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GERMAN NOTES ON
MINOR TACTICS

TRANSLATED AND COMPILED AT THE

ARMY WAR COLLEGE

WASHINGTON, 1917

WASHINGTON
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

1918

WAR DEPARTMENT.

Document No. 713.

Office of The Adjutant General.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, December 10, 1917.

The following pamphlet, entitled " German Notes on Minor
Tactics," is published for the information of all concerned.

[062.1, A. G. O.]
IJY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR I

JOHN BIDDLE,

Major General, Acting Chief of Staff.
OFFICIAL :

H. P. MCCAIN,

The Adjutant General.

€64357

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Page.
German notes on minor tactics:

Barrage fire against airplanes 7

Order for the army group 7

Note for the artillery of the region of Ypres 9

I. Activity of fire 9

II. Emplacements 10

1. Process of fire 13

2. Battery position 13

Means of liaison on the Somme front and their utilization

for artillery 15

I. Artillery liaisons 15

II. Liaison of the other arms 16

Information drawn from the use of the light machine

gun, model 1908-15, in the Sixth Army 18

I. Tactical employment 18

II. Directions for instruction 20

Chicanes constructed in the auxiliary defenses to allow

an offensive 22

General principles for constructing chicanes 23

German artillery — Organization of the command — Dens-
ity in defensive sectors — Distribution on the ground . . 25
The German artillery in line on both banks of the Meuse,

August 20, 1917 25

I. Organization of the command 26

Essential mission — Barrage and "annihilat-
ing" fire 26

II. Density of the enemy artillery in line 27

III. Distribution of the artillery on the ground 29

Conclusions 30

The transmission of intelligence in the German army. . . 31

I. General regulations 31

II. Means of liaison 32

A. Telephone 32

B. T. P. S. (earth-conduction telegraphy) 32

C. Infantry airplane 32

D. Panels of white cloth - 33

E. Carrier pigeons 33

F. Runners 33

G. Intelligence collection stations ("Melde-

sammelstellen ") 34

H. Observation posts inside the lines 34

Transmission of signals for barrage fire 34

6 CONTENTS.

German notes on minor tactics — Continued. Page.
German attack by gas wa\es which was to have taken

place in Champagne in September, 1917 35

I. Analysis of the files of the first Bavarian division

relating to the attack by gas waves 35

Orders Nos. 1, 2, and 3 of the 12th, 13th, and

17th of August, 1917 35

General instructions 35

Composition of the shock troops and detach-
ments 37

Shock troops 1 to 12 37

Shock troops A, B, C 38

Total strength of the salvage and destruction

' squads 38

Details of execution of the operation 39

Order No. 4 of the 25th of August, 1917 40

Postponement of the operation ' ' sine die " 41

II. Information emanating from the papers of a de-
serter and the declarations of prisoners 42

Nature of the gas 42

Detailed description of the apparatus for

emitting irritant gas 42

Irritant gas (reizgas) 42

Manipulation of the apparatus 43

Placing the gas bottles 44

Probable duration of the attack 46

Instruction 46

Masks 46

Preparation and execution of the German attack along the
ridge from the Mennechet signal station to the Cepy

farm • 47

Troops participating in the attack from north to south . 47

August 10th and llth 50

Arrangements made by the German commander for

the organization of the conquered terrain 51

Role of the enemy artillery and trench mortars 51

Execution of the attack 52

Days following the attack 53

Importance of artillery in action 53

Arrangements made by the enemy to organize the con-
quered positions (Dancourt trench) 54

Order of the colonel in command of the four hundred and

fifty-first infantry regiment 56

Program of works to be constructed after August 9,

1917 56

Tactics of German assault detachments 62

New defensive tactics. . i;o

GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

BARRAGE FIRE AGAINST AIRPLANES.

The appended translation of an order, dated February 7, 1917,
found at the front of the army shows that the Germans then con-
sidered special antiaircraft pieces insufficient for combat against
enemy airplanes in case of important operations, and had con-
sidered using barrage batteries for repulsing low-flying in-
fantry airplanes.

This order prescribed the initial training for "aerial bar-
rage." The result of the experiment is unknown.

[Ypres Army Group. Artillery 263/17.]

AEMY CORPS HEADQUARTERS,

' F«Hrwr$ 7, 7.9/7/r*

ORDER FOR THE ARMY GROUP. ' ' ' ' J ' ' '

It is not impossible that during the next offensive the enemy
will attack our infantry in their trenches with so large a num-
ber of aircraft that it will be necessary to combat them not
only with the. special antiaircraft batteries but also with a part
of the barrage batteries.

In general, buried or casemated batteries will be used against
enemy airplanes flying above. their respective barrage areas.
In short, momentarily they will have to project aerial barrages.

Fire against airplanes should be conducted in the simplest
possible fashion. The distance separating the battery from the
most advanced trench should be taken as range, always sup-
posing the direction of flight to be perpendicular to the direction
of the barrage fire. Direct laying should be used when possible.
If not, the laying-in direction should be that of the barrage fire
and should sweep the zone of the barrage fire.

8 GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

•
Laying-in elevation should be made by means of the gun

level or an ordinary level.

The range table appended 1 has been established for iield pieces
for an average altitude of 1,000 meters.

The enemy airplanes can not fly at very high altitudes, as the
effect of their machine guns would then be too reduced.

If the airplane flies lower than 1,000 meters, the combined
use of this range table and direct laying would result in plac-
ing the point of burst at too great a distance — that is, beyond
our first-line trenches.

The second column on the table gives the deflection to be em-
ployed, assuming that the speed of the airplane is 35 meters
per second.

Trials will be made by each division with a battery of light
howitzers and a battery of field guns to find out if barrage fire
at an altitude of 600 meters, 800 and 1,000 meters necessitates
any change in the construction of gun emplacements.

For these experiments the firing will be directed at least 100
meters beyond our most-advanced trenches; and the first rounds
still further, to prevent accidents.

The range table gives a sufficient approximation.

The fire will be conducted by locating sections. They will
indicate to 'the •foatteridb the elements for the adjustment of the
height of bv.rsf -Jivf will be charged with placing the point of
burst at the proper height

The result of the experiments will be reported, and the locat-
ing sections will add their own observations. The most prac-
ticable methods will be proposed. Batteries will indicate' par-
ticularly whether barrage is to be made simultaneously at two
different heights (600 and 800 meters, for example) or at a
single average height.

The locating sections will next make out range tables, placing
the point of burst above our first:line trench.

Vox TIIAKR,
Lieutenant Colonel, Chief of Staff.

1 This document missing.

NOTE FOR THE ARTILLERY OF THE REGION OF

YPRES.

In order to assure, in case of relief, continuity in the methods
of combat and of construction of positions, the following regu-
lations shall be strictly observed :

I. ACTIVITY OF FIRE.

(a) The principal objective is the destruction of the enemy
batteries. Insufficient expenditure of ammunition is equivalent
to waste. From 400 to 500 rounds are necessary. In general,
the number of rounds of 15 cm. fired should not exceed one-half
the total number of rounds, as the supply of 15-cm. shells is at
present limited. The balance shall be field artillery fire. To
destroy especially important batteries, the above figure may be
exceeded.

Never lose a single opportunity of counter battering the enemy
artillery ; call on the drachens, the aviation service, the locating
sections. The latter use here a very sure procedure. Batteries
located at night should immediately be counter battered, with
the aid of the locating sections, by batteries equipped with anti-
flash bags or by .other batteries firing from especially chosen
emplacements. Fire for effect can immediately follow the fire
for adjustment even if observation has become impossible.

When the fire for demolition has ended, execute on several
successive days, at irregular intervals, short harassing fires with
single time-fuse shells to hit the detachments clearing up the
debris.

(&) Bracket as many battery emplacements as possible in
order to have the data for fire with gas shells or to be prepared
if necessary to execute surprise concentrations of fire.

(c) Fire on trenches only in case of absolute necessity, and
then deliver only observed fire (except in case of fire for anni-
hilation). Avoid incessant regulation of barrage and registra-
tion fire. Do not fire on trenches without endeavoring to destroy
31279°— 18 2 9

10 GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

trench mortars, machine guns, or shelters. The first trench
generally is not occupied. In this region, shelters for personnel
or for kitchens are generally in the trenches farther to the
rear (most often far to the rear). If fire on the trenches is
necessary, it is on these constantly occupied parts that it should
principally be directed. It is advisable to prepare occasional
"mass fire," i. e., concentrated fire by several batteries on
especially important targets. Launch this fire by a short order,
such as " Mass fire for three minutes on point 723."

(d) Before or after adjustment of fire by airplane, balloon, or
locating section, it is generally advisable to choose a clearly
visible auxiliary target and adjust in range and, if possible, also
in height of burst (for example, when there is a steeple or a
chimney available) ; by means of this auxiliary target it will be
possible at any time to determine the corrections of the day
and make corresponding changes in the data for fire on the
target itself. Auxiliary targets situated very close to the target
are the best. This applies also to barrage fires.

(e) When our airplanes are in the air, they should always
dispose of one or two batteries, in order that they may be able
immediately to have fire delivered on important targets, such as
trains or assemblies of troops.

(/) For barrage fire, use the reduced charge as far as possible,
in order to save wear on the tubes.

Batteries of heavy guns and mortars should not take part in
barrage except by order of the general commanding the group
or in cases of absolute necessity. Regulate barrage fire with
all the guns and not merely with the directing gun. For barrage
fire make the adjustments in range for each piece. For fire on
trenches and for control of barrage fire, always come to an
understanding with the infantry officers interested.

(g) In case of enemy aerial activity, a careful decision must
be made in each instance under the actual circumstances whether
it is not more profitable to avoid disclosing the emplacement of
the gun than to execute the fire under contemplation.

(h) When enemy fire for adjustment on one of our batteries
has been observed, the battery should as far as possible before
the fire for effect, which often is not delivered until a day later,
avoid danger by removing to an alternative emplacement.

II. EMPLACEMENTS.

(a) Echelon th(> Mrtillcry in depth, arrange the battery em-
placements checkerwise, in order that If the enemy penetrates

GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS. 11

the lines, all batteries shall not be put out of action at the same
time.

In order to have a reserve ready in case of enemy penetration
to support the counter attack immediately, it is advisable to
establish from the first, for each divisional sector, one or two
batteries about 5,000 meters back of the first lines.

For these reserve batteries it is often advantageous to have
elevated emplacements (to secure the advantage of direct fire
on enemy elements which may have penetrated our lines, on
tanks, etc.).; build strongly of concrete; do not fire the guns
often.

(&) The thickness of reinforced and compressed concrete
should whenever possible be as much as 1.50 meters. Only con-
crete which has been prepared according to rule withstands
bombardment. Concrete blocks will not do this. Organize the
principal emplacement strongly. At the same time construct
at the alternative emplacement very strong isolated shelters for
the men and also some ammunition shelters. For protection
against direct hits penetrating under the shelter, it is necessary
to give it a strong concrete floor. Also organize strong observa-
tion posts, first establishing isolated posts with very wide fields,
then complete the system according to needs. It is the province
of the artillery commander to regulate the order of urgency
of these works. Observation posts are equally necessary in the
zone of the rear, and one should therefore be organized near
each battery to provide for the case of the enemy penetrating the
lines. An observation post should also be prepared for each
group commander. As far as possible, the field of fire of these
pieces should be 120°.

(c) At a distance of from 100 .to 400 meters from each bat-
tery, establish a. firing emplacement for a section or piece. The
latter should be of strong concrete and well masked ; it will serve
to satisfy the daily requirements for fire in order to conceal
the principal position from enemy aerial observation. It is
often advantageous to use for this purpose the best gun em-
placements of abandoned battery positions.

Construct isolated shelters, principally ammunition shelters,
at the sides of the battery and outside it.

(d) Simulated emplacements. — In general it is necessary by
all possible means to throw the enemy on false scents. Mobile
sections must constantly fire, especially at night, with frequent
changes of position. Simulated emplacements must be given,
even in the most minute details, the appearance of occupied

12 GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

emplacements. Fires will be lighted to produce smoke; trails
and Decauville roads will be built, actual fire delivered from
the emplacement, etc.

In all simulated emplacements particular care must be given
to imitating the stain on the ground produced under the muzzle
of a gun by the flame and blast of its discharge. This is the
detail which makes it possible to recognize a well-masked bat-
tery on photographs. The absence of this stain reveals that
the battery is not occupied.

To deceive the enemy some pieces should be made to continue
fire from emplacements which have been abandoned by reason
of the enemy fire. Flashes of discharge can be imitated by the
electric process and at the same instant fire can be delivered
by a battery equipped with antiflash devices. This is an excel-
lent means of deceiving the enemy.

(e) Too little attention is generally paid to protection against
view from aircraft. Our camouflage must constantly be im-
proved by study of our own aerial photographs. There is a very
special advantage in camouflaging our positions to conceal them
from aerial photography. All sharp edges, clearly outlined
shadows, regular lines and figures must be avoided. Prolong
roads, Decauville lines and trails up to false batteries or harrow
up the trails every day. Conceal the stain under the muzzle by
a camouflaged trellis or similar device.

(/) As far as possible all real fire should be masked by that
of a false battery or by exploding flash devices.

(#) Be prudent in the use of smoke, lighting several smoke
boxes simultaneously on a wide front not too close to the bat-
teries, the distance varying between 100 and 200 meters, accord-
ing to the wind, in order not to reveal the battery. Isolated use
of smoke boxes at different points of the ground gives a perfect
imitation of explosions and of battery emplacements. This
process can be used to advantage in many cases.

(h) The declination here is 13° 15', which is equivalent to the
reading of 212 for the fortress artillery and 235 for the field
jirtillery.

(i) If the battery emplacements have no cemented shelters
for the ammunition, the following arrangement for depots will
be exclusively used: Arrange the ammunition on planks in
small heaps surrounded by small dikes of earth and protected
ji.irainst rain by a light roof, preferably of corrugated iron.
Leave sufficient intervals between the heaps.

