The German-French war of 1870 and its consequences upon future civilization

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THE ROBERT E. COWAN COLLECTION

PRESENTED TO THK

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

BY

C. P. HUNTINGTON

dUNE. 18Q7.

Accession No, 766

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I'nftur.nC'O uprxu Futitr

BY

WILLIAM E. F.

Al'THOK OF "AMKKICAN INTERESTS IN BORNEO," "THE UNITED STATES' INTERESTS ABROAD,"

AND A NUMBER op POEMS IN THE ENGLISH AND GERMAN LANGUAGES.

SAN ^RANCISCO :

PRINTED BY JOSEPH WINTEKBU11N <fe COMPANY.

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417 Clay Street, between Battery and Sansome. (L

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CTNIVBHSITY

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PART THE FIRST

THE ADVANCE OF IREPUBLICAlXnSM.

IT being an avowed characteristic of the high order of civilization
attained to at this period of the world's history, for man and nations
to sympathize with and aid in ameliorating the misfortunes of one
another, it is quite natural that, we find the people of the United
States not only averse to and regretting all wars, from principle,
themselves politically acting upon its high commands, but observe
them aggrieved at the war which in turn has devastated France, as
affecting one of the most civilized nations by retarding its general
progress of prosperity.

Truly loyal in their wishes for the maintenance of the Republic in
France, and eager in discerning symptoms of a like improvement upon
government in other civilized nations, the American people, while
pondering over the extraordinary commotion of this war, experience
a relief in the contemplation that with the tranquil demise of the ven
erable Emperor of Germany, the great intellectual union of the Ger
man people may signify the unveiling of the bright Goddess of Lib
erty in Germany, and, resting at her heart, feel its throbbings a
mother's love for every child alike.

Then, with Great Britain and her colonies simultaneously to follow,
there is indeed a fair prospect, at this age, for all mankind to become
free! And how unlike the dark periods of history when the Romans
failed in the permanency of the Republic through want of universal
education, precluding a high state of morality, and wTere not guided
to happiness by experience in the inestimable advantages of an enlight
ening Christianity.

"With us the republican versus the monarchical government has
stood a centennial test — enough positive proof of not only its ra
tional superiority over all other forms of government, but of its admi
rable efficiency, de facto, and its indivisibility and feasibility in enlight
ened ages. It now excels as the most glorious achievement of
progress, because under it can be, and with us has been, is daily, and
shall forever be attained, the true object of all civilization; the individ-

ual happiness of man to an universal extent, duly commensurate with a
steady advance in the general progress of civilization, so as to justify,
as in accord with it, the prediction of its ultimate adoption by all
nations, and to be by them regarded as manifest destiny, so soon as
sufficiently enlightened and consequently unanimously determined of
proclaiming, appreciating and revering it.

Its legitimacy is found sacred, inasmuch as all truth and knowl
edge is derived from an incessant and correct interpretation and judi
cious application of nature, which wisdom, by labor attained, as ren
dering man good, virtuous and prosperous, enables him to properly
appreciate life, directing reason to guide him to actions which, when
sagaciously applied to the present, create his happiness, and, united
with others, expand civilization, in chronological order of the day,
through all ages of time. So the earnest reflectant not merely per
ceives man as living in great numbers, scattered all over the earth, and
originally born in mental and physical equality, but observes him as
with impartiality tenderly cradled amidst the grand loveliness of
nature, which, heralding the voice of God, distinguishes him as His
image by the exuberance of his reasoning powers, and vouchsafes him
happiness everywhere, while it demands of him the sacred duty of
fraternity. This duty, be it understood, the American people, as a nation,
really and almost only religiously obey, but which ought in this age to
serve every civilized being as the syntax of the great study of the use
of life, as acknowledged and demonstrated by civilization, which study
is made altogether supreme in importance by the force of reflection
upon the surety, as well as the mysterious uncertainty of the time, of
death.

The duty of fraternity is realized from the fact of the existence at
our age of about 1,000,000 people. Furthermore, God creating man
and not nations, land and not countries, nature not only points to
mail's independence through his individuality, as an inalienable right
wherever he lives, but to freedom of his actions and the liberty of
his will. As man at all arrives at civilization through external influ
ences, elevating his mind and cultivating his heart, so the circle of his
personal friends shall widen in proportion of his own advance to
that of others in usefulness and sympathetic attractiveness through
education, refinement and social intercourse. Consequently, the more
readily and generally the duty of fraternity is fulfilled, the more tol
erant, forbearing and compassionate man is, the more communicative
of his knowledge, the more considerate in his regard for the feelings
of others, the more gracefully and unassumingly he deports himself—
the more genteel and accomplished he is, the happier his life, the more
religiously and sensibly does he act; and the more universal such
enlightenment in a nation, the more civilized a people composed of

such ladies and gentlemen, and the more conspicuous the truth of
republicanism, which alone guarantees the independence of man.

Therefore no system of government is compatible with civilization
in the fullest sense of the word, in which man, its first principle, its
true idioni and object, is precluded from, is not considered morally fit
for self -government; who, possessing the attribute of moral fitness, as
emerged from cannibalism and heathenism, and with reasoning powers
unimpaired, has unquestionably the right, from the fact that he adds
at least some share of usefulness to the common wealth, of demanding
participation in a government which consolidates but for the one object,
and, unitedly only, successfully carries it out: the ennobling of man —
the happiness and usefulness of all in the presence of God.

In order that all mankind may adopt our precedent, we, finding at
least the European nations abundantly prepared for self-government,
which is daily ascertained from the German and French as well as any
other immigrant to whom we grant the yote and whom we receive into
the bosom of our commonwealth with the kindness and trust of a
friend — consequently whose brother (unfortunately for us left behind)
is equally fit for voting there — it becomes not only necessary but a duty
incumbent on the American people, as the most happy portion of the
fraternity of mankind, of illustrating by all manner of means the
direct effect of our institutions upon the happiness of men residing
here and forming the American nation, to all foreigners outside, for
their special edification and encouragement.

This duty effectually to carry out, which obviously is of such inesti
mable sesthetic worth to civilization, appears and becomes imperative
from the standpoint of our institutions, by which we foster a care for
the interest of humanity in all places and at all times; while officially
their peaceable tenor prescribes observance of strict neutrality in all
international affairs. It includes the hope for an universal law ere
long to be agreed upon and passed, by which wars may henceforth be
peremptorily avoided through mutual obligations of settling all unto-
wardly arising political dissensions by arbitration — substituting
for expensive standing armies the economical volunteer system and
similarly humane, rational and judicious derivations.

As an agreeable task, cheerfully undertaken, it is satisfactorily
accomplished by manfully expressing our gratitude for the happiness
we as a nation enjoy under the banner of freedom in this country, on
all occasions, publicly and privately— availing ourselves especially of
every foreign imbroglio to do so.

Such a feature would undoubtedly show its efficiency abroad because

of its lawfulness and access to the censors. It convinces. To vituper-

-tively denounce monarchical governments, or to praise our own in a

pompous manner, could not be thought of an instant; both attempts.

at making the desired impression would prove altogether futile — the
former with the ignorant abroad creating hatred, and with the pow-
ful a scornful delight ; while the latter would present the American
citizen altogether in a wrong light, likewise falling short of effect.

No; if the truth must be told, let every one prove his words by his
residence in this country, and not for whole years in European capi
tals; by his quiet contentedness here, so envied by the wealthiest
roaming cosmopolite; by his studied silence of opinion in regard to
wars as unelating and disagreeably obvious of misery; by a profound
disregard of the hollo wriess of a mere and altogether unreputed
appearance of man, as best stifling in the bud the spirit of aristocratic
intolerance; by a liberal acknowledgement of talent here and abroad;
by lavish exhibitions of industry in this country, while promptly fre
quenting those of Europe ; and by the diminution in the cost of
steamship travel and of letter postage, viewed as the carriers of civili
zation, which make known to the world the truth of republics and
influence emigration ; and we cannot fail in drawing the attention of
all 'foreign people upon us, touch with dignity and due effect the
pernicious pride of the aristocrat, the obstinate enemy of fraternity
and good will toward all men — the stoic skeptic in the religious truth
of the republic — and we shall succeed in arousing an earnest
longing and a fluttering among all classes to either emigrate here
or to be similarly free and happy there, leaving man's opinion to
mature on the spot, from the richness of facts received in double-quick
time.

These facts, vividly illustrated, as they shall depict life in the
United States in all phases of a veritably unsurpassed progress in civ
ilization, the cause of freedom, of man's personal independence in this
country; and of all the appliances of civilized life — free schools, a free
press and free labor — and not of favorable natural advantages and' a
thinly-populated country only, so often, with lamentable ignorance,
held forth*as an argument by men, strange tb say, in our very midst:
these proofs are daily abundantly given, and are hourly carried by
telegraph and by steam, in person, to and fro, the world over; in
books and in letters, by millions; are magnificently displayed by the
fabulous wealth of our commerce at home and abroad; then again, by
the unknown existence at any time of a poverty-stricken multitude in
our large cities, as one of the greatest blessings which republics only
afford, where men are sworn by the vote to the duty of ameliorating
the condition of one another, in order that all be drawn to the surface
of ease and comfort, and no partiality shown in detriment to the
divine rights of another, while purposely remiss in adulation of the
wealth of the man whose individual usefulness to the country at large
does not stand in exact proportion to it, or whose moral example is

none, nor his heart known to pulsate audibly for love as well as
public charities, as in the case of a charitable bachelor millionaire
acquiring with enormous wealth the peculiar duty of judiciously dis
posing of the greater part of it to the public before he dies; by the eti
quette of our National Government, which expects of the best of men
as well as the most useful and learned to say to himself, " There are
others aspiring to what I once honorably craved and now glory in,
of having successfully attained"; by the less than nominal expense to
the wealthiest nation upon earth of the care for the bodily comfort of
the inmates of the White House, as in concert with the habits of the
real American, who values wealth but as a medium of carrying out
intelligent ideas — worthless to him as a clap-trap for either power,
glory or fashion; and rising as another brilliant star to outshine the
allurements of Europe, where the retinue of courts serves as a gas by
which the fashionable avenues of trade are lit up; then, again, by
the innumerable institutions of benevolence; by the respect and cour
tesy shown to every lady in every station of life; by the protection
given and license of freedom granted to every child ; and, above all,
by the Press, in the light of a daily producer and conveyancer of
wholesome as well as delicious nutriment for the mind of man, serving,
caring and ambulancing the wounded hearts of mankind, without
intermission, to the glory of civilization, besides being the most irre
pressible arm. of Freedom, the ever invulnerable shield of Liberty.

By such means as those enumerated, which we know are in con
stant, active use, and always on the increase ever since the telegraph and
steam — in reality the manual hands of civilization, — have almost anni
hilated geographical distances, it appears an utter impossibility for the
leading European nations to adhere any longer to monarchical govern-
ernmeiits and classifications of society which are not only unnatural
but superannuated by the force of universal enlightenment. As a
standard truth, this assertion is verified by the full weight of the
naturalization oath resting upon it which the intelligent foreigner
takes in this country when, from conviction and sheer intelligence, he
abjures all allegiance to royalty as inconsistent with his conception of
what is humanly right. In doing so he likewise abjures all sympathy
with the usurped power of its mandates and adopts this country as his
only home, because of its entire freedom from arbitrary and hereditary
individual power, and with institutions drafted to that effect, as afford
ing him the desired and expected guarantee for, and a permanent
and peaceable enjoyment of, all his own individual and lawful rights.

In order to produce in California, or America generally, a synoptical
portraiture sufficiently explanatory of the various causes which led to
this memorable war, is perhaps preferably done by translating from
some work, well spoken of on the continent of Europe, instead of going

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to the infinite trouble of compiling it here. It possesses the considera
ble advantage of making the reader acquainted, in a piquant manner,
with many local incidents otherwise unattainable, yet indispensable, on
account of their elucidating events, when and where these have occurred
—items of importance in historical literature, and really serviceable for
better comprehension of the general subject under view. Besides, as little
lights of history, they are duly retained, destined of dispersing, to some
extent, the gloom which is cast over the mind during the perusal of
belletristic works, by their throwing an electric glare of truthfulness
over the dismal pages of nightly ignorance and gory battle-fields,
which latter they point out with unerring precision, and by the force
of the limpid, spasmodic dazzleness peculiar to the artificial nature of
that* extraordinary light, awake in every one anew the hope which
precedes the glorious daylight of enlightenment, that wars be altogether
eschewed through an obligatory international law, and its obedience
practically enforced among the nations, through the establishment of
a republican form of government.

As republicanism is the highest tribunal of civilization, it wields the
executive power of impartial justice to all men, mainly through the
institutional or lawful provision of peace, the ethereal shield of liberty,
protecting life, individually and collectively, nationally and internation
ally, publicly and privately, at all hazards.

In times of peace only, as obviously is the object of civilization,
the individual happiness of man, to an universal extent, duly at
tained, in full accordance with religion, which teaches us through
nature that God, creating man to live, intends him to die a natural
death. To expose one's self to an unnatural death, or worse, precipitate
it intentionally, is, therefore — the one a personal fault, and the other an
uncivilized action — similar to insanity, hereditary or not, which, caused
by disease of the vital brain, the consequence of an unwise life uncongru-
ous of nature, proves that life stands entirely unconnected with the time
of death, as so chastely and omnipotently veiled by God only. Then
again, the local items above referred to mournfully serve as links in
the chain of study, how far this war has detained the march of prog
ress — although it must be admitted that any war, like sin, once com
mitted, is a step nearer atonement, which signifies, in regard to politics,
that by the ready avowal of republican institutions, as redeeming a
nation from sin by freeing it from the last remnant of barbarism, may
render it in future more prosperous, and each individual better
and happier. In the same proportion that the Christian religion
stands to Paganism, civilization to barbarism, peace to war, the quick
spread of republicanism to universal popular enlightenment, so sure it
is that its advance in Europe stands parallel to the influence which it
receives from the United States of America. Revered by us as a politi-

cal as well as private acme of justice, and accordingly practiced as a
national law, in all international affairs, Peace is the Minerva of Liberty
in a free country, the Aurora Australia, which lovingly animates the
power of virtue, enabling man's happiness to unfold itself through
life in all its pristine purity and strength, and the terrestrial temple of
the soul, in which the conscience of man piously worships God. As
such America introduces republicanism into the civilized world, sub
stantiated by our greatness as a nation — the incontestible proof of
man's incomparable happiness, here attained under the canopy of in
dependence as well as of heaven.

No longer a matter of time, but of absolute certainty in this en
lightened age, of succeeding in making republicanism universally
appreciated, it requires but reduction of expense and of time in our
steamship travel and in letter postage. The more we gain upon anni
hilation of geographical distances by telegraph and steam, the speedier
we shall attain to the desired end of elevating all nations into political
manhood, affording them proper opportunities to copy from us, as
the living example. By thus constantly increasing the number of our
steamers, plying between America and Europe, and the world at large, at
the smaller an expense of passage and of freight moneys as practical
the better, increasing likewise the speed of travel, if at all possible, as
valuing time, we shall unfailingly bring about the desideratum — the
great point at issue in civilization — an increase of the explanation be
tween brother and brother, which knows of no hindrance, fears no
censor — is the sunny light of reason and of love, which goes to heart,
convinces, and succeeds. This reflection is drawn directly from the
uncontrovertible fact that Europe has gained more in liberal ideas since
the days of steamship travel, bringing it into frequent contact with
America, than its progress in that direction amounted to ever since the
invasion by the Huns, and which progress in the practical promulga
tion of civilizing principles is bound to increase in exact proportion to
the tide of immigration setting in here strongly, which ebbs its fer
tilizing truths through the lunar agency of sublunary happiness into the
hearts of all mankind, arousing them to be faithful and unfailing in
their own sovereign independence as republicans.

Every information in regard to European affairs generally, received
in America, whether officially or privately, it ought to be borne in mind
is furnished from abroad by aliens, who as such are unfortunately
biassed in the judgment of international affairs, from the very nature
of their governments, as consequent upon the conventional life the
people traditionally lead as rigid adherents to caste ; less indeed from
ignorance and prejudice, or good intentions in many individual cases,
concerning the duty of elevating man to the moral standard of social
equality, than what appears to us a willful and sinful lack of determina-

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tion of familiarizing themselves with, and without any more circumlocu
tory ado in this age, adopt our system of government, in which that stand
ard is secured to all as a form and basis of civilization, as they have
had ample opportunity afforded them during a hundred years, of
doing so.

I have already shown in the introductory of this work that the Ger
man and French, as well as any other immigrant here, proves to a
fault that his relatives he left behind possess to a like degree the proper
fitness for self-government there, and that dire necessity no longer
legitimatizes monarchical governments, where the people have by uni
versal enlightenment emancipated themselves from an originally bar
barous condition of unntness to live peaceably and within the
boundariesjof law, but that, proving now to be enlightened they ought
to know that government i^ not a compulsory institution among prac
tically, intelligent, and unbigoted beings, but merely a clerkship of
the nation, composed of everybody as an integral, a natural, and an in-
devisable part, and should never be dreaded as an instrument of arbi
trary power ; on the contrary, may well and should be loved as a huge
law office, in which the legitimate rights and the sacred welfare of
man are in quite a fraternal manner broadly and intelligently discussed
in the eyes of God.

The judgment of the powerful abroad with reference to war — re
sorted to in order to adjust difficulties, as if they still lived in mediaeval
ages, in which the rational being had not the full intellectual force of
fortitude at his disposal of combating with and of controlling the
infuriated senses of man and nations, constantly embarrasses us of
conceiving as justly, because bloodshed never coincides with noble or
brave acts, constituting enlightenment, nor ever was, or is now at this
period of the world's history, in accord with civilization, in which
peace at all hazards, in the settlement of difficulties, both privately and
politically, predominates as the principal characteristic, and rises on
the horizon of enlightenment as the most brilliant star, guiding man
through the dark labyrinthic nights of ignorance. We therefore
rigidly practice it as a nation, as in adherence to the superior wisdom,
and in proper conformity of the charitable principles pervading all our
institutions and industrious habits of life, confident that with the spread
of republics man's unhappiness will everywhere disappear from sight
altogether.

In regard to historical productions, they dwindle down to a mere
clever recital of authenticated occurrences, not at all elating in them
selves ; on the contrary, and in reality, very pitiable in their sad -con
sequences of so much sanguinary awfulness and general misery they
entail, sternly demanding no positively necessary attention beyond
tearful, and of course substantial succor, except that in every one of

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us it should arouse anew the one overwhelmingly sacred duty, amenda
tory of such misery, and incumbent upon an American to comply with,
and as a man of honor and personified truth cheerfully and voluntarily to
fulfill, which is to express his gratitude for our institutions, under
which, in peace and amidst plenty, he, and every one, is blessed, and can
live happily, who labors, acts sensibly, studying contentment and health,
and which is not the case in any other nation to such an approxima-
tingly universal extent, but should be the case the world over. Such
an avowal is not only always timely, but especially so now. It strenu
ously draws the attention of the world upon us, in order that foreign
nations be led to respect us by such a manful demonstration of a
proper feeling of nationality, which, while it honors us, refutes but
their stubborn unbelief in the superior meilts of our institutions ; it
is theory practically applied. For sheer want of such morally con
vincing proofs they remained so deplorably long in ignorance of the
manifold blessings they afford, openly derided' them, even held the
same in abuse for selfish purposes of their own, in no accord with
either the conscience of the rulers nor the intellectual greatness of a
nation so duped, showing it quite conclusively that the chances here
tofore afforded them for knowing America well, and of thoroughly
estimating its vast moral power, did anything but suffice.

Availing themselves of the misfortunes to man, monarchs covertly
denounced republics as a conglomeration of lawlessness, when secretly
at heart they fear the promulgation of the eternal truth of the equality
of man's mind for culture in the eyes of the civilized world, as laying
bare their position of aristocrats as untenable in this age, and pointing
with decimating effect towards the ruse of the origin of their preroga
tives as altogether unwarrantable, because devoid of charity and gen
erosity to fellow-men, and as to a hereditary right to them the absurdity
appearing like a dense fog, which disperses only when the sun rises —
then not the shadow of a vapor remains to justify it.

A sort of tomahawk they still use in blasphemously quoting the
Bible as authority of the will of God that rule and servitude should
exist on earth, and cite nature as legitimatizing coercion, when from a
study of the same nature we are taking quite a different version, and
find that it leaves us at a loss how to conceive man irrational. Reason,
therefore, by the strong, unobtrusive power of which we conceive and
comprehend Grod's love of all mankind alike, as our bright vision be
holds man living in inimitably animated forms of anatomically perfect
construction and equality, leading us to the decorous demeanor of
justice and kindness toward one another in the paths of private life,
led us to unanimously declare our independence from man's aggres
sion upon another's rights, and politically accomplish a gathering of
free and good men, denominated the republic, which significantly in-

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eludes all mankind. That its security be imperishable, and the world
may readily adhere to its sacred vows, we gathered into it all the avail
able principles which render man good, and consequently happy, so as
to serve not only us for the time being, but all mankind forever.

Upon this truly religious and equally rational comprehension of
God's will rests our conviction that all nations will arrive at the appre
ciation and adoption of the republican form of government, the time
for their proclamation being fixed according to the advance reached in
general intelligence by the people universally.

That in spite of the Christian religion, which the civilized world has
adopted, on account of its incomparably humanizing principles, but
we, and a few other but thinly populated countries, have as yet fol
lowed its divinely moral teachings, which although so near common
sense, appear still so distant in time of application, proves the difficulty of
the task, that without the aid of all, republican principles cannot be
thoroughly appreciated, inasmuch as universal enlightenment and per
sonal worth, based upon education, and, above all, a diffusion of a
fraternal spirit of amiability and generosity are indispensable requisites
for the clue attainment to its desirable, ultimate end.

WM. E. F. KRAUSE.

SAN FRANCISCO, February 22d, 1871.

THE W-A.R.

It appears that on the 19th of July, 1870, the Emperor of the
French declared war against Germany, to the great astonishment and
surprise of the people of the latter country, there being 110 palpable
reason for a necessity of any such warlike demonstration on his part.
It was, therefore, quite natural that the German people united in pre
venting serious mischief, leaving internal controversies pending — as is
always the case when a foreign foe is intermeddling or intruding.
This patriotic feeling became the more intensified the more it became
known, from the various pretexts advanced, proving to be shallow, that
they covered nothing less than a deliberate design upon the independ
ence and the freedom of the German people, thus forcibly reminding
them of the great war of liberty in bygone days, and securing for this
one that unanimous action which augurs victory from the commence
ment by its energetic execution, as inspired by the very holiness of the
cause of " the defence of national freedom."

What these pretexts were which the Emperor of the French ad
vanced for the inauguration of the war, and his real intentions en
shrouded by them, that has to be enunciated, that the latter, although
of a twofold nature, as being dynastical or personal, and political or
traditional, were by him blended into one determined design of ag
grandizing upon Germany.

During his entire reign the care for his throne, and a continuancy
of his dynasty, has actuated his policy at home and abroad, availing
himself of the influence of the church upon the peasantry, likewise of the
Imperialists, and of the army, with whom the name of Napoleon bears
a charm, and of the majority of the middle classes, who were his
staunch supporters, because they feared anarchy. By such aids he
held successfully in check the Bourbons, the Oiieanists, the Liberals,
and even the Republicans, always occupying the army in a manner
satisfactory to their martial spirit. But ever since his transatlantic ad
ventures in Mexico, the French nation, a liberty-loving people, began
to show their sagacity by leaning towards the espousal of the republi
can cause, exhibiting this inborn desire to be free ; in other words, in
dependent of the rule of any man whomsoever born of woman —
publicly and unmistakably — which showed Napoleon that not only had
republicanism and enlightenment largely increased in France since
1848, but that his throne was tottering in consequence, and his dynasty
in jeopardy of expiring. Such a calamity to his imperial self -inter-

12

ests he had two ways of encountering — either by war with a neighbor
ing nation or by a piebiscitum. Both were slippery and dangerous to
traverse. As to a war abroad, there was but one really popular, a war
with Germany, as answering the political traditions of France. In
case of victory, it would be considered by the nation as an answer
received to the queries of Leipsic, Waterloo, and Koniggratz, accom
panied by the Khemsh provinces, so ardently and persistently coveted,
as a pledge of the sincerity of future friendship.

But be it understood, in case of victory only, that the very attempt
of making victory a condition was not only hazardous in the extreme,
but fatal to himself and dynasty in case of defeat; while of course by
dictating peace from Berlin, his power would become indestructible
from that day, as far as the arbitrary rule of a monarch can find sub
missive supporters in oppression. Delay, however, was out of the
question, because of the imminent danger of his position, denying the
difficulty and nature of available means to avert it.

The idea of going to war with Germany, so daring in itself, became
preposterous when it was considered that France was not at all pre
pared for it. The genius of Napoleon, correctly estimating the press
ure of time, therefore, abstained for the present from this mode of
procedure, and adopted first the peaceable way — not, however, losing
sight of the dilemma wherein he might be placed of risking at any
time his fortune by war, for which untoward neceessity he never
nagged of preparing with consummate precision. His resolution now
was taken; votes were cast, he standing well in the eyes of the world
as the elect of the French people — thanks to the clergy, the prefects and
the maires. Still it was not enough. A liberty-loving people require
proofs, not words. Concessions they wanted, and concessions Napo
leon now made. To the astonishment of France it was a new Consti
tution, well framed, which he gave, at the same time with a majority
in the House devoted to himself which would secure for him, at all
times, personal control of all important decisions generally.

In spite of these apparent successes, France was observed to be still
in a ferment, the cause being that during the piebiscitum many had
voted aye upon condition that no war should be declared; but then
again — and what constituted more than his misgivings — the army, the
main pillar of the Napoleonic Empire, to the figure of 43,000 strong —
just about one in ten — had voted nay.

In the French Senate there was next observed a very obstinate and
energetic minority rising to awake stormy debates, proving to Napo
leon still more demonstratively the waning of his power, notwith
standing his success at the elections.

Several years had so elapsed, during which the greatest activity
was displayed and persevered in to procure the necessary material for

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war. The preparations were upon such a gigantic scale that all the
world might have guessed correctly who was meant by it, leaving
nothing doubtful but the moment of time for the outbreak of war. Na
poleon therefore decided upon war with Prussia and Germany, but
endeavoring first to attain to the same object by diplomatic means. The
object of course remained the Rhenish Provinces and the annexation
of Belgium ; and as the genius of Napoleon is well known to beiit
him more conspicuously for diplomacy than the battle-field, he tried to
effect the object by diplomacy. It was as early as 18G2, during the
Mexican expedition, that he made the first attempt of absorbing Bel
gium and adjusting the Rhenish frontier with the assistance of
Prussia, consulting Count Bisraark anterior to the Count's acceptance
of the portfolio of Prime Minister of Prussia. This defined to the world
the position of France in the German-Danish war in favor of the allies.
But when the Treaty of Gastein, between Austria and Prussia, was
signed, he immediately changed his tactics, showing a marked un
friendliness towards the latter country, accountable for only on the fear
that a too intimate friendship between Austria and Prussia would
deprive him of the fruits of his diplomacy in the German-Danish war.

About the same time Bismark gave Napoleon, at St. Cloud, a
general outline of his views upon Germany, while Napoleon responded
with his views upon Belgium, without further comment on either part
upon the feasibility of the execution of these plans. The silence of
Count Bismark on this occasion, Napoleon interpreted in favor of his
plans, having expected that the war between Austria and Prussia
would be fought in 1865, and instantly approached Prussia with
friendly overtures upon the rupture between Austria and Prussia
becoming imminent — availing himself of the presence of Prince Napo
leon in Berlin, as well as other confidential agents, to propose various
schemes for enlarging their respective boundaries. In one case it was
Luxembourg!! ; in another, the boundary of 1814, together with Lan-
dou and Sar-Louis ; then again, touching larger objects — for instance,
the territory of the French-speaking Swiss or the boundary of Pied
mont to be adjusted according to the language most prevalent among
the people.

All this occurred previous to the war between Austria and Prussia
in 18G6, and in May of that year the proposals assumed the shape of
an offensive and defensive alliance, of which Count Bismark made
mention in his circular of the 29th of July, 1870, the Count stating that:

Firstly — In case of a Congress, it should be unanimously declared
that Venetia be ceded to Italy, and the Duchies of the Elbe to Prussia.

Second — Should these cessions not be realized, then an offensive
and defensive alliance.

14

Third — The King of Prussia would commence hostilities within
ten days from the adjournment of Congress.

Fourth — Should Congress not at all assemble, Prussia to take the
field thirty days after the signatures to the agreement in question had
been exchanged.

Fifth— The Emperor of the French to declare war to Austria as
soon as hostilities between Austria and Prussia should have com
menced; to take the field in thirty days, with 300,000 men.

Sixth — No separate peace with Austria should be made.

Seventh — Peace to be concluded upon the following conditions:
Venetia to Italy; the German terrritories mentioned, footing up about
seven to eight millions of population, upon choice, to Prussia; besides
Federal reform in the Prussian sense of view. To France, the terri
tory between the Moselle and the Khine, with a population of 500,000,
without the strong fortresses of Coblentz and Mayence; the section of
Bavaria upon the left bank of the Rhine ; the cities of Birkenfield,
Homburg and Darmstadt, with a total population of 213,000.

Eighth — After the signatures to this treaty be obtained, a military
convention would be agreed upon between France and Prussia.

Ninth— The King of Italy should be a party to the convention.

The number of troops with which the Emperor of the French
should assist the King of Prussia, according to Article V, was men
tioned at 300,000 men, and the population to be acquired by France
1,800,000, according to a somewhat superficial census.

Here, adds Count Bismark, every one more specially acquainted
with the diplomacy and military history of the year 1866, may fathom
the political intentions which France had in regard to Italy, with
which it likewise secretly treated, and later acted upon with both
Prussia and Italy. Prussia, however, firmly declining, in June, 1866,
the alliance above mentioned, notwithstanding its threatening pressure
on the part of France on several occasions, the French Government
had now to rely upon victory of the Austrians over the Prussians and
what diplomatic advantages they might secure to themselves from
such a defeat. That the proposed Congress would have had the effect
of allowing the three months time to elapse without affording Prussia
the chance of making use of the treaty which existed betwen Prussia
and Italy, is well known ; likewise how France was active in regard to
Custozza, to jeapardize Prussia's interests. The anything but enviable
position of the French Minister of State, M. Rouher, serves as a com
mentary to these transactions.

From that day France never ceased to allure Prussia with projects
detrimental to Germany and Belgium. The impossibility of consent
of the Count of Bismark to these schemes was obvious ; yet in the
interest of peace, by acceding to nothing, even verbally, the Count

15

suffered the French statesmen to enjoy their illusions delightfully, and
during as much time as possible, considering that a deprivation of
their hopes by way of an abrupt astonishment would endanger the
peace of not only Germany but Europe, which to cherish was the
decided advantage of all.

The Count was not of opinion to prevent a war with France,
because it being inevitable ; he counted upon Providence as unveiling
the future, and was right. Even victory he considered an evil, as
viewed from the high principle of civilization. He could not but
calculate upon* the possibility of radical changes in France and in
French politics, which might altogether do away with the threatening
aspect of war between Germany and France — a hope, indeed, well
worthy his silence.

After the end of the correspondence with the King of the Nether
lands in regard to Luxembourg, France repealed her proposals to
Prussia in regard to Belgium and Southern Germany. During ijiat
conjuncture, the Benedetti manuscript was transmitted. That the
French Ambassador should have committed himself, and, without
authorization from his sovereign, should himself have made proposals,
placing them in the Count's hands, conferring with him repeatedly,
modifying the meaning of the writing, is as improbable and unlikely
as on another occasion it was stated that the Emperor Napoleon
never consented to the fortress of Mayence being ceded, which demand
was officially made to Prussia through the French Ambassador in
August, 1866, with threats of war if refused.

The various phases of French dislike and war delights which hap
pened from 1866 to 1869, very nearly coincide with the signs of incli
nation and disinclination for it which the French agents thought the
Count had inadventently at times betrayed to them.

In March, 1868, at the time of the Belgian Eailway trouble, Count
Bismark states he was given to understand by a person of high rank,
undoubtedly acquainted with former negotiations in regard to this diffi
culty that, in case the French should occupy Belgium — "Nous trouver-
ions bien not re Belyiqite aiUeurs." In a similar manner, on former
occasions, the Count was induced to consider that France, in a settle
ment of the Oriental question, could not absorb her share in the far
Orient, but on the frontier.

The Count had the impression that nothing but a sure conviction
that success with Prussia, to get at more territory, was impossible,
would induce Napoleon to try his best to prevent Prussia having any
success of the sort.

The Count had every reason to believe that, had this question not
been made public, France would have to offer proposals to us after
knowing we were ready for war, to advance upon Europe with a mil-

16

lion of men, and carry, by force of arms, the proposals previously
made, viz : to make peace either before or after the first battle, entirely
at the expense of Belgium, according to Benedetti's proposals.

In regard to these proposals, the manuscript which we have posses
sion of was the handwriting of Count Benedetti's, upon paper of
the Imperial French Embassy, and recognized as such by the various
Embassadors and Charge d' Affairs of Austria, Great Britain, Russia,
Baden, Bavaria, Belgium, Hesse, Italy, Saxony, Turkey and Wurten-
berg.

In Article I, Count Benedetti, during the first reading, passed the
last sentence — putting it in parenthesis — after the Count had told him
that it meant an interference of France into the internal affairs of
Germany which he, the Count, could not submit to even in documents
held private and in his keeping. Of his own accord he altered in Arti
cle II, on the margin, some sentence of less consequence. Lord Aug.
Loftus had verbally been made aware of the existence of this docu
ment on the 21th inst, and as the noble Lord doubted it, invited him
to inspect it himself. This he did on the 27th, and was convinced that
it was in the handwriting of his former French colleague.

That the Imperial Cabinet to-day denies these overtures, which
since 1814 it accompanied with alternating promises and threats, in
order to hurry us into submission, is quite explainable as matters now
stand.

This remarkable document from the manuscript of the treaty to
which Signor B. refers in his dispatch, reads as follows:

EL M., the King of Prussia, and H. M., the Emperor of the
French, considering it useful to strengthen still more the bonds of
friendship which now happily exist between them and their respective
nations as neighbors, and, on the other hand, convinced that they are
dutifully obliged to satisfactorily settle questions in regard to the
future of both nations, upon the result of which rests the peace of the
world, have for this purpose concluded to propose the following treaty,
having appointed as their respective representatives, H. M., etc.;
H. M., etc.; who, after having exchanged their credentials and found
them correct, have agreed upon the following articles :

ARTICLE I. H. M., the Emperor of the French, admits and
acknowledges the acquisitions made by Prussia in her late war with
Austria and the allies of Austria, as well as submits to the steps taken
already, and to be taken, by Prussia, for the formation of a North
German Union, and obligates himself at the same time to assist in
maintaining it.

ARTICLE II. H. M., the King of Prussia, promises to facilitate the
acquisition of Luxumbourg by France; to which end H. M. shall con-

17

fer with H. M., the King of the Netherlands, in order to induce that
sovereign to cede to the Emperor of the French his rights to the
Dukedom for a fair compensation or in some other way, the Emperor
of the French paying all costs and charges.

ARTICLE III. H. M., the Emperor of the French shall not oppose
a federal union of North Germany with the States of the South,
Austria excepted, which Confederacy should have a Parliament, but
so formed that the sovereign rights of the divers States should be
respected.

ARTICLE IV. In case circumstances should arise which shall induce
H. M. , the Emperor of the French., to cross with his army the frontier
of Belgium, for the purpose of conquest of that country, the King of
Prussia shall assist France with troops and with all his might, by land
and by sea, against any other nation which should declare war to
France on that account.

ARTICLE V. For the purpose of a perfect execution of the aforesaid
designs, H. M., the King of Prussia, and H. M., the Emperor of
the French, by this agreement form an offensive and defensive alliance
between themselves, which to respect they solemnly pledge them
selves; added to which their Majesties consider this alliance valid on
all other occasions on which the integrity of either country might be
jeopardized by a foreign foe, then to arm forthwith, being actuated
by no scruples, admissible of no excuse for evading the alliance.

Annexed is given a letter of Count Benedetti to Count Bismark,
with the manuscript of the treaty, as both were received from the
hands of the French Ambassador.

The letter reads as follows, as- published at the time in the Staats
Anzeiger :

MY DEAR PRESIDENT : In reply to the communication which I trans
mitted from Nikolsburg to Paris, in consequence of our conversation
on the 2Gth ultimo., I have received from Vichy the plan for a secret
convention, of which I beg to send you the inclosed copy. I hasten
to acquaint you with it, that you may digest it at your leisure. I am
at your service in talking the matter over with you at any time you
shall desire it. BENEDETTI.

SUNDAY, August 5, 1866.

The manuscript of the plan for this treaty reads as follows:

ARTICLE I. The French Empire again accedes to the lands which
formed in 1814 the boundaries of France, and which to-day belong to
Prussia.

18

AKTICLE II. Prussia pledges herself to obtain those lands which
are on the left bank of the Rhine and belong to the King of Bavaria
and the Grand Duke of Hesse, upon compensation to them for th«
same, and to cede possession of those lands to France.

ARTICLE III. Those dispositions which connect with the German
Union such lands as are standing under the sovereignty of the King
of Holland are canceled; likewise those which refer to such right to
lands within the fortress of Luxembourg.

In conseqnence of this note an official interview took place between
the Count of Bisinark and the French Ambassador, in which the latter
insisted upon his demands being complied with, which had been pro
jected by him, and threatened Prussia with war if refused. Notwith
standing this, the Chancellor respectfully declined ; upon which the
demand upon Luxembourg was made, which likewise did not succeed;
upon which, again, the more important demand upon Belgium was
made, which formed the contents of Count Bismark's explanatory dis
patch of July 29th, originally framed by Count Benedetti, and pub
lished in the Times.

All these diplomatic versions demonstrate clearly that State and
personal motives were blended by France into that traditional policy
which Louis XIV originated, and which ever since the great French
Revolution was rigorously adhered to.

This tradition comprises points which no Government in France has
ever slighted or lost sight of.

