ABERDEEN BOOKSHOP
KlRKaATE,
we collection o/
Presented to the
LIBRARY of the
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
by
HARRY SUTHERLAND
a
GENERAL CRAUFURD
AND HIS
LIGHT DIVISION
HORSBURGH.
EDINBURGH.
MAJOR-GENERAL ROBERT CRAUFURB,
Leader of the Light Division.
GENERAL CRAUFURD
AND HIS
LIGHT DIVISION
WITH MANY ANECDOTES, A PAPER AND LETTERS BY
SIR JOHN MOORE, AND ALSO LETTERS FROM THE
RIGHT HON. W. WINDHAM, THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,
LORD LONDONDERRY, AND OTHERS
BY THE REV.
ALEXANDER H. CRAUFURD, M.A.
FORMERLY EXHIBITIONER OF ORIEL COLLEGE, OXFORD
WITH A PORTRAIT
GRIFFITH FARRAN OKEDEN & WELSH
NEWBERY HOUSE, CHARING CROSS ROAD
LONDON AND SYDNEY
{The rights of translation and of reproduction are reserved?)
TO
THE OFFICERS, NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS,
AND PRIVATES
OF THE
43RD LIGHT INFANTRY (1ST OXFORDSHIRE LIGHT INFANTRY),
FORMERLY THE SENIOR REGIMENT OF THE GLORIOUS
LIGHT DIVISION,
THIS VOLUME,
WHICH CONTAINS SO MUCH CONCERNING
THE GREAT DEEDS OF THEIR MILITARY ANCESTORS,
IS DEDICATED,
AS A TOKEN OF SINCERE REGARD AND AFFECTION,
BY THEIR OLD COMPANION AND FRIEND,
THE AUTHOR.
"While memorials of the war in the Peninsula exist, the name of Robert
Craufurd will be for ever identified with this noble body of troops," i.e. the
43rd, the 52nd, and the 95th Rifles. COLE'S Memoirs of British Generals
Distinguished during the Peninsular War, vol. i. p. 238.
PREFACE.
THERE are two passages in English military literature
which make one marvel that nothing approaching to a real
memoir of General Robert Craufurd has ever been written ;
the one is in the Duke of Wellington's Despatches, and
the other in the "Early Military Life of Sir George
Napier." Writing to Craufurd on April 9, 1810, Welling-
ton says to him, " Since you have joined the army, I have
always wished that you should command our outposts, for
many reasons into which it is unnecessary to enter." Sir
George Napier says of his old leader, Robert Craufurd,
"Although he was a most unpopular man, every officer
of the Light Division must acknowledge that, by his
unwearied and active exertions of mind and body, that
Division was brought to a state of discipline and know-
ledge of the duties of light troops, which never was
equalled by any Division in the British army, or sur-
passed by any Division of the French army."
In some ways it may seem unsuitable that a civilian
should write concerning so great a military leader and so
glorious a Division. But, unfortunately, no soldier has
Vlll PREFACE.
directed his attention to the work here undertaken ; and
being General Craufurd's grandson and present repre-
sentative, I have at all events a strong hereditary interest
in the subject, and I have also the advantage of an
intimate acquaintance with letters and papers relating to
the General's private as well as his public life. It is very
likely that this volume may contain some technical errors
or inaccuracies ; but these can easily be corrected, if the
book should attain to a second edition. Of course, whilst
writing this work, I have very frequently consulted military
friends when I was in doubt as to the technical expressions
used in war. And the fact that in my former writings I
have been accustomed to deal with far deeper problems,
demanding the most precise and accurate thinking, may
possibly be of some use to me in this work that I have
now endeavoured to perform.
This volume, however, is intended to be essentially
light reading. One of my main objects has been to gather
together into a compact and portable form the many
interesting and amusing anecdotes about the Light
Division, which are at present scattered through a con-
siderable number of scarce and inaccessible books. Thus
to preserve and render easily accessible to the public all
these famous stories, has appeared to me nothing less than
a duty owing to the most glorious of all British Divisions,
and to its renowned leader.
The letters and the long paper by Sir John Moore
have never hitherto been published, so far as I know. I
PREFACE. IX
have a very large collection of Wellington's autograph
letters to Craufurd. Unfortunately, these have been
published in Gurwood's edition of the Duke's Despatches.
But many of them are so interesting that I have freely
used them to illustrate my subject, quoting from the
original letters in my own possession. The letter from
Wellington, which is marked private, is now made public
for the first time, to the best of my knowledge. Of course
the reasons for keeping it private have long since passed
away.
Though I am quite aware of the necessary imperfection
of my knowledge of military technicalities, it will be
observed that I speak with perfect assurance and con-
fidence when my subject leads me to deal with the ways,
thoughts, and feelings of private soldiers. For many
years I have been in the habit of giving voluntary assist-
ance to army chaplains, or acting chaplains, in their work,
during a great portion of each year. For five successive
winters periods of about six months each I believe that
I passed almost more time with the men in hospital in
Shorncliffe camp than any other minister of any denomi-
nation. During the greater part of four summers I
have helped the chaplain to look after the men belonging
to three different cavalry regiments at Piershill barracks,
near Edinburgh. Besides my five winters passed in
helping at Shorncliffe, I have also spent three winters in
helping the acting chaplain at Parkhurst barracks, in the
Isle of Wight. During the first part of this time the 43rd
X PREFACE.
Light Infantry were at Parkhurst, and during the later
part another regiment representative of the old Light
Division was there, viz. the 4th Battalion of the Rifle
Brigade.
Ever since the 43rd Light Infantry came home from
India, I have been accustomed to help to look after the
men of that regiment with peculiar regard and affection.
I am an honorary member for life of its officers' Mess, and
I am accustomed to talk to its men in the most outspoken
and familiar manner. This book is written from the point
of view of one who sympathizes fully as much with what
are called "common soldiers," as he does with British
officers. I always feel keen interest in the men. Their
frankness, and, in many cases, the warmth of their feelings
always draw me towards them. And when I am with
them I feel that I am in contact with the realities of life,
and not with its conventionalities, with human nature as
it truly exists, and not with unmeaning artificialities.
I have also found that my decidedly " broad " views on
religion have caused me to come into far closer contact
with the hearts and minds of the men than most ministers
ever come. A well-known dignitary of the Church of
England once said to me : " Your work amongst soldiers
always interests me, as bringing into contact natures in
many respects singularly different, yet singularly near in
some ways." What the Dean meant was this, that the
men have no cut-and-dry religious formulas, because they
seldom think on such subjects, and that I have no such
PREFACE. XI
formulas, because deep and prolonged thought has de-
prived me of them. And so, from widely different causes,
the men and I are alike, " naked and not ashamed " in a
spiritual sense. I firmly believe that the sympathetic and
compassionate Christianity of Christ is admirably suited to
meet the real wants of soldiers and of thinkers ; but the
narrower forms of religion are, as a matter of fact, about
equally repulsive to both these totally different classes of
human beings.*
My best thanks are due to my friend General W.
Napier, for his kind permission to make free use of his
most interesting and admirable work, " The Early Military
Life of Sir George Napier." Nowhere else in the English
language do we find so vividly and well expressed the
feelings cherished towards their men by really great
British officers ; nowhere else can we find such genuine
appreciation of the many fine qualities so often displayed
by the English private soldier, and such a deep sense of
the claims which he has on the consideration, kindness
and often on the affection of those placed over him. The
mind and heart of Sir George Napier were penetrated with
the kindly sagacity of Sir John Moore ; and if our present
officers would learn of that noblest of all our leaders,
(Moore), we should hear no more of mutinous conduct
in our regiments.
* Experience has taught me that a strong sense of humour and a real love
of jokes are an immense aid to all who seek to get at and influence the hearts
of soldiers.
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
PAGE
EARLIER LIFE ... ... ... ... ... ... i
CHAPTER II.
THE EXPEDITION TO BUENOS AYRES, WITH A LETTER FROM
MR. WINDHAM ... ... ... ... ... ... 13
CHAPTER III.
SIR JOHN MOORE ON SOME CHANGES IN THE ARMY ... ... 27
CHAPTER IV.
THE RETREAT TO VIGO, WITH A LETTER FROM SIR JOHN MOORE,
AND ANECDOTES FROM "RIFLEMAN HARRIS" ... ... 36
CHAPTER V.
CRAUFURD'S SERVICES UNDER WELLINGTON ... ... ... 65
CHAPTER VI.
SERVICES UNDER WELLINGTON CONCLUDED ... ... ... 152
XIV CONTENTS.
CHAPTER VII.
PAGE
CRAUFURD'S FUNERAL, WITH LETTERS CONCERNING HIS DEATH 202
CHAPTER VIII.
ANECDOTES, AND DIFFERENT ESTIMATES OF CRAUFURD'S CHA-
RACTER AND ABILITIES ... ... ... ... ... 225
APPENDIX.
ADDITIONAL LETTERS, ANECDOTES, ETC. ... ... ... 275
GENERAL CRAUFURD
AND HIS
LIGHT DIVISION.
CHAPTER I.
EARLIER LIFE.
CONSIDERING the comparative smallness of its population,
Scotland may justly claim to have contributed very largely
and generously to the successes and undying glories of
Britain's most dangerous, most brilliantly picturesque, and
most important war the long war waged against the
French in the earlier years of this century. Besides the
services of Sir Ralph Abercromby in Egypt, and besides
the invaluable aid of the well-known Scottish regiments,
the northern part of our kingdom gave to the army
engaged in the Peninsular War Sir David Baird and
Graham Lord Lynedoch, and also Sir John Hope, as well
as many other illustrious soldiers. And to the famous
Light Division itself, which is commonly considered almost
entirely English, Scotland supplied its three most dominant
B
2 GENERAL CRAUFURD
and characteristic names, those of Moore, Craufurd, and
Napier. And amongst other Scottish names renowned
throughout this same Division were those of Sir James
Shaw Kennedy, the most trusted and confidential of all
the officers of General Craufurd, and of the brilliant young
Charles Macleod, Colonel of the 43rd, and of William
Campbell, Brigade-Major, an officer whose singular gallantry
and nobleness of character endeared him to his General, and
to William Napier, and to the whole British army. The
heroic Sydney Beckwith, Colonel of the 95th Rifles, was
also, I believe, connected with Scotland in some way.
Robert Craufurd, like his friend and leader Sir John
Moore, was descended from an old Ayrshire family. He
was the third son of Alexander Craufurd, of Newark
Castle, in the county of Ayr. The Craufurds of
Newark were directly descended from those of Thirdpart,
in the same county ; and the family of Thirdpart were
cadets of the house of Craufurd of Auchenames, who were
the representatives of the old Craufurds of Loudoun, a
famous Ayrshire family which gave a mother to the
Scottish patriot, William Wallace.
From this old stock young Robert Craufurd doubtless
inherited a good deal of his constitutional pugnacity ; for
in earlier days in Ayrshire the Craufurds, together with
their kinsmen the Campbells, were engaged in almost
incessant family fights and quarrels with their neighbours
and hereditary enemies the Kennedies.
Lawlessness and considerable disregard for conven-
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 3
tional propriety and religious decorum, seem also in some
measure to have been inherited from his progenitors by
the future leader of the Light Division. For his ancestor
in the time of King Charles L, the Rev. George Craufurd,
minister of West Kilbride, seems to have been deposed
"for worldly-mindedness, and for selling a horse on the
Sabbath day." Possibly this latent impiety of the race
may have been at work in the mind of the leader of
the Light Division when, during his operations on the
Coa, the whole army being sorely straitened for money,
" Craufurd, unable to feed his Division, gave the reins to
his fiery temper and seized some church plate, to purchase
corn, a rash act which he was forced to redress ; yet it
convinced the priests that the distress was not feigned,
and they procured some supplies."
Robert Craufurd's father sold the estate of Newark
and settled in England. He was an intimate friend of
" Old Q," the celebrated Duke of Queensberry. Though
a man of considerable ability, he seems to have rather
wasted his talents, leading the life of a man about town.
From him his famous soldier son inherited a very violent
temper as well as a great tendency to fits of depression
and mental gloom. Alexander Craufurd (the father)
married a Miss Crokatt, daughter of James Crokatt of
Luxborough, in the county of Essex. The Crokatts also
were people with Scotch connections. Alexander Crau-
furd was created a baronet in March, 1781.
Alexander's brother, Quentin Craufurd, was a very
GENERAL CRAUFURD
well-known man. In early life he went out to India,
where he made a very large fortune. On returning home
he settled in Paris, where he became an intimate friend
of the unfortunate queen, Marie Antoinette, whom he
assisted to escape on one occasion. He was a man of
considerable talents, and an author of some reputation.
The two elder brothers of Robert Craufurd were both
active men, occupying prominent positions in life. The
eldest, James (afterwards Sir James), was British Resident
at Hamburg from 1798 to 1803, and afterwards Minister
Plenipotentiary at Copenhagen.
The next brother, Charles, was a far more remarkable
man, an ardent soldier, endowed with great clearness and
acuteness of judgment, who might have achieved much
distinction if he had not been desperately wounded whilst
serving with the Austrian army. He and his more cele-
brated younger brother, Robert were firm and close friends.
Together they translated one of the most famous German
treatises on the art of war. As General Charles Craufurd's
opinions will often be quoted in this memoir, it may be
well to give here the following particulars concerning
hmi, for some of which I am much indebted to an article
in the "Dictionary of National Biography," edited by
Mr. Leslie Stephen.
Lieutenant - General Sir Charles Craufurd, G.C.B.,
entered the army as a Cornet in the ist Dragoon Guards,
on December 15, 1778. He was promoted Lieutenant
in 1781, and Captain into the 2nd Dragoon Guards in
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 5
1785. In that year he was appointed equerry to the
Duke of York, whose intimate friend he became. He
accompanied the Duke of York to the Netherlands as
aide-de-camp, and was attached to the Austrian .head-
quarters as representative of the English commander-in-
chief. With the Austrian staff he was present at all the
earlier battles of the war, was promoted for his services
to the rank of Major in May, 1793, and Lieutenant-Colonel
in February, 1794. In the middle of 1794 he left the
Austrian head-quarters, and was appointed Deputy-
Adjutant-General to the English army. In this capacity
he specially distinguished himself by one daring charge,
when, with but two squadrons of dragoons, he took three
guns and one thousand prisoners. In 1795 he was again
sent on a special mission to the Austrian head-quarters.
He was an acute observer, and his reports are most
valuable documents ; they are preserved in the Record
Office. In 1796, he was so severely wounded that he was
invalided home, and henceforth his active services were
lost to the army. But he still continued to give valuable
advice to his more famous brother Robert, and exerted
all his political and military influence in his favour. He
was promoted Colonel on January 26, 1797, and Major-
General on September 25, 1803. He married the widow
of Thomas, third Duke of Newcastle, on February 7, 1800,
on which same day his brother Robert was also married.
Owing to his marriage General Charles Craufurd acquired
considerable political influence during the minority of the
6 GENERAL CRAUFURD
young Duke of Newcastle. He entered the House of
Commons as M.P. for East Retford in October, 1806, and
resigned his seat in 1812. He was made Colonel of the
2nd Dragoon Guards in 1807, and promoted Lieutenant-
General in 1810. He was made a G.C.B. on May 27, 1820,
and he died in 1821.
Sir Charles Craufurd was a most intimate friend of
General Charles Stewart, afterwards Marquis of London-
derry, from whom a most interesting and touching letter
concerning General Robert Craufurd's death will be found
in this volume.
Returning now to the subject of this memoir, I regret
to say that I have been unable to ascertain where my
grandfather, Robert Craufurd, received his earlier educa-
tion. He was born on May 5, 1764, and entered the army
at the early age of fifteen, and served four years as a
subaltern in the 25th Regiment. Having been promoted
to a company at the age of nineteen, he attended the
reviews at Potsdam, together with his brother Charles.
I have in my possession about six little notes addressed
to the brothers Craufurd by the king, Frederick the Great,
giving them permission to assist at the manoeuvres of the
Prussian troops. These little notes are written in French
by a secretary, and signed by the king himself. Young
Craufurd visited the principal theatres of war on the
continent, where, besides learning the German language
well, he devoted his time to the prosecution of military
studies, and pursued them with close application and un-
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 1
remitting ardour, so that he acquired a large knowledge of
military tactics and of history.^
Young Craufurd was promoted Captain into the 75th
Regiment in 1783. On his return from the continent he
was desirous of some active employment on foreign service,
and consequently we find him employed in India under
Lord Cornwallis. He served with the 75th Regiment
through the war waged against Tippoo Sultan in 1790, 1791,
and 1792, and distinguished himself wherever an occasion
offered, for a time obtaining the command of his regiment as
senior captain. Returning to England in 1794, he went to
assist his elder brother, Colonel Charles Craufurd, who was
then English representative at the Austrian head-quarters.
His elder brother being severely wounded, Robert Craufurd
had the superintendence of the mission entrusted to him,
and acquired much reputation in carrying it out. Return-
ing to England, he was promoted Lieutenant-Colonel in
December, 1797.
In 1798, an invasion of Ireland being apprehended,
he was appointed Deputy-Quartermaster-General in that
country. His services during the suppression of the Irish
insurrection were warmly recognized by his former com-
mander, Lord Cornwallis, and also by General Lake, more
especially those rendered in the operations against. General
Humbert and the French corps.
" ^v
In 1799 he was again employed on a military mission
to the Austrian armies during their campaign in Switzer-
land. Afterwards he served on the staff of the Duke of
8 GENERAL CRAUFURD
York in the expedition to Holland; and during that unfor-
tunate campaign he secured the entire approbation of his
commander, and added to his rapidly growing reputation.
During his whole life my grandfather seems to have
been liable to fits of depression and disgust, during which
he talked of retiring into private life. But he never could
have endured a life of inactivity. And, well knowing this,
his brother Charles gave him wise advice, as in the follow-
ing letter, written in the year 1801. I have omitted the
less interesting portions of the letter.
"Clumber, January n, 1801.
" MY DEAREST BROTHER,
" I am extremely anxious to hear about your
health, which I have not done for some time. I most
sincerely hope it is better ; and with the recovery of that,
depend upon it your spirits will recover. For I am con-
vinced that your own manliness, fortitude, and resignation
will prevent the disappointments you have hitherto met
with from dwelling upon your mind ; and certainly it must
be a very great satisfaction to you that your character for
uncommon abilities, superior knowledge, and extraordinary
intrepidity and firmness, is so universally established.
Such a character as yours, no doubt, creates much jealousy,
as that of every very superior person does. And you
have always found that, in their struggles in this world,
many of the first-rate men, and those who have rendered
the greatest services to their country, have been treated
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 9
with ingratitude and neglected. But standing on so very
broad a foundation of reputation as you do, and in posses-
sion of such transcendent abilities and superior knowledge
and experience, surely you have a very good prospect
before you. The great thing is to hold in contempt any
adverse circumstances that may happen in this life, and
never to despond, not to dwell upon the past, but
eagerly to look forward to the future. And you may rely
upon it that whatever aberrations you may reproach your-
self with, they will never be placed to the account against
so excellent a nature as yours.
" I am extremely anxious to do away your idea of giving
up everything and retiring quite from the busy scene of
life ; for I am convinced that, when your health began to
return, you would most sincerely repent it. I sincerely
hope you will not allow such a determination to fix itself.
The idea arises merely from that temper of mind which
an illness that preys much upon the spirits throws a person
into.
"You will have seen in the papers that the place of
Master and Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance in Ireland
are abolished. But I think it may be of the greatest con-
sequence to cultivate your connection with Lord Castle-
reagh ; he may be of essential service to you in some other
way. As to your situation in Ireland, so far from giving
it up, I would write to him on the subject of insuring your
succeeding to Cradock with the rank of Colonel as was
before intended in case of Cradock's removal or death.
10 GENERAL CRAUFURD
The latter may happen any day, as he is upon service ;
and the intrigues are so great, and people's merit and ser-
vices so often forgotten, that really you owe it to yourself
to prepare against this as much as possible. As you have
only the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, you know it would
have required, at the time when your services were fresh
in their memory, his exertion to get you made Quarter-
master-General ; and, of course, according to constant
experience, his exertion will be the more necessary now.
This certainly ought not to be the case, but it always is ;
and therefore one must guard against it. He has much in
his power, I do assure you ; and as he interested himself
so warmly about you before, I do not see why he should
not do so again. Certainly it was but justice this ; and it
will be great injustice now if the same disposition is not
persevered in ; and if he really wishes to serve you, he can
easily do it, as your character stands so very high in every
respect. Lord Camden, too, who you said was very hearty
towards you on that occasion, may be of most essential assist-
ance to you. These collateral circumstances should really
be attended to ; for a man's merit alone, however great, con-
stantly meets with disappointment, if they are neglected.
" Now that the Austrians will certainly be forced to
make peace, do you think it would be worth while to
persevere in your intention of raising a foreign regiment
for the East Indian service ? Perhaps upon the disband-
ing of some of their free corps, it might easily be done,
if approved at home.
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 11
" The Duchess joins me in kindest love to you and
your party,
" I remain ever,
" My dearest Bob,
" Your most affectionate Brother,
"C. CRAUFURD."
At the time when he received this letter, Robert
Craufurd was a married man. On February 7, 1800, he
had married Mary Frances, daughter of Henry Holland,
Esquire, of Hans Place, Chelsea. Towards his wife he
ever displayed unbounded affection ; and in after years,
when actively engaged in the Peninsular War, it was his
enforced separation from his wife that caused him to go
home for st>me months on leave, contrary to the wishes of
Lord Wellington, and also made him often talk of retiring
altogether from the army. But he was in reality ardently
devoted to his profession and to his own famous Light
Division, and he never actually intended leaving the army
for long during the war. Still, his way of talking as to his
wishes misled many as to his intentions ; and Colonel
Charles Macleod of the 43rd has declared that the General
meant to retire altogether after the capture of Ciudad
Rodrigo. But General Charles Stewart afterwards Lord
Londonderry who remained with Craufurd like a brother
during his last illness, knew better than to think anything
of the kind, and endeavoured to cheer the suffering leader
by talking of future operations. Lord Wellington also at
12 GENERAL CRAUFURD
first only expected to be deprived of General Craufurd's
services for a time, as is evident from his letter on the
subject to the authorities at home.
Robert Craufurd sat in Parliament for a time as M.P.
for East Retford, but resigned his seat in order to go on
foreign service. As regards political and military interest,
his most staunch and effectively useful friend was Mr.
Windham, for some time the Minister for War.
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 13
CHAPTER II.
THE EXPEDITION TO BUENOS AYRES, WITH A LETTER
FROM MR. WINDHAM.
ROBERT CRAUFURD was promoted Colonel on October
30, 1805. He was consequently quite a junior Colonel
when Mr. Windham entrusted to him the command of
a large force intended to conduct important operations
towards the end of the year 1806. My information con-
cerning this expedition is chiefly gathered from a book
published in London in the year 1808, and called "An
Authentic Narrative of the Proceedings of the Expedition
under the command of Brigadier-General Craufurd, until
its arrival at Monte Video, with an Account of the Opera-
tions against Buenos Ayres under the command of General
Whitelocke, by an Officer of the Expedition."
No name is given by the author of this interesting
narrative ; but he declares his perfect willingness to give
his name if it should be thought necessary.
The little army consisted of two squadrons of the 6th
Dragoon Guards, the 5th, 36th, 45th, and 88th Regiments
of Infantry, and also five companies of the Rifle Corps,* and
* The designation " The Rifle Corps " meant, in those days, the 95th
Rifles, and not the 6oth Rifles.
14 GENERAL CRAUFURD ,
two companies of the Royal Artillery, making altogether
about four thousand two hundred men. Alison tells us
that it was originally intended to effect the conquest of
Chili. The expedition started from Falmouth, on Novem-
ber 12, 1806.
" To command this little army, Colonel Robert
Craufurd had been nominated through the interest of
Mr. Windham, the War Minister of the day. The unpre-
cedented circumstance of a Colonel (and nearly the junior
of his rank) being appointed to a command fit for
a Lieutenant-General, excited much opposition to Mr.
Windham's nomination, and loud murmurs on the part
of those officers of superior rank who remained unem-
ployed ; but the firmness of the Secretary of the War
Department succeeded ; and Colonel Craufurd raised to
the rank of Brigadier on the occasion afterwards proved
himself, as far as he came into action, in every respect
worthy of the high opinion entertained of his talents
and qualifications by his patron. He had a large staff
attached to his command, and every appearance denoted
it to be independent of any other. It would have been
a happy circumstance for this little army, had it not
afterwards fallen under the authority of any other
person."
The expedition went to the Cape of Good Hope ; and
whilst there Craufurd's plans were entirely altered by his
receiving the following letter of instructions from Mr.
Windham.
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 15
" Downing Street, January 2, 1807.
" MY DEAR SIR,
"Though I have often reproached myself for
not having before written to you, I am very sorry to
have occasion for retrieving my fault, such as is now
presented to me.
" In a dispatch of Lord Strangford's received this
morning from Lisbon, and dated the 2Oth instant, mention
is made that a vessel had just arrived from the Brazils
(the Sirpio, a Portuguese ship) which gave an account
that on November 2 a Spanish schooner had come to
Paramoca, leaky and dismantled, having dispatches on
board with the news of the recapture of Buenos Ayres,
after a severe contest in which many were killed on both
sides, and all the remaining English taken prisoners.
" Though there is a hope that this news may not be
true, measures must be taken as if it was ; and the first
step is to send a vessel after Admiral Murray with the
dispatches which are now preparing for you and Sir
Samuel Auchmuty, and of which the object is to attempt,
by a combination of your joint forces, to recover what
the intelligence alluded to would describe as lost.
"The supposition made is that Auchmuty, who did
not sail from here till October 9, will not have reached
his destination till after the disaster had taken place, and
that proceeding probably in that case to the Cape, as
finding himself unequal to repair what had happened, he
will be there by the time the vessel leaving this (or some
16 GENERAL CRAUFURD
other sent by Admiral Murray) shall have arrived at the
Cape likewise.
" The instructions to him will then be that, if he does
not conceive the recovery of what is lost altogether
hopeless, he will proceed to join you at the rendezvous
which shall be fixed between you and Admiral Murray,
and which will probably be either the Plata or Rio
Janeiro. The latter seems to be preferable on account
of the length of time which you may have to wait for
his arrival, and which may require for the troops more
refreshments than the Plata will afford you. Should
Rio Janeiro be chosen, you will of course have to inquire,
upon your arrival there, whether Auchmuty may not be
still in the Plata prosecuting his operations, so as never
to have received the instructions forwarded to him from
you. In short, a meeting is to be concerted between him
and you for the recovery, if possible, of what may be
lost, except in the single case above alluded to, of his
being so much of opinion that success is impracticable,
as to make him take the decision of remaining at the
Cape ; in which case he will forward a vessel to you,
signifying that you are no longer to expect him.
"The whole of this we have been obliged to write
in such a hurry that it has been difficult to make the
instructions as full and as explicit as could be wished ;
but, knowing the general ideas, you will supply what is
wanting for the particular cases. Though it has been
thought right in one part to leave you a discretion, I
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 17
mean as to acting without waiting for General Auchmuty,
yet I have wished to put such a guard as may not leave
you exposed to too much responsibility, which, with the
enmity felt here both against you and me, ought to be
made as little as possible. The case of Auchmuty's
determining not to return or to make the attempt, and
of your finding that anything could be done by you
separately, is so little likely that no provision has been
made for it.
"With most sincere wishes for your success and
welfare, let me beg you to believe me ever, with great
regard,
" Your very faithful friend and servant,
"W. WlNDHAM."
Accordingly Craufurd and his little army go to Monte
Video. They are there placed under the notorious
General Whitelocke, together with the forces under Sir
Samuel Auchmuty, the Government having meanwhile
thought proper to send out a new Commander-in-chief.
" On May 10, 1807, the Thisbe frigate arrived at
Monte Video, bringing out Whitelocke ; and Major-
General Gower came with him as second in command."
From Monte Video the joint forces go to attack
Buenos Ayres. Whitelocke, in a letter to Mr. Windham,
states that he was joined at Monte Video on June 15,
1807, by the forces under Brigadier-General Craufurd.
It is unnecessary for me to give anything like a
C
18 GENERAL CRAUFURD
detailed account of the memorable and disastrous attack
on Buenos Ayres, the most melancholy and disgraceful
chapter in English military history. Whitelocke appears
to have had almost every possible disqualification for such
an enterprise, including a timidity and cowardice happily
unique in the long annals of British commanders.
In this expedition Craufurd commanded the Light
Brigade which formed the advanced guard of the army.
His command originally consisted of eight companies of
Light Infantry, a detachment of recruits (about seventy)
of the 7 ist Regiment, and eight companies of the 95th
or Rifle Corps. But from the day of his landing at the
Ensinada until the junction of the two Divisions of the
army before Buenos Ayres, four companies were taken
away from his Brigade and attached to the Division of
the army under the Commander-in-chief in person. The
invading army amounted altogether to nearly eight thou-
sand men.
When the troops under Major-General Gower arrived
near Buenos Ayres, the Spaniards commenced hostilities ;
but Craufurd, at the head of his light troops, made a
vigorous charge, drove back the enemy in utter confusion
and captured nine guns and a howitzer. The writer of
the account from which I chiefly derive my information
(himself an eye-witness) was perfectly certain that Buenos
Ayres could have been taken straight off, if Craufurd
had been supported "after the dispersion of three thou-
sand of their best troops, at the entrance of their streets,
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 19
threw confusion and dismay among the Spaniards in the
town." This writer greatly blames General Gower for
checking so extremely promising an attack. " But General
Gower would not authorize the attempt which, by all the
information we afterwards received, would have been
crowned with success, with but little, if any, loss. Our
vexation, when ordered to retire, may therefore be easily
conceived."
Craufurd himself confirmed this view by his evidence
given at the trial of Whitelocke. He said, " I trust the
court will here allow me to say that, from all I heard
since, I am convinced that, if the main division under
General Whitelocke had been as near as I thought it
might have been, we certainly should have taken the town
with ease ; I had very strong doubts whether we might
not have taken it with General Gower's corps."
Writing in October, 1810, to his brother Robert,
General Charles Craufurd more than confirms this view,
and by the most indisputable evidence. He says, " The
Duke told me, when here a few days ago, that he read
lately in one of the papers an account of Whitelocke's
affair at Buenos Ay res by the second in command to
Liniers, in which it was asserted that if you had been
allowed to advance into the town that evening, after
defeating Liniers, as you proposed to do, you would
certainly have taken the place." And thus the future
leader of the audacious Light Division would have saved
England from its greatest military disgrace and ignominy.
20 GENERAL CRAUFURD
One cannot help wondering how the home authorities
ever came to place confidence in the dull and spiritless
Whitelocke.
Even when the Commander-in-chief arrived at the
scene of action, he still delayed the attack, and so gave
the inhabitants ample time for preparation for the defence.
Most unfortunately, Whitelocke, in attacking the town,
" divided his troops into small detachments, and sent
them in unloaded and unprovided with anything like
proper and sufficient means for forcing barricades or
other impediments in the streets."
The plan for taking the town was execrably bad in
every way and ludicrously inadequate. There was no con-
nection or communication between the different portions
of the army, and when each portion had taken up the
position assigned to it, there were no further orders from
the commander, and no possibility of asking for any.
General Craufurd with his light troops occupied the place
that he was ordered to occupy, and there waited for
further orders, but none were forthcoming. As he said
at the trial of Whitelocke, he certainly did not expect to
be abandoned to his fate, as he was.
The inhabitants shot down our men from the tops of
their houses without any possibility of retaliation. Each
house was turned into a little fortress. Ditches were dug
in the streets, and heavy cannon used against our forces as
they advanced. Sir Samuel Auchmuty effected all that he
possibly could under such circumstances ; but the terrible
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 21
drawback was that our forces were so separated as to be
unable to communicate with each other, still more unable
to support each other.
Craufurd's forces, as might have been expected, were
entirely unsuccessful ; and at length he took possession of
the convent of St. Domingo as a refuge for his men. But
the enemy surrounded this on all sides, and " the surround-
ing enemy, to the number of six thousand, bringing \\\
cannon to force the wooden gates, Craufurd, judging from
the cessation of firing, that those next him had not been
successful, with a bitter pang of heart, surrendered at four
o'clock in the afternoon."
For some of these and other particulars I am much
indebted to a very interesting work, " Cole's Distinguished
Peninsular Generals." Cole tells us that, even after Crau-
furd's surrender, Whitelocke still possessed five thousand
effective soldiers and two strong posts in the town, and
his communication with the fleet was uninterrupted. Yet
he made no attempt to retrieve the disasters, but on
" Liniers offering to give up all his prisoners captured on
the day preceding, together with the /ist Regiment, and
others taken with General Beresford, if Whitelocke desisted
from any further attack on Buenos Ayres, surrendered
Monte Video at the end of two months, and withdrew his
Majesty's forces from the River Plata," this spiritless fool
accepted the hard terms, and made peace, thereby for
ever basely staining the glorious annals of England's
military history.
22 GENERAL CRAUFURD
It is small wonder that our country was enraged at
such unnecessary ignominy, and brought the Commander-
in-chief to trial for his pusillanimous feebleness. The
officer who was an eye-witness of the heart-rending events
informs us that " above seventy officers and one thousand
men were killed or badly wounded ; one hundred and
twenty officers and fifteen hundred rank and file were
taken prisoners ; and fifteen hundred stands of excellent
arms fell into the hands of the Spaniards." Well might
Charles Napier say that Whitelocke ought to be shot, and
that " the blood of hundreds is on his head."
Deep and furious were the disgust and anger of the
future heroes of the Peninsular War. Craufurd, and his
coadjutor, the brave and able Pack, and the gallant soldiers
of the 95th Rifles, destined to earn undying glory in after
years under happier circumstances, were peculiarly incensed
against their discreditable leader. One of Craufurd's own
men, " Rifleman Harris," writes thus in his interesting
" Recollections " : " This was the first time of our seeing
that officer (Whitelocke). The next meeting was at Buenos
Ayres ; and during the confusion of that day one of us
received an order from the fiery Craufurd to shoot the
traitor dead if we could see him in the battle, many others
of the Rifles receiving the same order from that fine and
chivalrous officer. The unfortunate issue of the Buenos
Ayres affair is matter of history, and I have nothing to
say about it ; but I well remember the impression that it
made upon us all at the time, and that Sir John Moore was
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 23
present at Whitelocke's court-martial ; General Craufurd
and, I think, General Auchmuty, Captain Elder of the
Rifles, Captain Dickson, and one of our privates being
witnesses. We were at Hythe at the time, and I recollect
our officers going off to appear against Whitelocke.
" So enraged was Craufurd against him, that I heard
say he strove hard to have him shot. Whitelocke's father,
I also heard, was at his son's trial, and cried like an infant
during the proceedings. Whitelocke's sword was broken
over his head, I was told ; and for months afterwards, when
our men took their glass, they used to give as a toast,
* Success to grey hairs, but bad luck to White locks'
Indeed, that toast was drunk in all the public-houses for
many a day."
Before he surrendered, Craufurd consulted all his
officers ; only one questioned the necessity for a surrender ;
and upon Craufurd offering to put himself at their head
and endeavour to force their way out, this one dissentient
officer declined to be in any way responsible for such an
attempt.
The future leader of the Light Division seems to have
been extremely anxious that his own conduct at Buenos
Ayres should form the subject of a regular inquiry ; but
this was deemed entirely unnecessary, the court-martial
being satisfied that the failure was altogether caused by
- the cowardly incapacity of Whitelocke. At this trial
Colonel Pack, afterwards destined to serve with Craufurd
in so many brilliant exploits in the Peninsular War, gives
24 GENERAL CRAUFURD
evidence in favour of his indignant leader. He says.
" General Craufurd seemed perfectly ready to sacrifice his
own life, but thought he was called upon to interpose to
save the lives of those under him." And he calls him " an
officer whom I must ever respect and admire, though
unfortunate." With all his fiery rashness, Robert Craufurd
cared far too much for his men to permit him to sacrifice
their lives unnecessarily.
But this unfortunate affair embittered his mind to the
very end of his career, and much increased his constitutional
tendency to melancholy brooding. And, no doubt, he had
reasonable grounds for grief and anger when he reflected
how very differently this South American expedition
would have ended if he and Sir Samuel Auchmuty had
been left alone, as at first intended, without the heavy
burden of Whitelocke's superintending incapacity.
It is difficult indeed to believe that even the most
carping of critics could ever have seriously questioned
the undaunted courage of one whom William Napier
habitually designated " the fiery Robert Craufurd." Still,
much military criticism emanates from men entirely
ignorant both of the art of war and of the Generals
conducting it. And so it is likely enough that the dis-
grace of this wretched affair may, in the popular judgment,
have somewhat stained the rapidly rising reputation of
this intrepid leader. Even Charles Napier, when blaming
some operations of Craufurd during the Peninsular War,
apparently indulged in a meaningless sneer against his
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 25
General for this business, though it is difficult to under-
stand how Craufurd could have acted more advantageously
when serving under Whitelocke. But I suppose the world
is pretty well agreed in thinking that many of Charles
Napier's earlier judgments (for instance, his censures of
Wellington) were hasty, violent, and unjust. In his later
life the grand old hero of Meanee found out by bitterest
personal experience how easy it is to misrepresent even
the best actions, and how seldom actual justice is done
to any born leader of men.
But, however this may be, Busaco and Ciudad Rodrigo
were Craufurd 's best reply to all unjust critics. The
officer who stood alone, with his aide-de-camp only, on
the crest of the glacis at Ciudad Rodrigo, in advance
of his division, and in advance even of the " forlorn hope,"
and there sacrificed his life from his ardent zeal to see
that Lord Wellington's orders were thoroughly carried
out, certainly had small need of a certificate as to bravery
even from Charles Napier.
General Craufurd, and apparently many other officers
engaged in the expedition to Buenos Ayres, were under
the impression that Whitelocke was a traitor as well as
a timid and vacillating fool ; but I have failed to find
in the account of the court-martial any solid evidence
in support of this impression.
Besides embittering the mind of my grandfather, his
services under Whitelocke had, I think, an injurious
effect on him in another way. I believe that the fact
26 GENERAL CRAUFURD
that he then and there saw plainly manifested and " writ
large" the deplorable results of timidity, helped to in-
crease unduly his own natural tendency to brilliant
audacity, which Wellington occasionally had to check.
Very possibly Robert Craufurd would never have fought
unadvisedly beside the Coa river, if he had not in earlier
years been thoroughly sickened with the disgraceful
outcome of yielding vacillation. To go to school under
Whitelocke was a bad training for General Craufurd, and
he really needed an Arthur Wellesley to efface from his
vivid intellect the erroneous ideas left in it by this earlier
education. Wellington wisely directed and utilized that
extraordinary quickness ' of perception and amazing
rapidity of movement which General Gower could only
thwart and General Whitelocke only paralyze.
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 27
CHAPTER III.
SIR JOHN MOORE ON SOME CHANGES IN THE ARMY.
THE hero of Corunna was constitutionally conservative ;
and this disposition made him look with much distrust
on the changes which Mr. Windham, the Minister for
War, introduced into the British army. Alison, in his
" History of Europe," tells us that the changes effected
by Windham, and especially his allowing soldiers to enlist
for a limited period instead of for life, were attended
with the very best results ; but Moore disliked many of
these innovations.
Craufurd, on the other hand, was always of an inno-
vating disposition, as he afterwards showed by proposing
many changes to his commander in the Peninsular War,
some of which Lord Wellington adopted. His intimate
friendship with Mr. Windham also made my grandfather
the more inclined to view his proposals favourably. But
Craufurd was also a friend of Sir John Moore ; and this
induced him to submit to Moore's judgment a paper of
his own on the proposed alterations. And it was in
answer to this paper that Moore addressed to Craufurd
28 GENERAL CRAUFURD
the following letter and detailed criticism which, to the
best of my knowledge, are now made public for the first
time.
"Private.
"Thursday.
" MY DEAR CRAUFURD,
" I return the paper you left with me. I have
added upon a separate paper such observations as occurred
to me. The fault of the proposed arrangement is that it
is complicated.
" I own I cannot bring my mind to approve of the
limited service ; the more I reflect on it, the more I dread
its effects. I doubt if a single man will be induced by
it to come into the army who would not have enlisted
at any rate. And I wish that for the present Mr.
Windham had been satisfied with raising the pay of
the non-commissioned officers, bettering the Chelsea
pensioners, and giving the soldier a right, at the expira-
tion of twenty-one years, to his discharge, and to a
shilling pension, and even more in cases where the Board
thought it requisite ; so that the old soldier, who could
not work, should never be seen but in a comfortable
situation.
" I remain,
" Yours faithfully,
"JOHN MOORE."
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 29
" Observations on a paper sent by Colonel Craufurd.
" The numbers in the margin refer to similar numbers
in the Colonel's paper.
" 2. I cannot reconcile myself to the intention of dis-
charging men in time of war. In the militia it was
proved not to answer ; but in the line the incon-
veniences are tenfold. But if it is adopted, the power
of extending the service for six months must, when
troops are abroad, be given to the military com-
mander in peace as well as in war. The military
commander may be enjoined and when once it is
the law, there is no reason to doubt his obedience to
it to send the soldiers, whose periods are expired,
home by the first opportunity ; but until such
opportunity offers, there seems a necessity that the
men, who are to continue to receive military pay and
allowances, should continue for the time soldiers,
and be subject to military discipline. Men of this
description left loose upon the public in foreign
garrisons, with money in their pockets, would commit
every disorder. It is even for their own sakes that
they should be under control.
"And I see no reason why, during the short time
they are thus detained, they should receive the
additional pay, which is intended as a reward to the
soldier who re-enlists. Should such men be put for
a moment in every respect on a footing with the
soldier who continues to serve his country ?
30 GENERAL CRAUFURD
" The addition of a shilling a day, if paid to him
at the time, would encourage irregularity, and lead
him to acts which it would be impossible not to
punish.
" 3. Some expedient must be fallen upon to prevent the
men, whose periods are expired when in America and
the West Indies, from going into the States, or from
settling with the planters. To this they will receive
such encouragement that, if means are not taken to
prevent it, no man will ever re-enlist when in those
stations.
" 4. The additional penny and twopence proposed to be
added to the soldier's pay, at the end of the first and
second periods, is too trifling a sum to induce men, in
the first instance, to enter the service. The pay of
the soldier is already ample, perhaps too much so,
and no addition can be made to it without hurting
the service.
" As an inducement to recruits, this addition will
have no effect ; and upon soldiers to continue, after
the expiration of their periods, it will have very little.
It is by a bounty that the latter will be tempted;
and as the bad consequences of a bounty are more
transitory, it will injure the service less.
" After twenty-one years' service many men will
be found able and willing to serve ; and as soldiers
of this description are invaluable, they should be
encouraged to continue with their regiments. It is
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 31
to such men, if any, that I should be inclined to
give additional pay, and I should not think three-
pence a day too much. I would give them no
bounty, and make the periods after twenty-one only
for three years.
"The pay of the non-commissioned officers was
not raised, some years ago, in the same proportion
with that of the men. It is by making their situation
comfortable that a portion of the more respectable
part of the population may be tempted into the
army. The sergeants should have two shillings a
day, the corporals one and sixpence. The pay of the
sergeant-majors and quarter-master-sergeants should
be raised. I believe it is now half-a-crown ; it might
be three shillings or three and sixpence.
" Upon re-enlisting, non-commissioned officers
may have the same bounty as the privates ; and
sergeants who had served fourteen years, and had
been non-commissioned officers seven years, might
receive an addition of threepence or sixpence a day.
To corporals it may not be necessary to give any
increase ; if they have real merit, they will be pro-
moted, and it is useful to excite their emulation.
5. I see no necessity of any intermediate rank or class
between the private and the corporals ; and I shall
always disapprove of the powers of selection to rank
or emolument in a regiment being vested in other
hands than those of the colonel or commanding
32 GENERAL CRAUFURD
officer. This class is a refinement taken from some
of the foreign services, neither necessary nor in the
spirit of ours. We had better content ourselves, as
heretofore, with plain sergeants and corporals, make
their situations comfortable, and increase their
number, if necessary, and leave to commanding
officers who have modes of gratifying and dis-
tinguishing deserving old soldiers.
"6. Men discharged at any period of their service for
wounds, infirmities, etc., to receive sixpence per day,
or ninepence, or a shilling as a pension, or to be put
into a veteran battalion, at the option of the Com-
mander-in-chief or the Chelsea Board.
" This certainty of being taken care of is a great
encouragement to men to enter and afterwards to
continue in the service. I cannot, therefore, think
that a man at the end of fourteen years' service, who
is still young and without ailment, if he refuses to
re-enlist, is entitled from his service to any pension.
Men of this description are most valuable; every
encouragement should be given to them to continue
in the service, and no temptation to withdraw from
it. If they withdraw, they should forfeit all the
advantages of their former service. If they re-enlist,
at the end of twenty-one years they get the shilling
pension ; but to place men of this kind in veteran
battalions is to mix with the weak and infirm the
very best soldiers in the service. It would be better
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 33
far to form privileged corps of them, give them
superior advantages, and make them the elite of the
army.
" It is thought, from the returns which have lately
been called for, that a very small proportion of our
soldiery ever attain fourteen years' service. The
returns of the present army may lead to this con-
clusion ; but it must be recollected that we are now
only recovering from the effects of a very destructful
St. Domingo and West India war, which, together
with the great augmentation made recently to the
army, renders the number of old soldiers at this
moment proportionally small. A great part of our
force at the end of the last war was for limited service,
and was disbanded at the peace.
