GALLIPOLI DIAEY
GALLIPOLI DIARY
BY GENERAL
SIR IAN HAMILTON, G.C.B.
AUTHOB OF " A STAFF OFFICEB'S SCRAP-BOOK," ETC.
WITH ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS
IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL. II
LONDON
EDWAKD AKNOLD
1920
[All rights reserved]
CONTENTS
CHAPTEB PAOB
XIII. K.'S ADVICE AND THE P.M/S ENVOY . . .1
XIV. THE FOECE REAL AND IMAGINARY . . .25
XV. SARI BAIR AND SUVLA . . . . .52
XVI. KAVAK TEPE ATTACK COLLAPSES . . .86
XVII. THE LAST BATTLE ..... 120
XVIII. MISUNDERSTANDINGS ..... 144
XIX. THE FRENCH PLAN . . . . .168
XX. LOOS AND SALONIKA . . . . . 196
XXI. THE BEGINNING OF THE END .... 234
APPENDIX I. STATEMENT ON ARTILLERY BY BRIGADIER-
GENERAL SIR H. S. BAIKIE . . . 279
APPENDIX II. NOTES BY LIEUT.-COL. C. ROSENTHAL RE-
LATING TO ARTILLERY AT ANZAC . .292
APPENDIX III. SIR IAN HAMILTON'S INSTRUCTIONS RELATING
TO THE SUVLA OPERATIONS . . 298
APPENDIX IV. INSTRUCTIONS TO MAJOR-GEN. H. DE LISLE . 335
INDEX . . 339
LIST OF ILLTJSTEATIONS
BEAITHWAITE, SIB IAN, AND FREDDIE MAITLAND . Frontispiece
FACING PAGE
MAJOR-GEN. SIR G. F. ELLISON, K.C.M.G. . . .6
LIEUT.-GEN. SIR A. G. HUNTER- WESTON, K.C.B., D.S.O. . 22
iUVLA FROM CHUNUK BAIR . . . . .54
GENERAL SIR W. R. BIRDWOOD, BART., G.C.M.G., K.C.B. . 80
LIEUT.-GEN. SIR A. J. GODLEY, K.C.B. , K.C.M.G. . . 84
GENERAL BAILLOUD ...... 146
FISH FROM THE ENEMY ..... 170
MARSHAL LIMAN VON SANDERS .... 182
CREMATING THE ENEMY DEAD ..... 256
MAP
SUVLA AND ANZAC .... At end of volume
GALLIPOLI DIARY
CHAPTER XIII
K.'S ADVICE AND THE P.M.'S ENVOY
llth July, 1915. Worked in my office from early
morning till 12.45. The whole scheme for to-
morrow's attack is cut and dried, according to
our cloth : time tables fixed and every round
counted.
Freddy Stopford and his Staff turned up from
Mudros. Stopford in very good form. The first
thing he did was to deliver himself of a personal
message from Lord K. He (Stopford) wrote it
down, in the ante-room, the moment he left the
presence and I may take it as being as good as
verbatim. Here it is :
" Lord Kitchener told me to tell you he had no
wish to interfere with the man on the spot, but
from closely watching our actions here, as well
as those of General French in Flanders, he is certain
that the only way to make a real success of an
attack is by surprise. Also, that when the surprise
ceases to be operative, in so far that the advance
is checked and the enemy begin to collect from
all sides to oppose the attackers, then, perseverance
VOL. II. 2
2 GALLIPOLI DIARY
becomes merely a useless waste of life. In every
attack there seems to be a moment when success
is in the assailant's grasp. Both the French and
ourselves at Arras and Neuve Chapelle lost the
opportunity."
Well said ! K. has made Stopford bring me
in his pocket the very text for what I wanted to
say to him. Only my grumbling thoughts find
expression by my pen but I have plenty of others
and my heart has its warm corner for K. whenever
he cares to come in.
As I told Stopford, K. has not only anticipated
my advice but has dived right down into this
muddle of twentieth century war and finds lying
at the bottom of it only the old original idea of
war in the year 1. At our first landing the way
was open to us for just so long as the surprise to
the Turks lasted. That period here, at the Dar-
danelles, might be taken as being perhaps twice as
long as it would be on the Western front which
gave us a great pull. The reason was that land
communications were bad and our troops on the
sea could move thrice as fast as the Turks on
their one or two bad roads. Yet, even so, there
was no margin for dawdling. Hunter- Weston and
d'Amade had tried their best to use their brief
surprise breathing space in seizing the Key to the
opening of the Narrows Achi Baba, and had
failed through lack of small craft, lack of water,
lack of means of bringing up supplies, lack of our
10 per cent, reserves to fill casualties. At that
crucial moment when we had beaten the local enemy
troops and the enemy reinforcements had not yet
K.'S ADVICE AND THE RM.'S ENVOY 3
come up, we could not get the men or the stuff
quick enough to shore. Still, we had gained three
or four miles and there were spots on the
Peninsula where, to-day, three or four miles would
be enough. Also, supposing he had to run a
landing, his (Stopford's) action would take place
under much easier conditions than Hunter- West on' s
on April 25th.
First and foremost, in our " beetles " or barges,
conveying 500 men under their own engines, we
had an instrument which reduced the physical
effort three quarters. This meant half the battle.
When we made our original landing at Anzac
we could only put 1,500 men ashore, per trip, at a
speed of 2 1 miles per hour, in open cutters. Were
a Commander to repeat that landing now, he would
be able to run 5,000 men ashore, per trip, at a
speed of five miles per hour with no trouble about
oars, tows, etc., and with protection against shrap-
nel and rifle bullets. As to the actual landing on
the beach, that could be done we had proved
it in less than one quarter of the time. Each
beetle had a " brow " fixed on to her bows ; a
thing to be let down like a drawbridge over which
the men could pour ashore by fours ; the same with
mules, guns, supplies, they could all be rushed on
land as fast as they could be handled on the beaches.
Secondly, we had already been for some time at
work to fix up the wherewithal to meet our chronic
nightmare, the water trouble. Thirdly, the system
of bringing up food and ammunition from the
beaches to the firing line had now been practically
worked out into a science at Helles and Anzac
4 GALLIPOLI DIARY
where Stopford would be given a chance of studying
it at first hand.
As to place, date, command, and distribution of
forces, these were still being considered ; still
undetermined ; and I could say no more at present.
Braithwaite was away at Helles but, if he would
go over to the General Staff, he would find Aspinall,
my G.S. (1), and the Q. Staff who would give him
the hang of our methods and post him in matters
which would be applicable to any date or place.
There was more in this message as taken down
by Stopford. After going into some details of
trench warfare, K.'s message went on :
"It is not the wish of the Cabinet that Sir Ian
Hamilton should make partial attacks. They (the
Cabinet) consider it preferable that he should
await the arrival of his reinforcements to make
one great effort, which, if successful, will give them
the ridge commanding the Narrows. It is not
intended, however, that Sir Ian should do nothing
in the meantime and if he gets a really good opportu-
nity he is to seize it."
There is something in this reminds me of Kuropat-
kin's orders to Stakelberg, yet I am glad to find
that our spontaneously generated scheme jumps
with the views of the Cabinet, for, there is only
one " ridge commanding the Narrows " (Kilid
Bahr is a plateau), and it is that ridge we mean
to try for by " one great effort."
In my reply I shall merely acknowledge. Sari
Bair is my secret ; my Open Sesame to the cave
K.'S ADVICE AND THE P.M.'S ENVOY 5
where the forty thieves of the Committee of Union
and Progress have their Headquarters. It makes
me uneasy to think the Cabinet are talking about
Sari Bair.
A battle is a swirl of " ifs " and " ands." The
Commander who enters upon it possessed by some
just and clear principle is like a sailing ship entering
a typhoon on the right tack. After that he lives
from hand to mouth. How far will wise saws
cut ice ? How much nearer do you get to shooting
a snipe by being told how not to take your aim ?
Well thought out plans and preparations deserve
to win ; order and punctuality on the part of
subordinates tend to make the reality correspond
to the General Staff conception ; surprise, if the
Commander can bring it off, is worth all K. can
say of it ; the energy and rapidity of the chosen
troops will exploit that surprise for its full value
bar, always, Luck the Joker; and Wish to
Fight and Will to Win are the surest victory getters
in the pack. The more these factors are examined,
the more sure it is that everything must in the last
resort depend upon the executive Commander ;
and here, of course, I am referring to an enterprise,
not to a huge, mechanically organized dead-lock
like the western front.
Stopford was away in G.H.Q. Staff tents all
afternoon ; afterwards both he and Adderley, his
A.D.C., dined. Stopford likes Reed who is, indeed,
a very pleasant fellow to work with. Still, I stick
to what I wrote Wolfe Murray : the combination
of Stopford and Reed is not good ; not for this
sort of job.
6 GALLIPOLI DIARY
12th July, 1915. Imbros. Had meant to start
for Helles an hour before daylight to witness the
opening of the attack by the French Corps and
the Lowland Division. But am too bad with the
universal complaint to venture many yards from
camp.
Stopford and Staff breakfasted. He has fallen
in love with our ideas. After lunch he and his
party left for Mudros. Am forcing myself to
write so as to ease the strain of waiting : the battle
is going on : backwards and forwards backwards
and forwards I travel between my tent ; the
signal station, and the G.S. map tent.
A delightful message from K., thanking me for
my letters : patting me on the back ; telling me
that Altham is coming out to run the communi-
cations, and Ellison to serve on my Staff.
Thank heavens we are at last to have a business
man at the head of our business ! As to Ellison,
K.'s conscience has for long been smiting him for
not having let me take my own C.G.S. with me
in the first instance. But Braithwaite has won
his spurs now in many a hair-raising crisis, so
K. may let his mind rest at ease.
Freddie Maitland and I dined with the Vice-
Admiral who kept a signaller on special watch for
my messages from the shore but nothing came
in. He, the Admiral, wants to take all the 600
stokers serving in the Royal Naval Division back
to the ships. This will be the last straw to the
Division. We had the treat of being taken off
MAJ.-GEN. SIR G. F. ELLISON, K.C.M.G.
F.A.Swainephot.
K.'S ADVICE AND THE P.M.'S ENVOY 7
the Triad in the Admiral's racing motor boat and
when we got ashore found good news which I
have just cabled home :
" In the southern section we attacked at day-
light to-day with our right and right centre. After
heavy fighting lasting all day the troops engaged,
namely, the French Corps and the Lllnd Lowland
Division, have succeeded in carrying the two
strongly held and fortified lines of Turkish trenches
opposite to them. The ground covered by the
advance varies in depth from 200 to 400 yards,
and if we can maintain our gains against to-night's
counter-attacks the effect of the action will be not
only to advance but greatly to strengthen our
line. Full details to-morrow."
July, 1915. Imbros. Still feeling very
slack. Nothing clear from Helles. My cable best
explains :
' Troops have been continuously engaged since
my last cable, but situation is still too confused
to admit of definition, especially as telephone
wires all cut by shell or rifle fire.
" So far as can be gathered the sum total of
the engagements taking place in a labyrinth of
trenches is satisfactory up to the hour of cabling
and we have taken some 200 prisoners. I hope
I shall be able to send definite news to-morrow
morning."
Oh, energy, to what distant clime have you
flown ? I used to be energetic ; not perhaps
8 GALLIPOLI DIARY
according to Evelyn Wood's standards but still
energetic ! Yet, see me to-day, when a poor
cousin to the cholera this cursed enteritis lays
me by the heels ; fills me with desperate longing
to lie down and do nothing but rest. More than
half my Staff and troops are in the same state of
indescribable slackness and this, I think, must be
the reason the Greeks were ten long years taking
Troy.
Some newspaper correspondents have arrived.
I have told them they may do whatever they
d d well please. Ashmead-Bartlett is vexed at
his monopoly being spoiled. Charlie Burn, who
came with the King's bag, lunched. The Vice-
Admiral, Roger Keyes, and Flag-Lieutenant Bowlby
dined ; very good of them to leave their own
perfectly appointed table for our rough and ready
fare. The A.D.C.'s between them managed to
get some partridges, opulent birds which lent quite
a Ritzian tone to our banquet.
As was expected, the Turks counter-attacked
heavily last night but were unable to drive us out
except in one small section on our right. To-day,
fighting is still going on and the Naval Division
are in it now. We have made a good gain and taken
over 400 prisoners and a machine gun. We are
still on the rack, though, as there are a lot of Turks
not yet cleared out from holes and corners of our
new holding, and ammunition is running very
short. If our ammunition does not run out alto-
gether and we can hold what we have, our total
gain will be 500 yards depth.
K.'S ADVICE AND THE RM.'S ENVOY 9
Since June 4th, when we had to whang off the
whole of our priceless 600 rounds of H.E., we
have had none for 18-prs. on the Peninsula not
one solitary demnition round ; nor do we seem
in the least likely to get one solitary demnition
round. Hunter-Weston and his C.R.A. explain
forcibly, not to say explosively, that on the 28th
June the right attack would have scored a success
equally brilliant to that- achieved by the 29th
Division on our left, had we been able to allot as
many shell to the Turkish trenches assaulted by
the 156th Brigade Lowland Division as we did
to the sector by the sea. But we could not,
because, once we had given a fair quota to the
left, there was not enough stuff in our lockers for
the right. Such is war ! No use splitting the
difference and trying to win everywhere like high
brows halting between Flanders and ,. Gallipoli.
But I am sick at heart, I must say, to think my
brother Scots should have had to catch hold of
the hot end of the poker. Also to think that,
with another couple of hundred rounds, we should
have got and held H. 12. H. 12 which dominates
so prisoners say the wells whence the enemy
draws water for the whole of his right wing.
To-day the old trouble is a-foot once again.
Hunter-Weston tells us the Turkish counter-attacks
are being pressed with utmost fury and are begin-
ning to look ugly, as we can give our infantry no
support from our guns although the enemy offer
excellent artillery targets. When K. is extra
accommodating it is doubly hard to be importunate,
but it's got to be done :
10 GALLIPOLI DIARY
General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kitchener.
" With reference to my telegrams No. M.F. 328
of 13th June and No. M.F. 381 of 28th June.
Each successive fight shows more clearly than the
last how much may hang on an ample supply
of ammunition, more especially high explosive
howitzer ammunition. In my telegram No. M.F.
381 I said that I hoped we might be able to achieve
success with the ammunition already promised,
and I adhere to that opinion ; but every additional
100 rounds means some reduction of risks and
greater assurance of success. I raise this question
again because I gather from what I hear that
matters in the other theatre of operations may
possibly be at a standstill without much prospect
of any vital alteration before the autumn fairly
sets in. If this should be the case it is for you to
consider whether a larger and more regular supply
of ammunition should be sent to me in order to
give this force the utmost chance of gaining an
early success. Judging from the increased effect
of the bombardments before the last two attacks
on facilitating the Infantry advance I am led to
hope that this success would not be long delayed
under the cumulative effect of unremitting bombard-
ment. If, therefore, any change in the general
situation should make it possible to allow me
temporary preferential claim to all the ammunition
I should like, I would ask for the following amounts
to be here by 1st August, in addition to those
accompanying the troops and already promised,
namely, 4. 5-inch howitzer, 3,000 rounds ; 5-inch
howitzer, 7,000 rounds ; 6-inch howitzer, 5,000,
and 9. 3-inch howitzer, 500 rounds, all high explosive.
K.'S ADVICE AND THE P.M.'S ENVOY 11
I should also ask for a monthly supply on the
following scale, first consignment to arrive before
15th August :
"18-pr 300,000
4.5-inch howitzer 30,000
5-inch howitzer 30,000
6-inch howitzer 24,000
60-pr 15,000
" 9.2-inch howitzer 6,000
4 The howitzer ammunition to be all high
explosive, the 60-pr. to be one-third shrapnel
and two-thirds high explosive, and the 18-pr. to
be half of each.
" The above monthly scale includes ammunition
for the following additional ordnance which I
should like to get, namely, two batteries of 4.5-inch
howitzers for each of the Xth and Xlth Divisions
(since 5-inch howitzers are found to be too inaccurate
to bombard the enemy trenches even in close
proximity to our own), one battery of 6-inch
howitzers and four 9.2-inch howitzers.
;c On the assumption already made it might be
possible for you to arrange to forward to Ordnance
Stores, Marseilles, the ammunition asked for to
be here by 1st August. Time would thus be
gained to accumulate the supply required, and I
could arrange with the Vice-Admiral to send a
fast steamer of 1,000 tons hold capacity to bring
the consignment of high explosives from Marseilles.
To get the steamer coaled, to arrive at Marseilles,
coal again and be ready to receive the ammunition,
would take seven days.
12 GALLIPOLI DIARY
" Please understand that this suggestion is only
prompted for the following reasons : (1) My
growing belief that ample artillery might, within
a limited period, lead to quite a considerable
success in this theatre, and (2) because the reports
which reach me seem to indicate that an offensive
is not likely to be undertaken elsewhere at present
(and I have mainly asked for offensive ammunition).
" The monthly supply above detailed I should
not expect would be required for more than two
months."
If our Government really whole-heartedly will
that there should be a complete success in the
East, they must, equally, with whole hearts and
braced-up will, resist (for a while) the idea of any
offensive in the West. In saying this I speak of the
A.B.C. of war. The main theatre is where the
amphibious power wishes to make it so. This
cable of mine sent to a man like Lord K. is a very
strong order. But now is the time to speak up
and let him realize that he must let the fields of
France lie fallow for the summer if he wishes to
plough the Black Sea waves in autumn.
July, 1915. Inibros. Wrote letters in the
morning, and in the evening went for a ride to the
Salt Lake and there inspected the new aeroplane
camp on the far side of the water.
Last night more counter-attacks, all driven off.
The French right is now actually on the mouth
of the Kereves Dere where it runs into the sea.
We have made about 500 prisoners and have
K.'S ADVICE AND THE P.M.'S ENVOY 13
captured a machine gun. Hunter- Weston had
to transfer the command of the 52nd Division,
temporarily, to Shaw, the new Commander of
the 13th Division.
Baikie is crying out to us for shells as if we were
bottling them up ! There are none.
15th July, 1915. Inibros. The answer has come
in from the War Office : the answer, I mean, to
mine of the day before yesterday in which it is
suggested that if our rich brethren were off their
feed for the moment, some crumbs of high explosive
might be spared :
" We have great difficulty in sending you the
amounts of ammunition mentioned in our No. 5770,
cipher, and even now the proportion of 18-pr.
high explosive will be less than stated therein.
In response, however, to your No. M.F. 444, we
are adding 1,000 rounds 4.5-inch, 500 5-inch,
500 6-inch and 75 9.2-inch. It will be quite
impossible to continue to send you ammunition
at this rate, as we have reduced the supply to
France in order to send what we have to you, and
the amounts asked for in the second part of your
telegram could not be spared without stopping
all operations in France. This, of course, is out
of the question."
" This, of course, is out of the question." " Stop-
ping all operations in France " is the very kernel of
the question. If half the things we hear about the
Bosche forces and our own are half true, we have
no prospect of dealing any decisive blow in the West
14 GALLIPOLI DIARY
till next spring. And an indecisive blow is worse
than no blow. But we can hold on there till all's
blue. Now H.E. is offensive and shrapnel is
defensive. I ought to attack at once; French
mustn't. Therefore, we should be given, now,
dollops of H.E.
This talk does not come through my hat. Some
of the best brains on the Western field are in touch
with those of some of my following here. The
winning post stares us in the face ; my old Chief
gallops off the course ; how can I resist calling out ?
And then I get this " of course " cable (not written
by K. I feel sure) which shows, if it shows anything,
that " of course " we ought never to have come
here at all ! Simple, is it not ? In war all is
simple that's why it's so complex. Never mind ;
my cable has not been wasted. We reckon the
1,100 extra rounds it has produced may save us
100 British casualties.
Rode over to " K " Beach and inspected the
25th Casualty Clearing Station, Commandant
Lieutenant-Colonel Mackenzie. Walked through
the different hospital wards talking to some twenty
officers and two hundred men ; mostly medical
cases. Did not think things at all up to the mark.
Made special note of the lack of mosquito nets,
beds, pyjamas and other comforts. For weeks past
Jean has been toiling to get mosquito nets bought
and made up, which was simple, and to get them
out to us, which seems impossible. Too bad when
so much money is being spent to see men lying on
the ground in their thick cord breeches in this
sweltering heat, a prey to flies and mosquitoes.
K.'S ADVICE AND THE P.M.'S ENVOY 15
Discussing the landing of the New Divisions in
Suvla Bay and the diversion to be made by Legge
on the right by storming Lone Pine, Birdwood
makes it clear in a letter just to hand, that he has
told his two Divisional Generals everything. I
had not yet gone into some of these details with
Hunter-Weston, Stopford or Bailloud, all Corps
Commanders, for I am afraid of the news filtering
down to the juniors and from them, in the mysterious
way news does pass, to the rank and file of both
services. Thence to the Turks is but a step.
Were the Turks to get wind of our plan, there would
be nothing for it but to change the whole thing,
even now, at the eleventh hour.
Lieutenant-Colonel F. G. Fuller, my late G.S.O.
(1) in the Central Force, came over to lunch. He
is now G.S.O. (2) of the 9th Corps.
At 5.30 p.m. rode over to " K " Beach for the
second time and inspected the Indian Brigade under
Brigadier-General Cox. They had to be pulled
out some time ago and given a rest. On parade
were the 5th, 6th and 10th Gurkha Battalions
with the 14th Sikhs. Walked down both lines
and chatted with the British and Indian Officers.
The men looked cheerful and much recovered.
In the evening Charlie Burn, King's Messenger,
and Captain Glyn came to dinner. Glyn has been
sent out as a sort of emissary, but whether by K.
or by the Intelligence or by the Admiralty neither
Braithwaite nor I are quite able to understand.
Cabled the War Office insisting that the lack of
ammunition is " disturbing." Also, that " half
16 GALLIPOLI DIARY
my anxieties would vanish " if only the Master-
General of Ordnance would see to it himself that
the fortnightly allowance could be despatched
regularly. I could hardly put it stronger.
Midnight. Just back from G.S. tent with the
latest. So far, so good. Bailloud and Hunter-
Weston have carried two lines of Turkish trenches,
an advance of two to four hundred yards. But
the ammunition question has reached a crisis, and
has become dangerous very dangerous. On the
whole Southern theatre of operations, counting
shell in limbers and shell loaded in guns, we have
5,000 rounds of shrapnel. No high explosive
and fighting is still going on !
Hijaculis illi certant defender e saxis.
To whomsoever of my ancestors bequeathed me
my power of detachment deep salaams ! How
many much better men than myself would not
close their eyes to-night with a battle on the balance
and 5,000 rounds wherewith to fight it ? But I
shall sleep D.V. ; I can't create shell by taking
thought any more than Gouraud could retake the
Haricot by not drinking his coffee.
I6th July, 1915. Imbros. Forcing myself to
work though I feel unspeakably slack ; wrangling
with the War Office about doctors, nurses, orderlies
and ships for our August battles. A few days
ago I sent the following cable and they want to
cut us down :
" It seems likely that during the first week of
August we may have 80,000 rifles in the firing line
K.'S ADVICE AND THE P.M.'S ENVOY 17
striving for a decisive result, and therefore certain
that we shall then need more medical assistance.
Quite impossible to foresee casualties, but suppose,
for example, we suffered a loss of 20,000 men ;
though the figure seems alarming when put down
in cold blood, it is not an extravagant proportion
when calculated on basis of Dardanelles fighting
up to date. If this figure is translated into terms
of requirements such a battle would involve
conversion of, say, 30 transports into temporary
hospital ships, and necessitate something like 200
extra medical officers, with Royal Army Medical
Corps rank and file and nurses in proportion. If
my prognosis is concurred in, these should reach
Mudros on or about 1st August. Some would,
D.V., prove superfluous, and could be sent back
at once, and in any case they could return as soon
as possible after operations, say, 1st September.
Medical and surgical equipment, drugs, mat-
tresses in due proportion. In a separate message
I will deal with the deficiencies in ordinary
establishment, but I think it best to keep this
cable as to specified and exceptional demands
distinct."
llth July, 1915. Imbros. After lunch felt so
sick of scribble, scribble, scribble whilst adventure
sat seductive upon my doorstep that I fluttered
forth. At 2 o'clock boarded H.M.S. Savage
(Lieutenant-Commander Homer) and, with Aspinall
and Freddie, steered for Gully Beach. We didn't
cast anchor but got into a cockleshell of a small
dinghy and rowed ashore under the cliffs, where
we were met by de Lisle. Along the beach men
VOL. II. 3
18 GALLIPOLI DIARY
were either bathing or basking mother-naked on
the hot sand enjoying themselves thoroughly.
I walked on the edge of the sea, as far as the point
which hides the gully's mouth from the Turkish
gunners, and was specially struck by the physique
and class of the 6th East Lancashires under Colonel
Cole Hamilton. Then mounted and rode to the
Headquarters of General Shaw, commanding the
13th (new) Division. Shaw was feeling his wounds ;
he had already been once round his lines ; so
I would not let him come again. But Colonel
Gillivan, G.S.0.1, Major Hillyard, G.S.O.2, Captain
Jackson, G.S.0.3, Colonel Burton, A.A. and Q.M.G.,
joined us. First we went to the Headquarters
of the 39th Brigade commanded by Brigadier-
General Cay ley (the Brigade Major is Captain
Simpson). Then I went and looked at the trenches
J.I 1-12- 13, where I met Colonel Palmer of the
9th Warwicks, Colonel Jordan, D.S.O., of the
7th Gloucesters, Colonel Nunn of the 9th Worcesters,
Colonel Andrews of the 7th North Staffordshires.
We tramped through miles of trenches. The men
were very fit and cheery. It was the day when they
were relieving one another by companies from the
reserve and there was a big crowd in the Ravine.
De Lisle told me that one week had made the most
astonishing difference to the savvy of these first
arrivals of the New Army. At first there was
confusion, loss of energy and time ; by the end of
the week they had picked up the wrinkles of the
veterans. There was a good lot of shelling from
the Turks but, humanly speaking, we were all
quite snug and safe in the big gully or moving down
the deep communication trenches. No one, not
K.'S ADVICE AND THE P.M.'S ENVOY 19
even the new 13th Division, paid the smallest-
deference to the projectiles.
Now began one of these semi-comic, semi-serious
adventures which seem to dog my footsteps. Just
as I got into the little dinghy, two bluejackets
pulling and a Petty Officer steering, the Turks
began to shell H.M.S. Savage as she lay about a
hundred yards out. She did not like it, and,
instead of waiting to let us get aboard, Commander
Homer thought it wiser to sheer off about half a
mile. When she quitted the Turks turned their
guns on to our cockleshell, and although none of
the shot came near us they still came quite near
enough to interest the whole gallery of some thou-
sands of bathing Tommies who, themselves safe
in the dead ground under the cliff, were hugely
amused to see their C.-in-C. having a hot time of
it. After ten minutes hard rowing we got close to
the destroyer and she, making a big circle at fairly
high speed, came along fast as if she was going to
run us down, with the idea of baffling the aim of
the enemy. Not a bad notion as far as the de-
stroyer was concerned but one demanding acrobatic
qualities of a very high order on the part of the
Commander-in- Chief. Anyway just as she was
drawing abreast and I was standing up to make my
spring a shell hit her plump and burst in one of her
coal bunkers, sending up a big cloud of mixed
smoke and black coal dust. The Commander was
beside himself. He waved us off furiously ; cracked
on full steam and again left us in the lurch. We
laughed till the tears ran down our cheeks. Soon,
we had reason to be more serious, not to say
pensive. The Savage showed a pair of clean heels
20 GALLIPOLI DIARY
this time and ran right away to Helles. So there
we were, marooned, half a mile out to sea, in a
tiny dinghy on which the Turks again switched
their blarsted guns. The two bluejackets pulled
themselves purple. They were both of them
fat reservists and the mingling of anxiety and
exertion, emotion and motion, made the sweat
pour in torrents down their cheeks. Each time
a shell plunked into the water we brightened up ;
then, gradually, until the next one splashed, our
faces grew longer and longer. At last we got so
far away that the Turks gave us up in disgust.
How much I should like to see that battery com-
mander's diary. Altogether, by the time we had
boarded the Savage, we had been in that cursed
little dinghy for just exactly one hour, of which I
should think we were being gently shelled for three
quarters of an hour. On board the destroyer no
harm to speak of : only one man wounded.
Cast anchor at Imbros at 9 p.m. General Legge
and Captain H. Lloyd came over to stay the night.
Mail from England.
Have cabled again to stir them up about the
hospital ships.
18th July, 1915. Church Parade. Inspected
troops. Wrote in camp all the afternoon. Walked
out to the lighthouse in the evening and watched
the shells bursting over Gully Beach where we were
yesterday. How often have I felt anxious seeing
these shrapnel through the telescope. On the
spot, as I know from yesterday's experience, their
bark is worse than their bite. Colonel Ward of the
K.'S ADVICE AND THE P.M.'S ENVOY 21
Intelligence came to dinner and Captain Doughtie,
commanding H.M.S. Abercrombie, paid me a visit.
19th July, 1915. Too much office work. Mr.
Schuler, an Australian journalist and war corre-
spondent, turned up. Seems a highly intelligent
young fellow. He had met me on tour in Australia.
Gave him leave to go anywhere and see everything.
The Staff shake their heads, but the future is
locked away in our heads, and the more the past
is known the better for us.
Braithwaite has heard from the War Office that
the Brigade of Russians which had started from
Vladivostock to join us here has been counter-
ordered. The War Office seem rather pleased than
otherwise that this reinforcement has fallen through.
Why, I can't imagine. As they are sending us a big
fresh force of Britishers, they probably persuade
themselves that 5,000 Russians would be more
trouble than they are worth, but they forget
the many thousands of shortage in my present
formations. Since they fixed up to send me the
new Divisions I must have lost ten thousand
rifles, but as all my old Divisions remain at the
Dardanelles in name, they are being regarded at
home, we strongly suspect, as a sort of widow's
cruse, kept full by miracles instead of men and
still, therefore, Divisions !
In the evening the Vice- Admiral came over and
we rode together down to the Naval Seaplane
Camp. The King's Messenger left at 5 p.m.
20th July, 1915. Imbros. Wrote double quick,
then galloped over to Kephalos to see the New
22 GALLIPOLI DIARY
Army, sub rosa. The men we struck were A.I.
They belong to the 32nd and 34th Brigades of the
llth Division. The 33rd has gone to Helles to
get salted.
Hunter- Weston is still staying with the Admiral.
He has had a hard time and a heavy responsibility
and is quite worn out. I devoutly trust he may
be on his legs again ere long. Have put in Stopf ord
to act for him at Helles. This should teach the
young idea how to shoot. With every aspect of
the command and administration of the Southern
theatre of operations thus under his immediate
orders he has a rare chance of learning how to do
it and how not to do it.
2lst July, 1915. Just signed a letter to the
Chief of the Imperial General Staff and as it gives
the run of my thoughts at the moment I spatch-
cock the opening and final paras :
" My dear Wolfe Murray,
" How do you manage to find time to write these
charming letters of yours with your own hand ?
They come like a gift from some oriental potentate
and carry with them the same moral obligations ;
i.e., that they ought to be returned in kind. But
to-day the time limit interposes, and I know you
will pardon me for once if I dictate.
" I am immensely interested in what you say
with reference to the 29th Division being below
strength, namely, that we are getting short of men.
Well, though one of the keenest voluntary service
people existing, I have always envisaged the
F. A. Swaine phot.
LIEUT.-GEN. SIR A. HUNTER-WESTON, K.C.P., D.S.O.
K.'S ADVICE AND THE P.M.'S ENVOY 23
fact that during a war we might be driven to
compulsion. Also in writing out fully my views
on this subject (views which I was not permitted by
late Chiefs of the General Staff to publish) I have
always, for that reason, pressed for National
Registration. It does no one any harm, and rubs
into the mind of the young man that, under certain
conditions, the State has first pull on his pocket,
labour, life and everything else. But, of course, if
your own wish that the 29th Division should take
out 10 per cent, extra for drafts (like the regiments
do in France), had been carried into effect, they
would never have fallen as low as they actually
did.
" Freddy Stopford and Reed have been staying
with me for 24 hours, and the former is now in
command of the 8th Corps on the Peninsula,
Hunter- Weston having gone sick. He asked to
stay with the Admiral for a couple of days' rest,
and the very moment he got safe on board ship
the overstrain of the past month told on him and
he went down with a sharp go of fever. I earnestly
pray he will get right again quickly for there are
not many Commanders of his calibre. Freddy
Stopford will now have a good chance of getting
the hang of this sort of fighting generally, surrounded
as he will be by Hunter- West on' s experienced
Staff. After sending my last letter I rather
repented of one or two harsh things I said about
Reed. There is some truth in them, but I need
not have said them. I hope he will do very
well out here."
24 GALLIPOLI DIARY
Now since that letter was written (yesterday) in
comes a cable from K. saying Winston can't leave
England but that Hankey starts in his place.
K. says he is sure I will give him every facility.
A pretty stuffy cable in from the War Office
on the Hospital ships and medical personnel and
material wrangle which is still going on. I,
personally, have checked every item of my estimate
with closest personal attention, although it took me
hours in the midst of other very pressing duties.
This is not Braithwaite's pidgin but Woodward's
and there was no help for it. Our first landing
found out a number of chinks in our arrangements,
and now, my Director of Medical Services is (quite
naturally) inclined to open his mouth as wide as
if ships were drugs in the market. So I have tried
very hard, without too much help, to hit the
mean between extravagance and sufficiency. Now
the War Office, who would be the first to round on
me if anything went wrong with my wounded,
query my demands as if we had just splashed off
a cable asking for the first things that came into
our heads !
I am all for thrift in ships, but thrift in the lives
of my wounded comes first ; my conscience is
clear and I have answered sticking to my point,
firmly ! They say the thing is impossible ; I
have retaliated by saying it is imperative.
CHAPTER XIV
THE FORCE REAL AND IMAGINARY
22nd July, 1915. Imbros. Had a jolly outing to-
day. Left for Cape Helles by trawler just before
10 o'clock. Aspinall, Bertier and young Brodrick
came with me. Lunched at 8th Army Corps
Headquarters with Stopford and handed him a
first outline scheme of the impending operations.
We read it through together and he seems to take
all the points and to be in general agreement. Left
Aspinall behind to explain any questions of detail
which might not seem clear, whilst I went a tour
of inspection through the Eski Lines of trenches
held by the 6th and 7th Manchesters of the 42nd
Division. These Eski Lines were first held about
the 7th or 8th May and have since been worked
up, mainly by the energy of de Lisle, into fortifica-
tions, humanly speaking, impregnable. General
Douglas, Commander of the Division, came round
with me. He reminds me greatly of his brother,
the late Chief of the Imperial General Staff ; ex-
cellent at detail ; a conscientious, very hard worker.
When I had seen my Manchester friends I passed
on into the Royal Naval Division Lines. There
General Paris convoyed me through his section
as far as Zimmerman's Farm, where I was joined
by BaiUoud with his Chief of Staff and Chief of
26 GALLIPOLI DIARY
Operations. Together we made our way round
the whole of the French trenches winding up at
de Tott's Battery.
After this whopping walk, we left by pinnace
from below de Tott's wondering whether the Asiatic
Batteries would think us game worth their powder
and shot. They did not and so we safely boarded
our trawler at Cape Helles. Didn't get back
to Imbros Harbour till 9 p.m. Being so late,
boarded the ever hospitable Triad on chance and
struck, as usual hospitality. Hunter- Weston is
really quite ill with fever. He did not want to see
anyone. As we were sitting at dinner I saw him
through the half open door staggering along on his
way to get into a launch to go aboard a Hospital
ship. He is suffering very much from his head.
The doctors prophesy that he will pull round in
about a week. I hope so indeed, but I have my
doubts. Aspinall reports that Stopford is entirely
in accord with our project and keen.
23rd July, 1915. Imbros. Spent day in camp
trying to straighten things out : (1) the personal,
(2) the strategical and (3) the administrative
arrangements.
(1) Hunter- Weston has to go home and I have
begged for Bruce Hamilton in his place, and have
told them I would have a great champion in him.
He and Smith-Dorrien were my best Brigadiers
in South Africa. They stood on my right hand
and on my left all the way between Bloemfontein
and Pretoria, and I never quite made up my mind
as to which was the better. Bruce is a fighting man
THE FORCE REAL AND IMAGINARY 27
with an iron frame, and, in Gallipoli, his chief
crab, his deafness, will be rather a gain to him.
(2) Bailloud, with his own War Minister in the
background, is doing all he knows to get 20,000
of my new troops allotted to a side show, not for
strategy's sake, but for the tactical relief of his
troops from the shelling. I quite sympathize
with his reason as, after all, he is responsible for his
own troops and not for the larger issue. But,
to take one objection only, the Navy could not land
a force at Besika Bay and at the same time carry
out landings at Suvla and Anzac. Again, since Bail-
loud urged these views, the guns fixed up at de
Tott's Battery have already begun to gain mastery
over the fire from the site of Troy. When we
have one of the new 14-inch gunned monitors
moored off Rabbit Island we shall get cross fire
observations and give the Turkish Asiatic guns the
clean knock out. Amphibious operations are ticklish
things : allied operations are ticklish things : but
the two together are like skating on thin ice arm in
arm with two friends who each want to cut a
figure of his own.
(3) Slovenly bills of lading. Bertie Lawrence,
who was sent to Mudros in June when things were
growing desperate, was here yesterday and has
made a report on the present business situation
which, though less chaotic, is still serious. There
are not launches enough to enable people to get
about. There are not lighters enough to work
the daily transhipment of 300 tons. But the
worst trouble lies in the bills of lading. Some-
times they arrive a week after their ships.
28 GALLIPOLI DIARY
Usually cargo shipped at Malta or Alexandria is
omitted. Half the time we can't lay hands on
vital plant, tackle, supplies, munitions, because we
have no means of knowing what is, or is not, on
board some ship in the harbour. The trouble is
of old date but has reached its climax owing to
our shortage of rounds for our 18-pounders.
We were notified a new fuse key would be required
for the new shells on the 12th June. The shells
arrived but the keys were not despatched till the
15th July ! The vouchers are all wrong, and there,
in idleness, lies the stuff that spells success. A
soldier is not a conjurer that he should be handed
over a fully laden ship and told to ferret out a
fuse key.
24th July, 1915. Last night the Turkish Com-
mander drove his troops into their tenth attack
upon our extreme left where they were beaten
off as usual with a loss of several hundreds this
time we only suffered about a dozen casualties.
Together with Braithwaite, I rode over to " K "
Beach at 11 a.m. to inspect part of the llth Division
there encamped. General Hammersley, Divisional
Commander, met me. Also Colonel Malcolm, his
General Staff Officer and Major Duncan. The
first Brigade I looked at was SitwelTs the 34th.
A fine looking lot of men :
8th Northumberland Fusiliers,
5th Dorsets,
9th Lancashire Fusiliers,
1 Coy. llth Manchester Fusilers.
THE FORCE REAL AND IMAGINARY 29
Next I passed on to Haggard's Brigade the
32nd. On parade were
9th West Yorkshires,
6th Yorkshires,
8th West Riding Regiment,
6th York and Lancashires.
Lastly I inspected the 67th and 68th Companies
R.E. of the 134th Fortress Company, as well as
the Field Ambulance. Officers and men looked
splendid. I was glad indeed to be able to congratu-
late Hammersley on his command. The doctors
tell me, that, short as has been their stay, a large
number of the men are already infected by the
prevalent disease. Well, they don't look like that,
and it won't kill them that's certain, for I have
had it on me strong for the best part of two months.
But it knocks out the starch from its victims,
and if fair play existed in moonlit lands, every white
man here should be credited with 25 per cent, extra
kudos for everything that he does with his brains
or his body under the shadow of this pestilence.
Have got a reply from the War Office (Q.M.G.2)
making light of my shipping troubles and saying
the War Office has always cabled full advices.
What can I say to that ? As the lamb thought
to himself when the wolf began to growl.
25th July, 1915. Spent most of the day in
camp. Church Parade at 9 a.m. Charles Lister
came over from " K " Beach to lunch. He is a
fascinating creature and has made a name for
himself with the Naval Division, where standards
30 GALLIPOLI DIARY
are high, as being the keenest of the keen and the
bravest of the brave. Hammersley, Malcolm and
Aitkin called in the evening, but I had gone for
a stroll and missed them.
The great Turkish attack timed by all our spies
for the 23rd has never come off but, as showing
the fine spirit which animates the Anzacs, it is
worth noting that on that day not one soul reported
sick. They would not go near the doctors for
fear they might be made to miss a battle.
Last night the French took a small trench, and
though the Turks had a dash at it in the morning,
they were easily beaten off. Twice out of three
times we gain something when we fight and the
third time we lose no ground.
Given, therefore, the factors of the problem,
men, munitions and the distance to be covered
(two to three miles), the result pans out like a
proposition by Euclid. No question of breaking
through is involved as in any other theatre,
but merely a question of pushing back a very
clearly limited number of yards. The men have
in their hearts a reservoir of patience which will
never run dry so long as they are sure of
the Will to Win at their backs. They need have
no qualms about G.H.Q. here, but politicians
are more shall we say, mercurial ? And the
experts from France are throwing cold water on
our cause by day and night. Therefore, as the
Fleet is not going to have a dash, it is just as
well we are about to try the one great effort and
get it done quickly. We will gain a lot of ground ; so
THE FORCE REAL AND IMAGINARY 31
much is certain, and it's as sure as anything can
be in war that somewhere we shall make good
a key to the position.
26th July, 1915. Stifling. Am sticking out
about the lack of proper advices of shipments.
Ammunition makes itself scarce enough without
being made scarce. Rare and curious articles are
worth careful booking ; that's the text of my cable.
21th July, 1915. Imbros. Hard at it. Altham
came in to see me and spent an hour and a half.
A man of business ! Mahon arrived at mid-day.
Very cheery but he feels that he is the only Lieuten-
ant-General executively employed with troops who
has so small a command as a Division. He says
that either he should be given a Corps, or that his
Lieutenant-General's rank should be reverted to
that of Major-General. I quite agreed. I feel as
strongly as he does that, as a Lieutenant-General,
he is clean out of his setting in a Major-General's
appointment and has blocked the way to a go-
ahead young Corps Commander, because that Corps
Commander must, by K.'s decision, be his senior.
Still, there didn't seem to be anything to be done,
so after my telling him how things stood here,
and hearing with great pleasure the fine account
he gave me of his Irish Division, we adjourned to
lunch. Colonel King, his G.S.O. (1), also lunched
and seemed to be a very nice fellow. After lunch
they both went off to the G.S. to be posted.
Admiral Wemyss came over from Mudros and
saw me. He is senior to de Robeck but has waived
32 GALLIPOLI DIARY
that accident of rank seeing we are at war. An
interesting man and a Keyesite ; i.e., he'd go
right through the Straits to-morrow, or go under.
He is one of those men, none too common in the
Services, whose mind has gained breadth in the
great world without losing its keenness. These
rival tenets are straining the fabric of the Fleet,
but, as I constantly tell our General Staff, my
course is as clear to me as a pikestaff. I back
the policy of the de facto Naval Commander-in-
Chief my own coadjutor. There is a temptation
to do wrong, but I resist it. What would it not
be to me were the whole Fleet to attack as we
land at Suvla ! But obviously I cannot go out
of my own element to urge the Fleet to actions,
the perils of which I am professionally incompetent
to gauge.
At 5.30 p.m. I went off riding with de Robeck,
Ormsby Johnson and Freddie Maitland. We
cantered over to Seaplane Camp ; passed the time
of day to the men there and over-hauled some of the
machines. Coming back, we passed through part
of the llth Division Camp ; all very ship-shape
and clean. Freddie Maitland and I dined on board
the Beryl with Sir Douglas Gamble. He seems
highly pleased with everyone and everything; I
wouldn't go quite so far ! There we met de Robeck,
Keyes, Altham, Ellison and Captain Stephens.
Got back at 11.
28th July, 1915. A cable from K. about Hunter-
Weston's breakdown, telling me the Prime Minister
thinks that Bruce Hamilton is too old for active
work and heavy strain. Instead I am to have
THE FORCE REAL AND IMAGINARY 33
Davies. I know Joey Davies everyone does. But
I also know Bruce Hamilton. There is no tougher
man or more resolute fighter in the Army. In my
letter to K. I said, " The only man I can think of
who would really inspire me with full confidence in
these emergencies, excursions and alarms, would
be Bruce Hamilton. Bruce Hamilton is a real
fighting man, and his deafness here would be a
great asset as he would be able to sleep through
the shell and rifle fire at night."
The older Officers will be sorry indeed to hear
Bruce Hamilton is barred. Shaw, the new Com-
mander of the 13th Division, will be especially
disappointed.
Admiral Gamble came off to see me and after-
wards dined. I was very careful as I don't want
to be quoted about the Sister Service. Gamble
sings praise of our outfit, but I can't help wondering
how, when and where he has got it into his head
that we have small craft in abundance !
29th July, 1915. Imbros. Stuck to camp, and
lucky I did so, for the cipher of a queer cable from
S. of S. for War came in and called for as much
thought as is compatible with prompt handling.
The message begins with a ripe sugar plum :
" At this stage of the operations which you have
conducted with so much ability and in which your
troops have so greatly distinguished themselves,
we " (this " we " is a new expression ; the S. of S.
always says " I ") " consider it advisable to
summarize what we are placing at your disposal
VOL. n. 4
34 GALLIPOLI DIARY
for the effort which we hope will bring your opera-
tions to a successful termination.
" We have sent you out " and then the cable
launches out into an inventory of the forces entrusted
to me which, though very detailed, is yet largely
based on what we call the widow's cruse principle.
As to the demnition total, "we" tells "me,"
categorically, (as the Lawyers say when they
describe the whiteness of soot) that I have " a
total of about 205,000 men for the forthcoming
operations." The A.G. who brought me the cable
could make nothing of it. Braithwaite then came
over and he could make nothing of it. We can
none of us see the point of pretending to us
that my force has been kept up to the strength
all the time, or of adding bayonets to the French
or of assuming to us that we possess troops which
Maxwell has told me time and again he requires
for Egyptian defence. Were these figures going to
the enemy Chief they might intimidate him coming
here they alarm me. There is a " We " at the
other end of the cable which knows so little
that it tells me, who know every gun, rifle and
round of ammunition I have at my disposal, that
I have double that number to handle. We won't
defeat the enemy by paper strengths. As far as
sentiments go, the cable is by chalks the heartiest
handshake we poor relations to the West have had
since we started. From the outset we've been
kicked by phrases such as, if you don't hurry up
we will have to " reconsider the position," etc., etc.
Now, the " Wees " wind up with a really wonderful
paragraph : -
THE FORCE REAL AND IMAGINARY 35
" We should like to hear from you after consider-
ing your plans whether there is anything further
in the way of personnel, guns or ammunition we
can send you, as we are most anxious to give you
everything you can possibly require and use.
You will realize that as regards ammunition we
have had to stop supplying France to give you the
full output, which will be continued as long as
possible ; in the short time available before the
bad weather intervenes the Dardanelles operations
are now of the highest importance."
The position seems now, to me, extraordinarily
delicate. Are we to let the mistakes in this flattering
cable slide, and build upon its promises, or, are
we to pull whoever believes these figures out of
their fool's paradise ? Well, I feel we must have
it out and although deeply grateful for the nice
words and for the splendid effort actually being
made, we cannot let it be assumed by anyone
that our vanishing Naval and Territorial Divisions
are complete and up to strength. As to ammuni-
tion, I asked plainly over a fortnight ago, for what
I thought was necessary to rapid success. I was
told in so many words that France would not
spare it ; though it would have been a small affair
to them. Now ; as if these cables had no existence,
they ask if there is " anything in the way of personnel,
guns or ammunition you can possibly require and use'''
The truth is, I don't like this cable ; in spite of
its flowery opening I don't like it at all. As to per-
sonnel, I ask for young and energetic commanders,
Byng and Rawlinson, and am turned down. Next
I ask for an old and experienced Commander,
36 GALLIPOLI DIARY
Bruce Hamilton, and am turned down. Next I
say that Reed, who would be a good staff officer
to some Generals, is not well suited to Stopford ;
I am turned down. I try to get a business man
to run Mudros and have been turned down till
just the other day. In all these points the War
Office are supreme and are acting well within their
rights. But they show some want of consistency in
talking to me all of a sudden, as if it was a matter
of course I should be met half way in my wishes.
So there and then we roughed out this reply:
" Your Nos. 6583 and 6588. Your appreciation
of our efforts will afford intense gratification and
encouragement to everyone.
" In regard to what we should like if it is available
in the shape of guns and ammunition, please see
my No. M.F. 444, of 13th July, which still holds
good. As to the final paragraph of your No. 6583,
I did not realize that you were stopping supplies
to France in order to give us full output, since a
fortnight ago your No. 6234 stated that it was then
impossible for you to send the ammunition I asked
for, and that it would be impossible to continue
supplies even on a much lower scale, since it would
involve the reduction of supplies to France. Natur-
ally, I have always realized that you, and not I,
must judge of the comparative importance of the
demands from the Dardanelles and from France.
" With regard to numbers, the grand total you
mention does not take into account non-effectives
or casualties ; it includes reinforcements such as
LIVth and part of the LUIrd Divisions, etc.,
THE FORCE REAL AND IMAGINARY 37
which cannot be here in time for my operation,
and it also includes Yeomanry and Indian troops
which, until this morning, I was unaware were at
my unreserved disposal. For the coming operation,
the number of rifles available is about half the
figure you quote, viz., 120,000. I am only anxious,
in emphasizing this point, to place the statement
regarding my strength on the correct basis, and
one which gives a true view of the position.
" What I want in a hurry is as much additional
high explosive shell as you can send me up to
amounts asked for in my No. M.F. 444, and as
many of the 4.5-inch and 6 -inch howitzers asked
for in that telegram as there is ammunition for.
I am despatching a ship immediately, and its time
of arrival at Marseilles will be telegraphed later.
c With regard to sending the Ilnd Mounted
Division unmounted, I am at once telegraphing
Maxwell to obtain his views."
The Mail bag went out this morning.
Hankey is now busy going over the Peninsula.
I have not seen much of him. A G.S. Officer
has been told off to help him along and to see that
he does not get into trouble. I am not going to
dry nurse him. He showed me of his own free
will a copy of a personal cable he had sent to Lord
Kitchener in which he says, speaking of his first
visit to Anzac, " Australians are superbly confident
and spoiling for a fight." This is exactly true and
I feel it is good that one who has the ear of the
insiders should say it. I wrote Wolfe Murray
a week ago that he was a successor to those Com-
38 GALLIPOLI DIARY
missioners who were sent out by the French Re-
public in its early days. Actually, I am very glad
to have him. Lies are on the wing, and he, armed
with the truth, will be able to knock some of them
out hereafter when he meets them in high places.
I have been bothered as to how to answer a
letter from a statesman for whom I cherish great
respect, who has always been very kind to me
and whom I like very much. He writes :
" It may interest you to know the Cabinet has
entrusted the superintendence of the Dardanelles
business to a comparatively small and really strong
committee drawn equally from the two parties.
We most thoroughly understand the extreme
difficulty of your task and the special conditions of
the problem in front of you and the Admiral.
All we ask from you is complete confidence and
the exact truth. We are not babes and we can
digest strong meat. Do not think that we ever
want anything unpleasant concealed from us, nor
do we want you ever to swerve one hair's breadth
from your own exact judgment in putting the
case before us, certainly never on the pleasant
side ; if you ever swerve pray do so on the
unpleasant side. ... If you want more ammuni-
tion say so. . . ."
" Could you eat a bun, my boy ? " said the old
gentleman to the little boy looking in at the shop
window. " Could I eat ten thousand b . . . . buns
and the baker who baked them ? 5: So the dear
little fellow answered. If I want more ammunition
indeed ? If ? I fear the " comparatively
small and really strong committee." They fairly
THE FORCE REAL AND IMAGINARY 39
frighten me. There they sit, all wishing us well,
all evidently completely bamboozled. " If you
want more ammunition, say so ! ?: Anyway, my
friend means me well but my path is perfectly
clear; I have only one Chief K. and I correspond
with no one but him, or his Staff, whether on the
subject of ammunition or anything else
As to the letter, I know it is entirely kind, genuine
and inspired by the one idea of helping me. But
I've got to say no thank you in some unmistakable
manner. So I have replied :
" I am grateful for your reassuring remarks
about your Committee having confidence in my
humble self. For my part I have confidence in
the moral of my troops and in the devotion of the
Navy which are the two great and splendid assets
amidst this shifting kaleidoscope of the factors
and possibilities of war.
" I am not quite sure that I clearly understand
your meaning about cabling home the exact truth.
Is there any occasion on which I have failed to
do so ? I should be very sorry indeed to think
I had consciously or unconsciously misled anyone
by my cables. There is always, of course, the
broad spirit of a cable which depends on the tem-
perament of the sender. It is either tinged with
hope or it has been dictated by one who fears the
worst. If you mean that you would prefer a
pessimistic tone given to my appreciations, then
I am afraid you will have to get another General."
30* July, 1915. Gascoigne of " Q " branch
lunched. On getting news of the decisive victory
40 GALLIPOLI DIARY
on the Euphrates I caused a feu de joie to be fired
precisely at 5 p.m. by all the troops on the Peninsula.
At the appointed hour I walked up the cliff's edge
whence I clearly heard the roll of fire. The question
of whether musketry sounds will carry so far is
settled. Evidently the Turks have taken up the
challenge for it was quite a long time before
the distant rumbling died away. In the cool of
the evening took a walk. Commandant Bertier
and la Borde dined.
Stopf ord, now commanding at Helles, has endorsed
a report from the Commander of the 42nd East
Lanes Division saying that out of a draft of 45
recruits just come from home three have been cast
as totally unfit and nine as permanently unfit
through blindness. Stopf ord says that he can't
understand this, as the second line Battalion, from
which these poor fellows were selected, contained
good soldiers and tall fellows quite lately when they
were under his command in England. Have cabled
the facts home ; also the following, showing the
result of the Admiralty's attitude towards their
own Naval Division now Winston has departed :
" (No. M.F. 505). From General Sir Ian Hamil-
ton to War Office. The effective strength of the
Marine Brigade is now reduced to 50 officers and
1,890 rank and file. In addition, only five battalions,
Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve Battalions, are
now remaining in the Division, as the Anson
Battalion has been withdrawn for special work in
connection with the forthcoming operations. More-
over, 300 men, stokers, from this division have
been handed over to the Navy for work in auxiliary
THE FORCE REAL AND IMAGINARY 41
vessels, see my telegram No. M.F.A. 1377, of llth
July. I have consequently decided to reduce
the division to eight battalions and to reorganize
it into two brigades as a temporary measure.
Can you give me any idea when the reinforcements
for this division are likely to be despatched and
when they may be expected here ? I should like
to see the division again at its strength of 12
battalions, and do not want to lose it, as it
contains a very valuable war-trained nucleus,
but unless it is brought under army administra-
tion, it does not appear likely that it can be
maintained."
31st July, 1915. Imbros. Quiet day spent in
trying to clear my table before sailing for Mitylene
to see the new Irish Division. The grand army
with which some War Office genius credited us
appear to have served their purpose. At our
challenge they have now taken to their heels like
Falstaff's eleven rogues in buckram suits. The
S. of S. (cabling this time as " I " and not as " We,")
says, "it is not worth while trying to reconcile
numbers by cable and it is difficult to make up
accurate states."
Do not let me forget, though, that a slice of
solid stuff is sandwiched into this cable we are
to get some 4.5 shell via Marseilles ; H.E. we hope :
also, two batteries of 4.5 howitzers : also that the
A.G. has been trying hard to feed the 29th Division.
The Territorials are the people who are being
allowed to go to pot not a word of hope even,
and before the eyes of everyone.
42 GALLIPOLI DIARY
1st August, 1915. Inibros. The usual rush before
leaving. No time to write. Sent two cables,
copies attached. The first to the War Office, in
answer to one from the A.G. wherein he plumes
himself upon the completeness of the 29th Division.
That completeness, alas, is only so relatively ;
i.e., in comparison with the sinking condition of
the Territorial Divisions :
" We are deeply grateful to you for the drafts
you have despatched for the XXIXth Division
as the fighting existence of that fine formation
has been prolonged by their timely arrival, but I
fear that you are very wide of the mark in your
assumption that these drafts have completed the
Division.
" As I have ventured to point out incessantly
since my arrival here, constant large numbers of
casualties must occur between the demands for
and the arrival of drafts owing to the length of the
sea voyage. It was for this very plain reason that
it was doubly necessary to have here the 10 per
cent, margin granted in the case of battalions
going to France. We must always be considerably
under establishment in the absence of some such
margin.
" I fully realize, in saying this, that it may be
quite impossible to meet such demands as I suggest,
but I feel bound to let you know the only possible
terms on which any unit in this force can ever
be up to establishment.
" At the present moment, excluding 1,700 drafts
coming on Simla and Themistocles, the actual
THE FORCE REAL AND IMAGINARY 43
infantry strength of the XXIXth Division is 219
officers and 8,424 other ranks."
The second cable is to K. The War Office Army
has melted into thin air and it only remains to
express my heartfelt thanks for the real Army :
" With reference to your No. 6645. Very many
thanks. You have done everything for us that
man can do. The ship will probably not reach me
in time but since I know that the ammunition is
actually en route for me, and that it will (D.V.) arrive,
I need not husband what we have, but can fire freely
if I see great results thus obtainable. The Turk,
at any rate, where he knows that he is fighting for
Constantinople, is a stubborn fighter, and the
difficulty is not so much in the taking of positions as
in the maintaining of them.
" Hence the extra ammunition you are sending
me will come in the nick of time. The ship will
arrive at Marseilles 7 p.m. 4th August, as I tele-
graphed to the Quartermaster-General yesterday.
Many thanks for the two batteries of 4.5-inch
howitzers, they are worth their weight in gold to
us."
At 5 p.m. embarked on H.M.S. Chatham (Captain
Drury Lowe) with George Lloyd of the General
Staff and young Brodrick. At 6 p.m. sailed for
Mitylene.
2nd August, 1915. H.M.S. " Chatham," Mitylene.
We opened Mitylene Harbour at 5.30 a.m. So
narrow was the entrance, and so hidden, that at
first it looked as if the Chatham was charging the
44 GALLIPOLI DIARY
cliffs ; next as if her long guns must entangle them-
selves in the flowering bushes on either side of the
channel ; then, as we sailed out over a bay like
a big turquoise, I felt as though we were at peace
with all men, making a pilgrimage to the home of
Sappho, and that we had left far behind us these
giant wars. But only for a moment !
After early breakfast, where I met Captain Grant
of H.M.S. Canopus, left in a steam pinnace to inspect
the 30th Brigade under Brigadier-General Hill.
Inspected :
H.M.T. Alaudia, 9.30 a.m.
6th Royal Dublin Fusiliers,
7th Royal Dublin Fusiliers,
Col. G. Downing, 7th R.D.F., in
command.
H.M.T. Andania, 10.30 a.m.
6th R. Inniskilling Fusiliers,
5th Royal Irish Fusiliers,
Lt.-Col. M. Pike, 5th R.I.F., in
command.
H.M.T. Canada, 11.30 a.m.
6th Royal Irish Fusiliers,
Lt.-Col. F. A. Greer in command.
H.M.T. Novian, 12 p.m.
5th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers,
Lt.-Col. H. Vanrennan in command.
The Royal Irish Fusiliers and Royal Inniskilling
Fusiliers had not got back on board ship by the
time I was ready for them, so I hurried off by
THE FORCE REAL AND IMAGINARY 45
motor launch to a landing in another part of the
Bay and, walking through a village, caught them
resting by their piled arms after a route march.
All of these men looked very well and cheery.
The villagers were most friendly and had turned
out in numbers, bringing presents of flowers and
fruit. Not more than 60 per cent, of the men are
Irish, the rest being either North of England miners
or from Somerset.
In the evening, crossed the glassy bay and motored
to pay a double-barrelled visit to the Military
and Civil Governors. Topping the watershed, yet
another pleasure shock. Through the sea haze
Mitylene shines out like an iridescent bubble of
light. Never had I seen anything so vivid in its
colour and setting as this very ancient, very small,
very brilliant city of Mitylene. Rio de Janeiro,
Sydney, the Golden Horn are sprawling daubs
to flawless Mitylene.