(Signed) KUHNK.

GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS. 13

The above instruction suggests the following remarks:

1. PROCESS OF FIRE.

The first point to note is the instructions in regard to the
number of rounds to fire for the demolition of a battery position.
This number is given as 500, but with the recommendation that
not more than one-half of the fire be with 15-cm. shells, the
other half being with smaller caliber shells. It is evident that
the effectiveness of the fire will be considerably reduced by this
practice. It is interesting to note that the reason for it is need
for economy.

Immediate fire for demolition on batteries located at night
is highly recommended, and in this connection allusion is made
to the very sure processes used for adjustment of fire by the
locating sections. This tendency of the enemy to adjust fire
by night by means of the locating sections is interesting to note.

It is also to be noted that when the German airplanes are
in the air they should always dispose of one or two batteries
in order to be able to fire immediately on important targets, sucli
as trains, columns, etc.

2. BATTERY POSITION.

(a) In practice it was not found in the course of the attacks
of July 31 and August 16 that the enemy disclosed any distant
batteries constructed on the principle here contemplated, 5.000
meters behind the lines for barrage fire.

In general, no unknown batteries were noted during the de-
velopment of the attacks, except about August 16 in the region
to the east of Houthulst Forest, where the photographs had not
revealed battery positions organized in advance and where the
pieces concerned were no doubt long-range pieces which had
been obliged to retire to the rear.

(1)) Construction. — Concrete, the use of which was recom-
mended in the note, was largely used in accordance with the
principles prescribed, and the recent test well demonstrates that
" concrete prepared according to rule withstands bombardment."
Batteries 47-80 and 47-83 (Bois de la Ferme) may be cited.
The first apparently corresponded to four unsheltered or weakly
casemated pieces, the emplacements of which, now completely
overturned, were separated by concrete shelters ; the second was
constructed for two pieces, the emplacements for which were

14 GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

prepared in a cast concrete work, which now appears as a
single concrete block about 15 meters long.

Against the first fire of 250 rounds of 220-mm. shells was de-
livered on three different occasions ; against the second, one fire
of 300 rounds o'f 220-rnrn. shells was delivered. Now, of the six
cement shelters of 47-80, only one was slightly broken into,
while the block of 47-83 remains almost intact. (The positions
had, nevertheless, become untenable for the artillery.) Experi-
ence has also shown that constructions of concrete in slabs
or blocks prepared in advance and separated do not withstand
fire for demolition delivered by heavy artillery.

(c) The precaution taken of installing at from 100 to 400
meters from each battery a firing emplacement for a section or
a piece has not prevented the battery emplacements from being
demolished or rendered useless by our fire, as our artillery took
for targets all concrete shelters which had been located on
photographs and shown on maps.

In conformity with the above instructions the ammunition
shelters had been installed at the sides of the batteries and out-
side them.

(d) The precautions suggested f$r false batteries are very
judicious. It seems impossible, however, to take such precau-
tions except in a quiet sector and the enemy seems not, in fact,
to have had either leisure or means for them since July 1. He
has, however, on several occasions endeavored to make us be-
lieve that he was continuing to occupy a position, either by
simulating activity of a piece on the day following a fire for
demolition, or by actually keeping a piece there when the ground
was so torn up that the piece could not be removed.

(e) The precautions for camouflage can be taken only during
a period of inactivity. In fact, the enemy has done little in the
way of such precautions during the course of the operations.
He did, indeed, try to conceal trails by harrowing, but the work
was not cleverly done.

(g) The enemy used smoke at the commencement of our
offensive, but abandoned the practice rather early.

In a general way our counter-battery work was not seriously
embarrassed by it.

MEANS OF LIAISON ON THE SOMME FRONT AND
THEIR UTILIZATION FOR ARTILLERY.

I. ARTILLERY LIAISONS.

1. Regardless of the number of liaisons installed by the in-
fantry with the rear, the artillery must, as a matter of principle,
itself organize the liaisons which it needs in order to receive
the reports of its liaison officers and first-line observation officers
and in order to direct its fire.

2. The means of liaison of which the artillery can dispose are :

(a) The telephone. — See "Composition of telephone material
equipment" (supplement to the Ministerial Circular of Sept.
17, 1915).

(b) Signal material. — Allotment (see Ministerial Circular of
Oct. 9, 1916).

Brigade staff : Two medium signal lamps, model 16.
Regimental staff: Four medium signal lamps.
Battalion staff: Four medium signal lamps and six
small signal lamps, model 16.

Battalion staff : Two pistols.
Battery : Three pistols.

(d) Signalwerfer.1 — Allotment (see order of the Fifty -sixth
Division, dated Nov. 30, 1916).

Regimental and battalion staff: One apiece.
Each battery : Two.

(e) Runners — Couriers. — Relays for runners and couriers.

3. Before these various means of liaison are used the ground
must be very thoroughly reconnoitered by officers. On the basis
of these reconnaissances the staffs will prepare the plan for
their liaison network.

1 !vote by French translator of the German document : " The Signal-
werfer is an apparatus for throwing illuminating signals (signal bombs)
more powerful than those used with signal pistols and thrown to a
greater height."

16 GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

4. Rules for the reconnaissance of the ground preparatory to
organizing liaison :

(a) Telephonic liaison along the line of relays. — Install In-
termediate telephone stations; use the relay posts of runners
not only for the transmission of messages but also as crews for
hunting telephone-line trouble.

(&) Place the visual signal stations near the telephone sta-
tions and the lines of relays ; if they are not so placed, provide
the visual signal stations with liaison by means of telephone
and runners.

5. Inspect from this point of view all liaisons already installed
and improve them where possible.

6. Make a sketch showing the whole liaison network; repro-
duce this sketch in numerous copies; distribute copies to all
batteries directly interested in knowing the network, to adjoin-
ing battalions of artillery, to the infantry of the same unit, to
the various liaison organs (observation and liaison officers and
the personnel assisting them, runners, couriers, visual signal
posts) ; report the installation of the liaison network to the
superior authorities.

7. Practice transmitting messages along a liaison line of a
certain length, only part of which has a telephone line, using
visual signals and relay posts.

8. Perfect operation of any liaison service is possible only
when it is permanently supervised by energetic officers or non-
commissioned officers.

II. LIAISON OF THE OTHER ARMS.

1. Staffs are under obligation to make sure, as soon as they
are in line, that all liaisons taken over from the force they
relieve are in working order; they will constantly test them to
see if the liaison still exists. Distribution will be made to all
batteries and all interested organs of sketches of the liaisons
available for their service.

2. The means of liaison at the disposal of the infantry are —
(a) The telephone.

(6) The visual-signal material.

(d) The Ahrend posts for earth-conduction telegraphy.

GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS. 17

(e) Liaison by signal lamps with infantry airplanes; then
liaison between infantry airplanes and wireless stations of divi-
sions, artillery commanders and infantry sector commanders.
Each staff, each battery, must know the emplacement of the
nearest wireless and must get in communication with it imme-
diately ; this communication will be maintained as permanently
as possible and will exist when all other means of liaison toward
the front fail.

These wireless stations will also intercept all radiograms trans-
mitted by the wireless stations of the advanced lines and will
thus continue to receive messages even when there are no in-
fantry airplanes in the air.

(/) The relay posts.

(ff) Report centralization posts; officers will be detailed to
these posts to exploit immediately all messages of value to the
artillery.

(h) Carrier pigeons and courier dogs.

3. When the artillery wishes to utilize a liaison line, it will
connect itself with this line by telephone or will detail liaison
agents to it.

4. Each observation and liaison officer must know and be
able to utilize all the means of liaison which are available for
him. He will inform the authority which sent him of the means
of liaison at his disposal, in order that they may establish com-
munication with his receiving station.

(Signed) VON HORN.

31279°— 18 3

INFORMATION DRAWN FROM THE USE OF THE
LIGHT MACHINE GUN, MODEL 1908-15, IN THF
SIXTH ARMY.

[Extract]

The 1908-15 machine gun is capable of giving very good results
in the hands of men who have perfect knowledge of the arm and
its handling, commanded by officers who have a very exact
understanding of the conditions under which it should be used
in battle.

As the 1908-15 machine guns were distributed to the troops
rather tardily, sufficient use has heretofore not been made of
this weapon, for the men have not received the thorough technical
instruction which is absolutely necessary for the use of the
guns.

It is extremely urgent that the infantry regiments of the divi-
sions which have been withdrawn from the front be provided
with 1908-15 machine guns for instruction purposes. It is also
advisable that not only the gunner but the other two men serv-
ing the 1908-15 machine gun should be armed with carbines in
order that these three men should not be completely lost for
combat in case the machine gun should not work.

I. TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT.

Use in the trench. — The 1908-15 machine gun should always be
used near the platoon commander, who assigns the machino
gunners the post which they must occupy. The battalion com-
mander should keep a reserve of these guns near him for pos-
sible counter attacks. The troops should not forget that the use
of the 1908-15 machine gun should be entirely independent of
Hint of the 1908 machine gun of the machine-gun companies.
It is on this principle that the emplacements of the 1908-15 ma-
chine guns must be determined.

They should be posted in the first line, in shell craters, or In

other available places which have been reconnoitered in advance.

It is not necessary to arrange them in platoons, but very special

importance should be attached to flanking fire, which should

GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS. 19

be practiced in such a way that two machine guns posted at
different points can both sweep the same ground. This model
of machine gun should not fire over the heads of infantry and
therefore should be installed between the first and second line
only in very exceptional cases. Their emplacement should be
changed frequently in order to deceive the enemy about their
position and to keep them as long as possible sheltered from
artillery fire and from view by airplanes. This is the only
means of securing full advantage of their great mobility on
ground full of shell craters, of the facility with which they can
be concealed from terrestrial and aerial observation, of their
ease of operation. The end of the small communication trenches
in front of the first trench also offers a favorable emplacement
for isolated machine guns of this model, free from risk of sur-
prise fire.

Good results can be obtained by fire on momentary targets
(men working on auxiliary defenses, detachments of carriers,
at night, in front of our lines) ; this is true of fire on offensive
patrols and on troops marching to the assault.

Bursts of harassing fire executed by surprise in short volleys
have also had very good results. It should not be forgotten,
however, that the precision of the 1908-15 machine gun is lim-
ited and that this fact must be taken into account in regulating
its utilization. This gun must never completely take the place
of infantry, but, on the contrary, the infantry must have clearly
in mind that for them the 1908-15 machine gun is only a means
of increasing their firing capacity. By reason of imperfections
of a technical order the 1908-15 model does not serve entirely
to replace the 1908 machine gun.

In mobile defense the 1908-15 machine gun is indispensable.
In this case it is posted either in the advanced first line or in
front of the first line proper, in machine-gun nests, shell craters,
etc. Its high capacity for fire will bring a certain moral support
to the first-line infantry.

On the attack the 1908-15 machine gun, well handled and judi-
ciously posted, brings a very valuable increase in the volume of
fire. In this case it can be carried forward with the first line
and used to fire on the parts of the enemy trench before which
our attack is stopped. This requires a certain spirit of initia-
tive. An effort should also be made always to use the 1908-15
machine gun near the platoon commander in order that the lat-
ter may be able to throw it rapidly during the battle to the
most favorable place.

20 GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

In small enterprises the gun can be used very effectively to
protect the flanks of the infantry attack and to support the attack
in case of need. The gun should not be carried prematurely into
a newly conquered position, but should be brought up only when
the bomb fighting has ended. While waiting, the gun remains
in front of the enemy trench and observes the ground toward
the enemy, looking 'for important targets. When it has once
been installed in the conquered trench, its task is to protect
the flanks or to stop enemy counter attacks if any are deliv-
ered. It is absolutely indispensable in this case to protect the
gun by special details of bomb throwers. By reason of its ex-
tremely light weight, the 1908-15 machine gun is perfectly
capable, with some dragging, of following the infantry. It is
not at all too heavy for this (with water reservoir, drum, and
belt it weighs 22 kilos.) The 1908 machine gun (which weighs
25 kilos with water reservoir and assault carriage) has already
frequently been used in assaults.

// the 1908-15 machine gun is used judiciously, the consump-
tion of ammunition is not excessive, from 1,200 to 1,500 car-
tridges should be enough. It should not deliver continuous fire,
but should be used only for precise fire on targets which are
offered under particularly favorable conditions. The highest
consumption of ammunition which has heretofore been reported
is 5,000 cartridges. This was an exceptional case where the
targets were extraordinarily advantageous. The longest con-
tinuous fire was 250 cartridges.

The 1908-15 machine gun should regularly be placed under the
orders of the infantry company commander, both for its tactical
use and for ammunition supply. The machine-gun officer of
the regimental staff is responsible only for the care of the gun
after battle. For this reason the replenishment of ammunition
for this model gun should be completely independent of that of
the machine-gun companies. The latter, moreover, will gener-
ally be between the lines or in rear of the first trench.

For all men of the infantry carriers' detachment detailed to
supply the 1908-15 machine guns with ammunition, it should be
a duty of honor to bring back to the ammunition depot near
the battalion commander all empty cartridge boxes and belts.
They must be carefully trained in this practice.

II. DIRECTIONS FOR INSTRUCTION.

The 1908-15 machine gun can be used with profit only by a well-
trained machine-gun man thoroughly familiar with the technique

GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS. 81

of this model of machine gun. Jams should not embarrass him.
He should, first of all, learn the following points: How to put
the machine gun rapidly into position in a shell crater without
letting the barrel touch the edge of the crater ; to change breech-
blocks and tubes at the bottom of a shell hole ; to load under the
most unfavorable conditions, even if his body is very cramped
in its movements; to carry the machine gun while crawling;
to spring from one shell crater to another carrying the machine
gun slung o\Ter the shoulder. It is necessary thoroughly to con-
vince the machine-gun man that his weapon yields nothing to
the infantry for mobility, and this conviction can be developed
in him by exercising him energetically and incessantly in
jumping.

