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THE Harris ' ^ouoidferieii Lectures at the 
University ""pf^Chicago have been made 
possible through" Wfe* generosity of the heirs of 
Norman Wait Harris and Emma Gale Harris, 
who donated to the University a fund to be 
known as "The Norman Wait Harris Memo- 
rial Foundation" on January 27, 1923. The 
letter of gift contains the following statement: 

It is apparent that a knowledge of world-affairs was 
never of more importance to Americans than today. The 
spirit of distrust which pervades the Old World is not 
without its effect upon our own country. How to combat 
this disintegrating tendency is a problem worthy of the 
most serious thought. Perhaps one of the best methods 
is the promotion of a better understanding of other nations 
through wisely directed educational effort. 

The purpose of the foundation shall be the promotion 
of a better understanding on the part of American citizens 
of the other peoples of the world, thus establishing a basis 
for improved international relations and a more enlight- 
ened world-order. The aim shall always be to give accu- 
rate information, not to propagate opinion. 

In fulfilment of this object, the First Institute 
was held at the University of Chicago in the 
summer of 1924. This series of volumes will 
include the lectures, delivered Jby foreign 
scholars at these Institutes, in essentially their 
original form. 







- ' * - t 


* * * %* 



Professor of International and Public Law and Political Science 
at the University of Konigsberg 

y* if* propose Hen) je nt 
suppos* rien,f expos*. 



All Rights Reserved 

Published December 1924 

Composed and Printed By 

The University of Chicago Press 

Chicago. Illinois, U.S.A. 




The following essays, originally given as 
lectures in the period between June 24 and July 
1 8, 1924, at the University of Chicago on the 
Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation, are 
given to the public at the request of the Com- 
mittee of the Foundation in the sincere hope that 
they may contribute their small part toward the 
lofty purpose which the letter of gift of the Harris 
Foundation describes with the words: 

.... The promotion of a better understanding on the 
part of American citizens of the other peoples of the world, 
thus establishing a basis for improved international relations 
and a more enlightened world-order. The aims shall always 
be to give accurate information, not to propagate opinion. 

To my great regret the fact that I am traveling 
and away from my library has rendered it impos- 
sible for me to add references to the extensive 
literature on which my discussions are based, and 
by which they are supported, as I would wish to do. 
I was also unable to compile the Index, for which I 
am obliged to the University Press. Nor was it pos- 
sible for me to consider in these lectures any event 
or fact which occurred after they were written. 

My lectures are printed in the form in which 
they were given. I have added only a few state- 


ments originally a part of them, which I was 
obliged to omit owing to lack of time. 

Before these lines leave my desk I must express 
my warm appreciation to all those who have 
given me such efficient assistance both in Germany 
and America, including the secretariat of the 
League of Nations in Geneva; the Deutsche 
Liga fur Volkerbund (German League of Nations 
Union), Berlin; Dr. Wilhelm Winkler, president of 
the Institute for Statistics of National Minorities 
at the University of Vienna; the Deutsche 
Industrie- und Handelstag, Berlin; Dr. Eugen 
Fischer, secretary and expert in the Parliamentary 
Commission of Inquiry of the German Reichstag; 
Professor Laun, Hamburg; Professor Stier-Somlo, 
Cologne, and last but not least Professor Quincy 
Wright, of the University of Chicago, and Francis 
Thayer Hobson, of Yale University, while I ask 
those I have not mentioned to pardon my not 
naming them individually, as they are so many. 

These essays are dedicated to my wife, who 
translated the lectures with me, and who by 
countless suggestions helped me indefatigably in 
the accomplishment of this work. 


July, 1904 









INDEX 227 



One of the greatest honors which can be paid 
a scholar is to be requested by a university of a 
foreign country to lecture on the results of his 
research and study, and the invitation to lecture 
here on the Harris Memorial Foundation, extended 
to me as a representative of German scholarship, 
seems to me a most promising sign that the 
lamentable wall which the war reared between the 
different provinces of science is beginning happily 
to be leveled. 

The aim of scholarship and science is universal. 
It is the truth in the largest sense of the word. 
There is no English, French^ or German truth, 
but only one truth as such. The great scholars 
and the great discoveries belong to the whole 

If the object of science is universal, it is the 
heritage of mankind, and the various national 
groups, down to that tiniest germinal cell, the 
individual scholar, dedicated to the investigation 
of truth, are but various departments of the world- 


wide, co-operative intellectual association self- 
governing and unfortunately still almost entirely 
unorganized provinces of the world-empire of sci- 
ence and truth. They constitute intellectual 
self-governing centers of labor and research, 
which by exchange of views and mutual criticism, 
by division of labor, and so forth, contribute 
their part to the great common purpose which 
inspires all. 

The League of Nations has, as you know, ap- 
pointed a commission for intellectual co-operation. 
In a report which the inspecteur general de F in- 
struction publique, Professeur Honoraire Julien 
Luchaire, presented to the League of Nations in 
1923 on some problems of intellectual organization, 
we read the question: "What can be done that 
the nations may learn to know and appreciate 
each other better through the organs of their 
intellectual culture?" He answers the question 
as follows: "One of the best and simplest methods 
consists in increasing the personal contact between 
the intellectual elite of all countries." 

I am actuated by the spirit of these thoughts 
when I tell you in these introductory words that 
I do not feel myself here the one who gives. The 
sentiment which dominates me today is that, in 
trying to impart something to you, I am at the 


game time a recipient, and that all of us here 
assembled with the purpose of reconstructing an 
intellectual contact are serving our all-mother 

Besides this feeling, another weighs upon me 
heavily a feeling of uncertainty and responsibil- 
ity. In order to make you realize what I mean 
by such a statement, I shall have to be rather 

German science stands today in a period of 
transition, and under an exceedingly high pres- 
sure. I can observe this especially in the various 
branches of law and political science with which 
I am closely connected. 

The German sciences of law and political sci- 
ence are at present naturally occupied to a great 
extent in mastering the endless problems which the 
revolution and the Treaty of Versailles have 
produced a quite Herculean task, for one feels 
the influence of this new epoch in the very finest 
complexes of public life, not only in the confines of 
constitutional law and the laws relating to the 
execution of the Treaty of Versailles, but also 
in the incisive tax-laws, labor laws, economic 
laws, and so forth. The reduction of government 
officials, a drastic measure which had to be adopted 
to cut down public expenditure, has recently 


brought us face to face with new problems, 
especially with the question of the simplification 
of juridical procedure. The task of appraising 
accurately the German debts was for quite a while 
the center of consideration. The whole inner 
administration is undergoing a phase of extensive 
reform, as well as the school system and municipal 
administration. The revolution penetrated the 
most obscure recesses of jurisprudence, setting a 
new standard for many things, and thereby creat- 
ing much confusion which was not altogether 
necessary, in my opinion. All these changes must 
first be studied, and scientifically construed, 
within the restricted limits allotted to theoretical 
science in Germany as everywhere else. 

Besides these practical occupations another 
phenomenon which interests us here has mani- 
fested itself clearly in German science of law and 
political science. I refer to the attempt to master 
our present problems theoretically. Form and pur- 
pose of government, law and economics, law and 
ethics, the conception of revolution, the question 
of the continuity of the legal order, federalism and 
unitarism, state and individual, the ideal state 
these are some of the problems which are being 
most keenly discussed and considered in Germany 
today. This development is primarily nothing 



less than a partial manifestation of the trend 
toward abstract science, which shows itself very 
actively in all branches of learning and is espe- 
cially noticeable in jurisprudence and political sci- 
ence. The German jurists are at present engrossed 
in a new theoretical investigation of the premises 
of the system of law, and this chiefly from a dog- 
matic point of view. The legal historism which 
swayed Germany for a century seems to have 
been more or less overcome. This process is 
now in full progress; the old foundations are 
shaken; almost no thing seems certain; a thousand 
tentative beginnings show themselves, but hardly 
anything appears finished. 

The literary results of this renaissance, which 
seems to me in part to tend back toward natural 
law, and even toward the scholasticism of the 
Middle Ages, give but an insufficient record of the 
intensity of this movement. 

International law in this regard is in a very 
curious position owing to the fact that the German 
scholars who really specialize in it can be counted 
on one's hands, without using all the fingers. 
The other people who occupy themselves with 
international law in Germany do so more or less 
as a side issue, and are rather few, owing especi- 
ally to the lack of foreign literature, without 


which a successful study of international ques- 
tions is a futile task. For years it has been 
almost impossible for German libraries to purchase 
foreign books. 

In this connection I feel impelled to express my 
appreciation for the generous fashion in which 
the Carnegie Endowment, as well as other Ameri- 
can institutions, have presented German libraries 
and scholars with books which have been of 
decisive importance in the continuation of much 
scientific work. 

These are some of the reasons which led me to 
speak of a feeling of uncertainty and responsi- 
bility in beginning these lectures. Isolation, lack 
of information, restricted activity in certain scien- 
tific circles, a universal fermentation in the prin- 
ciples of the scientific subjects to be considered, 
create but a poor platform for scientific explana- 
tions, especially when these are relative to acute 
international questions of today which will lead 
us no man knows where. 

This uncertainty has also a social-psychological 
element from which a German scholar, as a Ger- 
man, finds it difficult to free himself, and arises 
from the fact that for many years we Germans 
have not been in sufficient spiritual contact with 
the rest of the world. Considering all these things, 


I must ask myself whether I shall be successful in 
making you comprehend all that I would wish. 

The best method by which to avoid the dangers 
of misunderstanding seems to me perfect frank- 
ness in my discussions. I do not wish to exagger- 
ate or suppress anything, a promise which is only 
tempered by courtesy toward the land whose 
hospitality I have the honor to enjoy at the pres- 
ent time, and loyalty toward my own country. 

The motto for these lectures will be " Je ne pro- 
pose rien> je ne suppose rien y j 'expose," and my 
method, as far as possible, a social-psychological 

All questions I deal with will be considered as 
much as possible from the German point of view, 
I mean by this, what Germany thinks regarding 
this or that vital question, and this is the spirit 
in which I would have you interpret my lectures. 
This is a very difficult task, almost hopelessly 
difficult in relation to the Germany of today. 

The answer to a question about the true opin- 
ion or the real will of a country cannot be given 
directly, but is to be found through a complicated 
and often uncertain psychological analysis. I do 
"not need to emphasize the fact that the public 
opinion of a country is not necessarily that of the 
government, parliament, or press. It cannot be 


gauged by a sum in arithmetic, nor by polling the 
opinion of the majority of people regarding a 
given question. 

What I refer to here comes under the significant 
and as yet quite unsolved problem of the impor- 
tance of the number or unit of representation in 
political life. 

In considering this problem one must realize 
clearly that the adoption of any form of vote or 
plebiscite can do no more than introduce a legal 
order in the process of forming the public will and 
opinion. It is also apparent that the different 
methods of voting contain an unequal measure of 
justice because they do not provide an equal 
guaranty that the opinion of a certain social 
group will find as unaltered an expression as pos- 
sible through the medium of the vote in question. 
For instance, we consider the three-class system 
unjust which existed before the revolution in 
Prussia, and poisoned the political atmosphere 
there for decades. We consider the plural vote 
naive. For many years universal, equal, direct, 
and secret suffrage the system according to 
which the old Reichstag was elected was regarded 
as the height of political wisdom and justice. 
The new German Republic has adopted the 
system of proportional representation, against 



which criticism is becoming ever louder under pres- 
sure of the experience we have had in Germany 
and the different German "Lands" since its intro- 
duction. Now, most recently, there is an increas- 
ing demand from both the right and left sides 
for the introduction of quite a new system. A 
dictatorship, economic parliaments, or parliaments 
composed of the representatives of the different 
professions and trades are the three chief de- 
mands made in this direction. 

No such system can be ideal. All, in fact, are 
no more than legal methods of imputation. They 
are all weak in the possible dissonance between 
the number and political potentiality. The real 
opinion of a social group, the real will of a state's 
people, is not necessarily in fact, in the majority 
of cases is not the opinion of the majority, but 
the opinion which arises as the result of the many 
divergent opinions in the social unit concerned. 
It is not majorities that must be sought if one 
wishes to find the will and the real opinion of a 
social group, but the really important, decisive 
factors in this group. 

This is, of course, only of sociological-political, 
not of immediate legal, importance. 

From the legal standpoint the will of the state 
organ, of the men who are legally competent to 


construct and execute this will, is decisive. The 
will of the state is legally the will of the state 
organs in so far as they act according to law and 
constitution. The will of a social group, on the 
other hand, especially the real will of the people 
of a state, cannot be defined by such normative 
methods, for the reason that we are here concerned 
with facts not with the question of what should 
be, but what really is. Even the most superficial 
observation of public events and developments 
teaches anyone that a consideration of both these 
different standpoints can lead to very different 

Frank Vanderlip, in his much-read book, What 
Happened to Europe, which has also been trans- 
lated into German, devotes a whole chapter to the 
question of "The Power of Minorities/* He 
writes (p. 142) : "One of the most startling impres- 
sions which I have received in Europe is that the 
-majorities do not rule, and that sometimes minori- 
ties apparently almost inconsequently small may 
grasp power and wield it perhaps in a magic 
fashion." As a proof of the correctness of these 
very cautiously expressed words he refers to the 
Prussian Military party of antebellum days, and 
soviet Russia of today, as examples. He could 
have chosen his illustrations from any state in 


the world. It is apparently a natural law of 
constitutional life that under the protection of 
every constitution, of whatever character it be, 
small groups take the state machinery in their 
hands to a greater or lesser degree, and, accord- 
ing to the fundamental political law of stability, 
retain it, owing to the sole fact of this possession. 
These groups in power continue to rule that is, 
control the actions of the state even when they 
can no longer be considered representatives, i.e., 
the mouthpiece of the will of a group. 

We are not chiefly interested here in the will 
of the present government organs in Germany. 
What interests us more is the will and the opinion 
of the German people in this or that current politi- 
cal question. 

The picture which results when we try to 
construe the real opinion and will of the German 
people of today is highly complex. We are 
often confronted by an uncertain, groping multi- 
tude of men, absorbed by the cares of existence, 
most deeply divided among themselves, and very 
often influenced in their actions by coercive outside 

This condition of dissension can be most clearly 
demonstrated by the present German party sys- 
tem, to which I shall now devote a few words. 



Ever since about 1848, since there has been a 
party system in Germany, a strong tendency 
toward division has been noticeable, resulting, on 
the one hand, from the German's leaning toward 
individualism, and, on the other, from his predi- 
lection for organizations. Since the collapse 
after the war, this trend has increased tremen- 
dously. New parties and factions are constantly 
budding out from the old ones, or springing up 
from the damp swamp atmosphere of party politics. 
In this respect a condition of confusion exists in 
Germany now which is so great that only an expert 
is- able to make anything out of the general chaos. 
None of the large old German parties have remained 
uninfluenced by this process of disintegration. It 
began, as is well known, with the Social Demo- 
crats in 1917 when the Independents seceded 
from them. The latter in their turn lost the 
group of Communists (Spartacists), or the "Sec- 
tion of the Third Communist International/ 1 as 
they call themselves, in 1918. Meanwhile, in 1922 
the Independents rejoined the Majority Socialists, 
who then took the name Vereinigte Sozialdemo- 
kratische Partei DeutsMands (United Social Demo- 
cratic party of Germany), except a few individuals 
who refused to join this movement, and appeared 
again as a separate faction in the last election. 


Then came the turn of the Deutsch-Nationale 
Volkspartei (German National Peopled party), 
called, for the sake of brevity, "German Nation- 
als," which is on the whole composed of the former 
Conservatives, and from which not less than seven 
or eight other groups have drawn away voters, 
among these especially the Deutsch-Volkischert) 
the Deutsch Sozialen (German Socials), and also 
the Hitler group, the so-called Nationalsozial- 
istische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialistic 
German Workman's party). The Conservatives 
have probably lost the smallest number through 
the Hitler party. This party, in which fragments 
from almost all the other parties have been 
included, and which addresses itself primarily to 
the workman, is composed chiefly of youths, and 
has not taken the monarchy as a slogan. Hitler 
distinctly characterized himself as a Republican in 
the Munich trial. The essence of the program of 
this party is an extreme nationalism, and hatred 
of the "November criminals," Marxism, and the 
Semitic race. In the latter respect they are 
united with all the national radical parties, includ- 
ing the German Nationals, whose statutes explicitly 
exclude Jews as members of their party. At the 
head of this anti-Semitic movement, which con- 
stantly grows more intense, is the Deutsch Soziale 


(German Social) party, formed in the spring of 
1921 by the so-called Knuppel-Kunze y that is, 
"big-stick Kunze." 

Of particular interest is an analysis of the 
national-radical Deutsch-FoZkische Freiheitspartei 
(German People's Liberty party), which was 
formed by former deputies of the Deutsch-Nationale 
Folkspartei (German National People's party), and 
which includes General Ludendorff among its 
members. This party also is not distinctly mon- 
archical in its tendencies, and is quite anti-Semitic, 
very anti-Marxist, as is the Hitler party. In 
fact, it is hardly possible to find an essential differ- 
ence between these two parties beyond a social 
one: the Deutsch-Folkische Freiheitspartei seems 
to be chiefly composed of the uprooted middle 
classes, former officers, unpoised intellectuals, 
bourgeois, and people of private means, who are 
unable to comprehend the present time and who 
attack the symptoms as the root of the evil. 

It is often claimed that these and similar 
parties constitute the extreme right wing of the 
German party system. This is only correct in so 
far as nationalism and anti-Semitism are con- 
cerned, but is otherwise misleading, because the 
programs of these parties contain in part very 
virile socialistic and even communistic features. 


In Germany they are consequently frequently 
spoken of as "National Bolshevists/' Thus I 
would describe our present political party system 
as a kind of closed circle. The Communists and 
National Radicals have not infrequently acted 
together. Another term in use for the latter is 
"German Fascists," and thereby, in my opinion, 
expression is given to a movement which is not 
only confined to Germany but has found an 
apparent realization for instance in Spain, and its 
culmination in Italy. 

Not even the Zentrum, which now calls itself the 
Christlich Soziale Partei (Christian Social party), 
and the Deutsche Folkspartei (German People's 
party), have escaped this process of dissolution. 

The Zentrum party, which appeared the most 
closely united and is the party of the German 
Catholics, lost its Bavarian contingent, which is 
there named the Bavarian People's party, chiefly 
as a result of the differences between Bavaria and 
the Reich (see my last lecture on "Separatism in 
Germany," pp. 208-23). And during the last 
election for the Reichstag, Zentrum candidates 
entered the election campaign in Bavaria as well 
as candidates of the Bavarian People's party. 
The Deutsche Folkspartei (German People's party) 
experienced a similar misfortune. This party is 


the youngest of the big post-war parties. It is 
chiefly composed of those members of the former 
National-Liberals who under Stresemann's leader- 
ship could not decide to join the Democratic 
party. The essential difference between the Ger- 
man People's party and the Democratic party is 
that the former are monarchists. During the last 
election for the Reichstag the right wing of the 
German People's party seceded and established 
themselves as the National-Liberal Association 
because they felt that the policy of the German 
People's party was not far enough to the right. 

These new branches are not the only type of the 
new constellation, however. Quite as large, or 
larger in number, are the parties which have 
sprung up with the probable destiny of again 
sinking back into nothing. As an example I refer 
to the so-called Minority party, the Geusenbund> 
the Tenants' party, the Heusserbund, the Freiwirt- 
schaftsbundy and so forth. 

The reports of the last elections do not give us 
complete information as to this dissension, as 
many of these political factions did not succeed in 
nominating even one candidate, and have in part 
tied themselves to combined election cartels 
(Wahlkartelleri). And in the last elections for the 
German' Reichstag on May 4, 1924, no less than 


twenty-three parties entered the campaign. At 
this point it must be especially mentioned that the 
two national-radical parties, the Deutsch-Folkische 
Freiheitspartei and Hitler's National-Sozialistische 
Arbeiter-partei, worked in a combined list. Of 
the twenty-three parties only twelve won man- 
dates; the rest did not obtain any seats. This, in 
part, despite the fact that the party in question 
had received in the whole empire quite a con- 
siderable number of votes. Not less than 234,997 
votes were cast for the Independent Socialists, for 
instance, but despite this they did not secure a 
single seat in the Reichstag for the reason that in 
no one district had they received the 60,000 votes 
necessary for a mandate. 

It is no wonder that under such conditions in 
Germany there is constantly a cry for a, leader, 
which has so far been in vain. Perhaps this is 
simply because there is at present no leader in 
Germany, though certainly it is not because the 
German people as such are unable to accept one. 
Obedience and discipline in the presence of a 
strong personality have been most correctly 
classified as German characteristics. No, a leader 
has not appeared yet for the reason that this 
epoch has not produced any man of large enough 
political caliber to direct the storm. 


The absolute lack of leadership in Germany 
is illustrated by the fact that during the Hitler 
trial in Munich the men selected by the activists 
to be members of a German directory were 
persons quite unknown to the broader German 

Under these circumstances naturally a great 
political helplessness and lack of ideas exists in 
Germany today. For years we have constantly 
heard the same refrain; only the accent and tempo 
have varied. In my opinion only two really big 
constructive ideas in the sphere of foreign politics 
have been framed in Germany since the war. I 
mean the opposition on the Ruhr, and the Rapallo 
treaty with Russia. Otherwise the foreign policy 
is almost entirely controlled by the Treaty of 
Versailles, its execution, and the situation result- 
ing therefrom. Foreign politics also influence 
German domestic policies to a very great degree. 
It is sufficient to point as an example here to the 
influence which the execution of the Treaty of 
Versailles has had on social politics and social 
philanthropy, whose achievements are slowly 
but surely disappearing. One has only to think 
of the eight-hour day, which in spite of the 
German constitution and the Washington Labor 
Conference has almost ceased to exist in Germany, 


or to consider the policy of our taxation, duties, 
railroads, and so forth. 

At the same time, with the inexorable certainty 
of a natural law, political sentiment is being 
divided ever more sharply to the right and left. 
The movement toward the left came first. It was 
the indication, one of the determining factors, and 
the result of the revolution and collapse. Inci- 
dentally it manifested itself then less strongly 
than was expected. 

The red tidal wave seems now to have subsided 
to some extent, although within the left parties as 
a whole, political sentiment is increasingly tending 
toward communism. There is a steady process of 
radical secession to join the Communists, in so 
far as the movement does not lead toward one of 
the groups such as the Hitler Party. 1 What is still 
more important, one has the impression that the 
Communists in Germany have somewhat lost their 

1 The Reichstag which was dissolved in 1924 contained, finally, 
after a series of greater and lesser changes 466 representatives: 
171 seats for the United Social Democrats, 2 for Independent Social- 
ists, 17 for Communists (190 altogether). The original election had 
provided 112 seats for the Majority Socialists, 81 for Independents, 
a for Communists (195 altogether). 

Today there are in the Reichstag, according to the last election, 
472 representatives: 100 seats for the United Social Democrats, 
62 for the Communists, no seats for the Independents (162 al- 


driving force. This may be partially the result 
of lack of funds, partially because of the sobering 
accounts from Russia, but also because of the fact 
that the adherents of this movement lack the lei- 
sure and the tlan which is to be found in the 
extreme circles of the right. Bolshevism, with 
which Germany has been face to face several 
times, does not seem at the present moment 
to be an immediate danger, so far as one can 

On the other hand, it is unmistakable that the 
movement to the right and to national activism in 
Germany has so far been growing constantly 
stronger and more extreme. The returns from the 
elections of 1920 showed sixty-six seats for the 
German Nationals, none for the National Radicals. 
In 1924 the German Nationals had increased to 
ninety-six seats, to which are to be added the ten 
successful candidates of the Landllste, who are 
closely related to them. Besides these we must 
mention four German Social representatives and 
thirty-two representatives of the united Deutsch- 
Volkische und National Sozialistische Arbeiter 
parties. Nothing has furthered this movement 
more than the so-called "policy of sanctions," 
especially the invasion of the Ruhr, and incidents 
such as the execution of Schlageter. 


This tendency to extreme nationalistic activity 
would have a very different significance, were it 
not supported by numberless groups large and 
small which are not only ununited, but which in 
part wage bitter opposition against one another, 
and take the wind out of one another's sails. 
According to a newspaper report of April, 1924, 
there are no less than seventy-three right radical 
associations at present in Germany. 

A similar picture of disintegration is to be seen 
in the daily press, the political magazines, and in 
periodicals. It has become somewhat simplified 
under the influence of the financial and economic 
pressure which entailed the cessation of many 
newspapers and periodicals. According to a report 
lying before me, 245 daily newspapers were 
given up during the first quarter of 1923, 167 
reduced their size, and 89 were combined with 
other papers. Only political pamphlet literature 
has continually and surprisingly flourished and 
steadily increased during the last few years in 

The result of all these conditions is an aimless 
confusion, which might easily create an impression 
of political incapacity in the mind of an outsider. 
And yet one should be careful in this respect, I 
believe. It was a strange revelation when shortly 



after the Treaty of Versailles the people of 
Germany from the extreme right to the left refused 
rigidly to comply with the clause relating to the 
extradition of the so-called "war criminals" to 
which Germany had bound herself by this treaty; 
and by virtue of their solidarity the people carried 
their point. 

If I may venture a personal opinion here, I 
believe that the right cue at the right moment and 
the right man are all that will be necessary to 
create a unit from the many factions of the 
German people a unit strong enough to sweep the 
rest of the people with it for good or evil, as may 

be the case. 

* * * 

States live, grow, flourish, decay, and die like 
biological beings. Their fate and their history are 
chiefly determined by the following factors. 

First, by the strength of the pressure exerted 
from without on the state in question, as well 
as by the assistance and support it receives 
from without. We shall call these two cases the 
"outside factors." The so-called Etats Tampon 
(buffer states) and also bodies such as Danzig 
and German-Austria, which live entirely from 
the will of the victors of the world-war, are 
determined by these factors. 


A second group of factors corresponds to those 
above but resides inside the stte and people in 
question. The strength of resistance against the 
pressure from without, and further the ability to 
evade such pressure, belong to it. Just in this 
ability of evasion does real statesmanship find an 
opportunity to unfold itself in full mastery, and 
render the state immortal service. 

To these inner factors directed toward with- 
standing outside influences is added a third pair, 
which not only are contained within the state but 
also manifest themselves there. I refer to the 
strength of the inimical forces directed against the 
state among its own people, on the one hand, and 
the ability of the state to cope therewith, on the 

If the cases so far mentioned seem chiefly 
qualified to guarantee the undiminished power of a- 
state, they are joined by a further pair which work 
toward the progress, development, and growth 
of the state. I mean the degree of strength 
within a state and its people to operate expan- 
sively, productively, and creatively both without 
and within without, according to the still pre- 
vailing methods of today, chiefly by the exertion 
of pressure, but also by co-operation, persuasion, 
prestige, and so forth; within, by increase of 


population and concentration of the productive and 
creative powers of the citizens, their apportion- 
ment to the state, use for the state, and so forth. 

A premise for the efficiency of all these conserv- 
ing and developing factors inside the state is, above 
all, a good organization of the state, and at the 
same time the development of a system by which 
the best forces among the people automatically 
and without friction attain the authoritative posi- 
tions within the state. A further premise is 
definite aim and purpose in the state activities, 
a strongly developed patriotism on the part of 
the citizens, and, last but not least, a psychi- 
cally, physically, and morally sound, industrious 

As far as Germany is concerned, one can speak 
today only to a very limited degree of the direc- 
tion of the productive force toward the state, and 
its application for the state;^for the Treaty of 
Versailles provides that all, available surplus 
resulting from German work shall be directed 
toward the victors without. 

We have seen, and shall see further during the 
course of these lectures, that certain things in 
German organization are not in order. 

I must also state here that a certain weakening 
of the state idea and the sense of duty toward the 


same on the part of the individual seems to have 
taken place in Germany a question to which I 
will revert in my lecture on the German con- 

What, however, is the condition of the most 
important premise: the ability of the German 
people to work, and their moral health ? 

I remember, during the peace negotiations, a 
stimulating and highly interesting discussion took 
place in Berlin at a great conference of experts on 
the conditions of the peace treaty, between two of 
our most noted leaders of industry on the question 
of whether the German people's ability to work was 
broken or not. This question seems in the mean- 
while to have been decided in favor of the man who 
regarded the German people's ability to work as 
unbroken. I am repeatedly filled with astonish- 
ment at what despite all that we have behind us in 
every field of endeavor, despite the closely linked, 
often apparently impenetrable entanglement of 
laws and the restrictions they impose, despite 
the bonds of the Treaty of Versailles, the uncer- 
tainty of our political situation, or our thor- 
oughly confused financial market I am filled 
with astonishment, I repeat, at what German 
industry and trade have ventured and accom- 


Not so easy to answer is the question on the 
moral soundness of the German people. Certain 
ugly spots have become visible here, especially 
directly after the revolution, and later in the 
so-called period of depreciation, when the German 
paper mark died. Then German respectability 
seemed to be in danger of shipwreck. 

I have struggled long and seriously with this 
question, which seems imponderable, and can only 
be answered intuitively, not exactly; and have 
come to the conviction that the German people, 
in spite of its physical health having suffered con- 
siderably, is still on the whole morally sound. 

Every people has sick spots, but it can only be 
said that it is afflicted with a social sickness when 
the inability of the state to cope with this evil 
becomes manifest, and the evil has become habit- 
ual. J^hat appears today most ugly in Germany 
seems to me partly the unliquidated remains of the 
revolution and collapse, but greater than that is the 
reaction against the terrible pressure resting upon 
Germany as a result of the Treaty of Versailles and 
the situation it has created. The rest belongs 
under the category of the fundamental phenom- 
enon of mass psychology imitation. 

Is it surprising that during the period of infla- 
tion the German bourgeois began to speculate, 


when, deprived of their fortunes, they knew that 
their salaries or wages (their income on capital had 
ceased) would be certainly worth nothing the 
following day ? 

