GENERAL TAYLOR'S LETTERS.
LETTER OF GEN. TAYLOR TO GEN. GAINES SECRETARY MAR-
CY'S REPRIMAND OF GEN. TAYLOR AND GEN. TAYLOR'S
REPLY ; WITH THE FABLE ALLUDED TO ANNEXED.
LETTER FROM GENERAL TAYLOR TO GENERAL GAItfES.
B'^J) HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OCCUPATION OR INVASION,
I 8* '*" Monterey, Mexico, November 9, 1846.
MY DEAR ******* : Your very kind and acceptable letter of the 31st August,
******** reached m6 only a short time since, for which I beg leave to tender you
my sincere thanks. [A few confidential remarks on certain public transactions are
here omitted.]
After considerable apparent delay on the part of the Quartermasters Department, in
getting steamboats into the Rio Grande adapted to its navigation, I succeeded, towards
the latter part of August, in throwing forward to Camargo (a town situated on the San
Juan river, three miles from its junction with the Rio Grande, on the west side, nearly
500 miles from Brasos Island by water, and 200 by land, and 140 from this place) a con
siderable depot of provisions, ordnance, ammunition, and forage, and then, having brought
! o together an important portion of my command, I determined on moving on this place.
Accordingly, after collecting 1,700 pack mules, with their attendants and conductors, in.
the enemy's country, (the principal means of transportation for our provisions, baggage,
&c.,) I left, on the 5th of September, to join my advnnce, which had preceded me a few
' days to Seralvo, a small village 75 miles on the route, which I did on the 9th, and, after
waiting there a few days for some of the corps to get up, moved on and reached here on
the 19th, wiih 6,250 men 2,700 regulars, the balance volunteers. For what took place
afterwards, 1 must refer you to my several reports particularly to my detailed one of the
9th ultimo.
^ I do not believe the authorities at Washington are at all satisfied with my conduct in
regard to the terms of the capitulation entered into with the Mexican commander, which
you no doubt have seen, as they have been made public through the official organ, and
copied into various other newspapers. I have this moment recieved an answer (to my despatch an
nouncing the surrender of Monterey, and the circumstances attending the same) from the Secretary
of War, stating that " it was regretted by the President that it was not deemed advisable to insist
on the terms I had proposed in my first communication to the Mexican commander in regard to giving
up the city," adding that " the circumstances which dictated, no doubt justified the change." AL-
". though the terms of capitulation may be considered too liberal on our part by the President and his
v advisers, as well as by many others at a distance, particularly by those who do not understand the
""^...position which we occupied, (otherwise they might come to a different conclusion in regard to the
matter,) yet, on due reflection, I see nothing to induce me to regret the course I pursued. The pro
position on the part of General Ampudia, which had much to do in determining my course in the
matter, was based on the ground that our Government had proposed to his to settle the existing dif
ficulties by negotiation, (which I knew was the case without knowing the result,) which was then
under consideration by the proper authorities, and which he (General Ampudia) had no doubt would
result favorably, as the whole of his people were in favor of peace. If so, I considered the further
effusion of blood not only unnecessary but improper. Their force was also considerably larger than,
ours, and, from the size and position of the place, we could not completely invest it ; so that the
greater portion of their troops, if not the whole, had they been disposed to do so, could any night have
abandoned the city, at once entered the mountain passes, and effected their retreat, do what we
~could. Had we been put to the alternative of taking the place by storm, (which there is no doubt we
should have succeeded in doing,) we should in all probability have lost fifty or a hundred men in killed,
besides the wounded, which I wished to avoid, as there appeared to be a prospect of peace, even if a
distant one. I also wished to avoid the destruction of women and children, which must have been
very great had the storming process been resorted to. Besides, they had a very large and strong for
tification a short distance from the city, which, if carried with the bayonet, must have been taken at
great sacrifice of life, and, with our limited train of heavy or battering artillery, it would have re
quired twenty or twenty-five days to take it by regular approaches.
That they should have surrendered a place nearly as strong as Quebec, well fortified under the di
rection of skilful engineers their works garnished with forty-two pieces of artillery, abundantly
supplied with ammunition, garrisoned with 7,000 regular and 2,000 irregular troops, in addition to
some thousand citizens capable of (and no doubt actually) bearing arms, and aiding in its defence
to an opposing force of half their number, scantily supplied with provisions, and with a light train of
artillery, is among the unaccountable occurrences of the times.