Hesketh Smith and Compton Mackenzie were
with us. The Governors very polite. The soldier
man is a Cretan and seemed a good sort. We
took tea at the Hotel and then made our way
back to the Chatham. Found messages from G.H.Q.
to say all's well and stuff being smuggled in without
hitch at Anzac. At 7 p.m. we sailed for Imbros ;
a breeze from the West whipping up little waves
into cover for enemy periscopes. So the moment
we left the harbour we took on a corkscrew course,
dodging and twisting like snipe in an Irish bog,
to avoid winding up our trip in the dark belly of
a German submarine. Soon emerged from the
sea a huge piled up white cloud, white and clear
46 GALLIPOLI DIARY
cut at first as the breast of a swan upon a blue
lake, slowly turning to deep rose colour flecked
here and there with gold. As it swallowed up the
last lingering colours of the sunset, the world
grew grey, then black, and we were, humanly
speaking, safe.
3rd August, 1915. Imbros. Anchored at Imbros
roadstead 5.30 a.m. Braithwaite not up yet so
Altham got first innings about transport and
supply.
Next the G.S. All our preliminaries are working
on quite smoothly towards the climax and, so far,
it seems likely the Turks have no notion of the
scheme.
Girodon steamed over from Helles to see me and
went back again in the evening. He is the mirror
of French chivalry, modesty and good form,
besides being an extraordinary fine soldier.
The 33rd Brigade, sent by me to gain wisdom
at Helles, have now been brought here so that the
whole llth Division can start off together.
Just as the peculiar foggy air of Lancashire is
essential to the weaving of the finer sorts of tissues,
so an atmosphere of misunderstandings would
really seem to suit the War Office.
In the cable telling me I would have 205,000
troops for my push, the S. of S. had informed
me categorically that the 8,500 Yeomanry and
mounted troops in Egypt, as well as 11,500 Indian
troops and the Artillery stationed there were
mine.
THE FORCE REAL AND IMAGINARY 47
As the present garrison of Egypt numbers over
70,000 and as the old peace garrison of Egypt was
5,000 and as, further, there is no question of serious
attack on Egypt from outside, it seemed to us there
might be men in this part of the message. Leaving
the Indian troops out of the account, for the moment,
I therefore wired to Maxwell and asked him if he
thought he would be able to organize a portion
of the 8,500 mounted men, in order that, at a pinch,
they might be able to come and reinforce us here.
So the matter stood when I got another cable
from the S. of S. telling me 5,000 drafts are " en
route or under orders " to join the 29th Division
and that the War Office are " unable to carry out
your views about additional marginal drafts."
S. of S. then goes on :
" Maxwell wires that you are taking 300 officers
and 5,000 men of his mounted troops. I do not
quite understand why you require Egyptian
Garrison troops while you have the LUIrd Division
at Alexandria, and the LIVth, the last six battalions
of which are arriving in five or six days, on the
Aquitania.
1 When I placed the Egyptian Garrison at your
disposal to reinforce at the Dardanelles in case of
necessity, Maxwell pointed out that Egypt would
be left very short, and I replied that you would
only require them in case of emergency for a short
time, and that the risk must be run. I did not
contemplate, however, that you would take troops
from the Egyptian Garrison until those sent specially
for you were exhausted. How long will you require
Maxwell's troops, and where do you intend to send
48 GALLIPOLI DIARY
them ? They should only be removed from Egypt
for actual operations and for the shortest possible
time."
We may read this cable wrong but it seems to
us to embody a topsy-turvy tactic ! To wait till
one part of your forces are killed off (for that is
the plain English of " exhausted ") before you bring
up the other part of your forces.
It is not easy to know what to do. The very
best we can do, it sometimes seems to me, is to
keep quiet rather than add one iota to the anxieties
of people staggering under a load of responsibilities
and cares. In the good old days the Gordons
fought in two decisive battles in two Continents
within a few months and no one worried the War
Office about drafts ! The 92nd carried on had
to carry on ; they fell to quarter strength still
they were the Gordons and they carried on, just
as if they counted a thousand rifles in their ranks.
Now, I am quite prepared to do that to-day
if that is the policy. If that were the policy ; not
one grouse or grumble should ever cross my lips.
But that is not the policy. Press and People
believe a Division is a unit made up in scientific
proportions of different branches and numbering
a certain number of rifles. They are told so ;
the War Office keep telling them so ; they believe
it, and, in fact, it is an absolute necessity of this
modern trench war that it should be so. Although
the Gordons got no drafts between the battle of
Kandahar and the battle of Majuba Hill, they got
six months' rest ; which was even better. In
those days, apart from sieges, a battle was an
THE FORCE REAL AND IMAGINARY 49
event, here it is the rest or respite that is an event.
Even British soldiers can't stick day and night
fighting for ever. The attack spirit begins to ebb
unless it is fed with fresh blood. Whether K.'s
mind, big with broad views, grasps this new factor
with which he has never himself come into personal
contact, God knows. But for his sake, every bit
as much as for my own, it is up to me to keep
hammering, hammering, hammering at drafts,
drafts, drafts.
Dined with the ever hospitable and kind hearted
de Robeck on Triad. The Navy are still divided.
Some there are who would wish me to urge the
Admiral to play first fiddle in the coming attack.
This / will not do. I have neither the data nor
the technical knowledge which would justify me
to my conscience in doing so.
4th August, 1915. Imbros. Have been out seeing
the New Army at work. Some of the Xlth
Division were practising boat work in the evening
and afterwards a Brigade started upon a night
march into the mountains. The men are fit, although
just beginning to be infected with the Eastern
Mediterranean stomach trouble ; i.e., the so-called
cholera, which saved Constantinople from the
Bulgarians in the last war.
5th August, 1915. Imbros. The day so longed
for is very near now. that it had come at the
period of our victories ! But there is time enough
still, and the first moves of the plan are working
smooth as oiled machinery. For the past few nights
VOL. n. 5
50 GALLIPOLI DIARY
there has been steady flow into Anzac of troops,
including a Division of the New Army. This has
taken place, without any kind of hitch, under the
very noses of the Turkish Army who have no inkling
of the manoeuvre as yet ! The Navy are helping
us admirably here with their organization and
good sea discipline. Also, from what they tell me,
Shaw and the 13th Division of the New Army
are playing up with the clockwork regularity of
veterans. All this marks us up many points to
the good, before even the flag drops. For, given
the fine troops we have, the prime factors of the
whole conception ; the factors by which it stands
or falls ; are :
(1) Our success in hoodwinking the Turks ;
i.e., surprise.
(2) Our success in getting the 13th Division
and the Indian Brigade unnoticed into Anzac.
(3) Our success in landing the Divisions from
Imbros, Lemnos and Mitylene, at moments fixed
beforehand, upon an unknown, unsurveyed, un-
charted shore of Suvla. Of these three factors
(1) and (2) may already be entered to our credit ;
(3) is on the knees of the Navy.
The day before the start is the worst day for
a Commander. The operation overhangs him as
the thought of another sort of operation troubles
the minds of sick men in hospitals. There is
nothing to distract him ; he has made his last
will and testament ; his affairs are quite in
order ; he has said au revoir to his friends with
THE FORCE REAL AND IMAGINARY 51
what cheeriness he can muster. Looking back,
it seems to me that during two months every
conceivable contingency has been anticipated and
weighed and that the means of dealing with it
as it may arise is now either : embodied in our
instructions to Corps Commanders, or else, set
aside as pertaining to my own jurisdiction and
responsibility. To my thinking, in fact, these
instructions of ours illustrate the domain of G.H.Q.
on the one hand and the province of the Corps
Commander on the other very typically. The
General Staff are proud of their work. Nothing ;
not a nosebag nor a bicycle has been left to chance. 1
Davies and Diggle, his A.D.C., lunched and the
Admiral came to haul me out for a walk about
6 p.m.
Have written K. by this evening's Mail bag about
the sickness of the Australians, and indeed of all
the troops here, excepting only the native Indian
troops, and also about our Medical band-o-bast for
the battle. No question about it, the Dardanelles
was the theatre of all others for our Indian troops.
Have now seen all the New Army units except
six Battalions of the 10th Division.
French has written me a very delightful letter.
1 See Appendix III containing actual instructions, together
with a brief explanatory heading. IAN H., 1920.
CHAPTER XV
SARI BAIR AND SUVLA
6th August, 1915. Imbros. ! God of Bethel,
by whose hand thy people still are fed, I am
wishing the very rare wish, that it was the day
after to-morrow. Men or mice we will be by then,
but I'd like to know which. K.'s New Army,
too ! How will they do ? What do they think ?
They speak and with justice of the spirit of
the Commander colouring the moral of his men,
but I have hardly seen them, much less taken their
measure. One more week and we would have
known something at first hand. Now, except
that the 13th Division and the 33rd Brigade gained
good opinions at Helles, all is guess work.
Went down to " K " Beach to see the llth
Division go off. Young Brodrick, who was with
us, proved himself much all there on the crowded
pier and foreshore ; very observant ; telling me who
or what I had not noticed, etc. First the destroyers
were filling up and then the lighters. The young
Naval Officers in charge of the lighters were very
keen to show me how they had fixed up their
reserves of ammunition and water. Spent quite
a time at this and talking to Hammersley and
Malcolm, his G.S.O. (1) ; also to Coleridge, G.S.O.
SARI BAIR AND SUVLA 53
(2), and to no end of Regimental Officers and men.
Hammersley has been working too hard ; at
least he looked it ; also, for the occasion, rather
glum. Quite natural ; but I always remember
Wolseley's remark about the moral stimulus exerted
by the gay staff officer and his large cigar. The
occasion ! Yes, each man to his own temperament.
Some pray before battle ; others dance and drink.
The memory of Cromwell prevails over that of
Prince Rupert with most Englishmen but Prince
Rupert, per se, usually prevailed over Cromwell.
To your adventurous soldier ; to our heroes,
Bobs, Sir Evelyn, Garnet Wolseley, Charles Gordon
(great psalm-singer though he was) an occasion like
to-night's holds the same intoxicating mixture
of danger and desire as fills the glass of the boy
bridegroom when he raises it to the health of his
enigma in a veil. But I don't know how it is ;
I used to feel like that ; now I too am terribly
anxious. Disappointed not to see Stopford nor
Reed. They were to have been there. Besides
the men on the beetles there are men packed like
herrings upon the decks of the destroyers. I had
half a mind to cruise round in the motor launch
and say a few words to them Elandslaagte fashion,
but was held back by feeling that the rank and
file don't know me and that there was too long
an interval before the entry into the danger zone.
The sea was like glass melted ; blue green
with a dull red glow in it : the air seemed to have
been boiled. Officers and men gave me the " feel "
of being " for it " though over serious for British
soldiers who always, in my previous experience,
54 GALLIPOLI DIARY
have been extraordinarily animated and gay when
they are advancing " on a Koppje day." These
new men seem subdued when I recall the blaze
of enthusiasm in which the old lot started out of
Mudros harbour on that April afternoon.
The moral of troops about to enter into battle
supplies a splendid field of research for students
of the human soul, for then the blind wall set in
everyday intercourse between Commander and
commanded seems to become brittle as crystal
and as transparent. Only for a few moments
last moments for so many ? But, during those
moments, the gesture of the General means so much
it strikes the attitude of his troops. It is up to
Stopford and Hammersley to make those gestures.
Stopf ord was not there, and is not the type ;
Hammersley is not that type either. How true
it is that age, experience, wisdom count for less
than youth, magnetism and love of danger when
inexperience has to be heartened for the struggle.
Strolled back slowly along the beach, and, at
8.30, in the gathering dusk, saw the whole flotilla
glide away and disappear ghostlike to the North-
wards. The empty harbour frightens me. Nothing
in legend stranger or more terrible than the silent
departure of this silent Army, K.'s new Corps,
every mother's son of them, face to face with their
fate.
But it will never do to begin the night's vigil
in this low key. Capital news from the aeroplanes.
Samson has sent in photographs taken yesterday,
showing the Suvla Bay area. Not more than 100
SARI BAIR AND SUVLA 55
to 150 yards of trenches in all ; half a dozen gun
emplacements and, the attached report adds, no
Turks anywhere on the move.
*lih August, 1915. Imbros. Sitting in my hut
after a night in the G.S. tent. One A.D.C. remains
over there. As the cables come in he runs across
with them. Freddie Maitland runs fast. I am
watching to see his helmet top the ridge of sand
that lies between. The 9th Corps has got ashore ;
some scrapping along the beaches but no wire
or hold-up like there was at Sedd-el-Bahr : that
in itself is worth fifty million golden sovereigns.
The surprise has come off !
I'd sooner storm a hundred bloody trenches than
dangle at the end of this wire. But now, thank
God, the deadliest of the perils is past. The New
Army are fairly ashore. That worst horror of
searchlights and of the new troops being machine
gunned in their boats has lifted its dark shadow.
At Anzac, the most formidable entrenchment of
the Turks, " Lone Pine," was stormed yesterday
evening by the Australian 1st Brigade ; a desperate
fine feat. At midnight Birdie cabled, " All going
on well on right where men confident of repelling
counter-attack now evidently being prepared : on
left have taken Old No. 3 Post and first ridge of
Walden Point, capturing machine gun : progress
satisfactory, though appallingly difficult : casualties
uncertain but on right about 100 killed; 400
wounded."
At Helles a temporary success was scored, but,
during the early part of the night, counter-attacks
56 GALLIPOLI DIARY
have brought us back to "as you were." Fighting
is going on and we ought to be pinning the enemy
to the South which is the main thing.
From Suvla we have no direct news since the
" All landings successful " cable but we have the
repetition of a wireless from G.H.Q. IXth Corps
to the Vice- Admiral at 7.58 a.m. saying, " Prisoners
captured state no fresh troops have arrived recently
and forces opposed to us appear to be as estimated
by G.H.Q. Apparently one Regiment only was
opposed to our advance on left."
I have caused this cable to be sent to Stopf ord :
"4.20 p.m. G.H.Q. to 9th Corps. Have only
received one telegram from you. Chief glad to
hear enemy opposition weakening and knows you
will take advantage of this to push on rapidly.
Prisoners state landing a surprise so take every
advantage before you are forestalled."
8th August, 1915. Imbros. Another night on
tenter hooks : great news : a wireless from a war-
ship to tell us the Suvla troops are up on the foot-
hills : two cables from Stopford : many messages
from Anzac and Helles.
" 2.12 a.m. IXth Corps to G.H.Q. As far as
can be ascertained 33rd Brigade hold line the sea
about 91.1.9 to Suvla East corner x of Salt
Lake to Lala Baba inclusive. North of Salt Lake
31st and 32nd Brigade extended East of Asmak
117.U. preparatory. 34th Brigade advancing
having followed retreating enemy towards line
1 Must have meant south-east ? IAN H., 1920.
SARI BAIR AND SUVLA 57
diagonally across 117.X. and 117.D. One battalion
latter Brigade occupy high ground about square
135.X."
"5.10 a.m. IXth Corps to G.H.Q. Yilghin
Burnu is in our hands. No further information."
Awful work at Lone Pine. Desperate counter-
attacks by enemy, but now Birdie thinks we are
there to stay. Bulk of Turkish reserves engaged
there whilst Godley's New Zealanders and the new
13th Division under Shaw are well up the heights
and have carried Chunuk Bair. Koja Chemen
Tepe not yet ; but Chunuk Bair will do : with
that, we win !
At Helles we have pushed out again and the
East Lanes Division have gallantly stormed the
Vineyard which they hold. The Turks are making
mighty counter-attacks but their columns have
been cut to pieces by the thin lines of the Lancashire
Fusiliers. Neither from Helles nor from the
Southern area of Anzac are the enemy likely to
spare men to reinforce Sari Bair or Suvla.
At 11.30 I ordered the Arno for mid-day sharp.
Then happened one of those aquatic incidents
which lend an atmosphere all their own to amphi-
bious war. Rear- Admiral Nicholson, in local naval
command here, had ordered the Arno to fill up her
boilers. Some hitch arose, some d d amphibious
hitch. Thereupon, without telling me, he ordered
the Commander of the Arno to draw fires, so that,
when my signal w^as sent, a reply came from the
Rear-Admiral saying he was sorry I should be
inconvenienced, but he thought it best to order
58 GALLIPOLI DIAR\
the fires to be drawn ; otherwise the boilers might
have suffered. When, at a crisis, a boiler walks
into the middle of his calculations, a soldier is
simply boiled ! I could not altogether master my
irritation, and I wrote out a reply saying this was
not a question of convenience or inconvenience
but one of preventing a Commander-in-Chief from
exercising his functions during battle. I sent
the signal down to the signal tent and about an
hour later Braithwaite came over and said he had
taken it upon himself to tone it down. 1 Just as
well, perhaps, but here I was, marooned upon an
island !
No other ship could be signalled. As a rule there
was a destroyer on patrol about Helles which
could be called up by wireless, but to-day there
was no getting hold of it. I began to be afraid
we should not get away till dark when, at about
3.30 p.m. Nicholson signalled that the Triad
was sailing for Suvla at 4.15 p.m., and would I
care to go in her, the Arno following after she had
watered. We were off like a shot, young Brodrick,
Captain Anstey and myself for Suvla. Braithwaite
remained to carry on with Anzac and Helles. The
moment I quit my post I drop out and he takes up
1 Long afterwards long after the Dardanelles Commission
had finished their Report I had the curiosity to get permission
to look at the log of the Exmouth (Rear-Admiral Nicholson)
to see how my cable had been translated. Here it is, very much
Bowdlerized :" Sent 11.45, received 11.59. Sir I. Hamilton
to Rear- Admiral 3. Urgent. ' Understand Arno drawing
fires. Can this be stopped and Arno sent (to) Mercedes to water
at once \ Arno specially put at my disposal by Vice-Admiral
and I may require her at any moment/ " The Mercedes was the
ship with our military drinking water.
SARI BAIR AND SUVLA 59
the reins. His hands are capable fortunately !
To-day's cables before I left were right from Helles ;
splendid from Anzac and nothing further from
Suvla. 1
1 There is a hiatus in my diary here which I must try and
bridge over by a footnote especially as my story seems to run
off the rails when I say that " nothing further " had come in
from Suvla. At 10.50 a.m. a further cable did come in from
Suvla :
" Approximate position of troops under General Hammersley
this morning. Two battalions 33rd Brigade sea to S.E. corner
of Salt Lake : will be moved forward shortly to connect if possible
with Anzac troops. Two battalions 33rd holding Yilghin
Burnu. Position on Hill 500 yards East Yilghin Burnu not yet
certain. From Yilghin Burnu 31st Brigade holds line through
Baka Baba crossroads, thence North to about 118 2. 32nd
and 34th Brigades ordered forward from Hill 10 (117 R) where
they spent night to line 1 18 M.R. W. to fill gap with Tenth Division.
Detailed information of Tenth Division not yet definite : will
report later. Consider Major-General Hammersley and troops
under him deserve great credit for result attained against strenu-
ous opposition and great difficulty."
Manifestly, the data in this cable were not enough to enable
me to form any opinion of my own as to the credit due to anyone ;
but every soldier will understand that it was up to me to respond :
" To G.O.C. 8th Corps.
" From General Sir Ian Hamilton.
" You and your troops have indeed done splendidly. Please
tell Hammersley how much we hope from his able and rapid
advance."
I made no written note of this 10.50 a.m. cable (or of my reply
to it) at the time and, eighteen months later, no mental note
of it remained, probably because it had only added some detail
to the news received during the night. But I had reason to
regret this afterwards when I came to read the final Report of
the Dardanelles Commission, paragraph 89. There I see it
stated that " with regard to this message " (my pat on the back
60 GALLIPOLI DIARY
As we sailed in, that bay, always till now so
preternaturally deserted and silent, was alive and
bustling with ships and small craft. A launch
came along from the Chatham and I jumped in
whilst we were still going pretty fast and shot off
to see de Robeck. He seemed to think things
naval were going pretty well and that Rear- Admiral
Christian had been coping quite well with his
share, but suggested that, as he was under a severe
strain, I had better leave him alone. As to the
soldiers' show, he said what Turks were on the
ground, and there weren't many, had been
well beaten but but but ; and all I could get
him to say was that although he was well aware
the fighting at Helles and Anzac demanded my
closest attention ; still, that was in practised
hands and he had felt bound to wireless to beg
me to come up to Suvla and see things for myself.
Roger Keyes said then that the landings had come
off, on the whole, A.I. Our G.H.Q. idea, which
the Navy had shared, that the whole of the troops
should be landed South of Lala Baba had been
sound. The 33rd Brigade had landed there without
shot fired ; the 32nd had been sharply, but not
for Hammersley) " Sir Frederick Stopford informed us that
the result of the operations on the night of the 6th and day
of the 7th was not as satisfactory as he would have liked but
he gathered from Sir Ian Hamilton's congratulations that his
dispositions and orders had met with the latter 's approval " !
As to my actual feelings that forenoon, I do remember them
well. At sunrise victory seemed assured. As morning melted
into midday my mind became more and more uneasy at the
scant news about the Irish Division and at the lack of news of
a further advance of the llth Division. This growing anxiety
drove me to quit my headquarters and to take ship for Suvla.
SARI BAIR AND SUVLA 61
very seriously opposed ; the Brigade (the 34th)
which we, to meet the wish of the Corps, had
tried to land for them opposite Hill 10 inside
the Bay, instead of with the others as we had
originally arranged, had only been able to find
depth at the mouth of the Salt Lake ; had
suffered loss from rifle fire and had been thrown
into disorder by the grounding of some lighters.
The long wade through the water and mud had
upset the cohesion of the Brigade.
Aspinall now turned up. He was in a fever ;
said our chances were being thrown away with
both hands and that he had already cabled me
strongly to that effect. Neither the Admiral's
message nor Aspinall's had reached me. 1
Not another moment was to be lost, so Keyes
took us both in his motor boat to H.M.S. Jonquil to
see Stopford. He (Stopford) seemed happy and
said that everything was quite all right and going
well. Mahon with some of his troops was pressing
back the Turks along Kiretch Tepe Sirt. There
had been a very stiff fight in the darkness at Lala
1 The Admiral's wireless had said, so I was told : " It is
important we should meet shall I come to Kephalos or are
you coming to Suvla ? " As stated in text I did not get this
cable at the time nor did I ever get it. Four years later the signal
logs of the only ships through which the message could have
passed ; viz., Triad, Exmouth, Chatham, were searched and
there is no trace of it. So I think it must have been drafted and
overlooked. IAN H., 1920.
Aspinall's cable : " Just been ashore where I found all quiet
AAA. No rifle fire, no artillery fire and apparently no Turks
AAA. IXth Corps resting AAA. Feel confident that golden
opportunities are being lost and look upon the situation as
serious." I received this next morning from Braithwaite.
IAN H., 1920.
62 GALLIPOLI DIARY
Baba and next morning the Turks had fought
so hard on a little mound called Hill 10 that he
(Stopford) had been afraid we were not going to be
able to take it at all. However, it had been
taken, but there was great confusion and hours of
delay in deploying for the attack of the foothills.
They were easily carried in the end but by that
time the men were so thirsty and tired that they
did not follow up the beaten enemy.
" And where are they now ? " I asked.
" There," he replied, " along the foot of the
hills," and he pointed out the line, north to south.
" But they held that line, more or less, yesterday,"
I said.
" Yes," said Stopford, and he went on to explain
that the Brigadiers had been called upon to gain
what ground they could without serious fighting
but that, actually, they had not yet occupied
any dominating tactical point. The men had been
very tired ; he had not been able to get water up
to them or land his guns as quickly as he had
hoped. Therefore, he had decided to postpone
the occupation of the ridge (which might lead
to a regular battle) until next morning.
" A regular battle is just exactly what we are
here for" was what I was inclined to say, but
what I did say was that most of this was news to
me ; that he should have instantly informed me
of his decision that he could not obey my cabled
order of yesterday afternoon to " push on rapidly."
Stopford replied that he had only made up his
mind within the past hour or so ; that he had just
SARI BAIR AND SUVLA 63
got back from the shore and was going to send
me a full message when I arrived.
Now, what was to be done ? The Turks were
so quiet it seemed to me certain they must have
taken the knock-out. All along the beaches, and
inland too, no end of our men were on the
move, offering fine targets. The artillery which
had so long annoyed Anzac used to fire from behind
Ismail Oglu Tepe ; i.e., within point blank range
of where our men were now strolling about in crowds.
Yet not a single shell was being fired. Either,
the enemy's guns had been run back over the main
ridge to save them ; or, the garrison of Ismail
Oglu Tepe was so weak and shaken that they
were avoiding any move which might precipitate
a conflict.
I said to Stopford, " We must occupy the heights
at once. It is imperative we get Ismail Oglu
Tepe and Tekke Tepe now I 9! To this he raised
objections. He doubted whether the troops had
got their water yet ; he and Reed were agreed
we ought to get more guns ashore ; the combina-
tion of naval and military artillery was being
worked out for the morning ; orders would all
have to be re-written. He added that, whilst
agreeing with me on principle as to the necessity
for pushing on, there were many tactical reasons
against it, especially the attitude of his Generals
who had told him their men were too tired. I
thought to myself of the many, many times Lord
Bobs, French, every leader of note has had to
fight that same non possumus ; of the old days when
half the victory lay in the moral effort which could
64 GALLIPOLI DIARY
impel men half dead with hunger, thirst and
sleeplessness to push along. A cruel, pitiless busi-
ness, but so is war itself. Was it not the greatest
of soldiers who said his Marshals could always
find ten good reasons for putting off an attack
till next day !
So I said I would like to see the G.O.C. Division
and the Brigadiers personally so as to get a better
grip of things than we could on board ship in harbour.
Stopf ord agreed ; nothing, he said, would please
him more than if I could succeed where he had
failed, but would I excuse him from accompanying
me ; he had not been very fit ; he had just returned
from a visit to the shore and he wanted to give
his leg a chance. He pointed out Hammersley's
Headquarters about 400 yards off and said he,
Hammersley, would be able to direct me to the
Brigades.
So I nipped down the Jonquil's ladder ; tumbled
into Roger Keyes' racing motor boat and with
him and Aspinall we simply shot across the water
to Lala Baba. Every moment was priceless. I had
not been five minutes on the Jonquil and in another
two I was with Hammersley.
Under the low cliffs by the sea was a small half-
moon of beach about 100 by 40 yards. At the
North end of the half-moon was Hammersley.
Asked to give me an idea of the situation he gave
me much the same story as Stopford. The 9th
West Yorks and 6th Yorks had done A.I storming
Lala Baba in the dark. There had been marching
and counter-marching in the move on Hill 10.
The Brigadier had not been able to get a grip of
SARI BAIR AND SUVLA 65
his Battalions to throw them at it in proper unison
and form. A delay of precious hours had been
caused in the attack on Yilghin Burnu by a Brigadier
who wanted to go forward finding himself at cross
purposes with a Brigadier who thought it better
to hold back. At present all was peaceful and he
expected a Staff Officer at any moment with a
sketch showing the exact disposition of his troops.
He could not, he feared, point me out the Brigade
Headquarters on the ground. The general line
held followed the under features of the hills.
Malcolm, G.S.0.1, was then called and came up
from the far end of the little beach. He was in
the act of fixing up orders for next morning's
attack. I told both Officers that there had never
been a greater crisis in any battle than the one
taking place as we spoke. They were naturally
pleased at having got ashore and to have defeated
the Turks on the shore, but they must not fly
away with the idea that with time and patience
everything would pan out very nicely. On the
contrary, it was imperative, absolutely imperative,
we should occupy the heights before the enemy
brought back the guns they had carried off and
before they received the reinforcements which
were marching at that very moment to their aid.
This was no guess : it was so : our aeroplanes
had spotted Turks marching upon us from the
North. We might be too late now ; anyway our
margin was of the narrowest.
Hammersley assured me that sheer thirst, and
the exhaustion of the troops owing to thirst, had
been the only reason why he had not walked on
VOL. n. 6
66 GALLIPOLI DIARY
to Ismail Oglu Tepe last night. After Yilghin
Burnu had been carried, there was nothing to
prevent the occupation of the heights as the Turks
had been beat, but no one could fight against thirst.
I asked him how the water question stood.
He said it had been solved by the landing of more
mules ; there was no longer any serious supply
trouble. All the troops were now watered, fed
and rested. They had been told they should
gain as much ground as they could without com-
mitting themselves to a general action, but they
had not, in fact, made much progress. There-
upon, I pressed again my view that the Division
should get on to the ridge forthwith. Let the
Brigade-Majors, I said, pick out a few of their
freshest companies and get on to the crest right
now. Hammersley still clung to the view that
he could not get any of his troops under weigh
before daylight next morning. The units were
scattered ; no reconnaissance had been made of
the ground to their front ; that ground was jungly
and blind ; it would be impossible to get orders
round the whole Division in time to let the junior
ranks study them. Hammersley's points were made
in a proper and soldierly manner. Every General
of experience would be with him in each of them,
but there was one huge danger rapidly approaching
us ; already casting its shadow upon us, which,
to me as Commander-in-Chief, outweighed every
secondary objection. We might have the hills at
the cost of walking up them to-day ; the Lord only
knew what would be the price of them to-morrow.
Helles^and Anzac were both holding the Turks to
SARI BAIR AND SUVLA 67
their own front, but from Asia and Bulair the
enemy were on the march. Once our troops
dug themselves in on the crest no number of Turks
would be able to shift them. But ; if the Turks
got there first ? If, as Colonel Malcolm said, it
was impossible to get orders round the Division
in time, a surprising statement was there no
body of troops no Divisional reserve no nothing
which could be used for the purpose of marching
a couple of miles ? Seemingly, there was no
reserve ! Never, in all my long soldiering had I
been faced with ideas like these. I have seen attack
orders dictated to a Division from the saddle
in less than five minutes. Here was a victorious
Division, rested and watered, said to be unable
to bestir itself, even feebly, with less than twelve
hours' notice ! This was what I felt and although
I did not say it probably I looked it, for Malcolm
now qualified the original non possumus by saying
that although the Irish and the 33rd and 34th
Brigades could not be set in motion before day-
light, the 32nd Brigade, which was concentrated
round about Sulajik^ would be ready to move at
short notice.
The moment had now come for making up my
mind. I did so, and told Hammersley in the most
distinct terms that I wished this Brigade to advance
at once and dig themselves in on the crestline. 1 If
1 Looking to the distance of Sulajik, the Brigade might have
been expected to move in about an hour and a half. But, as I
did not know at the time, or indeed till two years later, this
Brigade was not concentrated. Only two battalions were at
Sulajik ; the other two, the 6th East Yorks and the 9th West
Yorks, were in possession of Hill 70, vide map. IAN H., 1920.
68 GALLIPOLI DIARY
the Brigade could fix themselves upon the heights
overlooking Anafarta Sagir they would make the
morning advance easy for their comrades and
would be able to interfere with and delay
the Turkish reinforcements which might try and
debouch between the two Anafartas during the
night or march down upon Suvla from the North.
Viewed from the sea or studied in a map there might
be some question of this hill, or that hill, but, on
the ground it was clear to half an eye that Tekke
Tepe was the key to the whole Suvla Bay area.
If by dawn, I said, even one Company of ours
was well entrenched on the Tekke Tepe height
we should have the whip hand of the enemy in
the opening moves next morning.
Hammersley said he understood my order and
that the advance should be put in hand at once.
Malcolm hurried off ; I left a little before 6.30
and went, via the Chatham, back to the Triad.
The Arno had by now come in, but de Robeck
has kindly asked me not to shift quarters if Anzac
and Helles troubles will permit me to stay the night
at Suvla.
All was dead quiet ashore till 11 p.m. I was
on the bridge until then and, seeing and hearing
nothing, felt sure the Brigade had made good
Tekke Tepe and were now digging themselves
in.
Captain Brody dined. The scraps of news picked
up from the sailormen, mainly by young Brodrick,
confirm what the soldiers had told us about the
landing inside Suvla Bay along the narrow strip
SARI BAIR AND SUVLA 69
of land West of the Salt Lake. The attacks on
Hill 10 went to pieces, not against the Turks, but
by mishap. The first assault made by one or two
Companies succeeded, but the assailants were
taken for Turks and were attacked in turn and
driven off by others of our men. A most distressing
affair.
If there was hesitation and mix-up in the general
handling, the Regimental folk atoned and there
were many incidents of initiative and daring on
the part of battalions and companies.
Mahon with some of his Irish and a Manchester
Battalion are fighting well and clearing Kiretch
Tepe Sirt. Until this morning bullets from that
ridge were falling on " A " Beach ; now the working
parties are not in any way disturbed.
August, 1915. Imbros. With the first streak
of dawn I was up on the bridge with my glasses.
The hills are so covered with scrub that it was hard
to see what was going on in that uncertain light,
but the heavyish shrapnel fire was a bad sign and
the fact that the enemy's guns were firing from a
knoll a few hundred yards East of Anafarta Sagir
was proof that our troops were not holding Tekke
Tepe. But the Officer of the Watch said that the
small hours passed quietly ; no firing ashore during
the hours of darkness. Could not make head or
tail of it !
As the light grew stronger some of ours could
be seen pushing up the western slopes of the long
spur running out South-west from Anafarta. The
70 GALLIPOLI DIARY
scrub was so thick that they had to climb together
and follow-my-leader along what appeared to be
cattle tracks up the hill. On our right all seemed
going very well. Looking through naval telescopes
we thought we all thought Ismail Oglu Tepe
height was won. Very soon the shrapnel got on
to those bunches of men on our left and there
was something like a stampede from North to
South. Looking closer we could see the enemy
advancing behind their own bursting shrapnel and
rolling up our line from the left on to the centre.
Oh for the good " Queen Bess," her high command,
and her 15-inch shrapnel ! One broadside and
these Turks would go scampering down to Gehenna.
The enemy counter-attack was coming from the
direction of Tekke Tepe and moving over the foot-
hills and plain on Sulajik. Our centre made a
convulsive effort (so it seemed) to throw back
the steadily advancing Turks ; three or four
companies (they looked like) moved out from the
brush about Sulajik and tried to deploy. But
the shrapnel got on to these fellows also and I
lost sight of them. Then about 6 a.m., the whole
lot seemed suddenly to collapse : including the
right ! Not only did they give ground but they
came back some of them half-way to the sea.
But others made a stand. The musketry fire
got very heavy. The enemy were making a
supreme effort. The Turkish shell fire grew hotter
and hotter. The enemy's guns seemed now to be
firing not only from round about Anafarta Sagir, but
also from somewhere between 113 and 101, 2,500
yards or so South-west of Anafarta. Still these
fellows of ours ; not more than a quarter of those
SARI BAIR AND SUVLA 71
on the ground at the outset stuck it out. My
heart has grown tough amidst the struggles of the
Peninsula but the misery of this scene well nigh
broke it. What kept me going was the sight of
Sari Bair I could not keep my eyes off the Sari
Bair ridge. Guns from all sides, sea and land,
Turks and British, were turned on to it and enormous
explosions were sending slices off the top of the
high mountain to mix with the clouds in the sky.
Under that canopy our men were fighting for dear
life far above us !
Between 7.30 and 8.0 the Turkish reinforcements
at Suvla seemed to have got enough. They did
not appear to be in any great strength : here and
there they fell back : no more came up in support :
evidently, they were being held : failure, not
disaster, was the upshot : few things so bad they
might not be worse. By 8.0 the musketry and the
shelling began to slacken down although there
was a good deal of desultory shooting. We were
holding our own ; the Welsh Division are coming
in this morning ; but we have not sweated blood
only to hold our own ; our occupation of the open
key positions has been just too late ! The ele-
ment of surprise wasted ! The prime factor set
aside for the sake of other factors ! Words are
no use.
Looked at from the bridge of the Triad not
a bad observation station the tendency of our
men to get into little groups was very noticeable :
as if they had not been trained in working under
fire in the open. As to the general form of our
72 GALLIPOLI DIARY
attack against the hills on our right, it seemed to be
what our French Allies call decousu. After a whole
day's rest and preparing, there might have been
more form and shape about the movement. Yet
it was for the sake of this form and shape that the
Turkish reinforcements have been given time to
get on to the heights. Our stratagems worked well,
but there is a time limit set to all make-believes ;
the hour glass of fate was set at forty-eight hours,
and now the sands have run out.
Before going over to Anzac I had to get hold
of Stopford so as to hear what news had come in
from Hammersley and from Mahon. If only Mahon
is pushing forward to Ejelmer Bay and can occupy
the high range to the East of it that would make
amends for much. After breakfast, therefore, at
8.30 got into a launch and landed at Ghazi Baba
with young Brodrick as my only companion. Our
boat took us into a deep, narrow creek cut by
nature into the sheer rock just by Ghazi Baba
a name only ; there is nothing to distinguish that
spot from any other. Along the beach feverish
activity ; stores, water, ammunition, all the wants
of an army being landed. Walking up the lower
slope of Kiretch Tepe Sirt, we found Stopford,
about four or five hundred yards East of Ghazi
Baba, busy with part of a Field Company of Engin-
eers supervising the building of some splinter-
proof Headquarters huts for himself and Staff.
He was absorbed in the work, and he said that it
would be well to make a thorough good job of
the dug-outs as we should probably be here for a
very long time. I retorted, " Devil a bit ; within
SARI BAIR AND SUVLA 73
a day or two you will be picking the best of the
Anafarta houses for your billet."
From the spot he had selected the whole of Suvla
Bay and the Salt Lake lay open ; also the Anafartas
and Yilghin Burnu. But, being on a lower spur
of Kiretch Tepe Sirt, his post was " dead " to
the fighting taking place along the crest of Kiretch
Tepe Sirt itself. I remarked on this and asked what
news of the Irish, saying that now we were certainly
forestalled at Yilghin Burnu and, apparently, on
Tekke Tepe also, it was doubly essential Mahoii
should make a clean sweep of the ridge. Stopford
said he was confident he would be able to do so,
aided as he ^ r ould be by the fire from the ships
in the harbour a fire which enfiladed the whole
length of this feature.
As to this morning's hold up, Stopford took it
philosophically, which was well so far as it went,
but he seemed hardly to realize that the Turks
have rushed their guns and reinforcements here
from a very long way off whilst he has been creeping
along at the rate of a mile a day. Stopford expected
Hammersley would be in to report progress in
person ; he will keep me well posted in his
news and he understands that the Welsh Divi-
sion will be at his disposal to help the llth
Division.
As Stopford could give me no recent news from
Mahon I suggested I should go and find out from
him personally how matters then stood. Stopford
said it was a good idea but that he himself thought
it better not to leave his Headquarters where
74 GALLIPOLI DIARY
messages kept coming in. I agreed and started
with George Brodrick to scale the hill.
About half a mile up we struck a crowd of the
Irish Pioneer Regiment (Granard's) filling their
water bottles at a well marked on the map as
Charak Cheshme. In their company we now made
our way Northwards along a path through fairly
thick scrub as high as a man's waist. We were
moving parallel to, and about 300 yards below, the
crestline of the ridge. When we had gone another
mile a spattering of " overs " began to fall around
like the first heavy drops of a thunderstorm. So
wrapped in cotton wool is a now-a-days Commander-
in-Chief that this was the first musketry fire I
could claim to have come under since the beginning
of the war. To sit in a trench and hear flights
of bullets flop into the sandbag parapet, or pass
harmlessly overhead, is hardly to be under fire.
An irregular stream of Irishmen were walking
up the path along with us ; one of them was hit
just ahead of me. He caught it in the thigh
and stretcher men whipped him off in a jiffy.
At last we got to a spot some 2J miles from Suvla
and had not yet been able to find Mahon. So
I sat down behind a stone, somewhere about the
letter " K " of Kiretch Tepe Sirt, and sent young
Brodrick to espy the land. He found that we
had pulled up within a couple of hundred yards of
the Brigade Headquarters, where portions of the
30th, 31st and 34th Brigades (sounds very formid-
able but only five Battalions) were holding a spur
and preparing to make an attack. General Mahon
was actually in the Brigade Headquarters (a tiny
SARI BAIR AND SUVLA 75
ditch which only held four or five people) and came
back to where I was sitting. He is angry, and small
wonder, at the chaos introduced somehow into
the Corps. He is commanding some of Hammersley's
men and Hammersley has the bulk of his at the
far extremity of the line of battle. He besought
me to do my utmost to get Hill and his troops back
to their own command.
I told him G.H.Q. had always understood Stop-
ford would land his, Mahon's, two Brigades intact
at A Beach. When the naval people could not
find a beach at A, they, presumably with Stopford's
concurrence, had most unluckily dumped them
ashore several miles South at C Beach. This was
the cause of the mix-up of his Division which
Stopford, no doubt, would take in hand as soon as
he could. Mahon seemed in fighting form. He
said he could clear the whole of Kiretch Tepe Sirt,
but that he did not want to lose men in making
frontal attacks, so he was trying to work round
South through the thick scrub so as to shift the
enemy that way. He had reckoned five or six
hundred men were against him gendarmes. But
there were more than there had been at daylight.
My talk with Mahon made me happier. Here,
at least, was someone who had an idea of what he
was doing. The main thing was to attack before
more Turks came down the coast. My own idea
would certainly have been to knock the Turks
out by a bayonet charge right there. So far they
had not had time to dig a regular trench, only a
few shallow scrapings along a natural fold of the
ground. If Mahon wished to make a turning
76 GALLIPOLI DIARY
movement, then, I think, he would have been
well advised to take it by the North where the
ground over which he must advance was not only
unentrenched and clear of brush, but also laid
quite open to the supporting fire of the Fleet.
But I kept these views to myself until I could see
Stopford ; said good-bye to Mahon and wished him
luck ; found Brodrick had wandered off on his own
to see the fun at close quarters ; legged it, all alone,
down the open southern slope of the Kiretch
Tepe Sirt and got down into ground less open to
snipers' fire from the scrub-covered plain. 1 Then,
still quite alone, I made my way back South-west
1 My Aide-de-Camp, George Brodrick, has permitted me
to use the following extract from a letter of his written to his
rather, Lord Midleton, at the time.
" I went to Suvla with Sir Ian in the afternoon of August 8th,
and we arrived to find * Nothing doing/ The beaches and
hillsides covered with our men almost like a Bank Holiday
evening at Hainpstead Heath. Vague shelling by one of our
monitors was the only thing which broke the peace of a most
perfect evening a glorious sunset.
" We went over to the Destroyer where General Stopford had
his Headquarters, and I fancy words of exhortation were
spoken to him. We slept on the Triad, Admiral de Robeck's
Yacht. I had a camp bed on the Bridge, so as to hear any
happenings during the night. About dawn our Monitors
started to shell the heights behind Anaf arta and a sort of assault
was made; the Turkish battery opened with shrapnel, and our
fellows did not seem to get very far.
"We went ashore on c A ' beach about 8 a.m. and walked
up to Stopford's Headquarters, as he had gone ashore the
night before. They all seemed a very lifeless crew, with but
little knowledge of the general situation and no spirit in them.
We made our way on across some rocky scrubby country
towards Brigade Headquarters * fairly heavy rifle fire was
going on, and after about two miles bullets began to ping
SARI BAIR AND SUVLA 77
towards Ghazi Baba on Suvla Bay. After a little
I was joined by two young Irish soldiers. I don't
know who or what they took me for ; certainly
not for the Generalissimo. They came along with
me and discussed identical adventures from diame-
trically different standpoints. One, in fact, was
an optimist ; the other a pessimist. One found
fault with the war for not giving him enough
hardship and adventure ; the other was entirely
fed up with adventures and hardships. This
seems a trivial incident to jot down amidst issues
so tremendous, but life is life, and my chat
with these youngsters put some new life into
me. Nearing the shore, I again struck Stop-
ford's Headquarters, now beginning to look
habitable. Braithwaite, and one or two others
of my Staff turned up from Imbros at that
moment. He shoved some cables into my hand
and hastened off to interview Reed. Helles and
Anzac have been duly w r arned we are both here
for a few hours ; all the component parts of my
machine, its cranks, levers, pulleys, are assembled
at Imbros, and G.H.Q. simply cannot be left under
a junior much longer. Meanwhile I told Stop-
ford about Mahon and the gendarmes. When I
said that the sooner the Kiretch Tepe nettle
was grasped the less it would sting, he informed
me he had issued an order that Commanders
ping unpleasantly all round us. I persuaded Sir Ian to lie
down behind a rock, much against his will, and went on myself
another 150 yards to where the Brigade Staff were sitting in a
dip behind a stone wall. They told me that about 800 Turks
were in front of them with no machine guns. We had 3
Battalions in the firing line and two in reserve and yet could
not get on."
78 GALLIPOLI DIARY
were not to lose men by making frontal attacks
on trenches but were to turn them.
So here is a theory which South African practice
proved to be more often wrong than right being
treated as an axiom at Gallipoli !
We next went into the question of digging a
defensive line of trenches halfway between Corps
Headquarters and Mahon's force. Here we were
in accord. No man knows his luck and the tide
may turn any moment. Both at Liao-Yang and
the Shaho the Japanese began to dig deep trenches
directly they captured a position.
Young Brodrick rejoined me here ; rather anxious
at having lost me. He had found Mahon with
the Brigade Staff. He had been shown the exact
positions on a rough sketch map made by one of
the Officers. We had three Battalions in the firing
line and two in reserve. The gendarmerie had been
reinforced and were now estimated at 700 without
machine guns or artillery. We had a mountain
battery shelling the gendarmes and a monitor occa-
sionally gave them a big fellow. The Brigade
Staff had said nothing to him about a battalion
working round to the South. I repeated this to
Stopford and begged him to make a push for it here.
By now Braithwaite had finished with Reed,
so we hurriedly discussed his budget of news.
Hammersley is expected but he has not turned up
yet. Indeed the situation is still by no means
free from anxiety although the arrival of the Welsh
Division gives confidence. A battalion of the 32nd
Brigade did get up on to Tekke Tepe last night,
it seems, but were knocked off this morning before
SARI BAIR AND SUVLA 79
they had time to entrench. 1 Seeing they should
have had several hours time to dig in, that seems
strange. Braithwaite handed me a bunch of signals
and wires ; also the news of what I had known at
the back of my mind since morning, the fact
that we had not got Sari Bair ! Then we started
back to see de Robeck and Keyes. For the first
time in this expedition Roger Keyes seemed down
on his luck : we had often before seen him raging,
never dejected. These awful delays : delay in
landing the Irish ; delay in attacking on the 7th ;
delay all night of the 7th ; delay during the day
of the 8th and night of the 8th, have simply deprived
him of the power of speech, to soldiers, that is
to say, though, to shipmates, no doubt . . . !
Now for Anzac. Since dawn a fever about Anzac
had held me. Shades of Staff College Professors,
from you no forgiveness to a Chief who runs about
the mountain quitting his central post. But the
luminous shade of Napoleon would better under-
stand my desperation. Some Generals are just
accumulators of the will of the C.-in-C. When
that is the case, and when they run down, there
is only one man who can hope to pump in energy.
Exact at noon Roger Keyes and I pushed off in
the racing motor boat. On our way we stopped
at " C " beach and picked up Commander Worsley.
Next to Anzac, but at the Cove, found that Birdwood
had left word he would meet me at the ex-Turkish
Post No. 2, so, as the water was shoal in spots,
we rowed down there in a dinghy, along the shore
where our lives would not have been worth half a
minute's purchase just three days ago.
1 Only one Company we hear now. IAN H., 15.8.15.
80 GALLIPOLI DIARY
After scrambling awhile over the new trenches,
Birdwood, Godley and I sat down on a high spur
above Godley's Headquarters which gave us a
grand outlook over the whole Suvla area, and across
to Chunuk Bair. Here we ate our rations and held
an impromptu council of war ; Shaw, commanding
the new 13th Division, joining in with us. All
three Generals were in high spirits and refused to
allow themselves to be damped down by the repulse
of the morning's attack on the high ridge. They
put down that check to the lethargy of Suvla.
Had Stopford taken up any point on the water-
shed yesterday when it was unoccupied except by
some fugitives, the whole Turkish position on the
Peninsula would have become so critical that they
could not have spared the numbers they have now
brought up to defend " Q " and Koja Chemen
Tepe. The Anzac Generals allowed that they
themselves had got into arrears in their time
tables, but they had been swift compared to Suvla.
Even as Godley was holding forth, messages
came to hand to say that the Turks were passing
from the defensive to the offensive and urging
fresh attacks on the New Zealanders holding Chunuk
Bair. Godley is certain the Turks will never make
us quit hold. Shaw, who also has some of his
men up there, is equally confident. Birdwood
thinks Chunuk Bair should be safe, though not
so safe as it would have been had we held on to
that ridge at " Q " where Baldwin's delay from
causes not yet known, lost us the crestline this
morning. Birdie said he could have cried, and is
not quite sure he didn't cry, when the bombard-
ment stopped dead and minute after minute passed
Elliott and Fry phot.
GKXERAL SIR W. R. BIRDWOOD, G.C.M.G., K.C.B.
SARI BAIR AND SUVLA 81
away, from one minute to twenty, without a sign
of Baldwin and his column who had been booked
to spurt for the top on the heels of the last shell.
Unaided, the 6th Gurkhas got well astride the
ridge, but had to fall back owing to the lack of
his support. None the less, these Anzac Generals
are in great form. They are sure they will have
the whip hand of the Narrows by to-morrow.
Birdie was offered my last reserves, the 54th
Essex Territorials under Inglefield. But he can't
water them. The effort to carry food, water and
cartridges to the firing lines is already overtaxing
the Corps. If Inglefield's men were also pushed
in they simply could not be kept going. When
communication trenches have been dug and brush-
wood and rocks flattened out, it will be easier.
Till then, the Generals agreed they would rather
the extra pressure was applied from Suvla. Bird-
wood and Godley were keen, in fact, that the Essex
Division should go to Stopford so that he might
at once occupy Kavak Tepe and, if he could,
Tekke Tepe. All that the Anzacs have seen for
themselves, or heard from their own extreme left
or from aeroplanes, leads them to believe that
the Turkish reinforcements to the Suvla theatre
came over the high shoulder of Tekke Tepe or
through Anafarta Sagir about dawn this morning
and that the enemy are in some strength now along
the ridge between Anafarta Sagir and Ismail
Oglu Tepe with a few hundred on Kiretch Tepe
Sirt : the Turkish centre was a gift to us yesterday ;
certainly yesterday forenoon ; now it can only be
won by hard fighting. But the Turks have not
VOL. H. 7
82 GALLIPOLI DIARY
yet had time to work round on to the high ridges
east of Suvla Bay and although a few Turks did
pass over Kavak Tepe, it seems to be now clear
of any enemy. There is no sign of life on the
bare Eastern slope of that mountain. Probably
one half of the great crescent of hills which encircles
the Suvla plain and, in places, should overlook the
Narrows, still lies open to an advance.
So together we composed a message to Stopford
and Godley sent it off by telephone now rigged up
between the two Corps Headquarters : the form was
filled in by Godley ; hence his counter signature :
TO:-G.O.C., IXth Corps.
Sender's number. Day of month. In reply to
N.Z.G. 103 9 number AAA
After speaking to Birdwood and Godley
think most important use fresh troops could
be put to if not urgently required to reinforce
would be the occupation as early as possible
of the commanding position running through
square 137-119 AAA Ismail Oglu Tepe are
less vital to security of base.
SIR IAN HAMILTON.
From
Place Fisherman's Hut.
Date 2 p.m. 9th August, 1915.
A. J. GODLEY,
Maj. Gen,
SARI BAIR AND SUVLA 83
Took leave of the Anzacs and the Anzac Generals
about 4.30 p.m. The whole crowd were in tip-top
spirits and immensely pleased with the freedom
and largeness of their newly conquered kingdom.
We of the G.H.Q. were bitten by this same spirit ;
Suvla took second place in our minds and when
we got on board the Arno the ugly events of the
early morning had been shaken, for the moment,
out of our minds. But, on the sail home, we were
able to look at the Peninsula as a whole. Because
the Anzacs, plus the 13th Division of the New
Army, had carried through a brilliant stroke of
arms was a reason, not for shutting our eyes to
the slowness of the Suvla Generals, but for spurring
them on to do likewise. There is nothing open
to them now not without efforts for which they
are, for the time being, unfit but Kavak Tepe
and the Aja Liman Anafarta ridge. So, on arrival
at 6 p.m., wrote out the following message from
myself to General Stopf ord :
" I am in complete sympathy with you in the
matter of all your Officers and men being new
to this style of warfare and without any leaven of
experienced troops on which to form themselves.
Still I should be wrong if I did not express my concern
at the want of energy and push displayed by the
llth Division. It cannot all be want of experience
as 13th have shown dash and self-confidence. Turks
were almost negligible yesterday once you got
ashore. To-day there was nothing to stop deter-
mined commanders leading such fine men as yours.
Tell me what is wrong with the llth Division.
Is it the Divisional Generals or Brigadiers or both ?
84 GALLIPOLI DIARY
I have a first-rate Major General I can send at once
and can also supply two competent Brigadiers.
You must get a move on or the whole plan of
operations is in danger of failing, for if you don't
secure the AJA LIMAN ANAFARTA ridge without
delay the enemy will. You must use your personal
influence to insist on vigorous and sustained action
against the weak forces of the Turks in your front,
and while agreeing to the capture of W Hills and
spur mentioned in C.G.S. letter to you of to-day, it
is of vital importance to the whole operation
that you thereafter promptly take steps to secure
the ridge without possession of which SUVLA BAY
is not safe. You must face casualties and strike
while the opportunity offers and remember the
AJA LIMAN ANAFARTA ridge is your principal
and dominant objective and it must be captured.
Every day's delay in its capture will enormously
multiply your casualties. I want the name of the
Brigadier who sent the message to say his left was
retiring owing to a strong attack and then subse-
quently reported that the attack in question has
never developed. Keep Birdwood informed as
he may be able to help you on your right
flank."
This message seemed so important that it was
sent by hand of Hore-Ruthven and another Officer
by special destroyer. Braithwaite tells me that,
when he was at 9th Corps Headquarters to-day
he showed General Stopford the last two para-
graphs of this memo which I had written
when toning down the wording of a General
Staff draft:
Elliott and Fry phot.
LIEUT.-GEN. SIR A. J. GODLEY, K C.B., K.C.M.G.
SARI BAIR AND SUVLA 86
" C.G.S.
" (1) I do not think much good rubbing it into
these fellows, there are very few Turks opposed to
them. We have done it, and that was right,
but we must not overdo it.
" (2) But the men ought to be made to under-
stand that really the whole result of this campaign
may depend on their quickly getting a footing on
the hills right and left of Anaf arta. Officers and
rank and file must be made to grasp this.
" (3) If Lindley and his new men were kept
intact and thrown in on the Anzac flank, surely
they ought to be able to make a lodgment.
(Initialled), " IAN H."
CHAPTER XVI
KAVAK TEPE ATTACK COLLAPSES
10th August, 1915. Imbros. Had to remain at
G.H.Q. all day the worst of all days. My visit
to Anzac yesterday had infected me with the
hopes of Godley and Birdwood and made me
feel that we would recover what we had missed at
Suvla, and more, if, working from the pivot of
Chunuk Bair, we got hold of the rest of Sari
Bair.
They believed they would bring this off and then
the victory would have been definite. Now
Chunuk Bair has gone !
The New Zealand and New Army troops holding
the knoll were relieved by two New Army Battalions
and, at daylight this morning, the Turks simply
ran amok among them with a Division in mass
formation. Trenches badly sited, they say, and
Turks able to form close by in dead ground. Many
reasons no doubt and lack of swift pressure from
Suvla. The Turks have lost their fear of Stopford
and concentrated full force against the Anzacs.
By Birdie's message, it looks as if the heavy fighting
was at an end an end which leaves us with a fine
gain of ground though minus the vital crests. Next
time we will get them. We are close up to the
KAVAK TEPE ATTACK COLLAPSES 87
summit instead of having five or six hundred feet
to climb.
News from Suvla still rotten. Here is the result
of Hammersley's visit to Stopf ord after I left :
"August 9. 5.35. Suvla Bay.
" DEAR BRAITHWAITB,
" I have had a talk with Hammersley and he
tells me that his troops are much exhausted, have
had very heavy fighting, severe losses and have
felt the want of water very much. He does not
consider that they are fit to make a fresh attack
to-morrow.
" I have decided after consultation with him
to make an attempt on the ridge about Abrikja
with three fresh Territorial Battalions and six
which have been used to-day. I am afraid from
what I hear that the Naval guns do not have much
effect on account of difficulty of accurate observa-
tion but I will arrange a programme, to be carefully
timed, with Brigadier-General Smith, my Brigadier
R.A., and of course all the field guns will also help.
I must see Smith so please ask the V. Admiral to
place a boat at Smith's disposal to bring him here
to see me and then to see Generals Hammersley
and Lindley. General Lindley will be in immediate
command of the operations as all troops engaged
in the attack will be Territorials.
" I trust the attack will succeed though to-day's
did not, but in view of the urgency of the matter
I feel the attempt ought to be made.
88 GALLIPOLI DIARY
"It is absolutely necessary that I should see
Smith.
" Yours sincerely,
(Sd.) "FRED W. STOPFORD."
At mid-day, got a cable from the 9th Corps
saying that Lindley's Division had duly gone at
Hill 70, a key feature on the ridge, about 1,500
yards North-east of Yilghin Burnu and had failed !
In giving me this news, Stopford proposes to
make a second attack this afternoon with the same
Division. Have caused Braithwaite to cable :
" Hear you propose attacking again. Chief doubts
advisability with tired troops after morning's
failure ; if you agree consolidate where you are
and rest and reorganize."
In a letter from Stopford in answer to my signal
of yesterday from Fisherman's Hut, he says :
"No. 1. Date, Aug. 9. Time, 4 p.m.
Place, Suvla Bay.
"To:
" DEAR SIR IAN,
" I have received your message from Fisherman's
Hut. Hammersley has not been able to advance
to-day, but the Turks have been counter-attacking
all day and he has had to put in one of the Territorial
Brigades to prevent being driven back.
" I quite realize the importance of holding the
high ground East of Suvla Bay, but as the Turks
KAVAK TEPE ATTACK COLLAPSES 89
advance through the gap between the two Anafartas
where all the roads are, it is absolutely necessary
to keep sufficient troops between Anafarta Sagir
and Ismail Oglu Tepe, as otherwise if I were to
seize the high ground between Anafarta Sagir and
Ejelmer Bay without securing this gap, I might
find myself holding the heights and the Turks
pouring down to the harbour behind me. I will
bear what you say in mind, and if I get an opportun-
ity with fresh troops of taking the heights whilst
holding on tight to my right flank I will do so.
I understand that one reason why it was necessary
to go for Ismail Oglu Tepe was that if I did not hold
the Turks there they would fire into the rear of
Birdwood's troops attacking Hill 305.
" I am, Sir,
" Yours sincerely,
(Sd.) " FRED W. STOPFORD."
For myself I wish the Turks would try to pour
down over that flat, open country by the Salt Lake
to seize the beaches under the guns of the warships.
Well, we had Chunuk Bair in our hands the best
part of two days and two nights. So far the Turks
have never retaken trenches once we had fairly
taken hold. Have they done so now ? I hope not.
Birdie and Godley are at work upon a scheme for
its recapture. The Turks are well commanded :
that I admit. Their Generals knew they were
done unless they could quickly knock us off our
90 GALLIPOLI DIARY
Chunuk Bair. So they have done it. Never mind :
never say die. Meanwhile we have the East Anglian
Division available to-morrow, and I have been over
in the G.S. marquee working out ways and means
of taking Kavak Tepe which may also give us an
outlook, more distant, but yet an outlook, on to
the Dardanelles.
llth August, 1915. Imbros. Did not dare to
break away from the wire ends. A see-saw of
cardinal events between Suvla and Anzac.
A workable scheme of attack has now been put
into such shape as to let Stopford dovetail his
Corps orders into it, and first thing sent him this
cable :
" G.H.Q. to IXth Corps. General Commanding
wishes 54th Division Infantry to attack line Kavak
Tepe peak 1195.5. at dawn to-morrow after night
march to foothills ; G.S.O. proceeding with detailed
instructions. See Inglefield, make arrangements
and give all assistance possible by landing 53rd
Signal Company, water gear and tools. 53rd
Division becomes general reserve."