Must it be considered a moral disease of 
Germany that some Germans attempted to hide 
their money in safe foreign countries, when no one 
knew what political and economic conditions in 
Germany would be tomorrow ? Can one find 
evidence of a moral disease in Germany in the fact 
that German merchants showed a tendency to 
hold back their wares when they knew that the 
cost of replacing them would be higher than the 
price of sale; or that the attempt was made to 
charge foreigners fortunate in the possession of 
other currency higher prices than Germans ? 

I am far from approving of these and other 
practices which I shall discuss later, such as a 
tendency to extravagance in expenditure in Ger- 
many, but I believe that these are inot evidences of 
moral insanity in the German people as a whole; 
they are merely accompanying symptoms of the 
great German sickness, which is called the Treaty 
of Versailles. 

It is often and repeatedly claimed that foreign 
policy has precedence over interior policy; that 
the latter must adapt itself to the former. The 


fate of Germany teaches us a corollary to this 
rule. It is new evidence for the often proved fact 
that the relations and conditions, the fate and 
history, of a state can be determined decisively by 
outside factors. Germany's example demonstrates 
how such outside factors at the same time may 
attain domination over the whole inner and outer 
life of a state, and how ominously fateful they can 
become for an intrinsically sound, vigorous people. 





The note of December 30, 1916, which the 
Entente issued in answer to President Wilson's 
peace offer of December 21, contains among other 
things the following statement: 

For the future the ruins caused by the German declara- 
tion of war, the innumerable aggressions committed by 
Germany and her Allies against the belligerents and against 
neutrals demand penalties, reparations, and guaranties. 

In the French text it is sanctions, reparations, 
garanties. I add the French wording for the 
reason that the term "sanctions" especially 
under the influence of the French so-called "policy 
of sanctions" has since then attained an almost 
general use in preference to the word "penalties/* 
although the Dawes Report, for instance, uses the 
word "penalties" again. 

With this triptych of words (sanctions, rtpara- 
tions, garanties} the vocabulary of political catch- 
words has been increased by three terms which 
now dominate the discussions on the fulfilment 
of the peace treaties; and not only the political, 
but also the ethical, economic, and legal discus- 



sions, although recently the term "guaranty" 
has been to a great extent superseded by the 
kindred expression "security." 

For the student of international questions only 
the words "sanctions" and "reparations" are 
new, or, to be quite exact, almost new, as they 
formerly were used occasionally in international 
law. This is, for instance, very clearly the case 
in the Italian-French dispute over the confisca- 
tion of the French mail steamer "Manouba" 
in the Turkish-Italian War a dispute decided by 
the Hague Court, May 6, 1913. We find here in 
the party pleadings the claim that the opponent 
be sentenced to pay certain sums of money: 

A titre de sanctions et reparations du prejudice poli- 
tique et moral resultant de la violation du droit international. 

I said purposely that the terms are new, or at 
least almost new. This would be incorrect for 
the thing itself, however. Especially the idea of 
the possibility of punishing states is an old, 
greatly disputed, scientific problem. This applies 
also to the idea of responsibility, upon which, as 
we shall soon ascertain, the idea of reparation is 

These three words sanctions, reparations , gar- 
anties are three of the great directive points 
upon which the Treaty of Versailles is con- 



structed; directive points which can hardly have 
been derived in the same measure and the same 
proportion from sincere motives, however. I 
shall revert to this later. 

They are to be found in varying degrees in 
different parts of the Treaty of Versailles, espe- 
cially of course in its so-called "reparation 
clauses," and then later in the negotiations for 
the fulfilment of these clauses. 

The idea of "guaranty" has in the course of 
development advanced ever more and more into 
the political foreground. It has become, in fact, 
under the term "security," a cornerstone of the 
French post-war policy, for which classical evi- 
dence is given in the French Yellow Book of 1924 
on the guaranties for safety against a German 
attack, and, finally, it has unhappily become 
merged with the other two ideas of sanctions and 
reparations, especially with the latter. 

What interests us primarily here is the idea of 
"reparation" which also gave the reparation 
system in the Treaty of Versailles its name. The 
new element in this idea of reparation compared 
with that of former times is chiefly of a quantita- 
tive but also of a national character. 

Formerly it was customary to speak of a "war 
indemnity," which the conquered had to pay in 


money and land according to the choice of the 
victor. That is an old custom. But never in 
the course of history have such sums as those on 
which the Treaty of Versailles is based been even 
approximately demanded* 

Coleman Phillipson, an English author, writes 
in his excellent work, Termination of War and 
Treaties of Peace, the most explicit book dealing 
with this problem: 

It has been estimated that from 1795 to 1871 by a very 
moderate calculation the sum of 7,235,000,000 francs was 
extorted by belligerent states in the form of war indemnities. 
Of this less than one-eighth represents those imposed by 
France, notwithstanding the numerous victories gained by 
the French arms during that period; 1,135,000,000 francs 
by the various powers, and the overwhelming sum of 
5,525,000,000 francs imposed by Prussia in her wars only of 
1866 and 1870 to 1871. That is about three-fourths of the 
entire sum. 1 

In this connection Coleman Phillipson quotes from 
the famous textbook of the South American 
international scholar, Calvo, the despairing excla- 
mation: "Devant telles gnormites il y a lieu de se 
demander oti s'arretera cette progression sans cesse 

* Op. V., p. 272. London, 1916. 
9 Op.c&, IV (1886), 275. 


But not only do quantitative differences of 
enormous dimensions exist between the past and 
present practice of war indemnities and the regu- 
lation of the reparation problem, but we must 
also notice a difference in the conception of the 

The war indemnity is the simple sequel to the 
fact of a lost war. "The spoils for the victors" 
is its foundation. Under the influence of Wilson's 
ideals this primitive idea did not suffice, however, 
to justify the tremendous sums which were to be 
imposed on Germany, and support was found 
in Article 1382 of the French Code Civil, which 
says: "Tout fait quelconque de Fhomme qui cause 
& I'autrui dommage oblige celui par lafaute duquel 
il est arrive a le rtyarer" ["Every action what- 
soever of an individual which inflicts an injury on 
another obliges him by whose fault this has oc- 
curred to repair the same."] 

This juristic process of reasoning was adopted 
and Germany's actions construed as a kind of civil 
"tort" which was based on the idea of "responsi- 
bility." The result is the famous Article 231 of 
the Treaty of Versailles. 

On the other hand, it would in no way be just 
toward this article were its meaning to be regarded 
as solely or even primarily limited to establishing 


the basis of the reparation claims from a point 
of civil law. The wording of Article 23 i, the 
caesura between it and Article 232, as well as the 
history of this article, exclude this, and prove that 
this connection with civilistic ideas meant some- 
thing more than a mere transposition of a legal 
idea from one legal sphere to another, from 
national civil law to the sphere of international 
law. At the same time there is here, in my opin- 
ion, rather a transposition of a legal notion to the 
sphere of international ethics. I find support for 
this theory especially from Bernard Baruch, who 
speaks of "moral responsibility" in reference to 
Article 231 in his book, The Making of the Rep- 
aration and Economic Sections of the Treaty of 
Versailles? and from Norman H. Davis, who 
announced before the Senate Committee: "My 
interpretation of the first article in the repara- 
tion chapter is that Germany is morally respon- 
sible." 2 

But Article 231 means even more than this; 
it denotes also a reversion to the old scholastic 
idea of the justum et injustum bellum, which in 
the course of time had been abandoned by the 
great majority of writers, and had never been 

*Op.cit. (1920), p. 7. 

a Senate Document No. 106, 6oth Congress, 1st Session, p. 99. 



realized in the practice of states an idea the his- 
tory of which has been quite elaborately dis- 
cussed by Vanderpol in a book well worth reading, 
La doctrine scolastique du droit de guerre (Paris, 

The authors of the Treaty of Versailles have, 
however, considerably exceeded the scholastic 
scholars in so far as they have connected this idea 
of justum et injustum bellum with the question of 
the war indemnity, and further by applying their 
theory at the same time retroactively 4 to facts 
which lay in the past. 

Consequently, "reparation," according to the 
idea which hovered before the Paris Peace Confer- 
ence, means a war indemnity based primarily on 
international ethics, and secondarily on law. 
The effort to transfer the war indemnity from the 
sphere of force and arbitrariness to the spheres 
of ethics and international law represents the 
attempt to introduce a new conception in the 
rules governing international intercourse. 

So far as sanctions are concerned, the note 
mentioned at the beginning of this explanation 
had apparently no connection with the definition 
of the word as conceived by constitutional law, 
which understands by the sanction of a law the 
legal command contained therein, the ita jus esfo. 


The most extensive use of this word, which repre- 
sents the whole "machinery for compelling com- 
pliance with international law/' 1 was probably also 
not considered then. It appears to me that we 
are chiefly concerned here with a form of speech 
such as is especially used by French doctrine which 
places "sanction" on the same plane as "punish- 
ment" in the sense of the word as used in criminal 
law. And apparently the note of December 30, 
1916, had in consideration, judging from its con- 
tents, penalties for the violation of Belgian 
neutrality, for Germany's guilt for the world-war 
and for Germany's guilt in the war factors which 
the Treaty of Versailles accepts as its premises. 

The Treaty of Versailles uses this expression 
differently. It applies it to the punishment of 
the so-called "war criminals" and the Kaiser. 
But besides this, the Treaty of Versailles Has a 
number of other clauses of penal character, among 
them Article 231. In order to realize this it is 
only necessary to see the protocols of the so-called 
Guilt Commission (Commission des Responsibility 
des Auteurs de la Guerre) , which demands a con- 
demnation Jormelle of Germany, and appeals for 
sanctions penales. It is further necessary only to 
read through the text of the French "Program 

1 Spaight, War Rights on Land (1911), p. 461. 



for the Peace Negotiations/' in which is men- 
tioned as one of the points to be treated 

.... stipulations of a moral character, recognition by Ger- 
many of the responsibility and premeditation of her rulers 
justifying the measures of penalization and precaution taken 
against her, solemn disavowal of the breaches of International 
Law and of the crimes against humanity. 1 

And so we are able to add a fourth idea to those 
already enumerated in this article: The idea of 
punishing Germany. 

But quite apart from this there are a great 
number of other clauses in the Treaty of Versailles 
embodying the idea of sanctions. I do not refer 
so much thereby to the expression of the old idea 
of "Talio" an eye for an eye, a tooth for a 
tooth, "a ton for a ton" nor will I more than 
mention the attempts of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations relating to this question. I 
am here considering primarily the special repara- 
tion claims of Belgium, certain prescriptions con- 
cerning the Saar mines, and similar details. 

In the period following the conclusion of peace, 
the idea of sanctions began to grow and became 
widely spread. It became more and more con- 
fused with the two other principles of reparations 
and guaranties, and it almost completely sup- 

Baker, Woodrow Wihon> III, 61, 


planted the so-called "reprisals" which at pres- 
ent do not appear to be discussed any more, and 
whose character differs from that of sanctions in 
that it lacks a specific penal character, and 
exhausts its function in the compulsion of fulfil- 
ment. This tendency to the compulsion of ful- 
filment enters into the conception of sanctions; 
but all the consequences of a possible non-fulfil- 
ment agreed upon in the Treaty of Versailles are 
also frequently spoken of as sanctions. Thus the 
term "sanctions" is used in connection with 
paragraph 18 of Annex 2 following Article 244, 
an article on which the Ruhr invasion and the 
sanctions of the London ultimatum are known to 
be based. It appears, in fact, as if this expres- 
sion "sanction" would become established as the 
term "for the whole machinery for compelling 
compliance with international law," and especially 
with the Treaty of Versailles. And yet it still 
distinctly retains a certain penal tendency and 
inclination. An inclination remains to speak 
only of sanctions when contemplating a reaction 
with punitary objects, in contrast to mere sub- 
stitution or compulsory measures of fulfilment. 
This is, for instance, very clear in Poincare's 
reparation plan, which he submitted to the Paris 
Conference early in January, 1923, by which he 


prepared the Ruhr invasion, and in which repara- 
tions, guaranties, and sanctions are dealt with in 
special sections. 

Consequently, -the Treaty of Versailles makes 
an attempt to affirm the old question of dispute as 
to whether states can be punished, and contains 
constructive material for a real international 
penal law an international penal law which as a 
specific branch of international law would have 
three divisions: (i) objective international law on 
the punishment of guilty state officials, (2) ob- 
jective international law on the punishment of 
states, and (3) the international part of the rules 
dealing with the conflicts between national penal 

It is as little my purpose here to follow the 
history of this idea in detail, especially in the 
League of Nations, as to cast its horoscope. Nor 
can I deal with that interesting question of outlaw- 
ing war, nor dwell on the fact that Lord Robert 
Cecil's "Draft Treaty for Mutual Assistance" 
and "The Draft Treaty of Disarmament and 
Security," prepared by an American Committee 
numbering Professor Shotwell and General Bliss 
among its members, attempt to introduce the idea 
of crime in international law by declaring certain 
forms of warfare a crime. 



But I must briefly draw attention here to the 
fact that in the Treaty of Versailles, these new 
ideas were applied to events which had occurred 
before these new principles just mentioned were 
established. By this action a breach was made in 
one of the greatest legal principles governing all 
the laws of all times: the principle of the non- 
retroactive power of law, with which we are 
especially familiar from the formula in criminal 
law, Nulla poena sine lege. 

The reason for my going into these complicated 
explanations here is that I wish to impress you 
with the theoretical confusion which exists in 
relation to the reparation problem. Three great 
intersecting thoughts, not clear in themselves and 
constantly confused with one another, meet in 
this question: the ideas of reparations, sanctions 
(penalties), and guaranties. In Article 231 of the 
Treaty of Versailles, which is placed at the begin- 
ning of the reparation clauses as their foundation, 
we are confronted by no less than four almost 
indissolubly entangled ideas.- It would seem to 
me as if clear distinctions in this seemingly theo- 
retical field would also have practical advantages 
for the reason that they would lead to a vast 
simplification of the reparation problem, and 
would considerably facilitate its solution. 



There are four theoretical possibilities by 
which the financial necessities which arise from a 
war can be met. 

1. One can destroy an adversary, and try to 
pay one's self with his heritage. 

2. One can let the vanquished opponent live, 
but burden him with indemnities, either in the 
form of a round sum of compensation or a sum 
which is estimated according to the amount of the 
damages. These damages can be differentiated 
as war costs and war damages. Perhaps it is 
possible to add a third category, the so-called 
"civil damages," as was attempted, for instance, 
in Brest Litovsk. This war indemnity can be 
estimated according to the capacity of the van- 
quished, for payment, and the latter is the sys- 
tem which is often called in Germany the system 
of the "milk cow," or the system of "the goose 
with the golden eggs." 

3. One can shake hands at the end of a con- 
flict, wipe the blood from sword and spear, go 
home, and each combatant nurse his own wounds. 

4. One can try in co-operative work to restore 
the damages done as completely as possible. 

All these theoretical possibilities just mentioned 
are degrees in a scale which ranges from the 
extremest nationalism to pure internationalism. 



The first system of destruction was emphatically 
repudiated at the peace negotiations and after. 
I shall mention only a speech of Millerand's here 
which he gave in Spa, July 10, 1920 a speech 
which rose to a height of unusual objectivity: 
"The Allies realize that a Germany which has 
recovered its power of production is a necessary 
feature in the life of the world." 

The third method is that which the Pope 
vainly suggested in his note of August 17, 1917, in 
which he said: 

As for the damages to be repaid and the cost of the war, 
we see no other way of solving the question than by setting 
up the general principle of entire and reciprocal condonations 
which would be justified by the immense benefit to be derived 
from disarmament, all the more as one could not understand 
that such carnage could go on for mere economic reasons. If 
certain particular reasons stand against this in certain cases, 
they should be weighed in justice and equity. 

The second and fourth methods remain. Among 
the numberless suggestions which the Reparation 
Commission submitted to the Peace Conference is 
one which begins with the following words: "The 
war costs of the states .... are supported in 
common by the assembly of nations. A general 
r6gime is charged with the liquidation of these 
costs of war." Does not this sound like a classic 
illustration of the fourth alternative of co-operative 


work? Does it not sound like absolute inter- 
nationalism ? Unfortunately, this is somewhat 
deceptive, for this plan from the pen of the former 
French minister of finance, Klotz, then chairman 
of the Reparation Commission, refers only to the 
costs, not to the damages of the war which are of 
primary consideration here. And it further pro- 
vides an arrangement between the Allies but not 
with Germany, who according to this plan would 
merely have participated in the payment. 

The Treaty of Versailles chose the second 
method, and adopted the sharpest form of the 
latter: The German state shall continue to exist, 
the claims of Versailles shall find their limit in its 
capacity and the capacity of its citizens of pay- 
ment. But only in this capacity. As a result 
of the inclusion of pensions and reparation allow- 
ances, according to the ideas of General Smuts 
and despite the persistent struggle of the American 
delegation, an amount then estimated as between 
$20,000,000,000 and $23,000,000,000, the reparation 
problem was reduced to the question formulated 
by the American expert Lamont, in the chapter 
on "Reparations" in Colonel House's well-known 
book, What Really Happened at Paris: "How much 
at her utmost capacity can Germany pay ? " r This 

1 Op. >., p. 261. 



is the formula on which the Dawes Report is also 
chiefly based. The claims of the reparations have 
precedence over all others until this capacity has 
been attained. They stand in the first place. 

In short, the following can be said of the ideas 
upon which the reparation clauses in the Treaty 
of Versailles are based. They are an attempt to 
extract by a method of organized co-operation 
with the debtor Germany, declared guilty of and 
responsible for the world-war, as much as seems 
suitable and possible (from the point of view of a 
world-ethics affirming Germany's right to exist- 
ence), to satisfy the individual claims of all the 

In the interest of truth, certain very unpleasant 
things have to be added here, however, and 
thereby we must revert to the confidential "Report 
to the Imperial Cabinet on the Final Conditions 
of Peace," which Count Brockdorff-Rantzau and 
his peace delegation wrote en route between Ver- 
sailles and Weimar, June 17, 1919, in the same 
distressing night in which we were also engaged on 
the train in translating the terms of the conditions 
of peace, which were presented to us only in 
English and French. This report strongly recom- 
mended the refusal of these peace conditions. 
This short report, which today reads partially 



like a prophecy, characterizes the final and then 
unchanged conditions of peace with the four 
lapidary words: unbearable (unertraglich), unful- 
fillable (unerfiillbar)) law-infringing (rechtsverkt- 
zend), insincere (unaufrichtig). 

These four words express the sentiments which 
today still fill an overwhelming majority of the 
German people toward the Treaty of Versailles, 
and in a greater degree toward some of its later 

I shall not attempt to prove the single details of 
this statement here, for my purpose is only to 
provide a premise for the expression of the Ger- 
man attitude toward the reparation problem. 

For this purpose it is impossible, however, to 
pass over four points. I must revert briefly to the 
so-called question of guilt for which Americans 
seem to prefer the term "responsibility for the 
war," and its significance in relation to Germany's 
attitude on the reparation problem. I must 
consider, secondly, the problem of reparation and 
German liberty. Thirdly, I must emphasize the 
psychological pressure and the importance which 
the weight of the reparation has for Germany. 
And, finally, I must add a few words on the actual 
effects of the reparation regime, and how, with 
time, it has developed in Germany. 



First, as to the so-called question of responsi- 
bility for the war the guilt question. I know 
that on the conclusion of peace the greater part 
of the world was convinced of Germany's guilt for 
the war, and that a very considerable part is still 
of this opinion. I am also aware that since the 
Treaty of Versailles has come into force many 
regard this question with Lloyd George as a " cause 
judged," to repeat an expression used by the latter 
in London on March 3, 1921, to the German min- 
ister of foreign affairs, Dr. Simons. I also realize 
that there is little sympathy for this question today 
in foreign countries in other words, this question 
is apt to be found boring. Consequently, it would 
probably be the part of diplomacy to ignore it. 
But should I do so I would be untrue to the prom- 
ise I made in my first essay; for no one can fully 
understand the present political state of mind in 
Germany, especially that relating to the question 
of reparations, who is not informed as to Ger- 
many's attitude toward the question of responsi- 
bility for the war. The German Peace Delegation 
fought to the last against the acknowledgment of 
guilt in Article 231 as the Germans interpret this 
article. It is generally maintained in Germany in 
opposition to this thesis that the world-war was a 


necessary explosion of the ever increasing imperial- 
ism which has dominated our era. 

This struggle on the guilt question is primarily 
an affair of honor for the Germans, a reaction of 
the German nation against the moral and criminal 
condemnation which has herein been filed against 
it. Besides this, the opinion continually gains 
ground in Germany that Article 231 is the heart of 
the whole Treaty of Versailles, on which the latter 
stands or falls. One refers often in this connection 
to the frequently quoted words of Lloyd George, 
who declared in the debate on the guilt question 
which took place between him and Dr. Simons in 
London March 3, 1921, that " for the Allies, German 
responsibility for the war is fundamental. It is 
the basis upon which the structure of the treaty has 
been erected, and if that acknowledgment is repudi- 
ated or abandoned the treaty is destroyed." 

Arguments and support are also derived from 
another remark of Lloyd George's, in the London 
Times on December 23, 1920, three months before 
the remark quoted above: 

The more one reads the memoirs and books written in 
the various countries of what happened before August i, 1914, 
the more one realizes that no one at the head of affairs quite 
meant war at that stage. It was something Into which they 
glided^ or rather staggered^ or stumbled [italics mine]. 


Taken all in all, one must say that the ques- 
tion of responsibility for the war becomes more and 
more the central point from which large circles in 
Germany regard the Treaty of Versailles. The 
struggle on the guilt question has become almost 
a species of crusade for them. They will wrestle 
with this question with German thoroughness, and 
work over it until the last attainable document is 
found, appreciated, judged, and classified. They 
will proceed with this crusade, quite unconcerned 
about what the world says and how it reacts. 
And finally, the Germans will be essentially influ- 
enced in their attitude toward foreign political 
problems by this struggle a fact which also 
plays a rfile in Germany's attitude toward the 
League of Nations, and which must equally 
influence the German attitude toward the repara- 
tion problem which is so closely associated with 
the question of guilt. 

This great German struggle against the guilt 
question is for me an unusually instructive illustra- 
tion of what a r61e honor, which is so often misused 
and substituted for personal will or unwillingness 
in the language of diplomats, can really play in 
the life of states. The acknowledgment of guilt in 
Article 231 seems to me like a smarting wound 
which burns in the soul of the German people. 


The second point, which I must not fail to 
mention at least briefly and in a particular aspect, 
is the question of the significance of the reparation 
system for German liberty. 

The Germans have been repeatedly assured 
that their inner legislation will not be interfered 
with and that their independence will not be cur- 
tailed. In fact, however, Germany is bound almost 
entirely hand and foot by the Treaty of Versailles, 
as already mentioned in the first lecture, and above 
all by this system of reparation. And these 
bonds have become ever firmer, so that the claim 
that Germany is free in regard to its inner legisla- 
tion is not even formally correct now. In my 
essay on "The New German Constitution," I 
will explain how the organs of reparation have in 
fact become the highest legislative organs of Ger- 
many, and how Germany is now facing the 
necessity of passing laws which have been dictated 
to their smallest detail. 

What was above a question of honor is here a 
question of the liberty, or, in other words, the 
sovereignty of Germany. For what, fundamen- 
tally, is everything which has been said and claimed 
in the name of sovereignty ? It is at the bottom 
nothing else but an active manifestation of the 
impulse of state liberty toward its subjects on one 



hand, and toward the other members of the 
society of nations, on the other. Sovereignty, 
for states, reduced to its simplest terms means, in 
my opinion, nothing else than what the enjoyment 
of liberty means for individuals. Immanuel Kant, 
the greatest scholar my home, Konigsberg, has 
produced, writes: "There is nothing more terrible 
than that the actions of a man should be con- 
trolled by the will of another"; and again: "The 
man who is dependent is no longer a man, he has 
lost this rank, he is no more than the appurte- 
nance of another person." 

If honor is a point which plays at least the 
same r61e in the life of states as in the experience 
of individuals, how much more true is this for the 
impulse of states toward liberty, for their desire 
for sovereignty? If this be so, one can see 
without further explanation the psychological im- 
portance of the fact that one of the most popu- 
lous states of Europe can, to a large extent, 
move only according to the commands of foreign 

A third very important fact for the explanation 
of the attitude of Germany and the Germans 
toward the reparation question is found above 
all in the many currents of psychological pressure 
weighing upon Germany. 



One of the chief reasons for this pressure can be 
perceived in the continual uncertainty and insecu- 
rity of conditions, which manifest themselves in 
the most varied directions. It has often not been 
known what interpretation the victors would 
put upon this or that provision of the ambiguous 
and often unintelligible Treaty of Versailles. 
The history of the treaty is the history of a struggle 
of interpretation, very interesting legally but at 
the same time very painful. New claims of not 
inconsiderable height, and often devastating for 
the state budget, were also constantly presented. 
The cost of the army of occupation is a particularly 
good example of this. According to official Ger- 
man statistics, Germany paid over 5,000,000,000 
gold marks for the occupation on the Rhine from 
the time of the Armistice until December, 1923. 
And besides this we have had to pay a monthly 
sum of 1,200,000 gold marks for the 200 members 
of the Allied Control Commissions whereas the 
4,000 officers of the German army only cost 
688,500 gold marks a month. Above all, however, 
until the London plan of payment, Germany stood 
under the pressure of not knowing what would 
finally be demanded of her, and at the same time 
in constant fear of a new manifestation of the 
so-called "policy of sanctions." 



Tcv this uncertainty a growing feeling of hope- 
lessness with regard to Germany's position was 
added. The impression and conviction that 
Germany could do nothing to avert a terrible 
destiny gained in force. 

The Germans have also perceived how the 
fulfilment and interpretation of the Treaty of 
Versailles has deviated in different directions from 
its premises, even if one takes, not the Wilson 
points, but the Treaty of Versailles itself, as such 
a premise. They saw how the fragments of 
Wilsonism still contained in the Treaty dis- 
appeared, how the Entente became loosened, and 
thereby the guaranties which remained after the 
United States had separated from it were weak- 
ened. They saw especially how measures of 
sanctions, reparations, and guaranties were ever 
more frequently and sharply applied for the same 
political purposes, until German economic unity 
was severed by the Ruhr invasion, and under the 
policy of positive pledges and sanctions the 
German economic body began to bleed to death. 
This is especially so since the era of the so-called 
"Micum treaties/' treaties between the Mission 
Interalliee de Controle des Usines et des Mines and 
the representatives of the local German mining 
industry. This hopelessness drew its arguments 



further also from the fact that year-long attempts 
to come to some possible arrangement remained 
without results. I have counted approximately 
forty suggestions for reparation plans. I was not 
able to determine the even greater number of 
reparation conferences. 

Is it a wonder that the impression was created 
that the world was simply incapable of mastering 
this problem of reparation, and even of providing 
indisputable fundamental facts and statistics of 
payment on it ? How would it otherwise have 
been possible for such contradictory statistics on 
Germany's capacity, on what Germany had per- 
formed, on the financial results of the Ruhr 
occupation, and on the cost of the occupation to 
be spread through the world ? 

The resulting nervous strain rested so heavily 
on the Germans that one was not infrequently 
reminded of the atmosphere which we experienced 
just previous to the collapse of the autumn of 
1918, and the period of the Armistice and peace 
negotiations, together with the hunger blockade, 
whose inexorability and deteriorating influence 
can be realized only by one who experienced it 
personally. I felt, therefore, as if someone had 
spoken from my own soul when I read the 
words of the Swiss Colonel Wildbolz in a report 



of January, 1924, to the Red Cross: "One can 
scarcely comprehend how people avoided going 

And now, finally, a few words about the present 
conditions in Germany as they have developed 
under the influence of the financial situation. 
They have indeed been made known in other 
countries by foreign investigations, conducted in 
part with noteworthy success and a great desire 
for objectivity. This is so much the case that 
foreign countries seem in part to be better informed 
about us than we are ourselves. The best example 
of this is the Dawes Report, 

Foreign countries have especially become 
acquainted with our existing misery in connection 
with their broad-minded assistance to our children 
and poor. 

The chaos of our currency and of our state 
budget, for the regulation of which questions the 
Dawes Commission was especially appointed, and 
all the outer signs of disintegration are known. 
But something still remains which is not at all 
or only incompletely known, and information 
on which is inaccessible to the outside observer 
because it is not to be expressed by statistics, or 
because the facts of these statistics have not yet 
fully exerted their effect. Many of the Germans 



themselves have very different and vague opinions 
on these questions and their influence. I have 
read with dismay, for instance, of a great decrease 
in the birth-rate, and of an ever increasing wave of 
emigration from Germany an emigration three 
times as great as in the last year before the war, 
and five times as great as the last five-year average. 
The decrease in the substance of the German 
economic property and economic income can be 
measured only in part. It is known to have been 
estimated that the German people earn only one- 
third of what they did formerly, and in regard to 
wealth, one has to point only to the blood-letting 
which the decline of the mark and the Third 
Emergency Tax Law inflicted on broad circles, 
especially the middle class, which is always the 
backbone of the people. 

There are certain indications here which can 
be followed, but they fail signally when applied 
to the question of what, for instance, disappears 
from the closets without being replaced, and the 
necessary repairs which are left undone. I think 
in this connection of the pitiful condition of a part 
of the German houses which are dropping to pieces 
bit by bit, and I hear from official sources that 
houses have to be constantly abandoned now for 
fear of their collapsing. 



I had a very discouraging illustration of this 
myself some months ago. On my daily walk 
through Konigsberg, I found a large apartment 
house in a poorer part of the city decorated by a 
sign which read, "Danger of collapse. Do not 
enter." Yet this house teemed with families of 
people who had no other shelter than this. 

