1
GENERAL WILLIAM GROENER
AND THE
IMPERIAL GERMAN ARMY
Helmut Haeussler
GENERAL WILLIAM GROENER
AND THE
IMPERIAL GERMAN ARMY
by
Helmut Haeussler
THE STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF WISCONSIN
for
THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN
Madison, 1962
Copyright 1962, by the
Department of History, University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin
All Rights Reserved
No portion of this book may be
reproduced in any form without
written permission from the publisher.
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY
BOOK CRAFTSMEN ASSOCIATES, INC., NEW YORK
CONTENTS
Chapter Page
Introduction vii
One. Formative Years 1
Two. In the General Staff 22
Three. The Naive Soldier 52
Four. The Political Soldier 81
Five. The Liquidation Responsibility 109
Notes to the Text 138
Bibliography 152
Index
KfiKSAS CtlY (MU.) PUBLIC LIBRARY
6800412
iii
DEDICATION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This book is dedicated to my father and mother, who .shared
in the life of the Second German Empire and reflected its virtues .
It is written as an outgrowth of a study begun under the careful
hand of Professor Chester V. Easum of the University of Wis-
consin. He first directed me into the Groener materials, and
he has been mentor and consultant in the progress of this work.
I wish also to express my appreciation to Professor Theo-
dore Hamerow and the publication committee of the Department
of History for providing this opportunity to present Groener 1 s
Empire career in book form. A special debt of gratitude is due
the editorial staff of the publisher for their resilient patience
with my manuscript problems.
Certain requirements of format have forced me to concen-
trate the Groener story and supply only representative notes.
Helmut Haeussler
California Lutheran College
October, 1961
INTRODUCTION
History knows William Groener mostly forthree signifi-
cant deeds. He directed the railroad mobilization in 1914
which launched the German strike into Belgium and northern
France. He managed the German army in its hour of defeat
and guided its difficult alignment with the Weimar republic.
Finally, he shared in the Bruening cabinet's losing effort to
sustain that state in its terminal agonies with economic de-
pression and political dissension. Groener 1 s generation in-
herited the as sumptions of a powerful Empire and was forced
to absorb the shock of military defeat and ideological change.
The dignity of earlier years gave way to the helplessness of
the Weimar experience and the disgrace of Nazi abandon.
Groener played a conspicuous role in the life of his
time and his nation's tragedy encompassed his own sense of
frustration and disillusionment. As a dedicated soldier and
disciple of Schlieff en, he was to be estranged from his Gen-
eral Staff colleagues because of his part in the Imperial col-
lapse and the republican experiment. He was the first to
tell Kaiser William II that the Hohenzollern command of the
army was finished and he espoused the Weimer republic as
the best emergency vehicle of continuing national interest.
As one who had himself dreamed of a century of German dom-
inance in Europe, he was to be scorned by later critics of
defeat as a soldier who had resisted the command of his su-
perior and pacted with a revolutionary republic. Himself a
monarchist, he was a greater nationalist and he chose to
salvage German unity in November, 1918, rather than invite
disintegrating civil war by continuing military support of
vii
Introduction
Kaiser William* s authority. He understood that an entire
people could not be asked to commit suicide for the sake of
a failing dynasty.
Groener ! s effort to help direct a reasonable German re-
action to the realities of defeat epitomized the psychic dilem-
ma of the Weimar state* Men who looked back on the Empire
as the finer world were confronted with new conditions of
national life. Groener and his friends regarded the new de-
mocracy as a destiny, not an ideal, but they stood up to the
disheartening turn of events and served the Weimar society
as best they could. Communist dangers were brought under
control and even the patriotic Social Democrats were gradually
brought into more conservative bourgeois harness. Such com-
promise republicanism was little appreciated by either the
left or right wings of German political feeling, and the Staats-
raeson of Groener and others could not muster consistent
public resonance* It was easier to condemn and promise more
decisively, and all too often those who lost the war pointed
accusing fingers at those who had as sumed the res ponsibilities
of defeat. Under the republic the chauvinist critics dominated
only the printed page, but they shared in the Nazi triumph and
thereafter enjoyed official sanction. Groener and his fellow
Weimar leaders were swept aside and he lived out his last
few years in the shadows of general disfavor.
Groener wrote his memoirs in the late nineteen thirties
but they were somewhat controversial for the day and publica-
tion was then postponed by the outbreak of World War II. His
papers were shipped into the quiet repose of the Heeresarchiv.
They were subsequently taken to America and finally returned
to Germany in 1955. In microfilm form, they consist of
twenty-seven rolls of book drafts, articles, memoranda, cor-
respondence, war journals, War Academy notes, day books,
army problems, speeches and news pa per clippings. Hillervon
Gaertring en's introduction to the Groener autobiography, pub-
lished in 1957, described some of the source material and
generally recognized its value and reliability. The alterations
which Groener effected in his various autobiographic drafts
and even in seme of his letters do not weaken the substantial
reliability of his material. The abundance of raw sources
makes critical view and evaluation readily possible.
Greener's material does much to mark the limitations
Introduction ix
of his biography by daughter Dorothea Groener-Geyer. Her
source foundation was rather narrow and the story was, under-
standably enough, in the nature of an apologia. She did align
much of the Weimar material and make it available to a broader
audience. But she tended to disregard the earlier militarism
of her father and stress only his more judicious Staatsraeson'
after 1917. The general's own autobiography then pointed
out his wartime transformation from militaristic naivete to
broader political circumspection giving real evolutionary depth
and development to his life. Now origins and change were
visible, rather than irere Weimar maturity.
Groener 1 s papers and person are thus in some distinct
outline, although continuing clarification and processing is
only in a beginning state* There is no full length, or critically
objective, biography. Much of his material still merits edit-
ing and publication. His view of state and army in the vari-
able Weimar re public has not really been worked out, and the
interesting themes of his military career have not been ade-
quately identified and delineated. His dramatic exchange
with dynastic interests at Spa on November 9 was only the
climatic moment of earlier breeding, experience, and delibera-
tion. Such an analysis of his imperial life and career, as it
leads up to November, 1918, is the subject of our study. Its
form and material cannot claim exhaustive or definitive pre-
sentation but improved knowledge and comprehension of
Groener ! s life should be made possible. And it may help to
focus this story if certain other aspects of his Empire role are
also given advance mention at this time.
Groener re presented the entry of the bourgeois technical
soldier onto the German war scene. He was one of the first
to understand the vital significance of machines and factories
in twentieth century war. His General Staff work plunged him
into railroad transportation detail usually shunned by the more
influential or fanciful. He became a key architect of the
we stern mobilization and he learned to master the function of
rail transportation in modern mass strategy. The Schlieffen
Plan relied on speed and Groener's mobilization in 1914 un-
folded with superb precision. Then, as trench war ensued,
his railroads swung between east and west to implement every
dangerous German pivotal action for the remainder of the war.
Groener 1 s railroad desiderata were frequently slighted
x Introduction
by the commanding strategists and he lamented often that they
did not fully understand the key role of transportation to
modern mass strategy. His grasp of technical war was then
deepened by a ten-month tour of duty in Berlin as Germany ! s
first chief of an economic War Office. From February until
October, 1918, he managed German operations in Ukraine,
where Ludendorff expected him to turn crumbs into food trains.
Groener knew first-hand about wartime labor and politics in
Berlin and he was intimate with the problems of the Russian
Revolution in Kiev. In fact, such rear echelon experience
pushed him into his fatal liquidation assignment on the west-
ern front in November, 1918. He was picked to replace
Ludendorff because he could best organize a German with-
drawal or demobilization. Since he had earlier gained the
confidence of the Social Democrats in Berlin, he seemed best
equipped to represent the army amid the democratic changes
which could no longer be avoided in the Fall of 1918.
Greener's technical talent had led him into home front indus-
trial assignments which gave him the political and labor con-
tacts so vital to the interests of army and emperor in the crisis
weeks of October and November, 1918.
Groener was a modern German nationalist. He was a
Swabian of modest family circumstance who was excited by
the expanded prestige and opportunity which the new Empire
offered. This son of a frustrated warrant officer in the army
of Wuerttemberg climbed eagerly upwards in the more capa-
cious structure and higher status of the Empire army. It was
still controlled by the Prussian aristocrat, but its very growth
into a modern mass force brought into it more and more bour-
geois and proletariat elements. Expansive national interests
had to be asserted by expanded national armies and German
particularism was giving ground before such comradeship of
arms. Alert young bourgeois sons like Groener were needed
and they would bring a new German patriotism into the Hohen-
zollern army. His sort regarded the Empire army as a national,
not a dynastic institution, and they understood it as an arm
of the German, not royal interest. Prussian posses siveness
in things military might be respected only as long as it cor-
related with effective and progressive national service. And
the Empire army was fairly successful in blending vested
junker interests with new bourgeois ambitions and with new
Introduction xi
national objectives. General patriotic ego and economic in-
terests were well pleased with German power, and Prussian
military leadership appeared capable of serving the nation
and amalgamating with broader circles of the citizenry.
The General Staff had room for such bourgeois types as
Groener, Kuhl, and Hoffman even though they were yet as-
signed the less exciting chores. Their technical chores un-
wittingly established them as the critical experts in the me-
chanical and industrial warfare which developed after the
opening Marne campaign in 1914. Groener felt himself to be
at home in the General Staff and he tended to look on vestiges
of Prussian exclusiveness as innocuous mementos of the past.
He never shared the class consciousness of his many aristo-
cratic colleagues but he respected their mettle and regarded
them as his comrades. He was no advocate of parliamentary
government either, but he did not feel him self to be threatened
by politicians, merchants, or workers. They were fellow
citizens of different viewpoint who also had their rightful
place and voice in the new Empire. Groener even wrote an
article before the war in which he advocated the army as a
unifying experience and training school for the entire German
citizenry.
A new national spirit, surmounting past class and re-
gional prejudice, was to be forged amid the comradeship of
arms. Such an integration of spirit was both realized and
lost in the course of World War I. The unity of 1914 gradu-
ally gave way to renewed class suspicions and alienation as
victory hopes began to fade despite the colossal sacrifices
of total war. The crisis of the war posed the question of the
nations survival and future, and it probed social and political
feeling to the bone. In 1918, Groener would place national
continuity above dynastic ego and be resented by many a
comrade who held his oath of personal fealty to the Kaiser to
be most sacred. German hierarchies were not yet integrated
and worlds of past and modern loyalties were here divided.
Most German leaders, regardless of their choice, were deeply
wrenched by the loss of their old world and they were heart-
sick in the new state. This was the psychic problem of the
Weimar republic and it too burdened Groener 1 s heart, for he
had made such a painful personal decision in choosing na-
tional continuity over Kaiser William II.
xli Introduction
The development of Groener's national spirit from mili-
tant enthusiasmtocalculatingStaatsraeson was a most inter-
esting facet of his ideological growth. Staatsraeson may be
described in short as the ethical and rational implementation
of state power. Not nullifying the opportunities of strength,
it calls for the politics of the possible, and seeks to maintain
in all political life a restraining sense of civility and modera-
tion. Groener was rather devoid of such political ethic during
the early years of the war when he thought mostly of complete
victory and a century of German dominance in Europe. He
disregarded more complexconsiderations of state as he urged
the full use of the Schlieffen Plan despite ominous diplo-
matic implications. He and his friends thought to recoup the
fading German fortune on the battlefield and they were willing
to resolve all issues militarily. Even after the Marne, the
will to win still possessed Groener and he was angrily resent-
ful of any talk about a M lazy peace. 11 Then as German strength
began to wilt in 1916, he began to understand those who ar-
gued for timely negotiation. He had contact with such men
asHansDelbrueckandFriedrich Meinecke, and perhaps their
more comprehensive considerations helped him to change from
a "naive 11 to a political soldier. By 1917 he was in favor of
diplomatic negotiation and domestic reform.
The Empire needed rest and modern reorganization if it
expected to continue a role of international influence in the
years to come. Now Groener understood that national policy
had deeper determinants than momentary battlefield desiderata.
The army should henceforth obediently screen for the diplo-
matic rescue rather than exercise a simple will to win. Such
timely flexibility was not effected as the Empire leaders chose
to dare a victory peace instead. And they got it at Compiegne
and Versailles. By then Groener was in a position of influence
but his choice remained only between national surrender or
suicide. For very instinctive reasons of state, the German
choice was elementary and rationally unavoidable. Under the
Weimar republic Groener would try to rebuild a foundation of
German strength and carefully recover a degree of international
security and maneuverability. Groener would cherish the
dream of a Schlieffen victory to his dying day, but after 1917
such military fancies were carefully curbed by broader and
more cautious political consideration.
Introduction xiii
Greener's political wisdom emerged only as victory
slipped out of reach and it need not be lauded as a remarkable
accomplishment. Many other Germans arrived at similar
conclusions in a not too difficult exercise of reason. But
Groener was one of the few soldiers who had the courage to
speak up and it was here that he played a lonely role. For
it he was stigmatized even before 1918, and his renunciation
of the Kaiser's authority at Spa only gave historic climax to
his reorientation. National continuity itself seemed to be at
stake in those final weeks in October and November, 1918.
The military operation was admittedly lost and the Kaiser fled
from angry reform re percussions in Berlin to his military head-
quarters at Spa.
Fears of a Russian-style revolution were acute and
Groener 1 s months in Kiev made him doubly afraid of such po-
litical chaos with its resultant national disintegration. Then
talk of Bavaria's withdrawal from Hohenzollern Germany be-
came rife, and at S pa the Kaiser asked for counter-revolution-
ary action and talked about going home at the head of his own
Prussian troops. A national break-up loomed ahead and it
was in such a moment of crisis, on November 9, that a fear-
ful and exasperated Groener finally told the Kaiser that "the
army will march home in peace and order under its leaders
and commanding generals, but not under the command of Your
Majesty, for it no longer stands behind Your Majesty/ 1 These
were fatal words, spoken in the Hohenzollem' s military camp
even as Berlin mobs overthrew his authority at home.
Groener's dramatic statement at Spa voiced the thought
of Hindenburg and it rested on a poll of almost half a hundred
frontline commanders. One might even see here a beginning
of that dilemma of command and obedience which attained
fuller scope in World War IL It seems permissible and nec-
essary to say that Groener expressed a consensus military
view at Spa even though royalist sympathizers and bitter crit-
ics would later portray his action in terms of a disobedient
coup. There heroes at the Spa meeting, such as Schulenburg
and the Crown Prince, could only argue that they still had the
troops n firmly in hand. 1 ' These were paltry and archaic words
after four years of colossal sacrifice as the fate of the nation
itself hung in the balance. It was a claim without modem
sense or ethic, belied by evident facts and even by their own
xiv Introduction
complaints about rear echelon disorder and home front dis-
sension. The soldiers who later resisted Hitler were con-
fronted by a much more fundamental ethical problem. But
perhaps even Groener' s demonstration of civic responsibility
can be understood as a beginning, or perhaps renewal, of the
German soldier's will to respect limits in command.
Groener learned that modern military power depended
on technical resources and mass psychological commitment.
National policy could not disregard geo-political capacities;
democratic feeling and continental limitations were impera-
tives to successful German policies of the future. Groener
learned that his army could not dominate Europe and that it
should not direct the larger national strategy. His hope that
the Empire might make its own timely adjustment was negated.
Then he sought to awaken in the Weimar army a willingness
to serve the republic and he asked postwar Germany to accept
a more modest future in European affairs. At best, it might
someday recover a position of continental influence, but only
by way of quiet economic energy and cautious diplomatic re-
covery. Such curtailment of his power ego was not easy and
his nation pulled away to follow the more impulsive program
of National Socialism.
Now, in mid-century, it seems that the Staatsraeson
of Groener, Meinecke and company has found a broader base
of popular support and international friendship. The German
power ego is apparently adjusted to its limitations and to
Europe's associative needs. Now it is Europe which must it-
self learn new modesties in its international life. In the
broader German and European context, Groener 1 s lesson in
the restraint and ethic of power represents a timely and uni-
versal political experience.
Chapter One
FORMATIVE YEARS
William Groener was born on November 22, 1867, in
the southern German kingdom of Wuerttemberg, The Swabian
background undoubtedly prepared him for later republican ad-
justments and a glimpse into his Wuerttemberg life is a logi-
cal first step in our effort to understand his person.
Certainly the Swabians did not excel in state growth,
as did the Prussians. They were content with a modest po-
sition in Germany's various confederate systems and they
directed their political attention more toward internal refine-
ment. In past centuries they had chased out more than one
ruler and executed more than one minister of state. One nota-
ble eighteenth century British statesman once commented that
in Europe only Britain and Wuerttemberg had constitutions
worthy of the name* The Swabians retained many of the lib-
eral institutions introduced by Napoleon and, with the men
of Baden, they led in the progressive resistance against
Metternich ! s Rest oration restrictions. The southwest liberals
and republicans gave key strength to left-wing sentiment in
the Frankfurt Parliament in 1848 and it was a Swabian dele-
gate, poet Ludwig Uhland, who there coined the celebrated
phrase that the German crown should be anointed "with a drop
of democratic oil. 11 And he swore to n no one single man," for
one he was himself.
The Parliament of 1848-1849 made its last stand in
Stuttgart as the rump group moved to this democratic strong-
hold after the Frankfurt session dissolved. And in the mo-
mentary flash of rebellious confusion which accompanied the
final defeat of the revolution, the officers of the Wuerttein-
2 General William Groener
berg army told their King that his rights were measured by the
Frankfurt and Wuertteniberg constitutions. As citizens and
as soldiers, they did not believe him to have unconditional
authority.
After the revolution Prussia and Austria began a final
duel for the controlling position in Germany. The northern
kingdom veered toward a policy of hegemony interest and
consolidation. The Danube empire hoped to continue a multi-
state Germany in which it could further forestall any Prussian
union. The small states sought to evade this power rivalry
if possible but they were finally forced into a decisive choice.
In 1866 most of the small state governments entered into the
German civil war on the side of Austria, since the Hapsburg
program promised to sustain, rather than integrate, German
federalism.
Wuerttemberg 1 s diplomatic maneuvers in these final
years of Prussian-Austrian rivalry typified small- state appre-
hension and flexibility. Certainly its citizens had need of
a sense of pessimistic Realpolitik in order to understand the
frequent diplomatic switching and disappointments. Wuert-
temberg stayed neutral with Prussia in the Crimean War, to
the irritation of both France and Russia. It favored Austria
against France in 1859, and Napoleon won. It supported the
Prince of Augustenberg* s claim to Schleswig-Holstein, but
Austria and Prussia shared mandate rights over the two penin-
sular provinces after their detachment from Denmark. A per-
plexed Wuerttemberg court then dared the decisive step in
1866 and joined Austria in the war against Prussia.
The behavior of the Wuerttembergers in that war of
1866 was rather typical of small- state opportunism and real-
ism. At the outset of conflict, Foreign Minister Varnbueler
cried vae victis to the Prussians, and his fellow citizens
talked cockily of marching into Brandenburg. When Prussian
power revealed its elf, a 11 such ebullience disappeared quick-
ly. Within a month, as the story goes, the same Varnbueler
found himself sitting on a beer keg outside Bismarck's tent
in Bohemia, waiting to receive terms. As one of the home
patriots wrote to Varnbueler: M It is yet possible to save our
fine land and our brave soldiers from the fate of needless
sacrifice. 11 Desperate heroism seemed entirely senseless to
these junior partners in German politics and spirited beginning
Formative Years 3
notwithstanding, Wuerttemberg had enough realistic sense
of self-preservation to jump off the war chariot once the ride
became both pointless and suicidal. The Varnbueler anecdote
is not without humor and it may have real meaning for the
Swabian philosophy of war and politics. Interestingly enough,
Groener received the same sort of letter from a Swabian
countryman in November, 1918, as did Varnbueler at the
point of defeat. War was senseless when victory was no
longer possible and when it must lead only to greater loss of
life and the ruination of the homeland. 1
Swabian enthusiasm was deeper and more lasting in
the unification war with France. The interest of the South-
west in a national state was finally rewarded and those Ger-
mans were wholeheartedly happy even though Prussian leader-
ship meant a less liberal constitution than they might have
wanted. But a covering national form was now reality,
Swabian autonomies were respected and future constitutional
improvements could be effected in the years to come. The
Swabian military were especially happy with the new devel-
opments. In the words of Schlieffen, as he observed them
during the Franco- Prussian war, "They are imbued with a
genuine enthusiasm for Prussia and admire features of ours
which do not even impress us. Furthermore, all these
Wuerttemberg officers are charming and sociable. 1 ' 2 They
were happy to climb aboard an organization of European range
and fame and their careers suddenly had magnified scope.
Generally a step below the social level of their new aristo-
cratic Prussian colleages, they had the ease and ego of
personality to disregard class differences and assume the
human contact. Of course such differences were not thereby
eliminated and their relationship would retain its paradoxical
nature.
The Swabians were rooted in looser democratic soil
and they did not have the class pride and mannerism of the
Prussian aristocrat, but they could respect the industry and
integrity of the latter and admire the scope of his activity.
The new identification with great power interests titillated
the erstwhile small- staters and they venerated Bismarck and
Moltke as German patriots, if not as Prussian aristocrats.
As yet the new Empire lacked constitutional symmetry or even
full spiritual unity, but it was a living thing, capable of
4 General William Groener
self-development and self-defense, and it remained to be
seen how well this Empire and its army could fuse conglom-
erate tensions into strong and binding unity.
Groener 1 s father was a frustrated paymaster in the
Wuerttemberg army, bom too soon for the Empire opportuni-
ties. His orbit was narrowly fixed and he chafed at the
thought that his talents never had a chance for full bloom.
His son, William, could and did stretch for a bigger place
in the sun and he recognized that such expanded opportunity
was made possible by the new national life* From his father 1 s
family he inherited the tenacity, frankness, and occasional
brusqueness common to the natives of the picturesque hill
and dale Swabian Alb. His mother stemmed from a bourgeois
family which had travelled a road of patient, ambitious prog-
ress. It had a meticulous trait which was probably passed
on to the future railroad general. Young William spent some
years in the old free city of Ulm with its smug, self-conscious
burgheratmosphere. Its time-honored garrison soldiers were
welcome intimates but also tolerated guests and the Swabian
military in no sense dominated their society. The spirit ap-
proximated that of a militia setting, though the organization
might be professional. Groener matured in these small cities
of Wuerttemberg where social life was substantially informal
and where no one group could seriously elevate itself above
the other.
Groener's memoirs also gave a special place of impor-
tance to the hiking trips of his youth. These were practical-
ly an institution in nineteenth century Wuerttemberg. Rich
and poor streamed out into nature, shared the same excursion
paths and sought refreshment and conviviality in the same
inn. And its long benches and tables defied segregation.
There the public rubbed elbows with itself, discussed poli-
tics and cheered up the day with a good glass of beer. Here
was a style of life, informal, hearty, intimate and uncon-
sciously democratic. Political and class differences in
Wuerttemberg were not stiff and hostile. There was social
exchange among the people and between factions. People
were accustomed to political disagreement not exaggerated
into a life and death struggle of tradition, honor, or even
interest. The King visited his legislature. Social Democrats
were not considered to be dangerous pariahs and they in turn
Formative Years 5
respected their state, even in opposition. The soldiers as-
sociated with the civilians and they were not elevated behind
special walls of privilege. Groener ! s memory of his earlier
years was perhaps not free of romanticism and yet there evi-
dently was a social lubricant which gave basic human equali-
ty and cohesion to Swabian society. Groener was never
estranged by the common man and he maintained such egali-
tarian social forms throughout his life.
In 18 84 Groener took a trip to Berlin to take a qualify-
ing examination for entrance into a Prussian officers candi-
date school. Then, on his seventeenth birthday, he enlisted
in the Wuerttemberg army. The young man wanted to relieve
the family budget and begin his own independence. He had
grownup in a barrack setting and he was alert to the oppor-
tunities in the new German army. Where else could one of
his simple background find a chance to develop a career in
which security, prestige, even democratic opportunity was
so capaciously available? Moltke ! s army was generally ac-
cepted as the first institution of the land and Groener stepped
into it with pride and ambition. He began his basic training
in Ludwigsburg and even participated in the Fall maneuvers
of 1884 where he saw Moltke, William I, and the future Wil-
liam II. The epic men and traditions of the unification army
were still present and the young soldier who would later be-
come known as the Liquidation General worked happily into
a promising career. His qualifying scores soon came through
from Berlin and early in 1885 he moved up to an officer train-
ing academy near Coblenz.
The two years along the middle Rhine saw care-free
fledgling growth and careful professional training. There he
and other young military enthusiasts were introduced to the
duties of army life and to the art of war. The Academy com-
mander was wise enough to close an eye now and then, and
the spirit of his young cadets was directed, rather than com-
pressed. Groener was impressed by this relaxed rein and he
apparently developed comparable tact and human understand-
ing in his own leadership. Down through the years he would
be an officer who granted autonomy and expected precision.
His Academy work showed a distinct flair for the practical.
He was only "satisfactory 11 in drill, fencing and mount know-
ledge, but he was "good 11 in riding, gymnastics and marks-
6 General William Groener
manship. His bearing was " out standing 11 and his superiors
noted freshness and originality in his work. He did excel in
military history and here practical troop command was en-
hanced by academic talent. Groener finally returned to his
home unit in 1886 with a lieutenant's commission and an ele-
vating future well in sight. 3
Not yet twenty, the young officer then lapsed into the
easy hum-drum of the peacetime army. His regiment had only
recently participated in an Imperial maneuver and such Fall
excitement was not liable to return too soon. Groener drilled
and lectured his men, trained the squad and maneuvered the
platoon. The work was routine and he slid lazily into tavern
pastimes* He and his colleagues had their morning and even-
ing drinks, and Groener did the town with enough persistence
to be finally dubbed the n night light. 11 He was usually the
last man home. At their inns the young officers exchanged
boisterous comradeship and sang sarcastic songs about the
civilians. In the later night hours it was not unusual for them
to improvise a parade ground by sliding the tables together.
On such a stage they would demonstrate their parade step and
gradually the inspectors would pull the tables apart until
some bold-striding warrior fell short and down. Such antics
were harmless enough although the entire army apparently
was beset by such boredom and gambling and drinking were
becoming real problems.
The Groener group had their jokes about civilians but
their laughs and songs hardly expressed caste feeling. The
bachelor officers ate in the public inns with the regular
burgher clientele and an egalitarian social atmosphere pre-
vailed. Yet certain changes were also coming into vogue
during these very years. Some of the officer groups inWuert-
temberg were beginning to reserve separate dining rooms and
in 1893 the new King, trained in Prussia, inaugurated the
first off icer 1 s club, or n Kasino !1 , in Ludwigsburg. Bourgeois
off icers were seeping into the Prussian caste structure but at
the same time certain junker military features were also
reaching into the non- Prussian lands.
In Prussia the Kasino represented the secluded retreat
and citadel of the military caste. There the officers could
eat, read, play and drink among their own kind. It was not
merely a convenient place of assembly for military friends,
Formative Years 7
but it was dedicated to the maintenance of a separate mili-
tary society. The Kasino consciously sought to preserve
the "officer's corps from the disintegrating influences 11 of
an outside world growing ever more strange and hostile. In
the Kasino the old guard could "keep a watchful eye over the
ygunger members" and protect the traditional spirit. The
breach between the military and the civilian worlds was pub-
licly recognized in Prussia where the officer's corps actively
pursued its factional interest by building rest homes, creat-
ing trust funds, publishing newspapers, and applying politi-
cal leverage wherever they could.
Modern methods of factional self-assertion were em-
ployed in order to defend established privileges. They had
their own honor courts for delinquents and one Prussian noble
was temporarily stripped of rank and decorations for voting
with reform elements in the Reichstag. That representative
assembly was generally unhappy with the class and caste
implications of the Kasino, especially since such club costs
drew from the regular army budget. But the Reichstag could
not penetrate the constitutional autonomy of the army in its
administrative, and even fiscal, matters. Old Moltke could
stand up among his fellow legislators and concede that they
might determine the periodic sum for military expenditures,
but that they had no right to control specific items within that
budget. He quietly told the anti-military critics that "we
have another word for caste spirit; we call it comradeship."
To bourgeois ears these were specious words although the
old man probably meant them in all positive sincerity. The
exclusive, hierarchic traditions of a passing world were
simply out of step with the march for new mass equality and
mass authority. 4
The Kasinos were moving south and the democrats were
going north, to the Reichstag in Berlin. The parts and people
of the new Empire were beginning to engage and a new body
politic was being formed. The Empire grew up with the in-
dustrial revolution and the privileged leadership of the found-
ing fathers was almost immediately challenged by an indus-
trializing society. The patrimonial style of the Hohenzollern
regime could not dignify the will and self-respect of the
modem masses who demanded equal rights for vital labor.
But determined and militant junker stubborness frankly blocked
8 General William Groener
constitutional improvement and consciously discounted any
deeper cohesion of the Empire spirit. They believed in hier-
archic alignment and trusting obedience, not general equality
and collective self -determination. Thus the leadership and
the sustaining energy of Empire growth were in almost immedi-
ate tension against one another and this new society ! s para-
moun problem was one of domestic integration. But Bismarck
tried to repress mass rights and the repelled socialists re-
sponded with comparable hardness and enmity. Liberal com-
promise efforts between these two poles of political force
were abused by the right and spurned by the left.
By 1890 the government and people of this great power
were still spiritually separated from one another even though
its outward force and inward order were unquestionable.
Junker dominance in the army and the bureaucracy represented
vital positions of control for that class, in coalition with the
Kaiser who staffed the national ministry, made war and peace
and absolutely controlled the armed force. Democratic oppo-
sition centered in the Reichstag where criticism of suffrage
discrimination and junker immunities was consistent and bit-
ter. But incumbent conservative control was protected by
constitutional decrees and unwittingly assisted by the radical
revolutionary program of early German socialism which drove
the bourgeois parties toward the right. Frequent diplomatic
dangers also tended to rally the people around their govern-
ment and make criticism of the army consistently unpopular.
Bismarck, Moltke, and their successors would repeatedly
disarm a suspicious Reichstag with warnings of military dan-
ger and appeals for comradeship in arms. Yet it was also
persistently evident that the Prussian leaders did not represent
German sentiment and that theirs was a selfish, outmoded
concept of political authority.
Groener was a satisfied monarchist officer and the so-
cialists had nothing to say to him, but he got a taste of the
Empire's ideological frictions even in the more peaceful and
homogeneous Wuerttemberg. The Kaiser gave up his brief ef-
fort to conciliate labor and by 1891 they were again portrayed
as national traitors. William even told his Guards that they
must be prepared to shoot their own fathers and brothers;
chivalry apparently excluded the ladies, 5 Feeling was not
that savage down in Wuerttemberg, but ev$n Groener 1 s unit
Formative Years 9
had its first May Day alert in 1891 and there were frequent
searches in the garrison for subversive literature. Once the
commander answered an anti-militaristic editorial by march-
ing the regiment, band and all, past the windows of the in-
solent press. Such ideological skirmishing occurred through-
out the Empire and it served to develop a deep rift of antag-
onism and suspicion between the military and the political
proletariat. This class breach was momentarily sealed by the
great crisis reconciliation in 1914, but it would open again
during the course of the war and plague the Empire with its
unresolved internal discriminations and tensions.
Groener's career did not get lost in such petty doctrinal
police work. He found himself drawn toward strategic studies
and by 1892 he was immersed in preparation for the qualify-
ing examinations to the War Academy. Competition was sharp
and only about 20 per cent of the candidates were usually
accepted, butthe erstwhile "night light 11 shifted successfully
to the midnight oil and in 1893 he made another big jump up-
wards. The paymasters son was accepted into the Prussian
War Academy and both of the Groener men had a high sense
of family satisfaction. The Imperial army was still very much
an aristocratic institution, but more and more young Germans
like Groener were being fitted into the Prussian military ma-
chinery. Their talent and vital usefulness were unquestion-
able but it remained to be seen whether their social attitudes
would receive, or infiltrate, the Prussian tradition.
Groener 1 s Swabian heritage came from a state which
had genuine concepts of charter rights and royal limitations.
His people felt and practiced a social egalitarian! sm which
softened class difference, lubricated political exchange, and
tempered authority all along the line. Men like Uhland did
not swear to n a single man 11 and the Wuerttemberg military
placed the constitution above the King. Wuerttemberg's strug-
gle to survive in confederate Germany, especially in the cli-
mactic 60 ! s, induced a Realpolitik of agile adjustment and
the example of Varnbueler seems aptly symbolic.
Groener 1 s personality was composite even before he
moved into the Prussian stage of his development. He had
burgher blood and a garrison childhood. He became an officer
under Prussian training but he served his practical appren-
ticeship in Wuerttemberg 1 s small cities, which were virtual
10 General William Groener
citadels of bourgeois life. He knew that world and its people
and he also understood that proletariat programs could not
simply be outlawed; they also represented social right and
will. The twenty-five year old Groener 1 s rootspread was not
narrow and he was ready for an even bigger world. The Prus-
sian War Academy would certainly add new features and di-
mensions to his growth, possibly even lead him into the
higher army circles* As yet his class limits were not visible
and his national patriotism was not vexed by particularistic
intransigence. The new Germany offered a seemingly clear
road to his ambitions and Groener went to Berlin with high
confidence in his future.
The old capital of the Mark was now the forum of Ger-
many, the political focal point of Europe and a leading city
of the world- Here diplomats engaged in global enterprise
while generals wondered desperately how to solve continen-
tal assignments. The Empire's energy and ambition simply
disregarded the modest or the cautious. A staid bureaucracy
and an infant navy were hurried to overseas positions even
though ill-prepared to manage global fronts. There were
constitutional problems enough at home and some wondered
whether the new Empire was settled enough internally to
venture on rather immediate global expansion. But a dramatic
young Kaiser got on the bridge in 1888 and would show his
subjects how to steer a world course, with full steam. His
policy was not mere personal whim for a very substantial
body of economic and patriotic interest also insisted on world
activity. Even the workers could be brought to believe that
colonies spelled industrial prosperity for both high and low.
A bigger place in the sun was to be achieved so that
the German nation could continue to grow and unfold. This
sense of growth and destiny pervaded Berlin in the 1890 ! s
and the city was caught up in a swirl of international plans
and action. Groener was exhilarated by such grand tempo
although he also observed that much of the political and in-
tellectual activity originated from the ranks of the dissatis-
fied. The German scene toward the end of the nineteenth
century reflected both zealous commercial optimism and
bilious political discontent, and the booming Empire was not
exactly building on settled foundations.
Hie German system still lacked important internal
Formative Years 1 1
improvements, both of a mechanical and spiritual nature* The
three-class voting system in Prussia insulted modem sensi-
tivities and, in Alsace-Lorraine and Poland, subjects without
full German rights wondered when they might be fully digni-
fied by their government. The Empire still lacked an adequate
revenue program and property tax rights remained within the
shelter of regional state authority. The junkers were not will-
ing to submit their estates to national regulation, and in
Prussia they easily controlled state laws and maintained their
property tax immunities. The military budget periodically
raised questions of ultimate constitutional authority in the
Reichstag and always the Kaiser prevailed as the absolute
war lord. He could remind the Reichstag that its part in the
military budget was a privilege conceded by the crown and
not a right with final powers. Since the bourgeois parties
feared socialism even more than they resented junker leader-
ship, it remained possible for the conservative force to keep
Reich stag alignments fluid and maintain their form of consti-
tutional authority. Socialism was of course anathema, but
any bourgeois Reichstag influence was also to be checked
for it represented national integration and the end of particu-
larist privileges and autonomies.
Under William II the junkers remained in formidable
position as the Bundesrat, bureaucracy, and army remained
under aristocratic control. The Bundesrat could initiate and
veto Empire legislation, and the army could impose martial
law at the Kaiser's command. Legally and militarily, Germany
was well hobbled by the Bismarkian constitution. 6 But the
Reichstag and the socialists continued to increase their pres-
sure and many junkers sensed that the conservative dike
could not forever hold back the tide of the modern, alien so-
ciety. Estates were falling into bourgeois hands and the city
politicians were coming into the Prussian villages. Many of
the young aristocrats even began to feel and talk in terms of
new equalities although not yet ready to forfeit the tradition-
al privileges. Groener first came in contact with this junker
class in the early 1890's and he suggested novelist Theodore
Fontane as a most intimate authority on the mood and prob-
lems of the Prussian junker in the final decades of the nine-
teenth century.
Fontane was both a friend and a critic of the nineteenth
12 General William Groener
century Prussian junker and his analysis has some claim to
fair-minded intelligence. A brief synopsis might be assayed
as follows: Once the junker class was secure on the land
and of vital service to the state it fought resolutely for the
King and governed the countryside with no little integrity and
progressiveness. The exaggerated disciplinary style was
even culturally helpful in a primitive setting, but in the nine-
teenth century the effects of economic and political change
began to eat into their rural patrimony. Bourgeois money,
ideas, even girl friends drifted into the junker life and the
younger generation began to lose its self-assurance. No
longer vital to society, their class sensitivity was often
overdrawn and their noble or authoritarian mannerisms bor-
dered on the caricature. They were going out of style and
they sensed it. A frivolous life with the Guards or an oc-
casional duel did not successfully replace respectable pur-
pose or ethical honor.
In a memorable scene Fontane portrayed the growing
political estrangement of the junker from the modern scene.
Dubslav Stechlin, an ideal type with a sincere feeling for
his fellow man, allowed himself to be entered in a Reichstag
electoral contest but his inept conservative backers could not
muster majority support. The villagers voted for a Social
Democrat from Berlin who neither knew them nor, thought
Stechlin, understood their problems. The election was a so-
cial story in itself as the stiff old nobles sat around awk-
wardly in their inn and awaited results. Even wise old Stech-
lin cast his vote with the snorting comment, "I 1 11 just have
to go along with this foolishness. " The new political world
of speeches and popularity was entirely strange to the junker
nature. After their man lost, Stechlin 1 s backers retired to a
fine dinner, toasted the King and Kaiser, and scattered to
their manor homes in their coaches* The world might be mov-
ing toward foolish democracy but on their estates they could
still maintain the old way of life and hope that the deluge
might yet be delayed awhile.
