Germany_Tomorrow

GERMANY TOMORROW

by
OTTO STRASSER

Translated from the German by

EDEN & CEDAR PAUL

Power, like a desolating pestilence,
Pollutes whate'er it touches; and obedience,
Bane of all genius, virtue, freedom, truth,
Makes slaves of men, and of the human frame
A mechanised automaton.

SHELLEY, Queen Mob

JONATHAN CAPE

THIRTY BEDFORD SQUARE

LONDON

FIRST PUBLISHED, JULY 1940
SECOND IMPRESSION, AUGUST 1940
THIRD IMPRESSION s OCTOBER 1940

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CONTENTS

BIOGRAPHICAL AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 13

PREFACE 1 5

PART ONE

IS REVOLUTION IN GERMANY

POSSIBLE? 23

PART TWO

LIQUIDATION OF THE WAR 47

PEACE PROPOSALS OF TOMORROW'S GERMANY

CHAPTER ONE PEACE OR ARMISTICE? 49

1. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PEACE TREATY 49

2. ELEMENTS OF EUROPEAN PEACE 5!

3. DISINTEGRATION OF GERMANY? 53

CHAPTER TWO FEDERALIZATION OF GERMANY 58

1. PARTITION OF PRUSSIA 58

2. FEDERATION OF THE PROVINCES 60

3. SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION 63

4. DEMOCRACY OF THE VOCATIONAL ESTATES 66

5. THE NEW SPIRIT 68

6. RENUNCIATION OF MILITARISM JQ

7. A WORD ON THE JEWISH PROBLEM 73

7

CONTENTS

CHAPTER THREE PROBLEMS OF THE PEACE CON-
FERENCE 79

1. PRELIMINARIES TO PEACE 79

2. THE GERMAN PARTNER 82

3. THE AUSTRIAN QUESTION 85

4. CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND SUDETENLAND 88

5. POLAND, DANZIG, THE CORRIDOR 9 1

6. THE BOLSHEVIK PROBLEM 94

7. IMPORTANCE OF THE WESTERN SLAVS TO

EUROPE 96

CHAPTER FOUR EUROPEAN FEDERATION 99

1 . A EUROPEAN CIVIL WAR 99

2. GUARANTEES OF SECURITY AND DISARMA-

MENT I O2

3. POLITICAL COLLABORATION 105

4. ECONOMIC COLLABORATION 107

5. CULTURAL COLLABORATION IO8

CHAPTER FIVE THE COLONIAL PROBLEM 1 10

HAPTER SIX WAR AIMS j i A

PART THREE

THE NEW ORDER 07

STRUCTURE OF GERMAN SOCIALISM

CHAPTER ONE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 1 1 9

1 . INTRODUCTORY j j q

2. RACE PEOPLE NATION I j g
3- RHYTHM OF HISTORY

4. MARXISM

8

CONTENTS

CHAPTER TWO GERMAN SOCIALISM I2Q

1. THE CRISIS OF CAPITALISM 129

A. Capitalist Economic Policy 131

B. Capitalist Economic Law 133

C. Capitalist Economic Form 135

2. ECONOMIC POLICY OF GERMAN SOCIALISM 137

A. Autarchy 137

B. State Monopoly of Foreign Trade 139

C. A Currency Standard of Our Own 140

3. ECONOMIC LAW OF GERMAN SOCIALISM 142

A. Private Property? 142

B. c EntaiF 144

C. Repudiation of State Socialism 147

4. ECONOMIC FORM OF GERMAN SOCIALISM 150

5. AGRICULTURE 153

A. The Coming System 153

B. Management of the Transition 156

C. Great Landed Estates 158

6. INDUSTRY AND WHOLESALE TRADE l6o

A. The Factory Fellowship 162

B. Contrast to Capitalism and Marxism 165

C. Management of the Transition 166

7. HANDICRAFT AND RETAIL TRADE 169

A. The Guild (or Corporation) 1 70

B. Management of the Transition 172

8. COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES 173

9. PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 1 75

CHAPTER THREE THE GERMAN SOCIALIST STATE 178

1. MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE 178

2. THE FORM OF THE STATE l8l

3. ADMINISTRATION 1 82

9

CONTENTS

4. PROVINCIAL SUBDIVISION 185

5. THE ESTATES SYSTEM 1 89

A. Abolition of the Party System 189

B. Vocational Councils 192

C. Chambers of Estates 197

CHAPTER FOUR CULTURAL POLICY OF GERMAN

SOCIALISM 2 O2

I- CONSERVATIVE REALISM 2O2

2. RELIGION AND CHURCH 304

3. THE NEW SCHOOL 208

4. ARMY AND LABOUR SERVICES 212

5. GERMAN LAW, JUSTICE, AND RIGHT 213

6. ELITE AND IDEAL TYPE 215

APPENDIXES

I. PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION OF THE

Aufbau 221

II. POSTFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION OF THE

Aufbau 223

III. PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION OF THE

Aufbau 225

IV. POSTFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION OF THE

Aufbau 227

V. DANGER OF THE PARTITION OF GERMANY 2 2Q
VL MANIFESTO OF BLACK FRONT TO THE GERMAN

PEOPLE

10

BIOGRAPHICAL AND
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

OTTO STRASSER, a Bavarian, was born on September 10,
1897. His brother, Gregor, five years older, was killed
by Goering's orders (Hitler accepted responsibility) in the
Blood Bath of June 30, 1934. Both brothers were Nazis
at a time when the National Socialists were really
socialists as well as nationalists, and they remained
socialists after Hitler had dropped this part of his creed.
That was the untoward fact that led to Gregorys murder.
Five years before this Otto had broken with Hitler; on
May 10, 1933, he left Germany to become a refugee in
Austria, subsequently in Czechoslovakia, Switzerland,
and France (where he now resides) .

Otto Strasser's ideas on German Socialism were
incorporated in a book Aufbau des deutschen Sozialismus
published in 1931, second edition 1936. The bulk of it
appears in Part Three of the present volume, being
essential to the author's presentation of Germany
Tomorrow. Part One, c ls Revolution in Germany
Possible? 5 , and Part Two 'Liquidation of the War (Peace
Proposals of Tomorrow's Germany) 5 , were written at
the turn of the year, i.e. well after the outbreak of the
war, expressly for the present book. All three parts, and
the Appendix matter, speak for themselves, so nothing
more need be said about bibliography.

Otto Strasser played an active part in the previous
war, joining the Bavarian army as a volunteer on
August 2, 1914, rising from the ranks' to become a

ii

PRELIMINARY NOTE

lieutenant, decorated, and twice wounded. He took the
degree of Doctor of Law in 1921, and for a time held an
official post under the Weimar Republic. Then he was
appointed legal adviser to an industrial concern in
Berlin. For some years after this he was editor-in-chief
(during the gradual rise of the Nazis) of most of the
North German periodicals of the National Socialist
Party. After his breach with Hitler he founded the
Black Front, an anti-Hitler organization, which aims
also (and chiefly) at promoting 'German Socialism 5 .
It plays a considerable part in this book, and will
perhaps play a still more considerable part in Germany
Tomorrow, and in Europe the Day after Tomorrow.
Since in Germany Today assassination has a recognized
function in politics, it is not surprising that even as a
refugee Otto Strasser has had several 'narrow squeaks'.
But he still continues his reasoned (and bloodless)
campaign for promoting the downfall of the Hitler
System and the upbuilding of German Socialism a
campaign with which Germany Tomorrow has much to do.
The book is addressed, not only to Germans, but to all
'Good Europeans 3 .

EDEN AND CEDAR PAUL

London
May Dqy y

GERMANY TOMORROW

PREFACE

THIS war is the inevitable outcome of the Hitler System.
For the last ten years, and especially since Hitler seized
power, I have been indefatigably trying to demonstrate
as much in countless publications.

Regard for historical truth makes it essential to state
that Hitler's seizure of power was part of that Germano-
European development to which I have given the general
name of the 'German Revolution', by which I mean the
birth of a new order in politics, economics, and civiliza-
tion. Issuing from Germany, this will to a greater or less
extent transform the established European system even
as, at their respective times, did the English Revolution
and the French.

From this outlook we can understand the otherwise
inexplicable mistakes and shortcomings of the statesmen
of other lands, beginning with Dollfuss and Schuschnigg,
going on to Hodscha and Beck, next to Francois Poncet
and Nevile Henderson, and last of all to the men of the
'Peace of Munich 5 since had it not been for these
mistakes and shortcomings Adolf Hitler would never
have been able to carry out his work of destruction and
even so we have to recognize that such work of destruc-
tion has been and is the necessary prelude to the up-
building of the new order which is the meaning of this,
as of every revolution. Contemplation based upon a
study of the philosophy of history does much to lessen
the blame attaching to the German people for the Hitler
System and the war to which it has given rise. The

15

PREFACE

Germans may have to shoulder the greater share of
blame, but their share is only a part of the general load
which must be assigned In varying degrees to the policies
of other countries than Germany.

Important, however, than the assignment of

shares of blame to Hitler and his war (an

assignment justified and restricted by our historical

outlook), Is the no less inevitable certainty we derive

that Hitler and his war will be defeated.

And how?

Certainly If we regard, as I and my friends do, the
Hitler System (and for our purposes that includes the
civil war In Europe which the Hitler System has brought
about) as a necessary stage in the transition from a
decaying old order to an evolving new one, as the epoch
during which effete forms are being swept away why
then we shall have the joyful conviction that such an
epoch of destruction cannot possibly be lasting. It will
come to an end as soon as the old and the worm-eaten
have really been swept away, and as soon as the new and
the young that are everywhere germinating beneath the
surface of things come clearly to light.

From this outlook Hitler is really no more than the
testing 'hammer of God' with which men and things
are tapped to discover whether life persists in them,
whether they still have faith, will, strength, and the
power of renewal. Where these good qualities are
lacking, the hammer breaks the old forms to powder
even as. In scripture, the tree which bore no fruit was to
be ruthlessly cut down. But when fruit-bearing is still
possible, the will to and the power for renewal will

16

PREFACE

infallibly spring up after the hard testing of these blows;
under new forms,, but in the old spirit, the spirit of the
'Mothers 3 In Faust which dwells in the depths of our soul,
the soul of every human being, the soul of every nation,
the soul of the West. Revolutionary in form, conserva-
tive in substance, is the policy that derives from such a
method of contemplation.

Victory over Hitler and his system of destruction,
victory in this war over the powers of destruction, is no
less certain than were the coming of Hitler and this war;
and both spring from the necessity and the nature of the
c German Revolution 3 .

Three questions necessarily arise for consideration
after such an outlook has been defined, three questions
which must be answered before we can be sure that we
have more to guide us than mere faith in the future;
three questions which the non-German world above all
will put, in order to learn what lies behind this conten-
tion, and what the foreign world has to expect from our
c German Revolution 3 :

(1) Is a revolution at all possible in Germany?

(2) What would the ideas of such a c German Revolu-
tion' be as regards the liquidation of the war?

(3) What sort of aspect would the new order have in
Germany?

The importance of these questions, and the warrant
we have for putting them, are all the more palpable
because war prevails, so that men are summoned to
battle, wish to know and are entitled to know what they
are fighting for and why they are making sacrifices.

The aim of this book is to answer these three questions,

B I 7

PREFACE

to answer them as accurately as possible and with a full
sense of responsibility imposed on us by the deadly
earnestness of our time.

It arises from the circumstances of the case that the
answers to questions (i) and (2) must c date ? , must arise
out of the extant military situation; while nevertheless
they arise out of the spirit of the new order, which
forces itself into the light Independently of Hitler's
regime and Hitler's war.

Nothing can prove this more convincingly than the
fact that the plans for the new order in Germany were
drafted years before the Hitler System, and therefore
longer still before the war. They were drafted in their
main Iines 3 and constituted the written program of a
large and active political movement in the Reich.

As Douglas Reed shows in his instructive book Nemesis? \
these main lines formed the substantial content of the
so-called Hanover Program which was adopted in 1925
as the program of the North German group of the
National Socialists, and became the cause of my breach
with Hitler. After 1930 it was the official program of the
Black Front, and was published as such in 1931 in the
first edition of my own book Aufbau des deutschen
Sozialismus.

The most important chapters of that book comprise
Part Three of the present work, and show the latter to
be in no sense a degenerate form of concession to the
present war and its expected result,

To^ emphasize this I have deliberately left standing
certain sections that have grown obsolete during the
last ten years, sections which the reader can correct for
himself in the light of the new formulations in Part Two.

18

PREFACE

For It seemed and seems to me of outstanding importance
that the scheme for a new order in Germany came into
being independently of the Hitler system and the present
war, for it was and Is the program of a young, active
and growing political movement in the Reich. Not hatred
of Hitler, nor the sourness of a refugee, nor a dread of
military defeat, nor concessions to the western powers,
guided my pen when I helped to draft that program.
In 1930 none of those influences were at work to say
little of the fact that since then I have done my utmost
to hinder such considerations from modifying my
political thought and will.

This suffices to show that the plan for a new order in
Germany issued from the sources of the German nature
and of German history, and Is therefore deeply based
upon the national spirit, is essentially permanent
whereas dictatorship from without is nothing but a
makeshift which every national wind can puff away.
If, therefore, it should prove practicable to combine the
safety of Europe with the reconstruction of Germany,
then every true-hearted German nationalist must gladly
accept the outcome.

This book is intended to provide the foundations for
such a testing-time, penned by one who is convinced that
German national security and European collaboration,
far from being mutually exclusive, tend to favour one
another.

OTTO STRASSER
Penned in Exile
Easter 1940

PART ONE

IS REVOLUTION IN GERMANY
POSSIBLE?

IS REVOLUTION IN GERMANY
POSSIBLE?

THE revolutionary character of the general situation in
Germany is unquestionable. Indeed, the foundation of
the historical and political views that have guided the
thoughts and actions of myself and my friends is the fact
that revolution has been going on in Germany for the
last twenty years - a revolution of which the Hitler
System is but one phase, the phase of destruction.

The caption of this Part One of my book can, there-
fore, relate only to the tactical question whether revolu-
tion is possible within the framework of the German
Revolution at large, to the question whether the Hitler
System can be overthrown, thereby initiating the last
phase of the German Revolution. That phase will consist
of the establishment of a new order.

Since the question c Can the Hitler System be over-
thrown by an internal movement in Germany? 5 is thus
tactical, it follows that the answer must likewise be
mainly determined by tactical considerations. Such
events as Hitler's striking successes in Scandinavia and
the Balkans (successes indirectly due to his ally Stalin's
victory in Finland) have a great influence upon the most
immediate general outlooks, and are of decisive import-
ance as regards the factor of time.

Having made this proviso, which must constantly be
borne in mind, we discover that the following general
features will help us to answer the question under dis-
cussion:

23

GERMANY TOMORROW

(1) The prevailing atmosphere, by which I mean the
masses" widespread dissatisfaction with the present
regime a dissatisfaction for which (as usual) numerous,
and often conflicting, causes can be found.

(2) The existence of a minority of persons prepared to
take action, a minority willing and able at the appropriate
moment to transform passive discontent into political
action^ much as a spark occurs to discharge electrical
tensions that have accumulated beyond a certain
amount,

(3) A paralysis of will within the system, or, rather, a
paralysis of will among the active defenders of the system,
because their self-confidence has been undermined,
because their assurance of victory has waned, because
they have lost discipline and resolution. In other words,
for revolution to be possible a considerable number of
those who wield the forces of the dominant system
must have come to sympathize with the aims of the
revolutionists, or must at least have ceased active oppo-
sition to these aims.

If we proceed to enquire how far, in the Germany of
1940, these fundamental prerequisites of a revolution
exist, it can be unambiguously shown that the general
atmosphere discloses all the features which make revolu-
tion possible.

So widespread, so virulent is the discontent of the
German people with the dominant Hitler System (vary-
ing, of course, with the successes or failures of the system)
that the enumeration of proofs would almost be super-
fluous. All the same, I shall give a summary of them,
to avert the danger of that self-deception which makes
dispassionateness impossible.

24

IS REVOLUTION IN GERMANY POSSIBLE?

Surely one of the most convincing proofs is the fact
that the Hitler System, after being in power for seven
years, must still rely upon the detestable terrorist methods
of the Gestapo and the concentration camps? Hereby
Goebbels 5 chatter about 'popular support 5 of the Nazi
regime is as flatly contradicted as by the ever more
extensive gagging of the press, the wireless, and any
other means by which the opinions of the German people
seek expression.

Precise investigations have shown that the number of
Germans who have pined for a longer or shorter time in
concentration camps, penitentiaries, and prisons during
the seven years of the Hitler regime totals more than
two millions. Official statistics show, then, that over
ten million Germans (if we add the dependents of the
victims) have been so actively antagonistic to Hitler as
to make personal acquaintance with his penal system.
Nay more, many, many thousands of Germans have been
put to death by their rulers, or, let us say bluntly, have
been murdered.

Today these facts should be all the more emphatically
proclaimed because they show, not only the profound
hatred of the German people for the Hitler System, but
also that an enormous part of the German people was
actively fighting that system at a time when the foreign
world was still associating with Hitler on friendly terms.
What this signifies is that the same enormous part of the
German people stands in the present 'European Civil
War 5 on the side of Europe against the dictatorship of
Hitler and Stalin, thus representing, not only a latent
revolutionary force, but also a direct military force
inasmuch as the majority of the two million Germans

25

GERMANY TOMORROW

who are or have been under the Hitlerian harrow are
Germans of military age.

Less manifest but not less effective than the open
antagonism of the victims past and present in Hitler's
concentration camps, penitentiaries, and prisons, is the
voiceless discontent of the millions of those who are
apathetic in political matters. Among these, who consist
In very large measure of women, it is not so much
political or philosophical considerations which bring
them into opposition with the system, as the experiences
of daily life. The luxury of the Hitler bosses, the increas-
ing bnitalization of youth, the fall in real wages, the rise
in prices (which largely takes the form of a deterioration
in quality), the more and more oppressive demands
enforced upon the manual workers and anyone else
willing to make sacrifices, the mendacity of propaganda,
the alarming effects of the reign of terror, religious perse-
cution, etc., were already operative before the war to
intensify discontent with the system among those who are
apathetic in politics and constitute something like 70%
of every nation. Hitler and Goebbels knew this just as
well as Himmler and Goering. But whereas the two
latter believed that the difficulty could be overcome by
tightening up the screw-press of the terror, the two former
were shrewd enough, in accordance with the old Roman
principle of 'bread and circuses 5 , to replace the lacking
bread (read 'butter') by an abundance of circuses (read
'spectacular successes').

This made it essential for Hitler to gain spectacular
national successes, and the statesmen of the West were
too dull-witted to perceive that every time Hitler made
a coup on or across the frontier - as by his military

26

IS REVOLUTION IN GERMANY POSSIBLE?
occupation of the Rhineland, his march Into Austria,
his conquest of Sudetenland, his annexation of Bohemia
and Moravia, and his regaining of Memel this was
also a slap in the face for the opposition on the home
front, made possible only by foreign aid. Each national
success secured temporarily for Hitler the approval of the
apathetic masses, who considered it a proof of 'the
Leader's genius', and a reward to themselves for the
sacrifices they were making.

But since the outbreak of war this stimulus has lost its
savour, for the coming of war gave the lie to the piping of
Goebbels during the last few years, to the unceasing
declaration that 'the Leader will do it all without war'.
During the first six or eight weeks after the declaration,
the Germans were, In fact, panic-stricken. Then came
recovery, thanks to the prompt victories in Poland, and
the inertia of the western powers, especially as concerned
their airforces. Still, the recovery of morale has by no
means been complete, as would be shown speedily
enough were Berlin to be bombarded from the skies.

Even though the dread of open belligerency that
prevailed in Germany before the war has by now in
great measure been appeased, the widespread discontent
of the non-political masses has been greatly enhanced by
the direct and indirect consequences of the blockade.
Above all, women as thrifty housewives and as anxious
mothers have been gravely discomfited by the scarcity of
essential articles of diet, of footwear, and of clothing; and
the daily expenditure of time and strength requisite
for the attempt to satisfy these needs is both exhausting
and discouraging. The consolations offered them by the
obese Goering sound derisory, while dread of Himmler's

27

GERMANY TOMORROW

Gestapo will not prevent women's tongues from wagging
while they stand for hours in queues, any more than it
will prevent their whispering to one another about
secret sources of 'black 3 supplies.

But what gets to work most powerfully among the
Germans who are politically apathetic, what makes them
Hitler's most dangerous enemies, is their remembrance of
the last war. The increasing privations of 1917 and 1918
are the nightmares of the German women of 1939 and
1940, while the men meditate on the horrors of inflation,
which robbed them of wages, savings, and profits,
without a chance of defence. Neither proclamations nor
bullying nor promises counteract these memories, for
there was no lack of them twenty years ago, and little
good did they do. Nor are the boastful reports of victories
in Poland, of successes in the air, of the sinking of Allied
ships by German submarines, any more effective. Every
German who is over thirty knows full well that Luden-
dorff, likewise, conquered the whole of Poland, the
whole of Serbia, the whole of Rumania, and that then
Bulgaria and Turkey fought on Germany's side; every
German over thirty knows how daily, weekly, and
monthly the naval chiefs issued bulletins regarding the
successes of the German submarines successes that
outdid even the victorious bulletins of Raeder and Goering
and that the end of it all were the Forest of Gompiegne
and the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles. Memories of these
things (especially when they are vigorously exploited by
an active propaganda) gives a political stamp today to
the general discontent of the German people even when
that discontent is not really the outcome of political
causes.

28

IS REVOLUTION IN GERMANY POSSIBLE?

Goebbels' declaration that 99 % of the German people
are backing Hitler cannot be more strikingly disproved
than by quoting the fact so incautiously divulged by the
same propagandist concerning the famous vote taken
among the inmates of Dachau concentration camp.
They numbered 1572. Of these 1554 voted for Hitler, 8
against, while 10 abstained. Here you have your 99 %
in favour of Hitler, but everyone knows what the 99 %
of Dachauers were really thinking and feeling.

To sum up, then, we can be confident that the general
atmosphere of dissatisfaction which is the first essential
for every revolution undoubtedly exists today in the Ger-
man people. The necessary stressing of the numerous,
and for the most part non-political, causes of this dis-
content does not weaken its significance, since we are
concerned only with a general atmosphere, and not with
a lucid manifestation of the popular will.

This underlines the importance of the second of the
three questions we set out to investigate in this con-
nexion. Does there exist in Germany today a minority
of persons willing and able to take action?

Of course we begin our answer by reminding ourselves
of those who were Hitler's political adversaries before he
seized power. Independents, majority socialists, demo-
crats, centrists, 'People's Party' men, and German
nationalists formed the patchwork front of those who
from the end of 1918 to the end of 1932 shared responsi-
bility for Germany's political life, and their representa-
tives who were disqualified by Hitler therefore form the
core of the German 'emigres in the narrower sense of the
term' (persons who, though they have not taken refuge

29

GERMANY TOMORROW

abroad, may be assumed on principle to be opposed just
as if they had fled) .

To the left and to the right of those who were dis-
qualified when Hitler seized power there were at that
time the opposition groups, consisting of those who fought
against Weimar just as they fought against Hitler the
Communists and the Black Front. The former were, or
are, supporters of an international-Marxist-revolution;
the latter were, or are, supporters of the German
Revolution, that is to say of a new order in the sense of
national freedom, social justice, and European collabora-
tion.

In addition to these political groups of persons who
oppose Hitler at home and abroad, there are the racial
and religious groups of Hitler's adversaries: notably the
Jews against whom Hitler and Streicher have preached a
crusade; and the Catholic and Protestant Churches
persecuted by Hitler and Rosenberg in so far as they
have not wholly or partially submitted. Of late, too,
there has been what we may call a quasi-economic
opposition, witnessed to by the flight of Edmund Stinnes
to London, and even of Fritz Thyssen (who was a mem-
ber of the Hitlerian Reichstag) to Switzerland.

^The mere enumeration of these groups indicates how
diversified are the trends, how varying the strength and
the Mnd, of this multifarious oppositional movement
against the Hitler System. Its extremely mixed com-
position is enough to show that no unified and vigorously
acting community could possibly be formed out of it

Speaking first of the 'dethroned Weimarians', their
pugnacity diminishes as you pass among them from left
to right. Even among the majority socialists there were

30

IS REVOLUTION IN GERMANY POSSIBLE?

men of note, like Noske and Severing, who made peace
with the Hitler System 3 while many other prominent
members of this group became 'non-political 5 . Never-
theless it may be proclaimed that not only the party
chiefs Wels and Vogel who became emigres (taking
refuge first in Prague and then in Paris), but also the
steadfast old members of the party who stayed in Ger-
many, continued firm opposition to the Hitler System,
and that they could still rally many supporters from
among the German working class.

The centrist Catholics proved less reliable, and still
less reliable the bourgeois democrats. Almost all their
leaders made peace with Hitler, and even refugee politi-
cians like Briining, Wirth, and Koch took up an attitude
of reserve which (since they had considerable influence
in England and the U.S.) was indirectly favourable to
the Hitler System. Not until the anti-Christian policy
of the Hitlerians became more marked, was a stronger
opposition carried on from the Catholic side, but it never
became distinctively political.

The same considerations apply more markedly to the
'People's Party 5 and German nationalist opposition,
which was chiefly represented abroad by Treviranus, an
ex-minister of the Reich. (There is a creditable exception,
Dr. Rauschning, a German nationalist who was at one
time president of the Danzig Senate.)

This brief sketch of the opposition formed by the
various parties of the Weimar Republic makes it plain
that only the social democrats were capable of producing
a minority c able and willing to take action 5 against the
Hitler System; whereas the opposition formed by the
other groups (individual exceptions apart) could do no

GERMANY TOMORROW

more than intensify the general dissatisfaction; but was,
even so, of considerable importance, especially in the
religious sphere.

Fundamentally different, that is to say pugnacious,
are the two opposition groups that stood on the left and
right flanks of the old party opposition to the National
Socialists, namely the Communists and the Black Front,
In structure they were of a much more revolutionary
type than die old legalist or constitutional party appara-
tus, and furthermore by their struggles in the pre-Hitler
period had been better prepared for the new fighting
conditions of illegality.

There can be no doubt that down to the outbreak of
the war the Communists formed an opposition to the
Hitler System, an opposition that was not always very
adroit and consistent, but was absolutely uncompromis-
ing. If nevertheless they had no striking success, this is
partly because since 1920-1921 the German people had
inwardly outgrown the Communist peril; partly because
the dictatorship of the Browns did not encourage a
yearning for the dictatorship of the Reds, but rather
favoured a desire for democratic freedom and self-
government.

How much justification there was for the ingrained
prejudice of the German people against the Communists
was shown by the Hitler-Stalin pact, which gave outward
expression to the internal kinship between the two
systems.

With the formation of the Stalin-Hitler alliance the
Communists were done for in Germany, both in their
influence upon the German people and in the number of

their membership. Inasmuch as every Communist both

32

IS REVOLUTION IN GERMANY POSSIBLE?

at home and abroad was transformed from an enemy of
Hitler Into an ally of Hitler, the German people (the
industrial workers not excepted) ceased to draw a dis-
tinction between Communist and Hitlerian.

Since then. Communism in Germany has no longer
been part of the opposition to Hitler, and this, perhaps,
Is the most satisfactory result of the Hitler-Stalin pact,
For just as in foreign policy the clear line of the European
struggle and still more of European reconstruction would
have been blurred if Bolshevik Russia had continued to
play a part in the democratic camp, so in home policy it
would have been a misfortune had Communism been
able to assert its claims as part of the German opposition
to Hitler.

As concerns the Black Front, of which I am the leader,
It has not only the tactical advantage of an organization
which was from the first designed for secret ( = 'black')
work, but has also the advantage from the outlook of
principle of having never taken part in the failures of
the Weimar period. Still more important was the fact
that it accurately foresaw and foretold the development
of the Hitler System, with the result that its early mem-
bers were strengthened in their convictions, and new
recruits were steadily gained. Sufficient proof of this is
given by the first January issue in 1937 of the Black
Front organ known as 'Die Deutsche Revolution 3 , of
whose contents a full translation will be found in the
Appendix to the present work (see below, p. 229). Since
then the members of the Black Front in the Reich have
been fortified by the evolution that has taken place in
the Interim. Of course this has not only increased their
confidence, but has also promoted their influence on the

c 33

GERMANY TOMORROW

surrounding strata of the population. The last notable
point is the unique position of the Black Front in relation
to the party and to the army a matter about which
there will be more to say in Part Two.

1 cannot conclude this discussion of 'the minority of
persons willing to take action 3 without considering the
position of the army, which has a special part to play in
the Hitler System. For a long time the hopes of foreign
adversaries of Hitler (bourgeois for the most part) were
concentrated upon the army, and they based these hopes
upon what happened on June 30, 1934.

But they overlooked what I had set forth five years ago
In my book Die deutsche Bartholomdusnacht [The German
Massacre of St. Bartholomew] that on this very day
Hitler had decided for what the generals wanted
namely for the war against the revolution. Subsequently
the union between Hitler and the generals became closer
and closer; Hitler complied with his allies' extravagant
demands for armaments, and in the end even agreed to
the pact with Russia they had unceasingly clamoured for,
asking no more in return than that they should be loyal
to his person and his system. When, on February 4,
1938, the remaining members of the general staff who
had independent characters (above all, Generals Fritsch
and Beck) were dismissed, this loyalty was ensured, and
the "Relchswehr Myth' had achieved its purpose.

It need hardly be said that this does not mean identity
of views and aims between Hitler and the general staff.
The grave internal and external dissensions between
army and party persist, over and above the inevitable
rivalry. Anyone acquainted with Prussian generals
know that their egoism exceeds their loyalty. They would

34

IS REVOLUTION IN GERMANY POSSIBLE?

not dream of allowing themselves to be dragged down to
destruction with Hitler, and if Hitler's ruin were im-
minent they would seize any chance of saving themselves
by the sacrifice of the Chancellor and his paladins. But
this has nothing to do with opposition; it only means that
the generals are unprincipled.

Since Hitler's purge of the general staff to rid it of men
of character, there is, so far as concerns our search for a
minority of persons 'willing and able to take action 5 in
Germany, no dependence to be placed upon the leaders
of the armed forces of the Reich. But it Is otherwise as
regards the commissioned officers of medium grade,
especially In the army (for there Is less to be said about
the airforce and the navy). In these army circles not
only does the best tradition of the German officers' corps
remain active, but politically as well the ideas of the
'Schleicher School' still prevail a school in which
thousands of captains and majors were trained in youth.
Among them there is, on principle, strong opposition to
the Hitler System, while they cherish bitter memories of
the murder of their leaders Schleicher and Bredow. It
would be inexpedient to say much about this just now,
but there can be no doubt as to the facts. Whereas the
generals of the German army are an unprincipled lot,
and the subalterns are ambitious youngsters who are
politically apathetic or even devoted to Hitler the
majority of the staff officers are persons of blameless
character, and in political matters are convinced as well
as actively disposed opponents of the Hitler System.

To summarize the results of our search for c a minority
of persons willing and able to take action 3 against the
Hitler System, we have found that such a minority really

35

GERMANY TOMORROW

exists In the German nation, but still lacks unity of
organization and purpose. It comprises three groups, the
socialist group, the Black Front group, and the army
group. In a word, It represents the Leipart-Strasser-
Schleicher constellation which once before (in December
1932) was a deadly peril to Hitler. If it should prove
practicable to bring these three groups Into accord on
the lines of the Schleicher-Strasser-Leipart combination,
die anti-Hitler revolution would have a good chance of
success.

The last stage of our study of the fundamental pre-
requisites for a successful revolution against the Hitler
System brings us to more concrete elements, the active
defenders of that system; to the question whether a
paralysis of will is likely among them. Who are they,
these active defenders? In the narrower sense they are
the army, the S.S. (Storm Guards), and the S.A. (Storm
Troops), in the wider sense they are the whole National-
Socialist Party and its members.

As regards the army, the foregoing disquisition has
already solved a considerable part of our problem.
Within the army there are strong and influential forces
which are not merely untrustworthy from the outlook of
upholders of the system, but are convinced opponents,
and ready to take action. They will take action as soon
as they are convinced that Hitler has become a danger
to the national existence of Germany. A glance at the
three-year-old Black Front periodical (see Appendix)
will disclose the problem that faces every German officer
and every German ranker with a sense of national
responsibility the problem of, Hitler or Germany?

36

IS REVOLUTION IN GERMANY POSSIBLE?

(Appendix, p. 232). There Is no decent ranker, there is
no decent officer, who would not answer 'Germany 3 if
he could only grasp the national necessity for a decision.
Himmler is well aware of this. The reports of thou-
sands of spies who act as orderlies in the officers 5 mess-
rooms have Informed him of the spirit that is afoot a
spirit he fights in all possible ways. Everyone in the
German army knows of the 'skirt' method he used so
successfully in the cases of Blomberg and Brauchitsch;
and also of the homosexual method he tried against
Fritsch but unavaillngly, so that later he was com-
pelled to have recourse to the time-honoured plan of
assassination.

Exceedingly symptomatic was the speech upon The
Home Front in Germany which he made to the officers'
corps in the summer of 1937, whose wording shows much
more plainly than does that of countless newspaper and
magazine articles by refugees both Himmler's dread of
the armed forces of the Reich and the Hitler System's
dread of an internal revolution.

For defence, Himmler relies upon the police, the
Gestapo, and especially upon the S.S., the Storm
Guards and their 'Death's-Head Battalions 3 . Let me
give a word-for-word extract from the aforesaid speech:

'Should war break out, I shall have the following tasks
to perform. In view of what I consider to be the duties
of the police, 15,000 men, or not more than 20,000 at the
outside, will be withdrawn for service with the colours.
The present total force of uniformed police is from 80,000
to 90,000. We have to remember that the great majority
of these uniformed police consists of men who are over
forty-five, or let us say over forty years of age, and there-

37

GERMANY TOMORROW

fore if I allow from 15,000 to 20,000 of the younger men
to go to the army, I shall be parting with the steel of my
police. In case of need I can replace them by calling
back to active police duties men over fifty-five or over sixty.

'This will only be practical if I can make sure of an
inner "stiffening" to be used for big and important
actions. It will consist of the "Death's-Head Battalions' 5 .

fi l shall be able to get along with my elderly policemen.
The civilians over forty-five years of age who will be
called up for auxiliary police service will, as has been
arranged, carry out the duties that used to be assigned
to the Landsturrn. They will be able to do sentry-go at
munition factories, railway-bridges, etc. always pro-
viding that I have some younger men as "stiffening".
These will be men between the ages of twenty-five and
thirty-five belonging to the "Death's-Head Battalions"
not older and not younger. I don't want very young
men, or men who are well up in years, for the "sabotage-
troops" and the "terror-troops" will consist of lively
young fellows with up-to-date weapons and I shall
never be able to fight them with elderly Lands turmers.

'The "DeathVHead Battalions" will be stationed in
every governmental district throughout Germany. They
will be disposed of as follows:

*i. No Battalion will be stationed in its own native dis-
trict. ^For instance, a Pomeranian Battalion will never
serve in Pomerania.

C 2. Each Battalion will be transferred to a new district
every three weeks.

C 3.^ No Battalion will be given street duty with its mem-
bers isolated. It would never do for a man wearing the
death's-head emblem to be stationed alone in the streets.

38

IS REVOLUTION IN GERMANY POSSIBLE?

'4. This force will act ruthlessly. That is what it will

be for. 5

There can be no doubt that the Storm Guard Bat-
talions, living in barracks, will fulfil their chief's hopes
and will act ruthlessly towards their own nationals. But
there is likely to be a hitch here in the case of Storm
Guard Battalions not quartered in barracks. (This
applies to nearly four-fifths of the total force of 300,000
men, for not more than 80,000 are kept in barracks.)
They are simply working men, townsmen, and peasants
part of the people, and subject therefore to the popular
mood.

This applies even more to the S.A., the Storm Troops.
Numbering millions, they enjoy few of the advantages
granted to the S.S., the Storm Guards; they are not to
serve on the foreign front, but only on the 'home front 9 ;
this suffices to place them among the field-grey masses
and estranges them from the Brown Shirts let alone
that it increases the long-standing friction between the
S.S. (Storm Guards) and the S.A. (Storm Troops).

Even more decisive is the fact that comparatively few
of the Storm Troopers are among the 'profiteers 5 of the
system. On the contrary, they have for years been
deceived and betrayed especially since June 30, 1934.
Immediately after the alleged attempt on Hitler's life in
I 939> I g ot hold of a letter penned by one of the chiefs
of the Storm Troopers, which contains the following
passage (quoted verbatim) :

'Various recent happenings have pleased me very
much, although they have left a bitter taste in the mouth.
All the same, with regard to the candidate for death I

39

n E R M A N Y T O M O R R O W

hold Schiller's view, "The man must be helped". Un-
fortunately, like the rest of us in Germany, I am badly
off for news. My wireless apparatus doesn't work very
well, for It needs an overhaul; and as for the newspapers,
they lie so glibly that when one reads them, one hardly
knows whether one is standing on one's head or one's
heels. Nothing shows this better than all the hubbub
about the unfortunate Elser. What is true that is said
about him, and what false? Perhaps you can tell me, for
1 really don't know. Most of it, I expect, arises out of
Goebbels' imagination. I could tell you a lot of fine
things, were it not for technical difficulties.. But to come
to the main point, we shall have to work hard and bring
off our coup as soon as possible. We must approach the
goal quickly, for there will be little chance of establishing
a revolutionary Germany after a long war.'

