Full text of "Global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction : hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Fourth Congress, first session"

S. Hrg. 104-422
'ART II

GLOBAL PROUFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS

DESTRUCTION

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iGlobal Proliferation of Weapons of...

BEFORE THE

PER^UXEXT
SUBCOMMITTEE OX IXl^STIGATIOXS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON
GO\^RNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

PART II

MARCH 13, 20 AND 22, 1996

Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs

SEP 2

3 1S9S

S. Hrg. 104-422
Part II

GLOBAL PROUFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS

DESTRUCTION

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

PERMANENT
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

PART n

MARCH 13, 20 AND 22, 1996

Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
23-432 cc WASHINGTON : 1996

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office

Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402

ISBN 0-16-052968-9

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman

WILLIAM V. ROTH, Jr., Delaware JOHN GLENN, Ohio

WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine SAM NUNN, Georgia

FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee CARL LEVIN, Michigan

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi DAVID PRYOR, Arkansas

JOHN McCain, Arizona JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut

BOB SMITH, New Hampshire DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii

HANK BROWN, Colorado BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota

Albert L. McDermott, Staff Director

Leonard Weiss, Minority Staff Director

Michal Sue Prosser, Chief Clerk

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

WILLIAM V. ROTH, Jr., Delaware, Chairman

TED STEVENS, Alaska SAM NUNN, Georgia

WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine JOHN GLENN, Ohio

FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee CARL LEVIN, Michigan

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi DAVID PRYOR, Arkansas

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut

BOB SMITH, New Hampshire DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii

HANK BROWN, Colorado BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota

Harold Damelin, Chief Counsel

Daniel S. Gelber, Chief Counsel to the Minority

John F. Sopko, Deputy Chief Counsel to the Minority

Alan Edelman, Counsel to the Minority

Carla J. Martin, Chief Clerk

CII)

CONTENTS

Opening statements: Page

Senator Roth 1

Senator Nunn 3, 69, 125

Senator Glenn 8, 78

Senator Lugar 10

Senator Levin 86

Senator Smith 144

Prepared statements:

Senator Lugar 69, 127

Senator Roth 129

■ WITNESSES

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 13, 1996

John Sopko, Deputy Chief Counsel to the Minority, and Alan Edelman, Coun-
sel to the Minority, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 14

Harold J. Johnson, Jr., Associate Director, International Relations and Trade
Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, General Ac-
counting Office 17

Graham T. Allison, Director, Center for Science and International Affairs,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University 21

William C. Potter, Director, Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Monte-
rey Institute of International Studies 25

Sarah Mullen, Chair, Global Organized Crime Nuclear Black Market Task
Force, Center for Strategic and International Studies 31

Gary Bertsch, Director, Center for International Trade and Security, Univer-
sity of Georgia 35

Andrei Glukhov, Former Deputy Chief, Ukrainian Nuclear Regulatory Agen-
cy, Currently with Battelle Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 48

Glenn E. Schweitzer, Director, Office for Central Europe and Eurasian, Na-
tional Academy of Sciences, Founding Director, International Science and
Technology Center in Moscow 53

Joshua Handler, Research Coordinator for Disarmament Issues, Greenpeace .. 57

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 20, 1996

John Deutch, Director, Central Intelligence Agency 73

Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, Executive Chairman, United Nations Special Com-
mission 90

David A. Kay, Senior Vice President, Hicks & Associates 105

Gary MilhoUin, Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control 110

FRIDAY, MARCH 22, 1996

John F. Sopko, Deputy Chief Counsel to the Minority, Permanent Subcommit-
tee on Investigations 130

Alan Edelman, Counsel to the Minority, Permanent Subcommittee on Inves-
tigations 134

Thomas E. McNamara, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Af-
fairs, Department of State 148

Frank Miller, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, International

Security Policy, Department of Defense 152

Charles B. Curtis, Deputy Secretary, Department of Energy 159

Robert M. Blitzer, Section Chief, Domestic Terrorism/Counterterrorism, Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation 162

(III)

Page

Connie Fenchel, Director, Strategic Investigations Division, U.S. Customs

Service 165

Gordon C. Oehler, Director, Nonproliferation Center, Central Intelligence
Agency 171

Alphabetical List of Witnesses

Allison, Graham T.:

Testimony 21

Prepared Statement 194

Bertsch, Gary:

Testimony 35

Prepared Statement 257

Blitzer, Robert M.:

Testimony 162

Prepared Statement 459

Curtis, Charles B.:

Testimony 159

Prepared Statement 448

Deutch, John:

Testimony 73

Prepared Statement 302

Edelman, Alan:

Testimony 14, 134

Prepared Statement 355

Ekeus, Ambassador Rolf:

Testimony 90

Fenchel, Connie:

Testimony 165

Prepared Statement 474

Glukhov, Andrei:

Testimony 48

Prepared Statement 270

Handler, Joshua:

Testimony 57

Prepared Statement 284

Johnson, Harold J. Jr.:

Testimony 17

Prepared Statement 187

Kay, David A.:

Testimony 105

Prepared Statement 324

McNamara, Thomas E.:

Testimony 148

Prepared Statement 424

MilhoIIin, Gary:

Testimony 110

Prepared Statement 333

Miller, Frank:

Testimony 152

Prepared Statement 438

Mullen, Sarah:

Testimony 31

Prepared Statement 230

Oehler, Grordon C:

Testimony 171

Prepared Statement 515

Potter, William C:

Testimony 25

Prepared Statement 198

Schweitzer, Glenn E.:

Testimony 53

Prepared Statement 277

Sopko, John:

Testimony 14, 130

Prepared Statement 355

Page

EXHIBIT LIST

1. a. Video showing the exterior and interior of the Aum Shinrikyo chemical

research and development laboratory (commonly referred to as
Tsuchiya's Laboratory) *

b. Five photographs from video of Aum Shinrikyo chemical research and
development laboratory depicting the exterior of facility, a reactor
vessel, glove box, incubator, and flow hood *

c. CIA assessment of video of Aum Shinrikyo facility 520

2. a. GAO Report, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S. Efforts To Im-

prove Nuclear Material Controls in Newly Jndeoendent States, March

1996, GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89 ' 522

b. Ten photographs of nuclear facilities in former Soviet Union, container
of HEU, Reactor fuel elements containing direct-use material, etc

3. Briefing Charts on Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR), Nunn-Lugar,
provided by the Department of Defense 567

4. Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing The Threat of Loose Russian Nu-
clear Weapons and Fissile Material, Graham T. Allison, Owen R. Cote,

Jr., Richard A. Falkenrath, and Steven E. Miller, 1996 *

5. The Nuclear Black Market: Global Organized Crime Project, Center for
Strategic & International Studies' Task Force Report, 1996 *

6. a. Restraining the Spread of the Soviet Arsenal: Export Controls as a

Long-Term Nonproliferation Tool, Status Report, by Gary Bertsch and

Igor Khripunov, The University of Georgia, March 1996 665

b. Russia's Nonproliferation and Conventional Weapons Export Controls
1995 Annual Report, compiled and edited by Gary Bertsch and Igor
Khripunov, Co-Directors, NIS Nonproliferation Control Project, The
University of Georgia *

7. William C. Potter, Before the Deluge? Assessing the Threat of Nuclear
Leakage From the Post-Soviet States, Arms Control Today, October 1995 ..

8. Glenn E. Schweitzer, Conversion Activities in the Russian Weapon Lab-
oratories, Technology In Society, Vol. 17, No. 3, pp. 239-261, 1995

9. a. Greenpeace Trip Report: Radioactive Waste Situation in the Russian

Pacific Fleet, Nuclear Waste Disposal Problems, Submarine Decommis-
sioning, Submarine Safety, and Security of Naval Fuel, October 27,
1994, prepared by Joshua Handler, Greenpeace Research Coordinator,
Disarmament Campaign and accompanying materials *

b. Working Paper: The Future of Russian Strategic Forces, Joshua Han-
dler, Research Coordinator, Disarmament Campaign, February 7,
1995 702

c. Four articles by Joshua Handler, Janes Intelligence Review, December
1993, April 1994, March 1995 and April 1995, regarding Russian naval
nuclear submarine bases and facilities *

d. Correspondence from Joshua Handler, to President William Clinton
in February 1993, and to Robert Bell, National Security Council in
April 1995, regarding problems with Russian nuclear naval systems .... *

e. Eight photographs provided by Joshua Handler of Russian nuclear
naval facilities *

10. John P. Holdren, Reducing The Threat of Nuclear Theft In The Former
Soviet Union: Outline Of A Comprehensive Plan, November 1995 *

11. Chronology of Nuclear Smuggling Incidents, dated October 13, 1995, pre-
pared by Nonproliferation Center of Central InteUigence Agency 712

12. United Nations Security Council Report dated December 7, 1995, Tenth
Report of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established
by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9(b)(i) of the Security
Council resolution 687 (1991), and paragraph 3 of resolution 699 (1991)

on the activities of the Special Commission *

13. David A. Kay, Denial and Deception Practices of WMD Proliferators:
Iraq and Beyond, The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1995 *

14. Recommendations for Improvement submitted by March 1996 Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations' witnesses regarding global proliferation

of weapons of mass destruction 717

15. Customs Today, Confronting the Threat of Nuclear Proliferation, Depart-
ment of the Treasury, U.S. Customs Service, Winter 1996, Volume 3,
Number 1 *

16. Organized Crime in the Federal Republic of Germany: The Situation

in 1994, prepared by Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) 740

Page

17. BKA Report, Special Edition — Nuclear Criminality, dated March 13, 1995
(German and English translation prepared by Congressional Research
Service) 758

18. Nuclear Crime, The Situation in the Federal Republic of Germany / En-
forcement Aspect, prepared by Peter Kromer of BKA for visit of Staff
Members of the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
September 15, 1995 791

