Lieutenant General Jubal Anderson Early, C.S.A. Autobiographical sketch and narrative of the war between the states

Lieutenant General

Jubal Anderson Early

C. S. A.

GENERAL JUHAL ANDERSON EARLY

Lieutenant General

Jubal Anderson Early

\*J* O. A.

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH AND NARRA
TIVE OF THE WAR BETWEEN THE STATES

With Notes by

R. H. Early

Philadelphia & London

J. B. Lippincott Company

1912

COPYRIGHT, 1912, BY J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY

PUBLISHED NOVEMBER, 1912

PRINTED BY J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY

AT THE WASHINGTON SQUARE PRESS

PHILADELPHIA, U.S.A.

EDITOR'S NOTE

IT becomes my duty and privilege to undertake the
publication of General Early 's narrative of the war left
in manuscript form at the time of his death, March 2,
1894. Its preparation covered the term of years begin
ning immediately after the close of the war and continu
ing to the end of his life. Impressed with the belief
that " truth crushed to earth will rise again," he labored
conscientiously at his task, the motive of his writing be
ing the wish that a detailed history, accurate as far as
lay within his compassing, might be handed down to
posterity. He was well equipped for the work under
taken and his efforts met with the encouragement of his
former comrades. In submitting to the public the result
of his long labor, I feel confident of its being accorded the
just consideration for which he strove.

B. H. EARLY
LYNCHBURG, VA.
June, 1912

257715

PREFACE

WHEN the question of practical secession from the
United States arose, as a citizen of the State of Virginia,
and a member of the Convention called by the authority
of the Legislature of that State, I opposed secession with
all the ability I possessed, with the hope that the horrors
of civil war might be averted and that a returning sense
of justice on the part of the masses of the Northern
States would induce them to respect the rights of the
people of the South.

While some Northern politicians and editors were
openly and sedulously justifying and encouraging seces
sion, I was laboring honestly and earnestly to preserve
the Union.

As a member of the Virginia Convention, I voted
against the ordinance of secession on its passage by that
body, with the hope that even then, the collision of arms
might be avoided and some satisfactory adjustment ar
rived at. The adoption of that ordinance wrung from
me bitter tears of grief ; but I at once recognized my duty
to abide the decision of my native State, and to defend
her soil against invasion. Any scruples which I may
have entertained as to the right of secession were soon
dispelled by the unconstitutional measures of the authori
ties at Washington and the frenzied clamor of the peo
ple of the North for war upon their former brethren of
the South. I recognized the right of resistance and revo
lution as exercised by our fathers in 1776 and without
cavil as to the name by which it was called, I entered
the military service of my State, willingly, cheerfully,
and zealously.

When the State of Virginia became one of the Con
federate States and her troops were turned over to the
Confederate Government, I embraced the cause of the

PREFACE

whole Confederacy with equal ardor, and continued in
the service, with the determination to devote all the
energy and talent I possessed to the common defence.
I fought through the entire war, without once regretting
the course I pursued, with an abiding faith in the jus
tice of our cause.

It was my fortune to participate in most of the great
military operations in which the army in Virginia was
engaged both before and after General Lee assumed the
command. In the last year of this momentous struggle,
I commanded, at different times, a division and two corps
of General Lee's Army in the campaign from the Eap-
idan to James Elver, and subsequently, a separate force
which marched into Maryland, threatened Washington
City and then went through an eventful campaign in
the valley of Virginia. No detailed reports of the oper
ations of these different commands were made before the
close of the war and the campaign in Maryland and the
Valley of Virginia has been the subject of much com
ment and misapprehension. I have now written a narra
tive of all my commands before and during the closing
year of the war and lay it before the world as a contribu
tion to the history of our great struggle for indepen
dence. In giving that narrative, I have made such state
ments of the positions and strengths of the opposing
forces in Virginia and such reference to their general
operations as were necessary to enable the reader to
understand it, but I do not pretend to detail the opera
tions of other commanders.

My operations and my campaign stand on their own
merits. And in what I have found it necessary to say in
regard to the conduct of my troops, I do not wish to be
understood as, in any way, decrying the soldiers who con
stituted the rank and file of my commands. I believe
that the world has never produced a body of men su
perior, in courage, patriotism, and endurance, to the
private soldiers of the Confederate armies. I have re
peatedly seen those soldiers submit, with cheerfulness,

PREFACE

to privations and hardships which would appear to be
almost incredible; and the wild cheers of our brave men,
when their thin lines were sent back opposing hosts of
Federal troops, staggering, reeling and flying, have often
thrilled every fibre in my heart. I have seen, with my own
eyes, ragged, barefooted, and hungry Confederate sol
diers perform deeds which, if performed in days of yore
by mailed warriors in glittering armor, would have in
spired the harp of the minstrel and the pen of the poet.

Having been a witness of and participant in great
events, I have given a statement of what I saw and did,
for the use of the future historian. I have not under
taken to speculate as to the causes of our failures, as
I have seen abundant reason for it in the tremendous
odds brought against us. Having had some means of
judging, I will say that, in my opinion, both Mr. Davis
and General Lee, in their respective spheres, did all
for the success of our cause which it was possible for
mortal men to do and it is a great privilege and com
fort for me so to believe. In regard to my own services,
I have the consciousness of having done my duty to my
country, to the very best of my ability.

During the war, slavery was used as a catch-word
to arouse the passions of a fanatical mob, and to some
extent the prejudices of the civilized world were ex
cited against us ; but the war was not made on our part
for slavery. High dignitaries in both church and state
in Old England, and puritans in New England, had par
ticipated in the profits of a trade by which the ignorant
and barbarous natives of Africa were brought from that
country and sold into slavery in the American Colonies.
The generation in the Southern States which defended
their country in the late war, found amongst them, in a
civilized and Christianized condition, 4,000,000 of the
descendants of those degraded Africans. The Creator
of the Universe had stamped them, indelibly, with a
different color and an inferior physical and mental or
ganization. He had not done this from mere caprice

ix

PREFACE

or whim, but for wise purposes. An amalgamation of
the races was in contravention of His designs or He
would not have made them so different. This immense
number of people could not have been transported back
to the wilds from which their ancestors were taken, or,
if they could have been, it would have resulted in their
relapse into barbarism. Reason, common sense, true
humanity to the black, as well as the safety of the white
race, required that the inferior race should be kept in
a state of subordination. The conditions of domestic
slavery, as it existed in the South, had not only resulted
in a great improvement in the moral and physical con
dition of the negro race, but had furnished a class of
laborers as happy and contented as any in the world,
if not more so. Their labor had not only developed the
immense resources of the immediate country in which
they were located, but was the main source of the great
prosperity of the United States, and furnished the means
for the employment of millions of the working classes in
other countries. Nevertheless, the struggle made by the
people of the South was not for the institution of slavery,
but for the inestimable right of self-government, against
the domination of a fanatical faction at the North; and
slavery was the mere occasion of the development of the
antagonism between the two sections. That right of
self-government has been lost, and slavery violently
abolished.

When the passions and infatuations of the day shall
have been dissipated by time, and all the results of the
late war shall have passed into irrevocable history, the
future chronicler of that history will have a most im
portant duty to perform, and posterity, while poring
over its pages, will be lost in wonder at the follies and
crimes committed in this generation.

Each generation of men owes the debt to posterity
to fraud down to it a correct history of the more impor
tant events that have transpired in its day. The his-

PREFACE

tory of every people is the common inheritance of man
kind, because of the lessons it teaches.

For the purposes of history, the people of the late
Confederate States were a separate people from the peo
ple of the North during the four years of conflict which
they maintained against them.

No people loving the truth of history can have any
object or motive in suppressing or mutilating any fact
which may be material to its proper elucidation.

The sole merit I claim for the narrative now given
to the public is its truthfulness. In writing it, I have
received material aid from an accurate diary kept by
Lieutenant William W. Old, aide to Major General Ed
ward Johnson, who was with me during the campaign in
Maryland and the Shenandoah Valley until August 12th,
1864; and the copious notes of Captain Jed. Hotchkiss,
who acted as Topographical Engineer for the Second
corps and the Army of the Valley District, and recorded
the events of each day from the opening of the cam
paign on the Rapidan in May, 1864, until the affair at
Waynesboro, in March, 1865.

J. A. EARLY

CONTENTS

EDITOR'S INTRODUCTORY NOTE v

PREFACE vii

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH xvii

THE INVASION OF VIRGINIA 1

FIGHT AT BLACKBURN'S FORD 6

EARLY'S BRIGADE AT MANASSAS 15

DETAILS OF THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS 31

OPERATIONS ALONG BULL RUN 47

MANOEUVRING ON THE PENINSULA 58

BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG 68

BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND 74

BATTLE OF CEDAR RUN 92

OPERATIONS ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK 104

CAPTURE OF MANASSAS JUNCTION 114

THE AFFAIR AT GROVETON 119

SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS 122

AFFAIR AT Ox HILL OR CHANTILLY 129

MOVEMENT INTO MARYLAND 134

BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM 139

PREPARATIONS ABOUT FREDERICKSBURG 162

BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG 167

OPERATIONS IN WINTER AND SPRING, 1862-63 184

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE 193

INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA 236

CAPTURE OF WINCHESTER 240

AT YORK AND WRIGHTSVILLE 253

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 266

RETREAT TO VIRGINIA 276

TREATMENT OF PRISONERS, WOUNDED AND DEAD 287

ON THE RAPIDAN 302

DEVASTATION OF THE COUNTRY 307

SKIRMISHING AT MINE RUN 319

AVERILL'S RAID AND THE WINTER CAMPAIGN 326

FROM THE RAPIDAN TO THE JAMES 343

BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS 346

BATTLES AROUND SPOTTSYLVANIA 352

xiii

CONTENTS

OPERATIONS NEAR HANOVER JUNCTION 359

BATTLES OF COLD HARBOR 361

CAMPAIGN IN MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA 366

PURSUIT OF HUNTER 371

OPERATIONS IN LOWER VALLEY AND MARYLAND 380

BATTLE OF MONOCACY 387

IN FRONT OF WASHINGTON 389

RETURN TO VIRGINIA 396

BATTLE OF KERNSTOWN 399

THE BURNING OF CHAMBERSBURG 401

RETREAT TO FISHER'S HILL 406

BATTLE OF WINCHESTER 420

AFFAIR AT FISHER'S HILL 429

THE MARCH UP THE VALLEY 432

BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK, OR BELLE GROVE 437

CLOSE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN 453

OPERATIONS IN 1865 459

CONCLUSION 466

APPENDIX 470

INDEX. . 481

ILLUSTRATIONS

PAGE

GENERAL JUBAL ANDERSON EARLY Frontispiece

GENERAL JUBAL ANDERSON EARLY (Profile) 16

GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE ON His HORSE, " TRAVELLER," 1867. (By

permission of A. H. Flecker) 74

MAJOR ANDREW L. PITZER (On General Early's Staff) 106

MAJOR SAMUEL HALE (On General Early's Staff). . . 144

CAPTAIN SAMUEL H. EARLY (On General Early's Staff) 186

MAJOR JOHN WARWICK DANIEL (On General Early's Staff) 188

WALL (ON THE LEFT OF ROAD) AT MARYE'S HEIGHTS. CHANCELLORS-
VILLE AND FREDERICKSBURG BATTLEFIELDS 206

LEE'S HEADQUARTERS — THE WILDERNESS 348

CEDAR CREEK BATTLEFIELD 438

GENERAL EARLY, DISGUISED AS A FARMER, WHILE ESCAPING TO

MEXICO, 1865 464

MAJOR THOMAS P. TURNER, COMMANDANT OF LIBBY PRISON, AND GEN
ERAL EARLY IN HAVANA, 1865 464

JEFFERSON DAVIS, PRESIDENT C. S. A., AND MRS. DAVIS. . . 472.

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

ACCORDING to the record in the family Bible, I was
born on the third day of November, 1816, in the County
of Franklin, in the State of Virginia. My father, Joab
Early,1 who is still living, is a native of the same county,
and while resident there, he enjoyed the esteem of his
fellow-citizens and held several prominent public posi
tions, but in the year 1847, he removed to the Kanawha
Valley in Western Virginia. My mother's maiden name
was Ruth Hairs ton, and she was likewise a native of
the County of Franklin, her family being among the most
respected citizens. She died in the year 1832, leaving
ten children surviving her, I being the third child and
second son. She was a most estimable lady, and her
death was not only the source of the deepest grief to
her immediate family, but caused universal regret in the
whole circle of her acquaintances.

Until I was sixteen I enjoyed the benefit of the best
schools in my region of country and received the usual
instruction in the dead languages and elementary math
ematics. In the spring of 1833, while General Jackson
was President, I received, through the agency of our
member of Congress, the Hon. N. H. Claiborne, an ap
pointment as cadet in the United States Military
Academy at West Point.

I repaired to the Academy at the end of May and
was admitted about the first of June in the same year.
I went through the usual course and graduated in the
usual time, in June, 1837. There was nothing worthy of
particular note in my career at West Point. I was
never a very good student, and was sometimes quite re
miss, but I managed to attain a respectable stand in all

1 Died at the home of his son, Robert H. Early, in Lexington, Mo., 1870.

xvii

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

my studies. My highest stand in any branch was in mili
tary and civil engineering and that was sixth. In the
general standing on graduation my position was eigh
teenth in a class of fifty.

I was not a very exemplary soldier and went through
the Academy without receiving any appointment as a
commissioned or non-commissioned officer in the corps
of cadets. I had very little taste for scrubbing brass,
and cared very little for the advancement to be obtained
by the exercise of that most useful art.

Among those graduating in my class were General
Braxton Bragg, Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton.
Major Generals Arnold Elzey and Wm. H. T. Walker,
and a few others of the Confederate Army; and Major
Generals John Sedgwick, Joseph Hooker, and Wm. H.
French and several Brigadier Generals of minor note
in the Federal Army. Among my contemporaries at
West Point were General Beauregard, Lieutenant Gen
eral Ewell, Major General Edward Johnson and some
others of distinction in the Confederate Army; Major
Generals McDowell and Meade and several others in the
Federal Army.

The whole of my class received appointments in the
United States Army shortly after graduation. By rea
son of the Indian War in Florida, there had been a
number of resignations and deaths in the army and very
few of the class had to go through the probation of
brevet lieutenants. I was appointed Second Lieutenant
in the Third Regiment of Artillery, and was assigned to
Company " E," which afterward became celebrated as
Sherman's battery. We did not enjoy the usual leave
of absence, but in August, 1837, a number of my class,
myself included, were ordered to Fortress Monroe to
drill a considerable body of recruits which were in ren
dezvous at that place, preparatory to being sent to
Florida, where the Seminole War was still in progress.
From Fortress Monroe, with several other officers, I
accompanied a body of recruits which sailed for Florida,

xviii

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

and we landed at Tampa Bay in October, 1837. From
Tampa Bay I went to Gary's Ferry, on Black Creek, and
there joined my company, which was comprised almost
entirely of recruits recently joined. My Captain (Lyon)
was an invalid from age and infirmity, and both the
First Lieutenants were absent on special duty, so that
being the senior Second Lieutenant, I was assigned to the
command of the company. In that capacity I went
through the campaign of 1837-8 under General Jessup,
from the St. John's Eiver south into the Everglades,
and was present at a skirmish with the Indians on the
Lockee Hatchee, near Jupiter Inlet, in January, 1838.
This was my first " battle, " and though I heard some
bullets whistling among the trees, none came near me,
and I did not see an Indian.

The party of Seminoles with which we had the skir
mish was subsequently pursued into the Everglades and
induced to come in and camp near us at Fort Jupiter,
under some stipulations between General Jessup and
the chiefs, about which there was afterwards some mis
understanding which resulted in the whole party being
surrounded and captured; and my company was em
ployed with the rest of the troops in this work. This
was my last "warlike exploit " for many years. After
this we remained near the sea-coast, inactive for the
most of the time, until late in the spring, when, as all
active hostilities had ceased, we were marched across to
Tampa Bay, from whence my company, with some other
troops, was shipped to New Orleans, and then sent up
the Mississippi, Ohio and Tennessee Eivers to Ross'
Landing (now Chattanooga) to report to General Scott,
who had charge of the removal of the Cherokees, with
whom some difficulty was apprehended. My company
was stationed near Ross' Landing, and it was soon dis
covered that there would be no trouble with the Indians.

It had not been my purpose to remain permanently
in the army, and, as there was to be no difficulty with
the Cherokees, and the Seminole War was thought to be

XIX

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

at an end, I determined to resign for the purpose of
going into civil life. I tendered my resignation and
received a leave of absence until it could be acted on.
Under this leave I started from Ross' Landing, on
July 4, 1838, for my home, by the way of Nashville and
Louisville. Upon arriving at Louisville, I found from
the papers that the army had been increased, and that
I was made a first lieutenant in my regiment. Had this
news reached me before the tendering of my resignation,
that resignation might have been withheld, but it was
now too late to alter my plans.

In the fall of 1838, I commenced the study of law
in the office of N. M. Taliaferro, Esq., an eminent law
yer residing at • the county seat of my native county,
who some years afterward became a judge of the Gen
eral Court of Virginia. I obtained license to practise
law in the early part of the year 1840, and at once en
tered the profession. In the spring of the year 1841, I
was elected by a small majority, as one of the delegates
from the County of Franklin, to the Virginia Legisla
ture, and served in the session of 1841 and 1842, being
the youngest member of the body.

In the following spring, I was badly beaten by my
former preceptor in the law, who was a member of the
Democratic Party, while I was a supporter of the prin
ciples of the Whig Party, of which Mr. Clay was the
principal leader.

My political opponent, though a personal friend, Mr.
Taliaferro, held the position of prosecuting attorney
in the circuit courts of several counties, and as these
offices were rendered vacant by his election to the Legis
lature, I received the appointments for the Counties of
Franklin and Floyd, having previously been appointed
prosecuting attorney in the county court of Franklin.
These appointments I held until the reorganization of
the State government under the new constitution of
1851.

In the meantime, I continued the practice of law in

XX

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

my own and the adjoining counties, with very fair suc
cess until the breaking out of the war between the United
States and Mexico, consequent upon the annexation of
Texas. Though I had voted, in the presidential elec
tion of 1844, for Mr. Clay, who opposed the annexation
of Texas, yet, when war ensued, I felt it to be my duty
to sustain the government in that war and to enter the
military service if a fitting opportunity offered. When
the regiment of volunteers from Virginia was called for
by the President, I received from the Governor and
Council of State the appointment as Major in that regi
ment, and was mustered into service on the 7th of Jan
uary, 1847. Colonel John F. Hamtramck, of the County
of Jefferson, and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas B. Ran-
dolph, of the County of Warren, were the other field offi
cers. The regiment was ordered to rendezvous at For
tress Monroe and the superintendence of the drilling
there and the embarkation for Mexico were entrusted
to me. Two extra companies were allowed to the regi
ment, and, on account of some delay in the organization
of them, I did not sail from Fortress Monroe with the
last detachment of these companies until March 1st, ar
riving at Brazos Santiago on the 17th, to learn, for the
first time, the news of General Taylor's victory at Buena
Vista. We proceeded up the Eio Grande at once and
the whole regiment was assembled at Camargo, under
the command of the Colonel, the day after my arrival
there.

About the first of April the regiment moved from
Camargo for Monterey, by the way of a little town
called China, as an escort for a provision train. One-
half of the regiment was left temporarily at China under
Lieutenant Colonel Eandolph, and the other half moved
to Monterey under my command — Colonel Hamtramck
having become too sick to remain on duty. We were
encamped at the Walnut Spring near General Taylor's
headquarters, and there I met, for the first time, Colonel
Jeffersor Davis, of the First Mississippi Regiment, who

XXI

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

has become illustrious as the President of the Confeder-
rate States. I was struck with his soldierly bearing, and
he did me the honor of complimenting the order and regu
larity of my camp. After being here a short time, the
battalion under my command relieved an Ohio regi
ment, which had been garrisoning Monterey, but was go
ing home, and for two months I acted as miltary gov
ernor of the city. It was generally conceded by officers
of the army and Mexicans that better order reigned in
the city during the time I commanded there, than had
ever before existed, and the good conduct of my men
won for them universal praise. Some time in the month
of June, the whole regiment, under the command of the
Colonel, moved to Buena Vista, a few miles from Sal-
tillo, and joined the forces of General Wool, at that
point. It remained near that locality for the balance
of the war, for the most part inactive, as all fighting on
that line, except an occasional affair with guerillas,
ceased after the battle of Buena Vista. I had, there
fore, no opportunity of seeing active service. For a
short time I was attached, as acting Inspector General,
to the staff of Brigadier General Caleb Cushing, who
commanded the brigade to which my regiment was at
tached, until he was ordered to the other line. During
this period I contracted, in the early part of the fall
of 1847, a cold and fever, which eventuated in chronic
rheumatism, with which I have ever since been afflicted.
My condition became such that I received a leave of ab
sence in the month of November, and returned to the
States, on a visit to my friends in the Kanawha Valley.
After improving a little I started back to Mexico,
and on my way I had the luck to meet with that fate,
which is very common to Americans who travel much,
that is, I was on a steamboat which was blown up, the
8th of January, 1848, on the Ohio River, a few miles be
low the mouth of the Kanawha. I had a very narrow
escape, as half of my state-room was carried off and
some pieces of the boiler protruded through the floor,

xxii

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

cutting and burning my feet when I jumped out of the
berth. The explosion took place about 1.00 o'clock at
night, when it was very dark and extremely cold, and
before the passengers, who were not killed, could get
ashore and obtain shelter, they were very much exposed;
but, after getting over the first effects of the slight in
jury received, I experienced a decided improvement in
my rheumatism, though I would not advise blowing up
in a western steamboat as an infallible remedy.

I rejoined the regiment about the first of February,
and commanded the greater part of it during the rest
of the war — three or four companies having been de
tached to the town of Parras — as Colonel Hamtramck
had returned to Virginia on recruiting service. At the
close of the war, I carried the regiment to the mouth of
the Rio Grande, and had it embarked at Brazos for
Fortress Monroe, going on one of the vessels myself. I
was mustered out of the service with the rest of the
regiment in the first part of April, 1848, being the only
field officer on duty with it. It had no opportunity of
reaping laurels during the war, but I can say that it
had not sullied the flag of the State, which constituted
the regimental colors, by disorderly conduct or acts of
depredation on private property, and non-combatants.
It had been my fortune to have the disagreeable duty of
breaking in the regiment at the beginning and I had
commanded it for a much longer time than any other
field officer. Being rather a strict disciplinarian and,
in consequence thereof, naturally regarded by inexpe
rienced troops as harsh in my treatment of them, I was
by no means popular with the mass of the regiment prior
to the commencement of the return march from Sal-
tillo, but I can safely say that, on the day they were
mustered out of service at Fortress Monroe, I was the
most popular officer in the regiment, and I had the satis
faction of receiving from a great many of the men the
assurance that they had misjudged me in the beginning
and were now convinced that I had been their best
friend all the time.

XXlll

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

I returned to the practice of law and continued it
until the commencement of the late struggle between the
Southern and Northern States.

After my return from Mexico, I was the only one of
my name left in my county, as all the rest of my father's
family had removed to the Kanawha Valley.

In the year 1850 I was a candidate for the conven
tion called to revise the constitution of Virginia, but I
was defeated by an overwhelming majority, receiving
only about two hundred votes in a district polling sev
eral thousand. I opposed firmly and unflinchingly all
the radical changes, miscalled reforms, which were pro
posed, and as the people seemed to run wild in favor
of them, not only was I beaten, but so were all other
candidates professing similar sentiments.

In the year 1853, I was again a candidate for the
Legislature, but was badly beaten, as the county had be
come strongly wedded to the opposite party.

My practice had become very considerable, and at
the close of my professional career, I believe I was re
garded as among the best lawyers in my section of the
State. My most important contest at the bar and my
greatest triumph was in a contested will case in Lowndes
County, Mississippi, in the autumn of 1852, in which a
very large amount of property was involved. I went to
Mississippi to attend to this case specially, and I con
tended single-handed and successfully with three of the
ablest lawyers of that State.

I had in a very limited degree the capacity for popu
lar speaking as generally practised in the States, and
it was regarded that my forte at the law was not be
fore a jury as an advocate, but on questions of law be
fore the court, especially in cases of appeal.

I was never blessed with popular or captivating man
ners, and the consequence was that I was often mis
judged and thought to be haughty and disdainful in my
temperament. When earnestly engaged about my busi
ness, in passing through a crowd I would frequently

xxiv

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

pass an acquaintance without noticing him, because of
the preoccupation of my mind, and this often gave of
fence. From all of which it resulted that I was never
what is called a popular man. I can say, however, that
those who knew me best, liked me best, and the preju
dices against me were gradually wearing off as the peo
ple became better acquainted with me.

My labors in my profession were rather spasmodic,
and by procrastination, I would often have to compass
a vast deal of work in a very short time, on the eve of
or during the session of a court. I was careless in se
curing and collecting my fees, very often relying on
memory as the only evidence of them, and the conse
quence was that my practice was never very lucrative.

I have now given a sketch of my life up to the time
of the beginning of the great struggle in the South for
independence, and like most men, I had done many things
which I ought not to have done, and left undone many
things which I ought to have done, but I had done some
good, and had not committed any very serious wrong,
considering it in a mere worldly point of view. I would,
however, by no means, commend my life as a pattern
for the young, unless it be in the sincerity and integrity
of purpose by which I claim to have ever been actuated.

As there have been some descriptions of my person
attempted, in which I have failed to recognize the slight
est resemblance, I will state that, up to the time of my
service in Mexico, I was quite erect and trim in stature.
My average weight for many years was from 154 to
164 pounds — during the war it was about 170 pounds.
The stoop with which I am now afflicted is the result of
rheumatism contracted in Mexico, and when casual ob
servers have seen me bent up, it has been very often
the result of actual pain to which I have been very much
subjected for the last nineteen years. One writer, who
was actuated by the most friendly motives and ought
to have known better, has described me as having a
rough, curly head and shaggy eye-brows, whereas the

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

fact is that my hair always has been, and what is left
still is, as straight as an Indian 's, and my eyebrows are
very moderate and smooth. Some writer, who certainly
never put himself in a position to see me during the
war, has described my dress as being habitually like
that of a stage-driver. All tailors who have ever worked
for me up to the present time will testify to the fact
that I have always been one of the most particular men
about the cut and fit of my clothes among their
customers.

During the war I was almost constantly in the camp
or field, except when wounded, and I had no time to get
new clothes if I had been able. My tastes would always
have induced me to dress neatly and genteelly if I could
have indulged them.

So much for my life previous to the war. Henceforth
it will be developed in my narrative.

THE WAR BETWEEN
THE STATES

CHAPTER I.

THE INVASION OF VIRGINIA.

AFTER the fall of Fort Sumter, the Government at
Washington commenced concentrating a large force at
that city under the superintendence of Lieutenant
General Scott of the United States Army, and it was
very apparent that Virginia would be invaded.

When the ordinance of secession had been passed by
the Virginia convention, and the authority had been
given to the Governor to call out troops for the defence
of the State, Governor Letcher called for volunteers.
The Navy Yard at Gosport, near Norfolk, and the
arsenal and armory at Harper 's Ferry were taken pos
session of by militia forces hastily assembled, but not
until the United States officers had partially destroyed
both.

As soon as General Lee reached Richmond, which was
very shortly after his appointment to the command of
the Virginia forces, he entered actively on the work
of reorganization.

The day the convention took recess to await the result
of the popular vote, I tendered my services to the Gov
ernor, and received from him the commission of Colonel
in the volunteer service of the State. On reporting to
General Lee, I was ordered to repair to Lynchburg, and
take command of all the Virginia volunteers who should
be mustered into service at that place, and organize them
into regiments, as they were received by companies. I

1

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

took command at Lynchburg on the 16th of May, and
proceeded to organize the volunteers, which were being
mustered into the Virginia service at that point, by
Lieutenant Colonel Daniel A. Langhorne.

While there, I organized and armed three regiments,
to-wit: The 28th Virginia Regiment (Colonel R. T.
Preston) and the 24th Virginia Regiment (my own),
both as infantry, and the 30th Virginia Regiment
(Colonel R. C. W. Radford), as cavalry. This latter
regiment was subsequently designated the 2d Virginia
Cavalry.

On the 24th of May, the day after the election in
Virginia ratifying the ordinance, of secession, the
Federal troops, under the command of Brigadier General
McDowell, crossed over from "Washington into Virginia,
the bands playing and the soldiers singing "John
Brown's soul goes marching on"; and John Brown's
mission was, subsequently, but too well carried out in
Virginia and all the Southern States under the inspira
tion of that anthem.

The Confederate Government had sent some troops
to Virginia, and a portion of them along with some of
the Virginia troops were concentrated at and near
Manassas Junction on the Orange & Alexandria Rail
road, about thirty miles from Washington. Brigadier
General Beauregard was sent to take command of the
troops at Manassas, and other troops had been sent to
Harper's Ferry, to the command of which General
Joseph E. Johnston was assigned. As soon as it was
ascertained that the Federal troops had crossed over
and occupied Alexandria, I commenced sending the regi
ments organized by me, as they were ready, to Manassas.
The infantry was armed with smooth-bore percussion
muskets, but there were no belts or bayonet scabbards
or cartridge boxes for them, and they had to be supplied
with cloth pouches for their ammunition. The cavalry
regiment, consisting of nine companies, was armed prin
cipally with double-barrelled shot guns, and sabres of
an old pattern which had been collected in the country

2

THE INVASION OF VIRGINIA

from old volunteer companies. The State had very few
arms of any kind, and those furnished the infantry had
been borrowed from North Carolina. There were no
cavalry arms of any value.

I also armed and sent off a number of companies to
be attached to regiments already in the field.

Having attended the convention when it re-assembled
in June, as soon as the ordinance of secession was
signed, I received orders to turn over the command at
Lynchburg to Colonel Langhorne and join my regiment
in the field. The Confederate Government had now
reached Richmond, and that city became the capital of
the Confederacy.

I reached Manassas and reported to General
Beauregard on the 19th of June. I found my regiment
(the 24th Virginia) under Lieutenant Colonel Peter
Hairston, located about four miles east of the Junction,
for the purpose of watching the fords of Bull Run
immediately above its junction with the Occoquon, and
those on the latter stream above the same point. At
this time no brigades had been formed, but in a few days
the regiments under General Beauregard 's command
were organized into six brigades, as follows : a brigade of
South Carolina troops under Brigadier General Bonham,
a brigade of Alabama and Louisiana troops under
Brigadier General Ewell, a brigade of South Carolina
and Mississippi troops under Brigadier General D. R.
Jones, a brigade of Virginia troops under Colonel George
H. Jerrett, who was subsequently replaced by Brigadier
General Longstreet, a brigade of Virginia troops under
Colonel Philip St. George Cocke, and a brigade composed
of the 7th and 24th Virginia, and the 4th South Carolina
Regiments under my command, but the 4th South Caro
lina had been sent to Leesburg in Loudoun and did not
join, it being subsequently replaced by the 7th Louisiana
! Regiment.

After this organization the troops were located as

i follows: the 4th South Carolina Regiment and Wheat's

Louisiana Battalion were at Leesburg under Colonel

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

Evans; Bonham 's brigade was at Fairfax Court-House,
Cocke's at Centreville, and Swell's brigade at and near
Fairfax Station, all in front of Bull Run; while D. R.
Jones7 brigade was encamped on the south of the Run
near the railroad, at a place called Camp Walker, Long-
street's at the Junction, and the 7th and 24th Virginia
Regiments of my brigade, camped separately, northeast
and east of the Junction, from three to four miles dis
tant. The cavalry, consisting of Colonel R. C. W. Rad-
ford's regiment of nine companies and several unat
tached companies, was employed mainly on scouting and
picketing duty with Evans, Bonham, and Ewell, one
company being on my right to watch the lower fords of
the Occoquon, and the landings on the Potomac below
the mouth of the Occoquon, where it was subsequently
joined by another.

It was my duty to watch the right of our line, and
the two companies of cavalry on that flank, Eugene
Davis' and W. W. Thornton's companies of Virginia
cavalry, were placed under my command, and Captain
John Scott was assigned to the immediate command of
them.

A few days after my arrival, under orders from
General Beauregard, I made a reconnaissance to the
village of Occoquon, near the mouth of the stream of
that name, with the 24th Regiment, and examined the
landings of the Potomac as far down as Freestone Point.

Early in July General Beauregard summoned all his
brigade commanders to a conference at Fairfax Station,
and there disclosed to them, in confidence, his plan of
operations in the event of an advance by the enemy, for
which he had learned active preparations were being
made.

He anticipated that the enemy's main force would
move on the road through Fairfax Court-House and
Centreville toward Manassas, and his plan was, for all
the troops on the north of Bull Run to fall back to the
south bank of that stream. Bonham, in the centre on the

4

THE INVASION OF VIRGINIA

direct road to Manassas, to Mitchell's Ford; Cocke, on
the left, to Stone Bridge on the Warrenton Pike; and
Ewell, on the right, to Union Mills; and Evans was to
retire from Loudoun and unite with Cocke ; while Long-
street was to move up to Blackburn's Ford, about a mile
below Mitchell's Ford; D. E. Jones to McLean's Ford,
about a mile or two further down ; and I was to move up
to Union Mills in support of Ewell. His anticipation
further was, that the enemy would follow up Bonham
and attack him at Mitchell's Ford; in which event the
rest of the troops were to cross Bull Bun and attack the
enemy on both flanks — Longstreet crossing at Black
burn's Ford, and Jones at McLean's Ford, and attacking
the enemy's left flank; Ewell at the same time moving
up towards Centreville, on the road from Union Mills,
and attacking the enemy on his left and rear; while I
was to follow Ewell in support and look out for his right
flank and rear, and Cocke, supported by Evans, was to
come down on the enemy's right flank.

The routes by which all these movements were to
be made were pointed out and designated on maps pre
viously prepared, and each brigade commander was
instructed to make himself familiar with the ground over
which he would have to operate. General Beauregard
at the same time informed us that the returns showed
an effective force under his command of very little
more than 15,000 men.

A few days after this, the 7th Louisiana Kegiment,
under Colonel Harry T. Hays, arrived, and was assigned
to my brigade in lieu of the 4th South Carolina. The
7th Virginia was commanded by Colonel James L.
Kemper, and the 24th by Lieutenant Colonel Peter
Hairston.

On the 12th of July I made another reconnaissance
to Occoquon, with the 7th Virginia Eegiment under
Lieutenant Colonel Williams, and a section of the Wash
ington Artillery of New Orleans, under Lieutenant
Squires, and returned to camp on the 14th.

5

CHAPTER II.

FIGHT AT BLACKBURN'S FORD.

ON the night of the 16th information was sent from
General Beauregard's headquarters that the enemy was
advancing, and orders were given for moving early
next morning in accordance with previous instructions.

At daylight on the morning of the 17th, I commenced
the movement of my brigade to its assigned position
in rear of the ford at Union Mills, and on my arrival
there I found General Swell's force falling back to the
same point. Under previous instructions four com
panies of the 24th Virginia Eegiment had been left under
Major Hambrick to guard the camp of the regiment and
picket on the right of our line, and the two companies
of cavalry under Captain Scott had also been left to
watch our right. Three pieces of artillery, under
Lieutenant Squires of the Washington Artillery, were
attached to my brigade and joined it at the position near
Union Mills. I remained there inactive during the rest
of the day after my arrival, but on the morning of the
18th I was ordered further to the left, to Camp Walker
on the railroad. On falling back, Ewell had burned the
bridges on the railroad between Fairfax Station and
Union Mills, and on this morning the bridge over Bull
Bun, at the latter place, was likewise burned.

After remaining for some time at Camp Walker, I
was ordered by General Beauregard to move my brigade
to the gate in rear of McLean's farm on the road from
Blackburn's Ford to the Junction, keeping it in the
woods out of view. The General had now established
his headquarters at McLean's house between my posi
tion and those of Generals Longstreet and Jones.
From this last position taken by me, the open fields on
the heights beyond Blackburn's Ford were visible, being
between two and three miles distant. A little before

6

FIGHT AT BLACKBURN'S FORD

12 M. we discovered clouds of dust from the direction
of Centreville and bodies of troops moving into the
fields beyond the ford, and while we were speculating
as to whether this was the enemy, we saw the smoke
arise from his first gun, the fire from which was directed
towards Bonham's position at Mitchell's Ford.

After the firing had continued for a short time, I
received an order from General Beauregard to move my
command to the rear of a pine thicket between McLean's
house and Blackburn's Ford, so as to be in supporting
distance of Bonham, Longstreet or Jones. In order to do
this I had to run through open fields in view of the enemy
and this attracted his fire in our direction, but I reached
the cover of the pines without any casualty, and I was
here joined by Lieutenant Richardson, of the Washing
ton Artillery, with two more pieces. The enemy's fire
was continued for some time, and one or two shells
passed through an out-house near General Beauregard 's
headquarters.

In the afternoon the General rode towards Mitchell's
Ford, and after he had been gone a short time a very
brisk musketry fire opened at Blackburn's Ford. The
enemy had attacked Longstreet at that point, and after
the firing had continued for some time, I received a mes
sage from General Longstreet, through one of his aides,
requesting reinforcements. I immediately put my whole
command in motion towards the ford, but before arriving
there, I received an order from General Beauregard to
carry two regiments and two pieces of artillery to Long-
street's assistance. My command was then moving with
the 7th Louisiana in front, followed immediately by the
7th Virginia, and I ordered the six companies of the 24th
Virginia, which were bringing up the rear under Lieu
tenant Colonel Hairston, to halt, and directed Lieutenant
Squires to move two pieces of artillery to the front and
halt the rest. I found that General Longstreet 's command
had been hotly engaged and had just repulsed an attempt
to force a crossing of the stream.

7

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

The position occupied by our troops was a narrow
strip of woods on low ground along the bank of the
stream, with an open field in rear, while the enemy occu
pied higher and better ground on the opposite bank.
Immediately on its arrival, the 7th Louisiana, Colonel
Hays, was put in position in the strip of woods on the
left of the ford, relieving the 17th Virginia Regiment
and some companies of the llth Virginia which had
been actively engaged ; and the 7th Virginia Regiment,
Lieutenant Colonel Williams commanding, was formed
on the right of the ford, in rear of the strip of woods,
and advanced to the bank of the stream, relieving the
1st Virginia Regiment.

These movements were made under fire from the
enemy on the opposite bluffs, and while the 7th Virginia
was being formed in line, two volleys were fired at it by
the enemy, throwing it into some confusion and causing
it to begin firing without orders, while there were some
of our troops in front of it. It, however, soon recovered
from the momentary confusion and advanced with firm
ness to the front. Lieutenant Squires moved his pieces
into the open field in rear of our line and to the right of
the road leading to the ford, and opened fire without any
guide except the sound of the enemy's musketry, as he was
concealed from our view by the woods on the bluffs occu
pied by him. The six companies of the 24th Virginia Regi
ment and the remaining pieces of the Washington Artil
lery, including two pieces under Lieutenant Garnett which
were attached to Longstreet's brigade, were sent for,
and the companies of the 24th were put in position along
the banks of the stream on Hays' left, while the rest of
the artillery was brought into action on the same ground
with Squires.

Squires had soon silenced the enemy's infantry, which
retired precipitately before his fire, but the artillery from
the heights beyond the stream had opened on ours, which
now responded to that of the enemy. An artillery duel
was thus commenced which lasted for a considerable

8

FIGHT AT BLACKBURN'S FORD

time. The opposing batteries were concealed from each
other's view by the intervening woods, and they were
therefore compelled to regulate their fire by the sound
of the guns. The enemy had the decided advantage of
position, as he was on high ground, while our guns were
located in a flat nearly on a level with the stream, thus
giving them the benefit of a plunging fire. This duel
finally ceased and the enemy retired, baffled in his effort
to force our position.

In his reports of this affair, the enemy represented
our troops as being protected by rifle pits with masked
batteries; whereas the fact was that we had nothing in
the shape of rifle pits or breastworks, and our guns were
in the open field, though concealed from the enemy's
view by the intervening woods. These guns had been
brought on the field along with my brigade, but were
so brought as to elude observation. Before their arrival
not an artillery shot had been fired by us from this
quarter, and there had been only a few shots earlier in
the day from the guns, with Bonham, at Mitchell's Ford
above.

As soon as it was ascertained that the enemy had
retired, General Longstreet moved to the rear with his
two regiments that had borne the brunt of the fight, and
I was left to occupy his former position with my brigade
and the llth Virginia Eegiment of his brigade. A few
were wounded in my command, but I believe none killed.
General Longstreet 's loss was not heavy, but an examina
tion of the ground on the opposite bank of the Run, next
morning, showed that the enemy had suffered severely,
quite a number of dead bodies being found abandoned.
At one point, where it was apparent a regiment had
been in line, over one hundred muskets and hats were
found in a row, showing evidently that they had been
abandoned in a panic, produced probably by the fire
from Squires' guns. Many knapsacks, canteens, blankets
and India rubber cloths were found scattered on the
ground, proving that the enemy had retired in confusion.

9

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

This fight was preliminary to the approaching battle,
and its result had a very inspiring effect upon our troops
generally. It was subsequently ascertained that the force
engaged, on the part of the enemy, was Tyler's division
of McDowell's army, which had been sent to the front
for the purpose of making a demonstration, while
McDowell himself was engaged in reconnoitring on our
right, for the purpose of ascertaining whether that flank
could be turned by the way of Wolf Run Shoals, just
below the junction of Bull Run and the Occoquon. Tyler
exceeded his instructions, it appears, and endeavored to
gain some glory for himself by forcing our position at
Blackburn's Ford, but he paid dearly for the experiment.
During the 19th I continued to occupy the position
at Blackburn's Ford, and occasionally small bodies of the
enemy could be seen by scouts sent to the opposite side
of Bull Run, on the heights where he had taken his posi
tion on the 18th, previous to the advance against Long-
street. During the day my troops, with a few rough tools
and their bayonets, succeeded in making very tolerable
rifle pits on the banks of the stream, and they were not
molested by the enemy.

About dark the brigade commanders were summoned
to a council at McLean's house by General Beauregard,
and he proceeded to inform us of his plans for the next
day. He told us that, at his instance, the Government
at Richmond had ordered General Johnston to move from
the Shenandoah Valley with his whole force to co-operate
with ours; and that the General was then on his march
directly across the Blue Ridge, and would probably attack
the enemy's right flank very early the next morning,
while we were to fall upon his left flank. Before he
finished the statement of his plans, Brigadier General
Thomas J. Jackson, subsequently famous as "Stonewall
Jackson," entered the room and reported to General
Beauregard that he had just arrived from General John
ston's army, by the way of the Manassas Gap Railroad,
with his brigade, about 2500 strong.

10

FIGHT AT BLACKBURN'S FORD

Tins information took General Beauregard by sur
prise, and he inquired of General Jackson if General
Johnston would not march the rest of his command on
the direct road so as to get on the enemy 's right flank.
General Jackson replied that he thought not, that he
thought the purpose was to transport the whole force
on the railroad from Piedmont station on the east of the
Blue Ridge. After General Jackson had given all the
information he possessed, and received instructions as
to the 'disposition of his brigade, he retired, and General
Beauregard proceeded to develop his plans fully. The
information received from General Jackson was most
unexpected, but General Beauregard stated that he
thought Jackson was mistaken, and that he was satisfied
General Johnston was marching with the rest of his
troops and would attack the enemy's right flank as before
stated.

Upon this hypothesis, he then decided that, when
General Johnston's attack began and he had become
fully engaged, of which we were to judge from the
character of the musketry fire, we would cross Bull Run
from our several positions and move to the attack of the
enemy's left flank and rear. He stated that he had no
doubt Johnston's attack would be a surprise to the enemy,
that the latter would not know what to think of it, and
when he turned to meet that attack and found himself
assailed on the other side, he would be still more sur
prised and would not know what to do, that the effect
would be a complete rout, a perfect Waterloo, and that
we would pursue, cross the Potomac and arouse Mary
land.

General Johnston's attack, according to General
Beauregard 's calculations, was to begin next morning
about or very shortly after daybreak. Having received
our instructions fully, we retired, and I returned to my
position at Blackburn's Ford, where I assembled my
colonels, and was proceeding to explain to them the
plans for the next day and instruct them to have every-

11

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

thing in readiness, when we were startled by a fierce
volley of musketry on our immediate right. This of
course put an end to the conference and every one
rushed to his position in anticipation of a night attack.

The llth Virginia Regiment, Colonel Samuel Garland,
was moved promptly to the rear of the point where the
firing occurred, which was repeated, and after a good
deal of trouble we succeeded in ascertaining that it
proceeded from two of my companies, which had been
posted in the woods on the bank of the stream to the right
of my position, in order to cover some points where a
crossing might be effected. The officers of one of the
companies declared that a body of the enemy could be
seen, stealthily moving down the opposite bank, and that
the firing had been at that body and had been returned.
The firing by this time had ceased and no movement of
the enemy could be heard. This affair, however, kept
us on the alert all night, but I became satisfied that it
resulted from some mistake, caused perhaps by the move
ment of some straggling persons of our own command,
in the darkness, in the woods. Such alarms were not
uncommon, subs xuently, when two opposing forces were
lying on their arms at night in front of each other. A
very slight circumstance would sometimes produce a
volley at night from the one or the other side, as it
might be.

At light on the morning of the 20th, instead of our
being required to advance to the attack of the enemy
according to the programme of the night before, General
Longstreet came in a great hurry to relieve me, and
with orders for my brigade to move as rapidly as pos
sible to a point on our right on the road leading from
Yates' Ford, below Union Mills, to Manassas Junction.
As soon as relieved, I moved in the direction indicated,
and the head of my column was just emerging into
Camp Walker, from the woods in rear of McLean's farm,
—where I had been on the 18th, at the time the enemy
opened his artillery fire beyond Blackburn's Ford, — when

12

FIGHT AT BLACKBURN'S FORD

I was met by a courier with orders to halt where I
was, as the alarm, upon which the order to me had been
founded, had proved false.

As this false alarm was rather singular in its nature,
but of such a character that any general might have
been deceived by it, I will state how it occurred. A
captain of General Ewell's brigade, who had been posted
with his company on picket at Yates' Ford not far
below Union Mills, retired from his post and reported
in the most positive manner that the enemy had ap
peared in heavy force on the opposite bank of Bull Run
and commenced building two bridges. He further stated
that he had seen General McDowell on a white horse
superintending the construction of the bridges.

As there was no reason to doubt his veracity or
courage, General Ewell, of course, sent at once the
information to General Beauregard and hence the order
for my movement. After the message was dispatched,
something suggested a doubt as to the correctness of
the report, and the officer making it was sent in charge
of another to ascertain the facts. On arriving in sight
of the ford he pointed triumphantly t /the opposite bank
and exclaimed, " There they are. Don't you see the two
bridges, don't you see McDowell on his white horse !"
when the fact was there was nothing visible but the ford
and the unoccupied banks of the stream, which were
so obstructed as to render a crossing impracticable until
the obstructions were removed.

It was then apparent that it was a clear case of
hallucination, produced by a derangement of the nervous
system, consequent on a loss of sleep and great anxiety
of mind resulting from the nature of the duties in which
he had been engaged. Neither his sincerity nor his
courage was questioned, and this affair shows how the
most careful commander may be misled when he has to
rely on information furnished by others. It requires
very great experience and a very discriminating judg
ment to enable a commanding general to sift the truth

13

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

out of the great mass of exaggerated reports made to
him, and hence he has often to rely on his own personal
inspection.

I have known important movements to be suspended
on the battlefield, on account of reports from very gal
lant officers that the enemy was on one flank or the other
in heavy force, when a calm inspection proved the re
ported bodies of the enemy to be nothing more than stone
or rail fences. Some officers, while exposing their lives
with great daring, sometimes fail to preserve that clear
ness of judgment and calmness of the nerves which is
so necessary to enable one to see things as they really
are during an engagement; and hence it is that there
are so many conflicting reports of the same matters.
The capacity of preserving one's presence of mind in
action is among the highest attributes of an efficient
commander or subordinate officer, and it must be con
fessed that the excitement of battle, especially when
the shells are bursting and the bullets whistling thick
around, is wonderfully trying to the nerves of the
bravest.

The false alarm out of which the above reflections
have sprung, operated as a very great relief to my com
mand, as it enabled my men, who had had very little to
eat, and scarcely any rest or sleep for two nights and
days, to cook provisions and get a good rest and sleep
in the woods where they were halted, and thereby to be
prepared to go through the extraordinary fatigues of
the next day.

On this day, the 20th, General Johnston arrived at
Manassas by the railroad, and an order was issued for
his assuming command, as the ranking officer, of all the
troops of the united armies. It was now ascertained
beyond doubt that all of his troops were coming by the
railroad.

CHAPTER III.
EARLY 's BKIGADE AT MANASSAS.

AT this time the largest organizations in our army
were brigades, and each brigade commander received his
orders directly from headquarters. Since the conference
at Fairfax Station, when General Beauregard stated that
his effective strength did not exceed 15,000 men, one
regiment, the 1st South Carolina, had been sent off by
reason of expiration of term of service, and one regiment,
the 7th Louisiana, had joined my brigade. Besides this,
General Beauregard 's troops had been augmented, since
the advance of the enemy, by the arrival of six com
panies of the 8th Louisiana, the 5th North Carolina
State Troops, the llth North Carolina Volunteers, the
13th Mississippi, three companies of the 49th Virginia
and Hampton's South Carolina Legion; the latter con
taining six companies of infantry. His whole effective
force, however, did not probably much exceed the
estimate made at the time of the conference, as the
measles and typhoid fever, which were prevailing, had
reduced very much the strength of the regiments, espe
cially among the Virginia troops which were entirely new.
To reinforce him, Holmes ' brigade of two regiments had
arrived from Aquia Creek, and Johnston's troops were
arriving by the railroad, after much delay by reason of
accidents or mismanagement on the part of the railroad
officials.

On the 20th we were not molested by the enemy,
and on the morning of the 21st the position of Beau-
regard's troops was pretty much the same as it had
been on the 18th, to wit: Ewell at Union Mills; D. E.
Jones at McLean's Ford; Longstreet, reinforced by the
5th North Carolina, at Blackburn's Ford; Bonham, re
inforced by six companies of the 8th Louisiana and the
llth North Carolina Volunteers, at Mitchell's Ford;

15

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

Cocke, reinforced by some companies of the 8th Virginia
Kegiment and three companies of the 49th Virginia
Regiment, at some fords below Stone Bridge ; and Evans
at Stone Bridge; while my brigade was in reserve in
the woods in rear of McLean's farm. No artillery was
attached to my brigade on this day.

The arrival of General Johnston in person and the
transportation of his troops on the railroad had, of
course, entirely changed the plans of operations as com
municated to us on the night of the 19th, but the new
plans, which were rendered necessary by the altered
condition of things, were not communicated to us, and
I had, therefore, to await orders.

Very early on the morning of the 21st the enemy
opened fire with artillery from the heights on the north
of Bull Run near Blackburn 's Ford, and I was ordered
to occupy a position in rear of the pine woods north
of McLean's house, so as to be ready to support Long-
street or Jones as might be necessary. After being in
position some time, I received a request from General
Longstreet for one of my regiments to be sent to him,
and I sent him the six companies of the 24th Virginia
under Lieutenant Colonel Hairston, and two companies
of the 7th Louisiana under Major Penn. Not long after
wards I received a request for another regiment, and
I carried the remaining eight companies of the 7th
Louisiana to Blackburn's Ford, leaving Colonel Kemper
with his regiment behind.

On arriving at the ford, I found that the whole of
Longstreet 's brigade had been crossed over Bull Run,
and were lying under cover at the foot of the hills on
its northern bank, awaiting a signal to advance against
the enemy, who was in considerable force near the point
occupied by his artillery at the fight on the 18th. The
companies of the 24th were being crossed over to join
Longstreet 's brigade, and the General ordered the 7th
Louisiana to be formed in line in the strip of woods
on the southern bank of the stream, covering the ford.

16

<;K\KRAI. .IUBAL ANDERSON EARLY

EARLY'S BRIGADE AT MANASSAS

The enemy was keeping up a continuous artillery fire
from two batteries, one in front of the ford and the
other some distance to the right, which rendered the
vicinity of the ford quite uncomfortable, but the troops
across the Run were in a great measure under cover.

After Hays' regiment had been put in position, Gen
eral Longstreet went across the stream to reconnoitre,
and in a short time returned and directed me to take
Hays' and Kemper's regiments, cross at McLean's Ford,
and move around and capture the battery to his right,
which he said could be easily taken. I was informed
by him that Jones had crossed the Run and was on the
hills beyond McLean's Ford, likewise awaiting the signal
to advance, and I was directed to move between him
and the Run against the enemy's battery. Hays' regi
ment was moved back to where Kemper's was, and
was exposed to the fire from the enemy's batteries which
was attracted by the dust arising from its march over
the direct road through the pines. A shell exploded
in the ranks, killing and wounding four or five men. The
two regiments were moved to McLean's Ford, and while
they were crossing over and forming, I rode forward
to an eminence, where I observed a lookout in a tree,
for the purpose of ascertaining the exact position of
the battery and the route over which I would have to
advance against it. While I was engaged in obtaining
this information, Colonel Chisolm, a volunteer aide of
General Beauregard, rode up and informed me that
General Beauregard's orders were that the whole force
should cross Bull Run to the south side.

I think this was about 11.00 A.M. I informed him
of the order I had received from General Longstreet,
and he stated that Longstreet was crossing, and that
the order embraced me as well as the rest. I felt this as
a reprieve from almost certain destruction, for I had
discovered that the route by which I would be compelled
to advance against the battery was along an open valley
for some distance and then up a naked hill to the plain
2 17

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

on which the battery was located, the greater part of
the route being raked by the enemy's guns. The look
out had also informed me that a considerable body of
infantry was in the woods near the battery. It turned
out afterwards that this battery, which I was ordered to
take, was supported by a brigade of infantry, posted
behind a formidable abattis of felled timber. An at
tempt to carry out my orders would very probably
have entailed the annihilation or utter rout of my two
regiments; and in fact much later in the day, Jones'
brigade on moving against this battery sustained a
damaging repulse.

After recrossing to the south side, I sent Kemper's
regiment to its former position, and moved with Hays'
regiment up the Run to Longstreet's position, as I
thought he probably desired its return to him. On reach
ing Blackburn's Ford, I found General Longstreet cau
tiously withdrawing a part of his troops across the
Run, and he informed me that he did not now require
Hays' regiment, but would retain the companies of the
24th. Hays was then ordered to move down the Run to
McLean's Ford and return in that way to the position
at which Kemper was, so as to avoid the artillery fire
while passing over the direct route.

I rode directly to Kemper's position, and after being
there a short time I discovered clouds of dust arising
about McLean's Ford, which I supposed to be produced
by Jones' brigade returning to its original position.
Fearing that Hays' regiment might be mistaken for the
enemy and fired upon, I rode rapidly to Jones' position
and found some of his men forming in the rifle pits in
rear of the ford, while the General was looking with his
field glasses at Hays' regiment, which was advancing
from the direction of the enemy's position higher up
the Run. I informed him what command it was and
requested that his men might be cautioned against firing,
for which they were preparing.

As soon as this was done, General Jones asked me

18

EARLY'S BRIGADE AT MANASSAS

if I had received an order from General Beauregard,
directing that I should go to him with my brigade. Upon
my stating that I had received no such order, he said
that he had received a note from General Beauregard
in which he was directed to send me to the General.
The note, which was in the hands of one of Jones' staff
officers, was sent for and shown to me. It was in pencil,
and after giving brief directions for the withdrawal
across the Run and stating the general purpose to go
to the left where the heavy firing was, there was a
direction at the foot in very nearly these words, — * ' Send
Early to me." This information was given to me some
time between 12 M. and 1 P.M.*

The note did not state to what point I was to go,
but I knew that General Beauregard 's position had
been near Mitchell's Ford and that he was to be found
somewhere to our left. I sent word for Hays to move
up as rapidly as possible, directed Kemper to get ready
to move, sent a message to General Longstreet request
ing the return of the companies of the 24th, and directed
my Acting Adjutant General, Captain Gardner, to ride
to Mitchell's Ford and ascertain where General Beau
regard was, as well as the route I was to pursue.

The messenger sent to General Longstreet returned and
informed me that the General said there was a regiment
in the pines to my left which had been ordered to report
to him, and that I could take that regiment instead of
the companies of my own, to save time and prevent
the exposure of both to the fire of the enemy's artillery
in passing to and from Blackburn's Ford. In this
arrangement I readily concurred, and soon found, to my
left in the pines, the 13th Mississippi Regiment under
Colonel Barksdale, which had very recently arrived. The
Colonel consented to accompany me, and as soon as the

* In his report General Beauregard states that I did not receive
this order until 2.00 P.M. This is a mistake. I could not possibly
have reached the battlefield at the time I did, if the reception of the
order had been delayed until 2.00 P.M.

19

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

command could be got ready, it was started on the road
towards Mitchell's Ford.

This movement commenced about or very shortly after
1 o'clock P.M. On the way I met Captain Gardner re
turning with the information that General Beauregard's
headquarters would be at the Lewis house, in the direc
tion of the firing on our extreme left, and that I was
to go there. On reaching General Bonham's position
in rear of Mitchell's Ford, he informed me that I would
have to move through the fields towards the left to
find the Lewis house, and he pointed out the direction;
but he did not know the exact location of the house. I
moved in the direction pointed out, and continued to
pass on to our left, through the fields, towards the firing
in the distance, endeavoring, as I advanced, to find out
where the Lewis house was.

While moving on, Captain Smith, an assistant in the
adjutant general's office at General Beauregard's
headquarters, passed us in a great hurry, also looking
for General Beauregard and the Lewis house. He told
me that information had been received at the Junction
that 6,000 of the enemy had passed the Manassas Gap
railroad, and it was this information (which subsequently
proved to be false) that he was going to communicate to
the General.

The day was excessively hot and dry. Hays' regi
ment was a good deal exhausted by the marching and
the counter-marching about Blackburn's and McLean's
Fords. Barksdale's regiment, an entirely new one, had
just arrived from the south over the railroad, and was
unused to marching. Our progress was therefore not
as rapid as I could have wished, but we passed on with
all possible speed in the direction of the firing, which
was our only guide. Towards 3 o 'clock P.M. we reached
the field of battle and began to perceive the scenes
usual in rear of an army engaged in action. On enter
ing the road leading from the Lewis house towards
Manassas, we met quite a stream of stragglers going

20

EARLY'S BRIGADE AT MANASSAS

to the rear, and were informed by them that everything
was over with us. I was riding by the side of Colonel
Kemper at the head of the column, and we had the
satisfaction of being assured that if we went on the
field on horseback, we certainly would be killed, as the
enemy shot all the mounted officers. Some of the men
said that their regiments had been entirely cut to pieces,
and there was no use for them to remain any longer.

It was to the encouraging remarks of this stream
of recreants that my command was exposed as it moved
on, but not a man fell out of ranks. Only one man who
had been engaged offered to return and he belonged
to the 4th Alabama Regiment, which he said had been
nearly destroyed, but he declared that he would "go
back and give them another trial." He fell into the
ranks of Kemper 's regiment and I believe remained
with it to the close of the battle. Captain Gardner
had been sent ahead for instructions and had met with
Colonel John S. Preston, a volunteer aide to General
Beauregard; and on our getting near to the battlefield,
Colonel Preston rode to meet us and informed me that
the General had gone to the front on the right, to con
duct an attack on the enemy, but that General Johnston
was on that part of the field near which we were and
would give me instructions. He pointed out the direc
tion in which General Johnston was, and I moved on,
soon meeting the General himself, who rode towards us
when he discovered our approach, and expressed his
gratification at our arrival.

I asked him at once to show me my position, to
which he replied that he was too much engaged to do
that in person, but would give me directions as to what
I was to do. He then directed me to move to our own
extreme left and attack the enemy on his right, stating
that by directing my march along the rear of our line,
by the sound of the firing in front, there could be no
mistake; and he cautioned me to take especial care to
clear our whole line before advancing to the front, and

21

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

be particular and not fire on any of our own troops^
which he was sorry to say had been done in some
instances.

Affairs now wore a very gloomy aspect, and from
all the indications in the rear the day appeared to be
going against us. While General Johnston was speaking
to me, quite a squad of men approached us going to
the rear, and the General asking them to what regiment
they belonged and where going without receiving any
satisfactory answer, directed me to make my men charge
bayonets and drive them back to the front. I immediately
ordered Colonel Kemper to charge them with his regi
ment, when they commenced making excuses, saying they
were sick, or wounded, or had no ammunition. I saw at
once there was no fight in them, and I directed Colonel
Kemper to move on and not delay battling with such
cowards.

Immediately in front of us was a body of woods ex
tending to our left, in which there was a constant rattle
of musketry, and I moved along the rear of this woods,
crossing the road from Manassas to Sudley, and inclining
to the left so as to clear our line entirely. While so
moving Colonel Kemper pointed out to me the United
States flag floating in the distance on some high point
in front of our right, probably the top of a house.

To clear our line entirely on our left, I found that
it was necessary to pass beyond the woods in which
our troops were, and as I approached the open space
beyond, a messenger came to me from Colonel, after
wards General, J. E. B. Stuart, who was on our ex
treme left with two companies of cavalry and a battery
of artillery under Lieutenant Beckham, stating that the
Colonel said the enemy was about giving way and if
we would hurry up he would soon be in retreat. This
was the first word of encouragement I had received
after reaching the vicinity of the battlefield. I was then
making all the haste the condition of my men, who were
much blown, would permit, and I directed my march to

22

EARLY'S BRIGADE AT MANASSAS

a field immediately on the left of the woods, and between
Stuart's position and the left of our infantry then en
gaged.

The messenger from Colonel Stuart soon returned
in a gallop and stated that the Colonel said the enemy
had only retired his right behind a ridge now in my
front, and was moving another flanking column behind
said ridge still further to our left, and he cautioned me
to be on the lookout for this new column.

Having now cleared the woods, I moved to the front,
in order to form line against the flanking column the
enemy was reported forming behind the ridge in front
of me. I ordered Colonel Kemper, who was in front,
to form his regiment, by file, into line in the open field,
just on the left of the woods, and sent back directions
for the other regiments to move up as rapidly as pos
sible and form to Kemper 's left in echelon. Just at
this time I observed a body of our troops move from a
piece of woods on my immediate right across an open
space to another in front of it, and this proved to be
the left regiment of Elzey's brigade. I heard a rapid
fire open from the woods into which this regiment had
moved, and a body of the enemy approached on the crest
of the ridge immediately in my front, preceded by a
line of skirmishers.

This ridge was the one on which is situated Chinn's
house, so often mentioned in the description of this
battle, and the subsequent one near the same position.
It is a high ridge sloping off towards our right, and
the enemy had the decided advantage of the ground,
as my troops had to form on the low ground on our
side of the ridge, near a small stream which runs along
its base. The formation of my troops was in full view
of the enemy, and his skirmishers, which were about
four hundred yards in front of us, opened on my men,
while forming, with long range rifles or minie muskets.
Barksdale and Hays came up rapidly and formed as
directed, Barksdale in the centre and Hays on the left.

23

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

While their regiments were forming by file into line,
under the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters, Kemper 's
regiment commenced moving obliquely to the right
towards the woods into which Elzey's troops had been
seen to move, and I rode in front and halted it, informing
it that there were no troops in the woods, and pointing
out the enemy on the crest of the ridge in front. I then
rode to the other regiments to direct their movements,
when Colonel Kemper, finding the fire of the enemy,
who was beyond the range of our smooth bores, very
annoying to his men, moved rapidly to the front, to the
cover of a fence at the foot of the ridge. As soon as
Hays' regiment was formed, I ordered an advance and
Hays moved forward until in a line with Kemper, then
their two regiments started up the side of the hill. As we
advanced the enemy disappeared behind the crest, and
while we were ascending the slope Lieutenant McDonald,
acting aide to Colonel Elzey, came riding rapidly towards
me and requested me not to let my men fire on the
troops in my front, stating that they consisted of the
13th Virginia Regiment of Elzey's brigade. I said to
him, — "They have been firing on my men," to which
he replied, "I know they have, but it is a mistake, I
recognize Colonel Hill of the 13th, and his horse." This
was a mistake on the part of Lieutenant McDonald,
arising from a fancied resemblance of a mounted officer
with the enemy to the Colonel of the 13th. This regiment
did not reach the battlefield at all.

This information and the positive assurance of Lieu
tenant McDonald, however, caused me to halt my troops
and ride to the crest of the ridge, where I observed a
regiment about two hundred yards to my right drawn
up in line in front of the woods where Elzey's left was.
The dress of the volunteers on both sides at that time
was very similar, and the flag of the regiment I saw
was drooping around the staff, so that I could not see
whether it was the United States or the Confederate
flag. The very confident manner of Lieutenant Mc-

24

EARLY'S BRIGADE AT MANASSAS

Donald, in his statement in regard to the troops in my
front, induced me to believe that this must also be one
of our regiments.

Colonel Stuart had also advanced on my left with
his two companies of cavalry and Beckham's battery
of four guns, and passed around Chinn's house, the
battery had been brought into action and opened a flank
fire on the regiment I was observing. Thinking it cer
tainly was one of ours, I started a messenger to Colonel
Stuart, to give him the information and request him to
stop the firing, but a second shell or ball from Beckham's
guns caused the regiment to face about and retire rapidly,
when I saw the United States flag unfurled and dis
covered the mistake into which I had been led by Lieuten
ant McDonald.

I immediately ordered my command forward and
it advanced to the crest of the hill. All this occurred
in less time than it has taken me to describe it. On
reaching the crest we came in view of the Warrenton
Pike and the plains beyond, and now saw the enemy's
troops in full retreat across and beyond the pike. When
Kemper's and Hays' regiments had advanced, Barks-
dale's, under a misapprehension of my orders, had not
at first moved, but it soon followed, and the whole
command was formed in line, along the crest of the
ridge, on the right of Chinn's house.

We were now on the extreme left of the whole of
our infantry, and in advance of the main line. The
only troops on our left of any description were the two
companies of cavalry and Beckham's battery with
Stuart. On my immediate right and a little to the rear
was Elzey's brigade, and farther to the right I saw
our line extending towards Bull Run, but I discovered
no indications of a forward movement.

My troops were now very much exhausted, especially
Hays' regiment, which had been marching nearly all the
morning before our movement to the left, and it was
necessary to give the men a little time to breathe. Beck-

25

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

ham's guns had continued firing on the retreating enemy
until beyond their range, and Stuart soon went in
pursuit followed by Beckham. Colonel Cocke now came
up and joined me with the 19th Virginia Regiment.

As soon as my men had rested a little, I directed
the brigade to advance in column of divisions along the
route over which we had seen the enemy retiring, and I
sent information to the troops, on my right, of my pur
pose to move in their front with the request not to fire
on us. I moved forward followed by Cocke 's regiment,
crossing Young's branch and the Warrenton Pike to
the north side. When we got into the valley of Young's
branch we lost sight of the enemy, and on ascending to
the plains north of the pike we could see nothing of
them. Passing to the west and north of the houses
known as the Dogan house, the Stone Tavern, the
Matthews house and the Carter or Pittsylvania house,
and being guided by the abandoned haversacks and mus
kets, we moved over the ground on which the battle had
begun with Evans in the early morning, and continued
our march until we had cleared our right.

We had now got to a point where Bull Run makes
a considerable bend above Stone Bridge, and I halted
as we had not observed any movement from the main
line. Nothing could be seen of the enemy, and his
troops had scattered so much in the retreat that it was
impossible for me to tell what route he had taken. More
over the country was entirely unknown to me. Stuart
and Beckham had crossed the run above me, and Cocke 's
regiment had also moved towards a ford above where
I was. While I was engaged in making some observa
tions and trying to find out what was going on, Colonel
Chisolm of General Beauregard's volunteer staff passed
me with a detachment of cavalry in pursuit of a body of
the enemy supposed to be across Bull Run above me.

About this time it was reported to me that the enemy
had., sent us a flag of truce, but on inquiry I found it
was a messenger with a note from Colonel Jones of the

26

EARLY'S BRIGADE AT MANASSAS

4th Alabama Regiment, who had been very badly
wounded and was at one of the enemy's hospitals in
rear of the battlefield, and I sent for him and had him
brought in to Matthews' house near where the battle
had begun. I also found Lieutenant Colonel Gardner of
the 8th Georgia Regiment in the yard of the Carter
house, where he had been brought by some of the enemy
engaged in collecting the wounded, and suffering from
a very painful wound.

Shortly after this President Davis, accompanied by
several gentlemen, rode to where my command was.
He addressed a few remarks to each regiment and was
received with great enthusiasm. I then informed him
of the condition of things as far as I knew them, told
him of the condition and location of Colonel Gardner,
and requested him to have medical assistance sent to
him, as no medical officer could be found with my com
mand at that time. I informed him of the fact that I
was unacquainted with the situation of the country and
without orders to guide me under the circumstances,
and asked him what I should do.

He said I had better form my men in line near where
I was and let them rest until orders were received. I
requested him to inform Generals Beauregard and
Johnston of my position and ask them to send me orders.
While we were conversing we observed a body of troops
across Bull Run, some distance below, moving in good
order in the direction of Centreville. I at first supposed
it to be Bonham's brigade moving from Mitchell's Ford,
but it turned out to be Kershaw's and Casii's regiments
of that brigade, which had preceded me to the battlefield
and were now moving in pursuit, after having crossed
at or below Stone Bridge. Bonham's position at
Mitchell's Ford was entirely too far off for his move
ment to be observed.

As soon as Mr. Davis left me, I moved my com
mand farther into the bend of Bull Run, and put it in
line across the bend with the flanks resting on the stream,

27

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

the right flank being some distance above Stone Bridge.
In this position my troops spent the night. They were
considerably exhausted by the fatigues of the day, and
had had nothing to eat since the early morning. They
were now miles away from their baggage and trains.
Early in the morning a Virginia company under Captain
Gibson, unattached, had been permitted, at the request
of the Captain, to join Kemper's regiment and remained
with it throughout the day. A South Carolina company
belonging to Kershaw's or Cash's regiment, which was
on picket at the time their regiments moved from
Mitchell's Ford, not being able to find its proper com
mand, had joined me just as we were advancing against
the enemy near Chinn's house, and had been attached
to Hays' regiment, with which it went into action. Lieu
tenant Murat Willis had volunteered his services early
in the day as aide and been with me through all my
movements, rendering valuable service.

The conduct of my troops during the whole day had
been admirable, and the coolness with which they formed
in open ground under the fire of the enemy's sharp
shooters was deserving of all praise. They were in a
condition to have taken up the pursuit the next day, but
it would have been with empty haversacks, or rather
without any except those picked up on the battlefield and
along the line of the enemy's retreat.

My loss was in killed and wounded, seventy-six, the
greater part being in Kemper's regiment.

The troops which were immediately in my front near
Chinn's house constituted the enemy's extreme right,
and were, I think, composed in part of the regulars
attached to McDowell's army. Their long range mus
kets or rifles enabled them to inflict the loss on my
command, but I am satisfied that the latter inflicted little
or no loss on the enemy, as he retired before we got
within range with our arms, which were smooth-bore
mu sleets.

As soon as my troops were disposed for the night

28

EARLY'S BRIGADE AT MANASSAS

and steps taken to guard the front, I rode with my staff
officers in search of either General Beauregard or Gen
eral Johnston, in order to give information of my
position and get instructions for the next morning. Not
knowing the roads, I had to take the circuitous route
over which I had advanced, but I finally reached the
Lewis, house to find it a hospital for the wounded, and
the headquarters removed. Not being able to get here
any information of either of the generals, I rode in the
direction of Manassas until I met an officer who said he
was on the staff of General Johnston and was looking
for him. He stated that he was just from Manassas
and did not think either of the generals was there.

Taking this to be true and not knowing where to
look further, I rode back along the Sudley Mills road
to the Stone Tavern, passing over the main battlefield,
and rejoined my command after twelve o'clock at night,
when I lay down to rest, my bed being a bundle of
wheat. While trying to find the generals, I discovered
that there was very great confusion among our troops
that had been engaged in the battle. They were scattered
in every direction, regiments being separated from their
brigades, companies from their regiments, while many
squads and individuals were seeking their commands.
That part of the army was certainly in no condition to
make pursuit next morning.

Very early on the morning of the 22nd, I sent Captain
Fleming Gardner to Manassas for instruction, and he
returned with directions to me from General Beauregard
to remain where I was until further orders, and to have
my men made as comfortable as possible. A heavy rain
had now set in, which continued through the day and
night. When it was ascertained that there was to be
no movement, I rode over the battlefield and to the hos
pitals in the vicinity to see about having my wounded
brought in who had not been taken care of. The country
in rear of the enemy's line of battle of the day before,
and along his routes of retreat was strewn with knap-

29

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

sacks, haversacks, canteens, blankets, overcoats, india-
rubber cloths, muskets, equipments, and all the debris
of a routed army.

A report subsequently made by a Committee of the
Federal Congress, of which Senator Wade was chair
man, gave a most preposterous account of " Rebel
atrocities M committed upon the dead and wounded of
the Federal army after the battle. I -am able to say,
from my personal knowledge, that its statements are
false, and the Federal surgeons, left with the wounded,
could bear testimony to their falsehood.

CHAPTER IV.

DETAILS OF THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS.

I HAVE now told what I saw and did during the first
battle of Manas sas, and as many very erroneous accounts
of that battle, both in its general features and its details,
were given by newspaper correspondents, from both
sections, which have furnished the basis for most of
the descriptions of it, contained errors — even in works
professing to be authentic histories, — I will here give a
succinct account of the battle from the authentic official
reports, and my own knowledge as far as it extends.

On the morning of the 21st we held the line of Bull
Run, with our right at Union Mills and our left at Stone
Bridge. EwelPs brigade was at Union Mills, Jones' at
McLean's Ford, Longstreet's at Blackburn's Ford, Bon-
ham's at Mitchell's Ford, Cocke at the fords below
Stone Bridge, and Evans with Sloan's regiment and
Wheat's battalion was at the Stone Bridge. Holmes'
brigade, which had arrived from Aquia Creek, was some
three miles in rear of Swell's position. My brigade was
in reserve to support Longstreet or Jones, as might be
required, and Jackson's and parts of Bee's and Bartow's
brigades of Johnston's army — which had arrived by
the Manassas Gap Railroad — were held as a general
reserve to be used as occasion might require. The War-
renton Pike from Centreville to Warrenton crosses Bull
Run at Stone Bridge, and its general direction from
Centreville is a little south of west.

McDowell's force had reached Centreville on the
18th, and that day the 19th and 20th had been employed
by him in reconnoitring. Contrary to General Beau-
regard's anticipations, McDowell, instead of advancing
against our centre on the morning of the 21st, left one
division (Miles') and a brigade of another (Tyler's) to
hold Centreville and amuse our right and centre, while

31

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

lie moved two divisions (Hunter's and Heintzelman's)
and three brigades of another (Tyler's) against our
left, with the view of turning that flank and forcing
us from the line of Bull Run. The three brigades of
Tyler's division moved directly against Stone Bridge,
over the Warrenton Pike, and opened an artillery fire
at six o 'clock A.M. About the same time lire was opened
from two batteries established by the enemy north of
Bull Run, near Blackburn's Ford, which was kept up
steadily until late in the afternoon. Hunter's division,
diverging from the Warrenton Pike, moved across Bull
Run at or near Sudley Mills, about three miles above
Stone Bridge, and then towards Manassas on the direct
road, so as to get in rear of Stone Bridge, while Heintzel-
man followed Hunter to support him.

When this movement was developed, Colonel Evans,
leaving a very small force at Stone Bridge, where the
road had been blocked up by felled timber, moved to the
left to meet Hunter and encountered his advance north
of the Warrenton Pike, sustaining his attack for some
time, until overwhelming numbers were accumulated
against him. Evans was being forced back when Bee,
with the parts of his own and Bartow's brigades which
had arrived, came to his assistance, and the advance of
the enemy was stopped for some time until Heintzelman 's
division united with Hunter's and two of Tyler's
brigades crossed over above Stone Bridge.

Bee and Evans, though fighting with great obstinacy,
were forced back across the Warrenton Pike to a ridge
south of it, and nearly at right angles with Bull Run.
Here they were reinforced first by Hampton's six com
panies and then by Jackson's brigade, when a new line
was formed and the fight renewed with great obstinacy.
Subsequently two of Cocke's regiments were brought
up, as also the seven companies of the 8th Virginia,
under Colonel Hunter; the three companies of the 49th
Virginia Regiment, under Colonel Smith; the 6th North
Carolina Regiment, under Colonel Fisher; and two of

32

DETAILS OF THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS

Bonham's regiments, under Colonel Kershaw; and
engaged in the battle.

The fighting was very stubborn on the part of our
troops, who were opposed to immense odds, and the
fortunes of the day fluctuated for some time. From
the beginning, artillery had been employed on both sides,
and a number of our batteries did most excellent ser
vice. Colonel Stuart made a charge at one time with
two companies of cavalry on the right of the enemy's
line. At a most critical period three regiments of
Elzey 's brigade — which had arrived at the junction by
the railroad and been promptly moved to the battlefield
under the direction of Brigadier General E. Kirby Smith
—came upon the field in rear of our line, and after
General Smith had been wounded were moved to our
left, under command of Colonel Elzey, just in time to
meet and repulse a body of the enemy which had over
lapped that flank. A short time afterwards, while the
enemy was preparing for a last effort, my brigade
arrived on the field, and operated on the left of Elzey 's
brigade just as the enemy began his attack.

He had been repulsed, not routed. When, however,
the retreat began, it soon degenerated into a rout from
the panic-stricken fears of the enemy's troops, who
imagined that legions of cavalry were thundering at their
heels, when really there were only a few companies acting
without concert. Kershaw 's two regiments with a bat
tery of artillery moved in pursuit along the Warrenton
Pike, and made some captures, but the mass of our troops
on this part of the field were not in a condition to pursue
at once. Swell's and Holmes' brigades had been sent
for from the right, when the day appeared doubtful, but
the battle was won before they arrived, and they were
ordered to return to their former positions.

D. R. Jones, in the afternoon, made an advance
against the battery which I had been ordered to take
in the morning, but was compelled to retire with loss.
Bonham and Long-street moved across the Run in the

3 33

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

direction of Centreville just before night, but retired to
their former positions on the approach of darkness.
The enemy retreated in great disorder to Centreville,
where he attempted to re-form his troops on the un
broken division and brigade that remained at that place,
but shortly after dark he retreated with great precipita
tion, and by light next morning the greater part of his
troops were either in the streets of Washington, or on
the southern banks of the Potomac.

Twenty-seven pieces of artillery fell into our hands,
some of which were captured on the field, but the greater
part were abandoned on the road between the battlefield
and Centreville. Besides the artillery, a considerable
quantity of small arms, a number of wagons, ambulances,
and some stores fell into our hands; and we captured
about 1,500 prisoners. Our loss in killed and wounded
was 1,852. The enemy's loss was much heavier, and is
reported by McDowell.

I have thus given an outline of the battle as it took
place, but I have not attempted to give the details of
what the several commands did, for which reference
must be had to the official reports.

. There are several popular errors in regard to this
battle, which have been widely circulated by the writings
of those who have undertaken to describe it, and about
which very few people indeed seem to be correctly in
formed.

Foremost among them is the opinion that General
Johnston yielded the command to General Beauregard,
and that the latter controlled the operations of our troops
during the battle. This erroneous statement was so
often and confidently made without contradiction, that I
must confess for a long time I gave it some credence,
though when I saw General Johnston on the field he
appeared to be acting the part and performing the
duties of a commanding general. Each of these gen
erals is entitled to sufficient glory for the part taken
in this battle in the performance of his appropriate

34

DETAILS OF THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS

duties, to render a contest among their friends for the
chief glory idle as well as mischievous.

I cannot better explain the truth of the matter than
by giving the following extract of a letter from General
Johnston himself to me, which is in entire accordance
with the facts coming within my knowledge on the field
as far as they go, and will not be doubted by any one
who knows General Johnston. He says: "General
Beauregard 's influence on that occasion was simply that
due to my estimate of his military merit and knowledge
of the situation. As soon as we met I expressed to him
my determination to attack next morning, because it
was not improbable that Patterson might come up
Sunday night. He proposed a plan of attack which I
accepted. It was defeated, however, by the appearance
of Tyler's troops near the Stone Bridge soon after sun
rise. He then proposed to stand on the defensive there
and continue the offensive with the troops on the right
of the road from Manassas to Centreville. This was
frustrated by the movement which turned Cocke and
Evans, and the battle fought was improvised on a field
with which General Beauregard and myself were equally
unacquainted. Early in the day I placed myself on the
high bare hill you may remember a few hundred yards in
rear of Mitchell's Ford, and General Beauregard soon
joined me there. When convinced that the battle had be
gun on our left, I told him so, and that I was about to
hasten to it. He followed. When we reached the field
and he found that I was about to take immediate control
of the two brigades engaged, he represented that it
would be incompatible with the command of the army
to do so, and urged that he should have the command
in question. I accepted the argument. This, however,
left him under me, and was the command of a small
fraction of troops."

This places the matter in its true light and does not
detract at all from the very great credit to which Gen
eral Beauregard is entitled for thwarting the enemy's

35

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

plans until the arrival of General Johnston, and for
his able cooperation afterwards. But it is nevertheless
true that General Johnston is entitled to the credit
attached to the chief command in this, the first great
battle of the war.

Another error in regard to the battle is the belief,
almost universal, that Kirby Smith, hearing the roar
of musketry and artillery while passing over the Manas-
sas Gap Railroad, stopped the cars before reaching the
Junction and moved directly for the battlefield, coming
upon the rear of the enemy's right flank. This is en
tirely unfounded in fact. Smith's command consisted
of Elzey 's brigade, three regiments of which were in
the battle, and they moved up from the Junction to the
rear of our centre, under orders which General Smith
found there on his arrival, and were subsequently moved
by Elzey to meet the enemy's right after Smith was
wounded. My brigade went to the left of Elzey, and
I am able to say that none of our troops got to the
enemy's rear, unless it may have been when Stuart
made his charge. The reports of Generals Johnston
and Beauregard as well as that of Colonel, afterwards
Major General, Elzey, show the truth of the matter,
and it is a little singular that those writers who have
undertaken to describe this battle have taken the news
paper accounts as authentic without thinking of having
recourse to the official reports.

Another erroneous statement in reference to 'the
battle which has gone current, is that Holmes' brigade
came up at a critical time and helped to save the day,
when the fact is that that brigade was further from
the field than any of our troops, and, though sent for
in the afternoon, did not reach the battlefield at all,
but its march was arrested by the close of the fight.

The concentration of Johnston's and Beauregard 's
forces against McDowell was a master stroke of strategy
well executed, and our generals displayed great ability
and energy in meeting and defeating the unexpected

36

DETAILS OF THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS

movement against our left. Claims were put forward
in behalf of several commands for the credit of having
saved the day and secured the victory.

It is rather surprising to observe that erroneous
views often prevail in regard to the relative merits of
different commands, engaged in bearing respectively
very necessary parts in an action. If a small force has
been fighting obstinately for hours against great odds,
until it has become exhausted and is beginning to give
way, and then fresh troops come up and turn the tide
of battle, the latter are said to have gained the day and
often reap all the glory. It is not likely to be considered,
that, but for the troops whose obstinate fighting enabled
the fresh ones to come up in time, the day would have
been irretrievably lost before the appearance of the
latter. It is an old saying that "It is the last feather
that breaks the camel's back/7 yet the last feather would
do no harm but for the weight which precedes it. The
first feather contributes as much as the last to the
catastrophe.

At this battle, but for the cavalry which watched
the enemy 's movements and gave timely notice to Evans
so that he could move to the left and check the advance
of Hunter, the day would probably have been lost at
the outset. But for the prompt movement of Evans to
the left and the obstinate fighting of his men, the enemy
would have reached the range of hills on which our
final line of battle was formed, thus turning our left
completely and necessitating a rapid falling back from
the line of Bull Run, which would most assuredly have
resulted in defeat. This would likewise have been the
case had not Bee arrived to the assistance of Evans
when he did and stayed the progress of the enemy by
his stubborn resistance.

When Bee and Evans were forced back across the
Warrenton Pike, the day would have been lost had not
Jackson arrived most opportunely and furnished them
a barrier behind which to re-form. From the beginning

37

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

our batteries rendered most essential service, and the
infantry would probably have been overpowered but
for their well directed fire. The arrivals of Cocke's two
regiments, Hampton's Legion, the ten companies of the
7th and 49th Virginia Regiments, the 6th North Carolina
and Bonham's two regiments all served to stem the tide
of battle and stay defeat, but still in all probability the
day would have been lost but for the timely appearance
of Smith with Elzey's command and the subsequent
movement of Elzey to our left.

I do not claim to have won or saved the day with my
command, but I think it will be conceded by all who read
the reports of Generals Johnston and Beauregard, that
the arrival of that command and the cool and deliberate
manner in which my men formed in line, under fire and
in full view of the enemy, and their advance had a
material effect in thwarting the last effort of the enemy
to flank our line and in precipitating his retreat. I
can bear testimony to the very efficient service rendered
by Stuart with his two companies of cavalry, and Beck-
ham's battery.

The fact is that all the troops engaged in the battle
were necessary to prevent defeat and secure victory,
and each command in its proper sphere may be said
to have saved the day. It is very unjust to give all the
credit or the greater part of it to any one command;
and I would not exempt from the general commendation
those troops on the right who held that part of the line,
under fire, and prevented the enemy from getting to
our rear and cutting off our communications.

It is not easy to account for McDowell's delay in
making his attack, thereby permitting the concentration
against him. So far as he is personally concerned, a
ready excuse is to be found for him in the fact that
he was inexperienced in command, having before that
served in the field only in the capacity of a staff
officer; but General Scott, an old and distinguished

38

DETAILS OF THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS

soldier, was in fact controlling the operations and
was in constant communication by telegraph with
McDowell, who had been his aide and was selected
to carry out his plans. General Scott was in fact the
commander and McDowell was merely his executive
officer in the field. The former was the responsible
man and to his name must be attached the discredit for
the failure at Bull Eun. Had McDowell's whole force
been thrown against our centre on the day Tyler ad
vanced on Blackburn's Ford, our line must have been
broken and a defeat to us must have ensued, for at that
time our troops were too few and too much scattered to
have furnished sufficient resistance to the enemy's over
whelming force, or to have permitted an effective attack
on his flanks. By delay this opportunity was lost and
the two armies were concentrated against McDowell.

McDowell seems to have made an honest effort to
conduct the campaign on the principles of civilized war
fare, and expressed a very just indignation at the ex
cesses committed by his troops. In a dispatch from
Fairfax Court-House, dated the 18th of July, he said:
"I am distressed to have to report excesses by our
troops. The excitement of the men found vent in burn
ing and pillaging, which, however, was soon checked. It
distressed us all greatly." On the same day he issued
an order from which I make the following extract :

"Any persons found committing the slightest depre
dation, killing pigs or poultry or trespassing on the
property of the inhabitants, will be reported to the then
headquarters, and the least that will be done to them
will be to send them to the Alexandria jail. It is again
ordered that no one shall arrest or attempt to arrest
any citizen not in arms at the time, or search or attempt
to search any house, or even enter the same without
permission. The troops must behave themselves with
as much forbearance and propriety as if they were at

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

their own homes. They are here to fight the enemies of
the country, not to judge and punish the unarmed and
helpless, however guilty they may be. When necessary,
that will be done by the proper person.

"By command of General McDowell.

"Jas. B. Fry, Assistant Adjutant General. "

This order deserves to be exhumed from the oblivion
into which it seems to have fallen, and is in strong con
trast with the subsequent practice under Butler, Pope,
Milroy, Hunter, Sheridan, Sherman, etc. This war order
of McDowell's might well have been commended to the
consideration of military satraps set to rule over the
people of the South in a time of "peace." It did not
prevent the burning of the entire village of German-
town, a few miles from Fairfax Court-House, but the
citizens agreed that McDowell had made an honest effort
to prevent depredations by his troops ; and it gives me
pleasure to make the statement, as it is the last time I
will have occasion to make a similar one in regard to
any of the Federal commanders who followed him.

Pursuit of the enemy was not made after the battle
in order to capture Washington or cross the Potomac,
and as this omission has been the subject of much com
ment and criticism, I will make some observations on
that head.

In the first place, it must be borne in mind that our
generals were inexperienced in command.

In the next place, it must be conceded that a com
manding general knows more about the condition of his
troops and the obstacles in his way than any other can
know ; and for very obvious reasons he is debarred from
making public at the time the reasons and conditions
which govern his course.

It must also be considered that he cannot know be
forehand as much as the critics who form their judgment
frtan the light of after events. Those, therefore, who
ascertained some days after the battle what was the

40

DETAILS OF THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS

actual condition of McDowell's army on the retreat,
must recollect that this was not known to General
Johnston until that army was safe from pursuit, even
if it had heen practicable to accomplish any more than
was done with our army in its then condition.

Without having been in General Johnston's con
fidence, or professing to know more about the motives
actuating him at the time than he has thought proper
to make public, I will undertake to show that it was
utterly impossible for any army to have captured Wash
ington by immediate pursuit, even if it had been in con
dition to make such pursuit, and that it would have
been very difficult to cross the Potomac at all.

In the first place, I will say that the army was not
in condition to make pursuit on the afternoon of the
21st after the battle, or that night. All the troops en
gaged, except Cocke's regiment, the 19th Virginia, the
two regiments with Kershaw, and my command, were
so much exhausted and shattered by the desperate con
flict in which they had participated, that they made no
attempt at pursuit and were incapable of any.

Our cavalry consisted of one organized regiment of
nine companies, and a number of unattached companies.
This cavalry was armed principally with shot guns and
very inferior sabres, and was without the discipline
and drill necessary to make that arm effective in a
charge. Moreover it had been necessarily scattered on
the flanks and along the line, to watch the enemy and
give information of his movements. It could not readily
be concentrated for the purpose of an efficient pursuit,
and the attempts made in that direction were desultory.

By light on the morning of the 22nd, the greater part
of the enemy's troops were either in the streets of
Washington or under the protection of the guns at
Arlington Heights.

The question then arises whether, by pursuit on the
morning of the 22nd, Washington could have been cap
tured. And I will here call attention to some facts which

41

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

seem entirely to have escaped the attention of the critics.
The Potomac is at least a mile wide at Washington and
navigable to that place for the largest vessels. The only
means of crossing the river, except in vessels, are by the
Long Bridge, the aqueduct on the Chesapeake & Ohio
Canal at Georgetown, and the chain bridge above
Georgetown.

The Long Bridge is an old wooden structure with at
least one draw and perhaps two in it, and could have
been easily destroyed by fire, besides being susceptible
of being commanded through its entire length by vessels
of war lying near Washington, where there were some
out of range of any guns we would have brought to bear.

The aqueduct is long and narrow with a channel for
the water, which we could not have turned off as it runs
from the northern side of the Potomac, and a narrow
towpath on the side. One piece of artillery at its north
ern end could have effectually prevented the passing
of troops over it, and besides it could have been easily
ruined and some of the spans blown up, so as to render
it impassable.

The chain bridge is a wooden structure and could
have been easily burned. If therefore the entire Federal
Army had fled across the river on our approach, we
could not have crossed it near Washington. The largest
pieces of artillery we had, capable of being transported,
were small field pieces of which the heaviest for solid
shot were six pounders, and we had no Howitzer larger
than a twenty-four pounder if we had any of that size.
None of our guns were of sufficient range to reach across
the river into the city. If, therefore, we had advanced
at once upon Washington and the Federal Army had
fled across the river on our approach, abandoning the
city itself, still we could not have entered it, unless the
bridges had been left intact; and it is not to be supposed
that McDowell, General Scott, and all the officers of the
regular army, were so badly frightened and demoralized
that they would have fled on our approach, and omitted
to destroy the approaches to the city, even if such had

42

DETAILS OF THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS

been the case with the volunteers, the civil authorities,
and the Congress.

All the bridges above, to and beyond Harper's Ferry,
had been burned, and the nearest ford to Washington,
over which at low water it is possible for infantry to
pass, is White's Ford, several miles above Leesburg,
and forty miles from Washington. This was then an
obscure ford, where, in 1862, General Jackson had , to
have the banks dug down before our wagons and artillery
could cross, and then the canal on the northern bank had
to be bridged. We had nothing in the shape of pontoons,
and it would have been impossible to have obtained
them in any reasonable time.

I had occasion, in 1864, to make myself acquainted
with the character of the Potomac and its crossing at
and above Washington, and what I state here is not
mere speculation. General Johnston had resided in
Washington for several years, and must be supposed to
have been acquainted with the difficulties.

I have heard some wiseacres remark that if we had
gone on, we could have entered pell-mell with the enemy
into Washington. To have done that, if possible, we
would have had to keep up with the enemy, and I don't
think any one supposes that a solitary soldier in our
army could have reached the banks of the Potomac by
daylight the morning after the battle. It is possible to
cross a bridge of a few yards in length, or enter through
the gates of a city pell-mell with an army, but no one
ever heard of that thing being done on a bridge more
than a mile in length and with a draw raised in the
middle.

The truth is that, while the enemy's retreat was very
disorderly and disgraceful, some of his troops retained
their organization and the condition of things at Wash
ington was not quite as bad as represented. Spectators
in the city, seeing the condition of the fugitives throng
ing the streets, and the panic of the civilians, may have
well supposed that the whole army was disorganized,
and so utterly demoralized that it would have fled on

43

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

the very first cry that the "rebels are coming," but if
General McDowell and his officers are to be believed,
there still remained on the southern bank of the Potomac
a considerable force in fighting condition. Miles'
division had not been engaged and Runyon's had not
reached Centreville when the battle took place. Besides
a considerable force had been retained in Washington
under Mansfield.

McClellan states in his report, that, when he assumed
command on the 27th of July, the infantry in and around
Washington numbered 50,000, and this was much larger
than our whole force was after the reinforcements had
reached us subsequent to the battle. The strength of
our army at this time, as well as on all other occasions,
has been greatly exaggerated even by Southern writers ;
its organization was very imperfect, many of the troops
not being brigaded.

If we had advanced, Alexandria would probably have
fallen into our hands without a struggle, and we might
have forced the enemy to evacuate his works south of
the Potomac, but very likely not until after a fight in
which our loss would have been greater than the object
to be accomplished would have justified. We might
have transferred our line to the banks of the Potomac,
but we could not have held it, and would eventually have
been compelled to abandon it with greater damage to
us than the evacuation of the line of Bull Run caused.

So much for the question as between the commanding
general and the cavillers. But there is another phase
of it, in which a staff officer of General Beauregard,
writing for a Northern journal, has endeavored to raise
an issue between that general and the Government at
Richmond. I have before shown that General Johnston,
as commander of the army, was the responsible person,
and I believe he has never attempted to evade the re
sponsibility. General Beauregard 's agency in the mat
ter could only be as an adviser and lieutenant of the
commanding general.

44

DETAILS OF THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS

The point made against the Government is that
Washington could and would have been taken, if the
President, Secretary of War, and the heads of the
Quarter-master and Commissary Departments had
furnished sufficient transportation and supplies, though
it is admitted that Mr. Davis left the question of an
advance entirely to his generals.

Now in regard to transportation, we had an abund
ance of wagons to carry all the ammunition needed, and
for gathering in provisions, and if the bridges on the
railroad had not been burned, we might have moved
our depot to Alexandria as we moved, provided we
could have advanced to that point, as the enemy had
repaired the railroad to Fairfax Station, and had not
interfered with it on his retreat. The burning of the
bridges on the railroad did not impede the progress
of the enemy before the battle, as he did not march on
it and Bull Run was fordable anywhere. That burning
could only have served the purpose of obstructing the
use of the railroad by the enemy in the event of our
defeat, which with his means of reconstruction would
have been but a very few days, and it did not obstruct
our movements for a much longer time. At the time of
the battle, the county of Loudoun on the Virginia side
of the Potomac, and the whole State of Maryland, were
teeming with supplies, and we could have readily
procured all the transportation needed from the citizens,
if we had not taken it from the enemy, which would
probably have been the case if an advance had been
practicable otherwise.

Certain it is, that in 1862, after the second battle of
Manassas, when the enemy's army had been defeated,
not routed, and was still vastly superior in number and
equipment to our own, we did not hesitate a moment
about supplies, though our army was without rations
and Fairfax and Loudoun had been nearly exhausted
of their grain and cattle ; but taking only transportation
for the ammunition and the cooking utensils, and send-

45

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

ing the rest of our trains to the valley, except wagons
to gather up flour, we marched across the Potomac into
Maryland, our men and officers living principally on
green corn and beef without salt or bread. Neither was
our army prevented from making the movement into
Pennsylvania, in 1863, for fear of not getting provisions.
We depended upon taking them from the enemy and
the country through which we marched, and did thus
procure them. The alleged difficulties in 1861 would
have been no difficulties in 1862, 1863, or 1864. These
were not the real difficulties which prevented the capture
of Washington after the battle of the 21st of July, and
the issue which is attempted to be made with the Govern
ment at Richmond is therefore an idle one.

These remarks are not made with the slightest pur
pose of disparaging in any way General Beauregard,
for whom I have great regard and admiration. When
he ordered the burning of the bridge over Bull Run, he
had reason to apprehend that his comparatively small
force would have to encounter McDowell's whole army
before any reinforcements arrived to his assistance, and
he had therefore good grounds to regard this as a pre
caution which the circumstances warranted and
demanded.

The foregoing reflections and comments are such as
my subsequent experience and observation have enabled
me to make, and I do not pretend that a tittle of them
occurred to me at the time.

Both of our generals, notwithstanding their inex
perience in command, displayed extraordinary energy
and capacity in thwarting the plans of a veteran com
mander, whom the country at that time regarded as
one of the ablest military chieftains of the age. If
they did not accomplish all that might have been accom
plished by an experienced and skilful commander, with
an army of veterans, they are not therefore to be con-
deitined ; but it is equally unjust to attempt to shift the
responsibility to the shoulders of the Government at
Richmond.

CHAPTER V.
OPERATIONS ALONG BULL, BUN.

IMMEDIATELY after the battle of the 21st a portion
of our troops were moved across Bull Bun and the
former line north of that stream was re-occupied. The
army at that time was known as the "Army of the
Potomac, " and General Beauregard's command was re
organized as the 1st corps of that army, with the same
brigade commanders as before. I was promoted to the
rank of brigadier general to date from the 21st of July,
and was assigned to the command of a brigade com
posed of the 24th Virginia Begiment, the 5th North
Carolina State Troops, Colonel Duncan K. McBae, and
the 13th North Carolina Volunteers (subsequently
designated the 23rd North Carolina Begiment), Colonel
John Hoke. The greater part of the army was moved
to the north of Bull Bun, but I resumed my position on
the right of the Junction at my former camps, and
remained there until the latter part of August, when
I moved to the north of the Occoquon, in front of Wolf
Bun Shoals, below the mouth of Bull Bun. Our line was
extended from this point by Langster's cross-roads and
Fairfax Station through Fairfax Court-House. Hamp
ton's Legion was composed of a battalion of infantry,
a battalion of cavalry, and a battery of artillery, and
remained south of the Occoquon on the right, and
watched the lower fords of that stream and the land
ings on the Potomac immediately below Occoquon.
Evans had occupied Leesburg.

Captain W. W. Thornton's company of cavalry had
been again attached to my command and subsequently,
in the month of September, a battery of Virginia artil
lery under Captain Holman reported to me. In the lat
ter part of August, General Longstreet, who had com
mand of the advanced forces at Fairfax Court-House,

47

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

threw forward a small force of infantry and cavalry
and established strong pickets at Mason's and Munson's
Hills, in close proximity to the enemy's main line on the
south of the Potomac.

McClellan had succeeded McDowell, in command of
the Federal Army opposed to us, and that army was
being greatly augmented by new levies.

A few days after I reached my camp in front of
Wolf Run Shoals, my brigade was ordered to Fairfax
Station, for the purpose of supporting Longstreet, if
necessary. After being there a day, I was ordered by
General Longstreet to move with two of my regiments
to Mason's Hill, to relieve one of his on duty at that
place. I took with me the 24th Virginia and 5th North
Carolina Regiments, and my movement was so timed
as to reach Mason's Hill in the night. I arrived there
before light on the morning of the 31st of August, and
relieved the 17th Regiment, Colonel Corse. About light
on that morning, one of Colonel Corse's companies,
which was on picket one mile from the main force in the
direction of Alexandria, was attacked by a detachment
from a New Jersey regiment, under its colonel, and
after a very sharp fight, repulsed the enemy and in
flicted a severe punishment on him.

This advanced line at Mason's and Munson's Hills
was about twelve or fifteen miles in front of Fairfax
Court-House, and was a mere picket line held ordinarily
by two infantry regiments with a few pieces of artillery,
while a small force of cavalry watched the flanks. From
it there were in full view the dome of the Capitol at
Washington and a part of the enemy's line on the
heights south and west of Alexandria. The two main
positions were in sight of each other and about a mile
apart. From them smaller pickets were thrown out in
front and up to within a very short distance of large
bodies of the enemy, those from Mason's Hill being in
some cases more than a mile from the main body. The
pickets were constantly skirmishing with those of the

48

OPERATIONS ALONG BULL RUN

eueiny, and it was very evident that he was much alarmed
at this demonstration in his immediate front, as Pro
fessor Lowe, who now made his appearance with his
balloons, kept one of them up almost constantly, and
large parties were seen working very energetically at
the line of fortifications in our front. Contemporaneous
accounts given by the enemy represent this movement
on our part as a very serious one, and he was evidently
impressed with the idea that the greater part of our
army was immediately confronting him, whereas, if it
had not been for his excessive caution and want of enter
prise, he might have moved out and captured the whole
of our advance force without the possibility of its
escape.

After my pickets had relieved those of Corse, it was
reported to me that a flag of truce had appeared at the
outside picket, where the fight had taken place in the
early morning, and I rode to a house in the vicinity of
that point and had the person bearing the flag brought
to me blindfolded. He proved to be a Dr. Coxe, surgeon
of the New Jersey regiment, a detachment of which
had been engaged in the above named affair. He stated
that he came on the part of Colonel Tyler of the 3rd New
Jersey to get the bodies of several men who were miss
ing, and that he was informed that General Kearney,
who commanded on that part of the line, had directed
Colonel Tyler to send the party with the flag.

I informed him of the irregularity of the proceeding,
but after some conversation in which I endeavored to
leave him under the impression that we had a large
force in the vicinity, I gave him permission to carry
off the dead bodies, two of which he had picked up out
side of my picket, and two others having been brought
in to the picket before his arrival. "We remained at
Mason's Hill three or four days, and I was then relieved
by Colonel Smith in command of the 20th Georgia Regi
ment. My pickets had been constantly skirmishing with
small parties of the enemy, and there had been one or

4 49

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

two false alarms of an approach against us, but the
enemy made no serious demonstration. This advanced
line of pickets was subsequently abandoned, after hav
ing been maintained for several weeks, but I did not
again return to it.

After leaving Mason's Hill, I moved back to my
camp in front of Wolf Bun Shoals, again occupying the
right of our line. I remained on this flank until the fore
part of October, and my regiments picketed at Spring
field on the line of the railroad, alternating with those
of Swell's brigade at Langster's cross-roads. On the
4th of October Major General Earl Van Dorn joined
our army and was assigned to the command of a division
composed of Swell's brigade and mine. This was the
first division organized in the "Army of the Potomac"
(Confederate) and I think in the entire Confederate
army. In a day or two afterwards my brigade was
moved to a position between Fairfax Station and Fair
fax Court-House, and remained there until .the army
was moved back to the line which it occupied for the
winter, my regiment picketing at Burke 's Station on
the railroad in the meantime.

Soon after the organization of the division, Captain
Green's company of cavalry, for which Thornton's had
been exchanged, was relieved from duty with me and
attached to General Van Dorn's headquarters. On the
7th of October, the 20th Georgia Regiment, Colonel
W. D. Smith, was attached to my brigade, and joined
me in a day or two thereafter. On the 15th of October
the whole of our army moved back from the line passing
through Fairfax Court-House to me, extending from
Union Mills on the right, through Centreville, to Stone
Bridge on the left. At the new position Van Dorn's
division was on the right, with Swell's brigade at Union
Mills and mine on its left above that point. We pro
ceeded at once to fortify the whole line from right to
leftt

McClellan's report shows that the troops under his

50

OPERATIONS ALONG BULL RUN

command in and about Washington, including those on
the Maryland shore of the Potomac above and below
Washington and the troops with Dix at Baltimore, on
the 15th day of October, the day before our retrograde
movement, amounted to 133,201 present for duty, and an
aggregate present of 143,647. The mass of this force
was south of the Potomac, and nearly the whole of it
available for an advance. The whole force under Gen
eral Johnston's command did not exceed one-third of
McClellan's, though the latter has estimated our force
"on the Potomac" in the month of October at not less
than 150,000.

After the occupation of the line at Centreville, the
infantry of our army at and near that place was organ
ized into four divisions of three brigades each and two
corps. Bonham's brigade was attached to Van Dora's
division, and the command of the other divisions was
given to Major Generals G. W. Smith, Longstreet, and
E. Kirby Smith, respectively. Van Dora's and Long-
street's divisions constituted the first corps under Gen
eral Beauregard, and the other two divisions constituted
the second corps under the temporary command of
Major General G. W. Smith.