" 7. A soldier who at any period of his service is disbanded,
at a peace, from reduction of establishment, if he
registers, which is, I apprehend, a declaration of his
wish to remain or to re-enter the service, upon re-
entering it is but just that he should get credit for his
former service, and be entitled to all its advantages.
But the service of the line should be held so high that
no service of any other kind should be substituted for
it, nor any person entitled to the rewards it holds out
by other than actual service in the line.
"8. The veteran battalions being composed of men dis-
charged from the regiments of the line as unfit for
active service, but deemed by the Commander-in-chief
D
34 GENERAL CRAUFURD
fit for garrison and home duties, if after twenty-one
years they are able and still willing to continue in
them, may receive the additional threepence a day, as
is proposed to similar men in the Line.
"9. Instead of what is here proposed, which will act as a
bribe to non-commissioned officers to retire from the
service, whom it is most desirable to retain, I should
propose a rate of Chelsea to be established for
sergeants and corporals, to which such alone were
entitled who had served seven years in their respective
ranks, and were discharged with good characters. To
this might be added, for cases of superior merit, an
increase in the pay and in the number of letter men.*
"J. MOORE, Lieut.-General."
" Having already explained the principle upon which
I found the propriety of increasing the pay of the Field
Officers and Captains of the army much beyond that of
the subalterns, the following rates are submitted
PRESENT PAY.
PROPOSED PAY.
s.
d.
*
d.
Lieut-Colonels
15
ii
I O
o
Majors
H
i
17
o
Captains
9
5
14
Lieutenants
5
8
7
o
Ensigns
4
8
5
Adjutants
8
9
Quartermasters
5
8
7
" The Field Officers, Adjutants, and Quartermasters to
* Letter men were those of the pensioners at Chelsea who had a letter from
the King to the Commissioners authorizing them to increase their pensions.
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 35
have, besides, forage for the horses they are obliged to
keep by regulation ; and if not all the above regimental
officers, at least from the Captains inclusive down, to be
exempt from the Income Tax. *
"J. M."
* Some of the proposals here criticized by Moore originated with Mr.
Windham, and were not Craufurd's own ideas.
36 GENERAL CRAUFURD
CHAPTER IV.
THE RETREAT TO VIGO, WITH A LETTER FROM SIR
JOHN MOORE, AND ANECDOTES FROM " RIFLEMAN
HARRIS."
IN October, 1808, Craufurd sailed from Falmouth with
Sir David Baird, for the Peninsula, and apparently even
then had command of the Light Brigade of the Corps
which Baird was ordered to take to the assistance of Sir
John Moore. But there was some difficulty as to giving
Craufurd this command, or allowing him to retain it, as will
be seen from the following unpublished letter addressed
by Sir John Moore to him after his arrival.
"Salamanca, November 13, 1808.
" MY DEAR COLONEL,
" I had the pleasure of your letter of the 3rd.
I hope you do not doubt my wish to oblige you. I feel
how unpleasant it would be to descend from a rank once
held, and I should have much satisfaction in relieving you
from that, as any other thing that was disagreeable to you ;
but you are notified to me, not as Brigadier, but as Colonel
upon the Staff. Not only so, but it has been added that,
as this may be disagreeable to you, to descend from a rank
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 37
you once held, it has been signified to you that, if you
choose it, you have the Duke's permission to return to
England. I should be most sorry, were you to accept this
alternative, and I hope to give you a command you will
like. But I cannot give you a rank the Duke does not
choose to give you, and which, at any rate, exceeds my
power. As to the arrangement you propose of Brigades
and Divisions, I need only say it is so contrary to what I
think proper for the army, that I need trouble you no
further on that score. The army will be organized, when
united, in the manner which is thought best generally for
the service, without regard to the "regiments coming from
Corunna or Lisbon ; and the plan you propose would be
unjust to other officers.
" I hope you will see all this as it is meant, and that
you will believe that no one regards or esteems you
higher than, my dear Craufurd,
" Yours faithfully,
"JOHN MOORE."
The difficulty here mentioned by Moore seems to have
been got over in some way ; for Craufurd retained the
rank of Brigadier, and had command of the Light Brigade,
numbering about three thousand men. Until separated
from the main body of Moore's army, Craufurd, after the
junction of the forces, and the beginning of the retreat,
was given the charge of the rear guard, a post requiring
extraordinary quickness and readiness.
38 GENERAL CRAUFURD
Baird's forces united with those of Sir John Moore
at Mayorga, on December 20. After this they at first
advanced ; but before long Moore received intelligence
which made it absolutely necessary to retreat as rapidly
as possible; otherwise he would have been surrounded.
Even as things were, his retreat was exceedingly dan-
gerous.
During the earlier days of this retreat, Craufurd's duty
was to check the advance of the enemy as much as
possible, in order that the rest of the army might be able
to retire.
The circumstances under which Moore began his
enforced retrograde movement were eminently disagreeable.
Quartermaster Surtees, of the 95th Rifles, says: "Winter
had now completely set in, the face of the country being
covered with deep snow ; the weather was unusually
severe. Our prospect, therefore, was by no means a
pleasant one. To commence a retreat in front of a
greatly superior force, and with the probability that other
French armies might be before us, and intercept our
retreat upon the sea, which was distant from us nearly
two hundred and fifty miles, with the country in our re.ar
already exhausted of everything that could contribute to
our support, and with such excessively bad weather,
rendered it as unpleasant a situation as troops could well
be placed in. Added to which, our commissariat was by
no means so efficient in those days as they have latterly
become ; and our troops in general, being young and
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 39
unaccustomed to privation, it was but too obvious that,
should the retreat continue long, many would be the
disasters attending it. On Christmas Day, our Brigade,
as the rear of the infantry, commenced its uncomfortable
retreat."
At this time Craufurd's Brigade performed efficient
service at the bridge of Castro Gonzalo : " The Com-
mander-in-chief approached the bridge of Castro Gonzalo
early in the morning of December 26 ; but the stores
were a long time passing, a dense fog intercepted the
view, and so nicely timed was the march, that the scouts
of the imperial horsemen were already infesting the flank
of the column, and even carried off some of the baggage.
The left bank of the river commanded the bridge, and
General Robert Craufurd remained with a brigade of
infantry and two guns to protect the passage ; for the
cavalry was still watching Soult, who was now pressing
forward in pursuit " {Napier).
This bridge of Castro Gonzalo was much menaced by
the light cavalry of the imperial guard, who rode close up
to the bridge, captured some women and baggage, and
endeavoured to surprise the post. And on this occasion,
as Napier relates, two private soldiers of the 43rd, John
Walton and Richard Jackson displayed something of that
extraordinary discipline and marvellous courage which
afterwards made their regiment one of the very greatest
in the world.
Napier tells us "on the 27th, the cavalry and the
40 GENERAL CRAUFURD
stragglers being all over the river, Craufurd commenced
destroying the bridge amidst torrents of rain and snow ;
half the troops worked ; the other half kept the enemy
at bay from the heights on the left bank ; for the cavalry
scouts of the imperial guard were spread over the plain.
At ten o'clock at night a large party, following some
waggons, again endeavoured to pass the piquets and
gallop down to the bridge ; that failing, a few dismounted,
and extending to the right and left, commenced a skir-
mishing fire, whilst others remained ready to charge, if
the position of the troops, which they expected to
ascertain by this scheme, should offer an opportunity.
They failed, and this anxiety to interrupt the work induced
Craufurd to destroy two arches instead of one, and blow
up the connecting buttress. The masonry was so solid
that it was not until twelve o'clock in the night of the
28th that all preparations were completed, when the
troops descended the heights on the left bank, and passing
very silently by single files, and over planks laid across
the broken arches, gained the other side without loss."
This was a bold and perilous measure, as the enemy might
have attacked during it ; but its success was perfect. And
Craufurd then marched to Benevente, where the cavalry
and the reserve still remained.
On December 31, Moore's forces were divided. Quarter-
master Surtees, of the 95th Rifles, informs us thus : "Till
now our Brigade had formed the rear of the infantry, there
being some cavalry in rear of us ; but it was now deter-
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 41
mined that ours and the Light German Brigade under
Brigadier-General Charles Alten, should strike off from
the great road (to Corunna) and take the route for Orense
and Vigo. This was done, I understand, with a view to
secure a passage across the Minho at the former place,
should Sir John with the main army be compelled to
retreat in that direction, and probably with the view also
of drawing off a part of the enemy's overwhelming force
from the pursuit of that body, and to induce them to
follow us into the mountains. Notwithstanding this, they
continued to pursue Sir John on the great road, whilst they
left us free altogether."
So now Robert Craufurd was left alone in independent
command of that Light Brigade which afterwards acquired
such undying distinction under him. His regiments now
were the 2nd battalion of the 95th Rifles, a battalion of the
43rd, and also one of the 52nd.
During this terribly trying and rapid retreat the General
took note of many defects in our way of marching, and
gathered many wise hints and suggestions which he after-
wards collected together in his famous " Standing Orders
for the Light Division," a work by which he left his mark
permanently on the British army.
On January i, 1809, began their march by a most
difficult road through the mountains, which were then
covered with snow. Food was extremely scarce, and
during the next few days want and fatigue compelled
many to fall out, some of whom, no doubt, perished in
42 GENERAL CRAUFURD
the snow on the bleak mountains ; others fell into the
hands of the enemy, and some few rejoined their regi-
ments after having obtained some little refreshment from
the natives.
The little army reached Orense'on January 7, having
previously pushed on, by double forced marches, a few
hundred men, to take possession of the bridge over the
Minho at this place. There they remained for a day, and
obtained provisions for the men, who were literally starving.
Their condition at this time was wretched, as their shoes
were nearly all worn out, and many were travelling with
bare feet. But their minds were now more at ease in one
respect, in that they had 'secured the passage of the Minho,
and thus prevented the enemy from getting in before
them ; for strong fears had been felt that the French would
have detached a corps from their main body to seize this
pass, and thus cut off their retreat to Vigo.
On the gth they left Orense, and in a few days more
reached Vigo, and were put on board the vessels destined
to take them home. But before starting they waited some
days in order to give stragglers a chance of coming in.
From Vigo they then went home to England.
I will now proceed to give some extracts from the
" Recollections of Rifleman Harris," a private in the bat-
talion of the 95th Rifles serving under General Craufurd
in this retreat. The book is both scarce and very amusing ;
and it is full of stories about the General, to whom this
private soldier was extremely devoted. I make no apology
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 43
for offering to the public so many expressions of the
thoughts and feelings of what the world calls a " common
soldier; " for I know well, from prolonged and most friendly
intercourse with the men, how keen an observer and how
just a judge the private soldier often is of those who
exercise command over him ; and I confess that in my
opinion it is usually the fault of the officers themselves
when they are permanently disliked by their men.
The book from which I am about to quote is a book
of anecdotes, and not a history, and consequently it is not
arranged in any precise chronological order.
Concerning the officers of those days Harris writes :
"The officers too are commented upon and closely
observed. The men are very proud of those who are brave
in the field, and kind and considerate to the soldiers under
them. An act of kindness done by an officer has often
during the battle been the cause of his life being saved.
" They are a strange set, the English, and so determined
and unconquerable, that they will have their way if they
can. Indeed it requires one who has authority in his face,
as well as at his back, to make them respect and obey him.
They see too often, in the instance of sergeant-majors, that
command does not suit ignorant and coarse-minded men,
and that tyranny is too much used in the brief authority
which they have. A soldier, I am convinced, is driven
often to insubordination by being worried by these little-
minded men for the veriest trifles, about which the gentle-
man never thinks of tormenting him. The moment the
44 GENERAL CRAUFURD '.'
seventy of the discipline of our army is relaxed, in my
opinion, farewell to its efficiency ; but for our men to be
tormented about trifles (as I have seen at times) is often
very injurious to a whole corps."
It might be well, even in these days, if the above
remarks of this brave rifleman were read, marked, learnt,
and inwardly digested by many.
This narrative begins before Craufurd's Light Brigade
was separated from the main army under Sir John Moore.
During this earlier period Harris received, through Quarter-
master Surtees, a very peremptory order to exercise his
skill. " Now, Harris," said he, " keep your eyes open, and
mind what you are about here. General Craufurd orders
you instantly to set to work, and sew up every one of these
barrels in the hides lying before you. You are to sew the
skins with the hair outwards, and be quick about it, for
the General swears that if the job is not finished in half-
an-hour, he will hang you."
" The latter part of this order was anything but
pleasant ; and whether the General ever really gave it, I
never had an opportunity of ascertaining. I only know
that I give the words as they were given me ; and, well
knowing the stuff Craufurd was made of, I received the
candle from the hands of Surtees, and bidding the men
get needles and waxed thread from their knapsacks, as the
Quartermaster withdrew, I instantly prepared to set about
the job."
After the retreat began, Harris writes concerning his
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 45
leader : " As we passed the walls of the convent, I
observed our General (Craufurd) as he sat upon his horse,
looking at us on the march, and remarked the peculiar
sternness of his features ; he did not like to see us going
rearwards at all ; and many of us judged there must be
something wrong by his severe look and scowling eye.
"'Keep your ranks there, men/ he said, spurring his
horse towards some riflemen who were avoiding a small
rivulet. 'Keep your ranks, and move on, no straggling
from the main body.' "
Their sufferings from fatigue and want of food were
now very great, and the men began to wonder if they
were ever to be halted again. " Many, even at this period,
would have straggled from the ranks and perished, had
not Craufurd held them together with a firm rein. One
such bold and stern commander in the East, during a
memorable disaster, and that devoted army had reached
its refuge unbroken ! Thus we staggered on, night and
day, for about four days, before we discovered the reason
of this continued forced march."
An Irish rifleman then asks one of his officers where
they were being taken to, and the officer replies : " to
England, if we can get there''
The men soon began to murmur at not being permitted
to turn and stand at bay, cursing the French, and swearing
they would rather die ten thousand deaths, with their rifles
in their hands in opposition, than endure the present toil.
They also heard at this time sounds of fighting between
46 GENERAL CRAUFURD
the French and our main army under Moore ; and this
made their present position all the more tantalizing.
Harris remarks : " Craufurd seemed to sniff the sound of
battle from afar with peculiar feelings. He halted us for
a few minutes occasionally, when the distant clamour
became more distinct ; and his face turned towards the
sound, and seemed to light up and become less stern. It
was then indeed, that every poor fellow clutched his
weapon more firmly, and wished for a sight of the enemy."
About this time the French were very near. Craufurd
ordered his riflemen to conceal themselves amongst the
hills. And Harris and a bold comrade climbed to the
very top of a mountain, to have a good look at the enemy.
They here came into very close quarters indeed with some
of the French. And " about a quarter of an hour after
this, as we still lay in the gully, I heard some person
clambering up behind us, and upon turning quickly round,
I found it was General Craufurd. The General was
wrapped in his great coat, and, like ourselves, had been
for many hours drenched to the skin, for the rain was
coming down furiously. He carried in his hand a canteen
full of rum and a small cup, with which he was occasion-
ally endeavouring to refresh some of the men. He offered
me a drink, as he passed, and then proceeded onwards
along the ridge. After he had emptied his canteen, he
came past us again, and himself gave us instructions as to
our future proceedings."
Though he was so extremely strict as to discipline, it
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 47
is plain that Craufurd really cared for his men, and did all
he could to help them. The keen eyes of young William
Napier soon perceived this ; for when writing home to his
mother on November 10, 1808, he observes: "I like our
General, Craufurd, much ; he is very attentive to the men."
And later on in this harassing retreat our rifleman tells
us, "Our men, spite of the vigilance of the General, seemed
many of them resolved to stray into the open country,
rather than traverse the road before them. The coming
night favoured their designs, and many were, before
morning, lost to us through their own wilfulness."
On this occasion even the faithful Harris straggles
away and is lost, and sticks fast in a morass, together
with a comrade. But by-and-by some lights seem to
approach them. "The lights, we now discovered, were
furnished by bundles of straw and dried twigs, tied on
the ends of long poles, and dipped in tar. They were
borne in the hands of several Spanish peasants, from a
village near at hand, whom Craufurd had thus sent to our
rescue. He had discovered, on reaching and halting in
this village, the number of men that had strayed from
the main body, and immediately ordering the torches I
have mentioned to be prepared, he collected together a
party of Spanish peasants, and obliged them to go out
into the open country, and seek for his men, as I have
said ; by which means he saved on that night many from
death."
The wilfulness and folly of his men often caused
48 GENERAL CRAUFURD
General Craufurd to treat them severely : but they never
made him in any way indifferent to them or neglectful of
their welfare. Hence it came to pass that in this most
trying retreat, the men identified themselves with their
leader, and endured at his hands punishments which in
all probability they would not have endured, if inflicted
on them by an ordinary General of the commonplace sort.
The fiery temper of the commander was by no means
entirely uncongenial to his followers these fierce riflemen
would have cared little for a meek and mild General
and his unfeigned solicitude for their comfort, combined
with his good sense and keen appreciation of the humorous,
secured to him much of .the affection and loyalty of his
men, as well as much of their admiration.
Concerning the great difficulties and trials of this
retreat, Harris writes thus : " Being constantly in rear
of the main body, the scenes of distress and misery I
witnessed were dreadful to contemplate, particularly
amongst the women and children, who were lagging and
falling behind, their husbands and fathers being in the
main body in our front. We now came to the edge of a
deep ravine, the descent so steep and precipitous that it
was impossible to keep our feet in getting down, and we
were sometimes obliged to sit and slide along on our
backs ; whilst before us rose a ridge of mountains quite
as steep and difficult of ascent. There was, however, no
pause in our exertions ; but, slinging our rifles round our
necks, down the hill we went ; whilst mules, with the
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 49
baggage on their backs, weaned and urged beyond their
strength, were seen rolling from top to bottom, many of
them breaking their necks with the fall, and the baggage
crushed, smashed, and abandoned."
" After the snow commenced, the hills became so slip-
pery (being in many parts covered with ice) that several
of our men frequently slipped and fell ; and being unable
to rise, gave themselves up to despair, and died. There
was now no endeavour to assist one another after a fall ;
it was every one for himself, and God for us all ! "
" I remember, among other matters, that we were
joined, if I may so term it, by a young recruit, when such
an addition was anything but wished for during the
disasters of the hour. One of the men's wives, who was
struggling forward in the ranks with us, presenting a
ghastly picture of illness, misery, and fatigue, being
very large in the family-way, towards evening stepped
from amongst the crowd, and lay herself down amidst
the snow, a little out of the main road. Her husband
remained with her ; and I heard one or two hasty observa-
tions amongst our men, that they had taken possession of
their last resting-place. The enemy, indeed, were not far
behind at this time, the night was coming down, and
their chance seemed in truth but a bad one. To remain
behind the column of march in such weather was to perish ;
and we accordingly soon forgot all about them. To my
surprise, however, some little time afterwards I, being
myself then in the rear of our party, again saw the
E
50 GENERAL CRAUFURD
woman. She was hurrying with her husband after us,
and in her arms she carried the babe she had just given
birth to. Her husband and herself between them managed
to carry that infant to the end of the retreat, where we
embarked. God tempers the wind, it is said, to the
shorn lamb ; and many years afterwards I saw that boy
a strong and healthy lad.
" The shoes and boots of our party were now mostly
either destroyed or useless to us from foul roads and long
miles, and many of the men were entirely barefooted,
with knapsacks and accoutrements altogether in a dilapi-
dated state. The officers were also, for the most part, in
as miserable a plight. They were pallid, wayworn, their
feet bleeding, and their faces overgrown with beards of
many days' growth. Many of the poor fellows, now near
sinking with fatigue, reeled as if in a state of drunkenness,
and altogether I thought we looked the ghosts of our
former selves. Still, we held on resolutely ; our officers
behaved nobly ; and Craufurd was not to be daunted by
long miles, fatigue, or foul weather. Many a man in that
retreat caught courage from his stern eye and gallant
bearing. Indeed, I do not think the world ever saw a
more perfect soldier than General Craufurd."
" When about a couple of miles from this village,
Craufurd again halted us for about a quarter of an hour.
It appeared to me that, with returning daylight, he wished
to have a good look at us this morning ; for he niingled
amongst the men as we stood leaning upon our rifles,
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 51
gazing earnestly in our faces as he passed, in order to
judge of our plight by our countenances. He himself
appeared anxious, but full of fire and spirit, occasionally
giving directions to the different officers, and then speaking
words of encouragement to the men. It is my pride now
to remember that General Craufurd seldom omitted a
word in passing to myself. On this occasion he stopped
in the midst, and addressed a few words to me, and
glancing down at my feet, observed, ' What ! no shoes,
Harris ; I see, eh ? ' ' None, sir,' I replied ; * they have
been gone many days back/ He smiled, and passing on,
spoke to another man, and so on through the whole body.
" Craufurd was, I remember, terribly severe during this
retreat if he caught anything like pilfering amongst the
men. As we stood, however, during this short halt, a very
tempting turnip-field was close on the side of us, and
several of the men were so ravenous that, although he
was in our very ranks, they stepped into the field and
helped themselves to the turnips, devouring them like
famishing wolves. He either did not or would not observe
the delinquency this time, and soon afterwards gave the
Word, and we moved on once more."
" About this period I remember another sight which
I shall not to my dying day forget ; and it causes me a
sore heart, even now, as I remember it. Soon after our
halt beside the turnip-field, the screams of a child near
me caught my ear, and drew my attention to one of our
women, who was endeavouring to drag along a little boy
52 GENERAL CRAUFURD
of about seven or eight years old. The poor child was
apparently completely exhausted, and his legs failing
under him. The mother had occasionally, up to this
time, been assisted by some of the men taking it in turn
to help the little fellow on ; but now all further appeal
was vain. No man had more strength than was necessary
for the support of his own carcase, and the mother could
no longer raise the child in her arms, as her reeling pace
too plainly showed. Still, however, she continued to drag
the child along with her. It was a pitiable sight, and won-
derful to behold the efforts the poor woman made to keep
the boy amongst us. At last the little fellow had not even
strength to cry, but, with mouth wide open, stumbled
onwards until both sank down to rise no more. . . . Poor
creatures ! they must have bitterly regretted not having
accepted the offer which was made to them to embark at
Lisbon for England, instead of accompanying their hus-
bands into Spain. The women, however, I have often
observed, are most persevering in such cases, and are not
to be persuaded that their presence is often a source of
anxiety to the corps they belong to."
"Rifleman Harris" was extremely devoted to his
General, concerning whom he writes at considerable
length and tells several interesting anecdotes.
, He says, "I do not think I ever admired any man
who wore the British uniform more than I did General
Craufurd. I could fill a book with descriptions of him ;
for I frequently had my eye on him in the hurry of action.
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 53
It was gratifying, too, to me to think that he did not
altogether think ill of me, since he has often addressed
me kindly when, from adverse circumstances, you might
have thought that he had scarcely spirits to cheer up the
men under him. The Rifles liked him ; but they also
feared him, for he could be terrible when insubordination
showed itself in the ranks. 'You think, because you are
riflemen, you may do whatever you think proper ; ' said
he, one day, to the miserable and savage-looking crew
around him in the retreat to Corunna : * but I'll teach you
the difference before I have done with you.'
" I remember one evening, during the retreat, he
detected two men straying away from the main body ;
it was in the early stage of that disastrous flight, and
Craufurd knew well that he must do his utmost to keep
the Division together. He halted the Brigade with a voice
of thunder, ordered a drum-head court-martial on the
instant, and they were sentenced to a hundred apiece*
Whilst this hasty trial was taking place, Craufurd dis-
mounting from his horse, stood in the midst, looking stern
and angry as a worried bull-dog. He did not like re-
treating at all, that man.
" The three men nearest him as he stood were Jagger,
Dan Howans, and myself. All were worn, dejected, and
savage, though nothing to what we were after a few
days more of the retreat. The whole Brigade were in a
grumbling and discontented mood ; and Craufurd doubtless
felt ill pleased with the aspect of affairs altogether.
54 GENERAL CRAUFURD
" ' D n his eyes/ muttered Howans, ' he had much
better try to get us something to eat and drink than
harass us in this way.'
" No sooner had Howans disburdened his conscience
of this growl, than Craufurd, who had overheard it,
turning sharply round, seized the rifle out of Jagger's
hand, and felled him to the earth with the butt-end.
" ' It was not I who spoke,' said Jagger, getting up and
shaking his head. ' You shouldn't knock me about.'
" ' I heard you, sir,' said Craufurd, and I will bring you
also to a court-martial.'
" ' I am the man who spoke,' said Howans.
" 'Very well,' returned Craufurd, 'then I'll try you, sir.'
"And accordingly, when the other affair was disposed
of, Howans' case came on. By the time the three men
were tried, it was too dark to inflict the punishment.
Howans, however, had got the complement of three
hundred promised to him ; so Craufurd gave the word
to the Brigade to move on. He marched all that night
on foot ; and when the morning dawned, I remember
that, like the rest of us, his hair, beard, and eyebrows
were covered with the frost, as if he had grown white
with age. We were, indeed, al) of us in the same con-
dition. Scarcely had I time to notice the appearance
of morning, before the General once % more called a halt.
We were then on the hills. Ordering a square to be
formed, he spoke to the Brigade, as well as I can re-
member, in these words, after having ordered the three
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 55
before-named men of the 95th to be brought into the
square.
"'Although/ said he, 'I should obtain the good will
neither of the officers nor of the men of the Brigade here
by so doing, I am resolved to punish these three men
according to the sentence awarded, even though the
French are at our heels. Begin with Daniel Howans.'
" This was indeed no tijne to be lax in discipline, and
the General knew it. The men, as I said, were some of
them becoming careless and ruffianly in their demeanour ;
whilst others, again, I saw with the tears falling down
their cheeks from the agony of their bleeding feet ; and
many were ill with dysentery from the effects of the bad
food they Jiad got hold of and devoured on the roac[.
Our knapsacks, too, were a bitter enemy on this prolonged
march. Many a man died, I am convinced, who would
have borne up well to the end of the retreat, but for the
infernal load we carried on our backs. My own knapsack
was my bitterest enemy ; I felt it press me to the earth
almost at times, and mpre than once felt as if I should
die under its deadly embrace. The knapsacks, in my
opinion, should have been abandoned at the very com-
mencement of the retrograde movement, as it would have
been better to have lost them altogether, if by such loss
we could have saved the poor fellows who, as it was, died
strapped to them on the road.
" There was some difficulty in finding a place to tie
Howans up, as the Light Brigade carried no halberts.
56 GENERAL CRAUFURD
However, they led him to a slender ash tree "which grew
near at hand.
"'Don't trouble yourselves about tying me up,' said
Howans, folding his arms ; ' I'll take my punishment like
a man.'
"He did so without a murmur, receiving the whole
three hundred. His wife, who was present with us, I
remember, was a strong, hardy Irishwoman. When it
was over, she stepped up and covered Howans with his
grey great-coat. The General then gave the word to
move on. I rather think he knew the enemy was too
near to punish the other two delinquents just then ; so
we proceeded out of the corn-field in which we had been
halted, and toiled away upon the hills once more,
Howans' wife carrying the jacket, knapsack, and pouch
which the lacerated state of the man's back would not
permit him to bear.
" It could not have been, I should think, more than an
hour after the punishment had been inflicted upon Howans,
when the General again gave the word for the Brigade to
halt, and once more formed them into square. We had
begun to suppose that he intended to allow the other two
delinquents to escape, under the present difficulties and
hardships of the retreat. He was not, however, one of the
forgetful sort, when the discipline of the army under him
made severity necessary.
"'Bring out the two other men of the 95th/ said he,
' who were tried last night.'
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 57
"The men were brought forth accordingly, and their
lieutenant-colonel, Hamilton-Wade, at the same time
stepped forth. He walked up to the General, and, lowering
his sword, requested that he would forgive these men, as
they were both of them good soldiers, and had fought in
all the battles of Portugal.
" ' I order you, sir,' said the General, ' to do your duty.
These men shall be punished.'
"The lieutenant-colonel, therefore, recovering his
sword, turned about, and fell back to the front of the
Rifles. One of the men, upon this, I think it was Arm-
strong, immediately began to unstrap his knapsack, and
prepare for the lash. Craufurd had turned about mean-
while, and walked up to one side of the square. Apparently
he suddenly relented a little, and again turning sharp
round, returned towards the two prisoners. ' Stop,' said
he ; 'in consequence of the intercession of your lieutenant-
colonel, I will allow you thus much. You shall draw lots,
and the winner shall escape ; but one of the two I am
determined to make an example of.'
"The square was formed in a stubble-field, and the
sergeant-major of the Rifles, immediately stooping down,
plucked up two straws, and the men, coming forward, drew.
I cannot be quite certain, but I think it was Armstrong
who drew the longest straw, and won the safety of his
hide ; and his fellow gamester was in quick time tied to
a tree, and the punishment commenced. A hundred was
the sentence ; but when the bugler had counted seventy-
58 GENERAL CRAUFURD
five, the General granted him a further indulgence, and
ordered him to be taken down, and to join his company.
The General, calling for his horse, now mounted for the
first time for many hours ; for he had not ridden all night,
not indeed since the drum-head court-martial had taken
place. Before he put the Brigade in motion again, he gave
us another short specimen of his eloquence, pretty much,
I remember, after this style : ' I give you all notice that I
will halt tjie Brigade again the very first moment I per-
ceive any man (disobeying my orders, and try him by
court-martial on the spot.'
" Many who read this, especially in these peaceful
times, may suppose this was a cruel and unnecessary
severity under the drea.dful and harassing circumstances
of that retreat ; but I who was there, and was besides
a common soldier of the very regiment to which these
men belonged, say it was quite necessary. No man but
one formed of stuff like General Craufurd could have
saved the Brigade from perishing altogether ; and, if he
flogged two, he saved hundreds from death by his manage-
ment. I detest the sight of the lash, but I am convinced
the British army can never go on without it. Late events
have taught us the necessity of such measures."
On this subject our rifleman has happily not turned out
a true prophet; but we must remember of what very
rough and often criminal materials the army was composed
in his days, so that soldiers then probably needed a very
different kind of treatment from that which suits them in
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 59
our days. For my own part, I am well convinced that
Sir Charles Napier was right in holding that, in time of
peace, flogging might well have been abandoned very many
years before it actually was.
General Craufurd was always greatly disliked by the
majority of his officers ; but there is ample evidence that
in the end he was much beloved by the men. The follow-
ing story from this rifleman, Harris, well exemplifies the
General's hostility to incompetent or ill-behaved officers in
his Division. " It was perhaps a couple of days after this
had taken place that we came to a river. It was tolerably
wide, but not very deep, which was just as well for us ; for
had it been deep as the dark regions, we must have some-
how or other got through. The avenger was behind us,
and Craufurd was along with us, and the two together
kept us moving, whatever was in the road. Accordingly
into the stream went the Light Brigade, and Craufurd, as
busy as a shepherd with his flock, riding in and out of the
water, to keep his wearied band from being drowned as
they crossed over. Presently he spied an officer, who, to
save himself from being wet through, I suppose, and wear-
ing a damp pair of breeches for the rest of the day, had
mounted on the back of one of his men. The sight of
such a piece of effeminacy was enough to raise the choler
of the General, and in a very short time he was plunging
and splashing through the water after them both.
" ' Put him down, sir, put him down ; I desire you to
put that officer down instantly ! ' And the soldier in an
60 GENERAL CRAUFURD
instant, I dare say nothing loth, dropping his burden like
a hot potato into the stream, continued his progress
through. * Return back, sir/ said Craufurd to the officer,
' and go through the water like the others ; I will not allow
my officers to ride upon the men's backs through the
rivers ; all must take their share alike here.'
" Wearied as we were, this affair caused all who saw
it to shout almost with laughter, and was never forgotten
by those who survived the retreat."
" General Craufurd was, indeed, one of the few men
who was apparently created for command during such
dreadful scenes as we were familiar with in this retreat.
He seemed an iron map ; nothing daunted him ; nothing
turned him from his purpose. War was his very element,
and toil and danger seemed to call forth only an increas-
ing determination to surmount them. I was sometimes
amused with his appearance and that of the men around
us ; for, the Rifles being always at his heels, he seemed
to think them his familiars. If he stopped his horse, and
halted to deliver one of his stern reprimands, you would
see half-a-dozen lean, unshaven, shoeless, and savage
riflemen standing for the moment leaning upon their
weapons, and scowling up in his face as he scolded ; and
when he dashed the spurs into his reeking horse, they
would throw up their rifles upon their shoulders, and
hobble after him again. He was sometimes to be seen
in the front, then in the rear, and then you would fall
in with him again in the midst, dismounted and marching
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 61
on foot, that the men might see he took an equal share
in the toils which they were enduring. He had a mortal
dislike, I remember, to a commissary. Many a time
have I heard him storming at the neglect of those gentry,
when the men were starving for rations, and nothing
but excuses forthcoming. ' Send the commissary to me ! '
he would roar. 'D n him, I will hang him, if the
provisions are not up this night/ "
This last extract from " Rifleman Harris," is peculiarly
interesting as throwing light on the vexed question
whether it was Picton or Craufurd who threatened to
hang the commissary, who thereupon went and com-
plained to Lord Wellington.
It is evident that it was really Craufurd who used the
threat. This opinion is confirmed by other evidence
besides the testimony of Harris. Kincaid, who was for
some time Adjutant of the 95th Rifles under Craufurd,
ascribes the threat to his own General, and not to Picton ;
but he says that the threat was to put the commissary
into the guard-house. Sir William Napier, when criticizing
Robinson's " Life of General Picton," in an appendix to
his history of the Peninsular War, objects to this writer
attributing to his hero (Picton) all the good stories con-
cerning the war, with special reference to this story. From
which one may justly infer that Napier considered that
this famous anecdote had been erroneously attributed to
Picton.
I have also very recently in October, 1890 received
62 GENERAL CRAUFURD
a few lines from General Whichcote, who joined the 52nd
Regiment at the beginning of the year 1811 ; and he says
that he remembers that it was Craufurd who threatened
to hang the commissary, and that the incident occurred
at a place called Alfayates.
The story is so well known that it is scarcely worth
while, perhaps, to repeat it. Still it may be unknown
to some of my readers. General Craufurd threatened to
hang a commissary if the rations for his Division were
not produced at a certain time. Whereupon the com-
missary went to Lord Wellington and complained greatly,
and also asked his advice as to what he had better do.
Apparently Wellington, seemed sympathetic at first ; for
he said, " Did General Craufurd go so far as that ? Did
he actually say he would hang you ? " " Yes, my lord,
he did," said the commissary. To which Wellington
then answered, " Then I should strongly advise you to
get the rations ready ; for if General Craufurd said he
would hang you, by G d, he'll do it."
Harris also writes further concerning his General j
" Twice, I remember, he was in command of the Light
Brigade. The second time he joined them he made, I
heard, something like these remarks, after they had been
some little time in Spain : ' When I commanded you
before, I know full well that you disliked me, for you
thought me severe. This time I am glad to find there is
a change in yourselves" "
Towards the close of this retreat, as they were
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 63
gradually and wearily and dejectedly crawling" to Vigo,
our rifleman again closely observes his trusted leader.
I remember to have again remarked Craufurd at this
period of the retreat. He was no whit altered in his
desire to keep the force together, I thought ; but still
active and vigilant as ever, he seemed to keep his eye
upon those who were now most likely to hold out. I
myself marched during many hours close beside him this
day. He looked stern and pale, but the very picture of
a warrior. I shall never forget Craufurd, if I live to a
hundred years, I think. He was in everything a soldier."
Here I am very reluctantly compelled to say farewell
to this brave, faithful, and intelligent private soldier, whose
simple narrative is so full of interest. After this expe-
dition, Harris served no more under his beloved leader.
His health was utterly destroyed by the fatal Walcheren
expedition, and he had to retire from the army altogether.
But the old soldier's heart was always with the gallant
95th Rifles and their fiery General. And his deep pride
in his old comrades was abundantly nourished and satisfied
as he heard from afar of their marvellous discipline and
steadfast valour in the Peninsular War. The grand march
to Talavera, the fierce combat at the Coa, the brilliant
action at Sabugal, the splendid victory of Busaco, the
cool and unyielding intrepidity displayed at Fuentes
d'Onoro, the 'successful storming of Ciudad Rodrigo, must
all have thrilled this soldier's heart with joy and pride for
his old corps. And, doubtless, this most faithful private
64 GENERAL CRAUFURD
mourned as truly as any one belonging to the army, when
he learnt that those qualities which, in the retreat to Vigo,
he admired so fervently in his old General, had led to his
premature death as he stood alone in advance of his whole
Division at Ciudad Rodrigo.
I am glad to say that in the rest of this volume I shall
have the valuable aid of another of General Craufurd's
riflemen, Edward Costello, a non-commissioned officer,
whose book, "Adventures of a Soldier," is certainly one
of the most amusing and interesting of all the many works
which have been written concerning the most brilliant of
all our many wars.
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 65
CHAPTER V.
CRAUFURD'S SERVICES UNDER WELLINGTON.
ROBERT CRAUFURD did not remain very long in England
after his return from Vigo. Orders were given to the
43rd, the 52nd, and the first battalion of the 95th Rifles,
to prepare for service again, with the least possible delay,
and to form a Brigade under Brigadier-General Robert
Craufurd, their destination being Portugal. On May 25,
1809, they embarked at Dover, and sailed immediately to
the Downs, where they were detained several days by
rough weather. They were again delayed by bad weather
off the Isle of Wight, and finally passed the Needles on
June 1 8. This delay in starting was decidedly unfortunate,
for, had it not occurred, this splendid Brigade would
almost certainly have been with Sir Arthur Wellesley at
the battle of Talavera.
They reached Lisbon on June 28, and were busily
engaged till July 2, in purchasing horses, mules, pack-
saddles, and many other necessities for the coming cam-
paign.
About this time the leader of this Brigade received two
letters of information one from Colonel Bathurst, and
F
66 GENERAL CRAUFURD
the other from General Charles Stewart, who was an
intimate friend of Robert Craufurd, having served with
him in the Austrian campaigns. I give both these letters,
as it is interesting to know how far Craufurd was able to
form any accurate conjecture as to the probability of Sir
Arthur Wellesley giving battle to the enemy.
"Private.
"Castello Branco, July I, 1809.
"DEAR SIR,
" I am sincerely rejoiced that you are arrived,
and I beg to congratulate you on having so fine a Brigade.
"Our latest accounts this day state that Joseph
Bonaparte passed through Toledo, and has joined Victor
with 5000 fresh troops ; and it is said that Sebastiani
has also moved by Toledo for the same purpose. If so,
the enemy will have near 50,000 men at Talavera.
" Cuesta has in consequence given orders to withdraw
his army again behind the Tagus between Almaraz and
Arzobispo. He has about 32,000 men. Venegas has
about 14,000 or 15,000 in La Mancha.
"Ney has abandoned Corunna and withdrawn to
Lugo, and is said to be marching by Villa Franca and
Astorga.
" Soult, with from 8000 to 10,000 men, is on his way, I
imagine, to Zamora.
" Kellerman, etc., have retired from Asturias, and the
forces, supposed to be near 10,000 men, are between Leon,
Salamanca, and Valladolid.
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 67
" Romana is at Orense, and has in all 1 5,000.
" Blake has about 20,000 men, and is opposed to Suchet,
who commands about 15,000 at Saragossa.
" I have sent you this short statement for your private
information, as I thought it might be satisfactory to you,
and therefore beg you will excuse the haste with which I
write.
"We go towards Placentia to-morrow, and I have just
sent off to request Cuesta to establish a bridge over the
Tagus on this side the Tietar, to communicate with us.
" Believe me, with great esteem,
" Dear Sir,
" Ever yours,
" F. BATHURST."
General Charles Stewart (afterwards Lord London-
derry) wrote as follows
"Zarza Mayor, July 3, 1809.
" MY DEAR ROBERT,
" I am much rejoiced to hear of your arrival on
many accounts, and lcng to have some conversation with
you. I sent orders to Lisbon that you might be furnished
with all the general orders given out by the Town Major.
Pray let me know up to what date you have received, and
if any are wanting. The disembarkation returns of your
Brigade are arrived to-day ; one woman only in the 95th.
Happy regiment ! Your friend Elder is the most pleasantly
68 GENERAL CRAUFURD
situated. How did you leave Charles ? What is your
speculation about our old friends the Austrians ? I long
to be on the Danube again ; there is something in this
country I am mortally sick of, and my situation does not
keep me in spirits. We have no news in our part
We move head-quarters on the 5th to Coria, and on the /th
to Placentia. God bless you. Hoping soon to shake you
by the hand,
" Believe me, ever yours most truly,
" CHARLES STEWART."
The following long letter from Mr. Windham, for some
time Minister for War, contains much interesting matter.
" Beaconsfield, July 18, 1809.
"DEAR SIR,
" Though I have long been full of an intention
to write to you, I might have remained possibly in that
state for a considerable time, if the additional drop to
make me flow over had not just been furnished by a
gentleman, who wishes me to give him a letter of introduc-
tion for his son. The gentleman in question saw you, I
think, at the York Hotel at Dover, and felt much obliged
by the leave you gave his son to pass some time with him.
His name is Norris, a physician settled in this neighbour-
hood, and universally esteemed as well for his conduct in
his profession as for his general worth and liberality.
Besides the profits of his profession, he has a competent
private fortune, a circumstance which I mention as showing
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. G9
that his son, who is an only child, had no motive but
liking for entering the army, and may therefore be pre-
sumed to have some of the qualities which may make him
deserving of encouragement in his profession. It was, in
fact, entirely against the wishes of his parents that he went
into the army. His choice was fixed, and _fixed in cir-
cumstances affording a good presumption that it was
formed on right grounds. The object of my application
is only to recommend him to your notice, and to such
favour as he may be found deserving of, and as his
situation (an Ensign in the 52nd) may be capable of.
" We know little for a good while past of your opera-
tions in the Peninsula ; nor are they in fact those which
are of most importance ; though it can never happen that
operations can be indifferent in which credit is to be gained
or lost by our troops, or that I personally should not feel
interested in those in which you may have a part. Our
fate, and that of all Europe, is to be looked for from the
banks of the Danube. But as the issue there may not be
conclusive, nor the cause completely decided one way or
the other, it is of great consequence that things should go
well in other , parts, so as to be ready in case the result
at Vienna should be something short either of complete
success or complete failure, I am, upon that principle, a
great enemy to what we are now doing in sending forth an
immense expedition, for no other object, as I apprehend,
than of destroying the ships and naval preparations of the
enemy in the Schelde. With the notice that they must
70 GENERAL CRAUFURD
have had of our intention, and with the uncertainties
attached to all such operations, there must be a great risk,
notwithstanding the amount of force, of failure. But the
object is, in my opinion, inadequate ; and therefore, de-
spairing of all effectual co-operation with the North of
Germany, I should be of opinion for sending the whole
of this armament to join what we have already in Spain,
so as to make our success in that quarter complete.
" Were the whole of the French force driven out of
Spain, and the Spanish government established throughout,
it must be a very complete triumph of Bonaparte over
the Austrians that could enable the French to get back
into Spain, aided as the Spaniards might continue to be
with the presence of our army. And if Bonaparte, instead
of being successful, should fail against the Austrians, there
is no part more advantageous than Spain from which
operations could be begun against France itself; I mean
with a view of profiting by the troubles which, in the state
of things supposed, could hardly fail to arise in that
kingdom.
" Instead of this, we shall be risking forty thousand men
(the risk not being less when the commander is a person so
totally devoid of experience as Lord Chatham) for the
mere respite to be obtained by the temporary destruction
of ships and arsenals, without any credit to be gained for
our exertions in the cause of Europe, and with little other
motive than that of furnishing a topick of boast for the
ministerial papers during the recess.
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 71
" If there were any expedition (meaning any separate
attempt) by which I would be at all tempted, it would
be one which few would look to, and which could only
be thought of with a view to distant consequences ; I mean
the capture of Belleisle, a place perfectly useless and
unproductive in the first instance, but of inestimable value
in case the exertion of the Austrian armies (the only
external means that now remain) should succeed in
shaking the power of Bonaparte, without being able to
overthrow it. If the dominion of France is ever to be
overturned, it must be, I believe, in part by internal
causes. Till the battles of the 2ist and 22nd of May,
internal causes could alone be looked to ; and if internal
causes are the sources on which we are to depend, I
know no way in which our endeavours can be made to
co-operate so effectually as by the station which I am
speaking of. No such idea, however, has, I take it for
granted, ever entered any one's mind, or would for a
moment be listened to.
" Though I do not urge your writing, knowing how
much your time must be taken up, yet I must not be so
careless about my own satisfaction as not to say how
glad I shall be, if on any occasion you can tell me how
you are going on, as well with respect to yourself person-
ally as with respect to all that is doing and may be
expected. Could Mrs. Windham be reconciled to my
absence, I am far from being sure that I should not make
you a visit, however little capable I am beginning to feel
72 GENERAL CRAUFURD
myself even of such fatigues as a mere residence at head-
quarters would expose me to. I am afraid, indeed, that
such is my state at present ; so it is well, perhaps, that
regard to Mrs. Windham's anxieties puts at once an end
to the question. I should feel otherwise great advantage,
as well as satisfaction, in getting some clinical lectures
from you on the art of war during the course of a cam-
paign. I am greatly inclined to the belief that your
commander, with whom I hope you now are, will exhibit
specimens of a very excellent praxis. I have a great idea
that Sir Arthur possesses what may fairly be called
military genius.