19. Report of Bavarian Minister of Justice, April 25, 1995, regarding the
confiscation of plutonium at the Munich Airport on August 10, 1994 800

20. Report of Bavarian Office of Criminal Investigation Office, April 25, 1995,
regarding the confiscation of plutonium at the Munich Airport on August

10, 1994 804

21. Excerpts from various German federal and state laws regarding illegal
trade in nuclear materials *

22. The Ninth Criminal Court of Munich District Court verdict and factual
statement regarding Bengoechea Arratibel, et al *

23. Undated report of the Bavarian Criminal Police concerning illegal trade

in radioactive material *

24. Report by the Nuclear Research Institute, Central Analytical Laboratory
at Rez, Czech Republic, regarding illicit HEU shipment secured in Prague

in December 1994 811

25. Memorandum from Charles Bolton, General Accounting Office, dated
March 21, 1996, to John Sopko, Permanent Subcommittee on Investiga-
tions, regarding "Technical Information on Fuel Elements Used at
Obninsk" 814

26. Materials received from Institute for National Security Studies, U.S. Air
Force Academy, Colorado, regarding nuclear weapons grade fissile mate-
rial smuggling *

27. The Last 15 Minutes: Ballistic Missile Defense in Perspective, Edited
by Joseph Cirincione and Frank von Hippel, Published by Coalition to
Reduce Nuclear Danger, 1996 *

28. Unofficial remarks of Kenneth N. Luongo, Director, Office of Arms Con-
trol and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of Energy, to Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace Conference, February 12, 1996 *

29. Miscellaneous items regarding U.S. v. Al M. Harb and Rula S. Harb,
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia *

30. a. Weapons Proliferation and Organized Crime: Russian Military Dimen-

sions, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort

Leavenworth, Kansas 816

b. Mafia In Uniform: The "Criminalization" of the Russian Armed Forces,
Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leav-
enworth, Kansas, July 1995 *

31. Statement for the Record of Los Alamos National Laboratory *

32. Statement for the Record of Sandia National Laboratories *

33. Statement for the Record of John Hnatio, U.S. Department of Energy,
New Independent States Industrial Partnering Program *

34. Statement for the Record of Michael W. Deegan, President, United States
Industry Coalition, Inc *

35. Statement for the Record of Dr. Laurie Mylroie, Senior Associate, Foreign
Policy Research Institute *

36. Statement for the Record of Henry Sokolski, Next Century Nonprolifera-
tion: A New Cold War? 835

37. Statement for the Record of United States Enrichment Corporation 846

38. Statement for the Record of Barry E. Carter, Deputy Under Secretary

for Export Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce 855

39. Supplemental Questions for the Record from Dr. John Deutch Director,
Central Intelligence Agency 858

40. Supplemental Questions for the Record from Franklin Miller, Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Policy, U.S.
Department of Defense 869

41. Supplemental Questions for the Record from Charles B. Curtis, Deputy
Secretary, Department of Energy 879

42. Supplemental Questions for the Record from Thomas E. McNamara, As-
sistant Secretary, Department of State 898

43. Supplemental Questions for the Record from Dr. Gordon Oehler, Director,
NonProliferation Center, Central Intelligence Agency 920

VII

Page

44. Supplemental Questions for the Record from Robert M. Blitzer, Section
Chief, Domestic Terrorism/Counterterrorism, Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation 923

45. Supplemental Questions for the Record from Connie J. Fenchel Chief,
Strategic Investigations, U.S. Customs Service 929

45. Supplemental Questions for the Record from David A. Kay 935

May Be Found In The Files of the Subcommittee

GLOBAL PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 13, 1996

U.S. Senate,
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,

Committee on Governmental Affairs,

Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room
SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. William V. Roth,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Senators Roth, Nunn, Glenn, Levin, Lieberman, and
Lugar.

Staff Present: Daniel S. Gelber, Chief Counsel to the Minority;
John F. Sopko, Deputy Chief Counsel to the Minority; Alan
Edelman, Counsel to the Minority; Mark Webster, Investigator to
the Minority; Mary D. Robertson, Assistant Chief Clerk to the Mi-
nority; Renee Pruneau-Novakoff (CIA Detailee); Richard Kennan
(Customs Detailee); Jim Christy (AFOSI Detailee); Harold
Damelin, Chief Counsel to the Majority; Carla J. Martin, Chief
Clerk; Michael Bopp, Counsel; Randy Rydell (Senator Glenn); Leon-
ard Weiss (Senator Glenn); Ken Myers (Senator Lugar): Rick Val-
entine (Senator Smith); Ian Brzenski (Senator Roth); Denny Wat-
son (CIA Detailee to Armed Services Committee); Max H. Delia Pia
(Senator Levin); and John Guest (Senator Lieberman).

Senator RoTH. The Subcommittee will please come to order.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROTH

Senator ROTH. Today we continue the series of hearings this
Subcommittee has held on the global proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. Previously we have focused upon the prolifera-
tion of chemical and biological weapons. Now we begin to examine
the black market for nuclear materials.

One of the most dangerous illusions of the post-Cold War era is
that the previous bipolar world has been replaced by an orderly
peace. Five years ago we lived in a world where two superpowers
engaged in a tense but stable standoff predicated on the notion of
mutually assured destruction.

Today while the concept of mutually assured destruction re-
mains, another has emerged, mutual uncertainty; imcertainty over
the safety of nuclear materials within the former Soviet Union, and
uncertainty as to whether and when a demand for nuclear mate-
rials will arise.

(1)

The breakup of the So\det Union was a victory for democracy and
the right of self-determination. But the victory did not come with-
out weighty responsibiHties and burdens.

First and foremost among these is the need to ensure the secu-
rity of the nuclear material, weapons and technology that made the
former Soviet Union such an apocal5rptic foe.

It may be useful to reflect for a moment on the enormity of the
task at hand. The former Soviet Union spans across land almost
two and a half times the size of the United States. Nuclear mate-
rials are stored across this expanse from Vladivostok in the east to
St. Petersburg in the west. And within their borders, many of the
former Soviet republics operate some elements of the nuclear fuel
cycle, ranging from mining to milling to fuel fabrication to power
generation.

Later this morning we will hear from Harold Johnson of the
GAO, which recently issued a report on nuclear nonproliferation.
The report notes that, during its existence, the Soviet Union pro-
duced some 12 hundred metric tons of highly enriched uranium
and some 200 metric tons of plutonium. The report further esti-
mates that a nuclear explosive could be built with as little as 25
kilograms of the former and eight of the latter.

The difficulties associated with controlling and protecting such
materials are exacerbated by the disorder in the Eurasian con-
tinent. The collapse of an authoritarian regime and the struggle for
new republics to establish orderly democratic institutions for gov-
ernance have led to widespread corruption and economic distress.
Nowhere is this disorder more apparent than the structures re-
sponsible for the control and accountability of nuclear materials
and technology.

In Russia and other newly independent states, the systems for
securing and accounting for nuclear materials are disastrously in-
adequate. The political and economic instability of this region, com-
bined with its vast borders, create immense security challenges.

To the south, the border stretches nearly 10,000 miles, separat-
ing newly independent states from neighbors that include Afghani-
stan, China, Iran and North Korea. Clearly, a nuclear smuggler
has a broad array of potential entrance and exit routes from which
to choose.

And while the protection, control and accountability of nuclear
materials, weapons and technology in the former Soviet Union is
critically important to our own Nation's security, it must not be our
sole concern. It must also train a watchful eye upon those nations,
groups and individuals who might create a demand for such items.

It is with these points in mind that the Subcommittee has called
this series of hearings. Our purposes are three-fold.

First, we seek to examine the supply, control and accountability
of nuclear weapons, materials and technology that currently exist
within the former Soviet Union. Second, we intend to expose the
demand side of the nuclear black market to similar scrutiny. And
third, we seek to address the efficacy and effectiveness of our gov-
ernment's nonproliferation program to assess our Nation's readi-
ness to contend with a nuclear threat or crisis, and to identify ways
of improving the multiple dimensions of U.S. counterproliferation
policies.

I want to especially thank our Ranking Minority Member, Sen-
ator Sam Nunn, for his tireless efforts to shed light in this dark
corner of our international community. My distinguished colleague
from Georgia and his staff are to be commended for initiating this
important set of hearings on the increasingly dangerous prolifera-
tion of nuclear materials and technologies.

Senator Nunn and Senator Dick Lugar drafted the Soviet Threat
Reduction Act of 1991. Over the last 5 years Congress has author-
ized some 1.79 billion dollars for this program, which remains the
core of U.S. efforts to facilitate the dismantlement of Soviet nuclear
weapons and to increase the security surrounding nuclear mate-
rials and technologies in the former Soviet Union.

As testimony to the foresight and leadership of these two legisla-
tors, the Soviet Threat Reduction Act is often referred to as simply
the "Nunn-Lugar" program.

Countering nuclear proliferation is among the most urgent na-
tional security challenges facing the U.S. We must ensure that our
government is implementing the soundest of strategies to counter
this threat Considering the diffuse and deadly realities posed by
nuclear proliferation, these hearings sound an urgent message.
They remind us to keep constant watch over the tools of mass de-
struction and those bent on using them.

It is now my pleasure to turn to Senator Sam Nunn.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR NUNN

Senator Nunn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your
leadership and cooperation in this important series of hearings.

Today there is no greater threat to our Nation or to the world
than the illicit spread of weapons of mass destruction. During the
Cold War our national security and that of the Soviet Union was
premised upon a dangerous but at least well understood balance of
terror and well-traveled avenues of diplomacy.