At 4.30 p.m., a letter from Stopford anent the
failure of the 53rd Division, depressing in itself
but still more so in its inferences as to the 54th
Division. He says these troops showed " no attacking
spirit at all. They did not come under heavy shell
fire nor was the rifle fire very severe, but they not
only showed no dash in attack but went back at
slight provocation and went back a long way.
Lots of the men lay down behind cover, etc. They
KAVAK TEPE ATTACK COLLAPSES 91
went on when called upon to do so by Staff and
other Officers but they seemed lost and under no
leadership in fact, they showed that they are not
fit to put in the field without the help of Regulars.
I really believe that if we had had one Brigade of
Regulars here to set an example both the New
Army and Territorials would have played up well
with them but they have no standard to go by."
Worse follows, for Stopford takes back his assur-
ance given me after my cable of the 9th when he
said, " given water, guns and ammunition, I
have no doubt about our being able to secure the
hills." He tells me straight and without any
beating about the bush, " I am sure they " (the
Territorials) " would not secure the hills with any
amount of guns, water and ammunition assuming
ordinary opposition, as the attacking spirit was
absent ; chiefly owing to the want of leadership
by the Officers."
Ignoring our Kavak Tepe scheme, he goes on
then to ask me in so many words, not to try any
attack with the 54th Division but to stick them
into trenches.
This letter has driven me very nearly to my wits'
ends. Things can't be so bad ! None of us have
any complaint at all of the New Army troops ; only
of their Old Army Generals. Stopford says the
13th Division were not reliable when they were at
Helles, whereas now, under Godley at Anzac they
have fought like lions.
Rushed off in this, the good tub Imogene (Lieute-
nant-Commander Potts). There the rushing ceased
92 GALLIPOLI DIARY
as she steamed along so slowly that we didn't get
to Suvla till 7 p.m. Walked up with Braithwaite
and Freddie to the 9th Corps Headquarters. Saw
Stopf ord. Wrestled with him for over an hour ;
Braithwaite doing ditto with Reed.
Stopford urged that these last two Territorial
formations sent out to us were sucked oranges,
the good in them having been drafted away into
France and replaced by rejections. He says he
would have walked on to the watershed the first
day had we only stiffened his force with the 29th
Division. There happened to be some pretty
decisive objections but there was no use entering
into them then. So I merely told him that the
9th Corps and the Territorials being now well
ashore we may be able to bring up the 29th. No
doubt had we a couple of Regular Divisions here
British or Indian at full strength no doubt
we could astonish the world. Having the 53rd and
the 54th Divisions, half -trained and at half strength,
I tried to make Stopford see we must cut our coats
with the stuff issued to us. The 54th were good
last winter, and, even if the best have been picked
out of them, the residue should do well under sound
leadership : Inglefield was a practised old warrior,
and would not let him down.
There was nothing solid to go upon in crying
down the credit of the 54th beyond hearsay and
the self-evident fact that they are half their nominal
strength. To assume they won't put up a fight
is a certain way of making the best troops gun-shy.
We are standing up to our necks in a time problem,
and the tide is on the rise. There is not a moment
KAVAK TEPE ATTACK COLLAPSES 93
to spare. The Turks have reinforced and they
have brought back their guns ; that is true. Now
they will begin to dig trenches indeed they are
already digging and more and more enemy troops
will be placed in reserve behind the Anafartas
and to the East of the Tekke Tepe Ejelmer
Bay range. On the 10th the Helles people reported
that, in spite of their efforts to hold the Turks,
they had detached reinforcements to the North.
These extra reinforcements may arrive to-morrow
at Anzac or on the Anafartas ; but, for at least
another twenty four hours, they will not be able
to get round to the high ridge between Anafarta
and Ejelmer Bay. So far as can be seen by aero-
plane scouting, this ridge is still unoccupied ;
certainly it is unentrenched.
Stopford who, at first, was dead set on digging
agreed to have a dart at Kavak Tepe. He will
throw the 54th at it. He will turn out the 9th
Corps and, if chance offers, they will attack along
their own front. His chief remaining ghost inhabits
the jungly bit of country between Anafarta Ova
and the foothills. In that belt he fears the Turkish
snipers may harass our line of supply so that,
when the heights are held, we may find it hard to
feed and water our garrison. The New Armies
and Territorials have no trained counter-snipers
and are much at the mercy of the skilled Anatolian
shikarris who haunt the close country.
So I suggested blockhouses on the South African
system to protect our line where it passed through
the three quarters of a mile or so of close country.
The enemy artillery would not spot them amongst
94 GALLIPOLI DIARY
the trees. I promised him also one hundred picked
Australian bushmen, New Zealand Maoris and
Gurkhas to act as scouts and counter-snipers.
Stopford took to this idea very kindly ; has
fixed up a Conference of 9th Corps and Territorial
Generals early to-morrow morning to discuss the
whole plan, and will make every effort to occupy
Kavak Tepe to-morrow night. Stopford seemed
in much better form to-night ; I think he is more
fit : there has been 24 hours' delay but by waiting
that time Inglefield and the Essex will have the
help of a body of first-class scouts quite a luminous
notion. Stopford, himself, presides at to-morrow's
Conference. Inglefield is a good, straight fellow,
not so young as we were in South Africa, but quite
all right.
Boarded the Imogene. Dropped anchor at 1 1 p.m.
at Imbros.
12th August, 1915. Imbros. Last thing last
night, Stopford promised to let me know the result
of the conference to be held at his Headquarters,
and upon the plans for the lines of supply. Sent
him a reminder :
" G.H.Q. to IXth Corps. Have you arranged
practical system for supplying troops in the event
of Tekke Tepe ridge being secured ? "
A cable from K. :
" I am sorry about the Xth and Xlth Divisions
in which I had great confidence. Could you not
ginger them up ? The utmost energy and dash
KAVAK TEPE ATTACK COLLAPSES 95
are required for these operations or they will
again revert to trench warfare."
K.'s disappointment makes me feel sick ! I
know the great hopes he has built on these magni-
ficent Divisions and I know equally well that he is
not capable of understanding how he has cut his
own throat, the men's throats and mine, by not
sending young and up-to-date Generals to run them.
K. in this, and this alone, is with Tolstoi. The men
are everything ; the man nothing. Have cabled
back saying, " I am acting absolutely as you indicate
by * ginger ' ; I only got back at 11 last night
from a further application of that commodity.
As a result a fresh attack will be made to-morrow
morning by the IXth Corps and the LIVth Division."
As to the New Army I point out to K. that
" they are fighting under conditions quite foreign
to their training and moreover they have no
regulars to set them a standard " : also, (and
pray Heaven it is truth) " Everyone is fully alive
to the necessity for dash, so I trust the attack of
to-morrow will be much better done than were
the two previous attempts."
Hardly had my cable to K. been despatched when
Stopford gives us a sample specimen of " dash "
by his answer to my reminder. He wires :
' IXth Corps to G.H.Q. I foresee very great
difficulty. The only system possible at first pro-
bably will be convoy under escort."
Twelve hours ago, more or less, Stopford had
agreed that there was a difficulty which it was up
96 GALLIPOLI DIARY
to him to solve and that, at first, (i.e., till block-
houses had been built) the system would be convoy
under escort. We ask him what he had done,
expecting to get the particulars worked out by his
Staff after the conference of Generals, and this is
the reply !
Five minutes later, in came another wire giving
the general situation at Suvla ; saying the 53rd
Division had failed to clear ground from which
the right of the advance of the 54th Division might
be threatened, and that Stopford wished to post-
pone his night march another four and twenty
hours.
So this is the result of our " ginger," and Braith-
waite or I must rush over to Suvla at once. Mean-
while, tactics and Kavak Tepe must wait.
Wired back :
" In the circumstances the operation for to-
morrow is postponed. Chief sending C.G.S. over
now to see you."
Braithwaite went : is back now : has seen both
Stopford and Reed : has agreed (with a sad heart)
on my behalf to the night march being put off
another twenty four hours.
Have had, therefore, to cable K. again, shoulder-
ing the heavy blame of this further delay :
"(No. M.P. 545). From General Sir Ian
Hamilton to Earl Kitchener. After anxiously
weighing the pros and cons, I have decided that
it is wiser to wait another 24 hours before carry-
ing out the general attack mentioned in my
No. M.F. 543. Braithwaite has just returned from
KAVAK TEPE ATTACK COLLAPSES 97
the IXth Corps, and he found that the spirit and
general organization were improving rapidly. A
small attack by a Brigade, which promised well,
was in progress. This morning the Xth Division
captured a trench."
The story of the Suvla Council of War : At
first the Generals were for fighting. Inglefield,
of the LIVth, who is told off for the attack, was
keen. All he asked was, a clean start from Anaf arta
Ova. If his Division could jump off, intact and
fresh, from that well-watered half-way house,
Kavak Tepe was his. The LUIrd Division for
their part agreed to make good Anafarta Ova ;
to clear out the snipers and to hold the place as a
base for the LIVth.
So at 10 a.m. Stopford issued orders saying the
LIVth must march off at 4 p.m. moving East of
Anafarta Ova. Then, when at last all seemed
settled, in came a message from the G.O.C. LUIrd
Division, saying he could not undertake to clear
Anafarta Ova of snipers and to hold it as a cover
to the advance of the LIVth.
Stopford thereupon cancelled his first order, and,
at 1.15 p.m., issued fresh orders directing the LIVth
Division to send in one of their own Brigades as an
advance guard to clear the ground up to a point
East of Anafarta Ova. Braithwaite stayed at
Corps Headquarters at Suvla until this Brigade,
the 163rd, was moving on Anafarta Ova driving
the snipers before them. Mahon, too, after sitting
for three days where I left him on the morning of
the 9th, has got tired of looking at the gendarmes
VOL. n. 8
98 GALLIPOLI DIARY
and has carried their trenches by the forbidden
frontal bayonet charge without much trouble or
loss although, naturally, these trenches have been
strengthened during the interval.
Amidst these tactical miss-fires entered Hankey.
He has had a cable from his brother Secretary,
Bonham Carter, saying the Prime Minister wishes
him to stay on longer and that Lord K. would like
to know if he can do anything to give an impetus
to the operations. Hankey showed me this cable ;
also his answer :
" Reference your 6910. I am glad to stay as
desired. The chief thing you could send to help
the present operations would be more ammunition.
For supplies already sent everyone is most grateful.
It is also important that units should be kept up
to strength.
" As General Officer Commanding has already
apprised you fully of the situation I have nothing
to add."
In the Gordons' Mess " a Marine " used to stand
as synonym for emptiness. Asquith's " Marine " x
is the reverse. Into two sentences totalling 27
words he boils down the drift of hundreds of cables
and letters.
13th August, 1915. Imbros. Well, I must put
it down. Worked till lunch. In the afternoon, left
in H.M.S. Arno and sailed over to Suvla to have
a last look over the band-o-bast for to-morrow's
twice to-morrowed effort. First, saw the Admiral
1 Hankey belonged to the Royal Marine Artillery. IAN H.,
1920.
KAVAK TEPE ATTACK COLLAPSES 99
and Commodore who are simply dancing with
impatience. No wonder. Whether or no Kavak
Tepe summit gives a useful outlook on to the back
of Sari Bair and the Dardanelles, at least it will
give us the whip hand of the guns on the Anafarta
ridge and save our ships from the annoying atten-
tions they are beginning to receive. The sailors
think too they have worked out an extra good scheme
for ship and shore guns.
Stopford then came aboard ; in the mood he was
in aboard the Jonquil on the 8th, only more so !
The Divisional Generals are without hope, that is
the text of his sermon. Hopeless about to-night,
or to-morrow, that is to say ; for there are rosy
visions and to spare for next week, or the week
after, or any other time, so long as it is not too
near us. There is something in this beats me.
We are alive we are quite all right the Brigade
of the LIVth sent on to Kuchuk Anafarta Ova
made good its point. True, one battalion got
separated from its comrades in the forest and was
badly cut up by Turkish snipers just as was Brad-
dock's force by the Redskins, but this, though
tragic, is but a tiny incident of a great modern
battle and the rest of the 163rd Brigade have
not suffered and hold the spot whence, it was
settled, the attack on Kavak Tepe should jump
off. Nothing practical or tactical seems to have
occurred to force us to drop our plan.
But no ; Stopford and Reed count the LUIrd
Division as finished : the LIVth incapable of
attack ; the rest of the IXth Corps immovable.
100 GALLIPOLI DIARY
If I accept ; we have lost this battle. We are
not beaten now the men are not but if I accept,
we are held up.
There is no way out. Whether there is any
good looking back even for one moment, God
knows ; I doubt it ! But I feel so acutely, I seem
to see so clearly, where our push for Constantinople
first began to quit the rails, that I must put it
down right here. The moment was when I asked
for Hawlinson or Byng, and when, in reply, the
keen, the young, the fit, the up-to-date Com-
manders were all barred, simply and solely that
Mahon should not be disturbed in his Divisional
Command. I resisted it very strongly : I went so
far as to remind K. in my cable of his own sad
disappointment at Bloemfontein when he (K.) had
offered him a Cavalry Brigade and he returned
instead to his appointment in the Sudan. The
question that keeps troubling me is, ought I to
have fought it further ; ought I to have resigned
sooner than allow generals old and yet inexperienced
to be foisted on to me ?
These stories about the troops ? I do not accept
them. The troops have lost heavily but they are
right if there were leaders.
I know quite well both Territorial Divisions.
I knew them in England that is to say. Since then,
they have had their eyes picked out. They have
been through the strainer and the best officers
and men and the best battalions have been
serving for months past in France. The three
show battalions in the 54th (Essex) Division are
KAVAK TEPE ATTACK COLLAPSES 101
in France and their places have been taken by
the 10th and llth London and by the 8th Hants.
Essex is good ; London is good and Hants is good ;
but the trinity is not Territorial. The same with
the Welshmen.
Yet even so ; taking these Territorials as they
are ; a scratch lot ; half strength ; no artillery ;
not a patch upon the original Divisions as I inspected
them in England six months ago ; even so, they'd
fight right enough and keen enough if they were set
fair and square at their fence.
In the fight of the 10th the Welshmen were not
given a chance. Sent in on a narrow front j am med
into a pocket ; as they began to climb the spur
they caught it from the guns, rifles and machine
guns on both flanks.
We might still do something with a change of
commanders. But I have been long enough Mili-
tary Secretary both in India and at home to realize
that ruthlessness here is apt to be a two-edged
sword. You can't clap a new head on to old
shoulders without upsetting circulation and equili-
brium. Still, I would harden my heart to it now
to-night were not my hands tied by Mahon's
seniority. Mahon is the next senior in the whole
force he stands next to myself. Had not Bruce
Hamilton been barred by the P.M. when I wanted
to put him in vice Hunter- Weston at Helles, the
problem would be simple enough. Even if I had
not, at the outset, given that well-tried, thrusting
old fighter the conduct of the Suvla enterprise, at
least I would have brought him in on the morning
102 GALLIPOLI DIARY
of the 9th instant quite easily and without causing
any upset to anyone or anything. He ranks both
Stopford and Mahon and nothing would have been
simpler than to let him bring up a contingent of
troops from Helles, when, automatically, he would
have taken command in the Suvla area. What
it would have meant to have had a man imbued
with the attack spirit at the head of this IXth
Corps would have been just victory !
Anchored at 9 p.m. and, before going to bed,
sent following cable :
" From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Secretary
of State for War.
" The result of my visit to the IXth Corps,
from which I am just back, has bitterly disappointed
me. There is nothing for it but to allow them time
to rest and reorganize, unless I force Stopford and
his Divisional Generals to undertake a general
action for which, in their present frame of mind,
they have no heart. In fact, these generals are
unfit for it. With exceeding reluctance I am obliged
to give them time to rest and reorganize their
troops.
" Though we were to repeat our landing operations
a hundred times, we would never dare hope to
reproduce conditions so favourable as to put one
division ashore under cover of dark and, as the
day broke, have the next division sailing in to its
support. No advantage was taken of these fav-
ourable conditions and, for reasons which I can
only explain by letter, the swift advance was not
delivered, therefore, the mischief is done. Until
KAVAK TEPE ATTACK COLLAPSES 103
we are ready to advance again, reorganized and
complete, we must go slow."
August, 1915. Imbros. Before breakfast,
Braithwaite brought me a statement of our inter-
view of last night with Stopford. He dictated it,
directly he got back last night ; i.e., about three
hours after the event. I agree with every word :
" Notes of an interview which took place on board
H.M.S. Triad between 6 and 7 p.m. on the
13th August, 1915, between the General Com-
manding and Sir Frederick Stopford, com-
manding 9th Corps.
Present :
General Sir Ian Hamilton, G.C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C.,
Lieut. -General Hon. Sir Frederick Stopford,
K.C.M.G., etc.,
Major-General Braithwaite, C.B.
" Sir Frederick represented that the 9th Corps
were not fit to undertake an advance at the present
moment. Questioned why, he replied that the
losses had been considerable, that the disorganization
of units was very great, and that the length of the
line he had to hold was all too thinly held as it was.
He stated that his Divisional Generals were entirely
of the same opinion as himself ; in fact, he gave
us completely the impression that they were
4 not for it,' but he only specifically mentioned
Hammersley and Lindley. He said water was no
difficulty. He implied that the troops were getting
better every day, and given time to rest and reor-
ganize, he thought they would be able in time
104 GALLIPOLI DIARY
to make an advance. But he was very emphatic
on the point that at present such a thing as an
attack had practically no chance of success. He
told us that the opposition in the centre about
Anafarta Ova could no longer be classed as
sniping, but that it was regular opposition. But
as he also told us that his landing was an opposed
landing, I think perhaps that during the short time
he has been on active service in this country he
has not quite realized what opposition really means.
But the salient fact remains that none of his Divi-
sional Generals who would be employed in the attack
thought that that attack would have any chance
of success whatever. Indeed, he saw every diffi-
culty, and though he kept saying that he was
an optimist, he foresaw every bad thing that could
possibly happen and none of the bright spots. It
was a most depressing interview, but it left no
doubt in the minds of the hearers that it would be
quite useless to order an attack to be undertaken by
a Commander and Divisional Generals whose hearts
were confessedly not in it, who saw a Turk behind
every bush, a battalion behind every hill, and a
Brigade behind every mountain."
At lunch time Lord K. answered my last night's
cable :
" If you should deem it necessary to replace
Stopford, Mahon and Hammersley, have you any
competent Generals to take their place ? From
your report I think Stopford should come home.
" This is a young man's war, and we must have
commanding officers that will take full advantage
of opportunities which occur but seldom. If,
KAVAK TEPE ATTACK COLLAPSES 105
therefore, any Generals fail, do not hesitate to act
promptly.
" Any Generals I have available I will send
you."
Close on the top of this tardy appreciation of
youth, comes another cable from him saying he has
asked French to let me have Byng, Home and
Kavanagh. " I hope," he says, " Stopford has
been relieved by you already."
Have cabled back thanking him with all my heart ;
saying I shall be glad of the Generals he mentions
as " Byng, Kavanagh and Home are all flyers."
Between them, these two messages have cleared
the air. Mahon's seniority has been at the root
of this evil. K.'s conscience tells him so and,
therefore, he pricks his name now upon the fatal
list. But he did not know, when he cabled, that
Mahon had done well. I shall replace Stopford
forthwith by de Lisle and chance Mahon's seniority.
De Robeck came over for an hour in the evening.
Lord and Lady Brassey arrived in the Sunbeam,
together with two young friends. They have both
of them shown great enterprise in getting here.
The dear old man gave me a warm greeting,
but also something of a shock by talking about
our terrible defeat : by condoling and by saying
I had been asked to do the impossible. I
have not been asked to do anything impossible
in taking Constantinople. The feat is perfectly
feasible. For the third time since we began it
trembled in the balance a week ago. Nor is the
capture of Suvla Bay and the linking up thereof
106 GALLIPOLI DIARY
with Anzac a defeat : a cruel disappointment,
no doubt, but not a defeat ; for, two more such
defeats, measured in mere acreage, will give us
the Narrows. A doctor at Kephalos, it seems,
infected them with this poison of despondency. In
their Sunbeam they will make first class carriers.
I5th August, 1915. Irribros. De Lisle has come
over to relieve Stopford. He has got his first
instructions l and is in close communication with
myself and General Staff on the preparations for
the next move which will be supported by the
Yeomanry from Egypt and by some more artillery.
I had meant to make time to run across to Suvla
to-day but Stopford may wish to see me on his
way to Mudros so I shall sit tight in case he does.
Cables to and from K. about our new Generals.
Byng, Maude and Fanshawe are coming. A
brilliant trio. All of the three Fanshawe brothers
are good ; this one worked under me on Salisbury
Plain. Maude is splendid ! Byng will make every
one happy ; he never spares himself. K. has
agreed to let de Lisle hold the command of the
9th Corps until Byng turns up. He wants Birdie
to take over the control of the whole of the Northern
theatre, i.e., Anzac and Suvla. I must think over
this. Meanwhile, have cabled back, " I am en-
chanted to hear Byng, Maude and Fanshawe are
coming I could wish for no better men."
Sent also following which explains itself :
" When I appointed de Lisle to command
1 See Appendix IV containing actual letter of instructions.
IAN H., 1920.
KAVAK TEPE ATTACK COLLAPSES 107
temporarily the IXth Corps I sent the following
telegram to Mahon :
" ' Although de Lisle is junior to you, Sir Ian
hopes that you will waive your seniority and
continue in command of the Xth Division, at
any rate during the present phase of operations.'
" To this Mahon sent the following reply :
' I respectfully decline to waive my seniority
and to serve under the officer you name. Please
let me know to whom I am to hand over the
command of the Division.'
" Consequently, I have appointed Brigadier-
General F. F. Hill to command temporarily the
Division and have ordered Mahon to go to Mudros
to await orders. Will you please send orders as
to his disposal. As Peyton is not due from
Egypt till 18th August, he was not in any case
available."
Also :
" Personal. You will like to know that the
XHIth Division is said to have fought very well
and with great tenacity of spirit. In many in-
stances poor company leading is said to have been
responsible for undue losses."
16th August, 1915. Imbros. A great press of
business. Amongst other work, have written a
long cable home giving them the whole story up
to date. Lots of petty troubles. Stopford goes
to Mudros direct. De Lisle makes a thorough
overhaul at Suvla.
108 GALLTPOLI DIARY
Glyn and Hankey both looked in upon me. It
is a relief to have an outsider of Hankey 's calibre
on the spot. He said, " Thank God ! " when he
heard of K.'s cable, and urged Birdie should be
told off to take Suvla in hand, in his stead. I
suppose the G.S. have let him get wind of K.'s
identical suggestion. As I told Hankey, I have
not yet made up my mind. But it would be an
awkward job for Birdie with all the Anzacs to run,
and no nearer Suvla really in point of time than
we are. Nor is he staffed for so big a business.
Hankey has been too long away from executive
work to realize that difficulty. But the decisive
factor is this ; that having been closely associated
with him and with his work for a good many years,
I know as Hankey cannot know, how much of his
strength lies in his personal touch and presence :
spread his powers too wide he loses that toflch.
Felt the better for my talk with Hankey. He
can grasp the bigness of what we are up against
and can yet keep his head and see that the game
is worth the candle and that it is in our hands the
moment we make up our minds to pay the price
of the illuminant.
Have written to the Chief of the Imperial General
Staff saying :
" I have just been through a horrible mental
crisis quite different from the ordinary anxiety
of the battlefield, where I usually see what I
think to be my way and chance it. I refer to
Freddy Stopford. Here is a man who has com-
mitted no fault ; whose life-long conscientious
study of his profession has borne the best fruits
KAVAK TEPE ATTACK COLLAPSES 109
in letting him see the right thing to do and how it
should be done. And yet he fails when many a
man possessing not one quarter of his military
qualifications carries on with flying colours. For
there is no use beating about the bush now and,
simply, he was not big enough in character to face
up to the situation. It overwhelmed him.
" A month ago we had the Turks down, undoubt-
edly and, whenever we could get a little ammuni-
tion together, we were confident we could take a
line of trenches. As for their attacks, it was obvious
their men were not for it. Now their four new
Divisions of fine fighting material seem to have
animated the whole of the rest of the force with
their spirit, and the Turks have never fought so
boldly as they are doing to-day. They are tough
to crack, but D.V., we will be the tougher of the
two."
Ylih August, 1915. Imbros. From his cable
of the 14th, K. seems prepared to see me relieve
Mahon of his command. But Mahon is a fighter and
if I give him time to think over things a bit at
Mudros, he'll be sure to think better. I am sure
the wisest course to take, is to take time. A
Lieutenant-General in the British Army chucking
up his command whilst his Division is actually
under fire is a very unhappy affair. Lord Bobs
used to say that a soldier asked, for the good of the
cause, to serve as a drummer boy under his worst
enemy should do so not only with alacrity but with
joy. Braithwaite agrees with me that we must
110 GALLIPOLI DIARY
just take the responsibility of doing nothing at
all and of leaving him quietly to cool down at
Mudros. Hill, who carries on, was the General
in command at Mitylene when I inspected there ;
he is a good fellow ; he was anxious to push on
upon that fatal 7th August at Suvla and everyone
says he is a stout fellow.
Have got the name of the doctor who upset the
Brasseys with his yarns. He declares he only
retailed the tales of the wounded youngsters whom
he tended. No more to be said. He has studied
microbes extensively but one genus has clearly
escaped his notice : he has never studied or grasped
the fell methods of the microbes of rumour or panic.
Am I sure that I myself have not crabbed my own
show a bit in telling the full story of our fight to
K. this afternoon ? No, I am by no means sure.
" (No. M.F. 562.) From General Sir Ian Hamil-
ton to Earl Kitchener. Have thought it best to
lay the truth fully before you, and am now able
to give a complete resume of the past week's opera-
tions, and an appreciation of the situation confront-
ing me.
" In broad outline, my plan was to hold the
Turks in the Southern zone by constant activity
of French and VHIth Corps, and to throw all the
reinforcements into the Northern zone with the
object of defeating the enemy opposite Anzac,
seizing a new base at Suvla, and gaining a position
astride the narrow part of the peninsula. With
this object, I reinforced General Birdwood with
the XHIth Division, 29th Brigade, Xth Division,
KAVAK TEPE ATTACK COLLAPSES 111
and 29th Indian Brigade, all of which were secretly
dribbled ashore at Anzac Cove on the three nights
preceding commencement of operations. This was
done without arousing the suspicions of the enemy.
Arrangements were made for the Xlth Division
to land at Suvla Bay on the same night as General
Birdwood commenced his attack. Meanwhile, the
Turks were deceived by ill-concealed preparations
for landings on Asiatic coast near Mitylene, at
Enos, South of Gaba Tepe.
" Following is detailed plan of operations:
" On the afternoon of 6th August the VHIth
Corps were to attack Krithia trenches, and simul-
taneously General Birdwood was to attack Lone
Pine trenches on his right front, as though attempt-
ing to break out in this direction. In this way it was
hoped to draw the Turkish reinforcements towards
Krithia and Gaba Tepe and away from Anzac's
left and Suvla Bay. At 10 p.m. General Bird wood's
main attack was to develop on his left flank, the
Turkish outposts were to be rushed and an advance
made in several columns up the precipitous ravines
leading to Chunuk Bair and the summit of Hill
305, which it was hoped might be captured before
daybreak.
" As soon as the high ridge was in our hands an
advance was to be made down the Hill 305 to take
in the rear the trenches on Baby 700 (see enlarged
map of Anzac positions) and at the same time the
troops in the original Anzac position were to
attack all along the line in an endeavour to break
out and hurl the enemy off the Sari Bair. Mean-
112 GALLIPOLI DIARY
while the Xlth Division was to commence landing
10.30 p.m. on 6th August, one brigade inside Suvla
Bay, two brigades on shore to South were to seize
and hold all hills covering Bay and especially
Yilghin Burnu and Ismail Oglu Tepe on which
enemy were believed to have guns which could
bring fire to bear either on back of General Bird-
wood's advance on Hill 305, or on Suvla Bay.
The ridge from Anafarta Sagir to Aja Liman was
also to be lightly held. The Xth Division, less one
brigade, was to follow Xlth Division at daybreak
and LUIrd Division was held in general reserve.
The LIVth Division had ot arrived and could not
be employed in the first instance.
" The moment Stopford had fulfilled the above
tasks, which, owing to the small number of the
enemy in this neighbourhood and the absence of
any organize4 system of trenches, were considered
comparatively easy, he was to advance South-west
through Biyuk Anafarta with the object of assisting
Birdwood in the event of his attack being held up.
" Reliable information indicated the strength
of the enemy about Suvla Bay to be one regiment,
one squadron and some Gendarmerie with at most
twelve guns, and events have shown that this
estimate was correct. It was also believed that
the -enemy had 36,000 in the Southern zone, 27,000
against Anzac, and 37,000 in reserve. Also 45,000
near Keshan who could not arrive for three days
and 10,000 on Asiatic shore.
" The attack by the VHIth Corps opposite Krithia
took place as arranged, but was met by determined
KAVAK TEPE ATTACK COLLAPSES 113
opposition. Some enemy trenches were captured,
but the Turks were found in great strength and full
of fight. They counter-attacked repeatedly on
the night of 6th/7th, and eventually regained the
ground we had taken. Prisoners captured stated
that the Turks had planned to attack us that night
in any case which accounts for their strength.
" In the Northern zone General Birdwood's
afternoon attack was successful and Lone Pine
trenches were captured by a most gallant Australian
assault. Throughout the day, and for three suc-
cessive days the enemy made repeated attempts to
recapture the position, but each time were repulsed
with severe loss. At 10 p.m. the main advance
on the left flank by the New Zealanders, Xlllth
Division, 29th Brigade and Cox's Brigade began,
and in spite of stupendous difficulties, moving
by night in most difficult country,, all enemy's
posts in foot of hills were rushed and captured
up to and including Damakjelik Bair. The enemy
was partly surprised, but his reinforcements were
all called up, and this, coupled with the extreme
difficulty of the country, made it impossible to
reach the crest of the hill that day or the following.
The position immediately below the crest, however,
was reached, and on the morning of the 8th, after
severe fighting, two battalions of the Xlllth
Division and Gurkhas reached the top of Kurt
Ketchede, and two battalions of New Zealanders
established themselves on the crest of the ridge
at Chunuk Bair.
"Unfortunately, the troops on Kurt Ketchede
were shelled off the ridge by our own gun fire,
VOL. II. 9
114 GALLIPOLI DIARY
and were unable to recapture it ; and 48 hours
later two battalions of the Xlllth Division, who
had relieved tired New Zealanders on Chunuk
Bair, were driven back by determined daybreak
assault, carried by the Turks in many successive
lines, shoulder to shoulder. Our troops were too
weary, and much too disorganized to make a
counter-attack at that time, and could only
maintain positions below crest. Water supply,
which had always been an anxiety, began to fail,
and grave difficulties arose which prevented the
possibility of reinforcing Birdwood, and almost
necessitated our giving up our gains. All this,
however, has now been put right.
" Meanwhile, Stopford's Corps at Suvla had
landed most successfully, but, owing to lack of
energy and determination on the part of leaders,
and, perhaps, partly to the inexperience of the
troops, had failed to take advantage of the oppor-
tunities as already reported.
" The result is that my coup has so far failed.
It was soon realized that it was necessary to give
impetus to the IXth Corps, and the LUIrd Division
was put in on 8th-9th. By this time the LIVth
Division was available as general reserve. Unfortu-
nately, the LUIrd Division broke in my hand,
leaving me like a fencer with rapier broken, and
by the time the LIVth Division arrived the remain-
ing troops of the Corps were too tired and disor-
ganized for further immediate effort.
" The IXth Corps holds the position from Kiretch
Tepe Sirt, bench mark 2 ; Sulajik ; Yilghin Burnu,
KAVAK TEPE ATTACK COLLAPSES 115
with right flank thrown south to connect with
Birdwood at Kazlar Chair. Godley has picket
between Kazlar Chair and Damakjelik Bair, whence
his line runs South-east to the spur South of Abdel
Rahman Bair, thence South-west to square 80 D,
South-east again to within 300 yards of Point 161
on Chunuk Bair, and thence back to the left of
the Anzac position.
" De Lisle has at his disposal the Xth Division,
less one brigade, the Xlth, LUIrd and LIVth
Divisions ; total rifles, owing to casualties, under
30,000. The Suvla losses have been too severe
considering extent and nature of the fighting
that has taken place, and can only be attributed
to the inexperience of the troops and their
leaders, and the daring way in which the enemy
skirmishers presumed upon it in the broken and
wooded country. Birdwood has lost about 13,000
since the action began, and has now available some
25,000 rifles. The VHIth Corps has 23,000 rifles,
and the French 17,000 rifles.
c The Turks have continued to be most active
in the South, no doubt with the object of preventing
us moving troops, but apparently they have now
no more than 35,000 in this zone. The majority
of the enemy Commander's troops are against
Anzac and in reserve in the valley between Hills
305 and 261, his strategic flank.
" In the Northern zone, in the fighting line at
Suvla and Anzac and in reserve he may now have
in all 75,000, and can either reinforce Hill 305
or issue through the gap between the two Anaf artas
116 GALLIPOLI DIARY
to oppose any attack on Ismail Oglu Tepe or on
the ridge running thence to Anafarta Sagir. He
has guns on Hill 305, on Ismail Oglu Tepe, and on
the ridge North of Anafarta Sagir from which he
can shell landing places at Suvla Bay, but is not
holding the latter ridge in strength, nor do I think
he has enough troops to enable him to do so.
' The position regarding the Turkish reinforce-
ments from Keshan is not clear. Only small
parties have been located by aeroplanes marching
South, and it appears that either this information
was incorrect or that the enemy's forces had
already got as far as the peninsula before fighting
began.
" I consider it urgently necessary to seize Ismail
Oglu Tepe and Anafarta Sagir at the earliest
possible moment, and I have ordered de Lisle
to make the attempt at the earliest opportunity.
I have also ordered Birdwood to make a fresh
attack on Hill 305 as soon as troops are reorganized
and the difficulties of water supply solved, but for
this he will require drafts and fresh troops. I
have great hopes that these attacks may yet be
successful, but it is impossible to disguise the
fact that owing to the failure of the IXth Corps
to take advantage of opportunities and the fact
that surprise may now be absent, and that the
enemy is prepared and in much greater strength,
my difficulties are enormously increased. In any
case my cadres will be so depleted as a result of
action that I shall need large reinforcements to
enable me to bring the operations to a happy
conclusion.
KAVAK TEPE ATTACK COLLAPSES 117
" The Turkish losses have been heavier than ours,
and the total number of prisoners taken is 702,
but I estimate that they have now in the peninsula
at least 110,000 rifles to my 95,000 and they have
all the advantage of position. They have, appar-
ently, all the ammunition they need and obtain
reinforcements as they are wanted. In particular,
we have had no news of the arrival of the 45,000
troops reported to be at Keshan, and ,only one
of the Asiatic Divisions has as yet come over.
I had hoped that their reinforcements would be of
poor quality and not a match for ours but this is
not the case, and unfortunately the Turks have
temporarily gained the moral ascendency over
some of our new troops. If, therefore, this cam-
paign is to be brought to an early and successful
conclusion large reinforcements will have to be
sent to me drafts for the formations already here,
and new formations with considerably reduced
proportion of artillery. It has become a question
of who can slog longest and hardest.
" Owing to the difficulty of carrying on a winter
campaign, and the lateness of the season, these
troops should be sent immediately. My British
Divisions are at present 45,000 under establish-
ment, exclusive of about 9,000 promised or on the
way. If this deficit were made up, and new forma-
tions totalling 50,000 rifles sent out as well, these,
with the 60,000 rifles which I estimate I shall have
at the time of their arrival, should give me the
necessary superiority, unless the absence of other
enemies allows the Turks to bring up large additional
reinforcements.
118 GALLIPOLI DIARY
" I hope you will realize how nearly this opera-
tion was a success complete beyond anticipation.
The surprise was complete, and the army was
thrown ashore in record time, practically without
loss, and a little more push on the part of the IXth
Corps would have relieved the pressure on Anzac,
facilitated the retention of Chunuk Bair, secured
Suvla Bay as a port, and threatened the enemy's
right in a way that should have enabled Anzac
to turn a success into a great victory.
" We are up against the Turkish Army which is
well commanded and fighting bravely."
After all's said and done the troops at Helles
and Anzac are still perfectly game and we have
got nearer our goal. We started forth to :
(1) Seize Suvla Bay ;
(2) Break out of Anzac and join on to Suvla ;
(3) Seize Sari Bair crestline ;
(4) Hold enough of the hinterland of Suvla
Bay to make it a comfortable harbour.
(1) and (2) we have carried through handsomely.
We have trebled our holding at Anzac and we
have put Suvla Bay in our pocket. (3) we have
not done ; we are short of it by a couple of
hundred yards ; (4) we have not done ; it is
a practicable harbour but subject certainly to
annoyance. In honest, gambler's language, we
have won a good stake but we have not broke
the Ottoman Bank.
KAVAK TEPE ATTACK COLLAPSES 119
De Lisle reports confusion throughout Suvla
Bay area. He must have three or four days to
pull the troops together before he organizes a
fresh offensive. The IXth Corps has been un
corps sans tete.
CHAPTER XVII
THE LAST BATTLE
ISth August, 1915. Imbros. Freddie and I left
in the Arno this morning ; Braithwaite and his
boy Val came with us. We sailed for Suvla via
Anzac and held a meeting which was nearer a
Council of War than anything up to date. Dawnay,
Deedes and Beadon stood by ; so did Generals
Skeen, Hammersley and Peyton. Reed, C.G.S.,
IXth Corps, was also present. The discussion of
the steps to be taken within the nex; two or three
days lasted an hour and a half. Every one who
spoke had studied the data and the ground and
there was no divergence of view, which was a
comfort. Our attack will have as its objective the
seizure of a foothold on the high ground. Anzacs
will co-operate. As I explained to the Generals,
we hardly dare hope to make a clean break through
till drafts and fresh munitions arrive as the Turks
now have had too long to dig in. But if we can
seize and keep a point upon the watershed (how-
ever small) from which we can observe the drop
of our shell, we can knock out the landing places
of the Turks. At the end, I told them I had
asked for 95,000 fresh rifles, 50,000 in new
formations, 45,000 to bring my skeleton units
up to strength, adding, that if I was refused
that help then I felt Government had better get
THE LAST BATTLE 121
someone cleverer than myself to put their Fleet
into the Marmora. The Generals seemed satisfied
with my demands and sympathetic towards my
personal attitude.
As to the coming attack, the tone of the Confer-
ence was hopeful. They agreed that the nut was
hard for our enfeebled forces to crack, but they
seemed to think that if we were once to get the
enemy on the run, with the old 29th Division and
the new, keen Yeomanry on their heels, we might
yet go further than we expected. One Brigade
of the 29th Division has been brought round from
Helles to put shape and form into the 53rd Division.
Peyton's men are to be attached to the Irish
Division. There is a new spirit of energy and hope
in the higher ranks but the men have meanwhile
been aimlessly marched and counter-marched,
muddled, and knocked about so that their spirit
has suffered in consequence.
No end of Yeomen on the beaches ; the cream
of agricultural England. Many of them recog-
nized me from my various home inspections.
Would like very much to have had a war inspection,
but the enemy gunners are too inquisitive.
De Lisle tells me he has now been round every
corner of Suvla and that the want of grip through-
out the higher command has been worse than he
dared to put on paper. To reorganize will take
several weeks ; but we have to try and act within
two or three days.
Skeen told us that when the Turks stuck up a
placard saying Warsaw had fallen, the Australians
gave three hearty cheers.
122 GALLIPOLI DIARY
The chief trouble in making plans for the coming
attack lies in the want of cover on, and for a mile
inland of, the Suvla Bay beaches. The whole
stretch of the flat land immediately East and South
of the Bay lies open to the Turkish gunners. This
is no longer a serious drawback if the men are
holding lines of trenches. But when the trench
system is not yet in working order, and they want
to deploy, then it is so awkward a factor that I
would have been prepared to turn the whole battle
into a night attack. The others were not for it.
They thought that the troops were not highly
enough trained and had lost too many officers
to be able to find their way over this country in
the darkness. They are in immediate touch with
the men : I am not.
Lindley asked if he might walk with me to the
Beach, and on the way down he told me frankly
his Division had gone to pieces and that he did
not feel it in himself to pull it together again.
Very fine of him to make a clean breast of it,
I thought, and said so : also advised him to put
what he had told me into writing to de Lisle, when
we will relieve him and I promised for my part,
to try and fit him with some honourable but
less onerous job.
On Hammersley's report, Sitwell, Brigadier of
the 34th Brigade, llth Division, has just been
relieved of his command.
19th August, 1915. Imbros. Sat sweating here,
literally and metaphorically, from morn till dewy
eve. King's Messenger left in the evening.
THE LAST BATTLE 123
Altham came over from Mudros. He stays to-
night and we will work together to-morrow when
the mails are off my mind.
Hankey dined and left with the King's Messenger
by the Imogene. He has been a real help. The
Staff has never quite cottoned to the chiel amang
us takin' notes, but that is, I think, from a notion
that it is not loyal to Lord K. to press the P.M.'s
P.S. too closely to their bosom. From my personal
standpoint, it will be worth anything to us if,
amidst the flood of false gossip pouring out by
this very mail to our Dardanelles Committee,
to the Press, to Egypt and to London Drawing
Rooms, we have sticking up out of it, even one
little rock in the shape of an eye-witness.
A shocking aeroplane smash up within a few
yards of us. A brilliant young Officer (Captain
Collet of the R.F.C.) killed outright and three men
badly hurt.
20th August, 1915. Stayed in my tent keeping
an eye on to-morrow. Put through a lot with
Altham. Am pressing him to hurry up with his
canteens at Helles, Anzac and Suvla. In May
I cabled the Q.M.G. begging him either to let me
run a canteen on the lines of the South African
Field Force Canteen, myself ; or, to run it from
home, himself ; or, to put the business into the
hands of some private firm like the Mess and Canteen
Company, or Lipton's, or Harrods or anything he
liked. In South Africa we could often buy some-
thing. In France our troops can buy anything.
124 GALLIPOLI DIARY
Here, had they each the purse of Fortunatus,
they could buy nothing. A matter this, I won't
say of life and death, but of sickness and health.
Now, after three months without change of diet,
the first canteen ship is about due. A mere flea
bite of 10,000 worth. I am sending the whole of
it to the Anzacs to whom it will hardly be more
use than a bun is to a she bear. Only yesterday
a letter came in from Birdie telling me that the
doctors all say that the sameness of the food is
making the men sick. The rations are A.I., but
his men now loathe the very look of them after
having had nothing else for three months. Birdie
says, " If we could only get this wretched canteen
ship along, and if, when she comes she contains
anything like condiments to let them buy freely
from her, I believe it would make all the difference
in the world. But the fact remains that at present
we cannot count on anything like a big effort from
the men who have been here all these months."
De Robeck came over at 4 p.m., by formal
appointment, to talk business, and deadly serious
business at that ! He has heard, by cable I suppose,
that the people at home will see him through if
he sees his way to strike a blow with the Fleet.
He takes this as a pretty strong hint to push through,
or, to make some sort of a battleship attack to
support us. De Robeck sfcnows that when the
Fleet goes in our fighting strength goes up. But
he can gauge, as I cannot, the dangers the Fleet
will thereby incur. Every personal motive urges
me to urge him on. But I have no right to shove my
oar in no right at all until I can say that we are
THE LAST BATTLE 125
done unless the Fleet do make an attack. Can
I say so ? No ; if we get the drafts and munitions
we can still open the Straits on our own and without
calling on the sister Service for further sacrifice.
So I fell back on first principles and said he must
attack if he thought it right from the naval point
of view but that we soldiers did not call for succour
or ask him to do anything desperate : ' You know
how we stand," I said ; "do what is right from
the naval point of view and as to what is right from
that point of view, I am no judge."
The Admiral went away : I have been no help
to him but I can't help it.
Hardly had he gone when Braithwaite (who
had heard what was in the wind by a side wind)
came and besought me to try and induce the Admiral
to slip his battleships at the Straits. All the
younger men of war are dying to have a dash,
he said. That's as it may be but my mind is clear.
If a sailor on land is a fish out of water, a soldier
at sea is like a game cock in a duckpond. When
de Robeck said on March 22nd he wanted the help
of the whole Army that was quite in order. He
would not have been in order at least, I don't
think so had he said in what manner he wanted
the Army to act after it had got ashore. We
are being helped now by the Navy ; daily, hourly :
we could not exist without the Fleet ; but it is
not for me to say I think the battleships should or
should not take chances of mines and torpedoes.
Brodrick is quite seedy. We are all afraid he
won't be able to stick it out much longer although
126 GALLIPOLI DIARY
he is making the most heroic efforts. In the
morning I attended the funeral of young Collet,
killed yesterday so tragically. A long, slow march
through heavy sand all along the beach to Kephalos ;
then up through some small rocky gullies, frightfully
hot, until, at last, we reached a graveyard. The
congregation numbered many of the poor boy's
comrades who seemed much cut up about his
untimely end.
The P.M. has answered my cable to Lord K.
asking for 45,000 rifles to fill up and for 50,000
fresh rifles. K. is in France, he says, and I will
have my answer when he gets back. The 5th
Royal Scots are down to 289 rank and file. I
have just cabled about them. Something must
be done. Certainly it must be " out " for that
particular unit if they don't very soon get some
men. The War Office still refer to them as a
Battalion !
2lst August, 1915. Sailed for Suvla about 1 o'clock
with Braithwaite, Aspinall, Dawnay, Deedes, Ellison,
Pollen and Maitland. The first time I have set
forth with such a Staff. Not wishing to worry
de Lisle, I climbed up to the Karakol Dagh, whence
I got something like a bird's eye view of the arena
which was wrapt from head to foot in a mantle of
pearly mist. Assuredly the Ancients would have
ascribed this phenomenon to the intervention of
an Immortal. Nothing like it had ever been seen
by us until that day and the cloud mist call
it what you will must have had an unfortunate
bearing on the battle. On any other afternoon
THE LAST BATTLE 127
the enemy's trenches would have been sharply
and clearly lit up, whilst the enemy's gunners would
have been dazzled by the setting sun. But under
this strange shadow the tables were completely
turned ; the outline of the Turkish trenches were
blurred and indistinct, whereas troops advancing
from the Aegean against the Anafartas stood out
in relief against a pale, luminous background.
As a result of our instructions ; of conferences
and of the war council we had got our plan perfectly
clear and ship-shape. Everyone understood it.
The 10th Division was Corps reserve and was lying
down in mass about the old Hill 10 in the scrub.
We had to trust to luck here as they were under the
enemy's fire if they were spotted. But very strict
orders as to keeping low and motionless had been
issued and we had just to hope for the best. The
Yeomanry were also Corps reserve at Lala Baba
where they were safe. But when they advanced,
supposing they had to, they would have to cross
a perfectly open plain under shell fire. This was
the special blot on the scheme but there was no
getting away from it. There was no room for
them in the front line trenches and communication
trenches to the front had not yet been dug.
As to the attack: on the extreme right the
Anzacs and Indian Brigade were to push out from
Damakjelik Bair towards Hill 60. Next to them
in the right centre the llth Division was to push
for the trenches at Hetman Chair. On the left
centre the 29th Division were to storm the now
heavily entrenched Hill 70. Holding that and
Ismail Oglu Tepe we should command the plateau
128 GALLIPOLI DIARY
between the two Anafartas ; knock out the enemy's
guns and observation posts commanding Suvla
Bay, and should easily be able thence to work our-
selves into a position whence we will enfilade the
rear of the Sari Bair Ridge and begin to get a
strangle grip over the Turkish communications
to the Southwards. From the extreme left on
Kiretch Tepe Sirt by the sea, to Sulajik where
they joined the 29th Division the 53rd and 54th
Divisions were simply holding the line.
Only the broad outline of the fighting was visible
through the dim twilight atmosphere and I have
not yet got any details. Our bombardment began
at 2.30 and lasted till 3 p.m., very inadequate in
duration but the most our munitions would run to.
Then, to the accompaniment of quick battery
salvoes of shrapnel from the enemy and a heavy
rattle of musketry, the whole line from about
a mile due East of the Easternmost point of the
Salt Lake down to Damakjelik Bair, nearly two
miles, began to stir and move Eastwards. We had
the joy of seeing the Turks begin to clear out of
the trenches on Hill 70, and by 3.30 p.m. it seemed
as if distinct progress was being made : about
that time it was I saw the Yeomen marching in
extended order over the open ground to the South
of the Salt Lake in the direction of Hetman Chair.
The enemy turned a baddish shrapnel fire on to
them, and although they bore it most unflinch-
ingly, old experience told me that their nervous
fighting energy was being used up all the time.
It only these men could have been brought within
charging distance, fresh and unbroken by any
THE LAST BATTLE 129
ordeal ! But here was just one of the drawbacks
of the battlefield and no getting over it.
After a bit, I went down to de Lisle and found
him sitting on a little spur about fifty yards from
his own Headquarters with one of his Staff Officers.
He was smoking a pipe quite calm. There is
usually nothing to be said or to be done once our
war dogs have been slipped. A soldier might as
well try to correct the aim of his bullet after he
has pulled the trigger ! Whilst I was there we
heard probably about 4.30 that the llth Division
had captured the Turkish first line trenches which
run North and South of Hetman Chair. Real
good news this. We were considerably bucked
up. Climbed back to Karakol Dagh but, from
that time onwards, could make out nothing of
the course of the battle save that Ismail Oglu
Tepe was not yet taken. As to Knoll 70, it was
completely shrouded in dust and smoke. Sometimes
it seemed as if the Turkish guns were firing against
it ; sometimes we thought they were our own.
Far away by Kaiajik Aghala things looked well
as many enemy shrapnel were bursting there or
thereabouts showing our men must have got home.
By 6.30 it had become too dark to see anything.
The dust mingling with the strange mist, and also
with the smoke of shrapnel and of the hugest
and most awful blazing bush fire formed an impene-
trable curtain.
As the light faded the rifles and guns grew silent.
So I clambered down off my perch and went again
to de Lisle' s post of command where I found him
still sitting. He had seen no more than I had seen.
VOL. II. 10
130 GALLIPOLI DIARY
The bulk of our reserves had been thrown in. No
more news had come to hand. All was quiet
now. Our role, in fact, was finished, and Marshall,
the man on the spot, by now held our destinies
in his hands. Firm hands too. The telephone
was working all right and I told de Lisle to try and
get a message through to him quickly saying that
I hoped he would be able to dig in and hold fast
to whatever he had gained. I have no fears about
de Lisle's nerve ; nor of Marshall's.
Went on board and sailed for Headquarters,
through darkness made visible by the fires blazing
on the battlefield. No shooting. Got on the
wires and found no news from Anzac nor more from
de Lisle. Crossed backwards and forwards the best
part of the night between my tent and the G.S.
tent, but de Lisle had heard nothing definite enough
to report. Brodrick still has fever. Buthven has
been wounded.
22nd August, 1915. Suvla gone wrong again ;
Anzac right. Left G.H.Q. at 11 o'clock with Braith-
waite, Commodore Keyes, Captain Phillimore,
Aspinall, Beadon, Freddy and Val in the Arno
and went direct to Anzac. There I picked up Birdie
and heard the Anzac part of the battle. The
Indian Brigade have seized the well at Kabak
Kuyu, and that fine soldier, Russell, fixed himself
into Kaiajik Aghala and is holding on there tooth
and nail. There was fighting going on there at
the moment but Russell is confident. How de-
lightful it is to have to deal with men who are
confident !
THE LAST BATTLE 131
This success of old Cox's is worth anything. The
well alone, I suppose, might be valued at twenty
or thirty thousand a year seeing it gives us beautiful
spring water in free gift from Mother Earth instead
of very dubious fluid conveyed at God only knows
what cost from the Nile to Anzac Cove. If we can
only hold on to Kaiajik Aghala, then the road
between Anzac and Suvla will be freed from the
sniper's bullet.
Went on to Suvla and landed with all my posse,
remaining in consultation with Corps Headquarters
till 3.30.
Our attack on Hill 70 and Ismail Oglu Tepe has
failed. The enemy has dug himself well in by now
and, therefore, we depended far more on our
gun fire than we did on the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th.
Unfortunately, the bombardment seems to have
been pretty near futile not the fault of the gunners,
but simply because, on the one hand, the mist
interfered with the accuracy of their aim, on the
other, shortage of shell prevented them from making
up for inaccuracy by quantity. Then the bush
fires seem to have come along in the most terrible
fashion and interposed between our brave 29th
and the Turks. The ancient Gods fought against
us yesterday : mist and fire, still hold their own
against the inventions of man. Last but not least,
all are agreed the fine edge of the llth Division has
been at last blunted and small wonder : there
is no use attacking any more with the New Army
until it has been well rested and refreshed with new
drafts.
132 GALLIPOLI DIARY
So far de Lisle has no clear or connected story
of the battle. The 29th Division say they were
shouldered off their true line of attack by the
llth Division, then driven in by the fire ; the llth
Division, on their side, say that the Yeomen barged
into them and threw them off their line. Had we
been able to dig in we would have made good a
lot of ground. But Marshall, not showy or brilliant
but one of my most sound and reliable soldiers,
decided, although he knew my wishes and hopes,
that the troops had got themselves so mixed up
and disorganized that it would be imprudent.
So orders were issued by him, on the battlefield,
to fall back to the original line. There was neither
use nor time to refer back to de Lisle and he had to
come to the decision himself. I am quite confident
he will be able to give good reasons for his act.
Many of the men did not get the order and were
still out at daylight this morning when they were
heavily attacked by the Turks and fell back then
of themselves into their old trenches. Another
case of "as you were." We have lost a lot of men
and can only hope that the Turks have lost as many.
I don't think for a moment they did, not at least
in the Suvla Bay sphere, but Cox and Russell
claim to have accounted for a very great number of
them in their first retreat and in their counter-
attacks in the Southern sector of the battle.
23rd August, 1915. Imbros. Not one moment,
till to-day, to weigh bearing of K.'s message of the
20th instant, the message sent me in reply to
my appeal for 50,000 fresh troops and 45,000 drafts.
In it K. tells me that a big push is going to take
THE LAST BATTLE 133
place in the Western theatre, and that I " must
understand that no reinforcements of importance
can be diverted from the main theatre of operations
in France." Certain named transports are carrying,
he says, more troops to Egypt, and he hopes
Maxwell will be able to spare me some. If we can't
get through with these we must hang on as best we
may.
To-day it has been up to us to try and bring
home to the Higher Direction the possible effects
of trying to do two things at once ; i.e., break
through in France and break through here. We
are to stand aside for a month or so just when
we have made a big gain of ground but not the
decisive watershed gain ; when the Turks, despite
their losses in life, shell, trenches and terrain, are
shaken only ; not yet shattered.
K. sees all the Allied cards we don't. But
we do know our own hand. We know that our
Navy have now come clean down on the ^Egean
side of the fence, and have determined once for all
to make no attack on their own. We have the
feel of the situation in our bones and it was up to
us I think it was to rub it in that although the
British War Direction may decree that the Dardan-
elles are to hang on without further help, indefinitely,
yet sickness is not yet under their high command,
nor are the Turks.
So Dawnay, who is making a name for himself
as a master of plain business diction, was told off
to draft me an answer to the War Office which
should remove as many beams as possible out of
134 GALLIPOLI DIARY
their optics. He overdid it : the whole tone of
it indeed was despondent, so much so that, as I
told Braithwaite, a S. of S. for War getting so
dark a presentment of our prospects would be
bound to begin to think it might be better to
recall the whole expedition. So I rewrote the
whole thing myself :
"(No. M.F. 578). From General Sir Ian
Hamilton to Secretary of State for War. We
will endeavour to do the best possible with forces
at our disposal ; we quite understand reason for
your inability to send us reinforcements necessary
to bring operations to a successful conclusion, and
thank you for putting it so plainly. After the
failure of the IXth Corps to take prompt action after
landing I took immediate steps to persevere with
plan in spite of absence of surprise and reinforced
northern wing with 2nd Mounted Division from
Egypt and XXIXth Division from Cape Helles.
These movements and the necessary re-organization
of the IXth Corps formations which had become
very mixed took time, so that I was not able to
renew the attack until 21st August.
" By then enemy positions in Ratilva Valley
had been immeasurably strengthened and I was
confronted with the difficulty that if I could not
drive the Turks back between Anafarta Sagir
and Biyuk Anafarta my new line from right of
old Anzac position to sea coast North-east of
Suvla Bay would be more than I could hold with
the troops at my disposal. It would thus be a
case of giving up either Anzac Cove or Suvla
Bay. Therefore, as a preliminary step to my fresh
THE LAST BATTLE 135
offensive I determined to mass every man available
against Ismail Oglu Tepe which position it was
necessary for me to capture whether as a first step
towards clearing the valley, or, if this proved
impossible and I was thrown on the defensive,
to secure comparative immunity from shell fire
either for Suvla Bay or Anzac Cove.
" De Lisle planned the attack well. The LUIrd
and the LIVth Divisions were to hold enemy from
Sulajik to Kiretch Tepe Sirt, and XXIXth Division
and Xlth Division were to attack Ismail Oglu
Tepe with two Brigades of Xth Division and the
Ilnd Mounted Division (5,000 rifles) in corps reserve.
I arranged that General Birdwood should co-operate
by swinging his left flank to Susak Kuyu and Kaiajik
Aghala.
" The troops attacked with great dash and stormed
the lower slopes of the hill in spite of strong en-
trenchments, but I regret to say they were not able
to attain their objective nor even to consolidate
the position gained and yesterday found the whole
line back in their original trenches except the left
of the Australians where one battalion of Gurkhas
and new Australian Battalion continue to hold
Susak Kuyu. Casualties not yet to hand, but I
fear they amounted to some 6,000 in all. This
renewed failure combined with the heavy total
casualties since 6th August, and the fact that sick-
ness has been greatly on the increase during the
last fortnight has profoundly modified my position,
and as you cannot now give me further reinforce-
ments it is only possible for me to remain on the
defensive. Naturally, I shall keep on trying to
136 GALLIPOLI DIARY
harry the Turks by local attacks and thus keep
alive the offensive spirit but it must be stated plainly
that no decisive success is to be looked for until
such time as reinforcements can be sent.
tc
The total casualties including sick since 6th
August amount to 40,000, and my total force is
now only 85,000, of which the fighting strength is
68,000. The French fighting strength is about
15,000. Sick casualties are becoming abnormal
chiefly owing to troops other than late arrivals
being worn out with hardship and incessant shell
fire, from which even when in reserve they are never
free. Where Anzac evacuated 100 a day they are
now evacuating 500, where Royal Naval Division
evacuated 10 they are now evacuating 60. The
result is that I have only some 50,000 men in the
North to hold a line from the right of Anzac to
the sea North-east of Suvla, a distance of 23,000
yards.
6 When there is no serious engagement, but only
daily trench fighting, the average net wastage from
sickness and war is 24 per cent, of fighting strength
per month. The Anzac Corps, the XXIXth
Division and the XLIInd Division are very tired
and need a rest badly. Keeping these conditions
in view, it appears inevitable that within the next
fortnight I shall be compelled to relinquish either
Suvla Bay or Anzac Cove, and must also envisage the
possibility of a still further reduction of my front
in the near future. Taking the first question of
abandoning Anzac Cove and closing to the North,
Suvla Bay is now netted and comparatively secure
from torpedo attack. Further, it offers certain
THE LAST BATTLE 137
facilities for disembarkation in winter gales. It
has, therefore, some decided advantages but though
I should be able to hold it safely at present, it
would present no facilities for further contraction
of my line to meet the future wastage of my force.
On the other hand, by retiring South of Suvla
I could first hold a line Lala Baba Yilghin Burnu
Kaiajik Aghala, and then, when normal wastage
diminished my strength below this limit I could,
if necessary, withdraw into the original Anzac
position. For these reasons it must probably be
Suvla and not Anzac which must be given up,
though on account of its advantages as indicated
above, and on account of the moral effect of retiring,
you may rely on my not relinquishing it a single
day before I am compelled.
" I do not wish to paint a gloomy picture. It
is a simple problem of arithmetic and measurement.
On the basis of normal wastage and the present
scale of drafts my total fighting strength by the
middle of December, including the French, will
be only, say, 60,000. Of this force, a certain per-
centage must of necessity be resting off the peninsula,
and the remainder will only suffice to hold Cape
Helles and the original Anzac line unless, of course,
the enemy collapses. Until now, however, the
Turks replace casualties promptly, although
frequently by untrained men. Also our other foe,
sickness, may abate, but seeing how tired are the
bulk of my force, I doubt if it would be wise to
reckon on this."
