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Power, like a desolating pestilence, 
Pollutes whate'er it touches; and obedience, 
Bane of all genius, virtue, freedom, truth, 
Makes slaves of men, and of the human frame 
A mechanised automaton. 

SHELLEY, Queen Mob 







:. No. 

/?(/ } 



Eool. Iv 
























































A. Capitalist Economic Policy 131 

B. Capitalist Economic Law 133 

C. Capitalist Economic Form 135 


A. Autarchy 137 

B. State Monopoly of Foreign Trade 139 

C. A Currency Standard of Our Own 140 


A. Private Property? 142 

B. c EntaiF 144 

C. Repudiation of State Socialism 147 



A. The Coming System 153 

B. Management of the Transition 156 

C. Great Landed Estates 158 


A. The Factory Fellowship 162 

B. Contrast to Capitalism and Marxism 165 

C. Management of the Transition 166 


A. The Guild (or Corporation) 1 70 

B. Management of the Transition 172 











A. Abolition of the Party System 189 

B. Vocational Councils 192 

C. Chambers of Estates 197 











Aufbau 221 


Aufbau 223 


Aufbau 225 


Aufbau 227 





OTTO STRASSER, a Bavarian, was born on September 10, 
1897. His brother, Gregor, five years older, was killed 
by Goering's orders (Hitler accepted responsibility) in the 
Blood Bath of June 30, 1934. Both brothers were Nazis 
at a time when the National Socialists were really 
socialists as well as nationalists, and they remained 
socialists after Hitler had dropped this part of his creed. 
That was the untoward fact that led to Gregorys murder. 
Five years before this Otto had broken with Hitler; on 
May 10, 1933, he left Germany to become a refugee in 
Austria, subsequently in Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, 
and France (where he now resides) . 

Otto Strasser's ideas on German Socialism were 
incorporated in a book Aufbau des deutschen Sozialismus 
published in 1931, second edition 1936. The bulk of it 
appears in Part Three of the present volume, being 
essential to the author's presentation of Germany 
Tomorrow. Part One, c ls Revolution in Germany 
Possible? 5 , and Part Two 'Liquidation of the War (Peace 
Proposals of Tomorrow's Germany) 5 , were written at 
the turn of the year, i.e. well after the outbreak of the 
war, expressly for the present book. All three parts, and 
the Appendix matter, speak for themselves, so nothing 
more need be said about bibliography. 

Otto Strasser played an active part in the previous 
war, joining the Bavarian army as a volunteer on 
August 2, 1914, rising from the ranks' to become a 



lieutenant, decorated, and twice wounded. He took the 
degree of Doctor of Law in 1921, and for a time held an 
official post under the Weimar Republic. Then he was 
appointed legal adviser to an industrial concern in 
Berlin. For some years after this he was editor-in-chief 
(during the gradual rise of the Nazis) of most of the 
North German periodicals of the National Socialist 
Party. After his breach with Hitler he founded the 
Black Front, an anti-Hitler organization, which aims 
also (and chiefly) at promoting 'German Socialism 5 . 
It plays a considerable part in this book, and will 
perhaps play a still more considerable part in Germany 
Tomorrow, and in Europe the Day after Tomorrow. 
Since in Germany Today assassination has a recognized 
function in politics, it is not surprising that even as a 
refugee Otto Strasser has had several 'narrow squeaks'. 
But he still continues his reasoned (and bloodless) 
campaign for promoting the downfall of the Hitler 
System and the upbuilding of German Socialism a 
campaign with which Germany Tomorrow has much to do. 
The book is addressed, not only to Germans, but to all 
'Good Europeans 3 . 


May Dqy y 



THIS war is the inevitable outcome of the Hitler System. 
For the last ten years, and especially since Hitler seized 
power, I have been indefatigably trying to demonstrate 
as much in countless publications. 

Regard for historical truth makes it essential to state 
that Hitler's seizure of power was part of that Germano- 
European development to which I have given the general 
name of the 'German Revolution', by which I mean the 
birth of a new order in politics, economics, and civiliza- 
tion. Issuing from Germany, this will to a greater or less 
extent transform the established European system even 
as, at their respective times, did the English Revolution 
and the French. 

From this outlook we can understand the otherwise 
inexplicable mistakes and shortcomings of the statesmen 
of other lands, beginning with Dollfuss and Schuschnigg, 
going on to Hodscha and Beck, next to Francois Poncet 
and Nevile Henderson, and last of all to the men of the 
'Peace of Munich 5 since had it not been for these 
mistakes and shortcomings Adolf Hitler would never 
have been able to carry out his work of destruction and 
even so we have to recognize that such work of destruc- 
tion has been and is the necessary prelude to the up- 
building of the new order which is the meaning of this, 
as of every revolution. Contemplation based upon a 
study of the philosophy of history does much to lessen 
the blame attaching to the German people for the Hitler 
System and the war to which it has given rise. The 



Germans may have to shoulder the greater share of 
blame, but their share is only a part of the general load 
which must be assigned In varying degrees to the policies 
of other countries than Germany. 

Important, however, than the assignment of 

shares of blame to Hitler and his war (an 

assignment justified and restricted by our historical 

outlook), Is the no less inevitable certainty we derive 

that Hitler and his war will be defeated. 

And how? 

Certainly If we regard, as I and my friends do, the 
Hitler System (and for our purposes that includes the 
civil war In Europe which the Hitler System has brought 
about) as a necessary stage in the transition from a 
decaying old order to an evolving new one, as the epoch 
during which effete forms are being swept away why 
then we shall have the joyful conviction that such an 
epoch of destruction cannot possibly be lasting. It will 
come to an end as soon as the old and the worm-eaten 
have really been swept away, and as soon as the new and 
the young that are everywhere germinating beneath the 
surface of things come clearly to light. 

From this outlook Hitler is really no more than the 
testing 'hammer of God' with which men and things 
are tapped to discover whether life persists in them, 
whether they still have faith, will, strength, and the 
power of renewal. Where these good qualities are 
lacking, the hammer breaks the old forms to powder 
even as. In scripture, the tree which bore no fruit was to 
be ruthlessly cut down. But when fruit-bearing is still 
possible, the will to and the power for renewal will 



infallibly spring up after the hard testing of these blows; 
under new forms,, but in the old spirit, the spirit of the 
'Mothers 3 In Faust which dwells in the depths of our soul, 
the soul of every human being, the soul of every nation, 
the soul of the West. Revolutionary in form, conserva- 
tive in substance, is the policy that derives from such a 
method of contemplation. 

Victory over Hitler and his system of destruction, 
victory in this war over the powers of destruction, is no 
less certain than were the coming of Hitler and this war; 
and both spring from the necessity and the nature of the 
c German Revolution 3 . 

Three questions necessarily arise for consideration 
after such an outlook has been defined, three questions 
which must be answered before we can be sure that we 
have more to guide us than mere faith in the future; 
three questions which the non-German world above all 
will put, in order to learn what lies behind this conten- 
tion, and what the foreign world has to expect from our 
c German Revolution 3 : 

(1) Is a revolution at all possible in Germany? 

(2) What would the ideas of such a c German Revolu- 
tion' be as regards the liquidation of the war? 

(3) What sort of aspect would the new order have in 

The importance of these questions, and the warrant 
we have for putting them, are all the more palpable 
because war prevails, so that men are summoned to 
battle, wish to know and are entitled to know what they 
are fighting for and why they are making sacrifices. 

The aim of this book is to answer these three questions, 

B I 7 


to answer them as accurately as possible and with a full 
sense of responsibility imposed on us by the deadly 
earnestness of our time. 

It arises from the circumstances of the case that the 
answers to questions (i) and (2) must c date ? , must arise 
out of the extant military situation; while nevertheless 
they arise out of the spirit of the new order, which 
forces itself into the light Independently of Hitler's 
regime and Hitler's war. 

Nothing can prove this more convincingly than the 
fact that the plans for the new order in Germany were 
drafted years before the Hitler System, and therefore 
longer still before the war. They were drafted in their 
main Iines 3 and constituted the written program of a 
large and active political movement in the Reich. 

As Douglas Reed shows in his instructive book Nemesis? \ 
these main lines formed the substantial content of the 
so-called Hanover Program which was adopted in 1925 
as the program of the North German group of the 
National Socialists, and became the cause of my breach 
with Hitler. After 1930 it was the official program of the 
Black Front, and was published as such in 1931 in the 
first edition of my own book Aufbau des deutschen 

The most important chapters of that book comprise 
Part Three of the present work, and show the latter to 
be in no sense a degenerate form of concession to the 
present war and its expected result, 

To^ emphasize this I have deliberately left standing 
certain sections that have grown obsolete during the 
last ten years, sections which the reader can correct for 
himself in the light of the new formulations in Part Two. 



For It seemed and seems to me of outstanding importance 
that the scheme for a new order in Germany came into 
being independently of the Hitler system and the present 
war, for it was and Is the program of a young, active 
and growing political movement in the Reich. Not hatred 
of Hitler, nor the sourness of a refugee, nor a dread of 
military defeat, nor concessions to the western powers, 
guided my pen when I helped to draft that program. 
In 1930 none of those influences were at work to say 
little of the fact that since then I have done my utmost 
to hinder such considerations from modifying my 
political thought and will. 

This suffices to show that the plan for a new order in 
Germany issued from the sources of the German nature 
and of German history, and Is therefore deeply based 
upon the national spirit, is essentially permanent 
whereas dictatorship from without is nothing but a 
makeshift which every national wind can puff away. 
If, therefore, it should prove practicable to combine the 
safety of Europe with the reconstruction of Germany, 
then every true-hearted German nationalist must gladly 
accept the outcome. 

This book is intended to provide the foundations for 
such a testing-time, penned by one who is convinced that 
German national security and European collaboration, 
far from being mutually exclusive, tend to favour one 

Penned in Exile 
Easter 1940 




THE revolutionary character of the general situation in 
Germany is unquestionable. Indeed, the foundation of 
the historical and political views that have guided the 
thoughts and actions of myself and my friends is the fact 
that revolution has been going on in Germany for the 
last twenty years - a revolution of which the Hitler 
System is but one phase, the phase of destruction. 

The caption of this Part One of my book can, there- 
fore, relate only to the tactical question whether revolu- 
tion is possible within the framework of the German 
Revolution at large, to the question whether the Hitler 
System can be overthrown, thereby initiating the last 
phase of the German Revolution. That phase will consist 
of the establishment of a new order. 

Since the question c Can the Hitler System be over- 
thrown by an internal movement in Germany? 5 is thus 
tactical, it follows that the answer must likewise be 
mainly determined by tactical considerations. Such 
events as Hitler's striking successes in Scandinavia and 
the Balkans (successes indirectly due to his ally Stalin's 
victory in Finland) have a great influence upon the most 
immediate general outlooks, and are of decisive import- 
ance as regards the factor of time. 

Having made this proviso, which must constantly be 
borne in mind, we discover that the following general 
features will help us to answer the question under dis- 



(1) The prevailing atmosphere, by which I mean the 
masses" widespread dissatisfaction with the present 
regime a dissatisfaction for which (as usual) numerous, 
and often conflicting, causes can be found. 

(2) The existence of a minority of persons prepared to 
take action, a minority willing and able at the appropriate 
moment to transform passive discontent into political 
action^ much as a spark occurs to discharge electrical 
tensions that have accumulated beyond a certain 

(3) A paralysis of will within the system, or, rather, a 
paralysis of will among the active defenders of the system, 
because their self-confidence has been undermined, 
because their assurance of victory has waned, because 
they have lost discipline and resolution. In other words, 
for revolution to be possible a considerable number of 
those who wield the forces of the dominant system 
must have come to sympathize with the aims of the 
revolutionists, or must at least have ceased active oppo- 
sition to these aims. 

If we proceed to enquire how far, in the Germany of 
1940, these fundamental prerequisites of a revolution 
exist, it can be unambiguously shown that the general 
atmosphere discloses all the features which make revolu- 
tion possible. 

So widespread, so virulent is the discontent of the 
German people with the dominant Hitler System (vary- 
ing, of course, with the successes or failures of the system) 
that the enumeration of proofs would almost be super- 
fluous. All the same, I shall give a summary of them, 
to avert the danger of that self-deception which makes 
dispassionateness impossible. 



Surely one of the most convincing proofs is the fact 
that the Hitler System, after being in power for seven 
years, must still rely upon the detestable terrorist methods 
of the Gestapo and the concentration camps? Hereby 
Goebbels 5 chatter about 'popular support 5 of the Nazi 
regime is as flatly contradicted as by the ever more 
extensive gagging of the press, the wireless, and any 
other means by which the opinions of the German people 
seek expression. 

Precise investigations have shown that the number of 
Germans who have pined for a longer or shorter time in 
concentration camps, penitentiaries, and prisons during 
the seven years of the Hitler regime totals more than 
two millions. Official statistics show, then, that over 
ten million Germans (if we add the dependents of the 
victims) have been so actively antagonistic to Hitler as 
to make personal acquaintance with his penal system. 
Nay more, many, many thousands of Germans have been 
put to death by their rulers, or, let us say bluntly, have 
been murdered. 

Today these facts should be all the more emphatically 
proclaimed because they show, not only the profound 
hatred of the German people for the Hitler System, but 
also that an enormous part of the German people was 
actively fighting that system at a time when the foreign 
world was still associating with Hitler on friendly terms. 
What this signifies is that the same enormous part of the 
German people stands in the present 'European Civil 
War 5 on the side of Europe against the dictatorship of 
Hitler and Stalin, thus representing, not only a latent 
revolutionary force, but also a direct military force 
inasmuch as the majority of the two million Germans 



who are or have been under the Hitlerian harrow are 
Germans of military age. 

Less manifest but not less effective than the open 
antagonism of the victims past and present in Hitler's 
concentration camps, penitentiaries, and prisons, is the 
voiceless discontent of the millions of those who are 
apathetic in political matters. Among these, who consist 
In very large measure of women, it is not so much 
political or philosophical considerations which bring 
them into opposition with the system, as the experiences 
of daily life. The luxury of the Hitler bosses, the increas- 
ing bnitalization of youth, the fall in real wages, the rise 
in prices (which largely takes the form of a deterioration 
in quality), the more and more oppressive demands 
enforced upon the manual workers and anyone else 
willing to make sacrifices, the mendacity of propaganda, 
the alarming effects of the reign of terror, religious perse- 
cution, etc., were already operative before the war to 
intensify discontent with the system among those who are 
apathetic in politics and constitute something like 70% 
of every nation. Hitler and Goebbels knew this just as 
well as Himmler and Goering. But whereas the two 
latter believed that the difficulty could be overcome by 
tightening up the screw-press of the terror, the two former 
were shrewd enough, in accordance with the old Roman 
principle of 'bread and circuses 5 , to replace the lacking 
bread (read 'butter') by an abundance of circuses (read 
'spectacular successes'). 

This made it essential for Hitler to gain spectacular 
national successes, and the statesmen of the West were 
too dull-witted to perceive that every time Hitler made 
a coup on or across the frontier - as by his military 


occupation of the Rhineland, his march Into Austria, 
his conquest of Sudetenland, his annexation of Bohemia 
and Moravia, and his regaining of Memel this was 
also a slap in the face for the opposition on the home 
front, made possible only by foreign aid. Each national 
success secured temporarily for Hitler the approval of the 
apathetic masses, who considered it a proof of 'the 
Leader's genius', and a reward to themselves for the 
sacrifices they were making. 

But since the outbreak of war this stimulus has lost its 
savour, for the coming of war gave the lie to the piping of 
Goebbels during the last few years, to the unceasing 
declaration that 'the Leader will do it all without war'. 
During the first six or eight weeks after the declaration, 
the Germans were, In fact, panic-stricken. Then came 
recovery, thanks to the prompt victories in Poland, and 
the inertia of the western powers, especially as concerned 
their airforces. Still, the recovery of morale has by no 
means been complete, as would be shown speedily 
enough were Berlin to be bombarded from the skies. 

Even though the dread of open belligerency that 
prevailed in Germany before the war has by now in 
great measure been appeased, the widespread discontent 
of the non-political masses has been greatly enhanced by 
the direct and indirect consequences of the blockade. 
Above all, women as thrifty housewives and as anxious 
mothers have been gravely discomfited by the scarcity of 
essential articles of diet, of footwear, and of clothing; and 
the daily expenditure of time and strength requisite 
for the attempt to satisfy these needs is both exhausting 
and discouraging. The consolations offered them by the 
obese Goering sound derisory, while dread of Himmler's 



Gestapo will not prevent women's tongues from wagging 
while they stand for hours in queues, any more than it 
will prevent their whispering to one another about 
secret sources of 'black 3 supplies. 

But what gets to work most powerfully among the 
Germans who are politically apathetic, what makes them 
Hitler's most dangerous enemies, is their remembrance of 
the last war. The increasing privations of 1917 and 1918 
are the nightmares of the German women of 1939 and 
1940, while the men meditate on the horrors of inflation, 
which robbed them of wages, savings, and profits, 
without a chance of defence. Neither proclamations nor 
bullying nor promises counteract these memories, for 
there was no lack of them twenty years ago, and little 
good did they do. Nor are the boastful reports of victories 
in Poland, of successes in the air, of the sinking of Allied 
ships by German submarines, any more effective. Every 
German who is over thirty knows full well that Luden- 
dorff, likewise, conquered the whole of Poland, the 
whole of Serbia, the whole of Rumania, and that then 
Bulgaria and Turkey fought on Germany's side; every 
German over thirty knows how daily, weekly, and 
monthly the naval chiefs issued bulletins regarding the 
successes of the German submarines successes that 
outdid even the victorious bulletins of Raeder and Goering 
and that the end of it all were the Forest of Gompiegne 
and the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles. Memories of these 
things (especially when they are vigorously exploited by 
an active propaganda) gives a political stamp today to 
the general discontent of the German people even when 
that discontent is not really the outcome of political 



Goebbels' declaration that 99 % of the German people 
are backing Hitler cannot be more strikingly disproved 
than by quoting the fact so incautiously divulged by the 
same propagandist concerning the famous vote taken 
among the inmates of Dachau concentration camp. 
They numbered 1572. Of these 1554 voted for Hitler, 8 
against, while 10 abstained. Here you have your 99 % 
in favour of Hitler, but everyone knows what the 99 % 
of Dachauers were really thinking and feeling. 

To sum up, then, we can be confident that the general 
atmosphere of dissatisfaction which is the first essential 
for every revolution undoubtedly exists today in the Ger- 
man people. The necessary stressing of the numerous, 
and for the most part non-political, causes of this dis- 
content does not weaken its significance, since we are 
concerned only with a general atmosphere, and not with 
a lucid manifestation of the popular will. 

This underlines the importance of the second of the 
three questions we set out to investigate in this con- 
nexion. Does there exist in Germany today a minority 
of persons willing and able to take action? 

Of course we begin our answer by reminding ourselves 
of those who were Hitler's political adversaries before he 
seized power. Independents, majority socialists, demo- 
crats, centrists, 'People's Party' men, and German 
nationalists formed the patchwork front of those who 
from the end of 1918 to the end of 1932 shared responsi- 
bility for Germany's political life, and their representa- 
tives who were disqualified by Hitler therefore form the 
core of the German 'emigres in the narrower sense of the 
term' (persons who, though they have not taken refuge 



abroad, may be assumed on principle to be opposed just 
as if they had fled) . 

To the left and to the right of those who were dis- 
qualified when Hitler seized power there were at that 
time the opposition groups, consisting of those who fought 
against Weimar just as they fought against Hitler the 
Communists and the Black Front. The former were, or 
are, supporters of an international-Marxist-revolution; 
the latter were, or are, supporters of the German 
Revolution, that is to say of a new order in the sense of 
national freedom, social justice, and European collabora- 

In addition to these political groups of persons who 
oppose Hitler at home and abroad, there are the racial 
and religious groups of Hitler's adversaries: notably the 
Jews against whom Hitler and Streicher have preached a 
crusade; and the Catholic and Protestant Churches 
persecuted by Hitler and Rosenberg in so far as they 
have not wholly or partially submitted. Of late, too, 
there has been what we may call a quasi-economic 
opposition, witnessed to by the flight of Edmund Stinnes 
to London, and even of Fritz Thyssen (who was a mem- 
ber of the Hitlerian Reichstag) to Switzerland. 

^The mere enumeration of these groups indicates how 
diversified are the trends, how varying the strength and 
the Mnd, of this multifarious oppositional movement 
against the Hitler System. Its extremely mixed com- 
position is enough to show that no unified and vigorously 
acting community could possibly be formed out of it 

Speaking first of the 'dethroned Weimarians', their 
pugnacity diminishes as you pass among them from left 
to right. Even among the majority socialists there were 



men of note, like Noske and Severing, who made peace 
with the Hitler System 3 while many other prominent 
members of this group became 'non-political 5 . Never- 
theless it may be proclaimed that not only the party 
chiefs Wels and Vogel who became emigres (taking 
refuge first in Prague and then in Paris), but also the 
steadfast old members of the party who stayed in Ger- 
many, continued firm opposition to the Hitler System, 
and that they could still rally many supporters from 
among the German working class. 

The centrist Catholics proved less reliable, and still 
less reliable the bourgeois democrats. Almost all their 
leaders made peace with Hitler, and even refugee politi- 
cians like Briining, Wirth, and Koch took up an attitude 
of reserve which (since they had considerable influence 
in England and the U.S.) was indirectly favourable to 
the Hitler System. Not until the anti-Christian policy 
of the Hitlerians became more marked, was a stronger 
opposition carried on from the Catholic side, but it never 
became distinctively political. 

The same considerations apply more markedly to the 
'People's Party 5 and German nationalist opposition, 
which was chiefly represented abroad by Treviranus, an 
ex-minister of the Reich. (There is a creditable exception, 
Dr. Rauschning, a German nationalist who was at one 
time president of the Danzig Senate.) 

This brief sketch of the opposition formed by the 
various parties of the Weimar Republic makes it plain 
that only the social democrats were capable of producing 
a minority c able and willing to take action 5 against the 
Hitler System; whereas the opposition formed by the 
other groups (individual exceptions apart) could do no 


more than intensify the general dissatisfaction; but was, 
even so, of considerable importance, especially in the 
religious sphere. 

Fundamentally different, that is to say pugnacious, 
are the two opposition groups that stood on the left and 
right flanks of the old party opposition to the National 
Socialists, namely the Communists and the Black Front, 
In structure they were of a much more revolutionary 
type than die old legalist or constitutional party appara- 
tus, and furthermore by their struggles in the pre-Hitler 
period had been better prepared for the new fighting 
conditions of illegality. 

There can be no doubt that down to the outbreak of 
the war the Communists formed an opposition to the 
Hitler System, an opposition that was not always very 
adroit and consistent, but was absolutely uncompromis- 
ing. If nevertheless they had no striking success, this is 
partly because since 1920-1921 the German people had 
inwardly outgrown the Communist peril; partly because 
the dictatorship of the Browns did not encourage a 
yearning for the dictatorship of the Reds, but rather 
favoured a desire for democratic freedom and self- 

How much justification there was for the ingrained 
prejudice of the German people against the Communists 
was shown by the Hitler-Stalin pact, which gave outward 
expression to the internal kinship between the two 

With the formation of the Stalin-Hitler alliance the 
Communists were done for in Germany, both in their 
influence upon the German people and in the number of 

their membership. Inasmuch as every Communist both 



at home and abroad was transformed from an enemy of 
Hitler Into an ally of Hitler, the German people (the 
industrial workers not excepted) ceased to draw a dis- 
tinction between Communist and Hitlerian. 

Since then. Communism in Germany has no longer 
been part of the opposition to Hitler, and this, perhaps, 
Is the most satisfactory result of the Hitler-Stalin pact, 
For just as in foreign policy the clear line of the European 
struggle and still more of European reconstruction would 
have been blurred if Bolshevik Russia had continued to 
play a part in the democratic camp, so in home policy it 
would have been a misfortune had Communism been 
able to assert its claims as part of the German opposition 
to Hitler. 

As concerns the Black Front, of which I am the leader, 
It has not only the tactical advantage of an organization 
which was from the first designed for secret ( = 'black') 
work, but has also the advantage from the outlook of 
principle of having never taken part in the failures of 
the Weimar period. Still more important was the fact 
that it accurately foresaw and foretold the development 
of the Hitler System, with the result that its early mem- 
bers were strengthened in their convictions, and new 
recruits were steadily gained. Sufficient proof of this is 
given by the first January issue in 1937 of the Black 
Front organ known as 'Die Deutsche Revolution 3 , of 
whose contents a full translation will be found in the 
Appendix to the present work (see below, p. 229). Since 
then the members of the Black Front in the Reich have 
been fortified by the evolution that has taken place in 
the Interim. Of course this has not only increased their 
confidence, but has also promoted their influence on the 

c 33 


surrounding strata of the population. The last notable 
point is the unique position of the Black Front in relation 
to the party and to the army a matter about which 
there will be more to say in Part Two. 

1 cannot conclude this discussion of 'the minority of 
persons willing to take action 3 without considering the 
position of the army, which has a special part to play in 
the Hitler System. For a long time the hopes of foreign 
adversaries of Hitler (bourgeois for the most part) were 
concentrated upon the army, and they based these hopes 
upon what happened on June 30, 1934. 

But they overlooked what I had set forth five years ago 
In my book Die deutsche Bartholomdusnacht [The German 
Massacre of St. Bartholomew] that on this very day 
Hitler had decided for what the generals wanted 
namely for the war against the revolution. Subsequently 
the union between Hitler and the generals became closer 
and closer; Hitler complied with his allies' extravagant 
demands for armaments, and in the end even agreed to 
the pact with Russia they had unceasingly clamoured for, 
asking no more in return than that they should be loyal 
to his person and his system. When, on February 4, 
1938, the remaining members of the general staff who 
had independent characters (above all, Generals Fritsch 
and Beck) were dismissed, this loyalty was ensured, and 
the "Relchswehr Myth' had achieved its purpose. 

It need hardly be said that this does not mean identity 
of views and aims between Hitler and the general staff. 
The grave internal and external dissensions between 
army and party persist, over and above the inevitable 
rivalry. Anyone acquainted with Prussian generals 
know that their egoism exceeds their loyalty. They would 



not dream of allowing themselves to be dragged down to 
destruction with Hitler, and if Hitler's ruin were im- 
minent they would seize any chance of saving themselves 
by the sacrifice of the Chancellor and his paladins. But 
this has nothing to do with opposition; it only means that 
the generals are unprincipled. 

Since Hitler's purge of the general staff to rid it of men 
of character, there is, so far as concerns our search for a 
minority of persons 'willing and able to take action 5 in 
Germany, no dependence to be placed upon the leaders 
of the armed forces of the Reich. But it Is otherwise as 
regards the commissioned officers of medium grade, 
especially In the army (for there Is less to be said about 
the airforce and the navy). In these army circles not 
only does the best tradition of the German officers' corps 
remain active, but politically as well the ideas of the 
'Schleicher School' still prevail a school in which 
thousands of captains and majors were trained in youth. 
Among them there is, on principle, strong opposition to 
the Hitler System, while they cherish bitter memories of 
the murder of their leaders Schleicher and Bredow. It 
would be inexpedient to say much about this just now, 
but there can be no doubt as to the facts. Whereas the 
generals of the German army are an unprincipled lot, 
and the subalterns are ambitious youngsters who are 
politically apathetic or even devoted to Hitler the 
majority of the staff officers are persons of blameless 
character, and in political matters are convinced as well 
as actively disposed opponents of the Hitler System. 

To summarize the results of our search for c a minority 
of persons willing and able to take action 3 against the 
Hitler System, we have found that such a minority really 



exists In the German nation, but still lacks unity of 
organization and purpose. It comprises three groups, the 
socialist group, the Black Front group, and the army 
group. In a word, It represents the Leipart-Strasser- 
Schleicher constellation which once before (in December 
1932) was a deadly peril to Hitler. If it should prove 
practicable to bring these three groups Into accord on 
the lines of the Schleicher-Strasser-Leipart combination, 
die anti-Hitler revolution would have a good chance of 

The last stage of our study of the fundamental pre- 
requisites for a successful revolution against the Hitler 
System brings us to more concrete elements, the active 
defenders of that system; to the question whether a 
paralysis of will is likely among them. Who are they, 
these active defenders? In the narrower sense they are 
the army, the S.S. (Storm Guards), and the S.A. (Storm 
Troops), in the wider sense they are the whole National- 
Socialist Party and its members. 

As regards the army, the foregoing disquisition has 
already solved a considerable part of our problem. 
Within the army there are strong and influential forces 
which are not merely untrustworthy from the outlook of 
upholders of the system, but are convinced opponents, 
and ready to take action. They will take action as soon 
as they are convinced that Hitler has become a danger 
to the national existence of Germany. A glance at the 
three-year-old Black Front periodical (see Appendix) 
will disclose the problem that faces every German officer 
and every German ranker with a sense of national 
responsibility the problem of, Hitler or Germany? 



(Appendix, p. 232). There Is no decent ranker, there is 
no decent officer, who would not answer 'Germany 3 if 
he could only grasp the national necessity for a decision. 
Himmler is well aware of this. The reports of thou- 
sands of spies who act as orderlies in the officers 5 mess- 
rooms have Informed him of the spirit that is afoot a 
spirit he fights in all possible ways. Everyone in the 
German army knows of the 'skirt' method he used so 
successfully in the cases of Blomberg and Brauchitsch; 
and also of the homosexual method he tried against 
Fritsch but unavaillngly, so that later he was com- 
pelled to have recourse to the time-honoured plan of 

Exceedingly symptomatic was the speech upon The 
Home Front in Germany which he made to the officers' 
corps in the summer of 1937, whose wording shows much 
more plainly than does that of countless newspaper and 
magazine articles by refugees both Himmler's dread of 
the armed forces of the Reich and the Hitler System's 
dread of an internal revolution. 

For defence, Himmler relies upon the police, the 
Gestapo, and especially upon the S.S., the Storm 
Guards and their 'Death's-Head Battalions 3 . Let me 
give a word-for-word extract from the aforesaid speech: 

'Should war break out, I shall have the following tasks 
to perform. In view of what I consider to be the duties 
of the police, 15,000 men, or not more than 20,000 at the 
outside, will be withdrawn for service with the colours. 
The present total force of uniformed police is from 80,000 
to 90,000. We have to remember that the great majority 
of these uniformed police consists of men who are over 
forty-five, or let us say over forty years of age, and there- 



fore if I allow from 15,000 to 20,000 of the younger men 
to go to the army, I shall be parting with the steel of my 
police. In case of need I can replace them by calling 
back to active police duties men over fifty-five or over sixty. 

'This will only be practical if I can make sure of an 
inner "stiffening" to be used for big and important 
actions. It will consist of the "Death's-Head Battalions' 5 . 

fi l shall be able to get along with my elderly policemen. 
The civilians over forty-five years of age who will be 
called up for auxiliary police service will, as has been 
arranged, carry out the duties that used to be assigned 
to the Landsturrn. They will be able to do sentry-go at 
munition factories, railway-bridges, etc. always pro- 
viding that I have some younger men as "stiffening". 
These will be men between the ages of twenty-five and 
thirty-five belonging to the "Death's-Head Battalions" 
not older and not younger. I don't want very young 
men, or men who are well up in years, for the "sabotage- 
troops" and the "terror-troops" will consist of lively 
young fellows with up-to-date weapons and I shall 
never be able to fight them with elderly Lands turmers. 

'The "DeathVHead Battalions" will be stationed in 
every governmental district throughout Germany. They 
will be disposed of as follows: 

*i. No Battalion will be stationed in its own native dis- 
trict. ^For instance, a Pomeranian Battalion will never 
serve in Pomerania. 

C 2. Each Battalion will be transferred to a new district 
every three weeks. 

C 3.^ No Battalion will be given street duty with its mem- 
bers isolated. It would never do for a man wearing the 
death's-head emblem to be stationed alone in the streets. 



'4. This force will act ruthlessly. That is what it will 

be for. 5 

There can be no doubt that the Storm Guard Bat- 
talions, living in barracks, will fulfil their chief's hopes 
and will act ruthlessly towards their own nationals. But 
there is likely to be a hitch here in the case of Storm 
Guard Battalions not quartered in barracks. (This 
applies to nearly four-fifths of the total force of 300,000 
men, for not more than 80,000 are kept in barracks.) 
They are simply working men, townsmen, and peasants 
part of the people, and subject therefore to the popular 

This applies even more to the S.A., the Storm Troops. 
Numbering millions, they enjoy few of the advantages 
granted to the S.S., the Storm Guards; they are not to 
serve on the foreign front, but only on the 'home front 9 ; 
this suffices to place them among the field-grey masses 
and estranges them from the Brown Shirts let alone 
that it increases the long-standing friction between the 
S.S. (Storm Guards) and the S.A. (Storm Troops). 

Even more decisive is the fact that comparatively few 
of the Storm Troopers are among the 'profiteers 5 of the 
system. On the contrary, they have for years been 
deceived and betrayed especially since June 30, 1934. 
Immediately after the alleged attempt on Hitler's life in 
I 939> I g ot hold of a letter penned by one of the chiefs 
of the Storm Troopers, which contains the following 
passage (quoted verbatim) : 

'Various recent happenings have pleased me very 
much, although they have left a bitter taste in the mouth. 
All the same, with regard to the candidate for death I 


n E R M A N Y T O M O R R O W 

hold Schiller's view, "The man must be helped". Un- 
fortunately, like the rest of us in Germany, I am badly 
off for news. My wireless apparatus doesn't work very 
well, for It needs an overhaul; and as for the newspapers, 
they lie so glibly that when one reads them, one hardly 
knows whether one is standing on one's head or one's 
heels. Nothing shows this better than all the hubbub 
about the unfortunate Elser. What is true that is said 
about him, and what false? Perhaps you can tell me, for 
1 really don't know. Most of it, I expect, arises out of 
Goebbels' imagination. I could tell you a lot of fine 
things, were it not for technical difficulties.. But to come 
to the main point, we shall have to work hard and bring 
off our coup as soon as possible. We must approach the 
goal quickly, for there will be little chance of establishing 
a revolutionary Germany after a long war.' 

I am sure that such a mood is the rule rather than the 
exception among the Storm Troopers, and for years it 
has seemed to me of the utmost importance to 'poison 
the minds 5 of the Storm Troop leaders (here, likewise, 
the middle grades rather than the men at the very top) 
with the watchwords of the Black Front. During the 
years 1 933- 1 938 our Huttenbriefe were sent by the million to 
all sections of the Storm Troops and the National Socialist 
Party. The specimen reprinted in the Appendix (p. 241) 
gives an excellent example of our propagandist method. 

Especially in the Party (where Gregor Strasser and 
the protracted work of the Kampf-Verlag (Fighting 
Publications) have not been forgotten) such activities 
have been most fruitful, more particularly in the Labour 
Front and among the Hitler Youth organizations. 

What we must do now is make it clear to the abundant 



profit-seekers within the party that Hitler's chances are 
practically nil, so that they will best promote their own 
interest if they take time by the forelock and adjust them- 
selves to coming events. This sort of propaganda would 
induce hundreds of thousands of members, especially 
among the officialdom, to draw aloof from the regime; 
and where we are dealing with the more stubborn it will 
be well to use a stronger tone, and even to employ threats 
of personal retaliation. With the average members of the 
National Socialist Party the well-tried lures and deter- 
rents of sweets and floggings will prove even more effec- 
tive than they do with the generality of mankind. 

Having shown that the three essential requisites for an 
internal revolution do actually exist in Germany, I have 
therewith reached a point still to be discussed the 
tactical necessaries for such a revolution. 

For simplicity, in expounding the tactical necessaries I 
shall stick to the same classification used in considering 
the general features of the revolutionary possibility. 

As concerns the mood that prevails among the German 
masses, we must use all possible means for diffusing 
among them a sound knowledge of the world situation. 
It is hard for a foreigner to conceive how vast a gulf 
yawns between the world situation as it actually is, and 
the world situation as it presents itself to the minds of 
the German people. After seven years of Hitlerian dic- 
tatorship and Goebbelsian propaganda, this impoverished 
nation, exhausted and isolated both materially and 
spiritually, has been deprived of the possibility of forming 
a sound judgment of its own. The antecedents of the 
outbreak of war, the violation of the Czechs, the atrocities 



in Poland, the betrayal of Finland, the comparative 
strength of Germany and the western powers these 
things are all as unknown to the German people as are the 
yielding disposition of France during the years 1933-1939 
and the peaceful temper of Chamberlain's government. 
The German people has absolutely no idea of the de- 
testation with which the rest of the world contemplates 
the Germany of Adolf Hitler, nor yet of the moral, 
political, and economic isolation of the country, which 
in 1940 is a hundredfold greater than it was in 1914. 

The principal aid to peace will be anything that will 
acquaint the Germans with these plain facts, with the 
facts and nothing else. Not until the German people 
knows the truth will its present dull dissatisfaction be 
transformed into an active political will. 