I am sure that such a mood is the rule rather than the
exception among the Storm Troopers, and for years it
has seemed to me of the utmost importance to 'poison
the minds 5 of the Storm Troop leaders (here, likewise,
the middle grades rather than the men at the very top)
with the watchwords of the Black Front. During the
years 1 933- 1 938 our Huttenbriefe were sent by the million to
all sections of the Storm Troops and the National Socialist
Party. The specimen reprinted in the Appendix (p. 241)
gives an excellent example of our propagandist method.

Especially in the Party (where Gregor Strasser and
the protracted work of the Kampf-Verlag (Fighting
Publications) have not been forgotten) such activities
have been most fruitful, more particularly in the Labour
Front and among the Hitler Youth organizations.

What we must do now is make it clear to the abundant

40

IS REVOLUTION IN GERMANY POSSIBLE?

profit-seekers within the party that Hitler's chances are
practically nil, so that they will best promote their own
interest if they take time by the forelock and adjust them-
selves to coming events. This sort of propaganda would
induce hundreds of thousands of members, especially
among the officialdom, to draw aloof from the regime;
and where we are dealing with the more stubborn it will
be well to use a stronger tone, and even to employ threats
of personal retaliation. With the average members of the
National Socialist Party the well-tried lures and deter-
rents of sweets and floggings will prove even more effec-
tive than they do with the generality of mankind.

Having shown that the three essential requisites for an
internal revolution do actually exist in Germany, I have
therewith reached a point still to be discussed the
tactical necessaries for such a revolution.

For simplicity, in expounding the tactical necessaries I
shall stick to the same classification used in considering
the general features of the revolutionary possibility.

As concerns the mood that prevails among the German
masses, we must use all possible means for diffusing
among them a sound knowledge of the world situation.
It is hard for a foreigner to conceive how vast a gulf
yawns between the world situation as it actually is, and
the world situation as it presents itself to the minds of
the German people. After seven years of Hitlerian dic-
tatorship and Goebbelsian propaganda, this impoverished
nation, exhausted and isolated both materially and
spiritually, has been deprived of the possibility of forming
a sound judgment of its own. The antecedents of the
outbreak of war, the violation of the Czechs, the atrocities

41

GERMANY TOMORROW

in Poland, the betrayal of Finland, the comparative
strength of Germany and the western powers these
things are all as unknown to the German people as are the
yielding disposition of France during the years 1933-1939
and the peaceful temper of Chamberlain's government.
The German people has absolutely no idea of the de-
testation with which the rest of the world contemplates
the Germany of Adolf Hitler, nor yet of the moral,
political, and economic isolation of the country, which
in 1940 is a hundredfold greater than it was in 1914.

The principal aid to peace will be anything that will
acquaint the Germans with these plain facts, with the
facts and nothing else. Not until the German people
knows the truth will its present dull dissatisfaction be
transformed into an active political will.

Here, too, what are spoken of as the 'War Aims' of
the western powers play a very important part. One of
Hitler's chief endeavours has been and is to inculcate the
legend that the western powers desire the 'annihilation of
Germany', and that consequently, were it merely for the
sake of self-preservation, Germans must rally round their
leaders that is to say round himself. 'We are all in the
same boat,' such is the leading theme of Goebbels 5 prop-
aganda at the present time; and herein he voices
nothing but his dread that the Germans may come to
realize how the precise opposite is true. Anyone who
wants to help himself and Germany must aid in downing
Hitler and flinging him overboard.

An intimate knowledge of my fellow-countrymen has
taught me that millions of them today are suffering
from a conflict between their moral duty and what they
still regard as a national duty. Directly the western

42

IS REVOLUTION IN GERMANY POSSIBLE?

powers avow as their essential war aims the reversal -of
the violent deeds wrongfully committed by Hitler, but
declare that they have no desire to discriminate against
or destroy Germainy, that very moment there will be an
end to the cleavage in the minds of millions upon millions
of Germans, and they will tranquilly obey their con-
sciences against Hitler.

Of course we cannot expect them to undertake an
active campaign forthwith. It is idle to ask a fettered
prisoner to begin by overpowering his heavily armed
warder, and it is unfair to blame him as guilty because
he is powerless. What we can demand of the German
people, and what we forerunners among the champions
of the German Revolution do demand, is passive resis-
tance. But this comprehensive notion must be inculcated
in numberless separate preliminary writings, by those
able to avail themselves of all possible chances of dif-
fusing information.

We must not say (I am thinking of things that can
best be said by Germans) to the German aviator, 'Refuse
to obey orders 5 , for in that case as things are at present
he will simply be court-martialled and put to death.
What we should say is: 'Drop your bomb near what you
are aiming at, but don't register a hit. No one can prove
that you could have hit. In that way you will help to
overthrow Hitler and to save Germany. 5 We must not
say to the German worker, 'Down tools 5 , for he would
only be sent to a concentration camp. What we should
say is: 'Do your work slowly and badly, misunderstand
orders, waste material but make sure you will never
be found out. 3 To the clerks and officials we must say:
'Make a muddle of what you do; pretend to be stupid or

43

GERMANY TOMORROW

overworked; address letters, documents, parcels wrongly;
falsify lists and specifications; be tardy and disagreeable
in your relations with the public, cautious but stupid in
your relations with your superiors in a word, "throw
grit into the bearings whenever you have a chance; and
even though each man does only a little, the massed
effect will be stupendous.' To business and professional
men: c Be backward with the authorities, ask the revenue
officials question after question, humbug customers while
never forgetting to praise the Leader; remind them how
Goering said, "Guns are more important than butter 55 ,
delay the delivery of stamps on the ground that you are
overworked, make complaint after complaint; all this will
help to overthrow Hitler and therewith restore peace to
Germany and Europe. 3

I wrote simply, c We must say 3 . Who are 'we 5 , and how
can we say it?

We' are Germans who live free and can take up the
fight against Hitler. I have enumerated the various
groups of such persons. The outstanding personalities
among them, have a great moral and political responsi-
bility to their supporters, to the German people, and
to the world at large. It speaks ill for them that they
have not yet succeeded in forming a representative
assembly of the German adversaries of Hitler. An im-
pulse in the direction of establishing in foreign parts such
a centralized representative body of Germans would act
more quickly and effectively than anything else towards
aggregating into united hopes for the future the moods of
those malcontents who are scattered throughout the
Reich, and towards concentrating the efforts of various

44

IS REVOLUTION IN GERMANY POSSIBLE?

groups In the minority that would gladly take action
against the Hitler System. Nor could anything be more
momentous than this in Its influence upon the foreign
world, whose cooperation will be indispensable to the
speedy outbreak of a revolution against Hitler.

Again, 'how can we say It? 3 Uninfluential refugees,
grudgingly tolerated as aliens, having no passports, no
wireless stations, no funds to spare for direct and indirect
propaganda, and persons to be numbered only by tens
of thousands how can we, actively disposed though we
are, geHn touch with the passive German masses, who
are millions upon millions?

Apart from this problem, It is obviously our duty to do
our utmost towards ending this war as soon as possible,
towards ending it before its full powers of destruction
have been wreaked. There can be no doubt that our only
way of helping here is to promote the internal revolution
against Hitler. The outcome of this preliminary investi-
gation paving been that such a revolution is possible,
surely it behoves us to use all available means in order
to bring it about? Such a question can only be answered
in the affirmative. Three years ago Himmler emphasized
the importance of The Home Front in Germany, and con-
cluded his address to the officers 3 corps with the words of
warning:

c An understanding that a completely new type of
organization Is essential must be universally diffused; so
must the idea of the home front in Germany, upon the
defence of which the very existence of the German nation
will depend if we ever have to bear the burdens of war. 3

It is time for the non-German world to understand
Himmler's cry of distress and turn it to account.

45

GERMANY TOMORROW

Our enquiry is finished. Its upshot has been that as far
as the objective requisites in Germany are concerned an
internal revolution against Hitler is possible, but that
there are indispensable subjective requisites as well.

To the foregoing disquisitions I must add one impor-
tant remark: the trigger will be pulled by a military
failure on Hitler's part.

For years in his foreign policy Hitler has scored
triumph after triumph; even in the present war the mili-
tary victories have, so far, all been Hitler's (in Poland)
with the result that up to now the word remains with him
should the question of negotiations arise. While this state
of affairs lasts, even the best propaganda and the most
skilful underground work can only pave the way,
generate doubt, undermine support, induce readiness to
secede or to resist.

Not until the nimbus of victory has faded on Hitler's
brow, not until his 'battle of the Marne' has convinced
every German patriot that the alternative 'Hitler or
Germany' has been presented, not until the military pre-
eminence of the western powers becomes as plain as their
moral superiority already is not until then will the ice
break that now encrusts the brains, the hearts, and the
arms of the Germans.

That day will come, and will be followed by the day
of the German Revolution which is enshrined as an
object of ardent desire within the hearts of the German
people.

Let us all be ready then, that our thoughts may be
great, our wills pure, and our deeds just for thereby
only will storm-tossed and tormented humanity be
enabled to reach the passionately desired goal of peace.

46

PART TWO

LIQUIDATION OF THE WAR

PEACE PROPOSALS OF TOMORROW'S

GERMANY

CHAPTER ONE

PEACE OR ARMISTICE?

I. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PEACE TREATY

No thoughtful person can fail to be aware that the
present war, generated by the very nature and by the will
of the Hitler System, will be decisive as to the future
political, economic, and cultural order of Europe.

Germany itself, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland
give a heartbreaking picture of what this 'order 5 will be
like should Hitler gain the victory.

What will that order be like should the Allies be
victorious? We have no picture of it, unless we adopt
the fatuous notion that it will be set up in utter forget-
fulness of the twenty-five years between 1914 and 1939,
that there will be re-established those pre-war conditions
whose impracticability could not be better demon-
strated than by the events of the two and a half decades
that have followed the outbreak of the last great war.

Anyone who is convinced, as I am, that all historical
happenings mean something, are the expression of a
living development, will regard such reactionary ideas
as incredible, and will pay no heed to them when dis-
cussing the political future.

If so, however, it becomes still more urgent to enquire
what will be the nature of the new order to be estab-
lished by the peace that will itself be the expression of
the coming order.

For here we impinge upon the first question to present

r 49

PEACE OR ARMISTICE?

Itself at the close of every war. Shall we really try to
make peace, true peace; or shall we be content with an
armistice which, while ending the present war., will bear
in its womb the embryo of a new one?

It is hard to raise such a question while war is still
being waged; for the mere question may readily arouse
dissensions within every belligerent power, and thus
reduce the energy requisite for carrying the war to a
successful conclusion. Since, however, experience teaches
that it is even harder, much harder, to settle such a
question properly when one side has gained a decisive
victory, for in these circumstances the heat of passion so
readily obscures the light of reason as well as the sense
of justice, it is really incumbent on us, while we go
on fighting, to prepare for peace, for the true peace that
will make the recurrence of our present woes impossible.

But is a true peace possible? Can there truly be 'peace
on earth 5 ? Sceptics will be inclined to answer much as
one who plays a leading part in this war answered me
when I put the question that forms the title of this
chapter: c Are you fighting for a peace, or only for an
armistice?' His reply was: 'What do you suppose?
Every peace is nothing more than an armistice. The
more difficult the peace, the longer will be the pause
before the next war.'

Since I consider that the teachings of history dictate
to us the laws of politics, I could not but agree, for the
question was too general in its terms.

But if the question be put more concretely, in the
form, c ls durable peace possible in Europe?' I should
answer, once more guided by the teachings of history,
with an emphatic c Yes'.

5

ELEMENTS OF EUROPEAN PEACE
2. ELEMENTS OF EUROPEAN PEACE

At bottom what are wars but the struggles of growth
among the nations? As soon as the peoples of a particular
family of peoples within a particular area have finished
growing, there cease between these peoples in this
particular area the crises that result from the way in
which growth has made them elbow one another,, just as
the cessation of feuds among the tribes and the clans
established peace In the national units we now call
Spain, Italy, France, Great Britain, Germany, etc. The
end of the century-old struggle within these nations was
a sign of the ripening of the characters or the personali-
ties of these ripened nations, of the end of their 'becom-
ing' stage. This was the necessary antecedent of the
settlement that will finish the 'international' quarrels
within the family of European nations.

Who can deny that all the nations of Europe, whether
large or small, have entered the ripening phase of
nationhood? Where can you find the Czech who wants
to become a German; the Pole who wants to become a
Russian; the Bulgarian who wants to become a Ruman-
ian; or the Groat who wants to become a Serb to say
nothing of the nations that ripened yet earlier? Now the
close of this ripening process necessarily involves our
putting an end to any sort of intra-European imperialism
thus ^making both possible and indispensable a col-
laboration on the basis of the unconditional recognition
of the freedom and independence of all the national 'per-
sonalities' which today comprise the European family.

Is not the remarkable lack of hatred in this war an
indirect proof that the European nations feel themselves

5 1

PEACE OR ARMISTICE?

to belong to one family? Is not the talk about war alms
that goes on simultaneously in the countries of all the
belligerents a sign that, despite the struggle that con-
tinues, they have a yearning for community? Even
Hitler and Goebbels feel impelled to declare that their
only war aim is 'defence of Germany's right to live 5 ; even
they have to hide their imperialist actions behind a cloud
of peaceful words, and to deck out the attack upon
Europe they are delivering in concert with Stalin as a
phase in the birth of Europe.

Have not the governments of the western powers also
officially declared their war aim to be 'no territorial con-
quests, but a guarantee of security'; and is not this
declaration a proof that those who take the lead in
Britain and France have deduced the consequences of
the completion of the ripening process among the nations
of Europe and are determined to build thereon the com-
ing peace?

But if this is so, we have no reason to fear that the
coming peace will be nothing more than an armistice,
and therefore it behoves us Germans to give the material
and ideal guarantees of the security to which all the
European nations are unconditionally entitled.

The central problem of the coming peace negotiations
may therefore be stated thus:

How shall we combine the right to live of the German
people who inhabit the centre of Europe, with other
Europeans' need for security and especially the need
of the nations that adjoin Germany, the nations whose
right to live is independent of what may happen to be
their size?

DISINTEGRATION OF GERMANY?
3. DISINTEGRATION OF GERMANY?

Our formulation of the central problem will command
almost unanimous assent,, but there will be differences
now that we come to the solution.

It would be foolish to deny that the demand for the
disintegration of Germany will automatically tend to be
voiced more loudly by the Allies the more the war
spreads and the longer It lasts.

Just because this Is so obvious, and for those who would
be guided only by feelings so justifiable a trend, I will
avoid trying to answer it on moral grounds. I shall con-
tent myself with a sober political rejoinder, which runs:
'True, the annihilation of an adversary will make it
quite certain that he will never want to fight you again,
and will therefore ensure a lasting peace 5 . The best ex-
ample that can be cited to illustrate this is the example of
the destruction of Carthage at the close of the third Punic
war. The Romans killed all the men and boys of
Carthage, sold the Punic women and girls into slavery,
and razed to the ground the buildings of the rival city;
and they symbolized the permanency of the destruction
by driving a plough over the desert where Carthage had
formerly stood. History tells us that there were no more
Punic wars.

If an adversary can be definitively destroyed, a vic-
torious power will naturally ask whether this will not be
the best way of guaranteeing the security of its own
people. Certainly I can find no moral arguments against
such^a course, though I am strongly convinced that under
the sign of the cross such arguments would carry far more
weight than they did in the days of pagan Rome. From

53

PEACE OR ARMISTICE?

the practical point of view. It was quite possible to kill
half of the remaining 100,000 to 120,000 inhabitants of
unhappy Carthage, and to sell the remaining half Into
slavery. But how could that be done with 70,000,000
Germans? Physical extirpation is simply out of the ques-
tion, even if It were to be considered the best way of
establishing peace in Europe.

I need not trouble to prove that no man living has so
crazy an idea as this when he contends that the dis-
integration of Germany might be the best possible way
of guaranteeing the peace he hopes to see established.
He does not dream of the bodily extermination of the
Germans, but of the destruction, or at any rate the
weakening of the political organization of the country
of the disintegration of the German State.

The disintegration (or partition) of Germany means
here that the left bank of the Rhine shall be annexed by
France, or shall become a puppet State under French
control; that East Prussia, with Danzig, the Corridor,
and parts of Silesia, shall become Polish; that Sudeten-
land shall go back to a restored Czechoslovakia; that
Austria shall be assigned to the Habsburgs (preferably to
be combined with Czechoslovakia and Hungary into a
'Danubian Federation 5 ); and that the remnants of Ger-
many shall become 'protectorates 5 , if possible under the
tutelage of the recalled princely houses: the aim of all
this being the permanent political impotence of the Ger-
man people, whose activities are to be restricted to
intellectual culture, industry, and agrarian production.

I shall not attempt to deny that this scheme may
appear most desirable to the French, who less than
seventy years ago suffered from the savage onslaught of

54

DISINTEGRATION OF GERMANY?

the Germans; or to assert that it would seem too cruel in
the eyes of the Czechoslovaks and the Poles, who have
been afflicted even more cruelly by the terrorist methods
of Hitler.

On the contrary, for years I myself and many other
German patriots have dreaded that this grotesque
scheme may some day be realized, and it is as German
nationalists inspired by such a dread that we have,, in
great measure, been prompted to carry on our campaign
against the Hitler System. Let me again refer the reader
to the illicit Black Front periodical which was circulated
by millions in the Reich at the beginning of 1937, and is
reproduced verbatim in the present work (See Appendix,
p. 229).

Once more I will answer with practical rather than
with moral arguments, by asking whether such a dis-
integration of Germany would create and stabilize peace.

I frankly recognize the possibility of such a disintegra-
tion of Germany, and I know that with a conquered
nation the victors can do what they please for a time.
But how long will it last?

A peace settlement which is not felt and thought to be
just by the conquered, will endure only so long as the
conquerors have, and use, force to sustain it.

First, then, would the German people feel and think
such a disintegration of Germany to be 'just? I do not
believe that any man or any woman can honestly say
fi Yes\ If there are persons who can believe that economic
security and possibilities for cultural development could
reconcile the Germans to political castration, then I am
convinced that such persons are labouring under a
profound delusion. Just because they have, as I say,

55

PEACE OR ARMISTICE?

'ripened 5 , all the nations in Europe the German nation
not excepted lay the utmost stress upon political free-
dom, which includes the possibility of independently
developing whatever form of national existence they may
prefer.

Perhaps after a crushing defeat, and after seven years 5
hunger and bodily chastisement, the German people
might accept such peace terms without demur, but as
soon as their palsy was over, as soon as the will-to-live
became active once more, the will-to-freedom, the will-
to-independence, and the will-to-equal-rights would also
return, and every German, young or old, would regard a
fight for German liberty and German unity as his supreme
aim.

Would this be wrong-headed? Is there a Frenchman,
an Englishman, a Pole, or a Czech who would act
differently in a similar situation?

Never will the Germans accommodate themselves to
the disintegration of Germany, to the tearing of their
country to tatters. If such peace terms are enforced,
those who enforce them will have to reckon upon the
permanent hostility of the Germans.

What this means is that the victors will have to remain
perpetually under arms to hold the Germans down nay
more, that they will have to pile up their own armaments
proportionally with the recovery of the German people
from the consequences of defeat.

It means, last not least, that the victors will have to
reckon with the fact that a nation of 70,000,000 living in
Central Europe will be ready, at any moment when there
is an uneasy international situation (a war in the Far
East, troubles in the Pacific, threats from Russia, or what

56

DISINTEGRATION OF GERMANY?

not), to join forces with the disturbers of the peace,
hoping under the shadow of this new menace to carry
on their own struggle for freedom.

These are not moral arguments, neither menaces nor
hopes they are facts, hard facts, reinforced by the
lessons of history and by the study of national psychology.
Some may try to dismiss them as trifling, but none can
deny their existence.

What could the disintegration of Germany signify,
really; but that such a liquidation 5 of the war would
eternalize the heavily armed and tense condition of
Europe? It would signify that the Germans would con-
centrate their energies on unsettling the settlement, and
that the other nations would have to concentrate theirs
on trying to maintain it.

Peace? That would not be peace, but an armistice
filled with hatred, an armistice whose duration would
be limited by the strain put upon the victors to keep
adequately armed a strain that would grow worse the
longer the armistice lasted.

57

CHAPTER TWO

FEDERALIZATION OF GERMANY

I. PARTITION OF PRUSSIA

AT this stage it becomes necessary to insist that with the
rejection of the plan to disintegrate Germany there must
be associated practical proposals and guarantees from
Germany for the security of her neighbours. The other
nations of Europe, having been alarmed by Germany's
foreign policy of late, will make it their first and most
urgent demand that their governments shall fulfil what
has been their principal war aim and it is essential that
the German people should give the requisite pledges and
guarantees, having recognized that its own future in
Europe is dependent thereon.

Nor must any German statesman fail to understand
that German utterances and promises 5 even when signed,
sealed, and delivered, are now practically valueless on
the international exchange. Too often have German
governments, made up of no matter what persons, failed
to keep their pledges, broken their oaths, and treated
documents duly signed by them as no more than 'scraps
of paper'. No clear-sighted German publicist will take
it amiss if non-Germans now demand from Germans, not
words, but deeds.

The most decisive of such deeds will be the partition of

Prussia.

In view of the profuse outpouring of historical litera-
ture during the last great war, there is no need to adduce

58

PARTITION OF PRUSSIA

detailed justification of this demand. Suffice it to say that
as long ago as 1931 the Black Front endorsed the idea in
its first public statement of aims, entitled Aufbau des
deutschen Sozialismus [Structure of German Socialism],
penned by myself (see below, pp. 117 and foil.) ; and that
on September 20 of the same year, in No. 34 of its
central organ c Die Schwarze Front 5 (of which I was
editor), it gave an exact description with a map of
the proposed partition of Prussia, and of what was to be
the territorial distribution of the New Germany.

Consequently the German demand for the partition
of Prussia originated, not under the stresses of war, not
because of fear of military defeat, not as the outcome of
foreign or refugee influence but owing to the over-
whelming logic of a study of the political and religious
structure of Germany, its history, and its motive forces,
when contemplated by a European consciousness. I
regard it as of the utmost importance to insist on this
today.

No one well acquainted with the spirit of Germany
can overlook the fact that for centuries within the Ger-
man people there has been a mental and political struggle
between what I have called the Frederician (the Prus-
sian) and what I have called the Theresian (the Austrian)
sections. This may be compared with the struggle that
goes on in a child's mind between the paternal and the
maternal elements a struggle which, as character
develops ultimately leads to the formation of a (new)
unity. The concept 'German' contains, and transcends,
both the Frederician (Protestant) and the Theresian
(Catholic) elements, wherein is mirrored all the multi-
plicity of the tribal souls that have respectively contri-

59

FEDERALIZATION OF GERMANY

buted to the over-riding concept * German 9 , without
having, so far, completely merged their identity in it.

Considered from an evolutionary standpoint, 'Prus-
sian 5 signifies the fateful domination of a partial element
over the whole, and is analogous to what is seen in
pathology when a cancer results from an excessive and
boundless proliferation of certain local cells, that master
(and destroy) the organism to which they belonged.

Politically, therefore, the development of Little Brand-
enburg into Great Prussia represents the growth of a
cancer threatening the life of the German body as a
whole, and it is a development which must be checked
at all costs if Germany, and Europe, are to be saved.
For it lies in the very nature of the doctrine 'might is
right 3 , a doctrine which forms the heart of the Prussian
mystery, that it should know no limits. That was why
Brandenburg grew into Prussia; Prussia into Great
Prussia, which struts as Germany in the belief that
Great Prussia will grow into the Continental Empire that
would like to strut as Europe.

We Germans must ourselves overcome Prussia, We
must overcome it territorially, economically, and spiritu-
ally; for only when we have done so will New Germany,
will New Europe, become possible.

2. FEDERATION OF THE PROVINCES

The fundamental principle of German organization is
the federative principle, based upon the German tribes
which have for ages been rooted in their respective terri-
tories, refusing to merge and willing only to federate.

The political structure of the millenniary German Reich

60

FEDERATION OF THE PROVINCES

has been based upon this federative segmentation, upon
the voluntary collaboration of all the tribes, upon the
organic union of its territories.

This teaching of a great past was rendered inaudible
by the clamour of Prussian propaganda. Force replaced
voluntary collaboration. The various territories, instead
of being given a chance to develop as they respectively
wished, were compelled to c toe the Prussian line'.

The territorial subdivision of Prussia must precede the
federalization of Germany., whose territories (like the
Swiss cantons) are tribal settlements, historical and
economic units, which form voluntary collaborators in
the German Reich.

Put more concretely, this signifies the re-establishment
of the 'Landschaften' or provinces of Rhineland, Hesse,
Hanover, Thuringia, Saxony, Brandenburg, etc., in place
of what now constitutes Prussia; the re-establishment of
the provinces of Swabia, Franconia, Bavaria, etc., in
place of what now constitute Wurtemberg, Baden^
Hohenzollern, Bavaria in a word, the territorial sub-
division of Germany into about fifteen provinces repre-
senting political, cultural, tribal, and economic units.

These provinces, having on the average not more than
about five million inhabitants each, would enjoy rights
of local self-government rather more extensive than those
of the Swiss cantons. As do the cantons, each province
would control its own government and its own popular
assembly; and (this is most important) all its functionaries,
from president to postman, would be natives of that par-
ticular territory. The aim should even be to make sure
that the federal officials assigned to any province should
as far as possible be natives of that province.

61

FEDERALIZATION OF GERMANY

The territorial disintegration of Prussia would thus be
supplemented by the destruction of the extant centralized
administrative apparatus which is one of the most power-
ful weapons of Prussian power politics. This would be
replaced by the federal administrative apparatus of the
respective provinces, which in its turn would be localized,
with the greatest possible amount of self-government and
democratic State-control.

The c German Reich 5 would thus veritably become a
league of substantially independent cantons, whose joint
instruments, the federal government and the popular
assembly, would be reinforced and controlled by the
body of provincial presidents. It may be taken as a
matter of course that Berlin would cease to be the capital
of the Reich. I myself think there is a good deal to be
said in favour of Ratisbon.

The details of the political structure of New Germany
will be considered in Part Three of this book.

Suffice it for the moment to insist that the destruction
of Prussia, the reconstitution of the provinces which
during the last century and a half have, one after another,
been 'gobbled up' by Prussia, the subdivision of Germany
into a league of federative provinces, are to be regarded
as indispensable preliminaries to the upbuilding of New
Germany.

It is heart-rending today to read an account of the
disputes between the Allied statesmen and those of Ger-
many that followed the surrender of November 1918.
An utter lack of psychological and historical knowledge
on the part of the former was supplemented by the
stupidity and weakness of the latter, with the result that
behind the mask of the Weimar Republic to begin

62

SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION

with, and behind the mask of Hindenburg and Hitler
subsequently, the power of Prussia became firmly
re-established, to resume the lost game after the lapse of
twenty-one years.

If those who will be responsible for the peace that will
some day follow this war want to put an end to the game
for ever, they must remember that there is only one way
of doing so:

Not by the disintegration of Germany, but by the
partition of Prussia.

3. SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION

The demand for the 'partition of Prussia 5 would be
not more than half complied with if the term were to
mean only a territorial subdivision and the destruction
of the centralized administrative apparatus.

The roots of Prussian power are quite as much social,
economic, and psychological; and without the destruc-
tion of these roots it will avail little to divide the stalks
and pluck the leaves, or even to pick the fruit.

The social power of Prussia is based upon the squire-
archy, the power of the junkers. These, numbering
18,688, own 16.7 % of the land used in Prussia for agri-
culture and stock-raising. This is more than one-quarter
of the land so farmed, the rest being farmed by the small-
holders, the peasants who comprise 4,500,000. The
feudalist caste of the Prussian junkers, the big landowners,
form the pillars of the Prussian State, Prussian militarism,
and Prussian power politics.

Without the social and economic overthrow of the
junker caste, without depriving the Prussian junkers of

63

FEDERALXZATION OF GERMANY

their power, there can be no lasting partition of Prussia,
and therefore no New Germany.

Far be It from me (a conservative as well as a revolu-
tionist) to deny the strength, the value, and the signi-
ficance of this sustaining stratum for the origin and
existence of Prussia, and during a certain phase of
Germany no less. Every people needs a sustaining
stratum, and no one but an intellectual out of touch
with the actualities of life can fail to see the notable
part that has been played by the aristocracy as the
sustaining stratum of the nation.

But every sustaining stratum, every aristrocracy, must
comply with the demands of the time. The French
noblesse was slower to recognize this than the English
gentry had been, and that was why the French noblesse
fell before Danton's revolution, whereas the English
gentry survived Cromwell's revolution. The Prussian
junker caste does not understand the situation in the
least Neither in 1918 nor in 1933 did it hear the call of
the time, but hid as pusillanimously behind the mask
of Hitler as it had hidden behind the mask of Ebert,
caring only to keep its social and economic power and
seizing any chance for carrying on its reactionary policy.

If, therefore, we wish to make an end of Prussianism,
we must deal radically with these representatives of
political reaction.

This means that the great estates will have to be
divided up, and that monopolist industries must be
nationalized.

For side by side with the Old Prussian estate of
junkers or great landowners, there came Into existence
after the foundation of the Bismarckian Reich (which,

64

SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION

under the device of the Weimar Republic, transformed
Itself more and more Into Great Prussia),, the New
Prussian estate of heavy industrials, represented towards
the last by Krupp and Thyssen, much as the junkers
were represented by Wangenheim and Oldenburg-
Januschau.

It Is possible, nay probable, that Influential circles In
England and France, having sympathy with the Prusso-
German social strata that will be hit hard by such
measures, will regard the plan as unduly revolutionary,
not to say c bolshevlk ? . The main argument here must
be a political one. The sympathizers must be shown that
unless we strike at the roots of the great landowners 5 and
heavy industrialists 5 power, It will be impossible to make
an end of Prussia and Prusso-German imperialism.

It will be necessary, however, to show that this
expropriation Is not to be effected without compensation,
nor yet in favour of the State or of any kind of State
socialism, but only in favour of self-governing economic
corporations in the industrial domain. (This matter,
likewise, will be more fully discussed In Part Three.)

My rejection on principle of any kind of bolshevlsm
(and of the Marxism on which it is based), together
with my Insistence on the maintenance of individual
rights, creative initiative, and the pursuit of economic gain,
must protect me against an erroneous interpretation of
my demand for the subdivision of great landed estates
and the nationalization of monopolist industry.

Whoever recognizes the truth of the saying 'Property
makes free 5 , whoever affirms the necessity for a sus-
taining stratum in any satisfactory social order must
look forward to the new order which will aim at the

E 65

FEDERALIZATION OF GERMANY

deproletarianizatlon of the people, and at our liberation
from the social and economic monopolies under whose
harrow no sort of freedom is possible.

4. DEMOCRACY OF THE VOCATIONAL

ESTATES

The picture of the far-reaching structural transforma-
tion requisite to establish the New Germany (a transfor-
mation which would have taken place even without
this war because it would have come as the completion
of the revolutionary changes that have been going on
since 1918) would be unfinished did it not disclose the
fundamental democratization that is essential to intra-
European collaboration.

For Wilson in 1918, and Chamberlain and Daladier
in 1939, rightly insisted that the new condition of
Europe, which must be and would be the outcome of
the war, could only be lasting if it were based upon
democratic freedom and self-government.

But when we say this, we must not forget Germany's
experiences from 1918-1933 in the matter of what was
called formal democracy; nor the way in which the
western powers, under the pressure of the necessities
of war, have been compelled to make many changes in
the machinery of democratic government.

It must be added that in Germany since Hitler seized
power it has become impossible to grant equal rights in
any sense to the totalitarian parties of the Nazis or the
Bolsheviks; and, on the other hand, that under the
hitherto prevailing form of party democracy it would
be impossible to refuse them these equal rights; and,

66

DEMOCRACY OF VOCATIONAL ESTATES

finally, that the social and economic dethronement of
what have heretofore been the leading strata must
somehow be ensured under the future form of democracy
(read c popular government').

All these considerations join forces for the rejection
of party democracy in the New Germany, and for the
acceptance of the democracy of the vocational estates.

Those acquainted with the internal development of
Germany may be glad to discern here the old ideas of the
councils' system which in 1918-1919 the masses of the
people vainly urged the petty-bourgeois social demo-
cratic leaders to work for. (From the first at that time
the traditional forces of Prussian-Germany were power-
fully operative among the petty-bourgeois social demo-
cratic leaders.)

Today, when the party of Hitlerism and Bolshevism
numbers many millions, every keen observer of German
conditions will agree that nothing but the elimination of
all parties and the inauguration of a democracy of the
councils and the estates can create the new form of
democracy that is essential both for home and foreign
affairs.

Once more I am only dealing here in outline with a
matter that will be more fully discussed in Part Three of
my book; and the fact that the program was drafted
in the years 1930 and 1931 should convince my readers
that the proposals were based upon the then situation
of Germany, and have not arisen out of the actual
position of the belligerents.

The basic maxim of this new form of democracy runs:
self-government by the estates, and their direct control
of the political administration.

67

FEDERALIZATION OF GERMANY

There are two routes along which this goal will be
reached: first by the construction of a comprehensive
organization of persons engaged in all vocations, in five
councils of manual workers, peasants, employees and
officials, manufacturers and traders, and members of the
liberal professions.

Secondly the people at large will secure its share of
power through joint chambers of estates which will be
set up in every district, every province, and last of all in
the Reich, to become a determinative factor in adminis-
tration and legislation.

This system of popular representation based upon
direct and indirect elections, representing in the councils
the economic interests and in the vocational estates the
political popular interests, seems to be the only way of
avoiding in Germany, not only any return of the reaction,
but also any revival of the Nazi and Bolshevik party
movements.

5. THE NEW SPIRIT

No political, social, and economic methods of organi-
zation would be of permanent value, unless this work
were crowned by the deliberate inauguration and
cultivation of a new spirit.

This spirit of the New Germany must and will be a
repudiation of the belief that might and force should
regulate the social life of mankind. There must and will
be a recognition, both in substance and in form, that
voluntary collaboration is to be the basis of human
society.

Force or voluntary collaboration? that is one of the

68

THE NEW SPIRIT

fundamental matters about which this war is being
fought. The answer can only be collaboration, both
national and international.

In Germany this new Spirit (which was as clearly
foreshadowed by Herder, as the spirit of William II and
Hitler was foreshadowed by Hegel) is most clearly
manifested by the passionate repudiation of the idols of
the totalitarian State, and by the whole-hearted accep-
tance of Christianity with its doctrines of the freedom
and dignity of the human soul.

In defiance of the Old Prussian prophets of State-
hegemony and the modern German advocates of race-
hegemony, the spirit of the West proclaims the fathership
of God and the sonship of man of all men and
Insists upon the dependence of all human institutions
(the State not excepted) upon the Law of God.

We fully recognize that the polarity Emperor-Pope,
State-Church, represents the very essence of Europe,
which cannot be removed, cannot be dispensed with,
without destroying the spirit and the soul of Europe.

Freedom of the spirit, of belief, of conscience, are the
foundations of Europe, and New Germany would cut
itself away from Europe should it fail to proclaim them
and to respect them.

No less Important as fundamentals of this European
spirit of the New Germany, are the Independence of the
press, of science, and of art, which must be free from
any sort of State interference or social monopolization.

Education and the school should have no other aims
than to promote the development of free personalities,
to foster the growth of frank and great souls. They will
best do this by ensuring the unrestricted development of

69

FEDERALIZATION OF GERMANY

the divine soul, thanks to which each of us, after his
kind and according to his powers, can fulfil himself,
and thus sing the praises of the Creator who fashioned
his soul as it is and no otherwise.

The diversity of human beings, the differences among
them in quality and value, their varying powers and
their varying tones, are intrinsic. All that education
can achieve is to foster the beauty of the tones given out
by each soul, so that when sounding together they can
produce the harmony that will guarantee inward and
outward peace,

6. RENUNCIATION OF MILITARISM

Such an avowal of a new spirit would be an idle
declamation unless it had prompt political consequences.

For the New Germany, one of these decisive results
would be the renunciation of Prussian militarism both
on principle and as a form of organization.

Unquestionably in foreign parts the idea of Prussia
was embodied, not so much in the knowledge of any
philosophy she might proclaim, as in an experience of
what use she made of her highly developed militarism.
Her practice counted for more than her precept, were it
only because of the sinister consequences of her practice.

In this connexion we must on no account forget to
allow for two decisive facts: first of all that, as a famous
historian has said, the nineteenth century was pre-
eminently the age of imperialism, and therefore mani-
fested a distinctive political structure that was by no
means confined to Prussianized Germany; secondly that
militarism had become a strange epidemic phenome-

70

RENUNCIATION OF MILITARISM

non, an epidemic malady of the now unbelieving souls
of European human beings.