The housing problem which, as is known, has 
been a very real one in almost all countries since 
the war, is particularly bad in Germany. During 
the war hardly anything was built, and since then 
there has also been comparatively little building, 
owing, among other reasons, to the fact that the 
government kept down the rents by law, and few 
people could afford to build houses, or even 
repair those they owned. The misery has been 
increased by an added population from the ceded 
territories, and the people expelled from the Ruhr 
and Rhine according to official German statistics 
of May, 1924, more than 140,000 people. The 
municipal authorities have the right to quarter 
people with any owner of a house or apartment in 
which the rooms exceed the occupants in number 
(children are only counted as half). This forcible 
introduction of strange and often highly inhar- 
monious elements in almost every home is 
undoubtedly one of the severest infringements on 


personal liberty and happiness, and has aroused 
more individual resentment and bitter feeling 
than almost any other measure. 

The statistics which are known regarding assist- 
ance to the poor are not exhaustive, as much goes 
on here under the surface; for the necessity of the 
present has brought good as well as much evil, in 
that the spirit of charity has noticeably increased 
in certain circles in Germany. 

Even less to be expressed in numbers is what 
the German people have lost by the fact that their 
scholars are without the necessary books, lack 
the material for experiments, are absorbed by the 
troubles of the day, and in some cases devote 
themselves also to other than scientific occupa- 
tions. It might be mentioned here that during 
the period of the depreciation of the mark, uni- 
versity professors as well as all other government 
officials had to stand in line for hours several times 
a week to draw their salaries, and then rush at 
once into town to invest their money before it lost 
its value. 

The whole misery of our scholars was brought 
back to me when a member of the University of 
Chicago told me that he had written asking a 
German scientist for a certain dissertation and 
that he had not received it yet. I told him that 


he would probably never receive it, as since the 
war we have been unable to print dissertations 
except in very rare cases. The most we can do 
is to print a single sheet containing a brief synopsis 
of the dissertation one typewritten copy of the 
dissertation is sent to the University of Berlin, 
one presented to the library of the university in 
which it has been written, and one to the faculty 
to which it was submitted. The same American 
criticized the German scholars for not quoting 
foreign scientists. I could only assure him that 
the vast majority of us would be very glad to do 
so were we or our libraries able to afford foreign 
books in sufficient numbers since the war. 

It is probably owing to the non-consideration 
of these and similar facts that foreign countries 
generally estimate our prosperity and economic 
capacity higher than we do in Germany. To 
this are added certain indications which are but 
deceptive. I refer primarily to the much-discussed 
high living and luxury of a small but very con- 
spicuous group of Germans. This is also noticeable 
in other countries such as Italy and Switzerland. 
Apparently the German government is not strong 
enough to suppress it, though it inspires at least 
as great a degree of resentment and disgust in 
Germany itself as in foreign countries. 


As far as the apparent luxury is concerned, 
it can be explained in part by the hysterical fear 
of the possession of money which still dominates 
Germany, and the clearly existing fever of expen- 
diture. This has somewhat abated under the 
influence of the Rentenmark, but is not dispelled. 
Many a couple whom one sees somewhere eating 
well and drinking wine do not own as much as 
their own bed, and perhaps little more than the 
clothes on their backs. 

The following incident was very instructive to 
me in this connection. A woman I know went 
into town to buy undergarments for her children. 
The price of the articles was higher than the sum 
at her disposal. As she left the store she saw a 
candy shop next door. Not having enjoyed any 
sweets for long she returned home without under- 
garments but with candy, as she had to get rid of 
her money before it decreased in value. 

In Germany the word Scheinblute (mock pros- 
perity) has become very common for the conditions 
existing there. But this also seems to be in the 
process of passing since the introduction of the 
Rentenmark, the shortage of money connected 
therewith, and the strangulation of unsecured 
credits. When I left Germany there was a decided 
atmosphere of crisis in industry and commerce, 


increased by some great strikes, almost no money 
to be had, everywhere helplessness and discourage- 
ment, and the courts overworked with cases of 
bankruptcy and the introduction of so-called 
Geschaftsaufsicht (business supervision), an any- 
thing-but-agreeable novelty which the war intro- 
duced in Germany. Many of the firms concerned 
were highly respected ones, and but recently 
were regarded as absolutely sound. According 
to what I have read since leaving Germany, this 
process seems to be rapidly continuing. Similar 
symptoms could be observed in agriculture, and 
added to this was a slow, not entirely explicable, 
increase in the cost of living. 

Only when one considers all these features can 
one understand the attitude of the German people 
toward the Dawes Report. For, on the face of 
this Report, which also regards the utmost 
capacity of Germany as the limits of her repara- 
tion duty, no one will maintain that it promises 
Germany an easy future. 

From the great number of objections which 
have been raised against this Report, I would 
like to emphasize the following: 

i. In this Report, which reminds one strongly 
of the London plan of reparations, the utmost 
capacity of Germany is greatly overestimated. 


Our industry, for instance, will hardly be in a posi- 
tion to raise the 300,000,000 gold marks demanded 
of it annually. There is even less prospect of 
being able to draw 950,000,000 gold marks annu- 
ally out of the railroads, which do not pay anything 
at present; not to mention the tremendous sum 
which Germany has to pay annually besides the 
amounts just mentioned. For this sum the follow- 
ing revenues are pledged as collateral securities: 
alcohol, tobacco, beer, sugar, and customs. So 
that under the Dawes plan Germany would not 
be able to introduce prohibition if it wished to. 

The discrepancy between what is expected of 
Germany and its capacities is most clearly revealed 
by the fact that the annual taxable income per 
capita in Germany, according to the most recent 
official calculations, amounts to 400 gold marks. 
Of this income more than 100 gold marks are 
paid annually for taxes in Germany. In Great 
Britain and Ireland the annual taxable income per 
capita amounts to 1,200 gold marks; in France, 
820 gold marks; and in Belgium, 1,000 gold marks. 

In regard to the German Volkseinkommen 
(people's income), it was estimated in 1913 by 
Helfferich at 45,000 million gold marks. In 1924 
it was estimated according to recent official fig- 
ures as only 25,000 million gold marks opposite 



which is a considerable increase in the cost of 
living, and tremendous income taxes, which 
Imperial Minister Luther estimated as amounting 
to 27.7 per cent of the whole income before the 
acceptance of the Dawes Report. 

2. The Report is based on the principle that a 
minimum of existence must be granted to every 
German, but does not state what this minimum is. 
Three hundred gold marks per capita does not 
seem to me an adequate sum. 

3. The Report, which frequently characterizes 
itself as an "intermediate plan," does not provide 
the final solution so necessary from an economic 
and psychological standpoint, nor does it, above 
all, suggest a final reparation sum. 

4. The German freedom of action, especially 
in economic fields, will be unbearably curtailed by ' 
this Report* 

5. The settlement planned destroys Germany's 
competitive ability in the world-market. 

6. The " transfer proceedings " expose Germany 
to the danger of an economic foreignization. 

7. The activity necessary to the existence of 
German trade must suffer seriously through a 
fiscal management of the railroads. , 

8. The Report leaves no margin for the fulfil- 
ment of social duties on the part of Germany, for 

1 66J 


the provision of those incapacitated for work; and 
it forbids in particular the compensation of the 
people ruined by the depreciation of the paper 

9. By this plan the debt of the German state 
is partially shifted to certain private groups. 

10. The Report gives no guaranty that the 
policy of sanctions will really cease, but on the con- 
trary leaves the possibility of their application open. 

n. The Report does not include the so-called 
points of honor in its calculations, that is, the 
amnesty for the people punished, a permission for 
the people expelled from the Ruhr to return to it. 

And yet this Report was not even known in its 
text, but only according to its broad lines and 
general tendencies, before the opinion was voiced 
from almost all sides, and even from authoritative 
quarters, that it must be recognized as a sufficient 
basis for negotiations. A great number of speci- 
fied votes in this direction lie before me. The 
voices against it came from the radical camps. 

We may attempt to sum up the chief reasons 
for this almost general affirmation of the Report, 
apart from the general enervation in Germany, as 

i. Primarily there is satisfaction that the 
Report starts from a premise of Germany's eco- 


nomic unity, and consequently takes the cessation 
of the Ruhr occupation for granted. 

2. The plan further starts from the premise 
that Germany's exports shall be taken as the basis 
for the reparation. 

3. The plan also provides that Germany be 
given a breathing space. 

4. It anticipates an international loan of 800 
million gold marks, which, however, is often con- 
sidered too small a sum. 

5. Stabilized currency and regulated budgets 
are the chief conditions for the reparation plan. 

6. The plan affirms Germany's right to exist- 

7. It makes an attempt by its own provisions 
of sanctions and securities to free the process of 
reparation from the system of sanctions and 
guaranties, as they have latterly developed, to 
treat the reparation problem as a purely economic 
problem, and to raise it, as it were, out of a political 
atmosphere. Unfortunately, however, this is done 
in a very imperfect fashion. 

8. The influence of the Reparation Commission 
is pushed back and that of real experts placed in 
the foreground. 

9. All the debts of the Treaty of Versailles 
will be combined in one item. 



We can perhaps reduce the general sentiment 
in Germany on the Dawes Report to the following 
formula: The sincere attempt to treat and solve 
the reparation problem as an international eco- 
nomic and financial problem is apparent in every 
word of the report. Even though the first part 
refers in its introduction to Germany's "primary 
moral obligation toward those who have suffered 
so severely through the war," its dominating 
motive is at the same time the idea of the soli- 
darity of the war burdens, and the idea of the 
solidarity of reciprocal interests. 

In the letter from the chairman of the First 
Committee of Experts to the Reparation Com- 
mission, dated April 9, 1924, accompanying the 
Dawes Report, this statement appears: 

With these principles fixed and accepted in that common 
good faith which is the foundation of all business and the best 
safeguard for universal peace, the recommendations of the 
committee must be considered not as inflicting penalties, but 
as suggesting means for assisting the economic recovery of 
all the European people, the entry upon a new period of 
happiness and of prosperity unmenaced by war. 

This is true internationalism; and this Report 
rises to an admirable ethical universalism when 
it declares: 

Deeply impressed by the sense of its responsibility to the 
universal conscience, it bases its plans upon those principles 



of justice, fairness and mutual interest in the supremacy of 
which not only the creditors of Germany and Germany itself, 
but the whole world, has a vital and enduring concern. 

There is a much-discussed book in Germany 
by Oswald Spengler, written in the atmosphere of 
the Gotterdammerung) with the title: Der Unter- 
gang des Abendlandes (The Decline of Western 

If the problem of reparation can be carried 
out in the spirit of the foregoing words of the 
Dawes Report, if only men who are filled with such 
a spirit and take this spirit as their only maxim are* 
intrusted with its application, then Spengler will be 
proven wrong, and Lloyd George and Nitti and all 
others who see war and destruction in the political 
heavens of the present will be mistaken. 

But will the Dawes Report be right with its 
prophecy of "a new period of happiness and pros- 
perity unmenaced by war ?" These words are an 
expression of the young, world-conquering opti- 
mism which we Europeans admire and sometimes 
envy in the Americans. 

Under the present conditions, Germans are 
hardly able to hope for anything like happiness 
from the execution of the Dawes Report. As long 
as the reparation system of the Treaty of Ver- 
sailles is not fundamentally changed, as long as it is 


based on the above-mentioned alternative 2 of 
Germany's utmost capacity, the question of a . 
greater or lesser happiness does not come into con- 
sideration for Germany. But a far more inexo- 
rable, fateful question weighs upon the German 
state, the German people, and the German nation: 
"To be or not to be." 





Whosoever approaches the complex of problems 
designated by the expression, "League of Nations," 
is confronted by multifarious forms almost impos- 
sible to disentangle, and an inseparable confusion. 

Lauded and abused, defended and condemned, 
relegated to the dead and praised as the great 
hope of the future, the Geneva League of Nations 
suggests the words of Schiller's Prologue to Wallen- 
stem's Camp: "By party favor and by hate con- 
fused, his image staggers down through history." 

The chief reason for this, in my opinion, is that 
the League of Nations has not only one Janus 
head, but turns a thousand faces toward the 
observer, and thereby it presents itself as a typical 
product of the epoch in which it was created and 
has its place. I refer to the short period of our 
present, which is filled with a powerful intellectual 
battle a battle of ideas which is so much more 
tremendous because it represents a contest between 
the past, stained with the world-war, and a new 
future, a new social order, the extension of the 



Idea of law throughout the world, the awakening 
of a world-conscience, the dawn of a world- 
permeating state ethics. And in the train of all 
these things the vision of world-economics, world- 
mutualism, world-co-operation, world-culture, at- 
tracts us, a vision which sounds in the last chords 
of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony: 

Freude, schoner Gotterfunken, 

Tochter aus Elysium, 
Wir betreten feuertrunken, 

Himmlische, dein Heiligtum". 

Deine Zauber binden wieder, 

Was die Mode streng geteilt; 
Alle Menschen werden Briider, 

Wo dein sanfter Flugel weilt. 

Seid umschlungen, Millionen ! 

Diesen Kuss der ganzen Welt! 

Briider iiberm Sternenzelt 
Muss ein lieber Vater wohnen. 

But these visions begin to disappear when we 
try to seize them, as the ghosts in Hades faded 
before Odysseus. This battle of ideas, these 
labor pains of a new era, are for us time-bound 
contemporaries a painful experience, a tragedy for 
individuals, groups, peoples, mankind, and the age. 

This contest, in so far as it does not occur 
within the states, as a constitutional struggle, or 
revolution, but extends over the each-for-itself of 


the states in a common sphere, is chiefly waged 
by three great ideas: the straggle is primarily 
between the ideas of nationalism and international- 
ism, but in the second rank universalism is also 
engaged in the combat. 

In speaking here of nationalism and inter- 
nationalism I do not intend to discuss the complex 
of questions with which I shall have to deal in my 
discussion of the principle of self-determination, 
but now I must at least emphasize that we have 
here a typical example of the practical importance 
of correct definitions and the exact use of words in 
political discussions, especially an exact distinction 
between the words "state" and "nation." 

Nationalism and internationalism are problems 
which have relation to the states, not to the 
nations, of the earth as their object. The principle 
of nationality can only be included among these 
problems as an especially important modern part 
of this complex of questions. 

Nationalism, as I understand this word of many 
meanings, is the principle of being-in-one's-self 
(Prinzip des fur-sich-Seins), the individuality of 
a state in relation to other states. Its life-principle 
is state egoism; its aim is its self-preservation. 
Self-sufficiency does not belong to it necessarily; 
on the contrary, the impulse of states to over- 



reach their boundaries is in a high degree a feature 
of modern nationalism. This impulse is usually 
designated by the term "imperialism." Imperial- 
ism is not necessarily expansionism. It can, for 
instance, be confined to hegemonial tendencies. 
Imperialism has recently manifested itself espe- 
cially as economic imperialism, which is instruc- 
tively illustrated by certain provisions of the peace 
treaties, bearing the traces of the Paris Economic 
Conference of June 14-17, 1916. 

Nationalism operates in competition and in 
opposition to other states. For this reason war 
is the most emphatic form of its operation; for 
here two states encounter each other in the 
strongest affirmation of their being-in-themselves 
and for-themselves. In this fact nationalism finds 
its antithesis to internationalism. 

Internationalism and nationalism have one 
factor in common. Both affirm the state, and 
both treat of relations between states. Whereas, 
however, nationalism signifies an antagonism be- 
tween the various states, internationalism means 
co-operation, mutualism, and concord in the rela- 
tions of the states to one another. 

Internationalism is an expression of the being- 
with-each-other of the different states (Prinzip 
des mit-einander-Seins). It means the tendency 



to introduce a higher order in the next-each-other 
of a multitude of state individualities with inter- 
secting and contrary interests. 

Internationalism defines the spheres of the 
sovereignty of states toward one another, divides 
their various duties among them, and above all 
assigns them their share in the execution of 
common tasks, which it at the same time appoints. 

By eliminating the restrictions which the vari- 
ous state boundaries make for legitimate private 
enterprises and extending them over several states, 
it at the same time opens the way for the forma- 
tion and pursuit of larger, even universal relations 
in trade, finance, science, religion, culture, etc., 
for mankind, .that is, for the manifestations of an 
unpolitical universalism in different directions. 
But it does this all from the standpoint of the state, 
not from a higher level, and thereby distinguishes 
itself fundamentally from universalism. 

Internationalism is above all not pacifism. The 
premises are different. Pacifism strives for a defi- 
nite object in the world peace. Internationalism 
is essentially a problem of the division of compe- 
tencies; yet both circles may converge slightly. 

Internationalism is not necessarily state-altruis- 
tic. There is state-egoistical internationalism. 
International law demonstrates this on every page. 



Its most conspicuous characteristic is still today 
that it is predominantly constituted as individual 
law analogous to national civil law. 

It contains a number of prescriptions, however, 
which ultimately are not intended as a guaranty of 
the state's individuality, but to serve social groups 
independent of state boundaries, or the interests of 
some universal idea for instance, free economics, 
trade, faith, etc., of mankind. It is only necessary 
to remember the numerous international treaties of 
a humanitarian nature. 

There is, therefore, at present a large group of 
manifestations of an egoistic state international- 
ism, and opposite them a small group of manifesta- 
tions of altruistic internationalism. 

Universalism in the sense in which I use the 
word here is the principle of the unity and union of 
mankind, or of smaller groups of men not divided 
by states but extending over the spheres of several 
states within humanity. In contrast to national- 
ism and internationalism, universalism stands 
beyond and apart from the state. It may direct 
its eyes toward the state, though universalism 
never derives its standpoint from the state but 
from a higher level. It appears in various forms, 
as ethical, legal, social, religious, cultural, and 
finally as political universalism. 



In two respects it is engaged in the present con- 
flict of ideas. For one thing it makes its demands 
on humanity, the time, the states, and the com- 
munity of nations. It is ethical universalism, for 
instance, which requires that man should respect 
his brother in man, and that the states should also 
act according to this rule. It is universalism 
which furthers the independence of science, con- 
science, and confession, which considers it intoler- 
able that international law should tolerate the 
slaughter of hundreds of thousands of the citizens 
of a state by its government, on the grounds that 
this is a so-called inner concern of the state in 
question, and at the same time should legally 
sanction a town's being bombarded by a foreign 
government because the home government in 
question has delayed to pay some debt. And 
finally it is universalism when universal pity and 
charity are aroused because in some distant corner 
of the world men are starving or freezing. This is 
one of the great sides of universalism. Another of 
its manifestations is of a more practical and 
technical nature. Mankind is organizing itself; 
organizing itself as private associations of an 
economic, charitable, and social nature. It organ- 
izes itself as the public opinion of the world. It 
organizes itself for the fulfilment of universal 


tasks. And finally, it organizes itself hesitatingly, 
in a fragmentary but actual world-constitution. 

When an international commission distributes 
clothes and food contributed by people from all 
possible parts of the earth in a district visited by 
famine, it no longer fits fully under the heading of 
internationalism. When a so-called international 
court or commission dismisses or admits the claim 
of a private person based on a provision of the 
Treaty of Versailles; when an international com- 
mission establishes a boundary, or when it ad- 
ministers some question directly under it, this is 
more than internationalism, it is the first, still 
half-hidden, silver ray of a new organized univer- 
salism in the world a ray of light which arouses 
the question: Will Kant's idea of the rights of men 
as citizens in a world-cosmopolitan system actually 
become a reality ? Will there sometime be rights 
of men and citizens which have really been pro- 
claimed, and whose recognition is demanded by all 
mankind ? Will the law of nature yet be law in 
the legal sense of the word ? And finally, will an 
actual world-law evolve ? 

It is not difficult to recognize these three ideas 
of nationalism, internationalism, and finally uni- 



versalism, though indeed everywhere most closely 
interwoven with one another, in the League of 
Nations Covenant and in the subsequent attitude 
of its organs. 

The idea of internationalism seems to confront 
us most immediately in the Covenant. Noyes 
very rightly called the Covenant " a Magna Charta 
of new internationalism" in his very readable 
book. While Europe Waits for Peace? Articles 24- 
25 aim to make the League of Nations the center 
of the whole international net of organization. 

It is also an expression of the idea of inter- 
nationalism when the Preamble of the Covenant 
enjoins the League of Nations " to promote inter- 
national co-operation." The prescription of new 
duties for the League of Nations by the shy and 
reluctant Article 23 of the Covenant, etc., is also 
an expression of internationalism. 

But it is chiefly a state-egoistical international- 
ism which we find in the Covenant. This, indeed, 
accounts for the prominence given the guaranty- 
to members of the League of mutual spheres of 
power and competence. Before this the idea of 
fulfilling other services more directly useful for 
their citizens, science, trade, culture, etc., was 
forced into the background. This form of inter- 


nationalism is farther to be seen in the constant 
obsequiousness to and recoil from the conception 
of sovereignty. 

Naturally state-egoistical considerations have 
their chief place where indications of nationalism 
are found in the Covenant. 

Nationalism, indeed, seems to be the idea which 
has so far exerted the most intense influence on the 
formation of the Covenant, and even more on the 
conduct of the League of Nations, especially in 
all political questions. One has the impression 
that the delegates to the League of Nations, who 
in contrast to the officials of the League appear 
there as instructed representatives of their govern- 
ments, are often, even in matters pertaining solely 
to the League of Nations, unable to free themselves 
from national considerations. In this connection 
it is especially interesting that on October I, 1920, 
a delegate in the Assembly broached the thesis: 
"The sentiment of the Assembly should be multi- 
national, not international." 

A collective nationalism of the victors of this 
world-war reveals itself sharply wherever the 
League's organs are invested with duties in the 
fulfilment of the peace treaties, and especially 
when those most closely associated are intrusted 
with their execution. 


A hidden expansionistic and imperialistic 
nationalism is further found in the prescriptions 
of the Treaty of Versailles in regard to the man- 
dates and in the fact that the Covenant has suc- 
ceeded in making only the vaguest and most de- 
ficient provisions on disarmament and execution 
provisions which the organs of the League have so 
far helplessly tried to reduce to concrete terms. 

But also universalism, chiefly cultural, chari- 
table, and ethical, peers uncertainly and shyly from 
the Covenant, and makes demands restricting the 
nationalism and internationalism of the League of 
Nations and its members. In this respect it is 
agreeable to ascertain that the work of the League 
of Nations has been more assiduous and successful 
than in any other direction of its labor, more 
successful than was to be expected from the word- 
ing of the Covenant. 

Peace, if I understand the spirit of the Cove- 
nant correctly in this respect, is no longer to be 
considered a legal good of the member-states of 
the League, but a legal right of humanity. And 
as the Preamble of the Covenant represents the 
rule of justice as one of the purposes of the League 
of Nations, the voice of humanity also is heard in 
the catalogue of duties in Article 23, and it per- 
meates in collusion with social ideals the most 

1 85 1 


satisfactory part of the treaty. Part 13, which 

relates to labor. 

# * * 

It is not my plan to follow these thoughts 
farther, and to analyze the League of Nations 
Covenant in detail, but rather to consider from 
the premises just explained the German attitude 
toward the League of Nations. 

In spite of an apparent similarity in the situa- 
tions of the United States and Germany toward 
the League, and in spite of some problems which 
are in fact the same for both powers, the League 
of Nations really means something very different 
for the United States and for Germany. 

After reading a number of clever articles which 
treat of the compatibility of the Monroe Doctrine 
and the League^fJ^ations, and in spite of the 
jus singulorum of Article 21 of the Covenant in 
favor of the United States, the unwilling attitude 
of the United States toward the League of Nations 
seems to me, apart from a trial of constitutional 
strength, to consist, above all, in a manifestation 
of the great American "principle of isolation," 
of which the Monroe Doctrine is the most impor- 
tant and vital subdivision. 

The foreign policies of the United States are, 
in my opinion, in so far as they are modeled on 



great and enduring principles, not only determined 
by the Monroe Doctrine but governed by three 
closely related principles, each of which has an 
independent historic course, and which all order 
themselves in the just-mentioned principle of 

To these principles, the policy "to adjust and 
settle international disputes through mediation 
and arbitration" has, as is known, been added 
since August 29, 191 6, by a constitutionally highly 
interesting declaration of Congress. 

The three subprinciples of the principle of 
isolation are, first, the principle of the avoidance of 
alliances a principle which the guaranty pacts 
with England on the one side and France on the 
other missed killing by a hair's breadth. 

The second subprinciple is the maxim of the 
de jure recognition of de facto governments in con- 
sideration only of the actual circumstances. This 
principle has apparently not found its way back 
into the policies of the United States. While all 
the other governments are recognizing the Russian 
soviet government in quick succession, the United 
States continues to refuse to do so in application 
of the principle of "the clean hand" which Presi- 
dent Wilson proclaimed against the Mexican 


The third subprinciple of the principle of 
isolation is the Monroe Doctrine, with its two 
subdivisions, namely, the prohibition against non- 
American powers and the injunction against any 
political action of the United States toward 
European states. It is the reawakening of this 
latter declaration, the death of which has been 
commonly supposed since the Spanish-American 
War, which seems to me to explain primarily the 
present attitude of the United States toward the 
League of Nations. 

Despite President Wilson's address of January 
22, 1917, in which he demanded the extension of 
the Monroe Doctrine over the whole earth, Eu- 
rope never can and never will have its Monroe 
Doctrine. In particular there will never be a 
Monroe Doctrine between the single members of 
the European state group. Europe cannot have 
it as long as and for the reason that a principle of 
nationality, uncertain and impractical frontiers, 
inimical neighbors, and similar factors exist there. 

As far as Germany is concerned, her foreign 
policy, which we have already characterized as to 
a very great degree compulsorily influenced, is not 
so independent as is that of the United States with 
regard to the League. Whereas the United States 
remains aloof from the League of Nations of its 



own volition, Germany is still excluded from the 
latter, has so far had no official opportunity to 
join, and does not know today what attitude the 
member-states would take toward her admission. 
It is quite clear, for instance, that Germany could 
not, and never would wish to enter the League 
against the will of France, even if the overwhelm- 
ing majority of the other nations were in favor of 
Germany's becoming a member. She further does 
not know what role she would play in the League, 
nor how she would be treated by the members. It 
is moreover uncertain whether Germany would be 
given a place in the Council, a place which is 
almost unanimously demanded in Germany as a 
condition of its entrance. 

Besides this, the relation of the League to 
Germany is that of an organ for the execution of 
the Treaty of Versailles. It has a close connec- 
tion, therefore, with the main line of German 
foreign policy, expressed by the phrase: "away 
from Versailles/* Public opinion in Germany is 
decidedly divided on the question of whether 
admission to the League of Nations would be 
harmful or beneficial for this foreign policy. While 
the question of the division of Upper Silesia was 
pending, the advocates of the League did not cease 
to claim loudly that the decision of the Council 


would perhaps have been more favorable if Ger- 
many had been a member. 

Furthermore, Germany is in a peculiar position 
toward the League of Nations, owing to the fact 
that Article I of the Covenant stipulates 'that the 
admission of new members shall be on the condi- 
tion that they shall give effective guaranties of 
their sincere intention to observe their inter- 
national obligations, and accept such regulations 
as may be prescribed by the League in regard to 
military, naval and air forces, and armaments. 
There is a strong and widely spread apprehension 
among the German people that as a result of this 
prescription a definite and voluntary acknowl- 
edgment of the Treaty of Versailles, and especially 
of Article 231 relating to the question of guilt, 
would be demanded, or at least that Germany's 
admission to the League could be regarded as an 
implicit acknowledgment of the same. Anything 
of this nature would be decidedly repudiated, and 
it is therefore also a cause for especial satisfaction 
that the question of responsibility has not been 
raised again either in the peace treaties with the 
United States or China, or in the Treaty of Rapallo 
with Russia. Nor did this question play a role 
in the decisions of the German-American Mixed 
Claim Commission in Washington. 


I have already mentioned above a few of the 
chief points which are raised against the League 
of Nations in Germany. Apart from these the 
Germans have not had sufficient opportunity 
yet to occupy themselves thoroughly with the 
question of the League of Nations, partly because 
the organization which would chiefly come in 
consideration for this purpose, the German League 
of Nations Union, lacks the funds for broadly 
planned propaganda. Besides which, other ques- 
tions such as reparations, sanctions, and similar 
problems have so far completely occupied the fore- 
ground of current foreign politics in Germany. 

The opinion on the League of Nations in Ger- 
many is as far as can be ascertained quite divided. 
I do not believe I would be justified in speaking of 
a German public opinion in this matter today. 
The parties of the extreme right and left naturally 
repudiate the idea. The opinion of the members 
of the German People's party is divided. The 
Zentrum^ Democrats, and Social Democrats, much 
as they criticize the Geneva League of Nations, 
approve of the idea of a League, and would cer- 
tainly vote for Germany's joinbg the Geneva 
League should the Reichstag be called together to 
give its decision on this subject. Consequently, 
with the present party combination, there would 


probably be a simple majority in favor of joining 
the League in case a vote were taken. Should a 
change in the constitution be involved in such a 
decision which is legally questionable it would 
probably be refused, for in the present Reichstag 
there would hardly be a two-thirds majority in 
favor of Germany's joining the League of Nations. 
Whether the German people, in case of a plebiscite, 
would share the opinion of its Parliament seems to 
me dubious. 

The fact must not be overlooked, however, that 
so far the introduction of the League of Nations in 
Germany has been rather unhappy. The decision 
on Eupen-Malmedy-Monschau caused the great- 
est resentment. The Upper Silesian decision en- 
listed many opponents against the League. The 
toleration of the conditions in the Saar, the decision 
in the Memel question, and the attitude toward 
Danzig in certain cases have had a similar effect. 
It is often pointed out that the League of Nations 
was passive when Germany was unjustly and 
illegally treated, as, for instance, by the occupa- 
tion of the Maingau and the invasion of the 

The representatives of the German government 
have in general expressed themselves cautiously in 
regard to the League of Nations, none of them 



negatively, however. The latest statement made 
f in the Reichstag on March i, 1924, by the Ger- 
man minister of foreign affairs, Stresemann, a 
member of the German People's party, seems to 
me of great importance in this direction. He 

The government of the Empire stands on the basis of the 
idea of the international solidarity fundamental to the 
League of Nations. This idea is only imperfectly realized in 
the present Covenant of the League of Nations. The attitude 
of the League of Nations so far has often greatly injured 
Germany's interests. Despite this, however, the German 
government does not refuse to join the League of Nations 
on principle. 

