepted the crown, and a.

■446 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

declaration to that effect was sent to Pollock's camp. The .latter
resolutely refused the chiefsrequest for men and money ; and the
question of leaving a mark of our displeasure now remained to
be settled. At the chief's earnest entreaty Pollock agreed to spare
the Bala Hissar, and determined to destroy the great bazar, as
the place where the remains of the Envoy had been exposed to
public ridicule. The order for its destruction was given to the
engineers, and a detachment under Colonel Kichmond was told
off to protect the town and its inhabitants from injury. Abbott
did not find the pulling down of the massive buildings an easy
■'task ; and gun-powder had to be used.

On the 11th of October orders were issued for the commence-
ment of the return march on the following

The return march. ^^^_ ^^^^^ j^^^^ 2iman Shah, and the

family of the late Shah Shuja were to accompany the troops to
India, under the charge of Captain George Lawrence. The British
■colours were lowered, the regiment was withdrawn from the Bala
Hissar, and the force prepared to march.

On the following morning the two divisions commenced their
journey. Pollock took with him what trophies he coidd, but had
not carriage for all the guns, of which he took forty-four
■and a large quantity of ordnance stores. He also took a large
number of Indians, crippled by wound or frost ; the remnants of
Elphinstone's army. As the force was leaving Kabul, the salute
was heard in honour of the succession of Prince Shahpur, whose
reign was very brief, as he was dethroned before the force reached
India.

The news of the victories of Pollock and Nott, and of the
^„ ^ . ,, ... release of the prisoners, was received with

Effect of the victoues. t^ >

enthusiasm in India. To Lord EUen-
iDorough the results were a source of boundless satisfaction.

Hindustan was quieting down, and there promised to be
a period of undisturbed repose. The Native States, which had
been wavering in their loyalty, were now recalled to their senses
by our successes. Lord Ellenborough proclaimed that Dost Muham-
mad was only " believed to be .hostile to British interests," and
that it had been decided to leave the Afghans to themselves, and
recognize any government wh'ch they might form. After such a

FINAL OPERATIONS. 447

iproclamation the retention of Dost Muhammad in captivity was
■out of the question. He, therefore, returned to Afghanistan.

The Governor-General busied himself at Ferozepore in
arranging for the reception of the victorious troops. Pollock had
brought his army with but little loss through the passes, and
was now marching through the Punjab. There had been some
•apprehension that the tribes would interfere with the retirement,
but so completely had their strength been broken that the Afghans
made no combined effort to annoy the British columns. Pollock
indeed wrote that he had not seen an enemy ; but M'Caskill and
Nott with the centre and rear divisions were not quite so fortunate.
From Kabul to Jalalabad, however, all was practically plain sail-
ing, except for some desultory night attacks on the baggage.

Nott reported to General Pollock that his rear-guard was attack-
.,.,,„ ed on the 14th of October by large

Action of the Haft Kotal. it j-,, .,,-^ °

bodies 01 the enemy m the Haft Kotal's
Pass, and that he hadjsent 200 sepoys, a wing of Her Majesty's
40th Regiment, and two companies of Her Majesty's 41st to help
Captain Leeson of the 42nd Native Infantry, who commanded
the rear -guard. He reported that the sepoys defeated and dispersed
the enemy, and that Captain Leeson spoke highly of the conduct
•of his men. He added that the British portion of the force
t»ehaved with their usual gallantry.

The retirement of M'Caskill's Division is described bv
M'CaskiU'3 Divisiou. Lieutenant Greenwood. A good deal of
confusion was caused at the start through
the baggage getting ahead of the column and jamming in a
narrow road, with a morass on either side ; and a delay of several
hours was the consequence. Sale's Division crowned the heights
•of the Khurd-Kabul while the main column passed through. In
-the Tezin Pass the enemy, taking advantage of the darkness,
-attacked the baggage, but were repulsed with heavy loss after a
sharp fight.

The force halted at Jalalabad for some days, as Pollock had
determined to destroy the defences. It had been proposed to
hand the place over to the Sikhs ; but the work of destruction
was completed before the orders of Government were received.

Pollock now pushed on for Peshawar. The Afridis offered to

448 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

sell the passage of the Khaibar, but Mackeson answered that it
would be taken gratis. The First Division passed through with only
the loss of a few privates. M'Caskill, however, did not take the-
precaution to crown the heights, and the Afridis attacked the
rear-guard, under their old enemy, Brigadier AVild. Two officers
were killed and two guns abandoned. Had M'Caskill and Nolt
taken the same precautions as Pollock, it is more than probable
that the enemy would never have appeared. General Pollock,,
to ensure that no plunder should fall into their hands, had ordered
that when a camel broke down it was to be shot and its load de-
stroyed. Ali Masjid fort was pulled down and the force soon
reached Pe'^hawar. The march through the Punjab was unevent-
ful, but sickness broke out and, owing to the shortage of carriage,.
it was difficult to provide transport.