His training must also habituate the machine-gun man to act
promptly and on his own initiative, and must also endeavor to
develop in him a certain tactical sense in view of the different
situations he may encounter during the course of an action. For
this purpose drills in detail, executed in concert with the infan-
try, are absolutely necessary.

It is only by satisfying these conditions that this fine weapon
can be made to give its maximum results.

CHICANES CONSTRUCTED IN THE AUXILIARY DE-
FENSES TO ALLOW AN OFFENSIVE.

The auxiliary defenses set up in front of positions, obstacles,
and dense wire entanglements, distributed over the ground,
cause great difficulty in carrying out an offensive movement and
putting the troops forward to an engagement.

Chicanes have been introduced into the lines of auxiliary de-
fenses and main obstacles of the Wilhelm position ; these
chicanes are marked on the terrain so that they can be recog-
nized. A map is now being drawn up showing the chicanes;
these maps will be distributed to the troops.

The chicanes will be methodically multiplied in the Albrecht
position. It is advisable to include chicanes in all the new
lines of defense.

The constant improvement in the obstacles and wire entangle-
ments on the intervening ground and the need of watching them
prevent all the chicanes from being shown on a map of a sector
for an entire division.

Because of this it is necessary for all the security detach-
ments who occupy the positions and works defending the inter-
vening ground (machine-gun nests) to know exactly the posi-
t ions of the near-by chicanes in order to be able to provide guides
when necessary. It is the duty of the commanders of the ma-
chine-gun companies to give detailed information to the per-
sonnel of the machine-gun nests. The passages will be indi-
cated on a diagram. The reconnaissance of chicanes is part of
the instruction of machine gunners.

This diagram will be handed over at each relief, together
with the other instructions to the men coming into the position.
The machine-gun officer of the division will be responsible for
the execution of this order. Also each detachment, on coming
into the position, will send out scouts to reconnoiter the position
of the chicanes and afterwards be responsible for them.

The scouts will carry wire cutters; for signaling they will
carry flash lights.

With their periodic report the commander of the pioneers
will hand in diagrams of the chicanes in the obstacles of the
22

GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS. 23

Wieltje and Furtuin position and the engineer officers of sectors
II and VI will hand in diagrams for the Albrecht position.

They will indicate the width of each chicane. The orders for
making new chicanes will be given according to the necessity.

When installing auxiliary defenses on the intervening ground,
one generally uses only very short entanglements and does not
extend them parallel to the positions ; this very often does away
with the making of chicanes. If the entanglement is more than
150 meters in length and runs parallel to the position, chicanes
are necessary. The engineer officers will show the chicanes in
their periodic reports.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR CONSTRUCTING CHICANES.

Each passage should have a width of 4 to 5 meters ; the pas-
sages will always be in groups ; for example, there will be four
passages in 80 to 100 meters of entanglement. A subsequent
order will indicate the number of groups of passages that it is
necessary to have.

On a single line of entanglements placed in the open the pas-
sages will run obliquely, so that they are not visible from the
direction of the enemy.

In entanglements of two or three rows of wire the gaps in
the lines will be staggered ; the passages will run parallel to the
lines and the men will follow them from one chicane to the other.

24 GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS:

When the entanglements ( are made up of wire hedges, the
chicanes will be left open on the side of the enemy and closed
on our side with chevaux de frise.

/VWWVWWVWM/WN.

W/l/MKWWk /WV \ A/y y; *M \'i!/ni

In chicanes intended exclusively for infantry the stakes are
left standing and wire is placed near them for closing the
chicanes. In chicanes intended for use by both infantry and
artillery the stakes are taken out and chevaux de frise are
placed near the chicanes.

It is useless to attempt chicanes for artillery in the Albrecht
position and in wire-hedge entanglements.

To prevent the grass near the chicanes from becoming tram-
pled down, which would render the passages visible and allow
them to be recognized in the enemy's photographs, it is forbidden
to use them for ordinary passage. The old passages near the
paths and roads will have to be used.

(Signed) VON DKWITZ.

GERMAN ARTILLERY.

ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMAND— DENSITY IN DEFENSIVE SEC-
TORS—DISTRIBUTION ON THE GROUND.

The following investigation of the organization of the com-
mand of the artillery in the German Army is published for its
value as information. It brings out the two following principal
points :

1. All artillery in position in a sector, with the exception of
the railway heavy artillery, is put under the orders of the com-
mander of the divisional artillery. For the Germans, therefore,
counter battery is a divisional work, the application of which
is strictly limited to the narrow front of the division.

This organization is very inferior to the French system, which
concentrates counter-battery work in the hands of the army and
the army corps and thus permits elastic use of the great range
of the guns by lateral actions.

2. As the result of prolonged artillery preparation, the Ger-
man infantry leaves its trenches and the reserves abandon their
assembling places. This procedure, which destroys the cohe-
sion of the first-line and counter-attacking units, will not even
succeed in forcing the German troops from the French artillery
fire if our artillery executes zone fire with time-fuse shells (see
note 28,610, of August 25, and note 1,606, of September 2, of the
general commanding in chief) and with gas shells.

To escape destruction by the French batteries, the German
artillery takes positions in the open. The artillery intelligence
service must give the greatest care to making sure where the
German battery emplacements are and when they are not actu-
ally occupied, and must regulate counter-battery fire accordingly.
If this is neglected, the French artillery will waste its fire on
a great number of empty emplacements and will thus play into
the enemy's hand.

THE GERMAN ARTILLERY IN LINE ON BOTH BANKS OF THE
MEUSE, AUGUST 20, 1917.

[Investigation made by the Second Army.]

Information collected confirms in a general way the facts
already known relative to the organization of the command,
the density and the disposition of the enemy artillery in a de-
fensive sector.

3127&0— 18 4 25

26 GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

I. ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMAND.

(a) All artillery in position, with the apparent exception of
the railway heavy artillery,1 is at the disposal of the infantry
division, and is placed under the orders of the commander of the
divisional artillery.3

In the " Maasswestgruppe " (group west of the Maass) at the
beginning of August there were directly dependent on the army
corps staff only some units of artillery not yet in battery ; a
foot artillery staff (apparently as reserve command) ; a staff
" for special employment " (the foot artillery regimental staff
for special employment No. 1).

(b) Within the divisions the distribution is variable.

In the " Maasswestgruppe " the artillery was divided within
each division into two great groups — the long-range group
("Fernkampfgruppe"), under the orders of a foot artillery
regimental staff, and the short-range group ("Nahkampf-
grnppe"), under the orders of the commander of the regiment
attached to the division.

The " Fernkampfgruppe " comprised the larger part of the
foot artillery guns and howitzers. Its essential mission is coun-
ter-battery and long-range harassing fire, and it also participates
in fire for annihilation.

The " Nahkamptgruppe " was formed by all the field artillery
at the disposal of the divisional artillery (the attached regiment
and reinforcing battalions), and also included some batteries of
heavy artillery (a large proportion of sector batteries).

ESSENTIAL MISSION BAKBAGE AND " ANNIHILATING " FIRE.

These two groups in turn were divided into subgroups, of
which the " Fernkampfgruppe " comprised two and the " Nah-
kampfgruppe" comprised two or three, all placed under the
orders of a field artillery group commander or of a foot artillery

1 Seven or eight railway batteries had been located by the artillery
intelligence service of the army. None of these batteries figures in the
tables of divisional artillery which have fallen into our hands.

2 Numbers of the " divisional artillery commands " noted : 25th Re-
serve Division, 228th Division, 206th Reserve Division, 213th Division,
6th Reserve Division, 127th Divisional Artillery Command, 228th Divi-
sional Artillery Command, 206th Divisional Artillery Command, 213th
Divisional Artillery Command, 94th Divisional Artillery Command.

GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

battalion commander and comprising a variable number of bat-
teries.1

In the " Maasstosstgruppe " (group east of the Maass) the
field artillery seems to have been placed entirely under the
orders of the commander of the regiment attached to the di-
vision, the heavy artillery forming a " foot artillery regiment."

II. DENSITY OF THE ENEMY ARTILLERY IN LINE.

(a) It has been possible to ascertain the whole composition of
the enemy artillery at the disposal of the three infantry divi-
sions of the left bank and of one of the infantry divisions of the
right bank (Two hundred and twenty-eighth Division, Beau-
mont sector, Bois des Fosses), as it was at the end of July and
beginning of August.

Division.

Number of batteries.

Front held by divisions.

1 Number of batteries per kilo-
meter.

Field
Artil-
lery.

Heavy Artillery.

Guns.

Heavy howitzers.

Mortars.

1
1

7.7 cm.

10.5 cm.

Two hundred and sixth
Division

14
1

8 1

2
6
4

28
31

Km.
3

2
23.5

2.8

11.7

14
9

Two hundred and thir-
teenth Division
Sixth Reserve Division.
Two hundred and
Twenty-eighth Divi-
sion

....
1

2
2

4
6

2
3

1(In the Sixth Reserve Division the distribution was as follows:
(a) SHOUT-UANGE (^UOUP :

West subgroup. — One 77-mm. battery ; one 9-cm. battery ; two
105-mm. howitzer batteries ; one 15-cm. howitzer battery ;
one 12-cm. battery.

Center subgroup. — Three 77-mm. batteries'; two 105-mm. how-
itzer batteries; one battery of 15-cm. Russian guns.
East subgroup. — Four 77-mm. batteries ; two 105-mm. howitzer

batteries ; one 15-cm. howitzer battery.
(6) LONG-RANGE GROUP:

Subgroup A. — Two 15-cm. howitzer batteries ; two 21-cm.
mortar batteries ; one 10-cm. battery ; one battery of Krupp
15-cm. guns.
Subgroup B. — Two 15-cm. howitzer batteries ; one 21-cm.

mortar battery; three 10-cm. batteries.)

2 No account is taken of the passive sector included between the railroad and the
Meuse,

28 GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

For the four divisions investigated, therefore, the average
density about August 1 would be a little less than 11 batteries
per kilometer.

The proportion of guns to howitzers and mortars was much
higher than normal — 21 heavy-artillery-gun batteries against 33
batteries of howitzers and mortars, or nearly 39 per cent of the
total (normal proportion, 27 per cent).

(&) It is difficult to ascertain the precise reenforcement made
l>y the enemy from August 1 to 20. According to the declara-
tions of prisoners and documents which have fallen into our
hands, it seems to have been relatively small on the left bank,
where the enemy had already been induced, as a result of the
battles of late June and of the month of July, to assemble a
considerable mass of artillery. On the right bank it was more
important, as several battalions of foot artillery arrived there
during the first two weeks of August (the Sixty-sixth and Sev-
enty-eighth Battalions of foot artillery).

It is also possible that part of the divisional artillery of the
four divisions in reserve may have been put in line;1 at least
it is certain that this artillery was in the immediate rear of the
front ready to enter into action on the very day of the attack.

Field artillery. — Each division had at its disposal, in addition
to its attached regiment, from six to nine batteries from an inde-
pendent regiment.2

Foot artillery. — During a quiet period (north front of Verdun,
in April and May) each division disposed of eight or nine bat-
teries, largely belonging to Landwehr battalions or to position
batteries. The reenforcement was made by means of newly-
formed battalions withdrawn from the sectors of battles of last
spring, the Aisne and Champagne.

1 In total, the artillery at the disposal of the divisions which under-
went our attack can be estimated to have been on August 20 about 180
or ZOO batteries, which would conespond to an average density of 12
or 13 batteries per kilometer.

To have an idea of the artillery participating in the battle there
should be added to this total seven or eight pieces of high-powered
heavy artillery not dependent on the infantry divisions (report of the
artillery intelligence service) and numerous batteries belonging to the
adjoining divisions and acting on the flanks of our attack.

3 Independent regiments identified on the front of attack : Left bank,
Fourth Bavarian and Two Hundred and Sixty-sixth Foot Artillery Regi-
ments ; right bank, Twenty-eighth Reserve and Twenty-fourth Reserve
Foot Artillery Regiments,

GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS. 29

III. DISTRIBUTION OF THE ARTILLERY ON THE GROUND,

Several documents which have fallen into our hands indicate,
for several divisional sectors, the arrangement of the artillery
at different periods, one of which corresponds to a period of
inactivity (Seventh Reserve Division, in April, 1917), and the
others to different moments of the enemy reenforcement (Sixth
Reserve Division, at the beginning of July, Twenty-ninth Divi-
sion about August 1).

Examination of these documents suggests the following re-
marks :

1. In a quiet period each battery of heavy artillery has at its
disposal at least one alternative emplacement. There are also
a considerable number of reenforcement emplacements.

In case, of the Seventh Reserve Division, for 18 batteries exist-
ing in April in its sector reenforcement by 12 batteries was con-
templated1 and emplacements for them were in course of con-
struction.

2. In all the sectors studied the larger part of the enemy artil-
lery is in the rear of the artillery-protection position. Some bat-
teries of all calibers are pushed forward. Among these it Is
interesting to note the particularly large proportion of guns
intended for the execution of harassing fire on our rear.

In the course of our preparation this arrangement was modi-
fied and most of the batteries of guns were withdrawn to the
rear of the second position.

3. The enemy had organized in great detail for defense against
tanks.2 In each sector several 90-mm. pieces taken from position
batteries and 77-mm. pieces detailed from batteries in the sector
were pushed forward and made responsible solely for combating
tanks or for fire against the infantry at the moment of the
assault.

In the course of our preparation all these pieces were ren-
dered incapable of intervening.

1 The total of 30 batteries thus contemplated corresponds exactly to
the density recommended in the German regulations of March 1 on
" the principles of defensive battle in trench warfare " and to the
actual density at the moment of our attack (see above).

2 The Germans seem to have had a strong idea of the possible par-
ticipation of tanks in our attack. Besides the artillery defense, cuts
had been made in all roads perpendicular to the front.