I am decidedly opposed to carrying the war beyond Saltillo in this direction, which place has been
entirely abandoned by the Mexican forces, all of whom have been concentrated at San Luis Potogi j
F^Oi"
1 1
and I shall lose no time in taking possession of the former as soon as the cessation of hostilities re
ferred to expires which I have notified the Mexican authorities will be the case on the 13th instant,
by direction of the President of the United States.
fc If we are (in the language of Mr. Polk and General Scott) under the necessity of " conquering
a peace," and that by taking the capital of the country, we must go to Vera Cruz, take that place,
and then march on to the city of Mexico. To do so in any other direction I consider out of the
question. But, admitting that we conquer a peace by doing so say at the end of the next twelve
months will the amount of blood and treasure that must be expended in doing so be compensated
by the same ? I think not especially if the country we subdue is to be given up ; and I ima
gine there are but few individuals in our country who think of annexing Mexico to the United States.
I do not intend to carry on my operations (as previously stated) beyond Saltillo, deeming it next
to impracticable to do so. It then becomes a question as to what is best to be done. It seems to
me that the' most judicious course to be pursued on our part would be to take possession at once of
the line we would accept by negotiation, extending from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific, and oc
cupy the same, or keep what we already have possession of; and that, with Tampeco, (which I hope
to take in the course of the next month, or as soon as I can get the means of transportotion,) will
give us all on this side of the Sierra Madre, and, as soon as I occupy Saltillo, will include six or
seven States as Provinces, thus holding Tampico, Victoria, Monterey, Saltillo, Monclova, Chihuahua,
(frhich I presume General Wool has possession of by this time,) Santa Fe, and the Californias, and
say to Mexico," Drive us from the country" throwing on her the responsibility and expense of
carrying on offensive war ; at the same time closely blockading all her ports on the Pacific and the
Gulf. A course of this kind, if persevered in for a short time, would soon bring her to her proper
senses, and compel her to sue for peace, provided there is a Government in the country sufficiently
stable for us to treat with, which I fear will hardly be the case for many years to come. Without
large reinforcements cf volunteers from the United States say ten or fifteen thousand, (those previ
ously sent out having already been greatly reduced by sickness and other casualties,) I do not believe it
would be advisable to march beyond Saltillo, which is more than two hundred miles beyond our de
pots on the Rio Grande a very long line on which to keep up supplies, (over a land route in a coun
try like this,) for a large force, and certain to be attended with an expense which will be frightful to
Contemplate when closely looked into.
From Saltillo to San Louis Potosi, the next place of importance on the road to the city of Mexico,
is three hundred miles ; one hundred and forty badly watered, where no supplies of any kind could
be procured for men or horses. I hare informed the War Department that 20,000 efficient men
would be neeessary to ensure success if we move on that place, (a city containing a population of
60,000. where the enemy could bring together and sustain, besides the citizens, an army of 50,000,)
a force which. I apprehend, will hardly be collected by us, with the train necessary to feed it, as well
as to transport various other supplies, particularly ordnance and munitions of war.
In regard to th? armistice, which would have expired by limitation in a few days, we lost nothing
by it, as we could not move even now, had the enemy continued to occupy Saltillo ; for, strange to
say, the first wagon which has reached me since the declaration of war was on the 2d instant, the
same day on which I received from Washington an ackdowledgment of my despatch announcing
the taking of Monterey ; and then I received only one hundred and thirty-five; so that I have been,
since May last, completely crippled, and am still so, for want of transportation. After raking and
scraping the country for miles around Camargo, collecting every pack-mule and other means of
transportation, I could bring here only 80,000 rations, (fifteen day's supply,) with a moderate supply
of ordnance, ammunition, &.C., to do which all the corps had to leave behind a portion of their camp
equipage necessary for their comfort; and, in some instances among the volunteers, their personal
baggage. I moved in such a way, and with such limited means that, had I not succeeded, I
should no doubt have been severely reprimanded, if nothing worse. I did so to sustain the Admin
istration. * * * *
Of the two regiments of mounted men from Tennessee and Kentucky, who left their respective
States to join me in June, the latter has just reached Camargo ; the former had not got to Matamo-
raa at the latest dates from there. Admitting that they will be as long in returning as in getting
ijjere, (to say nothing of the time necessary to recruit their horses,) and were to be discharged in
time to reach their homes, they could serve in Mexico but a very short time.
The foregoing remarks are not made with the view of finding fault with any one, but to point out
the difficulties with which I have had to contend.