About the same time, General Jackson, with the
rank of Major General, was sent to the valley with his
old brigade, and the 22nd of October an order was issued
from the Adjutant General's office at Richmond, estab
lishing the Department of Northern Virginia, composed
of the Valley district, the Potomac district, and the
Aquia district, under the command of General Johnston ;
the districts being assigned to the command of Major
General Jackson, General Beauregard, and Major Gen
eral Holmes, in the order in which they are named.
Colonel Robert E. Rodes of the 5th Alabama Regi
ment had been made brigadier general and assigned to
the command of Ewell's brigade, Ewell being tempo
rarily assigned to a brigade in Longstreet 's division,
and subsequently made major general and transferred

51

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JIJBAL A. EARLY

to the command of E. K. Smith's division, when the
latter officer was sent to Tennessee.

The affair of Evans' command with the enemy at
Ball's Bluff occurred on the 21st of October, and Stuart's
affair with the enemy at Drainesville occurred on the
20th of December. These are the only conflicts of the
"Army of the Potomac" with the enemy of any con
sequence, during the fall and winter, after the occupa
tion of the line of Centreville. Our front was covered
by a line of pickets some distance in front, extending
from left to right, and all under command of Brigadier
General J. E. B. Stuart of the cavalry, who was espe
cially assigned to that duty, details by regiments being
made from the infantry to report to him.

Rodes' brigade was moved to the south of Bull Run
to go into winter quarters, leaving my brigade on the
right of our line, which was now contracted so as to
merely cover McLean's Ford on that flank. About the
middle of January, 1862, Major General Van Dorn was
relieved from duty with the "Army of the Potomac"
and ordered to the Trans-Mississippi Department, Gen
eral Bonham succeeding to the command of the division
as senior brigadier general. On the 30th of January,
General Beauregard took leave of the "Army of the
Potomac," he having been ordered to Kentucky; and
after this time there was no distinction of corps in the
"Army of the Potomac," but all division commanders
reported directly to General Johnston.

After the 1st of February General Bonham re
linquished the command of the division, having resigned
his commission to take his seat in Congress, and I suc
ceeded to the command of the division as next in rank
—Colonel Kershaw, who was appointed brigadier gen
eral, succeeding Bonham in the command of his brigade.
My brigade had gone into temporary winter quarters
at the point to which it had moved, when we fell back
from the line of Fairfax Court-House for the purpose
of continuing the construction of the works on our right,

52

OPERATIONS ALONG BULL RUN

which were rendered necessary by the change in the line
before mentioned; and it was engaged in building new
winter quarters south of Bull Run, and completing the
earthworks covering McLean 's Ford when the line of
Bull Run was abandoned.

About two weeks before the evacuation took place,
division commanders were confidentially informed of
the probability of that event, and ordered to prepare
their commands for it in a quiet way. Up to that time
there had been no apparent preparation for such a
movement, but an immense amount of stores of all kinds
and private baggage of officers and men had been per
mitted to accumulate. Preparations, however, were com
menced at once for sending the stores and baggage to
the rear. Owing to the fact that our army had remained
stationary so long, and the inexperience in campaigning
of our troops, there had been a vast accumulation of
private baggage by both officers and men; and when it
became necessary to change a camp it was the work of
two or three days. I had endeavored to inculcate proper
ideas on this subject into the minds of the officers of
my own immediate command, but with very indifferent
success, and it was very provoking to see with what
tenacity young lieutenants held on to baggage enough
to answer all their purposes at a fashionable watering
place in time of peace.

After the confidential instructions for the evacuation
were given, I tried to persuade all my officers to send
all their baggage not capable of being easily transported
and for which they did not have immediate necessary
use, on the railroad to some place in the rear out of all
clanger, but the most that I could accomplish was to
get them to send it to Manassas Junction. This was
generally the case with the whole army, and the con
sequence was that a vast amount of trunks and other
private baggage was accumulated at the Junction at
the last moment, for which it was impossible to find
any transportation. This evil, however, was finally and

53

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

completely remedied by the burning which took place
when the Junction itself was evacuated, and we never
had any great reason subsequently to complain of a
plethoric condition of the baggage.

Besides this trouble in regard to private baggage,
there was another which incommoded us to some ex
tent, and that resulted from the presence of the wives
of a number of officers in and near camp. These would
listen to no mild appeals or gentle remonstrances, but
held on with a pertinacity worthy of a better cause, and
I was myself compelled, as a final resort, to issue a
peremptory order for some of them to leave my camp.

The order was finally given for the movement to
the rear on the 8th of March and early on that morning
I broke up my camps and moved with my brigade and
that of Kershaw towards the Junction. We were de
layed, however, waiting for the movement of the other
troops, and did not arrive at the Junction until in the
afternoon. A portion of EwelPs division was to move
in front of us along the railroad, while the remainder
of it, with Bodes' brigade, was to move on a road east
of the railroad. Our wagon trains had been previously
sent forward on the roads west of the railroad. We
waited at the Junction until the troops that were to
precede us had passed on, and the last of the trains of
cars could be gotten off. Finally at a late hour of the
night after the last available train of cars had left, we
moved along the railroad past Bristow Station, and
bivouacked for the night, my brigade bringing up the
rear of our infantry on that route.

A very large amount of stores and provisions had
been abandoned for want of transportation, and among
the stores was a quantity of clothing, blankets, etc., which
had been provided by the States south of Virginia for
their own troops. The pile of trunks along the railroad
was appalling to behold. All these stores, clothing,
truaks, etc., were consigned to the flames by a portion of
our cavalry left to carry out the work of their destruction.

54

OPERATIONS ALONG BULL RUN

The loss of stores at this point, and at White Plains,
on the Manas sas Gap Railroad, where a large amount
of meat had been salted and stored, was a very serious
one to us, and embarrassed us for the remainder of
the war, as it put us at once on a running stock.

The movement back from the line of Bull Eun was
in itself a very wise one in a strategic point of view,
if it was not one of absolute necessity, but the loss of
stores was very much to be regretted. I do not pretend
to attach censure to any one of our officials for this
loss, especially not to General Johnston. I know that he
was exceedingly anxious to get off all the stores, and
made extraordinary exertions to accomplish that object.
My own opinion was that the failure to carry them off
was mainly owing to inefficient management by the rail
road officials, as I always found their movements slow
and little to be depended on, beginning with the trans
portation of the troops sent by me from Lynchburg in
May and June, 1861.

McClellan in his report assumes that the evacuation
of the line of Bull Run, was in consequence of his pro
jected movement to the Peninsula having become known
to the Confederate commander, but such was not the
fact. Our withdrawal from that line was owing to the
fact that our force was too small to enable us to hold
so long a line against the immense force which it was
known had been concentrated at and near Washington.
McClellan 's statement of his own force shows that his
troops, including those in Maryland and Delaware,
numbered on the 1st of January, 1862, 191,840 for duty ;
on the 1st of February, 190,806 for duty; and on the
1st of March, 193,142 for duty. Of this force he carried
into the field in his campaign in the Peninsula con
siderably over 100,000 men, after having left over
40,000 men to protect Washington. He could have
thrown against General Johnston's army, at and near
Manassas, a force of more than four times the strength
of that army. I have before stated that Johnston's

55

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

army was composed of four divisions of infantry besides
the cavalry and artillery.

The division commanded by me was fully an average
one, and that division, including three batteries of artil
lery and a company of cavalry attached to it, as shown
by my field returns now before me, numbered on the
1st of February, 1862, 6,965 effective total present, and
an aggregate present of 8,703 ; and on the 1st of March,
5,775 effective total present, and an aggregate present
of 7,154. At both periods a very large number present
were on the sick list. The aggregate present and absent
on the 1st of March amounted to 10,008, there being at
that time twenty-four officers and 962 enlisted men ab
sent sick and 61 officers and 1,442 enlisted men absent
on furlough — the rest of the absentees being on de
tached service and without leave. This will give a very
good idea of General Johnston's entire strength, and
will show the immense superiority of the enemy's force
to his.

The evacuation of Manassas and the line of Bull
Run was therefore a movement rendered absolutely
necessary by the inability of our army to cope with the
enemy's so near to his base, and had been delayed fully
as long as it was prudent to do so.

Moving back over the routes designated, Swell's
division and mine crossed the Rappahannock on the
10th of March and took position on the south bank. We
remained there several days, when my division was
moved to the Rapidan and crossed over to the south
bank, Ewell being left to guard the crossing of the
Rappahannock. G. W. Smith's and Longstreet's
divisions had moved by the roads west of the railroad,
and were concentrated near Orange Court-House.

I remained near the Rapidan until the 4th of April,
when I received orders to move up to Orange Court-
House to take the cars for Richmond and report to Gen
eral Lee, who was then entrusted with the general direc
tion of military operations, under the President. I

5G

OPERATIONS ALONG BULL RUN

marched to the court-house next day, but found diffi
culty in getting cars enough to transport my division.
Rodes was first sent off, then Kershaw, and my own
brigade was finally put on board on the 7th. Going
with the rear of this last brigade, I reached Richmond
on the morning of the 8th of April, after much delay
on the road, and found that Rodes and Kershaw had
been sent to General Magruder on the Peninsula, to
which point I was also ordered with my own brigade,
part going by the way of York River, and the rest by
the way of James River in vessels towed by tugs. My
trains and artillery moved by land from Orange Court-
House.

CHAPTER VI.

MANOEUVRING ON THE PENINSULA.

I LANDED and reported to General Magruder on the
morning of the 9th of April.

After the abandonment of the line of Bull Run by
our troops, McClellan had moved the greater part of
his army to the Peninsula, and by the 4th of April had
landed about 100,000 men at or near Fortress Monroe.
Magruder at that time occupied the lower Peninsula
with a force which did not exceed in effective men 7,000
or 8,000. Upon this force McClellan advanced with his
immense army, when Magruder fell back to the line of
Warwick River, extending from Yorktown on York
River across James River, and checked the enemy's
advance. McClellan then sat down before the fortifica
tions at Yorktown and along Warwick River and began
a siege by regular approaches.

When I arrived at Magruder 's headquarters, I was
informed by him that his force, before the arrival of
mine, amounted to 12,000, he having been reinforced
since the enemy's advance, by troops from the south side
of James River and Wilcox's brigade of G. W. Smith's
(now D. R. Jones') division, the said brigade having
been detached from the army under Johnston. The
division carried by me now numbered about 8,000 men
and officers for duty, it having been increased to that
amount by the return of those on furlough and some
recruits; so that Magruder 's force now amounted to
20,000 men and officers for duty. McClellan, in a
telegram to President Lincoln, dated the 7th of April,
says: "Your telegram of yesterday received. In reply
I have to state that my entire force for duty amounts
to only about eighty-five thousand men." At that time,
except Wilcox's brigade, not a soldier from General
Johnston's army had arrived, and my division con-

58

MANOEUVRING ON THE PENINSULA

stituted the next reinforcement received from that army
by Magruder.

Yorktown had been previously strongly fortified,
and some preparations had been made to strengthen the
other part of the line, which, however, had not been
completed. Warwick Eiver runs diagonally across the
Peninsula from the vicinity of Yorktown, and its course
for the greater part of the way is through low, marshy
country. Though at its head it is quite a small stream,
it had been dammed up to within about a mile of the
works at Yorktown by dams thrown across at several
points, so as to be impassable without bridging at any
other points than where the dams were, which later we
defended with earthworks.

Between Warwick Eiver and Yorktown were two
redoubts, called respectively Eedoubt No. 4 and
Eedoubt No. 5, which were connected by a curtain,
with wings or lateral breastworks extending to
Warwick Eiver on the one side, and the head of a deep
ravine between Eedoubt No. 4 and Yorktown on the
other. Eedoubt No. 4, which was the one nearest York-
town, was sometimes called Fort Magruder. Gloucester
Point, across York Eiver from Yorktown, was occupied
by a small infantry force with some heavy batteries.
The whole line was nearly fifteen miles in length. The
assuming and maintaining the line by Magruder, with
his small force in the face of such overwhelming odds,
was one of the boldest exploits ever performed by a
military commander, and he had so manoeuvred his
troops, by displaying them rapidly at different points,
as to produce the impression on his opponent that he
had a large army. His men and a considerable body of
negro laborers had been and were still engaged in
strengthening the works by working night and day, so
that their energies were taxed to the utmost limit.

Before my arrival, Ker shaw's brigade had been
ordered to the right of the line and assigned to that
part of it under the command of Brigadier General

59

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

McLaws, and Bodes' brigade had been posted at the
works between the defences of Yorktown and the head
of the obstructions on Warwick Kiver. On my arrival
I was ordered to move my own brigade near the point
occupied by Bodes, and I was assigned to the command
of that part of the line extending from the ravine south
of Yorktown to the right of Wynn's Mill as far as the
mouth of the branch leading into the pond made by Dam
No. 1, which was the first dam below that at Wynn's
Mill. There were two dams on the line thus assigned
me, the dam at Wynn's Mill, etc. The troops defending
the part of the line thus assigned me consisted of Bodes'
brigade; my own, now under the command of Colonel
D. K. McBae, of the 5th North Carolina Begiment; the
2nd Florida Begiment, Colonel Ward ; the 2nd Mississippi
Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Taylor; Brigadier Gen
eral Wilcox's brigade; and two regiments temporarily
attached to his command under Colonel Winston of
Alabama; and the 19th Mississippi Begiment, Colonel
Mott. The latter regiment was, however, transferred
to another part of the line in a few days.

The only portions of my line exposed to the view
of the enemy were Bedoubts Nos. 4 and 5 and the works
attached to them, the works at Wynn's Mill and part
of a small work at the upper dam of Wynn's Mill—
the works at Wynn's Mill and the upper dam with the
intervening space being occupied by Wilcox's command.
Between the works designated, including Dam No. 1,
the swamps on both sides of Warwick Biver were thickly
wooded, and it would have been impossible to cross
without cutting away the dams, which could not have
been done without first driving away our troops. This
was also the case below Dam No. 1 to a greater or less
extent. Bedoubts Nos. 4 and 5 with the curtain and
lateral works had been from necessity constructed on
ground sloping towards the enemy, and the interior and
rear of them were therefore much exposed to his fire.
This was also the case at Wynn's Mill, and at both points

no

MANOEUVRING ON THE PENINSULA

it had been necessary to cut zig-zag trenches, or bayous,
to enable the men to pass into and from the works with
as little exposure as possible.

Our side of the Warwick River, between the exposed
points, was occupied by thin picket lines. Besides the
infantry mentioned, there were several batteries of field
artillery in the works, and in Redoubt No. 4 there were
two heavy guns and a large Howitzer. Brigadier Gen
eral Raines had charge of the immediate defences of
Yorktown and Gloucester Point.

When I took command I found the enemy busily
engaged in constructing trenches and earthworks in
front of Redoubts 4 and 5 and of Wynn's Mill. In
front of Redoubt No. 5 was a dwelling house, with sev
eral out-houses and a large peach orchard extending to
within a few hundred yards of our works, under cover
of which the enemy pushed forward some sharp
shooters, with long-range rifles, and established a line
of rifle pits within range of our works, which annoyed
us very much for several days, as nearly our whole
armament for the infantry consisted of smooth-bore
muskets, and our artillery ammunition was too scarce
to permit its use in a contest with sharp-shooters. On
the llth of April General Magruder ordered sorties
to be made by small parties from all the main parts of
the line for the purpose of fooling the enemy. Wilcox
sent out a party from Wynn's Mill which encountered
the skirmishers the enemy had thrown up towards his
front, and drove them back to the main line.

Later in the day Colonel Ward, with his own regi
ment and the 2nd Mississippi Battalion, was thrown
to the front on the right and left of Redoubt No. 5,
driving the enemy's sharp-shooters from their rifle pits,
advancing through the peach orchard to the main road
beyond, from Warwick Court-House and Fortress Mon
roe, so as to compel a battery, which the enemy had
posted at an earthwork on our left of said road, to retire
precipitately. Colonel Ward, however, returned to our

61

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

works on the approach of a large force of the enemy's
infantry, after having set fire to the house above men
tioned and performed the duty assigned him in a very
gallant and dashing manner without loss to his com
mand. These affairs developed the fact that the enemy
was in strong force both in front of Wynn's Mill and
Redoubts 4 and 5.

On the night following Ward's sortie, the 24th
Virginia Regiment, under Colonel Terry, moved to the
front, and cut down the peach orchard and burned the
rest of the houses which had afforded the enemy shelter ;
and on the next night Colonel McRae, with the 5th
North Carolina Regiment, moved further to the front
and cut down some cedars along the main road above
mentioned, which partially screened the enemy's move
ments from our observation, both of which feats were
accomplished without difficulty or loss; and after this
we were not annoyed again by the enemy's sharp
shooters. About this time Major General D. H. Hill
arrived at Yorktown with two brigades from General
Johnston's army, and was assigned to the command
of the left wing, embracing Raines' command and mine.
No change, however, was made in the extent of my
command, but I was merely made subordinate to General
Hill.

The enemy continued to work very busily on his
approaches, and each day some new work was developed.
He occasionally fired with artillery on our works, and
the working parties engaged in strengthening them and
making traverses and epaulments in the rear, but we
very rarely replied to him, as our supply of ammunition
was very limited.

During the month of April there was much cold,
rainy weather, and our troops suffered greatly, as they
were without tents or other shelter. Their duties were
very severe and exhausting, as when they were not on
the front line in the trenches they were employed in
constructing heavy traverses and epaulments in the rear

62

MANCEUVRING ON THE PENINSULA

of the main line, so as to conceal and protect the ap
proaches to it. In addition to all this, their rations were
very limited and consisted of the plainest and roughest
food. Coffee was out of the question, as were vegetables
and fresh meat. All this told terribly on the health of
the men, and there were little or no hospital accommoda
tions in the rear.

In a day or two after General Hill's arrival, Colston's
brigade reported to me and occupied a position be
tween the upper dam of Wynn's Mill and Eedoubt No. 5.
On the 16th the enemy made a dash at Dam No. 1 on
my right and succeeded in crossing the dam and enter
ing the work covering it, but was soon repulsed and
driven across the river with some loss. This was not
within the limits of my command, but a portion of my
troops were moved in the direction of the point at
tacked without, however, being needed. By the 18th,
the residue of General Johnston's troops east of the
Blue Ridge, except EwelPs division and a portion of
the cavalry which had been left on the Rappahannock
and a small force left at Predericksburg, had reached
the vicinity of Yorktown, and on that day General John
ston, having assumed the command, issued an order
assigning Magruder to the command of the right wing,
beginning at Dam No. 1 and extending to James River;
D. H. Hill to the command of the left wing, including
Yorktown, and Redoubts 4 and 5, and their appertinent
defences; Longstreet to the command of the centre,
which extended from Dam No. 1 to the right of the
lateral defences of Redoubt No. 5; and G. W. Smith
to the command of the reserve.

This order, as a necessary consequence, curtailed
my command, which was now confined to Redoubts Nos.
4 and 5 and the works adjacent thereto, and they were
defended by Rodes' and my brigades, and the 2nd Florida
Regiment, 2nd Mississippi Battalion, and 49th Virginia
Regiment, the latter regiment having been lately as
signed to me for the defence of the head of the ravine

63

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

south of Yorktown. Shortly afterwards General Hill
made a new arrangement of the command, by which
Bodes' brigade was separated from mine and General
Rodes was assigned to the charge of Redoubt Xo. 5
and the defences on its right, while I was assigned to
the charge of Redoubt No. 4 and the defences on the
right and left of it, including the curtain connecting the
two redoubts.

The enemy continued to advance his works, and it
was while we were thus confronting him and in constant
expectation of an assault, that the reorganization of the
greater part of the regiments of our army, under the
Conscript Act recently passed by Congress, took place.
Congress had been tampering for some time with the
question of reorganizing the army and supplying the
place of the twelve months' volunteers, which composed
much the greater part of our army ; and several schemes
had been started and adopted with little or no success
and much damage to the army itself, until finally it was
found necessary to adopt a general conscription. If
this scheme had been adopted in the beginning, it would
have readily been acquiesced in, but when it was adopted
much dissatisfaction was created by the fact that it
necessarily violated promises and engagements made
with those who had re-enlisted under some of the former
schemes. The reorganization which took place resulted
in a very great change in the officers, especially among
the field-officers, all of whom were appointed by election,
and as may well be supposed this state of things added
nothing to the efficiency of the army or its morals.

In the meantime the enemy's army had been greatly
augmented by reinforcements, and by the last of April
his approaches in our front had assumed very formid
able appearances. McClellan, in his report, states the
strength of his army as follows : present for duty, April
30, 1862, 4,725 officers, and 104,610 men, making 109,335
aggregate present for duty, and 115,350 aggregate pres
ent. This was exclusive of Wool's troops at Fortress

04

MANCEUVRING ON THE PENINSULA

Monroe. General Johnston's whole force, including
Magruder's force in it, could not have exceeded 50,000
men and officers for duty, if it reached that number, and
my own impression, from data within my knowledge, is
that it was considerably below that figure.

After dark on the night of Thursday the 1st of May,
General Hill informed his subordinate commanders that
the line of Warwick Eiver and Yorktown was to be
abandoned, according to a determination that day made,
upon a consultation of the principal officers at General
Johnston's headquarters; and we were ordered to get
ready to evacuate immediately after dark on the fol
lowing night, after having previously sent off all the
trains. This measure was one of absolute necessity, and
the only wonder to me was that it had not been pre
viously resorted to.

The line occupied by us was so long and our troops
had to be so much scattered to occupy the whole of it,
that no point could be sufficiently defended against a
regular siege or a vigorous assault. The obstacles that
had been interposed to obstruct the enemy, likewise
rendered it impossible for us to move out and attack
him after he had established his works in front of ours ;
and we would have to await the result of a regular siege,
with the danger, imminent at any time, of the enemy's
gunboats and monitors running by our works on York
and James Rivers, and thus destroying our communica
tion by water. About twelve miles in rear of Yorktown,
near Williamsburg, the Peninsula is only about three or
four miles wide, and there are creeks and marshes inter
secting it on both sides at this point, in such way that
the routes for the escape of our army would have been
confined to a very narrow slip, if our line had been
broken. The most assailable point on our whole line
was that occupied by Rodes and myself, and when the
enemy could have got his heavy batteries ready, our
works on this part of the line would have soon been
rendered wholly untenable.

5 G5

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

Owing to the fact that the ground on which these
works were located sloped towards the enemy's position,
so as to expose to a direct fire their interior and rear,
it would have been easy for him to have shelled us out
of them ; and when this part of the line had been carried,
the enemy could have pushed to our rear on the direct
road to Williamsburg and secured all the routes over
which it would have been possible for us to retreat, thus
rendering the capture or dispersion of our entire army
certain. Nothing but the extreme boldness of Magruder
and the excessive caution of McClellan had arrested the
march of the latter across this part of the line in the
first place, as it was then greatly weaker than we sub
sequently made it.

During the night of the 1st of May, after orders had
been given for the evacuation, we commenced a can
nonade upon the enemy, with all of our heavy guns, in
the works at Yorktown and in Redoubt No. 4. The ob
ject of this was to dispose of as much of the fixed
ammunition as possible and produce the impression that
we were preparing for an attack on the enemy's trenches.
This cannonading was continued during the next day,
and, on one part of the line, we were ready to have com
menced the evacuation at the time designated, but a
little before night on that day (Friday the 2nd) the
order was countermanded until the next night, because
some of Longstreet's troops were not ready to move.
We therefore continued to cannonade on Friday night
and during Saturday. Fortunately, after dark on the
latter day the evacuation began and was conducted suc
cessfully — Stuart's cavalry having been dismounted to
occupy our picket line in front, and then men attached
to the heavy artillery remaining behind to continue the
cannonade until near daylight next morning, so as to
keep the enemy in ignorance of our movements. There
was a loss of some stores and considerable public prop-
erty-which had been recently brought down, for which
there was no transportation, as the steamboats ex-

66

MANCEUVRING ON THE PENINSULA

pected for that purpose did not arrive, and the whole of
our heavy artillery including some guns that had not
been mounted had to be abandoned.

Hill's command, to which I was attached, moved on
the direct road from Yorktown to Williamsburg, but our
progress was very slow, as the roads were in a terrible
condition by reason of heavy rains which had recently
fallen. My command passed through Williamsburg
after sunrise on the morning of Sunday, the 4th, and
bivouacked about two miles west of that place. The
day before the evacuation took place the 20th Georgia
Regiment had been transferred from my brigade, and
its place had been supplied by the 38th Virginia Regi
ment under Lieutenant Colonel Whittle. The 2nd
Florida Regiment and the 2nd Mississippi Battalion
continued to be attached to my command. No supplies
of provisions had been accumulated at Williamsburg,
and the rations brought from Yorktown were now
nearly exhausted, owing to the delay of a day in the
evacuation and the fact that our transportation was
very limited.

We rested on Sunday, but received orders to be
ready to resume the march at 3 o'clock A.M. on next
day, the 5th. My command was under arms promptly
at the time designated, but it had been raining during
the night, and it was very difficult for our trains and
artillery to make any headway. My command, there
fore, had to remain under arms until about noon, before
the time arrived for it to take its place in the column
to follow the troops and trains which were to precede
it, and was just about to move off when I received an
order from General Hill to halt for a time. I soon re
ceived another order to move back to Williamsburg and
report to General Longstreet, who had been entrusted
with the duty of protecting our rear.

CHAPTER VII.

BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG.

ON reporting to General Longstreet at Williamsburg,
I ascertained that there was fighting, by a portion of
our troops, with the enemy's advance, at a line of re
doubts previously constructed a short distance east of
Williamsburg, the principal one of which redoubts,
covering the main road, was known as Fort Magruder.
I was directed to move my command into the college
grounds and await orders. There was now a cold,
drizzling rain and the wind and the mud in the roads,
and everywhere else, was very deep. After remaining
for some time near the college, I received an order from
General Longstreet to move to Fort Magruder and sup
port Brigadier General Anderson, who had command
of the troops engaged with the enemy.

My command was immediately put into motion, and
I sent my aide, Lieutenant S. H. Early, forward, to
inform General Anderson of my approach, and ascer
tain where my troops were needed. Lieutenant Early
soon returned with the information that General Ander
son was not at Fort Magruder, having gone to the
right, where his troops were engaged, but that General
Stuart, who was in charge at the fort, requested that
four of my regiments be moved into position on the
right of it and two on the left. As I was moving on to
comply with his request and had neared Fort Magruder,
General Longstreet himself rode up and ordered me to
move the whole of my command to a position which he
pointed out, on a ridge in a field to the left and rear of
the Fort, so as to prevent the enemy from turning the
position in that direction, and to await further orders.
General Longstreet then rode towards the right, and I
was" proceeding to the position assigned me, when one
of the General's staff officers came to me with an order

68

BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG

to send him two regiments, which I complied with by
sending the 2nd Florida Regiment and the 2nd
Mississippi Battalion, under Colonel Ward.

With my brigade proper I moved to the point desig
nated before this last order, and took position on the
crest of a ridge in a wheat field and facing towards a
piece of woods from behind which some of the enemy's
guns were firing on Fort Magruder. Shortly after I
had placed my command in position, General Hill came
up and I suggested to him the propriety of moving
through the woods to attack one of the enemy's batteries
which seemed to have a flank fire on our main position.
He was willing for the attack to be made, but replied
that he must see General Longstreet before authorizing
it. He then rode to see General Longstreet and I com
menced making preparations for the projected attack.
While I was so engaged, Brigadier General Eains, also
of HilPs command, came up with his brigade and formed
immediately in my rear so as to take my place when I
moved. General Hill soon returned with the informa
tion that the attack was to be made, and he proceeded
to post some field-pieces which had come up, in position
to cover my retreat if I should be repulsed.

As soon as this was done,- my brigade moved
forward through the wheat field into the woods, and
then through that in the direction of the firing, by the
sound of which we were guided, as the battery itself
and the troops supporting it were entirely concealed
from our view. General Hill accompanied the brigade,
going with the right of it. It moved with the
5th North Carolina on the right, then with the 23rd
North Carolina, then the 38th Virginia, and then the
24th Virginia on the left. I moved forward with the
24th Virginia, as I expected, from the sound of the
enemy's guns and the direction in which we were mov
ing, it would come upon the battery. After moving
through the woods a quarter of a mile or more, the
24th came to a rail fence with an open field beyond,

69

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

in which were posted several guns, under the support
of infantry, near some farm houses. In this field were
two redoubts, one of which, being the extreme left re
doubt of the line of which Fort Magruder was the
main work, was occupied by the enemy, and this redoubt
was, from the quarter from which we approached,
beyond the farm house where the guns mentioned were
posted. The 24th, without hesitation, sprang over the
fence and made a dash at the guns which were but a
short distance from us, but they retired very precipi
tately, as did the infantry support, to the cover of the
redoubt in their rear and the fence and piece of woods
nearby.

My line as it moved forward was at right angle to
that of the enemy, so that my left regiment alone came
upon him and as it moved into the field was exposed to
a flank fire. This regiment, inclining to the left, moved
gallantly to the attack, and continued to press forward
towards the main position at the redoubt under a heavy
fire of both infantry and artillery; but the other regi
ments had not emerged from the woods, and I sent
orders for them to move up to the support of the 24th.
In the meantime I had received a very severe wound
in the shoulder from a minie ball and my horse had
been very badly shot, having one of his eyes knocked
out. I then rode towards the right for the purpose of
looking after the other regiments and ordering them
into action, and met the 5th North Carolina, under
Colonel McEae, advancing in gallant style towards the
enemy. Upon emerging from the woods and finding
no enemy in his immediate front, Colonel McRae had
promptly formed line to the left and moved to the sup
port of the regiment which was engaged, traversing the
whole front which should have been occupied by the
two other regiments. He advanced through an open
field under a heavy fire from the enemy's artillery and
infantry, and soon became hotly engaged by the side of
the 24th.

70

BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG

Having by this time become very weak from loss
of blood, and suffering greatly from pain, I rode to
the second redoubt nearby, in full view of the fight
going on and but a few hundred yards from it, for the
purpose of dismounting and directing the operations
from that point. When I attempted to dismount I found
myself so weak, and my pain was so excruciating, that
I would not have been able to remount my horse, nor,
from these causes, was I then able to direct the move
ments of my troops. I therefore rode from the field,
to the hospital at Williamsburg, passing by Fort Ma-
gruder, and informing General Longstreet, whom I found
on the right of it, of what was going on with my com
mand.

The 24th Virginia and 5th North Carolina Regiments
continued to confront the enemy at close quarters for
some time without any support, until Colonel McRae, who
had succeeded to the command of the brigade, in reply to
a request sent for reinforcements, received an order
from General Hill to retire. The 23rd North Carolina
Regiment, as reported by Colonel Hoke, had received
an order from General Hill to change its front in the
woods, doubtless for the purpose of advancing to the
support of the regiment first engaged, but it did not
emerge from the woods at all, as it moved too far to the
left and rear of the 24th Virginia, where it encountered
a detachment of the enemy on his right flank. The
38th Virginia Regiment, after some difficulty, succeeded
in getting into the field, and was moving under fire to
the support of the two regiments engaged, when the
order was received to retire.

At the time this order was received, the 24th Vir
ginia and 5th North Carolina were comparatively safe
from the enemy's fire, which had slackened, as they had
advanced to a point where they were in a great measure
sheltered, but the moment they commenced to retire the
enemy opened a heavy fire upon them, and, as they had
to retire over a bare field, they suffered severely. In

71

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

going back through the woods, some of the men lost
their way and were captured by running into a regiment
of the enemy, which was on his right in the woods.

From these causes the loss in those two regiments
was quite severe. Colonel Wm. R. Terry and Lieutenant
Colonel P. Hairston, of the 24th Virginia, were severely
wounded, and Lieutenant Colonel J. C. Badham of the
5th North Carolina was killed, while a number of com
pany officers of both regiments were among the killed
and wounded. The loss in the 23rd North Carolina and
38th Virginia was slight, but Lieutenant Colonel Whittle
of the latter regiment received a wound in the arm.
The brigade fell back to the position from which it
advanced, without having been pursued by the enemy,
and was there re-formed. The troops of the enemy en
countered by my brigade in this action consisted of
Hancock's brigade and some eight or ten pieces of
artillery.

The charge made by the 24th Virginia and the 5th
North Carolina Regiments on this force was one of the
most brilliant of the war, and its character was such as
to elicit applause even from the newspaper correspond
ents from the enemy's camps. Had one of the brigades
which had come up to the position from which mine
advanced been ordered up to the support of Colonel
McRae, the probability is that a very different result
would have taken place, and perhaps Hancock's whole
force would have been captured, as its route for retreat
was over a narrow mill-dam.

McClellan, in a telegraphic dispatch at the time,
reported that my command had been repulsed by "a
real bayonet charge," and he reiterates the statement in
his report, that Hancock repulsed the troops opposed to
him by a bayonet charge, saying: "Feigning to retreat
slowly, he awaited their onset, and then turned upon
them : after some terrific volleys of musketry he charged
them with the bayonet, routing and dispersing their
whole force." This statement is entirely devoid of
truth. My regiments were not repulsed, but retired

72

BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG

under order as I have stated, and there was no charge
by the enemy with or without bayonets. This charging
with bayonets was one of the myths of this as well as all
other wars. Military commanders sometimes saw the
charges, after the fighting was over, but the surgeons
never saw the wounds made by the bayonets, except in
a few instances of mere individual conflict, or where
some wounded men had been bayoneted in the field.

Colonel Ward of Florida had led his command into
action on the right of Fort Magruder, and he was killed
soon after getting under fire. He was a most accom
plished, gallant, and deserving officer, and would have
risen to distinction in the army had he lived.

This battle at Williamsburg was participated in by
only a small part of our army, and its object was to give
time to our trains to move off on the almost impassable
roads. It accomplished that purpose. The enemy 's
superior force was repulsed at all points save that at
which I had been engaged, or at least his advance was
checked. A number of guns were captured from him and
his loss was severe, though we had to abandon some of the
captured guns for the want of horses to move them.

During the night, the rear of our army resumed its
retreat, and the whole of it succeeded in reaching the
vicinity of Eichmond and interposing for the defence
of that city, after some minor affairs with portions of
the enemy's troops. A portion of our wounded had to
be left at Williamsburg for want of transportation, and
surgeons were left in charge of them. I succeeded in
getting transportation to the rear, and, starting from
Williamsburg after 12 o'clock on the night of the 5th,
and deviating next day from the route pursued by our
army, -I reached James Eiver, near Charles City Court-
House, and there obtained transportation on a steamer
to Eichmond, where I arrived at night on the 8th. From
Eichmond I went to Lynchburg, and, as soon as I was
able to travel on horseback, I went to my own county,
where I remained until I was able to resume duty in the
field.

CHAPTER VIII.
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND.

DUEING my absence from the army, the battle of
Seven Pines, or Fair Oaks, as the enemy called it, was
fought on the 31st of May and the 1st of June, and
General Johnston had been wounded. General R. E.
Lee had succeeded to the command of the army of Gen
eral Johnston, and it was now designated "The Army of
Northern Virginia. "

General Lee's army had received some reinforce
ments from the South; and General Jackson (after his
brilliant campaign in the valley of the Shenandoah,
by which he had baffled and rendered useless large bodies
of the enemy's troops, and prevented McDowell from
being sent to the support of McClellan with his force
of 40,000 men) had been ordered to move rapidly toward
Richmond for the purpose of uniting in an attack on
McClellan 's lines.*

* The following correspondence shows how much the Federal
authorities, civil and military, were befogged by Jackson's movements.

" HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 24, 12 P.M., 1862.
" A very peculiar case of desertion has just occurred from the
army. The party states he left Jackson, Whiting, and Ewell, fifteen
brigades (a) at Gordonsville, on the 21st; that they were moving to
Frederick's Hall, and that it was intended to attack my rear on the
28th. I would be glad to learn, at your earliest convenience, the most
exact information you have as to the position and movements of Jack
son, as well as the sources from which your information is derived,
that I may the better compare it with what I have."

" G. B. MCCLELLAN, Major General.
" HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War."

" WASHINGTON, June 25, 2.35.
" MAJOR GENERAL MCCLELLAN :

" We have no definite information as to the numbers or position
of Jackson's force. General King yesterday reported a deserter's

74

BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND

This movement had been made with such dispatch
and secrecy, that the approach of Jackson towards
Washington was looked for by the authorities at that
city, until he was in position to fall on McClellan's rear
and left.

Having started on my return to the army, without
having any knowledge of the contemplated movement,
on my arrival at Lynchburg I found that the fighting
had already begun with brilliant results. I hastened
on to Richmond and arrived there late in the afternoon
of the 28th of June. Though hardly able to take the field

statement that Jackson's force was, nine days ago, forty thousand
men. Some reports place ten thousand rebels under Jackson at
Gordonsville ; others that his force is at Port Republic, Harrisonburg
and Luray. Fremont yesterday reported rumors that Western Vir
ginia was threatened, and General Kelly that Ewell was advancing
to New Creek, where Fremont has his depots. The last telegram
from Fremont contradicted this rumor. The last telegram from Banks
says the enemy's pickets are strong in advance at Luray. The people
decline to give any information of his whereabouts. Within the last
two days the evidence is strong that for some purpose the enemy is
circulating rumors of Jackson's advance in various directions, with a
view to conceal the real point of attack. Neither McDowell, who is
at Manassas, nor Banks and Fremont, who are at Middletown, appear
to have any accurate knowledge of the subject. A letter transmitted
to the Department yesterday, purporting to be dated Gordonsville, on
the fourteenth (14th) instant, stated that the actual attack was de
signed for Washington and Baltimore, as soon as you attacked Rich
mond; but that the report was to be circulated that Jackson had gone
to Richmond in order to mislead. This letter looked very much like
a blind, and induces me to suspect that Jackson's real movement now
is towards Richmond. It came from Alexandria, and is certainly de
signed, like the numerous rumors put afloat, to mislead. I think,
therefore, that while the warning of the deserter to you may also be
a blind, that it could not safely be disregarded. I will transmit to you
any further information on this subject that may be received here.
" EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War."

(a) Jackson's command consisted of nine brigades at this time.
Whiting with two brigades and Lawton with one had joined him after
the engagements at Cross Keys and Port Republic, at which time he
had only six brigades, three in Swell's division, and three in his own.

75

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

and advised by the surgeon not to do so, immediately on
my arrival in Bichmond I mounted my horse, and with
my personal staff rode to General Lee's headquarters
at Games' house, north of the Chickahominy, for the
purpose of seeking a command and participating in
the approaching battles which seemed inevitable. I
arrived at General Lee's headquarters about 11
o'clock on the night of the 28th, and found him in bed.
I did not disturb him that night but waited until next
morning before reporting to him. The battles of
Mechanicsville and Chickahominy * had been fought on
the 26th and 27th respectively, and that part of the
enemy's army which was north of the Chickahominy
had been driven across that stream to the south side.

The troops which had been engaged in this work
consisted of Longstreet's, D. H. Hill's, and A. P. Hill's
divisions, with a brigade of cavalry under Stuart, from
the army around Richmond, and Jackson's command,
consisting of his own, Ewell's, and Whiting's divisions.
All of these commands were still north of the Chicka
hominy, and Magruder's, Huger's, McLaw's, and D. R.
Jones' divisions had been left on the south side to defend
Richmond, there being about a division at Drewry's and
Chaffin's Bluffs under Generals Holmes and Wise.
Magruder's, McLaw's and Jones' divisions consisted
of two brigades each, and were all under the command
of General Magruder.

A reorganization of the divisions and brigades of
the army had been previously made, and my brigade,
composed of troops from two different States, had been
broken up, and my regiments had been assigned to other
brigadier generals. On reporting to General Lee on the
morning of the 29th (Sunday), I was informed by him
that all the commands were then disposed of, and no

* So called by General Lee, though designated by subordinate
commanders as the battle of Cold Harbor or Games' Mill, according
to the part of the ground on which their commands fought.

76

BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND

new arrangement could take place in the presence of
the enemy; but he advised me to return to Richmond
and wait until a vacancy occurred, which he said would
doubtless be the case in a day or two.

I rode back to Richmond that day, and on the next
day, the 30th, called on the Secretary of War, General
Randolph, who gave me a letter to General Lee, sug
gesting that I be assigned to the temporary command
of Elzey 's brigade of Swell's division, as General Elzey
had been severely wounded, and would not be able to
return to duty for some time. On the day before, our
troops on the north of Chickahominy had crossed to
the south side in pursuit of the enemy, and were march
ing towards James River, and Magruder had had an
engagement with the rear of the retreating column at
Savage Station on the York River Railroad. On the
afternoon of the 30th, I rode to find General Lee again,
and, being guided by reports of the movement of our
troops and, as I got nearer, by the sound of artillery, I
reached the vicinity of the battlefield at Frazier's farm,
just about the close of the battle near dark. This battle
had taken place between Longstreet's and A. P. Hill's
divisions and a large body of the enemy's retreating
forces. There had been a failure of other portions of
the army to come up as General Lee expected them to
do, but the enemy had been driven from the field with a
loss of some artillery and a considerable number in
killed, wounded and prisoners on his part.

I gave General Lee the letter of the Secretary of
War, and next morning he gave me an order to report
to General Jackson for the purpose of being assigned
temporarily to Elzey 's brigade. This was the 1st of
July, and I rode past the battlefield of the day before
with our advancing troops, until we reached the road
leading from across White Oak Swamp past Malvern
Hill to James River, where I found the head of General
Jackson's column. I rode forward and found the Gen
eral on the road towards Malvern Hill with a cavalry

77

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

escort, awaiting a report from some scouts who had
been sent forward to ascertain the enemy's position.

On reporting to General Jackson, he directed his
adjutant general to write the order for me at once,
but while Major Dabney, the then adjutant general,
was preparing to do this, the enemy opened with some
of his guns from Malvern Hill, and several shells fell
near us. This rendered an immediate change of quarters
necessary, and the whole party mounted at once and
retired to the rear, followed by the enemy's shells in
great profusion, as the cloud of dust arising from the
movement of the cavalry enabled him to direct his fire
with tolerable precision. As soon as we got out of
immediate danger, Major Dabney wrote me the neces
sary order, on his knee, in a hurried manner, and I thus
became attached to the command of the famous "Stone
wall" Jackson. I found General Swell's division in
the rear of Jackson's column, and upon reporting to
him the command of Elzey's brigade was at once given
me, it being then about ten o'clock P.M.

The brigade was composed of the remnants of seven
regiments, to-wit: the 13th Virginia, the 25th Virginia,
the 31st Virginia, the 44th Virginia, the 52nd Virginia,
the 58th Virginia, and the 12th Georgia Regiments. The
whole force present numbered 1,052 officers and men,
and there was but one colonel present (Colonel J. A.
Walker of the 13th Virginia Regiment), and two lieu
tenant colonels (of the 25th and 52nd Virginia Regiments
respectively), the rest of the regiments being com
manded by captains. General Jackson's command at
this time was composed of his own division, and those
of Ewell, D. H. Hill, and W. H. Whiting, besides a
number of batteries of artillery. Swell's division was
composed of Trimble's brigade, Taylor's Louisiana
brigade, the brigade to which I had been assigned, and
a small body of Maryland troops under Colonel Bradley
T. "John son.

After remaining for some time in the rear, we finally

78

BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND

moved forward past Willis7 Church, to where a line of
battle had been formed confronting the en'emy's position
at Malvern Hill. D. H. Hill's division had been formed
on the right of the road leading towards the enemy, and
Whiting's on the left, with an interval between his
right and the road into which the Louisiana brigade
of Swell's division was moved. My brigade was posted
in the woods in rear of the Louisiana brigade, and
Trimble's brigade was formed in rear of Whiting's left,
which constituted the extreme left of our line. Jack
son's division was held in reserve in rear of the whole.
The enemy soon commenced a heavy cannonade upon
the positions where our troops were posted, and kept it
up continuously during the rest of the day. From the
position which I occupied, the enemy could not be seen,
as a considerable body of woods intervened, but many
shells and solid shot passed over us, and one shell
passed through my line, killing two or three persons.

We remained in this position until about sunset, and,
in the meantime, D. H. Hill on our immediate right and
Magruder on his right had attacked the enemy and be
come very hotly engaged. Just about sunset I was
; ordered to move my brigade rapidly towards the right
to support General D. H. Hill. General Ewell accom
panied me, and we had to move through the woods in a
I circle in rear of the position Hill had first assumed, as
j the terrific fire of the enemy's artillery prevented our
j moving in any other route. As we moved on through
I intricate woods, which very much impeded our progress,
we were still within range of the shells from the enemy's
I numerous batteries, and they were constantly bursting
in the tops of the trees over our heads, literally strewing
the ground with leaves.

After moving through the woods for some distance

; we came to a small blind road leading into an open flat,

t where there had once been a mill on a creek which ran

through swampy ground between our left and the enemy.

On reaching the edge of the open flat I was ordered to

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

halt the head of my brigade, until General Ewell rode
forward with a guide, who had been sent to show us
the way, to ascertain the manner in which we were to
cross the creek. The musketry fire was now terrific,
and reverberated along the valley of the creek awfully.
General Ewell soon returned in a great hurry and
directed me to move as rapidly as possible. As soon as
the head of the brigade, led by Lieut. Colonel Skinner
of the 52nd Virginia Regiment, emerged into the open
ground, General Ewell turned to him and directed him
to go directly across the flat in the direction he pointed,
cross the creek, and then turn to the left through the
woods into the road beyond, ordering him at the same
time to move at a double quick. Before I could say
anything General Ewell turned to me and said, "We
will have to go this way," and he dashed off in a gallop
on a road leading to our right along the old dam across
the creek into another road leading in the direction of
the battlefield.

I had no option but to follow him, which I did as
rapidly as possible, but this required me to make a
considerable circuit to get to the point where I expected
to meet the head of my brigade. There were now
streams of our men pouring back from the battlefield,
and on getting into the road leading towards it I lost
sight of my brigade, as a woods intervened. I did not
find it coming into the road at the point where I ex
pected, and after some fruitless efforts to find it, in
which I was often deceived by seeing squads from the
battlefield come out of the woods in such manner as to
cause me to mistake them for the head of my brigade,
I rode back to find if it was crossing the flat.

I saw nothing of it then, and the fact was, as after
wards ascertained, that, after crossing the creek, Colonel
Skinner had turned to the left too far, and moved
towards the battlefield in a different direction than that
indicated. His regiment had been followed by three
others, the 13th, 44th, and 58th Virginia Regiments,

80

BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND

but the 12th Georgia and 25th and 31st Virginia Regi
ments, being in the rear in the woods when the head of
the brigade moved at a double quick, were left behind,
and when they reached the flat, seeing nothing of the
rest of the brigade, they crossed the creek at the dam
and took the wrong end of the road. In the meantime,
while I was trying to find my brigade, General Ewell
had rallied a small part of Kershaw's brigade and
carried it back to the field. I saw now a large body of
men, which proved to be of Toombs' brigade, coming
from the field and I endeavored to rally them, but with
little success.

While I was so engaged, the 12th Georgia of my
own brigade came up, after having found that it had
taken the wrong direction, and with that regiment under
the command of Captain J. G. Rogers, I moved on, fol
lowed by Colonel Benning of Toombs' brigade with
about thirty men of his own regiment. Lieutenant
Early, my aide, soon came up with the 25th and 31st
Virginia Regiments, which he had been sent to find.
On reaching the field, I found General Hill and General
Ewell endeavoring to form a line with that part of
Kershaw's brigade which had been rallied, while Ran
som's brigade, or a part of it, was moving to the front.

I was ordered to form my men in line with Kershaw's
men, and this was done in a clover field in view of the
flashes from the enemy's guns, the guns themselves and
his troops being concealed from our view by the dark
ness which had supervened. General Hill's troops had
been compelled to retire from the field as had been the
greater part of Magruder's, after a very desperate
struggle against immense odds, and a vast amount of
heavy siege guns and field artillery. I was ordered to
hold the position where I was and not attempt an
advance.

The enemy still continued a tremendous fire of artil
lery from his numerous guns, and his fire was in a circle
diverging from the main position at Malvern Hill so as

6 81

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

to include our entire line from right to left. This fire
was kept up until after nine o'clock, and shells were
constantly bursting in front and over us, and crashing
into the woods in our rear. It was a magnificent dis
play of fireworks, but not very pleasant to those exposed
to it. After being gone some time the part of Ransom's
brigade which had advanced in front of us, retired to
the rear. Trimble's brigade had arrived from the ex
treme left, and was posted in my rear. Generals Hill
and Ewell remained with us until after the firing had
ceased, and then retired after giving me orders to re
main where I was until morning and await further
orders. During the night General Trimble moved his
brigade back towards its former position, and General
Kershaw and Colonel Benning retired with their men
for the purpose of looking after the rest of their com
mands.

My three small regiments, numbering a little over
three hundred in all, were left the sole occupants of that
part of the field, save the dead and wounded in our im
mediate front. My men lay on their arms in the open
field, but they had no sleep that night. The cries and
groans of the wounded in our front were truly heart
rending, but we could afford them no relief. We ob
served lights moving about the enemy's position during
the whole night, as if looking for the killed and wounded,
and the rumbling of wheels was distinctly heard as of
artillery moving to the rear, from which I inferred that
the enemy was retreating.

At light next morning I discovered a portion of the
enemy's troops still at his position of the day before,
but it was evidently only a small portion and it turned
out to be a heavy rear guard of infantry and cavalry
left to protect the retreating army. The position which
he had occupied and which our troops had attacked was
a strong and commanding one, while the whole country
around, over which our troops had been compelled to
advance, was entirely open several hundred yards and

82

BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND

swept by his artillery massed on the crest of Malvern
Hill.

In my view were nearly the whole of our dead and
wounded that had not been able to leave the field, as
well as a great part of the enemy's dead, and the sight
was truly appalling. While watching the enemy's move
ments I observed to our right of his position and close
up to it a small body of troops lying down with their
faces to the enemy, who looked to me very much like
Confederates. I moved a little further to my right for
the purpose of seeing better and discovered a cluster
of Confederates, not more than ten or twelve in number,
one of whom was also looking with field glasses at the
body which I took to be a part of our troops. On riding
up to this party, I found it to consist of General Armi-
stead of Huger's division with a few men of his brigade.
In answer to my question as to where his brigade was,
General Armistead replied, "Here are all that I know
anything about except those lying out there in front."
He had spent the night in a small cluster of trees around
some old graves about two hundred yards from my right.

After viewing them with the glasses, we were satis
fied that the troops lying so close up to the position
of the enemy were Confederates, and it turned out that
they consisted of Generals Mahone and Wright of
Huger's division with parts of their brigades. The
whole force with them only amounted to a few hundred,
and this body constituted the whole of our troops mak
ing the assault who had not been compelled to retire.
They maintained the ground they had won, after min
gling their dead with those of the enemy at the very
mouths of his guns, and when the enemy finally retired
this small body under Mahone and Wright remained the
actual masters of the fight. Before the enemy did retire,
a messenger came from Generals Mahone and Wright,
with a request for the commander of the troops on the
part of the field where I was to advance, stating that
the enemy was retreating and that but a rear guard

83

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

occupied the position. I was, however, too weak to
comply with the request, especially as I was informed
that their ammunition was exhausted.

Shortly after light, General Ewell came in a great
hurry to withdraw my command from the critical posi
tion in which he supposed it to be, but I informed him
that the enemy had been retreating all night, and he sent
information of that fact to General Jackson.

Early in the morning a captain of Huger's division
reported to me that he had collected nearby about one
hundred and fifty men of that division, and he asked
me what he should do with them. I directed him to
hold them where they were and report to General
Armistead, who was on the field. About this time a
considerable body of the enemy's cavalry advanced
towards us on the road from his main position of the
day before, as I supposed for a charge upon us, and I
requested General Armistead to take command of the
detachment from Huger's division and aid me in re
pulsing the charge, but, while I was making the neces
sary preparations, a few shots from a small party of
infantry on the left of the road sent the cavalry back
again. By this time our ambulance details had com
menced to pass freely to the front for our dead and
wounded, and they began to mingle freely with those
of the enemy engaged in a similar work. For some
time a sort of tacit truce seemed to prevail while details
from both armies were engaged in this sad task, but
the enemy's rear guard finally retired slowly from our
view altogether, on the road toward Harrison's Landing.

It was not until this movement that I discovered
what had become of the rest of my brigade, and I then
ascertained that when the missing regiments had arrived
on the battlefield at a different point from that intended,
Colonel Walker had taken charge of them. It was dark
by that time, and they got in amongst some of the
enemy's regiments, when Colonel Walker quietly with
drew them, as the force into which they had got was

84

BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND

entirely too strong for him to attack. My brigade did
not draw trigger at all, but it sustained a loss of thirty-
three in killed and wounded from the artillery fire of
the enemy. During the 2nd it commenced raining, and
before night the rain was very heavy, continuing all
night. After being employed for some time in picking
up small arms from the battlefield, my command was
moved to a position near where we had been in line, the
day before, and there bivouacked with the rest of the
brigade, which had returned to that point the night
before.

At the battle of Malvern Hill, the whole army of
McClellan was concentrated at a very strong position,
with a limited front and both flanks effectively pro
tected. General Lee's entire army was likewise present,
and it was the first time during the seven days' fighting
around Richmond that these two armies had thus con
fronted each other.

McClellan 's army, however, was so situated that each
portion of it was in ready communication with, and in
easy supporting distance of, every other part, so that
the whole was available for defence or attack, while
such was the nature of the ground over which General
Lee's army had to move to get into position, and in
which it was drawn up after it got in position, that
communication between the several commands was very
difficult, and movements to the support of each other
still more difficult.

General Lee made the attack, and it was his pur
pose to hurl the greater part of his army against the
enemy, but there had been much delay in getting some
of the commands into position, owing to the difficulties
of the ground and an unfortunate mistake as to roads.
When the attack was made, it was very late in the
afternoon, and then, from the want of concert produced
by the want of proper communication, only a portion
of our troops advanced to the attack of the enemy. The
troops which did so advance consisted alone of D. H.

85

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

Hill's division of Jackson's command, Magruder's com
mand of three small divisions of two brigades each,
and three brigades of Huger's division, in all fourteen
brigades.

From some mistake in regard to the signal for the
advance, D. H. Hill, hearing what he supposed to be
that signal, and was probably intended as such, ad
vanced to the attack on the enemy's front with his five
brigades alone, and for some time confronted the whole
force at Malvern Hill, but after a desperate conflict
and a display of useless valor, was compelled to retire
with heavy loss. Magruder's command, including
Huger's three brigades, was then hurled upon the enemy
by brigades, one after the other, but those brigades
were likewise compelled to retire after making in vain
the most heroic efforts to force the enemy from his
position.

In the meantime, Holmes' division of three brigades,
Jackson's division of four brigades, EwelFs division
of three brigades, and Whiting's division of two
brigades, were inactive, while Longstreet's and A. P.
Hill's divisions, of six brigades each, were held in
reserve some distance in the rear. It is true two
brigades of Swell's division, and Jackson's whole
division, were ordered to the support of D. H. Hill after
his command had been compelled to retire, but it was
only to be thrown into confusion by the difficulties of
the way and the approaching darkness, and to be ex
posed to a murderous fire of artillery, for it was then
too late to remedy the mischief that had been done.

In addition to all this, our troops had to advance over
open ground to the attack of the enemy's front, while
exposed to a most crushing fire of canister and shrap
nel from his numerous batteries of heavy guns and field
pieces massed on a commanding position, as well as to
a flank fire from his gunboats in James River, as it was
impossible from the nature of the ground and the posi
tion of the flanks to turn and attack either of them.

86

BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND

Moreover, such was the character of the ground occupied
by us that it was impossible to employ our artillery,
as in attempting to bring the guns into action on the
only ground where it was possible to use them, they
could be knocked to pieces before they could be used
with effect, and such was the result of the few experi
ments made. Longstreet's and Hill's divisions were
held in reserve because they had been heavily engaged
at Frazier's farm the day before, but why the rest of
Jackson's command was not thrown into action I can
not say, unless it be that the difficulty of communicating,
and the impossibility of seeing what was going on on
our right, prevented the advance from that quarter from
being known in time. Certain it is that I was not aware
of the fact that it was any other than an affair of artil
lery, until ordered to General Hill's support, as the roar
of the artillery drowned the sound of the small arms.

General Hill states that his division numbered ten
thousand men at the commencement of the fighting
north of the Chickahominy, and he had sustained con
siderable loss in that fighting. General Magruder says
his force of three divisions (six brigades) numbered
about thirteen thousand men when the movement to the
north of the Chickahominy began, and he had been
severely engaged at Savage Station. Huger's three
brigades numbered perhaps seven or eight thousand,
certainly not more. Our troops engaged could not, there
fore, have numbered over thirty thousand, and was
probably something under that figure, while McClellan
was able to bring into action, to meet their assault on
his strong position, his whole force, or very nearly the
whole of it.

The loss in the two armies was very probably about
equal, and we were left in possession of the battlefield,
and all the abandoned muskets and rifles of both armies,
besides those pieces of artillery abandoned on the re
treat, and some wagons and ambulances, but all this
did not compensate us for the loss of valuable lives

87

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

sustained, which, were worth more to us than the ma
terial of war gained or any actual results of the battle
that accrued to our benefit.

Both sides claimed the victory, but I do not think
any advantage was gained by either army from the
battle, though McClellan made good the retreat of his
shattered army to the very strong position at Harrison's
Landing. If General Lee's plans for the battle had been
carried out, I have no doubt that it would have resulted
in a crushing defeat to the enemy.

On the 3rd of July the army was put in motion again,
and Jackson's, Swell's, and Whiting's divisions moved
around to the left and approached McClellan 's new posi
tion by the road leading from Long Bridge to Westover,
Ewell's division being in front. On the 4th we arrived in
front of the enemy, and advanced, with Swell's division
in line of battle, and skirmished in front, until we en
countered the enemy's skirmishers, when our progress
was arrested by an order from General Longstreet, who
had come up. We remained in line skirmishing heavily
with the enemy for a day, when we were relieved by
Whiting's division. It was now judged prudent not to
attack the enemy in this position, as it was a strong one
with very difficult approaches, and on the 8th our army
retired, the greater part of it returning to the vicinity
of Eichmond, thus leaving McClellan to enjoy the con
solation of having, after near twelve months of prepara
tion on the most gigantic scale and over three months
of arduous campaigning, accomplished the wonderful feat
of "a change of base."

McClellan in his report (Sheldon & Co.'s edition of
1864) shows that there was an aggregate present in his
army on the 20th of June, 1862, of 107,226, of which there
were present for duty 4,665 officers and 101,160 men,
making the aggregate present for duty 105,825. See
page 53. On page 239, he says: "The report of the
Chief of the ' Secret Service Corps,' herewith forwarded,
and dated 26th of June, shows the estimated strength

88

BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND

of the enemy, at the time of the evacuation of York-
town, to have been from 100,000 to 120,000. The same
report puts his numbers on the 26th of June at about
180,000, and the specific information obtained regarding
their organization warrants the belief that this estimate
did not exceed his actual strength."

He seems to have been troubled all the time with
the spectre of "overwhelming numbers " opposed to him,
and that he should have believed so when he had "Pro
fessor Lowe" with his balloons to make reports from
the clouds, and his "Chief of the Secret Service" and
"intelligent contrabands," to fool him with their in
ventions, may be perhaps conceded by some charitable
persons, but that he should have written such nonsense
as the above in 1863, and published it in 1864, is per
fectly ridiculous. If the United States Government with
its gigantic resources and its population of 21,000,000
of whites could bring into the field for the advance on
Richmond only 105,000 men, and some fifty or sixty thou
sand men for the defence of Washington, how was the
Confederate Government, with its limited means, its
blockaded ports, and its population of less than 6,000,000
of whites, to bring into the field, to oppose this one of
several large armies of invasion, 180,000 men, and if it
could get the men where were the arms to come from?

When I was at General Lee's headquarters, on the
night of the 28th of June, at Games' house, General
Longstreet, who occupied a part of the same house and
had accompanied General Lee from the commencement
of the operations on McClellan's flank and rear, in
formed me that, when the movement commenced, we had
about 90,000 men in all, including Jackson's command,
60,000 being employed in the movement north of the
Chickahominy, and 30,000 being left on the south side
for the protection of Richmond. This latter number in
cluded the troops at Drewry's Bluff and Chaffin's Bluff.
This statement was elicited in reply to a question by me,
in which I expressed some surprise at the boldness of the

89

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JIJBAL A. EARLY

movement, and asked how it was possible for General
Lee to undertake it with his force. General Longstreet
had no reason to underestimate the force to me, and his
estimate was a sanguine one, and, I think, perhaps rather
too large, as it was based on the idea that General Jack
son's force was stronger than it really was.

The very active campaign and rapid marching of
that part of Jackson's command which had been em
ployed in the valley, had very much reduced its strength,
and the brigades and regiments were very weak. The
whole force was probably somewhere between eighty and
ninety thousand, and certainly did not exceed the latter
number. A very large portion of the army was armed
with smooth-bore muskets, and it was not until after
the battles around Richmond, and of second Manas sas,
that we were able to exchange them for rifles and minie
muskets captured from the enemy.

The movement of General Lee against McClellan was
a strategic enterprise of the most brilliant character,
and at once demonstrated that he was a general of the
highest order of genius. Its results, independent of the
capture of artillery, small arms, and stores, were of the
most momentous consequences, as it relieved the capital
of the Confederacy of the dangers and inconveniences
of a regular siege for a long while, though it had not
resulted in the destruction of McClellan *s army as Gen
eral Lee had desired, and the army and country fondly
hoped ; but in a thickly wooded country, where armies
can move only along the regular roads, and move in
line of battle or compact columns along those roads,
there are facilities for the escape of a beaten army which
one accustomed to reading of European wars cannot well
understand. This wns peculiarly the case in the country
through which McClellan retreated, where the imprac
ticable character of the swamps and woods enabled him
to conceal his movements and to protect his trains, rear,
ancl flanks by blocking up the roads and destroying
bridges.

90

BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND

General McClellan, it must be confessed, displayed
considerable ability in conducting the retreat of his
army after it was out-manoeuvred and beaten, notwith
standing the excessive caution he had shown on the
Potomac and at Yorktown, and I think there can be no
doubt he was the ablest commander the United States
had in Virginia during the war, by long odds. During
the seven days' operations around Richmond, the two
armies were more nearly equal in strength than they
ever were afterwards.

CHAPTER IX.

BATTLE OF CEDAR BUN.

AFTER McClellan had been safely housed at his new
base on James Biver, Major General John Pope, of the
United States Army, made his appearance in Northern
Virginia, between the Bappahannock and Bapidan Bivers,
at the head of an army called the "Army of Virginia, "
and composed of the corps of McDowell, Banks, and
Fremont, the latter being then under Sigel. General
Pope issued a vain-glorious address to his troops, in
which he declared that he had never seen anything of
the " rebels " but their backs ; and he talked largely about
making his "headquarters in the saddle, " and looking
out for the means of advancing, without giving thought
to the "lines of retreat, " which were to be left to take
care of themselves. He certainly was producing great
commotion in the poultry yards of the worthy matrons,
whose sons and husbands were absent in the service of
their country, when General Lee sent " Stonewall' '
Jackson to look after the redoubtable warrior.

After remaining in camp several days near Richmond,
EwelPs and Jackson's divisions were ordered to Gor-
donsville under General Jackson, and, taking the lead,
EwelPs division arrived about the 15th of July. On
the next day after our arrival, a body of the enemy's
cavalry, having crossed the Rapidan, advanced through
Orange Court-House towards Gordonsville, and my
brigade and the Louisiana brigade were moved out with
a regiment of cavalry for the purpose of intercepting the
retreat of this body, but it made its escape across the
Rapidan by swimming that river, as the water was high.
EwelPs division went into camp near Liberty Mills on
the Bapidan, on the road from Gordonsville to Madison
Cotirt-House, and I remained there, with occasional
movements when approaches of the enemy's cavalry

92

BATTLE OF CEDAR RUN

were reported, until the 7th of August. In the mean
time, Jackson 's force had been reinforced by the
division of A. P. Hill, and there had been skirmishing
and fighting between our cavalry and that of the enemy
in Madison County and at Orange Court-House.

General Jackson ordered a forward movement to be
made on the 7th of August, and on that day Swell's
division crossed into Madison at Liberty Mills, and
moved down the Rapidan toward Barnett's Ford,
bivouacking for the night near that point. Early next
morning, we moved past Barnett's Ford, driving a small
detachment of the enemy's cavalry from the Ford, and
took the road for Culpeper Court-House. General
Beverly Robertson's cavalry now passed to the front and
had a skirmish and some artillery firing with the enemy's
cavalry at Robinson's River, where the latter retired.
We crossed Robinson's River and bivouacked north of it
at the mouth of Crooked Creek, Robertson's cavalry
going to the front some two or three miles.

On the morning of the 9th, I was ordered by General
Ewell to move forward in advance to the point occupied
by our cavalry some three or four miles ahead of us,
and to put out strong pickets on the road coming in from
the right and left. My brigade had now increased in
strength to something over 1,500 officers and men for
duty, by the return of absentees. As we moved forward,
the 44th Virginia Regiment under Colonel Scott, and six
companies of the 52nd Virginia were detached to picket
the side roads. Robertson's cavalry was found at a posi
tion about eight or nine miles from Culpeper Court-
House, not far from Cedar Run, and in his front, in some
open fields, bodies of the enemy's cavalry were in view,
watching his movements. On our right was Cedar Run
or Slaughter's Mountain, and between it and Culpeper
road were the large open fields of several adjacent farms
in the valley of Cedar Run, while the country on the
left of the road was mostly wooded.

After General Ewell came up, my brigade was moved

93

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

to the right towards the mountain, for the purpose of
reconnoitring, and a section of the battery attached
to it was advanced to the front under Lieutenant Terry
and opened on the cavalry in our view. This elicited a
reply from some of the enemy 's guns concealed
from our view in rear of his cavalry, but no
infantry was visible. My brigade was then moved
back to the Culpeper road and along it about a mile, to
its intersection with a road coming in from Madison
Court-House, where it remained for some hours.

Shortly after noon, Captain Pendleton, of General
Jackson's staff, came with an order from the General,
for me to advance on the road towards Culpeper Court-
House, stating that General Ewell would advance on the
right, over the northern end of Slaughter's Mountain,
with the rest of the division, and that I would be sup
ported by Brigadier General Winder with three brigades
of Jackson's division, which would soon be up; but I
was ordered not to begin the movement until I received
information from General Winder that he was ready to
follow me.

While waiting for the message from General Winder,
General Robertson and myself reconnoitred the position
of the enemy's cavalry, and the country immediately in
my front, for the purpose of ascertaining how I would
advance so as to surprise the force immediately in front
of us. Just ahead of me, the Culpeper road crossed a
small branch, a tributary of Cedar Run, and then passed
for some distance through a thick woods, leaving a
narrow belt on the right of it. Between this belt and
the mountain the country was an undulating valley, con
sisting of several adjoining fields.

All of the enemy's cavalry visible was in the field in
this valley, and the position where my command was
posted was hidden from its view by an intervening ridge,
which crossed the road diagonally from the woods into
the* fields and fell off into the low grounds on the small
branch mentioned. No infantry had yet been discovered,

94

BATTLE OF CEDAR RUN

and we were in doubt whether the enemy had any in the
vicinity. On the left of the road was a long, narrow
meadow on the branch, and as my brigade could not
march along the road except by flank, nor without great
difficulty through the woods if deployed in line, I de
termined to form it in the meadow out of view of the
enemy, and then advance obliquely across the road,
against his cavalry, following it through the fields on a
route parallel to the road.

About 2 o'clock in the afternoon, a messenger came
from General Winder saying that he was ready to fol
low me, and I commenced my movement. The brigade
was formed in line in the meadow, on the north of the
branch, with the 13th Virginia, under Colonel Walker,
thrown out as skirmishers to cover the front and flank
of the left of the brigade, which had to pass obliquely
through the corner of the woods. It then advanced to
the ridge behind which the enemy's cavalry was posted,
the right regiment (12th Georgia) moving by flank so as
to avoid observation, and forming in line as it reached
the ridge, when the whole moved over the crest and came
in view of the cavalry, which scampered off in a great
hurry, receiving as it went a slight volley at long range,
by which one or two saddles were emptied.

The brigade then swung around to the left and moved
forward in line for about three-fourths of a mile, until
we reached a farm road leading from Mrs. Crittenden's
| house on our right across the Culpeper road, Colonel
' Walker still continuing to cover the left, by moving with
his regiment extended as skirmishers into the woods
across the road, until we came to the farm road. At this
latter point the Culpeper road emerged from the woods
and ran along the left of a field in our front, by the side of
the woods to its termination, where it passed between
a cornfield on the right and a wheatfield on the left.
Colonel Walker immediately re-formed his regiment on
the left of the brigade and we advanced across the farm
road into the field beyond, to the crest of a ridge, where

95

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

we discovered a considerable body of cavalry on the
opposite side of the wheatfield, on a high ridge over
which the Culpeper road ran, and three batteries of
artillery opened on us, from over the crest of the ridge
in front.

No infantry had yet been seen, but the boldness with
which the cavalry confronted us and the opening of the
batteries, satisfied me that we had come upon a heavy
force, concealed behind the ridge on which the cavalry
was drawn up, as the ground beyond was depressed. I
therefore halted the brigade, causing the men to cover
themselves as well as they could by moving back a little
and lying down, and then sent word for General Winder
to come up. The position which I now occupied was
in an open field on Mrs. Crittenden's farm. Immediately
to my right and a little advanced, was a clump of cedars,
and from that point the ground sloped off to our right
to a bottom on a prong of Cedar Run, the whole country
between us and Slaughter's Mountain consisting of open
fields. The northern end of the mountain was opposite
my right and about a mile distant. On my left was the
woods mentioned, which was very dense and extended for
a considerable distance to the left.

In front of this woods, about a hundred yards from
my left, was the wheat field, in a hollow, or small valley,
and immediately in nay front was the cornfield, and a
small branch ran from the wheatfield through the corn
field, to which the ground sloped. On the farther side of
the wheatfield was the high ridge on which the enemy's
cavalry was formed, and beyond which his batteries
were posted; and it extended across the road into the
fields on the right, but was wooded on the left of the
road. It was on and behind this ridge the enemy's bat
teries were posted, and it was in the low ground beyond
that I supposed, and it subsequently turned out, his in
fantry was masked.

" Immediately after sending for General Winder, I sent
back for some artillery, but this request had been an-

96

BATTLE OF CEDAR RUN

ticipated, and Captain Brown, with one piece, and Captain
Dement, with three pieces of their respective batteries
of Maryland artillery, soon came dashing up, and were
posted at the clump of cedars on my right. They imme
diately opened on the enemy's cavalry and his batteries,
causing the former speedily to retire through the woods
over the ridge. Those guns continued to be served with
great efficiency during the action and rendered most
effectual service.

As there was a long interval between my right and
the northern end of Slaughter's Mountain, where Gen
eral Ewell was, I posted the 12th Georgia Eegiment,
under Captain Win. F. Brown, on that flank, to protect
the guns which were operated there. During all this
time the enemy poured an incessant fire of shells upon
us, and we were looking anxiously for the opening of
Swell's guns from the mountain, and the arrival of
Winder. General Winder came up as rapidly as pos
sible, and, when he arrived, he took position on my left,
and at once had several pieces of artillery brought into
action with good effect. E well's guns had by this time
opened and a brisk cannonading ensued.

From the position I occupied, I had an excellent view
of the whole ground — except that beyond the ridge where
the enemy's infantry was kept concealed, — and seeing
that a force could be moved from our left around the
wheatfield, under cover, so as to take the enemy's bat
teries in flank, I sent information of the fact to General
Winder ; but, in a very short time afterwards, the glisten
ing bayonets of infantry were discovered moving stealth
ily to our left, through the woods on the ridge beyond
the wheatfield, and I sent my aide, Lieutenant Early, to
warn General Winder of this fact, and caution him to
look out for his flank. Lieutenant Early arrived to find
General Winder just mortally wounded by a shell, while
superintending the posting of some batteries at an ad
vanced position, and the information was given to Gen
eral Jackson who had now arrived on the field.
7 97

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

After the artillery fire had continued some two hours
from the time it was first opened on me, the enemy's
infantry was seen advancing through the cornfield in my
front, but it halted before getting within musket range
and lay down. His line overlapped my right and I sent
a request to General Jackson for a brigade to put on that
flank, which was promised.

Before it arrived, however, several pieces of the artil
lery battalion attached to A. P. Hill's division, which
was just coming up, dashed in front of my brigade down
the slope to within musket range of the enemy in the
cornfield, and commenced unlimbering, when the enemy's
whole force rose up and moved forward. I saw at once
that these pieces would be captured or disabled unless
relieved immediately, and my brigade was ordered
forward at a double quick. On reaching the guns, the
brigade halted and opened fire on the enemy, checking
his advance and enabling the artillery to open on him
with canister. At the same time a heavy force of in
fantry had moved through the wheatfield, and fire was
opened on it from the brigades of Jackson's division on
my left, which were posted in the edge of the woods ad
joining the field, and the fight became general, raging
with great fury. Brown's and Dement's guns opened
with canister, and the 12th Georgia was brought from
the right and posted on the crest of a small ridge, lead
ing out from the main one around in front of the clump
of cedars on my right, so as to have a flank fire on the
enemy immediately in front of the brigade.

Just as I had made this arrangement, Thomas'
brigade of Hill's division came up to my support as
promised, and I posted it on the right of the 12th Georgia,
behind the crest of the same ridge, which was so shaped
that Thomas' line had the general direction of the main
line, but was in advance of it. The arrival of this
brigade was very timely, as the enemy was advancing
with a line overlapping my right considerably. Thomas
confronted this part of the opposing force, and effectu
ally checked its progress, strewing the ground with the

98

BATTLE OF CEDAR RUN

killed. While posting this brigade, the left of my own
brigade was concealed from my view, and as soon as I
had given Colonel Thomas his instructions, I rode to
see what was the condition of things on that part of the
line. On getting to where I could see, I discovered that
it had given way, and the men of several regiments were
retiring rapidly to the rear, while a portion of the enemy
had crossed the little stream in front of where my left
had been. The only thing now standing, as far as I
could see, was Thomas' brigade on my right, the 12th
Georgia, four companies of the 52nd Virginia, and part
of the 58th Virginia.

It was a most critical state of things, and I saw that
the day would probably be lost, unless I could hold the
position I still occupied. I could not, therefore, go to
rally my retreating men, but sent my Assistant Adjutant
General, Major Samuel Hale, to rally them and bring
them back, while I rode to the rest of my troops and
directed their commanders to hold on to their positions
at all hazards. On my giving the directions to Captain
Brown of the 12th Georgia, he replied: " General, my
ammunition is nearly out, don't you think we had better
charge them!" I could not admit the prudence of the
proposition at that time, but I fully appreciated its gal
lantry. This brave old man was then 65 years old, and
had a son, an officer, in his company. The position was
held until other troops were brought up and the greater
part of the retreating men rallied, and the day was thus
prevented from being lost.

The enemy had penetrated into the woods on my
left, and the brigades of Jackson's division there posted
had been driven back, after a desperate conflict. The
left of the line had thus given way, and the enemy had
got possession of the woods, from which he had poured
a galling fire into the rear of my regiments on the flank,
which had been thrown into confusion, and compelled
to retire in some disorder. Colonel Walker of the 13th
Virginia had withdrawn his own regiment and part of
the 31st Virginia in good order, after they had been

99

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

almost surrounded by the enemy. Only my own brigade,
Thomas' brigade, and the three brigades of Jackson's
division had been engaged up to this time, but some
of the other brigades of HilPs division were now coming
on the field, and being at once ordered into action, the
temporary advantage gained by the enemy was soon
wrested from him, and he was forced back into the wheat-
field, and then across it over the ridge beyond.

Colonel Walker with the 13th Virginia, and part of the
31st, and Captain Robert D. Lilley with part of the 25th
Virginia, returned to the attack while the woods on our
left was being cleared of the enemy, and participated in
his final repulse. Finding himself being driven from the
field, after sunset, the enemy made a desperate effort
to retrieve the fortunes of the day by a charge with
cavalry. We had no regular line formed at this time,
and our men were much scattered in advancing, when a
considerable body of cavalry came charging along the
road from over the ridge, towards the position where
the left of my brigade and the right of Jackson's division
had rested during the action. Without being at all dis
concerted or attempting to make any formation against
cavalry, small regiments nearby, among which was the
13th Virginia, poured a volley into the head of the ap
proaching cavalry, when it had got within a few yards,
causing it to turn suddenly to its right up through the
wheatfield, followed by the whole body, which made its
escape after encountering a raking fire from our troops
further to the left, by which many saddles were emptied.
The attack on the enemy was thus resumed and he was
driven entirely from the field.

We were ordered to pursue on the road towards Cul-
peper Court-House, and the division of General A. P.
Hill was placed in front, my brigade following it. Pur
suit was made for two miles, when the enemy's reinforce
ments, coming to the aid of the beaten troops, were en
countered, and there was some skirmishing after dark
between Hill's leading brigade and the enemy, and an
affair between one of our batteries and some of the

100

BATTLE OF CEDAR RUN

enemy's artillery, but night put an end to any further
operations. During the night, General Jackson ascer
tained that Pope's whole army had concentrated in his
front, and he therefore determined not to attack him.
In moving forward in pursuit of the enemy from the
field, my brigade rejoined the rest of the division under
General Ewell, and, after operations for the night were
suspended, we bivouacked about where the enemy's in
fantry had been masked when I first encountered his bat
teries. The two brigades with General Ewell had not
been engaged, but his artillery had done good service,
and prevented any attempt to flank us on the right.

On the morning of the 10th (Sunday), after some
manoeuvring on our part, and a little shelling from the
enemy, we moved back and covered the battlefield with
our troops, while the wounded were being carried off,
and the small arms abandoned by the enemy were being
gathered. Later in the day we moved farther back and
took position in rear of the battlefield, E well's division
being posted on the end and side of Slaughter's Moun
tain, and the other divisions crossing the Culpeper road
on our left. We remained in this position all night and
next day, but there was no fighting, as each army awaited
the advance of the other.

On Monday, the llth, the enemy requested a truce
for the purpose of burying his dead, which was granted,
until 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and subsequently ex
tended, at his request, to give him time to complete the
burial — the arrangements on our side being under the
superintendence of General Stuart, and on the side of
the enemy under that of Brigadier General Milroy.*

* Milroy, in his report, states that the truce was requested by us,
but General Jackson says it was applied for by the enemy, and no one
will doubt his word. I know that the extension was applied for by
Milroy or his staff officer, for I was on the ground in communication
with General Stuart at the time. This same Milroy was himself pre
vented by me from riding to the rear of the ground on whjich the
enemy's dead lay, and he witnessed the taking from the field, under
my directions, of very large quantities of small arms, which had been
abandoned by Banks' men on the day of the battle.

101

f XJEOTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

I went on the field under General Swell's orders, to
superintend the burial of a portion of our dead, who had
not been buried by their proper commanders. I found
on the field, stacked up, a very large quantity of excel
lent rifles, which the division, detailed to gather them up,
omitted to carry off. Some of the enemy's men were
taking these rifles, but I made them desist, and demanded
that a part already carried off, under direction of a staff
officer of General Sigel, should be brought back, which
was complied with. I then sent for a detail from my
brigade and had these arms carried off in wagons sent
to me from the rear, there being six full wagon loads.
While this work was going on, I heard a Federal soldier
say: "It is hard to see our nice rifles going that way,"
to which another replied: "Yes, but they are theirs,
they won them fairly."

The enemy had very large details on the field, and
several general officers rode on it, while the burial was
going on. This work was finally concluded a little before
dark, when the truce was concluded. The enemy buried
on this day over six hundred dead, a very large propor
tion of which were taken from the cornfield in front of
the positions occupied by Thomas' and my brigade on
the day of the battle. My detail buried the bodies of
98 of our men, nearly the whole of which were taken
from the woods in which the brigades of Jackson's
division had been engaged. From the want of sufficient
tools on our part and the hardness of the ground where
we buried our men, our work was not completed until
about the same time the enemy completed his.

On returning to my brigade, I found our troops pre
paring to move back to our former position south of the
Eapidan, as the army of Pope concentrated in our front
was entirely too large for us to fight. Our movement to
the rear commenced immediately after dark, Hill's
division bringing up the rear of the infantry and our
cavalry that of the whole army. On the next day, the
12th, Swell's division recrossed at Liberty Mills and

102

BATTLE OF CEDAR RUN

returned to its old camps in that vicinity, the withdrawal
of our entire force having been effected without serious
molestation from the enemy. In this action, Banks com
manded the Federal troops immediately on the field, but
Pope came up at its close with a portion of McDowell's
Corps and the whole of Sigel's.

The loss in my brigade was 16 killed and 145 wounded,
and the loss in General Jackson's whole command was
223 killed, 1,060 wounded and 31 missing, making a
total loss of 1,314. The enemy's loss in killed and
wounded very greatly exceeded ours, and we captured
400 prisoners, including one Brigadier General (Prince),
besides securing one-piece of artillery and more than
5,000 small arms.

Pope, or at least his soldiers, had now seen some
thing more of the "rebels" than their backs, and he was
soon to see other sights.

Shortly after our return from the battle, Lawton's
brigade was transferred from Jackson's division to
Swell's, and Starke's Louisiana Brigade, newly created
out of regiments which had been attached to other
brigades during the battles around Richmond, and had
accompanied Hill's division, was attached to Jackson's
division. General Jackson's command, as now consti
tuted, was composed of fourteen brigades, to-wit: four
in his own and Ewell's divisions each; and six in Hill's
division, besides the artillery attached to the divisions
(2 bout four batteries to each) ; and Robertson's cavalry
which was co-operating with us.

CHAPTER X.

OPERATIONS ON THE EAPPAHANNOCK.

THE presence of General Jackson in the vicinity of
Gordonsville, again bewildered the minds and excited
anew the fears of the Washington authorities. The
spectre of "overwhelming numbers" at Eichmond and
of a speedy advance on the Federal Capital now assumed
a fearful shape, and McClellan was ordered to remove
his army from Harrison's Landing to Aquia Creek as
rapidly as possible, for the purpose of uniting with Pope,
and interposing for the defence of Washington — Burn-
side, with 13,000 men from the North Carolina coast on
his way to join McClellan on James Eiver, having been
previously diverted from that point to Fredericksburg
on the Eappahannock.*

* The following correspondence taken from McClellan's report is
interesting, as it exhibits the bewilderment of the Federal authorities
and the hallucination under which McClellan himself continued to
labor in regard to the strength of General Lee's forces :

" WASHINGTON, July 30, 1862, 8 P.M.
"MAJOR GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN:

" A dispatch just received from General Pope, says that deserters
report that the enemy is moving south of James River, and that the
force in Richmond is very small. I suggest that he be pressed in that
direction, so as to ascertain the facts of the case.

" H. W. HALLECK, Major General."

" WASHINGTON, July 31, 1862, 10 A.M.
"MAJOR GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN:

" General Pope again telegraphs that the enemy is reported to be
evacuating Richmond, and falling back on Danville and Lynchburg.

" H. W. HALLECK, Major General."
104

OPERATIONS ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK

The execution of the order given to McClellan on
the 3rd of August for the evacuation of his base on James
River, was not completed until the 16th. In the mean
time, General Lee had ordered the divisions of Long-
street, Hood (formerly Whiting's), D. R. Jones, and
Anderson (formerly Huger's), to Gordonsville for the
purpose of advancing against Pope, and the three first
named arrived about the 15th of August, Anderson's fol
lowing later. The greater part of Stuart's cavalry was
also ordered to the same vicinity.

On the 15th Jackson's command moved from its
camps and concentrated near Pisgah Church on the road

"WASHINGTON, August 6, 1862.
" MAJOR GENERAL G. B. MCCLELLAN :

" You will immediately send a regiment of cavalry and small bat
teries of artillery to Burnside's command at Aquia Creek. It is re
ported that Jackson is moving north with a very large force.

" H. W. HALLECK, Major General."

The following is an extract of letter from Halleck to McClellan,
dated the 6th of August, 1862, explaining the reason for the order for
the removal of the troops from Harrison's Landing to Aquia Creek.

" Allow me to allude to a few of the facts in the case. You and
your officers, at our interview, estimated the enemy's force around
Richmond at 200,000 men. Since then you and others report that they
have and are receiving large reinforcements from the South. General
Pope's army, now covering Washington, is only about 40,000. Your
effective force is only about ninety thousand. You are about thirty
miles from Richmond, and General Pope eighty or ninety, with the
enemy directly between you, ready to fall with his superior numbers
upon one or the other, as he may elect."

"HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, BERKLEY,

August 14, 1862, 11 P.M.

" Movement has commenced by land and water. All sick will be
away to-morrow night. Everything done to carry out your orders. I
don't like Jackson's movements, he will suddenly appear where least
expected. Will telegraph fully and understandingly in the morning.

" G. B. MCCLELLAN, Major General."
"MAJOR GENERAL HALLECK, Washington, D. C."

105

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

from Orange Court-House to Somerville Ford on the
Rapidan, preparatory to the movement forward. While
here the 49th Virginia Regiment, Colonel William Smith,
joined my brigade. Pope's army, then reinforced by
the greater part of Burnside's Corps under Reno, was
in the County of Culpeper, north of the Rapidan; but
before we were ready to move it commenced to fall back
to the northern bank of the Rappahannock.

On the 20th, our whole army, now consisting of two
wings under Longstreet and Jackson respectively, and
Stuart's cavalry, crossed the Rapidan — Longstreet at
Raccoon Ford, and Jackson at Somerville Ford, — the
cavalry having preceded them early in the morning.
Jackson's wing, comprising the same force he had at
Cedar Run, camped at Stevensburg on the night of the
20th. On the 21st he moved past Brandy Station on
the Orange and Alexandria Railroad in the direction of
Beverly's Ford on the Rappahannock. Jackson's divi
sion under Brigadier General Taliaferro was in front
and moved to the ford, where there ensued some can
nonading, and a fight between a portion of our cavalry
and the enemy on the northern bank. Swell's division
bivouacked in the rear of Taliaferro near St. James'
Church.

On the morning of the 22nd the division moved up
to the vicinity of the ford, where the cannonading still
continued. It was then moved to the left, across Hazel
River at Wellford's Mill, towards Freeman's Ford,
Trimble's brigade being left at Hazel River to protect
our trains from a movement of the enemy from across
the Rappahannock. At Freeman's Ford, a portion of
Stuart's cavalry was found, and an artillery fight was
progressing with the enemy's batteries on the opposite
bank. The three remaining brigades passed to the left
from Freeman's Ford, and moved by a circuitous route
through the woods and fields towards the bridge at War-
renton Springs. Late in the afternoon, Lawton 's brigade
moved to the bridge at the Springs for the purpose of

106

MAJOR ANDREW L. PITZER

OPERATIONS ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK

crossing, and my brigade, followed by Hays' (formerly
Taylor's) under Colonel Forno of the Louisiana In
fantry, was moved to the right, under the superintend
ence of General Ewell, and crossed over about a mile
below the Springs, on an old dilapidated dam.

Hays' brigade was to have followed, but as it was
nearly dark when my brigade succeeded in getting over,
and the crossing was very difficult, that brigade was
left on the south bank until next morning. General
Ewell ordered me to occupy a pine woods or thicket in
front of the place at which I had crossed, and to establish
communications with General Lawton, the ' whole of
whose brigade it was expected would be crossed over
at the Springs. There had been a hard rain before I
was ordered to cross the river, and it was still raining
slightly. As soon as General Ewell left me, I moved
my brigade into the woods indicated, and established
my left near a road found leading from the Springs
towards the lower fords, throwing out pickets on the
front and flanks. By this time it had become intensely
dark, and we could see nothing except when the flashes of
lightning gave faint glimpses of things around.

As soon as the brigade was established in its position,
Major A. L. Pitzer, a volunteer aide, was sent to seek
General Lawton for the purpose of opening communica
tions with him. After he had been gone for some time, he
came back with a sergeant and six privates of Federal
cavalry as prisoners, with their horses, equipments and
arms complete. This party had passed up the road a
few minutes before I had taken position near it, and, on
getting near the Springs and finding that place occupied
by a portion of our troops, was deliberating as to what
should be done when the Major rode into it. He was at
once hailed and forced to surrender himself as prisoner,
and his captors started with him down the road leading
past my left. On getting near the point at which he
knew my brigade was posted, the Major told the party
having him in charge that they must reverse positions,

107

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

and when he explained the condition of things and stated
that General Lawton was on the right, my brigade on
the left with pickets all around, he succeeded in inducing
the whole of it to surrender to him and come quietly into
iny camp, to avoid being fired upon by the pickets. After
this attempt, as it was very dark and quite late, I did not
renew that night the effort to communicate with General
Lawton.

During the night there was a very heavy rain, and by
light on the morning of the 23rd, the Rappahannock, or
Hedgeman's River, as it is here called, was so much
swollen as to defy all attempts at crossing except by
swimming, as the bridge at the Springs had been burned
by the enemy.

A messenger sent to find General Lawton soon re
turned with the information that only one regiment of
Lawton 's brigade, the 13th Georgia under Colonel
Douglas, and Brown's and Dement 's batteries of four
guns each, had crossed at the Springs, the morning
before. As soon as this condition of things was ascer
tained, I sent a messenger, who was directed to swim
the river, with a note for General Ewell or Jackson,
whichever might be first met with, stating that if the
enemy advanced upon us in force, the whole of our
troops on the north of the river must be captured, and
suggesting the propriety of my attempting to extricate
them by moving up towards Waterloo bridge, several
miles above.

Before this note could be delivered, I received a
verbal message from General Jackson, which had been
given across the river at the Springs and was brought
to me by a sergeant of one of the batteries, directing me
to move my brigade up to where Colonel Douglas' was,
take command of the whole force, and prepare for de
fence, stating, at the same time, that there was a creek
running a short distance from the Springs into the river
below me, which was past fording also, and that no enemy
was in the fork of the river and this creek; and also

108

OPERATIONS ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK

informing me that he was having the bridge repaired
as rapidly as possible. Very shortly after the reception
of this message, I received a note from General Jackson,
in reply to mine, containing the same instructions con
veyed by his message, and directing me in addition, in
the event of the enemy's appearance in too heavy force
for me to contend with, to move up towards Waterloo
bridge, keeping close to the river; and stating that he
would follow along the opposite bank with his whole
force, to cover my movement.

I at once moved towards the Springs and found
Colonel Douglas occupying a hill, a short distance below
the buildings, which extended across from the river to
Great Run (the creek alluded to by General Jackson).
Colonel Douglas, on crossing the morning before, had
captured a portion of a cavalry picket watching the ford,
and there was still a small body on the opposite banks
of Great Run with which he had had some skirmishing.
Colonel Walker with the 13th and 31st Virginia Regi
ments had been posted across the road leading from
below, about three-fourths of a mile from Colonel Doug-
las' position, and I now posted the remaining regiments
of my brigade and the 13th Georgia along the hill occu
pied by the latter, so as to present the front to any force
that might come from the direction of Warrenton, across
Great Run above, resting my right on the Run and my
left on the river. The artillery was also posted on this
line, and the whole concealed as much as possible by the
woods. In this position, Colonel Walker guarded my
rear, and my right flank was the only one exposed, but
that was safe for the present, as the creek was very high
and Colonel Douglas had commenced the destruction of
the bridges across it, which was soon completed.

The body of the enemy's cavalry on the opposite side
of Great Run continued to hover about my right flank
all the morning, and some companies were posted on that
flank to watch the creek. Some time during the morning,
General Jackson sent over an officer familiar with the

109

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

country, to pilot one of the staff officers over the route
to Waterloo bridge, which it might be necessary to pass
over in case of emergency, and Major Hale was sent with
him to ascertain the road.

In the meantime, the creek began to fall, and in the
afternoon it was in a condition to be crossed.

It now began to be evident that the enemy was mov
ing up from below in very heavy force, and that my
command was in a critical condition, as large trains
were seen moving on the road, east and north of us,
towards Warrenton. Late in the afternoon a heavy
column of infantry with artillery made its appearance
on the hills beyond my right, but it moved with great
caution, and the enemy was evidently of the impression
that my force, which was concealed from his view, was
much larger than it really was. I now changed my front
so as to present it towards the force in sight, but this
movement was so made as to be concealed from the
enemy's view by the intervening woods.

About this time, General Robertson, who had accom
panied Stuart on a raid to Catlett's Station and upon
Pope's headquarters, arrived from the direction of
Warrenton with two regiments of cavalry and two pieces
of artillery. After consulting with me, General Robert
son posted his two pieces on a hill north of the Springs,
which commanded a view of the enemy's infantry and
opened on it. This fire was soon replied to by one of
the enemy's batteries, and I sent two Parrott guns from
Brown's battery to the aid of Robertson's guns, which
were of short range. A brisk cannonade ensued and was
kept up until near sunset, with no damage, however, to
my infantry or artillery, but one or two shells fell into
one of Robertson's regiments which was in rear of the
battery, on the low ground near the Springs, doing some
slight damage.

After the cessation of the artillery fire and very near
dark about a brigade of the enemy was seen approaching
the bank of the creek opposite where my brigade was

110

OPERATIONS ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK

posted, and in a few moments it delivered a volley into
the woods, which was followed by three cheers and a
tiger in regular style. Two of Dement 's Napoleons were
immediately run out to the left of my line, and opened
with canister upon the enemy, who was scarcely visible
through the mist which had arisen. This fire was, how
ever, so well directed and so rapid that the enemy was
soon driven back in confusion, and his cheering was ex
changed for cries and groans, which were distinctly
audible to those in his front. The volley delivered by
the enemy was entirely harmless, and my men reserved
their fire with great coolness, until there should be
greater need for it. A very short time before this affair,
the 60th Georgia Regiment of Lawton's brigade, under
Major Berry, had crossed over on the bridge, which was
now in a condition for the passage of infantry, though
not for artillery or wagons, and had been placed in
position.

There was no further attack on me, but it was now
very certain, from the noise of moving trains and artil
lery and the reports of scouts, that a very heavy force
was being massed around me, with a view of cutting me
off. I drew in Colonel Walker closer to my main force,
as he reported that the enemy had crossed the creek on
the road he was guarding and were massing in his front ;
and I sent a messenger to General Jackson, after dark,
with information of the condition of things and the sug
gestion that I be reinforced sufficiently to hold my
ground or be withdrawn. The remainder of Lawton's
brigade was crossed over on the temporary bridge, and
when General Lawton himself arrived, which was about
1 o'clock A.M. on the 24th, he informed me that he had
seen written instructions to General Ewell, directing to
cross over himself at daylight in the morning, and if it
was evident that the enemy was in heavy force, to recross
the troops, as it was not desired to have a general en
gagement at that junction.

On receiving this information, I immediately dis-

111

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

patched a messenger to General Ewell, to inform him
that there could be no doubt that the enemy was in very
heavy force, and if I was to be withdrawn, it had better
be done that night without waiting for daylight, as by
moving to my left the enemy could post artillery, so as
to command the bridge and ford completely, and prevent
my being either withdrawn or reinforced, and that I was
satisfied that he was preparing for that very object. In
response to this, General Ewell came over himself a
little before three o'clock A.M., and, after consultation
with me, gave the order for recrossing, which was begun
at once, Lawton's brigade crossing first and carrying
over the artillery by hand, and my brigade following,
so as to complete the withdrawal a very little after dawn.
General Ewell had not been entirely satisfied that the
enemy was in such strong force as I represented, and
he was rather inclined to the opinion that movements I
had observed indicated a retreating army. To satisfy
him, we remained behind until the advancing skirmishers
of the enemy made it prudent for us to retire, and we
then rode across the bridge in rear of my brigade. Soon
SigePs whole corps, supported by those of Banks and
Reno, moved to the position which I had occupied, and
a very heavy cannonading followed.

My command was thus rescued from inevitable de
struction, for it would have been impossible for General
Jackson to have crossed his troops in time to arrest its
fate, as his only means of crossing the river consisted
of one narrow, temporary bridge, unsuitable for the pas
sage of artillery, and which the enemy could have com
manded from several positions beyond the reach of our
artillery on the south bank. Pope's whole army was in
easy supporting distance of the force sent against me,
and I had in part confronted that army on the 23rd and
the following night.

^ The men of my command, including Douglas' regi
ment, had had very little to eat since crossing the river,
and were without rations, as there had been little oppor-

112

OPERATIONS ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK

tunity for cooking since leaving the Rapidan; and they
had lain on their arms during the night of the 22nd in a
drenching rain ; yet they exhibited a determined resolu
tion to withstand the enemy's attack at all hazards,
should he come against us.

After recrossing the river, Lawton's brigade and mine
retired to the vicinity of Jefferson for the purpose of
resting and cooking rations.

CHAPTER XI.

CAPTURE OF MANASSAS JUNCTION.

ON the same morning I had crossed the river, Stuart,
with a portion of his cavalry, after crossing the river
above, had made a raid to Catlett's Station and upon
Pope 's headquarters at Warrenton Junction, and among
other things had captured Pope's dispatch book.

The captured correspondence showed that Pope was
being reinforced from the Kanawha Valley and also from
McClellan's army, and General Lee determined to send
General Jackson to the enemy's rear, to cut the rail
road, so as to destroy his communications and bring on
a general engagement before the whole of the approach
ing reinforcements could arrive.

Jackson's wing of the army was put in motion early
on the morning of the 25th, with no wagons but the
ordnance and medical wagons, and with three days'
rations in haversacks, for a "cavalry raid with in
fantry." Moving with Swell's division in front, we
crossed the river at Hinson's Mill above Waterloo bridge,
and marched by a small place called Orleans to Salem,
near which place we bivouacked after a very long day's
march. On the morning of the 26th, we moved, with
Ewell's division still in front, past White Plains, through
Thoroughfare Gap in Bull Mountain to Gainesville on
the Warrenton Pike, and there turned off to the right
towards Bristow Station on the Orange & Alexandria
Railroad. At Haymarket, before reaching Gainesville,
we halted two or three hours to wait for Stuart to come
up with his cavalry, which had started that morning to
follow us, and did join us at Gainesville. Hays' brigade,
under General Forno, was in the advance of the division
on this day, and it arrived at Bristow Station a little
before sunset, just as several trains were approaching
from the direction of Warrenton Junction.

114

CAPTURE OF MANASSAS JUNCTION

There was but a small force of cavalry at Bristow,
which Colonel Forno soon dispersed, and he then arrested
and captured two trains of empty cars with their engines,
the first train which approached having made its escape
towards Manassas before the road could be sufficiently
obstructed, and other trains in the rear running back, on
hearing the alarm, towards Warrenton Junction. Gen
eral Trimble was sent, soon after dark, with two of his
regiments, to capture Manassas Junction, and in con
junction with General Stuart succeeded in taking the
place and securing eight pieces of artillery, a consider
able number of prisoners and horses, a long train of
loaded cars, and a very large amount of stores of all
kinds. As soon as the remainder of Swell's division
arrived at Bristow, it was placed in position to prevent
a surprise by the enemy during the night.

Very early on the morning of the 27th, Hays ' brigade
and one regiment of Lawton's with a piece of artillery
were moved towards Kettle Run in the direction of War
renton Junction on a reconnaissance, and a train of cars
was seen re-embarking a regiment which had been sent
to drive off the "raiding party," but, on finding the
strength of our force, was about retiring. A shot from
one piece of artillery sent the train off in a hurry, and
one regiment of Hays1 brigade was left on picket and
another regiment to tear up the railroad, with orders to
fall back skirmishing towards the main body, on the ap
proach of the enemy in force.

Trimble's other regiment, and the 12th Georgia,
which was now transferred from my brigade to his, were
sent to him at Manassas Junction this morning, and the
two other divisions of Jackson's command were ordered
to the same place. General Ewell had been ordered by
General Jackson to remain at Bristow with his three
remaining brigades to check any advance from Pope's
army along the railroad, but, if the enemy appeared in
heavy force, to retire upon the Junction, as he did not
desire a general engagement at this time. General Ewell

115

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

accordingly disposed his command across the railroad
and facing towards Warrenton Junction as follows: my
brigade on the right, Lawton's on the left and Hays' in
the centre, the main body being posted on a slight ridge
covering the station. The 49th Virginia Eegiment of my
brigade was moved to a ridge on my right, on the road
leading to and past Greenwich, and a regiment of Law-
ton's brigade (the 60th Georgia), with one piece of
artillery, was advanced on the left of the railroad so
as to support Forno's two regiments which were in
front, while the batteries were posted so as to command
the approaches on our front and flanks.

In the afternoon indications were seen of the ap
proach of the enemy from the direction of Warrenton
Junction, and the wagons were ordered to Manassas. In
a short time the enemy advanced in force with infantry
and artillery, and the 6th and 8th Louisiana Regiments
which had been left in front fell back to a woods about
three hundred yards in front of the remainder of the
brigade. As soon as the enemy got within range, our
batteries opened on him from their various positions,
and the 6th and 8th Louisiana, and 60th Georgia Regi
ments received him with well directed volleys, by which
two columns of not less than a brigade each were sent
back. The 5th Louisiana was sent to reinforce the 6th
and 8th, but by this time fresh columns of the enemy
were seen advancing, and it was apparent that his force
was larger than ours. As the position we occupied was
a weak one, and the enemy could very easily have turned
our flank by moving a force on the ridge to our right,
which he appeared to be doing, General Ewell determined
to retire in accordance with General Jackson's instruc
tions. The order for the withdrawal across Broad Run
was given, and I was directed to cover it with my brigade.

At this time the Louisiana regiments in front were
actively engaged, and a heavy column of the enemy was
moving against them. Lawton's brigade was first drawn
back across the ford at the railroad bridge over Broad

116

CAPTURE OF MANASSAS JUNCTION

Run, and took position on the northern bank. Hays'
brigade then followed, the regiments engaged in front
having retired in good order. My own brigade had been
withdrawn from a pine woods in which it was posted,
and covered the movements of the others by forming
successive lines of battle back to the ford, and was then
crossed over by regiments successively. All the artillery
was successfully withdrawn, a part crossing at Milford
several hundred yards above the bridge, at which point
the 49th Virginia also crossed.

In the meantime, the enemy had been advancing in
line of battle on both sides of the railroad, preceded by
skirmishers, and keeping up a constant artillery fire. The
13th Virginia had been deployed as skirmishers to keep
those of the enemy in check, and kept them from ad
vancing beyond the station until all the rest of our force
had crossed the Run, when it also retired. Lawton's
brigade had been formed in line on the north bank of
the Run, and some batteries put in position. Hays'
brigade was ordered to proceed to Manassas Junction
as soon as it crossed, and my brigade was moved back
about three-fourths of a mile and formed in line on a
hill commanding the road to the Junction, and in full
view of the enemy, who had halted on the ridges near
Bristow Station.

In a short time afterwards, General Ewell with
Lawton's brigade passed through my line, which was
across the road, and ordered me to remain in position
until further orders should be sent me. He left a battery
with me and directed that one or two regiments should
be so moved and manoeuvred as to present the appear
ance of the arrival of reinforcements to my assistance.
This was done, and a small party of the enemy which had
crossed the Run, and was moving along the railroad, was
driven back by a few shots from the artillery, but the
enemy's main force, which consisted of the advance
division of Pope's army under Hooker, did not come
further than the station.

117

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

Shortly after dark, under orders from General Ewell,
I retired to the Junction, where my men filled their haver
sacks with rations of hard bread and salt meat from the
stores captured from the enemy, but this was all of the
plunder obtained at that place which they could get.

Our loss in this affair was comparatively slight and
was confined almost entirely to the 5th, 6th and 8th
Louisiana, and the 60th Georgia Regiments, which were
the only troops who drew trigger on our side, except the
13th Virginia when deployed as skirmishers to cover our
withdrawal. The enemy reported his loss at 300.

The two captured trains had been burned in the early
part of the day, and the railroad bridge across Broad
Run had been destroyed. A brigade of the enemy which
advanced towards Manassas, after having been landed
from a train coming from Alexandria, had been met by a
party of our troops moving out from the Junction and
routed, its commanding officer being killed.

As soon as Swell's division had rested and broiled
a little meat, it moved from the Junction towards Black
burn's Ford on Bull Run, and the brigades became
separated and bivouacked at different places, mine lying
down in the open field.

The other divisions had previously moved, and
Stuart proceeded to burn the trains, and such stores as
had not been carried off.

CHAPTER XII.

THE AFFAIE AT GKOVETON.

IT having become evident that Pope had found it
necessary to look after his "lines of retreat," and was
moving his whole army back for the purpose of falling
upon General Jackson's comparatively small force, the
latter determined to move to the left so as to be in a
position to unite with the right wing of General Lee's
army under Longstreet. Jackson's division, under
Brigadier General W. S. Taliaferro, had therefore been
moved on the night of the 27th to the vicinity of the
battlefield of the 21st of July, 1861, and A. P. Hill's to
Centreville, with orders to Ewell to move up, by the
northern bank of Bull Bun, to the same locality with
Taliaferro early on the morning of the 28th. At dawn
on that morning, my brigade resumed the march, moving
across Bull Bun at Blackburn's Ford and then up the
north bank to Stone Bridge, followed by Trimble's
brigade. We crossed at a ford just below Stone Bridge,
and moved across the Warrenton Pike and through the
fields between the Carter house and the Stone Tavern,
where the battle of the 21st of July had begun, to the
Sudley road, near where Jackson's division was already
in position.

Lawton's and Hays' brigades had by mistake taken
the road to Centreville, but had now rejoined the rest
of the division, and the whole of the brigades were placed
under cover in the woods, north of the "Warrenton Pike,
through which the Sudley road ran. Hill's division came
up from Centreville subsequently. In the meantime
Pope's whole army had been moving by various roads
upon Manassas Junction, with the expectation of finding
Jackson's force there, but in the afternoon the corps of
McDowell's en route for Manassas had been ordered to
move to Centreville, and a portion of it marched along

119

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

the Warrenton Pike. Very late in the afternoon, Jack
son's division under Taliaferro was moved along parallel
to the pike, under cover of the woods, across the track
which had been graded for a railroad, until it passed the
small village of Groveton on our left. Ewell's division
followed Jackson's until the whole had crossed the rail
road track, and the two divisions were then halted and
formed in line facing the pike. General Ewell ordered
me to take command of my own brigade and Hays' and
form a double line in the edge of a piece of woods, with
my left resting on the railroad, and to await orders;
and he moved to the right with Lawton's and Trimble's
brigades.