Here, too, what are spoken of as the 'War Aims' of 
the western powers play a very important part. One of 
Hitler's chief endeavours has been and is to inculcate the 
legend that the western powers desire the 'annihilation of 
Germany', and that consequently, were it merely for the 
sake of self-preservation, Germans must rally round their 
leaders that is to say round himself. 'We are all in the 
same boat,' such is the leading theme of Goebbels 5 prop- 
aganda at the present time; and herein he voices 
nothing but his dread that the Germans may come to 
realize how the precise opposite is true. Anyone who 
wants to help himself and Germany must aid in downing 
Hitler and flinging him overboard. 

An intimate knowledge of my fellow-countrymen has 
taught me that millions of them today are suffering 
from a conflict between their moral duty and what they 
still regard as a national duty. Directly the western 



powers avow as their essential war aims the reversal -of 
the violent deeds wrongfully committed by Hitler, but 
declare that they have no desire to discriminate against 
or destroy Germainy, that very moment there will be an 
end to the cleavage in the minds of millions upon millions 
of Germans, and they will tranquilly obey their con- 
sciences against Hitler. 

Of course we cannot expect them to undertake an 
active campaign forthwith. It is idle to ask a fettered 
prisoner to begin by overpowering his heavily armed 
warder, and it is unfair to blame him as guilty because 
he is powerless. What we can demand of the German 
people, and what we forerunners among the champions 
of the German Revolution do demand, is passive resis- 
tance. But this comprehensive notion must be inculcated 
in numberless separate preliminary writings, by those 
able to avail themselves of all possible chances of dif- 
fusing information. 

We must not say (I am thinking of things that can 
best be said by Germans) to the German aviator, 'Refuse 
to obey orders 5 , for in that case as things are at present 
he will simply be court-martialled and put to death. 
What we should say is: 'Drop your bomb near what you 
are aiming at, but don't register a hit. No one can prove 
that you could have hit. In that way you will help to 
overthrow Hitler and to save Germany. 5 We must not 
say to the German worker, 'Down tools 5 , for he would 
only be sent to a concentration camp. What we should 
say is: 'Do your work slowly and badly, misunderstand 
orders, waste material but make sure you will never 
be found out. 3 To the clerks and officials we must say: 
'Make a muddle of what you do; pretend to be stupid or 



overworked; address letters, documents, parcels wrongly; 
falsify lists and specifications; be tardy and disagreeable 
in your relations with the public, cautious but stupid in 
your relations with your superiors in a word, "throw 
grit into the bearings whenever you have a chance; and 
even though each man does only a little, the massed 
effect will be stupendous.' To business and professional 
men: c Be backward with the authorities, ask the revenue 
officials question after question, humbug customers while 
never forgetting to praise the Leader; remind them how 
Goering said, "Guns are more important than butter 55 , 
delay the delivery of stamps on the ground that you are 
overworked, make complaint after complaint; all this will 
help to overthrow Hitler and therewith restore peace to 
Germany and Europe. 3 

I wrote simply, c We must say 3 . Who are 'we 5 , and how 
can we say it? 

We' are Germans who live free and can take up the 
fight against Hitler. I have enumerated the various 
groups of such persons. The outstanding personalities 
among them, have a great moral and political responsi- 
bility to their supporters, to the German people, and 
to the world at large. It speaks ill for them that they 
have not yet succeeded in forming a representative 
assembly of the German adversaries of Hitler. An im- 
pulse in the direction of establishing in foreign parts such 
a centralized representative body of Germans would act 
more quickly and effectively than anything else towards 
aggregating into united hopes for the future the moods of 
those malcontents who are scattered throughout the 
Reich, and towards concentrating the efforts of various 



groups In the minority that would gladly take action 
against the Hitler System. Nor could anything be more 
momentous than this in Its influence upon the foreign 
world, whose cooperation will be indispensable to the 
speedy outbreak of a revolution against Hitler. 

Again, 'how can we say It? 3 Uninfluential refugees, 
grudgingly tolerated as aliens, having no passports, no 
wireless stations, no funds to spare for direct and indirect 
propaganda, and persons to be numbered only by tens 
of thousands how can we, actively disposed though we 
are, geHn touch with the passive German masses, who 
are millions upon millions? 

Apart from this problem, It is obviously our duty to do 
our utmost towards ending this war as soon as possible, 
towards ending it before its full powers of destruction 
have been wreaked. There can be no doubt that our only 
way of helping here is to promote the internal revolution 
against Hitler. The outcome of this preliminary investi- 
gation paving been that such a revolution is possible, 
surely it behoves us to use all available means in order 
to bring it about? Such a question can only be answered 
in the affirmative. Three years ago Himmler emphasized 
the importance of The Home Front in Germany, and con- 
cluded his address to the officers 3 corps with the words of 

c An understanding that a completely new type of 
organization Is essential must be universally diffused; so 
must the idea of the home front in Germany, upon the 
defence of which the very existence of the German nation 
will depend if we ever have to bear the burdens of war. 3 

It is time for the non-German world to understand 
Himmler's cry of distress and turn it to account. 



Our enquiry is finished. Its upshot has been that as far 
as the objective requisites in Germany are concerned an 
internal revolution against Hitler is possible, but that 
there are indispensable subjective requisites as well. 

To the foregoing disquisitions I must add one impor- 
tant remark: the trigger will be pulled by a military 
failure on Hitler's part. 

For years in his foreign policy Hitler has scored 
triumph after triumph; even in the present war the mili- 
tary victories have, so far, all been Hitler's (in Poland) 
with the result that up to now the word remains with him 
should the question of negotiations arise. While this state 
of affairs lasts, even the best propaganda and the most 
skilful underground work can only pave the way, 
generate doubt, undermine support, induce readiness to 
secede or to resist. 

Not until the nimbus of victory has faded on Hitler's 
brow, not until his 'battle of the Marne' has convinced 
every German patriot that the alternative 'Hitler or 
Germany' has been presented, not until the military pre- 
eminence of the western powers becomes as plain as their 
moral superiority already is not until then will the ice 
break that now encrusts the brains, the hearts, and the 
arms of the Germans. 

That day will come, and will be followed by the day 
of the German Revolution which is enshrined as an 
object of ardent desire within the hearts of the German 

Let us all be ready then, that our thoughts may be 
great, our wills pure, and our deeds just for thereby 
only will storm-tossed and tormented humanity be 
enabled to reach the passionately desired goal of peace. 









No thoughtful person can fail to be aware that the 
present war, generated by the very nature and by the will 
of the Hitler System, will be decisive as to the future 
political, economic, and cultural order of Europe. 

Germany itself, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland 
give a heartbreaking picture of what this 'order 5 will be 
like should Hitler gain the victory. 

What will that order be like should the Allies be 
victorious? We have no picture of it, unless we adopt 
the fatuous notion that it will be set up in utter forget- 
fulness of the twenty-five years between 1914 and 1939, 
that there will be re-established those pre-war conditions 
whose impracticability could not be better demon- 
strated than by the events of the two and a half decades 
that have followed the outbreak of the last great war. 

Anyone who is convinced, as I am, that all historical 
happenings mean something, are the expression of a 
living development, will regard such reactionary ideas 
as incredible, and will pay no heed to them when dis- 
cussing the political future. 

If so, however, it becomes still more urgent to enquire 
what will be the nature of the new order to be estab- 
lished by the peace that will itself be the expression of 
the coming order. 

For here we impinge upon the first question to present 

r 49 


Itself at the close of every war. Shall we really try to 
make peace, true peace; or shall we be content with an 
armistice which, while ending the present war., will bear 
in its womb the embryo of a new one? 

It is hard to raise such a question while war is still 
being waged; for the mere question may readily arouse 
dissensions within every belligerent power, and thus 
reduce the energy requisite for carrying the war to a 
successful conclusion. Since, however, experience teaches 
that it is even harder, much harder, to settle such a 
question properly when one side has gained a decisive 
victory, for in these circumstances the heat of passion so 
readily obscures the light of reason as well as the sense 
of justice, it is really incumbent on us, while we go 
on fighting, to prepare for peace, for the true peace that 
will make the recurrence of our present woes impossible. 

But is a true peace possible? Can there truly be 'peace 
on earth 5 ? Sceptics will be inclined to answer much as 
one who plays a leading part in this war answered me 
when I put the question that forms the title of this 
chapter: c Are you fighting for a peace, or only for an 
armistice?' His reply was: 'What do you suppose? 
Every peace is nothing more than an armistice. The 
more difficult the peace, the longer will be the pause 
before the next war.' 

Since I consider that the teachings of history dictate 
to us the laws of politics, I could not but agree, for the 
question was too general in its terms. 

But if the question be put more concretely, in the 
form, c ls durable peace possible in Europe?' I should 
answer, once more guided by the teachings of history, 
with an emphatic c Yes'. 



At bottom what are wars but the struggles of growth 
among the nations? As soon as the peoples of a particular 
family of peoples within a particular area have finished 
growing, there cease between these peoples in this 
particular area the crises that result from the way in 
which growth has made them elbow one another,, just as 
the cessation of feuds among the tribes and the clans 
established peace In the national units we now call 
Spain, Italy, France, Great Britain, Germany, etc. The 
end of the century-old struggle within these nations was 
a sign of the ripening of the characters or the personali- 
ties of these ripened nations, of the end of their 'becom- 
ing' stage. This was the necessary antecedent of the 
settlement that will finish the 'international' quarrels 
within the family of European nations. 

Who can deny that all the nations of Europe, whether 
large or small, have entered the ripening phase of 
nationhood? Where can you find the Czech who wants 
to become a German; the Pole who wants to become a 
Russian; the Bulgarian who wants to become a Ruman- 
ian; or the Groat who wants to become a Serb to say 
nothing of the nations that ripened yet earlier? Now the 
close of this ripening process necessarily involves our 
putting an end to any sort of intra-European imperialism 
thus ^making both possible and indispensable a col- 
laboration on the basis of the unconditional recognition 
of the freedom and independence of all the national 'per- 
sonalities' which today comprise the European family. 

Is not the remarkable lack of hatred in this war an 
indirect proof that the European nations feel themselves 

5 1 


to belong to one family? Is not the talk about war alms 
that goes on simultaneously in the countries of all the 
belligerents a sign that, despite the struggle that con- 
tinues, they have a yearning for community? Even 
Hitler and Goebbels feel impelled to declare that their 
only war aim is 'defence of Germany's right to live 5 ; even 
they have to hide their imperialist actions behind a cloud 
of peaceful words, and to deck out the attack upon 
Europe they are delivering in concert with Stalin as a 
phase in the birth of Europe. 

Have not the governments of the western powers also 
officially declared their war aim to be 'no territorial con- 
quests, but a guarantee of security'; and is not this 
declaration a proof that those who take the lead in 
Britain and France have deduced the consequences of 
the completion of the ripening process among the nations 
of Europe and are determined to build thereon the com- 
ing peace? 

But if this is so, we have no reason to fear that the 
coming peace will be nothing more than an armistice, 
and therefore it behoves us Germans to give the material 
and ideal guarantees of the security to which all the 
European nations are unconditionally entitled. 

The central problem of the coming peace negotiations 
may therefore be stated thus: 

How shall we combine the right to live of the German 
people who inhabit the centre of Europe, with other 
Europeans' need for security and especially the need 
of the nations that adjoin Germany, the nations whose 
right to live is independent of what may happen to be 
their size? 


Our formulation of the central problem will command 
almost unanimous assent,, but there will be differences 
now that we come to the solution. 

It would be foolish to deny that the demand for the 
disintegration of Germany will automatically tend to be 
voiced more loudly by the Allies the more the war 
spreads and the longer It lasts. 

Just because this Is so obvious, and for those who would 
be guided only by feelings so justifiable a trend, I will 
avoid trying to answer it on moral grounds. I shall con- 
tent myself with a sober political rejoinder, which runs: 
'True, the annihilation of an adversary will make it 
quite certain that he will never want to fight you again, 
and will therefore ensure a lasting peace 5 . The best ex- 
ample that can be cited to illustrate this is the example of 
the destruction of Carthage at the close of the third Punic 
war. The Romans killed all the men and boys of 
Carthage, sold the Punic women and girls into slavery, 
and razed to the ground the buildings of the rival city; 
and they symbolized the permanency of the destruction 
by driving a plough over the desert where Carthage had 
formerly stood. History tells us that there were no more 
Punic wars. 

If an adversary can be definitively destroyed, a vic- 
torious power will naturally ask whether this will not be 
the best way of guaranteeing the security of its own 
people. Certainly I can find no moral arguments against 
such^a course, though I am strongly convinced that under 
the sign of the cross such arguments would carry far more 
weight than they did in the days of pagan Rome. From 



the practical point of view. It was quite possible to kill 
half of the remaining 100,000 to 120,000 inhabitants of 
unhappy Carthage, and to sell the remaining half Into 
slavery. But how could that be done with 70,000,000 
Germans? Physical extirpation is simply out of the ques- 
tion, even if It were to be considered the best way of 
establishing peace in Europe. 

I need not trouble to prove that no man living has so 
crazy an idea as this when he contends that the dis- 
integration of Germany might be the best possible way 
of guaranteeing the peace he hopes to see established. 
He does not dream of the bodily extermination of the 
Germans, but of the destruction, or at any rate the 
weakening of the political organization of the country 
of the disintegration of the German State. 

The disintegration (or partition) of Germany means 
here that the left bank of the Rhine shall be annexed by 
France, or shall become a puppet State under French 
control; that East Prussia, with Danzig, the Corridor, 
and parts of Silesia, shall become Polish; that Sudeten- 
land shall go back to a restored Czechoslovakia; that 
Austria shall be assigned to the Habsburgs (preferably to 
be combined with Czechoslovakia and Hungary into a 
'Danubian Federation 5 ); and that the remnants of Ger- 
many shall become 'protectorates 5 , if possible under the 
tutelage of the recalled princely houses: the aim of all 
this being the permanent political impotence of the Ger- 
man people, whose activities are to be restricted to 
intellectual culture, industry, and agrarian production. 

I shall not attempt to deny that this scheme may 
appear most desirable to the French, who less than 
seventy years ago suffered from the savage onslaught of 



the Germans; or to assert that it would seem too cruel in 
the eyes of the Czechoslovaks and the Poles, who have 
been afflicted even more cruelly by the terrorist methods 
of Hitler. 

On the contrary, for years I myself and many other 
German patriots have dreaded that this grotesque 
scheme may some day be realized, and it is as German 
nationalists inspired by such a dread that we have,, in 
great measure, been prompted to carry on our campaign 
against the Hitler System. Let me again refer the reader 
to the illicit Black Front periodical which was circulated 
by millions in the Reich at the beginning of 1937, and is 
reproduced verbatim in the present work (See Appendix, 
p. 229). 

Once more I will answer with practical rather than 
with moral arguments, by asking whether such a dis- 
integration of Germany would create and stabilize peace. 

I frankly recognize the possibility of such a disintegra- 
tion of Germany, and I know that with a conquered 
nation the victors can do what they please for a time. 
But how long will it last? 

A peace settlement which is not felt and thought to be 
just by the conquered, will endure only so long as the 
conquerors have, and use, force to sustain it. 

First, then, would the German people feel and think 
such a disintegration of Germany to be 'just? I do not 
believe that any man or any woman can honestly say 
fi Yes\ If there are persons who can believe that economic 
security and possibilities for cultural development could 
reconcile the Germans to political castration, then I am 
convinced that such persons are labouring under a 
profound delusion. Just because they have, as I say, 



'ripened 5 , all the nations in Europe the German nation 
not excepted lay the utmost stress upon political free- 
dom, which includes the possibility of independently 
developing whatever form of national existence they may 

Perhaps after a crushing defeat, and after seven years 5 
hunger and bodily chastisement, the German people 
might accept such peace terms without demur, but as 
soon as their palsy was over, as soon as the will-to-live 
became active once more, the will-to-freedom, the will- 
to-independence, and the will-to-equal-rights would also 
return, and every German, young or old, would regard a 
fight for German liberty and German unity as his supreme 

Would this be wrong-headed? Is there a Frenchman, 
an Englishman, a Pole, or a Czech who would act 
differently in a similar situation? 

Never will the Germans accommodate themselves to 
the disintegration of Germany, to the tearing of their 
country to tatters. If such peace terms are enforced, 
those who enforce them will have to reckon upon the 
permanent hostility of the Germans. 

What this means is that the victors will have to remain 
perpetually under arms to hold the Germans down nay 
more, that they will have to pile up their own armaments 
proportionally with the recovery of the German people 
from the consequences of defeat. 

It means, last not least, that the victors will have to 
reckon with the fact that a nation of 70,000,000 living in 
Central Europe will be ready, at any moment when there 
is an uneasy international situation (a war in the Far 
East, troubles in the Pacific, threats from Russia, or what 



not), to join forces with the disturbers of the peace, 
hoping under the shadow of this new menace to carry 
on their own struggle for freedom. 

These are not moral arguments, neither menaces nor 
hopes they are facts, hard facts, reinforced by the 
lessons of history and by the study of national psychology. 
Some may try to dismiss them as trifling, but none can 
deny their existence. 

What could the disintegration of Germany signify, 
really; but that such a liquidation 5 of the war would 
eternalize the heavily armed and tense condition of 
Europe? It would signify that the Germans would con- 
centrate their energies on unsettling the settlement, and 
that the other nations would have to concentrate theirs 
on trying to maintain it. 

Peace? That would not be peace, but an armistice 
filled with hatred, an armistice whose duration would 
be limited by the strain put upon the victors to keep 
adequately armed a strain that would grow worse the 
longer the armistice lasted. 





AT this stage it becomes necessary to insist that with the 
rejection of the plan to disintegrate Germany there must 
be associated practical proposals and guarantees from 
Germany for the security of her neighbours. The other 
nations of Europe, having been alarmed by Germany's 
foreign policy of late, will make it their first and most 
urgent demand that their governments shall fulfil what 
has been their principal war aim and it is essential that 
the German people should give the requisite pledges and 
guarantees, having recognized that its own future in 
Europe is dependent thereon. 

Nor must any German statesman fail to understand 
that German utterances and promises 5 even when signed, 
sealed, and delivered, are now practically valueless on 
the international exchange. Too often have German 
governments, made up of no matter what persons, failed 
to keep their pledges, broken their oaths, and treated 
documents duly signed by them as no more than 'scraps 
of paper'. No clear-sighted German publicist will take 
it amiss if non-Germans now demand from Germans, not 
words, but deeds. 

The most decisive of such deeds will be the partition of 


In view of the profuse outpouring of historical litera- 
ture during the last great war, there is no need to adduce 



detailed justification of this demand. Suffice it to say that 
as long ago as 1931 the Black Front endorsed the idea in 
its first public statement of aims, entitled Aufbau des 
deutschen Sozialismus [Structure of German Socialism], 
penned by myself (see below, pp. 117 and foil.) ; and that 
on September 20 of the same year, in No. 34 of its 
central organ c Die Schwarze Front 5 (of which I was 
editor), it gave an exact description with a map of 
the proposed partition of Prussia, and of what was to be 
the territorial distribution of the New Germany. 

Consequently the German demand for the partition 
of Prussia originated, not under the stresses of war, not 
because of fear of military defeat, not as the outcome of 
foreign or refugee influence but owing to the over- 
whelming logic of a study of the political and religious 
structure of Germany, its history, and its motive forces, 
when contemplated by a European consciousness. I 
regard it as of the utmost importance to insist on this 

No one well acquainted with the spirit of Germany 
can overlook the fact that for centuries within the Ger- 
man people there has been a mental and political struggle 
between what I have called the Frederician (the Prus- 
sian) and what I have called the Theresian (the Austrian) 
sections. This may be compared with the struggle that 
goes on in a child's mind between the paternal and the 
maternal elements a struggle which, as character 
develops ultimately leads to the formation of a (new) 
unity. The concept 'German' contains, and transcends, 
both the Frederician (Protestant) and the Theresian 
(Catholic) elements, wherein is mirrored all the multi- 
plicity of the tribal souls that have respectively contri- 



buted to the over-riding concept * German 9 , without 
having, so far, completely merged their identity in it. 

Considered from an evolutionary standpoint, 'Prus- 
sian 5 signifies the fateful domination of a partial element 
over the whole, and is analogous to what is seen in 
pathology when a cancer results from an excessive and 
boundless proliferation of certain local cells, that master 
(and destroy) the organism to which they belonged. 

Politically, therefore, the development of Little Brand- 
enburg into Great Prussia represents the growth of a 
cancer threatening the life of the German body as a 
whole, and it is a development which must be checked 
at all costs if Germany, and Europe, are to be saved. 
For it lies in the very nature of the doctrine 'might is 
right 3 , a doctrine which forms the heart of the Prussian 
mystery, that it should know no limits. That was why 
Brandenburg grew into Prussia; Prussia into Great 
Prussia, which struts as Germany in the belief that 
Great Prussia will grow into the Continental Empire that 
would like to strut as Europe. 

We Germans must ourselves overcome Prussia, We 
must overcome it territorially, economically, and spiritu- 
ally; for only when we have done so will New Germany, 
will New Europe, become possible. 


The fundamental principle of German organization is 
the federative principle, based upon the German tribes 
which have for ages been rooted in their respective terri- 
tories, refusing to merge and willing only to federate. 

The political structure of the millenniary German Reich 



has been based upon this federative segmentation, upon 
the voluntary collaboration of all the tribes, upon the 
organic union of its territories. 

This teaching of a great past was rendered inaudible 
by the clamour of Prussian propaganda. Force replaced 
voluntary collaboration. The various territories, instead 
of being given a chance to develop as they respectively 
wished, were compelled to c toe the Prussian line'. 

The territorial subdivision of Prussia must precede the 
federalization of Germany., whose territories (like the 
Swiss cantons) are tribal settlements, historical and 
economic units, which form voluntary collaborators in 
the German Reich. 

Put more concretely, this signifies the re-establishment 
of the 'Landschaften' or provinces of Rhineland, Hesse, 
Hanover, Thuringia, Saxony, Brandenburg, etc., in place 
of what now constitutes Prussia; the re-establishment of 
the provinces of Swabia, Franconia, Bavaria, etc., in 
place of what now constitute Wurtemberg, Baden^ 
Hohenzollern, Bavaria in a word, the territorial sub- 
division of Germany into about fifteen provinces repre- 
senting political, cultural, tribal, and economic units. 

These provinces, having on the average not more than 
about five million inhabitants each, would enjoy rights 
of local self-government rather more extensive than those 
of the Swiss cantons. As do the cantons, each province 
would control its own government and its own popular 
assembly; and (this is most important) all its functionaries, 
from president to postman, would be natives of that par- 
ticular territory. The aim should even be to make sure 
that the federal officials assigned to any province should 
as far as possible be natives of that province. 



The territorial disintegration of Prussia would thus be 
supplemented by the destruction of the extant centralized 
administrative apparatus which is one of the most power- 
ful weapons of Prussian power politics. This would be 
replaced by the federal administrative apparatus of the 
respective provinces, which in its turn would be localized, 
with the greatest possible amount of self-government and 
democratic State-control. 

The c German Reich 5 would thus veritably become a 
league of substantially independent cantons, whose joint 
instruments, the federal government and the popular 
assembly, would be reinforced and controlled by the 
body of provincial presidents. It may be taken as a 
matter of course that Berlin would cease to be the capital 
of the Reich. I myself think there is a good deal to be 
said in favour of Ratisbon. 

The details of the political structure of New Germany 
will be considered in Part Three of this book. 

Suffice it for the moment to insist that the destruction 
of Prussia, the reconstitution of the provinces which 
during the last century and a half have, one after another, 
been 'gobbled up' by Prussia, the subdivision of Germany 
into a league of federative provinces, are to be regarded 
as indispensable preliminaries to the upbuilding of New 

It is heart-rending today to read an account of the 
disputes between the Allied statesmen and those of Ger- 
many that followed the surrender of November 1918. 
An utter lack of psychological and historical knowledge 
on the part of the former was supplemented by the 
stupidity and weakness of the latter, with the result that 
behind the mask of the Weimar Republic to begin 



with, and behind the mask of Hindenburg and Hitler 
subsequently, the power of Prussia became firmly 
re-established, to resume the lost game after the lapse of 
twenty-one years. 

If those who will be responsible for the peace that will 
some day follow this war want to put an end to the game 
for ever, they must remember that there is only one way 
of doing so: 

Not by the disintegration of Germany, but by the 
partition of Prussia. 


The demand for the 'partition of Prussia 5 would be 
not more than half complied with if the term were to 
mean only a territorial subdivision and the destruction 
of the centralized administrative apparatus. 

The roots of Prussian power are quite as much social, 
economic, and psychological; and without the destruc- 
tion of these roots it will avail little to divide the stalks 
and pluck the leaves, or even to pick the fruit. 

The social power of Prussia is based upon the squire- 
archy, the power of the junkers. These, numbering 
18,688, own 16.7 % of the land used in Prussia for agri- 
culture and stock-raising. This is more than one-quarter 
of the land so farmed, the rest being farmed by the small- 
holders, the peasants who comprise 4,500,000. The 
feudalist caste of the Prussian junkers, the big landowners, 
form the pillars of the Prussian State, Prussian militarism, 
and Prussian power politics. 

Without the social and economic overthrow of the 
junker caste, without depriving the Prussian junkers of 



their power, there can be no lasting partition of Prussia, 
and therefore no New Germany. 

Far be It from me (a conservative as well as a revolu- 
tionist) to deny the strength, the value, and the signi- 
ficance of this sustaining stratum for the origin and 
existence of Prussia, and during a certain phase of 
Germany no less. Every people needs a sustaining 
stratum, and no one but an intellectual out of touch 
with the actualities of life can fail to see the notable 
part that has been played by the aristocracy as the 
sustaining stratum of the nation. 

But every sustaining stratum, every aristrocracy, must 
comply with the demands of the time. The French 
noblesse was slower to recognize this than the English 
gentry had been, and that was why the French noblesse 
fell before Danton's revolution, whereas the English 
gentry survived Cromwell's revolution. The Prussian 
junker caste does not understand the situation in the 
least Neither in 1918 nor in 1933 did it hear the call of 
the time, but hid as pusillanimously behind the mask 
of Hitler as it had hidden behind the mask of Ebert, 
caring only to keep its social and economic power and 
seizing any chance for carrying on its reactionary policy. 

If, therefore, we wish to make an end of Prussianism, 
we must deal radically with these representatives of 
political reaction. 

This means that the great estates will have to be 
divided up, and that monopolist industries must be 

For side by side with the Old Prussian estate of 
junkers or great landowners, there came Into existence 
after the foundation of the Bismarckian Reich (which, 



under the device of the Weimar Republic, transformed 
Itself more and more Into Great Prussia),, the New 
Prussian estate of heavy industrials, represented towards 
the last by Krupp and Thyssen, much as the junkers 
were represented by Wangenheim and Oldenburg- 

It Is possible, nay probable, that Influential circles In 
England and France, having sympathy with the Prusso- 
German social strata that will be hit hard by such 
measures, will regard the plan as unduly revolutionary, 
not to say c bolshevlk ? . The main argument here must 
be a political one. The sympathizers must be shown that 
unless we strike at the roots of the great landowners 5 and 
heavy industrialists 5 power, It will be impossible to make 
an end of Prussia and Prusso-German imperialism. 

It will be necessary, however, to show that this 
expropriation Is not to be effected without compensation, 
nor yet in favour of the State or of any kind of State 
socialism, but only in favour of self-governing economic 
corporations in the industrial domain. (This matter, 
likewise, will be more fully discussed In Part Three.) 

My rejection on principle of any kind of bolshevlsm 
(and of the Marxism on which it is based), together 
with my Insistence on the maintenance of individual 
rights, creative initiative, and the pursuit of economic gain, 
must protect me against an erroneous interpretation of 
my demand for the subdivision of great landed estates 
and the nationalization of monopolist industry. 

Whoever recognizes the truth of the saying 'Property 
makes free 5 , whoever affirms the necessity for a sus- 
taining stratum in any satisfactory social order must 
look forward to the new order which will aim at the 

E 65 


deproletarianizatlon of the people, and at our liberation 
from the social and economic monopolies under whose 
harrow no sort of freedom is possible. 



The picture of the far-reaching structural transforma- 
tion requisite to establish the New Germany (a transfor- 
mation which would have taken place even without 
this war because it would have come as the completion 
of the revolutionary changes that have been going on 
since 1918) would be unfinished did it not disclose the 
fundamental democratization that is essential to intra- 
European collaboration. 

For Wilson in 1918, and Chamberlain and Daladier 
in 1939, rightly insisted that the new condition of 
Europe, which must be and would be the outcome of 
the war, could only be lasting if it were based upon 
democratic freedom and self-government. 

But when we say this, we must not forget Germany's 
experiences from 1918-1933 in the matter of what was 
called formal democracy; nor the way in which the 
western powers, under the pressure of the necessities 
of war, have been compelled to make many changes in 
the machinery of democratic government. 

It must be added that in Germany since Hitler seized 
power it has become impossible to grant equal rights in 
any sense to the totalitarian parties of the Nazis or the 
Bolsheviks; and, on the other hand, that under the 
hitherto prevailing form of party democracy it would 
be impossible to refuse them these equal rights; and, 



finally, that the social and economic dethronement of 
what have heretofore been the leading strata must 
somehow be ensured under the future form of democracy 
(read c popular government'). 

All these considerations join forces for the rejection 
of party democracy in the New Germany, and for the 
acceptance of the democracy of the vocational estates. 

Those acquainted with the internal development of 
Germany may be glad to discern here the old ideas of the 
councils' system which in 1918-1919 the masses of the 
people vainly urged the petty-bourgeois social demo- 
cratic leaders to work for. (From the first at that time 
the traditional forces of Prussian-Germany were power- 
fully operative among the petty-bourgeois social demo- 
cratic leaders.) 

Today, when the party of Hitlerism and Bolshevism 
numbers many millions, every keen observer of German 
conditions will agree that nothing but the elimination of 
all parties and the inauguration of a democracy of the 
councils and the estates can create the new form of 
democracy that is essential both for home and foreign 

Once more I am only dealing here in outline with a 
matter that will be more fully discussed in Part Three of 
my book; and the fact that the program was drafted 
in the years 1930 and 1931 should convince my readers 
that the proposals were based upon the then situation 
of Germany, and have not arisen out of the actual 
position of the belligerents. 

The basic maxim of this new form of democracy runs: 
self-government by the estates, and their direct control 
of the political administration. 



There are two routes along which this goal will be 
reached: first by the construction of a comprehensive 
organization of persons engaged in all vocations, in five 
councils of manual workers, peasants, employees and 
officials, manufacturers and traders, and members of the 
liberal professions. 

Secondly the people at large will secure its share of 
power through joint chambers of estates which will be 
set up in every district, every province, and last of all in 
the Reich, to become a determinative factor in adminis- 
tration and legislation. 

This system of popular representation based upon 
direct and indirect elections, representing in the councils 
the economic interests and in the vocational estates the 
political popular interests, seems to be the only way of 
avoiding in Germany, not only any return of the reaction, 
but also any revival of the Nazi and Bolshevik party 


No political, social, and economic methods of organi- 
zation would be of permanent value, unless this work 
were crowned by the deliberate inauguration and 
cultivation of a new spirit. 

This spirit of the New Germany must and will be a 
repudiation of the belief that might and force should 
regulate the social life of mankind. There must and will 
be a recognition, both in substance and in form, that 
voluntary collaboration is to be the basis of human 

Force or voluntary collaboration? that is one of the 



fundamental matters about which this war is being 
fought. The answer can only be collaboration, both 
national and international. 

In Germany this new Spirit (which was as clearly 
foreshadowed by Herder, as the spirit of William II and 
Hitler was foreshadowed by Hegel) is most clearly 
manifested by the passionate repudiation of the idols of 
the totalitarian State, and by the whole-hearted accep- 
tance of Christianity with its doctrines of the freedom 
and dignity of the human soul. 

In defiance of the Old Prussian prophets of State- 
hegemony and the modern German advocates of race- 
hegemony, the spirit of the West proclaims the fathership 
of God and the sonship of man of all men and 
Insists upon the dependence of all human institutions 
(the State not excepted) upon the Law of God. 

We fully recognize that the polarity Emperor-Pope, 
State-Church, represents the very essence of Europe, 
which cannot be removed, cannot be dispensed with, 
without destroying the spirit and the soul of Europe. 

Freedom of the spirit, of belief, of conscience, are the 
foundations of Europe, and New Germany would cut 
itself away from Europe should it fail to proclaim them 
and to respect them. 

No less Important as fundamentals of this European 
spirit of the New Germany, are the Independence of the 
press, of science, and of art, which must be free from 
any sort of State interference or social monopolization. 

Education and the school should have no other aims 
than to promote the development of free personalities, 
to foster the growth of frank and great souls. They will 
best do this by ensuring the unrestricted development of 



the divine soul, thanks to which each of us, after his 
kind and according to his powers, can fulfil himself, 
and thus sing the praises of the Creator who fashioned 
his soul as it is and no otherwise. 

The diversity of human beings, the differences among 
them in quality and value, their varying powers and 
their varying tones, are intrinsic. All that education 
can achieve is to foster the beauty of the tones given out 
by each soul, so that when sounding together they can 
produce the harmony that will guarantee inward and 
outward peace, 


Such an avowal of a new spirit would be an idle 
declamation unless it had prompt political consequences. 

For the New Germany, one of these decisive results 
would be the renunciation of Prussian militarism both 
on principle and as a form of organization. 

Unquestionably in foreign parts the idea of Prussia 
was embodied, not so much in the knowledge of any 
philosophy she might proclaim, as in an experience of 
what use she made of her highly developed militarism. 
Her practice counted for more than her precept, were it 
only because of the sinister consequences of her practice. 

In this connexion we must on no account forget to 
allow for two decisive facts: first of all that, as a famous 
historian has said, the nineteenth century was pre- 
eminently the age of imperialism, and therefore mani- 
fested a distinctive political structure that was by no 
means confined to Prussianized Germany; secondly that 
militarism had become a strange epidemic phenome- 



non, an epidemic malady of the now unbelieving souls 
of European human beings. 

No less notable a man than Masaryk, a great statesman 
and philosopher (whose pupil I may take this oppor- 
tunity of again declaring myself to be) recognized this 
phenomenon, and described it as follows: 

'Modem militarism, especially Prussian militarism, is, 
considered scientifically and philosophically, a system 
of objectification a panic flight on the part of morbid 
subjectivity and suicidal mania . . . When Sombart, in 
the Hegelian manner, extolled German militarism, and 
bragged about fighting in the trenches beside Faust and 
Zarathustra, he did not realize how he was condemning 
German and European civilization as drenched with 
blood. What else is the war-making of modern civilized 
human beings than a panic flight from the anxieties that 
arise in the c ego 5 of the superman. That is why, as 
regards bellicosity, the intellectuals are as bad as, or 
worse than, the agriculturists and the urban workers. 
. . . Modern man suffers from a morbid suicidal impulse, 
from the fatigue and the anxiety that result from his 
spiritual and moral isolation. Militarism represents the 
superman's attempt to escape from this malady, which 
it really aggravates. In the nation of thinkers and 
philosophers there is the largest percentage of suicides; 
that nation has the most highly developed militarism, 
and it was mainly responsible for the world war. 3 

Masaryk had good reasons for emphasizing this 
characteristic feature of contemporary Europe; and he 
pointed out as the crowning 'sin' of Prussia that there 
the spiritual malady of modern Europeans had been 
promoted into an ideal and a system. 



The German people, more subject than any other to 
this spiritual malady and suffering from it In its worst 
form, taking to heart Clemenceau's profound remark that 
the Germans' chief danger is their being In love with 
death, must do their utmost to seek a cure. 

A radical and lasting cure can only come from a 
religious revival, can only come from their giving a new 
significance to life by Internal freedom and devotion to 

Prussian militarism must be overcome; In the spiritual 
field by a new ideal of life, and in the practical field by 
a new military organization. 

In the last section I mentioned the philosophical aims 
of education and the school. To these must be added 
the practical aim of drafting and exercising a new ideal 
of life. The hysterical heroism which has been adopted 
as the ideal of life in Hitlerian Germany, must be 
shown to be what it is, must be condemned and rejected 
as deceptive, as a swindle, as a denial of the truth of 

The joy of life, the Song of Songs whose strophes must 
be unfailingly sung to an impoverished, proletarianized, 
mechanized, and nihilistic mankind, will be the best 
prophylactic of the epidemic disease of suicidal impulse 
and militarism. When people have grasped the fact that 
schools of cookery are much more important than schools 
of politics, and that the amount of laughter which can 
be heard is the best indication of the quality of their 
political and economic institutions, the spirit of mili- 
tarism will have been definitively overcome. 

But in practice It will most promptly be overcome by a 
change In the prevailing military system. 



In accordance with my conviction of the diversity of 
human beings and of their right to self-determination, 
I hereby declare myself absolutely opposed to universal 
military service. 

In the first program of the Black Front we de- 
manded that army duty in Germany should be a volun- 
tary affair; and this, not least, because thereby would be 
facilitated the new joint military system of a general 
European army such as a European Federation will 

But if (and this will be one of the main topics of dis- 
cussion at the coming Peace Conference) such a joint 
military system cannot yet be established by the United 
States of Europe, there will remain for our model the 
Swiss militia system, which maintains universal service, 
but wherein the origin of any form of militarism is 
rendered impracticable by the most carefully devised 
democratic safeguards. 