This Fontane picture described the mood and setting of
the Prussian governing class, increasingly out of step with
social change in modern Germany, but also instinctively
stubborn and obtuse about self-liquidating reform. The
Groener 1 s were accepted in the Imperial Army as long as they
Formative Years 1 3
served the Prussian Hohenzollern. Any broader concept of
German patriotism must be subordinate, not superior, to that
dynasty which still represented junker control. Groener's
rejection of the Kaiser's authority in November, 1918, sym-
bolized the formal end of such junker sovereignty and identi-
fied him with the end of an age. This was the ideological
import of his role at Spa in 1918 and the reason for conserva-
tive bitterness against him. Defeat and abdication meant the
end of their rule and it was irrelevant to them that his heart
was also monarchic and strongly attached to the Prussian
General Staff. They resented him all the more as an alien
spirit within the very Hohenzollern council. His national
patriotism rising above any particular dynasty was directed
by bourgeois realism and Swabian flexibility. Such values
were meaningless to the junker credo and to Hohenzollern
egocentricity. As Chancellor Hohenlohe once remarked in
the 1890 f s, these Prussian nobles "cared nothing about the
Reich and would rather sacrifice it today than tomorrow. 11
And a pure Prussian like Schlieffen could also idly observe
that the Swabians were "honestly German-minded, in any
case more honestly than we Prussians. 1 ' 7
Prussian absolutism was an anomalous, yet dominating
relic among the Empire materialists, scientists, and seekers
of truth. n Durch Gottes Gnade bin ich was ich bin, 11 began
the service which was read to young William II as he pre-
pared to open his first Reichstag. On such an occasion one
may suspect that his sense of Grace entailed more power
than humility. The many hard-minded Germans did not believe
in such mysticism but they were happy to accept the power
and prosperity which the Hohenzollern Empire generated. But
the Kaiser and his Prussian lords apparently did believe in
the special righteousness of their authority, either as divine
destiny or as historical merit. A proud and fierce man like
Bismarck was committed to a concept of personal fealty. "I
will stand or fall with my own liege lord, 11 he could say,
"even if, in my opinion, he foolishly commits me to destruc-
tion." Or as junker Oldenbourg-Januschau told Wuerttem-
berger Conrad Haussmann in the Daily Telegraph debate in
1908: n . . . we are different in yet another conception: for
you the Kaiser is an institution. For us he is a person. And
we will serve His Majesty the Kaiser personally as long as
14 General William Greener
we live, without fear, but until the last breath, in the old
loyalty which we have never denied him. 11 It was the same
Januschau who once remarked that the King of Prussia must
at all times be in a position to tell a lieutenant, l! Take ten
men and close the Reichstag. " In their growing sense of
estrangement and even isolation, quite a few of the Januschau
group hoped that such a miraculous deed might yet come to
pass. 8
The Groeners did not swear to single men, but their
young lieutenant at the War Academy was not bothered by
such constitutional questions. He was a happy soldier in a
vibrant, exciting world capital. He merged into his new
Prussian environment and regarded certain Swabian distinc-
tions as mere localisms which had no bearing on his career
or on his patriotism. The question of the Empire 1 s survival,
or the Kaisers authority, certainly never crossed his mind*
Once he went through the red tape of applying for an invita-
tion to a royal ball. Lieutenants were in the sixty-second,
and last, rank of those who were eligible for such a select
affair. University rectors, incidentally, were in the forty-
seventh rank. Everyone had to be in uniform and for those
luckless enough to be without one, the Kaiser had designed
a special costume. It consisted of lacquered shoes with
buckle, long white stockings which merged into knee pants
under a colorful frock. No wonder old Chancellor Hohenlohe
was so concerned about somehow qualifying for the right to
wear a uniform.
Groenerwas probably somewhat a wed by the glitter and
show of such an Imperial gathering. The Kaiser 1 s palace on
the Spree had been lavishly refinished, in glaring contrast
to the relative simplicity of previous Hohenzollern residences.
William had to do everything different and bigger. But the
sumptuous and impersonal theatrics of the royal ball left
Groener rather hollow and bored. Wuerttemberg 1 s royal re-
ceptions had been so much smaller and graciously intimate.
There it was apparently not uncommon for a young lieutenant
to argue out his seating rank with the court steward, and at
the close, many groups would leave and continue the party
at a nearby hotel or inn. But the Imperial palace was not
Ludwigsburg and Groener wandered around rather lost. He
watched the red-jacketed Guards swirl their highly trained
Formative Years 1 5
dancing skill and he picked up a hat for a dignified old gov-
ernment official who was too tightly corseted to make the
effort himself.
A Prussian junker, wandering through the same royal
palace, could tell of his deep reverence before the mementos
and grandeur of the Prussian past as it was represented in
those halls. The boy who gamboled in the streets of Ulm and
later parried wits with the burghers of Schwaebisch-Gmuend
could hardly be thus affected. He would become a disciple
of Schlieff en and a devoted member of the General Staff, and
his loyalty to them would prevail. This was the tradition
which would absorb the best years, and dreams, of his life.
He regarded the Empire and the army as integrated German
institutions, regardless of past origins or contesting particu-
laristic sentiment, but he would regard the General Staff as
a national resource, not a hereditary Prussian possession*
Such expanded unity excited his nationalist spirit and served
his professional ambition.
The Prussian soldier cannot simply be identified with
the general maladjustment of his class. Old Moltke and
Schlieff en lived long and active lives, and the Imperial army
of the twentieth century was still their handiwork. Its quality
would be successfully demonstrated in World War I. The
Kaiser had meddled here, as elsewhere, but the organization
had its own deep tradition, and a world situation forced its
work and galvanized its spirit. This army and its junker
leaders had a critical, ever-changing job to do and thus they
maintained both their progressive energy and their status in
society. As German diplomacy stumbled after 1890, more
and more Germans began to regard their General Staff and
army as the emergency trump. After the Moroccan crisis and
evident German interest in stronger armament as evinced by
the elections of 1907, even the socialists began to speak of
modernizing and improving, rather than dismantling, the Em-
pire army. This key position of Prussian strength, under ab-
solute royal command, was thus left increasingly free of
criticism and its entrenched importance in public affairs
greatly buttressed conservative interests in the national po-
litical arena.
Several Empire elections were decided in favor of the
administration when some crisis persuaded patriotic unity or
16 General William Groener
when it seemed that the Reichstag critics were slighting ar-
mament needs. A thorough tax reform bill was consistently
postponed on the grounds that it would dangerously anger the
junker element in and out of the army, and a constitution for
Alsace-Lorraine was postponed in 191 3 because the army took
advantage of the Schnabele affair to continue its martial au-
thority along the French frontier. 9 The Kaiser and his army
represented the final great bastions of junker strength in an
industrializing society pressing for modern constitutional
change.
These facets of the Prussian world illustrate the new
environment into which young Lieutenant Groener was moving.
Bred to different values, he would nonetheless respect and
adopt much of the Prussian training. Without resenting junker
priorities, he trusted quietly in his own talents and prepared
to push through whatever path he might be enabled to follow.
His very rank and presence at the Academy indicated that
democratic advance was possible in the Imperial army and he
quickly developed an unbegrudging admiration for the Prussian
military tradition. And no one would question his disparate
origins until he began to reflect upon them in that future time
of crisis and decision.
Groener entered the War Academy in 1893 on the very
eve of basic diplomatic and strategic changes for Germany.
The Franco-Russian alliance was nearing reality and the dip-
lomatic fortunes of the Empire were about to go into reverse.
The subsequent two-front dilemma would then compel a radi-
cal change in Germany's military strategy. Schlieffen's
flanking idea was in evidence as early as 1891 but it would
not fully go on the General Staff planning board until 1894-
1895. Groener 1 s higher strategic education would take place
during those years of new planning and, by design or not,
some of his Academy work was not unrelated to General Staff
problems and studies of the day.
The Academy, for all of its elevated implications, en-
joyed neither Imperial favor nor army respect. It had the job
of giving advanced theoretical training to selected military
personnel and yet such work was not taken too seriously.
The Kaiser wanted to deflate the vaunted General Staff and
once again elevate the corps commanders to primary status,
illustrating his penchant for giving the important positions to
Formative Years 1 7
those less astute and brainy. He was more interested in
having the key officials personally amenable to himself. The
field commanders were naturally encouraged by such a royal
attitude and they also tended to sneer at Academy theory.
The Kaiser was chary with fiscal support and the regular units
sent instructors to the Academy who had neither the ability
nor the inclination to teach. Schlieffen was aware of such
impediments and he simply picked out the best of the Academy
students and finished their training in the Staff itself. The
Academy classrooms apparently reflected such multiple dis-
interest and Groener remembered that he often read newspa-
pers or wrote letters during class sessions. But Prussian
experience and application showed through despite such in-
difference and he received effective instruction in such sub-
jects as military history, terrain study, supply problems,
and procedures in tactics and strategy.
In a three-year sequence, the students worked through
the command assignments of a brigade, division, and corps.
Military history moved primarily from classical campaigns to
the strategy of Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and Moltke.
The final year was devoted especially to the strategy of
Moltke, as it was recent enough for detailed work and con-
temporary relevance. Groener and his class mates were taught
to appreciate the merits of a tough defense and yet the stress
was placed on offense. Frederick, Napoleon, and Moltke
were the venerated masters and all of them exemplified in-
telligent daring and the sacred fire of command. The cam-
paigns of Moltke especially demonstrated the speedy military
resolution of complicated political problems. Destruction
was minimal and his wars were regarded as artistic duels in
which struggle and civility were happily related. The German
military leaders thereafter tended to look on war as an in-
stinctive, scientific, and artistic exercise. The best plan
and the most skillful execution prevailed; problems were
solved and life rejuvenated.
Europe 1 s competitive principle of life was yet in high
noon and the happily successful Germans were in proud ac-
cord with such a world. Moltke was a thoroughly cultivated
and humane person who thought the dream of eternal peace
to be both foolish and ugly. Struggle was an integral part of
human nature and international wars could most mercifully be
18 General William Groener
controlled by rapid, conclusive engagement. He could en-
vision the massive sacrifice of the next war although the
magnitude and reality of such mass slaughter were of course
not fully impressed on these contemporaries of Bismarck.
He was the diplomat who knew how to end wars and thus give
them strategic sense. Moltke's intellectual heirs would find
that they could neither win their war nor end it.
One especially interesting item in Groener 1 s Academy
experience involved Frederick the Great and the Seven Years
War. The class considered the Prussian King's act of war
against Maria Theresa in 1756. Frederick was informed that
his enemies would attack him in the Spring of 1757. He de-
cided to strike first, going through neutral Saxony in order
to break most quickly into Bohemia. But he attacked only
after first delivering a fourteen-day ultimatum to Austria.
The military writer, Bernhardi, maintained that Frederick
should have moved immediately without a prior ultimatum.
The class was asked to discuss this Bernhardi criticism in
a written examination.
Groener's answer disagreed with Bernhardi. He pointed
out that those fourteen days did not worsen the military situa-
tion. They did not diminish the chance for victory and Fred-
erick's position was so unfavorable that he could well afford
to wait a few more days for some possible diplomatic assist-
ance. And the waiting period gave the Prussians a chance
for full military preparation behind a veil of diplomatic ne-
gotiation. 10 His answer reflected clever patience and op-
portunism, qualities which were of course easier to phrase
than to practice. For in the July crisis of 1914, Groener
would also say to the mobilization question, "better today,
than tomorrow. 11
The Academy strategist had no argument with Frederick's
march through Saxony and he did not try to justify it with any
legalistic or moralistic logic. Such a radical move seemed
.critically necessary to victory and thus to be ventured. He
sifted the various choices open to the Prussian King and then
made his choice.. The rights of the enemy were not denied,
they were simply opposed. Such a frankness and integrity
of mind would characterize Groener throughout his life. Rec-
ognizing that there were other alternatives and other rights
in the world of war and politics, he claimed only the right
Formative Years 19
to decide and assert his own interest. Tactics, strength,
and fate might then decide the victory and arbitrate between
the domestic political parties.
In his final Academy year Groener worked on a projected
encirclement and investment of Epinal. In that problem he
began to comprehend the formidable requirements of a break-
through operation against a modern fortification line. The
siege of Sevastapol in the Crimean War furnished the his-
torical lesson to that particular Groener study, and a few
years later the Russo-Japanese stalemate at Mukden confirmed
his conclusions. Mounting and relentless pressure, in men
and materiel, seemed necessary in a tedious, exhausting op-
eration. Groener favored wider flanking tactics to loosen
up the defense and he argued his point with those Academy
classmates who supported the power penetratiori. Such dis-
cussion by the neophytes echoed the actual problem facing
the General Staff at that very time. Schlieffen was already
at work on his flanking plan since it seemed increasingly
clear that a penetration of the French line would cost too
much time and manpower. He was not afraid to lose men but
the question of time now seemed even more important.
The two-front dilemma was a reality and quick offen-
sive victory in the west appeared to be the logical first as-
signment for the German army. Groener already favored the
broad, advancing front in the Academy classrooms and he
would convert easily to the celebrated flanking scheme of
Schlieffen. That plan, and the figure of Schlieffen, would
captivate the military admiration of Groener for the rest of
his life. Its radical logic characterized his militant spirit
until 1917 and then it represented an unvarying exception to
subsequent caution and political sophistication.
Groener' s Academy work in such key subjects as tac-
tics, military history and General Staff duty was superior,
and he was rewarded with an assignment to the topographic
section of General Staff headquarters. It was recognized as
a promising entry into that inner sanctum where Schlieffen
and his aides functioned as the brain cell of the German army.
There he could train his eye for the landscape and develop
the intimacy with map work so increasingly vital to the man-
agement of massive and far-flung armies. Groener 1 s first
summer of map work took him into the Lueneberger Heath
20 General William Groener
where he assembled his data and communed with nature. But
the ambitious little Swabian also saved on his expense money
and made week-end trips to Bremen and Hamburg. There he
studied and sketched dock facilities.
Germany ! s world policy was under way and the possi-
bility of a future shipping problem was not overlooked. And
his visits were not wasted for he later directed the railroad
assembly of the German Boxer expeditionary force, which
embarked in Hamburg. On his second summer assignment he
was sent far away from any major cities, so he spent his
spare time in the nearby taverns and hobnobbed with the na-
tives. Such grassroot habits were natural to him and he
stayed on friendly footing with the common man even though
his military career and Prussian influences led him definitely
toward authoritarian principles of leadership. Groener would
believe in democratic feeling and behavior much more than he
would ever believe in democratic authority.
During the winters of those first post-Academy years,
Groener prepared his maps and worked on self-as signed tac-
tical projects. He was merely on attached service with Gen-
eral Staff headquarters and hopefully alert for the chance to
show his quality and receive a regular appointment to this
highest command post. He and others in the topographic sec-
tion helped out with various aspects of Staff duties along with
their own specific mapping chores. Periodically they were
handed special strategic problems and were evaluated on their
performance. Here lay the big chance to make an impression.
Groener 1 s first winter exercise raised no eyebrows, and the
following winter his answer to a strategic problem was rated
last by the major who supervised the examination. But a
general, First Quartermaster von Alten, a trusted intimate of
Schlieffen, reviewed the papers and moved Groener up to first.
Dame Fortune had suddenly smiled on Groener and the Chief
himself was made aware of his talent.
Groener had not allowed Marshal Bazaine to retreat
across the Mosel toward Paris without first scoring a rear-
guard victory and perhaps this bit of aggressive defense
marked him as a man of proper fire and foresight. He was
appointed to General Staff headquarters on March 25, 1899,
and assigned duty in the railroad section. That very year
witnessed the first official decision to route the German
Formative Years 21
advance through Belgium and Groener 1 s railroad work became
immediately involved in the Schlieffen Plan. Its life was
Henceforth intertwined with his own.
Thus Groener moved into another stage of his life. The
Berlin sally had be en wondrously rewarding and now he func-
tioned on high Empire levels. A man of Swabian breeding and
Prussian training, he represented the sort of integration with
which the German Empire might be happy. As a soldier he
was both monarchic and democratic in social outlook. He
knew major parts of the Empire and comprehended the German
conglomeration; but he also assumed a continuing unification
process and he subscribed almost unconsciously to a national
patriotism which was above regional or class sentiment. n
CHAPTER TWO
In The General Staff
The Prussian army helped to liberate Germany from
Napoleon and it facilitated the national unification under Bis-
marck. Its military service and logic seemed well suited to
the national interest. The Napoleonic experience created the
need and will for national self-assertion in a world of obvious
insecurity. Hegel would now declare that self-defense was
the first requirement of any state and Clausewitz could agree
that !l all else can be regarded, strictly speaking, as faux
frais. German thought would begin to idealize the nature of
the state even as it had earlier idealized the sovereignty of
the spirit. Hegel 1 s first great "work dealt with the phenomen-
ology of the spirit. By mid-century, Ranke was giving dis-
course on the phenomenology of the state. And by 1900,
Treitschke and others understood national life almost as a
biological organism with its right to fight for life and growth.
Such competitive naturalism was certainly not unique to Ger-
man thought but it was here perhaps more ebulliently glorified
than among other more settled and experienced nations. l
The far-flung campaigns of the Napoleonic wars im-
pressed on all the contestants a need for informed and rami-
fied military planning. In Prussia such a study section was
first set up in the reorganization of the War Ministry in 1814.
For the next forty-five years this General Staff office occu-
pied a position of academic modesty and administrative sub-
ordinancy within the framework of the War Ministry. Its geo-
detic surveys and studies in war history impressed few people
and the regular army regarded it primarily as a research serv-
ice. The army commanders were much more interested in once
22*
In The General Staff 23
again working clear of War Ministry supervision and re-
establishing their direct relationship with the King. The
Prussian conservatives resisted the reform concepts of Boyen
and Gneisenau and they successfully blocked the authority
of the War Ministry and the development of a militia army.
The fighting quality of the civilian reserves was found to be
inferior in the Revolution of 1848-1849 and the resultant re-
organization of the Prussian army under Roon again entrenched
the King and his generals beyond the reach of the government
and the people.
The spectacular role of the Prussian military in the
German unification seemed to justify their place in the state
and most German patriots were thereafter willing to overlook
residual junker privileges and the army's immunity from ci-
vilian supervision. As William II could say to the Chancellor
of the Empire in the 1890's, "The army and its internal fea-
tures do not concern the State Ministry at all, since the con-
stitution specifically reserves these for the King's sole jur-
isdiction. " 2 This immunity of ruler and army from the
jurisdiction of the national government represented the basic
autocracy and militarism of the second German Empire. The
Hohenzollern authority was constitutionally entrenched by
his control of the Empire's Upper House (Bundesrat) and by
his direct command over the German army. Legal reform was
a practical impossibility as long as the Prussian King and the
Prussian aristocrats were thus in control of the Empire
machinery.
The man who best justified such modern military privi-
lege also first brought the General Staff to a position of pub-
lic prominence. Moltke was still head of an academic Gen-
eral Staff as the Danish War broke out in 1864. In fact, he
was almost left home in Berlin. Then his corrective views
on painful German blunders in the field impressed the King
and his status was decisively enhanced. On the very eve
of the war with Austria in 1866, he was placed in command
of all the Prussian armies. His victory at Koeniggraetz, and
later at Sedan in 1870, fully established the General Staff
as a scholarly and scientific master of wan Scientific prep-
aration and nervy calculation were seemingly blended into
an invincible instrument of German force. Under the leader-
ship of Moltke and Bismarck, the risk and pain of war seemed
24 General William Groener
advantageous and permissible to national policy. German
interests were advanced and yet also regulated. The German
army was praised as the first institution of the Empire, but
it was also kept subordinate to the political will of Bismarck.
In many German eyes it did seem that the Darwinistic neces-
sities of life were under successful and civilized manage-
ment. A highly cultivated and humane man, such as Moltke,
could say with stoical equanimity, !l Eternal peace is a dream
and not even a fine one, and war is a link in God's world
order. 11 Without war, man would become bogged down in idle
materialism. 3
For Bismarck and Moltke such a readiness to fight ex-
pressed the controlled instinct of sophisticated leaders.
Their experience with war had not been catastrophic. Their
will helped to excite a comparable public militancy but their
shrewdness and wisdom could not be as easily popularized.
Mass ego, mass interest, and mass means could exaggerate
their competitive daring into uncontrollable violence, es-
pecially when sparked by a jingoistic ruler and directed by
soldierly logic.
The Imperial Army ! s assignment after the wars of uni-
fication continued to be formidable and yet it was not des-
perate. The French were weak and the eastern Empires were
diplomatically attached to Germany. The feared two-front
war remained a realistic possibility and yet Moltke f s margin
of security seemed adequate. The Russian army was judged
awkward enough to be kept at bay and the German defensive
position between Switzerland and Luxembourg seemed much
too difficult for any French break-through. Even should such
a two-front war develop, it was confidently expected that the
German army could hold its position with mobile defensive
tactics and wait for a diplomatic solution. The quick offen-
sive elimination of France seemed highly improbable to Moltke
and he was not inclined to lose his force in Russian space. 4
He would rely on powerful defensive sallies and Bismarck 1 s
diplomacy. Such an aggressive defense seemed cogent as
long as Russian ineptitude and Bismarckian mastery continued,
but after 1890 conditions changed.
Bismarck was removed and, with French help, Russian
striking power was modernized. The French-Russian alliance
in 1 894 made grim reality out of what had been a mere
In The General Staff 25
hypothetical two-front problem* Germany 1 s hegemony power
was suddenly brought back into European balance and its
new leaders were confronted by resentful and suspicious
neighbors. German diplomacy could not maneuver its way
clear of such hostile currents and the German army was forced
to face up to a grave new assignment. And in its predica-
ment, this army adopted a more radical strategy and commit-
ted its nation to a role of irrational desperation in the wars
to come.
The Chief of Staff who had to solve the problem of en-
circlement was Schlieffen. Like Moltke, he featured a quiet
manner and tireless industry. Sphynx-like even among his
colleagues, he demonstrated a discreet public behavior and
and a co-operative propriety in his Staff's relationship with
the other agencies of government. In this respect he differed
radically from his immediate predecessor, Waldersee, who
flitted constantly about the political wings to demonstrate
the sort of mischief which was possible in a government
which tolerated private military channels of command respon-
sibility. Schlieffen 1 s part in the encouragement of militar-
istic influence lay in his fascinating strategic thought, not
in any opportunistic use of his office or person. This man
of simple piety and patient professional progress would study
the problem of a two-front war and commit his army to a radi-
cal, aggressive gamble. He would sweep through neutral
Belgium and defeat France in six to eight weeks. Then he
would shift his strength to the east and frustrate the Russian
enemy.
Schlieffen 1 s first memorandum as Chief of Staff, in
1891, reflected a will for aggressive, conclusive action.
He ruefully granted that the French defensive line was diffi-
cult and that a "decision 11 might have to be sought in the
east. It was too bad that the German and Austrian forces
could not be immediately consolidated, for then they could
knock out the French. Of course, another tactic might simply
be to outflank the French line by way of Belgium. Schlieffen 1 s
mind already entertained notions of immediate, or complete,
victory on a particular front. Moltke was willing to defend
and wait for a diplomatic solution. But he had Bismarck,
and his two-front problems remained theoretical. Schlieffen 1 s
predicament was actual and his response was less cautious.
26 General William Groener
He knew that the French and Russian armies were improving
and he also realized that industrial Germany would find it
difficult to sustain a long war. He placed little reliance in
his Austrian ally and the German navy admitted its inability
to be of any effective assistance in a western campaign.
Schlieff en had a prime army anckhe decided to commit it ab-
solutely. Maybe such Prussian directness reflected the
strength and limitations of his forefathers and he was less
subtle and complex than Moltke. Maybe his memory of the
Prussian hymn of victory on the heights of Koeniggratz fos-
tered his dream of another complete triumph. Certainly his
military responsibility was difficult and, just as certainly,
his strategic solution would 'prove to be of far-reaching con-
sequence to subsequent German history. 5
Schlieff en worked on his western offensive for the rest
of that decade. He studied a vital penetration at Nancy since
such a drive would also force a decisive French stand, but
it threatened to take too much time and expose the German
east to the expected Russian invasion. A lead-off action
against Russia could hardly end in a quick victory and
Schlieffen placed little stock in any meaningful Austrian co-
operation. He trusted nothing except his own army and his
own developing plan. In 1897 he projected, and abandoned,
a button-hook operation around Verdun since broad rail sup-
port could not be mustered there and the proximity of the
Belgian border hindered a broad thrust. Any forceful French
counter-attack toward Belgium would break the slender Ger-
man prong. Then he decided that, H Any offensive which
wants to turn around Verdun must not be afraid to violate the
neutrality of Luxembourg, nor even that of Belgium. 11 He de-
cided that neutral sanctities could not be allowed to restrict
the German chance and in 1899 he projected his army's drive
into France by way of Belgium.
Once the moral violation was digested, the advantage
of an even deeper flank through Lille would not long be dis-
regarded. The superior rail net west of the Meuse could
then be used to give effective supply support to the entire
flank, especially along its outside line. Thus the expansive
German rail facilities along the lower Rhine could be switched
through liege and Brussels towani the open French frontier,
with excellent road and rail systems continuing all the way
In The General Staff 27
to Paris. The speedy, mass movement so vital to Schlieffen f s
flanking force might here find its decisive logistical support.
Thus not only the tough French fortification line, but also the
superior German-Belgian rail net, drew Sch lief fen 1 s offensive
plans ever more to the northwest. n ln other words, M he said
to his Staff in 1904, " one attacks along the front Verdun-Lille,
not Belfort-Verdun, for that much expansion will be generally
necessary in order to get enough room for free mobility. 11
The General Staff had arrived at its solution to Germany ! s
two-front predicament.
The addition of Britain as another possible enemy did
not change the plans for a march on Paris. It was not ex-
pected to be able to block a German land operation and the
Schlieff en Staff simply felt it self forced to shrug off the mari-
time implications of any British opposition. It saw no other
recourse against the probable coalition. Defensive action
seemed even more hopeless and the German army chose to
force its opportunity rather than wait for two-front pressure.
Such grim, combative logic ruled out certain moral intangibles
which might accrue to a German defense and it discounted
the chance of any diplomatic relief. The Schlieffen Plan
chose to assert German strength rather than await a pleasant
diplomatic surprise. 6
The reaction of the Imperial government was a classic
in self-revelation. Schlieffen was no frondeur and he passed
his Belgian project into the private channels which conveyed
so much of the Empire 1 s business. Schlieffen was a good
friend of Holstein but, according to recorded memory, he
chose to give him cognizance of the plan by way of that vet-
eran liaison expert, Hutten-Czapski, who was close to both
Holstein and Chancellor Hohenlohe, and was expected to get
their reaction to the Belgian plan. It was in 1899 that Czapski
took Schlieff en's plan to Holstein and asked for the latter 1 s
judgment on the neutrality violation. The question was cru-
cial and almost worth a council of state. But Holstein took
the burden on himself, thought seriously for awhile and told
Czapski, "If the Chief of Staff, especially a strategic au-
thority such as Schlieffen, believes such a measure to be
necessary, then it is the obligation of diplomacy to adjust to
it and prepare for it in every possible way. 11 Holstein spoke
with his aged advisee, Hohenlohe, on the following morning
28 General William Groener
and a few days later Schlieffen was invited to dine with the
Chancellor in the company of other friends. There the Chief
of Staff and Hohenlohe retired for a private conversation.
Schlieffen was thereafter at ease with his project and un-
doubtedly it was given verbal sanction. It would not be
seriously weighted again by government officils until 1913. 7
One wonders whether Schlieffen and Holstein had not
privately discussed their problem before the Czapski action.
Holstein 1 s relatively quick response to such a question and
his fatuous praise of Schlieffen seem worthy of some sus-
picion. He and Schlieffen met almost weekly in long dinner
sessions during those years and one wonders why the general
had to convey his plan by way of Czapski. Such curiosity
notwithstanding, the rather informal and secretive acceptance
by the government of such an explosive piece of strategy
speaks volumes about its devious personal methods and its
fantastic submission to radical military logic.
Schlieff en's strategy placed a campaign victory above
deeper diplomatic and technological considerations. The fall
of Paris could not defeat Britain and the latter 1 s naval block-
ade would then presumably strangle Germany 1 s economic
capacity for a longer struggle. Admiral Tirpitz admitted his
helplessness on the blockade problem and German government
officials did not expect their nation to be able to sustain
more than an eighteen-month war effort. Yet the German dip-
lomatic position, especially after the French- British Entente,
was so perplexing that a desperate strike for relief and re-
alignment was for a time seriously considered. In 1904 the
unilateral French advance in Morocco angered German pride
and Berlin pressed for some compensation, preferably a port
along the North African coast. Russia was busy with its
Japanese war and France seemed to be momentarily isolated,
but Britain's maritime sensitivities were aroused and she
stepped resolutely to the side of her new colonial ally, France,
Holstein wanted to push German demands to the brink but
Chancellor Buelow accepted international arbitration after
two letters from the Kaiser warned him that the army and navy
were not ready, and the socialists were still a dangerous
problem.
On New Year 1 s Day, 1906, the mercurial ruler had to
tell his disappointed generals that there would be no war.
In The General Staff 29
They were ready to undertake a military recovery of the Ger-
man dec line and Schlieff en admitted, in 1904, that the Moroc-
can crisis presented an opportune moment, "should the
necessityfor a war with France reveal itself." But apparently
neither he nor his Kaiser directly pressed for war in the climax
months of 1905-1906. Nevertheless, that crisis did present
a situation and an atmosphere of tension, which gave special,
suggestive meaning to Schlieffen 1 s full and classic formula-
tion of his plan. 8
In the Fall of 1905, Schlieffen lectured to his Staff on
Napoleon's campaign against Prussia in 1806. Most of the
French power was concentrated on the right flank between
Bamberg and Bayreuth. With the opening of hostilities, Na-
poleon directed this flank toward Berlin. The same move sep-
arated that capital from its western armies and drove a wedge
between the Prussian force and its potential ally, Russia. An
attack straight into the western gateway to Prussia would
have allowed its army to recoil back onto its own base and
probably Russian support. The strike for a capital city was
a favorite tactic of Napoleon, forcing the enemy to make a
stand and producing a quick victory decision.
Napoleon 1 s right flank was directly up against Hapsburg
Bohemia and a neutrality violation by his advancing troops
seemed possible. Critics might censure the French emperor
for so flagrantly risking Austrian intervention, but Schlieffen
discounted such criticism. The right flank was Napoleon 1 s
vital force and he employed it despite risk, because he was
confident that it would bring victory. Its positive action and
prospect was not to be governed by Austrian decision* Na-
poleon stayed with his own plan for quick victory; he had the
will to act with positive force, not negative considerations.
Schlieffen urged his Staff to learn from the Napoleonic example.
Germany must emulate its method and multiply its force. Like
Napoleon, the German commanders must have the strength and
nerve to force their plan on the enemy.
In January, 1906, the barely retired Schlieffen finished
his celebrated memorandum on an operation into Belgium and
France. The Moroccan negotiations during those winter months
did give a certain crisis impetus to his work and already he
feared that his successor, the younger Moltke, would not
stress the flanking force enough.
30 General William Groener
Schlieffen's memorandum described France as a great
fortress. It had an almost impenetrable defensive line from
Belfort toMezieres. A second defensive arc behind Mezieres
extended from Verdun through Rheims to La Fere. Such forti-
fication lines were formidable obstacles and would undoubt-
edly tie upany German frontal assault. And the recent Russo-
Japanese war showed how maneuvering armies could lock
themselves in paralyzing trench war. Germany must avoid
such a stalemate because it had neither the position nor the
resources for such a test of strength. The entire French de-
fensive complex was to be outflanked by way of Belgium. The
northern wing would jump off through the Liege area and fan
out to the south and west over Namur and Brussels. Direction
was to be maintained toward Lille and Northwestern France.
Thus a flanking grip on the defending line could be maintained
and the envelopment continued. The French defense was to
be hooked in from behind and rolled up toward the Swiss fron-
tier. Strongholds were to be by- passed and mopped up by
follow-up lines of the advance. The "colossal fortress" of
Paris was to be encircled from the southwest.
This memorandum did not promise victory; indeed it fore-
cast failure unless certain improvements were made. The
Metz fortress position was not deeply buttressed enough to
securely anchor the long right flank and also hold planned
German defensive traps in Alsace-Lorraine. The army lacked
sufficient heavy artillery to smash through fortification points,
and eight more corps were needed if that right flank was to
have the controlling force it needed to flood Belgium and en-
velope Paris. It must have the power to push through any de-
fensive stand and peel off those units necessary to the invest-
ment of by-passed strongpoints. Man power was the critical
problem and it was on this point that Schlieffen was most un-
certain. Approach Paris as they might, he wrote,
"we will soon recognize that we are too weak for
a continuation of the operation in this direction.
We will find the experience of all earlier conquer-
ors certified: that offensive war requires and uses
up much strength, that such gets constantly weaker
as that of the defender increases and all this es-
pecially in a land which bristles with fortifications .
In The General Staff 31
... It is therefore necessary that the Germans be
as strong as possible on the right flank, for here
the decisive battle may be expected. 11
Thus did Schlieffen define and bequeath his thought to his
erstwhile Staff and it remained the governing idea of subse-
quent German strategy.
Gerhard Ritter ! s critique, and publication of the various
Schlieffen Plan fragments, has now brought the Schlieffen
controversy to a new level of understanding. It is quite evi-
dent that Schlieffen recognized the formidable problems which
would be involved in the success of such a massive envelop-
ment. Repeatedly he admitted that the German force would
find itself too weak. Liege and the Belgian railroads must
fall substantially preserved into German hands or the entire
operation would be without a sound logistical base. The
prospect of reducing Paris seemed slight and the English army
was not even mentioned in the main memorandum. A supple-
mentary fragment then followed in which the British force,
almost as an afterthought, was to be locked into its Channel
ports. Maritime implications of Britain 1 s presence in the war
were not brought into the discussion; such problems lay be-
yond army range, and were simply left to the gods. And
Schlieffen's bold project assumed no help from either Austria
or his own fleet. His army must address and solve its prob-
lem as though no other help was possible. In such assump-
tion he was not entirely unrealistic but his will to triumph
a. la Napoleon, instead of .a la Frederick, would prove to be
a fatal German gamble. Not only was his army prepared to
fight alone but it was permitted to shape its plan without the
serious consultation of German naval, or economic, or politi-
cal leaders. Here was a classic example of militaristic logic
in control of national policy. 9
William Groener would say, even after 1918, that the
Schlieffen Plan's only fault lay in its mismanaged failure in
1914; it was strategically sound and morally comprehensible.
But Gerhard Ritter has declared this plan to be not only me-
chanically unrealistic but also psychologically fatal to sub-
sequent German history. It committed Germany to an immoral
blunder and gave seeming justice to the Allied cause and the
Allied peace. It began that isolation of the German position,
32 General William Groener
moral and physical, which led to further desperation and even
deeper alienation from the spirit and body of western Europe.
For Ritter, the Schlieffen Plan was a foolish and fatal action,
pregnant with military imprudence and moral disregard.
William Groener 1 s years in the General Staff paralleled
the Imperial life and failure of the Schlieffen Plan. He partici-
pated in its construction from 1899 until 19 14 and he sub-
scribed to its thought with trust and admiration. He was re-
ceptive to war in 1905 and he agreed with Schlieffen that Ger-
many's diplomatic perplexities could only be relieved by bold
action. Certain problems could not be unravelled; they had
to be cut through and he was willing to assay the strike.
Groener was as signed to the railroad section of the Gen-
eral Staff and it was here that he became intimately involved
with the Schlieffen Plan. Such railroad work meant much time-
table drudgery and it was one of those technical chores gen-
erally avoided by those who had the pedigree for Guard or
cavalry units. The new bourgeois officers in the Imperial
army were frequently posted at such less exciting positions
and thus unwittingly trained for leadership in the technical
war to come.
The railroad gave nineteenth century Germany new pivotal
force in the life of Europe. It helped to facilitate Prussian
economic leadership and it gave the Germans more cohesive
military potential. In the clairvoyant words of economist
Friedrich List,
"Speed of mobilization, the rapidity with which
troops could be moved from a country's center to
its periphery and the other obvious advantages of
'interior lines 1 of rail transport would be of greater
relative advantage to Germany than to any other
European country. "
Prussian leaders understood this and they began to build such
new steel roads. Railroad costs helped to bring about the
constitutional crisis which led to Bismarck, and Moltke then
used the iron horse to climax German unification on the bat-
tlefields of Bohemia and France. He saw that modern mass
armies could best be moved and supplied by rail, and his ad-
vice was to "build railroads rather than fortresses." His new
In The General Staff 33
German army obtained supervisory authority over all German
rail construction and this influence solidified when most of
the state networks were placed under national control in 1887.
The federal states were usually quite happy to let the army
chart, and finance, railroad development. German rail ex-
pansion was thus planned with a studied regard for military
need.
Until 1890 railroad construction centered on Alsace-
Lorraine and southwest Germany, as did Moltke's strategic
interests. Industrial growth and changing military problems
then led to intensified rail expansion in East Prussia, Silesia,
and the Rhineland. The latter area was especially important
to the Schlieffen strategy and, after 1890, six more bridges
and a trans-Eif el network were constructed so that four armies
might be quickly aligned between Trier and Aachen. The
Schlieffen Plan required instantaneous speed, concentrated
volume, and open country for the rapid deployment of a mil-
lion-man army. Groener and his railroad colleagues would
labor unceasingly to perfect the transportation instrument so
vital to the entire project. Every winter they would pore over
schedules to exact minimum load and speed out of their sys-
tem. Every year they remodeled the plan as the Staff adjusted
to changing means and problems.
It was tedious and intensive labor with few mistakes
permissible and no opportunity for a meaningful rehearsal*
An antiquated twenty-mile practice track and the yearly corps
maneuver gave the railroad section slight practical experience.