The actual attitude of the German government 
toward the League of Nations can be character- 
ized as quite friendly. In fact, as is often for- 
gotten, Germany applied once for admission to 
the League of Nations, namely, during the peace 
negotiations. German representatives have taken 
part in the League's work whenever invited by 
the League, and under whatever conditions 
imposed upon them. We have consequently 
attended a number of international conferences 
organized by the League of Nations, for instance, 
the Financial Conference in Brussels, the Paris 
Passport Conference, the Traffic conferences in 



Barcelona and Geneva, the White Slave Confer- 
ence, also the Hygienic Conference, and even a 
foreign political conference, namely, the Confer- 
ence on the Non-Fortification of the Aaland 
Islands, October 10-20, 1920. 

One must not be misled by these facts, however, 
for the number of the institutions organized by the 
League of Nations to which Germany does not 
belong, although it should do so in the interest of 
the whole, is far greater. I will be silent on the 
absence of Germans on the staff of the secretariat, 
but one cannot overlook the fact that the Com- 
mission for Disarmament, the Commission for 
Mandates, and the Financial Committee work 
without Germans, in contrast, for instance, to the 
International Labor Office. 

Germany further submitted the Wimbledon 
case and the question of the German tenants in 
Poland to the verdict of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice. By sending the interna- 
tional treaties concluded by Germany to be regis- 
tered in the secretariat, according to Article 18 of 
the Covenant, even explicitly expressing its willing- 
ness to do so in a note of August n, 1921, the Ger- 
man government assumed of its free will an 
obligation to which it was not bound by treaty 
toward the League of Nations. 



On the other side, Germany has often made the 
unsuccessful attempt to stimulate the activity of 
the League of Nations by notes and protests. As 
an illustration it suggested that the League of 
Nations should judge the troublesome and awk- 
ward flag incident in Berlin. In the case of 
Eupen-Malmedy it protested to the League of 
Nations. It appealed to the League with the well- 
known mandate note of November 12, 1920, with 
its protest note against the occupation of the Ruhr, 
with numberless complaints against the actions of 
the Saar Commission, in the case of Upper Silesia, 
and so forth. 

The German mind is, as a matter of fact, 
not at all inaccessible to the idea of an organized 
federalism, for the Germanic Confederation of 1815 
was at bottom nothing else than a particularistic 
League of Nations. Its statutes remind one in 
part very strongly of the Covenant of the League 
of Nations. 

The history of internationalism, especially the 
movement toward the League of Nations, has 
many German names among the leaders, foremost 
among them Immanuel Kant, who, by the way, 
introduced the term League of Nations, and of 
whom has been written in the best German book on 
the League of Nations: 



The new in Kant is twofold. The penetration of the 
whole question with the idea of law and methodical in- 
vestigation in the spirit of criticism Kant's influence 

in the development of the idea of the League of Nations 
is the greatest which has been exerted by any single 
thinker. 1 

Besides Kant are found names like Herder, Wie- 
land, Schelling, Johann Jacob Fries, Karl Chris- 
tian Friedrich Krause, Schlegel, Novalis, Schleier- 
macher, the young Fichte, and others, not to 
mention the representatives of our own time such 
as the Baroness von Suttner, Alfred H. Fried, 
Wehberg, Schucking, and Quidde. 

A comparison between theory and practice in 
this subject results very negatively for practice, 
however. No one can maintain that German 
policies lent themselves to strong international 
tendencies in the pre-war period of imperialism. 
As little, however, could the same be said of Eng- 
land, France, Russia, Italy, or the United States^ 
There is no object, however, in drawing compari- 
sons in this direction between the imperialistic 
actions of the states of the world. The only 
positive results which can be recorded of the pre- 
war time are in the realm of cultural international- 

1 Veit Valentin, Geschichte fas Volkerbundesgedankens in Deutscb- 
land (Berlin, 1920),, p. 35. 



ism in the broadest sense of the word. Apart from 
the achievements of the Hague conferences and 
all that was connected with them, this fact mani- 
fests itself in a number of non-political treaties. 
In all these questions Germany was fully abreast 
of the other big powers. Her name rarely was 
lacking under one of the more important collective 
treaties the most important exception was per- 
haps the Hague Opium Convention of 1912. 
The Treaty of Versailles unfortunately has severed 
not a few of these threads. 

Two subjects require special consideration. I 
refer to disarmament and arbitration. The accu- 
sation is often heard that Germany has hin- 
dered international progress by her backward and 
intransigent attitude, created a hostile atmosphere, 
and taken thereby a historic ethical guilt upon 
herself. The present moment is particularly un- 
favorable for pursuing this line of thought far- 
ther. Not that I would consider it inopportune 
to discuss it, however. The reason is far more 
that, within the compass of the great German 
political enquetes over pre-war politics and the 
question of responsibility for the war, these two 
problems have been discussed by the Reichstag, 
and the material relating to them at this enqufoe 



is on the eve of publication. It contains, besides 
other material, the entire political correspondence 
relating to the Hague Conferences, which will 
appear in the extensive publication of German 
political documents; 1 and also the material which 
was then submitted to the first subcommission 
of the Commission of Inquiry of the Reichstag 
on the question of the attitude of Germany at 
the two Hague peace conferences. There were 
men of all political convictions in this Com- 
mission, including Germany's leading pacifist, 
Professor Schiicking. The Commission seems to 
have worked with German thoroughness, and it did 
not rely solely upon the declarations and reports 
of the two eye-witnesses, Professor Zorn and the 
former director of the legal department of the 
Foreign Office, Dr. Kriege, but also collected a 
number of reports, among them one from Dr. Hans 
Wehberg, the well-known German internationalist. 
This Commission arrived at a Pronundammto 
which is, in my opinion, so important that I should 
like to read you the last remarks, without identify- 
ing myself with them, however. This would be 
very unscientific, and would also be impossible if 

*Die grosse Politik der Europaischen Kdbinette 1871-2914. 
ce Sanunlung der diplomatischen Akten des auswartigen Amtes." 

198 I 


only for the reason that the declaration has not 
failed to produce contradiction in Germany. 

Summarizing, it should be said that the German govern- 
ment rendered valuable assistance to the cause of arbitration 
along the lines which it decided to follow, but that, just as in 
the question of limitation of armaments, so also in dealing 
with efforts both of official and of private circles for bringing 
about international understanding and arbitration, it would 
have been desirable to avoid the unjust suspicion that the 
German government was opposed in principle to arbitra- 
tion, thereby making it impossible for interests abroad that 
were inimical to Germany to cast suspicion upon German 
intentions. For this reason it would probably have been 
desirable for the German government to choose a form of 
reply that better expressed its readiness, and from the very 
beginning to take the lead in this matter as in fact it 
intended to. 

But the authors of the note of June 16, 1919, cannot, be 
conceded the right to raise charges concerning the attitude 
of the German government in the matter of arbitration, just 
as little as they can be granted this right in the question of 
limitation of armaments. If it is true that other states 
outwardly seemed more favorable to the idea of a world 
treaty of arbitration, it is also true that they made reserva- 
tions by which the practical realization of what they theo- 
retically and demonstratively professed was made exceedingly 
doubtful. The charge is unwarranted that the attitude of 
the German government at the Hague conferences was 
determined by her having decided upon a plan of strategy 
that had for its object the acquisition of world-dominion. 
Had the German government harbored such a dark plan, it 



would surely have been able to cover it up all the more surely 
by acquiescing in the proposals for disarmament and inter- 
national arbitration. 1 

This decision, based on an exact knowledge of 
the official documents, presents a somewhat 
unexpectedly favorable opinion, in contrast to 
what has so far been generally accepted even in 
Germany. For until now it was also believed 
in extensive circles in Germany that Germany, 
situated in the center of Europe and filled with 
peripheric fear, had refused a number of offers of 
arbitration, had behaved very cautiously toward 
the idea of arbitration, and consequently acted as a 
retarding element in this respect. In my opinion, 
however, one must add at the same time with- 
out an exact knowledge of the official documents 
mentioned above that the attitude of Germany 
toward the arbitration movement was in fact not 
so intransigent as it is today generally represented. 
Germany suggested the International Prize Court, 
for example. She suggested also a world-court 
at the second Hague Conference for Exchange 
Questions. She agreed to an arbitration clause 
in the Treaty of 1911 with France about Morocco 
and Equatorial Africa, concluded an obligatory 

1 Translation from the monthly periodical, Die Rriegsehuldfrage, 
II (May, 1924), 171. 

I xoo ] 


arbitration agreement with England on July 12, 
1904, which was twice renewed, and consented that 
the noted Casa-Blanca dispute with France should 
be decided by the Hague Court. She seems to 
have been very much afraid of a world-arbitration 
treaty, however. 

Be this as it may, it now all belongs to the past. 
A noticeable change in the German foreign office 
could already be perceived during the war. In 
numerous cases of dispute, especially cases con- 
cerning submarine warfare, Germany suggested 
settlement by arbitration. 

Since the collapse, the idea of arbitration has 
dominated Germany. The German suggestions 
for the establishment of a League of Nations pre- 
sented to the Versailles Peace Conference by the 
German delegates contain a detailed plan for a 
court of arbitration, which goes farther in some 
respects than the constitution of the League of 
Nations* Court. Whenever Germany becomes in- 
volved in a controversy now she offers settlement 
by arbitration. 

The climax of her recognition of the idea of 
arbitration is so far the Schieds- und Vergleuhs- 
verfrag (Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation), 
concluded December 3, 1921, with Switzerland, a 
masterpiece of legal technique and permeated with 


a strong belief in the idea of arbitration. It is 
to be regretted that the German government has 
apparently not been successful as yet in concluding 
similar treaties with other powers. 

In the memorandum with which the German- 
Swiss Treaty was submitted to the Reichstag, this 
recognition of the idea of arbitration is particularly 
emphasized by the following words: 

The government of the German Empire considers one 
of its most important duties in foreign politics to strive uni- 
versally to the end that international questions of dispute 
shall be decided by way of arbitration. 

So much for the problem of Germany and the 
idea of arbitration. 

The question has been asked me whether Ger- 
many is inclined to "greater self-sufficiency or 
more international co-operation " since the war. 
I believe that in spite of many indications tending 
to produce a negative opinion, I can affirm the 
latter. This seems to me also quite a matter to be 
taken for granted in a country whose threads of con- 
nection with foreign lands have been so radically 
severed by the war, for whom the reconstruction 
of these threads, or even the forming of new ones, is 
made so difficult, which has suffered psychologi- 
cally and physically so deeply under isolation, and 
which so vitally needs the rest of the world. 



But I hasten to my conclusions. 

The League of Nations has become a great 
international administrative organization with 
unpolitical duties, and has herein worked quite 
successfully. The direction of this occupation has 
now become inseparably connected with the idea 
of the League of Nations. It is today the center 
of a great part of the old and new international 
organizations concerning which we possess among 
others a most instructive book from the pen of an 
American, Public International Unions (Boston, 
1916), by Paul S. Reinsch. It is also potentially 
a means and starting-point for the formation of 
the public opinion of the world in political as well 
as non-political questions. It might, according to 
its idea, some day play a similar role as world- 
conscience. But its individual character, in which 
it differs from all other organizations, is derived 
from something else. 

In a program pamphlet, Vom Wesen des 
Folkerbundes (On the Nature of the League of Na- 
tions), which appeared in 1920, I formulated the 
nature of the League of Nations in the following 

The realization of the interest of humanity in the sway 
of quiet and order, or what means the same thing, of law in 
the world, is the great object of the League of Nations. 

1 103 } 


And on this premise I reached at that time the 
following definition of the League: 

The League of Nations is an attempt to unite the idea 
of an organized world legal order in cases of international 
conflicts with the self-dependency and the independence of 
its members. 

The true idea of the League of Nations is the 
extension of the idea of legal order throughout 
the world. This ideal finds its culmination in the 
idea of the realization of law in arbitration. In 
this thought all mankind is united today. All the 
cabinets of the earth recognize it, whether their 
states are members of the League of Nations or 
outside it. 

Arbitration is the soundest idea contained in 
the Geneva League of Nations, and the strongest, 
most deeply rooted in the minds of mankind today. 
Had the League of Nations dedicated its chief 
strength to this purpose, perhaps by the addition 
of certain cultural r61es and charitable tasks, and 
kept out of so-called political questions, it would, 
in my opinion, probably be farther today. Eppur. 
36 muove! (But it does move!) 

The intercourse between states inside and out- 
side the community of the League of Nations is 
today actually more filled with the ideas of the 


League than often appears to many of our con- 
temporaries tuned to the present. 

The winning plan of Mr. Edward Bok's Peace 
Award uses the wonderful expression of "the sheer 
force of social international gravitation." " Inter- 
national gravitation/' and this in all spheres po- 
litical, ethical, cultural, economic, and social this 
seems to me in fact to be a sign of the times, which 
stands in the background of the struggle between 
internationalism, nationalism, and universalism de- 
scribed in the beginning of this lecture. 

It is the direction of the dynamic movement of 
our era. Men have long ceased to move in small, 
hard social circles. These little circles have begun 
of themselves to turn, and now a whole great social 
solar system rotates and seeks its axis, a solar 
system quite as wonderful and worthy of reverence 
as the starry heavens above us. 

We can observe this process in the sphere of 
politics; there also it has begun to turn in the 
system. The states themselves have begun to 
rotate and together form state systems, which now 
move with and against one another. Alliances, 
international unions, confederations of states, 
international courts of arbitration and justice, 
the League of Nations, but also its antithesis, war, 
are the types which here most directly confront us. 


Nationalism, internationalism, and universal- 
ism are in this process three of the greatest prin- 
ciples which set the rhythm of this dynamic 
movement: nationalism which separates states 
from one another; internationalism and univer- 
salism which draw them together, one to turn them 
in the same direction, and the other to establish 
their centers and finally perhaps to dissolve them 
in some far-away future in political universalism. 

This all still seems a wild chaos. We miss the 
poles, the uniform direction, the great rhythm and 

What can and must take place is a vision of 
destiny. But the jurist beholds in this great 
process of evolution above all the reign of law, 
which is here realized as an ordering process which 
defines and compensates, gives direction and 

The student of law may be permitted to end 
this discussion by looking up to legality with the 
hope of its extension throughout the world. The 
continuation and development of arbitration, 
of cultural, social, and economic co-operation, a 
firmly organized world-federalism, strong, free 
states, in or beside the Geneva League of Nations, 
and the establishment of a well-balanced equilib- 
rium between internationalism, nationalism, and 

1 106} 


universalism by the methods of law and in the form 
of a legal order that is the final solution. 

My last words shall be a quotation from Eike 
von Repko's Sachsenspiegel, that great law book 
of the year 1230, which gave the Germans an 
individual legal terminology. In the Prefactio 
Rhythmica of this book Eike von Repko wrote 
in the quaint language of his time: 

Got uns sdbe leret 

Daz wir recht sin alle 

Unde unrecht uns missevalle. 






When I consider the complex of questions which 
is suggested by the popular phrase, "self-determina- 
tion of peoples," or the older term, "principle of 
nationality," my thoughts often revert to a sen- 
tence in George Washington's Farewell Address; 

Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have 
none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged 
in frequent controversies the causes of which are essentially 
foreign to our concerns. 

Are not these words as applicable to the prob- 
lems designated by these two phrases as if they 
had been spoken in reference to them, or at least 
in reference to the original significance of the 
principle of nationality, a significance subdivided 
into two minor principles for which the formula, 
"Every nation a state, the whole nation a state," 
has been found ? 

These two principles, that of the "right of 
nations to exist as states," and that of the "repu- 
diation of subnations," are lacking in the list of 
actual American political problems. In saying 

I ml 


this I am of course not considering the Philippine 
question. Never, for instance, in the history of 
the United States has the principle of nationality 
provided the reason and justification for the ex- 
ceptionally successful policy of expansion which the 
United States has followed. The Civil War was 
no war of nationalities, but the struggle of two 
brothers incensed over an economic and ethical 
-question. In fact, I believe, as is very generally 
believed in Europe, that the citizens of America 
have a very highly developed national conscious- 
ness, and that consequently they are to be con- 
sidered representatives of a nation in the strictest 
sense of the word. 

I would not emphasize this had I not happened 
some time ago to chance upon an address given 
by President Butler at a luncheon of the Associated 
Press on April 25, 1916, on "The Building of a 
Nation/' In this address President Butler dis- 
putes the qualifications of the United States as a 
nation by saying: 

There is not yet a nation, but the rich and fine materials 
out of which a true nation can be made by the architect with 
vision to plan, and by the builder with skill adequate to 

President Butler must permit me to object to 
these words, which were probably somewhat influ- 


enced by pedagogical war motives. In his state- 
ment he perhaps did not consider the differentia- 
tions possible in the intensity of national feeling, 
and that measured by a European standard the 
United States is a national state, within whose 
boundaries no Irredenta exists. I do not mean, 
however, that this principle has played no role at 
all in the history and fate of the United States. 
The existence of the United States rests, in fact, 
upon the above-named subprinciple of the 
"nation's right of existence." The Declaration of 
Independence is, in my opinion, a timid, but 
theoretically unmistakable, manifestation of the 
new American state-nation, which had begun its 
formation in Colonial times. 

This declaration speaks not yet of "nation" 
but of "people," and it construes the breaking 
loose from England as the exercise of the right of 
opposition based on a kind of natural law, as a 
forcible change of the state's form: 

That whenever any form of government becomes de- 
structive of these ends, it is the right of the People to alter or 
to abolish it, and to institute new government. 

And yet the idea of self-determination sounds 
clearly in the Declaration, as an expression of the 
principle of nationalities in its separatistic form, 
in the sonorous words: 


When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary 
for one People to dissolve the political bands which have 
connected them with another, and to assume among the 
powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which 
the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them 

In this connection I should like to call your 
attention also to the preference for the word 
"nation" to that of "state" already evident in the 
Federalist- How different this all is in Europe 
and especially in Germany! 

In order to give you an idea of this situation I 
must trouble you with a few statistics and facts. 
It is not without a certain hesitation and reluctance 
that I do this, for I fear it is not an easy matter 
for a citizen of America a great, broad, thinly 
settled, continentally thinking country of over 
100,000,000 inhabitants to realize the degree of 
importance which quantitatively small and narrow 
problems have for Europe and the European. 
One must not forget, however, that the more 
closely individualities are compressed into an 
area, the more valuable every part of this area 
becomes. And last but not least, we must not 
overlook a point which is of immediate universal 
appeal, as Hamlet says: 

Rightly to be great 

Is not to stir without great argument, 


But greatly to find quarrel in a straw 
When honor's at the stake. , ... I see 
The imminent death of twenty thousand men. 
That, for a fantasy and trick of fame, 
Go to their graves like beds, fight for a plot 
Whereon the numbers cannot try the cause, 
Which is not tomb enough and continent 
To hide the slain. 1 

We must notice also that the statistical material 
to be considered here has become a weapon in the 
active differences of opinion which have developed; 
and consequently the collection of exact data meets 
yith great difficulties. 

The multi-nationality state, Austria-Hungary, 
is dead, but its remains constitute in their turn, 
with the exception of the national state, German- 
Austria, new multi-nationality states and bodies 
strongly interspersed with minorities. 

In Czechoslovakia, for instance, the Czechs 
are in the absolute majority only when the 
Slovakians are included. There are 46 per cent 
Czechs and 13 per cent Slovakians living there. 
The fusion of these two groups is of course quite 
as much a fiction as is the proclamation of the 
Czecho-Slovakian language as the state language 
of Czecho-Slovakia. By according two different 

1 Act IV, scene 5 


languages legal equality, one can as little make the 
same language of them as black and white can be 
created the same color by law. Opposite this 46 
per cent plus 13 per cent stand 28 per cent Ger- 
mans, 8 per cent Magyars, 3 per cent Ruthenians, 
and the rest Poles and Jews. 

The case of Poland is similar. According to the 
official Polish census of September 30, 1921, among 
the 25,372,427 inhabitants there are 68 per cent 
Poles and 32 per cent foreign nationalities. These 
are the official statistics which are generally dis- 
puted by the minorities, however. It is supposed 
by them that at least 40 per cent minorities 
live in Poland, among whom are i.i million Ger- 
mans and 5.7 million Russians, White Russians, 
Ruthenians, etc. The number of the minori- 
ties there, however, especially of the Germans, 
decreases steadily as a result of Poland's policy of 

The kingdom of the Serbians, Croatians, and 
Slovenians is built upon the idea of a Serbian- 
Croatian-Slovenian nation. The so-called Decla- 
ration of Corfu of July 7, 1920, refers to it spe- 
cifically. In fact, however, there seems to be 
something out of joint in this composite nation. 
Before me lies a note dated February, 1922, from 
the sixty-three Croatian delegates of Croatia, 

I "6} 


Slovenia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
united in the Croatian bloc, addressed, "To All 
Free Civilized Peoples and Delegates of the Genoa 
Conference/' which describes this state body as in 
reality a centralized great Serbian state, and which 
complains bitterly over the suppression of the 
Croatian nation. We also read lately among 
other items of disturbing news from Jugo-Slavia 
that Stephan Raditch, leader of the Croat nation- 
alists, has been imprisoned. Besides these, this 
state with over 12,000,000 inhabitants, contains 
considerable German, Magyar, Bulgarian, Rou- 
manian, Italian, Albanian, Turkish, and Gypsy 
minorities, among whom are at least 500,000 Ger- 
mans. On the other hand, at least 2,000,000 of 
the South Slavs are living under Italian and Gre- 
cian sovereignty. 

The condition of the territorities of the van- 
quished Central Powers gives us the exact anti- 
type. They have been thoroughly purged of the 
people of foreign nationalities, and in the process 
a great deal was also eliminated which according 
to the principle of nationality should not have been 
taken away. 

According to the carefully collected statistics 
of the Austrian scientist, Winkler, the following 
German minorities living in compact masses directly 


adjoining the mother-country were brought under 
alien dominion without a plebiscite: 

Czechoslovakia 3 , 123 ,000 

France i ,614,000 

Poland 587,000 

Italy 228,000 

Lithuania 71 ,000 

Hungary . . . 54,000 

Belgium. 50,000 

Jugo-Slavia 50,000 

Denmark 18,000 


In these figures Danzig, with a population of 
364,380, is not considered. Nor furthermore are 
the 6.4 million inhabitants of German-Austria who 
wish to be united with the German Empire; to 
say nothing of the 653,000 inhabitants of the Saar, 
and the 6.5 million inhabitants of the occupied 
territory, not including the Ruhr district. 

With the exception of the small minorities of 
Danish nationality scattered throughout the part 
of North Schleswig which remained with Germany, 
a number of Poles in the districts bordering on 
Poland, and the Wendish enclave sprinkled 
through the Saxon Lausitz, there are now no 
foreign minorities to speak of in Germany. This 
is especially true in regard to the Protestant 



Masurians in East Prussia, who feel themselves 
German, as has been demonstrated by the plebis- 
cite, and by the last Reichstag elections, even 
though they are supposed to be by extraction a 
German-Polish mixed race. 

I shall deal with the separatistic movement in 
Germany later. 

I must further call attention in this respect to 
the many cases which came up for discussion in 
which a plebiscite was refused. German-Bohemia, 
South Tyrol, West Hungary, the ceded districts of 
Kaernten and Steiermark, were transferred without 
a plebiscite. This also applies to Eupen-Malmedy. 
The registration lists there can hardly be regarded 
as a plebiscite. It applies to Alsace-Lorraine, and 
above all to the Polish Corridor, to Danzig, 
Memel, and finally to the question of German- 
Austrian union. 

All the latter questions, with the exception of 
the last, particularly affect my own home in East 
Prussia with approximately 2,000,000 inhabitants. 
The most immediate and most persistent question 
is the so-called Polish Corridor, that broad strip 
through partially mixed German-Polish, partially 
pure German, and partially Polish territory, which 
was transferred to Poland without a plebiscite, 
thereby transforming East Prussia into an enclave, 



j. German island floating in a Slavish sea. It is 
necessary to have only "a Very limited imagination 
to conceive the psychological, economic, and 
political results of such a settlement, which no 
state treaty can eliminate. One fact is worthy of 
attention, that the pronounced political orienta- 
tion to the right in East Prussia finds one of its 
natural explanations in this severance. 

The separation of the ancient German city of 
Danzig constitutes a greater technical violation of 
the principle of self-determination, even though 
Danzig was not formally incorporated in Poland. 
It was, however, made a Lilliputian state body 
under the protection of the League of Nations, 
and the political influence of Poland, a state body 
whose juridical peculiarity mocks all legal construc- 
tion, and which in constant opposition to ever ac- 
tive Polish ambition for an increase in political and 
economic influence has long since become, besides 
the Saar problem, the chief object of the consulta- 
tions of the League of Nations Council. 

While here there is still a slight consideration 
of the idea of nationality, this idea is entirely lack- 
ing in the regulation of the Memel question. This 
territory, with its 141,000 inhabitants, was, accord- 
ing to the Treaty of Versailles, separated from 
Germany without a plebiscite, and is now under 



Lithuanian sovereignty since Lithuania in a coup 
de main & la Zeligowski took possession of this ter- 
ritory, contrary to law. Subsequently after refer- 
ring this question to the League of Nations, the 
principal Allied Powers recognized the Lithuanian 
sovereignty, despite, by the way, a Polish protest. 
That this territory, according to the principle of 
self-determination, would have remained with 
Germany is directly evident from the fact that 
a so-called inquiry of parents, instituted shortly 
before by the French force of occupation, showed 
that instruction to read and write Lithuanian was 
wished by only 400 of 22,000 pupils. This is 
1.8 per cent. 

The treatment of the question of German- 
Austrian union with the German Empire is the 
most striking. The German-Austrians, as well as 
the Sudete Germans and all Germans under the 
sovereignty of the border states surrounding Ger- 
many, wish to join the German Empire, and feel 
themselves a strongly united nation with her 

"The Germans cannot renounce uniting the 
whole German nation in the confines of one 
Empire," was said in a meeting of the National 
Assembly, February 6, 1919, by Ebert, the present 
President of the German Empire, then people's 

I 121] 


commissioner. Numerous manifestations bear 
witness to the prevalence of this will on both sides. 
The Austrian Staatsgesetzblatt> for instance, con- 
tained a clause in the law published March 12, 
1919, on the form of constitution: "German- 
Austria is a component part of the German 
Empire." The execution of this clause as well 
as the introduction of the word "German" in the 
name of this new state was denied the Austrians by 
the Treaty of St. Germain. This Treaty contains 
in Article 88 a direct prohibition of the union of 
German-Austria with the German Empire without 
the permission of the Council of the League of 
Nations, for which decision unanimity is neces- 
sary. This finds its counterpart and completion 
in Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles. By these 
prescriptions the active negotiations of union 
between the German and Austrian governments 
were terminated. It has become especially quiet 
in regard to this subject since the Allied and 
Associated Powers by note of September 2, 1919, 
extracted a protocol of September 22, 1919, rati- 
fied by the Reichstag, from the German govern- 
ment to the effect that Article 61, sentence ii, of 
the German constitution should be declared 
invalid, an article which provides that German- 
Austria after its union with the German Empire 


should be invested with the right of participation 
in the Council of the Empire, according to the 
number of votes of its inhabitants, and until then 
German-Austria should have an advisory vote in 
the Council of the Empire. 

But the desire for union is not dead. In a 
voluntary plebiscite held April 24, 1921, 85 per 
cent of the 98.8 per cent Tyrolese who voted 
expressed their will to unite with Germany. And 
on May 29, 99 per cent of the Salzburgers also 
voted in this sense. The will to union was given 
a strong expression also in the official speeches 
which were given March 20 and 21, 1924, on the 
occasion of the visit of Chancellor Marx and 
Foreign Minister Stresemann in Vienna. 

With my reference to these statistics and facts 
I have at the same time begun the general char- 
acterization of the problem which occupies us. 
It is, briefly expressed, besides the reparation 
question, Europe's most complex current political 
problem, which constitutes a continuous explosive 
danger for the maintenance of peace. 

The dissolution of Austria-Hungary resulted 
from the idea of the national state; the idea of 
the national state has become the greatest problem 
in the fate of the British Empire. The new group- 
ing of the heritage of czaristic Russia with its 


hundred national groups is to a great extent the 
result of this principle. The Flemish question in 
Belgium constantly assumes more actual forms. 
Unnumbered enmities in the world are based on 
this idea. 

To quote the best German authority on the 
principle of nationalities, Professor Laun, of Ham- 

Wherever one looks in Central and Eastern Europe one 
sees unsolved national enmity. Poles and Lithuanians, Poles 
and Ukrainians, Czechs and Magyars, Magyars and Rouma- 
nians, Magyars and South-Slavonians, South-Slavonians and 
Albanians, South-Slavonians and Bulgarians, Albanians and 
Greeks, Bulgarians and Greeks, Greeks and Turks, etc., have 
become involved in disputes on frontiers under the idea of 
the Principle of Nationality or "Self-Determination," and 
although the boundaries established by the peace treaties are 
on the whole outwardly respected today, none of the tempo- 
rarily curtailed elements have the least intention of finally 
relinquishing their co-nationals. 1 

Thus Laun writes, and the worst of it is that 
Laun's list is not even complete. 

A part of the disputes involved are only 
shadows in the European sky, which the Inter- 
national Court in the Hague may perhaps succeed 
in banishing. The Aaland Island question 
between Sweden and Finland was decided by the 

*Strapp, Warterbuch dts Volkerrechts, II (1923), 82-108. 