30 GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

CONCLUSIONS.

I. The numerical conclusions which we have reached in regard
to the number of enemy batteries in line are considerably lower
than the figures obtained by the artillery intelligence service.
The reasons for this difference may be found in the more and
more frequent changes of position by batteries, even in course
of battle. According to the declarations of prisoners, the coun-
ter-battered batteries have first moved to their alternative em-
placements, and when they were fired on the batteries have
moved out into the open and thereby escaped any further losses
from our counter battery.

II. To summarize, the enemy having sure knowledge as early
as the end of July of our projected attacks, reenforced, deployed,
and utilized his artillery exactly in accordance with the rules
laid down by him in March, 1917, in his " Principles of Defensive
Battle in Position Warfare."

This artillery, located with precision by us and energetically
counter battered, is admitted by officer prisoners to have found
it impossible to carry out the role expected of it. It is possible,
therefore, that the enemy, if he has the means, will in future
increase the density of artillery which he had planned for de-
fensive battle. We must also expect to see him endeavor to
diminish his losses by more and more frequent changes of posi-
tion, even going so far as to put batteries in the open outside
any prepared epaulernent.

THE TRANSMISSION OF INTELLIGENCE IN THE
GERMAN ARMY.

A German document of January 1, 1917 (Fifth Army : " Memo-
randum on the transmission of intelligence," signed V. Gallwitz),
furnishes valuable information on this important point.

The thing to be noted is the eminently defensive character
of the document. The liaison service is mainly utilized for the
purpose of transmitting intelligence so as to assure, at the op-
portune time, the action of the artillery and the execution of
counter attacks. The transmission of orders and the organiza-
tion of liaisons in conquered ground are not even contemplated.
It is probable that this document was written under the direct
impression of the French attacks at the end of 1916. The " In-
struction for the General Organization of Divisional Intelligence
Service," which is dated March, 1917, has the same strictly
defensive character.

I. GENERAL REGULATIONS.

The " memorandum " lays down the following principles :

" Both the general direction of operations and the coordina-
tion of the different arms of the service depend on the transmis-
sion of intelligence.

" Each process of transmission forms part of a definite whole.
The cooperation of all must be assured by direct or lateral
liaisons.

"As the first position is that most often destroyed by the
enemy fire, prepare in advance a plan for the reorganization
of the liaison service at points chosen both in the open ground
and in the second and third positions.

" Improvise numerous surprise drills, assuming the loss of
one or more positions. If possible, each regiment should be
drilled every day, the tactical situation being changed each
time.

" From the first lines to the regiment, only terms agreed upon
must be used.

" During combat it may be advisable to send an officer to the
immediately inferior unit.

32 GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

" During attacks the assaulting infantry should be accom-
panied by an artillery officer with signal material.

" During reliefs the personnel of the intelligence service must
not leave the sector until it has fully informed the relieving
personnel.

"Active liaison between the infantry and the artillery officers.

" Do not post artillery observers with infantry except at points
where the view is good and where sufficient liaison with the rear
is assured.

"At rest and in a sector, habituate the troops to the regular
utilization of the processes of transmitting intelligence. Espe-
cially instruct the infantry and artillery observers. The troops
should know these different processes in order that if one fails
they may use another.

" It is advisable to initiate the divisional cavalry in the tele-
phone and signal services.

" The instruction will be given by the telephone detachments.

" The men who are sufficiently intelligent should know the
Morse code. Numerous Morse alphabets should be posted in the
cantonments.

"All noncommissioned officers, whatever the situation, should
incessantly try to find new processes for assuring the liaison
between the first line and the nearest sure telephone post. Sug-
gestions should be brought to the attention of the Army."

II. MEANS OF LIAISON.

A. TELEPHONE.

The division commander and the commander of the divisional
artillery should be in the same locality. The staff lines will be
established only for messages and conversations of a tactical
order. Be sparing of material.

B. T. P. S. (EARTH-CONDUCTION TELEGRAPHY).

The memorandum considers that this means of liaison is not
yet sufficiently tested for the transmission of messages.

C. INFANTRY AIRPLANE.

(a) Instruction. — The memorandum insists on the instruction
of the troops. It prescribes :

First. Drills with panels, newspapers, Bengal lights, wireless
telegraphy, sirens, machine-gun fire, visual signals, etc.

GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS. 33

Second. Lectures illustrated with slides.

Third. Detailed discussions with the troops, either at the
aviation camp or at the cantonment.

Fourth. Courses of instruction for officers, noncommissioned
officers, and men.

The memorandum adds :

" The infantry airplane should appear every day, weather
permitting, over the infantry first lines and try some process
of liaison.

" Repeat the signals to the troops until they signal ' Under-
stood.' "

(&) Organization of the liaison. — The army corps should dis-
tribute the infantry airplanes among the divisions and organize
conferences between the chiefs of wireless-telegraphy sections,
of telephone sections, of the groups of infantry airplanes, and
an officer of the staff of the general commanding the artillery.

The infantry divisions should, the moment an infantry air-
plane goes up, advise the interested sectors in order : First, that
all may be ready to display the panels and to send the visual
signals; second, that the wireless-telegraphy stations may re-
ceive the waves exactly.

Later the infantry divisions advise when the airplane has
returned.

If telephonic communications are broken, the infantry
divisions will assign fixed hours for liaison by infantry air-
planes.

D. PANELS OF WHITE CLOTH.

Dimensions: 0.60 by 1.20 meters. Intervals: From 10 to 20
meters.

Make signals in Morse code with panels which are white on
one side and dark on the other.

E. GABBIER PIGEONS.

The " memorandum " considers that their efficacy is limited
(fog, obscure weather, varying results from different pigeons).

F. RUN NEBS.

Very strict organization.
31279°— 18 5

34 GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

G. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION STATIONS (" MELDESAMMEL-

STELLEN " ) . .

They receive the duplicate of every intelligence report so
that any that do not reach their destination may be made known
promptly. The troops should know the emplacement of these
stations. Choose emplacements near a road and connect the
station to the telephone by horsemen, cyclists, automobiles,
runners.

H. OBSERVATION POSTS INSIDE THE LINES.

" Particularly important," says the " memorandum," " is ob-
servation in the rear lines of the first position, in the second or
third positions, or near them." Such observations often give
indications essential for counter attacks when the enemy has
momentarily penetrated the first line.

TRANSMISSION OF SIGNALS FOR BARRAGE FIRE.

The " memorandum " outlines a scheme for liaison service on
the appearance of an enemy airplane. It recommends the in-
stallation at observation posts of orientation tables to permit
specific report of the place for which barrage fire is requested.

The scheme is as follows :

1. In each corps the troops, the antiaircraft guns, the air-
plane-locating section notify the officer in charge of the antiair-
craft defense of the corps.

2. The officers of the antiaircraft defense thereupon notify the
aviation intelligence collection center of the group.

3. The latter notifies the pursuit squadron, the commander
of the aviation groups, and the battle squadron.

Each airplane should be signaled separately, as a general mes-
sage arrives too late.

The " memorandum " concludes as follows :

"Thanks to the various processes of transmitting intelligence,
the high command and the artillery, even on days of great bat-
tles, can in one way or another be in liaison with the regiments,
often with the battalion commanders, and also, in spite of inter-
ruptions, with the advanced lines of the infantry.

" Generals commanding army corps will use these suggestions
to try out the dispositions taken for the transmission of intelli-
gence, will improve on them, and multiply them constantly, and
will stimulate the divisions by frequent drills. The absence of
intelligence reports during the course of a battle is generally to
be ascribed to IncK of organization or to insufficient supervision."

GERMAN ATTACK BY GAS WAVES WHICH WAS TO
HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN CHAMPAGNE IN SEPTEM-
BER, 1917.

The Germans last August had prepared a gas-wave attack as
a preliminary to the infantry attack west of Souain Hill. It Is
now known that we forestalled this attack.

In the course of our surprise attacks, particularly that of
September 3 on the Navarin farm, we captured orders and docu-
ments and took prisoners who furnished important information
concerning the preparations for this attack.

The attention of the armies is called to this information, for
it is to be expected that the Germans will not abandon their
project, but will attempt to carry out on some other front the
operation which failed in Champagne.

I. ANALYSIS OF THE FILES OF THE FIRST BAVARIAN DIVISION
RELATING TO THE ATTACK BY GAS WAVES.

The operation was to have been carried out by the First
Bavarian Division supported by the two neighboring divisions.
The front of the First Bavarian Division extended from the
Saint-Hilaire-Saint-Souplet road to Souain Hill (6 kilometers).

ORDERS Nos. 1, 2, AND 3 OF THE 12TH, 13TH, AND 17TH OF AUGUST,

1917.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS.

The First Bavarian Division will make use of the powerful
effect of gas in order to penetrate the enemy positions on the
entire divisional front.

Troops employed. — Twelve shock troops of the First Bavarian
Division, three shock troops of the Second Assault Battalion,
twelve salvage squads, twelve destruction squads (see the com-
position on pages 37 and 38).

Attack on the flank. — The attack of the First Bavarian Divi-
sion will be flanked by attacks of shock troops from the two

36 GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

neighboring divisions (the Thirtieth Division on the west and
the Fifty-fourth Reserve Division on the east).

Mission. — To destroy the enemy defenses on as wide a front
as possible ; to bring back the greatest possible quantity of war
material of all kinds, as well as documents. In the orders the
operation is called Sommerernte (summer harvest) ; to deter-
mine the losses of the enemy.

The occupation of the position.— The original plan provided
for a wide outflanking attack to capture and occupy territory.

The menace of our attack on the Verdun front obliged the
Germans to withdraw the Thirtieth Division and the Fifty-
fourth Reserve Division. In replacing them the enemy could
dispose only of divisions which had already suffered severely in
Flanders, the Two Hundred and Twenty-first and the Fifty-
second Reserve Divisions.

Under these conditions the German commander reduced the
scope of his plan (order of the 17th of August). After- the gas
emission the extent of the effect was to be observed, the destruc-
tion completed, and the greatest possible quantity of booty
brought back ; but there was to be no question of gaming ter-
ritory.

Front and objective. — The line to be attained formed an arc
the chord of which was approximately 9 kilometers (from a point
2 kilometers east of Auberive to the Souain Hill) and 3 kilome-
ters deep (1 kilometer west-southwest of Souain). The order
of the 17th of August provided that three shock troops would
push beyond the line originally fixed, and have for their respec-
tive objectives Saint-Hilaire, the Vacques farm, and Souain.

Prospective date. — The cylinders were to be in position by
August 15.1 The emission was to take place, at the earliest,
during the night of the 17th to 18th, one hour before daylight
(order of the 12th of August). Owing to prevailing contrary
winds, the order of the 17th of August postponed the operation
to the 1st of September (at the earliest).

Evacuation of the trenches. — The advanced trendies were to
be evacuated for the attack, and only pioneer gasers (Thirty-
fifth Regiment Pioneers), the sanitary personnel, and holding
garrison were to remain in them.

M iimte detailed instructions were given concerning the assem-
bling of the shock troops and the different squads. All orders
were given by code-conventional words.

i The Thirty-fifth and Thirty-sixth Resimonts of Pioneers seem to
have arrived on the sector the beginning of July.

GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS. 37

Emission — Crossing Ihe trenches. — The emission will last 15
minutes. Six companies of the Thirty-fifth Pioneer Regiment
will be distributed along the emission sector. If it is dangerous
for the shock troops to cross the emission trenches at the ap-
pointed hour, the commanders of pioneer companies will either
detain them or point out a safe route to them.

Use of the artillery and trench mortars. — During the entire
operation the enemy artillery will be neutralized by the fire
of shell and gas shell. In each regimental sector a platoon of
field artillery will advance as far forward as possible for the
immediate support of the shock troops during the advance. The
divisional artillery will hold itself in readiness to execute, on
request from the shock troops, a barrage fire in front of the ob-
jective assigned. The trench mortars, medium and light, of
the divisional company will be employed to support the attack
and to reduce isolated points of resistance.

Aviation. — Three infantry aeroplanes and one or two artillery
aeroplanes wrill be employed in the attack.

Preliminaries. — Special instructions to the shock troops and
squads. Detailed reconnaissance. Special organization of liai-
son. Partial rehearsal of the operation during the night of the
16th to the 17th.

COMPOSITION OF THE SHOCK TROOPS AND DETACHMENTS.

(a) Shock troops. — The First Bavarian Division will form 12
shock troops, Nos. 1-12 (4 per infantry regiment), and the
Second Assault Battalion will furnish 3 (A, B, C), making a
total of 15 shock troops.

troops 1 to 12.

Furnished by the infantry.

1 officer.

3 noncommissioned officers.

16 men.

1 light machine gun (5 men).

2 signalers.

1 noncommissioned officer, 4 miners, First Battalion of Pioneers.

3 pioneer gasers from the Thirty-fifth Regiment.

1 corporal and 3 miners. iFrom Assault Battalion

1 corporal and 6 grenade throwers. J No. 2.

2 stretcher bearers.

Total, 1 officer and 47 noncommissioned officers and men.

38 GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

Shock troops Nos. 2, 7, and 10 will be known as the principal
shock troops. They will have, in addition to the above, an artil-
lery patrol (1 officer and 5 men, including 2 telephone operators
and 2 signalers), one detachment of infantry telephone oper-
ators (1 noncommissioned officer and 3 men), one supplementary
detachment of visual signalers (2 men), and one pigeon tender,
making an additional force of 1 officer and 12 noncommissioned
officers and men.

Shock troops A, B, C.

1 officer. 1

30 men. iFrom Assault Battalion No. 2.

1 light machine gun (5 men), j

2 officers or warrant officers. 1

12 gunners and 2 light trench mortars. I From the infantry trench-
4 telephone operators. [ mortar detachments.

2 stretcher bearers.

Total, 3 officers and 51 men.