Theirs was a theoretical and bureaucratic preparation, to be
tested by the actual war emergency itself. They were unsung
heroes and not always happy in their role. Such painstaking
drudgery wore on human nature and Groener remarked in his
memoirs, "what person could not understand that the call to
action would be received as a liberation from a long and
wearily borne burden. 11 The desk soldiers wanted to see their
plans in operation too, and, in 1914, Groener would not flick
a muscle of concern as war loomed up. Somehow it seemed
that their repeated labors must also have some purpose and
climax.
Schlieffen 1 s Plan was admittedly beyond the strength of
the German army in 1905, even with Russia momentarily busy
in the Far East. It outlined aft operation which might succeed,
34 General William Groener
if an alerted German government would give its army the
the man power and equipment necessary to such a lightning
blow. Groener very much subscribed to the Schlieffen proj-
ect and he also understood that it depended on further im-
provements. He made a supply study of such a flanking
operation in 1906 and his conclusions could hardly be
termed optimistic. He did not share Schlieffen 1 s optimism
about having the advancing armies live off the land. He
reminded the Staff that there would hardly be time to organ-
ize supply feeders from the Belgian and French countryside
itself and such magical improvisation could neither be
planned or practiced. The job of maintaining supply con-
tact with a rapidly moving million-man army would be su-
premely difficult and it would demand happy co-ordination
and resourcefulness. The German army had better not plan
on a momentary organization of the Belgian resources but
develop its own supply program instead. There would be
enough need for self-help and improvisation even with suc-
cessful supply runs from the home front. All would depend
on a systematic rail action which must not be upset by
selfish pressure or special demands from any of the troop
commanders. It was clear that great difficulties would en-
sue "if the railroads are thoroughly destroyed. 11 Harness
teams would not be able to keep up and "the moment would
come when the armies would have to stop and let the sup-
ply columns catch up. " War had many variables and even
the weatherman could upset the best laid plans. Motor
trucks could effectively bridge the gap between railhead
and front-line, "but it will be a long time before we are in
a position to equip our supply columns with an adequate
number of such transport means. 11
Greener's memorandum prophetically fore saw that sup-
ply coetact with a racing front would become increasingly
difficult and that it might only be sustained by means of
motor tracks. They could serve as the connecting rods be-
tween the railheads and the forward distribution points.
They were yet experimental in 1906 and, as Groener feared,
they were not yet in adequate supply by 1914. Budgetary
provisions were always stingy and the German High Com-
mand was slow to recognize and promote the use of motor -
teed transportation, but its railroad section douid not be
In The General Staff 35
accused of obtuseness or technical narrowness on this point.
Groener had his finger on the motorized key as early as 1906. 10
In that same year Groener 1 s railroad section played
through a tele phone and telegram maneuver in Magdeburg. It
was the first large scale exercise for the German soldier in
this communication medium. Groener found that shortrange
contact between the front combat units was fairly good, but
headquarters to the rear had trouble staying in touch with
its advance units. Here also, rear echelon contact with a
rapidly advancing front was yet an unsolved problem. Ger-
man telephone and telegram communication was entirely in-
adequate in 1914. Groener 1 s studies revealed the practical
problems of the Schlieffen Plan then and later. He and his
Chief recognized that their project was yet unrealistic in
1906; its feasibility in 1914 remained to be tested. But their
man power and motorized requirements were never satisfied
and the plan would be executed in 1914 without such condi-
tional improvements. Certainly Groener 1 s postwar arguments
for the Schlieffen Plan would not be entirely in joint with his
own earlier qualifications, and its political shortsightedness
seems even greater in the light of such recognized technical
deficiencies.
Schlieffen ! s memorandum of 1906 was finished about a
month after his retirement and it represented a summary ex-
position of his idea. It had now been developed for more
than ten years and worked into the German war plan. It mag-
netized the interest of his subordinates and it would guide
Staff planning even after his retirement and death. But the
new Chief of Staff, the younger Moltke, also had certain
reservations about Schlieffen 1 s concept and he would lean
toward more caution. Some of the Schlieffen men in the Staff,
including Groener, would be critical .of the Moltke altera-
tions and, after the Marne failure, they would hold him re-
sponsible for this crucial German set-back. And yet, they
all liked Moltke personally and tended to regard him as a
noble, misplaced individual.
Groener compared the retirement of Schlieffen to that of
Bismarck, as a second major German step downward. Both
giants stepped from the stage with reluctance and both were
followed by men of lesser training and talent* The profes-
sionals were giving way to the favorites in a government
36 General William Groener
controlled by an egotistical dilettante who preferred congenial
subordinates to independent professionals. Schlieffen was
not without courtly obsequieusness, but he was also an aus-
tere, solitary man who could hardly be a companion to the
Kaiser* William preferred subordinates who were personally
congenial to him, perhaps also intellectually less spry than
he. Men like Bismarck and Schlieffen were entirely too sov-
ereign, distant, and entrenched for a Kaiser who loved to
banter, scintillate and instruct*
The younger Moltke was an intelligent, sensitive person
who tended to oscillate between fear and pride. He was fa-
miliar with the elite and relaxed in their company, having
served most of his career as an adjutant to his celebrated
uncle and to William II. Certainly he did not have the thorough
professional experience ordinarily to be desired in a Chief of
Staff. His brief troop service was with the preening Guards
and his first regimental command was bestowed in 1897. The
first review of his unit thrilled him with a sense of exultant
authority. He could recite passages from Faust in the midst
of some solitary field work and he was excited by the dramatic
exploits of Frederick the Great. Occasionally he admitted in
his letters that he was a born military leader. Certainly he
was flattered with his advancement to the higher echelon and
his expressed fear of the job hardly coincided with other
statements of interest. He was vice-Chief of Staff for more
than two years and expectantly aware of his pending eleva-
vation. His appointment was a rather typical act of Imperial
favoritism and yet he proved to be a competent Chief, es-
pecially with the assistance of the more talented and decisive
LudendorfL
Moltke was not inclined to accept Schlieffen 1 s Plan en
totoanditwas under his command that Groener undertook his
searching supply study. Moltke recognized that the success
erf such an undertaking would depend on a faultless opening
performance and he hardly expected such professional perfec-
tion after thirty-five years of peace. Schlieffen apparently
expected to surmount all problems with his grand, forcing
plan and a self-reliant resourcefulness. Moltke did not be-
lieve that will-power could surmount all difficulties and he
was much more apprehensive of German chances. n Believe
me," he cautioned a more optimistic associate, "too many
In The General Staff 37
hounds will kill the hare. 11
Moltke's strategic thought disagreed with the Schlieffen
Plan on two basic points. He was hesitant to risk the entire
campaign on a long flanking drive into northwest France. Al-
so he believed in meeting, not circling, the enemy.
The older Moltke had hesitated to wheel into France
north of Verdun. He thought such an extended wing would
expose the German line of communication to a crippling
counter-attack. The younger Moltke also feared a French
drive into the German rear. He believed that an exaggerated
German commitment in Belgium would leave the middle and
upper Rhine dangerously exposed to a French invasion. Ger-
man industry and the entire back side of the Belgian advance
would then come under French guns. The uncle had planned
to win in Alsace-Lorraine with a trapping, mobile defensive.
The nephew also had his heart set on this theatre and he
thought in terms of a balanced pincer strategy out of Belgium
and the Vosges. He would commit additional German troop
strength to the Vosges front and thus give his line more
balanced strength and potential. His Belgian- Lorraine ratio
of strength was 3 to 1, whereas the Schlieffen Plan called
fora preponderant 7 to 1. However, Moltke's reinforcements
on his southern flank were not drawn from the north. They
came from the greater man power available to the army after
1905. Thus he did not actually weaken Schlieffen 1 s actual
right flank strength. He simply declined to strengthen it
further and gave the extra man power to the left flank instead.
The new Chief believed in engaging the enemy. He told
his officers that there was little point in marching through
Belgium if the French were in Lorraine. The basic purpose
of a German move through Belgium was to draw the French
out of their fortified eastern front.
11 But if the French come out of their fortress, then
they will place themselves in an open field.
There is no point. . . in marching further through
Belgium with strong forces when the main French
army is advancing in Lorraine. Then only one
thought must be considered: to fall on the French
army with all possible strength and to strike it
wherever it can be found. n ll
38 General William Groener
Moltke wanted to maneuver with the French and draw them out
for the climatic engagement. He understood such a tactical
duel as the only normal, sensible way to conduct a campaign.
Schlieffen was not interested in finding the enemy. He hoped
to move around armies and envelop the entire French defensive
system- His plan projected a powerful, simple run to the
outside and a consequent enveloping hook. Moltke 1 s thought
was more cautious and more complicated. He would open up
with several simultaneous offensives, shuttling troops north
or south as the opportunity presented itself. He would im-
provise in the course of the conflict as his uncle had done so
masterfully. But the younger Moltke lacked the experience
and talent for such intuitive maneuvering and in 1914 he would
soon lose control of his multi-geared offensive.
InGroener's view, the new Chief simply lacked the nerve
to strip Lorraine and gamble with one decisive thrust into
northern France. He could speak of Schlieffen 1 s feu sacre
but he obviously did not have it. Once he cried because a
subordinate missed an assignment and the postponement of a
maneuver could make him frantic. He told his wife on one
such occasion, as rain forced a day's delay, "all the dispo-
sitions can now be thrown aside. . . . everything is topsy-turvy
... imagine the consequences if such a forceful intrusion
should occur in a real emergency. !rl2 In fact such a last-
minute disturbance did challenge him in 1914 and it brought
him to the verge of collapse. Neither he nor the Kaiser were
as nervy as they wanted to be and their Faustian dreams were
quite beyond their natures.
Groener worked well under Moltke, even though he re-
gretted the strategic alteration, and he became the head of
the full military railroad section in 1911. He would push for
final Improvements before war broke out in 1914. Groener
did not spend all of his time with the Staff in Berlin. There
wem tours of line duty in Lorraine and Wuerttemberg. He also
sailed with the Kaiser's young fleet for a week and then took
a busman's holiday through Holland, Belgium and France. It
was probably no mere coincidence that he visited those coun-
tries which were most related to his Staff work.
In Mets, Groener got a taste of the enemy. That city
was not reconciled to German control and its resentment per-
vaded Hie ataospfaete. The Germans were perso&ae non grata
In The General Staff 39
and the rare cry of "vive le empereur" only served to point up
the difference between the city and its ruler. Those families
which could, moved to France when their turn came to provide
quarters for the German officers and even Groener's easy good
will at the village inn table fell flat. High and low were al-
ienated by the new authorities. Abbe Sollin was the spiritual
leader of Metz and he moved through the streets with imperious
dignity. And one can imagine that the Kulturkampf did not ex-
actly help to reconcile Alsace-Lorraine to the new German as-
sociation. Lorraine was French, of course, and its displea-
sure had very natural roots, but the German Alsatians were not
happy either and their dissatisfaction could not be so easily
explained away. They had native anti- Prussian feelings and
some taste for the French culture and yet, the basic impedi-
ment to their spiritual reunion with Germany may well have
been constitutional. How could they give their loyalty to a
state which denied them equal rights of citizenship?
The German Empire allowed the life of Alsace-Lorraine to
be governed by the military interest. The German soldiers re-
garded these two provinces as a western glacis, critical to
their strategy and thus to be managed in the army ! s interest.
Their desiderata regulated both the native officials and the oc-
cupation bureaucrats. Constitutional protests by the inhabi-
tants were curtly brushed aside and they periodically excited
even tighter regulation. Bismarck understood the two provinces
to be military installations and he was not interested in their
rights or in their morale. Let them be unhappy with the Empire.
A good bureaucracy was the best constitution they might ex-
pect and their pull for more rights was simply reined in. And
when Alsace-Lorraine was finally on the verge of receiving
constitutional dignity in 1913, the Zabem affair in Alsace re-
newed military suspicions and military autocracy in the two
provinces. The Kaiser backed his military authorities to the
hilt and constitutional reform was filed away. Even the re-
sounding Reichstag criticism of the government's action in the
Zabem affair merely served to highlight civilian helplessness
throughout the Empire.
The Hohenzollern regime shrugged off the popular protest
and Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg blandly told the Reichstag
that its vote of censure had no constitutional significance.
This was the very man who had sponsored constitutional reform
40 General William Groener
for Alsace-Lorraine and awaited its fulfillment in 1913. In the
final analysis, this sincere and progressive official remained
a servant to his Kaiser and established dynastic authority.
His first official appearance before the Reichstag in the uni-
form of a major of the reserve was a highly symbolical act.
It marked his status and his responsibilities in the Prussian
world which bred him. 13
Groener 1 s company In Metz consisted mostly of young
miners from the Ruhr* Most of them were in sympathy with
socialism and they could hardly be expected to give the Kaiser
the naive loyalty which he requested. They were aware of his
anti-labor tirades and the military leaders were not at all
happy with this increasing volume of recruits from the city.
Some even hesitated to enlarge the army out of fear for this
new social element. Bourgeois officers and proletariat sol-
diers were still regarded with varying degrees of suspicion by
the junker military leaders. 14 Would this new breed serve
obediently and accept the traditions of an aristocratic officer
corps? A rising young professional like Groener never enter-
tained such questions about class and tradition and he ex-
pected the same uncomplicated patriotism from his men. He
was happy with his miners, for they served with cheerfulness
and alacrity.
Revolutionary fervor no longer represented the nature of
German socialism. Increasing prosperity, bargaining rights,
and Reichstag representation were steadily mollifying the op-
position mood of the working class. Unions and shop stewards
were careful to husband their gains and move forward a step
at a time* Talk of revolution and mass strikes now seemed
foolishly destructive and the mood was distinctly and opti-
mistically for practical progress. Twentieth century German
socialism was beginning to affiliate its interests with the
larger process of a national society. It even began to see a
relationship between colonies and competitive economic se-
curity and the army was more and more accepted as the shield
of national welfare. Here too a modem German patriotism was
esjerglag which understood factional objectives to be within
a larger national framework. Substantial democratic reforms
were still held to be necessary and yet the socialists were
settling into a patient evolutionary gait. 15
With his Metz company, Groener ran through various
In The General Staff 41
tactical problems under the bright eye of a dynamo named
Haeseler. The latter was a Prussian stereotype with a sparse
frame, energetic habits, and severe manner. He showed up
everywhere, dragging along his crippled foot in a slipper, and
only occasionally sitting down to rest in a chair which his
servant constantly carried behind him. He liked to experi-
ment with minimal food and sleep for himself, or with night
problems and new attack methods for his men. Even the Metz
units, stationed at one of Germany's major fortress positions,
worked extensively on offensive war. The entire spirit of the
Imperial army was one of bold aggressiveness. In fact this
was the spirit of the nation. There were problems everywhere,
but momentum was yet vibrantly evident and the German will
to succeed still set the tone.
Some years later, in 1908, Groener took a week's cruise
with the proud but yet insecure "risk 11 fleet. The General
Staff and the Admiralty exchanged such visiting tours of duty
in a rather half-hearted attempt to draw the two services to-
gether. Many in the General Staff envied the fiscal and pub-
licity talents of Admiral Tirpitz, but they saw no tactical jus-
tification for his navy, which took so much money away from
the army's budget, Groener enjoyed his sea voyage and he
was attracted by sunny skies and a sparkling, running sea.
He could sense the lure of the deep. But he soon tired of wake
and sky-line, and he turned to assess his friends in blue.
They spoke much of Britain and seemed to understand the su-
perity of the foe. Their own force was still in early growth
and their experience hardly measured up to the centuries be-
hind the British Jack. Even Tirpitz recognized that his force
could not successfully engage with the enemy, and the Gen-
eral Staff came to disregard any possible naval contribution
to its strategy. The two service arms did not even communi-
cate their plans to one another, much less correlate them.
One bald Moltke comment was rather suggestive of the entire
strategic dilemma, "since the navy had no choice for success
in a war against Britain, such a war must simply be avoided. 11
Only his Own Belgian plan would immediately guarantee such
unmanageable opposition. l6
Germany's prewar mistakes now seem rather obvious and
its naval program proved to be especially damaging. It al-
ienated Britain without being able to match such rival sea
42 General William Groener
power. It took much money, and strength, away from the army
in the perennial budget negotiations. And it fired up a colony-
minded patriotism which helped to pull Germany from its con-
tinental sockets into world rivalries for which she lacked basic
position.
After his week at sea, Groener continued with a modest
tour of the lands to the west. In Rotterdam and Amsterdam he
probably scrutinized dock and communication facilities as
well as art collections. In Brussels he saw many British visi-
tors and noticed that the Belgians thought nothing of a week-
end in Paris. A certain cultural bond between the three nations
seemed to exist and it would undoubtedly influence their po-
litical policies. Groener was one of those Germans who could
not possibly conceive of British neutrality in any German war
with France, even if Belgium 1 s neutrality were respected.
These western peoples had mutual interests and the British
would then simply assist the French at their own strategic
convenience, but the Germans would then have forfeited their
big offensive chance.
Groener was captivated by Paris and a planned two-week
visit stretched into six. The stubby Staff officer in civilian
dress sat in the boulevard cafes and watched French life
stream by. He liked the French and thought their vivacity to
be nicely balanced by a sense for measured form. He watched
the visitors from the provinces stand silently and reverently
at the tomb of Napoleon. These were the people, and this
the tradition, which his German army might some day face in
battle. Groener did not notice any militancy or anti-German
feeling in the capital. He watct^ the traditional parade on
Bastille Day and the French troops made an excellent impres^'
sion on him. His Prussian companions from the Legation
were smugly satisfied that the French were still less precise
and stalwart.
After that journey Groener rounded out his broader expe-
rience will* a longer tour of duty in Wuerttemberg. Now the
paymasters soa was the operations officer of the Thirteenth
Corps and tfee Duke of Wuerttemberg would read off Groener 1 s
reports as though they were his own. Hie simple young re-
cruit had climbed to high levels. Now he was a major from
the General Staff and the big man in the Corps. He plotted,
ted and lectured survey tripe into the home countryside. He
In The General Staff 43
organized a two-corps maneuver problem and helped to lay the
groundwork for an Imperial war game. As operations officer
he showed a preference for the timely withdrawal as a means
of regaining offensive nvobility. The counter-attack, naturally,
was delivered into the side and rear of the advancing enemy.
Flanking action had come to dominate his strategic thinking.
Some verse at a Corps party probably gave some realistic
caricature of Groener 1 s personality. In one skit he argued
against regional pride:
"Schoen ists ueberall im Reiche,
Jedes Land hat seinen Wert,
Mag man dort die Weine preissen,
Dorten mehr auch den Kaff ee,
Wir sind doch in einem einig:
In der Liebe zur Armee. "
Here was, in the parody of friends, a national German who
could appreciate traditional distinctions and yet also integrate
them in a united loyalty to nation and army. His life and ca-
reer had developed in a new German spirit and he accepted it
as his highest social value. Local pride and class differences
were mere elements in this modern national unity and ego.
Another bit of verse had fun with his soldierly will and
daring:
n Seht zum Beispiel Major Groener
Welch ein kluger Mann, ein schoener!
Wie ist ihm der Geist so vive
Wie strotzt er von Initiative
Schrecklich seinen Feinden alien
Tut er nachts sie ueberfallen
Ehe die sie noch bedacht
Hat er sie schon umgebracht
O der Grimme kennt kein Schonen
Schlachtet Reiterdivisionen. * . I!
The Prussian Groener was no longer a congenial " night light."
Now he was grimly aggressive and imaginatively daring* May-
be the slaughtered cavalry divisions even played on his tech-
nical accentuations. The respect of his staff seemed not to
lack friendliness but perhaps they were also struck somewhat
by Ms professional intensity* Life among the line units was
44 General William Groener
not that crisp and the returning Swabian from the General
Staff now had distinct Prussian markings. He could still re-
lax with his men but in the command tent he was a zealous,
systematic professional. At this stage of his life the Prussian
traits seemingly formed the profile of his personality.
In those last years before the war Groener also published
several essays which further illustrated his military passion.
In one article he envisioned the army as a sort of a national
school for the development of a proper Empire patriotism.
Here class and ideological differences could be fused in a
German n bond of comradeship. " The intrinsic disciplinary
and competitive nature of army training would impregnate
young Germans against the pacifistic and anarchic lures of
socialism. The outward national unity could thus be given
deeper inward foundations. Of course such political orienta-
tion was to be managed with intelligence and subtlety, but
the tactful officer, comprehending social background and hu-
man psychology, could do much for the stability of the mon-
archy. The army might be more than a mere shield of the cul-
ture; it could help to consolidate and shape a modem Empire
patriotism.
Another Groener article encouraged the German soldiers
to serve as instructors and advisers in foreign countries.
Such cosmopolitan variety would enhance their individual
lives and better serve the new world ambitions of Germany.
The Empire would need men of international experience in the
years tocome and the army should be alert to such future re-
quirements. These military advisers could also be a wedge
for German business. There was a note of boredom in such
thoughts of foreign service, but always there was military and
national opportunism. For Groener the army was no dead tool
of the state. It was an active, formative, institutional force
in the cultivation of a stronger Germany.
A third article ascribed universal qualities of human no-
bility to the railitary life. It was entitled "Das Erhabene und
Sohoe&e in der Kriegskunst*" In it Groener asserted that war
was not just an animalistic struggle for right and might; it
bad its own Justice and virtue. War protected culture and,
like nature, it allowed manifold freedom within iron limits.
11 Itifc finest pages of history are those which describe how
spiritual strength overcame hostile destiny and surmounted
In The General Staff 45
misfortune. 11 Such words echoed the older Moltke and they
supported the daring will of the Sehlieffen Plan. They also
represented a militant exploitation of older, purer German
idealism. 17
Groener and his colleagues found intellectual satisfac-
tion in such military philosophy and they were quite ready
for a martial clarification and rejuvenation. An exasperated
old veteran like Colmar von der Goltz was tired of enervating
peace and he wished Germany a good, hard fight so that the
spartanlike Prussian virtues might be revived. Groener was
not that direct or provincial but his spirit belonged in such
company. War was a test and not a catastrophe. German
prospects were grim but his army still trusted in its skill and
power. Let the diplomats make their frustrated circles. The
army had the will to cut Gordian knots and, armed with the
Schlieffen Plan, Groener confidently a waited the "unavoidable
military conflict 11 with his neighbors. He still regarded
Europe as a competitive family, but the German stock was
badly in need of a rally. He acclaimed the nerve of military
action; he did not yet appreciate the higher nerve and ethic
of diplomatic patience.
The vibrant Groener became Chief of the General Staff's
railroad section in 1911 and thereafter Germany f s lightning
start would depend on his work. He thought his facilities
could be improved and he immediately undertook an ambitious
expansion program. The German rail net at that time included
fourteen Rhine bridges, thirteen trunk lines into the important
Rhine assembly area, four trunk lines along the Rhine, and
fourtrunk lines across the Empire. Groener wanted five more
Rhine bridges, seven more western trunk lines, and a special
four-track through way from Hanover into western Germany*
With improved locomotives, Groener worked to raise his traf-
fic speed to twenty-five miles per hour and thereby cut three
days from the mobilization timetable. German rail transpor-
tation was to fall stringently under his authority with the
mobilization and military priorities not to be questioned, but
his zone commanders did check with civic officials for pos-
sible emergency needs and special milk and food trains were
somehow to be threaded into the mobilization schedule.
Groenerts section drilled incessantly on emergencies and im-
provisations. System and resourcefulness were considered
46 General William Groener
to be the two basic requisites for a successful mobilization
and subsequent supply race into northwestern France. 18
Groener 1 s projected improvements shot far over his bud-
get allotments and he would get only one more Rhine bridge
before the war started, and the other expansion requests were
also postponed or rejected* But he still had an extensive
quality system and its performance in 1914 more than satisfied
the German expectation* In fact, its exceptional work and
good fortune in that first summer campaign gave very danger-
ous substance to the extended flanking drive.
Budgetary restrictions held up Groener 1 s improvement
program and the General Staff was rather consistently vexed
by such financial caution. The Empire lacked a modern tax
structure as the confederate states resisted higher contribu-
tions and the Prussian nobility angrily checked efforts to levy
a national property tax. Both of these elements opposed the
idea of fiscal centralization and thus they obstructed the reve-
nue needs of modern German power* The bourgeois delegates
in the Reichstag were equally outraged by such conservative
selfishness and money problems invariably triggered their
sharpest criticisms of caste privilege and arrogance. Such
bitter debate in the Reichstag periodically inflamed Empire
feelings and exposed the serious ideological differences which
still remained* The government became wary of these Reich-
stag explosions, and its officials often preferred to postpone
or curtail requests for money rather than bring on more un-
pleasant exchange* Such debates seemed only to strengthen
bourgeous pressures and further isolate conservative authority*
Even a strong-willed Bismarck could remind his War Minister
about such Reichstag irritability and ask him to shape his
anaament requests with some patience and shrewdness. Later
German officials would be even more mindful of Reichstag
turbulence*
The aristocratic army leaders found themselves in a very
paradoxical position with regard to armament costs* Their
request for more mo&ey invariably opened up the question of
tax reform, thus exposing their class immunities to public
review and risking Reichstag encroachment. The Chief of
Staff genmaUy did not regard such domestic ramifications be-
catise his jbfo involved outward national security. He had to
wiri batttes against a foreign enemy and his strength had to
In The General Staff 47
measure up to such opposition. He asked for the money and
man power which he thought necessary to his international
assignment, but his requests had to clear through the War
Ministry and there were tailored to more complex specifica-
tions. The War Minister had to fit his budget to the Empire's
income and gain the ratification of the Treasury. Given
a modest, rather inflexible revenue system, that Treas-
ury office was stubbornly parsimonious. The War Minister
also had to fight his budget through the suspicious Reichstag
and there he asked only for the money and man power which
he thought consonant with the internal stability of a Hohen-
zollern Germany. Excessive armament costs meant dangerous
argument and perhaps even tax reform. Excessive army growth
meant bourgeois and proletariat corruptions of an aristocratic,
patrimonial tradition*
The War Minister wanted to neutralize the Reichstag
critics with deliberate, clairvoyant military progress. He
could justify periodic requests for more armament money but
he could not annually tell the nation 1 s delegates that the in-
vincible German army was again in jeopardy. His responsi-
bility involved problems of fiscal and political attunement;
the Chief of Staff necessarily thought only of victory or de-
feat. Schlieffen remarked that defeat would cost more than
timely armament. The War Minister could only point to bud-
get realities. He was dubious about the rage des noinbres
and he wondered sarcastically just how many corps the stra-
tegists 'needed to gain a sense of confidence. Schlieffen and
Moltke saw a circle of foes and knew only that they needed
more of everything. 19
Such varied perspectives were understandable and illus-
trative of some balance of power in Empire fiscal matters.
Certainly the General Staff did not control finances as it did
strategy* In fact there was a rather fatal lack of correlation
between the battle plan and the armament program. Schlieffen
and Moltke were allowed to prepare a campaign for which they
were denied the necessary resources. Such lack of cohesion
in matters of higher policy was common to the Empire govern-
ment. All too many important officials were responsible only
to the Kaiser and their policies and decisions might be thor-
oughly divergent. And in the tangle of such personal govern-
ment there was a basic estrangement between the authorities
48 General William Groener
and the people which also tended to deflect a full and frank
discussion of the Empire's problems. Groener thought the
army's expanding twentieth century needs should be frankly
explained to the people, and he was given to understand that
the Reichstag appreciated Germany 1 s foreign difficulties and
was quite ready to boost armament expenditures. After the
second Moroccan crisis in 1911, an anxious Moltke suggested
a yearly revision of the military budget, but the War Ministry
preferred the more orderly pace of a five-year allocation
( Quinquennat) ; it did not want to wrestle with the Reichstag
on a yearly basis making it even more intimate with army
affairs.
The military budget of 1911 allowed for modest technical
modernization and even the extra armament bill in 1913 gave
the General Staff only one of the three additional corps it
asked for* That reduction was decided on by the Kaiser and
not by the Reichstag. The War Ministry was afraid that a
sudden, massive expansion would inundate the army's aristo-
cratic breeding and the Kaiser agreed on more gradual growth.
Generally speaking, the government and the Reichstag were
still in a wary bargaining relationship with one another, and
the delegates were never taken into full confidence lest they
intrude themselves even more into affairs of state. Their
constant reform stratagems were already bothersome enough.
As head of the military railroads, Groener appeared before
this Reichstag budget committee to explain and defend some
of the technical requests. He thought there was too much in-
conclusive talk and not enough decisive consideration of
Germany's actual military predicament. He also represented
the General Staff at special economic deliberations in the
the Prussian Department of the Interior where he encountered
comparable civilian indecision. The soldier wanted a response
to problems and not mere cogitation. This was a crisp, con-
fident Groener who epitomized the aggressive will and decisive
intelligence of the General Staff, and he could not understand
people who pondered without action*
Ihe economic discussions in the Prussian Department of
the Interior involved the question of Germany's ability to en-
dure a longer war* Industrial Germany imported over half of
its raw materials, most of it by sea. The certainty of an ef-
fective British blockade was accepted and Admiral Tirpitz
In The General Staff 49
himself urged the government to study its economic position
in the light of such maritime interdiction. It was Tirpitz who
torpedoed the German chance for a reconciliation with Britain
in the Haldane negotiations of 1912-1913. Like the Schlieffen
Plan, his naval program guaranteed the very British opposition
which could strangle Germany and negate General Staff
strategy. Both Moltke and Tirpitz recognized the long-range
implications of the British fleet, hewing to their respective
Belgian and "risk" fleet projects despite opposition, and both
were allowed to have their way by a deferential government
and a kaleidoscopic Kaiser.
Groener's associates at these economic councils enter-
tained some hope that America would insist on freedom of the
sea in its trade with Europe and that Rotterdam might then
serve as an air-pipe to the outside world. But others doubted
such British leniency, especially if the German army were to
operate through neutral lands. The eastern European hinter-
land offered some relief but even here rail facilities were in-
adequate and the Danube had never been used as a volume
waterway. Even Balkan grain went to Germany by way of the
sea. No matter how they approached the problem, the German
economic experts saw no effective substitute for ocean trade.
Germany's substantial agricultural self-sufficiency depended
on large fodder imports for its animals. Without such imports,
the animal stock would either decrease or get its fodder from
acreage otherwise marked for human needs. The economic
prospect for continental Germany was entirely frustrating and
most of its experts estimated that a major war could be sus-
tained only from nine to eighteen months.
Groener listened to some of these grim reports and he
searched for an answer. Frederick the Great once set up a
storage system. Would it be possible to bring in grain im-
ports from Argentina and set up some sort of a food reserve
to cushion the German need? But the council had considered
and dropped that idea long before. Modern industrial pro-
duction and consumption could not long be sustained from a
static stock pile. The national expense would be doubled
and the basic economic problem of war hardly improved. That
sort of expense would be far better employed in a stronger
armament program which might possibly bring about the needed
quick victory. A few hoped for such a miracle. Others
50 General William Groener
wondered about the fabled ability of trade to find its way
through Findigkeit des Handels. Many trusted that the good
sense of Europe would not permit a ruinous war to continue
into self-destruction, and some had neither plan nor hope.
All these men recognized the seriousness of the German po-
sition and yet their concern was hardly desperate. War was
still only a theoretical possibility and the General Staff might
even be able to do the job.
One warning by Moltke in those last years before the war
was particularly prophetic:
11 The army command has the greatest interest in the
avoidance of an economic crisis on the home front
so that the soldiers may be heartened by the know-
ledge that the well-being of their families at home
is secured. Economic collapse and hunger during
a war would greatly heighten mass nervousness
and invite the most unreliable elements of the
people to forcefully push their revolutionary aims.
The morale of the troops, which is the most im-
portant and most sensitive instrument of victory,
would suffer heavy damage if unsteadiness would
spread about at home. It2
The army knew what home front discontent could mean to its
effort and to the state. But Moltke did not allow such somber
thoughts to change his war plan. In fact he now was prepared
to grab Liege on the fourth day of mobilization and practi-
cally eliminate the chance of British neutrality. German
strategists understood their problem and they sailed right into
it. The storm would prove too much for them.
Such militant will and national determination expressed
the character of German policy before 1914. This was the
exaggerated ego and voluntarism of the Empire which Meinecke
judged to be so much responsible for its collapse. The Ger-
ma& interest was to be asserted by bold action rather than
patient ctecuiaspectioti. A peaceful resolution of Europe's
tensions at that time, however, did not rest solely on German
behavloror Intent* Different German action would not neces-
sarily hai?e dispelled problems which entwined many states
and multiple factors. One can only say that the Empire 1 s
emphatic style and bold military leadership very substantially
In The General Staff 51
reduced chances for a diplomatic adjustment.
Groener was one of these German activists. He and his
friends in the General Staff were men of character and intel-
ligence who were allowed to direct national strategy with their
narrow campaign logic. Groener even visualized the army as
an orientation school for proper national patriotism. He
wanted military leadership to be a primary force in national
life and policy. Only when World War I exposed the limita-
tions of mere force and will did he come to understand that
the army could more intelligently serve the nation as a respon-
sive arm rather than as a directing instinct.
Chapter Three
THE NAIVE SOLDIER
In 1913 the Kaiser and his people celebrated the twenty-
fifth anniversary of his regime. It had been an era of great
economic growth, political ferment and cultural dispersion.
Patriots and critics, materialists and aesthetes crossed swords
freely on a gradual decline toward jingo creeds and profane
values. The minority regime still held the reins with firmness
and trust even though the ride was generally rough. Interna-
tional pitfalls threatened constantly and the political under-
brush at home was growing ever thornier. The social Demo-
crats, forexample, werenowthe largest party in the Reichstag,
but the restless subjects also knew how to count their national
blessings and they were prepared to defend their Fatherland.
Its problems could be attacked freely and its orderly way of
lif e undergirded the vibrations of social and political struggle.
German life was energetic, disciplined, argumentative,
ambitious and impulsive. . . not exactly misrepresented by its
Kaiser. British statesman Eyre Crowe could laud its civilizing
accomplishments and also be on the alert against its dynamic
unpredictability. And Germany's own Max Weber once phrased
his picture of fee young Kaiser and Empire, "One has the im-
pression of sitttog ia a high-speed train but worrying whether
the B$xt; switch is properly set." The rational Weber was very
much exasperated with such a national predicament, but his
analagrypEobafely expressed the Empire's sense of daring thrill
BM action under the last Hoheazollern King and Kaiser. 1
WilliajB wanted to expand his Empire into a world power
and he was determined to maintain the outmoded citadel of
Prussian authority at home. Itiesrete lay his two primary ob-
and tba paradoxical tension of hie regime. His world
52-
The Naive Soldier 53
ambitions required a solid domestic foundation which was
impossible if he insisted on patrimonial privilege and leader-
ship. Industrial Germany furnished the impetus and muscle
for such world ambitions, but it also created the bourgeois
and proletariat opposition to Prussian feudal leadership.
Many wanted him to recognize the new pillars of modern Ger-
man power and adjust the monarchy to the liberal and demo-
cratic fashions of a changed society , but William thought
himself destined and sufficiently adroit to manage the new
Germany in the older Prussian manner. He surveyed the Em-
pire from his Prussian citadel and he recognized its expan-
sive energy, but his comprehension of such modern force
remained purely mechanical. He was unable and unwilling
to dignify the social and political spirit of the new German
world and he could only respond to its egalitarian demands
with instinctive junker alarm. His sovereignty was based on
God's grace and the army f s loyalty, not to be infringed on by
rebellious subjects. He wanted loyal citizens who knew how
to express their freedom respectfully, within the limits of the
Bismarck constitution. His concept of Imperial responsibility
was once strikingly illustrated by a marginal comment, "An
outstanding election slogan would be that the Kaiser is re-
sponsible for the nation's security and it can demand of him
that his measures guarantee its safety. He who votes for
this is for the Empire. He who votes against it is against
the Empire. n William wanted the nation to have the right to
confirm his absolute authority.
The right arm of such Imperial authority was, of course,
the army. "We belong together, " he could tell his military
paladins. " We are born for one another and we shall eternally
stand together, whether God's will gives us peace or storm."
This army stood beyond the dimension of the regular German
government and was exclusively at the Kaiser's disposal. It
gave reality to his assumptions of absolutism and the two
actually did stand together above the state. The young Kaiser
could tell his generals that Bismarck was dismissed because
he refused the crown military obedience. Twenty-three years
older, in 1913, he offended the political sensitivities of
virtually the entire nation in supportii*g military authority and
arrogance in Alsace. His archaic, class-conscious absolut-
ism ^as airachored by his exclusive military command and in
54 General William Groener
the esprit de corps with his fraternal war lords. They heard
his innermost feelings and represented his ultimate strength.
His civilian officials recognized this primacy of the military
and they seldom ventured to contest with the men in uniform.
It was highly commensurate with Hohenzollem tradition when
the Kaiser fled to his army during the last days of revolution
and defeat in 1918. Groener 1 s pronounced judgment that the
troops would no longer respond to royal will cut through the
innermost cord of the Hohenzollem dynasty. 2
Many intelligent and sensitive Germans could regard the
Hohenzollem system with tolerant affection. Friedrich
Meinecke still thought that such experienced Prussian power
was necessary to the further progress and elevation of the
German interest. He was uneasy about the alienation of labor
and the crass materialism of German politics, but he hoped
that such tensions and corruptions could gradually be resolved
with national wisdom and civility. Meinecke delivered a
speech in honor of the Kaiser's twenty-fifth anniversary in
which he praised the personal leadership of William as a
treasured aspect of German life. He and his countrymen in-
sisted on the personification of government. They would "go
through fire 11 with the Kaiser and follow him up n steep paths
to the beclouded heights of (their) future." For Meinecke
the worlds of Goethe and Bismarck were in some effective
conjunction under the Empire. He trusted in a continuing re-
finement and integration of such a blend and he honored the
Hohenzollern part in such German growth. 3
A less sentimental man like Max Weber could only ex-
plode at the Empire 1 s twentieth century behavior. National
unification and industrialization had prepared Germany for
world expansion, indeed it could not maintain its European
power unless economic and military buttress positions were
added la 1fee colonial world. Population needs alone required
expansion even if Geraany were politically content to be a
<iutet Switzerland among the giants, but then the unification
maild have been a "boyish stunt, 11 without sense or purpose.