No less notable a man than Masaryk, a great statesman
and philosopher (whose pupil I may take this oppor-
tunity of again declaring myself to be) recognized this
phenomenon, and described it as follows:

'Modem militarism, especially Prussian militarism, is,
considered scientifically and philosophically, a system
of objectification a panic flight on the part of morbid
subjectivity and suicidal mania . . . When Sombart, in
the Hegelian manner, extolled German militarism, and
bragged about fighting in the trenches beside Faust and
Zarathustra, he did not realize how he was condemning
German and European civilization as drenched with
blood. What else is the war-making of modern civilized
human beings than a panic flight from the anxieties that
arise in the c ego 5 of the superman. That is why, as
regards bellicosity, the intellectuals are as bad as, or
worse than, the agriculturists and the urban workers.
. . . Modern man suffers from a morbid suicidal impulse,
from the fatigue and the anxiety that result from his
spiritual and moral isolation. Militarism represents the
superman's attempt to escape from this malady, which
it really aggravates. In the nation of thinkers and
philosophers there is the largest percentage of suicides;
that nation has the most highly developed militarism,
and it was mainly responsible for the world war. 3

Masaryk had good reasons for emphasizing this
characteristic feature of contemporary Europe; and he
pointed out as the crowning 'sin' of Prussia that there
the spiritual malady of modern Europeans had been
promoted into an ideal and a system.

71

FEDERAL I ZATION OF GERMANY

The German people, more subject than any other to
this spiritual malady and suffering from it In its worst
form, taking to heart Clemenceau's profound remark that
the Germans' chief danger is their being In love with
death, must do their utmost to seek a cure.

A radical and lasting cure can only come from a
religious revival, can only come from their giving a new
significance to life by Internal freedom and devotion to
Christianity,

Prussian militarism must be overcome; In the spiritual
field by a new ideal of life, and in the practical field by
a new military organization.

In the last section I mentioned the philosophical aims
of education and the school. To these must be added
the practical aim of drafting and exercising a new ideal
of life. The hysterical heroism which has been adopted
as the ideal of life in Hitlerian Germany, must be
shown to be what it is, must be condemned and rejected
as deceptive, as a swindle, as a denial of the truth of
life.

The joy of life, the Song of Songs whose strophes must
be unfailingly sung to an impoverished, proletarianized,
mechanized, and nihilistic mankind, will be the best
prophylactic of the epidemic disease of suicidal impulse
and militarism. When people have grasped the fact that
schools of cookery are much more important than schools
of politics, and that the amount of laughter which can
be heard is the best indication of the quality of their
political and economic institutions, the spirit of mili-
tarism will have been definitively overcome.

But in practice It will most promptly be overcome by a
change In the prevailing military system.

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A WORD ON THE JEWISH PROBLEM

In accordance with my conviction of the diversity of
human beings and of their right to self-determination,
I hereby declare myself absolutely opposed to universal
military service.

In the first program of the Black Front we de-
manded that army duty in Germany should be a volun-
tary affair; and this, not least, because thereby would be
facilitated the new joint military system of a general
European army such as a European Federation will
need.

But if (and this will be one of the main topics of dis-
cussion at the coming Peace Conference) such a joint
military system cannot yet be established by the United
States of Europe, there will remain for our model the
Swiss militia system, which maintains universal service,
but wherein the origin of any form of militarism is
rendered impracticable by the most carefully devised
democratic safeguards.

Between the two possibilities, between a small pro-
fessional army under European control and a militia
army after the Swiss model, the New Germany will have
to choose as the basis of its future military organization
of course in cooperation with the Peace Conference.
Neither scheme would leave any scope for Prussian
, militarism.

7. A WORD ON THE JEWISH PROBLEM

Theoretical and practical considerations make it
expedient to add a few words about the problem which,
since the rise of the Hitler System, has become a world-
wide problem, and one whose settlement will be an

73

FEDERALIZATION OF GERMANY

urgent topic at the Peace Conference. I refer to the
Jewish problem.

In various parts of my Deutsche Revolution and in
numerous articles in the international press I have
expressed the utmost disapproval of the shameless and
inhuman anti-Jewish campaign that has characterized
the Hitler System; and I may also mention that as early
as 19283 in a party periodical, I protested editorially
against antisemitism of the Streicher brand, voicing the
war-cry, 'Antisemitism is dead. Long live the idea of
the People! 5

This advocacy of the idea of the People logically
implied the disavowal of any valuation of peoples or
nations as good or bad, as better or worse, since they
all have equal rights, equal needs, and equal duties, in
accordance with the will of the Creator, who gave each
of them its own kind, its own nature, and its own tasks.
This profound respect for organic life, and the fact that
it is necessary for us and incumbent on us to recognize
and maintain human dignity, imply that it will be an
unconditional part of the social and political organiza-
tion of New Germany to maintain the equal rights of all
human beings.

Yet this fundamental principle of equality must not be
considered to invalidate the organic law that the peoples
and nations are fundamentally different, with the result
that they urgently need differences in their social and
political institutions a fact which every government
is bound to take into account.

In practical politics, therefore, there arises the problem
of national minorities, whose relations to the national
majorities in any area may present difficulties not local

74

A WORD ON THE JEWISH PROBLEM

merely (as in Germany, for instance), but pertaining to
Europe as a whole. Speaking generally it may be said
that a comprehensive and just solution will only be
possible within the framework of the European Federa-
tion,, where the simultaneous interests of almost all the
European peoples, whether as States or as national
minorities, will ensure that whatever legal arrangements
are made will be universally regarded as just, and will
therefore be faithfully adhered to.

But since this desirable joint solution will need time
to achieve. New Germany will have meanwhile to set
to work by herself to solve the problem of national
minorities (and therewith the Jewish problem) in that
modern spirit which will pay due regard both to the
organic laws of ethnical differences and to the moral
laws according to which all human beings have equal
rights. Politically considered there are three alternative
solutions:

(1) Persons of different racial origin from the majority
may be described as foreigners.

(2) Groups of persons of various racial stamps may be
deemed to constitute national minorities.

(3) Persons belonging to different stocks may be in-
corporated into the main body of the nation by assimila-
tion.

All three methods are equally possible and equally
honourable, with the urgent proviso that every adult
person of another stock than that of the majority must
himself or herself have full right to decide which method
to adopt.

As a matter of principle, there is no difference between
the general treatment of the problem of national

75

FEDERALIZATION OF GERMANY

minorities and the treatment of the Jewish problem. If
the latter is separately considered here, this is because
the peculiar way in which the question has presented
itself makes separate consideration expedient.

I recommend the above tripartite approach to the
matter as regards the Jews, because the formulation is
not the outcome of any fine-spun theory, but is grounded
upon the actual circumstances which must form the
basis of any new settlement of the Jewish problem.

(1) The category of foreigners emerges from the fact
that of late years there has been a widespread develop-
ment of the movement known as Zionism, which should
be supported by all 'nation-conscious' persons and
peoples as a genuine endeavour for the renovation of
Judaism.

(2) The category of national minorities corresponds to
the political fact that European Jewry has been domiciled
in Europe for many centuries, and in each country
rightly regards itself as belonging to that country,
though it does not wish to forsake its own national
religion and its own national peculiarities.

(3) The category of assimilation is nevertheless (despite
Hitler and his materialistic racial theory) a datum of
the position of the Jews in Germany and the rest of
Europe, in conformity with the accepted humanist
doctrine that every human being is entitled to liberty
and self-determination a, doctrine which New
Germany will unhesitatingly accept. Although we do
not deny our biological subordination to blood, race,
and nationality, we must emphatically proclaim that
the human spirit is privileged and competent to over-
come this subordination, and, as knowledge and choice

76

A WORD ON THE JEWISH PROBLEM

may decide, to adopt the present and future views upon
these matters.

It is likely enough that the preponderant majority of
German Jews will prefer to belong to the Jewish
commonwealth. Among these there will doubtless be
many who in former days were antagonistic to Zionism,
and perhaps even now are by no means wholly recon-
ciled to it, but will lose their scruples when they become
aware that as Jews, as members of the Jewish common-
wealth, they can still remain united to Germany while
preserving a Jewish stamp inasmuch as the Jewish
national group will be incorporated into New Germany.
This very fact,, their permanent incorporation into
Germany, will distinguish them from the Jews, say, of
Palestine or Poland not in substance, but in many of
the forms of life.

Of course this incorporation into Germany is funda-
mentally diverse from the complete assimilation that
will occur in the case of those belonging to the third
category. These latter will have to abandon Judaism
as a national religion, and will have to give this and other
guarantees of their determination to become Germans
in every respect. (Consider here the demands which
every modern State tends more and more to make of
alien elements that are to be incorporated and fully
assimilated.)

Of decisive importance as regards this question of
the political treatment of minorities (including the Jews)
is it that there should be established a State Department
of National Minorities whose head must be a member of
the government, and would automatically become the
representative of the national minorities of his country

77

FEDERALIZATION OF GERMANY

in the League of Nations (and in due course in the
European Federation) . Inasmuch as he would naturally
be chosen from the largest national minority, this
minister of State would in Germany obviously be of
Jewish blood a fact which would indicate the sound-
ness of the proposed solution, and would have an
excellent effect both at home and abroad.

CHAPTER THREE

PROBLEMS OF THE PEACE
CONFERENCE

I. PRELIMINARIES TO PEACE

THE previous sections have been concerned with questions

that will become urgent when the war is over, and the
way in which these questions are answered will be
decisive as to the kind and the duration of the peace that
will ensue. They are questions that will primarily have
to be solved by the Germans themselves. Their con-
nexion with the present war lies mainly in this, that the
war was in great measure launched by Hitler and his
henchmen in order to frustrate the solution of these
intra-Gerrnan and economic problems.

But the world-public at large will not be so much
exercised about intra-German problems as about
problems that have to do with the relations between
Germany and her neighbours. These latter are
problems that have been raised by the war, and their
discussion, before all, will be the topic of the peace
negotiations.

Immediately, therefore, we reach the crux of the
matter. Will the blunders of Versailles be avoided, or
will they not?

The brilliant French historian, Jacques Bainville,
whose work on the Treaty of Versailles [Les consequences
politiques de la paix y Paris, 1920] is today valued as a

79

PROBLEMS OF PEACE CONFERENCE

prophecy that has been fulfilled, joins the German
critics of the peace conditions of 1919 though for other
reasons than the Germans. Whereas the Germans
consider Versailles to have been unduly harsh, Bainville
deems it too lenient and both parties seem to have
been justified by the results.

The fact was that the most urgent problems were
then very little understood, so that those who had to
solve them were not ready for their task. Old and new
outlooks, superficial and profound discussions, sound and
unsound methods, were grotesquely Intermingled, with
the unfortunate consequence that, far from reinforcing
one another, they cancelled one another out.

The Peace of Versailles, like those dictated at Brest-
Litovsk and Bucharest, was a nineteenth-century and
not a twentieth-century peace. But the peace that
follows the present war must give a new visage to
twentieth-century Europe.

Without for a moment ignoring the material demands
for general security which Germany will have to satisfy
in order to atone for her complicity in Hitler's outburst
of violence (an atonement whose effects will be more
lasting, the more thorough and the more enduring the
German repudiation of the Hitler System), the coming
peace must be designed with an eye to the future of
Europe, to averting the evils that stand in the way of the
true pacification and the trusty collaboration of the
peoples of our continent.

This peace must embody:

(1) The principle of liberty, of independence, of self-
determination for all nations, large or small

(2) The principle that right, not might, shall prevail

80

PRELIMINARIES TO PEACE

in ail nations,, both in their domestic and in their foreign
affairs.

(3) The principle of joint security, joint wellbeing,
and joint culture.

These same principles must likewise secure expression
in the preliminaries to the peace., and in the methods by
which it is approached.

On the German side an essential will be that the
Germans must repudiate on principle Hitler's unwar-
rantable use of force, and the conditions that have
resulted therefrom. Without such repudiation there can
be neither armistice nor peace.

The repudiation of Hitler's unwarrantable use offeree
will imply the immediate evacuation by German troops
of all the non-German areas they may have occupied,
and a pledge to pay compensation for any damage they
may have done.

This re-establishment of right as against might will
not be a part of the peace, but a preliminary to peace,
and a main constituent of the agreement for an armistice.

The peace itself, if it is to deserve that name, must not
be the upshot of a dictatorship, but of comprehensive
negotiations, not only between Germany and her
adversaries, for the neutrals great and small must par-
ticipate in them, probably choosing the United States
and Italy as their representatives. A sort of Vienna
Congress will have to debate and adjust the interests
and wishes of the peoples of Europe, and elaborate a
harmony, bearing ever in mind the great commonwealth
of Europe and the salvation of the West.

81

PROBLEMS OF PEACE CONFERENCE
2. THE GERMAN PARTNER

It becomes necessary here to consider a question
which also involves matters of principle. Who will
represent Germany at this Peace Conference?

Those who have read my book thus far will see
plainly enough that it cannot be an envoy from a masked
or modified Hitlerian government, nor yet from a
'government of generals', but must be someone des-
patched by the government of the German Revolution.

For a successful revolution against Hitler before the
military collapse of Germany will not only be the decisive
contribution of the German people to the cause of peace,
but also the requisite proof of the genuineness and
durability of a change in the political structure of the
country.

Upon this will not only depend (for the most part)
the readiness of the Allies to make a just peace; for
nothing else can guarantee that the world has not to do
with an act of despair on the part of the German people,
or with an attempt at camouflage on the part of the
Prussian militarist stratum, but that Germany is honestly
animated by the constructive will to upbuild a New
Germany and make a voluntary contribution to a New
Europe.

If we do our best to ascertain what are the forces
and the personalities that can be expected to make the
German Revolution, and afterwards to represent
Germany at the Peace Conference, we shall be glad to
find that within Germany they are far stronger and more
unified than is obvious or than people outside Germany
suppose.

82

THE GERMAN PARTNER

This depends mainly upon the fact that the political
medley of those who comprise the mass of German
refugees in foreign parts does not constitute a proper
reflexion of the internal situation of Germany, or of
what is taking place there.

The fact that thousands of human beings have fled
from a region devastated by earthquake does not create
any sort of spiritual unity among them. That is why to
refugees, to those who were constituents of a political
order that has been overthrown, there clings an odour
of Goblenz [a rendezvous of emigres during the French
Revolution a century and a half ago]; why they always
seem to be persons 'who have learned nothing and
forgotten nothing'.

A few only of the German emigres, who in mind at
least have remained youthful, have had energy for self-
knowledge, have been able to go on learning, so that
they have been able to place themselves at the front of
the coming German Revolution. Not all of them are
working outside the frontiers of the Reich. Nor are they
merely to be regarded as the vanquished of yesterday.
They are the revolutionaries of tomorrow. They have
fought, and continue fighting, not only against yesterday
(the Weimar Republic), but against today (the Hitler
System) .

If, bearing these facts in mind, we study the forces
of the German Revolution, we encounter a front which
manifested itself several years ago in Germany, being
then named after its most noted leaders the Schleicher-
Strasser-Leipart Front.

Some of the high officers of the armed forces, consisting
of bchleicher (the 'socialist general 3 ) and his intimates

83

PROBLEMS OF PEACE CONFERENCE

had, animated by a close acquaintance with the dangers
of the situation, broken with the junkers (when the
Eastern Aid scandal became notorious) and with the
great capitalists (Hugenberg and Thyssen), and made
successful advances to the revolutionary socialist youth,
whose spiritual leader was Holler van den Brack and
whose chief organizer was Gregor Strasser. Together
they sought and found a way to the anti-bolshevik but
socialist workers who, led by Leipart, had ready in the
trade unions the foundation stones for a new future.

To the old powers of Prussianized Germany this
alliance of modern officers with the revolutionary youth
and the solid elements of the working-class seemed so
desperately dangerous that they were resolved at all
hazards to smash it; and Hindenburg, the Prussian, with
his whipper-in Oldenburg-Januschau, the junker, re-
placed the revolutionary group of Schleicher, Strasser,
and Leipart by the reactionary group of Papen, Hitler,
and Hugenberg - with the foreseen (and desired) result
that instead of an immediate internal revolution there
came, in due course, a war across the frontiers.

But the forces of the German Revolution which then,
in the end of 1932, could still be strangled (largely
because of the irresolution and muddle-headedness of its
leaders), have grown stronger, not weaker, during the
seven years of Hitler's rule.

I know (from direct acquaintance and active par-
ticipation) that the Front of these identical forces has
ripened and become more lucid, and that out of it will
proceed the German revolutionary government that will
overthrow Hitler and create the New Germany.

Its task at the Peace Conference will be far from easy,

8 4

THE AUSTRIAN QUESTION

and one to which there Is a solitary parallel In history
Talleyrand's task at the Congress of Vienna. Talley-
rand., having betrayed Napoleon but being a great
French patriot, saved his country at Vienna, where they
believed him when he assured them that Napoleon was
not France nor France Napoleon,, though for fourteen
years Napoleon had compromised France even as for
seven years Hitler has compromised Germany.

New Germany hopes that the "Geneva Congress of
1941' will have as much Insight into the actual state of
European affairs as the Vienna Congress had In 1814;
but that Geneva will excel Vienna doubly in courage to
dig down the problem to its very roots; and in a will
directed ahead towards the rebirth and the future of the
West.

3. THE AUSTRIAN QUESTION

One of the first and chief matters to be discussed at
the Peace Congress will be the Austrian question.

1 know well how complicated it is, too thickly set
with thorns - with a thousand hopes and fears, wishes
and grudges, expressed and unexpressed for any sort
of simple and easily acceptable solution to be possible.

On the other hand, I must have made so abundantly
clear my invincible persuasion of the inalienable right of
individuals and nations to self-determination, that I am
sure no reader will expect me to believe any valid reasons
could be adduced against the exercise of that right in
this particular case.

New Germany will therefore proclaim the right of
the Austrian people to decide its own future by means

85

PROBLEMS OF PEACE CONFERENCE

of an absolutely free and uncontrolled popular vote or
plebiscite.

As a matter of course this involves the cancellation of
the results of Hitler's conquest, i.e. that only men and
women who were Austrian citizens before the German
invasion will be entitled to vote. In like manner, the
popular decision, at a time and in conditions to be pre-
scribed by the Peace Conference, will have to be taken
under international supervision and control, and not
under the auspices of any government that may be in
power there at the time of the plebiscite.

Finally (and this is in my view an essential feature of
all such popular decisions) it is better to avoid having a
simple alternative, and to have as large as possible a
plurality of questions submitted for consideration.

It seems to me that as regards Austria there are three
practicable issues:

(1) Joining the Germanic Federation.

(2) Independence of the Red-White-and-Red

Schuschnigg Austria.

(3) Re-establishment of the Black-and-Yellow Habs-

burg-Austria, either as a personal union with
Hungary, or as a Danubian Federation con-
sisting of Austria, Hungary, and Czecho-
slovakia.

I shall venture no prophecy as to what would be the
outcome of such a plebiscite, and shall content myself
with affirming that in any case New Germany would
abide by the plebiscitary decision of its Austrian
brethren.

Joining the Germanic Federation must on no account
be confounded with the 'Anschluss 5 to Hitlerian

86

THE AUSTRIAN QUESTION

Germany, or with the 'Anschluss 3 to the Weimar
Republic of which there was talk at one time. As
previously explained, New Germany will be federal in
structure throughout, will be a league of autonomous
provinces, and from its size and population Austria
would have a considerable say in the Federation. I have
said that it must be a firmly established principle of the
federal constitution that all officials in a province must
be natives of that province, so that in Austria only
Austrians would rule and function, in Bavaria only
Bavarians, in Rhineland only Rhinelanders. Thus a
strong safeguard of the federal structure would be the
direct interest of the local intelligentsia in their own
locality.

A Red-White-and-Red Austria would seem thereby
to be outclassed in respect of the chief points in its
program. Besides, the experiment of St. Germain has
shown very clearly the weaknesses of such a scheme
though we must remember that the problem of a larger
economic area could be solved within the framework of
the European Federation. A decisive matter here, how-
ever, will be the question of the time-lag, for the Austrian
problem will demand prompt solution, whereas in the
most favourable circumstances there is likely to be con-
siderable delay in getting the European Federation into
working order.

The re-establishment of Habsburg Austria, whether
in the direct form of an Austria-Hungarian double
monarchy or in the indirect form of a Danubian Federa-
tion, presents itself almost as a matter of course, and
would find many supporters among the western powers.

In conformity with my principle that the Austrians

87

PROBLEMS OF PEACE CONFERENCE

(like any other people) should enjoy the right of self-
determination and be left to settle their own affairs, I
must point out that the re-establishment of the Habsburg
realm is primarily a concern of the Austrian, Hun-
garian, Czech, and Slovak peoples. Secondly, the
demands of Jugoslavia, Rumania, Poland, and Italy for
security would run counter to any such re-establishment,
and these countries might be expected in this matter to
have a more lasting pull at the Peace Conference than
would the Austrians, Hungarians, Czechs, and Slovaks
in respect of their right to self-determination. Anyone
who recalls the terms of the oath which had to be taken
by the wearer of the crown of St. Stephen, will feel that
there might be some justification for uneasiness on the
part of the neighbours of a re-established double
monarchy.

In whatever way the Austrian problem might be
formulated, and no matter what solution might seem
most accordant to the feelings and interests of those
concerned, it remains indubitable that the decisive
matter must be the right of self-determination of the
people of the country, with due regard to its neighbours 3
sense of the requirements for their safety.

4. CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND SUDETENLAND

This basic principle will guide us, not only as regards

the settlement of the Austrian question, but also as
regards the no less important problem of Czecho-
slovakia and Sudetenland.

Early in this chapter, on page 81, I declared that an
essential preliminary to peace negotiations must be an

88

CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND SUDETENLAND

evacuation by the German troops of all the non-German
areas they may have occupied, and a pledge to pay
compensation for any damage they may have done.
This applies unconditionally to all regions which prior
to 1938 formed part of Czechoslovakia.

It would be unwarrantable for New Germany to
appeal to the Munich Agreement of September 1938
on the ground that it was Voluntarily' signed by the
Czechoslovak government,, for the signature was really
extorted by threats and by force, and the agreement
brought nearly a million Czechs under foreign (i.e.
German) rule.

But no settlement can be sound if it deprives the
Sudetenland Germans of their right to self-determina-
tion.

Here the application of the principle will need special
safeguards if we are to avoid fresh injustices and the risk
of further disturbances.

So much intermingled are Germans and Czechs in
Sudetenland, that there a vote by districts rather than a
general counting of heads will be expedient. Nor must
the existence of 'national enclaves 5 be made a pretext for
arbitrary treatment of surrounding majorities of the rival
stock. There may have to be local migrations, or some
favoured treatment of minorities. The matter is touched
upon in the section on the Jewish problem (p. 73 and
foil).

Since we have expressly recognized, and must un-
failingly continue to recognize, that when a people's
right to self-determination is being fulfilled, due regard
must always be paid to its neighbours 3 sense of the
requirements for their safety, the definitive solution of the

PROBLEMS OF PEACE CONFERENCE

Sudetenland problem will mainly depend upon how far
the Czechoslovaks feel that their security will be guaran-
teed by New Germany. Upon the extent of this sense of
security will depend the importance that the future
Czechoslovakia will attach to a strategic frontier on the
German side of their country.

This will, in its turn,, be largely decided by the general
solution of the Czechoslovak problem, by the boun-
daries of the country and its internal construction.
Primarily these are matters for the Czechs and Slovaks
themselves; secondly, especially as regards the question
of boundaries, they are matters for the Peace Congress.
As far as New Germany is concerned,, that country will
certainly consider a large and healthy Czechoslovakia to
be a most important pillar of Central European order,
and also as a welcome partner in furthering German
economic life and in keeping Germany in friendly touch
with the Western Slavs.

The Czechs, thanks to the conspicuously European
trend of their minds, the admirably democratic organiza-
tion of their government, and their highly developed
science and economic system, seem the predestined in-
structors of the Ruthenians and Ukrainians, as is
manifest from the great achievements of Czechoslovakia
in promoting the civilization and the cultural develop-
ment of Carpathian Ruthenia.

The payment of reparations by New Germany to
Czechoslovakia (and Poland) is a matter of obvious
justice; the assessment of their amount will be a matter
for enquiry and negotiation.

Inasmuch as Czechoslovakia and Poland will both
desire prompt settlement of accounts, whereas Germany

90

POLAND, DANZIG, THE CORRIDOR

after Hitler is not likely to have much cash or credit
available, the only practicable way of raising funds
would seem to be by an international loan, the bulk of
which would probably be subscribed in the U.S.A.
The most likely way of extracting payments from
Germany would be for that country to establish a
tobacco monopoly whose profits would be ear-marked
for the payment of interest on the loan and the instal-
ments of amortization. Direct control of the business
side of the monopoly by representatives of the creditors
would provide the necessary guarantees of course
with due regard to political and psychological suscepti-
bilities.

5. POLAND, DANZIG, THE CORRIDOR

A bigger affair, and one even more vital to the per-
manent re-establishment of Europe, will be the manage-
ment and the solution of the Polish problem. Not only
because the present war broke out in relation to Poland,
thus showing clearly where c the shoe pinched 3 , but also
because the future peace of Europe turns more upon this
matter than upon any other.

Can a mutually satisfactory arrangement be made to
reconcile the conflicting interests of the Germans and
the Poles? If not, if the 'open sore' between Germanism
and Slavism cannot be healed, there can be no lasting
peace in Europe. For so long as the sore remained
open, how could any Peace Congress make sure that
after another twenty-five years the workers and peasants
of France, the inhabitants of Canada, South Africa, and
Hindostan, might not again take up arms to intervene

91

PROBLEMS OF PEACE CONFERENCE

in a war between Germany and Poland or between
Russia and Poland?

The looming of such possibilities, regard for the
interests of Europe at large, and (even more) considera-
tion for the joint interests of Germany and Poland, make
it possible to discover here also a way out of our diffi-
culties that will be compatible with the rights and the
wants of both peoples, and with the provision of guaran-
tees for the safety of the (comparatively weak) Poles.
Immediate evacuation of the parts of Poland occupied
by German troops, and a recognition that a war
indemnity is due to Poland, will be favourable prelimi-
naries to a settlement, and the offer of German help for
the liberation of Eastern Poland may facilitate matters.
The Germans must be prepared to expect that at
the Peace Conference demands will probably be voiced
for the incorporation of Danzig and even East Prussia
into the future Poland.

Apart from the consideration that this would be a
fundamental violation of peoples' right to self-deter-
mination, such an assignment of territory would
inevitably tend to perpetuate a hereditary feud between
Germany and Poland.

Seeing that the evacuation of nearly four million
Germans from East Prussia would involve widespread
misery, and that there would be enormous difficulties
organizational and other in clearing the regions along
the Baltic that have been forcibly colonized by Germans,
it Is most unlikely that any scheme of this quarrelsome
character will be adopted by the Peace Congress.
Besides, no conceivable German government could be
found to accept it.

92

POLAND, DANZIG, THE CORRIDOR

More difficult is the question of the Corridor. Here
two vital interests are in conflict: the German interest
in direct contact with an outlying portion of the Reich;
and the Polish interest in a route to the sea.

The recognition that both these interests are vital
makes a solution all the more urgent. In order to avert
causes of unceasing friction. To begin with, the Germans
must admit that for them the only vital matter is the
part of the Corridor which ensures direct communica-
tion between Pomerania and East Prussia.

Although the region in which the two nations have
conflicting vital interests is thus relatively small, this does
not make the conflict any easier to evade, for the proposal
to have c a corridor through the corridor 3 is but a verbal
artifice which gives no practical satisfaction.

A solution only becomes possible when we Include
the Baltic States in the domain of the matters at issue
between Germany and Poland, and this will have the
advantage of also helping us to solve the extremely
difficult Vilna problem.

New Germany will recognize, not only Poland's right
to exist, but also that Europe needs a great and powerful
Poland.

Poland, the eastern guardian of Europe, the 'limes' of
Christendom, must enjoy the material strength and
position requisite for the performance of these duties.
The cooperation of Poland with the minor Baltic States
of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, not only makes it
possible for these three European outposts which live under
the menace of Russia to be sure of autonomy and of
Independent development, but also gives Poland her best
chance of attaining a broad sea-front on the Baltic,

93

PROBLEMS OF PEACE CONFERENCE

The juxtaposition of the three petty States to Russian
military and naval positions convinces us that their
freedom can only be guaranteed by their having the
protection of a 'big brother 5 like Poland; and we may
be sure that the Poland of the future will carefully avoid
the chief error of the Poland of the past, and will
eagerly adopt the federative idea.

Enough! New Germany will feel impelled, both for
moral and material reasons, to undo the partition of
Poland of which Hitler has been guilty. New Germany
will therefore offer Poland her help in regaining Eastern
and Southern Poland. We may be sure that no Polish
government will renounce Bialystok, Brest-Litovsk,
Przemysl, and Lemberg; but we must also consider it
unlikely that Moscow will have any inclination for the
voluntary surrender of its plunder.

In this matter, too. New Germany will be able to
offer the most direct and concrete proof of her determina-
tion to make good in the field of reparations. The offer of
military aid in regaining Eastern and Southern Poland
will do more than the payment of indemnities in hard
cash to manifest a complete change in the relations
between Germany and Poland, and will react upon the
negotiations for Danzig and the northern end of the
Corridor. True peace can only be established by respect
of the vital interests and the sense of honour of individuals
and nations.

6. THE BOLSHEVIK PROBLEM

Several times already in this work I have touched on
the problem of Russia, which is greatly complicated by
the Bolshevik problem.

94

THE BOLSHEVIK PROBLEM

Happily what the latter signifies has of late been made
clear and become generally recognized thanks to the
close political, military, and economic ties between
Nazism and Bolshevism.

Bolshevism is a deadly peril to Europe a peril which
within Europe must be overcome, and on the eastern
edge of Europe must be made to keep its distance.

The intra-European conquest will be substantially
achieved by the overthrow of Hitler and the partition of
Prussia (which is an appendage to Russia) .

Keeping Bolshevism at a distance on the east of
Europe will be one of the most vital tasks of the Peace
Conference, and will necessitate radical measures for
safeguarding European peace.

The most urgent matter here is to keep Bolshevism
away from the Carpathians, and this can be only success-
fully achieved by extirpating Bolshevism from Europe.

The fulfilment of that purpose, however vital it may
be to Europe at large, does not and must not infringe the
vital interests of the Russian people.

Anyone well acquainted with the history of Moscow
and Russia will discover there evidence of a process akin
to that which has gone on in the history of Prussia and
Germany - a part has by force made itself master of the
whole, and even made itself master of extensive foreign
regions. No one can deny that White Russia and
Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, and the lesser peoples of
the Caucasus, were only subjugated by Moscow through
the use offeree, often after decades of struggle, and that
they have never abandoned the longing for freedom.
Lenin himself was aware of this, and therefore gave these
foreign nationalities at least a formal autonomy which

95

PROBLEMS OF PEACE CONFERENCE

his Caesarian successor has steadily reduced. I do not
feel competent, nor do I regard it as essential to the
matter in hand, to discuss whether and how far these
subjugated nationalities still aspire to independence and
crave for a reunion with Europe. If they do, I am
passionately convinced they have a right to be freed,
and I should deem it one of the basic duties of a genuinely
European Peace Conference to bring to these remote
brethren the light of freedom and independence.

Especially as regards White Russia and Ukraine, it
would seem that upon the comparatively advanced
Western Slavs (the Poles and the Czechs) devolves the
fraternal duty of introducing into the European family of
nations their so long oppressed and therefore backward
Slav brethren the White Russians and the Ukrainians.

This would notably enlarge the buffer regions of
Europe on the Bolshevik side; it would supply the highly
industrialized nations of Europe with an internal
colonial' market for their wares; and it would furnish
western capital with lucrative opportunities for invest-
ment. Besides these obvious advantages, we must like-
wise remember that the position of Europe in general
as a region for agricultural production would be greatly
improved; and that there would also be a better chance
than there is now for collaboration with Japan,
which would find her anti-Bolshevik safeguards thus
strengthened.

7. IMPORTANCE OF THE WESTERN
SLAVS TO EUROPE

I am deliberately stressing, not only the need for
compensating Poland and Czechoslovakia by the pay-

96

IMPORTANCE OF WESTERN SLAVS

ment of substantial reparations which may in some
measure make good the injustices they have suffered, but
also the fact that these peoples and their States are of the
utmost importance to the European community.

Two leading motives are at work here.

First of all, by strengthening the position of the Slavs
in Eastern Europe we shall give the less numerous
peoples of Western Europe the sense that they have a
counterpoise on the other side of the Germans in Central
Europe.

Secondly, when insisting upon the indisputable right
of the Western Slavs to be enrolled on an equal footing,
I desire to point out the gains that will ensue for the
economics, the politics, and, not least, the culture of
Europe.

As regards the former point, Tomorrow's Germany
would be so little afraid of being 'encircled 5 by Latins
and Slavs on the west, south, and east, that she would
gladly accept the maintenance of old alliances by France,
or the formation of new ones, as advantageous to the
European Federation (or to the renovated League of
Nations), inasmuch as that would make an end once
for all of alarms about possible attempts to establish
German hegemony. Since the Latin peoples outnumber
the Germans and are stronger, since the Anglo-French
alliance will assuredly continue after the war, and since
the Western Slavs (more especially if the White Russians
and the Ukrainians are freed) will rapidly gain impor-
tance and influence in Europe there would be an
admirable equipoise between Latins, Germans, and
Slavs, so that any racial predominance in Europe would
be excluded.

G 97

PROBLEMS OF PEACE CONFERENCE

As regards what Europe would gain by Incorporating
the Western Slavs on equal terms, in the long run the
cultural advantages would be even greater than the
political and economic. This is obvious, and has already
been expounded. The most outstanding political gain
would be the extinction of Panslavism, a movement no
less dangerous to Europe than Pangermanism. For
Panslavism gives the Asiatic power of Russia (under the
mask of Bolshevism no less than under the mask of
Tsarism) an opportunity for interfering in the problems
and disputes of Europe. During the last twenty years
there have been numerous examples of this.

The cultural gain, finally, cannot be over-estimated.
Anyone who has had even a glimpse of the cultural
treasures of the Czechs, Poles, Slovaks, Croats, Serbs,
and Bulgarians, will be convinced that the older nations
of Europe will find in them fountains of youth whose
healing waters are essential to the renaissance of the
West.

To those who take such an outlook it will seem that
the Bolshevik-induced homelessness of the Rumanian,
Bulgarian, and Serb Orthodox Churches (like that of the
Greek Church, which has also been robbed of its pillars)
is an excellent thing for Europe, to which it wholly
restores the last of the children that were influenced by
Moscow Byzantium.

98

CHAPTER FOUR

EUROPEAN FEDERATION

I. A EUROPEAN CIVIL WAR

THE historical demonstration that in the war which
began at the close of August 1939 the trigger was pulled
by the Hitler System's will-to-power (behind which
stood the traditional Prussian imperialism), and by the
Bolshevik will-to-power (mainly inspired by the Pan-
slavist tendencies of Tsarism), must be supplemented by
an account of the ideological character of the war, which
gives it the aspect of a European Civil War.

For the fact is that in every country, throughout
Europe, there is a party opposed to the official policy of
its own land: in Germany no less than in France; in
Finland no less than in Portugal; in Ireland as well as
in Rumania. No matter whether this internal opposi-
tion is large or small, whether it is evoked and sustained
more by Hitlerian propaganda or by Bolshevik ideology,
no one can deny that the war is substantially ideological,
is a 'war of religions 5 in which the adversaries are not
nations but groups of zealots. This is typical of civil war.

American observers, with the advantage of distance,
have plainly discerned this characteristic of the war,
comparing it with the American War of Secession, in
which political and economic differences were doubtless
at work, but which was essentially an ideological war,
and for this reason procreated the U.S.A. in its present
form.

99

EUROPEAN FEDERATION

The recognition that the war is really a civil war,
that it is ideological or almost religious in type 5 finds
expression in the hopes of the peoples and the avowed
aims of the belligerents.

Hitherto in this book I have been expounding the
hopes and aims of the German people as follows:

Liberation from the dominion of the junkers, the
generals, and the great capitalists by the establishment of
a socialist and economic order.

Liberation from the dominion of Prussia by a league
of the German tribes within the framework of a free
Germanic Federation.

As regards the hopes and aims of the whole 'European
Party 5 in this c Civil War 5 , there remains a third to
mention:

The transformation of Europe into a league of free
nations.

For centuries the poets and imaginative writers of all
the peoples of Europe have been dreaming of this unity,
the best thinkers have contributed to the idea, and during
the terrible years from 1920 to 1940 the economists have
again and again been forced to admit that their plans
will remain fruitless so long as 'Europe' does not really
exist.

Notable persons, among whom Axistide Briand and
Count Coudenhove-Kalergi should be especially men-
tioned, have made admirable efforts in this direction,
achieving important preliminary advances, but the
peoples still lag far behind these bold pioneers.

Only of late, in the theoretical disputes that preceded
the Civil War, and in the ideological clarifications which
it has promoted among all the peoples, have widespread

100

A EUROPEAN CIVIL WAR

aspirations for unity arisen, a knowledge of its impor-
tance, a longing for collaboration, and a will to bring it
about. The Pangermans' recent and present attempts
to achieve the conquest of Europe, with the consequent
revival of memories of the earlier attempts of Napoleon
and Charles V, have made it clear that no one nation in
Europe is strong enough to subjugate all the others and
establish a United European Empire modelled on the
Roman Empire of old.