(b) Destruction and salvage squads. — The First Bavarian
Division will form 12 salvage squads, Nos. 1 to 12 (4 per in-
fantry regiment), and the First Pioneer Battalion 12 destruc-
tion squads, 1 to 12.

Total strength of the Milnif/c. and destruction squads.

1 warrant officer.

3 noncommissioned officers.
21 men.

1 noncommissioned officer.

4 pioneers.

Infantry.

Pioneers.

3 pioneer gasers.

Total, 1 warrant officer and 32 noncommissioned officers
and men.

Twelve men of each salvage squad will carry the ammunition
for the light trench mortars of shock troops A, B, C.

(c) Limber detachments (for removing enemy guns). — Three
limber detachments will be constituted, each comprising 1 officer,

4 six-horse teams, with the necessary drivers and gunners, and,
in addition, 1 officer and 50 men of the pioneer battalion with
entrenching material and explosives.

GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS. 39

DETAILS OF EXECUTION OF THE OPERATION.

The forces intrusted with the operation will be arranged for
the attack in the following order :

(a) Shock troops 1 to 12 (first wave).

(6) Shock troops A, B, C (second wave).

The principal shock troops (2, 7, and 10) will regulate the
progress of the others.

The role of the shock troops will be to open a passage through
the enemy's positions for the salvage and destruction squads, to
break down the remaining resistance, to attain the objectives
assigned them, and to protect the salvage and destruction squads
during their operations.

If the shock troops attain their objectives and no enemy at-
tacks occur during the day, the troops shall remain in the con-
quered lines until dark.

If the shock troops encounter a strong resistance, which they
do not succeed in breaking down, they will hold out until the
search for and seizure of the booty has been completed.

Before a superigr enemy attack the shock troops will fall back
slowly, protected by a barrage fire, which they will ask for.

The patrols of artillery officers marching with shock troops
2, 7, and 10 will support the advance by directing the fire of the
advanced artillery platoons.

Shock troops A, B, and C, marching with the second wave, will
support those who advanced with the first wave, breaking the
enemy resistance as much as possible by flanking movements.
They will put their trench mortars into action rapidly.

The salvage squads will explore the captured trenches. If the
advance continues, they will organize a depot to which the com-
panies in position will send their fatigue parties to transport
important materiel to the rear.

All arms, appliances, telephones, listening apparatus, field
glasses, searchlights, maps, orders, documents, equipment, and
gas mask's will be collected.

Enemies overcome \)y the gas fumes will be brought into our
lines.

The role of the sappers-gasers operating with the shock troops
and squads is to point out the passages free from gas and to warn
the men against the danger of being overcome.

40 GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

The destruction squads, after removing the booty, will de-
stroy the principal enemy defenses (command posts, observation
stations, shelters, etc.).

Aviation. — The infantry aeroplanes will hold themselves in
liaison with the shock troops and will keep the regimental com-
manders and the divisional commander informed of the advance
of the shock troops.

Should a counter attack menace the shock troops, the aero-
planes will give warning by machine-gun fire.

Liaison. — The liaisons will be organized in every detail, in
order that the regimental and brigade commanders and the divi-
sional commander may be kept informed of the advance of
the shock troops. Liaison on the flanks will be constantly main-
tained. Only the principal shock troops (2, 7, and 10) will
communicate with the rear. The others will maintain lateral
liaison only.

The principal shock troops will dispose of the following means :

Telephone. — Six kilometers of wire and 3 telephones.

Visual signaling. — Three groups of signalers (1 for the rear,
1 for lateral liaison, and 1 for the artillery ) .

Pigeons. — Four pigeons.

Wireless. — Shock troop No. 7 will be accompanied by a group
of wireless operators.

Rockets will only be used in requesting barrage fire or exten-
sion of fire.

All the shock troops will designate runners for use in case the
other means of communication should fail.

ORDER No. 4 OF THE 25xn OF AUGUST, 1917.

By the 21st the Germans knew that we had discovered their
plans. On the entire front In question our artillery began
demolition fire (21st of August), and our infantry multiplied
its surprise attacks, resulting each time in the capture of pris-
oners and materiel. In order to face our offensive at Verdun,
the German commander was obliged to call upon his remaining
available resources west of the Argonne.

Therefore an order dated August 25 modified the arrangement.
" Under the present conditions a more energetic action on the
part of the enemy must be expected than was at first antici-
pated." Consequently—

The shock troops of each regimental sector will be placed un-
der the orders of a battalion commander, who, with his staff,

GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS. 41

will follow Hie movements of the principal shock troops. His
duties will be: To determine what linos will be held, and for
how long; to fix the moment of withdrawal, and to regulate the
advance ami the pm.urossivo withdrawal.

Each battalion commander icill dispose of a platoon of at
least 40 men, with two light machine guns, which will constitute a
reserve to be called upon in case of need, particularly to support
the shock troops in case of counter attacks.

The rear liaison installed by the three principal shock troops
will be at the disposal of the three battalion commanders.

All the men of the attacking troops will have leather masks
issued to them.

Kach of the three battalion staffs will have a squad of six
men furnished with Dreger apparatus.

Shortly before the sortie of the shock troops the trench mor-
tars will direct an energetic fire on the breaches and on such
machine guns as are still capable of operating.

POSTPONEMENT OF THE OPERATION "SINE DIE."

Finally, on the 29th of August a pioneer of the Thirty-fifth
Regiment deserted, bringing us. in addition to the confirmation
of a plan of attack, all the technical details to be desired. This
desertion was noted, and the Germans became aware that they
could no longer count on a surprise effect. Moreover, they had
taken some prisoners from us. who, in all probability, informed
them of our counter preparations.

Under such conditions the operation threatened to lose a good
part of its effectiveness. The intensity of our fire (increased
since August 27) no longer permitted the enemy to attempt even
a restricted infantry action, and the gas receptacles under our
bombardment became a source of danger to the Germans,1 a
danger which would be increased by an unfavorable wind. It
seemed certain that our very deadly and very depressing fire
would not diminish, while our patrols continued to point out
survivin r installations.

There remained, then, but one solution to the situation — the
postponement of the plan sine die and the removal of all the

1 According to the declarations of prisoners captured on the 29th of
August, our artillery fin- mused the explosion of numerous cylinders
and this resulted in casu:iltii'>\ After the fire of the niirht of the
lst-2d all tin1 cylinders which had been placed in the first trench were
brought back to the second.

42 GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

materiel as soon as possible, so that the enemy might be made
aware of this through his patrols. On the 10th of September
the Germans seem to have come to this decision.

To sum up, the " Sommerernte " seems to have gone through
three phases —

Postponement of a very extensive plan because of atmospheric
conditions and the menace of our attack along the Verdun front.

Reduction of the original plan owing to the Verdun attacks,
while still maintaining a less comprehensive plan to be carried
out as soon as the wind should permit.

Postponement sine die, if not definite abandonment, when all
hope of surprise has been lost and the operation appeared more
costly than profitable.

II. INFORMATION EMANATING FROM THE PAPERS OF A DESERTER
AND THE DECLARATIONS OF PRISONERS.

NATURE OF THE GAS.

The attack provided for two emissions, each of a different
gas:

First. Irritant gas (reizgas), probably sulphate of ethyl
bichloride, white color, drug-store smell. Escapes under the
form of a nontoxic vapor, accompanied by a little liquid, blue
and turning brown in the air, very corrosive. This noutoxic
gas penetrates the masks, and by irritating the skin compels
their removal. Duration of the emission, four minutes.

Second. Toxic gas (kampfgas), a gas already known, immedi-
ately following the preceding. It was expected that at this
moment, our men having taken off their masks, will be with-
out protection.

The officers captured from the Second Army indicated an
.analogous procedure for bombardment with poisonous shells.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE APPARATUS FOR EMITTING IRRITANT

GAS.

[Translation of a notebook taken on a deserter of tho Thirty-fifth Regi-
ment of Pioneers.]

IRRITANT GAS (REIZGAS).

It is contained in a case consisting of two cylindrical tin con-
tainers 70 centimeters high, handle 15 centimeters, escape tube
10 centimeters, the reservoir proper therefore being only 50
centimeters high.

GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS. 43

The reservoir proper consists of the handle fastened at the
bottom ; above the handle the priming powder, ignited by a fuse
primer placed in the handle, igniting itself when the handle is
pulled.

The interior of the receiver is constructed as follows: Two
tin cylinders (concentric), the exterior cylinder containing a
mass of sulphur and iron through which run fuses that are in
contact with the priming powder.

Protecttny

Fusefcortfs ofpetytfe/}

matter

(Kampfgas)

Manipulation of the apparatus.

The gas box being placed in position, supposing that the gas
is to be released at 11 o'clock, at 5 minutes to 11 the men put
on gas masks, making sure that they are properly adjusted.

44 GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

Then the commander of the battery (20 or 25 cylinders) gives
the signal to release the gas. Grasp between the first finger
and thumb of the left hand the point where the priming-powder
tube is screwed on and, having first unscrewed the stopper of
the escape neck, pull the fuse primer. A light whistle will
indicate that the priming powder has taken. On hearing this
whistle, take some earth and cover the bottom of the box with
it, the remainder of the box being already covered with earth
except the neck.

Wait two or three minutes until the heavy vapors have
escaped; now open the heavy gas cylinder (Beschwerungs-
flasche; a rag or any other sign distinguishes it from the
irritant-gas cylinders. The reason for this proceeding is to
make the irritant gas (lighter) trail nearer the level of the
ground, as otherwise it would rise and do no harm to the enemy.
At the end of four minutes the irritant-gas box is empty, and
then is the time to release the real asphyxiating gas.

On releasing the irritant gas from the box, a liquid forms and
settles on the rim of the neck. This liquid is very dangerous.
When removing the boxes after the operation, if this liquid
comes into contact with hands and faces, the box of chloride of
lime carried by everyone should be immediately employed and
the parts affected washed with this chloride of lime.

Placing the gas bottles.
A

Coc/c of the Bcxhwcrungsf/aschs.

GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

When the trench comprises a firing step, it is entirely removed.
The toxic-gas cylinders are placed upright, buried at the bottom
of the trench to a depth of 10 to 15 centimeters, and usually in
two rows. They should be protected behind and on top with
sandbags — two rows of sandbags behind the cylinders and at
least four, preferably six, layers above. Between each pair of
layers of sandbags on top of the cylinders there must be a sort
of covering called by the prisoner " Salsdecke," impregnated
with a salt intended to absorb the gas, which would otherwise
escape into the trench at the time of the emission. A spare
Salsdecke is always kept in a corner of the trench section where
the cylinders are. Should one of the cylinders explode as the
result of a bombardment, the Salsdecke is at once thrown over
the bottle and absorbs the gas. The Salsdecke is brownish in
color, like wet earth.

At the time of the emission the sandbags covering the bottles
are removed, the lead tubes are screwed to the neck ; they are
bound together in sheaves and thrown out onto the parapet of
the trench. At the same time the irritant-gas cylinders are laid
on the parapet. The whole arrangement before the emission
resembles a firing platform made of sandbags. Only the ends
of the keys of the cylinders can be distinguished, barely protrud-
ing behind the bags. One of these keys is marked with a dis-
tinguishing sign (a rag, for instance). It is the one to be
opened at the same time as the irritant-gas bottles in order to
weight the latter down. This is the " Besclrsverungsflasche."

SKETCH B. — Regulation arrangement for the future ; the bottles to be
set in the trench wall.

Tax/c 905 6otf/e5 ^

'*r

46 GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

But in the future it is ordered that the bottles be placed in a
sort of niche in the actual trench wall. Only the sandbags
behind the bottles will project into the trench.

Probable duration of the attack.

Four minutes for the irritant gas and 20 minutes for the
toxic gas. The effect of the toxic gas may be felt for a depth
of 6 to 7 kilometers.

Instruction.

In the rear depots the new irritant gas is not yet known, and
the men only know how to handle the old poisonous gas.

Masks.

The irritant gas will penetrate the new leather masks. When
handling irritant gas, carry in addition individual oxygen
bottles.

PREPARATION AND EXECUTION OF THE GERMAN
ATTACK ALONG THE RIDGE FROM THE MENNE-
CHET SIGNAL STATION TO THE CEPY FARM.

NIGHT OF AUGUST 9-10, ACCORDING TO STATEMENT OF PRISONERS.

[Extracts from investigations made by the Second Bureau of the Third
Army and of the Eleventh Army Corps.]

Objective. — According to the consistent statement of all the
prisoners, corroborated by a document found on the person of
the commanding officer of the Third Battalion, Four Hundred
and Fifty-first Regiment, the Germans wanted to seize the ridge
Mennechet Signal — Hill 124 — Cepy Farm, as far as the western
military crest.

The plan required that the Four Hundred and Fifty-first, to
which this operation was assigned, should retake its former
trenches which it had lost on the 13th of last April, gain enough
terrain in front to cover these trenches against any surprise
attack, and install itself securely in the conquered position by
constructing a double line of trenches.

TROOPS PARTICIPATING IN THE ATTACK FROM NORTH TO SOUTH.

1. In the first line. — A platoon of the Ninth Company, ordered
to cover the right flank of the attack; the Eleventh, Twelfth,
Seventh, and Sixth Companies; a platoon of the Eighth Com-
pany ordered to flank the attack on the left ; " Stosstrupps "
(assault units), some belonging to the Third Light Infantry Bat-
talion ("Sturmbataillon" of the Second Germany Army), the*
others belonging to the " Sturmkompagnie " of the Two Hundred
and Thirty-fourth Infantry Division; pioneers of the Three
Hundred and Sixtieth Company; three Stosstrupps (assault
units, each of 8 to 10 men) and two groups of pioneers were
assigned to each of the Twelfth and Seventh Companies ; five to
six "Stosstrupps" (assault units) and two groups of pioneers
to each of the Eleventh and Sixth Companies placed on the
wings.