Both the United States and the Soviets maintained formidable
nuclear arsenals, so there was a high risk that conflict would result
in certain and unacceptable losses no matter who the initial ag-
gressor. If conflict appeared possible, diplomatic channels were
available as a relief valve to avoid escalation of tension and every-
one knew they had a real stake in not letting tension escalate and
restraining clients all over the world. Although living in a climate
of high risk, we enjoyed a high degree of stability.

The collapse of Soviet communism and the end of the Cold War
eliminated what many considered to be the greatest threat to world
security. Certainly the threat of all-out war has gone down very
significantly. Yet, today the concerns of the Cold War have been re-
placed with new and far different threats. We have moved from an
era of high risks but also high stability to an era of much lower
risk, but also much lower stability.

Indeed, in many ways the world is far more unstable today than
it was a decade ago. Ethnic, religious, racial and political conflicts
have led to an increasing level of violence and terrorism all over
the globe. It seems no place is immune today. Not the subways of
Tokyo, not the buses of Jerusalem, not the office buildings of New
York City or Oklahoma City.

Zealotry in the name of a cause has led individuals, groups and
rogue nations to be increasingly willing to do the unthinkable,
often for no other reason than to cause destruction and terror.

The breakup of the Soviet Union and the growth of democracy
in Eastern Europe were hopeful signs for international tranquility.
However, the political meltdown of the former Soviet Union and
the loss of command structures throughout Europe has created sce-
narios which even if anticipated are unfathomable in their scope.

Never before has an empire disintegrated while in the possession
of 30,000 nuclear weapons, at least 40,000 tons of chemical weap-
ons, significant biological weapons capability, tons of fissile mate-
rials, and tens of thousands of scientists and technicians who know
how to make these weapons and their delivery systems, but who
do not know how to make a living for their families in a collapsing
economy.

As the remnants of that empire struggle to achieve democratic
reforms and build a free market economy, thousands of weapons
scientists and technicians, including nuclear scientists, now face
unemplo5mient and are looking for new ways to earn salaries with
which to feed their families. We will hear about that from one of
our witnesses later this morning.

Military officers accustomed to being treated as among the coun-
try's elite now face economic hardships with which they are not fa-
miliar. And plant managers and workers at some of the most sen-
sitive civilian research facilities who have always enjoyed, rel-
atively speaking, a high standard of living in Russia and the other
countries of the former Soviet Union, now labor under conditions
which make it difificult for them to even feed their families.

The challenge facing the Russians and the rest of the world is
to ensure that the former Soviet Union does not become a super-
market for the most deadly instruments and technology ever
known to man.

Unfortunately, this threat is no longer theoretical. When we
started this quest several years ago. Senator Lugar and I and Sen-
ator Roth and others were dealing with what we thought was a po-
tential, a very high potential risk. Now we are dealing with reality.

The leakage of nuclear materials from the former Soviet Union
is now fact. We will hear from Bill Potter of the Monterey Institute,
on that point this morning. On several occasions Russian authori-
ties recovered weapons grade material, usable nuclear materials,
which had been diverted from civilian research institutes by indi-
viduals who intended to sell the material abroad.

In four other cases, weapons-usable material, including highly
enriched uranium and plutonium, made its way from the former
Soviet Union into Europe before authorities finally seized it.

But what we really are worried about is what we don't know.
Slightly over 2 years ago I directed the staff of the Permanent Sub-
committee on Investigations, in full cooperation and partnership
with Senator Roth, to conduct an in-depth examination of this issue
in order to determine the likelihood of such diversion and traffick-
ing occurring.

In May of 1994 their efforts led to a hearing which brought to-
gether for the first time before the Congress the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the President of Germany's BKA,

which is their equivalent, as I understand it, of our FBI, and the
head of Russia's organized crime control department, a rather
unique three to have together.

The testimony of these officials revealed a high level of concern
about the threat posed by organized crime in the former Soviet
Union, and the possibility that under the right circumstances orga-
nized crime could become involved in either facilitating or creating
a nuclear black market.

In my view, this is almost inevitable. At the rate we are seeing
it right now, however, we don't have to wait for that threat to
emerge to be concerned because amateurs are putting together
entrepreneural-type networks to deal with stolen nuclear material.
It will be an interesting question as to how long it is before the
amateurs can be called organized themselves. I have heard pundits
say that it would be a mistake to call anything organized crime in
Russia today because nothing there is organized. But whatever the
case, we have got big problems.

In prepareation for our hearings, the staff embarked upon an in-
quiry which entailed hundreds of interviews with members of our
law enforcement, intelligence and defense communities, including
the FBI, U.S. Customs Service, Central Intelligence Agency, De-
fense Intelligence Agency, and various offices within the Depart-
ments of Defense, Energy, State, and Justice.

The staff also met with dozens of academics and scholars
throughout the United States, and we'll have some of those testify
this morning. As a matter of fact, Graham Allison in a meeting ear-
lier this morning that Senator Lugar and I attended, announced
the publication of a new book which we hope he will summarize for
us when he testifies today. It is very interesting and details with
a lot of these concerns.

Last year the staff traveled to both Western and Eastern Europe
to meet with law enforcement, intelligence, parliamentary and reg-
ulatory officials in Germany, the Czech Republic, the Ukraine and
Russia.

During the course of the staffs investigation, events which oc-
curred in the heart of downtown Tokyo made the idea of a terrorist
use of weapons of mass destruction move from a potential fear to
a chilling reality.

On the morning of March 20, 1995, at the height of the morning
rush hour, several members of a religious cult, the Aum Shinrikyo,
which preached Armageddon between the United States and
Japan, and which had avowed to basically destroy the Japanese
Government, unleashed a sarin gas attack on the innocent civilian
riders of the Tokyo subway system.

The attack specifically targeted a central station which served
Japan's major government agencies. Twelve persons were killed
and over 5,000 injured. If they had waited a fev/ more weeks or
months and developed a better delivery systems you would have
been talking about tens of thousands of deaths. They pulled the
trigger prematurely, thank God.

Had the cult's delivery system been more efficient, we would
have had a major, major disaster in Japan.

The revelation that the Aum cult had viewed Russia as a source
for the critical materials, equipment and technology necessary to

bring about its version of Armageddon only serves to underscore
the importance of addressing the situation in the former Soviet
Union with respect to the control of nuclear and other materials of
mass destruction.

Today and next week the Subcommittee will examine this and
other issues. At our hearing today, the Subcommittee will hear five
new reports from recognized authorities who will discuss the illicit
leakage of nuclear materials and know-how. Next week we will
hear about potential end-users for these weapons and materials of
mass destruction.

We'll hear from CIA Director John Deutch, who will talk about
the challenges in the Middle East and in other regions where
American interests are in peril.

Also, I'm pleased to announce that joining us in next week's
hearings will be Rolf Ekeus, chairman of the U.N. commission that
is inspecting the Iraqi weapons program. This will be the first time
Mr. Ekeus has addressed Congi'ess.

And finally, prior to next week's hearings the staff will release
the written report of its 2-year investigation into this issue with
findings and recommendations.

I believe today's panel of experts, though looking at different as-
pects of this concern, will deliver a strikingly similar message. The
threat of nuclear diversion and trafficking is one that we dare not
ignore, not only because what we know already is frightening; but,
more importantly, because the specter of what we don't yet fully
know is even more ominous.

The conclusions that will be reported this morning including the
threat of nuclear diversion and trafficking is real — as evidenced by
the documented seizures of weapons usable uranium and pluto-
nium in both Russia and Europe. There are confirmed cases of il-
licit smuggling of uranium and plutonium, and we know that key
weapons-system components have also been diverted from Russia
to Iraq.

The protection and control of nuclear materials, and to some ex-
tent even nuclear weapons, continues to be a great challenge. De-
spite the efforts by Russia in joint projects with the United States,
the General Accounting Office will release a report that explains
how there is still not even an inventory for hundreds of tons of nu-
clear materials that are spread out over more than 80 civilian fa-
cilities in the former Soviet Union.

Some of our witnesses will discuss the imposing challenges of se-
curing these materials and the need to concentrate these materials
in the smallest number of locations. One of the real paradoxes here
is when we succeed in getting the warheads off of missiles and dis-
mantling the materials, the remnants of that become harder to
handle and become more susceptible to theft than before. So our
very successes in this area also create new problems as we grow.

And I think it was Sally Mullen who said in the Center for Stra-
tegic and International Studies (CSIS) report that we will hear
later, that though the improvements are growing, the threat is out-
pacing those efforts. So we are making progress yet the challenges
at the same time are getting bigger and bigger.

Border and export controls throughout the former Soviet Union
are still lax. We will hear from that from our own University of

Georgia team — we are very proud to have them here today — about
the border problems there.

The porousness of the borders is evident by the number of smug-
ghng cases of all types of goods. The U.S. Government is working
closely with the Russians, and to a lesser extent the Baltic coun-
tries and Ukraine, to help them develop more rigorous export con-
trols and tighten their own borders. My staff, however, has deter-
mined that there has been little emphasis on the countries in the
south of the former Soviet Union — Central Asia and the Caucuses.

We found out that while almost all proliferation experts agree
that these countries are likely transit routes for fissile material
coming out of Russia, little work has been done to determine what
is coming out of these countries and to help these countries with
border and export controls. These countries border Iran and China
and are very close to Iraq, Syria, Pakistan and India.

Equally important as the leakage of fissile materials firom the
former Soviet Union is the disbursal of the technical know-how and
expertise as held by the 60,000 or so weapons scientists and techni-
cians who were once part of a very formidable Soviet Weapons pro-
gram and aerospace program. Today's witnesses will explain how
these scientists are subject to the same economic dislocation that
is affecting all the citizens of the former Soviet Union.

The staff has obtained examples of various entities attempting to
exploit this situation for money. The staff obtained a solicitation
letter fi-om a Hong Kong company that was found in the Middle
East. And this gives you an idea of the challenge.