The torrents of blood in which the originators of such
schemes have been or will be drowned will not have been
poured forth in vain, should the peoples of Europe learn
thereby that they are all members one of another, not
as servants of one nation or one man, but with equal
standing as members of one family, as voluntary con-
stituents of a European Federation.

Maybe, so far, in my disquisitions on the need for
European unity, I have not sufficiently emphasized the
federal idea, which was uncongenial to the centralist
trend of the nineteenth century. Noteworthy in itself
is the fact that we now speak of a European Federation,
and have dropped the term Taneuropa 5 . The federal
scheme is equally essential to the successful solution of
numerous political,, economic, and cultural problems
both within the various States of Europe and within
Europe itself.

When, therefore, I now proceed to discuss certain
practical tasks that will devolve upon the European
Federation, they are all to be considered on the provisos
of interconnexion, equality of rights, and voluntariness
which must be the pillars of every federation.

101

EUROPEAN FEDERATION

2. GUARANTEES OF SECURITY AND
DISARMAMENT

Before I begin a sketch of that European Federation,
a picture of which must loom in the minds of all the
soldiers (whether they are aware of it or not) as the aim
of the sacrifices they are making, let me turn back to the
practical political question of the guarantees for security
upon whose provision will depend fruitful negotiations
for the establishment of a new order in Europe.

Between us and this new order stands the war, the
extent of whose sacrifices is still uncertain, but whose most
immediate aim cannot but be the c never again 5 of the
attacked nations, which will only enjoy tranquillity
when guarantees of material security have been fur-
nished, and only then be ready to discuss far-reaching
plans.

For the very reason that New Germany appreciates
this psychological attitude and admits it to be justified,
and for the very reason that New Germany is assured of
the need for permanent collaboration and ardently
desires it, New Germany will be perfectly willing to
provide the requisite guarantees.

In my account of the prerequisites for an armistice, of
the federalization of Germany, of the democratic and
socialist reconstruction of Germany within, and of the
radical destruction of Prussian militarism which of old
has guided Germany's attitude towards her neighbours,
I have already expounded the most important of the
guarantees that will be given by New Germany.

Even more conspicuous, however, and therefore able
to have a greater effect abroad, will be Germany's

IO2

SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT

decisive adoption of the principle of equal rights directly
peace is signed.

New Germany will agree to the destruction of the
Siegfried Line under the supervision of British and
French experts while agreeing to the maintenance of the
Maginot Line!

New Germany will likewise agree to France's main-
taining her present alliances, both during and after the
establishment of the European Federation, whereas
Germany will promptly denounce her alliance with
Italy and Japan. Finally New Germany would be pre-
pared to renounce the ownership of Heligoland, and
this would involve a marked increase in the security of
the western powers as against Germany.

The status of the Belt and the Sound will urgently
need consideration under the same department. Hitler's
successful subjugation of Denmark in April 1940 with-
out striking a blow has shown how impracticable it is
that the keys of the Baltic should remain c in the hands
of a child 5 . Whether this question can best be settled by
the incorporation of Denmark into the British Empire,
or by the establishment of British fortresses in the
'Gibraltar of the Baltic 3 will be matters for enquiry and
negotiation. In one or other of these ways, guarantees
would be provided against future attacks by Germany
(or Russia), and enhanced protection would be secured
by Poland.

But the most decisive guarantee of general security,
and the only one which could content all the European
peoples, would be a general agreement to disarm.

Apart from the political question of security, we
are here concerned with the economic and financial

103

EUROPEAN FEDERATION

argument that unless there is a notable restriction
of armaments bankruptcy or impoverishment will
be general among the States of Europe. We have
merely to imagine what will be the condition of national
finance everywhere when the war draws to a close,
and we shall see that collapse and pauperization can
only be avoided by reducing to a very modest fraction
the milliards that have of late been squandered on
armaments.

But such a comprehensive reduction will only be
possible if there is a general agreement to disarm jointly
and simultaneously, the process being subjected to
reciprocal control.

The carrying out and the control of disarmament will
be the concern of a sub-committee of the Peace Confer-
ence. Enough here to say from the German side that
within the general staff a number of officers must
mutually exercise the control, for experience has shown
that effective control must be from within.

The climax of this reciprocal disarmament on the part
of the nations of Europe would be the creation of a
composite European army.

Its national constituents eould be so constituted as to
give the European peoples a hundred-per-cent guarantee
of security as against one another. Britain, for instance,
might supply the aviation contingent; France, the heavy
guns and the tanks; Germany, the light artillery and the
infantry; Poland, the cavalry; Czechoslovakia, the
pioneers. The neutral States, especially Spain and Italy,
would for the time being only undertake a systematic
reduction of their national armies. The formation of this
European army would be an additional and extremely

104

POLITICAL COLLABORATION

important factor of security, and the defensive capacity
of Europe as a whole would not be in the least

Impaired.

3. POLITICAL COLLABORATION

Our earnest desire for a European Federation and our
determination to establish it must not blind us to the
immense difficulties that will have to be overcome.
In my view the chief reason why so little support has
been given to any of the plans hitherto mooted has been
that they were all designed from a ready-made picture
and paid too little heed to extant national institutions
moss-grown with antiquity and deeply rooted.

In contrast to these plans, of which new variants are
published almost every day, I myself (true to my con-
servative principles) start from the conviction that all
historical processes need a considerable time to ripen.
I am also guided by the general experience that amal-
gamations had better begin with the minimum, for then
we can be sure that as time passes the attachments will
become firmer and more numerous.

To every advocate of the notion of a European
Federation which in 1940 must surely include all
thoughtful Europeans can be earnestly commended a
study of the British Commonwealth. There we have: a
minimum of coercion, a maximum of freedom; due
regard for diverging local interests and respect for national
susceptibilities; the maintenance of time-honoured insti-
tutions, even though they are often inconvenient; the
avoidance of undue levelling, and instead a deliberate
preservation of national or local manners and customs.

105

EUROPEAN FEDERATION

In a word 5 the amalgamation is to be made effective
without thereby sensibly or visibly altering the previous
methods, rules, or ways. Here is the best recipe for the
establishment of a European Federation.

To demand at the outset the establishment of a federal
government, a federal executive, and the like, would
only raise needless difficulties, perhaps amounting to
impossibilities. (Once more I say, look at the British
Empire.)

At the start, of course, the European Federation can
only be a voluntary union of European States, access to
which will be open to every European State that com-
plies with the prescribed regulations. It will be advan-
tageous to the Federation to make membership a thing
to be coveted by every European State.

Among the conditions of membership will be that the
candidate State must be subject to the reign of law, both
in home affairs and in foreign relations; it must recognize
the arbitral powers of the Federation; must participate
in the Permanent Court of International Justice at The
Hague and in the (renovated) League of Nations, and
in any international institutions established by these.

The most important feature of the Federation, and at
the same time the chief advantage of membership, will
be the collective security of the members, as maintained
by their reciprocal guarantees and by their mutual
pledges to combine in order to resist an attack made from
without upon any member of the Federation.

The enormous advantages, alike political, military,
and financial, of having a joint armed force are so obvious
that the members of the European Federation will
establish one sooner or later, even though to begin with

106

ECONOMIC COLLABORATION

it may take a more traditional form than the one
sketched above, having specifically distinct national con-
tingents.

The relations of the European Federation to the
League of Nations will be mainly determined by the re-
construction of the latter in the sense of a worldwide
representation of continental groups.

4. ECONOMIC COLLABORATION

Much closer (and therefore doubly attractive to out-
siders) can be economic collaboration. It is likely to be
developed forthwith - and experience teaches that joint
economic advantages form the strongest cement for
social cohesion.

The gradual abolition of all customs barriers upon
free trade; the discontinuance of insistence upon pass-
ports and other hindrances to freedom of movement; the
systematic cultivation of international economic and
financial relations; unified currency systems; the joint
performance of mighty schemes such will be the chief
methods of economic collaboration among the States that
will be members of the European Federation, and the
resulting advantages will be so overwhelming that any
sceptical or hesitant outsiders will soon be eager to join.

Collaboration of the national economies within the
European Federation will help to guard the members
against c trade crises', an effect that will be strengthened
by the unity of labour laws and labour-protection
schemes throughout the Federation.

Important contributions thereto will be made by the
increasingly unified action of the economic aggregate of

107

EUROPEAN FEDERATION

the European Federation in world-politics and upon the
world-market.

Additional possibilities for economic collaboration will
be provided by the facilitation of freedom of traffic and
trade, the open chances the citizens will have for settling
in one another's countries, the assimilation of their
respective systems of weights and measures and of
coinage, unified customs tariffs as against non-members,
a common policy as concerns stocks and shares, and
what not.

Of course it is likely enough that there will be varying
grades of collaboration among the members, such as
have been begun of late between England and France.
Here, too, the principle of the utmost flexibility is more
important than the principle of the utmost unity.

5, CULTURAL COLLABORATION

The most obvious of all the features of the Federation
will be, and should be, the cultural collaboration of its
members.

Among the peoples of Europe, which have too long
been spellbound by narrow national ideas, it is time to
revive an awareness of their historical and cultural
assocation.

Nothing will contribute more to this awakening than
a knowledge of the national peculiarities of the various
peoples of Europe, for that will make them respect one
another, and take pride in the multifariousness of the
West, inasmuch as variety is not only the charm of
Europe but its very essence.

A noble rivalry of national spirits and national arts,

1 08

CULTURAL COLLABORATION

an 'Olympiad of the mind 5 , should be inaugurated to
bring together the peoples of the European Federation
through regular publications and other suitable arrange-
ments, as a supplement of the physical Olympiad revived
at Athens in 1900, and rightly regarded as one of the finest
examples of international collaboration.

Appropriate to the cultural collaboration of the mem-
bers of the European Federation would be that they
should manifest their interdependency in their educa-
tional systems, and tolerate nothing that might run
counter to it. A good thing would be to have a special
committee appointed to attend to such matters, and
exercise a censorship over schoolbooks. In science, also,
there should be close collaboration; and the arts of
various countries should fertilize one another, as they
could effectively do through the instrumentality of a
European Academy.

The increasing importance that is being attached to
the work of the Churches would also help to promote
awareness of cultural collaboration, for the spirit of
Christianity is the most fundamental bond of the unity
of the West.

109

CHAPTER FIVE

THE COLONIAL PROBLEM

EVEN within this sketchy account of the Problems of the
Peace Conference and of the European Federation it is
desirable to consecrate a section to the colonial problem,
for the Conference will certainly have to consider the
German claim to colonies. Furthermore the treatment
of the colonial problem will give a crucial example of
the new spirit that will be essential to the establishment
of a new order in Germany and in Europe.

Speaking generally, the colonial problem must not be
solved, either for Germany or for the other European
States which have or desire colonies, in such a way that
the limited (and for various reasons dwindling) colonial
areas can ever again change masters in consequence of
an intra-European war.

There must be an entirely new attitude towards this
problem, and that will entail a new solution.

The first essential is to recognize that nowadays the
colonial problem is mainly a problem of raw materials.
Subordinate to this are such questions as that of economics,
settlement, fields for investment, etc. Last of all come
questions of prestige and national security.

Such a view of the colonial problem will steadily gain
ground with the establishment of a new political and
economic order in Europe, and the consequent growing
solidarity of the European peoples.

New Germany, for instance, will not claim that she

no

THE COLONIAL PROBLEM

has more right to colonies than other States, such as
Poland or Czechoslovakia. The arguments that Ger-
many might advance on behalf of being put in possession
of colonies might be advanced with equal force by other
European countries that have no colonies.

Inasmuch as a perennial struggle for colonies (whose
size and lucrativeness cannot be indefinitely magnified)
must be rendered impossible, a new sort of solution must
be found, and this is that certain regions of Africa shall
be jointly administered by the European States which
hitherto have had no colonies.

To avert the suspicion that such a formulation may be
a cloak for a predatory campaign on the part of the "have-
nots 5 against the 'haves 5 , and also to facilitate the accept-
ance of the scheme, it must be clearly understood at the
outset that England, France, Italy, and Spain the chief
colonial powers of Europe - will deliberately stand aside
as possible beneficiaries. (The same consideration applies
to the non-African colonies of the other European
powers.)

Thus the scheme would apply to the former German
colonies in Africa and to the African possessions of
Belgium and Portugal. These large, valuable, and still
for the most part undeveloped, areas would be placed
under the joint administration of all the European
powers, with the exception of the four great colonial
powers previously named.

With this end in view, the European States other than
those purposely excluded would jointly from a 'European
Colonial Company 5 (E.C.C.) to which each State would
subscribe funds proportional to the number of its inhabi-
tants. Investments, administrative posts, and possi-

iii

THE COLONIAL PROBLEM

bilities of settlement would be allotted pro rata to the
various States that had formed the E.C.C., subject to
adjustment every decade in accordance with the census
returns of the nations concerned. Any national quota
not taken up would be open to the public on loan, but
here also subject to decennial revision and recall.

The European Colonial Company would pledge itself
to respect the rights of the previous owners or man-
dataries of the regions it would take over.

To the previous owners or mandataries must, above
all, be assigned a ninety-nine year right to the returns on
the basis of the average yield of the last ten years.
Furthermore the E.C.C. would guarantee the main-
tenance of existing material and personal rights,
especially the tenure of their posts by extant officials,
military officers, and subordinate soldiers for life or
while fit for service^ previous rights to pensions, etc,,
being scrupulously preserved. The appointment of new
officials would only be made as needed, once more pro
rata. Military officers and subordinate soldiers would be
appointed as vacancies arose, but there would be no
increase in the staffs as they existed on December 31,
1938.

The E.C.C. would also guarantee that the flags that
had flown over the respective territories should continue
to fly there, but would have the right of hoisting its own
flag beside the other; it would continue to use whatever
had been the official language in any locality, but with
the right to use a second official language as well, should
this be expedient anywhere for administrative purposes.
Thus all the administrations would be placed on an
equal footing.

112

THE COLONIAL PROBLEM

Future officials and settlers would attend, to begin
with, a course of study in colonial schools to be set up
In the respective countries of Europe, and the teaching
in these would be unified as far as possible.

The E.C.C. would lay especial stress upon the ad-
vancement of the indigenes of the colonies, regarding
itself as their guardian; and when the natives developed
they would., as far as possible, be associated in the work
of administration.

The E.C.C. would endeavour to make with the great
colonial powers agreements that would be to their mutual
advantage. The great colonial powers would also be
entitled to join with the E.C.C. in the furtherance of all
or some of the latter's possessions.

New Germany would be prepared to assign uncon-
ditionally to the E.C.C. all its own colonial rights, even
its most recent ones, for it would regard the formation of
this body as a just and generally satisfactory solution.

It seems important to point out that the joint cultiva-
tion of interests within the E.C.C. would have favourable
repercussions upon the political collaboration of the
various States; and that the great civilizing work that
would be associated with the effective opening-up of
Africa would give a powerful impetus to economics and
science and be most beneficial to the youths of Europe.
Having great duties to perform makes people young,
vigorous, and cheerful. That is what Europe needs.

H

CHAPTER SIX

WAR AIMS

SUMMARIZING the ideas hitherto expounded, we can make
the following list of war aims:

(1) Overthrow of Hitler and Hitlerism.

(2) Annihilation of Prussian power politics by the
federalization of Germany.

(3) Restoration of liberty to the Czechoslovaks and the
Poles.

(4) Reparations to be paid by Germany to the Poles
and the Czechoslovaks.

(5) Right of self-determination for the inhabitants of
Austria, Sudetenland, and the Danzig region.

(6) The safeguarding of France by the destruction of
the Siegfried line while the Maginot line remains intact.

(7) Joint defence against the Bolshevik peril.

(8) General disarmament under reciprocal control.

(9) Expansion of the Anglo-French economic alliance
into an economic collaboration of Europe at large.

(10) The establishment of a European Federation
within the framework of a renovated League of Nations.

The foregoing Teace Aims of New Germany 5 are
primarily dedicated to the German people, which less
than any other Is in a position to grasp the nature and
meaning of this war, or to understand its outbreak and
its course. Seven years of propaganda have clouded the
minds of Germans within the Reich; seven years of the

114

WAR AIMS

Hitlerian Reign of Terror have in part intimidated them
and in part coarsened them. Nevertheless I am sure that
the feelings and thoughts of the German people will
endorse these Peace Aims; and that the German people
wants to take part in the upbuilding of a New Europe
which it longs for no less ardently than do the peoples of
other lands.

The latter should be convinced by these proposals that
Tomorrow's Germany will be ready to give the requisite
moral and material guarantees to show the eagerness of
the German people to be incorporated in New Europe.

I know that the dead of the war of 1914-1918 and
the dead of the war of 1940- bequeath as their
supreme legacy:

the upbuilding of a New Europe.

115

PART THREE

THE NEW ORDER

STRUCTURE OF GERMAN SOCIALISM

CHAPTER ONE

PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS

I. INTRODUCTORY

IN contradistinction to the hitherto prevailing liberal and
mechanistic views, we start with the belief that a people
or a nation is an organism, a living body, with definite
peculiarities of a corporeal, mental, and spiritual kind.

From this it follows that to the history of a nation there
applies the eternal law of organic life, the 'die and
become 5 , a biological compulsion to pass along the
inevitable road from the cradle to the grave, from the
apple-seed by way of the fruit-bearing tree to the dead
wood. This application of biological laws to the course
of national life does not invalidate the metaphysical
premises of fate and of the activity of God any more
than our knowledge and recognition of the inevitable
movement of the individual's life from birth to death can
either 'explain' or invalidate the enigma of his having
become a human being or the form taken by his nature.

2. RAGE PEOPLE NATION

If, therefore, we try to explain the origin of a people,

we 1 must never forget that we can do so only within the
limits to which all human knowledge is subject. That is
to say we can only explain it within that causal world
outside or above which we recognize the governance of

119

PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS

the fate that primarily sets causality to work and deter-
mines its trend.

From this outlook we perceive that a people is an
amalgam of various races, even as a child mingles within
itself in definite proportions both maternal and paternal
c raciaF constituents.

To the biological influences of this racial amalgam are
superadded the geopolitical influences of situation
climate, diet, etc.; and, finally, the historical effects of
the dispute one nation may have had with another, of
internal adjustments, of personal ripening, and what not.

Out of these threefold constituents of race, country,
and history, the 'people 5 is formed though we must
again emphasize the limits imposed upon this causal ex-
planation by referring to the becoming, the genesis, of a
human being, whose essential character and form are
outside the domain of causality.

Applying these considerations to Europe (to which
Russia does not belong, never has belonged, and never
will belong), this signifies that the peoples of Europe
have originated out of the same racial constituents (Dr.
Giinther, the famous ethnologist, distinguishes from four
to five primary races in Europe), which in different
countries are mingled in various proportions. In this
fundamentally similar racial composition we discern the
explanation of the typically European or western civiliza-
tion as that of one family of peoples in which the indi-
vidual children (read, 'individual peoples') represent
various minglings of the parents (read, 'races').

To the effects of this varying racial admixture within
the different members of the European or western family
of peoples were superadded the effects of differences in

120

RHYTHM OF HISTORY

the countries they inhabited, thanks to which their
visages were further differentiated; and, finally, the
effects of their respective histories, which even more
strongly influenced the further formation of the various
peoples. As a result has been produced the extraordinary
diversity of the western peoples, which nevertheless all
have, owing to their racial kinship, one and the same
rhythm of western culture, and have all been subjected
to the same vital laws of this family of peoples.

The concepts 'race* and 'people 5 (including family of
peoples, or cultural circle) having been thus explained,
the 'nation 5 obviously discloses itself to be a 'people 5 that
has become more fully self-conscious. A people whose
history has taught it its own specific peculiarity becomes
a nation, which simultaneously presents itself as the ripe
stage, the fully adult stage, of the people which is c at
home' in a specific area. (Compare this with the 'aware-
ness of personality' that ensues in the individual as a
result of his experiences and adventures.)

At this stage of our exposition it will become plain why
Young Germany insists that in the new epoch Inaugurated
by the war of 1 9 1 4- 1 9 1 8 the German people is undergoing
its development into nationhood as the last people of the
western cultural circle; and why Young Germany finds
therein the reason for the repercussion of the German
Revolution upon the whole western cultural circle.

3. RHYTHM OF HISTORY

From the foregoing dissertations it will have become
plain that we accept the validity of Oswald Spengler's
brilliantly formulated law of the rise and fall of the

121

PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS

cultural circle in this instance the western cultural circle;
and that we perceive therein a great law of motion of all
organic life, the law of birth, maturity, and death.

As something essentially new, we supplement this law
of motion which is comparable to the movement of the
earth round the sun, by a second law of motion one
whose manifestations I myself described several years
ago, giving it the name of the Law of Triune Polarity.
Its working may be compared to the rotation of the earth
on its own axis.

Empirical study of the course of development within
the western cultural circle shows certain regularities,
which on closer examination may be systematized as
follows. We discern epochs of constraint or fixity
alternating with epochs of unconstraint or revolution. A
study of dates shows that such an epoch lasts from 140
to 150 years, and is followed by another epoch which
lasts about the same time. Without transcending the
limits of this introductory work, I may point out that the
last three phases of transition were: 1789-1799, the great
French Revolution; 1640-1649, the English Revolution
under Cromwell; about 1500 began the mighty revolu-
tion we call the Reformation (America having been dis-
covered a few years before). Going farther back in
European history we come to such caesuras as 1350
(Hansa, Golden Bull, etc.); towards 1200, etc. Herbert
Blank's book, Schleicher? Hitler? Cromwell? \ published by
the Verlag Lindner (Leipzig, 1932), contains a detailed
account of this 'Rhythm of History 5 .

If we study more closely the ideas and the forms of
these various epochs, we discover the remarkable fact
that we only have to do with two conflicting ideas, two

122

RHYTHM OF HISTORY

opposing poles, between which the pendulum of history
swings unceasingly: the idea of constraint, and the idea of
unconstraint; or, we may say, conservatism and liberalism.

Should we try to transfer into organic life these two
ideas and the change from one to the other, we shall
easily recognize the two main forces of organic life, the
self-preservative impulse and the species-preservative
impulse. The first makes the self, the ego, the second
makes the species, the community of like persons, the
we, into the centre of the universe. The first is the soil
out of which the ego-idea, the second is the soil out of
which the we-idea grows.

It is needless to explain why we identify the ego-idea
with liberalism, and the we-idea with conservatism,
since after what has been said it is obvious that we reject
the attempt to grade their respective values, for we regard
this as non-organic. Just as you cannot say that day is
more valuable than night, or night than day, since each
determines the other, and both are merely the poles
between which the pendulum of the earth's rotation
swings; so you cannot say that the ego-idea is worth
more than the we-idea, or the we-idea worth more than
the ego-idea, that liberalism is preferable to conservatism,
or conservatism to liberalism, since each determines the
other, and they are but the poles between which life
swings on its course from birth to death. A simple com-
parison may make this twofold law-abidingness easier to
understand. Within the law from apple-seed to apple-
tree to dead wood, fulfils itself annually the rhythm of
summer and winter a rhythm whose forms of ex-
pression are chiefly determined by the law of age.

We prove, therefore, that the Ideas' of conservatism

123

PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS

and liberalism continually replace one another on the
visage of a cultural circle, determining the thoughts and
feelings of human beings, and thereby determining the
forms of their life,

In accordance with the three-dimensional character
of all organic life in body, mind, and soul (the bodily
plane representing the relation of human beings to
things; the mental plane, the relation of human beings
to one another; and the soul plane, the relation of man
to God), each of these ideas manifests itself equably and
simultaneously upon these three planes of life. In an
epoch when the c we-idea 5 is dominant, we therefore
observe constraint, conservatism, an economy in which
the we-idea prevails, a social order characterized by
the we-idea, a cultivation of the we-idea; and conversely
when the ego-idea is dominant we notice an economy in
which the ego-idea prevails, a society of the ego-idea, a
cultivation of the ego-idea.

In current parlance (regarding the now declining ego-
idea as characteristic of liberalism) we therefore speak of
Capitalism 5 when liberalism is dominant on the bodily
economic plane; speak of 'individualism 5 when liberalism
is dominant on the mental-social plane (i.e. in the State);
speak of 'materialism 5 when liberalism is dominant
culturally and on the plane of the soul (i.e. in religious
matters) .

This triad of capitalism, individualism, and material-
ism is what we discern as the forms of liberalism that
exist in the receding stage of the western cultural circle.

As contrasted with this triad of liberalism, the we-idea
of conservatism likewise manifests itself equably on the
three planes of life: as 'socialism* on the bodily economic

134

RHYTHM OF HISTORY

plane; as 'nationalism 5 on the mental-social plane (the
State); and as 'popular idealism 5 on the soul-cultural
plane (religion).

This triad of socialism, nationalism, and popular
idealism is what we discern as the forms of conservatism
that exist in the advancing stage of the western cultural
circle.

When we have mastered this basic outlook, w T e find it
easy to perceive the character of the French Revolution,
as a victory of liberalism,, and that of the English
Revolution as a victory of conservatism; for we know
that at about 1500 the liberal idea was becoming
dominant, and that at about 1350 a conservative epoch
was beginning and the differing vocabularies used in
those old days, or the varying forms dependent upon the
different phases of ripeness, will no longer be able to
hide the underlying ideas.

The law of triune polarity not only gives us an entirely
new explanation and appraisement of the past, but also
gives us an appraisement of the present and an inter-
pretation of the future. We perceive that the times are
being fulfilled, for the dominant epoch of liberalism and
its forms (capitalism, individualism, and materialism) is
drawing to a close, and ever since August 1914 the
pendulum of the clock of fate has been swinging towards
a new epoch when conservatism will be dominant in the
forms of socialism, nationalism, and popular idealism,
whose mighty uprise and eruption we call the German
Revolution.

I should like to make It plain that acceptance of these
philosophical foundations is not to be regarded as an
essential preliminary to the approval of the political and

125

PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS

economic disquisitions that follow. But I regarded it and
regard it as incumbent on me, as a matter of personal
decency, to allude, however briefly, to the deeper wells
from which I myself have drawn the constructive forms
I am going to expound, although others may wish to
study these forms for purely opportunist reasons, or may
arrive at the same results in very different ways.

Anyhow I should like to insist that it is of the utmost
importance for everyone who wishes to "play an active
part to have a sound and unified philosophical stand-
point (which for others may seem a mere hypothesis)
all the more because the multifariousness of life will con-
tinually present new tasks c outside the blue-prints 5 ; and
because the performance of these will (consciously or un-
consciously) be facilitated by waters drawn from the
deep wells of philosophy.

4 . MARXISM

It also seemed indispensable to begin Part Three by a
clear statement of the philosophical foundations of Ger-
man socialism, that we might thus early explain the
internal and fundamental opposition of German social-
ism to international Marxism a matter to which
allusion will frequently have to be made in the sequel.
For us National Socialists, of course, there is no question
of Marxism being an invention of c the Jew Marx 5
specially designed to lead the German workers into error
or even into poverty. But for us Marxism is a socialism
both liberal and alien, a doctrine whose liberal factors
necessarily unfit it for the upbuilding of the socialist (i.e.
conservative) future, and one whose program cannot
but involve it in the decline of liberalism. This applies

126

MARXISM

quite as much to the constitutional Marxism of the
S.P-D. (Socialist Party of Germany) as to the 'revolu-
tionary 5 Marxism of the K.P.D. (Communist Party of
Germany), as is shown convincingly enough by the fact
that the S.P.D. is no less hostile to National Socialism
than is the K.P.D.

There was nothing primarily 'wrongheaded 5 about
this liberal alienism. It was simply due to the fact that
the longing for socialism began to find expression at a
time when the ego-idea, liberalism that is to say, was in
the ascendant. In these circumstances the socialist
struggle of the workers had either to face inevitable
defeat (as the Peasants War of 1525 faced defeat because
then, likewise, liberalism was in favour), or else to adapt
itself to the dominant liberal ideas.

Thanks to Marx, Engels, Kautsky, etc. (all typical
liberals both by origin and by nature), socialism took
the liberal path towards alienism, as was plainly shown
by its relation to the International, its class-war tactics,
and its materialist philosophy.

For that reason, and only for that reason, it will be
impossible for Marxism to play a formative role in the
coming development, and for that reason Marxism will
be involved in the decline of liberalism.

The author has intentionally left the above paragraphs
exactly as they were written in 1931 in order to show how
the truth of what he then wrote has been confirmed by
subsequent facts. The catastrophe of the Marxian
parties in Italy, Germany, and Austria in part also in
Spain is only comprehensible when we realize that it
was the fateful consequence of the dying-out of the

127

PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS

liberal idea and of its associated forms. For neither the
differences in strategy as worked out by Marxism in its
two main trends of communism and social democracy,
nor yet the differences in tactics as practised by Marxism
during its death struggles in Germany and Austria, did
anything to save it from its fate.

Moreover, if we contemplate the position of the
Marxian parties in the other countries of Europe we see
that neither in its revolutionary nor in its reformist form
does Marxism play any decisive part in European events,
(In this connexion it is interesting to note that such part
as Marxian parties still play is directly proportional to
their attachment to the nation, and that in accordance
therewith the numerous and welcome attempts at the
renovation of Marxism necessarily start with a renewed
enquiry into the relation between the nation and the
workers.) 1

Nevertheless, in view of the fact that 'Fight Marxism'
has become a modern catchword., it seems to me only
just and decent to point out how much the Marxian
labour movement has achieved on behalf of the broad
masses of the people, and especially to stress the import-
ance of the trade unions.

But a knowledge and an admission of these things
makes it all the more necessary to enquire why Marxism
has been a political failure, and here I am not so much
concerned with hair-splittings about Marxian theory as
with the political practice of the Marxian parties. It is
this which must above all be kept in the limelight during
the investigations which follow.

1 C.f. the book Volk und Arbeiter by Wenzel Jaksch, a German social

democrat of Sudetenland,

128

CHAPTER TWO

GERMAN SOCIALISM

I . THE CRISIS OF CAPITALISM

IN the forefront of every consideration of economics
stands the question of its function. The man of the people
always answers as follows: 'The function of a nation's
economic system is to satisfy all the citizens 5 needs for
food, clothing, and shelter, and to put by reserves for
troublous times.'

Minor details apart, an economic system which does
these things secures the general approval of those whose
bodily needs are thus satisfied.

These considerations explain, not only the existence
and the duration of the liberal (i.e. the capitalist)
economic system, but also its present crisis and its
approaching end. Independently of all anti-capitalist
theories, the capitalist economy would persist (In Ger-
many) if it could continue to perform its task of ensuring
for all Germans a sufficiency of food, clothing, and
shelter. The 'crisis of capitalism', therefore, Is not an
outcome of the socialist movement, but, on the contrary,
its main cause.

For It Is an obvious fact that the capitalist economic
system can no longer perform its function (as above
defined), this being plainly shown by the huge numbers
of the unemployed, the proletarianization of the middle
class, the ruin of the peasantry, and the failure to provide
openings for the members of the rising generation.

i 129

GERMAN SOCIALISM

When within the domain of causality we seek explana-
tions of the breakdown of capitalism, we find that the
three most essential factors of the capitalist economy all
contribute to it equally:

a. The capitalist economic policy of a centralized world-
wide system of production, exchange, and the gold standard,

b. The capitalist economic law which decrees that
c private property is sacred 5 . /

c. The capitalist economic form of industrialization,
mechanization, rationalization, and gigantic enterprises.

It is necessary to indicate briefly the disastrous conse-
quences of these three features of the capitalist economic
system, as prelude to a demonstration of the opposing
trends which must be taken by German socialism.

Our view that capitalism is the economic system of
liberalism is fundamentally distinct from the Marxian
and the Hitlerian (or fascist) views.

To both the latter is attached an appraisement, which
becomes intensified to invectives against the supporters of
capitalism.

Marxism, with its unhistorical way of looking at things,
is further inclined to describe all earlier economic
systems as capitalist, or at least quasi-capitalist, with
which socialism is contrasted as something entirely new.

Thus the Marxians fail to recognize that capitalism is
ideologically linked with liberalism, prior to the dominion
of which there was an entirely different economic system
ideologically akin to socialism, though of course differing
from socialism in form. 1

In like manner the Hitlerians (and' the fascists) fail to

1 Abendldndische Revolution [The Revolution in the West], a recent book by
the Prague social democrat Emil Franzel, is a notable exception, to the common-
place Marxian sociology.

130

THE CRISIS OF CAPITALISM

understand that the ties between capitalism and liberal-
ism are inseparable, and they look forward to destroying
liberalism while keeping the capitalist system intact.

On the other hand the National Socialists, while
recognizing the importance of capitalism because of its
great achievements, are convinced that by internal
causes the system is doomed.

A. Capitalist Economic Policy

Capitalist economic policy is based upon the open
world-market, worldwide free trade, and the international
gold standard. But all three of these principles were irre-
parably destroyed by the war [of 1 9 14- 1918], and from our
'organic 5 outlook the \var was only the expression of a
revolution, not the cause of this revolution. For:

a. During the war the uncivilized and semi-civilized
countries (India, China, South America, North Africa,
South Africa) started gigantic industries of their own;
and when, after the war, the two countries where manu-
facturing enterprise had been longest established, Britain
and Germany backed up by the U.S.A., which during
the war had been transformed from an importing country
into an exporting country tried to supply their old
markets, they were faced everywhere by locally-produced
manufactured articles. These locally-manufactured goods
could be sold much cheaper, because wages were lower,
and nothing had to be added to the prices on account of
freight and customs dues.

b. In connexion with the war, vigorous nationalist
movements began everywhere, especially among the
semi-colonial and wholly colonial peoples. Their nation-
alist struggles for liberty were always linked with

131

GERMAN SOCIALISM

attempts to boycott 'white goods 5 , attempts of which
Gandhi's spinning-wheel is one typical instance, and
another is the universal movement in China against
imported commodities (a movement which went on
regardless of the disturbances resulting from the wars
between the generals). The economic policy of inde-
pendent Turkey took a similar line to those of Persia and
Egypt. Everywhere the struggle for national freedom
continued side by side with a campaign against 'white
goods', i.e. against the capitalism of Europe and the
U.S.A.

c. Another change having important consequences
was in connexion with the Bolshevik Revolution the
disappearance of Russia as a consumer of the goods pro-
duced by the older manufacturing countries. More than
a hundred and sixty million customers disappeared from
the c world-market 5 5 to say nothing of the developing
possibilities of Russia as an exporter.

The world-market, and trade generally, were com-
pletely upset by the cooperation of these and other fac-
tors. Then came the break- away of more and more
countries from the international gold standard, causing
shocks to which the German reparations contributed
jolts of their own.

Since all these causes remain in operation, and from
their nature are likely to act with increasing strength,
there is no prospect that the foundations of capitalist
economic policy will ever again be firmly established.

Although the capitalist world clung convulsively to the
hope that this was nothing more than a transient crisis,
that hope has been cruelly frustrated by the course of
world trade.

132

THE CRISIS OF CAPITALISM

According to statistics published by the Geneva
Bureau of the League of Nations, the trade of the world
as reckoned In milliards of French francs has been:

Tear Imports Exports

1929 813 735

1930 662 586

193 1 55 4*5

1932 3i9 28 5

1933 289 266

1934 273 252

The mighty and successful efforts of Russia and Japan
leave the manufacturing States of Europe (where pro-
duction is more costly) no chance of ever regaining their
old position as exporters; and it has to be remembered
that the U.S. policy of economic isolation. In conjunction
with the Empire policy Inaugurated by Britain at
Ottawa, tends to make matters worse. To the European
States the 'crisis' therefore presents Itself as a structural
one, which can only be overcome by an entire trans-
formation of the economic system.

B. Capitalist Economic Law

The capitalist economic law which decrees that
'private property Is sacred* 3 that c a man can do what he
likes with Ms own', was also completely undermined by
the war [of 1 9 1 4- 1 9 1 8] . In the hearts of the people there
spread a feeling that there was something fundamentally
unjust about a system which repudiated the moral de-
mand for safeguards against pauperization and lack of
bread, which brought about or maintained an anti-
social cleavage of the population into strata of exploiters

GERMAN SOCIALISM

and exploited, and excluded the great majority of the
citizens from any share In the property, guidance, and
advance of the nation. To every individual it became
plain that such an unrestricted right on the part of an
owner c to do what he liked with his own 3 conflicted with
the vital interests of the people, and that there could be
no inner justification for such a right at a time when the
whole nation was being called upon to shed its blood in
the defence of 'property'.

These experiences have made it impossible that the
capitalist law concerning the c sacredness of private pro-
perty 3 should ever again secure recognition from the
German people.

Of decisive significance in this matter Is the distinction
between the goods which can be augmented in quantity
as much as you please, and those which cannot be so
augmented because they are monopolies.

Since the very existence of a people depends upon cer-
tain goods of which there is only a restricted quantity
(land, the raw materials that lie beneath the surface of
the land, and with certain reservations the means
of production in general), people as a whole are directly
dependent upon those who own such monopolies. If the
(capitalist) right of private property Is considered to be
valid as regards these monopolies, then persons to whom
the monopolies 'belong 3 can dispose at will of the life and
death of millions of their fellow-countrymen. The
economic power which thus accrues to the owners of
monopolies is the essential curse of capitalism, and neces-
sarily involves the servitude of the dependent majority of
the population a servitude which radiates from the
economic into the political and cultural fields.