A final extract from Eawlinson's journal will be of interest : —
, ., , "A messenger arrived to-day from Kabul'

Eawlinsons review of Afghan .., . ■, .^ . ■. ^. .,, ,

affairs. with two letters from the Kizilbash

party, inviting the Nizam-ud-DauIah to
return, as Ghulam Muhammad Khan had already given offence by
endeavouring to reestablish an exclusive Durani influence round the-
puppet King. At present Khan Shirin is, so far as real power is
concerned, paramount, and he seems determined to carry things-
with a high hand, having given out that if Shahpur lends himself to-
Durani intrigue he will force him to abdicate in favour of another-
Prince. A strong Kizilbash detachment has at the same time been
sent to Ghazni under Muhammad Husain Khan to occupy that
place, and in conjunction with the Hazaras to hold in check any
possible movement of Ghilzais or Duranis from the westwards
Prince Haidar, with another party of the Ghulam Khana, has gone
to Bamian, and expects to secure the passes during the winter-
agianst the return of the Barakzais. Muhammad Akbar's force,,
which remained for some time at Khinjan,is said to have completely
dispersed, the Sardar himself, with Aminullah, having gone to Tash-
kurghan, and the men having all returned to their homes at
Kabul. Nawab Ziman Khan, Jabbar Khan, Usman Khan, and
Mir Haji are said to be at Khulm. The people of Kabul have
nearly all returned to the city, and are busy re -opening their
bouses against the winter. Many of the Kohistan Chiefs have also-

FINAL OPERATIONS. 44*

paid their respects to Shahpur, and Aminullah was expected shortly
to return. Muhammad Akbar either really iears for his own
personal safety, now that a party with which accommodation is
impossible has come into power, or he thinks it better policy to
allow dissension to fructify in the capital before he makes his
re-appearance on the scene. The Duranis are in a large minority
at Kabul, and must necessarily give way before the Ghulam
Khana, if Khan Shirin acts with any energy. I look to Kandahar
as their natural and necessary retreat, and no doubt at that place
Sadozai royalty, supported by their influence, will continue to
glimmer on, until Persia turns her attention to her eastern frontier,
and pushes forward the Barakzai Sardars to play a game for her.
The Kizilbashis, at the same time, cannot expect to hold their
jground at Kabul for any length of time."

Shahpur's reign soon came to an end. Akbar Khan descended
upon Kabul and carried all before him ; and the boy-king fled
to Peshawar. Dost Muhammad meanwhile was on his way to his
old principality.

On the 17th of December Sir Robert Sale crossed the Sutlej

Arrival at Ferozepore. ^* *^« ^^ad of his Jalalabad men, and
the Governor-General went to meet him.
Pollock and Nott crossed the Sutlej on the 19th and 23rd
respectively.

Bibliografhy.

(1) History of the war in Afghanistan — J. W. Kaye, f.r.s.

(2) Army of the Indus— Major W. Hough.

(3) Narrative of Services in Baluchistan and Afghanistan— Colonel
L. R. Stacy, c.b.

(4) Narrative of the Campaign of the Army of the Indus— R. H. Kennedy,

(5) Narrative of tae Late Victorious Campaign in Afghanistan under
General Pollock — Lieutenant Greenwood.

(6) The Expedition into Afghanistan — James Atkinson.

(7) Rough Notes of the Campaign in Sind and Afghanistan — Captaiu
James Outram.

(8) Narrative of the War in Afghanistan— Captain Henry Havelock.

(9) Sale's Brigade in Afghanistan— Reverend G. R. Gleig, m.a.

(10) Journal of the Disasters in Afghanistan— Lady Sale.

(11) History of Afghanistan— Malleson.

Vol III 3 j.

APPENDIX I.

THE BENGAL AND BOMBAY ARMIES.

The Bengal Force.
First Infantry Division. — Major-General Sir Willoughby Cotton, a.o.B

K.C.B.

First Brigade.
Colonel Sale, o.b. of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry.

Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry (Somersetshire

Light Infantry).
16th Native Infantry (disbanded, 1857).
48th Native lafantry (mutinied, 1857).

Second Brigade.