"You will see, by the date of this, from what house
I am writing. I am sitting in the very chair and leaning
on the very desk from which those counsels issued which,
one may fairly say, would have saved the world, had they
been listened to, from half the calamities under which it
is now suffering. What an example have we in this
instance of the difference between man and man, as
operating on the fate of nations ! All such differences
are now overlooked in the present temper of the country ;
and while the whole rage is for pulling the constitution
to pieces, under the notion of looking for abuses, the
conduct of campaigns and wars, and of the political
counsels of the country, are considered as matters of no
consequence. In military warfare, though the contention
is for mutual destruction, there is at least the satisfaction
of contending only against known and avowed enemies ;
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 73
and your friends, by those at least who are in command,
may be made to do what shall be thought best. In
political warfare the chief contention is with the folly,
ignorance, perverseness, and interestedness of those whom
you are endeavouring to serve. But the topick is too long
to go on upon.
" Ever, with great truth and regard,
" Yours,
" W. WlNDHAM.
P.S. Fine sport between Mr. Wardle and Mrs. Clark.
The parliament is to be disgraced and the constitution
to be pulled to pieces, because a majority of the House
of Commons would not give full credit to the assertion
of a witness whom Mr. Wardle now declares, in his own
case, is not to be credited upon her oath ! "
I now return to the movements of General Craufurd
and his Brigade after reaching Lisbon. From a narrative
by Colonel J. Leach, of the 95th Rifles, we learn that,
instead of landing the Brigade at Lisbon, and marching
it to Santarem, it was determined to convey the regiments
in boats to the village of Vallada, forty miles above the
capital, and that the baggage-animals should be sent by
land to Santarem. Accordingly they went to Vallada.
Concerning this Brigade Colonel Leach writes thus
with natural pride : " The three regiments composing the
Light Brigade having now landed, I may observe that
unprejudiced persons, and those neither directly nor
74 GENERAL CRAUFURD
indirectly connected with it, have pronounced it the finest
and most splendid Brigade that ever took the field. I
will venture to go so far as to assert that, if it has been
equalled, it has never been surpassed in any army, whether
the materials of which it was composed, its fine appoint-
ments and arms, its esprit du corps> its style of marching
and manoeuvring, and in short every requisite for a Light
Brigade, be considered. Each regiment was nearly eleven
hundred strong."
To this we may add that in each battalion there were
many soldiers who had seen a good deal of active service.
Some of Craufurd's men had been with him in the terrible
expedition to Buenos ^.yres under General Whitelocke,
and some had fought under Sir John Moore at Corunna.
From Vallada the Brigade marched first to Santarem,
where it halted some little time, waiting for the baggage-
animals, ammunition, and commissariat arrangements.
They then moved on to Abrantes.
Costello, in his interesting book, " Adventures of a
Soldier," remarks, " The excellent orders our Brigadier
issued for maintaining order and discipline on the line of
march, on this occasion, though exceedingly unpopular at
first, have since become justly celebrated in the service."
Craufurd was excessively strict during this march. " But
yet, with all this, strange as it may appear, Craufurd
maintained a popularity among the men, who, on every
other occasion, always found him to be their best friend."
The weather during this famous march was almost
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 75
intolerably hot, and so, for the most part, the troops
moved during the night or very early morning. After
reaching Castello Branco, they encamp near Zarza Mayor
on the 2Oth of July, and arrive at Coria on the 22nd. On
the 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th, they continued their march
under a burning sun. On the 28th they heard sounds of
something like a distant cannonade ; and this caused the
leader of the Light Brigade to make his wonderful march,
in order, if possible, to join Sir Arthur Wellesley before
the righting was over. Concerning this extraordinarily
rapid movement Sir William Napier wrote, " That day
(July 29) Robert Craufurd reached the English camp,
with the 43rd, 52nd, and 95th regiments, and immediately
took charge of the outposts. These troops had been,
after a march of twenty miles, hutted near Malpartida de
Plasencia, when the alarm caused by the Spanish fugi-
tives spread to that part. Craufurd, fearing for the army,
allowed only a few hours' rest ; and then, withdrawing
about fifty of the weakest from the ranks, recommenced
his march with a resolution not to halt until the field of
battle was reached. As the Brigade advanced, crowds of
the runaways were met with, not all Spaniards, but all
propagating the vilest falsehoods * Sir Arthur Wellesley
was killed/ ' The French were only a few miles distant '
nay, some, blinded by their fears, pretended to point out
the enemy's advanced posts on the nearest hills. Indig-
nant at this shameful scene, the troops hastened rather
than slackened their impetuous pace, and, leaving only
76 GENERAL CRAUFURD
seventeen stragglers behind, in twenty-six hours crossed
the field of battle in a close and compact body, having
in that time crossed over sixty-two English miles in the
hottest season of the year, each man carrying from fifty
to sixty pounds weight upon his shoulders. Had the
historian Gibbon known of such a march, he would have
spared his sneer about the delicacy of modern soldiers."
Even after this unprecedented march, the fine appearance
and bearing of Craufurd's splendid Brigade were such as to
evoke the heartiest admiration of the victors of Talavera.
On this occasion, as on so many others in after times,
there was with the Light Brigade " a magnificent troop
of Horse Artillery, under the command of Captain Ross."
Colonel Leach,* of the 95th Rifles, was in this most
renowned march, and tells us much of the frightful labour
and suffering of the soldiers during it. " Each soldier
carried from sixty to eighty rounds of ammunition, a
musket or a rifle, a great coat, and (if I recollect rightly)
a blanket, a knapsack complete with shoes, shirts, etc.,
a canteen and haversack, bayonet, belts, etc. Such a
load, carried so great a distance, would be considered a
hard day's work for a horse. ... It must also be added
that for some days before we had been very scantily
supplied with provisions."
During the whole of this march the soldiers often
suffered much from thirst, as one may gather from the
* The title of Colonel Leach's work is " Rough Sketches of the Life of an
Old Soldier."
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 77
following story of Colonel Leach : " Having reached a
pool of stagnant water near the road, in which cattle had
been watered during the summer, and where they had
constantly wallowed, a halt was ordered for an hour or
two. Those who have never been in similar situations,
may be inclined to doubt my veracity when I state that
the whole Brigade, officers and soldiers, rushed into this
muddy water, and drank with an eagerness and avidity
impossible to describe. The use of such an execrable
beverage, except on extreme occasions like the one in
question, when we had been the whole day without water,
under a sun as oppressive as can be experienced in
Europe, might indeed be deemed extraordinary ; but
excessive thirst knows no law."
The accuracy of Sir William Napier's reckoning as
to the exact length of this march has been questioned in
recent years ; but, even if we make some slight deduction
from the number of- miles, this amazingly rapid move-
ment of the Light Brigade still remains unparalleled in
the British Army, if we take into account the extremely
disadvantageous and trying circumstances under which
it was made. Colonel Leach makes the march fifty miles
in twenty-four hours.
Had Craufurd only known that Sir Arthur Wellesley
was likely to be engaged with the enemy, he might
easily have been in time to join in the battle of Talavera.
But, not knowing this, he moved in a very gradual
manner during the earlier part of the march, on account
78 GENERAL CRAUFURD
of the extreme heat. He was always very careful to
spare his men unnecessary hardship.
Costello informs us that on the battle-field of Talavera
they found the wounded and dying in a fearful condition.
" The long grass, which had taken fire during the action,
was still burning, and added dreadfully to the sufferings
of the wounded and dying of both armies ; their cries for
assistance were horrifying, and hundreds might have been
seen exerting the last remnant of their strength, crawling
to places of safety."
Costello, like almost every one else, formed a very
unfavourable opinion of Wellesley's ally, the Spanish
General, Cuesta, whom- he calls "that deformed-looking
lump of pride, ignorance, and treachery. He was the
most murderous-looking old man I ever saw."
General Craufurd was much pleased that his com-
mander at once intrusted to him the charge of the out-
posts of the army. For this work he was, no doubt,
pre-eminently fitted. Sir George Napier wrote of him,
" His knowledge of outpost duty was never exceeded by
any British General, and I much doubt if there are many
in any other service who know more of that particular
branch of the profession than he did." Lord Wellington
says to Craufurd in a letter dated April 9, 1810, and
published in the Duke's despatches, " Since you have
joined the army, I have always wished that you should
command our outposts, for many reasons into which it is
unnecessary to enter."
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 79
Successful though Wellesley had been at Talavera, his
position was very soon again beset by perils ; and these
were much increased by the almost incredible stupidity
and obstinacy of the fatuous Cuesta. The English com-
mander was soon in considerable danger of being hemmed
in by various French armies ; and it became of the highest
importance to secure a line of retreat. For this pur-
pose, while the English army moved towards Deleytoza,
Craufurd's Brigade and six guns were directed to gain
Almaraz, secure the boat-bridge, and oppose any attempt
to seize the Puerto de Mirabete. This was done with
the greatest rapidity, though the way was very rugged.
Colonel J. Leach writes thus : " To reach and to secure
the bridge of Almaraz was, however, of such vast import-
ance, that if only fifty men of the Division had strength
to accomplish it, push on they must. In reality we were
not certain whether, on our arrival, we should not find
Marshal Soult's army in possession of it ; in which case,
the situation not only of our Division, but of the whole
British army would have been far from enviable." How-
ever, all went well, and the Light Brigade became masters
of this very important bridge. Before long the army fell
back to the neighbourhood of Badajoz, whence there were
safe communications with Lisbon.
It is melancholy to think what a fine and effective rein-
forcement Wellington might have received about this period,
if a large English army had not been destined to waste
its strength in the pestilential marshes of Walcheren.
i
80 GENERAL CRAUFURD
Early in September, 1809, Craufurd's Brigade was
stationed at Campo Mayor, where it remained for about
three months, the head-quarters of the army being at
Badajoz.
Sir Arthur Wellesley wrote rather an interesting letter
to the leader of the Light Brigade from Badajoz on
September 4. In it he says, " I halted at Merida for
some days, in consequence of some letters I received from
Lord Wellesley expressing a desire that I should remain
within the Spanish frontier, at least for a time." He also
says to Craufurd, " I should put you in front on the other
side, only that I think the movement we shall probably
make next will be across the Tagus. The enemy appear
to entertain a design to attack Ciudad Rodrigo. Soult
proposes this operation in a letter to the king which we
have intercepted ; and I think it not improbable that they
will attempt it. If they should attempt it, we must make
an effort to prevent its success ; and I know of none that
would have the effect excepting a movement to that
quarter. If, however, I should be mistaken, and the
enemy should come this way, we could put you in front
before the army could be collected."
It is perhaps worth noticing that Wellington always
spelt the word enemy incorrectly ; he invariably wrote it
"ennemy." I have corrected the error in this volume,
lest it should be attributed to my ignorance.
In this same letter, Sir Arthur Wellesley intimates
that the army was then very flourishing so far as money
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 81
was concerned. " I have given directions that your Com-
missary may be supplied with money. His want of it
hitherto is to be attributed entirely to the Deputy-Commis-
sary-General, as there is more money with the army than
we know what to do with ; and we ought to pay in ready
money for everything we receive."
On September 29, Lord Wellington addressed a long
letter to General Craufurd on the subject of camp-kettles.
He begins by ssiying that he has been for some time very
anxious about the matter, and adds, " I am much obliged
to you for your sentiments on the subject."
The leader of the Light Brigade advocated the use of
tin kettles as being so much lighter and more portable.
But Wellington foresaw various objections to their general
use. " In deciding this question, much depends upon the
care which the officers take of their men, and the degree
of minute attention which they give to their wants.
In a regiment well looked after it is certain that tin
kettles would answer best, as the officers would oblige
the soldiers to take care of them. . . . But in two
thirds of the regiments of this army such care would
not be taken; whether the regiments would have kettles
or not would depend upon that most thoughtless of
animals, the soldier himself; and I should very soon
hear that there were none. . . . Upon the whole, there-
fore, I prefer the iron kettle to the tin for general purposes ;
but I have no objection to try the latter in some of our
best regiments, in order to see how the experiment would
G
82 GENERAL CRAUFURD
answer. I agree with you about the expediency of allow-
ing the captains of companies to ride. The forage re-
quired for this purpose is no object, as forage for two or
three hundred more mules or horses cannot be very difficult
to procure. The objection, I think, is, the increased
number of Bat men and servants which will be taken out
of the ranks, which becomes an object of the^ greatest
consequence/'
Lord Wellington went to Lisbon at the beginning of
October, having determined to create those lines of Torres
Vedras which afterwards proved such an invincible obstacle
to the French. By the middle of November he had re-
turned to Badajoz. He. does not appear to have confided
to the Divisional leaders of the army the highly important
fact of his having created these most formidable lines.
His reticence on this subject was probably injurious in
some respects, by causing his subordinate Generals inadver-
tently to thwart some of his wise schemes.
About December 12, General Craufurd's forces left
Campo Mayor, and marched to Aronches, on their way
to the north of Portugal. On January 4, 1810, they
arrived at Pinhel, quite near to the river Coa, which was
afterwards destined to be so closely associated with the
almost unrivalled activity of the ubiquitous Light Division
during four months of most perilous outpost work.
On January 3, 1810, Wellington writes from Coimbra
to Craufurd : " We have a store of provisions in Almeida,
from which you will draw what you require, if it should be
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 83
necessary, but don't use it unless it is so. ... I wish that
you would desire Captain Campbell, and any other officers
'in your Division who are capable of it, to examine the
course of the Coa which runs by Almeida, and to report
upon it ; and if possible, let me have a plan of it ; like-
wise, if the position of the enemy will allow of it, the
course of the Agueda. . . . Hereafter I shall fix my
head-quarters at Vizeu, and will go forward and pay you
a visit." ,
Colonel Leach tells us that General Craufurd remained
some time at Pinhel with the 43rd and 5 2nd Regiments,
whilst the battalion of the 95th Rifles, with some of the
famous ist German Hussars, were the only troops at first
pushed across the Coa, to observe the enemy's outposts on
the Agueda. These advanced troops crossed the Coa on
January 6, 1810.
On January 31, 1810, Wellington writes to General
Craufurd : " I am going for a few days to look about me
at Torres Vedras. ... I don't think the enemy is likely
to molest us at present ; but I am desirous of maintaining
the Coa, unless he should collect a very large force, and
obviously intend to set seriously to work on the invasion
of Portugal. If that should be the case, I don't propose
to maintain the Coa, or that you should risk anything for
that purpose ; and I beg you to retire gradually to
Celorico, where you will be joined by General Cole's
Division. From Celorico I propose that you should
retire gradually along the valley of the Mondego upon
84 GENERAL CRAVFURD
General Sherbrooke's Division and other troops which
will be there. If you should quit the Coa, bring the
Hussars with you."
On February 4, Wellington writes to supplement this
letter, and seems more inclined to maintain the Coa. " As
my views, in the position which the army now occupy, are
to take the offensive in case of the occurrence of certain
events, I wish not to lose the possession of the Coa ; and
I am anxious, therefore, that you and General Cole should
maintain your positions upon that river, unless you should
find that the enemy collect a force in Castille which is so
formidable as to manifest a serious intention of invading
Portugal."
General Craufurd having written to inform his Com-
mander that Marshal Ney was moving towards Ciudad
Rodrigo, Wellington writes again from Vizeu on February
18: "I don't understand Ney's movement, coupled as it
was with a movement upon Badajoz from the south of
Spain. The French are certainly not sufficiently strong
for two sieges at the same time ; and I much doubt
whether they are in a state even to undertake one . . .
In answer to your letter of the 1st, I have only to assure
you that in every event I should have taken care to keep
your command distinct, as I am convinced that you will
be able to render most service in such a situation. You
will have heard that General Stewart is gone to Cadiz ;
but General Picton is coming to the army, which will
render necessary a new arrangement, and will oblige me
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 85
to deprive you of Colonel Mackinnon's Brigade. But I
will make up for you the best corps I can, including your
own Brigade, of which you shall continue to have the
separate command."
Accordingly, the following general order was issued
by Lord Wellington, dated at Vizeu, February 22, 1810.
"The ist and 2nd battalions of Portuguese Chasseurs are
attached to the Brigade of Brigadier-General Craufurd,
which is to be called the Light Division." The 2nd
Chasseurs seem afterwards to have been exchanged for
the 3rd Chasseurs.
Notwithstanding this order of the Commander-in-chief,
many ignorant writers on the Peninsular War will persist
in calling Craufurd's famous command the Light Brigade
during its subsequent brilliant career, long after it had
become a Division. Considering that Craufurd's rank
was then only that of a Brigadier, his Commander must
undoubtedly have held a very high opinion of his abilities ;
for, before General Picton came out to the army, Craufurd
had under his command, on the retreat from Talavera,
seyeral other English regiments besides his own favourite
Brigade. These regiments were now made part of General
Picton's Division. Colonel Leach calls them " Colonel
Donkin's Brigade," and says that they consisted of the
45th, a battalion of the 6oth, and the 88th.
General Craufurd did not at first expect much from the
Portuguese troops placed under his command ; but they
eventually proved very useful. Costello, in his interesting
86 GENERAL CRAUFURD
book, " Adventures of a Soldier," expresses a very low and
probably rather unfair opinion of these Portuguese. He
says, " We were here joined by the ist and 3rd Regiments
of Portuguese Cacadores. These fellows I never had any
opinion of from the very first moment I saw them. They
were the dirtiest and noisiest brutes I ever came across.
Historians of the day have given them great credit ; but
during the whole of the Peninsular War, or at least the time
they were with us, I never knew them to perform one
gallant act. On the line of march they often reminded
me of a band of strollers. They were very fond of gam-
bling ; and every halt we made was sure to find them
squatted, and with the cards in their hands."
On the other hand, Costello greatly admired the
German Hussars, so long attached to the Light Division.
He says, "As cavalry they were the finest and most
efficient I ever saw in action ; and I had many opportu-
nities of judging, as some troops of them generally did
duty with us during the wan While on outpost duty their
vigilance was most admirable."
About the middle of March, Craufurd began his more
serious and important outpost work between the Coa and
the Agueda rivers. Lord Wellington wrote him a long
letter on March 8. In it he says, "I am very much
obliged to you for your letter of the 6th, which I received
last night. The fact is that the line of cantonments which
we took up, principally with a view to the accommodation
of the troops during the winter, and their subsistence on a
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 87
point on which it was likely that it might be desirable to
assemble the army, will not answer our purpose of assem-
bling on the Coa, if eventually that should be deemed an
object. Neither does our position, as at present occupied,
suit the existing organization of the army. For these
reasons, I have long intended to alter our dispositions, as
soon as the season would permit the troops to occupy the
smaller villages on the Coa, and as I should be able to
bring up the Portuguese light troops of your Division to
the front.
" Since we took up the position which we now occupy,
our outposts have come in contact with those of the
French ; and although there is some distance between the
two, still the arrangement of our outposts must be made
on a better principle, and the whole of them must be in
the hands of one person, who must be yourself. I propose,
therefore, as soon as the weather will allow of an alteration
of the disposition of the advanced corps, that your Division,
with the Hussars which will be put under your orders,
should occupy the whole line of the outposts, and, with
this, the Portuguese corps shall be brought up to the front
as soon as the state of the weather will allow them to
march.
" I am desirous of being able to assemble the army
upon the Coa, if it should be necessary ; at the same time
I am perfectly aware that if the enemy should collect in
any large numbers in Estremadura, we should be too
forward for our communications with General Hill even
GENERAL CRAUFURD
here, and much more so upon the Coa. But till they will
collect in Estremadura, and till we shall see more clearly
than I can at present what reinforcements they have
received, and what military object they have in view, and
particularly in the existing disposition of the army, I am
averse to withdrawing from a position so favourable as the
Coa affords, to enable us to collect our army and prevent
the execution of any design upon Ciudad Rodrigo. I
wish you, then, to consider of the parts to be occupied in
front of and upon the Coa, to enable me to effect that
object. The left should probably be at Castello Roderigo ;
and I believe you must have a post of observation as far
as Alfayates on the right. However, you must be a better
judge of the details of this question than I can be ; and I
wish you to consider of it, in order to be able immediately
to carry the plan into execution when I shall send to
you.
" I intend that the Divisions of General Cole and
General Picton should support you on the Coa without
waiting for orders from me, if it should be necessary ;
and they shall be directed accordingly."
This letter clearly shows that Wellington had great
confidence in Craufurd ; and it was to a certain extent
evoked by the not unnatural jealousy of Generals Cole
and Picton at having a Brigadier thus placed over them
and assigned a more important command, notwithstand-
ing the fact that he was their junior.
For the rest of Craufurd's operations between the Coa
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 89
and the Agueda, up to the day of the memorable battle,
the most ample and reliable information is to be found
in a diary of General Sir James Shaw Kennedy, who was
Aide-de-camp to the leader of the Light Division, and
his most confidential officer. That this officer was
thoroughly able to judge correctly of these remarkable
operations, is sufficiently proved by the fact that Sir
William Napier, writing in the year 1852, speaks of him
as having displayed "great intelligence, great zeal, and
undaunted courage on very many occasions." And
Napier adds, " He is, perhaps, with the exception of
Lord Seaton, the very ablest officer in the service."
(See the " Life of Sir William Napier," by H. A. Bruce.)
In a letter on outpost duties to Lord Frederick Fitz-
clarence, Sir James Shaw Kennedy explains clearly the
main object of Craufurd's operations between the rivers
Coa and Agueda : " The objects to be gained by the
Light Division holding as long as possible the whole of
the country on the left bank of the Agueda up to the
bridges and fords over that river, were to encourage the
governor of Ciudad Rodrigo to make a stout defence,
to keep open the communication with Almeida as long
as possible, and to command the resources of the country.
These were objects of great importance, as delay in taking
these towns was a formidable obstruction to the French
army, from its obliging them to undertake the operation
against Portugal at a late season of the year ; and was
of immense value to Lord Wellington in allowing time
00 GENERAL CRAUFURD
for bringing to greater maturity his defensive preparations.
The object was great; but the operation of holding a
country so extensive as that between the Coa and the
Agueda by a single small Infantry Division of about
2500 strong, with one cavalry regiment 400 strong, (the
1st German Hussars) and six light guns, the original force
with which it was undertaken, was unusually bold and
hazardous, being done in the face of Ney's corps sup-
ported by a powerful cavalry. As the operation pro-
gressed, Craufurd's force was augmented to 3500 infantry,
with occasional assistance of some squadrons of the i6th
Light Dragoons, and on the very last days of the opera-
tion by the whole of the I4th and i6th Light Dragoons ;
and he was supported on Jiis right by Carrera with 3000
Spaniards. But although Craufurd's force was thus
somewhat increased, his operation became greatly more
hazardous and difficult as it progressed ; for in the more
advanced part of it he was opposed to two entire corps
of the French army under Massena, and say 6000
cavalry."
"This formidable task, however, General Craufurd
undertook when at such a distance from the rest of the
army as to be totally unsupported by any portion of it
beyond the Coa. This operation by General Craufurd was
completely successful as an advanced post and outpost
operation. He held his ground firmly to the last with-
out any loss ; and remained in sight of Ciudad Rodrigo
till the place was reduced to the last extremity, after a
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 91
noble and protracted defence, considering the defective
nature of its works ; and he kept Almeida open and free
from all molestation, up to the day of its being invested
by the whole of Ney's corps supported by four or five
thousand cavalry. As an operation of an advanced corps,
therefore, nothing could have been more successful. The
whole of General Craufurd's force he brought back in
perfect safety under the guns of Almeida, and had
nothing further to do but to cross the Coa at his leisure,
and place his outposts on tl>e left bank."
General Shaw Kennedy then proceeds to explain
some of the reasons which made this case an exceptional
one. " I place first among these the personal qualifica-
tions of General Craufurd. This extraordinary under-
taking was in a great measure one of his own bringing
about. He almost led the Commander-in-chief into it
by the enthusiastic zeal with which he entered upon it,
and the activity and ability with which he carried it
through. He by these means may be said at least to
have caused the Commander-in-chief to endure it ; for
no prudent Commander-in-chief would have done so
unless he had great confidence in the person conducting
the operation. Another peculiarity of this case was the
great knowledge of outpost duties possessed by the
ist Hussars of the German Legion. General Craufurd,
in fact, worked out the most difficult part of the outpost
duty with them. He had the great advantage of speaking
German fluently, and he arranged for the outpost duties
92 GENERAL CRAUFURD
of the different parts of the long line he had to guard,
by his personal communications with the captains chiefly
of that admirable corps, men who were all masters them-
selves of the subject. They knew his plan for each space
that they covered, but not his general plan ; and each
worked out his part most admirably. The General com-
municated with them direct. He had the advantage of
possessing, with great abilities and activity and energy,
uncommon bodily strength, so that he could be on horse-
back almost any length of time."
These German Hussars are universally acknowledged
to have been the most efficient cavalry in our army at
that period. Lord Wellington says to General Craufurd
in one of his letters that he thinks that the work required
by the leader of the Light Division will be better done
by these men than by the I4th or i6th Light Dragoons.
Between Craufurd and his German cavalry there was,
as General Shaw Kennedy intimates, a very close
sympathy and mutual comprehension. Nor did these
his trusted and valued soldiers forget their wonderful
leader after his death. Major William Campbell, writing
to Craufurd's widow in the year 1814, says, "Upon one
occasion after my late return to Lord Wellington's army,
when I was surrounded by a considerable number of the
officers of one of the German Hussar regiments that had
generally served under him, the commanding officer of
the regiment, in expressing his regret to me that he
(Craufurd) was no longer there to conduct them, said,
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 93
with peculiar emphasis, that there was not an officer in
the corps that would not willingly give his best horse
an expression of more than ordinary strength in German
if he was there again."
Kincaid, who was for some time Adjutant of the 95th
Rifles, writes thus concerning these most efficient cavalry
soldiers : " I have seen the day, however, that I would
rather have dispensed with my dinner (however sharp set)
than the services of one of those thoroughbred soldiers ;
for they were as singularly intelligent and useful on out-
post duty, as they were effective and daring in the field.
The ist Regiment of Hussars were associated with our
Division throughout the war, and were deserved favourites.
. . . The Hussar was at all times identified with his horse ;
he shared his bed and board, and their movements were
always regulated by the importance of their mission. If
we saw a British dragoon at any time approaching at full
speed, it excited no great curiosity among us ; but when-
ever we saw one of the ist Hussars coming on at a gallop,
it was high time to gird on our swords and bundle up.
Their chief, too, was a perfect soldier, and worthy of being
the leader of such a band ; for he was to them what the
gallant Beckwith was to us a father as well as a leader.
He was one who never could be caught napping. They
tell a good anecdote of him after the battle of Toulouse,
when the news arrived of the capture of Paris and of
Bonaparte's abdication. A staff officer was sent to his out-
post quarter to apprise him of the cessation of hostilities.
94 GENERAL CRAUFURD
It was late when the officer arrived ; and, after hearing the
news, the colonel proceeded to turn into bed as usual,
'all standing,' when the officer remarked with some sur-
prise, ' Why, Colonel; you surely don't mean to sleep in
your clothes to-night, when you know there is an armi-
stice?' ' Air, .mistress or no air mistress,' replied the
veteran, ' by Got, I sleeps in my breeches ! ' '
Writing of an earlier period of the war, Kincaid also
tells us of this fine and vigilant soldier that " the chief
of the German Hussars, meeting our commandant one
morning: 'Well, Colonel,' sa^s the gallant German in
broken English, ' how do you do ? ' ' Oh, tolerably well,
thank you, considering that I am obliged to sleep with
one eye open.' ' By Gott,' says the other, ' I never sleeps
at all.' "
For some time the I4th and i6th Light Dragoons
were attached to the Light Division ; and it must not be
thought that General Craufurd undervalued their merits.
On the contrary, he was most anxious to have them under
his command, and valued them greatly. Both he and Lord
Wellington had an extremely high opinion of Colonel
Talbot, of the I4th Light Dragoons, and greatly regretted
his death. And on one important occasion, when the i6th
Light Dragoons were in much danger of losing their repu-
tation through ignorant gossip, Craufurd's remarks to
Lord Wellington concerning them were the chief means
by which their character was saved from unjust depre-
ciation. Nor was Charles Lever, the novelist, wrong in
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 95
supposing that the leader of the Light Division had a
great regard and esteem for the I4th Light Dragoons,
which he considered a very admirable regiment. But
still, for outpost work, there was no cavalry equal to his
German Hussars.
Colonel Leach says, "In addition to the ist German
Hussars, and his Division of Infantry, the following troops
were sent across the Coa during the spring to reinforce
Brigadier-General Craufurd : a troop of Horse Artillery,
commanded by Captain Ross, and the I4th and i6th
Light Dragoons ; the whole forming a command of which
a Lieutenant-General might have been ambitious." Many
were much displeased at this arrangement. Colonel Leach
observes, "Jealousy, which rears its head in all com-
munities and societies, I fear, is to be found in military
as well as in civil life. Amongst a certain number (I
hope a few only) of malcontents in the army, the very
name of the Light Division or the outposts was sufficient
to turn their ration wine into vinegar, and to spoil their
appetite for that day's allowance of ration beef also. In
good truth, General officers were to be found, whom I
could name, that bore towards us no very good will, per-
haps because it was not their lot to hold so prominent
a command as that of our more fortunate and favoured
Brigadier."
Notwithstanding the surpassing excellence of the
German Hussars, and Craufurd's great knowledge of out-
post work, the operations between the Coa and the
96 GENERAL CRAUFURD
Agueda would not have been possible, in face of such an
overwhelming force of the enemy, except for some special
circumstances. General Shaw Kennedy tells us that " the
people of the country were enthusiastically in our favour ;
the French could rely on nothing that they told them, and
could only look upon them as most determined enemies.
This prevented all enterprise on the part of the French.
They kept in masses, and acted with the greatest caution.
A party of Guerillas, under Don Julian Sanchez, acted
through the cantonments of the French army, and
obtained information of their movements, as well as
giving them annoyance."
At this critical period- Craufurd's plans were all formed
on the most precise calculations. His confidential aide-
de-camp writes again : " When General Craufurd took up
the line of the Agueda with the 1st German HusSars, he
kept his infantry back entirely, with the exception of the
infantry post of four companies of the Rifles at Barba del
Puerco, upon the calculation of the time that would be
required to retire the infantry to the Coa, after he received
information from the cavalry posts of the enemy's advance.
By this means he gained the great advantage of watching
the enemy's movements, preserving the country from their
foraging parties, and encouraging the defence of Rodrigo.
If we are properly to understand the operations of General
Craufurd, the calculation, as above stated, must never be
lost sight of; for it was upon that calculation that he
acted all along. The cause of hazarding the four com-
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 97
panics at Barba del Puerco forms a separate consideration.
It was formed upon the belief that the pass there was so
difficult that four companies could defend it against any
numbers, and that, if turned higher up the river, the
Hussars would give Colonel Beckwith warning in ample
time to enable him to make a safe retreat"
It would only weary my readers, if I were to attempt
to give anything like a full account of Craufurd's perilous
and brilliant work during more than four months between
the rivers Coa and Agueda. So all I intend to do here
is to notice a few of the more remarkable events, and to
give interesting extracts from Wellington's correspondence
with the leader of the Light Division at that critical
period of the war.
Sir William Napier says, "Craufurd having now four
thousand men and six guns, about the middle of March
lined the Agueda with his Hussars, from Escalhon on
his own left to Navas Frias on his right, a distance of
twenty-five miles. His infantry occupied the villages
between Almeida and the lower Agueda ; the artillery
entered Fort Conception, and the Ca^adores were held in
reserve. The French were then extended from San
Felices back to Salamanca and Ledesma ; and as they
thus left the pass of Perales open, Carrera, who was at
Coria, could also act in concert with Craufurd. The line
of the Agueda was long ; but from Navas Frias to the
Douro it was rendered unfordable by heavy rains, and
only four bridges crossed it on that extent. One was
H
98 GENERAL CRAUFURD
at Navas Frias, another a league below at Villar, one at
Ciudad Rodrigo, and one at San Felices, called the Barba
del Puerco. The two first were distant, and the Hussars
being alert, the infantry were sure of time to concentrate
around Almeida, before an enemy could from thence
reach them. Ciudad Rodrigo commanded its own bridge.
That of San Felices was near, and the French troops
close to it ; but the channel of the river was so profound
that a few rifle companies seemed sufficient to bar the
passage. This disposition was good while the Agueda
was flooded ; but that river was capricious, often falling
many feet in a night without apparent cause. When
fordable, Craufurd concentrated his Division ; yet to do
so safely required from the troops a promptitude and
intelligence the like of which have seldom been known.
Seven minutes sufficed to get under arms in the night,
a quarter of an hour, night or day, to gather them in
order of battle at the alarm posts, with baggage loaded
and assembled at a convenient distance in the rear ; and
this not upon a concerted signal and as a trial, but all
times certain, and for months consecutively.
"Scarcely had the line of the Agueda been taken,
when General Ferey, a bold officer, desiring to create a
fear of French enterprise, and thinking to surprise the
Division, collected six hundred Grenadiers close to the
bridge of Barba del Puerco, where he waited until the
moon rising behind him cast long shadows from the rocks,
deepening the darkness in the chasm. Then silently he
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 99
passed the narrow bridge, and with incredible speed
ascending the opposite side, bayonetted the sentries, and
fell upon the piquet so fiercely that friends and enemies
went fighting into the village of Barba del Puerco while
the first shout was still echoing in the gulf below. So
sudden was the attack, so great the confusion, that the
British companies could not form 1 , and each soldier
encountered the nearest enemy, fighting hand to hand,
while their Colonel, Sydney Beckwith, conspicuous by
his lofty stature and daring actions, a man capable of
rallying a whole army in flight, exhorting and shouting,
urged all forward until the enemy was pushed over the
edge of the ravine in retreat. This combat, fought on
the 1 9th, showed that the French might be bearded
while the Agueda was flooded. But the whole army was
sorely straitened for money ; and Craufurd, unable to
feed his Division, gave the reins to his fiery temper
and seized some church plate to purchase corn, a
fash act which he was forced to redress ; yet it con-
vinced the priests that the distress was not feigned,
and they procured some supplies " (Napier's " War in
the Peninsula ").
Colonel Beckwith was certainly one of the very best
of General Craufurd's officers. Kincaid tells us the
following story of him during this short but fierce com-
bat : " The Colonel, while urging the fight, observed a
Frenchman within a yard or two taking deliberate aim
at his head. Stooping suddenly down and picking up
100 GENERAL CRAUFURD
a stone, he immediately threw it at him, calling him at
the same time a 'scoundrel/ and 'to get out of that.' It
so far distracted the fellow's attention that while the
gallant Beckwith's cap was blown to atoms, the head
remained untouched." Kincaid adds that this was "the
first and last night-attempt which the enemy ever made
to surprise a British post in that army."
Lord Wellington thanked the heroic Beckwith and
his men greatly for their admirable conduct in this combat,
and General Craufurd issued an order highly compli-
mentary to the Riflemen. Craufurd seems to have been
peculiarly gratified with his men.
Concerning the gerreral position about this period
Kincaid (in his " Random Shots of a Rifleman ") expresses
himself thus : " The Light Division, and the cavalry
attached to it, was at this period so far in advance of
every other part of the army that their safety depended
on themselves alone ; for they were altogether beyond
the reach of human aid. Their force consisted of about
four thousand infantry, twelve hundred cavalry, and a
Brigade*, of horse artillery; and yet, trusting to his own
admirable arrangements and the surprising discipline of
his troops, did Craufurd with this small force maintain
a position which was no position, for three months, within
an hour's march of six thousand horsemen, and within
two hours' march of sixty thousand infantry of a brave,
* Kincaid has here inadvertently greatly over-estimated the amount of
Craufurd's artillery.
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 101
experienced, and enterprising enemy, who was advancing
in the confidence of certain victory."
In a letter dated March 20, Lord Wellington says to
Craufurd, " I hope that you will find the Ca^adores better
than you expect they will be. It is impossible to get
Elder's corps for you ; otherwise you may depend upon
it that I should have been happy to make your Division
so much stronger."
Writing on March 23, Wellington remarks, " I wish
I could send you some money ; but we are in the greatest
distress, and what is worse, have no hopes of relief. . . .
To this add that Government leaves me to my own
inventions in this as well as in other respects."
On March 24, the Commander-in-chief says, in a letter
to Craufurd, " I think you was quite right in occupying
Barba del Puerco under the circumstances in which you
did occupy that place, and equally so in withdrawing the
troops from thence on the night of the 22nd, when there
was a prospect that they would be attacked by a very
superior force. . . . Do you keep any cavalry in Barba
del Puerco ? It might be useful to be as near the French
posts as possible, in order to encourage and facilitate
desertion." And on March 26 he says, " By this time you
will have been joined by the two battalions of Cacadores,
and will be the best judge what to do with them."
Wellington had no great opinion of the veracity of
Spanish generals, as is evident from a letter to Craufurd
on March 30. He says, " I inclose a letter for General
102 GENERAL CRAUFURD
Carrera, in which I have requested him to communicate
with you. I beg you to observe, however, that very little
reliance can be placed on the report made to you by any
Spanish General officer at the head of a body of troops.
They generally exaggerate on one side or the other, and
make no scruple of communicating supposed intelligence,
in order to induce those to whom they communicate it to
adopt a certain line of conduct."
A letter dated April 4, 1810, from Wellington to
Craufurd contains much of general interest. He says,
" The Austrian marriage is a terrible event, and must
prevent any great movement on the continent for the
present. Still, I don't despair of seeing at some time or
other a check to the Bonaparte system. Recent trans-
actions in Holland show that it is all hollow within, and
that it is so inconsistent with the wishes, the interests, and
even the existence of civilized society, that he cannot trust
even his brothers to carry it into execution. If the
Spaniards had acted with common prudence, we should
be in a very different situation in the Peninsula ; but I fear
there are now no hopes."
In a letter written on April 15, the great commander
says to his subordinate General, " Your feeling respecting
your command is exactly what it ought to be, and what
might be expected from you. As long as I could make
up a Division of the proper strength for the service, with
your Brigade and Portuguese troops and cavalry, nobody
would have reason to complain. But the Lieutenant-
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 103
General and the senior Major-General of the army, recently
arrived, are without commands, and it would not answer
to throw more English troops into your Division, leaving
them unemployed. You may depend upon it, however,
that whatever may be the arrangement which I shall make,
I should wish your Brigade to be in the advanced guard."
In a letter written on April 20, Wellington had to
check General Craufurd's excessive ardour for fighting.
He writes thus : " The consequence of the attack which
you propose would be to commence a description of war-
fare upon our outposts, in which we should certainly sustain
some loss of men, and I should be obliged to bring up the
army to the front, than which nothing could be more in-
convenient and eventually injurious to us. I don't know
whether the state of tranquillity in which affairs have been
for some time is advantageous to the French, but I know
that it is highly so to us. The British army is increasing
in strength daily, and a continuance of the tranquillity in
which we have been, for a short time longer, will add con-
siderably to our numbers. The discipline and equipment
of the Portuguese troops is improving daily. The equip-
ment in particular, which is now very defective, will in a
short time be complete, as all the articles for it are arrived
from England. The sick of this army also are coming
out of hospital. The arms for the militia have lately
arrived, but some time must elapse before they can be
transported to the points at which they can be issued to
the different corps. ... I am not insensible of the advan-
104 GENERAL CRAUFURD
tages which we should derive from the successful issue of
an expedition such as you have proposed, particularly on
the state of the war in Spain. But I think that the
Spaniards begin to be sensible of the advantages which
they derive from our position in this country, and are
aware that circumstances do not allow us to interfere
with more activity at present in the operations of the war.
Upon the whole I prefer not to undertake this expedition."
"In answer to your letter of the i/th, I will only tell
you that it has excited any feeling in my mind excepting
anger. I have already told you that I shall regret exceed-
ingly the existence of a necessity to place in other hands
the command of our advanced guard ; and I shall regret
it particularly if it should deprive me of your assistance
altogether. I expect Marshal Beresford here in a day or
two, when I shall be able to make arrangements which
may enable me to leave you in the command of your
Division, which I am very anxious to do."
Lord Wellington repeatedly had to complain of the
conduct of the Spaniards. In a letter written to Craufurd
on April 23, he says, "The Spaniards, I believe, think it
necessary to our existence to assist and protect them ;
and I have more than once been obliged to remind
different authorities with which I have been in communi-
cation, that their protection is their own concern, and
that if they expect that we should assist them, they must
give us every assistance of provisions and supplies which
the country can afford."
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 105
It is quite plain that the English Commander-in-chief
was at this time anxious to preserve Ciudad Rodrigo from
the French, if possible. For he writes to Craufurd thus
on April 27 : "I still doubt, however, the intention to
make a serious attack upon Ciudad Rodrigo. I don't
think the enemy is sufficiently strong for that operation
without calling in Junot's corps ; and I understand that
the attack upon Astorga still continues.
" However, interested as we are to preserve Ciudad
Rodrigo, and particularly not to allow that place to fall
into the enemy's hands without making an effort to save
it, I should not have been justified if I had taken no notice
of the movements made since the 23rd, connected with
other recent preparations, notwithstanding the inconve-
nience which this movement is to us."
General Craufurd was always extremely anxious that
the soldiers of his Division, including the Portuguese
troops, should be properly fed ; and this anxiety some-
times caused him to make alterations in the commissariat
arrangements without having first obtained the sanction of
his commander. Accordingly, on May 5, Lord Wellington
says in a letter to Craufurd, " Nothing can be more advan-
tageous to me, or give me more satisfaction, than to receive
the assistance of your opinion upon any subject. But you
may depend upon it that there are few of the general
arrangements of the army which have not been maturely
considered by me ; and that although some inconveniences
may attend some of them, they are the smallest that, after
106 GENERAL CRAUFURD
full consideration, it was found would attend any arrange-
ments of the subjects to which the arrangements relate.
I therefore request that whenever you see reason to wish
to make any alteration, you will let me know it, but not
make the alteration without reference to me."
General Craufurd was an extremely sensitive person,
and always felt acutely anything like censure from his
commander, whom he very greatly admired. So he
appears to have taken his last rebuke too much to heart.
And so a few days later Wellington writes to soothe his
feelings, saying, " I am really concerned that you should
believe that I had any such feeling as disapprobation to-
wards you, in consequence of our little discussions upon
commissariat concerns."
Napier tells us in his history that the river Agueda
continued in flood until the end of May, and that, in
consequence, Craufurd maintained his advanced position
till that time. " Then came advice from Andreas Herrasti
that the French battery train was in motion ; and on
June i, Ney, as we before said, descended from the hills
with fifty thousand men, and threw his bridges over the
Agueda. This concentration of the French on the Agueda
enabled Wellington to draw down sixteen militia regiments
from Braganza to the lower Douro, and he could now
bring provisions up that river as far as Lamego. On the
8th four thousand French cavalry crossed the Agueda, and
Craufurd concentrated his forces at Gallegos and Espeja."
Again, Napier tells us, "On the loth the Agueda
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 107
became fordable in all parts ; but Craufurd, seeing the
enemy was raising redoubts to secure his lower bridge,
and making other preparations for the siege, still main-
tained his dangerous position. He thus encouraged the
garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and protected the villages
between the Azava and the Coa from the enemy's foraging
parties. . . . On the 25th the French batteries opened ;
their cavalry closed upon the Azava ; and Craufurd with-
drew his outposts."
Writing to the General of the Light Division on
June 10, Wellington says concerning the besieged in-
habitants of Ciudad Rodrjgo : " I am apprehensive that I
shall not be able to do more for them than oblige the
enemy to keep a large force collected in this quarter for
the purpose of this enterprise. With an army one fourth
inferior in numbers, a part of it being of a doubtful
description, and at all events but just made, and with not
more than one third of the enemy's cavalry, it would be
an operation of some risk to leave our mountains and
bring on a general action in the plains ; and would most
probably accelerate the period of our evacuation of the
Peninsula. However, I don't give over all thoughts of
attempting their relief, at least by throwing in supplies,
which possibly might be done without a general action.
This must depend upon the position which Massena con-
trives to hold with the right of the army."
About this period Wellington was again afraid that he
might be forced, against his own wishes, to deprive
108 GENERAL CRAUFURD
Craufurd of the command of his Division. Accordingly, he
wrote the following letter, which, to the best of my know-
ledge, is now published for the first time. It is interesting
as affording a decided proof of Wellington's high opinion
of Craufurd, and of his extreme reluctance to give into any
other hands the command of the advanced guard of his army.
"Private.
" Celorico, June 20, 1810.
"Mv DEAR GENERAL,
" You will have observed that I have hitherto
been able to make arrangements in such a manner as to
leave you in command of our advanced posts ; but by a
letter which I received- last night from Cadiz, I find that
General Ferguson is sent to that place, in order that
General Stewart may join the army. This arrangement,
at least the last part of it, had before now been proposed
to me, and I had resisted it ; but it is now effected in the
usual manner in England. I mention this to you in order
that you may not be surprised when you will hear of it.
Possibly circumstances, such as those which have already
occurred to preclude the necessity of my displacing you,
and which I did not expect when we last corresponded
upon this subject, may enable me again to avoid doing
what will be very disagreeable to me, and, in my opinion,
disadvantageous to the service. But I now apprise you of
what may happen.
" Ever yours most faithfully,
" WELLINGTON."
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 109
Again, as on former occasions, Wellington managed to
keep Craufurd in command of his Division ; and until his
death the Division was never intrusted to other hands,
except during the few months when General Craufurd was
in England on his own private affairs.
At the beginning of July Ciudad Rodrigo still resisted ;
the French pushed their infantry on to the Azava ; and
Craufurd, placing his cavalry at Gallegos, concentrated his
infantry in the wood of Alameda, two miles in rear.