My line was formed as directed, with my own brigade
in front and Hays' in rear of it, and as thus formed we
were on the left and rear of Starke's brigade of Jack
son's division, whose line was advanced farther towards
the pike. About sunset a column of the enemy com
menced moving past our position, and Jackson's division
and the two brigades with General Ewell moved forward
to attack him, when a fierce and sanguinary engagement
took place. While it was raging, and just before dark,
I received an order from General Jackson, through one
of his staff officers, to advance to the front, which I com
plied with at once, my own brigade in line of battle being
followed by that of Hays.

While advancing, I received an order to send two
regiments to the right to General Jackson, and I de
tached the 44th and 49th Virginia under Colonel Smith
for that purpose. On reaching the railroad cut in my
forward movement, I found it so deep that it was im
possible to cross it, and I had therefore to move to the
right by flank until I found a place where I could cross.
This proved to be a ravine with embankments on both
sides for a bridge or culvert, and I had here to pass
through by flank and form by file into line in front of a
marsh beyond. This brought me near the left of the
position to which Trimble's brigade had advanced, and I

120

THE AFFAIR AT GROVETON

had passed a part of Starke's brigade on the railroad
track. While my brigade was forming in line it was
exposed to a galling fire of canister and shrapnel, and
before it was ready to advance the enemy had begun to
retreat and it had become so dark that it was impossible
to tell whether we should encounter friend or foe. I
therefore advanced no farther and Hays' brigade was
halted on the railroad; and in this position the two
brigades lay on their arms all night.

A short distance from me General Ewell was found
very severely wounded by a ball through the knee, which
he had received while leading one of the regiments on
foot, and I had him carried to the hospital, after having
great difficulty in persuading him to go, as he insisted
upon having his leg amputated before he left the ground.

Lawton's and Trimble's brigades lay on their arms
a short distance to my right, near the points where they
were at the close of the action, and both had suffered
heavily. The enemy had retired from our immediate
front, and we could hear the rumbling of his artillery
as he was moving off in the distance.

CHAPTER XIII.

SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS.

THOUGH the force of the enemy, consisting of King's
division of McDowell's Corps moving on the left flank
of that corps, with which the engagement took place on
the afternoon of the 28th, had retreated in the direction
of Manassas, other troops had moved up to the vicinity,
and early next morning it was discovered that Pope was
moving his whole army against us from the direction
of Manassas and Centreville, to which point it had gone
in search of us.

It now became necessary to change our front to meet
the approaching columns, and Swell's division, under the
command of Brigadier General Lawton as senior
brigadier, was formed in line facing Groveton, near
where it had lain on its arms the night before, on a ridge
running nearly at right angles to Warrenton Pike, with
its right, my brigade, resting on the pike. The other
divisions were retired behind the unfinished railroad on
our left, and the whole line faced towards the enemy. At
an early hour the enemy's batteries opened on us and
were replied to by ours. After this artillery firing had
continued for some time, the position of Swell's division
was changed, and General Jackson in person ordered me
to move with Hays' brigade and my own, and Johnson's
battery of artillery, to a ridge north of the Warrenton
Pike and behind the railroad, so as to prevent the enemy
from turning our right flank, a movement from Manassas
indicating that purpose having been observed. Two of
my regiments, the 13th Virginia and 31st Virginia, under
Colonel Walker, were detached by General Jackson's
order and placed in position south of the pike, for the
purpose of watching the movements of the force that
was advancing from the direction of Manassas towards
our right.

122

SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS

Hays' brigade and my own were formed in line on
the ridge indicated, in the edge of a piece of woods, and
skirmishers were advanced to the line of the railroad,
Johnson's battery being placed in position to command
my front. In the meantime our main line had been
established on the railroad a mile or more to my left,
and Lawton's and Trimble's brigades had been moved
so as to conform thereto. The artillery firing had con
tinued all the morning, on my left at our main position,
and there had been some infantry fighting. The two
regiments under Colonel Walker, by skirmishing, kept
the head of the force moving from Manassas on our
right in check, until the appearance of the leading
division (Hood's) of Longstreet's force on the Warren-
ton Pike from the direction of Gainesville, which occurred
about ten or eleven o'clock A.M.

I remained in position until Longstreet's advance had
moved far enough to render it unnecessary for me to
remain longer, and, without awaiting orders, I recalled
Colonel Walker with his two regiments about one o 'clock
P.M., and then moved the two brigades to the left, to
rejoin the rest of the division. I found General Lawton
with his own brigade in line in rear of the railroad, not
far from the position I had occupied, the previous morn
ing, before the fight, and Trimble's brigade was in line
on the railroad between Jackson's division and Hill's,
the former being on the right and the latter on the left.
Along this railroad Jackson's line was mainly formed,
facing to the southeast. The track of the road was
through fields and woods, and consisted of deep cuts
and heavy embankments, as the country was rolling.
The two brigades with me were formed in line in the
woods, in rear of Lawton's brigade, with Hays' on the
right of mine.

We remained in this position until about half-past
three P.M., and in the meantime the enemy was making
desperate attempts to drive our troops from the line of
the railroad, having advanced some heavy columns

123

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

against Hill's brigades and been repulsed; and the battle
was raging fiercely in our front. Just about half-past
three, Colonel Forno, with Hays' brigade, was ordered
to advance to the assistance of one of Hill's brigades
which had been forced from his position, and he did so,
driving the enemy from the railroad and taking position
on it with his brigade. He was subsequently wounded
very seriously, while holding this position, by a sharp
shooter, and had to be removed from the field.

Some time after Forno 's advance, a messenger came
from A. P. Hill, with the information that one of his
brigades, whose ammunition was nearly exhausted, was
being very heavily pressed, and with the request that I
should advance to its support. I did so at once, without
waiting for orders, and moved directly ahead, as I was
informed the attack was immediately in my front; the
8th Louisiana Eegiment under Major Lewis, which had
been sent to the wagons the day before to replenish its
ammunition and had just arrived, accompanying my
brigade. As I passed Lawton's brigade I found the
13th Georgia Regiment preparing to move forward under
the General's orders. I continued to advance until I
came to a small field near the railroad, when I discovered
that the enemy had possession of a deep cut in the rail
road with a part of his force in a strip of woods between
the field and the cut. General Gregg's and Colonel
Thomas' brigades, having very nearly exhausted their
ammunition, had fallen back a short distance, but were
presenting a determined front to the enemy.

My brigade, with the 8th Louisiana on its left, ad
vanced at once across the field, and drove the enemy
from the woods and the railroad cut, dashing across the
railroad, and pursuing the retreating force some two
or three hundred yards beyond, before I could arrest
its progress. The messenger from General Hill had
stated that it was not desired that I should go beyond
the railroad, but should content myself with driving the
enemy from it, as General Jackson's orders were not to

124

SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS

advance but hold the line. I, therefore, drew my men
back to the railroad cut and took position behind it.
This charge was made with great dash and gallantry
by my brigade and the 8th Louisiana Regiment, and
very heavy loss was inflicted on the enemy with a com
paratively slight one to us, though two valuable officers,
Colonel William Smith of the 49th Virginia and Major
John C. Higginbotham of the 25th Virginia, were severely
wounded. At the time my brigade crossed the railroad,
the 13th Georgia advanced further to the right and
crossed over in pursuit.

This was the last of seven different assaults on Gen
eral Hill's line that day, all of which had now been
repulsed with great slaughter upon the enemy, and he
did not renew the attack, but contented himself with
furiously shelling the woods in which we were located.
Jackson's division had also repulsed an attack on his
front, and General Trimble was severely wounded dur
ing the course of the day by an explosive ball from a
sharpshooter. General Jackson had accomplished his
purpose of resisting the enemy until General Lee with
Long-street's force could effect a junction with him. The
lifter force was now up and a part of it had been en
gaged just about night with one of the enemy's columns.

Pope, in his report, claims that General Jackson was
retreating through Thoroughfare Gap, when his attack
arrested this retreat and compelled Jackson to take posi
tion to defend himself, and that he drove our troops
several miles, but there was no thought of retreat, and
the various movements of our troops had been solely for
the purpose of defence against the enemy's threatened
attacks as he changed their direction.

Hill's brigades, to whose relief I had gone, went to
the rear to replenish their cartridge boxes and did not
return to relieve me after the close of the fight on the
29th. I had therefore to remain in position all night with
my men lying on their arms.

I had understood that some of Hill's brigades were

125

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

to my left, but it turned out that they had also gone to
the rear to get ammunition and did not return ; and very
early in the morning of the 30th, the enemy's sharp
shooters got on the railroad embankment on my left
and opened fire on that flank, killing a very valuable
young officer of the- IStli Virginia Regiment, Lieutenant
Leroy. I thus discovered for the first time that my
flank was exposed, and the enemy's sharpshooters soon
began to cross the railroad on my left and advance
through a cornfield. I immediately sent word to General
Hill of this state of things, and, after some delay, some
brigades were sent to occupy positions on my left, who
drove the sharpshooters back. During the morning there
was very heavy skirmishing in my front, and the
skirmishers of my brigade, under Captain Lilley of the
25th Virginia, drove back a heavy force which was ad
vancing apparently for an attack on our position.

Subsequently our troops were arranged so as to place
Ewell's division in the centre, leaving Hill's division on
the left and Jackson's on the right, but when Lawton's
brigade was moved up, there was left space for only
three of my regiments, and leaving the 44th, 49th and
52nd Virginia Regiments on the line under General
Smith of the 49th, I retired about 150 yards to the rear
with the rest of the brigade. Hays' brigade, now under
Colonel Strong, had been sent to the wagons to get
ammunition and had not returned.

The fore part of the day was consumed by the main
body of the enemy and Longstreet's wing of the army in
manoeuvring and cannonading, but about four o'clock
P.M. the enemy brought up very heavy columns and
hurled them against Jackson's line, when the fighting
became very severe, but all of the attempts to force our
position were successfully resisted, and a very heavy
punishment was inflicted on the enemy. My three regi
ments under Colonel Smith, participated in the repulse
of the enemy, and as he retired they dashed across the
railroad cut in pursuit, very unexpectedly to me, as I

126

SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS

had given orders to Colonel William Smith not to ad
vance until the order to do so was given. His men, how
ever, had been incapable of restraint, but he soon re
turned with them. In the meantime, I advanced the
other regiments to the front of the line that had been
vacated. Trimble's brigade, now under Captain Brown
of the 12th Georgia, and Lawton's brigade had partici
pated in this repulse of the enemy likewise.

The attack on the part of the line occupied by Jack
son's division had been very persistent, but Longstreet
now began to advance against the enemy from the right
and was soon sweeping him from our front. Some of
Hill's brigades also advanced and the enemy was driven
from the field with great slaughter. While this was tak
ing place, the other divisions of Jackson were ordered
to advance, and my brigade was soon put in motion in
the direction taken by Hill's brigades, advancing through
the woods in our front to a large field about a quarter
of a mile from the railroad. I halted at the edge of the
woods to enable the other brigades to come up, as I was
ahead of them, when General Jackson rode >up and
ordered me to move by my left flank to intercept a body
of the enemy reported moving up Bull Eun to our left.
I did so, moving along with skirmishers ahead of the
brigade until I came to the railroad, and then along that
until I came to a field.

It was now getting dark, and as my skirmishers
moved into the field they were fired upon from their left.
This fire came from a very unexpected quarter, and I
immediately sent to let General Jackson know the fact,
as it would have been folly to have advanced in the
direction I was going if it came from the enemy. A
message was soon received from General Jackson, stat
ing that the fire very probably came from some of Hill's
troops, and directing me to send and see. This had been
anticipated by sending a young soldier of the 44th Vir
ginia, who volunteered for the purpose, and he soon re
turned with the information that the firing was from

127

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

the skirmishers from Gregg 's and Branch's brigades
of Hill's division who mistook us for the enemy. Fortu
nately no damage was done, and I was moving on when
I received an order to advance to the front from where
I was, and in a few minutes afterwards another to move
back by the right flank, as the report of the movement
of the enemy around our left flank had proved untrue.
I found that the other brigades of the division had
bivouacked near where I had left them, and my own
did the same.

The enemy had been driven beyond Bull Run, and
was in retreat to Centreville, our pursuit having been
arrested by the approaching darkness.

CHAPTER XIV.
AFFAIR AT Ox HILL OB CHANTILLY.

JACKSON'S command, after having rested on the
morning of the 31st, in the afternoon of that day was
put in motion for the purpose of turning the enemy's
position at Centreville. Crossing Bull Run at and near
Sudley's Ford, it moved to the left over a country road,
Jackson's division in front followed by Ewell's and Hill's
bringing up the rear, until the Little Eiver Turnpike
was reached, when we turned towards Fairfax Court-
House and bivouacked late at night. Early on the morn
ing of September the 1st, the march was resumed, and
continued until we reached the farm of Chantilly in the
afternoon. The enemy was found in position, covering
the retreat of his army, near Ox Hill, not far from
Chantilly, and a short distance beyond which the Little
River Pike, and the pike from Centreville to Fairfax
Court-House, intersect.

General Jackson at once put his troops in position on
the ridge on the east of the Little River Pike, with his
own division on the left, Hill's on the right and Ewell's
in the centre; Hays' and Trimble's brigades only of
Ewell's division being on the front line, Lawton's and
mine being formed in the woods in their rear. As we
moved into position the enemy opened a heavy artillery
fire on us, and soon the action commenced with some of
Hill's brigades on the right, extending to Trimble's and
Hays' brigades. During this action a severe thunder
storm raged, and while it was progressing, General
Starke, then in command of Jackson's division, repre
sented to me that a heavy force was threatening his left,
between which and the pike there was a considerable
interval, and requested me to cover it with my brigade
to protect him from the apprehended danger.

After examining the position I reluctantly consented

9 129

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

to yield to General Starke's entreaty, without awaiting
orders, as Hays' brigade was in my front and he repre
sented his situation as critical, and I proceeded to move
my brigade by the left flank to the point designated by
him. I had put myself on the leading flank, and while
moving I heard a considerable musketry fire, but as the
woods were very thick and it continued to rain I could
see only a short distance, and took it for granted that
the firing proceeded from the troops in front of where I
had been.

On reaching the position General Starke desired me
to occupy, which was but a short distance from the place
I had moved from, as his left was drawn back in a circle
towards the pike, I discovered that the 13th, 25th and
31st Virginia Regiments which were on my right had
not followed the rest of the brigade. I immediately sent
my aide, Lieutenant Early, back to see what had become
of the missing regiments, and he found them engaged
with a body of the enemy in their front. On ascertain
ing this fact, I moved back at once and found that my
regiment had repulsed the force opposed to them and
inflicted considerable loss on it. Hays' brigade under
Colonel Strong had fallen back in considerable confusion
about the time I commenced my movement, and passed
through the three regiments on my right, followed by a
considerable force of the enemy. The commanding offi
cers had very properly detained those regiments, as the
affair was entirely concealed from my view, and they
had received the enemy's onset with great coolness,
driving him back out of the woods.

Colonel Strong had attempted to change front when
the enemy were advancing on him, and, being entirely
inexperienced in the management of a brigade, he had
got it into such confusion that it was compelled to retire.
The 8th Louisiana Regiment, under Major Lewis, had
been halted and formed into line immediately in rear
of my regiments, and the remaining regiments were soon
rallied and brought back by their respective commanders.
After quite a severe action, in which the enemy lost two

130

AFFAIR AT OX HILL OR CHANTILLY

general officers, Kearney and Stevens, he was repulsed
at all points, and continued his retreat during the night.
After the close of the action, Jackson's division was
withdrawn from the left to the rear, and E well's division
covered the point previously covered by General Starke,
and Hays' and Trimble's brigades, and the men lay
on their arms during the night. While Trimble's brigade
was engaged, the gallant old Captain Brown, of the 12th
Georgia Regiment, in command of the brigade, was
killed, and Colonel James A. "Walker of the 13th Virginia
Regiment was subsequently assigned to the command of
the brigade, as it had no field officer present.

On the morning of the 2nd it was discovered that the
enemy had retired from our front, and during that day
Pope made good his escape into the fortifications around
Washington. He had now seen the "rebels" in various
aspects and found that his lines of retreat would not
take care of themselves; and very soon he was shipped
and sent to the northwest to look after the Indians in
that quarter.

This affair at Ox Hill closed the series of engage
ments with the enemy under Pope, and it was again the
old story of the "rebels in overwhelming numbers,"
opposed to a small army of "Union soldiers." Accord
ing to Pope's account, his army was wearied out and
broken down by the fatigues of the campaign on the
Rappahannock, and the incessant marching and manoau-
vring to confront Lee's army, and was short of rations
and ammunition. It does not seem to have occurred to
him that the soldiers of the army which thus wearied his
own were at all susceptible of fatigue or hunger, or that
when his own rations were short, their chances of supply
ing themselves were slim.

Pope's army had at the time of the battles of the
27th, 28th, 29th and 30th of August, been reinforced by
Burnside's corps under Reno, one brigade of Sturgis'
division from Alexandria, and the following troops
from McClellan's army: Heintzelman 's corps, Porter's
corps, and the division of Pennsylvania reserves com-

131

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

manded by Reynolds. At the time of the affair at Ox
Hill he had been further reinforced by Franklin's and
Sumner's corps of McClellan 's army, leaving but one
corps of that army (Keyes') which had not reached him.
His consolidated report of the 31st of July showed a
strength of 46,858 before he was joined by any of those
reinforcements and in the letter of Halleck to McClellan,
dated the 6th of August, Pope's army is stated to be
about 40,000. In a telegram from Halleck to McClellan,
dated the 12th of August, Burnside's force is stated to be
nearly 13,000.

General Lee's army at the time of these battles near
Manassas consisted of Jackson's wing of the army in
which there were three divisions of infantry containing
fourteen brigades, Longstreet's wing in which there were
four divisions of infantry containing fifteen brigades, and
two brigades of cavalry under Stuart. There was about
one battery of artillery of four guns for each brigade
attached to the divisions, and there was a reserve force
of artillery which may have numbered some eight or ten
batteries, but perhaps not so many.

Longstreet's command consisted of his own division,
seven brigades; Hood's division, two brigades; Jones'
division, three brigades; and Anderson's division, three
brigades. The whole of those brigades, as well as the
force of Jackson, had been in the battles around Rich
mond, except Evans' brigade — attached to Longstreet's
division, — and Drayton's brigade, attached to Jones'
division. Those two brigades had probably been brought
from the South since those battles, or they may have
been organized out of regiments attached to other
brigades at that time; but I think they were brought
from North and South Carolina, and if such was the
fact, they were the only reinforcements which I ever
heard of reaching General Lee after the battles around
Richmond or before or during the campaign against Pope
or the campaign in Maryland. D. H. Hill's division of
five brigades; McLaw's division of four brigades, com-

132

AFFAIR AT OX HILL OR CHANTILLY

posed of his own and Magruder's consolidated; and the
force of Holmes and Wise — all of which had constituted
part of the army at Richmond during the battles, — had
been left for the protection of that city until the whole
of McClelland force moved from James River.

When that event was fully ascertained, Hill's and
McLaw's division and two of Holmes' brigades, under
Walker, had been ordered to move North, but Hill and
McLaws got up on the 2nd, the day after the affair at
Ox Hill, and Walker later, so that Pope had only to
confront the 29 brigades before mentioned. My brigade
was fully an average one, and my effective force did
not exceed 1,500. Some idea therefore may be formed
of the force with which General Lee fought the second
battle of Manassas; I don't think it could have exceeded
50,000 effective men in all, including artillery and
cavalry, and it was probably considerably under that
number.

The loss in Swell's division, beginning with the artil
lery fighting on the Rappahannock and ending, with the
affair at Ox Hill, was in killed 366, wounded 1,169, and
missing 32, the loss in my own brigade being 27 killed
and 181 wounded.

The main battle, which occurred on the 29th and 30th
of August, has been called the second battle of Manassas,
but I think the little village or hamlet of Groveton is
entitled to the honor of giving its name to that great
battle, as the fighting began there on the 28th, and was
all around it on the 29th and 30th.

The first battle near the same spot, on ground which
was again fought over, had been properly named, as
Manassas Junction was then the headquarters and cen
tral position of our army, and was the objective point
of the enemy during the battle. Such was not the case
with either army at the last battle, and the Junction,
several miles off, had no more relation to the battle than
Bristow, Gainesville or Centreville.

CHAPTER XV.

MOVEMENT INTO MARYLAND.

ON the 2nd of September our army rested, while the
movements of the enemy were being ascertained. Pro
visions were now very scarce, as the supply in the
wagons, with which we had started, was exhausted. The
rations obtained by Jackson's command from the enemy's
stores, at Manassas, which were confined to what could
be brought off in haversacks, were also exhausted, and
on this day boiled fresh beef, without salt or bread, was
issued to my brigade, which with an ear or two of green
corn roasted by a fire, constituted also my own supply
of food, at this time. Longstreet's wing of the army was
in a worse condition than Jackson's, as it had not par
ticipated in the supply found at Manassas.

On the morning of the 3rd, Jackson's wing com
menced the march towards the Potomac, and moved to
the left over some country roads, crossing the Loudoun
& Hampshire Eailroad at a station, above Vienna, until
we reached the turnpike from Georgetown to Leesburg
in Loudoun, and then along this road through Draines-
ville, until we passed Leesburg on the afternoon of the
4th, and bivouacked near Big Springs, two or three miles
from the latter place, at night.

On the 5th we resumed the march and crossed the
Potomac at White's Ford, about seven miles above Lees
burg, into Maryland. This ford was an obscure one on
the road through the farm of Captain Elijah White, and
the banks of the river had to be dug down so that our
wagons and artillery might cross. On the Maryland side
of the river the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal runs along the
bank, and the canal had to be bridged over a lock to
enable our wagons to pass, as they could not get through
the culvert where the road ran. That night we bivouacked
near Three Springs in Maryland on the road leading

134

MOVEMENT INTO MARYLAND

towards Frederick City, and after my brigade had lain
down I received a message from General Jackson to let
my men get green corn for two days, but, I told the staff
officer bringing it, that they had already drawn their
rations in that article, which was all they had now to
eat. I will here say that green Indian corn and boiled
beef without salt are better than no food at all by a
good deal, but they constitute a very weakening diet for
troops on a long march, as they produce diarrhoea.

On the 6th we resumed the march and in the after
noon occupied Frederick City and the Monocacy Junction
on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. Jackson's division
took position near the city, and Hill's and Ewell's near
the Junction, which is about three miles from the city
in the direction of Washington. Ewell's division cov
ered the railroad and the approaches from the direction
of Baltimore, and Hill's those from the direction of
Washington. We were now able to get some flour and
salt, and our whole army was in a day or two concen
trated near the same points.

We remained in position until the 10th, and on that
day General Jackson's command moved through Freder
ick westward, for the purpose of capturing Harper's
Ferry and Maryland Heights, where there was a con
siderable force of the enemy. At the same time, McLaws,
with his own and Anderson's divisions, including three
brigades of Longstreet's attached to Anderson's division,
moved towards Maryland Heights, and Brigadier Gen
eral Walker with his two brigades moved towards
Loudoun Heights on the south of the Potomac, for the
purpose of surrounding Harper's Ferry and co-operat
ing with General Jackson in its capture.

On the night of the 10th, Ewell's division bivouacked
between Middletown and South Mountain. On the llth,
we moved across the mountain at Boonsboro Gap, and
through Boonsboro to Williamsport, where we crossed
the Potomac; Hill's division moving from that place
directly for Martinsburg on the pike, and Ewell's and

135

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

Jackson's divisions for North Mountain depot on the
Baltimore & Ohio Eailroad, some miles west of Martins-
burg, near which they bivouacked. On the morning of
the 12th we moved for Martinsburg, and found that a
force of the enemy at that place under General White
had retired in the direction of Harper's Ferry on the
approach of HilPs division. We passed through the
town in the direction of Harper's Ferry and Swell's
division bivouacked on the banks of the Opequon.

On the morning of the 13th we resumed the march,
and reached the turnpike from Charlestown to Harper's
Ferry, one mile above Halltown, and bivouacked in
sight of the enemy's work on Bolivar Heights, covering
the town at the ferry, to wait until McLaws and Walker
should get in position on Maryland Heights and Loudon
Heights respectively, both of which overlooked and com
manded the enemy's position.

On the afternoon of the 14th, McLaws and Walker
having previously gotten in position and opened fire
with their artillery, General Jackson's force moved
forward to invest the enemy's works, Hill's division
moving on the right along the Shenandoah, Swell's
division along the turnpike, and one brigade of Jack
son's division along the Potomac on the left, the rest of
the division moving in support. Swell's division moved
along and on each side of the pike in three columns until
it passed Halltown, when it was formed in treble line of
battle with Trimble's and Hays' brigades on the front
line, and Lawton's and my brigade in their rear, Law-
ton's forming the second line, and mine the third. In
this order we moved forward through some fields on
the right of the road until we reached a woods on a hill
called School House Hill, confronting the main works
on Bolivar Heights, and in easy range for artillery.

This was donev without opposition, and Hays' brigade
was then moved to the left of the road and mine posted
in its rear, the right being occupied by Trimble's and
Lawton's brigades in the same order. It was now dark

136

MOVEMENT INTO MARYLAND

and the artillery firing from Maryland and Loudon
Heights, as well as that from the enemy 's works, had
ceased. General Hill had had some skirmishing with the
enemy on our right, and had pushed some brigades close
to the enemy's left flank to favorable positions for
assaulting his works, and taking them on the flank and
rear, but night also closed his operations.

Early on the morning of the 15th, preparations were
made for the assault, and the batteries from Maryland
Heights, Loudon Heights, from a position across the
Shenandoah to which the guns belonging to Swell's
division had been moved during the night, from Hill's
position, from each side of the pike in front of Swell's
division, and from the left on the Potomac, opened on
the enemy. In front of the position occupied by Swell's
division was a deep valley between School House Hill
and Bolivar Heights, the whole of which was cleared.
On the opposite side the ascent to the enemy's works
was steep and over thick brush that had been felled so
as to make a formidable abattis. It was over this ground
we would have had to move to the assault, and the pros
pect was by no means comforting.

Very early in the morning, Lawton's brigade had
been moved to the right and then by flank to the upper
part of the valley in front of us, for the purpose of
supporting an attack to be made by Hill's division, and
the latter was moving to the assault, when the white flag
was hoisted on Bolivar Heights. This indication of the
enemy's surrender was received with very hearty and
sincere cheers all along the line, as we were thus saved
the necessity of an assault, which if stubbornly resisted
would have resulted in the loss of many lives to us.

Under the directions of General Jackson, General A.
P. Hill received the surrender of the enemy, then under
the command of Brigadier General White, Colonel Miles,
the commander of the forces at Harper's Ferry, having
been mortally wounded. About 11,000 prisoners were
surrendered and paroled, and we secured about 12,000

137

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

small arms, 70 pieces of artillery, and a very large
amount of stores, provisions, wagons and horses.

The victory was really a bloodless one so far as Gen
eral Jackson 's command was concerned, the only loss
being a very few killed and wounded in Hill's division,
but General McLaws had had heavy work in taking
Maryland Heights, and had been engaged severely with
the enemy coming up in his rear.

CHAPTER XVI.

BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM.

LATE in the afternoon of the 15th, General Lawton
received an order from General Jackson to move the
division on the road to Boteler's Ford, on the Potomac
below Shepherdstown, and he at once put his own and
Trimble's brigade, which had gotten rations from
Harper's Ferry, in motion, and ordered me to follow
with my own and Hays' brigade as soon as they were
supplied likewise from the stores of the enemy. I was
detained until after night before the men of the two
brigades could be supplied, and I then followed General
Lawton, finding him just before morning bivouacked
about four miles from Boteler's Ford. Brigadier Gen
eral Hays, wounded at Port Eepublic while Colonel of
the 7th Louisiana, had returned to the brigade on the
15th after the surrender of Harper's Ferry and assumed
command of his brigade before we started on this march.

The division moved at dawn on the 16th, and, cross
ing the Potomac, arrived in the vicinity of Sharpsburg
in the early part of the day, and stacked arms in a piece
of woods about a mile in rear of Sharpsburg, Jackson's
division having preceded it, and Hill's being left behind
to dispose of the prisoners and property captured at
Harper's Ferry.

After the different columns, which had been sent
against the latter place, had moved from the vicinity of
Frederick, the residue of General Lee 's army had moved
across South Mountain in the direction of Hagerstown,
and the division of General D. H. Hill had been left to
defend Boonsboro Gap against the Federal Army, com
posed of Pope's army and McClellan's army combined,
and heavy reinforcements which had arrived to their
assistance, now approaching under General McClellan.
General Hill had been attacked on the 14th, at Boons-

139

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

boro Gap, by the main body of McClellan's army, and,
after a very obstinate resistance for many hours to the
vast forces brought against him, had, with the reinforce
ments sent to his assistance in the latter part of the
day, retired late at night to Sharpsburg on the western
side of the Antietam.

A position had been taken on the morning of the 15th
by the force north of the Potomac, consisting of D. H.
Hill's division, five brigades; the three remaining
brigades of Longstreet's division; Hood's division, two
brigades; D. R. Jones' division, three brigades; and
Evans' brigade; fourteen brigades in all, covering
Sharpsburg on the north and east, with the right rest
ing on Antietam Creek, and the left extending to the
Hagerstown pike ; and the enemy had gradually moved
his whole army up to the front of this position. This
was the condition of things when Jackson's two divisions
arrived on the 16th, and in the meantime there had been
some skirmishing and artillery firing.

After remaining in position in the rear for some
hours, General Lawton was ordered to move to the right
to cover a bridge over the Antietam, but after the move
ment had commenced, it was countermanded and an
order received to follow Jackson's division to the left
through fields until we struck the turnpike from Sharps
burg to Hagerstown, and proceeding along this we
reached a piece of woods on the west of the pike in which
there was a Dunkard or Quaker Church, and found, some
distance beyond the church, Jackson's division already
posted in a double line on the west of the pike, and con
necting on the right with the left of Hood's division.
General Jackson in person directed me to place my
brigade, which was at the head of the division, on the
left of his own so as to protect its flank, and to com
municate with Brigadier General J. R. Jones, then in
command of that division.

It was then getting near dark, and there was heavy
skirmishing between Hood's troops further to the right

140

BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM

and the enemy, while shells were flying pretty thick. I
had some difficulty in finding General Jones or his left,
but after a while succeeded in doing so, and then posted
my brigade on the left of Starke's brigade, constituting,
as I was informed, Jones ' left, which was formed on the
west of the pike extending into the woods.

My brigade was posted on a small road running
along the back of the woods past Starke's left, and
thrown back at right angles to his line. Lawton's and
Trimble's brigades had been halted near the church, but
General Hays, under orders from General Jackson, re
ported to me with his brigade, and it was posted in rear
of mine. The artillery firing and the skirmishing except
occasional shots between the pickets was put to an end
by the darkness, and about ten or eleven o'clock Lawton's
and Trimble's brigades took the place, on the front line,
of Hood's two brigades, which were withdrawn to the
rear.

Very shortly after dawn on the morning of the 17th,
I was ordered by General Jackson in person to move
my brigade to the front and left, along a route pointed
out by him, for the purpose of supporting some pieces
of artillery which General Stuart had in position to
operate against the enemy's right, and Hays was ordered
to the support of Lawton's and Trimble's brigades.

Moving along the route designated by General Jack
son, I discovered a body of the enemy's skirmishers close
on my right pushing forward as if for the purpose of
getting around the left flank of our line, and I sent some
from my own brigade to hold them in check until I had
passed. I found General Stuart about a mile from the
position I had moved from, with several pieces of artil
lery in position on a hill between the left of Jackson's
division and the Potomac which were engaging some of
the enemy's batteries. At his suggestion, I formed my
line in rear of this hill and remained there for about an
hour, when General Stuart discovered a body of the
enemy's infantry gradually making its way between us

141

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

and the left of our main line, and determined to shift
his position to a hill further to the right and a little in
rear of the direction of our line.

This movement was executed by passing over a route
to the rear of the one I had taken in the morning, the
latter being in possession of the enemy, and, while I was
forming my brigade in a strip of woods running back in
an elbow from the northern extremity of the body of
woods in which the Dunkard Church was located, Gen
eral Stuart informed me that General Lawton had been
wounded, and that General Jackson had sent for me to
return with my brigade and take command of the division.
Leaving the 13th Virginia Regiment, numbering less than
100 men, with General Stuart, I moved the rest of the
brigade across the angle made by the elbow with the
main body of the woods, through a field to the position
I had started from early in the morning.

The enemy had by this time pushed skirmishers into
the northern or further end of this woods, and was
moving up a very heavy force to turn our left flank.
When I got near my starting point, I found Colonel
Grigsby of the 27th Virginia Regiment, and Stafford
of the 9th Louisiana rallying some two or three hundred
men of Jackson's division at the point at which Starke's
brigade had been in position the night before. As I
came up I halted my brigade and formed line in rear of
Grigsby and Stafford, and they at once advanced against
the enemy's skirmishers, who had penetrated some dis
tance into the woods, driving them back.

My brigade was advanced in their rear until we came
up with Grigsby and Stafford, where I formed line on
the crest of a slight ridge running through the woods
and directed them to form on my left. Heavy bodies of
the enemy were now discovered in the field beyond the
woods moving up to it. I left my brigade under the com
mand of Colonel "William Smith, of the 49th Virginia,
with directions to resist the enemy at all hazards, and
rode across the Hagerstown pike towards the right to

142

BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM

find the brigades which had been engaged early in the
morning, but I found that they had been very badly cut
up and had gone to the rear, Hood having taken their
place with his two brigades. Jackson's division had
also been very badly used, and the whole of it, except
the few men rallied by Grigsby and Stafford, had retired
from the field.

The facts were, as I subsequently ascertained from
the brigade commanders, that, at light, after skirmish
ing along the front of Lawton 's and Trimble's brigades
in a piece of woods occupied by him, the enemy had
opened a very heavy enfilading fire from the batteries
on the opposite side of the Antietam, and then advanced
very heavy columns of infantry against them, at the
same time pouring a destructive fire of canister and
shells into their ranks from the front. Hays' brigade
had gone to the support of the others and this terrible
assault from the front with the flank fire from the bat
teries across the Antietam, had been withstood for some
time with obstinacy, until General Lawton was severely
wounded; Colonel Douglas, commanding his brigade,
killed; Colonel Walker, commanding Trimble's brigade,
had had his horse killed under him, and himself been
disabled by a contusion from a piece of shell; all the
regimental commanders in the three brigades except two
had been killed or wounded; and Lawton 's brigade had
sustained a loss of very nearly one-half, Hays' of more
than one-half, and Trimble's of more than a third. Gen
eral Hood then came to their relief and the shattered
remnants of these brigades, their ammunition being
exhausted, retired to the rear.

Jackson's division in the meantime had been very
heavily engaged, and had shared a like fate, all of it
that was left being what I found Grigsby and Stafford
rallying, after General Jones had retired from the field
stunned by the concussion of a shell bursting near him,
and General Starke, who had succeeded him, had been
killed.

143

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

After having discovered that there was nothing of
the division left on the field for me to command except
my own brigade, and seeing that, what I supposed were
Hood's troops, were very hard pressed, and would prob
ably have to retire before overpowering numbers, I
sent Major J. P. Wilson, a volunteer aide who had been
serving with Generals Ewell and Lawton, to look after
the brigades which had gone to the rear, and I rode to
find General Jackson to inform him of the condition of
things in front, as well as to let him know that a very
heavy force was moving on the west of the pike against
our flank and rear, confronted by my brigade and the
small force under Grigsby and Stafford alone.

I found the General on a hill in rear of the Dunkard
Church, where some batteries were posted, and when I
informed him of the condition of things, he directed me
to return to my brigade and resist the enemy until he
could send me some reinforcements, which he promised
to do as soon as he could obtain them. I found my
brigade and Grigsby and Stafford's force at the point I
had left them, and the movement of the enemy in that
quarter was assuming very formidable proportions. The
woods in which the Dunkard Church was located, ran
along the Hag^rstown pike on the west side for about
a quarter of a mile until it came to a field on the same
side, about 150 or 200 yards wide. Then the woods fell
back to the left at right angles with the road, and then
ran parallel to it on the other side of the field for about
a quarter of a mile further, and then turned to the left
and ran some distance to the rear, making the elbow
before spoken of.

The field thus located between the pike and the woods
formed a plateau higher than the adjacent woods, and
the latter sloped towards a small road at the further
edge, which extended through the elbow, and was the
one on which I had been posted the night before, and
along which I had moved to the support of Stuart in
the early morning. The line formed by my brigade was

144

MAJOR SAMUEL HALE

BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM

entirely in the woods, with its right flank opposite the
middle of the field or plateau, and its direction was a
right angle with the Hagerstown pike. In the woods
were limestone ledges which formed very good cover
for troops, and they extended back towards the church.
From my position the forces of both armies on my right,
or rather in my rear, as I now faced, were entirely con
cealed from view, as the plateau on my right was con
siderably higher than the ground on which my brigade
was formed.

After my return, the enemy continued to press up
towards the woods in which I was, in very heavy force,
and I sent Major Hale, my Assistant Adjutant General,
to let General Jackson know that the danger was im
minent, and he returned with the information that the
promised reinforcements would be sent immediately.
Just as Major Hale returned, a battery opened on the
Hagerstown pike where the field, or plateau, and woods
joined. This was in rear of my right flank and not more
than two hundred yards from it. I had been anxiously
looking to my front and left flank, not dreaming that
there was any immediate danger to my right, as I had
seen our troops on the eastern side of the pike, at an
advanced position, engaged with the enemy, and I took
it for granted that this was one of our batteries which
had opened on the enemy, but Major Hale's attention
was called to it by a soldier in our rear, who was stand
ing on the edge of the plateau, and informed him that it
was one of the enemy's batteries. Major Hale examined
it himself and immediately informed me of the fact, but
I doubted it until I rode to the edge of the woods and
saw for myself that it was really one of the enemy's
batteries, firing along the pike in the direction of the
Dunkard Church.

While I was looking at it for a minute to satisfy my
self, I saw a heavy column of infantry move up by its
side. This column consisted of Green's division of Mans
field's corps. The fact was that Hood, after resisting

10 145

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

with great obstinacy immensely superior numbers, had
fallen back to the vicinity of the Dunkard Church, and
the enemy had advanced to this position. My position
now was very critical, as there was nothing between Hood
and myself, thus leaving an interval of from a quarter to
a half mile between my command and the rest of the
army. Fortunately, however, my troops were concealed
from this body of the enemy, or their destruction would
have been inevitable, as it was nearly between them and
the rest of the army, and the body, moving up on the left
in my front, had now got into the woods. Hoping the
promised reinforcements would arrive in time, I quietly
threw back my right flank under cover of the woods to
prevent being taken in the rear.

The situation was most critical and the necessity
most pressing, as it was apparent that if the enemy
got possession of this woods, possession of the hills in
their rear would immediately follow, and then, across
to our rear on the road leading back to the Potomac,
would have been easy. In fact the possession of these
hills would have enabled him to take our whole line in
reverse, and a disastrous defeat must have followed. I
determined to hold on to the last moment, and I looked
anxiously to the rear to see the promised reinforcements
coming up, the column on my right and rear and that
coming up in front, with which my skirmishers were
already engaged, being watched with the most intense
interest.

While thus looking out, I saw the column on my
right and rear suddenly move into the woods in the
direction of the rear of the church. I could not now
remain still, and I at once put my brigade in motion by
the right flank on a line parallel to that of the enemy's
movements, directing Grigsby and Stafford to fall back
in line, skirmishing with the enemy coming up on the
left. The limestone ledges enabled my troops to keep
out of view of the enemy moving in the woods on my
right, and they moved rapidly so as to get up with them.

146

BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM

On passing from behind one of these long ledges, we
discovered the enemy moving with flankers thrown out
on his right flank. I directed Colonel William Smith,
whose regiment, the 49th Virginia, was in the lead, to
open fire on the flankers, which was promptly done, and
they ran in on the main body, which was taken by sur
prise by the fire from the unexpected quarter from which
it came.

I now saw two or three brigades moving in line to
our assistance, at the further end of the woods, and
my brigade was faced to the front as soon as the whole
of it had passed from behind the ledge, and opened fire
on the enemy, who commenced retiring towards the pike
in great confusion, after delivering one or two volleys.
I had not intended to move to the front in pursuit, as
I saw a brigade of the troops coming to our assistance
moving into the woods at its further end on my right so
as to come upon the flank of mine if it advanced, and I
was, therefore, afraid that both would be thrown into
confusion by the collision, and that mine would be ex
posed to the fire of the other. Moreover the enemy's
other column was advancing on my left, held in check,
however, by Grigsby and Stafford with their men, aided
by the 31st Virginia Regiment, which was on that flank.
The brigade, however, without awaiting orders, dashed
after the retreating column, driving it entirely out of
the woods, and, notwithstanding my efforts to do so, I
did not succeed in stopping it until its flank and rear
had become exposed to the fire of the column on the left.
I then saw other troops of the enemy moving rapidly
across the plateau from the pike to the column, opposed
to Grigsby and Stafford, and I ordered my brigade to
retire a short distance, so as to change front and advance
against the enemy in that direction. Just as I was re
forming my line for that purpose, Semmes' brigade, and
two regiments of Barksdale's brigade, of McLaws' divi
sion, and Anderson's brigade of D. R. Jones' division
came up, and the whole, including Grigsby 's and Staf-

147

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

ford's small command, advanced and swept the enemy
from the woods into the fields, and the enemy retreated in
great disorder to another body of woods beyond that
from which he had been thus driven. As soon as the
enemy had been thus repulsed, I recalled my regiments
and caused them to be re-formed, when they were again
posted in their former position on the small ridge before
mentioned. As soon as his infantry had retired the
enemy opened a tremendous fire with canister and shell
upon the woods occupied by us, which was continued for
some time.

The troops which had been opposed to us in this latter
affair consisted of Sedgwick's division of Sumner's
corps, which had not been previously engaged, supported
by Mansfield's corps, under Williams, and which moved
up for a fresh attack on our extreme left. During his
advance, the enemy's columns had received a galling fire
from the guns under General Stuart on a hill in the rear
of our left which contributed very materially to the re
pulse, and General Stuart pursued the retreating force
on its flank for some distance, with his pieces of artillery
and the remnant of the 13th Virginia Eegiment under
Captain Winston.*

* McClellan says in reference to this affair on our left, his right :
" Entering the woods on the west of the turnpike, and driving the
enemy before them, the first line was met by a heavy fire of musketry
and shell from the enemy's breastworks and the batteries on the hill,
commanding the exit from the woods. Meantime a heavy column of
the enemy had succeeded in crowding back the troops of General
Green's division, and appeared in rear of the left of Sedgwick's divi
sion. By command of General Sumner, General Howard was forced
the third time to the rear, preparatory to a change of front, to meet
the column advancing on the left, but this line, now suffering from a
destructive fire both in front and on its left, which it was unable to
return, gave way towards the right and rear in considerable confusion,
and was soon followed by the first and second lines."

There was nothing in the shape of breastworks in the woods or
in its rear at that time, and the fight on our part was a stand up one
altogether. The slight works, made mostly of rails, which McClellan
saw after the battle, were made on the 18th when we were expecting
a renewal of the attack.

148

BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM

My brigade at that time numbered less than 1,000
officers and men present, and Grigsby and Stafford had
between two and three hundred; yet with this small
force we confronted, for a long time, Sumner's formid
able column, and held it in check until reinforcements
arrived to our assistance. Had we retired from the fear
of being flanked or cut off, the enemy must have obtained
possession of the woods, where we were, and, as a neces
sary consequence, of the hills in their rear, which would
have resulted in a decisive defeat to us, and a probable
destruction of our army.

While these operations on our extreme left were
going on, all of which transpired in the forenoon, two
other divisions of Sumner's corps, French's and Rich
ardson's, had been moving against our centre occupied
by General D. H. Hill, and were forcing it back after
a hard struggle, just about the time I was contending
with the two columns of the enemy in the woods. A
portion of this force moving against Hood near the
Dunkard Church, was met and repulsed by Kershaw's
and Cobb's brigades of McLaws' division, the portion of
Barksdale's brigade which had not come to my assist
ance, and Ransom's brigade of "Walker's division, at the
same time that the force opposed to me was repulsed.

Not long after my brigade had been re-formed and
placed in its former position, Colonel Hodges, in com
mand of Armistead's brigade of Anderson's division,
came up and took the place of my brigade, which latter
was then posted along the edge of the plateau on Hodges'
right, facing towards the Hagerstown pike. Subse
quently General McLaws posted Barksdale's brigade on
my right, and Kershaw's and Cobb's brigades on the
left of Hodges'. My line as established along the edge
of the woods and plateau after the repulse of the enemy,
extended beyond where the left of Jackson's division
rested at daylight, and embraced inside of it all of our
killed and wounded, and nearly the whole of that of the
enemy, in this last affair on our left.

149

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

Major Wilson had by this time returned with the
information that he had been able to find only a part of
Hays' brigade, which was under General Hays, who was
with General Hood, and that it was in no condition to
render any service. He further stated that the remnants
of the other brigades had gone to the rear for the pur
pose of re-forming and gathering up stragglers, but that
he had been unable to find them.

The enemy continued to shell the woods in which we
were for some time, doing, however, little or no damage,
as we were under cover, and his shot and shells went
over our heads. Some of our batteries, which had been
brought up to the hills in our rear, opened fire on the
woods where we were, on two occasions, under the im
pression that they were occupied by the enemy, and I
had to send and have it stopped. Some pieces of our
artillery were moved into the angle of the plateau on
my right and opened on the enemy, but were soon com
pelled to retire by the superior metal and number of
guns opposed to them.

We remained in position during the rest of the day,
as did the troops on my left, and those immediately
on my right. The enemy made no further attack on
us on this part of the line, but there were several demon
strations as if for an attack, and from the top of a tree
on the edge of the woods a lookout reported three lines
of battle beyond the pike with a line of skirmishers ex
tending nearly up to the pike. There were, however,
some attempts against our line further to the right, and
late in the afternoon a fierce attack was made on our
extreme right by Burnside's corps, which drove some
of our troops from the bridge across the Antietam on
that flank, and was forcing back our right, when some of
A. P. Hill's brigades, which were just arriving from
Plarper's Ferry, went to the assistance of the troops
engaged on that flank, and the enemy was driven back in
considerable confusion.

This affair, which terminated just before dark, closed
the fighting on the 16th, and after a most protracted and

150

BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM

desperate struggle, our centre had been forced back to
some extent, but the positions on our flanks were main
tained.

The attack on Jackson's command in the early morn
ing had been made by Hooker's and Mansfield's corps,
numbering, according to McClellan's statement, 24,982
men present and fit for duty, and this force had been
resisted by Jackson's division and the three brigades of
Swell's, and subsequently by Hood's two brigades, aided
by those of D. H. Hill's brigades sent to the assistance
of Hood, until Sumner's corps, numbering 18,813 men,
came up about nine A.M. to the assistance of Hooker's
and Mansfield's. Hood was then compelled to retire to
the woods near the Dunkard Church, and Sumner, in
command now of the entire right wing of the enemy,
prepared for another attack with his corps supported
by Hooker's and Mansfield's. This attack was made
on our left by Sedgwick's division supported by Mans
field's corps, and on the centre by French's and Richard
son's divisions supported by Hooker's corps, and was
repulsed as has been stated, Hill, however, losing ground
in the centre to some extent. Franklin's corps number
ing 12,300 men was then carried to the support of Sum
ner, arriving a little after twelve M., and a new attack
on the woods in which our left rested was projected, but
was arrested by General Sumner's orders.

Another attack, however, was made on Hill's posi
tion in the centre, which met with some success by reason
of the removal of one of his brigades, by mistake, from
its position, but the enemy's progress was arrested by
Walker's brigades and a part of Anderson's division,
which had arrived to his support. The enemy had then
made the attack with Burnside's corps, numbering
13,819, on Longstreet's right, on the Antietam, held by
D. R. Jones' division, which was repulsed on the arrival
of Hill's brigades as stated. The above is a condensed
account of the main features of this battle taken from
the reports of both sides, and the figures in regard to the
strength of McClellan's corps are taken from his own

151

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

report. Porter's corps of his army, numbering 12,930,
was held in reserve.*

Late in the afternoon, after it had become apparent
that no further attack on our left was to be made, I rode
to the rear in search of the missing brigades and found
about one hundred men of Lawton's brigade which had
been collected by Major Lowe, the ranking officer of the
brigade left, and I had them moved up to where my
own brigade was, and placed on its right. We lay on
our arms all night, and about light on the morning of
the 18th, General Hays brought up about ninety men of
his brigade, which were posted on my left. During the
morning Captain Feagins, the senior officer left of
Trimble's brigade, brought up about two hundred of that
brigade, and they were posted in my rear.

The enemy remained in our front during the whole
day without making any show of an attack on our left,
but there was some firing between the skirmish lines
farther to right. The enemy in my immediate front
showed a great anxiety to get possession of his dead
and wounded on that part of the ground, and several
flags of truce approached us, but, I believe, without
authority from the proper source. However, a sort of
informal truce prevailed for a time, and some of the
dead and very badly wounded of the enemy and of that
part of our army which had been engaged first on the
morning of the 17th, were exchanged even while the
skirmishers were firing at each other on the right. This
was finally stopped and the enemy informed that no flag
of truce could be recognized unless it came from the
headquarters of his army. We remained in position on
the 18th during the whole day, without any serious
demonstration by the enemy on any part of our line, and
after dark retired for the purpose of recrossing tTie

* Walker's division of two brigades (his own and Ransom's) had
reached the vicinity of the battlefield on the 16th and McLaws' divi
sion, and Anderson's, including the three brigades of Longstreet's with
him, did not get up until after the battle had begun.

152

BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM

Potomac. I held my position until my skirmishers in
front were relieved by a portion of Fitz. Lee's cavalry
and then retired in pursuance of orders previously re
ceived from General Jackson, carrying with me Armi-
stead's brigade under Colonel Hodges, which had re
ceived no orders from its division commander, and bring
ing up, I believe, the rear of the infantry of our entire
army. We found a large number of wagons and troops
massed at Boteler's Ford, and the division now com
manded by me did not cross until after sunrise. After
getting over the river, the division was formed in line
of battle on the Virginia side, under direction of General
Longstreet, and remained in position several hours, until
the enemy appeared on the other bank and opened on us
with artillery.

I was subsequently ordered to leave Lawton's brigade,
now increased to about four hundred men under Colonel
Lamar of the 61st Georgia Regiment (who had returned
after the battle of the 17th), at Boteler's Ford, under
the command of Brigadier General Pendleton, who was
entrusted with the defence of the crossing, and I was
ordered to move with the rest of the division towards
Martin sburg.

Our whole army with its trains had been safely re-
crossed and this terminated the operations properly con
nected with the battle of Sharpsburg.

In that battle, Ewell's division had lost in killed 119,
in wounded 1,115, and in missing 38, being an aggregate
loss of 1,352 out of less than 3,400 men and officers carried
into action. The loss in my own brigade was in killed 18,
and in wounded 156, and among the latter were Colonel
Smith and Lieutenant Colonel Gibson of the 49th Vir
ginia Regiment, both severely, and the former receiving
three distinct wounds before the close of the fight, in
which he was engaged. The loss in our whole army was
heavy, but not so great as the estimate put upon it by
the enemy.

There has been very great misapprehension, both on

153

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JTJBAL A. EARLY

the part of the enemy and many Confederates, not
familiar with the facts, about the strength of General
Lee's army at this battle. The whole of the troops then
constituting that army had belonged to the army which
opposed McClellan in the battles around Richmond, ex
cept Evans' and Drayton's brigades, and such absentees
as had returned, and there had been troops then belong
ing to the army, which had not left Richmond, exceeding
the number in the said two brigades. There had been
heavy losses in the battles around Richmond; and the
subsequent losses at Cedar Run, on the Rappahannock,
at Manassas and in the vicinity, at Maryland Heights
and in Pleasant Valley — where McLaws had been
severely engaged, — and at South Mountain, had very
materially weakened the strength of the army. Besides
all this, since crossing the Rappahannock we had been
without regular supplies of food, and had literally been
living from hand to mouth. Our troops were badly
shod and many of them became barefooted, and they were
but indifferently clothed and without protection against
the weather. Many of them had become exhausted from
the fatigues of the campaign, and the long and rapid
marches which they had made while living on short
rations and a weakening diet — and many were foot-sore
from want of shoes; so that the straggling from these
causes, independent of that incident to all armies, had
been frightful before we crossed the Potomac, and had
continued up to the time of the battle.

Some idea of the diminution from these various
causes may be found from the following facts: That
Christian gentleman, and brave, accomplished soldier,
General D. H. Hill, states that his division, which num
bered ten thousand at the beginning of the battles around
Richmond, had been reduced to less than five thousand
which he had at the battle of South Mountain. Yet he
had reached the army after all the fighting about Manas
sas, and he states that on the morning of the 17th of
September he had but three thousand infantry. Swell's

154

BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM

division, with Lawton's brigade, which was attached to
it after the battle of Cedar Run, must have numbered, at
the time they reached McClellan's right, north of the
Chickahominy, eight or ten thousand, as Lawton's
brigade was then a very large one, which had never been
in action. Yet that division numbered less than three
thousand four hundred on the morning of the 17th.

General Lee says in his report: "This great battle
was fought by less than forty thousand men on our
side, all of whom had undergone the greatest labors and
hardships in the field and on the march. ' ' This certainly
covered our entire force of all descriptions, and I am
satisfied that he might have safely stated it at less than
thirty thousand. There were forty brigades of infantry
in all in the army, one of which, Thomas' of A. P. Hill's
division, did not cross the Potomac from Harper's
Ferry, and the nine brigades of Swell's and D. H. Hill's
divisions, numbering in the aggregate less than 6,400
officers and men, were fully average ones.

General D. R. Jones states that his command, con
sisting of his division of three brigades and three of
Longstreet's, in all six brigades, numbering on the morn
ing of the 17th, 2,430; General J. R. Jones states that
Jackson's division of four brigades numbered less than
1,GOO ; General McLaws states that he carried into action
in his four brigades, 2,893; General A. P. Hill states
that his three brigades actually numbered less than
2,000; D. H. Hill's five brigades numbered 3,000; and
Ewell's four brigades numbered less than 3,400; which
gives 15,323 in these twenty-six brigades, leaving thirteen
other brigades on the field whose strength is not stated,
to-wit: the six brigades of his own division and Long-
street's brought up by General Anderson; A. P. Hill's
other two brigades; Hood's two brigades, both very
small; Walker's two brigades; and Evans' brigade.
General Anderson was wounded, and there is no report
from his division or any of his brigades, but General
D. H. Hill says that Anderson came to his support, which

155

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

was before Anderson's division became engaged, with
some three or four hundred men, and that force con
sisted of five brigades, Armistead's having gone to the
left. Averaging the thirteen brigades from which no
estimate was given with the others and it would give a
strength of 7,670, which would make our whole infantry
force on the field, from the beginning to the end of the
battle, twenty-three thousand at the outside. Our cavalry
was not engaged, as it had merely watched the flanks,
but six thousand would fully cover the whole of the
cavalry and artillery which we had on that side of the
river.

McClellan states his whole force in action at 87,164
men present and fit for duty, and he estimates General
Lee's at 97,445. As this estimate is a very remarkable
one and contains some very amusing features, it is given
here in his own language. He says :

"An estimate of the forces under the Confederate General Lee,
made up by direction of General Banks from information obtained by
the examination of prisoners, deserters, spies, etc., previous to the battle
of Antietam, is as follows:

General T. J. Jackson's corps 24,778 men.

" James Longstreet's corps 23,342 "

" D. H. Hill's 2nd division 15,525 "

" J. E. B. Stuart's cavalry 6,400 "

" Ransom's and Jenkins' brigades 3,000 "

Forty-six regiments not included in above 18,400 "

Artillery, estimated at 400 guns 6,000 "

Total 97,445 "

It is to be presumed that this estimate was made by
Banks when General Jackson was figuring around
Pope's rear, as he did not have a command in McClellan 'a
army, and it is well known that Banks always saw things
with very largely magnifying glasses when " Stonewall"
Jackson was about.

That some of the affrighted civilians who magnified

156

BATTLE OF SHARPSBIJRG OR ANTIETAM

one small company of cavalry at the first battle of Manas-
sas, called the Black Horse Cavalry, into 20,000, might
be misled by this estimate of McClellan's, or Banks',
might well be believed, but that the Major General com
manding the "Grand Army of the Potomac, " should
have so estimated the strength of General Lee's army at
Sharpsburg, is perfectly amazing.

Who commanded the "forty-six regiments not in
cluded in above," or where were the 400 guns to come
from?

This estimate of the relative strength of the two
armies gives rise to some very curious reflections :

It must be recollected that Bragg and Kirby Smith
were at this time in Kentucky, moving north, and if the
newly established Government at Richmond had been
able to put in the field and send into Maryland from
the comparatively small population of the Confederacy
an army of nearly 100,000 men with 400 pieces of artil
lery, it showed a wonderful energy on the part of that
government; while, the fact that the powerful Govern
ment at Washington, with its immense resources and its
very large population to draw from, after a call for
300,000 more men, and after taking everything in the way
of troops from the Ohio to the Atlantic, had been able
to bring into the field, for the defence of the National
Capital and to oppose the large invading army of
"rebels," only a force numbering less than 90,000 men,
displayed a weakness not at all flattering to the energy
of the head of the War Department at Washington, or
to the wisdom of the occupant of the White House, and
a want of "patriotism" by no means complimentary to
the people of the North.

McClellan had stated that the troops in and about
Washington and on the Maryland shore of the Potomac
above and below, including those in Maryland and
Delaware, amounted, on the 1st of March, 1862, to 193,142
present for duty and an aggregate present and absent
of 221,987. This did not include the 13,000 brought by

157

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

Burnside from North Carolina, nor the troops brought
by Cox from the Kanawha Valley, nor, is it presumed,
the forces of Fremont under Sigel, a large part of which
were probably brought from Missouri; and there had
since been at least one call, if not more, for an additional
levy of 300,000 men. Now the question very naturally
arises, as to what had become of all that immense force,
with the reinforcements and recruits, which had dwindled
down to 87,164 men on the morning of the 17th of Sep
tember, 1862.

It will be seen from the account previously given
that on the 15th and in the early part of the day of the
16th, McClellan's large army was confronted by a very
small force under Longstreet and D. H. Hill. Jackson
with two divisions numbering less than 5,000 men, and
Walker, with his two brigades arrived on the 16th, and
it was upon the force consisting of these reinforcements
and D. H. HilPs and Longstreet 's troops, including in
the latter Hood's two brigades, and Evans' brigade, that
McClellan's army had been hurled on the morning of the
17th. McLaws with his own and Anderson's brigades,
ten in all, did not arrive until the action had been
progressing for some hours. McLaws arrived at sun
rise, and A. P. Hill, with his five brigades, did not come
up until late in the afternoon.

The 24,982 men under Hooker and Mansfield had
attacked Jackson's division and Lawton's, Trimble's and
Hays' brigades of Ewell's division, numbering in all
4,000 men. When they were compelled to retire, Hood
with his two brigades supported by Ripley's, Colquit's
and Garland's and D. H. Hill's division had withstood
the enemy until Sumner arrived with his 18,813 men,
and then Hood was also compelled to retire to the Dunk-
ard Church. Sumner then with his corps and what was
left of the other two, attacked my brigade of less than
1,000 men, a remnant of about two or three hundred of
Jackson's division, and what was left of D. H. Hill's
and Hood's divisions, when McLaws and Walker with

158

BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM

their six brigades came to our assistance immediately
after the arrival of McLaws upon the field. Sumner was
repulsed and then Franklin with his 12,300 arrived to
his support, and the attack was renewed on Hill in the
centre, when Anderson with three or four hundred men
and one brigade of Walker's came to his assistance.
This force of 56,095 men was brought against a force
which with all its reinforcements, from first to last,
amounted to less than 18,000 men. How it had been
served will appear from the following extract from Mc-
Clellan's report. He says: "One division of Sumner's
corps, and all of Hooker's corps, on the right, had, after
fighting most valiantly for several hours, been over
powered by numbers, driven back in great disorder, and
much scattered; so that they were for the time some
what demoralized. In Hooker's corps, according to the
return made by General Meade, commanding, there were
but 6,729 men present on the 18th, whereas, on the morn
ing of the 22nd, there were 13,093 present for duty in
the same corps, showing that previous to and during the
battle 6,364 men were separated from their command."

McClellan was not able to renew the attack on the
18th, and, according to his own showing, had to wait for
reinforcements before doing so ; yet he claims a great
victory at Antietam, alleging that he had accomplished
the object of the campaign, to-wit: "to preserve the
National Capital and Baltimore, to protect Pennsylvania
from invasion, and to drive the enemy out of Maryland. ' '
This was a singular claim on the part of the General who,
scarce three months before, had boastingly stated that
the advance of his army was within five miles of the
Confederate Capital.

The truth is that the substantial victory was with us,
and if our army had been in reach of reinforcements, it
would have been a decisive one; but we were more than
200 miles from the point from which supplies of am
munition were to be obtained, and any reinforcements
which could have been spared to us were much further

159

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

off, while large reinforcements were inarching to Mc-
Clellan's aid. We had, therefore, to recross the Potomac.
The question had been mooted as to the propriety of
the campaign into Maryland, and in regard thereto I will
say: General Lee, on assuming command of the army
at Eichmond, had found that city, the seat of the Con
federate Government, beleaguered by a vast army, while
all Northern Virginia, including the best part of the
beautiful valley of the Shenandoah, was held by the
enemy. With a herculean effort, he had broken through
the cordon surrounding his army, and with inferior
numbers fallen upon the beleaguering enemy, and sent it
cowering to the banks of the lower James. He had then
moved north, and, after a series of hard fought battles,
had hurled the shattered remains of the army that had
been marauding through Northern Virginia, with all the
reinforcements sent from the lately besieging army, into
the fortifications around Washington. With the dimin
ished columns of the army with which he accomplished
all this, he had crossed the Potomac, captured an impor
tant stronghold defended by a strong force, securing a
large amount of artillery, small arms, and stores of all
kinds, and had fought a great battle with the newly
reorganized and heavily reinforced and recruited army
of the enemy, which later was so badly crippled that it
was not able to resume the offensive for near two months.
He now stood defiantly on the southern banks of the
Potomac, the extreme northern limit of the Confederacy,
and the result of all these operations, of which the march
into Maryland was an important part, had been that not
only the Confederate Capital had been relieved from the
presence of the besieging army, a danger to which it was
not subjected again for two years; but the enemy's
Capital had been threatened, his territory invaded, and
the base of operations for a new movement on Richmond
had been transferred to the north banks of the Potomac
at Harper's Ferry, from which there was an overland
route of more than two hundred miles. When that move-

160

BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG OR ANTIETAM

merit did take place, General Lee was in a position to
interpose his army, and inflict a new defeat on the enemy,
as was verified by subsequent events.

The following extracts from McClellan's report will
give some idea of the results obtained. Speaking, as of
the morning of the 18th, he says :

" At that moment — Virginia lost, Washington menaced, Maryland
invaded — the national cause could afford no risks of defeat. Our
battle lost, and almost all would have been lost." And he subsequently
says:

" The movement from Washington into Maryland, which cul
minated in the battles of South Mountain and Antietam, was not a
part of an offensive campaign, with the object of the invasion of the
enemy's territory, and an attack on his capital, but was defensive in
its purposes, although offensive in its character, and would be tech
nically called a f defensive-offensive ' campaign."

" It was undertaken at a time; when our army had experienced
severe defeats, and its object was to preserve the national capital and
Baltimore, to protect Pennsylvania, and to drive the enemy out of
Maryland. These purposes were fully and finally accomplished by
the battle of Antietam, which brought the Army of the Potomac into
what might be termed an accidental position on the upper Potomac."*

It was a great deal gained to force the enemy into a
"defensive-offensive" campaign in his own territory
and place the " Army of the Potomac " in that accidental
position, though we did fail in arousing Maryland, or
getting any reinforcements from that State.

* In a telegram to Halleck, dated September 22nd (Part II,
Conduct of the War, p. 495), McClellan said: "When I was assigned
to the command of this army in Washington, it was suffering under
the disheartening influence of defeat. It had been greatly reduced
by casualties in General Pope's campaign, and its efficiency had been
much impaired. The sanguinary battles of South Mountain and An
tietam Creek had resulted in a loss to us of ten general officers and
many regimental and company officers, besides a large number of
enlisted men. The army corps had been badly cut up and scattered
by the overwhelming numbers brought against them in the battle of
the 17th instant, and the entire army had been greatly exhausted by
unavoidable overwork, and want of sleep and rest." (See also his
testimony same volume, pages 439, 440 and 441.)
11 161

CHAPTER XVII.

PREPARATIONS ABOUT FREDERICKSBURG.

ON the afternoon of the 19th, after leaving Lawton's
brigade at Boteler's Ford, I marched with the three
other brigades on the road towards Martinsburg, about
six miles from Shepherdstown, and bivouacked.

During the night the enemy had succeeded in crossing
the Potomac and capturing four of General Pendleton's
guns near Shepherdstown, and on the morning of the
20th I was ordered to move back to Boteler's Ford. On
arriving near there, by order of General Jackson, my
three brigades were formed in line of battle in rear of
General A. P. HilPs division which had preceded me,
and were moving against the force of the enemy
which had crossed over to the south bank. My three
brigades were posted in pieces of woods on each side
of the road leading towards the ford, and remained
there within range of the enemy's guns on the opposite
side until late in the afternoon. In the meantime HilPs
division advanced, under a heavy fire of artillery from
across the river, and drove the enemy's infantry on the
southern bank pell-mell into the river, inflicting upon
him a very severe punishment for his rashness in under
taking to pursue us and making him pay very dearly
for the guns he had taken. One officer in my command,
Captain Frazier of the 15th Alabama Regiment,— the
only regimental commander in Trimble's brigade who
had not been killed or wounded at Sharpsburg,— was
severely wounded by a shell, which was all the damage I
sustained.

Late in the afternoon, I was ordered to move back,
and that night we marched to the vicinity of the Opequon
not far above its mouth. We remained at this position
until the 24th, when we moved across the Opequon to
the Williamsport pike, and on the next day to the vicinity
of Martinsburg. On the 27th, General Jackson's whole

162

PREPARATIONS ABOUT FREDERICKSBURG

command was moved to Bunker Hill on the road from
Martinsburg to Winchester, and went into camp in that
vicinity. By this time our baggage wagons, which had
been sent from Manassas to the valley, when we moved
into Maryland, had reached us.

We were now able to obtain supplies of flour, by
threshing wheat, of which there was a good supply in
the valley, and having it ground. While our camps were
located at Bunker Hill, Jackson's command destroyed
the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad from North Mountain to
within five miles of Harper's Ferry, which latter place
had been re-occupied by the enemy. More than twenty
miles of the road was thus destroyed, and it was done
effectively. The Winchester & Potomac Railroad was
also destroyed to within a short distance of the Ferry.
Previous to this there was a slight engagement between
the Stonewall brigade of Jackson's division and a small
force of the enemy on the railroad near Kearneysville,
but the enemy did not make a serious effort to molest
us, either while we were engaged in destroying the rail
road or subsequently.

The Army of Northern Virginia was now organized
into two regular corps of four divisions each, Genera]
Longstreet being assigned to the command of the first
corps, and General Jackson to the command of the second
corps, both with the rank of Lieutenant General. D. H
Hill's division was attached to the second corps, and
two divisions were formed out of Longstreet 's, D. R.
Jones' and Hood's divisions, under the command of
Generals Pickett and Hood respectively, they having been
promoted. The first corps consisted of the divisions of
McLaws, Anderson, Pickett and Hood, and the second
corps of the divisions of Ewell, D. H. Hill, A. P. Hill,
and Jackson (Swell's division being under my command
and Jackson's under J. R. Jones).

For some time the second corps remained camped
near Bunker Hill, and the first corps was camped in the
vicinity of Winchester.

McClellan in the meantime had concentrated the

163

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

main body of his army on the north bank of the Potomac
near Harper's Ferry, and was engaged in preparing for
a new campaign into Virginia, while Maryland and
Bolivar Heights were very strongly fortified by him.

A short time after the middle of October, General
Stuart, with a portion of his cavalry, made a successful
expedition through Maryland and Pennsylvania to the
rear of and around McClellan 's army.

Towards the last of October McClellan began to move
across the Potomac on the east side of the Blue Ridge,
with a view to another approach to Richmond. His army
had been largely recruited, and superbly equipped. The
army of General Lee had been considerably increased by
the return of stragglers and convalescents, but it con
tinued to be indifferently supplied with clothing and
shoes, of which articles there was a great deficiency.

As soon as McClellan's movement was ascertained,
Jackson's corps was moved towards the Shenandoah,
occupying positions between Charlestown and Berry-
ville, and one division of Longstreet's corps was sent
across the Blue Ridge to watch the enemy. When the
enemy began to move eastwardly from the mountain, the
whole of Longstreet's corps moved across the ridge for
the purpose of intercepting his march. D. H. Hill's
division of Jackson's corps was subsequently moved
across the ridge to watch the enemy's movements. A. P.
Hill's division had been put in position near Berryville,
covering the Shenandoah, at Snicker's or Castleman's
Ferry, where it had an engagement with a body of the
enemy that had crossed the ridge as McClellan was mov
ing on. Swell's division (under my command) was at
first posted on A. P. Hill's left, near a church, while
Jackson's division was on the Berryville and Charles-
town pike in my rear, but as the enemy's covered our
front I moved above, first to Millwood, and then to
Stone Bridge, near White Post, and Jackson's division
moved to the vicinity of the Occoquon between the posi
tions of the other divisions and Winchester.

164

PREPARATIONS ABOUT FREDERICKSBURG

After the enemy had left the vicinity of the Blue
Ridge, D. H. Hill's division recrossed the ridge and
moved up on the east side of the Shenandoah to the
vicinity of Front Royal. While my camp was at Stone
Bridge, my division destroyed the Manassas Gap Rail
road from Front Royal to Piedmont on the east side of
the Blue Ridge, a distance of twenty miles, and D. H.
Hill's division destroyed it from Front Royal to Stras-
burg.

In the meantime McClellan's army had been con
centrated in the vicinity of Warrenton, and McClellan
had been succeeded in the command by Burnside. Long-
street had previously taken position at or near Culpeper
Court-House.

About the 15th of November Burnside began the
movement of his army towards the lower Rappahannock
opposite Fredericksburg. When this movement was dis
covered Longstreet's corps was moved towards Freder
icksburg to dispute the enemy's crossing, and orders
were sent to General Jackson to move his corps across
the Blue Ridge. This movement of the latter corps
began about the 20th of November, and we moved up
the valley to New Market and then across Massanutten
Mountain, the Shenandoah and the Blue Ridge to the
vicinity of Madison Court-House. The weather had now
become quite cool, and our daily marches were long and
rapid, and very trying to the men. On this march I saw
a number of our men without shoes, and with bleeding
feet wrapped with rags. We remained in the vicinity
of Madison Court-House for two or three days, and it
was here that General Jackson wore, for the first time,
a new regulation coat with the wreath, and a hat, and
his appearance in them caused no little remark and
amusement among the men. His dress hitherto had
been a rusty grey coat, intended for a colonel, and a little
dingy cloth cap which lay flat on his head, or rather
forehead.

From Madison Court-House we moved past Orange

165

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

Court-House and along the plank road to the vicinity
of Fredericksburg, arriving there on the 1st of December.

Longstreet's corps was found guarding the Rappa-
hannock against Burnside's army which had concen
trated on the opposite bank. My division was moved to
the vicinity of Guiney's depot on the R., F. & P. Railroad,
as was Jackson's. After remaining here two or three
days, I was ordered to move towards Port Royal to
support D. H. Hill, whose division had been ordered to
the vicinity of that place, to watch some gun-boats there
and prevent a crossing. Port Royal is some eighteen or
twenty miles below Fredericksburg on the Rappahan-
nock. I first took position some six or eight miles from
Port Royal on the road from Guiney's depot, but sub
sequently moved to the vicinity of Buckner's Neck on
the Rappahannock a few miles above Port Royal, for the
purpose of watching the river and acting in concert with
General Hill. The latter, by the use of one Whitworth
gun and some other artillery, had driven the enemy's
gunboats from Port Royal, and in revenge they fired
into the houses in the little village of Port Royal and
some others below as they passed down the river.

While I was watching the river at Buckner's Neck,
which is in a bend of the river, and commanded by high
ground on the opposite side, so as to afford a good posi
tion for forcing a passage, the enemy hauled some
timbers to a place called the Hop Yard on the northern
bank, as if for the purpose of constructing a bridge at
that place, but this proved a feint. Jackson's division
had been left near Guiney's depot, and A. P. Hill's had
been camped in rear of Hamilton's Crossing for the pur
pose of supporting Longstreet's right, which rested at
the latter place. The different divisions of Jackson's
corps were thus posted, immediately preceding the battle
of Fredericksburg.

CHAPTEE XVIII.

BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.

FREDERICKSBURG is located on the southern bank of
the Kappahannock River at the head of tide water, and
the river is navigable to that point for steamboats and
small vessels. On the northern bank, opposite, above,
and below Fredericksburg, are what are called the Staf
ford Heights, which are close to the river, and completely
command the southern bank. Fredericksburg 's exact
location is on a narrow strip of low land between the
river and a range of hills in the rear. These hills leav
ing the river opposite the small village of Falmouth,
which is a short distance above Fredericksburg and on
the northern bank, diverge from it below, and gradually
declining, extend nearly to the Massaponix Creek, which
empties into the river four or five miles below the town.

The river flats or bottoms immediately below Fred
ericksburg widen out considerably and continue to widen
until they are from one and a half to two miles in width
at the lower end of the range of hills, where they unite
with similar but not so wide flats on the Massaponix,
which extend back for some distance in rear of the range
of hills mentioned. Below the mouth of the Massaponix
there are other hills which approach near to the bank of
the river, and extend down it for a considerable distance.
Hazel Run, rising southeast of Fredericksburg, runs
through the range of hills along a narrow valley, or
ravine rather, and passing close on the east of the town,
empties into the river. Deep Run rises below in the
range of hills, and runs across the wide bottoms through
a deep channel likewise into the river, something over
a mile below the town. The hills just in rear of the town
were, at the time of which I am speaking, nearly denuded
of growing timber, but below, to the end of the range,
they were for the most part covered with woods. The

167

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

bottoms were entirely cleared and in cultivation, furnish
ing several extensive farms, and up Deep Kun to its
sources is a valley making a large re-entering angle in
the line of hills, which valley was then also cleared and
in cultivation.

From the town a road, called the Telegraph Road,
runs south, crossing Hazel Run and then ascending the
hills passes towards Richmond by the way of Hanover
Junction. Another road called the Plank Road ascends
the hills above Hazel Run and runs westward by Chan-
cellorsville to Orange Court-House. A third road, called
the River Road, runs from the lower end of the town,
crossing Hazel Run and Deep Run, and, passing through
the bottoms about half way from the river to the foot
of the hills, in a direction very nearly parallel to the
river, it crosses the Massaponix not far above its mouth,
where it forks, one fork going to Port Royal below and
the other by Bowling Green in the direction of Richmond.
This is a wide road, and where it passes through the
bottoms there were on both sides high, thick, and firm
embankments thrown up for fences or enclosures to the
adjacent fields.

The Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad,
leaving the Potomac at the mouth of Aquia Creek,
crosses the river into Fredericksburg and then runs
through the bottoms below the town between the river
road and the hills, which latter it approaches closely at
their lower end, and then passes around at their foot
to take the direction to Richmond. Just at the rear of
the foot of the lower end of the hills, a country road
leading from the Telegraph Road and passing along the
east of the ridge crosses the railroad to get into the
River Road, and this is called "Hamilton's Crossing, "
from a gentleman of that name formerly residing near
the place. A canal runs from the river along the foot of
the hills above the town to the rear of it, for the purpose
of supplying water to several mills and factories in it,

168

BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBIJRG

and this canal connects by a drain ditch with Hazel Run,
over which ditch the Plank Road crosses.

What is called Marye's Heights or Hill lies between
Hazel Run and the Plank Road, and at the foot of it is
a stone wall, behind which and next to the hill, the Tele
graph Road runs. Above Marye's Hill on the east of
the Plank Road are what are called, respectively,
Cemetery, Stansbury's and Taylor's Hills, all overlook
ing the canal. In rear of these hills and overlooking
and commanding them are higher eminences. On the
east of Hazel Run and the Telegraph Road is quite a
high hill farther back than Marye's Hill and overlooking
it and nearly the whole ground, to which the name of
Lee's Hill has been given, because it was the position
generally occupied by General Lee during the battle.

Burnside's army had taken position on and in rear
of Stafford Heights, and the heights themselves, from
Falmouth to a point very nearly opposite the mouth of
the Massaponix, were covered with numerous batteries
of heavy guns, while the nature of the ground was such
as to afford easy access to the river by his troops. Long-
street's corps occupied the hills in rear of Fredericks-
burg to Hamilton's Crossing, and positions for some
distance above, while strong pickets were established in
the town and on the river bank above and below to watch
the enemy and impede a crossing.

It was impossible to resist successfully a crossing,
as the river is only between two and three hundred
yards wide, and the banks are so deep, and the river so
accessible, on the north bank by means of ravines running
into it, that our artillery, posted on the hills occupied
by our troops, could not play upon the bridges either
during the progress of the construction or afterwards,
while the enemy's batteries were able, by a concentrated
fire, to drive off the small bodies watching the river, or
to prevent any aid being sent to them over the wide
open plains formed by the bottoms. In addition to all

169

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

this, the bottoms towards the lower end of our lines were
so wide that we had no guns which would do effective
firing across them, while the enemy's heavy guns from
the north bank of the river completely swept the whole
of our front, and reached over beyond our line.

On the morning of the llth of December the enemy
commenced his movement, and by the use of his artillery
drove the regiments which were guarding the river from
its banks after an obstinate resistance, and succeeded in
laying down their pontoon bridges, one at the mouth of
Deep Creek, and the other two at Fredericksburg. The
first was laid early in the afternoon, but the latter two
not until near night, and during night and the next day
the enemy crossed in heavy force.

On the afternoon of the 12th I received an order from
General Jackson to move at once to the vicinity of
Hamilton's Crossing, which I did by marching nearly
all night, and a short time before day I bivouacked
some two miles in rear of the crossing where the division
had a little time to rest. At light on the morning of the
13th I moved up to the crossing, and found our army in
position confronting the enemy. Longstreet's line had
been constructed from the right, and General A. P. HilPs
division, which was much the largest in Jackson's corps,
now occupied the right of the line which rested near the
crossing. He was in the front skirts of the woods which
covered the hills, and on his left was Hood's division.

On the right of Hill's line was a small hill cleared
on the side next the enemy, on which were posted some
fourteen pieces of artillery under Lieutenant Colonel
Walker, which were supported by Field's brigade, under
Colonel Brockenborough, while Archer's brigade was on
the left of the guns. On Archer's left there was an
interval of several hundred yards in front of which was
a low flat marshy piece of woodland extending across
the railroad out into the bottom which was supposed to
be impracticable, and was therefore not covered by any
body of troops, but Gregg's brigade was posted in re-
no

BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG

serve in rear of this interval, without, however, being
in the line of battle. On the left of the interval were
the other three brigades of A. P. Hill's division, Lane's
brigade being next to it, but in advance of the general
line a considerable number of pieces of artillery were
posted along the left of Hill's line, but they were on
low and unfavorable ground, as there were no good
positions for guns on that part of the line.

On my arrival, my division was posted on a second
line several hundred yards in rear of A. P. Hill's, with
Jackson's, now under Brigadier General Taliaferro, on
my left. My right rested on the railroad at the crossing,
and extended along the ridge road, which here crossed
the railroad, for a short distance and then into the woods
on my left. Hays' brigade was on my right, with
Trimble's brigade under Colonel E. F. Hoke immediately
in its rear, Lawton's brigade under Colonel N. N. Atkin
son in the centre, and my own brigade under Colonel J.
A. Walker on the left. In this position there was a thick
woods intervening between my division and the enemy,
and the consequence was that he was entirely excluded
from our view as we were from his. D. H. Hill's division,
which had followed mine from below, was posted in a
third line in the open ground in my rear beyond the
hills.

The weak point in our position was on our right, as
there was the wide open plain in front of it extending
to the river and perfectly covered and swept by the
enemy's heavy batteries on the opposite heights, and to
the right, extending around to our rear, were the open
flats of the Massaponix, here quite wide and incapable
of being covered by any position we could take. There
was very great danger of our right being turned by the
enemy's pushing a heavy column down the river across
the Massaponix. The plains on that flank were watched
by Stuart with two brigades of cavalry and his horse
artillery.

A heavy fog had concealed the two armies from each

171

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

other during the early morning, but about nine o'clock it
began to rise, and then the artillery fire opened, which
was just as my division was moving into position. The
enemy's fire at first was not directed towards the place
where my division was posted, but after a short interval
the shells began to fall in our vicinity, and the division
remained exposed to a random but quite galling can
nonading for two or three hours.

Shortly after noon we heard in our front a very heavy
musketry fire, and soon a courier from General Archer
came to the rear in search of General A. P. Hill, stating
that General Archer was very heavily pressed and wanted
reinforcements. Just at that moment, a staff officer
rode up with an order to me from General Jackson, to
hold my division in readiness to move to the right
promptly, as the enemy was making a demonstration
in that direction. This caused me to hesitate about send
ing a brigade to Archer's assistance, but to be prepared
to send it if necessary, I ordered Colonel Atkinson to
get his brigade ready to advance, and the order had been
hardly given, before the adjutant of Walker's battalion
of artillery came galloping to the rear with the informa
tion that the interval on Archer's left (an awful gulf as
he designated it) had been penetrated by heavy columns
of the enemy, and that Archer's brigade and all our
batteries on the right would inevitably be captured unless
there was instant relief. This was so serious an emer
gency that I determined to act upon it at once notwith
standing the previous directions from General Jackson
to hold my division in readiness for another purpose,
and I accordingly ordered Atkinson to advance with his
brigade.

I was then entirely unacquainted with the ground in
front, having been able when I first got up to take only
a hasty glance at the country to our right, and I asked
Lieutenant Chamberlain, Walker's adjutant, to show the
brigade the direction to advance. In reply he stated that
the column of the enemy which had penetrated our line

172

BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG

was immediately in front of the brigade I had ordered
forward, and that by going right ahead there could be
no mistake. The brigade, with the exception of one regi
ment, the 13th Georgia, which did not hear the order,
accordingly moved off in handsome style through the
woods, but as it did so Lieutenant Chamberlain informed
me that it would not be sufficient to cover the entire gap
in our line, and I ordered Colonel Walker to advance
immediately with my own brigade on the left of Atkinson.

The enemy's column in penetrating the interval
mentioned had turned Archer's left and Lane's right,
while they were attacked in front, causing Archer's left
and Lane's entire brigade to give way, and one column
had encountered Gregg's brigade, which, being taken
somewhat by surprise, was thrown into partial confusion,
resulting in the death of General Gregg, but the brigade
was rallied and maintained its ground. Lawton's brigade
advancing rapidly and gallantly under Colonel Atkinson,
encountered that column of the enemy which had turned
Archer's left, in the woods on the hill in rear of the line,
and by a brilliant charge drove it back down the hill,
across the railroad, and out into the open plains beyond,
advancing so far as to cause a portion of one of the
enemy's batteries to be abandoned. The brigade, how
ever, on getting out into the open plain came under
the fire of the enemy's heavy guns, and the approach of
a fresh and heavy column on its right rendered it
necessary that it should retire, which it did under orders
from Colonel Evans, who had succeeded to the command
by reason of Atkinson's being severely wounded.

Two of Brockenborough's regiments from the right
participated in the repulse of the enemy. Colonel
Walker advanced, at a double quick, further to the left,
encountering one of the columns which had penetrated
the interval, and by a gallant and resolute charge he
drove it back out of the woods across the railroad into
the open plains beyond, when, seeing another column of
the enemy crossing the railroad on his left, he fell back

173

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

to the line of the road, and then deployed the 13th
Virginia Regiment to the left, and ordered it to advance
under cover of the timbers to attack the advancing
column on its flank. This attack was promptly made
and Thomas' brigade, attacking in front at the same
time, the enemy was driven back with heavy loss.

As soon as Atkinson and Walker had been ordered
forward, Hoke was ordered to move his brigade to the
left of Hays, but before he got into position, I received
a message stating that Archer 's brigade was giving way
and I ordered Hoke to move forward at once to Archer's
support, obliquing to the right as he moved. Just as
Hoke started, I received an order from General Jackson,
by a member of his staff, to advance to the front with
the whole division, and Hays' brigade was at once
ordered forward in support of Hoke. The 13th Georgia
Regiment which had been left behind on the advance of
Lawton's brigade was ordered to follow Hoke's brigade
and unite with it.

Hoke found a body of the enemy in the woods in rear
of Archer's line on the left, where the regiments on that
flank, which had been attacked in rear, had given way,
but Archer still held the right with great resolution,
though his ammunition was exhausted. Upon a gallant
charge, by the brigade under Hoke, the enemy was driven
out of the woods upon his reserves posted on the railroad
in front, and then by another charge, in which General
Archer participated, the railroad was cleared and the
enemy was pursued to a fence some distance beyond,
leaving in our hands a number of prisoners, and a large
number of small arms on the field.

The movements of the three brigades engaged have
been described separately from the necessity of the case,
but they were all engaged at the same time, though they
went into action separately and in the order in which
they have been mentioned, and Lawton's brigade had
advanced further out into the plains than either of the
others.

174

BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG

On riding to the front, I directed Lawton's brigade,
which was retiring, to be re-formed in the woods — Colonel
Atkinson had been left in front severely wounded and
he fell into the enemy's hands. Captain E. P. Lawton,
Assistant Adjutant General of the brigade, a most gal
lant and efficient officer, had also been left in front at
the extreme point to which the brigade advanced, mor
tally wounded, and he likewise fell into the enemy's
hands.

I discovered that Hoke had got too far to the front
where he was exposed to the enemy's artillery, and also
to a flank movement on his right, and I sent an order
for him to retire to the original line, which he did, an
ticipating the order by commencing to retire before it
reached him. Two of his regiments and a small bat
talion were left to occupy the line of the railroad where
there was cover for them and his other two regiments,
along with the 13th Georgia, which had not been en
gaged, were put in the slight trenches previously occupied
by Archer's brigade. Walker continued to hold the posi
tion on the railroad which he had taken after repulsing
the enemy. Lawton's brigade was sent to the rear for
the purpose of resting and replenishing its ammunition.
Hays ' brigade, which had advanced in rear of Hoke, had
not become engaged, but in advancing to the front it
had been exposed to a severe shelling which the enemy
began, as his attacking columns were retiring in confusion
before my advancing brigades. Hays was posted in rear
of Hoke for the purpose of strengthening the right in
the event of another advance. When I had discovered
Lawton's brigade retiring, I sent to General D. H. Hill
for reinforcements for fear that the enemy might again
pass through the unprotected interval, and he sent me
two brigades, but before they arrived Brigadier General
Paxton, who occupied the right of Taliaferro's line, had
covered the interval by promptly moving his brigade
into it.

The enemy was very severely punished for this attack,

175

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

which was made by Franklin's grand division, and he
made no further attack on our right. During this en
gagement and subsequently there were demonstrations
against A. P. Hill's left and Hood's right which were
repulsed without difficulty. Beginning in the forenoon
and continuing until nearly dark, there were repeated
and desperate assaults made by the enemy from
Fredericksburg against the positions at Marye's Hill and
the one to our right of it, but they were repulsed with
terrible slaughter, mainly by the infantry from Long-
street's corps posted behind the stone wall at the foot
of Mayre's Hill, and the artillery on that, and on the
neighboring heights. The loss to the enemy here was
much heavier than that on our right, while our own loss
at the same point was comparatively slight.

My two brigades, Trimble's under Hoke, and my own
under Walker, and the 13th Georgia Kegiment held their
positions on the front until night, while Hays retained
his position immediately in rear of Hoke, but there was
no further attack made on that part of the line, or on
any part of Hill's front, except the demonstrations on
his left which have been mentioned and which resulted
in some skirmishing and artillery firing.

When my division was first put in position on the
second line as described, having no use for my artillery,
I ordered Captain J. W. Latimer, my acting chief of
artillery, to report to Colonel Crutchfield, Chief of Artil
lery for the Corps, with the six batteries attached to the
division, to-wit: Carrington's, Brown's, Garber's,
D'Aquin's, Dement 's, and his own. Of these Brown's
and Latimer 's were posted on Hill's left, under the im
mediate charge of Captain Latimer, and did most effective
service, and D'Aquin's and Garber's were sent to Major
Pelham, Stuart's Chief of Artillery, on the right, where
they likewise did good service, Captain D'Aquin losing
his life while taking part in the artillery firing in that
quarter. Just before sunset of the day of the battle,
after having seen that all was quiet in my front, I rode

176

BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG

a little to the rear and discovered General D. H. Hill's
division moving to the front through the woods.

On my inquiring the meaning of the movement, Gen
eral Colquitt, in command of the front brigade, informed
me that orders had been given for the advance of the
whole line, and that Hill's division was ordered to ad
vance in support. General D. H. Hill himself rode up
in a few minutes, and confirmed the information. This
was the first intimation I had received of the order, as it
had not reached me. While General Hill and myself
were speaking of the matter, Lieutenant Morrison, aide-
de-camp to General Jackson, rode up and stated that the
General's orders were that I should hold my command in
readiness to advance; and immediately afterwards one
of my own staff officers came to me with the information
that General Jackson wished me to take command of
all the troops on the right and advance, regulating the
distance to which I should go, by the effect produced
on the enemy by our artillery which was to open.

I rode immediately to where Hoke's brigade was
posted and found General Jackson himself, who repeated
in person the orders to me, stating that I was to advance
in support of some artillery which he was about to send
forward. I informed him of the condition of my com
mand, the separation of Walker from the rest, the fact
of Lawton's brigade being in the rear, and that Hoke's
and Hays' brigades and the 13th Georgia were the only
troops immediately available. He told me to advance
with the latter and that he would give me abundant
support; I accordingly prepared to advance with Hoke's
brigade and the 13th Georgia in front, followed by Hays'
brigade. The programme was that a number of pieces
of artillery should be run out in front, and open on the
enemy's infantry, when I was to advance and the artil
lery to be again moved forward, followed by my infantry.

The movement with the artillery was commenced, and
as soon as it left the woods the enemy opened with
numerous batteries from the plains and from behind the
12 177

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

embankments on the river road. This fire was terrific
and many shells went crashing past us into the woods in
our rear, where D. H. Hill's division was massed. Our
own guns opened and continued to fire for a brief space,
and a part of Hoke's brigade advanced to the railroad,
but General Jackson soon became satisfied that the ad
vance must be attended with great difficulties and per
haps disastrous results, and abandoned it. It was well
that he did. The enemy had very heavy forces massed
behind the embankments on the river road, the one near
est us being pierced with embrasures for numerous
pieces of artillery. We would have had to advance nearly
a mile, over an entirely bare plain swept by all this
artillery, as well as cannonaded by the heavy guns on
Stafford Heights, and if we had been able to force back
the Bodies of infantry and the artillery occupying posi
tions on the plain between us and the woods, still when
we reached the road itself we would have found a vastly
superior force behind a double line of very strong breast
works.

Nothing could have lived while passing over that
plain under such circumstances, and I feel well assured
that, while we were all ready to obey the orders of our
heroic commander, there was not a man in the force
ordered to advance, whether in the front or in support,
who did not breathe freer when he heard the orders
countermanding the movement.

I have subsequently examined this ground with great
care, and this examination has strengthened the position
first entertained. It may perhaps be asked why our troops
had not occupied the line of this road, to which I will
reply that the road and the embankments on each side of
it were perfectly commanded by the batteries of Staf
ford Heights, which rendered the position untenable for
us, and the retreat from it most hazardous, while it
afforded safe protection to the enemy from our guns.

Shortly after the termination of this effort to advance,
I received a notification from General Jackson to move

178

BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG

my troops to the rear for the purpose of resting and
getting provisions as soon as they should be relieved by
the troops of A. P. Hill's division which had at first
occupied the positions now held by me, but no troops
came to my relief, and I therefore, remained in position.
Orders were received during the night for Taliaferro
to relieve Hill's troops in the front line beginning from
the left, and for me to occupy the remainder of the line
on the right which Taliaferro could not fill out. In ac
cordance with these directions, before dawn on the 14th,
Paxton relieved Walker, Hays took the position which
Paxton vacated, Hoke remained stationary, Lawton's
brigade under Colonel Evans was posted on Hoke's
right, and Walker was moved from the left and placed
in reserve behind Hoke. The evening before, Carrington's
battery had relieved Latimer's and Brown's on the left,
and still remained in position, and on the morning of the
14th, Dement 's battery relieved one of the batteries on
the right which had been engaged the day before.

During the 14th the enemy remained in position on
the plains and at Fredericksburg, an occasional shot
being exchanged by the artillery and some firing from
the skirmishers taking place on portions of the line, but
none in my front.

Before light on the morning of the 15th, D. H. Hill's
division relieved Taliaferro 's and mine on the front line,
and we moved to the rear in reserve, A. P. Hill's division
occupying the second line.

There was quiet on the 15th, the enemy still retaining
his position, but early on the morning of the 16th, as I
was moving into position on the second line in accord
ance with previous orders, it was discovered that the
enemy had re-crossed the river during the night, taking
up his bridges, and I was ordered to move at once to the
•vicinity of Port Royal to guard against the possible
contingency of the enemy's attempting to turn our right
by crossing the river near that place ; and I commenced
the march immediately.

179

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

The loss in the division under my command in this
battle was in killed 89 and wounded 639, to-wit: in
Hays' brigade, 5 killed and 40 wounded; Trimble's
brigade (Hoke's), 8 killed and 98 wounded; Lawton's
brigade, 55 killed and 369 wounded; my own brigade
(Walker's), 17 killed and 114 wounded; and in the artil
lery of the division 3 killed and 18 wounded. Among
the killed were Lieutenant Colonel Scott of the 12th
Georgia Eegiment, and Captain D'Aquin of the artillery,
and among the wounded were Colonel Atkinson of the
26th Georgia Regiment (in the hands of the enemy),
Captain E. P. Lawton, A. A. G. Lawton's brigade (Law-
ton mortally wounded and in the hands of the enemy)
and Colonel Lamar, 61st Georgia Regiment.

General Lee's entire loss in the battle was in killed
458, and wounded, 3,743, to-wit: in Longstreet's corps,
130 killed, 1,276 wounded; in Jackson's corps, 328 killed
and 2,454 wounded; and 13 wounded in Stuart's cavalry.

The enemy's loss was very much heavier, and over
900 prisoners, more than 9,000 stand of arms and a large
quantity of ammunition fell into our hands.

The failure of General Lee to attempt to destroy the
enemy's army after its repulse has been much criticised,
and many speculations about the probable result of an
attempt to drive the enemy into the river have been
indulged in by a number of writers. In the first place,
it must be recollected that no man was more anxious to
inflict a decisive blow on the enemy than General Lee
himself, and none understood better the exact condition
of things, and the likelihood of success in any attempt
to press the enemy after his defeat on the 13th. That
defeat was a repulse with very heavy loss, it is true,
but it was not a rout of the enemy's army; and candid
persons ought to presume that General Lee knew what
he was about and had very good and sufficient reasons
for not sallying from his line of defence, upon the ex
posed plains below, to make the attempt to convert the
repulse into a rout.

180

BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG

If attention is given to the previous description of
the ground on which the two armies were operating, it
must be seen that an attempt to pass over the wide
plain intervening between our line and the enemy's
position below the town, while exposed to the fire of
150 heavy guns on the Stafford Heights, and the num
erous field pieces securely masked in the Eiver road,
would inevitably have resulted in disaster, unless the
enemy's forces had become so paralyzed as to be in
capable of an effort at defence. Burnside's army was
composed of about 150,000 men in the grand divisions
under Sumner, Franklin, and Hooker, respectively.

In none of the assaults on our lines were the whole
of these grand divisions engaged, but when columns of
attack were sent forward, there were always very heavy
reserves for the attacking columns to fall back upon in
case of repulse; Sumner's and Franklin's grand divi
sions had been mainly engaged and Hooker's scarcely at
all. General Lee's army was not half as large as Burn-
side's and if he had at any time made an attempt to
advance, any force that he could have massed for that
purpose without abandoning his line of defence entirely
would in all likelihood have still encountered a superior
force of infantry behind a strong line of defence, in
addition to the artillery.

As I have stated, General Jackson made the attempt
to advance on the right late in the day on the 13th, but
he was compelled to desist, very fortunately, before any
disaster happened. Above the town, the same canal, at
the foot of the range of hills, which had furnished an
insurmountable obstacle to any attack by the enemy on
our extreme left, likewise furnished the same obstacle
to an advance on our part. The only other quarter from
which the advance could have been made was from the
hills immediately in rear of the town upon the enemy in
the town, and there the difficulties were greater even
than below. Any attacking columns from that quarter
must either have moved down the rugged face of the

181

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

base hills, or by flank along the Telegraph and Plank
roads, and then they would have been so much scat
tered by the artillery from the north bank, which would
then have had a more effective range than even on the
plains, that it would not have required the reserves,
posted behind the houses and defences in the town, to
complete the repulse and disaster.

As to a night attack, that is a very easy thing to talk
about but a most hazardous experiment to try, espe
cially on dark nights such as we then had. Such attacks
cannot be ventured on with safety unless with the most
thoroughly trained troops, and then not in large bodies,
for fear of confusion and firing into each other, the very
dread of which often paralyzes very brave troops.

It has been said that General Lee might have in
flicted tremendous damage upon the enemy by forcing
hot shot and shell into Fredericksburg while the enemy's
troops were massed there. The heroic and patriotic
people of that town, when it was threatened with a
bombardment by Sumner, had not appealed to the com
mander of their country's army to cause the danger to
be removed from them by not resisting its occupation
by the enemy, but had exhibited most commendable un
selfishness by, in most cases, abandoning their homes
without a murmur, while there were some too poor to
move elsewhere, and others who chose to remain and
share all the dangers of the approaching struggle; it
was not in the heart of the noble commander of the Army
of Northern Virginia to doom, by his own act, the re
maining few of that devoted people and the homes of
the absent to destruction, for the sake of killing and
wounding a few thousand of the enemy, and causing
dismay among the remainder.

Is this forbearance one to be criticised with severity
as a grievous military blunder?

It is probable that if General Lee had known that
the enemy was evacuating the town, his artillery might
have inflicted considerable damage, but the enemy had

182

BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG

given no indication of such a purpose, and he took ad
vantage of the darkness of the night and the prevalence
of a storm and wind to make good his retreat, when the
noise attending the movement could not be heard.

General Lee accomplished all that was possible with
the means under his control, except, indeed, the useless
destruction of what the enemy had left of the town of
Fredericksburg.

There was a ridiculous story about General Jackson,
to which currency was given by the newspapers, which
represented that, at a council of war called by General
Lee on the night after the battle, General Jackson fell
into a doze while the very grave question of what ought
to be done under the circumstances was being discussed,
and after all the rest had given their opinion, General
Lee turned to General Jackson and asked, "Well, Gen
eral, what is your opinion ?' ' to which the latter, waking
out of his nap, replied, "Drive 'em in the river, drive
'em in the river." This story is by no means creditable
to General Jackson, yet it obtained a wide circulation,
and the narrators of it seemed to think it was very
characteristic.

General Jackson was a most able commander and
heroic soldier, and it was not at all likely that he would
have acted so much like a besotted member of a council
of war called by his chief. I presume after the facts that
I have before stated, it is not necessary to assert that
no such incident occurred.

Had Burnside moved down the river to the Mas-
saponix, after crossing, or had thrown other bridges
across at or near the mouth of that stream, and crossed
one of his grand divisions there, he would inevitably
have forced us to abandon our line of defence, and
fight him on other ground.

CHAPTER XIX.

OPERATIONS IN WINTER AND SPRING, 1862-63.

ON the 16th of December, as soon as it was discov
ered that the enemy had recrossed the river, in accord
ance with the orders received, I moved to the vicinity
of Port Eoyal, arriving by nightfall.

The enemy was content with the experiment he had
made, and did not attempt any further movement at
that time. I proceeded the next day to picket the river
from a place called the Stop-Cock, near the Rappahan-
nock Academy, to the vicinity of Port Tobacco, below
Port Royal, the river having been watched on this line
previous to my arrival by some of Brigadier General
Wm. H. F. Lee's cavalry, which I relieved.

My division was encamped in the vicinity of Port
Royal, on the hills back from the river, and when it
was ascertained that the enemy was not preparing for
a new movement in any short time, the different brigades
built permanent winter quarters at suitable places.
After a careful examination of the country, I proceeded
to fortify the banks of the river at points likely to
afford facilities for crossing, and I established a line
of defence also along the main road running parallel
with the river, where high embankments with cedar
hedges on them afforded good cover for troops and
excellent breastworks. This line commenced at the up
per end of the Hazelwood estate, the former residence
of that distinguished Virginian, John Taylor of
Caroline, and with the defences on the river extending
to Camden, the residence of Mr. Pratt, some distance
below Port Royal, passing in rear of that town, which
was now nearly abandoned on account of the depreda
tions of the enemy's gunboats and the fear of their
repetition. New roads were constructed in rear of the
line of defence out of reach of artillery from the op-

184

OPERATIONS IN WINTER AND SPRING, 1862-1863

posite bank, for the purpose of facilitating communica
tion between the different positions, and two Whitworth
guns under Captain W. W. Hardwick were placed on a
high hill in rear of Port Royal, for the purpose of pre
venting the gunboats which were below from ascend
ing the river; and subsequently torpedoes were placed
in the bed of the river some two or three miles below
Port Royal under the superintendence of some one sent
from headquarters.

The enemy established a line of cavalry pickets on
the opposite bank of the river as far down as ours
reached, and the two were in sight of each other. The
river at Port Royal is between six and eight hundred
yards wide, and immediately opposite Port Royal is
the small village of Port Conway, which was occupied
by the enemy's pickets.

We were compelled to haul our supplies in wagons
from Guiney's depot on the railroad, and as the winter
was a severe one with much snow and rain, the country
roads, which we had to use, became almost impassable
from the mud, and we were compelled to employ the
men for a considerable time in corduroying them at the
worst places.

In the month of January, 1863, I was promoted to
the rank of Major General and was assigned to the
permanent command of Ewell's division, the name of
which was now changed. Colonel R. F. Hoke of the
21st North Carolina Regiment, who had commanded
Trimble's brigade since the termination of the Mary
land campaign, was promoted to the rank of Brigadier
General and assigned to the brigade he already com
manded, and the name of that also was changed. The
brigade had previously consisted of the 21st North
Carolina, the 12th and 21st Georgia, and the 15th Ala
bama Regiments, and a North Carolina battalion of
two companies. The 12th and 21st Georgia were now
transferred to a Georgia brigade in D. H. Hill's division,
and the 15th Alabama to a brigade in Hood's division,

185

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

the 6th, 54th, and 57th North Carolina Regiments from
Hood's division, taking the place in Hoke's brigade of
those transferred from it.

The 25th and 44th Virginia Regiments were trans
ferred from my own brigade to that of J. R. Jones, in
Jackson's division, and subsequently Colonel William
Smith of the 49th Virginia, who had been so severely
wounded at Sharpsburg and had not yet returned, was
appointed Brigadier General and assigned to my old
brigade as it remained after the transfer of the two
regiments. The organization of the artillery was now
changed, and in the place of the batteries which had
heretofore been attached to brigades, battalions were
organized, which were to be under the general control
of the Chief of Artillery for the Corps, and a battalion
to be assigned to a division on an active campaign, or
when required for defence. In consequence of this
arrangement, a number of promotions took place among
the artillery officers, and Captain J. W. Latimer, a
youthful but most gallant and efficient officer, was made
a Major of Artillery, a promotion which he had richly
earned, though he was scarcely twenty-one years old.
All the batteries heretofore attached to the division,
except Latimer 's, were sent to the rear of Bowling
Green to winter, in order to be more convenient to forage.
Latimer 's battery was retained to be used in case of
need, and it became Tanner's by virtue of the promo
tion of the first lieutenant.

My assistant adjutant general, while I was a
brigadier general, Captain F. Gardner, had resigned
the previous summer, and my aide, Lieutenant S. H.
Early,* had resigned while we were in the valley after
the Maryland campaign, as he was over fifty years of
age, and the condition of his family required his pres-

* Lieutenant Early, at General Early's request (and accompanied
by his young son, John Cabell Early, aged fifteen years), rejoined the
army in 1863 during its northern invasion, and was severely wounded
at the battle of Gettysburg.

186

CAPTAIN SAMUEL H. EARLY

OPERATIONS IN WINTER AND SPRING, 1862-1863

ence at home. I had had no regular personal staff since
then. I found no assistant adjutant general with
E well's division when I succeeded to the command at
Sharpsburg, and Major Samuel Hale, who held the com
mission of a commissary, had been acting in that
capacity for me while I commanded the brigade and con
tinued to do so while I commanded the division. I found
with the division Major J. P. Wilson and Mr. Henry
Heaton, who had been acting as volunteer aides to
General Ewell and then to General Lawton, and they
continued with me in that capacity until after my
promotion.