Expansion into the colonial world was also vital to the future
measure of personal freedom. The open, defenseless regions
of the world were being claimed by the big powers. Soon all
would belong to resolute states and each people would sub-
sequently be forced to contract within their own territory.
The Naive Soldier 55
Those nations with more land would be able to enjoy economic
living room and affiliated individual freedoms- Thus it now
behooved the Germans to get as large a slice of the globe as
they could.
Weber 1 s grim imperialism was certainly not out of step
with Germany's new world policy, but he was bitter with both
Bismarck and William II for their reactionary obstruction of
intelligent German growth. Bismarck restricted Germany's
colonial interests and his continental diplomacy would dis-
regard alliances of global import. At home he effectively
crippled the political parties and thus denied the nation sound
training and evolution in modern government. He even stulti-
fied the development of an experienced diploma tic corps since
he arrogated all important work unto himself and his son.
When he finally abdicated, Germany stood without colonial
help, without domestic political experience and even without
a national bureaucracy capable of managing a modern power.
The great junker autocrat simply stopped the process of
national co-ordination at a point convenient to his diplomatic
and class interests. The Empire was left administratively
and spiritually dissonant, and it lacked the inward organiza-
tion and solidarity necessary to successful expansion. And
the impulsive, offensive antics of young William only wor-
sened the problem by pulling this unsettled Empire into global
projects*
The junkers instinctively grasped the dangers of further
national integration, for the new material and psychological
needs of Germany were not suited to their patriarchal way of
life. The city people wanted a voice in public affairs in order
to express their will and serve their needs. Their constant
push for more rights threatened to inundate the patrimonial
junker world, and the alarmed, unbending nobility fought back
from behind their constitutional dikes. Weber respected
their contribution to the national cause and he appreciated
their fight for survival* He wrote,
11 It is the tragic fate of the German East that by its
great contribution to the nation it also dug the
grave for its own social organization. ... It was
not narrowness of view but a certain awareness
of what must come, when outstanding men in
56 General William Groener
Prussia, on up to the highest level, resisted as-
similation into the greater unity of the Empire. 1!
But the die was cast by history and now they had to be swept
aside in the interest of German evolution. The new age owed
them nothing. But to Weber's exasperation, the German na-
tion remained by the side of its reactionary Kaiser. Efficient
bureaucratic maturity was delayed and the patriarchial founders
still had their giant by the collar. This frustrated Weber's
concept of German progress and he was bitter toward both his
government and his countrymen, but he was fiercely loyal to
the German state as such and angry only because its greater
global opportunity was not being rationally exploited. 4
Max Weber espoused a cold Staatsraeson which was
committed to the national interest in whatever situation and
under any political form propitious to the age. More senti-
mental patriots like Meinecke and Groener were rooted more
firmly in the Empire tradition, but they too would come to
recognize that junker authority could no longer be permitted
to bridle the nation* Their thought on this matter was prompted
by wartime lessons and the exigencies of defeat. And their
constant loyalty to the German state, as empire or republic,
also reflected the supra-ideological national feeling of Max
Weber, Meinecke himself described his group of wartime
acquaintances, which included Groener and Weber, as modern
German politiques who sought to tone down factional interests
and accentuate necessities of state. 5
The jubilee year in 1913 witnessed Germany in a moment
of difficulty and hesitation. The tensions and limits of the
hierarchic, federal Empire were in distressing evidence.
Diplomacy accepted the guidelines of the military and allowed
thm very British enmity to be fixed which could throttle Ger-
man power, The Reichstag was excluded from the basic de-
cisions of gavf&am&nt and the Social Democrats, its largest
party, were still distrusted as revolutionary enemies of the
state, fbe gaiser regarded that Reichstag as a rival, not a
partner, *B the laanagepent of Genpan life* The Empire was
to dangerous international stmtts but little was done to or-
ganize it internally. Suffrage ami tax inequities still reflected
an inward lij^sapa^c^ of right aznj spirit, yt|$ business blocs,
Hie fem^aw^atic agencies and the federal states ^11 pulled
The Naive Soldier 57
for themselves first and tended to regard unification as an
opportunity rather than a responsibility. Certainly the much
celebrated German efficiency was not present on the higher
levels of national life and policy.
The Germans were beginning to wonder where it would
all lead. And yet they still felt their nation to be in ascen-
sion and somehow capable of resolving its problems. Hin-
denburg probably expressed more than mere military outlook
when he said in his memoirs, "Yet greater than our worry was
our confidence. M But the Empire's fall was not far off and
its confident strength would slowly be exhausted. Then an
earlier Meinecke prophecy would come to pass, when he
wrote about the democratic tide in 1907,
11 There will come a time when this flood, perhaps
driven by the winds of a world political crisis,
will tear down the present artificial barriers. Then
all will depend on whether the new ground of lib-
eral and industrial Germany will have the political
and national steadiness to substitute for that which
is levelled. 1 ' 6
The junker-industrial relationship in Germany throws
lighten the conflicting historical forces which engaged with
one another in that Empire. As a Swabian bourgeois and as
a railroad officer in the General Staff, Groener was affiliated
with both contesting worlds. He represented a personal syn-
thesis, as it were, of the Prussian-German union and its
disjointment under the pressures of World War I also disrupted
his own life harmony. Confronted with irreconcilable alter-
natives in 1918, he chose modern German continuity and left
the Prussian tradition to its fate. That decision seared his
life but he courageously abided by its sense in his service
to the successor Weimar state. The naive soldier became a
politique who urged and demonstrated the subordination of
faction and sentiment to higher national considerations.
War finally caine to Europe and Germany in the summer
of 1914. Now their competitive principles of life might again
be exercised in ultimate match play, ami the roar of the
crowds in every capital gave strange enthusiasm to the feared
contest* Many decades of nervous diplomatic maneuvering
created a tense Irritation which exploded in the moment of
58 General William Groener
decision. Undoubtedly Germany 1 s internal frustrations also
contributed to the patriotic outburst in that country. It was
a moment of family reconciliation in crisis.
As the Aiistro-Serbian crisis in the Balkans developed,
Groener was one of the many German leaders who dispersed
with the Kaiser for the summer holidays but only after Wil-
liam made his lf blank check 11 commitment of support to the
Hapsburg state. Then the excessive ultimatum to Serbia en-
sued and Europe's alliance chains began to fasten each na-
tion to its post. Collective security also meant collective
sensitivity and the storm clouds gathered over all the major
powers. Groener was on his way to Switzerland, but he de-
layed in Stuttgart as the ultimatum to Serbia was rejected.
He was ordered back to Berlin on July 26 where he and his
colleagues quietly watched the storm develop. Their long
awaited test was now under way and they were not afraid.
Groener 1 s timetables and marching orders lay ready and he
declined their last-minute review. He wanted no nervous
excitement in his office. He smoked his cigars and waited
for the diplomats to end their bit. When he was asked about
his attitude toward mobilization, he gave the laconic reply,
"better tomorrow than the day after tomorrow. 11 He was ready
to go.
Less tranquil, and with good reason, was Chief of Staff
Moltke. He was too sensitive and nervous to confront such
a moment of destiny with stoical resolve, and his opening
battle plan was misleading and daring enough to excite most
any man. He planned an immediate stab for Liege on the
third night after the beginning of mobilization. This open-
ing coup was so carefully guarded that the Cologne railway
district would receive its transportation assignment for that
special assault project only after the mobilization began.
German control of Uege was considered to be a first decisive
requirement and Moltke had thissur prise operation very much
oa his utad as fee diplomats fought for time. He wanted
clarity sad a quick decision. He was even afraid that the
French might beat hisa into Belgium, already working that
danger into the diplomatic prelude to his campaign plan. On
Ixily 26hedrewupthe ulttoatum which said that French troop
movements toward Namur forced Genaany to move into Bel-
gin for its own security. This was the vfcry note which the
The Naive Soldier 59
German government then presented in Brussels on August 2.
The French army alert had barely begun as Moltke wrote his
plot reflecting his nervous military fear and his slick under-
standing of international diplomacy. 7
Moltke almost did collapse when, a few hours after mo-
bilization began, the Kaiser ordered him to hold up the western
operation and prepare for an eastern war only. A misleading
telegram from the German ambassador in London gave some
hope of British and French neutrality. But Moltke had no full
assembly plan for the east and he would have had to reverse
his western mobilization. He excitedly told the Kaiser that
such a turn-about would leave them with a chaotic mob of
armed and hungry soldiers. Such lurid fears notwithstanding,
William sensed a saving opportunity and he ordered Moltke
to hold up the first step into Luxembourg. Moltke went to
his room and sobbed, contacting nobody. Then the hopeful
note from London was revealed to be a misunderstanding and
the Kaiser told his Chief of Staff, !f now you can do what you
want, 11 whereupon Moltke rushed his troops into Luxembourg.
Groenerwas the man who would have been asked to turn
those troops around to the east, although he knew nothing of
the incident until later. He always agreed with Moltke that
such neutrality in the west would have merely postponed
French and British participation at the expense of the German
chance for victory. But, said the railroad expert, such a
mobilization switch was not a technical impossibility. The
armies were not yet being assembled and the Groener staff
was well versed in the unexpected. The unavoidable initial
confusion could have been worked out. 8 The machinery of
war did entwine the strategist in a powerful chain of automatic
preparation, but man still pushed the buttons and mobilization
was not an inexorable commitment to war. More decisive
was the fear and opportunism of men and nations, who feared
the power of others and thus sought to get in the first crip-
pling blow. The Schlieffen Plan was really based on inse-
curity, finally even desperation.
Groener 1 s railway section received its alert on July 28.
Bridges and depots in the border provinces were placed under
guard. Troops needed for immediate border or service duties
were recalled to their home stations. On July 29 the entire
army was ordered to assemble at the base garrisons, and
60 General William Groener
railway guards were posted throughout the Empire. On July
30 the fleet was alerted and supply trains were dispatched to
the northern ports* The mobilization of the rail system itself
began on July 31 with the declaration that a n threat of wax 41
existed. The peacetime schedule continued, but special
military trains were pressed into it. Freight traffic in the
eastern and western border provinces ceased and railroad cars
were collected in the interior. Alsace-Lorraine alone was
cleared of almost five thousand freight cars. Germans crowded
into railway stations all over Europe and flooded into the
homeland. The German passenger service was tested to the
limit and, in effect, momentarily conditioned for the military
assignment to follow. Full mobilization was ordered on
August 1 and all German railroad transportation passed into
the hands of Colonel Groener. Now he and his crew suddenly
found themselves to be the mainspring of the German war
machine. The gamble for a quick victory in France depended
first of all on an instantaneous delivery of the armies to the
frontier.
On the evening of the third mobilization day, all civilian
traffic stopped and the military schedule of twenty miles per
hour went into effect. Within two weeks a force of almost
two million men was assembled along the western frontier.
Five hundred and fifty troop trains daily crossed the Rhine.
Every ten minutes a train moved over the northern Hohenzollern
bridge at Cologne. Not one of more than three thousand rail-
way substations checked back for instructions from Berlin.
The only traffic knot was quickly unravelled as the daily
four-hour pause gave officials their chance to straighten out
congestion. Only one troop train suffered more than a slight
delay. The cavalry unloaded to give chase to some automo-
biles thought to be the fabled "gold cars", speeding bullion
to Russia. Even the railway schedule could not completely
govern sucfe fantastic excitement. 9
Graeiiar i*as a ptotuze of ease and confidence. His mo-
bilization was a faultless demoias tration of General Staff ef-
fietency* Ewe a quip abotit a blown Rhine bridge was lightly
deflected. Call me when fliers aane two down, he joked hap-
pily. Be ie$s ready to divert an entire army to the right bank
of the Rhine, Bf August 12 an ansy o coffer thi^e million men
was assesabted and Groener Joined the Kaiser's party as it
The Naive Soldier 61
headed for Coblenz to direct the campaign in the west. The
Kaiser had already given his railroad chief a silent hand of
thanks and the railway section of the General Staff garnered
the first Imperial citation. Groener was suddenly an admired
and exemplary figure and German faith in the General Staff
was apparently being justified.
A German assault unit moved toward Liege on the night
of August 3-4. Armored trains with motorized and cavalry
support moved out to secure and begin repair of the crucial
rail connection between Aachen and Liege. Belgian demolition
orders were issued that same night but they were late and
poorly executed. Track destruction was ineffectual and the
damage to small bridges, switches, and station facilities
was not crippling. The numerous bridges, viaducts and tun-
nels along this twenty-five mile defile were seized relatively
intact and a golden chance to spike the German advance was
lost. The rail entry into Belgium was secured and the first
gamble of the campaign succeeded. The Belgians apparently
lacked thorough demolition plans and they were further sur-
prised by such quick action at the very outset of the German
mobilization* 10 On August 17 three armies of the flanking
wing began their advance across Belgium. Their progress was
rapid, as the defenders side-stepped into Antwerp or withdrew
toward the south and Allied help. German tactical progress
quickly cracked through resistance points at Namur and
Maubeuge, and in early September it was curling down on
Paris. Then came the French stand along the Marne and the
collapse of the German venture.
The German command planned to extend its Aachen-Liege
supply stem along two basic routes. The outside First army
would run its line to the southwest, from Liege to Brussels
toward Cambrai. Hie inside Second and Third armies intended
to work their line to the south, from Liege to Namur toward
St. Quentin. Additional cross-army supply help was also ex-
pected by way of Luxembourg-Libramont-Namur and later in
the drive by way of Metz-Sedan-Laon. These important lateral
arteries (rocades) would give systematic circulation and
emergency responsiveness to right flank traffic. The Germans
did not expect to capture these railroads undamaged and yet
they figured to reconstruct a functional skeletal framework in
step with the advancing front. Groener trusted in the element
62 General William Groener
of surprise, the skill of his Crew and the density of the Bel-
gian and French rail systems, which promised to allow for
numerous alternate routes. At least track would have to be
activated for ammunition supply. The troops would have to
live off the land as much as they could.
Greener's railway progress was both fortuitous and diffi-
cult. The outside line quickly reached Cambrai and by early
September it seemed that the First army was well launched
toward Paris and the lower Seine. Again the Belgians missed
vital demolition opportunities to the west and even northern
France allowed sound track to fall into enemy hands. The
French did not expect the invading flank to extend beyond the
Meuse and last minute demolition efforts lacked sufficient
engineering personnel, but they did severely block up the
Namur gateway and all significant routes to the south between
the Sambre and Meuse rivers. Liege was not connected with
Namur until September 2, and even then supply service into
northeastern France continued to depend on small-gauge im-
provisation track and lengthening truck hauls. Also the im-
portant tangent lines from Luxembourg and Metz were not
effectively tied into the right flank supply zone until after the
Battle of the Marne. "
Thus only one of the four projected supply lines was in
satisfactory contact with the fighting front as the September
test neared. The Second and Third armies were expected to
furnish the inner muscle of the sweep on Paris. They en-
countered not only better demolition work but also stiffening
resistance and both looked apprehensively at their faltering
tail support and straining truck service. It was Buelow of the
Second army who first warned, on August 25, that the advance
would stop unless the railroads caught up. And he was just
beg inning the descent into France, with its greater track des-
truction. The long cogitated supply problems of a rapidly
advancing flank were now becoming grim reality.
Qroene^s men were turning in a resourceful pressure
perfofiaajace but their skill and luck also had limits. Long,
key bridges were down at Namur and Hirson, and the entire
supply needs for the Second and Third armies had to go the
western way around, by way of Brussels and Cambrai. Those
bridges would not be repaired until the late Fall and the Buelow
complaint would not be satisfied in time for toe Marne decision*
The Naive Soldier 63
The rudimentary occupation net was not immediately ready to
convey both soldiers and equipment but Groener frequently
had to alternate the two. A corps from Schleswig-Holstein
was threaded through to the Antwerp front. A show-piece
heavy artillery batallion from Austria-Hungary was given ex-
ceptional track clearance, for German precision was on dis-
play.
In late August two corps were shipped east from Namur
and in early September an entire army was rushed up from
Lorraine. The Aachen-Liege run was chronically late and
restrictive in peace-time. Now it labored under the supply
needs of three armies and intermittent troop-train disruptions.
And a loud cry for ammunition would go out in September as the
opening campaign climaxed and these modern armies suddenly
showed their enormous firing needs. Needless to say, it was
not Groener who sponsored such criss-cross troop movements
at a time when a systematic supply push was both necessary
and difficult. Moltke ! s complicated maneuvers foolishly
taxed transportation facilities and the relative simplicity of
Schlieffen 1 s power drive now seemed even more sensible to
Groener.
There were many other problems as well. The German
military railway service was short on man power and special-
ist officers. Cramped training facilities denied them experi-
ence with standard track operation and major construction
work. These were shortcomings which simply had to be cor-
rected in the field. Beyond the frontier, strange track and
left-handed traffic slowed upthe trains, as did curves, grades,
and track bedding considered to be below German safety
standards. Even the Belgian coal fell through the German
grates and everywhere civilians cut track and wire, or stormed
trains and stations. Nor was Groener plagued only by such
enemy " rascality 11 . His own troop commanders did not easily
res pond to railroad regulations. Many held up trains for their
unloading convenience, then housed troops in the empty cars.
Some units hoarded their own supply stocks and almost im-
mediately attached themselves to railhead service. Others
- stole entire trains from one another and hid these so effec-
tively that they were not found until after the Marne. Some
unloaded ajnmunition trains were later turned up in areas where
the need had been greatest, and most vocal. Not a few trains
64 General William Groener
lacked sufficient ticketing and were lost in the shuffle. The
anxious commanders thought track repair meant supply and
they were slow to realize that signals, sidetracks, loading
ramps, and water tanks were also necessary to service.
Groener drove his men and snapped at the armies. He warned
them from the very start to comply with railroad regulations or
jeopardize the operation. He was working for systematic cir-
culation in lieu of advance depots and his traffic patterns re-
quired absolute co-operation. 12
Such initial friction between front and rear echelon re-
flected natural tenseness and adjustment. It also indicated
a hair-line supply gamble and latent crisis. Despite great
German luck and energy, the railheads were losing contact
with the fighting front and Groener wanted the right flank to
pause and tighten up along the French-Belgian border. Con-
sistent extension, even with a day's pause, seemed more im-
portant than disjointed haste. But Moltke pushed his armies
on, working for the necessary rout and afraid that delay might
enable the defenders to settle behind formidable river barriers.
In the last week of August, Moltke made three decisions
which Groener considered fatal to the operation. He withdrew
two corps from the right flank and sent them to the east. He
launched a second offensive along the Toul-Epinal front deny-
ir*g his Belgian armies timely reinforcement from the south.
And, on August 30, he turned the German right flank inside of
Paris and gave up the deeper envelopment. With each of these
orders, Moltke violated basic principles of the Schlieffen
Plan. Massive right-flank strength was never assembled as
Moltke moved his units with amazing flights of strategy. His
strategic reserve of six divisions were early sent to the Lor-
raine front. Then two corps were lifted out of Belgium, far
frois aSective rail transportation and critical to right-flank
success. Apparently Ludendorff did not even insist on rein-
forcjements from the west; he was cojafident of holding on with
what he had* But if help was to be sent, then the Lorraine
front }id h&w more available manpower and it had direct rail
contact with the eastern theatre. Its units would mill around
inconsequentially as the Belgian drive began to fade for lack
of raanpower.
fheTwi-pJmlassattlt> altered hy Moltke on August 27,
also wrinkled Groeiier's b&w* the whole Belgian operation
The Naive Soldier 65
was motivated by the German unwillingness to grind through
this formidable French defensive position. Now the extended
Belgian flank, the head- strong center under the Crown Prince
and the Lorraine troops would all join in a composite maneuver
involving a flanking envelopment, a penetration assault and
a general push. Moltke lost control of his armies, and stra-
tegic clarity, by the end of August. Defeat at the Marne was
not a military miracle; it was a smart French counter-attack
into the side of a fading German drive. 13
By the end of August, Groener saw that the French army
was still very much in the field and that the German drive was
thinning out, but he still wanted that right flank to move out
toward the southwest. Maybe its extension would still serve
to take the French off balance. Also Arras and Amiens were
key transportation points and they could furnish flank security
against the coast. A transportation line over Brussels-
Cambrai-Amiens would allow him to build up that weakening
outside flank and increase its pressure. Groener walked
around headquarters rotating his elbow to the outside, but
Moltke pulled his armies to the east of Paris and the Schlieffen
Plan was dead.
The right flank army leaders reported that they did not
have the strength to continue toward the west of Paris. They
were worried about their open Channel flank and began to ask
for reserve strength. Moltke accepted their assessment and,
on September 2, he ordered his right flank to pass northeast
of Paris and try to pinch off French units between that city
and the Mosel. German momentum, force and cohesion were
gone and the curling right flank was now itself exposed to
envelopment out of Paris and Amiens.
In contracting toward the southeast, the German flanking
armies were pulling ever farther away from their one good
supply line over Cambrai. The scene of major combat action
was shifting into very difficult transportation areas. The mili-
tary railroad map for early September, 1914, showed a great
transportation pocket between Hirson, Laon, Reims, and Sedan.
This was the very supply zone of the Second and Third armies
as they worked along the Marne. The small end railheads
were jammed and all trucking units were exhausted. Some
combat elements were one hundred miles beyond their rail
supply and, according to one of Groener 1 s aides, "it was
66 General William Groener
momentarily out of the question for the railroads to catch
up. . .." H The right wing had not received, nor required,
massive supply during the war of movement, but now it was
worn thin and logistically insecure for the decisive flurry
which followed.
The French commander in Paris watched the German flank
curl by and expose its side. Reinforcements poured into the
Parisian front as the French rail system demonstrated its own
flexible capacities. Joffre then launched his decisive counter-
attack on September 6. A two-pronged operation drew the
German wing apart and opened it up for a dangerous Allied
wedge. The entire German right flank was in danger of being
cutoff or badly maimed. Its armies fought viciously and Joffre
did not fully exploit his opportunity, but he had splintered
the German offensive and thwarted the enemy 1 s bid for a quick
victory. The entire German strategy, military and diplomatic,
had been subordinated to that knock-out effort. 15
Moltke and his headquarters had only sporadic impres-
sions of the decisive action along the Marne. Far to the rear,
in Luxembourg City, he and his staff dragged along with one
telegraph receiving set. His armies were instructed infre-
quently by radio but a direct exchange of information was
never possible. The critically engaged First army did not re-
ceive a single command from Headquarters between Septem-
ber 6 and 9, as it was fighting for its life. Control of the
operation was gone and Headquarters could only wait to see
how their armies had fared. As Groener wrote to his wife,
11 This waiting period until the decision has fallen is a ruinous
test of nerves. We see, hear and feel nothing of all these
battles. The infrequent telegrams which we receive only
seive to heighten the tension.' 1 The great plan ended in a
strategic vacuum.
Moltke stood in helpless anguish, on the verge of col-
lapse. ll lt goes badly, 11 he told his diary on September 9.
fEfae battles in front of Paris] will be decided against us. We
cannot avoid suffocating in the battle against east and west.
How different it was as we opened the campaign so brilliantly
a few weeks ago. Now comes the bitter disappointment. And
we will have to pay for everything which has been destroyed^ 1
Groener flexed well under defeat though disillusioned by the
mediocrity of German leadership. All went well until Schlieff en
The Naive Soldier 67
was " forgotten or laid aside; then the big victories were fin-
ished. 11 The great Leuthen had not been struck and an entire
generation of military thought was frustrated. Only the strik-
ing victory at Tannenberg in the east veiled the German fail-
ure and cushioned the shock. A stolid, old Hindenburg
remarked that the young men would now have to drop Schlieffen's
legacy and do some of their own thinking. l6
Groener's stubborn faith in the Schlieffen Plan merits
some assessment* Failure along the Marne began Germany's
twentieth century decline and of course it stirred fervent con-
troversy. Many tacticians argued that the field was won and
then foolishly abandoned. Others ruefully conceded that the
right flank lacked decisive force and was bound to fall short
of complete victory, north or south of the Marne. Studious
strategists, like Generals Kuhl and Groener, reaffirmed the
logic of the flanking move and they found fault with Moltke f s
instrumentation. Military historians like Hans Delbrueck and
Gerhard Ritter have scored the entire war plan as a political
and strategic mistake of the greatest import. Its aggressive
bid for victory clearly exceeded Germany's military capacity
and it ensured world hostility. Its bold Machiavellianism
introduced the twentieth century problem of a heedless Ger-
man power and behavior. Greater military restraint in 1914
could hardly have damaged the German interest as much. A
mobile defense along the western frontiers was not impossible
and it would have confronted France and Britain with difficult
problems of strategy and diplomacy.
It seems clear that the Mame was not lost because of
supply shortage. The right flank armies had enough to fight
with and they withdrew in order to seal their splintered front.
Ammunition needs were frantic but apparently not decisive. It
is possible that supply uncertainties helped to break the
German nerve, although no commander made such an admis-
sion. But all three right-flank armies had already expressed
their supply concern and they were working even farther away
from their railheads. It is probable that graver deficiencies
would have developed had these armies held their ground and
prolonged the engagement. It was the retreat to the Aisne
which again gave them a sound logistical foundation and again
stabilized the German line.
All the right flank armies were tired, weakened and in-
68 General William Greener
secure. . . by their own admission. They were at the point of
envelopment but they did not have the strength to follow
through. They still flailed dangerously but without positive
co-ordination. The Channel flank was dangerously exposed
and reserves were not within immediate reach. Even the of-
ficial German history of the war wondered whether its army,
"because of its difficult supply situation, . . * was in a position
to exploit any possible success 11 along the Marne. A maximal
extension of the invading force was reached and a reorganiz-
ing pause was necessary. Then the trench war would have
developed along the Marne, rather than the Aisne, and the
Schlieffen gamble for quick victory would have been equally
frustrated. n
Seemingly the great flanking effort did lack conclusive
man power, logistical carry and tactical co-ordination. Did
the fault lie in the plan itself or in its implementation?
Greener pointed an accusing finger at Moltke. Success
depended on decisive man power and deliberate, relentless
pressure. The German government never fulfilled Schlieffen 1 s
specifications and Moltke modified the plan. But, thought
Groener, even the drive of 1914 could have been pursued to
victory. The French attacked in Lorraine, left the Belgian
door wide open and were not prepared for German action west
of the Meuse. The enveloping action, with sound rail sup-
port over Liege-Brussels-Cambrai, was confronted with no
significant resistance. Amiens lay within German reach and
it would have given even greater strength to the German po-
sition. The German flank was hooking the defense and it
needed only to maintain its direction to the southwest to en-
sure complete envelopment. Somehow Paris would have been
reduced, had it been invested, and it would have surrendered
enough booty to help propel a further advance should such be
necessary.
Man power iras critical to such a sweep but it too was
within reach. Ihe six reserve divisions in Germany should
iiarvs been sent to Belgium, not Lorraine. The two corps at
Nacaur should have been left to the line. The Lorraine army
should femre beea brought north in time and systematically
saarched fc fe Aacheiu The trains for its transportation
stood seady, but they -were used too lat. AB entire Gennan
army Wfcs a*i Hie sails as tfee German feta ^mB seated north of
The Naive Soldier 69
Paris. Even then, decisive strength might still have been
generated a long the Maine had the whole German line angled
toward the northwest and brought its force to bear toward
Paris.
Groener readily admitted that his occupation rail net
could not initially carry both men and supplies. Schlieffen
never expected the troops to ride into France. Deep echelon
strength depended only on timely, persistent man power con-
signments to the Belgian front. This Moltke did not do and
herein lay his fundamental error. Groener 1 s assessment had
its own share of logic, hypothesis, and oversight. He argued
that the weight of the German drive should have been kept to
the outside, where the flanking grip could keep the defense
off balance and where volume supply was possible. Certain-
ly German man power was not well committed in that opening
campaign and Moltke did not exploit his right flank potential.
The Belgian venture hardly seemed justifiable in the light of
such meandering interest. But such uncertainty notwithstand-
ing, the possibility of a quick victory seemed nonetheless
slight. The supply columns were losing contact and the Ger-
man drive was running out of breath.
Groener 1 s own supply study once pointed up the vital
need for motorization and that deficiency still existed in 1914.
Motortrucks were perhaps more critical to that opening cam-
paign than man power. Harness teams were too slow and the
motorized connecting rod between the railroad and the combat
unit was not enough for the need of the moment. Groener 1 s
comment that the reduction of the Parisian fortress could
somehow be effected, even without a full investment force,
also lacked sobriety and proof. Schlieffen and the older
Moltke knew what that great complex could soak up, and
Paris could hardly be discounted by an inspired wave of the
hand. And if Paris should fall, what about Britain with its
constricting navy and broad world influence? Like Schlieffen,
railroad chief Groener thought primarily of the continental
fight. The British army ccmld be locked into the Channel ports.
Maybe the General Staff unconsciously expected diplomatic
negotiation with Britain once the French army was defeated.
But its written thought shows no such broader conjecture and
the German military's wartime attitude towaid trace proposals
mflect?4 any earlier calculation along such lines.
70 General William Groener
One can only conclude that the strategic views of the General
Staff actually stopped at the water line.
Any mechanical appraisal of the Schlieffen Plan neces-
sarily lies in the realm of hypothesis. It was Moltke's fate
to accept, modify, and mismanage the strategic concept of
his forerunner. His instincts were strange to its radical
daring and no one knows whether Schlieffen would have done
any better. Perhaps he also would have learned that will
powerdoesnot prevail over all, nor does it validate a theory.
His plan was admittedly not feasible in 1906 and it still lacked
strategic soundness in 1914, Groener agreed that it depended
on the effective seizure of the Belgian and French railroads.
The Germans were lucky at Liege and in northern France.
Their inside flanking elements then passed through heavy
demolition work and soon encountered serious supply hin-
drances. How sound was a plan which gambled on the enemy
to miss his demolition assignments? If supply success de-
pended on motorized help, how feasible was the plan in 1906,
or even 1914? It was generally recognized that the plan re-
quired a perfect opening performance. How realistic was it
to assume the faultless co-ordination of new masses and new
techniques after forty-f ive years of peace ?
Schlieffen portrayed the modern Alexander at a broad
desk, in comfortable quarters, serviced constantly by tele-
phone, telegraph, motorcycle, automobile, and airplane, but
his army either was not taught, or it did not absorb, the new
technical lessons and it failed the practical examination in
1914* In fact such facilities and techniques were yet more
visionary than actual. Moltke quailed in a youngster's school
beach as the German right flank fought its decisive action.
There were not enough railroad men, not enough trucks, not
enough telephones, not enough telegraph stations, not even
enough Liaison officers. Moltke should have dispatched
cosmunicaticms off icer Hentsch on an entirely different mis-
sion. The modern Alexanders could not convert theory into
practice overnight, as the Schlieffen Plan apparently expect-
ed them to do.
Groener could maintain that no German unit lost any en-
gagement because of supply deficiencies. This was true
enough but it hardly covered prospects at the Marne or be-
yond, fhe German front retracted before supply scarcities
The Naive Soldier 71
were exposed and even the critics of this retreat confessed
that the armies could not have pushed farther without man
power and supply refurbishment. The entire campaign required
spectacular good fortune and a perfect performance by one
and all, but it only came close and its failure forfeited all
subsequent strategy,
Groener ! s railroads were not able to save the Marne but
they did sustain the German line along the Aisne. Groener
wanted the new Chief of Staff, Falkenhayn, to detach his
right flank and rebuild his striking power near such rail points
as Mons and Namur. From such a rear base the German force
might coil again for a second major effort. But Falkenhayn
was afraid that his own flank might be turned and he raced
the Allies to the sea. Groener 1 s railroads were used to string
out that line, rather than build up a new offensive force. The
long front was spread-eagled from Switzerland to the Channel
and it lacked both defensive agility and offensive concentra-
tion. The impasse of trench war was already evident.
A final, wearing push was launched at Ypres but piece-
meal troop commitments robbed this action of decisive force
and it developed into a murderous attrition grind* The "flam-
ing enthusiasm 11 of Germany's university youth was not enough
to overcome the artillery barrage, the machine gun, and the
entrenched foe. "We are nailed fast again, !l wrote Groener
in October, 191 4. "The long, long line has operative immo-
bility." The failure at Ypres confirmed the defeat at the
Marne. The French campaign could not be ended quickly and
the German leaders now had to face the feared realities of a
two-front war and a British blockade.
Groener was no longer the ebullient optimist of August,
but he still thought that the army could resolve its problem
and he wanted no intrusion from the diplomats. The strategy
of the naive soldiers had failed but they were yet at the head
of a great army and still bent on a martial course of action.
Groener would cling to such militaristic logic, reflected in
his diary, letters, and memoranda, until 1916.
August was a month of great pride and bold-soldier talk.
Groener told his wife about the high railroad accomplishment,
his great authority, and his position of favor with the Kaiser.
The latter was "very friendly 11 to him and paid him "great
compliments* " Everything moved according to plan and it
72 General William Groener
seemed to be "the greatest moment that Divine Providence
has ever conferred on the life of the German people. " Even
Moltke's slimmer battaillon carre in Belgium was effectively
forcing the quick victory and "the spirit of the blessed
Schlieffen" accompanied them. The French were declared to
be "on the hi f as early as August 23, and Groener reassured
his wife that the war in the west was already won. "I am and
have been of this firm conviction from that moment when our
railroad and approach march succeeded in brilliant fashion."
Belgian rascality and British interference were mere annoy-
ances. They would put every British prisoner to bed with a
Russian and teach him not to impose such a barbaric ally on
the Germans again.
The "iron dice 11 were now rolling and it was no time for
hesitation or sentiment. "In order to achieve great things in
war," he wrote, "one cannot be hard enough. , . . One should
always aim for completeness, never be content with half
measures; the golden mean is not suited for war." Fortunate-
ly the General Staff was not in charge of German destiny and
it would correct the failures of the diplomats. It would do a
"thorough jott 1 and give the German people peace for the next
hundred years. The Chancellor and his group seemed to think
that war was a "philosophic concept 11 and probably inclined
toward a convenient peace. But "that was out of the ques-
tion" and the General Staff would take care of "Herr von
Bethmannand the other fools of the Foreign Office. " It would
root out this "humanitarian nonsense." Fortunately the Kaiser
was very much on their side and no longer listened to the
"weaklings." The German future required hardness, not sen-
timentality. Let the enemy expire by the "hundreds of thou-
sands; M as long as the Germans were strengthened thereby.
By Septesjber, Groener 1 s military scrutiny was coming
back into focus. Despite the many proclaimed victories,
there n?em few prisoners in evidence. On August 28 the Ger-
man weie oily five days 1 march from Paris but Groener was
already married about its defensive strength. His journal ex-
pressed concern about the opean Channel flank and the exposed
supply line running aloi*g that coast. One day before the
Mame, Qroaaear conceded to himself that "we dosi't have the
manpower*' tofosoethe Parisian front and sufficiently buttress
the B^felaii position Qu September 6 fee wondered how long
The Naive Soldier 73
the campaign would last and he began to hope for a big victory
in the east. Maybe it would help to break French resistance.
When the Marne results finally trickled through, it was clear
that the bid had failed and that "much hard work' 1 loomed a-
head. The enemy was n so numerous 11 and the German people
would simply have to work their way through this great crisis.
Now he could be slightly annoyed by the brassy hero talk
which still prevailed at the Kaiser 1 s table. The German people
might be better served by a frank enlightenment of their
situation. 18
Groener was never happy with the deceptive style of the
German war communiques. It merely created a sense of se-
curity and convenience at home, and the nation was not prop-
erly attuned to the grim challenge at hand. Of course, such
propaganda techniques involved more than narrow military will
or strident Hohenzollern fashion. Conservative authority and
reform fears also helped to motivate the deception of the pub-
lic. Victory prospects would tend to justify the established
German regime; indications of difficulty might stir up public
dissatisfaction. The Prussian autocracy was now bedeviled
with the fruits of its proud and exclusive authority. It could
not trust the German people with grim news and so it main-
tained a posture of heroic duty and invincibility. In England
the people were one with the government and there was no
fear of realistic danger and intensive public sacrifice. The
historical breach between the Prussian authorities and the
people obstructed such a sober, mature exchange of frankness
and effort in the Empire. The hierarchic state was not well
geared for the total mobilization necessary for modern war*
High sacrifice was expected of all Germans and in such a
democratic situation the presence of constitutional inequali-
ties was regarded by most as intrinsically immoral.
Evasive about reforms, the regime was yet intent on sus-
taining the united esprit of August, 1 91 4. Thus it spoke of
duty and Fatherland, invincibility and victory. The Hohen-
zollern system seemed well protected and well justified by
such thoughts. It sensed that anything short of victory would
place the government under irresistible reform pressure. 19
Thus the eternal victory promises, the tenacious annexation
plans, and the unwiUingaess to settle for a compromise peace,
&i the end it was fust as unwilling to admit defeat* Of course,
74 General William Groener
such public deception was rather decisive for the shock and
anger of October and November, 1918, when defeat could no
longer be concealed and the culprit dynasty no longer main-
tained.
By the end of 1914 Groener was rather resigned to a ten-
acious struggle and perhaps only a partial victory. Britain
could obviously not be brought to heel by the German army
and this war might see only an expansion of the German po-
sition on the continent* Then "many new soldiers 11 would be
needed for the final reckoning with Britain. Groener began to
see his war in terms of a Punic struggle. He was already be-
ginning to improve the German rail connection with the Belgian
system for the next war to come. And it was "so nice" to be
able to "command such work to be done without much talk and
correspondence, whereas in peace it took seven years of ink 11
and negotiation to get one Rhine bridge. The railroad colonel
was already building for the next war and apparently Belgium
was to remain important to German strategy. A geopolitical
asset like that was certainly not to be surrendered after vic-
tory.