Napier tells us that Craufurd, " obstinately resolute, how-
ever, not to yield a foot of ground he could keep by art
or force, disposed his troops in single ranks on the rising
grounds in the evening of the 2nd, and using some horse-
men to raise dust in the rear, made the infantry pass
the heights slowly, as if a great army was advancing to
succour the place. The artifice was successful ; he gained
two days." But a little later on "Craufurd took a fresh
post with his infantry and guns, in a wood near Fort
Conception ; his cavalry, reinforced by Julian Sanchez and
Carrera's Divisions, were disposed higher up on the Duas
Casas ; and the French withdrew behind the Azava,
leaving only a piquet at Gallegos."
Charles Napier, writing at the end of June, says that
the Light Division ought not to stay in its perilous
position. He remarks, " We shall be attacked some morn-
ing, and lose many men," (see "The Life of Sir Charles
Napier," by his brother Sir William). Yet Wellington,
writing to Craufurd on July 16, says, " I am desirous of
110 GENERAL CRAUFURD
holding the other side of the Coa a little longer." And on
July 5, Wellington seems to have thought that Craufurd
might again occupy his former more advanced position,
from which he had retired. He writes thus: "If the
enemy have drawn in again from Gallegos, I think it
would be desirable that you should resume your position
at Alameda, and place your piquets of cavalry on the
Agueda, so as at all events to have a view of the place,
encourage its continued resistance, and know what is
going on. In that case I would throw the troops of
General Picton's Division again into La Conception, and
the 1 4th Dragoons should continue there. If you think
you are better on this, side the Duas Casas, you might
either keep the I4th Dragoons with you, or send a part or
the whole of them to the rear, as you may think proper."
From a careful perusal of Wellington's letters to Crau-
furd at this critical period I have come to the conclusion
that the Commander-in-chief was far more anxious to
delay the surrender of Ciudad Rodrigo than the Napiers
thought he was, and also far more desirous to retain the
power of helping it, if the movements of the" French in
other parts should permit him to do this. In short,
Wellington was in favour of bolder measures than Charles
Napier considered wise and practicable. And this fact in
great measure accounts for General Craufurd's apparent
rashness.
In a letter from Wellington to Craufurd on July 8, it
is to be observed that the Commander, like his subordinate
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. Ill
General, thought it probable that the French would not
attack Almeida. This in great measure accounts for
General Craufurd's lingering there too long, and not cross-
ing the Coa earlier. Wellington writes thus : " I agree with
you in thinking that the enemy will not attack Almeida ;
and it is not improbable that, after Ciudad Rodrigo will
have fallen, they will direct their march upon Castello
Branco, and thus endeavour to cut in between General
Hill and me ; but I have in some degree provided for this
movement."
On July 10 there occurred an event which caused no
small amount of talk throughout the English army, and
which greatly vexed and annoyed the leader of the Light
Division. The enemy's marauding parties had latterly
become extremely troublesome, annoying the villages
immediately in front of the British posts, and plundering
them of anything which could be found. Lord London-
derry says also that they were in the habit of committing
" acts of barbarity." General Craufurd determined to cut
off the next of these marauding parties. Charles Napier,
at that period of his life always desirous to revile his
General, accuses Craufurd of cruelty for this ; but Lord
Londonderry evidently thought that the cruelty was on
the side of the French. General Craufurd "planted an
ambuscade of nine squadrons, supporting it with artillery,
five companies of Riflemen, and a battalion of Cacadores."
Unfortunately this attempt was a failure. Sir William
Napier attributes the failure to Craufurd's hot temper,
1 12 GENERAL CRAUFURD
owing to which he "pushed straight through a stone
enclosure difficult to clear, and thus disordering his men,
gave the enemy, two hundred strong, time to form square
behind a rather steep rise of ground, and so far from the
edge as to be unseen until the ascent was gained."
But Charles Napier's acrimonious censoriousness was
not content to lay the blame on the hot temper of his
General. He accuses Craufurd of " ignorance of cavalry."
Perhaps many might think this a very " ignorant " accusa-
tion. Of course the leader of the Light Division might be
skilful or unskilful in handling cavalry ; but he could
scarcely be " ignorant " of it, considering his long service
with the Austrian army,, and considering also the fact that
he, together with his brother, General Charles Craufurd,
had translated into English one of the chief German
treatises on the art of war. Moreover, I have shown
already that the Colonel of the 1st German Hussars (the
most efficient cavalry then serving in our army) and his
officers had an extremely high opinion of Craufurd's pro-
longed work with them at the outposts. And I suppose
that this celebrated Colonel of Hussars had a far better
practical knowledge of cavalry than Charles Napier had
at the time when, as a young and inexperienced soldier,
he wrote this condemnation of his leader.
Lord Londonderry wrote thus concerning this affair :
" The enemy's force did not exceed thirty cavalry and two
hundred infantry ; but they were advantageously posted
in an open space, just beyond a narrow defile ; and to
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 113
reach them it was necessary to thread that defile in a long
line. The consequence was that, though the Hussars who
led, formed up in succession as they got through, and
charged their opponents with great gallantry, they effected
nothing more than the dispersion of the handful of horse ;
for the infantry had time to form a square, and not all the
efforts of our people could succeed it breaking it. The
Hussars rode bravely up to the bayonets, but were repulsed
by a volley closely thrown in, which killed or wounded
upwards of a dozen men. The remainder wheeled off,
and pursuing the French cavalry, made way for a squadron
of the 1 6th. These galloped forward, but also took to the
left, and leaving the infantry uninjured, joined in pursuit
of the cavalry. When the last charge was made, the
French square was without fire, every man having dis-
charged his piece, and none having been able to load
again ; but when a third attempt was made, they were
better prepared to receive it. It fell to the lot of Colonel
Talbot of the I4th to lead this attack. It was made with
daring intrepidity ; but the enemy remained perfectly
steady, and reserving their fire till the bridles of the horses
touched their bayonets, gave it with such effect that
Colonel Talbot, with several of his men, were killed on the
spot. The rest drew off ; upon which, General Craufurd
despairing of success by the exertions of cavalry alone,
despatched an orderly to bring up a detachment of the
43rd, which chanced to be at no great distance.
" Whilst this was doing, the enemy's little column began
I
114 GENERAL CRAUFURD
its retreat, which it conducted with singular steadiness and
great order. The I4th Dragoons, seeing this, prepared to
launch another squadron against it ; and it was already in
speed for the purpose, when Colonel Arenschild, of the
Hussars, observed cavalry advancing both in front and
flank, and checked the movement. It was much to be
regretted afterwards that he took this step, for the horse
which alarmed him proved to be detachments from our
own people on their return from pursuing the enemy's
dragoons, the whole of whom they had captured. The
French infantry lost no time in availing themselves of the
indecision of our cavalry. They marched on, and returned
to their main body, without having lost a single prisoner,
or suffered in killed or wounded."
In his life of his brother Charles, Sir William Napier
writes thus concerning this singular combat: "Certainly
both they and their opponents were noble soldiers ! And
so was William Campbell the Brigade-Major, known then
and afterwards throughout the army for every generous
quality. He was sententious of speech, quixotic of look,
but handsome and strong ; and his sentiments of honour
were worthy of a Spanish don, his courage as high, yet
purged of folly ; he was indeed a gallant English gentle-
man in thought, look, word, and deed. In this combat he
charged so home that his horse was killed close to the
French bayonets ; but being himself unhurt, he arose, and
though alone, slowly stalked away, disdaining haste as he
disdained danger. The gallant French captain, Guache,
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 115
would not let his men slay the proud soldier. Thus all was
noble on both sides, and William Campbell escaped death."
I wish particularly to direct the attention of my readers
to this heroic soldier, William Campbell, because in a
later portion of this volume a letter of his on the death
of General Craufurd will appear, and also a most interest-
ing letter addressed to him by Craufurd's widow concern-
ing her husband's nature and character about a year
after his death. Between William Campbell and Robert
Craufurd there existed one of those strong, profound, and
tender friendships which are amongst the very best and
finest things in human life, but which are hardly ever
found except between people endowed with very excep-
tional gifts of heart and soul. It was from William
Campbell that Sir William Napier obtained conclusive
evidence that Craufurd and Picton did meet on the day
of the combat at the Coa ; and that Picton did refuse to
come to the assistance of the Light Division in its hour
of supreme peril. As Campbell wrote of that memorable
meeting, " Slight was the converse, short the interview ;
for upon Craufurd's asking inquiringly whether General
Picton did not consider it advisable to move out some-
thing from Pinhel in demonstration of support, or to
cover the Light Division, in terms not bland, the General
(Picton) made it understood that ' he should do no such
thing.' This, as you may suppose, put an end to the
meeting, further than some violent rejoinder on the part
of my much-loved friend, and fiery looks returned."
11.6 GENERAL CRAUFURD
This testimony of William Campbell was given in the
year 1835, when Craufurd had been dead for more than
twenty-three years. But deep souls never forget what
manner of men their greatest friends were, or lose their
affection for them.
Craufurd himself was excessively annoyed at the ill
success of the attack on the little party of marauding
Frenchmen. In a letter written to his wife on July 17,
1810, he says, "I had a little affair the other day which
terminated very unsatisfactorily. I went out in hopes of
cutting off some of the enemy's parties, but succeeded
only in part ; and the failure of the rest was attended
with some mortifying circumstances, and occasioned by a
series of unlucky accidents."
In accordance with the view here expressed, Craufurd
made his report to Lord Wellington, in which he threw
no blame on any part of his troops. But many other
officers of the English army were not so just and fair ;
and they virulently assailed the reputation of the English
cavalry engaged in this little affair with the French. In
fact, the business evoked more talk and more ignorant
censoriousness than many an important battle. But
fortunately Wellington determined to put a stop to this.
So he addressed to Craufurd the following letter, one
of the very best that he ever wrote, well suited to give
an idea of the great sense of justice, the keen good judg-
ment, and the right feeling which characterized the manly
and comprehensive mind of the great commander.
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 117
The letter has been printed in Gurwood's edition of
Wellington's Despatches, but the original is in my pos-
session. One of my reasons for giving it here is because
I think that in many respects it is well calculated to teach
a much-needed lesson to some ignorant and slanderous
gossips of our own day, who think nothing of staining
the splendid reputation of renowned regiments by their
gross exaggerations and misrepresentations of those checks
and accidents which, from time to time, happen and must
happen to all troops engaged in real war. Alas ! in
these days we have no Wellington, to shut the mouths of
venomous critics with direct incisive words of penetrating
rebuke.
" Alverca, July 23, 1810.
"Mv DEAR GENERAL,
" I received in the night your letter of the 22nd.
" I have been much annoyed by the foolish conversa-
tions and reports and private letters about the i6th Light
Dragoons. General Cotton wrote to me shortly after
the affair of the nth, to request that the conduct of that
regiment might be inquired into ; to which I replied
that you, in your report, had not made any charge against
the 1 6th, and that it would not be just towards that
regiment to make their conduct the subject of inquiry
for a failure which appeared to me to have been produced
by various unfortunate accidents which could not be
prevented.
" Two or three days afterwards General Cotton came
118 GENERAL CRAUFURD
here, and told me that he had traced some of those reports
and conversations to General Stewart, the A.G. Upon
which I had General Stewart and him before me, after
having pointed out to the former the inconvenience and
impropriety of a person in his situation circulating any
reports about the troops ; and I declared my determina-
tion, if I heard any more of it, to oblige him to come
forward with a charge against the i6th. So the matter
stands here.
"In respect to the business itself, it appeared to me
from the first that it would and must have succeeded,
notwithstanding the gallantry and steadiness of the
French infantry, if various accidents had not prevented
the execution of the plan as first formed ; and I have
stated this as my opinion in the report which I have
made upon the business. Your own report points out
clearly the variations from the original plan, and the
different accidents which occurred in the execution ;
among which certainly must be classed the charge of
the first squadron of the i6th to the left of the Hussars,
and the delay beween the first charge and the charge by
Talbot, owing to the first and second squadrons of the
1 6th having gone off after the cavalry.
" But even then the infantry would not have got away,
if the squadrons coming out of Barquilla had not been
taken for the enemy.
" I can only say that I have never seen an attack by
our troops in which similar, if not greater, accidents and
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 119
mistakes had not occurred, and in which orders had not
been given, for which no authority had proceeded from
the commander, and in which there were not corresponding
accidents and failures. This is to be attributed to the
inexperience of our officers, and, I must add, to some
good qualities in them as well as in the troops.
" All this would not much signify, if our Staff and
other officers would mind their business, instead of write
news and keep coffee houses. But as soon as an accident
happens, every man who can write, who has a friend who
can read, sits down to write his account of what he does
not know and his comments on what he does not under-
stand ; and these are diligently circulated and exaggerated
by the idle and malicious, of whom there are plenty in
all armies. The consequence is that officers and whole
regiments lose their reputation ; a spirit of party, which
is the bane of all armies, is engendered and fomented ;
a want of confidence ensues, and there is no character
however meritorious, and no action however glorious,
which can have justice done to it.
" I have hitherto been so fortunate as to keep down
this spirit in this army, and am determined that I will
persevere.
"In respect to the i6th Light Dragoons, they appear
in this affair to have conducted themselves with the spirit
and alacrity of soldiers. They failed in the intelligence
and coolness and order which can be acquired only by
experience; but it would be too hard to impute to them
120 GENERAL CRAUFURD
alone the failure of complete success, which may be traced
likewise to other accidental circumstances ; and it would
be equally cruel to allow the reputation of this regiment
to be whispered away by ignorance, idleness, and slander.
" You and I agree entirely upon the whole matter ;
and I have gone into this detail, just to explain to you
what has passed here, and upon what principle I have
acted.
" Ever yours most faithfully,
" WELLINGTON."
After reading this admirable letter, I cannot help
wondering what Wellington or Craufurd would have said
to the gross exaggerations which were so diligently
circulated concerning the very vexatious repulse of one
of the old Light Division regiments (the 43rd) in the New
Zealand war in the year 1861. This later repulse was
certainly of no more importance than that of the English
cavalry in their unfortunate attack above referred to
Many of the very same men who lost their heads for a
time, in the great confusion of the moment at the gate
Pah, when so many of their officers were killed or
wounded, not long afterwards triumphantly routed the
enemy. If any one wishes to see a really fair account of
the whole business, I would beg to refer him to a very
interesting book called " Bush Fighting in New Zealand,"
by Sir J. Alexander. It is published by Sampson Low
and Co.
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 121
Returning now to the days preceding the combat
at the Coa, I must notice the fact that General Picton
certainly owned that he was ordered to give support to
the Light Division ; for he wrote the following letter to
Craufurd. The original is in possession of General
Craufurd's family.
"Pinhel, July 4, 1810.
" SIR,
"It being important that I should communi-
cate to you, with as much expedition as possible, the
events that may take place on these parts of the Coa which
I am instructed to observe, I have to request that you will
have the goodness to station a dragoon at Valverde,
with orders to forward such communications as I may
have occasion to make, in the most expeditious manner ;
and I have also to request as early information as
possible of your movements, that I may be enabled to
co-operate with them, in obedience to his Excellency the
Commander of the Forces' instructions of the 2nd instant.
" I have the honour to be,
"Your faithful humble servant,
"TH. PICTON, M.G.,
"Commanding 3rd Division."
Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered on July 10 ; and the
Spanish troops, much grieved and irritated, separated from
the Light Division and marched in a different direction.
122 GENERAL CRAUFURD
On July n, Wellington wrote to Craufurd thus: "I
have received your letters of this day. The fall of Ciudad
Rodrigo was to be expected, and the defence has been
greater than we had a right to expect.
"I regret poor Talbot ; * he is a great loss.
" I have looked over my instructions to you, and I
see nothing to add excepting the word threaten in the
fourth paragraph ; that is to say, it will run, in case the
enemy should threaten to attack General Craufurd, instead
of in case the enemy should attack General Craufurd.
In short, I don't wish to risk anything beyond the Coa ;
and indeed, when Carrera is clearly off, I don't see why
you should remain any .longer at such a distance in front
of Almeida.
" It is desirable that the communication with
Almeida should be kept open as long as possible, in
order that we may throw into that place as much pro-
visions as possible ; and therefore I would not wish you
to fall back beyond that place, unless it should be
necessary. But it does not appear necessary that you
should be so far, and it will be safer that you should be
nearer, at least with your infantry."
On July 13 the Commander-in-chief says in a letter
to the leader of the Light Division, " I shall be obliged
to you, if you will direct your posts on the left to report
all extraordinaries to Major-General Picton's posts on the
* Talbot was Colonel of the I4th Light Dragoons, and a first-rate cavalry
officer.
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 123
Coa ; and they might fall back upon them, if necessary."
And on the I4th, Wellington observes, " It is strange
that the enemy have made no movement since the fall
of Ciudad Rodrigo. I should almost doubt their being
in possession of the place, and should be inclined to
believe that the cessation from fire has been an agree-
ment for a certain number of days, to see whether they
would be relieved ; as whatever may be the enemy's
ultimate plan of operations, it must be desirable to them
at least to see the banks of the Coa. I think you will do
well to move your infantry to Junca ; but you had
better retain all your cavalry till you will withdraw across
the Coa."
From these extracts I think it is plain that those of
Craufurd's critics are quite wrong who have said that he
was ordered to retreat over the Coa a long time before the
day on which he was attacked suddenly by the French,
July 24. Even so late as July 16, Wellington writes thus
to General Craufurd : " It is desirable that we should hold
the other side of the Coa a little longer ; and I think that
our doing so is facilitated by our keeping La Conception.
At the same time I don't want to risk anything in order
to remain at the other side of the river, or to retain the
fort ; and I am anxious that, when you leave it, it should
be destroyed."
On July 22 Wellington did seem to think that
Craufurd should cross the Coa, but not very decidedly.
He writes thus : " I order two battalions to support your
124 GENERAL CRAUFURD
flanks ; but I am not desirous of engaging in an affair
beyond the Coa. Under these circumstances, if you are
not covered where you are, would it not be better that
you should come to this side, with your infantry at least ? "
On July 24, the very day of Craufurd's fierce combat
on the Coa, Wellington wrote him an interesting letter,
though not on that subject. He says, " I believe I
omitted to tell you that I had got lately the emplacement
of the whole French army of June I, which is a very
curious document, and gives a tolerable notion of their
whole force in Spain, which is not less than 250,000 men.
But I don't think they have means of reinforcing it much
further. This document, together with the returns which
I have of the French corps in our front, gives me a
knowledge of the names of all the principal officers, etc.,
employed with those corps ; and any paper which may
fall into your hands, such as a requisition upon a village
signed by an officer or commissary, would be of use to
me, as it would serve to show in some degree their dis-
position, and would aid other information.
" I have observed that the French are singularly
accurate in preserving the different Corps d'Armee in the
order in which they are first arranged in the line of battle.
The corps of Key, Soult, Mortier, Victor, and Sebastiani
are at this moment in the same situation in respect to
each other that they held before the battle of Talavera.
And Junot's corps has come in, and has been placed
upon the right of the whole. Knowing the names of the
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 125
officers, the numbers of the regiments and battalions, and
the names of the commissaries attached to each corps,
and the general order in which they stand in the line, the
name of any person making a requisition in any place
must aid me in forming an opinion of the disposition of
the army.
" 2 p.m. I have heard both from Pinhel and Valverde
that there was a firing in your front as late as nine this
morning; but I conclude that I should have heard from
you if it had been serious."
On the 2 ist the enemy's cavalry had again advanced,
Fort Conception was blown up, and Craufurd, on the 22nd,
drew his whole force back near Almeida, observing with
piquets of cavalry the different roads on the great plain
in front.
Napier now writes concerning General Craufurd : " He
had kept a weak Division for three months within two
hours' march of sixty thousand men, appropriating the
resources of the plains entirely to himself; but this
exploit, only to be appreciated by military men, did not
satisfy his feverish thirst of distinction. He had safely
affronted a superior power ; and, forgetting that his stay
beyond the Coa was a matter of sufferance and not of
real strength, he with headstrong ambition resolved, in
defiance of reason and the reiterated orders of his General,
to fight on the right bank. He had four thousand British
infantry, eleven hundred cavalry, and six guns in position,
on a line oblique to tfe Coa. The right was on some
126 GENERAL CRAUFURD
broken ground, the left, resting on an unfinished tower
eight hundred yards from Almeida, was defended by the
guns of that fortress ; his cavalry was on the plain in
front ; but his back was on the edge of a ravine forming
the channel of the Coa ; and the bridge, more than a mile
distant, was in the bottom of the chasm."
Sir William Napier was much mistaken in saying that
Craufurd "resolved" to fight under these circumstances.
I will give Craufurd's own letter written to the Times on
this subject rather further on ; and, concerning his own
intentions, it must be admitted that he was a better judge
than Napier. Sir George Napier (in his " Early Military
Life") represents things- much more accurately when he
says, " Craufurd, however, let his vanity get the better of
his judgment, and delayed so long that at last the enemy
made a sudden attack." That is the real truth about the
business. And this was Lord Wellington's view. In a
letter to Lord Liverpool, written on July 27, he says,
" Unfortunately General Craufurd did not begin to retire
till the last moment." The Commander-in-chief evidently
never thought that Craufurd intended to defy this large
French army, contrary to his orders; but he did think
that the pugnacious leader of the Light Division lingered
too long before beginning his retreat. No doubt
Wellington would have been far more displeased with
Craufurd than he was, if he had regarded his error of
judgment as accompanied by deliberate disobedience.
Still, the interesting question remains, why did General
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 127
Craufurd not cross the Coa two or three days earlier?
Lord Londonderry tells us that Craufurd thought that
the French " would respect the fortress of Almeida, that
they would not push him very rapidly, and hence that he
would be able to make a regular retreat at any moment."
In the " Life of Sir William Napier," by H. A. Bruce, in
some "Notes of Conversations with the Duke of Welling-
ton," we find the following remark by the historian of the
Peninsular War : " Colonel , of Almeida, was very
negligent in not putting some men into the windmill in
front of the works. It would have delayed the investment,
and have given time to General Craufurd to withdraw his
Division in safety." And in his vivid description of the
fight by the Coa, Sir William Napier writes : " Massena
claimed to have taken two pieces of artillery, which was
true ; for the iron guns intended to arm the unfinished
tower near Almeida were lying at the foot of the building,
and thus fell into his hands. They belonged, however, to
the garrison, not to the Light Division ; and that they
were not mounted and the tower garrisoned was a great
negligence. Had it been otherwise, the French cavalry
could not have charged the left of the position, and the
after-investment of Almeida itself would have been re-
tarded."
These remarks of Sir William Napier are peculiarly
significant, because he held that the supreme danger to the
Light Division in this combat arose from the French
cavalry, which he thought might have annihilated it.
128 GENERAL CRAUFURD
It is evident, then, that Craufurd placed too much
confidence in the Governor and garrison of Almeida. He
considered himself bound to prevent the investment of
this fortress as long as he possibly could ; and so at last
the enemy made a sudden and unexpected attack upon
him, so that he could not retire without a fight. His judg-
ment was erroneous, no doubt, to some extent. But he
knew well that it was important to Lord Wellington's
general plans that the French should be delayed as long
as possible before Almeida. This is plain from the disgust
and dissatisfaction afterwards caused to the Commander
by the unfortunate and premature fall of this place.
In short, Craufurd's fault was excess of zeal, attempting
too much, a not very uncommon fault with natures so fiery
and eager as his was. Yet of him Sir George Napier
wrote : " When his reason was not obscured by passion,
few men possessed more clearness of judgment."
In justice to Craufurd it should also be remembered
that, in the case of his other Generals of Division, Lord
Wellington had sometimes to make a different but no less
real complaint ; he blamed them for timidity and want of
confidence and enterprise. Thus, only a few months after
Craufurd's death, when Hill was conducting some very
critical operations, they were to a considerable extent
marred by the timidity of some of the Generals concerned,
especially of the incompetent Erskine. In his history of
the Peninsular War, Napier, with reference to this, says of
Wellington: "To the ministers, however, he complained
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 129
that his Generals, stout in action personally as the poorest
soldiers, were commonly so overwhelmed with fear of
responsibility, when left to themselves, that the slightest
movement of the enemy deprived them of their judgment,
and they spread unnecessary alarm 1 far and wide." Cer-
tainly the great commander never had occasion to make
a complaint of that sort against General Craufurd. Of
him it was justly remarked in a biography of another
gallant officer (General Le Marchant) : " Others shunned
responsibility ; he courted it." This singular boldness had
its advantages. Concerning the four and a half months of
supremely difficult outpost work which preceded the fight
at the Coa, Sir James Shaw Kennedy, who had ample
means of knowing, wrote thus : " He (Craufurd) almost led
the Commander-in-chief into it by the enthusiastic zeal
with which he entered upon it, and the activity and ability
with which he carried it through." To such a leader some-
thing in the way of occasional errors of judgment may
surely be forgiven.
Sir William Napier's account of the combat at the Coa
is very vivid and graphic ; but it is so well known that I
think it will be more interesting to give here another
account by an officer who was also engaged in that
fight.
Colonel Leach, of the 95th Rifles, describes it thus :
u Soon after daybreak the whole of Marshal Ney's corps,
consisting of troops of all arms to the amount of about
25,000 men, advanced for the purpose of investing and
K
130 GENERAL CRAUFURD
laying siege to Almeida, and of driving General Craufurd's
corps of observation over the Coa, should it be found on
the same side of the river.
" General Craufurd placed his infantry in line amongst
some rocky ground and stone walls, his left being within
seven or eight hundred yards of Almeida, and his right
thrown back in a convex form towards the Coa. Our
cavalry posts in the plain were soon forced back on the
infantry, and a brisk cannonade commenced. The ad-
vance of the French cavalry were brought to bay by our
infantry in the intersected ground ; but Marshal Ney,
having more than 20,000 infantry at his back, was not
long to be delayed in this manner. Although the left of
our line was under the protection of the guns of the
fortress, the French assailed it with great impetuosity ;
and the right and centre also soon found itself beset with
a swarm of light troops, supported by heavy columns
constantly advancing, and aided by their artillery, which
cannonaded us warmly.
" The baggage, artillery, cavalry, and the two Portu-
guese light battalions were directed to retire instantly to
the bridge over the Coa, and to gain the opposite bank
without delay. Those who have seen and know this
narrow and difficult defile need not be informed that to
keep at bay as many thousand infantry as Marshal Ney
might think proper to send forward, whilst the road was
choked with troops, baggage, and artillery, which it was
absolutely necessary should be covered and protected
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 131
during a retreat of a mile or more, and until they had
crossed the bridge in safety, was no easy matter.
" The troops destined to cover the retreat consisted of
our own battalion and a considerable part or the whole
of the 43rd and 5 2nd Regiments. No further description
of this rocky defile is necessary, than that the road is very
narrow, and as bad as the generality of mountain roads in
the Peninsula are ; and, moreover, that it is overhung by
huge rocks in many places, from which, had our pursuers
been permitted to possess themselves of them, they might
have annihilated the troops underneath, without their
being able to retaliate. And thus the only option left
them would have been a walk to Verdun as prisoners of
war, or an instantaneous passage across the Styx instead
of the Coa.
" By this time the fight had begun in good earnest ;
and, in order that my story may not be too long, it will
be sufficient to say that, from the commencement of the
action at the edge of the plain until we reached the river,
every inch of ground admitting of defence was obstinately
contested by the rear-guard, which was followed by fresh
troops every instant arriving to support their comrades.
The French artillery failed not to help us along, when-
ever they had an opportunity, with a nine-pound shot.
" As the rear-guard approached the Coa, we perceived
that a part only of our cavalry, infantry, and artillery
had yet crossed the bridge ; it became therefore indis-
pensably requisite for us to keep possession of a small
132 GENERAL CRAUFURD
hill looking down on and perfectly commanding the
bridge, until everything had passed over, cost what it
might.
" I trust I shall be pardoned for saying that the
soldiers of the old and gallant 43rd, and that part also
of our own battalion whose lot it was to defend this
important hill against a vast superiority of numbers, proved
themselves worthy of the trust.
" In ascending the hill a musket-shot grazed the left
side of my head, and buried itself in the earth close by.
Both my subalterns, who were brothers, were severely
wounded in the defence of this hill ; and we had but
barely time to send them, with other wounded officers
and men, across the river, ere we were obliged to retire,
and to make a push in double-quick time to reach the
bridge, the whole time exposed to such a fire from the
hill which we had just abandoned, as might have satisfied
the most determined fire-eater in existence.
" If any are now living of those who defended the
little hill above the bridge, they cannot fail to remember
the gallantry displayed by Major Macleod of the 43rd,
who was the senior officer on the spot. How either he
or his horse escaped being blown to atoms, when in the
most daring manner he charged on horseback, at the head
of a hundred or two skirmishers of the 43rd and of our
regiment mixed together, and headed them in making
a dash at a wall lined with French infantry which we
soon dislodged, I am at a loss to imagine. It was one
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 133
of those extraordinary escapes tending strongly to implant
in the mind some faith in the doctrine of fatality.
" The whole of General Craufurd's corps at length
gained the opposite bank of the Coa, and was strongly
posted near the bridge, behind walls, rocks, and broken
ground. The torrents of rain which fell the night before
had so swollen the river that all the fords were at that
moment impassable ; a fortunate circumstance, as the
only way by which we could now be attacked was over
the narrow bridge, on which we could bring a destructive
fire ; and we likewise commanded the approach to it from
the opposite side with musketry. An incessant fire was
kept up across the river by both parties ; and, after it
had continued some time, the French sent a party of
Grenadiers to storm the bridge, with the vain hope of
driving us from our new position. They advanced most
resolutely in double- quick time, and charged along the
bridge ; but few, if any, went back alive, and most of
those who reached our side of it unhurt were killed after-
wards. This experiment was repeated, and it is almost
needless to add that it met the same fate each time.
"The French officer who directed those attacks on
the bridge, might have known, before he caused the
experiment to be made, that a few hundred French
Grenadiers, advancing to the tune of ' Vive 1'Empereur ! '
' En avant, mes enfans ! ' and so forth, were not likely
to succeed in scaring away three British and two Portu-
guese regiments supported by artillery. It was a piece
134 GENERAL CRAUFURD
of unpardonable butchery on the part of the man who
ordered those brave Grenadiers to be thus wantonly sacri-
ficed, without the most remote prospect of success. They
deserved a better fate ; for no men could have behaved
with more intrepidity.
" The total loss of the Light Division was from three
to four hundred men. Thus ended the affair of the Coa,
a day which will not easily be forgotten by those who
were present. And I may also add that, although an
overwhelming French force obliged the Light Division
to retreat, and to contend with it under every possible
disadvantage, until it had gained the opposite bank of
the river, the retreat was so well covered and protected
by the excellent disposition of the troops forming the
rear-guard, that we may, without being accused either of
vanity or bravado, look back upon it as a day of glory
and not of defeat."
Here the narrative of Colonel Leach ends. Napier
tells us that " Craufurd retired in the night behind the
Pinhel river." He also says of this fierce and difficult
combat, "There was no room for a line, no time for
anything but battle. Every captain carried off" his com-
pany as an independent body ; and joining as he could
with the riflemen and 52nd, the whole presented a mass
of skirmishers, acting in small parties and under no
regular command, yet each confident in the courage and
discipline of those on his right and left, and all keeping
together with surprising vigour."
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 135
Napier also says, " It was at first supposed that Lieu-
tenant Dawson and half a company of the 52nd, which
had been posted in the unfinished tower, were also cap-
tured ; but with great intelligence he passed all the
enemy's posts in the night, crossed the Coa at a distant
ford and rejoined his regiment. Ney lost one thousand men,
and the slaughter at the bridge was fearful to behold."
As might have been expected from the nature of the
combat and the splendid qualities of the soldiers of the
Light Division, occasion was here given for many an
exhibition of high courage and unflinching self-sacrifice
amongst Craufurd's men. The two following stories are
related by Sir William Napier, and may serve to show
us what manner of men the privates and non-commissioned
officers of the famous 43rd Light Infantry then were.
There was a young soldier named Stewart, nicknamed
" The Boy," as he was only nineteen years old, and of
gigantic stature. He had fought bravely and displayed
great intelligence beyond the river, and was one of the
last men who came down to the bridge ; but he would
not pass. Turning round, he regarded the French with
a grim look, and spoke aloud as follows: "So this is the
end of our boasting ! This is our first battle, and we
retreat ! The Boy Stewart will not live to hear that said."
Then striding forward in his giant might, he fell furiously
on the nearest enemies with the bayonet, refused the
quarter they seemed desirous of giving, and died fighting
in the midst of them.
136 GENERAL CRAUFURD
" The Boy " was a native of the north of Ireland.
Much as one must regret the loss of so gallant a soldier
through his rashness, it is certainly not for me, the grand-
son of his General, to condemn him ; for " The Boy " had
indeed a double portion of his leader's fiery pride ; and
both were made of the same stuff as the unyielding warriors
at Thermopylae. Peace be with the noble spirit of " The
Boy"!
Still more touching and more heroic was the grand and
sublime self-sacrifice of another warrior of the gallant 43rd,
Sergeant Robert McQuade, During Major Macleod's rush
this man, also from the north of Ireland, saw two French-
men level their muskets on rests against a high gap in a
bank, awaiting the uprise of an enemy. Sir George
Brown,* then a lad of sixteen, attempted to ascend at the
fatal point ; but McQuade, himself only twenty-four years
of age, pulled him back, saying with a calm, decided tone,
" You are too young, sir, to be killed." And then, offering,
his own person to the fire, fell dead, pierced with both
balls !
Of such grand material were then the non-commis-
sioned officers of the incomparable Light Division.
Assuredly young Brown had then and there read to
* It may interest some of my readers to know that Sir George Brown lived
to be Colonel-in-chief of the Rifle Brigade, and that he was profoundly devoted
to the memory of General Craufurd, and always kept a little portrait of him
n his own room. Through the kindness of SiV G. Brown's great-nephew,
Colonel Leslie of the Cameron Highlanders, this portrait was copied, and
a photograph of it now hangs in the officers' mess-room of the 43rd ; and it
has been used for the frontispiece of this volume.
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 137
him a better lesson in true self-sacrifice, true heroism, and
true religion than ever issued from the lips of a preacher !
When one remembers the genuine moral greatness and
nobleness so often exhibited, throughout our long history,
by what the world calls our "common soldiers;" when
one realizes, for instance, how splendid were the loyalty
and devotion to duty displayed by our ignorant soldiers
during the wreck of the Birkenhead, it makes one's blood
boil with indignation to think that they are habitually
looked down upon and treated with contumely by the
respectable and selfish Pharisees of a stupid convention-
alism, by men whose very religion is often steeped in
meanness, and utterly devoid of that spirit of self-sacrifice
which is in truth the very essence of Christianity and the
crowning glory of our human nature.
For my part, I own freely that I have lived on terms
of friendship and affection with many private soldiers, and
that I care far more for their opinion than for that of mere
respectability. Soldiers have many besetting faults and
sins ; but in the vast majority of cases I understand the
causes of their sins so well, that their offences in no way
alienate my strong hereditary sympathy. To be "numbered
with the transgressors "as the ordinary world reckons
transgressors often seems to me no unenviable fate ; for
amongst these reputed outcasts I have often found many
fine qualities and many of the warmest hearts that I have
known amongst all the sons of men. Quite lately British
soldiers were described as " scum " in the columns of a
138 GENERAL CRAUFURD
fashionable newspaper. Educated writers ought, I think,
to be ashamed to use such unfair and ungenerous language
of a large class of men to whom we all owe much. When
I think of the many privations and vexatious annoyances
to which the soldier is still often subjected, and which he
usually bears with great patience and good temper, it
seems to me that he is far more deserving of the gratitude
than of the contempt of the people of his country. And
I know well, by prolonged personal experience, that if one
wishes to detach him from his sins and to elevate his
moral nature, this is best effected by intelligent and
unrestrained sympathy, and not by harsh and unsparing
condemnation. A great many soldiers have very strong
feelings ; and it is by appealing to these that one moves
them most. I have noticed that in religious services the
men very often like best some of our hymns which second-
rate religionists are wont to stigmatize as "sentimental."
No preacher will ever touch the hearts of English soldiers
who expects cold prudential self-regard to work those
wondrous moral miracles of regeneration, which love and
pity wrought freely in the sin-stained but loyal hearts
of simple Galilean peasants in the days of old.
Marshal Massena appears to have been a very boastful
and untruthful person, and in his official report of the
combat on the Coa he indulged himself with some state-
ments contrary to facts and at the same time discreditable
to the conduct of the Light Division. General Craufurd,
though he had many faults, always thoroughly identified
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 139
himself with his men, and was as jealous of their reputation
as of his own. Consequently he published the following
long letter in the Times of November 21, 1810. This
letter is highly characteristic ; it also contains Craufurd's
defence of his own arrangements, and also shows clearly
that he never resolved (as Napier said he did) to fight
against any large force of the enemy on the French side
of the river. All that he hoped or designed to do was to
prevent the investment of Almeida by any small or
moderate number of troops.
"Marshal Massena, not content with the gross mis-
representations which were contained in his first official
account of the action of the 24th of July, near Almeida,
has in a subsequent despatch reverted to it in a tone
of boasting wholly unjustified by the circumstances ;
assuring the War Minister that his whole army is burn-
ing with impatience to teach the English army what
they taught the Division of Craufurd in the affair of
Almeida.
"Brigadier-General Craufurd has therefore determined
to give this public contradiction to the false assertions
contained in Marshal Massena's report of an action which
was not only highly honourable to the Light Division, but
which positively terminated in its favour, notwithstanding
the extraordinary disparity of numbers. A corps of 4000
men remained during the whole day in presence of an army
amounting to 24,000. It performed, in the presence of so
superior a force, one of the most difficult operations of war,
140 GENERAL CRAUFURD
namely, a retreat from a very broken and extensive
position over one narrow defile. It defended, during the
whole of the day, the first defensible position that was to
be found in the neighbourhood of the place where the
action commenced ; and in the course of the affair, this
corps of 4000 men inflicted upon this army of 24,000 a
loss equal to the double of that which it sustained. Such
were the circumstances of the action in which Brigadier-
General Craufurd's corps was opposed to the army
commanded by Marshals Massena and Ney on July 24 ;
and it is therefore indisputable that they had the best
of it
" From Marshal Mas^ena's official despatch, containing
a statement of the force to which we were opposed, it
appears that the cavalry consisted of the 3rd Hussars,
1 5th Chasseurs, roth, I5th, and 25th Dragoons, and that
the whole of the infantry of Ney's corps was present,
except one regiment of the Division of Marchand. The
infantry of Ney's corps, according to the intercepted
official returns, amounted at that time to upwards of
22,000 effectives, and the cavalry regiments were certainly
between 600 and 700 each. It therefore appears that 'the
force with which Marshals Massena and Ney advanced to
attack the Light Division on the morning of July 24, con-
sisted of 20,000 infantry, and between 3000 and 4000
cavalry ; to which were opposed three English battalions
(43rd, 52nd, and 95th), two Portuguese battalions (ist and
3rd Chasseurs), and eight squadrons of cavalry, making, in
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 141
the whole, a force of about 3200 British, and iioo Portu-
guese troops.
" Almeida is a small fortress situated at the edge of the
declivity forming a right bank of the valley of the Coa,
which river runs from the south to the north, and the
bridge over which is nearly an English mile west of the
town. From July 21 to 24 the chain of our cavalry
outposts formed a semi-circle in front of Almeida, the
right flank being appuye to the Coa, near As-Naves,
which is about three miles above the place, and the left
flank also appuye to the river near Cinco- Villa, which is
about three miles below the fortress. The centre of this
line was covered by a small stream ; and on the principal
roads by which it was expected the enemy would advance,
namely, on the right and centre of the position, the
cavalry posts were Supported by piquets of infantry. The
only road which our artillery and the body of our cavalry
could make use of, to retreat across the Coa, was that
which leads from Almeida to the bridge. The nature of
the ground made it difficult for the enemy to approach
this road on our left, that is to say, on the north side of
the town ; and the infantry of the Division was, therefore,
placed in a position to cover it on the right or south side,
having its right flank appuye to the Coa above the bridge,
its front covered by a deep and rocky ravine, and its left
in some enclosures near a windmill, which is on the plain,
about eight hundred yards south of the town. The
governor had intended to mount a gun upon the windmill ;
142 GENERAL CRAUFURD
and one was actually in it, but quite useless, as it was not
mounted. Another gun, also dismounted, was lying near
the mill. These are the guns which Marshal Massena says
he took in the action.
" On the morning of the 24th the centre of our line of
piquets was attacked, namely, that which occupied the
road leading from Almeida to Val de la Mula, which
village is about four English miles east of the fortress.
These piquets were supported by the I4th Light Dragoons
and two guns ; but when the head of a considerable
column, with artillery, presented itself, and began to form
on the other side of the rivulet, the piquets were with-
drawn. The enemy then passed the rivulet, a cannonade
took place, and they formed a line of fifteen squadrons of
cavalry, at a distance of about a mile from the above-
mentioned windmill, with artillery in its front, and a
Division of about seven thousand infantry on its right.
Other troops were seen, though not so distinctly, advancing
upon our right.
" It being now evident that we were opposed to such
a force as to render it impossible for Brigadier-General
Craufurd to prevent the investment of the place, he deter-
mined to cross the Coa. He ordered the artillery and
cavalry to move off by the road leading from the town to
the bridge, and the infantry to follow, retiring across the
vineyard in the same direction. The infantry were
directed to move in echelon from the left, it being neces-
sary to hold the right to the last, in order to prevent the
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 143
enemy approaching the bridge by a road coming from
Junca, and which runs along the bottom of the valley
close to the river. Some companies, which formed the
left of our line, were in a vineyard so completely enclosed
by a high stone wall, that it was quite impossible for
cavalry to get into it ; but the preceding night had been
excessively severe, and some of the troops stationed in
the vineyard had unfortunately pulled down the wall in
many places, to make use of the stones to form a shelter
against the violent rain. This wall, which Brigadier-
General Craufurd had considered as a complete defence,
was, therefore, no longer such ; and after our artillery and
cavalry had moved off, the enemy's horse broke into the
enclosure and took several prisoners.
" Our total loss in prisoners and missing amounted to
about sixty, after all those who were at first returned as
such had contrived to rejoin their regiments. The 43rd
Regiment, having been on the left of the line, was the first
that arrived near the bridge. The Brigadier-General
ordered some companies of it to occupy a height in front
of the bridge, and the remainder to pass on and form on
the heights on the other side of the river. Part of the
95th Rifles, and the 3rd battalion of Chasseurs, who
arrived next, were formed on the right of those companies
of the 43rd Regiment that were in front of the bridge.
This position was maintained until everything was over,
and until one of the Horse Artillery ammunition waggons,
which had been overturned in a very bad situation, was
144 GENERAL CRAUFURD
got up and dragged to the other side by the men. During
the remainder of the day the bridge was most gallantly
defended by the 43rd and part of the 95 th Regiments, and
after it was dusk, we retreated from the Coa.
"To retire in tactical order over such ground, so
broken, rocky, and intersected with walls, as that which
separated the first position from the second, would have
been impossible, even if not under the fire of the enemy ;
and the ground on the other side of the river was equally
unfavourable for reforming the regiments. Whoever
knows anything of war, knows that in such an operation,
and upon such ground, some derangement of regular order
is inevitable ; but the. retreat was made in a military,
soldier-like manner, and without the slightest precipi-
tation. In the course of it the enemy, when he pressed,
was attacked in different places by the 43rd, 52nd, and
95th Regiments, and driven before them.
" With respect to the enemy's loss, it is, of course,
difficult to say what it was, because we know that, from
the commencement of the revolutionary war, no French
official report has ever contained true statements on this
point. Upon this occasion Marshal Massena says, ' We
have taken one stand of colours, four hundred men, and
two pieces of cannon ; our own loss amounted to nearly
three hundred killed and wounded.' He took no colours ;
the cannon were the two dismounted guns belonging to
the fortress, which were lying in and near the windmill ;
and instead of four hundred prisoners, he took only about
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 145
sixty, supposing every one of those we returned as missing,
to have fallen alive into the enemy's hands. Now, if in
the same paragraph in which he states his own loss at
three hundred, he calls sixty prisoners four hundred, we
may fairly infer that he is not more accurate in the one
statement than in the other ; and this circumstance, as well
as the usual practice of their service, and the probability of
the thing from what we could observe, fully justify us in
assuming it to have been from six to seven hundred.
Ours amounted in killed, wounded, and prisoners, to three
hundred and thirty.
" Such is the true account of this affair, upon which the
Marshal prides himself so much, but in which it is certain
that the advantage was on our side. We could not
pretend to prevent the investment of the place ; but in
our retreat we did not lose a gun, a trophy, or a single
article of field equipage ; and we inflicted on the enemy a
loss certainly double that we sustained. The account,
contained in the commencement of the Marshal's despatch,
of what had passed on July 21, is equally contrary to the
truth. He talks of having forced the passage of the little
rivulet that runs between Almeida and Val de la Mula on
the 2 ist ; whereas our piquets remained there, and not
a single Frenchman passed it until the morning of the
24th. He says that many of our sharp-shooters fell into
their hands on the 2ist; the truth is that they did not
take a single man. The retreat of the I4th Dragoons
from Val de la Mula was conducted in the most slow and
L
V
146 GENERAL CRAUFURD
regular manner, and all our intentions with respect to Fort
Conception were completely fulfilled.