After I was assigned to the division as major gen
eral, Major Hale received the commission of adjutant
general with the rank of major, and A. L. Pitzer and
Wm. G. -Callaway were commissioned as aides with the
rank of first lieutenants.

My division staff as then organized consisted of the
following officers, all of whom except those above
designated had been with General Ewell as members of
his staff:

Lieutenant Colonel J. M. JONES, Inspector General.

Major SAMUEL HALE, Assistant Adjutant General.

Lieutenant A. L. PITZER, Aide.

Lieutenant WM. G. CALLAWAY, Aide.

Major C. E. SNODGRASS, Quartermaster.

Major BEN H. GREEN, Commissary.

Captain WILLIAM THORNTON, Assistant Commissary.

Captain C. W. CHRISTIE, Ordnance Officer.

Captain HENRY RICHARDSON, Engineer Officer.

Subsequently, in the spring, Major John W. Daniel,
who had been commissioned at my instance, was also
assigned to me as an assistant adjutant general. Lieu
tenant Eobert D. Early, who had been acting as aide
in one of the brigades in D. H. Hill's division, also re
ported to me during the winter, as acting aide, and con
tinued in that capacity until he was made an assistant
adjutant general to a brigade in Jackson's old division.

187

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

A company of mounted men organized as scouts,
couriers and guides by General Ewell, had remained at
tached to the division under the command of Captain
W. F. Randolph, but it was transferred in the spring
to General Jackson's headquarters. My division, as it
remained after the changes above mentioned, was com
posed of four brigades, to-wit : Hays' Louisiana brigade,
Hoke's North Carolina brigade, Lawton's Georgia
brigade (commanded by Colonel Evans), and Smith's
Virginia brigade, organized as follows:

Hays' brigade: 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Louisiana
Regiments.

Hoke's brigade: 6th, 21st, 54th, and 57th North
Carolina Regiments and Wharton's North Carolina
battalion.

Lawton's brigade: 13th, 26th, 31st, 38th, 60th, and
61st Georgia Regiments.

Smith's brigade: 13th, 31st, 49th, 52nd, and 58th
Virginia Regiments.

In a few days after the battle, the other divisions
of Jackson's corps were moved to positions above me,
covering the river from the mouth of Massaponix to my
left, Jackson's old division being on my immediate left,
then A. P. Hill's division, and then D. H. Hill's. In
January General Trimble, who had been severely
wounded near Groveton on the 29th of August previous,
was made a Major General and assigned to Jackson's
division, which had always heretofore remained without
a regular division commander, even while General Jack
son was a Major General, as his command had included
other troops.

The enemy made no demonstration whatever on my
front, and we had nothing to disturb our quiet during
the winter, except a little incident by which two officers
were captured by the enemy in rather a singular manner.
There were a considerable number of ducks on the river,
and Major Wharton, commander of the battalion in
Hoke's brigade, and Captain Adams, the assistant

188

MAJOR JOHN WARWICK DANIEL

From a photograph taken late in life

The Cross of Honor was bestowed by U. D. C.

OPERATIONS IN WINTER AND SPRING, 1862-1863

adjutant general of the brigade, took it into their heads
to go shooting. There were several boats at Port Royal
which I had directed to be hauled up on the bank with
orders to the pickets to keep watch over them and not
permit them to be launched.

On the day the Major and the Captain took for their
sport, the picket at Port Royal happened to be from
their brigade, and they easily induced the sentinel on
duty to let them have the use of one of the boats, to row
into the mouth of a creek above, on our side, where the
ducks were most numerous. The day was a very windy
one with the wind blowing across towards the enemy.
By keeping near the bank they avoided the effect of
the wind until they got opposite the mouth of the creek,
when it struck their boat and forced it out into the
stream. Not being expert boatmen, and moreover being
excited by the danger, they lost control of the boat and
were driven helplessly to the northern bank into the
hands of the enemy's pickets, and of course were made
prisoners. The Major having an old newspaper with him,
pulled it out when he reached the shore and proposed an
exchange, a practice sometimes prevailing with the
pickets in spite of all orders, but the Federal on post
was rather too shrewd to have that game played on
him, insisting that it was not exactly a case for ex
change of such civilities. This was a caution to all per
sons disposed to sporting and to interfere with the orders
to the pickets; and we had no more duck shooting in
boats.

Burnside made an abortive effort in January to ad
vance again by flanking us on the left, but he stuck in
the mud, and we were not put to any inconvenience by
the movement. About the last of the month he was
relieved of his command, and a new commander for the
Federal Army was selected,1 in the person of Major Gen
eral Joseph Hooker, called " Fighting Joe."

Though we passed the winter without the excitement
attending an advance of the enemy, still we were not

189

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

without some excitements of our own, and I may as well
relate the following occurrence to show how men who
had passed through the stirring scenes of the previous
year, who had fought with Jackson in the valley, around
Richmond, at Manassas, Sharpsburg, and Fredericks-
burg, could amuse themselves in winter quarters.

We had several severe snow storms during the winter,
and after one of them, when the snow lay deep on the
ground, Hoke's brigade challenged Lawton's for a battle
with snow balls, which challenge was accepted. The two
brigades were marshalled under their respective com
manders — Hoke on the one side, and Colonel Evans on
the other. Evans stood on the defensive in front of his
camp and Hoke advanced against him. Evans' force
was much the larger, but being Georgians who had been
brought from Savannah in the beginning of the previous
summer, his men were not accustomed to the fleecy
element. Hoke's men were more experienced, and when
they made a bold dash at the Georgians, pelting them
most unmercifully with their well pressed balls, and
giving the usual Confederate yell, there was no with
standing the shock of the onset. Evans' men gave way
in utter confusion and rout, and Hoke's men got pos
session of their camp.

The Georgians seeing that their camp and all their
effects were in possession of the enemy, who seemed to
be inclined to act on the maxim that "to victors belong
the spoils," took courage, rallied, and came back with
such vim that Hoke's men in their turn were routed,
and retreated in utter dismay. No time was given for
them to rally, but they were pursued to their own camp,
their leader having been captured in the pursuit. Evans'
men did not deem it prudent to press their victory too
far, but retired, though in good order. They acted mag
nanimously and released the leader of their opponents
on his parole of honor, not, however, without his having
been well wallowed in the snow.

There was no official report of this battle, but all the

190

OPERATIONS IN WINTER AND SPRING, 1862-1863

particulars were related at division headquarters by one
of the aides who happened to be present, and who was
himself captured under suspicious circumstances on
Hoke's retreat, but begged off on the ground that he was
a neutral and a mere spectator. He was much joked
by the other young men at headquarters, who charged
him with skulking on the occasion, and there was some
reason to suspect that he did not stand the storm of
snow balls as well as he did that of shot and shell on
many another occasion. Many, very many of the poor
fellows who shared in this pastime poured out their
life's blood on subsequent battlefields, and a small rem
nant were surrendered at Appomattox Court-House with
arms in their hands, and tears rolling down their cheeks.

About the first of March my division was moved to
Hamilton's Crossing to take place of Hood's, which had
been sent with Longstreet south of James River, and
a body of cavalry took the place of my division on the
right. In my new position, it was my duty to picket
and watch the river from the mouth of Hazel Run at the
lower end of Fredericksburg to the mouth of Massaponix,
which was done with three regiments at a time, posted
at different positions on the bank. These pickets were
in full view of and in musket range of the enemy's
pickets on the opposite bank, and also under the fire of
the guns on Stafford Heights, but by a tacit arrange
ment there was never any firing from either side on
ordinary occasions, but the picketing detachments on
both sides were moved into position and regularly re
lieved without molestation.

In the month of April the 31st Virginia Regiment
of Smith's brigade, in company with the 25th Virginia
of Jones' brigade, Trimble's division, was sent to the
valley for the purpose of accompanying an expedition
into Northwestern Virginia under General Imboden, and
did not return until late in May.

The growing timber on the range of hills which had
constituted our line of defence at the battle of Freder-

191

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

icksburg had been almost entirely cut down during the
winter to construct tents, and furnish firewood for
Hood's division, and there were left only a few scattering
trees on the hills and a thin skirt in front. Shortly after
my removal, General Jackson, whose headquarters had
been below, near Moss Neck, removed also to the vicinity
of Hamilton's Crossing.

Brigadier General J. B. Gordon, who had been Colonel
of the 6th Alabama Regiment in Rodes' brigade, D. H.
Hill's division, and very severely wounded at Sharps-
burg, was assigned in April to the command of Lawton's
brigade, which took his name.

There was perfect quiet along the river front until
the night of the 28th of April, though Fitz. Lee's brigade
of Stuart's cavalry had a fight with the enemy at Kelley's
Ford in Culpeper in March, and there was another affair
with the cavalry in April.

CHAPTER XX.

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.

BEFORE light on the' morning of the 29th of April, the
enemy, having moved three corps of his army up during
the night, by taking advantage of a heavy fog that over
hung the river, threw a brigade across in boats, just
below the mouth of Deep Run, and the 54th North
Carolina Regiment on picket at that point, being unable
to cope with the force brought against it, was forced
to retire, which it did without loss. The movement had
been conducted with so much secrecy, the boats being
brought to the river by hand, that the first intimation
of it, to the, regiment on picket, was the landing of the
force. Bridges were then rapidly laid down at the same
crossing used by Burnside at this point and a division
of infantry with some artillery was crossed over.

About a mile lower down below the house of Mr. Pratt,
a similar crossing was attempted, but that was discov
ered, and resisted by the 13th Georgia Regiment under
Colonel Smith until after sunrise, when that regiment
was relieved by the 6th Louisiana under Colonel Mona-
ghan going on picket in its regular time. The latter
regiment continued to resist the crossing successfully
until the fog had risen, when the enemy's guns were
brought to bear, and by a concentrated fire that regiment
was compelled to retire, not, however, without sustain
ing a considerable loss in killed and wounded as well as
prisoners, the latter being captured in rifle pits at points
below the crossing, which was effected by the enemy's
coming up in their rear before they had received notice
of his being across. The 13th Georgia had also sustained
some loss in killed and wounded, and prisoners captured
in the same way, who had not been relieved. The re
sistance made at this point delayed the enemy so that
the bridges there were not laid until after 10 o'clock A.M.

13 193

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

A little after light, information reached me of the
crossing at Deep Eun, and I sent notice of it at once to
General Jackson. Without, however, waiting for orders,
I ordered my division to the front, and as soon as it was
possible put it in line along the railroad, with my right
resting near Hamilton's Crossing and my left extending
to Deep Eun. Three regiments were sent to the front
and deployed along the Elver road as skirmishers. The
13th Virginia Eegiment, under Lieutenant Colonel Ter-
rill, on picket between the mouths of Hazel and Deep
Euns, was drawn back to the line of the Eiver road
above Deep Eun, and remained there until relieved by
McLaws' division, when it was brought up.

As soon as the enemy had laid down his bridges at
the lower crossing, a division of infantry and some
artillery were crossed over at that point. When the
fog rose, the slopes of the opposite hills were semi-
covered with troops the whole distance from opposite
Fredericksburg to a point nearly opposite the mouth
of the Massaponix. The question was whether they
were ostentatiously displayed as a feint, or whether they
were massed for crossing. The troops which had crossed
were seen throwing up breastworks covering the bridges
and also epaulments for artillery; but it was impossible
to discover the strength of the force already across, as
below the deep banks of the river there was ample space
for massing a large body of troops out of our sight.
There appeared no attempt to make a crossing at Fred
ericksburg, or to move up towards the town.

Some artillery was put in position on the hill near
Hamilton's Crossing on my right, and in rear of my
left. D. H. Hill's division, now under command of
Brigadier General Eodes, was soon brought up, and put
in position on my right, extending across the Mas
saponix, one brigade being placed below that creek across
the Eiver road, so as to guard the ford. A Whitworth
gun, of very long range, was also posted below the

194

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

Massaponix out of range of the enemy's guns across
the river and in position to partially enfilade them.

The remaining divisions of Jackson's corps were
brought up during the day, and A. P. Hill's was put in
position in a second line in rear of mine. Trimble's
division under the command of Brigadier General
Colston arrived very late in the afternoon and was placed
in reserve in the rear. Barksdale's brigade already
occupied the town of Fredericksburg, and the remaining
brigades of McLaws' division were brought up and
placed in position on the left of my line, one of his
brigades connecting with my left, which was now drawn
back from the railroad, and a shorter line made across
to Deep Eun, to connect it with McLaws' right. For
the greater part of the way the railroad track furnished
a very good protection, and it was strengthened by
throwing up embankments, the line being advanced a
little in front on the left of my centre where there was
a rise in the ground above the level of the road. In
order to occupy the whole of the line my brigades had
to be extended out, as the division was not strong enough
to man it fully.

During the day the enemy made no attempt to ad
vance against us in force with his infantry, and his
skirmishers were effectually kept from the Eiver road
by mine, and on the right Bodes' skirmishers, which ex
tended from the right of mine around to the river above
the Massaponix, prevented any movement in that direc
tion. There was some artillery firing, and one Whit-
worth gun from across the Massaponix played with very
considerable effect on the bottoms on the enemy's left.
Large bodies of the infantry on the opposite slopes oc
casionally moved down towards the river, where they
were concealed from our view by the bank on the south
side, which is the highest.

I retained my position on the front line during the
night, which passed quietly. The next day there was

195

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

very little change in the appearances in front. The
enemy had made strong tetes du pont covering his
bridges, and was constructing a line of entrenchments
connecting the two, passing in front of the Pratt and
Bernard houses, and extending below the lower bridge.

There was this day some apparent diminution of the
infantry in view on the opposite slopes, but there were
many heavy guns in battery on the heights and a very
large force of infantry still visible. There were some
demonstrations with the infantry on the north bank,
some skirmish firing, and some artillery firing also, but
the enemy on the south bank did not appear at all en
terprising, and rather contracted his lines on his left,
his skirmishers retiring before ours which were pushed
forward on that flank. The indications were that it was
a mere demonstration on our front, to cloak a more
serious move in some other quarter, and so it turned
out to be. When this was discovered, it is quite prob
able that we might have destroyed the comparatively
small force on the south bank by a movement against it
from our line, but this would not have compensated us
for the loss we would, in all probability, have sustained
from the enemy's heavy guns.

General Lee had ascertained that by far the largest
portion of Hooker's army had crossed the Rappahannock
and Rapidan Rivers above their junction, and were mov
ing down on his left. He therefore determined to move
up with the greater part of his own army to meet that
force, which was watched by Anderson's division of
Longstreet's corps and a portion of Stuart's cavalry.
Accordingly late on the afternoon of the 30th I was
instructed by General Jackson to retain my position on
the line, and, with my division and some other troops to
be placed at my disposal, to watch the enemy confronting
me while the remainder of the army was absent. Barks-
dale's brigade occupying Fredericksburg and the heights
in rear, was directed to retain his position, as was also
a portion of General Pendleton's reserve artillery, which

196

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

occupied positions on Marye's and Lee's Hills, and the
whole was placed under my command. In addition, Gra
ham's battery of artillery of four guns, two twenty
pounders and two ten pounders, Parrots, posted on the
hill on my right, was left with me, and Lieutenant Colonel
Andrews was ordered to report to me with his battalion
of four batteries with twelve pieces, to-wit: six
Napoleons, four three-inch rifles, and two ten pounder
Parrots. A Whitworth gun under Lieutenant Tunis was
also left at my disposal and posted on the right across
the Massaponix. With the rest of the army near Fred-
ericksburg comprising the other three divisions of Jack
son's corps, and three brigades of McLaws' division,
General Lee moved on the night of the 30th and the
morning of the 1st of May towards Chancellorsville to
meet Hooker.

Before leaving, General Lee instructed me to watch
the enemy and try to hold him; to conceal the weak
ness of my force, and if compelled to yield before over
powering numbers, to fall back towards Guiney's depot
where our supplies were, protecting them and the rail
road; and I was further instructed to join the main body
of the army in the event that the enemy disappeared
from my front, or so diminished his force as to render
it prudent to do so, leaving at Fredericksburg only such
force as might be necessary to protect the town against
any force the enemy might leave behind.

The force which had made the demonstration on our
front consisted at first of the 1st, 3rd, and 6th corps of
Hooker's army, under the command of Major General
Sedgwick. The 3rd corps moved to join Hooker during
the 30th, but the 1st and 6th remained in my front still
demonstrating. In his testimony before the Congres
sional Committee on the war, Hooker stated that the •
6th corps, according to the returns of the 30th of April,
1863, numbered 26,233 present for duty. Sedgwick says
that the 6th corps numbered only 22,000 when it crossed
the river. Taking the medium between them, the

197

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

effective strength may be put down at 24,000, which
General A. P. Howe, commanding one of the divisions,
says he was informed, at headquarters of the corps, it
was. The first corps must have numbered at least 16,000
and perhaps more, so that I must have been left con
fronting at least 40,000 men in these two corps, besides
the stationary batteries on Stafford Heights and Gib
bon's division of the 2nd corps which was just above,
near Falmouth, and, according to Hooker's statement,
numbered over 6,000 for duty on the 30th.

My division by the last tri-monthly field return which
was made on the 20th of April, and is now before me, had
present for duty 548 officers and 7,331 enlisted men,
making a total of 7,879. It had increased none, and I
could not have carried into action 7,500 in all, officers and
men, and not more than 7,000 muskets, as in camp when
everything was quiet, a number of men reported for duty,
who were not actually able to take the field. I had already
lost about 150 men in the resistance which was made at
the lower crossing. Barksdale's brigade did not prob
ably exceed 1,500 men for duty, if it reached that number.
I had, therefore, not exceeding 9,000 infantry officers
and men in all, being very little over 8,000 muskets ; and
in addition I had Anderson's battalion with twelve guns;
Graham's four guns; Tunis', Whitworths, and portions
of Watson's; Cabell's and Cutt's battalions under Gen
eral Pendleton, not numbering probably thirty guns. I
think 45 guns must have covered all my artillery, and
these were nothing to compare with the enemy's in weight
of metal.

The foregoing constituted the means I had for occupy
ing and holding a line of at least six miles in length,
against the enemy's heavy force of infantry, and his far
more numerous and heavier and better appointed artil
lery. It was impossible to occupy the whole line, and
the interval between Deep Run and the foot of Lee's Hill
had to be left vacant, watched by skirmishers, protected
only by a cross fire of artillery. I could spare no in-

198

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

fantry from the right, as that was much the weakest
point of the line, and the force which had crossed, and
which exceeded my whole strength, was below Deep Run,
and confronting my own division. Andrews' artillery
was placed in position on the morning of the 1st as fol
lows: four Napoleons and two rifles were placed under
Major La timer, near the left of the line occupied by my
division, behind some epaulments that had been made on
that part of the line ; two Parrots were placed with Gra
ham 's guns on the hill on my right, and two Napoleons
and two rifles were posted to the right of Hamilton's
Crossing, near a grove of pines, the Whitworth gun
being posted on a height across the Massaponix so as
to have a flank fire on the enemy if he advanced, and it
was without support. Colonel Andrews had charge of
all of the artillery on this part of the line, that on
Marye's and Lee's Hills was under the immediate super
intendence of General Pendleton, and some of the bat
teries were so posted as to have a cross fire on the upper
part of the valley of Deep Run.

The enemy remained quiet on the 1st, except in
demonstrating by manoauvres of his troops, and there
was no firing on that day. His line of entrenchments,
covering the two bridges, had been completed, and he
still displayed a heavy force of infantry, consisting of
the two corps under Sedgwick. The ensuing night also
passed quietly, and during it a battery of four Napoleons
was sent by General Pendleton to report to Colonel
Andrews, and was posted with the four guns near the
pines on the right of the crossing.

The morning of the 2nd opened with appearances
pretty much the same as they had been the day before ;
if anything there was more infantry in view on the north
bank than had appeared ,the previous day. Colonel
Andrews was ordered early in the day to feel the enemy
with his guns, and accordingly Latimer opened with his
two rifle guns on the enemy's position near Deep Run,
and Graham's and Brown's Parrots opened on the in-

199

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

fantry and batteries below and near the Pratt house.
Latimer's fire was not returned, but Graham 's and
Brown's was responded to by two of the batteries on
the north bank and some guns on the south side. Shortly
afterwards the infantry and artillery at the lower cross
ing disappeared behind the bank of the river, and that
crossing was abandoned.

During the morning I rode to Lee's Hill for the pur
pose of observing the enemy's movements from that
point, and I observed a considerable portion of his in
fantry in motion up the opposite river bank. While I
was, in company with Generals Barksdale and Pendle-
ton, observing the enemy's manoeuvre and trying to ascer
tain what it meant, at about 11 o'clock A.M., Colonel R.
H. Chilton, of General Lee's staff, came to me with a
verbal order to move up immediately towards Chancel-
lorsville with my whole force, except a brigade of infantry
and Pendleton's reserve artillery, and to leave at Fred-
ericksburg the brigade of infantry and a part of the
reserve artillery to be selected by General Pendleton,
with instructions to the commander of this force to watch
the enemy's movements, and keep him in check if pos
sible, but if he advanced with too heavy a force to retire
on the road to Spottsylvania Court-House — General
Pendleton being required to send the greater part of his
reserve artillery to the rear at once.

This order took me very much by surprise, and I
remarked to Colonel Chilton that I could not retire my
troops without their being seen by the enemy, whose
position on Stafford Heights not only overlooked ours,
but who had one or two balloons which he was constantly
sending up from the heights to make observations, and
stated that he would inevitably move over and take
possession of Fredericksburg and the surrounding
Heights. The Colonel said he presumed General Lee
understood all this, but that it was much more important
for him to have troops where he was, than at Fredericks-
burg, and if he defeated the enemy there he could easily

200

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

retake Fredericksburg ; he called my attention to the
fact, which was apparent to us all, that there was a very
heavy force of infantry massed on the slopes near Fal-
mouth which had moved up from below, and stated that
he had no doubt the greater portion of the force on the
other side was in motion to reinforce Hooker. He re
peated his orders with great distinctness in the presence
of General Pendleton, and in reply to questions from us,
said that there could be no mistake in his orders.

This was very astounding to us, as we were satisfied
that we were then keeping away from the army, opposed
to General Lee, a much larger body of troops than my
force could engage or neutralize if united to the army
near Chancellorsville. It is true that there was the force
massed near Falmouth and the indications were that it
was moving above, but still there was a much larger force
of infantry stationed below, which evinced no disposi
tion to move. While we were conversing, information
was brought me that the enemy had abandoned his lower
crossing, and that our skirmishers had advanced to the
Pratt house, but he still, however, maintained his position
at the mouth of Deep Creek with a division of infantry
and a number of guns on our side of the river.

The orders as delivered to me left me no discretion,
and believing that General Lee understood his own neces
sities better than I possibly could, I did not feel justified
in acting on my own judgment, and I therefore de
termined to move as directed. It subsequently turned
out that Colonel Chilton had misunderstood General
Lee's orders, which were that I should make the move
ment indicated if the enemy did not have a sufficient
force in my front to detain the whole of mine, and it
was to be left to me to judge of that, the orders, in fact,
being similar to those given me at first. It also turned
out that the troops seen massed near Falmouth were the
1st corps under Eeynolds, moving up to reinforce Hooker,
and that the 6th corps, Sedgwick's own, remained behind.

When Colonel Chilton arrived, General Pendleton was

201

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

making arrangements to move some artillery to the left
to open on the columns massed near Falmouth, but the
order brought rendered it necessary to desist from that
attempt in order to make preparations for the with
drawal.

My division occupied a line which was in full view
from the opposite hills except where it ran through the
small strip of woods projecting beyond the railroad,
and the withdrawal had to be made with the probability
of its being discovered by the enemy. I determined to
leave Hays' brigade to occupy the hills in rear of Fred-
ericksburg with one regiment deployed as skirmishers
on the River road confronting the force at the mouth
of Deep Run, and also to leave one of Barksdale's regi
ments, which was already in Fredericksburg and along
the bank of the river, picketing from Falmouth to the
lower end of the town.

The orders were given at once and the withdrawal
commenced, but it had to be made with great caution so
as to attract as little attention as possible and therefore
required much time. General Pendleton was to remain
at Fredericksburg, according to the orders, and the with
drawal of such of his artillery as was to be sent to the
rear was entrusted to him and executed under his direc
tions. The Whitworth gun was ordered to the rear
with the reserve artillery and Andrews' battalion and
Graham's battery were ordered to follow my column,
Richardson's battery, which was on the right, being re
turned to General Pendleton 's control. When the with
drawal commenced, the enemy sent up a balloon and I
felt sure that he had discovered the movement, but it
turned out that he did not.* It was late in the afternoon
before my column was in readiness to move, and Barks-
dale was ordered to bring up the rear with the three
regiments left after detaching the one on picket, as soon

* Professor Lowe's balloon reconnaissances so signally failed on
this occasion and in the operations at Chancellorsville, that they were
abandoned for the rest of the war.

202

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

as he was relieved by Hays. As soon as the troops were
in readiness the three brigades of my division moved
along the Ridge road from Hamilton's Crossing to the
Telegraph road, and then along a cross-road leading into
the Plank road, Barksdale going out on the Telegraph
road to join the column. Upon getting near the Plank
road, a little before dark, I received a note from General
Lee which informed me that he did not expect me to
join him unless, in my judgment, the withdrawal of my
troops could be made with safety, and I think he used
the expression that if by remaining I could neutralize
and hold in check a large force of the enemy, I could do
as much or perhaps more service than by joining him.

I had proceeded so far that I determined to go on,
as the probability was that if the enemy had discovered
my movement, the mischief would be done before I could
get back, and that I would not be able to recover the
lost ground, but might deprive General Lee entirely of
the use of my troops. When the head of my column had
reached the Plank road and moved up it about a mile, a
courier came to me from General Barksdale, stating that
the enemy had advanced against Hays with a very large
force, and that the latter and General Pendleton had
sent word that all of the artillery would be captured
unless they had immediate relief. The courier also stated
that General Barksdale had started back with his own
regiments.

I determined to return at once to my former position,
and accordingly halted the column, faced it about and
moved back, sending my Adjutant General, Major Hale,
to inform General Lee of the fact. The fact turned out
to be that just before dark Sedgwick had crossed the
remainder of his corps and moved towards the River
road below, called also the Bowling Green road, forcing
from it the 7th Louisiana Regiment, under Colonel Penn,
which occupied that road and fell back to the line on
the railroad after skirmishing sharply with the enemy.
There had been no advance against Hays at Fredericks-

203

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

burg, and Sedgwick had halted with his whole force
and formed line on the river, occupying with his advance
force the road from which Colonel Penn had been driven.

We regained our former lines without trouble about
ten or eleven o'clock at night, throwing out skirmishers
towards the River road. Barksdale occupied his old
position and Hays' returned during the night to the
right of my line. The night passed quietly on the right
after my return except some picket firing on the front,
but, just before daybreak on the morning of the 3rd, I
was informed by General Barksdale that the enemy had
thrown a bridge across at Fredericksburg and was mov
ing into the town. The General had ridden to see me
in person to request reinforcements, and I ordered Hays'
brigade to return to the left as soon as possible, directing
General Barksdale to post the brigade where it was
needed, as he understood the ground thoroughly. In
reply to a question from me, he informed me that the
crossing had not been resisted by his regiment, which
had retired skirmishing on the approach of the enemy,
as the struggle was deemed useless, and it undoubtedly
would have been. This was a mistake about the bridge
being laid at that time, but it was a very natural one,
as Sedgwick moved a portion of his force up the river
into the town, while doubtless preparations were making
for laying down the bridge early in the morning.

Barksdale 's brigade was then posted as follows:
the 21st Mississippi Regiment occupied the trenches on
Marye's Hill between Marye's house and the Plank
road; the 18th, the stone wall at the foot of the hill,
where it was subsequently reinforced by three companies
from the 21st; the 17th, the trenches on the front slope
of Lee's Hill; and the 13th, the trenches further to the
right. Squires' battery of the Washington Artillery was
posted in the works on Marye's Hill, and the rest of
Pendleton's guns on Lee's Hill on the front crest and
at positions further to the right, so as to cover the in
terval between the hills and the upper part of Deep

204

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

Run. There were no troops on the left of the Plank
road along the crest overlooking the canal. Very soon
after daylight, the head of Sedgwick's column, which
had moved up during the night from below, emerged from
the town and advanced against the defences at Marye's
Hill, but was repulsed by the fire of Barksdale's infantry
and the artillery posted there.

When it became sufficiently light to see, it was dis
covered by us that the opposite bank of the river was
bare of troops and it was very apparent that the enemy's
whole force lately confronting us on that side was across
for the purpose of a serious move, and the question was
as to where it would be made. The heaviest force in
view was in front of the crossing below the mouth of
Deep Run, and there were at that point a number of
pieces of artillery. The enemy, however, was also demon
strating against Marye's Hill with both infantry and
artillery, but the mass of his infantry there was con
cealed from our view, and there were indications also
as if he might attempt to pass up the valley of Deep Run
on the left bank. The fact was that there was one
division covering the bridge, one between Deep Run and
Hazel Run, and one masked in Fredericksburg. The
skirmishers from my division succeeded in getting to the
River road on the right, but the position next Deep Run
was held by too strong a force to be dislodged.

Very shortly after light the enemy commenced demon
strating at Deep Run as if to turn the left of my division
held by Hoke's brigade, and threw bodies of troops up
the ravine formed by the high banks of the run, while
there were demonstrations also on the left bank of the
run. Latimer opened with his guns on the ravine and
the advancing bodies of infantry where they could be
seen ; but a considerable body succeeded in getting up to
that part of the railroad next to the run and took posi
tion behind it, where they were protected against the
fire of our artillery. The enemy opened with two or
three batteries on Latimer 's guns, and there ensued a

205

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

brisk artillery duel. Andrews brought Graham's and
Brown's guns from the right to replace Latimer's
Napoleons, and also Carpenter's two rifles to take posi
tion with Latimer's two, and the firing was continued
for some time, as well against the enemy's infantry as
against his artillery. Finally Smith's brigade, which was
on the right of Hoke's, moved out and dislodged the
infantry which had taken position behind the railroad
embankment, and as it retired the artillery played on
it. This ended the demonstrations at Deep Run, and
soon heavy bodies of infantry were seen passing up
towards Fredericksburg, upon which Andrews' batteries
opened.

I had remained on the right with my division, as I
knew that that was the weakest part of our line, and I
was very apprehensive that the enemy would attempt to
cut my force in two by moving up Deep Run, which
would have been the most dangerous move to us he could
have made. I, however, kept a lookout upon the move
ments above and was in constant communication with
Generals Barksdale and Pendleton, from whom I received
several reports that they had repulsed all the attacks
upon their position, and thought they could hold it.
Shortly after sunrise, and after the repulse of the first
attack on Barksdale 's position, Gibbon's division, of the
enemy's 2nd corps, was crossed over into Fredericksburg
on the bridge which had been laid there, and it was then
moved above the town for the purpose of turning the
position on that flank, but this effort was balked by the
canal, over which there was no bridge ; it then attempted
to effect the movement by repairing a bridge over the
canal, the planking from which had been torn up, but
Hays' brigade had arrived by that time, and four of his
regiments filed into the trenches on the left of the Plank
road just in time to thwart this attempt, and another
made shortly afterwards to cross the canal at the upper
end of the same division.

Hays' brigade had had a long distance to march in
order to avoid the enemy, and when it arrived General

206

i?

r K

BB

Is

o >

if

6d ^L

a a

5 £
§ S

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

Barksdale placed one of the regiments, the 6th Louisiana,
Colonel Monaghan, on his right in the trenches near
what was known as the Howison house, and the other
four were sent to man the trenches along the crest of the
hills on the left of the Plank road, where they arrived just
in time to thwart the attempt to cross the canal as
before stated. The enemy's guns from the north side
of the river, as well as from positions on the south side
above and below the town, continued to fire upon the
positions occupied by Barksdale 's men and our artillery,
but the latter generally reserved its fire for the infantry.
An attempt to turn the right of the position by the
right bank of Hazel Eun was repulsed by Pendleton's
artillery and every effort to get possession of the heights
was baffled and repulsed until after 11 A.M., when two
large attacking columns of a division each were formed,
one of the divisions from below being brought up for
that purpose. One of these columns moved against
Marye's Hill and the other against Lee's Hill, both at
the same time, while Gibbon's division demonstrated
against the heights above with storming parties in front.
The column that moved against Marye's Hill, consisting
of Newton's division, made its attack on the famous stone
wall defended by a regiment and three companies, and
its storming parties were twice broken and driven back
in disorder by the gallant little band that held that
position, but constantly returning to the attack with
overwhelming numbers the enemy finally succeeded in
carrying the work, after having sustained terrible
slaughter.* Then passing around the foot of the hill a

* Sedgwick, in his testimony before the Congressional Committee
on the War, says : " I lost a thousand men in less than ten minutes'
time in taking the heights of Fredericksburg."

General Barksdale informed me that just before this final attack
was made the enemy sent a flag of truce to Colonel Griffin, commanding
the force behind the stone wall, asking permission to take care of his
wounded lying in front under our fire, which permission was im
prudently granted by Colonel Griffin, without his knowledge, and that
the weakness of the force at that point was thus discovered, and
immediately afterwards the assaulting columns advanced.

207

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

portion of the attacking column came up in the rear, cap
turing Squires' guns (which had been fought to the
last minute), and along with them the Captain and his
company.

The column sent against Lee's Hill did not succeed in
carrying it by assault, but was kept at bay until Marye's
Hill had fallen, when the position being untenable, the
regiments defending it were withdrawn up the hill, and
the enemy was thus able to take possession of that also.
The artillery on both hills had done good service in aid
ing to repel all the previous assaults and to resist this.
The companies of the 21st Mississippi in the trenches
on the left of Marye's Hill were compelled to retire to
prevent being surrounded and captured, as were also
Hays' regiments in the trenches further to the left, the
latter being compelled to cross the Plank road higher up,
as their retreat on the Telegraph road was cut off. The
enemy got on Hays' flank and rear before he was aware
the hill on his right was taken, and the consequence was
that he lost a few prisoners. He succeeded, however, in
making good his retreat.

General Barksdale partially rallied his regiments and
made obstinate resistance to the enemy's advance on the
Telegraph road, falling back gradually before the large
force opposing him. The greater portion of the guns
on Lee's Hill were carried off, but some were lost be
cause the horses belonging to them had been carried to
the rear to be out of reach of the enemy's shells, and
could not be got up in time to carry off the pieces. Ten
guns were lost in all, including those taken at Marye's
Hill, but two were subsequently recovered, making our
final loss in that respect eight pieces.

Wilcox's brigade was above at Banks' Ford, but not
under my command, and was about to move up to Chan-
cellorsville, but hearing that the enemy was advancing
up the river, General Wilcox hurried to the vicinity of
Taylor's house at the extreme left of the line with two
pieces of artillery and sixty men, and putting his guns

208

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

in position, opened with effect on a portion of Gibbon's
division when it was trying to effect a crossing of the
canal at the upper end. He then detained his brigade,
and subsequently started a regiment to Barksdale 's
assistance at his request, but before it arrived Marye's
Hill had been taken and it therefore retired. General
Wilcox subsequently did good service in resisting the
enemy's advance up the Plank road.

While these events were transpiring above, I was
near the left of the line occupied by my division, and in a
position from which I could observe a good deal of the
movements, but could not see Marye's Hill very well.
After what was supposed to be the enemy's effort to
move up Deep Run and thus break our lines had been
thwarted, and when I saw the infantry moving up
towards Fredericksburg, I sent one of my aides, Lieu
tenant Callaway, to Lee's Hill, to give notice to Generals
Barksdale and Pendleton and to ascertain how they were
getting on. After he had been gone some time, I became
uneasy and determined to ride up myself.

While I was on my way some one came galloping up
in my rear and stated that some person below had seen
the enemy's troops and flag go up on Marye's Hill. I
did not think this could be so, but rode on rapidly, hoping
that the statement was untrue. I soon met a courier from
General Pendleton with a note stating that they had so
far repulsed any attack and could hold their position.
This relieved me for an instant, but in a few minutes
Lieutenant Callaway came galloping with the informa
tion that the enemy certainly had carried the heights,
and that he had seen his attacking column ascending them
at Marye's house, a very few minutes after parting with
Generals Barksdale and Pendleton, who were on Lee's
Hill and who had just stated to him that they thought
they could hold the position.

I at once sent an order to General Gordon, who occu
pied my right, to move up as soon as possible with three
of his regiments over the road I was following, which was

14 209

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

the nearest practicable one. I then galloped to the
Telegraph road, and soon met Pendleton's artillery going
rapidly to the rear, and ordered it to be halted. Going
on I found General Barksdale on the ridge immediately
in rear of Lee's Hill rallying his men and skirmishing
with the enemy who had ascended the hill, and before
whom they were retiring gradually but obstinately.
Barksdale 's men were rather scattered, but the 6th
Louisiana had retired in good order and I directed it to
form a line, and Barksdale to halt and get his men in
line, which he did. I also ordered a battery of artillery
to be brought forward into action and soon one was by
my side and unlimbered but did not fire.

There was a line of the enemy in front a few hundred
yards on the crest of the hill, and I turned to the officer
commanding the battery and asked him why he did not
fire, to which he replied, "I have no ammunition, sir."
I ordered another to be brought forward, and a battery
of Howitzers, from CabelPs battalion, was brought up
and opened with canister. The enemy's advance had been
checked by the demonstration, but he soon brought up
some artillery and opened on us at short range with
shrapnel and canister, and I ordered the line to retire
a short distance, which it did in good order, taking up
another position. In this manner we continued to retire
.along the Telegraph road from point to point, taking ad
vantage of favorable portions of the ground to make a
stand until the enemy ceased to pursue. I then ordered
General Barksdale to take position at Cox's house, about
two miles in rear of Lee's Hill, where the first cross
road leaves the Telegraph road to get into the Plank
road, and to establish Hays (to whom I had sent a mes
sage to come around to the Telegraph road) on the line,
as well as Gordon's regiments, when they arrived.

By obtaining possession of Lee's Hill, the enemy had
obtained a position from which he could completely
enfilade my line on the right, and as soon as the fore
going arrangements were made, I rode rapidly to the

210

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

right and threw back the troops there into a second line
which had been previously prepared in the rear, and
which was not enfiladed; and Colonel Andrews was
ordered to take position with all of his guns on the
ridge at the head of the Deep Run valley, so as to protect
the left flank of my division and the right of Barksdale 's
line.

All these movements were made without molestation
from the enemy. Of course I did not know what the
purposes of the enemy were, and took my measures to
provide as well as I could for any emergency that might
present itself. I had met Gordon with his three regi
ments immediately after leaving Barksdale, and directed
him to join the latter. After making the dispositions on
the right, I rode back to Barksdale 's position and found
his line established with Hays and Gordon in position.

It had been now ascertained that the enemy was
moving up the Plank road, and I rode out to a position
across Hazel Run, from which I could see the moving
columns and discovered that it was moving very slowly,
and that it finally halted. Lieutenant Pitzer, one of
my aides, had been at Lee's Hill when the heights were
carried, and knowing the importance of the affair to
General Lee, had gone at once to give him the informa
tion, as he knew that it would be some time before I
could be informed so as to send a messenger myself, and
thus judiciously anticipated me in putting General Lee
on his guard.

While the events thus detailed were transpiring on
the line occupied by me, a great battle had been fought
between General Lee's forces and the main body of
Hooker's army. Hooker had crossed the river above and
concentrated four corps at Chancellorsville in a strong
position, and Anderson's division of Longstreet's corps,
Longstreet himself being still absent with two of his
divisions, had watched the movement of the enemy and
resisted his advance column, taking position on the Plank
road at Tabernacle Church. McLaws' division and the

211

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

three divisions of Jackson's corps had moved up during
the night of the 30th of April and the morning of the
1st of May and united with Anderson. Our troops had
thus moved forward on the Plank road and the stone
turnpike, Anderson's and McLaws' divisions in front,
and Jackson's divisions following Anderson's on the
Plank road, and had driven an advanced line of the
enemy back to within a mile of Chancellorsville upon his
main force.

Early on the morning of the 2nd, Anderson's and
McLaws' divisions, with the exception of Wilcox's
brigade of Anderson's division, which had been sent back
to Banks' Ford, and Barksdale's brigade of McLaws'
division which was at Fredericksburg, were left to con
front the enemy on the side next to Fredericksburg, and
Jackson moved with his three divisions, by a circuitous
route to the left, to gain the rear of the enemy's right.
Late in the afternoon, General Jackson reached the rear
of the enemy's right flank about three miles beyond
Chancellorsville, and with Eodes in front — followed by
Colston with Trimble's division, and A. P. Hill, — ad
vanced at once with great vigor, driving the enemy before
him, carrying position after position, routing entirely
one corps, and capturing a number of guns and prisoners,
until his advance was arrested by the abattis in front
of the central position near Chancellorsville. Night had
come on by this time, and General Jackson ordered A. P.
Hill's division, which was following in rear of the other
two, to the front to take the place of the latter. He
himself went to the front to reconnoitre for the purpose
of ordering another advance, and, having sent an order
to Hill to press on, while returning in the darkness was
shot and dangerously wounded * under an unfortunate
mistake, by a part of Hill's advancing troops. General

* Captain R. E. WELBOUBN :

Some conflicting accounts of the manner in which General Jackson
was shot have been published, and as you were with him, I will be

212

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

A. P. Hill was soon after disabled and the advance was
thus arrested.

When Jackson's guns opened, our troops on the right
pressed the enemy's left heavily to prevent any troops
being sent from that flank against Jackson, but no attack
in front was made then and night put an end to the
operations in that quarter. Hooker had been joined
during the day by the 1st corps brought up from opposite

very much obliged, if you will give me all the details of the affair.
With pleasant recollections of your official connection with me,

Yrs. very truly
LYNCHBURG, Feb. 12, 1873. J. A. EARLY.

General J. A. EARLY:

I give you the facts relating to the wounding of General T. J.
Jackson. As the details of the battle are familiar to you, I will begin
with Jackson's movements after the battle was over, and all seemed
quiet, the enemy having disappeared from our immediate front, and
all firing consequently having ceased. Jackson took advantage of this
lull in the storm to relieve Rodes' troops (who had been fighting and
steadily advancing and making repeated charges from the time the
fight began), and had ordered General Hill to the front to relieve
Rodes with his fresh troops, directing the change to be made as
quickly as possible. We were within a half mile of the open fields
near Chancellorsville, where the enemy was supposed to be strongly
entrenched. While the change was being made Jackson manifested
great impatience to get Hill's troops into line and ready to move
promptly, and to accomplish this he sent the members of his staff
with orders to Hill and other general officers to hurry up the move
ment. From the orders sent to General Stuart it was evident that
his intention was to storm the enemy's works at Chancellorsville as
soon as the lines were formed, and before the enemy recovered from
the shock and confusion of the previous fighting, and to place the left
of his army between Hooker and the river. While these orders were
being issued Jackson sat on his horse just in front of the line on the
pike. From this point he sent me with an order to General Hill. I
galloped back and met Hill, in about 50 yards, riding along the pike
towards General Jackson. I turned and rode with him to his lines, he
stopping within a few feet of their front. I then rode immediately
on to General Jackson, who was in sight, and only a few paces in
front of Hill, just in the position I had left him. As I reached him,
he sent off the only staff officer present, with orders to Hill to move

213

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

Fredericksburg, but at the close of the fight his lines had
been very much contracted, and his troops on his right
greatly scattered ; and early in the night he telegraphed
to Sedgwick to cross the river and move up to Chan-
cellorsville on the Plank road, which dispatch found
Sedgwick already across.

General Jackson had been entirely disabled by his
wound, and General A. P. Hill was so injured as to be
unable to command in the field. Brigadier General Rodes

forward as soon as possible, and then started slowly along the pike
towards the enemy. I rode at his left side, two of my signal men
just behind us, followed by couriers, etc., in columns of twos. General
Jackson thought, while awaiting HilPs movements, that he would ride
to the front, as far as the skirmish line, or pickets, and ascertain what
could be seen or heard of the enemy and his movements, — supposing
there was certainly a line of skirmishers in front, as his orders were
always very imperative to keep a skirmish line in front of the line of
battle. When we had ridden only a few rods and reached a point
nearly opposite an old dismantled house in the woods (near the road
to our right) and while I was delivering to him General Hill's reply
to his order — given a few moments before, — to our great surprise our
little party was fired upon by about a battalion or probably less of
our troops, a little to our right and to the right of the pike, the balls
passing diagonally across the pike and apparently aimed at us. There
seemed to be one gun discharged, followed almost instantly by this
volley. The single gun may have been discharged accidentally, but
seemed to have been taken as a signal by the troops, to announce the
approach of the enemy. I hardly think the troops saw us, though
they could hear our horses' feet on the pike and probably fired at
random in the supposed direction of the enemy. However, the origin
of the firing is mere conjecture, but it came as above stated, and many
of the escorts and their horses were shot down. At the firing our
horses wheeled suddenly to the left and General Jackson, at whose
side I rode, galloped away — followed by the few who were not dis
mounted by the first firing, — into the woods to get out of range of
the bullets, and approached our line a little obliquely, but had not gone
over 20 steps beyond the edge of the pike, into the thicket, ere the
brigade just to the left of the turnpike (on our right as we approached
from the direction of the enemy), drawn up within 30 yards of us,
fired a volley in their turn, kneeling on the right knee, as shown by the
flash of their guns, as though prepared to guard against cavalry. By
this fire General Jackson was wounded. These troops evidently mis-

214

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

was the officer next in rank, but having a very natural
hesitation to assume the responsibility of so large and
important a command, Major General Stuart of the
cavalry, who was operating in connection with General
Jackson, was requested to assume command, which he
did. During the night the enemy strengthened his con
tracted line with breastworks and abattis, and strongly
fortified other positions in his rear nearer the Bappa-
hannock.

took us for the enemy's cavalry. We could distinctly hear General
Hill calling, at the top of his voice, to his troops to make them cease
firing. He knew that we had just passed in front of him, as did the
troops immediately on the pike, and I don't think these latter fired.
I was alongside of Jackson, and saw his arm fall at his side, loosing
the rein, when the volley came from the left. His horse wheeled sud
denly and ran through the bushes toward the enemy. The limb of a
tree took off his cap and threw him flat on the back on his horse. I
rode after him, passing under the same limb, which took off my hat
also, but Jackson soon regained his seat, caught the bridle in his right
hand, and turning his horse towards the pike and our men, somewhat
checked his speed. As he turned to the pike, it gave me the inside
track, and I caught his horse as he reached the pike, which he was
approaching at an acute angle. Just as I caught the reins, Captain
Wynn rode up on the opposite side of him and caught hold of the
reins on that side, almost simultaneously. By this time the confusion
was over and all was quiet, and looking up and down the pike in every
direction, no living creature could be seen save us three.

As soon as I could check Jackson's horse, I dismounted, and see
ing that he was faint, I asked him what I could do for him, or if he
felt able to ride as far as into our lines. He answered, " You had best
take me down," leaning, as he spoke, toward me and then falling,
partially fainting from loss of blood.

' I was on the side of the broken arm, while his horse had his head
turned towards the enemy and about where we were when first fired
upon, and would not be kept still, as he was frightened and suffering
from his own wounds. As General Jackson fell over on me, I caught
him in my arms, and held him until Captain Wynn could get his feet
out of the stirrups, then we carried him in our arms some 10 or 15
steps north of the pike, where he was laid on the ground, resting his
head in my lap, while I proceeded to dress his wounds, cutting off his
coat sleeves, and binding a handkerchief tightly above and below his
wound and putting his arm in a sling. Wynn went for Dr. McGuire

215

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

Early in the morning of the 3rd, Stuart renewed the
attack with Jackson's division on the left, while Ander
son pressed forward with his right resting on the Plank
road, and McLaws demonstrated on the right. The enemy
was forced back from numerous strongholds until Ander
son's left connected with Stuart's right, when the whole
line attacked with irresistible force, driving the enemy
from all his fortified positions around Chancellorsville
with very heavy loss, and forcing him to retreat to the

and an ambulance, and I was left alone with him until General Hill
came up. Just before Hill reached us, Jackson revived a little and
asked me to have a skilful surgeon attend him. When I told him
what had been done he said " Very good."

The enemy evidently thought the firing had thrown our men into
confusion and resolved to take advantage of it by making a determined
attack at this time, so in a few minutes, it was announced by Lieu
tenant Morrison, who had joined Jackson while he was lying on the
ground, and now ran up in a very excited manner, crying out, " The
enemy is within 50 yards and advancing. Let us take the General
away." Jackson was still lying with his head in my lap, I had finished
tying up his arm where it was broken, and asked him where his other
wound was, and what I should do for that, when he replied, " In my
right hand, but never mind that, it is a mere trifle." He said nothing
about the wound in his left wrist, and did not seem aware of it,
doubtless owing to the fact that the arm was broken above. Upon
hearing Morrison's warning, I sprang up, and said, " Let us take the
General in our arms, and carry him back," to which he replied, " No,
if you will help me up, I can walk." He had only gone a few steps, when
we met a litter and placed him on it. He was being borne off on foot,
supported by Captain Lee and one or two others, I walking between
them and the pike, and leading three horses, trying to keep the troops,
then moving down the pike, from seeing who it was, but found this
impossible, and we met some men with this litter before we had gone
ten steps. While placing Jackson on it, the enemy opened fire on us
at short range, from a battery planted on the pike and with infantry;
a terrific fire of grape, shell, minie balls, etc., and advancing at a
rapid rate. Everything seemed to be seized with a panic, and taken
by surprise, our line was thrown into confusion. It recoiled and for
awhile continued to give way, and the enemy pressed forward. Such
was the disorder that I thought that General Jackson and party would
certainly fall into the hands of the enemy. The horses jerked loose,
and ran in every direction, and before we proceeded far one of the

216

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

new fortifications nearer the Eappahannock. By ten
o'clock A.M. General Lee was in full possession of Chan-
cellorsville and the field of battle. He then proceeded to
reorganize his troops for an advance against the enemy's
new position, to which the latter had been able to retreat
under shelter of the dense woods, which covered all the
ground, and also rendered an advance by our troops in
line of battle very difficult and hazardous.

General Lee had just completed his arrangements to
renew the attack, when he received the intelligence of
the capture of Marye's Hill by Sedgwick's force and the

litter bearers was shot, having both of his arms broken, and General
Jackson fell to the ground. As he lay there he grew faint from loss
of blood, having fallen on his wounded side, and his arm began to
bleed afresh. I rode away to try to get some whiskey for the purpose
of reviving him, and at a short distance met Dr. McGuire and Colonel
Pendleton, to whom I told what had happened, as we rode towards
the place where I left Jackson. The ambulance came up; we hurried
it to the front, and, reaching Jackson, placed him in it. As soon as
the ambulance left, I was ordered by Colonel Pendleton, after consul
tation with General Rodes, to go to General Lee as quickly as possible
and communicate the intelligence to him, explaining our position, what
had been accomplished, who had taken command; and ask him to
come to that place.

During the attack on our forces so many of our men had gone
past us that we seemed to be left with no troops between us and the
enemy, and I made up my mind to remain with the General to nurse
him, as it seemed we should soon be in their hands. However, the
gallant Fender — in command after the wounding of General Hill —
soon rallied his line and pressed forward, driving the enemy back to
his works, at which quiet was restored for the night, the fight having
ended as suddenly as it began.

Many people have thought it strange that Jackson should give an
order to troops to fire at everything, especially cavalry approaching
from the direction of the enemy, and then place himself in a situation
to have himself fired upon. I heard of no such order, and feel sure
that none such was given. If such had been the order it would have
been given to the skirmish line, and there could have been no necessity
for such an order to them, as they would do this anyway.

R. E. WELBOURX.

(Chief Signal Officer, 2nd Army Corps, 1863, Lieutenant General
Jackson, commanding.)

217

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JIJBAL A. EARLY

advance of his column ; and he found it necessary to look
after the new opponent. Sedgwick had moved up the
Plank road held by Wilcox's brigade, which gradually
retired, and finally made a stand at Salem Church on the
Plank road, about five miles from Fredericksburg, when,
by a gallant resistance, the head of the column was held
at bay until the arrival of McLaws with four brigades,
and the further advance of the enemy was effectually
opposed.*

It will be thus seen of what importance to General
Lee's own movements were those below at Fredericks-
burg, and how the capture of the heights in rear of the
two affected him. A force of at least 30,000 men had
been detained from Hooker's army by considerably less
than 10,000 on our side. It is true that Sedgwick had
finally broken through the force opposed to him and com
menced an advance up towards the rear of General
Lee's army, but he had not done so until the latter had
had time to gain a brilliant victory, and drive Hooker
to a position of defence from which he could not ad
vance except under great disadvantages.

Sedgwick 's column had thus been detained by Wil-
cox until a force was brought down to arrest its progress
entirely, and time was given to make arrangements to
fall upon Sedgwick while separated from the rest of
Hooker's army. Barksdale's brigade and the artillery
posted with it had resisted all assaults upon their posi
tion for at least six hours, thus giving General Lee the
requisite time to gain his victory, and in being finally

* In this condition of things, Lincoln telegraphed to General
Hooker's Chief of Staff, who was on the north bank near Falmouth,
as follows:

" WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, May 3, 1863.
" MAJOR GENERAL BUTTERFIELD :

"Where is General Hooker? Where is Sedgwick? Where is
Stoneman? A. LINCOLN.

"Sent 4.35 P.M." (See report Committee on the War.)

218

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

compelled to succumb to overwhelming numbers that
brigade had lost no honor. It was impossible for me to
reinforce Barksdale with a larger force than I sent to
him, and I then weakened very much the defences on the
right. Had Sedgwick communicated his purposes to me
and informed me that he would assault Marye's and
Lee's Hills and those positions alone, then I would have
moved my whole force to those points and held them
against his entire force.

As it was, a division of Sedgwick 's corps larger than
my own immediately confronted the position occupied
by the three brigades of my division left after Hays
had been sent to Barksdale, and if that position had been
abandoned and the brigades defending it moved to the
left, the division confronting it, and which was con
stantly demonstrating towards it, would have moved up,
taken possession of the line, and then moved upon my
rear, compelling me to abandon the works on the left
practically without a struggle, or submit to a much
greater disaster than that which occurred. Sedgwick
would hardly have been so blind as to rush his troops
up against the strong positions at Marye's and Lee's
Hill's while defended by a force sufficiently large to hold
them, when there would have been an easy way open
to him for their capture and that of the whole force
defending them by simply moving a portion of troops
to the rear. Marye's Hill would have fallen much sooner
than it did, if it had been occupied by my whole force,
or if a force sufficiently strong to prevent the position
from being turned had not been retained on the right.
By holding the position on the right, therefore, the fall
of Marye's Hill and the consequent advance of Sedg
wick 's column above were both very considerably re
tarded, and when the catastrophe did happen there was
left a considerable force to threaten and fall upon Sedg
wick 's rear. I think I may claim that the force entrusted
to my command had accomplished all that could reason-

219

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

ably have been expected of it under the circumstances
in which it was placed.

I will now return to my own position. Just as I
was returning from observing Sedgwick's column I en
countered, at Hazel Run, one of General McLaws' staff
officers, Major Costin, coming down under an escort of
cavalry, and he informed me that General McLaws had
moved down the Plank road to meet the enemy, and
that General Lee wished him and myself to attack Sedg-
wick in conjunction and endeavor to overwhelm him, and
there was a note or message from General McLaws re
questing information as to my position and that of the
enemy, and asking what place I proposed, for attacking
the enemy.

I think there was a note received later from General
Lee communicating his wishes in regard to the proposed
attack, similar to information brought by Major Costin—
at any rate the information of his views and wishes was
brought by Lieutenant Pitzer on his return. It was about
an hour before sunset when Major Costin reached me, and
that part of my division on the right was more than three
miles from the position at Cox's, so that it was im
possible to accomplish anything that night. I imme
diately sent a note to General McLaws informing him
that I would concentrate all my force that night and
move against the enemy very early next morning, drive
him from Lee's and Marye's Hills, and extend my left
while advancing so as to connect with his (McLaws')
right, and continue to move against the enemy above,
after his connection with Fredericksburg was severed;
and I asked General McLaws' co-operation in this plan.
During the night, I received a note from him assenting
to my plan and containing General Lee's approval of
it also.

As soon as the first communication had been received
from General McLaws, my troops from the right were
ordered up, but it was after night before they were all
concentrated. Andrews' artillery was brought up before

220

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

night, one battery being left on the ridge so as to cover
my right flank on the line across the Telegraph road,
and a regiment of infantry being posted so as to guard
against a surprise on that flank, if the enemy should
move around Lee's Hill up the left of Deep Bun. Just
before dark, we discovered a piece of artillery advancing
along the Telegraph road in our front, followed by a few
wagons. The men in charge of the piece of artillery
came on so deliberately, though in full view of our line,
that we took it for granted that it must be one of the
pieces supposed to be captured, with a forge or two, that
had been probably able to elude the vigilance of the
enemy by concealment in some of the ravines.

The approaching darkness rendered objects very in
distinct, and we therefore watched the approaching piece
until it got within a few hundred yards of us, when the
drivers suddenly discovered who we were, wheeled
rapidly and dashed to the rear, and we became then
aware that it was one of the enemy's pieces. Some of
Andrews' guns which were ready opened fire, but the
piece of artillery got off, though some of the mules to
a wagon and to a forge were killed, and we found and
secured the latter the next day with several fine mules.

The night passed quietly with us, and at light on the
morning of the 4th I prepared to advance. My plan
was to advance along the Telegraph road with Gordon's
brigade in line in front, followed by Andrews' battalion
of artillery and Graham's battery, with Smith's and
Barksdale's brigades following in the rear, forming a
second line, and to throw Hays' and Hoke's brigades
across Hazel Eun opposite my present position so as to
move down the left bank, as the column moved along
the Telegraph road against the heights, both of which I
took it for granted the enemy held, as the affair just at
dusk the evening before must have given him notice of
my presence.

It was my purpose, as soon as the heights were taken
and the enemy's connection with Fredericksburg cut, to

221

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

advance with Gordon's and Smith's brigades up the
Plank road and river, and for Hays and Hoke to advance
across towards the Plank road extending to the left
to connect with McLaws, while Barksdale 's brigade and
some of Pendleton's artillery should be posted to hold
Marye's and Lee's Hills and protect my rear from the
direction of Fredericksburg. The ravine of Hazel Run is
so rugged that it was impossible to cross it except where
there were roads, and therefore it was necessary to pass
Hays' and Hoke's brigades over at the ford on my left.

Gordon's brigade was placed in line at light, and
Andrews' artillery immediately in its rear, while Smith
and Barksdale were ordered to take their positions and
be in readiness to follow. I then went with General Hays
and Hoke, whose brigades were put in motion, across
Hazel Run to point out to them the positions they were
to take and how they were to move. After doing this,
I rode back and found to my surprise that Gordon had
moved off under a misapprehension of my order, as he
was to have waited until all was ready, and I designed
accompanying him. Andrews had followed him and I
immediately put Smith and Barksdale in motion, the
former along the road by flank, and Barksdale in line of
battle on the right.

The line of hills composed of Marye's, Cemetery,
Stansbury's, and Taylor's Hills descends towards the
Marye's Hill, which is the lowest, Taylor's, bordering
on the river at the upper end of the canal, being much
the highest. Stansbury's, Cemetery, and Marye's Hills
are separated from a higher range on the southwest
by a very small stream which rises between Taylor's
Hill and the Plank road and runs across that road into
Hazel Run, some distance above the crossing of the
Telegraph road over that run. Cemetery and Marye's
Hills slope back gradually to the little stream, and from
the latter, on the southwest, rise steep hills terminating
in a high, wide ridge, along which the Plank road runs ;
and the face of these hills fronting towards Cemetery

222

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

and Marye's Hills is intersected by a number of deep
ravines, up one of which the Plank road ascends to get
on the main ridge. On the south side of the road and
a little distance from it the main ridge terminates in a
high hill which descends abruptly to Hazel Eun, the face
towards the run being wooded. At the lower front of
the base of this hill is a mill called the Alum Spring
Mill. Just at the upper part of the base of the hill a
branch of Hazel Eun comes in, uniting with the main
stream. This branch rises some distance above near
the Plank road, and runs nearly parallel to it, through
a deep valley to its junction with the main stream.

On the south of this valley is another long wide ridge
which extends for some distance parallel to that along
which the Plank road runs and also terminates with an
abrupt descent to Hazel Eun. On the south of the Plank
road, and on the same ridge with it, is situated Mr.
Guest's house some two or three miles from Fredericks-
burg, and nearly opposite to it on the other ridge is Mr.
Downman's house. On the extremities of the lesser
ridges, projecting out from that on which the Plank
road is located, was a line of small works and epaulments
for artillery, extending from the river at Taylor's Hill
to and across the Plank road, which had been previously
made by our troops, and this line completely commanded
the crests and rear slopes of Marye's, Cemetery and
Stansbury's Hills, being much higher.

The Plank road crosses the little stream, with a
high embankment extending for some distance on both
sides, the stream passing through a culvert. The Tele
graph road passes towards Fredericksburg from Cox's
house, where I was, along a ridge to Lee's Hill and
descends the hill on the side of the slope next to Hazel
Eun.

Gordon, when he started, advanced rapidly along the
Telegraph road, and when he reached Lee's Hill, it was
found unoccupied, but a body of infantry was moving
along the Plank road from the town between Marye's

223

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

Hill and the ridge above, which halted and took position
behind the embankment of the road. In the valley be
tween Guest's and Downman's houses, was observed a
considerable body of infantry, and at Downman's house a
battery of artillery. Gordon threw out his skirmishers
and made preparations to descend the hill and cross over
Hazel Bun above Marye's Hill. Andrews placed Gra
ham's battery in position on the road and opened on the
infantry in the valley, which moved out of the way.
Two large bodies of infantry, supposed to be brigades,
each then moved over the ridge just beyond the Alum
Spring Mill, threatening Gordon's left, as he was ad
vancing. Graham turned his guns on them and soon
drove them off up the ridge. Gordon then made a dash
across the run and after a sharp engagement drove off
the infantry behind the road embankment, capturing
some prisoners and securing several baggage and sub
sistence wagons, a battery wagon, and a forge — with
their teams, — which were passing up the road with the
infantry he encountered.

This gave us the possession of Marye's and Cemetery
Hills again, and cut the enemy's connection with Fred-
ericksburg. Arriving soon after with Smith's brigade I
threw it across Hazel Run to the support of Gordon,
the batteries from the Stafford Heights opening a heavy
fire on it as it descended Lee's Hill. Barksdale's brigade,
which had halted in the rear without orders, was then
sent for, to occupy the stone wall at the foot of Marye's
Hill, and General Barksdale was ordered to move rapidly
into the town if not held by too large a force, get pos
session of the bridge, and secure a camp of wagons seen
at the lower part of the town. When Graham's guns
were operating upon the bodies of infantry in the valley
between Guest's and Downman's houses and those threat
ening Gordon's flank, the enemy's battery — at Down
man's house, — opened fire on them, but as soon as the
infantry was disposed of, Graham turned his two 20
pounder Parrots on the enemy's guns, which returned

224

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

across the valley and took position near Guest 's house
where they were out of reach.

Seeing the enemy's wagons moving off from the
town and not hearing Barksdale's rifles, I sent a staff
officer to repeat the orders, and received a reply that he
was preparing to send forward his skirmishers ; a second
messenger sent to him returned with the information that
his skirmishers reported a heavy force holding the town,
entrenched within rifle pits. The enemy's wagon trains
had thus made their escape, and I sent orders to Barks-
dale to desist from the attack on the town and to dis
pose of his brigade so as to resist any advance from that
direction. It turned out that the town was held by Gib
bon's division which had been left behind.

I had listened anxiously to hear the sound of McLaws '
guns or some indication of his being engaged, but heard
nothing. The enemy had not expected us in this direc
tion, and he was therefore evidently taken by surprise,
but Gordon's advance, which was so handsomely made,
being sooner than I had intended, had given the enemy
time to form his troops in line, to meet any further
advance I could make after my arrival; and as the char
acter of the ground was such that considerable bodies of
troops could be concealed from my view from any point
that was accessible to me, I could not tell what force I
would have to encounter on ascending the hills above.

I could see that all the little works on the heights
were occupied by infantry, making a line extending across
from Taylor's Hill to the brow of the hill beyond and
above the Alum Spring Mill. Gordon's and Smith's
brigades had taken position in the trenches along the
crests from the Plank road towards Taylor's Hill, facing
towards the enemy above and with their backs towards
Fredericksburg. The enemy did not open then with
artillery, and as they were very much exposed, I thought
possibly he did not have any on that flank, and I there
fore determined to feel him and make him develop what
he had.

15 225

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

Smith was ordered to advance his brigade towards
the heights occupied by the enemy above ; two regiments,
the 13th and 58th Virginia, advanced against one of the
positions which appeared to be occupied by the strongest
force, and the 49th and 52nd separately against other
points. The regiments advanced to the base of the hills
and commenced ascending, when the enemy appeared
in force on their crests, and also opened with artillery
from the neighborhood of Taylor's house. The 13th and
58th Regiments became heavily engaged, and the 49th
and 52nd slightly.

It was now apparent that the hills were held in strong
force, and as an attempt to carry them from that direc
tion, as my troops were then located, would have been
under great disadvantage and attended with great diffi
culty, I ordered the regiments to be withdrawn. The
49th and 52nd were withdrawn without difficulty and
with but slight loss, the 13th and 58th being on the right
and more exposed to the enemy's guns were withdrawn
with more difficulty and heavier loss. The 13th lost 17
prisoners and 58th 71, including the color bearer of
the latter with his colors, the most of the men captured,
including the color bearer of the 58th, taking refuge in
a house at the foot of the hill, under the fire of the
enemy's guns as well as his infantry, and declining to
fall back over the plain while exposed to the fire of the
artillery.

They were thus captured by their own misconduct,
the enemy sending to take possession of them, which I
could not prevent without bringing on a heavy engage
ment under disadvantageous circumstances, and thus in
curring a much heavier loss of men. The brigade re
sumed its position after this affair, and I sent Lieutenant
Pitzer to General McLaws to apprise him of what had
been done and my position, with a request for him to
begin his attack on the enemy and the information that
I could move two brigades, Hays' and Hoke's, across
towards the Plank road extending to the left as they

226

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

advanced to connect with his right, and, as soon as the
enemy was engaged so as to make it practicable, I would
move up from below with my other two brigades, Gor
don's and Smith's; Hays' and Hoke's brigades had
moved down the left bank of Hazel Run and were put in
position to co-operate with McLaws' attack, when made,
by moving across the ridge on which Downman's house
was located, and orders were given them accordingly.
General McLaws did not make the attack, and Lieutenant
Pitzer returned with the information that Anderson's
division was coming down, and with instruction for me
to wait until he was in position, when at a signal given
by firing three guns rapidly in succession, a simultaneous
attack should be made by the whole force.

When Anderson's force began to arrive, I was able
to draw Hays and Hoke nearer to my right, and I there
fore brought Hays' brigade across the branch of Hazel
Run, which has been mentioned, and put his brigade in
line at the foot of the hill near Alum Spring Mill, so that
it might move up the wooded face of the hill on to the
plain above, which was occupied by a part of the enemy's
force. Hoke's brigade was placed in line just in the edge
of the woods on the rear slope of the lower end of the
ridge on which Downman's house was, facing towards
the Plank road, concealed from the view of the enemy,
as was Hays '.

General Lee came down himself before the signal was
given, and sent for me to meet him towards my left. We
examined the position of the enemy together, as well as
we could, and I explained to him my plan of attacking
with my force, which was, for Hays to move up the hill
at foot of which he was and directly forward, which
would carry him to the Plank road, and up on the right
side; for Hoke to move over the ridge below Downman's
house and across the valley to the other ridge, as far as
the Plank road, where he was to change direction so as
to move up on the left of the road ; and when the signal
was heard, Gordon was to move rapidly by the flank to

227

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

the ravine up which the Plank road runs, and then
diagonally towards Taylor's house so as to sweep all the
crests in front of him and Smith as they were then
posted, and turn the enemy's left which rested near the
river. Smith was to remain stationary so as to re
inforce the brigades engaged, or Barksdale as might be
necessary. General Lee approved my plan and directed
me to carry it out as soon as the signal should be given,
and then left me.

Sedgwick's line covered the Plank road for some
distance on the south side; being in the centre along
the ridge or plateau on which the road is located, and
bending back across it with both flanks which rested
near the river, above and below. Guest's house was in
his line and some artillery was posted near it, while
Downman's house, and the ridge on which it was located
were occupied by his skirmishers. In advance of the
part of the line facing towards me, which was his left
wing, there was an advanced line occupying the crests
of the hills towards me, extending across from Taylor's
Hill to the lower end of the valley which has been men
tioned, with artillery posted near the left of this ad
vanced line.

The plateau, on the ridge where Downman's house was
located, was entirely cleared of timber below the house,
as was the valley between the two ridges. The ridge
along which the Plank road runs was cleared on the
south side of it, and from the direction of Fredericks-
burg up to within a short distance below Guest's house,
from which point bodies of woodland extended up the
road for some distance and across towards Taylor's
house, with occasional intervals of cleared land.

We waited for the signal, but it was not given until
a short time before sunset. When it was heard, Hoke
moved at once across the plateau in his front between
Downman's house and Hazel Run, then down the slope,
across the valley, and up the steep ascent of the next
ridge towards the Plank road, driving the enemy's

228

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

skirmishers before him, while the guns at Guest 's house
played upon his advancing line without disturbing his
beautiful order. Hays rapidly ascended the hill in front,
immediately encountering the right of the enemy's front
line, which he swept before him, and continued his ad
vance without a halt. It was a splendid sight to see
the rapid and orderly advance of these two brigades,
with the enemy flying before them. The officers and
men manning the artillery which had been posted on
eminences along the Telegraph road and on the right
bank of Hazel Bun so as to protect the infantry retreat
in case of disaster, debarred from an active partici
pation in the action, could not refrain from enthusiasti
cally cheering the infantry, as it so handsomely swept
everything in front.

In the meantime Gordon, as soon as the signal was
heard, moved his brigade by flank rapidly to the Plank
road, formed in line up the ravine and swept on towards
Taylor's house, clearing the crests of the enemy, com
pelling his artillery on that flank to retire rapidly and
driving the enemy's extreme left from its position back
towards Banks' Ford. On getting near the point of
woods below Guest's house, Hays' and Hoke's brigades
approached each other. The artillery at Guest's house
had been compelled to fly in order to prevent capture,
and the enemy was retiring in confusion on all parts
of the line confronting them and Gordon, but just then
Hoke fell from his horse, with his arm badly shattered
by a ball near the shoulder joint.

The brigade thus losing its commander, to whom
alone the instruction had been given, and without any
one to direct its movement at that particular crisis,
pushed on across the Plank road, encountered Hays'
brigade in the woods still advancing, and the two com
mingling together were thrown into confusion. They
crossed each other's paths in this condition, but still
continued to advance, getting far into the woods. Hays '
brigade pressed on in its proper direction, but Hoke's,

229

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

now under the command of Colonel Avery of the 6th
North Carolina, had got to its right. The regiments
of both brigades had lost their organization, and in the
woods it was impossible to restore it. Portions of both
brigades penetrated a considerable distance into the
woods, still driving the enemy before them, but when
scattered they came across a portion of the retiring force
which had been rallied, and the advance parties were
compelled to retire themselves, leaving some prisoners
in the enemy's hands, many of whom had become so
exhausted by their rapid advance that they were unable
to get out of the way, and were picked up after the
fighting was over. Other portions of the brigades, hear
ing Gordon's firing on the right and not aware of his
movements, thought the enemy was in their rear and
retired also. The brigades were then rallied and re
formed on the Plank road just below Guest's house. I
had taken my position on the heights near the Telegraph
road opposite the Alum Spring Mill, from which point
I could see the movement of all three brigades, and
when I discovered them all in motion and driving the
enemy as described, I rode across Hazel Run in the
direction taken by Hays' brigade.

I arrived just as the first men of that brigade were
emerging from the woods, and directed the re-formation
of the two brigades. Two regiments of Smith's brigade,
the 49th and 52nd, were ordered up, but when, they
arrived and the two brigades had been reorganized it
had become too dark to make any further advance, and
I did not hear either of the other two divisions engaged.
Gordon's progress was also arrested by the approach
of night, and he halted and assumed a position above
Taylor's house confronting the enemy's left, which he
had driven back very considerably. Hays' and Hoke's
brigades were put in line of battle across the Plank
road, at the point where they had been rallied, with
Smith's two regiments advanced to the front.

McLaws' division had not advanced at all. Ander-

230

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

son's division had advanced on Hoke's left, driving the
enemy's skirmishers, fronting his centre, from Down-
man's house and the upper part of the ridge, but it
did not cross to the Plank road until dark, when I saw
Posey's brigade moving up the hill on my, then, left
from the direction of Downman's house, and it took
position above me on the Plank road, the enemy having
retired from that road. Wright's brigade was subse
quently moved across to the Plank road at eight or
nine o'clock and took position on Posey's left. The main
attack had been made by my three brigades.*

* The force which I encountered in front in this action was
Howe's division. Brigadier General Howe testified before the Com
mittee on the Conduct of the War.

After speaking of the battle of Chancellorsville as a sharp
skirmish, and claiming all the credit for capturing Marye's Hill, though
his division advanced against Lee's Hill alone, and further claiming
to have done all the fighting on the 4th, he says:

" The prisoners taken all agreed that it was Early's, Anderson's,
and McLaws' divisions that attacked my division, and that the move
ment was led by General Lee, who told them that it would be a good
thing to destroy the 6th corps, or capture it; that it would not get out
the Chancellorsville way, and that the movements in our rear would
cut us off."

It was my three brigades alone that attacked him, McLaws' divi
sion being above confronting Sedgwick's right, and Anderson's advanc
ing against the centre. Again he says :

" Some time after this movement, after we had returned to our
old camps, I met General Hooker, and spoke to him of the movements
we had made and the positions we held. I stated to him that after the
fight on the 4th of May, I could have gone with my division on to the
heights at Fredericksburg, and held them, or, if necessary, could have
recrossed that way. He was surprised that those heights could have
been held the night of the 4th, and said : ' If I had known that you
could have gone on those heights and held them, and would have held
them, I would have reinforced you with the whole army.' That was the
key of the position, and there was no difficulty in holding it. I told
him that if I had not received orders to go back to Banks' Ford, but
had been allowed to go to the Fredericksburg heights, I could have
marched there uninterruptedly after nine o'clock that night; for after
the fight we had had, the rebels abandoned the heights, and there was
nothing to be seen of them. There was a bright moon that night, and

231

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

After dark General Lee sent for me to go to him at
Downman's house, where he had established his head
quarters for the night. After informing him of the
condition of things on my front, he directed me to leave
two of my brigades in line on the north of the road, at
right angles with it and facing the enemy, and to rein-

we could see an object of the size of a man or a horse at a great
distance."

Verily General Howe had accomplished wonders according to his
own showing. He had with his solitary division routed the greater
part of Lee's army, notwithstanding the rough handling it had been
able to give Hooker's five corps above. Perhaps if he had made the
attempt to march to the heights, he might have encountered the brigades
of Gordon and Hoke which occupied a line extending from above
Taylor's house towards the Plank road at Guest's house, and which had
escaped his observation notwithstanding the light of the " bright moon
that night." He might also have encountered Barksdale's, Hays', and
Smith's brigades holding the heights, and disturbed my own head
quarters on the left of Lee's Hill, which had been assumed at 12 at
night after I had ridden along his whole front with my staff at a late
hour, posting Hoke's brigade on Gordon's left and examining the
position of the latter. General Howe was either mistaken or he was
star gazing.

Hooker, in his examination before the Congressional Committee in
regard to the battle, made the following statement:

" Our artillery had always been superior to that of the rebels, as
was also our infantry, except in discipline, and that, for reasons not
necessary to mention, never did equal Lee's army. With a rank and
file mostly inferior to our own, intellectually and physically, that army
has, by discipline alone, acquired a character for steadiness and effi
ciency unsurpassed, in my judgment, in ancient or modern times. We
have not been able to rival it, nor has there been any near approxima
tion to it in the other rebel armies."

Their artillery certainly surpassed ours far in numbers of guns,
weight of metal, and the quality of the ammunition, and at long range
their firing was admirable, while ours \vas defective from the defect
in the ammunition, but when we came to close range so that our guns
could tell, their gunners lost their coolness and ours surpassed them in
the accuracy of the firing, always getting the advantage under such
circumstances unless the odds were too great.

Hooker did not complain that he was overpowered by numbers,
and he was the first of the commanders of that army who had not made
that complaint.

232

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

force Barksdale at Fredericksburg with the other two.
Hoke's brigade was moved to the right and placed on
line with Gordon's on its left, and Hays' brigade was
moved back and placed in the trenches at Lee's Hill on
Barksdale's right, and Smith's two regiments rejoined
the others and took position in the trenches on the left
of the Plank road overlooking the canal.

During the night General Barksdale reported to me,
once by his aide and once in person, that the enemy was
crossing troops and artillery into the town, and asked for
more reinforcements. I told him I had no doubt the
enemy was recrossing and would be gone in the morn
ing, and that I had no more reinforcements to give him.
When it became light the enemy was gone from the
town and his bridge was taken up. Sedgwick had also
recrossed during the night his whole force on bridges
laid at Banks' Ford and nothing remained on the south
bank but Hooker's force above. Some of McLaws'
brigades had advanced toward Banks' Ford during the
night, picking up some prisoners, and some pieces of
artillery had opened on the enemy's bridge as he was
recrossing. Posey's and Wright's brigades had also
advanced towards Banks' Ford, picking up some pris
oners. Next morning a number of prisoners were gath
ered who had been left behind when the main force
crossed, some of them being taken on the river by de
tachments from Gordon's brigade.

On the 5th, after it had been ascertained that all of
Sedgwick 's force was gone, I was ordered to move up
the Plank road towards Chancellorsville, leaving Barks-
dale at Fredericksburg. I moved up to the vicinity of
Salem Church, and was halted, remaining there some
time, when I was ordered to return to my old position.
In doing so my brigades were heavily shelled by the
enemy's batteries from across the river, as they were
crossing Hazel Eun to the Telegraph road. Smith's
brigade was left with Barksdale in the position it had
occupied the night before, and the others moved to their

233

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

former positions, which they regained in the morning, in
a tremendous storm of rain.

General Lee had moved all his troops back to oppose
Hooker, who had been confronted during the operations
against Sedgwick by Jackson's three divisions alone,
but on the morning of the 6th, he was found gone also,
having recrossed under cover of the storm and dark
ness of the previous night. The whole army then re
turned to its former camps, and Hooker resumed his
position opposite Fredericksburg.

My loss in the different actions around Fredericks-
burg at this time was, in my own division, 125 killed and
721 wounded, total 846; in Andrews' artillery 7 killed
and 21 wounded, total 28; in Barksdale's brigade 45
killed and 181 wounded, total 226.

A little over 500 prisoners were lost in my division,
more than half of which were lost in resisting the cross
ing at the enemy's lower bridge; from Hays' brigade
at the time of the fall of Marye's Hill ; and from Smith's
brigade in forcing the enemy's position on the morning
of the 4th; and the residue from Hays' and Hoke's
brigades in the attack on Sedgwick above Fredericks-
burg. Barksdale's brigade lost a little over 300 pris
oners captured from the 17th and 21st Mississippi Regi
ments at Marye's Hill. General Lee's entire loss in
killed and wounded was 1,581 killed and 8,700 wounded.
Hooker's loss far exceeded it in killed and wounded, and
we secured several thousand prisoners, thirteen pieces of
artillery, over twenty thousand stand of arms, besides a
large amount of ammunition, accoutrements, etc.

Hooker's army was more than double General Lee's,
which did not exceed, including my force, 50,000 muskets
and including all arms was under 60,000; yet Hooker,
on returning to his camps, issued a general order con
gratulating his troops on their achievements, and stat
ing that they had added new laurels to their former
renown, though on first crossing the river he had issued
an address to his troops intimating that General Lee's

234

BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

army was then in his power and that he would proceed
to destroy it.

During the operations at Chancellorsville and Fred-
ericksburg, the enemy's cavalry in large force under
Stoneman, having crossed the rivers higher up, made a
raid in the direction of Eichmond which accomplished
nothing of consequence, but merely frightened and depre
dated upon the unarmed country people. Stoneman 's
force was glad to make its escape back to its former
position.

On our part, our rejoicings over the brilliant and
important victory that had been gained were soon damp
ened by the sad news of the death of General Jackson.

CHAPTER XXI.

INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA.

UPON returning to our camps after Hooker had re-
crossed the Rappahannock, the old positions were re
sumed, General A. P. Hill, as senior major general, being
now in command of the corps.

Nothing of consequence occurred in our front during
the month of May. On the 30th of the month, a general
order was issued, organizing the army of Northern Vir
ginia into three corps of three divisions each. General
James Longstreet, who had returned from the south
of James Eiver, retained command of the 1st corps, now
composed of McLaws', Hood's, and Pickett's divisions.
General Richard S. Ewell was made a lieutenant gen
eral and assigned to the command of the 2nd corps, now
composed of my division, and those of Rodes and John
son — Brigadier General Robert E. Rodes having been
promoted and assigned to the command of D. H. Hill's
division, — and Brigadier General Edward Johnson hav
ing been promoted and assigned to the command of
Trimble's division, formerly Jackson's.

A third corps was formed, composed of the division
of Anderson (taken from the 1st corps), Heth's and
Pender's; and General A. P. Hill was made lieutenant
general and assigned to the command of it, and two
divisions of four brigades each were formed out of it
and two brigades, one of which was brought from North
Carolina and the other formed of Mississippi regiments
taken from other brigades, to the command of which
division Brigadier Generals Hetli and Pender were pro
moted, respectively.

My inspector general, Lieutenant Colonel John M.
Jones, and Colonel James A. Walker of the 13th Virginia
Regiment were made brigadier generals, and the former
was assigned to J. R. Jones' brigade in Johnson's divi-

236

INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA

sion, and the latter to Rodes' (the old Stonewall brigade),
in the same division, both promotions well deserved.

General Lee now determined to make a campaign
across the Potomac by turning the enemy's right flank,
so as to transfer the war into the enemy's country and
compel his army to withdraw from Virginia. Long-
street's corps was moved to Culpeper in advance of the
others, the two divisions which had been south of the
James having moved from Richmond by the way of
Gordonsville on the railroad.

On the 4th of June, Swell's corps took up its line
of march towards Culpeper Court-House— my division
moving by the way of Spottsylvania Court-House, fol
lowed by Johnson's and Rodes' by the way of Chancel
lor sville. A. P. Hill's corps was left to watch and amuse
Hooker's army. The first day of the march I passed
Spottsylvania Court-House and camped beyond it. On
the second day, during the march, I received an order
to halt and wait for further orders, as the enemy had
crossed a force at Fredericksburg in front of Hill. I
accordingly went into camp after crossing the Catharpin
Creek and remained stationary until the next day (the
6th of June). In the afternoon of the 6th, I received
orders to move on, and did so, continuing the march to
Culpeper Court-House by the way of Verdierville, and
Somerville Ford on the Rapidan, and, passing the Court-
House on the 8th, camped three or four miles west of
that place. We remained stationary near the Court-
House for two days. On the afternoon of the 9th, my
division was moved to the vicinity of Brandy Station
during a fight between our cavalry and that of the enemy,
but not being needed, it returned to its camps at night.

The 31st Virginia had returned just before our march
from Fredericksburg. The official tri-monthly report
of my division of the 10th of June, made at this place,
shows present for duty 610 officers and 6,616 enlisted
men, total 7,226. The brigade inspection reports of the
same date show about the same number of effectives

237

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

present. Lieutenant Colonel Hilary P. Jones' battalion
of artillery of four batteries, numbering in all thirteen
guns, had been assigned to duty with my division just
before starting.

My division was fully an average one for the whole
army, and perhaps more than an average one. Sixty-
five thousand officers and men may therefore be set down
as covering the whole of General Lee's infantry with
which he commenced the campaign, perhaps sixty thou
sand would cover the effective strength. Ten thousand
men would fully cover the artillery and cavalry and per
haps considerably overgo it— (The return for the 31st
of May, just four days before the commencement of the
movement, shows the infantry to have been 54,356 for
duty, cavalry 9,536, and artillery 4,460, total 68,352. This
return was not accessible to me when the within was
written.) — 150 guns would cover all of our artillery,
and they consisted of field pieces, the most of which had
been captured from the enemy. The largest guns we
had were a very few twenty pounder Parrots. The
brigade inspection reports in my division show that
about one-third of the men were without bayonets, and
this deficiency existed in the rest of the army, owing
in a great measure to the fact that nearly all of our small
arms had been taken from the enemy on the various
battlefields. There was a very great deficiency in shoes
for the infantry, a large number of the men being in
differently shod, and some barefooted. A like deficiency
existed in regard to the equipment of the men in other
respects, the supply of clothing, blankets, etc., being
very limited.

On the llth of June, Swell's corps resumed the
march, taking the road from the lower Shenandoah Val
ley across the Blue Eidge at Chester Gap. Johnson's
division, followed by mine, moved on the road by Sperry-
ville, and Little Washington through the gap, and Bodes'
division on a road further to the right through the same
gap. Late in the day of the 12th, my division reached

238

INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA

Front Royal, Bodes' and Johnson's having preceded it,
crossing both forks of the Shenandoah near that place.
Two of my brigades, Hoke's and Smith's, were crossed
over both of the forks that night. Hays' and Gordon's
and Jones' artillery with the division trains remained
on the east side of the South Branch.

CHAPTER XXII.

CAPTURE OF WINCHESTER.

VERY early in the morning of the 13th, the remainder
of my division crossed over the Shenandoah, and I re
ceived orders from General Ewell to move to the Valley
pike at Newtown, and along that road against the
enemy then occupying Winchester, while Johnson moved
along the direct road from Front Eoyal to the town,
Bodes being sent to the right to Berryville, where there
was also a force. Milroy occupied the town of Win
chester with a considerable force in strong fortifications,
and my orders were to move along the pike to Kerns-
town, and then to the left, so as to get a position on the
northwest of Winchester from which the main work of
the enemy could be attacked with advantage.

This main work was on a hill a little outside of the
town on the northwest, being an enclosed fort, with em
brasures for artillery, and I was informed that there
was a high hill on the northwest which commanded it,
and of which I was directed to get possession, if I could.
Six main roads centre at Winchester, to-wit: the Front
Royal road on which we were, coming in from the south
east and uniting with the Millwood road a mile or two
before it reaches town ; the Valley pike coming in on the
south and uniting with the Cedar Creek pike between
Kernstown and Winchester, Kernstown being about two
miles from the town ; the Romney or Northwestern pike
coming in on the west side; the Pughtown road coining
in on the northwest; the Martinsburg pike coming in
on the north, and uniting with the direct Charlestown
and Harper >s Ferry roads, three or four miles from
town ; and the Berryville road coming in on the east.

Lieutenant Barton of the 2nd Virginia Regiment,
Walker's brigade, Johnson's division, who had been
raised in the neighborhood, was furnished me as a guide,

240

CAPTURE OF WINCHESTER

and Brown's battalion of reserve artillery, under Captain
Dance, was ordered to accompany my division in addition
to Jones'.

Having received my orders, and leaving all my
wagons, except the regimental ordnance and medical
wagons, at Cedarville on the Front Eoyal road, I
diverged from that road at a little place called Ninevah
and reached the Valley pike at Newtown. On moving
along the latter road past Bartonsville towards Kerns-
town, I found Lieutenant Colonel Herbert of the Mary
land line occupying a ridge between the two places
with his battalion of infantry, a battery of artillery and
a part of a battalion of Maryland cavalry, and engaged
in occasional skirmishing with a body of the enemy's
troops which had taken position in and near Kernstown.

This force of the enemy covered the road which I
had to take to get to the west of Winchester, and it was
therefore necessary to dislodge it to enable me to get
into that road, and to drive it back upon the main body
in order that my movement should be unobserved.
Colonel Herbert could not inform me of the strength
of the force in his immediate front, and I therefore halted
my division and formed it in line across the pike, and
proceeded to reconnoitre. The only force in sight when
I arrived was a cavalry force, but I was informed that
a strong infantry picket occupied the town, and the sup
position was that a stronger force was in the neighbor
hood. Just beyond Kernstown and Pritchard's Hill and
a ridge extending from it to our left, which was covered
with trees, being the position occupied by Shields' troops
when General Jackson attacked him on the 23rd of
March, 1862. It was a position on which a considerable
body of troops might be posted out of our view, and I
soon discovered a battery of artillery on Pritchard's Hill
which opened on us.

I then reconnoitred the ground carefully, and, after
doing so, I moved Hays' brigade to the left, through
a skirt of woods and a meadow, to a small road coming

10 241

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

in from Bartonsville towards the Cedar Creek pike, and
then along that to a suitable position for advancing
against the artillery on Pritchard's Hill; and ordered it
to advance and get possession of the hill. Whilst ad
vancing General Hays sent me word that the enemy had
a considerable infantry force on the ridge to his left.
I immediately moved Gordon's brigade over the same
route Hays' brigade had taken, and ordered him to
advance and clear the ridge on Hays' left, sending an
order to the latter, who had advanced to Pritchard's
Hill, compelling the artillery and the force supporting it
to retire, to wait until Gordon had got up and cleared
the ridge on his left. Gordon advanced handsomely, as
directed, encountering a considerable force of infantry,
which, in conjunction with a body of skirmishers sent
out by Hays, he drove from behind a stone fence, and
then swept over the fields beyond the ridge, inclining, as
he moved, to the Valley pike, and forcing the enemy
across the Cedar Creek pike and Abraham's Creek, which
here crosses the Valley pike, to Bower's Hill on the
north of the creek under Burton's Mill, where there
were some reserves. Hays, in the meantime, advanced
to the front, thus coming up on Gordon's left after the
latter had reached the Valley pike. As soon as Hays
and Gordon were both in motion, Hoke's and Smith's
brigades were advanced to the front on each side of the
Valley pike past Kernstown.

The enemy had strong position on Bower's Hill,
held by infantry and artillery, and it was difficult of
access, from the nature of Abraham's Creek, a boggy
stream, running at its base, and the steep ascent to the
hill on the other side. Gordon formed his brigade in line
across the Valley pike. Hays was posted on his left
along a ridge between Cedar Creek pike and Abraham's
Creek, and Hoke's and Smith's brigades were brought
up and the latter placed on Hays' left, with a view to
further operations against the enemy, in order to drive
him from Bower's Hill; Hoke's brigade, under Colonel

242

CAPTURE OF WINCHESTER

Avery of the 6th North Carolina being held in reserve.
During these arrangements the enemy shelled my
brigades heavily from his guns on Bower's Hill; and
by the time they were made it became too dark to pro
ceed farther. Colonel Avery was then ordered back to
Kerns town, with his brigade, where it was placed in
position to protect the ambulances, ordnance and medical
wagons, and the artillery from any movement around
our left, and Colonel Herbert was ordered to take posi
tion with his battalion of infantry on Gordon's right,
which extended across the Valley pike. The troops then
lay down on their arms and spent the night in a drench
ing rain.

General Ewell had moved with Johnson's division on
the Front Eoyal road to the vicinity of Winchester, and,
after I had arranged my troops, I endeavored to reach
him by riding across the country, but the storm was so
violent and the night so dark that I was compelled to
desist and return.

During the night, the enemy withdrew his artillery
and the main body of his infantry from Bower's Hill to
the town, leaving only a body of skirmishers confronting
us. Very early on the morning of the 14th, I ordered
Hays and Gordon to advance each a regiment across the
creek to drive the enemy's skirmishers from Bower's
Hill, which was done after some sharp skirmishing. At
the same time Smith's skirmishers were advanced across
the creek on the left, and we got possession of the works
on the hill. While these operations were going on at
Bower's Hill, Major Goldsborough, with the skirmishers
of the Maryland battalion, advanced on the right into
the outskirts of Winchester, but fearing that the enemy,
whose principal force had taken position in and near the
main fort, might shell the town, I ordered him to retire.

General Ewell came up immediately after my skir
mishers had advanced to Bower's Hill, and together we
proceeded to reconnoitre from that point, from which we
had a very distinct view of the works about Winchester.

243

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

We discovered that the hill on the northwest, which I
had been ordered to occupy, had been fortified with
works facing in the direction from which I would have
to approach it, and that they were occupied. It became
necessary then to take this hill, which was the key to
the position, by assault, and having discovered a ridge
back of it from which it might be attacked, I was ordered
to leave a brigade and some artillery, where, I then was,
to amuse the enemy in front, while I moved the rest of
my command around by the left to the point from which
I could make the assault, taking care to conduct my
movement with secrecy so that the enemy would not
discover it. I accordingly left Gordon to occupy Bower's
Hill, and I left with him besides his own brigade the
Maryland battalion and battery, and another battery
(Hupp's) of Brown's battalion, and with the other three
brigades and the rest of the artillery I moved to the
left, following the Cedar Creek pike for a mile or two
and then passing through fields and the woods, which
latter was here sufficiently open to admit of the passage
of the artillery, and crossing the Romney road at Lup-
ton's house, about three miles west of Winchester, and
half a mile from a point at which I was informed by Mr.
Lupton that the enemy had had a picket the night before,
and probably had one then.

Leaving the 54th North Carolina Regiment of Hoke's
brigade at the point where I crossed the Romney road,
to watch my rear, I moved on along a small obscure road
to the rear of the position from which I wished to assault
the enemy's works, and I found it a very favorable one
for the purpose. My route had been a very circuitous
one, in order to check the enemy's vigilance, and I was
conducted over it by a very intelligent and patriotic
citizen, Mr. James C. Baker, who had a son in the service,
and who had been made to feel the tyranny of Milroy.
Mr. Baker thoroughly understood the object in view, and
fully appreciated the advantage of the position I was
seeking to reach; and it was mainly owing to the in-

244

CAPTURE OF WINCHESTER

telligent and skilful manner in which he guided me that I
was able to get there without attracting the slightest
attention from the enemy.

Having conducted me to the desired point, he thought
it prudent to retire, as he was of no further use as a
guide, and his residence was in the immediate neighbor
hood of the town. On the route we had not seen a
solitary man from the enemy's force, whether straggler,
scout or picket. We had met two very ordinary looking
men in the roads, and from prudential motives they
were carried with us and left at Lupton's with in
junctions to keep them.

After that the only person we saw was a young girl
of about thirteen years of age whom we met on horse
back with her young brother behind her. She was
carrying before her a large bundle of clothes tied up in
a sheet, and when she unexpectedly came upon us she
was at first very much frightened, but soon discovering
that we were Confederates, she pulled off her bonnet,
waved it over her head and " hurrahed," and then burst
into tears. She told us that the enemy had been shelling
the woods all around, firing occasionally into her father's
house, and that she had been sent from home by her
father and mother to get out of the way. She said that
they had not been able to imagine what the shelling
meant, as they did not know that any of "our soldiers,"
as she called us, were anywhere in the neighborhood.
It was not necessary to use any precaution as to her,
and she was permitted to pass on, feeling much happier
for the encounter.

To return from this digression: — the position which
I reached proved to be a long ridge bordering, at the
further end, on the Pughtown road and immediately con
fronting the fortified hill which I wished to carry, and
within easy range of it for our pieces. Where it imme
diately confronted the enemy's work it was wooded, the
trees having been partially cut down, and we found
posted at different points notices to the following

245

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JIJBAL A. EARLY

effect: "General Milroy orders all of the timber east
of this point to be cleared off." Enough, however, re
mained to conceal our movements and enabled me to
push forward a brigade under cover to within a short
distance of the base of the hill on which was the enemy's
work.

On the left of this woods, near the Pughtown road,
was a cornfield on Mr. Brinly's land, facing towards
the enemy's position and affording an excellent position
for posting artillery in the edge of the woods bearing
on the enemy. On the right of the woods, on the crest
of the ridge, was an old orchard and the remains of an
old house, called "Folk's old house," with the slope in
front cleared, which furnished another good position
for artillery to bear on the other flank of the enemy. I
reached this position about four o'clock P.M., and as the
day was exceedingly hot, and the men had marched a
circuit of eight or ten miles without meeting with water
to drink, and were very much exhausted, I massed them
in the woods in the rear of the position and gave them
time to rest.

In the meantime I proceeded to reconnoitre the
enemy's position and the ground over which I would
have to move. The enemy had no pickets thrown out
in the direction where I was, and did not seem to be
keeping any lookout that way. The main work on the
hill presented a bastion front towards us, and appeared
as if it might be an enclosed work. It was on the south
of the Pughtown road, and there was a line of works
running across that road from the flank of the main
one along a ridge, a small redoubt which, about 150
yards from the main work, was occupied by two guns
supported by infantry. On the other flank were rifle
pits on the slope of the hill. The men constituting the
force occupjdng the works in our front did not seem to
apprehend any danger in their immediate neighbor
hood, but were looking intently in the direction of Gor
don's position, against which a gradual advance was

246

CAPTURE OF WINCHESTER

being made with skirmishers supported by a body of
infantry and some pieces of artillery, which were firing
in that direction.

Colonel Jones, who had been entrusted with the com
mand of all the artillery, had been quietly getting it
into position out of sight, so as to be pushed by hand
rapidly to the front when the time arrived to open on
the enemy. When the men had become sufficiently re
freshed, Hays' brigade, which was selected to make the
assault, was moved to the front near to the edge of the
woods next the enemy's position, with directions to Gen
eral Hays to keep his men under cover until the artillery
opened, and then to advance to the assault across the
field and up the hill to the enemy's works, as soon as he
should discover that the force occupying them was
demoralized by the artillery fire. The artillery under
Jones had been posted, with twelve pieces on the right
of the woods, near Folk's old house, and right on the
left in rear of the cornfield the 57th North Carolina
Regiment of Hoke's brigade was posted so as to pro
tect the pieces on the left from an attack in the direction
of the Pughtown road. The rest of Hoke's brigade,
except the 54th North Carolina Regiment, still on picket
on the Romney road, and the whole of Smith's, were
placed in line in the woods about a quarter of a mile in
rear of Hays', so as to be ready to support him.

About an hour before sunset, everything being ready,
Jones caused his pieces to be run by hand to the front,
and opened almost simultaneously with the whole twenty
pieces upon the enemy, who thus received the first in
dication of our presence in that quarter. Of course he
was taken by surprise and thrown into confusion. Our
fire continued for about three-fourths of an hour very
rapidly, being replied to, after the first consternation
was over, by the enemy's guns, but in a very wild man
ner. Hays then advanced to the assault as directed,
crossing the field in his front, ascending the hill— the
slope of which was covered with abattis made by cutting

247

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

the brush wood growing on it, — and carrying the main
work on the crest in handsome style, capturing some
prisoners and six pieces of artillery, including those in
the small redoubt, two of which were immediately turned
on a body of the enemy's infantry seen approaching
from the main fort to the assistance of these outer
works.

The greater portion of the force occupying the cap
tured works was enabled to make its escape towards
the town, as it proved that this main work was open in
the rear with wings thrown back from the two flanks
of the bastion front presented to us. As soon as I saw
Hays' men entering the works, I ordered Smith's brigade
forward to their support, and directed Colonel Jones,
whose guns had ceased firing when Hays advanced, to
move the pieces on the left to the captured hill, those on
the right being left under the protection of three regi
ments of Hoke's brigade. Riding on myself in advance
of the supports ordered to Hays I discovered him in
secure possession of the captured works, and ascertained
that the attempt to advance against him had been aban
doned, the force that commenced advancing having been
repulsed by the fire from the captured guns which had
been turned on it.

The force which had been advancing upon Gordon
in the direction of Bower's Hill had retired precipitately,
and the enemy's whole force seemed to be in great com
motion. He had turned all his guns from the main fort,
and from a square redoubt on a ridge north of it, upon
the position now occupied by us, and as soon as Jones'
guns arrived they replied to the enemy's, firing into
both forts, which were completely commanded by the
one in our possession, and upon the masses of infantry
near them. The enemy's force occupying the works,
and around them, was quite large, and deep and rugged
ravines interposed between us and the two occupied
works, which rendered an assault upon them from that
direction very difficult.

248

CAPTURE OF WINCHESTER

By the time Smith's brigade and the artillery arrived,
it was too late to accomplish anything further before
night, and the capture of the other works by assault
would evidently require the co-operation of the other
troops around Winchester. The artillery fire upon the
enemy's position and his masses of infantry was con
tinued until a stop was put to it by the approach of
darkness. Hays' brigade was formed in line on the crest
of the ridge behind the captured works, with Smith's in
rear. The 57th North Carolina, Colonel Godwin, was
sent for, to occupy a portion of the works on the north
of the Pughtown road, Colonel Avery being left with
two regiments, to protect the artillery which had not been
brought forward and guard against a surprise in our
rear, the 54th North Carolina Regiment being still left
on picket on the Romney road, and the front and flanks
of our main position being watched by pickets thrown
out. The men then lay down on their arms to rest
from the fatigues of the day.

During my operations on the northwest, Johnson's
division had demonstrated and skirmished heavily with
the enemy on the east of the town, while Gordon demon
strated and skirmished with him from the direction of
Bower's Hill, his attention being thus diverted entirely
from the point of real attack, which enabled us to effect
a surprise with artillery in open day upon a fortified
position. It was very apparent that the enemy's posi
tion was now untenable, and that he must either submit
to a surrender of his whole force or attempt to escape
during the night.

I was of opinion that he would attempt an evacuation
during the night, and I sent a courier to General Ewell
with information of what I had accomplished, stating
my opinion of the probability of the attempt to escape,
but also informing him that I would renew the attack at
light if the enemy was not gone. I had been given to
understand that Johnson's division would be so moved
as to cut off the enemy's retreat in the event I succeeded

249

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

in capturing the position commanding his works, and I
took it for granted this would be done.

In order to prepare for any emergency that might
exist, I sent my aide, Lieutenant Callaway, with orders
to General Gordon, to move direct from Bower's Hill
against the main force at light next morning, and I set
my pioneer party at work during the night to turn the
captured works for my artillery, so that it might have
some protection from the enemy's guns, if it should be
necessary to open fire in the morning. As soon as it
was light enough to see it was discovered that the enemy
had evacuated his works and the town of Winchester
during the night, taking the Martinsburg road, and some
artillery was heard on the road which proved to be
Johnson's guns near Stephenson's depot firing on the
retiring enemy, whose retreat had been cut off by his
division.

The brigades with me, including the detached regi
ments of Hoke's, were immediately ordered forward to
the Martinsburg road for the purpose of taking up the
pursuit. Gordon had advanced at light, as ordered, and
finding the main fort unoccupied had pulled down the
large garrison flag still left floating over that work. The
13th Virginia Regiment under Colonel Terrill was im
mediately detailed by me as a guard for a large number
of loaded wagons found standing outside of the town,
and a considerable amount of stores left in the town
by the enemy, and the rest of my command, as soon as
Avery came up with Hoke's brigade, advanced in pur
suit along the Martinsburg road, Gordon's brigade hav
ing preceded the others. On getting near Stephenson's
depot, five or six miles from Winchester, I found that
General Johnson's division had captured the greater
part of Milroy's force, Milroy himself having made his
escape with a small fraction of his command, prin
cipally mounted on the mules and horses taken from the
wagons and artillery that had been left behind, and I
therefore desisted from further pursuit,

250

CAPTURE OF WINCHESTER

An enemy flying for safety cannot be overtaken by
a force on foot moving with arms in their hands, and
as we had but a very small battalion of cavalry (that
belonging to Herbert's command, which did capture
some prisoners), nothing was accomplished by the at
tempts made at further pursuit of Milroy, and he suc
ceeded in getting in safety to Harper's Ferry.

During the operations against Winchester, Rodes had
moved to Berryville, but the enemy fled from that place
before him; he then moved on to Martinsburg in con
junction with Jenkins' brigade of cavalry, and there
captured several hundred prisoners, several pieces of
artillery, and some stores. My division bivouacked near
Stephenson's depot, and I was ordered by General Ewell
into Winchester to make arrangements for securing the
stores and sending off the prisoners.

The enemy had abandoned the whole of his artillery,
wagon trains, camp equipage, baggage, and stores, and
twenty-five pieces of artillery with all their equipments
complete, including those captured by Hays' brigade at
the storming of the outer work, a very large number of
horses and mules, and a quantity of ammunition, though
in a damaged state, which fell into our hands. In the
hurry of the movement after Milroy was found to have
evacuated, I made such arrangements as I could to secure
the abandoned property by detailing a regiment to guard
it, but as usual on such occasions the contents of the
wagons and the stores in town were considerably plun
dered by stragglers and followers of our trains, before
they could be secured, and even after our quartermasters
and commissaries got possession of them, there was great
waste, and perhaps misappropriation of much of them,
as always seemed unavoidable on such occasions.

On getting into town I endeavored to rectify the
abuses as well as I could, but much was lost to the army
of what was of real value, because there was no means
of holding such agents to a strict responsibility. I sent
off to Richmond, under guard, by the way of Staunton,

251

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

108 commissioned officers and 3,250 enlisted men as pris
oners, much the larger portion of which had been cap
tured by Johnson's division. Besides these there were
left in Winchester several hundred sick and wounded
prisoners.

My loss in the operations around Winchester was
slight, consisting of 30 killed and 144 wounded, total 174,
all but one killed and six wounded being from Hays'
and Gordon's brigades.

CHAPTER XXIII.

AT YORK AND WRIGHTSVIL/LE.