At 11.15, red hot from France, there arrived in
camp Byng (to command the 9th Corps), Maude
138 GALLIPOLI DIARY
and Fanshawe (to command Divisions) ; also
Tyrrell and Byng's A.D.C., Sir B. Brooke, nephew
of my old friend, Harry Brooke. All three Generals
remained for lunch and then the two Divisionals
made off respectively to the llth and 13th Divisions.
Byng and Brooke stayed and dined. These fellows
seem pretty cheery. Maude especially full of ardour
which will, I hope, catch on.
24:th August, 1915. Imbros. Been revolving
yesterday's long cable. How often it happens
that a draft letter, if only it is well put, fixes
the mind into its grooves. My words were brighter
than Dawnay's but the backbone was not really
me. No one knows better than myself that a
great deal more than arithmetic or measurement
will be needed to make me give ground at Suvla.
The truth is, it is infinitely difficult to spur these
high folk on without frightening them ; and then,
if you frighten them, you may frighten them too
much. That's why cables are no substitutes for
converse.
To a Commander standing in my shoes, the
forces of the infidels are not one half of the battle.
The wobblers sit like nightmares on my chest.
" Tell them the plain truth " cries conscience.
What is the plain truth ? Where is it ? Is it
in Dawnay's draft, or is it in my message, or does
it lie stillborn in some cable unwritten ? God
knows I don't ! But one thing at least is true :
to steer a course between an optimism that deprives
us of support and a pessimism that may wreck
the whole enterprise, there indeed is a Scylla and
THE LAST BATTLE 139
Charybdis problem, a two-horned dilemma, or
whatever words may best convey the notion of
the devil.
The blessed cable is now lying on the well-known
desk where K. will frown at it through his enormous
spectacles. Then he calls the Adjutant-General
and tells him Hamilton must be mad as all his
formations are full to overflowing and yet he says
he is 45,000 short. Next enters the Master-
General of the Ordnance with a polite bow and K.
tells him Hamilton must be delirious as he keeps
on raving for shell, bombs, grenades although as
he, Von Donop, knows well, he has been sent more
guns and explosives than any man has ever enjoyed
in war. Impossible to be so disrespectful to the
Field Marshal or so inconsiderate to their depart-
ment as to reject the soft impeachment. How
easily do the great ones of this world kid them-
selves back into a comfortable frame of mind !
Then K. stalks off to the Dardanelles Committee.
Turns out that Cox and Russell did even better
than Birdwood had thought in the fighting on the
21st and the morning of the 22nd. They have
killed more Turks and the line held runs well out
to the North-east and quite a good long way to
the North of Kaiajik Aghala.
Byng left to take over his command. Davies
came over from Helles and stayed for dinner.
The Imogene sailed in with Mails. News by
wireless of German Naval defeat in the Baltic and
Italian declaration of war against Turkey. Well,
that part at least of K.'s aspirations has come off ;
140 GALLIPOLI DIARY
we have dragged in Italy. Now will she send us
a contingent ?
Davies dined. With his ideas still framed on
Western standards he puts it forcibly, not to say
ferociously, that we must, must, must be given our
fair share of trench mortars, bombs and gun ammuni-
tion. Fresh from France he watched the artillery
preparation at Helles and (although we had thought
it rather grand) says we simply don't know what
the word bombardment means. Instead of seeing,
as in the Western theatre, an unbroken wall of
flame and smoke rising above the enemy trenches
about to be stormed, here he saw a sprinkling of
shells bursting at intervals of 20 yards or so
a totally different effect. And yet the Turks
are as tough as the Germans and take as much
hammering !
When I read the British Press, starved and
yet muzzled, I feel as if I could render my country
no better service than to kill my friend the Censor
and write them one or two articles.
By surprise either Army can bulge in a sector
of the opposing lines but, until one Army loses its
moral, neither Army can break through. An engine
will be found to restore marches and manoeuvres
but, at this historic moment, our tactics are
at that stage. To break through, Armies must
advance some six or seven miles ; otherwise
they can't bag the enemy's big guns. But, the
backbone of their attack, their own guns, can't
support them when they get beyond five or six
miles. The enemy reserves come in ; they come
THE LAST BATTLE 141
at last to a stop. A three or four mile advance
should be easy enough, but, in the West, that
would mean just three or four miles of land ;
nothing more. But here, those three or four miles
nay, two or three miles (so ineffective in France)
are an objective in themselves ; they give us the
strategical hub of the universe Constantinople !
Suppose even that by paying the cost in lives
we did succeed in driving the Germans over the
Rhine, still we stand to gain less than by taking
this one little peninsula ! A quarter of the energy
they are about to develop for the sake of getting
back a few miles of la belle France could give us
Asia ; Africa ; the Balkans ; the Black Sea ;
the mouths of the Danube : it would enable us to
swap rifles for wheat with the Russians ; more vital
still, it would tune up the hearts of the Russian
soldiery to the Anglo-Saxon pitch.
Victory by killing Germans is a barbarous
notion and a savage method. A thrust with
small forces at a weak spot to bring the enemy
to their knees by loss of provinces, resources and
prestige is an artistic idea and a scientific stroke :
the one stands for a cudgel blow, the other for
rapier play.
We take it for granted that we have to " push " in
France and Flanders ; that we have to exhaust
ourselves in forcing the invaders back over their
own frontiers. Whereas, content to " hold " there,
we might push wherever else we wished.
I can well understand that a Frenchman should
say, " Let the world go hang provided I get back
142 GALLIPOLI DIARY
my Patrie, whole ; undivided and at once." Indeed,
only the other day, one of the best French Generals
here, after speaking of the decisive, world-embracing
consequences of a victory at the Dardanelles,
went on to say, " But we ought to be in France."
Seeing my surprise he added, " Yes, I am quite
illogical, I admit, but until our nine departements
are freed from the Boche, world strategy and
tactics may go to the devil for me."
Have been writing my weekly budget. Part of
my letter to K. harks back to the first Suvla
landing, and tries to give him a better notion of
the failure to profit by the enemy's surprise. Not
that I have yet got any very clear conception of
the detail myself. No coherent narrative does, in
fact, exist. New troops, new Staff, new Generals,
heavy losses, have resulted in the confusions,
gaps and contradictions still obscuring the story
of those first few days.
Now that I am getting more precise news about
what fighting there was, it seems clear that this
great mass of young, inexperienced troops failed
simply because their leaders failed to grasp the
urgency of the time problem when they got upon
the ground, although, as far as orders and pen and
ink could go, it had been made perfectly clear.
But, in face of the Turk, things wore another and
more formidable shape. Had Lord Bobs been
Commander of the 9th Corps ; yes, just think
of it ! How far my memory carries me back.
Every item needed for the rapid advance : water,
ammunition, supplies and mules closely and person-
ally checked and counter-checked. Once the troops
THE LAST BATTLE 143
landed a close grip kept on the advance. At the
first sign of a check nothing keeps him from the
spot. The troops see him. In an hour they are
up upon the crest.
So far, so good. We had not another Lord
Bobs and it would not have been reasonable of
us to expect him. But when I come to the failure
of the 21st, where I have a seasoning of Regulars
as well as a commander of energy still we do not
succeed. This time, no doubt, the enemy were on
the scene in force and had done ten days' digging ;
the non-success, in fact, may be traced to the loss
of the element of surprise ; energy, in fact, was met
by preparation. The battle had to be fought like
a manoeuvre battle and yet the enemy were ready
for us, more or less, and already fairly well en-
trenched. Since the morning of the 7th the
chances had been rising steadily against us. Still,
even so, the lack of precise detail baffles me
almost as much as in the case of the first Suvla
landing.
CHAPTER XVlII
MISUNDERSTANDINGS
25th August, 1915. Imbros. Davies left for
Helles at mid-day. Was to have gone with him
but heard that Bailloud with Captain Lapruin
would like to see me, so stayed to receive them.
Have got K.'s answer to my cable pointing out
the probable results of his declared intention of
sending us no " reinforcements of importance "
during an indeterminate period.
" (No. 7315, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to
General Sir Ian Hamilton. Your No. 578. You
will, I hope, fully discuss the situation described
by you with Birdwood and the Generals who
have just joined you, and, when a thorough examina-
tion on the ground of the whole state of affairs
has been made, give me the opinion at which you
arrive.
" It has been a sad disappointment to me that
the troops have not been able to do better, and that
the drafts and reinforcements sent out to you
and Egypt, excluding any you have drawn from
Egypt, amounting from 6th August to 47,000,
have not proved sufficient to enable you to contem-
plate holding your positions."
144
MISUNDERSTANDINGS 145
Braithwaite and I have been electrified by
this reference to 47,000 drafts and reinforcements :
it is so much Greek to us here : had there been
any question of reinforcements coming to us on
that scale, my 578 of 23rd August would never
have been sent.
On the heels of this has followed another :
" (No. 7319, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to
General Sir Ian Hamilton. My No. 7315. I hope
that the result of your deliberations will reach me
by Friday morning, as the decision to be taken
is one of considerable importance."
I have replied off the reel : -
"(No. M.F. 588). From General Sir Ian
Hamilton to Earl Kitchener. With reference to
your telegrams Nos. 7315 and 7319. I feel sure
you cannot think I would be capable of sending
a telegram of such import as my No. M.F. 578
without the deepest consideration and sense of
my personal responsibility which remains unaffected
by any amount of conferences with my subordinate
commanders. I was careful in this instance, how-
ever, to discuss the situation on the spot with
both Corps Commanders concerned and I then
cabled you my considered opinion. I constantly
visit both Suvla and Anzac and have personally
thoroughly examined the state of affairs. In view
of your telegram No. 7172, cipher, I do not under-
stand your allusion to 47,000 drafts and reinforce-
ments from 6th August as we have not been advised
of any such number as 47,000. I felt bound to
VOL. II. 11
146 GALLIPOLI DIARY
lay the case plainly before you as to what might
have to be undertaken, though I do not contem-
plate giving up any position one hour before I need.
If the present wastage from sickness continues,
however, and if my cadres are allowed to fall
below their present attenuated strength I may be
compelled to undertake such a step as I have
indicated."
Bailloud arrived at tea time. Away from Piepape
he is another person. At dinner, he cracked jokes
even about serious things like the guns of Asia.
Brodrick was carried off to the Hospital ship.
The doctors think there should be no real danger.
We shall all miss him very much ; as an aide he
has been A.I. ; sympathetic and thoughtful.
Braithwaite dined to meet Bailloud.
26th August, 1915. After clearing my table and
taking early lunch, started off in the Arno with
C.G.S*, Pollen, Freddie and Val. Sailed for Suvla
and went up straight to see Byng, brought by the
whirl of Fortune's wheel from a French chateau
to a dugout. During the two days he has been
here, he has been working very hard. I hope he
may not too regretfully look back towards la belle
France. Our old " A " Beach was being briskly
shelled as we walked down to our boats. Between
Hill 10 and the sea there were salvoes of shrapnel
falling and about every thirty seconds a big
fellow, probably a six incher, made a terrible
hullaballoo. The men working at piling up stores
" carried on."
GENERAL BAILLOUD
" Exclusive News " phot.
MISUNDERSTANDINGS 147
When we got back to G.H.Q. there was a heavy
thunderstorm in progress. Mail bag closed 9.30.
During our inspection at Suvla this " Personal "
from K. to myself has been deciphered :
"(No. 7337, cipher). From Earl Kitchener
to General Sir Ian Hamilton. Personal. I con-
sidered it advisable, that as the decision the
Government may have to come to on your No. 578
is one of grave importance, the Generals out there
should previously fully consider the situation on
the Gallipoli Peninsula ; hence my No. 7315.
It was intended to obviate any possibility of over-
looking points and in such cases two or more heads
sometimes elucidate matters that might otherwise
be missed or not given due weight to. It was in
no way intended thereby to detract from the
importance of your views on the subject or to
minimise your personal responsibility for them.
" I have no idea of the French Generals' views on
the matter, and you were apparently not fully
considering the drafts and reinforcements that were
being sent out.
" A detailed telegram is being sent you from the
office of the 47,000 men mentioned in my No. 7315.
" I hope that the return of Younghusband's
Brigade from Aden to Egypt will still further increase
these in a day or two (less one battalion).
" But you should look on the forces in Egypt
and your own as a whole, allowing, of course, for
the proper defence of Egypt, when you take the
148 GALLIPOLI DIARY
general situation at the Dardanelles into con-
sideration.
" Do you think the Navy could do anything more
than they are already doing to help the situation ?
I hear it is thought that they could land heavy
naval 6-inch guns on positions such as those in
square 92 M and other points, and might threaten
from Aja Liman the main road of Turkish supplies
between Kama Bili and Solvili (by gunfire from
ships) and also bring a heavy and effective shell
fire on the Turkish positions at and behind Anaf arta.
There is a cabinet to-morrow."
I would much like to sleep over this cable so
plain seemingly ; really so obscure. At face value,
how splendidly it simplifies the Dardanelles problem !
Had I been, all along, as this cable seems to make
me, the C.-in-C. of the Eastern Mediterranean
with Maxwell administering my Egyptian Base,
then, humanly speaking, this entry would have been
dated from Constantinople. But am I ? I can't
believe it even now, with the words before me.
Anyway, whether by my own fault or those of
others, one thing is certain, namely, that up to
date there has been misunderstanding. Now,
the Cabinet of to-morrow forces me to send a
momentous wire without too much time to think
it over. To clear my brain let me set down
the sequence of facts as they have so far appeared
to me :
Less than a week ago 20th inst. K. cables me
he is sending certain units to Egypt and certain
other units to the Dardanelles. The units and their
MISUNDERSTANDINGS 149
ships are named. He says there is going to be a
big push in France and that I must look to these
troops, earmarked for the Dardanelles, plus any
I " can obtain from Egypt " to carry on. He winds
up by saying, "It is hoped the troops going to
Egypt will enable Maxwell to send you more fighting
men on your demand."
This same assumption that the G.O.C., Egypt,
and myself are two equals each having equal
command over his own troops, is fully borne out
by another cable of the 21st August. My cable
of 23rd August is based on these messages ; i.e. on
the idea that we must carry on here for a good long
time to come with very little to help us. Then
comes K.'s of the 25th telling me he is sorry 47,000
drafts and reinforcements he has sent to Maxwell
and myself since 6th August are not going to be
enough to enable me to hold on. But no one
can make head or tail of these 47,000 drafts and
reinforcements ; no one can run them to ground.
He has notified me the units and the ships, but the
total coming to Maxwell and myself don't tot up
to that figure, much less the portion of them detailed
for the Dardanelles. 1 Now comes to-day's cable
in which Egypt is spoken of as being mine, and the
fatness thereof. Taking this message per se, any
one might imagine I could draw any troops I
liked from that country provided that / thought
/ was leaving enough to defend the Suez Canal :
1 As will be seen further on the 47,000 actually panned
out at 29,000, of whom two battalions were at once diverted
to Egypt, whilst two other battalions turned out to be non-
fighting formations. IAN H., 1920.
150 GALLIPOLI DIARY
and, apparently, the 47,000 men are about to
make an effort to materialize inasmuch as we are
told that details are being wired us. Finally,
Younghusband's Brigade sails to help us !
27th August, 1915. Imbros. As there is a
Cabinet to-day I had to get off my answer last night.
In it I have made a desperate effort to straighten
out the tangle :
" (No. M.F. 589). From General Sir Ian Hamilton
to Earl Kitchener. On returning from Suvla I
have just found your No. 7337, cipher. I hope
there may be no misunderstanding as to meaning
or intention of my No. M.F. 578. I asked in my
No. M.F. 562 for such drafts and reinforcements
as I considered necessary for the campaign to be
brought to a conclusion before the winter began.
You told me in your No. 7172 that you could spare
no more reinforcements beyond those mentioned
therein, and that if I could not achieve success
with these I must remain on the defensive for some
considerable time. I explained situation in my
No. M.F. 578, and said that the question was one
of arithmetic and measurement. I was anxious to
hold all I had got and to gain more, but I required
all my available force at the present time merely
to hold what I had got. I pointed out that mean-
while a large proportion of my troops were urgently
in need of rest, and sickness was so great that unless
reinforcements were sent out my force would soon
be too small for the number of yards of front to be
held. In that case, i.e., if reinforcements could not
be spared, but in that case only, it would be neces-
MISUNDERSTANDINGS 151
sary to contract my line. This welcome news
of 47,000 reinforcements, however, alters the whole
situation. Such a number will do much to complete
my diminished cadres, and should materially lessen
sick rate by giving more chance of taking tired troops
out of the trenches. Byng can certainly remain
where he is at present, and will even be able to
rest some of the tired XXIXth Division, while
the arrival of the Australian Brigade will give
General Birdwood a similar chance of resting some
of his troops.
" General Birdwood meanwhile is to make a
further advance to-morrow on the left flank, to
gain possession of important tactical feature, which
will eventually help an advance when the time
arrives. Byng is getting everything in order and
has infected all around him with his own energy
and cheeriness and has quickly grasped the whole
situation.
" In communication with Maxwell I find I can
have seven Territorial Force units and the Scottish
Horse, and now I have your welcome news of Young-
husband's Brigade. Please believe I am the last
man in the world to give up anything we have
gained except under direct necessity, which I
trust may now never arise. The Navy is supporting
me to its full capacity. The guns of the four ships
in Suvla Bay take on the Turkish positions you
mention almost as well as and certainly more
safely than if they were landed and placed where
you suggest. Moreover, Navy cannot lend those
guns unless I supply the detachments to work
them from the Naval Division, and the latter is
152 GALLIPOLI DIARY
fully employed at present and cannot spare the
men. We are constantly sending ships round to
Aja Liman to fire at enemy positions from there,
but I know you realize that one must not rely too
much upon effective fire on land targets from ships
which are not moored, as is the case in Suvla Bay.
" I have not consulted the French General about
the situation in the North as he is at the Southern
end and on the right of the line there. He thinks
more of Asia than of these operations in which he
has no troops engaged, but I discussed the matter
with him only last night. Before I sent my No.
M.F. 578 I discussed every point closely for two
hours with the Corps Commanders."
In the evening my A.G. brought me the promised
details of the 47,000 drafts and reinforcements.
He has gone into the detail in proper A.G. spirit,
namely, as an arithmetician rather than a tactician.
The result has given us a shock ! 10,000 men of
the 54th Division and 4,000 drafts are shown in
the War Office cable as being still due to come to
me as reinforcements whereas they had actually
landed on the Peninsula ; had, indeed, been shown
in my total fighting strength of 68,000 in my
original cable, M.F. 578 of 23rd August, and are,
too many of them, alas already hors de combat. Here
is the passage sent four days ago: " The total
casualties including sick since 6th August amount
to 40,000, and my total force is now only 85,000
of which the fighting strength is 68,000." In
this 68,000 were included 14,000 of the men shown
in subsequent War Office cables as being drafts and
reinforcements on their way to the Dardanelles !
MISUNDERSTANDINGS 153
So my A.G. has become a bit suspicious about
the balance of the 47,000. On paper, he says,
it looks as if I might expect to draw from Egypt
and England 30,000 reinforcements, but he re-
marks sententiously " we know by now that
paper is one thing and men are different." As to
Younghusband's Brigade, it turns out they cannot
be employed here : too many Mahomedans.
Have sent the following reply :
" (No. M.F. 595). From General Sir Ian Hamil-
ton to Secretary of State for War. With reference
to your telegram No. 7337, cipher. Have now
received details of the 47,000 drafts and reinforce-
ments in your No. 7354 cipher, and I find that
this figure includes nearly 10,000 men of the
LIVth Division and 4,234 drafts, all of whom had
been landed on the peninsula when I wrote my No.
M.F. 578, and were reckoned in the total fighting
strength of 68,000 mentioned in that telegram.
The statement, however, shows that I can expect
from England and Egypt during the next six weeks
a total of some 29,000 reinforcements, including
new formations and two battalions of non-fighting
lines of communication troops.
' This is a better situation than I was led by
your 7172, cipher, to expect, and you may rely
on me to do the best I can with this addition to
my present very depleted strength. I hope, how-
ever, you realize that whereas my British Divisions
are now more than 55,000 rifles below their establish-
ment only 17,000 of these 29,000 are drafts, and
before the last of the drafts can arrive these divisions
154 GALLIPOLI DIARY
will have lost another 25 per cent, of their remaining
number by normal wastage.
" In regard to Younghusband's Brigade, I learn
that the three battalions are practically half
Mahomedans, and I am advised that it is better
if it can be avoided not to use Mahomedans so
near the heart of Islam. Would it not be possible
to exchange these for some Hindu regiments in
France ? "
These cables give us an uncomfortable feeling
that the people at home wish to regard us as
stronger than we are a different thing from wishing
to add to our strength.
On the other hand, another sort of message has
come in which sheds a ray of hope across our path
so darkened at many other points :
"(No 7372, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to
General Sir Ian Hamilton. Although it is under-
stood that we do not at present see our way to
change the recent decision not to send any fresh
complete divisional units, we wish to have all the
material possible on which to form a judgment
from time to time. Therefore, will you please
telegraph me your opinion, from the point of view
of the military and strategical situation now existing
on the peninsula, as to the prospects there are,
after the experience you have recently had, of our
achieving the main objective of turning the Turks
out and what force you would consider would be
required to do this."
Taylor of the G.S. lunched. A big parcel mail
came in. Brodrick is to be sent to Alexandria.
MISUNDERSTANDINGS 155
28th August, 1915. Imbros. Braithwaite and
I both feel we must take time to think over last
night's last cable and I have wired to say so.
Cox's attack on Knoll 60 to the North-east of
Kaiajik Aghala came off well. The New Zea-
landers under Russell and the Connaught Rangers
did brilliantly. Fighting is still going on.
A reply from the War Office to mine of last
week wherein I pointed out that the once splendid
5th Battalion Royal Scots had fallen from a strength
of 1,000 down to 289. They have had no one since
the campaign began. To-day the Battalion is
just over 250 a Company ! Now I am officially
told that " no reinforcements can be found for the
l/5th Battalion of Royal Scots." This is the
Battalion which did so well about 11 o'clock on
the dreadful night of the 2nd May. I shall cable
the Lord Provost of Edinburgh. If we could
get into touch with the human beings of Edinburgh
they would help us to keep a battalion like the
Royal Scots on their legs even if they had to break
up half a dozen new formations for the purpose.
Freddie and I dined with de Robeck on board
H.M.S. Triad. The V.A. was well pleased with
my cable of the 26th.
29th August, 1915. Imbros. Last night two
cables :
"(No. 7414, cipher. C.I.G.S.). From War
Office to General Headquarters, Mediterranean
Expeditionary Force. Reference your No. M.F.Q.T.
156 GALLIPOLI DIARY
2737. The two Territorial Force battalions originally
detailed see my No. 7172 of 20th August to
sail in the Orsova will be taken by the Ceramic.
Of these, the 2/5th Devons is only about 700 strong
and contains a large percentage of recruits, while
the l/6th Royal Scots contains about 40 per cent,
partially trained men and a new Commanding
Officer who has only just been appointed. Until
it has had further training neither battalion is
fit for anything more than garrison duty. I
suggest that under these circumstances the Ceramic
should proceed direct to Egypt."
" (No. 7401, cipher, 554/A.3.). From War Office
to Inspector-General of Communications, Mediter-
ranean Expeditionary Force. We are receiving
from Malta and Alexandria very large demands for
materials and explosives for making grenades.
The supply of these seriously interferes with our
manufacture of grenades. At present we are
hoping to send you 30 to 40,000 grenades weekly
and this figure will be increased. When the materials
already sent out to Malta and Alexandria have been
used up, can the manufacture of grenades at
those places cease ? Please reply at once ; the
matter is urgent."
Do what I will my pen carries me away and I
find myself writing like an ill-conditioned " grouser."
As an old War Office " hand " I ought to know
and I do know the frightful time of stress
under which Whitehall labours. But, just look
at these two cables, you innocent and peaceful
citizen of a thousand years hence ! The residue
of the famous 47,000 rifles sent me by the Adjutant-
MISUNDERSTANDINGS 157
General are now being valued by the official
valuer, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
In all our calculations the 2/5th Devons has hitherto
masqueraded as an efficient battalion at full
strength. Figures are sometimes more eloquent
than words !
As to the second cable, that deals us a worse
blow. Seeing clearly, at last, we should extract
no hand grenades from the War Office, we turned
to Maxwell and Methuen, who have interested
themselves in our plight and have been making
us so many that, with what we ourselves can add
to their manufacture, we are at last beginning to
make things hum in the Turkish trenches. Then
in comes this War Office cable to crush our nascent
industry and give us in exchange some pious
aspirations.
There is no good making any trouble about the
hand grenades. As to the two raw battalions,
I am asking they be sent, raw and weak as they
are, as I can train them in the trenches much
better and more quickly than they could be trained
in Egypt or England.
Church Parade ; office work ; sailed over to
" K " Beach ; inspected Clearing Stations and
walked up to site for new camp. Then back to
G.H.Q., to meet the V.A. and Roger Keyes. They
remain the best of friends always.
This evening we were all in good form owing to
the news from Anzac. Knoll 60, now ours through-
out, commands the Biyuk Anafarta valley with
view and fire a big tactical scoop.
158 GALLIPOLI DIARY
30th August, 1915. Imbros. Still good news
from Anzac. Seeing that the stunt was on a small
scale, we seem to have got into the Turks with a
vengeance. In falling back as well as in counter-
attacking after we had taken Hill 60, the enemy
were exposed to the fire from our trenches along
the Kaiajik Dere. Birdie declares that they have
lost 5,000. We have taken several machine guns
and trench mortars as well as some fifty prisoners.
Have sent grateful message to all on the spot.
At 10.30 four Russian Officers made their salaams.
They are to report how things are going, and they
seem to have the usual quick Slav faculty for grasp-
ing essential points combined, no doubt, with the
usual Slav slackness which lets them go again. I
told them everything I knew. They told us that
our landing had saved the whole Army of the
Caucasus ; that the Grand Duke knew it and that
His Imperial Highness bitterly regretted that,
first of all, sheer lack of supplies ; afterwards the
struggles in Galicia and Poland, had prevented
Istomine and his Army Corps from standing by
to help.
At 1.30 the C.G.S., Deedes, Val., Freddy and I
crossed to Helles in the Arno. Had a hard after-
noon's walking, going first to 8th Corps Head-
quarters ; next to the Royal Naval Division and
last to the 52nd Divisional Headquarters. Re-
turned to the 8th Corps Headquarters and there
met Bailloud. He is now full of good cheer. Got
back to Headquarters without adventure or mis-
adventure.
MISUNDERSTANDINGS 159
Have cabled home a suggestion made to me by
Mahon, that the 16th Irish Division at home
might be used to fill up the gaps in the units of
the 10th Division out here.
31 st August, 1915. After early lunch, left in
the Arno for Suvla. With me were Braithwaite,
Manifold, Freddy and Val. Walked up to the 9th
Corps Headquarters and saw Byng. I am very
anxious indeed he should work his men up into the
mood for making a push. He charms everyone
and he is fast pulling his force together. Maude,
Fanshawe, and de Lisle seem to be keen to do some-
thing, but Byng, though he also is keen, has the
French standards for ammunition in his head.
He does not think we have enough to warrant us
in making an attack. Also, he does not realize
yet that if he is going to wait until we are
fitted out on that scale he will have to wait till
doomsday.
Walked to de Lisle's Headquarters and saw
him, and on to the llth Divisional Headquarters
where I met Fanshawe and Malcolm. With them
I climbed back on to Karakol Dagh and sat me
down on the identical same stone whereon I sweated
blood during that confused and indecisive battle
of the 21st August. From the Karakol Dagh I
got a very fair idea of our whole trench system.
On either flank we hold the hills ; elsewhere we
are on the flat. The llth Division have recovered
and only need drafts to be as good a formation
as any General could wish to command. In the
evening I left in the Arno carrying off with me de
160 GALLIPOLI DIARY
Lisle and Captain Hardress Lloyd to dine and stay
the night. Quentin Agnew also dined.
My first feeble little attempt to act on K.'s
assumption that Egypt and its army are mine has
fallen a bit flat. The War Office promptly agreed
to my taking these two weak, half -trained battalions,
the l/6th Royal Scots and 2/5th Devons, to be
trained in my trenches. That was yesterday.
But the Senoussi must have heard of it at once,
for Maxwell forthwith cables, " The attitude of
the Senoussi is distinctly dangerous and his people
have been latterly executing night manoeuvres
round our post at Sollum." To me, the night
manoeuvres of these riff-raff seem ridiculous. But
distance, perhaps, has lent its enchantment to my
view.
The quibble that the troops in Egypt are
mine has been broken to pieces by my first
touch ! I have renounced the two battalions
with apologies and now I daresay the Senoussi
will retire from his night manoeuvres round
Sollum and resume his old strategic position up
Maxwell's sleeve.
1st September, 1915. Imbros. Remained at
Headquarters working. Wrote, amongst other
things, to K. as follows :
cc
I have just finished two days' hard physical
exercise going round visiting Egerton and Paris
with Davies, and Fanshawe and de Lisle with
Byng. At Helles everything is quite right although
they have only troops enough there for the defensive.
MISUNDERSTANDINGS 161
They are getting a lot of stores in, and the really
only anxious feature of the situation is the health
of the men who are very, very tired right through,
having had no sort of relief for months, and who
go sick in large numbers.
" Fanshawe is first class. Full of go and plans, he
will, if the Lord spares him, be a real treasure.
Maude and Mahon I am going to see after Mail-
day, and then I shall hope to inspect our new cap-
tured position on the left of Anzac.
"I do not know if they showed you the cable
saying Hammersley has gone home very ill with a
clot of blood in his leg. He has to lie perfectly
prostrate and still, so I am told, as the least move-
ment might set it loose and it would then kill
him. Evidently he was not really fit to have been
sent out on service. And this was the man,
remember, on whom, under Stopford, everything
depended for making a push.
ic This Suvla Bay country, a jungle ringed round
by high mountains, is essentially a country for
Boers or for Indian troops. De Lisle and others
who have watched them closely in India, say that
a native soldier on the Peninsula (although there,
too, he goes to pieces if he loses his Officers and under
too prolonged a strain) is worth at least two Indian
soldiers in France. The climate suits him better,
but, most of all, the type of enemy is more or less
the sort of type they are accustomed to encounter.
Not Sahibs and Ohora Log in helmets but Mussalman
Log in turbans. As to the South Africans there
VOL. n. 12
162 GALLIPOLI DIARY
can be no two opinions, I think, that they would
stand these conditions better than those of Northern
Europe. Indeed, we have one or two Boers serving
now with the Australians, and they have done
extremely well."
Some of K.'s questions take my breath away.
I wish very much indeed he could come and spend
a week with me. Otherwise I feel hopeless of
making him grasp the realities of the trenches.
On the 30th of August he cables, " If required,
I could send you a fresh consignment of junior
Officers. Or have you sufficient supernumerary
Officers to fill all casualties ? " I have replied
to him that, in my four regular Divisions, I am
short of 900 effective Officers in the Infantry alone.
To meet my total shortage of 1,450 Officers I have
twenty-five young gentlemen who have lately
been sent out here to complete their training !
De Lisle and Hardress Lloyd sailed back to
Suvla in the evening.
CHAPTER XIX
THE FRENCH PLAN
2nd September, 1915. Imbros. An ugly dream
came to me last night. My tent was at Imbros
right enough, and I was lying in my little camp
bed, and yet I was being drowned, held violently
under the Hellespont.
The grip of a hand was still on my throat ;
the waters were closing over my head as I broke
away and found myself wide awake. I was tremb-
ling and carried back with me into the realms of
consciousness an idea that some uncanny visitor
had entered my tent. Already the vision was
fading. I could visualize the form of the presence,
but the face remained hidden in shadow. Never
had I suffered from so fearful a dream. For hours
afterwards I was haunted by the thought that the
Dardanelles were fatal ; that something sinister
was a-foot ; that we, all of us, were pre-doomed.
Dreams go by contraries. Strange that so black
a night should be followed by a noon so brilliant
so brilliant beyond compare.
K. cables the French are going to send three or
four Divisions to work with us along the Asiatic
mainland. From bankrupt to millionaire in 24 hours.
164 GALLIPOLI DIARY
The enormous spin of fortune's wheel makes me
giddy !
These French Divisions will be real Divisions :
must be ; they have no others.
0, Hallelujah !
" The sending of a force of three or four Divisions
to operate on the Asiatic mainland, independent
as regards command, but in close relation with the
British forces on the Peninsula, is being considered
by the French Government. They will require
an exclusively French military base at Mitylene,
and us to help with transport and fleet.
" So far I have not discussed any details with
the French, and have simply told them we shall
be delighted to have the help, which would be
given by such an expedition, towards the solution
of the Dardanelles problem.
" Presumably they would require their two
divisions now at Cape Helles. What forces would
you require to relieve them ? I have asked Sir
John French if the XXVIIth and XXVIIIth
Divisions could be spared for this purpose.
" Wire me any points that you think I had better
settle with the French authorities."
Deo volente we are saved ; Constantinople is
doomed. How clearly stand forth the mosques
and minarets of the Golden Horn.
Mr. Murdoch, an Australian journalist, paid me
a visit to thank me for having stretched a point
THE FRENCH PLAN 165
in his favour by letting him see the Peninsula.
Seemed a sensible man.
Glyn and Holdich dined : both clever fellows
in different ways. Dawnay and Glyn after dinner
left for England. Dawnay goes to explain matters
first hand to K. Next to my going home myself, or
to K. himself coming out here, this is the best I
can do. Dawnay is one of the soundest young
officers we have, but he is run down physically
(like most of us) and jaded. He should benefit
by the trip and so should the rumour-mongers at
home.
3rd September, 1915. Imbros. Two cables : one
to say that the news about the French Divisions
must be kept dark ; the other, in reply to a question
by me, refusing to let me consult de Robeck on the
matter. So Braithwaite and I had to make out
our cable expressing our delight and thankfulness,
and advising how the troops might best be used
entirely on our own.
The cable took some doing but got it off my
chest by mid-day and then sailed with Ellison,
Braithwaite and Val by the Arno to Suvla. We
landed this time on Lala Baba instead of at our
usual Ghazi Baba. Every five minutes the Turks
plumped one six-incher on to the beach. But
nobody now seems to mind. A lot of Generals
present ; Byng, Mahon, Marshall, Maude and
Peyton. Mahon took me up to the top of Lala
Baba and showed me the disposition of his division.
He kindly asked us all to tea at his Headquarters
but as someone added that Ashmead-Bartlett
166 GALLIPOLI DIARY
was going to take a cinema photo of the scene I
thought I would not be thus immortalized. The
Scottish Horse were bivouacking on the beach ;
they have just landed but already they have lost
a member or two of their Mess from shell fire.
No wonder they looked a little bewildered, but
soon they will shake down. When we got back
to the Arno we found she had been hit by shrapnel,
but no damage.
Things at Suvla are pulling together. No one
gave me more confidence than Maude. His mind
travels beyond the needs of the moment. He is
firmly convinced that no very out-of-the-way
effort by the Allies is needed to score a big point
in the War Game and that our hold-up here is not
a reality but only a hold-up or petrefaction of
the brains of the French and of our Dardanelles
Committee. I longed to tell him he was doing
them both, especially the French, an injustice,
and that four splendid divisions were as good as
on their way, but I had to content myself with
saying to him and to all the Generals that I
was overjoyed at a piece of news received
yesterday.
4:th September, 1915. Imbros. Life would be
as ditchwater were it not stirred to its depths
by K.'s secret cable. Sailed over with Freddie
at 11.30 to "K" Beach and inspected the 88th
Brigade. Had given orders to the Arno to stand
by and to take me over to Anzac in the afternoon,
but the weather was so bad that I could not get
off to her in the motor boat.
THE FRENCH PLAN 167
At 7.15 p.m. the V.-A. sent his picket boat for
me and Freddie and I went on board the Triad. At
10 p.m. she started for Mudros.
5th September, 1915. H.M.S. " Triad." Mudros.
Anchored at Mudros at 6 a.m. Breakfast over,
was met by Alt-ham, Colonel McMunn and Captain
Stephens who took me ashore. There I met
Lindley, now commanding the troops on the island ;
also General Legge (commanding the 2nd Australian
Division) ; Lord Dudley and Colonel Forster.
Lindley seems pleased at having been given this
command ; says he feels like a man out hunting
who has a bad fall but alights on his feet, and
Altham tells me he is doing the work very well.
Dudley, too, seemed full of business and con-
tented with his lot.
The moment I got through the reception stunt
I set myself to work like a nigger at the Red Cross
stunt : that's how people talk now-a-days. Saw
the 15th Stationary Hospital ; the 110th Indian
Field Ambulance ; " C " Section of No. 24 British
Indian Hospital ; ate a hearty lunch ; inspected
1st Australian Stationary Hospital. Walking round
a Hospital and seeing whether things are clean and
bright is a treat but trying to cheer people up and
give a fillip to all good works that implies an
expenditure of something vital and leaves a
man, after a few hours, feeling the worse for
wear.
By 4.45 the day's task was well over so refreshed
myself by some right soldier business reviewing
the 4th Gurkhas under Major Tillard a superb
168 GALLIPOLI DIARY
battalion 1,000 strong ! ! ! Had forgotten what
a full battalion looks like. At 5.45 wound up by
inspecting a huge Convalescent Depot under Colonel
Forde and got back to the Triad just in time for
dinner. Wemyss dined also.
6th September, 1915. H.M.8. " Triad." Mudros.
After breakfast sailed over to Mudros West ;
Lindley met me, also a host of doctors. Walked
to No. 3 Australian Hospital with an old acquain-
tance whose Italian name slips my memory at the
moment ; then to No. 2 Australian Stationary
Hospital ; then to Convalescent Depot of Lowland
Division. At 12.30 ran down to my launch and
was swiftly conveyed to lunch on board the Europa
with Admiral Wemyss. Such a lunch as a lost
voyager may dream of in the desert. Like roses
blooming in a snowdrift, so puffs and pies and kick-
shaws of all rarest sorts appeared upon a dazzling
white tablecloth, and then disappeared. We too
had to disappear and sail back to Mudros West
again. Horses were waiting and I rode to No.
18 Stationary Hospital and made a thorough over-
haul of it from end to end ; then tea with the
Officers of No. 1. In No. 3 Australian General
were eighty nurses ; in No. 3 Canadian Stationary
seven nurses ; in No. 1 Canadian Stationary twenty-
four nurses. Since Lady Brassey descended in some
miraculous manner upon Imbros, they were the
first white women I had seen for six months. Their
pretty faces were a refreshing sight : a capable
crowd too : all these Hospitals were in good order,
but the sick and wounded in charge of the girls
looked the happiest and no wonder. The Canadian
THE FRENCH PLAN 169
Medicos are fresh from France and discoursed
about moral. Never a day passed, so they said,
in France, but some patient would, with tears in
his eyes, entreat to be sent home. Here at Mudros
there had never been one single instance. The
patients, if they said anything at all, have showed
impatience to get back to their comrades in the
fighting line. We discussed this mystery at tea
and no one could make head or tail of it. In
France the men got a change ; are pulled out of
the trenches ; can go to cafes ; meet young ladies ;
get drinks and generally have a good time. On
the Peninsula they are never safe for one moment
(whether they are supposed to be resting or are
in the firing line) from having their heads knocked
off by a shell.
Returned to the Triad in time for dinner.
Admiral vexed as his motor boat has gone ashore.
Bowlby is with it trying to get it off.
The French Admiral commanding the Mediter-
ranean Fleet has just sailed in.
lih September, 1915. Imbros. At 9.30 left
the Triad to call on Admiral de la Perriera on
board the Gaulois. Thence to H.M.S. Racoon
(Lieutenant-Commander Hardy) and started back
for Imbros, where we arrived in time for tea.
Sth September, 1915. Imbros. Trying to clear
a table blocked with papers as a result of my two
days' trip. Have written to K. as the Mail bag
goes to-morrow. Have told him I have had a
nice letter from Mahon, thanking me for allowing
170 GALLIPOLI DIARY
him to rejoin his Division and saying he hopes
he may stay with them till the end. Have given
him all my Mudros news and have sent him a memo,
submitted to me by Birdwood showing how much
of the sickness on the Peninsula seems due to the
War Office having hung up my first request for a
Field Force Canteen.
Here is one of the enclosures to Birdwood's
memo. :
" N. Z. and A. Division.
I desire to draw attention to the remarkable
drop in the sick evacuations from this Brigade as
shown by the following figures :
August 28 59.
29 - 64.
30 58.
31 17.
Sept. 1-2.
2 6.
I am convinced that this amelioration, and the
observable improvement in the condition of the
men are largely to be attributed to the distribution,
on August 30 and 31 of Canteen Stores, providing
a welcome change of dietary.
I strongly recommend that every effort be made
to maintain such Canteen supplies.
(Sd.), MONASH."
9th September, 1915. Imbros. At 9.30 Admiral
de la Perriera returned my call. At 11.50 Braith-
waite, Freddy and I went aboard the Gaidois.
^
THE FRENCH PLAN 171
A five course lunch and I had to make a speech in
French.
When I got back I found that General Marshall,
commanding the 53rd Division, had come over
from Suvla to stay with me. Lancelot Lowther
dined ; he told us all the important things he was
doing.
IQth September, 1915. Imbros. Lancelot Lowther
left with the Mails at 7 a.m., glad, I suspect, to
shake from his feet the sand of these barbaric
Headquarters.
Not easy to get Marshall to loosen his tongue
about the battle of the 21st, and he would not,
or could not, add much to my knowledge. The
strength of Marshall depends not on what he
seems but upon what his officers and men know.
He has got his chance amidst the realities of
war. In peace, except by a miracle, he would
never have risen above the command of a
Battalion. The main reason I cannot draw him
about the battle of the 21st is, beyond doubt,
that he does not want to throw blame on others.
Marshall is a matter-of-fact, unemotici 1 sort of
chap, yet he told the sad tale of young O'Sulli-
van's death in a way which touched our hearts.
0' Sullivan was no novice where V.C.s were the
stake and the forfeit sudden death.
llth September, 1915. Imbros. Ran across in
the motor boat to see the 86th Brigade under
Brigadier-General Percival. Went, man by man,
172 GALLIPOLI DIARY
down the lines of the four battalions no very
long walk either ! These were the Royal Fusiliers
(Major Guyon), Dublin Fusiliers (Colonel O'Dowda),
Munster Fusiliers (Major Geddes), Lancashire
Fusiliers (Major Pearson).
Shade of Napoleon say, which would you rather
not have, a skeleton Brigade or a Brigade of
skeletons ? This famous 86th Brigade is a com-
bination. Were I a fat man I could not bear it,
but I am as unsubstantial as they themselves. A
life insurance office wouldn't touch us ; and yet
they kept on smiling !
12th September, 1915. Imbros. The C.O.'s,
Geddes, Pearson, Guyon and O'Dowda, lunched :
an ideal lot ; young, ardent, on the spot. Marshall
left by the Suvla trawler. Windy day, but calmer
in the evening and at night rained a little.
13th September, 1913. Imbros. Crossed again
with Freddie Maitland and inspected the 87th
Field Ambulance (Highland Territorials from
Aberdeen) under Colonel Fraser. Became so
interested the dinner hour was forgotten a bad
mark for a General. Much pleased with the whole
show : up to date, and complete in all respects.
Got back lateish. Altham dined. Sat up at
business till midnight.
Dictated a long letter to Callwell, Director of
Military Operations at the War Office, on the
suicidal behaviour of the Military Censor. In
South Africa, my Chief of the Staff's latchkey let
many a clandestine tit-bit slip through to keep
THE FRENCH PLAN 173
interest alive in England. K. regularly, when
the mails came back to roost, went for me, but the
messages had got home and done their duty as
good little tit-bits should. The B.P. cannot work
up the full steam of their war energy when the
furnaces of their enthusiasms are systematically
damped down ; shut off from any breath from out-
side. Your sealed pattern censor sees nothing
beyond the mischief that may happen if the enemy
gets to know too much about us ; he does not see
that this danger is negligible when compared
with the keenness or dullness of the nation.
General Headquarters,
Medtn. Expeditionary Force,
13th September, 1915.
" Dear Callwell,
" I am about to commit an atrocity by writing
to an overworked man on a subject which may
seem to him of secondary importance. Still, to
the soldiers out here, the said subject means encour-
agement or discouragement coming to them through
the medium of their home letters, so vital a
factor in victory or failure that the thought em-
boldens me to proceed.
" Our misfire of last month came within only a
fine hair's breadth of the grand coup and caused
us proportionately bitter disappointment at the
moment. Yet, looking back over the whole affair
in a more calm and philosophical spirit, any
General, I think, would now be bound to admit
that in some respects at least fortune had not been
too unkind.
174 GALLIPOLI DIARY
" The Australians and New Zealanders have
been extricated from what by all the laws and
traditions of war, was, in theory, an untenable
position ; their borders have been enlarged ; the
heights they hold have become more elevated and
commanding ; they have been entirely released
from shelling on the one flank and, on the other,
the shelling has dwindled away to next door to
nothing. North of them again we have captured
a more or less practicable winter harbour, and
have extended our grip on the coastline. From
the extreme South point of Anzacs to their extreme
North was formerly 2f miles. From the extreme
South point of Anzacs to our extreme North
point (along which there is inter-communication)
is now 13 miles. Thus we force the enemy to
maintain a much larger number of troops on the
Peninsula (where he is already slowly bleeding to
death under the stress of his supply and transport
difficulties) or else dangerously to weaken parts of
his line.
"As to the fighting by which this has been
accomplished, there is nothing from beginning to
end that any army need be ashamed of. Every
word I sent home in my Proemial cables might have
been published without raising a blush to the
cheek of the most ardent Imperialist. In saying
this I do not, of course, assume that raw troops
could tackle a totally strange and uncomfortable
proposition with the swift directness and savvy
of veterans. The feat performed by the Austra-
lians and New Zealanders was of the class of
the storming of the heights of Abraham, only it
THE FRENCH PLAN 175
was infinitely, infinitely more difficult in every
respect.
" On the other side, still assuming the philosophical
mantle, consider what might have happened. Had
the Australians and New Zealanders been average
troops, they would perhaps have burst through
the first series of wire entanglements and trenches,
but they would not have stormed the second, still
less the third, fourth, fifth or sixth lines. Again,
had the Turks got the smallest inkling of our
intention, the landing at Suvla Bay would have
failed altogether, and the New Armies would have
been virtually smashed to pieces without being
able to show any quid pro quo.
" We soldiers out here have then it seems to
me, much for which to thank God on our
bended knees. That, at least, is my personal
attitude.
" How is it then that our letters from home are
filled with lamentations and that, having just gained
a proportionately very large accretion of territory,
we see headlines in the papers such as ' The Gal-
lipoli standstill,' whereas it does not seem to
occur to anyone to speak about ' The French
standstill ' ?
" Well, I will tell you. The system upon which
the Press Bureau approaches the eagerly attentive
ear of the British Public is the reason.
" Why I begged the War Office to change the
method by which I sent copies of my Proemial
176 GALLIPOLI DIARY
cables to Maxwell was that I found he (animated,
of course, by the best intentions) was improving
the successes and minimising the failures. The
finishing touch was given when, one day, he inserted
the phrase * The enemy is demoralized and has to
submit by day and by night to our taking his
trenches.' Obviously, even the most stupid fella-
heen after reading such a sentence must, in the
course of time, begin to ask himself how, if
trenches are being easily taken by day and by
night, we still remain on the wrong side of Achi
Baba!
" Turning now to the Press Bureau and our
landing, there was nothing in that landing, as
I have just said, which need have caused sorrow
to a soul in the British Isles excepting, of course,
the deplorable heavy casualties which are insepar-
able now from making any attack. But, on the
23rd of August a correspondent cables to an Ameri-
can paper a sensational story of a decisive victory,
which the Press Bureau must have known to be a
tissue of lies. Had the lies taken the shape of
disasters to the British there would not, from the
point of view of us soldiers, have been the smallest
objection to publishing them. Suppose Mr. X,
for instance, had said that the landing did not
succeed, and had been driven off with immense
slaughter ? Apart from the fact that such a cable
would have made many poor women in England
unhappy for a few hours, the fabrication would
have done us positive good : when the truth was
known the relief would have been enormous, we
would have gained handsome recognition of what
THE FRENCH PLAN 177
had actually been done, and German inspired
lies would have been discounted in future.
" But there is no moral in the world that can
stand against a carefully engineered disappointment.
When you know perfectly well that the spirits of the
people are bound to be dashed down to the depths
within a few days, it is unsound statesmanship
surely so to engineer the Press that you raise those
selfsame spirits sky high in the meantime. To
climb up and up is a funny way to prepare for a
fall ! If you know that your balloon must burst
in five minutes you use that time in letting out gas,
not in throwing away ballast. If you want to
spoil a man's legacy of 500 tell him the previous
evening he has been left 50,000 !
"As I began by saying, do please forgive me,
my dear Callwell, for taking up your most precious
time. But you are more in touch with this particu-
lar business than anyone else at the War Office
and, from your large mindedness, I feel sure you
will be able to spare me some sympathy, and
perhaps even get some recognition for the general
principle I herewith put forward :
" (1). Do not too curiously censor false alarmist
reports put about by the enemy. Let
the papers publish them with a query and
then smash them as soon as this can
be done with positive certainty.
" (2). Mercilessly censor any report which you
think is, even in the smallest degree,
overstating your own case.
VOL. n. 13
178 GALLIPOLI DIARY
" The system needs courage but, with the
British Public, it would pay !
" Yours sincerely,
(Sd.), " IAN HAMILTON."
As suspense had, by now, become unbearable,
cabled home asking S. of S. to " let me know, as
soon as you can safely do so," when the new
divisions may be expected. I tell him I have
"informal" news from the French but dare not
take action on that.
I4:th September, 1915. Imbros. Mails in with
Ward as King's Messenger. Captain Vitali (Italian
liaison officer) and Captain Williams dined. Vitali
is worried about his status. He was told in the
first instance he was to be liaison officer between
General Cadorna and myself. On this understand-
ing we agreed to his coming to our Headquarters.
Once he was here the Italian Government (not
Cadorna he is careful to explain) said he must
be permanently attached to us. Vitali feels him-
self in a false position as he thinks that, had we
known, we might not have let him come. Personally,
I am quite glad to have him ; but we did not
have much talk as, immediately after dinner,
Braithwaite brought me the decipher of Lord
K.'s answer to my reminder to him. This has
greatly saddened me and takes up the whole of
my thoughts.
"(No. 7843, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to
General Sir Ian Hamilton. Reference your No.
M.F. 630. I have just returned from France where
THE FRENCH PLAN 179
I went to settle up the questions asked in that
telegram which were in a very indefinite state
owing apparently to a decision having been arrived
at by the French Government without reference
to their military advisers. The outcome of my
meeting with Millerand, Joffre and Sarrail was that
the French force of four Divisions proposed to be
sent to the Dardanelles cannot leave until the result
of the approaching offensive in France is determined.
If it be as successful as hoped for your position
in the Dardanelles would naturally be affected
favourably. It is hoped that the issue will be clear
in the first few days of October, and if indecisive,
that by 10th October two of our Divisions may be
at Marseilles for embarkation to be followed closely
by the four French Divisions. The embarkation
and transport of so large a force would, it is thought,
take about a month, but this has still to be worked
out in detail, so that by about the middle of
November would be the time when all would be
ready.
" In the meantime, as transport is available,
I shall continue to send you reinforcements and
drafts of which you are fully informed, up to 20th
instant, and on which you should alone calculate.
" Sarrail, backed by General Bailloud, is greatly
in favour of the French expedition being employed
independently on the Asiatic shore.
" Joffre greatly doubts the wisdom of this course,
and Millerand requested me to ask you to state
fully and confidentially, for his personal information,
your opinion on this matter.
180 GALLIPOLI DIAEY
" Joffre's objections appear to be that a landing
in Asia opens up a very wide field if the force be
not immediately successful, and that in that case
more troops, munitions and drafts would be
eventually required than he could spare with due
regard to the safety of France.
" Secondly, he is not very confident of Sarrail's
leadership, particularly as the plans Sarrail has
made seem to be worthless. Joffre is having
careful plans worked out by his Staff for the
expedition on the Asiatic shore which, he says,
though unfinished, do not look promising. The
same objection on his part would not, I gather, be
felt if the French troops were given a definite area
and objective on the Gallipoli Peninsula, where
the scope of their activities, and consequently the
support required from France, could be limited."
Where's the use of M. Millerand's consulting me
over what lies on the far side of a dead wall ?
Had he asked me to show why action here should
have priority over action in France, then I might
have been of some use. But that is settled : the
four French Divisions ear-marked for the East will
not now be sent until after " the results of the
coming offensive in France have been determined."
" If the success of this push equals expectations
you will reap the benefit." If indecisive then,
" by the 10th October," two British Divisions and
four French Divisions will be at Marseilles ready
to sail out here : " about the middle of November
would be the time when everything would be
ready." There are altogether too many ifs
and ands and pots and pans about Millerand's
THE FRENCH PLAN 181
question. When a man starts going West who
can foretell how long it will take him to arrive at
the East ?
(1) If the push in the West is victorious we will
score, says K. That is so. Far as the Western
battlefield lies from the scene of our struggle,
the report of a German defeat in France would
reverberate Eastwards and would lend us a brave
moral impetus. But the point I would raise
is this: did K., as representing a huge Eastern
Empire, press firmly upon Millerand and Joffire the
alternative, if the push in the East is victorious
the West will score ?
What express strategical gain do they expect
from pushing back the Germans ? A blow which
merely destroys a proportion of men and material
without paralysing the resources of the enemy is a
blow in the air. War cannot be waged by tactics
alone. That is a barbaric method. To bend back
the German lines in the West, or to push the first
line back on to the second or third, or twentieth,
has of itself but slight strategical or economic
import.
Here, on the other hand, we have literally in
our grasp a clear cut gift offered us by the Gods.
The impossible part, the landing, is done. All
that remains is so many fresh men and so many
thousand shell. The result is not problematical,
but mathematical. Napoleon is the only man who
has waged a world war in the world as we know it
to-day. Napoleon said, I think it was on the famous
raft, ' Who holds Constantinople is master of
the world." And there it lies at the mercy of
182 GALLIPOLI DIARY
the Briton could he only convince Joffre that
the shortest cut to freeing his country from the
Germans lies through the Dardanelles.
The principles which should underlie Entente
strategy will be clear to military historians although
obscured to-day by jealousies and amateurishness :
just the usual one, two, three they are, in this
order :
(a) Hold the sea.
(6) Hold the West.
(c) Smash the Turk.
A couple of miles won by us here gives England
wheat and Russia rifles ; gives us the whip hand in
the Balkans plus security in a couple of Continents.
A couple of miles lost by us here leaves the German
with a strengthened grip upon all the real world
objectives for which he went to war : it leaves
us with a ruined prestige in Asia. But what is
all that to Joffre to whom, as a good Frenchman,
the Balkans ; the bracing up of the Russian
Army ; all the Odessa corn ; Asia and Africa
thrown in, do not count against one departement
of la Patrie.
(2) If the push in the West is indecisive then our
push is only to be postponed. Postponed ! The
word is like a knell. To write it gives me a
feeling of sick despair. Only postponed ! As
well cable at once, only ruined ! !
(3) But there is a third eventuality not mentioned
by Lord K. How if our attack upon the main
strength of the entrenched Germans is beaten
off ? To Joffre France comes first and the rest
Exclusive News
MARSHAL LIMAN VON SANDERS
THE FRENCH PLAN 183
nowhere every time : that is natural. But our
Higher Direction are not Frenchmen not yet !
Armageddon is actually being fought here, at the
Dardanelles, and the British outlook is focussed
on France. We are to sit here and rot away with
cholera, and see the winter gales approach, until
the big push has been made in the West where
men can afford to wait where they are healthy
where time is all on their side. And this push
in the West is against the whole German Empire
linked to all its own vast resources by a few miles
of the best railways in the world. We .can attack
here with more men and more munitions than the
enemy the very moment we care to accept the
principle that, at this moment, Constantinople and
the heartening up of Russia and ascendency amongst
the Balkan States are not only the true positive
objectives of our strategy, but are the sole strategi-
cal stunts upon the board. We can do so because
of our sea power. We can borrow enough howitzers,
aeroplanes, munitions and drafts from the West ;
apply them here and then, if necessary, return
them. We are not exploiting our own special
characteristics, mobility and sea power!
Easy to preach patience to a nation in agony ?
Yes, for the whole agony of the whole world is
more important even than the agonies of France.
We've got to win the war and win it quick. There's
only one way to do that. The resources of the
Entente are not equal to carrying on two offensives
at the same moment. If our Army in the West
will just sit tight awhile, we here will beat the Turks,
and snip the last economic lien binding the Central
Powers to the outside world.
184 GALLIPOLI DIARY
Once more, our game is to defend in the West
until the attack in the East has borne economic
fruit in the shape of ships and corn : political fruit
in the sentiment of the Balkans : military fruit
in the fillip given to the whole force of the
Entente by actual tactical contact between the
British soldiers and the rank and file of the Huskies.
The collapse of the Central Powers, eclipsed in full
view of all Asia and Africa by the smoke from the
funnels of the British Fleet at anchor in the Golden
Horn is what we are after here. Even if French
and Joffre do drive the German main hordes back
to the Rhine the scope of their scoop would be far less
than ours, for we by getting to Constantinople
can starve those main armies stiff.
How few of our people know anything of the
Russians. At least, I have been attached for
eight months to the Armies which fought against
them in the field ; have visited Russia and Siberia
and have done two peace manoeuvres as their
guest. To send superior officers to Russia only
produces jealousy ; to send supplies only breeds
dishonesty. But with 50,000 British soldiers as
yeast we could leaven 5,000,000 Muscovites ; we
could fire their inert masses with our ardour ;
this is the best of all uses to which 50,000 British
soldiers could at present be put.
From the early days when he told me the New
Army should go to Salonika, K. had an intuition at
the back of his big mind that victory would dawn
in the East. But he is no longer the K. 01 K.,
the old K. of Khartoum and Pretoria. He still has
his moments of God-sent intuition. First, he had
THE FRENCH PLAN 185
absolute knowledge that the Germans would come
through Belgium : I repeat this. The assumption
was not uncommon perhaps, but he knew the fact /
Secondly, when everyone else spoke of a six
weeks' war ; when every other soldier I can think
of except Douglas Haig believed he'd be back before
the grouse shooting was over ; K. went nap on a
three years' war. Pray heaven he was wrong ;
but, right or wrong, he has already proved himself
to have been nearer the mark than anyone else.
Thirdly, he had a call (by heavenly telepathy,
I suppose) that his New Armies must go out to
the East. There is no more question about this
than there is about Belgium and the three years'
duration. He has told me so ; time and again.
Why then does he not act accordingly if he's in
the Almighty know ? Because he can't. With
the one exception of the Battle of Paardeberg,
he never in his palmiest days pretended to be a man
of action. But now he has lost his faculty of
forcing others to act. He makes a spurt but he
can't stay the distance. He has met Millerand,
French and Joffre in Council and allowed the
searchlights of his genius to be snuffed out !
That is what surprises me : He, who once could
deflect Joe Chamberlain and Milner from their
orbits ; who twisted stiff-necked Boers round his
little finger ; who bore down Asquith, Winston,
Prince Louis and Beatty in Valetta Harbour
East versus West Mediterranean versus North Sea
who, from 8 p.m. to 2 a.m., withstood, wrestled
with and overthrew Haldane's arguments in favour
of his taking up the succession to the Duke of
186 GALLIPOLI DIARY
Connaught, and that although he had one arm
tied to his side by having taken the King's shilling.
What a marvel he was and now-
Ichabod !
There is something so tragical in what home
letters let us guess that the pity of it almost makes
me forget our own still-born projects.
16th September, 1915. Imbros. Altham and
Major Hood left G.H.Q. for L. of C. Headquarters.