Between the two possibilities, between a small pro- 
fessional army under European control and a militia 
army after the Swiss model, the New Germany will have 
to choose as the basis of its future military organization 
of course in cooperation with the Peace Conference. 
Neither scheme would leave any scope for Prussian 
, militarism. 


Theoretical and practical considerations make it 
expedient to add a few words about the problem which, 
since the rise of the Hitler System, has become a world- 
wide problem, and one whose settlement will be an 



urgent topic at the Peace Conference. I refer to the 
Jewish problem. 

In various parts of my Deutsche Revolution and in 
numerous articles in the international press I have 
expressed the utmost disapproval of the shameless and 
inhuman anti-Jewish campaign that has characterized 
the Hitler System; and I may also mention that as early 
as 19283 in a party periodical, I protested editorially 
against antisemitism of the Streicher brand, voicing the 
war-cry, 'Antisemitism is dead. Long live the idea of 
the People! 5 

This advocacy of the idea of the People logically 
implied the disavowal of any valuation of peoples or 
nations as good or bad, as better or worse, since they 
all have equal rights, equal needs, and equal duties, in 
accordance with the will of the Creator, who gave each 
of them its own kind, its own nature, and its own tasks. 
This profound respect for organic life, and the fact that 
it is necessary for us and incumbent on us to recognize 
and maintain human dignity, imply that it will be an 
unconditional part of the social and political organiza- 
tion of New Germany to maintain the equal rights of all 
human beings. 

Yet this fundamental principle of equality must not be 
considered to invalidate the organic law that the peoples 
and nations are fundamentally different, with the result 
that they urgently need differences in their social and 
political institutions a fact which every government 
is bound to take into account. 

In practical politics, therefore, there arises the problem 
of national minorities, whose relations to the national 
majorities in any area may present difficulties not local 



merely (as in Germany, for instance), but pertaining to 
Europe as a whole. Speaking generally it may be said 
that a comprehensive and just solution will only be 
possible within the framework of the European Federa- 
tion,, where the simultaneous interests of almost all the 
European peoples, whether as States or as national 
minorities, will ensure that whatever legal arrangements 
are made will be universally regarded as just, and will 
therefore be faithfully adhered to. 

But since this desirable joint solution will need time 
to achieve. New Germany will have meanwhile to set 
to work by herself to solve the problem of national 
minorities (and therewith the Jewish problem) in that 
modern spirit which will pay due regard both to the 
organic laws of ethnical differences and to the moral 
laws according to which all human beings have equal 
rights. Politically considered there are three alternative 

(1) Persons of different racial origin from the majority 
may be described as foreigners. 

(2) Groups of persons of various racial stamps may be 
deemed to constitute national minorities. 

(3) Persons belonging to different stocks may be in- 
corporated into the main body of the nation by assimila- 

All three methods are equally possible and equally 
honourable, with the urgent proviso that every adult 
person of another stock than that of the majority must 
himself or herself have full right to decide which method 
to adopt. 

As a matter of principle, there is no difference between 
the general treatment of the problem of national 



minorities and the treatment of the Jewish problem. If 
the latter is separately considered here, this is because 
the peculiar way in which the question has presented 
itself makes separate consideration expedient. 

I recommend the above tripartite approach to the 
matter as regards the Jews, because the formulation is 
not the outcome of any fine-spun theory, but is grounded 
upon the actual circumstances which must form the 
basis of any new settlement of the Jewish problem. 

(1) The category of foreigners emerges from the fact 
that of late years there has been a widespread develop- 
ment of the movement known as Zionism, which should 
be supported by all 'nation-conscious' persons and 
peoples as a genuine endeavour for the renovation of 

(2) The category of national minorities corresponds to 
the political fact that European Jewry has been domiciled 
in Europe for many centuries, and in each country 
rightly regards itself as belonging to that country, 
though it does not wish to forsake its own national 
religion and its own national peculiarities. 

(3) The category of assimilation is nevertheless (despite 
Hitler and his materialistic racial theory) a datum of 
the position of the Jews in Germany and the rest of 
Europe, in conformity with the accepted humanist 
doctrine that every human being is entitled to liberty 
and self-determination a, doctrine which New 
Germany will unhesitatingly accept. Although we do 
not deny our biological subordination to blood, race, 
and nationality, we must emphatically proclaim that 
the human spirit is privileged and competent to over- 
come this subordination, and, as knowledge and choice 



may decide, to adopt the present and future views upon 
these matters. 

It is likely enough that the preponderant majority of 
German Jews will prefer to belong to the Jewish 
commonwealth. Among these there will doubtless be 
many who in former days were antagonistic to Zionism, 
and perhaps even now are by no means wholly recon- 
ciled to it, but will lose their scruples when they become 
aware that as Jews, as members of the Jewish common- 
wealth, they can still remain united to Germany while 
preserving a Jewish stamp inasmuch as the Jewish 
national group will be incorporated into New Germany. 
This very fact,, their permanent incorporation into 
Germany, will distinguish them from the Jews, say, of 
Palestine or Poland not in substance, but in many of 
the forms of life. 

Of course this incorporation into Germany is funda- 
mentally diverse from the complete assimilation that 
will occur in the case of those belonging to the third 
category. These latter will have to abandon Judaism 
as a national religion, and will have to give this and other 
guarantees of their determination to become Germans 
in every respect. (Consider here the demands which 
every modern State tends more and more to make of 
alien elements that are to be incorporated and fully 

Of decisive importance as regards this question of 
the political treatment of minorities (including the Jews) 
is it that there should be established a State Department 
of National Minorities whose head must be a member of 
the government, and would automatically become the 
representative of the national minorities of his country 



in the League of Nations (and in due course in the 
European Federation) . Inasmuch as he would naturally 
be chosen from the largest national minority, this 
minister of State would in Germany obviously be of 
Jewish blood a fact which would indicate the sound- 
ness of the proposed solution, and would have an 
excellent effect both at home and abroad. 




THE previous sections have been concerned with questions 

that will become urgent when the war is over, and the 
way in which these questions are answered will be 
decisive as to the kind and the duration of the peace that 
will ensue. They are questions that will primarily have 
to be solved by the Germans themselves. Their con- 
nexion with the present war lies mainly in this, that the 
war was in great measure launched by Hitler and his 
henchmen in order to frustrate the solution of these 
intra-Gerrnan and economic problems. 

But the world-public at large will not be so much 
exercised about intra-German problems as about 
problems that have to do with the relations between 
Germany and her neighbours. These latter are 
problems that have been raised by the war, and their 
discussion, before all, will be the topic of the peace 

Immediately, therefore, we reach the crux of the 
matter. Will the blunders of Versailles be avoided, or 
will they not? 

The brilliant French historian, Jacques Bainville, 
whose work on the Treaty of Versailles [Les consequences 
politiques de la paix y Paris, 1920] is today valued as a 



prophecy that has been fulfilled, joins the German 
critics of the peace conditions of 1919 though for other 
reasons than the Germans. Whereas the Germans 
consider Versailles to have been unduly harsh, Bainville 
deems it too lenient and both parties seem to have 
been justified by the results. 

The fact was that the most urgent problems were 
then very little understood, so that those who had to 
solve them were not ready for their task. Old and new 
outlooks, superficial and profound discussions, sound and 
unsound methods, were grotesquely Intermingled, with 
the unfortunate consequence that, far from reinforcing 
one another, they cancelled one another out. 

The Peace of Versailles, like those dictated at Brest- 
Litovsk and Bucharest, was a nineteenth-century and 
not a twentieth-century peace. But the peace that 
follows the present war must give a new visage to 
twentieth-century Europe. 

Without for a moment ignoring the material demands 
for general security which Germany will have to satisfy 
in order to atone for her complicity in Hitler's outburst 
of violence (an atonement whose effects will be more 
lasting, the more thorough and the more enduring the 
German repudiation of the Hitler System), the coming 
peace must be designed with an eye to the future of 
Europe, to averting the evils that stand in the way of the 
true pacification and the trusty collaboration of the 
peoples of our continent. 

This peace must embody: 

(1) The principle of liberty, of independence, of self- 
determination for all nations, large or small 

(2) The principle that right, not might, shall prevail 



in ail nations,, both in their domestic and in their foreign 

(3) The principle of joint security, joint wellbeing, 
and joint culture. 

These same principles must likewise secure expression 
in the preliminaries to the peace., and in the methods by 
which it is approached. 

On the German side an essential will be that the 
Germans must repudiate on principle Hitler's unwar- 
rantable use of force, and the conditions that have 
resulted therefrom. Without such repudiation there can 
be neither armistice nor peace. 

The repudiation of Hitler's unwarrantable use offeree 
will imply the immediate evacuation by German troops 
of all the non-German areas they may have occupied, 
and a pledge to pay compensation for any damage they 
may have done. 

This re-establishment of right as against might will 
not be a part of the peace, but a preliminary to peace, 
and a main constituent of the agreement for an armistice. 

The peace itself, if it is to deserve that name, must not 
be the upshot of a dictatorship, but of comprehensive 
negotiations, not only between Germany and her 
adversaries, for the neutrals great and small must par- 
ticipate in them, probably choosing the United States 
and Italy as their representatives. A sort of Vienna 
Congress will have to debate and adjust the interests 
and wishes of the peoples of Europe, and elaborate a 
harmony, bearing ever in mind the great commonwealth 
of Europe and the salvation of the West. 



It becomes necessary here to consider a question 
which also involves matters of principle. Who will 
represent Germany at this Peace Conference? 

Those who have read my book thus far will see 
plainly enough that it cannot be an envoy from a masked 
or modified Hitlerian government, nor yet from a 
'government of generals', but must be someone des- 
patched by the government of the German Revolution. 

For a successful revolution against Hitler before the 
military collapse of Germany will not only be the decisive 
contribution of the German people to the cause of peace, 
but also the requisite proof of the genuineness and 
durability of a change in the political structure of the 

Upon this will not only depend (for the most part) 
the readiness of the Allies to make a just peace; for 
nothing else can guarantee that the world has not to do 
with an act of despair on the part of the German people, 
or with an attempt at camouflage on the part of the 
Prussian militarist stratum, but that Germany is honestly 
animated by the constructive will to upbuild a New 
Germany and make a voluntary contribution to a New 

If we do our best to ascertain what are the forces 
and the personalities that can be expected to make the 
German Revolution, and afterwards to represent 
Germany at the Peace Conference, we shall be glad to 
find that within Germany they are far stronger and more 
unified than is obvious or than people outside Germany 



This depends mainly upon the fact that the political 
medley of those who comprise the mass of German 
refugees in foreign parts does not constitute a proper 
reflexion of the internal situation of Germany, or of 
what is taking place there. 

The fact that thousands of human beings have fled 
from a region devastated by earthquake does not create 
any sort of spiritual unity among them. That is why to 
refugees, to those who were constituents of a political 
order that has been overthrown, there clings an odour 
of Goblenz [a rendezvous of emigres during the French 
Revolution a century and a half ago]; why they always 
seem to be persons 'who have learned nothing and 
forgotten nothing'. 

A few only of the German emigres, who in mind at 
least have remained youthful, have had energy for self- 
knowledge, have been able to go on learning, so that 
they have been able to place themselves at the front of 
the coming German Revolution. Not all of them are 
working outside the frontiers of the Reich. Nor are they 
merely to be regarded as the vanquished of yesterday. 
They are the revolutionaries of tomorrow. They have 
fought, and continue fighting, not only against yesterday 
(the Weimar Republic), but against today (the Hitler 
System) . 

If, bearing these facts in mind, we study the forces 
of the German Revolution, we encounter a front which 
manifested itself several years ago in Germany, being 
then named after its most noted leaders the Schleicher- 
Strasser-Leipart Front. 

Some of the high officers of the armed forces, consisting 
of bchleicher (the 'socialist general 3 ) and his intimates 



had, animated by a close acquaintance with the dangers 
of the situation, broken with the junkers (when the 
Eastern Aid scandal became notorious) and with the 
great capitalists (Hugenberg and Thyssen), and made 
successful advances to the revolutionary socialist youth, 
whose spiritual leader was Holler van den Brack and 
whose chief organizer was Gregor Strasser. Together 
they sought and found a way to the anti-bolshevik but 
socialist workers who, led by Leipart, had ready in the 
trade unions the foundation stones for a new future. 

To the old powers of Prussianized Germany this 
alliance of modern officers with the revolutionary youth 
and the solid elements of the working-class seemed so 
desperately dangerous that they were resolved at all 
hazards to smash it; and Hindenburg, the Prussian, with 
his whipper-in Oldenburg-Januschau, the junker, re- 
placed the revolutionary group of Schleicher, Strasser, 
and Leipart by the reactionary group of Papen, Hitler, 
and Hugenberg - with the foreseen (and desired) result 
that instead of an immediate internal revolution there 
came, in due course, a war across the frontiers. 

But the forces of the German Revolution which then, 
in the end of 1932, could still be strangled (largely 
because of the irresolution and muddle-headedness of its 
leaders), have grown stronger, not weaker, during the 
seven years of Hitler's rule. 

I know (from direct acquaintance and active par- 
ticipation) that the Front of these identical forces has 
ripened and become more lucid, and that out of it will 
proceed the German revolutionary government that will 
overthrow Hitler and create the New Germany. 

Its task at the Peace Conference will be far from easy, 

8 4 


and one to which there Is a solitary parallel In history 
Talleyrand's task at the Congress of Vienna. Talley- 
rand., having betrayed Napoleon but being a great 
French patriot, saved his country at Vienna, where they 
believed him when he assured them that Napoleon was 
not France nor France Napoleon,, though for fourteen 
years Napoleon had compromised France even as for 
seven years Hitler has compromised Germany. 

New Germany hopes that the "Geneva Congress of 
1941' will have as much Insight into the actual state of 
European affairs as the Vienna Congress had In 1814; 
but that Geneva will excel Vienna doubly in courage to 
dig down the problem to its very roots; and in a will 
directed ahead towards the rebirth and the future of the 


One of the first and chief matters to be discussed at 
the Peace Congress will be the Austrian question. 

1 know well how complicated it is, too thickly set 
with thorns - with a thousand hopes and fears, wishes 
and grudges, expressed and unexpressed for any sort 
of simple and easily acceptable solution to be possible. 

On the other hand, I must have made so abundantly 
clear my invincible persuasion of the inalienable right of 
individuals and nations to self-determination, that I am 
sure no reader will expect me to believe any valid reasons 
could be adduced against the exercise of that right in 
this particular case. 

New Germany will therefore proclaim the right of 
the Austrian people to decide its own future by means 



of an absolutely free and uncontrolled popular vote or 

As a matter of course this involves the cancellation of 
the results of Hitler's conquest, i.e. that only men and 
women who were Austrian citizens before the German 
invasion will be entitled to vote. In like manner, the 
popular decision, at a time and in conditions to be pre- 
scribed by the Peace Conference, will have to be taken 
under international supervision and control, and not 
under the auspices of any government that may be in 
power there at the time of the plebiscite. 

Finally (and this is in my view an essential feature of 
all such popular decisions) it is better to avoid having a 
simple alternative, and to have as large as possible a 
plurality of questions submitted for consideration. 

It seems to me that as regards Austria there are three 
practicable issues: 

(1) Joining the Germanic Federation. 

(2) Independence of the Red-White-and-Red 

Schuschnigg Austria. 

(3) Re-establishment of the Black-and-Yellow Habs- 

burg-Austria, either as a personal union with 
Hungary, or as a Danubian Federation con- 
sisting of Austria, Hungary, and Czecho- 

I shall venture no prophecy as to what would be the 
outcome of such a plebiscite, and shall content myself 
with affirming that in any case New Germany would 
abide by the plebiscitary decision of its Austrian 

Joining the Germanic Federation must on no account 
be confounded with the 'Anschluss 5 to Hitlerian 



Germany, or with the 'Anschluss 3 to the Weimar 
Republic of which there was talk at one time. As 
previously explained, New Germany will be federal in 
structure throughout, will be a league of autonomous 
provinces, and from its size and population Austria 
would have a considerable say in the Federation. I have 
said that it must be a firmly established principle of the 
federal constitution that all officials in a province must 
be natives of that province, so that in Austria only 
Austrians would rule and function, in Bavaria only 
Bavarians, in Rhineland only Rhinelanders. Thus a 
strong safeguard of the federal structure would be the 
direct interest of the local intelligentsia in their own 

A Red-White-and-Red Austria would seem thereby 
to be outclassed in respect of the chief points in its 
program. Besides, the experiment of St. Germain has 
shown very clearly the weaknesses of such a scheme 
though we must remember that the problem of a larger 
economic area could be solved within the framework of 
the European Federation. A decisive matter here, how- 
ever, will be the question of the time-lag, for the Austrian 
problem will demand prompt solution, whereas in the 
most favourable circumstances there is likely to be con- 
siderable delay in getting the European Federation into 
working order. 

The re-establishment of Habsburg Austria, whether 
in the direct form of an Austria-Hungarian double 
monarchy or in the indirect form of a Danubian Federa- 
tion, presents itself almost as a matter of course, and 
would find many supporters among the western powers. 

In conformity with my principle that the Austrians 



(like any other people) should enjoy the right of self- 
determination and be left to settle their own affairs, I 
must point out that the re-establishment of the Habsburg 
realm is primarily a concern of the Austrian, Hun- 
garian, Czech, and Slovak peoples. Secondly, the 
demands of Jugoslavia, Rumania, Poland, and Italy for 
security would run counter to any such re-establishment, 
and these countries might be expected in this matter to 
have a more lasting pull at the Peace Conference than 
would the Austrians, Hungarians, Czechs, and Slovaks 
in respect of their right to self-determination. Anyone 
who recalls the terms of the oath which had to be taken 
by the wearer of the crown of St. Stephen, will feel that 
there might be some justification for uneasiness on the 
part of the neighbours of a re-established double 

In whatever way the Austrian problem might be 
formulated, and no matter what solution might seem 
most accordant to the feelings and interests of those 
concerned, it remains indubitable that the decisive 
matter must be the right of self-determination of the 
people of the country, with due regard to its neighbours 3 
sense of the requirements for their safety. 


This basic principle will guide us, not only as regards 

the settlement of the Austrian question, but also as 
regards the no less important problem of Czecho- 
slovakia and Sudetenland. 

Early in this chapter, on page 81, I declared that an 
essential preliminary to peace negotiations must be an 



evacuation by the German troops of all the non-German 
areas they may have occupied, and a pledge to pay 
compensation for any damage they may have done. 
This applies unconditionally to all regions which prior 
to 1938 formed part of Czechoslovakia. 

It would be unwarrantable for New Germany to 
appeal to the Munich Agreement of September 1938 
on the ground that it was Voluntarily' signed by the 
Czechoslovak government,, for the signature was really 
extorted by threats and by force, and the agreement 
brought nearly a million Czechs under foreign (i.e. 
German) rule. 

But no settlement can be sound if it deprives the 
Sudetenland Germans of their right to self-determina- 

Here the application of the principle will need special 
safeguards if we are to avoid fresh injustices and the risk 
of further disturbances. 

So much intermingled are Germans and Czechs in 
Sudetenland, that there a vote by districts rather than a 
general counting of heads will be expedient. Nor must 
the existence of 'national enclaves 5 be made a pretext for 
arbitrary treatment of surrounding majorities of the rival 
stock. There may have to be local migrations, or some 
favoured treatment of minorities. The matter is touched 
upon in the section on the Jewish problem (p. 73 and 

Since we have expressly recognized, and must un- 
failingly continue to recognize, that when a people's 
right to self-determination is being fulfilled, due regard 
must always be paid to its neighbours 3 sense of the 
requirements for their safety, the definitive solution of the 


Sudetenland problem will mainly depend upon how far 
the Czechoslovaks feel that their security will be guaran- 
teed by New Germany. Upon the extent of this sense of 
security will depend the importance that the future 
Czechoslovakia will attach to a strategic frontier on the 
German side of their country. 

This will, in its turn,, be largely decided by the general 
solution of the Czechoslovak problem, by the boun- 
daries of the country and its internal construction. 
Primarily these are matters for the Czechs and Slovaks 
themselves; secondly, especially as regards the question 
of boundaries, they are matters for the Peace Congress. 
As far as New Germany is concerned,, that country will 
certainly consider a large and healthy Czechoslovakia to 
be a most important pillar of Central European order, 
and also as a welcome partner in furthering German 
economic life and in keeping Germany in friendly touch 
with the Western Slavs. 

The Czechs, thanks to the conspicuously European 
trend of their minds, the admirably democratic organiza- 
tion of their government, and their highly developed 
science and economic system, seem the predestined in- 
structors of the Ruthenians and Ukrainians, as is 
manifest from the great achievements of Czechoslovakia 
in promoting the civilization and the cultural develop- 
ment of Carpathian Ruthenia. 

The payment of reparations by New Germany to 
Czechoslovakia (and Poland) is a matter of obvious 
justice; the assessment of their amount will be a matter 
for enquiry and negotiation. 

Inasmuch as Czechoslovakia and Poland will both 
desire prompt settlement of accounts, whereas Germany 



after Hitler is not likely to have much cash or credit 
available, the only practicable way of raising funds 
would seem to be by an international loan, the bulk of 
which would probably be subscribed in the U.S.A. 
The most likely way of extracting payments from 
Germany would be for that country to establish a 
tobacco monopoly whose profits would be ear-marked 
for the payment of interest on the loan and the instal- 
ments of amortization. Direct control of the business 
side of the monopoly by representatives of the creditors 
would provide the necessary guarantees of course 
with due regard to political and psychological suscepti- 


A bigger affair, and one even more vital to the per- 
manent re-establishment of Europe, will be the manage- 
ment and the solution of the Polish problem. Not only 
because the present war broke out in relation to Poland, 
thus showing clearly where c the shoe pinched 3 , but also 
because the future peace of Europe turns more upon this 
matter than upon any other. 

Can a mutually satisfactory arrangement be made to 
reconcile the conflicting interests of the Germans and 
the Poles? If not, if the 'open sore' between Germanism 
and Slavism cannot be healed, there can be no lasting 
peace in Europe. For so long as the sore remained 
open, how could any Peace Congress make sure that 
after another twenty-five years the workers and peasants 
of France, the inhabitants of Canada, South Africa, and 
Hindostan, might not again take up arms to intervene 



in a war between Germany and Poland or between 
Russia and Poland? 

The looming of such possibilities, regard for the 
interests of Europe at large, and (even more) considera- 
tion for the joint interests of Germany and Poland, make 
it possible to discover here also a way out of our diffi- 
culties that will be compatible with the rights and the 
wants of both peoples, and with the provision of guaran- 
tees for the safety of the (comparatively weak) Poles. 
Immediate evacuation of the parts of Poland occupied 
by German troops, and a recognition that a war 
indemnity is due to Poland, will be favourable prelimi- 
naries to a settlement, and the offer of German help for 
the liberation of Eastern Poland may facilitate matters. 
The Germans must be prepared to expect that at 
the Peace Conference demands will probably be voiced 
for the incorporation of Danzig and even East Prussia 
into the future Poland. 

Apart from the consideration that this would be a 
fundamental violation of peoples' right to self-deter- 
mination, such an assignment of territory would 
inevitably tend to perpetuate a hereditary feud between 
Germany and Poland. 

Seeing that the evacuation of nearly four million 
Germans from East Prussia would involve widespread 
misery, and that there would be enormous difficulties 
organizational and other in clearing the regions along 
the Baltic that have been forcibly colonized by Germans, 
it Is most unlikely that any scheme of this quarrelsome 
character will be adopted by the Peace Congress. 
Besides, no conceivable German government could be 
found to accept it. 



More difficult is the question of the Corridor. Here 
two vital interests are in conflict: the German interest 
in direct contact with an outlying portion of the Reich; 
and the Polish interest in a route to the sea. 

The recognition that both these interests are vital 
makes a solution all the more urgent. In order to avert 
causes of unceasing friction. To begin with, the Germans 
must admit that for them the only vital matter is the 
part of the Corridor which ensures direct communica- 
tion between Pomerania and East Prussia. 

Although the region in which the two nations have 
conflicting vital interests is thus relatively small, this does 
not make the conflict any easier to evade, for the proposal 
to have c a corridor through the corridor 3 is but a verbal 
artifice which gives no practical satisfaction. 

A solution only becomes possible when we Include 
the Baltic States in the domain of the matters at issue 
between Germany and Poland, and this will have the 
advantage of also helping us to solve the extremely 
difficult Vilna problem. 

New Germany will recognize, not only Poland's right 
to exist, but also that Europe needs a great and powerful 

Poland, the eastern guardian of Europe, the 'limes' of 
Christendom, must enjoy the material strength and 
position requisite for the performance of these duties. 
The cooperation of Poland with the minor Baltic States 
of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, not only makes it 
possible for these three European outposts which live under 
the menace of Russia to be sure of autonomy and of 
Independent development, but also gives Poland her best 
chance of attaining a broad sea-front on the Baltic, 



The juxtaposition of the three petty States to Russian 
military and naval positions convinces us that their 
freedom can only be guaranteed by their having the 
protection of a 'big brother 5 like Poland; and we may 
be sure that the Poland of the future will carefully avoid 
the chief error of the Poland of the past, and will 
eagerly adopt the federative idea. 

Enough! New Germany will feel impelled, both for 
moral and material reasons, to undo the partition of 
Poland of which Hitler has been guilty. New Germany 
will therefore offer Poland her help in regaining Eastern 
and Southern Poland. We may be sure that no Polish 
government will renounce Bialystok, Brest-Litovsk, 
Przemysl, and Lemberg; but we must also consider it 
unlikely that Moscow will have any inclination for the 
voluntary surrender of its plunder. 

In this matter, too. New Germany will be able to 
offer the most direct and concrete proof of her determina- 
tion to make good in the field of reparations. The offer of 
military aid in regaining Eastern and Southern Poland 
will do more than the payment of indemnities in hard 
cash to manifest a complete change in the relations 
between Germany and Poland, and will react upon the 
negotiations for Danzig and the northern end of the 
Corridor. True peace can only be established by respect 
of the vital interests and the sense of honour of individuals 
and nations. 


Several times already in this work I have touched on 
the problem of Russia, which is greatly complicated by 
the Bolshevik problem. 



Happily what the latter signifies has of late been made 
clear and become generally recognized thanks to the 
close political, military, and economic ties between 
Nazism and Bolshevism. 

Bolshevism is a deadly peril to Europe a peril which 
within Europe must be overcome, and on the eastern 
edge of Europe must be made to keep its distance. 

The intra-European conquest will be substantially 
achieved by the overthrow of Hitler and the partition of 
Prussia (which is an appendage to Russia) . 

Keeping Bolshevism at a distance on the east of 
Europe will be one of the most vital tasks of the Peace 
Conference, and will necessitate radical measures for 
safeguarding European peace. 

The most urgent matter here is to keep Bolshevism 
away from the Carpathians, and this can be only success- 
fully achieved by extirpating Bolshevism from Europe. 

The fulfilment of that purpose, however vital it may 
be to Europe at large, does not and must not infringe the 
vital interests of the Russian people. 

Anyone well acquainted with the history of Moscow 
and Russia will discover there evidence of a process akin 
to that which has gone on in the history of Prussia and 
Germany - a part has by force made itself master of the 
whole, and even made itself master of extensive foreign 
regions. No one can deny that White Russia and 
Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, and the lesser peoples of 
the Caucasus, were only subjugated by Moscow through 
the use offeree, often after decades of struggle, and that 
they have never abandoned the longing for freedom. 
Lenin himself was aware of this, and therefore gave these 
foreign nationalities at least a formal autonomy which 



his Caesarian successor has steadily reduced. I do not 
feel competent, nor do I regard it as essential to the 
matter in hand, to discuss whether and how far these 
subjugated nationalities still aspire to independence and 
crave for a reunion with Europe. If they do, I am 
passionately convinced they have a right to be freed, 
and I should deem it one of the basic duties of a genuinely 
European Peace Conference to bring to these remote 
brethren the light of freedom and independence. 

Especially as regards White Russia and Ukraine, it 
would seem that upon the comparatively advanced 
Western Slavs (the Poles and the Czechs) devolves the 
fraternal duty of introducing into the European family of 
nations their so long oppressed and therefore backward 
Slav brethren the White Russians and the Ukrainians. 

This would notably enlarge the buffer regions of 
Europe on the Bolshevik side; it would supply the highly 
industrialized nations of Europe with an internal 
colonial' market for their wares; and it would furnish 
western capital with lucrative opportunities for invest- 
ment. Besides these obvious advantages, we must like- 
wise remember that the position of Europe in general 
as a region for agricultural production would be greatly 
improved; and that there would also be a better chance 
than there is now for collaboration with Japan, 
which would find her anti-Bolshevik safeguards thus 


I am deliberately stressing, not only the need for 
compensating Poland and Czechoslovakia by the pay- 



ment of substantial reparations which may in some 
measure make good the injustices they have suffered, but 
also the fact that these peoples and their States are of the 
utmost importance to the European community. 

Two leading motives are at work here. 

First of all, by strengthening the position of the Slavs 
in Eastern Europe we shall give the less numerous 
peoples of Western Europe the sense that they have a 
counterpoise on the other side of the Germans in Central 

Secondly, when insisting upon the indisputable right 
of the Western Slavs to be enrolled on an equal footing, 
I desire to point out the gains that will ensue for the 
economics, the politics, and, not least, the culture of 

As regards the former point, Tomorrow's Germany 
would be so little afraid of being 'encircled 5 by Latins 
and Slavs on the west, south, and east, that she would 
gladly accept the maintenance of old alliances by France, 
or the formation of new ones, as advantageous to the 
European Federation (or to the renovated League of 
Nations), inasmuch as that would make an end once 
for all of alarms about possible attempts to establish 
German hegemony. Since the Latin peoples outnumber 
the Germans and are stronger, since the Anglo-French 
alliance will assuredly continue after the war, and since 
the Western Slavs (more especially if the White Russians 
and the Ukrainians are freed) will rapidly gain impor- 
tance and influence in Europe there would be an 
admirable equipoise between Latins, Germans, and 
Slavs, so that any racial predominance in Europe would 
be excluded. 

G 97 


As regards what Europe would gain by Incorporating 
the Western Slavs on equal terms, in the long run the 
cultural advantages would be even greater than the 
political and economic. This is obvious, and has already 
been expounded. The most outstanding political gain 
would be the extinction of Panslavism, a movement no 
less dangerous to Europe than Pangermanism. For 
Panslavism gives the Asiatic power of Russia (under the 
mask of Bolshevism no less than under the mask of 
Tsarism) an opportunity for interfering in the problems 
and disputes of Europe. During the last twenty years 
there have been numerous examples of this. 

The cultural gain, finally, cannot be over-estimated. 
Anyone who has had even a glimpse of the cultural 
treasures of the Czechs, Poles, Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, 
and Bulgarians, will be convinced that the older nations 
of Europe will find in them fountains of youth whose 
healing waters are essential to the renaissance of the 

To those who take such an outlook it will seem that 
the Bolshevik-induced homelessness of the Rumanian, 
Bulgarian, and Serb Orthodox Churches (like that of the 
Greek Church, which has also been robbed of its pillars) 
is an excellent thing for Europe, to which it wholly 
restores the last of the children that were influenced by 
Moscow Byzantium. 





THE historical demonstration that in the war which 
began at the close of August 1939 the trigger was pulled 
by the Hitler System's will-to-power (behind which 
stood the traditional Prussian imperialism), and by the 
Bolshevik will-to-power (mainly inspired by the Pan- 
slavist tendencies of Tsarism), must be supplemented by 
an account of the ideological character of the war, which 
gives it the aspect of a European Civil War. 

For the fact is that in every country, throughout 
Europe, there is a party opposed to the official policy of 
its own land: in Germany no less than in France; in 
Finland no less than in Portugal; in Ireland as well as 
in Rumania. No matter whether this internal opposi- 
tion is large or small, whether it is evoked and sustained 
more by Hitlerian propaganda or by Bolshevik ideology, 
no one can deny that the war is substantially ideological, 
is a 'war of religions 5 in which the adversaries are not 
nations but groups of zealots. This is typical of civil war. 

American observers, with the advantage of distance, 
have plainly discerned this characteristic of the war, 
comparing it with the American War of Secession, in 
which political and economic differences were doubtless 
at work, but which was essentially an ideological war, 
and for this reason procreated the U.S.A. in its present 



The recognition that the war is really a civil war, 
that it is ideological or almost religious in type 5 finds 
expression in the hopes of the peoples and the avowed 
aims of the belligerents. 

Hitherto in this book I have been expounding the 
hopes and aims of the German people as follows: 

Liberation from the dominion of the junkers, the 
generals, and the great capitalists by the establishment of 
a socialist and economic order. 

Liberation from the dominion of Prussia by a league 
of the German tribes within the framework of a free 
Germanic Federation. 

As regards the hopes and aims of the whole 'European 
Party 5 in this c Civil War 5 , there remains a third to 

The transformation of Europe into a league of free 

For centuries the poets and imaginative writers of all 
the peoples of Europe have been dreaming of this unity, 
the best thinkers have contributed to the idea, and during 
the terrible years from 1920 to 1940 the economists have 
again and again been forced to admit that their plans 
will remain fruitless so long as 'Europe' does not really 

Notable persons, among whom Axistide Briand and 
Count Coudenhove-Kalergi should be especially men- 
tioned, have made admirable efforts in this direction, 
achieving important preliminary advances, but the 
peoples still lag far behind these bold pioneers. 

Only of late, in the theoretical disputes that preceded 
the Civil War, and in the ideological clarifications which 
it has promoted among all the peoples, have widespread 



aspirations for unity arisen, a knowledge of its impor- 
tance, a longing for collaboration, and a will to bring it 
about. The Pangermans' recent and present attempts 
to achieve the conquest of Europe, with the consequent 
revival of memories of the earlier attempts of Napoleon 
and Charles V, have made it clear that no one nation in 
Europe is strong enough to subjugate all the others and 
establish a United European Empire modelled on the 
Roman Empire of old. 

The torrents of blood in which the originators of such 
schemes have been or will be drowned will not have been 
poured forth in vain, should the peoples of Europe learn 
thereby that they are all members one of another, not 
as servants of one nation or one man, but with equal 
standing as members of one family, as voluntary con- 
stituents of a European Federation. 

Maybe, so far, in my disquisitions on the need for 
European unity, I have not sufficiently emphasized the 
federal idea, which was uncongenial to the centralist 
trend of the nineteenth century. Noteworthy in itself 
is the fact that we now speak of a European Federation, 
and have dropped the term Taneuropa 5 . The federal 
scheme is equally essential to the successful solution of 
numerous political,, economic, and cultural problems 
both within the various States of Europe and within 
Europe itself. 

When, therefore, I now proceed to discuss certain 
practical tasks that will devolve upon the European 
Federation, they are all to be considered on the provisos 
of interconnexion, equality of rights, and voluntariness 
which must be the pillars of every federation. 




Before I begin a sketch of that European Federation, 
a picture of which must loom in the minds of all the 
soldiers (whether they are aware of it or not) as the aim 
of the sacrifices they are making, let me turn back to the 
practical political question of the guarantees for security 
upon whose provision will depend fruitful negotiations 
for the establishment of a new order in Europe. 

Between us and this new order stands the war, the 
extent of whose sacrifices is still uncertain, but whose most 
immediate aim cannot but be the c never again 5 of the 
attacked nations, which will only enjoy tranquillity 
when guarantees of material security have been fur- 
nished, and only then be ready to discuss far-reaching 

For the very reason that New Germany appreciates 
this psychological attitude and admits it to be justified, 
and for the very reason that New Germany is assured of 
the need for permanent collaboration and ardently 
desires it, New Germany will be perfectly willing to 
provide the requisite guarantees. 

In my account of the prerequisites for an armistice, of 
the federalization of Germany, of the democratic and 
socialist reconstruction of Germany within, and of the 
radical destruction of Prussian militarism which of old 
has guided Germany's attitude towards her neighbours, 
I have already expounded the most important of the 
guarantees that will be given by New Germany. 

Even more conspicuous, however, and therefore able 
to have a greater effect abroad, will be Germany's 



decisive adoption of the principle of equal rights directly 
peace is signed. 

New Germany will agree to the destruction of the 
Siegfried Line under the supervision of British and 
French experts while agreeing to the maintenance of the 
Maginot Line! 

New Germany will likewise agree to France's main- 
taining her present alliances, both during and after the 
establishment of the European Federation, whereas 
Germany will promptly denounce her alliance with 
Italy and Japan. Finally New Germany would be pre- 
pared to renounce the ownership of Heligoland, and 
this would involve a marked increase in the security of 
the western powers as against Germany. 