I REMAINED in Winchester until the afternoon of the
18th, General Ewell having moved in the meantime to
Shepherdstown on the Potomac, to which place Johnson's
division, and Gordon's brigade, Hays' brigade and three
regiments of Smith's brigade of my own division had
also moved. The 54th North Carolina Regiment of
Hoke's brigade, and the 58th Virginia of Smith's brigade
had been sent to Staunton in charge of the prisoners,
and leaving the 13th Virginia Regiment in Winchester,
I proceeded on the afternoon of the 18th with the residue
of Hoke's brigade, and Jones' battalion of artillery, to
Shepherdstown, which place I reached on the 19th.

By this time Longstreet's corps had begun to arrive
in the valley, and Hill's was following. The crossing
of the river at Fredericksburg by a portion of Hooker's
army had been for the purpose of ascertaining whether
our army had left the vicinity of that place, and when
ascertained that we were concentrating near Culpeper
Court-House, he withdrew his force from across the
river and moved his army north to defend Washington.

I remained at Shepherdstown until the 22nd. The
field return of my division at this place on the 20th
showed 487 officers and 5,124 men present for duty,
making a total of 5,611, and the brigade inspection re
ports for the same day showed the number of efficient
present to be about the same number, the reduction
since the last reports being caused by the absence of the
three regiments before mentioned and which did not
rejoin until the campaign was over, the permanent de
taching of Wharton's battalion of Hoke's brigade as a
provost guard for the corps, the loss sustained at Win
chester, and the sick and exhausted men left behind.

It is as well to state here that we had no hired men

253

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

for teamsters, or in any other capacity, but all the
duties usually assigned to such men with an army had
to be performed by men detailed from the ranks, as were
all our pioneer and engineer parties.

On the 22nd of June I crossed the Potomac with my
division and Jones' battalion of artillery at Boteler's
Ford below Shepherdstown and marched through
Sharpsburg and Boonsboro, camping three miles beyond
Boonsboro on the pike to Hagerstown. The 17th Vir
ginia Regiment of cavalry, under Colonel French, from
Jenkins' brigade, joined me on the march this day to
accompany my division by orders of General Ewell.
Rodes had moved through Hagerstown towards Cham-
bersburg, and Johnson's division, which had crossed the
Potomac ahead of me, moved in the same direction. I
was ordered to proceed along the western base of the
South Mountain. Maryland Heights and Harper's Ferry
were both strongly fortified, and were occupied by a
heavy force of the enemy, which we left behind us, with
out making any effort to dislodge it, as it would have
been attended with a loss disproportionate to any good
to be obtained. Our movements through and from
Sharpsburg were in full view of the enemy from the
heights.

On the 23rd, I moved through Cavetown, Smithtown,
and Ringgold (or Ridge ville as it is now usually called)
to Waynesboro in Pennsylvania. On the 24th I moved
through Quincy and Altodale to Greenwood, at the west
ern base of the South Mountain, on the pike from Cham-
bersburg to Gettysburg. There were no indications of
any enemy near us and the march was entirely without
molestation. We were now in the enemy's country, and
were getting our supplies entirely from the country
people. These supplies were taken from mills, store
houses, and the farmers, under a regular system ordered
by General Lee, and with a due regard to the wants of
the inhabitants themselves, certificates being given in all
cases. There was no marauding, or indiscriminate plun-

254

AT YORK AND WRIGHTSVILLE

dering, but all such acts were expressly forbidden and
prohibited effectually. On the 25th my command re
mained stationary at Greenwood, and I visited General
Ewell, by his request, at Chambersburg, where Rodes*
and Johnson's divisions had concentrated.

In accordance with instructions received from Gen
eral Lee, General Ewell ordered me to move with my com
mand across the South Mountain, and through Gettys
burg to York, for the purpose of cutting the Northern
Central Railroad (running from Baltimore to Harris -
burg), and destroying the bridge across the Susquehanna
at Wrightsville and Columbia on the branch railroad
from York to Philadelphia. Lieutenant Colonel Elijah
White's battalion of cavalry was ordered to report to
me for the expedition in addition to French's regiment,
and I was ordered to leave the greater portion of my
trains behind to accompany the reserve ordnance and
subsistence trains of the camps. I was also ordered to
rejoin the other divisions at Carlisle by the way of
Dillstown from York, after I had accomplished the task
assigned me.

I returned to Greenwood on the afternoon of the
25th, and directed all my trains — except the ambulances,
one medical wagon, one ordnance wagon, and one wagon
with cooking utensils, for each regiment, and fifteen
empty wagons for getting supplies, — to be sent to
Chambersburg. No baggage whatever was allowed for
officers, except what they could carry on their backs or
horses, not excepting division headquarters, and with
my command and the trains thus reduced, I moved across
South Mountain on the morning of the 26th, and we
saw no more of our trains until we crossed the Potomac
three weeks later.

As we were leaving, I caused the iron works of Mr.
Thaddeus Stevens near Greenwood, consisting of a
furnace, a forge, a rolling mill — with a saw mill and
storehouse attached, — to be burnt by my pioneer party.
The enemy had destroyed a number of similar works,

255

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

as well as manufacturing establishments of different
kinds, in those parts of the Southern States to which
he had been able to penetrate, upon the plea that they
furnished us the means of carrying on the war, besides
burning many private houses and destroying a vast deal
of private property which could be employed in no way
in supporting the war on our part; and finding in my
way these works of Mr. Stevens, who — as a member of
the Federal Congress — had been advocating the most
vindictive measures of confiscation and devastation, I
determined to destroy them. This I did on my own re
sponsibility, as neither General Lee nor General Ewell
knew I would encounter these works. A quantity of
provisions found in store at the furnace was appropri
ated to the use of my command, but the houses and
private property of the employees were not molested.

On getting to the eastern slope of the South Moun
tain, where the road forks about one and a half miles
from Cashtown, I heard that there was probably a force
in Gettysburg, and the pike leading through Cashtown
was found to be slightly obstructed by trees felled across
the road. I determined, therefore, to move a portion
of my force along the pike, which was the direct road
to Gettysburg, in order to skirmish with and amuse
the enemy in front, while I moved with the rest on the
road to the left, by the way of Hilltown and Murn-
masburg, so as to cut off the retreat of such force as
might be at Gettysburg. Accordingly, Gordon was sent
on the pike directly towards the town with his brigade
and White's battalion of cavalry, and I moved with the
rest of the command on the other road. There had been
a heavy rain the night before, and it was now raining
slightly but constantly, in consequence of which the
dirt road, over which the left column moved, was very
muddy.

Gordon moving along the pike, with about forty men
of White's cavalry in front, as an advance guard, en-

256

AT YORK AND WRIGHTSVILLE

countered a militia regiment a mile or two from Gettys
burg, which fled across the fields at the first sight of
White's advance party without waiting to see what was
in the rear, and Gordon moved on without resistance
into the town.

On reaching Mummasburg with French's cavalry in
advance of the infantry, I was informed that there was
but a comparatively small force at Gettysburg, and I
halted to wait for the infantry, whose march was im
peded by the mud, sending out one of French's com
panies towards the latter place to reconnoitre. In a
short time this company encountered some of the fleeing
militia and captured a few prisoners, and being in
formed of this fact and that the command to which they
belonged was retreating through the fields between
Mummasburg and Gettysburg, I sent the rest of
French's cavalry in pursuit. Hays' brigade, arriving
soon after, was ordered to move towards Gettysburg,
while the rest of this column was ordered into the camp
near Mummasburg.

I then rode to Gettysburg, and finding Gordon in
possession of the town, Hays was halted and encamped
within a mile of it, and two of his regiments were sent
to help French in catching the frightened militia, but
could not get up with it. French caught about two
hundred, but the rest succeeded in getting off through
enclosed fields and the woods. The regiment proved to
be the 26th Pennsylvania Militia, eight or nine hundred
strong. It was newly clad with the regular United States
uniform, and was well armed and equipped. It had
arrived in Gettysburg the night before and moved out
that morning on the Cashtown road. This was a part
of Governor Curtin's contingent for the defence of the
State, and seemed to belong to that class of men who
regard "discretion as the better part of valor." It was
well that the regiment took to its heels so quickly, or
some of its members might have been hurt, and all

17 257

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

would have been captured. The men and officers taken
were paroled next day and sent about their business,
rejoicing at this termination of their campaign.

On entering Gettysburg myself I called for the town
authorities in order to make a requisition on them for a
sum of money and some supplies. The principal
municipal officer was absent, but I saw one of the au
thorities, who informed me that the town could furnish
no supplies, as they were not there, and the people were
too poor to afford them. I caused the stores in town to
be searched and succeeded in finding only a small quan
tity of articles suited for commissary supplies, which
were taken. It was then late and I had to move early
in the morning towards York, so that I did not have
time to enforce my demands. Two thousand rations
were found in a train of cars which had been brought
with the militia, and these were taken and issued to
Gordon's brigade. The cars, ten or twelve in number,
and also a railroad bridge near the place were burnt,
there being no railroad buildings of any consequence. I
then ordered Colonel White to proceed with his bat
talion early the next morning along the railroad from
Gettysburg to Hanover Junction on the Northern Central
road, and to burn all the bridges on the former road,
also the railroad buildings at the Junction and a bridge
or two south of it on the Northern Central, and then
move along that road to York, burning all the bridges.
Gordon was ordered to move at the same time along the
macadamized road to York, and during the night I sent
him a company of French's cavalry and Tanner's bat
tery of artillery to accompany him.

With the rest of the command I moved at light next
day (the 27th) from Mummasburg towards York by the
way of Hunterstown, New Chester, Hampton, and East
Berlin, halting and bivouacking for the night after pass
ing the latter place a few miles. I then rode across to
the York pike to Gordon's camp to arrange with him
the means of moving against the town next day in the

258

AT YORK AND WRIGHTSVILLE

event that it should be defended. The information which
Gordon had received was that there were no troops in
York, and I directed him, in the event the town should
be unoccupied, to move on through to the Wrightsville
and Columbia bridge and get possession of it at both
ends and hold it until I came up.

On the next day (the 28th) both columns moved at
daylight, and a deputation consisting of the Mayor and
other citizens of York came out to meet Gordon and
surrender the town, which he entered early in the day
without opposition. Moving by the way of Weiglestown
into the Harrisburg and York road with the other
column, I entered the town shortly afterwards, and re
peated my instructions to Gordon about the bridge over
the Susquehanna, cautioning him to prevent the bridge
from being burned if possible. At Weiglestown French
had been sent with the greater part of his cavalry to the
mouth of the Conewago to burn two railroad bridges at
that point and all others between there and York. Be
fore reaching town Hays' and Smith's brigades were
ordered into camp about two miles on the north of it
at some mills near the railroad. Hoke's brigade under
Colonel Avery was moved into town to occupy it, and
preserve order, being quartered in some extensive hos
pital buildings erected by the United States Government.
I then levied a contribution on the town for 100,000 dol
lars in money, 2,000 pairs of shoes, 1,000 hats, 1,000
pairs of socks, and three days' rations of all kinds for
my troops, for which a requisition was made on the
authorities.

Gordon moved promptly towards "Wrightsville, and
on reaching the vicinity of that place found the western
end of the bridge defended by a force, which proved to
be twelve or fifteen hundred Pennsylvania militia, en
trenched around Wrightsville. He immediately took
measures to dislodge the enemy, and, finding it imprac
ticable to turn the works so as to cut off the retreat of
the enemy, opened with his artillery and advanced in

259

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

front, the militia taking to its heels after a few shots
from the artillery and outrunning Gordon's men, who
had then marched a little over twenty miles. Gordon
pursued as rapidly as possible, but, on getting half way
across the bridge, he found it on fire, inflammable ma
terials having previously been prepared for the pur
pose. He endeavored to extinguish the flames, but his
men had nothing but their muskets, and before buckets,
which were sent for, could be procured, the fire had
progressed so far as to render the effort hopeless, as
the superstructure of the bridge was of wood, it being
a covered one of more than a mile in length with a track
for the railroad, another for wagons, and a third as a
tow-path for the canal which here crossed the river. He
had therefore to desist, and retire to Wrightsville with
his men.

The bridge was entirely consumed, and as one or two
houses were adjoining it, at the Wrightsville end, they
were also consumed. When these houses caught fire
Gordon formed his brigade around them and by the ex
ertions of his men, then much exhausted, arrested the
flames and saved the town of Wrightsville from a con
flagration, though the houses immediately adjoining the
bridge could not be saved. The brigade which did this,
and thus saved from a disastrous fire, kindled by their
own defenders, one of the enemy's towns, was composed
of Georgians, in whose State, just a short time before,
the town of Darien had been fired and entirely destroyed
by a regular expedition of Federal troops.

As soon as I had made the necessary arrangements
for establishing order in the town of York, and pre
venting any molestation of the citizens, and had made
the requisitions on the authorities for what I had
determined to levy on the town, I rode in the
direction of Wrightsville. By the time I got outside of
the town I saw the smoke arising from the burning
bridge, and when I reached Wrightsville I found the
bridge entirely destroyed. I regretted this very much,

260

AT YORK AND WRIGHTSVILLE

as, notwithstanding my orders to destroy the bridge, I
had found the country so defenceless, and the militia
which Curtin had called into service so utterly inefficient,
that I determined to cross the Susquehanna, levy a con
tribution on the rich town of Lancaster, cut the Central
Railroad, and then move up in rear of Harrisburg while
General Ewell was advancing against that city from the
other side, relying upon being able, in any event that
might happen, to mount my division on the horses which
had been accumulated in large numbers on the east side
of the river, by the farmers who had fled before us, and
make my escape by moving to the west of the army,
after damaging the railroads and canals on my route
as much as possible.

This scheme, in which I think I could have been suc
cessful, was, however, thwarted by the destruction of
the bridge, as there was no other means of crossing the
river. Gordon was therefore ordered to return to York
early the next day, and I rode back that night. The
affair at Wrightsville had been almost bloodless ; Gordon
had one man wounded, and he found one dead militiaman,
and captured twenty prisoners.

Colonel White succeeded in reaching Hanover Junc
tion and destroying the depot at that place and one or
two bridges in the vicinity, but he did not destroy all the
bridges between there and York, as one or two of them,
as reported by him, were defended by a force of in
fantry. Colonel French succeeded in destroying the
bridges over the Conewago at its mouth, and all be
tween there and York, and on the 29th he was sent to
complete the destruction of the bridges south of the
town, over the Codorus, which he succeeded in doing,
as the force defending them had retired.

In compliance with my requisition some twelve or
fifteen hundred pairs of shoes, all the hats, socks, and
rations called for, and $28,600 in money were furnished
by the town authorities. The number of shoes required
could not be found in the place, and the Mayor assured

261

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

me that the money paid over was all that could be raised,
as the banks and moneyed men had run off their funds to
Philadelphia. I believed that he had made an honest
effort to raise the money, and I did not, therefore, take
any stringent measures to enforce the demand, but left
the town indebted to me for the remainder. The shoes,
hats, and socks were issued to the men, who stood very
much in need of them. A portion of the money was
subsequently used in buying beef cattle, which could be
found much more readily when they were to be paid for
than when certificates were to be given, and the residue
was paid into the hands of the quartermaster of the army,
to be used for public purposes. No public stores were
found.

A few prisoners taken in the hospitals and those cap
tured at Wrightsville by Gordon were paroled. Some
cars found in the town were burned. There were two
large car factories, and two depots and other railroad
buildings which I would have destroyed but for the fact
that the burning of them would set fire to some private
dwellings and perhaps consume a large part of the town,
and I therefore determined not to run the risk of entail
ing so much mischief on non-combatants, notwithstand
ing the barbarous policy that had been pursued by the
enemy in numerous similar cases. Neither were the
hospitals burned or injured in any way. I think the
people of York were very well satisfied and much sur
prised to get out of my hands as well as they did.* Cer
tainly any Southern town into which the enemy went
would have considered itself exceedingly fortunate to

* To THE CITIZENS OF YORK :

I have abstained from burning the railroad buildings and car
shops in your town, because, after examination, I am satisfied the
safety of the town would be endangered; and, acting in the spirit of
humanity which has ever characterized my government and its military
authorities, I do not desire to involve the innocent in the same punish
ment with the guilty. Had I applied the torch without regard to
consequences, I would have pursued a course that would have been

262

AT YORK AND WRIGHTSVILLE

have got off so well. Our forbearance, however, was
not at all appreciated by the enemy generally, for not
only did they not follow the example set them, but some
of the presses actually charged Gordon's brigade with
firing the town of Wrightsville.

During my movement to York, General Ewell had
moved towards Harrisburg and reached Carlisle with
Kodes' division and Jenkins' cavalry, Johnson's division
going to Shippensburg; — Longstreet's and Hill's corps
had also moved into Pennsylvania and reached the
vicinity of Chambersburg, while the Federal Army had
moved north on the East side of South Mountain, in
terposing between ours and Washington.

Late on the afternoon of the 29th, Captain Elliot
Johnson, aide to General Ewell, came to me with a copy
of a note from General Lee to General Ewell stating the
enemy's army was moving north and directing a con
centration of the corps on the west side of the South
Mountain; and also verbal instructions from General
Ewell to move back so as to rejoin the rest of the corps,
and information of his purpose to move back to unite
with Johnson.

In accordance with these instructions, I put my whole
command in motion at daylight on the morning of the
30th, taking the route by the way of Weiglestown and
East Berlin towards Heidlersburg, so as to be able to
move from that point to Shippensburg or Greenwood by
the way of Aaronsburg, as circumstances might require,
Colonel White being directed to move his battalion of

fully vindicated as an act of just retaliation for the many authorized
acts of barbarity perpetrated by your own army upon our soil. But
we do not war upon women and children, and I trust the treatment
you have met with at the hands of my soldiers will open your eyes to
the monstrous iniquity of the war waged by your government upon
the people of the Confederate States, and that you will make an
effort to shake off the revolting tyranny under which it is apparent
to all you are yourselves groaning.

J. A. EAHLY, Major General, C. S. A.
263

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

cavalry on the pike from York towards Gettysburg, to
ascertain if any force of the enemy was on that road.
At East Berlin, a small squad of the enemy's cavalry
was seen and pursued by my cavalry advance, and I
received at that place information, by a courier from
Colonel White, that a cavalry and infantry force had
been at Abbotstown on the York and Gettysburg road,
but had moved south towards Hanover Junction. A
courier also reached me here with a dispatch from Gen
eral Ewell, informing me that he was moving with Rodes '
division by the way of Petersburg to Heidlersburg, and
directing me to march for the same place.

I marched to within three miles of Heidlersburg and
bivouacked my command, and then rode to see General
Ewell at Heidlersburg, where I found him with Rodes'
division. I was informed by him that the object was to
concentrate the corps at or near Cashtown at the eastern
base of the mountain, and I was directed to move to
that point the next day by the way of Hunterstown and
Mummasburg, while Rodes would take the Toute by
Middletown and Arendtsville.

My march so far, to the bank of the Susquehanna and
back, had been without resistance, the performances of
the militia force at Gettysburg and Wrightsville amount
ing in fact to no resistance at all, but being merely a
source of amusement to my troops. The country maps
were so thorough and accurate that I had no necessity
for a guide in any direction. There had been no dep
redations upon the people, except the taking of such
supplies as were needed in an orderly and regular man
ner as allowed by the most liberal and intelligent rules
of war. No houses had been burned or pillaged, no
indignities offered to the inhabitants, who were them
selves amazed at the forbearance of our troops; not
even a rail had been taken from the fences for firewood.
I had returned over a large portion of the route taken
in going to York, and I was myself surprised to see so
little evidence of the march of an invading army. It

264

AT YORK AND WRIGHTSVILLE

furnished a most striking contrast to the track of the
Federal army, as I had witnessed the latter on many
occasions in my own state.

What was the case with my command, was the case
with all the rest of our army, and I venture to say that
the invasion of Pennsylvania by General Lee 's army, for
the forbearance shown to the invaded country, is with
out a parallel in the history of war in any age. Yet this
invasion was made by an army composed of men many
of whose own houses had been destroyed by a most ruth
less enemy, into the country of that very enemy, and
many of the houses thus spared were those of the very
men who had applied the torch to and ransacked the
houses of the men now so forbearing: yet those who
have left their mark indelibly all over the South charge
the invaders of Pennsylvania and their countrymen with
being barbarous, and with maltreating prisoners.

As we moved through the country, a number of people
made mysterious signs to us, and on inquiring we ascer
tained that some enterprising Yankees had passed along
a short time before, initiating the people into certain
signs, for a consideration, which they were told would
prevent the "rebels" from molesting them or their
property, when they appeared. These things were all
new to us, and the purchasers of the mysteries had been
badly sold*

* The " mysterious signs " referred to were supposed by the Con
federates to be made by Knights of the Golden Circle, a secret
organization said to sympathize with the South, but of which our
soldiers knew nothing.

CHAPTEE XXIV.

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.

HAVING ascertained, after I left General Ewell on
the night of the 30th, that the road from my camp to
Hunterstown was a very circuitous and rough one, on
the morning of the 1st of July I moved to Heidlersburg,
for the purpose of following the road from that point
to Gettysburg until I reached the Mummasburg road.
After moving a short distance for Heidlersburg on the
Gettysburg road, I received a dispatch from General
Ewell, informing me that Hill, who had crossed the
mountain, was moving towards Gettysburg against a
force of the enemy, which had arrived at that place and
pushed out on the Cashtown road, and that Rodes' divi
sion had turned off from Middletown towards Gettys
burg by the way of Mummasburg, and ordering me to
move on the direct road from Heidlersburg to the same
place. I therefore moved on until I came in sight of
Gettysburg.

Hooker had been supplanted in the command of the
Federal Army by Major General Meade, and the advance
of that army, consisting of the 1st corps under Reynolds,
the llth corps under Howard, and Buford's division of
cavalry, had reached Gettysburg; the cavalry on the
30th of June, and the infantry early on the morning of
the 1st of July. The cavalry had moved, on the morning
of the 1st, out on the Cashtown road and was there en
countered by Hill 's troops, two of his divisions only hav
ing as yet crossed the mountain. The enemy's infantry
then moved out to support his cavalry, and a heavy en
gagement ensued between it and HilPs two divisions.
While this was progressing Rodes' division came up on
the left of Hill, on the Mummasburg road, and imme
diately engaged the enemy.

When I arrived in sight of Gettysburg I found the

266

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG

engagement in progress on the Cashtown and Muminas-
burg roads, the enemy 's troops being advanced out from
that town on both roads for about a mile. Bodes had
opposed to him a very large force which overlapped
his left, and seemed to be pressing back that flank. On
the hill in rear of Gettysburg, known as Cemetery Hill,
was posted some artillery so as to sweep all the ground
on the enemy's right flank, including the Heidlersburg
or Harrisburg road, and the York pike. I could not
discover whether there was any infantry supporting this
artillery, as the hill was much higher than the ground
on which I then was.

Moving on the Heidlersburg road and on Bodes' left,
I came up on the enemy's right flank. I immediately
ordered the artillery forward and the brigades into line.
Gordon's brigade being in front formed first in line on
the right of the road, then Hays', with Smith's in rear
of Hoke's, and thrown back so as to present a line
towards the York pike. Jones' battalion was posted in
a field immediately in front of Hoke's brigade, so as to
open on the enemy's flank, which it did at once with
effect, attracting the fire of the enemy's artillery on
Cemetery Hill and that in front of the town on the
enemy's right flank. Between us and the enemy on the
northeast of the town ran a small stream, called Bock
Creek, with abrupt and rugged banks.

On the opposite bank of this creek in front of Gordon
was a heavy force of the enemy, on a low ridge par
tially wooded, with a part of it in line moving against
the left of Bodes' division held by Doles' brigade, so
as to compel it to fall back, while the right flank of this
advancing line was protected and supported by another
in position along the crest of the ridge. While the
brigades of Hays and Hoke were being formed, as
Doles ' brigade was getting in a critical condition, Gordon
charged rapidly to the front, passing over the fences
and Bock Creek and up the side of the hill, and engaged
the enemy's line on the crest, which, after a short but

267

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

obstinate and bloody conflict, was broken and routed.
The right flank of the force advancing against Doles
became thus exposed to Gordon's fire, and that force
endeavored to change front, but Gordon immediately
attacked it and drove it from the field with heavy
slaughter, pursuing towards the town and capturing a
number of prisoners, among them being General Barlow,
commanding a division of the llth corps, severely
wounded.

While Gordon was engaged, Hays' and Hoke's
brigades were advanced in line to Eock Creek, Smith's
brigade being ordered to follow, supporting the artil
lery as it advanced in rear of the other brigades. By
the time Hays and Avery had reached Rock Creek, Gor
don had encountered a second line just outside of the
town in a strong position behind some houses, and
halted his brigade behind the crest of a low ridge in
the open field. I then rode to Gordon's position and,
finding that the line confronting him extended beyond
his left across the Heidlersburg road, I ordered him to
remain stationary while Hays and Avery advanced on
his left. The latter were then ordered forward, and
advancing while exposed to a heavy artillery fire of
shell and canister, encountered the second line and drove
it back in great confusion into the town, capturing two
pieces of artillery and a large number of prisoners.

Hays encountered a portion of the force falling back
on his right, on which he turned some of his regiments
and entered the town fighting his way, along the left
end of a street running through the middle of the town.
Avery, after reaching the outskirts of the town, moved
to the left, and crossed the railroad into the open fields,
on the left of the town, while exposed to a heavy fire
from the batteries on Cemetery Hill, and took a position
confronting the rugged ascent to the hill, his men being
placed in a depression under cover of a low ridge, so as
to protect them from the fire of the enemy's artillery.
A very large number of prisoners were taken in the

268

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG

town, where they were crowded in confusion, the number
being so great as really to embarrass us and stop all
further movement for the present.

While Hays and Avery were driving the enemy so
handsomely, I saw a large force to the right of Gordon,
falling back in comparatively good order, before Bodes'
advancing brigades, around the right of the town,
towards the hills in the rear, and I sent for a battery of
artillery to be brought up so as to open on this force,
and on the town from which a fire was being poured on
Hays' and Avery 's then advancing brigades, but before
the battery reached me, Hays had entered the town and
the enemy's retreating columns had got out of reach,
their speed being very much accelerated and their order
considerably disturbed by Bodes' rapid advance. At
the same time I had sent for the battery, an order had
been sent for the advance of Smith's brigade to the sup
port of Hays and Avery, but, a report having been
brought to General Smith that a large force of the
enemy was advancing on the York road on our then rear,
he thought proper to detain his brigade to watch that
road.

As soon as I saw my men entering the town, I rode
forward into it myself, having sent to repeat the order
to Smith to advance, and when I had ascertained the
condition of things, I rode to the right of it to find either
General Ewell, General Bodes, or General Hill, for the
purpose of urging an immediate advance upon the enemy,
before he could recover from his evident dismay and
confusion. Bodes' troops were then entering the town
on the right and all plains on that flank had been cleared
of the enemy. The enemy, however, held the houses
in the edge of the town on the slope of Cemetery Hill
with sharpshooters, from which they were pointing an
annoying fire into Hays' left, and along the streets
running towards the hill.

The ascent to the hill in front of Avery was very
rugged, and was much obstructed by plank and stone

269

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

fences on the side of it, while an advance through the
town would have had to be made along the streets by
flank or in columns so narrow as to have been subjected
to a destructive fire from the batteries on the crest of the
hill, which enfiladed the streets. I, therefore, could not
make an advance from my front with advantage, and
thought it ought to be made on the right.

General Hill's troops had not advanced to the town,
but remained on or beyond Seminary ridge, more than
a mile distant, and before I could find either General
Ewell or General Rodes, General Smith's aide came to
me with a message from the General that the enemy
was advancing a large force of infantry, artillery, and
cavalry on the York road, menacing our left flank and
rear. Though I believed this an unfounded report, as
it proved to be, yet I thought it best to send General
Gordon with his brigade out on that road, to take com
mand of both brigades, and to stop all further alarms
from that direction.

Meeting with a staff officer of General Fender's I
requested him to go and inform General Hill that if he
would send a division forward we could take the hill
to which the enemy had retreated. Finding General
Ewell shortly afterwards in the town, I communicated
to him my views, and he informed me that Johnson's
division, which had moved from Shippensburg, by the
way of Greenwood Gap, was coming up, and he de
termined to move it to a wooded hill on the left of
Cemetery Hill, which seemed to command the latter
hill and to be the key to the position on that flank. This
hill was on the right or southwestern side of Rock Creek,
and seemed to be occupied by the enemy.

Johnson's division was late in arriving and when it
came, it was further delayed by a false, report that the
enemy was advancing on the York road, so that it be
came dark in the meantime, and the effort to get pos
session of the wooded hill was postponed until morn
ing, by which time it had been occupied and fortified

270

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG

by the enemy. My division went into this action about
three o'clock P.M. and at the close of the day a brilliant
victory had been achieved, between six and seven thou
sand prisoners and two pieces of artillery falling into
our hands, a considerable portion of which had been
captured by Bodes' division.

Perhaps that victory might have been made decisive,
so far as Gettysburg was concerned, by a prompt ad
vance of all the troops that had been engaged on our
side against the hill upon and behind which the enemy
had taken refuge, but a common superior did not hap
pen to be present, and the opportunity was lost. The
only troops engaged on our side were Hill's two divi
sions and Swell's two divisions, the rest of the army
not being up.

Late in the evening, when it had become too dark to
do anything further, General Lee came to General'
Swell's headquarters, and after conferring with Gen
eral Ewell, General Bodes and myself, we were given
to understand that, if the rest of the troops could be got
up, there would be an attack very early in the morning
on the enemy's left flank, and also on the right, at the
wooded hill before named.

During the night, Hays' brigade was moved to the
left into the open ground on that side, and placed in
front of the left end of the town, under cover from the
artillery and in a position to advance upon Cemetery
Hill when a favorable opportunity should offer, his line
connecting with Avery's right. In this position the two
brigades were behind a low ridge close to the base of
Cemetery Hill.

Gordon was still retained on the York road with his
own and Smith's brigades, as constant rumors were
reaching us that the enemy was advancing on that road.
Johnson's division had been moved to the left and
posted in the valley of Bock Creek, confronting the
wooded hill.

During the night a large portion of Meade's army

271

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

came up and the rest arrived in the course of the next
day before the battle opened.

The general attack was not made in the morning of
the 2nd because there was great delay in the arrival of
Longstreet's corps, and on the left Rodes' and my divi
sions remained in position until late in the afternoon,
waiting for the preparations on the right. Johnson,
however, had some heavy skirmishing during the day.

During the morning General Ewell and myself rode
to a ridge in rear of Johnson's position for the pur
pose of posting some artillery and several batteries
were placed in position there to fire upon Cemetery
Hill and the wooded hill.

I made an attempt to get possession of the wooded
hill in the morning, but found it occupied by the enemy
in force behind breastworks of felled trees.

The enemy's position consisted of a low range of
hills extending off to the southwest from Cemetery Hill
to what was called Round Top Mountain, and on the
right of it, confronting Johnson's division and my two
brigades, was an elbow almost at right angles with the
other part of the line, and terminating with the wooded
hill or range of hills in Johnson's front, which extended
beyond his left, the town of Gettysburg being located
just in front of the salient angle at the elbow.

For some distance on the right of Gettysburg the
ground in front of the line was open and ascended to
the crest of the ridge by a gradual slope. On the left
of the town, the ascent was very steep and rough, and
this was much the strongest part of the line and the most
difficult of approach.

The enemy had during the previous night and the
fore part of this day strengthened their position by
entrenchments.

Having been informed that the attack would begin
on the enemy's left at four o'clock P.M., I directed Gen
eral Gordon to move his brigade to the railroad on the
left of the town, and take position on it in rear of Hays

272

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG

and Avery, Smith's brigade being left with General
Stuart's cavalry to guard the York road. At or a
little after four o 'clock P.M. our guns on the right opened
on the enemy's left, and those on the ridge in rear of
Johnson's division opened on that part of the line con
fronting them, and a very heavy cannonading ensued.
After this cannonading had continued for some time the
attack was begun by Longstreet on the right, two of whose
divisions had only arrived, and during its progress
I was ordered by General Ewell, a little before sunset,
to advance to the assault of the hills in front of me as
soon as Johnson should become engaged on my left,
being informed at the same time that the attack would
be general, Rodes advancing on my right and Hill's divi
sion on his right.

I ordered Hays and Avery to advance, as soon as
Johnson was heard engaged, immediately up the hill in
their front, and Gordon to advance to the position
then occupied by them in order to support them.
Before Johnson was heard fairly engaged it was after
sunset, and Hays and Avery then moved forward on the
low ridge in their front and across a hollow beyond to
the base of the hill, while exposed to a severe fire from
the enemy's batteries. They then commenced ascending
the steep side of the hill in gallant style, going over
fences and encountering bodies of infantry posted in
front of the main line on the slope of the hill behind
stone fences which they dislodged, and continuing their
advance to the crest of the hill, when by a dash upon
the enemy's works Hays' brigade and a portion of
Hoke's succeeded in entering them and compelling the
enemy to abandon his batteries.

In the meantime Johnson was heavily engaged on the
left, but no fire was heard on the right, Rodes' division
had not advanced nor had the left division of Hill.
Colonel Avery, commanding Hoke's brigade, had fallen
mortally wounded near the crest of the hill, and the
portion of the force that had engaged the enemy's works

18 273

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

found itself unsupported, and paused for a moment, it
being now nearly dark.

During the attack on the left of the enemy's line, a
portion of his troops had been withdrawn from this part
of the line, but that attack had now ceased and in a few
minutes a heavy force in several lines was concentrated
on Hays' brigade, and that part of Hoke's which had
entered the enemy's works, and finding themselves un
supported and about to be overwhelmed by numbers,
they were compelled to retire, which they did with com
paratively slight loss, considering the nature of the
ground, and the difficulties by which they were sur
rounded. Hoke's brigade fell back to the position from
which it had advanced to bring off its wounded com
mander, and was then re-formed by Colonel Godwin of
the 57th North Carolina. Hays' brigade fell back to a
position on the slope of the hill, where it remained for
some time awaiting a further advance, and was then
drawn back, bringing off four battle flags captured on
Cemetery Hill. Gordon's brigade had advanced to the
position from which the two brigades had moved, for
the purpose of following up their attack when the divi
sions on the right moved, but finding that they did not
advance, it was not ordered forward, as it would have
been a useless sacrifice, but was retained as a support
for the other brigades to fall back upon.

During the advance of my two brigades I had ascer
tained that Eodes was not advancing, and I rode to
urge him forward. I found him getting his brigades
into position so as to be ready to advance, but he in
formed me that there was no preparation to move on
his right, and that General Lane, in command of Fender's
division, on his immediate right, had sent him word that
he had no orders to advance, which had delayed his own
movement. He, however, expressed a readiness to go
forward if I thought it proper, but by this time I had been
informed that my two brigades were retiring, and I told
him it was then too late. He did not advance, and the

274

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG

fighting for the day closed — Johnson's attack on the
left having been ended by the darkness, leaving him
possession of part of the enemy's works in the woods.

Before light next morning Hays and Godwin, who
had taken position on Gordon's left and right, respec
tively, were withdrawn to the rear and subsequently
formed in line on the street first occupied by Hays,
Gordon being left to hold the position in front. During
the night, by directions of General Ewell, Smith was
ordered to report by daylight next day to General John
son on the left and did so. Longstreet, supported by a
part of the right of Hill's corps, had been very heavily
engaged with the enemy's left, in the afternoon of the
2nd, gaining some advantages, and driving a part of
the enemy's force from an advanced line, but at the close
of the fight the enemy retained his main positions.

On the morning of the 3rd, the enemy made an attack
on Johnson to dislodge him from that part of the works
which he had gained the morning before, and very heavy
fighting ensued, continuing at intervals throughout the
day, in which Smith's three regiments were engaged
under General Johnson's orders, the enemy finally re
gaining his works. The rest of my command did not
become at all engaged on this day.

On the right, Pickett's division of Longstreet 's corps
having arrived, the attack on the enemy was renewed
in the afternoon after a very heavy cannonading of all
parts of his line, and a very sanguinary fight ensued
during which the enemy's line was penetrated by Pick
ett's division, but it was finally repulsed, as were the
supporting forces, with very heavy loss on both sides.

This closed the fighting at the battle of Gettysburg.
Meade retained his position on the heights, and our army
held the position it had assumed for the attack, while
both armies had sustained very heavy losses in killed
and wounded, as well as prisoners.

CHAPTEE XXV.

RETREAT TO VIRGINIA.

DURING the night of July 3rd, Ewell's corps was
withdrawn from its position in and to the left of
Gettysburg, and moved to the right, to the Cashtown
road, where it took position on Seminary Hill, the other
corps retaining their positions. My brigades were with
drawn from Gettysburg to the new position at two
o'clock in the morning of the 4th and were formed in
line in rear of Seminary Hill, Bodes' and Johnson's
divisions occupying the front line on the crest of the
hill across the road.

During the battle our line had encircled that of the
enemy, thus extending our army, which was much
smaller than his own, over a very long line.

We remained in position confronting the enemy dur
ing the whole of the 4th, being subjected in the after
noon to a very heavy shower of rain. The enemy showed
no disposition to come out, but hugged his defences on
the hills very closely.

General Lee sent a flag of truce on the morning of
this day to General Meade proposing an exchange of
prisoners, but he declined to accede to the proposition.

Before day on the morning of the 5th our army com
menced retiring from before Gettysburg.

The loss in my division in the battle, beginning with
the first and ending with the last day, was in killed 154,
wounded 799, and missing 227, total 1,180, of which Hays'
and Hoke's brigades lost in the assault at the close of
the day of the 2nd, in killed 39, wounded 246, and miss
ing 149, total 434. 194 of my command were left in hos
pitals near Gettysburg, the rest being carried off. The
loss of our army was heavy, as was that of the enemy.

I have before stated the size of General Lee's army
when this campaign was commenced. The army had

276

RETREAT TO VIRGINIA

received no accessions, but had been diminished by the
march, from straggling, exhaustion, and sickness. My
own division had been reduced from 7,226, its strength
when it left Culpeper, to 5,611 when I crossed the
Potomac, those numbers representing the strength in
officers and men, and not muskets. A similar loss ex
tended to the whole army, and I can venture to affirm
that it was as small in my division as in any other. Be
sides this we were in the enemy's country, and our large
trains had necessarily to be guarded. I think it may
be assumed, therefore, that General Lee's infantry at
this battle did not exceed 55,000 officers and men, and
that his whole force engaged, and in support of that part
engaged, was smartly under 60,000, the cavalry not being
employed at all except in watching the flanks and rear.
His artillery numbered less than 150 guns.

Meade, in his testimony before the Congressional
Committee, states that his strength, in all arms, was a
little under 100,000, about 95,000, making a greater re
duction from Hooker's force than I have allowed for
General Lee's for similar cause, and that he had but
little under three hundred guns. The odds, therefore,
were not very far from two to one. Hooker had conceded
the fact that he outnumbered our army, yet Meade, who
succeeded Hooker, taking up the old idea of superior
numbers, thinks General Lee now outnumbered him by
some 10,000 or 15,000 men. The figures which I give I
think fully cover our force, and the probability is that
it was less.

It will be seen, therefore, what difficulties we had
to encounter in attacking the enemy in his strong posi
tion. That position fought the battle for him. It is
exceedingly probable that, if we had moved promptly
upon Cemetery Hill after the defeat of the enemy on
the 1st, we would have gained the position, and
thereby avoided the battle at that point. What might
have been the result afterwards it is impossible to
conjecture. The battle would have had to be fought

277

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

somewhere else, and it may or may not have resulted
differently.

The fight on the 1st had not been contemplated by
General Lee, and he was not, therefore, on the ground
until it was over, and the time had passed for accom
plishing anything further when he arrived. This fight
had been brought on by the movement of Buford's
cavalry in the direction of Cashtown and the attack on
it by Hill's two divisions, which brought up the two corps
of the enemy. General Ewell had moved to the support
of Hill, but there was no communication between them
during the engagement, as they were on separate roads,
and each force went into action under its own commander,
without there being a common superior to direct the
whole. This want of concert existed after the defeat of
the enemy, and the consequence was that the opportunity
was not improved.

This battle of Gettysburg has been much criticised,
and will continue to be criticised. Errors were undoubt
edly committed, but these errors were not attributable
to General Lee. I know that he was exceedingly anxious
to attack the enemy at a very early hour on the morning
of the 2nd, for I heard him earnestly express that wish
on the evening previous, but his troops did not arrive
in time to make the attack. Why it was so I cannot tell.
In the assaults which were made on the enemy's posi
tion, there was not concert of action, but that was not
General Lee's fault.

Without commenting on the assault from right of
our line, which I did not witness, for that part of the
battle was entirely excluded from my view, I will say
that I believe that if the attack which was made by
Johnson on the extreme left, and my two brigades on
his right, at the close of the second day, had been sup
ported by an attack by the divisions to the right of us,
Johnson would have gained all of the enemy's works in
front of him, Cemetery Hill would have been carried,
and the victory would have been ours.

278

RETREAT TO VIRGINIA

So far as the fighting itself was concerned, the battle
of Gettysburg was a drawn battle, but under the circum
stances a drawn battle was a failure on our part and
a success for the enemy. We were far away from our
supplies of ammunition, and he was in his own country
and in easy communication with his depots of supplies
of all kinds. We were then in a part of the country by
no means abounding in provisions and there was a moun
tain at our back, which limited the area from which we
could draw food for our men, a most difficult task always,
under the most favorable circumstances, in a hostile
country, and rendered doubly so by the immediate pres
ence of a large army in our front, with its numerous
cavalry to aid the citizens in resisting the demands of
our foraging parties.

We were, therefore, under the necessity of retreat
ing, not because our army had been demoralized by a
defeat, but because our supply of ammunition had be
come short, and it was difficult to subsist our troops.
That retreat was made deliberately and in perfect order,
and the enemy did not venture to attack us, but was
content to follow us with a corps of observation at a
respectable distance. We carried off a very large pro
portion of our wounded, but many were left because
their condition would not admit of their transportation.
We carried off some captured guns, and a large number
of prisoners, after having paroled some three or four
thousand. The enemy had none of our guns and he
had in his hands fewer prisoners than we had taken.

My division with the rest of EwelPs corps was moved
from its position on the Cashtown road at two o'clock on
the morning of the 5th, arriving at the Fairfield road
after sunrise. The withdrawal of the other corps was
then progressing, and Swell's corps, being ordered to
bring up the rear, was here halted for several hours,
waiting for the others to clear the road, and confront
ing the enemy's position, which was still in our view,
by a line of battle.

279

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

The enemy seemed to be very cautious about com
ing out, but finally ran out a few pieces of artillery and
opened at long range, without doing any damage. My
division was ordered to constitute the rear guard of
the army, and White's battalion of cavalry was ordered
to accompany me. I waited on the Fairfield road until
it had been cleared by the rest of the army, including
the other two divisions of Swell's corps, and then in
the afternoon moved off slowly in rear of the army and
all the trains, Gordon, followed by White's battalion,
bringing up my rear.

On arriving in sight of Fairfield, which is situated
near the eastern base of South Mountain on a wide low
plain or valley surrounded by commanding hills, I found
the wagon trains blocked up at the village. While wait
ing for the road to be cleared of the wagons in front,
Colonel White sent me information that a force of the
enemy was advancing in my rear, and being on the
plain where I would be exposed to a fire of artillery
from the surrounding hills, I sent to hasten forward the
trains, but as they did not move off I was preparing to
fire a blank cartridge or two for the purpose of quick
ening their speed, when the advance of the pursuing
column of the enemy appeared on a hill in my rear with
a battery of artillery supported by infantry, and I
opened with shell on it. The enemy's battery replied to
mine, and Fairfield was soon cleared of wagons, as the
teamsters and wagon masters found it more convenient
to comply with this inducement to travel than my orders
and solicitations.

Gordon deployed his brigade and sent out the 26th
Georgia Regiment as skirmishers to dislodge the enemy's
advance, which it did after a sharp skirmish, and a loss
of seven wounded. This regiment was then ordered to
be withdrawn, and I moved the division in line gradu
ally through Fairfield to a favorable position for mak
ing a defence, and here waited the enemy's advance, but
he moved very cautiously, sending forward only a party
of skirmishers, which kept at a respectful distance.

280

RETREAT TO VIRGINIA

It was now night, and my division was formed in
line, a little nearer the base of the mountain, so as to
cover our trains that were packed on its side and at its
base. In this position my men lay on their arms all
night without molestation from the enemy.

At light on the morning of the 6th, the trains moved
forward, and General Bodes, whose division was to con
stitute the rear guard that day, relieved my skirmishers
in front, his division being formed in line just at the
base of the mountain, and I moved past him to take the
front of the corps ; when, pursuing the road over South
Mountain past Monterey Springs, I descended to the
western base near Waynesboro, and bivouacked a little
beyond the town, covering it on the north and west with
my brigades. The other corps were found already on
this side near the base of the mountain, and the rest of
Ewell's corps reached the same vicinity with mine. The
force following us proved to be the 6th corps under
Sedgwick, acting as a corps of observation. It gave
Bodes no trouble and did not come beyond Fairfield.

A body of the enemy's cavalry had previously come
upon that part of our trains that had preceded the army
in the retreat, but was repulsed by a few guards accom
panying the trains without being able to accomplish any
damage of consequence. Early on the morning of the
7th we moved towards Hagerstown by the way of Leit-
ersburg, my division following Bodes' and Johnson's
bringing up the rear. The corps was established on
the north and northeast of Hagerstown, and my division
took position on the Chambersburg pike about a mile
north of Hagerstown. In this position we remained
until the 10th, when the corps was moved to the south
of Hagerstown, the other corps being already there.

The enemy's troops had now commenced arriving on
the western side of the mountain, and we took position
on the south and southeast of Hagerstown to await his
attack — Longstreet's corps being on the right, Swell's
on the left and Hill in the centre, and our line covering
the road to the Potomac at Williamsport and Falling

281

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

Waters, a few miles below, where a pontoon bridge was
being constructed in the place of one previously de
stroyed by the enemy's cavalry. The advance of the
enemy resulted in a sharp engagement between a portion
of our cavalry and a part of his troops on the Boonsboro
road.

In the position near Hagerstown, my division was
posted across the Cumberland road on the southwest
of the town, but on the next day it was moved further
to the right so as to rest its right on the Hagerstown and
Williamsport road, where it remained until just before
dark on the 12th. In the meantime Meade's army, now
reinforced by some twelve or fifteen thousand fresh
troops, according to his own statement, had moved up
and taken position in our front, but did not attack.

Two of my absent regiments, the 54th North Caro
lina and 58th Virginia, had returned by this time, after
having been engaged in repelling an attack, made by
the enemy's cavalry at Williamsport on the 6th, on an
ordnance train coming up with a supply of ammunition.
Besides these, General Lee received no other reinforce
ments, but our army was not at all demoralized, and
calmly awaited the attack of the enemy. My own divi
sion was buoyant and defiant, for it felt that it had sus
tained no defeat, and though diminished in numbers it
was as ready to fight the enemy as at Gettysburg.

As night was setting in, on the 12th, my division was
taken out of the line and moved to the right, to the rear
of Hill's position, for the purpose of supporting his
corps, in front of which a very large force of the enemy
had accumulated. In this position it remained during
the 13th, but no attack was made. The Potomac had
been very much swollen by the previous rains, and after
subsiding a little was again threatened with another rise
from a rain that commenced on the 13th, and it was
therefore determined to recross that river so as not to
have an impassable stream at our back, when we had but
one bridge and that not yet fully completed, and which,

282

RETREAT TO VIRGINIA

being laid on pontoons, hastily constructed by our pioneer
and engineer parties, was liable to be washed away.
Accordingly our army commenced retiring after dusk
on the night of the 13th, Longstreet's and Hill's corps
going to Falling Waters and Ewell's to Williamsport to
ford the river.

My division brought up the rear of Swell's corps,
and the river being found too high for the passage of
artillery, Jones' battalion, under the escort of Hays'
brigade, was moved down the river to Falling Waters,
where it crossed during the morning of the 14th. The
rest of the division forded the river, in rear of the other
two divisions, after sunrise on the morning of the 14th
to a little above Williamsport, with the water nearly up
to the armpits of the men, who had to hold their guns
and cartridge boxes above their heads to keep them out
of the water. The regular ford was too swift to allow
of a crossing there, and we had therefore to cross in the
deeper water above.

The crossing at Williamsport was effected without
any molestation whatever, but at Falling Waters there
was considerable delay because of the greater number of
troops crossing there and the passage of the artillery
at that point, where there was but one bridge. The
enemy's cavalry came by surprise upon a portion of
Hill's corps covering the bridge, and succeeded in cap
turing some prisoners and in getting two pieces of artil
lery which were stuck in the mud, the surprise being
caused by a mistaken opinion that the front was watched
by some of our cavalry.

Our army remained in the neighborhood of Haynes-
ville that night, near which place my division camped,
and now for the first time since I moved from Green
wood, on the 26th of June, we had the benefit of our
baggage wagons. On the next day we moved through
Martinsburg, and on the 16th my division reached Dark-
ville, where it went into camp and remained until the
20th, in which neighborhood the whole of Ewell's corps

283

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

was concentrated, the other corps taking positions
further up towards and covering Winchester. In the
meantime, Meade made preparations for crossing the
Potomac below Harper's Ferry, and threw his army
into Loudoun, while General Lee prepared to intercept
his march by crossing his army over the Blue Ridge into
Culpeper.

It having been ascertained that a force had moved
from Cumberland in Maryland to the mouth of Back
Creek west of Martinsburg, on the afternoon of the 20th,
my division was ordered to move across North Moun
tain and then down Back Creek for the purpose of inter
cepting that force, while another division should hold
it in front. We moved that night to the foot of the
mountain at Guardstown, and crossing early next morn
ing (the 21st) through Mills' Gap, marched down Back
Creek to the rear of Hedgesville, where we found that the
force had made its escape by retiring the night before.
The division was then moved across the mountain
through Hedgesville and camped. During the night I
received orders to move up the valley for the purpose
of crossing the Blue Ridge, and next day (the 22nd) I
marched to Bunker Hill.

On the 23rd I passed through Winchester to the
Opequon on the Front Royal road, being joined that
day by the 13th Virginia Regiment. General Ewell,
who had preceded me with Rodes' and Johnson's divi
sions, had that day been engaged with a heavy force
which came through Manassas Gap, which he moved
out to meet, near the Gap, as he was moving past Front
Royal, and he sent at night to inform me that he would
retire up the Luray Valley for the purpose of crossing
at Thornton's Gap, and to order me to cross to the Valley
pike so as to move up by the way of New Market, and
across from there to Madison Court-House, as the enemy
was in very heavy force in Manassas Gap. The Shenan-
doah was then high and a pontoon bridge had been laid
near Front Royal below the forks, which he ordered

284

RETREAT TO VIRGINIA

to be taken up during the night, and to be transported
up the Valley pike under my protection.

Accordingly I moved by the way of Cedarville next
day to get the pontoon train, and then crossed to the
Valley pike, following the route taken by General Jack
son's corps the fall before and arriving at Madison
Court-House on the 28th, in the neighborhood of which
I found the other divisions which had come through
Thornton's Gap and by the way of Sperryville. I had
to use the pontoon train for crossing the Shenandoah, as
that river was up, and I then sent it up the Valley to
Staunton.

After remaining near Madison Court-House until the
31st I moved to the vicinity of the Eobinson Eiver, near
the road from Liberty Mills to Culpeper Court-House,
and the next day I crossed the Robinson just above its
mouth into Culpeper and then the Rapidan at the rail
road station, and encamped near Pisgah Church about
four miles from the station, the other divisions moving
to the same neighborhood.

Longstreet's and Hill's corps had preceded Swell's
corps across the Blue Ridge through Chester Gap, and
while Meade was moving his army up into Manassas Gap
to attack Ewell, they moved into Culpeper and waited
until Meade 's army had moved to the vicinity of War-
renton and the Rappahannock and halted without in
dicating any purpose to advance further; when, after a
body of the enemy's cavalry had been driven back, these
two corps moved to the south of the Rapidan and took
position near Orange Court-House, leaving Stuart's
cavalry to occupy the county of Culpeper.

This was the close of all the operations resulting
from the campaign into Pennsylvania.

There have been various opinions as to the utility of
this campaign into Pennsylvania. Undoubtedly we did
not accomplish all that we desired, but still I cannot re
gard the campaign in the light of a failure. If we had
remained on the Rappahannock confronting Hooker's

285

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

army, we would have been compelled to fight one or
more battles, and perhaps a series of them, during the
summer, which would probably have resulted in a much
heavier loss to us than we sustained at Gettysburg,
though the enemy might have been repulsed. Situated
as we were, it was simply a matter of impossibility for
us to have attacked the opposing army in its then posi
tion, for we did not have the means of forcing a passage
of the river — the advantage in that respect being all
on the other side. We should, therefore, have been
compelled to await the enemy's attack, which could only
have resulted in his repulse, in the most favorable aspect
for us.

We were in a country entirely devoid of supplies
and of forage, for Fredericksburg had been occupied the
previous summer by a Federal army, and no crops of
any consequence had been made in all that region. By
moving into Pennsylvania, we transferred the theatre
of the war for a time into the enemy's country. Our
army was supplied from that country and from stores
captured from the enemy for more than a month and
this gave a breathing spell to our commissary depart
ment, which had been put to great straits. We had
been living the previous winter on very limited rations
of meat, only % of a pound of bacon to the ration, with
few or no vegetables, and a change of diet was actually
necessary for our men.

When we came back, though we had lost many valu
able lives, our army was reinvigorated in health, and
the transfer of the two armies to the upper waters of
the Rappahannock and the Rapidan was a decided ad
vantage to us. The campaign into Pennsylvania cer
tainly defeated any further attempt to move against
Richmond that summer and postponed the war over into
the next year. Could the most brilliant victories which
it was in our power to gain in Virginia have accomplished
more? I think not.

CHAPTER XXVI.

TREATMENT OF PRISONERS, WOUNDED AND DEAD.

IT was from the close of this campaign that the diffi
culties in regard to the exchange of prisoners, and the
consequent complaints about the maltreatment of those
in our hands, dated.

The fall of Vicksburg simultaneously with the battle
of Gettysburg, gave to the enemy the excess of prisoners,
which had hitherto been on our side, and he now began
to discover that we would be more damaged by a cessa
tion in the exchange than he would : — our men when they
came back would go into our army for the war, and we
had no means of supplying their places while they re
mained prisoners. Many of his prisoners in our hands
had but limited terms to serve out, and the places of
those whose terms were longer could be readily supplied
by new drafts, while his high bounties, national, state
and local, opened to him the whole civilized world as a
recruiting ground. He had no inducement, therefore,
to continue the exchange as a matter of policy affecting
the strength of his army, while a failure to do so would
very much cripple us, by detaining from our army the
men held as prisoners, by imposing on our already over
taxed resources the support of the prisoners themselves,
as well as the diminution of the strength of our army
by the detail of a force to guard them.

While we were in Pennsylvania, President Lincoln
had issued an order, declaring that no paroles given,
unless at some of the places specified for the exchange of
prisoners in the cartel which had been adopted, or in
cases of stipulation to that effect by a commanding
officer in surrendering his forces, would be recognized.
I think the date of that order was the 1st of July, and
it was evidently intended to embarrass us while in Penn
sylvania, with the guarding and sustenance of such pris-

287

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

oners as should fall into our hands. This order found
us in possession of more than 6,000 prisoners taken on
the 1st at Gettysburg.

About 3,000 of them were paroled, but their paroles
were not recognized and they subsequently returned to
the army without being exchanged, including some offi
cers who solemnly pledged their honor to surrender
themselves as prisoners in the event their paroles were
not recognized by their government. The rest declined
to give paroles because of the order before mentioned,
and they were carried to Virginia and held in custody.
In addition to our willingness to parole these men, Gen
eral Lee proposed to make an exchange of prisoners after
the battle, but it was declined. Now if the prisoners
brought off by us from Gettysburg subsequently suffered
in prison, who was responsible for that suffering?

The order in regard to the recognition of paroles was
in violation of the well recognized principles of modern
warfare. In the most ancient times, a captive taken in
battle was held to have forfeited his life to his captors
and it was always taken. After a time this was changed,
and from motives of humanity the prisoner's life was
spared and he became by the laws of war, even among
the most civilized nations, the slave of his captor — his
enslavement being justified on the ground that it was a
boon to him to spare his life at the expense of his liberty.
The justice of this rule is recognized in Holy Writ
itself, and the rule continued to prevail long after the
commencement of the Christian era.

In the age of chivalry a modification of the rule pre
vailed, and a prisoner was allowed to ransom himself,
when he could raise the means of doing so. In more
modern times the system of paroles was adopted, and
the prisoner was allowed to go at large upon pledging
his honor not to take up arms against his captors until
regularly exchanged, the penalty of a forfeiture of his
parole being death if again captured. This is a contract
between the prisoner and his captors, which his govern-

288

TREATMENT OF PRISONERS

ment is bound to respect in the interests of humanity,
by the recognition of all civilized nations. It is not
necessary for him to receive the permission of his gov
ernment or his leader to give his parole. When he is
a captive, he is beyond the power and protection of
either and has a right to stipulate for his individual
safety against the penalties of death, slavery, or im
prisonment by neutralizing his services for the time
being. If his contract is not respected by his govern
ment, what must be the consequence!

When two nations or parties are at war, the object
of each is to destroy the physical power of the other,
in order to obtain peace, or accomplish the object for
which the war is undertaken. If one party is so situated
that it cannot hold, or cannot support its prisoners, and
the other will neither exchange nor recognize the validity
of paroles, is it to be expected that the prisoners shall
be turned loose to return again to augment the force of
the antagonistic party, and thus perhaps insure the
destruction of that party liberating them?

The very principle which justifies killing in battle,
that is the universal principle of self-preservation, will
justify the taking of no prisoners or the destruction of
all those that may be taken, if they can be neutralized
in no other way. It was on this principle that the great
Napoleon, in his Egyptian campaign, killed a number of
prisoners whom he did not have the means of feeding,
and who would not recognize the validity of a parole.
If he turned them loose they would have gone imme
diately into the ranks of his opponents, if he kept them
he would have had to take the food from the mouths of
his own soldiers to feed them, and the only way of getting
rid of them was by killing them. It is true a clamor
was raised by his enemies, whose interest it was to make
him appear as a barbarian devoid of humanity, but now
that the feelings of that day have subsided, impartial
men do not doubt the conformity of the act to the prin
ciples of war.

19 289

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

So when Mr. Lincoln's order appeared, if the safety
of General Lee's army, or the success of his campaign
had been jeopardized by the necessity of feeding and
guarding the prisoners in our hands, he would have been
justified in putting them to death, and the responsibility
for the act would have rested on the shoulders of the man
who issued the inhuman order. So too the latter was
responsible for all the sufferings to which those pris
oners who were carried off were afterwards subjected,
if they suffered.

The alleged reason for stopping the exchange was
the fact that the Confederate Government would not
parole or exchange negro slaves belonging to Southern
citizens who were captured in the Federal ranks. But
it cannot be doubted that this was the mere pretext and
not the real reason. That is to be found in the belief
existing on the part of the Federal authorities that the
failure to exchange would cripple us. The constitution
of the United States, then unchanged in any respect,
recognized the right of property in slaves, and guaran
teed the return of such as should flee from service.

The constitution of the Confederate States contained
the same guaranty, and the institution of slavery was
recognized by the laws and constitutions of all the States
composing the Confederacy, from which States alone
the Confederate Government derived its delegated
powers. That government was bound to respect the laws
of the States and the rights of the citizens under those
laws, and to protect them. Granting, for the sake of the
argument, that the United States may have had the right
to employ as soldiers the captured or fugitive slaves,
as it had to take into its armies deserters from ours,
still it took them subject to all the rights of the owners
and of the Confederate Government, in the event of their
recapture, just as deserters taken in arms in the op
posite camp were liable to all the penalties for their
crime without any infraction of the rules of war.

Many of the slaves put into the ranks of the Federal

2<.)0

TREATMENT OF PRISONERS

Army were put there by force, but whether their service
was enforced or voluntary, the Confederate Govern
ment would have been recreant to its trust, and grossly
neglectful of its rights and interests, to have allowed so
large a proportion of its own population to be used by
its enemy for the purpose of strengthening his armies,
by recognizing the claim set up on the part of these
slaves to the benefit of the rules of war. Most nations
have denied the right of its citizens even to expatriate
themselves, so as to be competent to serve in the ranks
of its enemies. None permit that expatriation to take
place after the commencement of hostilities, and it would
be the blindest folly to do so. In the case of the re
captured slaves, our government did not propose to
punish the slaves themselves, though those that had
voluntarily entered the enemy's service had justly for
feited their lives, but merely returned them to their
owners, to the great gratification of the negroes them
selves in most cases.

It was a case in which the Federal Government had
no rights whatever, any more than it could have had in
the case of deserters. The claim therefore set up to
have these slaves treated as other soldiers taken in battle
was without the slightest foundation in the principles
of international law, or the rules of civilized war; and
the cessation of the exchange on that pretence was a
most atrocious act of cruelty to its own prisoners by the

i Federal Government.

A great clamor was raised on this specious pretext in
order to reconcile the soldiers and the people of the

^ North to the discontinuance of the exchange, and blind
their eyes as to the real reason. Not denying the right
of the Federal Government to refuse to exchange pris
oners, if it was its interest to do so, and the war could
not be terminated favorably to itself in any other way,
still it had no right to violate the faith pledged to the
exchange by the cartel ; and least of all did it have the
right to deprive its own soldiers in our hands of the

291

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

right to release themselves from prison by giving their
paroles. If it thought proper not only to adopt the ex
treme harsh measure of non-exchange from motives of
policy, but to go further and adopt a new rule upon the
subject of paroles, then it had no right whatever to com
plain of any measures of harshness towards its pris
oners which the necessities or the interests of our gov
ernment and our army rendered necessary.

So much for the question of rights ; and now for the
facts as to the actual treatment which the prisoners in
our hands received. I think I can safely deny that they
were ever subjected to any maltreatment, suffering, or
neglect, which it was in our power to avoid. We did
not resort to the extreme measures which perhaps the
laws of war and our own necessities would have justified,
but the prisoners were treated with all the humanity
possible under the circumstances in which we were
placed. Doubtless there may have been rare individual
acts of maltreatment, but until human nature is a very
different thing from what it is, there can be no body of
men in which there are not some who act unjustly and
oppressively.

Such is the case everywhere over the world, in the
church, in government, in society, and in all the relations
which men bear to each other, it has been the case, and
will continue to be the case until the end of all things
that some will do wrong, and we of the South cannot
claim an exemption from the common lot. What I main
tain is that no harsh treatment to the prisoners was
authorized or tolerated, and if there were individual
cases of the kind they were exceedingly rare.

The condition of a prisoner is by no means a desirable
one under any circumstances, and he who is captured
in war must expect to suffer inconveniences. The sol
diers of the Federal Army were supplied with an abund
ance of everything necessary for their comfort and even
luxury, to which many of them, including some officers,
had never been accustomed before, and to which but few

292

TREATMENT OF PRISONERS

of them perhaps, except those who enriched themselves
by the plunder of our people, returned again after the
war. No army that ever took the field was so well sup
plied in all that was necessary, and much that was
superfluous.

The easy communication always kept up with the
positions of that army by railway and steamboat sup
plied it abundantly not only with ample and comfortable
clothing of every kind and the government ration of
everything, but with most of the delicacies incident to
city life. They had not only bread, meat, vegetables,
coffee and sugar in abundance, but the enormous horde
of sutlers following the army supplied it with wines,
liquors, fruits, oysters, canned meats and in fact every
thing that could be desired; and which high pay and
high bounties enabled both officers and men to purchase.
When such men, therefore, fell into our hands and were
subjected to the scanty fare to which Confederate soldiers
were reduced, it was very natural for them to complain
of their treatment.

Our ports were blockaded and we were cut off from
the commerce of the world. The enemy made not only
provisions, but medicines, contraband of war. He had
devastated the portions of our country to which he had
penetrated, destroying crops and farming utensils, and
burning barns, mills, factories of cloth and stuffs of
all kinds, and tanneries, and in fact committing every
possible waste and devastation which could cripple our
army or pinch the non-combatants who remained at
home. Coffee, tea and sugar had disappeared early in
1862 as a part of the ration to our men, and if there
was any at all, it was to be found in rare quantities and
at the most enormous prices. The scanty supplies of
provisions to which our own men were reduced can
hardly be conceived of by one who was not present to
know the actual state of the case.

On the night after the second victory at Manassas,
thousands of our men lay down to rest without having

293

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

had a mouthful to eat all day. I was then in command
of a brigade, and I was very well content, after the fight
at Ox Hill or Chantilly, to make my supper on two very
small ears of green corn, which I roasted in the ashes.
On the next day and for a day or two afterwards, all that
I had to eat was a piece of cold boiled fresh beef with
out either salt or bread, which I carried in a haversack.
This was the strait to which a Brigadier General was
reduced in our army.

I have many a time on the march, while a division and
corps commander, been glad to get a hard cracker and
a very small piece of uncooked bacon for my dinner, and
I have been often thankful on the road to a soldier for
a biscuit from his haversack which he himself had baked,
after mixing up the flour on an India rubber cloth, which
he had secured on some battlefield. When our money
became so depreciated as to be worth only from five to
ten cents on the dollar, many of the company officers were
compelled from necessity to eat with their men of the
scanty food furnished them.

I have seen commissioned officers often, marching on
foot with their pantaloons out behind, their coats out
at the elbow and their toes sticking out of their shoes,
with but a pretence for a sole, while they had but the
shirt that was on their backs as their whole supply of
linen. I have seen this the case with gentlemen of refine
ment, whose means before the war had enabled them to
live with every desirable comfort, yet they submitted
cheerfully not only to this, but to actual hunger ; and I
have seen them go into battle with the proud tread of
heroes, encouraging their men, cheering over the vic
tory, or bravely meeting death in defence of a country
which could treat them no better.

What these men were content with, the prisoners
taken by their valor, and who had been so well pampered
in their own country, thought proper to regard, when
furnished them, as evidence of a disposition to starve
them. Not only was our army so meagrely supplied with

294

TREATMENT OF PRISONERS

what was necessary not only to its comfort, but to its
very existence, but our people everywhere were pinched
for the necessaries of life. Gentlemen, ladies, and chil
dren, who had been accustomed to every indulgence and
luxury, were very often put to the utmost straits for
clothes to wear and meat and bread to eat, and while this
was the case with them there was a long, long list of
the wives and the children of the privates in the ranks
fighting for their homes and their altars, who were on
the very brink of actual starvation.

Now, I ask, in the name of all that is sacred, did
they expect that the men who had come down to make
war upon a people so reduced by their barbarous acts
to the very verge of starvation and nakedness should,
when taken in battle, be fed and clothed better than the
men who, sacrificing all mere personal considerations,
were so bravely meeting their foes in deadly strife, while
their wives, children, mothers and sisters were starving ?

There is talk about the food furnished the sick and
wounded as being unsuited for their condition. I will
mention an incident that occurred under my own ob
servation. While we were at Spottsylvania Court-House
in May, 1864, battling with such immense odds, I was
in command of a corps, and I received a message to come
to General Lee's headquarters at night on one occasion
for the purpose of receiving some instructions from him.
General Lee was then himself suffering with a dysentery
which had reduced him very much, and rendered all of
us who were aware of his condition exceedingly uneasy,
for we knew that if he failed all was gone.

When I arrived his dinner and supper, both in one,
were just ready and I was invited in to partake of the
meal, and I found it to consist of, what to me was most
acceptable, a scant supply of hard crackers, fried fat
bacon, and a beverage made as a substitute for coffee
out of parched wheat, without sugar, and this was all.
This was what the foremost commander of the age was
reduced to in the then critical condition of his health.

295

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JIJBAL A. EARLY

Such fare, if furnished to a sick or wounded Federal
soldier, would have been regarded as evidence of a bar
barous purpose to cause his death. To inflame the minds
of the Northern people and prejudice the civilized world
against us, an investigation was had before a committee
of the Federal Congress who made a report upon " rebel
atrocities," founded on the testimony of men who swore
to some things they had seen, many that they had heard,
and a great many more that they had neither seen nor
heard.

The press was flooded with stories of cruel treat
ment, illustrated by pictures, and during the war every
device was resorted to, 'to fix upon us the stigma of bar
barous treatment of the prisoners in our hands. After
the close of the war a poor feeble foreigner, Captain
Wirz, who had been in our service, and was then on the
very verge of the grave from wounds received in battle,
was selected as a victim to be sacrificed to the demands
of the North for more blood, and, after a farce of a trial,
was hung for alleged cruelty to prisoners. As a speci
men of the evidence given on his trial, it is only necessary
to mention that of Boston Corbet, the man who killed
Booth, while the latter, with a fractured leg, was in a
house in flames and surrounded by a large party of
Federal cavalry, by slipping up to the side of the house
and firing his revolver through a crack.

Boston Corbet testified on the trial of Wirz, stating
that he was a prisoner at Andersonville, and among
other atrocities testified to, by him, he mentioned the
fact that bloodhounds were kept to pursue escaped pris
oners, and he said that he himself with some others
made an escape, and the bloodhounds were put on the
track; that while he was concealed in the bushes, one of
the bloodhounds came up and rubbed its nose against
his. When asked why the hound did not do any mischief
to him, he said that he served the same Lord that Daniel
served when in the lions ' den.

There were many other witnesses in whose stories

296

TREATMENT OF PRISONERS

there was as little truth as in that of Boston Corbet, and
11 rebel " witnesses were denounced as unworthy of credit
unless they would prove renegades and endeavor to
propitiate their masters by turning against their com
rades. Even poor Wirz himself was offered his life if
he would testify against the high officials of the Con
federate Government, but he was too true a man and
Christian to attempt to save himself from his unjust
sentence by perjuring his soul; and he, therefore,
suffered on the gallows.

To appreciate at its proper worth the evidence of
the witnesses who have tried to fix upon the Confederate
authorities this iniquitous charge of maltreatment of
prisoners, it is only necessary to refer to the evidence
of the general officers of the Federal Army before the
Congressional Committee on the War. Let any candid
man read, for instance, the evidence contained in that
part of the report which refers to the battle of Gettys
burg and the operations of the Army of the Potomac
under Meade, where there is such palpable conflict, not
as to opinions merely, but as to facts ; and when he has
determined in his mind which of those general officers
tell the truth and which do not, let him say how much
credence is to be given to the stories of those men who
testified as to the horrors of Andersonville, and other
Confederate prisons. When the general officers of the
army were so loose in their testimony as to important
facts affecting each other, what was to be expected of
the subordinates and the privates, when testifying
against their enemies!

It is very easy to raise the cry of " rebel' ' when any
statement is put forth on the part of the Confederate
authorities ; and that is conceded a sufficient answer. The
same cry would invalidate the testimony of General Lee
or "Stonewall" Jackson. If such atrocities were com
mitted as those alleged, why is it that poor Wirz is the
solitary victim offered up in expiation of the thousands
of victims who, it is said, died from the effects of the

297

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

atrocities 1 The popular heart at the time of his sacrifice
thirsted for blood, notwithstanding the oceans that
flowed during the war, but when the first frenzy was
over the more cautious panderers to the tastes of their
countrymen felt that there was danger of shocking the
minds of the civilized world, and desisted.

If poor Wirz was guilty, he was the least guilty of
all those charged with the same crime, and was but a
mere instrument in the hands of others. His executioners
owed it to themselves and to the cause of truth and
justice to bring the others to trial in order to vindicate
their action in his case, and failing in this, they must
stand before the world as his murderers. Sufferings
there were doubtless at Andersonville and other prisons,
but how could they be avoided?

Our men in the army were suffering, and our women
at home were suffering. Could the men who came down
to kill and plunder us expect a better fate than that
which befell our own soldiers and people! Many per
haps died from the want of proper medicines, but thou
sands upon thousands of our own wounded and sick died
from the same cause. Who deprived us of the means
of getting medicines? When we could not feed, clothe,
and provide for these prisoners in such a manner as
would satisfy them, whose fault was it that they were
not released to be cared for by their own friends? Who
issued the order forbidding their being paroled? Who
put a stop to the exchange? Was it to be expected that
we would turn those men loose to come back again to
kill and plunder our people?

Kindred to this is another charge of plundering and
disfiguring the dead. Now as to the question of plunder
ing, I cannot but think that it is more cruel to plunder
the living than the dead, especially if the living be help
less women and children. I presume it is not necessary
to state the reasons why I entertain this opinion.

It is to me a little strange that the men who applauded

298

TREATMENT OF PRISONERS

Butler, Banks, Milroy, Sherman, and Sheridan, for
plundering and rendering utterly desolate the houses
of thousands of woman and children, should complain
that our barefooted soldiers took the shoes from the feet
of some of the men who had been engaged in this plunder
and were killed in order that they might not be able to
follow and fight the rest.

I have myself but too often seen in the track of the
Federal armies the evidence of how they plundered and
destroyed the property of our people. Not content with
taking provisions, cattle, horses, sheep and other things
which they might use, they often took what was of no
earthly use to them as soldiers, and destroyed what
they could not carry away. I have seen where they had
torn up the clothes of the women and children, hacked
to pieces furniture, pianos, and other articles, destroy
ing valuable papers and books, burned besides houses,
plows, carts and a variety of such things. This I have
seen in not a few instances, but I have seen whole com
munities rendered destitute in this way.

They also burned all our factories and tanneries
which they could reach, taking the hides out of the vats
in the latter and cutting them to pieces. When a man
is naked and barefooted, is he to be blamed for taking
such articles as he needs from the dead body of his enemy
who has thus treated him or his comrades, in order that
he may still continue to fight the despoilers of his home
and his country? Let the man who is disposed to con
demn him put the case to himself. He is plundered and
robbed, and perhaps some of his family or friends killed,
he pursues his plunderers and succeeds in killing one of
them, but he finds himself faint and sorefooted from
the want of shoes, and is therefore unable to continue
the pursuit. Will he hesitate to strip the shoes from
the feet of his fallen enemy to enable him to resume
the task of recovering his own and chastising his other
enemies ?

299

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

On one occasion, a very worthy chaplain in our army
on riding over a battlefield found a soldier pulling the
shoes from the feet of a dead Federal soldier, and this
being new to him, his feelings were rather shocked.
Speaking to the soldier he said: " My friend, if I were
in your place, I would have more respect for the dead,
and not do that." The soldier, looking at the comfort
able pair of boots which the chaplain by good luck was
able to sport, said: "Sir, I have as much respect for
the dead as you or any other man, but if you had marched
as long as I have without any shoes, and your feet were
as sore as mine, you would not think it so wrong to take
these shoes which can't do this man any good now, and
will do me a great deal." The chaplain was silenced,
and that was the whole question in a few words.

As to the other part of the charge, about disfiguring
the bodies, I do not presume our enemies themselves
believe it, though it was their policy to show that we
were barbarous, and this was set forth in the report of
a Congressional Committee. I was on many battlefields
beginning with first Manassas, both during and after
the battles, and I slept on some, with the enemy's dead
lying all around me. I never in a solitary case saw any
evidence of any such treatment, and I never heard of
any except from the reports put in circulation.

As I have passed along over the ground when we
were fighting I have had some of the wounded appeal
to me, saying they were informed by their officers that
we killed all the wounded, and I have ordered them to
be carried off and cared for. It was the policy to circu
late such reports in regard to the treatment of pris
oners, the wounded, and the dead, not only to inflame
the minds of the Northern people in order to induce them
to give a hearty support to the war, but to make the
soldiers in the army fight more obstinately; and there
were not wanting witnesses to aid the authorities by
their testimony.

300

TREATMENT OF PRISONERS

The appeal may be safely made to the world to decide
these charges against the comrades of General Eobert
E. Lee and "Stonewall" Jackson, and now that the war
is over, it would seem that we might even " appeal from
Philip drunk to Philip sober," but it will seem as if
such critics had not allowed those passions to subside, by
which they were intoxicated during the existence of
active hostilities.

CHAPTER XXVII.
ON THE RAPIDAN.

WE remained in camp during the month of August,
and the forepart of September, resting our men from
their late fatigues, and recruiting our strength by the
return of the sick and wounded who had recovered.
General Hoke having recovered from his wound, now re
turned to his brigade, but was soon sent off with one of
his regiments to North Carolina on special duty. In the
last of August, or first part of September, Longstreet's
corps was detached from our army, leaving only Ewell's
and Hill's.

The enemy's cavalry had been constantly increasing
in amount, and he had now a much larger force of that
arm than we had. He was able to keep his cavalry well
mounted, while horses were becoming very scarce with us.
On the 13th of September, a large force of the enemy's
cavalry, supported by infantry, advanced into Culpeper,
and Stuart's cavalry was compelled to retire. My divis
ion, followed by Rodes', was advanced to the Kapidan
to prevent the enemy from crossing, and we had some
sharp skirmishing with the enemy's cavalry which came
up to Somerville and Raccoon Fords, and we had some
brisk artillery firing also.

My division took position covering the two fords
named, and Rodes' went to Morton's Ford on my right
and took position covering that; some of Hill's troops
covering the fords above. The demonstrations by the
enemy's cavalry and the skirmishing continued a day or
two on the river, and a portion of Meade's infantry, all
of which had moved into Culpeper, came up and relieved
the cavalry, when the pickets were again established in
sight of each other. We then proceeded to strengthen
our position by rifle pits and epaulments for artillery,
and continued in position until the 8th of October, there

302

ON THE RAPIDAN

being occasional reconnaissances to the right and left
by the enemy's cavalry, and demonstrations with his
infantry by manoeuvring in our view, his camps being
distinctly visible to us from a signal station on Clark's
Mountain, at the base of which, on the north, the Eapidan
runs.

Meade had now sent off two of his corps, the llth and
12th, to reinforce Eosecrans at Chattanooga, Longstreet
Laving reinforced Bragg with two of his divisions ; and
General Lee determined to move around Meade 's right
and attack him, this movement commencing on the night
of the 8th. One of Bodes' brigades, and Fitz. Lee's brigade
of cavalry, were left to hold the line of the river on the
right of Eapidan Station until the enemy had disappeared
from the front, and my pickets having been relieved, my
division was concentrated that night in rear of my posi
tion, for the purpose of moving early next morning. The
movement was to be made by the way of Madison Court-
House so as to avoid the observation of the enemy, Hill
taking the lead, Ewell following.

I moved early on the morning of the 9th, taking the
road by Orange Court-House and crossing the Eapidan
at a ford a little above the mouth of the Eobinson Eiver,
camping a mile or two beyond. On the morning of the
10th I moved by the way of Madison Court-House, follow
ing the rest of the army, and crossing Eobinson Eiver,
camped again three or four miles from it. Just before
night there was a sharp fight in the advance with a por
tion of the enemy 's cavalry. On the llth we continued to
move to the left and then in direction of Culpeper Court-
House to Stone-House Mountain, when it was found that
the enemy had fallen back across the Eappahannock with
his infantry, but there was fighting with the cavalry
in the direction of the Court-House.

On the 12th we turned off in the direction of Fauquier
Springs, and our advance drove a body of the enemy's
cavalry from the river and crossed over, a portion of the
troops, including my division, remaining on the south

303

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JITBAL A. EARLY

side. On the 13th we crossed and proceeded to Warren-
ton, and Meade's army, which was on the Rappahannock
below, commenced its retreat on both sides of the railroad
towards Manassas. We took position that night around
Warrenton, Hill's corps being advanced out on the road
towards Centreville.

Stuart, with a part of his cavalry, had crossed the
river and got in between two of the enemy's columns,
where he spent the night of the 13th in imminent danger
of capture. We moved before daybreak on the morning
of the 14th, as well for the purpose of relieving Stuart
as for attacking the enemy, Swell's corps taking the road
by Auburn towards Greenwich and Bristow Station, and
Hill's, a route further to the left. About light, a con
siderable force of the enemy, composed of both infantry
and cavalry, was found at Auburn, on Cedar Creek,
occupying the opposite banks of the stream, where a
mill pond rendered the advance against him very difficult.
Rodes' division formed line in front, and some skirmish
ing and cannonading ensued, while I moved with my
division and Jones' battalion of artillery to the left
across the creek above the mill, and around to get in the
enemy's rear.

After I had started Rodes, having been replaced by
Johnson, moved to the right to cross the stream below.
The enemy's infantry in the meantime had moved off,
leaving only a cavalry force and some horse artillery to
dispute the passage, and as I was moving up to attack
this force in the rear and Rodes was coming up from
the right, it rapidly made its escape towards the railroad,
passing between us.

We then moved towards Greenwich, and near that
place Swell's corps turned off through some farms in
the direction of the bridge over Kettle Run, while Hill's
corps preceded us on the direct road to Bristow. At this
latter place, the 2nd corps of Meade's army, under War
ren, was found, and two of Hill's brigades which were

304

ON THE RAPIDAN

in the advance moved against it while behind the railroad
embankment, and were repulsed with some loss, a battery
of artillery, which was advanced to the front at the same
time, falling into the hands of the enemy. About this
time my division, in the lead of Ewell's corps, came up
on the right near Kettle Eun Bridge, and was ordered to
move forward against some troops and wagon trains said
to be moving on the road across the run in the direction
of Bristow. Gordon's brigade being in front was formed
in line facing the run and he was directed to wait until
the other brigades came up and were formed.

While I was hurrying these brigades up, Gordon see
ing some cavalry on the opposite hills made a rapid
advance across the run and up the hills on the other side,
driving the cavalry from the road to Bristow and pursu
ing it towards Brentsville. When the other brigades
were brought up, I found Gordon unexpectedly gone, and
I moved to the run, expecting to find him there, but he
was nowhere to be seen. Warren's corps constituted the
rear of Meade's army, and the troops and trains seen
across Kettle Run proved only a rear guard of cavalry
with some ambulances, the main wagon trains moving
on the east of the railroad by Brentsville. When I found
there was no enemy to attack in the direction I had been
ordered to move, I then formed my brigades in line across
the railroad facing towards Bristow Station, and sent
to find Gordon, for the purpose of moving against the
force behind the railroad at the station, according to
instructions I had received from General Lee.

After a time one of Gordon's staff officers came up
with the information that he was facing a heavy cavalry
force immediately in his front from which he could not
retire easily, and that there was a very large train of
wagons about Brentsville. Gordon's brigade was more
than one-third of my division, and with the other brigades
I was not strong enough to advance against the enemy's
position, especially as there was a very dense thicket of

20 305

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

young pines intervening between my position and that of
the enemy which rendered an advance in line almost
impossible.

It was now getting late, it being very nearly dark, and
though Johnson's division was ordered up to my assist
ance, before it could reach me it became entirely dark,
so as to put a stop to all further operations that night.
Very early next morning I advanced towards the station,
but the enemy was found to have made good his retreat
during the night. I then halted my division, and moved
on to Manassas Junction with a regiment, in order to
reconnoitre, picking up some stragglers on the way. The
enemy was found to have crossed Bull Run and taken
position behind it. Our cavalry advanced up to the Run
and had some skirmishing with the enemy, but our army
did not make any further movement forward.

We then proceeded to destroy the bridge over Broad
Run and Kettle Run and to tear up the railroad, burning
the cross-ties and bending the rails by heating them.

On the march from Rapidan, Brigadier General
Pegram, who had been assigned to the command of
Smith's brigade, joined us, General Smith, who had been
elected Governor of Virginia, having resigned at the close
of the Pennsylvania campaign.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

DEVASTATION OF THE COUNTRY.

WE remained near Bristow two or three days, but
were unable to supply our army in this position, and as
the enemy had destroyed the bridge over the Eappahan-
nock on his retreat, we crossed the river on a pontoon
bridge. Our army then occupied the line of the Bappa-
hannock, and remained there until the 7th of November,
nay division after several moves finally going into camp
in rear of Brandy Station, Eodes covering Kelly 's Ford
on the right, with Johnson between us, while Hill was
on the left. We still held the crossing of the Bappahan-
nock at the railroad bridge with a pontoon bridge across
the river and a tete du pont covering it.

Meade in the meantime had gradually moved his army
up to the vicinity of Warrenton and Warrenton Junction,
and we had sent forward, on several occasions, wagons
strongly guarded by infantry to bring back the rails that
had been torn up from the railroad between Bealton and
the river. On the last of these expeditions, which was
protected by my division, a considerable force of the
enemy's cavalry was encountered at Bealton and driven
off.

The tete du pont in front of the Eappahannock was
occupied by a brigade detailed alternately from my divis
ion and Johnson's with a battery of artillery detailed
from the artillery of the corps.

On the morning of the 9th of November, his position
was occupied by Hays' brigade under the command of
Colonel Penn of the 7th Louisiana Eegiment, and Green's
battery of artillery of four guns, while some works on
the south bank, immediately in rear of the tete du pont,
were occupied by Graham's and Dance's batteries of
artillery.

The tete du pont itself consisted of a line of rifle

307

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

trenches encircling the bridge and resting on the river
above and below, near the right of which were two small
redoubts embraced in the circle of works, one of which
had been constructed in the spring of 1862 when our
troops fell back from Manassas to face to the north, and
the other had been constructed by the enemy subsequently
to face to the north, both being remodelled for the use of
artillery. The rifle pits were slight, affording in them
selves no obstacle to the passage of a force over them
unless held by an opposing force, and the redoubts were
imperfectly remodelled — while there was no obstruction
in front, in the way of ditches, abattis or otherwise.

The work was completely commanded by higher posi
tions in front, on ridges behind which a cover for the
advance of troops from that direction was afforded, while,
on the immediate right of the point at which the rifle
pits touched the river, on that flank, the railroad
approached to the bank of the stream by a high embank
ment of earth, with a walled opening in it for the passage
of a road just in front of that part of the work. In rear
of the tete du pont the river was rendered impassable
except over the bridge, which was near the right, by a
mill dam which backed up the water, making a pond
extending along the entire rear of the work, the bridge
being across this pond.

The works in rear of the bridge occupied by Graham's
and Dance's batteries consisted of a redoubt that had
been constructed by the enemy on that side and which
had been turned, and some sunken pits for guns on the
left of it, the ground occupied by these works being lower
than the tete du pont in front. Some sunken pits for
artillery had been made on the south side of the river on
the right of the railroad in low, flat ground so as to sweep
the east side of the railroad embankment that was on
the north, but was unoccupied; there were also rifle
trenches connected with this epaulment, and lower down
to cover a point at which the enemy had had a bridge.
The works which were occupied on the south bank really

308

DEVASTATION OF THE COUNTRY

afforded no protection to those on the north, but merely
served to command the bridge itself in the event of the
tete du pont being carried, as the fire from the guns
posted in them would be over the latter, in order to reach
an advancing enemy.

Early in the day of the 7th, a small force of infantry
appeared in front of the tete du pont, beyond the range of
the artillery there posted, passing down the river, and a
little before noon a heavy force of infantry was developed
in front of the works, forming a line of battle encircling
them, but still out of range of our artillery ; and still later
a large force was seen passing down the river, that in
front still remaining in line of battle.

The enemy confronting this position, subsequently
ascertained to be two corps, the 5th and 6th, under Sedg-
wick, then commenced advancing by gradual steps, com
ing up a little nearer each time and forming a new line of
battle ; and Colonel Penn, who had three of his regiments
advanced to the front and on the flanks, so as to cover
the main position with a line of pickets while one was
in reserve in the trenches, and the other was on picket
on the river on the south bank, was compelled to retire his
advanced regiments gradually, until they were with
drawn into the woods, leaving only a line of skirmishers
in front as far as their safety would permit. On the
first appearance of the enemy in force, Colonel Penn had
sent me a dispatch informing me of the fact, but as my
camp was fully five miles off it did not reach me until a
little before 2 P.M.

I immediately signalled the information to General
Lee and General Ewell, and ordered my other brigades,
then engaged in constructing huts for quarters, to be
moved to the front as soon as they could be got together.
As this required some time, I rode in advance towards
the position occupied by my brigade on picket, and at
Brandy Station received another dispatch from Colonel
Penn informing me that the enemy still remained in his
front in line of battle with a very heavy force. For fear

309

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

that the information by signal had not reached General
Ewell, as I understood he was coming up towards Brandy
Station, I sent my Adjutant General, Major John W.
Daniel, to meet him and communicate the contents of the
two dispatches to him.

Before reaching the river I encountered General Lee,
who had not received my dispatch, and together we pro
ceeded to the river, where we arrived a little after three
o'clock. I immediately crossed over to Penn's position
and going out in front of the skirmish line, then con
siderably advanced, I discovered a very heavy force
which was gradually but very slowly and cautiously mov
ing up, encircling the whole position. Penn's regiments
had been drawn in, including the one on picket below,
except one company still left on picket at that point, and
now occupied the trenches, which they could not fully
man, while the guns of Green's battery were posted in
the works on the right.

After fully reconnoitring in front I rode back across
the river and communicated the state of the case to
General Lee. Shortly after I recrossed the river, the
enemy commenced forcing back our skirmishers, who
were compelled to retire towards the works, and having
got possession of the hills in front he opened with a bat
tery of artillery, his guns being replied to by Graham's
and Dance's with little or no effect, as the distance was
too great. The enemy's skirmishers in very heavy line
continued to advance, forcing ours back to the protection
of the line of works, and a portion of his getting to the
river bank about half a mile below the right of the tete du
pont. An attempt was then made to send one of Dance's
guns to the pits on the right of the railroad, but the
advance of the enemy's skirmishers up the opposite bank
of the river caused it to be abandoned, for fear of losing
the horses.

At four o'clock, General Hays, who had been detained
from his brigade by his duties as a member of a court
martial, arrived and assumed command of the tete du

310

DEVASTATION OF THE COUNTRY

pont. In a short time afterwards the three regiments of
Hoke's brigade, forming the advance of the rest of the
division, came up, and I sent them across the river, under
command of Colonel Godwin, to the support of Hays.
General Lee directed me to send no more troops across
the river, but retain the others on the south side, and
Gordon was moved to the right to occupy a hill further
down the river, while Pegram's brigade was formed in
line in rear of the hill occupied by Graham 's and Dance's
batteries, the 31st Virginia being sent to occupy the rifle
trenches at the gun pits on the right of the railroad.

The enemy now opened from a battery on our left and
soon from another on our right, and the fire of these bat
teries, which crossed in rear of our works, and that from
the front rendered the bridge very unsafe. The fire from
Graham's and Dance's guns seemed to be doing no good,
as they could not be used to advantage by reason of
having to fire over the works in front, and it was there
fore stopped by General Lee's orders. Green's battery,
however, under the command of Lieutenant Moore, con
tinued the fire in front, but was greatly overmatched.

On crossing the river, which was under the enemy's
artillery fire, Godwin's three brigades were put in the
trenches covering the river above the bridge — three regi
ments of Hays' brigade, the 6th, 9th and 8th, being on
the right and the 5th and 7th on the extreme left. The
portion of the trenches occupied by the 6th, 9th and 8th
regiments of Hays' brigade covered the bridge and to
the right of it and on this part of the works were the
four guns of Green's battery.

The enemy continued his artillery fire vigorously and
rapidly until dark, his skirmishers in the meantime ad
vancing in such heavy force as to drive ours into the
works, and themselves coming up to within easy rifle
range of the trenches. Just at dark the enemy's force
advanced in heavy columns immediately in front of the
position occupied by Hays' three regiments and our artil
lery, one of the columns moving up to within a short

311

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

distance under cover of the railroad embankment and
then suddenly debouching through the opening made for
the passage of the road, before mentioned.

This assault was resolutely met by Hays' men and
Green's guns, who poured a destructive fire into the
advancing masses of the enemy, breaking the heavy line
of skirmishers preceding the columns, but these columns
came on in such strong force and such rapid succession
that after a brief but obstinate resistance, Hays' men
were literally overpowered by numbers in the trenches,
which they held to the last, without attempting to leave
them. The enemy also rushed upon the guns at the same
time and, meeting with little or no obstacle from the
works themselves, overpowered the gunners at their
posts.

When the guns were taken General Hays made an
attempt to recapture them, but the enemy coming up
in still further force in front rendered the attempt abor
tive. The part of the line now taken was within a hun
dred yards of the northern end of the bridge and com
pletely commanded it, so that all the force on the left was
completely cut off from retreat.

An attack made on Godwin's front simultaneously
with that on Hays' right, but not in as strong force, had
been repulsed by the 54th North Carolina Regiment, and
when Godwin learned that Hays' line was broken, he
endeavored to move to his assistance, but the enemy had
now got between the trenches and the river and com
menced moving up a strong force against Godwin's right,
at the same time that another advanced against him in
front. He was therefore compelled to abandon a part of
the trenches on his right and present front, as well as he
could in the darkness, to the two forces, thus assailing
him in different directions, so as to try to cut his way
to the bridge.

He made a resolute struggle, but the enemy threw
such a force between him and the bridge that the attempt
to reach it was hopeless, and the rest of his men were

312

DEVASTATION OF THE COUNTRY

forced to abandon the trenches on the left. His three
regiments and the two Louisiana regiments on his left
were now completely surrounded, the enemy encircling
them in front and on the flanks, while an impassable river
was in their rear. Nevertheless, Colonel Godwin con
tinued to struggle, rallying and encouraging his men as
he retired from point to point towards the river, until he
himself, with only about seventy men still remaining to
him, was overpowered and taken by an irresistible force,
without surrendering himself or his command. A like
fate befell the 5th and 7th Louisiana Regiments.

I had remained with General Lee, by his direction, on
the hill in rear near Dance's guns, where he had taken
his position, observing the enemy's movements as well
as we could, until very nearly or about dark. When the
enemy's artillery fire ceased, we had discovered some
movement of his infantry, but we could see so indis
tinctly that we could not tell what it meant. We saw
the flashes of the rifles from our trenches and from the
guns on the side of the river, but a very heavy wind was
blowing, so that we could hear no sounds, not even that
of our guns, which were not more than three or four
hundred yards from us.

After this firing had continued some minutes, perhaps
twenty or thirty, it slackened, and not hearing from it,
we were of the opinion that it was at the enemy's skir
mishers. General Lee then, expressing the opinion that
the movement of the enemy in our front at this point was
probably intended merely as a reconnoissance or feint,
and that it was too late for him to attempt anything
serious that night, concluded to retire, leaving with me
two dispatches for General Ewell.

A short time before we saw the last firing, I had sent
my Inspector General, Major Hale, on foot across the
bridge to direct General Hays and Colonel Godwin to
send and have rations brought up for their men, and
just as I was preparing to send off the two dispatches
left with me for General Ewell, Major Hale returned

313

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

and informed me that when he saw General Hays the
enemy was advancing against him, but he and his men
were all right and in good spirits and that he then went
to Colonel Godwin, whom he found all right, but as he
was returning across the bridge he saw one or two of
Hays' men coming off, who said the enemy had just
broken through the line, the Major himself expressing
the opinion that the statement was entirely false. It was
now very dark and objects could not be seen at a very
short distance. General Lee could not have then gone
more than a few hundred yards since he left me.

Though I did not think the information brought could
be true, as what I had witnessed did not indicate such
a result, yet I sent Major Daniel to ascertain the truth,
and ordered Pegram to move his brigade to the bridge
immediately and Graham and Dance to man their guns.
I then started to the bridge and soon met Major Daniel,
who informed me he had just seen General Hays, who
had made his escape, and that the greater part of his
brigade was captured, the enemy in possession of the
works, and Godwin cut off from the bridge.

Pegram 's brigade was then hurried up to the bridge
to prevent the enemy from crossing and Gordon's was
sent for, information of the disaster being sent to General
Lee at once. Godwin's regiments had not yet been cap
tured, and I had the mortification of seeing the flashes of
their rifles, and hearing their capture without being able j
to render them the slightest assistance, as it would have I
been folly to attempt to cross the bridge, and I could not i
open with the guns on the south side, as it was so very 1
dark that nothing was visible, and we would have been
as apt to fire into our own men as into the enemy.

A number of Hays' officers and men had been able to
effect their escape by slipping off in the dark, after the
works were in possession of the enemy, many swimming
the river and others getting over the bridge. Some of
Godwin's officers and men also effected their escape by
swimming the river, and others by slipping down the

314

DEVASTATION OF THE COUNTRY

banks of it to the bridge, while the enemy was engaged
in securing the rest. General Hays had effected his
escape after he was entirely surrounded by the enemy,
and was in their power, by his horse's taking fright at a
musket fired near him and dashing off, when a number of
shots were fired at him, and finding that he had to run
the gauntlet anyhow, he made for the bridge and escaped
unhurt.

A regiment from Peg-ram 's brigade had been sent to
the end of the bridge and the rest of the brigade formed
in line in rear of it. To have attempted to cross the rest
of my command over the bridge would have but added
to the disaster, and therefore, after waiting for some time
to give an opportunity to all the men to escape who could,
and ascertaining definitely the capture of the regiments
on the left, and that the enemy had a guard at the further
end, the bridge was fired at the end next us, and so
destroyed that it could not be used by the enemy.

Eeceiving orders from General Lee to move back to
my camp, I did so at three o'clock in the morning, after
having sent off Graham's and Dance's batteries.

The loss in my division in this affair was 5 killed,
35 wounded, and 1593 missing, making a total of 1630.
The loss in Green's battery was 1 killed and 41 missing,
total 42, making the loss altogether 1672, besides the four
guns and the small arms. The killed are those who were
known to be killed, and the wounded were those who got
off. Doubtless there were a number killed and wounded
who were put down in the missing, but the enemy came up
to the works firing but very little, and therefore the loss
in that respect was comparatively slight.

Nearly three hundred of Hays' officers and men, be
tween one hundred and one hundred and fifty from the
three regiments under Godwin, and twenty men of
Green's battery made their escape. A considerable num
ber of the men in both brigades were engaged in getting
timber for building huts at the time and were not present
with their brigades, thus escaping capture.

315

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

The total force occupying the works was a little over
two thousand, and the force which attacked them con
sisted of two corps, numbering probably over thirty
thousand men. The result of the attack was unavoidable,
and I fully exempted my officers and men from all blame.
If the enemy chose to make the attack his success was
inevitable. The works were of too slight a character to
enable a body of troops to hold them against such over
whelming numbers. When the enemy reached the works
he had no trouble in walking over them, as there were no
ditches or obstructions in front.

In constructing these works too great reliance had
been placed in the want of enterprise on the part of the
enemy, and there was but one mode of approach to or
retreat from them, so that when the works were carried
in front of the only bridge there was, the fate of the rest
of the command was sealed. The enemy on this occasion
had more enterprise than had been presumed on, and
hence the disaster.

This was the first serious disaster that had befallen
any of my immediate commands, either as a brigade or
division commander, since the commencement of the war,
and I felt that I was not responsible for it, though I
bitterly regretted it.

The same afternoon three corps of the enemy had
attacked Eodes at Kelly's and forced a passage there,
inflicting on his division some loss in killed, wounded,
and prisoners.

On the next morning, the 8th, we formed a line of
battle, a mile or two in rear of Brandy Station, Ewell's
corps occupying the right, with its left, my division, rest
ing on the road to Culpeper Court-House, and Hill's corps
occupying the left, with his right connecting with my left.
In this position we awaited the advance of the enemy alii
day, but he made no attack on us, though there was some
fighting on Hill's left with the enemy's cavalry. Being
now in a very unfavorable position, and having no good
line to occupy in Culpeper, we fell back that night to the

316

I

DEVASTATION OF THE COUNTRY

Rapidan, and next morning crossed over and occupied
our old positions. Meade's army also occupied very
much the same positions it had previously occupied, and
the line of pickets on the Rapidan was re-established.

While we were in Culpeper on this occasion we dis
covered that Meade's army had almost entirely devas
tated that county. Many beautiful residences of gentle
men had been pulled down, and some within sight of
Meade's own headquarters, for the purpose of making
huts for the soldiers and chimneys to the officers' tents.
It was a scene of desolation, and the population was
almost gone. I had been on the track of this army under
all the other commanders, but I think it committed more
depredations under Meade than under any of the rest,
not excepting Pope himself.

After resuming our positions on the Rapidan, the
condition of things was pretty much as it had been before,
the enemy making some demonstrations but no serious
movement until the last of the month.

A little after the middle of the month, General Swell's
health had been impaired, and I succeeded temporarily
to the command of the corps.

There had been some demonstrations with the enemy's
cavalry force, and General Lee, apprehending that the
enemy might attempt to turn our right by moving across
some of the lower fords, directed me to examine all the
country on our right as far as Mine Run, and ascertain if
a line could be formed there, extending towards Verdier-
ville on the Plank road, which we could occupy in the
event of an advance in that quarter ; and to make myself
familiar with all the roads. Our right, then held by
Rodes' division, covered Morton's Ford and extended
around to the river above the mouth of Mountain Run—
the extreme right flank being unfavorably located, and
liable to be turned, not only by a movement across at
Germana Ford, but also at Jacob's Ford higher up, and
from our right, as well as at some other points in the
neighborhood.

317

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

After a careful examination of the country, I selected
a line to be connected with Bodes' right, by throwing
the latter back from the river and then running the new
line in its prolongation across Mountain Run, and a road
leading past Rodes' rear to Bartlett's Mill, to Locust
Grove, to Black Walnut Run above Bartlett's Mill, from
which point the line could be still further prolonged past
Zoar Church to Verdierville, if necessary, on a dividing
ridge between the waters of Black Walnut and Mine
Runs, which streams united just above Bartlett's Mill.
Johnson's division which had been camped in the rear
was then moved up to construct and occupy the right of
the line extending from Mountain Run to Black Walnut.

While we were engaged in constructing this new line,
with a view to its further prolongation if necessary, so
as to cover all the roads coming in from the right between
the Plank road and the river, on the 26th of November,
Meade's army was discovered to be in motion towards the
fords below on our right, and preparations were at once
made to meet it.

Fitz. Lee's cavalry was ordered to relieve our pickets,
and late in the afternoon of that day Rodes' division was
moved across Black Walnut to the right of Johnson on
the ridge extending towards Zoar Church, and my own
division under the command of General Hays was with
drawn from its position and concentrated with a view of
moving next morning on the old stone pike leading from
Orange Court-House to Fredericksburg by the way of
Locust Grove or Robertson's Tavern, and the old Wilder
ness Tavern so as to get on Rodes' right in prolongation
of the line.

CHAPTER XXIX.
SKIRMISHING AT MINE RUN.

GENERAL LEE had discovered that the enemy was cross
ing some of his troops as low down as Germana Ford, and
to prevent him from getting too far to his rear, he deter
mined to move forward, and not await the advance
against this new line ; and during the night I was ordered
to advance at daylight next morning as far as Locust
Grove on the three roads leading to that point, to wit:
the stone pike, the road by Zoar Church, and the one by
Bartlett's Mill.

In accordance with General Lee's instructions, the
three divisions of the corps were advanced at light on the
morning of the 27th, as follows: my own division under
Hays on the stone pike on the right, Rodes' on the road
by Zoar Church, and Johnson's on the road by Bartlett's
Mill ; and while the troops were moving forward I rode to
meet General Lee at Verdierville, in accordance with a
request from him to that effect.

Rodes' was a little in advance of the other divisions,
and as the advance of his column came in view of the
open ground around Locust Grove (Robertson's Tavern)
a very large force of the enemy was discovered moving
up and occupying the high ground at that point. General
Rodes then formed his division in line across the road
on which he was advancing, in a body of woods, and the
point at which that road united with the one by Bartlett's
Mill on which Johnson was. In a short time Hays came
up from Bartlett's Mill and finding Rodes in position in
possession of Locust Grove, formed his line across that
road confronting him — Johnson in the meantime coming
up from Bartlett's Mill and finding Rodes in positon in
front of him, halted his division along the road with his
advance a short distance in rear of Rodes' line, and his
division extending back towards Bartlett's Mill, so as to

319

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

make his position nearly at right angles with the line
occupied by Eodes. The enemy opened with artillery on
both Rodes and Hays, and some skirmishing ensued.

While I was in consultation with General Lee at
Verdierville, the information that the enemy had been
encountered at Locust Grove reached me in the afternoon,
and I rode to the front to Hays' position. I found the
enemy occupied commanding ground in front and around
Locust Grove, while the position Hays had been com
pelled to assume was low and very unfavorable. The
enemy 's guns raked the road as far as they could reach,
and each side of it the ground, ascending towards the
enemy, was very rough and so obstructed with young
pines and underbrush as to make an advance very difficult.
Causing Hays to connect his left with Rodes' right and
so post his troops as to render them as secure as possible,
I rode to Rodes' position, which I found equally disad
vantageous for defence or attack. General Rodes in
formed me that the force seen entering the plains around
Locust Grove was very heavy and that it was evident
other troops were moving up to that position.

After reconnoitring I was fully satisfied that I could
not make an attack upon the enemy with advantage, and
that he had decidedly the advantage of the ground for
attacking me. An examination of the ground on Hays'
right had caused me to suppose that an attack might be
made on the enemy's left by a force coming up on that
flank from the Plank road, and information of that fact
had been sent to General Lee.

While we were endeavoring to find out all we could
about the enemy's position and strength, a little before
sunset, General Johnson sent me word (to the point of
intersection of the Bartlett 's Mill and Zoar Church roads
where I then was, just in Rodes' rear) that a party of the
enemy had fired on his ambulances, on the road from
Bartlett 's Mill. I had received information that a body
of the enemy's cavalry had crossed in front of Fitz. Lee
at Morton's Ford, and had been cautioned by General

320

SKIRMISHING AT MINE RUN

Fitz. Lee to look out for my left flank against molestation
of the enemy's cavalry, and supposing the party firing on
Johnson's train might be a body of cavalry that had
crossed at some of the fords below Morton's, I sent word
to General Johnson that such was my opinion and
directed him to attack and drive off the cavalry. He at
once formed his division and moved forward to the attack,
soon encountering, instead of a cavalry force, a very
heavy force of infantry advancing towards the Bartlett's
Mill road.