Firstly — The Rhine is the natural boundary of France.

Secondly — France is destined and therefore justified and obliged to
be the leading power in Europe, and has to judge by arbitration in all
political matters disturbing the peac'e of Europe, and considers itself
duty bound to prevent other powers from doing anything without
her will. This the French elaborately conceive and euphemistically
and charmingly express by saying: " France marches at the head
of civilization/'

Thirdly and finally — As an united Germany would not only en
danger, but cancel these rights, and affect the dignity and the interests
of France ; in other words, the two points first mentioned, it must
never be allowed to unite. Every attempt at this dangerous union
must instantly be stifled, destroyed, and Germany kept down at all
hazards.

Shortly before hostilities commenced, the Moniteur expressed it ex
actly so : France merely intends keeping Europe in its normal con
dition and bring it back to its equilibrium, and is of opinion that a
disunited Germany signifies an absolute division there in permanancy;

19

in which state of severed strength and consequent weakness of the
Germans, as a nation, they, the French, have nothing to apprehend,
and which opinion is even so yet to a far greater extent: they are
wrong, because in preventing the consolidation of the German union,
for political reasons of their own, they injure the German people,
morally and materially disabling them from abolishing every remnant
of feudalism, through not allowing them the necessary peace of Europe
to succeed in it.

If, therefore, the German nation at large had not at this juncture
found itself providentially blessed with a Bismarck, whose patriotism
and unfathomable genius took hold of the matter correctly, frustrating
both their designs — the motive for the prevention of the German
union, as well as the motive for the war, by conferring with the pres
ent Emperor of Germany, to apply the efficient strength which his
great genius knew existed in the military and their leaders, a worse
misery might have been entailed upon the German people than is now
lamented by the French, for reasons of the above named particularism,
aggravated by the consequences of conquest, in which the uncontroll
able fury of the Kabyles figures among the undefensive.

But not only to the Count Bismarck, but to the Emperor of Ger
many is the German nation forever indebted, who, as a sovereign, thus
nobly appreciated the Count, enabling him to give full vent to and ex
ercise his genius and allowing him to use his discretion in the above
two matters — he knowing full well what such a consolidation of Ger
many would eventually lead to, in times of undoubted national strength
and general enlightenment, beyond the present temporary absorption
of the attention of the people by the war.

Returning from this digression to the balance of power in Europe,
as viewed by the French nation, from their political tradition and ver
sion, it rests upon the validity and instrumentality of these aforesaid
three points being maintained and adhered to. These formed, there
fore, the nominal reasons advanced by Napoleon and his ministers for'
the legitimacy and necessity of the war about to commence.

How the Emperor of the French and his ministers managed and
succeeded in making this war sufficiently popular in France so as to be
sanctioned by the people and undertaken, is best seen from a protocol of
Count Bismark's, which he produced during the twenty-sixth sitting of
the federal council, and which was laid before the German Parliament
on the 20th July. In which protocol the Count says : "The events
which during the last fortnight have transpired, disturbing the peace
of Europe, plunging it into war, are so well known, that but a re
capitulation of facts is necessary to clearly define and comprehend the
state of affairs at this moment.

" Aware of the communication which the President of the Spanish

20

Ministerial Council made to the Cortes on the llth of last month, like
wise of the circular dispatch of the Spanish Minister of Foreign Af
fairs, of the 7th inst. , published in the newspapers, and of the explanation
which Seiior Salazar had on. the 8th inst. printed in the Mazaredo of
Madrid, explanatory of the Spanish Government having for months past
negotiated with Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern for the acceptance
of the crown of Spain, that these negotiations were directly made with
the Prince and his father, through the medium of Sefior Salazar, with
out participation and interference of any foreign government; and,
furthermore, that it is known that finally the Prince decided upon ac
ceptance of the proffered crown. His Majesty the King of Prussia,
upon being made acquainted with this decision, concluded to let it pass,
the Prince being of age could do as he liked, the more readily so as
the Prince's father had given his consent to his son. Neither the For
eign Office of the North German Union nor the Government of the
King of Prussia knew anything at all about it. They first heard of it
through the telegram of the Paris Havas, of the third evening, reporting
that the Spanish Government had decided upon offering the crown of
Spain to Prince Leopold. On the 4th the French Charge D' Affairs
presented himself at the Foreign Office. By order of his government
he wras pained to state that this news had been very ill received at
Paris, authenticated, as it had proved to be, by Marshal Prim, and
asked whether Prussia was a party to it. Upon which the Secretary of
State told him. that it was no affair concerning the Prussian Govern
ment, nor Prussia in a position of explaining negotiations which might
have been made by or were pending between the President of the
Spanish Cortes and Prince Leopold.

' ' On the same day the Charge D'Affairs of the North German Union
at Paris had an interview with the Duke of Grammont, relative to the
same subject, and in presence of Minister Olivier."

21

It becomes here necessary to throw into high relief the moral and
praiseworthy grounds and motives, upon which stands the executive
of the Spanish nation before the world, when, seeing the republic
as yet impossible, the consequence of a criminal neglect of free
schools, it conferred upon a Prussian Prince the alternative of the
honor to accept the government over the people, the so-called crown
of Spain, as the best known guarantee to the Spanish nation for the
time being of a peaceable future and probably great national advan
tages. Therefore the French Government, in preventing the con
summation of such a laudable design, by allowing political reasons
and arbitrary actions to sway and impede the most noble impulses of
civilization: those of an indirect and sympathetic co-operation with
other nations besides their own in anxious strides towards national
prosperity in general — laid bare a degree of officiousness and peevish
ness which will never stand the paltry excuse for self-preservation;
on the contrary, does demonstrate a fund of jealousy highly compli
mentary to Prussia, especially after the battle of Sadowa, and still
more so by the remembrance of the Prussian Government of not hav
ing remonstrated with France at the time when one of the French
Princes became the son-in-law of the King of Italy and brother-in-law
to the Queen of Portugal.

Fortunately for Europe, with its many warlike nations densely peo
pled and all votaries to past feudal glories of strife — civilization has
comparatively of late astoundingly advanced in appliances and devel
opments of arts and sciences for the purpose of destroying the oppor
tunity that war, with all its exploits of personal bravery in self-
defense, is affected to such an extent as to reduce that virtue, called
personal courage to a mere reliance upon skill and strategy to butcher
in bulk. The present war, of but seven months' duration, proves
that a climax in the art of killing has about been reached, and by it
the domineering powrer of France over Europe transferred to the
cool prowess, practiced scholarship, and compact strength of Ger
many. Peace thus shielded by Germany, is now sure to the warlike
millions of Europe. Germany will henceforth be to Europe what the
Atlantic is to America: the safeguard against aggression. As long as
monarchical surveillance shall be necessary among nations unfit to
govern themselves, Germany is the country which knows how to
guard peace from without and within. It will stand between and
pacify Great Britain and Eussia. Having taken the place of France
in the balance of power in Europe, it will for many reasons always
be listened to as a mediator. Therein successful, German}7 is synony
mous of peace — it is the guarantee for future peace to Europe. As
to any other cloud arising at any future time upon the political hori
zon of Europe, it will give but weather lightning!

22

Returning to the interview which the Charge d'Affaires of the North
German Union had with the Duke of Grammont relative to the Span
ish crown question, and in presence of Minister Ollivier, it is stated
that the French Minister of State was on that occasion likewise cha
grined at the general news. Public opinion, he averred, would pro
nounce against it; a transaction of so grave an importance having
been held so profoundly secret by both Spain and Prussia, and now
having been made public, it could not possibly be otherwise inferred
but that France had been intentionally slighted. The main point at
issue being indeed the most immaterial one, whether the Prussian
Government were at all initiated into the affair or not, considering
the magnitude of consequences as bound to issue from these pro
ceedings. Should, therefore, the event really take place, peace would
be seriously jeopardized. It therefore were highly advisable to
appeal to the wisdom of the King of Prussia to withhold his approval
of said combination, now that he wras aware that as a secret it could
serve no longer. The French Minister then considered it a happy
omen that, it so happened that, Baron Werther being about to set out
for Ems, could report to the king the irksome effect this affair had
made in Paris, at the same time enabling Baron Werther of telegraph
ing at an early convenience to the French Minister any important
decision arrived at in regard to and of a pacific nature to the subject.
Baron Werther left Paris on the fifth. On the day of the departure
of Count Benedetti — Mr. Cochery brought the Spanish question
before the legislative body, but already the day after, a space of time
far too brief for the reception of any return news from Eins, the
Duke of Grammont responded to the interpellation of Mr. Cochery.

The Duke's answer, of course, avowed the impossibility of knowing
particulars in regard to the matter, yet he declared that with due
regard for Spain as a friendly neighboring nation . and respect for her
sovereign right as to her conducting State affairs umnolestedly by any
other nation, he, notwithstanding, could not suffer a foreign power to
interfere by placing one of her princes upon the throne of Charles V.
The consequences would be not only detrimental to the interests of
France, but would disturb the balance of power in Europe. Upon
this statement having become public, it could not be expected of the
Charge d'Affaires of the North German Union, who intended to com
municate with the Duke, that he should transmit to him any dis
patches at all. Instead of which he informed the German Embassy at
Paris of it on the ninth, and exactly alike in substance to what the
Prussian Government had on the fourth rendered in extent of informa
tion to the French Charge d'Affaires at Berlin. It amounted to this,
that the Spanish throne question did not effect the political relations
between Spain and Germany, but concerned Spain alone, as far as

23

the nature of the candidature for her throne had made it needful for
the Government of that country to go outside and fill it there. Thus,
in reality, it was only nominally an international affair, but practically
of importance only to none but the candidate himself. It was further
stated that Marshal Prim had these negotiations privately undertaken
without participation by the Prussian Government, and had directly
conferred with Prince Leopold, the King of Prussia not having been
found willing, out of respect for the will of the Spanish nation, to
influence the acceptance of the offer by a German prince.

In the meantime the French Government ordered the representative
at Berlin, who happened to be on furlough at Wildbad, to repair to
Ems. On the ninth the King of Prussia received Count Benedetti,
although the circumstance of meeting at a watering place implied a
desire on the part of the venerable King of at least not having to be too
lengthily engaged in matters of State. The information which Count
Benedetti then and there transmitted to the King of Prussia agreed
with what the Duke of Graminoiit had communicated to Baron von
Werther upon the same subject, amounting in substance to an appeal
to the wisdom of the King not to sanction the acceptance of the Span
ish crown by Prince Leopold — a decision of such moment in the
opinion of the French Government that it would be enough for
Europe to thereby regain its quietude. Upon which the Count was
diametrically given to understand, that the disquietude existing in
Europe had not been created by Prussia, nor was the Prussian Gov
ernment to be blamed for it, but might at once be successfully traced
into the inaccessible altitude of the legislative body of France. The
troubles which the Spanish throne question had thus unnecessarily
brought about, sprung from there. The volume of criticisms which
had issued forth had, in its rapid course, submerged Europe, and
endangered the peace of the world by its torrent of tribulations and
anticipations of all sorts of hallucinations, and predictions of disas
trous consequences, His (the King's) position as head of the family
of Hohenzollern, was exclusively and naturally one of a domestic
character, admitting of no control over the sovereign will of any of
its members in regard to the actions of a prince. As to affairs of
State, those stood entirely unconnected with matters of personal
interest. Neither the Prince and the Prince's father had by him been
interfered with, nor the honor of the acceptance of the Crown of
Spain by Prince Leopold been made the basis for private speculation
on the part of the royal house of Prussia.

On the twelfth instant Prince Leopold declined the candidature.
The Prussian Government received the first tidings of this important
step from Paris. It so happened that Baron von Werther having left
Ems for Paris on the eleventh, and arriving the next day, was present

OF THB

"UNIVERSITY

Of «.. . __ ,oj\K

24

at an interview which the Spanish Ambassador there had with the
Duke of Grammont, upon which occasion the telegram had been pro
duced which Prince Leopold had sent, transmitting his decision
declining the honor. Upon another occasion, later in the day, the
Duke of Grammont remarked to Baron von Werther that, after all,
the refusal of Prince Leopold was but of accessory consequence, inas
much as France would anyhow not have permitted the Prince to ascend
the throne of Spain — at the same time laying great stress upon the
slight inventively conceived to have been received at the hands of the
King of Prussia, in having at all granted to the Prince the alternative
of the acceptance of so important an offer without first consulting
France in regard to it. However, the Duke appeared satisfied with
the King of Prussia's explanation of the affair, in a letter to Napoleon,
having said that in granting to Prince Leopold the alternative of the
acceptance of the Crown of Spain, he had not been of opinion that the
interests and dignity of France would thereby be necessarily affected.
Now that the Prince had declined of his own free will, he (the King
of Prussia) had, of course, acquiesced to the decision of the Prince.

The day following, at Ems, Count Benedetti, upon meeting the
King, requested a confirmation of the refusal as transmitted by the
Prince, and an assurance besides that, at no future time, an accept
ance of this candidature by a German prince should be sanctioned by
the King. From that day Count Benedetti had no more interviews
with the King of Prussia.

How the Government of France could seriously view the acceptance
of the Crown of Spain by a German prince as positively dangerous to
France, moreover profess it as an affront to the French nation,
is inconceivable, otherwise than as a pretext for finding an excuse to
declare war, and for no other earthly purpose than to dim the light
of a rising star. All these subtilties and evasions serve as an evidence
of the culpable weakness of monarchial governments, in which the
nation is debarred by law from energetically interfering and uttering
at the right moment its powerful voice of disapproval, and of insisting
upon a peaceable settlement through the instrumentality of law and
the aid of diplomacy.

In the United States of America, such a case as was presented to
the world in the shape of the preliminaries to this war, would be
everywhere ridiculed. May be that boast is quite natural — the whole
world could not invade America. The idea of succeeding in misling
a whole nation to shoulder arms within, so to say, a day or
twOj betrays an ignorance on the part of all of the knowledge of
common occurrences of the day, which stamps the daily press of
France — the tutor of the million — as most deplorably deficient. The
most plausible reason for a war against a large foe in Europe, when

25

by somebody advanced in Great Britain, is never listened to by the
nation until the Orkney Islands know as much about the legitimacy
of the impossibility to avoid it as the Prime Minister himself. But
England is in this respect altogether republican ; it differs but in
name ; her monarchs are but hereditary presidents, drawing heavy
salaries, though. — As it is undoubted that the King of Prussia was
unofficially made acquainted with the negotiations pending between
the Government of Spain and Prince Leopold ; it enjoined upon him
the condition of privacy when he heard of it. It being a foreign
secret, officially affecting neither Prussia nor the North German
Union, its non-publicity by the King to the German nation at large
was decided upon as wise and proper. At the same time the King of
Prussia found it equally correct in the Spanish Government that it
should pursue its deliberations in search of a suitable candidate for
the Spanish throne, without hesitancy and compunction as to where
it should be pleased so to do, and the more independently, as the poli
tical position of Spain towards France invited this step, and in con
sideration, likewise, of certain personal amenities existing between
Napoleon and the Southern branch of the House of Hohenzollern.
As to the interests a Napoleonic dynasty could profess to have in a
Spanish national question, it coDfined itself to a vigilant guard against
the dreaded spread of republicanism or the organization of an Orleans
dynasty in a neighboring country ; but to view a secret correspond
ence regarding the honor of the acceptance of the Spanish Crown by
a German prince in the light of an intended affront by Prussia to the
French nation, was, indeed, as significant of personal ambition as it
was venturesome. Indeed it was too obvious that such rigor covered
the existence of an ulterior design hostile to the German nation,
as being not merely unwarrantable but altogether foreign to the inci
dent. If otherwise, all the French Government had to do in order to
ward off the troublesome coincidence, was to have addressed the King
of Prussia in a familiarly handsome manner upon the subject, pending
a satisfactory settlement in a diplomatic way, instead of which the
Napoleonic Government unhesitatingly rented the peace of Europe,
by the Duke of Gammont, in the legislative body of Paris, violently
calling the nation to war. To declare it, and upon so frivolous a pre
text as that of humbling the German nation, was, therefore, extremely
impolitic and full of surmises, especially when dispassionately consid
ered that the science of destroying human lives by tens of thousands
has reached its culminating climax to perfection, in producing woe
and misery to an unanswerable extent, and must end in victory
of republicanism over all monarchial governments extant. A sensible
proceeding, if for no other purpose truly than of making peace inter-

nationally and lawfully respected and abided in hereafter, viewing it
as the first necessity of civilization.

In order to systematically arrange all the causes which have led to
this memorable war, it is now necessary to produce the note which
Senor Sagasta, Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, transmitted to the
various Spanish Ambassadors abroad, announcing the decision of the
Spanish Government to offer the crown of Spain to Prince Leopold.
It is worded as follows :

" Your Excellency have on previous occasions been made acquainted
" with the important explanations which were transmitted to the Cor-
" fcez on June the llth, by the President of the Cabinet. In confessing
" that the steps taken to find a suitable candidate for the throne of
" Spain had been unsuccessful, he announced that he had received
"full power to continue his search to the best of his ability. He
1 ' had at first received this authorization from the Provisional Govern-
"•ment, then from the Executive Committee, and at last from the Re
gency.

' c Fortified with such power, Marshal Prim recommenced his diffi-
" cult mission in a discreet and secret manner, anticipating success,
" and hoping to give satisfaction to the nation at large. I have now
" the gratification of communicating to you, by order of the Spanish
" Government, that at a Cabinet meeting held at La Granja, on the
" fourth, and presided over by the Regent, Prince Leopold of Hohen-
" zollern Sigmaringen has been chosen and accepted as candidate for
" the throne of Spain. Public opinion having pronounced in favor
" of this Prince, the Government of Spain is hopeful that its candi-
" date will be joyously heralded by a large majority in the Cortes as
" King of Spain. The Provisional Government which began in 1868
" shall then close.

" Yesterday, as soon as it was possible to break silence, as until now
" demanded by discretion, I telegraphed to you the decision arrived
" at by the Government, which should best meet the approval of the
" Cortes, strictly mindful of the general constitutional law of the land,
" as well as of the rules which appertain to the choice of kings. In
" requesting of you to announce this event to the Government to
" which you are accredited, I alluded to its real and political iin-
" portance and significancy as unconnected with international affairs,
" notwithstanding the great influence which it necessarily must exer-
" cise upon and disclose to the Spanish nation in future.

" The extraordinary situation of the nation, as created by the Sep-
" tember revolution, had been well maintained by the Provisional
' ' Government until the day when the Cortes decided upon monarchy.
" From that day, however, the Provisional Government became a
' ' danger, because the wishes of the Spanish people as containing

27

" their preference had not then been realized by facts. Should,
' ' therefore, the Government not find means and ways of realizing this
" idea, her enemies would speedily gain ground and harass it by
" unreasonable expectations of every sort. But these difficulties have
" been obviated, thanks to the efforts made by the majority of the
" people, and by the Government — a rare occurrence, indeed, in any
" civilized nation of having been able, under similarly trying circum-
" stances, to maintain peace over two years. At last public opinion
" at home and abroad loudly demanded a radical change.

' ' In the interior of Spain the desire to crown the work of the revo
lution became great, while in foreign countries, befriended with
" Spain, the same wishes were expressed. The world required a
" guarantee for a permanent peace, as your Excellency has had fre-
'* quent opportunities of ascertaining.

" This very success of which I have made mention affords the
" Spanish Government to-day an opportunity of communicating
" through your Excellency to the Government of * * *, and
" which gratifying news I doubt not will be cordially received. Both
" countries, indeed, reciprocate a feeling of sincere friendship, ani-
" mated by expectations and wishes for its permanent continuancy.
" The present Government of Spain has always exerted itself in its
" foreign relations to merit public opinion, and benefit the Spanish
" nation.

" Should Prince Leopold be chosen to ascend the throne of Spain,
" upon the vote of the Cortes, as alone invested by the people with
" sovereign power to decide upon a prince's choice, and declare him
" King, then shall he represent a constitution the most democratically
' ' liberal of any ever possessed of by us or by any other nation so and
" similarly governed. Although he is a foreigner, about to occupy
" the highest position in the gift of the nation, his Government will
4 ' have less difficulty in obeying public opinion than might be inferred
' ' from the strange fact of he being a foreigner. From the day he
" does ascend the throne of San Fernando he shall be considered a
" Spaniard, and in a truly Spanish mariner shall he continue to
" strengthen the great achievements of the September revolution.
" His energies shall be principally directed towards a complete regen-
" eracy of the nation in her internal organization in all national
" points of view, while externally he shall observe the strictest neu-
" trality in all international relationships, and shall thus be enabled
' ' to devote all his studious efforts to the advancement of the moral
' ' and material interests of the country, in order that through him the
(f object may be attained of making Spain prosper. In this sense it is
* ' justifiable that the Government of the Regent, free to direct its
" steps according to discretion, has acted in this matter upon its own

28

" responsibility, and addressed Prince Leopold directly, nor reflected
" an instant upon it being* honorable to avoid every influence from a
' ' foreign Cabinet. I beg leave to direct your Excellency's special
"attention to this point, as much depends upon it being reliably
' ' known that the Government of the Regent has acted upon its own discretion
" in furthering this plan, and so that it maybe thoroughly understood
" that 110 national interest abroad, far less a foreign interest, has actu-
" ated the Government in pursuance of these negotiations.

" Nothing but the desire to grant the wishes of the nation, and to
' ' fulfill the mission which the Regent arid the Cabinet Ministers had
"delineated, has prompted him to address a prince duly of age, and
" related to most of the reigning families in Europe, at the same time
" standing in no direct lineage of becoming the recipient of a special
" crown, therefore free to accept and to become the possessor of the
" one of Spain; a point of importance to the Spanish nation, that it
" might at all times feel secure against hostilities from foreign powers
" upon dyiiastical ground.

" Thus the candidature of the Prince of Hoheiizollern Sigmaringen
" interferes in no wise with the friendly relations which Spain enjoys
" reciprocatedly abroad, nor can and should affect the interests of
" other reigning families as dynastically allied. As your Excellency
' ' is now assured of the intentions which animated the Government to
" decide upon this candidature, which shall be duly laid before the
" Cortes for acceptance, your Excellency will be able to act in con
formity with the motives which have led to these intentions and
" ultimate actions whenever an opportunity should present itself of
" explaining this event at the court to which you are accredited. I
" hold myself before hand convinced that your Excellency will zeal-
" ously convey the exact meaning of the purposes in view which have
" instigated the actions of the Government of his Highness.

" Please read this dispatch to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and
' ' then hand him a written copy. May God preserve your Excellency
" many years.

(Signed) "PEAEEDES M. SAGASTA.

" MADRID, 7th July, 1870."

Upon this document now follows the answer which the Duke of
Grammorit gave, July 6th, in the legislative body at Paris, upon the
interpellation of Mr. Cochery :

The Duke replied that " Marshal Prim had offered the Crown of
" Spain to the Prince of Hoheiizollern, and that the Prince had
" accepted the same. The Spanish people, however, had not expressed
"themselves upon that point. The French Government was not
" acquainted with the respective negotiations, and he (the Duke)

29

" thought best of adjourning the discussion upon this topic as alto
gether deficient in particulars in order to correctly judge in the
' ' matter. The Government would continue its neutrality, but would
" not suffer a foreign power in placing one of her princes upon the
" throne of Spain, and thus trespass upon the honor and dignity of
" France. The French Government had confidence in the wisdom of
" the German, and the friendship of the Spanish people. Should it be
" disappointed, it would know its duty without delay and weakness."

This speech was much applauded by the majority in the House, and
commented upon, on the fifteenth of July, by Mr. Ollivier, viz. :

" The mode and manner in which you have received the explana-
" tions as rendered on the sixth of July, assures us positively that
" you sanction our policy, and that we could be sure of your assist-
ct ance in case of emergency. We, hereupon, entered into negotia-
" tions with foreign powers, inviting them as mediators for the purpose
" of convincing Prussia of the legitimacy of our complaints. We
"have not required anything from Spain; the sensitiveness of her
" people we had no desire to evoke. We have not negotiated with
" the Prince of Hohenzollern, because we considered that Prince
" under the tutillage of the King of Prussia. We have abstained
" from commingling complaints over other matters with this particu-
cc lar affair. The majority of foreign powers approve more or less of
" the justice of our complaint !

The Prime Minister of Prussia has responded that he ' ' knew nothing
" of this affair, nor would the Cabinet of Berlin become cognizant of
" it. We then addressed the King. The King avowing that he
" had authorized the Prince of Hohenzollern to use his own judgment
" in accepting the Crown of Spain, declared that he was not acquainted
' ' with the particulars of the negotiations as pending between the
" Prince of Hohenzollern and Spain, he having acted in this mat-
" ter as head of the family, and not as Sovereign. The King of
" Prussia, moreover, has mentioned that this affair had by him been
" turned over to Count Bismarck. We could not accept this answer
" as satisfactory; we could not admit such delicate distinctions be-
" tweeii ' head of a family' and 'head of a nation.' In the meantime
<c we received from the Spanish Ambassador the news of the refusal
" of the Prince of Hohenzollern. It came unexpectedly, and from a
" direction which we had not anticipated. This happened on the
"twelfth of July, while our correspondence was going on with
(l Prussia.

' ' We insisted that the King should second the refusal ; that he
" should pledge himself not to give his sanction of the acceptance of
" the Crown of Spain by a prince of Hohenzollern, should it at any
" future time be again offered. Our demand was in itself moderate,

30

" and couched in an equally decorous language. We then wrote to
" Benedetti he might reiterate that we kept nothing under disguise,
" nor were searching for pretexts. The King refusing to grant this
" demand, told Count Benedetti that in this matter he preferred
" keeping his own counsel, as well as 011 all similar occasions, as cir-
" cumstances might arise which demanded full liberty of thought and
" action on his part.

"Notwithstanding, and out of sheer love of peace, we did not
" break off negotiation. In proportion to our forbearance, was our
* ' surprise great, when we heard yesterday that the King had officially
' ' refused an audience of Benedetti which news had come over
" from the Prussian Government. At the same time, we received in-
" formation that the Prussian Ambassador, von Werther, had been
" recalled, and that Prussia was arming. Under such circumstances
"it would have been remiss, undignified, and forgetful of duty, on
" our part, not to have made preparation for war. We have pre-
" pared ourselves to accept the challenge, leaving everybody his due
" part to enact, and responsibility to answer for; we have since yester-
" day called in the reserves and taken measures for the protection
" of the interests, the security, and the honor of France."

The conduct of Count Benedetti is best seen from the lucid de
scription of the occurrence, and enables history to infer who really
was the aggrieved party.

Count Benedetti solicited on the 9th of July, in Ems, an audience
of the King of Prussia, which was immediately granted. During
this interview Count Benedetti demanded that the King should com
mand the Prince of Hohenzollern to withdraw his acceptance of the
Spanish crown. The King replied that as far as this affair had devel
oped itself, he having been applied to as head of the family, and not
as King, he had not commanded the Prince to accept the candidature
for the Spanish throne, nor could he now command the Prince to
withdraw from the same. On the llth following, Count Benedetti
requested and was granted, a second audience, during which, he
rather pressed compliance with his demands. The King replied that
the Prince being of age, knew himself what course to pursue without
his, the King's, interference. Besides, he knew not even the where
abouts of the Prince at present, as he had been known of late to travel
among the Alps.

On the 13th, on the Esplanade at Ems, the King handed Count
Benedetti an extra from the Cologne Gazette, just received, containing
a telegram from Sigmaringen, in which the Prince, upon his own free
will, refused acceptance of the Crown of Spain, and mentioned to the
Count, at the same time, that not even he himself had received a
communication on the subject from the Prince, although, of course,

31

due during the day. Count Benedetti hereupon replied that he had
known it already, the night previously, direct from Paris. The King
now thought the matter satisfactorily settled. To his astonishment,
Count Benedetti demanded of the King that he should distinctly de
clare himself unwilling, at any future time, to grant a similar permis
sion. This the King flatly refused, and remained firm, although
again and again importuned upon the same subject. Now Count
Benedetti requested a third audience. Upon being asked by an aid-
de-camp what he had of so much importance to communicate, he
answered that he wished to have the honor of conversing upon the
same topic as in the morning. The King refused the audience, send
ing him word that he had no other answer to give, and referred the
Count to the Government at Berlin for further views upon the sub
ject. Count Benedetti, wishing to leave Ems, expressed a desire to
pay a last visit to the King, which was granted, the King receiving
him at the railway station, before the train started for Coblenz.

From this minute description of the manner of Count Benedetti, in
this affair, it might be inferred that he acted under instructions from the
French Government, disguising two set purposes: the one, to either
compromise the King in the eyes of all Germany and Europe, should
he have acceded to their demands ; or, the other, the more likely,
upon refusal of their compromising demands, incense the King of
Prussia to such a degree that the French Government might therefrom
weave the textile fabric of a casus belli.

That there was a way of guarding dignity and right, and maintain
both without having resort to war, appears to have been of unfath
omable depth in the minds of French statesmen, or maybe, that they
considered such a possibility too unreal. Compared with them, how
different the noble and dignified bearing of King William in this
matter; that military, so amiable as a gentleman, not merely baffled
the vileness of the snare laid for him to entrap himself in, but made
it serve him in convincing the entire German nation that the intent of
the insult received, was not for himself, but for the German Union.
When it became known how he had resented that imputation, then
the whole nation applauded him, and threw back with terrible vigor
the attempt at disturbing the peace of Europe upon frivolous pretexts.
From the manner in which the Duke of Grammont had answered the
interpellation of Mr. Cochery, and Count Benedetti conducted his mis
sion, there could be no further doubt as to their intention of forcing
a war. The peevish manner in which the Duke of Grammont had
received the news of the refusal of the Prince of Hohenzollern, cor
roborated it to a certainty. Another proof may be found in the fol
lowing expose of Monsieur Ollivier :

The Duke of Grammont having declared in a conversation he had

32

with Lord Lyons, the English Ambassador at Paris, that the refusal
of the Prince Hohenzollern would smooth matters entirely in regard
to the Spanish question — the London Cabinet at once endeavored to
bring about a verity of the settlement. When subsequently the de
sired non-acceptance had been obtained, instead of expressing him
self satisfied, he declared to the English Embassador that it was very
perplexing. On the one side public opinion was so aghast that he
doubted very much that the Government could maintain itself beyond
the morrow, if he should say the affair was satisfactorily settled,
unless more satisfaction could be obtained from Prussia and produced.
The very refusal of the Prince should here have ended the origin of
the dispute, and settled the affair de facto; instead of which, the pro
gramme of war was completely rehearsed by France.

As to Spain, it could no longer be drawn into the quarrel should it
come to war, as France and Prussia now only were concerned. The
English Ambassador remonstrating with the Duke, the latter evasively
said, that everything depended now upon the conclusion to be arrived
at to-morrow, the 13th of July, at a Cabinet meeting, presided over
by the Emperor, and which decision would at once be handed over to
the Legislative body, and he be unable to communicate to him. It
appears, however, that in the sitting referred to, no resolutions were
arrived at, for the Duke of Grammont had to announce to the Legis
lative body: " that the negotiations which we continue with Prussia,
" and which at no time embraced another point, have not, as yet,
''been concluded."

To the Ambassador of the North German Union, Baron von
"Werther, the Duke of Grammont unburdened himself, on the 12th of
July, without restraint. The refusal of the Prince of Hohenzollern
he considered, as before stated, of very little importance, inasmuch
as the French Government would have anyhow prevented his ascen
sion to the throne of Spain; it was the secret manner in which it had
been done, which had vexed him, and he feared would create an ill
feeling between the two nations. Moreover, he actually demanded
a letter from the King apologizing to the Emperor; proposed contents;
in short, became so ludicrous, and at the same time autocratic, as to
make one think that he had suddenly transplanted himself into the
days of Louis XI Y. The expose of Minister Ollivier on the 15th of
July, the day on which the French declared war against Germany,
was no less peremptory. Introducing the subject, he said: "We
" have not required anything of Spain, nor are willing to touch the sen-
cc sibilities of the Spanish nation. Then in regard to the permission
" given by King William to the Prince to use his own judgment in ac-
" cepting the crown, and to the demand made by France to withdraw
"that permission, he said: " We could not receive the answer as

33

' ' satisfactory, it being too subtle a distinction for us to acquiesce
"to father of the family and father of the nation," which plainly
proves, inasmuch as the distinction between one and the other is not at
all subtle, or could not be readily acquiesced to, that Napoleon
wanted war at all hazards.

Throwing all the blame for the war upon Prussia, because the King
had not received Benedetti, that "the Prussian Ambassador had been
"recalled, and Prussia was arming," Ollivier wound up by saying:
" We are prepared to accept the war wrhich is offered to us." Upon
which the Germans answered, the French as did the Romans the Car-
thagenians : " You will have war — well, war you shall have !"

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PART THE SECOND.

NAPOLEON'S C A L C U L A T i O N 8,

AND THE

OIF

When Napoleon had decided upon war against Prussia and its
probable allies, four years had elapsed during which time he had
prepared for it. He had minutely weighed his resources and those
of his antagonists, considered and reconsidered the alliances which
might possibly be his ; in short, thought of having omitted nothing
which might debar him of success.

In the first instance he counted upon the enthusiastic and excitable
nature of the French people. He thought the very chance offered to
regain the so-called ' f natural " boundary of France should add new
glory and new honors to the "great nation" of Europe, wipe out
the blots of Leipzig, Waterloo and Sadowa, and secure still more last
ingly the ambition of France to be the guardian of Europe; all these
points he thought would silence the various factions in the country,
inimical to, and endangering his dynasty, and would bring back to
him the army in admiration and devotion, without which, he well
knew he could not guard his throne against the republicans.

In this he was mistaken. The France of 1870 was not the France
in the sense of the first Napoleonic empire, the less so as he had not
the power the first Napoleon wielded, which, however, was necessary
to convince all parties of the intelligence of his grand idea, and of
the justice of the cause, for which the war should be fought and lives
and property risked and staked. Instead of which, factions in
creased, stormy debates in the Legislative body became frequent, the
demand arose for him to abdicate, without desire, "in favor of his
son," as the latter was not even mentioned. Of course this demand
originated with the Republicans, but the Orleaiiists were equally de
monstrative, although silent upon their aim. This in their stead did
the Empress Eugenie, who openly said that Napoleon's fall would in
stall the Orleans. From the ranks of the army it was occasionally

35

predicted that even the outbreak of war would not better Napoleon's
position. A French officer, later in captivity, said to a German:
" Oh, you and your army know well what you fight for; you go to
"war to carry out a fixed idea; but we fight to gratify the whims and
" caprices of two ladies. He meant the Empress Eugenie and the
" Ex-Queen Isabella of Spain."

The second consideration of Napoleon comprised the dissensions
which jealousy created among the many German sovereigns and vari
ous political factions. He had assiduously exerted himself to find
out the exact truth in regard to it, which has become well known
through the French Embassy at Stuttgart in Wurtemberg, which
propounded 41 questions on the subject, as follows, which proves
his Napoleonic designs:

1. How were the parties situated in Wurtemberg previously to the
war of 1866 ?

2. What changes have the events of 1866 produced in these parties.

3. How strong is the Democratic party; how strong the Catholic;
how strong the Prussian or Union; how strong the Anti-Prussian or
Conservative party ?

4. Which is their modus operandi of gaining strength ? Who are
the leaders among these parties, who are the most influential persons ?
What newspapers have they got ?

5. Which party has gained the most popularity and has the best
auspices for future success ?

6. What are the views of the various classes of society?

7. Is the dynasty popular ? Has it a party of its own? Would
these risk everything to defend it ?

8 Are there any political events of note which have transpired
since 1866 ?

9. What are their principle laws, duly passed by both Houses ?

10. How do the parties in the first House confront each other since
the war ? How in the second House ?

11. What effect has the new army organization had upon the peo
ple ? What the duty 011 tobacco ? on salt ? and what views in regard
to the loan ?

12. How do the people like the new law of election ? and how do
they regard universal suffrage ?

13. What will be the effect of it in future ?

14. What is the opinion of the people in regard to the organization
of the army ? and in how far has it been successful ?

15. What is the situation of Wurternberg in point of advance in
industry and commerce ?

16. What effect have the late events had upon commerce and
industry ?

36

17 . Has general prosperity increased ?

18. What is the amount of the annual value of their exports at
present ? and of their imports ?

19. What effect have the events of 1866 had 011 'Change ?

20. The most important event of the last two years is the tariff dis
cussion. What do the people think and say of it ? Do they predict
for it a future ?

21. What is the cause of the defeat of the Prussian party during
the tariff elections ?

22. Why did they not succeed in a Southern German Union ?

23. What creates the jealousy among the Southern German States ?
(divise ?)

24. Are the material interests of the South such as to be hazarded
by a formation of a Southern Union ?

25. Are the general interests of the South identically those of the
North ? Can these at all be separated? What are these interests ?

26. Are there not affiliations of reciprocated interests between South
Germany and Austria.

27. Could it not be made at all possible to create a vast commerce
between the East and the West : between South Germany and the
countries bordering on the Adriatic ?

28. What is the Prussian policy in regard to the Southern German
States ?

29. Has it abandoned the idea of the Union of Germany ?

30. Why does Austria not try to regain its influence in South
Germany ?

31. What policy does the present Government in Wurtemberg pur
sue ? What is its position towards the other parties ? Towards Prus
sia ? towards Austria ?