(Signed) "ROBERT CRAUFURD,
" Brigadier-General."
Charles Napier was present at the combat on the Coa.
He drew up a long list of the errors committed by General
Craufurd on this occasion, and this list has been published
in his life by his brother, Sir William. Charles Napier
said that he made the list for his own instruction ; but
men are very often not conscious of their really deter-
mining motives ; and the strong language used by Charles
Napier on this occasion makes it plain that detestation of
his General was his chief incentive. Substantially, I
imagine that most of his criticisms were correct ; but the
edge of them is considerably blunted when one remembers
that General Craufurd had not " resolved " to withstand
the whole army of Massena, but was attacked suddenly.
Sir William Napier, who really believed that his General
had " resolved " to fight, agrees with the censure passed on
Craufurd by Charles Napier ; but his judgment was much
fairer than that of his brother. Remembering what the
Light Division owed to Craufurd, or at all events re-
membering some part of it, William Napier adds, " Still,
he was a great officer."
Mr. Bruce, in his more recent life of Sir Charles
Napier, omits this last remark of Sir William, and so
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 147
conveys to his readers a rather misleading idea of
the great historian's deliberate opinion of his famous
leader.
But even William Napier's judgment of this matter
was inevitably biased to a considerable extent by his
fervent adoration of the great Sir John Moore. He said,
" Only Moore's regiments could, with so little experience,
have extricated themselves from the danger into which
they were so recklessly cast. Their matchless discipline
was their protection ; a phantom hero from Corunna
saved them."
This seems hardly accurate or fair. The Light Division
had been under Craufurd for more than a year in the
Peninsular War when the fight at the Coa occurred ; and
some of its men had been with him at Buenos Ayres, and
in the harassing retreat to Vigo. Captain Kincaid, of the
95th Rifles, speaks, I believe, with far greater accuracy
and discriminating justice when he says, " He (that is,
Craufurd) received the three British regiments under his
command finished by the hands of a master in the art,
Sir John Moore, and as regiments they were faultless ; but
to Craufurd belonged the chief merit of making them the
war Brigade which they became, alike the admiration of
their friends and foes." And again this same writer says
of Craufurd, " He had introduced a system of discipline
into the Light Division which made them unrivalled. . . .
It was not until a short time before he was lost to us for
ever, that we were capable of appreciating his merits, and
148 GENERAL CRAUFURD
fully sensible of the incalculable advantages we derived
from the perfection of his system."
And so I think that Sir William Napier's picturesque
language about the "phantom hero from Corunna" re-
quires modification to a certain extent. According to Sir
James Shaw Kennedy, whose ability Napier thoroughly
admits or rather asserts, the four or five months of remark-
able outpost work which preceded the fight at the Coa,
must in the nature of things have been a most effective
education for Craufurd's troops, and must have trained
them in vigilance and in rapidity of movement to a far
greater extent than any teaching by Sir John Moore ever
did. I suppose that the. soldiers of the British army have
never performed any other exploits in the way of outpost
work equal to that carried on between the rivers Coa
and Agueda ; and Craufurd's men were fresh from that
supremely difficult work when they encountered Marshal
Massena and his numerous forces.
Napier was evidently correct in saying that Craufurd
and Picton met on the day of this combat on the Coa, and
that the latter refused to move to the assistance of the
Light Division ; but why Picton thus refused no one has
ever been able to find out.
In his " Narrative of the Peninsular War," Lord Lon-
donderry, who knew Craufurd most intimately, evidently
thinks that he ought not to have fought on the French
side of the Coa ; but still he writes : " Yet was Craufurd
an officer of singular ability and bravery, and certainly one
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 149
of the best in the army, as all his proceedings on other
occasions showed ; and even here he did as much, or
perhaps more, than most men in a similar situation could
have performed."
It ought also to be borne in mind that though the
leader of the Light Division erred gravely in judgment on
this occasion, yet his error was no worse than many com-
mitted by French Marshals whose general reputations yet
stand deservedly very high on the whole.
Lord Wellington was on this occasion much vexed and
annoyed with General Craufurd ; yet he passed no direct
censure on him, and never deprived him of his command
for a single day ; he only omitted to thank Craufurd,
while greatly praising the conduct of the officers and men
of his Division.
It is much to be wished that those who compile military
histories would study to be accurate so far as is possible.
Sir R. Levinge, in his " Historical Records of the 43rd
Regiment," inserts, with apparent approval and sanction, a
letter from a young subaltern named Booth, in which it is
declared that Lord Wellington had deprived General
Craufurd of the command of the Light Division, and given
it to Sir Brent Spencer. This is totally untrue ; and Sir R.
Levinge might easily have discovered its untruth, by look-
ing into Gurwood's edition of Wellington's Despatches,
wherein he would have made the discovery that, directly
after the fight at the Coa, Wellington writes to Crau-
furd as still in possession of his old command, that he
150 GENERAL CRAUFURD
continues to do so, and that whilst Craufurd lived, his
Division was never intrusted to other hands except for a
few months much later on in the war, when General
Craufurd went home on his own private affairs, greatly
contrary to Lord Wellington's expressed wishes. This can
easily be proved by a reference to the despatches which
I have mentioned ; and it seems rather strange that the
" Historical Records of the 43rd Regiment " should contain
such a grave and gratuitous error.
Craufurd himself felt keenly Wellington's disapproba-
tion and implied censure. And he was also very anxious
to know what was said on the subject at home in England.
Accordingly, he wrote to make inquiries through his wife
and his brother, General Charles Craufurd. And they tell
him that very little has appeared on this business in the
newspapers, excepting a rumour that the Light Division
had been taken away from him and given to "General
William Stewart, a brother of Lord Galloway." But
General Charles Craufurd says, in a letter to his brother
Robert, that he put down this rumour to political spite,
as the intimate friendship of the leader of the Light
Division with Mr. Windham caused him to be much
disliked by certain people belonging to a different political
set.
I have in my possession a letter written by Wellington
to Craufurd the day after the battle, namely July 25, at
6 p.m., in which nothing much is said about the affair, and
directions are given quite in the usual way ; and the tone
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 151
and style are the same as ever. And on the following
day, July 26, the Commander-in-chief again writes to his
subordinate General in his customary manner. In fact,
notwithstanding Craufurd's dangerous error of judgment,
Wellington seems never to have contemplated removing
him from his command, or to have revoked the remarkable
words which he had addressed to him only a few months
ago on April 9, 1810 " Since you have joined the army,
I have always wished that you should command our
outposts, for many reasons into which it is unnecessary to
enter."
Before many months had passed, "the masterly dis-
positions " as Napier calls them of his troops at Busaco
by the leader of the Light Division were destined to prove
conclusively that Lord Wellington was right, and that
General Craufurd was a far abler man than some of his
indignant regimental officers were willing to confess him to
be, when they heaped abuse on him and yearned for his
removal on account of his memorable fight against the
enemy beside the river Coa.
152 GENERAL CRAUFURD
CHAPTER VI.
SERVICES UNDER WELLINGTON CONCLUDED.
ON July 28, the Light Division arrived at Celorico, and
made huts for themselves there. And about this time
Lord Wellington directed that the Division should be
divided into two Brigades, and be commanded as follows :
the first Brigade by Lieutenant-Colonel Beckwith, con-
sisting of one half of his own battalion the 95th Rifles, the
43rd Regiment, and the 3rd Portuguese Cacadores ; the
second Brigade by Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay of the 52nd,
consisting of his own regiment, the other part of the 95th
Rifles, and the 1st Portuguese Cacadores.
Immediately after Craufurd's retreat across the Coa,
on July 24, Massena commenced the siege of Almeida,
though in a rather dilatory manner. The Governor of
Almeida was Colonel Cox, an English officer in the Portu-
guese service ; and Wellington expected the place to hold
out for a considerable time, and thus delay the advance of
the French.
Writing to General Craufurd, on July 27, to explain
his arrangements to him, Wellington remarks : " What-
ever may be the enemy's intentions (which I think are to
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 153
dash at us as soon as they will be prepared, and make
our retreat as difficult as possible), we shall be in
such a situation as to be able to effect it without being
much pressed, or to move forward again if a blow can be
struck with advantage." In this letter the Commander
says that " these circumstances and the general view of
our situation have determined me to make a move to the
rear with our infantry, with the exception of the fourth
Division, which I will leave in observation on Guarda."
Sir William Napier, writing concerning this period of
the war, says, " In these positions, expecting a vigorous
defence from Almeida, he (Wellington) hoped to delay the
enemy for two months, when the rainy season would give
him further advantages in defence of the country. His
original intention had been to keep the Light Division
always on the Cabeca Negro, a rugged hill overhanging
the bridge of the Coa, expecting thus to keep open his
communication with the fortress, or to make the French
invest the place with their whole army. Craufurd's rash-
ness marred this plan ; and his despondency after the
action on the 24th rendered it imprudent to renew the
project."
General Craufurd's apparent " despondency " was cer-
tainly not caused by any apprehension of the French
forces, as is sufficiently evident from his "almost bringing
on a premature action with them a few weeks later, just
before the battle of Busaco. The occupation of this
rugged hill overlooking the Coa would have suited him
154 GENERAL CRAUFURD
remarkably well ; and one cannot help regretting that Lord
Wellington did not mention to Craufurd his plans a little
earlier, and then the unnecessary fight on the Coa would
almost certainly have never taken place.
From an inspection of Craufurd's correspondence with
his brother, I am enabled to confirm Sir William Napier's
statement that he was then suffering from "despondency;"
but the cause of this dejection was not what Napier, and
perhaps Wellington, took it to be. It was the great
Commander's own displeasure which was depressing the
spirits of the fiery leader of the Light Division. Until
after the battle of Busaco where Craufurd earned the
very warmest eulogy -from his much-respected chief
the two men were not any longer on comfortable terms ;
and this Craufurd felt keenly, as he always entertained the
very highest opinion of his Commander's abilities and
soundness of judgment. The writer of General Craufurd's
life, in Mr. Leslie Stephen's valuable " Dictionary of
National Biography," is very much mistaken in his asser-
tion that " Craufurd cared little for Wellington's censure."
On the contrary, he cared a great deal for it ; and his cor-
respondence affords ample evidence of this. Mr. Hooper,
in his " Life of Wellington," justly enough describes
the leader of the Light Division as " always burning to
fight " ; but, like many men of passionate temperament, he
was extremely sensitive. Lord Wellington was well aware
of this fact, but its full significance may at times -have
escaped his observation. The simple circumstance that his
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 155
chief had not praised him for his services at the action on
the Coa, disquieted the mind of the eager and impetuous
subordinate. Actual censure Craufurd could never have
borne ; he would have given up his command at once.
About August 26, the French batteries opened on the
fortress of Almeida ; and a few hours after the bombard-
ment commenced, most unfortunately a shell exploded in
the great magazine, blew half the town about the ears of
the garrison, and so injured the works that the Governor
was obliged to capitulate. This was most disadvantageous
to Wellington, as Marshal Massena was now able to
prosecute his march on Lisbon some weeks earlier than
had been expected.
Early in September the army began to retreat to
Coimbra, and many people thought that it would soon
embark at Lisbon for England. But about the 2oth of
this month the Light Division crossed the river Mondego
by a ford, and found themselves on the main road leading
from Vizeu to Coimbra. As they were approaching the
Sierra de Busaco, Craufurd's eagerness to fight nearly
brought on a premature engagement; but Lord Wellington
arrived at the post in time, and ordered him to retire to
Busaco. There on the heights, on a spur of the mountain
jutting out very considerably, the Light Division took up
its position.
Sir William Napier gives September 29 as the date of
the battle of Busaco ; but I suppose this must be a
misprint, as all the other authorities give the 27th.
156 GENERAL CRAUFURD
In this battle the Light Division and its leader earned
undying distinction. Ney's attack upon Craufurd was
repulsed in the most brilliant and effective manner.
Napier remarks, " Ney's attack had as little success.
From the abutment of the mountain upon which the Light
Division was stationed, the lowest parts of the valley could
be discerned ; the ascent was steeper than where Reynier
had attacked ; and Craufurd, in a happy mood of com-
mand, made masterly dispositions. The table-land between
him and the convent was sufficiently scooped to conceal
the 43rd and 52nd Regiments drawn up in line ; and a
quarter of a mile behind them, on higher ground, and close
to the convent, the German infantry appeared to be the
only solid line of resistance on this part of the position.
In front of the British regiments, some rocks, overhanging
the descent, furnished natural embrasures in which Ross's
guns were placed ; and beyond them the Riflemen and
Ga^adores were planted as skirmishers, covering the slope
of the mountain.
"While it was still dark, a straggling musketry was
heard in the deep valley ; and when the light broke, three
heavy masses, detached from the sixth corps, were seen to
enter the woods below and throw forward a profusion of
skirmishers. One of these, under General Marchand,
emerging from the dark chasm and following the main
road, seemed intent to turn the right of the Light Division ;
a second under Loisoh made straight up the face of the
mountain against the front ; the third remained in reserve.
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 157
Simon's Brigade, leading Loison's attack, ascended with a
wonderful alacrity ; and though the light troops plied it
unceasingly with musketry, and the artillery bullets swept
through it from the first to the last section, its order was
never disturbed, nor its speed in the least abated. Ross's
guns were worked with incredible quickness, yet their
range was palpably contracted every round ; the enemy's
shot came singing up in a sharper key ; the English
skirmishers, breathless and begrimed with powder, rushed
over the edge of the ascent ; the artillery drew back, and
the victorious cries of the French were heard within a few
yards of the summit.
"Craufurd, standing alone on one of the rocks, had
been intently watching the progress of this attack, and
now with a shrill tone ordered the two regiments in
reserve to charge ; the next moment a horrid shout
startled the French column, and eighteen hundred British
bayonets went sparkling over the brow of the hill. Yet
so brave, so hardy were the leading French that each
man of the first section raised his musket, and two officers
and ten soldiers fell before them. Not a Frenchman had
missed his mark. They could do no more. The head of
their column was violently thrown back upon the rear ;
both flanks were overlapped at the same moment by the
English wings ; three terrible discharges at five yards'
distance shattered the wavering mass, and a long trail of
broken arms and bleeding carcases marked the line of
flight/'
158 GENERAL CRAUFURD
Sir George Napier, in his "Early Military Life,"
gives one or two interesting details not mentioned by his
brother. He says " General Craufurd himself stood on
the brow of the hill watching every movement of the
attacking column ; and when all our skirmishers had
passed by and joined their respective corps, and the head
of the enemy's column was within a very few yards of
him, he turned round, came up to the 52nd, and called
out, ' Now, 52nd, revenge the death of Sir John Moore !
Charge ! Charge ! Huzza ! ' ; and waving his hat in the
air, he was answered by a shout that appalled the enemy,
and in one instant the brow of the hill bristled with two
thousand British bayonets wielded by steady English
hands, which soon buried them in the bodies of the fiery
Gaul ! " . . . " Poor Colonel Barclay received a severe
wound, of which he afterwards died in England." . . .
" We kept firing and bayonetting till we reached- the
bottom, and the enemy passed the brook and fell back
upon their main body, which moved down to support
them and cover their retreat. All this was done in a very
short time, that is, it was not above twenty minutes from
the charge till the French were driven from the top to the
bottom of the mountain like a parcel of sheep. I really
did not think it possible for such a column to be so
completely destroyed in a few minutes as that was,
particularly after witnessing how gallantly they moved
up under a destructive fire from the artillery and a
constant galling one from our sharp-shooters."
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 159
Colonel Leach, of the 95th Rifles, also wrote thus
concerning the hopeless repulse of the French on this
occasion : " The instant the attacking columns were turned
back, they were exposed to the fire of our whole Division ;
whilst our battalion and some Cacadores were ordered to
pursue and to give them a flanking fire ; and the horse
artillery continued to pour on them a murderous fire of
grape, as they were struggling through the narrow streets
of Sula, and trampling each other to death in their great
haste to escape. Men, muskets, knapsacks, and bayonets
rolled down the side of the mountain in such a confused
mass as it is impossible to convey a just idea of."
Lord Londonderry also declared, " Never was rout
more complete than that which followed the movement.
The enemy, unable to retreat and afraid to resist, were
rolled down the steep > like a torrent of hailstones driven
before a powerful wind."
Sir William Napier writes concerning the remainder
of that memorable day, " Loison did not renew the action ;
but Marchand, having formed several small bodies, gained
a pine-wood half-way up the mountain on the right of the
Light Division, and sent a cloud of skirmishers against
the highest part. On that steep ascent, however, Pack's
men sufficed to hold them in check, and half a mile higher
up Spencer showed a line of the Foot Guards which
forbade any hope of success. Craufurd's artillery also
smote Marchand's people in the pine-wood ; and Ney,
who was there in person, after sustaining this murderous
160 GENERAL CRAUFURD
cannonade for an hour, relinquished that attack also.
The desultory fighting of the light troops then ceased,
and at two o'clock parties from both armies were, under a
momentary truce, mixed together, carrying off wounded
men."
Thus ended the glorious battle of Busaco so far as the
Light Division was concerned. To General, and officers
and men, this victory must have been peculiarly grati-
fying ; for it was a crushing and effective reply to the
mendacious boasting of Marshal Massena concerning the
combat on the Coa. The French Marshal had assured
the War Minister that " his whole army was burning with
impatience to teach the English army what they taught
the Division of Craufurd in the affair of Almeida."
Well, on the mountain side of Busaco they once more
encountered "the Division of Craufurd," and the results
were so overwhelmingly disastrous that the arrogant and
vainglorious Massena appears this time to have been
so genuinely impressed with the prowess of the Light
Division and its leader that he actually forgot to brag
and, in order to account for his own failure, even
exaggerated the vehement and irresistible attack made
by the 43rd and 52nd Regiments when they emerged from
the hollow in which they had been so skilfully hidden
by their leader. In a letter to Craufurd, written on
November 1 2 following, Lord Wellington said : " If you
could come over here some day, I would show you
Massena's despatch on Busaco, which I have got, from
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 161
which it appears that you attacked Loison 'en deux
colonnes serrees en masse ! ' '
Captain Kincaid relates the following amusing story
as one of the results of this famous battle : " On the day
of the battle, the 27th, the French General Simon^ who
led the attack upon our Division, was wounded and taken
prisoner ; and as they were bringing him in, he raved
furiously for General Craufurd, daring him to single
combat ; but as he was already a prisoner, there would
have been but little wit in indulging him in his humour."
General Craufurd and his Division were warmly
praised by Lord Wellington for their brilliant services on
this momentous occasion ; and a complete reconciliation
was now effected between the great Commander-in-chief
and his well-trusted subordinate General.
The splendid victory much delighted our people at home,
as is made manifest by the following letter addressed to
the leader of the Light Division by his brother, General
Charles Craufurd, who had himself seen so much service
with the Austrian army in earlier days.
"Drakelow, October 19, 1810.
"MY DEAREST BROTHER
"Most sincerely do I congratulate you on
having again distinguished yourself in so brilliant a
manner. The victory of Busaco was indeed a glorious
one ! Thank God for it, for the part you bore in it, and
for your safety ! As the Portuguese troops conduct them-
M
162 GENERAL CRAUFURD
selves so well, and as the French have felt their equality
at least and our decided superiority both at Busaco
and on the Coa, I think one may be justified in being
sanguine as to the result of the campaign.
"Really this behaviour of the Portuguese, combined
with these victories and the other which probably has
by this time taken place, must electrify the Spaniards
as well as Portuguese in such a manner as to render
them very formidable to their enemy. The cause seems
to revive.
"Lord Wellington has conducted his operations
capitally, and I have no doubt of his bringing them to
a happy termination, and adding fresh laurels to the
many he has already gained. You, too, have an ample
portion, I assure you. You always had a great opinion
of Lord Wellington's abilities, and you are now proved
to be right.
"The Duke told me, when here a few days ago, that
he read lately in one of the papers an account of
Whitelocke's affair at Buenos Ayres, by the second in
command to Liniers, in which it was asserted that, if
you had been allowed to advance into the town that same
evening after defeating Liniers, as you proposed to do,
you would certainly have taken the place.
"The Duchess* desires her kindest remembrances
* General Charles Craufurd, afterwards General Sir Charles Craufurd,
G.C.B., had married the Duchess of Newcastle, widow of Thomas,
third Duke. She was a daughter of the Earl of Harrington.
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 163
and begs you to be convinced that she most heartily
rejoices in the great honour you are incessantly acquiring.
I suppose you will soon have a regiment of course.
" Believe me always,
" My dearest Robert,
" Your most truly affectionate Brother,
"C. CPAUFURD."
It will be seen from this letter that Robert Craufurd
and his brother Charles were singularly devoted to each
other. My grandfather always greatly admired and re-
vered the serene temperament and unruffled magnanimity
of his elder brother, which were such a contrast to his
own internal storm and strife. When writing to his
wife, Robert Craufurd's habitual expression on this subject
was, " Charles is the very best of men."
After the battle of Busaco the army began moving
off to the famous lines of Torres Vedras, but without any
precipitation. The Light Division retired to Coimbra,
then to Pombal, then to Battalha, and then to Alemquer,
and finally to Aruda, On October n, Lord Wellington
wrote a long letter to Craufurd from a place near Sobral.
He says " I hope your men are well put up in Aruda in
this terrible weather. I don't think the enemy's plan is
quite decided yet. He has still some troops at Alemquer,
and there is a body of cavalry and infantry (I saw of
the latter about 300 men) on this side of Alemquer. I mean
however, to hold the town of Sobral as long as I can.
164 GENERAL CRAUFURD
"The peasants say that they were marching this
morning upon Villa Franca ; which is to attack our
right, where Hill is. They can make no impression
upon the right by the high road positively ; and they
must therefore endeavour to turn Hill's position upon
the Sierra of Alhandra, by its left. This is a tough job
also, defended as the entrances of the valleys are by
redoubts, and the villages by abattis, etc. However, that
is what they must try. . . . From this statement, however,
you will see how important the situation of Aruda and
the possession of the Pass of Matos (which by-the-bye
tself turns Hill's position) are to our operations.
" Aruda itself I don't think could be held for any great
length of time against a superior force ; but the Pass of
Matos can, defended as it is by the two redoubts. I
understand from Fletcher also that the redoubts com-
mand the road going out of Aruda towards Alhandra ; so
that, if you should find it most advantageous to give up
Aruda, the enemy could not make much use of that
road, at least by daylight.
" I need say nothing to you about the defence of the
Pass of Matos. I think it would be desirable, however,
that you should occupy with the 52nd or 43rd the high
ground which continues from the right of the right hand
redoubt, looking from Matos towards Aruda."
Craufurd thoroughly entered into his commander's
designs at this period, and co-operated in the most
intelligent manner, so that Sir William Napier wrote
It'-
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 165
thus : " Massena, surprised at the extent and strength of
works * which he had only heard of five days before he
came upon them, employed several days to examine their
nature. The heights of Alhandra were inexpugnable ;
but the valleys of Calandrix and Aruda attracted his
attention. By the former he could turn Alhandra and
reach the weakest part of the second line ; but the
abattis and redoubts, hourly strengthening, gave little
encouragement to attack there. The ground about Aruda
did not give him a view of the troops, although he
frequently skirmished to make Craufurd show his force ;
but that General, by occupying Aruda as an advanced
post, had rendered it impossible to discover his true
situation without a serious affair, and in an incredibly
short space of time he secured his position in a manner
worthy of admiration. Across the ravine on the left,
a loose stone wall, sixteen feet thick and forty feet high,
was raised ; across the great valley of Aruda a double
line of abattis was drawn, not, as usual, of the limbs of
trees, but of full-grown oaks and chesnuts digged up
with all their roots and branches, dragged by main force
for several hundred yards, and then reset and crossed so
that no human strength could break through. Breast-
works, at convenient distances to defend this line of trees,
were also cast up ; and along the summits of the
mountain, for a space of nearly three miles, including
the salient points, other stone walls six feet high by
* The famous lines of Torres Vedras generally.
166 GENERAL CRAUFURD
four in thickness, with banquettes, were piled up !
Romans never raised greater works in the time ! "
Thus General Craufurd again baffled his boastful enemy.
Marshal Massena.
As this volume is merely a memoir, and makes no
pretence to be anything like a history, I need not attempt
to describe the famous lines of Torres Vedras, which the
far-seeing sagacity of Wellington had prepared as a barrier
against the French around Lisbon. A few brief extracts
from Sir William Napier will suffice. The lines consisted
of three distinct ranges of defence, of which the third was
intended to cover a forced embarkation, if necessary. "Of
these stupendous lines the second, whether for strength or
importance, was the principal ; the others were appendages,
the third a mere place of refuge. The first line was
originally designed as an advanced work, to stem the
primary violence of the enemy and enable the army to
take up its ground on the second line without hurry or
pressure. But while Massena remained inactive on the
frontier, it acquired strength, which was now so much
augmented by the rain that Wellington resolved to abide
the attack there permanently.
" These celebrated lines were great in conception and
execution, more in keeping with ancient than modern
military labours ; and it is clear that the defence was not
dependent, as some French writers suppose, upon the first
line. If that had been stormed, the standard of Portuguese
independence would still have floated securely amidst the
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 167
rocks of the second line. But to occupy fifty miles of
fortification, to man one hundred and fifty forts, and work
six hundred guns required many men ; and numbers were
not wanting. A great fleet in the Tagus, a superb body
of Marines sent out from England, the civic guards of
Lisbon, the Portuguese heavy artillery corps, the militia
and ordenan^a of Estremadura, furnished a powerful reserve
to the regular army. The native gunners and the militia
supplied all the garrisons of the forts on the second and
most of those on the first line ; the British Marines
occupied the third line ; the navy manned the gun-boats
on the river, and aided in various ways the operations in
the field. The recruits from the depdts and the calling
in of all the men on furlough rendered the Portuguese
army stronger than it had yet been, while the British
troops, reinforced from Cadiz and England, and remark-
ably healthy, presented such a front as a General would
desire to see in a dangerous crisis."
Another writer tells us that " The Peninsula on which
Lisbon stands, is traversed by two lofty heights which
stretch from the river Tagus to the ocean, varying in
altitude and abruptness, and running in a parallel direc-
tion, at a distance of from six to nine miles. Through the
passes in these mountains run the four great roads that
communicate between Lisbon and the interior."
Colonel Leith Hay explains the mode in which these
formidable lines would have been defended : " No British
soldiers, with the exception of artillery, would have acted
168 GENERAL CRAUFURD
within the walls. Some Portuguese infantry, with the
militia and ordenanca, were destined to compose the
garrisons ; while the whole allied army, numerous, brilliant
in equipment, high in spirit, confident in its great com-
mander, was prepared to move in every direction, to cover
the summits of mountains, to descend into valleys, or to
pour in torrents on any luckless column that, with dimin-
ished numbers, might have forced their way past the
almost impenetrable obstacles of this grand position."
Napier tells us that "more than one hundred and
twenty thousand fighting men were rationed within the
lines, seventy thousand being regular troops."
The position of the French was far from being well-
secured or comfortable ; for whereas the allies had abun-
dant supplies, which could always be brought by sea, the
French had behind them an exhausted district, and a very
unfriendly population, and a host of irregular troops
waiting only an opportunity to become actively aggressive.
Marshal Massena found it impossible to attack the
famous lines ; and about the middle of November he
withdrew to Santarem. There the French strengthened
their position, and determined to remain. But Napier tells
us that " Craufurd, however, still thought a rear-guard only
was at Santarem ; his spirit was chafed ; he seized a
musket and, followed by a sergeant, advanced in the night
along the causeway, to commence a personal skirmish with
the French piquet ; he escaped from its fife miraculously
and came back convinced that Massena was not in flight."
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 169
The two armies remained here in a state of comparative
inactivity for about three months. Colonel Leach, of the
95th Rifles, speaks thus of a certain addition now made
for a time to the Light Division : " When we arrived here
from the lines of Torres Vedras, the Duke of Brunswick's
Gels' corps of infantry, which had recently reached
Portugal, was sent to join the Light Division. They
deserted to the French in such numbers that we had a
lease of them but for a few weeks. Lord Wellington
caused several of them, who had been taken in the attempt
to desert to the enemy, to be tried and shot ; and immedi-
ately afterwards he directed that the corps should be sent
away from the Light Division.'' This decision of the
Commander-in-chief was probably in great measure the
result of Craufurd's report of these troops, which was most
unfavourable ; in fact he detested to have them mingled
with his own staunch and admirably trained men.
General Craufurd went home to England on leave at
the beginning of February in the year 1811, thinking that
no great operations were likely to be undertaken during
the winter. In a letter written on December 9, 1810,
Wellington said to Craufurd, "Adverting to the number
of General officers senior to you in the army, it has not
been an easy task to keep you in your command ; " and he
goes on to say that if the leader of the Light Division went
home, it might not be possible to give him back his com-
mand on his return to the army. And in another letter on
the same subject, written on January 28, 1811, Wellington
170 GENERAL CRAUFURD
says that he assents to Craufurd going home, but that he
cannot approve.
During the absence of its old leader the command of
the Light Division was temporarily given to Sir W. Erskine,
who proved himself to be by no means a brilliant General.
Whilst General Craufurd was away in England, his
Division was earning much additional distinction, especi-
ally at Redinha and in the combat of Sabugal, of which
latter action Wellington declared, " This was one of the
most glorious actions British troops were ever engaged in."
Sir W. Erskine arranged things very badly on this
occasion, so that Beckwith, who commanded his first
Brigade, having with him only one bayonet battalion and
four companies of Riflemen, found himself assailing twelve
thousand infantry, supported by cavalry and artillery.
Colonel Leach, of the 95th Rifles, gives us the follow-
ing account of the combat at Sabugal : " The outline of
the plan was that the Light Division and some cavalry
should pass the river Coa by a ford at some distance
above Sabugal, whilst other Divisions assailed the position
by fords and the bridge near the town. The operations of
the day commenced by the Light Division passing the
Coa at a ford of considerable depth, under fire of Reynier's
advanced posts, who were driven back on their supports by
Colonel Beckwith's Brigade, which first crossed the river.
" In this, as in all other mountainous regions, thick
fogs appear and disappear very suddenly ; and such was
the case on the present occasion. Its temporary dis-
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 171
persion discovered Colonel Beckwith's little Brigade
almost in contact with the whole of Reynier's corps,
which, after a sharp fire, forced back with overwhelming
numbers the four companies of the 95th (that composed
Colonel Beckwith's advance) on the 43rd regiment ; and
aware that the number of his opponents was trifling, the
French General made an impetuous attack with infantry
cavalry, and artillery, to crush and annihilate them before
support should arrive. But the 43rd, on which the Rifle-
men were driven back for support, was a corps not to be
meddled with free of expense, as they very soon proved to
their antagonists by driving them back, in most gallant
style, with the bayonet. Fearful as were the odds, Colonel
Beckwith's Brigade pursued the French into their own
position, and inflicted on them a severe loss ; but, being
reinforced, they again drove back this handful of men.
Our men, however, possessed themselves of some stone
walls and broken ground, by which they contrived to hold
on until they once more obliged their enemy to retreat ;
and entering their position with them, our men charged
and captured a howitzer. For the recapture of this, the
French were making another grand effort, when the second
Brigade of the Light Division, with troops also of the 3rd
and other Divisions, arrived near the scene of action,
which obliged Reynier to make a rapid retreat. In less
than forty-eight hours afterwards the whole French army
was over the Portuguese frontier, and sought shelter under
the guns of Ciudad Rodrigo.
172 GENERAL CRAUFURD
"Thus did Massena's invasion of Portugal terminate,
and in this manner was his threat fulfilled of ' driving the
English into the sea.' "
This combat by the Coa must have been peculiarly
gratifying to the Light Division, considering the way in
which Marshal Massena had boasted of his former
encounter with it beside the same river only eight or nine
months before.
Wellington hap! now saved Portugal. Napier tells us
that " Massena entered Portugal with sixty-five thousand
men, and his reinforcements while at Santarem were about
ten thousand ; he repassed the frontier with forty-five
thousand ; the invasion, therefore, cost him thirty thousand
men."
Wellington now invested Almeida, which was in pos-
session of the French, Colonel Leach informs us that
"the Light Division, with its old friends, the 1st German
Hussars, soon took up the same line of outposts on the
Azava, which they held last summer, during the period
that Massena was laying siege to Ciudad Rodrigo. One
Brigade was at Gallegos, the other at Espeja, having
Hussar piquets across the Azava at Carpio and Marialva,
and on the Agueda at Moulina dos Flores."
In April, 1811, General Craufurd was on his way back
to take the command of his own favourite Division, His
leading had been much missed during his absence, as Sir
W. Cope has remarked ; and the following letter from the
Commander-in-Chief will show that he was glad to
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 173
welcome back his active, vigilant, and enterprising sub-
ordinate.
"Villa Formosa, April 14, 1811.
"MY DEAR GENERAL,
"I received this morning your letter of the
9th. You will find your Division in your old quarters at
Gallegos, and the sooner you can come up to them the
better.
" We are blockading Almeida, in which there may be
about a month's provisions. The greater part of the
French army are gone to the Douro.
" Ever yours most faithfully,
" WELLINGTON.
" General Craufurd."
I notice that in this letter Wellington no longer calls
Craufurd a Brigadier-Qizwztd\ \ but I believe he was not
actually gazetted as a Major-General till June 4, 1811.
In a letter written about this time to his wife, Craufurd
says that he finds that his Division has been earning great
additional distinction during his absence, and that he
" cannot pretend " not to feel much grieved at not having
participated in it. The combat of Sabugal was in fact
one after Robert Craufurd's own heart ; the almost
incredible audacity of his Riflemen, his 43rd, and his 52nd
was eminently calculated to make him prouder than ever
of that unequalled Division which he always loved so well,
and to which he devoted himself so freely. His strong
174 GENERAL CRAUFURD
natural affections caused him to feel keenly the long
separation from his wife and children, and in consequence
he was always talking of retiring from the army ; but it
is plain enough that he never could have left it for any
great length of time whilst the war lasted. His nature
was made for activity, and as one of his own soldiers
(Rifleman Harris) said of him, " war was his very element."
Craufurd rejoined his Division just before the battle
of Fuentes d'Onoro, which took place on May 5, 1811.
He was received with ringing cheers by his men, and
these cheers seem to have astonished the French. Costello
(a non-commissioned officer of the 95th Rifles) tells us
that "while things were* in this state, General Craufurd
made his reappearance amongst us from England, and
was welcomed with rrfuch enthusiasm by the Division.
Although a strict disciplinarian, the men knew his value
in the field too well not to testify their satisfaction at
his return. The Ca^adores, particularly, caused much
laughter among us by shouting out in Portuguese, the
moment they caught sight of him, ' Long live General
Craufurd who takes care of our bellies ! ' ; meaning by
this exclamation they got their rations regularly while
under his command. The General seemed highly pleased,
and bowed repeatedly with his hat off, as he rode down
their ranks."
Napier informs us that Wellington at this period had
only thirty-two thousand infantry, twelve hundred cavalry
in bad condition, and forty-two guns, whereas on the side
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 175
of the enemy, " forty thousand French infantry, and five
thousand horse, with thirty-six pieces of artillery were
under arms." Thus the enemy were enormously superior
in cavalry, especially as, according to Napier, not more
than a thousand English troopers were actually in the
field. "The French, therefore, drove in all the cavalry
out-guards at the first shock, cut off Ramsay's battery of
horse artillery, and came sweeping in upon the reserves
of cavalry and upon the 7th Division. Their leading
squadrons, approaching in a disorderly manner, were
partially checked by fire ; but a great commotion was
observed in their main body ; men and horses were seen
to close with confusion and tumult towards one point,
where a thick dust and loud cries, and the sparkling of
blades and flashing of pistols indicated some extraordinary
occurrence. Suddenly the multitude became violently
agitated, an English shout pealed high and clear, the
mass was rent asunder, and Norman Ramsay burst forth,
sword in hand, at the head of his battery, his horses
breathing fire, stretched like greyhounds along the plain ;
the guns bounded behind them like things of no weight,
and the mounted gunners followed close, with heads bent
low and pointed weapons, in desperate career. Captain
Brotherton of the 1 4th Dragoons, seeing this, instantly
rode forth and with his squadron shocked the head of
the pursuing troops, and General Charles Stewart, joining
in the charge, took the French Colonel Lamotte, fighting
hand to hand ; but then the main body of the French
176 GENERAL CRAUFURD
came on strongly, and the British cavalry retired behind
the Light Division which was immediately thrown into
squares."
Owing to the progress of the French in another part,
it became absolutely necessary that the original concen-
trated position above Fuentes d'Onoro should be quickly
regained by the English troops. Accordingly Napier
says : " The /th Division were therefore ordered to cross
the Turones and move down the left bank to Fre-
nada, while the Light Division retired over the plain ;
the cavalry covered this movement, and the ist and
3rd Divisions and the Portuguese were at the same
time placed on the steppe of land before described, per-
pendicular to the ravine of Fuentes d'Onoro. General
Craufurd, who had resumed the command of the Light
Division, covered Houstoun's passage across the Turones,
arid then retired slowly over the plain in squares, followed
by the French horsemen, who continually outflanked, but
never dared to assail him. . . . Many times Montbrun
feigned to charge Craufurd's squares, but always he found
them too dangerous to meddle with, and this crisis passed
without a disaster ; yet there was not, during the whole
war, a more perilous hour."
An officer of the Light Division, Colonel Leach, speaks
with justifiable pride of the conduct of that famous band
of men on this occasion. " The British right being turned
at Navis d'Avair, the mass of French cavalry, with artillery,
continued to advance along the plain, threatening to cut
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 177
off the Light Division from the position on the heights.
We were therefore directed to retire from the wood, to
form squares of battalions, and to fall back over the plain
on the ist Division. The steadiness and regularity with
which the troops performed this movement, the whole
time exposed to, a cannonade and followed across a plain
by a numerous cavalry ready to pounce on the squares,
if the least disorder should be detected, has been acknow-
ledged by hundreds of unprejudiced persons (unconnected
with the Light Division) who witnessed it from the heights,
to have beea a masterpiece of military evolutions."
After much desperate fighting, in which "the /ist,
79th, the 2nd battalion of the 24th, and all the regiments
employed in the defence of the village, rivalled each other
in gallantry and good conduct," Lord Wellington was
victorious; and as Colonel Leach remarks, "Thus did
Massena utterly fail in every attempt, and left the village
and the ground near it covered with killed and wounded."
The marvellous coolness and steadiness of the Light
Division on this occasion have called forth many expres-
sions of admiration from those well qualified to judge.
But General Picton, always jealous of Craufurd, thought
proper to speak disparagingly of his brother General and
the troops under his command ; and Sir William Napier
has given the flattest contradiction to Picton's assertions.
This is contained in an appendix in the last volume of
the " History of the War in the Peninsula," wherein Napier
writes thus :. " Again, General Picton, writing of the battle
N
178 GENERAL CRAUFURD
of Fuentes d'Onoro says, 'The Light Division, under
General Craufurd, was rather roughly handled by the
enemy's cavalry, and had that arm of the French army
been as daring and active upon this occasion as they were
when following us to the lines of Torres Vedras, they
would doubtless have cut off the Light Division to a man.'
Nevertheless, as an eye-witness, and being then a field-
officer on the Staff, I was by Mr. Robinson's rule entitled
to see, I declare most solemnly that the French cavalry,
though they often menaced to charge, never came within
sure shot distance of the Light Division. The latter, with
the exception of the 95th Rifles, who were skirmishing in
the wood of Pozo Veftio, was formed by regiments in
three squares, flanking and protecting each other; they
retired over the plain leisurely without the loss of a man,
without a sabre-wound being received, without giving or
receiving fire ; they moved in the most majestic manner,
secure in their discipline and strength, which were such
as would have defied all the cavalry that ever charged
under Tamerlane or Genghis."
About May the loth the Light Division found itself
once more in its old quarters at Gallegos and Espeja.
On the night of May the loth the French garrison in
Almeida contrived to effect its escape, very much to the
annoyance of Lord Wellington. Besides carrying off
successfully the greater part of his men, the French General,
Brennier, also rendered the fortress useless to the allies by
mining the principal bastions and destroying the guns.
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 179
The English Generals whom Napier blames for their
negligence on this occasion were General Campbell and
Sir W. Erskine. A recent compiler of military history
throws the blame on Craufurd, who had absolutely nothing
to do with the affair. Napier's account of the vexatious
affair is perfectly clear, and it is much to be wished that
compilers would not gratuitously circulate erroneous state-
ments about renowned leaders.
Concerning this escape of the garrison of Almeida Lord
Londonderry wrote : " It seemed as if, by this untoward
event, all the advantages obtained by the battle of Fuentes
d'Onoro were thrown away." He also says that General
Campbell was the person to, blame for this.
Lord Wellington issued a severe and caustic rebuke to
the officers of his army in consequence of this business ;
and it is said that in a private letter he declared that he
" began to be of opinion that there is nothing on earth so
stupid as a gallant officer."
About this time Marshal Marmont arrived from France
to take command and to supersede Massena, the old enemy
of the Light Division.
About May the 22nd intelligence reached the army
of the sanguinary battle fought at Albuera, between the
French under Marshal Soult and the little army under
Marshal Beresford.
Towards the end of the month of May the Light
Division received orders to move towards Marshal Beres-
ford on the Guadiana, as Marmont was now endeavouring
180 GENERAL CRAUFURD
to form a junction with Soult in order to raise the siege of
Badajoz, which Beresford had now again commenced. On
June 23, Craufurd's troops "bivouacked on the hottest and
most parched piece of ground in the Peninsula, lying
between Aronches and Campo Mayor, and on the left bank
of the Caya. In this neighbourhood Lord Wellington had
concentrated his whole army."
Marshals Soult and Marmont having united their forces,
amounting according to Colonel Leach to about eighty
thousand men, Wellington was obliged to raise the siege of
Badajoz. The British army remained in position on the
Caya for about a month. Then the two French Marshals,
not liking to attack, broke up from the Guadiana, after
having garrisoned and provisioned Badajoz.
On July 20 the army marched in a northern direction,
retracing its steps. Only General Hill's Division, with
some cavalry, remained in Alemtejo
About August the loth the Light Division and its old
companions, the German Hussars, were once more advanced
across the Agueda. Napier says that " Wellington reached
the Coa on August 8, intending first a close blockade of
Ciudad Rodrigo, and finally a siege. He was too late ; the
place had been revictualled for two months on the 6th by
Bessieres' convoy, and the blockade being necessarily
relinquished, the troops were quartered near the sources of
the Coa and Agueda." Early in September, however,
Wellington had formed his blockade, and fixed his own
head-quarters at Guinaldo.
\
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 181
The following letter from the Commander-in-chief to
General Craufurd, written at this time, will show that his
confidence in the ability of the leader of the Light
Division remained as great as ever. As usual, the post
requiring the greatest vigilance and daring was assigned
to Craufurd's troops.
"Guinaldo, August 18, 1811.
"My DEAR GENERAL,
" I heard ot the misfortune which occurred to
one of your brigades of mules, but I hope it is not so
extensive as you imagine. The Commissary-General
will remedy it. I don't know how they came to pass by
St. Martin ; and it is still more difficult to account for the
surprise of our piquet there. But I understand that the
whole party, Germans, English, Spaniards, and muleteers
were looking at a procession when the French entered the
town.
" It is very unfortunate that the cavalry, who I had
ordered to Gata, were not sent to that place. If they had
been, this misfortune would not have occurred, and I
should have known of the enemy's being at Gata suffi-
ciently early to attempt something upon them.
" I heard last night (but not from good authority) of a
party being collected at Granadilla probably for another
reconnoissance. I am going over to Cesmiro this morning,
in order to look at the country on the other side of Ciudad
Rodrigo, and I shall not be back till to-morrow ; but if
182 GENERAL CRAUFURD
anything comes near enough to you to enable you to
strike a blow without incurring much risk, I wish you
would do it. You see by Grant's account of the i6th how
the last reconnoissance got off. I think the next would
be directed more towards Escarigo.
" It is not impossible that they might wish to open a
communication with Ciudad Rodrigo, in which case I mean
to assemble the army about Pedro de Toro ; and you
might collect your Division at once at Zamorra, and be in
readiness to fall upon anything, not too large for you,
which should attempt to cross the plain. I consider
Monsagro to be a point at which you ought to have an
intelligent officer, who wOuld be able to give you informa-
tion of all that passes in the Sierra on that side.
" Ever yours most sincerely,
" WELLINGTON."
About this time many officers and men of the Light
Division died, having brought malignant fever with them
from the unhealthy camp on the Cay a in Alemtejo. The
Division was now reinforced by five companies of the 3rd
battalion of the 95th Rifles, under Lieutenant-Colonel
Barnard. They arrived at Lisbon from Cadiz, and had
been present at the memorable battle of Barossa. Two
companies also of the 2nd battalion of the same regiment
had been sent from England to join the Light Division
within the last six or eight months, these being the most
effective men that could be collected from a battalion
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 183
which went to Walcheren, in 1809, upwards of a thousand
strong. Probably some of these men belonging to the 2nd
battalion had been with Craufurd in his retreat to Vigo,
but the faithful " Rifleman Harris " was not one of them.