Had another hour with Altham before he got aboard
his destroyer. Gave an interview to Buchanan,
A.M.S. After lunch, Braithwaite, Val, Wells,
Deedes, Freddie and myself went off to Suvla
aboard H.M.S. Scourge (Lieutenant-Commander
Tupper). On landing, Braithwaite branched off
to see the G.S. Byng has a keen sense of humour ;
is energetic and by his looks and manner attracts
all ranks. No one could wish a better corps com-
mander and I have never in all my experience
known anyone take greater and more minute
trouble with his field days and manoeuvres than
he did in Egypt the year before the war. But
his sojourn on the Western front has given him
inflated standards as to the number of guns and
stocks of H.E. shell which are essential to
success ; especially with troops who have suffered
heavy losses. Perhaps he is right. This para,
from a letter written to the great man to-night
explains more generally what I feel :
" Maude is burning to get on and do something
and I heard him myself ask Byng when he was
THE FRENCH PLAN 187
going to let him have a dash. As to Byng, I think
myself he is not quite sure yet about the spirit
of his men. I have been trying to spur him on
for the last day or so, although only by very gentle
hints, as I think, with a man of Byng's great
reputation, one must leave him to himself for as long
as possible. I daresay he may be quite right and
very wise. Still, these reinforcements have brought
the Suvla Bay troops up to no less than 37,000
men, and I am most anxious they should do some-
thing soon a little more rapid than sapping out
slowly towards the enemy's lines which they are
doing."
After my talk with Byng, we went on to meet Fan-
shawe and de Lisle. Maude came along with me as
far as the crestline. I asked him about his Division.
He replied : "Sir Ian, may I be frank with you about
the Division ? J: At these ominous words I shivered.
They positively gave me the shivers. So I braced
myself up when I answered, " But of course ! "
Maude then said, " If you give the order now, and
will arrange for a little artillery support, my Division
will storm and hold on to any thousand yards of
Turkish trench you like to point out ; to-morrow."
I could have embraced him, but I had to go steady
and explain to him that a Corps Commander must
judge all his Divisions and that, taking the situation
as a whole, Byng did not think it fair on the men
to let them have a dart yet not, at least, till they
had more munitions at their back. Byng has
had wide experiences in the West and he looks on it
as trying the men unfairly to ask them to attack
without a preliminary bombardment on a scale
188 GALLIPOLI DIARY
which we cannot at present afford. " Yes," said
Maude, " that is all very well but after all you must
remember the Turks have neither the artillery nor
the munitions the Germans have at their command
on the Western front."
" Well," I replied, " you put your points to Byng
and you know I am a man who never yet in my
life refused a good brave offer like yours." He
has a great admiration for Byng and so, though
sadly, he went away.
Fanshawe met me at the South end of the
Division trenches, as bright and keen as a new
nail. His men, too, seem full of go. Fanshawe
hopes to carry the whole ridge whenever he gets
the order. The llth Division promise to be as
fine a unit as any in the Army once they get their
gaps filled in.
IQth September, 1915. Imbros. We had quite
a lively morning here. At 7.30 an enemy's biplane
dropped four bombs on our Headquarters camp
and got away with hardly a shot fired at it. At
7.50 an enemy's Taube came over and dropped
bombs near my Signal Tent, also a little summer
shower of small steel darts : five men were wounded.
At 8.10 a.m. yet another enemy biplane circled round
but was kept at a respectful distance by the
ship's guns.
Gave an interview to Colonel Stewart, Armoured
Car Squadron.
Vice- Admiral Foumet and Staff called on me in
the forenoon. He replaces Admiral Nicol gone sick.
THE FRENCH PLAN 189
Mails went out this evening. Freddie and I gave
tone to our debilitated constitutions by dining with
the ever hospitable V.A. on the Triad"
A cable from Dawnay saying Lord K. " would
not regard unfavourably " a withdrawal from
Suvla Bay.
Dawnay left under the cloud of the 21st August.
He it was who rough-drafted the cable (in very
much stronger terms than my final version) sug-
gesting that we might have to draw in our horns
if we were not kept up to strength. Since then
our skies have cleared ; the spirit of the men
has risen to set fair and we have got drafts enough,
not for a big push but certainly to enable us to
be delighted should the Turks attempt any sort
of an attack, either at Suvla or anywhere else.
The Turks, in fact, are strictly on the defensive
both actually and in their spirit.
17th September, 1915. Imbros. Had been going
to Anzac to inspect and then to bring Birdie back
to stay with me. But the weather was too bad.
He got here all right as the wind is from the North
and he was able to climb aboard under the lee of
Nibrunesi Point. Just as well, perhaps, we did
not go, for one way or another a good deal of extra
work had to be got through. One thing ; two
cables from Maxwell to the War Office have
been repeated to us here ; inadvertently we
think ; divertingly for sure. The story is this :
A few days ago we were offered the 51st and
53rd Sikhs who, despite their titles, are half
190 GALLIPOLI DIARY
Mahomedan. After consulting Cox, Birdie and
other Indian Army Officers I cabled back saying we
would gladly have them " as soon as transport can
be arranged," unless French is willing to exchange
them for two purely non-Mahomedan units. Here
are the collateral cables from Maxwell to the War
Office : -
" Both the 51st and 53rd Sikhs have already been
disembarked. They had better remain off ship
as long as possible, I think, since they are reported
to be feverish. The troopship can wait at Port
Said. The men on the canal, I should like to
point out, barely get two nights in bed per week."
" I have been asked by Hamilton to send him
a double Company of Patiala Sikhs to reinforce
the 14th Sikhs. I can do this, and if you concur
I think it is a better arrangement than to send him
the 51st and 53rd Sikhs."
The Sikhs meant for Gallipoli are gone ; we shall
never see them more ; they mount guard by night
against the ghosts of the Suez Canal.
Another thing ; a Correspondent writes in and
tells us that for the honour of his profession he
feels bound to let us know that Mr. Ashmead-
Bartlett has secretly sent home an uncensored
despatch per, of all people in the world, Mr. Murdoch!
I had begun to wonder what had come over
Mr. Murdoch and now it seems he has come over
me !
The next paper on the table was my draft cable
of advice for M. Millerand. Joffre wants his four
THE FRENCH PLAN 191
Divisions to land on the Peninsula ; Sarrail wishes
them to work along the Asiatic side. No doubt
the views of the French Generals are being coloured
by their wish to stand as clear as they can of
British command. So I have been careful to
sweep away that obstacle by offering to stand down.
Now they can fix up the problem on its merits :
" Closest consideration has been given to your
No. 7843, cipher. Until now I have consistently
opposed a landing on the Asiatic side of the Straits
with less than 6 divisions see my telegram No.
M.F. 349 of 19th June. On Gallipoli Peninsula
area and difficulties of supply limited liabilities
of the opposing forces whereas mainland of Asia
gave scope for the deployment of large forces by
the enemy. Now, however, the situation is clear-
ing up and there has been a great change in the
conditions.
"The Turks had formerly 10,000 to 12,000
men on Asiatic shore with large reserves on the
Peninsula available to cross over there if necessary.
Now Anatolia and Syria have been drained of
troops to oppose us on the Peninsula where the
Turks have far longer front to hold, namely, 9^
miles instead of 2J, whilst our position and strength
at Suvla and Anzac are more threatening to their
communications than was our position at Anzac
in June. If, therefore, we can be strong enough
to maintain pressure on whole Turkish line on the
Peninsula it is unlikely that Turks could detach
troops to oppose French landing on Asiatic shore.
Assuming even that the Turks were enabled to
release every soldier from Thrace by a definite
192 GALLIPOLI DIARY
understanding being arrived at with Bulgaria,
I calculate they might gather a total of five divisions
but of these probably only one or at most two
would be on Asiatic side at beginning of the opera-
tions and would probably be scattered so that
opposition in strength to surprise landing is im-
probable. Moreover, only one of the divisions
is composed of good Nizam troops, others believed
to be not up to establishment. The Asiatic coast
down to Yukeri Bay is now heavily trenched but
I do not think much has been done below that
point. Supposing, therefore, French bring good
divisions at war strength and succeed in keeping
their destination secret, they appear to have a
good chance of obtaining good covering positions
without much loss and of thence advancing on
Chanak defeating any Turkish forces sent against
them. Degree of their success would depend on
whether the entrenched positions which have been
prepared on the Kum Kale Ehren Keui road
could be turned by the good road which leads
from Yukeri through Ezine and Ishiklar to Chanak,
as it is unlikely that Turks would be able to quickly
organize new defensive positions with entirely new
line of supply. The distance of landing place
from objective is a secondary consideration. It
is easier to march and fight 100 miles than to
take three lines of trenches. In the one case there
is room for manoeuvre at which Turks are bad while
in the other case siege warfare results at which the
Turks stand supreme. Once Ehren Keui reached,
the Turks between that place and Kum Kale
would be forced to retire and Kum Kale would
become our base, thereby greatly shortening line
THE FRENCH PLAN 193
of supply. Supposing Turks endeavoured to make
bridgehead on Chanak promontory, the country
is so big that large forces would be necessary and
once the Turks were cut off from North their supply
difficulties would be most serious. French posses-
sion of Chanak should be equivalent to victory,
but as Turks are stubborn fellows it is better to
confine anticipations to commencement of results
which I consider would be as follows : Cutting
off of Turkish supply line Chanak to Akbashi
Liman. Narrows would be useless to Turks.
Nagara communications could be cut. Our 15-inch
howitzer could be used to batter Kilid Bahr forts.
Allied Fleets should be able to enter Marmora
without loss.
" Turning to alternatives. If French were held
up and unable to reach Chanak, at least the last
Turkish reserves would have been used up and
I think happy termination of operations though
postponed would begin to come clearly into view.
Supposing the worst happened and that the French
were compelled to fall back after landing. In
that case a clear road for retirement to a bridge-
head would be open. Positions covering landing
could be taken up and there they would continue
to draw towards them considerable Turkish forces
which would otherwise be available for use on
Peninsula.
" Finally, greater difficulties beset all other
schemes. The notorious military disadvantages
of independent command would be less harmful
if the respective armies were separated by the
Straits than if they were mixed up together on
VOL. n. 14
194 GALLIPOLI DIARY
Peninsula. As Achi Baba is now one of the
strongest fortresses in Europe, it would be unpopu-
lar to palm off the Cape Helles end upon the French.
Moreover, all the French here are, and always
have been, dead set on Asia. If the French were
employed at Suvla they would have to fight side
by side with the British, a situation which, with
co-equal commanders, would be a military absurdity.
Were that course decided upon, I would ask the
Allied Governments to make up their minds which
General had the most daring, brains and experience,
and if it were the Frenchman I would serve under
him loyally.
"As to making the attempt to the North of
the Gulf of Xeros : a landing there is certain to
be opposed, and the Turkish reinforcements
which are always held ready in the neighbourhood
of Uzunkiupru and Keshan could arrive in strength
very quickly and imperil the whole project. A
further objection lies in the distance of the French
intermediate base and great strain it would throw
on Allied Fleets. Finally, it is all-important that
absolute secrecy should be maintained. I suggest
that it should be allowed to leak out that the
destination of the French is Enos, this would
probably have the effect of tricking Turkish troops
in Thrace, as Enos is a destination which would
gain most credence."
Birdie has at last worn off the fine edge of his
keenness ; he looks a little tired : General Russell,
the New Zealander, dined also and was in great
form.
THE FRENCH PLAN 195
18th September, 1915. Imbros. A cable to say
that the French Government are anxious to form
two bases each capable of supplying three Divisions :
one to be at Mudros, the other at Mitylene. Is
it business ? In spite of delay, in spite of lost
chances, is it business ?
CHAPTER XX
LOOS AND SALONIKA
LEFT G.H.Q. at noon to-day, 18th, sailed to
Helles ; lunched with Davies ; went up to inspect
the East Lanes Division. The trenches are in
apple-pie order and the men are in good heart,
but the stomach has always been held to be the
mainstay of the fighting man, and theirs are in
the grip of enteritis. Stopped at 5th Corps Head-
quarters on my way back.
De Putron and la Borde came back with me.
Struck an interesting scientist called Lawes whilst
I was in the Lancashire trenches. As we were
entering the harbour at Kephalos an enemy
Taube tried to drop a bomb aboard. No harm.
Dined with the V.A. together with Birdie,
Lord Anglesey and Freddie.
When we got back found this from War Office.
Rather amusing to be in the know of the counter
moves and to see their outcome :
" The exchange of battalions mentioned in No.
7873, cipher, of 14th September cannot be effected,
so that at present the 51st and 53rd Sikhs will
196
LOOS AND SALONIKA 197
not proceed to France. From the General Officer
Commanding, Egypt's, telegram No. 1854. E. of
15th September, it is understood that he can
send you another double company of Patiala
Sikhs to reinforce the 14th Sikhs. Possibly this
will suffice for your requirements in the mean-
time, and the 51st and 53rd Sikhs will be left
at the disposal of General Officer Commanding,
Egypt. If so, will you please make arrangements
with him accordingly ?
" Repeated to General Officer Commanding,
Egypt."
Our defeat is a foregone conclusion : the Senoussi
is too strong for us. All the same I am determined
to press the matter to an issue, if only to have a
clean cut precedent as to whether we do have a
first call on troops in Egypt or whether it is the
other way about. We want these men so badly.
They don't get sick here ; are worth four European
Battalions at present, and Birdie has become
most anxious to get them, especially the 53rd.
So I am cabling to Maxwell just to send us our
troops (for they are ours) forthwith and have
cabled to the War Office : -
' With reference to your telegram No. 8012,
cipher. In accordance with your telegram No.
8711, of llth September, I am asking General
Officer Commanding, Egypt, to send here, at once,
the 51st and 53rd Sikhs, as I cannot do without
them. I shall be very glad to receive the Patiala
Sikhs as well, as the 14th Sikhs are badly in need
of a reinforcement."
198 GALLIPOLI DIARY
Imagine had we been sent Indian Divisions for
Suvla and if the New Army, Territorials and
Yeomen had been sent instead to France ! Each
category would have given (let me put it mildly)
double value. The heat, the thirst, the scrub,
the snipers, all so disconcerting to our fresh
contingents would have been commonplaces of
frontier warfare to our Indian troops. See what
the handful with us here have achieved. Yet
in vain do I write and cable my personal entreaties
to Beauchamp Duff, the all-powerful Commander-
in-Chief in India, and a very old friend, for two
hundred Sikhs : first he offers me a couple of
hundred Brahmins wherewith to fill the ranks
of the famous 14th Sikhs and then, when I hesitate
before a proposal which appears monstrous, with-
draws even that offer. Again, I beg for 200 recruits
for the 14th, saying I will train them myself ;
I am refused very politely and at great length
refused, because it would be " politically inex-
pedient " to send them. In vain do we try to
get our own two battalions through the Egyptian
morass; they are going to stick and do sentry
go over nothing. Why ; were there any real
trouble in Egypt I could land a whole Division
there within four and a half days !
As for the New Army and Territorials, gradually
entered with their veteran comrades in the trenches
of France and Flanders, they too would have
had more familiar surroundings and fairer play
as everyone here now recognizes, too late !
The crystals of history take shape while we
fight. As in a glass darkly the outlines begin
LOOS AND SALONIKA 199
to appear to anyone who has a moment wherein
to peer beyond the end of the war. Everything
has gone by the contrary. Our people have done
as well as their neighbours, and better, with their
imaginations, whether in diplomacy, strategy or
tactics. Where the Gibbon or Plutarch who sur-
vives the War Office Censor is going to damn
their reputations into heaps is over their failure
in business commonsense. Under their noses, parts
of their system, were two great live organisms ;
the Indian Army and the Territorial Force. From
the moment the mobilization flag was dropped it
was up to them to work tooth and nail to treble
or quadruple these sound, vigorous existing entities.
What have they done ? After a year of war,
the Indian Army and the Territorial Army are
staggering on their last legs instead of being the
best part of our forces. Compare the East Lanes
Division, who had the good fortune to escape from
War Office clutches by getting right out to Egypt
at the outbreak of the war, with Territorial
Divisions which have remained since then under
the eyes and in the hands of the War Office !
The Turks are still withdrawing troops from
the Caucasus front to ours. Good for the Russians.
Whilst I was at Helles, the enemy guns started
a heavy bombardment along the whole of our
nine mile front from the right of Anzac to the left
of Suvla ; a heavy musketry fire also along the
Turkish trenches. An attempt was then made
to launch infantry assaults against our lines, but
these fizzled out, the rank and file having no heart
for the job. There is no doubt the Turks have
200 GALLIPOLI DIARY
had enough of it. They can still hold on, but
that's about all.
19th September, 1915. Imbros. News in to say
that the Turkish rank and file at Suvla are not
equal to any attack. At the end of the bombard-
ment yesterday a few officers jumped on to the
parapet and waved their swords ; the men shouted
from the safety of the trenches that was all.
Alec McGrigor arrived from Alexandria as A.D.C.
vice Brodrick. At 9 p.m. an enemy aeroplane
dropped a couple of bombs. Very jolly having Birdie
here. He says that his latest returns show a daily
sick list of ten per battalion of British or Australian
troops and of one per battalion of Indian troops.
20th September, 1915. Imbros. Nothing doing.
There is still scope for action at Suvla but we
can't get them to take up any little schemes
we may suggest. Shell shortage is the invariable
answer. At 5 p.m. Birdie and Anglesey went
back to Anzac.
21st September, 1915. Imbros. Further devel-
opment of the Sikh comedy : Maxwell cables,
"No. 1883 E. Your No. M.F. 648. I have
received no orders to send these regiments.
According to my last information from the War
Office they were to remain here, as I require them,
but that I should send you a double company
of Patiala Sikhs to reinforce the 14th Sikhs."
I have cabled this on to the War Office, saying,
" As I understand it, your No. 8012 of 18th Sep-
tember does not mean that the War Office have
LOOS AND SALONIKA 201
withdrawn the offer of these two regiments, which
are urgently required here. I therefore hope that
you will give early authority to General Officer
Commanding, Egypt, to send them on to Mediter-
ranean Expeditionary Force."
The battalions were thrown at my head when
that grand statement was made as to the grand
army I commanded ; now where are they ?
Started off with Taylor, Freddie and Colonel
Napier (British Military Attache to Bulgaria) for
Anzac. No shelling. Went round the whole left
centre and left of Birdie's position to right and left
of Cheshire Point, and saw the new Australian
Division very fine fellows. Bullets were on the
whistle and " the boys " were as keen and happy
as any real schoolboys. Memories of the Khyber,
Chitral and Tirah can hardly yield samples of a
country so tangled and broken. Where the Turks
begin and where we end is a puzzler, and if you do
happen to take a wrong turning it leads to Paradise.
Met various Australian friends a full-blown Lord
Mayor many other leading citizens both of
Melbourne and of Sydney.
At 5 p.m. re -embarked. Napier gave birth to
a happy thought on our way back. His idea is
that we should transfer the troops on the Gallipoli
Peninsula to Salonika so as to hearten up the
Serbians and Greeks and dishearten our enemies
at Sofia. He has pressed his view, he said, on
the Foreign Office. I asked him if his Chief, the
Minister at Sofia, stood behind him. He said he
202 GALLIPOLI DIARY
could not vouch for his Minister's views, but
that he, Napier, had power in his capacity as
Military Attache to correspond with the British
Government direct.
K. himself did at one time toy with the thought
of sending his New Army to Serbia either under
Rundle or myself, and was only restrained by the
outbreak of typhus in that country. But, keen
as I was for the warpath, a very little study of the
terrain and supply question was enough to cool
my ardour.
Salonika is ruled out by history. In all the
campaigns waged of old in these very regions the
part played by Salonika has been naval, not military.
There must have been some reason for this : there
was ; it still exists geography ! You could not,
and cannot, carry out anything big via a couple
of narrow cracks through a trackless labyrinth
of mountains. The problem is a repetition of
the Afghanistan dilemma. A big army would
starve at Nisch and along the Danube ; a small
army would be swallowed up by the enemy. Unless
they are going to trust to Bulgaria and Roumania
for supplies, one British Army Corps is about
as much as can manage to live and fight in Serbia.
If they want to make Serbia safe their only possible
chance is to push through to Constantinople !
There is no other way. I said all this to Napier
and a lot more besides and left him keener on
Salonika than ever.
He actually thinks that from Salonika we could
do what could be done by us at any time at the
f^i
*
LOOS AND SALONIKA 203
Dardanelles ! Salonika is no alternative to the
Dardanelles. I wish the War Office could hear
Gouraud ; Gouraud, that big sane man with
local knowledge. How strong he used to be on
the point that Greece lay altogether outside the
sphere of any military action by the Entente.
We can't feed Russia with munitions through
Salonika, nor can we bring back Russian wheat
via Salonika, not much, seeing we would not be
able to feed ourselves were we fifty miles into
the mountains. Salonika is a military mare's
nest.
Scatters Wilson and Captain Cheape dined and
stayed the night. The King's Messenger arrived
with the Mails.
Three cables : -
"(No. M.F. 654). From General Sir Ian
Hamilton to War Office. Only two machine guns
per battalion are being brought by the City of
London battalions, the balance, by order of General
Officer Commanding, Egypt, being handed over
to Chief Ordnance Officer, Egypt. The former
telegraphs that this has been done by your order.
There is nothing that is more important to my
force than an ample supply of these guns. I
would therefore request that early authority should
be given to General Officer Commanding, Egypt,
to send on these guns."
"(No. I.D. 116). From General Headquarters,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, to War Office.
My No. I.D. 110. Please inform me whether
Murdoch has arrived, and whether my information
204 GALLIPOLI DIARY
was correct as regards his carrying a despatch for
Sir Harry Lawson from Ashmead-Bartlett."
"(No. 8108, cipher). Prom War Office to
General Headquarters, Mediterranean Expedition-
ary Force. Your No. I.D. 116. A despatch
answering the description has been taken from
Murdoch at Marseilles. You should delay action,
however, until we have seen it and you hear from
us further."
The despatch should have been censored here
and ought, therefore, to be sent back here for
censoring. The War Office, I suppose, want to
have first look in !
22nd September, 1915. Scatters and Cheape
sailed back for Suvla at 6.45 a.m. just in good
time to avoid a raid on our Headquarters carried
out by three Taubes between 7.50 and 8 a.m.
A dozen bombs dropped ; no serious harm done.
Heseltine, King's Messenger, came to dinner.
Bad news from Bulgaria. She is mobilizing,
not, we may be sure, for the sake of helping those
who do not help themselves. Well do I remember
Ferdinand, as long ago as 1909, turning to me
and saying as he pointed to a picture of himself
in the robes of a Byzantine Emperor, " Quand
vous arrivez au Bosphore, pensez d moi" Well,
there is one good side to working over a narrow
Peninsula, under the guns of your own Fleet,
all the Bulgars in the Balkans cannot add a rifle
to the number of enemy troops on Gallipoli, who
already, can only be munitioned, watered and fed
LOOS AND SALONIKA 205
with the greatest difficulty. The more targets
the enemy cram on to their present narrow front
the merrier for our gunners ; the better the chance
for our submarines starving the lot of them. So
long as our Fleet holds the ^Egean, we may snap
our fingers at the Bulgarians, whereas they, were
they fools enough to come here, would live on
tenter hooks lest haply some fine morning our
Fleet should sail into the Marmora.
Yes, two or three battleships in the Marmora !
Think of it ! The sea communications, Constanti-
nople-Gallipoli and Asia-Gallipoli, would cease,
ipso facto, to exist. The railways between Europe
and Constantinople and Asia and Constantinople
must shut down. In a fortnight the Turks on the
Peninsula begin to pack up ; in a month the
Turks in Constantinople move bag and baggage
from Europe to Asia. Ferdinand watching the
cat's jump, prepares to turn those 400,000 bayonets
of his against the Kaiser. So wags my world
in the might-be ; very much " might-be " for the
Navy are turning down the " to be " for the third
time of asking. Three times the Sibyl makes her
prodigious offer : May August September a new
world for old battleships : two four six !
23rd September, 1915. Stormy weather: the
Imogene could hardly crawl out. Have written
K. to tell him how day succeeds day, never without
incident, but never with achievement ; how we
are burnt up with longing to get on and how we
know that he is as anxious. Yet, as I tell him,
we " can't force the pace." How can we ? We
206 GALLIPOLI DIARY
have not the wherewithal the stuff. " Ityng
would like to have four days' successive bombard-
ment for an hour, and then attack, and speaks of
one H.E. shell per yard as pat as if they were
shells we could pick up on the seashore. I have
assured him it is no earthly use ; that he shall
have his share of what I have got, but that stuff
for bombardment is simply not in existence,
not here, at least."
24:th September, 1915. Imbros. Fought against
exasperation all day. As I thought :
"(No. 8193, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to
General Sir Ian Hamilton. In the existing situa-
tion, the two battalions referred to in your No.
M.F. 655 of 21st September, should remain for
the present in Egypt. I have informed Maxwell
to this effect."
K. has reopened the idea of giving up Suvla,
saying, " it might become necessary in certain
eventualities to abandon that area." In my reply
I have said, " I hope there will be no question
now of the abandonment of Suvla In
the Northern zone I have now more troops than
at the time of my telegram, my line is stronger,
the old troops are resting, the new troops are
improving, and preparations are being made for
a local advance. At this stage withdrawal will
be a great moral victory for the Turks. Moreover,
it would release a large number of enemy divisions
to oppose the Russians in Asia, or for other enter-
prises."
LOOS AND SALONIKA 207
Another cable also sent dealing with the ever
present, ever pressing, ever ghastlier shortage upon
the Peninsula generally :
" My present shortages, 21st September, of infan-
try rank and file are 2,645 in the XXIXth Division,
17,166 in the three New Army Divisions, and
23,986 in the four Territorial Divisions, totalling
43,797 ; out of respective establishments of 11,652,
37,869 and 44,824, total, 97,345."
Were the Royal Naval Division included the
percentage would be worse.
Peter Pollen and I dined with the Admiral.
After dinner, we discussed Fox-Ferdinand's little
tricks. The Admiral had heard a lot about his
flirtations with the Duke of Mecklenburg lately
sent from Berlin on some sort of an ambassadorial
mission to the Balkans. I told him of my visit
to Sofia during the interval which took place
between Prince Ferdinand proclaiming himself
Tsar, and the tardy and unenthusiastic recognition
of his new rank by Great Britain. Ferdinand's
Court Chamberlain asked me to dine. I wanted
to refuse as I had meant to go on to Constantinople,
but Sir George Buchanan, our Minister, begged
me to accept. Diplomatic relations were broken
off ; he had not seen Ferdinand for a month :
he wanted to know what that Prince would say
to me : " but," he added, " you must on no account
go in uniform. Seeing you are on the Army
Council it would almost amount to a recognition
of his Kingship if you went there in uniform."
I thought this a little far-fetched; however, I
208 GALLIPOLI DIARY
wrote back and said that I had the honour to
accept, but that, as I was travelling, I had only
my kleine Uniform ; i.e., undress kit, handy. I
proposed, therefore, with permission to take the
liberty of presenting myself in evening dress,
wearing miniature medals and decorations and
the ribbon of the Grand Cross of the Bath. By
return messenger an answer came back, " His
Majesty particularly wished once more to see the
admirable British uniform : " would I come in
kleine Uniform ; meanwhile, to put me quite at
my ease, H.M. had commanded the Court also
to wear undress. I showed this to Sir George,
who laughed and said, " He is too sharp ; he has
done us ; you must go now there is no help for it."
So I went in my grubby blue serge and found
Ferdinand and the whole of his Court blazing with
orders in the fullest of full dress !
25th September, 1915. To Anzac in the Arno.
Birdie met me and we walked along the lower
part of the left of the Australian trenches until
we reached the New Zealanders and were joined
by Godley. Lunched with General Inglefield ; then
plodded through the trenches held by his Division
(the 54th ; nice-looking boys) and by the Indian
Brigade. On the left of the Indian Brigade I
was met by Peyton who did pilot to me through the
Scottish Horse section. The Bard joined us here
and was in great form, full of administrative good
works as in South Africa. The Scottish Horse
are as keen as schoolboys out for their first shoot.
They were very proud of themselves and of the
effect their rifles with telescopic sights had produced
LOOS AND SALONIKA 209
when put into the hands of gillies and deer stalkers,
and at every twenty yards or so there was a
Scottish Horseman looking along his sights, finger
on trigger, and by his side a spotter whose periscope
was fixed on the opposite loophole. The moment
a Turkish shadow darkened the loophole the word
was given, the bullet sped. Not a very big mark
a loophole at over 100 yards but they got it, they
said, one try out of three.
At the end of the Scottish Horse we came to
the Worcester Yeomanry trench. But time was
up * and I had to make tracks for Anzac where
we had tea with Birdie, who had stuck to us
throughout the tour. Imbros by dinner-time.
The quietest day, bar none, we have had on the
Peninsula since we first landed. Not a shot was
fired anywhere except by our own snipers.
26th September, 1915. Imbros. Last night,
after dinner, Braithwaite came across with a black
piece of news in his pocket :
"(No. 8229, cipher). From Earl Kitchener to
General Sir Ian Hamilton. On account of the
mobilization of the Bulgarian Army Greece has
asked the Allies to send a force to Salonika in order
to enable her to support Serbia should the latter
be attacked by Bulgaria, as well as by German
forces from the North. No doubt you realize
that if by such action Bulgaria joins hands with
the Central Powers they will have a clear road to
Constantinople and Gallipoli, and be able to send
1 We had to get into Kephalos Harbour before dark ; other-
wise the submarine indicator nets were damaged. Ian H.
VOL. H. 15
210 GALLIPOLI DIARY
large quantities of ammunition or troops, render-
ing your position very hazardous.
" Both France and ourselves have promised to
send between us the troops asked for, viz., 150,000
men, and urgency is essential. It is evident that
under these circumstances some troops will have to
be taken from the Dardanelles to go to Salonika,
but it must be clearly understood that there is
no intention of withdrawing from the Peninsula
or of giving up the Dardanelles operations until
the Turks are defeated. Your staff officer has
suggested to me that you saw no difficulty in
reducing the length of your line and concentrating
your forces by withdrawing from the position now
held around Suvla Bay to the neighbourhood of
the Kaiajik Aghala position whence a line might
be drawn to the sea.
" Before the situation was changed by the
Bulgarians' action we considered that, owing to
the marshy nature of the country now occupied
at Suvla and the approaching winter, this reduction
of front would be strategically advantageous. Hence
my telegram No. 8162 to which your No. M.F. 664
replies.
" An offensive along practically the whole line
in France has now commenced. The infantry are
attacking to-day. Far-reaching results are antici-
pated which, if secured, should greatly affect your
situation.
" The projected dispatch of reinforcements of
French and British divisions for Asiatic operations
LOOS AND SALONIKA 211
must be in abeyance until a decision in the Western
theatre can be reached. The troops now at the
Dardanelles which are required for Salonika would
be two divisions, preferably the Xth and Xlth.
The French would also have to withdraw either a
brigade or a division from their force at Helles
for the same purpose. The Yeomanry now en
route to you would also have to be diverted to
Salonika and we should have to arrange to mount
them from Egypt after their arrival.
" Cable me at once your ideas as to meeting
these requirements. The Dardanelles Committee
consider a withdrawal from Suvla to be advisable
under the circumstances, but they had not seen
your telegram No. 664. We have been asked to
send the 15-inch howitzer, now on board ship at
Mudros, to Belgrade as soon as possible."
Amen so be it ! Our mighty stroke at the
vitals of the enemy is to break itself to pieces
against the Balkans. God save the King ! May
the Devil fly away with the whole of the Dardanelles
Committee ! !
What arguments what pressure I wonder can
have moved K. to swap horse in mid-Dardanelles ?
In December K. as good as told me I was "for
it " if the day should come along for his New Army
to help the Serbians. G.H.Q. in France had
belittled his effort to create it ; they had tried to
throw cold water on it (the New Army) and now
we should see how they liked it going to Salonika !
The reason why K., at that time, turned the project
down was his view that one Army Corps was too
212 GALLIPOLI DIARY
small a force to launch into those regions of great
armies and that, if the Germans turned seriously
in that direction, it would be gobbled up. But
two Army Corps would starve, seeing we had no
pack transport and that the railway would only
feed 40,000 men. Nor had we any mountain guns.
In February he resurrected the question but that
time he was put off by the typhus. " Whatever
destroys my New Army," he said, "it shall not
be the Serbian lice." Now he cables as if he was
being quite consistent and sensible, now, when
in every aspect, the odds have turned against the
undertaking. As to the Bulgarians having " a
clear road to Constantinople and GaUipoli " my
memorable dinner with Ferdinand, and his insistence
on his " pivotal " position, makes me perfectly
certain that the bones of no Bulgarian grenadier
will fertilize the Peninsula whatever happens.
And if the inconceivable were conceivable and
Ferdinand were to work for anything but his own
immediate gain there is no room for them here !
That fact is cast iron. The Turkish Empire
is here in full force. Enver can't feed more !
These numbers cause us no alarm. Since the last
abortive effort of the Turkish Command to get their
men to attack every soldier in the trenches knows
well that the enemy are afraid of us. They dare
not attack, they will not attack, and they cannot
attack. We know that quite well. If K. would
only come out here he would realize that the Turk
has lost his sting. I don't mean to say he is not
still a formidable fellow to turn out of his trench,
but he can't attack any more : and that is just
the moment we have chosen to sit down and do
LOOS AND SALONIKA 213
nothing ; now, when the enemy has been brought
to a standstill !
During my absence Bailloud has wired saying
he had received orders from his own Minister
of War to arrange for sending away one Division
of the C.E.O. and Braithwaite has cabled the
startling news to our S. of S. for War.
Well, well. If the Greeks and ourselves are
going to push through the mountains to help the
Serbs to hold Belgrade and the line of the Danube,
why then, no doubt, we are embarking upon some-
thing that would be fine were it feasible some-
thing more hopeful than sitting at Salonika and in
its salubrious suburbs, the "political " advantages
of which were preached to us by Napier.
But let no man hereafter talk of Dardanelles
adventures. M on Dieu !
Once again see the dupes of maps preparing
to dash out their brains, or rather the brains of
others, against the rocks. If only Joffre and K.
had looked at Belgrade over the guns of an Austrian
Battery in Semlin, as I did in 1909 ! The line of
the Danube is untenable except by a very large
force against the very large forces that can, and
will, be brought against it and there is no Fleet
there to feed a large force. Also, the communica-
tions of such a defending force will not only be
mechanically rotten but will also be strategically
at the tender mercy of the most cunning Prince
in Europe. We may think we have squared Ferdi-
nand. But it is easier to square the circle than
quare a fox.
214
GALLIPOLI DIARY
On the Danube, the Central Powers can put
and keep six men to our one, unless we control
the river from its mouth to Belgrade. This we
can only do by forcing the Dardanelles.
After outlining an answer for Braithwaite to
draft, I started off at 10.45 for Anzac and Suvla.
With me were Taylor, Gascoigne, Lieutenant
Moore and Freddie. From Anzac I walked along
the old communication trench for a couple of
miles, and then went round General Taylor's Brigade
along the front by Green Hill and the Chocolate
Hills. The heat was very exhausting.
Yesterday's calm has proved to be the prelude
to an attempted storm. At 5 a.m. there was a big
bombardment of the front line trenches, and the
Turks made a gesture of defiance. The gesture
did not go beyond fixing bayonets and shouting
" Allah ! " and the only result has been to render
Suvla more convinced than ever that the Turks
are absolutely fed up.
After invigorating myself with a good draught
of regimental spirit, set forth to walk back to
Anzac. Half way I halted at the Indian Brigade
Headquarters, and, on the invitation of the hospitable
Colonel Palin, had a square meal. Met Allanson,
the brave commander of the 6th Gurkhas ; Allanson
who scaled the heights of Sari Bair and entered
for a few hectic hours into the promised land.
Oh, what a wonderful adventure his has been !
To have seen the Dardanelles and their defences
lying flat at his feet ! To feel as he says he did
that he held the whole Turkish Army by the throat !
LOOS AND SALONIKA 215
To-day's inspection has once more brought me
into personal touch with the perfect confidence felt
both at Anzac and Suvla in the demoralization
of the Turks. This has nerved me to cable agree-
ing to spare the 10th and 53rd Divisions from'
Suvla as well as a Brigade of French from Helles
and four and a half Brigades of British Field
Artillery :
"(No. M.F. 675). From General Sir Ian
Hamilton to Secretary of State for War. Reference
your No. 8229. Let me begin by saying that
I quite realize that, to you, playing for your large
stakes, the Dardanelles operation may temporarily
become of a secondary nature. In spite of the
Salonika scheme I am, however, particular to note
that it is not intended to withdraw from the
Gallipoli Peninsula, nor to give up here until the
Turks are beaten. Bearing this in mind it becomes
my duty to point out the objection to the abandon-
ment of Suvla Bay, the consequences of which at
this stage would, I consider, be so grave that I am
warranted in running much risk to get you your
two divisions by other means. The situation has
greatly changed since I first suggested the possi-
bility of abandoning the Bay, and its abandonment
at this stage would, I feel convinced, enormously
accentuate the difficulties of any subsequent attempt
to capture the Narrows ; unless, as a result of
our landing troops at Salonika, Bulgaria were
induced to side with us and not against us. Even
when I told you in my No. M.F. 578 of 23rd August
that the diminution of my forces might compel
me to contract my line, I could not view the
216 GALLIPOLI DIARY
project without misgiving, in spite of the fact
that, at that time, I had landed few reinforcements
and little artillery in the new zone, and my views
are not rightly interpreted when it is said that
I saw no great difficulty in the enterprise. After
I had received the reassuring news of reinforce-
ments I sent you my No. M.F. 589 of 26th August
and I have from that date been pouring in large
quantities of reinforcements and supplies in antici-
pation of winter, and have landed a large additional
amount of artillery. Therefore, I could not
hurriedly evacuate the Bay without sacrificing
the majority of supplies and warlike stores. I
might also have very considerable losses, for the
Turks, who were previously 700 yards away,
are now within bombing distance in places. They
have a large number of guns in the northern zone
and a retirement could only be effected under
heavy fire, which with unseasoned troops would
make the retreat a hazardous one. As explained
in my No. M.F. 664 evacuation of the Bay would
involve with it the eventual evacuation of all but
the original Anzac position. But even if this
last step were not necessary the withdrawal of
British soldiers from Suvla would be an over-
whelming victory for the Turks. Our position
in the Dardanelles would be entirely altered for
the worse and even the effect of our landing of
troops at Salonika might be discounted in Bulgarian
eyes. At the present moment the Turkish com-
missariat difficulties and tales of starving families
which the wounded bring back from Constantinople
are having a bad effect on their moral and the
number of desertions is on the increase. Two
LOOS AND SALONIKA 217
Turkish attempts at the offensive have broken
down completely during the last week as their
troops refused to leave cover. If I give ground
the Turkish moral will immediately recover and
instead of containing over 60,000 Turks in the
Northern Zone there would be large numbers set
free to go elsewhere. All these arguments seem
to prove plainly that to evacuate a yard of Suvla
would be a most serious, and might prove a disas-
trous step. I would therefore prefer to run the
risk of holding the line defensively with fewer
troops in order to spare two divisions for the
new enterprise.
" I have at present one division in Corps Reserve
at Suvla and the 1st Australian Division resting
at Mudros and also one brigade resting at Imbros.
By bringing the tired Australians back and making
them replace the Mounted Division in the section
north of Susak Kuyu I could spare Xth and LUIrd
Divisions or else Xth and Xlth. I could also
spare one French brigade from Cape Helles without
replacing it by troops from Suvla, and a total of
4| British Field Artillery brigades. This would
at any rate enable me to postpone any evacuation
at Suvla and if the withdrawal became necessary
later on there would be less loss involved in
supplies and stores, as I could gradually make
necessary preparations for this deplorable con-
tingency.
e The 15-inch howitzer is at Alexandria and
can be sent whenever you desire on the receipt
of instructions. To-morrow I am having a con-
ference here with the Corps Commanders concerned
218 GALLIPOLI DIARY
to consider the details. I hope that you realize
that though the IXth Corps consists of Xth,
Xlth and Xlllth Divisions there are attached to
it LUIrd Welsh Division, Mounted Division and
XXIXth Division, and I therefore sincerely trust
you will not contemplate the withdrawal of the
Corps Staff and Corps Commander to accompany
the two divisions destined for Salonika, for I
have absolutely no one to replace them."
27th September, 1915. After breakfast a dove,
the German sort, flew across from Chanak and
dropped four bombs on our Headquarters ; all
wide ; no damage. At 11 o'clock Bird wood and
Byng came over for a confab on the last upset.
Both Generals went word by word through my
M.F. 657 of the 26th September, (1) as to drawing
in our horns at Suvla, (2) as to our power of hold-
ing on after we lose the 10th and 53rd Divisions.
They concur in my cables and are emphatic as to
the futility of making a gift of ground to any
enemy who are shaking in their shoes. What
the Turks want is a gift, not of ground but of
high explosive shell. A few thousand pounds
worth of that and Byng would go ahead and settle
their hash for good. Birdie stayed to lunch during
which meal I got a message from Bailloud telling
me flat that he had orders from his Government
to get one Division over to Mudros forthwith.
As long as I am in command no soldier but myself
shall handle the troops entrusted to me. I have
sent the following reply : " Sorry that as my orders
already telegraphed to you this morning are
specific, I cannot permit any movement of troops
LOOS AND SALONIKA 219
away from the Peninsula pending further instruc-
tions."
Ross and Nevinson (Press Correspondents), who
have been away on a jaunt, called on me and
had tea. Lord William Percy and Sir Walter
Barttelot dined.
28th September, 1915. Office. At midnight an
enemy aeroplane let us have a taste of his high
explosive no harm done. At 10.30 this morning
another came over and dropped a couple of bombs
into the aerodrome close by two men hit.
Colonel Dorling reported himself to me as Senior
Paymaster.
A cable from K. saying he is glad to meet me as
to holding on at Suvla. He agrees in fact that to
draw in our horns would merely set free six Turkish
Divisions to attack us elsewhere. He agrees also
with my choice of Divisions for Salonika. K.
seems astonished at the behaviour of the French
Government in sending tactical orders direct to
Bailloud. Most extraordinary, he calls it. He
wants Byng to go to Salonika and winds up glori-
ously by telling me of the great things they are
doing in France ; that, up to the present, 23,000
prisoners and over 40 guns have been taken, and
that he hopes there are more of each to follow.
This fine success, he says, should help us along
in the East. So it should. I have cabled the good
news across and ordered a feu de joie to be fired
everywhere on the Peninsula in honour of the
victory. The ball was opened at Helles at 7 p.m.,
220 GALLIPOLI DIARY
the Turks replied vigorously with every gun and
rifle they could bring to bear, and rarely, I imagine,
has a " furious joy " expressed itself more furiously.
Nowhere in the Empire has this fine victory
brought more heartfelt relief and joy than at the
Dardanelles : to have been brought to a standstill,
for the third time of asking, for nothing ; that was
the fear which had haunted us.
September, 1919. Work. At 11 a.m. tore
myself away from my papers to play principal
part in a gay little ceremony. Outside my office
a guard of honour of Surrey Yeomanry, Naval
Division and Australians formed three sides of
a square. Bertier, de la Borde and Pelliot were
led in smiling like brides going up to the altar,
and, after a tiny speech, I decorated the first
with the D.S.O. and the other two with the Military
Cross. All three Officers are most popular, and
there were loud cheers. De la Borde had tea and
Mitchell came in at the same time to say good-bye.
We are all distressed at losing Mitchell. He is a
very fine specimen of the sailor of the modern school.
Efficient, modest, untiring at his work. He has
collaborated in the most loyal and devoted manner
with the G.S., and I don't know how we should
ever have got on without him.
Nevinson, the Correspondent, came again with
Maxwell, the Press Censor. Nevinson wants to
find out whether it would be worth his while to
go to Salonika. I would like to lend him a hand
for he is such a nice fellow, but the matter is
about as secret as can be, and I don't feel myself
LOOS AND SALONIKA 221
free to say much. The Captains of H.M.S.
Cornwall and Cornwallis dined ; also Flight Com-
mander Samson and Ward, King's Messenger.
The last named starts to-morrow night and
carried off with him my letter to K. Amongst
other things I write : " In the cables which have
passed between us, I have found it anything but
an easy business to strike the happy mean between
executing your wishes promptly and cheerfully
on the one hand, and, on the other, giving you
a faithful impression of how we should stand here
once your orders had been carried out.
" If I make too little of the dangers which sur-
round me, then you may be encouraged to weaken
me still further, thereby jeopardizing the whole of
this enterprise. But if I allow my anxieties to
get too much the upper hand, why then I may
be ruining some larger enterprise, the bearing of
which I have no means of gauging."
I then explain the situation and wind up :
" In the small hours of the morning, before I have
had my matutinal cup of tea, the immediate out-
look gives me a feeling of cold feet in a more
aggravated form than I have hitherto experienced.
The whole plan of the French Asiatic subsidiary
operation has gone, for the meantime, by the board.
England and France between them cannot find
men enough, I should think, to send considerable
forces to Asia as well as run an entirely new
show elsewhere. Indeed, Naval requirements alone
would seem entirely to forbid it. But I must not
worry you any more with surmises. After all,
222 GALLIPOLI DIARY
nothing great in this world was ever easily accom-
plished. Never has there been such an example
of that as in the Dardanelles Expedition. How
many times has success seemed to be on the point
of crowning our efforts, and yet, on each occasion,
just as we are beginning to see light through the
tangle of obstacles, preparing for an assault, or
whatever it may be, something occurs to upset
the apple-cart. None the less we do advance,
and we will succeed in the end. I feel I am
playing it rather low down inflicting on you the
outline of my own trouble at a moment when your
own must be infinitely greater.
" Reading over this letter which I have not now
time to re-write or correct, it strikes me that in
concentrating my mind purely on the Dardanelles
I may have given a wrong impression of my general
attitude towards your latest demand. No one
can realize, I believe, more clearly than I do that
the Dardanelles operations themselves hinge for
their success to a very large extent upon the main-
tenance of a barrier between the Central Powers
and Constantinople. As far as reinforcements of
men to the enemy in the field are concerned, such
inter-communication would not be so fatal as
might perhaps be imagined. The Gallipoli Penin-
sula is a limited area, and if the Germans had
a million men at Constantinople they could not,
under present conditions, add many, if any, to
the numbers already opposed to us. But the free
transit of coal, flour, ammunition and big guns
might well put us all in the cart the cart being
in this instance, the sea."
LOOS AND SALONIKA 223
My A.D.C. has brought me an irritated message
from the A.G., War Office:
"Your No. M.F.A. 4003 of the 24th instant.
Are you aware that your telegram was really a
demand for 60,000 men with a weekly supply in
addition. We do not see how to meet such large
numbers in view of the present situation in France.
Have the numbers at Base, Alexandria, and men
returning from hospital, etc., been taken into
account ? Please state what are your minimum
requirements to carry on with."
Am I aware, etc. ? Why certainly ; and so is
the A.G. To ignore facts is one thing ; to be
ignorant of them is another. These facts are,
or should be, the daily bread of his Department.
I resent this surprise ; it is not genuine. If, as
the A.G. says, they have not got the men to send,
why in God's name do they go on telling the
people they have got them ?
Have drafted out this answer :
" A.G. My telegram No. M.F.A. 4003 told you
the number required to bring and keep all forma-
tions up to establishment and, as an estimate,
the numbers given therein are accurate. There
is nothing new in that telegram ; it is only the
culmination of many demands, the deficiency,
which was serious enough before, being aggravated
by the prevailing epidemic. I took into account
the numbers in Base depots and men returning
from hospital. I certainly hope that there may
be a decrease in the sick rate and that there will
224 GALLIPOLI DIARY
be an increase in the numbers returning from
hospital, but that cannot make any difference
to my present shortage of establishment though
it would affect the strength of monthly drafts
required.
" I would like further to point out that only 750
of the 20,000 drafts now coming are for the Terri-
torial Force, the remainder being for the Regulars.
Hence assuming that wastage will be equally
distributed over all the eight divisions, the esti-
mated shortage of 30,490 on 9th October will
be constituted as follows : Four Territorial Force
divisions, 26,583 ; four Regular divisions, 3,907.
" When my No. M.F.A. 4003 was sent no question
had arisen of denuding my force for a fresh expedi-
tion elsewhere. I fully realize that you cannot send
what does not exist and I will do the best possible
with what you, knowing my situation, are able to
send ; but I do not consider that it is possible to
view my position in winter with any equanimity
unless I am to receive substantial drafts and unless
a normal flow of reinforcements for all divisions can
be arranged so as to counter the difficulties that are
inherent in keeping a force operating so far from
England up to establishment."
30th September, 1915. Imbros. Peace on the
Peninsula ; trouble at G.H.Q. The 10th Division
is taking its departure from Suvla undisturbed by
the enemy. Not a shot is being fired. Some say
this denotes extraordinary skill in the conduct
of the withdrawal ; others, extraordinary delight
on the part of the Turks to see them clearing out.
LOOS AND SALONIKA 225
I don't believe in either theory. The Turks have
been fought to a standstill and there is no attack
left in them not under any circumstances or tempta-
tion ; that is what I believe in my heart, otherwise
I would refuse point blank to strip myself of two
full divisions under their noses. Still, it is nervous
work presuming to this extent upon their fatigue
and I will not agree to the 53rd going too, as the
loss of three Divisions would leave an actual hole
in our line. Meanwhile, it is a relief to hear that
the move is going on just like peacetime. As to
G.H.Q., all is held up by uncertainty. Our whole
enterprise hangs still in the balance. No date for
the sailing of our troops for Salonika can yet be
fixed, and we may get them back. Am glued to the
cable terminus waiting, waiting, waiting. I have
agreed to let the 2nd Brigade of the French go !
This cable sent to-day to Lord K. explains
itself :
" The following has just been received from
Bailloud : ' I have the honour to inform you that
I have received a telegram from the French Minister
of War ordering me (1) to embark one division
of the Corps Expeditionnaire immediately for
Salonika ; (2) to organize this division, which will
be placed under my command, into two brigades of
Metropolitan Infantry with two groups of 75 mm.,
one group of mountain artillery, one battery of
125 mm. howitzer and four 120 mm. guns. I
am taking steps to execute this order and to hold
the present section of the French line with the
force remaining in the Peninsula, which will be
placed under General Brulard.'
VOL. n. 16
226 GALLIPOLI DIARY
"I said in my telegram No. M.P. 675, that I
could only spare one brigade of the French. I
desire to place on record that if this order of the
French Government is carried out the LUIrd Divi-
sion cannot possibly be spared without seriously
endangering the safety of this force and the whole
future of the Dardanelles enterprise. Even if
I were to keep the LUIrd Division it would not
relieve me of intense anxiety. The fact will not
escape your notice that the division to go is being
re-constructed so that nothing but European troops
are included, thus leaving an undue proportion
of Senegalese. This constitutes such a grave
danger that, if I had the power, I would refuse
to allow Bailloud to carry out this order of his
Government. It need hardly be pointed out that
all your hopes of success in the Balkans would be
upset by a disaster at Cape Helles. Even when
I said that I could spare one French Infantry
Brigade the Commander of the VHIth Corps, who is
one of the last men in the Army to express alarmist
views, represented to me, in view of the physical
condition of a large proportion of his troops, the
gravity of the case in the strongest terms."
A reminder of mine re the Ashmead-Bartlett
incident has drawn an amusing and highly unex-
pected answer from the War Office :
" Murdoch was found to be carrying a despatch
for the Prime Minister criticizing military operations
in Gallipoli. He carried nothing for Lawson."
I could not help laughing heartily at the blue
looks of Tyrrell, the Head of our Intelligence.
LOOS AND SALONIKA 227
After all, this is Asquith's own affair. I do not
for one moment believe Mr. Asquith would employ
such agencies and for sure he will turn Murdoch
and his wares into the wastepaper basket. I
have reassured Tyrrell. Tittle-tattle will effect
no lodgment in the Asquithian brain.
Lieutenant Moore from the Military Secretary's
office in London dined. He has been useful to
us. During the night there was rain and heavy
fog. The evacuation of Suvla by the 10th
Division goes on without the smallest hitch and is
almost finished all except the guns. Whether
the Turks have fallen asleep or only closed an eye
is the question of the hour but Birdwood's Intelli-
gence are certain they are stone cold and cannot
be dragged to the attack.
1st October, 1915. Imbros. S. of S. cables he will
not overlook our wants in the matter of ammuni-
tion but that " at the present moment all he can
get has to be sent to France." I have thanked
him. Not a word from France since we fired the
feu de joie.
K. believes in the East and sends shell to the
West. The reason is that K.'s beliefs are only
intuitions ; he believes in the same sort of way
that Elijah knew certain things.
The principle underlying the world war seems
to me this : that wherever the new system of
trenches, dugouts, barbed wire, can reach its
fullest development, there we should prefer the
228 GALLIPOLI DIARY
defensive. Wherever this new system cannot be
fully developed, there the old ideas hold good
and there are the theatres for the offensive. In
France and Flanders where both sides are within
a few hours' run, on good railways, from their
own chief arsenals and depots the new system
attains prodigious power. In the Turkish Empire
almost all the conditions ; railways, material,
factories, etc., are favourable to the old and un-
favourable to the new conditions.
To me these views appear as clear as crystal
and as unanswerable as Euclid. The tenacity
of the new system of defence ; the pressure
of France ; the apathy of a starved military
opinion ; the fact that all our most powerful
soldiers are up to their necks in the West, combine
to keep us ramming our heads against the big
pile of barbed wire instead of getting through
by the gate called strait.
Next Braithwaite with the following electrical
bombshell :
" By Bailloud's report I see that he considers
that the French line can be held by one division.
If, on reconsideration, you agree with this view
can you spare the LUIrd Division ? "
K. has pounced like a hawk on Bailloud's state-
ment (which I cabled to him yesterday) that he
is taking steps for Brulard to hold the French
section with one division.
Have answered :
LOOS AND SALONIKA 229
"(No. M.F. 703). From General Sir Ian
Hamilton to Earl Kitchener. Your No. 8409,
cipher. Not one word of my No. M.F. 693 can
I take back. The situation at Cape Helles cannot
be fully realized. May I remind you that when
on 20th August I moved the XXIXth Division
to Suvla, I left at Cape Helles only the minimum
garrison compatible with safety. Since that date
the total British troops there have decreased in
strength from 15,300 to 13,300 rifles, and now
I am losing a French composite division which is
made up of the only troops of the Corps Expedition-
naire on whom I can rely, as well as 44 guns.
It is my considered opinion that to leave protection
of Cape Helles to one division of Colonial troops,
plus 13,300 worn-out British Territorials and Naval
Volunteers, is running too serious a risk. To-day,
therefore, I am moving one brigade of XXIXth
Division back from Suvla to reinforce VHIth
Corps in order to have some regular troops there
on whom I can rely. This makes it impossible
to spare the LUIrd Division. The change of
opinion on the part of Bailloud, when he gets
away from a position which I have found it difficult
to persuade him to hold with two divisions, and
which he now, as you say, thinks can be held with
one division composed largely of blacks, is startling
enough to need no comment. If you want to
get at his real opinion, suggest that he stays here
with one division while Brulard goes to Salonika.
" A despatch from Bailloud has just reached me
on the situation in French section after his own
departure with one division. It is as follows :
230 GALLIPOLI DIARY
cc c
One division will then be defending our present
line with an effective strength reduced by half,
and with Infantry which comprises only Colonial
contingents, half European and half native. I
feel it to be my duty to expose the situation to
you in order that you may be able to decide whether
the time has not now arrived to reduce the present
section of the C.E.O., making part of it occupied
by British troops and holding a solid reserve in
rear of the Allies' first line capable of dealing with
any situation.'
" I believe this indicates Bailloud's real opinion ;
it is a curious contrast to that quoted in your
No. 8409, cipher, dated 30th September."
At 11.30 crossed to " K " and inspected the
87th Brigade of the 29th Division. Lucas, of the
Berks Regiment, commanded. Saw the Border
Regiment under Colonel Pollard ; then the renowned
Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers under Major Pierce,
the full strength of the Battalion on parade " all
present" was 220! Next the K.O.S.B.s ; they
were under the command of Major Stoney ; last
the South Wales Borderers under the command
of Captain Williams.
The men were in rags and looked very tired.
This is the first time in the campaign our rank
and file have seemed sorry for themselves. Ten
days of rest had been promised them and now they
are being hurried back to the trenches before
they have had a week. My heart goes out to them
entirely. Were I they I would feel mad with me.
The breaking of my word to the 29th Division
LOOS AND SALONIKA 231
has to be shouldered by me just like all the other
results of this new Balkan adventure ; the with-
drawal of the Irish and the French for Salonika
leaves no margin of rest for what's left.
Inspected also the West Riding Field Company
of Royal Engineers under Major Bayley, and the
West Lancashire Field Ambulance.
A long letter from Maxwell putting his point
of view about the 51st and 53rd Sikhs. Were
we both sealed-pattern Saints we'd be bound
to fall foul of one another working under so perverse
a system. He has written me very nicely ; nothing
could be nicer. I have replied by return :
" Yours of 24th just received. As to the wires
about the 51st and 53rd between myself and the
War Office, and your remarks thereon, we stand
so much on one platform, and are faced so much
by the same difficulties, that I think it ought to
be fairly easy for us to come to an understanding
in most conceivable circumstances, as indeed our
co-operation up to date has shown.
" If Egypt goes, then I shall not last very long.
If I am wiped out, I think it will be the preface
to trouble in Egypt. 1
1 The last time this subject was broached between Lord
Kitchener and myself was immediately after the evacuation of
Helles. Everyone was intensely relieved, especially Lord
Kitchener, for he had realized better than our politicians the
desperate stakes we had planked down in our gamble with
the Clerk of the Weather. Yet in that very moment when the
burden of an intolerable anxiety had just been lifted from his
shoulders he took the occasion to declare to me that he stood by
every word he had said. What he " had said," was that any
232 GALLIPOLI DIARY
" As to myself I am 60,000 below strength. I
had a cable from the War Office a day or two ago
expressing naive astonishment at this figure. I
replied that the figure was accurate and that
there was nothing new about it as it only denoted
the accumulation of a state of things which had
been continuously reported since the very first
day when we started off from England minus
the ten per cent, margin of excess given to every
unit going across to France. This is the essential
cause of our repeated failure to make that last
little push which just differentiates partial from
conclusive success. In every case this has been
so. Had I been able to throw in my ten per cent,
margin on the third day after landing, there is
no doubt in the world we would have got right up
on to Achi Baba. Afterwards, each engagement
we fought, although our total numbers may have
been largely increased, the old formations were
always at half strength or something less. However,
I won't bother you about this as your time is too
precious to enter into ' might-have-beens' and so
is mine.
withdrawal from the Dardanelles must react in due course upon
Islam, and especially upon Egypt. Cairo, he held to be the
centre of the Mahomedan doctrine and the pivotal point of
our great Mahomedan Imperium. An evacuation of the Darda-
nelles would serve as an object lesson to Egypt just as our
blunders in the Crimea had served as a motive to the Indian
mutineers. Ultimate success was not the point in either case.
The point was that the legend of the invincibility of British
troops should be shattered in some signal and quite unmistak-
able fashion. " The East," he said, " moved slowly in the fifties,
and it will move slowly now. We've had a wonderful delivery
but depend upon it the price has yet to be paid ! " IAN H.,
1920.
LOOS AND SALONIKA 233
" Meantime, my line is very, very thin, and the
men are getting entirely worn out. In the midst
of this I am called upon to send away two Divisions,
the French and the Irish, to you know where.
I have done so without a murmur, although it
puts me into a ticklish position. Reinforcements
are now to be diverted elsewhere and my command
is not an enviable one. I quite understand the
necessity of trying to maintain a barrier between
Essen and Constantinople. I quite understand
also the danger of doing so at the expense of this
attenuated, exhausted force. I have represented
the facts home, and it is for them to decide."
Dined with the Admiral.
2nd October, 1915. The despatch of the Salonika
force and their outfit are absorbing all my energies.
Our whole Expeditionary Force is being drawn
upon to send the 10th Division creditably turned
out to the new theatre. The twenty-four hours'
delay caused by the political crisis at Athens
has been a godsend in enabling me to reclothe and
re-equip the detachment from top to toe. The
supplies for my own force are now exhausted, but,
on the principle of the starving garrison who threw
loaves over the ramparts at the besiegers, we
must try and make a good first impression on
the Greeks.
The submarine catcher, or the " Silver Baby "
as the men call it, has been flying about all day,
without luck. Gascoigne and Bertier dined. Blaz-
ing hot ; quite a setback to August temperatures.