The letter states, "We have detailed files of hundreds of former
Soviet Union experts in the field of rocket, missile and nuclear
weapons. These weapons experts are willing to work in a country
which needs their skills and can offer reasonable pay."

You don't have to have too vivid an imagination to fathom the
effect this brain drain can have on our national security and the
national security of countries all over the world.

As economic conditions in the former Soviet Union continue to
deteriorate, and I hope that will turn around soon, we in this coun-
try have a real stake in getting some degree of economic stability
in Russia and those other countries. Whether we know it or not,
we have a stake in their economic development, because as long as
they are under tremendous economic deterioration and pressure,
then the pressure on all of these areas of proliferation, including
the pressure on scientists and military officials, grows.

As economic conditions in these countries continue to deteriorate,
we have to move more rapidly to help them and stimulate them
and give them incentives to secure and protect these lethal mate-
rials. We have to bear in mind through all of this that 90 percent
of the work in these areas has to be done by the countries them-
selves. We are not capable of solving their problems. We can help
stimulate their efforts, we can help prioritize, we can help give
them incentives, but we can't solve the problems for them. They
have their own national security at stake here too and they have
to realize it.

However, all experts agree that the wisest policy is to secure the
materials at their source. When they get out into the world market
the degree of difficulty in dealing with it gets bigger and bigger.

We must redouble our commitment to combat this threat. We have
started, but we have a long, long way to go.

Our expenditures in this regard are not commensurate with the
threat. And, it is not foreign aid. That mistaken belief is one of the
big problems Senator Lugar and I have realized. This is not foreign
aid. This is an expenditure directly in the interest of our national
security. If that point is not made clear over and over again, then
any support here on Capitol Hill will deteriorate.

Despite our commitment, the vast majority of work and resources
must still come from the nations within the former Soviet Union.
Nevertheless, we can serve as a partner and a catalyst in this ef-
fort.

We must accept the notion, whether we like it or not, that no
other nation in the world is capable of leading this effort. We are
going to have to lead and help others move in this direction.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Roth. Thank you. Senator Nunn.

Senator Glenn.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR GLENN

Senator Glenn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Permanent Sub-
committee on Investigations and the Governmental Affairs Com-
mittee, the parent committee, has a long and impressive record of
addressing various nuclear threats facing our Nation. It is a record
that has been further distinguished by the bipartisan approach we
have taken over these years and I am pleased to see this tradition
continue today.

Though we are now in what the pundits call a post Cold War
world, much of our whole approach to national security is still driv-
en by threats from the Cold War period. We are still spending tens
and indeed hundreds of billions of dollars both to maintain a robust
nuclear deterrent and to defend the country against incoming nu-
clear armed ballistic missiles.

I'm a member of the Armed Services Committee and the Intel-
ligence Committee, so I'm not one to argue that we no longer need
a nuclear deterrent. We do.

But I do strongly support the efforts of our country to negotiate
substantial international reductions in the size of the nuclear
weapons stockpiles.

We can maintain deterrence using fewer nuclear weapons, and
we have undertaken commitments to the international community
to continue this process toward the eventual goal of someday elimi-
nating such weapons altogether.

We sponsored the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) and backed NPT and we are glad to see it become
a permanent treaty instead of one that had to be reviewed every
5 years, with the idea that the NPT would hold the line while we
got control of our nuclear weapons stockpiles vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union.

We'll hear testimony today that a more immediate and credible
threat to our security comes from weapons produced from nuclear
materials acquired en the black market.

It is fashionable these days to assume that the only conceivable
source of these materials are the factories, laboratories and storage

depots of the nuclear establishment of the former Soviet Union and
a few other places. But I think it is also useful to recall that some
500 tons of Plutonium will be separated by European countries and
by Japan over the next 20 years. That's about five times the
amount of plutonium in the whole current U.S. nuclear arsenal.

We know that it only takes about five kilograms of plutonium to
make a nuclear weapon, and this comes out to I guess 100,000 or
more nuclear weapons potential out of that kind of a stockpile.

We'll hear testimony today that a more immediate and credible
threat to our security comes from the weapons produced fi*om nu-
clear materials acquired on the black market. In short, the crux of
the matter is more in the nature of the materials we are dealing
with here today, plutonium and highly enriched uranium, more
than the simple issue of their national origin.

No accounting system involving large scale use of nuclear mate-
rials, not in Russia, not here, not anywhere, is 100 percent perfect.
There will always be the threat that relatively small amounts of
these materials will leak into a global black market without detec-
tion.

We also know very little about the whereabouts and precise uses
of such materials in international commerce worldwide, even in
and between countries with which we have very fi*iendly relations.

I'm also very concerned today about — and we'll have following
hearings on this on CW and BW, chemical weapons and biological
weapons. I think they maybe even pose a bigger threat in the long
term future because they are so much easier to make.

Judge Webster, then head of the CIA, in this hearing room sit-
ting at the table where the gentlemen are here right now, testified
that a very credible chemical weapons factory could be set up by
terrorists or by a nation in a space about the size of this hearing
room, in pointing the difficulty that it is for them to track and keep
track of where all these places may be all over the world. And the
formulas for those things do not require a huge industrial complex
to put together.

So the danger is not all fi-om nuclear weapons. But anj^way, plu-
tonium I think also has another danger to it that maybe we have
overlooked sometimes, apart fi-om the nuclear weapons. If we had
someone with a good stock of plutonium they had been able to get
some place and just spread it around Times Square, I don't know
what we would do.

It would be something that posed a terrific problem, and we
could have terrorism that doesn't require such a huge industrial
complex to put a whole weapons system together.

As we listen to the testimony today therefore, I think is is vital
for us to all recognize we are dealing with a profoundly difficult
global problem here, not just one pertaining to Russia or a handful
of so-called rogue nations.

If another satchel filled with plutonium turns up in the trunk of
a Mercedes parked in Munich, we in all likelihood may never no
where the stuff originally came from. You can't always identify its
national origin. A plutonium atom is a plutonium atom, and I un-
derstand modern electron microscopes have finally begun to ob-
serve actual atoms, or close to it, but they don't have little flags

hooked on to them that's for sure. So we don't know where these
things would come from.

Clearly, we have a lot of work to do before we can even hope to
have a timely and accurate answer to some of these questions.

So it is in this context I look forward to today's testimony and
the subsequent hearings we will have. I congratulate the Sub-
committee for its efforts in this area and the bipartisan leadership
it has shown.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Roth. Thank you, Senator Glenn.

Senator Lieberman, I understand you have no opening state-
ment. We are indeed pleased to have Dick Lugar with us today. He
has played such a principal role in addressing the problems of nu-
clear proliferation and other weapons of mass destruction. Wel-
come.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LUGAR

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'd like for
my full statement to be made a part of the record.

If I may, I'll summarize.
' Senator ROTH. Please proceed.

Senator LuGAR. Let me say, Mr. Chairman, that I'm impressed,
as I think all members are, by Senator Glenn's point on the
globalization of and thus the multilateral aspects of the problem
associated with the proliferation of materials of mass destruction.
But the bilateral problem with Rassia resulting from the Cold War
is a very special focus. And I have been appreciative of the leader-
ship of Senator Nunn in working with me and with other members
on this particular situation.

The Cold War led to massive research, production and stocks of
nuclear, chemical and biological materials. We discovered in a pre-
vious hearing of this Subcommittee that, in total, as much as 800
million dollars of the United States budget each year is now ex-
pended trying to protect ourselves from what we have produced,
what v/e have in storage and which could harm Americans, quite
apart from other countries.

This is a massive expenditure and gives some quantification to
the enormity of the problem as we see it with regard to the nu-
clear, biological and chemical stocks.

Now, this massive effort on our part has been paralleled in part
by Russia and the other states left over after the Soviet Union dis-
integrated. But it is clear, as I'm sure witnesses will point out
today and others witnesses did in Foreign Relations Committee
hearings in August, that the degree of security surrounding such
weapons and materials on the part of Russia is substantially less.
And I suspect that difficulty will continue, due to difficulties in the
Russian economy, and maybe bottlenecks in their bureaucracy.

What I think we have going for us in this country and in Russia
now is that there is a growing and perhaps comparable apprecia-
tion of the dangers posed by these weapons and materials to our
own peoples. In other words, it is very probable that in the event
that nuclear leakage occurs, or leakage of biological or chemical
components, the first victims could be Russian. There are any num-

ber of disputes going on in that country now in which people might
be included to use in combat whatever means they have at hand.

And I suspect the other problem that we are all trying to come
to grips with is what might be called "new think" as opposed to
"old think." The "old think" focused on an idea that was extremely
difficult for us to comprehend of ICBMs aimed at us, thousands of
them, and the potential destruction of our country.

Now, much of that threat still remains, and arms control negotia-
tions as well as unilateral reductions are trying to address that sit-
uation. In a modest way, Nunn-Lugar funds have been utilized by
our country to work with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and other
parts of the former Soviet Union, now independent republics, to in
fact take warheads off of missiles, even to destroy missiles, and to
blow up silos. So in fact some of that threat is being met.

But the new threat is obviously not one borne by an ICBM. It
is the problem, illustrated in various testimony of important com-
mittees, of somebody utilizing a suitcase or satchel to smuggle in
a small device that has been machined with expertise and em-
ployes sufficient highly enriched uranium to create a nuclear inci-
dent.

That type of threat has not been perceived widely. In fact, I
would contend that the American people by and large are almost
in a state of denial over this possibility. But denial or not, it is
there. And the importance of this hearing is to illustrate, I suppose,
not only the technical ability to build such weapons, but the avail-
ability of the fissile material to create such a weapon.

Let me just say that our situation here in the Congress is the
need to think through very rapidly what we are going to do in
terms of authorizing and appropriating funds to deal with these
problems for the coming year.