•Colonel Nott of the 42nd Native Infantry.

42nd Native Infantry (5th Light Infantry).
31st Native Infantry (2nd Q. 0. Rajput L. I.).
43rd Native Infantry (6th Jat Light Infantry).

Third Brigade.

Colonel Dennis of Her Majesty's 3rd Bufis.

27th Native Infantry (disbanded, 1857).

Her Majesty 3rd BuSs (East Kent Regiment).

2Qd Native Infautry (disbanded, 1859).

One Company of Sappers.
Second Infantry DjVjsjon.— Major-General Duacan.

Fourth Brigade.
Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts of the Bengal European Regiment.

Bengal European Regiment [(Royal

Minister Fusiliers).
35th Native Infantry (disbanded

1857).
37th Native Infantry (mutinied
1857).

^ ' * 3L2

452 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Fifth Brigade.
Lieutenart-Colonel Worsley of the 28th Native Infantry.

5th Native Infantry (mutinied, 1857),
28th Native Infantry (mutinied, 1857).
53rd Native Infantry (mutinied, 1857).
One Company of Sappers.

Cavalry Brigade.
Cohmel Arnold of Her Majesty's 16th Lancers.
Her Majesty's 16th Lancers.
2nd Regiment Light Cavahy.
3rd Regiment Light Cavaky.
4th Local Horse.
Part of 1st Local Horse (Skinner's).

' Artillery.
Lieutenant-Colonel Graham, of the Bengal Horse Artillery.

2nd troop, 2nd Brigade, Horse

Artillery.
3rd troop, 2nd Brigade, Horse
Artillery.

3rd Company, 2nd Battalion.
4th Company, 2nd Battalion.
2nd Company, 6th Battalion.
N.B.—Oi the Bengal Infantry only the First, Second and Fourth
Brigades crossed the Indus. Of the Artillery, two troops of Horse Artillery
had a battery of 9-pounders.

The whole was formed into one Division under Sir Willoughby Cotton.

The Bombay Force.
Lieutenant-General Sir John Keane.

First Infantry Brigade.
Colonel Willshire of Her Majesty's 2nd Regiment (The Queen's).
19th Native Infantry (119th Infantry).
Her Majesty's 17th Regiment (Leicestershire Regi-
ment).

Second Brigade.
Colonel Gordon of 1st Native Infantry (101st Grenadiers).

2nd Native Infantry (102nd Grenadiers).
5th Native Infantry (105th Light Infantry).

APPENDICES. 453

Cavalry.
Lieutenant-Colonel Scott,— 4tli Light Dragoons.

2 squadrons, Her Majestj 's 4tli Ligtt
Dragoons (4tli Hussars).
1st Regiment, Light Cavalry (31st Lancers).

Artillery.

Colonel Stevenson,— 2 troops. Horse Artillery.
2 troops, Foot Artillery.

APPENDIX II.

Composition of the Force which returned from Kabul.
First Division.

4 guns, 3id troop ; 1st Brigade, Horse Artillery (now 58th Battery
Royal Field Artillery).

No. 6 Light Field Battery (manned by 2nd Company, 6th Battalion —
afterwards 7th Battalion, mutinied at Nasirabad in 1857).

2 18-pounders and details, European Artillery.

Mountain Train.

Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons (now 3rd King's Own Hussars).

4 Risalas, 3rd Irregular Cavalry (partially mutinied at Saugor, 1857 ;
disbanded 1861).

1 Squadron, First Light Cavalry (mutinied at Mhow, 1857).

Her Majesty's 9th Foot (now 1st Battalion, the Norfolk Regiment).

Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry (now 1st Battalion, the Somersetshire
Light Infantry).

26th Native Infantry (disarmed at Mian Mir, afterwards mutinied, and
was destroyed at Ajnala, 1857).

35th Light Infantry (disbanded, 1859).

5th Company, Sappers and Miners (now 1st Prince of Wales' Own
Sappers and Miners).

Broadfoot's Sappers (became 9th and 8th Companies, Bengal Sappers
and Miners).

Second Division.

2 guns, 3rd Troop ; 2nd Brigade, Horse Artillery (became 2nd Company
2nd Depot Division, Royal Artillery).

Captain Blood's Battery of 9-pounders (became 3rd Company, First
Battalion, Bombay Artillery, now 30th Field Battery, Royal Field Artil-
lery).

2 Squadrons First Light Cavalry (mutinied at Mhow in 1857).

Her Majesty's 31st Foot (now 1st Battalion, East Surrey Regiment)

2nd Regiment, Native Infantry (disarmed at Barrackpur, 1857).