134

THE CRISIS OF CAPITALISM

For no State, however shrewd and honourable those
who manage its affairs may be, can effectively safeguard
the interest of the non-possessing majority of those who
depend for their very lives upon access to and use of the
monopolies, if the legal system of the country recognizes
private property in these monopolies, with the owners'
unrestricted right to do what they like with their own.

Moral and economic causes therefore combine to in-
duce latter-day human beings to repudiate as far as
the aforesaid monopolies are concerned the capitalist
economic law that 'private property is sacred'.

Basically different, on principle, is ownership of the
goods whose quantity can be augmented at will
ordinary commodities of whatever kind. Their owner-
ship (and we shall see later this applies also to money)
does not create any such 'economic power over the non-
possessing 5 , for these latter are not dependent upon goods
that are at any time augmentable, and therefore do not
become the dependents of the 'private owners' of such
goods.

C. Capitalist Economic Form

Lastly the war [of 1914-1918], through the fierce in-
dustrialization that occurred, had a disastrous effect
upon the bodily and still more upon the mental health
of the Germans. Doubts concerning the c victory of
machinery' were intensified by the results of the rational-
ization that took place during the post-war period, pro-
ducing huge industrial undertakings and vast bodies
of unemployed.

Not without effect, moreover, were the results of the
renewed contact with nature which the men at the fight-
ing front had had in the trenches, the youngsters in their

GERMAN SOCIALISM

hiking leagues, and the unemployed in their allotments,
thanks to which, in industrial life afterwards, they all
began to ask themselves whether the great town with its
brick-built dens, the murderous giant factories with their
conveyers, really provided worth-while conditions during
the brief span between cradle and grave.

The feelings of the masses turned away more and more
from the capitalist economic forms of industrialization,
the tentacular towns, and manufacturing technique, and
made the dispossessed more and more insistent In their
demand for new forms.

Therein a genuinely conservative repudiation found
utterance a repudiation of the tendency to overvalue
the technical and other recent acquirements of civiliza-
tion. Herein we have an important distinction from
Marxism, which in these matters, likewise^ shows its
mental kinship to liberalism. (We see signal examples of
this in Russia, where Marxist panegyrics on industrial
development are in high favour, and where the recent
'Stakhanoff Movement 5 reminds us so much of certain
features of early-liberal capitalism.)

To the liberal (and Marxian) ideal of a boundless
increase In production and consumption we contrapose
the conservative (and socialist) ideal of a thoughtful and
cheerful existence, which naturally requires as its founda-
tion a sufficient supply of the necessaries of life, but seeks
and finds its main fulfilment in very different values.

The first thing that emerges from the foregoing dis-
cussions Is the reason why the economic policy, the
economic law, and the economic form of capitalism are
In the throes of a crisis from which no exit can be found;
but we are also introduced to the germs of the trend and

136

ECONOMIC POLICY OF GERMAN SOCIALISM

the kind of economic policy, economic laws, and economic
form that will characterize German socialism.

2 . ECONOMIC POLICY OF GERMAN
SOCIALISM

Arising very urgently out of the collapse of world
economy, world trade, and the gold standard, come the
demands of German socialism for autarchy, a State
monopoly of foreign trade, and a currency standard of
our own.

A. Autarchy

Autarchy, self-sufficiency, I.e. adequate domestic
sources for the supply of raw materials, is a necessary
antecedent to the satisfaction of the main demand of a
socialist national economy the safeguarding of the
food, clothing, and shelter of the community. It is also
the necessary antecedent to national freedom and popu-
lar cultural development, as Is plainly shown to the Ger-
man people by the Issue of the world war. With regard
to food-supply, autarchy must be absolute, w r hereas in
the case of our minimal cultural requirements it can be
and will be relative. We already have the bulk of the
conditions. With the necessary improvements, our agri-
culture and stock-raising could supply a sufficiency of
food for the German people. The most important raw
materials that are lacking (cotton, oil, and rubber), can
in part be replaced by such substitutes as artificial silk
and flax and in part by synthetic products.

Efforts to make our national economy independent of
the rest of the world will be facilitated by simplifying the
lives of our fellow-countrymen. Under the capitalist
system a great many "daily needs' are artificially

137

GERMAN SOCIALISM

developed by advertisement. Simplifying life would not
mean a 'relapse into barbarism 3 , for culture is not de-
pendent upon luxury or upon the gratification of need-
lessly created wants. In a true fellowship no one would
make a to-do about the satisfaction of such needs while
any of his fellow-countrymen were going hungry from
lack of work.

Thus the stress that is laid upon promoting the idea of
autarchy needs certain restrictions but still more does
it need an important amplification.

National autarchy cannot and must not be the last aim
of a socialist economic policy, for we are not concerned
with a Spartan Ideal, but with a Dionysiac ideal, in the
profoundest sense of the term. Consequently this national
autarchy can only be a transitional phase though the
present international situation makes us suppose that it
will be the terminal phase of German socialism. Not
through our own will, but under stress of circumstances
and it seems undesirable that one nation should blame
another for these circumstances.

European autarchy, however, is here deliberately ad-
vocated as the necessary economic policy of German
socialism, since this is essential to the maintenance of the
level of European culture and civilization, and can be
shown to be possible If there is a suitable adjustment of
agricultural and industrial capacities for production and
consumption. Nothing but the establishment and safe-
guarding of European autarchy can make It safe to carry
on a luxury-trade with other parts of the world without
endangering the existence of Europe. For the very
reason that European autarchy Is an aim of German
socialism, and for the very reason that extant political

138

ECONOMIC POLICY OF GERMAN SOCIALISM

and economic data are still obstacles to the reaching of
this aim, the national autarchy of German socialism is
an indispensable antecedent thereto.

B. State Monopoly of Foreign Trade

So far as import of raw materials or luxuries seems
necessary or desirable, the German people will export
some of its own wares in exchange for the requisites,
exporting the produce either of a natural monopoly
(potash, chemicals) or of an artificial monopoly (electro-
plate, expensive machinery, etc.).

The exchange will not be effected in accordance with
the arbitrary wishes of the individual producers, but in
accordance with a plan drafted to suit the needs of the
State, and this will involve the existence of a State
monopoly of foreign trade. Such a State monopoly will
not (as does the Russian) aim at itself conducting the
foreign trade, but will merely supervise, and give licences
for export to such persons as may need them.

Once more it is necessary to distinguish between what
may be the terminal situation of German socialism, and
what may be aimed at beyond it.

In what will probably be the situation of German
socialism to begin with, a national monopoly of foreign
trade will be urgently required. Not merely will the
natural opposition of international capitalism render
indispensable this concentration of all the forces of the
German national economy, but the monopoly will also
suit the needs of a planned economy, without which a
socialist economy is impossible.

Inasmuch as even after European autarchy has been
established, the internal structures of the various national

*39

GERMAN SOCIALISM

economies will differ, when this later condition is reached
German socialism will not be able to dispense with the
monopoly of foreign trade.

The fact that there will only be a monopoly in grant-
ing licences to trade will make it easy to adapt matters
to the various requirements of intra-European and
overseas trade.

Above all it will safeguard and turn to useful account
those incommunicable experiences in foreign trade
which cannot be acquired by any bureaucratic apparatus.

C. A Currency Standard of Our Own
Abandonment of the international gold standard will
be an essential preliminary to autarchy, for so long as the
foreign world can have any influence on our currency
(which is the 'blood 5 of economic life), no really inde-
pendent national economy is possible. As regards the
practicability of our having a currency standard of our
own, it might be enough to point to the German renten-
mark or to the Russian chervonets. But so great is the
interest taken in currency questions that it seems ex-
pedient to make a few general remarks upon the problem
of money and the problem of the gold standard.

The preponderant part that money plays in contem-
porary economic life is due to the circumstance that, in
addition to fulfilling the tasks of being a medium of ex-
change and a standard of value, money is also a com-
modity, being in most countries dependent on gold, a
commodity which is privileged over all other com-
modities by having assigned to it by law a fixed value.
This peculiar commodity-character of money as depen-
dent on gold, and the concentration of the extant supplies

140

ECONOMIC POLICY OF GERMAN SOCIALISM

of gold in the hands of the great financiers, enable these
In all States where gold is current coin, or at least the
standard of currency, to exert a decisive influence upon
the economic life of the States concerned, an influence
whose danger has repeatedly been disclosed by the events
of post-war political life. The commodity money-gold
has, moreover., a peculiar quality which attaches to no
other commodity, namely the power of increasing itself
through interest accruing while it lies idle and its owner
does nothing at all.

This quality of gold is not natural but artificial. The
natural purpose of money is to facilitate exchange.
Money Is (i) a means of exchange, (2) a measure of
value. Since in a large and complicated economic unit,
barter becomes impracticable, the producer sells his
goods, receiving in exchange, not goods of corresponding
value, but a 'certificate 3 , a 'token', of the value of what
he has sold. He accepts this token being confident that
therewith he will be able to buy a corresponding
amount of other goods. He does not primarily wish to
exchange commodities for money, but commodities for
commodities. He will only be able to do this if the goods
he wants are already obtainable or will soon be obtain-
able in the market. Confidence in the purchasing power
of the monetary certificate or token which he accepts,
gives this token its value, makes the token 'current coin 5
(or current notes) . All currency is therefore sustained by
the confidence of the owners of the current coin and of
the mass of goods ready for exchange. If the current
coin Is faced by a suitable quantity of goods, the stability
of the currency is ensured. When goods are scarce,
money depreciates, for a fixed amount of money will buy

141

GERMAN SOCIALISM

less: when there is a glut, money appreciates, for the
same amount of money will buy more. Only in a cir-
cumscribed economic system, where the circulation of
money and the circulation of goods are not exposed to
the influence of outside forces, is it possible to make sure
that the quantity of money and the quantity of goods
shall be in an appropriate relation each to the other. By
the State monopoly of foreign trade we shall be able to
prevent any outside forces from exerting undue influence
upon the quantity of marketable goods, and by having a
currency standard of our own we shall be enabled to
exert a decisive influence upon the circulation of money.

It is necessary here to remind the reader of the differ-
ence between the immediate national aim in these
matters, and the ultimate aim of the United States of
Europe.

However urgent it may be for German socialism to
establish a currency of its own, this must be supple-
mented by establishing, within the European economic
system we aspire to (brought about no matter how), a
supra-national currency available throughout the joint
region.

Various practical considerations seem to indicate that
the stable Swiss franc can and will become the supra-
national currency, this giving new tasks to a Swiss bank-
ing system, under general European control.

3. ECONOMIC LAW OF GERMAN SOCIALISM

A. Private Property?

The transformation of economic policy by the estab-
lishment of autarchy, a State monopoly of foreign trade,

142

ECONOMIC LAW OF GERMAN SOCIALISM

and a currency standard of our own subsumed under
the comprehensive term of a c planned economy 5 , is today
regarded as necessary by numerous groups In Germany
and elsewhere In Europe. But this theoretical recognition
of c planned economy 5 will remain sterile so long as these
groups still cling to the prevailing capitalist economic
law which decrees that c private property is sacred 5 ,

With the utmost possible emphasis, therefore, the con-
servative revolutionist must at this point insist upon (as
indispensable preliminary to a genuine and effective
planned economy) the abrogation of the prevailing
economic law of private property.

One who takes his stand upon the maintenance of
private property in land, the raw materials that lie be-
neath the surface of the land, and the means of produc-
tion In general, is not only repudiating German socialism,
but Is also defending what will make a planned economy
impossible no matter how ardently in theory he may
desire It.

This follows without more ado from the very nature of
the owner's claim that he has the right 'to do what he
likes with his own', the claim which forms the core of the
legal notion of ^private property'. So long as the owner
of land, the raw materials that lie beneath the surface of
the land, and the means of production in general, can
do what he pleases with his 'property 5 ; so long as the
peasant can cultivate Ms fields or not as he prefers, the
owner of a coalmine have the coal mined or not as he
likes best, the factory owner have his factory working or
Idle at Ms own sweet will just so long is a planned
economy impossible. (To say nothing about the privi-
lege of the owner to sell his property to a foreign indl-

GERMAN SOCIALISM

vidual, corporation, or State, which would be fatal to
the organization of a German planned economy.)

For these reasons therefore, as well as for the moral
reasons that have already been specified, the abolition
of private property in land, the raw materials that lie
beneath the surface of the land, and the means of pro-
duction, is the main demand of German socialism, and
the presupposition to a planned national economy.

The same demand is made by all Marxians, and to
this extent they are socialists, though the carrying into
effect and the fruitfulness of their demand have been
hindered and will be hindered by their liberal alienism.
I consider it expedient to dwell upon the identity of
demand in this respect as between the international
Marxians and the German socialists, this being a prelude
to insisting, as regards constructive methods, upon the
difference between Marxism and German Socialism.

B. 'Entail^

This difference is based upon our (conservative) view
of the nature of (German) human beings.

Biological and historical experience precludes the
possibility of any change in human nature, and even of
an intention to change it. Our political task is therefore
to study human nature as it actually exists in its German
stamp, and to allow for that nature in our economic and
social institutions. We must not try to force an economic
theory upon Germans, but, on the contrary, we must

1 This term is not here quite identical with the specifically English use of the
word 'entail*, but we know of no other possible term for the rendering of the
German Erblehen. We therefore use it in quote marks. Its meaning will
soon become plain to careful readers. A conceivable alternative term would be
'usufruct', but this lacks the 'atmosphere' of 'entail*. Translators" Note.

144

ECONOMIC LAW OF GERMAN SOCIALISM

deduce an economic theory from the nature of Germans,
and, more particularly, we must then formulate an
economic system under which Germans can live and
develop. (If, in what follows, we deal exclusively with
^Germans 5 , this is merely to restrict our field, and not
from any overweening presumption.)

First of all, then, let me insist that the German has a
longing for his own peculiar style, for independence, for
delight in responsibility and joy in creation. The lack of
possibilities for satisfying this longing constitutes the tap-
root of the homelessness, the discontent, the purposeless-
ness of the existence of the latter-day German. He suffers,
in a word, from the proletarian character of his life, from
his lack of possessions, from the hopeless prospect of his
old age, and from the dependence of his present.

To deproletarianize the Germans must therefore be
the main task of German socialism.

This deproletarianization is only possible by finding
possessions for every German. Nothing but possessions
of his own can give that independence of thought and
development, that stamp of creative energy, and that
experience of the sense of responsibility which can really
and truly satisfy a German.

This brings us to two apparently contradictory de-
mands of German socialism:

1 i ) No German shall any longer have private property
in land, the raw materials that lie beneath the surface
of the land, and the means of production in general;

(2) Every German shall have possessions in these same
things.

The escape from the apparent contradiction between
these two fundamental demands of German socialism
K 145

GERMAN SOCIALISM

can be made by something which we were the first to
advocate the introduction of 'entail'.

The nation, that is to say the whole body of the Ger-
man people, the community at large, is the sole owner of
the land, the raw materials that lie beneath the surface
of the land, and the means of production in general, the
right of exploiting these being assigned to individual
Germans in c entaiP according as they may be capable
and worthy of it.

To make this demand intelligible we must briefly dis-
tinguish between 'private property 5 [Eigentum] and
'possession 3 [Besitz].

To have a thing as one's 'private property' means that
one can do what one likes with it can sell it, injure it,
or destroy it at will.

To have 'possession' of a thing means usufruct, that
one is entitled to use the thing, to exploit it, but subject
to the will and supervision of another, the substantial
c owner', whose 'private property' it is.

The proprietor of the entire German national economy
will henceforward be no one other than the community
at large, the whole nation. But the nation, or its
organizational form the State, will not run this economy
itself. It will hand the national economy over, frag-
mented and in 'entail', for exploitation by German
individuals or German groups.

This watchword of 'entail' forms the core of German
socialism.

Nothing but 'entail' will render possible that com-
bination of general welfare with private advantage which
is another of the aims of German socialism, since it con-
forms with the inalienable requirements of human nature.

14.6

ECONOMIC: LAW OF UFRM ix SOCIALISM

Intolera,bl. to tint highly developed Individualism of

the Germans (and doubtless of other Europeans; would
be any economic or social system that should run counter
to a German's personal Initiative or restrict his freedom.
The brief interlude of the Hitler System will make no
change here.

The fata! defect of the capitalist economic system has
been that Its increasing monopolization and bureau-
cratization of the masses has for them done away with
the possibility of their having lives of their own, of
advancing, of acquiring possessions. This "proletarian-
ization'., with Its terrible economic phenomena and its
ghastly cultural defects, cannot be overcome by univer-
salizing a proletarian lack of possessions. Deproletarian-
ization Is absolutely essential to the cure of this cancer
of our time: I mean the assignment of possessions to all
working members of the community, either as Indi-
viduals or associated in groups.

This will be rendered possible by c entaiP, which for
centuries was the legalized form of the German and
European economic system, and which, in Its fruitful
tension between the community spirit and the individual
will, represents the German and western way of manag-
ing affairs.

C. Repudiation of State Socialism

This systematized method of c entaiP further Involves
an emphatic rejection of any form of State capitalism,
euphemistically termed State socialism.

The need for the repudiation must be thoroughly ex-
plained, all the more because not only the Marxians but
many sections of non-Marxians who are working for a

GERMAN SOCIALISM

'national planned economy' aspire towards State capital-
ism or, as they prefer to say. State socialism.

In so far as this would involve the transfer of all owner-
ship rights to the community, as represented by the
State, it is in perfect harmony with the aims of German
socialism.

But when we come to the carrying on of enterprises by
the State or its organs, the German socialists are pas-
sionately opposed to such a method, because thereby
mental (^proletarianization, the development of creative
energy, and the encouragement of delight in responsi-
bility would be even more impaired than they are in the
private capitalist system to say little of the fact that
those who did the work would be even more under the
thumb of their employer.

So well do I know from personal experience what a
destructive effect bureaucratic control has upon the
individuality of the workers, and, on the other hand,
what a craving for independence the German peasants
and the members of the German middle class have, that
I cannot but regard with disfavour any scheme which
would kill this craving for independence by the blight of
bureaucracy.

To my way of thinking the chief curse of proletarian
life is the lack or the perpetual suppression of a longing
for independence, and I therefore believe it to be the
chief aim of mental deproletarianization to provide
independence for the urban operatives rather than to
undermine the independence of peasants and members
of the middle class by proletarianizing them.

We have furthermore to consider the increased
subordination of all 'hands 5 , financially, socially, politi-

148

ECONOMIC LAW OF GERMAN SOCIALISM

cally, and personally, when the Staff 5 besides being
their employer, will be their only court, of appeal. Under
private capitalism the State (since the worker who has
a complaint to lodge Is anyhow subject much like
another, being a taxpayer and a soldier) must always be
fairly impartial in its attitude towards the employer, and
this benefits the worker.

But under State capitalism there is no such impar-
tiality since employer and State arc one and the same
person, one and the same authority.

1 know that the revolutionary Marxians try to in-
validate this argument by pointing out that their "State 5
Is the proletarian dictatorship, in which there can be
no antagonism between employee and State. However s
so long as a bureaucracy exists, there Is no genuine
proletarian dictatorship, but only the rule of a class 3 the
official class, over the great mass of the working people,
who are far more effectively subjected to the class
dominion of the bureaucracy than today under capital-
ism they are subjected to the class dominion of the
owners of the means of production.

Decisively In favour of our 'entail* plan Is the popular
belief that It is a million times more contributory to the
people's welfare that there should be a thousand Inde-
pendent peasants than a thousand agricultural workers
In State employ; In other words that the crucial aim of
German socialism must be to make the number of
economically independent persons as large as is the
number of citizens who actually exist Inspired with a will
to independence.

The repudiation of State capitalism and State socialism
Is one of the most marked characteristics of German

149

GERMAN SOCIALISM

socialism. Herein German socialism gives expression both
to a genuinely conservative scepticism of organization
and to the popular dislike for bureaucracy; and it also
avows its faith in individuality, which is threatened just
as much by mass rule as by party dictatorship. (We shall
return to this when we come to discuss the State.)

The fascists and the communists rival one another in
glorifying the State, in suppressing economic and per-
sonal independence, in unduly extolling power and the
successes of organization, of decrees, of planning, and
as a last requisite the police.

It is precisely in the economic field that the German
socialists deliberately aim at the utmost independence
and autonomy of all fit members of the population; and
in their system those who do not achieve individual
economic autonomy will, by combining to form co-
operatives, acquire a considerable measure of that
independence which is the only soil where firm charac-
ters can grow.

To this popular (non-economic) outlook the German
socialists purposely subordinate all such views as c what
pays best 5 , c the greatest good of the greatest number 5 , etc.

4. ECONOMIC FORM OF GERMAN SOCIALISM

The popular outlook likewise dictates our aims as re-
gards the economic form of German socialism.

Those who understand that life in our huge tentacular
towns is a danger to the human race cannot fail to regard
systematic de-urbanization as urgently required for the
sake of the people. De-urbanization will also be a

150

ECONOMIC FORM OF GERMAN SOCIALISM

logical consequence of the establishment of autarchy and

the introduction of c entalf as regards peasant farming,
since both will make it necessary that Germany should
be agrarianized once more.

This re-agrarianization of Germany will be supported

from the towns by a far-reaching policy of land-settle-
ment, which will mainly take the form of fi marginal

settlements 5 .

Here it becomes appropriate to mention in passing that
systematic de-urbanization in conjunction with a mar-
ginal settlement policy will be of the utmost importance
to the defence of our country, inasmuch as thereby the
risks to the industrial centres from aviation attacks with
poison-gas and incendiary or explosive bombs will be
greatly reduced through the dispersion of motive force
that has now been rendered possible by the distant
transmission of gas and electricity and by the local use
of internal combustion engines.

The utilization of these recent discoveries will further
make it possible to fulfil the demand of German socialism
that industry should be decentralized for its own. sake,
and that the excessive industrialization of German
economic life should be counteracted.

To the liberal capitalist and liberal Marxian ideal of
modern mammoth factories producing vast quantities of
goods, we should contrapose the conservative ideal of a
full and free life, so that it will be the task of a responsible
government to create the economic and social conditions
essential to the realization of such an ideal.

No sane conservative will admit that it is reactionary
to shatter, as far as may be desirable, the idols of
mechanical technique. It is assuredly time for Germans

151

GERMAN SOCIALISM

to end the tyranny of technique, to overthrow the
dominion of the machine, and to make technique and
the machine once more servants instead of masters for
their domination has been an unmitigated curse.

Already, in the subsection on Capitalist Economic
Form (pp. 135 and foil.), I have referred to the new
attitude which German socialism adopts towards the
problem of 'man and economic life'.

Most emphatically do we reject the capitalist (and
Marxian) creed that man is sent into the world c in order
to work'. The Song of Labour is a capitalist device for
the training of diligent slaves, and the same characteriza-
tion applies to both the fascist and the communist glori-
fication of labour, whose sole aim really Is to Inculcate
diligence upon the slaves of the State.

The conservative revolutionist regards labour as
nothing but the means for the maintenance of life, an
instrument which can only transcend narrow limits in the
higher form of 'creation'.

Consequently industrial work with its murderous
monotony must somehow enable the individual worker
to find a chance for 'creation 5 outside his daily round of
toil, i.e. this daily round must not claim more than a
fraction of his life. (But at the same time as much
attention as possible must always be paid to the 'spiritual-
ization 5 of daily labour itself.)

In view of the vast productive powers of modern Ger-
man factories, etc., there is nothing Utopian in the idea
that various branches of industry can produce a suffi-
ciency by winter work alone or mainly, so that the
workers engaged in these branches will be left free during
the summer for their own 'creative 5 work, for learning to

152

A G R I G U L T U R E

know their fatherland better, the world at large, and

what not.

The disintegration of titanic enterprises and a healthier
estimate of the role of machinery will give their stamp to
this new life, even as Increasing joy will promote new
sociability and foster true culture.

These Ideas will be admirably rounded off when the
spiritual leadership of the New Germany no longer has
its headquarters established in one of the nerve-destroy-
ing giant towns, but In a new and carefully chosen capital
of the Reich. For historical and other reasons, Goslar or
Ratisbon would seem admirably fitted for this purpose.

Later historians will recognize how overwhelmingly
strong are the arguments in favour of such a conservative
choice, and will agree that the governmental capital of
a country ought not to be in one of Its great industrial
towns. They will point to the examples of Versailles and
Paris, of Potsdam and Berlin; and 5 outside Europe, to
Washington and Kyoto as against New York and Tokyo.

5. AGRICULTURE

A. The Coming System

The object of agriculture is to make sure that the
community will be fed.

The land available for the use of the community is
owned exclusively by the nation, for it was not by any
individual but by the community at large that the land
was acquired, by battle or by colonization on the part
of the community, and by the community it has been
defended against enemies.

The community as owner puts the land at the disposal

153

GERMAN SOCIALISM

of the nation in the form of 'entails 3 to those able and
willing to use them for husbandry and stock-raising.

This 'entailing' will be undertaken by the self-govern-
ing corporation of the local peasant-councils (see below,
Chapter Three, 5 J3, Vocational Councils, pp. 192 and
foil.) and the appropriate circle president will merely act
on the instructions of that corporation.

The size of the farms will be limited in accordance
with the local qualities of the land: the maximum being
determined by the principle that no one may hold in
c entail' more land than he is able to farm unaided; and
the minimum being determined by the principle that the
landholder must have enough land to provide, not only
food for self and family, but a superfluity by the disposal
of which he will be able to obtain clothing and shelter
for self and family.

The maximum limitation will result in freeing large
quantities of land for settlement by peasants, particularly
in Eastern Germany. This peasant settlement is all the
more necessary because the existence of an abundance of
peasants thus settled on their own farms furnishes the best
guarantee for the maintenance of public health and
public energy.

The landholder who thus receives a farm on c entail'
will pledge himself to manage this farm for the best ad-
vantage of the community and to use his utmost en-
deavours to make sure that the land shall be farmed to
supply the food of the community. He will therefore
have to pay a land-tax, a tithe-rent, to the community.
This will be payable in kind, the amount being fixed in
accordance with the area and quality of the land. No
other taxes will be payable by the peasant.

A O R I C U L T U R E

Should the holder of an "entail 5 die, the farm will pass
to a son able and willing to carry it on. If there are no
male children available, the c entaif will revert to the
community, and will be reallotted by the local peasants 5
council.

In the event of bad farming, an "'entail 5 will also revert
to the community, the decision upon this matter resting
with the local self-governing body (peasants' council) in
agreement with the State (represented by the circle
president) .

The introduction of 'entail 3 into German agriculture
will be in such manifest conformity with German tradi-
tion and with the right and necessary ideas of peasant
possessorship 5 that neither psychological nor material
difficulties are likely to ensue.

Even the Hitler System, which had not attempted any
radical attack upon capitalism, was compelled, upon
pressure from the German peasants, to introduce a
measure that was based in some degree upon the same
ideas.

But the Patrimonial Farm Law of the Hitler regime
differs from our 'entail 5 plan in the most essential
respects.

(1) It leaves the entire capitalist system in being. For
this reason the patrimonial farm peasant has great diffi-
culty in securing credit, since, in view of the nature of his
tenancy, the capitalists will not lend him money.

(2) The extant fiscal system levies taxes in money from
the patrimonial farm peasants, who can only pay their
dues by getting into debt.

(3) Old mortgage liabilities remain, as well as other
debts, and to pay the interest on these (let alone clearing

GERMAN SOCIALISM

off the principal) is even more impossible to a patrimonial
farm peasant than to a freeholder.

(4) It extends only to a portion of the peasantry, and
has therefore created three kinds of agricultural entre-
preneurs: peasants whose holdings are so small as to be
unviable; middle and great peasants who are tenant-
farmers; and great landowners who run their estates on
purely capitalist lines.

(5) It protects the great landowners who, sheltering
behind the Patrimonial Farm Law, can avoid having
their estates divided up, and thus frustrate their younger
sons' hopes of attaining at least a peasant's independence.

(6) It is an instrument controlled by the State and the
party bureaucracy, not a method of peasant self-
government.

(7) It knows nothing of the cancellation of tenure
which the local government can effect in cases of bad
farming, nor yet of reversion of the land to the com-
munity when the family becomes extinct in the male
line.

B. Management of the Transition
When we compare this coining system with the present

one, in order to discover how the transition can best be

managed, we find first of all that the majority of German

peasants will remain in possession of their farms.
For of the 55096,533 farms in Germany (census of

1925) only 18,668 were of the size of 500 acres or more.

All the others are peasant farms, and would remain such

under the new system.

Indeed, properly speaking they would first become

peasant farms under the new system. The transformation

156

AGRICULTURE

of 'privately owned farms 5 Into 'entailed possessions"

would necessarily Involve the cancellation of all mort-
gages., land held as an 'entail 5 under the new system
being by hypothesis unmortgageable. The transforma-
tion would free the peasants from their burden of debt,
and would make it impossible for them to get into debt
again. The new (really Old-Germanic) organization of
land tenure would make the man who is now enslaved
by having to pay interest into a free peasant.

This complete liberation of German agriculture from
debt, as a necessary consequence of the proposed c entaif
system, carrying with It the impossibility of the burden
of debt ever being renewed. Is of decisive importance,
first, to promote both psychologically and materially the
acceptance of German socialism by the peasants; and,
secondly, to make our agriculture a paying concern for
all time.

For in this way German socialism would justly present
Itself to the peasant as the redeemer, coming to deliver
him for evermore from the claws of the mortgagees, the
bankers, and the tax-gatherers.

To save the creditors from ruin, and in this way to
avert a convulsion In the capitalist money-market, the
sums owing on mortgage would be converted into non-
interest-bearing bonds payable by the Mortgage Can-
cellation Department, a three-per-cent sinking-fund
being arranged by the Agricultural Tenants 5 Redemption
Scheme.

No less Important, as the system gets into working
order, will be the disappearance of the taxes now de-
manded from the peasants by the State, in place of which
there will be one general annual payment of the c tithe 3 ,

GERMAN SOCIALISM

so that there will be no possibility of the peasant posses-
sions becoming once more burdened with debt.

The danger to the State that there may be variations
in the revenue from the tithes, and the danger to the
peasants of there being localized failure of the crops, will
be obviated by the solidarization of the peasantry of the
circle and the province. (Whereby at the same time will
be established the necessary community of material
interests among the peasants a community that will
make the working of the peasants' councils stable and
effective.

C. Great Landed Estates

The subdivision of the great landed estates will be
fundamental to the re-agrarianization of Germany,
which is one of the aims of German socialism.

The 18,688 big farms in Germany, of a size of 500
acres and upwards each, utilize more than 16.7 % or
if we take in all farms of 250 acres and upwards, more
than 20 % of the land suitable for agricultural pur-
poses. Even stronger than this moral argument is the
urgent need for the provision of more peasant farms,
since nothing else can prevent the second and third sons
of our peasants from drifting into the towns.

The objection that such expropriation of the great
landed estates would be unjust is invalid, seeing that
what remained for the former owners, who would become
'entaiP farmers, would be completely freed from debt;
and, further, compensation could be paid by the Mort-
gage Cancellation Department.

The main objection advanced against dividing-up the
great landed estates into independent peasant farms (an

158

AGRICULTURE

objection voiced both by Marxians and by capitalists) is
the alleged indispensability of large-scale farming to the
supply of a sufficiency of cereals to the great towns.

TMs argument Is based upon various considerations,
some of which are still sound today but will be overruled
tomorrow, when the proposed de-urbanization of great
industries will have markedly reduced the population of
our towns a movement which will be reinforced by
administrative and military defensive measures.

Besides, the systematic intensification of agriculture by
the spread of market-gardening will in any case involve
a structural change such as we see in Denmark and
Holland, and this presupposes the partition of the great
landed estates.

Finally the Inclusion of the south-east,, the granary of
Europe, in the economic system of Central Europe, In
conjunction with the other general alms of the European
Federation, will inevitably liberate Germany from the
need for producing cereals c at all hazards' a need
which would impair the chances for the establishment of
a planful agricultural system in this part of the world.

It has already been pointed out that these changes will
take time. Obviously, therefore, the partition of the
great landed estates must be part of a general plan for
agrarian reform that will look years ahead, making
arrangements for the erection of the necessary farm-
buildings and habitations, the choice of the young
peasants who will run the new small farms, the provision
of agricultural implements, live-stock, etc. Not least, the
State will have to found in each province a number of
model farms, as centres for the supply of seed, for
stock-raising, and general agricultural progress. This

159

GERMAN SOCIALISM

development will facilitate the maintenance of the extant
c model farms 5 that have been established by progressive
landowners, the personal services and peculiar skill of
these being recognized and utilized by appointing them
'bailiffs of the domains'.

It is important to remember that the tithe-rent payable
to the State can be paid in kind, and that this will save
the peasants from the wasteful conversion of their pro-
duce into money, whereas the State will in a very simple
way come into possession of a notable part of the harvest,
which it will to some extent use directly as food-supply
for the army, and to some extent put on the market as
may seem desirable to regulate prices. (The salaries of
officials, allowances to pensioners, etc., may be partly
payable in kind.)

The transition from the capitalist agriculture of today
to the socialist agriculture of tomorrow will thus be com-
paratively easy, because the German peasantry has an
interest in escaping from the fleecing capitalist system,
and in gaining and safeguarding a position in which the
peasants will be free and independent.

6. INDUSTRY AND WHOLESALE TRADE

Industrial enterprises are fundamentally different
from agricultural enterprises. Whereas an agricultural
enterprise is mainly carried on by the work of an indi-
vidual and his dependents, an industrial enterprise needs
the collaboration of a manager or foreman and his
staff of workers. The produce of agriculture varies with
the soil and the climatic conditions; the produce of
industry varies with the supply of raw materials and their

1 60

INDUSTRY AND WHOLESALE TRADE
distribution. Raw materials arc either supplied from the
sources within the country, such as coal deposits, ores,
etc. 5 which are the property of the community, or else
they are procured by import (In Germany: oil,' cotton,
and rubber). For the freedom and independence of a
national economy, it is essential that there should be (to
the extent previously explained) autarchy and a State
monopoly of foreign trade. In this way the State acquires
a decisive influence upon the supply of an industry with
raw materials., and it must be in a position to cope with
the requirements of production for use. Thus besides
the manager and his staff of workers there must be a
third party to the affair as representative of the com-
munity, and there are three factors concerned in any
Industrial enterprise:

Manager; Staff of Workers; the State.

It Is needful that we should have a clear idea of this
trlpartition of interests that results from the very nature
of the industrial process, since therefrom are logically
derived the forms of possession, the management of
enterprise, and the distribution of profits, as envisaged
by German socialism.

German socialism emphatically repudiates a totali-
tarian claim on the part of any one of these three factors:
whereas capitalism makes a totalitarian claim on behalf
of the entrepreneur; fascism makes a totalitarian claim
on behalf of the State (a claim it has not so far been
possible to enforce in practice); and communism makes
a totalitarian claim on behalf of the workers.

As contrasted with the totalitarian claim of any one
factor, we have the notion of an equipoise throughout the
whole, and here (in current parlance) is manifested an
L 161

GERMAN SOCIALISM

Important distinction between liberalism and con-
servatism.

A. The Factory Fellowship

Manager, staff of workers, and State are the three
partners in any enterprise They constitute a factory
fellowship.

The State, which in agriculture is the exclusive pro-
prietor of the land, is equally, in an industrial enterprise,
the exclusive proprietor of the concern. Through the
instrumentality of the appropriate vocational council it
assigns the work in fief to a manager who is competent
and willing to undertake it. In return there will be pay-
able to the State an impost (corresponding to the tithe
payable by an agricultural enterprise) 5 the amount of
which will be assessed at regular intervals (5 or 10 years,
let us say). These imposts, since, in conjunction with the
tithes from agricultural enterprises, they must provide
for State expenditure upon public affairs, will have
priority over net profits, allowances for wear and tear,
and reserves.

Management, possession, and profits are thus assigned
in thirds to the manager, the staff of workers, and the
State. The management decides about the world policy
of the enterprise, settling the kind and quantity of goods
to be produced, fixing the respective amounts payable
for depreciation (wear and tear), reserve, and profit, and
prescribing the wages to be paid.

Whilst the approved imposts from the works, in con-
junction with the tithes from agriculture, are the returns
payable to the State for safeguarding the public economy,
the share of the State in the profits represents a variable

162

! X 1) U S T R Y A X D W H O L E S A L E T R A 1) E

revenue which can be disbursed for special purposes.
/Current expenses: for administration, education, army,
etc.: extraordinary expenses; public buildings, canals,
power stations, etc,}

The manager derives his income from his share in
possession and profits, so that his economic position

turns upon the success or failure of the enterprise.
Success will depend upon his devoting his whole time
and capacity; and his share should, therefore, be com-
paratively large.

In virtue of his share in the possession of the enterprise,
every member of the working staff will draw a portion of
the profits, and will also receive wages suitable to Ms
achievements. The two together form the basis of his
economic self-maintenance.