Marshal Marmont had assembled his whole army, and
was intending to raise the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo
and to throw into it a large convoy of provisions. His
advanced guard was on the river Agueda, and some of
his cavalry watched the Light Division, which occupied
a very extended line of country behind the Vadillo, a
river flowing into the Agueda, which latter stream sepa-
rated Craufurd's troops from the rest of the army, and
rendered their position a very dangerous one. On Sep-
tember 25, some of Wellington's troops were fiercely
engaged in the combat at El Bodon ; " but the Light
Division, being at the time on the Vadillo, some leagues
off, could only hear the distant cannonade, and were
kept many hours in a state of uncertainty and anxiety,
knowing that, unless the troops on the left bank of the
Agueda were able to keep the French in check, they must
necessarily be cut off from the main body of the army and
scramble into the mountains, at whose base they were in
position."
Colonel Leach further says that " the same night the
Light Division marched from the Vadillo, and on the
26th, crossing the Agueda by a ford near the mountains,
joined the 3rd and 4th Divisions in the position at
Guinaldo."
184 GENERAL CRAUFURD
Napier says, " The Light Division should have marched
by Robledo to Guinaldo, and Craufurd received the order
at three o'clock, heard the cannonade, and might have
reached Guinaldo before midnight ; but, fearing a night
march, he only moved to Cespedosa, one league from the
Vadillo, which river was immediately passed by fifteen
hundred French." Napier adds that the English position
at Guinaldo was occupied by only 14,000 men, of which
about 2600 were cavalry. General Graham was ten miles
distant.; the Light Division being at Cespedosa and de-
barred from the direct route by the ford of Garros, was
sixteen miles distant ; the 5th Division, posted at Payo
in the mountains, was twelve miles distant. Meanwhile
Marmont united 60,000 men in front of Guinaldo. Wel-
lington was then dangerously menaced, but he would
not abandon the Light Division, which, being intercepted
by the French cavalry at Robledo, and compelled to make
a circuit, did not arrive until after three o'clock in the
evening. Then the danger was over ; as Napier remarks,
" Marmont's fortune was fixed in that hour ! "
Lord Wellington was much annoyed with General
Craufurd on this occasion, and to this affair really refer
the following remarks in the "Private Journal of F. S.
Larpent, Judge-Advocate-General of the British Forces
in the Peninsula : 5) " On one occasion, near Guinaldo, he
(Craufurd) remained across a river by himself, that is,
only with his own Division, nearly a whole day after he
was called in by Lord Wellington. He said he knew
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 185
he could defend his position. Lord Wellington, when he
came back, only said, ' I am glad to see you safe, Crau-
furd.' The latter said, ' Oh, I was in no danger, I assure
you.' * But I was from your conduct,' said Lord Welling-
ton. Upon which Craufurd observed, ' He is d d
crusty to-day.' "
Mr. George Hooper, in his " Life of Wellington," and
also one or two other writers, have rather absurdly re-
ferred this anecdote of Larpent's to the meeting between
Wellington and Craufurd after the combat on the Coa.
They are manifestly wrong ; for, in the first place, Lar-
pent distinctly says that the affair took place near
Guinaldo ; in the next place, Craufurd knew well that he
was in great danger in the battle on the Coa, and was
not likely to deny it ; and lastly, Wellington himself was
personally in no danger from Craufurd's fight at the Coa,
whereas he was, according to Napier, in the very greatest
peril at Guinaldo. If this anecdote is related at all, it might
as well be told correctly, and not in such a way as to make
both Wellington and Craufurd speak very inappropriately.
From Guinaldo Wellington withdrew his army to
Aldea Ponte, except the Light Division and some of the
ist German Hussars, which were left as a rear-guard, and
followed the main body of the forces gradually. From
Aldea Ponte the army moved to Soita, and there Welling-
ton gathered together all his troops except the Division
of General Hill. It was now expected that a great battle
would take place ; but Marmont, in a few days, withdrew
186 GENERAL CRAUFURD
his whole army across the Agueda, and from thence to
Salamanca and Placentia. He had been obliged to
collect, at great inconvenience, a force vastly superior to
that of the allies, particularly in cavalry, and to march a
long distance for the purpose of introducing a large
convoy of provisions into Ciudad Rodrigo ; and by drain-
ing Placentia, Salamanca, and other districts of French
troops, he afforded an opportunity to the Spaniards of
operating on his flanks and rear.
The Light Division, reinforced by some cavalry, now
resumed the nominal blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo in
concert with Julian Sanchez ; and the rest of the army
was cantoned on both sides of the Coa, head-quarters
being fixed at Frenada.
Wellington soon made secret preparations for attacking
Ciudad Rodrigo. Napier says, " Almeida was now repaired
so far as to resist a sudden attack ; and while the recent
movement across the Agueda occupied the enemy's atten-
tion, the battering-train and siege stores were introduced
without notice as an armament for the new works. A
trestle-bridge to throw over the Agueda was also secretly
prepared in the arsenal of Almeida by Major Sturgeon of
the Staff Corps an officer whose brilliant talents, scientific
resources, and unmitigated activity continually attracted
the attention of the whole army. Thus the preparations
for the attack of Ciudad Rodrigo advanced, while the
English General seemed to be only intent upon defending
his own positions."
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 187
At the beginning of January, 1812, the favourable
moment for action, so long watched for by Wellington,
came at last. An imperial decree had again remodelled
the French armies, which were much reduced in numbers
in the Peninsula. The Imperial Guards, 17,000 strong,
marched to France in December 1811, being required for
the Russian war. Altogether, not less than 4O>ooo of the
best soldiers were withdrawn, and the maimed and worn-
out men being sent to France at the same time> the force
in the Peninsula was diminished by 60,000 men.
On January i> 1812) General Craufurd wrote to his
wife one of the last letters that he was destined to
write; for he received his mortal wound on the iQth
of the same month. At this period he seems to have
been troubled by some pecuniary difficulty, and also to
have been much longing for reunion with his wife and
children. He writes thus : " There is such a sameness in
our life here, and such a uniformity in my feelings and
state of mind, and such a settled desire of getting out of
this horrid scrape that I am entangled in, that at the end
of each week I have only to repeat what I told you at the
beginning of it." He also says, " I cannot say that Lord
Wellington and I are quite so cordial as we used to be.
He was nettled at a report which I made of the wants of
the Division." General Craufurd also says that he hopes
to be reunited to his wife by the end of the year. Perhaps
she might have again gone out to him in the Peninsula ;
or he might have gone home again on leave ; but I think
188 GENERAL CRAUFURD
it is quite certain that he never could have left the army
for any great length of time whilst the war lasted. Even
if he had retired from the army altogether, he would
inevitably have returned to it before very long ; and Lord
Wellington knew his merits too well to feel the least
hesitation as to giving him a warm welcome again. How-
ever, after the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, the war became so
exciting that Craufurd would have been very unlikely to
retire.
For the enterprise against Ciudad Rodrigo Wellington
had altogether 35,000 men, including cavalry. Napier tells
us that " seventy pieces of ordnance had been collected,
but from the scarcity of 'transports only thirty-eight guns
could be brought to the trenches ; and these would have
wanted their due supply of ammunition, if eight thousand
shot had not been found amidst the ruins of Almeida."
A pontoon bridge had been thrown across the river
some distance below the town. The Divisions were to
relieve each other in the trenches every twenty-four hours,
the frost being very severe. On January 8th, the Light
Division marched before break of day and forded the river
Agueda. On some rising ground stood the redoubt of San
Francisco, which it was necessary to take before operations
could be commenced against the town. At nine o'clock at
night 300 men belonging to the 43rd, 52nd, 95th, and the
3rd Portuguese Ca^adores, under the command of Colonel
Colborne, of the 52nd, stormed and carried it. Colonel
Leach also tells us that " all the French troops in the fort,
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 189
amounting to about seventy men and three officers, were
either made prisoners or bayonetted in the assault. Strong
working parties immediately commenced the first parallel
on the heights where the redoubt stood ; and as the
garrison kept up an extremely heavy fire, both of shot and
shells, without intermission throughout the night, our men
worked like rabbits, and before daybreak we were tolerably
well covered in the trenches." Sir William Napier says
that "the siege was advanced several days by this well-
managed assault."
Colonel Leach further informs us that "the ist Division
relieved the Light Division on the 9th ; and the French
being able to overlook us from the top of the cathedral
tower, and to see the troops as they arrived to relieve
each other, always took that opportunity, when the trenches
were crowded with double numbers, to open every gun and
mortar which could possibly be brought to bear, and kept
up as dreadful a fire of shot and shells as men were ever
exposed to. General Craufurd's horse was killed under
him by a round shot. Having been relieved by the ist
Division, we went through the freezing operation of fording
the Agueda, and returned to our villages late at night, the
being some leagues distant from the fortress/'
Concerning further operations, Napier writes : " On the
1 2th the Light Division resumed work; the Riflemen, profit-
ing from a thick fog, covered themselves in pits which they
digged in front of the trenches, and from thence picked off
the enemy's gunners ; yet the weather was so cold, and the
GENERAL CRAUFURD
besieged shot so briskly that little progress was made. On
the 1 3th the same causes impeded the labourers of the ist
Division. Scarcity of transport also balked the operations.
One third only of the native carts had arrived, and the
drivers of those present were very indolent ; much of the
twenty-four pound ammunition was still at Villa de Ponte,
and intelligence arrived that Marmont was collecting his
forces to succour the place. In this difficulty it was
resolved to hasten the siege by opening a breach with the
counter-batteries, which were not quite six hundred yards
from the curtain, and then to storm the place without blow-
ing in the counterscarp ; in other words, to overstep the
rules of science, and sacrifice life rather than time ; for the
capricious Agueda might in one night flood, and enable a
small French force to relieve the place. The whole army
was therefore brought up from the distant quarters and
posted in the villages on the Coa, ready to cross the
Agueda and give battle."
On the night of the I3th a convent in the suburbs,
in which the French had three pieces of artillery which
enfiladed the trenches, was stormed and carried with
great bravery by some troops of the German Legion
belonging to the ist Division. On the following day the
40th Regiment assailed most gallantly another convent
in the suburbs ; and at four o'clock the same afternoon
our batteries opened on the town for the first time. The
3rd Division was in the trenches on the I5th, and the
firing from both parties was kept up with great fury.
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 191
The Light Division took their turn in the trenches on
the 1 6th, and Napier tells us that " the ramparts were
again battered and fell so fast that it was judged expedient
to commence the small breach at the turret ; therefore in
the night five more guns were mounted. At daylight
the besiegers' batteries recommenced, but at eight o'clock
a thick fog compelled them to desist ; nevertheless, the
small breach had been opened, and the place was
summoned, but without effect. At night the parallel on
the lower Teson was extended, and a sharp musketry
was directed from thence against the great breach ; the
breaching- battery as originally projected was also com-
menced, and the Riflemen of the Light Division continued
from their pits to pick off the enemy's gunners."
On the 1 7th, the fire on both sides was very heavy,
and on the i8th two breaches in the walls having been
reported practicable, the 3rd and Light Divisions were
ordered to arrive on the ground on the iQth, and to
storm the town that night.
The general plan of the attack was as follows : the
3rd Division was to storm the large breach, and the Light
Division the smaller one, whilst General Pack's Portuguese
Brigade was to make a false attack at a different
point. Wellington ended his order for the assault
with this sentence, "Ciudad Rodrigo must be stormed
this evening," and his troops responded nobly to the
demand made upon them. The Light Division, as
usual, displayed surpassing heroism ; and its trusted leader
192 GENERAL CRAUFURD
sacrificed his life from his ardent desire to see that the
designs of his Commander-in-chief were thoroughly carried
out.
The storming party of the Light Division was com-
manded by Major George Napier, an officer of whom
General Craufurd always held a very high opinion. In
his interesting "Early Military Life," Sir George Napier
writes as follows concerning the storming of Ciudad
Rodrigo : " The next day, as I thought from all I saw
and heard from the Engineers that ere long the breaches
would be practicable, I went to General Craufurd, and
asked him as a favour that he would allow me to com-
mand the storming party of the Light Division, whenever
the Commander-in-chief determined on making the assault.
This he promised; and on January 19, 1812, we received
orders to move from our cantonments and march to
the trenches. About a mile from the town we halted,
and General Craufurd desired me to get one hundred
volunteers from each British regiment in the Division,
with proportionate officers and non-commissioned officers,
to form them up in front of the Division, and take the
command of them in order to lead the assault. I went
to the three regiments, viz. the 43rd, $2nd, and Rifle
Corps, and said, 'Soldiers, I have the honour to be
appointed to the command of the storming party which
is to lead the Light Division to the assault of the small
breach. I want one hundred volunteers from each
regiment ; those who will go with me come forward.'
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 193
Instantly there rushed out nearly half the Division, and
we were obliged to take them at chance."
I may add that Sir George Napier lost an arm on
this occasion, that he did his work most admirably, and
amply justified his General's selection of him for the
important position assigned to him. Probably no family
in the whole world ever gave to any Division at the same
time three such splendid soldiers as the brothers, Charles,
William, and George Napier.
Edward Costello, a non-commissioned officer of the
95th Rifles, writes thus in his interesting " Adventures of
a Soldier," concerning the party forming the Forlorn
Hope : " General Craufurd, who led us in person, while
we stood formed under the wall, addressed us upon the
nature of the duty assigned us. It was the last enterprise
his gallant spirit was ever destined to direct. On this
memorable occasion his voice was more than ordinarily
clear and distinct.* His words sank deep in my memory ;
and although the shock of many a battle has rolled over
my grey locks since that period, I remember some of his
language as follows : ' Soldiers, the eyes of your country
are upon you. Be steady, be cool, be firm in the assault.
The town must be yours this night. Once masters of the
wall, let your first duty be to clear the ramparts, and in
doing this keep together. " Costello also adds, " General
* I have heard through several old soldiers of this war one having been
in a different Division that Craufurd's voice was singularly clear, and that it
could be heard distinctly even amidst the din of battle.
O
194 GENERAL CRAUFURD
Craufurd calling out, ' Now, lads, for the breach/ led the
way."
This same writer informs us that Craufurd was " beloved
by the men." They at all events believed in him, though
many of his officers disliked him. The soldiers of the
Light Division were always ready to follow their trusted
leader ; so that a military historian wrote of them on this
occasion : " The men, true to Craufurd's orders, cleared
the ramparts."
The time taken in the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo
seems marvellously short. Colonel Leach says, " At eight
o'clock at night the assault was given, and in less than
half an hour both the breaches were carried, after a severe
struggle, during which the assailants were exposed to a
most destructive fire of musketry and grape, hand-
grenades, etc."
Sir William Napier thus describes the part performed
by the Light Division on this momentous occasion : " On
the left the stormers of the Light Division, who had three
hundred yards of ground to clear, would not wait for the
hay-bags, but with extraordinary swiftness, running to
the crest of the glacis, jumped down the scarp, a depth
of eleven feet, and rushed up the fausse braie under a
smashing discharge of grape and musketry. The ditch
was dark and intricate ; the forlorn hope inclined towards
the left ; the stormers went straight to the breach, which
was so narrow at the top that a gun placed across nearly
barred the opening. There they were joined by the forlorn
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 195
hope, and the whole body rushed up ; but the head of
the mass, crushed together as the ascent narrowed, staggered
under the fire, and, with the instinct of self-preservation,
snapped their own muskets, though they had not been
allowed to load. Major Napier, struck by a grape-shot,
fell at this moment with a shattered arm, but he called
aloud on his men to use their bayonets, and all the un-
wounded officers simultaneously sprang to the front ; thus
the required impulse was given, and with a furious shout
the breach was carried. Then the supporting regiments,
coming up in sections abreast, gained the rampart ; the
52nd wheeled to the left, the 43rd to the right, and the
place was won."
Napier adds, " During this contest, which lasted only a'
few minutes on the breach, the righting at the great breach
had continued with unabated violence ; but when the
stormers and the 43rd came pouring along the rampart
towards that quarter, the French wavered ; three of their
expense magazines exploded at the same moment ; and
then the 3rd Division, with a mighty effort, broke through
the retrenchments. The garrison fought indeed for a
moment in the streets, yet finally fled to the castle where
Lieutenant Gurwood, who, though severely wounded in
the head, had entered amongst the foremost at the lesser
breach, received the Governor's sword.
"Three hundred French had fallen, fifteen hundred
were made prisoners, and the immense stores of ammu-
nition, with one hundred and fifty pieces of artillery,
196 GENERAL CRAUFURD
including the battering-train of Marmont's army, were
captured. The allies lost twelve hundred men and ninety
officers in the siege, of which six hundred and fifty men
and sixty officers were slain or hurt at the breaches.
Generals Craufurd and Mackinnon, the former a person of
great ability, were killed, and with them died many gallant
men."
Napier's account of Craufurd's services on this occasion
is singularly meagre, being nothing more than the passage
last quoted. But fortunately I am able to give much
ampler details furnished by the one person in the world
most able to give them ; I mean the late General Sir
James Shaw Kennedy, 'who was then acting as Aide-de-
camp to the leader of the Light Division.
In the year 1861 General Sir James Shaw Kennedy
sent a long letter about General Craufurd's death to the
present Sir William Augustus Eraser, who, though not
descended from the leader of the Light Division, is a great-
nephew of his by maternal descent. Sir William Fraser
has published a great portion of this interesting letter in
a volume of verses called " Coila's Whispers " ; but as
this work is very little known to the world in general,
I will here give a few extracts, referring my readers to
the book itself for fuller information. I may as well state
that a copy of Sir James Shaw Kennedy's letter was sent,
by the wish of the writer, to my uncle, the late Mr. Robert
Craufurd (second son of the General), and so I had the
advantage of reading the whole letter before it appeared
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 197
in "Coila's Whispers ;" and my uncle's representative was
desirous that the whole letter should appear in this
memoir.
After describing the general arrangements for the
assault of Ciudad Rodrigo, the letter goes on to say,
" While the columns, as above described, advanced to the
assault, General Craufurd, keeping to the left of the
columns, proceeded directly to the crest of the glacis,
about sixty yards to the left of where the columns entered
the ditch ; and from this spot, at the highest pitch of his
voice, continued giving instructions to the column. This
brought upon him an intense fire of musketry from the
opposite parapets of the fausse braie and ramparts, and at
a very short distance ; for the ditch of the fausse braie was
very narrow, and even the main ditch was very narrow,
and the place had no covered way. He was thus exposed
to a double fire of infantry at a very short distance ;
the superior slope of the parapet of the fausse braie
being in the same line as the slope of the glacis, he
could not remain many minutes where he was without
being hit. Accordingly he was struck by a musket ball,
which passed through his arm, broke through the ribs,
passed through part of the lungs, and lodged in or at the
spine ; and he not only fell, but the shock was so great
that, on falling, he rolled over down the glacis."
His aide-de-camp then further tells us that there was
no one even near them, and that he " half dragged and
half carried him to where there was an inequality of
198 GENERAL CRAUFURD
ground in which he was out of the direct fire from the
place."
General Craufurd then thought that he was actually
dying, and he begged Shaw Kennedy to say to his wife
that he was " quite sure that they would meet in heaven."
The aide-de-camp also says, " By accident I met Lord
Wellington at the Salamanca gate on the morning of the
2Oth, and he asked most anxiously for Craufurd. I gave
him an unfavourable report of his state. His Lordship
called afterwards and saw Craufurd, and they conversed
together for some time. Craufurd congratulated Lord
Wellington on the great advantage he had gained by
taking Ciudad Rodrigo ; to which his Lordship replied
something in these words, ' Yes, a great blow, a great blow
indeed.' " *
After having written the long letter concerning the
death of his old leader in answer to Sir William Fraser,
Sir James Shaw Kennedy wrote a shorter letter to my
uncle, Mr. "EitoFfc- Craufurd, in which he says, "The part
of my (former) letter describing the circumstances of your
father's death which will probably attract your special
attention, are the expressions which he used in regard to
your mother immediately after he was wounded, and when
he thought himself just dying. Those expressions were
* I imagine that Wellington was really thinking at this time of Craufurd's
imminent death, which the Commander-in-chief regarded as "a great blow,"
whatever others may have considered it. A short extract from one of
Craufurd's own letters disproves the assertion that he and Wellington were
never very cordial or friendly with each other.
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 199
the genuine impulses of his mind when under the impres-
sion that he was almost instantly to quit this life, and
proved to me his deep feeling of affection for your mother ;
they also proved a truly deep-seated religious conviction.
He lived for upwards of four days afterwards ; but during
the whole of that time had hopes of surviving his wounds,
so that what he said was not so striking to my mind.
What communications were made to his family I know
not, as all that was arranged by Sir Charles Stewart,! with
whom your father was so intimate that they always
addressed each other as Robert and Charles."
Even amidst the great sufferings of his last hours
Craufurd still felt the keenest sympathy with the officers
and men of his beloved Division. Major George Napier,
being wounded, was in the same house, in a room below
that occupied by his dying leader ; and he tells us that
General Craufurd sent almost hourly messages down to
him, to know how he was, and to express his approval
of his conduct and his regret that he should never see
him again.
The storming of Ciudad Rodrigo, so glorious to the
British troops, unfortunately terminated in frightful law-
lessness and excesses. Sir William Napier says, "The
town was fired in three or four places ; the soldiers
menaced their officers and shot each other ; many were
killed in the market-place ; intoxication soon increased
t Adjutant-General to Lord Wellington's army, and afterwards Marquis
of Londonderry.
200 GENERAL CRAUFURD
the tumult, and at last, the fury rising to absolute
madness, a fire was wilfully lighted in the middle of the
great magazine, by which the town would have been
blown to atoms but for the energetic courage of some
officers and a few soldiers who still preserved their senses."
Napier adds that the excuse that " the soldiers were
not to be controlled " will not suffice. " Colonel Macleod,
of the 43rd, a young man of a most energetic spirit,
placed guards at the breach, and constrained his regiment
to keep its ranks for a long time after the disorders
commenced ; but as no previous general measures had
been taken, and no organized efforts made by higher
authorities, the men were finally carried away in the
increasing tumult."
As regards the men of the Light Division, Craufurd
had probably reckoned on being with them personally
to keep them in order. The extreme severity with which
he punished stealing amongst his men shows plainly that
he would have taken the very strongest measures to
repress the much worse offences committed on this occa-
sion. Some have endeavoured to make excuses for the
odious crimes committed by our soldiers at Ciudad
Rodrigo and afterwards at Badajoz. But great officers,
such as William Napier or Robert Craufurd, never did
this. They well knew that the most sincere regard and
affection for the men are quite consistent with the very
firmest determination to prevent them from behaving
cruelly and vilely. Those who love English soldiers the
a' V-
.-V
AND HIS LIGHT .DIVISION. 201
best are naturally the most unwilling to pay them the
very bad compliment of declaring or insinuating that their
natures are so debased and brutal that they cannot help
acting like wild beasts, when once their passions are
roused. When properly taught and managed, I believe
that the British soldier is genuinely capable of displaying
every form of magnanimity, not only that comparatively
lower form of it involved in "taking a city," but also
that more difficult form involved in "ruling his spirit"
in hours of sorest trial and supreme temptation. That
the soldier often has in him the elements of moral
and spiritual as well as of military glory and greatness
is, I think, made clearly manifest by our long annals
of heroic self-sacrifice amongst the men of our armies.
The marvellous discipline and sublime self-abnegation
of the soldiers on the ill-fated ship Birkenhead show
plainly enough that it is not in vain to appeal to the
very noblest and most profoundly human feelings as
existing in the breast of the ignorant common soldier.
202 GENERAL CRAUFURD
CHAPTER VII.
CRAUFURD'S FUNERAL, WITH LETTERS CONCERNING
HIS DEATH.
SIR WILLIAM FRASER, in his "Words on Wellington,"
gives us the following interesting information : " One of
the most striking pictures I have ever seen was shown
many years ago at the Gallery of Illustration. Among
a series of dissolving views was one of Wellington standing
alone before the High Altar in the cathedral of Ciudad
Rodrigo, looking at the coffin of General Craufurd, which
was placed on a bier immediately in front of it"
The same writer also says : " General Craufurd was
buried in the breach which he had taken, and the bastion
bears the name of ' Craufurd's bastion.' "
A former well-known Chaplain-General to the army,
the Rev. G. R. Gleig (author of "The Subaltern"), wrote
a very interesting account of Craufurd's funeral in a
magazine called the "Gem" in the year 1829. This
narrative has been reprinted for private circulation only,
and is scarcely at all known by the public. I will
therefore print it in this volume, as it gives a perfectly
impartial account of the feelings evoked amongst the
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 203
army in general by Craufurd's premature death. Of
course Mr. Gleig was a very young man when he went
out to the Light Division ; but he was an acute observer,
and his impressions are of some permanent value to any
who wish to form a true estimate of a famous leader
concerning whom the most opposite opinions have been
held by those who knew him.
Mr. Gleig's narrative a somewhat long one is as
follows : " It was on a cold rainy afternoon, towards the
end of January, 1812, that the little party, of which I
was at the head, arrived at the seat of war, and took
up its abode in one of the detached cottages which at
that time gave shelter to the Light Division. We had
landed at Lisbon early in the month, where, upon one
pretence or another, we were detained for nearly a fort-
night ; and we had traversed the country between the
capital and the frontier by forced marches ; but all our
diligence failed in enabling us to reach head-quarters
in sufficient time to take part in the toils and dangers
to which our comrades were immediately exposed. The
fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo, of the investment of which
we had been aware, was already reduced ; and the army
was preparing, as men generally believed, to take up once
more its line on the Coa. This was abundantly mortify-
ing to an individual like myself, who had not yet seen
a shot fired in earnest, and who, at the commencement
of his career, experienced an extreme desire to signalize
his valour ; but the accidents which stood in the way
204 GENERAL CRAUFURD
of this laudable inclination were, as I well knew, unavoid-
able ; and I found comfort in the reflection that, in all
human probability, the period was not very remote when
other and no less favourable opportunities of winning a
mural crown would be presented.
"I reached the hamlet in which our Division was
cantoned just four days after the place had been carried
by storm, and the scene which met me there was of no
ordinary character. Crowded into a few scattered cottages,
the soldiers, though destitute of all that the world calls
comfort, appeared to enjoy admirable health and the
highest spirits. As might be expected, the events of the
late siege, and, above air, of its perilous conclusion, formed
in every circle the sole topic of conversation, whilst
articles of plunder were everywhere offered for sale, and
bargains the most absurd, and purchases the most gro-
tesque, were everywhere in progress. Mingled with this
general appearance of hilarity, however, might be dis-
cerned here and there signs of the deepest grief, where
individuals had lost a friend, and messes a favourite
member ; and, above all, the name of Craufurd was heard,
coupled, as often as it was pronounced, with expressions
of the most profound reverence and poignant sorrow. It
is needless 'for me to remind you that the gallant officer
in question had long commanded the Division, by whom
he was regarded, in point of intelligence and military
skill, as second only to Lord Wellington, or that his
unremitting attention to the wants of the troops secured
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 205
for him to the full as much of their love as of their
respect.
" I will not waste time by describing to you the manner
in which I was received by my companions in arms, or by
giving any outline of the conversation which drew us on
from hour to hour in continuation of our vigils. You can
easily guess that that was not the least agreeable night of
my military life, and that the necessity of causing our
mattresses to be spread was not alluded to till the last cup
of wine left in the boraccio had been drained. But the
wine was at length expended ; hints were dropped of an
early parade on the morrow ; and we finally separated
with a firm determination of bringing to a close, in the
evening after, a conference thus prematurely interrupted.
" Whether the fatigues of yesterday's march told
heavily upon me, or the wine which I had swallowed over
night acted as a narcotic, I cannot tell ; but when I awoke
next morning, I found myself alone in the chamber. My
comrades had both risen, and were gone abroad ; and
though I felt that they acted kindly in not disturbing my
slumbers, I was nevertheless chagrined at the idea that,
on the very first morning of my arrival at head-quarters,
I should appear slothful. I accordingly arose in all haste,
and went to the window. The sky was clear and bright,
and the rain of the preceding day having been succeeded
by a bracing frost, everything around wore an aspect
widely different from that which it presented when, weary
and half famished, and shivering in my saturated garments,
206 GENERAL CRAUFURD
I first arrived at my present habitation. The roads,
which then wore the appearance of mere tracks across a
marsh, were now hard and firm ; and the face of the
country, though in general bleak and desolate enough,
was at least less bleak and desolate than it seemed to be
when examined through the veil of a heavy and uninter-
mitting shower.
" I saw, too, for the first time, that the Brigade to
which I was attached inhabited about half-a-dozen hovels
scattered at some distance the one from the other, on the
north side of the Agueda ; and I beheld that romantic
stream rolling in all the majesty of a swollen torrent, and
chafing against the rough and precipitous rocks which
formed its banks. Directly opposite to me stood the
town of Ciudad Rodrigo, placed upon one of the three
hills which alone break in upon the sameness of the plain,
standing even in its ruins with an air of singular majesty
above the widely-extended flat which on all sides begirt
it. But the object which most forcibly attracted my
attention was the parade of the several corps of the
Division, which were already beginning to assemble. I
knew not for what purpose this muster was going on ;
my fertile imagination readily conjured up a picture of
advancing columns of the enemy, and a threatened
engagement; so I made all haste possible in completing
my toilet, and hurried forth to take my station.
" On reaching the parade ground, I heard that this
was the day appointed for the funeral of General Craufurd,
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 207
and that the whole of his Division had been commanded
to pay the last tribute of respect to his much-honoured
remains. The individual who communicated to me this
fact had been his aide-de-camp, and as he happened to be
an old acquaintance of my own, he very readily com-
plied with my entreaty to be made acquainted with all the
circumstances which attended the death of his lamented
chief. It appeared that General Craufurd's Division
having been appointed to storm the smaller breach,
formed by the fall of a round tower, opposite to the
convent of San Francisco, advanced at the appointed
hour under its gallant leader, and made good with, com-
paratively speaking, little loss, a lodgment on the
summit of the rampart. Among the number of those,
however, whose career of glory was then cut short, poor
Craufurd himself happened to be included. He was at
the head of the column,* at once directing and animating
his people, when a musket ball took his left arm, and,
penetrating into the side, lodged in his lungs. For a
moment he struggled, as it were, with the weakness of
humanity, and strove to head his brave followers as he
had hitherto done, but the effort was fruitless. He failed,
and fell back into the arms of one of the soldiers. He
was instantly carried to the rear, where the medical atten-
dants bled him twice, and he appeared to derive benefit
from the operation.
* Considerably in advance of it, standing on the crest of the glacis, with
his aide-de-camp only.
208 GENERAL CRAUPURD
" In the meanwhile the contest was going on with
great obstinacy, and my informant could not, of course,
abandon it ; but as soon as the town was carried, and
everything like fighting ceased, he hurried off to attend
the General. The latter was then in a heavy, death-like
slumber, into which, soon after the bleeding, he had fallen,
and from which he did not awake till long after dawn on
the 2Oth. But he awoke with no favourable symptoms
about him ; and it soon became evident, as well to the
surgeons as to his friends who watched beside his pallet,
that all hope of recovery was futile.
" I have reason to believe that General Craufurd him-
self, from the instant of receiving his wound, never enter-
tained an idea of recovery. On the contrary, when
General Stewart,* who remained with him like a brother,
and his other attendants would have flattered him by
talking of future operations, he only shook his head and
replied in a feeble voice that his futurity, at least upon
earth, would be of short duration ; and so it proved to be.
Little change took place during the 2ist and 22nd ; he
suffered both then and previously internal agony ; but on
the 23rd the pain abated, and his anxious friends fondly
persuaded themselves that this was a symptom of the
recovery for which they wished rather than hoped. The
case was widely different ; he spoke, indeed, from that
moment with greater composure and apparent ease ; but
his conversation was now, what it had ever been, even
* Adjutant-General of the army, and afterwards Marquis of Londonderry.
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 209
during the paroxysms of his sufferings, of his wife and
children. He repeatedly entreated his aide-de-camp to
inform his wife that he was 'sure they would meet in
heaven,' and that there was a Providence over all, which
never yet forsook and never would forsake the soldier's
widow and orphans. Thus passed the moments till about
two o'clock in the morning of the 24th, when, for the first
time since the night of the iQth, he fell into a slumber.
From that slumber he never awoke, but, like an infant at
the breast of its mother, he dozed calmly and beautifully
into eternity.
" I have said that among the Generals of Division and
Brigade in the army, none were more beloved or more
respected by the officers and men placed immediately
under their command than General Craufurd. In saying
this I did but meagre justice either to his merits or to the
good sense and correct judgment of the army at large.
Of the place which he held in the estimation of the
Commander-in-chief it will be unnecessary to speak, when
I mention that to Craufurd, though only a Brigadier-
General,* was entrusted the guidance of a Division more
than all the rest requiring at its head an officer of
activity of body and intelligence of mind. Craufurd on
every occasion commanded the advance of the army in
pursuits, its rear-guard in retreats, its outposts when in
position, and its detached corps when such by any chance
was needed ; nor in any of these situations did he ever
* This is a mistake; Craufurd became a Major-General on June 4, 1811.
P
210 GENERAL CRAUFURD
fail to earn the decided approbation of Lord Wellington.
This was known throughout the army ; and the man him-
self was in consequence regarded as one of those who,
should circumstances ever place him in a situation of
distinct responsibility and trust, would unquestionably add
to the renown which the British troops had already
acquired. Under these circumstances it was to be ex-
pected that the deepest sorrow would everywhere be felt,
when his premature death came to be known ; and it was
determined, in order to mark the sense entertained of his
extraordinary merits as an officer and a man, that a sort of
public funeral should be given to him.
"I need not remind 'you that, when a man dies as poor
Craufurd died, nobody dreams of keeping the corpse, for
form's sake, any longer than the arrangements deemed
necessary for its interment may require. As soon as the
fatal issue of his illness became apparent, directions were
given to the artificers to prepare his coffin, and he was laid
in that, his last bed, on the evening of the same day on
which his heroic spirit quitted the body. In the mean-
while, orders were issued directing the forms to be used in
committing the sacred burthen to the earth ; and it was in
obedience to these orders that his own favourite Division
appeared this morning under arms. Having advanced
to the house where his mortal remains slumbered, the
Division proceeded on with arms reversed, between a
double row of soldiers of the 5th Division, who, with their
muskets likewise pointing to the ground, lined the road on
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 211
each side. This done, so as that the rearmost company
of the Division should line with the house itself, the troops
halted till the coffin, borne by six serjeant-majors, and
having six field-officers as supporters, came forth.
"The word was given to march, the several bands
striking up slow and mournful airs, and the coffin was
followed first by General Stewart and the aide-de-camp
of the deceased, as chief mourners, and then by Lord
Wellington, General Castanos, Marshal Beresford, and a
long train of Staff and General officers. In this manner
we proceeded along the road till we gained the very breach
in assaulting which the brave subject of our procession
met his fate, where we found that a grave had been dug
for him, and that he was destined to sleep, till the last
trumpet should rouse him, on the spot where his career of
earthly glory had come to a close. Never have I beheld
a more striking or melancholy spectacle. The regiments
being formed into close columns of battalions, took post as
best they could about the grave, towards which the coffin,
headed by a chaplain, advanced. At this moment the
military music ceased, and no sound could be heard
except the voice of the clergyman, who faltered forth
rather than read the solemn declaration, 'I am the
resurrection and the life.' Arrived at the brink of the
sepulchre, the procession paused, and the shell was rested
upon the ground ; and then I could distinctly perceive
that, among the six rugged veterans who had borne it,
there was not a dry eye, and that even of the privates who
212 GENERAL CRAUFURD
looked on there were few who manifested not signs of
sorrow such as men are accustomed to exhibit only when
they lose a parent or a child.*
"The few striking sentences having been read which
that most affecting of all rituals, the funeral service of the
Church of England, requires, the body was lowered into
the grave, and dust was committed to dust and ashes to
ashes. This part of the ceremony being concluded, there
followed that salute, both of artillery and musketry, which
the rank of the deceased required ; and then the corps,
being once more formed into marching order, filed back
to their several cantonments. But the scene of deep
melancholy which pervaded every breast during the
continuance of the ceremony, could not wholly evaporate
as soon as the ceremony itself came to a close. Even
I, to whom the merits of the deceased were only known by
common report, could not all at once shake off the painful
impression which a contemplation of the real grief of
others had produced ; and as I perceived no one to be
more light-hearted than myself among all my acquaint-
ances, I found no inducement to follow up the schemes of
amusement which I had chalked out for myself during the
preceding evening. It had been determined that several
of my friends should initiate me into the mysteries of
warfare, by guiding me this day through the town and
* This plain statement of facts observed by Mr. Gleig, together with the
ringing cheers with which Craufurd was received on returning to his Division
at Fuentes d'Onoro, must suffice to confute those who have asserted that he
was not loved by the men under his command.
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 213
fortress of Rodrigo ; but the business of the morning was
of a nature well calculated to strike at the root of all
merely pleasurable arrangements ; and the appointments
into which each and all had, with so much eagerness,
entered only a few hours before, were either forgotten or
disregarded. Instead of visiting the town, we wandered
about in little groups of two and three, during the
remainder of the day, some in the immediate vicinity of
their quarters, others along the margin of the Agueda ;
and we retired to our several billets in the evening, as
melancholy and dejected as if each were mourning the loss
of some much-loved relative."
Here Mr. Gleig's interesting narrative ends. On
January 29, 1812, Wellington writes thus concerning
Craufurd's death to the Earl of Liverpool, Secretary of
State : " Major-General Craufurd died on the 24th instant,
of the wounds which he received on the I9th, while
leading the Light Division of this army to the assault of
Ciudad Rodrigo. Although the conduct of Major-General
Craufurd on the occasion on which these wounds were
received, and the circumstances which occurred, have
excited the admiration of every officer in the army, I
cannot report his death to your lordship without expres-
sing my sorrow and regret that his Majesty has been
deprived of the services, and I of the assistance, of an
officer of tried talents and experience, who was an orna-
ment to his profession, and was calculated to render the
most important services to his country." Craufurd's ex-
214 GENERAL CRAUFURD
perience was certainly great, for he entered the army when
Wellington was only ten years old.
The following letter concerning Craufurd's death was
written by the Adjutant-General, Charles Stewart, after-
wards Marquis of Londonderry, to General Charles
Craufurd, an elder brother of the leader of the Light
Division.
" A.G.O., Gallegos, January 26, 1812.
" My DEAR FRIEND,
" I have to entreat you to summon to your
aid all that resignation to the will of heaven, and manly
fortitude, which I know you to possess, to bear with com-
posure the sad tilings this letter is doomed to convey.
I think you must have discovered that, from the first
moment, I did not encourage sanguine hopes of your
beloved brother, whose loss we have, alas ! now to deplore.
But, my dear friend, as we all must pass through this
transitory existence sooner or later, to be translated to a
better, surely there is no mode of terminating life equal to
that which Providence ordained should be his. Like
Nelson, Abercromby, Moore, and inferior to none (if his
sphere had been equally extensive), your much-loved
brother fell ; the shouts of victory were the last he heard
from the gallant troops he led ; and his last moments were
full of anxiety as to the events of the army, and considera-
tion for his Light Division. If his friends permit them-
selves to give way to unbounded grief under this heavy
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 215
calamity, they are considering themselves rather than the
departed hero. The army and his country have the most
reason to deplore his loss ; for, as his military talents were
of the first calibre, so was his spirit of the most intrepid
gallantry.
" There is but one universal sentiment throughout all
ranks of the profession on this subject ; and if you and
those who loved him dearly (amongst whom, God knows,,
I pity most his angel wife and children) could but have
witnessed the manner in which the last duties were paid
to his memory by the whole army, your tears would have
been arrested by the contemplation of what his merits
must have been to have secured such a general sensation,
and they would have ceased to flow, from the feelings of
envy which such an end irresistibly excited.
" As I fervently trust that, by the time you receive this
letter, you may be so far prepared for this afflicting stroke
as to derive consolation even from sad details, and as I
really am unequal to address Mrs. Craufurd at present,
I think it best to enter at large into everything with you,
leaving it to your affectionate and prudent judgment to
unfold events by degrees in the manner you deem best.
" You will perceive by Staff-Surgeon Gunning's report
(Lord Wellington's own surgeon) upon an examination of
the wound (which I inclose) that, from the nature of it, it
was impossible Robert should have recovered. The direc-
tion the ball had taken, the extreme difficulty of breathing,
and the blood he brought up, gave great grounds for alarm;
216 GENERAL CRAUFURD
but still it was conceived the ball might have dropped
lower than the lung ; and as there have been instances ol
recovery from wounds in the same place, we were suffered
to entertain a hope, but alas ! that was all. Staff-Surgeons
Robb and Gunning, who were his constant attendants, and
from whose anxiety, zeal, and professional ability every-
thing was to be expected, were unremitting in their atten-
tions. His aides-de-camp, young Wood and Lieutenant
Shaw of the 43rd, showed all that affectionate attention
which even his own family could have done to him ; the
former, I must say, evinced a feeling as honourable to his
heart as it must have been gratifying to its object. To
these I must add Captain William Campbell, whose long
friendship for Robert induced him never to leave him ; and
he manifested in an extraordinary manner his attachment
on this occasion. If my own duties had permitted me,
you may believe I never should have absented myself from
his bedside ; as it was, feeling like a brother towards him
my heart led me to act as such to the utmost of my poor
abilities.
" The three officers I have above named, and his
surgeon, alternately watched and attended him from the
evening of the I9th until ten o'clock on the morning of the
24th, when he breathed his last. On the 22nd he was
considered easier and better ; the medicines administered
had all the effects desired. He conversed some time with
me, principally about the assault, and he was most anxious
as to news of the enemy. He was so cheerful that his
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 217
mind did not revert, as it had done before, to his wife and
children ; and I was anxious to keep any subject from
him that might awaken keen sensations. I knew well,
from many conversations I have had with him, the un-
bounded influence and affection Mrs. Craufurd's idea was
attended with, and his ardent anxiety as to the education
and bringing up of his children. These thoughts I was
anxious, while a ray of hope existed, not to awaken, it
being of the utmost consequence that he should be kept
free from agitation ; and I trust this will be a sufficient
reason to Mrs. Craufurd and yourself for my being unable
to give you those last sentiments of his heart which he no
doubt would have expressed, had we felt authorized to
acquaint him that he was so near his end.
"I do not mean to say that he was ignorant of his
situation ; for when he first sent to me, he said he felt his
wound was mortal, and that he was fully prepared for the
will of Heaven ; but I think subsequently he cherished
hopes. At two o'clock in the morning William Campbell
wrote me a most cheering account of him. He had been
talking of his recovery and every pleasing prospect ; and
he fell into a comfortable sleep, as those about him
imagined ; but alas ! from that sleep he never woke again.
His pulse gradually ceased to beat, his breath grew shorter,
and his spirit fled, before those near him were conscious he
was no more. So easy was his passport to heaven ! If,
in detailing so mournful a recital, I can derive the smallest
consolation, it arises from knowing his last words united
218 GENERAL CRAUFURD
his affection for his wife and his friendship for me in one
train of thought, in which he closed his eyes.
" Having thus acquainted you, as well as my present
feelings enable me, with the last scene, I shall now assure
you that no exertion was wanting to prepare everything
for the mournful ceremony that was to follow, with the
utmost possible regard and respect to his memory. Lord
Wellington decided he should be interred by his own
Division near the breach which he had so gallantly carried.
The Light Division assembled before his house, in the
suburbs of the San Francisco Convent, at 12 o'clock on the
25th ; the 5th Division lined the road from his quarters to
the breach ; the officers' of the Brigade of Guards, cavalry,
3rd, 4th, and 5th Pivisions, together with General Castanos
and all his Staff, Marshal Beresford and all the Portuguese,
Lord Wellington and the whole of head-quarters moved
in the mournful procession. He was borne to his place of
rest on the shoulders of the brave lads he had led on ;
the Field Officers of the Light Division officiated as pall-
bearers ; and the whole ceremony was conducted in the
most gratifying manner, if I may be permitted such an
epithet on such a heart-breaking occasion. I assigned to
myself the mournful task of being chief mourner ; and I
was attended by Captain Campbell, Lieutenants Wood and
Shaw, and the Staff of the Light Division. Care has been
taken that his gallant remains can never be disturbed, and
he lies where posterity will commemorate his deeds !
" All his worldly affairs here I shall not neglect ; his
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 219
papers, writing-case, books, etc., and everything which I
conceive may be in the least gratifying as remembrances,
or important, shall be carefully sealed, packed up, and sent
by one of his most confidential servants to London as soon
as possible. His horses and campaign furniture of every
description shall be disposed of by public auction, to the
best advantage, as is usual in similar cases. An exact
inventory of the whole shall be taken and forwarded ; any
demands that may be against him shall be liquidated, and
his servants paid and discharged ; and the Paymaster-
General's account, and the whole of the above, shall be
remitted in proper form without delay to you. Lord
Wellington has declared his intention of writing to Mr.
Perceval very strongly to do everything possible for Mrs,
Craufurd and his children, and to commemorate his memory
as he so nobly deserves ; and I entertain a perfect con-
fidence that the most gratifying arrangements will be made
on this head.
"Alas! my dear friend, of our small party of five who
were headed by you, and first knew each other in '96, how
many are gone, and how cruelly have others suffered, poor
Anstruther, and Robert, and yourself who have gone
through so much ! Proby and myself alone remain ; and
while we lament over our two invaluable lost friends, the
conviction of their merits and the force of their example
should never be absent from our thoughts. I hope you
know me sufficiently to believe what I must suffer on the
.present occasion. If I have been silent as to myself, it is
220 GENERAL CRAUFURD
because I will not intrude my own affliction on those so
heavily borne down. But where shall I find so inestimable
a friend again ? Excuse me, my dearest friend, I will not
now add to this, but will write again shortly, when we shall
all be more composed.
" Believe me as ever,
" Your most affectionate and ever obliged,
"CHARLES STEWART."