16th Regiment, Native Infantry (disarmed at Mian Mir, 1857; dis-
banded, 1859).

( 455 )

456 FRONTIER AND 0VBRSEA8 EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

Wing, 33rd Native Infantry (now 4th Prince Albert Victor's Ovra
Rajputs).

Wing, 60th Native Infantry (mutinied at Rohtak, 1857).

General Notts'' Force.

One Troop, Bombay Horse Artillery (afterwards First Troop, Bomby
Horse Artillery ; now "N" Battery, Royal Horse Artillery).

One troop. Horse Artillery, Shah Shuja's Force (afterwards 5th Troop,
1st Brigade, Bengal Horse Artillery converted into a European Battery,
862 ; now " T " Battery, Royal Horse Artillery).

Detachment, Foot Artillery.

3rd Bombay Light Cavalry (now 33rd Light Cavalry).

Detachment, First Irregular Horse (Haldanes') (now Skinner's Horse,"

Christie's Horse (became 9th Irregular Cavalry ; disbanded, 1861).

Detachment, Sappers and Miners (now First Prince of Wales' Own
Sappers and Miners).

Detachment, Madras Sappers and Miners (now Queen's Own Sappers
and Miners).

Her Majesty's 40th Foot (now 1st Battalion, South Lancashire Regi-
ment).

38th Native Infantry (mutinied at Delhi, 1857).

3rd Shah Shuja's Infantry (now 12th Pioneers).

Her Majesty's 41st Foot (now First Battalion, The Welsh Regiment.)

42nd Native Infantry (now 5th Light Infantry).

43rd Native Infantry (now 6th Jat Light Infantry).

APPENDIX III.

Captain Broadfoot to Major-General Sir Robert Sale.
Note on the Defensive Works in Jalalabad.

Jalalabad, 16th April 1842.

Sir,

On the 12th of November, the Major-General Commaading having
resolved to occupy Jalalabad, directed me with a committee of officers to
•examine and report on the works of the place.

The committee reported unanimously that they were then not defensible
.against a vigorous assault.

As will be seen by the accompanying plan* the town is an irregular
quadrilateral, having half of the western side
salient, and the southern side broken by a deep
re-entering angle. It was surrounded on every side with gardens and
.houses, enclosed fields, mosques, and ruined forts, aSording strong cover
to an enemy ; these were everywhere close to the walls, and in maiy places
•connected with them. Beyond these on three sides (north, east, and west),
•at from 400 to 500 yards, run the ruins of the wall of the ancient city, on which
the sand has accumulated so as to form a Hue of two heights, giving cover to
the largest bodies of men. Opposite the south-west angle a range of heights,
composed of bare gneiss rocks, commences at 330 yards from the works and
•extends about 400 yards from north-north-east to south-south-west ; these
completely overlook the town, and from the vicious tracing of the works,
.enfilade some of the longest curtains ; parallel to the north side, at 170 yards,
runs a steep bank 20 feet high ; it extends a considerable way to the west
and several miles to the east, affording a secure and unseen approach to any
^number of men ; it is, probably, an old bank of the river. From it numer-
ous ravines run up towards the walls, affording the enemy a covered passage
into the buildings and enclosures adjoining the works.

Two very solid walls, 300 yards apart, run from the place to this bank,

thus enclosing on three sides a space probably occupied originally by the

Mogul Emperor's palace, but found by us to contain a large mosque and

numerous gardens and houses occupied by fakirs ; one of the gates of the

■town opens into it, and it was traversed by a water-course, about 10 feet

( 457 )
Vol. Ill

458 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

wide, which entered the town by a tunnel under the rampart, large enough
to admit several men abreast. A similar tunnel allowed it to pass out of the
town on the eastern side. The walls' of the town extended about 2,000'
yards, without reckoning the bastions, of which there were 33.

The works were of earth, and in the usual style of the country, viz.,
a high thin rampart, but in a state of ruin, without parapets and without
ditch, covered way, or outworks of any kind.

The bastions were full, but in some places lower than the adjoining
Curtains, very confined, without parapets, and sloping downwards from the
gorge to the salient, so that the terrepleine was completely exposed.

There were four gates and a postern, all of the usual vicious native con-^
struction, and, except that on the northern side, in a ruinous state.

To give some idea of the state of the works, I may mention that of the
Committee sent to inspect them on the 13th of November, not one, except
myself, succeeded in making the circuit.