A very heavy engagement with both artillery and in
fantry ensued, in which Johnson's division encountered
the enemy's 3rd corps under French, supported by the
6th corps under Sedgwick, and, after a very obstinate
fight lasting until after dark, Johnson effectually checked
the enemy's advance, driving his troops back, and main
taining full occupation of the road. His brigades behaved
with great gallantry, encountering many times their own
numbers, and by the check thus given to the enemy in this
quarter saved the whole corps from a very serious dis
aster, for if the enemy had got possession of this road,
he would have been able to come up in rear of the other
division, while they were confronting the large force at
Locust Grove.

During the engagement one of Rodes' brigades was
taken from his left and sent to Johnson's assistance, but
before it arrived the action had closed. Johnson's divis
ion did not then exceed 4,000 men, if it reached that num
ber. The two corps moving against it numbered not less
than 30,000 men, though French's corps, the 3rd, was the
only one which became actually engaged.

This affair satisfied me that the enemy's whole army
was in the immediate neighborhood, and as Swell's corps,
under my command, was then in a most unfavorable posi
tion, I determined to fall back across Mine Run about
two miles in our rear, where I had observed a good posi
tion as I passed on. Accordingly after Johnson's fight
was over, and all his wounded and dead had been collected

21 321

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

as far as practicable, in the darkness, the divisions were
withdrawn across Mine Run, my own and Rodes' on the
stone pike, and Johnson's on the road to Zoar Church.
Division commanders were directed to place their divis
ions in position at light next morning, on the west side of
the run, Hays ' left and Rodes ' right resting on the stone
pike, and Johnson's division across the Zoar Church road
so as to connect with Rodes' left. Anderson's division
of Hill's corps had been sent from the Plank road to my
assistance, by General Lee, arriving about dark in rear of
Hays' right, and before withdrawing my own troops I
communicated to General Anderson my purpose, and he
also withdrew across the run, so as to take position on
Hays' right next morning. A strong line of pickets hav
ing been posted in front, the troops lay down on their
arms a short time before day to rest from their fatigue.

In the affair between Johnson's division and the
enemy's 3rd corps, there was some loss of valuable offi
cers and men in killed and wounded, among the former
being Randolph of the Stonewall Brigade, and among
the latter Brigadier General J. M. Jones; but a much
heavier loss was inflicted on the enemy.

After light on the morning of the 28th I rode to see
General Lee at Verdierville for the purpose of advising
him fully of the condition of things and receiving his
further instructions. After being there a short time, in
formation was sent me that the enemy ,was advancing
on the stone pike from Locust Grove, and on riding to
the front I found his skirmishers on the hills beyond Mine
Run. The line on the west bank was now taken and the
men commenced .strengthening it with rifle trenches.
Previous to this time not a spade of earth had been
thrown up on the whole line. In the course of the day
the enemy moved up his whole force in our front; Hill's
corps, which had come up, having taken position on my
right extending across to the Plank road, and covering
that also.

Some skirmish firing ensued between the advance line

322

SKIRMISHING AT MINE RUN

of skirmishers, but no serious move was made by the
enemy.

Our position was a very good one and it was rapidly
strengthened with the ordinary rifle trenches and some
epaulments for artillery. The enemy's position on the
opposite banks of Mine Eun was also a strong one for
defence, the ground there being a little higher than that
occupied by us; and he proceeded to throw up strong
epaulments for his artillery in numerous favorable posi
tions. A direct attack from either side would have been
attended with great difficulties, on account of the neces
sity of having to descend the slopes to Mine Run and
then after crossing that stream to ascend the opposite
slopes under the fire of artillery as well as infantry.

As the enemy had crossed the river to attack us, we
calmly awaited his assault for several days, with full
confidence that we would be able to punish him severely
for disturbance of us at this inclement season.

The weakest part of the line occupied by me was on
the left, where Mine Run made a turn somewhat around
that flank, so as to afford the enemy an opportunity of
placing guns in position to partially enfilade the line.
He was slow, however, to take advantage of this, and
our lines at the exposed parts were protected in some
measure by traverses hastily made. On the 30th, he was
observed moving troops to his right beyond our left, and
dispositions were made to meet him by extending
Johnson's line to the rear around towards Zoar Church.
There had been occasional artillery firing by the enemy,
and on this day he opened quite heavily for a time, our
fire being generally reserved for the attack when it should
be made. Andrews' battalion of artillery, however, near
Johnson's left, supported by some guns from the reserve
artillery, replied to the enemy's for a time.

A force of infantry crossing Mine Run in front of my
division, under cover of some woods on the bank of the
stream, came up to an imperfect line of trenches in front,
which had been abandoned for a better and shorter line

323

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

in their rear and were then only held by a line of skir
mishers, but was soon compelled to retire.

The enemy had possession of Bartlett's Mill road
which ran on our left towards the fords above, and con
nected with a road from Bartlett's Mill to Zoar Church in
our rear; and as there was great danger of our left being
turned in this direction, a watch was kept by videttes and
pickets on that flank, so as to advise us of any movement,
and enable us to move the line in prolongation until it
connected with the one on the river.

The enemy made no such movement, however, and
though on the 30th there were indications as if he were
going to attack our left, yet he did not do so.

At the same time there had been indications of a
purpose to attack our right beyond the Plank road, and
corresponding movements were made to meet an attack
there.

We remained in position awaiting the enemy's move
ments until December, when, all purpose to attack on his
part being apparently abandoned, General Lee deter
mined to attack him on his left flank, and for that purpose
drew out two of Hill 's divisions on the right to make the
attack early next morning, the other division being moved
to occupy their positions and my divisions being extended
out to the right to occupy the part of the line evacuated
by Hill's left division (Anderson's). During the night,
however, the enemy withdrew from our front, and next
morning he was found gone.

As soon as this was discovered I moved forward with
the whole corps on the stone pike and then towards Ger-
mana Ford, capturing some two or three hundred pris
oners, but the enemy's main force had crossed the river
early in the morning.* After going to within a short dis-

* Though Meade's performance on this occasion was somewhat
like that of a King of France on a certain occasion, yet he had not
failed to accomplish something towards the " suppression of the re
bellion." There was a little tanyard near Locust Grove, in sight of
his headquarters, which belonged to and was operated by a poor man

324

SKIRMISHING AT MINE RUN

tance of Germana Ford, and finding that there was no
prospect of accomplishing anything further, I returned
that night across Mine Run and encamped. The next
day we returned to our former positions and the old state
of things was resumed.

During our absence a division of the enemy's cavalry
had crossed at Morton's Ford, and after some fighting,
had been compelled by Fitz. Lee's cavalry to retire.

The loss in the corps during this affair was slight,
nearly the whole of it being sustained by Johnson's
division in the fight of the 27th.

who took in hides to tan on shares for the neighbors, but who was in no
wise engaged in tanning for the government or the soldiers. The
community around it was very poor, and this was the sole dependence
for shoes for the women and children of that neighborhood. The
tannery building and the house of the owner were burned, the leather
all destroyed, and the hides in the vats taken out and cut to pieces so
as to be worthless. In addition to this, all the plows and farming
utensils, and wheeled vehicles, including old ox-carts and dilapidated
buggies, in the neighborhood and on the road to Germana Ford were
burned, and the houses of a number of citizens ransacked and the
furniture destroyed. In the very few cases where there were pianos or
libraries, the former were hacked to pieces with axes, and the books in
the latter torn up and scattered over the ground, private papers shar
ing the same fate. I saw the evidences of these things myself. The
women and children around Locust Grove had no new shoes that winter,
and the people in all that country were deprived of the means of
properly cultivating their crops next season, to say nothing of those
who lost what little source of amusement, recreation or mental employ
ment there was left to them.

Can it be doubted that this was calculated to break the spirit of
the "rebellion"1? Meade's expedition to Mine Run accomplished this
much if no more.

CHAPTER XXX.
AVERILL'S RAID AND THE WINTER CAMPAIGN.

A FEW days after our return from Mine Run, General
Ewell came back to the command of the corps, and I re
turned to my division, all remaining quiet on the Rapidan.

About the middle of December a force of cavalry and
infantry moved from New Creek on the Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad up the south branch of the Potomac, under
General Averill of the Federal Army, apparently threat
ening Staunton in the Valley, while at the same time
another force under Colonel Wells moved up the Valley
from Martinsburg to Strasburg. General Imboden com
manding in the Valley, having only a small brigade of
cavalry and a battery of artillery, applied to General Lee
for reinforcements, and two brigades of Hill's corps,
Thomas ' and II. H. Walker 's, were sent to Staunton over
the railroad, Fitz. Lee's brigade of cavalry being ordered
to move to the Valley also. General Lee then ordered
me to proceed to the Valley and take command of all the
troops there.

I started at once, leaving Orange Court-House by rail
and, reaching Staunton, by reason of some delay on the
railroad, after the middle of the night. I found Thomas '
brigade in Staunton, it having arrived the evening before,
ahead of me, and Walker's had moved out to Buffalo
Gap, ten miles beyond Staunton on the road to McDowell,
at or near which place the enemy under Averill was
reported to be.

Very early next morning General Imboden came into
town, and I rode with him to his camp across the moun
tain from Buffalo Gap near the Calf Pasture River. He
reported that the enemy's force was about five thousand
strong and still confronted him behind Bull Pasture
River, on the other side of the intervening mountains,
where it was watched by a detachment of his cavalry, and

AVERILL'S RAID AND THE WINTER CAMPAIGN

such was the report we found at his camp. After I had
been at his camp but a very short time, a courier came
to me with a telegraphic dispatch from General Lee, who
was then in Eichmond, stating that Averill had left the
Sweet Springs on the morning of the day before on the
road towards Salem. I then started back to Buffalo Gap,
and on the way I received another telegraphic dispatch
from General Lee, informing me that Averill had entered
Salem on the Virginia & Tennessee Railroad the morning
of that day, and directing me to make arrangements to
capture him.

It turned out that Averill with his cavalry had left
the front of General Imboden at least two days before
I started from Orange, leaving the small infantry force
with him, under Colonel Thoburn, to. amuse Imboden 's
pickets, and that Thoburn had also started back to the
valley of the South Branch before I arrived. Imboden
was ordered to bring his brigade back to Buffalo Gap,
that night, for the purpose of being sent after Averill.

The question was how to cut off AverilPs retreat, as
he had several ways of getting back to a safe position.
He might return the way he went — go up the railroad and
then by the way of Blacksburg in Montgomery — come back
by the way of Fincastle to Covington — or by the way of
Buchanan and Lexington through the Valley, there being
numerous intervening roads between these main routes
which afforded him ample facilities for escape if he had
good guides. After consultation with General Imboden,
who was very familiar with the country, I determined to
send his brigade to Covington next day, where it would be
in a position to intercept AverilPs retreat on the road by
that place or move to the right and intercept him at
Callahan's if he returned the same way he went.

During the night it rained in perfect torrents — such
a rain as I have rarely seen — and by the next morning
all the streams were very high. The direct route to
Covington was down the valley of the Little Calf Pasture
crossing that stream many times, across Big Calf Pasture

327

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

and Cow Pasture Rivers. Little Calf Pasture itself, it
was evident from the condition of the very small streams
at Buffalo, would be impassable where there were no
bridges, and there was no bridge over the Cow Pasture,
quite a large river, on this route. It was, therefore, im
possible for him to go the direct road, but being informed
by him that there was a bridge over the Cow Pasture not
far above its junction with Jackson's River, which could
be reached by going through Rockbridge, and avoiding
the other streams, I ordered him to take that route, which
was by the way of Brownsburg.

The infantry brigades I determined to move back to
Staunton, to be used for the defence of that place in the
event of Averill 's moving that way, as it was useless to
be sending them after cavalry over such a track of coun
try. Colonel Wm. L. Jackson was at Jackson's River
Depot at the termination of the Central Railroad, with
about five hundred men of his brigade dismounted, and
that covered a route by Clifton Forge from Fincastle up
the river to Covington. Railroad communication with
him was cut by the previous destruction of the bridge
over Cow Pasture, but there was telegraphic communi
cation with him, and he was ordered to keep a lookout
and make disposition to stop Averill if he came that way.
I expected to find Fitz. Lee in the valley by this time,
either at Staunton or farther down, and I rode to that
place to order him to such point as might be advisable
after I heard what route Averill had taken.

On arriving at Staunton, I found General Fitz. Lee
himself, who had come in advance of his brigade, which
had crossed the mountain at Swift Run Gap. I was now
in telegraphic communication with General Nichols at
Lynchburg, and from him I received information that
Averill had started back on the same route he came, but
was stopped by high water at Craig's Creek some twelve
or fifteen miles from Salem. I, therefore, determined to
order Fitz. Lee to Covington by the way of Lexington and
Colliertown, at which latter place Imboden was ordered

328

AVERILL'S RAID AND THE WINTER CAMPAIGN

to unite with him. His brigade passed through Staunton
late that afternoon, and General Lee followed very early
next morning, with instructions to make all necessary
arrangements to capture the raiding force, and with
directions to move to any point that might be necessary
according to the information which he might receive
either at Lexington or elsewhere.

About the middle of the day I received a telegraphic
dispatch from General Nichols covering one from an
operator, stating that he had gone on the railroad that
morning to within a mile of Salem, and that Averill was
returning to that place, having been unable to cross
Craig's Creek. If this was true, Averill must then
attempt to make his escape by the way of the western
route by Blacksburg, or the northern route by the way
of Buchanan, and taking it for granted that it was true,
I at once sent a copy by a courier to General Lee for his
information, stating to him at the same time that as he
was much nearer to Averill than I was, he might have
other information on which to act, and leaving it to his
discretion to move to Buchanan or to Covington as his
information might justify.

When my dispatch reached General Lee he had united
with Iinboden at Colliertown, and after consultation with
the latter he determined to move to Buchanan, as he had
no information which warranted him in supposing that
the dispatch from Lynchburg was not true.

During the night after I had received the dispatch
informing me of Averill 's return to Salem, I received
another from General Nichols informing me that the in
formation sent was not true and that Averill had suc
ceeded after some delay in crossing Craig's Creek and
moving on. It was now too late to reach Fitz. Lee by
courier and I hoped that he might have had some accurate
information.

I now determined to try to reach Jackson's position
with one of the brigades of infantry, and Thomas' was
sent next morning on the railroad, to endeavor to get

329

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

across Cow Pasture in boats and so reach Jackson. The
running stock of the railroad was in such bad condition,
and the grades beyond Millboro were so heavy, having a
temporary track with inclined planes at an unfinished
part of the road beyond that point, that Thomas' brigade
could not get any further. I ran down on the road myself
to see if the brigade could not be thrown to some point to
intercept the enemy. Arriving just at night I found
General Thomas in telegraphic communication with Jack
son, and the information was soon received that AverilPs
advance had made its appearance on an obscure road
across the mountains into the Jackson's Eiver Valley,
and that a small part of Jackson's men were skirmishing
with the enemy. This road came in above Jackson's
main position, and the party watching it was soon forced
back, and Averill's force got into the road between
Jackson and the bridge above him, which bridge was
guarded by a party of some eight or ten reserves, who
abandoned their post.

The enemy thus got possession of the bridge and com
menced crossing rapidly. Jackson, in the meantime,
moved up and attacked the enemy's rear, which he threw
into great confusion, capturing over two hundred pris
oners. In his alarm the enemy set fire to the bridge,
thus cutting off all of his wagons, and some two or three
hundred of his men. The wagons were burned and the
men left behind subsequently moved up the river and
forded by swimming.

All this information was communicated to me that
night and next morning by telegram, and I knew that
it was useless to make any further attempt to cut the
enemy off with my infantry, as he was beyond pursuit of
any kind.

When Fitz. Lee reached Buchanan and found Averill
was not coming that way, he moved by the way of Fin-
castle in pursuit, and ascertaining what route Averill had
taken, he then went to Covington and from there followed
to Callahan's, but the greater part of the raiding party

330

AVERILL'S RAID AND THE WINTER CAMPAIGN

had made its escape, so he desisted from what was then
a useless effort. The facts were that on going back on
the route he had come, from the Sweet Springs, Averill
found his retreat cut off that way by Echol's brigade of
General Sam Jones' force from Southwestern Virginia,
which was posted on what is called Potts' or Middle
Mountain, and he then turned across toward Covington
over Rich Patch Mountain, being compelled to come into
the valley of Jackson's River at the point he did to
reach the bridge on the road from Clifton Forge to
Covington, as there was no bridge on the direct road to
that place. He thus succeeded in making his escape by
the stupidity or treachery of a telegraph operator, but the
amount of damage he had been able to do did not com
pensate for the loss of men and horses which he sustained,
and the sufferings the others endured. He had been able
to burn a small depot at Salem with a few supplies in it
and one or two small bridges in the neighborhood, which
were rebuilt in a few days. His raid really amounted to
very little except the name of it.

The same night that Averill made his escape by
Jackson, I received a dispatch from General Walker at
Staunton informing me that the force that had been at
Strasburg was moving up the valley, and had passed
New Market. I telegraphed to him to move to the North
River at Mount Crawford at once, which he did early
next day. Thomas' brigade was moved back to Staunton,
starting early in the morning, but on account of the con
dition of the road, did not reach there until nearly night.
On arriving at Staunton myself, I rode out to Walker's
position eighteen miles beyond, leaving orders for
Thomas to march up during the night. On reaching
Walker I found that the enemy was in Harrisonburg, and
I ordered an advance early next morning.

At light next day, Thomas came up, both brigades
moving forward. The enemy was found to have retired
during the night, leaving a small cavalry rear guard,
which retreated as we came up. I had no cavalry except

331

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

a few stragglers from different cavalry commands, which
I could employ only as scouts to observe the movements
of the enemy, but I pushed on in pursuit. After passing
Harrisonburg, a battalion of mounted men exempt from
regular service by age or otherwise, called the Augusta
Raid Guards, came up, and were ordered forward in pur
suit, but accomplished nothing. According to the organ
ization of the command, the men were not bound to go
beyond the limits of any adjoining county, and when they
reached the Shenandoah line they halted, standing upon
their legal rights, though it may be doubted if they
would have stood upon them if the enemy had turned
back.

This force of the enemy had now got beyond reach,
and Thomas' brigade was halted at Lacy's Springs after
having marched thirty-six miles since after nightfall the
evening before. Walker's moved on to New Market and
halted there, having then marched twenty-eight miles.

The movement in this direction had been made to
divert some of the troops from the pursuit of Averill,
so as to aid his escape ; and the force making it now re
treated rapidly to Martinsburg. Thomas being moved
up to New Market, I rested the men a few days, and I
then received directions from General Lee to send a
cavalry expedition into the counties of Hardy and Hamp
shire to get some cattle and meat for his men. Our army
was now very much straitened for provisions, espe
cially for meat, of which they were sometimes devoid
for days at a time. As soon as Fitz. Lee had returned
from the pursuit of Averill I ordered him up to the
vicinity of New Market, and when his men and horses
had rested a few days he was ordered to cross the Great
North Mountain into Hardy, try and dislodge an infantry
force at Petersburg, cut the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
at the mouth of the South Branch of the Potomac, and of
Patterson's Creek, gather all the beef cattle he could,
and likewise get what of value was to be had.

By the last of December he was ready to move, and

332

AVERILL'S RAID AND THE WINTER CAMPAIGN

started, accompanied by McNeil's company of partisan
rangers and Gilmor's Maryland battalion, crossing the
mountain over a rugged road near Orkney Springs. I
started McClanahan's battery of artillery of Imboden's
command with him and some wagons, but it was now the
1st of January and the weather had become excessively
cold, the thermometer being near zero, and when the
artillery got to the top of the mountain, it was found
that the roads on the other side, which were very steep,
were sheeted with ice, rendering it impracticable to get
the artillery down in safety. The cavalry succeeded in
getting down, by the men being dismounted to lead their
horses, but the artillery and wagons had to be sent back.

To attract attention from this expedition I moved at
the same time down the Valley pike to Fisher's Hill with
Thomas' brigade, preceded by Imboden's cavalry under
Colonel Smith, and remained there until Fitz. Lee's re
turn, Smith being sent beyond Strasburg to demonstrate
towards Winchester. Walker's brigade had been left at
Mount Jackson. While we were at Fisher's Hill, there
were two heavy snows, and there was very hard freezing
weather all the time. The men had no tents and their
only shelter consisted of rude open sheds made of split
wood, yet, though Thomas' was a Georgia brigade, they
stood the weather remarkably well and seemed to take
a pleasure in the expedition, regretting when the time
came to fall back.

In the meantime Fitz. Lee had reached Hardy,
attacked a guarded train moving from New Creek to
Petersburg for the supply of that post, captured more
than twenty wagons and some prisoners, invested the
post at Petersburg, which he found strongly fortified, but
having no artillery he abandoned the attempt to dislodge
the enemy without making an attack. He then moved
down to the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, destroyed the
bridge over Patterson's Creek and that over the South
Branch partially, collected a large number of cattle, and
came off with the captured wagons, and prisoners, and

333

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

some eight hundred or one thousand head of beef cattle.
His men had been exposed to the same severe weather
to which those at Fisher's Hill had been, and the feet of a
few of them had been frosted. As soon as I heard of
his safe return, I moved back up the valley, and the cattle
brought off were sent to the army.

Not long afterwards, Fitz. Lee's cavalry returned to
the eastern side of the ridge, but its place was taken by
Rosser 's brigade, which had come into the valley.

About the last of January I undertook another expe
dition into the Hardy Valley for the same objects for
which the first had been made. This I determined to
make with Rosser's brigade of cavalry and one of the
brigades of infantry, accompanied by McClanahan's bat
tery, that being the only artillery there was in the valley.

Rosser with his brigade, McNeil's company, a part
of Gilmor's battalion, the battery and some wagons
passed through Brock's Gap into the valley of Lost River,
while Thomas' brigade moved over the mountains, at the
Orkney Springs pass, to the same valley. Imboden was
left with Walker's brigade of infantry at Mount Jackson,
and his own brigade of cavalry advanced down the Valley
pike towards Winchester, to demonstrate in that direc
tion. Passing over the mountain to Matthews' on Lost
River in advance of Thomas' brigade I found Rosser at
that place, where we spent the night. From this point
the road to Moorefield ascends to the summit of Branch
Mountain and then along that for several miles, through
a wild, mountainous and desolate looking region, until
it comes to the point of descent into the Moorefield Val
ley, which latter, a most beautiful and fertile valley sur
rounded by high mountains, is reached at the western
base of the mountain on the South Fork of the South
Branch.

Starting early in the morning we reached the South
Fork with the cavalry and artillery early in the day, and
leaving the main force there, behind the mountain inter
vening between the two forks, McNeil's company was

334

AVERILL'S RAID AND THE WINTER CAMPAIGN

thrown forward to Moorefield and the North Fork, to
cover our front and prevent the enemy, who occupied the
fortified fort at Petersburg eight or ten miles above
Moorefield on the North Fork, from discovering our pres
ence in force; McNeil's company being composed mainly
of men from that section, and being in the habit of mak
ing frequent raids into the valley.

We had ascertained that a large loaded wagon train
was on the point of starting from New Creek for Peters
burg, and some very trusty scouts perfectly familiar with
the country were watching it. During the night, we were
informed by the scouts that the train of about one hun
dred wagons had started, guarded by a force of infantry,
and that it would be on the Patterson Creek road across
Patterson Mountain from Moorefield at an early hour
next day. Rosser immediately made preparations to
move with his brigade and the battery of artillery before
light in the morning. Crossing over Patterson Moun
tain, he found the road obstructed with trees felled across
it, extending some distance on each side, and the obstruc
tions defended by a force of infantry. Dismounting a
part of his men, he attacked and drove the enemy from
the obstructions, and clearing the road, he passed through
and soon encountered the train.

The infantry guard was very strong, and McClana-
han's guns were brought into action, when by a vigorous
charge the guard was dispersed, taking refuge in the
mountains, and over ninety loaded wagons with their
teams, and more than one hundred prisoners were cap
tured. Fifty of the wagons were sent back with their
teams and loads, but the rest were so badly smashed in the
confusion resulting from the attack, that they could not
be moved; and securing the teams and such of the con
tents as could be brought off, the injured wagons were
burned.

Rosser had been ordered to move around and take
position on the road north and west of Petersburg, so
as to cut off the retreat of the enemy from that place,

335

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

against which I proposed moving at light next day, as the
infantry would be up at night, and he proceeded to obey
the orders.

Thomas' Georgians, moving along the summit of
Branch Mountain with nothing but wild inaccessible
mountains and deep ravines on each side as far as the eye
could reach, could not understand why they were carried
over such a route at this season and inquired of each
other: " What can General Early mean by bringing us
into such a country as this in the midst of winter ? ' But
when they came suddenly in view of the beautiful valley
of Moorefield and saw spread out before them what John
son might have taken as the original of his ideas of the
" Happy Valley " in Easselas, they burst into wild
enthusiasm at the unexpected scene, so beautiful and
inviting even in the midst of winter and with the tread
of an invading enemy upon it.

They were no longer disposed to murmur, and reach
ing the vicinity of Moorefield late in the afternoon, their
spirits were still further cheered by the sight of a large
number of beautiful girls rushing out to see and welcome
" our " infantry, as they fondly called it, a sight that
had not met the eyes of those warm-hearted beings since
a portion of the force constituting Garnett's ill-starred
expedition had retreated that way early in the war. The
Georgians were ready then to go anywhere. Not dis
continuing their march they were thrown across the North
Fork just at dark on the road to Petersburg, by felling
trees from each side so as to interlap, and enable them
to crawl over.

The road to Petersburg passed through a narrow de
file above, just wide enough for a wagon way, with the
river on one side and a very high vertical precipice of
rock on the other side, so as to make it impracticable to
pass through the file if held by any force at all, and it was
then strongly picketed by the enemy, whose main force
was in reach. The men bivouacked and kept as quiet as
possible during the night so as not to alarm the enemy,

336

AVERILL'S RAID AND THE WINTER CAMPAIGN

and at light next morning I moved with them over the
mountain, on a mere pathway lately unused and nearly
grown up with underbrush, so as to avoid the defile
spoken of and get in its rear, being guided by Captain
McNeil with his company.

A thick fog overspread the mountains and the valley,
as it was moist, mild weather, and when we reached the
open ground on the other side where we were within easy
artillery range of the enemy's works, nothing could be
seen of them or the town of Petersburg. We heard some
drums beating and an occasional cheer, and having sent
a small force to get in rear of the defile while I made
disposition to advance upon the point where I was told
the enemy's works were, information reached me that
Rosser was in possession of the enemy's works, the force
of the latter consisting of two regiments and some artil
lery, having evacuated during the night and taken a
rough obscure road to the west through the mountains
of which Rosser had not known.

Some provisions and forage were found in the works
which were appropriated, and Rosser was ordered to
move at once down Patterson Creek, cut the railroad, and
gather all the cattle and sheep he could by sending detach
ments through the country. After demolishing the works,
which contained several bomb-proof shelters for men and
magazines for ammunition and other stores, Thomas'
brigade was moved back towards Moorefield, and next
day posted so as to cover the approaches from the direc
tion of Winchester.

The men now had an abundance of provisions, and
the luxury of a little coffee taken from the enemy; and
the kind hospitality of the good people of Moorefield and
the vicinity rendered this winter campaign into the
mountains a most pleasant episode in their army
experiences.

Rosser succeeded in cutting the railroad at the mouths
of Patterson Creek and the South Branch where it had
been previously cut by Fitz. Lee, dislodging a guard from
22 337

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

the latter place, and also in collecting a considerable num
ber of cattle and sheep, with which he returned to Moore-
field in two or three days. The enemy, however, had
moved from Cumberland with a large force of infantry
and cavalry, and also a brigade of cavalry from Martins-
burg to intercept, but he succeeded in passing in safety
between the columns sent against Mm. McNeil's com
pany and part of Gilmor's battalion had been sent west
to the Allegheny Mountains to collect cattle and were now
returning by the way of Petersburg with a good lot of
them.

The morning after Rosser's return I made prepara
tions to retire with the prisoners, plunder, cattle, and
sheep in our possession, and as we were moving out of
Moorefield, the enemy's force consisting of Kelly's com
mand from Cumberland and Averill's brigade of cavalry
came in view on the opposite banks of the river, and
opened with artillery. Thomas' brigade, which had
moved across to the valley of the South Fork, and com
menced retiring, was brought back a short distance and
formed in line across the valley with the artillery in posi
tion, while Rosser's cavalry retiring through Moorefield
took position below Thomas, sending out some skir
mishers to encounter those of the enemy.

The object of this was to enable Captain McNeil to
get in rear with his cattle, with which he was coming up
on a road around our left flank, as we were then faced,
and give time to the wagons and cattle and sheep to get
well up the sides of the mountain, so that they might be
protected against the enemy. As soon as this was done,
and we could see the wagons, cattle and sheep slowly mov
ing up the road on the side of the mountain, extending
over a distance of some two or three miles, we withdrew
gradually, but a small force of the enemy's cavalry fol
lowed at a most respectful distance, to the base of the
mountains, where it halted.

Rosser's brigade took an obscure road to the left

338

AVERILL'S RAID AND THE WINTER CAMPAIGN

across the mountain, so as to come into the valley of Lost
River below Matthews', and Thomas followed the trains.
The enemy did not attempt to molest us further, and he
had the mortification of seeing all the plunder we had
obtained marched off in a long winding train, visible to
him for several miles, without being able to interfere with
us. It was not in accordance with the object of my expe
dition to give him battle at this time, and I therefore
contented myself with securing what I had.

Everything reached the valley in safety, Rosser taking
the route through Brock's Gap with the wagons, etc., and
Thomas moving across the mountain the same way we had
gone. Riding ahead of the infantry the day after we left
Moorefield, I understood, on the road, there was a report
at Mount Jackson that the enemy was moving up from
below in strong force, and quickening my force I reached
Mount Jackson just after the report had been ascertained
to be false, and the commotion had been allayed. The
whole report had originated in the foolish fright of a
small cavalry picket at Columbia Furnace, below, where
a road comes in across the mountain from the valley of
Lost River, which was caused by the approach on that
road of a company of Rosser 's men whose homes were
in that immediate neighborhood, they having been allowed
to go to them for a day or two.

When discharged, after crossing the mountain, with
out knowing that a picket was near, the men, who had
been out in a rain, commenced discharging their arms,
and the picket made off, not stopping to hear the calls of
the men at whose appearance it had become frightened,
but continuing to retreat the faster, magnifying the force,
in imagination, at every step, until, when the commander
of the picket reached General Imboden, with his horse
panting and foaming, it had swelled to two or three
thousand men.

Those things will happen sometimes to the bravest of
men. We were again able to send General Lee's army

339

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

about a thousand beef cattle, and some few other supplies,
which served to keep up the spirits of our much enduring
men.

The weather we had had for this expedition was
unusually mild and favorable for that season when, in the
section into which we went, the climate is usually as harsh
among the mountains as it is in that part of Canada
bordering on the Lakes.

Shortly after our return, the troops were moved fur
ther up the valley, the two infantry brigades going into
camp near Harrisonburg, and the cavalry going to Rock-
bridge and the railroad west of Staunton where forage
could be obtained, a small force being left to picket down
the valley.

Major Gilmor subsequently made a raid down the
valley, and captured a train on the Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad.

After the troops had been located, in company with
Captain Hotchkiss, topographical engineer for Swell's
corps, I made a reconnoissance of the country and moun
tain passes west of Staunton and extending across
Jackson's River to the mountains beyond, and selected a
line to be fortified so as to prevent raids. Captain Hotch
kiss made a sketch of this line and the country, which
being sent to General Lee, he ordered the necessary works
to be constructed, which I believe was subsequently done.

About the last of February, my services being no
longer necessary in the valley, I left for the purpose of
returning to my division, after a leave of absence of two
weeks granted me. In reaching Gordonsville by the rail
road, I ascertained that some movement was being made
by the enemy, and I therefore ran down to Orange Court-
House to be present with my command if anything serious
was going on.

It turned out that the enemy's movement was for the
purpose of a cavalry raid against Richmond. A force
being moved towards Charlottesville on our left, while
the main raiding party, under Kilpatrick, went towards

340

AVERILL'S RAID AND THE WINTER CAMPAIGN

Richmond for the purpose of capturing and burning the
city, releasing the Federal prisoners, and bringing off or
killing the Confederate authorities. This raid proved a
ridiculous failure, its approach to Richmond being pre
vented by some home guards and local troops composed
of employees in the departments, while Hampton dis
persed a part of it with a few of his cavalry hastily gotten
up. The force moving on Charlottesville retired from
before a few pieces of artillery which had no support.

After this affair was settled I took the benefit of my
short leave — the only indulgence of the kind asked for
or received by me during the whole war.

I returned to my division about the middle of March,
and assumed command, finding it in its old position,
nothing serious having occurred during the winter.

What was left of Hoke's brigade had been detached
and sent under General Hoke to North Carolina, where
it participated in some movements, including the capture
of the town of Plymouth, with its garrison, by Hoke. It
did not return to the division until after the commence
ment of the subsequent campaign, though it took part in
the defence of Petersburg and the attack on Butler by
General Beauregard.

We remained in position in our old place until the
opening of the spring campaign. In the meantime Major
General U. S. Grant had been assigned to the command
of all the armies of the United States, with the rank of
Lieutenant General, and had come to take immediate com
mand of the army confronting us, which army was being
very greatly strengthened by recruits, drafted men, and
other troops.

The Army of the Potomac under Meade had been con
solidated into three corps instead of five, to-wit : the 2nd,
and 6th, and 9th corps under Burnside, which had been
very greatly increased, was added to the force in our
front. The Army of the Potomac, and the 9th corps,
with the artillery and cavalry, the latter having been
largely increased, constituted Grant's immediate com-

341

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

mand, though he had a general control of all the forces.
By the last of May it was very evident that the enemy
was making very formidable preparations for a campaign
against us, and to meet them we had but what remained
of the army with which we had fought the year before,
recruited since the close of active operations, only by
such men as had recovered from wounds and sickness,
and a few young men who had just arrived at the age of
military service. Longstreet had returned from his ex
pedition into Tennessee with two of his divisions,
McLaws' and Field's (formerly Hood's), Pickett's being
absent and south of James River.

CHAPTER XXXI.

FROM THE EAPIDAN TO THE JAMES.

ON the 3rd of May, 1864, the positions of the Con
federate Army under General Lee, and the Federal Army
under Lieutenant General Grant in Virginia, were as
follows : General Lee held the southern bank of the Rapi-
dan River, in Orange County, with his right resting near
the mouth of Mine Run, and his left extending to Liberty
Mills on the road from Gordonsville (via Madison Court-
House) to the Shenandoah Valley; while the crossings of
the river on the right, and the roads on the left, were
watched by cavalry : Swell's corps was on the right, Hill's
on the left, and two divisions of Longstreet 's corps were
encamped in the rear, near Gordonsville. Grant's army
(composed of the Army of the Potomac under Meade,
and the 9th corps under Burnside) occupied the north
banks of the Rapidan and Robinson rivers ; the main body
being encamped in Culpeper County and on the Rappa-
hannock River.

I am satisfied that General Lee's army did not exceed
50,000 effective men of all arms. The report of the Fed
eral Secretary of War, Stanton, shows that the " avail
able force present for duty, May 1st, 1864," in Grant's
army, was 141,166, to-wit: In the Army of the Potomac
120,386, and in the 9th corps 20,780. The draft in the
United States was being energetically enforced, and vol
unteering had been greatly stimulated by high bounties.
The Northwestern States had tendered large bodies of
troops to serve one hundred days, in order to relieve
other troops on garrison and local duty, and this enabled
Grant to put in the field a large number of troops which
had been employed on that kind of duty. It was known
that he was receiving heavy reinforcements up to the very
time of his movement on the 4th of May, and afterwards ;
so that the statement of his force on the 1st of May, by

343

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

Stanton, does not cover the whole force with which he
commenced the campaign. Moreover, Secretary Stan-
ton's report shows that there were in the Department of
Washington and the Middle Department, 47,751 available
men for duty, the chief part of which, he says, was called
to the front, after the campaign began, " in order to re
pair the losses of the Army of the Potomac; " and Grant
says that, at Spottsylvania Court-House, "the 13th, 14th,
15th, 16th, 17th and 18th (of May) were consumed in
manoeuvring and awaiting the arrival of reinforcements
from Washington." His army, therefore, must have
numbered very nearly, if not quite, 200,000 men, before a
junction was effected with Butler.

On the 4th of May, it was discovered that Grant's
army was moving towards Germana Ford on the Rapi-
dan, which was ten or twelve miles from our right. This
movement had begun on the night of the 3rd, and the
enemy succeeded in seizing the ford and effecting a
crossing, as the river was guarded at that point by only
a small cavalry picket. The direct road from Germana
Ford to Richmond passes by Spottsylvania Court-House
and when Grant had effected his crossing, he was nearer
to Richmond than General Lee was. From Orange Court-
House, near which were General Lee's headquarters,
there are two nearly parallel roads running eastwardly to
Fredericksburg — the one which is nearest to the river
being called " The old Stone Pike," and the other " The
Plank Road. ' ' The road from Germana Ford to Spottsyl
vania Court-House crosses the old Stone Pike at the "Old
Wilderness Tavern," and two or three miles farther on
it crosses the Plank road.

As soon as it was ascertained that Grant's movement
was a serious one, preparations were made to meet him,
and the troops of General Lee's army were put in motion
— Swell's corps moving on the old Stone Pike, and Hill's
corps on the Plank Road; into which latter road Long-
street's force also came, from his camp near Gordonsville.

Ewell's corps, to which my division belonged, crossed

344

FROM THE RAPIDAN TO THE JAMES

Mine Run, and encamped at Locust Grove, four miles
beyond, on the afternoon of the 4th. When the rest of the
corps moved, my division and Ramseur's brigade of
Rodes' division were left to watch the fords of the Rapi-
dan, until relieved by cavalry. As soon as this was done,
I moved to the position occupied by the rest of the corps,
carrying Ramseur with me.

EwelPs corps contained three divisions of infantry,
to wit: Johnson 's, Rodes' and my own (Early 's). At this
time one of my brigades (Hoke's) was absent, having
been with Hoke in North Carolina ; and I had only three
present, to wit: Hays7, Pegram's and Gordon's. One of
Rodes' brigades (R. D. Johnston's) was at Hanover Junc
tion. I had about 4,000 muskets for duty; Johnson about
the same number; and Rodes (including Johnston's bri
gade) about 6,000.

CHAPTER XXXII.

BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS.

ON the morning of the 5th, Ewell's corps was put in
motion, my division bringing up the rear. A short dis
tance from the Old Wilderness Tavern, and just in ad
vance of the place where a road diverges to the left from
the old Stone Pike to the Germana Ford road, the enemy,
in heavy force, was encountered, and Jones ' brigade, of
Johnson's division, and Battle's brigade, of Bodes' divis
ion, were driven back in some confusion. My division was
ordered up, and formed across the pike, Gordon's bri
gade being on the right of the road. This brigade, as soon
as it was brought into line, was ordered forward, and
advanced through a dense pine thicket in gallant style.
In conjunction with Daniel's, Doles' and Eamseur's bri
gades, of Bodes' division, it drove the enemy back with
heavy loss, capturing several hundred prisoners, and
gaining a commanding position on the right. Johnson,
at the same time, was heavily engaged in his front, his
division being on the left of the pike and extending across
the road to the Germana Ford road, which has been men
tioned. After the enemy had been repulsed, Hays' bri
gade was sent to Johnson's left, in order to participate in
a forward movement ; and it did move forward some half
a mile or so, encountering the enemy in force ; but from
some mistake, not meeting with the expected co-operation,
except from one regiment of Jones' brigade (the 25th
Virginia), the most of which was captured, it was drawn
back to Johnson's line, and took position on his left.

Pegram's brigade was subsequently sent to take posi
tion on Hays' left; and, just before night, a very heavy
attack was made on its front, which was repulsed with
severe loss to the enemy. In this affair, General Pegram
received a severe wound in the leg, which disabled him
for the field for some months.

346

BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS

During the afternoon there was heavy skirmishing
along the whole line, several attempts having been made
by the enemy, without success, to regain the position
from which he had been driven ; and the fighting extended
to General Lee's right on the Plank road. Gordon occu
pied the position which he had gained, on the right, until
after dark, when he was withdrawn to the extreme left,
and his place occupied by part of Bodes' division,

The troops encountered, in the beginning of the fight,
consisted of the 5th corps, under Warren; but other
troops were brought to his assistance. At the close of the
day, EwelPs corps had captured over a thousand pris-
oneis, besides inflicting on the enemy very heavy losses
in killed and wounded. Two pieces of artillery had been
abandoned by the enemy, just in front of the point at
which Johnson's right and Bodes' left joined, and were
subsequently secured by our troops.

After the withdrawal of Gordon's brigade from the
right, the whole of my division was on the left of the
road diverging from the pike, in extension of Johnson's
line. All of my brigades had behaved handsomely; and
Gordon's advance, at the time of the confusion in the
beginning of the fight, was made with great energy and
dispatch, and was just in time to prevent a serious
disaster.

Early on the morning of the 6th, the fighting was re
sumed, and a very heavy attack was made on the front
occupied by Pegram's brigade (now under the command
of Colonel Hoffman of the 31st Virginia Begiment) ; but
it was handsomely repulsed, as were several subsequent
attacks on the same point.

These attacks were so persistent, that two regiments
of Johnson's division were moved to the rear of Pegram's
brigade, for the purpose of supporting it; and when an
offer was made to relieve it, under the apprehension that
its ammunition might be exhausted, the men of that gal
lant brigade begged that they might be allowed to retain

347

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

their position, stating that they were getting along very
well indeed and wanted no help.

During the morning, the fact was communicated to
General Ewell, by our cavalry scouts, that a column of
the enemy's infantry was moving between our left and the
river, with the apparent purpose of turning our left
flank; and information was also received that Burnside's
corps had crossed the river, and was in rear of the
enemy's right. I received directions to watch this column,
and take steps to prevent its getting to our rear; and
Johnston's brigade, of Rodes' division, which had just
arrived from Hanover Junction, was sent to me for that
purpose. This brigade, with some artillery, was put in
position, some distance to my left, so as to command some
by-roads coming in from the river. In the meantime
General Gordon had sent out a scouting party on foot,
which discovered what was supposed to be the enemy's
right flank resting in the woods, in front of my division ;
and, during my absence while posting Johnston's brigade,
he reported the fact to General Ewell, and suggested the
propriety of attacking this flank of the enemy with his
brigade, which was not engaged. On my return, the sub
ject was mentioned to me by General Ewell, and I stated
to him the danger and risk of making the attack under the
circumstances, as a column was threatening our left flank
and Burnside's corps was in rear of the enemy's flank,
on which the attack was suggested. General Ewell con
curred with me in this opinion, and the impolicy of the
attempt at that time was obvious, as we had no reserves,
and, if it failed, and the enemy showed any enterprise, a
serious disaster would befall, not only our corps, but
General Lee's whole army. In the afternoon, when the
column threatening our left had been withdrawn, and it
had been ascertained that Burnside had gone to Grant's
left, on account of the heavy fighting on that flank, at my
suggestion, General Ewell ordered the movement which
Gordon had proposed. I determined to make it with Gor
don's brigade supported by Johnston's and to follow

348

BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS

it up, if successful, with the rest of my division. Gordon's
brigade was accordingly formed in line near the edge of
the woods in which the enemy's right rested, and John
ston 's in the rear, with orders to follow Gordon and obey
his orders.

I posted my adjutant general, Major John W. Daniel
with a courier, in a position to be communicated with by
Gordon, so as to inform me of the success attending the
movement, and enable me to put in the other brigades at
the right time. As soon as Gordon started, which was
a very short time before sunset, I rode to my line and
threw forward Pegram's brigade in a position to move
when required. In the meantime Gordon had become en
gaged, and, while Pegram's brigade was being formed
in line, I saw some of Gordon's men coming back in con
fusion, and Colonel Evans, of the 31st Georgia Eegiment,
endeavoring to rally them. Colonel Evans informed me
that his regiment which was on Gordon's right had struck
the enemy's breastworks and had given way. I immedi
ately ordered Pegram's brigade forward and directed
Colonel Evans to guide it. Its advance was through a
dense thicket of underbrush, but it crossed the road
running through Johnson's line, and struck the enemy's
works, and one of the regiments, the 13th Virginia, under
Colonel Terrill, got possession of part of the line, when
Colonel Hoffman ordered the brigade to retire, as it was
getting dark, and there was much confusion produced by
the difficulties of advance. Gordon had struck the
enemy's right flank behind breastworks, and a part of his
brigade was thrown into disorder. In going through
the woods, Johnston had obliqued too much and passed
to Gordon's left, getting in rear of the enemy.

Major Daniel, not hearing from Gordon, had endeav
ored to get to him, when, finding the condition of things,
he attempted to lead one of Pegram's regiments to his
assistance, and was shot down while behaving with great
gallantry, receiving a wound in the leg which has per
manently disabled him. Notwithstanding the confusion

349

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

in part of his brigade, Gordon succeeded in throwing the
enemy's right flank into great confusion, capturing two
brigadier generals (Seymour and Shaler), and several
hundred prisoners, all of the 6th corps, under Sedgwick.
The advance of Pegram's brigade, and the demonstration
of Johnston's brigade in the rear, where it encountered
a part of the enemy's force and captured some prisoners,
contributed materially to the result. It was fortunate,
however, that darkness came to close this affair, as the
enemy, if he had been able to discover the disorder on our
side, might have brought up fresh troops and availed him
self of our condition. As it was, doubtless, the lateness
of the hour caused him to be surprised, and the approach
ing darkness increased the confusion in his ranks, as he
could not see the strength of the attacking force, and
probably imagined it to be much more formidable than it
really was. All of the brigades engaged in the attack
were drawn back, and formed on a new line in front of
the old one, and obliquely to it.

At light on the morning of the 7th, an advance was
made, which disclosed the fact that the enemy had given
up his line of works in front of my whole line and a good
portion of Johnston's. Between the lines a large number
of his dead had been left, and at his breastworks, a large
number of muskets and knapsacks had been abandoned,
and there was every indication of great confusion. It was
not till then that we ascertained the full extent of the
success attending the movement of the evening before.
The enemy had entirely abandoned the left side of the
road, across which Johnston's line extended, and my divi
sion and a part of his were thrown forward, occupying a
part of the abandoned works on the right of the road,
and leaving all those on the left in our rear. This ren
dered our line straight, the left having been previously
thrown back, making a curve.

During the day there was some skirmishing, but no
serious fighting in my front. The loss in my division
during the fighting in the Wilderness was comparatively
light.

350

BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS

On the morning of the 8th, it was discovered that the
enemy was leaving our front and moving towards
Spottsylvania Court-House. General Lee's army was
also put in motion, Ewell's corps moving along the line
occupied by our troops on the day before, until it reached
the Plank road, where it struck across to Shady Grove,
which is on the road from Orange Court-House to
Spottsylvania Court-House.

On reaching the Plank road, I received through
General A. P. Hill, who was sick and unable to remain on
duty, an order from General Lee, transferring Hays ' bri
gade from my division to Johnson's, in order that it
might be consolidated with another Louisiana brigade
in that division, whose brigadier general had been killed
in the Wilderness, and Johnston's brigade from Bodes'
division to mine ; and assigning me to the temporary com
mand of Hill's corps, which was still in position across
the Plank road, and was to bring up the rear. I accord
ingly turned over the command of my division to Gordon,
the senior brigadier left with it, and assumed command
of Hill's corps.*

* Grant says General Lee had the advantage of position. As the
latter had to move from his lines on the Rapidan and attack Grant in
the Wilderness, how happened it that he was enabled to get the ad
vantage of position, after the two days' fighting? He also says that
General Lee was enabled to reach Spottsylvania Court-House first,
because he had the shorter line. The fact is, that, as the two armies
lay in their positions at the Wilderness, their lines were parallel to
the road to Spottsylvania Court-House. Grant had the possession of
the direct road to that place, and he had the start. General Lee had
to move on the circuitous route by Shady Grove, and he was enabled
to arrive there first with part of his infantry, because his cavalry held
Grant's advance in check for nearly an entire day.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

BATTLES ABOUND SPOTTSYLVANIA.

HILL'S COEPS was composed of Heth's, Wilcox's and
Mahone 's (formerly Anderson's) division of infantry and
three battalions of artillery under Colonel Walker.
When I took command of it, the infantry numbered about
13,000 muskets for duty.

General Lee's orders to me were to move by Todd's
Tavern along the Brock road to Spottsylvania Court-
House as soon as our front was clear of the enemy. In
order to get into that road, it was necessary to reopen
an old one leading from Hill's right, by which I was en
abled to take a cross-road leading into the road from
Shady Grove to Todd's Tavern. The wagon trains and all
the artillery, except one battalion, were sent around by
Shady Grove. About a mile from the road from Shady
Grove to Todd's Tavern, the enemy's cavalry videttes
were encountered, and Mahone 's division was thrown for
ward to develop the enemy's force and position. Mahone
encountered a force of infantry which had moved up from
Todd's Tavern toward Shady Grove and had quite a
brisk engagement with it, causing it to fall back rapidly
towards the former place. At the same time General
Hampton, who had communicated with me, after I left the
Plank Eoad, moved with his cavalry on my right and
struck the enemy on the flank and rear; but on account
of want of knowledge of the country on our part, and
the approach of darkness, the enemy was enabled to
make his escape. This affair developed the fact that the
enemy was in possession of Todd's Tavern and the Brock
road, and a continuation of my march would have led
through his entire army. We bivouacked for the night,
at the place from which Mahone had driven the enemy,
and a force was thrown out towards Todd's Tavern, which
was about a mile distant.

352

BATTLES AROUND SPOTTSYLVANIA

Very early next morning (the 9th), I received an order
from General Lee, through Hampton, to move on the
Shady Grove road towards Spottsylvania Court-House,
which I did, crossing a small river called the Po twice.
After reaching the rear of the position occupied by the
other two corps, I was ordered to Spottsylvania Court-
House, to take position on the right, and cover the road
from that place to Fredericksburg. No enemy appeared
in my front on this day, except at a distance on the Fred
ericksburg road.

Early on the morning of the 10th I was ordered to
move one of my divisions back, to cover the crossing of
the Po on the Shady Grove road; and to move with
another division to the rear and left, by the way of
Spottsylvania Old Court-House, and drive back a column
of the enemy which had crossed the Po and taken pos
session of the Shady Grove road, thus threatening our
rear and endangering our trains which were on the road
leading by the Old Court-House to Louisa Court-House.

Our line was then north of the Po, with its left, Fields '
division of Longstreet's corps, resting on that stream,
just above the crossing of the Shady Grove road. The
whole of the enemy's force was also north of the Po,
prior to this movement of his. Mahone's division was
sent to occupy the banks of the Po on Fields' left, while
with Heth's division and a battalion of artillery I moved
to the rear, crossing the Po on the Louisa Court-House
road, and then following that road until we reached one
coming in from Waiters Shop on the Shady Grove road.
After moving about a mile on this road, we met Hampton
gradually falling back before the enemy, who had pushed
out a column of infantry considerably to the rear of our
line. This column was in turn forced back to the posi
tion on Shady Grove road which was occupied by what
was reported to be Hancock's corps. Following up and
crossing a small stream just below a mill pond, we suc
ceeded in reaching Waite's Shop, from whence an attack
was made on the enemy, and the entire force, which had

23 353

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

crossed the Po, was driven back with a loss of one piece
of artillery, which fell into our hands, and a consider
able number in killed and wounded. This relieved us from
a very threatening danger, as the position the enemy
had attained would have enabled him to completely enfi
lade Fields' position and get possession of the line of our
communications to the rear, within a very short distance
of which he was, when met by the force which drove him
back. In this affair Heth's division behaved very hand
somely, all of the brigades (Cook's, Davis ', Kirkland's
and Walker's) being engaged in the attack. General
H. H. Walker had the misfortune to receive a severe
wound in the foot, which rendered amputation necessary,
but otherwise our loss was slight. As soon as the road
was cleared, Mahone 's division crossed the Po, but it was
not practicable to pursue the affair further, as the north
bank of the stream at this point was covered by a heavily
entrenched line, with a number of batteries, and night
was approaching.

On the morning of the llth, Heth was moved back to
Spottsylvania Court-House and Mahone was left to
occupy the position on the Shady Grove road from
which the enemy had been driven.*

My line on the right had been connected with EwelPs
right, and covered the Fredericksburg road, as also the
road leading from Spottsylvania Court-House across
the Ny into the road from Fredericksburg to Hanover
Junction. Wilcox was on my left, uniting with Ewell, and
Heth joined him. The enemy had extended his lines
across the Fredericksburg road, but there was no fighting
on this front on the 10th or llth, except some artillery
firing.

* It will be seen that after this affair I held, for a time, both of
General Lee's flanks, which was rather an anomaly, but it could not
be avoided, as we had no reserves and the two other corps being imme
diately in front of the enemy in line of battle, and almost constantly
engaged, could not be moved without great risk. It was absolutely
necessary to occupy the position, held on the left by Mahone, to avoid
a renewal of the danger from which we had escaped.

354

BATTLES AROUND SPOTTSYLVANIA

On the afternoon of the llth, the enemy was demon
strating to our left, up the Po, as if to get possession
of Shady Grove and the road from thence to Louisa
Court-House. General Hampton reported a column of
infantry moving up the Po, and I was ordered by General
Lee to take possession of Shady Grove, by light next
morning, and hold it against the enemy. To aid in that
purpose, two brigades of Wilcox's division (Thomas' and
Scales') were moved from the right, and Mahone was
ordered to move before light to Shady Grove ; but during
the night it was discovered that the movement to our
left was a feint and that there was a real movement of
the enemy towards our right.

Before daybreak on the morning of the 12th, Wilcox's
brigades were returned to him, and at dawn Mahone 's
division was moved to the right, leaving Wright's brigade
of that division to cover the crossing of the Po on Field's
left. On this morning, the enemy made a very heavy
attack on Ewell's front, and the line where it was occupied
by Johnson's division. A portion of the attacking force
swept along Johnson's line to Wilcox's left, and was
checked by a prompt movement on the part of Brigadier
General Lane, who was on that flank. As soon as the
firing was heard, General "Wilcox sent Thomas' and
Scales' brigades to Lane's assistance and they arrived
just as Lane's brigade had repulsed this body of the
enemy, and they pursued it for a short distance. As soon
as Mahone 's division arrived from the left, Perrin's and
Harris' brigades of that division and, subsequently, Mc-
Gowan's brigade of Wilcox's division were sent to
General Ewell's assistance, and were carried into action
under his orders. Brigadier General Perrin was killed
and Brigadier General McGowan severely wounded,
while gallantly leading their respective brigades into
action; and all the brigades sent to Ewell's assistance
suffered severely.

Subsequently, on the same day, under orders from
General Lee, Lane's brigade of Wilcox's division and

355

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

Mahone's own brigade (under Colonel Weisiger) were
thrown to the front, for the purpose of moving to the
left, and attacking the flank of the column of the enemy
which had broken Ewell's line, to relieve the pressure on
him, and, if possible, recover the part of the line which
had been lost. Lane's brigade commenced the movement
and had not proceeded far, when it encountered and
attacked, in a piece of woods in front of my line, the
9th corps, under Burnside, moving up to attack a salient
on my front. Lane captured over three hundred pris
oners and three battle flags, and his attack on the enemy's
flank taking him by surprise, no doubt contributed mate
rially to his repulse. Mahone's brigade did not become
seriously engaged. The attacking column which Lane
encountered got up to within a very short distance of a
salient defended by Walker's brigade of Heth's division,
under Colonel Mayo, before it was discovered, as there
was a pine thicket in front, under cover of which the
advance was made.

A heavy fire of musketry from "Walker's brigade and
Thomas' which was on his left, and a fire of artillery from
a considerable number of guns on Heth's line, were
opened with tremendous effect upon the attacking column,
and it was driven back with heavy loss, leaving its dead
in front of our works. This affair took place under the
eye of General Lee himself. In the afternoon another
attempt was made to carry out the contemplated flank
movement with Mahone's brigade, and Cook's brigade
of Heth's division, to be followed up by the other troops
under my command ; but it was discovered that the enemy
had one or more entrenched lines in our front, to the fire
from which our flanking column would have been exposed.
Moreover the ground between the lines was very rough,
being full of ragged ravines and covered with thick pines
and other growth ; and it was thought advisable to desist
from the attempt. The two brigades which were to have
commenced the movement were then thrown to the front

356

BATTLES AROUND SPOTTSYLVANIA

on both sides of the Fredericksburg road, and passing
over two lines of breastworks, defended by a strong force
of skirmishers, developed the existence of a third and
much stronger line in rear, which would have afforded an
almost insuperable obstacle to the proposed flank move
ment. This closed the operations of the corps under
my command on the memorable 12th of May.

Between that day and the 19th, there was no serious
attack on my front, but much manoeuvring by the enemy.
General Mahone made two or three reconnaissances to
the front, which disclosed the fact that the enemy was
gradually moving to our right. In making one of them,
he encountered a body of the enemy which had got pos
session of Gayle's house, on the left of the road leading
from our right towards the Fredericksburg and Hanover
Junction road, at which a portion of our cavalry, under
Brigadier General Chambliss, had been previously
posted, and drove it back across the Ny.*

Another reconnaissance, handsomely made by Briga
dier General Wright, who had been brought from the
left, ascertained that a heavy force of the enemy was be
tween the Ny and the Po, in front of my right, which was
held by Mahone, and was along the road towards Hanover
Junction. To meet this movement of the enemy Field 's
division was brought from the left and placed on my
right.

On the 19th, General Ewell made a movement against
the enemy's right, and to create a diversion in his favor,
Thomas' brigade was thrown forward, and drove the
enemy into his works in front of the salient, against which

* The Matapony River, which, by its juncture with the Pamunkey
forms York River, is formed by the confluence of four streams, called
respectively, the " Mat," " Ta," " Po," and " Ny." The Ny is north
and east of Spottsylvania Court-House, and behind it the enemy did
most of his manoeuvring in my front. It unites with the Po, a few
miles to the east and south of Spottsylvania Court-House, and both
streams are difficult to cross except where there are bridges.

357

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

Burnside's attack had been made on the 12th, while the
whole corps was held in readiness to co-operate with
Ewell, should his attack prove successful; but as he was
compelled to retire, Thomas was withdrawn.

Subsequently, the enemy retired from Heth's and
Wilcox 's fronts; and on the afternoon of the 21st Wilcox
was sent out on the road leading from Mahone's front
across the Ny with two of his brigades to feel the enemy,
and found him still in force behind entrenched lines, and
had a brisk engagement with that force. While Wilcox
was absent, an order was received by me, from General
Lee, to turn over to General Hill the command of his
corps, as he had reported for duty. I did so at once and
thus terminated my connection with this corps, which I
had commanded during all the trying scenes around
Spottsylvania Court-House. The officers and men of the
corps had all behaved well, and contributed in no small
degree to the result by which Grant was compelled to
wait six days for reinforcements from Washington, be
fore he could resume the offensive or make another of his
flank movements to get between General Lee's army and
Richmond.

CHAPTEE XXXIV.

OPERATIONS NEAR HANOVER JUNCTION.

THE movement of the enemy to get between our army
and Eichrnond had been discovered, and on the afternoon
of the 21st Swell's corps was put in motion towards
Hanover Junction.* After turning over to General Hill
the command of his corps, I rode in the direction taken
by EwelPs corps, and overtook it, a short time before day
on the morning of the 22nd. Hoke 's brigade, under Lieu
tenant Colonel Lewis, this day joined us from Petersburg,
and an order was issued, transferring Gordon's brigade,
now under the command of Brigadier General Evans, to
Johnson's division, which was placed under the command
of General Gordon, who had been made a major general.
This left me in command of three brigades, to wit:
Pegram's, Hoke's and Johnston's, all of which were very
much reduced in strength. My Adjutant General, Major
Daniel, had been disabled for life by a wound received
at the Wilderness, and my Inspector General, Major
Samuel Hale, had been mortally wounded at Spottsyl-
vania Court-House on the 12th while serving with the
division and acting with great gallantry during the dis
order which ensued after Ewell's line was broken. Both
were serious losses to me.

On this day (the 22nd) we moved to Hanover Junc
tion, and, next day, my division was posted on the ex
treme right, covering a ferry two or three jniles below
the railroad bridge across the North Anna. While at

* Hanover Junction is about 22 miles from Richmond and is at
the intersection of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Rail
road with the Central Railroad from Richmond west, via Gordonsville
and Staunton. It is on the direct road, both from Spottsylvania
Court-House and Fredericksburg, to Richmond. The North Anna
River is north of the Junction about two miles and the South Anna
about three miles south of it. These two streams unite south of east,
and a few miles from the Junction, and form the Pamunkey River.

359

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

Hanover Junction my division was not engaged. At one
time it was moved towards our left, for the purpose of
supporting a part of the line on which an attack was
expected, and moved back again without being required.
It was subsequently placed temporarily on the left of
the corps, relieving Kodes' division and a part of Field's
while the line was being remodelled, and then took posi
tion on the right again. During the night of the 26th,
the enemy again withdrew from our front.*

* At Hanover Junction General Lee was joined by Pickett's divi
sion of Longstreet's corps, and Breckenridge with two small brigades
of infantry, and a battalion of artillery. These, with Hoke's brigade,
were the first and only reinforcements received by General Lee since
the opening of the campaign. Yet Grant's immense army, notwith
standing the advantage gained by it on the 12th of May, had been
so crippled, that it was compelled to wait six days at Spottsylvania
Court-House for reinforcements from Washington, before it could
resume the offensive. Breckenridge's infantry numbered less than
3,000 muskets. Grant puts it at 15,000 and says, " The army sent to
operate against Richmond having hermetically sealed itself up at
Bermuda Hundreds, the enemy was enabled to bring the most, if not
all the reinforcements brought from the South by Beauregard against
the Army of the Potomac." He therefore determined to try another
flank movement, and to get more reinforcements from the army at
Bermuda Hundreds.

CHAPTER XXXV.

BATTLES OF COLD HARBOR.

ON the 27th, the enemy having withdrawn to the
north bank of the North Anna, and commenced another
flank movement by moving down the north bank of the
Pamunkey, Ewell's corps, now under my command, by
reason of General EwelPs sickness, was moved across the
South Anna over the bridge of the Central Railroad, and
by a place called "Merry Oaks," leaving Ashland on the
Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad to the
right, and bivouacked for the night at Hughes' cross-road,
the intersection of the road from Ashland to Atlee's Sta
tion on the Central Railroad with the road from the
Merry Oaks to Richmond. Next morning I moved by
Atlee's Station to Hundley's Corner, at the intersection
of the road from Hanover Town (the point at which Grant
crossed the Pamunkey), by Pole Green Church to Rich
mond, with the road from Atlee's Station, by Old Church
in Hanover County, to the White House on the Pamunkey.
This is the point from which General Jackson commenced
his famous attack on McClellan's flank and rear, in 1862,
and it was very important that it should be occupied, as it
intercepted Grant's direct march towards Richmond. All
of these movements were made under orders from
General Lee.

My troops were placed in position, covering the road
by Pole Green Church, and also the road to Old Church,
with my right resting near Beaver Dam Creek, a small
stream running towards Mechanicsville and into the
Chickahominy. Brigadier General Ramseur of Rodes'
division was this day assigned to the command of my
division. Swell's corps, the 2nd of the Army of Northern
Virginia, now numbered less than 9,000 muskets for duty,
its loss, on the 12th of May, having been very heavy.

361

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

On the 29th, the enemy having crossed the Tottopoto-
moy (a creek running just north of Pole Green Church,
and eastward to the Pamunkey), appeared in my front on
both roads, and there was some skirmishing but no heavy
fighting.

On the afternoon of the 30th, in accordance with
orders from General Lee, I moved to the right across
Beaver Dam, to the road from Old Church to Mechanics-
ville, and thence along that road towards Old Church,
until we reached Bethesda Church. At this point the
enemy was encountered, and his troops, which occupied
the road, were driven by Bodes * division towards the
road from Hundley's Corner, which unites with the road
from Mechanicsville, east of Bethesda Church. Pegram's
brigade, under the command of Colonel Edward Willis
of the 12th Georgia Regiment, was sent forward with
one of Rodes' brigades on its right, to feel the enemy, and
ascertain his strength; but meeting with a heavy force
behind breastworks, it was compelled to retire, with the
loss of some valuable officers and men, and among them
were Colonel Willis, mortally wounded, and Colonel
Terrill of the 13th Virginia Regiment, killed. This move
ment showed that the enemy was moving to our right
flank, and at night I withdrew a short distance on the
Mechanicsville road, covering it with my force. When
I made the movement from Hundley's Corner, my posi
tion at that place was occupied by a part of Longstreet's
corps, under Anderson.

On the next morning, my troops were placed in posi
tion on the east side of Beaver Dam across the road to
Mechanicsville, but Rodes was subsequently moved to the
west side of the creek. Grant's movement to our right,
towards Cold Harbor, was continued on the 31st, and
the 1st of June, and corresponding movements were made
by General Lee to meet him, my command retaining its
position with a heavy force in its front.

362

BATTLES OF COLD HARBOR

On the 2nd, all the troops on my left, except Heth's
division of HilPs corps, had moved to the right, and in
the afternoon of that day, Rodes' division moved for
ward, along the road from Hundley's Corner towards Old
Church, and drove the enemy from his entrenchments,
now occupied with heavy skirmish lines, and forced back
his left towards Bethesda Church, where there was a
heavy force. Gordon swung round so as to keep pace
with Rodes, and Heth co-operated, following Rodes and
taking position on his left flank. In this movement there
was some heavy fighting and several hundred prisoners
were taken by us. Brigadier General Doles, a gallant offi
cer of Rodes ' division, was killed, but otherwise our loss
was not severe.

On the next day (the 3rd), when Grant made an attack
at Cold Harbor in which he suffered very heavily, there
were repeated attacks on Rodes' and Heth's fronts, those
on Cook's brigade, of Heth's division, being especially
heavy, but all of them were repulsed. There was also
heavy skirmishing on Gordon's front. During the day,
Heth's left was threatened by the enemy's cavalry, but
it was kept off by Walker's brigade under Colonel Fry,
which covered that flank, and also repulsed an effort of
the enemy's infantry to get to our rear. As it was neces
sary that Heth's division should join its corps on the
right, and my flank in this position was very much ex
posed, I withdrew, at the close of the day, to the line
previously occupied, and next morning Heth moved to the
right.

My right now connected with the left of Longstreet's
corps under General Anderson. The enemy subsequently
evacuated his position at Bethesda Church and his lines
in my front, and having no opposing force to keep my
troops in their lines, I made two efforts to attack the
enemy on his right flank and rear. The first was made
on the 6th, when I crossed the Matadaquean (a small

363

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

stream, running through wide swamps in the enemy's
rear), and got in rear of his right flank, driving in his
skirmishers until we came to a swamp, which could be
crossed only on a narrow causeway defended by an en
trenched line with artillery. General Anderson was to
have co-operated with me, by moving down the other side
of the Matadaquean, but the division sent for that pur
pose did not reach the position from which I started until
near night, and I was therefore compelled to retire, as my
position was too much exposed.

On the next day (the 7th), a reconnaissance made in
front of Anderson's line showed that the greater part of
it was uncovered, and, in accordance with instructions
from General Lee, I moved in front of, and between it and
the Matadaquean, until my progress was arrested by a
ravine and swamp which prevented any further advance,
but a number of pieces of artillery were opened upon the
enemy's position in flank and reverse, so as to favor a
movement from Anderson's front, which had been
ordered but was not made ; and at night I retired from
this position to the rear of our lines.

Since the fighting at the Wilderness, Grant had made
it an invariable practice to cover his front, flank, and rear
with a perfect network of entrenchments, and all his
movements were made under cover of such works. It
was therefore very difficult to get at him.

On the llth, my command was moved to the rear of
Hill's line, near Games' Mill; and on the 12th, I received
orders to move, with the 2nd corps, to the Shenandoali
Valley to meet Hunter. This, therefore, closed my con
nection with the campaign from the Rapidan to James
River.

When I moved on the morning of the 13th, Grant had
already put his army in motion to join Butler, on James
River, a position which he could have reached, from his
camp on the north of the Rapidan, by railroad trans-

364

BATTLES OF COLD HARBOR

ports, without the loss of a man. In attempting to force
his way by land, he had already lost, in killed and
wounded, more men than were in General Lee's entire
army; and he was compelled to give up, in despair, the
attempt to reach Eichmond in that way.*

* Grant, in describing his movement from Spottsylvania Court-
House to Hanover Junction, says : " But the enemy again having the
shorter line, and being in possession of the main roads, was enabled
to reach the North Anna in advance of us, and took position behind it."
And, when he speaks of his final determination to join Butler, he
says : " After the battle of the Wilderness it was evident that the
enemy deemed it of the first importance to run no risk with the army
he then had. He acted purely on the defensive, behind breastworks,
or, feebly, on the offensive, immediately in front of them, and where,
in case of repulse, he could retire behind them. Without a greater
sacrifice of life than I was willing to make all could not be accom
plished that I designed north of Richmond."

He has made some observations, in his report, about the advantages
of interior lines of communication, supposed to be possessed by the
Confederate commanders, which are more specious than sound. The
Mississippi River divided the Confederacy into two parts, and the
immense naval power of the enemy enabled him to render communica
tion across that river, after the loss of New Orleans and Memphis,
always difficult. The Ohio River, in the West, and the Potomac, in
the East, with the mountains of Western Virginia, rendered it im
possible for an invading army to march into the enemy's country,
except at one or two fords of the Potomac, just east of the Blue Ridge,
and two or three fords above Harper's Ferry. The possession of the
seas, and the blockade of our ports, as well as the possession of the
Mississippi, the Ohio, and Potomac Rivers, with the Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad, and the railroads through Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana,
Illinois, Kentucky and Tennessee, enabled the enemy to transport
troops, from the most remote points, with more ease and rapidity than
they could be transported over the railroads under the control of the
Confederate Government, all of which were in bad condition. The
enemy, therefore, in fact, had all the advantages of interior lines;
that is, rapidity of communication and concentration, with the ad
vantage, also, of unrestricted communication with all the world, which
his naval power gave him.

CHAPTER XXXVI.
CAMPAIGN IN MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA.

THE Valley of Virginia, in its largest sense, embraces
all that country lying between the Blue Ridge and Alle-
ghany Mountains, which unite at its southwestern end.

The Shenandoah Valley, which is a part of the Valley
of Virginia, embraces the counties of Augusta, Rocking-
ham, Shenandoah, Page, Warren, Clarke, Frederick, Jef
ferson and Berkeley. This valley is bounded on the north
by the Potomac, on the south by the county of Rockbridge,
on the east by the Blue Ridge and on the west by the
Great North Mountain and its ranges.

The Shenandoah River is composed of two branches,
called, respectively, the " North Fork " and the " South
Fork," which unite near Front Royal in Warren County.
The North Fork rises in the Great North Mountain, and
runs eastwardly to within a short distance of New Market
in Shenandoah County, and thence northeast by Mount
Jackson and Strasburg, where it turns east to Front
Royal. The South Fork is formed by the union of North,
Middle and South Rivers. North River and Middle River,
running from the west, uni% near Mount Meridian in
Augusta County. South River rises in the southeastern
part of Augusta, and runs by Waynesboro, along the
western base of the Blue Ridge, to Port Republic in
Rockingham, where it unites with the stream formed by
the junction of the North and Middle Rivers, a few miles
above. From Port Republic, the South Fork of the Shen
andoah runs northeast, through the eastern border of
Rockingham and the county of Page, to Front Royal in
Warren County.

The North Fork and South Fork are separated by the
Massanutten Mountain, which is connected with no other
mountain but terminates abruptly at both ends. Its
northern end is washed at its base, just below Strasburg,

366

CAMPAIGN IN MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA

by the North Fork. Its southern end terminates near
the road between Harrisonburg and Conrad's Store on
the South Fork, at which latter place the road through
Swift Run Gap in the Blue Ridge crosses that stream.
Two valleys are thus formed, the one on the North Fork
being called "The Main Valley,7' and the other on the
South Fork, and embracing the county of Page and part
of the county of Warren, being usually known by the
name of ' ' The Luray Valley. ' ' The Luray Valley unites
with the Main Valley at both ends of the mountain. There
is a good road across Massanutten Mountain from one
valley to the other through a gap near New Market. South
of this gap, there is no road across the mountain, and
north of it the roads are very rugged and not practicable
for the march of a large army with its trains. At the
northern or lower end of Massanutten Mountain, and
between two branches of it, is a valley called " Powell's
Fort Valley," or more commonly "The Fort." This
valley is accessible only by the very rugged roads over
the mountain which have been mentioned, and through a
ravine at its lower end. From its isolated position, it
was not the theatre of military operations of any conse
quence, but merely furnished a refuge for deserters,
stragglers and fugitives from the battlefields.

From Front Royal, the^ghenandoah River runs along
the western base of the Blue Ridge to Harper's Ferry,
where it unites with the Potomac, which here bursts
through the mountains. The mountain, in extension of
the Blue Ridge from this point through Maryland and
Pennsylvania, is called "South Mountain."

Strictly speaking, the county of Berkeley and the
greater part of Frederick are not in the Valley of the
Shenandoah. The Opequon, rising southwest of Win
chester, and crossing the Valley Pike four or five miles
south of that place, turns to the north and empties into
the Potomac some distance above its junction with the
Shenandoah ; the greater part of Frederick and nearly the

367

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JIJBAL A. EARLY

whole of Berkeley being on the western side of the
Opequon.

Little North Mountain, called in the lower valley
" North Mountain, " runs northeast, through the western
portion of Shenandoah, Frederick and Berkeley Counties,
to the Potomac. At its northern end, where it is called
North Mountain, it separates the waters of the Opequon
from those of Back Creek.

Cedar Creek rises in Shenandoah County, west of
Little North Mountain, and running northeast along its
western base, passes through that mountain, four or five
miles from Strasburg, and, then making a circuit, empties
into the North Fork of the Shenandoah, about two miles
below Strasburg.

The Baltimore & Ohio Eailroad crosses the Potomac
at Harper's Ferry, and passing through Martinsburg in
Berkeley County, crosses Back Creek near its mouth, runs
up the Potomac, crossing the South Branch of that river
near its mouth, and then the North Branch to Cumberland
in Maryland. From this place it runs into Virginia again
and, passing through Northwestern Virginia, strikes the
Ohio River by two stems, terminating at Wheeling and
Parkersburg respectively.

There is a railroad from Harper's Ferry to "Winches
ter, called "Winchester & Potomac Railroad," and also
one from Manassas Junction on the Orange & Alexan
dria Railroad, through Manassas Gap in the Blue Ridge,
by Front Royal and Strasburg to Mount Jackson, called
"The Manassas Gap Railroad," but both of these roads
were torn up and rendered unserviceable in the year 1862,
under the orders of General Jackson.

From Staunton, in Augusta County, there is a fine
macadamized road called "The Valley Pike," running
through Mount Sidney, Mount Crawford, Harrisonburg,
New Market, Mount Jackson, Edinburg, Woodstock, Stras
burg, Middletown, Newtown, Bartonsville and Kernstown
to Winchester in Frederick County, and crossing Middle
River seven miles from Staunton ; North River at Mount

368

CAMPAIGN IN MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA

Crawford, eighteen miles from Staunton ; the North Fork
of the Shenandoah at Mount Jackson ; Cedar Creek be
tween Strasburg and Middletown; and the Opequon at
Bartonsville, four or five miles from Winchester. There
is also another road west of the Valley Pike connecting
these several villages called the "Back Road," and in
some places, another road between the Valley Pike and
the Back Road, which is called the "Middle Road."

From Winchester there is a macadamized road via
Martinsburg, to Williamsport on the Potomac in Mary
land, and another via Berryville in Clarke County, and
Charlestown in Jefferson County, to Harper's Ferry.
There is also a good pike from Winchester to Front
Royal, which crosses both forks of the Shenandoah just
above their junction; and from Front Royal there are
good roads up the Luray Valley, and by the way of Con
rad's Store and Port Republic, to Harrisonburg and
Staunton.

From Staunton, south, there are good roads passing
through Lexington, in Rockbridge County, and Buchanan,
in Botetourt County, to several points on the Virginia
& Tennessee Railroad; and others direct from Staunton
and Lexington to Lynchburg.

The Central Railroad, from Richmond, passes through
the Blue Ridge, with a tunnel at Rockfish Gap, and runs
through Waynesboro and Staunton, westwardly, to Jack
son's River, which is one of the head streams of James
River.

This description of the country is given in order to
render the following narrative intelligible, without too
much repetition. In the spring of 1864, before the open
ing of the campaign, the lower Shenandoah Valley was
held by the Federal troops, under Major General Sigel,
with his headquarters at Winchester, while the upper
Valley was held by Brigadier General Imboden, of the
Confederate Army, with one brigade of cavalry, or
mounted infantry, and a battery of artillery. When the
campaign opened, Sigel moved up the Valley and Major

24 3G9

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

General Breckenridge moved from Southwestern Vir
ginia, with two brigades of infantry and a battalion of
artillery, to meet him. Breckenridge, having united his
forces with Imboden's, met and defeated Sigel at New
Market on May 15th, driving him back toward Winches
ter. Breckenridge then crossed the Blue Kidge and
joined General Lee at Hanover" Junction, with his two
brigades of infantry and the battalion of artillery. Subse
quently, the Federal General Hunter organized another
and larger force than Sigel's, and moved up the Valley,
and on the 5th day of June defeated Brigadier General
William E. Jones, at Piedmont, between Port Republic
and Staunton — Jones' force being composed of a very
small body of infantry, and a cavalry force which had
been brought from Southwestern Virginia, after Breck
enridge 's departure from the Valley. Jones was killed,
and the remnant of his force, under Brigadier General
Vaughan, fell back to Waynesboro. Hunter's force then
united with another column which had moved from Lewis-
burg, in Western Virginia, under the Federal General
Crook. As soon as information was received of Jones'
defeat and death, Breckenridge was sent back to the
Valley, with the force he had brought with him.

CHAPTEE XXXVII.
PURSUIT OF HUNTER.

ON the 12th of June, while the 2nd corps (Ewell's)
of the Army of Northern Virginia was lying near Games'
Mill, in rear of HilPs line at Cold Harbor, I received
verbal orders from General Lee to hold the corps, with
two of the battalions of artillery attached to it, in readi
ness to move to the Shenandoah Valley. Nelson's and
Braxton's battalions were selected, and Brigadier
General Long was ordered to accompany me as Chief of
Artillery. After dark, on the same day, written instruc
tions were given me by General Lee, by which I was
directed to move, with the force designated, at 3 o'clock
next morning, for the Valley, by the way of Louisa Court-
House and Charlottesville, and through Brown's or Swift
Eun Gap in the Blue Eidge, as I might find most advis
able; to strike Hunter's force in the rear, and, if possible,
destroy it; then to move down the Valley, cross the
Potomac near Leesburg in Loudoun County, or at or
above Harper's Ferry, as I might find most practicable,
and threaten Washington City. I was further directed to
communicate with General Breckenridge, who would
co-operate with me in the attack on Hunter and the expe
dition into Maryland.

At this time the railroad and telegraph lines between
Charlottesville and Lynchburg had been cut by a cavalry
force from Hunter's army; and those between Eichmond
and Charlottesville had been cut by Sheridan's cavalry,
from Grant's army; so that there was no communication
with Breckenridge. Hunter was supposed to be at Staun-
ton with his whole force, and Breckenridge was supposed
to be at Waynesboro or Eock-fish Gap. If such had been
the case, the route designated by General Lee would have
carried me into the Valley in Hunter's rear.

The 2nd corps now numbered a little over 8,000

371

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

muskets for duty. It had been on active and arduous
service in the field for forty days, and had been engaged
in all the great battles from the Wilderness to Cold
Harbor, sustaining very heavy losses at Spottsylvania
Court-House, where it lost nearly an entire division, in
cluding its commander, Major General Johnson, who was
made prisoner. Of the brigadier generals with it at the
commencement of the campaign, only one remained in
command of his brigade. Two (Gordon and Ramseur)
had been made Major Generals; one (G. H. Stewart) had
been captured; four (Pegram, Hays, J. A. Walker and
R. D. Johnston) had been severely wounded; and four
(Stafford, J. M. Jones, Daniel, and Doles) had been killed
in action. Constant exposure to the weather, a limited
supply of provisions, and two weeks' service in the
swamps north of the Chickahominy had told on the health
of the men. Divisions were not stronger than brigades
ought to have been, nor brigades than regiments.

On the morning of the 13th, at two o'clock, we com
menced the march; and on the 16th, arrived at Rivanna
River near Charlottesville, having marched over eighty
miles in four days.*

From Louisa Court-House I had sent a dispatch to
Gordonsville, to be forwarded, by telegraph, to Brecken-
ridge ; and, on my arrival at Charlottesville, on the 16th,

* On the 15th we passed over the ground, near Trevillian's depot,
on which Hampton and Sheridan had fought on the llth and 12th.
Hampton had defeated Sheridan and was then in pursuit of him.
Grant, in his report, says that on the llth Sheridan drove our cavalry
" from the field, in complete rout," and, when he advanced towards
Gordonsville, on the 12th, "he found the enemy reinforced by in
fantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles from the latter
place, and too strong to successfully assault." There was not an infantry
soldier in arms nearer the scene of action than with General Lee's
army, near Cold Harbor; and the "well-constructed rifle-pits" were
nothing more than rails put up in the manner in which cavalry were
accustomed to arrange them to prevent a charge. Sheridan mistook
some of Hampton's cavalry, dismounted and fighting on foot, for
infantry.

372

PURSUIT OF HUNTER

to which place I rode in advance of my troops, I received
a telegram from him, dated at Lynchburg, informing me
that Hunter was then in Bedford County, about twenty
miles from that place, and moving on it.

The railroad and telegraph between Charlottesville
and Lynchburg had been, fortunately, but slightly injured
by the enemy's cavalry, and had been repaired. The
distance between the two places was sixty miles, and
there were no trains at Charlottesville except one which
belonged to the Central road, and was about starting for
Waynesboro. I ordered this to be detained, and immedi
ately directed, by telegram, all the trains of the two roads
to be sent to me with all dispatch, for the purpose of
transporting my troops to Lynchburg. The trains were
not in readiness to take the troops on board until sun
rise on the morning of the 17th, and then only enough
were furnished to transport about half of my infantry.
Ramseur's division, one brigade of Gordon's division and
part of another were put on the trains, as soon as they
were ready, and started for Lynchburg. Rodes ' division,
and the residue of Gordon's, were ordered to move along
the railroad, to meet the trains on their return. The
artillery and wagon-trains had been started on the
ordinary roads at daylight.

I accompanied Ramseur 's division, going on the front
train, but the road and rolling stock were in such bad con
dition that I did not reach Lynchburg until about one
o 'clock in the afternoon, and the other trains were much
later. I found General Breckenridge in bed, suffering
from an injury received by the fall of a horse killed under
him in action near Cold Harbor. He had moved from
Rock-fish Gap to Lynchburg by a forced march, as soon
as Hunter's movement towards that place was discov
ered. When I showed him my instructions, he very read
ily and cordially offered to co-operate with me, and
serve under my command.

Hunter's advance from Staunton had been impeded
by a brigade of cavalry, under Brigadier General Mc-

373

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

Causland, which had been managed with great skill, and
kept in his front all the way, and he was reported to be
then advancing on the old stone turnpike from Liberty
in Bedford County by New London, and watched by
Imboden with a small force of cavalry.

As General Breckenridge was unable to go out, at
his request, General D. H. Hill, who happened to be in
town, had made arrangements for the defence of the city,
with such troops as were at hand. Brigadier General
Hays, who was an invalid from a wound received at
Spottsylvania Court-House, had tendered his services
and also aided in making arrangements for the defence.
I rode out with General Hill to examine the line selected
by him, and make a reconnaissance of the country in
front. Slight works had been hastily thrown up on
College Hill, covering the turnpike and Forest roads from
Liberty, which were manned by Breckenridge 's infantry
and the dismounted cavalry of the command which had
been with Jones at Piedmont. The reserves, invalids
from the hospitals, and the cadets from the Military In
stitute at Lexington, occupied other parts of the line.
An inspection satisfied me that, while this arrangement
was the best which could be made under the circumstances
in which General Hill found himself, yet it would leave
the town exposed to the fire of the enemy 's artillery,
should he advance to the attack, and I therefore deter
mined to meet the enemy with my troops in front.

We found Imboden about four miles out on the turn
pike, near an old Quaker church, to which position he
had been gradually forced back by the enemy's infantry.
My troops, as they arrived, had been ordered in front of
the works to bivouac, and I immediately sent orders
for them to move out on this road, at a redoubt about
two miles from the city, as Imboden 's command was
driven back by vastly superior numbers. These bri
gades, with two pieces of artillery in the redoubt, arrested
the progress of the enemy, and Ramseur's other brigade,
and the part of Gordon 's division which had arrived, took

374

PURSUIT OF HUNTER

position on the same line. The enemy opened a heavy
fire of artillery on us, but, as night soon came on, he
went into camp in our front.*

Upon my arrival at Lynchburg, orders had been given
for the immediate return of the train for the rest of my
infantry, and I expected it to arrive by the morning of
the 18th, but it did not get to Lynchburg until late in the
afternoon of that day. Hunter 's force was considerably
larger than mine would have been, had it all been up,
and as it was of the utmost consequence to the army at
Richmond that he should not get into Lynchburg, I did
not feel justified in attacking him until I could do so with
a fair prospect of success. I contented myself therefore
with acting on the defensive on the 18th, throwing Breck-
enridge's infantry and a part of his artillery on the front
line, while that adopted by General Hill was occupied by
the dismounted cavalry and the irregular troops. Dur
ing the day, there was artillery firing and skirmishing
along the line, and, in the afternoon, an attack was made
on our line, to the right of the turnpike, which was hand
somely repulsed with considerable loss to the enemy. A
demonstration of the enemy's cavalry on the Forest road
was checked by part of Breckenridge's infantry under
Wharton and McCausland's cavalry.

On the arrival of the cars from Richmond this day,
Major Generals Elzey and Ransom reported for duty, the

* Hunter's delay in advancing from Staunton had been most re
markable. He had defeated Jones' small force at Piedmont, about
ten miles from Staunton, on the 5th, and united with Crook on the
8th, yet he did not arrive in front of Lynchburg until near night on
the 17th. The route from Staunton to Lynchburg by which he moved,
which was by Lexington, Buchanan, the Peaks of Otter and Liberty,
is about one hundred miles in distance. It is true that McCausland
had delayed his progress by keeping constantly in his front, but an
energetic advance would have brushed away McCausland's small force,
and Lynchburg, with all its manufacturing establishments and stores,
would have fallen before assistance arrived. A subsequent passage
over the greater part of the same route showed how Hunter had been
employed.

375

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

former to command the infantry and dismounted cavalry
of Breckenridge 's command, and the latter to command
the cavalry. The mounted cavalry consisted of the rem
nants of several brigades divided into two commands, one
under Imboden, and the other under McCausland. It was
badly mounted and armed, and its efficiency much im
paired by the defeat at Piedmont, and the arduous ser
vice it had recently gone through.

As soon as the remainder of my infantry arrived by
the railroad, though none of my artillery had gotten up,
arrangements were made for attacking Hunter at day
light on the 19th, but some time after midnight it was dis
covered that he was moving, though it was not known
whether he was retreating or moving so as to attack
Lynchburg on the south where it was vulnerable, or to
attempt to join Grant on the south side of James River.
Pursuit could not, therefore, be made at once, as a mis
take, if either of the last two objects had been contem
plated, would have been fatal. At light, however, the pur
suit commenced, the 2nd corps moving along the turn
pike, over which it was discovered Hunter was retreating,
and Elzey's command on the right, along the Forest
road, while Ransom was ordered to move on the right of
Elzey, with McCausland 's cavalry, and endeavor to strike
the enemy at Liberty or Peaks of Otter. Imboden, who
was on the road from Lynchburg to Campbell Court-
House to watch a body of the enemy's cavalry, which had
moved in that direction the day before, was to have
moved on the left towards Liberty, but orders did not
reach him in time. The enemy's rear was overtaken at
Liberty, twenty-five miles from Lynchburg, just before
night, and driven through that place, after a brisk skir
mish, by Ramseur's division. The day's march on the
old turnpike, which was very rough, had been terrible.
McCausland had taken the wrong road and did not reach
Liberty until after the enemy had been driven through
the town.

It was here ascertained that Hunter had not retreated

376

PURSUIT OF HUNTER

on the route by the Peaks of Otter, over which he had
advanced, but had taken the road to Buford's depot, at
the foot of the Blue Ridge, which would enable him to go
either by Salem, Fincastle or Buchanan. Ransom was,
therefore, ordered to take the route, next day, by the
Peaks of Otter, and endeavor to intercept the enemy
should he move by Buchanan or Fincastle. The pursuit
was resumed early on the morning of the 20th, and upon
our arrival in sight of Buford's, the enemy's rear guard
was seen going into the mountain on the road towards
Salem. As this left the road to Buchanan open, my
aide, Lieutenant Pitzer, was sent across the mountain to
that place, with orders for Ransom to move for Salem.
Lieutenant Pitzer was also instructed to ride all night
and send instructions, by courier from Fincastle, and
telegraph from Salem, to have the road through the
mountains to Lewisburg and Southwestern Virginia
blockaded. The enemy was pursued into the mountains
at Buford's Gap, but he had taken possession of the crest
of the Blue Ridge, and put batteries in position command
ing a gorge, through which the road passes, where it
was impossible for a regiment to move in line. I had
endeavored to ascertain if there was another way across
the mountain by which I could get around the enemy, but
all men, except the old ones, had gotten out of the way,
and the latter, as well as the women and children, were in
such a state of distress and alarm, that no reliable infor
mation could be obtained from them. We tried to throw
forces up the sides of the mountains to get at the enemy,
but they were so rugged that night came on before any
thing could be accomplished, and we had to desist, though
not until a very late hour in the night.

By a mistake of the messenger, who was sent with
orders to General Rodes, who was to be in the lead next
morning, there was some delay in his movement on the
21st, but the pursuit was resumed very shortly after sun
rise. At the Big Lick, it was ascertained that the enemy
had turned off from Salem towards Lewisburg, on a road

377

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

which, passes through the mountains at a narrow pass
called the "Hanging Rock," and my column was immedi
ately turned towards that point, but on arriving there it
was ascertained that the enemy's rear guard had passed
through the gorge. McCausland had struck his column
at this point and captured ten pieces of artillery, some
wagons and a number of prisoners; but, the enemy hav
ing brought up a heavy force, McCausland was compelled
to fall back, carrying off, however, the prisoners and a
part of the artillery, and disabling the rest so that it could
not be removed. As the enemy had got into the moun
tains, where nothing useful could be accomplished by pur
suit, I did not deem it proper to continue it farther.

A great part of my command had had nothing to eat
for the last few days, except a little bacon which was
obtained at Liberty.* The cooking utensils were in the
trains, and the effort to have bread baked at Lynchburg
had failed. Neither the wagon trains, nor the artillery
of the 2nd corps, were up and I knew that the country,
through which Hunter's route led for forty or fifty
miles, was, for the most part, a desolate mountain region ;
and that his troops were taking everything in the way of
provisions and forage which they could lay their hands
on. My field officers, except those of Breckenridge's com
mand, were on foot, as their horses could not be trans
ported on the trains from Charlottesville. I had seen
our soldiers endure a great deal, but there was a limit to
the endurance even of Confederate soldiers. A stern
chase with infantry is a very difficult one, and Hunter's
men were marching for their lives, his disabled being car
ried in his provision train, which was now empty. My
cavalry was not strong enough to accomplish anything
of importance, and a further pursuit could only have
resulted in disaster to my command from want of pro
visions and forage.

I was glad to see Hunter take the route to Lewisburg,

* Now Bedford City.

378

PURSUIT OF HUNTER

as I knew he could not stop short of the Kanawha River,
and he was, therefore, disposed of for some time. Had
he moved to Southwestern Virginia, he would have done
us incalculable mischief, as there were no troops of any
consequence in that quarter, but plenty of supplies at that
time. I should, therefore, have been compelled to follow
him.*

My command had marched sixty miles, in the three
days' pursuit, over very rough roads, and that part of it
from the Army of Northern Virginia had had no rest
since leaving Gaines ' Mill. I determined therefore to rest
on the 22nd, so as to enable the wagons and artillery to
get up, and to prepare the men for the long march before
them. Imboden had come up, following on the road
through Salem after the enemy, and the cavalry was sent
through Fincastle, to watch the enemy and to annoy him
as he passed through the mountains towards Lewisburg,
and also ascertain whether he would endeavor to get into
the valley towards Lexington or Staunton.

* In his report Grant says : " General Hunter, owing to a want
of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place " (Lynch-
burg). Now it appears that this expedition had been long contem
plated and was one of the prominent features of the campaign of
1864. Sheridan, with his cavalry, was to have united with Hunter at
Lynchburg and the two together were to have destroyed General Lee's
communications and depots of supplies and then have joined Grant.
Can it be believed that Hunter set out on so important an expedition
with an insufficient supply of ammunition? He had only fought the
battle of Piedmont with a part of his force, and not a very severe
one, as Jones' force was a small one and composed mostly of cavalry.
Crook's column, not being there, was not engaged. Had Sheridan
defeated Hampton at Trevillian's, he would have reached Lynchburg
after destroying the railroad on the way, and I could not have reached
there in time to do any good. But Hampton defeated Sheridan and
the latter saw "infantry too strong to successfully assault." Had
Hunter moved on Lynchburg with energy, that place would have fallen
before it was possible for me to get there. But he tarried on the way,
and when he reached there, there was discovered " a want of ammuni
tion to give battle."

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

OPERATIONS IN LOWER VALLEY AND MARYLAND.

AT Lynchburg I had received a telegram from General
Lee directing me, after disposing of Hunter, either to
return to his army or to carry out the original plan, as
I might deem most expedient under the circumstances in
which I found myself. After the pursuit had ceased, I
received another dispatch from him, submitting it to my
judgment whether the condition of my troops would per
mit the expedition across the Potomac to be carried out,
and I determined to take the responsibility of continuing
it. On the 23rd, the march was resumed and we reached
Buchanan that night, where we struck again the route
over which Hunter had advanced.* Ransom's cavalry
moved by Clifton Forge, through the western part of

* The scenes on Hunter's route from Lynchburg had been truly
heart-rending. Houses had been burned, and women and children left
without shelter. The country had been stripped of provisions and
many families left without a morsel to eat. Furniture and bedding
had been cut to pieces, and old men and women and children robbed
of all clothing except what they were wearing. Ladies' trunks had been
rifled and their dresses torn to pieces in mere wantonness. Even
negro girls had lost their little finery. We now had renewed evidences
of outrages committed by the commanding general's orders in burn
ing and plundering private houses. We saw the ruins of a number
of houses so destroyed. At Lexington Hunter had burned the Military
Institute, with all its contents, including its library and scientific
apparatus; and Washington College had been plundered and the statue
of Washington taken. The residence of Ex-Governor Letcher, at that
place, had been burned, and but a few minutes given Mrs. Letcher and
her family, to leave the house. In the same county a Christian gentle
man, Mr. Creigh, had been hung because he had killed a straggling
and marauding Federal soldier while in the act of insulting and
outraging the ladies of his family. The time consumed in the per
petration of those deeds was the salvation of Lynchburg, with its
stores, foundries and factories, which were so necessary to our army
at Richmond.

OPERATIONS IN LOWER VALLEY AND MARYLAND

Rockbridge, to keep a lookout for Hunter and ascertain
if he should attempt to get into the Valley again.

On the 26th, I reached Staunton in advance of my
troops, and the latter came up next day, which was spent
in reducing transportation and getting provisions from
Waynesboro, to which point they had been sent over the
railroad. Some of the guns and a number of the horses
belonging to the artillery were now unfit for service, and
the best of each were selected, and about a battalion taken
from Breckenridge's artillery, under Lieutenant Colonel
King, to accompany us, in addition to the two battalions
brought with the 2nd corps. The rest were left behind
with a portion of the officers and men in charge of them.
The dismounted cavalry had been permitted to send for
their horses which had been recruiting, and Col. Bradley
T. Johnson, who had joined me at this place with a battal
ion of Maryland cavalry, was assigned to the command
of Jones ' brigade, with the temporary rank of brigadier
general, that brigade having been reorganized and the
two Maryland battalions attached to it. General Breck-
enridge had accompanied us from Lynchburg, and, to
give him a command commensurate with his proper one,
and at the same time enable me to control the cavalry
more readily, Gordon's division of infantry was assigned
to his command in addition to the one under Elzey, and
Ransom, in charge of the cavalry, was ordered to report
to me directly. Major General Elzey was relieved from
duty, at his own request, and the division under him was
left under the temporary command of Brigadier General
Vaughan.

The official reports at this place showed about two
thousand mounted men for duty in the cavalry, which
was composed of four small brigades, to wit: Imboden's,
McCausland's, Jackson's and Jones' (now Johnson's).
Vaughan 's had not been mounted, but the horses had been
sent for from Southwestern Virginia. The official re
ports of the infantry showed 10,000 muskets for duty,
including Vaughan 's dismounted cavalry. Nearly, if not

381

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

quite, half of the company's officers and men were bare
footed or nearly so, and a dispatch had been sent from
Salem by courier, and Lynchburg by telegraph, to Rich
mond, requesting shoes to be sent to Staunton, but they
had not arrived.

Another telegram was received here from General
Lee stating that the circumstances under which my orig
inal orders were given had changed, and again submit
ting it to my judgment, in the altered state of things,
whether the movement down the Valley and across the
Potomac should be made. The accession to my command
from Breckenridge 's forces had not been as great as
General Lee supposed it would be, on account of the
disorganization consequent on Jones' defeat at Piedmont,
and the subsequent rapid movement to Lynchburg from
Rock-fish Gap, but I determined to carry out the original
design at all hazards, and telegraphed General Lee my
purpose to continue the movement.

The march was resumed on the 28th with five days'
rations in the wagons and two days' in haversacks, empty
wagons being left to bring the shoes when they arrived.
Imboden was sent through Brock's Gap in the Great
North Mountain to the Valley of the south branch of the
Potomac, with his brigade of cavalry and a battery of
horse artillery, to destroy the railroad bridge over that
stream and all the bridges on the Baltimore & Ohio Rail
road from that point to Martinsburg. The telegraph line
was repaired to New Market as we marched down the
Valley, and communications kept up with that point by
signal stations. On the 2nd of July_ we reached
Winchester * and I here received a dispatch from General

* On this day we passed through Newtown, where several houses,
including that of a Methodist minister, had been burned by Hunter's
orders, because a part of Mosby's command had attacked a train of
supplies for Sigel's force, at this place. The original order was to
burn the whole town, but the officer sent to execute it had revolted at
the cruel mandate and another was sent who but partially executed
it, after forcing the people to take an oath of allegiance to the United

382

OPERATIONS IN LOWER VALLEY AND MARYLAND

Lee, directing me to remain in the lower Valley until
everything was in readiness to cross the Potomac and to
destroy the Baltimore & Ohio Eailroad and the Chesa
peake & Ohio Canal as far as possible. This was in
accordance with my previous determination, and its policy
was obvious. My provisions were nearly exhausted, and if
I had moved through Loudoun, it would have been neces
sary for me to halt and thresh wheat and have it ground,
as neither bread nor flour could otherwise be obtained, f
which would have caused much greater delay than was '
required on the other route, where we could take provi
sions from the enemy. Moreover, unless the Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad was torn up, the enemy would have been
able to move troops from the West over that road to
Washington.

On the night of the 2nd, McCausland was sent across
North Mountain, to move down Back Creek, and burn the
railroad bridge at its mouth, and then to move by North
Mountain depot to Haynesville on the road from Martins-
burg to Williamsport ; and, early on the morning of the 3rd,
Bradley Johnson was sent by Smithfield and Leetown, to
cross the railroad at Kearneysville east of Martinsburg,
and unite with McCausland at Haynesville, so as to
cut off the retreat of Sigel, who was at Martinsburg with
a considerable force. Breckenridge moved, on the same
morning, direct from Martinsburg, with his command
preceded by Gilmor 's battalion of cavalry, while I moved
with Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions, over the route
taken by Johnson, to Leetown. On the approach of
Breckenridge, Sigel, after very slight skirmishing, evacu
ated Martinsburg, leaving behind considerable stores,
which fell into our hands. McCausland burned the bridge

States to save their houses. Mosby's battalion, though called "gueril
las" by the enemy, was a regular organization in the Confederate
Army, and was merely serving on detached duty under General Lee's
orders. The attack on the train was an act of legitimate warfare, and
the order to burn Newtown and the burning of houses mentioned were
unjustifiable.

383

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

over Back Creek, captured the guard at North Mountain
depot, and succeeded in reaching Haynesville ; but John
son encountered a force at Leetown, under Mulligan,
which, after hard fighting, he drove across the railroad,
when, Sigel having united with Mulligan, Johnson's com
mand was forced back, just before night, on Rodes' and
Ramseur's divisions, which had arrived at Leetown, after
a march of twenty-four miles. It was too late, and these
divisions were too much exhausted, to go after the enemy ;
and during the night, Sigel retreated across the Potomac
at Shepherdstown, to Maryland Heights.

On the 4th, Shepherdstown was occupied by a part of
Ransom's cavalry. Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions
moved to Harper's Ferry and the enemy was driven
from Bolivar Heights and the village of Bolivar, to an
inner line of works under the cover of the guns from
Maryland Heights. Breckenridge after burning the rail
road bridges at Martinsburg, and across the Opequon,
moved to Duffield's depot, five miles from Harper's Ferry,
destroying the road as he moved. During the night of the
4th, the enemy evacuated Harper's Ferry, burning the
railroad and pontoon bridges across the Potomac.

It was not possible to occupy the town of Harper's
Ferry, except with skirmishers, as it was thoroughly
commanded by the heavy guns on Maryland Heights ; and
the 5th was spent by Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions in
demonstrating at that place. In the afternoon Brecken
ridge 's command crossed the river at Shepherdstown,
and Gordon's division was advanced over the Antietam
towards Maryland Heights. At night, considerable
stores, which had been abandoned at Harper's Ferry,
were secured; and before day, Rodes' and Ramseur's
divisions moved to Shepherdstown, and crossed the
Potomac early on the 6th, Lewis' brigade, of Ramseur's
division, being left to occupy Harper's Ferry with
skirmishers.

On this day (the 6th) Gordon's division advanced
towards Maryland Heights, and drove the enemy into

384

OPERATIONS IN LOWER VALLEY AND MARYLAND

his works. Working parties were employed in destroying
the aqueduct of the canal over the Antietam, and the locks
and canal-boats.

On the 7th Rodes moved through Rohrersville, on the
road to Crampton's Gap in South Mountain, and skir
mished with a small force of the enemy, while Brecken-
ridge demonstrated against Maryland Heights, with
Gordon's division, supported by his other division, now
under Brigadier General Echols, who had reported for
duty.

While these operations were going on, McCausland
had occupied Hagerstown, and levied a contribution of
$20,000, and Boonsboro had been occupied by Johnson's
cavalry. On the 6th I received a letter from General
Lee, by special courier, informing me that, on the 12th,
an effort would be made to release the prisoners at Point
Lookout, and directing me to take steps to unite them
with my command, if the attempt was successful; but I
was not informed of the manner in which the attempt
would be made — General Lee stating that he was not,
himself, advised of the particulars.

My desire had been to manoeuvre the enemy out of
Maryland Heights, so as to enable me to move directly
from Harper's Ferry for Washington; but he had taken
refuge in his strongly fortified works, and as they could
not be approached without great difficulty, and an attempt
to carry them by assault would have resulted in greater
loss than the advantage to be gained would justify, I
determined to move through the gaps of South Mountain
to the north of the Heights. On the 7th, the greater por
tion of the cavalry was sent across the mountain, in the
direction of Frederick ; and that night, the expected shoes
having arrived and been distributed, orders were given
for a general move next morning; and an officer (Lieu
tenant Colonel Goodwin of a Louisiana regiment) was
ordered back to Winchester, with a small guard, to collect
the stragglers at that place, and prevent them from
following.

25 385

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

Imboden had reached the railroad, at the South
Branch of the Potomac, and partially destroyed the
bridge, but had not succeeded in dislodging the guard
from the block-house at that place. He had been taken
sick and very little had been accomplished by the expe
dition ; and his brigade, now under the command of Col.
George H. Smith, had returned.

Early on the morning of the 8th the whole force
moved; Eodes, through Crampton's Gap, to Jefferson;
Breckenridge, through Fox's Gap ; and Eamseur, with the
trains, through Boonsboro Gap, followed by Lewis' bri
gade, which had started from Harper's Ferry the night
before, after burning the trestle-work on the railroad,
and the stores which had not been brought off. Brecken
ridge and Eamseur encamped near Middletown, and
Eodes near Jefferson. Eansom had occupied Catoctan
Mountain, between Middletown and Frederick, with his
cavalry, and had skirmished heavily with a body of the
enemy at the latter place. McCausland was ordered to
move to the right, in the afternoon, and the next day cut
the telegraph and railroad between Maryland Heights
and Washington and Baltimore — cross the Monocacy,
and, if possible, occupy the railroad bridge over that
stream, at the junction near Frederick.

Early on the 9th, Johnson, with his brigade of cavalry,
and a battery of horse artillery, moved to the north of
Frederick, with orders to strike the railroads from Balti
more to Harrisburg and Philadelphia, burn the bridges
over the Gunpowder, also to cut the railroad between
Washington and Baltimore and threaten the latter place ;
and then to move towards Point Lookout, for the pur
pose of releasing the prisoners, if we should succeed in
getting into Washington. The other troops also moved
forward towards Monocacy Junction, and Eamseur 's
division passed through Frederick, driving a force of
skirmishers before it.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

BATTLE OF MONOCACY.