Monterey, the capital of New Leon, is situated on the San Juan river, where it comes out of the
mountains the city (which contains a population of about twelve thousand) being in part surround
ed by them at the head of a large and beautiful valley. The houses are of stone, in the Moorish
style, with flat roofs, which, with their strongly enclosed yards and gardens in high stone walls, all
looped for musketry, make them each a fortress within itself. It is the most important place in
Northern Mexico, (or on the east side of Sierra Madre,) csmmanding the only pass or road for car
riages from this side, between it and the Gulf of Mexico, to the table-lands of the Sierra, by or
through which the city of Mexico can be reached.
I much fear I shall have exhausted your patience before you get half through this longand unin
teresting letter. If so, you can only commit it to the flames, and think no more about it, as I write
in great haste, besides being interrupted every five minutes ; so that you must make great allow-
ances for blots, interliniations, and blunders, as well as want of connexion in many parts of the same.
Be so good as to present me most kindly to your excellent lady, and accept my sincere wishes for
your good health, prosperity, and fame.
I remain, truly and sincerely, your friend, Z. TAYLOR.
MR. MARCY'S REPRIMAND.
WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, January 27, 1847.
SIR: I deem it proper to send to you a letter (taken from a newspaper) which first
appeared in the "New York Morning Express," and has since, as a matter of course,
been transferred to many other journals. I learn from General Gaines that the letter is
genuine. This information, I am assured, he had previously given to others. As the
letter was not marked " confidential," he adjudged that circumstances existed which
justified the publication of some part of it, though he expresses an opinion that it was
not written with such a view.
It will, in a short time, be in possession of our enemy ; and coming, as it does, from
the General to whom the conduct of the war, on our part, was confided, it will convey
most valuable information to the Mexican Commander, not only in relation to our present
line of operations, but as to the new one, which alone, in your opinion, can be taken with
a prospect of success, if an attempt is to be made on the city of Mexico.
The disclosure of your views, as to the future operations of our forces, accompanied,
as it is, with your opinion, that the fruits of the war, if completely successful, will be
of little worth to u*, will, it is greatly to be feared, not only embarrass our subsequent
movements, but disincline the enemy to enter into negotiations for peace. With particu
lar reference to these effects, the publication is most deeply to be regretted.
The 650th paragraph of the General Regulations of the Army, published March 1,
1825, declares that " Private letters or reports, relative to military marches and opera
tions are frequently mischievous in design, and always disgraceful to the army. They
are therefore strictly forbidden, and any officer found guilty of making such report for publi
cation, without special permission, or of placing the writing beyond his control, so that it
finds its way to the press, within one month after the termination of the campaign to
which it relates, shall be dismissed from the service."
This paragraph was not included in the compilation of the General Regulations, pub
lished in 1841, but is deemed peculiarly applicable to a state of war, and the President has
directed it to be republished, and the observance of it strictly enjoined upon all fficers.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedieutservant, W. L. MARCY,
Major General Z. TAYLOR, U. S. Army, in Mexico. Secretary of War.
LETTER FROM GENERAL TAYLOR TO MR. MARCY.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OCCUPATION, Agua Nueia, March 3, 1847.
SIR : I have had the honor to receive your communication of January 27th, enclosing
a newspaper slip, and expressing the regret of the Department that the letter copied in,
that slip, and which was addressed by myself to Major General Gaines, should have
been published.
Although your letter does not convey the direct censure of the Department or of the
President, yet, when it is taken in connexion wiih the revival of a paragraph in the re
gulations of 1825, touching the publication of private letters concerning operations in the
field, I am not permitted to doubt that I have become the subject of Executive disap
probation. To any expression of it, coming with the authority of the President, I am
bound by my duty, and by my respect for his high office, patiently to submit; but, lest
my silence should be construed into a tacit admission of the grounds and conclusions set
forth in your communication, I deem it a duty which I owe to myself to submit a few
remarks in reply. I shall be pardoned for speaking plainly.
In the first place, the published letter bears upon its face the most conclusive evidence
that it was intended only for private perusal, and not at all for publication. It was pub
lished without my knowledge, and contrary to my wishes. Surely, 1 need not say that
I am not in the habit of writing for the newspapers. The letter was a familiar one,
written to an old military friend, with whom I have for many years interchanged opin
ions on professional subjects. That he should think proper, under any circumstances, to
publish it could not have been foreseen by me.