Large gaps cut oli the communication, or insecure footing compelled
the officers to descend among the adjoining enclosures, from which it was
difficult to find the way ; while on the south side the ramparts were so
embedded in houses and surmounted by them, that its course could only be
traced by laboriously threading the lanes of the native town.

On the north side the wall rose to a very great height towards the town, but
sloped down to the interior in a heap of ruins, almost everywhere accessible
while, at the foot, were houses and gardens so strongly occupied by the enemy
that during the night of the 13th of November our troops were unable to main-
tain their posts, and, with the exception of the gateway, a line of -400
yards on the northern face was without a man in the works.

Had the enemy then attacked us we must have been reduced to a street
combat.

On the following morning (14th November), the Major-Gen eral
ordered a sortie in force, which drove the enemy from his positions with
such loss that it was some time before he ventured near enough to disturb
our works which were now as vigorously prosecuted as our scanty supply of
tools and the difficulty of procuring materials allowed.

We had only the tools as per margin,* brought from Kabul with the

Sappers for the operations expected in the

„„„ o," "^f ' Tazin Valley, and we were without wood or

Other tools in propor- ""on. Wood was obtamed from the rums of the
tion ; many tools have been cantonment and from houses demolished in the
made there. town. Iron was collected in small quantities from

the neighbourhood, but it was that of the
country, good in quality, but imperfectly melted, and requiring about ten

APPENDICES. 459.

times as much labour and time as English iron. By the persevering labour
of the troops, however, much was done, and when the enemy next attacked'
us (1st December) ramparts had been made and the guns mounted on the
bastions for which they were destined, the water-course and other passages
through the walls blocked up, the foot of the scaips cleared from rubbish,
and parapets built in all the bastions and many of the curtains, while much-
of the external cover was destroyed.

On the 1st of December the enemy were again routed, and the works pro-
ceeded with little or no interruption.

By the middle of January (the commencement of the rainy season)
a parapet, nowhere less than 6 feet high, with a banquette, as wide as the-
nature of the rampart allowed, was completed entirely round the place. The
gates were repaired and strengthened by buttresses ; two of them were
retrenched and a ditch carried round the north-west angle, while some of
themostdangerousravines were laid open to our fire, and roads were opened
into the low ground on the north side.

By the middle of February the ditch was carried round the place, with as
good a covered way as the size of the ditch and supply of earth allowed ;
while the mosques, forts, gardens, and cover of every description, had been
destroyed for several hundred yards round the place.

At this time Muhammad Akbar Khan moved into the valley in order to-
attack the place, but they were unable to effect more than a distant invest-
ment ; they frequently occupied the rocks on the south-west, but the
parapets and the traverses rendered their fire harmless.

On the 19th of February an earthquake, which nearly destroyed the
town, threw down the greater part of our parapets, the Kabul gate with the
two adjoining bastions, the north-west bastion, and a part of the new
bastion which flanked it. Three other bastions were also nearly destroyed,
while several large breaches were made in the curtains ; one on the Peshawar
side, eighty feet long, was quite practicable, the ditch being filled in and
the ascent easy. Thus, in one moment, the labours of three months were, in-
a great measure, destroyed.

No time, however, was lost ; the shocks had scarcely ceased when the
whole garrison was told off into working parties, and before night the breaches-
were scarped, the rubbish below cleared away, and the ditches before them
dug out ; while the great one, on the Peshawar side, was surrounded by a
good gabion parapet.

A parapet was erected on the remains of the north-west bastion, witli
an embrasure allowing the guns to flank the approach of the ruined Kabul
gate ; the parapet of the new bastion was restored so as to give a flanking fire^
to the north-west bastion, while the ruined gate was rendered inaccessible by

460 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

a trench in front of it, and in every bastion round the place a temporary
,parapet was raised.

From the following day all troops ofi duty were continually at work, and
such were their energy and perseverance that by the end of the month the
parapets were entirely restored, the Kabul gate again serviceable, the bastions
either restored or the curtain filled in when restoration was practicable, and
•every battery re-established.

The trenches have been built up, with the rampart doubled in thickness,
and the whole of the gates retrenched.

It is not easy to give an adequate idea of the extent of the labour per-
.formed by the troops.

The parapets, banquettes, etc., are built of the ruins of the buildings
thrown down cemented with clay mixed with straw and bound together, when
requisite, by bond timbers ; of this masonry about 104,500 cubic feet had been
built before the earthquake, and since then (including new works) about
103,900 cubic feet have been erected," making in all above 208,000 cubic feet
of masonry. But the material had to be procured from a distance by the
laborious process of demolition ; and the ruinous wall had to be scarped,
cleared at the base, and prepared for the work.