The respective shares of the manager and the working
staff in the profits must be so apportioned that the
manager will be able to provide for his own living ex-
penses and those of his family out of Ms share In the
profits and nothing more, whereas the worker's ordinary
expenditure will be defrayed out of his wages. The
manager's share In possession and profits must, therefore,,
be comparatively large, whilst that of the individual
worker can be comparatively small. Furthermore it Is
undesirable that the workers should have a large share
in the profits, for such copious profit-sharing may foster
a deleterious overdriving of the means of production and
the neglect of Improvements that technical and hygienic
considerations render desirable.

It is also essential to remember that there should not be
any aim at large profits, since these are excluded by paying
due regard to the need for good wages and low prices.

163

GERMAN SOCIALISM

The factory fellowships with their basis of fiefs thus
resemble the agricultural enterprises with their basis of
'entails', but the former are substantially collective
whereas the latter are substantially individual in
character.

Of especial importance are three primary qualities of
this new form of industrial enterprise :

1 i ) There will come into being, in contradistinction to
the extant 'class' of capitalists, an 'estate 5 of managers
which, regardless of wealth or origin, will constitute a
functional aristocracy that, thanks to the very methods
of its selection, may be said to be made up of 'captains
of industry' or 'commissioned officers of economic
life'.

(2) The dispossessed 'class' of proletarians will vanish,
its place being taken by an 'estate' of fully privileged
workers, directly and indirectly participating in and
therefore interested in their 'workshop'. They will no
longer be the objects of economy, but its subjects.

(3) The relations between State and economic life will
be radically altered. The State will not be the 'night-
watchman and policeman' of capitalism, nor will it be a
dictator whose bureaucracy cracks the whip that drives
the workers to the bench and spurs them at their tasks;
but it will be trustee of the consumers, and as such it will
have much influence, but only within and beside the self-
determination of the working producers, namely of the
manager (who may be a plurality) and the staff of
workers (consisting in appropriate proportions of clerical
and other intellectual workers, on the one hand, and
manual operatives, on the other).

164

INDUSTRY AND WHOLESALE TRADE

5. Contrast to Capitalism and Marxism
It .seems desirable to give a brief account of the basic

distinction between the watchwords of German socialism
in these matters and those of capitalism, on the one !iand ?
Marxism, on the other.

1. DISTINCTION FROM CAPITALISM

a. There Is no private property in the means of pro-
duction. They can neither be bought nor sold, so that
even though there may be persons who possess large
quantities of commodities or money ('wealth 9 in this
sense being both possible and permissible), nothing like
^capitalism' can come into existence.

b. The staff of workers and the State are equally privi-
leged partners with the manager, who is not a Capitalist*,
but merely a fief-holder.

c. The need for economic and systematic production
is enforced upon the manager because his partners out-
number him.

d. Every German citizen is one of the joint possessors
of the entire German economy.

2. DISTINCTION FROM MARXISM

a. The personal initiative of the responsible managers
is preserved, but it is incorporated into the needs of the
community*

b. Within the systematically planned management of
the whole national economy by the State (organically
safeguarded by the equal third of influence which the
State has in every industrial enterprise) the wholesome
rivalry of the individual enterprises is maintained.

c. The treatment of State and economic enterprise,
that is to say of official and industrial manager, on an

165

GERMAN SOCIALISM

equal footing is avoided; so is the arbitrary power of the
State which deprives the worker of his rights.

d. Everyone engaged in an enterprise is, in virtue of
his being part-possessor as a citizen, one of the immediate
and influential possessors of his enterprise, his c workshop 5 ,
and can exert this possessive right in full measure on the
supervisory council of the concern.

The form of the factory fellowship, founded upon the
legal idea of the fief, and vivified by the great self-
governing body of the workers 3 and employees 5 councils,
on the one hand, the industrial and trades 5 councils, on
the other, constitutes the new economic system of Ger-
man socialism, which is equally remote from western
capitalism and eastern bolshevism, and nevertheless
complies with the requirements of large-scale industry.

C. Management of the Transition

Although the content and the form of German
socialism are so strikingly different from those of the
contemporary capitalist economic system, the technical
management of the transition from one to the other will
be comparatively easy provided always that the
political question of the change in the economic law has
been overcome.

The simplest way will be to transform all industrial and
trading enterprises that employ a considerable amount of
labour-power into joint-stock companies, for the tripar-
tition of possessorship and the corresponding subdivision
of control and profits will be easy enough to arrange.

The 'shares 5 will, of course, be very different from those
of the extant joint-stock companies, for they will be real
portions, inalienable because of their fief-character,

1 66

1 X D U S T R V A X I) TV H O L E S A L E TRAD E

neither saleable nnr p1r;clsroablr non-negotiable in fact,

belonging exclusively to the assignee,

The extent to which 'present c owneiV can become
fief-holders will turn upon their achievements as effective
managers of the enterprise in which they hold shares and
upon their attitude towards the German Revolution,
The Formation of an "estate 5 of managers Is no less
Incumbent upon German socialism than the formation
of an officers' corps was incumbent upon Prussia ~ an
analogy of profound significance.

The unified representation of the State in the national
economic life as a whole (a representation fundamentally
distinct from the fascist regulation of economic life) will
secure the lasting organic joint leadership of economic life
by the State, without resulting in forcible Intervention on
the part of Insufficiently skilled officials. More especially
it will ensure the systematic de-urbanization of Industry,
in conjunction with its requisite unification and simpli-
fication, as well as the permanent control of production,
wages, and prices. All this will grow organically from
within, elaborated by experts, and unceasingly adjusted
by the wills of the working staffs and the managers.

Thus the transformation of profit-making Industry and
trade into socialist industry and trade, working for use
instead of profit, will be comparatively simple, because
It will conform with the interests of the community, the
workers., and even the managers whenever these are of
sterling quality.

The most frequent objection is that our method of
transition will render It possible for 'capitalists* to come
into existence once more, or will perhaps actually leave
them, in being.

167

GERMAN SOCIALISM

This objection overlooks the radical difference between
a capitalist and a business-manager (entrepreneur), and
especially does it forget that 'capitalism 5 , that is to sav
economic power based upon monopoly-goods, cannot
arise under the new conditions. No matter how much
money a man may have, he will not be able to buy por-
tions of an enterprise (the sometime 'shares'), which can
now be held only in fief.

This becomes peculiarly plain when we consider how
the monetary and banking system will be run under
socialist control,

Except during the time of transition, when indubitably
the needs of the situation will demand a (postponed)
fixing of maximum and minimum incomes, the acquire-
ment and possession of money will be limited by what
work a man can do, and by that alone. Thereby the
standard -of life will be as much differentiated as human
nature demands. (Of course a strict legal control of
inheritance will play its part.) But the decisive point is
that, under the conditions that will prevail, even the
ownership of vast sums of money cannot lead to 'capital-
ism', because, although commodities of the kind that can
be multiplied as much as you please are purchasable to
any amount, monopolies such as land, the raw materials
that lie beneath its surface, and the means of production
in general, are not purchasable at all.

Consequently interest will still be obtainable for
money, but with two important restrictions. The Reichs-
bank, which issues banknotes, is a State institution, and
determines what the official rate of interest shall be, and
by this rate the great banks (which will have the ordinary
character of professional corporations, unless it has been

1 68

HANDICRAFT A \ D RETAIL T R A D E

thought expedient to have tuein taken ova' by the State 1 ;

will have to ablde ; with an additional allowance for ex-
penses. On the other hand, the small banks and local
credit Institutions will have more latitude in this matter
of the .rate of Interest, But credit will have to be granted
without any concrete security, so that it will be a purely
personal matter of notes-of-hand. There can be no mort-
gaging of landj factoiies 5 or business undertakings of any
kind 3 since they will all be national property assigned for
usufruct as 'entails 3 or fiefs.

The increased Importance of private and local credit
institutes will, however, revive the private bankers of the
old days, and this will be 'good for trade 5 ; advantageous
to the economic system as a whole. Owing to the
Increased risk to the money thus lent on personal security
alone 3 'interest slavery 5 having been done away with by
making mortgages Impossible, the present objection to
'incomes made without trouble or labour 5 will cease to
exist.

Finally, this elastic way of treating the money and
interest problem will facilitate the practical testing of the
latest monetary theories, whose general application by
the community would involve excessive - and needless -
risk.

7. HANDICRAFT AND RETAIL TRADE

Under the caption of handicrafts and retail trade come
the various independent petty undertakings In which
there are no more workers (mostly styled 'apprentices 5 ,
'pupils' 3 or 'assistants') than can have a reasonable
expectation of some day becoming Independent them-
selves.

169

GERMAN SOCIALISM

These handicraft enterprises and petty establishments
for retail trade are fundamentally different from the
factory fellowships. Whereas in a factory fellowship the
success of the concern, and therewith the weal or woe of
every one of the workers engaged in it, does not depend
upon individuals but on the associated labour of all, the
welfare of an independent handicraft enterprise depends
upon the personality of the 'boss 5 . In a factory fellow-
ship, problems are jointly decided by its three sections,
the manager, the staff of workers, and the State; but, in
the independent handicraft enterprise the boss decides
c on his own 5 . He is solely responsible for what is done.
In a socialist economy this amount of personal freedom
is only conceivable if there are leagues which organize
the individuals into a community. Such a league will
federate the handicrafts or branches of retail trade into
a guild.

A. The Guild (or Corporation)

Handicraft enterprises, small shops, and also the liberal
professions, will therefore be incorporated into guilds.

The State will grant the guilds certain rights over their
members, and in return the guilds will undertake to
collect from their members the contributions which will
make up the lump sum due from each guild in the way
of taxes to the State.

They will allot the right to practise a petty industry or
trade by conceding to suitable persons the title of
'master', which can only be acquired by one who gives
definite undertakings. The guild will insist upon work
of a certain quality, and in that case will guarantee sup-
port to the guildsmen. It will decide how many appren-
tices each guildsrnan may take, etc.

170

H A N D 1 C! R A F T A X D RET n ! I T T l A D R

These regulations will renaer it impossible for the

guildsman to pursue his own interests ruthlessly, to make
an improper use of his economic freedom, for he will

have to subordinate his interests to the needs of the com-
munity.

It will be obvious that one who is employed in such a
petty enterprise is not entitled to any share in its posses-
sion, profits, or management. Though apparently dis-
advantaged as compared with the members of the work-
ing staff of a great enterprise, this is because the position
of the former as employed members is different. In
reality they are nothing more than apprentices or pupils
who know that in due time, when they have given
proof of competence, they will become independent
masters.

This presupposes that the possibilities for such ad-
vancement have been duly considered by the guild and
the administration, working together, and bearing in
mind the public demand for persons practising such
crafts or professions. The granting of diplomas by the
authorities will be subordinated to the growth of popula-
tion, and the schools will have to guide their pupils in the
choice of avocations. Especially does this apply to the
liberal and academic professions.

Such inevitable encroachments upon individual liberty
will be more than compensated by increasing security of
livelihood and promotion; apart from the fact that the
encroachments will not be the work of bureaucratic State
officials, but will be made solely through the instruments
of a system of self-government that will have to act
within a framework prescribed by the State.

171

GERMAN SOCIALISM

B. Management of the Transition

Here the extant vestiges of the guilds and cooperatives
will provide stepping-stones. The advantages to the
independent handicraftsmen and the members of the
middle class that will derive from the new vocational
associations, from the fixing of maximum numbers, etc.,
will be so great that the apparent disadvantage of the
official control of prices will be fully made good all the
more seeing that the associations will be established by
self-governing bodies, and will only be subject to State
supervision.

Of great importance in this connexion will be the
abolition of the existing scale and method of taxation, in
place of which the guild will pay a lump sum, collected
by the guild from its members.

The transformation of the minor handicrafts and petty
retail establishments into the guild system of German
socialism will be all the easier because the German
handicraftsmen and small traders have a vital interest
in escaping the destruction with which they are
threatened by the capitalist system, and thus maintain-
ing their existence as independent artisans, small shop-
keepers, etc.

For the sake of completeness I must point out that
house-ownership comes within the category of 'goods
which can be augmented in quantity as much as you
please' (see above, pp. 134-5), and will therefore remain
private property. The necessary adjustment of rents will
be arranged for by seeing to it that municipalities and
cooperative building societies of all kinds shall provide a
sufficiency of new dwellings on behalf of the public wel-
fare always on the presupposition (applying to pri-

172

COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES

vately owned houses no less than to others; that land is
not private property, but will merely be leased to the
houscowner as a fief for a definite term of years. This
fundamental principle will make sure that the State or

the municipality (which in general will here be trustee
for the State) shall have a decisive Influence in the build-
Ing market. Besides, the new way of dealing with banks
and mortgages will make It easy to control the building-
sites on which fantastic groundrents are now paid. Thus
from the monetary side the building market will be made
healthy once more.

8. COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES

One of the main objects of German socialism is to
combine the personal egoism that Is a necessary and use-
ful part of our human equipment with advantage for the
general welfare, much as the working of the engine
propels an automobile.

This aim finds expression, for example. In the fact that
a peasant's tenure of his farm is to be arranged with an
eye to communal benefit. The surplus he produces by
working harder will be 'tax-free 5 . Another and even
more striking instance Is that there will be no limit to
the acquisition of commodities other than the natural
limit to a man's working powers. Herein,, once more, is
a sharp distinction between German socialism and
Marxian communism, for the latter only recognizes
personal freedom In such matters within marked limits.
But the decisive point Is that however much money a
man may possess, or however large a quantity 7 of goods,
these will not enable him to become an owner of land,
its mineral resources, or the means of production for

175

GERMAN SOCIALISM

they are only obtainable on c entaiP. (Apart altogether
from the heavy inheritance tax which, except for a few
taxes on luxuries, will be the only c tax' of the old sort to
remain.)

Although our picture of German socialism can be no
more than a sketch, we can at least make it plain that the
voluntary formation of producers 3 and consumers 5 co-
operatives will be strongly encouraged by the State,
which will be competent to encourage it through playing
so active a part in all great enterprises.

Though it will be uncongenial to the nature of German
socialism to introduce any kind of State coercion into
economic life, this objection is neither theoretical nor un-
conditional, but merely represents a practical inference
from the German character.

The development of cooperatives will be an important
supplement to German socialism, and the economic
counterpart to political self-government. It need hardly
be said that the individual will be free to enter or leave
a cooperative at will, partly because none but voluntary
members can be expected to work cordially in the
organization, and partly because nothing should be done
to diminish the friendly rivalry between cooperative and
non-cooperative enterprise. From this outlook it may be
taken as a matter of course that there should be no
material favouring of the cooperatives by the State,
except that the State will certainly encourage the
educational activities of the cooperatives, and this will be
especially valuable where agricultural cooperatives are
concerned.

Ideologically considered, the future trade unions will
be simply workers* cooperatives whose main task will be

PUBLIC ASSISTANCE

to promote vocational training and development; for the
economic and political interests of the workers (and em-
ployees) will be best served, directly by the workers 5
councils (or employees' councils), and indirectly by the
estates 5 chambers. (See below, pp. 197 and foil.)

I may take this opportunity of repeating that the Ger-
man temperament is equally opposed to the disposition
of western capitalism to ignore the rights of the com-
munity, and to the disposition of eastern bolshevism to
ignore individual responsibility and to despise the
creative will of the personality.

The economic system of German socialism is, therefore,
no less hostile to eastern bolshevism than to western
capitalism; and our socialists feel strongly akin to those
forms of the Middle Ages that gave expression to our
national peculiarities, and to the essentials of the German
nature.

9. PUBLIC ASSISTANCE

Public assistance comprises care for those members of
the community who are no longer in a position to gain
their own livelihood.

The main significance of the term Community' or
"commonwealth 5 is that no one who belongs to it shall
have to endure the miseries of poverty. For the duties
which every citizen owes to the community are also
entail rights, being set off by the duties which the com-
munity owes to every citizen.

This principle implies the need for a comprehensive
system of national insurance, covering childhood, un-
employment, accident, old age, and death, supple-
mented by voluntary insurance.

GERMAN SOCIALISM

In contrast with, the existing methods, the whole com-
plicated system of insurance and support would be re-
placed under socialism by a unified life insurance. Every
citizen would thereby be insured in a way that would
guarantee him a sufficiency whatever happened, and no
matter whether he (or she) was temporarily or per-
manently unfitted. Every citizen, moreover, by paying
a supplementary premium, would be able to secure in
case of need an allowance supplementary to that pro-
vided by the national insurance scheme.

As a matter of organization this would mean that all
private insurance companies would be fused into one
comprehensive national insurance scheme which would
be directly connected with the Reichsbank. The
economy effected by sweeping away the intricate
apparatus of the extant private insurance companies,,
and by putting an end to the earning of considerable
profits by the stockholders in such companies, would
greatly reduce the premiums.

Further, matters would be much simplified by having
only one aim of insurance to safeguard the supply of
a sufficiency for maintenance to anyone who should
become unfitted for earning a livelihood, whether tem-
porarily or permanently, and by whatever cause.

Desires for individual variations in what is regarded
as a minimum subsistence would be met by having
different grades of insurance. The lowest grade would
be compulsory, and the premiums would be automatic-
ally deducted from wages or salary. What supple-
mentary premiums were thought advisable would be
decided by people themselves, at their own risk and at
their own responsibility.

176

PUBLIC ASSISTANCE

In these circumstances under German socialism there
would be no further possibility that any members of the
community should go hungry, as they do today, or even
(horrible to relate) actually starve to death.

Every German, man or woman, would then be freed
from the dread of poverty in old age s which now, to
many, is a source of unceasing anxiety and gloom.

M

CHAPTER THREE

THE GERMAN SOCIALIST STATE

I. MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE

IN accordance with the organic conception that all
institutions must be judged by the extent to which they
favour organic life, we regard the State, not as something
that stands above the community at large, but as
nothing else than the organizational form of the peopkj
the form that will ensure the fullest possible development
of the organism known as the 'German people 5 . The
State is not an end in itself, but something whose aim is
(or should be) so to deal with the organism of the 'people 5
(or 'nation') that it may most effectively utilize all the
energies that will enable the community to maintain
itself as against other communities In the world.

It follows from this that the State is always determined
by the peculiarities of the people. No people can take
over intact the State-forms of another. When the form
of the State is adapted to the peculiarities of the people
of one country, our organic outlook makes it plain that
this form of State cannot be perfectly adapted to the
peculiarities of any other people. If, for instance, fascism
is the form of State best suited to the Italian people
(and the fact that the Italian people tolerates it makes
this probable), then fascism cannot be the form of State
best suited to the German people. The same considera-
tions apply to the bolshevik form of State which prevails

178

MATTERS O F PRINCIPLE

In Russia, which cannot possibly be the best form of
State for the German people.

The State must originate out of the nature of the
people; it should arrange the people's life, and reduce
Internal friction to a minimum, for then the outwardly
directed energies will grow more powerful. The athlete
who trains for some great achievement, who makes his
nerves and muscles cooperate without friction, and who
by the regular practice of graduated exercises also
cultivates the mental powers of self-confidence and
will-to-victory. Is the model of an organism in prime
condition. A team trained for success In some particular
sport, such as football, is a community whose chances
of victory depend on the same presupposition the
reducing of Internal friction to a minimum, in order
to secure the maximum output of well-directed
energy.

This conception of the State as the best possible
organization of the people Involves the rejection on
principle of the demigod role which all dictators and
would-be dictators ascribe to the State, and Implies the
frank avowal of the C people 5 s State 5 , The organic
connexion between people and State which underlies
the latter notion Imposes upon the conservative revolu-
tionary as a necessary deduction that the forms of the
State must adapt themselves to the Internal and external
transformation of the people, of the popular conscious-
ness, of the popular degree of maturity. It also follows
as a matter of principle that those forms of the State are
'good*, i.e. suitable,, which are favourable to the bodily
and mental health and development of the organism
that Is the people; even as those forms of the State are

1 79

THE GERMAN SOCIALIST STATE

'bad 3 , i.e. unsuitable, that are unfavourable and in-
hibitive in these respects.

For the people is the content, the living, the organic;
the State is the form, the dead, the organizational.

The experiences of recent years, and especially our
experiences of the Hitler System, make it necessary to
reject with the utmost possible emphasis the principle of
the 'totalitarian State'.

The national idea, according to which man and his
organic community the people should be the core of the
social system, involves by its conservative nature the
repudiation of any attempt to idolize an organizational
form. No less decisively in favour of this repudiation is
the recognition that the State, from its very nature, can
only have regulative functions, that is to say can only
influence and ought only to influence a part (though
an important part) of the social life. Both the lower
plane, that of the c body 5 (= economic life), and still
more the higher plane, that of the c soul' (= culture),
tend by their very nature to set themselves apart from
the plane of the 'spirit' (= society), and claim for
themselves independent fulfilment, unless the natural
equilibrium is to be impaired, which will inevitably lead
to the illness and ultimately to the death of the organism
as a whole.

In accordance with the introductory thoughts to our
Philosophical Foundations (see above, pp. 119 and
foil.) the reader will, I think, understand these
dissertations even if he finds I am making a somewhat
unfamiliar use of terms. (This is mainly because the
words like old coins have been worn thin by excessive
use. They will need to be reminted in days to come.)

i So

THE FORM OF THE STATE

The lordly sense of superiority with which the genuine
conservative always regards the State as nothing more
than an instrument, a tool as a *suil of clothed which

fits the people more or less well is justified, even as is
justified the humble respect he lias for the organism of
the 'nation 5 , in which lie sees the durable whilst the
State Is the transient (varying with the extant growth or
ripeness of the nation).

2. THE FORM OF THE STATE

For these reasons, at bottom the State form is Indiffer-
ent, and all we have to enquire is which form of State is
most appropriate to the present ripeness (= age) and
ideology of the German people.

For these reasons, more especially, the question
monarchy or republic is of little moment. Our choice
will be determined by our answer to the question^
"Which ftrm of State will be most suitable to the German
character and essential nature? 5 The more suitable the
State is to the German character, the more harmonious
will be its internal organization, and the more powerful
will it be in a world where it is faced by other States.

The principle that only the best and most efficient
among German men shall be summoned to lead the
State 5 excludes hereditary monarchy, for it is contrary to
probabilities that talent will be so perfectly transmitted
by inheritance that the son of the best leader will also be
the best leader of his people. An additional argument
against hereditary monarchy is the principle that there
must be no handicap in life, that there shall be equality
of opportunity for all the citizens. A form of State in
which a supreme position is assured, by the mere fact

181

THE GERMAN SOCIALIST STATE

of birth, to the eldest son of the reigning monarch
conflicts so drastically with the principle of equality of
opportunity that it is self-condemned.

Remains to decide between an electoral monarchy
and a republic. In either case the head of the State will
be elected: in an electoral monarchy, for life; in a
republic, for a specified term.

A short term certainly involves the danger that the
president will be tempted, in order to favour his chances
of re-election, to bribe the electors by concessions of one
sort or another; and this will make dispassionate govern-
ment unlikely. The danger of bias will be greater
when the president is energetic and ambitious (two
qualities that are otherwise desirable in a statesman),
resulting in corruption when the electorate is small, in
the courting of popularity when it is large.

Such dangers are obviated when the president (or
monarch) is elected for life, for this makes him inde-
pendent of the electors, and enables him to contemplate
and carry out far-reaching schemes regardless of any-
thing so mutable as popular favour.

For these reasons it seems to us that the best arrange-
ment for Germany would be that the Reich should have
a president elected for the term of his natural life. That
would be conformable with the experience of more than
a thousand years of German history, and it matters not
whether the monarch so chosen is called an emperor or
a president.

3. ADMINISTRATION

The president of the Reich, elected for life, will be
the supreme representative of the State authority. The

182

A1> M !XI >TR AT10N

ministers appointed by and subordinate to him will
merely be experts \\ith advisory functions, and will not

be responsible wield ers of Slate power: they will be
personally responsible to the president.

The second wielder of State authority will be the
Great Council.

The Great Council will consist of the presidents of
the provinces (from twelve to seventeen in number),
the five ministers of State,, and the presidium of the
Reich Chamber of the Estates. It will therefore have
about two dozen members, all of them persons of
outstanding importance. By a simple majority vote, the
Great Council will also elect the president of the Reich
(who need not be a member of the Council).

The third wielder of State authority will be the
Reich Chamber of Estates. This will consist of no
members, 100 being elected and 10 being nominated.
It stands at the head of the entire Estates System,
(Fuller details will be found in Section Five, below.)

The three wieiders of State authority will have equal
powers. A law will require the assent of any two of
them for enactment or repeal.

Stability in the management of the State will be
ensured by the fact that the president of the Reich is
elected for life, that he will command a majority in the
Great Council (since he appoints the presidents of the
provinces), and because 3 nominating ten members of
the Reich Chamber of Estates, he will also have pre-
dominant influence in that body.

The position of the president of the Reich, which was
outlined by the author in 1931, obtruded itself into the
Hitler System after Hindenburg's death but with

183

THE GERMAN SOCIALIST STATE

the difference typical of the transitional character of the
Hitlerian epoch, that here it was an inevitable outcome
of circumstances, not the fruit of creative will This
accounts for the absurdity that the ministry de jure of
the Reich still has in the main (as the Weimar constitu-
tion foresaw) de facto the character of a mere body of
experts with advisory functions, and lacking the powers
of responsible government.

But precisely because the president of the Reich will
thus have a great deal of power, it is vital that there
should be the two other wielders of State authority,
to establish the eminently desirable modern form of
c authoritarian democracy 3 , which is fundamentally
distinct both from the dictatorship (of an individual or
of a party) and from the mass dominion (of parties or
councils) . Once more, fuller details will be found
below in Section Five.

Here it becomes necessary to say something very
important about the officialdom. In conformity with
the essential nature of the genuine 'people's State 3 which
we desire to establish, there must be no privileged
officials. Probably there is no popular sentiment more
widely diffused, and certainly there can be none better
justified, than discontent with an officialdom which
considers itself entitled to lead a sheltered life apart
from the economic struggles of the broad masses of the
people. Less than ever today do any exceptional
achievements of the officialdom warrant such a position.
When as a matter of principle the 'official 3 has become
nothing more than a 'public servant 3 , he will have to
fulfil all the demands for efficiency and hard work that
are made of the members of the liberal professions, and

184

P R O V I X C T A L SUBDIVISION

to share in the vicissitudes of the general welfare. In
other words, whereas In contemporary Germany the
officials have peculiar rights in that they cannot be
dismissed and are entitled to pensions when the new
order has been established, absolute security against
dismissal will have been forfeited by officials of all
grades, whilst the right to a pension will belong to every
German citizen without exception.

It will be a firm principle with German socialism that
a privileged and powerful officialdom bureaucracy, in
short will be a deadly peril, against which the only
safeguards are a maximum of self-government, and a
minimum of official rights. That is why strict supervision
and control of all public functionaries will be so im-
perative.

4. PROVINCIAL SUBDIVISION

One of the most difficult questions of German home
policy, hitherto, has been the puerile one, unitarism or
federalism? The question Is of typically liberal origin,
and It need hardly be said that the liberal answer has
always been Militarism 5 .

Though a conservative German will no less certainly
answer 'federalism*, it must not be supposed that he
dreams of making the present German States the units of
this new federalism. These States nowise correspond to
the organic integrality of the populations living within
their 'borders'. They came into being as a result of the
local dynasts' endeavour to bring as much territory and
as many "subjects 5 as possible under their respective
sways an endeavour which was most powerful (and

185

THE GERMAN SOCIALIST STATE

also most deleterious to Germany) In the Habsburg
monarchy.

It will, therefore, obviously be needful for Germany,
as a start, to break up and rearrange these separate
States.

I know that, as things are now, both Old Prussia
and New Prussia will strongly oppose the disintegration
of the State that passes by the name of Prussia, on the
ground that it would be disastrous to the Reich because
it would impair the formative energy of the Prussian
spirit,

I have, indeed, too much respect for the Prussian
spirit, and am too keenly aware of the important part
it has played in German history, to be moved by any
anti-Prussian resentment such as I might be supposed
to have imbibed in my Bavarian homeland.

But my knowledge of the German character and of
German history have convinced me that the Prussian
particularist solution was no more than an arbitrary
expedient which did not cease to be an arbitrary
expedient because it was advocated and adopted by
Frederick the Great and then by Bismarck. My general
understanding of historical interlacements convinces
me, indeed, that in the epoch of the (liberal) national
State there was no other way by which the Reich could
be established than by the hegemony of Prussia. But
the same understanding now informs me that the time
is ripe for a revival of the old (conservative) idea of the
Reich, an idea whose mystical interconnexion with the
rebirth of the West is overwhelmingly confirmed by the
history of the last thousand years.

The development of the German people into a true

1 86

P R O V I N G 1 A L S U B !) 1 V 1 S I O X

German nation (which I regard as the substantial

meaning of the German Revolution) demands and
compels that Prussian particularism in all its forms shall
be thrown into the melting-pot, demands and compels
a wedding of the Frederician German type with the

Theresian German type to procreate (anew) the
German for to the true German appertains a European
sense, w r hich was so conspicuously and fatefully lacking
in Prussian particularism.

This recognition of the necessarily unified character
of the German State is not an acceptance of the ideal of
liberal unitarisrn. For this unified German State must
not be ruled centrally from one spot. There are such
marked geopolitical, religious, and cultural differences
within the German people as to forbid a uniformity that
would conflict with the very nature of the Germans.
Though, therefore, the coming German realm will be
unified, it will be federally subdivided into provinces.
The extant arbitrarily formed States and territories
having been broken up, they will be rearranged into
from twelve to fifteen provinces, each corresponding to
a geopolitical, cultural, and tribal entity.

The weekly periodical I used to edit under the title of
c Der schwarze Front' 1 contains, in its issue of September
30, 1931, a sketch of the proposed provincial subdivision
of the German Reich as it then existed, to which I refer
readers who want more details.

The province will be subdivided into circles (Kreise),
each having approximately the size of the present circles
(in Bavaria, Bezirk; in Saxony, Amtshauptmannschaft;

1 It has now [1936] become Die deutsche Revolution^ Verlag Heinrich
Grunov, Prague.

187

THE GERMAN SOCIALIST STATE

in Wurtemberg, Oberamt; in Baden, Amtsbezirk; in
Mecklenburg and Oldenburg, Amt).

Reich province circle will thus be the organiza-
tional subdivision of the administrative areas of the
German State.

Each province will have its own president, who will
hold office for seven years. He will be appointed by the
president of the Reich, but the appointment will be
subject to the approval of the Provincial Chamber of
Estates. If this approval is withheld for two years in
succession, the provincial president will have to retire,
and the president of the Reich must appoint another.

In like manner the circle president will be appointed
for five years by the provincial president, and his
appointment will need the approval of the Circle
Chamber of Estates. Here also, if approval is withheld
once, the question will come up again after a year's
interval.

The need for confirmation of the appointment of the
chief provincial and circle officials by the respective
Chambers of Estates implies the exercise of an extremely
important influence by the popular assemblies. Thereby
the presidents of circles and provinces will become at
least as dependent upon the good will of the people
as upon that of their official superiors, and this is all the
more important because thus the popular influence in
the Great Council will go far beyond that in any case
exercised through the representatives directly elected
by the people (the five chairmen of the Reich Chambers
of Estates).

The prescription of a one-year-interval before a
second vote by which the president of a province or a

1 88

THE ESTATES SYSTEM

circle can be definitively dismissed safeguards these
officials against excessive mutability of public opinion,
and ensures in any case the continuous functioning of

State authority.

5 . THE ESTATES SYSTEM

A. Abolition of the Party System

The most important inference from the conservative
view that human beings (even the members of the same
people) are unequal in bodily, mental, and religious
respects, and therefore unequal in what they can do for
the community, is the repudiation of the (pseudo-)
democratic principle of equality.

A further inference is the recognition that every human
being can only form valid judgments about things and
persons that he knows from his own achievements and
from personal experience. This involves the repudiation
of the politico-parliamentary electoral system.

It is time to unveil the repulsive and gain-seeking
falsehood of popular government which is an essential
constituent of liberalism, which is disseminated by
selfish groups of capitalists, promulgated by inter-
nationals of all kinds, maintained by demagogy that
tickles the vanity of the masses and contributes to
securing for various obscure forces an influence and
leadership that would be impossible in a better-managed
State.

That is why the German socialists unconditionally
reject any kind of political election, any election by
political parties and groups which always remain
anonymous, and, conversely, why they insist that it is

189

THE GERMAN SOCIALIST STATE

necessary to establish a system of popular representa-
tion by vocational estates.

On principle these demands signify the end of all
political parties, and whatever kind of parliaments they
may have formed. From their very nature political
parties have a vital interest in sundering the people into
factions, for they exist through producing such a
cleavage, and their main task is to foster and intensify
oppositions of every kind by means of the press, public
meetings, etc. A genuine commonwealth of the people
can, therefore, only be established by the destruction
of the existing party system.

If I here reproduce without change what appears
concerning this matter in the first edition (1931) of the
Aufbau des deutschen So^ialismus^ it is only to show in how
inadequate, half-hearted, and therefore Inveracious a
way the Hitler System fulfilled this primary demand of
the German Revolution. The necessary and eminently
desirable dissolution of political parties was stayed as
regards the dissolution of the HItlerian Party; the (evil
and corrupt) system of rule by political parties was
replaced by the (still more evil and still more corrupt)
system of rule by a monopolist party.

All complaints made of the party system apply with
redoubled force to the monopolist party system of the
Hitler regime, which has all the drawbacks of the
multiple-party system and none of its advantages.

In my view the parliamentary form of party govern-
ment is incomparably preferable to any kind of un-
controlled personal or party dictatorship not forgetting
that there are varieties of parliamentary party govern-
ment, ranging from the ideal-democratic system of the

190

THE ESTATES SYSTEM

Swiss canton of Appenzell by way of the conservative-
democratic system of Great Britain to the demagogic-
democratic system of the Weimar Republic.

The fact that there are such diversities within the
field of parliamentary democracy shows that where
there are different preliminaries, at varying times and
under various developmental conditions, there may be
distinctive forms of democracy, and that It is conse-
quently incumbent upon us to study what new r kinds of
democracy may be called for by existing circum-
stances.

Nor must we forget the signal fact that during the last
decades of western social evolution there has been going
on everywhere a 'massing 5 of the people which cannot
fail to have momentous consequences. Owing to the
rapid growth of towns, of enormous towns, tentacular
towns, people have been uprooted from the countryside
and 'intellectualized* in a way that has weakened their
healthy instincts; this has been accompanied by a
growing inclination to overrate both machinery and
sport, these In their turn tending to hasten the general
despiritualization of life. The net upshot has been the
fateful change of the peoples into mere masses, a change
which has increasingly affected all the European
nations. Elsewhere/ discussing the matter in detail,
I have given concrete Instances of this trend and its
effect upon political life. Here, then. It will suffice to
reiterate my conclusion that this disastrous change from
people to mass will necessarily involve the decay of all
the old forms of democracy a decay that Is so con-

1 See my book Die deutsche BartholomaUsnacht [the German Massacre of

St. Bartholomew], Reso-Verlag, Zurich, 1935, pp. izg and foil.

THE GERMAN SOCIALIST STATE

spicuously displayed by the cheapjack methods of the

mass political parties of today.

A logical inference from this, reinforced by a know-
ledge of what has been happening in Germany, is that
the revival of the old parties has become impossible.

The German people's passive acceptance of these
(still no more than half-finished) workings of the Hitler
System shows very clearly [In 1936] how accurate was
the diagnosis of the situation I made five years ago,
and how In this respect the Hitler System has been
fulfilling the will of the German Revolution.

B. Vocational Councils

It is of the utmost importance, therefore, to establish
a new form of democracy which shall avoid the defects
of the old kinds, shall make due allowance for the
'massing 3 which has occurred, shall go out to meet the
dangers that have resulted therefrom, and shall over-
come them within its own structure trying, at the
same time, to arrest, and as far as may be to reverse, this
process of disintegration.

These things will only be possible if we can liberate
once more the mighty energies of self-government,
loosen the framework of society, educate the people by
systematically encouraging political responsibility in the
very lowest strata of the community, and thus consolidate
a supporting tier, without which authoritative demo-
cracy Is impossible.

We must therefore create, instead of the bureau-
cratically dictatorial State of fascist, bolshevist, or par-
liamentary irresponsibility, the genuinely popular State
of German democracy and aristocratic responsibility.

192

THE ESTATES SYSTEM

The principles and forms of an aristocratically
responsible way of carrying on the State have been
expounded in the first four sections of this chapter.
We now have to consider the principles and forms of
supervision and collaboration by the people, of self-
government by the estates, of what I call 'German
democracy 5 .

Starting from the conservative view enunciated above
(p. 189) that a human being can only form valid judg-
ments about things and persons that he knows from his
own achievements and from personal experience, we
arrive at the vocation as the basis of every 'choice', every
election, that the individual German can make in his own
sphere of achievement and personal experience.

Therewith is fulfilled another vital demand based upon
the conservative view, that only those citizens shall have
seat and vote in the Thing who contribute a prescribed
minimum by way of achievement on behalf of the
community, in a word, only those who work.

The demand that the electors should be personally
known is fulfilled by the circumstance that the 'con-
stituency' shall be the smallest 'administrative unit 5
the circle.

The German citizen will therefore make one primary
electoral act, within his own vocation and his own circle.