48 GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

The liaison between the Cepy Farm and the Eighth Company
was assured by elements of the regiment at the right of the
division occupying the Saint Quentin sector (Four Hundred and
Forty-eighth Infantry Regiment, Two Hundred and Thirty-third
Infantry Division).

2. As support. — Along the entrenched line of Hy£nes, Bois
Squaw, Terrier de Renard, 94.05: Two platoons of the Ninth
Company, the Tenth and Fifth Companies, and two platoons of
the Eighth Company.

These units were to furnish fatigue detachments, to rein-
force and relieve at need the companies which suffered heavy
losses, and to construct a line of trenches on the eastern slope
of the ridge.

3. As reserve. — The First Battalion, with two companies in
the former first position ; the second company in the Hauptmann
trench; the first company in the southern part of the Hetre
trench ; two companies a little further to the rear ; the fourth
company in the shelters of the Huissier trench, and the third
company in the Hamac trench.

The whole regiment had thus been pushed forward to take
part in the attack or to support it if there were need. The
attacking troops proper included 150 men for the " Stosstrupps "
(assault units), 70 men for the pioneers, and 450 men at least of
the Four Hundred and Fifty-first Infantry Regiment

Preparations for the attack. — During the fortnight preceding
the attack the Germans worked steadily in the construction of
battery emplacements, trench mortar emplacements, shelters,
buried telephone lines, and new communication trenches.

In addition the four companies intended for the first line were
sent to Remaucourt between the 1st and the 7th of August to
practice the projected attack ; and each one of these companies
took part in at least one attacking practice by day and two by
night.

Preliminary movements. — On the 6th the attacking companies
were taken to the Jungwaldstellung (Huissier and Hamac
trenches) ; on the evenings of the 7th and 8th they occupied
the first line (Hetre trench).

During the night from the 9th to the 10th, between 11 and 12
o'clock1 p. m. the supporting companies in their turn occupied
the first line. The attacking companies, the " Stosstrupps "
(assault units), and the pioneers attached to them were ;is

•All time indicated Is French time.

GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS. 49

sembled, the Eleventh Company on the western edge of the
Indian Wood, the Twelfth near the road from Crater 93.13 to
Fayet, the Seventh at Terrier de Renard, and the Sixth on road
No. 44.

Between 12 o'clock midnight and 1 a. m., these four com-
panies made a new rush forward and occupied their positions for
the start, almost at the eastern military crest of the ridge, at a
distance from the French line varying from 75 to 200 meters
(see appended sketch), while the supporting companies took
their place.

Arrangement. — The Sixth, Setenth, and Twelfth Companies
were arranged in two waves, each formed of a line of skir-
mishers 20 meters apart. The eleventh company was formed in
three waves, each composed of small detachments of eight men
and one noncommissioned officer.

The first wave included the " Stosstrupps " of the Third
Light Infantry Battalion and of the divisional Sturmkompagnie,
reenforced by groups chosen from the companies (Ersatzstos-
strupps).

The second wave of each company (and the third of the
Eleventh Company) had two or three light machine guns and
twc " Granatenwerfer " (bomb throwers).

The ordinary machine guns, grouped behinc^ the Gangue
and Hoquet trenches on the evening of the ninth, were to follow
up the advance, but none of the prisoners saw them during
action.

Finally, 100 or 200 meters to the rear of the second wave,
fatigue detachments brought up materiel and munitions.

Missions. — The mission of the first waves ("Stosstrupps"
and " Ersatzstosstrupps " ) was to seize the first French trench
(Landerneau-Dancourt-Eylau) and to push on as quickly as
possible to the determined objective.

The second waves were to occupy the Dancourt and Lander-
neau trenches, then utilize the shell holes to organize an ad-
vanced line, following approximately the military crest and
passing about 30 meters wrest of crater 87.10, returning along
the Gricourt Road, then advancing anew toward the west in the
region of the Dancourt-Eylau junction.

The " Stosstrupps " were ordered to return to the rear as
soon as their mission had been fulfilled and as soon as the fire
of the French artillery should permit.

50 GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

The aim of the support companies, in addition to the contin-
gent reinforcement of the attacking waves and their replenish-
ing, was likewise to advance to the eastern military crest of the
ridge and to establish a trench there immediately, connecting
the Indian Wood and the Squaw Wood, then to pass west of the
Terrier de Renard to the extremity of the communication
trenches dug before the attack connecting with garden 93.05.

(Photographs taken the 13th show that only a portion of
this trench had been constructed at that date.)

Execution. — At 1 a. m. the German artillery and the " Minen-
werfer" (noticeably increase<j for the operation) opened an
extremely heavy fire on our first lines and to the rear of them.

At 10 minutes past 1 the heavy and medium trench mortars
ceased fire and the artillery increased its fire.

The attacking waves, without waiting any other signal, imme-
diately rushed toward our trenches. In spite of the resistance
of our troops they succeeded in seizing the Landerneau and
Dancourt trenches and in reaching the Saint-Quentin-Gricourt
Road. On the .wings the " Stosstrupps " attempted to advance
to the Chilly and Eylau trenches, but they were soon stopped,
and then repulsed in the vicinity of the road.

AUGUST 10 AND 11.

(a) South sector of the line 87.09-91.11. — As soon as they
reached the west side of the hollow road the Sixth and Seventh
Companies were subjected to a violent bombardment from the
French artillery and suffered serious losses. They were each
reenforced by a platoon of the Eighth Company, which was thus
entirely engaged. In the afternoon of the 10th they tried in
vain to advance to the Eylau trench, but a French counter
attack pushed them back into the Dancourt trench, which
position they held with difficulty.

At nightfall the Sixth and Seventh Companies were hastily
relieved by the Fifth and Third Companies, each reinforced by a
platoon of the Second Company. These latter succeeded in stop-
ping our advance in the Dancourt trench and tried to organize
their position but were prevented everywhere by our machine-
gun fire.

On the afternoon of the llth the French artillery fire, which
was very accurate, increased in intensity. The number of
killed and wounded increased rapidly and many men tried to
escape into the Squaw Wood, the Terrier de Renard, and the

GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS. 51

Garden 93.05 (die Gartiierei), but the mujority of them, stopped
by the former French wire entanglements, which had not been
completely destroyed, were killed by our projectiles.

In the energetic French counter attack at 6 p. m. the last
occupants of the Dancourt trench, about 30 men per company,
were either captured or killed.

(I)) North sector o/ the line 87.09-91.11.— The Eleventh and
Twelfth Companies, which took a position at the hollow road
on the two sides of the Crater 87.10, immediately after the 1
o'clock attack, occupied at daybreak a line of shell holes sit-
uated about 30 meters west of this road. There they were sub-
jected to a violent French bombardment, which was responsible
for heavy losses, and they likewise suffered from a heavy Ger-
man artillery barrage fire. In the afternoon of the 10th they
were driven from the hollow road by one of our counter attacks
and left several prisoners in our hands. They still hold the
Lauderneau trench.

In the evening they had to be relieved or reenforced by the
Ninth and Tenth Companies which were in a position behind
them as support.

On the morning of the llth the French troops cleared the
Lunderneau trench by grenade combat and took up their posi-
tion there, thus retaking all the terrain lost in this sector.

ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY THE GERMAN COMMANDER FOR THE OR-
GANIZATION OF THE CONQUERED TERRAIN.

The enemy intended to organize strongly the conquered posi-
tion and to occupy it against all counter attacks from us.

Careful orders had been given to this end. All the regimental
companies, including the machine-gun companies, three com-
panies of pioneers, and of the "Armierungs bataillone" (bat-
talions of laborers) were to participate in the work, each at a
carefully defined point.

ROLE OF THE ENEMY ARTILLERY AND TRENCH MORTARS.

Preparation. — It seems that the enemy artillery began, on
July 25, to adjust their fire on all the important points of the
sector, communication trenches and trenches; but this adjust-
ment was made with such care not to alter the appearance of
the regular fire that it was scarcely discernible.

On July 27 different caliber trench mortars in turn began
their adjustment with the same caution.

5£ GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

There was increased activity iu the adjustment during the
first days Of August; but at this time, following statements
made by Polish deserters of the Twenty-third Reserve Infantry
Regiment, who disclosed the intentions of the enemy, our artil-
lery became more active and began its demolition fire on the
trench-mortar positions which were known. This recrudescence
of activity of the enemy artillery might easily have been taken
as a simple reprisal.

On the 6th of August counter-battery fire began against our
75-mm. batteries in the Bois de la Loutre; 200 rounds of the
ISO's on one, 30 rounds of the 105's on the other.

The 7th was a quiet day, doubtless because of the thickness
of the weather.

On August 8, at 9 a. m., the enemy began a violent demolition
fire with 150's and large-caliber trench mortars (350 rounds in
a few hours). From this time on the enemy artillery kept up
a less violent but steady fire on our whole first line to prevent
the trenches and auxiliary defenses from being repaired.

At 8 in the evening, moreover, the enemy caused us to open
our barrage fire by firing red rockets. This was doubtless for
the purpose of finding the range of our barrage batteries. On
the 9th, at 11 a. m., he resumed his counter-battery fire, always
in the region of the Bois de la Loutre, with time-fuse 105's and
150's (150 rounds in 3 hours).

EXECUTION OF THE ATTACK.

(a) On August 10, at 1 a. m., a very violent fire opened sud-
denly on our lines. The signal for it was given by two white
rockets, one coming from Cepy Farm and the other from the
Indian Wood, marking the line of attack.

This fire included:

1. A heavy bombardment of all caliber trench mortars on
our first lines and their auxiliary defenses, from the Eylau
trench to the Chilly trench. Flange bombs were thrown at
the same time on the same points.

2. A violent barrage fire on the whole Fayet hollow.

3. A bombardment with all caliber shells on the village <>f
Fayet, the Breton communication trench, and the Selency road

At 10 minutes past 1 the trench-mortar fire stopped abruptly.
This was. the signal agreed upon for the attacking waves to
start. The barrage fire and the rear bombardment continued
until half-past 2, slightly diminishing, in intensity.

GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS. 63

During the entire afternoon of the 10th there was keen activity
of the enemy artillery in the sector.

( b ) Counter battery. — Neutralization fire on our batteries like-
wise commenced at 1 o'clock. It was aimed principally at the
battalion which ordinarily dropped barrage on the attacked
front. The fire seemed to be executed by two batteries of 150
mm. and one battery of 77 mm., solely with tear-producing and
asphyxiating shells, and was conducted in twTo periods from 1
to 1.30 and from 2 to 3 at a slow rate, interspersed by rapid
volleys.

The number of projectiles thus sent was calculated at 1,500.

DAYS FOLLOWING THE ATTACK.

The activity of the enemy artillery during the 10th and llth
consisted for the most part of barrage fire opened at. different
times to prevent any attempts at counter attacks and to keep
our troops from being reassembled. This fire was directed
almost exclusively on the hollow of Fayet and on the Chilly
trench.

Several times, and particularly on the llth, at 5 p. m., the
enemy conducted a violent fire on our first line with heavy
caliber.

No particular activity of the trench mortars was noticed after
the attack.

IMPORTANCE OF ARTILLERY IN ACTION.

Forty-seven battery emplacements were reported in action
during the night of the 9th-10th, 10 of which had not before this
been sighted.

A comparison of all the batteries reported in action opposite
the front of the Army Corps in the period from the 13th to the
23d of July (German attack on the Pire-Aller) with those in the
period from the 3d to the 13th of August shows that the number
of batteries was practically the same. But it was observed that
29 batteries seen in action from the 13th to the 23d of July, and
almost all in the region including Isles-Harly-Mesnil-Saint-Lau-
rent, have since disappeared, and that during the last 10 days 25
emplacements, either new or long since silent, displayed activity,
almost all in the region Omissy-Morcourt-Saint-Quentin.

Account must be taken of the fact that certain emplacements
are doubtful and that others may correspond only to a section,

64 GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

or even a single piece. We are led to the conclusion that when-
ever the enemy makes attacks like that on Pire-Aller or on the
Mennechet signal station they have at their disposal 15 or 20
batteries, withdrawn from near-by commands, to reinforce the
commands supporting the attack.

As for the trench mortars, information supplied by prisoners
regarding emplacements which they saw in action lead us to
believe that the enemy used for the attack :

All the trench mortars (heavy, medium, and light) of the
trench-mortar company of the Two Hundred and Thirty-fourth
Infantry Division ; light trench mortars of the Four Hundred
and Fifty-first Infantry Regiment (12 pieces) ; and the larger
part of the light trench mortars of the two regiments on the
right and on the left of the Four Hundred and Fifty-first Infantry
Regiment, or a total of four 240-mm. trench mortars, six 170-mm.
trench mortars, and from thirty to forty 75-min. trench mortars.

ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY THE ENEMY TO ORGANIZE THE CONQUERED
POSITIONS (DANCOURT TRENCH).

By their attack on the 9th and 10th of August on our Lan-
derneau and Dancourt trenches the Germans counted on taking
from us the whole ridge from the Mennechet signal station to
the Cepy Farm, solidly organizing themselves there, occupying
it in force, and repulsing all counter attacks on our part.

This fact is proved by a document found on the corpse of the
lieutenant in command of the Third Company, Four Hundred
and Fifty-first Regiment.

This document includes :

(1) A battle map, with the plan of the trenches and communi-
cation trenches to be constructed.

(2) A detailed list of the work to be undertaken by each
company as soon as the position was conquered.

The translation of this document is given below, with the
reproduction of the map. (The names of the French trenches
and the French system of cross sectioning have been added to
the latter to facilitate its reading.)

Before the attack the Four Hundred and Fifty-first Infantry
Regiment occupied a first position (position A), including two
lines of trenches — the Hauptmann and Hetre trenches, the
Gangue and Hoquet trenches; a second position (Bereitschaft
support position), likewise including two lines — the Condole
and Huissier trenches, the Humour trench (unfinished) ; and,

GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS. 66

finally, toward the rear, tin interimi'luti* position — the Gland
and Hamac trenches.