I j The quantity of walls of forts, mosques, gardens, etc., destroyed were
■considerably more than double that of the walls of the place, and the ex-
cavation from the ditch exceeds 860,000 cubic feet.

In addition to this the troops had to build barracks for themselves
and guard rooms round the works, each corps undertook its own
Isarracks, while the construction of the guard-rooms was superintended
'by Captain Moorhouse, Quarter-master of brigade, and Lieutenant

and Quarter-master Sinclair, of Her Majesty's
wI°oi:r:m";t°e 13th Light Infantry, whose assistance on this
■Commissariat. Long fur- point left me more leisure for the defensive
nished materials and work- works
men ; the credit of the whole
• contrivance and construe- The working parties, in emergencies, con-

tionisdue solely to Lieute- gisted of all men of! duty, often assisted by the
nant Sincliar, G.B. , , , , . "^

guards when the works were near their posts.

On ordinary occasions they consisted of all the Sappers and Miners, about 200
men of Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, 130 of the 35th Native Infantry,

.a party of Artillery men of Captain Abbott's battery, and all the men of! duty
in Captain Backhouse's Mountain Train, and the detachment of the 6th
•Infantry, ShahShuja's Force, doing duty with the Mountain Train detach-
ments ; also camp-followers were employed in bringing materials, etc.

Nothing could exceed the cheerful energy of every officer and man in
these labours.

APPENDICES. 461

The Sappers and Miners worked from daybreak to sunset (with 2i hours-
for meals), and, when occasion required, at night. Their conduct was such
as to leave me nothing to desire, and it has been honoured with the Major-
General's recorded approbation.

*******

The other troops having very severe garrison duty, laboured for a short
period, yet seldom less than 6 hours a day.

It will be seen that the largest parties were furnished by Her Majesty's
13th Light Infantry, and I know not how adequately to express my sense
of the services of this admirable body of men; though having little more thaa
every other night in bed, they laboured for months, day after day, officers
and men, with a cheerfulness and energy not to be surpassed. To enumerate
all, whose zeal and energy were conspicuous, would almost require me to go-
over the list of the officers and to mention even many of the valuable non-
commissioned officers.

* ******

The 35th Native Infantry were much employed in destroying the forts-
and other covers around the place ; and it is due to Captain Seaton to men-
tion his great activity, and the skill with which, by directing the water-
courses used for irrigation, on the most massive ruins, he effected a quantity
of demolition which, with our short supply of gunpowder, would have other-
wise been impracticable.

With the exception of a few of the larger bastions, the whole of the bat-
teries were prepared by the Artillery themselves, under the superintendence
of their own officers. Besides this a party of Captain Abbott's artillerymen
was always ready to assist in the works generally. * * * *

Captain Backhouse, with his own men, and a detachment of the 6th Infantry,
Shah Shuja's Force, not only prepared the parapets and embrasures for his
own guns, and repaired the damage done to them by the earthquake, but he
undertook and completed several of the most useful and laborious opera-
tions ; he executed, among others, a large and widely-breaching series of
ravines, giving cover to many hundred men, within pistol shot of a very weak
part of the works, which was filled up ; or entirely laid open to fire, and that
with a number of men, which without his untiring zeal and personal exe rtion.
would have been inadequate.

*******

I have, etc.,
GEORGE BROADFOOT.
53 I. B.

CRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF EVENTS.

;1835. — Lord Aucklaad appointed Governor-General of India.
1836.— The Burnrs Mission starts for Kabul.
1837. — The Mission reaches Kabul on the 20th of September.

Viktevitch arrives at Kabul on the 19th of December.

Eldred Pottinger arrives at Herat in August.

Ghorian falls before the Persian Army in November.

Commencement of th^ siege of Herat on the 23rd of November.
1838. — Perso-Afghan alliance proposed on the 21st of March.

Burnes leaves Kabul on the 26th of April.

Treaty signed by Ranjit Singh on the 26th of June.

Siege of Herat raised on the 9th ot September.

November. — Army for invasion of Afghanistaa assembles at Feroze-
pur.

Birrnes sent to treat with the Baluchi Princes.

December. — The expedition starts.
1839. — lith January. — The Army of the Indus enters Sind.

2lst January. — Shah Shuja's Contingent at Shikarpur.

22th January. — Cession of Bakkar.

20th February.— Cottiin reaches Shikarpur.

k3rti February.- — Force leaves Shikarpur.

lOth March. — Arrival at Dadar.