32. Does it regret the alliance, offensive and defensive, with Prussia ?

33. In case of war would Wurtemberg be an ally of Prussia?

34. In case of war with Prussia would France find allies in the
South of Germany ?

35. Is the devotion of the Wurtemberg army great?

36. Why does the Wurtemberg Government persist in prussianiz-
ing (prussianiser) her army still more ?

37. Does the Government seek entrance into the North German
Union ?

38. What are the political views and general tendencies of the
principle members of the Cabinet ?

39. What political influence does Queen Olga enjoy ?

40. Does Eussia befriend and assist Wurtemberg ?

41. As matters now stand, can this state of affairs last? Does it
lead to some non-chimerical predictions in future ?

37

Upon these forty-one and other similar queries,, the respective
French charge d'affaires, must have answered, more or less, suitable
to the plans of the Parisian Cabinet. With how great a certainty the
French Government counted upon the alliance of the South German
States with France, in case of war with Prussia, and upon what mo
tives it thought the various South German Governments would be
thereto prompted, may be partially seen from the ebullition of temper
which Count Moosburg, French charge d'affaires atCarlsruhe, Baden,
gave vent to, in a fit of diplomatic indiscretion, when, hearing of a decla-
atioii of war by Bavaria to France, he finally ejaculated : "I
" cannot understand it :— The Emperor Napoleon meant it well with
" the King of Bavaria, and intended to assist him in enlarging the
" boundaries of his Kingdom." This episode shows, more than any
thing, the want of penetration on the part of the French agents in
correctly fathoming public opinion, and the advanc.ed and enlightened
patriotism of Germany, as it had of late matured: mainly owing to
free and good public schools, and the influence everywhere in Europe,
and especially in Germany, from the United States of America, as
the model of nations, in which, above all other proofs of civilization,
the National Union is sacredly revered and defended by the people as
an imperishable bulwark of solid and invulnerable strength.

Entirely owing to incorrect views upon progress in Germany, the
French Cabinet was lulled into the belief that the same animosity ex
isted among the German Princes, which facilitated the military achiev-
ments of the First Napoleon there, and, consequently now would those
of Napoleon III. The Parisians, far too exclusive citizens, seldom
going outside of beautiful France, nor the reminiscences of her past
glory, thought little of Germany from 1813 up to 1848; somewhat
more since 1864 and 1866, until now, when enlightenment upon the
general progress of the world forces itself upon them in rather an ec-
latant manner. Another misguidance was, that the French Govern
ment thought the newly acquired provinces of Prussia maintained still
a traditionally barbarous idolatry of discontent and envy among
themselves. The belief originated from Hietzixig, where it was taken
for granted that the Haimoverians, the Nassau people, the Hessians,
the people of Schleswig-Holsteiii, and the citizens of Fraiikfort-on-
the-Main would hail with delight the victorious French armies, and
would be found anxious to free themselves from the nick-named
" Prussian Yoke." This additionally tended to encourage the
French Government in expecting success without adequate efforts; in
short, to see the days of the first Empire repeated, culminating in the
dictating of peace at and from Konigsberg, and similar hallucinations.
Then again, Napoleon III relied upon Denmark and Austria as his
allies the moment war should be declared. He considered both as

38

naturally allied to his cause, as they were hereditary enemies of Prus
sia, falling short, however, in his reckoning by not reflecting upon
the situation in which both Denmark and Austria were placed. He
anticipated some diversion on their part, advantageous to French
arms, but never anticipated the}7 would not fight. Denmark, he
thought, might have ventured it b}^ risking the fortunes of war,
although, alone, it was too weak, and the aid which France could so
give, confined to naval attacks only. Neither had Sweden an interest
in so doing; by becoming an ally of Denmark in a war with Prussia
setting aside the probability that in rotation Russia would have
attacked Sweden.

Both Sweden, as well as Denmark, were therefore forced to remain
neutral, unless the latter had been indiscreet enough in taking a
course by which it would have risked its very existence.

Of Austria it was supposed an alliance with France might be ex
pected; but the internal condition of that country, at that time, kept
a strain upon its ability to do so. Besides the Austrian German pro
vinces always stand by Germany. As to Hungary, it did not even
listen to an alliance, as Russia might have found a pretext for uncere
moniously absorbing Galicia. Nor had Austria recovered from the
shock of 1866 ; her army was not prepared to front an antagonist,
well armed and but lately victorious ; her treasury was likewise not
sufficiently encouraging to undertake a war against Prussia ; and as
to internal dissensions respecting her crown lands, those were con
stant arid alarming : in fact have gained an importance that the pros
perity of Austria is, through them, seriously retarded, and its free
dom of action paralized.

From these remarks it may be seen that Louis Napoleon was disap
pointed as to those aforesaid alliances. No less was he in error in
regard to the two great powers of Europe — Great Britain and Rus
sia. England, he thought, might become his ally on account of
Hanover ; yet it was not so : England does riot go to war frivolously
with civilized nations. And as to Russia, the Emperor of all the
Russias answered the French Einbassador, upon being asked permis
sion to transmit the Czar's well wishes for the French arms, " My
wishes for France go by way of Germany." As to Italy, it remained
neutral because the people were found unanimously in favor of Ger
many, while the Government was in favor of France, a very danger
ous devise, indeed, to be abruptly disrespected. Even Turkey
remained neutral.

Great Britain and Russia, the two leading European powers, be
sides a united Germany and France, were found disinclined to declare
themselves enemies of Germany.

39

Great Britain in thus regretting the still existing yet tiresome alli
ance with France, which had led to the treaty of Paris of the thirtieth
of March, 1856 — nothing shorter than an epitaph upon the graves of
the Scottish Greys at Balaklawa, and others then and there uselessly
slain — truly the bitter cup of a political blunder of not having allied
herself at the time with modest but substantial Prussia, kindred to her
in race and religion, instead of heterogenious, vain-glorious France,
unnatural to her feelings and traditions — the sure precursor of the
natural consequence of such a mistake as "the thirteenth of March,
1871," plainly denominated the " Pontus boundary question ratified."
By whom? Russia and Turkey, and Germany, France, Austria, and
Italy. And where ? In London ! as it should have been done already,
in 1855, peaceably, instead of upon the Malakoff.

This great power remained passive during this terrible war of 1870.
She had no further desire to uphold a dynasty which she once was
most vigorously active in destroying, and regarded as forever banished
far into the broad bosom of the Atlantic, until suddenly and com
pletely beguiled by Gallia. England's Pitt, Fox, Canning, or the
later Palmerston, unfortunately no more, proud Albion was weak,
and yielded to the syren. But the English nation soon rued its
unheard of sentimentality when it saw arise, right opposite Ports
mouth, another's — a friend's — formidable Cherbourg, from which Na
poleon intended, after the programme of having conquered Germany,
to invade England. So she thought correctly — better late than
never — and stood aloof. Moreover, the shadow of old Blucher, and
others of Waterloo and Blenheim memory, during the period of this
war, having suddenly reappeared at Sadowa in the person of the
greatest strategist of this century, named " General Moltke," and
better informed by her own child than France was through Colonel
StofFel, of the true and solid growth and strength of Germany in
enlightenment and moral courage, she felt the proper sympathy for
Germany, thought of sweet home of old England, was wise and
remained there, quietly watching her daughter and a little foster
ling across the Channel, to Osteiid. In spite of Earl Graiiville's igno
ble remark, on the nineteenth of July, that the French would visit
Berlin in three weeks, the once staunch allies of Prussia at Waterloo,
the British nation, repudiated the idea, and respectfully begged leave
to be excused from believing any such or similar nonsense. The
British know why Prussia has to be a military nation — why its stern
discipline. The interpellation of D'Israeli's premising a secret under
standing between Russia and Prussia, as having existed anterior to the
war, was decidedly spiritualistic, and too infidel altogether, for a saga
cious and powerful nation like the English to be intimidated by.
Besides, Great Britain had internally changed very much, indeed,

40

since her unnatural alliance with France, which has served Napoleon
in his phantastic designs at the expense of British lives in the Crimean
war, and England nothing whatever, because, neither Suez nor even
Constantinople are the keys to India, but Aden and Massowah only,
which it is not likely that all Europe will touch. As to entering
India via Persia, although feasible at various points, Persia first would
have to be conquered by Russia — too remote a day to now expect its
consummation — setting aside the ease with which Great Britain could
at all times land her armies on Persian soil via Herat in the North, as
well as via the Straits of Ormus in the South.

Routes like the Paropomisan Mountains, leading into the extreme
north of Afghanistan, through interminable deserts first, ere these are
reached on such an Hannibal adventure, are too impracticable to be
even thought of without railroads of infinite extent traversing the
dreary steppes of independent Turkey, and innumerable steamships
to be built on the Volga, and crossing the Caspian Sea towards the
South, before even the inhospitable mountains itselves shall come in
sight of by the Russians.

The powerful influence of England in Europe, as formerly wielded
by an ambitious aristocracy, requiring heavy sacrifices, but somewhat
recompensing the nation with their successes, is felt no longer. The
first Parliamentary reform bill forced the aristocracy to a division of
power with the gentry, upon which ensued the second Parliamentary
reform bill, which even now is but a few years old, and suits the people
so well, that, should Gladstone's bill pass concerning secret elections,
and waving of costs at elections, there can be no farther doubt of the
national party coming into pov\ er. With such a change it is no won
der that her international policy is materially altered, general interests
of humanity predominating with Manchester men, eschewing traditional
military glory. Instead of war — diplomacy, free schools, versus gen
eral uncharitableness. None of the people censured the parties who
sold arms and ammunition to the French, although it increased the
misery and prolonged the agony of the inglorious ally of the Govern
ment, but solvent customers withal. Wise people all over the world
are in the habit of making a little something by the folly of others ;
in fact, are necessitated in the very face of civilization to counteract
a stagnated commerce and the robbing of a virtuous peace by accel
erating the end of war. It is one way, a new and very radical one, this
methodical killing by the ten thousand, which is bound to put a
stop to quarreling, outrooting wars altogether. It will serve as a pre
ventive, horrid as it is, until the blessed school book shall have
enlightened the million to feel its abhorrence, and so keenly as to
shun it as a barbarous way of settling difficulties, having made man to
man sufferable in daily social intercourse, amiable and law-abiding,

41

In the hands of Germany, at least, the weapon of war is safe. A
hard task, though, to keep peace among two hundred and eighty mill
ions upon so small a ground as Europe, unless assisted in by the
working people, who form the millions and are the soldiers to be
killed, that they connect to denounce every war except leading to
republican independence.

Upon the pages of history the Anglo-French alliance is but a waste
of sixteen years ; to Great Britain, however, an everlasting lesson that
the power of civilization is vested in the Germanic race mainly, to which
she and her colonies America, and Germany belong. Their triumvirate
directs the intellectual and physical world, shields Christianity against
barbarism, worships God from the innermost soul, and gives readiest
access of free schools to the poorest of the poor, encircling and com
prising all.

Like the American Union succeeded in quieting the Rebellion, even
the French Republic has since execrated hers, so has Germany at
last succeeded in baffling the equivocal designs of past monarchical
France in regard to Southern Germany, and neither Great Britain nor
Russia shall ever regret their neutrality, which enabled the Southern
German States to appreciate Prussia, and her disinterested national
policy.

As to Russia, the immediate and formidable neighbor of Germany,
it was natural that Prussia should have been anxious to secure her
neutrality by expressing a willingness to assist in pushing aside the
Pontus treaty, so humiliating to not only the Czar, but the entire Rus
sian nation. But of a further understanding than this, between the
two nations' history has no clue. Russia's policy in regard to Ger
many has been quite logical. Her boundaries 011 the Baltic are not
sufficiently wide, although she succeeded during the last century in
conquering from Sweden several provinces, which annihilated the
supremacy of the Swedes upon the Baltic; yet she was not sure
of Germany uniting with Denmark for the purpose of blockading
the Baltic so as to hinder her free egress. As long as Germany was
disunited, it of course was impossible; the several single German
States, even when united with Denmark, would not have been able to
cope with Russia. On the other side, Denmark could not possibly
have pursued an anti-Russian policy and united with one or the other
of the German States as long as in possession of Schleswig and Hoi-
stein, which necessitated her intention to embrace an anti-German
policy, in which she relied upon Russia to assist her in securing pos
session.

Russia, like France, uncharitably trusting in the disunion of Ger
many, thought Schleswig andHolstein, an integral part of Denmark,
the German provinces of Russia, Russian; Hanover, English ; The

42

Dutch, a distinct nation, Holland; the Flemish people, Belgium; and
Alsace and Lorraine, French; 14 millions Germans of the Austrian
empire of 34 millions population, Austrian — leaving out Switzerland,
which stands aloof — a republic. But Russia, when recovered from
the shock of 1812-15, had been perfectly absorbed until 1856 by the
attention she had to bestow upon the consequence of the war of lib
erty of the Greeks, and felt herself too weak to declare war against the
German Union without an ally, with the problematical issue in view
of becoming mistress of the Baltic. Therefore she abided by the
dictation of the Congress at Vienna, which enabled her to serve as
umbrage to both Prussia and Austria. The war of 1863-64 against
Denmark by both Prussia and Austria, threw Russia, in common
with France, off the track. No nation comprehended the policy of
Prussia endeavoring to accomplish the German Union without Aus
tria. In the Austrian-Prussian war she hoped France would join
Austria, so that Russia joining Prussia, might after the war, together
with France, as being equally anxious to prevent the consummation of
the German Union, frame conditions detrimental to the cause of Ger
many. But France was engaged with Italy, and absorbed in the
reorganization of her own army, so that Russia was obliged, together
with all other nations, to observe the issue of the war without solic
ited interference. The interests of both nations, Russia and France,
collide the least of any in Europe. The war in the Crimea changed
somewhat this enteinte. Russia's war, in Palestine, with France,
assumed dimensions which did not suit France. Although careless as
to Russia's progress in Turkey, if satisfactorily recompensed, after
peace was declared at Paris-France was prevented by Great Britain,
the avowed antagonist of Russia, to ally herself more closely with
Russia. The, battle of Sadowa, alarming both Russia and France,
these nations tried hard to seduce the Southern German States to
infidelity and unfaithfulness towards the Fatherland of the Germans, and
to strengthen Austria in her ancient German policy. Suddenly France
declared war in 1870 against Prussia. Impatient, and not properly
prepared, though sufficiently informed by Colonel Stoffel of the mili
tary strength of the North German Union, it became evident that the
rash act itself emanated from Paris alone. The dynasty of Napoleon
waning, the nation nevertheless became clamorous for outside trans
actions. How Napoleon and the French nation were both doomed to
disappointment, history has shown. Russia not prepared and in
want of all communicative aid, remained neutral; an alliance with
France was by no means sure to lead to victory over Germany, so
that she should become sole mistress of the Baltic and gain France
over to her plans in the southeast " of Europe. As one of the great
powers of Europe, Russia, like Great Britain, was fully aware that

43

the victor in a German-French war would change the balance of
power in Europe. Yet, in a European war at large, her interests
seriously collided with those of Great Britain, and knowing that Ger
many was anxious to fight it out alone with France, while France
tried hard to give the war the dimensions of a European one, she,
like Great Britain, remained neutral at the risk which she could not
obviate, of losing some of her political prestige among the nations
of the world.

The fact of the neutrality of Russia, as well as that of all other
large nations, explains the sympathy for Germany all over the world.
Victor over France without any aid whatsoever, it blots out the pages
of the history of the First Napoleon, which the French themselves
have thrown into eternal oblivion by the destruction of the Arc of
Triumph, demonstrating thereby that France has sworn fidelity to the
Republic, and by that simple act elevated herself to a higher stand
ard of civilization than any other nation in Europe, with the exception
of Switzerland, has as yet de facto reached and enjoyed.

The neutrality of Austria, since the battles of Sadowa and Konigs-
gratz was added to the neutrality of Russia : The one of Italy by the
desire for Union, and universal education, by means of free schools
throughout all other Catholic countries, upon the American and Prus
sian plan. As in nations, so in individuals throughout the world: the
intelligent and well informed have sided with Germany, to the credit
of civilization and their own honorable impartiality; and be it well
understood, that not only the various Governments, but the great
million were imbued with the necessity of Germany superseding the
power of France so as to hereafter afford peace as the principal
condiment of civilization, for the purpose of paving the way to Eu
ropean Republicanism. No better proof is more convincing or can
be more gratifying than that the vast millions of Germany at least
possessed this understanding of their real interest in this war as well
as knew of the more cosmopolitan advantages which would accrue
to them from victory, than was demonstrated by the mechanics and
working classes of Gratz, Austria. At a time much later in the his
tory of the war, when victories had been obtained (thanks to the love
of right and justice of the Germans) their courage and enlighten
ment in mastering beforehand their own ancient and now forgotten
feuds and passions — those Austrian mechanics issued a manifest to
United Germany which augurs extremely well for the peaceful future
of their common fatherland. A nation composed of such bone and
sinew may now already vie with America, for there is no longer any
chance for either extreme : rebellion or despotism, dismember
ment or treachery. They said, " In consideration that it has become
" apparent that the developments of liberty and the rights of nations

44

" can be secured only through a permanent European peace, of
' ' which a powerful and invincible Germany is the guarantee now and
<e forever, and in consideration that the French nation has availed
" itself of its former supremacy of power, to enfeeble all other nations,
" blaspheming liberty while the Germans have totally excelled them
" by cosmopolitan views of life, and the exercise of justice in political
" matters,

" Be it Resolved, by the German Republican (democratischer Club*)
" that the welfare of mankind, the developement and security of lib-
" erty, require that Germany brings the present war then only to a

*The democracy of Europe comprises the republican element there, after the
American definition of radicalism in party sentiment here, but, in monarchies
abroad, is, of course, not lawfully enacted, therefore, without revolution, remains
secret and ineffective in public.

The confusion of these names, Democracy and Republicanism, does great harm
in America, where the brave immigrant landing upon our blessed shores is beguiled
by the name only of voting, in due time of citizenship, the democratic ticket, not
knowing that ticket is legitimately subdivided, and does not alone and exclusively
embody the principles of American or lawful republicanism, nor that freedom neces
sarily signifies an unanimous sentiment in regard to the manner and means by which
liberty in a free country reaches, is enacted and enjoyed of by everybody. Not
being aware of either that there should bo a republican party necessary besides a
democratic one, for the better working of the machinery of government, he, upon
hearing of it, often remains prejudiced, through the force of habit, against the repub
lican party, imagining that, after all, the latter may signify a tendency, like in bon-
daged Europe, towards lawlessness and rebellion.

That both the democratic party as well as the republican, with their many minor
subdivisions, more or less radical, constitute harmonious and integral parts of the
sworn and legitimate Republic of the United States of America at large, versus and
in eternal distinction and defense of, against monarchism and blood aristocracy of
the world, synonymous, the latter with hereditary and concrete imposition upon jus
tice, through criminal neglect of duty to alike educate the people ; as well as through
the upholding of exclusive privileges of man to the palpable detriment of the rights
of fellow-men, from a religious and charitably humane and equitable point of view,
he, the emigrant, does not at once entirely comprehend, nor that democracy differs
from republicanism in minute form and various axioms of conservatism.

Inexperienced why it is absolutely necessary that both parties should here exist,
in order to separately, at the polls, yet conjointly in force, fully draw out the
strength of the mind and will of a free and independent citizen and voter, who con
stitutes the American nation at large, it may be useful to foreigners to here state
that thereby the Government is effectually prevented from at any time relapsing
into a barbarous incongruity and European idolatry, insidiously undermining the
strength of justice and of right, so put in imperishable republican form, and now
nearly centennially ancient.

Inasmuch as truth is in itself imperishable as characterizing the inimitable works
of Creation, in our species is founded in and is perpetuated by a well-drawn-out
and hourly more cultivated reason, so is mankind redeemable to republicanism
through civilization, in no matter how many ages to come. The principle is the only
correct one because it is the principle of Life — heavenly ordained, blissful, and
eternal.

45

" close, concludes peace then only when by it the unrepublican war-
" like power of France is forever broken, as of no use whatever to
" civilization. Germany receives back Alsace and Lorraine, and a
11 state of affairs is created which shall entrust Germany alone with
" the leadership over the great family of European nations, and the
" guardianship over European civilization."

As the aforesaid are the sentiments of laboring men in German Aus
tria, sentiments thoroughly honest, it becomes a matter of cer
tainty that fourteen millions Germans shall ere long be added to the
great collective Union of Germany, nor would it be just and equita
ble not to recover the German Russians and old Germanic Holland,
which Germany reveres of old, and which is essentially necessary to
a united race and fatherland. If the King of Prussia can lay down
his crown upon the German fatherland, the King of Holland can,
and others, as the Kings of Bavaria, of Saxony, of Hanover and of
Wurtemberg have done. In regard to England, the greater the
power of Germany the greater the friendship of Great Britain, as iden
tical with progress, and her best security for India in future ; besides
Queen Victoria's daughter will be Impress of Germany as long as
Emperors are at all necessary for guiding an enlightened nation, which
is rapidly advancing in fitness to guide and govern itself. France —
a republic, England is no longer forced to add her strength to the
maintenance of peace in Europe. She is now ready to follow Amer
ica in the enjoyment of the colossal material advantages accruing
to her vast domain all over the world from the blessings of perma
nent peace. Europe begins fully to comprehend the principle of the
republican form of government, as exemplified in the United States
of America, a cosmopolitan nation, where peace is lawfully abided
in under all international circumstances occurring; although, with two
hundred and eighty millions Europeans, instead of forty millions in
the United States, and numerous war-like aggressive neighboring
nations to contend with, and at a few day's notice, instead of none at
all, and isolated withal, it may yet take ages in Europe to achieve
what the United States have already enjoyed with perfect impunity
nearly a century. And as to Europe so soon disarming previously to
a far more universal state of enlightenment in the million, than exists
after all this day, such a blessing to the people's prosperity can unfor
tunately, as yet, but be implored.

The most annoying of all circumstances to Napoleon, had been that
he was necessitated to withdraw his troops from Rome, because in a
war with Germany he could not spare their number.

By this step he offended the priests, without whom, he could not
do much, and whom he expected should at this particularly critical
moment be his most valuable allies.

46

When these reflections are recapitulated, none of which arguing suc
cess, and Napoleon is, nevertheless, known to have declared war, it
becomes evident that he relied, for reasons of his own whether or not,
upon victory, and that he fancied the French army superior to the
Prussian in the same proportion as the Prussian army had proven
itself superior to the Austrian. Again, it is owing to his incompetent
military agents in Germany, who have thus served him scandalously.
Colonel Stoffel explained to him from Berlin, that the Prussian inno
vations upon military organizations were disadvantageous, therefore
advantageous to France. Thus, Napoleon anticipated the whole war
to become a delightful military promenade to Berlin and beyond,
halting at Konigsberg, where peace would be declared. Connected
with these illusions rose the hope that, after the first victory should
have been obtained the South German States would desert Prussia,
the newly annexed provinces of Prussia would rebel and revolt, and
Denmark and Austria, encouraged by the success of the French arms,
appear on the scene of action as aiding participants.

Buoying himself up with this hope, Napoleon now framed his
famous declaration of war to Prussia, which arrived in Berlin on the
19th of July, and reads as follows:

" The undersigned Charge d' Affaires of France, in execution of the
' ' command received from his Government, has the honor of cominu-
" nicating to His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs of His
" Majesty, the King of Prussia, that the Government of His Majesty,
" the Emperor of the French, in viewing the plan of placing a
" Prussian Prince upon the throne of Spain as hazardous to the ter-
" ritorial security of France, has been necessitated to demand of His
" Majesty, the King of Prussia, the assurance that such a combination
" should not be realized with his consent. As His Majesty, the King
" of Prussia has refused to extend this assurance, and moreover, has
" given the Charged' Affaires of His Majesty, the Emperor of the French,
" to understand that, he would act in this case, as well as in any
" other similar emergency, according to circumstances possibly arising
" and influencing his decision, the Imperial Government of France
' ' cannot but suspect from the declaration of the King of Prussia that it
" covers a design hostile to France as well as jeopardizing the balance
" of power in Europe. The aforesaid declaration has even been
"aggravated by the announcement to the various Cabinets of the
' ' refusal to receive the Charge d' Affaires of the Emperor and to
" further animadvert upon the question.

" In consequence of which, the French Government considers it a
" duty, broaching no delay in its execution of defending its honor
" and of guarding its injured interests, and is determined for this
' ' purpose to avail itself of all strenuous measures demanded by the

47

"situation. It therefore declares itself from this day at war with
" Prussia.

" The undersigned has the honor of assuring His Excellency of
" his highest esteem and regard."

(Signed) LE SOURD.

BERLIN, July 19, 1870.

Before commenting upon the declaration of war and the conse
quence arising therefrom, it becomes necessary to refer to that episode
when first the Times brought to light Napoleon's policy, to which
Count Bismarck responded, and then what interesting developments
the case divulged. A synopsis of the French and German army
organization is likewise necessary in order to portray correctly and
vividly the events which followed.

The moral defeat which the Parisian Cabinet had sustained by the
publication of the projected treaty with Prussia had been too great,
and the impression it had made upon neutral powers too extraordi
nary as that France should not have made every imaginable effort of
placing the matter in a different light. In order to bring this about
the following letter of Count Benedetti to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs was published in the Journal Official:

" PARIS, July 29th, 1870.

" DUKE: — No matter how unjust may have been the criticisms to
f ' which I saw myself exposed, when it became known in France
"that the Prince of Hohenzollern had accepted the Spanish Crown,
" I have not deemed it fit and proper to confront them. My duty
" commanded me to leave the trouble to the Imperial Government of
"setting those criticisms right. I cannot, however, indulge in that
" same silence considering the use wrhich Count Bismarck has made,
"of a document to which he endeavors to attach an importance
" which it never had, and I entreat Your Excellency to explain every
" solitary fact with minute precision. It is well known everywhere
" that Count Bismarck before and during the last Prussian wrar with
" Austria, had been found willing of assisting France in annexing
" Belgium, if France returned the civility to Prussia by allowing her a
" similar compensation in the direction of territories coveted by
" Prussia, which since then have been acquired. The whole European
" diplomatic body could bear witness, as every member became cog-
" nizant of it. The Imperial Government has constantly refused
" these offers, and one of its predecessors, Monsieur Drouyn de
" FHuys, is in a position to explain it, and in a manner that can leave
" no doubt. "When peace had been concluded at Prague, and con-
' f sidering the excitement which prevailed in France consequent upon
"the annexation of Hanover, Kurhessen, and the city of Frankfort-

48

" on-the-Main, by Prussia, Count Bismarck again expressed his great
' ' desire of amending the balance of power thus gently shaken by his
" acquisitions. Different combinations they were, to be sure, not
' ' concerning lands bordering upon the frontiers of either France or
" Germany, which had become the topic of several interviews, in all
" of which Count Bismarck endeavored to obtain preference for his
" personal ideas. To one of these interviews I consented, in order to
"be better able to comprehend his combinations thoroughly, and
" copied, so to say, what he dictated. The form as well as the con-
' ' tents of that manuscript proves plainly that it has been jny purpose
" to confine myself to sketching the project as it had been conceived
" and developed itself. Count von Bismarck retained it, wishing to
" transmit it to the King. I, on my part, immediately communicated
" the contents, precisely and correctly as they were given to me, to
l( the Imperial Government.

" The Emperor refused these schemes immediately. I must say
" that even the King of Prussia did not approve of their basis, so that
" ever since, viz., during the last four years, I have not compared notes
" and exchanged ideas with Bismarck upon the topic above mentioned.
' ' Had the initiative to any such agreement been taken by the Im-
"perial Government, the copy of the manuscript would have been
11 retained by the Ministry, so that I would have been unable to pro-
" duce a copy written by myself. Besides which, it would have been
" revised, and would have afforded an opportunity of entering into
" negotiations upon the subject, which would have been carried on
" simultaneously in Paris and in Berlin. In such an event, you may
" rely upon it, Count Bismarck would not have been satisfied with
(e publishing its contents in an indirect way, especially at a moment
" when your Excellency set to rights other errors, which were inteii-
" tionally circulated — by inserting the dispatches in the Journal Offi-
" cial. But to attain to his end, viz., to mislead public opinion, and
"to be ahead of any little indiscretion which we might have been
" unwise enough to commit, he availed himself of this aid, because, by
" so doing, he rid himself of the necessity of minutely quoting at what
" precise time, under what circumstances, and in what manner this
" important document had originally been composed. He undoubt-
" edly thought such silence would lead to premises which would
" exonerate him, and compromise the Imperial Government of France
" instead.

" Such a proceeding need not be further commented upon ; suffice
" it to publish it, and all Europe will be able to decide.
''Accept the assurance, etc., etc.,

"V. BENEDETTI."

49

The Parisian journals have exposed the flatness and shallowness of
the aforesaid epistle, and emphatically avowed the absurdity of the sup
position that Count Bismarck should have retained the manuscript for
the purpose of handing it over to the King, after it had just 'before
been said, and clearly demonstrated, that the manuscript contained
the full expression of the ideas of Count von Bismarck. Had that
been the case, of what use would have been the manuscript? Why !
all Count Bismarck had to do was to verbally communicate to the
King his ideas, which certainly would have been done more impres
sively than with a document composed by the French Ambassador.

To an equal certainty the Parisians comprehended from Benedetti's
letter the inadequateness of the rejection of the accusation, so that
shortly afterwards a circular appeared of the Duke of Grammont's to
the French diplomatic body abroad, which was intended to serve as an
answer to the accusations of Count Bismarck in his last circular, and
neutralize its effect. The French circular said :

PARIS, the 3d August, 1870.

Y. Exc. : We have, this day, become acquainted with the fur
ther meaning of the telegram which Count Bismarck has transmitted
to the Prussian Ambassador in London, in order to communicate to
England those supposed secrets, of which the Chancellor of the North
German Union professes to be aware. His dispatch, however, contains
no additional and essentially important information beyond the facts
which he has already brought to light. We, ourselves, find only some
more improbabilities. Public opinion has already pronounced judg
ment upon these assertions, which do not gain authority by the bold
ness with which they are repeated. We consider it as finally settled,
in spite of all denial, that the Emperor Napoleon never proposed to
Prussia a treaty which had for its purpose the forcible annexation of
Belgium. This idea belongs exclusively to Bismarck, and intended
to serve him as one of the means with which to manage his unscrupu
lous policy, which, however, is now as we hope fast approaching its
frustration. I would have altogether refrained from reciting assertions,
the wrongfulness of which stands to-day manifested, if the author of
the Prussian dispatch, with a want of tact which has no precedent to
my knowledge in any diplomatic document, had not cited relatives of
the Emperor as having been the bearers of such compromising commu
nications and messages. With what a disgust I feel necessitated to
follow and keep an eye upon the Prussian Chancellor, and pursue a
course contrary to my habits, I cannot tell; yet, I must overcome this
feeling, because it is my duty to defend the members of the Imperial
family against the horrid insinuations which are meant for them, and
evidently directed to reach the Emperor himself.
5

50

It was at Berlin where Count Bismarck, taking hold of the initiation
of the ideas, the first conception of which he to-day dexterously
ascribes to us, accosted the French Prince, whom he now draws
with contempt of all conventional rules into the circle of his polemic,
with these words : You searched for " a thing impossible. You
Cf want to take the provinces of the Rhine, which are German. Why
" do you not rather annex Belgium ? made up of people partially of
" your own race, who profess the same religion, and who speak the
" same vernacular. The same thing I have already given the Emperor
" to understand : that if he should share my views, we would aid
" him to take Belgium. As far as I am concerned, if I was master
" here, and not hindered by the stubbornness of the King, it would
" have been done by this time." These words of the Prussian Chan
cellor were, so to say, repeated verbatim by Count von der Goltz, at
the French Court. This very Ambassador made it so little a secret
there that the number of witnesses who have heard it is considerable.
I have to add that, at the time of the great exhibition, these propositions
from Prussia reached the ears of a somewhat more than exalted per
sonage who took a precise notice of it, and even now remembers it
well. Besides it was with Count Bismarck no effervescent whim; on
the contrary, a well meditated project which he fostered with his am
bitious plans, and in which he persevered with a pertinacity which
augured realization until it was wrecked upon the unshakable will of
the Emperor, whom he often visited in Paris, as well as in Biarritz and
other places for that very purpose, but who declined to participate in a
policy which was unworthy of Napoleon's loyalty.

I now quit this topic, which I have touched upon for the last time,
being determined not to return to it any more, and approach a really
new one, found in the dispatch of Count von Bismarck : "I have
" reason to believe (so he says) that, if the treaty had not been made
" public, France would have made us the offer after we had both
" armed, to execute her propositions previously made, as we had now
" together a well equipped army of more than a million of men,
•e against unarmed Europe, by which Bismarck intended to convey:
" to grant peace before or after the first battle, according to the pro-
" posals of Mr. Benedetti, and of course at the expense of Belgium."

It would not be proper for the Government of the Emperor to suf
fer to consider such an assurance. In the face of Europe the Minis
ters of His I. Majesty demanded of Count Bismarck to produce a solitary
proof from which it might be inferred they had shown an intention
either directly or indirectly, officially, or with aid of secret agents, tc
unite with Prussia for the purpose of committing an attentat upon the
independance of Belgium similar to the one that has been enacted
upon Hanover. We have not negotiated with Count von Bismarck

51

either in regard to Belgium nor in regard to anything else. Far
from seeking war, of which we stand accused, we have even
requested Lord Clarendon to intervene with the Prussian Minister,
in order to bring about a reciprocated disarmament, which important
mission Lord Clarendon unhesitatingly undertook, out of friendship
to France, as well as out of devotion to the ideas of peace.

But the following letter will prove to a fault that the ire of the
French arose from the designs of their intervention, in 1866, having being
frustrated DV the victories of Sadowa and Konigsgratz, as France had
but one motive by that intervention, if possibly to participate in the
spoils without having done anything in the way of help of action. Of
course, Germany never listened to it, and Bismarck paid nothing in
the way of inches of territory.

Drouyn de THuys wrote to the Prussian Ambassador in Paris,
Count v. d. Goltz :

YICHY, 3d August, 1866.

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR : I hasten to answer your letter of the day
before yesterday, in regard to the wish of Count von Bismarck, that
we (France) officially acknowledge the annexations which Prussia
intends to make in Northern Germany.

As often as I have touched, in my conversations with you, upon
this question of territorial modifications in favor of Prussia, I have
expressed to you my confidence in the Berlin Cabinet, acknowl
edging the propriety and equity of France of asking a recompensation
for it in a manner which shall have for its purpose the somewhat com
parative increase of the defensive strength of the French Empire.

Of this sort of condition I reminded Count Benedetti, on the twenty-
third of July, in a dispatch approved of by the Emperor. It was by
him confidentially communicated to Count Bismarck, who acknowl
edging the pardonable nature of the principle, exchanged with him
some ideas in regard to the manner and means by which the concep
tion might be practically realized.

Said conversation, of which Count Bismarck told me in his letter of
the twenty-sixth of July, preceded the signing of the preliminaries of
peace, and of the armistice. It should be taken up again later. On
the twenty-ninth, by telegram, in my answer to his letter, approved
of by the Emperor, I have precisely stated our views. Our Ambassa
dor must have received the telegram either at Nickolsburg or in
Berlin.

As you, my dear Count, refer in your letter to the conversations
which you have had with the Emperor upon the subject, I have handed
the letter to his Majesty, and requested his commands. Here is the
answer which I am authorized to give you :

52

' ' When the Emperor offered his good services because of the recon-
" struction of peace, he did not hesitate to acknowledge that Prussia,
" by her victories, had a right to ask of Austria a territorial extension
" of her boundaries, to the figure of three to four millions of inhabit-
" ants iipoii it. If otherwise, the Emperor would not mistake that
" an undue enlargement would derange the equlibrium of strength
" upon our boundary.

" But His Majesty would not increase the difficulty of an affair which
" was of a general European magnitude, by treating beforehand with
" Prussia upon territorial questions which concern France particularly,
" besides were not mentioned in the preliminaries of peace.

" It appeared to his Majesty as enough to have alluded to this ques-
" tion, reserving to himself an examination of the same in unison with
" the Cabinet of Berlin, as soon as the role he had played as inter-
" ventor should have been finished.

" With these views upon the subject, the Emperor commanded me
" to instruct Count Benedetti as mentioned."

As soon as we shall have received his reply, I shall be enabled to
inform you. my dear Count, of the decision of the Emperor in regard
to the points comprising the contents of your letter.

D. DE L'H.

The manner in which these sly importunities of France were an
swered in Berlin, the diplomatic archives published last year have
shown. It is certain that both Germany and France distrusted each
other from those dates of Sadowa and Konigsgratz. It was nothing
more nor less than a grudge.

It is well the heart is relieved, the pachy dermal fury evaporated,
and calm reason prevails.

Here follow the words which Count Daru, in a letter of the first of
February, expressed to the Marquis of Lavalette, French Ambassador
in London, as being the intentions of the French Government :

' ' I would assuredly not mix myself up in this affair, nor request of
" England to meddle with it, if it was merely and simply a banale and
" formal controversy, having no other purpose, than to afford Count
"Bismarck an opportunity of renewing his expression of a refusal.
" But it requires a firm, earnest, and positive action. The Secretary
' ' of State appears to predict that Count von Bismarck will experience
" a sensation of discontent and annoyance. It is possible, but not
"certain. In this expectation, however, it is perhaps well to so
" arrange matters that a negative answer is thereto at once avoided. I
' ' am convinced that reflection and time will bring the Chancellor to
' ' seriously contemplate the step England has taken ; if he has not

53

" the first day refused explanation, then the interests of Prussia and
" Germany will soon loudly demand of him to relent. He will not
" arouse public opinion of the whole country against him. What,
" indeed, would be his position if we took away from him the sole
*' pretext behind which he could possibly barricade himself, viz., the
" arming of France ?"

Upon this Count Bismarck answered he could not well do it and
lay before the King the communication from the British Government,
being sufficiently informed of the views of his Sovereign, as not to be
able to anticipate the impression such communication would certainly
make upon him. King William, he said, would observe in a step of
that sort from the British Cabinet, a proof of a change in the friendly
sentiments of England towards Prussia. Finally, the Chancellor
recapitulated his explanation: "It would be impossible for Prussia
"to modify a military system which was firmly interwoven with the
" traditions of the country, formed a part of the basis of its consti-
" tution and' was totally normal." Count Daru was not discomfited
by this first response. On the 13th of February he wrote to Mr. von
Lavalette: " I hope Lord Clarendon does not consider himself van-
" quished, and will lose his presence of mind. We shall very soon
" afford him another opportunity to return to the same attack when-
" ever he shall see fit to reopen the discourse upon the same topic
" with the German Chancellor, which has thus been interrupted.
" Our intention really is to diminish our contingent; wre would have
" diminished it much more if we had received from the Chancellor of
" the North German Union a favorable answer; we shall now dimin-
" ish it less, because his answer was negative; nevertheless, we do
" diminish it, and the reduction I hope will amount to 10,000 men,
" each contingent; this number I shall propose. In this manner we
" shall attest our policy and intention by action, which are always
" worth more than words. Nine contingents diminished, each of
" 10,000 men, make a total of 90,000 men. That is something— a
" tenth of the army; I regret only that I cannot do more. The law in
" regard to the contingent shall soon be presented; Lord Clarendon
" may then judge whether it is time to remonstrate with Count Bis-
" marck, that it is the Prussian Government alone in Europe which
" does not make concession in favor of peace, and that it puts itself
;< in a critical position among the nations of Europe, because it lends
" arms to all tbe world against itself, even against the people thus
" oppressed by military taxes as necessarily levied upon them.