League of Nations. The Permanent Court of 
International Justice has given an advisory opin- 
ion in regard to the Jaworzina question,, a Polish- 
Czechish question of boundaries. Other questions 
are more difficult. The conference on the Bessara- 
bian question held in Vienna between soviet Russia 
and Roumania was broken off without success, but 
at least the fact that a conference on this question 
took place is a proof that the disputing parties con- 
sidered a peaceful solution a diplomatic possibility. 
There are questions, based on differences of nation- 
alities in the world, however, which hardly warrant 
such a hope heavy, black storm clouds in the 
political heavens of Europe, from which some day 
a bolt must fall. It is only uncertain when this 
will occur. 

Ukraine is now, as you know, a part of the 
Russian Federated Soviet Republic, or rather, a 
fragment of Ukraine, for not less than 4,800,000 
Ukrainians are living today in a compact settle- 
ment under Polish sovereignty. Who has any 
hope of a peaceful solution, especially as this is not 
the only question which stands between Russia 
and Poland ? Or who believes that Lithuania as 
long as it exists as an independent state will for- 
ever renounce the possession of its coronation 
city, Vilna, which is now in the hands of the Poles, 


as the result of General Zeligowski's coup de main? 
Nor would an incorporation of Lithuania in Russia 
or in a confederated Baltic state diminish the 
importance of this problem. 

A very spiritedly written book from the pen of 
Hildebert Bohm has just appeared in Germany, an 
introduction to the present principle of nationality. 
This book, which has been forbidden in occupied 
territory, bears the title Europa Irredenta. This 
title is very significant, almost as descriptive 
as the Italian Minister Nitti's accusation of the 
Treaty of Versailles, which he called Europa senza 
pace ("Europe without peace"). 

Europa Irredenta^ Europa senza pace; this is a 
correct picture which is at the same time a terrible 
gravestone for many hopes, and yet it character- 
izes the political situation, as it has developed, 
owing to the fact that it was not possible for the 
peace conferences to master satisfactorily the prob- 
lems arising from the principle of nationalities. 
* * * 

But to what complex of questions are these two 
phrases, "principle of nationality" and "principle 
of self-determination," related ? 

This inquiry is not difficult to answer approxi- 
mately; in fact, it was partially answered when I 
said above that the original significance of the 


principle of nationality was contained in the 
double formula, "The whole nation a state; 
every nation a state/' 

Besides the two subprinciples there is, however, 
a third the youngest one. It can be expressed by 
the formula, "Only the nation a state." I shall 
call this the "principle of the repudiation of over- 
nations." This third subprinciple quickly grew 
to be a maxim of world-political importance, and, 
we must add, has become a world-danger; It is 
the basis of those fanatic racial demands which we 
find on the program of the radical right parties, 
that the Jews shall be cast out of the community of 
people joined into a state, and treated as foreigners 
yes, even driven out. 

In this respect certain parallels with specific 
American problems can be drawn, namely, the 
Negro problem, the problem of the domestic, 
dependent nations the Indians and finally the 
Asiatic problem, although the original and quite 
un-European treatment of these questions pre- 
vents their classification under the European 
principle of nationality. 

Besides the anti-Semitic tendency, the repudia- 
tion of the over-nation is also the basis for a great 
number of measures which at present agitate 
Europe and the world. I refer especially to the 


methods of clearing an area of the undesired ele- 
ments (i) by an attempt to extirpate them 
one has to think only of the Armenian atrocities 
(2) evacuation, that is, systematic expulsion, or 
(3) by driving out the people by vexations of vari- 
ous kinds. As an illustration I may refer to the 
muzzling of the press; the recent so-called agri- 
cultural reforms in the eastern border states which 
amount, in fact, to confiscation; the well-known 
ejection of the tenants in Poland, a case in which 
the International Court of the League of Nations 
passed an opinion against Poland; the school 
politics and language politics of the modern multi- 
nationality states; and other similar methods. 

These practices, examples of which during the 
war found general repudiation and condemnation 
on the grounds of their inhumanity, have acquired 
tremendous proportions today. According to the 
material in my possession, not fewer than 150,000 
inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine have been driven 
from their homes; in Posen and West Prussia the 
number is said to be 700,000 to 800,000. 

It is hardly necessary to remark that the 
effectiveness of such measures has not yet been 
proved. Flight from one's native soil does not 
necessarily entail forgetfulness of one's home, 
even though a strange race is now living there, 


and many a grandchild may still turn with longing 
and desire in his thoughts to the house and farm 
of his ancestors. In other words, I regard the 
Heimatliebe ("love of native soil") as a political 
factor which should not be lost sight of beside the 

principle of nationality. 

* * * 

All these principles lead us back to the concep- 
tion of the nation. Qtfest-ce qu'une Nation? 
(What is a Nation ?) This question of the great 
French philosopher of religion, Ernest Renan, in 
his famous treatise of the same title/ is the one 
which we have to consider. It has been asked, 
discussed, and disputed a thousand times. 

If we attempt to gain at least a rough survey in 
the maze of opinions, we are directly confronted by 
three groups of theories. First, there is the 
objective group, which considers certain objective 
characteristics of race, descent, language, a com- 
mon political fate history as it is generally 
termed common culture, and finally a common 
form of faith, as alternative or cumulative criteria 
to decide the nationhood of a social group. 

The antithesis of this group of theories is that 
which reduces everything to the subjective- 
psychical, and which we consequently call the "sub- 

J See Discours et Conferences, 1887. 
1 129! 


jective group." In this category, for instance, 
belongs the theory which defines a nation entirely 
as a phenomenon of will, to quote an expression of 
Redslob's. 1 Here also is the theory of Baron 
Eotvoes when he writes: 

Si Ton demande a quoi Ton peut reconnaitre une indi- 
vidual! ti nationale nous rpondrons: uniquement dans la 
conscience qu'elle puise de son existence personelle, par le 
besoin de raliser cette existence. 

It must be added that the prevailing opinion sup- 
ports this subjectively construed idea of a nation. 

Between these two groups there is a mediating 
third the combination theory which does not 
restrict itself to either subjective or objective 
characteristics, but appropriates a part of each. 

Which opinion is right ? Certainly not any 
objective theory. Especially no theory can be 
right which considers a single objective char- 
acteristic as decisive. Nationality is above all 
things not identical with common race or descent. 
There are today no pure races, no great groups of 
persons who can claim common extraction. 
Nationhood is also not to be identified with 
common language; otherwise the English and 
the citizens of the United States would be one 
nation. Besides which, Rudolf Laun has proved 

*Das Problem dts Volkerrcchts (Leipzig, 1917), p* 244. 


that there are at least seven different uses of the 
term "mother-tongue." 1 

The supposition that a common political des- 
tiny constitutes a nation is settled by reference 
to the political conditions and sentiment in the 
Habsburg dual monarchy. Finally the criterion 
of a common culture is, to my mind, despite 
many particular nuances, much too universal to 
furnish the basis for the idea of nationhood. 
Besides which, it contains a great deal of sub- 
jective matter. Corresponding criticism is appli- 
cable to the criterion of a common religion. 

Furthermore, no combination of these different 
objective criteria enables us to define a nation. 
None of the so-called objective elements are 
necessary; none of them must exist. This is 
particularly clear in regard to language. The fact 
that Switzerland is a nation cannot be disputed, 
but the language of the country is divided into 
several tongues. 

A short empirical consideration teaches us 
that a subjective element is present in every social 
group which we regard as a nation; that, conse- 
quently, a nation is in fact a social-psychological 
phenomenon. But if we inquire into the reasons 

* Mitteilungen der Deutschen Gesellschaft fur VoJkerrcc^ Heft 
IV, 1924. 


for this fact we inevitably discover one or more of 
the objective characteristics just referred to, not 
necessarily any particular one, . certainly not 
necessarily, though very frequently, that of lan- 
guage. As a rule, we find several such character- 
istics, but occasionally only one, which is most 
commonly that of a common history, which, 
indeed, is an important factor in the existence of 
the other objective characteristics mentioned 
above, with the exception, of course, of race. For 
these reasons I must profess myself an adherent 
of the combination theory. The nation is, accord- 
ing to my opinion, a social-psychological unity, 
composed of a number of individuals, who are 
distinguished from other social groups by an indi- 
vidual and characteristic consciousness of belong- 
ing together, resting upon peculiarities of race, 
descent, language, political history, culture, or 
finally of faith. 

The word "consciousness" in my definition 
necessitates a few words of explanation. One 
speaks, as a rule, in referring to the subjective 
element in nations, of "national feeling" (National^ 
gefuhl). Redslob speaks of "will"; Renan uses 
on one occasion the expression "principe spirituer^ 
Eotvos speaks of "conscience"; and in Karl Ren- 
ner we find the word "consciousness" (Bewusst- 

1 13*1 


sein}. I have also used the expression "conscious- 
ness," but in a broader sense than Renner in the 
broader sense provided by philosophy intent on 
circumscribing the psychical as such, so as to 
include all psychic experience, perception, feeling, 
imagination, volition (intelligible and unintelli- 
gible, conscious and unconscious). 

The whole problem with which I am dealing is 
very much confused by the lax terminology which 
we use. Everyone who has occupied himself 
with these questions knows that the terms "state," 
"people," and" nation " are constantly used promis- 
cuously by science as well as in practice to the 
detriment of the cause. This fact is above all famil- 
iar to the professor of international law, who in fact 
lectures not on "law of nations," nor droitdes gens 
(law of the peoples), but on "law between states" 
(an expression favored by Kant). It is typical of 
this condition that the English language uses the 
word "national" as a comprehensive expression 
for "subject" and "citizen," and attributes 
" nationality " to the same. The latter expression, 
like its German equivalent Nationditat^ applies 
equally to the characteristics of the subjects of a 
state, to those of the members of a nation, to 

1 133 1 


those of a nation as a whole and to those of a 
national group. Let us call the parts of a nation 
"national groups" rather than "nationalities" 
while using the expression "nationality" for the 
sum of the characteristics of which a nation is 
consti tilted, and "nationhood" for the fact of 
being a nation. "National" is for us, according 
to the prevailing terminology, the member of a 
nation. "National state" is a state whose citizens 
belong to a single nation. "Multi- nationality 
state" is a state comprising several national 

To illustrate the confusion of the terms "state," 
"people," and "nation" very drastically, I would 
like to quote a conversation which took place 
during the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk 
between the chief delegates of Germany, Austria- 
Hungary, and Russia, The conversation ran as 

HERR VON KUHLMANN (reading from suggestions of the 
Central Powers] : "Both peoples intend to live in peace hence- 
forth with each other." 

TROTZKI: Both states. 

VON KUHLMANN: Both nations. 

TROTZKI: Here stands "both treaty-making powers" 

VON KUHLMANN: The nations intend, consequently I am 
surprised that you make so much opposition. 

TROTZKI: Bad translation. 

1 134 1 


VON KUHLMANN: Yes, but we are not responsible for 
the translation. Is the term "both nations" acceptable ? 

TROTZKI: "Both peoples" would be more so. 

CZERNIN: "Both peoples" is impossible, for the reason 
that a great many peoples live in Austria-Hungary all of whom 
hope to live in peace with Russia. 

VON KUHLMANN: This applies to Germany and Russia, 
as the treaties are separately concluded and only then put 

CZERNIN: It might therefore be better if we came to an 
agreement at once, and selected a correct corresponding form, 
which would also apply to us, where the term "both peoples" 
could not be accepted. Here in my draft stands "both con- 
tracting parties of the treaty." 

VON KUHLMANN: Our draft for the German-Russian rela- 
tions says: "both nations." 

CZERNIN: I also would not object to saying: "the con- 
tracting parties of the treaty." 

It is utterly misleading to identify the people 
with the state, even in the purest form of democ- 
racy, in which not only according to the text of 
the constitution but in reality, all executive author- 
ity is derived from the people, and the people is 
sovereign. For even here it is not in the end the 
people as such which is the state, but the settled, 
residing, organized people as a social-psychological 
unity. It remains true that the people constitute 
the personal substratum of the state and one of its 
necessary elements, but the people are not the 

1 135 1 


state. Be that as it may, it can be said that the 
terms "nation" and "people" are equally appli- 
cable to groups of men, but groups of men con- 
sidered under different points of view; "people" 
in the usage of political science is the sum of the 
citizens or subjects. In this "people," individuals 
of the most heterogeneous national consciousness 
may be included. 

This confusion between people, nation, and 
state is, I believe, the reason for the fact that one 
often speaks of "self-determination of peoples," 
sometimes of the " self-determination of the popula- 
tions," in certain places even of "self-determination 
of states," and to crown the disorder, the "self- 
determination of races." The only correct term 
here is "self-determination of nations" or eventu- 
ally of "national groups." For the term "self- 
determination of peoples" leads back inevitably 
to the erroneous subjective conception of the na- 
tion as a community based upon pure sentiment. 
We demand more with the term "self-determination 
of nations." It does not satisfy us that a number 
of men should acquire the right to change their 
political destiny by merely declaring their will to 
the effect that they wish to separate from the state 
to which they at that time belong. We maintain 
that those men must already constitute a nation 


or a national group within the state in order to 
acquire this right. 

What I have said also provides the foundation 
for the elucidation of the relation of both expres- 
sions "principle of nationality" and "right of self- 
determination of nations." They are not anti- 
thetic, but rather move in the same direction. 
The principle of self-determination of nations is a 
comprehensive expression for the modern develop- 
ment of the principle of nationality. 

Before explaining this, we must become some- 
what more familiar with the idea of the principle of 
nationality, however. 

If we attempt to relegate this principle to its 
place in the scientific system, we discover that it 
belongs in the thus far rather unsatisfactorily 
investigated doctrine of the social-psychological 
reasons for the development of the state. 

The principle of nationality is a dynamic 
principle forming history and fate in the life of 
states. Seen from inside the state, it is primarily 
to be regarded as a consolidating factor for the 
cohesion of the citizens in the state unit in so far 
and because these citizens represent a solid 
national group, or even a whole nation. But the 
principle of nationality may, secondly, be decen- 
tralizing if a number of heterogeneous national 



groups exist within the population of a state. The 
principle of nationality has, thirdly, an expansive 
influence, if the nations, or the national groups 
united in a state, are not saturated in regard to 
their stock of population, and if they strive for 
the inclusion of national groups of similar being 
and kind as members in their state. Its effect is, 
lastly, separatistic in so far as these national groups 
contain populations of different kinds. 

Each of the three last-named tendencies 
decentralization, expansion, or separation inevi- 
tably presents many points of contact and conflict 
between states. This is especially the case with 
the expansionistic tendency, a tendency in which 
we recognize our "principle of the repudiation of 
under-nations" without difficulty. For here the 
union of state, people, and nation must be brought 
about at the expense of another state, namely, 
the one which counts the Irredenta among its 

Consequently, the principle of nationality, 
especially in its expansive tendency, is chiefly a 
political-dynamic principle which influences the 
growth and diminution of some states at the cost 
of others. It is therefore an apple of discord, and 
has great significance for the comprehension of the 
real reasons for wars. 


In the list of the various social-psychological 
state-developing principles nationality belongs in 
the category of the immaterial impulses in con- 
trast to the material impulses such as the economic 
impulses: the urge toward better pastures; the 
desire for saltpeter, coal, and iron; the great fate- 
forming impulse to the open sea, the eternal 
thalatta of mankind; and other like instincts. 
The principle of nationality stands in the same 
category with princes' lust of honor and sover- 
eignty, with churches* and sects' impulse to con- 
version (we only have to remember the Crusades), 
with fear of bad neighbors which produces the 
striving for strategic boundaries and recently for 
neutralized zones, and finally the principle of na- 
tionality stands on the same level with the form 
of purely brutal life-impulse which seethes in the 
veins of the ambitious younger peoples, and is one 
of the chief impulses of modern imperialism. 

The principle of nationality is therefore one of 
the many principles dealing with the social- 
psychological development of states. It is the 
youngest and most often named, but not in all 
respects the most triumphant of these prin- 

It is generally claimed in regard to its age that 
it sprang from the world of thought of the great 


French Revolution. This is not quite correct. 
The consciousness of nationality has existed and 
exercised an influence as a factor in history as 
long as there have been states. This is above all 
true of the separatistic tendencies contained in 
this principle. 

In this connection I should like to refer to a 
little-known pamphlet by Finke on Weltimperial- 
ismus und Nationals Regungen im spaten Mittel- 
alter (World-Imperialism and National Tendencies 
in the Late Middle Ages), which states that the 
occidental world has the ancient Germans to 
thank for its national structures, which further 
calls our attention to the fact that the great 
German historian Ranke sees in the enthusiasm 
over the battle of Bouvines (1124) "the first life- 
movement of a common consciousness of the 
French nation"; 1 that Macaulay dates the history 
of the English nation from the Magna Charta 
(1215); and that P. J. Block, in a treatise on 
Holland und das Reich vor der Burgunder Zeit 
(1908)3 says, on page 629: "Towards 1300 the 
germs of Dutch nationality can be distinctly felt/' 1 

The importance of the ideas of the great French 
Revolution for the principle of nationality appears 
to me to lie chiefly in the fact that it constitutes a 

1 Italics are mine. 



milestone and turning-point in its intensity and 
dynamic significance > especially in that of its 
expansive tendency. It is often said that the 
French Revolution discovered the individual and 
his rights, or, more correctly, completed the 
already prepared discovery, for Europe* and 
revealed all its consequences. But it not only 
conceived the individual in all his peculiarities; 
the French Revolution at the same time became 
the starting-point of a constantly increasing col- 
lectivism, because it composed and intensified 
the individuality and the right of existence of 
certain collective groups as social individualities. 
This is especially the case in regard to the nation 
and its soul the national consciousness. 

Thus, only after the French people felt and 
conceived themselves as a national collective 
unity, was it possible for French politics to develop 
in the direction of that purposeful national expan- 
sionism which characterizes the foreign policy of 
the French Revolution and its heir Napoleon, only 
indeed to become soon pure imperialistic expan- 

This is one thing which must be said of the 
world-historic importance of the French Revolu- 
tion for the principle of nationality. But a second 
observation has to be added here which impresses 

1 141 1 


me as still more important: The French Revolu- 
tion consummates the connection of the principle 
of nationality with the democratic idea, and 
becomes thereby the mother of the modern demo- 
cratic principle of nationality. 

A long time still elapsed, indeed, before this 
thought of the connection of the principle of 
nationality with the idea of democracy was 
expressed in forms of speech. This took place 
only when, through the Russian revolutionaries, 
the formerly only occasionally used expression 
"self-determination" of peoples, and so forth, 
quickly became generally adopted. 

The form of plebiscite as a manifestation of the 
principle of nationality has remained dominant. 
It was applied in the union of Italy; Napoleon III 
used it; the Russians in Brest-Litovsk also em- 
phatically demanded its use with long, theo- 
retical arguments. But it must be emphasized 
that it did not remain the only form in use in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I shall only 
refer to the union of the German states in a Ger- 
man national-state in 1870 and 1871. In none of 
the new states which emerged from the war have 
plebiscites of the people concerned really taken 
place as to whether or not they really wished 
to form a state and yet they have all adopted the 


principle of self-determination as the reason and 
justification of their existence. 

It is known that in the above-mentioned peace 
negotiations of Brest-Litovsk a theoretical duel of 
words took place for days, especially between 
Herrn von Kuhlmann, on the one side, and Joffe 
(later replaced by Trotzki), on the other a 
strange and singular proceeding which recalls dis- 
putations in the Middle Ages. 

The Russians had a very clearly conceived idea 
that self-determination is a democratic principle. 
The first of Joffe's announcements in the opening 
session December 22, 1917, contains the following 
words: "The Russian delegation have the clearly 
expressed will of the people of Revolutionary 
Russia as their premise to attain the conclusion of 
a democratic peace as soon as possible." He 
refers then to the Peace Decree of the All-Russian 
Congress of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputations, 
which was confirmed by the All-Russian Congress, 
and which began with the idea that, by a just, 
democratic peace, a peace without annexations is 
understood. On this occasion the following defini- 
tion, which interests us greatly in this connection, 
was given for the idea of annexation, a defini- 
tion which also proves in how broad a fashion 
the Russians had conceived the problem of the 


principle of nationality. This definition reads as 

According to the legal consciousness of Democracy in 
general and the working classes in particular, the government 
understands by annexation and the occupation of foreign 
lands by force every incorporation of a small or weak nation 
into a larger or stronger nation, unless the consent and the wish 
of this nation has been given a distinct^ clear expression of its 
free will in this direction* 

The Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk supported 
the standpoint that lacking other representative 
bodies, the existing and historic representative 
bodies presumptively represented the expression 
of the people's will, but the Russian delegates 
insisted that proof of whether an organ expresses 
the will of the people could be had only by a 
general questioning of the whole national group, 
which is thus called upon to exercise its right of 
self-determination by vote. This questioning 
bears the technical term "plebiscite." 

Consequently, there are today three theoretical 
forms of application of the principle of nationality 
and right of self-determination: first, the plebis- 
cite; secondly, the spontaneous unorganized ex- 
pression of the will of a national group; and 
thirdly, the expression of the will of such a group 

1 Italics mine, 

1 144 1 


by the medium of the historic organs of their will, 
especially their parliaments. 

It is hardly necessary to say that the plebiscite 
is the only form which the prevalent opinion of 
our time considers qualified to guarantee the 
adequate expression of a nation's will, under the 
condition, of course, that most explicit guaranties 
for a just and uninfluenced practice of the same 
are provided. The latter is a demand which has 
proved to be essentially imperative, since the 
experiences of plebiscite in the execution of the 
treaties of peace. 

While the three above-named forms are not 
the only ones in which the principle of nationality 
may exercise itself, they are, however, the only 
forms > in which it manifests itself on the question 
of state succession, and consequently, in my 
opinion, the only forms in which the right of self- 
determination of nations can manifest itself. In 
other words, the right of self-determination is the 
application of the principle of nationalities to cases 

of state succession. 

* * * 

The so-called right of self-determination is 
today an impulse for the development of states. 
Regarded from the normative side, it is not law 
or a right in the legal sense but a political rule of 


conduct similar to the principle of legitimacy, the 
principle of balance of powers, the principle of 
the open door, the principle of free trade and the 
Monroe Doctrine as long as the latter was not 
legally recognized, and made thereby the premise 
for a subjective right of the United States in the 
legal sense of the word which in the system of 
international law is to be classified approximately 
with the so-called spheres of influence and the 

But is this all ? Is the principle of self- 
determination of nations no more ? Is it not 
also an ethical principle? Then only would it 
become sanctified as a political principle. For we 
acknowledge the claim which Immanuel Kant 
formulated in his treatise on Eternal Peace in 
the sentence: "True politics cannot take any step 
without having first done homage to morals/' 

I can be brief here, for the question of whether 
the principle of self-determination of nations is 
intrinsically ethical is a matter, not of perception 
and evidence, but of belief. Consequently, we 
must confine ourselves to the question whether we 
believe in the principle of self-determination in 
this sense, and I must limit myself to saying that 
I believe in the ethical justification of this prin- 
ciple as a developing factor of states as long as 


and because the nations exist as social beings, 
because mankind acknowledges them, tries to 
group itself according to them, and conceives its 
political happiness in national union. 

Another thing must be added: This natural 
claim of nations to political existence requires the 
most painstaking legal regulations and limitations. 
So long as the anarchy existing today in this 
respect continues, this principle in fact contains 
political dynamite, which can only arouse desire 
without satisfying it, as Secretary of State Lansing 

Above all, a national consciousness, which may 
be as highly developed as you will, does not 
provide a claim to existence as a state nation, in 
my opinion, unless the group in question is actually 
large enough to constitute a really efficient state. 
Otherwise the national group in question must be 
satisfied to form a state people together with other 
national groups. The idea of federalism and, as a 
makeshift, also the principle of the protection of 
minorities seem adapted to mitigate and to do 
away, at least to a certain degree, with the result- 
ing severities. 

To my great regret it is impossible for me to 
expand the details with which this problem is 
particularly interspersed. 



Its essence is fundamentally, however, like all 
the great international problems of today, less 
legal than of a social-pedagogical nature. It 
would be futile to attempt to order this chaos 
by legal norms only, as long as we do not find 
other opinions and convictions pre-existing, as long 
as quite new conceptions of the relations of states 
to one another, the duties of the state, and the 
relation of the individual in and toward the state 
have not entered the heads of mankind, especially 
those of the leading statesmen. And these must 
be ideas which are based on the acknowledgment of 
the sovereignty of ethics in the life of states, a 
sovereignty of the same strength and absoluteness 
as in the life of the individual. Ideas similar to 
those preached by men like Bossuet, Fenelon, 
Friedrich the Great in his Anti-Machiavell> George 
Washington, Kant, and Francis Lieber in his 
Manual of Political Efhics, must become universal. 
Here are the greatest preparatory problems for 
science, especially for that almost forgotten branch 
of political science state-ethics. 

My lecture on the League of Nations concluded 
with an appeal to and a confession of law and the 
hope of the diffusion of law throughout the whole 
world. But law is fundamentally nothing more 
than an ethical minimum (Jellinek), and I believe 


that I cannot end this discussion better than by 
concluding it with the words with which Washing- 
ton began his Farewell Address: 

Observe good faith and justice toward all nations. 
Cultivate peace and harmony with all. Religion and moral- 
ity enjoin this conduct; and can it be that good policy does 
not equally enjoin it ? It will be worthy of a free, enlight- 
ened, and in no distant period, a great nation, to give to 
mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a 
People always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence. 




As Clemenceau gave his speech of introduction 
before the Treaty of Versailles was signed, and used 
therein the expression Empire Allemande (Ger- 
man Empire), he was interrupted from several 
sides by exclamations of " Rsichl " " Reich! " This 
noteworthy incident was the first apparent attempt 
to decline the expression "empire'* for the Ger- 
man state body in its international relations, and 
substitute the German expression Reich. 

This attempt seems unwarranted, and the argu- 
ment advanced that the term "empire" is synony- 
mous with "monarchy" with an emperor (Kaiser) 
at its head is untenable, since the German Empire 
before the Revolution was in fact, as we shall see 
later, an oligarchical republic, and the Germans 
themselves make a distinction between Kaiser- 
reich and Reich. The repeated efforts to intro- 
duce this term Reich for the new German state 
have fortunately suffered shipwreck, and the 
expression "empire" is being used increasingly 
in international relations in reference to the new 
German state. 


In another case a German expression must be 
retained, however: there is a tendency still to call 
the former member-states of the German Empire 
" states." This is not constitutionally permissible, 
as the new German constitution uses the word 
Land in distinction from the word Staat ("state"). 
The use of the word "state" in connection with 
these bodies is the less permissible as it would 
denote taking sides in a deeply rooted contro- 
versy on the constitutional nature of these bodies. 
As there is no term for Land in any other lan- 
guage, we must apply this German word in inter- 
national terminology. This would not be without 
precedent, as, to cite one of many instances, the 
German word Hinterland is commonly used in 
international law. We are the more justified in 
doing this as the constitutional form signified by 
the word Land is not peculiar to Germany, but 
is found elsewhere, as scholars like Redslob and 
Georg Jellinek have demonstrated. 

Consequently, in presenting some observations 
on the spirit of the new German constitution here, 
I speak of the constitution of the new German 
Empire, while in my next discussion on "Separatism 
in Germany," which is intended as a continuation of 
this subject, I shall deal with certain vital questions 
between the German Empire and the "Lands." 

I i54l 


The constitution of a nation is its apparel, its 
mantle. It is, or ought to be, its shield and back- 
bone, and the expression of its soul. 

It is no festive garment, no royal robe, which 
the German people wrapped around their muti- 
lated body with the constitution of August n, 
1919. On the contrary, one sees a rather patched 
covering, the cut of which was to a great extent 
dictated by outside factors. 

When I call this constitution rather patched I do 
not mean thereby that it is an expression of an imi- 
tative tendency which the Germans are rightly or 
wrongly often said to possess. As far as the new 
German constitution is concerned, it is almost com- 
pletely independent of concrete foreign examples. 
Not that it does not contain thoughts which are 
also to be found in other constitutions of our era. 
But these features, which one remarks here and 
there, are generally common ones, not borrowed, 
and are rather a double proof of the similar funda- 
mental ideas of our day than the expression of a 
relation of original and copy. This, for instance, 
applies to the fact that Germany is a parliamentary 
republic based to a certain extent on the principle of 
the separation of powers, that she has a president 
as her head, and that in the new constitution a list 
of fundamental rights fills the entire second part. 

1 155 I 


There is, by the way, one completely original 
line in the German constitution. I do not mean the 
exposition of the Vorlaufigen Reichswirtsckaftsrat 
(Temporary Imperial Economic Council), a new 
body with parliamentary features, which possesses 
advisory functions relating to social and economic 
legislation, and in which all the social forces of 
Germany are supposed to be represented. I refer 
rather to the fashion in which the principle of self- 
determination is included in this constitution. 
Article 18 limits the right to incorporate new 
areas in the German Empire by the condition that 
the inhabitants of the territory in question indi- 
cate their wish to be united with the German 
Empire by a referendum. I would further call 
your attention to the prescription for the protec- 
tion of minorities in Article 113, which provides, 
without any international obligation, that those 
elements of the population within the Empire 
which speak a foreign language may not be inter- 
fered with by legislative or administrative action 
in their free and characteristic development espe- 
cially in the use of their mother-tongue in the 
schools, or in matters of internal administration, 
and the administration of justice. 

Of course I would not maintain that the writers 
of our new constitution had no foreign examples 


in their minds, nor that, in so far as time and the 
literary sources at their disposal permitted, they 
did not investigate these foreign examples care- 
fully to ascertain their suitability. In fact, they 
applied this examination especially to the constitu- 
tions of the United States and France. But in 
the end, as a result of comparison, study, and 
doubt, a more or less original third constitution 
emerged which reminds one here and there of the 
examples but does not echo them. 

When I say that the German constitution is 
almost completely uninfluenced directly by foreign 
examples, I refer to the relations between this 
constitution and non-German constitutions, as 
those between the German constitution of 1871 
and the Japanese constitution, between the Bel- 
gian and the Prussian constitution of 1850, and 
between the Danzig or Polish constitutions and 
our new German constitution. 