But it is clear that we need a sense of urgency here. We have
to think about our priorities in terms of how much money we are
prepared to spend on various programs to meet the new threats
that Graham Allison and the Harvard people have outlined in their
remarkable new publication. "New Think" will require new re-
sources and new programs.

These are urgent affairs. Small amounts of money have been
spent by DOD and DOE to help the Russians achieve better secu-
rity in their facilities. But this is barely a pilot project situation,
with an enormous number of Russian facilities clearly in disarray,
with the real prospect of people walking off with nuclear material,
and with ready markets, whether it be rogue states, terrorists orga-
nizations, to receive this material.

Now, ultimately, if we do not succeed in stemming theflow of
those materials, in a fairly short time fi'ame, we will have a prob-
lem of proliferation that is literally beyond control. For the mo-
ment, we have still an opportunity to get it under control and we
ought to do so. And the urgency of the situation is highlighted by
this hearing.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling the hearing and for in-
cluding me as a part of the panel this morning.

[The prepared statement of Senator Lugar follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Thank you Mr. Chairman, for including me in this series of hearings by the Per-
manent Subcommittee on Investigations. We commenced our deliberation on the
problems associated with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction with 2
days of hearings last August by the European Subcommittee of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee. At that time, we focused on the nuclear component of the weap-
ons-of-mass-destruction problem, and indeed heard from some of the same witnesses
scheduled to appear before this Subcommittee. Last October, this Subcommittee
delved into the chemical component of the problem, with a focus on the activities
of a Japanese terrorist organization.

It is important, Mr. Chairman, that we proceed with our investigations into these
emerging threats to U.S. national security interests. It is not at all clear to me that
there is a proper appreciation of these looming threats throughout the country as
a whole. I have just come off the campaign trail. With the exception of some com-
mercials that I ran highlighting the dangers posed by the illicit trade in nuclear ma-
terials and efforts by rogue states and terrorist organizations to acquire such mate-
rials, there has been no national security component to the presidential debates. For
that reason, I applaud the efforts of the Subcommittee to stick with this theme of
the dangers posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In commending the Subcommittee for pursuing the issues associated with the pro-
liferation of weapons of mass destruction and appropriate U.S. policy responses to
such threats, I want to draw Members' attention to a major recommendation of the
Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community (the
so-called Brown Commission) which issued its report on March 1. The Commission
calls for the establishment of a single element of the National Security Council,
chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to develop
and coordinate appropriate strategies to counter threats to our national security
such as nuclear terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In its report entitled "Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intel-
ligence", the Commission, chaired by former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown,
noted that the end of the Cold War has meant a significant change in the nature
of the foreign threats to U.S. security. The principal wori^^ of most Americans is no
longer a devastating military offensive from abroad, but rather more insidious as-
saults which hit closer to home, threatening lives and property, and creating a cli-
mate of fear. The bombing of the World Trade Center and the thwarted attacks
against other targets in New York City demonstrated that terrorist acts are no
longer risks that Americans confront only abroad. The use of chemical agents in the
attack on the Tokyo subway heightened the concern that similar attacks could occur
here. The Commission concluded that "the breakup of the former Soviet Union and
increased efforts by other countries to obtain weapons of mass destruction and relat-
ed technologies have resulted in greatly increased trafficking in illicit materials,
leading many Americans to worry more now about the possibility of a nuclear explo-
sion than during the Cold War."

Most of these threats to our security stem from foreign groups whose activities
are not limited by governmental or national boundaries. Some operate with the sup-
port or tolerance of a government; others do not. Some are organized groups with
far-flung operations; others are independent actors.

The Brown Commission notes that such "non-traditional" or "transnational"
threats will pose increasing dangers to the American people in the years ahead as
the perpetrators grow more sophisticated and take advantage of new technologies.
These threats also affect U.S. interests in other ways, for example, by undermining
the stability of friendly governments or even requiring the commitment of U.S.
forces.

Recognizing the increasingly menacing nature of these threats, the President pre-
viously issued separate directives specifically identifying international terrorism,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international organized crime as
threats to national security, and creating separate interagency working groups
under the auspices of the National Security Council to share information with re-
gard to them. A growing number of Federal departments and agencies now have re-
sponsibility for combating global crime, including the Department of Justice, the
FBI, and DEA, as well as the Departments of State and Defense and the Intel-
ligence Community.

However, while each of these agencies' roles is important, their overlapping re-
sponsibilities have led to conflicts in missions and methods, particularly between the
law enforcement and intelligence communities, to the point where the country's abil-
ity to combat such threats in an effective manner has been undermined. This has
to stop!

The U.S. Government, in my judgment, has reUed too heavily on law enforcement
as the primary response to international wrongdoers, to the detriment of other pos-
sible actions. While law enforcement can be an extremely powerful weapon against
terrorism or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, it may not be the
most appropriate response in all circumstances. Diplomatic, economic, military, or
intelligence measures, in many cases, can offer advantages over a strict law enforce-
ment response.

Some may believe that it is improper for the Executive branch to subordinate law
enforcement interests to other policy considerations, such as the impact on foreign
relations, protection of intelligence sources and methods, or implications for the use
of U.S. forces. I do not! The President has responsibility not only to enforce the laws
but also to conduct foreign policy and provide for the common defense. It is essential
for the President to weigh various competing policy interests in determining the
most effective response to such global criminal activity. It is up to the President to
decide whether to give priority to law enforcement, or to intelligence, or to other pol-
icy options.

The Brown Commission noted that, while the recently created NSC working
groups are fostering broader interagency exchanges of information on different kinds
of global crime, "these groups do not provide the necessary strategic direction to at-
tack these activities in a systematic and comprehensive way. These working groups
are not convened at a sufficiently high level to set overall strategies or to settle
interagency differences". Moreover, the current NSC Deputies Committee "is used
on an ad hoc basis and does not provide significant or continuing strategic direc-
tion."

Thus, the Brown Commission recommended that the President create by Execu-
tive Order a Global Crime Committee of the National Security Council to direct the
U.S. Government's actions against transnational activities that threaten the na-
tional security. It further recommended that this Committee should: (1) establish an
overall strategy for dealing with global crime, once certified; (2) monitor implemen-
tation by the executive departments and agencies; (3) determine the appropriate ap-
proach to specific types of global crime, such as terrorism or proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction; and (4) resolve operational and policy differences among the
various departments and agencies.

To conclude, Mr. Chairman, law enforcement agencies historically have taken the
lead in responding to global criminal activities carried out by foreign groups such
as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. But where U.S.
security is threatened, strategies which employ diplomatic, economic, military, or in-
telligence measures may be required instead of, or in collaboration with, a law en-
forcement response. It is essential that there be overall direction and coordination
of U.S. responses, and I am strongly supportive of the Brown Commission's rec-
ommendations in this area.

For that reason, Mr. Chairman, I would hope that, as the Subcommittee pursues
its work through this series of hearings on threats associated with the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, it would also devote some thought to strategies for
countering these threats to our national security. What we need, Mr. Chairman, and
what we seem to be lacking at the moment, is the necessary strategic direction to
attack these activities in a systematic and comprehensive way.

Senator RoTH. Thank you, Senator Lugar.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, with your permission I would sug-
gest we start today with a brief statement from John Sopko and
Alan Edelman of our staff to bring us up to date on the Aum
Shinrikyo matter. There have been a few developments since we
had our hearings 5 months ago and I thought it might be a good
way to get started today.

I think they would probably need to be sworn in with our other
witnesses.

Senator ROTH. Please rise. Do you swear the testimony you will
give before this Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth,
and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?

Mr. SoPKO. I do.

Mr. Edelman. I do.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN F. SOPKO, DEPUTY CfflEF COUNSEL TO
THE MINORITY; ACCOMPANIED BY ALAN EDELMAN, COUN-
SEL TO THE MINORITY, PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON IN-
VESTIGATIONS

Mr. SOPKO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As Senator Nunn has already indicated, the staff will be provid-
ing next week a more detailed staff statement on the problems we
found dealing with nuclear proliferation and the potential smug-
gling of material from the former Soviet Union.

But what we wanted to do today is to provide to the Subcommit-
tee and the public new revelations that we believe are so important
that we need to bring them to your attention, to the public's atten-
tion.

The staff, as you know, has continued to follow the activities of
the Japanese terrorist group — the Aum. In the course of that, we
acquired a 41 minute videotape; which is an actual videotape of the
interior of the laboratory used by the Aum Shinrikyo to produce
the sarin used in the Tokyo subway attack. ^

This videotape has never before been seen here in the United
States. The depiction we have up on the chart, there with the
arrow, is the laboratory where the sarin was produced that was
used in the deadly Tokyo incident.

This videotape and the pictures and diagrams we have prepared
from it were provided by the staff to our law enforcement and intel-
ligence community. That is a diagram of the chemical lab based
upon a review of the videotape by the CIA.^

The staff forwarded this videotape upon its acquisition to the
CIA where it was analyzed. The CIA was able to confirm the au-
thenticity of the video and, in brief, they concluded the laboratory
shown is the chemical research and development laboratory of the
Aum Shinrikyo. 2

A diagram of the laboratory was drawn based upon the video
footage which you see up there. "Still" photos were also prepared,
and those are some of the "still" photos. ^

I would direct your attention to the lower right-hand corner, and
we also have blowups of those pictures which I believe we have
provided for the Senators.

That photograph depicts the actual reactor vessel that our intel-
ligence community believes was used to process the Aum's sarin
gas used in the Tokyo incident. That is their analysis based upon
this videotape that the staff provided to our intelligence commu-
nity.

This was the first time that western intelligence and law enforce-
ment agencies have had an inside look at this important facility.
And as Senator Glenn mentioned, you can make sarin in a room
a lot smaller than this hearing room. Actually, if you look at the
diagram chart, the reactor vessel is up in the corner and that room
is probably half the size of today's hearing room. That was enough
sarin to kill the 12 people in Tokyo and injure the 5,000.