Lively pressed, Count Bismarck considered it necessary to give
Lord Clarendon new explanations. These were full of reticencies as
transmitted to us by letter from Mr. von Lavalette, dated February
23d. The Chancellor of the North German Union had returned to

54

his first resolution, and had had a conversation with King William
upon the proposal as recommended by England. The King, however,
had declined. Count Bismark based this refusal upon the apprehen
sion of a possible French alliance between Austria and South Ger
many, and the inclination which France might evince in enlarging
her boundary. Above all, he clouded his argument into the anxiety
which the policy of Russia gave him, and upon this occasion made
some pointed remarks in regard to the Court of St. Petersburg, which
were incomprehensible to me.

These are the grounds upon which Count Bismarck based his non-
compliance with the request of the French Imperial Government, as
transmitted through Lord Clarendon, and duly represented as a loyal
and conscientious matter.

If, therefore, Europe remained under arm when a million of men
were about to wound each other upon battle-fields, then it is not any
longer permissible to deny that Prussia is responsible for such a con
dition of things ; she has rejected every thought in regard to disarma
ment when we have had the proposition made, and commenced by
giving an example. Is not, moreover, this behavior explainable
from the fact that in the same hour in which France diminished her
contingent, the Prussian Cabinet organized in the dark the provoking
candidature of a Prussian Prince for the Spanish Throne ? No mat
ter what calumnies the Chancellor of the North German Union may
have invented, we are without fear. He has lost the right to find
credence. The conscience of Europe and history shall say that Prus
sia provoked the present war by aiming an insult at France, while the
latter was busy perfecting its political improvements, which affront
no proud and courageous nation could have stood without deserving
execration from all the world.

With assurances of high regard, etc., etc.,

(Signed) GEAMMONT.

Even the aforesaid circular was not sufficient to allay the distrust
once aroused among the European Courts, as it contained nothing
new beyond what Benedetti had already advanced by stating, without
proofs, that Count Bismarck had been the originator of the project
which the Emperor of the French had perseveringly rejected. The
most interesting part of the document is, however, the manner in
which developments, as systematically arranged by Count Bismarck,
were made to connect with the candidature of the Prince of Hohen-
zollern for the throne of Spain, its conception likewise ascribed to him
and which fusion had to serve France to get as a pretext for the inaug
uration of the present war. By this artful device the Duke of Gram-
mont is lucky enough to put down Count Bismarck as the abomina-

^

ble originator of the war, and place France near him as the innocent
lamb which had to go against its will, that civilization might be saved
and the disturbed balance of power in Europe readjusted. It cannot
be denied, though, that the following document, which had appeared
not long before the one just given, and serving as an introductory to
the same, has been executed with so much dramatic skill, that it is not
to be wondered at that in the eyes of Frenchmen, who love and
admire, above everything, a good theatrical effect, it appeared as an
expression of the most verified truth. This document reads as fol
lows:

PARIS, 21 July, 1870.

GENTLEMEN: — You are already aware of the entanglement of facts
which have brought about the breach of peace with Prussia. The
announcement which the Government of the Emperor had, on the
15th inst., issued forth from the tribunal of the corporation of great
nations, the exact contents of it I have duly communicated to you,
has explained to France and Europe the quick changes wrought in
a negotiation which had for its purpose the preservation of peace,
during the management of which the secret plans of an adversary,
determined to contract our exertions in behalf of peace, developed
themselves, and at the same ratio at which we redoubled our efforts
of securing it.

Be it that the Berlin Cabinet considered war necessary in order to
be enabled of carrying out its old plans against the independence of
the German States, be it that the Berlin Cabinet was not content
with possessing, in the very heart of Europe, a military power which
had already become extremely formidable to its neighbors, and
was anxious of making use of that power, self-evidently for the
purpose of deranging the international balance of power in Europe,
at any rate the well defined intention to refuse a positively necessary
guarantee for our security as well as our honor, clearly shows itself
throughout its demeanor.

The following was undoubtedly the plan projected against us: Ac
cording to an agreement made with non-responsible persons, it should
have carried the result of the measure directly to the spot, where the
Cortes were to be suddenly made acquainted with the candidature of
the Prussian Prince. A vote thus attained by surprise and forestall
ing the mature deliberation of the Spanish people upon so important
an event, should then — such was the hope — • unanimously pro
claim Prince Leopold von Hohenzollern the Heir to the Scepter of
Charles V.

' ' In this manner Europe would have found itself confronted by an
cc accomplished fact, while it indulged in speculations upon our con-
* ( stant readiness to advance the grand principle of the sovereignty of

56

" peoples. Therefore, Europe expected that France would stand
" firmly by that principle in spite of her transient anger, when brought
"opposite the expression of a nation apparently real, for whom all
" the world is aware of our sympathies.

" As soon as it had been informed of the danger, this Government
" did not hesitate to inform the agents of the country, as well as all
" the European Cabinets, of it; to then counteract the manoeuvre, we
" were assisted in by public opinion, which became the legitimate ally
" of the Government. The impartial minds have nowhere been dis-
" appointed in regard to the real state of things, these quickly compre-
" hended that if it touched, us painfully to see Spain assigned to play-
" ing a role in the exclusive interest of an ambitious dynasty, not at
" all suitable to the loyalty of that chivalrous people, besides did so
" little accord with the promptings and transfer of friendship which
"binds Spain to us, we could not be expected to dissemble our
" constant esteem for the independence of her national decisions,

11 One has felt it that the but little scrupulous policy of the Prus-
" sian Government played here its part. That Government is it in
"reality, which, not considering itself bound by common right and
" regard of the rules, to which the wisest powers have possessed the
" wisdom of bowing, has attempted to burden a deceived Europe with
" so dangerous an extension of its influence. France, however, has
" taken the case of the balance of power in hand, viz: The case of
" all nations which are jeopardized by a disproportioned enlargement
"of some kingly house.

"Every nation, we take a pleasure in so saying, is mistress of its
" own destiny. This principle, which France has openly acknowl-
" edged, has become one of the main laws of modern politics. But
" the right of each nation, exactly the same as the right of every in-
" dividual, is kept in check by the right of another, and it is forbid-
" den to a nation, under pretext of exercising its own right of sover-
" eignty, to endanger the existence or the security of a neighboring
" one. In this sense spoke one of our great orators, Mr. von Lam-
" artine, in 1847: that the moment the question comprised the election
"of a sovereign, a government had never the right to demonstrate
" demands, but it had the right to remonstrate them. This doctrine
" is under circumstances adhered to by all cabinets, and is analogous
" to the one in which the candidature of the Prince of Hohenzollern
" has put us, and particularly to the one of the year 1831, to the one
" in the Belgian question of 1830 and in the Greek question of 1802.
" In the Belgian question the voice of all Europe was heard. The
" five great powers decided. The three Courts which took the Greek
" question in hand were unanimous among themselves, being guided

57

" by interests which they had in common with each other, not to
" accept the throne of Greece for one of their princes.

" The Cabinets of Paris, London, Vienna, Berlin and St. Peters-
" burg', all of which were represented at the London Conference,
" made an example of it; they set it down as a rule, when negotiating
" on questions affecting the peace of the world. They did homage —
* ( so solemnly — to this great law for the equilibrium of strength, as
" forming the basis of the European political system. In vain the
" Belgian National Congress insisted, in spite of this agreement, to
" elect the Duke of Nemours; France adhered to its obligation and
" rejected the crown, which the Belgian delegates had brought to
" Paris. But France insisted in a like manner that the candidature
" of the Duke of Leuchtenberg should similarly not be accepted.
" Likewise in Greece, the Government of France prevented the can
didature of Prince Alfred of England, and of another candidate,
" the Duke of Leuchtenberg.

"England, acknowledging the weight of our proposition, declared
' ' at Athens that the Queen had forbidden her son to accept the Crown
" of Greece. Russia declared similarly in regard to the Duke of
'•Leuchtenberg; besides, that nobleman does not come within the
" pedigree of the Imperial family. Finally, and voluntarily, the
" Emperor Napoleon declared his adhesion to these principles, and
" published a note, on the first of September, I860, in the Moniteur,
' ' in which he refused the candidature of Prince Murat for the throne
" of Naples. Prussia, which we had not omitted of reminding of
" these precedents, appeared for a moment to yield to our represen-
' ' tation ; Prince Leopold declined the candidature ; one was nattered
" that peace would not be disturbed. But this hope soon waned.
"New anxieties arose, which increased to a certainty, that Prussia,
" without seriously withdrawing her pretensions, contemplated to
" gain time. The language upon the subject, as made use of by the
" head of the family of Hohenzollern — first evasive, then decisive and
" haughty — his refusal to adhere to the same avowed non-acceptance
"in future, the treatment of our Charge d' Affaires, who had been
" denied further audiences, disabling him from amicably arrang-
"ing this case as instructed, finally the publicity to which these
" extraordinary preliminaries were exposed to in the Prussian news-
" papers, and which had been given of the same to the various Cabi-
" nets — all these consecutive symptoms of hostile plans could not but
" put aside every doubt in minds the most partially inclined. Is there
" a mistake possible, when a Sovereign, who can dispose of over a mil-
" lion of soldiers, and putting his hand upon his sword, declares he
" will reserve to himself his decision, and be guided by circumstances
" only? We have about arrived at the utmost point, where a nation
6

58

" which feels what it owes to itself does not further negotiate for
" demands upon its own honor. If these last named proofs in this
" woeful controversy do not throw a sufficient light upon the matured
c ' plans of the Berlin Cabinet, a circumstance will certainly do it, which
" is far less known, but which, nevertheless, stamps those plans as
" real and decisive.

" The fact is, the thought to put a prince of Hohenzollern upon the
"throne of Spain was not a new one. Already, in March, 1869, we
" had been given to understand, by our Charged' Affaires at Berlin, that
" such a thought existed. "We authorized him to explain to Count
" Bismarck how we, the Imperial Government, would view such
" eventuality. Count Benedetti had made it known in several conver-
" sations which he had upon the subject with the Chancellor of the
" North German Union, as well as with the Under Secretary of State,
' ' that we could not permit it that a Prussian prince should succeed in
" reigning on the other side of the Pyrenees.

" Count Bismarck on his part declared that we had it not necessary
" to busy ourselves with a combination which he himself considered
" inexecutable ; and later, at a time when the Chancellor happened to be
" absent, and Count Benedetti thought it a good moment to express
" himself unbelievingly and pressingly, Mr. Yon Thiele had given his
" word of honor that the Prince of Hohenzollern was not in earnest a
" candidate for the Spanish throne, nor could he become one.

' ' If one should draw info doubt the veracity and truthfulness of
' ' such explicit official assurances, all diplomatic intercourse would
" cease to be the pledge of European peace, and be nothing but a
" snare and a danger. As soon as our Charge d' Affaires communi-
" cated those declarations to us without reserve, the Imperial Gov-
" eminent considered itself as notified to interpret the same favorably.
" It has been constrained to draw into doubt the good belief of this
" assurance up to the moment when this combination suddenly
" revealed itself, wrhich evidently is the contrary to the same. Unex-
" pectedly retiring from the word given to us, without even the at-
" tempt to release herself from an obligation, Prussia has prepared for
" us a real disappointment. Informed of the value which the most
" formal assurances of Prussian statesmen possess, we considered it a
" peremptory duty in future incumbent upon us, of asking a guarantee
" for our honesty, which should secure us against a new attempt of
" disrespect. We therefore were obliged to do as we have done, viz.,
" to insist upon receiving a security which should be definitive and
" earnest, and not full of reserves, as the former.

" It is evident that the Court of Berlin bears the responsibility for
" the war from a time previous to the combination, while it had all

59

" the means at its disposal of avoiding it, but insisted upon having.
" And under what circumstances has it sought the strife?

" After France had, during four years, given proofs of an uaalter-
" able moderation, — after she had abstained with an anxiety perhaps
" carried too far from reminding the Prussian Government of the
" treaties which had been made by intervention of the Emperor, the
" international disregard discernible in all the acts of said Govern-
" ment clearly demonstrates that it already intended, to rid itself of the
" same when it signed the contract.

" Europe bears witness to our conduct, and has had time to com-
*' pare that of Prussia. To-day it may pronounce its veto on the jus-
" tice of our cause. Whatever may be the fate of battles, we expect,
" without disquietude, the judgment of contemporaries, as well as that
"of the future.

" Pray accept the assurance of, etc., etc.,

"GBAMMONT."

This remarkable document, the sophistry and illusive surmises as
to consequence of the contents of which an unpreposessed mind can
easily grasp, was vigorously reinforced by two proclamations which
were no less noticeable, one of which was directed to the French
people. I shall here produce and comment upon both. The procla
mation to the French people reads as follows :

" There are, during the existence of a nation, solemn moments :
" when the honor of a nation, violently assailed, rises, with an irre-
" sistable might, when it commands all other interests, and manages
" alone and directly the fate of the nation. One of those decisive
" moments is the present one for France. Prussia, which we have
" shown the most forgiving sentiments to during the war of 18(>6, has
" ever since taken no notice at all of our good will and forbear-
" ance. Impetuously pursuing its course of conquests it has given
" reasons for mistrustfulness; made everywhere excessive armaments
"necessary; transforming Europe into a military camp, in which
" apprehension prevails.

" The glorious nag which we once more unfurl to those who pro-
" vokes us, is the same which has carried the civilizing ideas of our
" great revolution all over Europe ; it represents the same ideas ; it
" will inspire the same feelings of devotion. Frenchmen, I am ready
" to place myself at the head of this brave army, which is imbued
" with a keen sense of duty, and animated by its love of France; the
" army knows its own worth, for it has seen how, in four divisions of
" the globe, victory accompanied its footsteps. I take my son with
" me, notwithstanding his youthl'ulness he understands the duties
" which his name demands of him ; he is proud of being permitted
" to share the dangers of those who fi§ht for France. A last inter-

60

" veiling event has been added, which brings more fully to light the
" changebleness of international relations, showing the full earnest-
" ness of the situation. Opposite the new pretensions of Prussia are
" our reinforcements. One has despised them, followed byatesti-
" fied contempt. Our country has been deeply incensed in conse-
" queiice, and the war-cry heard from one end of France to the other.
' ' Nothing is now left to us but to let our fate be decided by force of
" arms. We do not wage war against Germany, the independence of
" which we respect. We have the wish that the people of whom the
" German Union is composed may, of their own free will, decide in
" this case. We ourselves require a state of things which guarantees
" our security and our future. We want to attain to a lasting peace.
" God will bless our exertions. A great people defending a just cause
<( are invincible.

"NAPOLEON."

It is interesting to observe how groundless reproaches against Prus
sia, over-estimation of their own actions, and general egotism are
harmoniously blended together for the purpose of producing a sem
blance of a substance, palatable to French military vanity. In regard
to the praised forbearance of France we now find out its source : the
hope of enlarging her territory ; the " victories in four divisions of
"the globe." It might be useful to remember that Napoleon III
did not obtain one without allies ; as soon as he fought alone he
did not achieve anything, which the events in Mexico have clearly
shown, and this present war still more so. How little correct the
assurance is that the war-cry was heard from one end of France to
the other, is best attested by the demands for peace from Nizza and
Bordeaux, and by the remarks from Michelet and Louis Blanc in
newspapers. Those of Louis Blanc may serve as an example.

He wrote to the Eappel: ". . . . Be it well understood that this
" war to which we are driven by the martial spirit of honest minds,
" betrayed by the martial spirit of knavish souls, is entered into on
" the one side to make despotism stronger than liberty, and on the
" other side to cover the lack of success of a Napoleonic dynasty and
" adjust the damage done at the expense of France. A double reason
" to be on guard and to prevent it! The Union of Germany is, nev-
" ertheless, a danger. I repeat, that this Union, difficult and slow
" as it can be effected in times of peace, will instantly be consolidated
" when the war trumpet sounds. Put Germany under threats of war,
" one may rely on it — she will rise to a man. Don't speak any more
" of annihilating Prussia, but reflect upon annihilating Germany. A
"terrible shock, that of the Latin and Germanic races, a shock in
" which we, a Latin nation, would, strange to say, have Latin nations

61

<c arraigned against us — a shock which would sow enmities for ever,
" and carry civilization back a century, perhaps two. That it is which
" is demanded of France, to that she shall allow herself to be driven,
" under the pretext that the vanity of some diplomatist is tanta-
" mount to the dignity of the nation; and for what purpose? it is
" barely concealed; of giving the baptismal of glory to the supposed
" heir to the throne! Great people of France! is it possible that one
' ' dares to count upon a harrassed mind to such an extent ? dares to
" ensnare your bravery to such a degree ?"

The language of many others in the newspapers conveys pretty much
the same meaning, as the words of Louis Blanc, demanding peace in
the most determined manner, and shows the power of republicanism.

Finally, the reproaches against Prussia of her desire for conquest,
her insatiable ambition, etc., etc., those are as old and unfounded as
they are unproved, and if she is particularly reproached because of
having lately enlarged her territory, it is not to be forgotten that
Prussia was menaced in her very existence, during the war with Aus
tria, by the hostility of Hanover and other States, and the artful
devises of jealous adversaries, among whom France was by no means
the smallest one. Besides, Prussia had been previously put at the
Congress of 1815, in a position, the natural condition and doubtful
ness of which, was such as to sooner or later predict a rupture or a
radical change in the destiny of Prussia, lest she should have had to
rue complete annihilation.

Herein consisted the impetus, germinating the power, which, since 1815
has produced all these events, and which is not to be attributed to vainglo
rious ambition, or a desire for conquest, which the world has been made
to fancifully believe as having alone actuated the policy of Prussia, but
to self-preservation through self-defense and the true belief in God and
themselves.

The second document commences with the same words as the first,
so that it might be inferred it has had the same author, it is by no
means less noticeable than the first, and reads as follows:

" There are during the existence of a nation solemn moments when
" God affords them an opportunity of showing who they are, and
"what they can do. One of those moments has come for France !
" One has often had the opinion that the great nation, so resolute in
tc attack, did not well know how to bear misfortune. What now
" developes itself before our eyes resents the calumny with falsity.
" The bearing of the population shows no discouragement; on the con-
" trary, a patriotic fierceness towards the aggressors of France, who
" shall here find their graves. All Frenchmen shall rise to a man. They
' ' will remember their ancestors and think of those who shall follow.
" Behind them centuries of glory, before them a future full of liberty

62

cf and power, which their heroism shall create. Never before has
" France shown her noble pride and the strength of ner national
" character in such an equally great and imposing manner. Every-
" body full of enthusiasm exclaims: To arms! to conqueror die! While
" our soldiers heroically defend the soil of the country, Europe is
" justly full of anxiety in regard to the successes of Prussia. One does
" not know how far the ambition of that insatiable power may carry it,
" should a final triumph make it, still more presumptive.

"It is an unchangeable law of history that every nation which dis-
" turbs the general balance of power by its extraordinary success, is
" awakening a reaction consequent upon those very victories, and cre-
" ates for itself the enmity of all other nations. It cannot fail that
" this truth shall now again be confirmed by facts. So especially con-
" sidered.

" Who, then, after all, is interested in a reconstruction of a German
"Empire? Who, after all, can wish that the North Sea and the
" Baltic become Prussian lakes ? Is it, perhaps, Sweden, Norway, and
" Denmark, which the triumph of Prussia would annihilate? or is it
" Russia, whose interest it is, more than any other power, to protect
" the equilibrium of the North against the advance of a compact Ger-
" many ? Is it, perhaps, England, which as a great naval power and
" protector of Denmark, is obliged to protest against further pro-
" gress in the formation of the Prussian marine? Is it, perhaps, Hol-
" land, which has been long enough threatened by the intrigues of
"Bismarck?

" In regard to Austria, the reconstruction of the German Empire
" by the house of Hohenzollem, would be the most dangerous blow
" dealt not only to the dynasty of the Hapsburgs, but to the very
" existence of an Austro -Hungarian, monarchy. Prussia would surely
" endeavor to make promises to the Cabinet of Vienna, but one knows
" what belief to attach to the words of Bismarck. A proffered guaran-
" tee, of whatever nature, could never be stronger than the ties which
" have bound Prussia to the former German Union, and, notwith-
" standing which, Prussia, unmindful of her obligations, has rented in
" such a violent manner. A definitive triumph of the house of Hohen-
" zolleru would be for Italy no less deplorable than for Austria. A
" German Empire would seek to provide for itself, at all costs,
" countries bordering upon the sea, as well in (he South as in the
" North. It would covet possession of Venice, Triest. as well as Am-
" sterdam. Thus, the regeneration of Italy would be in danger, as
" well as Austria and Holland.

" We appeal to the Governments and the nations of Europe to tear
" Europe off the grasp of Piussian despotism, in order that they
" may be able to assist us, by alliances and sympathies, to protect the

63

" European balance of power. In England, Denmark, and Sweden
" there are already signs of such a turn. Austria and Italy have com-
" meiicod to arm. OUT patriotism i;s proof against all dangers. The
" more seriously the circumstances, the greater the energy the nation
" shall display. "

That what especially rivets the attention of the aforesaid document
is not the passus, which places Prussia as an insatiably ambitious
power in Europe, which should be fully feared, and which accusation
serves but as a somewhat modified repetition of Avhat had been
advanced in the previous document ; but the passus in which the ques
tion is put and answered — who it is that after all is interested in the
restoration of* German Empire ? The answer, of course, is : ' ( nobody/'

On the contrary, all are interested that such a consolidation should
not be realized ; in other words, that Germany should remain weak
and disunited as hi times of yore. One has denominated this passus
in diplomatic circles : a mendicancy of France to obtain alliances, and
justly so ; for that is its version from the one side. But the purpose
of it is by no means thereby exhausted. On the contrary, the more
important and extensively versified portion of that passus has not
therein even been touched. This passus expresses on the one side the
apprehension of France of a change in affairs as inaugurated previ
ously to 1804, and which the Moniteur calls " normal," viz., predicting
the destruction of the supremacy of France presumptively exercised
over the European continent ever since the days of Louis XIV, and
of the possibility of a future cessation of the supremacy of England
in the European waters through the full development of the strength
of Germany. The " enteinte cordiale" between France and Great
Britain, of which so much was made, rested in its exact meaning upon
the thoughts to strengthen by mutual action the supremacy of both
in Europe, for the purpose of keeping it at bay, for the execution of
which strategy it became, however, absolutely necessary that Ger
many remained disunited, and consequently weak and powerless.

This " enteinte cordiale" cooled off when Great Britain thought it
detected other purposes on the part of France, which were directed
towards absorbing from England, at a fit opportunity, her share of
the supremacy at sea, which thought matured in English opinion by
France constantly strengthening her fortifications at Cherbourg, be
sides noticing the considerable increase of her navy, as there was no
other nation in Europe but England against which such hostile pre
parations of magnitude might be warranted to be so developed in
embryo. The pointed hints which Napoleon III threw out with refer
ence to and in anticipation of a successful realization of the assiduous
and indefatigable exertions of Prussia striving to form a German Em-

64

pire, should serve to stimulate the commercial ambition as well as
awaken the suspicion of Great Britain. Of course, his purpose was
to again attract that great moral power to the modern alliance, so as
to cosily hide his mischievous conriivings before the world. How, in
1855, so shortly after his ascension to the throne as a revenging spectre
of his uncle, he ever succeeded in duping England to such an extent
as to induce that stern power to completely untomb at St. Helena the
shade of Napoleon I, in the eyes of the Holy alliance, is more than
history will ever draw information of and fathom from blue books.

Similar purposes should the addresses serve, which Napoleon trans
mitted to the other nations of Europe, as mentioned in the aforesaid
document, leaving nothing further to remark but that those were of
as feeble a nature as they were frivolous. He simply relied on the
feeling of awe, which pervaded all Europe, and which the wars of his
uncle had bequeathed to him as a very serviceable legacy. The
French nation forsaking in 1848, the Republic, relied upon the talis
man of the name Napoleon as creating a reality, expecting nothing
short of a repetition of a victorious run through Europe. The battle
of Sadowa, therefore, ignited the martial spirit of the French, and
throwing themselves upon Napoleon, forced him to the mad attempt
of this war. It shows that the world never went beyond antecedents,
and with Indian fierceness and ignorance failed to consider that the
foe of barbarity, the ABC book, had been about and at work. Natu
rally they all have found it out by this time, that the combined war
like hordes of the world could not now conquer Germany, monarchi
cal though she yet is, having but lately been freed from political
shackles, which of course prevented her of doing the republic.

The same school-book will affix itself to the bravest soldier holding
fire-arms in self-defense, as David slew Goliah, strip wars of their
glory by the scientific process of extermination and additional moral
courage, until all mankind shall disarm and live law-abidiiigly, peace
fully and happily.

As many proofs more could be showrn and defended in favor of an
accomplishment of the endeavor to form a strong German empire,
and that such a power could not but exercise a beneficial influence
upon the peace and liberty of Europe. In fact, Germany owes her
present success to her clear-headedness which defines to her the duty
of absorbing upon civilized grounds of humanity and charitableness,
all other strayed-off German elements, monarchical alienated, besides
Alsace and Lorraine in due avail of her physical powers if made rea
sonably necessary.

As it is this enlightened feeling which pervades her actions in this
war, not a feudal delight to cripple her adversary, she will not dis
continue uniting the remainder of Germanic races at once. She has

65

been signally crowned with immediate success in this war, at the same
time ridding herself and Europe of the glare of igneous firebrands
of war in a feudal sense.

She will now continue in a friendly manner to first induce Austria
and Russia to act humanely just, and give up the Germans and not
thwart the happiness of millions of people now forlorn and alien.

The land which said aliens at present occupy, shall b}r Germany be
most liberally bought and paid for.

Speedily accomplished either way, peaceably or by main force, she
shall have received twofold blessings; the exquisiteness of conscience,
of having performed her duty to the fatherland, and the impossibil
ity of a re-occurrence of war, especially with France, should the
master spirit of faith be there once* more overruled, and the republic
be a third time made a sham, which republic alone places France to
day next to the United States of America in general importance of
the civilization of the world, attained so far. The republic shall
eventually intimately befriend France with Germany, if the latter
country continues to prove its wisdom by at all times of the future
assisting the French people in never permitting- a monarch to again
rule over France, plunge the world into agony and the French nation
into moral and political retrogradation.

Secondly, and especially important, is the document, because it
expresses the leading opinions of all the European nations in regard
to the Union of Germany, as so considered at least by France. It is
a French opinion, from a party stand-point, therefore one-sided, not
withstanding there is much truth in it worth noticing and to be
reflected upon.

Thirdly, and finally, the document points out the means of which
Napoleon III availed himself in order to attain to his end with the
nations he has mentioned; they consisted of suspicion, an awakening-
distrust and general mischievous talk of results already gained, or
to be so nearly. As a set-off to such damaging insinuations, one may
simply remember the conduct of the European nations, as shown
throughout this matter, in order to realize the weak ground from
which the wrong-fulness of French insinuations had been produced.
The trouble is that France, with but thirty-six millions of popula
tion and no more, feels that she has far less population than a United
Germany has, comprising the Germanic race on the continent of
Europe sure to unite ere very long. From nowhere has a voice been
heard which justified the proceedings of France, or sanctioned the
motives for the war. Everywhere Napoleon's manner has been most
severely censured, and instead of having served him as a moral assist
ance, as he boasts of, it has been transferred to the Germans as pro
voked to war because attacked, and has been gladly accorded and
7

GG

avowed by all nations, with the exception of the Scandinavians, equally
troubled as France, for the very same reasons of a minority of popu
lation, compared with the Union of the Germans.

Previously to the commencement of actual hostilities at the time
when the German Diet was about to adjourn at Berlin, Count Bis
marck entered and issued the following manifest :

" It has been my intention to lay before you the documents in con-
" secutive order, which are in the hands of the Government, and
" refer to the origin of the dispute with France. I expect these doc-
" uments every moment. For the present I have but to explain that
" the collection is very meagre. We have received in this whole
" affair but one official communication, and that is the declaration of
" war [motion]. That is the only official document which has at all
" been transmitted to us by the French Government. In regard to
" it, all conversation which Count Benedetti, in his capacity as Charge
(f d' Affaires, had upon the subject with the King, privately and at the
" Springs of Ems: —

" Likewise all definitions which one has attempted to force in that
" way, and which, perhaps would have been so forced if His Majesty
" had been less manly and firm of character than he is, would always
" have been considered personal expressions which the Monarch would
" have confirmed in a different manner, if that had been his earnest
"will.

" After having said this in advance, I take the liberty of throwing a
short glance at those other documents, which were produced after the
affair could not any longer be peaceably arranged, simply to explain
to the other Governments how this case developed itself. In the
order here given, these communications contain the particular news
paper telegram already known, which the French Ministry consider as
the real cause of the war, for the reason that one has attached to it
the importance of a " note " by which the French Cabinet fancies
itself to have been deceived. [Hear ! Hear !] I shall not go to the
trouble of explaining what is meant by " notes/' For all those at all
acquainted with diplomacy it is enough to understand that f< newspa
per telegrams " cannot be qualified and become " notes." The gen
tlemen then have taken good care not to produce the said document,
[Hear ! Hear !] for everything would have been considered as naught
upon the contents of the document becoming known. The second
and third documents are those already known through the newspa
pers, referring to the authenticated occurrences at Ems. Then,
fourthly, a dispatch from Baron v. Werther, dated Paris, twelfth July.
That one, at least, is an official document, exchanged between Prus
sian authorities, and not between Prussia and France. In this dis
patch there are the contents given of a conversation which Barren v.

67

Wertlier had had with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and at
the same time with the Minister of Justice, Monsieur Ollivier. In this
dispatch we are made acquainted with the unacceptable demand of a
letter of apology [Laughter] which the King should have to write. I
have, hereupon, answered the Charge d' Affaires nothing more than
that he could not but have misunderstood the wishes of the French
Government, as they had appeared to me impossible. I do not con
sider myself justified to lay before the King — demands of that sort.
| Bravo !] I wrote to the Representative he might ask of the French
Government to put their demand in form, and to have it here offi
cially presented through their Charge d' Affaires. The fifth is the cir
cular of the eighteenth of July, and the sixth the dispatch from
the English Government to intervene. The seventh is the response
of the Chancellor of the North German Union, which has not as
yet been made known to the House.

"Count Bismarck read the reply, from which it appears that
although the proposition of an intervention had been gratefully
acknowledged, and nothing would have been rejected which might
have enhanced the security for an acceptable basis of peace, yet,
one was now no longer in a position to avail oneself of the initiative,
after having unofficially heard that France had already declined the
intervention of England, because such a step would be misunderstood
by the Germans, whose national pride had been wounded by the
threats of France. The gentlemen might rest assured that the For
eign Office of the North German Union had not been one moment
remiss in advising moderation and quiet,

' ' Upon this follows the French version of the declaration of war,
of which the translation into German is already known, and then a
circular to the Ambassadors of the North German Union, which ex
plains the causes from which originated the war, and the manner in
which we treat the affair. [Lively applause.] The documents shall,
after the close of this session, be immediately handed over by the
Chancellor of the North German Union to the President of the House,
and then published in" the daily papers."

Thereupon the session was declared closed by the President, and
when afterwards resumed, Bismarck explained :

GENTLEMEN :— The three Presidents of the Diet have been permitted
already, shortly after noon, to transmit to the King the addresses which
had been decided upon this forenoon. His Majesty ordered the
addresses to be read to him, and then directed us in his name to
express to the House his most sincere and grateful thanks; for as the
King literally said : " The beautiful and ennobling expressions of devo
tion to the German Fatherland." |Here the whole house rose.] In
this declaration so unanimously decided upon, the King recognizes

68 •

likewise a pledge for the final and complete success of the great
tasks which lie before him and before us. He likewise found his fall
confidence confirmed that the nation would never cease to pursue
those aforesaid tasks with unrelenting perseverance. [Lively ap
plause.]

In order to more lucidly explain the declaration of the Diet, we
may as well here produce the newspaper telegram, to which the
Chancellor refers, and. which the French Minister valued as a "note"
and reasoned that therefrom had emanated the actual cause of the
war.

"After the advices of the refusal of the hereditary Prince of
" Hoheuzollern had been officially transmitted by the Spanish to the
" Imperial French Government, the French Charge d' Affaires had
" demanded of the King of Prussia, at Ems, that the King should
" authorize him to telegraph to Paris, that he pledged himself for all
" future not to give his sanction to such an alternative of acceptance,
" should a Prince of Hohenzollern again return to the candidature.
" The King hereupon declined to further receive the French Charge
" d' Affaires, and had sent him word through his Aid-de-camp on duty,
" that he had nothing further to communicate to him."

On the 21st of July the Chancellor again adjourned the Diet,
because in one respect the purpose for its assembling had been real
ized, and in the other, the Government, in consequence of the pres
sure of events, had now to direct its attention to other more import
ant matters, especially the necessary preparations for the war about
to commence, the more obligatory as the time for their completion
had been but tardily given. The most important point of all was, of
course, the arming of the troops in the shortest possible time, which
succeeded so happily and speedily, thanks to the admirable efficiency
of the army organization, that it became impossible for the French
to surprise the Germans.

Gfc)

PART THE THIRD.

THE PROVISIONAL BATTUE-GROUND.

The German-French Frontier is divided into two entirely distinct
parts. From Basle in Switzerland, to Lanterburg, a distance of twenty-
two and a half miles (one German mile is equal to four and a quarter
English), the Rhine forms the frontier, while the Bavarian palatinate
of the Rhine, and the Prussian province of the Rhine commence at
Lauterburg to be the neighbors of France. The Rhine along its right
— the German — bank, is accompanied as far as Lauterberg by the heav
ily timbered mountain ridges of the so-called "Black Forest." These
stretch nearly down to the banks of the river, and continue so nearly
down from Schlingen. From there mountains extend off the river at
a distance of about one to two German miles, forming the fertile val
ley of the Rhine. The discontinuation of the Black Forest from these
plains is quite abrupt and bluff. The Black Forest at the upper end,
as far as the River Murg, appears as a rugged and almost impenetra
ble fastness, over the summit of which but few paths lead. Length
ways along the summit the mountain roads are almost impassable, so
that the Black Forest there may be considered a heavy obstacle to
all military operations. Its breadth from Muhlheim to Blumberg is
ten German miles, although in the north it loses of its breadth as
well as elevation, footing up but six and a half miles between Frei
burg and Donau-Eschingen, and but six miles between Baden and the
city of Weil, at an elevation the same as at the strong fortress Rastatt.
The central part of the Black Forest, from the Murg to the Pfing,
admits of a more passable formation, and at its lower end from the
Pfing to the Neckar it gently verges into undulating hill lands. In
consequence of which the central and lower sections of the Black
Forest can barely be considered more than a weighty obstacle to mili
tary operations, when large armies are concerned. Further to the
north is the Odenwald, or Odenforest, with which the space from
the river Neckar to the river Main is filled. The slope of these hil
locks are steep towards the Neckar, and even the more elevated por
tions of it are rough and densely timbered. The leading roads avoid

70

the Odenwald ; others are scarce, and very bad in rainy weather and
during winter, because of the limy and muddy soil, so that this hilly
section might likewise be termed an obstacle to military operations.
(Between the Rhine and the western section of the river Main, the
Odeiiwaid, as well as the Black Forest, afford the richest kind of
farming lands to a width of two to three German miles.)

Upon the left bank of the Rhine, opposite the Black and the Oden
Forests, stretch the Yosges mountains, upon French soil. These rise in
the neighborhood of the source of the river Moselle (in equal eleva-
vation with Muhlheim, Blumberg, therefore exactly opposite the Black
Forest in its largest horizontal and vertical extension) and like the
Black Forest, fall steeply towards the valley of the Rhine, gradually
diminishing towards the north, in both elevation and breadth. In the
palatinate, as well as in the mountains of the Haardt, the Vosges bor
der there upon a broad valley of the Rhine, and are frequently crossed
by roads and even railroads.

If one so compares the so-called military sections of the country adja
cent to both banks of the Rhine, one finds that the higher and less
passable elevations of the mountains on both sides are in the South,
and not easily suitable for military operations. From Rastatt-Hageiiau
down, the valley of the Rhine appears to become much broader, and
the mountains more passable. Should, therefore, military operations
take place south of the river Main, it must necessarily be between
Mayence, Saarbruck, Strasburg, Rastatt, Pforzheim, Heilbronn,
AVurzburg, and Frankfort-on-the-Main. The impassable parts of the
mountains of the " Oden Forest " may be in this case avoided, from
the southwest, either ma Darmstadt or Heidelberg, towards Wurzburg
Up to Lauterburg, the Rhine opposite France, forms a line of defense.
The German-French boundary from Lauterburg, as far as the neutral
Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, however, is free, and the German terri
tory behind exposed to hostile invasion. To the northwest, from
Lauterbach, the Haardt rises, of which mountain chain already men
tion has been made. It falls abruptly towards the east, while towards
the west it gradually verges into an open, hilly ground. From
Kaisers Lautern, through a sort of sink which separates the Haardt
from the Mountains of Donner, as well as through numerous valleys,
there lead railroads and many other roads, from the upper Saar
to the Rhine, as far as Lauterburg-Biiigen. The valley of the Nahe
forms towards the northwest, the ; last chance for these communica
tions. On the other side of the Nahe, between it and the other rivers,
the Moselle and the Saar, the Mountains of the Dog's Back extend,
which, together with the Mountains of Taunus, surround the
stream, and like those latter mountains, characterize themselves by
their rocky ground and yawning abysses, encircling the lowrer val-

71

leys. Along the narrow valley of the Moselle, spirally appear, oppos
ite the Dog's Back, the principal sections of the West Lower-Rhinish
hilly landscapes, which cover the whole country half down the Maas,
and are known by the names, Eifel and High Veen, together with
the mountainous country of the Westerwald, (or Westerforest) and
that of the so-called Saueiiand encompassing the Rhine further down
as far as the neighborhood of Bonn. The Plateaux of the Eifel and
High Veen are, moreover, compressed and very rough, especially when
these approach the deep crevices which ultimately lead into the larger
valleys of the Moselle, and especially the Rhine, besides are studded
everywhere with isolated peaks and entire and conically-shaped
mountain ranges, befitting them very unfavorably for military opera
tions upon a large scale.