It was at a Christmas party in 1914 that a rather heady
Groener expounded more publicly on the future control of the
Belgian railroads. Falkenhayn was apparently impressed and
two months later he asked Groener to put his ideas in writing.
The army was interested in maintaining an occupation force in
postwar Belgium and Groener 1 s respected technical views
might help to influence the German course of action. Thus
he could participate in the widespread "memorandum assault"
for expansion which characterized German politics in the
Spring of 1915.
Greener's memorandum declared that the railroads were
the "necessary foundation* 1 for the armed might of a nation.
Modern strategy involved the assembly and mobility of mass
armies ami no plan should evolve without full railroad con-
siderations. Alsace and Lorraine were taken in order to but-
tress Genaan strength along the upper Rhine. Now the German
march into Belgium "still had to squeeze itself laboriously
past the Dutch province of limbuig. M Since this war was not
the last of the series, the German army must "gain space" in
order to set itself for the next. Belgium must be occupied so
that the Ruhr industrial area might be shielded and Ranee
The Naive Soldier 75
held in a permanent flanking grip.
The future political status of Belgium did not concern
Groener. He spoke only for a strong occupation force and
direct German military control of the Belgian railroads. Groener
expected Belgian resentment and he was prepared to bridle it.
He wanted no interference from German civilian bureaucrats
who might "allow Belgian interests to step to the forefront 1 '
or even try to ]I find the soul of the Belgian people. 11 With
such a net at its disposal, the German army could run through
maneuver and railroad problems at will. It could finance its
own occupation costs and perhaps even return some surplus
to the Empire. The military railway service could ramify its
organization and training without cost to the German state*
Belgium would be seriously hurt, of course, by the loss of its
railroads. "But since the interests of German business do
not allow the economic independence of Belgium to be sus-
tained, military and business logic here join. " Groener
stressed railroad and military desiderata, but he was also
shrewd enough to suggest revenue benefits for the Empire and
market expansion for German business.
This memorandum well reflected Groener 1 s militaristic
view of life. Belgium and Alsace- Lorraine were mere positions
in Germany 1 s strategic alignment. Their own civic ego and
happiness was entirely irrelevant. Belgium was appraised for
its significance to the Schlief fen Plan of the future and for the
opportunity it offered to Groener 1 s military railway section.
There, presumably under his able direction, it would gain
control of an entire national work. What an improvement that
would be over the paltry facilities of prewar days. His mem-
orandum reflected personal, professional, and national ambi-
tions. Very decidedly, he was yet a naive soldier whose
political comprehension was controlled by the strategic out-
look. He saw the world from the perspective of military his-
tory, but he did not have enough foresight to note in his
journal that the Belgian project was a bit premature. 20
Greener's Belgian memorandum conceded that a complete
German victory in the west no longer seemed possible. The
Empire could only strengthen its European position and wait
for the next round. Like many other Germans, Groener turned
his eyes to the east where large victories and deep expansion
were still possible. In 1915 Haumann's Mitteleuropa scored
76 General William Groener
the biggest publishing hit since Bismarck 1 s memoirs. Here
lay a natural German interest after failure in the west signalled
the restriction of maritime expansion. "The imperialistic ef-
fort is finished, 1 ' wrote Naumann; "left is withdrawal to the
continental position, to the Bismarckian tradition, though
transformed and deepened." The world was consolidating in-
to gigantic American, British, and Russian blocks. Could
smaller, but talented, central Europe assert itself among such
global giants? That was the "fundamental question" and the
alternate opportunity for German influence and leadership.
Naumann thought of his Mitteleuropa as a group of states with
a common future, related in an economic confederation under
German leadership. His friend, Max Weber, was more inter-
ested in a straight, unsentimental German hegemony. The
generals and the professional patriots talked of direct annexa-
tions or frontier territories. 21
Groener had no particular program for eastern Europe. He
only saw that the German armies could win in the east and
there acquire an economic hinterland which could cushion the
blockade and strengthen the German position for the years to
come* He had no fixed territorial objectives, but he and his
Staff colleagues were "not at all happy 11 with Bethmann-
Hollweg's idea that the new Germany should stretch out to the
Meuse, Niemen, and Narew rivers. The Chancellor was much
too moderate, thought Groener, and apparently inclined to for-
feit improvements earned by the blood of thousands. He could
only hope that the German people would "rise up against such
weakly views." Groener 1 s political world still consisted pri-
marily of pedantic bureaucrats and dilatory diplomats. They
allowed Germany to slip into its dilemma and they must not be
permitted to hold up thorough military corrections. zz
In Germany, the year 1915 was one of steady strength,
inconclusive victories and gradual concern. The west front
held firm but several German <3rlves in the east stopped short
of damaging victory* Falkenhayn was content to stab the
Russian giant off balance and biiild up for his great assault on
ftance. His outward poise and confidence had done much to
steady the German headquarters after the Mame, but he lacked
strategic? breadth and be did not uBctersjand how to exploit the
very considerable strength which the Genual* apsy still had.
As Grower coBnnented toitably talHs diaiy f tf He never has a
The Naive Soldier 77
great operative idea, no inspired soul, always only the small,
immediate goal." Groener wanted major eastern campaigns,
to drive deeply toward Vilna in the north or Kiev in the south-
He respected Ludendorff and Hindenburg, who seemed to un-
derstand strategic sweep and mobility* They did not hesitate
to withdraw for the moment or strike for the deep target. They
gave real substance to Germany's new eastern dreams even
though denied conclusive help by Falkenhayn.
Groener 1 s railroads functioned impressively in the fre-
quent troop shuttles between east and west, but such piece-
meal switching was more spectacular than effective. Within
half a year he dispatched sizeable consignments to Poland,
East Prussia, the Carpathians, and Serbia, but a real power
push was nowhere launched and in the east it could neutralize
an entire front- Groener basked in the headlines for his rail-
road heroics but he was thoroughly exasperated by such con-
tinued fragmentation. Such mistakes had cost Germany the
French campaignand created the two-front dilemma. Now they
continued to plague German strategy on a front where signifi-
cant victories were still possible. Each operation required
its own due time and concentration and it should be geared
for a complete campaign victory. This also was a Schlieffen
principle which fell into disregard.
In that eastern whirlpool the German generals were also
annoyed by the kaleidoscopic political considerations. Beth-
mann-Hollweg was worried by early Austro-Hungarian dis-
couragement and Falkenhayn was persuaded to send troops for
a late winter attack into Galicia. It bogged down in heavy
Carpathian snows. The Gorlice operation in the Spring was
undertaken in part to display German power and check the
Italian and Rumanian drift toward the Allies. Its success was
not carried through and German attention then shifted quickly
to Serbia. The supply route to Turkey needed clearing and
Rumania merited a further demonstration of German capacities*
In the north Ludendorff was denied break-through strength for
his Masurian Lakes campaign for fear of exposing West Prus-
sia to possible Russian harassment. German headquarters in
the east buzzed constantly with plans for a new Polish state
uiider German supervision. Even in the west, political coir
s id era t ions jostled the men in uniform as Germany gave up
its submarine war to deference to the American protest*
78 General William Groener
Groener was not happy with such meekness nor did he like
the repeated intrusion of political thought into military de-
cisions- Victory was the key to national satisfaction and the
soldiers should be left to do their job. If only they could
11 neutralize all the diplomats, n the war would be over much
sooner.
Greener's grumbling in 1915 retained an aggressive edge
and yet it was not without pensive hesitation and insight* He
regretted that his prestige and leadership had blossomed so
late in life* Now his verve was somewhat restrained, "for
one does not become wiser with age, rather plum-soft, which
is then called experience. 11 He was sure that his prewar views
on strategy were all confirmed, but he had not expected the
German ~front to stretch out in such long, inoperative lines,
11 with which no great success can be attained. 11 The diplomats
were a nuisance, but he also knew that Italy's decision for
war and Rumania 1 s independent manner reflected significant
foreign assessment of the German prospect.
Notable civilian acquaintances were growing dubious
about their country's situation. Historian Hans Delbrueck told
Groener they might do well to settle for status quo ante bellum.
Friends in the Food Office were beginning to see black and
Groener probably remembered that prewar estimates for German
self-sufficiency ranged from nine to eighteen months. In the
early months of the year he told Falkenhayn to build a modern
defensive f certification line from Metz to Ostende and the Chief
of Staff was amused. After a summer of Balkan and eastern
meandering, Groener was even more guarded about the military
prospect. Neither his government nor his superiors seemed
to have a clear idea as to how to proceed and what to aim for.
Groener dropped one particularly intuitive comment dur-
ing those sKmths of frustration as he noted that the "notewor-
thy aspect of this war 11 seemed to be that the "correct military
decision so often steps Into the background of other consid-
erations* lf This war was strangely complex for the General
Staff which Ksanted to fight and win on the field of battle. It
did not fully understand that modem strategy might be better
implemented by diplomatic and economic leverage. General
Luctwig Beck later observed that his fellow officers were not
prepared to reckon with strategy different from their own.
They did not see that the instruments of modem military power
The Naive Soldier 79
no longer lay with the field operation and the tactical unit.
Even Groener first understood his railroads primarily as a
tactical instrument. When the military effort failed, his du-
ties then involved him in domestic transportation which showed
him the mounting economic strain on beleaguered Germany.
He sat on coal and food committees; his trains delivered the
physical needs of the nation. In the Fall of 1915 his office
organized the badly needed f1 cereal trains 11 from Rumania into
central Europe, which relieved public apprehension somewhat
and again glamorized his public image.
Groener was the resourceful specialist who could thread
Germany through its two-front difficulties, but he was hardly
happy with such temporary solutions; they could only postpone
the developing constriction of the Empire. "The foe sits at
the longer lever, !l he admitted to his diary, "and it was our
job to prevent a war of attrition (Ermattungskrieg) from wear-
ing us down." Certainly his "hooray" naivete was gone and
he was being forced to grapple with the economic conditions
of war.
Groener 1 s Christmas letter in 1915 well reflected the
pensive mood of an experienced and concerned soldier. He
wrote to his wife,
"Let us hope that we may again celebrate next year
in peace. When one regards the war situation,
one cannot help but think of Frederick the Great
and the Seven Years War. And if the present war
does not last exactly seven years, we must yet
prepare ourselves fora third Christmas in the field.
Let it be and come as it will, we will just have to
stick it out. "
Now he too was ready to agree with Hans Delbrueck that Ger-
many could be content with status quo ante bellum. He was
no longer willing to risk American intervention with submarine
activity. He disagreed with those who thought Britain might
be willing to negotiate on terms favorable to Germany. That
well- positioned foe was not going to "let loose" and "submit
themselves to our terms." He was even dubious about
Falkenhayn's coming assault on Verdun and France. A drive
toward Odessa seemed much more rewarding and sensible to
Groener. He now understood the complex risk and nature of
80 General William Greener
total war, and he was no longer a naive soldier. As he said
in his memoirs, "The time in which I should be carried away
by unfounded hopes was past. I began to regard our situation
very soberly and, . . * it was very serious. Great caution ap-
peared to be in order. 11 The war was now clearly a desperate
struggle for survival in which the Empire might well be happy
to settle for its old frontier and its old way of life. Z3
Chapter Four
THE POLITICAL SOLDIER
Germany's geo-political restrictions were recognized be-
fore the war and discounted. They were ominously realized
after the failure of the opening campaign. General Seeckt
described the Empire's position as that of a "beleaguered cita-
del, ir which could launch sallies but which lacked the final
force to break the siege. The first attempt was the strongest;
each succeeding strike against Allied constriction must neces-
sarily be weaker. In 1914 the German army neglected to con-
centrate decisively at the vital point. Thereafter it lacked
the leisure to do so within its concentric fronts. The General
Staff was thus consigned to the very kind of mobile defense
which it had feared and sought to avoid. "That is the fruit of
the evil deed," sighed Groener to his diary as he watched the
German army pursue its fragmentary defensive strategy in
1915. That was the "fate 11 which they could !l no longer evade 11
unless miraculous good fortune might yet "fall in their lap. 111
Groener and his own section aides had discussed Ger-
many's strategic problem and generally agreed that the defen-
sive advantages in trench war were to be heeded. They favored
defense in the west and bold offensive drives in the east, but
Falkenhayn kept his eye on the west. Russia was too vast and
the Balkans too peripheral for war-ending action in the east.
He would wear down the French army, which he considered to
be the tf sword of England," and simultaneously strike at the
blockade with unrestricted submarine action. He decided to
apply relentless pressure at the focal point of Verdun and
bleed out the French army- A break-through was not even
planned for. Fertiaps the British army would then be tempted
81
82 General William Groener
into starting an incautious relief offensive. Verdun could
thus start out as an attrition campaign against the French and
loosen up the enemy front for a series of terminal maneuvers.
Groener was not excited by the idea but he gave assurance
that a formidable concentration of men and fire power could
be mustered by the rail system. He did not appreciate an as-
sault which was not planned to break through, and he saw no
logic in Falkenhayn ! s intent to bleed out the French while at
the same time inviting American intervention with submarine
war* But hope sprang eternal and on the eve of the offensive
he wrote almost prayerfully, n Maybe the fortunes of war will
come to our aid once more and give us a situation which is
made for fast action I hope we will know how to move then. 11
His Journal then marked the tension and critical delay of the
pending assault.
February 12. "Rain. * . opening bombardment postponed. 11
February 13. " Night. . .starry heavens. . .morning. . .misty
Knobelsdorff hesitates to shoot! Rain the entire day! If Verdun
does not start soon a surprise is doubtful.
February 14. M Rain .... It is impossible that the attack
against Verdun can move in such weather. "
February 15. M Rain, nothing but rain. Verdun continues
to be postponed and deserters from the Fifth or some other
Corps. It is hardly likely that the French are still uncertain. 11
February 16. IT It continues to rain. Knobelsdorf and the
Crown Prince have no weather luck. . . .The rain has let up some
in the afternoon, the skies are clearing. in Berlin a preacher
has supposedly asked God's Grace from the pulpit for our
pending offense! !"
February 17. "The weather is clearing. . . . The French are
excited about Artois .... No talk of Verdun. . . . A war-ending
success in the west is impossible. Odessa. A blue sky is
pushing through the clouds Kaiser^weather is on its way. "
February 20. "The past night we had a full moon, today
the sky is bright* ff this weather holds for a few days we can
finally start before Verdun. l!
February 21. "Pine weather! We have been shooting on
Verdun since this morning. General Faikenhayn and several
of my staff have gone up. God grant that the attack will suc-
ceed and that losses will not be too heavy. T1
February 22. "The Temps in Paris Informed its readers
The Political Soldier 83
that the Germans might attack Verdun. It reassured them that
the fortress was strong. If the Germans really wanted to at-
tack there, they could be could be assured of a rousing wel-
come. 11
February 23. "Our artillery barrage is quite intense; it
is a tremendous spectacle . , . . One could only see the giant
clouds of our shells . . . .Soon the entire mass of our artillery
fire was united on the town of Brabant the town disappeared
in black and gray explosion clouds so that the houses and
church could be seen only now and then. ... In the meantime
it began to snow. 11
The great assault was under way and a new chapter in
mass war was opened. The scene was more horrible than im-
pressive to the men up front, who crouched stupefied in their
forward posts and waited to spring up in dutiful sacrifice.
More than ever before, the individual soldier had become a
mere mathematical figure in the new strategy of attrition
The front line made "nice progress 11 for a few days. "Fort
Douamont has been stormed. . . . Bravo, " wrote Groener. But
the enemy stiffened quickly and hundreds of trucks brought in
reinforcements. Fort Douamont did not fall and by the end of
the month the German attack was in need of a pause. The long
rains softened up the clay roads and supply was a harassing
problem. The artillery added to the difficulties by making the
first displacement away from the major ammunition dumps, in
violation of the planned pattern. Falkenhayn brought in more
heavy artillery from Belgium and later he stripped the arma-
ments from such fortification points as Metz and Diedenhofen*
German strength was being truly expended and the French
packed their line to meet the attack head-on. Losses were
huge and both armies were strained to the breaking point* One
German corps, which was withdrawn for shipment to another
front, virtually ran to its trains. Falkenhayn truly took the
"bull by the horns" but he were himself exit in the struggle.
The French maintained their will to continue and they could
better afford the losses than the Genaans. They were sup-
ported by world resources, not surrounded by them.
Douamont finally fell and, on March 9, the Germans re-
ported the capture of the other key bastion, Fort Vaux. Greener
wa$ both faappyahd wary, "ff the fort stays in ow hands, then
itis tb secid faieach which has been laid into the fortress
84 General William Groener
and its effect on the Parisians in case they are informed
will not miss its mark." But German enthusiasm was foiled
again and the sour diarist had to admit that I! Fort Vaux was
recovered by the French as we trumpeted out our victory fan-
fare. l! By the middle of March it was clear that Verdun would
not fall. Even the systematic Falkenhayn hesitated and he
pondered an alternate offensive in Flanders, but his strength
was already gathered at Verdun and he decided to "bleed out"
the French. His request for unrestricted submarine action had
also been fended off by Bethmann-Hollweg, and his great of-
fensive against the west was checked within three weeks.
The grind and the losses continued but the German bid for a
decision in France was painfully tied up. 2
Groener detached his hopes from the struggle with a mo-
rose threat that the Allies had better hang on to Verdun "be-
cause if we ever get it we shall never give it up. If we want
the Briey ore basin then we must also have Verdun." It was
a mere departing volley, for he was certainly more discouraged
than aroused by the costly failure. Again the German strategy
seemed pedestrian and he was only afraid that its problems
would be compounded by unrestricted submarine warfare. A
mere fifty submarines could not cripple the British, who would
confiscate more German tonnage in neutral ports than they
would lose to the submarines. The navy had done enough to
complicate the German assignment and he was not impressed
with the "theatrical" Tirpitz. Certainly American manpower
should not be brought into the war for a submarine action which
seemed to be more spectacular than effective. Let the navy
be quiet and assemble a fleet of several hundred submarines.
Then the question of their use might be re-opened.
Greener received his relief from Veidun in May and June,
and he once again toured his eastern stations. There the
Austro-Hungarians were reeling under Russian pressure but
Groener was not upset. A few setbacks would restore a proper
degree to the ally, who was overly flattered by recent success
in Italy* The east was now a tactical breeze for the German
fences and Groener could cockily predict that they " would re-
store things to oider. ft He had no respect far the Hapsburg
ajray and when the Bulgarians refused to place themselves
under its command, he could only comment flatly, "they are
probably right* 11 When a chastened Falkenhayn consulted witii
The Political Soldier 85
Conrad and for once promised quick help, Groener again could
not refrain his sarcasm, "Both strategists departed again this
evening, apparently pleased to find themselves sponsors of
the same idea, which is supposed to happen very seldom
among strategists." He was sour with the world and beginning
to regard its problems with tough dis passion. There would
still be intermittent flights of hope, but his spirit was gradu-
ally building its shell as the disappointments became more
and more suggestive of a basic trend.
On his way back to the west, Groener stopped off in Ber-
lin to attend Moltke's funeral. Like Bethmann-Hollweg, the
former Chief of Staff was a tragic figure in the decline of the
Empire. 3 Both were intelligent men of culture, sensitive to
German problems, but neither was gifted enough to control
his strategic assignment, and each was considerably respon-
sible for the dilatory strategy on the home and fighting front.
Both were forced to withdraw in failure. Moltke sought a
balanced offensive and stumbled his way into diffuse frag-
mentation. Bethmann was looking for a l! diagonal 1 f policy at
home which could find the line of compromise between the
various German parties. He finally satisfied no group and
was pushed aside for the unilateral leadership of the High
Command.
Groener was a frequent visitor in Berlin as he made his
inspection trips from front to front. There he could see his
family, participate in various transportation conclaves and
continue acquaintances in one of Berlins foremost war soci-
eties, Die Mitwoch Gesellschaft. There he came in contact
with Walther Rathenau, Ernst Troeltsch, Hans Delbrueck, and
Friedrich Meinecke, who undoubtedly influenced his views on
war and peace. These men were moderates in matters of war
annexations and by 1916 they accepted the necessity of suf-
frage reform in Prussia. Delbrueck and Troeltsch were amoiig
the first to speak up for a peace negotiation without expansion.
With Rathenau they thought that Germany's best postwar op-
portunity lay in a friendly relationship with Britain and a more
restrained colonial program.
Meinecke had moments of a slight expansion fever, but
by 1916 he thoroughly opposed annexation and argued for more
traditional European restraint and sophistication. 4 He and
Groener promenaded wife one another and the general was
86 General William Groener
exposed to new ideals of European civility and careful Staats-
raeson. This meant that German power must understand its
physical means and its cultural responsibilities. The life of
a neighboring state and the conscience of the German citizenry
were to be respected* Groener 1 s agile spirit expanded in such
company and he began to discern the deeper implications of
the war and the broader problems of the nation. After Verdun
the stability, survival, and future of the German state would
concern him much more than isolated campaign strategies.
The Berlin vis its also brought Groener contact with home-
front morale, ^In January, 1915, a friend in the Food Office
told him the nation could feed itself for one more year* The
"cereal trains 11 from Rumania at the end of that year testified
to the approximate accuracy of his prediction. Such basic
staples as grain, cotton, and copper were becoming scarce
and prices rose as supply fell. But private enterprise still
filled the shop windows with nonessential products and the
federal states in the south kept their food supply to themselves.
Those with money bought good food in the black market and
those without grew hungry on their shrinking rations. Many
still hoped that the General Staff could save the day. But
another pole of sentiment formed around the socialists, who
were growing increasingly suspicious of bald victory promises
and impossible annexationist demands. They resumed their
criticism of the government and a policy of competitive self-
interest within the nation.
A victory peace seemed clearly unlikely and even of sin-
ister import to their democratic program. The junker monarchy
would then be more self-righteously entrenched than ever.
And a negotiated peace was hardly possible as long as German
leaders entertained their expansion claims, especially in the
west. Their suspicions were not groundless, for the German
conserratives, junker ami conservative, were very much con-
scious of a relationship between annexations and status quo
reaction at hosne. They planned to disarm public discontent
wtfibi imperialistic ornaments and patriotic exaltation.
Ifee crisis-galvanized Empire of 1914 was beginning to
pull apart again along its class and regional seams. It had
not substantiated that initial surge of unity with any tangible
symbols of anew relationship between government and nation,
needs of the citizenry wese not given impartial,
The Political Soldier 87
decisive attention, and the comradeship of a nation in arms
was not honored by any official recognition of basic constitu-
tional rights. The Hohenzollern Empire had the nerve to ask
mass sacrifice for its system of privilege. Under Bethmann-
Hollweg's representation it cogitated the ethics and tactics
of political reform* But the military emergency after Verdun
brought Ludendorff and Hindenburg to the western front, who
understood the industrial importance of the home front and
who would ask for even greater domestic sacrifice and disci-
pline. Their will to manage the home front economy was logi-
cal enough in the narrow military sense, but labor and the
Reichstag were hardly in a mood to consign even more of Ger-
man life into the hands of two such junkers incarnate* The
home front wanted constitutional reform in exchange for any
new concentration of effort. It would be confronted, and domi-
nated, by a high-handed Ludendorff who thought that every
German must be a soldier under his command. This was his
concept of military responsibility for victory*
The Tannenberg heroes were brought west in response to
German weakness after Verdun* The Allies launched their own
major offensive with Russian pressure in Galicia and a smash-
ing British push along the Somme. Now Falkenhayn faced an
enemy application of n brutal force. 11 British artillery hammered
down the German batteries and literally blew up the defensive
line. The German front began to erode away and the first signs
of exhaustion and anxiety became visible among the men in
grey. This was the great Materialschlacht which impressed
on the German army the tremendous Allied edge in resources.
Equipment, firepower, and food simply abounded among the
khaki-clad and suddenly the German soldier felt himself to be
in a doomed cause,
Ernest Juenger drew a memorable portrait of the new Ger-
man soldier, his face shadowed by the steel hetaet, set in
grim, weary, dispassionate lines. Hefo\ightwith professional
skill and forgotten purpose. Even back at Headquarters, the
face of Falkenhayn assumed the weary set of his troops. His
confidence was gone and he was suddenly a hesitant old
man even his own aides recognized that he must be replaced
but the Kaiser liked him and for a while resisted any change.
Rather typically, four days before accepting Falkenhayn 1 s
resignation, WillSasi said to him, ll we will stay together until
88 General William Groener
the war's end* 11 The Kaiser was not at all eager for the her-
alded and confident pair from the east. He knew what every-
body else knew: that the strong-willed Ludendorff was hard
to live with. 5
The new High Command received authority in a moment
of German military crisis. They were the Tannenberg victors
and they had cudgelled the Russians with unremitting consis-
tency in Poland and Lithuania. The fatherly old Hindenburg
and his aggressive executive had caught and actively culti-
vated the fancy of the German patriots. There was German
steadfastness and nerve combined in one harmonious command
unit. Hindenburg and Ludendorff carried the shaken German
hopes and their recommendations would be hard to oppose.
They represented the final military effort and were able to un-
derstand, and impose, themselves as the final, absolute
guardians of the Empire.
Groener was one of those who believed that the eastern
pair should be given a chance on the major front. He did not
like Ludendorff *s brusque egotism and radical will, but he had
high regard for his military talents. Ludendorff knew how to
concentrate an operation and give it bold, decisive lines.
Groener had frequently spoken for his man power and supply
needs when Falkenhayn considered reinforcements for the
eastern front. Ludendorff was often a thorn in Groener 1 s side
cm matters of supply and transportation. He was imperious
about asking for rail support and quick about destroying track.
He pressed constantly for more supply although he was often
negligent about its care and distribution. He was a deficit
Ofganizer who scrounged for tomorrow 1 s battle and trusted to
victoiy to solve subsequent problems. In short, he was a
steieotype militarist who thought primarily in terms of the
tactical need and expected the nation to serve the military.
As early as 1915, Groener jotted into his journal, "How will
It all turn out with him. Already I see him sitting on a very
h!#fa throne as Chief of the General Staff*" And when Luden-
dorff finally did come west, a friend remarked to Groener that
his forotog style Blight well completely exhaust Germany and
even endanger the dynasty.
Tfoe initial action of the new cosmaiKiing pair typified
their style and spirit. Hie leicfestag was assured that every-
thing was under coatpol even thougfe the Bowie strata had the
The Political Soldier 89
German army wobbly. In early September they held a war
council with the government leaders. The men in uniform were
in favor of unrestricted submarine war and Admiral Holtzendorf
predicted that Britain ! s will to fight could be broken before the
end of that year. Bethmann-Hollweg opposed with the thought
that a negotiated peace through President Wilson might still
be possible. Ludendorff admitted that he would like to finish
the Rumanian campaign first whereupon the pliable Bethmann
agreed that submarine action was a matter of proper military
timing. Ludendorff saw his opening. He too thought that it
was a decision for the High Command and he asked the Chan-
cellor to stress this point to the Reichstag. He regarded that
body as nothing more than a rubber stamp and he was abso-
lutely brazen in his abuse of its function and intelligence.
When the Chancellor later protested that he had the constitu-
tional authority to decide on submarine war, Ludendorff re-
minded him of the earlier understanding and insisted that he
was responsible for victory. 6
The long fumbling and disrespected leaders of the Empire
government were now caged with a tiger and Bethmann 1 s verbal
meditations would be ruthlessly falsified and exploited. And
he lacked the tradition of office, or combative sense of re-
sponsibility, to subordinate the generals. The long Prussian
deference to the men in uniform, often controlled by men of
wisdom, now gave an embattled Germany into the hands of a
willful hasardeur. His verve was not yet blunted by failure or
by the frightful attrition of war in the west, and he would force
a final German effort.
Groener recovered some of his buoyancy with the coining
of Ludendorff even though he recognized the unpleasantries
and risk involved. Maybe he could restore German military
security in the west and give new verve to the war effort.
Groener was not initially impressed with Hindenburg who sage-
ly disclosed that his main worry about unrestricted submarine
war concerned the reaction "of Holland and Denmark. lf And
a baffled Groener wrote in his diary, "apparently he does not
think of America." But he himself could still say things which
did not exactly correspond with Germany's military predica-
ment. His own peace program was recorded in a conversation
he had in August, 1916, in the midst of the Somme crisis. He
told a friend,
90 General William Groener
"ARussian policy in the Bismarckian fashion No
self-reliant Poland. ... In the west bring back the
King of Belgium, but keep Belgium in a dependent
tie with Germany keep the railroads, make the
Belgians intermediaries for our industry. Win over
Holland. Social Democracy at home, directed by
the government. We cannot get through without
state socialism, therefore grab hold rather than
wait. "
This did not sound much like status QUO ante bellum and ob-
viously such talk represented one of Groener 1 s happier mo-
ments in an anxious summer. The image of a negotiated peace
changed constantly and perhaps this August conversation was
attuned to the outlook under a new High Command. Groener
did not like the prospects of German moderation and he enter-
tained more ambitious hopes until the very last summer, but
they became ever more exceptional to a basic trend of pessi-
mism.
These diplomatic notions were not strange to an admirer
of Bismarck and Schlieffen. Holland and Belgium were again
appreciated fa: flanking purposes. A Bismarckian relationship
with Russia expressed the interest of the General Staff. Sat-
ellite plans for eastern Europe seemed tangible enough since
the German army already was asserting itself from the Baltic
to the Black Sea. The new feature in the Groener outlook was
his acceptance of the need fora domestic realignment. Maybe
he had learned from his Berlin friends that the junker founda-
tions of Frederick the Great could no longer satisfy modern
needs and sensitivities. An industrial monarchy of the twen-
tieth century rested on mass support and mass self-respect.
The Kaiser should recognize such new foundations and asso-
ciate his authority with a new state socialism. In such a
desKpcmtic monarchy, the tradition and discipline of the old
state might best be aligned with the welfare and ego of the
modern public* 7
Groener was beginning to think of Empire evolution, The
German interest obviously rested on the energy of its people
and now tt*e crovm was expected to adjust itself to such new
aatioiialiaqtqcs, but Jsi Ms isilitary posltio^ he w&s still en-
twined with colleagues wbo would racier crfppJ<3J the nation
The Political Soldier 91
than change the governing system* Such talk of a socialistic
monarchy was confined to private conversation although it
probably drifted to other ears as well. Groener 1 s Swabian in-
stincts and flexibility were coming alive again as the national
dilemma deepened and he began to work with the imperious
Ludendorff. The new order was rather clique-conscious and
resented by many of the troop commanders, but the High Com-
mand esteemed his ability and he was the only officer not in
the operations section who was invited to eat at the table with
Hindenburg and LudendorfL Such high favor was fatal to
Groener ! s life, for it would soon pull him out of his railroad
sovereignty and make him a satellite to the coming strong man.
Lud end orff knew that the war in the west involved a strat-
egy of supply and he sent Greener on a tour of the front to
study army needs after the battle of the Somme. The General
Staff was working out a call for total mobilization which was
to be known as the Hindenburg program, and Groener was a
natural choice to direct such a production assignment* His
transportation experience and reputation seemed valuable to
any military supervision of the domestic war effort* Industry
and government had failed to organize an efficient war econo-
my and now the army was eager to intercede.
Groener 1 s background included varied contacts with the
civilian economy. His railroad work involved considerable
supply and assistance from German industry and he was fa-
miliar with the transportation needs of the domestic society.
All traffic depended on his clearance and priorities and he
knew about the foodstuff and raw material problems of every
area. Before the war he had participated in the vexing supply
discussions of the Prussian government and he represented
the army in the delayed effort to set up a co-ordinated War
Food Office { Kriegsernaehrungsamt) in the Spring of 1916.
The Empire stumbled badly over its factions and states as no
one wanted to be subjected to a regimented economy. The
southern states kept their food and the Prussian junkers ad-
hered to their own cultivation habits in defiance of govern-
ment crop regulations. Hie northern cities had no particular
assets and they were gradually reduced to subsistance nour-
ishment levels. The socialists clamored for an Empire ration-
ing program but bad to settle for a maze of separate and in-
effective food agencies. There ware offices for potatoes,
92 General William Groener
fruits and vegetables, sugar, fats, fish and eggs.
This bureaucratic tangle was further tightened in 1915 by
a poor harvest which ranged from 15 to 35 per cent lower than
normal. Relief shipments from Rumania helped some in the
winter of 1915-1916, but Austria-Hungary soaked up most of
the Balkan grain. The fears and predictions of the prewar
councils were now materializing. Germany simply did not have
the position or the resources for a longer war. The munition
factories were beginning to request higher rations for their
workers and there was a sprinkling of strikes and food riots in
the summer of 1916. The Somme crisis further accentuated
German need and Allied wealth. 8
The food problem seemed most immediate in the Spring of
1916 and the Empire government assayed another bureaucratic
formation* It planned a national Food Office in which repre-
sentatives of various German groups could appraise and direct
commodity distribution. Falkenhayn earmarked Groener as the
army delegate to such a council and the latter was agreeable,
provided he might simultaneously command his railway troops
his professional anchor. The railroads gave him leverage in
any economic issue and identified him as a man of means and
influence. He went to Berlin in the middle of May to present
his ideas on food supply to Bethmann-Hollweg. He asked that
one military authority be given charge of all domestic, occu-
pied, and front-line supply needs. Such a supply czar must
be free of all regional military intrusion.
Groener had experience with rear echelon impediments and
hewaated a free, authoritative hand. Undoubtedly he had him-
self in mind for the job. How else was his own transportation
sovereignty to be reconciled with that of such a supply czar?
Groeaer saw only civilian bankruptcy and he thought the public
was ready for, and in need of, more efficient military leader-
ship. His concept of leadership was more consultative and
fair-minded than the brassy and clannish manner of Ludendorff.
The latter commanded from a pedestal of uniformed, junker au-
thority. Gioener addressed himself to the national emergency
as an impatient, talented organizer who sought productive dis-
cipline from every German, and he regarded every last working
raaa as an equal fellow citizen, but war was no time for demo-
cratic discussion or bureaucratic indecision,
Groene^s concept was not accepted, for the War Ministry
The Political Soldier 93
did not care to see the General "Staff intrude itself so deeply
into home front affairs. That command zone belonged properly
to the War Ministry. Thus a Multi-member Food Office was
created in which Groener was only one of seven and president
Batocki of East Prussia was its executive head. Groener had
with his transportation knowledge and instrument expected to
be the key man. But before the original group of seven ever
began its assignment, the Reichstag camel also stuck its nose
into the tent. Soon there were eleven in that group and another
sixteen-man Reichstag committee entrusted itself with special
consultative rights on any matter of particular interest. The
distrust between the soldiers and the civilians again expressed
itself and obstructed effective supply methods. " What became
of the food dictatorship, !! snorted the railroad chief. The
soldier found it difficult to appreciate the machinery of parlia-
mentary action.
The frustrated Reichstag of World War I did not exactly
demonstrate crisis co-operation at its best. Distrust was its
heritage and divisive party quarrels its nature. The right and
left wings were deeply alien to one another and the bourgeois
middle divided unpredictably on every issue. After 1915 the
patriotic reconciliation with the government was ended and
the sniping attack on the autocratic regime was renewed. The
Reichstag moved back into such aggravating problems as Prus-
sian suffrage and gave running discussion to peace plans and
war leadership. The conservatives thought the Reichstag
might better go home or content itself with enthusiastic sup-
port of the war effort. The socialists wanted national eco-
nomic controls and full suffrage equality. Everybody disagreed
on annexations, submarines and peace diplomacy. In short,
the Empire was thoroughly at odds with itself by 1916 and
hardly co-ordinated for the desperate struggle at hand. Now
that spirits were raw and materials scarce, it was a little late
for harmonious regulation and contraction.
Groener was one of those who wanted to send the Reich-
stag home. Let all the parties be represented in a national
executive council and let it entrust war leadership to the mili-
tary. At the same time, the national spirit could be rejuvenated
by some significant democratic action, stich as suffrage re-
form. Then a unified and uplifted Germany might be able to
thwart Allied pressure and work out a satisfactory peace for
94 General William Groener
itself. According to Groener, the frustrated German people
were ready for a military dictatorship in the "firm, naive be-
lief 1 that the soldiers might still organize success. And a
postwar Reichstag investigating committee also judged that
the General Staff took charge of Germany mainly because ef-
fective civilian leadership was absent* Apparently the com-
ing dictatorship of Ludendorff reflected a national situation
as well as a personal arrogation. 9
The army made its bid for control of the home front in the
Fall of 1 916. Ludendorff approached Bethmann-Hollweg for a
levee en masse in which the High Command would gain au-
thority over every German within a certain age bracket, per-
haps between fifteen and sixty. But the Chancellor thought
such a request would be quite unacceptable; it would be dif-
ficult enough to work a more modest draft of labor through the
Reichstag. So the Hindenburg program resorted to a less for-
ward pronunciation of its desiderata. It asked for more sol-
diers and for more home-front production. Somehow, by a
Ludendorff act of will, the German production line was to sur-
render more men to the army, yet also increase its volume of
output. That meant tighter control of raw materials, produc-
tion aiKl labor. Non-essential work had to stop and a general
labor draft was to be Invoked. Women and handicapped per-
sons were to be utilized. Organized youth might help out on
the farm. The worker was to be forced into war industry and
frozen to his job. He must be enlisted in the industrial army
and man his station as though he were in uniform.
The entire productive machinery of the Empire was to be
given into the hands of the military. Ludendorff understood
1at his immediate use of more recruits would automatically
reduce the reserve strength of the future. That shortage would
ftenhaveto be counter-balanced by more equipment, machine
guns, mortars and cannons. The army's future stability was
thus premised on the success of the Hindenburg program.
German industry quickly promised Ludendorff astronomical
production increase ai*d he counted his immediate reinforce-
ments as a smart loan from the future. 10
Qroener was the choice of the High Command for its
planned domestic mobilization, but this time he would have
to relinquish his railroad post* He did so reluctantly for here
Jay his unassailable skill, authority, and hapjfeess. But
The Political Soldier 95
there was an economic job to be done, so he snapped on the
harness and stepped into the Berlin arena. His happy days
and unsullied reputation would henceforth move into eclipse.