By the repudiation of foreign examples I also do 
not claim that the constitution of 1919 was quite in- 
dependent of example. Nothing would be further 
from the truth, for this constitution adhered closely 
to two prototypes, but these prototypes were of 
German origin. I refer to the old German consti- 
tution of 1871 as one, and the draft of a constitution 
framed in the Paul's Church in Frankfurt in 1849. 


If one compares the constitutions of 1871 and 
1919, there are fundamental constructive, cate- 
gorical differences, besides a marked alteration in 
the distribution of the competences and authority 
of the highest executive organs of the Empire. 

The divergence between the old and new con- 
stitutions is characterized among other features, for 
instance, by the quantitative difference in relation 
to the authority and competence of the Reichstag. 
The old Reichstag together with the Eundesrat 
(the Council of the Federation) were the legislative 
organs of the German Empire, while today the 
Reichstag alone is invested with this power. The 
participation of the Rsichsrat (Council of the 
Empire) and the other highest organs of the 
Empire in framing legislation is today only of a 
preparatory and corrective auxiliary character. 
The competency to dismiss ministers by a vote 
of want of confidence has given .the Reichstag 
even a very important new function compared to 
the old German constitution. 

The alteration in the relations between the 
Empire and the German "Lands," which were form- 
erly called Gliedstaaten (member-states), consists 
chiefly in a combination of very largely increased 
competencies, and the creation of new competen- 
cies for the benefit of the Empire. But the diver- 


gencies between yesterday and today in this 
respect are so tremendous that they must at the 
same time be regarded as qualitative. 

The constructive differences between the old 
and new constitutions are especially apparent in 
the position of the head of the German Empire. 
According to the general opinion, to quote a defini- 
tion of Prince Bismarck's, die Gesamtheit der ver- 
bundeten Regierungen (" the body of the federated 
governments") represented in the Council of the 
Federation were sovereign in the old Empire. 

In this Council of the Federation, therefore, we 
find the representatives of all the governments of 
the German Empire, which, according to the pre- 
vailing constitutional theory, was an oligarchical 
republic, not a monarchy as is generally believed 
in lay-circles. The Kaiser was not the monarchical 
head of this state-body. The term "Kaiser" was 
no more than a title for the king of Prussia in 
his function as "occupant of the presidency of 
the federated state termed "German Empire." 
Article ii of the old constitution provides verbally 
that the president of the federation is the king of 
Prussia, who bears the tide German Emperor. And 
in the preamble of the old constitution we read: 

His Majesty, the King of Prussia, in the name of the 
North German Federation. His Majesty, the King of 

1 159! 


Bavaria, and so forth, form a permanent Federation. This 
Federation will bear the name "German Empire." 

Thus the letter and law of the old constitution. 
It must be added, however, that during the half- 
century in which it was in force, the development 
taken by the constitution in this as in other 
respects was apparently toward unity and toward 
"Empire/' in the most limited sense of the word. 

In the new constitution this is all fundamen- 
tally different, and far more simple from a con- 
structive standpoint. A president directly elected 
by and representing the sovereign people is at 
the head of the Empire. And, as exponent of the 
federalistic idea, the Reichsrat (Council of the 
Empire) has succeeded the Bundesrat (Council 
of the Federation) as the highest executive organ. 

The fundamental difference between these two 
constitutions can be explained by the following 
antithesis. On the one hand, a constitutional, oli- 
garchical republic with certain tendencies toward 
monarchy; on the other^ a parliamentary, republi- 
can, representative democracy the sharpest con- 
. trast. 

This contrast does not indeed suggest a relation 
of original and copy. And yet the assertion that 
the constitution of 1871 was to a great extent the 
pattern for the constitution of the German Repub- 



lie of today is quite correct. It is especially note- 
worthy that the fathers of the Weimar constitu- 
tion exerted themselves to a large degree to pre- 
serve a formal connection between the old and 
the new constitutions. Two laws demonstrate 
this better than long explanations, namely, the 
so-called Ueber gangs gesetz (Transitory Law) of 
March 4, 1919, which created the Deutsche Na- 
tional Versammlung (German National Assembly) 
for the period of the constitutional deliberations at 
Weimar, and Article 179 of the new constitution. 
These laws, together with the old constitution, 
form a threefold chain of legal continuities in the 
organizational construction of the Empire. The 
lines run from the old Reichstag through the Wei- 
mar National Assembly to the Reichstag of today; 
from the Kaiser through the Rat der Folksbeauf- 
tragten (Council of People's Commissioners) and 
the temporary President of the Empire to the 
permanent President of the Empire; and from 
the Staatenausschuss (Council of the Federation 
over the State Committee) to the Council of the 

And now that second prototype. The draft 
constitution of 1849 mar k s one f tne stages of 
the German people's development, a glimpse of 
the promised land, a hope which was disappointed 


on the eve of fulfilment because the time was not 
yet ripe as the German-Austrian struggle for 
supremacy in Germany had not yet been decided 
on the battlefields of Koniggratz, because the 
fate of Germany was not at that period in the 
hands of a Bismarck, and no Wilhelm I was on 
the Hohenzollern throne, but a Friedrich Wilhelm 
IV 3 who refused to accept the election as Folks- 
kaiser (people's emperor) which had fallen to him 
at the Assembly in the Paul's Church. Conse- 
quently, the constitution proclaimed on March 
28, 1849, an d the Election Law of the Empire, as 
well as the Grundrechts (Fundamental Rights) 
published before, never became German law. 
Their influence, however, was a vital one, and 
seventy years later they experienced a partial 
resurrection in the Weimar constitution of the 
Empire in 1919. 

The Fundamental Rights of which I speak are 
thus discussed in the best German book on the 
Convention in the Paul's Church: 

The German National Assembly struggled most fiercely 
over the Fundamental Rights and its Election Laws. One 
can say that the Fundamental Rights were written with sweat, 
blood, and tears. We can compare these paragraphs with 
the stations of a martyr's path which the German people had 
to climb with difficulty. In the discussion of every single 
paragraph by the assembly, the cases from the time of the 


reaction, which rendered such regulations necessary, were 
cited; those disgraceful cases of the curtailment of personal 
liberty, of the suppression of independent opinion, and of 
religious and economic conviction. In these Fundamental 
Rights are contained the breath of liberty from the time of 
the Reformation, from the time of Puritanism, and the great 
French Revolution, that deep belief in the dignity, the 
equality and the right of self-determination in humanity 
as such. 1 

Thus Veit Valentin. There is, in fact, something 
moving in this catalogue of confused wishes, fears, 
and hopes. Much of it has been absorbed by the 
present conscience as something to be taken for 
granted. It is a document from which one can 
construe the constitutional mentality and political 
ideology of the Germans better than from the 
works of a Heinrich von Treitschke or General 
von Bernhardi, or even a Hegel not to mention 
Friedrich Nietzsche. 

A great part of these Fundamental Rights was 
included literally in the Weimar constitution. 
The Frankfurt constitution, of course, lacked the 
social features, those fragments from the Socialists, 
Erfurter Program, and similar emanations, not 
to mention the Economic Council idea a com- 
bination of soviet Russian and German thoughts. 

1 Valentin, Die erste deutsche Nationahersammking (Munchen, 
Berlin, 1919), p. 152. 

I 163! 


The social state was only in the process of being 
discovered in 1848. 

Besides these Fundamental Rights, many other 
features, chiefly from the regulations for organiza- 
tion, have been taken over from the Frankfurt 
constitution. These are features the discussion of 
which would go too far here, but I should at least 
like to remind you that the flag of the Empire 
with its black, red, and gold colors, which is the 
cause of so much dissension in Germany today, 
was also to be the flag of the Paul's Church 

In describing the Weimar constitution as 
rather patched, I was not alluding to these two 
prototypes, however, for these are German 
examples, and the connection with them seems to 
me rather a proof of the genuineness of the Weimar 
constitution, and an indication that it is German 
in its spirit a revelation ripened in the course of 
the history of the German peopled soul. By the 
expression "patched," I would rather call atten- 
tion to the fact that this constitution, as the 
product of a strongly divergent parliamentary 
coalition majority, is to a great extent a political 
party compromise. 

Successful as the constitution of 1919 is from 
the standpoint of the legal scholar in its close 


structure and the legal precision of its first part, 
from a political point of view it appears in certain 
parts very disconnected and imperfect. Only too 
often its regulations, balanced between yes and 
no, have stuck in the middle, and indicate a 
compromise between right and left. 

A number of prescriptions dealing with the 
Fundamental Rights serve as an especially good 
example. In these Fundamental Rights a decided 
lack of resolution, consistency, and the willingness 
to assume responsibility is evident. The regula- 
tions are filled with limitations and conditions. 
They are in part so carefully formulated that dis- 
agreement exists as to whether they embody 
actual law, or are merely directions for the legisla- 
tor, good intentions, promises, or consolations. 
The hard verdict that this catalogue of Funda- 
mental Rights is at the bottom little more than 
an interfactional party program has not been 
uttered without a certain justification. 

In studying the new constitution one some- 
times has the impression that its authors were 
frightened by their own courage in this or that 
question. The rules for the initiative and referen- 
dum, for instance, are surrounded by so many 
clauses that they have almost lost their political 
usefulness. And, in fact, in spite of recurring 



agitation, there has been no use made of these 
provisions in the Empire, though in a number 
of German "Lands'* a Volksabstimmung\&& taken 

A lack of united purpose and self-reliance can 
also be seen in the fact that the constitution has 
avoided an exact circumscription of the compe- 
tencies with which the highest organs of the state 
are invested. One would seek in vain to ascertain 
from the contents of the constitution what degree 
of political influence the Council of the Empire, 
the President, the Temporary Imperial Economic 
Council, or even the Chancellor of the Empire are 
expected to exert in the structure of the govern- 
mental machine. The constitution has left this 
to future development. Only in one point is its 
purpose quite clear. We are struck by the 
apprehension that the influence and position of 
the Reichstag as heart and central organ of the 
constitutional machine might not be sufficiently 
guaranteed. Consequently, the position of the 
Reichstag is established in the constitution with 
the greatest emphasis and care. 

There is also another respect in which the con- 
stitution is explicit, and manifests no uncertainty 
or deviation. I refer to the new form of govern- 
ment in the Empire. The new Empire is a 


democracy. This idea is literally hammered into 
the constitution, without compromise, and with 
an effectiveness hardly to be exceeded or even 
equaled in any constitution. "The German people 
has given itself this constitution" are the words 
with which it begins, and its conclusion is in the 
same tenor. Article i, Part 2 (the first part of this 
article proclaims the Republic), states: "The 
political authority is derived from the people." 
Every "Land" must have a republican constitu- 
tion. The representatives of the people must be 
elected by universal, equal, direct, and secret suf- 
frage of all German citizens, both men and women, 
according to the principle of proportional represen- 
tation. The government shall require the confi- 
dence of the people. In Articles 20 and 22 we 
read: "The Reichstag is composed of the delegates 
of the German people." " The delegates are repre- 
sentatives of the whole people." In Article 54 
it is stated: "The Imperial Chancellor and the 
Imperial Ministers require for the administration 
of their offices the confidence of the Reichstag." 
Thus the constitution finds in one paramount 
principle its firmly established premise. 

My statement that the cut of the constitution 
was dictated by outside factors did not refer 
to the psychological pressure which President 


Wilson exerted toward the abolishment of the 
monarchy and the realization of the democratic 
idea in Germany. This already occupied many 
minds in Germany. Great as was the suggestive 
effect of this peace propaganda, I was alluding 
more to the far greater influence of the Treaty of 
Versailles on the German constitution and Ger- 
man constitutional life. By the terms of Article 
178 of the constitution, as well as by publication 
in the Reichsgesetzblatt (the official journal for the 
publication of German laws), the Treaty of 
Versailles has become a kind of annex to the 
constitution, an annex which, however, does not 
share the especial guaranties provided for con- 
stitutional prescriptions. Among the numerous 
consequences resulting from the legal situation pro- 
duced thereby, one fact interests us especially, 
namely, that now institutions like the Council of 
the League of Nations, the Conference of Am- 
bassadors, formerly the Supreme Council, which 
are often confused with each other, the Repara- 
tion Commission, the International Courts, and 
the other organs which are occupied with inter- 
national administrative and judicial functions 
under the Treaty of Versailles, are actually forced 
into the German official organization, without, 
however, fitting in organically. To name all 


the international organs or their individual func- 
tions which come under this category would 
be futile, owing to the extent of the material to 
be considered. But I would call your attention 
to the significant fact that the Reparation Com- 
mission is more influential and powerful in the 
prerogatives with which it is invested than any 
German constitutional organ, apart from the fact 
that it has a quite different authority behind it 
from that which the weakened German state can 
guarantee its inner political organs. 

Article 244, paragraph n, Annex 2 of the 
Treaty of Versailles says of the Reparation 

The Commission shall not be bound by any particular 
code or rules of law or by any particular rules of evidence or 
of procedure, but shall be guided by justice, equity, and good 

The even more radical paragraph 14 states: 

Decisions of the Commission, in accordance with the 
powers conferred upon it, shall forthwith become binding 
and may be put into immediate execution without further 

Now, according to the Dawes plan, a fateful 
increase in the number of such institutions faces 


It is no wonder that under such circumstances 
in Germany the question of whether Germany is 
still sovereign has been raised and denied. And 
this takes place not only in political discussion, 
which is inclined to a lax verbal habit, but even 
in German science grave doubts have developed in 
this respect. These doubts cannot be satisfied by 
the cautious formulation of the Belastung der 
deutschen Souveranitat ("weight on German sover- 
eignty") by Dr. Simons, the former minister of 
foreign affairs, now president of the Reichsgericht 
(Supreme Court). They are based primarily on 
the fact of the authority exercised by the numerous 
international commissions in Germany just men- 
tioned. According to the prevailing conception 
of the term "sovereignty" this is incorrect, I 
believe, for all these institutions are theoretically 
based upon a German expression of will, on Ger- 
many's signature and ratification of the Versailles 
Treaty, and the publication of the Treaty as a law 
of the Empire. 

According to the view I hold on the theory of 
sovereignty, however, the fact that limitations of 
power are derived from self-obligation does not 
necessarily prevent their infringing on sovereignty. 
I consider that sovereignty is actually infringed 

c 170! 


upon even by self-obligations when they furnish 
the foundation and premise for the exercise of 
foreign prerogatives and authority within the state. 
Foreign authority, on one side, and sovereignty on 
the other are in my opinion incompatible, for they 
entail a relationship of superiority and inferiority 
which contradicts the natural conception of sov- 
ereignty. If Germany can still be characterized 
as sovereign today it is only for the reason that 
the obligations of the Treaty of Versailles are 
limited in duration. Consequently it is, in my 
opinion, correct to say that sovereignty is sus- 
pended in Germany, exactly as it is, for instance, 
in the occupied territories. 

What I have just said provides a far from prom- 
ising premise for discussion of the two questions: 
(i) whether and in what degree the German con- 
stitution is really a protection and shield for the 
Germans and their Empire, and (2) in what degree 
it can be regarded as the expression of the German 
people's soul. 

If we are just, however, we must see a gratifying 
proof of the German people's will for constitutional 
order in the fact that a constitution was framed 
at all in August, 1919, and turned out as it did 
with its hurried birth, under the pressure of what 


had happened, the collapse, the two revolutions 
following, the uncertain future, and last but not 
least the lack of experience. 

In turning to the consideration of the two 
questions defined above, I must be careful in 
answering them, for so far the new German con- 
stitution has hardly had an opportunity to work 
itself out, and represent what it really is in the 
calm course of events. Revolts, political mur- 
der, violence, unexpected situations in foreign 
politics, "sanctions," and similar incidents in 
quick succession have constantly created new, 
exceptional situations, which have rendered excep- 
tional measures of defense necessary. Article 
48 of the new constitution, which provides for 
the so-called Ausnahm-zu-stand, supplies the chief 
constitutional background for such exceptional 
measures. Unfortunately, lack of space prevents 
my dealing with this interesting question as I at 
first intencled to do. 

When one looks back on the thorny path 
which the German people have trod during the 
last years, one must acknowledge that the new 
German constitution has manifested on the whole 
a comparatively great strength. Naturally it has 
not survived these storms unaltered. We can 
already point out several changes, although not 


fundamental in character, which are partly of cus- 
tomary, partly of written, law. 

I cannot let this opportunity pass without a 
short reference to the general weakening of the 
conception of state in Germany as a result of the 
disillusionment, and the decrease in the authority 
of the Empire. This condition manifests itself in 
other countries also, and is probably to be chiefly 
explained as a general post-war and revolutionary 
phenomenon. Every Devisen-Kommissar (com- 
missioner for foreign currency), every official 
against profiteering, and every revenue officer 
could tell a tale in this respect. This is not at all 
surprising in Germany, where the best classes have 
been impoverished, and, as they claim, not with- 
out telling arguments, partially through the fault 
of the state, in which they believed, to whom they 
gave their gold, and from whom they bought their 
Kriegsanleihe (war bonds), but which did not repay 
their confidence. I shall cite only the fact that the 
so-called Third Steuernotverordnung (Emergency 
Tax Law) of February 14, 1924, provides among 
other things that only 15 per cent of their nominal 
value in gold marks can be claimed from mort- 
gages, bonds, and life insurance policies, and that 
the payment of the sums in question cannot be 
demanded before 1932. In the case of savings 



banks the total deposits are simply to be divided 
among the depositors. The interest and redemp- 
tion of Empire and state loans, which were out- 
standing before the Third Emergency Tax Law 
was put into effect, according to paragraph 16 of 
this law, cannot be claimed before the settlement 
of all obligations of the reparations. This affects 
the owners of German war bonds in particular. 

These measures, which constitute a severe 
encroachment on the substance of the German 
people's property, are in no way materially differ- 
ent from the measures attending an interior state's 
bankruptcy. Is it a wonder that even a crisis of 
the state idea has been discussed in Germany and 
this chiefly in reference to certain particularly 
vigorous manifestations of the conditions just 
mentioned? Besides minor symptoms of a de- 
crease in the law-abiding will, certain violent 
bursts of activity on the part of the workers' 
unions, on the one hand, and of industry, on 
the other, independently of the state, and even 
against the state, also come into consideration here. 

Before the breaking-off of the general strike, 
which was begun on March 18, 1920, to defeat the 
Kapp-Revolt of March 13, the unions presented 
the government with eight conditions in the form 
of an ultimatum, which exercised a very decisive 


influence on politics, and which the government 
was obliged to accept at that time, but from which 
we are today quite far removed again. 1 The 
unions repeated their methods in a very pro- 
nounced form with the ten conditions of the 
Board of Directors of the Deutsche Gewerk- 
schaftsbund of February 26, 1921, to combat 
unemployment. 2 

Of the greatest interest is the communication of 
May 25, 1923, addressed to Chancellor Cuno by 
the President of the Reichsverband der deutschen 
Industrie (Imperial Association of German Indus- 
try), in which the powers of industry professed 
their willingness to carry 40 per cent of the then 
contemplated 500,000,000 gold marks yearly addi- 
tional guaranty of the reparation burden upon 
the whole German economic system. They, how- 
ever, made a number of conditions, among others: 
maintenance of the tax sovereignty, the exploita- 
tion of the objects of value in the possession of the 
Empire and "Lands" according to scientific prin- 
ciples, equality of German productions in foreign 
countries, the government's abstinence on principle 
from the manufacture and distribution of goods, 

1 See Korrespondenz-Blatt des Allgemeinen DeutschenGewerkschafts- 
bunden, XXX (1920), 153. 

a See Korrespondenzblatt des Deutschtn Gewerkschajtsbunden, 
XXXI (1921)^ 132. 



the creation of a lucid taxation system calculated 
to incite economy, and so forth. 

This action was noticed with the following 
words by the trade unions in a communication of 
June i, 1923, addressed to the President: 

The inner political conditions, appear to us completely 
to reverse the relation of industry to the state. Industry 
attempts to deal with the state as an independent power, and 
makes stipulations where the case in question is one of ful- 
filling the duty of citizens towards the state. The attitude 
of industry suggests the conclusion that it intends to regulate 
the entire problem of reparations between industry and indus- 
try over the head of the state, and the authority of the state 
would be unbearably weakened if the government of the Em- 
pire should accept the conditions of the Imperial Association. 

Dombrowski writes very justly in the Berliner 
Tageblatt of May 295 1923, in reference to the 
Imperial Association note: "The tone is displeas- 
ing* In former times the Kurfiirsts spoke thus, 
and the dukes spoke thus to the Emperor, after 
they had seceded territorially." This comparison 
with the Middle Ages is, in fact, one which pre- 
sents itself here, a parallel of which one is also 
reminded when one hears, for instance, of the 
Stinnes-Lubersac Treaty, the Micum treaties, and 
similar manifestations. But, if I am not mistaken, 
one might be able to find some parallels to these 
facts in the United States of America. 



Such conditions must necessarily reflect also 
on the theory of the state, and this especially when, 
as in Germany, there is a material reduction of the 
state's functions, a very far-reaching reduction 
of officials, and a weakening of the strength of the 
state under the severe obligations which the repar- 
ation problem imposed. So far this reflection 
has shown itself primarily as an antithesis, and has 
expressed itself in Germany in the appearance of a 
number of radical theoretical publications. On 
the other hand, Theodor Niemeyer, the Nestor of 
German international scholars, has among others 
taken the facts just mentioned into positive 
account in a cycle of lectures with the rather 
metaphysical title, "The State and the Human 
Soul," which he gave this spring in Kiel, a series 
of lectures in which he scourges the aggrandize- 
ment of the state, particularly in the unlimited 
expansion of executive- functions and of state's 
objects. Observing these tendencies, he says, far- 
seeing minds in all lands recognize a danger for 
the state itself, which is most unfortunate because 
mankind cannot do without the state as a form 
of life. Of particular interest is his last lecture, in 
which he considers the problem of how the tension 
of the state can be reduced, and he comes to the 
conclusion that the present state idea must impose 

1 177 1 


restrictions upon itself in the service of higher 
duties, and that this can only be accomplished by 
the supremacy of thought which exists in the 
individual as strength of intellect, and as a life- 
element in the soul of the community. 

On the whole, however, to return to our 
premise, the German constitution has maintained 
itself, and proved a bulwark against the destruc- 
tive forces seething in the German people, as well 
as against the outside factors set against the gov- 
ernment and Germany herself. 

The share of credit due the German officials 
should not be underestimated in this respect. 
They accepted the existing facts promptly. Even 
when their sympathies were elsewhere, they ful- 
filled their oath of loyalty to the constitution with 
the impersonal discipline and conscientiousness 
peculiar to them, in spite of the present unmistak- 
ably inimical tendency toward officialdom in Ger- 
many. There is no doubt that a great part of the 
credit for keeping the ship of state off the many 
rocks in its course is due to the German officials, 
including the Reichswehr (Imperial Guard). The 
question has often been asked as to whether our 
official body works with its former efficiency. It 
is quite clear that the efficiency of our officials must 
have diminished to some extent as a result of the 


thousand burdens since the war. Of course, the 
degree differs in the different classes of officials. 
The revolution elevated certain men who were 
unable to fill the requirements of their high posi- 
tions. But the vast majority of the latter type 
have since sunk back to where they came from, 
and those who have retained their positions, 
especially in this period of reduction and restora- 
tion, have proved themselves able to occupy the 
same. I refer, of course, only to our professional 
officialdom, of which we Germans are so proud, and 
not in any way to the natural consequences of 
parliamentarism and representative democracy, 
which consequences, by the way, are so far not as 
pronounced in Germany as in the United States. 
We do not yet have the "spoils system." The 
integrity of our officials does not seem to me to 
have suffered. Cases such as that of the late 
Saxon minister Zeigner, an Independent Socialist 
and product of the revolution, whose impeachment 
on the charge of graft caused a great sensation in 
the spring, are decidedly the exception, and to be 
classified as milestones in the process of purifying 
the body of German officials. 

While I just stated that the German constitu- 
tion has maintained itself on the whole, I would 
have to use more decided words were I able to 

I i79l 


maintain that this was entirely, or even essentially, 
the result of positive vital force emanating from it. 
This, however, is not altogether the case in my 
opinion. I believe, without doubt, that the great 
political law of stability to which I have already 
referred is of not inconsiderable significance for the 
continuous validity of the German constitution. 
The constitution persists through the mere fact 
that it is established law. This law of stability 
derives its particular strength and efficiency for the 
maintenance of the new constitution chiefly from 
the fear existing in extensive circles of any com- 
prehensive constitutional changes, and of the 
unavoidable disturbance which would inevitably 
result. The dissensions in the German political 
parties and their inability to agree on a new form 
of constitution are also factors of importance. 
International facts likewise play a certain r61e here. 
I have only to remind you in this connection of 
the question of Austria's joining Germany. 

The question of the durability of the Weimar 
constitution, which is here suggested, leads us to 
the more comprehensive and greater problem of 
whether and in what degree the constitution is 
rooted in the German people. 

When we consider the relation of the Germans 
to their new constitution from the psychological 


standpoint, we must acknowledge that this new 
constitution contains a number of decidedly pop- 
ular prescriptions, measures which are affirmed by 
sentiment, and which represent old as well as new 
heritages of culture, which would in all human 
judgment survive great constitutional changes in 
Germany. Among these I include much which is 
contained in the Fundamental Rights, and espe- 
cially just those provisions which are often con- 
sidered superfluous, for example, the idea of what 
we call Freizugigkeit (the right to travel and to 
reside freely where we wish throughout Germany), 
the guaranty of personal freedom, the secrecy of 
the mail, the freedom of meetings, the right to 
form societies, the independence of judges, and 
not last among them, the prescription that no Ger- 
man may be surrendered to a foreign government 
for prosecution or punishment, a paragraph which 
became very important owing to the question of 
the surrender of the so-called "war criminals/* 
I would also include, with a certain reservation, 
the universal, direct, and secret suffrage for men 
and women. 

On the other side, the Treaty of Versailles and 
the burdens laid by it on the German people and 
German constitutional life are repudiated with 
overwhelming unanimity by popular sentiment, 



and this includes the paragraphs on the abolish- 
ment of conscription and the so much overempha- 
sized limitation of armament. 

The Imperial Council and Imperial Economic 
Council are distant and on the whole indifferent 
features in the general consciousness. The Impe- 
rial Council is lauded as the exponent of federalism 
by the federalistic circles in Germany. The 
Imperial Economic Council is regarded as an 
organ of quiet economic insight and judgment, 
whose lack of influence is consequently regretted 
by economic circles. The Cabinet of the Empire 
has hardly aroused the interest of the masses. 
Sober-thinking people who are not associated with 
active politics have always greeted the appoint- 
ment of professional experts as ministers with 
approval. This has been the case several times 
so far, especially in regard to the position of the 
minister of foreign affairs. Otherwise the chief 
interest in the Cabinet centers in the question of 
its dependence on Parliament. 

The situation in regard to the Reichstag is rather 
complicated. The last Reichstag had become de- 
cidedly unpopular, because it was too old, and. 
could no longer be considered actually represen- 
tative of the German people. Furthermore, 
Germany has been touched, as every other coun- 


try has, by the great wave which is described as 
a crisis of parliamentarism, of which I spoke in 
my first essay. I refer to that movement which 
is the result of the fact that the immense demands 
of the present times have so clearly revealed the 
limits of the efficiency of a many-headed parlia- 
ment, and its weakness in groping for new forms 
for the highest legislative organs. This skepticism 
toward Parliament has grown quite strong in Ger- 
many, and has increased under the influence of 
the last parliamentary election on May 4, 1924. 
The representation of the professions and trades, 
the council idea, dictatorship, and directory are 
some of the chief institutions proposed as sub- 
stitutes, but none of these suggestions were made 
with a unanimity and emphasis which renders their 
realization probable. With these very decided 
reservations one cannot say that the institution of 
a parliament as such is repudiated in Germany by 
public opinion. Practical experience in the system 
of proportional representation has disillusioned 
very many. 

The institution of a president is naturally a 
thorn in the flesh for both those of the right and 
those of the extreme left. But, in my opinion, 
very few people in Germany have really at present 
an expectation of this institution's being abolished, 

1 183] 


The predominant majority in Germany has at 
least reasonably accepted the presidency nolens 

On the other hand, we are in general quite 
aware in Germany that the relation between the 
Empire and the "Lands" must be changed sooner or 
later, and this in the direction of Bavarian wishes 
as a result of the Bavarian attitude. Even the 
Unitarists, who are in my opinion numerically in 
the decided majority, are no longer able to deny 
this political necessity. This appears to me the 
only point in which the question of constitutional 
reform has really attained actuality, or is beginning 
to do so, 

If the German people had to construct a new 
constitution today, either by a plebiscite, or by the 
agency of a national assembly as was the case at 
Weimar, the consultations would naturally take a 
different course than they did at Weimar. This 
for the reason that the parties now have a clearer 
conception of their positions than at Weimar. 
There, surprised by the novelty of the situation 
and the unexpected increase in their power, they 
frequently continued in their old tactics, and 
occasionally acted in opposition to their real party 
interests. Whether many different decisions 
would result from a reconsideration of the con- 



stitution cannot be answered. But if the German 
people were asked today the question of whether 
the Weimar constitution should be fundamentally 
altered or abolished, the majority would probably 
answer "No." In this connection it is very inter- 
esting to remember that in Bavaria, as well as in 
Baden, plebiscites regarding changes in their con- 
stitutions were recently held with negative results. 
In only one point would a reconsideration 
probably manifest a different will, and this would 
be in the direction of the Bavarian Memorandum 
on the revision of the German constitution in the 
federalistic direction. But this brings me to the 
subject of my next discussion. 





The scholar who probably has exerted the most 
lasting influence on political science in our genera- 
tion in Germany is Professor Georg Jellinek, who 
died a few years ago in Heidelberg, a man who was 
also closely concerned with American political 
thought and theory. In his very well-known 
pamphlet entitled, Die Erklarung der Menschen- 
und Burger-Rechte (The Declaration of the Rights 
of Men and Citizens) y which is regarded as quite 
a classic in Germany, he brings evidence that 
not Jean Jacques Rousseau's Contrat Social, but 
the Bills of Rights of the American state con- 
stitutions, became after 1776 the direct example for 
the Declaration des droits de Fhomme et du citoyen 
of the great French Revolution. 