CHAPTER XXI
THE BEGINNING OF THE END
3rd October, 1915. Inibros. Church Parade. In-
spected escort, men of the Howe and Nelson
Battalions and a contingent from the 12th and
26th Australian Infantry. At 12.15 Bailloud,
Brulard and Girodon arrived from Mudros for a
last conference. Everything is fixed up. We are
going to help the derelict division of French in
every way we can. Bailloud, for his part, promises
to leave them their fair share of guns and trench
mortars. Whenever I see him I know he is one
of the best fellows in the world. We went down
and waved farewells from the pier. He was quite
frank. He does not think the Allies have either
the vision or the heart to go through with Gallipoli :
he begins to suspect that the big push on the
Western Front is going to yield no laurels : so
Salonika hits his fancy.
Lieutenants Weston and Schemallach of the
Australians and Lieutenant Gellibrand of the
Naval Division lunched. A Mr. Unsworth came
to talk over gifts for the Australian troops.
He seems a capital chap ; full of go and goodwill
to all men.
234
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 235
4:th October, 1915. Imbros. Vague warnings
have taken shape in an event. A cable from K.
telling me to decipher the next message myself.
I have not drafted out an average of fifty telegrams
a day for Lord K. for six months at a stretch with-
out knowing something of his modus scribendi.
The Staff were pleasantly excited at the idea that
some new move was in the wind. I knew the new
move or thought I did.
Well, not that : not exactly that ; not this time.
But the enemies of our enterprise have got our
range to a nicety and have chucked their first
bomb bang into the middle of my camp.
A " flow of unofficial reports from Gallipoli,"
so K. cables to me, is pouring into the War Office.
These " unofficial reports " are " in much the same
strain" (perhaps they spring from the same source ?).
" They adversely criticize the work of the Head*
quarters Staff and complaints are made that its
members are much out of touch with the troops.
The War Office also doubt whether their present
methods are quite satisfactory." K. therefore
suggests " some important changes in your Head-
quarters Staff ; for instance, if you agreed, Kiggell
from home to take Braithwaite's place with you.
Should you, however, decline and desire to remain
as at present, may we assume that we are quite
safe in regarding these unofficial reports as not
representing the true feelings of the troops ? "
So ! On the face of it this cable seems
to suggest that a man widely known as a straight
and capable soldier should be given the shortest
236 GALLIPOLI DIARY
of shrifts at the instance of " unofficial reports " ;
i.e., camp gossip. Surely the cable message carries
with it some deeper significance !
I am grateful to old K. He is trying to save me.
He picked out Braithwaite himself. Not so long
ago he cabled me in his eagerness to promote him
to Major-General ; he would not suggest substi-
tuting the industrious Kiggell if he didn't fear for
me and for the whole of this enterprise.
K. wants, so he says, " some important change " ;
that cannot mean, surely, that he wants a sufficiently
showy scapegoat to feed the ravenous critics or
does it ? Perhaps, he's got to gain time ; breath-
ing space wherein to resume the scheme which
was sidetracked by the offensive in France and
smashed by the diversion to Salonika. Given
time, our scheme may yet be resumed. The Turks
are in the depths. Sarrail with his six divisions
behind him could open the Narrows in no time.
I see the plan. K. must have a splendid sacrifice
but by the Lord they shan't have the man who
stood by me like a rock during those first ghastly
ten days.
The new C.R.E., General Williams, and Ellison
turned up for lunch. Williams gave us the first
authentic news we have had about those Aden
excursions and alarms.
An amusing aftermath of the evacuation by the
French and Irish Divisions. When the last of
Bailloud's troops had embarked the Turks dropped
manifestoes from aeroplanes along the lines of
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 237
the Senegalese calling upon these troops to make
terms and come over now that their white comrades
had left them to have their throats cut. I have
cabled this queer item to the S. of S. Evidently
the enemy were quite well aware of our withdrawal.
Then why didn't they shell the beaches ? At
French Headquarters they believe that the Turks
were so glad to see our backs that they hardly
dared breathe (much less fire a shell) lest we should
change our minds.
5th October, 1915. First thing another cable
from K. saying, " I think it well to let you know "
that it is " quite understood by the Dardanelles
Committee that you are adopting only a purely
defensive attitude at present." Also : " I have
no reason to imagine you have any intention of
taking the offensive anywhere along the line
seeing I have been unable to replace your sick and
wounded men." But, if he knows I can't take
the offensive, why trouble to cable me that the
Dardanelles Committee expect me to adopt " only
a purely defensive attitude " ? I realize where
we stand ; K., Braithwaite and I, on the verge.
We are getting on for two months now since
the August fighting all that time we have been
allowed to do nothing literally, allowed toT.do
nothing, seeing we have been given no shell. What
a fiasco ! The Dardanelles is not a sanatorium ;
Suvla is not Southend. With the men we have
lost from sickness in the past six weeks we could
have beaten the Turks twice over. Now Govern-
ment seem to be about to damn everything
themselves included.
238 GALLIPOLI DIARY
But after all, who am I to judge the Government
of the British Empire ? What do I know of their
difficulties, pledges, and enemies whether outside
or inside the fold ?
I have no grouse against Government or War
Office still less against K. though many hundred
times have I groused. 1
Freely and gratefully do I admit that the indi-
viduals have done their best. Most of all am I
indebted very deeply indebted to K. for having
refrained absolutely from interference with my
plan of campaign or with the tactical execution
thereof.
But things are happening now which seem beyond
belief. That the Dardanelles Committee should
complacently send me a message to say we " quite
understand that you are adopting only a purely
1 I think I hardly knew how often till I came to read through
my diary in cold print. But all the time I was conscious, and
am still more so now, of K.'s greatness. Still more so now
because, when I compare him with his survivors, they seem
measurable, he remains immeasurable.
I wish very much I could make people admire Lord K. under -
standingly. To praise him wrongly is to do him the worst
disservice. The theme can hardly be squeezed into a footnote,
but one protest must be made all the same. Lord Fisher gives
fresh currency to the fable that K. was a great organizer.
K. hated organization with all his primitive heart and soul,
because it cramped his style.
K. was an individualist. He was a Master of Expedients ; the
greatest probably the world has ever seen. Whenever he saw
any organization his inclination was to smash it, and often
but not always he was right. This may sound odd in Anglo-
Celtic ears. But most British organizations are relics of the
past. They are better smashed than patched, and K. loved
smashing. IAN H., 1920.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 239
defensive attitude at present " is staggering when
put side by side with the carbon of this, the very
last cable I have sent them. " I think you should
know immediately that the numbers of sick
evacuated in the IXth Corps during the first
three days of October were 500 men on the 1st
instant ; 735 men on the 2nd instant and 607
men on the 3rd instant. Were this rate kept up
it would come to 45 per cent, of our strength
evacuated in one month."
Three quarters of this sickness is due to inaction
and now the Dardanelles Committee " quite
understand " I am " adopting only a purely
defensive action at present." I have never
adopted a defensive attitude. They have forced
us to sit idle and go sick because at the very last
moment they have permitted the French offensive
to take precedence of ours,* although, on the face
of it, there was no violent urgency in France as
there is here. Our men in France were remarkably
healthy ; they were not going sick by thousands.
But I feel too sick myself body and soul to
let my mind dwell on these miseries.
Sealed my resolution (resignation ?) by giving
my answer about Braithwaite. Though the sins
of my General Staff have about as much to do with
the real issues as the muddy water had to do with
the death of the argumentative lamb, I begin
by pointing out to the War Office wolf that " no
Headquarters Staff has ever escaped similar
criticism."
Grumblings are an old campaigner's vade mecum.
Bred by inaction ; enterprise and activity smother
240 GALLIPOLI DIARY
them. A sickness of the spirit, they are like the
flies that fasten on those who stay too long in one
place. Was Doughty Wylie "much out of touch
with the troops " when he led the Dublins,
Munsters and Hampshires up from " V ' beach
and fell gloriously at their head ? Was Williams
"out of touch" when he was hit? Was Hore
Ruthven ? "As to Braithwaite," I say, "my
confidence in that Officer is complete. I did not
select him ; you gave him to me and I have ever
since felt most grateful to you for your choice."
Now I feel better.
The plot thickens. A cable just come in from
the S. of S. for War :
" The following statement has been made in
letter to Prime Minister, Australia, by Mr. Murdoch :
* The fact is that after the first day at Suvla an
order had to be issued to officers to shoot without
mercy any soldier who lagged behind or loitered
in advance.' Wire me as to the truth or otherwise
of this allegation."
Murdoch must be mad. Or, is there some method
in this madness ?
Mr. Murdoch was not a war correspondent ; he
is purely a civilian and could hardly have invented
this " order " on his own. No soldier could have
told him this. Someone not a soldier someone
so interested in discrediting the Dardanelles Cam-
paign that he does not scruple to do so even by
discrediting our own troops must have put this
invention about, per Murdoch. Doubtless we strike
here upon the source of these " unofficial state-
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 241
ments " which have been flowing into the War
Office. All I remember of his visit to me here
is a sensible, well-spoken man with dark eyes,
who said his mind was a blank about soldiers and
soldiering, and made me uncomfortable by an
elaborate explanation of why his duty to Australia
could be better done with a pen than with a rifle.
He was one week at the Press Correspondents'
camp and spent, so they tell me, a few hours only
at Anzac and Suvla, never once crossing to Helles.
If then his letter to his Prime Minister is a fair
sample of the grounds upon which Braithwaite
has been condemned, Heaven help us all !
As a relief to these disagreeable thoughts, a
Taube dropped a couple of bombs into camp.
She flew so high that she was hard to see until
the bursting shrapnel gave us her line. As she
made tracks back through the trackless blue, the
ships gave her a taste of some big projectiles,
12-inches or 9.2. The aerial commotion up there
must have been considerable.
At noon, sailed over to Suvla in H.M.S. Savage.
We took our lunch on board. As we came into
harbour the Turks gave us a shell or two from
their field guns, then stopped. Young Titchfield,
the Duke of Portland's son, met us at the beach
and brought us along to Byng's Headquarters,
where I met also de Lisle and Reed. After hearing
their news I started off with the whole band to
make a tour of the trenches held by the 88th
Brigade, under General Cayley. On the way I
was taken up to " Gibraltar " observation post
to get a bird's-eye view of the line. Besides my
VOL. II. 17
242 GALLIPOLI DIARY
old friends of the 29th Division I saw some of the
new boys, especially the 1st Newfoundland Batta-
lion under Colonel Burton, and the 2/1 st Coy.
of the London Regiment. This was the New-
foundlanders' first day in the trenches and they
were very pleased with themselves. They could
not understand why they were not allowed to sally
forth at once and do the Turks in. The presence
of these men from our oldest colony adds to the
extraordinary mix-up of people now fighting on
the Peninsula. All the materials exist here for
bringing off the biblical coup of Armageddon
excepting only the shell.
In the course of these peregrinations I
met Marshall of the 53rd Division, Beresford,
commanding the 86th Brigade, and Colonel
Savage, R.E.
After tea with Byng, including the rare treat
of a slice of rich cake, we went down to our friend
H.M.S. Savage. The wind had risen to a fairly
stiff gale, and the sea was beginning to get very
big. Those field gun shells had caused the Savage
to lie a desperate long way out to sea ; we had a very
stiff pull in the teeth of the waves, and every one of
us began to think that salt water rather than the
bullet was going to end our days. However,
we just managed by the skin of our teeth and the
usual monkey tricks, to scramble up on board.
As I said in my wrath when I first stood on the firm
deck, I would sooner have a hundred shells fired
at me by the Turks.
Captain Davidson commanding H.M.S. Corn-
wallis dined ; everyone liked him very much.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 243
6th October, 1915. Left General Headquarters
soon after 11 o'clock for Helles, taking with me
Aspinall and Freddie. Lunched with Davies at
8th Corps Headquarters.
Afterwards rode across to Royal Naval Division
and saw Paris. Then went with Bertie Lawrence,
commanding 52nd Division, to his lines. Our
route lay up Achi Baba Nallah and along the trenches
to the Horse Shoe ; then along Princes Street
trench up the Vineyard, and back along the
Krithia Nallah to the Headquarters of the 156th
Brigade. There we mounted our horses and rode
back to Corps Headquarters. I brought Steward
back with me to dine and sleep the night. Colonel
Tyrrell and Major Hunloke (King's Messenger)
also dined.
1th October, 1915. Wasted energy brooding over
the addled eggs of the past. Are the High Gods
bringing our new Iliad to grief in a spirit of wanton
mischief ? At whose door will history leave the
blame for the helpless, hopeless fix we are left in
rotting with disease and told to take it easy ?
That clever fellow Deedes dined ; also Rowan
Hamilton, son of my old Simla friend the Colonel
of that name.
October, 1915. Imbros. At 11 a.m. Ellison,
Taylor, Gascoigne and Freddie sailed with me for
Anzac. There we lunched with the ascetic Birdie
and Staff off bully beef, biscuits and water. Then,
the whole lot of us, together with de Crespigny,
Birdie's Staff Officer, hurried five miles an hour
244 GALLIPOLI DIARY
down the communication trench to the Head-
quarters of the Indian Brigade. After greetings
we shoved on and saw the 2nd Lovat Scouts under
Lieutenant-Colonel Stirling and met, whilst going
round their line, Major Morrison Bell and Captain
Oppenheim. They seemed in very good fettle,
and it would have been hard to find a finer lot
of men. Taking leave ,1 the 2nd Lovat Scouts,
we worked along the trenches of the Fife and Forf ar
Yeomanry, under Colonel Mitchell, until we came
to the 1st Lovat Scouts under Colonel Bailey.
Lovat himself was sick, but Peyton commanding
the 2nd Mounted Division turned up just when the
inspection was at an end. He had got lost in the
trenches, or we had. Next time the way was lost
there was no mistake as to who had made the mistake.
Birdie and I were pushing along as fast as we could
leg it back towards Anzac. In the maze of trenches
we came to a dividing of the ways. Two jolly
old Sikhs were sitting at the junction. I asked if
the road to the left led to the Headquarters of the
Indian Brigade. They said, " Yes," so on we went,
I leading, Birdie following. The trench got shallower
and shallower until, in a little grove of trees, it petered
out entirely. But it seemed to begin again in the
other side and so we crossed through the trees.
Once there we found that the supposed trench was
only a shallow scratching up of the earth, and that
we were standing within a hundred yards of the
Turkish lines just about half way between them and
the Lovat Scouts ! I shouted to Birdie and we
turned and ran for it for our lives, I mean.
Luckily the Turks were slow at spotting us, all
except one who was a rank bad shot : so tumbling
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 245
back into the trenches from which we had emerged,
we saved ourselves by the skin of our teeth. I
could not have been smarter about dodging 5wo
or three bullets had it been the beginning of our
enterprise and had the high minarets of Constanti-
nople glittered before my eyes.
When we got back to where the two old Sikhs
were sitting, as placid as idols, Birdie gave them
his opinion of their ancestors. On reaching the
Australian and New Zealand Division we were
done to a turn, but Godley revived us with tea
and then we made our way back to our destroyer
and to Headquarters. It was dark when we
arrived and a bad storm was setting in wind and
rain which went on till midnight.
Replies have come in to our enquiries as to
Mr. Murdoch's statement to the Prime Minister
of Australia that British Officers had been ordered
to " shoot without mercy any soldier who lagged
behind or loitered." As the Secretary of State
seems to take this charge seriously, I thought it
well, before I sent my answer, just to make sure
that no subordinate had said, or done, or written
anything which could plausibly be twisted into
this lie. The Generals have denied indignantly ;
are furious, in fact, at the double insult to their
men and to themselves.
Have cabled accordingly :
" (No. M.F.A.B. 4491). From General Sir Ian
Hamilton to Secretary of State for War. With
reference to your No. 8554 M.O. 414 of the 5th
inst. I have pro forma made full enquiries and
246 GALLIPOLI DIARY
I find that there is no truth whatever in the allega-
tion made by Murdoch."
9th October, 1915. Had made my band-o-last
for running over to Helles, but the Vice- Admiral
cabled he wanted to see me if he could at 11.45.
Anyway the sea is still a bit rough for the crossing
and landing. A lot of damage was done last night
to the Anzac piers, two of them being clean washed
away. Peter Pollen is off colour. Freddie and
I dined on board the Triad.
Whilst at dinner got full reports both from Suvla
and Anzac as to the effects of the storm. The
southerly gale, which not only washed away the
piers but sunk the water lighters at Anzac, has
done no harm at Suvla except that three motor
lighters have been driven ashore. The Admiral
is clear that, during southerly gales we shall have
to supply both Anzac and Suvla by the new pier
just north of Ari Burnu. The promontory is
small but last night it gave complete protection
to everything in its lea. By sinking an old ship
we can turn Ari Burnu into quite a decent little
harbour.
Wth October, 1915. Made my deferred visit to
Helles, going over this morning in the Arno with
Braithwaite, Val and Alec McGrigor. Looked in
at the Clearing Hospital and cast an eye over
Lancashire Landing. Then, in company with
Jimmy Watson and Colonel Ayres, walked up to
Corps Headquarters where we had a fine lunch
with Davies, de Rougemont and the melancholy
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 247
Yarr. Afterwards rode across to the Headquarters
of the Royal Naval Division and on to their trenches,
some 3 miles. Generals Mercer and Paris followed
us through their trenches. The Hood and Hawke
Battalions were in the firing line where we talked
to great numbers of old comrades of all ranks.
Glad to meet Freyberg again (the man who swam
to light the flares at Enos). Kelly of the Hood
Battalion too, I saw, and Fairfax of the Hawke,
also Commander King of the Drake Battalion and
Burrows, a gunner who was running a bombing
school with much zeal on a piece of ground specially
patronized by the Turks as a target for their own
shelling practice. Got back to Helles by the
Saghur Dere and the Gulley. Going down the
Gulley, nearly lost two of our attendant Generals,
a shrapnel bursting between them with a startling
loud report caused by the high banks of the Gulley
on either side.
In the Gulley we met a swarm of old friends
from Kent ; Brigadier-General Clifton-Browne, an
officer whose command I had inspected both at
Potchefstroom and near Canterbury, with a Brigade
of West and East Kent and Sussex Yeomen.
They made a brave showing, but he tells me some
of them have caught this wretched enteritis already.
Amongst others, I spoke to Douglas, commanding
the East Lancashire Division, Major Edwards of
the Sussex Yeomanry, Major Sir S. Scott and
Colonel Whitburn of the West Kent Yeomanry,
Colonel Lord Guilford, East Kent Yeomanry. A
cheerier crowd no one could wish to meet. If
these are the type of men who spin black yarns
248 GALLIPOLI DIARY
for home wear, T can only say that not the most
finished actors could better disguise their despair.
General King, R.A., rode part of the way back
with us.
After all this hard exercise, got back to the
Arno in a lather of sweat about 6 o'clock carrying
Davies with me. Leslie Wilson, commanding the
Hawke Battalion, had gone sick to-day, so sent
him a telegram after dinner to the Hospital ship
Somali, telling him his trenches had been found in
apple-pie order.
llth October, 1915. Bad night with this beastly
complaint. De Robeck came up at 11 o'clock to
see me. He has had a message from the Admiralty
asking him what number of extra troops could be
maintained on the Peninsula if the units there now
were brought up to strength. The Admiral asked
me for the figures and the A.G. brought them over.
My force as a whole is as near as may be to half
strength. Half of that half are sick men. We
have 100,000 men on the Peninsula, 50,000 of whom
are unfit : if the unfits were up to strength there
would be 200,000 men on the Peninsula as well
as excitement and movement which would greatly
reduce the disease. Bearing in mind that the
Anzacs have been well supported by their Govern-
ments and that their units are fairly strong, these
figures show what wait-and-see-sickness has meant
to British Regiments.
The tone of this Admiralty question had seemed
cheerful : almost as if the Higher Direction were
thinking of putting us on our legs but, in the
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 249
evening, another cable from K. gave a different
and a very ominous complexion to the future :
" From Earl Kitchener to General Sir Ian
Hamilton. What is your estimate of the probable
losses which would be entailed to your force if the
evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula was decided
on and carried out in the most careful manner ?
" No decision has been arrived at yet on this
question of evacuation, but I feel that I ought to
have your views.
" In your reply you need not consider the possible
future danger to the Empire that might be thus
caused." I
If they do this they make the Dardanelles into
the bloodiest tragedy of the world ! Even if
we were to escape without a scratch, they would
stamp our enterprise as the bloodiest of all tragedies !
K. has always sworn by all his Gods he would have
no hand in it. I won't touch it, and I think he
knew that and calculated on that when he cabled.
Anyway, let K., cat or Cabinet leap where they
will, I must sleep upon my answer, but that answer
will be NO !
1 Lord K.'s reason for putting in this last paragraph may be
obscure unless I make it clear. As explained in a previous
footnote, Lord K. knew that I knew his strong personal view
that the smashing blow to our military reputation which would
be caused by an evacuation of the Dardanelles must, in course
of time, imperil our hold upon Egypt. Therefore, for the
moment, it was necessary to warn me that the problem must
be considered in the purely military, tactical, aspect. IAN H
1920.
250 GALLIPOLI DIARY
Just as I am turning in, a cable from the S. of S.
saying, " there is an idea that Sir John Maxwell
is not sending you as many troops as he might from
Egypt. Have you any complaints on this score ? "
Rather late in the day this " idea." Certainly,
I have never made any " complaints " and I don't
mean to do so now. The War Office have only to
look up their returns and see how many men are
being maintained to defend us from the Senoussi !
Maxwell has never had less than 70,000 troops
in Egypt, a country which might have been held
with 10,000 rifles ever since we landed here,
that is to say. My troops can sail back to Egypt
very much faster than the Turks or the Senoussi
for that matter -can march to the Canal.
In the same cable the S. of S. asks what is the
cause of the sick rate and remarks that, " some
accounts from the Dardanelles indicate that the
men are dispirited." Small wonder if they were !
When they see two Divisions taken away from the
Peninsula ; when their guns can't answer those
of the enemy ; when each unit finds itself half-
strength, and falling why then, tumbling as they
do to the fact that we won't get through till next
year, they ought to be unhappy. But the funny
thing is that the Cabinet, the Secretaries of State,
are the people who are " dispirited " and not
the people out here. If the P.M. could walk round
the trenches of the Naval Division at Helles,
or if K. could exchange greetings with the rank
and file at Anzac and Suvla, they would find a
sovereign antidote for the blues and would realize
that it was they who were down-hearted and
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 251
not the men at the Dardanelles. There was an
old French Colonel, killed at Gravelotte ; he had
studied the classic world battles and he shows
that it was never the front line who gave way
first, but always the reserves : they, the reserves,
watched bloodshed in cold blood until they could
stand it no longer and so took to their heels
whilst the fighting men were still focussed upon
victory. Not the enemy in front but the friends
behind are the men who spread despondency and
alarm.
Charley Burn has arrived on the Imogene with
Dawnay.
Davies went back to Helles after tea. Dawnay
says K. was most interested in him and most
charming to him all through his stay until his
last interview just before he started on his return
journey. K.'s manner then, he said, had changed
so much so as to give him an impression that
the great man was turning, or was being turned,
against all of us out here. K.'s conduct at the
first meetings is in full harmony with his message
sent to Braithwaite for me by Fitz about a fortnight
ago, saying I possessed his fullest confidence. The
change of manner was marked and Dawnay is
sure he made no mistake about it. But nothing
has happened since the date of Dawnay's arrival
and departure save a very well engineered with-
drawal of the 10th and the French Divisions for
which, in point of fact, we have all been rather
expecting congratulations. Dawnay thinks some
queer things are happening. He could or would
say nothing more.
252 GALLIPOLI DIARY
12th October, 1915. Imbros. Early in the morning
got off my answer to K.'s evacuation cable. The
elements, the enemy and ourselves are the three
factors of the problem. Were I to measure my
problem by the night flitting of the Irish and French
Divisions (who lost neither man nor beast in the
process), I could guarantee that we would shoot
the moon with the balance of the force smoothly,
swiftly and silently. That is to say, supposing
the Turks and the weather remain constant. But
these are two most inconstant things : no one can
tell how a Turk will behave under any given
conditions ; the Turks themselves do not know how
they will behave : the weather now is written down
by the meteorologists for sudden changes ; for
storms. Unsettled weather is due and ought to
be reckoned upon. Imagine a blow coming up from
the South when the evacuation is half way through.
That does not seem to be, and is not, any great
stretch of imagination. Well then, having so
imagined, we get a disaster only equalled in history
by that of the Athenians at Syracuse : a disaster
from which the British Empire could hardly hope
to recover.
Twice backwards and forwards to the General
Staff Marquee with the draft of my guesses, my
first being that we would probably lose 35 to 45
per cent. But the General Staff have also been
consulting their oracle and w r ere clear for 50 per cent.
Months of the most anxious calculations will not
get a white man one whit forrarder in seeing into
the brains of an Asiatic Army or in forecasting
Mediterranean weather. Safest to assume that
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 253
both brains and weather will behave as the German
General Staff would wish them to behave rather
than as they chanced to behave when the French
and Irish went off a few days ago. So have ended
by taking the Staff's figure because any figure
being, in any case, the wildest of shots, their shot
best suits my views on the issue.
" From General Sir Ian Hamilton to Earl Kit-
chener. Our losses would depend on such uncertain
factors, enemy's action or inaction, weather, question
whether we could rely on all troops covering
embarkation to fight to the last, that impossible
to give you straight answer especially until I
have permission to consult Admiral. Once dis-
cussing this very problem with General Gouraud,
we came to the conclusion that at Cape Helles
we must sacrifice two divisions out of total of six
divisions and Cape Helles easiest of three places
to get away from. My opinion now is that it would
not be wise to reckon on getting out of Gallipoli
with less loss than that of half the total force as
well as guns, which must be used to the last, stores,
railway plant and horses. Moral of those who got
off would fall very low. One quarter would pro-
bably get off quite easily, then the trouble would
begin. We might be very lucky and lose consider-
ably less than I have estimated. On the other
hand, with all these raw troops at Suvla and all
these Senegalese at Cape Helles, we might have
a veritable catastrophe."
Do the men toying with the idea of bringing
off our men not see that thereby the Turks will
be let loose somewhere ; not nowhere ? Do they
254 GALLIPOLI DIARY
not see that if they are feeling the economic pinch
of keeping their side of the show in being, the
Turks, much weaker economically, must be feeling
it much more !
It was a relief to get this perilous stuff off
my chest, and in a brighter frame of mind,
sailed for Anzac on the destroyer Lewis. We
took biscuits and bully beef with us but the hospit-
able sailors insisted on regaling us with a hot meal.
Sat in cabin all the way as usual writing up my
record. Freddie tells me that these studious habits
of mine have started the shave that I spend my
time composing poetry, especially during our battles!
At Anzac Birdwood took us round the trenches
and underground passages about Russell's Top
and Turk's Head, held by the 5th Brigade, 2nd
Division, under Legge. Half way up to Russell's
Top was the 3rd Battery Australian Field Artillery :
talked with Major King, the C.O. Next unit
was the 20th Infantry Battalion under Major
Fitzgerald. Colonel Holmes, commanding the 5th
Infantry Brigade, and Wilson, his Brigade Major,
took us through their cave dwellings. Ex-wester-
ners say that in France they have nothing to touch
these Australian tunnellings. In one place they are
boring into a crater only 20 feet from the Turkish
trench. There is nothing unusual in the fact, but
there is in the great depth they are going down
so as to cross the danger zone far below the beaten
track of mines and counter-mines. On the steep
slope in another place there is a complete under-
ground trench running parallel to, and only a
short bomb-throw from, a Turkish trench. We
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 255
went through it with a lantern. Sandbags, loop-
holes, etc., all are there, but blind ! They are still
veiled from view by several feet of clay. To-
morrow night the Anzacs are going to chip off
the whole upper crust of earth, and when light
dawns the Turks will find a well equipped trench,
every loophole manned, within bombing range of
their own line.
Other notables met with were Major Murphy of
the 20th Infantry Battalion, Major Anderson (an
old friend) commanding the Australian Field
Artillery, and Captain Perry Oakdene, the Engineer
Officer on the job. Saw Birdie and returned in
the destroyer about 6.30. The day had been
so quiet that it would have been almost dull had
it not been for the sightseeing hardly a shot was
fired by Turk or Anzac with either gun, trench
mortar or rifle.
Bishop Price, the Bishop of North China, and
Charlie Burn, King's Messenger, dined. The quiet-
ness of the Bishop was remarkable.
Have cabled the S. of S. for War in answer to
his enquiries about the causes of the sickness, and
as to whether Maxwell is not holding up my share
of troops in Egypt, saying: (1) that "constant
strain and infection by dust and flies " have caused
the sickness but that the men are getting better ;
(2) that " we have been under the impression that
drafts meant for us and due to us have been retained
in Egypt ; also, that men discharged fit from Hospi-
tals have been held back, but I have represented
this last point to Maxwell personally as I always
256 GALLIPOLI DIARY
feel I am not the person to gauge Maxwell's needs.
On 27th September, I asked him to send up all
available Australian New Zealand Army Corps
drafts and reinforcements, and, as you already
know, am at present in telegraphic correspondence
about these reinforcements coming straight here
without being kept in Egypt for training at all."
At 10.40, after clearing my table, went with
Ellison, Taylor, and Freddie on board H.M.S.
Lefroy (Commander Edwards) and steamed for
" V " Beach. Enjoyed a fine luncheon with Brulard
and then started off for the trenches. At Morto
Bay we were met by Captain de Bourbon, a big
handsome man with the characteristic Bourbon
cut of countenance. He took us first to the chateau
whence we worked down along the trenches to
where our extreme right overlooks the Kerevez
Dere. General Faukard was here and he thinks
that we ought easily to get complete mastery of
both sides of the Kerevez Dere as soon as we get
the means and the permission to shove ahead
again. When we do that the advance will let our
Fleet another half mile up the Straits and the
" spotting " for the ships' guns will double their
value in the Narrows. From the Kerevez Dere
we worked along the fire trenches towards the
French centre and then, getting to a sheltered
strip of country, walked back across the open to
the second line. From the second line we made
our way, still across the open, to the third line,
over a heather covered strip. No one ever moves
here by daylight except in double quick time as
there is always danger of drawing a shell either
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 257
from Asia or from Achi Baba and so it was that
" Let the dead bury the dead " had been the motto
and that we met many corpses and skeletons.
Merciful God, what home tragedies may centre
in each of these sinister bundles. But it is the
common lot only quicker. Here, too, we found
excavations made by the French into a burial
ground believed to be of the date 2,500 B.C. The
people of that golden age had the sentimental
idea of being buried in couples in big jars. A
strange notion of our Allies unburying quiet people
who had enjoyed dreamless rest for 2,000 years
whilst, within a few yards, their own dead still
welter in the parching wind.
Had meant to run across and see Davies but time
had slipped away and so we made tracks for
H.M.S. Lefroy, and on back here to G.H.Q., where
a letter from Callwell was laying in wait as a refresher
after my fat'gues.
Callwell begins by saying he encloses a document
written by my late visitor, Mr. K. A. Murdoch,
although " there are certain statements in this
which are palpably false," and although Dawnay
has pointed out to him at the War Office " a number
of passages in it which are wholly incorrect as
matters of actual fact." He says, Lord K., " who
has not had time to read it yet," thinks I ought
to be given a chance of defending myself.
Callwell goes on to write about the Press Censor-
ship and my plea for publicity and then says he
dislikes the Salonika stunt " because I am not quite
clear of where we are going to, and the immediate
VOL. ii. 18
258 GALLIPOLI DIARY
result at the present is to take away from you
troops that you can ill spare." Also, because " we
may be involving ourselves in operations on a
great scale in the heart of the Balkans, the result
of which it is very difficult to foresee."
Godley dined. Captain Davidson, R.N., the
Senior Naval Officer in harbour now, is a real
Godsend. He looks after us as if we were Admirals
of the Fleet.
Have now read, marked, learnt and inwardly
indigested CallwelTs enclosure ; viz., the letter
written by Mr. K. A. Murdoch to the Prime Minister
of Australia. Quite a Guy Fawkes epistle. Braith-
waite is " more cordially detested in our forces than
Enver Pasha." " You will trust me when I say
that the work of the General Staff in Gallipoli is
deplorable." " Sedition is talked round every tin of
bully beef on the Peninsula." " You would refuse
to believe that these men were really British
soldiers . . . the British physique is very much
below that of the Turks. Indeed, it is quite ob-
viously so. Our men have found it impossible
to form a high opinion of the British K. men and
Territorials. They are merely a lot of childlike
youths, without strength to endure or brains to
improve their conditions." " I shall always remem-
ber the stricken face of a young English Lieutenant
when I told him he must make up his mind for a
winter campaign." " I do not like to dictate
this sentence, even for your eyes, but the fact is
that after the first day at Suvla an order had to
be issued to Officers to shoot without mercy any
soldier who lagged behind or loitered in an advance."
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 259
Well, Well ! I should not worry myself over
the out-pourings of our late guest, who has evidently
been made a tool of by some unscrupulous person,
were it not that Mr. Asquith has clothed the said
out-pourings in the title, number, garb and colour
of a verified and authentic State paper. He has
actually had them printed on the famous duck's
egg foolscap of the Committee of Imperial
Defence, and under his authority, as President
and Prime Minister, they have been circulated
round the Government and all the notables
of the Empire without any chance having been
offered to me (or to K.) of defending the
honour of British Officers or the good name of the
British Rank and File. K. tells Callwell I should
be given the opportunity of making a reply. Not
having read it himself he has not yet grasped the
fact that he also should have been given the
opportunity of making a reply to the aspersions
upon his selections. As for me, by the time
my answer can get home and can be printed and
circulated the slanders will have had over a month's
start in England and very likely two months'
start in Australia, where all who read them will
naturally conclude their statements must have been
tested before ever they were published in that im-
pressive form.
Here we see an irresponsible statement by an
ignorant man and I instinctively feel as if it were
being used as one more weapon to force Asquith' s
hand and to ruin our last chance. I only hope
it may not prove another case of, " Behold, how
great a matter a little fire kindleth ! "
260 GALLIPOLI DIARY
Certain aspects of this affair trouble my under-
standing. The covering note (dated 25th September)
which encloses the letter to the Prime Minister
of Australia (dated 23rd September) is addressed
by Mr. Murdoch to Mr. Asquith by name. In
that covering note Mr. Murdoch says, " I write
with diffidence, and only at Mr. Lloyd George's
request." Within three days (so great the urgency
or pressure) Mr. Asquith causes as he, President
of the Committee of Imperial Defence, alone can
cause the covering note as well as the seven or
eight thousand words of the letter to be printed
and circulated round the big wigs of Politics, as
well as (to judge by the co-incident hardening of
the tone of this mail's papers) some of the Editors.
Not one word to me as to Mr. Murdoch's qualifica-
tions or as to the truth or falsity of his statements,
until these last have been a week in circulation.
Then, I receive ; first, a cable saying unofficial
reports had come in censuring my General Staff
and that I had better, therefore, let Braithwaite
go ; secondly, a cable asking me whether the absurd
story of my having ordered my own soldiers to be
shot " without mercy " is well-founded ; thirdly,
a bad last, the libellous letter itself.
Yet Mr. Asquith did know the paper contained
some falsehoods. He may have attached weight
to Mr. Murdoch's tale of the feelings of French
soldiers at Helles (although he never found time to
go there) : he may have believed Mr. Murdoch
when he says that Sir John Maxwell " has a poor
brain for his big position " ; that " our men feel
that their reputation is too sacred to leave in the
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 261
hands of Maxwell " ; that Sir William Birdwood
" has not the fighting quality or big brain of a great
General " ; that General Spens was " a man broken
on the Continent" (although he never was broken
and never served on the Continent) ; that " Kit-
chener has a terrible task in getting pure work
from the General Staff of the British Army, whose
motives can never be pure, for they are unchange-
ably selfish " ; that " from what I saw of the Turk,
I am convinced he is .... a better man than
those opposed to him " (although, actually, Mr.
Murdoch saw nothing of the Turks). The P.M.
may have taken these views at their face values :
even, he may have swallowed Mr. Murdoch's
picture of the conscientious Altham " wallowing "
in ice whilst wounded were expiring of heat within
a few hundred j^ards ; but Mr. Asquiih has seen
the K. Army and, therefore, he cannot have believed
that these soldiers have suddenly been transformed
into " merely a lot of childish youths without
strength to endure or brains to improve their
conditions."
Once more ; these reckless scraps of hearsay
would not be worth the paper they are printed on
were it not that they are endorsed with the letters
C.I.D., the stamp of the ministerial Holy of Holies.
Only the Prime Minister himself, personally, can
so consign a paper. Lord K. and I were both
members of the C.I.D., and members of long stand-
ing. For the President to circularize our fellow
members behind our backs with unverified accusa-
tions is a strange act, foreign to all my ideas of
Mr. Asquith. On this point Callwell is quite clear:
262 GALLIPOLI DIARY
the Murdoch letter was published to the C.I.D.
on the 28th ult. and Callwell writes on the 2nd
inst., and says Lord K. " has not had time to read
it yet." x But nothing else is clear. In fact, the
whole thing is foreign to all my ideas of Mr.
Asquith. He does not need to work the C.I.D.
oracle in this way. As P.M. he has only to speak
the word. He does not work the Press oracle either :
not his custom : also he likes K. The whole thing
is a mystery, of which I can only say with Hamlet
" miching mallecho ; it means mischief."
I4:th October, 1915. Imbros. Colder than ever.
We are told that the winter will kill the flies and
that with their death we shall all get hearty and
well. Meanwhile, they have turned to winged
limpets.
Being Mail day as well as rough, stuck to camp.
My friend England sailed into harbour in the
Chelmer and came up to lunch. In the evening
he took Godley back to Anzac. Duncannon came
to dinner. I have made him liaison officer with
the French in place of de Putron who has gone to
Salonika with Bailloud.
As to the Murdoch unpleasantness, I began an
expose to be sent to the Governor General of Austra-
lia ; another to the Secretary of the C.I.D. But
Pollen, Braithwaite and Dawnay (the last of
whom had been shown the document whilst he
was at home, though he had said nothing to me
1 Lest anyone should imagine there is any privilege or secrecy
attached to this document it may be well to explain that all
the best passages came back to me from Melbourne in due course ;
often with marginal comment. IAN H., 1920.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 263
about it) thought this was to make much ado
about nothing. They cannot believe Lord K.
will trouble himself about the matter any further
and they think it best handled in lighter vein.
Is K. still the demi-God, that is the question ?
Anyway, there is simply no time this Mail to deal
with so many misstatements, so that has settled it.
" GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
" MEDTN. EXPEDITIONARY FORCE,
" Uth October, 1915.
" DEAR CALLWELL,
" I have read Mr. Murdoch's letter with care,
and I have tried to give it my most impartial
consideration and not to allow myself in reply
to be influenced in any way by the criticisms
he may have felt himself bound to make upon
myself personally.
" What does this letter amount to ? Here we
have a man, a journalist by profession, one who is
quick to seize every point, and to coin ep thets,
which throw each fleeting impression into strongest
relief. He comes armed with a natural and justifi-
ably enthusiastic admiration for everything con-
nected with the Commonwealth to which he belongs,
and ready to retail to his Minister or his public
anything that can contribute to show the troops
they have sent in an heroic light.
" Here he obtains his first sight of war and of the
horrors and hardships inseparable from it. He
finds men who have just been through some of
264 GALLIPOLI DIARY
the hardest fighting imaginable and who have
suffered terrible losses ; he finds probably that
very many of those whom he hoped to see,
certainly many of those of whose welfare their
motherland would wish to hear, are killed, wounded
or laid up with illness, he finds all this and he
becomes very deeply depressed. In such an
atmosphere Mr. Murdoch composes his letter, a
general analysis of which shows it to be divided,
to my mind, into two separate strata.
" First an appreciation in burning terms of the
spirit, the achievements, the physique and all sol-
dierly qualities of the Australian Forces. Secondly,
a condemnation, as sweeping and as unrelieved
as his praise in the first instance is unstinted, of
the whole of the rest of the force. I myself as
C. in C., my Generals, my Staff, Lines of Communi-
cation, Sir John Maxwell and General Spens at
the Base, even the British soldiers collectively and
individually, are all embraced in this condemnation
which is completed by the inclusion of the entire
direction of the Forces at home, both Naval and
Military.
" Where all are thus tarred with the same brush,
I am content to leave it to the impartial reader
to decide what reliance can be placed on Mr.
Murdoch's judgment. My own feeling certainly
is that in his admiration for the Australian Forces,
and in his grief at their heavy losses (in both of
which feelings I fully share) he has allowed himself
to belittle and to criticize us all so that their virtues
might be thrown into even bolder relief.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 265
" With Mr. Murdoch's detailed points I do not
propose to deal, nor do I think you expect me to
do so. On every page inaccuracies of fact abound.
The breaking of Spens on the Continent, a theatre
of war he has never visited ; the over-statement
of our casualties by more than 40 per cent. ; the
acceptance as genuine of a wholly mythical order
about the shooting of laggards really the task
would be too long. As to the value of Mr. Murdoch's
appreciation of the strategical and tactical elements
of the situation you can yourself assess them at
their true value.
"Finally, I do not for one moment believe the
general statement put forward to the effect that
the troops are disheartened. Neither that state-
ment nor the assertion that they are discontented
with the British Officers commanding them has
the slightest foundation in fact.
" Believe me,
"My dear Callwell,
" Yours very sincerely,
(Sd.) " IAN HAMILTON.
"P.S. I attach correspondence showing how
Mr. Murdoch's visit arose. I believe I exceeded
my power in giving him permission to come but
I was most anxious to oblige the Australian Prime
Minister and Senator Pearce. You will see that
he promises faithfully to observe any conditions
I may impose. The only condition I imposed was
that he should sign a declaration identical with
that which I attach. He signed and the paper is
in my possession."
266 GALLIPOLI DIARY
CORRESPONDENCE.
" Dear Sir,
" On the advice of Brigadier-General Legge
I beg to request permission to visit Anzac.
" I am proceeding from Melbourne to London
to take up the position of managing editor of the
Australian news cable service in connection with
the London Times and at the Commonwealth
Government's request am enquiring into mail
arrangements, dispositions of wounded, and various
matters in Egypt in connection with our Australian
Forces. I find it impossible to make a complete
report upon changes that have been suggested here
until I have a better knowledge of the system
pursued at base Y, and on the Mainland, and I
beg of you, therefore, to permit me to visit these
places.
" I should like to go across in only a semi-official
capacity, so that I might record censored impres-
sions in the London and Australian newspapers
I represent, but any conditions you impose I should,
of course, faithfully observe.
" I beg to enclose (a) copy of general letter from
the Prime Minister and (b) copy of my instructions
from the Government. I have a personal letter
of introduction to you from Senator Pearce,
Minister of Defence.
" May I add that I had the honour of meeting
you at the Melbourne Town Hall, and wrote fully
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 267
of your visit in the Sydney Sun and Melbourne
Punch ; also may I say that my anxiety as an
Australian to visit the sacred shores of Gallipoli
while our army is there is intense.
" Senator Millen asked me to convey his most
kindly remembrances to you if I had the luck to
see you and in case I have not I take this oppor-
tunity of doing so.
" As I have only four weeks in which to complete
my work here and get to London a 'collect reply
by cable to C/o Colonel Sellheim, Australian
Intermediate Base, Cairo, would greatly oblige.
" I have the honour to be,
" Sir,
" Your obediently,
(Sd.) " KEITH A. MURDOCH.
" C/o Colonel Sellheim, C.B.,
"A.I.F. Intermediate Base,
" Cairo.
"August 17, 1915."
" COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA,
" PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT,
" MELBOURNE.
"July Uth, 1915.
' This letter will serve to introduce Mr. Keith
Arthur Murdoch, a well known journalist, of
Melbourne, who is proceeding to Europe to under-
take important duties in connection with his
profession.
268 GALLIPOLI DIARY
" Mr. Murdoch is also undertaking certain
inquiries for the Government of the Commonwealth
in the Mediterranean Theatre of War. And for
any facilities which may be rendered him to enable
him the better to carry out these duties I shall
be personally obliged.
(Sd.) " ANDREW FISHER,
" Prime Minister."
" DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE,
" MELBOURNE,
"July 2nd, 1915.
" Mr. Keith A. Murdoch,
" Alfred Place, Melbourne.
" The Minister desires that you furnish a report
upon the following matters together with any
suggestions for improvements.
"1. Arrangements for the receipt and delivery
of letters, papers and parcels to and from members
of the Australian Imperial Force.
"2. Arrangements for the receipt and delivery
of cablegrams to and from members of the Australian
Imperial Force.
"3. Arrangements for notifications to the
Department in Australia of the disposition of
Australian Wounded in Hospitals.
"4. Suggested despatch of special expert corps
to Hospitals.
" 5. Frauds by impersonation at cable offices.
(Sd.) "T. TRUMBLE,
" Acting Secretary for Defence."
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 269
When I got this, I hesitated. Evidently the
writer was not accredited as a war correspondent
and his remark about having written me up in
the Sun and in Punch did not count for much.
But I was anxious then, as ever, that as many
journalists as possible should be put into a position
for seeing the fine things the troops had done and
were doing ; I noted the emphasis laid by the
writer upon his acceptance of the censorship, and
so I took upon myself to exceed my powers and
asked Braithwaite to cable to Mr. Murdoch :
" This cable is your authority to come to G.H.Q,
at once whence you will be sent to Anzac.
C.G.S., Medforce."
Mr. Murdoch landed on the 2nd instant and on
that date signed the following declaration :
DECLARATION TO BE USED BY WAR
CORRESPONDENTS.
I, the undersigned, do hereby solemnly undertake
to follow in every particular the rules issued by
the Commander-in-Chief through the Chief Field
Censor, relative to correspondence concerning the
forces in the Field, and bind myself not to attempt
to correspond by any other route or by any other
means than that officially sanctioned.
Further, in the event of my ceasing to act as
correspondent with the British Forces, I will not
during the continuance of the War join the forces
of any other Power in any capacity, or impart to
270 GALLIPOLI DIARY
anyone military information of a confidential
nature or of a kind such that its disclosure is
likely to prejudice military operations, which may
have been acquired by me while with the British
Forces in the Field, or publish any writing, plan,
map, sketch, photograph or other picture on
military subjects, the material for which has been
acquired by me in a similar manner, unless first
submitted by me to the Chief Field Censor for
censorship and passed for publication by him.
(Signature of Correspondent)
15th October, 1915. Imbros. Bitter cold. The
whole camp upside down and all the Staff busy
with their shift of quarters to the other side of the
Bay.
Altham has been at Salonika and came over to
report how things were going there. Remembering
the accusation of " wallowing " in ice, I nearly
touched him for a Vanilla cream.
As to Salonika, he tells me that, so far, the
occupation has been a travesty of any military
operation. No plan ; no administration ; much
confusion ; troops immobile and likely to sit for
weeks upon the beach. The Balkan States Intelli-
gence Officers are on the spot and grasp the infer-
ences. Until the troops landed they were not
quite sure whether some serious factor was not
about to be sprung upon them : now they are
quite sure nothing can happen, big or small, beyond
our letting a lot of our bayonets go rusty. Sarrail
has been implored by the Serbians to push his
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 271
troops up into their country, but lie has been
wise enough to refuse. How can he feed them ?
On the top of it all, the conduct of the Greeks
seems fishy. As to the Bulgarians, they have
already thrown off the mask. Although Salonika
is going to be our ruin, I can still spare some pity
for Sarrail.
Have heard from Birdie who at last gives me
leave to see his Lone Pine section. Until now I
have never been able to get him to let me go there.
Too many bombs, he says, to make it quite healthy
for a Commander-in-Chief.
16th October, 1915. Imbros. Had just got into
bed last night when I was ferreted out again
by a cable " Secret and personal " from K.
telling me to decipher the next message myself.
The messenger brought a note from the G.S.
most of whom have now gone across to the other
side of the Bay to ask if I would like to be awakened
when the second message came in. As I knew the
contents as well as if I had written it out myself,
I said no, that it was to be brought me with the
cipher book at my usual hour for being called in
the morning. When I had given this order, my
mind dwelt awhile over my sins. Through my
tired brain passed thought-pictures of philosophers
waiting for cups of hemlock and various other
strange and half-forgotten antique images. Then
I fell asleep.
Next morning, Peter Pollen came in with the
cipher book and the bow-string. I got K.'s
272 GALLIPOLI DIARY
message pat in my dreams last night and here
it is, to a word, in black and white :
" The War Council held last night decided that
though the Government fully appreciate your
work and the gallant manner in which you person-
ally have struggled to make the enterprise a success
in face of the terrible difficulties you have had to
contend against, they, all the same, wish to make
a change in the command which will give them an
opportunity of seeing you."
How far we have travelled, in spirit, since K.
sent me his September greetings with spontaneous
assurances of complete confidence ! Yet, since
then, on the ground, I have not travelled at all
have indeed been under the order of the Dardanelles
Committee to stand still.
Charles Munro is to relieve me and brings with
him a Chief of Staff who will take Braithwaite's
place. On my way back I " might visit Salonika
and Egypt " so as to be able to give the Cabinet
the latest about the hang of things in these places.
When I go, Birdie is to take my place pending
Munro's arrival.
De Eobeck must give me a cruiser so that we
may start for home to-morrow. The offer of a
jaunt at Government expense to Salonika and
Egypt leaves me cold. They think nothing of
spending some hundreds of pounds to put off an
awkward moment. What value on earth could
my views on Salonika and Egypt possess for
people who have no use for my views 011 my
own subject !
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 273
After breakfast, read K.'s cable over once more.
" A War Council," it seems, decided to make the
change. Did the War Council also appoint Munro ?
K. did not appoint him anyway. Munro succeeded
me at Hythe. In 1897 I was brought home from
Tirah to Hythe by Evelyn Wood in order that I
might keep an eye on the original ideas which,
from India under Lord Roberts, had revolutionized
the whole system of British musketry. I left
Hythe on the outbreak of the South African
War and during that war Munro went there.
He was born with another sort of mind from me.
Had he been sent out here in the first instance he
would never have touched the Dardanelles, and
people who have realized so much may conclude
he will now clear out. But it does not follow.
Munro's refusal to attempt a landing in the first
instance would have served as the foundation
stone for some totally different policy in the Near
East. That might perhaps have been a good
plan. But to start a campaign with me and try
to carry it on with Munro has already been tried
and found hardly fair to either of us. The intention
of whoever selected Munro is so to use him as
to force K. to pull down the blinds. But they
may be mistaken in his character.
One thing is sure : whenever I get home I shall
do what I can to convince K. that the game is
still in his hands if only he will shake himself free
from slippery politics ; come right out here and run
the show himself. Constantinople is the only big
big hit lying open on the map at this moment. With
VOL. II. 19
274 GALLIPOLI DIARY
the reinforcements and munitions K., as Commander-
in-Chief, would have at his command, he can
bring off the coup right away. He has only to
borrow a suitable number of howitzers and aero-
planes from the Western front and our troops
begin to advance. Sarrail has missed the chance
of twenty generations by not coming here. Let
K. step in. In the whole of the Near East his
name alone is still worth an Army Corps. My
own chance has gone. That is no reason why
my old Chief should not himself make good. I
told the War Council we held at Suvla before
the battle of the 21st August that if the
Government persisted in refusing me drafts and
munitions if they insisted on leaving my units
at half-strength then they would have to get
someone cleverer than myself to carry out the
job. Well, it has come to that now. K. looms
big in the public eye and can insist on not being
starved. He must hurry up though ! Time enough
has been lost, God knows. But even to-day there
is time. Howitzers, trench mortars, munitions,
men, on a scale France would hardly miss, the
Asiatic side of the Straits would be occupied and,
in one month from to-day, our warships will have
Constantinople under their guns. If K. won't
listen to me, then, having been officially mis-
informed that the War Council wish to see me
(the last thing they do wish), I will take them at
their word. I will buttonhole every Minister from
McKenna and Lloyd George to Asquith and Bonar
Law, an( j grovel at their feet if by doing so I
can hold them on to this, the biggest scoop that is,
or ever has been, open to an Empire.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 275
Rather a sickly lunch. Not so much the news
as the Benger's on which we all feasted for our
stomach's sake. Birdie came over at 4 p.m.
with Ruthven. Both his A.D.C.s are sick. I am
going to ask him to take on young Alec McGrigor.
Peter and Freddie will come home with Braithwaite
and myself. What a true saying, a friend in
need is a friend indeed. Were I handing over to
Birdie for good I should feel unalloyed happiness
in his well-deserved success.
At tea Ellison, Braithwaite, Bertier, Colonel
Sykes and Guest appeared. They looked more
depressed than I felt. I had to work like a beaver
before I could brighten them up. "I'm not dead
yet," I felt inclined to tell them, " no, not by long
chalks." What I did say to one or two of them
was this : " My credit with Government is ex-
hausted ; clearly I can't screw men or munitions
out of them. The new Commander will start fresh
with a good balance of faith, hope and charity
lodged in the Bank of England. He comes with
a splendid reputation, and if he is big enough
to draw boldly on this deposit, the Army will
march ; the Fleet will steam ahead ; what has been
done will bear fruit, and all our past struggles and
sacrifices will live."
Dined with Freddie on the Triad. De Robeck
and Keyes were all that friends can be at such a
moment.
17th October, 1915. H.M.S. "Chatham" (At
sea). A pretty beastly day within and without.
For the within part, all sorts of good-byes to put
276 GALLIPOLI DIARY
pain into our hearts ; for the without, a cold drizzle
chilling us all to the bone.
At 10.30 Brulard and his Staff came over ; also
Generals Byng and Davies with their Staffs. After
bidding them farewell ; a function whereat I was
grateful to the French for their lightness of touch,
I rode over with Braithwaite and the A.D.C.s to
the new Headquarters at Kephalos to say good-
bye to my own Staff. Although I had meant to
live there until we drove the Turks far enough
back to let us live on the Peninsula, I had
found time to see my little stone hut built by
Greek peasants on the side of the hill : deliciously
snug. To-day, this very day, I was to have struck
my tent and taken up these cosy winter quarters ;
now I move, right enough, but on the wrong road.
The adieu was a melancholy affair. There was
no make-belief, that's a sure thing. Whatever
the British Officer may be his forte has never
lain in his acting. So, by 2.30, I made my last
salute to the last of the old lot and boarded the
Triad. A baddish wrench parting from de Robeck
and Keyes with whom I have been close friends for
so long. Up to midnight de Robeck had intended
coming home too. Keyes himself is following
me in a day or two, to implore the Cabinet to
let us at least strike one more blow before we
haul down our flag, so there will be two of us at
the task.
I wrung their hands. The Bo'sun's whistle
sounded. The curtain was falling so I wrung
their hands once again and said good-bye ; good-
THE BEGINNING OF THE END 277
bye also to the Benjamin of my personal Staff,
young Alec, who stays on with Birdie. A bitter
moment and hard to carry through.
Boarded the Chatham (Captain Drury-Lowe)
and went below to put my cabin straight. The
anchor came up, the screws went round. I won-
dered whether I could stand the strain of seeing
Imbros, Kephalos, the camp, fade into the region
of dreams, I was hesitating when a message came
from the Captain to say the Admiral begged me
to run up on to the quarter deck. So I ran, and
found the Chatham steering a corkscrew course
threading in and out amongst the warships at
anchor. Each as we passed manned ship and
sent us on our way with the cheers of brave men
ringing in our ears.
FAREWELL ORDER BY GENERAL SIR
IAN HAMILTON*
" GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
" MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE,
"October 17th, 1915.
" On handing over the Command of the Mediter-
ranean Expeditionary Force to General Sir C. C.
Munro, the Commander-in-Chief wishes to say a
few farewell words to the Allied troops, with many
of whom he has now for so long been associated.
First, he would like them to know his deep sense
of the honour it has been to command so fine
278 GALLIPOLI DIARY
an Army in one of the most arduous and difficult
Campaigns which has ever been undertaken ;
secondly, he must express to them his admiration
at the noble response which they have invariably
given to the calls he has made upon them. No
risk has been too desperate ; no sacrifice too great.
Sir Ian Hamilton thanks all ranks, from Generals
to private soldiers, for the wonderful way they have
seconded his efforts to lead them towards that
decisive victory, which, under their new Chief,
he has the most implicit confidence they will
achieve."
APPENDIX I
STATEMENT ON ARTILLERY BY BRIGADIER
GENERAL SIR HUGH SIMPSON BAIKIE, EX-
COMMANDER OF THE BRITISH ARTILLERY
AT CAPE HELLES.
THE first landing of British troops at Cape Helles took place
on 25th April, 1915. On arriving at that place during the
first week in May, I found that heavy fighting had occurred
without ceasing from the time of the disembarkation. Having
come straight from the Headquarters Staff of the 2nd Army
in France, where the question of artillery ammunition was a
constant source of anxiety to all the higher commanders,
I at once set to work to discover what reserves remained in
the hands of G.H.Q. and what the daily expenditure had
been since the landing. The greatest difficulty was experienced
in obtaining figures of expenditure from the units, so constant
had been the fighting, which still continued, and so great the
casualties, and consequent confusion in reckoning expenditure.
Yet, after some delay, sufficient information was obtained to
enable me to demonstrate with certainty that, if such severe
fighting continued, the Force would soon be in danger of
losing their artillery support.
On the 4th May a cable was sent, I believe, to Lord Kitchener
saying that ammunition was becoming a very serious matter
owing to the ceaseless fighting ; pointing out that 18 pr.
shell were a vital necessity and that a supply promised by a
certain ship (I believe the S.S. Funia) had not turned up.
A day or two later, a cable was received by G.H.Q. saying
munitions were never calculated on a basis of prolonged
occupation of the Peninsula, and that the War Office would
have to reconsider the whole position, if more was wanted.
If I remember aright, the cable finished by saying, " It is
2T9
280 GALLIPOLI DIARY
important to push on." A few days later a cable was received
saying the War Office would not give us more ammunition
until we submitted a return of what was in hand. The com-
pilation of that cut-and-dried return in the midst of a desperate
battle was a distracting and never-to-be-forgotten effort, but
there was no help for it : no return, no shells ; that was the
War Office order. The ammunition still in hand lay mostly
in the holds of the ships at Mudros, 60 miles away, and did
not lend themselves to easy counting ; while the actual
expenditure was, for reasons already given, an intricate
problem indeed.
Continuous cables on the subject of ammunition passed
during the next few days between G.H.Q. and the War Office,
all of which passed through my hands and some of which I
drafted for superior authority. I cannot remember their
sequence and not always their purport, but I distinctly remem-
ber about the 10th or llth May a cable being received from
Lord Kitchener saying ammunition for Field Artillery was
being pushed out via Marseilles. I think the figures given
were about ten or twenty thousand rounds of 18-pr. and some
one thousand rounds of 4.5 howitzer H.E., but I am not sure.
The fact that does remain indelibly impressed on my mind
is that I am convinced from the cables that passed through
my office that no provision had been made by the War Office
to keep up a regular supply of artillery ammunition to the
Dardanelles Expedition. The W.O. authority appeared to
have given a bonus of ammunition when the Expedition
sailed, and to have been somewhat taken aback and annoyed
by the fact that a sure and continuous supply should afterwards
be demanded.
On 29th May I left G.H.Q. on appointment as Brigadier-
General to command all the artillery at Cape Helles, in which
capacity I served till September, i.e. through all the big
attacks and counter-attacks of June, July and August. In
this capacity I was brought face to face with all the deficiencies
in artillery materiel and ammunition, of which the following
were the most important.
Although there was only one Battery of 4.5 and one Battery
of 6-in. howitzers at Helles there was always an extreme
deficiency of howitzer H.E. ammunition. So great was the
shortage that immediately on taking up my command I found
it necessary to issue a most stringent order that no howitzer
APPENDIX I 281
on Cape Helles was ever to fire H.E. without my personal
authority. When the Turks attacked, 18-prs. and 15-prs.
were to support the Infantry with shrapnel ; howitzers were
only to be used with my personal permission and then were
only to fire shrapnel. All howitzer H.E. was to be used
exclusively for supporting British attacks by bombarding
the Turkish trenches before and during such activities.
Throughout the above months, constant appeals were made
to me by Infantry Commanders to bombard the Turkish
trenches with H.E. in order to retaliate for the loss our men
had suffered from the Turkish guns using H.E. Such requests
I had invariably to refuse.