Ahead lay only complex responsibility, insoluble dilemma,
harrassing Ludendorff impatience and misunderstood failure.
Before his appointment to the new War Office, he ex-
press ed his views about the Hindenburg program to the Chan-
cellor and the dual commanders. He wondered if it might not
be better to ask for voluntary response from labor; it might
willingly staff an expanding war industry and make a coercive
law to that effect unnecessary* He thought the material short-
age needed more careful regulation. The idea of female labor
was fine but the factories would first have to be made fit for
femininity, and he reminded his superiors that the use of un-
skilled or handicapped workers would also involve on-the-job
training. Having aired some of his views, Groenerthen pre-
pared to assume charge of the new position and escort Luden-
dorff ! s Auxiliary Service Bill (Hilfsdienstgesetz) through the
Reichstag. His political career was under way. n
Groener began to negotiate the bill through Reichstag
channels at the end of October, 1916. His co-sponsor was
Prussian Minister of the Interior Helfferich. The High Com-
mand proposed that every German male between the age of
fifteen and fifty-nine be made available to the military au-
thorities for possible assignment to a war job. The War Min-
istry was to manage such registration and the newly created
War Office was to fix industry needs and guide the distribu-
tion of man power. Joint local committees, composed of an
employer, a labor delegate, and a War Office representative
were to select the specific personnel needed. Petition against
such committee decisions, or uncertainties about the defini-
tion of a war job, were to be decided by the higher echelons
of the War Office, Ludendorff wanted to control the mobility
of labor within the war industry and all newly constructed
Genaan factories were expected to serve War Office needs
first* It was recognized that certain industries would be
stripped of their labor force and that certain hardships in such
a national realignment could not be avoided.
Heifferich, l$bor, and some of the German states hesi-
tated almost immediately. The Prussian Minister believed in
iaissez faire and he wofidered whether a voluntary labor and
96 General William Groener
industrial effort could not satisfy requirements* The states
did not welcome such intrusion into their economic affairs.
Whole industries might be laid still and problems of unemploy-
ment created. Labor suspected the motives of the High Com-
mand and was hostile to any job freeze. Their lives would
then be even more thoroughly under the control of the military.
Initial discussions of the bill brought questions of detail to
the fore. Where did the division of authority between the War
Office, the War Ministry, and the civilian bureaucracy lay ?
Howwere the rights of labor, or the autonomy of business, to
be regulated and protected? Was it wise to expose such a
controversial measure to the argumentive Reichstag? Some
officials thought it would be wiser to proclaim such action
through the federal Bundesrat. 12
Groener was irked by such explicit and cautious attention.
He wanted the Auxiliary Service bill to serve as a broad, in-
spiring declaration of intensified effort and national solidarity.
Details could be worked out later. He was willing to include
civilian help and counsel in his War Office, and labor was
promised important representation as well as strong petition
safeguards. Helfferich was prepared to maneuver his way
through the Reichstag but the general looked for quick agree-
ment and deferred questions. He reported such unwelcome
reactions back to Headquarters and a sked for another round of
support. So the High Command reassured Groener that its
request must be accepted as it stood. Only then was a l! clear
solution" to Germany's dilemma possible. Let the Reichstag
understand that the war could be won "only with the help of
such a law. 11 And it required the "collaboration of the Reich-
stag, which absolutely must share the burden of responsibil-
ity. 11 The High Command wanted Reichstag approval for demo-
cratic resonance and appearance but it rejected sincere delib-
eration. The Reichstag might even assume responsibility in
case tilings went wrong- l *
The socialists were not impressed with such imperious
wisdom and they proceeded to work their bridgeheads into the
bill, they were rather pleased wife the Head of the new War
Office even though he sponsored a dangerous bill. He spoke
with human directness and evident sincerity. He understood
labor's need and its competitive concern about the conditions
and implications of the Auxiliary Service bill. He guaranteed
The Political Soldier 97
fair administration of all industrial matters, high and low.
He even expressed interest in a surplus profits tax as a justi-
fiable corollary to any labor draft. Promises and informal
understandings were broached informally in committee meet-
ings. Groener wanted the bill to come to life and he was
willing to ad just to certain labor modifications. He understood
that German power now rested very substantially on its labor
corps and he realistically accepted their growing place in
German politics. He could admit that the High Command was
not always right, whereas the War Minister insisted a few days
later that the "High Command does not make mistakes* 11 The
same General von Stein who wrote the bulletin had denied de-
feat at the Marne. Compared to such rigid types, Groener
impressed the Reichstag delegates, and especially the so-
cialists, as a reasonable, intelligent fellow German.
The General Staff and the Social Democrats were emerging
ever more clearly as the two exponents of German force, and
it was Groener 1 s job to correlate the interests of both in the
new domestic mobilization. Success depended on friendly
negotiation and joint national interest on the part of all con-
cerned. His Swabian qualities were suddenly of real value
as the General Staff sought greater civilian sacrifice and help
at home. Groener was at ease in the bourgeois world and he
knew how to talk to the common man. A few words spoken at
a union meeting in December of that year well illustrated his
egalitarian simplicity:
11 Iknowthat we will assist one another in the great-
est mutual trust. And when the Auxiliary Service
law is out of force after the war, then we can shake
one another by the hand and say: we did that with
real good sense* t!
He felt, and conveyed, a sincerity and democracy of attitude
which did much to mollify labor's suspicions about the Luden-
dorff campaign into the home front. 14
Labor would not allow itself to be completely disarmed by
a personality, least of all in uniform. Greener's impression
notwithstanding, the military request for total mobilization
tfireatened the freedom of the working citizen and it had to be
modified* In classic parliamentary fashion, a dangerous bill
of four paragraphs was expanded to a porous eighteen. Labor
98 General William Groener
kept its right to change war jobs and gained important petition
rights and a key representative in the structure of the War Of-
fice. And the War Ministry was also given a place in the ad-
ministration of the new economic effort. That meant stiff old
generals and procedures which would resist the new War Of-
fice and alienate the citizens forced into their registry and
processing care. Groener was accustomed to complete au-
thority in his railroad work and now his jurisdiction was to be
carefully regulated, but he stepped into the job with typical
energy with the hope that his considerable arbitration powers
might enable him to shape a system more to his liking.
In his willingness to make concessions to labor, Groener
alienated his own political partner, Helfferich. The latter was
a shrewd and suspicious Minister of the crown who regarded
the Reichstag as the constitutional enemy. The general was
told to get a quick mobilization bill and he did not hesitate
to make concessions as they seemed to be necessary. He was
accustomed to executive independence, but Helfferich was
not always at the Reichstag committee meetings and was not
always kept informed of Groener 1 s spontaneous actions. His
own chary bargaining was thus often undermined by the mili-
tary partner. He was thoroughly chagrined and annoyed when
the socialist delegates onceasked him, "How can you oppose
things which General Groener has long since granted us? 11
And probably Helfferich was not too happy when Groener told
him that the war involved the "greatest democratic wave ever
to pass over the nations. 11 One could not oppose such a wave.
one could only l! steer with it. lt15
Such democratic determinism on the part of his general
apparently sifted through to the Kaiser. He was in good auto-
cratic form that Fall and impregnable to such thoughts. Even
after the Sornme he could still boast to Reichstag delegates,
"where my Guaids appear, there is no room for democracy. "
There was the equally revealing comment to a conservative
leader,
"Albert shall keep his Belgium, since he too is King
by Divine Right. . * . Though of course he will have
to toe the line there, I iiaagine our future relation-
ship to be rather like that of the Egyptian Khedive
to the King of England. " |6
The Political Soldier 99
When Groener appeared at a royal dinner shortly after the
Auxiliary Service law was passed, he felt the cool wind of
disfavor. William shook hands with his little finger, a pert
sign of displeasure, and later accused his general of being a
popularity seeker. The crown simply could not accept a mode
of procedure which recognized the Reichstag as a legitimate
and dignified organ of the national governing process.
Groener 1 s War Office tackled an impossible assignment*
There simply was not enough man power to go around and cer-
tain material deficiencies also helped to hamstring productive
strength. Ludendorff wanted more men to be released from in-
dustry and dispatched to the front lines. At the same time he
also wanted higher production quotas. Women, children, and
handicapped persons were to staff the reorganized industrial
system and give the German army the abundant supply which
it hitherto lacked. Ludendorff recognized the difficulty of
such a reorganization, with marginal resources everywhere,
and yet he apparently thought it could be successfully carried
through. But his executive inside Germany soon had very
grave doubts.
The labor problem did not involve numbers as much as
skill. Germany 1 s skilled man power was in the trenches and
now the High Command wanted the rest of it withdrawn from
industry. Women and children could not replace their func-
tions. In fact, more women were looking for work than there
were positions available, and the few specialists left at home
were taking advantage of their Auxiliary Service loophole.
They were switching frequently to better paying jobs and the
war industry was not on a healthy labor footing. Enterprise
contributed its part to the problem by offering higher wages to
other workers.
A com parable shortage plagued the matter of raw material
distribution and production charting. Industry designed its
expansion plans and then applied to the War Office for the
necessary supply allocations. Greener's office, in trying to
husband its res ounces and direct an efficient expansion, gave
very careful bureaucratic scrutiny to all such industrial re-
quests. There was a discouraging maze of paper-work and
War Office inspection. Supply margins were thin and a hither-
to untraiaiBeled industrial world suddenly found itself with a
1 00 General William Groener
military bit in its mouth. They had expected the regimentation
of labor, not of production, so they complained privately to
Ludendorff that the War Off ice had created a confusing bureau-
cratic labyrinth which made it impossible for them to fulfill
their production promises.
The winter of 1916-1917 was no help* Industrial expan-
sion meant that the railroads had to haul construction material
for the new factories being built* A cold winter froze up the
waterways and the railroads assumed even more extra duty.
A shortage of lubricating grease caused the entire German
transportation system to buckle dangerously. The building
program had to stop and all the materials poured into that ef-
fort now stood wasted in partly constructed factories and
warehouses.
An entire national economy, worn thin by two years of
war and blockade, could not simply double or treble produc-
tion on order of the High Command. Maybe Ludendorff thought
the demand for the impossible would bring the possible. Such
logic had its limits on the battlefield and it only strained eco-
nomic stability at home. The forcing haste of the Hindenburg
program took hold of the resources left to Germany and wasted
a good deal in impetuous expansion. Groener 1 s office could
simplify production and bring related industrial processes
closer together in order to save on transportation, but it could
not create the labor and the raw materials needed, and it was
too late for orderly improvisation.
Ludendorff registered his first complaint to Groener late
in January, 1917. The munitions stockpile was not building
up very rapidly and new factory construction was practically
at a standstill. He indicated that there was considerable
criticism of the way in which the War Office functioned. In
mid-February he elaborated on that comment. The War Office
was too ramified; each item of business had to go through
many different hands. Hie subordinates lacked independence
of action and had to clear everything through higher channels*
There was much uncertainty of procedure and too much redun-
dant deliberation. Certain production matters would get lost
for weeks without anyone knowing where the files were.
Ludeixiorff conceded that Greener's system must exeicise care
and that productive abundance wtth marginal resources was a
difficult undertaking, yet jbe wondered whether there was not
The Political Soldier 101
too much paper-work and consultation.
Ludendorff was superficially informed and fundamentally
unrealistic in his criticisms. Groener readily admitted that
there had been initial confusion and duplication of action. He
wanted a careful system and thought proper initial routine
more important than a few quick production decisions. He
told his people to stress the personal contact with industry
and labor; correspondence and memoranda were to be kept on
a functional, even first-draft, level. He had never been one
to stifle the independence of subordinates and such uncertainty
was due only to the novelty of the job itself, but mere system
alone could not produce that which Ludendorff needed and
which industry had promised. Greener's was a thankless,
experimental assignment in which an impulsive Ludendorff,
laissez faire habits, and deep labor suspicions were to be
dissolved and blended in a magical industrial creation. And
all this was to be done with marginal supply, deteriorating
railroads, and inadequate labor. Groener could only explain
problems to Ludendorff, not solve them, and such wisdom was
pointless to the victor of Tannenberg. 17
Groener's travail continued throughout the severe 11 turnip
winter 11 and Spring marked Germany's first great munitions
strike. Production lagged and worker morale sank to the point
of resistance. Far to the east the Russian revolution stirred
the hopes and fears of many Germans. Spartacist agitators
and Independent Socialist opportunists worked to touch off a
mass protest* la On the right the German conservatives and
super-patriots were just as radical in their stubborn need of
victory and continuing autocracy.
A reduction in the bread ration was announced for April
16, and many Germans expected a labor demonstration to take
place. Berlin police reports worried about an indifferent and
defeatist public. Reichstag delegate Haase asked, on March
30, if the Government wanted the masses to start talking
"Russian." The war censorship office cautioned the news-
papers not to deal carelessly with the Russian revolution, for
fear of irritating class antagonisms and further weakening the
German stand. A strike "lay In the air" and the authorities
in Berlin got ready for it. Groener urged that labor be given
timely representation on the food agencies. The Prussian
Ministry of the fotertor asked the police to be cautious and
102 General William Groener
refrain from calling in the military unless a crisis actually did
arise, the army must not be used against the public. And the
Majority socialists were afraid that mass disturbances might
lead to a complete militarization of the economy or to an un-
controllable, revolutionary rip-tide.
About 200,000 workers walked out of the Berlin armament
factories on the morning of April 16. Some of the strikers
marched toward government office areas and others went out
to the parks for a day of relaxation. A few bakeries were looted
but public order generally prevailed. The police had discreetly
broken up the drift toward the government office areas and
there was no mass procession. Groener 1 s War Office and the
Prussian Government promised the workers more food and direct
re presentation in the food distribution agencies, but this quiet
emotional release and protest could not be dispelled in a day
or two.
Some workers returned to their jobs on April 17, but such
pacification was more than counterbalanced by the appearance
of a political petition from Leipzig demanding peace without
annexation, equal suffrage, nullification of the Auxiliary Ser-
vice law, the termination of martial law and the censorship
of the press. It also asked that the Chancellor receive a dele-
gation of strikers from Leipzig. The demonstration moved in-
to political gear and the action of the government was critically
important. Majority socialists Ebert and Scheidemann urged
the workers to reject such explosive political demands, and
the union leaders barely managed to swing their groups against
the Leipzig resolution. The same union leaders asked their
men to return to work on April 18, and the organized nerve of
the strike was broken. A Hindenburg appeal for home front
loyalty appeared in the newspapers on April 20, and Groener
asked labor for "unstinting co-operation 11 with the War Office.
Most of th& strikers went back to work although new trouble
loomed ahead for the traditional socialist May Day.
On April 21, Groenear met in a general council with other
military and Prussian government leaders. They agreed that
a military fight with labor must be avoided to the last and that
an effort should be made to pick off the leaders instead. The
central meeting of tfee metal unions on April Z2 would soon
sfeqisrkilx^sf^^ That p&eetiBg was post-
poaed amd Groener knew that the union leaders bad regained
The Political Soldier 103
control and would not further challenge the government.
Now with the trend moving back toward law and order a-
gain, Groener employed a more decisive tone. His report to
the Main Committee of the Reichstag discussed the strike as
an understandable psychological outburst. The Leipzig de-
mands and the propaganda material uncovered first gave the
strike its dangerous aspect. Groener warned that there were
to n benomore strikes 11 and that he would n proceed ruthlessly 11
against any instigators. At the same time, he reassured labor
that he would defend their rights under the Auxiliary Service
law. He and the War Office were "absolutely neutral. !fl9
On the following day, April 27, Groener addressed himself
to the broad German public. He referred to Hindenburg ! s call
for unity and arms.
ft Who dares defy Marshal von Hindenburg's call? He
is a scoundrel who strikes while our armies face the
enemy. . . Our worst enemies are in the midst of us.
They are the faint-hearted,., .the strike agitators,.,*
He is a coward who listens to their words. Read
what the Imperial Penal Code says about high trea-
son. Who dares to refuse work when Marshal von
Hindenburg demands it?. . .We are not far from the
goal. The existence of our people is at stake. "
Hindenburg's letter and Groener 1 s "manifesto 11 were to be
posted on all factory bulletin boards where labor might be
properly reprimanded and inspired. The tone was patriotic and
strident, obviously colored by the revolutionary experience of
the moment. Groener 1 s own views were not that simple or op-
timistic.
Not only did Groener address himself to the Reichstag and
to the public; he also resorted to private influence. He liter-
ally cornered Independent Socialist leader Haase in the Reich-
stag committee room to tell him that any May Day demonstra-
tion would be met with gunfire. Haase was too cautious for
that sort of a climax and he assured Groener "that under no
circumstances would there be a strike 11 on that day. All in all,
the authorities had scouted and controlled the strike with flex-
ible skill. It lacked real leadership and a crisis s ituation,
but it could well have developed into a turbulent, explosive
street feattle. Groener 1 s anti-revolutionary experience was
1 04 General William Greener
now begun, even as he realized that the Hohenzollern govern-
ment must ride with the reform wave or else capsize. 20
Groener received no thanks for his defense of the state in
that April moment of danger. The conservatives could not un-
derstand his initial laxity toward the strike and the socialists
were offended by his crude denunciation and naive appeal*
11 One does not speak to free, thinking workers like that, 11 said
socialist Bauer in the Reichstag. "The workers do not take
orders from the military. They laugh at such language and are
not at all impressed- 11 And Groener assured his socialist
critics that he had phrased the "Hundsfott 11 charge with care
and he out-flanked them by exhibiting a collection of revolu-
tionary leaf lets which clearly showed that the strike was more
than a mere cry of hunger* His unfortunate battle with labor
was then terminated with a letter from the Trade Unions which
upheld the logic of Groener and Hindenburg, M Strikes at the
present time must be avoided; the preservation and security
of the Empire take first place* 1121
That letter of reassurance from the Trade Unions expressed
labor's complaint, as well as its loyalty* Black market luxu-
ries were still easily available to the rich. The Auxiliary
Service law mobilized labor and often countenanced personal
hardship, but it did not require better working conditions or
raise pay levels. Groener understood the basic discrimination
and dissatisfaction. The law chafed the working man more
than it did the industrialist* The latter could dodge paper regu-
lations, pile up excessive war profits, and find emergency
help from Ludendorff when necessary.
The April strike convinced Groener that the German situa-
tion was grim and in need of early peace. Such home-front
instability further doomed the Hindenburg program and the
foundations of German strength* Hie Russian revolution prom-
ised to neutralize a front, but it also heightened the danger of
a social explosion within the Hohenzoliern empire. Now was
the tiiae to negotiate a settlement in the west and renew the
loyalty of the German people with democratic reforms. Groener
tried to convey his thoughts to the Kaiser. He had a longer
talk with the Empress telling her about the blockade and the
hardship which it brought to ike conimon people. She was
sympathetic and eager to help;, but she still thought only in
tetrmsofcharftyaiKi seemingly did not comprehend that gracious
The Political Soldier 105
concern was no longer enough. Hie people wanted rights and
care. Apparently the Empress did help Groener get another
invitation to a royal dinner where he tried to get the Kaiser's
ear, but to no avail. The latter sparkled with entertaining
chit-chat and almost seened intent on avoiding any serious
exchange with his controversial general.
Having failed at the palace, Groener then expressed him-
self to Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and to Valentini, head
of the Kaiser's personal cabinet. He reminded them that vic-
tory might not be possible and that it was time to prepare the
nation for something less. The step from !1 non-victory to de-
feat was not very big" but the shock to an unprepared public
could have revolutionary ramifications. Let the events in
Russia serve as a timely warning. He expressed similar
thoughts to other conservative leaders, among then Luden-
dorffs friend Hugo Stinnes. They all agreed that the German
situation was precarious, but they could not accept the suf-
frage reform and the socialistic monarchy which Groener thought
necessary to the day. Stinnes insisted stoutly that "Luden-
dorff will win. 11 To which Groener flatly retorted, "Ludendorff
will not win."
Groener finally received a visitor himself in the person
of the Kaiser's military adjutant, General von Plessen. In the
halcyon days of August, 1914, this old friend of Schlieffen re-
peatedly led Groener into the Kaiser 1 s presence. Then victory
seemed near and the railroad chief stood as an admired dis-
ciple of the Schlieffen school, but now Plessen had other
thoughts on his heart. He charged that Groener seemed intent
on warning the Kaiser that this was impossible. Groener
should give up any further attempt to see His Majesty. Groener
indicated that realistic frankness was also an obligation of
duty but he agreed to the Plessen demand. Let the Kaiser's
friends be responsible for the Hohenzollern future.
The word was passed around that General Groener was
"letting his tail hang; it might be good to send him to the
front. 11 That might straighten out his logic and revitalize his
will. Berlin was full of faltering patriots that Summer and
Groener was not alone in his seaich for an early peace. A
Reichstag majority supported the July Peace Resolution of
Matthias Erzbeiger. It evasively spoke "for a peace of under-
standing 11 aad did not categorically renounce the possibility
1 06 General William Groener
of territorial acquisitions. It had a tone of adroit, rather than
sincere, good will, but it did express a German recognition
that the war could not be won and must be terminated. As
Friedrich Naumann wrote, it was "decision time in German
history. 11 Only the men of realistic national interest lost out
to the Prussian junkers and the industrial tycoons. These men
controlled the Kaiser and the army, and they were not interested
in a compromise peace. They could even baldly admit that
they would rather bring Germany to ruin than accept a compro-
mise peace and consequent democratic reform at home. Beth-
mann-Hollweg was forced to resign and his effort to find some
"diagonal 11 link between autocracy and democracy, victory and
peace, was cast aside. zz
As the High Command maneuvered its way through the
peace crisis that summer, Groener threw his own bomb into
the Ludendorff ranks. He submitted a memorandum to the
government which recommended stringent national control of
both wages and profits. He had favored such action from the
very beginning of his War Office assignment and, in the ne-
gotiations over the Auxiliary Service bill, he even prompted
the socialist delegates to promote the idea in the Reichstag*
An aide by the name of Merton wrote the memorandum and
Groener had it personally delivered to Chancellor Michaelis
as he assumed office in late July. It would disappear into the
files and, in the Spring of 1918, have its very existence de-
nied by the government on the Reichstag floor. Even then, the
original draft lay in the files of the War Office. The memoran-
dum which Groener submitted finally turned up after the war,
with marginal comments by Helfferich who happened to be the
chief protagonist of a laissez faire economy. 23
The memorandum accused the Genaan entrepeneur of at-
tuning his war business methods to the profit lure and not to
the patriotic need. He insisted on the maintenance of free
enterprise, but he did not hesitate to gouge the state on war
cof*HBcts* The wages of labor were often far too low and it
quickly emulated enterprise in demanding what the market
might pay. Since industry could always isatch pay raises with
higher prices, a price spiral was begun which was both costly
and disastrous to the nation's fiscal stability* Germans liked
to sneer at English merohaat zeal but that country had been
quick to regulate its ecxmomip life In support of $m waj effort.
The Political Soldier 107
The memorandum urged that wages be fixed, every contract
cost set at the beginning of production, and all profit taxed
to the hilt. The government should be given the right to seize
any industry and operate it in accordance with the law. fl En-
terprise must clearly understand that war is no time for money
making but that it requires actual sacrifice, involuntary if
necessary, from everyone. 11 Such discipline now would also
prepare the German economy for the difficult postwar adjust-
ments.
A few weeks later, Groener was removed from the War Of-
fice and assigned to a division on the western front. He rec -
ognized his isolation and indicated his readiness to go, should
Ludendorff think a change opportune. The Hindenburg program
was not fulfilled and the Auxiliary Service law remained rather
ineffective, Acertain mobilization of labor and simplification
of production took place, but prices, wages, and profits
spiralled steadily upwards as workers and enterprise alike
pulled clear of regulation. Groener 1 s office and person at-
tracted a lengthening line of critics and his transfer seemed
to be due.
The manner of his release was more objectionable than
objective. He made a routine visit to Ludendorff on August 15
and discussed various business matters with him. There was
no indication of a possible change. On returning to Berlin the
following morning, Groener read in the newspaper that he was
being transferred. The official orders followed later that day.
Groener suspected that big industry had learned of the Merton
memorandum and pushed for his removal. A week before his
removal, industrialist Duisberg was reported to have informed
a group of his associates that Groener ft was through. " The
suspicions of Groener were probably valid but there were also
other reasons why his transfer seemed desirable. **
The conservative news papers shrugged off his removal as
just another administrative move. The socialists saluted him
as a man who respected the equality of labor in the German
social complex. This general had more regard for their prob-
lems than did the civilian government. The Frankfurter Zeituncr
described him as a man who actually did not ft know any parties"
and truly sought to serve the national interest. The picture
of this energetic and friendly general, chatting casually with
the socialists at their own caucus table in the Reichstag, rep-
108 General William Groener
resented the kind of civility and social harmony which that
great newspaper espoused for modern Germany. 25
Groener was not able to subordinate both labor and industry
to centralized military control. Full authority was not granted
by the suspicious civilians and the different German parts
continued to move independently within the Empire system.
Labor sensed its growing strength in the Reichstag and on the
Berlin streets* Industry found access to the tent of Ludendorf f
The compromise bourgeois parties in the middle floated help-
lessly between these two poles of power. Groener tried to
reconcile labor and the army but he was successful only in a
personal fashion. Suspicion of the High Command remained
and his War Office could not muster a levee en masse at a time
when resources and spirit were already beyond rally by com-
mand. Groener recognized that German strength and stability
were at the breaking point and he spoke up for domestic and
diplomatic adjustments which made him an appeaser. The
general was sent to the troops where he could watch his fears
come true.
Chapter Five
THE LIQUIDATION RESPONSIBILITY
Greener's division was on a quiet sector of the Lorraine
front where he had a chance to refresh his spirit and reflect
on the German problem. It was too late for exaggerated
patriotism or military heroics, and the zeal of Ludendorff and
his faction no longer served the national interest. They could
not win and they would not make peace. Let Ludendorff try
to make the kind of a peace If which the All-Germans regale
him with. 11 Such naive and selfish militancy could only bring
the weakening nation to a point of complete helplessness and
social collapse. The wage- price spiral would wipe out the
middle class and add another wing to the dissatisfied prole-
tariat. The vigorous socialists would rebel rather than duti-
fully serve the High Command.
Two naive soldiers were left in charge of German destiny
at a time when caution and slyness were imperative. Groener
felt sure that this old guard could not successfully harness
the new German currents coming to the surface. It was now
clear that the modern state could find stability only if it sat-
isfied the working class and cultivated the good will of the
public. Let the people n feel themselves 11 to be governed in
a liberal fashion. That ideological vogue must somehow be
satisfied, even if only in a superficial way* 1
His own troops certainly were in no mood for romantic
heroics. Theirs had become an animalistic fight for life and
they were dull to any problem or promise except the dream of
peace* Tales and pep talks were no longer welcome* Groener
kept All-German patriotic leaflets away from his men because
he thought they would cause more $nger than enthusiasm.
Groener womlered whether they had the sufficiency of strength
109
110 General William Groener
and equipment to sustain a final victory offensive. But it was
still a hardened, muscular force which knew how to fight and
die. With them, Ludendorff and Germany would make one more
climatic effort to force a victory in the west.
Again Groener preferred operations elsewhere. As he
wrote to his wife in early January, 19 18, "Ten Hindenburgs and
Ludendorff s cannot effect the superiority of men, weapons and
munitions really necessary to finish a fight in the west. 11 Of-
fensive action against the less formidable armies in Italy and
the Balkans impressed him as being the more astute German
strategy. The Russian revolution crumbled the eastern front,
and now Germany could buttress such new hinterland security
and expansion with victories along the Mediterranean. Then
the Empire might yet wedge out a profitable peace for itself.
Now and then Groener could still dream of a happy end,
for his Staatsraeson responded to the opportunities, as well
as the necessities, of power. But he also recognized that the
German public expected a major victory effort in the west.
lAidendorff told him it had to be ventured. Home-front morale
was weakening, as were allies Turkey and Austria-Hungary.
The American troops would soon be pouring into France to make
that front even more impregnable. It would be a colossal
struggle, but an intoediate strike for victory in the west should
not be deferred. 2
Groener dubiously hoped for the best and watched the
German army settle into its starting blocks, but he was des-
tined to watch, rather than share, in that final failure of the
General Staff. In early February he was transferred to the
Ukrainian theatre where he was to organize food shipments to
Gemany and keep the new Ukrainian government clear of Bol-
shevik control, iadendorff wanted economic help for Germany,
aadB^rUai^antedarti^Fof satellite states to be formed around
Bolshevik Russia. So Groener made the long train ride to
Brest-Litowskandoiitoliev. He was chief of staff in a corps
which controlled an area more than twice as large as Germany,
tmt again his asslgniaetit co**ld only partially be fulfilled,
the Ukrainian grata bin was empty. Years of war had
strained agricultural pxriuctioa; months of revolution disrup-
ted it. Geraan soldiers mo^ed iato a land wbera orderly eco-
nomic Me bad ceased, What tiie peasat&ts needed for them-
selves, iberf Jh|d to undeEgronaa oseiie^ Neither tibe
The Liquidation Responsibility 111
nor the Bolsehviks could locate these, and for Greener's pur-
poses they were insignificant. He soon realized that Ukraine
was not going to satisfy the German supply expectations. As
he told his wife: Berlin thinks that Ukraine is a well stocked
larder and that I am the magician who can send grain and hogs
to the homeland. "How to get this on a freight train, or if
there even is one, does not gve those people much of a head-
ache. "
Groenerwas not veiy happy with the young idealists who
were trying to establish the Ukrainian People's Republic. They
talked of dividing the large estates and neither their plans nor
their actions were very helpful to German supply interests.
The government in Berlin recognized this Ukrainian regime be-
cause it was anti-Bolshevik, but Groener saw little economic
profit in their experiments and he leaned toward the large land-
holders and immediate stability. His job was to set up a sup-
ply base and he was not interested in diplomatic logic or ideo-
logical sentimentalities. He complained to Ludendorff and
Berlin that the incumbent Ukrainian government could not en-
sure the needed grain deliveries and he asked for stronger
German leadership.
Apparently his clearance came through. On April 23 he
consulted with emissaries from the German and Austro-
Hungarian foreign off ices. On the following day he discussed
the situation with General Skoropadski, a Ukrainian nobleman
and spokesman for the large landholders. On April 28 a de-
tachment of German troops broke into the Ukrainian Assembly
(Rada), dispersed the delegates and arrested some of the
government ministers. Groener said their action was unauthor-
ized and his superior, General Eichorn, expressed his regrets.
But both German leaders were quick and happy to deal with
the new government of General Skoropadski. His aversion for
socialistic experiments complemented their own and he prom-
ised to give them the foodstuffs they were looking for. The
Skiropadski regime dissolved the Rada, placed fee Ukrainian
anay under German control and agreed to reimburse the Ger-
mans for their military help. It also restored large estates to
their landlords and agreed to a forthcoming military and eco-
nomic pact with Germany, Such were Genaan satellite policies
in a beginning drive to exploit eastern weakness.
Groener c&ortted happily over bis
112 General William Groener
11 People on the street say that the German command
has conducted this overthrow and they are not very
far from wrong. It just would not go with the old
regime any more and a strong cuff across the ear,
which they earned, was enough to unseat such
youngsters from their ministerial stools. I!
Public order was much improved under Skoropadski but pro-
duce shipments did not increase. The Ukrainians could not
deliver their promised quotas of fruits, fats, eggs, and live-
stock. The Germans also fell short on their deliveries of coal,
agricultural machinery, and other manufactured products. Both
societies were exhausted by war and all the exhortation by
Groener and Skoropadski was futile. Just as Ludendorff could
not command industrial sufficiency in Germany, so now did
Groener pull fruitlessly at an exhausted, disinterested
Ukrainian people. There were not enough German soldiers and
Skoropadskis to muster the land. There was not even enough
seed in the ground, or peasants at the hoe.
In Ukraine, Groener got a firsthand look at revolutionary
disorder and collapse. H God protect us, 11 he wrote to his wife
about the initial socialist leaders, "from such chaos and a
government which has possibly the finest ideas for human
happiness but cannot act for all its ideas and talk. lf That
grim impression of a disintegrated society would serve to guide
Groener 1 s values and decisions in the German trial to come. 3
Under Skoropadski, life in Kiev settled into an occupation
routine for Groener and he could direct his main worry to the
west, where the Ludendorff offensive gambled for victory or
defeat. The first drive toward Amiens almost broke through,
but Foch plugged the hole and succeeded in shouldering the
German advance away from the coast. Much ground was gained
by the Geraans but the Allied line still stood intact. Groener
wanted Amiens and its transportation facilities . n When Amiens
is taken a&d the British right flank north of the Somme is
wedged away from the river then we can shoot the victory
salute and hang out tfee flags. ft But that fleeting dream soon
passed on as the second drive for the Channel ports was well
contained, ludeudorffs victory offensive was finished and
he should have contracted for defense again. His bulging ad-
vances merely represented lengthier front-line commitments
The Liquidation Responsibility 113
for a tiring army* He, the Crown Prince, and many others
recognized as early as June that Germany 1 s ability to assert
itself militarily was now in terminal decline* Ludendorff even
consulted with Foreign Secretary Kuehlmann about preparations
for a negotiated peace. Kuehlmann 1 s ventilation of that fact
in the Reichstag stung the pride of the High Command and he
was disavowed and forced out of office. 4
A third German drive was then instantaneously crushed at
Chateau-Thierry and three days later the Allied counter-offensive
began with a startling penetration at Villers-Cotterets. The
German retreat began and when a Guards division panicked on
Augusts, it symbolized the beginning of the end. Both Luden-
dorff and the Kaiser agreed at a crown council on August 14
that the war must be ended, but they decided to wait for a more
propitious tactical moment before making their truce interests
public. The High Command simply could not face up to the
fact that the war was irretrievably lost and that diplomatic
negotiations could not forever be postponed. As they waited,
their army's collapse became ever more evident and the Ger-
man diplomats would have less to bargain with in the weeks
and months to come*
Groener watched helplessly from Kievas the German army
began to stumble and reel. He encouraged his wife to take
things in disciplined stride but his own spirit had to work its
way through the agony of defeat. He waited hopelessly for
his army to hold off the Allied attacks after July 18. He waited
for the Ukrainian harvest which might give new life to the
hungry peoples of the Central Powers, but it was a damp,
rainy summer. Three days after the demoralizing defeat of
August 8, he too finally gave up the ghost. He wrote from the
eastern hinterland,
"A dreary and cold rainy day hangs over Kiev and
depresses my spirit. What is going to happen to the
harvest with weather like we have been having? Is
it raining right in the middle of the harvest at home
too ? Good God, have you become an American, or
what is going on? At the moment things look very
serious in the west. Despite the U-boats, more
Americans have come overtiianwe anticipated. 11
Ludendorff had chanced too mich and now the consequences
114 General William Groener
were unavoidable. As a delegate of the Center party had con-
fidently predicted a few months back, "the sword brought us
peace in the east, it will also bring us peace in the west. "
That was the Ludendorff gamble and it became the German
destiny* 5
The Allies now had the Germans tired and off balance,
and they struck vigorously to harvest their advantage. Foch
concentrated on collapsing the several German salients which
protruded into his line* A highly successful American attack
at St. Mihiel then dangerously loosened the southern anchor
of the German armies in Belgium and northern France. A pene-
tration here could slice right up the Meuse and break up the
German right flank. Foch now decided to launch a general
offensive pivoting on Verdun and rolling up the Antwerp- Meuse
line. If he could interdict the German rail line running from
Metz through Sedan to the north, then the logistical agility of
the entire enemy front would be seriously impaired. The Ameri-
can army at Verdun was closest to this line and its progress
would be a critical barometer of strategic developments.
In late September, Groener made a visit to Berlin and the
western front* The Headquarters people at Spa told him that
the situation was critical but Hindenburg and Ludendorff were
quietly poised* Groener asked Ludendorff for the truth. "The
situation is serious," answered the latter, "but in no way im-
mediately threatening. " In fact the Allied armies were in the
process of re-grouping. Groener asked how long the army
could hold out. H We must have peace by Christmas, " was
the answer. The entire impression at Headquarters was one
of disciplined resignation*
A few days later Ludendorff f s request for an immediate
araistice was conveyed to a select Reichstag group. Strange-
ly enough, the Reichstag was again included in his unpleasant
co&amissloa of responsibility* Now they could be involved in
gweiBiaeatas representatives of the people and counsel to a
losing peace. JjudendodEFs emissary reported that the Allied
offensive ted resumed and the Bulgarian defection signalled
the break-up of the Balkan front. "Every twenty four hours, M
be said, fl cap Impair the situation and give our opponent the
opportunity of clearly realizing 11 tfee Genaan predicament*
Groener* s Berlin friends were greatly distressed but he took
The Liquidation Responsibility 115
he regarded this report as merely a technique to hurry the
German diplomats into action. Actually they had been held
back by the High Command itself as it chose to wait for more
favorable news from the front. Now Ludendorf f wanted a truce
immediately to preserve whatever strength and territory there
was left to his army. 6
Hans Delbrueck judged this armistice demand of the High
Command to be one of the great diplomatic blunders of the war.
Fittingly enough, it was another military decision. It an-
nounced to the enemy and to the German people that the Im-
perial army was finished. How could the German diplomats
bargain with such an open confession of weakness? The Al-
lies could now wait for the Germans to crack completely. And
on the home front, Ludendorf f ' s action formally opened the
revolutionary season. 1! Now we have them, n cried Haase to
his fellow Independent Socialist Ledebour. Now they could
agitate against a defeated government and plot their revolu-
tionary strategy in step with the exposures and angry shock
sure to come. 7
Ludendorf f ! s confession of weakness did reach Allied ears
and it disarmed Germany's subsequent negotiation with Wil-
son. The idealist shrewdly exploited his strength and urr
folded terms in step with mounting military success. Groener
was not surprised and beyond shock. Allied dominance al-
lowed the American arbiter mundi t6 impose rather than nego-
tiate. Three letters in those last days at Kiev well reflected
Groener 1 s mood and thought on the eve of German defeat:
(October 18). "Many sad and depressing thoughts
pass through my mind these days; I cannot write
them even to you. I must first digest inneriy that
which oppresses me in this most difficult hour of the
German people, since I see no way out and I have
feared this for several years because we were strick-
en with blindness. . . Ludendorff chanced the last
throw and lost. It was beyond our strength!. ...