The status of the Belt and the Sound will urgently 
need consideration under the same department. Hitler's 
successful subjugation of Denmark in April 1940 with- 
out striking a blow has shown how impracticable it is 
that the keys of the Baltic should remain c in the hands 
of a child 5 . Whether this question can best be settled by 
the incorporation of Denmark into the British Empire, 
or by the establishment of British fortresses in the 
'Gibraltar of the Baltic 3 will be matters for enquiry and 
negotiation. In one or other of these ways, guarantees 
would be provided against future attacks by Germany 
(or Russia), and enhanced protection would be secured 
by Poland. 

But the most decisive guarantee of general security, 
and the only one which could content all the European 
peoples, would be a general agreement to disarm. 

Apart from the political question of security, we 
are here concerned with the economic and financial 



argument that unless there is a notable restriction 
of armaments bankruptcy or impoverishment will 
be general among the States of Europe. We have 
merely to imagine what will be the condition of national 
finance everywhere when the war draws to a close, 
and we shall see that collapse and pauperization can 
only be avoided by reducing to a very modest fraction 
the milliards that have of late been squandered on 

But such a comprehensive reduction will only be 
possible if there is a general agreement to disarm jointly 
and simultaneously, the process being subjected to 
reciprocal control. 

The carrying out and the control of disarmament will 
be the concern of a sub-committee of the Peace Confer- 
ence. Enough here to say from the German side that 
within the general staff a number of officers must 
mutually exercise the control, for experience has shown 
that effective control must be from within. 

The climax of this reciprocal disarmament on the part 
of the nations of Europe would be the creation of a 
composite European army. 

Its national constituents eould be so constituted as to 
give the European peoples a hundred-per-cent guarantee 
of security as against one another. Britain, for instance, 
might supply the aviation contingent; France, the heavy 
guns and the tanks; Germany, the light artillery and the 
infantry; Poland, the cavalry; Czechoslovakia, the 
pioneers. The neutral States, especially Spain and Italy, 
would for the time being only undertake a systematic 
reduction of their national armies. The formation of this 
European army would be an additional and extremely 



important factor of security, and the defensive capacity 
of Europe as a whole would not be in the least 



Our earnest desire for a European Federation and our 
determination to establish it must not blind us to the 
immense difficulties that will have to be overcome. 
In my view the chief reason why so little support has 
been given to any of the plans hitherto mooted has been 
that they were all designed from a ready-made picture 
and paid too little heed to extant national institutions 
moss-grown with antiquity and deeply rooted. 

In contrast to these plans, of which new variants are 
published almost every day, I myself (true to my con- 
servative principles) start from the conviction that all 
historical processes need a considerable time to ripen. 
I am also guided by the general experience that amal- 
gamations had better begin with the minimum, for then 
we can be sure that as time passes the attachments will 
become firmer and more numerous. 

To every advocate of the notion of a European 
Federation which in 1940 must surely include all 
thoughtful Europeans can be earnestly commended a 
study of the British Commonwealth. There we have: a 
minimum of coercion, a maximum of freedom; due 
regard for diverging local interests and respect for national 
susceptibilities; the maintenance of time-honoured insti- 
tutions, even though they are often inconvenient; the 
avoidance of undue levelling, and instead a deliberate 
preservation of national or local manners and customs. 



In a word 5 the amalgamation is to be made effective 
without thereby sensibly or visibly altering the previous 
methods, rules, or ways. Here is the best recipe for the 
establishment of a European Federation. 

To demand at the outset the establishment of a federal 
government, a federal executive, and the like, would 
only raise needless difficulties, perhaps amounting to 
impossibilities. (Once more I say, look at the British 

At the start, of course, the European Federation can 
only be a voluntary union of European States, access to 
which will be open to every European State that com- 
plies with the prescribed regulations. It will be advan- 
tageous to the Federation to make membership a thing 
to be coveted by every European State. 

Among the conditions of membership will be that the 
candidate State must be subject to the reign of law, both 
in home affairs and in foreign relations; it must recognize 
the arbitral powers of the Federation; must participate 
in the Permanent Court of International Justice at The 
Hague and in the (renovated) League of Nations, and 
in any international institutions established by these. 

The most important feature of the Federation, and at 
the same time the chief advantage of membership, will 
be the collective security of the members, as maintained 
by their reciprocal guarantees and by their mutual 
pledges to combine in order to resist an attack made from 
without upon any member of the Federation. 

The enormous advantages, alike political, military, 
and financial, of having a joint armed force are so obvious 
that the members of the European Federation will 
establish one sooner or later, even though to begin with 



it may take a more traditional form than the one 
sketched above, having specifically distinct national con- 

The relations of the European Federation to the 
League of Nations will be mainly determined by the re- 
construction of the latter in the sense of a worldwide 
representation of continental groups. 


Much closer (and therefore doubly attractive to out- 
siders) can be economic collaboration. It is likely to be 
developed forthwith - and experience teaches that joint 
economic advantages form the strongest cement for 
social cohesion. 

The gradual abolition of all customs barriers upon 
free trade; the discontinuance of insistence upon pass- 
ports and other hindrances to freedom of movement; the 
systematic cultivation of international economic and 
financial relations; unified currency systems; the joint 
performance of mighty schemes such will be the chief 
methods of economic collaboration among the States that 
will be members of the European Federation, and the 
resulting advantages will be so overwhelming that any 
sceptical or hesitant outsiders will soon be eager to join. 

Collaboration of the national economies within the 
European Federation will help to guard the members 
against c trade crises', an effect that will be strengthened 
by the unity of labour laws and labour-protection 
schemes throughout the Federation. 

Important contributions thereto will be made by the 
increasingly unified action of the economic aggregate of 



the European Federation in world-politics and upon the 

Additional possibilities for economic collaboration will 
be provided by the facilitation of freedom of traffic and 
trade, the open chances the citizens will have for settling 
in one another's countries, the assimilation of their 
respective systems of weights and measures and of 
coinage, unified customs tariffs as against non-members, 
a common policy as concerns stocks and shares, and 
what not. 

Of course it is likely enough that there will be varying 
grades of collaboration among the members, such as 
have been begun of late between England and France. 
Here, too, the principle of the utmost flexibility is more 
important than the principle of the utmost unity. 


The most obvious of all the features of the Federation 
will be, and should be, the cultural collaboration of its 

Among the peoples of Europe, which have too long 
been spellbound by narrow national ideas, it is time to 
revive an awareness of their historical and cultural 

Nothing will contribute more to this awakening than 
a knowledge of the national peculiarities of the various 
peoples of Europe, for that will make them respect one 
another, and take pride in the multifariousness of the 
West, inasmuch as variety is not only the charm of 
Europe but its very essence. 

A noble rivalry of national spirits and national arts, 

1 08 


an 'Olympiad of the mind 5 , should be inaugurated to 
bring together the peoples of the European Federation 
through regular publications and other suitable arrange- 
ments, as a supplement of the physical Olympiad revived 
at Athens in 1900, and rightly regarded as one of the finest 
examples of international collaboration. 

Appropriate to the cultural collaboration of the mem- 
bers of the European Federation would be that they 
should manifest their interdependency in their educa- 
tional systems, and tolerate nothing that might run 
counter to it. A good thing would be to have a special 
committee appointed to attend to such matters, and 
exercise a censorship over schoolbooks. In science, also, 
there should be close collaboration; and the arts of 
various countries should fertilize one another, as they 
could effectively do through the instrumentality of a 
European Academy. 

The increasing importance that is being attached to 
the work of the Churches would also help to promote 
awareness of cultural collaboration, for the spirit of 
Christianity is the most fundamental bond of the unity 
of the West. 




EVEN within this sketchy account of the Problems of the 
Peace Conference and of the European Federation it is 
desirable to consecrate a section to the colonial problem, 
for the Conference will certainly have to consider the 
German claim to colonies. Furthermore the treatment 
of the colonial problem will give a crucial example of 
the new spirit that will be essential to the establishment 
of a new order in Germany and in Europe. 

Speaking generally, the colonial problem must not be 
solved, either for Germany or for the other European 
States which have or desire colonies, in such a way that 
the limited (and for various reasons dwindling) colonial 
areas can ever again change masters in consequence of 
an intra-European war. 

There must be an entirely new attitude towards this 
problem, and that will entail a new solution. 

The first essential is to recognize that nowadays the 
colonial problem is mainly a problem of raw materials. 
Subordinate to this are such questions as that of economics, 
settlement, fields for investment, etc. Last of all come 
questions of prestige and national security. 

Such a view of the colonial problem will steadily gain 
ground with the establishment of a new political and 
economic order in Europe, and the consequent growing 
solidarity of the European peoples. 

New Germany, for instance, will not claim that she 



has more right to colonies than other States, such as 
Poland or Czechoslovakia. The arguments that Ger- 
many might advance on behalf of being put in possession 
of colonies might be advanced with equal force by other 
European countries that have no colonies. 

Inasmuch as a perennial struggle for colonies (whose 
size and lucrativeness cannot be indefinitely magnified) 
must be rendered impossible, a new sort of solution must 
be found, and this is that certain regions of Africa shall 
be jointly administered by the European States which 
hitherto have had no colonies. 

To avert the suspicion that such a formulation may be 
a cloak for a predatory campaign on the part of the "have- 
nots 5 against the 'haves 5 , and also to facilitate the accept- 
ance of the scheme, it must be clearly understood at the 
outset that England, France, Italy, and Spain the chief 
colonial powers of Europe - will deliberately stand aside 
as possible beneficiaries. (The same consideration applies 
to the non-African colonies of the other European 

Thus the scheme would apply to the former German 
colonies in Africa and to the African possessions of 
Belgium and Portugal. These large, valuable, and still 
for the most part undeveloped, areas would be placed 
under the joint administration of all the European 
powers, with the exception of the four great colonial 
powers previously named. 

With this end in view, the European States other than 
those purposely excluded would jointly from a 'European 
Colonial Company 5 (E.C.C.) to which each State would 
subscribe funds proportional to the number of its inhabi- 
tants. Investments, administrative posts, and possi- 



bilities of settlement would be allotted pro rata to the 
various States that had formed the E.C.C., subject to 
adjustment every decade in accordance with the census 
returns of the nations concerned. Any national quota 
not taken up would be open to the public on loan, but 
here also subject to decennial revision and recall. 

The European Colonial Company would pledge itself 
to respect the rights of the previous owners or man- 
dataries of the regions it would take over. 

To the previous owners or mandataries must, above 
all, be assigned a ninety-nine year right to the returns on 
the basis of the average yield of the last ten years. 
Furthermore the E.C.C. would guarantee the main- 
tenance of existing material and personal rights, 
especially the tenure of their posts by extant officials, 
military officers, and subordinate soldiers for life or 
while fit for service^ previous rights to pensions, etc,, 
being scrupulously preserved. The appointment of new 
officials would only be made as needed, once more pro 
rata. Military officers and subordinate soldiers would be 
appointed as vacancies arose, but there would be no 
increase in the staffs as they existed on December 31, 

The E.C.C. would also guarantee that the flags that 
had flown over the respective territories should continue 
to fly there, but would have the right of hoisting its own 
flag beside the other; it would continue to use whatever 
had been the official language in any locality, but with 
the right to use a second official language as well, should 
this be expedient anywhere for administrative purposes. 
Thus all the administrations would be placed on an 
equal footing. 



Future officials and settlers would attend, to begin 
with, a course of study in colonial schools to be set up 
In the respective countries of Europe, and the teaching 
in these would be unified as far as possible. 

The E.C.C. would lay especial stress upon the ad- 
vancement of the indigenes of the colonies, regarding 
itself as their guardian; and when the natives developed 
they would., as far as possible, be associated in the work 
of administration. 

The E.C.C. would endeavour to make with the great 
colonial powers agreements that would be to their mutual 
advantage. The great colonial powers would also be 
entitled to join with the E.C.C. in the furtherance of all 
or some of the latter's possessions. 

New Germany would be prepared to assign uncon- 
ditionally to the E.C.C. all its own colonial rights, even 
its most recent ones, for it would regard the formation of 
this body as a just and generally satisfactory solution. 

It seems important to point out that the joint cultiva- 
tion of interests within the E.C.C. would have favourable 
repercussions upon the political collaboration of the 
various States; and that the great civilizing work that 
would be associated with the effective opening-up of 
Africa would give a powerful impetus to economics and 
science and be most beneficial to the youths of Europe. 
Having great duties to perform makes people young, 
vigorous, and cheerful. That is what Europe needs. 




SUMMARIZING the ideas hitherto expounded, we can make 
the following list of war aims: 

(1) Overthrow of Hitler and Hitlerism. 

(2) Annihilation of Prussian power politics by the 
federalization of Germany. 

(3) Restoration of liberty to the Czechoslovaks and the 

(4) Reparations to be paid by Germany to the Poles 
and the Czechoslovaks. 

(5) Right of self-determination for the inhabitants of 
Austria, Sudetenland, and the Danzig region. 

(6) The safeguarding of France by the destruction of 
the Siegfried line while the Maginot line remains intact. 

(7) Joint defence against the Bolshevik peril. 

(8) General disarmament under reciprocal control. 

(9) Expansion of the Anglo-French economic alliance 
into an economic collaboration of Europe at large. 

(10) The establishment of a European Federation 
within the framework of a renovated League of Nations. 

The foregoing Teace Aims of New Germany 5 are 
primarily dedicated to the German people, which less 
than any other Is in a position to grasp the nature and 
meaning of this war, or to understand its outbreak and 
its course. Seven years of propaganda have clouded the 
minds of Germans within the Reich; seven years of the 



Hitlerian Reign of Terror have in part intimidated them 
and in part coarsened them. Nevertheless I am sure that 
the feelings and thoughts of the German people will 
endorse these Peace Aims; and that the German people 
wants to take part in the upbuilding of a New Europe 
which it longs for no less ardently than do the peoples of 
other lands. 

The latter should be convinced by these proposals that 
Tomorrow's Germany will be ready to give the requisite 
moral and material guarantees to show the eagerness of 
the German people to be incorporated in New Europe. 

I know that the dead of the war of 1914-1918 and 
the dead of the war of 1940- bequeath as their 
supreme legacy: 

the upbuilding of a New Europe. 








IN contradistinction to the hitherto prevailing liberal and 
mechanistic views, we start with the belief that a people 
or a nation is an organism, a living body, with definite 
peculiarities of a corporeal, mental, and spiritual kind. 

From this it follows that to the history of a nation there 
applies the eternal law of organic life, the 'die and 
become 5 , a biological compulsion to pass along the 
inevitable road from the cradle to the grave, from the 
apple-seed by way of the fruit-bearing tree to the dead 
wood. This application of biological laws to the course 
of national life does not invalidate the metaphysical 
premises of fate and of the activity of God any more 
than our knowledge and recognition of the inevitable 
movement of the individual's life from birth to death can 
either 'explain' or invalidate the enigma of his having 
become a human being or the form taken by his nature. 


If, therefore, we try to explain the origin of a people, 

we 1 must never forget that we can do so only within the 
limits to which all human knowledge is subject. That is 
to say we can only explain it within that causal world 
outside or above which we recognize the governance of 



the fate that primarily sets causality to work and deter- 
mines its trend. 

From this outlook we perceive that a people is an 
amalgam of various races, even as a child mingles within 
itself in definite proportions both maternal and paternal 
c raciaF constituents. 

To the biological influences of this racial amalgam are 
superadded the geopolitical influences of situation 
climate, diet, etc.; and, finally, the historical effects of 
the dispute one nation may have had with another, of 
internal adjustments, of personal ripening, and what not. 

Out of these threefold constituents of race, country, 
and history, the 'people 5 is formed though we must 
again emphasize the limits imposed upon this causal ex- 
planation by referring to the becoming, the genesis, of a 
human being, whose essential character and form are 
outside the domain of causality. 

Applying these considerations to Europe (to which 
Russia does not belong, never has belonged, and never 
will belong), this signifies that the peoples of Europe 
have originated out of the same racial constituents (Dr. 
Giinther, the famous ethnologist, distinguishes from four 
to five primary races in Europe), which in different 
countries are mingled in various proportions. In this 
fundamentally similar racial composition we discern the 
explanation of the typically European or western civiliza- 
tion as that of one family of peoples in which the indi- 
vidual children (read, 'individual peoples') represent 
various minglings of the parents (read, 'races'). 

To the effects of this varying racial admixture within 
the different members of the European or western family 
of peoples were superadded the effects of differences in 



the countries they inhabited, thanks to which their 
visages were further differentiated; and, finally, the 
effects of their respective histories, which even more 
strongly influenced the further formation of the various 
peoples. As a result has been produced the extraordinary 
diversity of the western peoples, which nevertheless all 
have, owing to their racial kinship, one and the same 
rhythm of western culture, and have all been subjected 
to the same vital laws of this family of peoples. 

The concepts 'race* and 'people 5 (including family of 
peoples, or cultural circle) having been thus explained, 
the 'nation 5 obviously discloses itself to be a 'people 5 that 
has become more fully self-conscious. A people whose 
history has taught it its own specific peculiarity becomes 
a nation, which simultaneously presents itself as the ripe 
stage, the fully adult stage, of the people which is c at 
home' in a specific area. (Compare this with the 'aware- 
ness of personality' that ensues in the individual as a 
result of his experiences and adventures.) 

At this stage of our exposition it will become plain why 
Young Germany insists that in the new epoch Inaugurated 
by the war of 1 9 1 4- 1 9 1 8 the German people is undergoing 
its development into nationhood as the last people of the 
western cultural circle; and why Young Germany finds 
therein the reason for the repercussion of the German 
Revolution upon the whole western cultural circle. 


From the foregoing dissertations it will have become 
plain that we accept the validity of Oswald Spengler's 
brilliantly formulated law of the rise and fall of the 



cultural circle in this instance the western cultural circle; 
and that we perceive therein a great law of motion of all 
organic life, the law of birth, maturity, and death. 

As something essentially new, we supplement this law 
of motion which is comparable to the movement of the 
earth round the sun, by a second law of motion one 
whose manifestations I myself described several years 
ago, giving it the name of the Law of Triune Polarity. 
Its working may be compared to the rotation of the earth 
on its own axis. 

Empirical study of the course of development within 
the western cultural circle shows certain regularities, 
which on closer examination may be systematized as 
follows. We discern epochs of constraint or fixity 
alternating with epochs of unconstraint or revolution. A 
study of dates shows that such an epoch lasts from 140 
to 150 years, and is followed by another epoch which 
lasts about the same time. Without transcending the 
limits of this introductory work, I may point out that the 
last three phases of transition were: 1789-1799, the great 
French Revolution; 1640-1649, the English Revolution 
under Cromwell; about 1500 began the mighty revolu- 
tion we call the Reformation (America having been dis- 
covered a few years before). Going farther back in 
European history we come to such caesuras as 1350 
(Hansa, Golden Bull, etc.); towards 1200, etc. Herbert 
Blank's book, Schleicher? Hitler? Cromwell? \ published by 
the Verlag Lindner (Leipzig, 1932), contains a detailed 
account of this 'Rhythm of History 5 . 

If we study more closely the ideas and the forms of 
these various epochs, we discover the remarkable fact 
that we only have to do with two conflicting ideas, two 



opposing poles, between which the pendulum of history 
swings unceasingly: the idea of constraint, and the idea of 
unconstraint; or, we may say, conservatism and liberalism. 

Should we try to transfer into organic life these two 
ideas and the change from one to the other, we shall 
easily recognize the two main forces of organic life, the 
self-preservative impulse and the species-preservative 
impulse. The first makes the self, the ego, the second 
makes the species, the community of like persons, the 
we, into the centre of the universe. The first is the soil 
out of which the ego-idea, the second is the soil out of 
which the we-idea grows. 

It is needless to explain why we identify the ego-idea 
with liberalism, and the we-idea with conservatism, 
since after what has been said it is obvious that we reject 
the attempt to grade their respective values, for we regard 
this as non-organic. Just as you cannot say that day is 
more valuable than night, or night than day, since each 
determines the other, and both are merely the poles 
between which the pendulum of the earth's rotation 
swings; so you cannot say that the ego-idea is worth 
more than the we-idea, or the we-idea worth more than 
the ego-idea, that liberalism is preferable to conservatism, 
or conservatism to liberalism, since each determines the 
other, and they are but the poles between which life 
swings on its course from birth to death. A simple com- 
parison may make this twofold law-abidingness easier to 
understand. Within the law from apple-seed to apple- 
tree to dead wood, fulfils itself annually the rhythm of 
summer and winter a rhythm whose forms of ex- 
pression are chiefly determined by the law of age. 

We prove, therefore, that the Ideas' of conservatism 



and liberalism continually replace one another on the 
visage of a cultural circle, determining the thoughts and 
feelings of human beings, and thereby determining the 
forms of their life, 

In accordance with the three-dimensional character 
of all organic life in body, mind, and soul (the bodily 
plane representing the relation of human beings to 
things; the mental plane, the relation of human beings 
to one another; and the soul plane, the relation of man 
to God), each of these ideas manifests itself equably and 
simultaneously upon these three planes of life. In an 
epoch when the c we-idea 5 is dominant, we therefore 
observe constraint, conservatism, an economy in which 
the we-idea prevails, a social order characterized by 
the we-idea, a cultivation of the we-idea; and conversely 
when the ego-idea is dominant we notice an economy in 
which the ego-idea prevails, a society of the ego-idea, a 
cultivation of the ego-idea. 

In current parlance (regarding the now declining ego- 
idea as characteristic of liberalism) we therefore speak of 
Capitalism 5 when liberalism is dominant on the bodily 
economic plane; speak of 'individualism 5 when liberalism 
is dominant on the mental-social plane (i.e. in the State); 
speak of 'materialism 5 when liberalism is dominant 
culturally and on the plane of the soul (i.e. in religious 
matters) . 

This triad of capitalism, individualism, and material- 
ism is what we discern as the forms of liberalism that 
exist in the receding stage of the western cultural circle. 

As contrasted with this triad of liberalism, the we-idea 
of conservatism likewise manifests itself equably on the 
three planes of life: as 'socialism* on the bodily economic 



plane; as 'nationalism 5 on the mental-social plane (the 
State); and as 'popular idealism 5 on the soul-cultural 
plane (religion). 

This triad of socialism, nationalism, and popular 
idealism is what we discern as the forms of conservatism 
that exist in the advancing stage of the western cultural 

When we have mastered this basic outlook, w T e find it 
easy to perceive the character of the French Revolution, 
as a victory of liberalism,, and that of the English 
Revolution as a victory of conservatism; for we know 
that at about 1500 the liberal idea was becoming 
dominant, and that at about 1350 a conservative epoch 
was beginning and the differing vocabularies used in 
those old days, or the varying forms dependent upon the 
different phases of ripeness, will no longer be able to 
hide the underlying ideas. 

The law of triune polarity not only gives us an entirely 
new explanation and appraisement of the past, but also 
gives us an appraisement of the present and an inter- 
pretation of the future. We perceive that the times are 
being fulfilled, for the dominant epoch of liberalism and 
its forms (capitalism, individualism, and materialism) is 
drawing to a close, and ever since August 1914 the 
pendulum of the clock of fate has been swinging towards 
a new epoch when conservatism will be dominant in the 
forms of socialism, nationalism, and popular idealism, 
whose mighty uprise and eruption we call the German 

I should like to make It plain that acceptance of these 
philosophical foundations is not to be regarded as an 
essential preliminary to the approval of the political and 



economic disquisitions that follow. But I regarded it and 
regard it as incumbent on me, as a matter of personal 
decency, to allude, however briefly, to the deeper wells 
from which I myself have drawn the constructive forms 
I am going to expound, although others may wish to 
study these forms for purely opportunist reasons, or may 
arrive at the same results in very different ways. 

Anyhow I should like to insist that it is of the utmost 
importance for everyone who wishes to "play an active 
part to have a sound and unified philosophical stand- 
point (which for others may seem a mere hypothesis) 
all the more because the multifariousness of life will con- 
tinually present new tasks c outside the blue-prints 5 ; and 
because the performance of these will (consciously or un- 
consciously) be facilitated by waters drawn from the 
deep wells of philosophy. 


It also seemed indispensable to begin Part Three by a 
clear statement of the philosophical foundations of Ger- 
man socialism, that we might thus early explain the 
internal and fundamental opposition of German social- 
ism to international Marxism a matter to which 
allusion will frequently have to be made in the sequel. 
For us National Socialists, of course, there is no question 
of Marxism being an invention of c the Jew Marx 5 
specially designed to lead the German workers into error 
or even into poverty. But for us Marxism is a socialism 
both liberal and alien, a doctrine whose liberal factors 
necessarily unfit it for the upbuilding of the socialist (i.e. 
conservative) future, and one whose program cannot 
but involve it in the decline of liberalism. This applies 



quite as much to the constitutional Marxism of the 
S.P-D. (Socialist Party of Germany) as to the 'revolu- 
tionary 5 Marxism of the K.P.D. (Communist Party of 
Germany), as is shown convincingly enough by the fact 
that the S.P.D. is no less hostile to National Socialism 
than is the K.P.D. 

There was nothing primarily 'wrongheaded 5 about 
this liberal alienism. It was simply due to the fact that 
the longing for socialism began to find expression at a 
time when the ego-idea, liberalism that is to say, was in 
the ascendant. In these circumstances the socialist 
struggle of the workers had either to face inevitable 
defeat (as the Peasants War of 1525 faced defeat because 
then, likewise, liberalism was in favour), or else to adapt 
itself to the dominant liberal ideas. 

Thanks to Marx, Engels, Kautsky, etc. (all typical 
liberals both by origin and by nature), socialism took 
the liberal path towards alienism, as was plainly shown 
by its relation to the International, its class-war tactics, 
and its materialist philosophy. 

For that reason, and only for that reason, it will be 
impossible for Marxism to play a formative role in the 
coming development, and for that reason Marxism will 
be involved in the decline of liberalism. 

The author has intentionally left the above paragraphs 
exactly as they were written in 1931 in order to show how 
the truth of what he then wrote has been confirmed by 
subsequent facts. The catastrophe of the Marxian 
parties in Italy, Germany, and Austria in part also in 
Spain is only comprehensible when we realize that it 
was the fateful consequence of the dying-out of the 



liberal idea and of its associated forms. For neither the 
differences in strategy as worked out by Marxism in its 
two main trends of communism and social democracy, 
nor yet the differences in tactics as practised by Marxism 
during its death struggles in Germany and Austria, did 
anything to save it from its fate. 

Moreover, if we contemplate the position of the 
Marxian parties in the other countries of Europe we see 
that neither in its revolutionary nor in its reformist form 
does Marxism play any decisive part in European events, 
(In this connexion it is interesting to note that such part 
as Marxian parties still play is directly proportional to 
their attachment to the nation, and that in accordance 
therewith the numerous and welcome attempts at the 
renovation of Marxism necessarily start with a renewed 
enquiry into the relation between the nation and the 
workers.) 1 

Nevertheless, in view of the fact that 'Fight Marxism' 
has become a modern catchword., it seems to me only 
just and decent to point out how much the Marxian 
labour movement has achieved on behalf of the broad 
masses of the people, and especially to stress the import- 
ance of the trade unions. 

But a knowledge and an admission of these things 
makes it all the more necessary to enquire why Marxism 
has been a political failure, and here I am not so much 
concerned with hair-splittings about Marxian theory as 
with the political practice of the Marxian parties. It is 
this which must above all be kept in the limelight during 
the investigations which follow. 

1 C.f. the book Volk und Arbeiter by Wenzel Jaksch, a German social 

democrat of Sudetenland, 





IN the forefront of every consideration of economics 
stands the question of its function. The man of the people 
always answers as follows: 'The function of a nation's 
economic system is to satisfy all the citizens 5 needs for 
food, clothing, and shelter, and to put by reserves for 
troublous times.' 

Minor details apart, an economic system which does 
these things secures the general approval of those whose 
bodily needs are thus satisfied. 

These considerations explain, not only the existence 
and the duration of the liberal (i.e. the capitalist) 
economic system, but also its present crisis and its 
approaching end. Independently of all anti-capitalist 
theories, the capitalist economy would persist (In Ger- 
many) if it could continue to perform its task of ensuring 
for all Germans a sufficiency of food, clothing, and 
shelter. The 'crisis of capitalism', therefore, Is not an 
outcome of the socialist movement, but, on the contrary, 
its main cause. 

For It Is an obvious fact that the capitalist economic 
system can no longer perform its function (as above 
defined), this being plainly shown by the huge numbers 
of the unemployed, the proletarianization of the middle 
class, the ruin of the peasantry, and the failure to provide 
openings for the members of the rising generation. 

i 129 


When within the domain of causality we seek explana- 
tions of the breakdown of capitalism, we find that the 
three most essential factors of the capitalist economy all 
contribute to it equally: 

a. The capitalist economic policy of a centralized world- 
wide system of production, exchange, and the gold standard, 

b. The capitalist economic law which decrees that 
c private property is sacred 5 . / 

c. The capitalist economic form of industrialization, 
mechanization, rationalization, and gigantic enterprises. 

It is necessary to indicate briefly the disastrous conse- 
quences of these three features of the capitalist economic 
system, as prelude to a demonstration of the opposing 
trends which must be taken by German socialism. 

Our view that capitalism is the economic system of 
liberalism is fundamentally distinct from the Marxian 
and the Hitlerian (or fascist) views. 

To both the latter is attached an appraisement, which 
becomes intensified to invectives against the supporters of 

Marxism, with its unhistorical way of looking at things, 
is further inclined to describe all earlier economic 
systems as capitalist, or at least quasi-capitalist, with 
which socialism is contrasted as something entirely new. 

Thus the Marxians fail to recognize that capitalism is 
ideologically linked with liberalism, prior to the dominion 
of which there was an entirely different economic system 
ideologically akin to socialism, though of course differing 
from socialism in form. 1 

In like manner the Hitlerians (and' the fascists) fail to 

1 Abendldndische Revolution [The Revolution in the West], a recent book by 
the Prague social democrat Emil Franzel, is a notable exception, to the common- 
place Marxian sociology. 



understand that the ties between capitalism and liberal- 
ism are inseparable, and they look forward to destroying 
liberalism while keeping the capitalist system intact. 

On the other hand the National Socialists, while 
recognizing the importance of capitalism because of its 
great achievements, are convinced that by internal 
causes the system is doomed. 

A. Capitalist Economic Policy 

Capitalist economic policy is based upon the open 
world-market, worldwide free trade, and the international 
gold standard. But all three of these principles were irre- 
parably destroyed by the war [of 1 9 14- 1918], and from our 
'organic 5 outlook the \var was only the expression of a 
revolution, not the cause of this revolution. For: 

a. During the war the uncivilized and semi-civilized 
countries (India, China, South America, North Africa, 
South Africa) started gigantic industries of their own; 
and when, after the war, the two countries where manu- 
facturing enterprise had been longest established, Britain 
and Germany backed up by the U.S.A., which during 
the war had been transformed from an importing country 
into an exporting country tried to supply their old 
markets, they were faced everywhere by locally-produced 
manufactured articles. These locally-manufactured goods 
could be sold much cheaper, because wages were lower, 
and nothing had to be added to the prices on account of 
freight and customs dues. 

b. In connexion with the war, vigorous nationalist 
movements began everywhere, especially among the 
semi-colonial and wholly colonial peoples. Their nation- 
alist struggles for liberty were always linked with 



attempts to boycott 'white goods 5 , attempts of which 
Gandhi's spinning-wheel is one typical instance, and 
another is the universal movement in China against 
imported commodities (a movement which went on 
regardless of the disturbances resulting from the wars 
between the generals). The economic policy of inde- 
pendent Turkey took a similar line to those of Persia and 
Egypt. Everywhere the struggle for national freedom 
continued side by side with a campaign against 'white 
goods', i.e. against the capitalism of Europe and the 

c. Another change having important consequences 
was in connexion with the Bolshevik Revolution the 
disappearance of Russia as a consumer of the goods pro- 
duced by the older manufacturing countries. More than 
a hundred and sixty million customers disappeared from 
the c world-market 5 5 to say nothing of the developing 
possibilities of Russia as an exporter. 

The world-market, and trade generally, were com- 
pletely upset by the cooperation of these and other fac- 
tors. Then came the break- away of more and more 
countries from the international gold standard, causing 
shocks to which the German reparations contributed 
jolts of their own. 

Since all these causes remain in operation, and from 
their nature are likely to act with increasing strength, 
there is no prospect that the foundations of capitalist 
economic policy will ever again be firmly established. 

Although the capitalist world clung convulsively to the 
hope that this was nothing more than a transient crisis, 
that hope has been cruelly frustrated by the course of 
world trade. 



According to statistics published by the Geneva 
Bureau of the League of Nations, the trade of the world 
as reckoned In milliards of French francs has been: 

Tear Imports Exports 

1929 813 735 

1930 662 586 

193 1 55 4*5 

1932 3i9 28 5 

1933 289 266 

1934 273 252 

The mighty and successful efforts of Russia and Japan 
leave the manufacturing States of Europe (where pro- 
duction is more costly) no chance of ever regaining their 
old position as exporters; and it has to be remembered 
that the U.S. policy of economic isolation. In conjunction 
with the Empire policy Inaugurated by Britain at 
Ottawa, tends to make matters worse. To the European 
States the 'crisis' therefore presents Itself as a structural 
one, which can only be overcome by an entire trans- 
formation of the economic system. 

B. Capitalist Economic Law 

The capitalist economic law which decrees that 
'private property Is sacred* 3 that c a man can do what he 
likes with Ms own', was also completely undermined by 
the war [of 1 9 1 4- 1 9 1 8] . In the hearts of the people there 
spread a feeling that there was something fundamentally 
unjust about a system which repudiated the moral de- 
mand for safeguards against pauperization and lack of 
bread, which brought about or maintained an anti- 
social cleavage of the population into strata of exploiters 


and exploited, and excluded the great majority of the 
citizens from any share In the property, guidance, and 
advance of the nation. To every individual it became 
plain that such an unrestricted right on the part of an 
owner c to do what he liked with his own 3 conflicted with 
the vital interests of the people, and that there could be 
no inner justification for such a right at a time when the 
whole nation was being called upon to shed its blood in 
the defence of 'property'. 

These experiences have made it impossible that the 
capitalist law concerning the c sacredness of private pro- 
perty 3 should ever again secure recognition from the 
German people. 

Of decisive significance in this matter Is the distinction 
between the goods which can be augmented in quantity 
as much as you please, and those which cannot be so 
augmented because they are monopolies. 

Since the very existence of a people depends upon cer- 
tain goods of which there is only a restricted quantity 
(land, the raw materials that lie beneath the surface of 
the land, and with certain reservations the means 
of production in general), people as a whole are directly 
dependent upon those who own such monopolies. If the 
(capitalist) right of private property Is considered to be 
valid as regards these monopolies, then persons to whom 
the monopolies 'belong 3 can dispose at will of the life and 
death of millions of their fellow-countrymen. The 
economic power which thus accrues to the owners of 
monopolies is the essential curse of capitalism, and neces- 
sarily involves the servitude of the dependent majority of 
the population a servitude which radiates from the 
economic into the political and cultural fields. 



For no State, however shrewd and honourable those 
who manage its affairs may be, can effectively safeguard 
the interest of the non-possessing majority of those who 
depend for their very lives upon access to and use of the 
monopolies, if the legal system of the country recognizes 
private property in these monopolies, with the owners' 
unrestricted right to do what they like with their own. 

Moral and economic causes therefore combine to in- 
duce latter-day human beings to repudiate as far as 
the aforesaid monopolies are concerned the capitalist 
economic law that 'private property is sacred'. 

Basically different, on principle, is ownership of the 
goods whose quantity can be augmented at will 
ordinary commodities of whatever kind. Their owner- 
ship (and we shall see later this applies also to money) 
does not create any such 'economic power over the non- 
possessing 5 , for these latter are not dependent upon goods 
that are at any time augmentable, and therefore do not 
become the dependents of the 'private owners' of such 

C. Capitalist Economic Form 

Lastly the war [of 1914-1918], through the fierce in- 
dustrialization that occurred, had a disastrous effect 
upon the bodily and still more upon the mental health 
of the Germans. Doubts concerning the c victory of 
machinery' were intensified by the results of the rational- 
ization that took place during the post-war period, pro- 
ducing huge industrial undertakings and vast bodies 
of unemployed. 

Not without effect, moreover, were the results of the 
renewed contact with nature which the men at the fight- 
ing front had had in the trenches, the youngsters in their 


hiking leagues, and the unemployed in their allotments, 
thanks to which, in industrial life afterwards, they all 
began to ask themselves whether the great town with its 
brick-built dens, the murderous giant factories with their 
conveyers, really provided worth-while conditions during 
the brief span between cradle and grave. 

The feelings of the masses turned away more and more 
from the capitalist economic forms of industrialization, 
the tentacular towns, and manufacturing technique, and 
made the dispossessed more and more insistent In their 
demand for new forms. 

Therein a genuinely conservative repudiation found 
utterance a repudiation of the tendency to overvalue 
the technical and other recent acquirements of civiliza- 
tion. Herein we have an important distinction from 
Marxism, which in these matters, likewise^ shows its 
mental kinship to liberalism. (We see signal examples of 
this in Russia, where Marxist panegyrics on industrial 
development are in high favour, and where the recent 
'Stakhanoff Movement 5 reminds us so much of certain 
features of early-liberal capitalism.) 