One of the greatest and, in my opinion, insuffi- 
ciently appreciated services of Georg Jellinek is 
his insistence in his treatise on the Allgemeine 
Staatslehre (General Theory of State} upon the im- 
portance of the idea of unity for the comprehen- 
sion of the state. 1 This idea of unity, which the 

1 Op. cit. (3d ed, 1923), p. 177. 

1 189] 


American philosopher William James maintained 
in his book on Pragmatism, is the most central of 
all philosophic problems because it is so fruitful. 

Unfortunately Georg Jellinek, while showing 
us the importance of unity for the comprehension 
of the state, and also including this word in his 
definition of the state, did not develop the thought 
in detail. Without doubt, he would otherwise 
have explained the relativity of the idea of unity 
in all the manifestations which specifically inter- 
est a scholar of political science from whatever 
side he may happen to approach this problem. 

What appears to us in public life from a 
synthetic point of view as unity is dissolved by 
an analytical consideration into an endless, ever 
further divisible plurality of facts, connections, 
and functions, which does not even stop with the 
individual. The state then becomes a vast multi- 
tude of people, the line of action of endless legal 
relations and actions imputed to it. 

The so-called Staatswille (will of the state) be- 
comes a mental synthesis of numberless acts of 
volition of human groups, parliaments, ministries, 
cabinets, state officials, etc. 

The legal prescription which we habitually 
characterize as a specific general rule of conduct 
acquires quite a new aspect, considered from this 



point of view. I am naturally not referring to 
the fact that such a legal prescription may be 
dissolved into single words and letters, or that its 
creation is the result of a thousand single actions. 
It can, besides this, be conceived as a plurality of 
commands and prohibitions, which are addressed 
to an indefinite mass of people and are intended 
to last an indefinite period of time, during which 
it will be applied in an indeterminable number 
of cases, and neglected in others. 

Legal obedience, the premise for legal validity, 
becomes a constantly repeated confession of many 
people to legality, or at least resignation toward 
the law, chiefly inspired by motives of loyalty or 

Patriotism then appears to us as a plurality 
of social-psychological sentiments and conditions 
among the members of a social group. 

The relativity of the idea of unity interests 
us here especially for the reason that it also 
provides the explanation for the possibility of 
dissonance among the elements of a unity, and 
even in the directions not essential to the unity 
between these elements and the unity itself. 

Every human decision is finally the result of a 
struggle in the human breast. Every decision 
of will, as well as the formation of will' in a social 


group, is preceded by struggle, victory, defeat, and 
compromise which have transpired in its depths. 

Every social unity is a complicated being com- 
posed of numerous sub-unities, down to the indi- 
vidual; sub-unities, none of which are able fully 
to embrace the larger composite unity. 

It has been claimed that the state embraces 
men potentially in their whole being. This is 
incorrect, for love, hate, compassion, and fear, in 
short all the inner life of humanity, is not fully 
accessible to any collective group, neither the 
church nor the family nor the state. And there- 
fore it is possible, in fact even usual and necessary, 
that all social units, beginning with man, stand 
in numerous social relations to many other units, 
some of which are relations within the substratum 
of the unity, some of which are relations of 
antagonism. This applies primarily to the social- 
psychological unities; but it is also analogically 
true of the so-called teleological unities: those 
manifestations which are connected by their pur- 
pose as a subjective unity. 

From the point of view of purpose, the problem 
of unity or plurality in connection with the state 
is primarily a problem of legal technique. The 
fundamental question in this respect is that of 
how the state can be best organized and con- 


structed in order that it may most practically and 
easily satisfy its purpose and best fulfil the duties 
imposed upon it. Decentralization, centraliza- 
tion, state administration, and self-government, 
the division of competencies between the central 
power and the member-powers in the composite 
state, the relation of motherland and colony, etc., 
are the chief titles with which the concrete prob- 
lems of this antithesis, unity and plurality, are 
characterized from a teleological point of view. 

In all these cases a deeper examination inevi- 
tably encounters social-psychological problems, 
however, discovers social-psychical beings with a 
superindividual will, groups of people who are held 
and united by the psychic bond of a group will 
"social-psychic unities," as we shall call them. 
* * * 

All these theoretical deductions, especially the 
fact of the relativity of the idea of unity, the 
distinction between the teleological and the social- 
psychic unity, and the principle of plurality in 
unity, prove to be an unusually fruitful basis for 
the continuance of the ideas which I explained in 
my discussion on the principle of self-determination, 
and further for the comprehension of the group of 
questions with which I closed my last discussion on 
the spirit of the new German constitution. 



The nation is for us a social-psychological 
unity of individuals, united by a national con- 
sciousness. We can perceive that this conscious- 
ness of belonging together does not necessarily 
have as its object the desire to form a single state, 
and thus we recognize a difference between the con- 
ception of a cultural nation and a political nation. 

We can now perceive further that the national 
consciousness of a nation united as a political 
people must not go so far as to exclude within 
itself the formation of sub-unities of very clear 
individuality and considerable exclusiveness, or to 
prevent divergence and antagonism between these 
sub-unities among themselves, or toward the higher 
unity of the nation and the national state. The 
principle of plurality in unity maintains its efficacy 
here. This dissonance and antinomy may be of a 
constitutionally technical, teleological character. 
But it may also be based on social-psychic contrasts. 

In this you have, in my opinion, the basis for 
explaining all the organizational and constitutional 
disputes which occupied the men who framed 
the American Constitution; which were widely 
discussed before the war of secession; which com- 
pose the background of all the theoretical ques- 
tions concerning the League of Nations and 
organized internationalism* It is likewise the key 

1 15*1 


to comprehending the present differences between 
the German Empire and the "Lands/' especially 
between the Empire and Bavaria, the Empire 
and the Weljen (Guelphs) and the separatistic 

Herein you further have the basis for an answer 
to the question of whether Germany is a nation, 
in spite of the just-mentioned troubles, and in 
spite of all which is happening today in the Rhine 
provinces, the Saar, and the Palatinate. And 
finally, what I have said forms, in my opinion, the 
premise for explaining the scientific discussion of 
ideas like unitarism, federalism, particularism, 
separatism, centralism, state administration and 
self-government, centralization and decentraliza- 
tion, and so forth. 

Only one of these terms, however, is essential 
for 'the question of whether the German Empire is 
really a national state today, namely, that of 
separatism, or, as we shall add to avoid confusion, 
of Reichseparatism (separation from the Empire) ; 
for only the existence of a movement of the Ger- 
man people with the aim "away from the Empire" 
is incompatible with the idea of a German national 
state that idea of which Germany dreamed for 
a thousand years and which became an actuality 
through Germany's greatest statesman, Bismarck. 


What is the truth, however, in regard to this 
Reichseparatism? To be sure, since the revolution, 
beginnings of a tendency in this direction have 
sprung up here and there. We have been able to 
observe this especially in East Prussia, Pomerania, 
Bavaria, in the Palatinate, and in the Rhine 
provinces. This was chiefly the case directly after 
the war and the revolution, consequently in 
excited times, in which all kinds of mischief are 
accustomed to flourish. 

A number of these tendencies are by no means 
to be regarded as separatistic in a technical sense, 
that is, as an at least primitively organized group 
movement, with the object of separation from 
Germany, but rather as speculations on what 
should be done in case Germany should be sub- 
merged in bolshevism, and exposed to constitu- 
tional chaos. The men who indulged in such 
speculations under these circumstances were not 
always the worst among us. 

Every incident tending toward Reichseparatism 
in Bavaria which has become known, as, for 
instance by the trial of Baron Leoprechting, is in 
my opinion no more than an isolated phenomenon. 

In the Rhine provinces what has been and is 
now taking place under the name of separatism is, 
according to the opinion generally prevailing in 


Germany, either rheinisch Particularism, a tend- 
ency away from Prussia (Prussian separatism), 
or an artificially rigged-up movement, instigated 
from without, and supported chiefly with foreign 
money by a few fanatics or criminals, far too weak 
and too little rooted in the soil really to be called a 
movement, much less to be dignified by an "ism." 
What exists here is in no way Reickseparatism. 

I cannot substantiate in detail the opinion here- 
with expressed, which by the way is supported 
by men such as President Wilson, General Allen, 
Mr. Noyes, and other non-German witnesses, for 
the reason that I would be obliged to produce a 
great amount of documentary evidence. I would 
have in particular to acquaint you with the con- 
tents of an official publication 1 the climax of which 
is a protest against the remarkable action of Major 
Louis, who on October 24, 192,3, declared the 
Palatinate to be independent in a session of its 
District Assembly (Kreistag), fortunately without 
any success. 

Such circumstantiality would necessarily end 
in a detailed and extremely sharp criticism of a 
certain government. . But, according to the plan of 
these discussions, I am fortunately not under an 

1 "Notenwechsel zwischen der deutschen und der franzosischen 
Regierung uber die separatistischen Umtriebe in dem besetzten 
Gebiet," German White Book (1924), No. i. 



obligation to support the opinion just uttered with 
evidence, for my chief purpose is to reproduce Ger- 
man opinion and German sentiment for you, and in 
regard to this point there is only one opinion in 

Another question, not to be confused with that 
of Reichseparatism, is that of whether there exists 
a people's movement with the aim "away from 

This Prussian separatism confronts us in a 
threefold form: It is, first, a movement within 
Prussia. In certain territorially limited parts of 
Prussia there is a movement to separate these 
parts from Prussia and to constitute them as new 
"Lands" within the structure of the German Em- 
pire. The Guelph movement in Hannover and else- 
where, and certain tendencies in the Rhinelands, 
are to be valued thus. We shall call this move- 
ment "Prussian special separatism." 

Prussian separatism is, secondly, an instru- 
ment in the hands of certain Reichsfederalists to 
loosen the structure of the German Empire. This 
is particularly so in the case of the extreme groups 
of these federalists, whom we shall call "separatis- 
tic federalists," and of whom I shall soon speak. 
This movement we may call "Prussian general 

1 198 1 


Thirdly, by the slogan Zertrummerung Preus- 
sens ("Destruction of Prussia") an instrument 
is given Prussian separatism which has been used 
by general separatism, but especially by the 
German Unitarists who wish to achieve a German 
unitary state by means of a radical solution of the 
Prussian-German problem. 

What is the Prussian-German problem ? This 
problem means, as defined by the noted German 
teacher of constitutional law, Anschiitz, "the 
whole nucleus of questions relating to the correct 
union of the Prussian state with the German 

There are four solutions proposed for this prob- 
lem. First, the relation between the Empire and 
Prussia can be built up on the principle of Prussian 
hegemony within a German federated state. 
Secondly, the problem .can be solved by Prussianiz- 
ing Germany. A third solution is the transforma- 
tion of Prussia into a Reichsland the official 
term which was adopted to define the relation of 
the Empire and Alsace-Lorraine, but for which I 
am unable to find an exact English expression, as 
the literal translation "Empire's land" does not 
seem possible, and the term "dominion!*" which I 
would be tempted to use, is only applicable to 
colonies. The fourth solution is that of destroy- 


ing Prussia, dividing it more or less completely 
into its different provinces, either as the equal 
members of a German federated state, or as prov- 
inces of a unitary state, in which these "Lands," 
decentralized to the greatest possible extent, would 
have equal rights with the other member-states. 

The third of these propositions, the idea of a 
Reichsland, demands a short explanation. The 
idea on which it is founded is that Prussia, and 
only Prussia of all German "Lands," shall re- 
nounce her state rights, that the organs of the 
Empire shall administer the affairs of a Reichsland 
Prussia invested with broad autonomous compe- 
tencies. Prussian laws would be passed by its 
representatives in the Parliament of the Empire 
and so forth. 

I would not enlarge on these ideas, which, by 
the way, date as far back as the year 1848, were 
it not for the fact that they are much discussed 
in Germany, and are supported by men to whom 
great influence must be attributed in public affairs. 

The doctrine of Prussian hegemony in the 
German Empire was to a large extent embodied in 
the German constitution in 1871, and during the 
course of its development became associated with 
certain premises of the second proposal, the idea 
of Prussianization. The way in which this 



hegemonial principle was incorporated in the 
constitution of 1871 without wounding the vanity 
and sensitiveness of the non-Prussian federated 
princes must be characterized as a constitutional 
and political master-stroke. 

The thought of introducing a German Einheits- 
staat (unitary state) by destroying the statehood 
of Prussia as well as of the other members of the 
German Empire dominated many brains after the 
revolution. It especially haunted the father of 
the new constitution, Professor Hugo Preuss, who 
was then imperial minister of the interior and who 
gave it quite a pronounced and sharp expression 
in his first draft of the constitution. Paragraph 
ii of this draft provided: 

The German people may form new autonomous republics 
within the Empire without consideration of the state bound- 
aries until now in existence, in so far as the tribal nature of the 
inhabitants, the economic conditions, and the historic rela- 
tions warrant the formation of such states. Newly formed 
autonomous republics must comprise at least two million 

And in Paragraph 29 he even sketched the method 
of dividing the German Empire for election pur- 
poses until the definite formation of the new 
autonomous republics. He recognizes a Prussia 
which consists only of East and West Prussia, 


and .the district Bromberg, a Silesia, a Branden- 
burg, an autonomous Berlin, a Lower Saxony; he 
treats the three Hansa cities as a unit, then follows 
Upper-Saxony, together with the district of 
Merseburg and parts of German-Bohemia. (You 
will notice here the so-called Grossdeutsche Gedanke, 
a term which can only be inexactly and rather con- 
fusedly translated as the idea of a greater Ger- 
many, and is not to be in any way confused with 
the Pan-German movement.) As an eighth unit 
Thuringia follows, then Westphalia, Hessen, the 
Rhine provinces, Bavaria, Wiirtemberg, Baden, 
then as another expression of the Grossdeutsche 
Gedanke German-Austria, and finally Vienna. 

The German constitution of 1919 poured much 
water into this unitaristic wine. Article 1 8 provides 
unusually complicated provisions for the process 
by which the existing boundaries of "Lands" can be 
changed and new German "Lands" created, and 
thereby implicitly relegates the final solution of 
the Prussian-German problem to the future. 

It is interesting to add that Article 18 has not 
as yet led to the diminution of Prussia. In two 
cases so far the question of separating parts of 
Prussia and constituting them as separate Ger- 
man cc Lands" has taken an acute form in Germany. 
I refer to Upper Silesia and the Hannoverian ques- 



tion. The Upper Silesians answered the question 
of whether they wished to form a separate "Land" 
or remain within Prussia submitted to them on 
September 3, 1922, according to Articles 167 and 
1 8 of the constitution, in favor of remaining with 
Prussia. They now constitute, according to a 
Prussian law, an autonomous Prussian province in 
so far as the territory did not come under Polish 

The recent plebiscite of the Hannoverians who, 
as is well known, lost their sovereignty in the year 
1866, and were incorporated in Prussia, on the 
analogous question of whether they should remain 
with Prussia or form an independent "Land," led 
to the same result. 

What I have said of Article 18 applies only to 
the destruction of Prussia. As a matter of fact, 
the latter has been enlarged by the incorporation of 
Pyrmont, a part of the "Land" Waldeck-Pyrmont, 
as a result of this article by an imperial law of 
March 24, 1922, and the question of whether 
Waldeck should also be incorporated in Prussia 
is still pending. Furthermore, Article 18 is the 
legal background for the union of the Lilliputian 
states in Thuringia, which are now joined as one 
"Land/* Thuringia. Coburg, a part of the former 
Thuringian state Sachsen-Coburg-Gotha, also lost 


its independence on the ground of Article 18, being 
incorporated in Bavaria by an imperial law of 
April 30, 1920. The rest of Sachsen-Coburg- 
Gotha was absorbed by Thuringia. 

If I may venture to add a word regarding 
Prussia's hegemonial position in the German 
Empire, it is to be noted that the new constitution 
has entirely abolished it, not least by the fact that 
the close and manifold association between the 
Prussian and German official organizations which 
existed formerly has been dissolved. This asso- 
ciation found its culmination in the possession of 
the imperial dignity by the Prussian crown, a 
combination which rendered antagonism between 
the policy of the Empire and Prussia practically 
impossible. This has now been changed, and in 
fact slight differences between Prussia and the 
Empire have already manifested themselves. But 
the hegemonial position of Prussia has also been 
curtailed by according her too few representatives 
in proportion to her inhabitants in the Reichsrat 
(Council of the Empire). 

Today the Unitarists, with Professor Preuss at 
their head, have changed their opinion, and are at 
present the most active opponents of this idea of 
smashing Prussia which they formerly supported. 1 

1 See H. Preuss, Um die Reichsverfassung, Berlin, 1924. 


One has the impression that both tendencies, 
special, as well as general separatism, in Prussia 
have today passed their zenith, especially general 
separatism. It is naturally impossible to prophesy 
what tomorrow may bring. The special separa- 
tism of Prussia is at least shelved. A number of 
resolutions have been passed by the local party 
organizations in the Rhineland not to consider this 
question during the occupation, and the defeat of 
the Guelphs in the plebiscite mentioned above also 
illustrates my statement. The Vorabstimmung 
(preliminary plebiscite) instigated by the German 
Hannoverians, on May 18, 1924, in five districts 
of Hannover, on the question of the secession of 
the province of Hannover with the exception of 
the municipal district Aurich, from Prussia, and 
the establishment of this province as an inde- 
pendent German "Land/* lacked the third of the 
voters (589,600) legally necessary by 140,639 votes. 
(There were only 448,961 votes in favor of the 
secession of the territory in question.) It is of 
particular significance that this one-third was not 
reached in any of the municipal districts con- 

This result was the more important, as a 
victory of the Guelphs would doubtless have 
provided an incentive for further secessionistic 



movements, for there are at present certain tend- 
encies to unite this territory with other "Lands." 

Another movement at present in the foreground 
of discussion in Germany is the so-called "federal- 
ism." This expression, "federalism," as well as 
that of "federalists," has not quite clearly defined 
usage in Germany today. It is sometimes applied 
to the idea of and tendency toward the Bundestaat 
(federated state), in the same sense, if I am not 
mistaken, in which it is generally used in the 
United States. Apparently, however, it is being 
applied more and more in Germany to all political 
tendencies away from the unitary state the ideal 
of the tendency designated as unitarism whether 
in the direction of a federated state or in that of a 
Staatenbund (confederation of states). 

Both species of federalism, that directed toward 
the federated state as well as that toward the con- 
federation of states, have one thing in common: 
both wish to emphasize the statehood of the 
parts of the higher unity. But only the first 
species, the tendency toward the federated state, 
is really seriously interested in the state unity of 
the whole, only this tendency earnestly wishes 
a state plurality and at the same time a state 
unity a state unity constructed from a plurality 
of states. 



The second more radical species of federalism, 
which we shall call "separatistic federalism," when 
consistently analyzed negates the state-bond 
between the individual state units, and substitutes 
in its place a treaty, an alliance. Thus the tend- 
ency toward Foedus is typical of separatistic fed- 

Consequently, we have here four different 
political tendencies: (i) absolute separatism, which 
strives for the complete dissolution of a state unity 
of any kind, the abolishment of every legal connec- 
tion between its former parts; (2) separatistic 
federalism, which tends in the direction of a 
confederation of states; (3) pure federalism, as 
we shall call it, the ideal of which is the federated 
state; and finally, (4) the unitary state, with its 
many variations* 

As we are here dealing with tendencies, one 
does not, in fact, exclude the other. It is possible 
to point out the partial realization of several of 
these principles in one and the same state body at 
the same time, unitaristic as well as federalistic 
and separatistic. This is as much the case in the 
constitution of any other composite state body. 
Pure types exist only in theory, never in reality. 

In this group of political tendencies what we 
call "particularism" has no place. It is often 


confused with separatism, and may frequently, 
though not necessarily, manifest itself as such. 
It also often appears as federalism, in one of its 
two forms, but this again is not necessary. 

Particularism is simply the strongly developed 
social-psychological feeling of unity in a part of a 
larger social unit, the concentration of the smaller 
unit, and the preference for it without necessarily 
opposing the larger unit. 

Pure federalism, which strives for the federated 
state, may manifest itself alternatively or cumula- 
tively in the two directions typical of the federated 
state. First, it may manifest itself in the claim 
of the member-states to participate in the forma- 
tion of the will of the federated state, especially 
in its legislation. Secondly, it may appear in the 
demand for a circumscription of the competencies 
of the federated state, on the one hand, of the 
members, on the other, and of the relations of 
these competencies to each other. 

Federalism has, as is known, its chief stronghold 
today in Bavaria. The differences, which have 
been very serious, between the Empire and Bavaria 
are to be attributed to various causes. Apart from 
a constitutional Bavarian particularism combined 
with, and stimulated by, the small love which 
many Bavarians have for the Prussians, and com- 



bined with certain current mass-pathological 
phenomena, two reasons for this come especially 
into consideration party politics and federalism, 

As for the first reason, the dominating political 
as well as official attitude in Bavaria has been 
directed decidedly farther to the right than in 
other parts of Germany, especially Berli^ since 
the overthrow of Kurt Eisner's dictatorship in 
Bavaria with the assistance of Prussian forces. 
Since the last elections for the Reichstag, however, 
this dissonance has been not inconsiderably re- 

To this is added the fact, closely related both 
as cause and effect, that Bavaria is the residence, 
refuge, field of operations, and center of activity 
of certain radically directed non-Bavarians, with 
General Ludendorff and Hitler at their head. At 
the present time, therefore, two great movements 
are operating side by side in Bavaria, the "Blue- 
White movement," named after the Bavarian 
national colors and containing men like Kahr, 
Lossow, and Seisser, and beside it the "Black- 
White-Red movement/' named for the colors of 
the old German Empire, whose extreme exponents 
are Ludendorff and Hitler, and which contains 
much black and white Prussian character. Each 
of these movements is engaged in inner political 



party struggles with Berlin. Otherwise they 
have, as you know, as a result of differences 
relating to time and method, become inimical 
brothers, who faced each other with tjie most 
bitter resentment and wrath in the Hitler trial 
before the bar of the Munich Folksgericht (People's 

Naturally, I do not intend to assert that all 
Bavaria belongs to one of these two factions. On 
the contrary, the Bavarian elections of April 6 and 
May 4 gave almost the same multi-colored picture 
in the composition of the Bavarian Landtag 
(parliament) as in the other German parliaments 
and the Reichstag, only the color combination is 
a little different. The Bavarian People's party, 
which is there the Zentrum, and Kahr's party re- 
ceived 46 seats; the Volkische Block, 23; the Social 
Democrats also 23, the Mittelstandsbund, 10, the 
Communists, 9, etc. 

The Blue-White party is the chief exponent of 
the federalistic idea in Bavaria. In fact, that 
overemphasis upon the unitaristic idea, combined 
with a dissonance in political sentiment between 
Bavaria and Berlin, is the main reason for the 
differences between the Empire and Bavaria is 
proved by glancing over the incidents which have 
led to conflict and dissatisfaction. Almost invari- 


ably these have been occasioned by measures of 
the Empire affecting Bavaria which are in opposi- 
tion to the political belief prevalent there, and 
which, according to Bavarian opinion, at the same 
time injure Bavarian interests. This is especially 
apparent in both the chief disputes, first, in that 
which resulted from the passage of the Gesetz 
mm Schutze der Republik (Imperial Law for the 
Protection of the Republic) and the Reichs Krim- 
inalgesetz (Imperial Criminal Police Law) after 
the murder of Walter Rathenau in the summer of 
1922. Both these laws were regarded by the 
Bavarian government, and by the prevailing pub- 
lic opinion in Bavaria, as directed against the 
existing political tendencies as well as against the 
"sovereignty" of Bavaria, with the result that 
Bavaria itself passed a law for the protection of 
the Republic. The president of the Bavarian 
ministry at that time, Count Lerchenfeld> said in 
an official announcement: 

These measures had an exceptional character contra- 
dictory to the essentials of true democracy. They were 
directed towards a class domination and to a socialistic 
unitary state striking ruthlessly over all the constitutionally 
assured sovereign rights of the "Lands/ 1 

A second dispute arose from the taking over 
of the Reichswehr stationed in Bavaria at the 

211 I 


end of October, 1923, by the Bavarian govern- 
ment. This measure in turn was caused by the 
dispute over the confiscation by the Empire of 
an ultra-radical paper appearing in Bavaria, the 
" Volkische Beobachter" which is an organ of the 
National Socialistic party, certainly in itself a 
small thing. 

The opinion that it is federalism which inspires 
the Bavarians in their attitude is underscored with 
particular emphasis by the "Memorandum on the 
Revision of the Weimar Constitution," presented 
January 8, 1924, by the ^Bavarian government to 
the imperial government. This "Memorandum," 
which is drawn up on essentially the same lines 
as the federalistic program of the strongest Bava- 
rian party, the Bavarian People's party, expresses 
the aspirations and aims of the Bavarian Blue- 
White party more completely than any com- 
ment I could make upon them. Consequently, 
I may be permitted to quote a few sentences to 
you from this "Memorandum," which is bound to 
become a milestone in the relations between 
Bavaria and the Empire, and in the history of 
the German constitution. The importance of 
this "Memorandum" is considerably increased 
by another memorandum with the title Das 
Reich und die Lander ("The Empire and the 


'Lands' ") presented to the Landtag of Baden by its 
president, Dr. Eugen Baumgartner, at the request 
of the Geschaftsordnungsausschuss (Commission for 
Proceedings), November, 1923, a document which 
sounds the same refrain as the Bavarian -"Memo- 
randum" from * which I now read: 

In the Weimar constitution a unitary spirit contrary 
to that of Bismarckian Federalism manifested itself. . . . 
The new form of the Empire's existence has proved itself 
unfruitful, the member-states have sacrified more vital 
strength than the Empire has gained by unitarism and 
centralization. According to all historic experience, states 
can only be preserved by the forces which have created them. 
In the case of the German Empire these were the forces centered 
in and emanating from federalism, not unitarism. . . . , x 

The idea of national unity? which has experienced its 
constitutional incarnation in the Empire, would not suffer any 
detriment by a reversion to Bismarck's federalism. Statehood 
of the "Lands" is not synonymous with national impotency; 
on the contrary, the German national state is only possible 
through the concentration of the historically founded Ger- 
man member-states, and on the basis of their constitutional 
and cultural existence. The true exponent of Germanism 
\des deutschen Volkstums] is not a unitary state composed only 
of individuals, but the multitude of constitutional and 
national (volkiscK) organisms as, and in so far as, they have 
been preserved in the German federated state. In the 
unitarism of the Weimar constitution the idea of the national 
state exceeds the optimum of unification and concentration 

1 Italics mine. 

f 213 I 


to its detriment. The unitaristic centralization of the 
Weimar constitution does not do justice to the historic Ger- 
man idea of the national state which is based on and emanates 
from the strong dynamic self-consciousness of the member- 
states toward the whole. 

It is clearly apparent from these words that 
Bavarian federalism is based primarily on social- 
psychological sentiment. 

It must not be overlooked, however, that there 
are in the Bavarian "Constitutional Memoran- 
dum" a number of arguments of a more technical 
administrative character in favor of a regressive 
revision of the constitution of the Empire, which 
to my regret I cannot here quote in detail. The 
most interesting feature of the same is perhaps 
that which maintains that: 

The political position of the economic powers, through the 
formation of cartels, trusts, and organizations embracing the 
employers and the employees of the whole Empire, is today 
so strong and hypertrophic that it may be said with a certain 
justice that not the state but economic power rules in the 
Empire, and this to the detriment of the state. The libera- 
tion of the Empire from its position in relation to economics 
is not possible without a considerable reduction of centraliza- 
tion. In place of the political center toward which economic 
power is now directed, and which is controlled by ij, a plu- 
rality of centers must again be established in order to break 
the power of the economic organizations which force their will 
upon the Empire today. 


I think this may at the same time be quite an 
interesting addition to what I said on this subject 
in my discussion of the German constitution. 

A further, extremely important fact can also 
be ascertained from the first part of the "Memo- 
randum" quoted above: The Bavarian constitu- 
tional movement has in fact no separatistic 
tendencies according to this "Memorandum." 
It affirms the German Empire, even a strong 
German Empire, and it affirms the German nation. 
It only negates unitarism, and proclaims state 
plurality in the unity of the national German state, 
pure federalism according to the Bismarckian 

In this last respect the "Memorandum" is 
not accurate. The Blue-White Bavarians do not, 
in fact, wish a reversion to a Bismarckian empire, 
for this would necessarily also mean a reversion to 
Prussian hegemony in the Empire. Bismarck's 
empire was a federated state, according to the 
decidedly prevailing opinion, which is disputed 
by only a very small group led by the deceased 
Munich professor of constitutional law, von 
Seydel, whose views closely resemble those of 
Calhdun in the United States. But the constitu- 
tion of this federated state was based upon a 
masterfully conceived psychological and technical 


system of Prussian hegemony in Germany and 
over the member-states, a system which at the 
same time shielded the vanity and sensitiveness 
of the federated princes, and the particularism 
of the member-states and their inhabitants, 
especially that of Bavaria to whom a number of 
Reservat-Rechfe (reserved rights) were accorded on 
the basis of the treaties of alliance which had 
preceded the foundation of the Empire. This 
Prussian hegemony manifested itself especially in 
the "Kaiser" title for the wearer of the Prussian 
crown, and the dominating role which Prussia 
played in the Eundesrat (Council of the Confed- 
eration). It extended, however, as a result of the 
growth of a number of new relations of an organ- 
izational character between Prussia and the 
Empire, much further than is apparent from the 
text of the imperial constitution and was con- 
tinually increasing with the passage of time. 