As the system of the communication answers to the topography of
the country, as just now sketched, it becomes evident that it is and
would so be found the most widely spread in the valley of the
Rhine, between Lauterburg and Mayence, and on the other side in
the belt between the Rhine and the Maas. In the Eifel High Veen
and in the Dog's Back it has fewer branches, while among the hilly
lands, as well as in the Haardt, communications are mostly formed by
defiles.

From the peculiar condition of the boundary line, as well as from
the geographical relationship to adjacent objects, it is clear that mili
tary operations which are aimed at Paris by Germany, and at Berlin
by France, can be undertaken by two routes : the one by way of the
Bavarian palatinate of the Rhine, above Mayence, and the other
by way of the Upper Maas in France via Luxemburg, in the vicinity of
Duseldorff, or, vice versa. The valley of the Moselle, with the adja
cent impassable portions of the Dog's Back and of the Eifel, confronts
both directions of these military operations, separating both battle
grounds from one another.

PART THE FOURTH.

THE PEUSSIAN AND FEENCH AEMY OEGANIZATIONS.

It is well known that France can throw an army upon the Ehine
much easier than Prussia can, because the way from Paris to Saar
Louis is but half as far as from Berlin to Saar Louis, and the yearly
frequented camp of Chalons, as well as the strong and well mantled
fortresses of Metz and Strasburg, (which since have capitulated) close
upon the boundary of Germany, and facilitate essentially the initia
tive to such a mammothian enterprise. It was, therefore, on the part
of the Germans, no useless apprehension of such surprise, as it would
have forced them beyond the Ehine. But the haste with which the
French diplomatists accelerated the breach of peace, upon which the
declaration of war should immediately follow, a proof of their utter
ignorance of affairs in Germany, especially of military organizations,
prevented the execution of the attempt at a surprise which otherwise,
beyond a doubt, would have become dangerous to Prussia.

France, however, unable to act as quickly as the voluble tongue of
her diplomatists dictated, gave Germany time to rally her strength to
a proportionate extent. The cause itself of their delay in action,
from the declaration of war to the commencement of hostilities, was
chiefly in placing the French army on a war footing, the consequence
of an organization so extremely bad, that it frustrated the advantages
that its greater strength in times of peace decidedly possesses over
the Prussian. Single sections of the army, for instance, the guards,
soon gathered their quotum of men from soldiers on furlough
in and near Paris; likewise the Zouaves Turcos and the Foreign Le
gion, which sustain in times of peace their full strength; all these are
quickly put in marching order. Even the infantry has, in proportion
to the Prussian, far less reserves and furlough to gather.

Yet the draft requires a greater time, because the regiments have to
draw their men, not from certain provinces close by, but from all over
the country. In the Prussian military organization, however, each
army corps is formed of men drawn from a certain province or county;
for instance, Pomerania, Mark, Westphalia, etc., and the war material
attached to it likewise from there. Such a system for the organiza-

73

tion of army corps, divisions and brigades is unknown in France;
their regiments receive their reserves as promiscuously gathered from
all over the Empire. (Which, by the by, to California readers it may
be interesting to remember, has two hundred thousand English square
miles, with about thirty-six millions of population upon it, while our
beloved State, Eureka, has one hundred and eighty-eight thousand
square miles, and about one million thoroughly happy people upon
it, who, by way of a past- time, always prefer bear-hunting to man
slaughter, and a serene happiness to the agony of ambition.)

Besides, in France there is no organization which reaches beyond
the formation of a regiment. The tactical combination of army corps,
the brigade division and corps connections, which in Prussia are per
manent, have in the French army, at the commencement of a war, to
be newly formed.

To these military defects may be added those of State. The Gov
ernment is, in a manner, unnaturally centralized in Paris, which
tends to suffocate and stifle all progress in towns and counties, by
alienating the thousands of various officials there from their duty as
free men, to be at all times personally responsible for their actions.
Everything has to emanate from Paris, and unless it is there com
manded, nothing whatever is done in the counties.

In Germany, especially in war times, every official throughout the
Empire holds in readiness what could possibly, and on a sudden,
be of him required by his immediate superior, so that as to the
army, the fact may be illustrated to its full admiration, that although
not a soldier of the entire army stood in the ranks on the 15th of July,
yet on the 4th of August, the frontier of Germany, towards France,
was found guarded in a manner that made a surprise on the part of
the French an impossibility.

But France had been busy ever since Sadowa, to put her army, if
not on a war footing, at least in readiness, and Minister Bouher never
uttered a more truthful word than when he said that peace, at that
date, existed only because Napoleon was not ready. May be he wrould
have waited still further, if he had succeeded in gaining Prussia over
to his plans in regard to the annexation of Belgium, and on the other
hand, by so much waiting and inertness, could have been sure that
the army would not have forsaken him. But the French army, ever
since 1866, underwent reforms ; the nation had been roused from its
security, although it was felt its present army system could not stand
securely the shock of war, especially against Prussia. Said reforms
were of a two -fold kind : either of a practical nature, like the intro
duction of the Chassepot rifle, the replenishing of the arsenals, the
increase of stock of small arms, the change in the system of drilling,
the rebuilding of eastern fortresses fit to stand the new inventions in

74

cannon: — or again reached the basis of army regulations, the recruit
ing system, or amended the law to buy off allegiance to serve ; like
wise the time of service in the army; the duty as reservist and the
establishment of the Mobile or volunteer guard. All these changes were
well conceived, but did not eradicate the evil. The permission to buy
off service had been considerably curtailed, but the main defect in the
French army system: the want of every kind of reserve remained
unaltered to its former full and pernicious extent. As to the Guard
Mobile, it was but a sorry imitation of the Prussian Landwehr system,
which all military men have entirely condemned. Particularly bad had
been the effect upon the military system of the expedition to Mexico,
having cost so much money, and above all, having injured the French
nation. The Government would not dare to state the figures it had
amounted to. All that was done, instead of replenishing the lost
material, large furloughs were granted to artillery and cavalry, which
put the army into such a state that it required all the energy and
indefatigable spirit of Marshal Niel, as Minister of War, to set
things somewhat right. The Senate granted one hundred and fifty-
eight million francs, and in 1868 sanctioned a loan of four hundred
and eleven million francs. All this money had been expended on
military purposes, as re-building of forts, manufacturing of Chasse-
pot rifies and other war materials. To every regiment of the line
were added two new companies ; a new regiment of Chasseurs had
been formed so as to reach the former compliment of cavalry; the artil
lery augmented in 1867 by one hundred and twenty cannon, made in
Austria and Germany, and a purchase made of thirty-six thousand
horses, and in 1868 ten thousand horses and mules additionally.
Marshal Niel then declared that but twenty-eight thousand horses
more were needed to consider the entire army on a war footing.
Probably that statement had been as incorrect as that there should
be ready up to 1870 nine hundred and twenty-two thousand Chassepot
rifles.

But there were other defects in the French army which were not
changed by these amendments and augmentations of materials. Louis
Napoleon had made his Marshals millionaires, and his soldiers pecuni-
arly independent. In 1855 he had introduced by law the horrid prac
tice of a buying off service ; a miserable system, according to which
every Frenchman could rid himself of military duty, by paying into
the Dotation Fund the sum of two thousand three hundred to two
thousand eight hundred francs, obliging the State to find a substitute
for him. In order to do so, the State re-enlisted old soldiers about
to quit, by paying them a bonus, increasing their pay, and then after
the time of their additional service had altogether elapsed, granted

.75

them an annuity, so that army service afforded means, after a certain
time, of making the individual pecuniarly independent.

The baneful consequences of this system to the French army, no
body more elaborately nor truthfully depicts and explains than Trochu,
in his celebrated work regarding the French army. He shows therein
that by it the consciousness of personal duty is entirely destroyed,
when the State finds substitutes, and societies are formed which find
such substitutes even for those who with little money can secure them
selves against the fatal muster roll of conscription.

That the army had to deplore such comradeship taking the place of
volunteers from all classes of society, is the natural consequence of
such a system. Soldiers becoming grey in barracks cannot again
become serviceable as industrious citizens of the nation, having alien
ated themselves from society, and not unfrequently become corrupted
by vices emanating from idleness, especially bad whisky. Every am
bition which might have been advantageous to both army and people
is thereby wantonly destroyed and made naught.

The original intention of this system, which so signally has failed,
had been to create an army personally devoted to the Napoleonic
dynasty, needing no yearly additions and renovations, yet ruined the
strength and the martial spirit of the army. Of the contingent of
one hundred thousand men, which, since 1856, should yearly be got
together, but twenty-three thousand appeared. Thus, the re-enlisted
old soldiers footed up one hundred and twenty-five thousand men,
and with other service added, viz., volunteers who choose the mili
tary career, officers, gens d'arms, foreign legions, in all about two
hundred and forty thousand men. Then the military budget of three
hundred million francs did not suffice for four hundred thousand men
in times of peace, although, in fact, there were but three hundred and
thirty to three hundred and fifty thousand in all ; consequently, there
was but room for one hundred thousand raw recruits, which was
abundantly filled during seven years with twenty-three thousand men
annually. In a military point of viewr, the natural consequence of
this pernicious system proved to be the dying out of all strength of
reserves. In times of war the army was without means to recuperate
its strength from the people. Napoleon experienced it already during
the Italian war, because in case of a war with Prussia at one and the
same time, he had only sixty thousand men left, deducting the depots
and fortresses, to guard the eastern frontier of France. Afterwards
he tried his best to amend the fault. Why he did not succeed had
two reasons — the one of a military, the other of a political nature.
From a military stand-point it contradicted the custom of annually
recruiting ninety thousand reserves necessary for a successful reorgan
ization, requiring a devotion to the task of drilling on the part of

76

officers and sub-officers, which is not at all part of the French char
acter. In the other case, by drawing from and again returning to
the nation, a full third of that figure would have given to the army
the appearance of an army of the people, which did not at all suit the
plans of Napoleon. He therefore adhered to the buying- off system
with its old soldiers, and annually small additions, but endeavored
to create a sort of army of reserve — this way, that by a decree of 1861,
he divided the number of annual recruits into two halves ; the one
should serve a longer time and then be attached to the so-called active
companies, while the other half should be drilled but two or three
months annually, and later five months, and then with their flighty
knowledge be dismissed, yet should stand ready in war times to serve
as recruits. Thus Napoleon thought of having solved the grand
problem of the organization of reserved bodies. General Troclm con
demns it by saying it does not depend upon large ciphers, but upon
the quality of troops. In 1889 the buying-off system was somewhat
modified, and the old decree of 1832 reinstalled, which made it op
tional to the man on duty to find a substitute. The re-enlisting was
abridged. After a five years' service the soldier should but serve
another five years as substitute, and those which had entered a ten
years' service should receive a situation in the civil service instead of
pecuniary remuneration. Since 1865, the first demand would bring a
contingent of sixty-three thousand men ; the second, with five months'
service, twelve thousand men. In this manner, and in obedience to
the law of the first of February, 1868, which guaranteed after a five
months' service a four yearly reserve, the army in nine years, there
fore — 1877 — would have a strength of seven hundred and seventy-six
thousand men.

But the duty to serve as reservist never suited French habits, while
the Prussian soldier serves as reservist six years, and as militia six
years. Marshal Niel then proposed to increase the Mobile Guard up
to five hundred and fifty thousand men from all over France, consist
ing of infantry and artillery, two thousand men each company. They
drilled, but could not be expected to stay more than a day from home.
Their duty should be to represent and take the place of the army in
large cities, fortresses, and on the coast and frontier, caring likewise
for security within the country. It consisted of young Frenchmen,
wTho did not serve in the army, together with volunteers, while officers
and sub-officers were pensioned officers and sub-officers of the regular
army there. Besides their pension they received a handsome pay for
this particular service. Since the death of Marshal Mel this innova
tion is, however, neglected, as it did not receive the approbation of
the people, especially in the south and west of France. General
Trochu touches these defects as not only detrimental to the tactical

77

advancement of the troops, but so personally. Styling the infantry
the " Queen of Battles," he deplores their disregard. At first special
annual recruits select their necessary arms, then the best drilled sol
diers are attached to the guards, and finally each battalion of the line
adds two special companies. The consequence is, that the four com
panies of the center form a feeble mass. Gen. Trochu succeeded in
abolishing the latter so as to disperse them among the whole battalion
as soldiers of the first class, but he failed in demanding for each bat
talion a company of efficient sharpshooters besides. Gen. Trochu
explains the want of tactical education in French officers as follows:

" In our last wars our tactic was to allow the troops nobly inspired
" to run for the battle-field; as soon as the first perished the battalion
" advanced, but no longer compact, general dissolution ensued/'

Incapable of flying, and likewise incapable of being cool and col
lected, they stormed onward to ascertain the cause of the effect. Dis
obeying the officers, they became commingled in large masses with
the enemy, which paralized the action of their artillery and cavalry,
upsetting the plan of the battle, and all the ramified and general
combinations which their cominaiiders-m-chief had made.

Gen. Trochu states that the cause is the nervous temperament of
soldiers from bad habits acquired in Africa, reducing systematic mili
tary operations to a guerrilla warfare, and lastly as consequent upon
the rigid rules of manoeuvres in time of peace, perfectly useless in
war.

While the French forgot the doctrine of Napoleon I, the Prus
sians studied it and added to its theory the experiences of the Crimean
war, the Italian and the North American. The French adhering to
the German idea or the old Dessauer, drilled continually in barracks,
Avhich proved to be of 110 use whatever in practice.

Altliough on the 16th of March, 1869, new orders were given as to
the drilling of infantry, yet France knows of its rigor little more
to-day than it did in 1792, which shows that France is by inclination
less martially than peacefully and republicanly inclined.

PART THE FIFTH.

THE WAR IN" DETAIL.

At the commencement of the war, the French army confronting
the German, footed up about four hundred thousand men, although
nominally, all reserves included, it was given at eight hundred and
sixty thousand men. They comprised but eight corps in all:

Guards, under General Bourbaki.

1st Corps " Marshal McMahon.

2d " " General Frossard.

3d " " Marshal Bazaine.

4th " " General de 1'Admirault.

5th " " General de Failly.

6th " " Marshal Canrobert.

7th " " General Felix Douay.

The North German army numbered four hundred and ninety-three
thousand men, and one thousand two hundred and forty-eight pieces
of artillery. The militia available at any time, two hundred and
thirty thousand men. During war the body of reserves numbers
one hundred and thirty thousand; in all, eight hundred and fifty-three
thousand men. The South German army numbers — Bavaria., ^everity
thousand men, with one hundred and ninety- two pieces of artillery;
Wurtemberg, twenty-three thousand six hundred men, and fifty-four
pieces of artillery; Baden, twenty-one thousand six hundred men,
and forty- two pieces of artillery.

The entire army, nine hundred and sixty- eight thousand two hun
dred men, with one thousand five hundred and thirty-six pieces of
artillery.

Commander-in-Chief of the entire army is the King of Prussia.

1st Army Corps, commanded by General von Steinmetz.

2nd Army Corps, commanded by Prince Frederick Charles, of
Prussia.

2nd Army Corps, commanded by the Crown Prince of Prussia.

4th Army Corps, commanded by the Crown Prince of Saxony.

First Army Corps of Reserves, commanded by the Grand Duke of
Mecklenburg-Schwerin .

79

The Bavarian! Army Corps, commanded by General von der Tann.

The Wurtemberg Army Corps, commanded by Lieutenant-General
von Obernitz.

The Baden. Army Corps, commanded by Lieutenant-General von
Beyer.

SKIRMISHING.

The watch of the Khine gives the alarm :

The great horn of Orlando is sounded.

Let Alsace be mine, which does you no harm ;

With Metz and Lorraine the matter be rounded. — GERMANIA.

Small detachments of African Chasseurs of the French army cros
sing the German frontier on the 19th of July, were immediately driven
back on French soil by German Lancers. The French, returning in
larger bodies, skirmishing commenced near Saarbruecken on the 24th;
at the village Gerweiler, south of the little river Saar, and to the
west of Saarbruecken, on the 2Gth ; and at Niederbronn, five Ger
man miles from the frontier, until the 30th of July, noon, when the
first telegram was received from Trier, which stated that the enemy
kept quiet. Later in the day, at five P.M., another telegram was
received at Saarbruecken, which said that the German infantry had
orders, in case of overwhelming masses, to quickly retire from Saar
bruecken, the cavalry only keeping the enemy in sight. It was fur
ther mentioned that the French were concentrating to the east of Thi-
onville, having vacated Gersweiler, after having been chased out of
the forest of St. Arnual. Next day, at nine A.M., a telegram was
received from Saar Louis, wrhich informed the German commander
that the French were beyond Forbach, with four regiments of infan
try strong, one company sharpshooters, three squadrons cavalry, and
one battery. The idea of the French had been to separate the Ger
mans at Saar Louis from those at Trier, by destroying the railroad
which runs parallel with the French frontier from Saarbruecken to
Saar Louis and Trier, it being the only one which directly connects
the latter cities. They attempted it from Forbach, a frontier town of
French Lorraine, as it is situated opposite the Prussian frontier town
of Saarbruecken, the railroad there being but two English miles dis
tant from France. St. Arnual and Gersweiler, both Prussian villages,
are situated between Forbach and Saarbruecken, while Louisenthal
and Voelklingeii are little railroad towns between Saarbruecken and
Saar Louis. The Germans, of course, were equally industrious in
destroying the French railroad between Saargemund and Hagenan,
which traverses the Kheinthal (valley of the Khine) down to the river
Saar, and might have been very serviceable to the French in trans
porting provisions for their troops, besides possessing other tactical
and strategical advantages.

so

Matters became rather trifling until the 2nd of August, when sud
denly the French darkened the sun with the Chassepots of three
divisions (about forty thousand men) and twenty-three pieces of artil
lery, under the heir apparent, with the tremendous intention of annihal-
ating seven hundred and fifty solitary Prussian Leonidasians in the
Thermopilan passes of that anything but gappy neighborhood. The
fourth and fifth dispatches explain this affair earnestly : ' ' On the
" second of August, ten A.M., the small detachment at Saarbruecken
" was attacked by three divisions and the town bombarded with
" twenty-three pieces of artillery. At noon the heights, and at two
" P.M. the town were duly deserted, the detachment retiring to the
" nearest station. Loss comparatively trifling. At the same time it
c ' was mentioned that Emperor Napoleon had arrived at eleven o'clock
" before Saarbruecken."

On the same day the King of Prussia had arrived at Mayence. The
command over the three army corps, duly entrusted by him to Gen
eral von Moltke, subdivided, as they were, into the first, the northern,
mostly centered in the county of Trier, resting on the fortress Coblenz,
and commanded by General von Steinmetz ; the second, the central,
centered in the Bavarian palatinate, and resting on the fortress of
Mayence, and commanded by Prince Frederick Charles ; and the
third, the southern, centered in the palatinate, and resting on the
fortress of Rastatt, commanded by the Crown Prince of Prussia;
the venerable Moltke took command.

THE BATTLES.

Having issued his orders to the three army corps to advance upon
the enemy, the southern wing, under the Crown Prince of Prussia,
began, on the 4th of August, to close on the enemy at Weissenburg,
Alsace, and storming the adjacent strongly fortified Glaisberg, defeated
the French division under JDouay, in a very decisive manner. Con
tinuing to advance, the same commander, but a few days later,
on the 6th, engaged the French in the first great battle, the
memorable one of Woerth, in which the third army put to flight
the first corps of the French, under Marshal McMahon, while on
the same day the Northern army, under Steinmetz, with death-
defying impetuosity, stormed the heights of Spicheren, defeat
ing Frossard, in command of the second corps of the French. The
natural consequence of these thorough victories had been that the
entire French army was forced to retreat towards the river Moselle.

To counteract the terrible blow which French official statements of
victories, instead of defeats, had dealt to the dynasty of Napoleon, the

81

Emperor decided upon transferring the command of the French army
to Marshal Bazaine.

Be it remembered that the genius of Moltke having so placed the
German army as to form with its three army corps a wide half -circle,
of which the center under Prince Charles had not as yet been in action
at all, Moltke now commanded the united forces to at once close upon
Metz, the virgin fortress of Germany, taken from her three hundred
and nineteen years ago, and one of the j/rincipal -strongholds of
France.

Although the French army had entrenched itself near the river
Nied, on French territory, it, nevertheless, vacated the neighborhood,
crossing the river Moselle, near Metz, upon the cavalry of the Ger
mans arriving before Metz, Pont-a-Mousson, and Nancy, together
with sections of the army from Strasburg. Here it was, before Metz,
where in three days the redoubtable Germans dashed to pieces the
old glory of French arms, and transferred upon themselves the grim
visage of Mars, who, wherever he thrones, holds the crimes which are
heirs to barbarism in subjugation. On the fourteenth of August,
General Steinmetz threw into confusion three French divisions, at
Pange and Courcelles, forcing them back upon Metz. On the six
teenth, Prince Frederick Charles having crossed the Moselle but a day
previously, annihilated in twelve hours, at Mars la Tour and Vionville,
the martial pride of selected French troops, while on the eighteenth
of August the venerable hero, King William, in grand command
of the whole slaughtering force, attacked the French in their fortified
position to the west of Metz, and wrung from them in nine hours time
the victories at Gravelotte and Razonville, beyond a doubt for ever fatal
to the French nation as a ruling war power in Europe.

From that hour history asserts it that the French had to yield the
continental power of Europe to Germany as practically consequent
upon this very victory, and owing to the decided superiority in the
leadership over the German armies in comparison with the one over
the French. Leaf after leaf was duly plucked by Germany from
gory battle fields in victories without end, in self-defence of her
national independence, and to wind the wreath of laurels which shall
forever grace the broad forehead of Germania, as the future continental
safeguard of peace, enlightenment, and constant exercise in humane
deeds of love. The newly-born sister of America will, in due time,
receive the baptismal of political liberty, without restraint, as the
natural consequence of the prodigious effect of universal free schools,
to be realized in times of peace only ; but until then, in the face of the
awful fact of being closely surrounded by less advanced, and conse
quently murderous and warlike nations, on the continent of Europe,
9

82

Germany lias to stand for possibly a generation to come in the unen
viable position of a gaoler.

It lias, furthermore, to enforce law and order at home, to prevent a
disturbance of the prolific soil against immature republicanism, best
denominated " the unripe fruit of knowledge instead of communism."
The sound seed is long ago sown ; like upon a bed of flowers, the
young plants in due time appear and become visible in masses upon
a sudden, so shall Germany produce in due time a compact mass of
principally equally informed millions of men, who, in their real, con
sequently social amiability, shall so have universally advanced, and so
be considered sufferable to each other, while coining in contact with
one another in public life, as to be able to neutralize the chilly fog of
the spirit of caste, which hangs over all aristocratic atmosphere, and
obscures the happiness of all on the sole account of that uneven dis
tribution of kiiowlege. Dispersed, the genial warmth of the ever
charitable sun of enlightenment, will quickly mature reason so as to
make the obvious truth fully bloom in all its pristine loveliness, that
every man living at any time upon earth shall not merely be his own
independent sovereign, but respect the sovereignty of every other man
he sees living next to him, near him, far and wide.

When 011 the evening of the last named great day, the Pomera
nians, the bravest of the brave, on a par in physical strength with
our stalwart backwoods-men, stormed, under the very eyes of
Moltke, all the heights to make sure of victory, when the legions un
der Bazaine waved for shelter towards the walls of Metz, (Moselle)
when at last the greatest warrior of the age, the aforesaid Moltke,
testified to the historically astounding truth of a complete victory:
Suddenly appearing before the King, merely saying, while he delib
erately wiped his forehead with his handkerchief, " Sire, the battle
is won, the enemy retires," — then it was that the French war power
was crushed, and European civilization rescued from the fangs of
surplus crime and that mediaeval superstition so easily practiced in
blood.

Germany, the world may rest assured, shall never have to blush
before it, as having had other intentions than to prepare Europe for
self-government, but not until that distracted division of the globe
is thoroughly competent for the task through education and general
enlightenment, which shall, like with us, ensure a peaceful permanency
to the republic of nations, shall she relinquish the grasp upon the
sword to awe the vast millions of Europe in obedience into law and or
der, nor cease to prevent unmerciful masses from blaspheming before
hand with carnage, and revenge the sacred republic and her worthy
disciples in France and everywhere else in Europe,

Bazaine, with a greater portion of the French army thrown into

83

Metz, McMahon, with the remainder of the army thoroughly pre
vented from joining Bazaine, the Germans found free the road to
Paris.

Prince Frederick Charles immediately tightening the ring around
Metz, the 3d army corps, under the Crown Prince of Prussia, began
at once to march upon Paris in a south-westerly direction, in company
with the newly formed 4th army corps commanded by the Crown
Prince of Saxony, moving northwardly along the river Maas.

Suddenly their movements had to be changed, as McMahon having
received reinforcements, had quitted the Camp at Chalons (Maine);
but instead of hastening to cover Paris, he endeavored to again reach
the north, intentionally of joining Bazaine. However, the Crown
Prince of Saxony barricaded his way on the 27th of August, near
Busancy, which afforded the army under the Crown Piince of Prus
sia the necessary time for returning from the feint, and joining the
former, enabling the Germans to conjointly finish the army of Mc
Mahon at Beaumont, and in a manner that a junction with Bazaine
was henceforth not only made impossible, but the single road into
Belgium at all left for the disorganized columns of the French to pos
sibly effect their escape upon.

Bazaine likewise had not been idle. On the 31st of August he de
bouched with all his forces, left at his disposal, in an easterly direc
tion towards Servigny and Noisseville, trying with all his might to
break the iron fetters of the Germans. However, the heroic resist
ance of the division of Kummer, and of the East Prussians under Man-
teuffel, impenetrable like bristling cactus hedges, forced him after a
fight of thirty-two hours duration, to return to his prison. During
the night, from the 31st of August to the 1st of September, the Prus
sians, Saxons, and Bavarians, forming upon the banks of the river
Maas, encircled the French army in a wide space to the east of the
fortress Sedan (Maas). "With the dawn of day, the terrific battle,
of which history shall forever make mention, commenced with
what was designed to either capture or route the entire French
army and finish the war. The French driven from the villages Floirig
and Bazeilles, before a fire out of 800 pieces of artillery, the circle of
the German army became smaller and smaller, until the enemy within,
inclusive of Napoleon, was hurled like Caffres into a kraal, in hurried
flight into Sedan. Forsaken by his own soldiers, who had lost their
irresistible elan, and under circumstances had become demoralized,
Napoleon wrote to the King of Prussia expressing himself willing to
deliver up his sword and himself as prisoner of war. Maximum im-
perium sibi imperare. The capitulation of the army followed next
day; Marshal McMahon, being dangerously wounded, General

84

Wimpffen delivered up the army, 83,000 men, with 4,000 officers. A
few hours later Napoleon appeared before* the King of Prussia.

The Napoleonic empire broken upon the battle-field on the 2d Sep
tember, 1870, which news Palikao kept secret for forty-eight hours,
ceased to be on the 4th of September a national institution of France.
With it disappeared the Empress, her son, Benedetti, Ollivier, and
especially, Grammont, and as usually the republic was declared.

In the most brilliant manner have victories upon victories justified
the Prussian military organization of 1860 as the greatest providen
tial fortune which ever Germany was favored by. It has served as
the mightiest aid towards the accomplishment of the union of Ger
many. The few croakers against it in Southern Germany have disap
peared as if by magic, and are not any longer noticing the bard
Count F. Filippi de Faby, who resides at a short distance from Berlin,
in No. 22 Place Napoleon Cherbourg, who tried to chant a poem to

them:

D'un NapoleoD, la gloire
Vous voit encore abfitus:
C'est toujour la votre histoire
La senl de vos vertus.
Vous pensier d'etre invincibles
Soit domp'te penple trop vain !
Pour toi, restant inflexibles
Nous gardous les bords du Rhine.

[Exit Napoleon and his bard forever.]

Created in 1860 and improved upon and introduced into all Ger
many in 1866, the Prussian military organization has saved Germany.
Through it the country was enabled to appear upon the frontier with
an overwhelming army, to surprise and defeat the single divisions of
the enemy in constant succession. The enormous number of reserv
ists and militia put Germany in a position to immediately fill voids
which a murderous fire had made, and without allowing a weakening
of the army of operations to take place, made it possible that strong
divisions of reserve could enter France, and large numbers of com
panies of militia could occupy the long lines of operations and re
possess those portions of territory which had lately been occupied.

The North German divisions of militia alone amount to over 200,000
men, and the South German divisions over 30,000 men. That they
are all very competent has become known even abroad, especially so
they have proved at the siege as well as in the close battles before
Metz. Germany would have had no chance of success in a war like
this, in which it not only depended upon victory after victoiy to pre
vent the enemy from recuperating, but to hold the ground which had
been conquered, which comprised pretty nearly one-third of France,
if it had not been for the Prussian organization of the army. It has
not only created an army of unsurpassed numerical vastness, but
every soldier was fit to be called one, which alone culminated in the
success of subduing the French upon their own ground.

PART THE SIXTH.

THE FRENCH REPUBLIC

It appears reasonably certain that no monarch can fill the vacant
chair of Favre! Had Favre at once remained as President of the
republic instead of Thiers — a former Minister of Louis Phillip —
being substituted, not only would the rebellion from the 18th of
March to the 19th of May, 1871, not have occurred, but the republic
would have been maintained quite satisfactorily to the majority of the
people. If the republic cannot command respect by virtue of the
law, how can a future monarch protect the law without access to
force ? It is therefore reasonable that the republic be maintained
and thus peace made lawful, without a name as President, whose an
tecedents were monarchical, and who as such must be obnoxious to
the very people who withj glad consent declared and voted the repub
lic on the 4th of September. Besides, to return to monarchs them
selves whom the French nation indulged in only for vainglory of their
arms, is now made impossible since the Napoleons, so to say, self-
made monarchs by success of arms, and not of blue blood, are like
wise legitimately and consistently obliterated from their memory.
The second Napoleon in rule having filled the right scale to an over
flow of misery for the nation, justice now lifts high the left scale of
the first Napoleon, with his martial and especially his political suc
cesses, as based and consequent upon his ambition and meddlesome
diplomacy, which succeeded so long in alienating the Southern Ger
man States from the natural tie of the Northern, upon the obtuse
plea that the hnmanization of mankind, heterogeneous as to national
ities, could be effected without preparatory education — under monarchi
cal rule — in other words, by rude force.

As to Germany, the world will admit that in regard to the Union of
Germany, it is not the offspring of fear of Prussia on the part of the
Southern German States, but is the natural consequence of enlight
enment having attained its principal height in Prussia, diffused itself
through the North as well as through Bavaria, Baden and Wurtem-
berg, and is daily encouraged in by the example of America, where
about eight millions of citizens reside who are of German origin.

86

(As to manifestations of rejoicings of the latter at the Union so
cemented by brotherly love, they were indeed touching in the extreme.

The torch-light processions in beautiful San Francisco — a distance
from Germany of just about half around the globe — were large
enough, on several occasions, to suffice to illuminate the hearts of all
Germany as now seen from the Cathedral of Strasburg, and make
them confident as sympathy can only.)

Again, the conduct of the revolutionists in Paris, proves conclu
sively that the greatest freedom from caste cannot aid the Republic at
all, unless the people become universally enlightened, and conse
quently peaceable, by means of a radical reform in school education,
and make it everywhere a municipal law that the poorest of the
poor children of the million have free and unpai$ access, to it.
The pedigree of civilization rests upon merit, as merit upon knowl
edge, and knowledge upon developed reason through education in
peaceful times. It will place itself where it belongs in progress, aided
by the Odd-Fellowship 01 the appreciation of the worth of man, in
this enlightened age, which knows naught but of merit. That merit
has but one towering ambition : to please God !*

* Diverge to the very antipodes of the globe, and, for instance, place God's child
of a Cannibal of the Solomon group off Northeastern Australia, whose parent,
to-day, habitually partakes of man food, into civilized hands at a very tender age,
give it education, and nourish its divine soul with love, and it will be in proper time
as useful a member of society as anybody else. But should an uncharitable aristo
crat by heart, although republican by name — an ignorant anthropologist, who, vexed
at being unable to find out whether Adam and Eve, names which shall signify the
first pair of the human race, who lived and were created to Kve the short space of
time upon earth, had been brown, yellow, red, black or white, where, and especially
when those two had been living, if such an ante-mundane visionary should get hold
of the little one, then, of course, it is not to be wondered at, should he be all his life
time afraid of the anthropophagic propensities of an innocent child's late royal
savage great grandfathers.

Forgetting that the Mongolians settled in Europe though comparatively to the Jura
period but a few years ago, he is incensed at the Chinese in China remaining again
concealed, and won't even associate with him there, nor of their own accord visit
him here, until he shall have proved to them in their own vernacular, which is
necessary for him to do, in order to introduce an effect upon their understanding,
how much better he is than they are, and in what his superiority over them exists,
and more than that, shall have convinced them of it within the top of their cues. How
wonderfully he will do in China, where they pretend to have never heard of earth
quakes in Java, or the Red Sea flooding the globe, the dense millions then of East
ern Asia not having been communicative, and with whom a few days, synonymous of
a few thousand years later, Vasco de Gama and Magellan found that virtues existed
which it must have taken ages to acquire — for instance, that hunger is with them
interpreted by cheerful labor, a good appetite by health ; thirst is assuaged by tea,
and quarrels by smoke, and love , the priceless treasure of the heart, is not a ware
which is vended in Sultanic callousness, and who as one nation foot up a concourse

87

History now continues its pages of this war, as unwisely waged by
the Republic of France. It is, therefore, the second period of the
war. Before it so does, reference to important events which have
occurred in the east of France, take due precedent. Just as little as
it had been possible for the French armies to resist upon the open
battle-field the efficient precision of the German artillery, could the
fortresses in the north-east of France do it, which it was necessary
for the Germans to take. A number of them had capitulated up to

of 400,000,000 people, possessing a literature without an alphabet, and a language
without a grammar, thus realizing the solution of the greatest enigma ever heard of.
As to countless centuries, during which the Government has been in the hands of
State philosophers, and the vernacular dialects have been abandoned to the laboring
classes, how he will be startled to find that the Chinese language is, notwithstanding,
by no means the most intricate, cumbrous, and unwieldy vehicle of thought, that
ever in spite of eighteen distinct dialects, obtained credence among other people
including himself.

The fact is, it is for this Government to enlighten the remainder of the civilized
world upon the immediate consequences so multitudinously resulting from steam,
now permanently connecting the great race of mankind in Asia, inclusive of Japan
ese, and exclusive of Hindoos, (as being the latter taken care of by the British)
nearly 450,000,000 of people, with all the chances of an appreciation of our system
of civilization, from which consequences the realization of our hopes of success of
progress among mankind at large may be safely predicted, upon one condition, viz. ,
that the Chinese language be introduced all over the less populated civilized world.
It being the language spoken by a living people numbering 400,000,000, would be
far more useful in the end to know than any language except the English ; and as to
Latin and Greek, the wisdom derived through them from those defunct pagan nations
might be found, upon close study, considerably exceeded and excelled, for what we
are really aware of this day, by the Chinese classics, and at once much valuable time
saved to the LIVING AGE. A people so very ancient and great in numbers, who
carry with them, wherever they happen to go for a minute or two, three standard
virtues of our civilization — Peacefulness, Industry, and Sobriety — should not be
reasoned with by the sword by any nation, as stamping the civilized and reasoning
world in their eyes as far more uncivilized and unreasonable, than they themselves are,
at least surely were, previous to this century, in that particular respect, and fully
explains that, for the present, the Chinese are not a migrating people, and when they
do, proudly enshroud themselves in their ancient habits, not finding the civilized
world at all comprehensibly superior to themselves.

Another reason is this, that they, when traveling, acquire knowledge of the Eng
lish language, and interpret falsely our civilization after their own concretely, pre
judiced fashion, because a mere smattering of a foreign language, sufficient in daily
life, is quite insufficient to draw wisdom from literature, nor adequate to do justice
to and appreciate the virtues of a people, while we, altogether, tapping in darkest
ignorance of the Chinese language, presumptively judge at random from hearsay,
knowing in reality next to nothing ourselves personally of them. All this accounts
that the Chinese contribute nothing to our civilization, except eatables and wearables,
nor voluntarily and gladly allow the civilized world to benefit them, because of igno
rance of their language, and prejudices of every sort against them, as consequent
upon general ignorance of their literature. That China and Japan are redeemable

88

September, 1870, after a resistance of more or less duration of time-
but two of them, Strasburg and Metz, had not. Being strongly for
tified, they fell into German hands much later, and not until after a
long and laborious siege. Already in August the Government over
the two provinces of Alsace and the German part of Lorraine,
had been duly and justly transferred to Germany, as one of the
necessities and consequences of the war. Not only are the people of
Alsace and Lorraine originally German, whom the sacred duty to the
Union require that they should be annexed, no matter how long a
time they had been alienated from her, but, by abridging them from
France and adding them to Germany, the numerical strength of the
former became duly diminished, while that of the latter augmented

in time to republicanism, through adoption of our civilization, appears very encour
agingly certain from the virtues aforenamed, which they very universally possess to
an astonishing degree, and the friendliness which their Governments and peoples
show America in preference to Europe, which they view as a torn-to-pieces conglom
eration of small nations, very far inferior to them in compactness, and as they con
clude, from constant wars, in all other respects. No ! our honor now forbids to rest,
since steain affords us a constant opportunity of coming in close contact with them,
until we can explain to them in their own vernacular why we are the civilized peo
ple, of whom they would and should profit, morally, socially, and materially, and
thus gain upon them the adoption of our American principles of civilization, and the
steady custoniship of innumerable articles of commerce, especially the consumption
of our impenetrable forests, which, on the Knitchpack, in Alaska alone, would pay
for the little outlay of $7,250,000 ten-fold to begin with, and which, otherwise, would
stay there until the next flood.