There were fifty-six 18-prs. at Helles, when I assumed
command on the 29th May, and subsequently they were
increased to seventy-two at the end of July. Except for 640
rounds of H.E., which was fired off during the 4th June battle,
no more H.E. arrived till the end of July.
Never during my command did the total number of rounds
of 18-pr. ammunition at Helles ever reach 25,000. Before one
of our attacks, with very careful previous husbanding, the
total used perhaps to reach 19,000 to 23,000. The total
amount I could therefore allot justifiably for the artillery
preparation before an attack of our four British Infantry
Divisions never exceeded 12,000 rounds ; as from 6,000 to
7,000 must necessarily be kept in reserve to assist in beating
off the determined hostile counter-attacks. As I remarked
at the beginning of this paper, artillery ammunition was a
constant anxiety to the higher commanders on the Western
Front also, but never, I believe, had Infantry to attack with
so little artillery support as the above. My position in France
did not give me any inside knowledge of the details of artillery
supply, but in one action at St. Eloi (near Ypres) on 14th
or 15th February, in which only 27th Division was concerned,
the artillery of this Division (so the C.R.A. informed me)
alone fired 10,000 18-pr. rounds in one night. At a similar
action at the same place by the same division about a month
later the divisional artillery fired, I believe, a slightly larger
amount. Again, at Neuve Chapelle, in February, 1915,
each Division had its own divisional artillery and the ammun-
ition expenditure worked out to 150 rounds per 18-pr. gun.
These official figures were shown me a few days after the
battle by the G.O.C., 2nd Army.
282 GALLIPOLI DIARY
In comparing the ammunition expenditure of France in
1915 and in the Dardanelles, the enormous discrepancy in
the number of 18-prs. per Division must be taken into account.
Reckoning on the scale of the number of 18-prs. allotted to a
British Division in France, we had at Helles little more than
sufficient 18-prs. for one Division, yet with this number we
had to give artillery support to four Divisions. As to the
French artillery at Helles, they could always reckon on being
able to expend 40,000 to 45,000 rounds when their two Divisions
attacked.
The complete absence of H.E. was severely felt, as shrapnel
were of little use for destroying trenches, machine gun em-
placements, etc. Therefore, in each and every British attack,
success was jeopardized and our infantry exposed to cruel
losses, because, firstly, there was not sufficient ammunition
to prepare their attack, and, secondly, there was no H.E.
(except for howitzers) to destroy the machine guns in their
emplacements. The latter, therefore, inflicted great losses
on our Infantry in their advance.
Our unfortunate position did not escape the notice of the
French, who used at times generously to place under my
command some of their field guns and howitzers, but in the
latter they were also lamentably deficient, and in ammunition
they were, themselves, during May and early June, none too
well provided, although towards July their reserves grew
more sufficient. The British deficiency in ammunition, how-
ever, was so great, and created so much merriment among
the French that they christened the British Artillery, " Un
coup par piece " ; with which term of endearment I was
always personally greeted by the French Artillery General
and his Staff, with all of whom I was great friends.
At the battle of 28th June the French were unable to spare
us the howitzers or ammunition we begged of them. The
failure of the gallant 156th Brigade of the 52nd Division to
take the H.I 2 trenches was essentially due to lack of artillery
ammunition, especially of H.E. Allowing for losses that must
have been suffered under any condition, I believe that some
700 or 800 Scottish casualties were due to this cause. Before
the action the Corps Commander sent for me to say that he
did not consider that enough guns and ammunition had been
allotted to this portion of the Turkish trenches. I replied
that I agreed, but that there were no more available and that
APPENDIX I 283
to reduce the bombardment of the hostile trenches on the
left of our front would gravely prejudice the success of the
29th Division in that quarter and that I understood success
there was more vital than on our right flank. After consult-
ation with the G.O.C. 29th Division, the Corps Commander
agreed with my allotment of the artillery. We then did our
utmost to obtain the loan of more guns, howitzers or am-
munition from the French without success and with the result
that the attack was beaten off.
So successful had been the attack on our left with its capture
of five successive lines of Turkish trenches that we had actually
some ammunition to spare. In the afternoon it was agreed
that there should be another attack on H.12, preceded by a
very short but very intense bombardment from every gun and
howitzer we possessed. All artillery arrangements for this
were completed before 2.30 p.m., from which hour all the guns
waited alert and ready for the Infantry to inform us of the
hour they wished us to commence fire. I was in direct
telephonic communication with the commander of the 52nd
Division, having had a private wire laid on to his Headquarters
the previous day. Suddenly, to my horror, I received a
telephone message from my Artillery Group Commander,
Colonel Stockdale, saying the Infantry were making the assault
and that he had no time to do more than fire half a dozen
shots !
In the attacks of 12th and 13th July, the French placed
some thirty or forty guns and howitzers under British command,
and on account of the shortage of British ammunition their
guns undertook the whole of the artillery preparation, our
artillery confining itself to covering fire during and after the
Infantry advance. The counter-attacks were so violent and
the calls for artillery support were so incessant that towards
the afternoon of the 13th July the British gun ammunition
began to get alarmingly low, until finally only about 5,000
rounds of 18-pr. ammunition, including all rounds in Battery
charge, remained at Helles. The French were reluctant to
supply further artillery support, fearing further attacks on
themselves. This was the most anxious night I spent on
the Peninsula all but a limited number of rounds were
withdrawn from most Batteries and were placed in horsed
ammunition wagons, which perambulated from one side of
the British position to the other according to where it seemed
284 GALLIPOLI DIARY
most likely the next Turkish attack would take place. These
measures were successful and no Battery actually was left
without one round at a critical moment, but the position
throughout that night was a most dangerous one. Every
hour a wire was sent to G.H.Q. giving expression to our crying
needs, but there was next to nothing at Mudros, while desperate
fighting still went on without a minute's respite. At 11 p.m.
that night a trawler did, to the joy of every gunner, reach
Helles with 3,000 rounds of 18-pr., but on the arrival of my
Staff Officer to unload it, it was found that the fuses were of
a new pattern never issued before and that the existing fuse
keys would not adjust the fuses. As no new pattern fuse keys
had been sent from home the Batteries had to manufacture
their own, which was successfully accomplished after two
days' delay.
During June two Batteries, and during July two more
Batteries of 5-inch howitzers, manned by Territorials, arrived
at Helles. During the last week of July the first two Batteries
were sent to Anzac. Some of these howitzers were very old
and worn by corrosion, and were consequently inaccurate.
The Gun History sheets of some of them showed they had
been used at the Battle of Omdurman, seventeen years before,
and had been in use ever since. After the big British attacks
of 6th and 7th August, their ammunition began to run short.
On demand about 500 or 700 rounds were sent up from Mudros
on arrival each shell was found to be of only 40 Ib. weight,
whereas former shells were of 50 Ib. weight. Their fuses
were also of new pattern, which existing fuse keys would
not fit and, to crown all, no range tables had been sent
for this new pattern of shell. In spite of continual letters
and telegrams to the War Office, when I left Helles in September
no new pattern fuse keys or range tables had ever arrived
from England ; consequently these shells remained stacked
on the Peninsula while the Batteries only fired occasionally
for want of ammunition !
On another occasion, when we were in the greatest straits
for 15-pr. ammunition, many hundreds of rounds arrived
at Helles, which on being landed were discovered by my
Staff only to be suitable for the Ehrhardt R.H.A. guns in
Egypt, no such guns being in the Dardanelles.
As for heavy artillery, practically speaking, there was
none 1 Only one 6-inch Howitzer Battery (4 howitzers) and
APPENDIX I 285
one 60-pr. Battery (4 guns) were in action at Helles up to
July when four more guns of the latter calibre were landed.
Unfortunately, however, the 60-prs. were of little use, as the
recoil was too great for the carriages and the latter broke
down beyond repair by our limited resources after very few
rounds. At the beginning of August only one 60-pr. gun
remained in action. Consequently, we had no heavy guns
capable of replying to the Turkish heavy guns which enveloped
us on three sides, and from whose fire our infantry and artillery
suffered severely.
As to spare parts, spare guns and carriages, such luxuries
were practically non-existent. No provision appears to have
been made by the War Office to replace our guns or their parts,
which became unserviceable through use or through damage
by the hostile artillery. As the British were holding the lower
slopes of the Achi Baba position, and as all our gun positions
could be seen into by the Turks with powerful spectacles
from their observation posts on the top of Achi Baba, our
equipment suffered severely. During June and July one
6-inch howitzer and twenty -five 18-prs. (out of a total of
seventy -two) as well as one or two 60-prs., were put out of action
by direct hits from the hostile artillery. Such guns were
withdrawn to the field workshops on " W " Beach, but as
these workshops were exposed to the enemy's artillery fire
from three sides, the guns were often further damaged while
under repair. Damaged guns had sometimes to wait for days
in this workshop until other guns had been damaged in a
different place by the hostile artillery. Then possibly one
efficient gun could be made up of the undamaged portions
of one, two or more guns. Batteries often, therefore, remained
for days short of guns on account of the lack of spare parts.
When I assumed command of the artillery at Helles, there
were two Batteries of mountain guns (10-prs.) in action, but
they were of a prehistoric pattern. In 1899 the Khedive of
Egypt possessed in his Army, in which I was then serving,
mountain guns which were more up-to-date in every respect.
So inaccurate were these 10-prs. that they had to be placed
close behind the front trenches lest they should hit our own
Infantry, the result being a very heavy casualty list in officers
and men amongst their Territorial personnel. Many of these
lives could have been saved, had reasonable modern weapons
been supplied. These obsolete old guns wore out so quickly
286 GALLIPOLI DIARY
that the two Batteries quickly melted into one Battery, and
when they finally left Helles for Anzac at the end of July,
I believe only 3 guns and their detachments were left in
being.
As for anti-aircraft guns, they did not exist at all and the
hostile aeroplanes used to fly over and drop bombs ad lib.
without fear of molestation, the only saving clause being
that the enemy appeared to possess almost as few aeroplanes
as the British.
In no point of their equipment did the force at Helles suffer
so much in comparison with their comrades in France as in
the matter of aeroplanes which, at the Dardanelles, were
hopelessly deficient not only in the numbers but also in quality.
There were not sufficient pilots and there were no observers
at all. Brave and efficient as the naval pilots were, they could
not be expected to be of any use as artillery spotters unless
they had been thoroughly trained for this important duty.
This deficiency had to be made good at all costs by drafting
young artillery subalterns from their Batteries and sending
them to the Air Force, where their lack of training and
experience in operation was at first severely felt, although
later these lads did magnificent work. Thus Batteries were
deprived of their trained subalterns just at the moment when
the latter were most required on account of the severe casualties
suffered in the landing and during the subsequent early opera-
tions. But few of the aeroplanes were fitted with wireless
and the receivers on the ground could not take in messages
over a distance longer than 5,000 yards. Consequently,
each aeroplane had to return within this radius of the receiver,
before its observation could be delivered, thus immensely
curtailing the usefulness and efficiency of the aeroplane
observation. Owing to the above conditions, aeroplanes
could only be used for the counter-batteries firing on hostile
artillery.
As regards trench mortars, the supply was hopelessly
inadequate. I cannot give the exact figures, but I believe
there were not a dozen at Helles during the whole period I
was there, and these were of such an indifferent type as to be
practically useless, and for this reason no one bothered about
them. No provision appears to have been made for the
supply of such necessities of trench warfare by the Home
Authorities. This appears to be indefensible, as I believe
APPENDIX I 287
very early in the operations their provision was specially asked
for by G.H.Q. The absolute failure to supply such articles
of vital necessity eventually led to the French C.-in-C. at
Helles lending the British two dernizel trench mortars and
large quantities of ammunition. These were manned by
artillery detachments, and by their magnificent work and the
constant demand from the Infantry for their services, it was
conclusively proved what an invaluable aid a sufficient supply
of these weapons would have been.
From the very first it was apparent to me that the number
of British guns at Helles was not sufficient to prepare and
support simultaneous Infantry attacks of the whole British
Force at this end of the Peninsula. In June I drew up a
memorandum to G.H.Q. pointing this out and asking for a
big increase of guns, howitzers and ammunition. What
happened to this I cannot say. I only know that the guns and
ammunition asked for never materialized.
The whole story of the artillery at Helles may be summed
up in the following sentences : insufficiency of guns of every
nature ; insufficiency of ammunition of every nature, especially
of H.E. ; insufficient provision made by the Home Authorities
for spare guns, spare carriages, spare parts, adequate repairing
workshops, or for a regular daily, weekly or monthly supply
of ammunition ; guns provided often of an obsolete pattern
and so badly worn by previous use as to be most inaccurate ;
lack of aeroplanes, trained observers and of all the requisites
for air observation ; total failure to produce the trench mortars
and bombs to which the closeness of the opposing lines at
Helles would have lent themselves well in short, total lack
of organization at home to provide even the most rudimentary
and indispensable artillery requisites for daily consumption ;
not to speak of downright carelessness which resulted in wrong
shells being sent to the wrong guns, and new types of fuses
being sent without fuse keys and new types of howitzer shells
without range tables. These serious faults provoked their
own penalties in the shape of the heavy losses suffered by our
Infantry and artillery, which might have been to a great
measure averted if sufficient forethought and attention had
been devoted to the " side-show " at the Dardanelles.
After commanding the starved artillery at Helles it was my
good fortune to command the artillery of the 21st Army Corps
at the third Battle of Gaza, in November, 1917, and also at the
288 GALLIPOLI DIARY
great Battle of 19th September, 1918, in which the Turks
in Palestine were finally crushed, and I think it may add
emphasis to what I have said if I contrast the artillery support
of the two campaigns and show the results which ensued.
On the night before the third Battle of Gaza, the artillery
under my command (to support three Divisions) consisted of
the following, viz. : 19 J Batteries (i.e., 78 guns and howitzers)
of heavy artillery, comprising 8-inch howitzers, 6-inch guns,
6-inch howitzers and 60-pr. guns all of the most modern
and up-to-date type.
The Field Artillery comprised 108 18-prs. and 36 4.5 howitzers
while in addition there were 8 modern mountain howitzers
and guns. There was not an artillery weapon in the whole
Army Corps that was not efficient and up-to-date, while
immediately behind the front line existed perfectly organized
workshops capable of executing any repairs. There was
ample provision of spare guns, carriages and parts, and an
abundance of trench mortars which, though they would have
changed the whole face of the Peninsula conflict, could not be
used in Palestine owing to the breadth of No Man's Land.
Ammunition for every nature of gun and howitzer was pressed
upon us in profusion over a thousand rounds per gun was
buried and concealed near every Battery, while immediately
behind the fighting line huge reserves were available for
immediate use if required. At the advanced railhead, G.H.Q.
literally built mountains of ammunition as a further supply ;
all this in addition to vast quantities stored in dep6ts in
Egypt and on the banks of the Suez Canal. So great was
the superabundance of shell, that hundreds of tons were left
lying on the ground after the nine days' Battle at Gaza ;
which it took months to remove. At the battle of the 19th
September, 1918, in Palestine conditions were exactly the
same. There was an absolute embarros de richesse of every
artillery requisite. This wealth of artillery material was
supported in Palestine by a full complement of artillery,
aeroplanes, pilots and observers, the latter being all thoroughly
trained and efficient. In addition, by a sufficiency of fighting
aeroplanes with most efficient pilots, our artillery were
adequately guarded from sunrise to sunset from any hostile
aeroplane observation.
In short, our air supremacy was undisputed and absolutely
protected our own artillery against damage and molestation
APPENDIX I 289
from the hostile guns. On the other hand, the enemy's
artillery lay at our mercy directly their gun positions were
discovered.
The whole science of artillery and aeroplane co-operation
had, of course, been vastly extended and perfected since
Gallipoli days, but the point I wish to make is this : that in
1917 and 1918 the Palestine Front was fitted out on the
same scale, proportionately, as the Western Front ; whereas
in 1915 this was not the case in the Dardanelles as regards
artillery, for instance, only one Division (the 29th) at Helles
having 18-pr. guns and the Naval Division having been given
no artillery at all !
To put the matter shortly, whereas at Helles I had under
my command no more than 88 to 95 guns and howitzers of all
natures with scarcely any ammunition or aeroplanes to support
four British Divisions ; in Palestine at Gaza I had at least
230 guns and howitzers (one -third of which were of heavy
calibre) with an abundance of ammunition and a sufficiency
of aeroplanes to support the attack of one and a half Divisions,
the remaining one and a half Divisions at Gaza being in reserve.
At the battle of 19th September, 1918, in Palestine I had, to
the best of my recollection, about 360 guns of all calibres to
support four Divisions. The terrible casualties suffered by
our Infantry at Helles are well known, and my feelings as
Artillery Commander unable to give them anything like the
support they would have had in France or Flanders may be
guessed. But this was made up to me afterwards when I
commanded the artillery at Gaza, that strong fortress which
was captured by the 21st Army Corps, with certainly under
3,000 casualties and I believe with under 2,000 killed and
wounded. At Gaza the Turks were simply crushed by our
overwhelming artillery, fed from inexhaustible Ordnance
parks and dumps. Before the Infantry attack commenced
the position was subjected to a continuous bombardment
night and day for six days and six nights from every available
gun and howitzer. The Infantry then attacked and took a
large portion of the position with a loss of, I believe, under
1,000 men. The Turks counter-attacked, but they melted
away under the tremendous artillery barrage and never
attempted another during this battle. Next night our Infantry
tried to extend their conquest but the Turks had meanwhile
brought up an old Gallipoli Division, the 7th, which held them
VOL. n. 20
290 GALLIPOLI DIARY
at bay and inflicted upon them serious losses which, I believe,
increased their casualties to between two and three thousand.
The Corps Commander then decided to let the Infantry stand
where they were, to submit the Turks to a further three days*
and three nights' bombardment, at the end of which our
Infantry advanced again only to find that the Turks were
evacuating the whole of the Gaza position. After the Battle
of 19th September, 1918, many Infantry commanders of
Divisions, Brigades and Battalions have told me the Turks
appeared crushed by the terrific artillery bombardment (under
cover of which our men advanced) and offered a resistance
which, in comparison with our experiences of Gallipoli, can
only be called feeble.
The cardinal fact that remains in my mind is that in Palestine
the 21st Army Corps always had enough (and more than enough)
of every artillery requisite for whatever number of Divisions
the Army Corps was composed of ; whereas, in Gallipoli,
the Vlllth Army Corps at Helles, which was composed of
four British Divisions, never had enough Field Artillery or
ammunition to support more than one Division, and never
possessed sufficient heavy artillery to support more than
one Infantry Brigade.
The material part of my statement ends here, and it only
remains for me to remind you that all the grievous short-
comings I have exposed were actually made good by the heroism,
devotion and sufferings of the Officers and men of the Artillery
at Helles, both Regular, Territorial, Australian and New
Zealand. Best was impossible, as no Battery could ever be
withdrawn from the line and all field Batteries were under
rifle fire. If placed outside that range, they were destroyed
by flanking fire from Turkish guns in Asia. No dug-outs
were possible, as dug-outs were understood in France, as there
was no timber or roofing for their construction. All ranks
were thus exposed night and day to continuous fire, and were
sometimes killed as they slept in their valises by stray bullets,
thousands of which were fired unaimed every night by the
Turks in the hopes of inflicting casualties ; water for drinking
and washing was almost as precious as guns and shells. The
joys of a canteen, as was at that time supplied by the War
Office to our Army in France, were unknown ; bare rations
washed down by a limited allowance of water were our only
form of food ; everyone suffered more or less from dysentery,
APPENDIX I
291
spread by the millions of flies which settled on every mouthful
we ate and made life almost insupportable by day. No Man's
Land was one vast litter of unburied corpses. Yet no man's
spirit ever wavered and all ranks remained as bright, as hopeful
and as cheerful as on the day of the first great landing. If
shells were scarce, complaints were non-existent ; all were
upheld by the wonderful religion of self-sacrifice. It will
ever remain my greatest pride that I had the astonishing
good fortune to be associated with such a body of officers
and men ; to them I owe a debt of gratitude that is beyond
redemption, and to them alone is due the credit for any success
which the artillery at Helles may have attained in what
was one of England's greatest tragedies, but was also one of
England's greatest glories.
APPENDIX II
DARDANELLES EXPEDITION
NOTES BY LIEUT. -COLONEL CHABLES ROSENTHAL,* COMMANDING
3RD AUSTRALIAN FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE, IST AUS-
TRALIAN DIVISION, RELATING TO ARTILLERY AT ANZAC,
FROM 25TH APRIL TO 25TH AUGUST, 1915. (Compiled
from personal diary.)
During the early hours of 25th April, 1915, the 3rd Australian
Infantry Brigade landed on Gallipoli Peninsula, close to Gaba
Tepe, at a point now known as Anzac Beach, followed by other
troops of 1st Australian Division and Australian and New
Zealand Division.
Arrangements had been made for artillery to land about
10 a.m. on the same morning, but owing to delays in dis-
embarkation of Infantry, and enemy shelling of transports
necessitating ships temporarily leaving their allotted anchorage,
it was after midday before the vessels carrying guns were
actually in correct position for disembarkation.
I did not wait for the naval boats to come alongside, but
after issuing necessary instructions to Battery Commanders
concerning the landing of the guns, I disembarked in a ship's
boat manned by a volunteer crew from my Brigade Ammunition
Column, accompanied by two officers and sixteen men of my
Headquarters' Staff.
Immediately on landing I reported to my C.R.A., and was
by him informed that the Divisional Commander had decided
no artillery should land during the day. This decision abso-
lutely nonplussed me, and on asking the reason I was informed
the position was not considered sufficiently secure to ensure
the safety of guns, if emplaced. With this decision I did not
agree and urged, without result, that the safety of guns was
surely secondary to the proper supporting of the troops already
committed.
1 Now Major-General Sir Charles Rosenthal, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
-IAN H. 1920.
APPENDIX II 293
In view of the above decision instructions were at once
sent off to the ships ordering Colonel Johnstone, Commanding
2nd A.F.A. Brigade, and Major Hughes, acting for me in
command of 3rd A.F.A. Brigade, to defer disembarkation of
guns. Colonel Johnstone, however, by this time had one
18-pr. gun well on the way to the shore. Permission was
given for it to be landed and it was brought into action close
to the beach against guns at Gaba Tepe, undoubtedly tem-
porarily silencing them.
In the meantime the Indian Mountain Battery attached to
1st Australian Division, which had landed early in the day,
was in action doing splendid work though suffering severe
casualties.
By the order of Colonel White, G.S.O. (I), 1st Australian
Division, I spent the afternoon in collecting Infantry stragglers
and getting them forward again to the firing line. At 5 p.m.
I reported completion of this task and then proceeded to
thoroughly reconnoitre the right flank, overlooking Gaba
Tepe, which had seemed to me, from observations made from
the ship, to be a suitable area for emplacing of guns.
I returned to Divisional Headquarters just before dark,
and informed the C.R.A. and Divisional Commander that
I had found suitable places for batteries and could use them
effectively.
I had in my reconnaissance conferred with three Battalion
Commanders (one of whom was killed a couple of days later),
who were delighted to hear that the artillery they were so
anxiously waiting for was to come up in support.
After much discussion and persuasion the Divisional
Commander agreed to allow me to land two of my three 18-pr.
batteries. This approval was shortly afterwards altered to
permission to land two guns only, and finally all approval
was cancelled, though no information of these decisions
officially reached me.
During the night, in anticipation of early arrival of guns,
my Headquarters personnel worked untiringly in preparing
a track from the beach to the selected sites for guns, and it
was not till 5.30 a.m. on 26th that I learned approval to land
guns had been cancelled overnight.
During the morning of 26th April one gun of 1st Battery,
1st Brigade, and one gun of 4th Battery, 2nd Brigade, were
294 GALLIPOLI DIARY
landed, hauled up the steep hill to their positions, and came
into action on the extreme right of ridge overlooking Gaba
Tepe.
Later in the day the 7th Battery of my Brigade came into
action on the same ridge and the single guns of 1st and 4th
Batteries were withdrawn for return to their respective
Brigades.
During the afternoon there also came ashore, apparently
without order, two guns of 3rd Battery, 1st Brigade, and
8th Battery, 3rd Brigade 3 but were returned to their respective
ships by the C.R.A.
My guns were placed absolutely in the Infantry front trenches,
on the sky line, no troops of any kind being in advance of them.
It would have been quite useless to take up positions behind
the Infantry line in the normal way, owing to the configuration
of the ground, for in such cases the lowest range at which
the crest could be cleared was 3,000 yards, while our targets
were from 500 to 1,000 yards distant. Indeed at night,
shrapnel shell with fuse set at zero was frequently used.
Each gun fired during the 26th about 400 rounds, over
open sights, and caused very heavy casualties to the enemy.
The whole battery covered a front of 187, necessitating
each gun being personally controlled by an officer and each
with its own particular arc of fire.
The supply of ammunition was very difficult. It had to
be delivered by hand to the guns over a bullet-swept area,
the distance from the beach to the guns being about half a
mile, while in this distance the hills rose 400 feet.
By the afternoon of the 3rd May, two guns of 8th Battery,
3rd Brigade, were in action, and 2nd Brigade also had guns
in position on the left flank of 1st Australian Divisional Front.
The Australian and New Zealand Division also had 18-prs.
in action together with two 4.5-inch Howitzer Batteries,
the latter being the only howitzers available up to this time
at Anzac.
I was wounded on 5th May, evacuated to Cairo, and did not
rejoin my command at Anzac till 26th May. During this
interval gun positions, as well as Infantry trenches, had been
much improved, and the enemy country in our immediate
front which, when I left on 5th May, gave no signs of life,
was now well traversed by trenches.
APPENDIX II 295
I found in my sector that the guns of my Brigade were
now all in action, and the remainder of the artillery of the
Division was also emplaced.
About this time 6-inch howitzers were made available and
later emplaced, one for left sector, one for the centre, and one
for the right, but with very limited quantities of ammunition.
Another 6-inch howitzer was landed on 17th June.
I had made continual urgent representations for two 4.7-inch
guns for right flank to deal with innumerable targets beyond
the range of 18-prs., but it was not till llth July that one
very old and much worn gun arrived, and was placed in position
on right flank, firing its first round on 26th July.
On 24th June a Scottish Territorial Howitzer Battery
(the 5th Battery, City of Glasgow Lowland Howitzer Brigade)
arrived and came under my command.
On 14th July a heavy battery was organized for right flank,
consisting of the two 6-inch howitzers and the 4.7-inch gun
before mentioned, but ammunition was still very scarce.
On 15th July a 5 -inch Howitzer Brigade under Colonel
Hope Johnstone commenced to arrive and was complete in
position by 18th July.
On 28th July the 4th Battery of Lowland Brigade arrived.
About this time some alterations were made in artillery
dispositions and grouping in preparation for impending battle
at Suvla Bay and Lone Pine, commencing on 6th August,
and on 30th July the artillery of right sector under my command
was as follows :
3rd A.F.A. Brigade (18-prs.).
Heavy Battery (two 6-inch howitzers and one 4.7-inch
gun).
2 Mountain Guns.
Two 5-inch Howitzer Batteries, Lowland Brigade.
One 5-inch Howitzer Battery, 69th Brigade.
When leaving Australia in 1914 I had urged that a battery
of 5 -inch howitzers (which I commanded prior to the outbreak
of war), together with stocks of ammunition held by Australia,
should accompany 1st Australian Division. This was not
approved. On arrival at Gallipoli Peninsula, when the need
296 GALLIPOLI DIARY
for howitzers was at once apparent, I again re-opened the
question, particularly on the 29th May, when the C.R.A.
agreed to press for them to be sent forward. The Divisional
Commander, on 25th June, cabled Australia definitely asking
for this battery, which was at once forwarded, but arrived at
the Peninsula too late to be of any service.
Two Australian Field Batteries (together with a Brigade
of Infantry) were transferred to Cape Helles on 5th May
and did not rejoin the Australian Division at Anzac till 18th
August.
With the limited number of guns available it was exceedingly
important that transfers might be made very rapidly from one
part of our front to another, and on 2nd June I put forward
a proposal which was approved immediately to make a road
along the entire front just behind the crest on which infantry
trenches were sited. This road was completed in about two
weeks and was a great boon alike to gunners and Infantry.
Up to 24th August no anti-aircraft guns had been provided,
but specially constructed emplacements had been made for
18-prs. to be used against aircraft, and though never successful
in bringing down an enemy 'plane they certainly made good
enough shooting to cause enemy aviators to treat them with
respect. About 20th August three 3-pr. Hotchkiss arrived
for anti-aircraft purposes. They were of obsolete pattern
and had been manufactured for the Japanese Government
many years before. In fact the only range tables provided
were printed in Japanese, but thanks to the fact that one of
my Sergeants (who was a Master Mariner) spoke Japanese,
we succeeded in preparing serviceable range tables.
Two Japanese trench mortars were also used from Infantry
trenches with excellent effect, but owing to ammunition supply
becoming soon exhausted and no fresh supplies being available
they had to be discarded. A good supply of these weapons,
together with full supplies of ammunition, would have been
invaluable in bombarding enemy front line trenches.
The ammunition supply at all times up to the operation
of 6th August was a difficult problem. Frequently we had to
be rationed to a very small allowance per battery per day,
and the guns of the heavy battery were for some time not
permitted to fire more than two rounds per day and then only
by special permission of the C.B.A.
APPENDIX II 297
On 20th June I was first informed that H.E. for 18-pr.
was to be supplied, and shortly afterwards a small supply
for experiment was landed at Anzac. I think I am right in
saying my share was 15 rounds per battery.
On 2nd August our first supply of H.E. arrived, but only
150 rounds per battery.
During the first few months of the campaign, when our
stocks of ammunition were desperately low, our guns and
gunners had to suffer considerable casualties without be^'ug
able to effectively reply.
Our batteries were of necessity in many cases under direct
observation of the enemy, and only the splendid work of the
detachments in building earthworks for their protection made
it possible to carry on.
Under the protection of the banks of a small ravine near
the beach, our artificers established a workshop, and the extra-
ordinary ingenuity and skill displayed in the repairing and
replacing of damaged guns earned for the artificers our most
grateful appreciation and thanks.
On 25th August I was evacuated suffering from enteric.
These notes only apply to the right sector, which I com-
manded.
APPENDIX III
THE Dispatch of a Commander-in-Chief is not a technical
document. In it the situation should be set forth, as briefly
and clearly as may be, together with a few words indicative
of the plan of G.H.Q. for coping with it. After that comes
a narrative which ends with thanks to those individuals and
units who have earned them. A Dispatch should be so
written that civilians can follow the facts stated without
trouble : it should not be too technical. But when the
Military Colleges and Academies at Camberley, Duntroon,
Kingston, West Point and in the European and Japanese
capitals set to work in a scientific spirit to apportion praise
or blame they are more influenced by the actual instructions
and orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief before and during
the battle, than by any after -the-event stories of what happened.
They are glad to know the intentions of the Commander, but
his instructions i.e., the actual steps he took to give practical
effect to those intentions, are what really interest them.
When I came to write my Dispatch of the llth December,
so much about the actual course of events at Suvla was still
obscure, that it had become desirable either to write the
narrative in a more technical form than was customary or
else to publish my actual instructions simultaneously with
the Dispatch. I chose the latter course. The authorities
had raised objections to several passages in the Dispatch,
and in every case but one, where they had wished me to add
something which was not, in my opinion, correct, I had met
them. No objection had been raised to the inclusion of my
instructions. At 9 p.m. on the night of the 6th January
(the Dispatch being due to appear next morning) I received
a letter by Special Messenger from the War Office telling me
the Press Bureau were wiring to all those to whom the Dis-
patch had been issued to suppress the instructions !
Whatever the reason of this action may have been, its
result was clear enough : my Dispatch was eviscerated at
the very moment it was stepping on to the platform. Had
I known that these instructions, now given, were to have
been cut out, my Dispatch would have been differently written.
IAN H., 1920.
APPENDIX III 299
SIR IAN HAMILTON'S INSTRUCTIONS.
To VICE-ADMIRAL, COMMANDING
EASTEBN MEDITERRANEAN SQUADRON,
nth July, 1915.
SIR, I have the honour to forward a series of tables drawn
up to show in detail the men, animals, vehicles, stores, etc.,
which it will be required to land in connection with the forth-
coming operations. I shall be grateful if you will let me
know as early as possible if you consider that any part of the
programme indicated presents especially serious difficulties
or is likely to require modification.
In informing me of the results of your consideration, I
shall be obliged if you will let me know what craft you intend
to use in carrying out the disembarkations referred to in
tables B, C, D and E, so that detailed arrangements with re-
gard to embarkation and to the allocation of troops, etc.,
to boats may be prepared.
2. Immediately after the disembarkation of the details
referred to in the attached tables it will be necessary, if the
operations are successful, to land 5,000 to 7,000 horses in order
to render the force sufficiently mobile to carry the operations
to a conclusion. Details as to disembarkation of these horses
will be forwarded to you later. In the meantime the horses
will be collected at Alexandria, and should subsequently be
brought up to Mudros or Imbros, to begin arriving on August
6th.
It will also be necessary to land the remaining portions
of the units referred to in the tables (first line transport, etc.),
and, further, the remaining units of the formations to which
they belong. In this latter category will be included three
batteries of heavy artillery with mechanical transport. It
will not be required to land any of the above until after August
7th, and details as to numbers, order of disembarkation,
etc., will be forwarded to you later.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(Signed) IAN HAMILTON,
General, Commanding
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.
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306 GALLIPOLI DIARY
GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING,
AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND ARMY CORPS.
With reference to your G.288 of 15th July, the Navy is
being asked to provide transport for the following ammuni-
tion to be landed at Anzac by the 3rd August :
For A. and N.Z.A.C. Sufficient S.A.A. to bring the amount
on shore up to 500 rounds per rifle and 27,500 per machine-
gun.
For other Troops. 300 rounds per rifle and 24,000 rounds
per machine-gun (in addition to what the troops will carry
on landing).
These will come to 10,000,000 rounds in all, and arrange-
ments are being made to begin landing this ammunition as
soon as possible.
2. The following artillery ammunition will also have to be
gradually landed and stored, and should all be ashore, if pos-
sible, by August 3rd :
10 pr. 5,700 rounds
18 pr. (probably 15 per cent. H.E.) . . 15,500
4.5-in. Howitzer probably half H.E. . . 1,600
5-in. Howitzer majority H.E 10,000
6-in. Howitzer majority H.E 1,200
60 pr. probably two-thirds H.E. .. 1,000
All of this ammunition is not yet arrived, and the propor-
tion of H.E. shell is not yet ascertainable from England.
The arrangements suggested in your paragraph 2 (iii.) of
your letter are noted, and will be followed as far as
possible.
3. With regard to the marking of ammunition-boxes, the
necessary arrangements are being prepared. You will be
informed of the arrangements and of the system of marking
in due course.
Consignments of Mark VI. and Mark VII. will be sent
separately as you suggest.
4. The above figures do not include the periodical replenish-
ment referred to in paragraph 2 (iv.) of your letter. Dispatch
APPENDIX III 307
of consignments on this account and consignments for the
reserve will be notified to you separately.
(Signed) W. P. BRAITHWAITE,
Major-General, C.G.S.,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.
Enclosed a copy of tables forwarded to Vice- Admiral,
showing troops, animals, stores, etc., which the Navy is being
asked to land at Anzac.
July, 1915.
GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING,
9TH CORPS.
The General Commanding wishes me to send you the
following outline of his plans for the next general attack,
for the exclusive information of yourself, your Divisional
Generals, and such Officers of your Corps Headquarters and
Divisional Headquarters as you may consider it necessary
to take into your confidence. I am to add that it is Sir lan's
wish that as few officers as possible should be made acquainted
with it.
2. The general plan is, while holding as many of the enemy
as possible in the southern theatre, to throw the weight of
our attack on the Turkish forces now opposite the Australian
and New Zealand Army Corps. It is hoped, by means of an
attack on the front and right flank of these forces, to deal
them a crushing blow, and to drive the remnants south towards
Kilid Bahr. It will then be the object of the General Com-
manding to seize a position across the peninsula from Gaba
Tepe to Maidos with a protected line of supply from Suvla
Bay.
3. The strength of the enemy north of Kilid Bahr at the
present time is about 30,000 men. Of these some 12,000
are permanently maintained in the trenches opposite the
Anzac position, and the majority of the remainder are held
in reserve at Boghali, Kojadere and Eski-Keui. It is believed
that there are about three battalions in the Anafarta villages,
a battalion at Ismail Oglu Tepe (New map 1/20,000), a bat-
talion near Yilghin Burnu, and small parties of outposts at
Lala Baba (Sq. 104.L.) and Ghazi Baba (Sq. 106.N.). The
hills due east of Suvla Bay towards Aji Liman are believed
308 GALLIPOLI DIARY
to be held only by a few Gendarmerie, but information on
this point is at present not precise. The hills near Yilghin
Burnu and Ismail Oglu Tepe are known to contain one 4.7-in.
gun, one 9.2-in. gun, and three field guns, protected by wire
entanglements and infantry trenches, but it is believed that
the main defences are against attack from the south or west,
and that there is no wire on the northern slopes of the hills ;
also that the guns can only be fired in a southerly direction.
4. The success of the plan outlined in paragraph 2 will
depend on two main factors :
(a) The capture of Hill 305 (Sq. 93.W.).
(6) The capture and retention of Suvla Bay as a base
of operations for the northern army.
5. The operations from within the present Anzac position
against the enemy on Hill 305 will be carried out by the
Australian and New Zealand Corps, temporarily reinforced
by the following units of the 9th Army Corps :
13th Division (less 66th, 67th and 68th Brigades, R.F.A.).
29th Infantry Brigade (10th Division).
29th Indian Brigade.
69th Howitzer Brigade, B.F.A.
6. The landing near Suvla will be entrusted to you, and
you will have at your disposal :
llth Division.
10th Division (less 29th Brigade).
Highland Mountain Artillery Brigade.
lst/4th Lowland Howitzer Brigade.
The disembarkation of your command, which may be
expected to be opposed, though not in great strength, will
be after dark at a point immediately south of Lala Baba.
The first troops to disembark will be the llth Division, which
will have been concentrated at Imbros previously to the
attack, and will be brought across under cover of darkness
in destroyers and motor-lighters. It is expected that ap-
proximately 4,000 men will be disembarked simultaneously,
and that three infantry brigades and the mountain artillery
brigade will be ashore before daylight.
APPENDIX III 309
Your first objectives will be the high ground at Lala Baba
and Ghazi Baba, and the hills near Yilghin Burnu and Ismail
Oglu Tepe. It will also be necessary to send a small force
to secure a footing on the hills due east of Suvla Bay. It is
of first importance that Yilghin Burnu and Ismail Oglu Tepe
should be captured by a coup-de-main before daylight in
order to prevent the guns which they contain being used
against our troops on Hill 305 and to safeguard our hold on
Suvla Bay. It is hoped that one division will be sufficient
for the attainment of these objectives.
Your subsequent moves will depend on circumstances
which cannot at present be gauged, but it is hoped that the
remainder of your force will be available on the morning of
the 7th August to advance on Biyuk Anafarta with the
object of moving up the eastern spurs of Hill 305 so as to
assist General Birdwood's attack.
7. The operations from within the present Anzac position
will begin during the day immediately preceding your dis-
embarkation (the reinforcements for General Birdwood's
force having been dribbled ashore in detachments at Anzac
Cove on the three previous nights). The operations will
begin with a determined attack on the Turkish left centre,
Lonesome Pine and Johnston's Jolly (see enlarged map of
Anzac position), with the object of attracting the enemy's
reserves to this portion of the line. The Turks have for long
been apprehensive of our landing in the neighbourhood of
Gaba Tepe, and it is hoped that an attack in force in this
quarter will confirm their apprehensions. At nightfall the
Turkish outposts on the extreme right of the enemy's line
will be rushed, and a force of 20,000 men will advance in three
or more columns up the ravines running down from Chunuk
Bair. This advance, which will begin about the same time
as your first troops reach the shore, will be so timed as to
reach the summit of the main ridge near Chunuk Bair about
2.30 a.m. (soon after moon-rise).
Latest photographs show that the Turkish trenches on
this ridge do not extend further north than Chunuk Bair,
and it is unlikely that the higher portions of the ridge are
held in great strength.
As soon as a lodgement has been effected on this ridge a
portion of the attacking force will be left to consolidate the
310 GALLIPOLI DIARY
position gained and the remainder will advance south-west
against the enemy's trenches near Baby 700, which will be
attacked simultaneously by a special detachment from within
the Anzac position.
An advance by your force from the east will, as already
indicated in paragraph 6, be of great assistance in the event
of this attack being checked.
8. The landing of sufficient transport to secure the mobility
of your force will be a matter of considerable difficulty. No
animals or vehicles of any kind will be able to land in the
first instance, and machine-guns, tools and necessary medical
and signalling equipment must be carried by hand. All
men will land with two iron rations (one day's meat ration
only is advised) ; infantry will carry 200 rounds S.A.A. and
machine-gun sections 3,500 rounds in belt boxes. Packs
and greatcoats will not be taken ashore. Before dawn it is
hoped to land enough horses to secure the mobility of the
mountain artillery brigade and one battery R.F.A., and it
is hoped that within the first 24 hours the disembarkation
of all the personnel, horses and vehicles enumerated in the
attached table will be complete.
One brigade R.F.A. llth Division, l/4th Lowland 5th
Howitzer Brigade (two batteries) and the 10th Heavy Battery,
will be landed at Anzac before the operations commence,
and their personnel and horses will disembark on the morning
following your disembarkation, and will then be directed
along the beach to join your command.
Water is plentiful throughout the Anafarta Valley, but
pending the disembarkation of water carts a number of mules
with special 8-gallon water bags will be attached to the units
of your command.
(Signed) W. P. BBAITHWAITE,
Major-General, C.G.S.,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.
P.S. This letter is never to be out of an officer's possession,
and if, as is probable, you require to send it to your Brig.-
Gen. G.S., it must be sent to Mudros in charge of an officer.
APPENDIX III
311
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312 GALLIPOLI DIARY
Organization Orders for Tro&ps Landing at Anzac.
1. Troops landing at Anzac are to land equipped as follows :
F.S. equipment, including respirator ;
Pack and waterproof sheet ;
No blanket.
Officers' kit reduced to what they can carry.
No transport of any kind will be available to move
Baggage or equipment.
Ammunition S.A.A. 200 rounds per rifle or person;
3,500 rounds per machine-gun in belt boxes.
No regimental reserve S.A.A.
Gun, limbers and wagons filled with fused shell.
Water bottles filled.
Kations iron rations one day meat and biscuit, two
days' groceries.
Sufficient to provide breakfasts.
(Fuel will be issued on shore.)
Tools infantry. Regimental reserve distributed to
individuals and carried on person ; Brigade reserve
entrenching tools distributed to units, by them to indi-
viduals and carried on person.
Engineers tools for road making and entrenching
work carried on person.
Other arms usual allotment.
Signal company cable and equipment usually carried
in carts to be transferred to barrows.
Ambulances all available stretchers and equipment of
dressing stations only. Tent sub-divisions in readiness
to rejoin early.
A.S.C. Small allowance of distributing equipment, to
be brought by advance parties of S. and T. personnel.
Establishments.
2. No horses, attendants or drivers are to land. Brigade
Sections of Signal Companies are to land with the brigades
they serve.
Tent sub-divisions of field ambulances are not to land.
Equipment carried in technical vehicles is to be transferred to
vehicles which can be hand-propelled or else carried on person.
APPENDIX III 313
3. Troops should disembark into lighters, etc., in complete
units, companies, platoons, and so on, unless much space
is sacrificed in so doing.
4. All troops should land wearing two white 6-inch armlets
and a white patch on back of right shoulder.
5. No lights or noise are to be permitted while disembark-
ing ; troops will move into the lighters or horse-boats as
quickly as possible.
6. On disembarking troops will be met by staff officers
and guides, and will be marched off direct to the ground
allotted to them in no case more than 1,200 yards from the
beach. All kit brought must be removed by the troops,
and must be taken out of the lighters at the same time as
the troops leave.
Special parties to assist with the machine-gun and other
loads are to be detailed in the load of each lighter.
7. No lights or talking are permitted on the beach or till
the troops reach their allotted area. Fires are not to be lit
in any area till 4.15 a.m., and must be extinguished by 8 p.m.
Green wood is not to be used ; the smoke it causes will draw
shell fire.
8. No troops are to leave the area allotted to them between
4 a.m. and 8 p.m. except on special duty with the authority
of the Brigade Commander. Piquets will be placed under
area arrangements at intervals round the area to prevent
men straying independently.
9. Troops may be exposed to desultory shelling during
the day or night. This is never aimed, and the best protec-
tion against it is to move into the bottom of the gully in
which the troops are bivouacked.
10. Troops are not to use any portion of the iron ration
with which they land. Issues will be made under brigade
arrangements of rations and extras to last the period of their
stay.
11. Water is issued on ration at one gallon fresh water
per day. This includes water for all purposes. For bathing,
the sea ia available, but may only be visited after 9 p.m.
daily.
12. Latrines for immediate use are dug and marked in
each area ; additional latrines are to be prepared by units
314 GALLIPOLI DIARY
and the strictest orders issued to prevent fouling the ground.
Latrines are to be made very deep, as space is much restricted.
13. Casualties of any kind after treatment in the field
ambulance affiliated to the brigade will be taken to the casualty
clearing station in Anzac Cove for removal to Hospital Ship.
Urgent cases at any time ; others as far as possible between
7.30 and 8.30 p.m. and between 6 and 9 a.m.
14. The following is to be practised by all troops after
landing :
Falling in once during the night in any close formation,
and to remain so closed up for a period of at least half
an hour, during which passing of commands (messages
from front to rear and back again and to the flanks) is
to be practised.
The troops must be accustomed to the starlight, which
may be expected during night operations.
15. If aeroplanes pass overhead troops are not to look up,
as this will give away the position of bodies of troops and
probably draw shell fire.
16. Troops landing should be provided with Maps 1/20,000
of the area in which operations are to take place. These
maps to be in bulk, and not issued till after landing.
Maps 1/10,000 of the Anzac area showing roads and bivouacs
will be issued to unit commanders on arrival.
17. Telephone lines will be found laid from Anzac Head-
quarters to points suitable for Brigade or higher Headquarters.
On arrival brigades will join up these points to Anzac.
An officer and two orderlies per brigade will also be detailed
to remain at Anzac Headquarters.
Staffs of formations higher than brigades will be located
within easy reach of Anzac Headquarters.
G.S.R. Z. 18/2.
Instructions for G.O.C. $th Army Corps.
Reference Sheet Anafarta Sagir Gallipoli Map 1/20,000.
1. The intentions of the General Commanding for the
impending operations, and a rough outline of the task which
he has allotted to the troops under your command, were
communicated to you in my G.S.R. Z. 18, dated 22nd instant.
APPENDIX III 315
2. In addition to the information contained in paragraph 3
of the above quoted letter, small numbers of Turkish mounted
troops and Gendarmerie have been reported in the country
north of Anzac, and three guns with limbers, each drawn
by six oxen, have been seen moving into Anafarta Sagir.
An aeroplane photograph has also disclosed the presence of
a few trenches on Lala Baba. A sketch of these trenches,
which have apparently been constructed for some months,
is attached. It is believed that the channel connecting the
Salt Lake with Suvla Bay is now dry.
3. Your landing will begin on the night 6th/7th August.
Your primary objective will be to secure Suvla Bay as a
base for all the forces operating in the northern zone. Owing
to the difficult nature of the terrain, it is possible that the
attainment of this objective will, in the first instance, require
the use of the whole of the troops at your disposal. Should,
however, you find it possible to achieve this object with only
a portion of your force, your next step will be to give such
direct assistance as is in your power to the G.O.C. Anzac in
his attack on Hill 305, by an advance on Biyuk Anafarta,
with the object of moving up the eastern spurs of that
hill.
4. Subject only to his final approval, the General Com-
manding gives you an entirely free hand in the selection of
your plan of operations.
He, however, directs your special attention to the fact
that the hills Yilghin and Ismail Oglu Tepe are known to
contain guns which can bring fire to bear on the flank and
rear of an attack on Hill 305, and that on this account they
assume an even greater importance in the first instance than
if they were considered merely part of a position covering
Suvla Bay. If, therefore, it is possible, without prejudice
to the attainment of your primary objective, to gain posses-
sion of these hills at an early period of your attack, it will
greatly facilitate the capture and retention of Hill 305. It
would also appear almost certain that until these hills are
in your possession it will be impossible to land either troops
or stores in the neighbourhood of Suvla Bay by day.
5. The troops at your disposal will be :
llth Division (less one Brigade R.F.A., at Helles).
10th Division (less 29th Infantry Brigade).
316 GALLIPOLI DIARY
Three squadrons R.N. Armoured Car Division, R.N.A.S.
(one squadron motor cycles, six machine guns ; one
squadron Ford cars, six machine guns ; one squadron
armoured cars, six machine guns).
Two Highland Mountain Artillery batteries.
An endeavour will be made to release for your force one
or more 5-in. howitzer batteries, now at Anzac, during the
day following your initial disembarkation.
6. In order that you may be able to arrange for the dis-
embarkation of your force to agree, so far as Naval exigencies
will admit, with the plan of operations on which you decide,
the allocation of troops to the ships and boats to be provided
by the Navy is left to your decision.
With this object, tables have been drawn up, and are en-
closed with these instructions, showing the craft which can
be placed at your disposal by the Navy, their capacity, and
the points at which the troops can be disembarked. The
tables also show what numbers of troops, animals, vehicles,
and stores can be landed simultaneously.
The beaches available for your landing on the first night
are (1) a frontage of 600 yards in Suvla Bay (sq. 117 Q.V.) ;
(2) a frontage of 1,800 yards S. of Kuchuk Kemikli (sq. 9,
103 z, 104 V ; 91 A.B.), called " New Beach " in the tables.
It will not be possible in the first instance to land more than
one brigade of your force in Suvla Bay, though other vessels
can simultaneously be discharging their passengers on New
Beach.
7. As regards the time at which the disembarkation may be
expected to commence, no craft will be allowed to leave
Kephalos Harbour till after dark, and the passage across
will take from one and a half to two hours. It is unsafe,
therefore, to count on any troops being ashore before 10.30
p.m., and in no case must your approach be disclosed to the
enemy till 10 p.m., the hour at which the outposts on the
left flank of the Anzac position are to be rushed.
8. No allowance has been made in the tables for the dis-
embarkation of your headquarters, as it is not known at
what period of the operations you will wish them to land.
9. Special attention is directed to paragraph 8 of my letter
G.S.R. Z. 18, dated 22nd July.
APPENDIX III 317
10. The infantry of the 53rd Division will be available as
Army Reserve, and will be at the disposal of the General
Commanding.
11. Special instructions regarding signal communications
will be issued later. In general terms the arrangements will
be as follows :
There is a submarine cable between Imbros and Anzac,
and a cable will be laid as soon as practicable from Imbros
to Suvla Bay. A submarine cable and a land cable will also
be laid between Anzac and Suvla Bay as soon as circumstances
permit, probably before dawn. Pending the completion of
this work inter-communication between Anzac and Suvla
Bay will be carried out by lamp, and, subject to Naval
approval, between Suvla Bay and Imbros by wireless
telegraphy.
1 Two military pack W.T. stations and one R.N. Base
W.T. station will be provided at Suvla Bay, four naval ratings
will be attached to each station as visual signalling personnel.
One of these military pack W.T. stations will be disembarked
with the second brigade to land, and will act as a base station
pending the arrival of the R.N. Base wireless station. The
second military pack W.T. station will be disembarked with
the third brigade to land ; it will be placed on a flank and
used mainly for fire control under the B.G.R.A.
A wagon wireless station at G.H.Q., Imbros, will be in com-
munication with both these pack W.T. stations.
One officer and 23 other ranks, with two pack animals
from the Brigade Signal Section, will be landed with each
Infantry Brigade.
These parties will lay their cable by hand and establish
telephone and vibrator communication from the beach for-
ward. No vehicles will be landed in the first instance, all
necessary stores being man-handled.
Three officers, 74 other ranks, 28 animals and five vehicles
will be landed with Divisional Headquarters.
The advance parties will release the brigade sections from
the beach and be prepared to lay cable lines by hand.
Two cable wagons will be included in the five vehicles,
and should be the first of those vehicles to be disembarked.
All W.T. arrangements are subject to alteration, as they
have not yet been confirmed by the Vice-Admiral.
318
GALLIPOLI DIARY
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322 GALLIPOLI DIARY
As soon as possible after Corps Headquarters go ashore,
the personnel of the Divisional Signal Companies will be
released from work at the beach.
Arrangements will be made subsequently to disembark an
air line detachment and a cable section to provide and pole
local lines.
The remainder of the Corps Headquarters Signal Company
will be kept in readiness to be forwarded as soon as Corps
Headquarters reports that circumstances admit of its dis-
embarkation.
12. Two Military Landing Officers and their assistant
military landing officers will be placed at your disposal from
units other than those under your command.
13. In addition to the units mentioned in Tables A-E
forwarded to you with my letter G.S.R. Z. 18, dated 23rd
July, the following are being dispatched from Alexandria in
this order :
Three Squadrons Armoured Car Division R.N.A.S. (These
will be available to land on the morning after your
disembarkation begins, if you so desire.)
(1) H.Q.R.A. 10th Division.
Two F.A. Brigades 10th Division (modified scale of
horses).
R.A. personnel and ammunition of 10th Divisional Am-
munition Park.
(2) One F.A. Brigade llth Division (modified scale of horses).
One F.A. Brigade 10th Division (modified scale of horses).
(3) Two F.A. Brigades 13th Division.
(4) Horses for llth Division.
and the following will be assembled at Imbros to land when
required :
llth Divisional Cyclist Company (less two Platoons).
10th Divisional Cyclist Company.
13th Divisional Cyclist Company.
14. You are requested to submit your proposed plan of
operations to G.H.Q. for approval at the earliest possible
date.
(Signed) W. P. BRAITHWAITE,
Major-General, C.G.S.,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.
2Vth July, 1915.
APPENDIX III 323
G ' S - R - Z ' 18 / 2 ' July 29ft.
GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING,
STH CORPS.
The General Commanding has decided that his next main
attack shall be made in the vicinity of Anzac with the object
of placing ourselves astride the Peninsula to the north of
Kilid Bahr.
2. The 8th Corps with attached troops is to assist this
main operation by offensive action in the south, the scope
and form of this action being determined solely with reference
to its effects on the main operation.
As the decisive point will be in the neighbourhood of Anzac,
all reinforcements will be utilized in that theatre, and it is
improbable that any will be available for the southern zone
before the middle of August, except such drafts for the 8th
Corps and the Corps Exp. Orient as may reach the Peninsula
in the next ten days.
3. In order to free sufficient troops to enable the 8th Corps
to take the offensive, the French will take over part of the line
as defined in Force Order No. 22.
4. In addition to the troops of the 8th Corps and R.N.D.
at present at your disposal, the following reinforcements may
be expected :
29th Division . . . . 280 due 29th July.
29th Division . . . . 900 due 4th August.
42nd Division . . n; 100 due 29th July.
Total U580
which, allowing for normal wastage, should give an effective
total of 24,780 on 5th August. These numbers, with the
shorter line you will be called upon to hold, should leave you
with sufficient troops to undertake a limited offensive opera-
tion on or about that day.
5. Assuming that you are not attacked in the meanwhile,
the total amount of ammunition which should be available
at Helles early in August for offensive action, and to main-
tain a reserve is :
18 pr 36,000
4.5 inch . . . . 2,000 Plus any amounts saved
5 inch . . . . . . 4,000 from normal daily ex-
6 inch . . . . . . 545 penditure.
60 pr. .. .. .. 3,000,
324 GALLIPOLI DIARY
but it must be borne in mind that no replacements can be
looked for before August 16th.
6. The scope of your offensive action mupt be based upon
these figures, and it is thought that the most suitable objective
will be the capture of the Turkish trenches up to the line
F. 13, G. 13, H. 13, and H. 12. Plans for this operation
should, therefore, be undertaken at once.
7. Pre-supposing that this attack is successful, and that
the numbers at your disposal admit of a further advance,
the capture of the trenches on the line H. 14 to H. 15, followed
perhaps by the capture of Krithia could then be undertaken,
and plans for this action should be prepared beforehand.
But as the launching of this further attack must be entirely
dependent on unknown factors, a definite decision on this
point cannot be arrived at beforehand. It is, moreover,
essential that the plan of your first attack should not definitely
commit your troops to a further advance unless the trend of
events should render such a course desirable.
8. As regards the date for launching your first attack, it
is thought that the most favourable time would be shortly
before the main operations at Anzac begin, and you should
therefore arrange for your first attack to take place on the
4th August.
9. Beyond holding the enemy in front of them to their
positions and assisting you with artillery fire, the French
will not be asked to take part in your first attack, but, in
the event of your reaching Krithia. they will be directed to
conform to your movements and to establish themselves on
the spurs leading up to Achi Baba.
I will ascertain the amount of artillery support and lean
you can expect from the C.E.O., and if the information arrives
in time will attach it as an appendix to this letter.
10. The possibility of the southern force being able to
capture Achi Baba has not been dealt with in this memorandum,
as the attempt should only be made in the event of large
reinforcements being available for the southern zone, and
these must depend on the course of events in the main
theatre.
(Signed) W. P. BRAITHWAITE,
Major-General, C.G.S.,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.
APPENDIX III 325
It will be apparent to you how necessary it is not to allow
any suspicion of the reason for the date mentioned in para-
graph 8 being told to any person other than your Brigadier-
General G.S.
(Intd.) W. P. B.
APPENDIX.
French Artillery Support for 8th Corps.
1. One Brigade of 75's will be placed at the disposal of
the 8th Corps for the attack on 4th-5th August.
Of these
(a) One battery will be moved to support closely the attack
on Krithia.
(6) One battery will fire up the Nullah E. of Krithia.
2. In addition, six French howitzers will be so disposed
as to open fire upon Turkish artillery north of the ridge 150
Achi Baba peak.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR G.O.C. A. AND N.Z. ARMY CORPS.
Reference Map Anafarta Sagir Gallipoli Map 1/20,000.
1. The General Commanding has decided to mass the whole
oi his reinforcements in and immediately north of the area
occupied by the corps under your command, with a view to
securing Suvla Bay as a base of operations, driving the enemy
off the Sari Bair, and eventually securing a position astride
the Gallipoli Peninsula from the neighbourhood of Gaba
Tepe to the straits north of Maidos.
2. The general outline for your proposals for the action
of the A. and N.Z. Army Corps contained in your G a 89 of
1st July are approved.
3. (a) The General Commanding wishes your operations to
begin on August 6th with a strong and sustained attack on
Hill 125 (Plateau 400), every effort being made to deceive
the enemy as to the locality against which our main effort
is to be made, and to induce him to believe that it will be
directed against his lines opposite the southern portion of
your position. In pursuance of this object the Vice- Admiral
has arranged that H.M. ships shall in the meantime display
326 GALLIPOLI DIARY
increased activity off the coast between Gaba Tepe and Kum
Tepe. It has been arranged that soundings shall be taken
by night off the coast south of Gaba Tepe ; and, on the evening
of August 6th, a naval demonstration will be made off this
part of the coast, H.M. ships being accompanied by a number
of trawlers as if a landing were to be undertaken.
(6) The General Commanding further concurs in the sub-
sequent sequence of the operations outlined by you, namely :
(i) The clearing of the enemy's outposts from the ridges
facing Nos. 2 and 3 posts, to be undertaken after
nightfall.
(ii) An attack in as great strength as possible up the Sazli
Beit Dere, the Chailak Dere and the Aghyl Dere,
against the Chunuk Bair ridge, by night.
(iii) When the Chunuk Bair ridge is gained, a converging
attack from that ridge, and from the north-eastern
section of your present position, against Hill 180
(Baby 700).
4. (a) For the above operations the following troops will
be at your disposal :
A. and N.Z. Army Corps.
13th Division, less all artillery except 69th F.A. (Howitzer)
Brigade.
29th Brigade (10th Division).
29th Indian Brigade.
(6) At the date of commencement of the operations the
following troops belonging to or attached to the 9th Army
Corps will be at Anzac, but will not, except so far as is stated
hereunder, be at your disposal :
One F.A. Brigade, llth Division : To rejoin 9th Army
Corps as soon as horses are landed.