Bavaria naturally does not wish this Prussian 
hegemony back. It does not wish a hegemonial 
federalism, but rather one which is based on the 
principle of federalistic equality & la Constantin 
Frantz, Bismarck's great opponent, of whom the 
apt words were once written by the German 
scholar Triepel, "He remained unto his end the 
gloomy prophet who beheld the horsemen of the 

1 216 1 


Apocalypse riding from Prussia against confeder- 
ated Germany." 

Yet, not even the statement that Bavaria 
wishes federalistic equality is quite correct, for it 
is apparent from the "Memorandum" that the 
Bavarian government wishes a restoration of some 
of the old reserved rights of Bavaria in connection 
with traffic and especially the railroads, and also 
the post and telegraph systems. She really wants 
an inequality in favor of Bavaria. 

Several minor demands in excess of the Bis- 
marckian constitution might be mentioned but the 
most important features of the Bavarian aspira- 
tions are the two mentioned above: First, the 
regaining of greater influence by the "Lands" in 
the formation of the will of the Empire, and to 
this end restoration of the Reichsraf (Council of 
the Empire) to the position of the old Bundesrat 
(Council of the Federation) with a decisive influ- 
ence in the legislation of the Empire. 

The second direction of these ambitions tends 
toward a new circumscription of competencies 
between the Empire and "Lands" in many different 
spheres to the advantage of the "Lands," which are 
incidentally to be called "states" again. 

It would be going too far to explain the details 
to you here. I wish to mention only the two 

1 217 1 


most important points: the reconstruction of the 
"Lands"' independent power of organization by 
reinvesting them with so-called constitutional 
autonomy, of which Article 17 of the constitution 
of the Empire has deprived them. And secondly > 
the investment of the "Land" with full competency 
in the politics and administration of culture and 

The fact that Bavaria is a Catholic country, 
whose dominating party is the Catholic Bavarian 
People's party, is the paramount reason for this 
demand. These two matters belong exclusively in 
the hands of the "Land," according to the Memo- 
randum, which reads: 

The purpose of culture belongs to the state. German 
culture has grown and blossomed from the soil of the German 
races (Stamme) and their state organizations. The spirit of 
the people, which varied according to their race and their state 
form, was the soil which nourished it. Decentralization, not 
centralization, has stamped German culture with its indi- 
viduality. Even after the unification of the German races 
(Stamme) in a federated Empire this decentralization 
remained. The Empire experienced the realization of its 
state purpose of culture in its member states; it restricted 
itself to supporting and assisting the states in their adminis- 
tration of culture; the state was the pillar of the policy and 
administration of culture. Thus the realization of the pur- 
pose of culture was the task of the member states. And 
this kind of division of labor was to the equal advantage of 


both Empire and state. It corresponded to the German 
people's will for culture in the same degree that it did to 
their form of state life. 

An alteration in this relation of the state and Empire in 
the sphere of culture must affect the existence of the German 
states as much as that of German culture. The unitaristic 
spirit of the Weimar constitution did not hesitate to do this, 

The Bavarian people wish to remain the masters of their 
own souls y and the masters of the souls of their state; it is a 
Christian people, and wishes above all to holdfast to the Chris- 
tian state which it has created for itself, because it is filled with 
the conviction that without the strength resting in Christianity 
reconstruction is not possible^ and that the authority of the state 
cannot be upheld if the divine authority is no longer recognized? 
It does not see any guarantee for this conviction, however, if 
it is to be made dependent upon political powers, which in 
the last and decisive questions are frequently conclusive in 
the Empire. 

So much for the Bavarian "Memorandum/' 
which writes the fateful problem of church and 
state on the wall, and this in a surprisingly sharp 
and open form. 

The Unitarists, and others as well, oppose the 
federalistic tendency on which it is based with 
much energy. They call attention especially to 
the fact that the time is most unsuitable for a 
change of constitution in Germany, because it 
would inevitably weaken the Empire. Minister 

x Italics mine. 



Preuss even calls this Bavarian "Memorandum" 
a friendly invitation to national suicide. Atten- 
tion is especially called to the fact that such a 
policy means playing France's game, as nothing 
would be more acceptable to France than German 
"federalism." Numerous pieces of evidence sup- 
port this assertion. For example, in a communi- 
cation of November 29, 1918, of the French 
ambassador to the secretary of state of the United 
States, reprinted in Baker's Wilson? it is explicitly 
declared that the French are interested in the 
furtherance of German federalism. The French 
scholars Brunner and Berthelmy state that in 
consideration of the unitarism which has attained 
expression in the new German constitution, 
France has lost the war politically, And for us 
Germans there are in addition numerous proofs 
and indications of attempts since the beginning 
of the war to destroy German unity. Recently 
the text of a letter of September 30 October 
13, 1914, No. 497, from the Russian ambassador 
to France, Iswolsky, addressed to the Russian 
minister of foreign affairs, Sassanoff, was pub- 
lished in the German press in which we read: 

The chief object of France in this war, and therein all 
three Allied Powers are united, is the destruction of the 
1 Op. cit., Doc. Ill, p. 57. 

220 I 


German Empire, and the greatest possible reduction of 
Prussia's military and political strength. One must arrange 
the matter so that the German member-states mil themselves be 
interested therein? It is still too early to discuss the details 
of the future formation of the German state; England will 
probably demand the creation of an independent Hannover, 
which will naturally not be opposed by Russia and France. 
Schleswig-Holstein must be given to Denmark, etc., etc. 

What is going to happen ? The German gov- 
ernment has politely acknowledged the receipt of 
the Bavarian "Memorandum/* and has begun a 
consideration of its contents. The Blue- White 
party in Bavaria has suffered severe losses in 
the last election; the plebiscite on the question of 
whether Bavaria wishes a state president, which 
she now lacks, submitted by the dominating Bava- 
rian party at the same time as the elections, was 
to their surprise answered in the negative by the 
Bavarian people; and considerable relaxation in 
the tension between the Empire and Bavaria has 
taken place. The chief actors in the last event, the 
so-called Hitler-Putsch^ have left the stage. 
According to the American newspapers, General 
Ludendorff has now even broken off the party 
association with Hitler. General von Seckt, the 
commander-in-chief of the Reichswehr y has held 
a military review in Bavaria. But all this 

1 Italics mine. 

f 221 1 


occurred only after a governmental agreement, 
which gave heed to the Bavarian wishes in the 
adjustment of the military relations in Bavaria, 
had been made between the governments of 
Bavaria and the Empire. This is parallel to the 
events which followed the disagreements after 
Rathenau's murder. This incident ended by a 
similar agreement. We may also notice a " traffic 
agreement" of the same character between Bavaria 
and the Empire. And in the Third Emergency 
Tax Law, we find a very far-reaching prescription 
(Sec. 42), which hardly was to be expected therein, 
according to which the regulation and independent 
administration of public welfare, educational and 
school questions, and the police are transferred to 
the individual "Lands." In other words, without 
changing the constitution, the Bavarian wishes 
have received a high degree of consideration in a 
fashion which must not only interest the teacher of 
public law, but arouse certain legal doubts within 

But what will still happen ? Everything which 
has occurred so far can only be considered as 
temporizing* One can reply to this question only 
with the expression of good hopes. 

If, however, you ask the question, "What is 
your Fatherland ? " of me, or any German, in the 



vast majority of cases the answer would be given 
in the words of Freiherr von Stein, the great 
German reformer, after Napoleon had decimated 
Prussia and Europe: "I know only one Father- 
land, and it is called Germany." 




Aaland Islands, 94, 124 

Africa, 100 

Agricultural reforms, 128 

Air forces, 90 

Albanians, 117, 124 

Allen, General, 197 

Allied and Associated Powers, 

121, 122, 220 

Allied Control Commissions, 55 
Allies, 33, 46, 47, 5* 
All-Russian Congress, 143 
Alsace-Lorraine, 119, 128, 199 
Ambassadors, Conference of, 168 
America, 114; see United States 
American Committee, 43 
Americans, 49, 8i; problems of, 


Anarchy, 147 
Anschutz, 199 
Anti-Semitic movement, 15, 16, 

Arbitration, 87, 97, 99, 100; court , 

of, 101 

Armaments, 90, 99, 182 
Armenian atrocities, 128 
Armistice, 55, 57 
Asiatic problem, 127 
Aurich, 205 
Austria-Hungary, 115, 134, 180; 

dissolution of, 123 

Baden, 185, 213 
Barcelona, 94 
Baruch, Bernard, 38 
Baumgartner, Dr. Eugen, 213 
Bavaria, 184, 195, 196, 208 ff., 

211 f., 216, 217; elections in, 

Bavarian Memorandum, 184, 

213, 214, 217, 218 , 221 
Bavarian People's party, 17, 212, 

218; attitude of, 184; (Zen- 

trum), 210 
Belgium, 40, 41, 118; Flemish 

question in, 124 
Berlin, 98; flag incident in, 95 
Bernhardi, General von, 163 
Bessarabian question, 125 
Bills of Rights, 189 
Bismarck, 159, 162, 195 
Black-Red-White movement, 209 
Bliss, General, 43 
Block, P. J n 140 
Blue-White movement, 209, 210, 

212, 215, 221 

Bohm, Hildebert, 126 

Bok, Edward, Peace Award of, 105 

Bolshevism, 22, 196 

Bolshevists, National, 17 

Bosnia-Herzegovina, 117 

Bossuet, 148 

Bouvines, battle of, 140 


BrestLitovsk, 45, 134, 142, 143, 

British Empire, 123 
Brockdorff-Rantzau, Count, 48 
Buffer states, 24 
Bulgarians, 117, 124 
Bundesrat, 158, 216, 217 

Calvo, 36 

Carnegie Endowment, 8 

Casa Blanca dispute, 101 

Catholics, German, 17; see Zen- 

Cecil, Lord Robert, 43 

Central Powers, 117, 144 

Chancellor of the Empire, 166 

Christian Social party, 17 

Civil damages, 45 

"Clean hand, the," 87 

Clemenceau, 153 

Coburg, 203 f. 

Collectivism, 141 

Commission of Inquiry, of the 
Reichstag, 98 

Communism, 21 

Communists, 14, 17, 21, 210 

Compensation, 67; see Repara- 

Conference, Washington Labor, 

Congress, declaration of, 87 

Conscription, 182 

Conservatives, 15 

Constitution: American, 194; 
Memorandum on the Revision 
of the Weimar, 212 f.; the new 

German, 20, 53, 122, 153, 155, 

157, 161 ff., 164, 168, 171 f., 
178, 179, 180, 193, 202, 213, 
220; the old, of 1871, 157, 158, 
1 60, 163, 164, 200 f.; of Paul's 
Church (Frankfurt), 1849, 157, 

158, 164 

Corfu, Declaration of, 116 

Council idea, 183 

Council of People's Commission- 
ers, 161 

Council of the Empire, 161, 166, 
182, 204 

Croatia, 116 

Croat nationalists, 117 

Crusades, 139 

Cuno, Charicellor, 175 

Currency, stabilized, 68 

Customs, 65 

Czecho-Slovakia, 115, 118; lan- 
guage of, 115 

Czechs, 115, 124, 125 

Czernin, 134 

Dalmatia, 117 

Danzig, 24, 92, n 8, 119; separa- 
tion of, 120 

Davis, Norman H., 38 

Dawes Commission, 58; plan, 65, 

Dawes Report, 33, 48, 58, 64, 66, 
67, 69, 70; basis for negotia- 
tions, 67 

Democratic party, 18, 91 

Denmark, 118 

Deutsche Industrie und Han- 
delstag, x 


Disarmament, 46, 85, 97; Com- 
mission for, 94 

Dombrowski, 176 

" Draft Treaty for Mutual Assist- 
ance," 43 

"Draft Treaty of Disarmament 
and Security," 43 

East Prussia, 120, 196; Masu- 

rians in, 119 
Ebert, 121 
Economic Council, 163; Imperial, 

182; Temporary Imperial, 156, 

Economic freedom of action, 66, 


Eisner, Kurt, 209 
Elections, 18, 21, 22, 119; laws, 


England, 87, 96, 101, 113,130 
Entente, 33, 56 
Eotvoes, Baron, 130, 132 
Erfurter Program, 163 
Eupen-Malmedy-Monschau, 92, 

95, U9 
Europe, 54, 88, 112, 114, 141 

Expansionism, 78, 142 

Fascists, German, 17 
Federalism, 6, 147, 182, 195, 206, 

208, 213, 220 
Federalist, 114 
F6nelon, 148 
Fichte, 96 

Financial Committee, 94 
Financial Conference in Brussels, 


Finke, 140 

Fischer, Dr. Eugene, x 

France, 87, 96, 100, 118, 157, 219 

Frankfurt, 163, 164 

Frantz, Constantin, 216 

French Code Civil, 37 

French, conditions of peace in, 48 

French Revolution, 140, 141, 189 

French Yellow Book, 35 

Fried, 96 

Friedrich, Wilhelm IV, 162 

Fries, Johann Jacob, 96 

Garanties, 33, 41, 43, 44; "repri- 
sals," 42; see Guaranties 

Geneva, x, 94, 104 

Genoa Conference, 117 

George, see Lloyd George 

German-American Mixed Claim 
Commission, 90 

German-Austria, 24, 115, 118, 
122; question of union, 119, 
121, 202 ; struggle, 162 

German-Bohemia, 119 

German Empire, 121, 122, 153, 
I5 8 > J 59> T 95> J 98 201, 209; 
Cabinet of, 1 82 ; division of, 202 

German League of Nations 

Union, x, 91 

German minorities, 117 f. 
German National Assembly, 161 
German party system, 12, 13 
German Peace Delegation, 50 
German people: ability to work, 

27; minimum of existence, 66; 

moral soundness, 28 

| 229 I 


German People's Liberty party, 

German Republic, the new, 10, 
160; proclamation of, 167 

German statistics, 55, 60 

Germanic Confederation of 1815, 

Germans, 116, 117; ancient, 140; 
Sudete, 121 

Germany, 33, 47, 100, 134, 216; 
abstinence from manufacture, 
175; affirmation of Dawes Re- 
port, 68; and arbitration, 100, 
loi; attitude to foreign prob- 
lems, 52; bankruptcy, 174; 
bolshevism, 22; capacity of, 57, 
64, 71; chaos in, 13; charity in, 
61; conditions, 58; cost of liv- 
ing, 64, 66; creditors, 70; crisis 
in commerce and industry, 70; 
debt of, 6, 67; emigration from, 
59; exports of, 68_; foreign 
minorities, 118; foreign policy, 
89; government, 93; guilt of, 
47, 4^ 3 5; independence, 53; 
lack of books, 8, 61 ; no leader 
in, 19; and League of Nations, 
52, 75, 91 , 93 ; luxury in, 62, 63; 
moral disease, 29; morally 
responsible, 38, 51 ; and Peace 
Conference, 98; personal free- 
dom, 181; political conditions, 
3; power of production, 46; 
right to existence, 68; rights in, 
181; separatism, 119, 189; sov- 
ereignty, 53; spiritual contact 
of, 8; no spoils system, 179; as 
a state, 47, 153; will and 
opinion of, 9, 13; in world- 
market, 66 

Geschaftsaufsicht, 64 
Government, form and purpose 

of, 6 

Grecian sovereignty, 117 
Greeks, 124 

Grossdeutsche Gedanke> 202 
Guaranties, 34, 44, 56, 68 
Guelph movement, 198 
Guelphs, 195, 205 
Guilt: acknowledgement of, 50; 

question of Germany's, 40, 49, 


Guilt Commission, 40 
Gypsy minorities, 117 

Habsburg dual monarchy, 131 

Hague Conferences, 97, 98, 100 

Hague Court, 34, 101, 124 

Hague Opium Convention, 97 

Hannover, 198 

Hannoverian question, 202, 203, 

Hegel, 163 

Helfferich, 65 

Herder, 96 

Hitier,2oq; group, 15; party, 15, 
16, 19, 21; -Putsch, 221; Re- 
publican, 15; trial, 15,20,210 

Hobson, Francis Thayer, x 

Honor, points of, 67 

House, Colonel, 47 

Housing problem, 60 

Huerta, 87 

Hungary, 118; West, 119 

Hygienic Conference, 94 


Imperialism, 78, 96, 139 
Income: per capita, 65; people's 

(Volkseinkommeri), 65 
Independence, Declaration of, 1 13 
Independents, 14 
Industry, Imperial Association of 

German, 175 

Initiative and referendum, 165 
International Labor Office, 94 
International law, 7, 40, 41, 79, 

81, 154; penal, 43 
International loan, 68 
International obligations, 90 
International Prize Court, 100 
Internationalism, 45, 47, 69, 77, 

?8, 79, 80, 83, 95, 105, 106 
Iron, 139 

Irredenta, 113, 138; Euro fa, 126 
Iswolsky, 220 
Italians, 117 
Italy, 17, 62, 96, 118, 142 

James, William, 190 
Jaworzina question, 125 
Jellinek, Georg, 148,153* l8 9> J 9 
Jews, 116; see Anti-Semitic 

Joffe, 143 

Jugo-Slavia, 117, n 8 
Justum et injustum Vellum, 38, 39 

Kaernten, 119 
Kahr, 209 
Kaiser, the, 40, 153 
Kant, Immanuel, 54, 82, 95, 96, 
133, 146, 148 

Kapp-Revolt, 174 

Klotz, 47 

Koniggratz, 162 

Konigsberg, 54, 60 

Krause, Carl Christian Friedrich, 


Kriege, Dr., 98 
Kuhlman, von, 134 f., 143 
Kunze (KnuppeLKunze)> 16 
Kurfursts, 176 

Lament, 47 

Land, 154 

Landliste, 22 

"Lands," German, n, 166, 175, 
182, 195, 200, 202, 206, 213, 

Lansing, 147 

Laun, Professor, x, 124, 130 

Lausitz, Saxon, 118 

Law, 5, 6, 104; and ethics, 6; and 
economics, 6; international, 7 

League of Nations, 4/43, 52,- 85, 
86, 92, 101, 103, 104, 120; 
Council, 89, 122, 1 68; Cove- 
nant of, 41, 83, 85, 86; Geneva, 
75, 91, 104, 125; and Germany, 
70, 86, 89, 90, 91, 92, 95; idea 
of, 104; International Court of 
the, 128; new members, 90; 
and United States, 86, 88 

Left wing of German party 
system, 24, 91, 183 

Legislation, economic, 156 

Leoprechdng, Baron, 196 

Lerchenfeld, Count, 211 

Liberty, 53, 54 

I 231 1 


Lieber, Francis, 148 

Lithuania, 118, 121, 125, 126; 

literacy, 121 
Lithuanians, 124 
Lloyd George, 50, 51, 70 
London plan of payment, 55, 64 
London Times, 51 
Lossow, 209 
Louis, Major, 197 
Luchaire, Professor Honoraire 

Julien, 4 

Ludendorff, General, 16, 209, 221 
Luther, Imperial Minister, 66 

Macaulay, 140 
Magna Charta, 140 
Magyars, 1 1 6, 117, 124 
Maingau, occupation of the, 92 
Mandates, 85; Commission for, 


"Manouba," dispute over, 34 
Mark, decline of the, 59, 61; 

paper, 28, 67 
Marks: gold, 65, 66, 173, 175; 

loan, 68 

Marx, Chancellor, 123 
Marxism, 15 
Masurians, 119 
Member-states, 154 
Memel, 119; question, 92, 120 
"Micum treaties," 56, 176 
Military forces, 90 
Millerand, 46 
Minorities, 116, 118; power of, 

12; protection of, 147, 156 
Minority party, 18 

Mittelstandsbundy 210 
Money, shortage of, 63 
Monroe Doctrine, 86, 88, 146 
Morocco, ico 
Munich trial, 15, 20, 210; see 

Mutualism, 76 

Napoleon, foreign policy of, 141 

Napoleon III, 142 

Nation, as a unity, 132 

National Assembly, 121 

National consciousness, 112, 194 

National-Liberal Association, 18 

National People's party, Ger- 
man (German Nationals), 15, 
1 6, 17, 1 8, 22 

National Radicals, 17, 22 

National Socialistic German 
Workman's party, 15 

Nationalism, 45, 77, 78, 105, 106; 
in the Hitler party, 15 

Nationality, in, 137; French, 
English, Dutch, 140; principle 
of, 124, 126, 129, 134, 139 f., 

Negro problem, 127 
Neutrality, violation of Belgian, 
4 o 

Newspapers, reduction of, 23 
Niemeyer, Theodor, 177 
Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 

. l63 
Nitti, 70, 126 

Novalis, 96 

"November criminals," 15 

Noyes, 83, 197 


Over-nations, repudiation of, 127 

Pacifism, 79, 98 

Palatinate, the, 195, 196, 197 

Pan-German movement, 202 

Paris Economic Conference, 78 

Paris Passport Conference, 93 

Paris Peace Conference, 39,42,46 

Particularism, 207, 208 

Parties, 23; political, 19 

Patriotism, 191 

Paul's Church: Assembly at, 162; 
constitution, 157, 158 

Peace, 79, 85; conditions of, 27, 49; 
translating, 48; negotiations, 
57; without annexations, 143 

Peace Decree of the All-Russian 
Congress of Workmen's and 
Soldiers' Deputations, 143 

Peace Negotiations, Program for 
the, 41 

"Peace, Report to the Imperial 
Cabinet on the Financial 
Conditions of," 48 

Penalties, 33 

People, 134; see State, Nation, 

Permanent Court of Interna- 
tional Justice, 94, 125 

Philippine question, 112 

Phillipson, Coleman, 36 

Plebiscite, 10, 92, 118, 119, 123, 
142, 145, 184, 221 

Poincar6's reparation plan, 42 

Poland, 1 1 6, 118, 119, 125; Ger- 
man tenants in, 94, 128 

Poles, 1 1 6, 1 1 8, 124 

Polish Corridor, 119 
Polish sovereignty, 203 
Pomerania, 196 
Posen, 128 

Preuss, Professor Hugo, 201, 204, 

Pronunciamento, 98 

Prussia, 10, 197 

Prussian hegemony, 199, 200, 

Prussian Military party, 12 

Quidde, 96 

Raditch, Stephen, 1 17 

Railroads, 65, 66 

Ranke, 140 

Rapallo treaty, 20, 90 

Rathenau, Walter, 211, 221 

Red Cross, 58 

Redslob, 130, 132, 154 

Reich y 17, 153 

Reichsland, 200 

Reichsrat, 160, 204, 217 

Reichstag, 17, 18, 19, 21, 91, 92, 
97, 102, 122, 1 61, 1 66, 182; con- 
fidence of the, 167; elections of, 
119, 209; old, 158 

ReicJiswehr, 178, 211, 221 

Reinsch, Paul S., 103 

Renan, Ernest, 129, 132 

Renner, Karl, 132, 133 

Rentenmark, 63 

Reparation Commission, 46, 47, 
68, 69, 1 68, 169; American del- 
egation, 47 

1*33 I 


Reparation question, 33, 34, 50, 
125; Dawes plan, 67, 68; effect 
of, 49; exports a basis for, 68; 
final sum, 66; German attitude 
toward, 49, 52, 54; and German 
liberty, 49, 53; London plan, 
55, 64; plans, 57; problem, 44, 
57, 68, 69, 77; and question of 
guilt, 52 

Reparations, 33, 34, 43, 44, 47, 48, 
56, 91; special claim of Bel- 
gium, 41 

Repko, Eike von, 107 

Representation, unit of, 10; pro- 
portional, 10 

Republic, the new German, 10 

Revolution, 6, 179; the concep- 
tion of, 6 

Rhine, occupation on the, 55; 
people expelled, 60; provinces, 
195, 196 

Right wing of German party 
system, 16, 18, 24, 91, 183 

Rights, fundamental, 155, 162, 
164, 181 

Roumania, 117, 124, 125 
Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 189 

Ruhr: inhabitants, 118; invasion, 
22, 42, 43, 56; occupation, 57, 
68, 92, 95; opposition on the, 
20; people expelled, 60, 67 

Russia, 96, 134; Czarist, 123; 
Rapallo treaty with, 20, 90; 
Soviet, 12, 22, 87, 125, 163 

Russian Federated Soviet Repub- 
lic, 125 

Russians, 116; White, 116 
Ruthenians, 116 

Saar, 195; Commission, 95; con- 
ditions in, 92; inhabitants of 
the, 1 1 8; mines, 41; problem, 

Sachsen-Coburg-Gotha, 203, 204 

Salzburgers, 123 

Sanctions, 33, 34, 41, 43, 44, 56, 
91, 172; compulsion of, 42; 
definition of, 39, 42; penal 
character of, 42; policy of, 22, 
33> 55> 6 7; system of, 68 

SassanofF, 220 

Scheinbliite, 63 

Schelling, 96 

Schlageter, execution of, 22 

Schlegel, 9 6 

Schleiermacher, 96 

Schleswig, North, 118 

Schucking, 96, 98 

Science, 3, 5, 6, 61, 62, 79, 83; 
abstract, 7; independence of, 
81; political, 5,7 

Secht, General von, 221 

Seisser, 209 

Self-determination, 113, 120, 
136; and democracy, 142; and 
Germany, 1 1 1 ; principle of, 77, 
124, 126, 156; right of, 144, 193 

Self-government, 193, 195 

Separatism, 189, 195, 196, 206; 
Prussian, 197, 198, 205 

Separatistic movement, 119, 140, 

Serbian state, 117 

Serbians, 116 

Seydel, von, 215 

Shotwell, Professor, 43 


Simons, Dr., German minister, 
5> 5i> i? 

Slavs, South, 117 

Slovakians, 115 

Slovenes, 116, 117 

Smuts, General, 47 

Social Democrats (United Social 
Democratic party), 14, 21, 91, 

Socialists, Independent,- 19, 21, 
163; majority, 14, 21 

Sovereignty, 53, 54, 84 

Spa, 46 

Spain, 17 

Spanish-American War, 88 

Spartacists, see Communists 

Spengler, Oswald, 70 

State, 25, in, 134, 137, 142, 192; 
conception of, 173, 189; multi- 
nationality, 115; outside fac- 
tors, 30 

Steiermark, 119 

Stein, Freiherr von, 223 

Stier-Somlo, Professor, x 

Stinnes-Lubersac Treaty, 176 

Stresemann, 18, 123 

Strikes, 64 

Strupp, 124 

Submarine warfare, 101 

Sugar, 65 

Suttner, Baroness von, 96 

Sweden, 124 

Switzerland, '62, 131 

talio, idea of, 41 

Tax Law, Third Emergency, 59, 
173, 174, 222 

Taxes, income, 66 

Tenants' party, 18 

Thuringia, 204 

Trade, 79, 80, 83; German, 66 

Traffic conferences, 93 

"Transfer proceedings," 66 

Transitory Law, 161 

Treaties, peace, with China, 90; 
with France, ico; interna- 
tional, 80; with Switzerland, 
101 ; with United States, 90 

Treaty of arbitration and con- 
ciliation, 101; German-Swiss, 
102; of St. Germain, 122; 
Stinnes-Lubersac, 176; world- 
arbitration, 101 ; of Versailles, 
3, 20, 24, 26, 27, 28, 34, 44, 47, 

49, 5*> 5 a > 82 > 8 5> 97> 90, 120, 
122, 126, 153, 169, 171, 181; sn 

Treipel, 216 

Treitschke, Heinrich von, 163 

Trotzki, 134 f., 143 

Turkish-Italian War, 34 

Turkish minorities, 117 

Turks, 124 

Tyrol, South, 119 

Tyrolese, 123 

Ukraine, the, 125 
Ukrainians, 124 

Under-nations, repudiation of, 138 
Unemployment, 175 
Unions, Public International, 

103; trade, 176; workers 1 , 174 
Unitarism, 6, 184, 195, 199, 204, 




United States, 56, 61, 87, 885-96, 
215, 220; foreign policies, 86; 
principle of isolation, 86, 87; 

, spoils system, 179 

Unity, economic, 68, 190; Ger- 

" man, 220 

Universalism, 77, 80, 85, 105 

University: of Berlin, 62; of Chi- 
cago, 6 1 

Upper Silesia, 202 f.; question of 
division, 89, 92, 95 

Valentin, Veit, 96, 163 

Vanderlip, Frank, 12 

Vanderpol, 39 

Versailles, 48; Peace Conference, 

Versailles, Treaty of, 3, 20, 24, 26, 
*7 a8, 35, 3 6 > 37, 39> 41, 44, 
49, 5 1 , 5 2 , 82, 85, 90, 97, 120, 
122, 126, 153, 169, 171, 181; 
debts, 68; Germany forced by, 
53 ; influence of, 1 68; interpreta- 
tion of, 56; penal clauses, 40; 
question of guilt, 40, 50; rati- 
fication of, 170; reparation 
clauses, 70 

Vienna, 125, 202 

Vilna, 125 

Vote, forms of, 10 

Folkische Block, 210 

Waldeck-Pyrmont, 203 
War, 78, 101, 105, 142, 179, 220; 
bonds, holders of German, 174; 

burdens, L 69; criminals, 24, 40, 
% i8i ; damages, 45, 46; indemni- 
fies, 35, 36, 37, 39. 

Washington, George, in, 148 

Wehberg, Dr. Hans, 96, 98 

Weimar, 48, 161, 162 ff,, 180 

Wendish, 118 

West Prussia, 128 

White Book, German, 197 

White Slave Conference, 94 

Wildholz, Colonel, 57 

Wilson, President, 33, 88, 197; 
ideals of, 37; influence in Ger- 
many, 1 68; and Monroe Doc- 
trine, 88; points, 56; principle 
of "the clean hand," 87 

Wimbledon case, 94 , 

Winkler, Dr. Wilhelm, x, 117 

World-conscience, 76, 103 

World-constitution, 82 

World-court, 100 

World-culture, 76 

World-dominion, 99 

World-federalism, 106 

World-law, 82 

World-war, 48 ; responsibility for, 
38, 51, 52; victors of the, 24, 84 

Wright, Professor Quincy, x 

Zeigner, 179 
Zeligowski, General, 126 
Ztntrum (Christian Social party), 

17, 91, 210 
Zorn, Professor, 98 



122 172