As soon as the Mennechet Ridge signal station was taken a
new position, including two lines of trenches, was to be con-
structed— an " advanced line " following the western military
crest of the ridge, utilizing in part our Dancourt trench, with a
" counterslope line " following the eastern military crest.

These two lines were to be protected by extensive wire en-
tanglements.

Four communication trenches were to be constructed, start-
ing from the initial sections made before the attack, to connect
this new position with the old ones.

In order to execute this work and at the same time occupy
the sector with sufficient strength to resist all our counter attacks,
the new position was to be held by four companies in the ad-
vanced line and four companies in the counterslope line.

The reserve battalion was to have two companies in the old
first position and two companies in the old support position, and
the works were to be carried on by trench-mortar companies
and machine-gun companies in the preparation of their own
positions, three companies of pioneers, specially charged with the
construction of shelters and of command posts, and four com-
panies of workmen (of Armierungs battalions) to make im-
provements in the former position and in its rear.

Everything had been carefully provided with reference to
success.

ORDER OF THE COLONEL IN COMMAND OF THE
FOUR HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIRST INFANTRY
REGIMENT.

[Translation of a German document.]

PROGRAM OF WORKS TO BE CONSTRUCTED AFTER AUGUST 9, 1917.

During periods when no important combats are taking place,
the organization of the conquered height should be pushed with
the utmost energy. The technical execution of this task should
be guided by the following general principles :

(a) Protective defenses of the first-line trench and the coun-
terslope position. — Fifty meters in front of our own trench, a
first line of spiral wire ; to the rear, on our side, hedgehogs about
1 meter wide and closely intertwined ; immediately behind these,
a second line of spiral wire, then a wire entanglement with a
depth of 5 meters erected on screw stakes. The hedgehogs
should be so placed that at the least displacement they become
closely bound by their hooks to near-by wires. The second
wire entanglement, with a depth of 8 meters, erected on screw
stakes, should be located 10 meters further back.

(6) Shelters. — Do not repair the old French shelters in the
first line unless their entrances face toward our side and unless
they fulfill all conditions demanded by first-line shelters.
Otherwise, construct new shelters. Shelters on the counter-
slope position should have a cover 8.50 meters thick; arid this
can be all the more easily provided as the terrain in this place
rises from the entrance toward the shelter proper.

(c) Trenches. — Do not use the old trenches in the first line
unless their construction is adaptable ; if not, it is preferable to
dig new trenches. In the counterslope position, first dig the
small sections traced in color to a depth of 1.50 meters, then
the junctions, a.nd finally deepen all the trenches to 2.20 meters.
56

GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

Num-
ber
of the
order.

Vnits.

Works to be constructed.

Numbers.

Length of
the work.

Company A . .

Company B.

do..:....

Company C . .

Company D.

..do...

Construction of a trench
from the Mennechet Mill
to 100 meters north of the
Petit Crater-Fayet Road.
Excavation of recesses and
construction of shelters for
noncommissioned officers'
stations.

Auxiliary defenses in front of
this trench.

Lookout service

Construction of a trench run-
ning from 100 meters north
of the hollow road from
Petit Crater to Fayet, to
the southern extremity* of
the hollow road 200 meters
south of Petit Crater (limit
of the battalion). Excava-
tion of recesses and con-
struction of shelters for
noncommissioned officers'
stations.

Auxiliary defenses in front
of this trench.

Lookouts

Construction of a new trench,
including auxiliary defen-
ses, going from the Menne-
chet Mill to the Indian
Wood.

Construction of a communi-
cation trench connecting
the Squaw Wood to Com-
pany A's new trench.

Construction with auxiliary
defenses of the Bois Squaw
trench and the Harem
communication trench,
from the Squaw Wood to
the second line of position
A (Hoquet trench); repair-
ing of the first line of posi-
tion A (with auxiliary de-
fenses) from the boundary
of the sector of the regi-
ment at the right (91.17) as
far as 92.14. Construction
of shelters (see No. 40).

Construction of a new trench,
including auxiliary de-
fenses, from the Mennechet
Mill to the Indian Wood.

Construction of a communi-
cation trench connecting
the Terrier de Renard
grove with the Petit Crater.

Construction of the counter-
slope position, including
auxiliary defenses from the
Squaw Wood (former
Fayet position) to 150
meters southeast of the
Grand Cratere Petit Cra-
tere Road. Construction
of shelters (see No. 38).

£ company...

.do.

....do

...do...

.do.

.do.
.do.

..do.

.do.

do..

.do.

Will depend
on the situ-
ation.

GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

Num-
ber
of the
order.

Units.

Works to be constructed.

Numbers.

Length of
the work.

Company E..

Company F...

.do.

Company G..

.do.

Company H..

Construct, partly new and
partly by transforming the
old French trench, accord-
ing to conditions, a trench
going from the southern
extremity of the hollow
road, 100 meters south of
Petit Cratere (battalion
limit) to a point situated
360 meters beyond, in a
southeasterly direction
(limit of the sector of the
company at the left).

Auxiliary defenses in front
of this trench.

Lookouts * ...................

Construction of a trench
going from the left wing of
E Company (see No. 13) to
150 meters northwest of the
crossroads situated on the
northwest peak of the
Cepy Farm. Partly all
new, partly restoration,
according to conditions, of
the old French trench.
Construction of shelters for
noncommissioned officers'
stations and excavation of
recesses.

Auxiliary defenses in front
of this trench.

Lookouts ....................

Construction of a new trench
with auxiliary defenses,
connecting the left wing of
F Company to the trench
of the adjoining regiment
near the west of the Cepy
Farm.

Construction of the com-
munication trench Hin-
denburg, from the Terrier
de Eenard to the first
trench of E Company.

Construction of the counter-
slope position with auxili-
ary defenses, in liaison
with D Company (see No.
12) as far as 150 meters
northwest of the northwest
peak of garden 95.15. Con-
struction of shelters (see
No. 38).

Construction of a new trench
with auxiliary defenses
connecting the left wing of
F Company with the
trench of the neighboring

J company..

regiment west of
Farm.

Cepy

.do.

....do...
....do...

.do..

.do.
.do.

..do

.do.

..do..

GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

Num-
ber
of the
order.

Units.

Works to be constructed.

Numbers.

Length of
the work.

Company H . .

Construction of a communi-
cation trench leading from

$ company...

the garden 95.15 to Com-

....do

pany F's first trench.
Construction of the counter-

....do

slope position, with obsta-

cles, in liaison with G

Company as far as the hol-
low road leading to the

Cepy Farm, and the con-

struction of shelters (see

No. 38).

Company I

Repairing of the first line of
position A with auxiliary

§ company . . .

defenses (Hauptmanh

trench) from 90.14 to 100

meters north of the small

butt; maintenance of the

Hindenburg communi-

cation trench (95.11-98.13-

05.16) from the Haupt-

mann trench to the Ho-

quet and Preussenweg

trench (from Grand Cra-

tere to Hill 122).

Construction of the Hin-
denburg communication

J company . . .

trench, from the Haupt-

mann trench to the

counterslope position of

Company K..

G Company (92.09).
Repair of the He'tre trench
with obstacles, from a

§ company . . .

point situated 100 meters

north of the butt to the

boundary of the regiment

at the left. Maintenance

of the Ludendorff com-

munication trench (98.06

to 100.07).

Construction of the Luden-

J company..

dorff communication

trench, from 98.06 to the

termination of the com-

munication trench of gar-

den 95.05 in the counter-

slope position.

Company L . .

Construction of shelters in

16 men

2 shifts.

the Hoquet trench (see

No. 42).

Construction of a shelter for

8 men

Do.

the battalion command

post (hill 122.8).

Concrete foundation for the

30 men

Do.

signal station and the ob-

servation station of the

command post of the regi-

ment (20.18).

.do

Repair of the company posi-

The rest.

tion and the Hinden-

burg communication

trench from hill 118 to 98.13

GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

Num-
ber
of the
order.

Units.

Works to be constructed.

Numbers.

Length of
the work.

33
34

Company M...
. do

Safety troops and party for
transfer to Morcourt.
Unloading and transporta-

i company.
do

tion parties.
Maintenance of the company

Four hundred

position and the Luden-
dorff communication
trench from the Hache
trench to the Hoquet
trench.
Transportation and placing

40 men

According to

and fifty-
first Com-
pany of Pio-
neers.

of materiel for reenforcing
the auxiliary defenses in
front of the advanced first
trenches on hills 124.2 and
126.4.
Construction of the com-

40 men

the situa-
tion.

The rest in

38
39

One hundred
and fifty-
ninth Com-
pany of Pio-
neers.
..do

mand post of the regiment.
Construction of shelters in
the counter-slope position
of hills 124.2 and 126.4 (re-
enforcing D, G, and H
Companies).
Clearing out of the blown-up

28 men
4 men..

two shifts.
2 shifts.

Do.

41
42'
43

Three hundred
and sixtieth
Company of
Pioneers.
do

do
do.

shelter near Grand Cratere.
Construction of shelters in
the Squaw Wood position,
on hill 126.4 (reenforcing E
Company).
Construction of the battalion
post of command, hill 122.8.
Construction of shelters in
the Hoquet trench.
Concrete foundation for the

16 men

do
do
20 men

Do.

Do.
1 shift.
Do

44
45

Machine-gun
company.

Light trench
mortars.

Fifth Com-

observation station of the
regimental command post
and the signal station at
Croix d'Omissy (19.17).
Care of machine-gun em-
placements in the Haupt-
mann and He'tre trenches
and construction of ma-
chine-gun nests continued.
Care of new trench-mortar
emplacements ; shelter con-
struction continued and
supply of necessary muni-
tions.
Drilling for a well north of

78 men
60 men.
8 men..

According to
the situa-
tion.

1 shift (8

pany of the
Thirty-first
Fatigue
Battalion.
do

hill 118.

Completion of the Hinden-
burg trench from the Croix
d'Omissy to the height
where the post of com-
mand of C3 North Battal-
ion is located (probably
crossroads, hill 118).

132 men.

hours).

GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

Num-
ber
of the
order.

Units.

Works to be constructed.

Numbers.

Length of
the work.

Fifth Company
of the Thirty-

Construction of shelters com-
menced in the intermedi-

\ company.

first Fatigue

ate north position (Gland

Battalion.

trench).

Organization of the interme-

diate north position.

Fourth Com-

Completion of the Hinden-

100 men.

pany Fifth

burg communication

Bavarian

trench from the Croix

Fatigue

d'Omissy to the post of

Battalion.

command of the C3 North

Battalion and following.

.do

Completion of shelters com-

^ company .

2 shifts.

menced in the south inter-

mediate position.
South Gland trench and

.do

Hamac trench and organi-

zation of the south inter-

mediate position.

Fatigue Bat-

Construction of a communi-

1 company.

talion.

cation trench from the

post of command of the C3

South Battalion 07.11 to

the Hamac trench.

Completion of the Hamac

^ company.

position.

.do

Completion of auxiliary de-

fenses provided for in No.

54.

AUGUST 9, 1917.

( Signed ) VON PONCET,

Major, in Command of the Regiment.
For duplicate copy :
WESTHAUSEN,

Lieut., Commanding Regimental Working Force.

TACTICS OF GERMAN ASSAULT DETACHMENTS.

Three successful coups, which are recounted below, were
recently executed by German assault detachments on the
heights of the Meuse and to the north of Rheims.

The methods used in the three cases varied according to the
distance of the objective and the nature of the terrain.

In the first two cases it was a question of taking a distinct
objective. The method used presents the following character-
istics :

1. Minute preparation of the operations in the rear. — Getting
together the units for the attack raised from the Sturm bat-
talions, Sturm companies, and Stosstrupps for preparatory ex-
ercises lasting about one week on practice trenches represent-
ing the objectives to be taken.

2. Preliminary reconnaissance. — Executed by the heads of
assault detachments one or two days in advance.

3. Preparatory ivork. — Openings in the German entangle-
ments one or two days ahead of time, and in the French en-
tanglements a few hours before the attack, the breeches being
made with wire cutters.

4. Preparation by the artillery and by the trench mortars. —
Very violent during the preparatory work. No immediate prep-
aration. Caging fire from the beginning of the attack.

5. Attack of the Stosstrupps (distance 1,100 w.).— By groups,
using the shell holes. Reenforced groups on the wings to insure
the protection of the flanks.

In the third case it covered a very close objective, over ditli-
cult ground. The Germans wanted to take it by surprise, by
means of a mine explosion. No preparations in the rear. No
previous reconnaissance. Breeches made one day in advance
by minenwerfers and artillery firing of all calibers, to isolate
the breeches. The troops, not knowing the terrain, failed to
find the breeches.

In the three cases the attacks failed, thanks to the vigilance
of our watchmen and, especially in the third case, thanks to the
ability of one regimental information officer.
62

GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS. 63

1. Operation at Villers-sous-Bonchamps (distance between the
lines 1,100 meters). — The village of Villers and the trenches
to the east have the appearance, according to aerial photog-
raphy, of an isolated center jf resistance bound to the rear by
one single very long communicating trench.

The Germans might have hoped, had they realized their sur-
prise attack, to capture quite a large garrison and retire before
the supporting troops could counter attack, because of their too
great distance and because of the barrage fire.

Consequently the operation was confided to one very well
trained Stosstrupp. Minute reconnaissance was made of the
terrain, breeches were prepared in the entanglements, and a
well-planned itinerary made. In a word, the operation was
studied to the smallest detail.

On our side the flat and bare terrain, the great distance be-
tween the lines, and the difficulty of counter attacking had led
us to cover ourselves by a mobile watching unit, which, seeing
the arrival of the Stosstrupp, delayed it, gave the alarm, asked
for a barrage, and, in a word, suppressed the surprise.