The antipathy which the civilized world has against them to-day, as absorbing
labor to the pecuniary detriment of our people, would last forever, as consequent
upon the impossibility of nationally and familiarly associating with them as ynt, on
account of the prevailing ignorance of their language, and our pardonable prejudices
against their tastes, their habits, and their manners, in consequence of having, so to
say, but now come in earnest contact with them since the creation of the world,
which reciprocated antipathy befogs the true interests and enlightened duties of two
halves of mankind.

The time has come for the ice of clannishness and intolerance — the offspring of
ignorance — to melt, before the genial warmth of an ever-progressing, universal
enlightenment, and the question forever and ever truthfully answered. Has God cre
ated two halves of mankind, that they should live estranged upon this earth ? — that
they should live in enmity, or be the laughing stock of each other ? Has the aristo
crat ever charitably conceived it that the savage lives by the same grace of the
Almighty Creator of the illimitable Universe as he does ? And that, consequently,
he should go there and befriend him, and consider the Samaritan promptings of such
an act in the light of a performance of a filial duty to God, and himself as a
gentleman. Besides, what would our civilization really amount to if we could not
make more money out of barbarians than they of us ? On the other hand, in what
does Europe benefit America ? Setting aside the immigrant question, in what would
it so do, suppose we had no commerce with Asia, with Oceanica, and with Africa ?
Perhaps the aristocrat will condescend to answer candidly ! Again, how those

89

to approach to and form an equal balance of power of strength
among the two nations, which, for the sake of peace hereafter, was,
more than any other reclamation, absolutely necessary, and, there
fore, demanded of France to comply with.

The hue and cry which arose against this proceeding among civil
ized nations, had a treble origin, all of which three reasonings were
not alone unjust, but wrong altogether.

Firstly. The republicans all over the world thought it their duty to
be with the Kepublic of France, as Napoleon had left with no possi
bility of a return; who, having once not only abjured the Republic,

Chinese and Japanese yearn to learn of us, the Japanese have lately best shown.
Therefore, it is our turn, indeed, to quickly learn, if not Japanese, at least Chinese,
as being a vernacular spoken by a ten times larger nation than the Japanese lan
guage is diffused among, teach it in all public schools of America and Europe.
Waste no more time upon dead languages than is materially considered absolutely
necessary. Our Oriental students coming here to study Webster, Clay, and Sunmer,
and finding us bending over Plato, Cicero, or Demosthenes, would politely substi
tute the great Chinese Confucius, and with all the etiquette of a devout Salaam, leave
for home by the next mail steamer.

The smaller scholars in our schools would be far more amused to learn Chinese
than any European language, for the reason that the writing is so contrived as to
denote by the same character the sounds of each of the nineteen different words, all
of which it equally represents, and is, therefore, very easily acquired. It is likewise
known that it is of no great use among the multitude in China who cannot read,
which would be of so much greater advantage to our people in the end.

At present it appears that of all the great scholars of the Chinese language, outside
that mysterious fraternity, there is probably not one who to-day can converse in six
of those aforesaid eighteen dialects, or could either orthographically write or inter
pret an important State paper without the assistance of a teacher. Alas ! Those
teachers, who are they ? So far to foreigners in China, on account of prejudice and
mistrustfulness on the part of the Chinese, for reasons above stated, the teachers which
can be obtained are obviously but the very scum and refuse of the Chinese literary
body, the plucked of the examinations, and the runagates from justice or tyranny.
These are engaged at a lower salary by foreigners than they would obtain among the
Chinese as Secretaries to a high official, if they were otherwise suitable ; and if they
are calygraphists, or speak a tolerable idiom, or pronounce with a certain purity of
accent, (although they have to be unavoidably feared as domestic spies, repeating all
they see and hear) they are blandly respected by some confiding Sinologue, who
maintains them because he can't help himself. If one of those Chinese philologists
should happen also to be the son of some small mandarin, he becomes to his pupil
-a very great authority on Chinese politics. Chinese politics ! Good ! Non-inter
course ! which signifies that all mankind is barbarous save themselves, because they
can do without the outside world of 600,000,000, and have so done for ages, together
with the Japanese, while we cannot do without them, because we need their teas.
The above teacher is, at the same time, a Petronius of Chinese ceremonial. Papers
are indited, and foreign policy is shaped according to the response of this oracle.
The Sinologue who derives his inspiration from this source, is again taken as an
absolute authority by the civilized world in general. He has, furthermore, to think
it his official duty to adopt, while he is in the flowery land, what he is given to
10

90

had ever since availed himself of his sovereign power to gratify dynas-
tical pride at the expense of the prodigal trust of a confiding nation.
That from under imperial robes, thus folded a republican heart,
should designedly have disguised itself, harboring the noble intention
of setting Europe free after France should have conquered its heteroge
neous millions and annexed them to France, upon the example of Amer
ica absorbing into the folds of outstretched brotherly arms the emigrant
from any portion of the terrestrial globe, the world has long ago
eschewed as a base imposition upon its credulity, and therefore exe
crated the Napoleons.

The idea of monarchs and conquerors taking America as an
example ! Why, America, no more than a Free Mason or an Odd

understand are Chinese customs, and to amuse himself the best way he can by pity
ing instead of studying the Chinese anti-flooded, rather antique and interesting cere
monial of 400,000,000 peaceable, sober, and industrious people.

Returning to the moral principle of republicanism as resting upon enlightenment,
it is considered the first, highest, and strongest pillar of truth, which reason builds
through all ages, that, the human race has equal rights and duties. An universally
educated country will always guarantee an easy going republic. As to France, it
has less idolatrous spirit of caste, and consequently is more self-possessed of a
manly appreciation of the principles of republicanism, than any other nation in
Europe. Her people are proverbial for graceful, social manners, and a jovial,
hilarious spirit. Proofs are, her various attempts at a republic, while every
where else in Europe, ignorance, and strange to say including France — among
280,000,000 of people — and their want of all personal influence and power, in con
sequence, was hithertofore so pitifully discernible that it could not much more than
be thought of by them, far less be attempted with the remotest hope of success.
Republicanism is altogether the personification of gentility. It is universal par
excellence. The definition of that word is Freedom, is Christianity, is Masonry, is
Odd Fellowship, etc. ; in short, is everything reasonable, good, enlightened, amia
ble and independent. In the United States of America every born American is a
gentleman by the breath of liberty. The formal European finds it out in about a
score of years; the poor, however, feel it upon landing that the Americans are not
the only ones so born. In the meantime the aristocrat suffers dreadfully from
ennui. Everybody labors but he: the effeminated or prejudiced European does not;
at least not with that natural ease with which the born American performs that
wisely ordained intellectual duty by which he guards himself against sin, until the
habits of the European are entirely changed by the ever-tossing wheel of time.
Then only has he benefited by his travels, and then only does he stay where he is
and is genteel. As labor, demanded by the physical condition of man, is a wise
peremptory necessity, so it is destined to serve as the promoting power, of virtue
and morality, being the whetstone of the intellect, when obeyed in cheerfully and
voluntarily, mentally or manually performed. It consequently creates that gentility
which is but a double progress — an augmentation of the attributes of civilization
and an increase of the comfort and happiness to the individual being.

The application of time constantly devoted to either mental or manual labor,
leaving no room for a waste of energy from idleness and its degrading effects of
slothful habits leads to the attainment of wealth. That there are among the
40,000,000 Americans already more substantially wealthy individuals than can be

91

Fellow, thinks of forcing people into the union of brotherly love !
It might as well ask a grown up Apache, or a bigamist, or a criminal,
or an habitual drunkard, or an infidel, or any other vicious or crazy
element, to be their brother! No! If charity demands pity of man and
nations in the sight of God, it likewise demands prudence not to
expose a good cause to the infallible ruin from seduction by what
is barbarous and fatal to it. Charity strives, by all manner and
means, to civilize and befriend man wherever he lives forlorn, in order
that he may appreciate freedom for his own and for the good of man
kind.

found among 280,000,000 Europeans, is traceable only to that fact of an universal
love of voluntary individual labor, which is instigated by personal independence in
a free and fabulously rich country. Such men always appreciate freedtom, enjoy
wealth, and live peaceably. Every gentleman is peaceable when he is at work. It
includes a fearful courage at the same time, when he is disturbed at it. Attack a
peaceable man, a peaceable nation, and the aggressor is either cut by the frown of
independence and the etiquette of disgust; or, if murderously inclined, suffers
extermination forthwith. So it was in the war for the defense of the Union in
America, and so it is now for the defense of the Union of Germany. Deplorable as
the cases are in this enlightened age, yet they admit of no alternative. Revenge is
unknown, unforgiving heart's revenge. A civilized man governs himself, and
never offends. The law is made for ungovernable men. Every gentleman lives
\vithiu. the boundary of decorum, therefore within the pale of law and decency. In
the United States of America law is subordinate to the immense masses of gentle
men, who do not need it except as a guarantee for the comforts of life to be officially
testified to. As to a fear of the law, it is not so understood in America at all. A
gentleman fears nothing, averring rightly that fear is the consciousness of guilt — the
remembrance of a bad action; a gentleman is never guilty of anything which might
be called bad; he communes with God and governs himself before he acts, which
leads to lawful and civilized actions — makes friends instead of enemies wherever he
lives, which is sense well applied, and which education, good company, especially
Ladies', and an appreciation of art, science, and the beauties of nature, develop in
him.

PART THE SEVENTH.

WHY PEACE WAS NOT CONCLUDED AT SEDAN.

The republicans, in other words, the entire unbiased civilized
world, became at last convinced that the republic of France had bet
ter yield the two provinces to Germany, because these were, as
already stated, of German origin, had been German property once
summarily taken, had now in monarchical fashion been legitimately
re-conquered, and by their population diminishing France and en
larging Germany, adjusted the physical strength of both nations upon
a satisfactory equality absolutely necessary for the sake of future
peace in Europe. They argued correctly that the republican cause
had lost nothing by the cession, if considered that Germany to-day
like Great Britain stands upon intellectual and moral grounds, dis-
guisedly nearer the principles of a legitimate, lawful, law-abiding and
therefore permanent republic, flourishing in peace only, than France
visibly does in spite of the latter, remaining ahead of both Germany,
Great Britain with her colonies, as well as the entire remainder of
nations upon the continent of Europe, with the only exception of
Switzerland and Montenegro, because it is one to-day, and the others
are not, which guarantees to a republic wherever it is in reality es
tablished, the sympathy of the civilized world with the United States
of America at their head, acknowledging its legitimacy.

Viewed from this consistent point of view, the idleness of the
SECOND AKGUMENT against the acquisition of Alsace and a portion
of Lorraine is likewise exonerated and explained as follows: The
two provinces conquered from Germany posterior to the foundation,
in due historical rotation, of the French monarchical power over the
continent of Europe, as founded by Henry IV, within that period of
his reign which dates from 1598 to 1610, and was possible only and
consequent upon the decline of Spain at the time of the government
of Lerma, and which French traditional power has been perpetuated
as such through the three consecutive c\ynasties of the Bourbons, the
Orleans arid Napoleons, up to the 4th of September, 1870, when it
was duly ceded to Imperial Germany by the force of this war — as to
these two provinces republican France now says, it will not spare an

93

inch of territory. What does it mean ? Do they think the people
of Alsace and Lorraine are consigned to perdition ? — are irredeema
bly lost to republicanism ? which principle embraces not only Ger
many, but mankind!! No. It means nothing less than that the
Kepublic will continue in the footsteps of the principles of mon
archy, power! and is not sure of its permanency, being harrassed by
monarchical claimants and their troublesome adherents. Anyhow,
it is very inconsistent and very unwise if considered that Germany
never yet proved an aggressive spirit, nor that any monarchy ever
yet dared to attack a legitimate republic, and in this case, Germany,
a disguised republic as to comparative intelligence and fitness, and as
such peaceably inclined towards all foreign nations, except those
which shall withhold German non-republican elements from immedi
ate cession to the fatherland, gives as great a guarantee to Alsace and
Lorraine for the future happiness of the prosperity of their popula
tion as France does.

Monarchical Germany can wage war against those foreign nations
only which call a Germanic population their own, as Austria, Russia,
Holland, excluding Switzerland only, where the Germans are already
living under a republican form of government, and need no prelimi
nary fostering and care, and which aforesaid nations shall refuse that
liberal pay or exchange for their Germanic elements, which Germany
is duty bound to prodigally offer for the sake of the fulfillment of
her sacred duty to complete the union by gathering together her Ger
manic elements, but never will the Emperors of Germany wage war
upon civilized nations with an anti-feudal aggressive design upon ter
ritory, and indulge in a Caesarian lust for barbarous conquests gen
erally.

When thereupon the French republic argues: " You do not take
the German Swiss from the republic of Switzerland, why do you take
the German French from the republic of France ?" The answer is,
that if France to-day had Alsace and Lorraine, it would to-morrow
forsake a third time the glorious republic and be monarchical toute
suite, and as such would be unjustly unforgiving, war inclined as
before, try as quickly as possible to recuperate, endeavor to form
alliances with all Europe if possible, and march like locusts by mill
ions in balloons, with the white flag or the lily flowers pending, as
the case may be, to Berlin as if nothing at all had lately happened.
That explains it for the very good of the republic, why Emperor
William did not already conclude peace at Sedan, because he could
not get from the Republic of France those strategical points and
lands necessary for the defence of Germany in case of a third over
throw of the republic. He had history as well as knowledge of the
character of the monarchically inclined portion of the French peo-

94

pie to guide him, and although he proved by the acknowledgment
of the republic, that politically he had confidence in its permanency,
yet he had duties to perform towards Germany which were peremp
tory in the face of the Bourbons and the Orleans being visibly about.
He is by no means unamiable on that account, or at all a conqueror
in a barbarous sense; if he was a second Barbarossa he would have
conquered the whole of France at once, and kept it, instead of which,
he was satisfied with the symbolical act of a centaurian gallop around
the Arc of Triumph, like a man of principle and not of retaliation,
in memory of his father, Frederick William III, and the entire Ger
many, balancing accounts with the shade of the first Napoleon, and
then quietly retired without further noticing the captive one at Wil-
helinshcehe.

When, therefore, the Germans marched on from Sedan to Paris,
and there around the Arc of Triumph, to finish the conquest over the
former general monarchial power of France, still smouldering in a
warlike and revengeful republic, the sturdy architect of Germany did,
simultaneously of time, a signal service, and a great deal of good to
the republican cause j which it is obvious he must have had at heart,
when he acknowledged the young republic born under his very eyes,
weighing correctly the chance of her permanency against those of a
disgraceful collapse as dearly affecting the peaceful growth of future
Germany. It demonstrated confidence in the majority of the French
nation, while it pointed to the olive branch of peace, which, above all,
should be the greatest adornment upon the forehead of the Goddess
of Liberty that they Republicans should not further resist as unworthy
of their principles.

Has ever a brave nation, or really a brave man, a good cause, a
noble intention, been disgraced by defeat? Can, for instance, a
republic like America ever be disgraced? By whom or by what?
One should like to know. Has Christ not forgiven the very people
whom he could not with his two hands prevent killing him? So
should every republican be as good as Christ, and every man be a
republican, until there is not a hand lifted to strike, which makes
self-defense of the other unnecessary. That is why the civilized world
are called Christians, that we should follow his example ; that, incase
of helpless misery in life, of defeat, or even of death, among bar
barians, we possess that inner courage — fortitude, resignation, and
faith — which is ready in a good conscience at all times to cling in the
exquisitiveness of a loving caress to God, the Creator of the Universe,
by whose inscrutable wisdom we at all here do live and die. Does
man ever forget, or is so blind that he can't see, that he is God's son,
as well as anybody that is and was created by His Grace ? That each
tiny plant, each worm, lives by the same inscrutable grace only, for

95

purposes which are mysterious and yet are not ? That we live now
while others lived in the remotest past ? What arrogates to- man superi
ority over the brute creation ? Man's equally distributed possession of
the divinity of an originally healthful reason, endowed with for the
purpose of living happily himself, and to make others happy, while so
living upon earth. Therefore, to act unreasonably, is to be cruel and
bad, non-republican and warlike ; and no civilized being likes to thus
stand degraded within himself before the great Creator.

The world now acquiesces in the cession of those provinces, as the
population of Alsace and Lorraine is not lost to republicanism, no more
than we do consider the entire civilized world lost to it ; on the con
trary, it is steadily preparing for it as all mankind is plainly and rea
sonably redeemable to it.

That by an augmentation of Germany the cause of republicanism in
Europe should be retarded, because Germany is as yet monarchial, is
not dialectical, therefore unlogical and altogether wrong. The enmity
of the cause of republicanism in Europe has disappeared, with the dis
closure of the Germans acknowledging the Republic of France at the
very moment of complete victory, generally so seductive an oppor
tunity for crowned heads to forget their vows, except in this glorious
case of Emperor William. History has duly marked it that from now
dynastical rules are no longer considered stringently necessary. It
really and incontestably proves that Europe is far advanced in civil
ization ; *it is constitutional ; therefore on the high road to republican
ism. It is, so to say, a political syllabus got rid of ; it is Protestant
freedom, politically and nationally practically applied, It is in
accordance with liberalism, as far as the untutored millions are daily
more quickly becoming reduced in numbers to digest it, and be thank
ful for it to God only. With the King of Prussia transmuting into an
Emperor of Germany, and acknowledging the French Republic when
he had it in his power to absorb the whole French country, all politi
cal hierarchy and infallibility to rule by especial divine right is left
with the empty chrysalis. That act speaks volumes of rational hope for
Germany itself ; it is a just tribute paid to the fact of the existence of
enlightenment, and a constant increase of liberty in Germany ; it is
the unmistakable dawn of freedom. Thus reason wings itself etheri-
ally high, throwing off all dogmatical restraint which hinder its flight
within the realm of bliss, and lives not to conquer and to die, but to
live and to love. With such a version of the condition of Germany
and all Protestant monarchial countries, the THIRD ARGUMENT against
the acquisition of Alsace and Lorraine is already principally refuted,
which advanced the theory that the Roman Catholic religion would be
assailed, as if religion was a terrestrial body, which could at all be
slain. Roman Catholics have found out by this time that Protestant-

96

ism and Liberalism go there hand in hand at the same rate as Koman
Catholicism and Liberalism go hand in hand in Italy. In the same
proportion that beyond a constitutional monarchy a nation advances
into the highest order of civilization, the fitness for self-government,
which are the republics all over the civilized world, so does religion
advance to prepare the mind of civilized man to a direct pious com
munion with God. In republics it is precisely where Roman Catholics
and Protestants hinder each other, if at all, then very harmlessly
indeed, and certainly not politically, of any consequence. Their
occasional hatred in this age is simply nonsensical, because it is not
any more the offspring of ignorance and bigotry, but an old, decrepid
habit which is fast becoming exploded and extinct. It is on a par
with the hereditarily diffused blue blood of aristocracy, which fears an
inoculation from the lowly, forgetting that it is their crime of not
having educated the masses, which criminal neglect created hitherto-
fore all the insecurity, hatred, and general disobedience to law and
order. Besides, Protestants and Koman Catholics have more to do
than to hate each other, when they reflect a little that far over half of
mankind await their eloquent persuasion.

Inasmuch as republicanism testifies to civilization and signifies it,
so does Christianity strive to make proselytes among the nearly treble
number of heathens in Asia, Africa, and Oceanica, where Roman
Catholics and Protestants pioneer hand in hand with this noble
cosmopolitan purpose in view, of redeeming them to our faith. There
is no heart so obdurate which would not cease to hate when minutely
reflecting upon the vulgarity of such antipathy and animosity among
Christian brethren, that it involuntarily reminds one of a poem by
Tiedge, about a hundred years old, which always elates and edifies
wherever and whenever it is read:

PIETY.

Alas! should'st from Thy grave

Thou greatest sufferer! arise;
Once more teaching, bent upon a stave,

A wanderer through life, so wise!
Should'st Thou behold the mischief all!!

How they pervert the truth, this gift
Of wisdom, plain, yet so beautiful,

Flowed from your lips, the soul to lift!
How they disdain all love's affection,

Press persecution from Thy teachings,
Which teach to love and bless upon reflection !

How they forget all tolerant doings,
Which bear with faults, love what is good —

And Thou, alas! dejected by contumely
Up to thy very last in Cypress blood

Hast exercised upon Thy murderers truly.

97

Thou would 'st now shed a tear

So bitter! — as ever from Thy mortal eyes
Then fell upon the olive mount so dear.

And should'st Thou here your teachings
Yourself reveal— they would: these elves

And pseudo exegetics hearken to proceedings,
Who hear no one but themselves —

Should'st Thou, however, dare to differ;
Not do, as bid by their presumption,

Not believe in Thee, except through their transfer —
They would surely crucify you twice.

Free schools to all liberally paid for by a government, acknowledged
as the divine right of mankind to their heavenly dowry, " reason,"
which education enables them to further develop in active life for the
purpose of being able to lead a happy and useful existence, and to
cosmopolitanly appreciate republican life, as guaranteeing the inde
pendence of man while it rests upon the individual ability of piously
revering the commands of God so obvious to that effect — is the first
doctrine of civilization practically applied.

The French nation hithertofore barricading the way of Germany to
uniting her elements, had to be disabled by physical force of contin
uing it in the face of the degree of civilization attained to in the 19th
century of the Christian era. The French had to be thoroughly dis
abled for that purpose; it was absolutely necessary, and one may as
well assert, the will of heaven that the provocation to this war, which
accomplished the union, should have been given by France. Now
while the iron is hot, the Austrian Germans, the Russian Germans,
and Holland ought at once to return to their original national allegi
ance; the quicker it is now enforced by Germany, the better, for
France recuperated, unless she remains republican, might ally with
Austria and Russia for the same vainglorious purpose of conquest as
of yore. But if fourteen millions of Austrian Germans, together
with all the other non-republican German elements outside of Ger-
man}T, as that country to-day shows its configuration of forty millions,
are added to it, then peace is permanently established in all Europe,
and with the rise of another generation the Germanic race in Europe
may be predicted shall be republican. In the meantime Germany
and England unite to allow education to take a deep root, and what
ever revolutionary disturbances may take place in Europe, they will
rightly pronounce them premature, and take care of the north of
Europe. United Italy, on the other hand, will take care of the south
of Europe, being now unmolested by France — a republic — so that
Spain and Portugal, together with the rest of the south of Europe,
may "not be disturbed in their earnest strides for progress. Republi
can France is equivalent to peace. Every republic is equivalent to it.
11

98

On the other hand, nobody will dispute in Germany and England
that the love of country is sacred; but to say, to prefer a monarchi
cal government to a republican, and to try to prove it, that life and
property, law and order, are safer and greater, would show an effem
inacy of manhood, which is quite unnatural to any sensible being,
and has but one parallel — that of a rich bachelor, or amiable maiden
Lady to make the world believe they live happier in their single
blessedness than if they were married, as if they knew anything at
all about it. Again, take a widower or widow Lady deprived of his or
her playmate by death or lawful divorce, and observe how quickly
they again embrace matrimony at all hazards. So it is exactly with
an intelligent and moral man who once has lived in a republic, and
should change his domicil and again live in a monarchical country;
how he yearns until he has returned to the republic. As to the Uni
ted States of America, there is not a man who ever lived in sunny
California is absent abroad upon some occasion or other, who would
not readily exchange the world for his lovely Eureka.

One of the most potent reasons why the remainder of the civilized
world acquiesced in the cession of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany,
was besides the impossibility of preventing it by force, the justice of
the case itself, which clearly demanded it. The idea to deprive a
victor of his booty, after the entire Germany had been exposed to the
chances of ruin, and had to offer upon the altar of Liberty a life, a
human life, of greater value than the universe, and more than that,
tens of thousands of such sacred lives, ignorant people only could
have harbored, or worse than ignorance of theirs that Germany, which
had just now positively proved a sagacity and strength greater than
any continental nation in Europe possesses, could so have been reck
less and soft as to leave a conquered country empty-handed, and all
out of womanish mercy and sickly sentimentality, knowing, as all the
world does, that thereby it would have actually encouraged France
to a repetition of the same sort of intent to at an early convenience
invade Germany as in 1870. Better ask a tiger to give you back the
lamb; war is barbarous and conducts itself as such, vice versa.

This gandering arose at Sedan, and continued at Paris (beautiful
Paris, a third of which demolished by exasperated French citizens)
that Germany could afford to be magnanimous and abstain from
humiliating France. Of course she could, but see France five years
hence, as hinted before, resume the same business of frightening
peaceable nations. No ! the Bowie-knives had to be kept ; leave
France to-day as strong as Germany, and there is never any peace.
For that reason Germany now adds all her Germanic elements, dom
ineered over by foreigners, for the purpose of being not only equal
but stronger than France, in order to arrive at a permanent European

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peace. It is then immaterial, in a strictly political point of view,
whether France remains true to the present republic or not.

As Germany does not aggress for purposes of conquest, surely
France cannot be parceled out like helpless Poland. So Germany
took pay in those two provinces, and Metz as the key to the European
powder magazine of wars, for no other reason than duty to the Ger
man fatherland.

This action, was, therefore, never intended to humiliate France, no
more than the First Napoleon ever intended humiliating Germany
by overrunning the whole country. It is by no means retaliation,
which is as unchristianly as war itself, but simply proves that war
lurks in ambush, and that the Christian disciple is insincere.*

Germany acts, therefore, extremely wise, if she continues to absorb
all Germanic elements throughout Europe, for the one purpose, and
as swiftly as possible: to outnumber France in population, as France
might forsake the Republic, for the third time, and again go to war.

* Rather should man ensnare the strong lion and rhinoceros and other felines and
pachyderms living upon earth, although even those cannot be exterminated because
they are there and eminently dangerous — no more than the most destructive arms
can exterminate war, despotism and revenge; the guillotine aristocrats, or a Bar
tholomew's night, the Protestants. The weapon successfully wielded against fury,
injustice and intolerance is equal knowledge. It is by reason that man and nations
shall govern himself and themselves, and overcome difficulties as God points to the
aforesaid physically thousand-fold stronger creation that it shall be so.

Look upon the street, and you will find the divine nationality of the race — the
promiscuous multitude of human beings of equally puny height within an inch or
two, as being equally destined by God to live socially, contentedly and hopefully in
the world. It is the clue to the truth that the rights of man are the same which
knowledge — the developed reason — explains and duly expounds. You will find
them following each other through this life like monkeys crossing a stream, co con
tinue upon the other side in safety and harmony. That swarth for man is wisdom
— to live peaceably everywhere and enjoy life socially. It is reason fully developed.
It is the Eden found upon earth; the lee-side of the storm of war and individual
passion. It — is — wisdom— how — to — live.

As God gives life, he takes it— and nobody else dare.

PART THE EIGHTH.

THE CAPITULATION OH' STBASBURG AND METZ.-NAVAL
ENGAGEMENTS.

The province of Alsace and the German portion of Lorraine were
therefore added to Germany, and Strasburg and Metz taken as per
emptorily necessary for future safely. The fortress of Strasbm- so
bravely defended by its commander, General Ullrich, from the llth
of August, yielded the keys on the 28th of September, at last Nei
ther the investment nor a dreadful bombardment, which unfortun
ately devastated a large portion of the city, with its columns and
treasures of arts, proved of avail to induce the heroic General Uhrich
3 surrender. A regular assault had to be made before success
crowned the heroic efforts of the great German General von Werder
Hoisting the white flag to the world renowned Strasburg Cathedral'
at the immense height of 480 feet, it being the 27th of September'
L870, reminded Germany of how, 198 years ago, that celebrated city
was torn from the German empire by France. The day of that anni
versary, the 27th Sept., 1870, the fortress mournfully capitulated A
onth later the energy and perseverance of the German troops were
likewise and equally brilliantly recompensed by the success before
Metz. After having nine long weeks invested the place, apparently
an invulnerable one, suffering hunger and cold, and exposed as a
target to a deadly fire of grape, and having repelled those energetic
assaults of Bazaine's, which he ventured on even after the battles of
Noisseville, of Peltre, of Mercy, of St. Eemy, and at last of Woippv
on the 7th of October, which latter lasted nine hours; then it was at
that critical moment that the misery of the besieged becoming an ally of
the Germans, induced the proud Marshal, with 173,000 men, to capit
ulate. At the castle Frescaty, on the 27th October, 1870, this event
received its historical signature, and the second French army corps
the first one, was sent into captivity to Germany. So the laurels
faded which Bazaine, the victor of San Puebla, had not long since
usurped m Mexico, while Prince Frederick Charles had patriotically
gathered new ones at Metz, in France, similarly to the Crown Prince

101

of Prussia, the victor of Orleans, had gathered his, both receiving the
rank of Field-Marshal Generals, as memento mori in due conse
quence of their Cervices to the German nation, and the well deserved
sincere thanks besides.

Less prominent than were the successes on terra firma, yet not
without importance to Germany, were those at sea, in the memorable
summer and fall of 1870. General Yogel von Falckenstein, having
been appointed Governor-General of all the lands upon the German
coast, issued, on the 24th of July, a demand for volunteers to join
the marine. Then torpedoes were laid and the coast properly forti
fied to prevent the possible landing of the enemy, and the little Ger
man fleet lay ready at Kiel and "Wilhelmshaven to cope, to the best of
its ability, with the by far stronger one of the French, relying some
what upon the ignorance of the French of the geography of the coasts
of the North sea and the Baltic. Strange to say, the French fleet was
really unsuccessful. Barely two engagements deserve mention : the
one off the island Kuegen, and the other off "Weichselmuende,
the harbor of Danzig upon the Vistula. In the West Indes, off the
Moro of Havana, the German gun-boat "Meteor" preserved the
honor of the German flag in a bout with the " Bouvet." The Ger
man ships " Grille," and " Nymphe," had done similar brave acts in
the German waters.

In the meantime, the second period of the siege of Paris had com
menced to develop itself against the Kepublic of France.

On the 19th of September, the larger portion of the German armies
had reached Paris in forced marches, forming a huge and strong gir
dle of some forty odd English miles in extent around the city, which
the statesman under Louis Phillippe, the venerable Thiers, had once
metamorphosed into one of the strongest fortresses upon the globe.
It was about that time that peace appeared near at hand, for suddenly
the President of the French Kepublic, Monsieur Jules Favre, appeared
at the German headquarters, soliciting an interview with Count Bis
marck respecting the chances for an armistice. But their auspices
were not good , and the non-republican conduct of the French at the
time, of not yielding what was demanded by common sense and
equity, and had and should be granted to the Germans as victors,
frustrated their accomplishment. This political blunder on the part
of the young republic has already been explained at large upon pre
vious pages. Suffice here once more to say that the world at large
approved the cession of territory for the purpose of the equalization of
the military strength of the two nations, and a payment of five mil
liards of francs for damages besides, for what, in fact, cannot be at
all refunded: the divine lives of human beings, having died by thou
sands, contrary to civilization. Therefore, war continued, and more

102

sanguinary in proportion to the resistance offered than before. In
fact, all France arose and followed Gambetta, to try what was neither
wisdom nor republicanism, but savored much of hatred and revenge
instead of patriotism. Besides, as might have been foreseen, it proved
unavailing.

The damage done by the French to France in these national efforts,
in the way of destruction of roads and property, was a severe lesson
to the young republic for having disgraced the sacred republican doc
trine of peace, having parliamentary ways at her disposal to force
Thiers to leave. The excuse for self -defense on their part was inad
missible, because the Germans had been found ready to accept peace
against being paid for what was fair, and besides were known as not
harboring any intention whatever of an opprobrious kind, as touching
the independence of France. As to the frantic fury of the French, in
trying to prevent the organized German armies of continuing their
besieging operations before Paris, it was, as might have been expected,
ineffectual.

PART THE NINTH.

THE SIEGE OF PAKIS, AND THE BATTLES AGAINST THE
AKMY OF THE LOIEE.

General Troehu having been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the
besieged forces within the walls of Paris, by the Eepublican Govern
ments at Paris and at Tours, had an army of at least 350,000 men
under his command, inclusive of National and Guards Mobile. The
numerous and good artillery within the forts consisted mostly of
marines. Scarcely had the Germans completed their investment,
when the sorties of the French commenced, demanding incessant
attention on the part of the Germans. The latter, however, soon
made their work in a manner thorough, that, after destruction of the
subterranean telegraph lines, the French had no other way of com
municating from Paris with outside France than by balloon, which
was rather an out-of-the-way mode of communicating, on account of
accidents from shots of the enemy, and also under circumstances
of being so very uncertain. After the King of Prussia had moved
his headquarters to Versailles, the residence of Louis XIV, the
sorties of the French became often — ostensibly to exercise the troops,
but intentionally to break through the enemy's lines. On the 7th
October they pressed towards Malmaison ; on the 13th towards
St. Cloud, which latter castle was destroyed by their own grape from
Mount Valerien, and on the 15th towards Yillejuif. The battle on
the 21st October, near Malmaison, in the presence of King William,
was very severe, as were those near Le Bourget, on the 28th and 30th
October, which place had to be stormed by the Prussian Guards in
the most heroic manner, signifying severe losses of the latter in offi
cers and men.

The month of November went off comparatively quiet, because the
newly-formed provincial armies had to receive their first teachings
from the mythological Mars ; the forts, however, keeping up a lively
but expensive cannonade, which resulted in a dead German costing
France about 80,000 francs.

Gambetta had gone early in October, by balloon, to Tours, to there
organize three new armies, known as the army of the Loire. The

104

venerable Garibaldi, the celebrated General of Italy, appeared among
them, and, with his two sons, took command. But the defense,
nevertheless, degenerated into a guerilla warfare, in spite of the
remonstrances of Garibaldi, through the formation of bands of
Franc-Tireurs, or sharpshooters, who, lying in ambush, like at Ablis
and Chatillon, tried hard to decimate the gallant Prussians, by mur
dering them. It was, therefore, luck, indeed, for the Germans that
Metz fell into their hands the latter part of October, which enabled
them to send a great army against them to silence them forthwith.
Part of the entire army of the Germans remained before Paris, the
other under Prince Frederick Charles and the Grand Duke of Meck
lenburg, was directed to operate against the army of the Loire. Thus,
the battles of the Germans against the French Republic were fought
by three armies stationed : the first, easterly, south of Alsace, the sec
ond along the River Loire, and the third in the North of France.

After Strasburg had capitulated, General von Werder had the com
mand assigned to him over the Eastern army, consisting of Baden
troops and Prussians, with whom he cleared Alsace the first half of
October, in the skirmishes at Champenai, Noinpatelize, Epinal, and
other places, leaving nothing of weight but the strong fortress in the
mountains named Belfort, the siege of which was commenced later
on the 8th of November. Upon this, General von Werder, reinforced
by the reserve army of General Lowenfeld, advanced south upon the
Eastern army, under General Cambriels, and upon the Garibaldians.
The first he vanquished in the fight at Oignon Lake, and the latter
he drove out of Gray, invested Dijon, (Burgundy) Moiitbeliard, and
Dole, and then spread his operations toward the west, the upper part
of the River Seine. On the 22d November, the General was attacked
by the Garibaldians, at Nuits, who felt somewhat more confident
since their surprise at Chatillon. He stood it bravely, so that when
a few days later the venerable hero, Garibaldi, repeated the attack,
near Pasques, trying to circumgo his location near Dijon, he, the
commander of Strasburg memory, scattered the Garibaldians on the
26th and 27th November.

Now succeed the battles in the south, the great battle-field of this
war, which occurred from October 1870 to January 1871. These were
indeed the most difficult , complicated and laborious of the whole
campaign. Already in September raids of cavalry had been made
against the army of the Loire down towards Orleans. In the early
part of October the Bavarian General von der Tanii, reinforced by
the Crown Prince of Prussia, marching their respective armies south
and engaging the enemy in victorious battles at Toury, Etampes and
Artenay, forced the latter to retreat towards Orleans. That city they
stormed on the 12th of October, after an engagement of nine hours,

105

which sent the French across the Loire. Shortly afterwards, north
of Orleans, General von Wittich annihilated a French army at
Chateaudun, and taking the city, invested Chartres on the 21st of
October. Towards the end of that month the German armies in the
south, especially those under Prince Charles, had been largely in
creased after Toul, Soissons and Metz had been taken, and the end
of the war supposed to be near at hand. Such was, however, not the
case. The energy of Gambetta must have been of an enormity truly
admirable, although it was not wisely conceived, for not only did he
manage to largely increase the army of the north, under Bourbaki,
the army of the west under Keratry, and the army of the Loire under
Aurelles de Paladine, but he put the same on a regular war footing.
The latter General, who had already early in November more than
80,000 men under his command, tried now to cut off the Bavarians at
Orleans, he having a vastly superior force at his disposal, and if suc
cessful, to reach Paris forthwith; circumstances favored him so far
that General von der Tann had to give up Orleans, and after the fight
at Coulmieres had to retire upon Toury, although the Grand Duke of
Mecklenburg had put to flight part of the army under Keratry, on
the 17th of November, near Dreux, and General von Wittich had
forced back a second portion of the enemy's army upon Chateauneuf .
Matters stood thus doubtful, when Prince Frederick Charles came to
the rescue, and thoroughly routing Paladine on the 28th of Novem
ber at Beaune la Bolande, while on his way to Paris, prevented a
serious conflict, for General Trochu, informed of the intention of
Paladine, made those energetic sorties at Brie and Champigny on the
30th of November, and 2d of December, respectively, in consequence
of which history has taken note that these have been unfortunately
very sanguinary, but nevertheless were repulsed. Simultaneously
with these events General Manteuffel cut off the north army under
Bourbaki, preventing it from reaching Paris, by defeating it at Amiens.
In spite of all these disasters the French were by no means discom
fited. Dismissing Aurelles de Paladine, and gathering the disheveled
masses, (which Prince Charles in the meantime had promptly pursued,
retaking Orleans on the 4th of December) under General Chanzy, in
the west, and under Bourbaki in the east, it had been shrewdly
decided to intrust the army of the north to the most intelligent gen
eral of France, General Faidherbe, as ceded to him by General Bour
baki. The French army was now divided into two commands, in
stead of as formerly into three. General Chanzy endeavored to stay
the advance of Prince Charles upon Tours, which city, the Govern
ment fancying defeat possible, had wisely quitted in time, and
adjourned to Bordeaux, but was defeated a second time in battles
lasting four days — from the 7th to the 10th of December — at Beau-
12

106

gency and Marchenoir, retiring towards le Mans (Orleannais). The
iron Prince, together with the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, contin
uing their pursuit, chased the French out of Veiidome 011 the 15th of
December, and took possession of the whole line from le Mans to
Tours. Not, however until January, after many skirmishes had taken
place, was the army of the west thoroughly beaten. The battle of le
Mans (province Orleannais) lasting four days, finished Chanzy and
the army of the west. The severity of the winter had assisted the
Germans as it did of yore the Russians against the first Napoleon,
besides the Germans are, as were then the Russians, used to such
horrid cold weather — France, therefore, could not be saved in that
direction. As to the second chance: the army of the north under
Faidherbe had to succumb to the superior vigor of the Generals Man-
teuffel and von Goeben, although the former, General Manteuffel,
had had to evacuate St. Quentin (Picardie) after having invested
Rouen, the great manufacturing town upon the River Seine, famous
for its iron works, and Dieppe, a small seaport. Yet he managed to
throw the army of the north, fully 60,000 strong, upon Arras, after
the French had suffered a second defeat near Amiens (Picardie) on
the 23d of December, two days before Christmas.