10th Heavy Battery, R.G.A. : Ditto.
14th Lowland (Howitzer) Brigade (two Batteries) : Arrange-
ments must be made so that these batteries may be
free to rejoin the 9th Army Corps before nightfall on
August 7th.
5. The operations carried out by the Corps under your
command will form part of a general combined offensive
undertaken by the whole of the forces of the Gallipoli Peninsula
APPENDIX III 327
and by the 9th Army Corps, which will be disembarked in
the neighbourhood of Suvla Bay, beginning on the night of
August 6th-7th.
(a) The 8th Army Corps, in conjunction with the Corps
Expeditionnaire, will attack the Turkish lines south of Krithia
on August 4th and 5th. The attack will be made on a large
scale, and will be vigorously pressed, and it is hoped that
by its means the enemy will be induced to move part of his
central reserves southward into the Cape Helles zone during
the 5th and 6th, so that they may not be available in the
northern zone on the 6th and 7th.
(6) The 9th Army Corps will begin landing in and close
to Suvla Bay during the night of August 6th-7th. Three
infantry brigades, with one field and two mountain batteries,
engineers and medical services, should be ashore before dawn,
and will be closely followed by two more infantry brigades
and additional artillery and engineers.
The G.O.C. 9th Army Corps has been informed :
(i) That his mission is to secure Suvla Bay as a base of
operation for all the forces in the northern zone.
(ii) That the seizure of Yilghin Burnu and Ismail Oglu
Tepe (" W " and Chocolate Hills), on account of
the presence there of artillery which may interfere
with your operations, must be considered as of
very special importance.
(iii) That so far as is possible after the fulfilment of his
primary mission, he is to render you such direct
assistance as may be practicable by moving any
available troops via Biyuk Anafarta up the eastern
slopes of the Sari Bair.
(c) At the commencement of these operations the infantry
of the 53rd Division will be available as Army Reserve and
will be at the disposal of the General Commanding.
6. The Vice-Admiral has agreed provisionally to the follow-
ing allotment of ships affording naval support to the opera-
tions :
In Suvla Bay : One 6-in. monitor.
South of Kuchuk : H.M.S. Endymion.
Kemliki (Nibrunesi Point) : H.M.S. Edgar, H.M.S. Talbot,
one 6-in. monitor, one 9.2-in. monitor.
328 GALLIPOLI DIARY
These ships would be in position at daylight on August 7th,
and would mainly be required to support the operations of
the 9th Army Corps.
West of Gaba Tepe : H.M.S. Baccanto, H.M.S. Humber
H.M.S. Havelock, one 6-in. monitor.
These ships would be in position at 3 p.m. on August 6th,
except H.M.S. Havelock, which would be in position at day-
light on August 7th. They would be detailed for support
of the right flank of the A. and N.Z. Army Corps.
Off Kum Tepe : One 6-in. monitor.
A separate communication is being sent to you with regard
to the final settlement of details as to the support of the
operations by naval guns, allocation of targets, etc.
7. Special instructions regarding signal communication will
be issued later. In general terms the arrangements will be
as follows :
A submarine cable and a land cable will be laid between
Anzac and Suvla Bay as soon as circumstances permit.
A submarine cable will also be laid as soon as practicable
between Imbros and Suvla Bay. Pending the comple-
tion of connection between Anzac and Suvla Bay,
intercommunication will be carried out by lamp.
Two military pack W/T stations and a R.N. Base W/T
station will be established in the vicinity of Suvla
Bay. The W/T station at Anzac will be able to inter-
cept messages from seaplanes, but must not attempt
to reply.
W/T via the ships will be an alternative means of com-
munication between G.H.Q. and the troops ashore in
case of interruption of cable communication.
A system of flares will be arranged for employment on
the left flank of your position at dawn on August 7th
to indicate to the ships the positions reached by the
troops.
8. G.H.Q. will in the first instance be at Imbros.
(Signed) W. P. BEAITHWAUE,
Major-General, C.G.S.,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.
G.H.Q., Wth July, 1915.
APPENDIX III 329
FORCE ORDER No. 25.
GENERAL HEADQUAKTEBS,
2nd August, 1915.
1. The total forces of the enemy in the Gallipoli Peninsula
are estimated at 100,000.
Of these, 27,000 are in the neighbourhood of Anzae (5th,
19th, 16th Divisions, and 18th and 64th Regiments) ; 36,000
are in the Southern zone (1st, 4th, 6th Division less one regi-
ment, 7th Division, llth Division less one regiment, and one
regiment each of the 12th, 25th and 3rd Divisions) ; and
37,000 are in Reserve (9th Division less one regiment, 12th
less one regiment, 13th, 14th, and 25th less one regiment,
and 10th Divisions). Of this reserve force two Divisions
are in the Bulair district and one Division in the Eyerli
Tepe zone. There are 12,000 on the Asiatic shore of the
Dardanelles (2nd Division and 8th Division less one
regiment). There are believed to be five Divisions (45,000
men) in the Keshan area belonging to the 5th and 6th
Corps.
All reports tend to show that though the enemy may be
expected to fight well in trenches, their moral has suffered
considerably a a result of their recent heavy casualties, and
that their stock of ammunition is low.
2. The General Commanding intends to carry out a com-
bined and simultaneous attack on the enemy in the northern
and southern zone commencing on 6th August, in accordance
with the special instructions already issued to the Corps Com-
manders concerned.
During the first phase of these operations the 13th Division
(less three 18-pdr. Bdes. R.F.A.), the 29th Infantry Brigade
will be attached to the A. and N.Z. Army Corps. Three
squadrons R.N. Armoured Car Division and two batteries
Highland Mounted Artillery will be attached to 9th Corps.
86th Brigade R.F.A. and 91st Heavy Battery R.G.A. will
be attached to 8th Corps.
3. Special instructions regarding embarkation and dis-
embarkation are issued to G.O.C. 9th Corps. G.O.C., A. and
N.Z. Corps, and I.G.C., as appended to this order.
330 GALLIPOLI DIARY
4. The 53rd Division will remain at the disposal of the
General Commanding as general reserve.
5. G.H.Q. will remain in the first instance in its present
situation.
(Signed) W. P. BRAITHWAITE,
Major-General, C.G.S.,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.
Issued to : G.O.C. Corps Expeditionnaire ; G.O.C. A.
and N.Z. Army Corps ; G.O.C. 8th Army Corps ;
G.O.C. 9th Army Corps ; G.O.C. 53rd Division ; I.G.C. ;
Vice- Admiral.
APPENDIX TO FORCE ORDER No. 25.
Embarkations.
1. The embarkation of units of the 9th Corps concentrated
at Imbros will be carried out under the orders of G.O.C. 9th
Corps, commencing for personnel on 6th August, for vehicles
and stores at such earlier date as may be convenient. The
necessary ships and boats (lists of which have already been
handed to the G.O.C. Corps) will be assembled in the harbour
beforehand ; and the embarkation programme will be worked
out in consultation with Commander Ashby, R.N., who has
been detailed by the Vice- Admiral for this purpose, and who
will arrange for the various vessels to be in their allotted
positions at the hours arranged.
G.O.C. 9th Corps will also be responsible for the allocation
to ships or lighters, and for the embarkation of the following
units :
At Imbros: One W.T. Section (Nos. W. 10 and W. 11
Pack Wireless Stations) ; Two Anson Battalions R.N.D.
(for duties on the beach) ; No. 16 Casualty Clearing
Station.
In transit from Mudros to Imbros : One Casualty Clearing
Station.
Units and formations concentrated at Mudros and Mitylene
will be embarked for their various destinations under the
orders of I.G.C. in accordance with the programme already
issued to that officer.
APPENDIX III
331
Military Transport Officers.
2. G.O.C. 9th Corps and I.G.C. respectively will ensure
that an officer is appointed Military Transport Officer on every
ship for the embarkation of which they are severally respon-
sible (vide paragraph 1).
Landing Places.
3. The landings of the 9th Corps will be referred to as " A,"
" B," and " C " Beaches.
" A " Beach Square 117.q. and v.
" C " Beach Square lOS.u.z.
" B " Beach Square 91.b, i, o.
" C " and " B " Beaches are practically contiguous.
Beach Control Personnel.
4. The following naval and military beach control per-
sonnel have been appointed for the landing places of the
9th Corps :
Principal Beach Master: Captain H. F. G. Talbot, E.N.
Beach Masters : Commander I. W. Gibson, M.V.O. (" A "
Beach), Captain C. P. Metcalfe, R.N. (" B " Beach),
Commander C. Tindal-Carril-Worsley (" C " Beach).
Assistant Beach Masters and Beach Lieutenants : Four
Lieutenant Commanders, ten Lieutenants, B.N.
Principal Mil. L.O. : Colonel W. G. B. Western, C.B.
Mil. L.O.'s : Major F. W. Pencock, Derbyshire Yeomanry,
Major Sir R. Baker, Dorset Yeomanry, Captain Tylsen
Wright, A.S.C.
Assistant Mil. L.O.'s : Captain Wade Palmer, Derbyshire
Yeomanry, Captain B. A. Smith, South Notts Hussars,
Lieutenant H. V. Browne, Dorset Yeomanry, Lieutenant
Krabbe, Berks Yeomanry.
The allocation of the above military officers to the various
landing places will be detailed by the P.M.L.O. in consultation
with the P.B.M.
Special instructions with regard to beach fatigue parties
have already been issued to the G.O.C. 9th Corps.
332 GALLIPCLI DIARY
G.O.C., A. and N.Z. Army Corps will detail such military
landing officers, assistant military landing officers, and beach
parties for A.N.Z.A.C. as he may consider necessary. The
names of officers so appointed will be reported as early as
possible to V.A. and to G.H.Q.
The following special service officers are attached to H.Q.,
A. and N.Z. Army Corps, for such duties in connection with
the landing as the G.O.C. may direct :
Major P. R. Bruce, S. Notts Hussars.
Captain C. R. Higgens, County of London Yeomanry.
Captain Sir E. Pauncefort Buncombe, Royal Bucks Hussars.
General Instructions for Landing.
5. All troops will land with two iron rations (one day's
meat only in case of troops disembarking at Anzac). Infantry
will carry 200 rounds of S.A.A., machine-gun sections 3,500
rounds. Packs will not be worn. A proportion of heavy
entrenching tools, signalling and medical gear will be carried
by hand. Camp kettles will be handed to the Ordnance
Officer of the camp at which units concentrate before embarka-
tion. They will be forwarded and reissued at the first oppor-
tunity.
6. Horses will be landed harnessed, and with nosebags
filled to their full capacity.
Poles of G.S. wagons will be removed before slinging and
made fast to the body of the wagon. Poles of carts, limbers,
and limbered wagons will not be removed ; these vehicles
should be so placed in the boats that they can be landed pole
leading.
Ammunition.
7. The G.O.C. 9th Corps will depute an officer to arrange,
in consultation with the P.M.L.O., for the storing of reserve
ammunition in convenient localities near the beach. Guards
for these stores may be found from the beach fatigue parties.
Water.
8. The strictest economy must be exercised with regard
to drinking water. Under arrangements already made by
G.H.Q., receptacles filled with water will be landed as early
as possible from the ships carrying the mule corps, and will
APPENDIX III 333
be conreyed to the troops as transport becomes available.
Waterproof tanks (2,300 gallon capacity) and lift and force
pumps will be available on the Prah R.E. Storeship
in Kephalos Harbour, and will be forwarded by D.Q.M.G.,
G.H.Q., on request of G.O.C. Corps.
Transport.
9. Transport to supplement that in possession of units
will be provided for the 9th Corps and the A.N.Z. Corps by
the Indian Mule Corps. The amount of transport for each
formation has been calculated to carry rations, water, and
S.A.A., making one or two trips a day, according to the anti-
cipated distance of the various units from the beach.
This transport will be handed over, as it is landed, by an
officer appointed by the D.S.T., to transport officers of Brigades
and divisional troops for allotment as circumstances may
require.
Senior transport officers of Divisions will be ordered to
report to the following representatives of the D.S.T. immediately
on landing :
At Anzac : Lieutenant-Colonel Streidinger, A.D.T.
At " A " Beach : Major Badcock, D.A.D.T.
Supplies.
10. A supply dep6t has been formed at Anzac, and it is
in charge of Major Izod, A.S.C. A supply dep6t will be
formed by D.S.T. at " A " Beach as soon as supplies can be
landed, and will be in charge of Major Huskisson, A.S.C.
Senior supply officers of Divisions will be ordered to place
themselves in communication with the officer in charge of
the nearest supply depot and to keep him informed of their
daily requirements. Supplies will, so far as possible, be handed
over to them in bulk at the dep6t. Owing to the difficulty
in landing sufficient animals in the first instance it is possible
that only half rations may be available on the third and
fourth days after the operations begin. All units should be
specially ordered to husband their rations.
Medical.
11. Arrangements have been made to establish on the
beach at Anzac two casualty clearing stations, which will
334 GALLIPOLI DIARY
be embarked by I.G.C., and two at " A " Beach, which will
be embarked under orders of G.O.C. 9th Corps (see paragraph
1). Medical officers will be appointed by G.H.Q. to control
these units, and to take charge of the arrangements for evacua-
tion of the wounded from the beach.
(Signed) C. F. ASPINALL,
Lieutenant-Colonel,
For Major-General, C.G.S.,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.
APPENDIX IV
INSTRUCTIONS TO MAJOR-GENERAL H. DE LISLE,
C.B., D.S.O.
1. The operations of the northern wing of the Army have
only been partially successful.
(a) The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps,
with the 13th Division and the 29th Brigade of 10th
Division attached, has greatly extended the area occupied,
and now holds a position under the Chunuk Bair Ridge,
which the G.O.C. considers a favourable one from which
to launch the final attack on the ridge. The necessity
for reorganization after the recent operations, and for
establishing a satisfactory system of forwarding water,
ammunition and supplies, will involve a delay of some
days before the attack on the main ridge can be made.
(6) The 9th Army Corps, less the 13th Division and
29th Brigade, but with the 53rd and 54th Divisions
attached, holds the Yilghin Burnu hills, and a line north-
wards from the easternmost of these two hills roughly
straight across the Kuchuk Anafarta Ova to the highest
point of the Kiretch Tepe Sirt. Attacks by the llth
Division against the Ismail Oglu Tepe and the Anafarta
spur from the north-west have been made without any
success. In the course of the operations the 9th Corps
became very much disorganized, and since August llth
the work of reorganization and consolidation has been
proceeding.
2. At present the enemy has shown no great strength
north of an east and west line through Anafarta Sagir. He
has a force operating on and near the Kiretch Tepe Sirt, the
strength of which cannot yet be accurately estimated. From
present indications this appears to be a detachment which
is known to have guarded the coast from Ejelmer Bay to
336 GALLIPOLI DIARY
Suvla Bay ; it does not appear to have been reinforced to
any extent. Across the Kuchuk Anafarta Ova there appear
to be no more than snipers. In the region Anafarta Sagir-
Ismail Oglu Tepe and the Biyuk Anafarta Valley the enemy
has developed considerable strength his intention being, no
doubt, to protect the right of his main force which opposes
the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, and to prevent
our advance on the Anafarta gap.
3. The General Commanding has decided to strike as quickly
and in as great strength as possible against the enemy's on
the line Ismail Oglu Tepe-Anafarta Sagir with the objects,
first, of driving in this flank and preparing a further envelop-
ing advance ; and, secondly, by clearing the Anafarta spur
to deny to the enemy the gun positions and facilities for
observation therefrom, which would otherwise endanger
Suvla Bay. He considers it imperative to effect this with
the least possible delay. In his view the left flank of this
advance will require comparatively little protection, at all
events in the first instance, in view of the difficulty which
the enemy may be expected to find in throwing any con-
siderable force round our left over the high and difficult country
north of Anafarta Sagir. It appears that the double purpose
of defeating the enemy and securing Suvla Bay as a port
for the northern wing of the Army can best be served by
an attack on the enemy's right on the Anafarta spur, made
with all the strength at our command, while leaving a com-
paratively small force as left flank guard to clear the enemy's
snipers out of the Kuchuk Anafarta Ova and to occupy and
press back his detachment in the Ejelmer Bay region.
4. You will have at your disposal the following troops :
llth Division,
10th Division (less 29th Brigade),
53rd Division,
64th Division,
and there is on its way from Egypt to join you the 2nd Mounted
Division (5,000 men dismounted), which should be available
by August 18th. The 10th, llth and 53rd Divisions are
considerably depleted, and the moral of the latter at present
leaves much to be desired. There are at present ashore,
belonging to the above two F.A. Brigades (three batteries
of which are awaiting horses to bring them up from Anzac) and
APPENDIX IV 337
two Heavy Batteries. In addition, two Highland Mountain
Batteries, attached to the 9th Corps, are ashore, and the
l/4th Lowland Brigade (two batteries 5-inch howitzers) are
at your disposal when they can be brought up from Anzac.
It has only been possible to land a bare minimum of horses
owing to difficulties in respect of water and the landing of
forage.
Three further F.A. Brigades and the 57th Brigade (two
batteries) 4.5-inch howitzers are at Mudros ready to be brought
up as soon as it is possible to land them. These Brigades
will probably have to be landed without any horses in the
first instance, and taken into position by the artillery horses
already ashore.
5. For the purpose of an early attack in accordance with
the plan indicated in paragraph 3, the A. and N.Z. Army
Corps will probably not be able to co-operate directly with
more than one Infantry Brigade, and it is possible that it may
be able to do no more than swing up its left into line with
the right of your advance. It is improbable that the 8th
Corps and the C.E.O. will be in a position to do more than
undertake vigorous demonstrations.
6. With the above in view, you will proceed at once to
Suvla Bay and take over command of the 9th Corps. Your
immediate and most urgent concern will be to complete the
reorganization of the Corps and to prepare as large a force
as possible for the offensive against Ismail Oglu Tepe and
the Anaf arta spur, bearing in mind that time is of vital impor-
tance. You will then consider and report at the earliest
moment :
(a) What force you consider that you will be able to
employ for this purpose.
(6) The date on which you will be ready to undertake
the offensive.
(c) The method by which you purpose to carry out
your task.
(Signed) W. P. BRAITHWAITE,
Major -General, Chief of the General Staff,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.
VOL. ii. 23
INDEX
" A " BEACH, II. 69, 75, 146.
Abdel Rahman Bair, II. 115.
Abrikja, II. 87.
Achi Baba, I. 272, 362 ; II. 194.
Adderley, Lieut., II. 5.
Adrianople, I. 10.
Aeroplanes, I. 110.
Agnew, Col. Quentin, II. 160.
Air Service, I. 8, 287, 384.
Aitkin, Capt., II. 30.
Aja Liman, II. 112, 148, 152.
Aja Liman Anafarta Ridge, II.
83, 84
Akbashi Liman, I. 291 ; II. 193.
H.M.T. Alaudia, II. 44.
Alexandretta, I. 9.
Allanson, Col., II. 214.
Altham, GenL, II. 6, 32, 123, 167,
172, 186, 261, 270.
Ambulance
87th Field, II. 172.
110th Indian Field, II. 167.
3rd R.N.D. Field, I. 317.
West Lanes. Field, II. 231.
Amery, Col., I. 342.
Ammunition, I. 62, 196, 286, 289,
308; II 9. 10, 11, 13,35,41,
140
Anafarta, II. 148
Anafarta Ova, II. 93
Anafarta Sagir, II. 68, 69, 70, 81,
89, 112.
Anatolia, II. 191
H.M.T. Andania, II. 44.
Anderson, Maj., II. 255
Andrews, Col., II. 18.
Anglesey, Lord, II. 196, 200.
Anson Bn., I. 73, 271, 274, 333.
Anstey, Capt., II. 58.
Anzac Cove, II. 111.
S.S. Arabian, I. 316.
H.M.S. Arcadian, I. 84, 185, 248.
Ari Burnu, II. 246.
Armistice, I. 248, 387.
Armoured Car Section, I, 106 ;
II. 188.
H.M.S. Arno, II. 57, 58, 98, 146,
158, 159, 165, 166, 246.
Artillery, I. 48, 307, 374 ; II. 35.
Australian, I. 117.
See also Appendices I. and II.
Ashmead-Bartlett, Mr., I. 106,
253, 334; II. 8, 165, 190,
204, 226.
H.I.M.S. Askold, I. 106, 135.
Aspinall, Lt.-CoL, I. 152, 169,
383 ; II. 4, 17, 25, 26, 61,
64, 126, 130, 243.
Asquith, Rt. Hon. H. H., I. 54,
247 ; II. 227, 259, 260, 261,
262, 274.
Asquith, Lieut. Arthur, I. 20, 71.
Australian F.A., 3rd Battery, II.
254
Australian Light Horse, I. 285,
359.
Australians
9th Bn., I. 49.
12th Bn., II. 234.
15th Bn., I. 216.
16th Bn., I. 216.
20th Bn., II. 254, 255.
26th Bn., II. 234.
Ayres, Col., II. 246.
BABTIE, GenL, I. 367,
Baby 700, II. 111.
H.M.S. Bacchante, I. 154.
Backhouse, Commodore, I. 333.
Bailey, Col., II. 244.
Bailloud, GenL, I. 192, 207, 243,
371, 379; II. 25, 27, 146,
158, 179, 213, 218, 219, 225,
226, 228, 229, 230, 234
339
340
GALLIPOLI DIARY
Baldwin, Goal., I. 386; II. 80, 81.
Balkans
C.-in-C. J s views on, I. 115.
Bard, see Tullibardine.
Barttelot, Sir W., II. 219.
H.M.S. Basilisk, I. 328, 370, 372.
Battle-
Rum Kale, I. 135, 150.
Landing, I. 126.
Naval, I. 30.
Quinn's Post, I. 255.
Sedd-el-Bahr, I. 131.
" V Beach, I. 135.
" W " Beach, I. 130.
"X J3 Beach, I. 130.
" Y Beach, I. 129 et seq.
Yeni Shahr, I. 151.
6th-9th May, I. 206.
4th June, I. 270 et seq.
28th June, I. 344 et seq.
12th July, II. 6 et seq.
21st August, II. 127 et seq.
Bayley, Maj., II. 231. (Should
read " Baylay.")
Beadon, Lt.-CoL, II. 120, 130.
Beetleheim, Capt., I. 273.
Bell, Maj. Morrison, II. 244.
Benbow Bn., I. 333.
Beresford, GenL, I. 242.
Berks Regt., II. 230.
Bertier, Maj., I. 119, 379 ; II. 25,
40, 220, 233, 275.
Beryl, II. 32.
Besika Bay, I. 9.
Birmingham, I 326
Bishop, Maj., I. 320.
Biyuk Anafarta, II. 112, 157.
Blockhouses, II. 93.
Bluff Redoubt, I. 226.
Boers, II. 161, 162.
Bombs, I. 43, 258, 321, 383;
II. 140.
Bonham-Carter, Mr., II. 98.
Bonsor, Maj., I. 370.
Boomerang Redoubt, I. 344, 352.
Border Regt., I. 352 ; II. 230.
Bouvet, I. 36.
Bowlby, Flag-Lt., II. 8, 169.
Boyle, R.N., Capt., I. 38.
Boyle, R.N., Lt.-Comr., I. 234,
240.
Braithwaite, Capt.V., II. 120, 130,
146, 158, 159, 165, 186, 246.
Brassey, II. 110.
Brassey, Lady, II. 105, 168.
Brassey, Lord, II. 105.
Bridges, GenL, I. 118, 179, 229,
256.
Brigade
1st (Australian), II. 55.
2nd (French), II. 225.
2nd (Naval), I. 333.
3rd (Australian), I. 336.
3rd (Marine), I. 303.
4th (Australian), I. 249, 256.
5th (Australian), II. 254.
30th, II. 44.
32nd, II. 22, 29, 60
33rd, II. 22, 46, 60.
34th, II. 22, 28, 61.
39th, II. 18.
86th, I. 82, 220, 302, 345, 352
II. 171, 172.
87th, I. 82, 209, 210, 224, 301,
345, 352 ; II. 230.
88th, 1. 170, 209, 210, 293,353;
II. 166, 241.
127th, I. 317.
155th, I. 303.
156th, I. 303, 346, 352, 371 ;
II. 9, 243.
Indian, I. 301 ; II. 15, 127,
130, 208.
Light Horse, I. 336.
Manchester, I. 272, 273.
Younghusband's, II. 147, 150,
151, 153, 154.
Brodrick, Capt. Hon. G., I. 357 ;
II. 24, 52, 68, 72, 74, 76, 78,
125, 130, 146, 154.
Brody, Capt., II. 68.
Brooke, Sir B., II. 138.
Brooke, Rupert, I. 71, 122, 124.
Brown, Percy, I. 371.
Browne, Maj., I. 336.
Bruce, Col., I. 74, 359, 301, 361.
Bruce, Maj., I. 74.
Brulard, Genl., II. 225, 228, 229,
234, 256, 276.
Bryant, Lt.-Col., I. 323.
Buchanan, Col., II. 186.
Buchanan, Sir G., II. 207, 208.
Bulair Lines, I. 9, 29, 130, 275,
290, 291, 292, 361.
Bulgaria, I 116; II. 192, 202,
204, 209.
INDEX
341
Bulgarians, II. 212.
Burleigh, Bennett, I. 339.
Burmeister, Flag-Capt., I. 71.
Burn, Col. C., I. 121 ; II. 8, 15,
251, 255.
Burrell, Lieut., I. 370.
Burrows, Capt., II. 247.
Burton, Col., II. 18, 242.
Bush-fires, II. 131.
Byng, Genl., I. 303 ; II. 35, 105,
106, 137, 138, 139, 146, 151,
159, 160, 165, 186, 206, 218,
219, 241, 242, 276.
" C BEACH, II. 75.
Cadorna, Genl., II. 178.
Callwell, Genl., I. 6, 241 ; II.
172 et seq., 257, 259, 261, 263.
Camel Corps, Bikaner, I. 74.
Cameron, R.N., Capt., I. 8, 31.
Campbell, Col., I. 74.
H.M.T. Canada, II. 44.
H.M.S. Canopus, II. 44.
Canteen, II. 123, 170.
Garden, Admiral, I. 17, 19,
Carruthers, Genl., I. 142.
Carter, Capt., I. 280.
Carthage, I. 371.
Casualty Clearing Station, 25th,
II. 14.
Cayley, Genl., II. 18, 241.
Censorship, I. 320, 327, 332 ; II.
140, 172 et seq,, 257.
H.M.T. Ceramic, II. 156.
Chanak, I. 291, 292, 293 ; II. 192.
Charak Cheshme, II. 74.
H.M.S. Chatham, II. 43, 45, 60,
275, 277.
Chauvel, Genl., I. 285, 359.
Cheape, Capt., II. 203, 204.
H.M.S. Chelmer, II. 262.
Cheshire Point, II 201.
Chocolate Hill, II. 214
Christian, Admiral, II. 60.
Chunuk Bair, I. 330, 361 ; II.
57, 86, 111, 113.
Churchill, Rt. Hon. W., I. 44, 161,
240, 242, 247 ; II. 24.
Churchill, Maj. J., I. 153, 178 ;
II. 155.
Church Parade, I. 370'; II. 20,
29, 157, 234.
Clarke, Lt.-Comr., f :I. 335.
Clifton-Browne, Genl., II. 247*
Coddan, Capt., I. 121.
oleridge, II. 52.
ollet, Capt., II. 123, 126.
Oollingwood Bn., I. 333.
Collins, Lt.-Col., I. 317.
H.M.S. Colne, I. 112, 178, 180,
343.
Conference
17th March, I. 21.
22nd March, I. 41.
18th April, I. 118.
Midnight, 25th April, I. 142.
Connaught Rangers, II. 155.
Constantinople, I. 10.
Convalescent Depdt, II. 168.
H.M.S. Cornwall, II. 221.
H.M.S. Cornwallis, I. 134, 138
II. 221, 242.
Cowans, Genl., I. 365, 366.
Cox, Genl., I. 73, 174, 186 ; II:
15, 132, 139, 155, 190.
D'AMADE, Genl., I. 3, 21, 64, 78,
118, 222, 223, 226.
Damakjelik Bair, II. 113, 127,
128.
Danube, I. 11 ; II. 202.
H.M.S. Dartmouth, I. 106.
Davidson, R.N., Capt., II. 242,
258.
Davies, R.N.A.S. Capt., I. 109.
Davies, Genl., II. 33, 51, 139, 140,
144, 160, 196, 243, 246, 248,
251, 276.
Dawnay, Capt., I. 152, 178, 343 ;
II. 120, 126, 133, 165, 189,
251, 262.
De Bourbon, Capt., II. 256.
De Crespigny, Capt., II. 243.
Deedes, Capt., I. 344; II. 120,
126, 158, 186, 243.
De la Borde, Lieut., I. 119 ; II.
40, 196, 220.
De la Fontaine, Capt., I. 185.
De Lisle, Genl., I. 274, 280, 293,
356; 11.17,18, 25, 106,119,
121, 129, 130, 132, 159 etseq.,
241.
De Lothbiniere, Genl., I. 259,
357.
Dent, R.N., Capt., I. 118, 122.
De Putron, Maj., II 196, 262.
342
GALLIPOLI DIARY
De Robeck, Admiral, I. 21, 41,
48, 142, 383; II. 60, 124,
275, 276.
De Rougemont, Col., II. 246.
Des Coigns, Col., I. 183, 185.
De Tott's Battery, I. 134; II.
26, 27.
Devon Regt., 2/5th, II. 156, 157,
160.
Dick, Col., I. 105, 385.
Diggle, Capt., II. 51.
Division
1st (Australian), II. 217.
1st (French), I. 323, 324.
2nd (Australian), II. 167
2nd (French), I. 323, 324.
2nd (Mounted), II. 37.
10th, I. 306, 328 ; II. 97, 127,
159, 217, 224, 227, 233.
llth, I. 328 ; II. 49, 52, 60, 83,
127, 129, 131, 132, 159, 188.
llth (Turkish), I. 373.
13th, I. 328, 386 ; II. 18, 57,
83, 91, 107.
16th (Irish), II. 159.
42nd, I. 386 ; II. 40.
52nd, I. 386 ; II. 158, 243.
53rd, II. 90, 128, 217, 225, 226.
54th (Essex), II. 81, 90, 92, 100,
128, 208.
East Lanes., I. 58, 314 ; II. 57,
196.
Irish, II. 31, 41, 60.
Lowland, I. 355 ; II. 6.
Mounted, II. 217.
Naval, I. 272, 303, 318, 377 ;
II. 8, 25, 40, 158.
Welsh, II. 101.
Djavad Pasha, I. 20.
Dod, Col. Wolley, I. 302.
Doran, Genl., I. 280, 282.
H.M.S. Doris, I. 68.
Dorling, Col., II. 219.
Dorset Regt., 5th, II. 28.
Doughtie, R.N., Capt., II. 21.
Douglas, Genl., I. 282, 337, 382 ;
II. 25, 247.
Downing, Col., II. 44.
Drafts, I. 368 ; II. 16, 35, 42, 46,
126, 132, 139, 223
Drake Bn., I. 73.
Drury-Lowe, R.N., Capt., II. 43,
277.
H.M.S. Dublin, I. 109, 146.
Dublin Fusiliers, I. 157, 224 ; II.
172.
Dudley, Lord, II. 167.
Duff, Genl. Beauchamp, II.
198.
Duncan, Major, II. 28.
Duncannon, Lord, II. 262.
H.M.S. E 11,1. 282, 284.
H.M.S. E 14, 1. 234, 240.
East Lanes. Regt., 6th, II. 18.
East Kent Yeomanry, II. 247.
East Yorks, 6th, II. 67.
Edinburgh, Lord Provost of, II.
155.
Edwards, Maj., II. 247.
Edwards, Comr., II. 256.
Edwards, Lieut., I. 370.
Egerton, Genl., I. 371 ; II. 160.
Egyptian Gazette, I. 77.
Ehren-Keui, II. 192.
Ejelmer Bay, II. 72.
Elliot, Genl., I. 353.
Elliot, Lieut., I. 336.
Ellison, Genl., I. 7, 280, 366;
II. 6, 32, 126, 165, 236, 243,
256, 275.
Engineers, I. 43, 48.
Enos, I. 275 ; II. 194.
Enver Pasha, I. 12, 363 ; II. 212
258.
Erskine, Genl., I. 303.
Eski Lines, II. 25.
Essex Regt., I. 136, 220.
H.M.S. Europa, II. 168.
H.M.S. Euryalus, I. 133.
Ewart, Genl., I. 306.
H.M.S. Exmouth, II. 58.
Ezine, II. 192.
FAIRFAX, Comr., II. 247.
Fallowfield, R.N., Lieut., I. 328,
370.
Fanshawe, Genl., II. 106, 138,
159, 160, 161, 188.
Faukard, Genl., II, 256.
Ferdinand, Tzar, II. 204, 205,
207, 208, 212, 213.
Fife and Forfar Yeomanry, II.
244.
Fisher, Lord, I. 44, 240, 247.
Fitz, see FitzGerald.
INDEX
343
FitzGerald, Col., I. 320, 321 ; II.
251.
Fitzgerald, Maj., II. 254.
Fitzmaurice, R.N., Capt., I. 112.
Fitzmaurice, Mr., I. 114.
Forde, Col., II. 168.
H.M.S. Foresight, I. 16
Forster, Col., II. 167.
Forts, I. 6.
Foumet, Admiral, II. 188.
H.M.S. Franconia, I. 36.
Fraser, Col., II. 172.
Freddie, see Maitland.
French, Sir John, I. 269, 289, 305,
306, 311, 374.
French Corps, I. 78.
French Mission, I. 119.
Freyberg, Lieut., II. 247.
Fuller, Lieut.-Col., I. 178; II.
15.
GAMBLE, Sir D., II. 32, 33.
Gascoigne, Lieut. -Col., II. 39,
214, 233, 243.
Gascon, I. 228.
Gaidois, I. 35, 36, 169, 170.
Geddes, Maj., II. 172.
Gellibrand, Lieut., II. 234.
George, Rt. Hon. Lloyd, II. 260,
274.
Ghazi Baba, II 72, 77.
Gillivan, Col , II. 18.
Girdwood, Capt., I. 372.
Girodon, Genl., I. 234, 244, 260,
325, 379 ; II 46, 234.
Glyn, Capt., II. 15, 108, 165.
Godfrey, Maj., I. 152, 326.
Godley, Genl., I. 118, 179, 309,
331, 386; II. 80, 82, 208,
245, 258, 262.
Goeben, I. 162.
H.M.S Goliath, I. 146, 152, 156,
224.
Gouraud, Genl , I. 226, 244, 260,
270, 281, 288, 295 et seq.,
304, 305, 333, 346, 355,
359, 385 ; II. 203, 253.
Graives, Mr., I. 385.
H.M.S. Grampus, I. 293.
Grand Duke Nicholas, I. 230 ; II.
158.
Grant, R.N., Capt., II. 44.
Greece, I. 116; II. 203.
Greeks, II. 201.
Green Hill, II. 214.
Greer, Lieut.-Col., II. 44.
Guepratte, Admiral, I. 21, 101,
118, 157.
Guest, Capt. (?), II. 275.
Guildford Castle, I. 217.
Guilford, Col. Lord, II. 247.
Gully Ravine, I. 376.
Gurkhas, Bde. of, I. 43, 55, 56,
59, 75, 83, 193, 225, 226, 352,
359, 361, 362, 364 ; II. 94.
Gurkhas
4th Bn., II. 167.
5th Bn., II. 15.
6th Bn., I. 74, 76; II. 15, 81,
214.
10th Bn., II. 15.
Guyon, Maj., II. 172.
H. 12, I. 355, 372 ; II. 9.
Haig, Sir Douglas, I. 306 ; II.
185.
Haldane, Lord, I. 240, 289.
Hamilton, Genl. Bruce, II. 26,
32, 36, 101.
Hamilton, Col. Cole, II. 18.
Hamilton, Lieut. Rowan, II. 243,
Hammersley, Genl., I. 328 ; II.
28, 52, 59, 64 et seq., 72, 87,
103, 104, 120, 161.
Hampshire Regt,, I. 155, 157,
220.
8th Bn., II. 101.
Hand grenades, I. 43, 48, 356 ;
II. 156, 157.
Hankey, Col , II. 24, 37, 98, 108,
123.
Harding, Col., I. 74.
Hardy, Lieut. -Comr., II. 169.
Hare, Mr., I. 338.
Haricot Redoubt, I. 244, 271,
272, 324.
Hawke Bn., II. 247, 248.
Heliopolis, I. 61.
Herbert, Aubrey, I. 239, 243.
Herts Yeomanry, I. 58.
Heseltine, Capt., II. 204,
Hetman Chair, II. 128, 129.
Hill, Genl., II. 44, 107, 110.
Hill 10, II. 61, 62, 64, 69, 146.
Hill 60, II. 127, 155, 157, 158.
Hill 70, II. 88, 127, 128, 129, 131.
344
GALLIPOLI DIARY
Hill 305, 1. 330 ; 11-89,111.
Hillyard, Maj., II. 18.
Hindlip, Lord, I. 166.
Hogg, Capt., I. 74.
Holdich, Lt.-Col., II. 165.
Holmes, Col , II. 254.
Homer, Lt.-Comr., II. 17.
Hood, Maj., II. 186.
Hood Bn., I. 206, 274, 333 ; II.
247.
Hope, R.N., Capt., I. 26, 116
Home, GenL, II. 105
Horse Shoe, II. 243.
Hospital Ships, II. 24.
Hospital
No. 1 Stationary, I. 323 ; II.
168.
No. 1 (Australian) Stationary,
II. 167.
No. 2 Stationary, I. 322.
No. 2 (Australian) Stationary,
II. 168.
No. 3 (Canadian) Stationary,
II. 168.
No. 3 (Australian) Stationary,
II. 168.
No. 15 Stationary, I. 322 ; II.
167.
No. 16 Stationary, I. 322.
No. 18 Stationary, II. 168.
No. 24 (British-Indian), II.
167.
Howe Bn., I. 71, 73, 274, 333 ;
II. 234.
Howitzers, I. 48. See also Ap-
pendices I and II.
Hunloke, Maj., II. 243.
Hunter-Weston, GenL, I. 3, 61,
62, 89, 118, 260, 280, 288,
346 ; II. 22, 26.
Imogene, II 91, 123, 139, 205,
251.
H.M.S. Implacable, I. 52.
Indian troops, II. 161.
H.M.S. Inflexible, I. 33.
Inglefield, Genl., II. 81, 90, 94,
97, 208.
Inniskilling Fusiliers, I. 224, 361.
Irish Pioneer Regt., II. 74.
H.M.S. Irresistible, I. 35, 36,
61.
Ishiklar, II. 192.
Ismail Oglu Tepe, II. 63, 70, 81,
89, 112, 127, 129, 131.
Istomine, Genl., I. 70, 108, 186 ;
II. 158.
Italy, II 140.
Ivanoff, Capt., I. 106.
J. 13, 1. 362.
Jackson, Capt., II 18.
Jeanne d l Arc, I. 135.
Joffre, Genl., I 269, 289, 305,
374 ; II. 179, 180, 190, 213.
Johnson, R.N., Lieut. Ormsby,
I. 326 ; II. 32.
Jones, Col., I. 322.
H.M.S. Jonquil, II. 61
Jordon, Col., II. 18.
Junia, I. 196.
KABAK KUYTT, II. 130.
Kahn, Capt., I. 184.
Kaiajik Aghala, II. 129, 130, 139,
155, 210.
Kaiajik Dere, II. 158.
Kantara, I. 73.
Karabingha, I. 292.
Karakol Dagh, II. 126, 129, 159.
Kama Bili, II. 148.
Kavak Tepe Sirt, II. 81, 82, 90.
Kavanagh, GenL, II. 105.
Kelly, R.N., Capt., I. 109.
Kelly, Comr., II. 247.
H.M.S. Kennett, I. 176.
Kephalos Camp, I. 317 ; II. 21,
126, 196, 209, 276.
KerevesDere, 1. 324, 362 ; II. 256,
Kereves Dere Ravine, I. 211.
Keshan, II. 112, 194.
Keyes, Commodore, I. 21, 48, 56,
142, 253; II. 60, 64, 79,
275, 276.
Keyes, Sir C., I. 56.
Keyes, Lady, I. 56.
Keyes, Lt.-Comr., I. 254, 270
Kiggell, GenL, II. 235, 236.
Kilia Liman, I. 291.
Kilid Bahr, I. 330, 362 ; II. 193.
King, Col., II. 31.
King, Comr., II. 247.
King, GenL, II. 248.
King, Maj., II. 254.
King's Own Scottish Borderers,
I. 129 ; II. 230.
INDEX
345
Kiretch Tepe Sirt, II. 61, 69, 72,
75, 77, 81, 128.
Koja Chemen Tepe, II. 57.
Krithia, I. 330, 362.
KumKale,!. 135,150,159; II. 192.
Kurt Ketchede, II. 113.
LALA BABA, II. 61, 64.
Lancashire Division, I. 198.
Lancashire Fusiliers, I. 136, 220,
352 ; II. 172.
Lancashire Fusiliers
1st Bn., I. 320.
5th Bn., I. 272.
9th Bn., II. 28.
Lancashire Fusilier Brigade, I.
207.
Lancashire Landing, I. 371, 376;
II. 246.
Lapruin, Capt., II. 144.
Laverton, Lieut., I. 371.
Law, Rt. Hon. Bonar, II. 274.
Law, Capt., I. 372.
Lawes, Capt., II. 196.
Lawrence, Genl., I. 382 ; II. 27,
243.
Lawson, Sir H., II. 204, 226.
H.M.S. Lefroy, II. 256, 257.
Legge, Genl., II. 15, 20, 167, 254,
266.
Lemnos, I. 26.
H.M.S. Lewis, II. 254.
Liman von Sanders, Genl., I. 95,
246, 357, 358.
Lindley, Genl., II. 85, 87, 103,
122, 167, 168.
Lines of Communication, I. 354,
365, 380 ; II. 264.
Lister, Hon. C., II. 29.
Lloyd, Capt., II. 20, 160, 162.
H.M.S. London, I. 154.
London Regt., 2/lst Coy., II. 242.
10th Bn., II. 101.
llth Bn., II. 101.
Lone Pine, II. 55, 57, 111, 271.
Long, Capt., I. 279.
H.M.S. Lord Nelson, I. 228,248.
Loring, R.N., Capt., I. 119.
Lovat, Lord, II. 244.
Lovat ? s Scouts
1st Bn., II. 244.
2nd Bn., II. 244.
Lowland Division, I. 219.
Lowther, Lancelot, II. 171.
Lucas, Maj., II. 230.
MACKENZIE, Lieut.-Col., II. 14.
Mackenzie, Compton, I. 234 ; II.
45.
Maclagan, Col., I. 336.
Maclean, Maj., I. 371.
Maher, Col., I. 322.
Mahon, Genl., I. 285, 289, 306,
328 ; II. 31, 61, 69 et seq.,
100 et seq., 159, 161, 165,
169.
Maidos, I. 291, 330.
Maitland, Capt. F., I. 323, 336,
383 ; II. 17, 32, 55, 92, 126,
130, 146, 158, 159, 166, 167,
170, 172, 186, 189, 196, 214,
243, 254, 256, 276.
H.M.S. Majestic, I. 154, 252.
Makalinsky, I. 121.
Malcolm, Col., II. 28, 52, 65 et
seq., 159.
Mai Tepe, I. 130.
Manchester Bde., I. 207.
Manchester Regt.
6th Bn., II. 25.
7th Bn., II. 25.
llth Bn., II. 28.
Manifold, Col., II. 159.
Manitou, I. 116.
Maoris, I. 234 ; II. 94.
Marmora, II. 193, 205.
Marshall, Genl., I. 224 ; II. 130,
132, 165, 171, 172, 242.
Matthews, Lt.-Col., I. 72.
Maude, Genl., II. 106, 137, 138,
159, 161, 165, 166, 186.
Maxwell, Sir J., I. 58, 73, 306 ;
II. 149, 176, 231, 250, 255,
260, 264.
Maxwell, Capt., II. 220.
McClay, Lieut., I. 372.
McGrigor, Capt., II. 200, 246,
275, 277.
McKenna, Rt. Hon. R., II. 274.
McMahon, Sir H., I. 66, 77.
McMunn, Col., II. 167.
Mecklenburg, Duke of, II. 207.
Mena Camp, I. 60.
H.M.S. Mercedes, II. 58.
Mercer, Genl., I. 73 ; II. 247.
Methuen, Lord, I. 73, 259, 326,
346
GALLIPOLI DIARY
Mewes, Maj., I. 72.
Micklem, Col., I. 243.
Millen, Senator, II. 267.
Millerand, M., II. 179, 180, 190.
Mitchell, Col., II. 244.
Mitchell, Commodore, II. 220.
Mitylene, II. 43, 45.
Monash, Col., I. 249 ; II. 170.
Moore, Lieut., II. 214, 227.
H.M.S. Mosquito, I. 335, 337.
Mountain Battery, 29th, I. 74.
Mudge, Col., I. 371.
Mudros, I. 322 ; II. 167.
Mudros West, II. 168.
Munro, Genl., II. 272, 273, 277.
Munster Fusiliers, I. 157 ; II.
172.
Murdoch, Mr. K. A., II. 164, 190,
203, 204, 226, 227, 240, 245,
246, 257, 260 et seq
Murphy, Maj., II. 255.
Murray, Genl. Wolfe, II. 5, 22, 37.
NAGABA POINT, I. 290 ; II. 193.
Nallah
Achi Baba, II. 243.
Krithia, II. 243.
Napier, Genl., I. 150.
Napier, Col., I 115; II. 201,
202.
Nasmith, Comr., I. 234, 284.
Nelson Bn., I. 73 ; II. 234.
Nevinson, Mr., II. 219, 220,
Newfoundland Bn., 1st, II. 242.
New Zealand Mounted Rifles, I.
250, 256, 359.
Nibrunesi Point, II. 189.
Nicholas, Grand Duke, I. 108,
230; II. 158.
Nicholls, Admiral, II. 260.
Nicholson, Admiral, I. 57.
Nicol, Admiral, I. 247 ; II. 188.
Nisch, II. 202.
Nogues, Col., I. 135, 151, 325.
Northcliffe, Lord, I. 66, 340.
Northumberland Fusiliers, II. 28.
H.M.T. Novian, II. 44
Nuillon, Col., I. 383.
Nunn, Col., II. 18.
OAKDENE, Capt. Perry-, II. 255.
H M.S. Ocean, I. 35, 36, 51.
Odessa, I. 11.
O'Dowda, Col., II. 172.
Olivant, Lt.-Col., I. 71.
Onslow, Capt., I. 360.
Oppenheim, Capt., II. 244
Order to the Troops
21st April, I. 120
22nd April, I. 121.
28th April, I. 171.
9th May, I. 213.
12th May, I. 222.
25th May, I. 250.
Farewell, II. 277.
By Genl. Gouraud, I. 324.
Turkish Divisional, I. 372.
H.M.T. Orsova, II. 156.
O'Sullivan, V.C., II. 171.
Owen, Genl. Cunliffe-, I. 143.
PALIN, Col., I. 74 ; II. 214.
Pallin, Genl., I. 372.
Palmer, Col., II. 18.
Palmer, Maj., I. 72.
Palmer, Mr. F., I. 338
Panderma, I. 292, 293.
Paris, Genl., I. 3, 71, 93, 166, 303,
333 ; II. 25, 160, 243, 247
Paterson, Col., I. 106.
Pearce, Senator, II. 265, 266.
Pearson, Maj., II. 172.
Peebles, Col., I. 372.
Peel, Col., I. 117.
Pelliot, Lieut., I. 119; II 220
Percival, Genl., II. 171.
Percy, Lord William, II. 219.
Periscopes, I. 43, 48.
Perriera, Admiral de la, II. 169,
170.
Peter, see Pollen.
Peyton, Genl., II. 107, 120, 165,
208, 244.
H.M.S. Phaeton, I. 18, 35, 36.
Phillimore, R.N., Capt., I. 118,
178 ; II. 130.
Piepape, Col., I. 379 ; II. 146.
Pierce, Admiral, I. 71.
Pierce, Maj., II. 230.
Pike, Lt.-Col., II. 44.
H.M.S. Pincher, I. 335
Plan of attack
C.-in-C.'s on Peninsula, I. 95.
Sari Bair, I. 329.
Suvla Landing, I. 329 ; IT 3
Plymouth Bn., I. 72, 129, 221.
INDEX
347
Pollard, Capt., II. 230.
Pollen, Capt., I. 21, 41, 178 ; II.
126, 146, 207, 246, 262, 271,
275.
Porter, Sir James, I. 367.
Potts Lt.-Comr., II. 91.
Press, I. 320, 327, 332, 337 ; II.
140, 175 et seq.
Price, Bishop, II. 255.
H.M.S. Prince of Wales, I. 154.
Princes Street, II. 243.
Punjabis
69th Bn., I. 74.
89th Bn., I. 74.
Q., II. 80.
Quadrilateral, I. 355, 358.
H.M.S. Queen, I. 35, 52, 154.
H.M.S. Queen Elizabeth, I. 21,
32, 35, 103.
Queensland Bn., I. 346, 358.
Queen Victoria's Own Sappers,
I. 74.
Quinn's Post, I. 255, 256, 257,
259.
RABBIT Island, I. 35 ; II. 27
H.M.S. Racoon, II. 169.
Ratilva Valley, II 134
H.M.S. Rattlesnake, I. 228.
Rawlinson, Genl., I. 303 ; II. 35.
Reconnaissance of Peninsula, I.
28.
Regiment de marche d*Afrique,
175th, I. 79.
Regiment, 4th Colonial, I. 79.
Regiment, 6th Colonial, I. 135.
Reed, Genl., II, 5, 36, 53, 63, 77,
96, 99, 120, 241.
Reinforcements, I. 368 ; II. 144
et seq,
Rhodes, Lieut., I. 386.
Rifaat, Col., I. 373.
H.M.T. River Clyde, I. 131, 254.
Rochdale, Lord, I. 317.
Rodosto, I. 293.
Roper, Genl., I. 178.
Rosomore, Comr., I. 31.
Ross, Mr. Malcolm, II. 219.
Roumania, I. 116 ; II. 202.
Royal Dublin Fusiliers
6th Bn., II. 44.
7th Bn., II 44.
Royal Engineers, II. 72.
West Riding Field Coy., II.
231.
67th Coy., II. 29.
68th Coy., II. 29.
134th Fortress Coy., II. 29.
Royal Field Artillery, 10th By.,
I. 364. See also Appendix It
Royal Fusiliers, I. 136, 345 ; II.
172.
2nd Bn., I. 352.
Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, II.
230.
5th Bn., II. 44.
6thBn.,II 44.
Royal Irish Fusiliers
5th Bn., II. 44.
6th Bn., II. 44.
Royal Scot, wounded, I. 356.
Royal Scots, I. 352, 355.
4th Bn., I. 372.
5th Bn., I. 190, 220, 318 ; II:
126, 155.
6th Bn., II. 156, 160.
7th Bn., I. 372.
Ruef, CoJ , I. 186.
Rundle, Genl., I. 14 ; II. 202.
Russell, Genl., I. 359; II. 130,
132, 139, 155, 194.
Russell's Top, II. 254.
Russian Corps, I. 255, 375 ; II
21.
Russian Officers, II. 158.
Ruthven, Maj. Hore-, I. 357 ; II
84, 130, 240, 275.
Ryrie, Col., I. 336.
SAGHIB DEBE, I. 351, 352 ; II.
247.
St. Louis, I. 325.
Salonika, II. 184, 201 et seq.
Salt Lake, I. 329 ; II. 69, 128.
Samson, Comr., I. 109, 181, 238,
383 ; II. 54, 221.
H.M.S. Sapphire, I. 146.
Sari Bair, I. 330, 360 ; II. 71,
111, 128.
Saros, I. 28, 349.
Sarrail, Genl., II. 179, 180, 191,
236, 270, 271.
Savage, Coi., II. 242.
H.M.S. Savage, I. 303 ; II. 17,
19, 20, 241, 242.
348
GALLIPOLI DIARY
Scatters, see Wilson.
Schemallach, Lieut., II. 234.
Schroder, I. 95.
Schuler, Mr., II. 21.
Sclater, Genl., I. 365.
H.M.S. Scorpion, I. 253, 344,
351, 356, 364.
Scott, Maj. Sir S., II. 247.
Scottish Horse, II. 151, 166, 208,
209.
Scottish Rifles, 8th Bn., I. 372.
Scott-Moncrieff, Genl., I. 303.
H.M.S. Scourge, I. 346; II.
186.
Seaplane Camp, II. 21, 32.
Sedd-el-Bahr, I. 131.
Sellheim, Col., II. 267.
Senegalese, I. 104, 192, 195, 212 ;
II. 226, 237, 253.
Serbia, II. 202, 209.
Serbians, II. 201, 213.
Seymour, Comr., I. 343.
Shaw, Genl., I. 328 ; II. 13, 18,
33, 80.
Sheppard, Lieut., I. 370.
Sickness, II. 136, 170, 239,
255.
Signal Coy., 53rd, II. 90
Sikhs, II. 244, 245.
14th Bn., I. 73, 74 ; II. 15,
190, 197, 198, 200.
51st Bn., II. 189, 190, 196, 197,
231
53rd Bn., II. 189, 190, 196,
197, 231.
Silver Baby, II. 233.
H.M.T. Simla, II. 42.
Simpson, Capt., II. 18.
Simpson-Baikie, Genl., I. 286,
344, 376, 387.
Sinclair, Capt., I. 372.
Sitwell, Genl., II. 122.
Skeen, Col., I. 288, 319 ; II. 120,
121.
Smith, Col., I. 336.
Smith, Genl., II. 87.
Smith, Hesketh, II. 45.
Smith, R.N., Lieut., I. 134.
Sofia, II. 207.
Soghan Dere, I. 290, 362.
Solvili, II. 148.
Somali, II. 248.
Southland, I. 118.
South Wales Borderers, I. 134,
318, 370 ; II. 230.
2nd Bn., I. 138.
Spens, Genl., II. 261, 264, 265.
Stanley, Capt., I. 322.
Stephens, Capt., II. 32, 167.
Steward, (Col. ?), II. 243.
Stewart, Col., II. 188.
Stewart, Lieut. Shaw-, I. 387.
Stirling, Lt.-Col., II. 244.
Stockdale, Lt.-Col., I. 186.
Stoney, Maj., II 230.
Stopford, Genl., I. 306 ; II. 1, 5,
25, 26, 40, 53, 61 et seq., 72,
77, 82, 87, 99, 102, 104, 106,
108.
Street, Col., I. 182.
Stuart, Lt.-Col. Crauford-,1.274
Stuart, Maj. Villiers-, I. 234.
Sulajik, II. 67, 70, 128.
Sultan of Egypt, I. 58, 60.
Sunbeam, II. 105.
Surrey Yeomanry,!. 370; II. 220
Susak Kuyu, II. 135, 217.
Sussex Yeomanry, II. 247.
Suvla Bay, I. 328; II. 84, 111.
Sykes, Sir Mark, I. 335 ; II. 275.
Syria, II. 191.
TACTICS, I. 363,
Talaat, I. 12.
H.M.S. Talbot, I. 344, 351.
Taube, I. 102, 171, 194, 196, 302 ;
II. 188, 196, 204, 218, 219,
241.
Taylor, Genl., II. 214.
Taylor, Col., II. 154, 201, 214,
243, 256.
Tekke Tepe, II. 63, 68, 69, 70,
79, 81.
Tenedos, I. 21, 227, 331, 384.
H.M.T. Themistocles, II. 42.
Thomson, Col. Courtauld, I. 260.
Thursby, Admiral, I. 52, 118,
142, 179, 239.
Tillard, Maj., II. 167.
Titchfield, Lord, II. 241.
Tollemashe, Capt., I. 371.
Trench mortars, I. 43, 48, 288,
317, 326, 352 ; II. 140.
H.M.S. Triad, I. 284, 316, 357 ;
II. 58, 71, 155, 167, 168, 275,
276.
INDEX
349
Trotman, GenL, I. 303.
H.M.S. Triumph, I. 112, 154,
247, 248.
Trumble, Mr. T., II. 268.
Tullibardine, Lord, II. 208.
Tupper, R.N., Lieut., I. 346 ; II.
186.
^Turkish Regt.
13th, I. 356.
16th, I. 356.
33rd, I. 356.
127th, I. 373.
Turk's Head, II. 254.
Tyrrell, Col., II. 226, 227, 243.
Tyrrell, Capt., II. 138.
UNSWOBTH, Mr., II. 234.
Usborne, Neville, I. 384.
Uzunkiupru, II. 194.
VAL, see Braithwaite.
Valley of Death, I. 256.
Vandenberg, GenL, I. 185.
Vanrennan, Lieut. -Col., II. 44.
" V " Beach, I. 135, 360.
Venezelos, M., I. 316.
H.M.S. Vengeance, I. 248.
Vineyard, II. 57, 243.
Viont, Col., I. 324.
Vitali, Capt., II. 178.
Von Donop, Genl., I. 197, 305 ;
H. 139.
Vyvian, R.N., Capt., I. 118.
WALDEX POINT, II. 55.
Wallace, Genl., I. 279, 353, 354,
382
Waratah, I. 371.
War Correspondents, I. 320, 334,
338 ; II. 190, 269.
Ward, Lt.-Col., I. 284, 343 ; II.
20, 178, 221.
Wardian Camp, I. 84.
Watson, Col. Jimmy, I. 344 ; II.
246.
" W " Beach, I. 130, 177, 293.
Weber Pasha, I. 387.
Wedgwood, Comr., I. 106, 206,
228.
Wells, Col., II. 186.
Wemyss, Admiral, I. 21, 38, 41
48, 118; II. 31, 168.
West Kent Regt., 8th, II. 29.
West Kent Yeomanry, II. 247
Westminster Dragoons, I. 58.
Weston, Lieut., II. 234.
West Yorks Regt., 9th, II. 29,
64, 67.
Whitburn, Col., II. 247.
White, Lt.-Col., I. 323.
Wigram, Col. Clive, I. 208.
Williams, Capt., II. 178, 230.
Williams, Col., I. 17 ; 266 ; II.
240.
Williams, Genl. Hanbury, I. 255.
Williams, Genl., II. 236.
Wilson, Bde.-Maj., II. 254.
Wilson, Col. "Scatters," II. 203,
204, 248.
Winter, Genl., I. 17, 118, 165,
353, 354.
H.M.S. Wolverine, I. 254, 270,
344, 351, 356.
Woodward, Genl., I. 17, 80, 118,
165 ; II. 24.
Worcester Regt., I. 136, 318.
Worcester Yeomanry, II. 209.
Worsley, Comr., II. 79.
Wyld, Lt.-Comr., I. 335.
Wylie, Col. Doughty-, I. 53, 156 ;
n. 240
" X " BEACH, I. 135.
Xeros, II. 192.
YARR, Col., II. 247.
" Y JS Beach, I. 129, 146, 163.
Yeni Shahr, I. 151.
Yeomanry, II. 121, 127, 128, 132,
211,244,247.
Yilghin Burnu, II. 57, 65, 112.
Yorks Regt., 6th Bn., II. 29.
York and Lanes Regt., 6th Bn.,
II. 29
Younghusband, Genl., II. 147.
Yukeri, I. 331 ; II. 192.
ZIMMERMAN'S FARM, II. 25.
Zion Mule Corps, I. 84.
Zouaves, I. 212.
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Mr. Edward Arnold's
SPRING
ANNOUNCEMENTS, 1920.
THE MARCH ON PARIS AND THE
BATTLE OF THE MARNE, 1914.
By ALEXANDER VON KLUCK, GENERALOBERST.
With Portrait and Maps, and Notes by the Historical Section (Military
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command, but the climax of interest is reached when we come
to the fateful days at the beginning of September which ended in
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Mr. Edward Arnold's Spring Announcements. 3
THE ADVENTURES OF
DUNSTERFORCE.
By MAJOR-GENERAL L. C. DUNSTERVILLE, C.B.
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Who is not familiar with Mr. Rudyard Kipling's figure of
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humour and a courage undaunted by the appalling complexity of
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Towards the end of 1917, under the seal of absolute secrecy,
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4 Mr. Edward Arnold's Spring Announcements.
OUR KID, AND OTHER LONDON
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