^ Exhibit No. la. is retained in the files of the Subcommittee.

2 See Exhibit No. Ic. on page 520.

3 Exhibit No. lb. is retained in the files of the Subcommittee.

The video shows several pieces of expensive equipment, including
an incubator, a fume hood, an autoclave, glove box, and two pieces
of equipment assessed to be mass spectrometers.

The equipment alone identified in this video costs upward to
$355,000, but all appear to have been manufactured domestically.
You could buy off the shelf in Japan.

The video shows a large insulated piece of equipment in a sepa-
rate room with external ventilation. This was assessed to be the
chemical reactor which I have previously referred to, with an esti-
mated 1,000 liter capacity.

Oversall, the laboratory depicted was determined to be a pilot
sc£de production facility with enough capacity to have produced the
quantity of sarin used in the Tokyo incident.

Senator NUNN. You said, Mr. Sopko, there was enough to kill five
people. If they had had delivery means, it would have been enough
to kill far more.

Mr. SoPKO. Absolutely, Senator. The thousand liters of sarin
could have killed 10,000 people or more. It just was the delivery
system that was not effective.

But that is our best estimate, and the intelligence community's
estimate is that the photo depicted was where the sarin was pro-
duced in that vessel right there in that building that eventually
was used in the subway attack.

As our investigation revealed, there is a larger building where
there was a massive production system set up where they were
supposed to produce tons of sarin per year, but that production fa-
cility had actually broken down, if you recall, from the testimony
from last Fall.

That larger building you see to the left of the arrow is where that
larger production facility was located.

The videotape and the photographs produced today have never
been explained before in public and the staff believes they are an
important addition to our knowledge of this terrorist group. We
would ask, Senator, that the videotape, the still photos and the dia-
gram be made part of the Subcommittee's official record. ^

Senator Roth. Without objection.

Mr. Sopko. Thank you, Senator. That's all we have to say at this
time.

Senator NuNN. I think before we get started on our next panel
of witnesses, if we could just ask you to give us a brief summary
of the relationship between the Aum Shinrikyo and Russia, par-
ticularly its membership and what it was doing there in recruiting.
This would be a recounting of previous testimony, but I think it is
important to keep in mind.

Mr. Edelman. Senator, our investigation showed that the Aum
was very active in the former Soviet Union, both in terms of re-
cruiting members and in terms of viewing the former Soviet Union
as, in the words that you yourself used in your opening, a super-
market for technology, equipment and expertise.

1 Exhibit No. la. and lb. is retained in the files of the Subcommittee. Exhibit No. Ic. appears
on page 520.

We found that within Russia the Aum actually had more mem-
bers than they had within Japan. I believe their membership in
Russia was somewhere close to 30,000 members.

They were also very active in terms of touring military facilities,
trying to get training with helicopters and airplanes. There are in-
dications that they had meetings with high level Russian officials,
and there are even some indications that there may have been dis-
cussions held concerning the possibility of obtaining nuclear weap-
ons.

There was a notation found in the notebooks of the so-called con-
struction minister of the Aum in which he made reference to a nu-
clear weapon and how much it would cost to purchase a nuclear
weapon.

The Aum also owned a television-radio transmitter station within
Russia from which they broadcast daily programs both within the
former Soviet Union and from there to Japan. So they were very
active within that country, and viewed that as a rich source of ma-
terials for their activities.

Senator GLENN. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one question?

Wasn't there a press report or something that they had bought
a uranium mine in Australia and that they were interested in laser
equipment, or something like that?

Mr. Edelman. Yes. We had found information that, in addition
to their activities in Russia, they had also purchased property in
Australia. It was a very remote location in the outback of Australia
which they apparently used to test their sarin. They tested it on
sheep located on this ranch out in Australia.

In addition to that activity, there are indications that they were
searching for uranium. That part of Australia is apparently known
to have some uranium deposits, and there was evidence that the
Aum had rented mining equipment and had in fact conducted some
mining activity on that property.

It is unclear whether they ever actually took any uranium out of
the ground and back to Japan, but they did apparently attempt to
mine there.

Senator Glenn. Thank you.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, I suggest our next panel come up and I'll intro-
duce them.

Harold Johnson, who is the Associate Director of International
Relations and Trade Issues, National Security and International
Affairs Division, of the General Accounting Office.

The next witness is Graham T. Allison, Director of the Center for
Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. And Dr.
Allison will present the findings from the book he and his col-
leagues are releasing today, "Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy, Contain-
ing the Threat of Loose Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Materials."

Also, we have William Potter, Director for the Center for Russian
and Eurasian Studies of the Monterey Institute. Dr. Potter will
present his latest study on nuclear diversion cases from the former
Soviet Union.

Our next witness will be Sarah Mullen. Ms. Mullen is Chair of
the Global Organized Crime nuclear Black Market Task Force at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Ms. Mullen will

summarize the findings of the task force, and I think the full report
is going to be issued sometime in the next few days.

Our last witness with this panel will be Gary Bertsch, Director
of the Center for International Trade and Security at the Univer-
sity of Georgia. Dr. Bertsch will summarize the findings of two re-
ports that are being released today on export control issues in the
former Soviet Union.

Senator Roth. It is a pleasure to welcome each and every one of
you here. As you know, it is the practice of the Subcommittee to
swear in all the witnesses. So would you please stand and raise
your right hand.

Do you swear the testimony you will give before this Subcommit-
tee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help you, Grod?

Mr. Johnson. I do.

Dr. Allison. I do.

Dr. Potter. I do

Ms. Mullen. I do

Dr. Bertsch. I do

Senator RoTH. Please be seated.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, if I could suggest, each one of
these witnesses we could benefit greatly hearing from them for an
hour at least, probably 2 hours. But one of the big benefits of hav-
ing this group here is to get an interchange between them and hav-
ing ideas flow around the table and between that table and this
table here.

So we have told each one of the witnesses to try to limit them-
selves to 10 to 15 minutes. And without being rude, what I suggest
is that if it would help our witnesses to give you a 10-minute re-
minder, just a brief interruption sa3dng 10 minutes, and then per-
haps you can start wrapping up for the next 3 minutes, spilling
over to about 5 minutes, and we'll try to keep it within a reason-
able time, because we do have another panel and I would like to
be able to have the Senators have some dialogue.

We know you are going to know a lot more than you tell us this
morning. We are going to stipulate that for the record.

Senator ROTH. Do you want to start, Mr. Johnson?

Mr. Johnson. Certainly.

TESTIMONY OF HAROLD J. JOHNSON, JR.,i ASSOCIATE DIREC-
TOR, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND TRADE ISSUES, NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Mr. Johnson. Mr. Chairman, hopefully I'll be shorter than 10 or
15 minutes. In that our report is being released today, I have a
very brief statement that I'll present orally.

We are pleased to be here today to discuss the report that is
being released today that deals with controls over direct-use mate-
rial in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union.^
Keeping fissile material such as highly enriched uranium and plu-
tonium from terrorists and other countries seeking nuclear explo-

* The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson appears on page 187.
2 See Exhibit No. 2a. which api>ears on page 522.

sives has become a primary national security concern for the Unit-
ed States and for the newly independent states.

Our report specifically addresses the nature and extent of the
problem of controlling direct-use materials in Russia, Ukraine
Kazakhstan and Belarus; the status of, and future prospects for
U.S. efforts to help strengthen the controls over these states; and
the consolidation of U.S. efforts within the Department of Energy.

Our review focused on control of direct-use material handled by
civilian authorities and used in naval nuclear propulsion vessels.
We did not review controls over nuclear weapons in the possession
of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

In summary, the social and economic changes in the newly inde-
pendent states have increased the threat of theft and diversion of
nuclear material. With the breakdown of the Soviet era control sys-
tems, the newly independent states may not be as able as they
were in the past to counter that increased threat.

While we have no direct evidence that a black market for stolen
or diverted nuclear material currently exists in the newly inde-
pendent states, seizures of direct-use material in Russia and Eu-
rope have increased the concerns about the adequacy of controls at
nuclear facilities.

Let me cite just a few facts to illustrate the problem. According
to the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, it takes
about 25 kilograms of HEU or about 8 kilograms of plutonium,
both direct-use materials, to make a bomb. DOE suggests that the
amounts may be actually less than that.

Russia and the six other newly independent states have hun-
dreds of tons of material not contained in weapons located in 80
to 100 facilities, but an exact inventory and the location of the ma-
terial is not known.

Direct-use materials are attractive to theft because the materials
are not highly radioactive, and in some instances can be trans-
ported by one or two people.

Material protection, control and accountability systems in Russia
and other newly independent states have serious weaknesses, lack-
ing such things as automated material tracking systems, portal
monitors, adequate perimeter barriers, and adequate seals on con-
tainers to help detect losses.

In response to these problems, the United States has pursued
two different but complementary programs to help the newly inde-
pendent states improve their nuclear material control and account-
ability systems. The first is a direct government-to-government pro-
gram to help the governments of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and
Belarus develop national control systems and improve existing con-
trols over civilian material.

The second is a lab-to-lab program to improve controls at Rus-
sian nuclear facilities that handle direct-use material. The govern-
ment-to-government program was initially sponsored and funded
by the Department of Defense under the Nunn-Lugar program, but
was implemented by the Department of Energy. The lab-to-lab pro-
gram is sponsored by DOE and is jointly funded by DOE and DOD.

U.S. efforts began in 1993 with the government-to-government
program, but got off to a slow start. The Russian Ministry of Atom-
ic Energy, known as MinAtom, initially refused U.S. officials access

to Russia's direct-use facilities, and projects at facilities with direct-
use material in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus were just getting
under way at the time of our review.