To the liberal (and Marxian) ideal of a boundless 
increase In production and consumption we contrapose 
the conservative (and socialist) ideal of a thoughtful and 
cheerful existence, which naturally requires as its founda- 
tion a sufficient supply of the necessaries of life, but seeks 
and finds its main fulfilment in very different values. 

The first thing that emerges from the foregoing dis- 
cussions Is the reason why the economic policy, the 
economic law, and the economic form of capitalism are 
In the throes of a crisis from which no exit can be found; 
but we are also introduced to the germs of the trend and 



the kind of economic policy, economic laws, and economic 
form that will characterize German socialism. 


Arising very urgently out of the collapse of world 
economy, world trade, and the gold standard, come the 
demands of German socialism for autarchy, a State 
monopoly of foreign trade, and a currency standard of 
our own. 

A. Autarchy 

Autarchy, self-sufficiency, I.e. adequate domestic 
sources for the supply of raw materials, is a necessary 
antecedent to the satisfaction of the main demand of a 
socialist national economy the safeguarding of the 
food, clothing, and shelter of the community. It is also 
the necessary antecedent to national freedom and popu- 
lar cultural development, as Is plainly shown to the Ger- 
man people by the Issue of the world war. With regard 
to food-supply, autarchy must be absolute, w r hereas in 
the case of our minimal cultural requirements it can be 
and will be relative. We already have the bulk of the 
conditions. With the necessary improvements, our agri- 
culture and stock-raising could supply a sufficiency of 
food for the German people. The most important raw 
materials that are lacking (cotton, oil, and rubber), can 
in part be replaced by such substitutes as artificial silk 
and flax and in part by synthetic products. 

Efforts to make our national economy independent of 
the rest of the world will be facilitated by simplifying the 
lives of our fellow-countrymen. Under the capitalist 
system a great many "daily needs' are artificially 



developed by advertisement. Simplifying life would not 
mean a 'relapse into barbarism 3 , for culture is not de- 
pendent upon luxury or upon the gratification of need- 
lessly created wants. In a true fellowship no one would 
make a to-do about the satisfaction of such needs while 
any of his fellow-countrymen were going hungry from 
lack of work. 

Thus the stress that is laid upon promoting the idea of 
autarchy needs certain restrictions but still more does 
it need an important amplification. 

National autarchy cannot and must not be the last aim 
of a socialist economic policy, for we are not concerned 
with a Spartan Ideal, but with a Dionysiac ideal, in the 
profoundest sense of the term. Consequently this national 
autarchy can only be a transitional phase though the 
present international situation makes us suppose that it 
will be the terminal phase of German socialism. Not 
through our own will, but under stress of circumstances 
and it seems undesirable that one nation should blame 
another for these circumstances. 

European autarchy, however, is here deliberately ad- 
vocated as the necessary economic policy of German 
socialism, since this is essential to the maintenance of the 
level of European culture and civilization, and can be 
shown to be possible If there is a suitable adjustment of 
agricultural and industrial capacities for production and 
consumption. Nothing but the establishment and safe- 
guarding of European autarchy can make It safe to carry 
on a luxury-trade with other parts of the world without 
endangering the existence of Europe. For the very 
reason that European autarchy Is an aim of German 
socialism, and for the very reason that extant political 



and economic data are still obstacles to the reaching of 
this aim, the national autarchy of German socialism is 
an indispensable antecedent thereto. 

B. State Monopoly of Foreign Trade 

So far as import of raw materials or luxuries seems 
necessary or desirable, the German people will export 
some of its own wares in exchange for the requisites, 
exporting the produce either of a natural monopoly 
(potash, chemicals) or of an artificial monopoly (electro- 
plate, expensive machinery, etc.). 

The exchange will not be effected in accordance with 
the arbitrary wishes of the individual producers, but in 
accordance with a plan drafted to suit the needs of the 
State, and this will involve the existence of a State 
monopoly of foreign trade. Such a State monopoly will 
not (as does the Russian) aim at itself conducting the 
foreign trade, but will merely supervise, and give licences 
for export to such persons as may need them. 

Once more it is necessary to distinguish between what 
may be the terminal situation of German socialism, and 
what may be aimed at beyond it. 

In what will probably be the situation of German 
socialism to begin with, a national monopoly of foreign 
trade will be urgently required. Not merely will the 
natural opposition of international capitalism render 
indispensable this concentration of all the forces of the 
German national economy, but the monopoly will also 
suit the needs of a planned economy, without which a 
socialist economy is impossible. 

Inasmuch as even after European autarchy has been 
established, the internal structures of the various national 



economies will differ, when this later condition is reached 
German socialism will not be able to dispense with the 
monopoly of foreign trade. 

The fact that there will only be a monopoly in grant- 
ing licences to trade will make it easy to adapt matters 
to the various requirements of intra-European and 
overseas trade. 

Above all it will safeguard and turn to useful account 
those incommunicable experiences in foreign trade 
which cannot be acquired by any bureaucratic apparatus. 

C. A Currency Standard of Our Own 
Abandonment of the international gold standard will 
be an essential preliminary to autarchy, for so long as the 
foreign world can have any influence on our currency 
(which is the 'blood 5 of economic life), no really inde- 
pendent national economy is possible. As regards the 
practicability of our having a currency standard of our 
own, it might be enough to point to the German renten- 
mark or to the Russian chervonets. But so great is the 
interest taken in currency questions that it seems ex- 
pedient to make a few general remarks upon the problem 
of money and the problem of the gold standard. 

The preponderant part that money plays in contem- 
porary economic life is due to the circumstance that, in 
addition to fulfilling the tasks of being a medium of ex- 
change and a standard of value, money is also a com- 
modity, being in most countries dependent on gold, a 
commodity which is privileged over all other com- 
modities by having assigned to it by law a fixed value. 
This peculiar commodity-character of money as depen- 
dent on gold, and the concentration of the extant supplies 



of gold in the hands of the great financiers, enable these 
In all States where gold is current coin, or at least the 
standard of currency, to exert a decisive influence upon 
the economic life of the States concerned, an influence 
whose danger has repeatedly been disclosed by the events 
of post-war political life. The commodity money-gold 
has, moreover., a peculiar quality which attaches to no 
other commodity, namely the power of increasing itself 
through interest accruing while it lies idle and its owner 
does nothing at all. 

This quality of gold is not natural but artificial. The 
natural purpose of money is to facilitate exchange. 
Money Is (i) a means of exchange, (2) a measure of 
value. Since in a large and complicated economic unit, 
barter becomes impracticable, the producer sells his 
goods, receiving in exchange, not goods of corresponding 
value, but a 'certificate 3 , a 'token', of the value of what 
he has sold. He accepts this token being confident that 
therewith he will be able to buy a corresponding 
amount of other goods. He does not primarily wish to 
exchange commodities for money, but commodities for 
commodities. He will only be able to do this if the goods 
he wants are already obtainable or will soon be obtain- 
able in the market. Confidence in the purchasing power 
of the monetary certificate or token which he accepts, 
gives this token its value, makes the token 'current coin 5 
(or current notes) . All currency is therefore sustained by 
the confidence of the owners of the current coin and of 
the mass of goods ready for exchange. If the current 
coin Is faced by a suitable quantity of goods, the stability 
of the currency is ensured. When goods are scarce, 
money depreciates, for a fixed amount of money will buy 



less: when there is a glut, money appreciates, for the 
same amount of money will buy more. Only in a cir- 
cumscribed economic system, where the circulation of 
money and the circulation of goods are not exposed to 
the influence of outside forces, is it possible to make sure 
that the quantity of money and the quantity of goods 
shall be in an appropriate relation each to the other. By 
the State monopoly of foreign trade we shall be able to 
prevent any outside forces from exerting undue influence 
upon the quantity of marketable goods, and by having a 
currency standard of our own we shall be enabled to 
exert a decisive influence upon the circulation of money. 

It is necessary here to remind the reader of the differ- 
ence between the immediate national aim in these 
matters, and the ultimate aim of the United States of 

However urgent it may be for German socialism to 
establish a currency of its own, this must be supple- 
mented by establishing, within the European economic 
system we aspire to (brought about no matter how), a 
supra-national currency available throughout the joint 

Various practical considerations seem to indicate that 
the stable Swiss franc can and will become the supra- 
national currency, this giving new tasks to a Swiss bank- 
ing system, under general European control. 


A. Private Property? 

The transformation of economic policy by the estab- 
lishment of autarchy, a State monopoly of foreign trade, 



and a currency standard of our own subsumed under 
the comprehensive term of a c planned economy 5 , is today 
regarded as necessary by numerous groups In Germany 
and elsewhere In Europe. But this theoretical recognition 
of c planned economy 5 will remain sterile so long as these 
groups still cling to the prevailing capitalist economic 
law which decrees that c private property is sacred 5 , 

With the utmost possible emphasis, therefore, the con- 
servative revolutionist must at this point insist upon (as 
indispensable preliminary to a genuine and effective 
planned economy) the abrogation of the prevailing 
economic law of private property. 

One who takes his stand upon the maintenance of 
private property in land, the raw materials that lie be- 
neath the surface of the land, and the means of produc- 
tion In general, is not only repudiating German socialism, 
but Is also defending what will make a planned economy 
impossible no matter how ardently in theory he may 
desire It. 

This follows without more ado from the very nature of 
the owner's claim that he has the right 'to do what he 
likes with his own', the claim which forms the core of the 
legal notion of ^private property'. So long as the owner 
of land, the raw materials that lie beneath the surface of 
the land, and the means of production in general, can 
do what he pleases with his 'property 5 ; so long as the 
peasant can cultivate Ms fields or not as he prefers, the 
owner of a coalmine have the coal mined or not as he 
likes best, the factory owner have his factory working or 
Idle at Ms own sweet will just so long is a planned 
economy impossible. (To say nothing about the privi- 
lege of the owner to sell his property to a foreign indl- 


vidual, corporation, or State, which would be fatal to 
the organization of a German planned economy.) 

For these reasons therefore, as well as for the moral 
reasons that have already been specified, the abolition 
of private property in land, the raw materials that lie 
beneath the surface of the land, and the means of pro- 
duction, is the main demand of German socialism, and 
the presupposition to a planned national economy. 

The same demand is made by all Marxians, and to 
this extent they are socialists, though the carrying into 
effect and the fruitfulness of their demand have been 
hindered and will be hindered by their liberal alienism. 
I consider it expedient to dwell upon the identity of 
demand in this respect as between the international 
Marxians and the German socialists, this being a prelude 
to insisting, as regards constructive methods, upon the 
difference between Marxism and German Socialism. 

B. 'Entail^ 

This difference is based upon our (conservative) view 
of the nature of (German) human beings. 

Biological and historical experience precludes the 
possibility of any change in human nature, and even of 
an intention to change it. Our political task is therefore 
to study human nature as it actually exists in its German 
stamp, and to allow for that nature in our economic and 
social institutions. We must not try to force an economic 
theory upon Germans, but, on the contrary, we must 

1 This term is not here quite identical with the specifically English use of the 
word 'entail*, but we know of no other possible term for the rendering of the 
German Erblehen. We therefore use it in quote marks. Its meaning will 
soon become plain to careful readers. A conceivable alternative term would be 
'usufruct', but this lacks the 'atmosphere' of 'entail*. Translators" Note. 



deduce an economic theory from the nature of Germans, 
and, more particularly, we must then formulate an 
economic system under which Germans can live and 
develop. (If, in what follows, we deal exclusively with 
^Germans 5 , this is merely to restrict our field, and not 
from any overweening presumption.) 

First of all, then, let me insist that the German has a 
longing for his own peculiar style, for independence, for 
delight in responsibility and joy in creation. The lack of 
possibilities for satisfying this longing constitutes the tap- 
root of the homelessness, the discontent, the purposeless- 
ness of the existence of the latter-day German. He suffers, 
in a word, from the proletarian character of his life, from 
his lack of possessions, from the hopeless prospect of his 
old age, and from the dependence of his present. 

To deproletarianize the Germans must therefore be 
the main task of German socialism. 

This deproletarianization is only possible by finding 
possessions for every German. Nothing but possessions 
of his own can give that independence of thought and 
development, that stamp of creative energy, and that 
experience of the sense of responsibility which can really 
and truly satisfy a German. 

This brings us to two apparently contradictory de- 
mands of German socialism: 

1 i ) No German shall any longer have private property 
in land, the raw materials that lie beneath the surface 
of the land, and the means of production in general; 

(2) Every German shall have possessions in these same 

The escape from the apparent contradiction between 
these two fundamental demands of German socialism 
K 145 


can be made by something which we were the first to 
advocate the introduction of 'entail'. 

The nation, that is to say the whole body of the Ger- 
man people, the community at large, is the sole owner of 
the land, the raw materials that lie beneath the surface 
of the land, and the means of production in general, the 
right of exploiting these being assigned to individual 
Germans in c entaiP according as they may be capable 
and worthy of it. 

To make this demand intelligible we must briefly dis- 
tinguish between 'private property 5 [Eigentum] and 
'possession 3 [Besitz]. 

To have a thing as one's 'private property' means that 
one can do what one likes with it can sell it, injure it, 
or destroy it at will. 

To have 'possession' of a thing means usufruct, that 
one is entitled to use the thing, to exploit it, but subject 
to the will and supervision of another, the substantial 
c owner', whose 'private property' it is. 

The proprietor of the entire German national economy 
will henceforward be no one other than the community 
at large, the whole nation. But the nation, or its 
organizational form the State, will not run this economy 
itself. It will hand the national economy over, frag- 
mented and in 'entail', for exploitation by German 
individuals or German groups. 

This watchword of 'entail' forms the core of German 

Nothing but 'entail' will render possible that com- 
bination of general welfare with private advantage which 
is another of the aims of German socialism, since it con- 
forms with the inalienable requirements of human nature. 



Intolera,bl. to tint highly developed Individualism of 

the Germans (and doubtless of other Europeans; would 
be any economic or social system that should run counter 
to a German's personal Initiative or restrict his freedom. 
The brief interlude of the Hitler System will make no 
change here. 

The fata! defect of the capitalist economic system has 
been that Its increasing monopolization and bureau- 
cratization of the masses has for them done away with 
the possibility of their having lives of their own, of 
advancing, of acquiring possessions. This "proletarian- 
ization'., with Its terrible economic phenomena and its 
ghastly cultural defects, cannot be overcome by univer- 
salizing a proletarian lack of possessions. Deproletarian- 
ization Is absolutely essential to the cure of this cancer 
of our time: I mean the assignment of possessions to all 
working members of the community, either as Indi- 
viduals or associated in groups. 

This will be rendered possible by c entaiP, which for 
centuries was the legalized form of the German and 
European economic system, and which, in Its fruitful 
tension between the community spirit and the individual 
will, represents the German and western way of manag- 
ing affairs. 

C. Repudiation of State Socialism 

This systematized method of c entaiP further Involves 
an emphatic rejection of any form of State capitalism, 
euphemistically termed State socialism. 

The need for the repudiation must be thoroughly ex- 
plained, all the more because not only the Marxians but 
many sections of non-Marxians who are working for a 


'national planned economy' aspire towards State capital- 
ism or, as they prefer to say. State socialism. 

In so far as this would involve the transfer of all owner- 
ship rights to the community, as represented by the 
State, it is in perfect harmony with the aims of German 

But when we come to the carrying on of enterprises by 
the State or its organs, the German socialists are pas- 
sionately opposed to such a method, because thereby 
mental (^proletarianization, the development of creative 
energy, and the encouragement of delight in responsi- 
bility would be even more impaired than they are in the 
private capitalist system to say little of the fact that 
those who did the work would be even more under the 
thumb of their employer. 

So well do I know from personal experience what a 
destructive effect bureaucratic control has upon the 
individuality of the workers, and, on the other hand, 
what a craving for independence the German peasants 
and the members of the German middle class have, that 
I cannot but regard with disfavour any scheme which 
would kill this craving for independence by the blight of 

To my way of thinking the chief curse of proletarian 
life is the lack or the perpetual suppression of a longing 
for independence, and I therefore believe it to be the 
chief aim of mental deproletarianization to provide 
independence for the urban operatives rather than to 
undermine the independence of peasants and members 
of the middle class by proletarianizing them. 

We have furthermore to consider the increased 
subordination of all 'hands 5 , financially, socially, politi- 



cally, and personally, when the Staff 5 besides being 
their employer, will be their only court, of appeal. Under 
private capitalism the State (since the worker who has 
a complaint to lodge Is anyhow subject much like 
another, being a taxpayer and a soldier) must always be 
fairly impartial in its attitude towards the employer, and 
this benefits the worker. 

But under State capitalism there is no such impar- 
tiality since employer and State arc one and the same 
person, one and the same authority. 

1 know that the revolutionary Marxians try to in- 
validate this argument by pointing out that their "State 5 
Is the proletarian dictatorship, in which there can be 
no antagonism between employee and State. However s 
so long as a bureaucracy exists, there Is no genuine 
proletarian dictatorship, but only the rule of a class 3 the 
official class, over the great mass of the working people, 
who are far more effectively subjected to the class 
dominion of the bureaucracy than today under capital- 
ism they are subjected to the class dominion of the 
owners of the means of production. 

Decisively In favour of our 'entail* plan Is the popular 
belief that It is a million times more contributory to the 
people's welfare that there should be a thousand Inde- 
pendent peasants than a thousand agricultural workers 
In State employ; In other words that the crucial aim of 
German socialism must be to make the number of 
economically independent persons as large as is the 
number of citizens who actually exist Inspired with a will 
to independence. 

The repudiation of State capitalism and State socialism 
Is one of the most marked characteristics of German 



socialism. Herein German socialism gives expression both 
to a genuinely conservative scepticism of organization 
and to the popular dislike for bureaucracy; and it also 
avows its faith in individuality, which is threatened just 
as much by mass rule as by party dictatorship. (We shall 
return to this when we come to discuss the State.) 

The fascists and the communists rival one another in 
glorifying the State, in suppressing economic and per- 
sonal independence, in unduly extolling power and the 
successes of organization, of decrees, of planning, and 
as a last requisite the police. 

It is precisely in the economic field that the German 
socialists deliberately aim at the utmost independence 
and autonomy of all fit members of the population; and 
in their system those who do not achieve individual 
economic autonomy will, by combining to form co- 
operatives, acquire a considerable measure of that 
independence which is the only soil where firm charac- 
ters can grow. 

To this popular (non-economic) outlook the German 
socialists purposely subordinate all such views as c what 
pays best 5 , c the greatest good of the greatest number 5 , etc. 


The popular outlook likewise dictates our aims as re- 
gards the economic form of German socialism. 

Those who understand that life in our huge tentacular 
towns is a danger to the human race cannot fail to regard 
systematic de-urbanization as urgently required for the 
sake of the people. De-urbanization will also be a 



logical consequence of the establishment of autarchy and 

the introduction of c entalf as regards peasant farming, 
since both will make it necessary that Germany should 
be agrarianized once more. 

This re-agrarianization of Germany will be supported 

from the towns by a far-reaching policy of land-settle- 
ment, which will mainly take the form of fi marginal 

settlements 5 . 

Here it becomes appropriate to mention in passing that 
systematic de-urbanization in conjunction with a mar- 
ginal settlement policy will be of the utmost importance 
to the defence of our country, inasmuch as thereby the 
risks to the industrial centres from aviation attacks with 
poison-gas and incendiary or explosive bombs will be 
greatly reduced through the dispersion of motive force 
that has now been rendered possible by the distant 
transmission of gas and electricity and by the local use 
of internal combustion engines. 

The utilization of these recent discoveries will further 
make it possible to fulfil the demand of German socialism 
that industry should be decentralized for its own. sake, 
and that the excessive industrialization of German 
economic life should be counteracted. 

To the liberal capitalist and liberal Marxian ideal of 
modern mammoth factories producing vast quantities of 
goods, we should contrapose the conservative ideal of a 
full and free life, so that it will be the task of a responsible 
government to create the economic and social conditions 
essential to the realization of such an ideal. 

No sane conservative will admit that it is reactionary 
to shatter, as far as may be desirable, the idols of 
mechanical technique. It is assuredly time for Germans 



to end the tyranny of technique, to overthrow the 
dominion of the machine, and to make technique and 
the machine once more servants instead of masters for 
their domination has been an unmitigated curse. 

Already, in the subsection on Capitalist Economic 
Form (pp. 135 and foil.), I have referred to the new 
attitude which German socialism adopts towards the 
problem of 'man and economic life'. 

Most emphatically do we reject the capitalist (and 
Marxian) creed that man is sent into the world c in order 
to work'. The Song of Labour is a capitalist device for 
the training of diligent slaves, and the same characteriza- 
tion applies to both the fascist and the communist glori- 
fication of labour, whose sole aim really Is to Inculcate 
diligence upon the slaves of the State. 

The conservative revolutionist regards labour as 
nothing but the means for the maintenance of life, an 
instrument which can only transcend narrow limits in the 
higher form of 'creation'. 

Consequently industrial work with its murderous 
monotony must somehow enable the individual worker 
to find a chance for 'creation 5 outside his daily round of 
toil, i.e. this daily round must not claim more than a 
fraction of his life. (But at the same time as much 
attention as possible must always be paid to the 'spiritual- 
ization 5 of daily labour itself.) 

In view of the vast productive powers of modern Ger- 
man factories, etc., there is nothing Utopian in the idea 
that various branches of industry can produce a suffi- 
ciency by winter work alone or mainly, so that the 
workers engaged in these branches will be left free during 
the summer for their own 'creative 5 work, for learning to 


A G R I G U L T U R E 

know their fatherland better, the world at large, and 

what not. 

The disintegration of titanic enterprises and a healthier 
estimate of the role of machinery will give their stamp to 
this new life, even as Increasing joy will promote new 
sociability and foster true culture. 

These Ideas will be admirably rounded off when the 
spiritual leadership of the New Germany no longer has 
its headquarters established in one of the nerve-destroy- 
ing giant towns, but In a new and carefully chosen capital 
of the Reich. For historical and other reasons, Goslar or 
Ratisbon would seem admirably fitted for this purpose. 

Later historians will recognize how overwhelmingly 
strong are the arguments in favour of such a conservative 
choice, and will agree that the governmental capital of 
a country ought not to be in one of Its great industrial 
towns. They will point to the examples of Versailles and 
Paris, of Potsdam and Berlin; and 5 outside Europe, to 
Washington and Kyoto as against New York and Tokyo. 


A. The Coming System 

The object of agriculture is to make sure that the 
community will be fed. 

The land available for the use of the community is 
owned exclusively by the nation, for it was not by any 
individual but by the community at large that the land 
was acquired, by battle or by colonization on the part 
of the community, and by the community it has been 
defended against enemies. 

The community as owner puts the land at the disposal 



of the nation in the form of 'entails 3 to those able and 
willing to use them for husbandry and stock-raising. 

This 'entailing' will be undertaken by the self-govern- 
ing corporation of the local peasant-councils (see below, 
Chapter Three, 5 J3, Vocational Councils, pp. 192 and 
foil.) and the appropriate circle president will merely act 
on the instructions of that corporation. 

The size of the farms will be limited in accordance 
with the local qualities of the land: the maximum being 
determined by the principle that no one may hold in 
c entail' more land than he is able to farm unaided; and 
the minimum being determined by the principle that the 
landholder must have enough land to provide, not only 
food for self and family, but a superfluity by the disposal 
of which he will be able to obtain clothing and shelter 
for self and family. 

The maximum limitation will result in freeing large 
quantities of land for settlement by peasants, particularly 
in Eastern Germany. This peasant settlement is all the 
more necessary because the existence of an abundance of 
peasants thus settled on their own farms furnishes the best 
guarantee for the maintenance of public health and 
public energy. 

The landholder who thus receives a farm on c entail' 
will pledge himself to manage this farm for the best ad- 
vantage of the community and to use his utmost en- 
deavours to make sure that the land shall be farmed to 
supply the food of the community. He will therefore 
have to pay a land-tax, a tithe-rent, to the community. 
This will be payable in kind, the amount being fixed in 
accordance with the area and quality of the land. No 
other taxes will be payable by the peasant. 

A O R I C U L T U R E 

Should the holder of an "entail 5 die, the farm will pass 
to a son able and willing to carry it on. If there are no 
male children available, the c entaif will revert to the 
community, and will be reallotted by the local peasants 5 

In the event of bad farming, an "'entail 5 will also revert 
to the community, the decision upon this matter resting 
with the local self-governing body (peasants' council) in 
agreement with the State (represented by the circle 
president) . 

The introduction of 'entail 3 into German agriculture 
will be in such manifest conformity with German tradi- 
tion and with the right and necessary ideas of peasant 
possessorship 5 that neither psychological nor material 
difficulties are likely to ensue. 

Even the Hitler System, which had not attempted any 
radical attack upon capitalism, was compelled, upon 
pressure from the German peasants, to introduce a 
measure that was based in some degree upon the same 

But the Patrimonial Farm Law of the Hitler regime 
differs from our 'entail 5 plan in the most essential 

(1) It leaves the entire capitalist system in being. For 
this reason the patrimonial farm peasant has great diffi- 
culty in securing credit, since, in view of the nature of his 
tenancy, the capitalists will not lend him money. 

(2) The extant fiscal system levies taxes in money from 
the patrimonial farm peasants, who can only pay their 
dues by getting into debt. 

(3) Old mortgage liabilities remain, as well as other 
debts, and to pay the interest on these (let alone clearing 


off the principal) is even more impossible to a patrimonial 
farm peasant than to a freeholder. 

(4) It extends only to a portion of the peasantry, and 
has therefore created three kinds of agricultural entre- 
preneurs: peasants whose holdings are so small as to be 
unviable; middle and great peasants who are tenant- 
farmers; and great landowners who run their estates on 
purely capitalist lines. 

(5) It protects the great landowners who, sheltering 
behind the Patrimonial Farm Law, can avoid having 
their estates divided up, and thus frustrate their younger 
sons' hopes of attaining at least a peasant's independence. 

(6) It is an instrument controlled by the State and the 
party bureaucracy, not a method of peasant self- 

(7) It knows nothing of the cancellation of tenure 
which the local government can effect in cases of bad 
farming, nor yet of reversion of the land to the com- 
munity when the family becomes extinct in the male 

B. Management of the Transition 
When we compare this coining system with the present 

one, in order to discover how the transition can best be 

managed, we find first of all that the majority of German 

peasants will remain in possession of their farms. 
For of the 55096,533 farms in Germany (census of 

1925) only 18,668 were of the size of 500 acres or more. 

All the others are peasant farms, and would remain such 

under the new system. 

Indeed, properly speaking they would first become 

peasant farms under the new system. The transformation 



of 'privately owned farms 5 Into 'entailed possessions" 

would necessarily Involve the cancellation of all mort- 
gages., land held as an 'entail 5 under the new system 
being by hypothesis unmortgageable. The transforma- 
tion would free the peasants from their burden of debt, 
and would make it impossible for them to get into debt 
again. The new (really Old-Germanic) organization of 
land tenure would make the man who is now enslaved 
by having to pay interest into a free peasant. 

This complete liberation of German agriculture from 
debt, as a necessary consequence of the proposed c entaif 
system, carrying with It the impossibility of the burden 
of debt ever being renewed. Is of decisive importance, 
first, to promote both psychologically and materially the 
acceptance of German socialism by the peasants; and, 
secondly, to make our agriculture a paying concern for 
all time. 

For in this way German socialism would justly present 
Itself to the peasant as the redeemer, coming to deliver 
him for evermore from the claws of the mortgagees, the 
bankers, and the tax-gatherers. 

To save the creditors from ruin, and in this way to 
avert a convulsion In the capitalist money-market, the 
sums owing on mortgage would be converted into non- 
interest-bearing bonds payable by the Mortgage Can- 
cellation Department, a three-per-cent sinking-fund 
being arranged by the Agricultural Tenants 5 Redemption 

No less Important, as the system gets into working 
order, will be the disappearance of the taxes now de- 
manded from the peasants by the State, in place of which 
there will be one general annual payment of the c tithe 3 , 


so that there will be no possibility of the peasant posses- 
sions becoming once more burdened with debt. 

The danger to the State that there may be variations 
in the revenue from the tithes, and the danger to the 
peasants of there being localized failure of the crops, will 
be obviated by the solidarization of the peasantry of the 
circle and the province. (Whereby at the same time will 
be established the necessary community of material 
interests among the peasants a community that will 
make the working of the peasants' councils stable and 

C. Great Landed Estates 

The subdivision of the great landed estates will be 
fundamental to the re-agrarianization of Germany, 
which is one of the aims of German socialism. 

The 18,688 big farms in Germany, of a size of 500 
acres and upwards each, utilize more than 16.7 % or 
if we take in all farms of 250 acres and upwards, more 
than 20 % of the land suitable for agricultural pur- 
poses. Even stronger than this moral argument is the 
urgent need for the provision of more peasant farms, 
since nothing else can prevent the second and third sons 
of our peasants from drifting into the towns. 

The objection that such expropriation of the great 
landed estates would be unjust is invalid, seeing that 
what remained for the former owners, who would become 
'entaiP farmers, would be completely freed from debt; 
and, further, compensation could be paid by the Mort- 
gage Cancellation Department. 

The main objection advanced against dividing-up the 
great landed estates into independent peasant farms (an 



objection voiced both by Marxians and by capitalists) is 
the alleged indispensability of large-scale farming to the 
supply of a sufficiency of cereals to the great towns. 

TMs argument Is based upon various considerations, 
some of which are still sound today but will be overruled 
tomorrow, when the proposed de-urbanization of great 
industries will have markedly reduced the population of 
our towns a movement which will be reinforced by 
administrative and military defensive measures. 

Besides, the systematic intensification of agriculture by 
the spread of market-gardening will in any case involve 
a structural change such as we see in Denmark and 
Holland, and this presupposes the partition of the great 
landed estates. 

Finally the Inclusion of the south-east,, the granary of 
Europe, in the economic system of Central Europe, In 
conjunction with the other general alms of the European 
Federation, will inevitably liberate Germany from the 
need for producing cereals c at all hazards' a need 
which would impair the chances for the establishment of 
a planful agricultural system in this part of the world. 

It has already been pointed out that these changes will 
take time. Obviously, therefore, the partition of the 
great landed estates must be part of a general plan for 
agrarian reform that will look years ahead, making 
arrangements for the erection of the necessary farm- 
buildings and habitations, the choice of the young 
peasants who will run the new small farms, the provision 
of agricultural implements, live-stock, etc. Not least, the 
State will have to found in each province a number of 
model farms, as centres for the supply of seed, for 
stock-raising, and general agricultural progress. This 



development will facilitate the maintenance of the extant 
c model farms 5 that have been established by progressive 
landowners, the personal services and peculiar skill of 
these being recognized and utilized by appointing them 
'bailiffs of the domains'. 

It is important to remember that the tithe-rent payable 
to the State can be paid in kind, and that this will save 
the peasants from the wasteful conversion of their pro- 
duce into money, whereas the State will in a very simple 
way come into possession of a notable part of the harvest, 
which it will to some extent use directly as food-supply 
for the army, and to some extent put on the market as 
may seem desirable to regulate prices. (The salaries of 
officials, allowances to pensioners, etc., may be partly 
payable in kind.) 

The transition from the capitalist agriculture of today 
to the socialist agriculture of tomorrow will thus be com- 
paratively easy, because the German peasantry has an 
interest in escaping from the fleecing capitalist system, 
and in gaining and safeguarding a position in which the 
peasants will be free and independent. 


Industrial enterprises are fundamentally different 
from agricultural enterprises. Whereas an agricultural 
enterprise is mainly carried on by the work of an indi- 
vidual and his dependents, an industrial enterprise needs 
the collaboration of a manager or foreman and his 
staff of workers. The produce of agriculture varies with 
the soil and the climatic conditions; the produce of 
industry varies with the supply of raw materials and their 

1 60 

distribution. Raw materials arc either supplied from the 
sources within the country, such as coal deposits, ores, 
etc. 5 which are the property of the community, or else 
they are procured by import (In Germany: oil,' cotton, 
and rubber). For the freedom and independence of a 
national economy, it is essential that there should be (to 
the extent previously explained) autarchy and a State 
monopoly of foreign trade. In this way the State acquires 
a decisive influence upon the supply of an industry with 
raw materials., and it must be in a position to cope with 
the requirements of production for use. Thus besides 
the manager and his staff of workers there must be a 
third party to the affair as representative of the com- 
munity, and there are three factors concerned in any 
Industrial enterprise: 

Manager; Staff of Workers; the State. 

It Is needful that we should have a clear idea of this 
trlpartition of interests that results from the very nature 
of the industrial process, since therefrom are logically 
derived the forms of possession, the management of 
enterprise, and the distribution of profits, as envisaged 
by German socialism. 

German socialism emphatically repudiates a totali- 
tarian claim on the part of any one of these three factors: 
whereas capitalism makes a totalitarian claim on behalf 
of the entrepreneur; fascism makes a totalitarian claim 
on behalf of the State (a claim it has not so far been 
possible to enforce in practice); and communism makes 
a totalitarian claim on behalf of the workers. 

As contrasted with the totalitarian claim of any one 
factor, we have the notion of an equipoise throughout the 
whole, and here (in current parlance) is manifested an 
L 161 


Important distinction between liberalism and con- 

A. The Factory Fellowship 

Manager, staff of workers, and State are the three 
partners in any enterprise They constitute a factory 

The State, which in agriculture is the exclusive pro- 
prietor of the land, is equally, in an industrial enterprise, 
the exclusive proprietor of the concern. Through the 
instrumentality of the appropriate vocational council it 
assigns the work in fief to a manager who is competent 
and willing to undertake it. In return there will be pay- 
able to the State an impost (corresponding to the tithe 
payable by an agricultural enterprise) 5 the amount of 
which will be assessed at regular intervals (5 or 10 years, 
let us say). These imposts, since, in conjunction with the 
tithes from agricultural enterprises, they must provide 
for State expenditure upon public affairs, will have 
priority over net profits, allowances for wear and tear, 
and reserves. 

Management, possession, and profits are thus assigned 
in thirds to the manager, the staff of workers, and the 
State. The management decides about the world policy 
of the enterprise, settling the kind and quantity of goods 
to be produced, fixing the respective amounts payable 
for depreciation (wear and tear), reserve, and profit, and 
prescribing the wages to be paid. 

Whilst the approved imposts from the works, in con- 
junction with the tithes from agriculture, are the returns 
payable to the State for safeguarding the public economy, 
the share of the State in the profits represents a variable 


! X 1) U S T R Y A X D W H O L E S A L E T R A 1) E 

revenue which can be disbursed for special purposes. 
/Current expenses: for administration, education, army, 
etc.: extraordinary expenses; public buildings, canals, 
power stations, etc,} 

The manager derives his income from his share in 
possession and profits, so that his economic position 

turns upon the success or failure of the enterprise. 
Success will depend upon his devoting his whole time 
and capacity; and his share should, therefore, be com- 
paratively large. 

In virtue of his share in the possession of the enterprise, 
every member of the working staff will draw a portion of 
the profits, and will also receive wages suitable to Ms 
achievements. The two together form the basis of his 
economic self-maintenance. 

The respective shares of the manager and the working 
staff in the profits must be so apportioned that the 
manager will be able to provide for his own living ex- 
penses and those of his family out of Ms share In the 
profits and nothing more, whereas the worker's ordinary 
expenditure will be defrayed out of his wages. The 
manager's share In possession and profits must, therefore,, 
be comparatively large, whilst that of the individual 
worker can be comparatively small. Furthermore it Is 
undesirable that the workers should have a large share 
in the profits, for such copious profit-sharing may foster 
a deleterious overdriving of the means of production and 
the neglect of Improvements that technical and hygienic 
considerations render desirable. 

It is also essential to remember that there should not be 
any aim at large profits, since these are excluded by paying 
due regard to the need for good wages and low prices. 



The factory fellowships with their basis of fiefs thus 
resemble the agricultural enterprises with their basis of 
'entails', but the former are substantially collective 
whereas the latter are substantially individual in 

Of especial importance are three primary qualities of 
this new form of industrial enterprise : 

1 i ) There will come into being, in contradistinction to 
the extant 'class' of capitalists, an 'estate 5 of managers 
which, regardless of wealth or origin, will constitute a 
functional aristocracy that, thanks to the very methods 
of its selection, may be said to be made up of 'captains 
of industry' or 'commissioned officers of economic 

(2) The dispossessed 'class' of proletarians will vanish, 
its place being taken by an 'estate' of fully privileged 
workers, directly and indirectly participating in and 
therefore interested in their 'workshop'. They will no 
longer be the objects of economy, but its subjects. 

(3) The relations between State and economic life will 
be radically altered. The State will not be the 'night- 
watchman and policeman' of capitalism, nor will it be a 
dictator whose bureaucracy cracks the whip that drives 
the workers to the bench and spurs them at their tasks; 
but it will be trustee of the consumers, and as such it will 
have much influence, but only within and beside the self- 
determination of the working producers, namely of the 
manager (who may be a plurality) and the staff of 
workers (consisting in appropriate proportions of clerical 
and other intellectual workers, on the one hand, and 
manual operatives, on the other). 