In each circle there will be elected five vocational
chambers, or vocational councils, namely:
the Workers' Council of the Circle,
the Peasants' Council of the Circle,
the Council of the Liberal Professions,
the Council for Industry and Trade,
the Council for Employees and Officials.

N 193

THE GERMAN SOCIALIST STATE

Each vocational council of the circle will consist of
twenty-five members elected for three years.

These vocational councils will be the only popular
assemblies that are the outcome of general, equal, secret 5
and direct election by persons active in a vocation or
retired therefrom.

They are exclusively vocational representations of
persons united by common interests.

This fact prescribes their sphere of activity. The
vocational councils will deal with all vocational interests;
will supervise wages, working conditions, vocational
training, etc.; they will be the experts to be consulted
upon all vocational questions by the national adminis-
tration; and, above all, they will decide matters of fiefs
and 'entails'. They alone will nominate the candidate
for any fief that becomes vacant, and the State will
ratify the appointment through the instrumentality of
the appropriate circle-president or else will refuse to
ratify it, in which case the vocational council concerned
will have to make a fresh nomination.

The vocational electors will naturally do their utmost
to elect as members of the vocational council the persons
best fitted for their task, being guided by a knowledge
of the candidates both in vocational and in private
life.

The further development of the vocational councils
will accord with the structure of the administration in
this way, that the vocational councils of the circles will
elect the five vocational councils of the province,
consisting of fifty members each, belonging to the
appropriate vocation; and the vocational councils of
the provinces will elect the five vocational councils of

194

THE ESTATES SYSTEM

the Reich, each consisting of one hundred members,
belonging to the appropriate vocation.

The decisive feature here is that these elections of the
provincial chambers and the Reich chambers Is not
primary,, but Indirect; not by the ultimate electors, but
by the members of the next lower grade of vocational
representation. The object here is, of course, to ensure
that the most capable and effective vocational represen-
tatives shall rise into the higher bodies, which will be
guaranteed all the more securely by indirect election
without any canvassing of the primary electorate
because the election of the fittest is in the Interest of
each vocation.

The members of the provincial vocational council
will be elected for five years, those of the Reich vocational
council for seven.

The sphere of activity of the higher councils will be
identical with that of the circle councils. Substitutes
will have to be elected to a lower council in place of
those appointed to a higher council.

Thus the vocational councils will represent the interests
of all the active workers in Germany,

It is Important to note that the self-government of these
councils will be absolutely independent, whereas In
Italy and Russia the State and the respective monopolist
parties dominate (that is to say interfere with) the self-
government of the active workers. This is especially
marked in Italy, where none but members of the Fascist
Party or the fascist unions are eligible for election and
entitled to vote, the representation of the active workers
being thus limited to a small fraction of the population
(carefully sifted by the organs of the State), consisting

*95

THE GERMAN SOCIALIST STATE

of persons in relation to whom the masses of active
workers have no rights whatever. (It is the same here
in Germany under the Hitler System, without even the
trifling fragment of the corporations.)

It is somewhat different in Russia, where (in theory,
at least) the whole mass of active workers has the suf-
frage. Still, the different categories of active workers
have different voting powers, and some are expressly dis-
franchized. Five peasant votes correspond to one
worker vote though we are told that there is to be a
change in the next elections; and many persons engaged
in 'bourgeois 3 vocations, notably the intellectual pro-
fessions, are disfranchized. It is significant that in
Russia the motions that are to be voted on are decided
by the party, and merely have to be 'approved 5 by the
assemblies. Also we note in Russia a very remarkable
fact that whereas in the councils of the lower grade there
are many non-party members (of course persons
acceptable to the party), there is a much larger propor-
tion of communists in the middle-grade bodies, and the
highest councils consist exclusively of party members.
This signifies that there can be no genuine, independent,
democratic representation of the interests of all active
workers.

Contrariwise the war-cry of German socialism is that
we shall ensure unrestricted, truly democratic self-
government by all the active workers of the population.
There must be no influence exerted by, no dependence
upon, any powerful group or party, and least of all upon
the State. No matter what the State may desire, under
the German system any German who enjoys the con-
fidence of others that pursue the same vocation will be

196

THE ESTATES SYSTEM

able to make his way into the highest offices by which the
State Is controlled and led; even becoming a member of
the Reich Chamber of Estates or the Great Council.
This will mean the most complete democracy attainable
and without a chance of Its degenerating Into demagogic
rule.

C. Chambers of Estates

Inasmuch as the vocational councils of the circle, the
province, and the Reich will represent nothing but
vocational Interests, they must be supplemented by
general popular representation.

In each administrative unit (circle, province, Reich)
there will, consequently, be formed out of Its vocational
councils a Chamber of Estates, as follows.

The Circle Chamber of Estates will consist of twenty-
five persons elected by the vocational councils of that
circle and three additional members nominated by the
circle president. These nominees must be eminent and
respected inhabitants of the circle.

The Provincial Chamber of Estates will consist of
fifty persons elected by the vocational councils of the
province and five additional members nominated by
the president of the province.

The Reich Chamber of Estates will consist of one
hundred persons elected by the vocational councils of the
Reich and ten additional members nominated by the
president of the Reich.

Of decisive importance to the composition of the
Chambers of Estates is It to make sure that they shall
faithfully reflect the sociological stratification of the
circle, the province, or the Reich. For this reason the

THE GERMAN SOCIALIST STATE

various vocational councils will not elect the same
number of members each to the appropriate Chamber
of Estates, but a number proportional to the composition
of the population in the administrative area concerned.
If, for instance, in a province there are 40% of workers,
25% of peasants, 10% of tradespeople, 10% practising
the liberal professions, and 15% of employees or officials,
then the membership of the Chamber of Estates must
comprise the same respective proportions. Of the fifty
members of this provincial Chamber of Estates, twenty
would be industrial workers; twelve, peasants; five,
tradesmen; five, members of the liberal professions;
eight, employees or officials. One necessary limitation
to this would be that no vocation must have more than
50% of the members of the Chamber, so that it would
not be possible for one of the estates to command a clear
majority over the others.

In each administrative area the presidium of a
Chamber of Estates would be formed by the five chair-
men of the vocational councils.

The sphere of activity of a Chamber of Estates is
fundamentally different from that of a vocational
council.

The Chambers of Estates form an important part of
the State administration and State leadership.

Their collaboration in every governmental measure
is direct insofar as every decree by a circle president
or provincial president would need the approval of the
appropriate Chamber of Estates. Moreover, as explained
in Section Four of this chapter (pp. 188 and 189), the
circle president and the provincial president will need
to enjoy the confidence of their respective Chambers of

198

THE ESTATES SYSTEM

Estates for the proper performance of their official
duties.

But the right of veto possessed by a Circle Chamber of
Estates or a Provincial Chamber of Estates only becomes
effective when exerted, about the same matter, for a
second time after a year's interval. This measure cuts
both ways: for, on the one hand 5 it prevents the holding-
up of measures urgently required for the good of the
State; and, on the other hand, the permanent enforce-
ment of an unpopular measure, or the continuance in
office of an unpopular president, will be prevented by
the system of popular representation.

In addition the activity of the Chambers of Estates
will render possible their authoritative supervision of
the whole State administration in the area under their
control, and especially their collaboration In matters of
consumption, prices, quality, etc.

The duration of the Chambers of Estates, in con-
formity with that of the vocational councils, will be
three years for the circle, five for the province, seven for
the Reich.

The special duties of the Reich Chamber of Estates
as the legislative body, and the further duties of its
presidium of five (consisting of the chairmen of the five
Reich vocational councils) has been discussed in Section
Three of this chapter.

Not unimportant is it to mention that representative
services in the vocational councils and Chambers of
Estates will be honorary. Compensation will be allowed
for loss of time and out-of-pocket expenses., but there
will be no financial advantage In holding such a
post.

THE GERMAN SOCIALIST STATE

The decisive importance of this scheme for the repre-
sentation of the estates, lies in the fact that thereby the
popular will can find expression throughout the work
of administration no matter what the State authorities
may do or desire to do.

The distinction between vocational councils and
Chambers of Estates, both as regards their composition
and as regards their duties, is of the utmost moment.

Whilst the vocational councils give expression and
influence to the vertical stratification of the German
people, the Chambers of Estates represent the horizontal
stratification, and thus give a cross-section through
the interests of various parts of the population in all areas
of the Reich.

The councils represent purely vocational interests, so
that their duties are correspondingly restricted to the
particular vocations and the relation of these to the
State; but the Chambers secure for the localities a
general popular representation, and consequently form
an important part of the general State administration
and State guidance.

Of especial consequence is it that thereby will be
ensured a direct and lasting popular control of the State
and its officials in all parts of the State apparatus.

In the fascist State there is no such control; in the
bolshevik State it can only be exercised c by way of the
Party 5 (which is almost identical with the State); and
in the parliamentary State, at the best, control can only
be exercised by unseating the government, which is often
a difficult matter. But the Circle and Provincial
Chambers of Estates, with their right of veto over circle
president and territorial president, can control the State

200

THE ESTATES SYSTEM

apparatus permanently, directly, and effectively; can
control it from the bottom to the top through the
instrumentality of independent popular representatives.
Hereby we realize the idea of a people's State as con-
trasted with bureaucracy.

2OI

CHAPTER FOUR

CULTURAL POLICYOF GERMAN
SOCIALISM

I. CONSERVATIVE REALISM

IN conformity with our knowledge of the completeness
of the revolution that is inevitable, and is therefore in
progress, we realize that there is also going on a revolu-
tionary change in peoples' minds. They are forming a
new estimate of the meaning of life and of the task that
awaits mankind.

The philosophy of the liberal epoch has been and still
is materialism. Nothing typifies Marxism more plainly
than the fact that it is tainted with alien views of
socialism, that its program is shaped by the materialist
philosophy which it shares with liberalism.

Before the French Revolution we already encounter
traces of a new outlook on life - the outlook of those who
aspire to break away from their allegiance to God, and to
take their stand exclusively upon the logical plane of a
human knowledge that has been freed from sparks of
the divine.

This rationalist way of looking at things involved a
number of serious errors. The rationalists and material-
ists believed themselves able to explain nature; but they
failed to grasp nature in its entirety, in its relations to life;
they recognized no other phenomena than those that
could be numbered, weighed, and measured, and thus
subjected to what they regarded as 'law'. All that lay

202

CONSERVATIVE REALISM

beyond this., which was non-rational and therefore *un~
reasonable 3 , all that was inaccessible to the reason, to
the understanding, having been deliberately excluded
from observation, they then went on trying to force
their rationalist laws upon the non-rational.

The development of science, which convinced them
they would be able to understand and explain every-
thing, induced an overweening pride which made them
regard the understanding of the ego as the measure of
all things, and recognize as real only that which the
understanding (thus limited) could grasp. Matter and
force were the foundations of all being. The rationalists,
the materialists, felt that they could really understand
matter, but force remained inexplicable. Still, this did
not bother these would-be 'explainers 3 . The contempla-
tion of dead matter, of its atomic structure, of the juxta-
position of these atoms and their mechanical relations in
a universe where they were moved by named but in-
explicable forces, became the foundation of their picture
of the world, the basis of the materialist outlook of
materialism.

To us conservatives this attempt of the liberals to
evade the mysteries of life, the subordinations to destiny,
with the methods of a soulless logic, seems to us as childish
as would be the endeavour to ascertain the perfume of
a flower with a yardstick or a weighing machine.
Humbly and modestly we recognize that the decrees
of fate lie outside human control, and that it behoves
man to abide by these decrees in a word, to accept
'God's will'. We know and accept His will as the pre-
supposition of all that befalls man and of all human
action, and we solve the eternal enigma of the freedom

203

CULTURAL POLICY OF GERMAN SOCIALISM

of the human will by saying that the 'What' lies without
the sphere of that will, but the 'How 5 within.

We thus find a new significance for life in the fulfil-
ment of the c God-willed' specific peculiarities of our
people, in the affirmation and perfectionment of the
people's soul as a revelation from God.

But we should only be making a blunder akin to that
of the materialists were we, in our turn, to proclaim
idealism as an exclusive philosophy of the world.

Indubitably it has been one of the great and never-
to-be-forgotten services of liberalism in general and of
Marxism in particular to have proved how valuable
and important to life are material forces, material
relations, and material functions; a service which abides,
however much the liberals and the Marxians may have
underestimated the value and importance of ideal forces,
ideal relations, and ideal functions.

Were the German socialists, instead, to overestimate
the value and importance of idealism, they would be
false to the crucial doctrine of the neo-conservative
organic philosophy, according to which the true and
all-embracing reality of life is discoverable in the
relations and the functions of the necessarily unified
forces of body, mind, and soul. We are justified there-
fore in speaking of conservative realism as the typical
philosophy of the German socialists.

2. RELIGION AND CHURCH

Conservative realism not only regards the power of
faith as one of the most splendid manifestations of the
soul, but also affirms the greatness and everlastingness

204

RELIGION AND CHURCH

of the religious sentiment which unites the human soul
with God.

But our humility towards every true religion must not
blind us to the fact that not only religious ideas, but also
(and even more) religious forms, i.e. the Churches, are
intertwined with the specific peculiarities of the various
nations and with the general laws of human transitori-
ness which finds expression in the mutability of all the
phenomena of life.

Here, then, arises (more especially in view of the turn
the German Revolution has taken of late), the question
where Christianity stands in the picture.

We should be false to the teachings of history were we
to deny that the source of Christianity did not flow from
the spot where the heart of the West beats. But if, as we
showed In the chapter on Philosophical Foundations, the
concept 'West 3 includes the religious elements of history
as well as the racial and geopolitical ones, it follows un-
deniably that the mighty experience of Christianity has
been an inseparable constituent of the West, and that any
attempt to eliminate it would be as foolish and imprac-
ticable as to attempt to make the impressions of two
thousand years of history non-existent.

This does not mean that the mutations of the West, as
determined by the eternal law of growing older and by
the rhythmic change in ideas, will not have a decisive
influence upon Christianity itself. If today far-seeing
Christian theologians speak and write both of the c Ger-
manization of Catholicism 5 and of the 'Catholicization of
Protestantism', 1 this shows to how great an extent muta-

1 Cf. the article entitled 'Katholische Kirche und National- Sozlalismus* in the
Neue Zurdwr Zeitung, No. 1268, July 21, 1935.

205

CULTURAL POLICY OF GERMAN SOCIALISM

tion Is going on in Christianity. A glance at the religious
and organizational struggles in the Protestant Churches
and in the Greek Orthodox Church, at the changed and
changing relations between Catholicism and Protestant-
ism, and also between the Catholic Church and the
Greek Orthodox Church, will confirm the view that
political and economic structural changes in the West
are bound to have a decisive influence upon its religious
and cultural forms,

Ail this Indicates that Christianity and Europe are not
antitheses, but that, on the contrary, the mental attitude
of the West has been formed and determined by Chris-
tianity which itself, though beginning outside Europe,
has largely been domiciled there for ages.

In this connexion the reader will do well to refer back
to the last paragraph on p. 98, where I deal with the
question of the relation of the Eastern Catholic (Ortho-
dox) Churches to Western Europe.

The author does not wish, nor does he feel competent,
to go more deeply into these eminently personal religious
problems. Enough to have referred to the matter In
general terms, and to have recognized (with considerable
gratification) that inside and outside Christianity great
and vigorous movements are heralding a religious re-
naissance, though without as yet having any obvious
effect upon the extant Churches.

Above all he is interested in the relations between
State and Church, and is strongly in favour of the separa-
tion of the two.

This separation would mean the end of an unworthy
dependence of the Church upon the State, and also the
beginning of a free development of the extant Churches.

206

RELIGION AND CHURCH

It would still be the obvious duty of the State to protect
the Churches against attack from without.

A separation of the main Church in a country from
the State would likewise be beneficial to other religious
communities, and would favour the growth of all genuine
religious movements, with whose internal affairs the
State should never interfere.

The proclamation of the freedom of faith and con-
science would be usefully supplemented by a recognition
of the freedom of art and science, whose healthy growth
needs independence from the rule of the average man
and what more can any State be in these respects? Then
only will the intellectual and artistic rivalry of the Euro-
pean nations, an Olympiad of the spirit, be really fruitful,
so that a cultural renovation of Europe will be no less
certain than a political and economic revival.

The press requires special consideration. Though on
principle we demand the freedom of the press, liberty
does not mean libertinage, as it has done often enough
under liberal auspices. Guarantees will have to be given
to ensure that freedom shall not be misused.

The most effective guarantee will be insistence that
every contribution to a periodical shall be signed. The
abolition of anonymity and of the editorial 'we 3 will
make the writer responsible both politically and legally.
Another valuable safeguard will be that a sharp distinc-
tion shall be drawn between politics and business. It
must be made impossible for the advertisement columns
to influence the 'news'. This will be achieved by an
advertisement monopoly, and the consequently reduced
cost of production and distribution in the case of many
commodities will have a good effect on prices.

207

CULTURAL POLICY OF GERMAN SOCIALISM
3. THE NEW SCHOOL

The position and form of the school is of direct interest
to the present work.

The position and form of the school are dependent
upon the importance attached to the school, and upon
the tasks assigned to it by popular culture and the Ger-
man State.

For the State, the school is the principal means by
which the intellectual leaders are sifted out. Though
earlier I have castigated and repudiated the liberal
illusion concerning human equality, I nevertheless
ardently champion the conservative doctrine that
equality of opportunity is essential that, as far as can
be, all should be given an equal start in the race of life.
There must be no needless handicaps.

Nothing but an equal start for all citizens can ensure
that there shall be an organic stratification into 'estates',
that is to say into groups of similar, equally competent,
equally directed human beings whose occupation is in
harmony with their 'calling' instead of a disastrous
stratification into 'classes', this meaning into groups of
dissimilar, variously competent, variously directed human
beings who follow the same occupation, not because they
have a 'calling', but because they have been forced to.

To give an equal start, education at all the schools
must be free, and the pupils will be gratuitously supplied
with the requisite books and materials. Arrangements
must also be made to render it possible for every pupil
at an elementary school to pass on to a higher school,
no matter where he lives for of course there will not be
a secondary school in every district. The cost of attend-

208

THE NEW SCHOOL

ing such schools at a distance from the pupils 5 homes will
be defrayed by the State.

A people's community can have only one kind of
primary schools, at which there will be separate classes
for more highly gifted and less highly gifted children.
When the course at the elementary school is finished,
education will be continued at a technical or vocational
school, in other cases at a higher school,, and later, in
suitable cases, at a university. The uniformity of system
does not mean that all the schools will be exactly alike,
for they will be variously adapted to peculiarities in the
provinces and circles.

The subjects taught in the elementary school will be
German, history, arithmetic, knowledge of the homeland,
the beginnings of natural science, bodily exercises, gar-
dening, simple technical training the aim being, not
to 'impart information 5 but to educate Germans. The
age for attendance at the elementary school will be from
six to fourteen, inasmuch as not until after puberty will
the vocation be chosen and vocational training begin.
Before that, the child will be growing up into the German
cultural world, without having his mind unduly diverted
towards alien cultures during the receptive years of
childhood.

At puberty a child will pass on from the elementary
school, either to a vocational (technical) school, or else
to a higher school where training in the direction of the
intellectual professions will be carried on.

At a high school, education will be more diversified.
Since German culture will have been thoroughly instilled
at the elementary school, alien cultures can now be
taught, for there will be little risk of alien contamination.

o 209

CULTURAL POLICY OF GERMAN SOCIALISM

When the high-school education is finished, selection
of pupils for the university will take place. Here it is not
simply the 'amount of knowledge' that has been acquired
which will be taken into consideration, but also the
character that will be considered desirable in a person
destined to be one of the future leaders of the German
people.

The decisive feature of the selection will be, not that
the youngsters (or their parents for them) want university
education, but the will of the community, as expressed
through the teaching staffs and the examiners (who must
have had plenty of practical experience) . Mistakes can
be avoided by insisting, not only on promotion certificates
from the school which is being left, but on the passing of
an entrance examination at the higher school or univer-
sity to which the pupil is going.

These methods will fulfil the aims of any careful and
intelligent system of State leadership, that the best
elements of the whole population shall be given a good
chance of rising to the top. Only a lasting and self-
regulative process of renovation can prevent the occur-
rence of 'morbid stasis' here and there in the national
organism.

It is expedient to point out that for such a structural
alteration in the German educational system, a spiritual
change throughout will be indispensable.

Hitherto the main object of schooling has been to 'im-
part information', but henceforward it will be regarded
as at least equally important to train character. As a
result, not only will the pupil's character have a decisive
influence upon his chances of promotion to a higher
school or a university, but the educational institutions

210

THE NEW SCHOOL

will thereby be profoundly modified both subjectively
and objectively.

More especially the universities will differ greatly from
our present ones. They will lose the duplex character
they now have of being institutions both for teaching and
for research. Whereas, nowadays, for practical reasons
more emphasis is usually laid upon research than upon
teaching, in days to come there will be great stress on
teaching and on character-training. The universities
will be of a collegiate type, that is to say they will be cir-
cumscribed institutions, in the country rather than in
towns, with an attached economic branch where in the
vacations the students will be engaged in practical
labours. The two first terms will be devoted to general
philosophical, historical, and artistic studies, after which
the separation into faculties will begin. Great value will
be attached to sports, comradeship, and the like; each
university will probably have its own tradition, to the
maintenance of which sometime-students' clubs will
contribute.

The higher schools will be analogous to our present
gymnasia, but early specialization will be avoided,
Special importance will be attached to high schools
having courses conducted in foreign tongues, which will
not only promote close touch with the intellectual world
of foreign nations, but will encourage the appearance of
many good linguists among the Germans. (This will
further have a good effect upon the national minorities
living in Germany, and will encourage foreigners to come
to German schools.)

One may hope that former pupils of a high school will
continue to take a lively interest in its work, partly in the

CULTURAL POLICY OF GERMAN SOCIALISM

indirect form of patronage, partly in the direct form of
assistance as examiners. These outsiders, both in the
high school and in the elementary school,, will assist the
teaching staff in deciding a pupil's chances of promotion.
It is of fundamental importance that by thus regulating
promotion the State should be able to prevent the over-
stocking of the country's professional intelligentsia, for
any such overproduction of intellectuals or would-be in-
tellectuals is most unwholesome to the social organism.

4. ARMY AND LABOUR SERVICES

However much we may insist on the need for a sifting
by character, the school, from its very nature, will always
tend to lay more weight upon intelligence tests.

How important it is therefore that schooling should be
followed by another method of selection which allows
adequately for the fact that in human beings the forma-
tion of character is not completed until after puberty,
when the first educational period is over.

This supplementary testing will be effected in the uni-
versal labour service and in the voluntary army service.

For all young Germans of both sexes the close of early
vocational training will be followed by a year of labour
service in which the pupil will have to learn a handicraft.
This year of labour service, during which the pupils will
lead a comradely life that will be of considerable social
importance, will also enable young Germans to revise
their choice of a vocation, and will subject them to a
process of selection that will help to disclose (after they
have left the elementary school) those that are fitted for
an intellectual vocation.

212

GERMAN LAW, JUSTICE, AND RIGHT

Of peculiar importance in selection by character will
also be the period of voluntary military service for those
that undertake it. This follows from the constitutional
inequality of human beings, a recognition of which 1
have several times explained as one of the main features
of the conservative philosophy.

Whereas a year of labour service will be compulsory,
report for army service will be a voluntary affair. Inas-
much as military service will continue for several years,
is not associated with the acquisition of new, privately
useful knowledge, and involves considerable risk in the
event of war, we may be sure that none but the nationally
useful young fellows will wish to enter the army, In this
way will be ensured the racial selection of those who will
form the supporting stratum of the German socialist State.

The outstanding value of such a selection, which will
confer on those who are sifted out a new title to nobility.
will be that the title is acquired, not by birth, but by
personal choice.

The extreme political importance of such a sustaining
stratum, which will extend through all vocations and
estates, can be underlined once more by providing that
every person who occupies a highly esteemed un-
rermmerated position (all magistrates, guardians, trustees,
etc.) shall be taken from this stratum.

5. GERMAN LAW, JUSTICE, AND RIGHT

Our account of the national culture would be in-
adequate should we fail to insist how essential it is that
this culture shall favour the development of a German
system of law, justice, and right.

213

CULTURAL POLICY OF GERMAN SOCIALISM

It is self-evident from the national outlook that there
can be no such thing as law per se', for the consciousness
of right and the prevailing forms of law derive from the
peculiarities of each people, from the age it has reached,
and from the ideas that are at any time dominant.

That basic notion secured expression in our demand for
a new economic law, and I have again and again stressed
the national peculiarity of this economic law of German
socialism.

But the law relating to persons needs a no less radical
transformation than the law relating to things. It is pre-
posterous to suppose that the present Civil Code can
remain in force for as much as a day after the German
Revolution has become effective.

Without going into too much detail I may mention as
the fundamental idea of German law that the protection
of honour is more important than the protection of things
and rights. Another very important notion is that the
Roman-Christian idea of punishment must be replaced
by the Teutonic idea of reparation or compensation, and
that the essential purpose of legal activity is not to dis-
cover individual blame, but to prevent injury to society.

The basic difference between the German law of to-
morrow and the Civil Code of today will result in a
complete change as regards punishments, and, above all,
will reduce to a minimum the present absurd practice of
punishing people by depriving them of liberty. As re-
gards the enormous majority of offences, the cruel pun-
ishment of depriving the offender of liberty will give
place to making him compensate whoever has been
injured by imposing a fine which will be levied in case of
need by making the offender work in a State workhouse

214

ELITE AND IDEAL TYPE

without imprisonment. All offences against the com-
munity will be expiated by excluding the offender from
the community temporarily or permanently, either by
banishment or death. Thereby a repetition of the offence
will be prevented.

Of decisive value for the carrying out of such ideas,
especially during the period of transition, will be the
abolition of expert courts in which judges and lawyers
function. Instead there will be peoples 3 courts, where" the
sound instincts of the people can be trusted to observe the
principles of German law, justice, and right until new
legal forms have been elaborated,

6. ELITE AND IDEAL TYPE

The foregoing remarks upon the cultural program
of German socialism are fragmentary and sketchy, this
being partly due to the nature of the topic and partly to
my own inadequacy. Still, I can supplement them by
saying a few more words about their aim.

Their aim is to insist upon the need for cultivating an
elite of the German people, in accordance with an ideal
type that shall conform to the essential nature of the
Germans.

This ideal type must be deeply rooted in the constitu-
tional characteristics of the German people, and must
therefore have the traits which the study of German
history from its beginnings has made familiar to us; and
yet, on the other hand, it must be modern enough to
conform with the requirements of the socialist order to
be established in the twentieth century.

Both demands will be fulfilled by producing the Old-

215

CULTURAL POLICY OF GERMAN SOCIALISM

German type of knight, the chivalrous being whose best
characteristics are embodied in all the greatest figures of
German civilization, and who stand forth from the
earlier (conservative) epochs of German history.

German education must be concentrated upon the
production of this knightly, this chivalrous type, even as
English education is concentrated upon the production
of the type of the 'gentleman 3 which has been maintained
for generations.

Here it becomes needful to return briefly to the
problem of the upbuilding of the State. Before, when we
were considering the revolutionary birth of the new order,
we could only answer negatively the problem of how to
produce this supporting stratum (by referring to the fact
that the party system would have to be abolished) ; but
now, again insisting upon the revolutionary genesis of the
new order, we can throw light on the matter positively.

The production, the culture, of a supporting stratum,
of an elite, is the vital problem of the new order, and
upon its solution will depend the permanency and the
satisfactory working of German socialism.

It will not suffice to do no more than formulate the
principles of selection for intelligence and character, and
to organize the process of selection by the schools, the
labour service, and the voluntary army, for we shall also
have to explain what will guide us in the actual practice
of our methods of selection.

The picture of the new order proclaimed in this work,
the new order of national freedom, social justice, and
European collaboration, will be crowned by the declara-
tion that the elite, the ideal type we aim at installing as
leaders of Germany shall be the 'knights', that mighty

216

ELITE AND IDEAL TYPE

creation which appeared so early in the West; which,
unrestricted by national frontiers, became symbolic of
the whole European community; and is now, consistently
enough, being revived simultaneously with the resurrec-
tion of the West.

For this, and nothing else, is the meaning and the con-
tent of the German Revolution:

The Resurrection of the West.

217

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
OF THE AUFBAU

THIS work is the first attempt at a complete transformation of
German life in the sense of that mighty revolution which has
been going on under our eyes since 1914. It is, in a sense, an
account of the structure of the new crystal whose coming we
foresee, whose forms we can deduce from the nature of the
lye, from the forces that animate it, and the laws under which
it works.

This remark exemplifies both the defects and the merits of
such an attempt. The precise thinker would like to be shown
finality, with every detail made manifest, and a timetable
accurately drawn. But we are dealing with organic processes
which defy accuracy of this sort. We recognize that organic
processes are subject to their own internal laws, and it is from
these that issue the forms which are predictable in accordance
therewith. The better acquainted we are with these laws, the
more fully will our predictions be confirmed by the reality.
We conservative revolutionaries (for thus do I and my friends
regard ourselves) are always aware that the organic process is
primary, and that our schemata can be no more than sketches
of what will go on within that process. In other words, when
there is a conflict between life and a plan, life is always right,
and the plan must be modified to suit it.

Despite these provisos and limitations, it seems expedient to
draft our plan, for this will help to explain and give a meaning
to what has been happening since 1914, and to all the sacrifices
of wealth and blood that have been demanded of the German
people during these eighteen years. It will console us, will
encourage us to bear the last years of the transition, will give

221

APPENDIXES

us strength to further the new developments; for awareness of
what is happening, when it comes to countless Germans, will
give them a sense of purpose which can accelerate the changes
and make the sacrifices seem less onerous. The clearer the
grasp of the direction and the better the preparations, the less
resistance will there be, and the smaller the sacrifices.

It seems to us as if the tediousness of the process we term the
German Revolution were an indication given by fate that the
German people must systematically and deliberately prepare
for the revolution, must recognize that the sacrifices of wealth
and blood demanded are not more than the organism of the
German people (no longer very young) can properly be ex-
pected to bear, and that the last violent act of birth can be
achieved with a minimal loss of energy.

That is how the author and his friends contemplate the
German situation, and they believe it to be incumbent on them
to explain what they have learned from the last two decades of
German history, to indicate the nature of the trend which
discloses itself and to show how its fulfilment offers the only
way of restoring health to the German people. To promote
such a restoration of health must assuredly be the aim of
German policy.
Berlin, Autumn, 1931.

222

APPENDIX II

POSTFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
OF THE A UFBA U

WITHIN the narrow framework of a sketch of the upbuilding
of German socialism I have tried to give an account of the new
order whose establishment will supply a meaning to all the
sacrifices of the last two decades. I know only too well that
many important details have been omitted, but I trust that the
intelligent reader will be able to fill in the gaps for himself.

There is one question I have intentionally refrained from
trying to answer how realization should be or can be secured.
Even when the question has been mooted, it will be plain from
the (repeatedly stressed) organic nature of the process that the
answer cannot be a simple one.

Still, some parts of the answer are concrete enough. Neces-
sarily the change will occur by way of revolution. All organic
new-formation demands, in the last resort, a violent act as is
seen plainly enough in birth, though here the new-formation
has been completed some time before. In our view, then, the
violent act is not the beginning but the end of the revolution,
the end of the reconstruction of the feelings, the thoughts, and
the will of the Germans.

Another signpost on this road to the German Revolution is
that a system can never be overthrown by the tools belonging
to that system, but only by the tools that belong to the coming
system, the one destined to be victorious. He, therefore, who
uses liberal weapons to defeat a liberal system, will inevitably
fail. Practical political consequences of this view are that we
must ruthlessly oppose any democratic choice, any participa-
tion in a coalition with the old system, any opportunist attempt

223

APPENDIXES

to maintain a portion of the system or one of its essential
measures.

Of great importance, finally, is it to recognize that this
revolution will not be made by the masses, but by a small
number of persons who are ready to take risks, who have in
their minds a clear picture of the new order, who are sufficiently
self-sacrificing and sufficiently pugnacious to stake their lives
in the hope of making their picture a reality.

This demands strength of character; readiness to endure
solitude, persecution, mental and spiritual isolation. Unless
the would-be revolutionist is prepared, as were Lenin and his
associates, to risk exile or a long term in Siberia, fate will not
hold him worthy to share responsibility for establishing the
new order.

It is my daily prayer that great numbers of Germans see this
and possess the required energy, so that at length there may be
established in Germany the new order on behalf of which
millions of the best of my fellow-countrymen have died.

Hail Germany!

224

APPENDIX III

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
OF THE A UFBA U

NEARLY five years have passed since the first edition of this
book was published.

They have been eventful years: and Adolf Hitler's rise to
power on January 30, 1933, substantially forms part of the
contents of my book.

It is obvious that the second edition might pay heed to many
other happenings which five years ago were not so manifest as
was the likelihood of Hitler's rise. If, nevertheless, little change
has been needed in the second edition, this shows the general
accuracy of our view of the German Revolution, and amounts
to a proof of the conformity of history to law a notion that
was embodied in our Philosophical Foundations.

The purpose of this book having been to draft the Structure
of German Socialism, i.e. to give a design for the New Germany
(as part of what will certainly be a New Europe), polemic was
needless, just as little as an architect is disposed to argue about
or find justifications for this or that detail of his drawings of a
new cathedral (except where argument may be needed to
clear up some otherwise doubtful point) .

No, what was necessary, now and again, was to show that
the draft paid due heed to extant data, and yet solved all the
important problems that arose. Also it was important that the
author should make his meaning clear, even as an architect
must clearly show what he is planning to build. But the
architect is not concerned with the question whether those
who examine his plans will agree with him in every detail.

Of course such a method of demonstration involves a certain
coldness, a lack of impetus, a dryness of exposition. But one

P 225

APPENDIXES

who, beyond the details, can see the great aim, one who bears
within his own mind a vision of the cathedral of German
socialism, one who feels the rhythm of life that pulsates beneath
the abundance of social and economic details such a one
will grasp the essential spirituality of a dry architectural
design, and will gain thereby the will-to-action without which
knowledge and experience are no better than a tale told by an
idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.

It is the will-to-action that transforms such a design as this
from 'words, words, words 3 into a play of motive forces, and
sounds a fanfare that induces all those who wish to mould the
future to get together and start building the cathedral, New
Germany, New Europe.

Prague. Spring, 1936.

226

APPENDIX IV

POSTFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
OF THE A UPBAU

THE postface to the second edition of this book cannot
content itself with generalities like those of the postface
to the first edition, but must start from the fact of the Hitler
System, and show the downfall of that system to be an indis-
pensable preliminary to German socialism.

There has been no change in my general attitude to the
Hitler System and to the party which sustains it. As I explained
in my book Die deutsche Bartholomdusnacht [the German Massacre
of St. Bartholomew, Reso-Verlag, Zurich, 1935], the Hitler
System represents the (transient) Gironde epoch of the
German Revolution, the interlude of revolutionary feelings
and reactionary forms, which arises spontaneously out of a
progressive internal radicalizatlon, and thereby (mostly by a
detour into war) clears the ground for an epoch of revo-
lutionary construction.

This observation supplies the task, the strategy, and the
tactics of the German socialists as against the Hitler System.
With uncompromising energy and with any and every means
(other than those which might run counter to their own ideas),
and with unswerving resolution, they must work for the over-
throw of the Hitler System.

The decisive point is that this struggle can only be successful
if, and in so far as, they have recognized and solved the urgent
economic, social, and cultural problems. Hitler was only
possible and inevitable because these urgent problems had not
been solved - and Hitler will fall because he, too, has not
solved them.

227

APPENDIXES

It behoves us to effect the overthrow of the Hitler System; it
behoves us, therefore, above all, to soiv$ these urgent problems,
and thus to inaugurate a new epoch of German and European
history, whose business it is to give human life once more a
meaning and a goal.

228

APPENDIX V

DANGER OF THE PARTITION OF
GERMAN Y

[Translation of the first January Issue in 1937 of c Die deutschc
Revolution' , a bi-monthly issued as the organ of the Black
Front, edited by Otto Strasser, published (then) in Prague
and Copenhagen.]

DANGER OF THE PARTITION OF GERMANY

THE Hitler System will bring war, and war will bring the
partition of Germany, unless a Socialist Revolution in Ger-
many comes in time to prevent it.

With deep concern all patriotic Germans watch the opening
of 1937, for their observations convince them that this will be
a crucial year.

The Hitler System is, with inevitable consistency, being
driven towards the end, along the road it entered on June 30 3
1934 [the date of the Blood Bath].

Before this, Hitler had not yet made his choice between the
two alternatives that were open to him at the beginning of that
year Socialist Revolution and Fascist War which from the
first were implicit in the nature, the theory, and the practice
of the Hitler System.

On June 30, 1934, this system entered the bloody road
leading to war, for by the murder of the advocates of the
second revolution Adolf Hitler blocked the path that would
have led to German socialism. The question whether in this
matter he was driver or driven is of little consequence to our
political j udgmen t.

Since then, with somnambulist confidence, he has been

229

APPENDIXES

advancing towards war, whose successive stages - armament,
compulsory military service, the fortification of Rhineland,
Danzig, two years' army service, the treaty between Germany
and Japan are still fresh in all men's memories.