In the absence of proof that the publication was made with my authority or knowl
edge, I may be permitted to say that the quotation in your letter of the six hundred and
fiftieth paragraph of the superseded regulations of 1825, in which the terms " mischiev-
ous" and " disgraceful" are employed to characterize certain letters or reports, conveys,
though not openly, a measure of rebuke which, to say the least, is rather harsh, and
which many may think not warranted by the premises. Again: I have carefully ex
amined the letter in question, and I do not admit that it is. obnoxious to ihe objections
urged in your communication. I see nothing in it which, under the same circumstances,
I would not write again. To suppose that it will give the enemy valuable information,
touching our past or prospective line of operations, is lo know very little of the Mexican
sources of information, or of their extraordinary sagacity and facilities in keeping con
stantly apprized of our movements.
As to my particular views in regard to the general policy to be pursued towards Mexico,
I perceive by the public journals that they are shared by many distinguished statemen,
and also in part by a conspicuous officer of the navy, the publication of whose opinions
is not perhaps obstructed by any regulations of his Department. It is difficult, then, to
imagine that the diffusion of mine can render any peculiar aid to the enemy, or specially
disincline him " to enter into negotiations for peace."
In conclusion, I would say that it has given me great pain to be brought into the posi
tion in which I now find myself with regard to the Department of War and the Govern
ment. It has not been of my own seeking. To the extent of my ability, and the means
placed at my disposal, I have sought faithfully to serve the country by carrying out the
wishes and instructions of the Executive. But it cannot be concealed that since the capitu
lation of Monterey the confidence of the Department, and I too much fear of the Presi
dent, has been gradually withdrawn, and my consideration and usefulness correspond
ingly diminished. The apparent determination of the Department to place rne in an
attitude antagonistical to the Government has an apt illustration in the well-known fable
of Esop.* But I ask no favor, and I shrink from no responsibility. While entrusted
with the command in this quarter I shall continue to devote all my energies to the public
good, looking for my reward to the consciousness of pure motives and the final verdict of
impartial history.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Z. TAYLOR,
Maj. Gen. U. S. A., commanding.
Hon. W. L. MAKCY, Secretary of War, Washington.
* THE WOLF AND THE LAMB.
One hot, sultry day, a Wolf and a Lamb happened to come, just at the same time,
to quench their thirst in the stream of a clear, silver brook that ran tumbling down the
side of a rocky mountain. The Wolf stood upon the higher ground, and the Lamb at
some distane from him down the current. However, the Wolf, having a mind to pick
a quarrel with him, asked him, what he meant by disturbing the water, and making it
so muddy that he could not drink ? and, at the same time, demanded satisfaction. The
Lamb, frightened at this threatening charge, told him, in a tone as mild as possible, that,
with humble submission, he could not conceive how that could be; since the water
which he drank, ran down from the Wolf to him, and therefore it could not be disturbed
so far up the stream. "Be that as it will," replies the Wolf, "you are a rascal, and I
have been told that you treated me with ill language, behind my back, about half a year
ago," "Upon my word," says the Lamb, "the time you :^L ; ition was before I was
born." The Wolf, finding it to no purpose to argue any longer against truth, fell into a
great passion, snarling and foaming at the mouth, as it he had been mad ; and drawing
nearer to the Lamb, "Sirrah," says he, "if it was not you, it was your father, and that
is all one." So he seized the poor innocent helpless thing, tore it to pieces, and made a
meal of it.
APPLICATION.
The thing which is pointed at in this fable is so obvious, that it will be impertinent
to multiply words about it. When a cruel ill-natured man has a mind to abuse one in
ferior to himself, either in power or courage, though he has not given the least occasion;
for it, how does he resemble the Wolf! whose envious, rapacious temper could not bear
to see innocence live quietly in its neighborhood. In short, wherever ill people are in
power, innocence and integrity are sure to be persecuted ; the more vicious the commu
nity is, the belter countenance they have for their own villanous measures. To practice
Lonesty in bad times, is being liable to suspicion enough ; but if any one should dare to
prescribe it, it is ten to one but he would be impeached of high crimes and misdemean
ors ; for to stand up for justice in a degenerate and corrupt State, is tacitly to upbraid the
Government, and seldom fails of pulling down vengeance upon the head of him that
offers to stir in its defence. Where cruelty and malice are in combination with power,
nothing is so easy as for them to find a p^tence to tyrannize over innocence, and exer
cise alf manper of injustice.