There is no point in delivering funeral orations about
the past if we would only finally learn to look truth
soberly in the eye, I fear, however, that many of
our people are stlU far from recognizing the truth
and , Great Headquarters, which should have
1 1 6 General William Groener
considered its responsibility to honor tne truth, shies
from it because it fears the loss of trust and confi-
dence in the army. . . . Our strength is fading, mili-
tarily and economically, whereas that of our enemy
is still in the ascendant. God grant our government
and Great Headquarters united wisdom and strength. 11
(October 23). "The present government cannot be
held accountable for that which now follows natur-
ally out of the past self-deception of our high mili-
tary leaders. It is true that this government lost its
head as Hindenburg opened its eyes to our military
situation. The disappointment was simply too great
after having heard for years of victory, and Hinden-
burg and Ludendorff were celebrated as victors this
last Spring for their unfortunate offensive. Such
mistakes take their toll in the life of nations as well
as of individuals. Our entire people slipped into
self-deception through the shining material ascent
of the last decades, and they became fixed in the
thought that our strength was invincible. We plunged
into world politics before we secured our continental
position and without adequate military preparation. "
<October 25). "The will of a merciless tragedy has
struck the German people. The man whom fate gave
to the Kaiser as his related spirit, to whom the ruler
bowed completely Ludendorff the hope of all Old-
Prussian and All-German circles, must now become
the grave-digger of the Prussian monarchy. For I
still hope that the German monarchy might be saved
in the fall of the Prussian. Prussia must be dissolved
to the Reich. The obstructions are yet too great and
it is not yet clear whether the present government
can even keep the monarchy alive and healthy. It
is a pity that we missed the psychological moments
for certain political developments during the war.
Always we come too late with our decisions, which
are then wrestled through in difficult moments, at
the cost of the government. ltS
Groener did not know then feat the last scene of this
The Liquidation Responsibility 117
tragedy was reserved for him. Ludendorff was unwilling to
stay at the death-bed of the Old Prussian monarchy and Groener
was called to its side instead. He became one of that group
which was not "accountable" for defeat, but which had to
minister to Germany's distress and burdens. He was the un-
happy soldier who looked "truth soberly in the eye" and final-
ly blurted out its fatal meaning for the disbelieving Hohen-
zollern. And he was thereafter villified as the general who
abandoned the Kaiser, whereas Prussian heroes Ludendorff and
Hindenburg were memorialized in the junker hall of fame.
Ludendorff made his exit in late October, but only after
asking for a last-ditch levee en masse against the advancing
Allies. His interest in a truce disappeared once he realized
that the Allies would require the complete withdrawal and
neutralization of the German army. He was even willing to
enlist Social Democrat Ebert as an inspirational leader for
such a national resistance effort, but that party was much
more interested in seeing the Kaiser and his paladins go.
Ludendorff ! s convulsive logic made an especially poor
impress ion on the new government as he briefed a crown council
on October 17. He forecast that the next four weeks would
be critical. He sensed that the Allied attacks were coming to
an end, but he also expected another in the Verdun area on
the following day. Without Rumanian oil Germany could fight
only for six more weeks. He could not promise that his army's
position would be improved in four weeks. War was a matter
of luck. If he could have more men he could face the future
with confidence again. The situation could become critical
only if the army suffered defeat near Verdun, otherwise the
immediate danger was slight. The new Chancellor, Prince
Max of Baden, was amazed by such a garbled analysis from
this man who was generally recognized as a military genius.
Eight days later the High Command tried to force the govern-
ment into breaking off the negotiations with the United States.
For once the Kaiser stood by his Chancellor and accepted
Ludendorff 1 s resignation. 9
The civil government recovered authority in Germany just
in time to direct the surrender* A relieved Kaiser and the stead-
fast Hindenburg sifted fora new executive commander and they
settled on Groener. Other officers of stature were either un-
available or unwilling, Groener 1 s matchless trans portation
118 General William Groener
skill would be invaluable in the pending withdrawal and de-
mobilization. Prince Max esteemed his political comprehension
and the Majority Socialists whose good will and co-operation
were critically necessary if the monarchy was to be kept alive
appreciated him as a fair-minded practitioner of the national
interest. Those who still hoped to fight clear of surrender
were dismayed by the appointment. As the Crown Prince said,
he "possessed none of that spirit which alone could save what
was to be saved. 11 His salvage values were of course far dif-
ferent from those of Groener. 10
Groener received his call in Kiev on October 26. He was
being brought in to liquidate Germany's military enterprise and
he knew that it would be a thankless assignment. As he told
his colleagues on leaving, M I understand very clearly that I
will have to play the goat. There is no longer any honor to be
gained from this appointment. " But he went in duty and re-
sponsibility, perhaps even with a grain of gallows- pride. He
was at the side of Hindenburg, and the much criticized "southr
ern German democrat? 1 was being asked to help rescue crown
and army. Like the new government, he feared revolution the
most and his experience in Ukraine decisively colored his re-
action to the problems and alternatives ahead. A unified na-
tion and its army must be kept intact at all cost, in bourgeois
form and under monarchic direction if possible. He was proud
of the General Staff and convinced of its vital importance to
national stability and recovery* For even as Groener prepared
to accept the humilities and problems of defeat, he nurtured
the will to stubborn national survival and recovery.
Sinking Germany was to a fever of crisis change and dan-
ger. By late October the press openly discussed the justice
and advantage of abdication. The public expected a sacrifice
and many believed the Kaiser's departure meant better truce
terms. The socialist newspaper, Vorwaerts, reminded one and
all that the shipwreck of the state had "certain consequences. . .
for the captain. M Which leader would explain the situation
and its requirement to the Kaiser? Time was all-important.
Radicals plotted to ride the tidal wave of public disiilusion-
ment to power and, as October ended, most of Germany's news-
papers and public figuiBs iegaided abdication as a necessary
and effective palliative of revolutionary anger. The bourgeois
leaders and the Majority Socialists needed a symbol of decisive
The Liquidation Responsibility 119
reform if they were to keep a bridle on public feeling. A letter
by Walther Rathenau illustrated this acute fear of Bolshevik
disintegration,
11 Momentarily the danger of Bolshevism is the great-
est threat. Its containment is more important than
any other state problem. If this movement ever
breaks loose, military or administrative containment
will be impossible."
His fear'was representative and absolutely basic to the tac-
tics and considerations of Prince Max and Groener. Most
Germans wanted reform but not radical revolution. Their na-
tion had not been unhappy like Old Russia, nor did it want to
be revolutionary like New Russia. n
On October 31 Austria-Hungary informed Berlin of its de-
cision to sue for peace. It signified the collapse of the east-
ern and southern front, and magnified the necessity of im-
mediate German surrender. The anti- Imperial mood began to
crest as preserving reformers and destructive revolutionaries
raced for leadership of the public. The government of Prince
Max recognized the climactic moment of crisis and decided to
ask the Kaiser for abdication. Such voluntary action might
cushion both liberal and conservative feeling and make a suc-
cession within the dynasty possible. The Kaiser anticipating
the request fled fermenting Berlin for the security of the mili-
tary headquarters at Spa. There he_ explained that the govern-
ment desired his abdication and that he could better oppose
such action from the midst of his army. He told the astounded
Berlin officials that he had to install General Groener in his
new post and that war frequently necessitated such spon-
taneous moves. In effect he left government and nation to
solve their own problems.
Groener passed through Berlin en route to Spa and he
registered the rebellious restlessness of the home front.
Desperately hoping for the loyal solidarity of army and nation,
he feared that the removal of the Kaiser would demoralize the
officer class and trigger a flight to federalism. Already the
officers weine being upset by rumors that William and Hinden-
buig were in exit, and it was public knowledge that Bavaria
was learning toward secession. On October 31 an entire di-
vision balked and one of Groener 1 s first reports to Berlin
General William Groener
described weakening morale and discipline. He believed the
Kaiser question was undermining the army's spirit and in a
letter to Payer he asked for the restriction of further abdica-
tion polemic. Groener warned that the monarchic officers
would honor their oath of loyalty to William and would not
accept an artifically installed regent. But the Berlin govern-
ment persisted in its effort for abdication and Prussian Min-
ister of the Interior Drews courageously undertook to present
the abdication problem in the Spa lair itself. The Kaiser re-
ceived him in the company of Generals Plessen, Hindenburg,
and Groener.
Drews relayed the Berlin analysis* Abdication might in-
duce better truce terms. If these were unacceptable, a final
levee en masse was hardly possible without a crown change.
The government desired voluntary action in order to neutralize
further weakening dissension over the matter. William won-
dered how a sworn Prussian official could participate in such
a mission. He and Hindenburg warned of leaderless anarchy
in the army and at home. William affirmed that he had also
sworn an oath to Germany and he was not going to break his
bond. The royal princes had already expressed their refusal
to continue the dynasty at the father 1 s expense. He would
lead his troops back and restore order. Then Groener chimed
in to charge the government with grave neglect in its tolerance
of anti- Imperial propaganda which was infecting and debili-
tating the front-line morale. National survival depended on loyal
solidarity. Such words heartened the Kaiser who said to his
official, "Now a Wuerttemberger has been forced to tell you
what is proper for a Prussian patriot. 11 Drews was somewhat
deaf and the angry men in uniform made sure he heard. He
too flared up in defense of his position and for a moment a
verbal storm resounded in the villa. When the Kaiser recov-
ered he quietly told the distraught emissary to return and
"give my opinion to the gentlemen in Berlin/ 1 The govern-
ment's first formal request for abdication had been rejected.
William was pleasantly surprised by the erstwhile " south-
ern German democrat. " He told his adjutant,
11 You should have seen how the Field Marshal placed
himself in front of his Kaiser! and that the quiet
Groener could become so aroused. He told Drews
The Liquidation Responsibility 121
where the main danger to the fatherland lies: not
in the superior power of our enemies but in the dis-
cord and rebelliousness at home. How gratifying
that it was a south German general who stepped
into the breach for the German Kaiser and the Prus-
sian King."
The Kaiser was still sure of his army and again confident of
Imperial authority. His steady nerve in those days of dis-
integration showed both crisis courage and blindness. 12
The south German general quickly regretted his sharp
treatment of Drews. In subsequent quiet he realized the in-
nocence of the messenger and the significance of his message.
Political leaders whom he respected had concluded that timely
and voluntary abdication promised a better peace and preven-
tion of revolution. Berlin's Foreign Office emissary at Spa
continued the pressure by asking Groener to speak to Hinden-
burg about a death-seeking front line appearance for the
Kaiser. A day after the Drews scene, Groener did remark to
Hindenburg, Marshall, and Plessen that the Kaiser's posi-
tion had become "untenable." "Honorable 11 death or injury at
the front might best save the monarchy and possibly even
arouse the nation to heroic resistance. Plessen, one of the
arch-protagonists of a fight to the finish, refused to take him
seriously. And Hindenburg 1 s comment was equally unheroic,
"then we would no longer have a Kaiser. " 33 These Hohen-
zollem vassals still res pec ted His Majesty's person and will
above all else, but more Germans, like Groener, were begin-
ning to worry that they might no longer have a nation.
Groener 1 s inspection of the front confirmed his sense of
finality. The straining line was thin in depth and man power.
Rear depots bulged with soldiers who heeded neither command
nor plea to fight. Discipline was often a bargain among
equals and many exchanged combat promises for immediate
furloughs. More were up front in their hopeless stand, wait-
ing for a responsible government to relieve them. A last
desperation offensive project bore the appropriate code name,
Haqen. As Groener remembered, "there was really nothing
left." Even Ludendorff admitted on October 17 that the fight-
ing man was at the limit of his nerve and strength. One friend
wrote to Greener, "Yet have we fulfilled our duty. Every day
122 General William Groener
gives witness of that. But the moment of collapse moves dan-
gerously near. " And the strategic situation was growing
equally desperate.
In Kiev, Groener wondered why the extended right flank
was not disengaged earlier and entrenched in a line running
from Antwerp south along the Meuse to Verdun, but Ludendorff
and Hindenburg wanted all of Belgium for bargaining power at
the truce table. Their fighting withdrawal against superior
strength cost heavily and eventually grappled their exhausted
armies to the Allied bear-hug. Workers began to scrape out
an Antwerp- Meuse- Verdun fortification line in October but it
was a belated move. The American drive toward Sedan threat-
ened the supply system and the logistical mobility of the en-
tire right flank. This was the "dangerous point" which Luden-
dorff stressed in his last report to the government and its
implications haunted Groener as well* He ordered his right
flank to withdraw to the Meuse-Antwerp line but American
progress was already loosening the southern anchor of that
projected new front, and the German army in defense of this
key pivot area was badly extended and caught west of the
Meuse. The imminent fall of Sedan would prevent the rescue
of its men and material knocking out the base of the right flank
and disjointing the entire German line.
On his inspection trip Groener spoke with the commanders
of that imperiled Fifth army at Sedan. He reassured the Crown
Prince and his executive officer, Schulenburg, that the Ger-
man army and ruler were still in firm unity. Obviously he con-
tradicted his own already expressed opinion that the Kaiser's
position had become "untenable. 11 He did not suggest to the
son that the father should seek an "honorable" end at the front.
As a Wuerttemberg officer, Groener was inclined to seek con-
venient and natural neutrality on the crown question, but as
a Wuertternbeig nationalist he was also resolved not to allow
the sacrifice of the German state for the Prussian dynasty.
Torn between responsibility and duty, he fluctuated between
discreet suggestion and loyal resolve. It was an ambiguous
stand but the choice of nation or commander was not easy and
to be delayed as long as possible.
Oa November 4 Groener left for Berlin in response to a
call from Prince Max* Not only did the Chancellor desire a
military report but fee also hoped that the visit might better
The Liquidation Responsibility 123
focus Groener 1 s comprehension of the home front problem.
Groener ! s Berlin friends expected him to serve as a medium
for conducting realistic government desiderata into the inner
command circle, and they were apparently surprised by his
part in the Drews mission. 14 But his effort to convey the
"suicide" idea in to the royal circle promised a more favorable
receptivity to the needs of Berlin. Groener took the long night
ride to the capital city and undoubtedly there were hours of
gloomy reflection, punctured by spasms of angry regret. The
punishment for the disregard of Schlieffen was at hand. Ruler
and people had carelessly dissipated their strength and now
they had to "drink the bitter cup to the dregs. 11 He had warned
earlier than most and been disgraced for it. How should he
choose if the alternative between revolution or abdication ac-
tually was unavoidable?
Groener's report to the government on November 5 drew a
somber picture of encirclement, weariness and Bolshevik dan-
ger. The Allies were pressing toward Germany 1 s western
frontier and he could only withdraw if he was to save the army
from a "decisive defeat." Germany might still maintain its
occupation force in Ukraine and thus hold off the Bolshevik
threat in the east, but if the nation and the army were to be
kept intact, then the domestic "criticism or polemics" would
have to stop. Even with a loyal home front the army could
hold out only for a few more days. . . , He, Hindenburg and
"every other honorable soldier" were agreed that if
the attacks on the Kaiser did not cease, then the
"fate of the army (was) sealed; it will break in
pieces. And the wild beast will break out in the
bands of irregular soldiery pouring back into their
native land."
"It will be saving the German Empire from internal disintegra-
tion and dissolution, if the structure of the Army remains firm,
if its desire for a common Fatherland is unweakened and its
spirit held to obedience." 15
Like his predecessor, Groener wanted to keep his army
intact, but he no longer planned to use it against the foreign
enemy; that defeat was already accepted. He valued a dis-
ciplined army as an instrument for national stability at a time
of crisis* lliat army m&Bt help to protect, even influence, an
124 General William Groener
organic German change in the crucible of defeat. That army
must screen out, and uproot, the Bolshevik threat to central
Europe. This was its mission and service to the continuing
German interest.
After Groener's report, the war council heard from Hauss-
mann concerning the naval revolt in Kiel. That rebellion was
already under the direction of a Workers 1 and Sailors 1 Soviet.
Its leaders demanded abdication and amnesty. Haussmann
recommended that they be conciliated, but the council refused
and undertook to isolate the city from outside road and rail
communication. Such news confronted Groener with the very
domestic dissolution he feared most. Unlike the council,
Groener did not think the Kiel rebellion could be localized.
The public temper was much too strained to forego demonstra-
tion against that authority which had promised, and exacted
so much and had disillusioned so many. It would be sparked
into planless and manipulated protest. Local military police
would not prevail for the entire movement was against the au-
thority of the uniform. Successful containment would require
sizeable troop contingents. And even if they were available,
which they were not, Groener was sure that after four years
of trial and comradeship, " field grey would not shoot against
field grey. 11 He expected the Kiel rebellion to jump its flimsy
barrier into nearby cities and then spread throughout the na-
tion. Not Kiel, but the army in the west, faced early isolation.
When he arrived in Berlin, Groener was informed at the
railroad station that the American drive toward Sedan was ac-
celerating and that key position would soon be gone. De-
manding unity at home, he heard of revolution. And probably
he did, as Haussmann said, "change his estimate of the front's
capacity to resist overnight. 11 On the morning of November 6,
Groener told Prince Max that there must be an armistice in
three days. Diplomatic negotiations were too slow; emis saries
would have to cross the line with the white flag. As he ex-
plained to the later council,
11 1 too hoped that we could hold eight to ten days un-
til we could settle in our new line. After being in-
formed of what has since happened in Kiel, Tyrol
and to home morale, especially in Bavaria with its
very serious political consequences, I have become
The Liquidation Responsibility 125
convinced that we must take the step, as painful
as it is, and ask Foch."
Before leaving the capital, Groener met with Social Demo-
cratic leaders. The government was relying on them to retain
control of the masses and to preserve monarchism. It arranged
the meeting in the hope that they might persuade Groener 1 s en-
listment in the abdication campaign. The labor leaders asked
their favorite general to help unseat the Kaiser and thereby re-
lieve revolutionary pressure. Although re publicans in principle,
they were willing to defend the Empire from revolution, but
without a crown change they would lose the masses to Bolshe-
vik leadership. Groener understood and refused. He told them
the army and the Kaiser belonged together. After all these
years the Kaiser could not simply say "I abdicate* "
As these troubled patriots appealed and parried, Scheide-
mann entered to re port excitedly that the revolution had jumped
from Kiel to Hamburg and Hanover; "the abdication is now no
longer a matter for discussion, the revolution is on the march.' 1
The effort to localize the Kiel uprising failed and now it was
fanning into the nation.
The stolid Ebert lost neither nerve nor patience. He turned
to Groener, "Once more, General, I urgently advise you to take
the last opportunity to save the monarchy by helping to bring
about the regency of one of the royal princes." The group
pressed anxiously around Groener. They warned that unless
he helped secure abdication, Germany faced catastrophe, but
the soldier did not strike his Spa colors. Abdication was out
of the question, he said, and the princes were already on rec-
ord against the regency idea. It was enough for Ebert.
11 Under those circumstances further discussion is su-
perfluous. Now things must run their course. We
thank you, excellency, for the frank discussion and
we shall always remember with pleasure our coopera-
tive work with you during the war. From now on our
paths go different ways. Who knows if we shall see
one another again. "
As the labor leaders filed out, Colonel Haeften remarked to
Groener, "That means revolution. These leaders no longer
126 General William Groener
have the masses in hand." 16
These men obviously felt themselves to be in the presence
of a great historical moment. Their own Empire was dying and
the great Russian revolution in the east was visible and fright-
ening to all of them. There, such beginnings had ramified into
a cataclysmic social earthquake* Every decision in Berlin or
Spa might be the crucial determinant for a sane adjustment or
a wild reaction.
Groener returned to Spa with a clear, if troubled, heart.
Despite the voice of reality within himself, he did not betray
the Kaiser in absentia. Later he would remember the rejection
of Ebert f s plea as his biggest mistake and guilt in the collapse,
but that was mere speculative and agonizing retrospect. His
disavowal of the Kaiser in Berlin might have agitated the army
into its own civil war, and quiet collusion with the Berlin
leaders also had its dubious prospects. An earlier decision
against the ruler might have developed its own dangerous re-
percussions. Maybe a certain helpless patience in those days
was not so fatal, A quiet transition depended more on his co-
operation than on timing or tactic, and in a few days the with-
ering fruit would drop by itself.
Back at Spa, Groener watched and planned, meditating
on ways to preserve the old army in the new Germany. The
armistice delegation came west on the same train with him
and the front problem was resolving itself. Groener swung
his attention toward his own country, especially to the Rhine,
which was a critical transportation barrier in any large scale
evacuation or demobilization. Millions of riflemen must be
canalized quickly and efficiently into quiescent, responsible
family life. Traffic congestion there would expose impatient,
calloused veterans to the army-baiting agitation of demagogue
egalitarians* Groener dispatched a communications officer
to observe and report on revolutionary conditions in the key
rail city of Cologne. He also set up a special map of his rear
echelon network in order to keep close watch on the security
of his supply lines. He and his staff discussed the formation
of anti-revolutionary free corps to engage revolution in Ger-
many, assert the German interest in the east and generally
give professional, patriotic occupation to the expected officer
surplus* Anticipating the appearance of soidiers 1 councils in
the mnks and hoping to neutralize their revolutionary effect,
The Liquidation Responsibility 127
he considered their creation by command. In a few days of-
ficers from the Imperial army would pick their own soldiers 1
councils. This was revolution a la General Staff .
Although planning for the future, Groener was yet unre-
solved about the Kaiser question. It was the unavoidable
hurdle for changing Germany and unless the army rejected
William there was little chance of his elimination without a
civil war. Already knee-deep in a rising tide of revolution on
November 8, the government again dispatched a request for
abdication. Its liaison men in Spa, Hintze and Gruenau, pre-
pared to deliver the petition to the Kaiser and they asked
Groener to join them. Again he refused. He had repeatedly
ad vis edHindenburg that the combat soldier would not fight for
the Kaiser in civil war. Beyond such suggestive information
he could not go; he could not break away from his old com-
mander. 17 And as yet Hindenburg stood stolidly with his Kaiser
against unexplainable destiny. A proclamation to the army on
November 6 reminded his men of their sacred obligation,
11 Every member of the army has sworn an oath of loyal-
ty to the Kaiser and for it there is no Kaiser question.
Come what may the army will honor its oath. The
only justification necessary is unshakeable convic-
tion. 11
But the large majority of his countrymen no longer possessed
such n unshakeable conviction' 1 in Hohenzollern leadership,
and they were hardly ready to sacrifice themselves for their
service oath. These were no longer Nibelungen days.
The revolution assumed national scope on November 8.
Major cities everywhere fell into the hands of soldiers 1 and
citizens 1 committees and the government tabulated sweeping
ft red n success. The capital poised in uneasy quiet as it a-
waited response to a Majority Socialist ultimatum for abdica-
tion* Ebert's party had to jettison the Kaiser in order to retain
leadership of the street public. Given abdication it hoped to
11 guarantee a favorable development of the situation* !f Con-
servative socialism was about to seize authority in defense
of itself and in defense of German bourgeois society.
Hie revolution delivered the coup de grace to the stricken
armies on the front. Every major rail hub in the west passed
into rebel hands ami Gioener expected the Rhine bridges to
1 28 General William Groener
follow suit. His forces had supplies for half a week and were
hopelessly wedged between foreign and domestic foe. They
could not disengage Allied pressure until the armistice was
signed and for the moment, limitation of the revolution de pended
on moderates at home. To all but a few it seemed the military
had no choice but to tolerate Majority Socialist leadership and
contingent political alterations. But the obdurate few still
commanded at Spa.
On this frightening day of revolution Prince Max desper-
ately tried for abdication* By telegram and telephone he ex-
plained to William that civil war and possible better peace
terms hinged on such action. Ebert 1 s faction could contain
Bolshevism, but not without this symbol of punishment and of
fundamental change. The Kaiser, however, felt secure with
his army and rejected the pleas from Berlin. With amazing
nerve he ordered Groener to prepare an operation for the recov-
ery of authority between Aachen and Cologne. It was to regain
control of the Rhine line and begin the march to Berlin. "The
Kaiser,' 1 mused Groener later, "still reckoned with a tempor-
arily ugly mood in Germany which would vanish with his ap-
pearance."
The sorely perplexed Groener continued in duty and he
prepared an elite division for the Aachen-Cologne project. To
complement this initial test of dynastic strength he also de-
cided to sound the spirit of the combat soldier. Was the rank
and file committed to the Kaiser against a revolutionary home
front? Groener thought not but it was time for substantiation.
Each army was instructed, without further explanation, to send
five regimental commanders to Spa. Apparently the order was
deliberately brief so higher echelon might not suspect and ob-
struct. Groener wanted no misrepresentation. !I We needed, I!
he explained, "the judgment of those leaders who lived in
direct contact with the troops." He also polled his head-
quarters for its estimate of the army's solidarity with the Kaiser.
Events soon confirmed Greener's doubts. Instead of
spearheading a Hohenzollern recovery, the elite division mu-
tinied and its "field grey 11 trooped for home. The spirit of re-
volt was infecting the army and its relationship to the Kaiser
demanded clarification. That night Groener 1 s report to Hin-
denburg and Plessea indirectly conveyed his conclusion in the
Kaiser question. He gave an unsparing account of combat
The Liquidation Responsibility 129
exhaustion and logistical paralysis. The army had neither re-
serves nor supply system; it did not even have a supporting
state. Everywhere revolutionary success was established or
impending and obviously beyond Imperial correction. The mu-
tiny of that day reflected the unreliability of the troops. The
cause was lost and they wanted peace and life. Effective po-
lice action by the army was not immediately possible; it would
be folly to send cynical, exhausted war units against the
catching slogans of revolution. The disobedient element would
prevail and start a landslide to complete military disintegra-
tion and revolutionary triumph. Dissolution of the war army
was prerequisite to the selective construction of a counter-
revolutionary corps. Such reorganization was impossible with-
out a few weeks time and a peaceful return to Germany.
Groener 1 s analysis implied the necessity for abdication.
Pies sen understood and resisted. It seemed preposterous that
the great German army should capitulate to a handful of trai-
terous rascals. A few units, dispatched to key points, would
quickly restore order. The Aachen-Cologne project was the
beginning of such corrective action and it must be undertaken.
The monarchy must not run down its colors without a fight.
Groener shared Pies sen's sentiments but not his conclusions
and he stood by his depressing facts and interpretation. The
army was helpless and momentarily unreliable; it was physi-
cally and spiritually incapable of disciplining the home front.
Hindenburg listened in silence as the unbending honor
and class interest of the old vassal dueled with the more re-
alistic preservation tactics of the younger bourgeois. The
stolid field marshal accepted the analysis of his executive
officer and the two decided to report the impossibility of coun-
terrevolution to the Kaiser the following morning. The dye was
cast at Spa. The army could choose either civil war or sub-
ordination to domestic developments which were abandoning
the Kaiser. Groener said nothing of abdication to Plessen but
he grimly defined and stubbornly opposed the alternative of
civil war. His logic received Hindenburg 1 s sanction and
thenceforth re presented the High Command. It chose the con-
tinuity of nation and army to untimely, undeserving, all-
destroying counter-revolution.
Later that evening Groener received a telephone call from
Payer. The truce with Berlin's labor was expiring and Payer
130 General William Greener
asked Groener for help in securing abdication. From the en-
suing conversation, Payer got the impression that Groener was
finally willing to abandon the Kaiser, but the general was still
resolved that William affirm that decision himself. Such a
voluntary abdication was needed in order to cushion the de-
moralization of the aristocratic officers 1 corps. 18
On the morning of November 9 the Kaiser awaited his gen-
erals in the garden of his villa. They were to report on the
progress of the Aachen-Cologne project. Another urgent abdi-
cation telegram from Berlin had been delivered and disregarded.
William was now serenely resolved to stay in command and
fight his way back to Berlin if necessary. As they waited, he
and his aides discussed the revolution and its Bolshevik chal-
lenge, confident that Imperial action would soon turn the tide.
Apparently neither Hindenburg nor Plessen had previewed the
Kaiser on the scheduled briefing.
Hindenburg and Groener met again that morning to confirm
their information and conclusion* They also read telegrams
from Berlin which reported public and government sentiment for
abdication* They were approached by Hintze who once more
asked for help in implementing such action. Their response
must have been satisfactory for he telephoned Berlin that the
High Command was about to confess the army's helplessness
and disloyalty to the Kaiser. The listening official in Berlin
remarked that such a re port would make abdication unavoidable.
Hintze said nothing. The Berlin official immediately called
Ebert in order to stop the planned labor demonstration with his
abdication promise, but it was too late. William 1 s problem
children, the proletariat, already were in the streets and the
overthrow of imperial authority was under way.
At Spa the commanding pair moved toward the painful ren-
dezvous. En route Hindenburg stopped to welcome arid brief
the regimental comiaanders who were so hastily assembled by
Greener's veiled onier. Numb with cold, fatigue and despon-
dency, they clustered around their venerated patriarch for ex-
planation. He told them they were to give account of the
soldiers 1 unwillingness to fight with the Kaiser against the
home front* He also gave a digest of Groenear's evening report,
underlining the bleak supply situation and warning that suc-
cessful action would entail a three-week drive to Berlin.
Having espfeinad the problem to fee lower echelons,
The Liquidation Responsibility 131
Hindenburg resumed course with Groener and Pies sen. The
tall, spare Prussian dabbed his eyes; the stock Wuerttemberger
showed no emotion. He had given warning earlier than most
and been stigmatized for it by the selfsame Plessen. Already
numbed by multiple frustration, Groener's passionate Schlieffen
soul had sustained the psychological shock of defeat months
before. Now, resigned and impassive, he grasped ugly reality
with firm courage to present it where it had not been presented
before.
At the briefing Hindenburg quickly excused himself. The
old soldier stood night watch at the bier of William I and he
could not read sentence on the last Hohenzollern. As a Prus-
sian officer he pleaded inability to say what had to be said;
he would rather resign than report the army's disloyalty. The
theme was set. 1! We shall see, " parried the Kaiser and eyes
turned to the executive.
Groener was slightly surprised but hardly unsettled* His
analysis was made and he did not mind repeating it, but the
Wuerttemberger was determined to stand clear of the abdica-
tion decision which devolved more properly on William and
his Prussian advisors. He was not inclined to assume respon-
sibility for the historical decision at hand and was quite will-
ing to let events set their own imperative. Once more he ex-
plained the army ! s hopeless situation, sparing no evidence
and insinuating no conclusion. He claimed confirming support
from Hindenburg and from every section chief in Headquarters.
The Groener report requested cancellation of the Aachen-
Cologne operation and implied abandonment of the Kaiser. The
defendant ruler hoped for disagreement and asked Count Schu-
lenburg f or his view. This forceful and class-confident Junker
echoed and fortified the earlier protest of Plessen* He con-
sidered the Groener analysis unjustifiably.black. Quick troop
consignments into the nation wouid restore order, especially
if armed with a stirring slogan to rekindle the patriotism of
army and public. The response would be unquestionable if
naval and revolutionary treachery against the heroic front
soldier were properly exposed. The heavy autumn fighting
demonstrated that the men were still M firmly in hand. " Mo-
mentarily, of course, the prospect of armistice suspended all
will to fight either foreign or domestic foe, but a ten-day rest
would revive their Imperial loyalty, even against the Rhine.
1 32 General William Groener
The food situation was bad but they always could draw on rich
Belgium.
Groener needed support and he got it* Commander in Chief
Hindenburg upheld the validity of his executive 1 s analysis.
He and Groener expressed sympathy and understanding for the
Schulenburg reaction but adhered to more pessimistic realism.
Supported by his superior, Groener then launched his rebuttal,
exposing the contradiction between the call for immediate rest
and immediate action* The most reliable troops were deeply
engaged at the front- In view of evacuation problems they
could not be re-deployed even within a ten -day period. In the
meanwhile the revolutionaries would continue the reduction
and seizure of Germany. Past combat strength was no proof
of present resilience. The troop mutiny of the preceding day
demonstrated the unfeasibility of counter-revolutionary action,
even with elite war units. As for Belgium, it was barren after
fouryears of war and was already being evacuated. Also, the
Rhine operation would merely begin the drive to Berlin. Revo-
lutionary strength and destruction would increase in the face
of the Imperial challenge. The Kaiser's army was unwilling
and unable to subdue the home front, and such an effort would
only bring Germany to ruin.
The Hohenzollern swayed between the hope and despair
of his generals. He of course leaned toward Schulenburg who
stiU accepted the reality of Imperial authority, but the com-
manding pair persisted. Recapture of the home front was not
possible. Its attempt would unleash a suicidal civil war in
which they could assume no responsibility for the loyalty of
the army and even the safety of the Kaiser. It was slight balm
to hear Groener condemn the government for past laxity in
counter-propaganda. The unspoken choice remained abdica-
tion car civil war. William shyed from either, treasuring both
public welfare and dynastic destiny, but he finally stepped
toimid his fete and cancelled the Aachen-Cologne operation.
He would not cause civil war, but he delayed the alternative
by requesting a poll of his senior commanders in the field.
He had to be sure; he would go only if they denied him the
loyalty of the army*
Qroener stepped back. His analysis was delivered and
the coiintesr-ire^olutioiiary operation was qai&celle^. Although
still seeking rescue, the Kaiser finally seemed cognizant of
The Liquidation Responsibility 133
his helplessness. Events in Spa and Berlin would continue to
narrow and force the ultimate decision. Thinking his painful
chore completed, Groener gladly slipped into the smaller dis-
cussion groups which formed in the garden. The facts were
in; the decision was not his to make* But his withdrawal was
to be merely an interlude and it served to raise him in even
sharper prominence.
Cancellation of the Aachen-Cologne project admitted the
inability of Imperial recovery. Schulenburg now tacked in
continuing, tenacious defense of his liege lord and their way
of life. He urged that William surrender only the German crown
and return home as Prussian King in the safe escort of Schulen-
burg^ loyal troops. Groener retorted that such dynastic ma-
nipulation was several weeks too late and now impossible
against surging revolutionary sentiment which was directed
against the very person of the Kaiser, but Schulenburg stiffened
with his new idea and the Kaiser seemed receptive. National-
ist Groener then lost his cautious neutrality and self-restraint.
He was "startled by this action 11 which forsook the unity of
army and nation. His concern was not for Hohenzollern Prus-
sia but for a united Germany. Confounded by "so much un-
reality, 11 patience left him and he served notice on Schulenburg
and the Kaiser, "The army will march home in peace ahd order
under its leaders and commanding generals, but not under the
command of Your Majesty, for it no longer stands behind Your
Majesty. 11
Mutiny, pronounced by Groener and given mute confirma-
tion toy Hindenburg, was within Imperial earshot. The Kaiser's
face darkened and he snapped at the offending speaker, "Ex-
cellency, my commanding generals will have to tell me that
in writing." Groener stood alone in the silence of the garden,
conscious of his irritation and exposure. He half expected to
witness a suicide, or be shot down himself.
Schulenburg again opposed Groener's view and he pledged
the loyalty of all the generals in his army group* His highest
maxim seemed to be command and obedience in ultimate com-
mitment to the HoheB^ollem. In the face of national disinte-
gration and front line exhaustion, he could still speak of his
men as being M firaly in hand* 1 ' Such woris hardly did justice
to their four years of sacrificing service and to the national
problem of the moment. In fact, Schulenburg' s commanding
1 34 General William Groener
officer, the Crown Prince, was already angrily upset by the
desertions and poor behavior of their own Fifth army. And
soon Schulenburg would be stung by another Groener heresy
and overwhelmed by a massive rebuttal from the trenches and
from Berlin's angry streets.
The group broke into smaller clusters and again the bour-
geois realist crossed ideological swords with his junker col-
leagues. One of these expressed amazement at the developing
disloyalty of the officers. Had they not sworn an oath of
fealty to the war lord? Groener observed that in such moments
of personal and national strain, the terms war oath and war
lord were fictitious. Schulenburg who was told of this com-
ment was sure that Groener did not know the "pulsebeat" of
the front soldier, who was dedicated to the Kaiser and inspired
by the "bible and the song book. 11 Not too many armies in the
world would qualify for such description and certainly not the
battered German army of 1918.
Colonel Heye appeared next to report on troop morale as
represented by the assembled front commanders. They had
been asked two questions. Would the men fight with the Kaiser
against the revolution? Would they fight against Bolshevism
at all? Groener and Hindenburg were already worried about a
future which extended beyond the Kaiser. The response to
both questions was resoundingly negative and gave parliamen-
tary expression to the exhausted apathy of the German army.
Only one of the thirty-nine officers polled thought the troops
would fight with the Kaiser in counter-revolution. That lone
optimist, incidentally, was not from Schulenburg 1 s army group
which was represented by sixteen delegates of whom twelve
said no and four were uncertain. Not one of the thirty-nine
could give unconditional promise of help against Bolshevism.
Nineteen were uncertain and twelve thought the men would-
flght against such a challenge after a few weeks of rest and
orientation.
Heye added a comment to his statistics,
fl lbe troops still are loyal to Your Majesty but they
aiB tired gtnd indifferent; they want only peace and
rest. At the moment they will not march against the
homeland, not even with Your Majesty at their head.
And they will not march against Bolshevism; they
The Liquidation Responsibility 135
want only armistice, the sooner the better. 1 '
Later critics of this poll said that the assembled com-
manders had travelled all night and were naturally grim, tired,
and depressed. Given some rest and refreshment they might
have viewed the situation with more optimism. Greener's dis-
creet communication with the lower command echelons has
also been frowned on. This was dubious military procedure.