I have often heard that Lord Londonderry had many
faults ; but he was a most gallant soldier, and I think that
this letter plainly shows that his heart was a singularly
warm one. Later on, he poured forth another eloquent
lament over Robert Craufurd in his narrative of the
Peninsular War. It seems to me that many of the dis-
tinguished soldiers of those days had far keener and
warmer affections than most people have in our days,
though very probably their language and their morals were
less conventionally correct. In almost every age of the
world conventionalism has been a foe to friendships of the
old heroic sort.
General Charles Craufurd also received the following
letter about his brother's death from Captain William
Campbell, a most devoted friend, and a man of rare noble-
ness of character.*
* For William Napier's estimate of William Campbell's character, see
page 114 of this volume.
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 221
" Gallegos, January 29, 1812.
" MY DEAR SIR,
"General Stewart has taken from off me the
painful duty of communicating to you the intelligence of
the death of your brother and alas ! our friend.
" But that I received his last words, and that some of
them were directed by his tenderness to his wife and
children, I should therefore have been silent when my heart
breaks to speak. My duty, however, calls upon me to tell
to you, in order that they may be conveyed to his wife, his
last expressions concerning her. I am quite incapable of
doing it myself.
" He bid me tell her, for he said that I knew how (not
knowing, alas ! how incompetent I am to the task), he bid
me say that his whole heart and thoughts were of her and
of his children. He said most solemnly that, however
much he might have neglected the outward forms of
religion,* that she should believe that he expected to meet
her again in heaven.
" The physicians had desired him not to think in any
way calculated to create irritation, and he therefore said
no more after the igth.
" General Stewart has related to you the manner of his
death, which precluded his entering more into the subject
of his wife and children, which I am convinced possessed
* Religion as a system of outward forms or of conventional proprieties is
little suited to ardent natures such as those of Robert Craufurd or Charles
Napier ; but the Christianity of Christ, which is but the eternal consecration
of sympathy, is to such an imperious necessity.
222 GENERAL CRAUFURD
him wholly during the whole course of his sufferings. Upon
them, indeed, was every thought bestowed for which, from
his active military duties, he had leisure to give room.
" I am thankful that General Stewart's presence
insured the communication of our melancholy intelligence
in a proper manner. I should have been as incapable of
its performance as I am of expressing my misery and the
blank which his death has created in my heart. General
Stewart has charged me to put up the whole of his papers
in a small writing-case which he brought last from
England with him. These consist of only a few private
letters, as he had destroyed most other papers a few days
previous to that on which took place the attack in which
he fell.
"This case will also contain his watch and some of
his accounts, which shall be accompanied by notes in
Explanation. All the letters must be first seen by you
before they arei sent to Mrs. Craufurd ; for among them
there are some of her own which, having arrived after his
death, are unopened. In all and every arrangement con-
cerning his effects, his aide-de-camp and myself will be
governed by General Stewart.
" I am, my dear sir,
" Your affectionate and most unhappy,
"WILLIAM CAMPBELL.'
A monument was erected to General Craufurd in St.
Paul's Cathedral by the nation. As General Mackinnon
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 223
was killed at the same time as Craufurd, one monument
served for both these officers. But the most real monu-
ment of the leader of the Light Division was Ciudad
Rodrigo itself, or perhaps an even better one was the
surpassing excellence of his troops, over whom his gifted
spirit long continued to exercise a decided sway after his
departure from this world. It was in every way most
fitting that he should be buried in the breach, and not in
St. Paul's or Westminster Abbey. Thus in death, as in
life, he was made one with his own gallant soldiers.
Moreover, writing to his wife concerning himself and his
career he said truly, " My whole life has been passed in a
kind of storm." Peace, composure, or tranquillity he
never found in this life. And for the bruised storm-
warriors in the realms alike of action and of thought, for
the leaders of the world's tragical " forlorn hopes," for the
^//"-successful children of glimmering and erratic genius,
for distinctly dualistic * natures, for such as were never
really in harmony with their environment, the serene
pomp and finished perfection of an English cathedral
seem at times almost a mockery. The soldier's simple
grave seems better far for such, since war has been their
o
very element. Hollow and unreal indeed, when said over
such eager baffled spirits, must ever sound the undis-
* In the next chapter of this book I think it will appear plainly that Sir
William Napier saw deeply into Craufurd's strangely complex nature, when
he wrote of him, *' If ever the Manichaean doctrine was made manifest in
man, it was so in Craufurd." But Napier's words, like some of those of
the old Hebrew prophets, had a far wider range and a much profounder
significance than he who uttered them was aware of.
224 GENERAL CRAUFURD
criminating and almost unmeaning eulogies of sleek
commonplace divines. Erected over the graves of storm-
tossed heroes, almost all epitaphs seem vain and futile, save
only that wise and tender one in which the divine reason
expresses at once an effective apologia and a gladdening
prophecy : " These are they which came out of great
tribulation ; therefore are they before the throne of God."
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 225
CHAPTER VIII.
ANECDOTES, AND DIFFERENT ESTIMATES OF CRAUFURD'S
CHARACTER AND ABILITIES.
THE marked and striking personality of General Craufurd,
his love of jokes and keen sense of humour, and also his
extraordinary activity, made it quite certain that a great
number of amusing anecdotes would be associated with
his name during such an exciting period as that of the
war waged in the Peninsula. I will now proceed to
gather together a few of these. Some of the best have
been handed down to us by one of Craufurd's riflemen,
Edward Costello, a non-commissioned officer, in his
interesting " Adventures of a Soldier." The book is now
extremely scarce.
One of this writer's most diverting stories about his
fiery leader is as follows : " The following laughable
incident occurred while we lay at Gallegos, I happened
to be acquainted with General Craufurd's private servant,
a Frenchman, chiefly through my being employed as
orderly to the Brigadier. At times, when an opportunity
offered, we used to take a glass of wine together on the
most convivial terms. One morning, however, when I
Q
226 GENERAL CRAUFURD
thought the Brigadier had gone out, as was his usual
custom, I went to his room, to ask the valet to partake of
some wine which I had received from the patron of the
house. On opening the door, I unhesitatingly went in
and beheld, as I imagined, the individual I wanted in a
morning gown looking out of the window. It entered into
my head to surprise my servant friend ; so, as he had not
been disturbed by my approach, I stepped softly up to
his rear and, with a sudden laugh, gave him a smart slap
on the back. But my consternation and surprise may be
better imagined than described, when the gentleman in
the dressing-gown, starting round with a ' Who the devil
is that?' disclosed, not the merry phiz of the valet, but
the stern features of General Graufurd himself.
" I thought I should have sunk through the ground at
the moment, had it have opened to swallow me. I could
only attempt to explain the mistake I had made, in
a very humble way, as I gradually retreated to the
door.
" ' And where did you get the wine from, sir ? ' said the
General, with a good-humoured smile ; for he observed the
fright I was in.
" I informed him.
" ' Well, well, you may go,' said the General ; ' but pray,
sir, never again do me the honour to take me for my
servant.'
" I needed not the permission to vanish in a moment.
And many a laugh and jest were created at my expense
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 227
afterwards among the men, as the circumstance got circu-
lated by the valet."
Strict and stern though Craufurd was as a disciplinarian,
his men seem to have thoroughly realized the fact that he
had a strong sense of humour ; and they acted accordingly.
In his "Distinguished Generals during the Peninsular War,"
Cole relates the following story : " A rollicking Hibernian
of the Light Division was once trudging leisurely along
the road with a pig in a string behind him, when, as bad
luck would have it, he was overtaken by General Craufurd.
The salutation, as may be supposed, was not the most
cordial ' Where did you steal that pig, you plundering
rascal?' ' What pig, Giniral ? ' exclaimed the culprit,
turning round to him with an air of the most innocent
surprise* ' Why, that pig you have got behind you, you
villain.' ' Well then I vow and protest, Giniral/ rejoined
Paddy, nothing abashed, and turning round to his four-
footed companion as if he had never seen him before, ' it
is scandalous to think what a wicked world we live in, and
how ready folks are to take away an honest boy's character.
Some blackguard, wanting to get me into trouble, has tied
that baste to my cartouch-box.' The General could restrain
his risible faculties no longer, and struck spurs to his
horse, and rode on*"
Two other little stories, though trivial in themselves,
may serve to illustrate the appreciation of this side of
Craufurd's character by those serving under him. They
were communicated to me by the son of a well-known
228 GENERAL CRAUFURD
officer who served in the 43rd Light Infantry during the
Peninsular War.
The General had given the strictest orders that no
soldier should fall out, whilst marching, without a ticket
from the medical officer. General Craufurd was fond of
poultry and usually carried about a good supply with his
Division. It so happened that one of his turkeys was
injured in the leg. So one of the men tied the necessary
medical ticket to the bird. Craufurd, riding up, saw the
bird limping along, and proceeded to mutter some remarks
not favourable to the practical joker.
The other little anecdote about Craufurd and his
poultry is this : It was Christmas-time, and some people
had been round the camp selling a considerable number of
geese. Whereupon two choice spirits put their heads
together and concocted the following joke. They went
from officer's tent to officer's tent, speaking to each occupant
in something like the following words : " I say, Brown,
have you heard the row ? Some one has stolen the General's
geese, and been selling them in camp. You have not
bought any, have you ? " " Well, yes, I have bought one ;
but it is not picked ; what do you advise me to do ? "
" Take it to the General, by all means, and explain to him."
The next officer had just picked his bird, and another had
cooked it ; but all went, taking their birds in various stages
of destruction, and eagerly apologized to their astonished
commander. At first General Craufurd thought that all
these officers of his had gone mad ; but gradually he began
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 229
to realize the true position of affairs. The story does not
inform us what he then said, but in all probability he joined
heartily in the harmless joke.
The leader of the Light Division always had the very
greatest dislike to punishing any of his men whom he
thought fine soldiers ; and accordingly he sometimes went
very much out of his way to protect them, as this story,
taken from Costello's book, will show: A regiment of
Brunswickers being sent to the Division, they had to be
watched, in order to prevent their deserting to the enemy.
Craufurd detested them and was not willing to punish his
own men for excessive zeal in watching these traitors. A
sergeant of the Rifles called Fleming, " one night being
posted in piquet, unluckily came in collision with one of
the Brunswick officers, and suspecting his intentions to bolt
to the enemy, knocked him down with his rifle and other-
wise maltreated him. The result was that Fleming was
tried by a Brigade court-martial, convicted for the assault,
sentenced to be reduced to the ranks, and to receive a
corporal punishment of five hundred lashes." But Craufurd,
after saying to Fleming that his crime would be quite
inexcusable if it really was exactly of the sort described,
took upon himself to remit the corporal punishment on
account of the excellent character for gallantry and
honourable conduct given of this sergeant by his own
officers. " And I here " (proceeded the General, turning
round to the Division) " take the opportunity of declaring
that if any of these gentlemen" (meaning the Brunswickers)
230 GENERAL CRAUFURD
" have a wish to go over to the enemy, let them express
it, and I give my word of honour I will grant them a pass
to that effect instantly ; for we are better without such."
" Fleming was shortly afterwards reinstated, and fell
leading on the ladder party irj the forlorn hope at Badajoz."
He thus lived long enough tQ be present at Craufurd's
funeral.
This anecdote of Craufurd is very characteristic. No
one ever valued a fine soldier more than he did. As his
humble follower, " Rifleman EJarris," said of him ; " he was
in everything a soldier, the very picture of a warrior."
I extract from Sir W. Cope's " History of the Rifle
Brigade " the following story, as it serves well to illustrate
both J:he unhappy violence qf my grandfather's temper and
the substantial justice of his anger : " On one occasion
during IVJoore's retreat, Lieutenant Thomas Smith, then
a very young officer who had but lately joined, was
accompanying ammunition which was in charge of a
Quartermaster (Ross). On their arrival at Craufurd's
head-quarters, the wily Quartermaster advised Smith to
go and report their arrival to the Qeneral. The other
demurred, saying that he was rjot in charge of the ammu-
nition, but only accompanying it. However, the Quarter-
master urged him, reminding him that he must be hungry;
they had not in fact tasted food for twenty-four hours ;
and that the General would probably ask him to dinner.
Thus counselled by his senior, and impelled by his hunger,
he presented himself at the General's quarters, and saw
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 231
his aide-de-camp, who going upstairs returned v/ith an
order to proceed at once a further march of some three
leagues. Smith returned to the Quartermaster with this
woeful order, adding that as he was in charge, he might
remain with it, for that he should go on and overtake his
battalion. The Quartermaster declared he should do no
such thing ; and, after a sharp argument, they both started
and joined the battalion.
" In the morning, as Smith was sitting down to
breakfast, an order came from Craufurd, who had come
up, that he and the Quartermaster should attend him.
On being ushered into the General's presence, they found
him warming himself before a comfortable brazier, while
breakfast stood on the table. In a voice of great severity
he asked which of the two had received hjs order the
night before.
"'I did, sir/ said Smith, 'but '
" ' No but, sir/ interrupted Craufurd, ' consider yourself
under arrest ; and/ adding a tremendous oath, * I will
smash you.'
"Poor Smithfor Craufurd would not hear a word
more returned in dismay to his brother officers, whom
he found at breakfast ; but, hungry as he was, and pressed
by them to be of good heart, food had now no charms for
him.
"Eventually Beckwith* represented to Craufurd that
* Beckwith, afterwards Sir T. Sydney Beckwith, was General Craufurd's
favourite of all the Colonels who served under him. The two men had much
232 GENERAL CRAUFURD
the offender was but a boy just joined ; and his pleadings,
coupled perhaps with the fact that they were just going
to fight, when every available officer would be wanted,
induced Craufurd, contrary to his wont, to relax his
seventy and to release Smith from his arrest.
"Long afterwards, as Craufurd was standing talking
with the officers of the battalion round a camp fire, he
turned to him.
"'Smith,' said he, 'did I not once put you under
arrest ? '
"'Yes, sir, you did,'
" ' And do you know,' he continued, ' what became of
the ammunition? I found it steadily going towards the
French lines, and had but just time to put spurs to my
horse and to turn it back. So that through your default
I had nearly lost my ammunition.' "
A large part of General Craufurd's extreme unpopu-
larity with his officers, no doubt, was caused by his firm
determination to force them all to do their work
thoroughly. That he could genuinely appreciate and
value really able and efficient officers is made manifest
by the energy with which he successfully resisted Beres-
ford, when that Marshal wanted to take George Napier
out of the Light Division and make him Colonel of one
in common, and the General accorded to Beckwith much more freedom and
latitude than he granted to any other Colonel. Colonel Colborne, afterwards
Lord Seaton, of the $2nd, was a still abler man ; but he was only a short time
under Craufurd. Old Beckwith was probably the best officer that the 95th
Rifles ever produced, well described by Napier as " a man capable of rallying
an army in flight.
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 233
of his own Portuguese regiments. In his " Early Military
Life " Sir George Napier thus relates this affair : " I
wished at that period very much to be allowed to enter
the Portuguese service as a Lieutenant-Colonel command-
ing a regiment, and therefore I asked Lord Wellington's
permission to make application to Marshal Beresford to
appoint me to the command of a Light Infantry regiment,
as the Portuguese army was under the command of the
Marshal. Lord Wellington granted my request, and
accordingly I went to Marshal Beresford, who received
me very kindly, and said he would appoint me with
pleasure to a Light Infantry regiment which happened
to be vacant at that very time. I was delighted at this
and went off to get my things ready, etc., but I found that
our General (Craufurd), having heard of my application
to enter the Portuguese army, had gone to Lord Welling-
ton and represented that he had been at great pains to
make good field officers in the Light Division, and that,
if he was to be deprived of them in this way, the Division
would be ruined ; and as he was pleased to say I was one
of his best officers, he positively refused to let me go out
of his Division. He would have been content if the
Marshal would appoint me to one of the Portuguese
light regiments in his own Division, which was com-
manded by a Portuguese Colonel whom Craufurd did not
like ; but this was out of the question, and Lord Welling-
ton therefore acquiesced in General Craufurd's demand
that I should remain where I was.
234 GENERAL CRAUFURD
" This was very annoying to me, but from the
flattering manner General Craufurd had spoken of me
to the Commander-in-chief, I could not be angry ; and
indeed I think he was right not to permit those officers
who had been constantly serving with him, and formed
under his own directions in the finest Division in the
army, to be taken from him just as their long experience
had made them more valuable tp him. Lord Wellington
sent for me the next day, and told me he was very sorry
for my disappointment, but that he hoped it would be
made up to me by his informing me I was made Major
of the 52nd Regiment, and although I actually belonged
to the 2nd balttaliort, which was in England, I should
remain on service with the yst battalion. This put me
in such good spirits that I cared very little ^bout going
into the Portuguese service. I went, however, to inform
Marshal Beresford, and to thank him for his kindness.
He was not very well pleased with General Craufurd,
and expressed himself in pretty strong terms on the
occasion."
From this narrative it is evident that Wellington was
much influenced by Craufyrd's judgment in anything that
concerned the Light Division. I do not think that
General Craufurd ever entertained a very high opinion
of Beresford's capacities. I believe that he thought very
much as Sir William Napier did about that brave but not
conspicuously able leader.
Having now shown _how the leader of the Light
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 235
Division valued a really able officer, I will proceed to
illustrate his feelings towards good soldiers amongst his
men. Costello, who was an eye-witness of the affair,
writes as follows : " The Duke of Wellington attended
the funeral of the gallant veteran (Craufurd), who, though
most strict in discipline, was averse to punishment, and
was beloved by the men for his justice and care for them,
as well as for his bravery. The following incident, of
which I was an eye-witness, will serve to show his
character. I happened to be on guard one day when
General Craufurd came riding in from the front with his
orderly dragoon, as was his usual custom, when two of
our men, one of them a corporal, came running out of
a house with some bread which they had stolen from the
Spaniards. They were pursued by a Spanish woman
crying lustily, ' Ladrone ! padrone!' (Thief! thjef!) They
were immediately pursued by the GeneraJ and his
orderly ; the bread was given back to the woman, and
the men were placed in the guard-house.
"The next day they were tried by a Brigade court-
martial, and brought out to a wood near the town, for
punishment. When the Brigade was formed, and the
Brigade-Major had finished reading the proceedings of
the court-martial, General Craufurd commenced lecturing
both men and officers on the nature of their cruelty to
the harmless inhabitants, as he called the Spaniards. He
laid particular stress on our regiment (the 95th Rifles),
who, he said, committed more crimes than the whole of
236 GENERAL CRAUFURD
the rest of the British army. ' Besides, you think,' said
he, ' because you are riflemen and more exposed to the
enemy's fire than other regiments, that you are to rob
the inhabitants with impunity ; but while I command you,
you shall not.' Then, turning round to the corporal,
who stood in the centre of the square, he said with a
stern voice, ' Strip, sir/
" The corporal, whose name was Miles, never said a
word until tied up to a tree ; when, turning his head round
as far as his situation would allow, and seeing the General
pacing up and down the square, he said, ' General
Craufurd, I hope you will forgive me/ The General
replied, 'No, sir, your crime is too great/ The poor
corporal, whose sentence was to be reduced to the pay
and rank of a private soldier, and to receive a punishment
of a hundred and fifty lashes, and the other man two
hundred, then addressed the General to the following
effect : * Do you recollect, sir, when under the command
of General Whitelocke, in Buenos Ayres, we were marched
prisoners, with a number of others, to a sort of pound
surrounded with a wall ? There was a well in the centre,
out of which I drew water with my mess-tin, by means
of canteen-straps I collected from the men who were
prisoners like myself. You sat on my knapsack ;. I
parted my last biscuit with you. You then told me you
would never forget my kindness to you. It is now in
your power, sir ; you know how short we have been of
rations for some time/
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 237
" These words were spoken by the corporal in a mild
and respectful accent, which not only affected the General,
but the whole square. The bugler who stood waiting to
commence the punishment, close to the corporal, received
the usual nod from the Bugle-Major to begin. The first
lash the corporal received, the General started, and
turning hurriedly round, said, 'Who taught that bugler
to flog ? Send him to drill ! Send him to drill ! He
cannot flog ! He cannot flog ! Stop, stop ! Take him
down ! Take him down ! I remember it well, I remember
it well,' while he paced up and down the square, muttering
to himself words that I could not catch, and at the same
time blowing his nose and wiping his face with his
handkerchief, trying to hide the emotion that was so
evident to the whole square.
"A dead silence prevailed for some time, until our
gallant General recovered a little his noble feeling, when
he uttered, with a broken accent, * Why does a brave
soldier like you commit these crimes ? ' Then, beckoning
to his orderly to bring his horse, he mounted and rode
off. It is needless to say that the other man also was
pardoned, and in a few days the corporal was restored
to his rank."
Scenes such as this must have amply sufficed to con-
vince Craufurd's men that their vehement and passionate
leader had a warm heart, and that he keenly appreciated
.- their many fine qualities. But the full pathos of this
scene could only be understood by those few suclv as
238 GENERAL CRAUFURD
William Campbell or Charles Stewart who realized the
fact that the fiery spirit of Robert Craufurd was in truth
quite extraordinarily sensitive and profoundly affectionate,
and also that the sore wound inflicted at Buenos Ayres
on his aspiring pride remained unhealed to the day of
his death. Those few who really knew this stern leader
well were quite aware that his heart was ever most eager
to respond effectively to all the claims made upon it by
gratitude and sympathy. Craufurd was not an amiable
man, in the common sense of the term ; but his intimate
friends considered him a really great man in character
as well as attainments. His wife, who was a woman of
the calmest judgment, always thought that his violence
of temper was almost entirely caused by his unhappy
sensitiveness, which made him fe'el things far more acutely
than ordinary men feel them. And I suppose the fact
really is that what the world usually re'ckons amiability is
largely based on obtuseness of feeling ; and so the most
affectionate natures are often more liable to stormy gusts
of passing anger than colder natures are. In the human
heart the sources of tenderness and also of a kind of
fierceness are not far apart. The old Hebrew prophets
made manifest the truth of this apparent paradox, and in
our own military history it was well illustrated by the
complex character of Charles Napier. On the other hand,
the amiability of some natures is the result of animal
selfishness well gratified, and has no more real moral
significance than the purring of comfortable cats,
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 239
Concerning General Craufurd's abilities strangely
opposite opinions have been expressed. Some have even
thought that he might have rivalled Wellington, if his
sphere had been equally extensive, whilst others have
questioned his skill whilst acknowledging his undaunted
courage. Charles Lever, in his story, " Charles O'Malley,"
very ridiculously represents the leader of the Light
Division as " relying on headlong heroism rather than
on cool judgment and well-matured plans." That this
estimate is absurd is sufficiently obvious from Sir James
Shaw Kennedy's account of the extremely accurate
calculations and the great knowledge and skill involved
in Craufurd's wonderful outpost work between the rivers
Coa and Agueda. Cole says of Craufurd, " There have
been many opinions expressed as to this brave officer's
capability of command. It has been even asserted by his
admirers that, with the same opportunities he would have
equalled Wellington ; but such hyperbolical eulogy is as
injurious as detraction. Take him on the whole, he was
one of the readiest and most dashing executive officers in
the service, and his early death must be considered a
national loss."
Lord Wolseley, if I remember rightly, has declared
In a magazine article on " Military Genius," that " with
one or two exceptions," Wellington " apparently had the
very poorest opinion of his Generals of Division." Probably
Robert Craufurd is included by Lord Wolseley in these
extremely few exceptions. But, however this may be,
2-40 GENERAL CRAUFURD
I think I have in this volume made it abundantly
manifest that in reality Craufurd's Commander-in-chief
had a very high opinion indeed of his capacity as well
as of his energy and activity.
In the text of Napier's " Peninsular War" there is one
well-known passage in which he compares Picton and
Craufurd, and is by no means complimentary to either
of these renowned leaders. But the place in which this
criticism is found explains to a great extent Sir William
Napier's apparent depreciation of these Generals ; and
as regards Craufurd, the unfavourable opinion expressed
is very much lessened in significance by later utterances
of the same judge. Both these Generals had given very
great offence to Napier by their conduct at the Coa,
Craufurd by righting unnecessarily, and Picton by refusing
to come to the assistance of the Light Division in its
hour of supreme peril. Consequently the historian wrote
thus concerning them : " Picton and Craufurd were, how-
ever, not formed by nature to act cordially together. The
stern countenance, robust frame, saturnine complexion,
caustic speech, and austere demeanour of the first promised
little sympathy with the short thick figure, dark flashing
eyes, quick movements, and fiery temper of the second ;
nor did they often meet without a quarrel. Nevertheless,
they had many points of resemblance in their characters
and fortunes. Both were inclined to harshness, and rigid in
command ; both prone to disobedience, yet exacting entire
submission from inferiors. They were alike ambitious
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 241
and craving of glory. Both possessed military talents,
were enterprising and intrepid ; yet neither was remark-
able for skill in handling troops under fire. This also
they had in common, that after distinguished services
they perished in arms, fighting gallantly; and, being
celebrated as Generals of Division while living, have
since their death been injudiciously spoken of as rivalling
their great leader in war.
" That they were officers of mark and pretension is
unquestionable, and Craufurd more so than Picton, because
the latter never had a separate command, and his oppor-
tunities were necessarily more circumscribed ; but to
compare either to Wellington displays ignorance of the
men and of the art they professed. If they had even
comprehended the profound military and political com-
binations he was then conducting, the one would have
carefully avoided fighting on the Coa ; the other, far from
refusing, would have eagerly proffered his support."
The last sentence in this famous passage seems to me
totally unfair to both Generals. Napier must either mean
that Craufurd and Picton were incapable of comprehending
" the profound military and political combinations " which
their chief was then conducting, even if they had been in
possession of adequate data in the way of full information
as to facts, or else merely that they were so incapable
with the very scanty and inadequate information which
they possessed at that time. In the former case Napier's
assertion is quite untrue, and as regards Craufurd it is
R
242 GENERAL CRAUFURD
plainly refuted by the fact that Wellington often discussed
his general plans with him, as is made evident in this
volume ; in the latter case Napier's censure is somewhat
meaningless, and applies to his own brother Charles quite
as much as to Picton or Craufurd. Political considerations
of a highly complex character often induced Wellington
to modify his military operations in a manner otherwise
undesirable or even inexplicable. These considerations
were thoroughly and exhaustively known only by the
Commander-in-chief himself; in their fulness he com-
municated their nature to no one ; and consequently no
officer serving under him could be rationally blamed for
not completely comprehending the profound combinations
which the wisdom of Wellington designed in order to
deal with them. Charles Napier did not understand why
the Commander-in-chief persisted in holding so long the
perilous position occupied between the rivers Coa and
Agueda in the summer of the year 1810. In his life, by
his brother, Sir William, we find Charles Napier saying
at the end of June that the Light Division ought not to
stay in its advanced and perilous position ; yet Wellington
says in a letter to Craufurd on July 16, "It is desirable
that we should hold the other side of the Coa a little
longer." From which it appears that even Charles Napier
was not always quite omniscient, and did not then " com-
prehend the profound military and political combinations
which Wellington was conducting."
Picton's biographer, Mr. Robinson, not unnaturally
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 243
found fault with Sir William Napier's remarks as to the
abilities of that renowned leader. In reply, Napier says
in an appendix to his history, " As to the charge of faintly
praising his military talents, a point was forced by me
in his favour, when I compared him to General Craufurd,
of whose ability there was no question ; more could not
be done in conscience, even under Mr. Robinson's assur-
ance that he was a Roman hero."
In Cole's " Distinguished Generals during the Penin-
sular War," we find another comparison of the rival leaders,
Picton and Craufurd. It seems to have been written by
Sir Denis le Marchant, from materials furnished by Major-
General le Marchant, who served under Wellington. In
some respects this estimate may well be considered more
accurate and more fair than the somewhat hostile one
written by Napier. It is as follows : " Picton and Crau-
furd were officers alike distinguished by gallantry and
talent, but most opposite in disposition and deportment,
and, it may not be uninteresting to add, in person. Picton,
when wrapped in his military cloak, might have been
mistaken for a bronze statue of Cato, and was equally
staid, deliberate, and austere ; whilst Craufurd, of a dimi-
nutive and not imposing figure, was characterized by
vivacity almost mercurial both in thought and act ; his
eager spirit and fertile brain ever hurrying him into enter-
prises of difficulty and danger, which he loved the more
because they sometimes left him at liberty to follow his
own views of the crisis of the moment. Others shunned
244 GENERAL CRAUFURD
responsibility, he courted it. He had served on the Staff
of the Austrian armies during the revolutionary war, and
was well versed in their tactics, as he had shown by his
translation of one of their best military histories ; but
this knowledge was of very questionable benefit to him,
for it occasionally led him to try experiments which were
hardly consistent with the comparative insignificance of
his corps. In short, he was too much disposed to aim at
objects which were the province of the Commander rather
than of a subordinate General.
" Picton had no such ambition ; but he was slow to
execute orders of which he disapproved, and the quickness
of his perception * was not equal to the soundness of his
judgment. Craufurd had the faults incidental to a hasty
temper, Picton those belonging to a morose one. Each
was possessed of indefatigable industry and perfect famili-
arity with all the duties of his profession ; and last, though
not least, both were men of the highest integrity and
honour. Next to Lord Wellington, none stood higher in
the estimation of the army. Both these officers were
friends of General le Marchant."
Picton and Craufurd were also singularly different in
their feelings and attitude towards the troops forming
their respective Divisions. Picton seems to have detested
* Picton's biographer says that his hero would not have fought the action
at the Coa, if he had been trusted with the outpost operations assigned to
Craufurd. Probably this is quite true ; but Wellington knew well that Picton
had not sufficient rapidity of perception to carry on successfully for four months
the marvellously dangerous work performed by Craufurd and his Division.
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 245
his own men. " On one occasion, while heading a charge,
he addressed them with these flattering epithets, ' Come
on, you plundering, fighting blackguards.' J: And, for
some unknown reason, he appears to have especially
disliked the gallant 88th, or Connaught Rangers. General
Craufurd, on the contrary, "was so vain of the Division
he commanded that he had persuaded himself that he
might safely oppose it to any number of the enemy."
Cole, who was very much inclined to prefer Picton to
Craufurd, says of Picton, " Although not personally loved
by the soldiers, he was respected by them." Certainly
he was never received by the troops of his Division with
ringing cheers such as were freely given to the leader of
the Light Division on his return to the army just before
the battle of Fuentes d'Onoro ; nor, I imagine, did his
heroic death evoke any such pathetic laments as those
which Lord Londonderry and William Campbell poured
forth over the fiery but warm-hearted Robert Craufurd.
In this respect, in the power of attracting the affections
of his men, Craufurd certainly was far superior to Picton ;
and I suppose that there can be no doubt that Lord
Wolseley is right in considering such a power a very
great one, and an almost necessary attribute of military
genius.
Craufurd's efficiency as a leader was greatly lessened
by the violence and obstinacy of his temper. These
sometimes obscured the clearness of his judgment, and
made him determined to hold his ground at all costs,
246 GENERAL CRAUFURD
when retreat was decidedly expedient. Thus genius
partially marred by passion characterized his whole
career. Sir William Napier expresses this truth, though
with some degree of inadvertent unfairness, when he says
of his old leader (in the "Life of Sir Charles Napier"), " If
ever the Manichsean doctrine was made manifest in man,
it was so in Craufurd. At one time he was all fire and
intelligence, a master spirit in war ; at another, as if
possessed by the demon, he would madly rush from
blunder to blunder, raging in folly." Following Napier,
a writer in the Quarterly Review once spoke of Craufurd
as " the good and evil genius of the Light Division."
But to a very great' extent such estimates of Craufurd
are unintentionally misleading. They suggest that his
evil influence was about as extensive and habitual as his
good influence, that his errors were about as frequent in
their occurrence as his hours of wisdom, vigilant thought-
fulness, and brilliant audacity. And of course the idea
thus inevitably suggested is false. Sir George Napier
plainly considered that Craufurd's mistakes were few and
by no means habitual. He says of him, "Although in
some few instances he got into scrapes, it was more
through vanity than anything else." And of course it
is manifest that his mind must have been well directed
in the immense majority of its activities ; for otherwise
it could never have been truly said of him, as it was by.
the authority last quoted : " Every officer in the Light %
Division must acknowledge that, by his unwearied and
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 247
active exertions of mind and body, that Division was
brought to a state of discipline and knowledge of the
duties of light troops which never was equalled by any
Division in the British army, or surpassed by any Division
of the French army." Certainly so splendid a service as
that was never yet performed by any General whose
activities were made up, in about equal proportions, of
masterly power and raging folly.
After all, the occasions on which Napier censures
Craufurd, in his history of the war, are few some three
or four I believe and on other occasions he speaks more
highly of him than he ever does of any other General
who served under Lord Wellington. He never says of
Hill, Beresford, Stapleton Cotton, Sir Brent Spencer,
Picton, scarcely even of Thomas Graham Lord Lynedoch,
that he was in his better moments "full of fire and
intelligence, a master spirit in war."
And it ought to be remembered that, before he praised
General Craufurd, William Napier had to emancipate his
judgment from a very strong influence which tended to
sway it in a contrary direction. Charles Napier very
greatly disliked the leader of the Light Division, and lost
no opportunity of expressing a bad opinion of him.
Charles Macleod of the 43rd, William Napier's dearest
friend in the world, absolutely hated Craufurd, as is made
extremely evident by a copy of the omniscient young
critic's journal his age was only 25 now to be found
amongst the books and manuscripts belonging to the
248 GENERAL CRAUFURD
officers of his old regiment. Consequently one may
always feel [certain that William Napier's praises of his
General are well deserved ; especially as to praise Craufurd
might sometimes seem to be undervaluing Sir John Moore.
As Colonel Charles Macleod's journal has never been
published, it is not necessary that I should take much notice
of his remarks about his General. I will content myself
with saying that I believe that the temperaments of the
two men were so utterly different as to make mutual com-
prehension almost impossible, Craufurd being of a singu-
larly outspoken nature, and Macleod exceedingly reserved.
The fact that the latter was so fervently loved by William
Napier is a sufficient 'proof that he had some remarkably
fine qualities ; but amongst these intellectual modesty can
hardly be numbered. It never seems to have occurred to
this virulent critic that his General might possibly know
more of war than he knew himself, as Craufurd had been
in the army for thirty-three years. And the simple fact
that Lord Wellington took great trouble to keep Craufurd
in command of a Division which more than any other
demanded real ability in its leader, might well have
caused this juvenile critic to hesitate before pronouncing
unmeasured censure on his hated chief. Craufurd's junior
rank amongst the Generals often made it difficult for
the Commander-in-chief to secure to him his command.
Macleod might also easily have known that Sir John
Moore had a high opinion of General Craufurd. But we
all know how self-confident and conceited clever young
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 249
men frequently are ; and the juvenile warrior of the 43rd
had evidently some need of a few words of wise warning
such as those said to have been addressed to a young
student by a famous professor: "We are none of us
infallible, not even the youngest?
In the "Private Journal of F. S. Larpent, Judge-
Advocate-General of the British forces in the Peninsula,"
we find the following remarks about the leader of the
Light Division : " He was very clever and knowing in his
profession, all admit, and led on his Division, on the day
of his death, in the most gallant style ; but Lord Welling-
ton never knew what he would do. ... Lord Wellington
knew his merits, and humoured him ; it was surprising
what he bore from him at times."
In his " Narrative of the Peninsular War," Lord
Londonderry writes thus of Craufurd: "It is scarcely
necessary to add that the loss of so many valuable lives
was keenly felt, not only by private friends, but by the
army in general ; but among them all there fell not one
more universally or more justly lamented than Major-
General Craufurd. He was an officer of whom the highest
expectations had been formed, and who on every occasion
found an opportunity to prove that, had his life been
spared, the fondest hopes of his country would not have
been disappointed ; and he was a man to know whom in
his profession without admiring was impossible. To me
his death occasioned that void which the removal of a
sincere friend alone produces. From the moment of
250 GENERAL CRAUFURD
receiving his wound, he knew that all hope of recovery
was idle ; he lingered on for several hours, and at last
submitted to his fate with the magnanimity of a hero and
the resignation of a Christian. Poor Craufurd ! whilst
the memory of the brave and the skilful shall continue
to be cherished by British soldiers, thou wilt not be for-
gotten ; and the hand which scrawls this humble tribute
to thy worth must be cold as thine own, ere the mind
which dictates it shall cease to think of thee with affection
and regret."
In a book called " Random Shots from a Rifleman,"
Captain Kincaid, of the 95th Rifles, has much to say con-
cerning his old leader.' He tells us that " Craufurd was
no common character. He, like a gallant contemporary
of his, was not born to be a great General, but he certainly
was a distinguished one ; the history of his Division, and
the position which he held beyond the Coa in 1810, attest
the fact. He had neither judgment, temper, nor discretion
to fit him for a chief, and as a subordinate he required to
be held with a tight rein ; but his talents as a General of
Division were nevertheless of the first order. He received
the three British regiments under his command finished
by the hands of a master in the art, Sir John Moore, and
as regiments they were faultless ; but to Craufurd belonged
the chief merit of making them the war Brigade which
they became, alike the admiration of their friends and
foes."
The assertion that Craufurd " was not born to be a
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION, 251
great General," and that he would not have done for a
chief, seems a rather rash one to make concerning a leader
whom William Napier declared to be in his better hours
" a master spirit in war." But Kincaid, though an efficient
officer, was in no sense a great one, and his opinion on
this point is far from decisive. Lord Londonderry had
far better means of estimating Craufurd's capacities, and
he thought him quite equal to Sir John Moore in ability,
though immensely inferior as regards character. Mr.
Gleig also informs us that at the time of Craufurd's death,
" the man himself was regarded as one of those who,
should circumstances ever place him in a situation of
distinct responsibility and trust, would unquestionably add
to the renown which the British troops had already
acquired." Mr. Gleig was a shrewd observer, and his
testimony as to what was the general opinion in the army
as to Craufurd's powers is of considerable value, though
this observer's own opinion on such a matter could not
then be worth much.
Moreover, in the expedition to Buenos Ayres the
leader of the Light Division had unquestionably shown
that the British army would never have incurred its
greatest disgrace, if he had been Commander-in-chief,
instead of being a subordinate General. The most serious
defect in General Craufurd was his great violence of
temper, and Sir George Napier has testified that this
was being gradually conquered. Some of his errors also
arose, as Sir Denis le Marchant has observed, from his
.252 GENERAL CRAUFURD
being too apt to aim at objects which were really the
province of the Commander-in-chief; so that in some
respects he might have done better as a chief than as a
subordinate. This view is rather confirmed by Wellington
when he wrote to Craufurd, "In every event I should
have taken care to keep your command distinct, as 1
am convinced that you will be able to render most service
in such a situation." He was very much wanting in tact,
no doubt; but many great Generals have certainly been
lacking in that quality. That Craufurd had sufficient
knowledge and genius to enable him to play the part of
a great General is, I think, sufficiently clear ; but whether
he would ever have conquered his constitutional tendency
to perilous rashness, it is impossible to say, though all
history, I imagine, teaches us that a position of distinct
and grave responsibility very often evokes caution and
prudence, to a very remarkable extent, in leaders up to
that time characterized by extreme audacity and some-
what reckless obstinacy.
However, it is as a great General of Division, as a
man of vivid intelligence and extraordinary rapidity of
perception, as a master of outpost work, as a leader
endowed with unconquerable resolution, as perhaps, in
some respects, the greatest disciplinarian that the British
army ever produced, that Robert Craufurd will always
be remembered. Whatever his failings may have been
and they were many I suppose that all really impartial
students of military history will agree with a recent writer,
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 253
who says of him, " Craufurd was an officer who left his
mark on the English army, and was unquestionably
the finest commander of light troops who served in the
Peninsula. In spite of his faults of temper, he won and
retained to the last the devoted love of the soldiers he
commanded." (See a sketch of Craufurd's career in the
" Dictionary of National Biography," edited by Mr. Leslie
Stephen.)
Captain Kincaid tells us that the men hated Craufurd's
extreme strictness at first, but that they afterwards came
to understand and appreciate it. He writes thus : " But
Craufurd's cat forced them to take the right road whether
they would or no ; and the experiment, once made, carried
conviction with it that the comfort of every individual in
the Division materially depended on the rigid exaction
of his orders ; for he shewed that on every ordinary
march he made it a rule to halt for a few minutes every
third or fourth mile (dependent on the vicinity of water),
that every soldier carried a canteen capable of containing
two quarts, and that, if he only took the trouble to fill it
before starting, and again, if necessary, at every halt, it
contained more than he would or ought to drink in the
interim ; and that therefore every pause he made in a
river for the purpose of drinking was disorderly, because
a man stopping to drink delayed the one^ behind him pro-
portionately longer, and so on progressively to the rear
of the column,
" In like manner the filing past dirty or marshy parts
254 GENERAL CRAUFURD
of the road, in place of marching boldly through them,
or filing over a plank or narrow bridge in place of taking
the river with the full front of their column in march,
he proved to demonstration, on true mathematical prin-
ciples, that with the numbers of those obstacles usually
encountered on a day's march, it made a difference of
several hours in their arrival at their bivouac for the night.
He shewed that, in indulging by the way, they were that
much longer labouring under their load of arms, ammu-
nition, and necessaries, besides bringing them to their
bivouac in darkness and discomfort It very likely, too,
got them thoroughly drenched with rain, when the sole
cause of their delay nad been to avoid a partial wetting,
which would have been long since dried while seated at
ease around their camp-fires ; and if this does not redeem
Craufurd and his cat, I give it up.
"The General and his divisional code, as already
hinted at, was at first much disliked. Probably he enforced
it in the first instance with unnecessary severity, and it
was long before those under him could rid themselves of
that feeling of oppression which it had inculcated upon
their minds. It is due, however, to the memory of the
gallant General to say that punishment for those disorders
was rarely necessary after the first campaign ; for the
system, once established, went on like clock-work, and
the soldiers latterly became devotedly attached to him ;
for, while he exacted from them the most rigid obedience,
he was, on his own part, keenly alive to everything they
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 255
had a right to expect from him in return, and woe befel
the commissary who failed to give a satisfactory reason
for any deficiencies in his issues."
This same author, in another book called " Adventures
in the Rifle Brigade," thus testifies to his old leader's sur-
passing excellence as a General of Division : " General
Craufurd fell on the glacis at the head of our Division,
and was buried at the foot of the breach which they so
gallantly carried. His funeral was attended by Lord
Wellington and all the officers of the Division, by whom
he was, ultimately, much liked. He had introduced a
system of discipline into the Light Division which made
them unrivalled. A very rigid exaction of the duties
pointed out in his code of regulations made him very
unpopular at its commencement ; and it was not until
a short time before he was lost to us for ever, that we
were capable of appreciating his merits, and fully sensible
of the incalculable advantages we derived from the per-
fection, of his system."
General Craufurd's Standing Orders of the Light
Division were justly famous, and have had a great effect
on the army. Sir W. Cope informs us that for fully
twenty years after the termination of the Peninsular War
every officer of the 95th Rifles was required to learn and
know these Orders. They were republished in 1844 for
the use of the army serving in Ireland ; and General and
Commanding Officers were authoritatively requested to
enforce the observance of the system therein laid down,
256 GENERAL CRAUFURD
on all occasions when circumstances should permit.
Again in the year 1880 they were republished for the use
of the Curragh Brigade by Major-General Charles Fraser,
i
a great-nephew of General Robert Craufurd. Even now,
Craufurd's celebrated Orders as to marches are much
valued in the 43rd Light Infantry.
The most elaborate and careful sketch of the character
and capacities of the old leader of the Light Division is
given us by General Sir George Napier, who certainly
knew him well. It is as follows : " Indeed, General
Craufurd was always kind to me, and ready to do me a
service, when in his power. In a day or two he breathed
his last, and thus a 'period was put to his long, faithful,
and I may add brilliant services in many instances ; for
although he was a most unpopular man, every officer in
the Light Division must acknowledge that, by his
unwearied and active exertions of mind and body, that
Division was brought to a state of discipline and know-
ledge of the duties of light troops, which never was
equalled by any Division in the British army, or surpassed
by any Division of the French army. I do not mean, or
wish to insinuate, that we were better than the others
either in physical power or courage (all Englishmen are
alike), but most unquestionably we understood our business
better, and had a better system of marching and dis-
cipline than any other Division, the proof of which is
the use the Duke of Wellington made of us during the
war. In every siege, in every battle, his despatches will
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 257
bear me out in my estimation of the services and activity
of the Light Division. Again, look at the extraordinary
number of privates from our three regiments who were
made officers, and who, the moment they joined their new
regiments, were almost without exception made Adjutants;
and the number of field officers and commanding officers
promoted from the 43rd, the 52nd, and the Rifle Corps
proves the estimation in which his Royal Highness the
Duke of York held the Division under General Craufurd's
command. And at the end of the Peninsular War, nearly
all the captains of those three regiments were majors by
brevet, having received the rank for their services on the
field of battle."
Sir George Napier's exceedingly high estimate of the
superior efficiency of the Light Division is confirmed by
a passage in his brother's " History of the War in the
Peninsula." Nearly a year after Craufurd's death, Lord
Wellington, irritated by the conduct of the army generally,
and the many crossings he had experienced during the
last campaign, gave vent to his feelings in a circular letter
addressed to the superior officers. In this letter he com-
plained that discipline had deteriorated without the men
having suffered any unusual privations, that the officers
had lost all command over their men, and that excesses,
outrages of all kinds, and inexcusable losses had occurred ;
and he added that this deplorable state of affairs was to
be traced to the habitual neglect of duty by the regi-
mental officers. Sir William Napier adds : " Nevertheless
s
258 GENERAL CRAUFURD
this circular was not strictly just, because it excepted none
from blame, though in conversation Wellington admitted
the reproach did not apply to the Light Division nor to
the Guards."