According to DOD officials, the program was also slowed by the
requirement for using U.S. goods and services and for audits and
examinations.

The government-to-government program began to gain momen-
tum in January of last year when U.S. and Russian officials agreed
to upgrade the nuclear material controls at five high priority facili-
ties handling direct-use material.

DOE and Russian nuclear agencies have also agreed to cooperate
on a national material control and accountability regulation infra-
structure.

DOE's lab-to-lab program, which started in 1994 as an extension
of other lab-to-lab relationships, had a quicker start. It has already
improved controls at two research reactors and begun providing nu-
clear material monitors to several MinAtom defense facilities to
help them detect unauthorized attempts to remove direct-use mate-
rial. The program, is now implementing projects in Russia's nuclear
defense complex.

For fiscal year 1996, the United States has expanded its assist-
ance program, and I would like to comment that we call this an
assistance program, but I think we agree with Senator Nunn's com-
ment in his opening statement that this really is not assistance,
but is a cooperative effort in the United States' interest. The pro-
gram has been expanded to include all known facilities in the
newly independent states with direct-use material outside of weap-
ons.

Also beginning in 1996, management and funding for the ex-
panded program have been consolidated within DOE. DOE expects
to ask the Congress for about $400 million over a seven-year period
for the program. That would be from fiscal year 1996 through 2002.

DOE faces several uncertainties in managing the expanded pro-
gram. For example, DOE does not know exactly how many facilities
will require upgrades, or how much the upgrades at each facility
will cost.

The number of facilities to be upgraded could be as high as 135.
The cost estimates range from five million to ten million. Because
of these uncertainties, the total programs could cost over a billion
dollars.

In addition, DOE may be limited in its ability to directly assess
program progress and concern that U.S. assistance is being used as
intended, because the Russians may limit the measures that can
be used for these purposes at highly sensitive facilities.

In response to these uncertainties, DOE has initiated the follow-
ing steps. They have developed a long-range plan for the expanded
programs that consolidates both the government-to-government
and lab-to-lab programs. The plan establishes objectives, priorities
and timetables for implementing projects at facilities. However, at
the time we completed our review in January of this year the plan
had not been released.

DOE is also developing a consolidated cost reporting system to
provide more current financial data on both programs, and it is im-

plementing a more flexible audit and program evaluation approach
to assure that the assistance is used as intended.

Before concluding my remarks, I would like to add that the re-
port that is being released today is one in a series of reports that
we have issued, or are working on, dealing with nuclear safety and
the Nunn-Lugar program.

Thank you.

Senator NUNN. [Presiding.] Thank you very much, Mr. Johnson.

I know that during your review you visited a number of different
facilities where direct-use material is handled.

First I would like to ask you, I won't interrupt all the witnesses
with this, but we need to get some definitions.

Would you give us a definition of what you mean by direct use?
And then second, you took some pictures, and I think while you are
testifying it would be good if we could look at some of those pic-
tures.^

Mr. Johnson. Yes. Direct-use material is the highly enriched
uranium and plutonium that can be converted and used for making
bombs without further processing. As direct use implies, it can be
used directly.

Senator NuNN. So it is the most dangerous material as far as
proliferation is concerned, because it does not require processing?

Mr. Johnson. That's correct.

Senator NuNN. Maybe you could just show us those pictures
here.

Mr. Johnson. Yes. This picture was taken at Obninsk, and what
this shows is a fuel element of direct-use material that can be held
in ones hand without protection. It is not highly radioactive. I
brought a mockup of that pellet, and it is this size. As you can see,
it is very easy to conceal in one's pocket and just walk out the door
with.

Senator NuNN. How many of those would it take to really make
a weapon? I mean, what are you talking about?

Mr. Johnson. Well, we calculated it would take about 50 or 55
of those. But the problem at this particular facility was that at the
time we were there they had not yet taken an inventory, and offi-
cials at the lab, in response to a question by our staff, indicated
that they really didn't know the precise number.

So it would be fairly simple for somebody to walk out every other
day with a couple of these pellets in their pocket and collect enough
fairly quickly to construct a bomb.

Senator NuNN. You put three or four in your pocket a day within
2 or 3 weeks you would have enough to make a weapon?

Mr. Johnson. Yes, sir. Now, with the HEU it would take a little
longer because it requires a larger amount of material, but the
same could happen.

Senator NuNN. Is this plutonium or HEU?

Mr. Johnson. This is plutonium.

This picture was taken at Kurchatov Institute and depicts a
vault where direct-use material is contained. As you can see, the
seal is a fairly rudimentary t3T)e of seal. It is a wax seal that can

' Exhibit No. 2b. is retained in the files of the Subcommittee.

be — I was just handed a note that that was at Obninsk, so I was
incorrect on it being Kuschatov.

But as you can see, it is a fairly rudimentary type of seal that
can be easily defeated. It is not too difficult to replace it so that
one can't detect that it has been entered.

Senator NUNN. Senator Lugar, would you like to move over here
so you can see these pictures?

Senator LuGAR. Sure, that's a good idea.

Senator NuNN. We welcome you on this side of the aisle.

Senator Levin. For this and other purposes, Dick.

Senator NUNN. Well, on this side of the aisle the vision is clearer.

Mr. Johnson. Before you remove the picture, I would like to just
point out — and we don't have a picture of the floor area, but you
can see wax drippings. So, obviously, this has been entered and
exited more than once. One can only speculate as to whether that
was a surreptitious entry or not.

Senator NuNN. Flash that pellet chart back up there and let Sen-
ator Lugar take a look at that.

Mr. Johnson. OK. Now, we are at Kurchatov.

As you can see from this picture — and it is a little bit hard to
detect in the back — but there is an outer fence, a cement wall, and
an inner fence. But the difficulty here is that the area between is
not clear so that an intruder could be easily detected.

There is vegetation growing between the two fences. The tree is
also between the two fences. It seems clearer now because the foli-
age is off the tree, but it would be more difficult to detect an in-
truder with this type of vegetation growing in what supposedly is
a clear area.

The other thing that we did not observe when we visited the
Kurchatov Institute were surveillance cameras or guards in this
particular area. So an intruder would be more likely to be able to
enter the facility.

Now, this building is within the perimeter fence that we just
saw. In a U.S. facility there would also be a fence located more
closely to the building to prevent entry into the building. But as
you can see here, security is rather lax and it would not be terribly
difficult for one to just melt into the background.

Senator NuNN. Is that it on the pictures?

Mr. Johnson. Yes, sir.

Senator NuNN. Thank you very much. The pictures are very illu-
minating, to say the least.

Dr. Allison, glad to have you.

TESTIMONY OF GRAHAM T. ALLISON,* DIRECTOR, CENTER
FOR SCIENCE & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, JOHN F. KEN-
NEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Dr. Allison. Thank you. Senator.

My reports and findings I think are very consistent with those
that Mr. Johnson has already begun with. It is an honor for me to
be here and I want to salute particularly you, Senator Nunn and
Senator Lugar, for the work that you all have done in attempting
to get all of us to focus squarely on this issue.

'The prepared statement of Dr. Allison appears on page 194.

Today we are releasing a year-long study, published as a book by
MIT Press, called Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy, copies of which, I
think, have been given to the Members of the Subcommittee. ^

This book attempts to respond directly to a challenge put by Sen-
ators Nunn and Lugar earlier, and I am glad to report that in the
first instance, in our analysis we find that you are correct in your
provocative proposition, stated more than a year ago, that the
threat posed by loose nuclear weapons-usable material, and indeed
nuclear weapons themselves, is the No. 1 most urgent threat to
American national security today.

This book attempts to analyze the shape of that threat, to ex-
plore and explain why and how it happens to be arising now, and
to analyze as clearly as we can what our American stakes are in
the risk of loss of nuclear weapons-usable material, or what Harold
is calling direct-use material, material from which one could fash-
ion a crude nuclear device, or indeed nuclear weapons themselves.

I gave a preview of the findings on that to Senator Lugar's hear-
ing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last summer. I
won't concentrate on the threat today, except to say very briefly
two things: First, if a party got a softball size or grapefruit size 30
pounds of highly enriched uranium, which is easily carried in my
briefcase, or a baseball size of plutonium, and took it out of more
than a hundred such facilities in Russia, with that material and
other equipment available at Radio Shack and equivalent stores in
the United States, and a couple hundred thousand dollars and a
couple of months, they could make a serious nuclear device. So,
point one.

Point two, if that device was carried in the minivan that was
placed in the World Trade Center, or at Oklahoma City, with the
design that is available on a worldwide web site — I actually
brought the address for you that my assistant had pulled up — the
same design that the United States used for Hiroshima, so it is
public knowledge for quite a long time. If a nuclear device had been
in the minivan, placed at the World Trade Center, the lower part
of Manhattan would have disappeared, up to Gramercy Park, all of
Wall Street. Oklahoma City would be history. Or Tokyo.

Third, why is this happening now? As you said earlier this morn-
ing. Senator Nunn, because we have seen a collapse of an empire,
and a continuing collapse of all of the centralized control systems
of that empire.

The empire that imprisoned a society, previously left material
like that safe, because everything was watched by the KGB and the
internal security forces, and everyone was living inside a prison.
Those prison walls have collapsed. That's the good news for free-
dom in Russia.

The bad news is that people can walk in there and take some-
thing for themselves, personally, freelancers, Mafia, others. And as
you said in your opening statement, this is not just a hypothetical,
this has now happened, and Bill Potter will have more to say about
that.

What this report then does is attempt in the final chapter to ad-
dress the classic Russian refrain, or Shto delat? What is to be

1 Exhibit No. 4 is retained in the files of the Subcommittee.

done? And that's the focus of what I'll make my brief remarks on
here today.