THE enemy, in considerable force under General Lew
Wallace, was found strongly posted on the eastern bank
of the Monocacy near the Junction, with an earthwork
and two block-houses commanding both the railroad
bridge and the bridge on the Georgetown pike. Ram-
seur's division was deployed in front of the enemy, after
driving his skirmishers across the river, and several bat
teries were put in position, when a sharp artillery fire
opened from both sides. Rodes' division had come up
from Jefferson and was placed on Ramseur's left, cover
ing the roads from Baltimore and the crossings of the
Monocacy above the Junction. Breckenridge's command,
with the trains, was in the rear between Frederick and the
Junction, while the residue of the cavalry was watching
a force of the enemy's cavalry which had followed from
Maryland Heights. The enemy's position was too strong,
and the difficulties of crossing the Monocacy under fire too
great, to attack in front without greater loss than I was
willing to incur. I therefore made an examination in per
son to find a point at which the river could be crossed, so
as to take the enemy in flank.

While I was engaged in making this examination to
my right, I discovered McCausland in the act of crossing
the river with his brigade. As soon as he crossed, he
dismounted his men, and advanced rapidly against the
enemy's left flank, which he threw into confusion, and he
came very near capturing a battery of artillery, but the
enemy concentrated on him, and he was gradually forced
back obstinately contesting the ground. McCausland 's
movement, which was very brilliantly executed, solved the
problem for me, and, as soon as I discovered it, orders
were sent to Breckenridge to move up rapidly with
Gordon's division to McCausland 's assistance, and to fol
low up his attack. This division crossed at the same

387

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

place, and Gordon was ordered to move forward and
strike the enemy on his left flank, and drive him from
the position commanding the crossings in Ramseur 's
front, so as to enable the latter to cross. This movement
was executed under the personal superintendence of
General Breckenridge, and, while Ramseur skirmished
with the enemy in front, the attack was made by Gordon
in gallant style, and, with the aid of several pieces of
King's artillery which had been crossed over, and Nel
son's artillery from the opposite side, he threw the
enemy into great confusion and forced him from his
position. Ramseur immediately crossed on the railroad
bridge and pursued the enemy's flying forces and Rodes
crossed on the left and joined in the pursuit.

Echols' division, which had been left to guard the
trains, was ordered up during the engagement, but was
not needed. The pursuit was soon discontinued, as
Wallace's entire force had taken the road towards Balti
more, and I did not desire prisoners. Wallace's force I
estimated at 8,000 or 10,000 men, and it was ascertained
that one division of the 6th corps (Rickett's), from
Grant's army, was in the fight. Between 600 and 700
unwounded prisoners fell into our hands, and the enemy's
loss in killed and wounded was very heavy. Our loss
in killed and wounded was about 700, and among them
were Brigadier General Evans wounded, and Colonel
Lamar of the 61st Georgia Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel
Tavener of the 17th Virginia Cavalry and Lieutenant
Hobson of Nelson's artillery, killed. The action closed
about sunset, and we had marched fourteen miles before
it commenced. All the troops and trains were crossed
over the Monocacy that night, so as to resume the march
early next day. Such of our wounded as could not be
moved in ambulances or otherwise were sent to the hos
pitals at Frederick under charge of competent medical
officers, and our dead were buried. During the operations
at Monocacy, a contribution of $200,000 in money was
levied on the city of Frederick, and some needed supplies
were obtained.

CHAPTER XL.

IN FRONT OF WASHINGTON.

ON the 10th, the march was resumed at daylight, and
we bivouacked four miles from Eockville, on the George
town pike, having marched twenty miles. Ramseur's
division, which had remained behind for a short time to
protect a working party engaged in destroying the rail
road bridge, was detained for a time in driving off a party
of cavalry which had been following from Maryland
Heights, and did not get up until one o'clock at night.
McCausland, moving in front on this day, drove a body
of the enemy's cavalry before them and had quite a brisk
engagement at Rockville, where he encamped after defeat
ing and driving off the enemy.

We moved at daylight on the llth ; McCausland mov
ing on the Georgetown pike, while the infantry, preceded
by Imboden's cavalry under Colonel Smith, turned to the
left at Rockville, so as to reach the 7th Street pike which
runs by Silver Spring into Washington. Jackson's
cavalry moved on the left flank. The previous day had
been very warm, and the roads were exceedingly dusty,
as there had been no rain for several weeks. The heat
during the night had been very oppressive, and but little
rest had been obtained. This day was an exceedingly
hot one, and there was no air stirring. While marching,
the men were enveloped in a suffocating cloud of dust,
and many of them fell by the way from exhaustion.
Our progress was therefore very much impeded, but I
pushed on as rapidly as possible, hoping to get into the
fortifications around Washington before they could be
manned. Smith drove a small body of cavalry before him
into the woods on the 7th Street pike, and dismounted his
men and deployed them as skirmishers. I rode ahead
of the infantry, and arrived in sight of Fort Stevens on
the road a short time after noon, when I discovered that
the works were but feebly manned.

389

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

Rodes, whose division was in front, was immediately
ordered to bring it into line as rapidly as possible, throw
out skirmishers, and move into the works if he could. My
whole column was then moving by flank, which was the
only practicable mode of marching upon the road we were
on, and before Rodes' division could be brought up, we
saw a cloud of dust in the rear of the works towards
Washington, and soon a column of the enemy filed into
them on the right and left and skirmishers were thrown
out in front, while an artillery fire was opened on us
from a number of batteries. This defeated our hopes
of getting possession of the works by surprise, and it
became necessary to reconnoitre.

Rodes' skirmishers were thrown to the front, driving
those of the enemy to the cover of the works, and we pro
ceeded to examine the fortifications in order to ascertain
if it was practicable to carry them by assault. They were
found to be exceedingly strong, and consisted of what
appeared to be enclosed forts of heavy artillery, with a
tier of lower works in front of each pierced for an im
mense number of guns, the whole being connected by
curtains with ditches in front, and strengthened by pali
sades and abattis. The timber had been felled within
cannon range all around and left on the ground, making
a formidable obstacle, and every possible approach was
raked by artillery. On the right was Rock Creek run
ning through a deep ravine which had been rendered
impassable by the felling of the timber on each side, and
beyond were the works on the Georgetown pike which had
been reported to be the strongest of all. On the left, as
far as the eye could reach, the works appeared to be of
the same impregnable character. The position was natur
ally strong for defence, and the examination showed,
what might have been expected, that every appliance of
science and unlimited means had been used to render the
fortifications around Washington as strong as possible.
This reconnaissance consumed the balance of the day.

The rapid marching which had broken down a number

390

IN FRONT OF WASHINGTON

of the men who were barefooted or weakened by previous
exposure, and had been left in the Valley and directed to
be collected at Winchester, and the losses in killed and
wounded at Harper's Ferry, Maryland Heights and
Monocacy, had reduced my infantry to about 8,000
muskets. Of those remaining, a very large number were
greatly exhausted by the last two days' marching, some
having fallen by sunstroke, and I was satisfied, when we
arrived in front of the fortifications, that not more than
one-third of my force could have been carried into action.
I had about forty pieces of field artillery, of which the
largest were 12 pounder Napoleons, besides a few pieces
of horse artillery with the cavalry. McCausland reported
the works on the Georgetown pike too strongly manned
for him to assault. We could not move to the right or
left without its being discovered from a signal station
on the top of the "Soldiers' Home," which overlooked
the country, and the enemy would have been enabled to
move in his works to meet us. Under the circumstances,
to have rushed my men blindly against the fortifications,
without understanding the state of things, would have
been worse than folly. If we had any friends in Washing
ton, none of them came out to give us information, and
this satisfied me that the place was not undefended. I
knew that troops had arrived from Grant's army, for
prisoners had been captured from Eickett's division of
the 6th corps at Monocacy.

From Sharpsburg I had sent a message to Mosby, by
one of his men, requesting him to cross the Potomac below
Harper's Ferry, cut the railroad and telegraph, and
endeavor to find out the condition of things in Washing
ton, but he had not crossed the river, and I had received
no information from him. A Northern paper, which was
obtained, gave the information that Hunter, after moving
up the Ohio Eiver in steamboats, was passing over the
Baltimore & Ohio Eailroad, and I knew that he would be
at Harper's Ferry soon, as Imboden had done very little
damage to the road west of Martinsburg. After dark on

391

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

the llth I held a consultation with Major Generals
Breckenridge, Rodes, Gordon and Ramseur, in which I
stated to them the danger of remaining where we were,
and the necessity of doing something immediately, as the
probability was that the passes of the South Mountain
and the fords of the upper Potomac would soon be closed
against us. After interchanging views with them, being
very reluctant to abandon the project of capturing Wash
ington I determined to make an assault on the enemy's
works at daylight next morning, unless some information
should be received before that time showing its impracti
cability, and so informed those officers. During the night
a dispatch was received from Gen. Bradley Johnson from
near Baltimore informing me that he had received infor
mation, from a reliable source, that two corps had
arrived from General Grant's army, and that his whole
army was probably in motion. This caused me to delay
the attack until I could examine the works again, and
as soon as it was light enough to see, I rode to the front
and found the parapets lined with troops. I had, there
fore, reluctantly to give up all hopes of capturing Wash
ington, after I had arrived in sight of the dome of the
Capitol, and given the Federal authorities a terrible
fright.

In his report, Grant says, in regard to the condition of
things when I moved towards Washington, "The garri
sons of Baltimore and Washington were at this time
made up of heavy artillery regiments, hundred days ' men,
and detachments from the invalid corps. " And, in re
gard to the force of Wallace at Monocacy, he says: "His
force was not sufficient to ensure success, but he fought
the enemy nevertheless, and although it resulted in a
defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy and thereby
served to enable General Wright to reach Washington
with two divisions of the 6th corps, and the advance of
the 19th corps before him." Stanton says in his re
port: "Here (at Washington) they (we) were met by
troops from the Army of the Potomac, consisting of the

392

IN FRONT OF WASHINGTON

6th corps under General Wright, a part of the 8th corps
under General Gilinore and a part of the 19th corps, just
arrived from New Orleans under General Emory."

Taking Grant's statement of the troops which had
arrived from his army, they were sufficient to hold the
works against my troops, at least until others could
arrive. But in addition to those which had already
arrived, there were the detachments from the invalid
corps, called, I believe, the " Veteran Beserves" (of which
I was informed there were 5,000), the heavy artillery
regiments, the hundred days' men, and, I suppose, the
part of the 8th corps mentioned by Stanton. To all
of these may be added the local troops, or militia, and the
Government employees. Some of the Northern papers
stated that, between Saturday and Monday, I could have
entered the city : but on Saturday I was fighting at Monoc-
acy, 35 miles from Washington, a force which I could not
leave in my rear; and after disposing of that force and
moving as rapidly as it was possible for me to move, I
did not arrive in front of the fortifications until after
noon on Monday, and then my troops were exhausted and
it required time to bring them up into line. I had then
made a march, over the circuitous route by Charlottes-
ville, Lynchburg and Salem, down the Valley and through
the passes of the South Mountain, which, notwithstand
ing the delays in dealing with Hunter's, Sigel's, and Wal
lace's forces, is, for its length and rapidity, I believe,
without a parallel in this or any other modern war — the
unopposed excursion of Sherman through Georgia not
excepted. My small force had been thrown up to the very
walls of the Federal Capital, north of a river which could
not be forded at any point within 40 miles, and with a
heavy force and the South Mountain in my rear, — the
passes through which mountain could be held by a small
number of troops. A glance at the map, when it is recol
lected that the Potomac is a wide river, and navigable
to Washington with the largest vessels, will cause the
intelligent reader to wonder, not why I failed to take

393

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

Washington, but why I had the audacity to approach it
as I did, with the small force under my command.

It was supposed by some, who were not informed of
the facts, that I delayed in the lower Valley longer than
was necessary; but an examination of the foregoing
narrative will show that not one moment was spent in
idleness, but that every one was employed in making some
arrangement, or removing some difficulty in my way,
which it was necessary to make or remove ; so as to enable
me to advance with a prospect of success. I could not
move across the Potomac and through the passes of the
South Mountain, with any safety, until Sigel was driven
from, or safely housed in, the fortifications at Maryland
Heights.

After abandoning the idea of capturing Washington, I
determined to remain in front of the fortifications during
the 12th, and retire at night, as I was satisfied that to
remain longer would cause the loss of my entire force.

Johnson had burned the bridges over the Gunpowder,
on the Harrisburg and Philadelphia roads, threatened
Baltimore, and started for Point Lookout, but I sent an
order for him to return. The attempt to release the
prisoners, of which I was informed by General Lee, was
not made, as the enemy had received notice of it in some
way. Major Harry Gilmor, who burned the bridge over
the Gunpowder on the Philadelphia road, captured Major
General Franklin on a train at that point, but he was
permitted to escape, either by the carelessness or exhaus
tion of the guard placed over him, before I was informed
of the capture.

On the afternoon of the 12th, a heavy reconnoitring
force was sent out by the enemy, which, after severe skir
mishing, was driven back by Bodes' division with but
slight loss to us. About dark we commenced retiring and
did so without molestation.

Passing through Eockville and Poolsville, we crossed
the Potomac at White's Ford, above Leesburg in Loudoun
County, on the morning of the 14th, bringing off the pris-

394

IN FRONT OF WASHINGTON

oners captured at Monocacy and everything else in safety.
There was some skirmishing in the rear, between our
cavalry and that of the enemy which was following, and
on the afternoon of the 14th, there was some artillery fir
ing by the enemy, across the river, at our cavalry which
was watching the fords. Besides the money levied in
Hagerstown and Frederick, which was subsequently very
useful in obtaining supplies, we brought off quite a large
number of beef cattle, and the cavalry obtained a number
of horses, some being also procured for the artillery.*

* On the night of the 13th the house of Postmaster General Blair
near Silver Spring was burned, and it was assumed by the enemy that
it was burned by my orders. I had nothing to do with it and do not
yet know how the burning occurred. Though I believed that retalia
tion was justified by previous acts of the enemy, yet I did not wish
to incur the risk of any license on the part of my troops and it was
obviously impolitic to set the house on fire when we were retiring, as
it amounted to notice of our movement.

CHAPTER XLI.

RETURN TO VIRGINIA.

WE rested on the 14th and 15th, near Leesburg; and
on the morning of the 16th, resumed the march to the
Valley, through Sincker's Gap in the Blue Eidge. Hunter
had arived at Harper's Ferry, and united with Sigel, and
the whole force had moved from that place, under Crook,
to Hillsboro, in Loudoun, and a body of cavalry from it
made a dash on our train, as we were moving towards the
Valley, and succeeded in setting fire to a few wagons, but
was soon driven off by troops from Rodes' and Ramseur's
divisions, and one piece of artillery was captured from
the enemy.

On the morning of the 17th, we crossed the Shenan-
doah, at Snicker's or Castleman's Ferry, and took posses
sion near Berryville — Breckenridge covering the ford at
the ferry and the river above and below, and Rodes' and
Ramseur's division the roads from Harper's Ferry.

On the 18th the enemy, having moved through
Snicker's Gap, appeared on the banks of the Shenandoah.
and there was some skirmishing. In the afternoon, a
heavy column of his infantry made a dash at Parker's
Ford, one mile below the ferry, and crossed over, after
driving back the picket of 100 men at that point. Brecken
ridge moved Gordon's and Echols' divisions to the front,
and held the enemy in check, while Rodes' division was
brought up from the left, and attacked and drove him
across the river, with heavy loss, and in great confusion.

The enemy's main body still occupied the eastern bank
of the Shenandoah on the 19th, and smaller columns
moved up and down the river, to effect a crossing. Im-
boden, with his own and McCausland's cavalry, resisted
and repulsed one of these columns, which attempted to
cross at Berry's Ferry, with considerable loss to the
enemy. The horses of Vaughan's cavalry having been

396

RETURN TO VIRGINIA

brought from Southwestern Virginia, his small force had
been now mounted. On this day I received information
that a column under Averill was moving from Martins-
burg towards Winchester, and as the position I held near
Berryville left my trains exposed to expeditions in the
rear from Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry, I deter
mined to concentrate my force near Strasburg, so as to
enable me to put the trains in safety and then move out
and attack the enemy. This movement was commenced
on the night of the 19th; Ramseur 's division, with a bat
tery of artillery, being sent to Winchester, to cover that
place against Averill, while the stores, and the sick and
wounded were being removed, and the other divisions
moving through Millwood and White Post to the Valley
Pike at Newtown and Middletown.

Vaughan's and Jackson's cavalry had been watching
Averill, and, on the afternoon of the 20th, it was reported
to General Ramseur, by General Vaughan, that Averill
was at Stephenson's depot, with an inferior force, which
could be captured, and Ramseur moved out from Win
chester to attack him ; but relying on the accuracy of the
information he had received, General Ramseur did not
take the proper precautions in advancing, and his divis
ion, while moving by the flank, was suddenly met by a
larger force, under Averill, advancing in line of battle,
and the result was that Ramseur 's force was thrown into
confusion, and compelled to retire, with the loss of four
pieces of artillery, and a number in killed and wounded —
Brigadier Generals Lewis and Lilly being among the
wounded, and Colonel Board of the 58th Virginia Regi
ment among the killed. Colonel Jackson made a vigorous
charge with his cavalry, which enabled Ramseur to rally
his men, restore order, and arrest the progress of Averill
before he reached Winchester. The error committed, on
this occasion, by this most gallant officer, was nobly re
trieved in the subsequent part of the campaign. I
received at New Market the news of Ramseur 's misfor
tune, and immediately moved to his assistance with

397

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

Rodes' division; but on arriving at Winchester, I found
that the enemy, after being checked, had fallen back a
short distance ; and, as another and much larger column
was moving through Berryville, I did not go after Averill,
but moved the whole command to Newtown — the stores,
and such of the wounded and sick as could be transported,
having been gotten off.

On the 21st my whole infantry force was concentrated
near Middletown ; and, on the 22nd, it was moved across
Cedar Creek, towards Strasburg, and so posted as to
cover all the roads from the direction of Winchester.

A report having been sent to me, from Mount Jack
son, that a force of the enemy was moving from the
Valley of the South Branch of the Potomac to that place,
Imboden was sent to ascertain its truth, and it proved to
be false. We rested on the 23rd, while waiting to ascer
tain the movements of the enemy, and during the day a
report was received from the cavalry in front that a large
portion of the force sent after us from Washington was
returning, and that Crook and Averill had united and
were at Kernstown, near Winchester.

CHAPTEE XLII.

BATTLE OF KERNSTOWN.

ON the reception of the foregoing information, I deter
mined to attack the enemy at once; and, early on the
morning of the 24th, my whole force was put in motion
for Winchester. The enemy, under Crook, consisting of
the "Army of West Virginia," and including Hunter's
and Sigel's forces, and Averill's cavalry, was found in
position at Kernstown, on the same ground occupied by
Shields, at the time of General Jackson's fight with him,
on March 22nd, 1862. Eamseur's division was sent to
the left, at Bartonsville, to get around the enemy's right
flank, while the other divisions moved along the Valley
Pike, and formed on each side of it. Eansom's cavalry
was ordered to move in two columns: one, on the right,
along the road from Front Eoyal to Winchester, and the
other on the left, and west of Winchester, so as to unite
in rear of the latter place, and cut off the enemy's retreat.
After the enemy's skirmishers were driven in, it was dis
covered that his left flank, extending through Kernstown,
was exposed, and General Breckenridge was ordered to
move Echols' division, now under Brigadier General
Wharton, under cover of some ravines on our right and
attack that flank. This movement, which was made under
General Breckenridge 's personal superintendence, was
handsomely executed, and the attacking division struck
the enemy's left flank in open ground, doubling it up and
throwing his whole line into great confusion. The other
divisions then advanced, and the rout of the enemy be
came complete. He was pursued, by the infantry and
artillery, through and beyond Winchester; and the pur
suit was continued by Eodes' division to Stephenson's
depot, six miles from Winchester — this division then hav
ing marched twenty-seven miles from its position west
of Strasburg. The cavalry had not been moved according

399

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

to my orders ; and the enemy, having the advantage of an
open country and a wide macadamized road, was enabled
to make his escape with his artillery and most of his
wagons. General Ransom had been in very bad health
since he reported to me in Lynchburg, and unable to take
the active command in the field ; and all of my operations
had been impeded for the want of an efficient and ener
getic cavalry commander. I think, if I had had one on
this occasion, the greater part of the enemy's force would
have been captured or destroyed, for the rout was thor
ough. Our loss, in this action, was very light. The
enemy's loss in killed and wounded was severe, and two
or three hundred prisoners fell into our hands; and
among them, Colonel Mulligan, in command of a divis
ion, mortally wounded. The infantry was too much ex
hausted to continue the pursuit on the 25th, and only
moved to Bunker Hill, twelve miles from Winchester.
The pursuit was continued by our cavalry, and thej
enemy's rear guard of cavalry was encountered at Mar-
tinsburg; but after slight skirmishing, it evacuated the
place. The whole defeated force crossed the Potomac,
and took refuge at Maryland Heights and Harper's
Ferry. The road from Winchester, via Martinsburg, to
Williamsport was strewed with debris of the rapid re
treat — twelve caissons and seventy-two wagons having
been abandoned, and most of them burned.

CHAPTER XLIII.

THE BURNING OF CHAMBERSBURG.

ON the 26th we moved to Martinsburg, the cavalry
going to the Potomac. The 27th and 28th were employed
in destroying the railroad, it having been repaired since
we passed over it at the beginning of the month. While
at Martinsburg, it was ascertained that while we were
near Washington, after Hunter's return to the Valley,
by his orders, a number of private residences had been
burned, — among them the homes of Mr. Alex. B. Boteler,
an ex-member of the Confederate Congress, of Mr.
Andrew Hunter, a member of the Virginia Senate, and of
Mr. Edmund I. Lee, a distant relative of General Lee, — all
in Jefferson County, with their contents, only time
enough being given for the ladies to get out of their
houses. A number of towns in the South, as well as pri
vate country houses, had been burned by the Federal
troops. I came to the conclusion it was time to open the
eyes of the people of the North to this enormity, by an
example in the way of retaliation. I did not select the
cases mentioned, as having more merit or greater claims
for retaliation than others, but because they had occurred
within the limits of the country covered by my command
and were brought more immediately to my attention.

The town of Chambersburg in Pennsylvania was
selected as the one on which retaliation should be made,
and McCausland was ordered to proceed, with his brigade
and that of Johnson and a battery of artillery, to that
place, and demand of the municipal authorities the sum
of $100,000 in gold or $500,000 in U. S. currency, as a
compensation for the destruction of the houses named
and their contents; and in default of payment, to lay
the town in ashes. A written demand to that effect was
sent to the authorities, and they were informed what
would be the result of a failure or refusal to comply with

26 401

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

it : for I desired to give the people of Chambersburg an
opportunity of saving their town, by making compen
sation for part of the injury done, and hoped the pay
ment of such a sum would have the effect of causing the
adoption of a different policy. McCausland was also
directed to proceed from Chambersburg towards Cumber
land, Maryland, and levy contributions in money upon
that and other towns able to bear them, and if possible
destroy the machinery of the coal pits near Cumberland
and the machine shops, depots and bridges on the Balti
more & Ohio Railroad as far as practicable.

On the 29th, McCausland crossed the Potomac near
Clear Spring above Williamsport, and I moved with
Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions and Vaughan 's cavalry
to the latter place, while Imboden demonstrated with his
and Jackson's cavalry towards Harper's Ferry, in order
to draw attention from McCausland. Breckenridge re
mained at Martinsburg and continued the destruction of
the railroad. Vaughan drove a force of cavalry from
Williamsport, and went into Hagerstown, where he cap
tured and destroyed a train of cars loaded with supplies.
One of Rodes' brigades was crossed over at Williamsport
and subsequently withdrawn. On the 30th, McCausland
being well under way I moved back to Martinsburg, and
on the 31st, the whole infantry force was moved to
Bunker Hill, where we remained on the 1st, 2nd, and
3rd of August.

On the 4th, in order to enable McCausland to retire
from Pennsylvania and Maryland, and to keep Hunter,
who had been reinforced by the 6th and 19th corps, and
had been oscillating between Harper's Ferry and Monoc-
acy Junction, in a state of uncertainty, I again moved to
the Potomac with the infantry and Vaughan 's and Jack
son's cavalry, while Imboden demonstrated towards
Harper's Ferry. On the 5th, Rodes' and Ramseur's
divisions crossed at Williamsport and took position near
St. James' College and Vaughan 's cavalry went into
Hagerstown. Breckenridge, with his command, and

402

THE BURNING OF CHAMBERSBURG

Jackson's cavalry, crossed at Shepherdstown, and took
position at Sharpsburg. This position is in full view
from Maryland Heights, and a cavalry force was sent
out by the enemy to reconnoitre, which, after skirmishing
with Jackson's cavalry, was driven off by the sharp
shooters of Gordon's division. On the 6th, the whole
force recrossed the Potomac at Williamsport, and moved
towards Martinsburg, and on the 7th we returned to
Bunker Hill.*

* While at Sharpsburg on this occasion, I rode over the ground
on which the battle of Sharpsburg or Antietam, as it is called by the
enemy, was fought, and I was surprised to see how few traces of that
great battle remained. In the woods at the famous Dunkard or Tunker
Church, where, from personal observation at the battle, I expected to
find the trees terribly broken and battered, a stranger would find diffi
culty in identifying the marks of the bullets and shells.

I will take occasion here to say that the public, North or South,
has never known how small was the force with which General Lee
fought that battle. From personal observation and conversation with
other officers engaged, including General Lee himself, I am satisfied
that the latter was not able to carry 30,000 men into action. The
exhaustion of our men, in the battles around Richmond, the subsequent
battles near Manassas, and on the march to Maryland, when they
were for days without anything to eat except green corn, was so great,
that the straggling was frightful before we crossed the Potomac. As
an instance of our weakness, and a reminiscence worthy of being
recorded, which was brought forcibly to my mind while riding over
the ground, I state the following facts; in the early part of the day,
all of General Jackson's troops on the field except my brigade (A. P.
Hill had not then arrived from Harper's Ferry) were driven from the
field in great disorder, and Hood had taken their place with his
division.

My brigade, which was on the extreme left, supporting some
artillery with which Stuart was operating, and had not been en
gaged, was sent for by General Jackson and posted in the left of the
woods at the Dunkard Church. Hood was also forced back, and then
the enemy advanced to this woods — Sumner's corps, which was fresh,
advancing on our left flank. My brigade, then numbering about 1000
men for duty, with two or three hundred men of Jackson's own
division, who had been rallied by Colonels Grigsby and Stafford, and
with an interval of at least one-half a mile between us and any
other part of our line, held Sumner's corps in check for some time,

403

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

On the 30th of July McCausland reached Chambers-
burg and made the demand as directed, reading to such
of the authorities as presented themselves the paper sent
by me. The demand was not complied with, the people
stating that they were not afraid of having their town
burned, and that a Federal force was approaching. The
policy pursued by our army on former occasions had been
so lenient that they did not suppose the threat was in
earnest this time, and they hoped for speedy relief. Mc
Causland, however, proceeded to carry out his orders,
and the greater part of the town was laid in ashes.*

He then moved in the direction of Cumberland, but
on approaching that town, he found it defended by a force
under Kelly too strong for him to attack, and he with
drew towards Hampshire County in Virginia, and crossed
the Potomac near the mouth of the South Branch, captur
ing the garrison at that place and partially destroying

until Green's division, of Mansfield's corps, penetrated into the in
terval in the woods between us and the rest of our line, and I was
compelled to move by the flank and attack it. That division was driven
out of the woods by my brigade, while Grigsby and Stafford skirmished
with Sumner's advancing force, when we turned on it, and with the
aid of three brigades— to wit : Anderson's, Semmes' and Barksdale's—
which had just arrived to our assistance, drove it from the woods in
great confusion and with heavy loss. So great was the disparity in
the forces at this point that the wounded officers who were captured
were greatly mortified, and commenced making excuses by stating that
the troops in their front were raw troops who stampeded and pro
duced confusion in their ranks. McClellan, in his report, states that
Sumner's corps and Green's division encountered in this woods "over
whelming numbers behind breastworks," and he assigns the heavy losses
and consequent demoralization in Sumner's corps as one of the reasons
for not renewing the fight on the 18th. "We had no breastworks or
anything like them in that woods on the 17th, and, on our part, it was
a stand up fight there altogether. The slight breastworks subsequently
seen by McClellan were made on the 18th, when we were expecting a
renewal of the battle.

* For this act I, alone, am responsible, as the officers engaged in
it were simply executing my orders, and had no discretion left them.
Notwithstanding the lapse of time which has occurred and the result
of the war, I see no reason to regret my conduct on this occasion.

404

THE BURNING OF CHAMBERSBURG

the railroad bridge. He then invested the post on the
railroad at New Creek, but finding it too strongly forti
fied to take by assault, he moved to Moorefield in Hardy
County, near which he halted to rest and recruit his men
and horses, as the command was now considered safe
from pursuit. Averill, however, had been pursuing
from Chambersburg with a body of cavalry, and John
son's brigade was surprised in camp, before day, on the
morning of the 7th of August, and routed by AverilPs
force. This resulted also in the rout of McCausland's
brigade, and the loss of the artillery (4 pieces), and about
300 prisoners from the whole command. The balance of
the command made its way to Mount Jackson in great
disorder, and much weakened. This affair had a very
damaging effect upon my cavalry for the rest of the
campaign.

CHAPTER XLIV.

RETREAT TO FISHER'S HILL.

ON the 9th, Imboden reported that a large force had
been concentrated at Harper's Ferry, consisting of the
6th, 19th, and Crook's corps, under a new commander,
and that it was moving to our right. The new commander
proved to be Major General Sheridan, from Grant's
army. On the 10th, we moved from Bunker Hill to the
east of Winchester, to cover the roads from Charles-
town and Berry ville to that place ; and Ramseur 's division
was moved to Winchester, to cover that place against
a force reported to be advancing from the west ; but, this
report proving untrue, it was subsequently moved to the
junction of the Millwood and Front Royal roads.

On the morning of the llth, it was discovered that the
enemy was moving to our right on the east of the Ope-
quon, and my troops, which had been formed in line of
battle covering Winchester, were moved to the right,
towards Newtown, keeping between the enemy and the
Valley Pike. Ramseur had a brisk skirmish with a body
of the enemy's cavalry on the Millwood road, and drove
it back. Imboden 's and Vaughan's brigades had a severe
fight with another body of cavalry at the double toll-gate,
at the intersection of the Front Royal road with the road
from White Post to Newtown ; and it was discovered that
there had been a considerable accession to that arm from
Grant's army.

Just before night, Gordon had very heavy skirmish
ing near Newtown, with a large force of cavalry, which
advanced on the road from the double toll-gate, and drove
it off. We encamped near Newtown; and on the morn
ing of the 12th, moved to Hupp's Hill, between Strasburg
and Cedar Creek. Finding that the enemy was advancing
in much heavier force than I had yet encountered, I de
termined to take position at Fisher's Hill, above Stras-

406

RETREAT TO FISHER'S HILL

burg, and await his attack there. Imboden with his bri
gade was sent to the Luray Valley, to watch that route ;
and, in the afternoon, we moved to Fisher's Hill. I had
received information, a few days before, from General
Lee, that General Anderson had moved with Kershaw's
division of infantry and Fitz. Lee's division of cavalry
to Culpeper Court-House; and I sent a dispatch to An
derson informing him of the state of things, and request
ing him to move to Front Royal, so as to guard the
Luray Valley.

Sheridan's advance appeared on the banks of Cedar
Creek, on the 12th, and there was some skirmishing with
it. My troops were posted at Fisher's Hill, with the right
resting on the North Fork of the Shenandoah, and the
left extending towards Little North Mountain; and we
awaited the advance of the enemy. General Anderson
moved to Front Royal, in compliance with my request,
and took position to prevent an advance of the enemy
on that route. Shortly after I took position at Fisher's
Hill, Major General Lomax reported to me to relieve
Ransom in command of the cavalry, and McCausland and
Johnson joined us with the remnants of their brigades.
Sheridan demonstrated at Hupp's Hill, within our view,
for several days, and some severe skirmishing ensued.

Upon taking position at Fisher's Hill, I had estab
lished a signal station on the end of Three Top Mountain,
a branch of Massanutten Mountain, near Strasburg,
which overlooked both camps and enabled me to communi
cate readily with General Anderson in the Luray Valley.
A small force from Sheridan's army ascended the moun
tain and drove off our signal-men and possession was
taken of the station by the enemy, who was in turn driven
away; when several small but severe fights ensued over
the station, possession of it being finally gained and held
by a force of 100 men under Captain Keller of Gordon's
division.

On the morning of the 17th, it was discovered that
the enemy was falling back, and I immediately moved

407

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

forward in pursuit, requesting General Anderson, by sig
nal, to cross the river at Front Royal and move towards
Winchester. Just before night, the enemy's cavalry and
a body of infantry, reported to be a division, was encoun
tered between Kernstown and Winchester, and driven
through the latter place, after a sharp engagement, in
which Wharton's division moved to the left and attacked
the enemy's infantry, and drove it from a strong position
on Bower's Hill, south of Winchester, while Ramseur
engaged it in the front and Gordon advanced against the
cavalry on the right.

On the 18th we took possession to cover Winchester,
and General Anderson came up with Kershaw's division
of infantry, Cutshaw's battalion of artillery and two
brigades of cavalry under Fitz. Lee. General Anderson
ranked me, but he declined to take command, and offered
to co-operate in any movement I might suggest. We had
now discovered that Torbert's and Wilson's divisions of
cavalry from Grant's army had joined Sheridan's force,
and that the latter was very large.

On the 19th, my main force moved to Bunker Hill and
Lomax's cavalry made reconnaissances to Martinsburg
and Shepherdstown, while Anderson's whole force re
mained near Winchester.

On the 20th, our cavalry had some skirmishing with
the enemy's, on the Opequon, and on the 21st, by con
cert, there was a general movement towards Harper's
Ferry — my command moving through Smithfield towards
Charlestown, and Anderson's on the direct road by Sum
mit Point. A body of the enemy's cavalry was driven
from the Opequon, and was pursued by part of our
cavalry towards Summit Point. I encountered Sheri
dan's main force near Cameron's depot, about three miles
from Charlestown, in a position which he commenced
fortifying at once. Rodes' and Ramseur 's divisions were
advanced to the front, and very heavy skirmishing en
sued and was continued until night, but I waited for
General Anderson to arrive before making a general

408

RETREAT TO FISHER'S HILL

attack. He encountered Wilson's division of cavalry
at Summit Point, and, after driving it off, went into camp
at that place. At light next morning, it was discovered
that the enemy had retired during the night, and his rear
guard of cavalry was driven through Charlestown to
wards Halltown, where Sheridan had taken a strong
position under the protection of the heavy guns on Mary
land Heights.

I demonstrated on the enemy's front on the 22nd, 23rd
and 24th, and there was some skirmishing. General
Anderson then consented to take my position in front of
Charlestown and amuse the enemy with Kershaw's divis
ion of infantry, supported by McCausland's brigade of
cavalry on the left and a regiment of Fitz. Lee's cavalry
on the right, while I moved with my infantry and artillery
to Shepherdstown and Fitz. Lee with the rest of the
cavalry to Williamsport, as if to cross into Maryland, in
order to keep up the fear of an invasion of Maryland
and Pennsylvania.

On the 25th Fitz. Lee started by way of Leetown and
Martinsburg to Williamsport, and I moved through Lee-
town and crossed the railroad at Kearneysville to Shep
herdstown. After Fitz. Lee had passed on, I encountered
a very large force of the enemy's cavalry between Lee-
town and Kearneysville, which was moving out with
several days' forage and rations for a raid in our rear.
After a sharp engagement with small arms and artillery,
this force was driven back through Shepherdstown, where
we came near surrounding and capturing a considerable
portion of it, but it succeeded in making its escape across
the Potomac. Gordon's division, which was moved
around to intercept the enemy, became heavily engaged,
and cut off the retreat of part of his force by one road,
but it made its way down the river to the ford by another
and thus escaped. In this affair, a valuable officer,
Colonel Monaghan, of the 6th Louisiana Regiment, was
killed. Fitz. Lee reached Williamsport, and had some

409

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

skirmishing across the river at that place, and then moved
to Shepherdstown.

On the 26th I moved to Leetown, on the 27th moved
back to Bunker Hill ; while Anderson, who had confronted
Sheridan, during the two days of my absence, with but
a division of infantry, and a brigade and a regiment of
cavalry, moved to Stephenson's depot. On the 28th our
cavalry, which had been left holding a line from Charles-
town to Shepherdstown, was compelled to retire across
the Opequon, after having had a brisk engagement with
the enemy's cavalry at Smithfield. On the 29th, the
enemy's cavalry crossed the Opequon near Smithfield,
driving in our cavalry pickets, when I advanced to the
front with a part of my infantry, and drove the enemy
across the stream again, and after a very sharp artil
lery duel, a portion of my command was crossed over
and pursued the enemy through Smithfield towards
Charlestown.

Quiet prevailed on the 30th, but on the 31st there
were some demonstrations of cavalry by the enemy on the
Opequon, which were met by ours. On this day Anderson
moved to Winchester, and Eodes, with his division, went
to Martinsburg on a reconnaissance, drove a force of the
enemy's cavalry from that place, interrupted the prep
arations for repairing the railroad, and then returned.

There was quiet on the 1st, but on the 2nd, I broke
up my camp at Bunker Hill, and moved with three divis
ions of infantry and part of McCausland's cavalry, under
Colonel Ferguson, across the country towards Summit
Point, on a reconnaissance, while the trains under the
protection of Eodes' division were moved to Stephenson's
depot. After I had crossed the Opequon and was moving
towards Summit Point, Averill's cavalry attacked and
drove back in some confusion first Vaughan's and then
Johnson's cavalry, which were on the Martinsburg road
and the Opequon, but Bodes returned towards Bunker
Hill and drove the enemy back in turn. This affair
arrested my march and I recrossed the Opequon and

410

RETREAT TO FISHER'S HILL

moved to Stephenson's depot, where I established my
camp.

On the 3rd, Rodes moved to Bunker Hill in support of
Lomax's cavalry, and drove the enemy's cavalry from
and beyond the place.

A letter had been received from General Lee request
ing that Kershaw's division should be returned to him,
as he was very much in need of troops, and, after consul
tation with me, General Anderson determined to recross
the Blue Ridge with that division and Fitz. Lee 's cavalry.
On the 3rd, he moved towards Berryville for the purpose
of crossing the mountain at Ashby's Gap, and I was to
have moved towards Charlestown next day, to occupy the
enemy's attention during Anderson's movement. Sheri
dan, however, had started two divisions of cavalry
through Berryville and White Post, on a raid to our rear,
and his main force had moved towards Berryville.
Anderson encountered Crook's corps at the latter place,
and after a sharp engagement drove it back on the main
body. Receiving information of this affair, I moved at
daylight next morning, with three divisions, to Ander
son's assistance, Gordon's division being left to cover
Winchester.

I found Kershaw's division extended out in a strong
skirmish line confronting Sheridan's main force, which
had taken position in rear of Berryville, across the road
from Charlestown to that place, and was busily fortifying,
while the cavalry force which had started on the raid was
returning and passing between Berryville and the river
to Sheridan's rear. As may be supposed, Anderson's
position was one of great peril, if the enemy had pos*
sessed enterprise, and it presented the appearance of the
most extreme audacity for him thus to confront a force so
vastly superior to his own, while, too, his trains were at
the mercy of the enemy's cavalry, had the latter known
it. Placing one of my divisions in line on Kershaw's left,
I moved with the other two along the enemy's front
towards his right, for the purpose of reconnoitring and

411

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

attacking that flank, if a suitable opportunity offered.
After moving in this way for two miles, I reached an
elevated position from which the enemy's line was visi
ble, and within artillery range of it. I at first thought
that I had reached his right flank and was about making
arrangements to attack it, when, casting my eye to my
left, I discovered, as far as the eye could reach, with the
aid of field glasses, a line extending toward Summit
Point.

The position the enemy occupied was a strong one,
and he was busily engaged fortifying it, having already
made considerable progress. It was not until I had had
this view that I realized the size of the enemy's force, and
as I discovered that his line was too long for me to get
around his flank and the position was too strong to attack
in front, I returned and informed General Anderson of
the condition of things. After consultation with him, we
thought it not advisable to attack the enemy in his en
trenched lines, and we determined to move our forces
back to the west side of the Opequon, and see if he would
not move out of his works.

The wagon trains were sent back early next morning
(the 5th) towards Winchester, and about an hour by sun,
Kershaw's division, whose place had been taken by one
of my divisions, moved toward the same point. About
two o 'clock in the afternoon my troops were withdrawn,
and moved back to Stephenson's depot. This withdrawal
was made while the skirmishers were in close proximity
and firing at each other; yet there was no effort on the
part of the enemy to molest us. Just as my front divis
ion (Rodes') reached Stephenson's depot, it met, and
drove back, and pursued for some distance, Averill's
cavalry, which was forcing, towards Winchester, that
part of our cavalry which had been watching the Martins-
burg road.

It was quiet on the 6th, but on the 7th the enemy's
cavalry made demonstrations on the Martinsburg road
and the Opequon at several points and was repulsed.

412

RETREAT TO FISHER'S HILL

On the 8th it was quiet again, but on the 9th a detach
ment of the enemy's cavalry came to the Opequon below
Brucetown, burned some mills and retreated before a
division of infantry sent out to meet it.

On the 10th, my infantry moved by Bunker Hill to
Darksville and encountered a considerable force of the
enemy's cavalry, which was driven off, and then pursued
by Lomax through Martinsburg across the Opequon. We
then returned to Bunker Hill and the next day to Stephen-
son 's depot, and there was quiet on the 12th.

On the 13th, a large force of the enemy's cavalry,
reported to be supported by infantry, advanced on the
road from Summit Point, and drove in our pickets from
the Opequon, when two divisions of infantry were ad
vanced to the front, driving the enemy across the Opequon
again. A very sharp artillery duel across the creek then
took place and some of my infantry crossed over, when
the enemy retired.

On the 14th, General Anderson again started, with
Kershaw's division and Cutshaw's battalion of artillery,
to cross the Blue Ridge by the way of Front Royal, and
was not molested. Fitz. Lee's cavalry was left with me,
and Ramseur's division was moved to Winchester to
occupy Kershaw's position.

There was an affair between one of Kershaw's bri
gades and a division of the enemy's cavalry, while I was
at Fisher's Hill and Anderson at Front Royal, in which
some prisoners were lost; and two affairs in which the
outposts from Kershaw's command were attacked and
captured by the enemy's cavalry, one in front of Win
chester and the other in front of Charlestown; which I
have not undertaken to detail, as they occurred when
General Anderson was controlling the operations of that
division, but it is proper to refer to them here as part of
the operations in the Valley. On the 15th and 16th my
troops remained in camp undisturbed.

The positions of the opposing forces were now as
follows: Ramseur's division and Nelson's battalion of

413

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JTJBAL A. EARLY

artillery were on the road from Berryville to Winchester,
one mile from the latter place. Rodes', Gordon's and
Wharton's divisions (the last two being under Brecken-
ridge), and Braxton's and King's battalions of artillery
were at Stephenson's depot on the Winchester & Poto
mac Railroad, which is six miles from Winchester.
Lomax's cavalry picketed in my front on the Opequon,
and on my left from that stream to North Mountain, while
Fitz. Lee's cavalry watched the right, having small
pickets across to the Shenandoah. Four principal roads,
from positions, centred at Stephenson's depot, to wit:
the Martinsburg road, the road from Charlestown via
Smithfield, the road from the same place via Summit
Point, and the road from Berryville via Jordan's Springs.
Sheridan's main force was near Berryville, at the en
trenched position which has been mentioned, while Averill
was at Martinsburg with a division of cavalry. Berry
ville is ten miles from Winchester, nearly east, and Mar
tinsburg twenty-two miles nearly north. The crossing of
the Opequon on the Berryville road is four or five miles
from Winchester. From Berryville there are two good
roads via White Post to the Valley Pike at Newtown and
Middletown, the last two roads running east of the Ope
quon. The whole country is very open, being a lime
stone country which is thickly settled and well cleared,
and affords great facilities for the movement of troops
and the operations of cavalry. From the enemy's fortifi
cations on Maryland Heights, the country north and east
of Winchester, and the main roads through it are exposed
to view.

The relative positions which we occupied rendered
my communications to the rear very much exposed, but
I could not avoid it without giving up the lower Valley.
The object of my presence there was to keep up a threat
ening attitude towards Maryland and Pennsylvania, and
prevent the use of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, and the
Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, as well as to keep as large
a force as possible from Grant's army to defend the

414

RETREAT TO FISHER'S HILL

Federal Capital. Had Sheridan, by a prompt movement,
thrown his whole force on the line of my communications,
I would have been compelled to attempt to cut my way
through, as there was no escape for me to the right or
left, and my force was too weak to cross the Potomac
while he was in my rear. I knew my danger, but I could
occupy no other position that would have enabled me to
accomplish the desired object.

If I had moved up the Valley at all, I could not have
stopped short of New Market, for between that place and
the country, in which I was, there was no forage for my
horses ; and this would have enabled the enemy to resume
the use of the railroad and canal, and return all the
troops from Grant's army to him. Being compelled to
occupy the position where I was, and being aware of its
danger as well as apprised of the fact that very great
odds were opposed to me, my only resource was to use my
forces so as to display them at different points with great
rapidity, and thereby keep up the impression that they
were much larger than they really were. The events of
the last month had satisfied me that the commander
opposed to me was without enterprise, and possessed an
excessive caution which amounted to timidity. If it was
his policy to produce the impression that his force was
too weak to fight me, he did not succeed, but if it was to
convince me that he was not an energetic commander, his
strategy was a complete success, and subsequent events
have not changed^my opinion.

My. infantry force at this time consisted of the three
divisions of the 2nd Corps of the Army of Northern Vir
ginia, and Wharton's division of Breckenridge 's com
mand. The 2nd corps numbered a little over 8,000
muskets when it was detached in pursuit of Hunter, and
it had now been reduced to about 7,000 muskets, by long
and rapid marches, and the various encampments and
skirmishes in which it had participated. Wharton's
division had been reduced to about 1,700 muskets by the
same causes. Making a small allowance for details and

415

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

those unfit for duty, I had about 8,500 muskets for duty.

When I returned from Maryland, my cavalry con
sisted of the remnants of five small brigades, to wit:
Imboden's, McCausland's, Johnson's, Jackson's and
Vaughan's. Vaughan's had now been ordered to South
western Virginia, most of the men having left without
permission. The surprise and rout of McCausland's and
Johnson's brigades by Averill at Moorefield had resulted
in the loss of a considerable number of horses and men,
and such had been the loss in all the brigades, in the
various fights and skirmishes in which they had been
engaged, that the whole of this cavalry, now under
Lomax, numbered only about 1,700 mounted men. Fitz.
Lee had brought with him two brigades, to wit: Wick-
ham's and Lomax 's old brigade (now under Colonel
Payne), numbering about 1,200 mounted men. I had
three battalions of artillery which had been with me near
Washington, and Fitz. Lee had brought a few pieces of
horse artillery. When I speak of divisions and brigades
of my troops, it must be understood that they were mere
skeletons of those organizations.

Since my return from Maryland, my supplies had been
obtained principally from the lower Valley and the coun
ties west of it, and the money which was obtained by
contributions in Maryland was used for that purpose.
Nearly the whole of our bread was obtained by threshing
the wheat and then having it ground, by details from my
command, and it sometimes happened that while my
troops were fighting, the very flour which was to furnish
them with bread for their next meal was being ground
under the protection of their guns. Latterly our flour had
been obtained from the upper Valley, but also by details
sent for that purpose. The horses and mules, including
the cavalry horses, were sustained almost entirely by
grazing.

I have no means of stating with accuracy Sheridan's
force, and can only form an estimate from such data as
I have been able to procure. Citizens who had seen his

416

RETREAT TO FISHER'S BILL

force stated that it was the largest which they had ever
seen in the Valley on either side, and some estimated it as
high as 60,000 or 70,000, but of course I made allowance
for the usual exaggeration of inexperienced men. My
estimate is from the following data: in Grant's letter to
Hunter, dated at Monocacy, August 5th, 1864, and con
tained in the report of the former, is the following state
ment: "In detailing such a force, the brigade of cavalry
now en route from Washington via Rockville may be
taken into account. There are now on their way to join
you three other brigades of the best cavalry, numbering at
least 5,000 men and horses. " Sheridan relieved Hunter
on the 6th, and Grant says in his report, "On the 7th of
August, the Middle Department and the Departments of
West Virginia, Washington and the Susquehanna were
constituted into the Middle Military division, and Major
General Sheridan was assigned to the temporary com
mand of the same. Two divisions of cavalry, commanded
by Generals Torbert and Wilson, were sent to Sheridan
from the Army of the Potomac. The first reached him
at Harper's Ferry on the llth of August."

Before this cavalry was sent to the Valley, there was
already a division there commanded by Averill, besides
some detachments which belonged to the Department of
West Virginia. A book containing the official reports of
the chief surgeon of the cavalry corps of Sheridan's
army which was subsequently captured at Cedar Creek
on the 19th of October, showed that there were present
for duty in that corps, during the first week in September,
10,000 men. The extracts from Grant's report go to con
firm this statement, as, if three brigades numbered at
least 5,000 men and horses, the two divisions, when the
whole of them arrived with Averill 's cavalry, must have
numbered over 10,000.

I think, therefore, that I can safely estimate Sheri
dan's cavalry at the battle of Winchester, on the 19th of
September, at 10,000. His infantry consisted of the 6th,
19th, and Crook's corps, the latter being composed of the

27 417

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

"Army of West Virginia, " and one division of the 8th
corps. The report of Secretary Stanton shows that there
was in the department of which the "Middle Military
division" was composed the following "available force
present for duty May 1st, 1864," to wit:

Department of Washington 42,12

Department of West Virginia 30,782

Department of the Susquehanna 2,970

Middle Department 5,627

making an aggregate of 81,503 ; but, as the Federal Secre
tary of War in the same report says, "In order to repair
the losses of the Army of the Potomac, the chief part of
the force designed to guard the Middle Department and
the Department of Washington was called forward to
the front," we may assume that 40,000 men were used
for that purpose, which would leave 41,503, minus the
losses in battle before Sheridan relieved Hunter in the
Middle Military division, exclusive of the 6th and 19th
corps, and the cavalry from. Grant's army. The infantry
of the Army of the Potomac was composed of the 2nd,
5th, and 6th corps, on the 1st of May, 1864, and Stanton
says the "available force present for duty" in that army,
on that day, was 120,386 men. Allowing 30,000 for the
artillery and cavalry of that army, which would be a very
liberal allowance, and there would be still left 90,385
infantry; and it is fair to assume that the 6th corps
numbered one-third of the infantry, that is 30,000 men on
the 1st of May, 1864.

If the losses of the Army of the Potomac had been
such as to reduce the 6th corps to less than 10,000 men,
notwithstanding the reinforcements and recruits received,
the carnage in Grant's army must have been frightful
indeed. The 19th corps was just from the Department of
the Gulf and had not gone through a bloody campaign.
A communication which was among the papers captured
at Cedar Creek, in noticing some statement of a news
paper correspondent in regard to the conduct of that

418

RETREAT TO FISHER'S HILL

corps at Winchester, designated it as " a vile slander on
12,000 of the best soldiers in the Union army."

In view of the foregoing data without counting the
troops in the Middle Department and the Departments
of Washington and the Susquehanna, and making liberal
allowances for losses in battle, and for troops detained
on post and garrison duty in the Department of West
Virginia, I think that I may assume that Sheridan had
at least 35,000 infantry against me. The troops of the
6th corps and of the Department of West Virginia, alone,
without counting the 19th corps, numbered on the 1st of
May, 1864, 60,784. If with the 19th corps Sheridan
did not have 35,000 infantry remaining from this force,
what had become of the balance? Sheridan's artillery
very greatly outnumbered mine, both in men and guns.

Having been informed that a force was at work on the
railroad at Martinsburg, I moved on the afternoon of the
17th of September, with Bodes' and Gordon's divisions,
and Braxton's artillery, to Bunker Hill, and on the morn
ing of the 18th with Gordon's division and a part of the
artillery to Martinsburg, preceded by a part of Lomax's
cavalry. Averill's division of cavalry was driven from
the town across the Opequon in the direction of Charles-
town, and we then returned to Bunker Hill. Gordon was
left at Bunker Hill, with orders to move to Stephenson's
depot by sunrise next morning, and Rodes' division
moved to the latter place that night, to which I also
returned. At Martinsburg, where the enemy had a tele
graph office, I learned that Grant was with Sheridan
that day, and I expected an early move.

CHAPTER XLV.

BATTLE OF WINCHESTER.

AT light on the morning of the 19th, our cavalry
pickets, at the crossing of the Opequon on the Berryville
road, were driven in, and information having been sent me
of that fact, I immediately ordered all the troops at
Stephenson's depot to be in readiness to move, directions
being given for Gordon, who had arrived from Bunker
Hill, to move at once, but by some mistake on the part of
my staff officer, the latter order was not delivered to
General Breckenridge or Gordon. I rode at once to
Ramseur 's position, and found his troops in line across
the Berryville road skirmishing with the enemy. Before
reaching this point, I had ascertained that Gordon was
not moving and sent back for him, and now discovering
that the enemy's advance was a real one and in heavy
force, I sent orders for Breckenridge and Rodes to move
up as rapidly as possible. The position occupied by
Ramseur was about one mile and a half out from Win
chester, on an elevated plateau between Abraham's Creek
and Red Bud Run. Abraham's Creek crosses the Valley
Pike one mile south of Winchester, and then crosses the
Front Royal road about the same distance southeast of
the town, and running eastwardly, on the southern side
of the Berryville road, crosses that road a short distance
before it empties into the Opequon.

Red Bud Run crosses the Martinsburg road about a
mile and a half north of Winchester and runs eastwardly,
on the northern side of the Berryville road, to the Ope
quon. Ramseur was therefore in the obtuse angle formed
by the Martinsburg and Front Royal roads. In front of
and to the right of him, for some distance, the country
was open. Abraham 's Creek runs through a deep valley,
and beyond it, on the right, is high open ground, at the
intersection of the Front Royal and Millwood roads. To

420

BATTLE OF WINCHESTER

Ramseur's left the country sloped off to the Red Bud,
and there were some patches of woods which afforded
cover for troops. To the north of the Red Bud, the coun
try is very open, affording facilities for any kind of
troops. Towards the Opequon, on the front, the Berry-
ville road runs through a ravine with hills and woods on
each side, which enabled the enemy to move his troops
under cover, and mask them out of range of artillery.

Nelson 's artillery was posted on Ramseur's line,
covering the approaches as far as practicable, and Lomax
with Jackson's cavalry and part of Johnson's was on the
right, watching the valley of Abraham's Creek, and the
Front Royal road beyond, while Fitz. Lee was on the left,
across the Red Bud, with his cavalry and a battery of
horse artillery; and a detachment of Johnson's cavalry
watched the interval between Ramseur's left and the Red
Bud. These troops held the enemy's main force in checlj
until Gordon's and Rodes' divisions arrived from
Stephenson's depot.

Gordon's division arrived first, a little after ten
o'clock A.M., and was placed under cover in a rear of a
piece of woods behind the interval between Ramseur's
line and the Red Bud, the detachment of Johnson's cav
alry having been removed to the right. Knowing that it
would not do for us to await the shock of the enemy's
attack, Gordon was directed to examine the ground on the
left, with a view to attacking a force of the enemy which
had taken position in a piece of wood in front of him, and
while he was so engaged, Rodes arrived with three of his
brigades, and was directed to form on Gordon's right in
rear of another piece of woods. While this movement
was executed, we discovered very heavy columns of the
enemy, which had been massed under cover between the
Red Bud and the Berryville road, moving to attack Rarn-
seur on his left flank, while another force pressed him
in front. It was a moment of imminent and thrilling
danger, as it was impossible for Ramseur's division,

421

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

which numbered only about 1,700 muskets, to withstand
the immense force advancing against it.

The only chance for us was to hurl Rodes and Gordon
upon the flank of the advancing columns, and they were
ordered forward at once to the attack. They advanced
in most gallant style through the woods into the open
ground, and attacked with great vigor, while Nelson's
battery on the right, and Braxton's on the left, opened a
destructive fire. But Evans1 brigade of Gordon's divis
ion, which was on the extreme left of our infantry, re
ceived a check from a column of the enemy, and was
forced back through the woods from behind which it had
advanced, the enemy following to the very rear of the
woods, and to within musket range of seven pieces of
Braxton's artillery which were without support.

This caused a pause in our advance and the position
was most critical, for it was apparent that unless this
force was driven back the day was lost. Braxton's guns,
in which now was our only hope, resolutely stood their
ground, and under the personal superintendence of
Lieutenant Colonel Braxton and Colonel T. H. Carter, my
then Chief of Artillery, opened with canister on the
enemy. This fire was so rapid and well directed that the
enemy staggered, halted, and^ commenced falling back,
leaving a battle flag on the ground, whose bearer was
cut down by a canister shot. Just then, Battle's brigade
of Rodes' division, which had arrived and been formed in
line for the purpose of advancing to the support of the
rest of the division, moved forward and swept through
the woods, driving the enemy before it, while Evans' bri
gade was rallied and brought back to the charge.

Our advance, which had been suspended for a moment,
was resumed, and the enemy's attacking columns were
thrown into great confusion and driven from the field.
This attacking force of the enemy proved to be the 6th
and 19th corps, and it was a grand sight to see this
immense body hurled back in utter disorder before my
two divisions, numbering a very little over 5,000 muskets.

422

BATTLE OF WINCHESTER

Ramseur's division had received the shock of the
enemy's attack, and been forced back a little, but soon
recovered itself. Lomax, on the right, had held the
enemy's cavalry in check, and, with a part of his force,
had made a gallant charge against a body of infantry,
when Ramseur's line was being forced back, thus aiding
the latter in recovering from the momentary disorder.
Fitz. Lee on the left, from across the Red Bud, had poured
a galling fire into the enemy's columns with his sharp
shooters and horse artillery, while Nelson's and Brax-
ton's battalions had performed wonders.

This affair occurred about 11 A.M., and a splendid
victory had been gained. The ground in front was strewn
with the enemy's dead and wounded, and some prisoners
had been taken. But on our side, Major General Rodes
had been killed, in the very moment of triumph, while
conducting the attack of his division with great gallantry
and skill, and this was a heavy blow to me. Brigadier
General Godwin of Ramseur's division had been killed,
and Brigadier General York of Gordon's division had
lost an arm. Other brave men and officers had fallen,
and we could illy bear the loss of any of them.

Had I then had a fresh body of troops to push our
victory," the day would have been ours, but in this action,
in the early part of the day, Miad present only about
7,000 muskets, about 2,000 cavalry and two battalions of
artillery with about 30 guns ; and they had all been en
gaged. Wharton's division and King's artillery had not
arrived, and Imboden's cavalry under Colonel Smith, and
McCausland's under Colonel Ferguson, were watching
the enemy's cavalry on the right, on the Martinsburg road
and the Opequon. The enemy had a fresh corps which
had not been engaged, and there remained his heavy force
of cavalry. Our lines were now formed across from
Abraham's Creek to Red Bud and were very attenuated.
The enemy was still to be seen in front in formidable
force, and away to our right, across Abraham's Creek,
at the junction of the Front Royal and Millwood roads,

423

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

he had massed a division of cavalry with some artillery,
overlapping us at least a mile, while the country was open
between this force and the Valley Pike and Cedar Creek
Pike back of the latter ; which roads furnished my only
means of retreat in the event of disaster. My line did
not reach the Front Royal road on the right or the
Martinsburg road on the left.

When the order was sent for the troops to move from
Stephenson's depot, General Breckenridge had moved to
the front, with Wharton's division and King's artillery,
to meet a cavalry force, which had driven our pickets
from the Opequon on the Charlestown road, and that
division had become heavily engaged with the enemy, and
sustained and repulsed several determined charges of
his cavalry, while his own flanks were in great danger
from the enemy's main force on the right, and a column
of his cavalry moving up the Martinsburg road on the
left. After much difficulty, and some hard fighting,
General Breckenridge succeeded in extricating his force,
and moving up the Martinsburg road to join me, but he
did not reach the field until about two o'clock in the
afternoon.

In the meantime there had been heavy skirmishing
along the line, and the reports from the front were that
the enemy was massing for another attack, but it was
impossible to tell where it would fall. As the danger
from the enemy's cavalry on the right was very great and
Lomax's force very weak, Wickham's brigade of Fitz.
Lee's cavalry had been sent from the left to Lomax's
assistance. When Wharton's division arrived, Patton's
brigade of that division was left to aid Fitz. Lee in guard
ing the Martinsburg road, against the force of cavalry
which was advancing on that road watched by Lomax's
two small brigades; and the rest of the division in the
centre, in order to be moved to any point that might be
attacked. Late in the afternoon two divisions of the
enemy's cavalry drove in the small force which had been
watching it on the Martinsburg road, and Crook's corps,

424

BATTLE OF WINCHESTER

which had not been engaged, advanced at the same time
on that flank, on the north side of Eed Bud, and, before
this overwhelming force, Patton's brigade of infantry
and Payne's brigade of cavalry under Fitz. Lee were
forced back.

A considerable force of the enemy's cavalry then
swept along the Martinsburg road to the very skirts of
Winchester, thus getting in the rear of our left flank.
Wliarton's two other brigades were moved in double
quick time to the left and rear, and making a gallant
charge on the enemy's cavalry, with the aid of King's ar
tillery, and some of Braxton's guns which were turned to
the rear, succeeded in driving it back. The division was
then thrown into line by General Breckenridge, in rear of
our left and at right angles with the Martinsburg road,
and another charge of the enemy's cavalry was hand
somely repulsed. But many of the men on our front line,
hearing the fire in the rear, and thinking they were
flanked and about to be cut off, commenced falling back,
thus producing great confusion. At the same time Crook
advanced against our left, and Gordon threw Evans' bri
gade into line to meet him, but the disorder in the front
line became so great that, after an obstinate resistance,
that brigade was compelled to retire also.

The whole front line had now given way, but a large
portion of the men were rallied and formed behind an
indifferent line of breastworks, which had been made just
outside of Winchester during the first year of the war,
and, with the aid of the artillery which was brought back
to this position, the progress of the enemy's infantry was
arrested. Wharton's division maintained its organiza
tion on the left, and Ramseur fell back in good order on
the right. Wickham's brigade of cavalry had been
brought from the right, and was in position on Fort
Hill just outside of Winchester on the west. Just after
the advance of the enemy's infantry was checked by our
artillery, it was reported to me that the enemy had got
around our right flank, and as I knew this was practicable

425

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

and was expecting such a movement from the cavalry on
the Front Royal road, I gave the order to retire, but in
stantly discovering that the supposed force of the enemy
was Ramseur's division, which had merely moved back
to keep in line with the other troops, I gave the order
for the latter to return to the works before they had
moved twenty paces.

This order was obeyed by Wharton's division, but not
so well by the others. The enemy's cavalry force, how
ever, was too large for us, and having the advantage of
open ground, it again succeeded in getting around our
left, producing great confusion, for which there was no
remedy. Nothing now was left for us but to retire
through Winchester, and Ramseur's division, which main
tained its organization, was moved on the east of the town
to the south side of it, and put in position, forming a basis
for a new line, while the other troops moved back through
the town. Wickham's brigade, with some pieces of horse
artillery on Fort Hill, covered this movement and checked
the pursuit of the enemy's cavalry. When the new line
was formed, the enemy's advance was checked until night
fall, and we then retired to Newtown without serious
molestation. Lomax had held the enemy's cavalry on the
Front Royal road in check, and a feeble attempt at pur
suit was repulsed by Ramseur near Kernstown.

As soon as our reverse began, orders had been sent
for the removal of the trains, stores and sick and wounded
in the hospitals to Fisher's Hill over the Cedar Creek
Pike and the Back Road. This was done with safety, and
all the wounded, except such as were not in a condition
to be moved, and those which had not been brought from
the field, were carried to the rear.

This battle, beginning with the skirmishing in Ram
seur 's front, had lasted from daylight till dark, and, at
the close of it, we had been forced back two miles, after
having repulsed the enemy's first attack with great
slaughter to him and subsequently contested every inch
of ground with unsurpassed obstinacy. We deserved

426

BATTLE OF WINCHESTER

the victory, and would have had it, but for the enemy's
immense superiority in cavalry, which alone gave it to
him.

Three pieces of King's artillery, from which the
horses were shot, and which, therefore, could not be
brought off, were lost, but the enemy claimed five, and if
he captured that number, two were lost by the cavalry and
not reported to me. My loss in killed, wounded and
prisoners was severe for the size of my force, but it was
only a fraction of that claimed by the enemy. Owing to
its obedience to orders in returning to the works, the
heaviest loss of prisoners was in Wharton's division.
Colonel G. W. Patton, commanding a brigade, was mor
tally wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy;
Major General Fitz. Lee was also severely wounded. In
the death of Major General Eodes, I had to regret the
loss, not only of a most accomplished, skilful and gallant
officer, upon whom I placed great reliance, but also of a
personal friend, whose counsels had been of great service
to me in the trying circumstances with which I had found
myself surrounded. He fell at his post, doing a soldier's
and patriot's duty to his country, and his memory will
long be cherished by his comrades. General Godwin and
Colonel Patton were both most gallant and efficient offi
cers, and their loss was deeply felt, as was that of all
the brave officers and men who fell in this battle. The
•enemy's loss in killed and wounded was very heavy, and
some prisoners fell into our hands.

A skilful and energetic commander of the enemy's
forces would have crushed Eamseur before any assistance
could have reached him, and thus ensured the destruction
of my whole force ; and later in the day, when the battle
had turned against us, with the immense superiority in
cavalry which Sheridan had, and the advantage of the
open country, would have destroyed my whole force and
captured everything I had. As it was, considering the
immense disparity in numbers and equipment, the enemy
had very little to boast of. I had lost a few pieces of

427

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

artillery and some very valuable officers and men, but the
main part of my force and all my trains had been saved,
and the enemy 's loss in killed and wounded was far
greater than mine. When I look back to this battle, I can
but attribute my escape from utter annihilation to the
incapacity of my opponent.*

* The enemy has called this battle " The Battle of the Opequon,"
but I know of no claim it has to that title, unless it be in the fact
that, after his repulse in the forepart of the day, some of his troops
ran back across that stream.

CHAPTER XL VI.

AFFAIR AT FISHER'S HILL.

AT light on the morning of the 20th, my troops moved
to Fisher's Hill without molestation from the enemy,
and again took position at that point on the old line—
Wharton's division being on the right, then Gordon's,
Bamseur's and Bodes', in the order in which they are
mentioned. Fitz. Lee's cavalry, now under Brigadier
General Wickham, was sent up the Luray Valley to a
narrow pass at Millwood, to try to hold that valley
against the enemy's cavalry. General Bamseur was
transferred to the command of Bodes' division, and
Brigadier General Pegram, who had reported for duty
about the 1st of August, and been in command of his
brigade since that time, was left in command of the divis
ion previously commanded by Bamseur. My infantry
was not able to occupy the whole line at Fisher's Hill,
notwithstanding it was extended out in an attenuated line,
with considerable intervals. The greater part of Lomax's
cavalry was therefore dismounted, and placed on Bam
seur's left, near Little North Mountain, but the line could
not then be fully occupied.

This was the only position in the whole Valley where
a defensive line could be taken against an enemy moving
up the Valley, and it had several weak points. To have
retired beyond this point would have rendered it neces
sary for me to fall back to some of the gaps of the Blue
Bidge, at the upper part of the Valley, and I determined
therefore to make a show of a stand here, with the hopes
that the enemy would be deterred from attacking me in
this position, as had been the case in August.

On the second day after our arrival at this place,
General Breckenridge received orders from Bichmond,
by telegraph, to return to Southwestern Virginia, and
I lost the benefit of his services. He had ably co-operated

429

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

with me, and our personal relations had been of the most
pleasant character.

In the afternoon of the 20th, Sheridan's forces ap
peared on the banks of Cedar Creek, about four miles
from Fisher's Hill, and the 21st, and the greater part of
the 22nd, were consumed by him in reconnoitring and
gradually moving his forces to my front under cover of
breastworks. After some sharp skirmishing, he attained
a strong position immediately in my front and fortified it,
and I began to think he was satisfied with the advantage
he had gained and would not probably press it further;
but on the afternoon of the 22nd, I discovered that an
other attack was contemplated, and orders were given for
my troops to retire, after dark, as I knew my force was
not strong enough to resist a determined assault. Just
before sunset, however, Crook's corps, which had moved
to our left on the side of Little North Mountain, and
under cover of the woods, forced back Lomax's dis
mounted cavalry and advanced against Ramseur's left.

Ramseur made an attempt to meet this movement by
throwing his brigades successively into line to the left,
and Wharton's division was sent for from the right, but
it did not arrive. Pegram's brigades were also thrown
into line in the same manner as Ramseur 's, but the move
ment produced some disorder in both divisions, and as
soon as it was observed by the enemy, he advanced along
his whole line and the mischief could not be remedied.
After a very brief contest, my whole force retired in
considerable confusion, but the men and officers of the
artillery behaved with great coolness, fighting to the very
last, and I had to ride to some of the officers and order
them to withdraw their guns, before they would move.
In some cases, they had held out so long, and the roads
leading from their positions into the Pike were so rugged,
that eleven guns fell into the hands of the enemy. Vigor
ous pursuit was not made, and my force fell back through
Woodstock to a place called the Narrow Passage, all the
trains being carried off safely.

430

AFFAIR AT FISHER'S HILL

Our loss in killed and wounded in this affair was
slight, but some prisoners were taken by the enemy, the
most of whom were captured while attempting to make
their way across the North Fork to Massanutten Moun
tain, under the impression that the enemy had possession
of the Valley Pike in our rear. I had the misfortune to
lose my Adjutant General, Lieutenant Colonel A. S. Pen-
die ton, a gallant and efficient young officer, who had
served on General Jackson's staff during his Valley cam
paign, and subsequently to the time of the latter 's death.
Colonel Pendleton fell mortally wounded about dark,
while posting a force across the Pike, a little in rear of
Fisher's Hill, to check the enemy. He was acting with
his accustomed gallantry, and his loss was deeply felt
and regretted.

CHAPTER XLVII.
THE MARCH UP THE VALLEY.

ON the morning of the 23rd, I moved back to Mount
Jackson, where I halted to enable the sick and wounded,
and the hospital stores at that place to be carried off. In
the afternoon Averill's division of cavalry came up in
pursuit, and after some heavy skirmishing was driven
back. I then moved to Rude's Hill between Mount Jack
son and New Market.

On the morning of the 24th, a body of the enemy's
cavalry crossed the North Fork below Mount Jackson,
and attempted to get around my right flank, but was held
in check. The enemy's infantry soon appeared at Mount
Jackson, and commenced moving around my left flank, on
the opposite side of the river from that on which my left
rested. As the country was entirely open, and Rude's
Hill an elevated position, I could see the whole movement
of the enemy, and as soon as it was fully developed, I
commenced retiring in line of battle, and in that manner
retired through New Market to a point at which the road
to Port Republic leaves the Valley Pike, nine miles from
Rude's Hill.

This movement was made through an entirely open
country, and at every mile or two a halt was made, and
artillery opened on the enemy, who was pursuing, which
compelled him to commence deploying into line, when the
retreat would be resumed. In this retreat, under fire in
line, which is so trying to a retiring force, and tests the
best qualities of the soldier, the conduct of my troops
was most admirable, and they preserved perfect order
and their line intact, notwithstanding their diminished
numbers, and the fact that the enemy was pursuing in
full force, and every now and then dashing up with horse
artillery under the support of cavalry, and opening on the
retiring lines. At the last halt, which was at a place

432

THE MARCH UP THE VALLEY

called " Tenth Legion, " near where the Port Republic
road leaves the Pike, and was a little before sunset, I
determined to resist any further advance so as to enable
my trains to get on the Port Republic road; and skir
mishers were sent out and artillery opened on the ad
vancing enemy, but after some skirmishing, he went into
camp in our view, and beyond the reach of our guns. At
this point a gallant officer of artillery, Captain Massie,
was killed by a shell. As soon as it was dark, we retired
five miles on the Port Republic road and bivouacked.

In the morning Lomax's cavalry had been posted to
our left, on the Middle and Back Roads from Mount Jack
son to Harrisonburg, but it was forced back by a superior
force of the enemy's cavalry, and retired to the latter
place in considerable disorder. Wickham's brigade had
been sent for from the Luray Valley to join me through
the New Market Gap, but it arrived at that gap just as
we were retiring through New Market, and orders were
sent for it to return to the Luray Valley, and join me at
Port Republic. In the meantime, Payne's small brigade
had been driven from Millf ord by two divisions of cavalry
under Torbert, which had moved up the Luray Valley,
and subsequently joined Sheridan through the New
Market Gap. This cavalry had been detained by Wick-
ham with his and Payne's brigades, at Millf ord, a suffi
cient time to enable us to pass New Market in safety.
If, however, it had moved up the Luray Valley by Con
rad's store, we would have been in a critical condition.

On the morning of the 25th, we moved towards Port
Republic, — which is in the fork of the South Fork and
South River, and where the road through Brown's Gap
in the Blue Ridge crosses those rivers, — in order to unite
with Kershaw's division which had been ordered to join
me from Culpeper Court-House. We crossed the river
below the junction, and took position between Port Re
public and Brown's Gap. Fitz. Lee's and Lomax's cav
alry joined us here, and on the 26th, Kershaw's division
with Cutshaw's battalion of artillery came up, after

28 433

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

having crossed through Swift Run Gap, and encountered
and repulsed, below Port Republic, a body of the enemy's
cavalry. There was likewise heavy skirmishing on my
front on the 26th with the enemy's cavalry, which made
two efforts to advance towards Brown's Gap, both of
which were repulsed after brisk fighting in which artillery
was used.

Having ascertained that the enemy's infantry had
halted at Harrisonburg, on the morning of the 27th, I
moved out and drove a division of his cavalry from Port
Republic, and then encamped in the fork of the rivers. I
here learned that two divisions of cavalry under Torbert
had been sent through Staunton to Waynesboro, and were
engaged in destroying the railroad bridge in the latter
place, and the tunnel through the Blue Ridge at Rock-fish
Gap, and on the 28th I moved for those points. In mak
ing this movement I had the whole of the enemy's infan
try on my right, while one division of cavalry was in my
rear and two in my front, and on the left was the Blue
Ridge. I had therefore to move with great circum
spection.

Wickham's brigade of cavalry was sent up South
River, near the mountain, to get between the enemy and
Rock-fish Gap, while the infantry moved in two columns,
one up South River, with the trains guarded in front by
Pegram's and Wharton's divisions, and in rear by Ram-
seur's division, and the other, composed of Kershaw's
and Gordon's divisions with the artillery, on the right
through Mount Meridian, Piedmont and New Hope. Mc-
Causland's cavalry, under Colonel Ferguson, was left to
blockade and hold Brown's Gap, while Lomax, with the
rest of his cavalry and Payne's brigade, watched the
right flank and rear. Wickham's brigade, having got
between Rock-fish Gap and Waynesboro, drove the
enemy's working parties from the latter place, and took
position on a ridge in front of it, when a sharp artillery
fight ensued. Pegram's division, driving a small body of
cavalry before it, arrived just at night and advanced upon

434

THE MARCH UP THE VALLEY

the enemy, when he retired in great haste, taking the
roads through Staunton and west of the Valley Pike,
back to the main body. A company of reserves, com
posed of boys under 18 years of age, which had been
employed on special duty at Staunton, had gone to Rock-
fish Gap, and another company of reserves from Char-
lottesville, with two pieces of artillery, had moved to
the same point, and when the enemy advanced towards
the tunnel and before he got in range of the guns, they
were opened and he retired to Waynesboro.

On the 29th and 30th, we rested at Waynesboro, and
an engineer party was put to work repairing the bridge,
which had been but partially destroyed.

On the 1st of October, I moved my whole force across
the country to Mount Sidney on the Valley Pike, and took
position between that place and North Eiver, the enemy's
forces having been concentrated around Harrisonburg,
and on the north bank of the river. In this position we
remained until the 6th, awaiting the arrival of Rosser 's
brigade of cavalry, which was on its way from General
Lee 's army. In the meantime there was some skirmishing
with the enemy's cavalry on the North River, at the
bridge near Mount Crawford and at Bridgewater above.

On the 5th, Rosser 's brigade arrived and was tem
porarily attached to Fitz. Lee's division, of which Rosser
was given the command, as Brigadier General Wickham
had resigned. The horses of Rosser 's brigade had been
so much reduced by previous hard service and the long
march from Richmond, that the brigade did not exceed
six hundred mounted men for duty, when it joined me.
Kershaw's division numbered 2,700 muskets for duty and
he had brought with him Cutshaw's battalion of artillery.
These reinforcements about made up my losses at Win
chester and Fisher's Hill, and I determined to attack
the enemy in his position at Harrisonburg, and for that
purpose made a reconnaissance on the 5th, but on the
morning of the 6th it was discovered that he had retired
during the night down the Valley.

435

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

When it was discovered that the enemy was retiring,
I moved forward at once and arrived at New Market
with my infantry on the 7th. Rosser pushed forward
on the Back and Middle roads in pursuit of the enemy's
cavalry, which was engaged in burning houses, mills,
barns, and stacks of wheat and hay, and had several
skirmishes with it, while Lomax also moved down the
Valley in pursuit, and skirmished successfully with the
enemy's cavalry on the 8th; but on the 9th they encoun
tered his whole cavalry force at Tom's Brook, in rear of
Fisher's Hill, and both of their commands were driven
back in considerable confusion, with a loss of some pieces
of artillery, — nine were reported to me as the number
lost, but Grant claims eleven. Rosser rallied his com
mand on the Back Road, at Columbia furnace opposite
Edinburg, but a part of the enemy's cavalry swept along
the Pike to Mount Jackson, and then retired on the
approach of a part of my infantry. On the 10th, Rosser
established his line of pickets across the Valley from
Columbia Furnace to Edinburg, and on the llth Lomax
was sent to the Luray Valley to take position at Millf ord.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK, OR BELLE GROVE.

HAVING heard that Sheridan was preparing to send
part of his troops to Grant, I moved down the Valley
again on the 12th. On the morning of the 13th we reached
Fisher's Hill, and I moved with part of my command to
Hupp's Hill, between Strasburg and Cedar Creek, for the
purpose of reconnoitring. The enemy was found posted
on the north bank of Cedar Creek in strong force, and
while we were observing him, without displaying any of
my force except a small body of cavalry, a division of his
infantry was moved out to his left and stacked arms
in an open field, when a battery of artillery was run out
suddenly and opened on this division, scattering it in
great confusion.

The enemy then displayed a large force, and sent a
division across the creek to capture guns which had been
opened on him, but when it had advanced near enough,
Conner's brigade of Kershaw's division was sent forward
to meet this division, and after a sharp contest drove it
back in considerable confusion and with severe loss.
Conner's brigade behaved very handsomely indeed, but
unfortunately, after the enemy had been entirely re
pulsed, Brigadier General Conner, a most accomplished
and gallant officer, lost his leg by a shell from the opposite
side of the creek. Some prisoners were taken from the
enemy in this affair, and Colonel Wells, the division com
mander, fell into our hands mortally wounded. The
object of the reconnaissance having been accomplished, I
moved back to Fisher's Hill, and I subsequently learned
that the 6th corps had started for Grant's army but was
brought back after this affair.

I remained at Fisher's Hill until the 16th observing
the enemy, with the hope that he would move back from
his very strong position on the north of Cedar Creek, and

437

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

that we would be able to get at him in a different position,
but he did not give any indications of an intention to
move, nor did he evince any purpose of attacking us,
though the two positions were in sight of each other.
In the meantime there was some skirmishing at Hupp's
Hill, and some with the cavalry at Cedar Creek on the
Back Eoad. On the 16th Rosser 's scouts reported a
brigade of the enemy's cavalry encamped on the Back
Road, and detached from the rest of his force, and
Rosser was permitted to go that night, with a brigade of
infantry mounted behind the same number of cavalry,
to attempt the surprise and capture of the camp. He
succeeded in surrounding and surprising the camp, but
it proved to be that of only a strong picket, the whole
of which was captured — the brigade having moved its
location.

At light on the morning of the 7th, the whole of my
troops were moved out in front of our lines, for the pur
pose of covering Rosser 's return in case of difficulty,
and, after he had returned, General Gordon was sent
with a brigade of his division to Hupp's Hill, for the
purpose of ascertaining, by close inspection, whether the
enemy's position was fortified, and he returned with the
information that it was. I was now compelled to move
back for want of provisions and forage, or attack the
enemy in his position with the hope of driving him from
it, and I determined to attack. As I was not strong
enough to attack the fortified position in front, I deter
mined to get around one of the enemy's flanks and attack
him by surprise if I could.

After General Gordon's return from Hupp's Hill, he
and Captain Hotchkiss, my topographical engineer, were
sent to the signal station on the end of Massanutten
Mountain, which had been re-established, for the purpose
of examining the enemy's position from that point, and
General Pegram was ordered to go as near as he could
to Cedar Creek on the enemy's right flank, and see
whether it was practicable to surprise him on that flank.

438

BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK, OR BELLE GROVE

Captain Hotchkiss returned to my headquarters after
dark, and reported the result of his and General Gordon's
examination, and he gave me a sketch of the enemy's
position and camps. He informed me that the enemy's
left flank, which rested near Cedar Creek, a short distance
above its mouth, was lightly picketed, and that there was
but a small cavalry picket on the North Fork of the
Shenandoah, below the mouth of the creek, and he stated
that, from information he had received, he thought it
was practicable to move a column of infantry between the
base of the mountain and the river, to a ford below the
mouth of the creek. He also informed me that the main
body of the enemy's cavalry was on his right flank on
the Back Road to Winchester.

The sketch made by Captain Hotchkiss, which proved
to be correct, designated the roads in the enemy's rear,
and the house of a Mr. Cooley at a favorable point for
forming an attacking column, after it crossed the river,
in order to move against the enemy and strike him on the
Valley Pike in rear of his works. Upon this information,
I determined to attack the enemy by moving over the
ground designated by Captain Hotchkiss, if it should
prove practicable to move a column between the base of
the mountain and the river. Next morning, General Gor
don confirmed the report of Captain Hotchkiss, express
ing confidence that the attack could be sucessfully made
on the enemy's left and rear, and General Pegram re
ported that a movement on the enemy's right flank would
be attended with great difficulty, as the banks of Cedar
Creek on that flank were high and precipitous and were
well guarded. General Gordon and Captain Hotchkiss
were then sent to examine and ascertain the practicability
of the route at the base of the mountain, and General
Pegram, at his request, was permitted to go to the signal
station on the mountain to examine the enemy's position
himself from that point. Directions were given, in the
meantime, for everything to be in readiness to move that
night (the 18th) and the division commanders were re-

439

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

quested to be at my quarters at two o 'clock in the after
noon, to receive their final instructions.

The river makes a circuit to the left in front of the
right of the position at Fisher's Hill and around by Stras-
burg, leaving a considerable body of land between it and
the mountain, on which are several farms. Whenever
Fisher's Hill had been occupied by us, this bend of the
river had been occupied by a portion of our cavalry, to
prevent the enemy from turning the right of the position,
and it was now occupied by Colonel Payne with his
cavalry, numbering about 300. In order to make the
contemplated movement, it was necessary to cross the
river into this bend, and then pass between the foot of
the mountain and the river below Strasburg, where the
passage was very narrow, and across the river again
below the mouth of Cedar Creek. The enemy's camps
and position were visible from a signal station on Round
Hill in rear of Fisher's Hill, and had been examined
by me from that point, but the distance was too great to
see with distinctness. From the station on the mountain,
which immediately overlooked the enemy's left, the view
was very distinct, but I could not go to that point myself,
as the ascent was very rugged, and it required several
hours to go and come, and I could not leave my command
for that time. I had, therefore, necessarily, to rely on
the reports of my officers.

General Gordon and Captain Hotchkiss, on their re
turn, reported the route between the mountain and river,
which was a blind path, to be impracticable for infantry,
but not for artillery, and a temporary bridge was con
structed under Captain Hotchkiss' superintendence, at
the first crossing of the river on our right.

The plan of attack on which I determined was to send
the three divisions of the 2nd corps, to wit: Gordon's,
Ramseur's and Pegram 'sounder General Gordon, over the
route which has been specified to the enemy's rear, to
make the attack at five o'clock in the morning, which
would be a little before daybreak — to move myself, with

440

BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK, OR BELLE GROVE

Kershaw's and Wharton's divisions, and all the artillery,
along the Pike through Strasburg, and attack the enemy
on the front and left flank as soon as Gordon should
become engaged, and for Rosser to move with his own
and Wickham's brigade, on the Back Road across Cedar
Creek, and attack the enemy's cavalry simultaneously
with Gordon 's attack, while Lomax should move by Front
Royal, across the river, and come to the Valley Pike,
so as to strike the enemy wherever he might be, of which
he was to judge by the sound of the firing.

At two o'clock P.M. all the division commanders, ex
cept Pegram, who had not returned from the mountain,
came to my headquarters, and I gave them their instruc
tions. Gordon was directed to cross over the bend of the
river immediately after dark; and move to the foot of the
mountain, where he would rest his troops, and move from
there in time to cross the river again and get in position
at Cooley's house in the enemy's rear, so as to make
the attack at the designated hour, and he was instructed,
in advancing to the attack, to move for a house on the
west side of the Valley Pike called the " Belle Grove
House," at which it was known that Sheridan's head
quarters were located.

A guide, who knew the country and the roads, was
ordered to be sent to General Gordon, and Colonel Payne
was ordered to accompany him with his force of cavalry,
and endeavor to capture Sheridan himself. Rosser was
ordered to move before day, in time to attack at five
o'clock next morning, and to endeavor to surprise the
enemy's cavalry in camp. Kershaw and Wharton were
ordered to move, at one o'clock in the morning, towards
Strasburg under my personal superintendence, and the
artillery was ordered to concentrate where the Pike
passed through the lines at Fisher's Hill, and, at the
hour appointed for the attack, to move at a gallop
to Hupp 's Hill — the movement of the artillery being thus
delayed for fear of attracting the attention of the enemy
by the rumbling of the wheels over the macadamized road

441

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

Swords and canteens were directed to be left in camp, so
as to make as little noise as possible.

The division commanders were particularly admon
ished as to the necessity for promptness and energy in
all their movements, and they were instructed to press
the enemy with vigor after he was encountered, and to
allow him no time to form, but to continue the pursuit
until his forces should be completely routed. They were
also admonished of the danger to be apprehended from a
disposition to plunder the enemy's camps by their men,
and they were enjoined to take every possible precaution
against it.

Gordon moved at the appointed time, and, after he had
started, General Pegram reported to me that he had dis
covered, from the signal station on the mountain, what he
supposed to be an intrenchment thrown up since Gordon
and Hotchkiss made their examination; and he suggested
the propriety of attacking the enemy's left flank at the
same time Gordon made his attack, as he would prob
ably have more difficulty than had been anticipated. I
adopted this suggestion and determined to cross Ker-
shaw's division over Cedar Creek, at Bowman's Mill, a
little above its mouth, and strike the enemy's left flank
simultaneously with the other attacks, of which purpose
notice was sent to General Gordon by General Pegram.

At one o'clock on the morning of the 19th, Kershaw
and Wharton moved, and I accompanied them. At
Strasburg Kershaw moved to the right on the road to
Bowman's Mill, and Wharton moved along the Pike to
Hupp's Hill, with instructions not to display his forces
but avoid the enemy's notice until the attack began, when
he was to move forward, support the artillery when it
came up, and send a force to get possession of the bridge
on the Pike over the creek. I accompanied Kershaw 's
division, and we got in sight of the enemy's fires at half-
past three o'clock. The moon was now shining and we
could see the camps. The division was halted under cover
to await the arrival of the proper time, and I pointed out

442

BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK, OR BELLE GROVE

to Kershaw, and the commander of his leading brigade,
the enemy's position and described the nature of the
ground, and directed them how the attack was to be made
and followed up. Kershaw was directed to cross his
division over the creek as quietly as possible, and to
form it into column of brigades, as he did so, and advance
in that manner against the enemy's left breastwork, ex
tending to the right or left as might be necessary.

At half -past four he was ordered forward, and, a very
short time after he started, the firing from Eosser, on
our left, and the picket firing at the ford at which Gordon
was crossing were heard. Kershaw crossed the creek
without molestation and formed his division as directed,
and precisely at five o'clock his leading brigade, with
little opposition, swept over the enemy's left work, cap
turing seven guns, which were at once turned on the
enemy. As soon as this attack was made, I rode as
rapidly as possible to the position on Hupp's Hill to which
Wharton and the artillery had been ordered. I found
the artillery just arriving, and a very heavy fire of mus
ketry was now heard in the enemy's rear from Gordon's
column. Wharton had advanced his skirmishers to the
creek, capturing some prisoners, but the enemy still held
the works on our left of the Pike, commanding that road
and the bridge, and opened with his artillery on us. Our
artillery was immediately brought into action and opened
on the enemy, but he soon evacuated his works, and our
men from the other columns rushed into them.

Just then the sun rose, and Whar ton's division, and
the artillery were ordered immediately forward. I rode
in advance of them across the creek, and met General
Gordon on the opposite hill. Kershaw 's division had
swept along the enemy's works on the right of the Pike,
which were occupied by Crook's corps, and he and Gordon
had united at the Pike, and their divisions had pushed
across it in pursuit of the enemy. The rear division of
Gordon's column (Pegram's) was crossing the river at
the time Kershaw 's attack was made, and General Gordon

443

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

moved rapidly to Cooley's house, formed his troops and
advanced against the enemy with his own division on the
left, under Brigadier General Evans, and Ramseur's on
the right, with Pegram in the right supporting them.

There had been a delay of an hour at the river before
crossing it, either from a miscalculation of time in the
dark, or because the cavalry which was to precede his
column had not gotten up, and the delay thus caused,
for which no blame is to be attached to General Gordon,
enabled the enemy partially to form his lines after the
alarm produced by Kershaw's attack, and Gordon >s
attack, which was after light, was therefore met with
greater obstinacy by the enemy than it would otherwise
have encountered, and the fighting had been severe.

Gordon, however, pushed his attack with great energy,
and the 19th and Crook's corps were in complete rout,
and their camps, with a number of pieces of artillery and
a considerable quantity of small arms, abandoned. The
6th corps, which was on the enemy's right, and some dis
tance from the point attacked, had had time to get under
arms and take position so as to arrest our progress.
General Gordon briefly informed me of the condition of
things and stated that Pegram 's division, which had not
been previously engaged, had been ordered in. He then
rode to take command of his division, and I rode forward
on the Pike to ascertain the position of the enemy, in
order to continue the attack.

There was now a heavy fog, and that, with the smoke
from the artillery and small arms, so obscured objects
that the enemy's position could not be seen; but I soon
came to Generals Ramseur and Pegram, who informed
me that Pegram 's division had encountered a division of
the 6th corps on the left of the Valley Pike, and, after
a sharp engagement, had driven it back on the main body
of that corps, which was in their front in a strong posi
tion. They further informed me that their divisions were
in line confronting the 6th corps, but that there was a
vacancy in the line on their right which ought to be filled.

444

BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK, OR BELLE GROVE

I ordered Wharton's division forward at once, and
directed Generals Ramseur and Pegram to put it where
it was required. In a very short time, and while I was
endeavoring to discover the enemy's line through the ob
scurity, Wharton's division came back in some confusion,
and General Wharton informed me that, in advancing to
the position pointed out to him by Generals Ramseur and
Pegram, his division had been driven back by the 6th
corps, which, he said, was advancing. He pointed out
the direction from which he said the enemy was advanc
ing, and some pieces of artillery, which had come up,
were brought into action. The fog soon rose sufficiently
for us to see the enemy's position on a ridge to the west
of Middletown, and it was discovered to be a strong one.
After driving back Wharton's division he had not ad
vanced, but opened on us with artillery, and orders were
given for concentrating all our guns on him.

In the meantime, a force of cavalry was advancing
along the Pike, and through the fields to the right of
Middletown, thus placing our right and rear in great
danger, and Wharton was ordered to form his division at
once, and take position to hold the enemy's cavalry in
check. Wofford's brigade of Kershaw's division, which
had become separated from the other brigades, was
ordered up for the same purpose. Discovering that the
6th corps could not be attacked with advantage on its
left flank, because the approach in that direction was
through an open flat and across a boggy stream with deep
banks, I directed Captain Powell, serving on General
Gordon's staff, who rode up to me while the artillery
was being placed in position, to tell the General to advance
against the enemy's right flank and attack it in con
junction with Kershaw, while a heavy fire of artillery
was opened from our right; but as Captain Powell said
he did not know where General Gordon was and expressed
some doubt about finding him, immediately after he
started, I sent Lieutenant Page of my own staff, with

445

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

orders for both Generals Gordon and Kershaw to make
the attack.

In a short time Colonel Carter concentrated 18 or 20
guns on the enemy, and he was soon in retreat. Ramseur
and Pegram advanced at once to the position from which
the enemy was driven, and just then his cavalry com
menced pressing heavily on the right, and Pegram 's divi
sion was ordered to move to the north of Middletown,
and take position across the Pike against the cavalry.
Lieutenant Page had returned and informed me that he
delivered my order to General Kershaw, but the latter
informed him that his division was not in a condition
to make the attack, as it was very much scattered, and
that he had not delivered the order to General Gordon,
because he saw that neither his division nor Kershaw 's
was in a condition to execute it. As soon as Pegram
moved, Kershaw was ordered from the left to supply his
place.

I then rode to Middletown to make provision against
the enemy's cavalry, and discovered a large body of it
seriously threatening that flank, which was very much
exposed. Wharton's division and Wofford's brigade
were put in position on Pegram 's right, and several
charges of the enemy's cavalry were repulsed. I had no
cavalry on that flank except Payne's very small brigade,
which had accompanied Gordon, and made some captures
of prisoners and wagons. Lomax had not arrived, but I
received a message from him, informing me that he had
crossed the river after some delay from a cavalry force
guarding it, and I sent a message to him requiring him to
move to Middletown as quickly as possible, but, as I subse
quently ascertained, he did not receive that message.
Rosser had attacked the enemy promptly at the appointed
time, but he had not been able to surprise him, as he was
found on the alert on that flank, doubtless owing to the
attempt at a surprise on the night of the 16th.

There was now one division of cavalry threatening my
right flank and two were on the left, near the Back Road,

448

BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK, OR BELLE GROVE

held in check by Rosser. The force of the latter was too
weak to make any impression on the enemy's cavalry, and
all he could do was to watch it. As I passed across Cedar
Creek after the enemy was driven from it, I had discov
ered a number of men in the enemy's camps plundering,
and one of Wharton's battalions was ordered to clear the
camps, and drive the men to their commands.

It was reported to me, subsequently, that a great
number were at the same work, and I sent all my staff
officers who could be spared, to stop it if possible, and
orders were sent to the division commanders to send for
their men.

After he was driven from his second position, the
enemy had taken a new position about two miles north of
Middletown, and, as soon as I had regulated matters on
the right so as to prevent his cavalry from getting in rear
of that flank, I rode to the left, for the purpose of order
ing an advance.

I found Ramseur and Kershaw in line with Pegram,
but Gordon had not come up. In a short time, however, I
found him coming up from the rear, and I ordered him to
take position on Kershaw 's left, and advance for the pur
pose of driving the enemy from his new position — Ker
shaw and Ramseur being ordered to advance at the same
time. As the enemy 's cavalry on our left was very strong,
and had the benefit of an open country to the rear of that
flank, a repulse at this time would have been disastrous,
and I therefore directed General Gordon, if he found the
enemy 's line too strong to attack with success, not to make
the assault. The advance was made for some distance,
when Gordon's skirmishers came back, reporting a line
of battle in front behind breastworks, and Gordon did not
make the attack.

It was now apparent that it would not do to press my
troops further. They had been up all night and were
much jaded. In passing over rough ground to attack the
enemy in the early morning, their own ranks had been
much disordered, and the men scattered, and it had re-

447

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

quired time to re-form them. Their ranks, moreover,
were much thinned by the advance of the men engaged in
plundering the enemy's camps. The delay which had
unavoidably occurred had enabled the enemy to rally a
portion of his routed troops, and his immense force of
cavalry, which remained intact, was threatening both of
our flanks in an open country, which of itself rendered an
advance extremely hazardous.

I determined, therefore, to try and hold what had
been gained, and orders were given for carrying off the
captured and abandoned artillery, small arms and
wagons. A number of bold attempts were made during
the subsequent part of the day, by the enemy's cavalry,
to break our line on the right, but they were invariably
repulsed.

Late in the afternoon, the enemy's infantry advanced
against Ramseur's, Kershaw's and Gordon's lines, and
the attack on Ramseur's and Kershaw's fronts was hand
somely repulsed in my view, and I hoped that the day
was finally ours, but a portion of the enemy had pene
trated an interval which was between Evans' brigade, on
the extreme left, and the rest of the line, when that bri
gade gave way, and Gordon's other brigades soon fol
lowed. General Gordon made every possible effort to
rally his men, and lead them back against the enemy, but
without avail. The information of this affair, with exag
gerations, passed rapidly along Kershaw's and Ram
seur's lines, and their men, under the apprehension of
being flanked, commenced falling back in disorder, though
no enemy was pressing them, and this gave me the first
intimation of Gordon's condition.

At the same time the enemy's cavalry, observing the
disorder in our ranks, made another charge on our right,
but was repulsed. Every effort was made to stop and
rally Kershaw's and Ramseur's men, but the mass of
them resisted all appeals, and continued to go to the
rear without waiting for any effort to retrieve the partial
disorder. Ramseur, however, succeeded in retaining with

448

BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK, OR BELLE GROVE

him two or three hundred men of his division, and Major
Goggin of Kershaw's staff, who was in command of
Conner's brigade, about the same number from that
brigade; and these men, with six pieces of artillery of
Cutshaw's battalion, held the enemy's whole force on our
left in check for one hour and a half, until Ramseur was
shot down mortally wounded, and the ammunition of
those pieces of artillery was exhausted. While the latter
were being replaced by other guns, the force that had
remained with Ramseur and Goggin gave way also.
Pegram's and Wharton's divisions, and Wofford's bri
gade had remained steadfast on the right and resisted all
efforts of the enemy's cavalry, but no portion of this
force could be moved to the left without leaving the Pike
open to the cavalry, which would have destroyed all hope
at once.

Every effort to rally the men in the rear having failed,
I now had nothing left for me but to order these troops
to retire also. When they commenced to move, the dis
order soon extended to them, but General Pegram suc
ceeded in bringing back a portion of his command across
Cedar Creek in an organized condition, holding the enemy
in check, but this small force soon dissolved. A part of
Evans' brigade had been rallied in the rear, and held a
ford above the bridge for a short time, but it followed
the example of the rest. I tried to rally the men immedi
ately after crossing Cedar Creek, and at Hupp's Hill, but
without success.

Could 500 men have been rallied, at either of these
places, who would have stood by me, I am satisfied that
all my artillery and wagons, and the greater part of the
captured artillery could have been saved, as the enemy's
pursuit was very feeble. As it was, a bridge broke down
on a very narrow part of the road between Strasburg and
Fisher's Hill, just above Strasburg, where there was no
other pas sway, thereby blocking up all the artillery, ord
nance and medical wagons and ambulances which had not
passed that point; and, as there was no force to defend

29 449

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

them, they were lost, a very small body of the enemy's
cavalry capturing them.

The greater part of the infantry was halted at
Fisher's Hill, and Eosser, whose command had retired in
good order on the Back Road, was ordered to that point
with his cavalry. The infantry moved back towards New
Market at three o'clock next morning, and Rosser was
left at Fisher's Hill to cover the retreat of the troops,
and hold that position until they were beyond pursuit.
He remained at Fisher's Hill until after ten o'clock on the
20th, and the enemy did not advance to that place while
he was there. He then fell back without molestation to his
former position, and established his line on Stony Creek,
across from Columbia Furnace to Edinburg, seven miles
below Mount Jackson. My other troops were halted at
New Market, about seven miles from Mount Jackson, and
there was an entirely open country between the two
places, they being very nearly in sight of each other.

Lomax had moved, on the day of the battle, on the
Front Royal road towards Winchester, under the im
pression that the enemy was being forced back towards
that place, and he did not reach me. When he ascer
tained the reverse which had taken place in the latter part
of the day, he retired up the Luray Valley to his former
place at Millf ord, without molestation.

My loss in the battle of Cedar Creek was twenty- three
pieces of artillery, some ordnance and medical wagons
and ambulances, which had been carried to the front for
the use of the troops on the field, about 1860 in killed
and wounded, and something over 1,000 prisoners. Major
General Ramseur fell into the hands of the enemy mor
tally wounded, and in him not only my command, but the
country sustained a heavy loss. He was a most gallant
and energetic officer, whom no disaster appalled, but his
courage and energy seemed to gain new strength in the
midst of confusion and disorder. He fell at his post fight
ing like a lion at bay, and his native State has reason
to be proud of his memory. Brigadier General Battle

450

BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK, OR BELLE GROVE

was wounded at the beginning of the fight, and other
valuable officers were lost. Fifteen hundred prisoners
were captured from the enemy and brought off, and his
loss in killed and wounded in this action was very heavy.

This was a case of a glorious victory given up by my
own troops after they had won it, and it is to be accounted
for on the ground of the partial demoralization caused by
the plunder of the enemy's camps, and from the fact that
the men undertook to judge for themselves when it was
proper to retire. Had they but waited, the mischief on
the left would have been remedied. I have never been
able to satisfy myself that the enemy's attack in the after
noon was not a demonstration to cover his retreat during
the night. It certainly was not a vigorous one, as is
shown by the fact that the very small force with Ramseur
and Goggin held him in check so long; and the loss in
killed and wounded in the division which first gave way
was not heavy, and was the least in numbers of all but
one, though it was the third in strength, and its relative
loss was the least of all the divisions.

I read a sharp lecture to my troops, in an address pub
lished to them a few days after the battle, but I have
never attributed the result to a want of courage on their
part, for I had seen them perform too many prodigies of
valor to doubt that. There was an individuality about the
Confederate soldier which caused him to act often in
battle according to his own opinions, and thereby impair
his own efficiency; and the tempting bait offered by the
rich plunder of the camps of the enemy's well-fed and
well-clothed troops was frequently too great for our
destitute soldiers, and caused them to pause in the career
of victory.

Had my cavalry been sufficient to contend with that of
the enemy, the rout in the morning would have been com
plete; as it was, I had only about 1,200 cavalry on the
field under Rosser, and Lomax's force, which numbered
less than 1,700, did not get up. My infantry and artillery
was about the same strength as at Winchester. The re-

451

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

ports of the Ordnance officers showed in the hands of my
troops about 8,800 muskets in round numbers, as follows :
in Kershaw's division 2,700, Ramseur's 2,100, Gordon's
1,700, Pegram's 1,200 and Wharton's 1,100. Making a
moderate allowance for the men left to guard the camps
and the signal station on the mountain, as well as for a
few sick and wounded, I went into this battle with about
8,500 muskets and a little over forty pieces of artillery.

The book containing the reports of the chief surgeon
of Sheridan's cavalry corps, which has been mentioned
as captured at this battle, showed that Sheridan's cavalry
numbered about 8,700 men for duty a few days previous,
and from information which I had received of reinforce
ments sent him, in the way of recruits and returned con
valescents, I am satisfied that his infantry force was fully
as large as at Winchester. Sheridan was absent in the
morning at the beginning of the fight, and had returned in
the afternoon before the change in the fortunes of the
day.*

It may be asked why with so small a force I made the
attack. I can only say we had been fighting large odds
during the whole war, and I knew there was no chance of
lessening them. It was of the utmost consequence that
Sheridan should be prevented from sending troops to
Grant, and General Lee, in a letter received a day or two
before, had expressed an earnest desire that a victory
should be gained in the Valley if possible, and it could
not be gained without fighting for it. I did hope to gain
one by surprising the enemy in his camp, and then
thought and still think I would have had it, if my direc
tions had been complied with, and my troops had awaited
my orders to retire.

* The retreat of the main body of his army had been arrested,
and a new line formed behind breastworks of rails, before Sheridan
arrived on the field ; and he still had immense odds against me when
he made the attack in the afternoon.

CHAPTER XLIX.

CLOSE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN.

AFTER the return from Cedar Creek, the main body of
my troops remained in their camp for the rest of the
month without disturbance, but on the 26th of October
the enemy's cavalry attacked Lomax at Millford and
after sharp fighting was repulsed. Having heard that
Sheridan was preparing to send troops to Grant, and that
the Manassas Gap Railroad was being repaired, I moved
down the Valley again on the 10th of November. I had
received no reinforcements except about 250 cavalry
under General Cosby from Breckenridge 's department in
Southwestern Virginia, some returned convalescents and
several hundred conscripts who had been on details which
had been revoked.

On the llth, on our approach to Cedar Creek, it was
found that the enemy had fallen back towards Winches
ter, after having fortified and occupied a position on
Hupp's Hill subsequently to the battle of Cedar Creek.
Colonel Payne drove a small body of cavalry through
Middletown to Newtown and I followed him and took
position south of the latter place and in view of it. Sheri
dan's main force was found posted north of Newtown in
a position which he was engaged in fortifying.