General Faidherbe, nothing daunted, tried it once more, early in
January, to attack General Manteuffel, but the Germans stood the
brunt well near Bapaume, on the 2d and 3d January, 1871. General
Manteuffel, upon being transferred to a command in the East, General
Goeben took charge of the German army of the North. He, likewise,
was attacked by Faidherbe off Cambray, but the Germans repulsed
him a third time in a battle near St. Quentin, (prov. Picardie) which
lasted seven hours, and this time in a manner which was equivalent to
a rout.

While all this took place, Paris having now been invested over three
months, yet unwilling to give up the keys of the city, having managed
to get at sufficient food some way or another, and being determined to
resist to the last, approached its fall. From the 19th to the 22d
December, General Trochu debouched, but without success. The
German artillery at last did the work effectively ; it destroyed the
strong position of the French upon Mount Avron on the 27th and
and 28th December, and on New Years day 200 cannon sent the molten
gifts of Yulcan into Paris and the forts, with compliments from
General v. Karneke and the Prince of Hohenlohe, Paris was para
lyzed. Once more, on the 19th January, the French tried it near
Mount Yalerien, but were again defeated under the very eyes of
Emperor William of Germany. General Trochu had now to leave
his command, and President Favre appeared, on the 24th January, at
the headquarters of the Germans at Versailles, to negotiate for a sur-

107

render. Paris then had been in a state of mutiny. At midnight of
27th January firing ceased. Next day the armistice was agreed to, to
last three weeks, which handed Paris over to the Germans after a
siege of four weeks. From said armistice, however, the Eastern bat
tlefield was excluded.

A constitutional assembly was formed at Bordeaux, which should at
once decide upon the future form of Government, in order to be ena
bled to make peace.

The 18th January, 1871, had its especial significance. The King of
Prussia had been, on the 16th December, 1870, unanimously declared
Emperor of Germany by the German Eeichstag, after a proposal by
the King of Bavaria, on the 9th December, 1870, to all the German
Princes and free cities of Germany. On the 18th January the victorious
Emperor celebrated the historical event in Versailles, only seventy
vears after the Kingdom of Prussia had at all been founded.

The month of January was likewise decisive in the East. There
stood Garibaldi with his volunteers, reinforced by the new army of
Lyons, under command of General Bourbaki, whom Gambetta wished
to throwback the weaker numerical strength of Werder, should retake
Belfort, (Alsace) and march into Northern Germany. Good ! the
idea was by no means bad, for danger there was ; therefore the Ger
mans quickly sent aid to Werder, by the 2d and 7th army corps,
as he had to retire before overwhelming forces from Dijon upon
Vesoul, in order to cover Belfort. But even before all these auxiliary
troops were upon the spot, the heroic Werder had repulsed Bourbaki,
in a three days' fight at Montbeliard, which forced him to retire to
Besangon.

The second plan of the French to unite with Garibaldi was likewise
frustrated. The brave General was attacked at Dijon by the Gist
Regiment, and had to remain there, which enabled the 2d army corps
to arrive unobserved, and place itself between the two combatting
armies, and in a manner that, with Werder, surrounded the entire
French army under Bourbaki. There was then no other alternative
left for the latter but to either surrender or retire into Switzerland.
On the 1st February, at Sombacourt and Frasne, Bourbaki fougkt
desperately and lastly, but he was thoroughly defeated, and his de
moralized army had to disarm before the Swiss General Herzog.

The celebrated, and very bravely defended fortress of Belfort, in
Alsace, capitulated, on the 16th February, with free egress of its brave
garrison.

The eight months are gone — the war finished ! What horrors ! and
yet how small the hope that it has been the last. May the Omnipotent
console those loving mothers, sisters, wives, and brides. Man cannot,
nothing on earth can ; not a deluge of tears could. May he send to

108

us all a genius, who shall know how to prevent bloodshed among
civilized nations ! — since everybody reads the Bible, and nobody fol
lows the doctrine of peace.

When it is asserted that in 180 days 156 fights, and 17 more or less
battles occurred, that 26 fortresses more or less strong were stormed,
373,000 prisoners made, 6,700 pieces of artillery taken, and 120
standards and other military emblems were conquered ; that these
astounding victories gave back to Germany what is hers, Alsace and
the German part of Lorraine, together with Metz, and reimbursed the
nation for the costs of the war with about 1,300,000,000 thalers, equiv
alent to five millards of francs, and enlarged Germany to 9.900 square
German miles (a German mile is about equal to 4^ English miles),
with a population of 40,000,000 upon it, and divided into twenty-five
States, then it may be rightly supposed that the peace made at Frank-
fort-on-the-Main is based upon the physical impossibility of France
of ever again attempting to disturb it.

Setting aside the moral improbability of the republic of France,
so far forgetting her advance in civilization as to again fall back into
the fetters of monarchical rule, it is a national and sacred duty in
cumbent upon Germany, to propose without delay to Austria and
Russia the cession of the German provinces upon the most liberal
terms, at the same time peremptorily insisting upon compliance with
such a natural and patriotic demand. It is supposed that nearly
twenty millions of population of German origin are living under for
eign monarchical rule. There can be no peace until these have re
turned to their national allegiance; besides, an alliance might be
arranged at any future time between recuperated France (should it not
remain republican) Eussia and Austria, as it is so easy to tear to pieces
what blood upon battlefields has cemented, and monarchs dispute
anew. As monarchy signifies war, and the republic peace, and the
one is based upon physical and the other upon moral strength, so
does it appear as extremely unlikely that peace can be applied to
Europe as long as Germany is not among monarchical nations the
highest power of physical strength. Bound as she is then to meta
morphose herself into a correctly acting republic, she is, at least, up
to that time a bulwark of force and a tower of strength against Aus
tria, Russia and France, should the latter prove a sham and undue
the republic. As this last hypothesis is now unlikely, as France takes
a high rank as a republic, having succeeded in quieting the rebellion,
Germany will easily manage with Austria, Russia, etc., either peacea
bly or by war.

But their Germans must belong to the general nation at all hazards,
and upon any condition. It is the great desideratum of the age, the
centralization of the nationalities. It is done in the interest of civil-

109

ized mankind; it will accelerate age by age the promulgation of the
commands of God, who created neither nations nor countries, but
the independent being upon the one land of the earth. France, at
present impotent, and as a republic, unwilling — Great Britain the
natural ally of Germany in case of war with Russia, Austria and the
remainder of European nations — war will not be resorted to on that
account, and the Germans be released against any amount of money
and non-Germanic territory.

As to Poland, she has a more natural future among the broad Scla
vonic race which it is the destiny of Austria to henceforth gather;
and as to Russia, she has a similar one from among the more dis
persed and heterogeneous nationalities of the entire northern Asia.*

The world wished France well; it is fully aware of her misfortune; it
has ascertained abroad what her grief is at home. The Nouvelliste
in Rouen, repeating the words of the novelist, Alexander Dumas,
who acquainted the world with the grief of France in the following
touching passage, says: "For the moment it's clear, that the invasion
has conquered and muddled us, that the rebels have cleaned us out
and dishonored us, that the country has lost two of its most beautiful
provinces, that the most elegant third of Paris is in ruins, that the
capital of the civilized world has proved again in 1871 what it did in
1793, viz., that it stands always at the disposal of horror, and that
our people possess the same qualifications as Kings do, viz., to learn
nothing from misfortune. Public disasters, private misery, irrepar
able losses of life, of inspiration, of love, of hope, of luck, of labor,
of faith, an enormous foreign debt, a senseless one at home, humilia
tion, disheartedness, doubt, apprehension, gloom, high and low, and
everywhere gloom, dispersion of families, dissolution of parties, a rout
of principles, and especially a double current ; of an instinctively

* The world has a right to exchange opinions in regard to the future of nations,
which have undergone a radical change either in prosperity or adversity. It is es
pecially inclined to wish well to the unfortunate as in accordance with the tower
ing principles of civilization. It is one of its most ennobling traits to be charitable.
As in individuals, so in nations, to sympathize with the afflicted and to be always
ready to stretch out the helping hand to the needy without waiting to be called
upon so to do, shows the true disciple of Christ, applies practically the finger sign
of heaven, so feelingly illustrated by the act of the Samaritan, as the sweetest nutri
ment to the living soul upon earth. The greater the delicacy with which these
heavenly inspirations lead to the act of charity, the more the donor prevents the
blood mantling upon the cheeks of the helpless recipient — the more delightful is the
moment of ineffable bliss of having done one's duty in a grandly religious manner,
and the more visibly does Providence reward him upon the spot. As it is at the
same time the equally distributed chance to all of heavenly wealth, it proves that
the principle of benevolence is the developing element of gentility and general civ
ilization, planted by education, and germinated by religion.

110

double need of reprisals and rest ; of retaliation and resignation, of
hatred and love ; that is, in a few words, our situation at this hour."
And, possibly, ifc is ; but France is not lost no more than a gentleman
is. A mind full of faith, repentance, energy, and health, lives ; it
views crucification as purification ; it draws strength from defeat, and
fortitude from sorrow ; it is the sunlit-smiling earth after the raven
blackness of a tempestuous night ; it is, above all, a momentarily
clearer conception of the hope of an eternally blissful hereafter, as
powerfully convinced of by the inimitable existence of life, of the mo
ment in so grand and obviously perishable a world in common with
us, awaiting the further will of Heaven, to continue altogether, and
thus realize the purpose of creation.

France is a republic, and Dumas is too severe when he says she has
learned nothing from misfortune ; she has learned a great deal : she
has learned to conquer the rebels, what she didn't know when she
allowed Napoleon III to forsake the republic scarcely twenty years
ago, which proves that there are to-day far more enlightened men in
France than ignorant ones. In whatever country that is the case,
freedom is permanently at hand. Educate! educate! continue to edu
cate every child living, and pay for it by law, and you will strengthen
the republic and uproot vice upon this earth, circumgo the intoxicated
profligate gambling parent (the cause in all countries of the growth of
vice in children), crime and wars ! Education and peace live upon
reason and love; their strength cements the union and the universe,
and social life becomes not only bearable, in a rigorous conventional
point of view, but shows its divine nature ; as men approach each
other naturally, the All-wise wills it that there should be no distinc
tion except the sweet rivalry of how to add to the usefulness and hap
piness of one another, until the moment of life, which is in God's
hand, is by Him recalled. France has leveled these distinctions, by
force upon Napoleon, disowning his vows to the republic, and be per
mitted so to do, instead of like Washington standing by the side of
the people and be forever beloved. Great Britain, Germany and
Italy will level them peaceably. France — the Gallic race — is impetu
ous; the Teutons are not; they await all the effects of universal edu
cation upon the worth of man to appreciate freedom quietly and
resignedly. Their goverinental heads at least mean well or else the
world had to despair of their sincerity ; they change the diet of the
patient in proportion to his convalescence. They await the arising of
the million in the terrestrial garden of free air and liberty with joy
and hope, as every physician does who is not a charlatan, and can
premise the time of convalescence as far as study goes, and the Al
mighty's heavenly will in the case commences.

Ill

Although France is a republic, and as such synonymous of peace,
and has proved her inner strength by the subjugation of her improp
erly educated brethren, yet she may as well remember for a while
longer the significant words of Picard in his proclamation of the 27th
of February, announcing the entry of the German troops into Paris.
The confused monarchical spirit among some incorrigible minds, is
still a heavy incubus upon an easy-going young republic, setting aside
the customary dynastically selfish attempts of the three dynasties
plotting an entry, to either one of which it would be idle to suppose
for a moment that the French nation would forget itself so far as to
listen. Picard said, " We conclude peace with the expectation of
" future retaliation," at least many so said with more or less distinc-
tiveiiess, and many French who do not say it think so beyond
doubt. It would be difficult to teach those who pushed the war, liv
ing upon glory and brooding over the chances of enlarging the terri
tory of the country, to henceforth think otherwise. This great
knowledge of the character of many, guided Bismarck in asking
proper security for peace in the shape of territory belonging to the
republicans. To continue the war to the knife was as unwise of the
republic as it was impolitic and useless. Has ever a sensible man
doubted the bravery of a Frenchman ? Of what use was, then, an
idle attempt to struggle with the giant of fate ? All it did it showed
lack of wisdom. To cope with impossibilities, is to compare man, frail
as he is, struggling in the grasp of a pachyderm. If the French made
peace upon this comparison, and not for wisdom's sake, then they are
really to be pitied, for there are three realities, which are as clear as
daylight, that they cannot regain — what they have once lost — as Ger
many is too intelligent to idle and vegetate upon war laurels. It is
ahead of France now, and will labor to so continue.

PART THE TENTH.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR UPON FUTUEE CIVIL
IZATION.

Above all this war has demonstrated to France the complete mili
tary superiority of Germany. France possesses really better small
arms ; but the great physical strength of the soldier, the more thorough
organization of the army, and the better discipline and the superiority in
moral qualities, has everywhere been acknowledged has given victory to
the Germans. Those are, indeed, superiorities which cannot be easily
acquired, even in a long time, especially if the national character and
public affairs are not exactly favorable to^the performance of exploded
war measures; viz., upon universal military service France is not
likely to decide, on account of its principles of republicanism.

France has no inclination for this earnest exercise of military duty.
A preponderance of physical strength is, therefore, put out of reach.
The French people dimmish slightly in physical strength, as this war
has evidently shown. Increase of population advances much slower
in France, in percentage, than it does in Germany. The ex
haustion in France of disposable men took place quicker during
this war than it could be possible among the Germans, setting aside
that the French enlisted old men and small youth promiscuously.
Besides, in a few years from now, after the Prussian system of the
organization of the army shall have been adopted by all Germany,
both North and South, Germany shall have far more numerous armies
than at present. The times are not yet such as to disband soldiers
and make working men out of them. The Rhine is not quite so broad
as the Atlantic ! This alone will make the French think twice before
they overthrow the republic and commence a dynastical war.

The second reality is the changed boundary and the new constitu
tion of Germany. The boundaries of Germany hithertofore, as good
as if they stood widely open, together with the political separation of
the South from the North, were a great seduction for France under
either of the three dynasties to wage war with her German neighbors.
To-day Germany has finely locked boundaries, and stands united to a
man against the combined continent of Europe.

113

What must be her security of peace to Europe when the foreign
non-republican Germans are added to the Union ! Then she may force
Europe to disarm, and be the first to do it.

The third reality is the financial impossibility. In the French
Budget for 1870, the interest of the national debt absorbed already
twenty-four per cent, of the entire income ; army and navy, twenty-
eight per cent. At present, the costs of the war, so it was stated at
Bordeaux, footed up three and a half millards of francs, besides the
five millards which she has to pay to Germany. At five per cent, this
enormous debt of eight and a half millards of francs adds to itself
annually 425,000,000 of francs. The ease with which she lately paid
the first installment of the debt to Germany, although it proves propor
tionately large wealth, and but little impaired credit, yet is the dam
age done by the rebels fearfully great, nor was the destruction of
property, both private and public, by any means small, which the
French in their eagerness to defend Paris, rashly considered neces
sary to destroy, in order to keep off the enemy. Likewise the lost
material of war, during the campaign, upon both battle-fields, as well
as in the fortresses, has been of note. As all this will be felt for
many years to come, France cannot retaliate even if she was not repub
lican ; she has, therefore, to reduce the expenses of the army and
navy, which, in 1870, comprised about 590,000,000 francs, and has to
change her tariff and income taxes. France managed, during the
reign of Napoleon III, to pay four milliards of francs — war expenses ;
and when in the summer of 1868 she made a loan for army expenses,
etc., and everybody anticipated a war with Prussia, which then only
was prevented by the revolution which had broken out in Spain, said
loan was signed thirty-four times. At the high rate of 69J francs for
three-francs bond, equivalent to 115 5-6 for five per cent., fully fifteen
milliards were put at her disposal. It was, indeed, a speaking witness
of the accumulated wealth of France. It is an historical fact. To
this same extent it is deplorable that these milliards of France are
nearly gone already. The Pays so stated it in the fall of the year
(1870) as having been expended upon the war up to that time and
until its end. It cited the figures : ,

1 milliard for armaments from 1868 to 1870.

\\ do. for destroyed and rebuilding of fortifications.
1J do. for arms, and cannon, and other war materials, which
the Germans have destroyed and taken as booty.

2 do. for destruction of buildings, fields, and other immovable

property, by both the French and their enemy.
1 do. for complete and partial ruin of manufacturers, farmers,
and speculators.
13

114

2 \ milliards for payment to Germany for the cost of the war (which
has since then been doubled by Bismarck).

2 do. for losses consequent upon the direct effect of all these
misfortunes.

These figures are rather summarily taken, yet they may have come
within the knowledge of the exchequer. At least Pouyer-Quertiers
stated in June, 1871, after this war was ended, and the damage done
could be somewhat less vaguely estimated, that loans had to be made
to the figure of eight milliards. Then it has to be considered that at
least fourteen counties in which the war waged could not produce any
grain, and the remainder seventy-five had no hands left to do the
work. Most of the manufacturers were equally stagnated. The
harvest of 1870 had not been gathered in at all upon a large section
of the country, and in other parts it was wilfully destroyed that it
might not fall into the hands of the Germans ; besides, was not a good
one in consequence of insufficient rains. This want of grain, last
year, has proved since then to have been severely felt, as could not be
otherwise expected.

Another consideration is, that the rich had left the country, at least
would be absent for a long while ; in short, the non-republican conduct
of waging war has added losses upon losses without necessity. As to
the world, generally it does not admire at all heroism of bloodshed in
any shape any longer. The days of Csesarism are over, and the poet
writes the epitaph :

Csesar Galliam subegit, Caesar noster maximus,
Castra fregit et Gallorum nostrum exercitus,
Fugans milites Suaves Gallicosque Zephyros.

Imperator Germanorum, Caesar noster maximus,
Regnum fundat exoptatum, rem exoptatissimam
Nobis adferens a flava Sequana in patriam.

En Augustus imperator, Caasar noster maximus,
Fines auget Germanorum, quondam eheu ! perditos,
Lotharingi cum Alsatis redeunt in patrios.

Ecce venit Triumphator, Caesar noster maximus,

Ecce venit in triumpho maximus exercitus,

Ecce venit Pax triumphans, fructus noster aureus.

Unfortunately the proximity to each other of so many largely pop
ulated and warlike nations in Europe having made it indispensable
for self-preservation to study the science of life destruction minutely,
it has fortunately developed itself to a degree that it is not likely that
war shall again be resorted to for purposes of settling political diffi
culties by it, as it borders upon the aboriginal character of cruelty.

115

As to the present war it demonstrates but the ancient principle of
how to carry it on victoriously. The initiation or strategical inde
pendence is the main point. The genius of the commander-in-chief
secures it to the army, holding it in readiness to commence operations
sooner than his antagonist, and if at all possible, with a numerically
stronger force. The Germans acted upon this principle, and the
result has been astonishingly good and unprecedentedly successful.
The French were always taken by surprise. All the German gener
als listened to but one voice: the King's of Prussia in grand com
mand, with General Moltke as his immediate executive.

The French had Napoleon, and Napoleon had Leboeuf. Unfortu
nately, Napoleon resigned his command and placed it in the hands
of two commanding generals instead of one, which proved ruinous.

The Germans quickly cutting Bazaine off Verdun and Thion-
ville prevented his junction with McMahon, forcing the latter to capit
ulate. "When Bazaine decided to retreat upon Verdun, he wasted
forty-eight hours, as he had to return the same way, which enabled
the Prussians to blockade his way. Equally slow McMahon ap
proached Stenay, moving to and fro without covering his march at all.
It is welL known that the Germans at Saarbruecken as well as at
Mars la Tour, were much weaker in point of numbers than the French,
not having at all concentrated their strength; yet they conquered
through mutual and timely assistance among each other during the
fight — although Napoleon I used to say that two-thirds of success
is the consequence of calculation, and but one-third luck; it appears
that the Germans calculated all three- thirds the whole war through,
not having lost a single battle. Fifty thousand cavalry covering at all
times the armies, while preparing for battle as well as while march
ing, it cannot be said otherwise but that they carried out this plan
methodically, which realized their victories. Wars carried on with
the assistance of railroads, telegraphs and needle-guns, are almost
new: at least the old Bulow system is exploded. Troops are trans
ported three times quicker than before, and heavy war materials fif
teen times. The French already in their Italian war in 1859, availed
themselves of railroads. It appears that the destructive needle-gun
and chassepots procrastinate the commencement of the fight. Bavo-
nets and cavalry have changed their importance but little, except* that
the attack commences from far greater distances than before. The
artillery aims 5,000 paces and ceases with 1,500, while formerly it
commenced firing at 1,500 paces. And as to the mitrailleuse of the
French, it has proved of little service. The dreaded French mitrail
leuse requires as great a circumference as its organization is expen
sive and preparation costly, without even coming up to anything like
t he effect which the canon has in all collective points of consideration .

116

It likewise offers to the enemy's fire an equally large aim as the canon
does. In firing at large distances it proves to be of little or no ac
count, because its absolute capacity to hit is too deficient, the room
it can command too small, and an observation almost impossible.
Upon small distances the densely collected sharp-shooters of the
enemy are as dangerous to it as to artillery in general. Towards
troops behind covering, it cannot be used at all, because its shots have
not the power to pierce nor to scatter. To initiate the offensive it
cannot be used, and for defense, it can aid the infantry then only
when the necessary room for the front is wanted in order to direct the
sufficient number of rifles from a suitable position — for instance, in
the defense of narrow mountain passes, etc. It is, therefore, very
rare indeed that it can aid the infantry advantageously. These
are the reasons which convince that canister shot will not be largely
resorted to in future wars, as long as this sanguinary way of settling
difficulties is at all tolerated by civilization.

Strange to say the terrific battles of the war of 1870, were, after all,
less sanguinary than those of Borodino and Waterloo. The German
loss at Gravelotte is estimated but at six per cent., and that of the
French at eleven per cent., as the consequence of firing at very large
distances. The so-called luck in war is now, fortunately, put into so
small a compass, through knowledge, which includes the knowledge
of the inhumanity and crime of war, that peace, which is the well
applied knowledge of civilization, will soon conquer war to the only
and true glory of sound sense as the element of knowledge. Thus,
Germany, at least, being both physically and intellectually the domi
neering power on the continent of Europe, will force war back among
nations that henceforth shall prove their semi-civilization by a reck
less provocation to it. On the other hand, she will endeavor and
succeed in a diplomatic way, conjointly with Great Britain and
America, to pacify beforehand the temper of nations having differ
ences to adjust, so that the tender growth of the proletariat of man
kind into the social circle of gentility, as the grand object of civilization,
may not be disturbed by wars any more. It cannot be heralded often
enough throughout the world that wars are the consequence of a void
in civilization on the part of the great masses of the population form
ing a nation, from which deplorable fact had sprung in ancient times
the dire necessity of monarchial governments, which, in adjustment of
the degree and nature of barbarity thus lawlessly practiced, and in
consideration of the number of millions thus found barbarous, ruled
autocratically. In proportion to the waning of barbarity in the mil-
li ons of a nation the rigor is relaxed, and a constitutional government
adopted, until the nation at large has altogether emancipated itself from

117

every remnant of feudalism, and is able to govern itself, adopting the
republican form of government.

Man then lives peaceably through the power of culture, and appre
ciates reveringly the sovereign power endowed with by the Creator for
His inscrutable purpose of the human race at all existing upon earth ;
therefore, while so living to be personally independent, to live hap
pily, and to act humanely. The republican government thus appears,
and really is the clerkship of a nation, as composed of such an enlight
ened fraternity, of whom every one is supposed to avail himself of the
full republican trust of personal independence to render himself
through life better in virtues than he is, and the nation at large to
progress the civilization of the age by socially developing their moral
acts, and unitedly apply them.

On the other hand, how quickly a nation can recover from the shocks
of a devastating war lasting four years, to-day the condition of the
United States proves best. The victorious Union had to make loans
to the amount of over $3,000,000. The quick recovery was made pos
sible by immediately after the war reducing the expenses of the army
and navy to the utmost extent. France, of course, is not as rich in
resources, and capability of standing heavy losses, as the United States
are. Although famous for its manufactures, yet the French people,
like the remainder of European continental people, are rather ne
cessitated to value money, the whole of Europe footing up as much
land as is about arable in the United States of America.

When four years afterwards one of the most distinguished men of
progress of this or any other age, Ex-Governor of California, Leland
Stanford, planned the greatest technical enterprise of the day, a
through railroad from the Atlantic to the Pacific, it became evident
that the thinking, laboring people of the United States had forgotten
all about the war. And if not so fast as the people of the United
States, still the French will recover. Her national property will
steadily reproduce itself in its principal sections. The French, with
a vivaciousness of spirit rarely found, inhabiting a fertile country,
although but as large as one single State among some odd thirty of
the United States, the State of California, still its situation, the
national character of the people, will soon forget the debt of five mil-
lards of francs, provided they follow the example of the United States,
and disarm, as demanded by the principle of the republic, and then
impose a very heavy import duty upon every superfluous article of
luxury which the rich can stand and the poor don't care for.

The French national character has excellent qualifications. The
French are sober, industrious, parsimonious, and singly very peace
able throughout the country — the clubs of Paris excepted. What is,
therefore, understood by the word, "the people/' these have found

118

out by this time, through the pressure of debt, what is meant by
bearing the incubus of royalty.

The idea of being dazzled by royal splendor in this age would
show an Indian taste, as everybody knows that it is despotically main
tained tit the expense of the people, to the detriment of their ability
to directly provide for themselves more comforts of their own choice,
and deprives the nation from superintending the expenditure of such
regal money for the benefit of all, in the manifold manner in which it
is done in America.

But the pressure of debt will operate upon France ; her economists
shall attentively read J. Stuart Mill, the English national economist,
or send over to Washington for information. France shall soon be out
of debt. She shall be vigilant as to the Bourbons, Orleans, Napole
ons, these so-called hereditary adherents to royalty. That there
is a minority of benighted people left at all times, and in all civilized
countries, who adhere to legends of such a past, is deplorably unal
terable. These are like corn-flowers in a wheat field which has been
ploughed and resowii a dozen times ; they are both of no account,
simply beautiful to look at ; the economist and farmer are accustomed
to them. The Orleanists, it is vividly remembered, openly said :
"France is rich enough to pay for her glory." What glory? The
glory of ambition and of conquest — the crime of murderous wars. A
njce glory in the face of reason and America ! ! of civilization and of
practically applied common sense ! — an inadmissible theory — an ex
ploded practice ! France is now fully convinced that wars are non-
republican, wicked, and belong to mediaeval times and ungovernable
people. This war did it. Sevastopol, Syria, China, and Mexico were
not enough, nor the splendor of the metropolis could hide the cripples
in the glare of the sun of day, nor the neglect of the thousands of the
needy. But now the French Republic, having proved by the over
throw of the rebellion that by far the greatest number of the popula
tion of the country are aware of the danger that is consequent upon
rebellion, and more so from aristocrats who created rebellion, by not
educating the poor, they will, in the face of the five millards of francs
which their last doings levied upon them all, take good care that it
does not reoccur. They shall not listen to chauvinists who harangue
a republican country with retaliation. The nation will know how
to put into the legislative body men universally respected and care
fully voted for, who are enlightened, and consequently peaceably
inclined, and industrious, producing citizens withal, and who, as such,
put out of the way the old seductive budget of the army and navy,
reducing it, like in America, to a reasonable and legitimate standard.
Taking America as an example, where a President of the United States
receives $25,000 per annum, because he would feel hurt if the country,

119

the people, should be forced, on account of his position, to support
him as if he was a cripple, and not a worthy man, the worthiest of
them all, in their own judgment, who labors and is happy to do his
duty to the country at all times, which, like the religion of man, is
rewarded from within and not without. The French should now make
a law which prohibits the exchequer to be drawn upon for war pur
poses, it being then to rescue native-born citizens from incarceration
while traveling, like the English nobly did it in Abyssinia, the
Americans lately in Corea, China, and in this war the Germans mem
orably repulsed the French. Such wars are in their nature necessary
in this age — lawful constabulary proceedings. They rest on a differ
ent principle altogether ; it is simply self-defense, like the Union of
America defended itself against rebellion, any nation against invasion,
man against a murderer, or the exercise of force is used in the main
tenance of law. How often do we hear people in Europe exclaiming :
" Life is not safe in a republic !" the idea as if they could not reason
ably comprehend that life is everywhere safe if man takes care of him
self first. It is little credit to a man, and looks very suspicious in a
nation, to ask a gens d'arms to do it for him. A gentleman includes
the guarantee to himself, through his gentlemanly behavior, that he
has no enemies, and that consequently his life is safe.

Besides there are far more robbers, etcetra, bad people in a monar
chical country than in a republic, on account of abject poverty: the
consequence of a lack of social freedom to enable man to better his
condition himself, and so perfect himself in the legitimate exercise of
his individual sovereignty, which is his right.

One of the weightiest reasons of all, which can predict to the repub
lic of France a speedy recovery from the calamities of war, is the utter
void of retaliation on the part of the Germans during this war guar
anteeing to France no unnecessary disturbance in future, which con
cerns her. The republic knows well that public opinion best shields
it against foreign aggression, but if ever it should prove weak,
and allow an attempt at overwhelming and overthrowing the republic
to be successfully made a third time culminating in royalty, which
signifies war against Germany, then Germany shall demand full pay
of the old score of 1806 and 1808, and in proportion to the following
figures: If 4,500,000 Prussians who inhabited a piece of territory
after the peace of Tilsit as concluded by Napoleon I, of 2,856 square
German miles were obliged to pay to the French nation; thalers,
245,000,000, Prussian currency, how much, shall 35,500,000, or more
of French people have to pay, in land and money, who live upon
such a date of the declaration of war against Germany, upon a piece
of territory exclusive of colonies of just about 200,000 (English) square
miles? A fresco painting with an appropriate inscription, should im-

120

mediately adorn the tribunal of the presidential chair, in the legisla-
lative hall at Paris, that the solution to the above Pythagorean prob
lem may paralize the effort of any member there who shall intend to
annul the republic !

France now dutifully takes every surplus franc; firstly, to educate
the million, and, further, expends it upon the proletariat in comforta
ble abodes, after the Peabody plan, and lawfully and carefully looks
after it. . France does it in a truly charitable, republican manner, and
so should all Europe.

The houses for the inebriates should be all over Europe multiplied,
and the river Styx dammed off, the waters of which are intoxicating
beverages, which infuriate. The latter mammothian enterprise will
set millions to work, for the river Styx overflows the whole of para
dise upon earth, fertilizing in it the domain of Satan Sin. As among
civilized nations the Americans are the most industrious people, among
mankind the Chinese, and of all creation the bees, nature so proves
by its love of labor the superiority : of the one in universal individual
comfort; the other, one-third of all mankind, in the comparative free
dom from vice; and the third, by the accumulation of honey, which puts
at all times to shame the labor of the most industrious man. Our
dreadful ignorance of the Chinese language, debared us, hitherto-
fore, from estimating properly those 400,000,000 of living people, but
the time is at hand, since steam girdles the world, when civilized
nations may learn a great deal of them, as they constantly do of
nature. Besides the English and the Americans, the French republic
has the best chance, thanks to the acquisition of those six provinces
in Anam (Cochin-China), which are theirs, to reimburse the nation
for the outlay, at the time of what was intended not to reach all, like
in a republic, but be absorbed by the Napoleonic dynasty.

PART THE ELEVENTH

PEACE.— THE NEW BOUNDARY OF GERMANY.

After the capture of Napleon III at Sedan, and the flight of the
Regency from Paris, Germany found herself in a dilemma of the most
serious kind. She saw nobody with whom to conclude peace. With
whom, therefore, was an idle question, because it could not be
answered. Germany was ready to make peace, asking nothing but
security for the impossibility of France to ever again rise in the offen
sive against Germany, as well as for the covering of the costs of the
war. Napoleon, in spite of his captivity, was yet the legitimate head
of the nation ; [the latest legitimate expressions of the wil] of the
French people, thejjjplebiscitum of May, 1870, had not been canceled
nor revoked. The Legislative Body and the Senate, though by force
dispersed on the 4th of September, could not be considered as having
been sent away by the nation ; on the other hand the Provisional
Government of the Republic existed, acknowledged, at least, by the
majority of the'people. De facto it had no legal basis to rest upon,
because the French nation at large had not been consulted in regard
to sanctioning it. Germany therefore reserved to herself, Napoleon,
or his Regency, to make peace with ; or again, with the Legislative
Body of France, or with the party of national defense, respectively:
with a committee so authorized by France to conclude peace. Napol
eon, therefore, was treated at Wilhelmshohe not as a prisoner, but as
a fugative Emperor, at the same time that Favre was admitted to
the German head-quarters soliciting to negotiate for an armis
tice and convoke a provisional government. The latter attempt was
given up at the end of September, a second time at the end of Octo
ber, when Thiers^had returned from his visit to the various neutral
governments of Europe, and was formally introduced by them to the
French nation as the proper person who, and with whom, peace could
be negotiated. He came, introduced by monarchs, but not by the
republic of France. However, the government of national defence,
organizing new armies and sending them to Paris, preferred a sort of
dictatureito both Theirs "and peace. They intentionally evaded a
14

122

national representation of the will of the people. At last negotiations
were cut off altogether, which was surety not the fault of the Ger
mans.

This dictature must have believed in the ultimate success of the bat
tles, and so the wa,r was resumed.

Matters remained in statu quo until the armies were everywhere
defeated, and Paris could not be saved.

At that time, about the end of January, 1871, Germany might as
well have taken Paris and its forts, made 180,000 prisoners, disarmed
the national guards, occupied the town and forts, assumed the cus
tody over the exchequer of France, and introduced the police into
the clubs. All that was possible and executable after monarchical-
maxims generally, but the original question, with whom to make
peace? what finishes the war? remained unanswered. In that case,
as just now mentioned, peace could not be concluded with the pro
visional government. The government a prisoner — as Napoleon had
been made one at Sedan — had no authority to negotiate for peace.
In Bordeaux Gambetta continued war ; he would indeed have con
tinued it until all France would have had to be occupied by the Ger
mans, and even then the question could not have been answered, with
whom to negotiate peace. Of Napoleon, the Germans could not
think any longer, nor of his Regency, as both had lost every influence
in France ever since September, 1870. The Napoleons were indeed
consigned to oblivion by the French nation.

Germany, instead of taking and occupying Paris, found, never
theless, the way to make peace. The provisional government in
Paris had not to be disturbed, that was the idea. It could not pos
sibly be accomplished. It had to be so managed that the provisional
government, which was well aware of the necessity on its part to
make peace, had to so conduct itself that the war party should res
pect it, and then take measures for an election all over France,
which should lead to a new national government. That by it peace
would be arrived at, was expected as natural. The armistice of the
28th of January was, therefore, an important step towards it. It
saved Germany the trouble of transporting 180,000 prisoners to Ger
many, and the pacification and support of the excited Parisians, which
their own government enjoyed. Another advantage was that the
neutral powers could be convinced of the moderation of Germany,
and its earnest desire for peace. Already Gambetta ceased his war-
cry; early in February the elections took place, and proved, as was
duly predicted, a large majority in favor of peace. A chief of the
executive was appointed by the national assembly, the first legitimate
government since the 4th of September, who, imbued with the neces
sity to make peace, duly negotiated at German head-quarters for it,

123

and signed the document accepted by the national assembly at Bor
deaux. The preliminaries of peace were solemnly and mutually rati
fied at head-quarters, on the 2nd of March, and the answer to the
query found and given.