2. Operation to the south of the Sechamp Woods (distance
between the lines, about 250' meters) — Composition of assault
detachment. — Twenty men taken from Sturm Battalion I ; 8
men taken from Sturm company of the Two Hundred and
Twenty-seventh Division ; 60 men taken from the infantry regi-
ment of the Two Hundred and Twenty-seventh Division; 6
officers, 3 sergeants, 9 gefeite (106 men all told).

Preparatory exercises. — From the 17th to the 24th of July
the detachment was exercised at a special training ground to
the northwest of Avaux. The French trenches to be taken were
represented in accordance writh the most recent aerial photo-
graphs. A very detailed preparation of the surprise attack was
made. In these preparatory exercises the artillery officers who
were to support the attack took part.

The front attack was about 300 meters wide.

The detachment had two light machine guns and one auto-
matic rifle (musket). Each man had a Mauser pistol, a trench
knife, a bayonet, and in a sandbag 16 grenades with handles and
8 egg-shaped grenades.

Several heavy and field artillery batteries and about 50 trench
mortars (small and medium-size minnenwerfers and Granaten-
werfer) supported the attack.

Execution of the attack. — Two days before, viz, on the 24th
of July, two men of each group and one lieutenant went up to

64 GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

the front-line trench to look over the position, and. that night
they made breaches in the German entanglements.

On the 25th of July; at 20 (8 p. m.) o'clock, the remainder of
the detachment embarked in three autos for Pignicourt, by way
of Neufchatel. From there they went on foot on the Moulin
du Merlet, where it crosses the Suippe, reached the Fink Woods
and the Sechamp Woods.

On July 26th, at 3 o'clock (a. m.) (German time), the de-
tachment left the Sechamp Woods. Each group sent two men
ahead, who advanced by creeping or by bounds, to make eight
breaches of from one to one and a half meters in the French
entanglements. The work was done in 10 minutes with wire
clippers. The men returned, and the entire detachment came
out of the V. Haeseler trench at 3.50 a. m., through the breach
made in the German entanglements, and laid down in shell
holes between the German and French entanglements.

During this time the light and medium size Minnenwerfer and
the Granatenwerfer, placed back of the German front-line
trenches, opened fire and battered the points from which a
counter attack might come. Then the Minnenwerfers lengthened
their fire on the French lines of resistance.

At the same time the infantry attack was started, but it was
stopped, thanks to our illuminating rockets, and was attended to
by one of our machine guns. The men fell to the ground or
hid in the grass.

The attack did not pass our line of watching posts. In case
the detachment had succeeded in further penetrating our lines
the signal for lengthening fire was to have been given by means
of small white signal flags, which were to be waved by signal
men echeloned along the way they had come.

3. Operations of the Eparges Woods. — This operation, which
was executed July 17, began the 14th, with enemy artillery ad-
justment on all the important points in the region between the
Calonne trench and the Montgirmont crest, and heavy fire on
our batteries.

On the 16th fire became greater and was accompanied by a
destruction fire on the Gross trench with large Minnenwerfers.
A breach was opened in our entanglements. The day of the
17th was calm, but at 8.30 p. m. a mine was fired at les Eparges
and an extremely violent fire of all calibers began to isolate the
points where the destruction had been made.

Here, too, the operation was confined to a " Stosstrupp," but
these men were only brought up in an auto the evening of the

GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS. 65

17th, without having made any previous reconnaissance. They
had shown each man on an old aerial map what he must do.
On our side the regimental information officer of the sector in-
terpreted correctly the declarations of two deserters a few days
before in that region. He studied with care the fire of the
enemy's artillery and Minnenwerfer and the information from
the special posts. He kept everybody awake and watching,
and having guessed the point aimed at by the enemy, the dis-
position for the defense and the counter attack were made auto-
matically.

The enemy gained nothing but losses.

NEW DEFENSIVE TACTICS.

TRANSLATION OF A GERMAN DOCUMENT.

[With reference to Ypres Group la 87084/88187.]

1. The following terms are laid down and will be strictly ad-
hered to in connection with the new defensive tactics :

(a) Outpost line of the forward zone (Sicherungslinie der
Vorfeldzone) to indicate our own front line in the forward zone.

(b) Line of resistance of the forward zone (Widerstandslinie
der Vorfeldzone) to indicate that line to which the infantry in
the forward zone will retire in the first instance, in the garrison
of which it will be incorporated, and in which it will offer
resistance.

In order to avoid misunderstandings and confusion, no other
terms will be used.

2. The forward zone in front of the main line of resistance
will be held as lightly as possible. The strength of the garrison
will depend on the ground and the locality. Generally speak-
ing, the main bodies of the companies of the battalion in front
line will be posted in the main line of resistance, and only small
detachments (a group per company with 1 machine gun, or 2
or 3 platoons taken from 1 company) will be moved into the
forward zone for the purpose of repelling large hostile patrols.
With this object, it is advisable to hold the weakly garrisoned
forward zone as a zone of defense, organized in depth, with the
troops distributed checkerwise, and not to hold only the front
line by a series of posts forming a single line which can be
quickly penetrated.

The action of this garrison of the forward zone will vary.
Generally speaking, it will resist and delay the enemy ; that is,
it will only retire when forced to by the enemy or on receipt of
a definite order as to the origin of which the commander is
satisfied. The establishment of hostile posts in our forward
zone must be absolutely prevented.

GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS. 67

3. On receipt of the code word " Grosskampf am 10.x 6 vorm "
(" Large attack on 10/10 at 6.00 a. m."), which will be sent out
by group headquarters as early as possible on the previous even-
ing, if an attack on a large scale is anticipated, the front line
of the forward zone will be withdrawn according to plan about
500 meters (beginning at the above-mentioned hour) into the
" line of resistance of the forward zone," in which a few light
machine guns and Granatenwerfer will have been previously dug
in. This " line of resistance of the forward zone " must be
permanently marked out on the ground by means of pegs, trip
wire, posts, sticks painted with luminous paint, flags, etc.

At those points \vhere the present front line of the forward
zone is less than 500 meters from the main line of resistance, it
is best for the outposts to fall back on the main line of re-
sistance. When there is no forward zone, the disposition of the
garrison will remain unaltered.

4. The distance of 500 meters appears to correspond with the
British orders for the position of their barrage. The British
first put a protective barrage on to the area to be attacked, con-
sisting of a wave of fire 540 meters in depth, measured from the
front line of our forward zone. This barrage then advances.
It is heaviest in the vicinity of the front line of our forward
zone, wrhere it consists of artillery, machine-gun, and rifle fire.
At a distance of 500-600 meters from the front line of our for-
M-ard zone it is considerably less intense.

5. As a natural consequence, our artillery defense will be or-
ganized as follows :

Shortly after the zero fixed for the attack on a large scale, our
barrage fire and annihilating fire, which have hitherto covered
predetermined areas in front of our foremost outpost line, must
now be put down farther back on this outpost line. The time
allowed for the completion of the infantry movement will be
fixed at 15 minutes.

The moment the British barrage commences our counter bar-
rage must be put down at once with every battery of every cali-
ber, with the exception of the heavy flat-trajectory guns, in
order to catch the British before they can follow up their own
barrage. The batteries of the flanking groups, if they can not
switch their fire with direct observations, will continue to fire
on their allotted areas until they receive orders to change the
direction of their fire.

68 GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

Our batteries will not register our original front line, but
will each work out the correction required for shortening range
15 minutes after zero.

6. Should the expected attack in force not take place, the
order, " Old line X/10, 7.30 p. m.," will be given as early as pos-
sible on X day ; in which case, without further orders, the ad-
vanced posts will, commencing at 7.30 p. m., push forward again
into the front line of our forward zone. This operation will be
commenced from the line of resistance of the forward zone at
7.30 p. m. After 7.30 p. m., the barrage areas will be those pre-
viously registered in advance of the old front line of our for-
ward zone.

7. Contact must be maintained without fail with units on the
flanks, especially at divisional boundaries. Every commander
is responsible for maintaining constant touch with the units on
his flank.

8. Every opportunity for counter attack must be seized,
whether it be made in front of the main line of resistance or in
front of the line of resistance of the forward zone, as, for ex-
ample, pursuit of the enemy who has been repulsed or compelled
to retire. Experience has shown that these counter attacks yield
booty and secure our hold on our forward zone.

9. (a) Should the enemy attack before the code word " Gross-
kampf " has been given, our counter barrage will be put. down in
front of the foremost outpost line of the forward zone. The
outposts on the line of the attack, as soon as it is certain that
an attack is taking place, will retire in order to the " line of
resistance of the forward zone," and will be absorbed into its
garrison. There they will make a stand, retiring on to the
main line of resistance, either under pressure from the enemy
or on receipt of an order.

Once it has been definitely ascertained that this movement
has been completed, the company commander in the main line
of resistance will send up a white flare, breaking into small
stars. This signal will be repeated to the rear. The artillery
will then immediately shorten range so as to place its barrage
close in front of the main line of resistance.

(6) The same tactics will be resorted to when " Grosskampf "
has been signaled, but the enemy attacks before the zero given,
i. e., before the infantry has commenced to retire to the line of
resistance of the forward zone. They will equally apply in the
event of an attack subsequent to the reoccupation of an outpost

GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS. • 69

line in the evening which had been evacuated in the morning
as the result of a " Grosskampf " signal.

(c) Should the enemy attack while the movements resulting
from a "Grosskampf" signal are in progress (for example,
between 6.00 and 6.15 a. m., when " Grosskampf " has been given
for 6.00 a. m.), the artillery will at first put down a counter
barrage in front of the original outpost line of the forward zone.
The outposts will continue their methodical retirement from the
outpost line to the line of resistance of the forward zone, and
will be absorbed into the garrison of the latter. At 6.15 a. m.,
as prearranged, the barrage will jump back to our original out-
post line. The infantry will make a stand in the line of re-
sistance of the forward zone, retiring to the main line of re-
sistance under pressure from the enemy or on receipt of an
order. Subsequent action will be regulated in accordance with
the second subparagraph of paragraph 9 (a).

(rf) Those portions of the outpost line of the forward zone
which are not attacked will hold their ground and cover their
exposed flank by throwing it back. They can be further stiffened
by pushing up weak supports from the line of resistance of the
forward' zone. They will only retire to the latter when forced
to do so by threat of envelopment. The line of resistance of
the forward zone will then be held according to plan.

10. The signal " Lift your fire " means that the artillery is to
increase its range by 100 meters. The reason for the signal
may be either that our artillery is firing short, i. e., shelling our
own infantry, or that an attack which has been repulsed is to
be followed by artillery fire as it retires.

Every time the signal is repeated the artillery will again in-
crease its range by 100 meters. Attempts must be made and all
means should be employed to ascertain exactly where the flare
signals are being sent up, in order to prevent our barrage being
withdrawn from the front of our main line of resistance when
it is still needed by our infantry. It must be borne in mind that
the British, in order to induce us to lift our fire from points
where it is particularly accurate, often imitate our flare signal
"Lift your fire." The range will, therefore, only be increased
in response to flare signals if the sector in which the flare
signals are being given can be established with some degree of
certainty. The same applies to the signal for " Shorten range,"
which must only be given by the company commander or some
senior officer.

70 . GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS.

Flare signals for "Lift your fire" will not apply to barrage
and destructive fire on the areas in front of the foremost line of
our defensive zone which have been registered with direct ob-
servation.

The cooperation of the artillery survey sections is of the
greatest value in fixing the point at which the flare signals are
being sent up, as they can determine the exact point where the
signal was given by means of intersection on the flares. They
will report the result of the intersection as quickly as possible
to the artillery commanders, who will transmit it by the quickest
means available to the batteries concerned which are firing in
this sector.

11. The white flare signal for " Shorten range " will be given
from the main line of resistance (by a company commander or
senior officer) if it is seen that the troops stationed in the line
of resistance of the forward zone are retiring from it.

Flare signals for " Shorten range " should only be provided
for the main line of resistance. This flare signal should not be
issued to the forward zone, in order to prevent it being used at
the wrong time.

12. The main point in all alterations in the range of -the artil-
lery fire is direct observation of the battle field, which provides
the most certain means of obtaining a clear idea of the situa-
tion and of deciding as to the targets to be fired at. Emphasis
must once more be laid on the fact that an artillery liaison
officer must be attached to every commander of the troops in
line, and must be amply provided with telephone wire, with
his own runners drawn from the artillery, and with all other
means of communication (wireless, carrier pigeons, etc.). It is
essential that every battery and every subgroup be supplied
with a close-observation post.

13. Balloons and airmen should be provided with flare signals
for barrage fire, annihilating fire, and " Shorten range." On
days of very heavy fighting they must pay particular attention
to observing where these signals are being given in our front
line, and will call the attention of the artillery to the signals
which are being sent up by the front line by repeating them.
Balloons must also endeavor, by means of lines of direction laid
far in advance of the balloon beds, to establish the points at
which the individual flare signals are being sent up, and the
information derived from their observation in this way must be
transmitted to the artillery command posts, with which they

GERMAN NOTES ON MINOR TACTICS. 71

are connected by telephone. It is the duty of airmen, as soon
as they have established the points at which the flare signals
are being sent up, to transmit by wireless the meaning of the
flare signals and the points from which they are being sent up.

14. These tactics of altering range aim at simplification and
at preventing the enemy from passing through our barrage fire
as well as enabling us to withdraw our infantry without its com-
ing under our own fire.

15. Regiments will practice these tactics immediately and ex-
plain their object to the men. In these operations emphasis
must again and again be laid on the fact that the British infan-
tryman is in no sense the equal of our infantry as soon as our
infantry gets to grips with him in a counter attack.

( Signed ) BEAUCHITSCH.

FOURTEEN DAY USE

RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED

This book is due on the last date stamped below, or
on the date to which renewed.

Renewed books are subject to immediate recall.

l9OcV55E°

OCT5 1955 IU

SEPl 0 1988

AUTODiSC.SEP 01*88

Berkeley

LIBRARY -U.C.Btmvc«Y

BQ003132M3

664357

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY

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