I remained in front of him during the llth and 12th,
Rosser being on my left flank on the Back Road, and
Lomax on my right between the Valley Pike and the
Front Royal road, with one brigade (McCausland's)
at Cedarville on the latter road. Rosser had some skir
mishing with the enemy's cavalry on the llth, and on the
12th two divisions advanced against him, and after a
heavy fight the enemy was repulsed and some prisoners
captured. Colonel Payne, who was operating immedi
ately in my front, likewise had a sharp engagement with
a portion of the enemy's cavalry and defended it. When

453

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

Rosser was heavily engaged, Lomax was ordered to his
assistance, with a part of his command, and during his
absence, late in the afternoon, Powell's division of the
enemy's cavalry attacked McCausland at Cedarville, and
after a severe fight drove him back across the river with
the loss of two pieces of artillery.

At the time of this affair, a blustering wind was blow
ing and the firing could not be heard; and nothing was
known of McCausland 's misfortune until after we com
menced retiring that night. In these cavalry fights, three
valuable officers were killed, namely: Lieutenant Colonel
Marshall of Rosser 's brigade, Colonel Radford of Mc
Causland 's brigade, and Captain Harvie of McCausland 's
staff.

Discovering that the enemy continued to fortify his
position, and showed no disposition to come out of his
lines with his infantry, and not being willing to attack
him in his entrenchments, after the reverses I had met
with, I determined to retire, as we were beyond the reach
of supplies. After dark on the 12th, we moved to Fisher's
Hill, and next day returned in the direction of New
Market, where we arrived on the 14th, no effort at pur
suit being made. I discovered by this movement that no
troops had been sent to Grant, and that the project of
repairing the Manassas Gap Railroad had been aban
doned.

Shortly after our return to New Market, Kershaw's
division was returned to General Lee, and Cosby 's cav
alry to Breckenridge. On the 22nd of November two
divisions of the enemy's cavalry advanced to Mount
Jackson, after having driven in our cavalry pickets. A
part of it crossed over the river into Meem's Bottom at
the foot of Rude's Hill, but was driven back by a portion
of my infantry, and the whole retreated, being pursued
by Wickham's brigade, under Colonel Munford, to
Woodstock.

On the 27th, Rosser crossed Great North Mountain
into Hardy County, with his own and Payne's brigade,

454

CLOSE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN

and, about the 29th, surprised and captured the fortified
post at New Creek, on the Baltimore & Ohio Kailroad. At
this place, two regiments of cavalry with their arms and
colors were captured and eight pieces of artillery and a
very large amount of ordnance, quartermaster and com
missary stores fell into our hands. The prisoners, num
bering 800, four pieces of artillery, and some wagons and
horses, were brought off, the other guns, which were
heavy siege pieces, being spiked, and their carriages and
a greater part of the stores destroyed. Rosser also
brought off several hundred cattle and a large number
of sheep from Hampshire and Hardy counties.

This expedition closed the material operations of the
campaign of 1864 in the Shenandoah Valley, and, at that
time, the enemy held precisely the same portion of that
valley which he held before the opening of the cam
paign in the spring, and no more, and the headquarters
of his troops were at the same place, to wit : Winchester.
There was this difference, however: at the beginning of
the campaign, he held it with comparatively a small
force, and, at the close, he was compelled to employ three
corps of infantry, and one of cavalry, for that purpose,
and to guard the approaches to Washington, Maryland
and Pennsylvania. When I was detached from General
Lee's army, Hunter was advancing on Lynchburg, 170
miles south of Winchester, with a very considerable force,
and threatening all of General Lee 's communications with
a very serious danger.

By a rapid movement, my force had been thrown to
Lynchburg, just in time to arrest Hunter's march into
that place, and he had been driven back and forced to
escape into the mountains of Western Virginia, with a
loss of ten pieces of artillery and subsequent terrible
suffering to his troops. Maryland and Pennsylvania had
been invaded, Washington threatened and thrown into a
state of frantic alarm, and Grant had been compelled to
detach two corps of infantry and two divisions of cavalry
from his army. Five or six thousand prisoners had been

455

LIEUTENANT GENERAL J1TBAL A. EARLY

captured from the enemy and sent to Richmond, and
according to a published statement by Sheridan, his army
had lost 13,831, in killed and wounded, after he took
command of it. Heavy losses had been inflicted on that
army by my command, before Sheridan went to the
Valley, and the whole loss could not have been far from
double my entire force. The enemy moreover had been
deprived of the use of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, and
the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, for three months.

It is true that I had lost many valuable officers and
men, and about 60 pieces of artillery, counting those lost
by Ramseur and McCausland, and not deducting the 19
pieces captured from the enemy ; but I think I may safely
state that the fall of Lynchburg with its foundries and
factories, and the consequent destruction of General Lee's
communications, would have rendered necessary the
evacuation of Richmond, and that, therefore, the fall of
the latter place had been prevented; and by my subse
quent operations, Grant's operations against General
Lee's army had been materially impeded, and for some
time substantially suspended.

My loss in killed, wounded and prisoners, at Winches
ter and Fisher's Hill, had been less than 4,000, and at
Cedar Creek, about 3,000, but the enemy has claimed as
prisoners several thousand more than my entire loss.
I know that a number of prisoners fell into the enemy's
hands who did not belong to my command : such as cav
alrymen on details to get fresh horses, soldiers on leave
of absence, conscripts on special details, citizens not in
the service, men employed in getting supplies for the de
partments, and stragglers and deserters from other com
mands. My army during the entire campaign had been
self-sustaining so far as provisions and forage were
concerned, and a considerable number of beef cattle had
been sent to General Lee's army; and when the difficulties
under which I labored are considered, I think I may
confidently assert that I had done as well as it was pos
sible for me to do.

456

CLOSE OF THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN

Shortly after Rosser 's return from the New Creek
expedition, Colonel Munford was sent with Wickham's
brigade to the counties of Hardy and Pendleton, to pro
cure forage for his horses, and, cold weather having now
set in so as to prevent material operations in the field,
the three divisions of the 2nd corps were sent, in suc
cession, to General Lee, — Wharton's division, the cavalry,
and most of the artillery being retained with me.

On the 16th of December, I broke up the camp at
New Market, and moved back towards Staunton, for the
purpose of establishing my troops on or near Central
Railroad — Lomax's cavalry, except one brigade left to
YvTatch the Luray Valley, having previously moved across
the Blue Ridge so as to be able to procure forage. Cav
alry pickets were left in front of New Market, and tele
graphic communications kept up with that place, from
which there was communication with the lower Valley, by
means of signal stations on the northern end of Massa-
nutten Mountain, and at Ashby's Gap in the Blue Ridge,
which overlooked the enemy 's camps and the surrounding
country.

The troops had barely arrived at their new camps
when information was received that the enemy's cavalry
was in motion. On the 19th, Custer's division moved
from Winchester towards Staunton, and, at the same
time, two other divisions of cavalry, under Torbert or
Merrit, moved across by Front Royal and Chester Gap
towards Gordonsville. This information having been
sent me by signal and telegraph, Wharton's division was
moved on the 20th, through a hailstorm, towards Harri-
sonburg, and Rosser ordered to the front with all the
cavalry he could collect. Custer 's division reached Lacy 's
Spring, nine miles north of Harrisonburg, on the evening
of the 20th, and next morning before day, Rosser, with
about 600 men of his own and Payne's brigades, attacked
it in camp, and drove it back down the Valley in some
confusion.

Lomax had been advised of the movement towards

457

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

Gordonsville, and as soon as Ouster was disposed of,
Wharton's division was moved back, and on the 23rd a
portion of it was run on the railroad to Charlottesville,
Munford, who had now returned from across the great
North Mountain, being ordered to the same place.

On my arrival at Charlottesville on the 23rd, I found
that the enemy's two divisions of cavalry, which had
crossed the Blue Eidge, had been held in check near Gor
donsville by Lomax, until the arrival of a brigade of
infantry from Richmond, when they retired precipitately.
I returned to the Valley and established my headquarters
at Staunton — Wharton's division and the artillery being
encamped east of that place, and Rosser's cavalry west
of it ; and thus closed the operations of 1864 with me.

CHAPTER L.

OPERATIONS IN 1865.

ON the 2nd of January, 1865, 1 had a consultation witn
General Lee at Richmond, about the difficulties of my
position in the Valley, and he told me that he had left
me there with the small command which still remained
in order to produce the impression that the force was
much larger than it really was, and he instructed me to
do the best I could. Before I returned from Richmond,
Rosser started with between 300 and 400 picked cavalry,
for the post of Beverly in West Virginia, and, on the
llth, surprised and captured the place, securing over
500 prisoners and some stores. This expedition was made
over a very mountainous country, amid the snows of an
unusually severe winter. Rosser 's loss was very light,
but Lieutenant Colonel Cook, of the 8th Virginia Cavalry,
a most gallant and efficient officer, lost his leg in the
attack, and had to be left behind.

The great drought during the summer of 1864 had
made the corn crop in the Valley a very short one, and, as
Sheridan had destroyed a considerable quantity of small
grain and hay, I found it impossible to sustain the horses
of my cavalry and artillery where they were, and forage
could not be obtained from elsewhere. I was therefore
compelled to send Fitz. Lee's two brigades to General
Lee, and Lomax's cavalry was brought from across the
Blue Ridge, where the country was exhausted of forage,
and sent west into the counties of Pendleton, Highland,
Bath, Alleghany and Greenbrier, where hay could be
obtained. Rosser 's brigade had to be temporarily dis
banded, and the men allowed to go to their homes with
their horses, to sustain them, with orders to report when
called on, — one or two companies, whose homes were
down the Valley, being required to picket and scout in
front of New Market.

459

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

The men and horses of Lieutenant Colonel King's
artillery were sent to Southwestern Virginia to be win
tered, and most of the horses of the other battalions
were sent off under care of some of the men, who under
took to forage them until spring. Nelson's battalion, with
some pieces of artillery with their horses, was retained
with me and the remaining officers and men of the other
battalions were sent, under the charge of Colonel Carter,
to General Lee, to man stationary batteries on his lines.
Brigadier General Long, who had been absent on sick
leave for some time and had returned, remained with me,
and most of the guns which were without horses were sent
to Lynchburg by railroad. This was a deplorable state
of things, but it could not be avoided, as the horses of the
cavalry and artillery would have perished had they been
kept in the Valley.

Echols' brigade of Wharton's division was subse
quently sent to Southwestern Virginia to report to
General Echols for special duty, and McNeil's company
of partisan rangers, and Woodson's company of unat
tached Missouri cavalry, were sent to the county of
Hardy, Major Harry Gilmor being likewise ordered to
that county, with the remnant of his battalion, to take
charge of the whole, and operate against the Baltimore &
Ohio Eailroad ; but he was surprised and captured there,
at a private house, soon after his arrival. Two very
small brigades of Wharton's division, and Nelson's bat
talion with the few pieces of artillery which had been
retained, were left, as my whole available force, and these
were in winter quarters near Fishersville, on the Central
railroad between Staunton and Waynesboro. The tele
graph to New Market and the signal stations from there
to the lower Valley were kept up, and a few scouts sent
to the rear of the enemy, and in this way was my front
principally picketed, and I kept advised of the enemy's
movements. Henceforth my efficient and energetic signal
officer, Captain Welbourn, was the commander of my
advance picket line.

460

OPERATIONS IN 1865

The winter was a severe one, and all material opera
tions were suspended until its close. Late in February,
Lieutenant Jesse McNeil, who was in command of his
father's old company, with forty or fifty men of that
company and Woodson's, made a dash into Cumberland,
Maryland, at night and captured and brought off Major
Generals Crook and Kelly, with a staff officer of the lat
ter, though there were at the time several thousand troops
in and around Cumberland. The father of this gallant
young officer had performed many daring exploits during
the war, and had accompanied me into Maryland, doing
good service. When Sheridan was at Harrisonburg in
October, 1864, Captain McNeil had burned the bridge at
Edinburg in his rear, and had attacked and captured the
guard at the bridge at Mount Jackson, but in this affair
he received a very severe wound from which he subse
quently died. Lieutenant Baylor of Eosser's brigade,
who was in Jefferson County with his company, made one
or two dashes on the enemy's outposts during the winter,
and, on one occasion, captured a train loaded with sup
plies, on the Baltimore & Ohio Eailroad.

On the 20th of February, an order was issued by
General Lee, extending my command over the Depart
ment of Southwestern Virginia and East Tennessee, pre
viously commanded by General Breckenridge, the latter
having been made Secretary of War.

On the 27th, Sheridan started from Winchester up the
Valley with a heavy force, consisting, according to the
statement of Grant, in his report, of "two divisions of
cavalry, numbering about 5,000 each." I had been in
formed of the preparations for a movement of some kind,
some days previous, and the information had been tele
graphed to General Lee. As soon as Sheridan started, I
was informed of the fact by signal and telegraph, and
orders were immediately sent by telegraph to Lomax,
whose headquarters were at Millboro, on the Central
Kailroad, forty miles west of Staunton, to get together
all of his cavalry as soon as possible. Eosser was also

461

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

directed to collect all of his men that ha could, and an
order was sent by telegraph to General Echols, in South
western Virginia, to send his brigade by rail to Lynch-
burg. My own headquarters were at Staunton, but there
were no troops at that place except a local provost guard,
and a company of reserves, composed of boys under 18
years of age, which was acting under the orders of the
Conscript Bureau. Orders were therefore given for the
immediate removal of all stores from that place.

Rosser succeeded in collecting a little over 100 men,
and with these he attempted to check the enemy at North
River, near Mount Crawford, on the first of March, but
was unable to do so. On the afternoon of that day, the
enemy approached to within three or four miles of Staun
ton, and I then telegraphed to Lomax to concentrate his
cavalry at Pound Gap in Rockbridge County, and to fol
low and annoy the enemy should he move towards Lynch-
burg, and rode out of town towards Waynesboro, after all
the stores had been removed.

Wharton and Nelson were ordered to move to
Waynesboro by light next morning, and on that morning
(the 2nd) their commands were put in position on a
ridge covering Waynesboro on the west and just outside
of the town. My object in taking this position was to
secure the removal of five pieces of artillery for which
there were no horses, and some stores still in Waynes
boro, as well as to present a bold front to the enemy,
and ascertain the object of his movement, which I could
not do very well if I took refuge at once in the mountain.
The last report for Wharton 's command showed 1,200
men for duty; but as it was exceedingly inclement, and
raining and freezing, there were not more than 1,000
muskets on the line, and Nelson had six pieces of artillery.
I did not intend making my final stand on this ground,
yet I was satisfied that if my men would fight, which I
had no reason to doubt, I could hold the enemy in check
until night, and then cross the river and take position in
Rock-fish Gap ; for I had done more difficult things than
that during the war.

462

OPERATIONS IN 1865

About twelve o 'clock in the day, it was reported to me
that the enemy was advancing, and I rode out at once
on the line, and soon discovered about a brigade of cav
alry coming up on the road from Staunton, on which the
artillery opened, when it retired out of range. The
enemy manoeuvred for some time in our front, keeping
out of reach of our guns until late in the afternoon, when
I discovered a force moving to the left. I immediately
sent a messenger with notice of this fact to General
Wharton, who was on that flank, and with orders for him
to look out and provide for the enemy's advance; and
another messenger, with notice to the guns on the left,
and directions for them to fire towards the advancing
force, which could not be seen from where they were.

The enemy soon made an attack on our left flank, and
I discovered the men on that flank giving back. Just
then, General Wharton, who had not received my mes
sage, rode up to me and I pointed out to him the disorder
in his line, and ordered him to ride immediately to that
point and rectify it. Before he got back, the troops gave
way on the left, after making very slight resistance, and
soon everything was in a state of confusion and the men
commenced crossing the river. I rode across it myself
to try and stop them at the bridge and check the enemy ;
but they could not be rallied, and the enemy forded the
river above and got in our rear. I now saw that every
thing was lost, and after the enemy had got between
the mountain and the position where I was, and retreat
was thus cut off, I rode aside into the woods, and in that
way escaped capture. I went to the top of a hill to
reconnoitre, and had the mortification of seeing the
greater part of my command being carried off as pris
oners, and a force of the enemy moving rapidly towards
Rock-fish Gap.

I then rode with the greater part of my staff and
15 or 20 others, including General Long, across the moun
tain, north of the Gap, with the hope of arriving at
Greenwood depot, to which the stores had been removed,
before the enemy reached that place ; but on getting near

463

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

it, about dark, we discovered the enemy in possession.
We then rode to Jarman's Gap, about three miles from
the depot, and remained there all night, as the night was
exceedingly dark, and the ice rendered it impossible for
us to travel over the rugged roads.

The only solution of this affair which I can give is
that my men did not fight as I had expected them to do.
Had they done so, I am satisfied that the enemy could
have been repulsed ; and I was and am still of opinion that
the attack at Waynesboro was a mere demonstration, to
cover a movement to the south towards Lynchburg. Yet
some excuse is to be made for my men, as they knew that
they were weak and the enemy very strong.

The greater part of my command was captured, as
was also the artillery, which, with five guns on the cars
at Greenwood, made eleven pieces. Very few were killed
or wounded on either side. The only person killed on our
side, as far as I have ever heard, was Colonel Wm. H.
Harman, who had formerly been in the army but then
held a civil appointment ; and he was shot in the streets
of Waynesboro, either after he had been made prisoner,
as some said, or while he was attempting to make his
escape, after everything was over. My aide, Lieutenant
Wm. G. Callaway, who had been sent to the left with one
of the messages, and my medical director, Surgeon H. Mc-
Guire, had the misfortune to fall into the hands of the
enemy. All the wagons of Wharton's command were
absent getting supplies; but those we had with us, in
cluding the ordnance and medical wagons and my own
baggage wagon, fell into their hands.

On the 3rd, I rode, with the party that was with me,
towards Charlottesville ; but on getting near to that place,
we found the enemy entering it. We had then to turn
back and go by a circuitous route under the mountains to
Gordonsville, as the Rivanna River and other streams
were very much swollen. On arriving at Gordonsville, I
found General Wharton, who had made his escape to
Charlottesville on the night of the affair at Waynesboro,

464

c

H

si

M >

II

hj -

OPERATIONS IN 1865

and he was ordered to Lynchburg, by the way of the
Central and Southside Eailroads, to take command of
Echols' brigade, and aid in the defence of the city.
General Long was ordered to report to General Lee at
Petersburg.

The affair at Waynesboro diverted Sheridan from
Lynchburg, which he could have captured without diffi
culty, had he followed Hunter's route and not jumped at
the bait unwillingly offered him, by the capture of my
force at the former place. His deflection from the direct
route to the one by Charlottesville was without adequate
object, and resulted in the abandonment to capture
Lynchburg, or to cross the James River to the south side.
He halted at Charlottesville for two or three days, and
then moved towards James River below Lynchburg,
when, being unable to cross that river, he crossed over the
Rivanna, at its mouth, and then moved by the way of
Frederick's Hall on the Central Railroad, and Ashland
on the R., F. & P. Railroad, across the South and North
Anna, and down the Pamunkey to the White House.

At Gordonsville, about 200 cavalry were collected
under Colonel Morgan of the 1st Virginia Cavalry, and,
with this force, I watched the enemy for several days
while he was at Charlottesville, and when he was endeav
oring to cross the James River. When Sheridan had
abandoned this effort, and on the day he reached the
vicinity of Ashland, while I was riding on the Louisa
Court-House and Richmond Road, towards the bridge
over the South Anna, with about 20 cavalry, I came
very near being captured, by a body of 300 cavalry sent
after me, but I succeeded in eluding the enemy with most
of those who were with me, and reached Richmond at
two o'clock next morning, after passing twice between the
enemy's camps and his pickets. My Adjutant General,
Captain Moore, however, was captured, but made his
escape.

Lomax had succeeded in collecting a portion of his
cavalry and reaching Lynchburg, where he took position

30 465

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

on the north bank of the river, but the enemy avoided that
place. Rosser had collected a part of his brigade and
made an attack, near New Market, on the guard which
was carrying back the prisoners captured at Waynesboro,
with the view of releasing them, but he did not succeed
in that object, though the guard was compelled to retire
in great haste. He then moved towards Richmond on
Sheridan's track.

After consultation with General Lee, at his head
quarters near Petersburg, Rosser 's and McCausland's
brigades were ordered to report to him under the com
mand of General Rosser, and I started for the Valley,
by the way of Lynchburg, to reorganize what was left of
my command. At Lynchburg, a despatch was received
from General Echols, stating that Thomas was moving in
East Tennessee, and threatening Southwestern Virginia
with a heavy force, and I immediately went, by train,
to Wytheville. From that place I went with General
Echols to Bristol, on the state line between Virginia and
Tennessee, and it was ascertained, beyond doubt, that
some important movement by the enemy was on foot. We
then returned to Abingdon, and while I was engaged in
endeavoring to organize the small force in that section,
so as to meet the enemy in the best way we could, I re
ceived, on the 30th of March, a telegraphic despatch from
General Lee, directing me to turn over the command in
Southwestern Virginia to General Echols, and in the
Valley to General Lomax, and informing me that he
would address a letter to me at my home. I complied at
once with this order and thus terminated my military
career.

CONCLUSION.

In the afternoon of the 30th of March, after having
turned over the command to General Echols, I rode to
Marion in Smythe County and was taken that night with
a cold and cough so violent as to produce hemorrhage

466

CONCLUSION

from the lungs, and prostrate me for several days in a
very dangerous condition. While I was in this situation,
a heavy cavalry force under Stoneman, from Thomas'
army in Tennessee, moved through North Carolina to the
east, and a part of it came into Virginia from the main
column, and struck the Virginia & Tennessee Eailroad
at New Eiver east of Wytheville ; whence, after destroy
ing the bridge, it moved east, cutting off all communi
cation with Eichmond, and then crossed over into North
Carolina. As soon as I was in a condition to be moved,
I was carried on the railroad to Wytheville, and was
proceeding thence to my home, in an ambulance under
charge of a surgeon, when I received, most unexpectedly,
the news of the surrender of General Lee. Under the
disheartening influence of the sad tidings I had received,
I proceeded to my journey 's end, and I subsequently
received a letter from General Lee, dated on the 30th
of March, explaining the reasons for relieving me from
command. This letter, written on the very day of the
commencement of the attack on General Lee's lines,
which resulted in the evacuation of Eichmond, and just
ten days before the surrender of the Army of Northern
Virginia, has a historical interest; for it shows that
Lee, even at that late day, was anxiously and earnestly
contemplating the continuation of the struggle with
unabated vigor, and a full determination to make avail
able every element of success.

Immediately after the battle of Cedar Creek, I had
written a letter to General Lee, stating my willingness
to be relieved from command, if he deemed it necessary
for the public interests, and I should have been content
with the course pursued towards me, had his letter not
contained the expressions of personal confidence in me
that it does ; for I knew that in everything he did as com
mander of our armies, General Lee was actuated solely
by an earnest and ardent desire for the success of the
cause of his country. As to those among my countrymen
who judged me harshly, I have not a word of reproach.

467

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY

When there was so much at stake, it was not unnatural
that persons entirely ignorant of the facts, and forming
their opinions from the many false reports set afloat in a
time of terrible war and public suffering, should -pass
erroneous and severe judgments on those commanders
who met with reverses.

I was not embraced in the terms of General Lee 's sur
render or that of General Johnston, and, as the order
relieving me from command had also relieved me from
all embarrassment as to the troops which had been under
me, as soon as I was in a condition to travel, I started
on horseback for the Trans-Mississippi Department to
join the army of General Kirby Smith, should it hold out;
with the hope of at least meeting an honorable death
while fighting under the flag of my country. Before I
reached that Department, Smith's army had also been
surrendered, and, without giving a parole, after a long,
weary and dangerous ride from Virginia, through the
states of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Ala
bama, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Texas, I finally suc
ceeded in leaving the country.

LETTER FROM GENERAL LEE.

" HD. QRS., C. S. ARMIES,
30th March, 1865.

"LT.-GENERAL J. A. EARLY, FRANKLIN Co., VA.

" General, — My telegram will have informed you that I deem a
change of commanders in your Department necessary; but it is due
to your zealous and patriotic services that I should explain the reasons
that prompted my action. The situation of affairs is such that we can
neglect no means calculated to develop the resources we possess to
the greatest extent, and make them as efficient as possible. To this
end, it is essential that we should have the cheerful and hearty support
of the people, and the full confidence of the soldiers, without which
our efforts would be embarrassed and our means of resistance weak
ened. I have reluctantly arrived at the conclusion that you cannot
command the united and willing co-operation which is so essential to
success. Your reverses in the Valley, of which the public and the
army judge chiefly by the results, have, I fear, impaired your in
fluence both with the people and the soldiers, and would add greatly

468

CONCLUSION

to the difficulties which will, under any circumstances, attend our
military operations in S. W. Virginia. While my own confidence in
your ability, zeal, and devotion to the cause is unimpaired, I have
nevertheless felt that I could not oppose what seems to be the current
of opinion, without injustice to your reputation and injury to the
service. I therefore felt constrained to endeavor to find a commander
who would be more likely to develop the strength and resources of the
country, and inspire the soldiers with confidence; and to accomplish
this purpose, I thought it proper to yield my own opinion, and to
defer to that of those to whom alone we can look for support.

" I am sure that you will understand and appreciate my motives,
and no one will be more ready than yourself to acquiesce in any
measures which the interests of the country may seem to require, re
gardless of all personal considerations.

" Thanking you for the fidelity and energy with which you have
always supported my efforts, and for the courage and devotion you
have ever manifested in the service of the country,

" I am, very respectfully and truly

" Your ob't servant,

" R. E. LEE,

" Gen'l."

APPENDIX.

THE TESTIMONY OF LETTEKS.

I FEEL reluctant to add a word to what General Early
has written of himself and yet his letters, bearing (as
many of them do) upon his manuscript, show that there
are some things he has left untold which would interest
the reader of his life.

My feeling in this matter proceeds from the remem
brance of his sentiments on the subject of biography,
which he forcibly expressed in a letter written in 1866
to a correspondent who proposed writing an account of
his life, saying :

I trust that you will not suspect me of rudeness or a desire to
offend when I respectfully request that you omit mine from the list of
biographies you propose writing. If I were to furnish you the ma
terials desired, you would become the biographer of my choice, and I
would be bound by what you might write. I hope you will understand
what I mean, and will not interpret what I say as intended in an
offensive sense. I cannot, of course, prevent your writing on any
subject you may choose.

If my biography was of sufficient importance to require its being
placed before the world, and my wishes were consulted, I would not
trust its compilation to any but one who had known me personally and
well: you and I are, personally, entire strangers. During my life I
have often associated with men who thought they knew me, but who
in fact had very little appreciation of my true character. I would
not therefore expect it to be understood by one who is a stranger.

Naturally possessing a reserved disposition, and in
his bachelor life cut off from the softening influences of
familiar intercourse to be found in the home, it was not
entirely the fault of others that he was often misunder
stood : but as he has said, those who knew him best were
the ones who best appreciated him. The opportunity of
intimate acquaintance enabled one to fathom the depths
of his kindly nature and to discover his real feelings.

In his autobiographical sketch he writes of the mother
whose death was the source of grief to her family, but
he does not tell of the affection which caused him to

470

APPENDIX

choose her companionship preferably to that of any other,
nor of the sense of deprivation he felt upon the loss of
her tender counsels at the early age of sixteen. His
father was a most thoughtful and affectionate parent, but
from him, too, he was parted during the crucial period of
his youth, though that parent's watchful care followed
closely in a correspondence, preserved by the son, during
a long lifexof many vicissitudes.

As the son's character developed, he inspired more
and more confidence and respect, until the relations of
father and son seemed to become reversed, and, as years
wore on, the position of head of the family was insensibly
accorded the son. Possessing a sense of right never
swayed by impulse, his opinion and advice were never
questioned by members of his family. His grandmother,
observing the promise of his youth, had said of him that
he was born to make a name for himself.

In his nineteenth year, while a cadet at West Point
Academy, his sympathies were very much aroused for
the Texans in their revolt against the tyranny of Santa
Anna, and he wrote urging his father's consent to his
joining in their cause. This letter portrays the disposi
tion of the future patriot, and is in part as follows :

The Texans are bound by every principle of self-preservation and
are justified by the natural law of rights, as well as by precedent, to
declare their independence and to resist the attempt which is being
made to annihilate them. And we of the United States are called upon
by every principle of humanity, by our love of liberty and our detesta
tion of oppression, to go to the succor of our countrymen and aid in
overwhelming the tyrant. Shall we shed tears over the fate of Greece
and Poland, yet see our countrymen slaughtered with indifference?
The respect we entertain for our forefathers of the Revolution forbids
it. The gratitude we owe another country for espousing our cause
imperiously commands us to espouse that of the oppressed. The cause
of the Texans is more justifiable than was ours. We resisted the
usurpation of our lawful government. They are resisting the tyranny
and cruelty of an usurped government. Liberty has been driven from
the old world and its only asylum is in the new. It is the imperious
duty of every one, who in this fair land has received it and its prin
ciples unsullied from his ancestors, to extend its dominion and to
perpetuate its glorious light to posterity. How can this be done if

471

APPENDIX

tyranny more despotic than that which exists in Europe is allowed to
exist in our very confines ? In succoring the Texans we should consider
that we extend the sway of the goddess we worship, that we secure to
their progeny the benefits of which we are so tenacious, and secure
to oppressed freemen of other countries an asylum which our own
country will, ere long, not be able to afford them. . . .

The great end of all education is to expand the mind and gain a
knowledge of human nature. What is more calculated to expand the
mind than the espousing and working in the cause of liberty? What
better book in which to study human nature than such a variety of
characters as I would be constantly thrown with? All things cry out
to me to go. Oh, my dear father, will you not give me permission?
Do not think that my resolution has been taken unadvisedly, and do
not smile at my aspirations. I do not believe that I shall become a
Bonaparte or a Bolivar, but he who never aspires, never rises.

I have confined this letter to one subject because my whole soul is
taken up with that subject.

General Early returned from Canada to the States in
1869; that winter was devoted to visits among his rela
tives and friends from whom he had been so long parted.
His father died in 1870. In the autobiography he writes
of his father as still living: it is therefore presumable
that his manuscript was, at least, commenced while he
was in Canada.

Previously he had published at Toronto (in 1866),
"A Memoir of the Last Year of the War for Independ
ence," which was written, he states, "under a solemn
sense of duty to my unhappy country, and to the brave
soldiers who fought under me, as well as to myself."

His correspondence was very large and in many cases
continued during years. Through this runs the story of
his unflagging interest and industry in endeavoring to
confirm every minutest detail of the narrative he desired
to complete. The letters all show the esteem in which
he was held. Many of them are written to thank him
for contributions, already written, in the defence of the
South. Others urge that he prepare a complete history
of the war giving the Southern side.

From among these letters the following are selected ;
not the least of the interest in which proceeds from the
fact that they are voluntary offerings, generally from

472

JEFFERSON DAVIS, PRESIDENT C. S. A.. AND MRS. DAVIS

APPENDIX

warm personal friends and received in the course of
private correspondence.

The first is from the pen of the beloved leader and
is followed by tributes from Jefferson Davis, Generals
D. H. Hill and W. H. Payne, Colonels Marshall and John
ston, Senator John W. Daniel, Professors Peters and
Venable, Dr. McGuire, and others, — if less known to
fame, — none the less ardent in the expression of their
regard.
GENERAL J. A. EARLY: LEXINGTON, VA., Nov., 1865.

I received last night your letter, which gave me the first authentic
information of you I had received since the cessation of hostilities
and relieved the anxiety I had felt on your account. I am very glad
to hear of your health and safety, and I wish you every happiness and
prosperity : you will always be present to my recollections.

I desire, if not prevented, to write a history of the campaigns in
Virginia; all of my records, books, orders, etc., were destroyed in the
conflagration and retreat from Richmond, only such reports as were
printed are preserved. Your reports of your operations in '64 were
among those destroyed. Can you not repeat them and send me copies
of such letters, orders, etc., of mine and particularly give me your recol
lection of our effective strength at the principal battles? My only
object is to transmit, if possible, the truth and do justice to our brave
soldiers. ROBERT E. LEE.

March, 1866.

I am much obliged for the copies of my letters. Send me reports
of the operations of your commands in the campaign from the Wilder
ness to Richmond, at Lynchburg, in the Valley, Maryland, etc. . . .
All statistics as regards numbers, destruction of private property by
the Federal troops, etc., I should like to have, as I wish my memory
strengthened on these points. It will be difficult to get the world to
understand the odds against which we fought and the destruction or
loss of all returns of the army embarrasses me. We shall have to be
patient and suffer till a period when reason and charity may resume
their sway. At present the public mind is not prepared to receive
the truth. I hope in time peace will be restored to the country and
that the South may enjoy some measure of prosperity. I fear, how
ever, much suffering is still in store for her and that the people must
be prepared to exercise fortitude and forbearance.

ROBERT E. LEE.

GENERAL J. A. EARLY: MONTREAL, CANADA.

I wish to thank you for your last offering to the cause you
served so zealously and efficiently in the field. To vindicate the struggle

473

APPENDIX

of the South to preserve their political and social inheritance by truth
fully stating events was alike due to those to whom its regenera
tion must be confided, as well as to those who suffered for that cause.
Your career as a commander met my entire approval and secured my
admiration. It was such estimate concurrently held by General Lee
and myself that led to your selection to command the vitally important
and difficult campaign which you have described in your recent pub
lication. The means were known to be disproportionate to the task
before you when you marched against General Hunter. That they
proved adequate, is glory enough for you and your associates. It
would be easy to show, if it were desirable now to enter upon that
question, at whose door lies the responsibility of subsequent disasters.
You have rendered the more grateful and useful service of showing at
whose door it does not belong. JEFFERSON DAVIS.

GENERAL J. A. EARLY: UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA.

I have thought much of this matter of the Army of Northern
Virginia, and my earnest, honest belief is that you should write
memoirs of its campaigns. I don't know any nobler labor of love, even
if you do not publish it.

If you write and leave it unfinished even, I will pledge myself to
edit it and have it published as a true memorial of your love and
affection for that noble army of martyrs. General Lee ought to have
done this thing. Now that he is gone, the duty devolves on you to
give the account of all the campaigns in detail from the beginning to
the end. This is the only way to defeat the deplorable effects of
thousands of books of misapprehension, because nobody has written
authoritatively on the subject. I do hope you will take the matter
into consideration and undertake the work. I will do everything I
can to collect material for you. . . . Your address at Washington and
Lee is the best piece of military criticism which has been written on
our war, and I beg you earnestly and solemnly as a duty to that old
Army of Northern Virginia to write a history of its campaigns; it
would be most appropriate and essential.

CHARLES S. VENABLE.

GENERAL J. A. EARLY : UNIVERSITY OP VIRGINIA.

I write, at the lapse of twenty-five years from the close of the
war, on a matter in which you are interested as well as every man
who served under you. It is due to yourself and to the truth of his
tory that you should write a minute, calm and complete history of
your campaigns, from the time you were detached from the army
around Petersburg, in 1864, until the affair at Waynesboro.

My honest conviction is that your campaign will lose nothing by

474

APPENDIX

comparison with that of our great Jackson in the same field, and for
the following reasons:

(1st) With about 12,000 (perhaps fewer) men you met and
defeated Hunter at Lynchburg with an army of 20,000 men. You
pursued him, driving him out of Virginia into Kanawha Valley, thus
diverting him from the valley of Virginia. He had (I think) two
brigades of cavalry, — you did not have over 1,500 cavalry.

(2nd) You made a forced march down the valley, whipping
another army of 12,000 men at Monocacy, after driving all the Federal
forces out of the valley, marched to the very walls of Washington
City, causing the withdrawal of a large force from the front of Lee,
for the protection of the city.

(3rd) You fell back into Virginia, when your force reduced by
fighting and marching could not have exceeded 9,000 men. Sheridan
was sent to meet you with 35,000 or 40,000 men. Up to this period
your campaign was brilliantly successful. The disproportion was vastly
greater between your forces and Sheridan's than between Jackson's
and Shields' at Kernstown. If it had been possible to reinforce you
at Winchester to the extent of 20,000, you would have driven Sheridan
into the Potomac.

(4th) Now observe. After Kernstown, Jackson fell back up the
valley, was reinforced by Ewell; the latter was left to hold Banks in
check. Jackson marched with his own force, 4,500 men, took command
of Johnston's force of two brigades, 3,500 men, defeated Milroy,
7,000 men, returned centre with Ewell and with a force, now some
thing over 20,000, expelled Banks (who commanded not over 7,000)
from the valley. When threatened by Fremont from the west and.
Shields from the east — each with about 18,000 men — he retired, keeping
them in check, and fought with equal numbers, the battle of Port
Republic.

Again. At Chancellorsville Jackson, by order of Lee, by a forced
and daring march, attacked the right flank of the Federal Army,
surprised and routed it. You, by a similar march, surprised and routed
the advance forces of Sheridan at Cedar Creek. His remaining force
would have been routed had not the troops halted to plunder the cap
tured camp. Who was responsible for this? Those who commanded
under you, whose business and duty it was to keep their troops well
in hand, and pursue the routed army.

I have thought much of your campaign in the valley when our
military affairs were in extremis and think you did all that could have
been done. I urge that you will write a full, consecutive history of
that campaign, not leaving out of view the service rendered by your
cavalry; they acted a most important part in saving Lynchburg until
your arrival.

You reached Lynchburg late in the afternoon; the day before

475

APPENDIX

your cavalry met the Federal force at New London at 2 o'clock P.M.
and held them until night; fell back during the night to the old
Quaker Church and there held them till the following night. Had the
cavalry not so detained Hunter, he would have captured Lynchburg
during the forenoon of the day in which you reached the city. No
campaign of the war was superior to this. WILLIAM E. PETERS.

GENERAL J. A. EARLY : LEXINGTON, VIRGINIA.

I throw out a suggestion for your consideration, which would be
to the country a matter of inestimable value, for the merit of truth
and knowledge. I refer to a history of Virginia. You have given the
subject more accurate study than anybody else. Write it out and
publish it. I write after a good deal of reflection about it. Though
you may not know it, your explicit, lucid pen reflects your mind more
accurately always than your tongue, which must banter, willy-nilly.

WM. PRESTON JOHNSTON.

GENERAL J. A. EARLY : NEW YORK-

More than a year ago in some correspondence with the sons of
General R. E. Lee, I was referred to you by General W. H. F. Lee,
for information respecting the intention of the commanding general
of the Army of Northern Virginia at the time of the assault on Fort
Steadman and Haskell before Petersburg, March 25th, 1865. Although
you may not have been actually engaged there, General Lee says you
are an authority on all the operations of that army.

GEORGE L. KILMER.

TREASURY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.
GENERAL J. A. EARLY :

Accept my special thanks for a copy of your narrative of the
military operations in the Shenandoah Valley and east of the Blue
Ridge. Knowing your strict and straightforward fidelity to the truth
makes the perusal all the more interesting. w. S. ROSECRANS.

For the benefit of history, a physician would prolong
his life indefinitely.

GENERAL J. A. EARLY : RICHMOND, VIRGINIA.

I leave the city to-night on my way to England, but I cannot go
without telling you how glad I am that you have been chosen to
deliver the address at Lexington.

I know General Jackson admired you and believe, if he could be
consulted in the matter, he would select you to make the address.
1 wish you could live forever, if only to keep history straight.

HUNTER McGuiRE, M.D.
476

APPENDIX

There are so many pages devoted to recalling war
incidents and exploits that it becomes difficult to make the
choice, from among them, of such as might serve to gain
the especial interest of the reader; those which disclose
critical situations and unconscious heroism, such as these
sent from Charlotte, North Carolina, and Farmdale, Ken
tucky, will best appeal to veterans of the war :

CHARLOTTE, N. C.
GENERAL J. A. EARLY :

You remember that I was the cause of your being sent to Ross
Pole just before the first Fredericksburg battle. Did you ever notice
that Burnside said that Halleck had selected Ross Pole for the crossing
of the Federal Army, but that he had taken the responsibility of
crossing at Fredericksburg, because Halleck had selected Ross Pole
before troops had been sent to guard it, and that as the circumstances
had changed he felt at liberty to disobey orders'? Your presence at
the first place made Burnside cross at Fredericksburg. On that hor
rible Sunday I rode up with young Morrison from Port Royal to Ross
Pole, and found that we did not have even a cavalry picket there,
while the Federals were in force on the other side and were working
on a batteau bridge. I wrote to General Jackson about the condition
of things, and you were sent down. You never rendered more im
portant service. . . .

You and I were long side by side, and, like you, I was only un
popular with those soldiers who did not do their duty. . . .

Your letter was full of touching interest to me, who am alive to
any incident connected with the rank and file.

I have laid it away for the benefit of my children's children. You
are so accurate in statistics, I would be afraid of a blunder, if I
differed with you.

In comparing my statistics with yours in my address, I wished
to say, " General Early knows more of Confederate history than any
man now living, probably for the reason that he has never moved out
of the Confederacy " — but I know you did not like some haversack anec
dotes which were entirely to your credit, and which endeared you to
thousands of our people. You were so fortunate, or unfortunate, as
to be considered the wittiest man in the army and doubtless many
clever and witty things were put upon you in consequence.

Heaven bless you always ! D. H. HILL.

477

APPENDIX

KENTUCKY MILITARY INSTITUTE,

Farmdale, Ky.
GENERAL J. A. EARLY :

Captain Sam Gaines went to the reunion at Gettysburg some
years ago and while standing at the point taken by you (Hays' and
Hoke's brigades on Cemetery Heights) he says a Federal officer, who
was also in the battle, told him that your charge was more serious
than you or our people seemed to be aware of, — that you really had
passed in rear of Meade's headquarters and that Meade and his staff
would certainly have been your prisoners had you been supported on
your right, so that you could have held the ground you had taken. The
officer pointed out the house in which Meade and his staff, virtually for
the time (you held the heights) your prisoners, were at the time you
made the assault, and that it was in the rear of your position ; that it
was indeed a crisis with the Federals. D. F. BOYD, Supt.

In his manuscript, General Early refers to his order
for the burning of Chambersburg ; this I do not find, but
in an article in the Bichinond State, June 22nd, 1887,
he makes this statement:

The act was done in retaliation for outrages committed by General
David Hunter in the Valley of Virginia.

I thought it was time to try and stop this mode of warfare by
some act of retaliation, and I accordingly sent a cavalry force to
Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, to demand of the authorities of that
town compensation for the houses of Messrs. Hunter, Lee and Boteler,
upon pain of having their town reduced to ashes on failure to pay
the compensation demanded. The three houses burned were worth
fully $100,000 in gold and I demanded that, or what I regarded as
equivalent in greenbacks. No attempt was made to comply with my
demand and my order to burn the town was executed.

This was in strict accordance with the laws of war and was a just
retaliation. I gave the order on my own responsibility, but General
Lee never in any manner indicated disapproval of my act, and his
many letters to me expressive of confidence and friendship forbade
the idea that he disapproved of my conduct on that occasion. It
afforded me no pleasure to subject non-combatants to the rigors of
war, but I felt that I had a duty to perform to the people for whose
homes I was fighting and I endeavored to perform it, however dis
agreeable it might be.

It may not be out of keeping with General Early 's
object in writing a history of the war to insert a letter

478

APPENDIX

from a former Federal soldier acknowledging kindness
received while he was held as prisoner within Southern
lines. The one chosen gives the address at the National
Military Home in Montgomery County, Ohio :

GENERAL J. A. EARLY:

I write in memory of old times and a special act of kindness on
your part, when in the midst of battle, with your self -earned brave
army around, and General Sheridan's army contending at Cedar Creek,
Virginia, October 19th, 1864. I was wounded, early at dawn of day,
in the face and right thigh, and was unable to walk on account of my
wounds. Your men came to me and asked how long since I was paid
off ; and then searched me, but I had no money, as I had not lately been
paid. One of the men came up to me and took my canteen; just then
you came riding along and spoke to me, asking if I was badly hurt.
I said " Yes, sir, I am." I looked earnestly at you and said to you,
"Do you allow a man to rob another of the last drop of water he
possesses?" You replied, "No." "Well," I said, pointing to a man
who had just robbed me, " there stands the man who took my can
teen."

Straightway you rode up to him, made him give up my canteen,
and filled it, yourself, with water for me.

" Now," said you, " get away to your command."

THOMAS DOUGLAS,
Late of Co. G, 12th Reg.

Volumes might be filled from the collection, which in
length of time covers the period of his manhood to old
age, all attesting respect for the veracity of his character.
Perhaps the finest tribute to him comes from the pen of
his devoted friend, General Wm. H. Payne, of Warrenton,
who writes :

There is no man now living who so entirely commands my respect,
or of whose good opinion I am so covetous, as yours. What I most
admire in you is your passionate love of truth. I am truly pleased to
know that you are to deliver the address on the Jackson statue. So
many false conceptions of men and events are cultivated, that one
gives up all hope of truth ever having an audience. It is a consolation
to know that it will be spoken at Lexington.

The friendship between General Early and Senator
Daniel dated from the time the latter became a member
of Early 's staff.

The acquaintance thus begun ripened into a friendship

479

APPENDIX

which never paled, and which afforded General Early
great satisfaction. I have selected from a bundle of his
letters a hurried note written in 1874 while Senator
Daniel was a candidate for Congress, — in order to show
the friendly relations existing between these two.

MY DEAR GENERAL:

The three tickets enclosed were elected here to-night by overwhelm
ing majorities. I shall have 60 votes on first ballot. I ask that you
will do me the honor to nominate me in convention. It will be glory
enough whether I succeed or not. I beg that you will come and help
me now. You said, in Richmond, you " raised me." Come then and

stand by your boy. vnmx tmlv

ulv' JOHN W. DANIEL.

After an interval of eight years, there is a letter tell
ing of Daniel's desire to write the life of his friend. To
accomplish this purpose he seems to have collected a vast
deal of material. The answer to his request has not
been found.

MY DEAR GENERAL: December 3rd> 1882'

I have wished to talk with you about a contemplated undertaking
in which you are not disinterested. With your permission and good
will in the plan, I desire to render such contribution to the history of
the war as I may be able to do, in the shape of a volume to bear the
title " The Life and Campaigns of Lieutenant General Jubal A. Early."
I have some elements of qualification in familiarity with some of
your campaigns and a very good general knowledge of the conditions
under, and means with which you conducted others. My mind con
tinually recurs to the war and not a day passes that its various scenes
and phases are not revolved over and over again. It would be a relief
to work on the subject, and did you consent to my doing so in the
manner indicated, in a year or two I could prepare the work as well
as my poor abilities permit: and while, to tell the truth would be ever
the uppermost thought, it would be a labor of love to me to recount it
in the themes proposed. If for any reason you do not wish me to
write such a book, your wishes would of course control me, but unless
you object, my mind is made up to the undertaking. If yon approve
there are many things in which I would need your assistance. Think
over this matter and let me know your views. Most truly yours,

JOHN W. DANIEL.

INDEX

Aaronsburg, 263

Abbottstown, 264

Abingdon, 466

Abraham's Creek, 242, 420, 421, 423

Adams, Captain, 188

Aquia Creek, 15, 31, 104, 105, 168

Aquia District, 51

Alabama Troops, 3, 21, 27, 51, 60,

61, 162, 185, 192, 468
Alexandria, 2, 39, 44, 45, 48, 75, 118,

131

Alleghany County, 459
Alleghany Mountains, 338, 366
Altodale, 254
Alum Spring Mill, 224, 225, 227,

230
Anderson, General, 68, 105, 132, 135,

147, 149, 151, 152, 155, 156, 158,

159, 163, 196, 198, 211, 212, 216,

227, 231, 234, 236, 322, 323, 324,

352, 362, 363, 364, 404, 407, 408,

409,410,411,412,413
Andersonville, 297, 298
Andrews, Colonel, 197, 199, 206, 211,

220, 221, 222, 224, 323
Antietam, 139, 140, 143, 150, 151,

156, 161, 384, 385, 403
Antietam Creek, 140
Appomattox Court-House, 191
Archer, General, 170, 172, 173, 174,

175

Arendtsville, 264
Arkansas, 468
Arlington Heights, 41
Armistead, General, 83, 84, 149, 153,

156
Army of Northern Virginia, 74, 163,

182, 236, 361, 371, 379, 415, 466
Army of Potomac, 47, 50, 52, 74, 157,

161, 341, 343, 344, 360, 392, |

417, 418

Army of Virginia, 92
Army of Western Virginia, 399, 418 i

Ashby's Gap, 411, 457

Ashland, 361, 465

Atkinson, Colonel N. N., 171, 172,

173, 174, 175, 180
Atlee's Station, 361
Auburn, 304

Augusta County, 366, 368
Augusta Raid Guards, 332
Averill, General (U. S. A.), 326, 327,

328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 338, 397,

398, 399, 410, 412, 414, 416, 417,

419. 432
Avery, Colonel, 230, 242, 243, 250,

259, 268, 269, 271, 273

Back Creek, 284, 368, 383, 384
Back Road, 369, 426, 433, 436, 438,

439, 440, 446, 450, 453
Badham, Colonel J. C., 72
Baker, Jas. C., 244
Ball's Bluff, 52
Baltimore, 51, 75, 135, 159, 255, 386,

387, 388, 392, 394
B. & O. R. R., 135, 136, 163, 326,

332, 333, 340, 368, 382, 383, 391,

402, 414, 455, 456, 460, 461
Banks' Ford, 208, 212, 229, 231,

233
Banks, General (U. S. A.), 75, 92,

101, 103, 112, 156, 157, 475
Barksdale, Colonel, 19, 20, 23, 25
Barksdale, General, 147, 149, 195,

196, 198, 200, 202, 203, 204, 206,

207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 218,

219, 221-25, 228, 232-34, 404
Barlow, General, 268
Barnett's Ford, 93
Bartlett's Mill, 318, 319, 320, 321,

324

Barton, Lieutenant, 240
Bartonsville, 241, 242. 368, 369
Bartow, General, 31, 32
Bath County. 459

481

482

INDEX

Battle, General, 346, 422, 450

Baylor, Lieutenant, 461

Bealton, 307

Beauregard, General, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,

10, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 20, 21, 26,

27, 29, 31, 33, 34, 35, 38, 44, 46,

47, 51, 52, 341

Beaver Dam Creek, 361, 362
Beckham, Lieutenant, 22, 25, 26,

38

Bedford City, 372, 374
Bedford County, 378
Bee, General, 31, 32, 37
Belle Grove, 437, 441
Benning, Colonel, 81, 82
Berkeley County, 366, 367, 368
Bermuda Hundreds, 360
Bernard House, 196
Berry, Major, 11, 240, 251
Berry's Ferry, 396
Berryville, 164, 240, 369, 396, 397,

406, 411, 414, 420, 421
Bethesda Church, 362, 363
Beverly, 459
Beverly's Ford, 106
Big Calf Pasture, 327
Big Lick, 377
Big Springs, 134
Blackburn's Ford, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12,

15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 31, 32, 39, 118,

119

Black Horse Cavalry, 157
Black Walnut Run, 318
Blacksburg, 327, 329
Blair, Postmaster General, U. S.,

395
Blue Ridge, 10, 11, 63, 164, 165, 238,

284, 285, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370,

371, 377, 396, 411, 413, 429, 433,

434, 457, 458, 459, 476
Board, Colonel, 397
Bolivar, 384

Bolivar Heights, 136, 137, 164, 384
Bonham, General, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 15,

20, 27, 31, 33, 38, 51, 52
Boonsboro, Pa., 135, 139, 140, 254,

282, 385

Boonsboro Gap, 386
Boteler, Honorable A. R., 401, 478
Boteler's Ford, 139, 153, 162, 254
Botetourt County, 369

Bower's Hill, 242, 243, 244, 248, 249,

250, 407

Bowling Green, 168, 186, 203
Bowman's Mill, 442
Boyd, Superintendent, J. F., 477
Bragg, General Braxton, 157, 303
Branch, General, 128
Branch Mountain, 334, 336
Brandy Station, 106, 237, 307, 309,

310, 316
Braxton, Colonel, 371, 414, 417, 419,

422, 423, 425
Breckenridge, 360, 370, 371, 372, 374,

375, 376, 378, 381, 382. 384, 385,

386, 387, 388, 392, 396, 399, 402,

414, 415, 420, 424, 425, 429, 453,

454, 461
Brentsville, 305
Bridgewater, 435
Brinly's Land, 246
Bristol, 466
Bristow, 54, 114, 115, 117, 133, 304,

305, 307

Broad Run, 116, 117, 118, 306
Brock Road, 352

Brockenborough, Colonel, 170, 173
Brock's Gap, 334, 339, 382
Brown, Captain, 97, 98, 127, 131, 176,

179, 199, 206, 241, 244
Brown, Captain Wm. F., 97, 99, 108,

110

Brownsburg, 328
Brown's Gap, 371, 433, 434
Brucetown, 413
Buchanan, 327, 329, 330, 369, 375,

377, 380

Buckner's Neck, 160
Buffalo, 328
Buffalo Gap, 326, 327
Buford, Colonel, 278
Buford, General (U. S. A.), 266
Buford's Depot, 377
Buford's Gap, 377
Bull Mountain, 114
Bull Pasture River, 326
Bull Run, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 16, 17, 18, 19,

25, 26, 27, 31, 32, 33, 37, 39, 44,

45, 46, 47, 52, 53, 54, 55, 58,

118, 119, 127, 128, 129, 306
Bunker Hill, 163, 284, 400, 402, 403,

406, 408, 410, 411, 413, 419, 420

INDEX

483

Burke's Station, 50

Burnside, General (U. S. A.), 104,
105, 106, 131, 132, 150, 151, 158,
165, 166, 169, 180, 189, 192, 341,

343, 348, 356, 358, 477
Burton's Mill, 242

Butler, General (U. S. A.), 40, 341,

344, 364
Butterfield (U. S. A.), 218

Cabell, General, 198, 210

Calf Pasture River, 326

Callahan's, 327, 330

Callaway, Lieutenant Wm. G., 187,

209, 250, 464
Camden, 184
Cameron's Depot, 408
Campbell Court-House, 376
Camp Walker, 6, 12
Canada, 472
Capital, 90, 159, 160
Carlisle, 255, 263
Caroline, 184
Carpenter, 206
Carrington, 176, 179
Carter, Colonel, 445
Carter House, 26, 27
Carter, Lieutenant T. H., 422, 460
Cash, Colonel, 27, 28
Cashtown, 256, 257, 264, 266, 267,

276, 278, 279

Castleman's Ferry, 164, 396
Catharpin Creek, 237
Catlett's Station, 110, 114
Catoctan Mountain, 386
Cavetown, 254
Cedar Creek, 242, 368, 369, 398, 406,

407, 417, 418, 430, 437, 438, 439,

440, 441, 442, 447, 449, 450,

453, 456, 466, 475, 479
Cedar Creek Pike, 240, 242, 304,

424, 426
Cedar Run, 92, 93, 94, 96, 106, 154,

155

Cedarville, 241, 284, 453, 454
Cemetery Hill, 169, 222, 223, 224,

267, 268, 270, 271, 272, 273, 277,

278, 478
Central R. R., 261, 378, 359, 361,

369, 372, 457, 460, 461, 465

Centreville, 4, 5, 6, 7, 27, 31, 33, 35,

44, 50, 51, 52, 119, 122, 128, 129,

133, 304

Chaffin's Bluff, 76, 89
Chamberlain, Lieutenant, 172
Chambersburg, 254, 255, 263, 281,

401, 402, 404, 405, 477
Chambliss, General, 357
Chancellorsville, 167, 193, 197, 200,

201, 202, 208, 211, 212, 213, 214,

216, 217, 231, 233, 235, 237, 475
Chantilly, 129

Charles City Court-House, 73
Charlestown, 136, 164, 240, 369, 406,

408, 409, 411, 413, 414, 419, 424
Charlottesville, 340, 341, 371, 372,

378, 393, 401, 435, 458, 464, 465
C. & O. Canal, 42, 134, 383, 414, 456
Chester Gap, 238, 285, 457
Chickahominy, 76, 77, 87, 89, 155, 361
Chilton, Colonel R. H., 200, 201
Chinn's House, 23, 25, 28
Chisholm, Colonel, 17, 26
Christie, Captain C. W., 187
Clarke County, 366, 369
Clark's Mountain, 303
Clear Spring, 402
Clifton Forge, 328, 331, 380
Cobb's Brigade, 149
Cocke, Colonel Ph. St. G., 3, 4, 5, 16,

26, 31, 32, 35, 38, 41
Codorus, 261
Cold Harbor, 76, 361, 362, 363, 371,

372

College Hill, 374
Colliertown, 328, 329
Colquitt, Genera], 158, 177
Colston, General, 63, 195, 212
Columbia, 255
Columbia Bridge, 259
Columbia Furnace, 339, 436, 450
Conduct of the War, 161, 231-32
Conewago, 259, 261
Confederate Government, 2, 3, 10,

98, 160
Congressional Committee, 197, 207,

232, 256, 277, 297, 300
Conner's Brigade, 437, 449
Conrad's Store, 367, 369, 433
Conscript Act, 64
Conscript Bureau, 462

484

INDEX

Cook, Lieutenant Colonel, 459

Cooke, General, 353, 356, 363

Cooley's House, 439, 441, 444

Corbet, Boston, 296, 297

Corse, Colonel, 48, 49

Cosby, General, 453, 454

Costin, Major, 220

Covington, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331

Cow Pasture River, 328, 330

Cox, General (U. S. A.), 158

Cox's House, 210, 220, 223

Coxe, Dr. (U. S. A.), 49

Craig's Creek, 328, 329

Crampton's Gap, 385, 386

Creigh, 380

Crittenden's House, 95, 96

Crook, General (U. S. A.), 370, 375,

379, 396, 398, 399, 406, 411, 417,

424, 425, 430, 443, 444, 461
Crooked Creek, 93
Cross Keys, 75
Crutchfield, Colonel, 176
Culpeper County, 285, 316, 317
Culpeper Court-House, 93, 94, 95, 96,

100, 101, 106, 165, 192, 237, 253,

277, 284, 302, 303, 316, 343, 407,

433
Cumberland, 282, 284, 338, 368, 402,

404, 461

Curtin, Governor, 257, 261
Custer, General (U. S. A.), 457, 458
Cutshaw's Battalion, 408, 413, 433,

435, 449
Cutt's Battalion, 198

Dabney, Major, 78

Dams, 59, 60, 63, 72, 80, 81, 109

Dance, Captain, 241, 307, 308, 310,

311, 313, 314, 315
Daniel, General, 346
Daniel, Major J. W., 187, 310, 314,

349, 359, 473, 474, 479, 480
Danville, 104

D'Aquin, Captain, 176, 180
Darien, 260
Darkesville, 283, 413
Davis, Eugene, 4
Davis, General, 353
Davis, President Jefferson, 27, 45, 56,

473
Death of Jackson, 235

Delaware, 45, 157

Dement, Captain, 97, 98, 108, 111,

176, 179

Deep Creek, 170, 201
Deep Run, 167, 168, 193, 194, 198,

199, 202, 205, 206, 209, 211, 221
Department of the Gulf, 418
Department of Northern Virginia, 51
Department of Southwestern Vir
ginia and Eastern Tennessee, 461
Department of Susquehanna, 417,

418, 419
Department of Washington, 344, 417,

418, 419
Department of Western Virginia,

417, 418, 419
Dillstown, 255
Dix, General (U. S. A.), 51
Dogan House, 26

Doles, General, 267, 268, 346, 363
Douglas, Colonel, 108, 109, 112, 143
Downman's House, 223, 224, 227,

228, 231, 232
Drainesville, 52, 134
Drayton's Brigade, 132, 154
Drewry's Bluff, 76, 89
Duffield's Depot, 384
Dunkard Church, 140, 142, 144, 145,

146, 149, 151, 158

Early, General J. A., 1-7, 13, 15-29,
31, 33, 38, 41, 47-49, 52. 56, 58,
60-73, 75-85, 88, 92-103, 106-
111, 114, 116-130, 133, 136, 140-
166, 170-179, 184, 185-187, 194,
195, 200-213, 219-228, 230-238,
240, 243-248, 250-257, 260, 263,
264, 267, 269, 271-276, 279, 280-
480

Early, Jno. C., 186

Early, Captain R. D., 187

Early, Lieutenant S. H., 68, 81, 97,
130, 186

East Berlin, 258, 263, 264

East Tennessee, 466

Echols. General, 331, 385, 388, 396,
399, 460, 462, 465, 466

Edinburg, 368, 436, 450, 461

Elzey, General, 23, 24, 25, 33, 36, 38,
77, 78, 375, 376, 381

Emory, General (U. S. A.), 393

INDEX

485

Evacuation, 53, 54, 55, 56, 65, 66, 67,
89, 105, 363, 384, 467

Evans, Colonel, 4, 5, 16, 26, 31, 32, 35,
37, 47, 52, 132, 140, 154, 155, 158,
173, 188, 190, 349, 359, 388, 422,

425, 444, 448

Ewell, General, 3-6, 13, 15, 31, 33, 50,
51, 54, 56, 63, 74-82, 84, 86, 88,
92-94, 97, 101-03, 106, 107, 108,
111, 112, 114-122, 126, 129, 131,
133, 135, 136, 137, 144, 151, 153-
155, 158, 163, 164, 185, 187, 188,
236, 237, 238, 240, 243, 249, 251,
253-56, 261, 264, 266, 269-273,
275, 276. 279-281, 283-85, 303-05,
309, 310, 313, 316, 317, 321, 326,
340, 343-48, 351, 354-59, 361,
371, 475

Fairfax Court-House, 4, 39, 40, 45,

47, 48, 50, 52, 129

Fairfax Station, 4, 6, 15, 45, 47, 48, 50
Fairfield, 279, 280, 281
Fair Oaks, 74
Falling Waters, 282, 283
Falmouth, 167, 169, 198, 201, 202, 218
Farmdale, 477, 478
Fauquier Springs, 303
Feagans, Captain, 152
Ferguson, Colonel, 410, 423, 434
Field, General, 170, 342, 353, 354,

355, 357, 360

Fincastle, 327, 328, 330, 377, 379
First Division, C. S. A., 50
Fisher, Colonel, 32
Fisher's Hill, 333, 334, 406, 407, 413,

426, 429, 430, 431, 435, 436, 437,
440, 441, 449, 450, 454, 456

Fishersville, 460

Florida Regiment, 60, 63, 67, 69, 73

Folk's Old House, 246, 247

Forest Road, 374, 376

Forno, General, 107, 114, 115, 116,

126

Fort Haskell, 476
Fort Hill, 425, 426
Fort Magruder, 59, 68, 69, 70, 73
Fort Steadman, 476
Fort Stevens, 389
Fortress Monroe, 58, 61, 65
Fox's Gap, 386

Franklin County, 468

Franklin, General (U. S. A.), 151, 159,
176, 181, 394

Frazier, Captain, 162

Frazier's Farm, 77, 87

Frederick City, 135, 139, 385, 386,
387, 388, 395

Frederick County, 366, 367, 368

Frederick's Hall, 74, 465
I Fredericksburg, 63, 104, 135, 162,
166-170, 176, 179, 182, 183, 190-
192, 194-97, 200-207, 209, 212,
214, 218, 220, 221, 223-25, 228,
231, 233-35, 237, 253, 285, 318,
344, 353, 354, 357, 477
! Freeman's Ford, 106
i Freestone Point, 4

Fremont (U. S. A.), 75, 92, 158, 475

French, Colonel, 254, 255, 257, 258,
259, 261, 321

French, General (U. S. A.), 149, 151

Front Royal, 165, 239, 240, 241, 243,
284, 366, 367, 368, 369, 399, 406,
407, 408, 413, 420, 421, 423, 424,
426, 444, 450, 453, 459

Fry, A. A. G. (U. S. A.), 40

Fry, Colonel, 363
i

i Gaines, Captain S., 478
I Games' House, 75, 89
i Games' Mill, 76, 364, 371, 379
; Gainesville, 114, 123, 133
Garber, 176

Gardner, Captain F., 19, 20, 29, 186
Gardner, Lieutenant Colonel, 27
Garland, General S., 12, 158
! Garnett, Lieutenant, 8

Garnett's Expedition, 336
I Gayle's House, 357
j General Conscription, 64
Georgetown, 42, 134, 387
Georgetown Pike, 387, 389, 390, 391
Georgia Troops, 27, 49, 50, 67, 78, 81,
95, 97, 98, 99, 107, 109, 111, 115,
116, 118, 124, 125 127, 131, 153,
173-77, 180, 185, 190, 193, 259,
280, 333, 336, 349, 362, 388, 390,
393, 468
Germana Ford, 317, 319, 324, 325,

344, 346
Gerr^antown, 40

486

INDEX

Gettysburg, 254-58, 264, 266, 267, 271,
272, 275, 276, 278, 279, 282, 286-
288, 290, 478

Gibbon, General (U. S. A.), 198, 206,
209, 225

Gibson, Captain, 28

Gibson, Colonel, 153

Gilmor, Major H., 333-34, 338, 340,
383, 394, 460

Gilmore, General (U. S. A.), 393

Gloucester Point, 59, 61

Godwin, Colonel, 249, 274-75, 311-
314

Godwin, General, 423, 427

Goggin, Major, 449, 451

Goldsborough, Major, 243

Goodwin, Colonel, 385

Gordon, General J. B., 192, 209-11,
221-25, 227, 229, 230, 232-33, 239,
240, 242-44, 246, 248-250, 252-53,
256-263, 267-275, 280, 305, 311,
245-351, 359, 363, 372, 374, 381,
384-85, 388, 392, 396, 403, 406,
408-09, 414, 419-23, 425, 429, 434,
438-444, 446, 448, 452

Gordonsville, 74-75, 92, 104-05, 237,
340, 343-44, 359, 451, 458, 464,
465

Gosport Navy Yard, 1

Government at Richmond, 44, 45, 46,
89, 157, 160, 290, 297

Government at Washington, 89, 157

Graham's Battery, 197-99, 206, 221,
224, 307, 308, 310-11, 314-15

Grant, General (U.S.A.), 341, 343-44,
348, 351, 358, 360-64, 371, 376,
379, 388, 390-393, 406, 408, 414,
415, 417-19, 436-37, 452-56,
461

Great North Mountain, 332, 356, 382,
454, 458

Great Run, 109

Green, Captain, 50, 307, 310, 311,
312, 315

Green, General (U. S. A.), 145, 148,
404

Green, Major B. H., 187

Greenbrier County, 459

Greenwich, 116, 304

Greenwood Depot, 254, 263, 283, 463

Greenwood Gap, 270

Gregg, General, 124, 127, 170, 173

Griffin, Colonel, 207

Grigsby, Colonel, 142-44, 146-47, 149,

403, 404,

Groveton, 119, 120, 122, 133
Guardstown, 284
Guest's House, 223-25, 228-29, 230,

232

Guiney's Depot, 166, 185, 197
Gunpowder River, 386, 394

Hagerstown,139, 142, 144, 145, 281-82,

285, 395, 402

Hagerstown Pike, 140, 145, 149, 254
Hairston, Colonel P., 3, 5, 7, 16, 72
Hale, Major S., 99, 110, 145, 187, 203,

313, 359
Halleck, General (U. S. A.), 104, 105,

132, 477

Halltown, 136, 408
Hambrick, Major, 6
Hamilton's Crossing, 166, 168-170,

191-92, 194, 199 203
Hampshire County, 332, 404, 455
Hampton, General, 32, 341, 352-53,

355, 379

Hampton, Pa., 258
Hampton's Legion, 15, 28, 47
Hancock, General (U. S. A.), 72,

352

Hanging Rock, 378
Hanover County, 167, 361
Hanover Junction, 258, 261, 264, 345,

348, 354, 357, 359, 360, 370
Hanover Town, 361
Hardwick, Captain W. W., 184
Hardy County, 332-34, 404, 454-55,

457, 460

Hannan, Colonel Wm. H., 464
Harper's Ferry, 1, 2, 43, 135-37, 139,

150, 155, 160, 163-64, 240, 251,

254, 284, 367-69, 371, 384-86,

391, 396-97, 400, 402-03, 406,

408, 417

Harris, General, 355
Harrisburg, Pa., 255, 259, 261, 263,

267, 386, 394
Harrisonburg, 75, 331-32, 340, 367-69,

433-35, 457, 461

Harrison's Landing, 84, 88, 104, 105
Harvie, Captain, 454

INDEX

487

Haymarket, 114

Haynesville, 283, 383, 384

Hays, General, 5, 7, 8, 17-20, 23-25,
28, 107, 114-124, 126, 129-131,
136, 139, 141, 143, 150, 152, 158,
171, 175-77, 179, 180, 188, 202-04,
206, 208, 210, 211, 219, 221, 222,
226-27, 229, 230, 232-34, 239,
241-43, 247, 248-49, 251-53, 257,
259,267-69, 271-76, 307, 310, 311-
315, 319, 320, 322, 345-46, 351,
374, 478

Hazel River, 106

Hazel Run, 167-69, 191, 194, 205, 207,
211, 220-24, 227-30, 233

Hazel wood, 184

Hedgeman's River, 108

Hedgesville, 284

Heidlersburg, 263-64, 266-68

Heintzelman, General (U. S. A.), 32,
131

Herbert, Colonel, 241, 243, 251

Heth, General, 236, 352-54, 356, 358,
363

Higginbotham, Major J. C., 125

Highland County, 459

Hill, Colonel, 24

Hill, General A. P., 76-77, 86, 93, 98,
99, 100, 102-03, 119,123-29, 133,
135-39, 150, 155, 158, 162-64, 166,
170-72, 176, 179, 188, 195, 211-17,
236-37, 253, 263, 266, 269, 270-71,
273, 275, 278, 281-83, 285, 302-04,
307, 316, 322, 324, 326, 343-44,
351-52, 358-59, 363-64, 371, 403

Hill, General D. H., 62-65, 67, 69, 71,
76, 78, 79, 81, 82, 86, 87, 132, 139,
140,149, 151, 154-56, 158-59, 163-
66, 171, 175, 177-79, 185, 187-88,
192, 194, 236, 374-75, 473, 477

Hillsboro, 396

Hilltown, 256

Hinson's Mill, 114

Hobson, Lieutenant, 388

Hodges, Colonel, 149, 153

Hoffman, Colonel, 347

Hoke, General, 47, 71, 171, 174-79,
185-86, 188, 190, 205-06, 221-22,
226-234, 239, 242, 244, 247-48,
250, 253, 259, 267-68, 273-74, 276,
302, 311, 341, 345, 359, 360, 478

Holman, Captain, 47

Holmes, General, 15, 31, 33, 36, 51,

76, 86, 133
Hood, General J. B., 105, 123, 132,

140, 141, 143-46, 149-151, 155,

158, 163, 170, 176, 185-86, 191-92,

236, 342, 403
Hooker, General (U. S. A.), 117, 151,

158,181,189,196-97,200-01,211,

213, 218, 231-34, 236-37, 253,

266, 277, 285
Hop Yard, 166
Hotchkiss, Major J., 340,438-39,440,

442

Howard, General (U. S. A.), 148, 266
Howe, General A. P. (U. S. A.), 198,

231-32

Howison House, 207
Huger, General, 76, 83, 84, 86, 87, 105
Hughes' Cross- Roads, 361
Hundley's Corner, 361, 362, 363
Hunter, Andrew, 401, 478
Hunter, Colonel, 32
Hunter, General (U. S. A.), 32, 37, 40,

364, 370-72, 375-76, 378-382, 391,

393, 396, 399, 401-02, 415, 417,

455, 465, 475-76
Hunterstown, 258, 264, 266
Hupp's Battalion, 244

Imboden, General, 191, 326-29, 333-
34, 339, 369, 370, 374, 376, 378,
381-82, 386, 389, 391, 398, 402,
406, 416, 423

Jackson, Colonel Wm. L., 328-331,
381, 389, 397, 399, 402-03, 416,
421

Jackson, General T. J., 10, 11, 31, 32,
37,43,51,74-79, 84, 86-90,92-94,
97-109, 111, 112, 114-16, 119,
120, 122-27, 129, 131-32, 134-145,
149, 151, 153, 155-56, 158, 162-66,
170-72, 174, 177-78, 180-81, 183,
187-88, 190, 194-97, 212-217,
234r-236, 241, 285, 297, 301, 361,
368, 403, 431

Jackson's River, 327-28, 340, 369

Jackson's River Depot, 328

Jackson's River Valley, 330

Jacob's Ford, 317

488

INDEX

James River, 57, 58, 63, 65, 73, 77, 86,

92, 104, 105, 132, 160, 191,236-37,

342-43, 364, 369, 376, 465
Jarman's Gap, 464
Jefferson, 113, 386

Jefferson County, 366, 369, 401, 461
Jenkins, General, 156, 251, 254, 263
Jerrett, Colonel George, 3
Johnson, Captain Elliot, 263
Johnson, General B. T., 78, 381, 384,

386, 392, 394, 401, 405, 407, 410,

416, 421
Johnson, General Edw., 236-240, 243,

249, 250, 252-55, 263, 270-73,

275-76, 278, 281, 284, 304, 306,

307, 318-23, 325, 345-47, 349, 351,

355, 359

Johnson's Battery, 122, 123
Johnson's Cavalry, 385
Johnston, Colonel Wm. P., 473, 476
Johnston, General Jos. E., 2, 10, 11,

13, 15, 16, 21, 22, 27, 29, 31, 33,

34-36, 38, 41, 43-44, 51-52, 54-

55, 58, 62-63, 65, 74, 468, 475
Johnston, General R. D., 345, 348-49,

350-51, 359

Jones' Battalion, 267, 304, 374-75
Jones' Brigade, 346, 381
Jones, Colonel, 26
Jones, Colonel Hilary P., 238-39, 241,

247-48, 253-54
Jones, General D. R., 3-7, 15-19, 31,

33, 58, 76, 105, 132, 140, 147, 151,

163
Jones, General J. R., 140-41, 143, 155,

163, 186, 191, 236, 382
Jones, General Saml., 331
Jones, General W. E., 370
Jones, Lieutenant Colonel J. M., 236,

322

Jordan Springs, 414
Junction, 12, 36, 49, 53-54, 114-15,

117-18, 133, 135, 167, 258, 359,

387

Kanawha River, 378
Kanawha Valley, 114, 158, 475
Kearney, General (U. S. A.), 49, 131
Kearneysville, 163, 383, 409
Keller, Captain, 407
Kelley's Ford, 192, 307, 316

Kelly, General (U. S. A.), 75, 338,

404, 461
Kemper, General J. L., 5, 16, 17, 19,

21-25, 28
Kentucky, 52, 157
Kentucky Military Institute, 477
Kernstown, 240-42, 368, 398-99, 408,

426, 475
Kershaw, General, 27-28, 33, 41, 52,

54, 57, 59, 81, 82, 139, 407-09, 411-

413, 433-35, 437, 441-49, 452, 454
Kettle Run, 115,304-06
Kettle Run Bridge, 305
Keyes, General (U. S. A.), 132
Kilmer, G. L., 476
Kilpatrick (U. S. A.), 340
King, General (U. S. A.), 74, 122
King, Lieutenant Colonel, 381, 388,

414, 423-25, 427, 460
Kirkland, General, 353
Knights of the Golden Circle, 353

Lacy's Springs, 326, 457

Lamar, Colonel, 153, 180, 388

Lancaster, 261

Lane's Brigade, 171, 173, 199, 274,
355-56

Langhorne, Colonel D. A., 2, 3

Langster's Cross-Roads, 47, 50

Latimer, Captain J. W., 176, 179, 186,
199, 200, 205-06

Lawton, Captain E. P., 175, 180

Lawton, General, 75, 103, 106-08, 111,
112, 115-17, 119-124, 126-27, 129,
136-37, 139, 140-44, 152-53, 155,
158, 162, 171, 174-75, 177, 179,
180, 187-88, 190, 192

Lee, Captain, 216

Lee, Edmund L, 401, 478

Lee, General Fitz., 153, 192, 303, 318,
320-21, 325-26, 328-30, 332-34,
337, 407-09, 411, 413-14, 416, 421,
423, 424-25, 427, 429, 433, 435,
459

Lee, General R. E., 1, 5-7, 74, 76-77,
85, 88-90, 92, 104, 105, 114, 119,
125, 131-33, 139. 154-57, 160-61,
164,169, 180, 181-83, 196-97,200-
01, 203, 211, 217-18, 220, 227-28,
282, 284, 288, 290, 297, 301, 303;
305, 307, 309-11, 313-14, 315,

INDEX

489

317, 319-20, 322, 324, 326-27, 329,
332, 339-40, 343-44,347-48,351-
56, 358, 360-64, 370-71, 380, 382-
383, 385, 394, 403, 407, 411, 435,
453, 454-57, 459-61, 465-69, 473,
475

Lee, General Wm. H. F., 184, 476

Lee's Hill, 169, 197-200, 204, 208-11,
219-21, 223-24, 231-33

Leesburg, 3, 43, 47, 134, 371, 394, 396

Leetown, 383, 384, 409, 410

Leitersburg, 281

Leroy, Lieutenant, 126

Letcher, Governor, 1, 380

Lewis, General, 397

Lewis House, 20, 29

Lewis, Lieutenant Colonel, 359

Lewis, Major, 124, 130

Lewis' Brigade, 384, 386

Lewisburg, 370, 377-79

Lexington, 327-29, 360 374-75, 379-
380, 473-74, 476

Liberty, 374-76, 378

Liberty Mills, 92, 93, 102, 285

Lilly, General R. D., 100, 126, 397

Lincoln, President A., 58, 218, 287,
290

Little Calf Pasture, 327, 328

Little North Mountain, 368, 407, 429,
430

Little River Pike, 129

Little Washington, 238

Locust Grove, 318-22, 324, 325, 345

Lomax, General L., 407-08, 411, 413-
14, 416, 419, 421-24, 426, 427-30,
433-34, 436, 441, 446, 450, 451,
453-54, 457-58, 461-62, 465-66

Long Bridge, 42, 88

Long, General A. L., 371, 460, 463, 465

Longstreet, General J., 3-10, 12, 15-
19,31,33,47-48,51,56, 63, 66-71,
76-77, 86-90, 105-06, 119, 123,
125-27, 132, 134, 135, 140, 151-53,
155-56, 158, 163-66, 169, 170, 176,
180, 191, 196, 211, 236-37, 253,
263, 272-73, 275, 281, 283, 285,
302-03, 342, 343, 353, 360, 362,
363

Lost River, 334, 339

Loudoun County, 3, 5, 45, 134, 284,
371, 383, 394, 396

Loudoun Heights, 135-136, 137
Loudoun & Hampshire R. R., 134
Louisa Court-House, 353, 355, 371, 465
Louisiana Troops, 3, 5-8, 15, 16, 78,
79, 96, 103, 107, 116-18, 124-25,
130, 139, 142, 188, 193, 203, 207,
210, 307, 313, 351, 385, 409
Lowe, Major, 152
Lowe, Professor, 49, 89, 202
Lupton's, 244, 245
Luray Valley, 75, 284, 367, 369, 407,

429, 433, 436, 450, 457
Lynchburg, 1-3, 54, 73, 75, 104, 328-
329, 369, 371, 372, 375-76, 378-82,
393, 400, 455-56, 460-61, 464,
465-66, 475

Madison County, 93

Madison Court-House, 92, 94, 165,
284-85, 303, 343

Magruder, General, 5, 7, 58-9, 61, 63,
65-66, 76-77, 79, 81, 86, 87, 133

Mahone, General Wm., 83, 352-58

Main Valley, 367

Malvern Hill, 77-79, 81, 83, 85

Manassas, 2-5, 15, 20, 22, 29, 30-32,
35, 45, 47, 56, 75, 90, 114-19,
122-23, 132-34, 154, 163, 190,
293, 300, 304, 306, 308, 403

Manassas Gap, 284, 285, 286

Manassas Gap R. R., 10, 20, 31, 36,
54, 165, 368, 453, 454

Manassas Junction, 368

Mansfield, General (U. S. A.), 44, 145,
148, 151, 158, 404

Marion, 466

Marshall, 454, 473

Martinsburg,135-36, 153, 162-63, 240,
250-51, 283-84, 326, 332, 338,
368-69, 382-84, 391,397, 400-03,
408-10, 412-14, 419, 420, 423-25

Marye's Heights, 169, 197, 199, 204,
205, 207, 208, 209, 217, 219, 220,
222-23-24, 231, 234

Marye's House, 204

Maryland, 45-46, 51, 54, 78, 98, 132,
134, 157, 159, 160, 161, 164, 185-
186, 241, 243-44, 367, 369, 371,
380-81,384,402-03,409, 414,416,
455, ,461

490

INDEX

Maryland Heights, 135-36-37-38, 154,
164, 176, 254, 284, 333, 365, 368,
385-86-87, 389, 391, 394, 400,
403, 408, 414

Mason's Hill, 48, 49, 50

Massanutten Mountain, 165, 366-67,
407, 431, 438, 457

Massaponix, 167-68-69, 171, 183,
188, 191, 194, 195, 197, 199

Massie, Captain, 433

Matadaquean, 363, 364

Matapony, 357

Matthews' House, 26, 27, 334, 339

Mayo, Colonel, 356

McCausland, General, 374-75-76,
378, 381, 383, 385-86-87, 389,
391, 396, 401-02, 404, 407, 409-
10, 416, 423, 434, 453, 454, 456, 466

McClanahan's Battery, 333-34-35

McClellan, General (U. S. A.), 44, 48,
50, 51, 54, 58, 64, 66, 72, 74, 75,
85, 87-92, 104, 105, 114, 131-32-
33, 140, 148, 150, 154-159, 161,
163-64-65, 361, 404

McDonald, Lieutenant (A. A.G.), 24,
25

McDowell, 326

McDowell, General (U. S. A.), 2, 10,
13, 28, 31, 33, 36, 38-42, 44, 46,
48, 74, 75, 92, 103, 119, 122

McGowan's Brigade, 355

McGuire, Surgeon H., 215, 217, 464,
473, 476

McLaws, General, 60, 76, 132-33, 135-
36-37, 147, 149, 152, 154-55,
158,' 163, 194-95, 197, 211-12,
216, 218, 220, 225-26-27, 230-31,
233, 236, 342

McLean's Farm, 6, 12, 16

McLean's Ford, 5, 15, 17, 18, 20, 31,
52, 53

McLean's House, 6, 7, 10, 16

McNeil, Captain, 333-34-35, 337-38,
460

McNeil, Lieutenant Jesse, 461

McRae, General, 47, 60, 62, 70-71-72

Meade, General (U. S. A.), 267, 271,
275-76-77, 282, 284, 285, 297,
302-03-04-05, 307, 317, 318,324-
325, 341, 343, 478

Mechanicsville, 76, 361, 362

Meem's Bottom, 454

Merritt's Division (U. S. A.), 457

Merry Oaks, 361

Middle Department, 418, 419

Middle Military Division, 344, 417,

418

Middle Mountain, 331
Middle River, 366, 368
Middle Road, 369, 433, 436
Middletown, 75, 135, 264, 266, 368-69,

386, 397-98, 414, 444, 446, 447,

453

Miles' Division (U. S. A.), 31, 44, 137
Milford, 117, 433, 436, 450, 453
Military Institute, 374, 380
Millboro, 330, 461
Mills' Gap, 284
Millwood, 164, 240, 397, 406, 420,

423, 429
Milroy, General (U. S. A.), 40, 101,

240, 244-46, 250-51, 475
Mine Run, 317-19, 321-23, 325-26,

343, 345
Mississippi Troops, 3, 15, 19, 60-61,

63, 67, 69, 204, 208, 234, 236, 466
Missouri, 158, 460
Mitchell's Ford, 5, 7, 9, 15, 19, 20,

27-28, 31, 35, 60, 61
Monaghan, Colonel, 193, 207, 409
Monocacy, 135, 186, 387-88, 391-92-

93, 395, 417, 475
Monocacy Junction, 386, 402
Monterey Springs, 281
Montgomery County, 327, 479
Montreal, Canada, 473
Moore, Captain, 465
Moore, Lieutenant, 311
Moorefield, 334-339, 404, 416
Moorefield Valley, 334
Morrison, Lieutenant, 177, 216, 477
Morton's Ford, 302, 317, 320-21, 325
Mosby, Colonel Jno. S., 382-83, 391
Moss Neck, 192
Mott, Colonel, 60
Mount Crawford, 331, 368-69, 435,

462
Mount Jackson, 333-34, 339, 366,

368-69, 398, 404, 432-33, 450,

454, 461

Mount Meridian, 366, 434
Mount Sydney, 368, 435

INDEX

491

Mountain Run, 317, 318
Mulligan, Colonel (U. S. A.), 384, 400
Mummasburg, 256-57-58, 264, 266-67
Munford, General T. T., 454, 457-58
Munson's Hill, 48

Narrow Passage, 430

National Military Home, 479

Navy Yard, 1

Nelson's Battalion, 371, 388, 413,
421-22-23, 460, 462

New Chester, 258

New Creek, 75, 326, 333, 335, 405,
455, 456

New Hope, 434

New Jersey Regiment, 48, 49

New London, 374, 476

New Market, 165, 284, 331-32, 366-
367-68, 370, 383, 397, 415, 433,
436, 450, 454, 457, 459, 460, 466

New Market Gap, 433

New Orleans, 393

New River, 467

New York, 476

Newton's Division, 207

Newtown, 240^-41, 368, 382-83, 397-
98, 406, 414, 426, 453

Nichols, General, 328, 329

Ninevah, 241

North Anna, 359, 361, 465

North Branch, 368

North Carolina Regiments, 15, 32, 38,
47-48, 60, 62, 69, 70-71, 104, 132,
158, 185-86, 188, 193, 230, 236,
242, 244, 247, 249, 253, 274, 282,
302, 312, 341, 345, 467-68

North Fork, 335-36, 366-67-68-69,
407, 431-32, 439

North Mountain, 136, 163, 368, 383-
384, 414

North River, 331, 366, 368, 435, 462

Northern Central R. R., 255, 258

Northwestern Virginia, 191, 368

Ny River, 354, 357-58

Occoquon River, 3, 4, 5, 10, 47

Ohio River, 368, 391, 479

Old Church, 361-62-63

Old Court-House, 353

Old Stone Pike. 344, 346

Old Wilderness Tavern, 344, 346

Opequon River, 136, 162, 367-68-69,

384, 406, 408, 410, 412-14, 419-

21, 423-24, 428
Orange County, 327, 343
Orange Court-House, 56, 59, 92-93,

106, 165, 168, 285, 318, 326, 340,

344, 351
Orange & Alexandria R. R., 106, 114,

368

Orkney Springs, 333, 334
Orleans, 114
Ox Hill, 129, 131-32-33

Page County, 366, 367

Page, Lieutenant, 444, 445

Pamunkey River, 357, 359, 361-62, 465

Parkersburg, 368

Parker's Ford, 396

Patterson, General (U. S. A.), 35

Patterson's Creek, 332-33-34, 337

Patterson's Mountain, 334

Patton, Colonel G. W., 427

Patton's Brigade, 424, 425

Paxton, General, 175, 179

Payne, General Wm. H., 416, 425,

433-34, 440-41, 446, 453-54, 457,

473

Peaks of Otter, 375, 376, 377
Pegram, General, 306, 311, 314-15,

345-46-47, 349, 350, 359, 362,

429, 430, 434, 438-39, 440-47,

449, 452

Pelham, Major, 176
Pender, General, 217, 236, 270, 274
Pendleton, Captain, 94
Pendleton, Colonel A. S., 217, 431
Pendleton County, 457, 459
Pendleton, General, 153, 162, 196,

198-204, 207, 209-10
Peninsular, 54, 57-58-59, 65
Penn, Colonel, 307, 309, 310
Penn, Major, 16, 203, 204
Pennsylvania, 46, 131, 159, 164, 236,

257, 259, 263, 264, 285-86-87,

306, 367, 401-02, 409, 414, 455
Perrin, General, 355
Perrin's Brigade, 355
Peters, Professor Wm. E., 473, 474
Petersburg, Pa., 264
Petersburg, Va., 341, 359, 465-66,

474, 476

492

INDEX

Petersburg, Western Virginia, 332-33,

335-338

Philadelphia, 255, 262, 386, 394
Pickett, General, 163, 236, 275, 342,

360
Piedmont, 165, 370, 374-75-76, 382,

434

Piedmont Station, 11
Pisgah Church, 105, 285
Pittsylvania House, 26
Fitter, Major A. L., 107, 187, 211,

220, 226-27, 377
Plank Road, 167, 169, 182, 203-212,

214, 216, 218, 220, 222-23, 225-

233, 317-18, 320, 322, 324, 344,

351-52

Pleasant Valley, 154
Plymouth, 340
Po River, 353-54-55, 357
Point Lookout, 385-86, 390
Pole Green Church, 361, 362
Poolsville, 394
Pope, General (U. S. A.), 40, 92, 102-

106, 110, 112, 114-15, 117, 119,

122, 131-32-33, 139
Port Con way, 185
Port Republic, 75, 139, 366, 369-70,

432-33-34, 475
Port Royal, 166, 168, 179, 184-85, 189,

477

Port Tobacco, 184
Porter, General (U. S. A.), 131,

152

Posey, General C., 231, 233
Potomac District, 51
Potomac River, 4, 33, 40-41-42-43,

45-46-47-48, 51, 91, 134-141,

146, 152, 154-55, 157, 160, 237,

253-55, 277, 281-82, 284, 297,

326, 332, 366-69, 371, 380, 382-

384, 386, 391-94, 398, 400-404,

409, 415, 475
Potts' Mountain, 331
Pound Gap, 462
Powell, Captain, 444
Powell Fort Valley, 367
Powell's Division (U. S. A.), 454
Pratt, 184, 193, 196, 200, 201
Preston, Colonel R. T., 2
Preston, General J. S., 21
Prince, General (U. S. A.), 103

Pritchard's Hill, 241, 242
Pughtown, 240, 244, 246

Quaker Church, 140, 374, 476
Quincy, 254

Raccoon Ford, 106, 302

Radford, Colonel R. C. W., 24

Radford, Lieutenant Colonel, 454

Raines, General, 61, 62, 64

Ramseur, General, 345-46, 361, 372,
374, 376, 383-389 392, 396-97,
399, 402, 406, 408, 413, 420-430,
434, 440, 444-452, 456

Randolph, Captain, W. F.f 188, 322

Randolph, Secretary General, 77

Ransom, General, 82, 149, 152, 156.
375-77, 380, 384, 386, 399, 400

Rapidan River, 56, 92-93, 102, 105-
106, 113, 196, 237, 285-86, 302,
303, 343-45, 351, 364

Rapidan Station, 303, 306, 317, 326

Rappahannock, 56. 63, 92, 102, 104,
106, 131, 133, 154, 165, 166-67,
196, 215, 217, 236, 285-86, 303,
307, 343

Rappahannock Academy, 184

Red Bud Run, 420, 423, 425

Redoubts, 59-64, 66, 68

Reno, General (U. S. A.), 106, 112, 131

Reynolds, General (U. S. A.), 132,
201, 266

Richardson, Capt. H., 187

Richardson, General (U. S. A.), 149,
151

Richardson, Lieutenant, 7

Richmond, Va., 1, 3, 10, 44, 46, 51, 56,
57, 73-77, 85, 88-92, 103-04-05,
132-33, 154, 160, 164, 168, 190,
235, 237, 251, 286, 327, 340-41,
344, 358-59, 361, 369, 371, 375,
380, 382, 429, 435, 456, 458-59,
465-66, 476

R., Fred. & Po. R. R., 166, 168, 359,
361, 465

Rich Patch Mountain, 331

Ricketts Division (U. S. A.), 388, 391

Ridge Road, 65

Ridgeville, 254

Ringgold, 254

Ripley, General, 158

INDEX

493

Rivanna River, 464

River Road, 168, 180, 194, 202-03-
204-05

Robertson, General B. H., 93, 94, 103,
110

Robertson's Tavern, 318, 319

Robinson's River, 93, 295, 303, 343

Rockbridge County, 328, 340, 366,
369, 381, 462

Rock Creek, 267, 268, 270, 271, 380

Rock-fish Gap, 369, 371-72, 382,
434-35, 462-63

Rockingham County, 366

Rockville, 389, 394, 417

Rodes, General R. E., 51, 52, 54, 57,
60-65, 192-195, 212-217, 236-
240, 251, 254-55, 263-64, 266-
276, 281, 284, 302-307, 316-322,
344-48, 351, 360-63, 372, 377,
383-87, 390, 392, 394, 396, 398-
399, 402, 408, 410-13, 419-23,
427, 429

Rogers, Captain J. G., 81

Rohrersville, 385

Romney, 240, 244, 247, 249

Rosecrans, General (U.S.A.), 303,476

Ross Pole, 477

Rosser, General T. L., 334-339, 435-
436, 438, 441, 443, 446, 447, 450-
462, 466

Round Hill, 440

Round Top Mountain, 272

Rude's Hill, 432, 454

Salem, 114, 327-29, 331, 377, 379, 382,

393

Salem Church, 218, 233
Santa Anna, 471
Savage Station, 77, 87
Savannah, 190
Scales, General, 355
School House Hill, 136, 137
Scott, Captain John, 4, 6
Scott, Colonel, 93, 180
Scott, General, 1, 38, 39, 42
Secret Service Corps, 88, 89
Sedgwick, General (U. S. A.), 148,

151, 197, 201, 203-04, 207, 214,

217-220, 228, 231, 233-34, 281,

309, 321, 360
Seminary Hill, 270, 276

Semmes, General, 147
Seven Pines, 74
Seventh Street Pike, 389
Seymour, General (U. S. A.), 350
Shady Grove, 351-355
Shaler, General (U. S. A.), 350
Sharpsburg, 139, 140, 153, 157, 162,

186, 190, 192, 254, 391, 403
Shenandoah, 10, 74, 136-37, 160, 164-

165, 237, 239, 240, 284, 295, 332,

343, 366-369, 371, 396, 407, 414,

439, 455, 476
Shepherdstown, 139, 162, 253-54,

284, 408-09-10
Sheridan, General (U. S. A.), 40, 371,

379, 406-411, 414, 419, 427, 430,

433, 437, 441, 452-53, 456, 459,

461, 465-66, 475

Sherman, General (U. S. A.), 40, 393
Shields, General (U. S. A.), 241, 399,

475

Shippensburg, 263, 270
Sigel, General (U. S. A.), 102-03, 112,

158, 369, 370, 383-84, 393-94,

396, 399

Silver Spring, 389, 395
Skinner, Lieutenant Colonel, 80
Slaughter's Mountain, 93, 94, 96, 97,

101

Sloan's Regiment, 31
Smith, Captain, 20
Smith, Colonel Geo. H., 49, 386, 389
Smith, Colonel W. D., 50, 193, 333, 423
Smith, Colonel Wm., 32, 106, 120,

125-26-27, 142, 147, 153
Smith, General E. K., 33, 36, 38, 51,

52, 157, 468

Smith, General G. W., 51, 56, 58, 63
Smith, General Wm., 186, 188, 191,

206, 221-22, 224-228, 230, 232-

234, 239, 242-43, 247-48-49, 253,

259, 267-272, 273, 275
Smith, Governor of Virginia, 306
Smithfield, 383, 408, 410, 414
Smithtown, 254
Smythe County, 466
Snicker's Ferry, 396
Snicker's Gap, 164, 396
Snodgrass, Major C. E., 187
Soldiers' Home, 391
Somerville Ford, 106, 237, 302

494

INDEX

South Anna, 351, 361, 465

South Branch, 239, 327, 322-24, 337,

368, 386, 398, 404

South Carolina, 3, 5, 15, 28, 132, 468
South Fork, 334, 338, 366-67, 433
South Mountain, 135, 139, 152, 161,

254-55-56, 263, 280-81, 367, 385,

392-93-94

South River, 366, 433, 434
Southside R. R., 465
Southwestern Virginia, 331, 378, 381,

397, 416, 429, 453, 466, 469
Sperryville, 238, 285
Spottsylvania, 200, 237, 344, 351-354,

358-360, 374
Springfield, 50
Squires, Lieutenant, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 204,

208
Stafford, Colonel, 142-43, 146-47,

149, 403-04
Stafford Heights, 167, 169, 178, 181,

191, 198, 200, 224
Stansbury Hill, 169, 222-23
Stanton, Secretary of War, 74, 75,

343-44, 392-93, 417
Starke, General, 103, 120-21, 129-

131, 140-42-43
Staunton, 251, 253, 285, 326, 328-29,

331, 340, 359, 368, 369-372, 375,

379, 381-82, 434-35, 457-58,

461, 462-63
St. James Church, 106
St. James College, 402
Stephenson's Depot, 250-51, 397,

399, 410-414, 419, 420-21, 424
Stevens, General (U. S. A.), 131
Stevens, Thaddeus, 255, 256
Stevensburg, 106
Stewart, General G. H., 372
Stone Bridge, 5, 16, 26-28, 31-32, 35,

50, 119, 164, 165
Stone Tavern, 26, 29
Stonewall Brigade, 163, 237, 322
Stony Creek, 450
Stop-Cock, 184
Strasburg, 165, 326, 331, 333, 366,

368-69, 397-98-99, 406-07, 437^

440-41-42, 449
Strong, Colonel, 126, 130
Stuart, General J. E. B., 13, 22-23,

25-26, 33, 36, 38, 52, 66 68, 76,

101, 105-06, 110, 114-15, 118,
132, 141, 144 148, 156, 164, 171,
176, 180, 192, 196, 213-16, 273,
285, 302-03-04

Sturgis, General (U. S. A.), 131

Sudley, 22, 29, 32, 119, 129

Summit Point, 408-09-10, 412-414

Sumner, General (U. S. A.), 132, 148-
149, 151, 158-59, 180, 182, 403

Sumter, Fort, 1

Susquehanna, 255, 259, 261, 264

Sweet Springs, 327, 331

Swift Run Gap, 328, 367, 371, 434

Tabernacle Church, 211

Taliaferro, General, 106, 119, 120,

171, 175, 179
Tanner, 186, 258
Taverner, Colonel, 388
Taylor, Colonel, 60
Taylor, General, 78, 107
Taylor, John, 184
Taylor's Hill, 169, 222-23, 225, 228
Taylor's House, 208, 226, 228-230,

232
Telegraph Road, 167-68-69, 182, 202-

203, 208, 210, 221, 223, 229, 230,

233

Tennessee, 52, 342, 466
Tenth Legion, 433
Terrill, Colonel, 349, 362
Ten-ill, Lieutenant Colonel, 194, 250
Terry, Colonel, 62, 72
Terry, Lieutenant, 94
Texas, 468
The Fort, 367

Thoburn, Colonel (U. S. A.), 327
Thomas, Colonel, 99, 124
Thomas, General (U. S. A.), 98, 100,

155, 174, 326, 329-334, 336,

337-38-39, 355-56-57-58, 466,

467

Thornton, Captain Wm., 187
Thornton, W. W., 4, 47, 50
Thornton's Gap, 284, 285
Thoroughfare Gap, 114, 125
Three Springs, 134
Three Top Mountain, 407
Todd's Tavern, 352
Tom's Brook, 436
Toombs, General, 81

INDEX

495

Torbert, General (U. S. A.), 408, 417,
433, 434

Tottopotomoy, 362

Trans-Mississippi Department, 52, 468

Treasury Department, 476

Trimble, General, 78, 79, 82, 106, 115,
119, 120-21, 123, 125, 129, 131,
136, 139, 141, 143, 152, 158, 162,
171, 176, 185, 188, 191, 212, 236

Tunis, Lieutenant, 197, 198

Tunker Church, 403

Trevillian's, 379

Tyler, Colonel, 49

Tyler's Division (U. S. A.), 10, 31, 32,
35, 39, 49

Union Mills, 5, 6, 12, 13, 15, 31, 50
University of Virginia, 474
Upper Valley, 369

Valley District, 51

Valley of Virginia, 285, 326-27, 333,
366, 370-71, 380-83, 391, 393-94,

396, 398, 401, 413-17, 424, 429,
435-37, 452-53, 456-58-59-60-
461, 466, 468

Valley Pike, 240-243, 284-85, 334,
367-68-69, 390, 397, 406, 414,
420, 430-433, 435, 436, 439, 441-
446, 453

Van Dorn, General, 50, 51, 52

Vaughan, General, 370, 381, 396-97,
402, 406, 410, 416

Verdierville, 237, 317-319, 320, 322

Veteran Reserves, 393

Vicksburg, 287

Vienna, 134

Virginia Troops, 1-9, 12, 15, 16, 24,
26, 28,32, 38, 41, 47,48,62-63,67,
69, 70-72, 78, 80, 81, 93, 95, 99,
100, 106, 109, 116, 117, 118, 120,
122, 125-26-27, 130-31, 142, 147-
148, 153, 174, 186, 194, 195, 226,
236-37, 240, 250, 253-54, 282,
284, 311, 346-47, 349, 362, 388,

397, 459, 465

Virginia & Tennessee R. R., 327, 369,
467

Wade, M. C., U. S., 30
Waite's Shop, 353

.Walker, Colonel J. A., 78, 84, 95, 99,
100, 109, 111, 122 123, 131,
133

Walker, General H. H., 326, 354

Walker, General J. A., 135, 136, 143,
149, 155, 158-59, 170-177, 179,
236, 240, 331-334, 352-53

Walker's Brigade, 356, 363

Walker's Division, 152

Wallace, General Lew (U. S. A.),
387-88, 392-93

Ward, Colonel, 60, 61, 62, 69, 73

Warren County, 366-367

Warren, General (U. S. A.), 304, 305,
347

Warrenton, 31, 109-10, 165, 285, 304,
307, 479

Warrenton Junction, 114, 115, 116,
307

Warrenton Pike, 5, 25, 26, 31-32-33,
37, 114-15, 119, 120-22-23

Warrenton Springs, 106-110

Warwick Court-House, 61

Warwick River, 58, 59, 60, 61, 65

Washington Artillery, 5, 6, 7. 8, 204

Washington College, 380

Washington, D. C., 2, 34, 40-46, 48,
51, 54, 75, 89, 104, 105, 131, 135,
157, 160-61, 253, 263, 344, 358,
360, 371, 383, 385, 386, 389, 390-
394, 398, 401, 416-17, 455, 475

Waterloo Bridge, 108, 109, 110, 114

Watkins, Colonel, 114

Watson, 198

Waynesboro, Pa., 254, 281, 370-71-
372, 381, 434-35, 460, 468

Waynesboro, Va., 366, 369, 464-66,
474

Weiglestown, 259, 263

Weisiger, General D. A., 356

Welbourn, Captain, 212, 460

Wellford's Mill, 106

Wells, Colonel (U. S. A.), 326, 437

Westover, 88

Western Virginia, 75

Wharton, General G. C., 188, 253,
375, 399, 414-15, 423-27, 429-30,
434, 441-443, 445-47, 449, 452,
457-58, 460, 462-64

Wheat's Battalion, 3, 31

Wheeling, 368

496

INDEX

White, Captain Elijah, 134, 255-58,

261, 263-64, 280

White, General (U. S. A.), 136, 137
White House, 361, 465
White Oak Swamp, 77
White Plains, 54, 114
White Post, 167, 397, 406, 411, 414
White's Ford, 43, 134, 137
Whiting, General W. H., 74-76, 78-79,

86, 88, 105

Whittle, Colonel, 67, 72
Whitworth, 198
Wickham, General W. C., 416, 424-

425-26, 429, 433-34-35, 441, 454,

457
Wilcox, General, 58, 60-61, 208-09,

212, 218, 352, 354, 355, 358
Wilderness, 346, 350-51, 359, 363
Wilderness Tavern, 318
Wrilliams, Colonel, 5, 8
Williams, General (U. S. A.), 148
Williamsburg, 65-68, 70, 71, 73
Williamsport, 135, 162, 281-83, 369,

383, 400, 402-03, 409
Willis' Church, 79
Willis, Colonel Ed., 362
Willis, Lieutenant Murat, 28
Wilson's Division (U. S. A.), 408-09,

417

Wilson, Major J. P., 144, 150, 187
Winchester, 163, 240-41, 243-44, 249-

253, 284,333-34,367-70,382, 385,

391, 397-400, 406, 408, 410, 412-
414, 417, 419-20, 425-26, 435,
439, 450-453, 455, 457, 475

Winchester & Potomac R. R., 163,
368, 414

Winder, General, 94, 95, 96, 97

Winston, Captain, 148

Winston, Colonel, 60

Wirz, Captain, 296, 297, 298

Wise, General, 76, 132

Woffard's Brigade, 444, 446, 449

Wolf Run Shoals, 10, 47, 48, 50

Woodson's Company 460, 461

Woodstock, 368, 430, 454

Wounding of Jackson, 212

Wright, General, 83, 231, 233, 255,257

Wright, General (U. S. A.), 392, 393

Wrightsville 235, 255, 259, 260-61-
262-63-64

Wynn, Captain, 215

Wynn's Mill, 60, 61, 62, 63

Wytheville, 466, 467

Yates' Ford, 12, 13

York, 253, 255, 258-64, 267

York, General, 423

York River, 57-58-59, 65

York River R. R., 77

York Road, 269-71, 273, 357

Young's Branch, 26

Zoar Church, 318-20, 322-23-24

HOME USE

CIRCULATION DEPARTMENT
MAIN LIBRARY

This book is due on the last date stamped below.
1 -month loans may be renewed by calling 642-3405.
6-month loans may be recharged by bringing books

to Circulation Desk.
Renewals and recharges may be made 4 days prior

to due date.

ALL BOOKS ARE SUBJECT TO RECALL 7 DAYS
AFTER DATE CHECKED OUT.

n/^f

•I —

'AUTO DISC OCT 07 '91

7ED

or

SB

JD —

361 H

^££-3-3-

1373

Q*CtM<10N D£Pr.

Den ft 197Q

JEC^CIR. JAN

W7Q

^W' *^

5

LD21— A-407H-5,'74 Ar^ General Library
(R8191L) University of California
Berkeley

!?_

/

LD 21A-60m-7,'66

((i 1 l'J7slOM7«B

General Library

University of California

Berkeley

YC 5IC26