5. Contrast to Capitalism and Marxism 
It .seems desirable to give a brief account of the basic 

distinction between the watchwords of German socialism 
in these matters and those of capitalism, on the one !iand ? 
Marxism, on the other. 


a. There Is no private property in the means of pro- 
duction. They can neither be bought nor sold, so that 
even though there may be persons who possess large 
quantities of commodities or money ('wealth 9 in this 
sense being both possible and permissible), nothing like 
^capitalism' can come into existence. 

b. The staff of workers and the State are equally privi- 
leged partners with the manager, who is not a Capitalist*, 
but merely a fief-holder. 

c. The need for economic and systematic production 
is enforced upon the manager because his partners out- 
number him. 

d. Every German citizen is one of the joint possessors 
of the entire German economy. 


a. The personal initiative of the responsible managers 
is preserved, but it is incorporated into the needs of the 

b. Within the systematically planned management of 
the whole national economy by the State (organically 
safeguarded by the equal third of influence which the 
State has in every industrial enterprise) the wholesome 
rivalry of the individual enterprises is maintained. 

c. The treatment of State and economic enterprise, 
that is to say of official and industrial manager, on an 



equal footing is avoided; so is the arbitrary power of the 
State which deprives the worker of his rights. 

d. Everyone engaged in an enterprise is, in virtue of 
his being part-possessor as a citizen, one of the immediate 
and influential possessors of his enterprise, his c workshop 5 , 
and can exert this possessive right in full measure on the 
supervisory council of the concern. 

The form of the factory fellowship, founded upon the 
legal idea of the fief, and vivified by the great self- 
governing body of the workers 3 and employees 5 councils, 
on the one hand, the industrial and trades 5 councils, on 
the other, constitutes the new economic system of Ger- 
man socialism, which is equally remote from western 
capitalism and eastern bolshevism, and nevertheless 
complies with the requirements of large-scale industry. 

C. Management of the Transition 

Although the content and the form of German 
socialism are so strikingly different from those of the 
contemporary capitalist economic system, the technical 
management of the transition from one to the other will 
be comparatively easy provided always that the 
political question of the change in the economic law has 
been overcome. 

The simplest way will be to transform all industrial and 
trading enterprises that employ a considerable amount of 
labour-power into joint-stock companies, for the tripar- 
tition of possessorship and the corresponding subdivision 
of control and profits will be easy enough to arrange. 

The 'shares 5 will, of course, be very different from those 
of the extant joint-stock companies, for they will be real 
portions, inalienable because of their fief-character, 

1 66 


neither saleable nnr p1r;clsroablr non-negotiable in fact, 

belonging exclusively to the assignee, 

The extent to which 'present c owneiV can become 
fief-holders will turn upon their achievements as effective 
managers of the enterprise in which they hold shares and 
upon their attitude towards the German Revolution, 
The Formation of an "estate 5 of managers Is no less 
Incumbent upon German socialism than the formation 
of an officers' corps was incumbent upon Prussia ~ an 
analogy of profound significance. 

The unified representation of the State in the national 
economic life as a whole (a representation fundamentally 
distinct from the fascist regulation of economic life) will 
secure the lasting organic joint leadership of economic life 
by the State, without resulting in forcible Intervention on 
the part of Insufficiently skilled officials. More especially 
it will ensure the systematic de-urbanization of Industry, 
in conjunction with its requisite unification and simpli- 
fication, as well as the permanent control of production, 
wages, and prices. All this will grow organically from 
within, elaborated by experts, and unceasingly adjusted 
by the wills of the working staffs and the managers. 

Thus the transformation of profit-making Industry and 
trade into socialist industry and trade, working for use 
instead of profit, will be comparatively simple, because 
It will conform with the interests of the community, the 
workers., and even the managers whenever these are of 
sterling quality. 

The most frequent objection is that our method of 
transition will render It possible for 'capitalists* to come 
into existence once more, or will perhaps actually leave 
them, in being. 



This objection overlooks the radical difference between 
a capitalist and a business-manager (entrepreneur), and 
especially does it forget that 'capitalism 5 , that is to sav 
economic power based upon monopoly-goods, cannot 
arise under the new conditions. No matter how much 
money a man may have, he will not be able to buy por- 
tions of an enterprise (the sometime 'shares'), which can 
now be held only in fief. 

This becomes peculiarly plain when we consider how 
the monetary and banking system will be run under 
socialist control, 

Except during the time of transition, when indubitably 
the needs of the situation will demand a (postponed) 
fixing of maximum and minimum incomes, the acquire- 
ment and possession of money will be limited by what 
work a man can do, and by that alone. Thereby the 
standard -of life will be as much differentiated as human 
nature demands. (Of course a strict legal control of 
inheritance will play its part.) But the decisive point is 
that, under the conditions that will prevail, even the 
ownership of vast sums of money cannot lead to 'capital- 
ism', because, although commodities of the kind that can 
be multiplied as much as you please are purchasable to 
any amount, monopolies such as land, the raw materials 
that lie beneath its surface, and the means of production 
in general, are not purchasable at all. 

Consequently interest will still be obtainable for 
money, but with two important restrictions. The Reichs- 
bank, which issues banknotes, is a State institution, and 
determines what the official rate of interest shall be, and 
by this rate the great banks (which will have the ordinary 
character of professional corporations, unless it has been 

1 68 


thought expedient to have tuein taken ova' by the State 1 ; 

will have to ablde ; with an additional allowance for ex- 
penses. On the other hand, the small banks and local 
credit Institutions will have more latitude in this matter 
of the .rate of Interest, But credit will have to be granted 
without any concrete security, so that it will be a purely 
personal matter of notes-of-hand. There can be no mort- 
gaging of landj factoiies 5 or business undertakings of any 
kind 3 since they will all be national property assigned for 
usufruct as 'entails 3 or fiefs. 

The increased Importance of private and local credit 
institutes will, however, revive the private bankers of the 
old days, and this will be 'good for trade 5 ; advantageous 
to the economic system as a whole. Owing to the 
Increased risk to the money thus lent on personal security 
alone 3 'interest slavery 5 having been done away with by 
making mortgages Impossible, the present objection to 
'incomes made without trouble or labour 5 will cease to 

Finally, this elastic way of treating the money and 
interest problem will facilitate the practical testing of the 
latest monetary theories, whose general application by 
the community would involve excessive - and needless - 


Under the caption of handicrafts and retail trade come 
the various independent petty undertakings In which 
there are no more workers (mostly styled 'apprentices 5 , 
'pupils' 3 or 'assistants') than can have a reasonable 
expectation of some day becoming Independent them- 



These handicraft enterprises and petty establishments 
for retail trade are fundamentally different from the 
factory fellowships. Whereas in a factory fellowship the 
success of the concern, and therewith the weal or woe of 
every one of the workers engaged in it, does not depend 
upon individuals but on the associated labour of all, the 
welfare of an independent handicraft enterprise depends 
upon the personality of the 'boss 5 . In a factory fellow- 
ship, problems are jointly decided by its three sections, 
the manager, the staff of workers, and the State; but, in 
the independent handicraft enterprise the boss decides 
c on his own 5 . He is solely responsible for what is done. 
In a socialist economy this amount of personal freedom 
is only conceivable if there are leagues which organize 
the individuals into a community. Such a league will 
federate the handicrafts or branches of retail trade into 
a guild. 

A. The Guild (or Corporation) 

Handicraft enterprises, small shops, and also the liberal 
professions, will therefore be incorporated into guilds. 

The State will grant the guilds certain rights over their 
members, and in return the guilds will undertake to 
collect from their members the contributions which will 
make up the lump sum due from each guild in the way 
of taxes to the State. 

They will allot the right to practise a petty industry or 
trade by conceding to suitable persons the title of 
'master', which can only be acquired by one who gives 
definite undertakings. The guild will insist upon work 
of a certain quality, and in that case will guarantee sup- 
port to the guildsmen. It will decide how many appren- 
tices each guildsrnan may take, etc. 


H A N D 1 C! R A F T A X D RET n ! I T T l A D R 

These regulations will renaer it impossible for the 

guildsman to pursue his own interests ruthlessly, to make 
an improper use of his economic freedom, for he will 

have to subordinate his interests to the needs of the com- 

It will be obvious that one who is employed in such a 
petty enterprise is not entitled to any share in its posses- 
sion, profits, or management. Though apparently dis- 
advantaged as compared with the members of the work- 
ing staff of a great enterprise, this is because the position 
of the former as employed members is different. In 
reality they are nothing more than apprentices or pupils 
who know that in due time, when they have given 
proof of competence, they will become independent 

This presupposes that the possibilities for such ad- 
vancement have been duly considered by the guild and 
the administration, working together, and bearing in 
mind the public demand for persons practising such 
crafts or professions. The granting of diplomas by the 
authorities will be subordinated to the growth of popula- 
tion, and the schools will have to guide their pupils in the 
choice of avocations. Especially does this apply to the 
liberal and academic professions. 

Such inevitable encroachments upon individual liberty 
will be more than compensated by increasing security of 
livelihood and promotion; apart from the fact that the 
encroachments will not be the work of bureaucratic State 
officials, but will be made solely through the instruments 
of a system of self-government that will have to act 
within a framework prescribed by the State. 



B. Management of the Transition 

Here the extant vestiges of the guilds and cooperatives 
will provide stepping-stones. The advantages to the 
independent handicraftsmen and the members of the 
middle class that will derive from the new vocational 
associations, from the fixing of maximum numbers, etc., 
will be so great that the apparent disadvantage of the 
official control of prices will be fully made good all the 
more seeing that the associations will be established by 
self-governing bodies, and will only be subject to State 

Of great importance in this connexion will be the 
abolition of the existing scale and method of taxation, in 
place of which the guild will pay a lump sum, collected 
by the guild from its members. 

The transformation of the minor handicrafts and petty 
retail establishments into the guild system of German 
socialism will be all the easier because the German 
handicraftsmen and small traders have a vital interest 
in escaping the destruction with which they are 
threatened by the capitalist system, and thus maintain- 
ing their existence as independent artisans, small shop- 
keepers, etc. 

For the sake of completeness I must point out that 
house-ownership comes within the category of 'goods 
which can be augmented in quantity as much as you 
please' (see above, pp. 134-5), and will therefore remain 
private property. The necessary adjustment of rents will 
be arranged for by seeing to it that municipalities and 
cooperative building societies of all kinds shall provide a 
sufficiency of new dwellings on behalf of the public wel- 
fare always on the presupposition (applying to pri- 



vately owned houses no less than to others; that land is 
not private property, but will merely be leased to the 
houscowner as a fief for a definite term of years. This 
fundamental principle will make sure that the State or 

the municipality (which in general will here be trustee 
for the State) shall have a decisive Influence in the build- 
Ing market. Besides, the new way of dealing with banks 
and mortgages will make It easy to control the building- 
sites on which fantastic groundrents are now paid. Thus 
from the monetary side the building market will be made 
healthy once more. 


One of the main objects of German socialism is to 
combine the personal egoism that Is a necessary and use- 
ful part of our human equipment with advantage for the 
general welfare, much as the working of the engine 
propels an automobile. 

This aim finds expression, for example. In the fact that 
a peasant's tenure of his farm is to be arranged with an 
eye to communal benefit. The surplus he produces by 
working harder will be 'tax-free 5 . Another and even 
more striking instance Is that there will be no limit to 
the acquisition of commodities other than the natural 
limit to a man's working powers. Herein,, once more, is 
a sharp distinction between German socialism and 
Marxian communism, for the latter only recognizes 
personal freedom In such matters within marked limits. 
But the decisive point Is that however much money a 
man may possess, or however large a quantity 7 of goods, 
these will not enable him to become an owner of land, 
its mineral resources, or the means of production for 



they are only obtainable on c entaiP. (Apart altogether 
from the heavy inheritance tax which, except for a few 
taxes on luxuries, will be the only c tax' of the old sort to 

Although our picture of German socialism can be no 
more than a sketch, we can at least make it plain that the 
voluntary formation of producers 3 and consumers 5 co- 
operatives will be strongly encouraged by the State, 
which will be competent to encourage it through playing 
so active a part in all great enterprises. 

Though it will be uncongenial to the nature of German 
socialism to introduce any kind of State coercion into 
economic life, this objection is neither theoretical nor un- 
conditional, but merely represents a practical inference 
from the German character. 

The development of cooperatives will be an important 
supplement to German socialism, and the economic 
counterpart to political self-government. It need hardly 
be said that the individual will be free to enter or leave 
a cooperative at will, partly because none but voluntary 
members can be expected to work cordially in the 
organization, and partly because nothing should be done 
to diminish the friendly rivalry between cooperative and 
non-cooperative enterprise. From this outlook it may be 
taken as a matter of course that there should be no 
material favouring of the cooperatives by the State, 
except that the State will certainly encourage the 
educational activities of the cooperatives, and this will be 
especially valuable where agricultural cooperatives are 

Ideologically considered, the future trade unions will 
be simply workers* cooperatives whose main task will be 


to promote vocational training and development; for the 
economic and political interests of the workers (and em- 
ployees) will be best served, directly by the workers 5 
councils (or employees' councils), and indirectly by the 
estates 5 chambers. (See below, pp. 197 and foil.) 

I may take this opportunity of repeating that the Ger- 
man temperament is equally opposed to the disposition 
of western capitalism to ignore the rights of the com- 
munity, and to the disposition of eastern bolshevism to 
ignore individual responsibility and to despise the 
creative will of the personality. 

The economic system of German socialism is, therefore, 
no less hostile to eastern bolshevism than to western 
capitalism; and our socialists feel strongly akin to those 
forms of the Middle Ages that gave expression to our 
national peculiarities, and to the essentials of the German 


Public assistance comprises care for those members of 
the community who are no longer in a position to gain 
their own livelihood. 

The main significance of the term Community' or 
"commonwealth 5 is that no one who belongs to it shall 
have to endure the miseries of poverty. For the duties 
which every citizen owes to the community are also 
entail rights, being set off by the duties which the com- 
munity owes to every citizen. 

This principle implies the need for a comprehensive 
system of national insurance, covering childhood, un- 
employment, accident, old age, and death, supple- 
mented by voluntary insurance. 


In contrast with, the existing methods, the whole com- 
plicated system of insurance and support would be re- 
placed under socialism by a unified life insurance. Every 
citizen would thereby be insured in a way that would 
guarantee him a sufficiency whatever happened, and no 
matter whether he (or she) was temporarily or per- 
manently unfitted. Every citizen, moreover, by paying 
a supplementary premium, would be able to secure in 
case of need an allowance supplementary to that pro- 
vided by the national insurance scheme. 

As a matter of organization this would mean that all 
private insurance companies would be fused into one 
comprehensive national insurance scheme which would 
be directly connected with the Reichsbank. The 
economy effected by sweeping away the intricate 
apparatus of the extant private insurance companies,, 
and by putting an end to the earning of considerable 
profits by the stockholders in such companies, would 
greatly reduce the premiums. 

Further, matters would be much simplified by having 
only one aim of insurance to safeguard the supply of 
a sufficiency for maintenance to anyone who should 
become unfitted for earning a livelihood, whether tem- 
porarily or permanently, and by whatever cause. 

Desires for individual variations in what is regarded 
as a minimum subsistence would be met by having 
different grades of insurance. The lowest grade would 
be compulsory, and the premiums would be automatic- 
ally deducted from wages or salary. What supple- 
mentary premiums were thought advisable would be 
decided by people themselves, at their own risk and at 
their own responsibility. 



In these circumstances under German socialism there 
would be no further possibility that any members of the 
community should go hungry, as they do today, or even 
(horrible to relate) actually starve to death. 

Every German, man or woman, would then be freed 
from the dread of poverty in old age s which now, to 
many, is a source of unceasing anxiety and gloom. 





IN accordance with the organic conception that all 
institutions must be judged by the extent to which they 
favour organic life, we regard the State, not as something 
that stands above the community at large, but as 
nothing else than the organizational form of the peopkj 
the form that will ensure the fullest possible development 
of the organism known as the 'German people 5 . The 
State is not an end in itself, but something whose aim is 
(or should be) so to deal with the organism of the 'people 5 
(or 'nation') that it may most effectively utilize all the 
energies that will enable the community to maintain 
itself as against other communities In the world. 

It follows from this that the State is always determined 
by the peculiarities of the people. No people can take 
over intact the State-forms of another. When the form 
of the State is adapted to the peculiarities of the people 
of one country, our organic outlook makes it plain that 
this form of State cannot be perfectly adapted to the 
peculiarities of any other people. If, for instance, fascism 
is the form of State best suited to the Italian people 
(and the fact that the Italian people tolerates it makes 
this probable), then fascism cannot be the form of State 
best suited to the German people. The same considera- 
tions apply to the bolshevik form of State which prevails 



In Russia, which cannot possibly be the best form of 
State for the German people. 

The State must originate out of the nature of the 
people; it should arrange the people's life, and reduce 
Internal friction to a minimum, for then the outwardly 
directed energies will grow more powerful. The athlete 
who trains for some great achievement, who makes his 
nerves and muscles cooperate without friction, and who 
by the regular practice of graduated exercises also 
cultivates the mental powers of self-confidence and 
will-to-victory. Is the model of an organism in prime 
condition. A team trained for success In some particular 
sport, such as football, is a community whose chances 
of victory depend on the same presupposition the 
reducing of Internal friction to a minimum, in order 
to secure the maximum output of well-directed 

This conception of the State as the best possible 
organization of the people Involves the rejection on 
principle of the demigod role which all dictators and 
would-be dictators ascribe to the State, and Implies the 
frank avowal of the C people 5 s State 5 , The organic 
connexion between people and State which underlies 
the latter notion Imposes upon the conservative revolu- 
tionary as a necessary deduction that the forms of the 
State must adapt themselves to the Internal and external 
transformation of the people, of the popular conscious- 
ness, of the popular degree of maturity. It also follows 
as a matter of principle that those forms of the State are 
'good*, i.e. suitable,, which are favourable to the bodily 
and mental health and development of the organism 
that Is the people; even as those forms of the State are 

1 79 


'bad 3 , i.e. unsuitable, that are unfavourable and in- 
hibitive in these respects. 

For the people is the content, the living, the organic; 
the State is the form, the dead, the organizational. 

The experiences of recent years, and especially our 
experiences of the Hitler System, make it necessary to 
reject with the utmost possible emphasis the principle of 
the 'totalitarian State'. 

The national idea, according to which man and his 
organic community the people should be the core of the 
social system, involves by its conservative nature the 
repudiation of any attempt to idolize an organizational 
form. No less decisively in favour of this repudiation is 
the recognition that the State, from its very nature, can 
only have regulative functions, that is to say can only 
influence and ought only to influence a part (though 
an important part) of the social life. Both the lower 
plane, that of the c body 5 (= economic life), and still 
more the higher plane, that of the c soul' (= culture), 
tend by their very nature to set themselves apart from 
the plane of the 'spirit' (= society), and claim for 
themselves independent fulfilment, unless the natural 
equilibrium is to be impaired, which will inevitably lead 
to the illness and ultimately to the death of the organism 
as a whole. 

In accordance with the introductory thoughts to our 
Philosophical Foundations (see above, pp. 119 and 
foil.) the reader will, I think, understand these 
dissertations even if he finds I am making a somewhat 
unfamiliar use of terms. (This is mainly because the 
words like old coins have been worn thin by excessive 
use. They will need to be reminted in days to come.) 

i So 


The lordly sense of superiority with which the genuine 
conservative always regards the State as nothing more 
than an instrument, a tool as a *suil of clothed which 

fits the people more or less well is justified, even as is 
justified the humble respect he lias for the organism of 
the 'nation 5 , in which lie sees the durable whilst the 
State Is the transient (varying with the extant growth or 
ripeness of the nation). 


For these reasons, at bottom the State form is Indiffer- 
ent, and all we have to enquire is which form of State is 
most appropriate to the present ripeness (= age) and 
ideology of the German people. 

For these reasons, more especially, the question 
monarchy or republic is of little moment. Our choice 
will be determined by our answer to the question^ 
"Which ftrm of State will be most suitable to the German 
character and essential nature? 5 The more suitable the 
State is to the German character, the more harmonious 
will be its internal organization, and the more powerful 
will it be in a world where it is faced by other States. 

The principle that only the best and most efficient 
among German men shall be summoned to lead the 
State 5 excludes hereditary monarchy, for it is contrary to 
probabilities that talent will be so perfectly transmitted 
by inheritance that the son of the best leader will also be 
the best leader of his people. An additional argument 
against hereditary monarchy is the principle that there 
must be no handicap in life, that there shall be equality 
of opportunity for all the citizens. A form of State in 
which a supreme position is assured, by the mere fact 



of birth, to the eldest son of the reigning monarch 
conflicts so drastically with the principle of equality of 
opportunity that it is self-condemned. 

Remains to decide between an electoral monarchy 
and a republic. In either case the head of the State will 
be elected: in an electoral monarchy, for life; in a 
republic, for a specified term. 

A short term certainly involves the danger that the 
president will be tempted, in order to favour his chances 
of re-election, to bribe the electors by concessions of one 
sort or another; and this will make dispassionate govern- 
ment unlikely. The danger of bias will be greater 
when the president is energetic and ambitious (two 
qualities that are otherwise desirable in a statesman), 
resulting in corruption when the electorate is small, in 
the courting of popularity when it is large. 

Such dangers are obviated when the president (or 
monarch) is elected for life, for this makes him inde- 
pendent of the electors, and enables him to contemplate 
and carry out far-reaching schemes regardless of any- 
thing so mutable as popular favour. 

For these reasons it seems to us that the best arrange- 
ment for Germany would be that the Reich should have 
a president elected for the term of his natural life. That 
would be conformable with the experience of more than 
a thousand years of German history, and it matters not 
whether the monarch so chosen is called an emperor or 
a president. 


The president of the Reich, elected for life, will be 
the supreme representative of the State authority. The 


A1> M !XI >TR AT10N 

ministers appointed by and subordinate to him will 
merely be experts \\ith advisory functions, and will not 

be responsible wield ers of Slate power: they will be 
personally responsible to the president. 

The second wielder of State authority will be the 
Great Council. 

The Great Council will consist of the presidents of 
the provinces (from twelve to seventeen in number), 
the five ministers of State,, and the presidium of the 
Reich Chamber of the Estates. It will therefore have 
about two dozen members, all of them persons of 
outstanding importance. By a simple majority vote, the 
Great Council will also elect the president of the Reich 
(who need not be a member of the Council). 

The third wielder of State authority will be the 
Reich Chamber of Estates. This will consist of no 
members, 100 being elected and 10 being nominated. 
It stands at the head of the entire Estates System, 
(Fuller details will be found in Section Five, below.) 

The three wieiders of State authority will have equal 
powers. A law will require the assent of any two of 
them for enactment or repeal. 

Stability in the management of the State will be 
ensured by the fact that the president of the Reich is 
elected for life, that he will command a majority in the 
Great Council (since he appoints the presidents of the 
provinces), and because 3 nominating ten members of 
the Reich Chamber of Estates, he will also have pre- 
dominant influence in that body. 

The position of the president of the Reich, which was 
outlined by the author in 1931, obtruded itself into the 
Hitler System after Hindenburg's death but with 



the difference typical of the transitional character of the 
Hitlerian epoch, that here it was an inevitable outcome 
of circumstances, not the fruit of creative will This 
accounts for the absurdity that the ministry de jure of 
the Reich still has in the main (as the Weimar constitu- 
tion foresaw) de facto the character of a mere body of 
experts with advisory functions, and lacking the powers 
of responsible government. 

But precisely because the president of the Reich will 
thus have a great deal of power, it is vital that there 
should be the two other wielders of State authority, 
to establish the eminently desirable modern form of 
c authoritarian democracy 3 , which is fundamentally 
distinct both from the dictatorship (of an individual or 
of a party) and from the mass dominion (of parties or 
councils) . Once more, fuller details will be found 
below in Section Five. 

Here it becomes necessary to say something very 
important about the officialdom. In conformity with 
the essential nature of the genuine 'people's State 3 which 
we desire to establish, there must be no privileged 
officials. Probably there is no popular sentiment more 
widely diffused, and certainly there can be none better 
justified, than discontent with an officialdom which 
considers itself entitled to lead a sheltered life apart 
from the economic struggles of the broad masses of the 
people. Less than ever today do any exceptional 
achievements of the officialdom warrant such a position. 
When as a matter of principle the 'official 3 has become 
nothing more than a 'public servant 3 , he will have to 
fulfil all the demands for efficiency and hard work that 
are made of the members of the liberal professions, and 



to share in the vicissitudes of the general welfare. In 
other words, whereas In contemporary Germany the 
officials have peculiar rights in that they cannot be 
dismissed and are entitled to pensions when the new 
order has been established, absolute security against 
dismissal will have been forfeited by officials of all 
grades, whilst the right to a pension will belong to every 
German citizen without exception. 

It will be a firm principle with German socialism that 
a privileged and powerful officialdom bureaucracy, in 
short will be a deadly peril, against which the only 
safeguards are a maximum of self-government, and a 
minimum of official rights. That is why strict supervision 
and control of all public functionaries will be so im- 


One of the most difficult questions of German home 
policy, hitherto, has been the puerile one, unitarism or 
federalism? The question Is of typically liberal origin, 
and It need hardly be said that the liberal answer has 
always been Militarism 5 . 

Though a conservative German will no less certainly 
answer 'federalism*, it must not be supposed that he 
dreams of making the present German States the units of 
this new federalism. These States nowise correspond to 
the organic integrality of the populations living within 
their 'borders'. They came into being as a result of the 
local dynasts' endeavour to bring as much territory and 
as many "subjects 5 as possible under their respective 
sways an endeavour which was most powerful (and 



also most deleterious to Germany) In the Habsburg 

It will, therefore, obviously be needful for Germany, 
as a start, to break up and rearrange these separate 

I know that, as things are now, both Old Prussia 
and New Prussia will strongly oppose the disintegration 
of the State that passes by the name of Prussia, on the 
ground that it would be disastrous to the Reich because 
it would impair the formative energy of the Prussian 

I have, indeed, too much respect for the Prussian 
spirit, and am too keenly aware of the important part 
it has played in German history, to be moved by any 
anti-Prussian resentment such as I might be supposed 
to have imbibed in my Bavarian homeland. 

But my knowledge of the German character and of 
German history have convinced me that the Prussian 
particularist solution was no more than an arbitrary 
expedient which did not cease to be an arbitrary 
expedient because it was advocated and adopted by 
Frederick the Great and then by Bismarck. My general 
understanding of historical interlacements convinces 
me, indeed, that in the epoch of the (liberal) national 
State there was no other way by which the Reich could 
be established than by the hegemony of Prussia. But 
the same understanding now informs me that the time 
is ripe for a revival of the old (conservative) idea of the 
Reich, an idea whose mystical interconnexion with the 
rebirth of the West is overwhelmingly confirmed by the 
history of the last thousand years. 

The development of the German people into a true 

1 86 

P R O V I N G 1 A L S U B !) 1 V 1 S I O X 

German nation (which I regard as the substantial 

meaning of the German Revolution) demands and 
compels that Prussian particularism in all its forms shall 
be thrown into the melting-pot, demands and compels 
a wedding of the Frederician German type with the 

Theresian German type to procreate (anew) the 
German for to the true German appertains a European 
sense, w r hich was so conspicuously and fatefully lacking 
in Prussian particularism. 

This recognition of the necessarily unified character 
of the German State is not an acceptance of the ideal of 
liberal unitarisrn. For this unified German State must 
not be ruled centrally from one spot. There are such 
marked geopolitical, religious, and cultural differences 
within the German people as to forbid a uniformity that 
would conflict with the very nature of the Germans. 
Though, therefore, the coming German realm will be 
unified, it will be federally subdivided into provinces. 
The extant arbitrarily formed States and territories 
having been broken up, they will be rearranged into 
from twelve to fifteen provinces, each corresponding to 
a geopolitical, cultural, and tribal entity. 

The weekly periodical I used to edit under the title of 
c Der schwarze Front' 1 contains, in its issue of September 
30, 1931, a sketch of the proposed provincial subdivision 
of the German Reich as it then existed, to which I refer 
readers who want more details. 

The province will be subdivided into circles (Kreise), 
each having approximately the size of the present circles 
(in Bavaria, Bezirk; in Saxony, Amtshauptmannschaft; 

1 It has now [1936] become Die deutsche Revolution^ Verlag Heinrich 
Grunov, Prague. 



in Wurtemberg, Oberamt; in Baden, Amtsbezirk; in 
Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, Amt). 

Reich province circle will thus be the organiza- 
tional subdivision of the administrative areas of the 
German State. 

Each province will have its own president, who will 
hold office for seven years. He will be appointed by the 
president of the Reich, but the appointment will be 
subject to the approval of the Provincial Chamber of 
Estates. If this approval is withheld for two years in 
succession, the provincial president will have to retire, 
and the president of the Reich must appoint another. 

In like manner the circle president will be appointed 
for five years by the provincial president, and his 
appointment will need the approval of the Circle 
Chamber of Estates. Here also, if approval is withheld 
once, the question will come up again after a year's 

The need for confirmation of the appointment of the 
chief provincial and circle officials by the respective 
Chambers of Estates implies the exercise of an extremely 
important influence by the popular assemblies. Thereby 
the presidents of circles and provinces will become at 
least as dependent upon the good will of the people 
as upon that of their official superiors, and this is all the 
more important because thus the popular influence in 
the Great Council will go far beyond that in any case 
exercised through the representatives directly elected 
by the people (the five chairmen of the Reich Chambers 
of Estates). 

The prescription of a one-year-interval before a 
second vote by which the president of a province or a 

1 88 


circle can be definitively dismissed safeguards these 
officials against excessive mutability of public opinion, 
and ensures in any case the continuous functioning of 

State authority. 


A. Abolition of the Party System 

The most important inference from the conservative 
view that human beings (even the members of the same 
people) are unequal in bodily, mental, and religious 
respects, and therefore unequal in what they can do for 
the community, is the repudiation of the (pseudo-) 
democratic principle of equality. 

A further inference is the recognition that every human 
being can only form valid judgments about things and 
persons that he knows from his own achievements and 
from personal experience. This involves the repudiation 
of the politico-parliamentary electoral system. 

It is time to unveil the repulsive and gain-seeking 
falsehood of popular government which is an essential 
constituent of liberalism, which is disseminated by 
selfish groups of capitalists, promulgated by inter- 
nationals of all kinds, maintained by demagogy that 
tickles the vanity of the masses and contributes to 
securing for various obscure forces an influence and 
leadership that would be impossible in a better-managed 

That is why the German socialists unconditionally 
reject any kind of political election, any election by 
political parties and groups which always remain 
anonymous, and, conversely, why they insist that it is 



necessary to establish a system of popular representa- 
tion by vocational estates. 

On principle these demands signify the end of all 
political parties, and whatever kind of parliaments they 
may have formed. From their very nature political 
parties have a vital interest in sundering the people into 
factions, for they exist through producing such a 
cleavage, and their main task is to foster and intensify 
oppositions of every kind by means of the press, public 
meetings, etc. A genuine commonwealth of the people 
can, therefore, only be established by the destruction 
of the existing party system. 

If I here reproduce without change what appears 
concerning this matter in the first edition (1931) of the 
Aufbau des deutschen So^ialismus^ it is only to show in how 
inadequate, half-hearted, and therefore Inveracious a 
way the Hitler System fulfilled this primary demand of 
the German Revolution. The necessary and eminently 
desirable dissolution of political parties was stayed as 
regards the dissolution of the HItlerian Party; the (evil 
and corrupt) system of rule by political parties was 
replaced by the (still more evil and still more corrupt) 
system of rule by a monopolist party. 

All complaints made of the party system apply with 
redoubled force to the monopolist party system of the 
Hitler regime, which has all the drawbacks of the 
multiple-party system and none of its advantages. 

In my view the parliamentary form of party govern- 
ment is incomparably preferable to any kind of un- 
controlled personal or party dictatorship not forgetting 
that there are varieties of parliamentary party govern- 
ment, ranging from the ideal-democratic system of the 



Swiss canton of Appenzell by way of the conservative- 
democratic system of Great Britain to the demagogic- 
democratic system of the Weimar Republic. 

The fact that there are such diversities within the 
field of parliamentary democracy shows that where 
there are different preliminaries, at varying times and 
under various developmental conditions, there may be 
distinctive forms of democracy, and that It is conse- 
quently incumbent upon us to study what new r kinds of 
democracy may be called for by existing circum- 

Nor must we forget the signal fact that during the last 
decades of western social evolution there has been going 
on everywhere a 'massing 5 of the people which cannot 
fail to have momentous consequences. Owing to the 
rapid growth of towns, of enormous towns, tentacular 
towns, people have been uprooted from the countryside 
and 'intellectualized* in a way that has weakened their 
healthy instincts; this has been accompanied by a 
growing inclination to overrate both machinery and 
sport, these In their turn tending to hasten the general 
despiritualization of life. The net upshot has been the 
fateful change of the peoples into mere masses, a change 
which has increasingly affected all the European 
nations. Elsewhere/ discussing the matter in detail, 
I have given concrete Instances of this trend and its 
effect upon political life. Here, then. It will suffice to 
reiterate my conclusion that this disastrous change from 
people to mass will necessarily involve the decay of all 
the old forms of democracy a decay that Is so con- 

1 See my book Die deutsche BartholomaUsnacht [the German Massacre of 

St. Bartholomew], Reso-Verlag, Zurich, 1935, pp. izg and foil. 


spicuously displayed by the cheapjack methods of the 

mass political parties of today. 

A logical inference from this, reinforced by a know- 
ledge of what has been happening in Germany, is that 
the revival of the old parties has become impossible. 

The German people's passive acceptance of these 
(still no more than half-finished) workings of the Hitler 
System shows very clearly [In 1936] how accurate was 
the diagnosis of the situation I made five years ago, 
and how In this respect the Hitler System has been 
fulfilling the will of the German Revolution. 

B. Vocational Councils 

It is of the utmost importance, therefore, to establish 
a new form of democracy which shall avoid the defects 
of the old kinds, shall make due allowance for the 
'massing 3 which has occurred, shall go out to meet the 
dangers that have resulted therefrom, and shall over- 
come them within its own structure trying, at the 
same time, to arrest, and as far as may be to reverse, this 
process of disintegration. 

These things will only be possible if we can liberate 
once more the mighty energies of self-government, 
loosen the framework of society, educate the people by 
systematically encouraging political responsibility in the 
very lowest strata of the community, and thus consolidate 
a supporting tier, without which authoritative demo- 
cracy Is impossible. 

We must therefore create, instead of the bureau- 
cratically dictatorial State of fascist, bolshevist, or par- 
liamentary irresponsibility, the genuinely popular State 
of German democracy and aristocratic responsibility. 



The principles and forms of an aristocratically 
responsible way of carrying on the State have been 
expounded in the first four sections of this chapter. 
We now have to consider the principles and forms of 
supervision and collaboration by the people, of self- 
government by the estates, of what I call 'German 
democracy 5 . 

Starting from the conservative view enunciated above 
(p. 189) that a human being can only form valid judg- 
ments about things and persons that he knows from his 
own achievements and from personal experience, we 
arrive at the vocation as the basis of every 'choice', every 
election, that the individual German can make in his own 
sphere of achievement and personal experience. 

Therewith is fulfilled another vital demand based upon 
the conservative view, that only those citizens shall have 
seat and vote in the Thing who contribute a prescribed 
minimum by way of achievement on behalf of the 
community, in a word, only those who work. 

The demand that the electors should be personally 
known is fulfilled by the circumstance that the 'con- 
stituency' shall be the smallest 'administrative unit 5 
the circle. 

The German citizen will therefore make one primary 
electoral act, within his own vocation and his own circle. 

In each circle there will be elected five vocational 
chambers, or vocational councils, namely: 
the Workers' Council of the Circle, 
the Peasants' Council of the Circle, 
the Council of the Liberal Professions, 
the Council for Industry and Trade, 
the Council for Employees and Officials. 

N 193 


Each vocational council of the circle will consist of 
twenty-five members elected for three years. 

These vocational councils will be the only popular 
assemblies that are the outcome of general, equal, secret 5 
and direct election by persons active in a vocation or 
retired therefrom. 

They are exclusively vocational representations of 
persons united by common interests. 

This fact prescribes their sphere of activity. The 
vocational councils will deal with all vocational interests; 
will supervise wages, working conditions, vocational 
training, etc.; they will be the experts to be consulted 
upon all vocational questions by the national adminis- 
tration; and, above all, they will decide matters of fiefs 
and 'entails'. They alone will nominate the candidate 
for any fief that becomes vacant, and the State will 
ratify the appointment through the instrumentality of 
the appropriate circle-president or else will refuse to 
ratify it, in which case the vocational council concerned 
will have to make a fresh nomination. 