From these preliminaries to the " definitive peace," was not an easy
matter to proceed, by any means, and not expected by either party
on the 26th of February, when the preliminaries were settled, that it
would be so difficult to bring peace about. In France existed a lawful
assembly, and a government accordingly. Nobody could foresee
what pretensions might be made on the 18th of March, to question
the rights of the national assembly and its executive of government
to make peace. The ease was strangely exceptional: indeed without
example in history. And still there arose one. It was the Paris
commune. Still stranger the revolution spread in quarters of Paris
within range of the north and east forts, occupied by the Germans.
The danger of this rebellion was the possibility that the conduct of
the metropolis might be imitated in other large cities of France ; then
again, the great weakness and helplessness of the government with
which Germany had concluded peace ; likewise the consequences of
the possibility of a successful rebellion, or one so partially as it, would
affect the exchequer of France by retarding the financial and eco
nomical growth of it, of interest to Germans at that moment. As to
Germany, she kept perfectly quiet ; the Germans had nothing to do
with internal French quarrels. Besides, another difficulty arose,
from another direction: the French government, though anxious to
conclude peace as quickly as possible, and to be on good terms with
Germany, exerted itself to postpone the conferences at Brussels rather
than push them. Doubts arose after all whether they could or would
be in favor of peace. The German empire had no representative at
Versailles who might have found out and informed the country of the
true cause of this vascillation. The situation was to such a degree
delicate and perplexing that the Germans were about to take Paris
without further ado, and keep it as a pledge until the French should
bend to the necessity of making peace. Bismarck, however, adroitly
managed the difficulty. He hit upon the expedient of personally con
fronting the French ministers, and succeeded admirably. He soon
found out that the difficulty rested on a misunderstanding. Not only
did he find the French ministers at Frankfort quite tractable, determined
to make peace, and as quickly as possible, and by no means bashful
as to acknowledging the truth : that France could very well afford to
pay so just a sum of money. Whether it was a change of climate
which invigorated their manliness, or the absence of English advice
and mediators, or the Bismarckian eloquence which created the lovely
harmony between them, it is hard to tell. Enough that the French

124

ministers at Frankfort were found to be entirely different genii than
were the negotiators at Brussels. They even decided to still further
secure the money which had been in the proclamation agreed upon to
be paid. The first half milliard should be paid thirty days after the
capitulation of Paris, the second payment of 1000 millions to be paid
during 1871, and then only Germans to quit the forts of Paris. By the
4th of May, 1872, the fourth half milliard should have to be paid. All
payments to be made in coin or notes on good banks, and first-class
bills of exchange. As to the remaining milliards to be produced, the
stipulated time, as given in the preliminaries, should be adhered to.

The occupation of the forts of Paris until one and a half milliards
should have been paid by the end of 1870, was considered absolutely
indispensable and necessary as a matter of precaution against fluctu
ations, to which the internal condition of France at that time remained
exposed. In regard to the treaty of commerce, when it is part of the
financial system, and forms one of the most important portions of
indirect taxation, Germany took the firm ground that it should not
be forced upon a great nation. The working classes, as they now con
template the matter in spite of the episode of free trade during the
reign of Napoleon, would feel constantly chafed at Germany being at
all favored by the tariff. Suffice it for Germany that the reduction in
the tariff, and similar advantages which France has accorded to Great
Britain, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Austria, and Kussia, should
continue to be accorded to Germany also. The extraordinary favors
above this, as accorded to the Zolvereiii in 1862, would, however, be
canceled. It does not matter much to Germany, for France has always
been slow to make concessions. At one time France wished to cancel
all the above named treaties of commerce, the one of Germany in
cluded ; whether it can now afford to so do, remains to be seen.

THE PKELIMINAKIES OF PEACE.

The preliminaries of peace, as stipulated at Versailles, on the 26th
of February, 1871, were worded as follows :

Between the Chancellor of the German Empire,

Count Otto von Bismarck-Schonhausen,
who holds power of attorney from the Emperor of Germany and

King of Prussia,
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the King of Bavaria,

Count Otto von Bray-Steinburg,

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the King of Wurtemburg,
Freiherrn August von Waechter,

€JRP
OF i
ivr
^J

The Minister of State and President of the Ministerial Council of
the Grand Duchy of Baden, Julius Jolly, Esq.,
all of whom represent the German Empire

on the one side,
And the Chief of the Executive Power of the French Kepublic,

Monsieur Thiers,

And the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jules Favre,

who represent France,

on the other side ;

(the power of attorney of all being found in good and regular
form correct,) is made the following agreement, which shall serve as
the preliminary basis to peace, to be ratified later (and which was
duly concluded at Frankfort-on-the-Maiii, on the 10th of May, 1871).
ARTICLE I. France resigns to Germany all her rights and preten
tious to those territories which lie to the east of the boundary, which
is sketched as follows : The line of demarcation commences on the
northwesterly boundary of the Canton Cattenom, stretching towards
the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, continues southward to the western
boundary of the Cantons Cattenom and Thionville, divides the Canton
Briey, while running lengthways of the western boundaries of the par
ishes of Montois-la Montague and Roiicourt, as well as lengthways of
the eastern boundaries of the parishes of Marie-aux Chenes, Saint Ail,
and Habouville, touches the boundary line of the Canton Gorze,
which it divides lengthway of the boundaries of the parishes Vionville,
Bouxieres and Onville, runs parallel to the southwest respectively,
the south frontier of the County of Metz, the western boundary of the
County Chateau-Salins, as far as the parish Pettoiicourt, of which line
it embraces the western and southern frontier, and then follows the
spur of hills which stretch between the Seille and the Moncel, as far
as the frontier of the County of Saarburg, south of Garde. Then the
line of demarcation unites at the frontier of this county as far as the
County Tanconville, of which it touches the northern boundary.
From there it follows the spurs of hills which are situated between the
sources of the rivulets Sarreblanche and of the Vezouze, as far as the
boundary of the Canton Schirmeck, continues along the western fron
tier of said canton, includes the parishes of Saales, Bourg-Bruche,
Colroy-la-Eoche, Plaine, Kanrupt, Saulxures, and Saint Blaise-la-
Koche, all of which are within the Canton Saales, and then joins the
western boundary of the provinces of Lower and Upper Ehine, as far
as the Canton Belfort. Quitting the southern boundary of it, not far
from Vourvenans, it divides the Canton Delle at the southern frontier
of the parishes Bourogne and Froide-Fontaine, and so reaches the
frontier of Switzerland, running along the eastern boundaries of the
parishes of Jonchery and Delle.

126

The German Empire shall, forever, possess these boundaries in full
sovereign power and right of ownership to same. An international
commission, consisting on both sides, in equal numbers, of the rep
resentatives of the contracting parties, shall immediately be ordered,
after exchange of ratifications of the present treaty, to arrange upon
the spot the new boundary line in accordance with the aforesaid stip
ulation.

Said Commision shall govern the division of ground and soil, as
well as divide the value of property which heretofore belonged in
common to districts and parishes, which now are separated by the
new boundary line. In case of differences of opinion among them
selves in regard to the boundary line, and the orders for their set
tlement, said Commissioners shall refer the matter to their respective
Governments for ultimate decision.

The boundary line, fixed as above delineated, is given in green upon
the new map, of which two have been made, which are exactly alike,
and show the territorial sections which come under the Government
of Alsace, as published already in September, 1870, at Berlin, by the
geographical and statistical department of the War Office. The two
maps shall be affixed, one to each of the documents of the present
treaty.

The line of demarcation as so far given, has, however, been changed
as by mutual agreement of the contracting parties, and altered as
follows : In the former department of Moselle the villages Marie-aux
Chenes, near St. Privat-la-Montagne and Vionville, to the west of Re-
zonville, are ceded to Germany, against which France shall keep the
town and forts of Belfort, with some city property attached to it,
which shall later be fixed upon.

ARTICLE II. France shall pay to the Emperor of Germany the sum
of five milliards of francs. At least one milliard of which shall be
paid in the course of the year 1871, and the remainder in the course
of three years from the date of the ratification of the present treaty.

ARTICLE III. The evacuation of the French from territory taken
possession of by German troops shall commence after the ratification
of the present treaty by the National Assembly in session at Bordeaux.
Immediately after the ratification, the German troops shall quit the
city limits of Paris, as well as those forts of Paris which are situated
upon the left bank of the River Seine. The Germans shall likewise
evacuate in as little time as possible, according to agreement between
the military authorities of both countries, the departments altogether
of Calvados, Oriie, Sarthe, Eure et Loire, Loiret, Loir et Cher, Indre
et Loire, and Yonne ; and further, the departments Seine inferieure,
Eure, Seine et Oise, Seine et Marne, Aube, Cote d'or, down to the
left bank of the Seine. At the same time the French troops shall

127

withdraw to beyond the Loire, which river they shall not be permitted
to cross ere the treaty of definite peace is signed. Excepted is the
garrison of Paris, the strength of which shall not exceed 40,000 men,
and those garrisons which are absolutely necessary to be maintained
for the security of fortified places.

The evacuation by German troops of departments which are situ
ated between the right bank of the Seine and the eastern boundary,
shall gradually take place after the ratification of the definitive treaty
of peace has been signed, and the payment of the first half milliard of
contribution money shall have been duly made, as stipulated in Arti
cle II.

The evacuation shall commence from those departments which lie
nearest to Paris, and shall so continue in proportion to the contribu
tion money coming in. After the first payment of half a milliard, the
following departments shall be evacuated : Somnie, Oise, and those
sections of the departments Seine inferieure, Seine et Oise, and Seine
et Marne, which are situated upon the right bank of the Seine, as
well as the sections of the Department Seine, and the forts upon the
right bank of the Seine.

After the payment of two milliards, the occupation of French terri
tory by German troops shall comprise but the departments of Marne,
Ardennes, Haute Marne, Meuse, Vosges, Meurthe, as well as the
fortress Belfort, with its city limits, which shall serve as further pledge
for the debt until the remainder three milliards shall have been forth
coming. The number of German troops upon said territory shall not
exceed 50,000 men.

It is left for the Emperor of Germany to decide whether he will
accept a financial guaranty to a territorial one, which he has got now,
while occupying certain sections of France, should the Government
of France make overtures to that effect for the purpose of a riddance
of the Germans from France, and the Emperor of Germany prefer
accepting them as in the interest of Germany as amounting to the
same thing.

For the three milliards, if their payment should be put off, five per
cent, interest will be added to the sum total until paid, and counted
from the day of ratification of the present compact.

ARTICLE IV. The German troops shall not touch anything in the
departments which they occupy, in the way of requisitions, whether
of money or property, of the French. Against which those troops
who have to remain in France for the present shall be maintained
at the expense of the Government of France, and provided for at a
ratio as shall be agreed upon by the Commissary Department of the
German Empire.

128

ARTICLE V. The interests of the inhabitants of territory ceded by
France to Germany, shall be regulated for them as favorably as possi
ble, in regard to their commerce and industrial rights, and as soon as
the conditions of a definitive peace shall have been fixed upon. For
this purpose a certain time will be agreed to, within which those
inhabitants shall enjoy especial facilities for a free exchange of their
commercial productions of industry. The German Government shall
not hinder the free egress of inhabitants from those sections of terri
tory, nor shall it take measures towards any of those inhabitants
which touch the person or property.

ARTICLE VI. The prisoners of war who have not as yet been liber
ated, by way of an exchange of prisoners, shall be delivered up imme
diately upon the ratification of the preliminaries. In order to facili
tate the transportation of the French prisoners, the French govern
ment shall put a certain number of railway cars at the disposal of the
German authorities, and send so many of them into the interior of
Germany as shall be found expedient for such an accommodation
and at a charge the same as paid in France by the Government for
the transport of the military.

ARTICLE VII. The opening of the negotiations in regard to a defin
itive peace, which is to be concluded upon the basis of these prelimina
ries, shall take place in Brussels, and without delay, after ratification
of their contents by the National Assembly and the Emperor of Ger
many.

ARTICLE VIII. After conclusion and ratification of the definitive
peace, the administration of the departments which have to remain
occupied by German troops, shall again be turned over to French
authorities. Yet the latter shall have to submit to the dictation of
commanding generals of those German troops in regard to what they
consider necessary to be required of said authorities for the safety,
the care, and the cantonments of soldiers.

In the departments so occupied the collecting of taxes shall be at
tended to after ratification of the present treaty for account of the
French Government and through French officials.

ARTICLE IX. It is understood that the present treaty stipulations
cannot give to the German military authorities a right of any kind to
the ownership of those sections of the territory, which are not at
present occupied by German troops.

ARTICLE X. The present preliminaries shall be laid without delay
before the Emperor of Germany, as well as before the French
National Assembly, which holds its sessions at Bordeaux, for ratifica
tion. (Signatures.)

Done at Versailles the 26th of February, 1871.

Witness : BLUME,

Mayor in the staff of Generals.

PART THE TWELFTH.

GEBMANY AT HOME.

At home Germany has now laws, thanks to progress, which give
freedom to the press, that man may promulgate his opinion and cul
tivate truth, knowledge and taste among the people — give liberty to
marry by pacifying the old feudal anxiety of caste, so mainly and
obviously detrimental to nuptial bliss of the parties concerned — does
away with the uncharitable act of imprisonment for debt, which
debars man from rallying his energies thus paralized, while it lulls
the other into inertness to look out for his own business, whom to
trust and when losing, is apt to blame everybody else save himself,
in spite of the law shielding him in the courts of justice against
downright villainy — secures free labor, and finally regulates trade and
commerce among the divers States of the Union; provides for the
homeless, the sick and the needy in a dutiful and suitable way, and
in a fraternal Christian manner .

How greatly and beneficially these aforesaid laws affect personal
liberty, advance the unrestrained movements of man, and above all,
lift the working classes into home comforts through these laws, which
secure their happiness and shield their independence, enabling them
to put a proper value upon their labor and time, and thus receive far
better wages than hithertofore attainable according to their labor's
legitimate worth, all these traits of civilization cannot be loudly
enough commended and applauded, nor by the Germans sufficiently
heartily appreciated.

That Germany has so changed for the better, within comparatively
a brief space of time, is perfectly wonderful, and what is still more
gratifying, the world believes in it as having been proved by success,
and correctly and justly attributes the defeat of the French, not to a
decadence of prowess in the latter nation, but simply to the greater
moral and intellectual strength of Germany as displayed by the
Union.

Those mental links of theirs, composed of the strength of enlighten
ment, which were commenced to be made a generation previously to
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130

1870, have now been hotly smelted in the unearthly fire of the war
by all concerned, and have completed the chain of brotherhood to a
length which shall maintain its solidity of independence forever, It
shall be extended to the outside world, until the last German now
under foreign mo-.iarchial rule shall belong to the mother country,
and the change oi: the present form of Government into the repub
lican be duly, peaceably, and everlastingly inaugurated.

This latter task 01 the requisition of foreigners shall comparatively
be an easy one, and it is to be hoped will be a peaceful one.

Instead of 40,000,000, as at present, Germany shall then foot up
about 60,000,000 population, a strength which is at all times of the
future a guarantee for peace, as long as monarchial governments
addicted to wars shall be in Europe ; but at the same time points to
the impossibility of harmonizingly holding together so vast an enlight
ened nation, except under a republican form of Government, after the
experience in the United States of America.

How petty monarchies wane under such auspices this war has best
shown. As the previous alienation of the South from the North was
the work of unscrupulous machinations, therefore unenlightened, so
it had to wane before the power of genius of a Bismarck, and the
patriotism of an Emperor William and his son.

Some thirty kingdoms, dukedoms, principalities, free cities, etcetera,
German sovereignties, among one kindred people, upon a small piece
of land of the globe, harrassing one another by wanton obstreperous-
ness, to love each other as nearest relatives among mankind, suddenly
concentrating into one national government in Germany. What pro
gress of the age !

What is it which so blessed their understanding ? — tearing the grey
veil from their eyes, and showed them cured of glaucoma, with no
fear of a relapse ? It was the universally applied medicine of the
school book ! ! ! Religion, faith in God and themselves, as evoked
upon the occasion by the hostility of a warlike and aggressive nation —
self-defense in barbarous times, made necessary to be deplored.

It lead to the internal application of knowledge, instead of the use
of the painful and risky operations of external force. And who is the
learned physician, the Graeffe of the faculty? America ! America !
where 8,000,000 of citizens of German origin continually correspond
with their respective relatives on the continent of Europe, and tell
them how freely, unrestrainedly, and comfortably they live and are
happy.*

* The poorer of the means of subsistence foreigners arrive in America, the more
gratefully and quicker will they write home, provided always, and applicable to all
nations alike, the individual has temperate habits; but the richer the universal for
eigner arrives in America, the longer the time in which he improves to comprehend

131

As to this war, if there is anything which could at all recompense a
citizen for having bravely risked his life to save the country, outside
of the reward, with which his conscience of having done his duty fills
his breast with serene happiness, it is for once the undisguised,
straightforward intention on the part of the Germans to amend their
social laws — and what is more, they have done it.

There now exists a universal right and liberty of a citizen of one
State desirous of choosing and settling in any other German State, to
so do, and to be viewed in every respect as if he were born there. It
is altogether in imitation of America ; it is completely republican,
humane, and broad. The citizen so settling has free liberty to do
what he may please in pursuit of his happiness ; he has the same state
rights as the citizen born, there, can settle permanently, labor as he
may prefer, can apply for some official position, can buy and sell
land, can become, as said before, a citizen, if he chooses, of that
State ; in fact, stands on a par with one born there, including every
justice in courts, which is eked out to him as to others, and every
juridical protection. Neither the State where he was born in, or came
from last, nor any other, can molest him, while in his new domicil

this incomparably free country. The latter gentlemen, from Dan to Bethsheba,
alight at their respective clubs and stay there, adding nothing to their knowledge,
nor do they forget what afflicted them in Europe with the glaucoma upon their vis
ion; they absolutely defy, above everything, the appreciation of the virtue of labor
in any shape, which necessarily consigns them to the more arduous duties of the
refinement of the aboriginal, in the various shapes of sensual gratification more or
less gross. They are the unrelenting enemies of the charitable feeling of brother
hood and tolerance, until introduced to members of the club, having excited their
curiosity by their good breeding, their knowledge and their wealth.

Upon becoming more intimately acquainted, the Europeans begin to reflect, and
are beyond measure astonished to find that their new com/e', the Americans, are the
beloved sons of self-made men, and their amiability, unresisting, because natural
in the atmosphere of this country, and the Americans, that the ancestors of the
foreigners of rank slew more human beings in battle th.in the King of Ashantee,
and the ''accomplished gentleman " generally an icy matter of form.

It is this incorrigible restraint, fostered by a want of productive labor, and aggri-
vated by aristocratic customs, which prevents an intelligent /orei^ner from compre
hending the moral strength and vastiiess of the number of useful and important
citizens in the United States to their real worth, and actually leaves the country
with a theatrical impression upon his mind that the liberty of America is a gaudy
coulisse, behind which the tragedy of pandemonium is rehearsed, which is bound to
swallow up the Union with fire and brimstone, when the country shall be as popu
lated as Europe.

It is well that he leaves, and better still, should he be accompanied by a precious
bevy of promiscuous infidels, who, born Christians, have lost their pious faith in
God, in the permanency of the Republican institutions, and in marriage. Setting
aside the reprehensible tendency in a purely patriotic- view, such harrangue, at this
age, from otherwise intelligent people, to which one is unavoidably subjected, is, to
say the least, extremely vulgar, and would deserve no notice whatever if it was not

132

and abode. This law, so generous, humane, and republican, came
into force 1st July, 1871. All the States of the Union embraced it
except Bavaria, and that State is, of course, but for the present reluc
tant to so do.

It comprises not only laboring men, mechanics, and merchants, but
every citizen. As it is of more general avail among persons in the habit
of constantly moving about, it is so much more beneficial in a public
point of view. This great law answers the modern principles of social
rights, it does away with the old barrier of sedentary habits and here
ditary customs, cures the lethargic effects of home sickness, and hurls
every one into the great current of public usefulness and cheerful
labor. Soon the country will be too small, and they want colonies.
Go ahead. If that law is not copied from America, then the members
of the German Diet are men of sound republican principles, beyond a
doubt, and are, indeed, original, and deserve encomium far and wide.
With this great law the last fibre of a narrow-minded, selfish, particu-
larismus is outrooted.

As it is in the Union of America, so it is in Germany : A citizen of
California is as dear to the Union of America as a citizen of Maine or
Florida ; and in Germany a citizen of Prussia is as integral a part of
the Union of Germany to-day as is one of Saxony or Wurtemberg.
All this was planned in 1866, arid in four years fully consummated.
What a progress !

positively dangerous to public welfare because of its contamination among the un
sophisticated.

To openly rattle at \pillars of the civilization of ages, built and hourly strength
ened by reason, truth and duty, fully sustained by grateful experience, and resting
eternally erected upon the living truth of life itself, cannot but end in an entire
overthrow of the mind of such an unfortunate individual, ultimately consigning it
either to the asylum , or a paroxism of suicidal despair.

The fact is, the rich European seeks America in large cities only, just as he erron
eously judges France from Paris only, mistaking the dash of extreme fashion for the
governing principle of civilization, and therefore remains ignorant of the import
ance of the nation at large.

To an aristocrat the definition of the word materialisrnus is at all times wanted.
His intellect is perfectly obfuscated as to the purposes of labor and its virtuous ten
dencies towards the advancement of the morality and happiness of man, as he
never experienced the pecuniary necessity of it. He therefore cannot comprehend
that to a civilized being, to the most civilized nation, there is nothing left but labor
to save them, rich or poor, from idiocy or barbarism.

How can such minds comprehend the wealth which freedom in America lavishes
upon every one worthy of himself, and enables him to make labor of all kinds, at all
times, immediately productive and "useful to himself and mankind at large. The
sweets of toil, the charms of fraternity, are pitifully lost to the aristocrat, the igno
rance of which sours his temper and makes him disagreeable to, and frequently
derided by all enlightened fellow-men, all because inertness debarred him from
knowing himself.

133

It appears from the broadness of this blessed law that it will become
entirely unnecessary for Germany to forcibly insist upon the transfer
of the not-united, monarchically ruled Germans ; suffice that it be
comes known abroad. The respective foreign governments will be
obliged to initiate the question themselves, and meet Germany half
way upon the subject, or else expect a revolution in their own coun
tries which would lose them the provinces without remuneration.

As a matter of course, these various laws which the German Diet
have so honestly made, were vouchsafed by the constitution ! To
carry out the constitution is to guarantee liberalism and prepare for
republicanism. It shows the spirit of the Union as being largely
and equally diffused among the more uniformly enlightened people,
which shall henceforth enable the nation to progress steadily and
without hinderance by foreign nations, being at all times in a position
to ignore with patriotic contempt any outside design at an impedi
ment to such a steady national growth, correctly judged by them as
emanating from a political jealousy, and the daring of the attempt
itself at such a hostile act, to be sternly viewed in the light of a casus
belli.

Those aforesaid intelligent classes shall continue to enlarge them
selves from the million, just like in the United States of America,
constantly reaching the surface of intellectual strength through as
much universally uniform a school system as ever possibly to continue
to be created, in order to be enabled to pave their own way to the
notice of their merits in after life, by the fellow-citizens of their
country and the world at large.

Cfc)

PART THE THIRTEENTH.

THE FUTURE OF THE GERMANIC RACE.— THE REGEN
ERATION OF THE NETHERLANDS.

All that Germany needs besides the inland Germans, ruled over by
foreigners, is Holland, its fleet and colonies, as it would give to the
entire German Union the necessary adjacent seacoast to unitedly
develop itself from, and to be enabled to create and maintain com
mercial facilities in proportion to its political greatness. Germany
may then consider herself internationally independent, and in a posi
tion to enjoy freedom, happiness and influence in a full cosmopolitan
view. Without Holland, the trans-oceanic commerce of Germany
could never develop itself in due and full proportion to her national
strength in general, and would unavoidably fall a prey to other
nations, to the obvious detriment of her political influence.

As to the two only cosmopolitan nations of the World, the United
States of America and Great Britain, they would conjointly receive
the youthful giant with open arms, the only one besides them that
was needed to vest the progress of future ages principally in the Ger
manic race. As there is room enough in Oceanica and Africa for the
youthful giant to colonize among the natives, Germany does not in
terfere with the interests of Great Britain; on the contrary, the two
nations shall progress together. The comparatively slumbering
energy of the Dutch and Hanse-towns would, revive to a miraculous
extent under the strong shield of protection from the all-common
fatherland. There never was a theory which could so easily be prac
tically applied. The idea of the French, an inferior nation as. to
population when compared with Germany, as it should be, can be,
and must be, to settle in Cochin-China ! It would be an everlasting
opprobrium to Germany to now not unite all her elements for a simi
lar purpose. What glory it would be to civilization! What a future
for Holland!

Why ! she would by far eclipse Prussia in Germany. Holland in
Germany would represent Germany in the world, while Prussia
alone can represent the present Union but in Europe only, possessing

135

neither colonies nor a fleet in adequate proportion to the present con
solidation of the country. Holland, together with the Hanse-towns
and Baltic ports, would lead the way into the world, converting once
more their own commerce into uncountable gold, and the united pro
ductions of such a Germany into requisition by all mankind.

Holland and Belgium, (the lower lands of Germany, as formerly
continental Germany formed the upper land of the Dutch Empire)
have shown to the world in ages past what progress a nation can pave
when possessing accessible and good harbors, and what a union of
energetic men is capable of performing and achieving. Just like her
incomparable neighbor in Europe to-day : the British nation. What
has made Great • Britain great ? Character, knowledge of geography,
indomitable courage, perseverance and discretion. Has she not got
the same attributes ? Enough, Holland has proved it once, and shall
prove it again. Those same virtues that gave her neighbor a London,
a Liverpool, a Manchester, a Birmingham, a Glasgow, and a Calcutta,
gave to the Netherlands of that great Dutch Empire an Amsterdam,
a Eotterdam, a Middleburg, a Batavia, and to the now called Belgium
an Antwerp, which was, about three centuries ago, the largest com
mercial city upon the globe. Imperishable as her renown is the one
of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lubeck, which sisterhood shall again pro
duce a cosmopolitan greatness, and undoubtedly greater than before,
because assisted by steam.

As to Belgium, which i$ partially hidden from the German Union
by the French language, the British Empire has hithertofore gladly
protected her against the encroachments of France as entirely owing
to the previous incompetency of Germany, on account of its distrac
tion so to do, but which is now obviated by this war. The Belgians,
as early as the fifteenth century, were proud to call themselves of
Germanic origin. Her alienation, like that of Holland, is, therefore,
unnatural, and, consequent only, upon the rise of the British Em
pire as having superseded the greatness of the Dutch Empire, from
which dissolution the Netherlands were saved.

As Holland once included Germany, so shall Germany now include
Holland, because, as said before, a great Union has to require a great
seacoast. The re-establishment of the greatness of the Netherlands,
and Hanse-towns, depends, therefore, entirely upon the entrance of
the former into the present Union of Germany. The world will be
lieve in it, because it remembers that the Wallonian city of Luttich
vied in elegance with any other of the period — that the Luxembur-
gians afforded princes who ascended the throne of Germany, as
well as that the memorable battle of Muehldorf decided the fate of
Germany and Italy — that it was in Flanders where the German Hansa

136

lived her imperishable renown before the world, and that Brugge was
unsurpassed.

The most palmy days of Brabant where those when her people
commingled their interests with those of the German Empire. As to
the Vlamish people, those are of Germanic origin, best proved by the
Vlamish language. They should all belong to Germany, with the
exception, perhaps, of the Wai lo mans, who have, more or less, adopted
French habits and customs ; in fact, are partially identified with the
French.

How great the change has been among the two greatest nations of
the world — the United States of America and Great Britain — in their
esteem for the present German Union, and all the exemplary intelli
gent men who have so signally contributed to it is but seen here from
the sudden silence of the sneering tongue among the vast forty mill
ions, pardonably doubting at the commencement of the war victory
over the French, although somewhat prepared for it since the battle
of Sadowa, yet by no means expecting it as a certainty — said tongue
became more and more paralized during the continuancy of the war
and its endless victories. It ceased altogether from one end of the
country to the other to audily vibrate, when by the venerable Em
peror's entrance into Paris, the strange fact of the existence of a larger
and stronger nation upon the continent of Europe than the French
were, revealiiigly flashed upon them all at once, having become a
glaringly incontrovertible and undeniable fact.

From the day that the Hollandish Knickerbockers had settled in
New York, down to the hour in which the battle of Jena had lately
been balanced in Paris by the above symbol of justice, the Americans
at large had fancied the German to be a degenerated Hollander, the
so-called Germany being incomprehensible to them on account of the
confusion of petty sovereignties and feudal enmities among a kindred
people, who were to them therefore excusably less known than the
tribes of Indians upon their Occident.

The less educated again down to the altogether unceremonious boy,
indulged even in epithets, which though law and inhospitable, had
likewise their origin in the political nonentity of the Germans as a
nation of union, of harmony, and of strength, not having had, until
the battle of Sadowa, a single proof to the contrary on record, nor
at all caring to investigate causes.

Although the present Germany is not as yet by any means what
Holland once was — a cosmopolitan nation, and at her time the most
powerful nation upon the globe, because of not having either colo
nies or a fleet in proportion to her continental greatness to-day-
still America begins, as well as England, to expect it. As Holland
once included Germany upon reasons of compactness, so Germany
must now include Holland, her colonies and fleet.

137

*

It is the new doctrine of the concentration of nationalities practi
cally carried out by monarchs, in order to save to the people not
merely the expense of so many hereditary superfluities, but to legiti
mately centralize their power to suit the times, which demand on the
part of a people, the expansion of general progress in proper accord
ance with this age of fleetness, which intends to exhaust the wealth
of the world ever since Steam has brought it within reach of all.

If the Kings of Prussia, of Bavaria, of Saxony, of Hanover, of
Wurtemberg and the remainder of German princes, can lay down
their crowns upon the altar of the German fatherland, surely the
King of Holland can, and Holland shall, like the Hanse-towns have
already commenced to gain by the broadness of the impetus given to
commercial progress, the full revival of its ancient renown and cos
mopolitan importance as explained already in previous pages.

When, in the rotation of history, the Dutch yielded their supremacy
of the commerce of the world to the British, the Americans, although
indifferent to the power of the latter, nevertheless always considered
the English, in case of aggression, a competent foe to compete with,
but never did they estimate Germany or any other nation as of any
real consequence in the balance of power of the world. Even
France never excelled much in their eyes beyond a continental Euro
pean power far less than any other power upon the continent of Eu
rope; and that little political respect which America had for France
as a cosmopolitan power, during the reign of the first Napoleon, was
fully obliterated by the fiasco the other Napoleon made in Mexico,
doubting the Union of the United States of America. Too exalted
to take any notice of his non-Monroeian intentions at the time, and
too republican and noble to exult over the defeat of the French in
this war with Germany, they were like the English, heartily relieved
when French influence suddenly disappeared in a cloud.

In Great Britain the change has been equally great. Justly vexed at
the inconsistency of her own Government of having inveigled the nation
into an alliance with France, at the time of the Crimean war, instead
of having elevated, as was then feasible, tiny but vigorous Prussia,
for the same purpose of counteracting the influence of Kussia in
Turkey, etc., is explained from an over-estimation of French power
and general importance ever since the reign of the first Napoleon,
the world not having had an opportunity afforded of becoming dis
abused of it. England now embraces the opportunity of not only
remembering the auld lang syne of Waterloo, and is naturally at all
times sweetly reminded of the welfare of her own daughter, but com
prehends the harmony of race and religion .

Vice versa the German politicians who are unfriendly to Great
Britain, or worse, defend a monarchical against the American form
16

138

of government, are always theorists who, in their younger days have
not /traveled outside of the small continent of Europe; they don't
know anything of Great Britain and the United States of America
either — as nations; they cannot possibly get at any correct conception
of what a cosmopolitan power really means, because they have not
traveled in what is called " the world " nor even themselves been
Hamburg or Bremen merchants, of a world-wide influence, to be
able to judge correctly of the power of nations. A voyage to the
United States of America, continued to China and India, would facil
itate their theoretical knowledge, to be condensed into practical views
and enable them to more steadily progress.

PART THE FOURTEENTH.

THE COSMOPOLITAN POWER OP THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, GREAT BRITAIN, AND UNITED GERMANY.

History, in viewing and recapitulating the social consequences of
this war, at this high period of the world's civilization, above all notes
the firm basis which education has so far built in Europe, and upon
which liberalism securely rests. That basis is of a firmness which no
anti-liberalism can distrust or assail. There is no falling back from
the height of knowledge attained ; there is no labyrinthian darkness in
the mind of man when the external sun of liberty, of humane tole
rance, of goodness, and of charitable plenty, pierces the openings in
the walls of reason, but very dimly lit up at all times in any one
by the artificial light of knowledge of any kind. That such is the case
in Europe is now an incontrovertible fact, thanks to liberalism, thanks
to its causes — education, thanks to America which influenced its appli
cation, thanks to steam and telegraph, by which geographical distances
have been annihilated, so as to hourly and ceaselessly promote its
spread, and thanks to the pioneers of liberalism and those of com
merce, a liberalism cosmopolitanly, materially, and practically aiding
it. The anti-Liberal constraint in religious, political, and social matters,
is gladly found to abate rapidly. The concentration of crowns, espec
ially in Germany and Italy, asserts the truthful fact.

The non-interference of Great Britain in this war, another import
ant proof of how liberalism is but synonymous of peace, humanity,
tolerance, individual comfort and enlightenment, the fruits of educa
tion, gathered from the tree of life, which is ordained to be indepen
dent. Great Britain, a non-interferent in this war, while an ally of
Prance, showed most undoubtedly that her people acquiesced in the
doctrine of the continuancy for the present of monarchial power, for
the same careful reasons which Germany and Italy advance. She
could not have sided with France against those^ convictions, as that
would have led to revolution all over Europe. Personal restraint,
which is so chronic in Great Britain and Germany, it is to be feared
if violently rented, would bring untold misery. The ripe fruit of

140

republicanism will fall off the tree of knowledge, without hindrance,
in due time, like any fully ripe garden fruit.

The hatred of some of the French people against foreigners — a
sickly glare from the smouldering embers of ambition on the part of
their monarchial adherents — -after France, to-day, is enjoying the prac
tical blessings of the republican form of government, is another reason
why the remainder of the people upon the continent of Europe can
not as yet be republican, nor even venture to disarm, especially con
sidered that the normal condition of society is but now enabled to
commence changing for the better. France thus herself in dang-er,
cannot be said to enjoy peace. The humane institutions of the repub
lican form of government, as resting upon peace, are already assailed
by those rotating dynastical interests of monarchial aspirants there.

In order to henceforth shield Europe against the eventuality of
dynastical wars, Great Britain, Germany, and Italy have to unite to
guard the liberalism of Europe, synonymous of progress, as resting
upon and developing itself in peace only, until that division of the
globe shall be so universally intellectual and strong as to respect it
law-abidingly.

America, so favorably isolated by the Atlantic, comprehends the stu
pendous efforts of enlightened Europe struggling to surely and continu
ally, but gradually, advance Freedom. Upon a piece of territory but as
large as half the Occident, and crammed with five times the popula
tion of the whole of our division of the globe, it is no easy matter to
accomplish. It is not only the desparity of population, but a feudal
autocratic power now only waning within the latter half of this cen
tury, from which public, mature understanding is alone capable of
rescuing Liberty, and of comprehending the vastness of the strides
which it costs to accomplish it legitimately. Time, the divine ameli
orator of Grief, shall soon roll over this war, and the bright encour
agement of Hope, diffusing life, enable nations to henceforth insure
their happiness and progress peaceably. Then to disarm will be the
order of the day. What happiness and wealth is sacrificed by such a
state of suspense and dread of war ! What misery entailed upon
millions of people by the one word ' ' hate " — war, rivalry in physical
force, all of which gladiatorship is centered in the two words " un
educated and bad " — America only can as yet comprehend.

Fed during two centuries as was the former monarchial power of
France, by the permanent disunion of Germany and Italy, that nutri
ment is gone, Europe, the hunting ground for man, "fenced in !"
" The watch of the Rhine ! a huntsman, a weather-beaten dead shot,
on the look-out !" He shall not keep his eye off France as long as
the River Rhine flows upon the earth, nor of Europe until it is repub
lican, and is fit to be so called. Until then it will be difficult for

141

Europe to disarm. That difficulty rests entirely with society, the
normal state of which time only can ameliorate the conventional rigor
of, and universal education radically change.

That in consequence of the crammed nature of European popula
tion within the small periphery of the territorial size of Europe, and
that in consideration of the many heterogeneous national elements
adhering to legends of the past, hatred of the present, and revenge
for the future, " republicanism in its manhood" is yet far distant, is
deplorably clear.

The only hope which shall not stay the deliberate progress of Eu
rope, is that Germany, more intelligent than the rest, becomes doubly
as numerically strong as France, instead of as to-day, merely equal
to her in strength. She will then be able to relax from the rigor of
discipline which alone secured to her her physical preponderance, and
bestow her exclusive attention to a radical change in the normal rules
of her society. From her compact strength she at present may guard
peace, although she cannot initiate disarming; but the full develop
ment of her greatness depends upon the social elevation of the people
at large, and the cosmopolitan extension of her commerce.

The nations of United Europe have, therefore, for the present to
continue to maintain the folly of former ignorance, and pay for it.
That folly, that incubus, that terrible detriment, consisted on the 1st
of September, 1871, in maintaining upon land and seas 5,164,300
soldiers and 512,394 horses, and keep from rust 10,224 pieces of
artillery, exclusive of about 800 mitrailleuses — of which ruinous in
vestment Germany alone maintains 18 army corps with 37 divisions of
infantry and 10 divisions of cavalry, and 337 batteries, actually sup
porting 1,152,506 men, and caring for 239,314 horses, and keeping
on a war footing 824,990 men, with 95,724 horses and 2,022 pieces of
artillery.

The consequences of this war recapitulate in this : Great Britain
having allied herself in 1856 with France instead of Prussia, entitles
the present Union of Germany, since the defeat of the French in this
war, to the Netherlands, which viewed as the remnant of the former
great Dutch empire, are as such, consistently and inevitably necessary
to now contribute to the formation of an equally vast German empire.

The consummation of this desideratum to be considered peremp
tory as demanded by duty towards the entire Germanic race, embrac
ing all who are at present alienated under foreign monarchical
governments — to the detriment of the expansion of the Union in its
great aim and strides of progress : the fitness for self-government and
the possibility of contributing greatly towards the humanization of
mankind at the present age.

142

Thus the present regeneration of the Netherlands, the Hanse-towns
and Baltic ports to their former greatness centuries ago — the realiza
tion of the manifest destiny of the German Union, shall induce
Great Britain to morally ally herself with Germany, as strictly de
manded by Progress, is facilitated by race and religion, is augmented
by similarity of character and strength, is made serviceable to mutual
advantage because possible, and is incumbent as a duty which the
two nations are destined to fulfill unitedly, peaceable and harmoni
ously, to the glory of civilization.

As to the English language, it is evident it shall become the lan
guage of the civilized world, because the "United States of America,
absorbing the immigration from all parts of it, absorb likewise the
various languages.

THE END.

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