26th March. — Arrival at Quetta.

March. — Burnes Mission to Mehrab Khan.

Qth April. — Sir John Keane assumes command.

1th April. — March resumed.

2th April. — Arrival at Haikalzai.

25th April. — Arrival at Kandahar.
21th June. — March resumed.

21s< Jwi;/— Arrival at Ghazni.

22nd </«?«/.— Attack by Ghazis.

23rd ./«(;(/.— Fall of Ghazni.

2nd August. — Flight of Dost Muhammad.
1th August. — Arrival at Kabul.

Zrd September. — Prince Timxir reaches Kabul.
( 463^)

464 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

2nd October. — Orders received for the greater part of Bengal Di-
vision to remain in Afghanistan.

\Wh October. — Bengal troops begin return march to India.

\8th October. — Bombay troops begin return march to India.
1840. — l^tli March. — News reaches Kabul of the failure of the Rus-
sian Expedition to Khiva.

lih May. — Anderson's expedition against the Ghilzais.

\lih May. — Anderson's action against the Ghilzai-.

June. — Disaster at Bajgah.

August.— Dost Muhammad escapes from Bokhara.

dOth August. — Attack on Bajgah.

September. — Rising in Turkistan.

lith September. — Dennis reinforces Bamian.

18th September — Defeat of Usbegs near Bamian.

3rd October. — Sale attacks Julga.

llih October. — Dost Muhammad reaches Ghorband.

11th October. — Withdrawal of Bamian detachment.

2nd November. — Action at Parwan Dara.

2nd November. — Surrender of Dost Muhammad.

12th November. — Dost Muhammad leaves for India.

November. — The cuuit moves to Jalalabad for the winter.
1841. — 3rd January. — Farrington's action near Kandahar.

January. — Todd's Mission leaves Herat.

7th April. — Action near Kalat-i-Ghilzai.

May — ^Wymer's action at Assiya-i-Ilmi.

3rd July. — Action on the Helmund.

5th August. — Chambers' Expedition against the Ghilzais.

17th August. — Action at Girishk.

September. — Expedition to Tarin and Derawat.

September. — Capture of Akram Khan.

October. — Nott returns to Kandahar.

9th October. — Attack on Monteith's camp at Butkhak.

I2th October. — ASair of Khurd-Kabul. — March to Gandamak.

2nd November. — Murder of Burnes.

2nd November.— Shelton arrives at the Bala Hissar.

3rd November. — Arrival of 37th Native Infantry at Kabul.

3rd November. — Macnaghten writes to recall Sale's force and the
troops returning to India.

3rd November. — Abandonment of Mackenzie's post.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF EVENTS. 465

Uh November.— Foit containing conamissariat stores abandoncrJ.
6(Ji November.— Ca-ptnxe of Muhammad Sharit's fort.
Gth November. — Action by Anderson's Horse.
7th November. — Return of Akbar Khan to Bamian.
9th November. — Shelton returns to Cantonments.
10th November. — AfTaii- of Rikab Bashi's fort.
lOlh November. — News of Kabul outbreak reaches Sale.
11th November. — March to Jalalabad from Gandamak commonced.
i2th November. — Rearguard action.
12th November. — Arrival at Jalalabad.
13th November.' — First fight on the Bemaru Hills.
15</( November. — Arrival of Pottinger after the Charikar disaster.
l%th November. — First action at Jalalabad.
l%th November. — Macnaghten recommends holding out.
'2'ird November. — Second fight on the Bemaru Hills.
25th November. — Macnaghten interviews the Chiefs.
November. — Massacre at Ghazni.
' November. — Capitulation of Ghazni.
1st December. — Second action at Jalalabad.
Qth December. — Abandonment of Muhammad Sharif's fort.
8th December. — Macnaghten consults Elphinstone on question of

retreat.
8th December. — Discussion of treaty.

8//j December. — Return to Kandahar of Maclaren's Brigade.
13th December. — Evacuation of Bala Hissar.
22nd December. — Orders issued for the evacuation of Ghazni,

Kandahar, and Jalalabad.
23rd December. — Murder of Macnaghten.
26th December. — Encouraging letters from Ja'alabad.
27th December. — Mutiny of Janbaz at Kandahar.
1842. — 1st January. — Treaty ratified.

4j/< January. — First Brigade of the Relief Force crosses the

Sutlej.
&th January. — Retreat from Kabul commences.
7th January.— iskmnei proceeds to Akbar Khan with flag of

truce.
8th January. - Sale receives letter from Pottinger.
8^^ January. — Kabul Force marches to Tazin.
9th January.— Oiders received at Jalalabad for the evacua-
tion.— The reply.
12th January — Action of Arghandab.