The vocational electors will naturally do their utmost 
to elect as members of the vocational council the persons 
best fitted for their task, being guided by a knowledge 
of the candidates both in vocational and in private 

The further development of the vocational councils 
will accord with the structure of the administration in 
this way, that the vocational councils of the circles will 
elect the five vocational councils of the province, 
consisting of fifty members each, belonging to the 
appropriate vocation; and the vocational councils of 
the provinces will elect the five vocational councils of 



the Reich, each consisting of one hundred members, 
belonging to the appropriate vocation. 

The decisive feature here is that these elections of the 
provincial chambers and the Reich chambers Is not 
primary,, but Indirect; not by the ultimate electors, but 
by the members of the next lower grade of vocational 
representation. The object here is, of course, to ensure 
that the most capable and effective vocational represen- 
tatives shall rise into the higher bodies, which will be 
guaranteed all the more securely by indirect election 
without any canvassing of the primary electorate 
because the election of the fittest is in the Interest of 
each vocation. 

The members of the provincial vocational council 
will be elected for five years, those of the Reich vocational 
council for seven. 

The sphere of activity of the higher councils will be 
identical with that of the circle councils. Substitutes 
will have to be elected to a lower council in place of 
those appointed to a higher council. 

Thus the vocational councils will represent the interests 
of all the active workers in Germany, 

It is Important to note that the self-government of these 
councils will be absolutely independent, whereas In 
Italy and Russia the State and the respective monopolist 
parties dominate (that is to say interfere with) the self- 
government of the active workers. This is especially 
marked in Italy, where none but members of the Fascist 
Party or the fascist unions are eligible for election and 
entitled to vote, the representation of the active workers 
being thus limited to a small fraction of the population 
(carefully sifted by the organs of the State), consisting 



of persons in relation to whom the masses of active 
workers have no rights whatever. (It is the same here 
in Germany under the Hitler System, without even the 
trifling fragment of the corporations.) 

It is somewhat different in Russia, where (in theory, 
at least) the whole mass of active workers has the suf- 
frage. Still, the different categories of active workers 
have different voting powers, and some are expressly dis- 
franchized. Five peasant votes correspond to one 
worker vote though we are told that there is to be a 
change in the next elections; and many persons engaged 
in 'bourgeois 3 vocations, notably the intellectual pro- 
fessions, are disfranchized. It is significant that in 
Russia the motions that are to be voted on are decided 
by the party, and merely have to be 'approved 5 by the 
assemblies. Also we note in Russia a very remarkable 
fact that whereas in the councils of the lower grade there 
are many non-party members (of course persons 
acceptable to the party), there is a much larger propor- 
tion of communists in the middle-grade bodies, and the 
highest councils consist exclusively of party members. 
This signifies that there can be no genuine, independent, 
democratic representation of the interests of all active 

Contrariwise the war-cry of German socialism is that 
we shall ensure unrestricted, truly democratic self- 
government by all the active workers of the population. 
There must be no influence exerted by, no dependence 
upon, any powerful group or party, and least of all upon 
the State. No matter what the State may desire, under 
the German system any German who enjoys the con- 
fidence of others that pursue the same vocation will be 



able to make his way into the highest offices by which the 
State Is controlled and led; even becoming a member of 
the Reich Chamber of Estates or the Great Council. 
This will mean the most complete democracy attainable 
and without a chance of Its degenerating Into demagogic 

C. Chambers of Estates 

Inasmuch as the vocational councils of the circle, the 
province, and the Reich will represent nothing but 
vocational Interests, they must be supplemented by 
general popular representation. 

In each administrative unit (circle, province, Reich) 
there will, consequently, be formed out of Its vocational 
councils a Chamber of Estates, as follows. 

The Circle Chamber of Estates will consist of twenty- 
five persons elected by the vocational councils of that 
circle and three additional members nominated by the 
circle president. These nominees must be eminent and 
respected inhabitants of the circle. 

The Provincial Chamber of Estates will consist of 
fifty persons elected by the vocational councils of the 
province and five additional members nominated by 
the president of the province. 

The Reich Chamber of Estates will consist of one 
hundred persons elected by the vocational councils of the 
Reich and ten additional members nominated by the 
president of the Reich. 

Of decisive importance to the composition of the 
Chambers of Estates is It to make sure that they shall 
faithfully reflect the sociological stratification of the 
circle, the province, or the Reich. For this reason the 


various vocational councils will not elect the same 
number of members each to the appropriate Chamber 
of Estates, but a number proportional to the composition 
of the population in the administrative area concerned. 
If, for instance, in a province there are 40% of workers, 
25% of peasants, 10% of tradespeople, 10% practising 
the liberal professions, and 15% of employees or officials, 
then the membership of the Chamber of Estates must 
comprise the same respective proportions. Of the fifty 
members of this provincial Chamber of Estates, twenty 
would be industrial workers; twelve, peasants; five, 
tradesmen; five, members of the liberal professions; 
eight, employees or officials. One necessary limitation 
to this would be that no vocation must have more than 
50% of the members of the Chamber, so that it would 
not be possible for one of the estates to command a clear 
majority over the others. 

In each administrative area the presidium of a 
Chamber of Estates would be formed by the five chair- 
men of the vocational councils. 

The sphere of activity of a Chamber of Estates is 
fundamentally different from that of a vocational 

The Chambers of Estates form an important part of 
the State administration and State leadership. 

Their collaboration in every governmental measure 
is direct insofar as every decree by a circle president 
or provincial president would need the approval of the 
appropriate Chamber of Estates. Moreover, as explained 
in Section Four of this chapter (pp. 188 and 189), the 
circle president and the provincial president will need 
to enjoy the confidence of their respective Chambers of 



Estates for the proper performance of their official 

But the right of veto possessed by a Circle Chamber of 
Estates or a Provincial Chamber of Estates only becomes 
effective when exerted, about the same matter, for a 
second time after a year's interval. This measure cuts 
both ways: for, on the one hand 5 it prevents the holding- 
up of measures urgently required for the good of the 
State; and, on the other hand, the permanent enforce- 
ment of an unpopular measure, or the continuance in 
office of an unpopular president, will be prevented by 
the system of popular representation. 

In addition the activity of the Chambers of Estates 
will render possible their authoritative supervision of 
the whole State administration in the area under their 
control, and especially their collaboration In matters of 
consumption, prices, quality, etc. 

The duration of the Chambers of Estates, in con- 
formity with that of the vocational councils, will be 
three years for the circle, five for the province, seven for 
the Reich. 

The special duties of the Reich Chamber of Estates 
as the legislative body, and the further duties of its 
presidium of five (consisting of the chairmen of the five 
Reich vocational councils) has been discussed in Section 
Three of this chapter. 

Not unimportant is it to mention that representative 
services in the vocational councils and Chambers of 
Estates will be honorary. Compensation will be allowed 
for loss of time and out-of-pocket expenses., but there 
will be no financial advantage In holding such a 


The decisive importance of this scheme for the repre- 
sentation of the estates, lies in the fact that thereby the 
popular will can find expression throughout the work 
of administration no matter what the State authorities 
may do or desire to do. 

The distinction between vocational councils and 
Chambers of Estates, both as regards their composition 
and as regards their duties, is of the utmost moment. 

Whilst the vocational councils give expression and 
influence to the vertical stratification of the German 
people, the Chambers of Estates represent the horizontal 
stratification, and thus give a cross-section through 
the interests of various parts of the population in all areas 
of the Reich. 

The councils represent purely vocational interests, so 
that their duties are correspondingly restricted to the 
particular vocations and the relation of these to the 
State; but the Chambers secure for the localities a 
general popular representation, and consequently form 
an important part of the general State administration 
and State guidance. 

Of especial consequence is it that thereby will be 
ensured a direct and lasting popular control of the State 
and its officials in all parts of the State apparatus. 

In the fascist State there is no such control; in the 
bolshevik State it can only be exercised c by way of the 
Party 5 (which is almost identical with the State); and 
in the parliamentary State, at the best, control can only 
be exercised by unseating the government, which is often 
a difficult matter. But the Circle and Provincial 
Chambers of Estates, with their right of veto over circle 
president and territorial president, can control the State 



apparatus permanently, directly, and effectively; can 
control it from the bottom to the top through the 
instrumentality of independent popular representatives. 
Hereby we realize the idea of a people's State as con- 
trasted with bureaucracy. 





IN conformity with our knowledge of the completeness 
of the revolution that is inevitable, and is therefore in 
progress, we realize that there is also going on a revolu- 
tionary change in peoples' minds. They are forming a 
new estimate of the meaning of life and of the task that 
awaits mankind. 

The philosophy of the liberal epoch has been and still 
is materialism. Nothing typifies Marxism more plainly 
than the fact that it is tainted with alien views of 
socialism, that its program is shaped by the materialist 
philosophy which it shares with liberalism. 

Before the French Revolution we already encounter 
traces of a new outlook on life - the outlook of those who 
aspire to break away from their allegiance to God, and to 
take their stand exclusively upon the logical plane of a 
human knowledge that has been freed from sparks of 
the divine. 

This rationalist way of looking at things involved a 
number of serious errors. The rationalists and material- 
ists believed themselves able to explain nature; but they 
failed to grasp nature in its entirety, in its relations to life; 
they recognized no other phenomena than those that 
could be numbered, weighed, and measured, and thus 
subjected to what they regarded as 'law'. All that lay 



beyond this., which was non-rational and therefore *un~ 
reasonable 3 , all that was inaccessible to the reason, to 
the understanding, having been deliberately excluded 
from observation, they then went on trying to force 
their rationalist laws upon the non-rational. 

The development of science, which convinced them 
they would be able to understand and explain every- 
thing, induced an overweening pride which made them 
regard the understanding of the ego as the measure of 
all things, and recognize as real only that which the 
understanding (thus limited) could grasp. Matter and 
force were the foundations of all being. The rationalists, 
the materialists, felt that they could really understand 
matter, but force remained inexplicable. Still, this did 
not bother these would-be 'explainers 3 . The contempla- 
tion of dead matter, of its atomic structure, of the juxta- 
position of these atoms and their mechanical relations in 
a universe where they were moved by named but in- 
explicable forces, became the foundation of their picture 
of the world, the basis of the materialist outlook of 

To us conservatives this attempt of the liberals to 
evade the mysteries of life, the subordinations to destiny, 
with the methods of a soulless logic, seems to us as childish 
as would be the endeavour to ascertain the perfume of 
a flower with a yardstick or a weighing machine. 
Humbly and modestly we recognize that the decrees 
of fate lie outside human control, and that it behoves 
man to abide by these decrees in a word, to accept 
'God's will'. We know and accept His will as the pre- 
supposition of all that befalls man and of all human 
action, and we solve the eternal enigma of the freedom 



of the human will by saying that the 'What' lies without 
the sphere of that will, but the 'How 5 within. 

We thus find a new significance for life in the fulfil- 
ment of the c God-willed' specific peculiarities of our 
people, in the affirmation and perfectionment of the 
people's soul as a revelation from God. 

But we should only be making a blunder akin to that 
of the materialists were we, in our turn, to proclaim 
idealism as an exclusive philosophy of the world. 

Indubitably it has been one of the great and never- 
to-be-forgotten services of liberalism in general and of 
Marxism in particular to have proved how valuable 
and important to life are material forces, material 
relations, and material functions; a service which abides, 
however much the liberals and the Marxians may have 
underestimated the value and importance of ideal forces, 
ideal relations, and ideal functions. 

Were the German socialists, instead, to overestimate 
the value and importance of idealism, they would be 
false to the crucial doctrine of the neo-conservative 
organic philosophy, according to which the true and 
all-embracing reality of life is discoverable in the 
relations and the functions of the necessarily unified 
forces of body, mind, and soul. We are justified there- 
fore in speaking of conservative realism as the typical 
philosophy of the German socialists. 


Conservative realism not only regards the power of 
faith as one of the most splendid manifestations of the 
soul, but also affirms the greatness and everlastingness 



of the religious sentiment which unites the human soul 
with God. 

But our humility towards every true religion must not 
blind us to the fact that not only religious ideas, but also 
(and even more) religious forms, i.e. the Churches, are 
intertwined with the specific peculiarities of the various 
nations and with the general laws of human transitori- 
ness which finds expression in the mutability of all the 
phenomena of life. 

Here, then, arises (more especially in view of the turn 
the German Revolution has taken of late), the question 
where Christianity stands in the picture. 

We should be false to the teachings of history were we 
to deny that the source of Christianity did not flow from 
the spot where the heart of the West beats. But if, as we 
showed In the chapter on Philosophical Foundations, the 
concept 'West 3 includes the religious elements of history 
as well as the racial and geopolitical ones, it follows un- 
deniably that the mighty experience of Christianity has 
been an inseparable constituent of the West, and that any 
attempt to eliminate it would be as foolish and imprac- 
ticable as to attempt to make the impressions of two 
thousand years of history non-existent. 

This does not mean that the mutations of the West, as 
determined by the eternal law of growing older and by 
the rhythmic change in ideas, will not have a decisive 
influence upon Christianity itself. If today far-seeing 
Christian theologians speak and write both of the c Ger- 
manization of Catholicism 5 and of the 'Catholicization of 
Protestantism', 1 this shows to how great an extent muta- 

1 Cf. the article entitled 'Katholische Kirche und National- Sozlalismus* in the 
Neue Zurdwr Zeitung, No. 1268, July 21, 1935. 



tion Is going on in Christianity. A glance at the religious 
and organizational struggles in the Protestant Churches 
and in the Greek Orthodox Church, at the changed and 
changing relations between Catholicism and Protestant- 
ism, and also between the Catholic Church and the 
Greek Orthodox Church, will confirm the view that 
political and economic structural changes in the West 
are bound to have a decisive influence upon its religious 
and cultural forms, 

Ail this Indicates that Christianity and Europe are not 
antitheses, but that, on the contrary, the mental attitude 
of the West has been formed and determined by Chris- 
tianity which itself, though beginning outside Europe, 
has largely been domiciled there for ages. 

In this connexion the reader will do well to refer back 
to the last paragraph on p. 98, where I deal with the 
question of the relation of the Eastern Catholic (Ortho- 
dox) Churches to Western Europe. 

The author does not wish, nor does he feel competent, 
to go more deeply into these eminently personal religious 
problems. Enough to have referred to the matter In 
general terms, and to have recognized (with considerable 
gratification) that inside and outside Christianity great 
and vigorous movements are heralding a religious re- 
naissance, though without as yet having any obvious 
effect upon the extant Churches. 

Above all he is interested in the relations between 
State and Church, and is strongly in favour of the separa- 
tion of the two. 

This separation would mean the end of an unworthy 
dependence of the Church upon the State, and also the 
beginning of a free development of the extant Churches. 



It would still be the obvious duty of the State to protect 
the Churches against attack from without. 

A separation of the main Church in a country from 
the State would likewise be beneficial to other religious 
communities, and would favour the growth of all genuine 
religious movements, with whose internal affairs the 
State should never interfere. 

The proclamation of the freedom of faith and con- 
science would be usefully supplemented by a recognition 
of the freedom of art and science, whose healthy growth 
needs independence from the rule of the average man 
and what more can any State be in these respects? Then 
only will the intellectual and artistic rivalry of the Euro- 
pean nations, an Olympiad of the spirit, be really fruitful, 
so that a cultural renovation of Europe will be no less 
certain than a political and economic revival. 

The press requires special consideration. Though on 
principle we demand the freedom of the press, liberty 
does not mean libertinage, as it has done often enough 
under liberal auspices. Guarantees will have to be given 
to ensure that freedom shall not be misused. 

The most effective guarantee will be insistence that 
every contribution to a periodical shall be signed. The 
abolition of anonymity and of the editorial 'we 3 will 
make the writer responsible both politically and legally. 
Another valuable safeguard will be that a sharp distinc- 
tion shall be drawn between politics and business. It 
must be made impossible for the advertisement columns 
to influence the 'news'. This will be achieved by an 
advertisement monopoly, and the consequently reduced 
cost of production and distribution in the case of many 
commodities will have a good effect on prices. 



The position and form of the school is of direct interest 
to the present work. 

The position and form of the school are dependent 
upon the importance attached to the school, and upon 
the tasks assigned to it by popular culture and the Ger- 
man State. 

For the State, the school is the principal means by 
which the intellectual leaders are sifted out. Though 
earlier I have castigated and repudiated the liberal 
illusion concerning human equality, I nevertheless 
ardently champion the conservative doctrine that 
equality of opportunity is essential that, as far as can 
be, all should be given an equal start in the race of life. 
There must be no needless handicaps. 

Nothing but an equal start for all citizens can ensure 
that there shall be an organic stratification into 'estates', 
that is to say into groups of similar, equally competent, 
equally directed human beings whose occupation is in 
harmony with their 'calling' instead of a disastrous 
stratification into 'classes', this meaning into groups of 
dissimilar, variously competent, variously directed human 
beings who follow the same occupation, not because they 
have a 'calling', but because they have been forced to. 

To give an equal start, education at all the schools 
must be free, and the pupils will be gratuitously supplied 
with the requisite books and materials. Arrangements 
must also be made to render it possible for every pupil 
at an elementary school to pass on to a higher school, 
no matter where he lives for of course there will not be 
a secondary school in every district. The cost of attend- 



ing such schools at a distance from the pupils 5 homes will 
be defrayed by the State. 

A people's community can have only one kind of 
primary schools, at which there will be separate classes 
for more highly gifted and less highly gifted children. 
When the course at the elementary school is finished, 
education will be continued at a technical or vocational 
school, in other cases at a higher school,, and later, in 
suitable cases, at a university. The uniformity of system 
does not mean that all the schools will be exactly alike, 
for they will be variously adapted to peculiarities in the 
provinces and circles. 

The subjects taught in the elementary school will be 
German, history, arithmetic, knowledge of the homeland, 
the beginnings of natural science, bodily exercises, gar- 
dening, simple technical training the aim being, not 
to 'impart information 5 but to educate Germans. The 
age for attendance at the elementary school will be from 
six to fourteen, inasmuch as not until after puberty will 
the vocation be chosen and vocational training begin. 
Before that, the child will be growing up into the German 
cultural world, without having his mind unduly diverted 
towards alien cultures during the receptive years of 

At puberty a child will pass on from the elementary 
school, either to a vocational (technical) school, or else 
to a higher school where training in the direction of the 
intellectual professions will be carried on. 

At a high school, education will be more diversified. 
Since German culture will have been thoroughly instilled 
at the elementary school, alien cultures can now be 
taught, for there will be little risk of alien contamination. 

o 209 


When the high-school education is finished, selection 
of pupils for the university will take place. Here it is not 
simply the 'amount of knowledge' that has been acquired 
which will be taken into consideration, but also the 
character that will be considered desirable in a person 
destined to be one of the future leaders of the German 

The decisive feature of the selection will be, not that 
the youngsters (or their parents for them) want university 
education, but the will of the community, as expressed 
through the teaching staffs and the examiners (who must 
have had plenty of practical experience) . Mistakes can 
be avoided by insisting, not only on promotion certificates 
from the school which is being left, but on the passing of 
an entrance examination at the higher school or univer- 
sity to which the pupil is going. 

These methods will fulfil the aims of any careful and 
intelligent system of State leadership, that the best 
elements of the whole population shall be given a good 
chance of rising to the top. Only a lasting and self- 
regulative process of renovation can prevent the occur- 
rence of 'morbid stasis' here and there in the national 

It is expedient to point out that for such a structural 
alteration in the German educational system, a spiritual 
change throughout will be indispensable. 

Hitherto the main object of schooling has been to 'im- 
part information', but henceforward it will be regarded 
as at least equally important to train character. As a 
result, not only will the pupil's character have a decisive 
influence upon his chances of promotion to a higher 
school or a university, but the educational institutions 



will thereby be profoundly modified both subjectively 
and objectively. 

More especially the universities will differ greatly from 
our present ones. They will lose the duplex character 
they now have of being institutions both for teaching and 
for research. Whereas, nowadays, for practical reasons 
more emphasis is usually laid upon research than upon 
teaching, in days to come there will be great stress on 
teaching and on character-training. The universities 
will be of a collegiate type, that is to say they will be cir- 
cumscribed institutions, in the country rather than in 
towns, with an attached economic branch where in the 
vacations the students will be engaged in practical 
labours. The two first terms will be devoted to general 
philosophical, historical, and artistic studies, after which 
the separation into faculties will begin. Great value will 
be attached to sports, comradeship, and the like; each 
university will probably have its own tradition, to the 
maintenance of which sometime-students' clubs will 

The higher schools will be analogous to our present 
gymnasia, but early specialization will be avoided, 
Special importance will be attached to high schools 
having courses conducted in foreign tongues, which will 
not only promote close touch with the intellectual world 
of foreign nations, but will encourage the appearance of 
many good linguists among the Germans. (This will 
further have a good effect upon the national minorities 
living in Germany, and will encourage foreigners to come 
to German schools.) 

One may hope that former pupils of a high school will 
continue to take a lively interest in its work, partly in the 


indirect form of patronage, partly in the direct form of 
assistance as examiners. These outsiders, both in the 
high school and in the elementary school,, will assist the 
teaching staff in deciding a pupil's chances of promotion. 
It is of fundamental importance that by thus regulating 
promotion the State should be able to prevent the over- 
stocking of the country's professional intelligentsia, for 
any such overproduction of intellectuals or would-be in- 
tellectuals is most unwholesome to the social organism. 


However much we may insist on the need for a sifting 
by character, the school, from its very nature, will always 
tend to lay more weight upon intelligence tests. 

How important it is therefore that schooling should be 
followed by another method of selection which allows 
adequately for the fact that in human beings the forma- 
tion of character is not completed until after puberty, 
when the first educational period is over. 

This supplementary testing will be effected in the uni- 
versal labour service and in the voluntary army service. 

For all young Germans of both sexes the close of early 
vocational training will be followed by a year of labour 
service in which the pupil will have to learn a handicraft. 
This year of labour service, during which the pupils will 
lead a comradely life that will be of considerable social 
importance, will also enable young Germans to revise 
their choice of a vocation, and will subject them to a 
process of selection that will help to disclose (after they 
have left the elementary school) those that are fitted for 
an intellectual vocation. 



Of peculiar importance in selection by character will 
also be the period of voluntary military service for those 
that undertake it. This follows from the constitutional 
inequality of human beings, a recognition of which 1 
have several times explained as one of the main features 
of the conservative philosophy. 

Whereas a year of labour service will be compulsory, 
report for army service will be a voluntary affair. Inas- 
much as military service will continue for several years, 
is not associated with the acquisition of new, privately 
useful knowledge, and involves considerable risk in the 
event of war, we may be sure that none but the nationally 
useful young fellows will wish to enter the army, In this 
way will be ensured the racial selection of those who will 
form the supporting stratum of the German socialist State. 

The outstanding value of such a selection, which will 
confer on those who are sifted out a new title to nobility. 
will be that the title is acquired, not by birth, but by 
personal choice. 

The extreme political importance of such a sustaining 
stratum, which will extend through all vocations and 
estates, can be underlined once more by providing that 
every person who occupies a highly esteemed un- 
rermmerated position (all magistrates, guardians, trustees, 
etc.) shall be taken from this stratum. 


Our account of the national culture would be in- 
adequate should we fail to insist how essential it is that 
this culture shall favour the development of a German 
system of law, justice, and right. 



It is self-evident from the national outlook that there 
can be no such thing as law per se', for the consciousness 
of right and the prevailing forms of law derive from the 
peculiarities of each people, from the age it has reached, 
and from the ideas that are at any time dominant. 

That basic notion secured expression in our demand for 
a new economic law, and I have again and again stressed 
the national peculiarity of this economic law of German 

But the law relating to persons needs a no less radical 
transformation than the law relating to things. It is pre- 
posterous to suppose that the present Civil Code can 
remain in force for as much as a day after the German 
Revolution has become effective. 

Without going into too much detail I may mention as 
the fundamental idea of German law that the protection 
of honour is more important than the protection of things 
and rights. Another very important notion is that the 
Roman-Christian idea of punishment must be replaced 
by the Teutonic idea of reparation or compensation, and 
that the essential purpose of legal activity is not to dis- 
cover individual blame, but to prevent injury to society. 

The basic difference between the German law of to- 
morrow and the Civil Code of today will result in a 
complete change as regards punishments, and, above all, 
will reduce to a minimum the present absurd practice of 
punishing people by depriving them of liberty. As re- 
gards the enormous majority of offences, the cruel pun- 
ishment of depriving the offender of liberty will give 
place to making him compensate whoever has been 
injured by imposing a fine which will be levied in case of 
need by making the offender work in a State workhouse 



without imprisonment. All offences against the com- 
munity will be expiated by excluding the offender from 
the community temporarily or permanently, either by 
banishment or death. Thereby a repetition of the offence 
will be prevented. 

Of decisive value for the carrying out of such ideas, 
especially during the period of transition, will be the 
abolition of expert courts in which judges and lawyers 
function. Instead there will be peoples 3 courts, where" the 
sound instincts of the people can be trusted to observe the 
principles of German law, justice, and right until new 
legal forms have been elaborated, 


The foregoing remarks upon the cultural program 
of German socialism are fragmentary and sketchy, this 
being partly due to the nature of the topic and partly to 
my own inadequacy. Still, I can supplement them by 
saying a few more words about their aim. 

Their aim is to insist upon the need for cultivating an 
elite of the German people, in accordance with an ideal 
type that shall conform to the essential nature of the 

This ideal type must be deeply rooted in the constitu- 
tional characteristics of the German people, and must 
therefore have the traits which the study of German 
history from its beginnings has made familiar to us; and 
yet, on the other hand, it must be modern enough to 
conform with the requirements of the socialist order to 
be established in the twentieth century. 

Both demands will be fulfilled by producing the Old- 



German type of knight, the chivalrous being whose best 
characteristics are embodied in all the greatest figures of 
German civilization, and who stand forth from the 
earlier (conservative) epochs of German history. 

German education must be concentrated upon the 
production of this knightly, this chivalrous type, even as 
English education is concentrated upon the production 
of the type of the 'gentleman 3 which has been maintained 
for generations. 

Here it becomes needful to return briefly to the 
problem of the upbuilding of the State. Before, when we 
were considering the revolutionary birth of the new order, 
we could only answer negatively the problem of how to 
produce this supporting stratum (by referring to the fact 
that the party system would have to be abolished) ; but 
now, again insisting upon the revolutionary genesis of the 
new order, we can throw light on the matter positively. 

The production, the culture, of a supporting stratum, 
of an elite, is the vital problem of the new order, and 
upon its solution will depend the permanency and the 
satisfactory working of German socialism. 

It will not suffice to do no more than formulate the 
principles of selection for intelligence and character, and 
to organize the process of selection by the schools, the 
labour service, and the voluntary army, for we shall also 
have to explain what will guide us in the actual practice 
of our methods of selection. 

The picture of the new order proclaimed in this work, 
the new order of national freedom, social justice, and 
European collaboration, will be crowned by the declara- 
tion that the elite, the ideal type we aim at installing as 
leaders of Germany shall be the 'knights', that mighty 



creation which appeared so early in the West; which, 
unrestricted by national frontiers, became symbolic of 
the whole European community; and is now, consistently 
enough, being revived simultaneously with the resurrec- 
tion of the West. 

For this, and nothing else, is the meaning and the con- 
tent of the German Revolution: 

The Resurrection of the West. 





THIS work is the first attempt at a complete transformation of 
German life in the sense of that mighty revolution which has 
been going on under our eyes since 1914. It is, in a sense, an 
account of the structure of the new crystal whose coming we 
foresee, whose forms we can deduce from the nature of the 
lye, from the forces that animate it, and the laws under which 
it works. 

This remark exemplifies both the defects and the merits of 
such an attempt. The precise thinker would like to be shown 
finality, with every detail made manifest, and a timetable 
accurately drawn. But we are dealing with organic processes 
which defy accuracy of this sort. We recognize that organic 
processes are subject to their own internal laws, and it is from 
these that issue the forms which are predictable in accordance 
therewith. The better acquainted we are with these laws, the 
more fully will our predictions be confirmed by the reality. 
We conservative revolutionaries (for thus do I and my friends 
regard ourselves) are always aware that the organic process is 
primary, and that our schemata can be no more than sketches 
of what will go on within that process. In other words, when 
there is a conflict between life and a plan, life is always right, 
and the plan must be modified to suit it. 

Despite these provisos and limitations, it seems expedient to 
draft our plan, for this will help to explain and give a meaning 
to what has been happening since 1914, and to all the sacrifices 
of wealth and blood that have been demanded of the German 
people during these eighteen years. It will console us, will 
encourage us to bear the last years of the transition, will give 



us strength to further the new developments; for awareness of 
what is happening, when it comes to countless Germans, will 
give them a sense of purpose which can accelerate the changes 
and make the sacrifices seem less onerous. The clearer the 
grasp of the direction and the better the preparations, the less 
resistance will there be, and the smaller the sacrifices. 

It seems to us as if the tediousness of the process we term the 
German Revolution were an indication given by fate that the 
German people must systematically and deliberately prepare 
for the revolution, must recognize that the sacrifices of wealth 
and blood demanded are not more than the organism of the 
German people (no longer very young) can properly be ex- 
pected to bear, and that the last violent act of birth can be 
achieved with a minimal loss of energy. 

That is how the author and his friends contemplate the 
German situation, and they believe it to be incumbent on them 
to explain what they have learned from the last two decades of 
German history, to indicate the nature of the trend which 
discloses itself and to show how its fulfilment offers the only 
way of restoring health to the German people. To promote 
such a restoration of health must assuredly be the aim of 
German policy. 
Berlin, Autumn, 1931. 




WITHIN the narrow framework of a sketch of the upbuilding 
of German socialism I have tried to give an account of the new 
order whose establishment will supply a meaning to all the 
sacrifices of the last two decades. I know only too well that 
many important details have been omitted, but I trust that the 
intelligent reader will be able to fill in the gaps for himself. 

There is one question I have intentionally refrained from 
trying to answer how realization should be or can be secured. 
Even when the question has been mooted, it will be plain from 
the (repeatedly stressed) organic nature of the process that the 
answer cannot be a simple one. 

Still, some parts of the answer are concrete enough. Neces- 
sarily the change will occur by way of revolution. All organic 
new-formation demands, in the last resort, a violent act as is 
seen plainly enough in birth, though here the new-formation 
has been completed some time before. In our view, then, the 
violent act is not the beginning but the end of the revolution, 
the end of the reconstruction of the feelings, the thoughts, and 
the will of the Germans. 

Another signpost on this road to the German Revolution is 
that a system can never be overthrown by the tools belonging 
to that system, but only by the tools that belong to the coming 
system, the one destined to be victorious. He, therefore, who 
uses liberal weapons to defeat a liberal system, will inevitably 
fail. Practical political consequences of this view are that we 
must ruthlessly oppose any democratic choice, any participa- 
tion in a coalition with the old system, any opportunist attempt 



to maintain a portion of the system or one of its essential 

Of great importance, finally, is it to recognize that this 
revolution will not be made by the masses, but by a small 
number of persons who are ready to take risks, who have in 
their minds a clear picture of the new order, who are sufficiently 
self-sacrificing and sufficiently pugnacious to stake their lives 
in the hope of making their picture a reality. 

This demands strength of character; readiness to endure 
solitude, persecution, mental and spiritual isolation. Unless 
the would-be revolutionist is prepared, as were Lenin and his 
associates, to risk exile or a long term in Siberia, fate will not 
hold him worthy to share responsibility for establishing the 
new order. 

It is my daily prayer that great numbers of Germans see this 
and possess the required energy, so that at length there may be 
established in Germany the new order on behalf of which 
millions of the best of my fellow-countrymen have died. 

Hail Germany! 




NEARLY five years have passed since the first edition of this 
book was published. 

They have been eventful years: and Adolf Hitler's rise to 
power on January 30, 1933, substantially forms part of the 
contents of my book. 

It is obvious that the second edition might pay heed to many 
other happenings which five years ago were not so manifest as 
was the likelihood of Hitler's rise. If, nevertheless, little change 
has been needed in the second edition, this shows the general 
accuracy of our view of the German Revolution, and amounts 
to a proof of the conformity of history to law a notion that 
was embodied in our Philosophical Foundations. 

The purpose of this book having been to draft the Structure 
of German Socialism, i.e. to give a design for the New Germany 
(as part of what will certainly be a New Europe), polemic was 
needless, just as little as an architect is disposed to argue about 
or find justifications for this or that detail of his drawings of a 
new cathedral (except where argument may be needed to 
clear up some otherwise doubtful point) . 

No, what was necessary, now and again, was to show that 
the draft paid due heed to extant data, and yet solved all the 
important problems that arose. Also it was important that the 
author should make his meaning clear, even as an architect 
must clearly show what he is planning to build. But the 
architect is not concerned with the question whether those 
who examine his plans will agree with him in every detail. 

Of course such a method of demonstration involves a certain 
coldness, a lack of impetus, a dryness of exposition. But one 

P 225 


who, beyond the details, can see the great aim, one who bears 
within his own mind a vision of the cathedral of German 
socialism, one who feels the rhythm of life that pulsates beneath 
the abundance of social and economic details such a one 
will grasp the essential spirituality of a dry architectural 
design, and will gain thereby the will-to-action without which 
knowledge and experience are no better than a tale told by an 
idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing. 

It is the will-to-action that transforms such a design as this 
from 'words, words, words 3 into a play of motive forces, and 
sounds a fanfare that induces all those who wish to mould the 
future to get together and start building the cathedral, New 
Germany, New Europe. 

Prague. Spring, 1936. 




THE postface to the second edition of this book cannot 
content itself with generalities like those of the postface 
to the first edition, but must start from the fact of the Hitler 
System, and show the downfall of that system to be an indis- 
pensable preliminary to German socialism. 

There has been no change in my general attitude to the 
Hitler System and to the party which sustains it. As I explained 
in my book Die deutsche Bartholomdusnacht [the German Massacre 
of St. Bartholomew, Reso-Verlag, Zurich, 1935], the Hitler 
System represents the (transient) Gironde epoch of the 
German Revolution, the interlude of revolutionary feelings 
and reactionary forms, which arises spontaneously out of a 
progressive internal radicalizatlon, and thereby (mostly by a 
detour into war) clears the ground for an epoch of revo- 
lutionary construction. 

This observation supplies the task, the strategy, and the 
tactics of the German socialists as against the Hitler System. 
With uncompromising energy and with any and every means 
(other than those which might run counter to their own ideas), 
and with unswerving resolution, they must work for the over- 
throw of the Hitler System. 

The decisive point is that this struggle can only be successful 
if, and in so far as, they have recognized and solved the urgent 
economic, social, and cultural problems. Hitler was only 
possible and inevitable because these urgent problems had not 
been solved - and Hitler will fall because he, too, has not 
solved them. 



It behoves us to effect the overthrow of the Hitler System; it 
behoves us, therefore, above all, to soiv$ these urgent problems, 
and thus to inaugurate a new epoch of German and European 
history, whose business it is to give human life once more a 
meaning and a goal. 




[Translation of the first January Issue in 1937 of c Die deutschc 
Revolution' , a bi-monthly issued as the organ of the Black 
Front, edited by Otto Strasser, published (then) in Prague 
and Copenhagen.] 


THE Hitler System will bring war, and war will bring the 
partition of Germany, unless a Socialist Revolution in Ger- 
many comes in time to prevent it. 

With deep concern all patriotic Germans watch the opening 
of 1937, for their observations convince them that this will be 
a crucial year. 

The Hitler System is, with inevitable consistency, being 
driven towards the end, along the road it entered on June 30 3 
1934 [the date of the Blood Bath]. 

Before this, Hitler had not yet made his choice between the 
two alternatives that were open to him at the beginning of that 
year Socialist Revolution and Fascist War which from the 
first were implicit in the nature, the theory, and the practice 
of the Hitler System. 

On June 30, 1934, this system entered the bloody road 
leading to war, for by the murder of the advocates of the 
second revolution Adolf Hitler blocked the path that would 
have led to German socialism. The question whether in this 
matter he was driver or driven is of little consequence to our 
political j udgmen t. 

Since then, with somnambulist confidence, he has been 



advancing towards war, whose successive stages - armament, 
compulsory military service, the fortification of Rhineland, 
Danzig, two years' army service, the treaty between Germany 
and Japan are still fresh in all men's memories. 

However just and necessary it was and is, for the sake of 
our national freedom and the future of Germany, to shake off 
the fetters of the Treaty of Versailles, it was and is no less 
unreasonable and criminal to adopt and advocate German 
imperialism in place of the imperialism of those who coerced 
us in 1919. 

Apart from the fact that one injustice is not overcome by 
substituting for it another injustice, every glance at German 
and European history shows that a forcible dictatorship will 
neither bring freedom and safety to our own nation, nor peace 
and unity to Europe. 

The freedom and safety of Germany, the peace and unity of 
Europe are not attainable by means of the old methods of brute 
force, but only by means of the ideas of a new order. 

The ideas that will bring about the new order that is vital to 
a better future and essential to our very lives are the ideas of the 
German Revolution, the ideas of: 

National Freedom, 
Social Justice, 
European Collaboration. 

The Hitler System's betrayal of the German Revolution is, 
historically and personally, a crime committed by those who 
now rule Germany. 