Why did he not ask the commanding generals about army mo-
rale, said one critic. They would have given him an entirely
different answer. Groener went to the troop commanders be-
cause he wanted information about the men on the front. He
had enough realistic experience and intelligence to realize
that the army generals might not be too intimate, or even too
honest, with the mood of the front. Schulenburg and the Crown
Prince gave excellent illustration of higher echelon hauteur
and incomprehension. And if the assembled troop commanders
were cold and tired after an over-night train ride, maybe their
vote was thereby even more intimately realistic and represen-
tative. The men on the front were tired too and they were not
sleeping in relatively snug railroad cars. And if Greener's
poll was unusual to military procedure, how should one rate
the behavior of the men it offended? Was their stubborn and
selfish control of German life in keeping with the larger pro-
prieties of national interest and welfare?
The distraught Kaiser's fate seemed clear enough after the
Hey ere port but he explored it a step further. He asked, "Will
the army march home in order without me ? Groener thinks yes ;
Schulenburg no. 11 Again H eye's answer hurt,
!t The troops will march home in order under their gen-
erals alone and in this respect they still are in the
hands of their leaders. And they extend joyous wel-
come to His Majesty if he wants to come along. But
the army wants to fight no more, neither at the front
nor at home. 11
The survey of the troop commanders was a crushing blow, sup-
porting Groener and relieving his isolation* His pessimism
received additional substantiation from Berlin.
After Hintze's morning phone call, government officials
1 36 General William Groener
in Berlin waited anxiously for the culmination and they main-
tained pressure with reports of mounting disorder. The workers
were in the streets and key guard units joined the demonstra-
tors. There was gunfire and bloodshed, but the city was
hardly "flowing in blood" as the government reported to Spa.
Hintze unsuccessfully tried to speak with Prince Max and
finally checked with army headquarters in Berlin. That office
modified the picture of violence but did confess inability to
control the city. This confirmation reached the Kaiser direct-
ly after the Heye report and only minutes before another bid
for abdication from Prince Max, which demanded action in
minutes, not hours. This confluence of bad news from army,
people, and government climaxed the Kaiser 1 s agony. He de-
cided to advise Berlin of pending abdication of the German,
not the Prussian, crown. The Schulenburg straw was still be-
ing clutched but without loyal soldiers all royal strategy was
mere delusion and the Prussian capital hardly qualified as a
haven for continuing Hohenzollern rule.
The declaration drawn up by the Kaiser 1 s advisers ex-
pressed readiness toabdicate the German crown alone. Hintze
read it to Berlin and barely gained audience. The listening
party interjected protest to the partial abdication move and,
after allowing Hintze to finish, dropped its own bombshell.
He read a governmental proclamation which already had been
released to a national news agency. It began,
"The Kaiser and King has resolved to renounce the
throne. The Chancellor will remain in office until
those questions are settled which relate to the
Kaiser's abdication, to the crown waiver of the Ger-
man and Prussian crown prince and to the installa-
tion of the regency. "
Prince Max finally deposed his own relative in a last effort
to preserve monaichism and the public order. Not many min-
utes later Spa heard that Scheidemann had announced the re-
public.
On receiving the abdication news, the Kaiser's shock at
first was matched by militant anger. "Treason, shameless,
outrageous treason, 11 he cried and began to fill telegram blanks
with his denial of the Berlin pronouncements. He assured his
son and Schulenburg that he would stay as King of Prussia and
The Liquidation Responsibility. 137
these two again urged counter-revolution. But William rejected
the idea of civil war and the Groener-Hindenburg pair did not
forget to remind him that Berlin developments were beyond
army control. The Marshal explained rather plaintively that
he could not allow His Majesty to be seized and judged by
street mobs. The court then decided on a written protest a-
gainst the Berlin coup, to be made public at a later date. The
Kaiser was no stronger than his army; both were isolated and
helpless. In this final spasm of life and death it was Hinden-
burg who most inflexibly precluded remedy. His words were
deferential but his solidarity with the Groener position was
not. It was he who finally recommended Holland as a
sanctuary. 19
The spotlight of history had fixed on Groener and debate
released his tongue and judgments. After rejecting the Imperial
sanctities he retired to unobtrusive observation. Heye and
the Berlin bulletins showed he had not misgauged the sentiment
of his army and people. He and other liquidation associates
calculated the consequences of dynastic will and heeded their
responsibility to the nation. Suicidal self-destruction, in the
presence of Allied armies and Bolshevik opportunists, may
well have been averted. The fate and lesson of 1945 had been
avoided. ZQ
NOTES TO THE TEXT
Chapter One
For the Wuerttemberg background see Gustav Ruemelin, Reden
und Auf saetze ( Frieburg, 1894}, III, 384; Albert Schaeffle,
Aus meinem Leben f Berlin, 1905), I, 134; Veit Valentin, Die
Geschichte der deutschen Revolution von 1848/49 ( Berlin,
1931), II, 499; Adolf Rapp, Die oeffentliche Meinuno in
Wuerttemberg von 1866 bis zu den Zollparlamentswahlen, Mai
1868 { Stuttgart, 1907), 53.
Alfred Schlieff en, Jnefe, ed. by E. Kessel(Goettingen, 1958),
254. See also Gerhard Ritten Staatskunst und Krieashandwerk,
(Munich, I960), II, 123.
The Papers of General William Groener (in microfilm), roll
IV, piece 17. Hereafter referred to as Grower Papers. See
also Wilhelm Groener, Lebenserinnerunqen, ed. by F. H. von
Gaertringen ( Goettingen, 1957), 43f.
Eberhard Kessel, Moltke (Stuttgart, 1957), 697ff. See also
Franz Endres, The Social Structure and Corresponding Ideolo-
gies of the German Officers 1 Corps (New York, 1937), 6;
Robert von Mohl, Lebenserinnerunaen (Leipzig, 1902), II,
163; Friedrich Naumann, Demokratie und Kaisertum ( Berlin,
1904), 211.
As reported in Graf Carl von Wedel, Zwischen Kaiser und
KanzeL ed. by E. v. Wedel (Leipzig, 1943), 125. See also
Gerhard A. Ritter, Die Arbeiterbewegung im Wilhelminischen
Reich { Berlin, 1959), 23-40.
William n was re ported to have said of the constitution, "Die
Verfassung habe ich nie gelesen und kenne sie nicht. " He
wanted "einestarkeRegierung, die ohne Reichstag wirtschaf ten
138
Notes 139
kann." Ritter, Staatskunst. II, 157, 165.
Schlieffen, Briefe, 284, and Hohenlohe-Schillingsfuerst,
Denkwuerdigkeiten der Reichskanzlerzeit. ed. by K.A. von
Mueller (Berlin, 1931), 534.
Q
Tim Klein, ed. , Der Kanzler: Otto von Bismarck in seinen
Brlefen, Reden und Erinnerunaen (Munich, 1915), 172, and
Elard von Oldenburg-Januschau, Erinnerungen (Leipzig, 1936),
99, 110. See also General Oberst Helmuth von Moltke, Erin-
nerungen, Briefe, Dokumente 1877-1916. ed, by E. von Moltke
(Stuttgart, 1922), 143.
9
Hans-Guenter Zmarzlik, BethmannHollweqals Reichskanzler,
1909-1914 (Duesseldorf, 1957), 100-125. See also Das
Reichsarchiv, "Kriegsruestung und Kriegswirtschaft, fl Der
Weltkriea 1914 bis 1918 (Berlin. 1928), II, 121ff, and Rltter,
Staatskunst, II, 167ff.
10
Groener Papers. XVI, piece 149.
Groenermight well be understood as one of those new Ger-
man nationalists who placed the interest of the state above all
regional or class sentiment. Max is described as an outstand-
ing example of such n National-egoismus u in Wolfgang J.
Mommsen, Max Weber und die Deutsche Politik, 1890-1920
(Tuebingen, 1959), 42.
Chapter Two
Riter Staatskunst, I, 60-90, 269. The outstanding work on
the relationship between the modem German state and army.
For an excellent sketch of the German shift from idealism to
materialism see also Walther Hofer, jgeschichte zwischen
Philosophie und Politik ( Basel, 1956), 47-71.
Rudolf Schmidt-Bueckeburg, Das Militaerkabinett der Preus-
sischen Koenlcre und Deutschen Kaiser (Berlin. 1933), 214.
Geleralfeldmarschall Graf Helmuth von Moltke, Gesammeltke
Schriften ( Berlin. 1892), V, 194.
4
Moltke's strategic concepts are given documentary presenta-
tion in Graf Moltke, "Die deutschen Aufmarschplaene 1871-
1890," Forschunoen iind Darstellunaen aus dem Reichsarchiv
140 Notes
(Berlin, 1929)* See also Kessel, Moltke, 625-650.
5 Alfred von Schlief f en, Gesammelte Schriften ( Berlin, 1913),
II, 451. See also Ritter, Staatskunst, II, 115-282.
Gerhard Ritter, Per Schlieffenplan (Munich, 1956), 43. The
best analysis of the Schlieffen Plan with documentary presen-
tation of the classic memorandum and its related fragments.
Ritter, Schlieffenplan. 96f, and Graf Hutten-Czapski, Sechzig
Tahre Politik und Gesellschaft (Berlin, 1936), 371ff.
o
For information on this point see Das Deutsche Auswaertige
Amt, Die Grosse Politik der Europaeischen Kabinette 1871-
1914 (Berlin, 1925), XIX, part 2, 479f; Karl von Einem,
Erinnerungen eines Soldaten (Leipzig, 1933), 111-115; Ritter,
Schlieffenplan, 102-119.
a
Ritter, Staatskunst, II, 239-281, and Schlieffenplan, 141-200.
Groener Papers, XVIII, piece 168. As Groener warned at the
beginning of his re port, n Es wird viel zu wenig darueber nach-
gedacht, wie schwierig die Nutzbarmachung der Vorraete des
Landesist, wiebesonders bei einem laengeren, die Entschei-
dung suchenden, unaufhaltsarnenVormarschdieHeranschaffung
der Vorraete des Landes an die Marschstraessen mit der
Schnelligkeit der Vorwaertsbewegung kaum Schritt halten kannJ 1
Herman von Kuhl, Der deutsche Generalstab (Berlin, 1920),
I69f, and Wolfgang Foerster, Aus der Gedankenwerkstatt des
deutschen Generalstabes (Berlin, 1921), 38. Compare a
statement by the older Moltke in 1870, "Wir suchen indiesem
KriegdiefeindlicheArmeeauf, das ist das strategische Objekt
fuer uns; geht die feindliche Armee nach Belgien, so suchen
wir sie dort auf, ." As cited in Generaloberst von Seeckt,
Moltke, (Berlin, 1931), 128.
Moltke y Eriniterunaen* 245L See also the very instructive
study by Hermann Gaekenholz which concludes that Moltke
valued the Schlieffen Plan only in case the French aray re-
mained defensive* This he did not expect after 1905 and he
modified the operation. Gaekenholz, Entscheiduna in Loth-
rinaen 1914. l$f.
Bethmann Hoilweg, 101-140^ and
Notes ] 41
des Reichstags (Berlin. 1913), Vol. 291, 6282c.
14
Reichsarchiv, Kriegsruestuna. II, 57, 178ff. As War Min-
ister Heeringen told Moltke in 1913, n lch halte eine Vergroes-
serung der preussischen Armee urn fast ein Sechstel ihres
Bestandes fuer eine so einschneidende Massnahme, dass
eingehenderwogenwerdenmuss, ob nicht ihr innerer Gehalt. . .
wesentlichdarunter leidet. Ohne ein Hineingreifen in fuer die
Ergaenzung des Off izierkorps wenig geeignete Kreise, das, von
anderen Gefahren abgesehen, dadurch der Demokratisierung
ausgesetzt waere, . . . fl
Carl E. Schorske, German Social Democracy. 1905-1917
(Cambridge, 1955), 60-85.
A. von Tirpitz, Politische Dokumente ( Berlin, 1924}, 160.
Opinion rendered at a crown council held on June 3, 1909.
Groener Papers, XIII, piece 132.
18
Groener, Einnerungen, 131-140, and Groener Papers, XIX,
pieces 172-178.
19
Reichsarchiv, Krieasruestung. II, 66f, 76ff , 87, 92f, 184f,
192f.
Reichsarchiv, Kriegsruestung, II, 349.
Chapter Three
Mommsen, Max Weber, 158. In a prophetic letter of Decem-
ber 31, 1889, Weber wrote, "Wenn nur der junge Kaiser erst
Konsistenz gewonnen haben wird! Diese boulangistisch-
bonapartistische Art von Kundgebungen sind doch nachgerade
unerwuenscht. ManhatdenEindruck, als saesse man in einein
Eisenbahnzuge von grosser Fahrgeschwindigkeit, waere aber
imZweifel, obauchdienaechsteWeicherichtiggestellt weitten
wuerde."
The entire question of the Kaiser 1 s simple and tasteless au-
thoritarianism is illustrated in Reichsarchiv, Krieasruestung*
II, 21, 38; Kessel, Moltke. 746; Tirpitz, Politische Dokumente.
332. He could tell his generals of Bismarck, M Er verweigert
mirdieHeeresfolge. . .will also nicht Ordre parieren! Er muss
fcart. . . . Ibh kanB 3ber seiche Minister nicht brauchen;
1 42 Notes
dieselben muessen mir vielmehr gehorchen. 11 Such an attitude
persisted and as a much older man, in 1913, the Kaiser could
still inform the British government, "With respect to the inti-
mation in the despatch, that Sir E. Grey could only conclude
the agreement with the present Chancellor, Your Minister la-
bours under an illusion. The Chancellor as well as the Foreign
office are both purely officials of the Emperor. It is the Em-
peror, who gives them the directions as to which policy is to
be pursued and they have to obey and follow his will. 11
Friedrich Meinecke, Preussen und Deutschland im 19. und 20.
Tahrhundert ( Berlin, 1918), 34-40, 140.
4
Mommsen, Weber, 45. "Nicht Frieden und Menschenglueck
habenwirunserenNachfahren mit auf den Weg zu geben,' 1 said
Weber, "sondern den ewigen Kampf um die Erhaltung und Em-
porzuechtung unserer nationalen Art. 11 And the legacy of Bis-
march? "Er hinterliess seine Nation ohne alle und jede poli-
tische Erziehung, tief unter dem Niveau, welches sie in dieser
Hinsicht zwanzig Jahre vorher bereits erreicht hatte. Und vor
allem eine Nation ohne alien und jeden politischen Willen,
gewohnt, das der grosse Staatsmann an ihrer Spirze fuer sie
die Politik schon besorgen werde."
Meinecke, Nach der Revolution. 44.
6
Meinecke, Weltbuergertum und Nationalstaat ( Berlin, 1915),
513.
Karl Kautsky, Max Montgelas and Wilhelm Schuecking, ed. ,
Die deutschen Dokumente zum Krieosausbruch (Berlin, 1919),
I, 98 and II, 122f. Gerhard Fitter said, t! Aus reiner Furcht, ein
paar !&ge, veillelcht auch mir ein paar Studen zu spaet zu
koramen, glaubte der Generalstab und damit auch die deutsche
Regierung sich genoetigt, das Odium des Angreifers und Frie-
densbrecfaers auf sich zu laden. 11 Gerhard Ritter, Lebendiqe
Veraangeaheit f Munich. 1958), 177.
Q
Groener*s opinion on this mobilization problem expressed to
General von Kuhl in a letter of December 28, 1922. Groener
Papers. VIII, piece 34^-1. Also re pea ted in Groener, Erlnneninaen,
145L
9
Groener, Erinnenrnqen. 145, and Das Reichsarchiv, Pas
Notes 143
deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen (Berlin. 1928), 30-50.
10
Reichsarchiv, Feldeisenbahnwesen. 59f, and Military OP-
erations of Belgium, ed. by the Commander-in-Chief of the
Belgian Army (London, 1915), 5* Special thanks are also due
the Historical Section of the Belgian Ministry of National De-
fense, which graciously furnished me with information about
those first days of invasion.
French demolition orders were given but apparently the prob-
lem of proper timing and the lack of sufficient engineering
personnel compounded the general confusion of crisis and with-
drawal. See Les Armies Francaises dans La Grande Guerre
(Paris, 1925), Tome Premier, II, 15f; A. Marchand, Les
chemins de fer de Test et la guerre de 1914-1918 (Paris. 1924),
12-28; D. Noce, Strategic Demolitions of Railroads in Front
of the German Right Wing (Washington. 1940), 6-9.
Reichsarchiv, Feldeisenbahnwesen. 90-100, and Generals
von Kuhl and Bergmann, Movements and Supply of the German
First Army during August and September 1914 (Fort Leavenworth,
1929), 40f, 112, H6f, 214.
Marchand, Les chemins de fer. 296, and Les Annfees Fran-
qaises. Tome Premier, HI, llff.
H. Baur, Deutsche Eisenbahnen im Weltkrieg 1914-1918
(Stuttgart, 1927), 16. See also Reichsarchiv. Per Weltkrieg
1914-1918 (Berlin. 1925), IV, 1-31; A. von Kluck, Per Marsch
auf Paris und die Marneschlacht 191 4 (Berlin. 1920), 95;
Hermann von Kuhl, Per Marnefeldzug 1914 (Berlin, 1921), 85-
120.
Mueller- Loebnitz, "Die Sendung des Oberstleutnants
Hentsch, n Forschungen und Darstellunaen aus dem Reichs-
archiv (Berlin. 1922), 20-30. Moltke's performance stood
judged by one of his own prewar lectures: If the parts of an
army "follow their own separate purposes, which no longer
correspond to the effort of the common action, then the High
Command has lost its reins, it has not understood how to bring
the necessary unity into the movements and battles of the
single groups." Wolfgang Foerster, ffiaf Schlieifen und der
Weltkriea (Berlin. 1925), 15f.
144 Notes
Groener Papers. HI, piece 13-1, and Moltke, Erlnnerunaen.
384L
17
Reichsarchiv, Per Weltkriecr, IV, 517. See also a letter
from the editor of the official German war history work to
Groener, July 7, 1920, in which Haerfen expresses the con-
sensus doubt M dass das deutsche Westheer zur Ausnuetzung
eines etwaigen Erfolges wegen seiner schwierigen Nachschub-
veribaeltnisse gar nicht in der Lage gewesen sein wuerde."
In Groener Papers, VIII. See also the diverse German views
conveniently collected in E. Kaebisch, Streitfracren desWelt-
krieaes 1914-1918 (Stuttgart. 1924).
18
Groener 1 s war journal for this period in Groener Papers. Ill,
piece 13-1 The correspondence with his wife in Groener Pa-
pers, V, piece 23, i-iv.
19
This theme is best substantiated in Hans Gatzke, Germanv ! s
Drive to the West (Baltimore. 1950), 28, 117, 186ff, 250L
20
Groener Papers. XXV. piece 234-235, and III, 13-ii. "Die
Aeusserung fuerden Reichskanzlerueberdie Belgischen Bahnen
ist mir noch nicht so gelungen, t! he wrote into his journal.
"Angesichts der fehlendsn Entscheidung.. . kann ueber die
Belgische Frage eigentlich noch kein abschleissendes Urteil
abgegeben werden. fl
Theodore Heuss, Friedrich Naumann ( Berlin. 1937), 439.
See also Henry Cord Meyer, Mitteleuropa. in German Thought
and Action. 1815-1945 (The Hague. 1955), 197f.
22
Good samples of Greener's journal and correspondence
available in his Erinneruncren. 526-546,
23
Groener Papers, n, 383, and EB, 13-ii.
Chaster Four
Groener Papers, m, 1 3-ii, In referring to the wasteful use
of tfee Sixth and Seventh armies in 1914, Groener wrote, f ' Davon
gehtdleKetteaus, die unseie operative Ffreiheit mehr und mehr
fesselt* Das ist die Fhicht der boesen Tat, die fottzeugend
Boeses muss gebaerea, das Fatum, dem wir nicht m^ir entrinnen
koeniaen, wenn u0s nicht noch eto Glueckszufail in d^t Schoss
Notes 145
faellt."
Groener Papers, III, 13-iv, 13-v.
f! Er 1st eben kein 'Staatsmann 1 , der arme Kerl," Max could
say of the Chancellor, n so wenig wie Moltke der Juengere ein
Stratege war. " Both men were personally comfortable for the
Kaiser and thus entrusted with the German destiny. Mommsen,
Max Weber, 249.
4
Friedrich Meinecke, Probleme des Weltkrieas (Berlin, 1917),
llf, 40-70; Annelise Thimme, Hans Delbrueck als Kritiker der
Wilhelminischen Epoche (Duesseldorf. 1955), 120-130; Gatzke,
Germany 1 s Drive to the West. 56, 60, 133.
Groener Papers, II, 435, and III, 13-vi. This change of
command, according to Arthur Rosenberg, "marked the down-
fall of the Bismarckian Empire and the beginning of the German
Revolution." Arthur Rosenberg, The Birth of the German Re-
public ( New York, 1931), 123.
Reichsarchiv, Weltkriecu XI, 443-461, and Klaus Epstein,
Matthias Erzberger ( Princeton. 1959), 155-165.
Groener Papers, HI, 13-vi. See also the interesting Meinecke
article in the Frankfurther Zeituna. January 3, 1917, M Ein neues
Autoritaetsband zwischen Staat und Massen muss geknuepft
werden, unddiese neue Autoritaet kann nur aus der freien und
freudigen Gesinnung derer, die sie anericennen sollen hervor-
gehen. . . . Denn nur diejenige Autoritaet gilt dem modernen
Menschen noch als heilig und unverletzlich, die er in seinem
Willenaufgenommen hat und innerlich miterzeugt. . . Friedrich
der Grosse, der im Rahmen des ancien regime das Junkertum
pflegenmusste, uineinfestesRueckgrat fuer sein bunt zusam-
rnengesetztes Heer zu haben, muesste heute die Mas sen pflegen,
um das Einheits-und Massenheer zu haben, das ein sieben-
jaehriger Krieg im 20. Jahrhundert erfonlert."
Ralph Haswell lAitz, oi., Fall of the German Empire I Stan-
forf, 1932), II, 141-198.
Q
Deutscher Reichstag, Die Ursachen des Deutschen Zusam-
menbruches im lahre 1918 (Seriiiu 1926), Vierte Reflie, VZD,
19f . lf P^rdeutsie Qeialstab Kaesipfte gegen das englische
nlcht etwa, well in Detitschlai^J der Militarism**
146 Notes
herrschte, sondern einfach deshalb, well in Deutschland eine
dem englischen politlschen Willen ebenbuertige politische
Macht, die die Anwendung der Gewalt Leitete, gehlte. !l Oras
Groener expressed it, "sowuidedamals der Ruf nach der Mili-
taerdiktatur in irgendeiner Form laut, in dem festen, naiven
Glauben, dassunsereMilitaers und vor allem der Generalstab
es schon 'schmeissen 1 werde. ff Erinneruncren, 338.
Erich Ludendorff , ed* , Urkundender Obersten Heeresleituna
{Berlin, 1920), 63-80* See also Hindenburg ! s letter to Beth-
mann Hollweg on October 10, 1916, in Groener Papers. XX,
piece 192-L
As reported by Groener in a letter to the Reichsarchiv on
April 9, 1923. Groener Papers. XX, piece 192-L
As reported back to the High Command by Groener after the
first full day of discussion with other government officials on
October 29, 1916. "Es ist beabsichtigt, wenn das Ergebnis
der Montags-Nachmittagssitzung nicht meine zustimmung
findet, Abends 9 Uhl erneut die Minister zusammenzuberufenJ 1
Groener Papers. XX, piece 192-L
Groener Papers. XX, piece 1 92-L " . * nur auf dem Boden
meines Vorschlages und unter Mitwirkung des Reichstags, der
unbedingt die Verantwortung mitzutragen hat, ... { Let the
Reichstag understand) dass wir nur mit Hilfe eines solchen
Gesetzes den Krieg gewinnen koennen. 11 And in another letter
to Groener, If . . . wir koennen daher den Krieg nur gewinnen
wenn wir dem Heere soviel Kriegsgeraet zufuehren dass es
denfeindlichenArmeengleich stark gegenuebersteht. * . dieses
hoechstmas an Leistuiigen kann aber nur erreicht werden wenn
dasgesamteVolk sich in den Dienst und nur in den Dlenst der
Kriegswirtschaft und dainit des Vaterlandes stellt. . . . schreiten
wir nicht zu einer schnellen und ganzen Loesung dieser Frage
so werden der Obersten Heeresleitung die Mittel zum Siege
entzogen. "
Groener fepers. XX, piece 192-L As reported by Paul Um-
bzeit in fee bulletin "Gemeinsame Arbeit der Behoerden und
der Gewerfcschaften. lf
Gcoener, ErinBerunae^u 360, and Bar! HelSerich, Der Welt-
kriggj Berlin, 1919), II, 268L
Notes 147
Gatzke, Germany's Drive to the West. 144, 201,
Letters from Ludendorff to Groener on January 26 and Febru-
ary 16, 1917. Groener Papers, XX, piece 192-i, 193. See
also Groener, Erinneruncren. 356ff.
18
The circumstances and conditions of Germany 1 s internal
collapse are best presented in Ursachen. Reihe Vier, IV-VIL
Germany 1 s radicals met with Russian Bolshevik leaders in
Switzerland in 1915. It was decided to undertake "Massenak-
tionen ft in order to stop the war and bring about social democ-
racy. Germany's Independent Social Democrats accepted and
propagated the idea of the mass strike, See especially Ur-
sachen, Reihe Vier, V, 10-28.
19
Lutz, Fall of German Empire. II, 224f.
Ursachen. Reihe Vier, VI, 18 Of; Verhandlunaen des Reich-
stags. VoL 309, 3058ff, 3095, and Vol. 310, 3124, 3131,
3135-3141. See also the helpful new material presented in
Heinrich Scheel, "Der Aprilstreik 1917 in Berlin," Revolution-
aere Ereicmisse und Probleroe in Deutschland (Berlin, 1957).
Scheel's documentary information appears reliable even though
it serves a didactic, ideological purpose.
Lutz, Fall of German Empire, II, 228f, and newspaper arti-
cles as arrayed in Groener Papers, XXI, piece 194.
Gatzke, Germany 1 s Drive to the West, 190, 250f; Epstein
Matthias Erzbertrer, 170-200; Heuss, Friedrich Naumann, 469f
23 Groener. Erinnerunaen, 368f, and Papers, XX, 192-ii.
Groener wrote "Der Luegenbeutel" in the margin of the news-
paper as he read that his memorandum had been denied in the
Reichstag. Ludendorff queried him about its whereabouts in
the Spring of 1918 and Groener referred him to the War Office
files.
24 Groener Papers, XX, piece 192-ii.
25 AstheNeueZuercherZeitung commented, "ihmwar die Gabe
richtiger Menschenbehandlung zu eigen. " And Majority So-
cialist Scheidemann said, "General Groener, etaerderver-
staendigsten Offiziere ueberhaupt Manohmal musste maa
annehmen, dass er der einzige hoehere Offizier war, der eine
148 Notes
Ahnung vom Leben, Leiden, Streben und Arbeiten des Volkes
hatte war abgesaegt worden." Groener Papers. XX, 192-ii,
and Philipp Scheidemann, Memoiren eines Sozlaldemokraten
(Dresden, 1928), II, 60.
Chapter Five
Groener Papers. II, 13-viii, and Erinnerunaen. 383. In a
letter to his wife, "Dass imGefolge eines solchen Weltkrieges,
den man als groesste Umwaelzung staatlichen Lebens vielleicht
wind buerteilen muessen, eine starke demokratische Welle
ueberdie Voeikergeht, istnicht zu verwundern. . . . Die Haupt-
sache ist, dass die Monarchic bei uns obenauf bleibt. Wenn
sie dies erreichen will, muss sie sich von der Welle tragen
lassen und bestrebt sein, die Gesiter zu beherrschen. Das
reine Verneinen und Entgegenstemmen gegen die natuerliche
Entwicklung der Dinge koennte der Monarchie gefaehrlich
wezden,
E. Ludendorff, Meine Krieoserinneninaen (Berlin, 1921) , 472.
Ernst Troeltsch wrote later that German leadership wanted only
victory or defeat, n das Entweder-Oder. " See Ernst Troeltsch,
Spektator-Briefe. ed. by H. Baron (Tuebingen, 1924), 2.
Groener 1 s Ukraine tour of duty given military documentation
in Papers* XXVII. See also his war journal and correspondence
in m, 1 3~x and VI, piece 23, vi-ix- See further his Erinner-
unaen, 564-572, and John Reshetar, The Ukrainian Revolution
(Princeton, 1952), 115-150.
4
Lutz, Fail of the German Empire, II, 353ff, and Groener Pa-
pers, n, 555.
Gustav Streseiaann, Reden und Schriften (Dresden, 1926), I,
195, and Groener Papers. VI, piece 23, vi-ix.
6
Groener, Erinnerunaen. 41 2f, and Lutz, Fall of the German
Empire, n, 460f . For informed and divergent American analy-
sis of the Ludeadorff aimlstice tactics see Chester V. Easum,
Half-Ceatiupy of Conflict (New York, 1952), 66-72; Hairy
Riidin, Armistice J918 t Yale. 1944), 54; A, Rosenberg, Eirth
o German Republic^ 245f.
For an interesting diagnosis of &iden<lorf by a neutral col-
Notes 1 49
league, see Ludwig Beck, Studieru ed. by Hans Speidel (Stutt-
gart, 1955), 190-215. As Speidel said, "Sie zeigt die Gefahren
einer Ein-Mann-Herrschaft, die Resignation erst des Staats-
mannes, dann des militaerischen Fuehrers, aber auch den
sittlichen Mut der damaligen Obersten Heeresleitung trotz
aller Fehler , denVerlust des Krieges zu erkennen und daraus
die Konsequenzen zu ziehen. "
Max von Baden, Erinnerungen Und Dokumente (Stuttgart. 1928),
340ff . See also Ursachen, Reihe Vier, VI, 48.
Q
Groener Papers. VI, piece 23, vi-ix.
9
Reichskanzlei, Voraeschichte des Waffenstillstandes (Berlin,
1919), 67-87, and Max, Erinnerunaen. 419-452.
"DieSueddeutschenwuerdenbesser mit den PSrlamentariern
fertig, als die Preussen, hiess es, 11 Groener was stung by the
political overtones of his appointment although assured by
Hindenburg it was based on military considerations. Groener
Papers, I, 607.
11 Walther Rathenau, Politische Briefe ( Dresden. 1929), 205;
Friedrich Meinecke, Erlebtes 1901-1919 (Berlin. 1947), 151.
Or as Max Weber could say after the war: n . . . mit einer welt-
politischen Rolle Duerschlands ist es vorbei: die angelsaechs -
ische Weltherrschaft. . . ist Tatsache. Sie ist hoechst uner-
freulich, aber: vielSchlimmeres dierussischeKnutel haben
wirabgewendet. Dieser Ruhm bleibt uns. Amerikas Weltherr-
schaft war so unabwendbar wie in der Antike, die Roms nach
dem punischen Krieg. Hoffentlich bleibt es dabei, dass sie
nichtmitRusslandgeteiltwird. 11 Marianne Weber, Max Weber
(Heidelberg, 1950), 685, and Max Weber, Gesammelte poli-
tische Schriften ( Munich. 1921), 483f.
Alfred Niemann, Revolutioii von Oben: Umsturz von Unten
(Berlin, 1927), 123.
13
The liaison man from Berlin was Hlntze. His account In
Niemann, Revolution von Oben, 367, checks with Greener,
Papers. VII^ piece 34-i. Plessen's shocked response was,
"Aber Sie wollen den Kaiser doch nicht in Lebensgelahr
14
Prince Max, Erinaenipae, 570L
150 Notes
National Chancellery, Preliminary History of the Armistice
(London, 1924), 137-143. Even temporary German resistance
11 would depend on whether the enemy could affect it material-
ly, especially on whether at one particular and very important
point, all attacks could be consistently repelled." That point
was the American advance toward Sedan and the German defense
was being penetrated. See also Hans Herzfeld, Die deutsche
Sozialdemokratie und die Aufloesung der nationalen Einheits-
front im Weltkriege f Leipzig. 1928), 375.
Prince Max, Erinnerungen, 591ff, and Groener Papers, I, 623.
Niemann, Revolution von Oben. 377. Groener told Hintze,
"Erhabedem Feldmarschall Wiederholt gesagt dass die Armee
zum Buergerkrieg wohl nicht zu haben sein wuerde, er koenne
aber den Feldmarschall nicht desavouieren. M In Groener 1 s
words, the Kaiser n glaubtenochimmeraneine voruebergehende
boese Stimmung in Deutschland, die mit seinem Erscheinen
verfliegen werde. " Groener Papers, II, 625.
18
Friedrich Payer, Von Bethmann-Hollweg bis Ebert (Frankfurt/
Main, 1923), 159. Apparently Payer conveyed no such anti-
cipation to Prince Max because the latter still believed Groener
to be obdurate. Prince Max, Erinneruncren, 625.
19
All eye-witness accounts of the Spa council are from memo-
ry and they frequently diverge from, and contradict, one an-
other. Problematical, discriminating reconstruction is un-
avoidable. The official, royalist description of the scene, as
published on June 27, 1919, admittedly sought to portray the
scene in the Kaiser's favor. Consisting of four eye-witness
accounts, it was carefully axx! loyally edited by Court Westarp.
Greener's views were not welcome and not officially included.
See Kuno Graf von Westarp, Das .Ende der Monarchie { Berlin,
1952). Groener insists that his rejection of the Kaiser fol-
io wed the sepamtist maneuver of Schulenburg* He also main-
tains that his comment on n war paths 11 was not heard by Hin-
denburg, the Kaiser and the Crown Prince, who were in another
cluster* The Crown Prince, incidentally, came late and missed
much of the action he so dramatically describes. Of Schulen-
btarg and Plessen one can only agree with Walther Lambach 1 s
statement, "Deutschland brach zaisamiaea, ohne dass seine
henrschenden Kreise auch nur geahnt haetten, dass und in
Notes 151
welcher Weise sie selbst das Zerstoerungswerk vollbracht
haben." Ursagheru Reihe Vier, IV, 209. Groener was heart-
broken by the defeat of his Empire and a month later he would
refuse to give up his sword, insignia and medals to revolution-
ary delegates. He also had his sacred "ideas 11 but they re-
volved around nation and army, not around Prussia and the
Hohenzollerns.
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INDEX
Alsace- Lorraine, 39-40, 75
Armiens, 112
Army, German, 9, 15-16, 41,
48, 53, 61, 76-81, 123-
124, 126-130, 132, 134
Belgium, 26-27, 75, 122
Bismarck, 13, 24, 35-36,
46, 53, 55, 76
Bolshevism, 119, 123-124
Bundesrat, 11
Chateau-Theirry, 113
Ebert, Frieddck, 125-128
"Economic situation, 49-50,
54, 86, 91-92, 94-96,
99-101, 106
Falkenhayn, Erich, 81, 83-
84* 87-88
Fiscal policy, 46-48
FreiKJh-Russian alliance, 25
German empire, 10-11, 52-
53, 56, 73, 81, 86-87,
82, 104
Groener, William, summary
of contributions, vii-x;
memoirs, 6; biography,
ix; characterization,
ix-3di; 9-10, 15; birth,!;
family, 4; youth, 4; mill-
5|
by War Academy, 9, 14, 16;
strategy, 18-19; assigned
to topographic section of
Gen. staff, 19; head of
railroad section, 38; rail-
road program, 45, 48; mo-
bilization for World War I,
59; Schlieffen plan, 67;
outlook, 78-80, 85-86, 90;
heads War Office, 95; and
Hindenburg program, 95;
labor relations, 96-98, 101-
104, 107-108; memorandum
on production, 106-107;
removed from War Office,
sent to Front, 107; trans-
ferred to Ukraine, 110;
letters on defeat, 115-116;
named executive commander,
117-118; report to govern-
ment, 123; stand on abdi-
cation, 12P-123, 125,127;
report to Hindenburg and
Kaiser, 128-129, 131-133;
ultimatum, 133
Hindeaburg, Paul, on western
front, 87-89; program, 91,
94-95, 104; attempt to
188,
160
Index
121, 123, 127-128; ac-
cepts necessity for ab-
dication, 129-130
Joffre, Joseph, 66
Junkers, 11-13, 86
Kaiser William II, policy,
10-11, 17; objectives, 52-
53; military support, 54;
autocracy, 98-99; flight
to Spa, 119; refusal to a
abdicate, 120-121, 128,
130-132; deposed, 136
Kiel rebellion, 124-125
Labor, 95-96, 99-103, 107-
109
Ludendorff, Erich, leader-
ship, 87-89, 91; and
War Off ice, 100-101;
defeat, 112-114; request
for armistice, 114;
Groener appraisal, 116;
military analysis, resig-
nation, 117
Mame, 65-67, 70-71
Meincke, Friedrich, 54,
84-85
Moltke, Helmuth, J. , char-
acterization, 17; head
of Prussian army, 23-24;
succeeds Schlieffen, 29,
35-36; strategy, 37-38,
50; 58-59; violates
Schlieffen plan, 64-67,
69-79; death, 85
Navy, 41, 49-50, 84
Railroads, importance, 32;
development, 33; prob-
lems, 63, 71; future
plans for, 74-75; opera-
tion, 77
Reichstag, influence, 11;
161
fiscal policy, 46-48; limi-
tations, 56; divisions, 93;
Auxiliary Service bill, 96-
97; support of Pease Reso-
lution, 105
Revolution, 118, 123, 127,
129-130, 132, 134-136
Schlieffen, description, 25;
strategy, 26-28; retired,
29
Schlieffen plan, 30-33; and
Groener, 34, 35; defects,
47, 70; basis, 59; Moltke
violation, 64-69; defeat,
66-67
St. Mihiel, 114
Sedan, 122, 124
Social Democrats, 97, 125,
127-128
Socialism, 40, 90-91; 96-97,
101,107,112,118-119
Ukraine, 11, 123
Verdun campaign, 82-84
Ypres, 71