However just and necessary it was and is, for the sake of
our national freedom and the future of Germany, to shake off
the fetters of the Treaty of Versailles, it was and is no less
unreasonable and criminal to adopt and advocate German
imperialism in place of the imperialism of those who coerced
us in 1919.

Apart from the fact that one injustice is not overcome by
substituting for it another injustice, every glance at German
and European history shows that a forcible dictatorship will
neither bring freedom and safety to our own nation, nor peace
and unity to Europe.

The freedom and safety of Germany, the peace and unity of
Europe are not attainable by means of the old methods of brute
force, but only by means of the ideas of a new order.

The ideas that will bring about the new order that is vital to
a better future and essential to our very lives are the ideas of the
German Revolution, the ideas of:

National Freedom,
Social Justice,
European Collaboration.

The Hitler System's betrayal of the German Revolution is,
historically and personally, a crime committed by those who
now rule Germany.

It is also the source of the terrible danger which threatens
Germany like a colossal nightmare, imperilling both its existence
as a State and its future as a nation.

For Hitler's decision to enter the road that leads to war, his
reversion to the aims and methods of Prussian reactionary
capitalism and imperialism, have conjured up a new worldwide
coalition against Germany a coalition whose deadly encircle-
ment has once already led to a complete collapse of our country.

230

APPENDIXES

The almost insuperable severance of the German people from
the world, the systematic leading of the populace astray by a
fiendishly vertiginous propaganda^ has hidden the real nature*
of the present situation. That situation is, in plain words, the
following:

Should war ensue, no matter why or on what fronts, Germany
will be faced by a worldwide coalition, led by England 9 France,
Russia, and the Little Entente, while America, Poland, the
Balkan Entente, and the Baltic Entente will constitute a reserve
that will never decide for Germany, but in case of need will fight
against her.

Of the reputed allies of Germany (Japan, Italy, Hungary, and
Austria)., it is possible that Japan will fulfil her pledges, will,
that is to say, seize the chance, during the European complica-
tions, of strengthening her own position in the Far East; while
the other powers named, with Italy at their head, will (In their
own interest and from a sense of responsibility) remain neutral,
especially during the decisive first weeks of the war,

Thus the result of the fateful and blind foreign policy of the
Hitler System has been to establish a situation which, even
though the German army should fight heroically and the Ger-
man people prove ready for any sacrifices (provisos which, in
existing circumstances, can by no means be relied upon), must
inevitably result in the defeat of Germany.

Now what can this inevitable defeat of Germany mean other
than the end of its political and economic independence, the
end of its existence as a State. In a word, what can It mean
other than the partition of Germany?

After losing a second World War, after a second Treaty of
Versailles, there would only remain a powerless and disintegrated
Germany, consisting of three or four dependent monarchies
wholly subject to the dictatorial control of the victors.

In view of this situation, whose gravity makes us, the cham-
pions of the German Revolution, feel profoundly responsible,
we have but one task:

231

APPENDIXES

To make an end of the Hitler System before It has destroyed
Germany.

Every patriotic German, every German socialist above all,
must recognize that Germany's life and future can only be safe-
guarded by making an end of the Hitler System before Germany
is defeated.

Today to many of our fellow-countrymen these words, these
perspectives, appear to be the outcome of needless panic; and
perhaps the result of a phobia against the system, inspired by
the morbid hate that fills refugees.

But tomorrow, when this forecast has been shockingly ful-
filled, every German who loves his country and its people,
every German nationalist and every German socialist, will be
aware that the warnings of the Black Front have been and are
justifiable, and all will echo our war-cry:

Down with the Hitler System before Germany is defeated,

Every officer of the Reich, every manual worker, every intellec-
tual, and every peasant will then have to choose between Hitler
and Germany, and we know that they will choose Germany.

Only in that case will the overthrow of the system be achieved
without causing the defeat of Germany; and to the foreign
governments and their peoples we urgently proclaim: C A new
Versailles could mean nothing but a fresh disaster for us and
for you, since never will Germany renounce her unity and her
freedom. 9

But the guarantees that Europe will demand from Germany
will be: in the negative sense, the overthrow of the Hitler System;
and in the positive sense, the upbuilding of German socialism
and the establishment of a European Federation.

The Black Front adjures the German people and the peoples
of Europe to cling, before the war, during the war, and after
the war, to these three aims:

National Freedom,
Social Justice,
European Collaboration.
232

APPENDIXES

NO GERMAN BLOOD FOR SPAIN

(Appeal of the Black Front to the German People}

Fellow-countrymen :

The rumours which for weeks have been spreading through
Germany have of late been abundantly confirmed,

The Hitler System is selling more and more German soldiers,
as mercenaries, to the Spanish generals.

Thousands upon thousands of young fellows, the best blood
of Germany, are being shipped abroad, where they are fighting
and dying, not to promote the national interests and the histori-
cal greatness of Germany, but on behalf of the reactionary party
in a foreign civil war.

We accuse the Hitler System of this misuse of State authority,
this squandering of irreplaceable national values. We accuse
the Hitler System of deliberately injuring the German people,
under the influence of partisan blindness and in the idiotic pur-
suit of prestige.

We ourselves do not take a side in the Spanish civil war. Just
as we should repudiate any attempt by foreign powers to inter-
fere in the home affairs of Germany, and would strenuously
resist any invasion of our country by foreign mercenaries, so do
we repudiate any German intervention in the home affairs of
Spain, and most emphatically protest against the recruiting and
use of German mercenaries on behalf of non-German interests.
This attitude, which must be a matter of principle for every
sincere German nationalist, is reinforced by the fact that^the
German soldiers now being exported to Spain by the ^Hitler
System are to be used there in favour of an economic and
political reaction of the kind we ourselves have had to contend
with for decades here in Germany, and to fight which is one of
the main objects of genuine national socialism.

In its foreign policy of alliance with the Spanish reaction^ the
Hitler System is but reiterating its home policy of alliance with

233

APPENDIXES

the German reaction a policy that led to the German
Massacre of St. Bartholomew on June 30, 1934, and to the
betrayal of German socialism.

National and socialist considerations make the fight against
the sending of German troops to Spain one of the most impor-
tant duties of every genuine National Socialist.

The Black Front therefore calls upon all true Germans, and
especially upon all who belong to the Reichswehr, the S.S.
[Storm-Guards], and the S.A. [Storm-Troops] to resist in every
possible way this anti-national and anti-socialist policy of the
Hitler System, under the slogans:

No German Blood for Spain,
Hail Germany.

On behalf of the German Black Front,

Otto Strasser

A GALL TO ARMS

(Watchword for the New Year, by Otto Strasser)

For two years the policy of the Hitler System has profited by
the torpidity that seized poor old Europe after the consternating
experiences of 1933. The system deliberately availed itself of
the dread inspired by the prospect of a German Revolution, of
the National Socialist renovation and renaissance of the Ger-
man people, to stupefy capitalist Europe and scare it into inert
neutrality. But this torpidity necessarily passed off, the spell
was necessarily broken, when the alleged German Revolution
disclosed itself to be no more than a desperate attempt on the
part of the dominant classes to ensnare, slow down, strangle the
revolution. The plainer it became to the governments of the
victors of 1919 that the Hitler-Schacht-Goering-System lacked
the inspiration of the revolutionary idea, that the wind of the
revolutionary storm had blown over, that there was no genuinely

234

A P P E'N D I X E S

creative revolutionary conception to animate the Continent, the
more resolutely did they prepare for defence. When, after June
30, 1934, it became increasingly obvious to them that Hitler
was playing the same cards as those which other statesmen had
played before and were now playing beside him; that arma-
ments, alliances, devices and momentary feints, opportunist
combinations and veiled intrigues, were merely the pawns of
his statecraft; but that he was nowise moved by a great idea
able to revolutionize the old w T orld 5 to procreate a new order in
political and other human affairs, characterized by new laws
and competent to produce new forms the masters of old
Europe, recognizing in Hitler a sprig of their own world ^de-
generate, perhaps, and declassed, but still endeavouring to
maintain the dominance of the bourgeoisie), saw that he was
merely fighting them with familiar weapons on the familiar
battlefield, and they prepared more vigorously than ever to
resist.

Against the alliances of the Hitler System its adversaries first
established the Franco-Russian Alliance which had nothing in
common with bolshevism and communism, with Marxism and
the revolution, but was merely a revival of the league, formed In
1894 and broken in 1917, between the two powers lying to the
West and to the East against the hegemony of Central Europe.
The systematic consolidation of the Little Entente and the
greater attention now paid by France to possible allies on the
margin of Central Europe, with the resumption of cordial rela-
tions between France and Poland, were further stages of toe
defence against Hitler's policy of armament and treaty revision.
But much the most dangerous measure was the systematic re-
armament of Great Britain and the whole British Empire.
During the years 1933-1936, nothing but themilitary weakness of
England made it possible for Italian and German imperialism
to achieve notable advances, and created situations in which
Eneland showed herself inert, or masked inertness by a badly
simulated inattention towards the demand for treaty revision

235

APPENDIXES

and the pugnacity of the other side. By now, in the beginning
of 1937, England is getting ready to utter decisive words in
international policy.

In order to set off the increasing activity of Western Europe,
in 1936 Hitler and Mussolini began a counterstroke in Spain.
The enterprise initiated by Generals Sanjurjo and Franco in
July of that year (an enterprise they would never have ventured
at that time unless they had come to an understanding with
Berlin and Rome) was designed as a preventive occupation of
what was ideologically, politically, and from the military stand-
point the weakest point of Western Europe and of a future
Franco-British coalition; it was a stab in the back for France, a
preparation for a naval campaign against Britain. Actually for
the time being the affair seemed to bode well for the interven-
tionists. England was hampered by a dislike (based upon
private capitalist interests) for the prospect of socialization of
the Spanish mines, disinclined for anything that might lead to
the U.S.S.R. getting established in the Western Mediterranean,
and, being still only in the earlier stages of rearmament, again
pretended to be blind and deaf, and let the reins drop. France,
under the rule of the comparatively unstable popular front,
could venture nothing without British aid. Russia, at first, was
as neutral as the western powers. The generals, armed by Italy
and Germany, were able to drive back the badly equipped and
imperfectly trained militia of the Spanish government. A
triumph of the Berlinese and of the Italian revisionary policy
seemed assured. After three months, however, at long last,
Russia began to intervene. Whether Moscow is moved by
idealist promptings, stirred up by the internal pressure of the
still unsettled struggle between Stalinism and Trotskyism, and
wants to prevent the Spanish generals from gaining a complete
victory, or is perhaps alarmed by the prospect of a political and
military display on the Western European anti-Hitler front, it
may be hard to decide. Anyhow the U.S.S.R. has intervened
sufficiently in Spain to keep the fires of the civil war still burning

236

APPENDIXES

briskly in mid-winter, so that a powerful reaction against the
rebels remains possible. The military critics speak of what F
going on in Spain as a 'Trial War', in which the soldiers of the
great powers are fighting one another, and testing their up-to-
date weapons. This remarkable civil war, fought on Spanish
soil between Europeans of diverse nationalities under the com-
mand of Russian, German, and Italian officers, and using Rus-
sian, German, and Italian weapons, may develop into a general
European war at any moment this year.

Hitler, who since 1934 has been captive of Ms own delusion,
continues to believe that he has saved Europe from Bolshevism,
and that the nations of Europe are waiting for him to lead them
upon an anti-Russian crusade, fancies that he could not find a
more suitable occasion for war than this Spanish adventure.
In his lunacy he overlooks the fact that between, on the one
hand, the anti-bolshevik moods of the petty bourgeoisie, which
throughout Europe sympathizes with the Spanish rebels, and,
on the other, the motives which might induce the French, the
British, and not least the Italian governments to allow them-
selves to be led into a decisive conflict, there lies all which he
the c cork 5 of the revolution, the barometer of the German petty
bourgeoisie, the idol of the masses, driven not driving, senti-
mentalist and somnambulist, no more than a pseudo-leader
is fundamentally incapable of understanding. The German
generals understand well enough, and for weeks at Berchtes-
gaden have been fighting desperately against the Spanish
adventure.

Whereas Mussolini continues to keep paths of withdrawal
open, and should matters grow threatening would probably
try to detach the fate of Italy from the fate of Germany, Hitler,
mimicking the most preposterous fidelity, continues before all
the world, through the mouth of Ward Price, to give General
Franco pledges to the effect that Franco's cause is his own, and
that no defeat of the Burgos government will be allowed. He
really believes himself to be fighting against bokhevism and the

237

APPENDIXES

popular front, and that the possible fall of Blum might induce
France to take the side of Franco. But the very opposite is true,
is absolutely certain. If Blum were to be replaced by Mandel,
Chautemps, Petain, any statesman of the Centre or the Right,
France's attitude would only be stiffened, and it would become
easier for Russia to invoke the aid of the Franco-Russian
Alliance.

This winter Hitler's difficulties at home will be intensified to
a pitch beyond anything that has been witnessed during the
last few years, for they can only be paralleled by those of Ger-
many, during the last war, between 1916 and 1918. For
whereas in 1935 and 1936, after a difficult winter it was possible
without serious risk to open the safety-valve of foreign policy,
in March 1937 this safety-valve will probably have to take
the form of war.

That will not merely be a matter of Hitler's political choice,
for military considerations will likewise be operative. So bad is
the prognosis for Germany that at the last moment a preventive
war will very probably be begun, simply because it will be im-
possible to compete any longer with the heaping-up of arma-
ments which has been going on in France, Russia, and England.
For reasons that have frequently been stated here, Germany
cannot now cope with it if Stalin should increase his standing
army by another third of a million, if he transfers a hundred
thousand more workers to the munition factories, if he places a
yet larger quantity of raw materials at the disposal of the Red
Army. Germany will not be able to compete should France
devote her considerable gold reserve to further technical im-
provements in the army or to the construction of the Maginot
line. Germany will have to take a back seat if England conjures
up out of the ground a thousand more airplanes, gigantic
battleships, whole fleets of destroyers and swift cruisers, huge
squadrons of tanks. More and more risky becomes Goering's
blitzkrieg in view of the titanic camps that surround Germany
with inexhaustible arsenals, etc. The generals, who have

238

APPENDIXES

recently discountenanced a military adventure, will soon have

to decide whether to down Hitler, or to join Hitler in a leap
into the dark, to venture the unknown depths of a preventive
war.

But to down Hitler means to open the doors for the second
revolution. The generals will not do this so long as Blombergis
supreme. Germany's fate today rests with Biomberg, with the
life-or-death powers which, under Hitler's patronage, have been
entrusted to the three dictators, Goering, Schacht, and Blombcrg,
The enormous powers which Hitler has granted to his vassal
Blomberg is the leaden weight that paralyses the once influential
Reichswehr. No longer can the Reichswehr decide against
Hitler and for Germany; or, rather, it could only do so after
Blomberg's fall. More and more improbable is it that an evolu-
tionary possibility will be found, and decision by war looms as
a bitter necessity.

In this war the new home political fronts will soon appear.
The overwhelming odds that will face Germany in the struggle,
the inevitable desertion of her expected allies, 'betrayal" by
those friends upon whom Hitler and the people (deceived by
Goebbels) count, the disastrous defeats that will certainly await
the German army after its effective opening manoeuvres, be-
come plainer than they were in 1914 after the catastrophe on
the Marne plainer and more fulminant, for Germany no
longer has ample reserves of men and stores of munitions for
years of campaigning. This discloses the true situation of the
German people, and demands a clear decision from the nation.
In view of the millions of soldiers who will march against Ger-
many from east and west and south, overshadowed by the
bombing squadrons that will scatter death and destruction upon
our towns and factories, stifled and strangled by a blockade that
will cut us off from three-fourths of the world and deprive us of
the raw materials most indispensable to war, the German
people will have to choose between perishing, on the one hand,
or, on the other, overthrowing the present system, and, under

239

APPENDIXES

the sign of socialist renaissance, seeking enrolment in the com-
munity of western nations.

For this reason Hitler's mobilization must also be the signal
for our own. For this reason we call the people to arms when
Hitler calls them. We call them against Hitler, against the
murderous Angel of Death to whom Hitler sacrifices Germany's
young men, against pestilence and fire to which he will deliver
Germany's towns and fields. We summon the people on behalf
of Germany, on behalf of socialism, and in order to save Europe.
During these years that are pregnant with fate we shall have
no illusions, and we shall take the inevitable course of declaring
war against Hitler when Hitler declares war; and to our com-
rades who in a few months will have to take up arms, we now
have but two words to say:

'Get ready.'

240

APPENDIX V I

HUTTEN BRIEF

MANIFESTO OF THE BLACK FRONT TO THE
GERMAN PEOPLE

[Ulrich von Hutten (1488-1533) was inspired throughout his

short adult career by the aim of promoting a political and
religious renaissance of Germany. His chief weapon was the
pen, his chief medium consisted of letters, and he was probably
one of the main authors of the famous obscurorum

virorum. His letters have become proverbial, and it was natural
that the champions of the German Revolution in the twentieth
century should claim to be speaking in the name of the man
who laboured on behalf of a German a European Revolu-
tion four hundred years ago.]

GREGOR STRASSER, THE HARBINGER OF
GERMAN SOCIALISM

ON June 30, 1934, was murdered by Goering's orders (though

Adolf Hitler, in the notorious Reichstag speech of July 13, 1934,,
frankly proclaimed his own responsibility) the man who, in
conjunction with Moeller van den Brack, may be regarded as
chief herald and pioneer of German socialism Gregor
Strasser.

Through him alone it was that millions of Germans of both
sexes made acquaintance with the new idea of national socialism,
Hundreds of thousands of the members of the National Socialist
Party knew him personally, the tall and vigorous man with a
striking head, lucid eyes, and a powerful voice, who indefatigably
preached the gospel of national socialism all over the country,

ft 241

APPENDIXES

Tens of thousands had watched from close at hand his unceasing
efforts on behalf of the party whose organization in North
Germany was exclusively, and elsewhere in the Reich mainly,
his work, which was done with that rare mingling of personal
cordiality and unstinted zeal for toil that enabled him to move
persons and master things. Thousands valued him as a friend,
a helper in time of trouble, a leader into a new intellectual and
spiritual world.

Not that he was ever a leader' in that superficial, arrogant,
Byzantine style which later became typical of the party, when
its soul had vanished and form had become all-important,
demanding worship from idolaters. No, he was a leader of the
spirit, a leader of the heart, a leader of endeavour.

It is not only because Gregor Strasser had so outstanding a
personality that we wish to put a portrait of him before the
nation to keep his memory fresh and vivid, but even more be-
cause his clear-sighted pursuit of an aim should never be for-
gotten, because his firmness of will should be a perennial
warning, a promise, an example, and a consolation.

For in spite of, nay because of, Hitler's monstrous treason to
the German people, it is needful, instructive, and comforting to
keep our eyes fixed upon the lofty aim that was once put for-
ward as that of the National Socialist Party, that National
Socialist Party which in practice the Hitler System has so
shamelessly betrayed, so basely desecrated.

German comrades and fellow-countrymen, sometime National
Socialists and now party members, examine the books and
writings, the speeches and pamphlets of Gregor Strasser,
immerse yourselves in their words and their sense, read the
'inalterable' program of twenty-five points, and then turn
back to consider what the Hitler System has actually been doing.
In that way you will be enabled to grasp all the desolation of the
German present.

You will perceive the most abominable fraud ever perpetrated
upon believers, and you will understand why the henchmen of

242

APPENDIXES

this system had the teacher and herald of German ^riafcm put
to death.

Like an inkling of the doom that awaited him ?ound tlift
words which Gregor Strasser used as dedication for his master-
work, Kampfum Deutsckland [Fight for Germany]:

At one with in will,
I consecrate this book
to those who died
for the

In very truth it was for this German socialism that the fighters
in the troubles of the post-war period went to their tombs. They

died for the coining Germany of national freedom and social
justice.

They did not die to promote the economic dictatorship of
Schacht, Krupp, and Kirdorff; to establish the control of
peoples' minds by Goebbels, Himmler, and Goering; to have
our souls enslaved by Streicher, Rosenberg, and Kent

That is why we pledge ourselves to these dead; why we pledge

ourselves to Gregor Strasser who, having been the harbinger of

German Socialism, became its martyr; why we solemnly swear:

The Hitler System shall perish.

German Socialism shall survive.

Otto Strasser

FIGHT FOR GERMANY

by Gregor Strasser

Editorial Introduction: Gregor Strassefs own words will demonstrate,

better than we could hope to do by anything that we could write 9 his
creative importance to German socialism.

We therefore extract from his Kampf urn Deutschland,
in 1932 by the official Eher-Verlag, the following passages

243

APPENDIXES

porate his guiding principles , and adjure all genuine National Socialists
to compare with the aims of National Socialism, as thus expounded, the
actual deeds of the Hitler System.

We National Socialists are socialists, genuine, national, Ger-
man socialists. We repudiate any attempt to tone down this
idea by using the word 'social reformer 5 instead of the word
'socialist'. This change of wording represents nothing but a
hypocritical attempt to hide the most glaring defects of the
capitalist economic system. Or at best it can be regarded as the
endeavour of compassionate and honourable persons to cure,
by covering them up with plaster, the festering sores on the
body of our economic life and of our people. We are 'socialists',
and not mere c social reformers', and we do not hesitate to say
it, although the Marxians have so painfully distorted the mean-
ing of the former term.

What do we mean when we call ourselves National Socialists;
and why are we National Socialists?

We start from the idea that a nation is made up of persons
who have a community of fates. Now to have a community of
fates signifies that there must be a community of needs, and if
there is a community of needs there must be a community of
bread.

The nationalist movement joins us in recognizing that there
is a community of fates and a community of needs, but calls a
halt when we say this necessarily means a community of bread.
A community of bread signifies that the land, its treasures, and
its powers, are the property of the entire people, of the entire
nation. That is the significance of the misleading Marxian ex-
pression 'ownership of the means of production'. For not any
one class, not even the working class, owns the means of pro-
duction. The owner is the nation as a whole. (Pp. 72-73.)

That denotes revolution an economic revolution? Cer-
tainly it does. We want this economic revolution, just as Baron

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vom Stein once wanted an economic revolution, and made it,
to secure the national freedom of the German people. For what
else but an immense economic revolution was the widespread
liberation of the serfs a revolution which the feudal magnates
of those days would certainly have described (If the word had
already existed) as 'bolshevik*, and which they did describe as
e a danger to the State 5 even as our National Socialist demand
is now described in capitalist circles. Only thanks to the
economic revolution of the liberation of the serfs, only through
the incorporation of the newly established system of estates into
the calcified organism of the State, were freed the mighty
forces that were requisite; only thanks to this did the Prussia
of 1806 become the Prussia of 1812 and the Germany of 1870,
Moreover it is our profound conviction that ia no other way
than by the liberation of the fourth estate, by the Incorporation
of the German working class into the organism of the German
nation, can the Germany of 1918 be transformed Into the free
Germany of a near and the Great Germany of a in ore distant
future. (Pp. 74-75-)

We National Socialists perceive that there Is a fateful and
causal tie between the national liberty of our people and the
economic emancipation of the German workers. We have
recognized that the capitalist economic system with Its ex-
ploitation of those who are economically weak, with its robbery
of the workers' labour-power, with its unethical way of apprais-
ing human beings by the number of things and the amount of
money they possess, instead of by their internal value and their
achievements, must be replaced by a new and just economic
system, in a word by German socialism. The basic Idea of
socialism which, though Hebraically falsified, materialistically
degraded, and demagogically caricatured, nevertheless lives on
in the minds of millions upon millions of social-democratic and
communist workers, that ancient Teutonic notion of joint
ownership by the whole tribe, by the whole nation, of the entire

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means of production, of the land, which the individual who tills
it holds only in 'entail 3 , as a usufructuary entrusted with his
farm by the community such is the rock-bottom upon which
our wish to refashion economic life is grounded. This convic-
tion,, which is so deeply rooted in individual hearts that even a
capitalistically inclined person really accepts it in his inmost
self, supplies the motive force to our National Socialist idea of
economics, society, and the State. (Pp. 101-102.)

We have to learn that work is more than possession, that
achievement is more than dividends. The most deplorable
legacy of the capitalist economic system is that it has taught us
to judge all things by the standards of money, ownership,
possession. The decay of a people is a necessary outcome of
applying such a standard of value, for selection by ownership
is the mortal foe of the race, of blood, and of life. We have no
shadow of doubt that under National Socialism this privilege
of ownership will be annulled, and that the liberation of the
German worker will go so far as to include a share in profit, a
share in ownership, and a share in management. But we shall
not have escaped from the old standard of value if we leave
matters there, without insisting upon that revolution in the
mind which impels us to our assault upon the spirit of the present
system. We deliberately change from valuation by ownership
to valuation by achievement, this latter being our sole standard.
For us achievement is the main point, not dividend, just as we
consider responsibility, rather than wealth or display, to be the
climax of human endeavour. Here we have a new outlook, a
new religion for economic life. Thanks to this the worship of
the golden calf will come to an end; the differences between
human beings and the differences between their rights will be
differences between their achievements, differences in the
degrees of their responsibility, differences that come from God
and are therefore sacred. (Pp. 132-133.)

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APPENDIXES

In the people's movement there Is much talk about the
crystallizing of a new leadership, and this touches upon what I
have just been saying. But the methods that have been sug-
gested for coming to a decision as to the best leaders,, such as
examination of the blood, and what not, seem to my practical
mind rather dubious s as to their possibility, their use, and their
effect. There is another plan, an Old-German, a Prussian plan,
of which my friend PfeSer has reminded me, and which seems
to me admirable. I mean, choice based upon the army.

As a preliminary to the use of this method, service in the army
must be voluntary a privilege and not a duty. The practical
plan would be to provide by law that every German citizen
must do State service for a year. What I propose Is that
during this year he should not be set to roadmaking or some
other sort of mass-labour, but should be taught a handicraft,
so that there should be no grown-up Germans who had not
received at least one year's training in some craft or other. But
the choice of the best would be left to apply to those who, after
the year's e civil service 3 , chose to volunteer for the army.
Army service would last several years, and, apart from this, it
would only attract self-sacrificing persons, inasmuch as it
would involve the chance of being exposed to the perils of war,
and would therefore call for the heroic virtues. But, I repeat^
to adopt service in the army would be left voluntary and un-
constrained. Who can doubt that those Germans who volun-
teered for military service, which would take them away from
private life for at least twice as long as the civil service did,
would give no practical advantages for vocational life, but which
besides being much harder work, would entail upon the volun-
teer all the risks of war who can doubt, I say, that such Ger-
mans as these volunteers would be the best Germans, racially
the best, whose achievements on behalf of the State now and
in the future would enormously transcend those of the average
man? (Pp. 134-135.)

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APPENDIXES

The souls of human beings are overshadowed by a terrible
hopelessness. Fixed values have been crumbling away. People
don't know what to cling to, and vainly seek a centre of gravity,
which they have lost in morals, and cannot find in religion.
'Relativity 3 has become the shibboleth of modern culture, the
relativity of all things, of all knowledge, of all feelings. Vainly
does the sufferer try to escape the dull anxiety of an uneasy
conscience, try to mask and to excuse his instability with the aid
of psychoanalysis. The core has been gnawed at until very little
of it remains.

This is the sorest wound, perhaps incurable. For it is a pro-
found truth that moral health is indispensable to the social and
political stability of a people. Don't let the reader misunder-
stand me when I use the word 'moral'. Morality cannot be
established upon any other foundation than the soul, cannot be
sustained by any reputedly inalterable commandments, even
though to begin with these commandments were fortified with
a sort of 'extract of the soul'. We are not concerned here with
the dogmatic morality proclaimed by an estate or by a religion,
but with the harmony that prevails (or should prevail) between
eternal nature and that which is divine in man. The form,
therefore, is temporal, like man himself; but the content, the
soul, is eternal. (Pp. 137-138.)

You German workers number fifteen millions. With your
dependents you comprise 85% of the German people. Why,
then, should you tolerate having to suffer all through life, every
hour of every day, from the most horrible anxiety about the
morrow, the dread whether next pay-day, or on the first of
next month, you will still have enough money to provide you
and yours with food, clothing, and shelter.

Why should you put up, year after year, with the most
poignant anxiety about old age, having continually to ask your-
selves: 'What on earth shall I do when I am no longer able to
work?* Why do you endure having all the joys of life the

248

APPENDIXES

founding of a family, the upbringing of happy, healthy children
poisoned by the tyranny of a system that mercilessly exploits
you, and treats you as slaves? Why should you stand having
life's lesser pleasures reverie in a wood, choosing a toy for the
baby spoiled, once more, by the tyranny of money?

Why do you put up with this servile existence which robs you
of human dignity; cuts you off from the happiness of life; and
converts that life of yours, which according to the eternal laws
of nature and the eternal rights of man ought to be a psalm of
praise to the Almighty, into a scream of hatred for the devil, a
wail of sorrow and despair, of poverty and disgust and death.

Why do you bear it, brothers and sisters?

Because they lie to you and cheat you, cloud your vision so
that you fail to see the enemy who afflicts you with all your
woes. Because your hearts and brains are so drugged that you
quarrel with one another instead of joining forces against that
enemy: the unemployed has a grudge against the employed;
the manual operative against the brainworker; the townsman
against the agricultural labourer; the countryman against the
official; and so on and so forth. Because you let them incite
you against one another: the communists against the social
democrats, both of them against the 'bourgeois*; the soldier
against the civilian; the Red Front men against those who wear
the Swastika. But aren't you comrades, comrades in mis-
fortune, 'brothers of the chain 5 ? Is not the same whip cracked
in the ears of you all, are not you scourged by the same dread
of poverty? Are not your lives unhappy enough already, with-
out these quarrels? Are not you universally defrauded of the
Rights of Man? (Pp. 146-148.)

We should not be socialists if we were unwilling to fight
against the class-rule of the capitalist system, which permits a
class of citizens whose only title is one of ownership to decide
the lives and the deaths of the great majority of their fellow-
citizens. But we should not be nationalists if we were not no

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less passionately determined to repudiate the hateful attempt
to turn matters upside-down at the will of the brutalized masses
of those who have hitherto been under the harrow, and are
now unable to recognize the impossibility of detaching the
fortunes of one class (be it a small minority or a large majority)
from the fortunes of the nation. For here is our great discovery,
that true socialism is identical with true nationalism, both being
equally hostile to the class rule of a privileged bourgeoisie and
the class rule of the proletariat.

What do we want, then? Neither the 'bourgeois 3 nor yet the
'proletarians' neither the bourgeois State nor yet the prole-
tarian State. We want a new kind of man, we want the State
of these new human beings who evoke in its pristine purity
from the bourgeoisie the idea of nationalism which issues from
the depths of the blood; and evoke from the proletariat the
idea of socialism, redoubled in strength by the injustice the
proletarians have suffered. We want all the champions from
both camps who have discovered within themselves the synthesis
that bridges the formidable abyss which now yawns between
the two camps; that synthesis of the new idea which teaches us
to be socialists because we are nationalists, and to be nation-
alists because we are socialists.

Like a fate it lowers over German history, which is an out-
flow of the struggle of the German soul on behalf of itself and
to find itself this surge of mutual hatreds, this murderous
struggle of brother against brother for the sake of an idea
which remains unknown to most of the combatants until, after
the most fearful birthpangs, it is born in the synthesis which
was something new and nevertheless embodied what was best
in both the contesting parties: in the Guelph-Ghibelline
synthesis of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation;
in the Papist-Lutheran synthesis of the lesser German empire
which secured its definitive configuration through Bismarck;
in the Bourgeois-Proletarian synthesis of the coming Third
Reich of national liberty and social justice. (Pp. 165-166.)

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APPENDIXES
GREGOR STRASSER'S LEGACY

MUNICH, FEBRUARY 6, *933

MANY thanks for your letter of the 3rd inst. I am always
glad to hear from you, and to know that the group holds
firmly together. It is my hope and my earnest wish that the
'Strasser Case' will not lead to any change in this respect.
The newspapers will have kept you acquainted with the
political situation in Germany. In the end I and my political
views have won, for I felt that, whatever happened, the
N.S.D.A.P. [National Socialist Party] ought to be incorporated
in the State. This has happened, in part because of my direct
efforts, and to some extent because the party was afraid of me.
To all appearance I may seem to have been left out in the cold,
but inwardly I don't feel this, for the renunciation of all
economic ministries (which are in the hands of the arch-
reactionary Hugenberg), and of the Prussian instruments of
power (which are in the hands of the much-reviled Papen) ,
may indeed promote the national aims of the National
Socialists, but will not further what we call German socialism
and that, I am firmly convinced, is what the future will demand.
My time will come when in Germany the power of the great
financiers and the great landowners has to be broken; no
matter whether it is done with the aid of the N.S.D.A.P. by
currency methods, or by establishing the political front in a
new form and with new energies.

What perturbs me rather, from time to time at least, is the
fact that, by various intrigues, some of the subordinate leaders,
ambitious or otherwise shady persons, have been dragging my
name and honour in the mire by unprecedented misstatements
and infamies. But I shall keep my end up all right, and after a
while even exasperated people will come to understand the
reasons that have moved me and the general soundness of my
conduct. The conversation that was arranged for has been
postponed by Hitler. Since meanwhile he has become Chan-

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APPENDIXES

cellor, it is very difficult for me to make the first move, since I
might be suspected of place-hunting the last thing in the
world I should ever dream of. To conclude, never in my life
have I shunned a fight, or avoided doing whatever my con-
victions made me feel to be essential.

Yours,,

GREGOR STRASSER

AIMS AND METHODS OF THE
BLACK FRONT

No ONE who reads and takes to heart the glowing utterances
quoted, in this Huttenbrief, from Gregor Strasser's masterwork
KampJ urn Deutschland will be inclined to wonder that for this
genuine National Socialist there was not likely to be a place
in the Hitler-Hugenberg-Papen cabinet of 1933.

Historically inevitable will also appear the dismissal of
Gregor Strasser from his offices in December 1932, since the
depriving of this socialist champion of power was, for such
men as Schroder, Papen, Hugenberg, and Schacht, a needful
preliminary to the seizure of power by the Hitlerian party.

This was as plain to Gregor Strasser as it could be to anyone
else. In the letter printed above this (to a party-friend who
has recently placed the original at my disposal) Gregor Strasser
explicitly foresaw that the Hitler System would never establish
German socialism, and that this task would be incumbent
upon Germany in the future.

In this legacy of his to the German people, Gregor Strasser,
besides mentioning some of the chief items such as breaking
the power of financial capital, dividing up the large landed
estates, drawing the teeth of Prussia indicates the path to
be taken in order, in a new way and with enhanced energy,
to march forward and ensure the victory of German socialism.

Here we have the unique purpose of the Black Front, which

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APPENDIXES

has deliberately gone on with the campaign of Gregor Strasser,
in his sense and towards his goal, but in a new way and with
enhanced energy.

It can no longer be our main concern to stir up the masses
of the German people and inspire them with a longing for
German socialism,

What we need today is to get together and train a well-
informed, trusty, and energetic elite which will elaborate
the revolutionary sentiments of the masses, clarify the minds of
these as to the ends to be attained, making them ready and
willing to fight against the Hitler System, because that, under
present conditions, is the only way of advancing towards
German socialism.

No longer can we proclaim the need for the narrow confines
of a political party, with the inevitable dangers of presumption,
exclusiveness, and dictatorship.

Our present need is to proclaim the unified action of the
popular community, in the sense of the watchword Gregor
Strasser Schleicher Leipart 5 , which in former days sounded
like a promise of new times, but tomorrow will be the manifest
expression of the creative will of revolutionary youth, soldierly
purpose, and socialist longing and as such will convey a
promise of fulfilment to the German people.

No longer will it suffice in meetings and speeches, in essays
and other writings, to voice the promises of German socialism
vague in content, incomprehensible in form, obscure in con-
figuration.

What we now need is an unambiguous and lucid scheme for
the upbuilding of German socialism, such a scheme as forms
the program of the Black Front. We need a clear and carefully
thought-out statement of the economic, social, and cultural
aims of New Germany, a description of the forms it will
assume, an account of its inner technique and functioning.

Here we have the aims and method of the Black Front,
which can be enumerated as follows:

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APPENDIXES

Economic Field: Destruction of the private capitalist and
State-capitalist economic system, and upbuilding of the new
order of German socialism; nationalization of the German
popular economy, under the economic form of life, with an aim
at the effective deproletarianization of the German people.

Home Policy: Overthrow of the party dictatorship and the
establishment of a political system legally based upon self-
government by the estates; a new subdivision of Germany into
provinces with federalized administration and a supreme
centralized federal government.

Cultural Field: Break the idol of the 'totalitarian State',
enthrone the true faith; establish freedom of conscience;
restrict the partial truths of 'blood and soil' to their proper
fields of application; recognize the value of the spirit, the
value of the soul, the value of religion.

Foreign Policy: Repudiate every kind of imperialism;
effectively recognize a European federation on the basis of
national freedom and the popular development of all nations
and minorities.

To sum up: A New Germany in a New Europe, on the basis
of

National Freedom,
Social Justice,
European Collaboration.

As groundworks and provisos of

The Rebirth of the West.

G.