Concerning Craufurd personally Sir George Napier
goes on to say : " To give a sketch of General Craufurd's
character is neither an easy nor a pleasant task, as truth
compels me to acknowledge he had many and grave
faults. Brilliant as some of the traits of his character
were, and notwithstanding the good and generous feelings
which often burst forth like a bright gleam of sunshine
from behind a dark and heavy cloud, still there was a
sullenness which seemed to brood in his inmost soul, and
generate passions which knew no bounds.
" As a General commanding a Division of light troops
of all arms, Craufurd certainly excelled. His knowledge
of outpost duty was never exceeded by any British
General, and I much doubt if there are many in any other
service who know more of that particular branch of the
profession than he did. He had by long experience,
unwearied zeal, and constant activity, united to practice,
founded a system of discipline and marching which
arrived at such perfection that he could calculate to the
minute the time his whole Division, baggage, commis-
sariat, etc., would take to arrive at any given point, no
matter how many days' march. Every officer and soldier
knew his duty in every particular, and also knew he must
perform it. No excuse would save him from the General's
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 259
rage, if he failed in a single iota. As a Commissary he
was perfect,* and if provisions were to be got within his
possible reach, his Division never was without them. His
mental activity was only surpassed by his physical powers.
The moment his Division arrived at its ground for the
night, he never moved from his horse till he had made
himself master of every part of his post, formed his plan
for its defence, if necessary, and explained all his arrange-
ments to the staff-officers and the field-officers of each
regiment, so that, if his orders were strictly obeyed, a
surprise was impossible. He was seldom deceived in the
strength of the enemy's outposts, for he reconnoitred
them with the eye of one who knew his business well ;
and although in some few instances he got into scrapes,
it was more through vanity than anything else, as he was
so vain of the Division he commanded, that he really had
persuaded himself he might oppose it to any number of
the enemy ; and when once in action, he was obstinately
bent upon holding his ground at any risk, and in the heat
of the battle often let his temper get the better of his
judgment. The action with Marshal Ney's corps at the
Coa was a proof of this.
" I am inclined to think that, had he lived, he would
have altered his conduct in many particulars, and con-
quered in some measure the extraordinary bursts of
* This statement is confirmed by the strange exclamation of the Portu-
guese Cacadores, when they caught sight of Craufurd at Fuentes d'Onoro,
on his return to the army : " Long live General Craufurd, who takes care of
our bellies ! "
260 GENERAL CRAUFURD
passion, which knew no bounds, and were the cause of
his extreme unpopularity. But, take him altogether,
he was an active, clever man, well skilled and experienced
in his profession ; and when his reason was not obscured
by passion, few men possessed more clearness of judg-
ment, or were more inclined to act rightly. I believe
the first impulse of General Craufurd's heart was kind-
ness ; but as he never made any attempt to control his
passions, the least opposition made that kindness vanish,
and in its stead, violence, harshness, and hatred ruled
his feelings in spite of himself. But he is gone, and as
his later life was evidently much improved, and his
temper more mild 'to those under his command, we
have a right to conclude he would ere long have mastered
his passions. But as a glorious death put a period to
his career, let his faults and errors be buried with his
earthly remains. His good qualities and his gallantry
will ever live in the minds of those who served under
him in Spain."
The only important error which I am able to detect
in this long and interesting sketch of my grandfather's
character is where Sir George Napier says that he " never
made any attempt to control his passions." But what
Napier really meant was that Craufurd never made any
perceptible attempt of that sort. Sir George was a man
endowed with rare justice and nobleness of mind, and
he would have been amongst the very first to condemn
any attempt to dogmatize concerning the inner depths
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 261
of his neighbour's heart and soul. Moreover, he distinctly
tells us that his General was gradually becoming milder
in his temper ; and such moral improvement always
implies considerable effort in natures so fiery and obsti-
nate as that of the leader of the Light Division.
The interior of a great and struggling heart is always
interesting, and especially in the case of a famous leader
of men. A man's letters to the one person in the whole
world who really understands his nature adequately must
ever be full of deep moral significance. I propose there-
fore in L some measure to lift the veil which hid the
fiery spirit of Robert Craufurd from his fellow-men, and
to disclose his true character as he revealed it to his
wife. No human being could be more painfully aware
of his own besetting infirmities than my grandfather was.
Pride often showed itself in his outward bearing ; but
genuine humility reigned within. Nor was his soul un-
touched by that profound melancholy which comes to
such as have sought God early and have not found Him.
Thus before he was married, writing in the year 1799
to his intended wife, he says : " The Almighty whose
name I would not take in vain knows that I speak the
truth when I say that I feel myself unworthy of the
blessing He has bestowed upon me in giving me your
affection ; but I feel, and, with the most religious grati-
tude to my benevolent Creator, acknowledge in this a
proof (if* indeed it is true that He notices such insig-
* This terrible "if" inevitably haunts all deep spirits. This and many
262 GENERAL CRAUFURD
nificant beings as we are, and if it is possible that His
bounty should be expressly extended to so imperfect,
so little deserving a creature as myself), I acknowledge
a proof of His compassion. It appears to me as if it
was intended that the sort of storm in which, from my
own vehement disposition, the acuteness of my feelings,
the situations into which I have been thrown, and par-
ticularly the misfortunes which have been peculiarly felt
by myself as if the sort of storm in which, from these
causes, my mind has for many years past been involved,
should subside into that state of tranquil happiness, com-
posure, reflection, and confirmed piety which will make
me value my existence here, and prepare me for that
which is to come. The idea I have always formed to
myself of a future state of happiness, the only one my
capacity enables me to conceive, and consequently the
only one of which I can say without hypocrisy that I
have any real hope, is that we shall there meet those
with whom we have been united here by the ties of
sacred and virtuous affection."
It is evident from this letter that "the eternity of
the tabor" would never prove attractive to the vivid
nature of Robert Craufurd ; but to him, as to all men
blessed or cursed with extremely strong affections, a
future life seemed absolutely necessary, if human existence
was not to be reckoned a tantalizing failure.
other similar interesting problems I have carefully considered in a volume of
Essays called " Enigmas of the Spiritual Life," published by David Stott,
Oxford Street, London.
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 263
Writing to his wife in the year 1806, on the death
of her parents, my grandfather again discloses a quite
pathetic humility and also that feeling of the impossibility
or futility of moral self-formation, or righteousness for
self, which characterizes the ardently affectionate. It is
only through the influence of others that such can be
redeemed or rise to higher things. Speaking of his
wife's deceased parents, he says : " Whose absence I hope
I shall never cease to lament until the hour comes that
I am called to join them there, where, in consideration
of their virtues and yours, my own sins will, I trust, be
forgiven. Be assured that nothing can exceed my affec-
tion for you and my admiration of every part of your
character. And although this affection be sometimes
obscured by the effects of temper, yet you may be
assured that the affection is always there, as warm and
immutable in its nature and essence as the sun itself,
though sometimes covered by a cloud."
Again, in 1806, we find this strong and resolute man
of action imploring his wife, with almost tearful supplica-
tion, to exercise an unceasing moral protectorate over the
wild anarchical elements of his storm-vexed nature. He
says that he should then be happy in every respect except
for one thing, " the apprehension lest you should not
exert, by all the means which you know you possess,
that influence which it is so much for my happiness
and pleasure that you should exercise ; but my most
earnest entreaty to you is that you will do it upon every
264 GENERAL CRAUFURD
occasion. Most solemnly I declare to you that, if I was
assured that you would do so upon all occasions, I should
feel that to be the firmest basis of my happiness, because
I am quite sure that nothing can aid so much to make
me contented with myself and inoffensive to others,
nothing can tend so much to ensure my being on happy
terms with my children, as my living constantly under
your influence."
Here, as in so many other instances, we find that
heroism and genius are in some ways akin to weakness
rather than to power, that the incapacity to live upon self
or to regulate self is a distinctive mark of many of the
noblest and most ardent natures.
I think that the unveiling of Robert Craufurd's real
character (so little known to his ordinary acquaintances)
will be much assisted if I now put before my readers a
letter written by his widow to a most intimate friend
concerning her deceased husband's true internal disposition.
But I must warn all commonplace" people that to them this
admirable letter will appear very absurd. It will be under-
stood and appreciated only by those who know and realize
the baffling complexity of human nature, wherein the most
opposite elements are ever interpenetrating each other and
almost changing characters with each other ; so that in
man good and evil seem most nearly related to each other,
brethren between whom no great gulf is ever fixed in this
life. The wise and thoughtful know well that through
manifold palpable contradictions lies the way to all valu-
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 265
able truth, that it is only by freely " entertaining " those
intellectual "strangers" called paradoxes that we can
really " entertain " the veritable " angels " who bring to
us a larger revelation of the deep mysteries of man's
fathomless heart.
This letter was written more than a year after General
Craufurd's death, when the mind of his widow had grown
calm and able to estimate things clearly. Mrs. Craufurd
was a woman of a singularly serene temperament, in many
ways a great contrast to her fiery consort. And, though
I hold that nothing could well be of less moral significance
than the opinion of a silly woman, I am yet convinced
that a really wise woman often sees much deeper into
a man's heart and character than any of his fellow-men
can see. It should also be borne in mind that the friend
to whom this letter was addressed was no conventional or
commonplace person, but the heroic and ardently affec-
tionate William Campbell, whose character has been
described on page 1 14 of this volume. This great soldier
had now become a Major.
To this sympathizing friend Mrs. Craufurd wrote the
following letter
" Knightsbridge, February 10, 1813.
" MY DEAR SIR,
" You promised me the indulgence of listening
to me when I addressed you, and have said that you would
answer any questions I might wish to ask concerning my
266 GENERAL CRAUFURD
most dearly loved husband, You can hardly know how
great a comfort I feel it. The thoughts of him are all
that really interest my heart, and after a day of exertion
in endeavouring to perform the duties that are, in so
peculiar a manner, required from me to my dearest
children, and in wearing that cheerful appearance which
is due to the kindness of my friends, I feel it an unspeak-
able consolation, when sitting over my fire in the evening,
to express some of the thoughts that engage me, to one
who feels so true an interest in the subject of them.
" It has occurred to me to endeavour to retrace to you
some features of his exalted mind which may have escaped
your observation ; for though you did admire and value
him, you could not be so acquainted with him as I was.
"That he was a hero you know that he has proved,
too fatally alas ! to the whole world ; but do you know
that to the most exalted heroism he united more than a
woman's tenderness ? He had a tear for every human
woe, a heart of sympathy for every sorrow. As a husband
and a father I dare not speak of him. Such, and so
unutterable was his fondness, his devotion, that in mourn-
ing his separation from me, I often check a rising spirit
of repining, by a conscious sense that I would not ex-
change my present lot with that of any human being ; so
much more valuable do I feel to be the remembrance of
having been loved as I was loved by him, than the posses-
sion of any other blessing my heart could have known.
"With all his superiority of talents he had not one
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 267
particle of arrogance ; and who so quick to observe and
ready to allow the merit of others ? With so high a spirit
as his, he could not but take fire at the bare imagination
of injustice ; but how forgiving he was ! and when he
found himself in error, how candid in acknowledging it !
" During the last few weeks he ever spent with me he
gave a memorable instance of forbearance. On his arrival
he went, with open arms and full of cordial feelings, to one
who should have been his friend. He was received by him
with a hard-hearted cruelty for which he had not given
even the shadow of a provocation ; and all that could be
done to embitter the few moments he was allowed to
devote to his home, was done. You may suppose how
indignant / felt, and how k hurt to see him so wounded.
But never shall I forget the benevolent sweetness with
which he reproved me, when I expressed myself on the
subject. ' My dear Fanny,' he said, ' it is all very true, but
he is unfortunate,' and a tear started from his eye. That
the person was unfortunate from his own misconduct never
appeared to be remembered by Robert ; and although
persecuted more cruelly than you can imagine, or I am
at liberty to tell you, to almost the last hour of his stay,
yet this one sentiment, ' he is unfortunate,' so predominated
and so blinded him to all resentment, that he kept firm in
the resolution to leave no effort to serve him untried, and
in fact did make every exertion in his power for this
purpose. Oh, how much I could write, and how much
I should still have to say !
268 GENERAL CRAUFURD
" I do not complain of his having been taken from me.
It is a hard world, and he had so much feeling to contend
with. The bitter strokes that had assaulted him he bore
with his own noble fortitude, and with a submission to the
will of Providence the most absolute I ever saw ; but he
felt them with a poignancy proportionate to the ardour of
his nature. His sufferings had been great and many, and
he was sometimes almost borne down by them.
"Of his generosity, his complete disinterestedness,
and of the social qualities with which nature had endowed
him, you must have had proof, and must have observed
how, after a day of laborious exertion, and with what
peculiar felicity he would receive and diffuse around him
amusement from the most trivial circumstances. He was
always first to promote the pleasures of others, and to
enter into them himself with real zest. Of his children
he was the chosen playmate, participating in their little
games as if he had been one of them. But here the scene
comes too home, and I have not courage to retrace to you
the thousand anecdotes, characteristic of his affectionate
sympathy in the pleasures of his little ones, which crowd
into my mind.
"I hasten to the questions I wish to ask you, and which
I beg you to answer candidly on reading them, as if to
yourself. After his last return to the army how were his
spirits ? Was he greatly occupied by his military duties,
and at other times cheerful ? or did the thoughts of home
press heavily on him ? Do you think, had I gone to
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 269
Lisbon the last autumn, he could have passed any part
of it with me? Did he ever express regret that I was
not there ? Were you near him when he was wounded ?
or how soon afterwards did you get to him? I know
how unremittingly you watched beside him to the last ;
but I want to know how soon he had the comfort of your
presence, and who took charge of him during the first
fatal moments.
" Farewell, my dear Sir, and may God protect you.
When you write, pray mention your health ; for I thought
you still looking very ill when I saw you last, and I am
anxious to find that you do not suffer from returning to
the army so soon after your severe indisposition.
" I am ever,
" Your very faithful friend,
" M. F. CRAUFURD."
This portrayal of " the stern Craufurd," the rigid
disciplinarian, who was prepared to flog any number of
his soldiers rather than permit discipline to be relaxed,
will seem to some false and unnatural. Doubtless, the
picture is here and there touched with the bright hues of
the dawning ideal rather than with the glimmering light
and changing colours of the fitful and stormy actual. But
so it must ever be with all adequate portrayals of vivid
natures. In their higher moments rather than in their
ordinary days the true meaning of their hearts and the
veritable raisons d'etre of their spirits are best revealed.
270 GENERAL CRAUFURD
Moreover, in the case of General Craufurd it must be
distinctly remembered that though hasty and passionate
in temper, he certainly was never cruel. Like other
Generals of that day, he used punishments to the men
which we now consider barbarous ; but they were not
thought so at that time, and one of his own soldiers,
Edward Costello, has borne witness that the General was
always "averse to punishment." Many a humane judge
in those days was obliged to sentence men to be hanged
for sheep-stealing. In the long run also Craufurd's soldiers
derived more benefit and comfort than suffering from his
wonderfully vigilant discipline ; otherwise they would
not have become " devotedly attached to him," as Captain
Kincaid has declared that they did become.
Lord Wellington appears to have taken a considerable
time in making up his mind as to who should be General
Craufurd's successor. During the siege and storming of
Badajoz the command of the Light Division had been
held by Lieutenant-Colonel Barnard, of the 95th Rifle
Corps, who conducted it with great ability through all
its arduous work. Later on, the command was given to
Major-General Baron * Charles Alten, who had served a
good deal with Craufurd. He was a very active and
efficient officer, more generally popular than Robert
Craufurd, but not endowed with such a striking per-
sonality or such remarkable abilities. Sir William Napier,
* I find this leader sometimes designated Baron Alten and sometimes Count
Alten.
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 271
for some reason, appears to have disliked Baron Alten ;
for he refused to subscribe in order to present this General
with a sword of honour, at the termination of the war.
And now I have come to the end of my narrative, and
with real regret I must take farewell of the glorious old
Light Division, consoled in part by the knowledge that in
recent times I have formed an intimate friendship with its
senior regiment, the 43rd Light Infantry, and also with a
large number of the men and some few of the officers of
the famous 52nd.
I would fain follow the career of the Division after the
death of its old leader, even until Lord Wellington took
a last look at its collective British regiments near the
suburbs of Bordeaux in June, 1814. The great Com-
mander departed amidst Joud cheers of officers and men,
some of whom had followed him in so many successful
campaigns. Yet his feelings must have been full of sad-
ness and regret ; for then was dispersed and broken up,
never to come together again, the very finest Division of
Light Infantry that the British army ever produced. The
story that when, at Waterloo, some part of the line was
terribly pressed, Wellington exclaimed, "Send the 43rd
there,' 5 seems well authenticated ; but the forgetfulness
implied in this order is so unlike the great Commander
that I hesitate to believe it, though he, like Robert
Craufurd, held habitually the very highest opinion of that
splendid regiment, which then, alas ! was far away from
the battle-field of Waterloo. However, the Riflemen were
272 GENERAL CRAUFURD
there, bold and enterprising as in the days of old, and the
52nd added to, though they could never surpass, their
heroic achievements in earlier years.
To me personally it must ever be a source of pro-
foundest gratification to feel persuaded, as I do feel, that
the assertion of Cole, in his " Distinguished Peninsular
Generals," remains a solid truth : " While memorials of
the war in the Peninsula exist, the name of Robert
Craufurd will be for ever identified with this noble body
of troops," i.e. 43rd, 52nd, and the 95th Rifles. In helping
to look after the men now serving in the 43rd and 52nd *
I have always felt a peculiar affection for them, as if it
were my natural and inherited privilege to help them in a
really fraternal way, as though they were the descendants
of the soldiers who served under my grandfather, and so
in a spiritual sense bound to me by strongest ties of
kinship and unfading memories of the grandest heroism.
And, being naturally interested in the men, I greatly
rejoice to know that the hearts of many of these soldiers
have been opened to me, that I have done all I could to
help, console, and cheer them, and that I have gained the
affection of many of them.
I have often wished that General Craufurd had lived
to see the splendid services of his Division at Badajoz,
even though he should have died directly afterwards.
* Owing to the present arrangement of linked battalions, many of the
43rd soldiers whom I knew best are now serving in the 52nd. The present
system is hated by the men, is exceedingly uncomfortable, and almost fatal to
esprit de corps.
AND HIS LIGHT DIVISION. 273
His aide-de-camp " the intrepid Shaw " was there, and,
as Napier tells us, displayed "inexpressible coolness."
Napier is never so graphic and so enthusiastic as in
describing the glories of Badajoz. Great were the
achievements and sad the losses of the Light Division on
that occasion. The historian says, " And how deadly the
breach strife was may be gathered from this ; the 43rd
and 5 2nd Regiments lost more men than the seven
regiments of the 3rd Division engaged at the Castle."
" Who shall do justice to the bravery of the British soldiers,
the noble emulation of the officers ! Who shall measure
out the glory of Ridge, of Macleod, of Nicholas, of O'Harc
of the 95th, who perished on the breach at the head of
the stormers, and with him nearly all the volunteers for
that desperate service ! Who shall describe the springing
valour of that Portuguese Grenadier who was killed the
foremost man at the Santa Maria ? or the martial fury of
that desperate rifleman who, in his resolution to win,
thrust himself beneath the chained sword-blades, and
there suffered the enemy to dash his head to pieces with
the ends of their muskets ! Who can sufficiently honour
the intrepidity of Walker, of Shaw, of Canch, or the
hardiness of Ferguson of the 43rd, who, having in former
assaults received two deep wounds, was here, his former
wounds still open, leading the stormers of his regiment,
the third time a volunteer, the third time wounded ! "
But the fiery spirit of Robert Craufurd had then gone
to its rest. The Light Division went on its conquering
T
274 GENERAL CRAUFURD.
way under another leader; but the genius and the
methods of its old leader were with it even unto the end.
The Division produced many other famous officers, con-
spicuous amongst whom was Colborne, Lord Seaton.
Still, I think all careful and candid students of military
history must agree in holding that Craufurd never really
had any perfectly adequate successor. Amidst a crowd
of heroes associated with the undying glories of the
Light Division, three brilliant personalities must ever
appear most dominant and most characteristic. Amongst
many illustrious names connected with that famous corps,
three names must always remain the greatest and most
distinctive of all, the names of John Moore, Robert
Craufurd, and William Napier. The first of these trained
the Division with far-seeing sagacity and wisest methods
principally in days of peace ; the second trained it in time
of war, and communicated to it much of his own bound-
less activity and wonderful rapidity both of perception
and of movement ; the third served it with admirable
power, and then wrote its splendid annals with a fire, an
energy, a fulness of knowledge, and a picturesqueness of
language unsurpassed by any military historian through-
out the long ages of the world,
APPENDIX.
ADDITIONAL LETTERS, ANECDOTES, ETC
THE following letter was addressed by Sir Morton Eden (the
first Lord Henley), the diplomatist, to Robert Craufurd in the
year 1795, when he was serving with his brother Charles on a
military mission to the Austrian armies. Then, as on so many
other occasions, the well-known slowness of the Austrian military
authorities was acting in a very prejudicial manner for the
interests of Europe.
"Vienna, Monday, September 7, 1795.
"MY DEAR SIR,
"I avail myself of an opportunity offered by the
return to the army of Count Dietrichstein to acknowledge the
receipt of your letter of the 2 9th past, by express, which reached
me last night.
" I feel most sensibly all the mischiefs that arise to the
common cause from the inaction of the Austrian army, which I
am convinced has, moreover, done more prejudice to the interests
of this Court in the Empire than the loss of a battle. My repre-
sentations, consequently, to bring them to act offensively on any
point and in any manner that they may deem to be the most
likely to produce success, are unremitting. That they intend
immediately to commence offensive operations, the appointment
276 APPENDIX.
of a man of General Wurmser's decided character to so great a
separate command (which has given very particular satisfaction
to the King's ministers), and the opinions which I know he has
expressed since his arrival at Fribourg, with the preparations
making for the passage of the Rhine, furnish, independently of
the most solemn assurances to that effect, just grounds to expect.
" The passage through the territory of Basil may militarily
be a very wise measure, though exclusively of all political con-
siderations, it would in its execution become a very hazardous
one, if there be in that part of the country any denies where a
handful of men might stop the progress of an army. I will take
a very early opportunity of insinuating it here, but with that
delicacy which you must feel is necessary as well towards this
Ministry as the Commander-in-chief; and be assured that I shall
at all times be happy to receive from you any suggestions that
you think can promote our common views.
"We understand here that the troops, magazines, artillery,
etc., are all drawing to a centre for the purpose of attempting the
passage. Of this you are able to give Lord Grenville more ac-
curate information than I can do.
" I have the honor to be, with great and unfeigned regard,
" Ever, my dear Sir,
"Your most faithful humble servant,
"MORTON EDEN."
General Robert Craufurd, as well as his brother, General Sir
Charles, seems to have been favoured with the steadfast friend-
ship of His Royal Highness the Duke of Kent. For at the end
of January, 1820, just after the death of the Duke of Kent, the
Duchess of Newcastle (wife of Sir Charles Craufurd) makes the
following remarks in a letter addressed to her sister-in-law,
the widow of General Robert Craufurd, who also seems to have
APPENDIX. 277
known His Royal Highness very well : " We thank you for so
kindly complying with our anxious wish to have the earliest and
most authentic details of the poor Duke of Kent, but fear the
last you sent must have been very distressing to you. His in-
variable friendship for the General, and his having been quite
like a father to my poor Pelham, when he was for two years in
his family at Gibraltar, can now be remembered by us but with
the greatest gratitude, and gave us an interest in his illness
beyond that of most people, though he is so much and generally
regretted. . . . You gratified us beyond expression, my dear
Fanny, by the account of the Christian manner in which the
Duke of Kent's last hours were past. There were persons before
who cast reflections on him in some respects ; but who shall say
now that he was not a good man, and one who, had he lived,
would have set the best example ? He, so suddenly called to
appear before our great Judge, was perfectly prepared. Did
you know that the Regent had written the most affectionate and
most anxious of letters to his brother, to whom it was of the
most essential comfort, as assuring him that the Regent was in
brotherly affection towards him (though some disagreeable things
had passed previously), and that his widow and child would find
from the Regent the kindest protection? Poor souls, they
need it."
I will now give a few more extracts from "The Adventures
of a Soldier," by Edward Costello, a non-commissioned officer of
the 95th Rifles, and afterwards a Captain in the British Legion.
He writes thus favourably of one of his own officers : " The
Honourable Captain Pakenham was a brother-in-law of the Duke
of Wellington. This gentleman, who belonged to my regiment,
was very much beloved by us all. On every occasion, when the
fresh arrival of necessaries, meat, wine, etc., brought the men in
278 APPENDIX.
crowds about the stores, he invariably would abide his turn, and,
as though he were one of ourselves, oblige every new comer,
whatever his rank, to submit to the same. This, though mere
justice, for its rare occurrence with the other officers, was never
forgotten by the men."
Costello confirms the truth of the stories so often told as to
the way in which French and English soldiers fraternized, when
not engaged in actual fighting. " All this time, and for a great
part of that in which we were quartered here, a, very friendly
intercourse was carried on between the French and ourselves.
We frequently met them bathing in the Rio Mayor, and would as
often have swimming and even jumping matches. In these games,
however, we mostly beat them ; but that was attributed perhaps
to their half-starved, distressed condition. This our stolen inter-
courses soon made us awake to, until at length, touched with pity,
our men went so far as to share with them the ration biscuits
which we were regularly supplied with from England by our
shipping. Indeed, we buried all national hostility in our anxiety
to assist and relieve them. Tobacco was in great request; we
used to carry some of ours to them, while they in return would
bring us a little brandy. Their reveille was our summons as well as
theirs ; and although our old captain seldom troubled us to fall in
at the reVeille, it was not unusual to find the rear of our army
under arms and, perhaps, expecting an attack. But the captain
knew his customers ; for, though playful as lambs, we were watchful
as leopards."
Even immediately after the fierce fighting at Fuentes d'Onoro,
this strange habit of fraternizing appears to have been kept up by
the French and English soldiers. For at the termination of that
battle Costello writes as follows : " The opposing lines of sentries
were very close to each other, the French being divided from us
APPENDIX. 279
only by a narrow plank thrown across the mill-dam, which was
occupied on one side by our company, who were now on piquet.
" A blacksmith of ours, of the name of Tidy, who had erected
his forge in the old mill, was at work close by, shoeing the officers'
horses. The French sentry had crossed the plank to light his
pipe, and was standing carelessly chatting with me, when who
should I see approaching but General Craufurd, inquiring if Tidy
had shod his horse. The Frenchman's red wings soon attracted
the General's notice, and he suddenly, with his well-known stern
glance, inquired, "Who the d 1's that you're talking with,
rifleman?" I informed him the French sentry, who had come
over for a light for his pipe.
" Indeed," replied Craufurd, " let him go about his business ;
he has no right here ; nor we either," said he in a low whisper to
his aide-de-camp ; and away he walked."
Costello's dislike of the Portuguese troops has already been
shown in this work ; but the following passages make it still more
manifest : " The sanguinary nature of the Portuguese during the
whole period of the war was notorious. When crossed or excited,
nothing but the shedding of blood could allay their passion. It
was always with the greatest difficulty that we could ipreserve our
French prisoners from being butchered by them, even in cold
blood. They would hang upon the rear of a detachment with
prisoners, like so many carrion birds, waiting every opportunity
to satiate their love of vengeance, and it required all the firmness
and vigilance of our troops to keep them in check. It was well
known that even our men fell in stepping between them and the
French whom they had marked out as victims. Indeed, it was
not unfrequent for our men to suffer from the consequences of
their ferocity, and I myself, while at Vallee, had a narrow escape.
I had crossed the hills to purchase some necessaries at the quarters
of the 52nd Regiment, and on my return fell in with several of
280 APPENDIX.
the soldiers of the 3rd Cacadores. One of them, a fierce-looking
scoundrel, evinced a great inclination to quarrel, the more par-
ticularly as he perceived that I was unarmed and alone. Having
replied rather sharply to some abuse they had cast upon the
English, by reflecting on their countrymen in return, he flew into
a rage, drew his bayonet, and made a rush at me, which I avoided
by stepping aside, and tripping him head foremost on the ground.
I was in the act of seizing his bayonet, when a number of his
comrades came up, to whom he related, in exaggerated terms, the
cause of our disagreement. Before he had half concluded, a
general cry arose of " Kill the English dog ; " and the whole,
drawing their bayonets, were advancing upon me when a party of
the 52nd came up, the tables were turned, and the Cacadores fled
in all directions."
Writing concerning another occasion, this same writer says :
"The same evening Colonel Colborne, with less than two hundred
men of the 43rd, 52nd, and the Rifles, carried in the most gallant
manner a strong fort of the enemy. Prior to its being stormed,
a number of Cacadores had been ordered to take blankets to
convey away the wounded French as well as the British. But
most of those employed in this duty took advantage of it to strip
the prisoners, whom, to the number of fifty, they left almost as
naked as they were born, and exposed to all the rigours of the
inclement month of January. I was present near the tent of
General Craufurd when a talkative, smart little Frenchman,
whom I guessed to be an officer, was brought before him. The
poor fellow had nothing on but his trousers, and bled profusely
from the nose and mouth, through the blows he had received.
" The General was very chagrined at the sight, and lamented
his inability to give him clothes, his own baggage being so distant.
Tom Crawley (a private), however, who had been actively em-
ployed in hunting the Portuguese from them, immediately stepped
APPENDIX. 281
forward, and touching his hat after his own inimitable manner,
' Yer hornier,' said Tom, his eyes sparkling at being able to assist,
' I'll lend him my great-coat, if ye'll allow me.'
"Craufurd, much pleased at his frank offer, instantly
answered, 'You are very good, rifleman, let him have it;' and
Tom proceeded to strip. Meanwhile more of the Frenchmen
were marched in, many worse off than their officer. One of
them, a sergeant and a smart-looking fellow, as soon as he
perceived the officer, ran to embrace him, and leaning his head
on his shoulder, burst into tears over their mutual misery.
Captain Smith, the General's Aide-de-camp, being present,
generously pulled forth his pocket-handkerchief, and wrapped it
round the sergeant's totally naked person, till further covering
could be obtained."
Writing about the storming of Ciudad Rodrigo, Costello says,
" Regardless of the enemy's fire and every other impediment, the
men dashed in over the breach, carrying everything before them.
I had got up among the first, and was struggling with a crowd
of our fellows to push over the splintered and broken wall that
formed the breach, when Major (George) Napier, who was by my
side encouraging on the men, received a shot, and staggering
back, would in all probability have fallen into the trench, had I
not caught him. To my brief inquiry if he were badly hurt,
he squeezed my hand, whilst his other arm hung shattered by
his side, saying, ' Never mind me, push on, my lads, the town is
ours.' "
This anecdote is thoroughly characteristic of that brave,
noble-minded and unselfish officer, Sir George Napier, in whom
General Robert Craufurd always placed such firm trust.
Costello says further, " There is no doubt but Wilkie, Major
Napier, and indeed several others in advance, fell by the fire of
the Portuguese, who, being panic-struck by the first volley they
282 APPENDIX.
received from the town, instantly lay down on the glacis, and
commenced firing on the breach; a random shot through the
embrasure deprived my friend (Wilkie) of life."
I fancy that this writer has a little exaggerated the demerits
of the Portuguese, though General Craufurd also appears at first
to have thought very little of them ; for Wellington says in a
letter to him, " I hope you will find the Portuguese Cacadores
better than you expect."
Speaking of a later period about the time of the siege of
San Sebastian Costello gives us a very curious bit of infor-
mation. "It was about this time that those men of the 52nd
who were fortunate enough to have survived the ' forlorn hope '
of Rodrigo and Badajoz, were distinguished with a badge of
laurel on the right arm. It was given by their commanding
officer as a testimonial of their gallant conduct, which was
expressed by the two letters V. S. or valiant stormer, placed
beneath: the wreath. Why the men of our battalion (of the 95th
Rifles) and those of the 43rd, who had equally distinguished
themselves on those occasions, were not similarly honoured, I
know not."
This information is very interesting as well as strange. It
shows in a marked way the intense sympathy and pride which
that great soldier John Colborne, Colonel of the 52nd (afterwards
Lord Seaton), always felt for the men of his glorious regiment.
But I know well that General Craufurd always considered his
Riflemen who had been with him in so many hours of
marvellous peril and adventure and the men of the old 43rd
quite on an equality with the heroes of the 52nd. Colonel
Macleod, of the 43rd, very greatly disliked Robert Craufurd;
yet he testifies that the General always liked the regiment.
I will conclude my almost unending extracts from the work
of my grandfather's gallant Rifleman to whom I am so greatly
APPENDIX. 283
indebted in compiling this record with one truly pathetic and
tragical story. It was told to Costello by a Corporal Henley, of
the i4th Light Dragoons, a regiment which Craufurd very
highly valued, and which our Rifleman designates as " that
gallant and highly distinguished regiment." " I must here
relate," continued Henley, with deep emotion, "an event which
at the time filled all who were present with a sorrow which
indeed I shall never forget. General Slade, observing the
numerous cavalry against which his Brigade had to contend,
advised the officer in command not to allow their ranks to be
weakened by conducting prisoners to the rear, but, after
disarming them, to let them proceed of their own accord. It
was not uncommon, therefore, to observe groups of French
dragoons riding quietly to the rear, looking for any one to take
them in charge. It happened that a hussar of the 3rd Germans,
having taken a prisoner, ordered him to fall back also. The
latter, having ridden some little distance as directed, suddenly
applied both spurs to his horse, making a detour to his regiment.
The German, observing this, as quickly pursued, and, upon
closing with him, fired his pistol, and the dragoon fell dead from
his horse.
" The hussar, having secured the Frenchman's rein, conveyed
him some little distance to the rear, and proceeded to take off his
valise, when, overhauling the contents, he discovered a letter
from his father, on reading which, he found that it was his own
brother who had fallen by his hands. Stupefied with horror,
he sat motionless and speechless on his horse for some minutes,
when he exclaimed, the big tears rolling down his veteran cheek,
1 The King has commanded, and my God will forgive me,' at
the same time applying his spurs, he rushed headlong into the
battle.
" A few days after, meeting a patrole of the same regiment
284 APPENDIX.
near Gallegos, inquiry was made respecting our unfortunate
hussar, when we were informed that he too had that day been
numbered with the dead, not far from the corpse of his
brother."
Poor soldier ! Kingly commands and even divine forgiveness
could not really avail to heal the grievous wounds of self-reproach
and sorrowing affection. To noble natures led into transient
errors quite alien to their true character, the most difficult thing
of all is ^//"-forgiveness.
Consequently, though the first duty of a soldier is unquestion-
ably obedience, it cannot be so in civilian life. There the in-
dividual conscience must be our highest guide, and must often
lead to apparent rebellion against authority. This is well illus-
trated by a story told of one of General Craufurd's ancestors, a
certain Kennedy of Drummellane, an Ayrshire laird in the old
days. He was called upon to assist Claverhouse and his party in
hunting down the Covenanters. But, though opposed to the
Covenanters, he refused to join in persecuting them. As the
story tells us, " The laird proudly replied, that he would serve his
King in the field, but would not be his executioner."
The tragical misfortune of the German Hussar happened at
Fuentes d'Onoro, where Lord Wellington was so badly off for
cavalry.
In a work called "A Narrative" of Events in the South of
France," by Captain Cooke of the 43rd Light Infantry, who served
in the Peninsular War from the year 1811, we find some apparent
corroboration of Lord Wolseley's statement that Wellington never
gained the affection of his soldiers. " I know that it has been
said that Wellington was unpopular with the army. The question
now is, with what part of the army, those actually carrying arms
or the absentees ? Now I can assert with respect to the Light
Division that the troops rather liked Wellington than otherwise.
APPENDIX. 285
The soldiers would exclaim in the ranks, ' Oh, here he comes.' "
..." Although Wellington was not what may be called popular,
still the troops possessed great confidence in him, nor did I ever
hear a single individual express an opinion to the contrary. And
yet, singular as it may appear, although the troops were glad to see
him, and when ordered on to the attack, threw on their knapsacks
with intrepid alacrity, yet I never for a moment heard his absence
regretted, or a single soldier express the least anxiety at the want
of his presence in any onset that I ever saw made, from the
storming of a field-work to the assault of a breach, or even on
the eve of a great battle."
I do not think that these somewhat depreciatory reflections
of Captain Cooke have much real significance. The Commander-
in-chief would, in the nature of things, seem to the soldiers at the
time being of less importance to them than the officers more
immediately in command of them. The average private would
naturally look for guidance to the subordinate officers whom
he knew well personally, and not to the comparatively far-oft
superintendence of the presiding genius. That the officers, on
very many occasions, sorely missed the direct instructions of the
great chief is abundantly manifest.
This Captain Cooke 'goes on to say, " Let it be clearly under-
stood that when I assume to talk upon the popularity of the Duke
of Wellington with the army at large, I do so with the military
pen, well knowing that popularity has nothing to do with military
discipline, nor indeed is needful for one of his Majesty's Lieu-
tenants or Generals to possess in the command of an army ; his
soldiers being only living instruments placed at his disposal by a
superior power, to be employed in whatever manner may be most
conducive to the honour and welfare of the country."
Lord Wolseley would, no doubt, very greatly disagree with the
views expressed by Captain Cooke in this last passage, and in so
286 APPENDIX.
disagreeing he would have the whole teaching of military history
on his side. The career of Sir John Moore was a living and
striking refutation of Cooke's ridiculous assertion that " popularity
has nothing to do with military discipline ; " and I think it is also
manifest that the "popularity" which Robert Craufurd obtained
amongst the men, owing to his unceasing care for their wants,
made his soldiers far more willing to submit to his extraordinarily
rigid discipline than they would otherwise have been.
It seems to me that all really thoughtful and intelligent people
must agree with Lrd Wolseley in holding that the capacity for
gaining the affection of the soldiers is one great attribute of
military genius. And yet I am perfectly convinced that Lord
Wolseley is wrong in denying to Wellington the possession of
great military genius, on the ground that he was never loved by
his men. I believe that ' the truth really is that Wellington had
not the usual temperament of genius, and that he was lacking in
some of its most attractive and brilliant attributes, whilst yet
possessing substantially those high and very rare capacities for
war which may certainly claim to be called genius. Wellington
had not the fervour of nature which usually characterizes inspired
men in almost every department of intellectual and moral great-
ness. His personality was unquestionably a far less striking one
than that of Napoleon or Hannibal. His temperament was not
suited to evoke enthusiastic attachment. It was more in harmony
with the spirit of the eighteenth century philosophy, which
shunned enthusiasm as a vice, than with our modern thought,
which regards it as the very source and fountain of all true good-
ness and of all true religion. The highest and grandest of all
mental faculties is that imperial one called imagination, and this
was in Wellington extremely fettered and restricted in its range.
That he had that kind of imagination which is necessary in order
to guess at or divine the intentions of a subtle enemy in war,
APPENDIX. 287
cannot be reasonably doubted ; but he never displayed the faintest
traces of any other sort of imaginative power.
Yet, on the other hand, the very fact which Lord Wolseley
adduces as fatal to Wellington's pretensions to high military genius,
is in some ways calculated to enhance our sense of his vast capacity
for war. The very fact that this great Commander was able to
accomplish such splendid results in the face of almost overwhelm-
ing difficulties, without that great advantage which arises from the
power of attracting the enthusiastic affection of the soldiers, does
but show the more plainly his genuine intellectual greatness. He
was able to do without a kind of help which is commonly deemed
essentially necessary to success in war.
Emerson said of the greatest of all German writers, " Goethe
can never be dear to mankind ; " and doubtless the remark is
true. And we might say the same of the greatest of all British
Generals. A certain coldness of temperament marred to some
extent the splendid qualities of these two widely different kings
of men. Yet in both cases alike, the very fact that the intellect
had, to a considerable extent, to do the work of the heart as well
as its own proper work, tended to develop certain phases of
mental power, and thus to vindicate and assert the possession of
true genius, even whilst limiting its influence. Fervour of nature
is a glorious power, but genius sometimes exists without it. The
intellect sometimes appears to grow all the stronger because it
eats up the rations of the heart as well as its own.
General Craufurd had, of course, a far more intimate know-
ledge of Wellington in war than Lord Wolseley can have. And
I know for certain that the leader of the Light Division always
had the very highest admiration of the military genius of his
great chief, though I know equally well that to " the fiery Robert
Craufurd " Wellington often seemed somewhat cold-hearted and
deficient in geniality and other attractive qualities of human nature.
288 APPENDIX.
The following description of the different qualities of the
regiments composing the Light Division was written by Captain
Cooke, of the 43rd Light Infantry, and is very interesting : " This
was the last of the Light Division. The separation now came.
Though amongst the regiments which composed it there existed
an unanimity which was almost without a parallel in war, yet there
was a shade of difference between them, a something peculiar to
each corps, distinguishing it from all the others ; which was the
more remarkable as amongst them there was a sort of fraternal
compact, and it has occurred that three brothers held commissions
at the same time in the 43rd, 52nd, and the Rifle Corps.
" The 43rd were a gay set, the dandies of the army, the great
encoura.gers of dramatic performances, dinner parties, and balls,
of which their head-quarters was the pivot.
" The 52nd were highly gentlemanly men, of a steady aspect ;
they mixed little with other corps, but attended the theatricals
of the 43rd with circumspect good-humour, and now and then
relaxed, but were soon again the 52nd.
" The Rifle Corps were skirmishers in every sense of the word,
a sort of wild, sportsmen, and up to every description of fun
and good-humour ; nought came amiss ; the very trees responded
to their merriment, and scraps of their sarcastic rhymes passed
current through all the camps and bivouacs.
" In this way the brothers of the three regiments met together,
each being the very type of the corps to which he belonged.
Amongst them are to be enumerated the Napiers, the Maddens,
the Booths, the Rowans, the Whichcotes, the Maynes, the Dobbs,
the Patricksons, the Harvests, and others. And before we take
our farewell, I may affirm that, although these troops were bound
together by an iron code of discipline, no Roman tribune could
ever boast of more camp orators, nor was there any fraternity that
ever lived in happier independence when off duty."
APPENDIX. 289
It may interest some of my readers to be reminded that these
famous regiments have never entirely parted from each other, but
remain permanently honorary members of each others' messes.
Perhaps, also, I may be permitted to remark that the 52nd is still
supposed to be characterized by its old gentlemanly sedateness.
Captain Cooke of the 4$rd also tells us, in his work just
quoted, that "The eight British Divisions, during the war in the
south of Europe, were known by the names of the Generals who
usually commanded them, such as ' Graham's Division,' ' Hill's
Division,' ' Picton's Division,' ' Cole's Division,' and { Craufurd's
Division.' "
It may gratify some of my readers to know that an appreci-
ative, though brief, sketch of the career of the heroic Sir T.
Sydney Beckwith is to be found in the ' ' Dictionary of National
Biography," edited by Mr. Leslie Stephen. The writer of Beck-
with's life in this work justly says concerning him : " He, with
Craufurd, shares the honour of being one of the finest leaders of
light troops ever known."
Craufurd and Beckwith were staunch friends. In my grand-
father's last letter to his wife written a week before he was
fatally wounded he says that Beckwith had managed to procure
some greyhounds for him. As I have before observed, the leader
of the Light Division trusted this famous soldier more than any
other Colonel serving under him. And there is no doubt that
Beckwith was the greatest officer that the 95th Rifles ever pro-
duced, an ideal hero, of whom the Rifle Brigade ought for ever
to be proud. He was simply adored by the soldiers serving
under him.
Though very many of our most valiant soldiers in the Penin-
sular War were Irish, Sir James Shaw Kennedy tells us in his
diary of General Craufurd's outpost operations in 1810 that a
considerable number of Irishmen served against our country
U
290 APPENDIX.
systematically in the ranks of the French. This writer says that
at the beginning of July, 1810, " a sergeant who deserted from the
enemy's Irish Brigade " gave information that the Irish Brigade
was then in Junot's corps, that it was commanded by General
Torny, and that the Brigade had two battalions with about three
hundred and fifty men in each, and that the yoth (French)
Regiment was brigaded with it.
General Sir James Shaw Kennedy evidently thought that his
old leader (Craufurd) was, to say the very least, fully equal to
Marshal Soult in his knowledge of outpost work. In a long
letter addressed to Lord Frederick Fitzclarence in the year 1850,
this experienced veteran says : " Your Lordship mentions having
been with the French army three years ago, and having found
their instruction very perfect in all that regards outpost duty.
I suppose that at the time you allude to (three years ago) they
were regulated in this respect by what is ordered in the paragraphs
from 8 1 to 97 inclusive of the Ordonnance of 1832, " Sur le
service des Armees en campagne," issued by Marshal Soult ; which
regulation seems to be very good, and yet not to contain even
all that was adopted by General Craufurd in the Light Division,
and not much that was not adopted by him."
Even the experience gained in many years subsequent to
Robert Craufurd's death seems to have scarcely enabled Marshal
Soult to surpass that wonderful knowledge of outpost work which,
together with their matchless discipline, made the soldiers of the
Light Division, in its palmy days, superior, as regards some of
the most hazardous operations of war, to any troops produced by
any other nation throughout the world's long history of brilliant
and heroic contests.
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