3 M

4f66 FRONTIER AND OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS FROM INDIA.

12th Jamiary.—The end of the Kabul Force.

I3th Jarmanf. — Arrival of Brydon at Jalalabad.

26</; Janiwn/.— Sale convenes council of war.

10^/; February. — Governor-General issues order prescribing object

of Relisf Force.
\Ztli Fehrvary. — Earthquake at Jalalabad.
19</( February. — Disaster at Ali Masjid.
21st February. — Order for evacuation reaches Kandahar.
23?-c? February. — Evacuation of Ali Masjid.
1th March. — Action near Kandahar.
loth March. — Attack on Kandahar.
25</* March. — Wymer's action near Kandahar.
28</i March. — England's defeat at Hailcalzai.
Zlst March. — Pollock reaches Janirud.
\st A-pril. — Death of Shah Shuja.
5th April. — Action in the Khaibar.
7th April. — Action at Jalalabad.
30(/j April. — Passage of the Khojak.
Ma?/.— Pollock at Jalalabad.
May. — Relief of Kalat-i-Ghilzai.
May. — Akbar Khan captures the Bala Hissar.
29th May. — Action near Kandahar.
Jmmc.— Operations in Shinwari Valley.
7th August. — Evacuation of Kandahar.
20th August. — Pollock sets out from Jalalabad.
20th August. — Action near Gandamak. .

28th August. — Cavalry action near Mukur.
?>Oth August. — Action near Ghoyen.
5th September. — Action at Ghazni.
8th September. — ^ Action in Jagdalak Pass.
12th September.— Action at Sayidabad.
^epiember.— Progress of M'Caskill's Division.
ISth September. — Action at Tazin.
15th September. — Pollock arrives at Kabul.
Idth September.— ^ott arrives at Kabul.
29<7t September. — Action at Istalif.
12th October.— The force leaves Kabul.
Uth October. —Action of Haft Kotal.
nth December.— ATTiva.1 at Ferozepur.

[ THE END OF VOL. III. ]

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES

THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
This book is DUE on the last date stamped below

FEB 2 4 1956

. ^'^' MAR tl -9

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365

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JUL 2 '^ 2003
,UE 2 VVK^rHoJATE RECEIVED^ ^^.^^

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-A 579

Bcf^'^'Ji CA 90095

REC'DYRL •••5 14?003

.i3I/i

r?r:'?T:?B77 'i I .'iu..<«^

0^3
475.1
A3 ■
V,5

)90

GENERAL MAP

TO ILLUSTRATE VOLUME III of FRONTIER
and OVERSEAS EXPEDITIONS

No. 4,467.,-!., 1908.

ino

^•3

"" — ^- ■ — ■'—

MAP

TO ILLUSTRATE THE MOVKMENTS

O F T H E

EXPEDITIONARY FORCB

U w n E B

BRrGAOtER'GENERAL C M MacGREGOR CB CSI CIE

to V „ber

No. 4.429-1.. 1908.

KEFERENCB.

II u

POCKET MAP No. IL

PART OF THE

To illustrate the operations of the force under BRIGADIER-GENERAL

HODGSON in 1853; the route followed by the SURVEY EXPEDITION

to the TAKHT-I-SULIMAN in 1883, and THE ZHOB FIELD FORCE

under SIR GEORGE WHITE in 1890.

'~' ' i ', Ktrinaaiff-~ l-Js/, i

I n Tono t),v No T 2T^
fixu C J A Mnroh I90A

Milas 6 4 3 2

Scale. Imch^ 'Imll.s

REFERENCES,

No. 4.431-1., 1908.

RoJte of Expedilior. 1853

1883

1890

'dm'

•««»qo 5iHt *>-^

475,

^■3

5 A

EXPLANATORY SKETCH

Of the forcing of ihe KHAN BAND, held by the Bozdar Tribe

against a force under BRIGADIER-GENERAL. N. CHAMBERLAIN, C. B.,

on the 7th March I8S7.

m .,ir;*

I. B. Topo Pt No. 7.274.
Bui. C. J. A. April ItfUS.

Scale I inch ^ I mtle
1000 2000 3000

dOOO BOOO 6000 Yardi

REFERENCES.

British Forces ,

Bozdars .,

Routes taken by British forces

No. 4.430-1.. 1908.

ino

3 158 01245 6090

475.1
A3
v,3

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