It is also the source of the terrible danger which threatens 
Germany like a colossal nightmare, imperilling both its existence 
as a State and its future as a nation. 

For Hitler's decision to enter the road that leads to war, his 
reversion to the aims and methods of Prussian reactionary 
capitalism and imperialism, have conjured up a new worldwide 
coalition against Germany a coalition whose deadly encircle- 
ment has once already led to a complete collapse of our country. 



The almost insuperable severance of the German people from 
the world, the systematic leading of the populace astray by a 
fiendishly vertiginous propaganda^ has hidden the real nature* 
of the present situation. That situation is, in plain words, the 

Should war ensue, no matter why or on what fronts, Germany 
will be faced by a worldwide coalition, led by England 9 France, 
Russia, and the Little Entente, while America, Poland, the 
Balkan Entente, and the Baltic Entente will constitute a reserve 
that will never decide for Germany, but in case of need will fight 
against her. 

Of the reputed allies of Germany (Japan, Italy, Hungary, and 
Austria)., it is possible that Japan will fulfil her pledges, will, 
that is to say, seize the chance, during the European complica- 
tions, of strengthening her own position in the Far East; while 
the other powers named, with Italy at their head, will (In their 
own interest and from a sense of responsibility) remain neutral, 
especially during the decisive first weeks of the war, 

Thus the result of the fateful and blind foreign policy of the 
Hitler System has been to establish a situation which, even 
though the German army should fight heroically and the Ger- 
man people prove ready for any sacrifices (provisos which, in 
existing circumstances, can by no means be relied upon), must 
inevitably result in the defeat of Germany. 

Now what can this inevitable defeat of Germany mean other 
than the end of its political and economic independence, the 
end of its existence as a State. In a word, what can It mean 
other than the partition of Germany? 

After losing a second World War, after a second Treaty of 
Versailles, there would only remain a powerless and disintegrated 
Germany, consisting of three or four dependent monarchies 
wholly subject to the dictatorial control of the victors. 

In view of this situation, whose gravity makes us, the cham- 
pions of the German Revolution, feel profoundly responsible, 
we have but one task: 



To make an end of the Hitler System before It has destroyed 

Every patriotic German, every German socialist above all, 
must recognize that Germany's life and future can only be safe- 
guarded by making an end of the Hitler System before Germany 
is defeated. 

Today to many of our fellow-countrymen these words, these 
perspectives, appear to be the outcome of needless panic; and 
perhaps the result of a phobia against the system, inspired by 
the morbid hate that fills refugees. 

But tomorrow, when this forecast has been shockingly ful- 
filled, every German who loves his country and its people, 
every German nationalist and every German socialist, will be 
aware that the warnings of the Black Front have been and are 
justifiable, and all will echo our war-cry: 

Down with the Hitler System before Germany is defeated, 

Every officer of the Reich, every manual worker, every intellec- 
tual, and every peasant will then have to choose between Hitler 
and Germany, and we know that they will choose Germany. 

Only in that case will the overthrow of the system be achieved 
without causing the defeat of Germany; and to the foreign 
governments and their peoples we urgently proclaim: C A new 
Versailles could mean nothing but a fresh disaster for us and 
for you, since never will Germany renounce her unity and her 
freedom. 9 

But the guarantees that Europe will demand from Germany 
will be: in the negative sense, the overthrow of the Hitler System; 
and in the positive sense, the upbuilding of German socialism 
and the establishment of a European Federation. 

The Black Front adjures the German people and the peoples 
of Europe to cling, before the war, during the war, and after 
the war, to these three aims: 

National Freedom, 
Social Justice, 
European Collaboration. 



(Appeal of the Black Front to the German People} 

Fellow-countrymen : 

The rumours which for weeks have been spreading through 
Germany have of late been abundantly confirmed, 

The Hitler System is selling more and more German soldiers, 
as mercenaries, to the Spanish generals. 

Thousands upon thousands of young fellows, the best blood 
of Germany, are being shipped abroad, where they are fighting 
and dying, not to promote the national interests and the histori- 
cal greatness of Germany, but on behalf of the reactionary party 
in a foreign civil war. 

We accuse the Hitler System of this misuse of State authority, 
this squandering of irreplaceable national values. We accuse 
the Hitler System of deliberately injuring the German people, 
under the influence of partisan blindness and in the idiotic pur- 
suit of prestige. 

We ourselves do not take a side in the Spanish civil war. Just 
as we should repudiate any attempt by foreign powers to inter- 
fere in the home affairs of Germany, and would strenuously 
resist any invasion of our country by foreign mercenaries, so do 
we repudiate any German intervention in the home affairs of 
Spain, and most emphatically protest against the recruiting and 
use of German mercenaries on behalf of non-German interests. 
This attitude, which must be a matter of principle for every 
sincere German nationalist, is reinforced by the fact that^the 
German soldiers now being exported to Spain by the ^Hitler 
System are to be used there in favour of an economic and 
political reaction of the kind we ourselves have had to contend 
with for decades here in Germany, and to fight which is one of 
the main objects of genuine national socialism. 

In its foreign policy of alliance with the Spanish reaction^ the 
Hitler System is but reiterating its home policy of alliance with 



the German reaction a policy that led to the German 
Massacre of St. Bartholomew on June 30, 1934, and to the 
betrayal of German socialism. 

National and socialist considerations make the fight against 
the sending of German troops to Spain one of the most impor- 
tant duties of every genuine National Socialist. 

The Black Front therefore calls upon all true Germans, and 
especially upon all who belong to the Reichswehr, the S.S. 
[Storm-Guards], and the S.A. [Storm-Troops] to resist in every 
possible way this anti-national and anti-socialist policy of the 
Hitler System, under the slogans: 

No German Blood for Spain, 
Hail Germany. 

On behalf of the German Black Front, 

Otto Strasser 


(Watchword for the New Year, by Otto Strasser) 

For two years the policy of the Hitler System has profited by 
the torpidity that seized poor old Europe after the consternating 
experiences of 1933. The system deliberately availed itself of 
the dread inspired by the prospect of a German Revolution, of 
the National Socialist renovation and renaissance of the Ger- 
man people, to stupefy capitalist Europe and scare it into inert 
neutrality. But this torpidity necessarily passed off, the spell 
was necessarily broken, when the alleged German Revolution 
disclosed itself to be no more than a desperate attempt on the 
part of the dominant classes to ensnare, slow down, strangle the 
revolution. The plainer it became to the governments of the 
victors of 1919 that the Hitler-Schacht-Goering-System lacked 
the inspiration of the revolutionary idea, that the wind of the 
revolutionary storm had blown over, that there was no genuinely 


A P P E'N D I X E S 

creative revolutionary conception to animate the Continent, the 
more resolutely did they prepare for defence. When, after June 
30, 1934, it became increasingly obvious to them that Hitler 
was playing the same cards as those which other statesmen had 
played before and were now playing beside him; that arma- 
ments, alliances, devices and momentary feints, opportunist 
combinations and veiled intrigues, were merely the pawns of 
his statecraft; but that he was nowise moved by a great idea 
able to revolutionize the old w T orld 5 to procreate a new order in 
political and other human affairs, characterized by new laws 
and competent to produce new forms the masters of old 
Europe, recognizing in Hitler a sprig of their own world ^de- 
generate, perhaps, and declassed, but still endeavouring to 
maintain the dominance of the bourgeoisie), saw that he was 
merely fighting them with familiar weapons on the familiar 
battlefield, and they prepared more vigorously than ever to 

Against the alliances of the Hitler System its adversaries first 
established the Franco-Russian Alliance which had nothing in 
common with bolshevism and communism, with Marxism and 
the revolution, but was merely a revival of the league, formed In 
1894 and broken in 1917, between the two powers lying to the 
West and to the East against the hegemony of Central Europe. 
The systematic consolidation of the Little Entente and the 
greater attention now paid by France to possible allies on the 
margin of Central Europe, with the resumption of cordial rela- 
tions between France and Poland, were further stages of toe 
defence against Hitler's policy of armament and treaty revision. 
But much the most dangerous measure was the systematic re- 
armament of Great Britain and the whole British Empire. 
During the years 1933-1936, nothing but themilitary weakness of 
England made it possible for Italian and German imperialism 
to achieve notable advances, and created situations in which 
Eneland showed herself inert, or masked inertness by a badly 
simulated inattention towards the demand for treaty revision 



and the pugnacity of the other side. By now, in the beginning 
of 1937, England is getting ready to utter decisive words in 
international policy. 

In order to set off the increasing activity of Western Europe, 
in 1936 Hitler and Mussolini began a counterstroke in Spain. 
The enterprise initiated by Generals Sanjurjo and Franco in 
July of that year (an enterprise they would never have ventured 
at that time unless they had come to an understanding with 
Berlin and Rome) was designed as a preventive occupation of 
what was ideologically, politically, and from the military stand- 
point the weakest point of Western Europe and of a future 
Franco-British coalition; it was a stab in the back for France, a 
preparation for a naval campaign against Britain. Actually for 
the time being the affair seemed to bode well for the interven- 
tionists. England was hampered by a dislike (based upon 
private capitalist interests) for the prospect of socialization of 
the Spanish mines, disinclined for anything that might lead to 
the U.S.S.R. getting established in the Western Mediterranean, 
and, being still only in the earlier stages of rearmament, again 
pretended to be blind and deaf, and let the reins drop. France, 
under the rule of the comparatively unstable popular front, 
could venture nothing without British aid. Russia, at first, was 
as neutral as the western powers. The generals, armed by Italy 
and Germany, were able to drive back the badly equipped and 
imperfectly trained militia of the Spanish government. A 
triumph of the Berlinese and of the Italian revisionary policy 
seemed assured. After three months, however, at long last, 
Russia began to intervene. Whether Moscow is moved by 
idealist promptings, stirred up by the internal pressure of the 
still unsettled struggle between Stalinism and Trotskyism, and 
wants to prevent the Spanish generals from gaining a complete 
victory, or is perhaps alarmed by the prospect of a political and 
military display on the Western European anti-Hitler front, it 
may be hard to decide. Anyhow the U.S.S.R. has intervened 
sufficiently in Spain to keep the fires of the civil war still burning 



briskly in mid-winter, so that a powerful reaction against the 
rebels remains possible. The military critics speak of what F 
going on in Spain as a 'Trial War', in which the soldiers of the 
great powers are fighting one another, and testing their up-to- 
date weapons. This remarkable civil war, fought on Spanish 
soil between Europeans of diverse nationalities under the com- 
mand of Russian, German, and Italian officers, and using Rus- 
sian, German, and Italian weapons, may develop into a general 
European war at any moment this year. 

Hitler, who since 1934 has been captive of Ms own delusion, 
continues to believe that he has saved Europe from Bolshevism, 
and that the nations of Europe are waiting for him to lead them 
upon an anti-Russian crusade, fancies that he could not find a 
more suitable occasion for war than this Spanish adventure. 
In his lunacy he overlooks the fact that between, on the one 
hand, the anti-bolshevik moods of the petty bourgeoisie, which 
throughout Europe sympathizes with the Spanish rebels, and, 
on the other, the motives which might induce the French, the 
British, and not least the Italian governments to allow them- 
selves to be led into a decisive conflict, there lies all which he 
the c cork 5 of the revolution, the barometer of the German petty 
bourgeoisie, the idol of the masses, driven not driving, senti- 
mentalist and somnambulist, no more than a pseudo-leader 
is fundamentally incapable of understanding. The German 
generals understand well enough, and for weeks at Berchtes- 
gaden have been fighting desperately against the Spanish 

Whereas Mussolini continues to keep paths of withdrawal 
open, and should matters grow threatening would probably 
try to detach the fate of Italy from the fate of Germany, Hitler, 
mimicking the most preposterous fidelity, continues before all 
the world, through the mouth of Ward Price, to give General 
Franco pledges to the effect that Franco's cause is his own, and 
that no defeat of the Burgos government will be allowed. He 
really believes himself to be fighting against bokhevism and the 



popular front, and that the possible fall of Blum might induce 
France to take the side of Franco. But the very opposite is true, 
is absolutely certain. If Blum were to be replaced by Mandel, 
Chautemps, Petain, any statesman of the Centre or the Right, 
France's attitude would only be stiffened, and it would become 
easier for Russia to invoke the aid of the Franco-Russian 

This winter Hitler's difficulties at home will be intensified to 
a pitch beyond anything that has been witnessed during the 
last few years, for they can only be paralleled by those of Ger- 
many, during the last war, between 1916 and 1918. For 
whereas in 1935 and 1936, after a difficult winter it was possible 
without serious risk to open the safety-valve of foreign policy, 
in March 1937 this safety-valve will probably have to take 
the form of war. 

That will not merely be a matter of Hitler's political choice, 
for military considerations will likewise be operative. So bad is 
the prognosis for Germany that at the last moment a preventive 
war will very probably be begun, simply because it will be im- 
possible to compete any longer with the heaping-up of arma- 
ments which has been going on in France, Russia, and England. 
For reasons that have frequently been stated here, Germany 
cannot now cope with it if Stalin should increase his standing 
army by another third of a million, if he transfers a hundred 
thousand more workers to the munition factories, if he places a 
yet larger quantity of raw materials at the disposal of the Red 
Army. Germany will not be able to compete should France 
devote her considerable gold reserve to further technical im- 
provements in the army or to the construction of the Maginot 
line. Germany will have to take a back seat if England conjures 
up out of the ground a thousand more airplanes, gigantic 
battleships, whole fleets of destroyers and swift cruisers, huge 
squadrons of tanks. More and more risky becomes Goering's 
blitzkrieg in view of the titanic camps that surround Germany 
with inexhaustible arsenals, etc. The generals, who have 



recently discountenanced a military adventure, will soon have 

to decide whether to down Hitler, or to join Hitler in a leap 
into the dark, to venture the unknown depths of a preventive 

But to down Hitler means to open the doors for the second 
revolution. The generals will not do this so long as Blombergis 
supreme. Germany's fate today rests with Biomberg, with the 
life-or-death powers which, under Hitler's patronage, have been 
entrusted to the three dictators, Goering, Schacht, and Blombcrg, 
The enormous powers which Hitler has granted to his vassal 
Blomberg is the leaden weight that paralyses the once influential 
Reichswehr. No longer can the Reichswehr decide against 
Hitler and for Germany; or, rather, it could only do so after 
Blomberg's fall. More and more improbable is it that an evolu- 
tionary possibility will be found, and decision by war looms as 
a bitter necessity. 

In this war the new home political fronts will soon appear. 
The overwhelming odds that will face Germany in the struggle, 
the inevitable desertion of her expected allies, 'betrayal" by 
those friends upon whom Hitler and the people (deceived by 
Goebbels) count, the disastrous defeats that will certainly await 
the German army after its effective opening manoeuvres, be- 
come plainer than they were in 1914 after the catastrophe on 
the Marne plainer and more fulminant, for Germany no 
longer has ample reserves of men and stores of munitions for 
years of campaigning. This discloses the true situation of the 
German people, and demands a clear decision from the nation. 
In view of the millions of soldiers who will march against Ger- 
many from east and west and south, overshadowed by the 
bombing squadrons that will scatter death and destruction upon 
our towns and factories, stifled and strangled by a blockade that 
will cut us off from three-fourths of the world and deprive us of 
the raw materials most indispensable to war, the German 
people will have to choose between perishing, on the one hand, 
or, on the other, overthrowing the present system, and, under 



the sign of socialist renaissance, seeking enrolment in the com- 
munity of western nations. 

For this reason Hitler's mobilization must also be the signal 
for our own. For this reason we call the people to arms when 
Hitler calls them. We call them against Hitler, against the 
murderous Angel of Death to whom Hitler sacrifices Germany's 
young men, against pestilence and fire to which he will deliver 
Germany's towns and fields. We summon the people on behalf 
of Germany, on behalf of socialism, and in order to save Europe. 
During these years that are pregnant with fate we shall have 
no illusions, and we shall take the inevitable course of declaring 
war against Hitler when Hitler declares war; and to our com- 
rades who in a few months will have to take up arms, we now 
have but two words to say: 

'Get ready.' 





[Ulrich von Hutten (1488-1533) was inspired throughout his 

short adult career by the aim of promoting a political and 
religious renaissance of Germany. His chief weapon was the 
pen, his chief medium consisted of letters, and he was probably 
one of the main authors of the famous obscurorum 

virorum. His letters have become proverbial, and it was natural 
that the champions of the German Revolution in the twentieth 
century should claim to be speaking in the name of the man 
who laboured on behalf of a German a European Revolu- 
tion four hundred years ago.] 


ON June 30, 1934, was murdered by Goering's orders (though 

Adolf Hitler, in the notorious Reichstag speech of July 13, 1934,, 
frankly proclaimed his own responsibility) the man who, in 
conjunction with Moeller van den Brack, may be regarded as 
chief herald and pioneer of German socialism Gregor 

Through him alone it was that millions of Germans of both 
sexes made acquaintance with the new idea of national socialism, 
Hundreds of thousands of the members of the National Socialist 
Party knew him personally, the tall and vigorous man with a 
striking head, lucid eyes, and a powerful voice, who indefatigably 
preached the gospel of national socialism all over the country, 

ft 241 


Tens of thousands had watched from close at hand his unceasing 
efforts on behalf of the party whose organization in North 
Germany was exclusively, and elsewhere in the Reich mainly, 
his work, which was done with that rare mingling of personal 
cordiality and unstinted zeal for toil that enabled him to move 
persons and master things. Thousands valued him as a friend, 
a helper in time of trouble, a leader into a new intellectual and 
spiritual world. 

Not that he was ever a leader' in that superficial, arrogant, 
Byzantine style which later became typical of the party, when 
its soul had vanished and form had become all-important, 
demanding worship from idolaters. No, he was a leader of the 
spirit, a leader of the heart, a leader of endeavour. 

It is not only because Gregor Strasser had so outstanding a 
personality that we wish to put a portrait of him before the 
nation to keep his memory fresh and vivid, but even more be- 
cause his clear-sighted pursuit of an aim should never be for- 
gotten, because his firmness of will should be a perennial 
warning, a promise, an example, and a consolation. 

For in spite of, nay because of, Hitler's monstrous treason to 
the German people, it is needful, instructive, and comforting to 
keep our eyes fixed upon the lofty aim that was once put for- 
ward as that of the National Socialist Party, that National 
Socialist Party which in practice the Hitler System has so 
shamelessly betrayed, so basely desecrated. 

German comrades and fellow-countrymen, sometime National 
Socialists and now party members, examine the books and 
writings, the speeches and pamphlets of Gregor Strasser, 
immerse yourselves in their words and their sense, read the 
'inalterable' program of twenty-five points, and then turn 
back to consider what the Hitler System has actually been doing. 
In that way you will be enabled to grasp all the desolation of the 
German present. 

You will perceive the most abominable fraud ever perpetrated 
upon believers, and you will understand why the henchmen of 



this system had the teacher and herald of German ^riafcm put 
to death. 

Like an inkling of the doom that awaited him ?ound tlift 
words which Gregor Strasser used as dedication for his master- 
work, Kampfum Deutsckland [Fight for Germany]: 

At one with in will, 
I consecrate this book 
to those who died 
for the 

In very truth it was for this German socialism that the fighters 
in the troubles of the post-war period went to their tombs. They 

died for the coining Germany of national freedom and social 

They did not die to promote the economic dictatorship of 
Schacht, Krupp, and Kirdorff; to establish the control of 
peoples' minds by Goebbels, Himmler, and Goering; to have 
our souls enslaved by Streicher, Rosenberg, and Kent 

That is why we pledge ourselves to these dead; why we pledge 

ourselves to Gregor Strasser who, having been the harbinger of 

German Socialism, became its martyr; why we solemnly swear: 

The Hitler System shall perish. 

German Socialism shall survive. 

Otto Strasser 


by Gregor Strasser 

Editorial Introduction: Gregor Strassefs own words will demonstrate, 

better than we could hope to do by anything that we could write 9 his 
creative importance to German socialism. 

We therefore extract from his Kampf urn Deutschland, 
in 1932 by the official Eher-Verlag, the following passages 



porate his guiding principles , and adjure all genuine National Socialists 
to compare with the aims of National Socialism, as thus expounded, the 
actual deeds of the Hitler System. 

We National Socialists are socialists, genuine, national, Ger- 
man socialists. We repudiate any attempt to tone down this 
idea by using the word 'social reformer 5 instead of the word 
'socialist'. This change of wording represents nothing but a 
hypocritical attempt to hide the most glaring defects of the 
capitalist economic system. Or at best it can be regarded as the 
endeavour of compassionate and honourable persons to cure, 
by covering them up with plaster, the festering sores on the 
body of our economic life and of our people. We are 'socialists', 
and not mere c social reformers', and we do not hesitate to say 
it, although the Marxians have so painfully distorted the mean- 
ing of the former term. 

What do we mean when we call ourselves National Socialists; 
and why are we National Socialists? 

We start from the idea that a nation is made up of persons 
who have a community of fates. Now to have a community of 
fates signifies that there must be a community of needs, and if 
there is a community of needs there must be a community of 

The nationalist movement joins us in recognizing that there 
is a community of fates and a community of needs, but calls a 
halt when we say this necessarily means a community of bread. 
A community of bread signifies that the land, its treasures, and 
its powers, are the property of the entire people, of the entire 
nation. That is the significance of the misleading Marxian ex- 
pression 'ownership of the means of production'. For not any 
one class, not even the working class, owns the means of pro- 
duction. The owner is the nation as a whole. (Pp. 72-73.) 

That denotes revolution an economic revolution? Cer- 
tainly it does. We want this economic revolution, just as Baron 



vom Stein once wanted an economic revolution, and made it, 
to secure the national freedom of the German people. For what 
else but an immense economic revolution was the widespread 
liberation of the serfs a revolution which the feudal magnates 
of those days would certainly have described (If the word had 
already existed) as 'bolshevik*, and which they did describe as 
e a danger to the State 5 even as our National Socialist demand 
is now described in capitalist circles. Only thanks to the 
economic revolution of the liberation of the serfs, only through 
the incorporation of the newly established system of estates into 
the calcified organism of the State, were freed the mighty 
forces that were requisite; only thanks to this did the Prussia 
of 1806 become the Prussia of 1812 and the Germany of 1870, 
Moreover it is our profound conviction that ia no other way 
than by the liberation of the fourth estate, by the Incorporation 
of the German working class into the organism of the German 
nation, can the Germany of 1918 be transformed Into the free 
Germany of a near and the Great Germany of a in ore distant 
future. (Pp. 74-75-) 

We National Socialists perceive that there Is a fateful and 
causal tie between the national liberty of our people and the 
economic emancipation of the German workers. We have 
recognized that the capitalist economic system with Its ex- 
ploitation of those who are economically weak, with its robbery 
of the workers' labour-power, with its unethical way of apprais- 
ing human beings by the number of things and the amount of 
money they possess, instead of by their internal value and their 
achievements, must be replaced by a new and just economic 
system, in a word by German socialism. The basic Idea of 
socialism which, though Hebraically falsified, materialistically 
degraded, and demagogically caricatured, nevertheless lives on 
in the minds of millions upon millions of social-democratic and 
communist workers, that ancient Teutonic notion of joint 
ownership by the whole tribe, by the whole nation, of the entire 



means of production, of the land, which the individual who tills 
it holds only in 'entail 3 , as a usufructuary entrusted with his 
farm by the community such is the rock-bottom upon which 
our wish to refashion economic life is grounded. This convic- 
tion,, which is so deeply rooted in individual hearts that even a 
capitalistically inclined person really accepts it in his inmost 
self, supplies the motive force to our National Socialist idea of 
economics, society, and the State. (Pp. 101-102.) 

We have to learn that work is more than possession, that 
achievement is more than dividends. The most deplorable 
legacy of the capitalist economic system is that it has taught us 
to judge all things by the standards of money, ownership, 
possession. The decay of a people is a necessary outcome of 
applying such a standard of value, for selection by ownership 
is the mortal foe of the race, of blood, and of life. We have no 
shadow of doubt that under National Socialism this privilege 
of ownership will be annulled, and that the liberation of the 
German worker will go so far as to include a share in profit, a 
share in ownership, and a share in management. But we shall 
not have escaped from the old standard of value if we leave 
matters there, without insisting upon that revolution in the 
mind which impels us to our assault upon the spirit of the present 
system. We deliberately change from valuation by ownership 
to valuation by achievement, this latter being our sole standard. 
For us achievement is the main point, not dividend, just as we 
consider responsibility, rather than wealth or display, to be the 
climax of human endeavour. Here we have a new outlook, a 
new religion for economic life. Thanks to this the worship of 
the golden calf will come to an end; the differences between 
human beings and the differences between their rights will be 
differences between their achievements, differences in the 
degrees of their responsibility, differences that come from God 
and are therefore sacred. (Pp. 132-133.) 



In the people's movement there Is much talk about the 
crystallizing of a new leadership, and this touches upon what I 
have just been saying. But the methods that have been sug- 
gested for coming to a decision as to the best leaders,, such as 
examination of the blood, and what not, seem to my practical 
mind rather dubious s as to their possibility, their use, and their 
effect. There is another plan, an Old-German, a Prussian plan, 
of which my friend PfeSer has reminded me, and which seems 
to me admirable. I mean, choice based upon the army. 

As a preliminary to the use of this method, service in the army 
must be voluntary a privilege and not a duty. The practical 
plan would be to provide by law that every German citizen 
must do State service for a year. What I propose Is that 
during this year he should not be set to roadmaking or some 
other sort of mass-labour, but should be taught a handicraft, 
so that there should be no grown-up Germans who had not 
received at least one year's training in some craft or other. But 
the choice of the best would be left to apply to those who, after 
the year's e civil service 3 , chose to volunteer for the army. 
Army service would last several years, and, apart from this, it 
would only attract self-sacrificing persons, inasmuch as it 
would involve the chance of being exposed to the perils of war, 
and would therefore call for the heroic virtues. But, I repeat^ 
to adopt service in the army would be left voluntary and un- 
constrained. Who can doubt that those Germans who volun- 
teered for military service, which would take them away from 
private life for at least twice as long as the civil service did, 
would give no practical advantages for vocational life, but which 
besides being much harder work, would entail upon the volun- 
teer all the risks of war who can doubt, I say, that such Ger- 
mans as these volunteers would be the best Germans, racially 
the best, whose achievements on behalf of the State now and 
in the future would enormously transcend those of the average 
man? (Pp. 134-135.) 



The souls of human beings are overshadowed by a terrible 
hopelessness. Fixed values have been crumbling away. People 
don't know what to cling to, and vainly seek a centre of gravity, 
which they have lost in morals, and cannot find in religion. 
'Relativity 3 has become the shibboleth of modern culture, the 
relativity of all things, of all knowledge, of all feelings. Vainly 
does the sufferer try to escape the dull anxiety of an uneasy 
conscience, try to mask and to excuse his instability with the aid 
of psychoanalysis. The core has been gnawed at until very little 
of it remains. 

This is the sorest wound, perhaps incurable. For it is a pro- 
found truth that moral health is indispensable to the social and 
political stability of a people. Don't let the reader misunder- 
stand me when I use the word 'moral'. Morality cannot be 
established upon any other foundation than the soul, cannot be 
sustained by any reputedly inalterable commandments, even 
though to begin with these commandments were fortified with 
a sort of 'extract of the soul'. We are not concerned here with 
the dogmatic morality proclaimed by an estate or by a religion, 
but with the harmony that prevails (or should prevail) between 
eternal nature and that which is divine in man. The form, 
therefore, is temporal, like man himself; but the content, the 
soul, is eternal. (Pp. 137-138.) 

You German workers number fifteen millions. With your 
dependents you comprise 85% of the German people. Why, 
then, should you tolerate having to suffer all through life, every 
hour of every day, from the most horrible anxiety about the 
morrow, the dread whether next pay-day, or on the first of 
next month, you will still have enough money to provide you 
and yours with food, clothing, and shelter. 

Why should you put up, year after year, with the most 
poignant anxiety about old age, having continually to ask your- 
selves: 'What on earth shall I do when I am no longer able to 
work?* Why do you endure having all the joys of life the 



founding of a family, the upbringing of happy, healthy children 
poisoned by the tyranny of a system that mercilessly exploits 
you, and treats you as slaves? Why should you stand having 
life's lesser pleasures reverie in a wood, choosing a toy for the 
baby spoiled, once more, by the tyranny of money? 

Why do you put up with this servile existence which robs you 
of human dignity; cuts you off from the happiness of life; and 
converts that life of yours, which according to the eternal laws 
of nature and the eternal rights of man ought to be a psalm of 
praise to the Almighty, into a scream of hatred for the devil, a 
wail of sorrow and despair, of poverty and disgust and death. 

Why do you bear it, brothers and sisters? 

Because they lie to you and cheat you, cloud your vision so 
that you fail to see the enemy who afflicts you with all your 
woes. Because your hearts and brains are so drugged that you 
quarrel with one another instead of joining forces against that 
enemy: the unemployed has a grudge against the employed; 
the manual operative against the brainworker; the townsman 
against the agricultural labourer; the countryman against the 
official; and so on and so forth. Because you let them incite 
you against one another: the communists against the social 
democrats, both of them against the 'bourgeois*; the soldier 
against the civilian; the Red Front men against those who wear 
the Swastika. But aren't you comrades, comrades in mis- 
fortune, 'brothers of the chain 5 ? Is not the same whip cracked 
in the ears of you all, are not you scourged by the same dread 
of poverty? Are not your lives unhappy enough already, with- 
out these quarrels? Are not you universally defrauded of the 
Rights of Man? (Pp. 146-148.) 

We should not be socialists if we were unwilling to fight 
against the class-rule of the capitalist system, which permits a 
class of citizens whose only title is one of ownership to decide 
the lives and the deaths of the great majority of their fellow- 
citizens. But we should not be nationalists if we were not no 



less passionately determined to repudiate the hateful attempt 
to turn matters upside-down at the will of the brutalized masses 
of those who have hitherto been under the harrow, and are 
now unable to recognize the impossibility of detaching the 
fortunes of one class (be it a small minority or a large majority) 
from the fortunes of the nation. For here is our great discovery, 
that true socialism is identical with true nationalism, both being 
equally hostile to the class rule of a privileged bourgeoisie and 
the class rule of the proletariat. 

What do we want, then? Neither the 'bourgeois 3 nor yet the 
'proletarians' neither the bourgeois State nor yet the prole- 
tarian State. We want a new kind of man, we want the State 
of these new human beings who evoke in its pristine purity 
from the bourgeoisie the idea of nationalism which issues from 
the depths of the blood; and evoke from the proletariat the 
idea of socialism, redoubled in strength by the injustice the 
proletarians have suffered. We want all the champions from 
both camps who have discovered within themselves the synthesis 
that bridges the formidable abyss which now yawns between 
the two camps; that synthesis of the new idea which teaches us 
to be socialists because we are nationalists, and to be nation- 
alists because we are socialists. 

Like a fate it lowers over German history, which is an out- 
flow of the struggle of the German soul on behalf of itself and 
to find itself this surge of mutual hatreds, this murderous 
struggle of brother against brother for the sake of an idea 
which remains unknown to most of the combatants until, after 
the most fearful birthpangs, it is born in the synthesis which 
was something new and nevertheless embodied what was best 
in both the contesting parties: in the Guelph-Ghibelline 
synthesis of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation; 
in the Papist-Lutheran synthesis of the lesser German empire 
which secured its definitive configuration through Bismarck; 
in the Bourgeois-Proletarian synthesis of the coming Third 
Reich of national liberty and social justice. (Pp. 165-166.) 




MANY thanks for your letter of the 3rd inst. I am always 
glad to hear from you, and to know that the group holds 
firmly together. It is my hope and my earnest wish that the 
'Strasser Case' will not lead to any change in this respect. 
The newspapers will have kept you acquainted with the 
political situation in Germany. In the end I and my political 
views have won, for I felt that, whatever happened, the 
N.S.D.A.P. [National Socialist Party] ought to be incorporated 
in the State. This has happened, in part because of my direct 
efforts, and to some extent because the party was afraid of me. 
To all appearance I may seem to have been left out in the cold, 
but inwardly I don't feel this, for the renunciation of all 
economic ministries (which are in the hands of the arch- 
reactionary Hugenberg), and of the Prussian instruments of 
power (which are in the hands of the much-reviled Papen) , 
may indeed promote the national aims of the National 
Socialists, but will not further what we call German socialism 
and that, I am firmly convinced, is what the future will demand. 
My time will come when in Germany the power of the great 
financiers and the great landowners has to be broken; no 
matter whether it is done with the aid of the N.S.D.A.P. by 
currency methods, or by establishing the political front in a 
new form and with new energies. 

What perturbs me rather, from time to time at least, is the 
fact that, by various intrigues, some of the subordinate leaders, 
ambitious or otherwise shady persons, have been dragging my 
name and honour in the mire by unprecedented misstatements 
and infamies. But I shall keep my end up all right, and after a 
while even exasperated people will come to understand the 
reasons that have moved me and the general soundness of my 
conduct. The conversation that was arranged for has been 
postponed by Hitler. Since meanwhile he has become Chan- 



cellor, it is very difficult for me to make the first move, since I 
might be suspected of place-hunting the last thing in the 
world I should ever dream of. To conclude, never in my life 
have I shunned a fight, or avoided doing whatever my con- 
victions made me feel to be essential. 




No ONE who reads and takes to heart the glowing utterances 
quoted, in this Huttenbrief, from Gregor Strasser's masterwork 
KampJ urn Deutschland will be inclined to wonder that for this 
genuine National Socialist there was not likely to be a place 
in the Hitler-Hugenberg-Papen cabinet of 1933. 

Historically inevitable will also appear the dismissal of 
Gregor Strasser from his offices in December 1932, since the 
depriving of this socialist champion of power was, for such 
men as Schroder, Papen, Hugenberg, and Schacht, a needful 
preliminary to the seizure of power by the Hitlerian party. 

This was as plain to Gregor Strasser as it could be to anyone 
else. In the letter printed above this (to a party-friend who 
has recently placed the original at my disposal) Gregor Strasser 
explicitly foresaw that the Hitler System would never establish 
German socialism, and that this task would be incumbent 
upon Germany in the future. 

In this legacy of his to the German people, Gregor Strasser, 
besides mentioning some of the chief items such as breaking 
the power of financial capital, dividing up the large landed 
estates, drawing the teeth of Prussia indicates the path to 
be taken in order, in a new way and with enhanced energy, 
to march forward and ensure the victory of German socialism. 

Here we have the unique purpose of the Black Front, which 



has deliberately gone on with the campaign of Gregor Strasser, 
in his sense and towards his goal, but in a new way and with 
enhanced energy. 

It can no longer be our main concern to stir up the masses 
of the German people and inspire them with a longing for 
German socialism, 

What we need today is to get together and train a well- 
informed, trusty, and energetic elite which will elaborate 
the revolutionary sentiments of the masses, clarify the minds of 
these as to the ends to be attained, making them ready and 
willing to fight against the Hitler System, because that, under 
present conditions, is the only way of advancing towards 
German socialism. 

No longer can we proclaim the need for the narrow confines 
of a political party, with the inevitable dangers of presumption, 
exclusiveness, and dictatorship. 

Our present need is to proclaim the unified action of the 
popular community, in the sense of the watchword Gregor 
Strasser Schleicher Leipart 5 , which in former days sounded 
like a promise of new times, but tomorrow will be the manifest 
expression of the creative will of revolutionary youth, soldierly 
purpose, and socialist longing and as such will convey a 
promise of fulfilment to the German people. 

No longer will it suffice in meetings and speeches, in essays 
and other writings, to voice the promises of German socialism 
vague in content, incomprehensible in form, obscure in con- 

What we now need is an unambiguous and lucid scheme for 
the upbuilding of German socialism, such a scheme as forms 
the program of the Black Front. We need a clear and carefully 
thought-out statement of the economic, social, and cultural 
aims of New Germany, a description of the forms it will 
assume, an account of its inner technique and functioning. 

Here we have the aims and method of the Black Front, 
which can be enumerated as follows: 



Economic Field: Destruction of the private capitalist and 
State-capitalist economic system, and upbuilding of the new 
order of German socialism; nationalization of the German 
popular economy, under the economic form of life, with an aim 
at the effective deproletarianization of the German people. 

Home Policy: Overthrow of the party dictatorship and the 
establishment of a political system legally based upon self- 
government by the estates; a new subdivision of Germany into 
provinces with federalized administration and a supreme 
centralized federal government. 

Cultural Field: Break the idol of the 'totalitarian State', 
enthrone the true faith; establish freedom of conscience; 
restrict the partial truths of 'blood and soil' to their proper 
fields of application; recognize the value of the spirit, the 
value of the soul, the value of religion. 

Foreign Policy: Repudiate every kind of imperialism; 
effectively recognize a European federation on the basis of 
national freedom and the popular development of all nations 
and minorities. 

To sum up: A New Germany in a New Europe, on the basis 

National Freedom, 
Social Justice, 
European Collaboration. 

As groundworks and provisos of 

The Rebirth of the West.