What can we do about this problem? Given its proportions and
dimensions as analyzed in this study £md by the work of other
members of the panel, one is almost tempted to say this is inevi-
table, throw up our hands, say this is too hard.

We say two things in two lines. First, recognize this as the num-
ber one threat to American national security today, the threat of
loose nuclear weapons and loose nuclear weapons-usable material
from the former Soviet Union.

And second, mobilize a high priority all-azimuth attack on this
threat: An attack motivated by a strategy and commanding the at-
tention, money, energy and imagination commensurate to our stake
in the threat. Those are the two lines. Recognize it as the No. 1
threat, and mobilize an all-azimuth attack proportionate to the
problem.

Now, specifically what might this involve? And in deference to
the vernacular of our political season, in my testimony that I have
submitted for you today we try to state the agenda for action to
contain loose nukes in a manner as straightforward as A, B, C.

In the final chapter of the book, we have a more academic ver-
sion of the 26 point plan. But I think this may be easier to recall,
A, B, C.

A, the A-No. 1 problem.

Senator NUNN. You are gearing this to a lower level to fit your
audience, right?

Dr. Allison. No, sir, to myself so that I can be sure to remem-
ber. The A-No. 1 problem is the threat of loose nukes, as you and
Senator Lugar have said. They are the first and most urgent threat
to U.S. interests. Mostly nobody gets it. Mostly people don't believe
it. Even when you say it, mostly people don't take it seriously.

Is the threat assessment correct? I believe that if one looks at the
evidence, one will come to the conclusion, yes. We have not seen
anybody whom we have had look at the evidence in detail and not
come to this conclusion. So I think it is a matter though of waking
up to something that is fairly unbelievable. The A-No. 1 threat, and
A-No. 1 threat that also stands for absolute priority.

That is, as an operational objective of containing loose nuclear
weapons and loose nuclear materials at the source is an absolute
operational priority for the United States in our relations with Rus-
sia.

Now, what does it mean, an absolute priority? I go into some-
what more detail in the written testimony. We gave in the past, ab-
solute priority to avoiding a major nuclear war with the Soviet
Union. That was an objective we had to achieve in order to get on
with anj^hing else.

Similarly, whether the question is about Russian sales of reac-
tors to Iran, or Russian behavior in Chechnya, or NATO expansion,
or any other item relative to those issues on our agenda, containing
loose nukes we say should be the absolute No. 1 priority. That's A.

B stands for two things: Bilateral initiative, a bilateral Russian
American initiative. We agree entirely. Senator Nunn, with your
statement that 90 percent of the action has got to be taken by Rus-
sians. They are dealing with the Kurchatov Institute. They are

dealing with the other facihties. So this has got to be a bilateral
initiative in which they are taking most of the actions. But we are
attempting to motivate them.

So B stands first, for bilateral initiative, American and Russian,
and second, B stands for buy, that is Americans bu3dng Russian
highly enriched uranium and plutonium, bringing it here, and
using it for fuel in its diluted form in our civilian reactors.

As incredible as that idea seems to some people, they would be
surprised to learn that in fact, as you Senators of course know, a
deal of this sort was negotiated by the Bush Administration, it has
been signed by the Clinton Administration. We have a contract to
buy 500 tons of highly enriched uranium from Russia. That is
about half of the entire stockpile.

This deal is now bogged down in bureaucratics and business as
usual and is going to take over 12 years, and who knows whether
it will even be fulfilled.

Senator NUNN. I find that inexcusable. Senator Lugar and I
watched that situation develop, and we were in the Ukraine about
three or four times, and we saw the difficulty in ever getting those
weapons dismantled. It looked almost hopeless.

And then with a breakthrough, and the HEU purchase was the
centerpiece of that breakthrough, and now we are letting it just
wander off as if it is going to all be solved by some kind of free-
market mechanism. Free market can play a role it it, but it cannot
be the dominant, and that's a tragic error.

Dr. Allison. Precisely. And this contract is in place. It is not
that Mikhailov, the head of MinAtom, as difficult as he is, is not
ready to sell this material today. If you talk to him, as you have
done, he will say bring the money today and take the material
today.

Senator NuNN. One thing about him, with all his problems, it is
not the principle of the thing with him, it is the money.

Dr. Allison. Yes, it is the money. So B is bilateral and buy. Buy
in a quasi-business deal in which the U.S. Government, because of
our national security stakes, has got to be the principal actor. But
we get a chance to get back a substantial amount of our investment
as we sell this material as fuel.

C stands for two things again: Concentrate the remaining mate-
rial and weapons in the fewest possible sites, and control. Control
that material in every way one would attempt to control anything
that was valuable in the midst of a society all of whose centralized
systems are collapsing.

Now, I think if we take the pictures that Harold Johnson was
giving us, those just happen to be the Kurchatov Institute. That
just happens to be the institute in Moscow.

Senator NuNN. That's probably one of the best, isn't it?

Dr. Allison. Absolutely. There are many facilities in which this
would look like the good news as opposed to the bad news.

There are closed cities in which in principle nobody was supposed
to get outside of that city, so everything inside of the city is fi-ee.
But, of course, now everybody moves back and forth in Russia in
a manner that is almost like a normal society today, or indeed in
many ways it is like a Wild East society.

So we need to take the material that remains to the fewest pos-
sible sites, then control it. Think of it as if one were tr3ang to con-
trol diamonds, or gold, or a pile of hundred dollar bills, and ask:
How does a banker, how does a business man in Russia today ad-
dress that task?

And first, they take the money and put it in the middle of a vault
that has got a foot of steel around it. Then they have an electronic
device around that. And then they have a cage around that. And
then they have the best ex-KGB guards guarding that. And then
they have it inside of a building. And then there are police outside.

Even with all of that, as Mr. Gusinsky, the guy who runs Most
Bank, will explain to you, they lose some money because some peo-
ple inside steal some and some people outside steal some. It is a
problem.

Relative to that, for our interests, American interests, this nu-
clear material needs to be concentrated and to be controlled.

In my testimony, Senator, I have D, E, and F, but I'll stop at this
point.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Dr. Allison. I appreciate
the way you explained it on the terms you did. I think you made
it very vivid.

Dr. Potter.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM C. POTTER,i DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR
RUSSIAN AP^ EURASIAN STUDIES, MONTEREY INSTITUTE
OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Dr. Potter. Thank you very much. Senator Nunn, and other
Members of the Subcommittee, for the opportunity to report to you
findings from my study, "Nuclear Leakage from the Post-Soviet
States," a lengthier version of which is available for those who
don't already have it.

Rather than attempt to summarize the study, I'll confine my oral
remarks to three issues that I believe merit special attention. They
are, first of all, what are the confirmed cases of proliferation — sig-
nificant diversions, and exports of nuclear materials from the post-
Soviet states?

Second, what patterns of behavior may be discerned across these
cases?

And third, and perhaps most interestingly, because the informa-
tion is less widely available, what are the most serious nuclear
threats that have not received adequate attention to date?

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union one can identify at least
four confirmed cases in which more than minuscule quantities of
highly enriched uranium or plutonium have been exported from the
post-Soviet Union, and another three cases in which highly en-
riched uranium or plutonium were diverted fi-om Russian nuclear
facilities but were seized prior to export.

An additional four cases of diversion and/or export are of pro-
liferation concern, but do not as clearly meet the standard of unam-
biguous evidence with respect to either independent sources to cor-
roborate the diversion, or the size or the enrichment level of mate-
rials. So you have basically 11 significant cases.

1 The prepared statement of Dr. Potter appears on page 198.

The most important characteristics of these cases are summa-
rized in the appendix to my written report. What I will do now is
simply summarize a few of the salient aspects of those cases.

The first confirmed case involving the diversion of fissile material
from nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union occurred at the
Luch Scientific Production Association in Podolsk, a town approxi-
mately 40 kilometers southwest of Moscow.

Between late May and early September 1992, Leonid Smirnov, a
chemical engineer and a long-time employee of the plant, stole ap-
proximately one and a half kilograms of weapons-grade uranium.
He accumulated this quantity by some 20 to 25 different diver-
sions, taking the material home in a glass jar and storing it on his
apartment balcony.

Smirnov had no accomplices and appears to have been motivated
by an article he read in a Russian newspaper about the fortune to
be made by selling highly enriched uranium.

One of the earliest confirmed thefts of highly enriched uranium
occurred in late July 1993 at a storage facility of the Northern
Naval Fleet base at Andreeva Guba, some 40 kilometers from the
Norwegian border.

Two naval servicemen were arrested in the case and accused of
stealing 1.8 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from two fuel as-
semblies. The material which was recovered was enriched to ap-
proximately 36 percent, U-235, and used as fuel for third genera-
tion naval reactors.

The men said they were operating under instructions from two
naval officers. At a trial of the four suspects, which concluded in
November of this past year, the two servicemen were sentenced to
prison terms of 5 and 4 years; the two naval officers were found
not guilty for lack of evidence.

What is interesting about this case is it is one of the few cases
where there is apparently some linkage to a Murmansk-St. Peters-
burg criminal ring. So you have at least some tell-tale signs of or-
ganized criminal involvement. And this aspect of the case is still
under investigation.

On November 27, 1993 you have a second naval fuel diversion
case. I'm not going to detail it. I have explained it at length in
other publications.

What was most striking was the ease with which insiders were
able to penetrate the naval facility, basically walking through a
hole in the fence around the facility. As it was described by the
chief military prosecutor in the case, had the culprits not left the
back door of the shed where the material was stored open, the theft
probably still would not have been discovered.

This is the person who gave the nice title to my article, "Even
potatoes were guarded better." And I think that remains the case,
despite the fact that much of the fuel in the naval propulsion sec-
tor, and even in the civilian naval sector, is enriched to weapons
grade.

Moving on to the first of the so-called German cases, you found
in May of 1994 the first instance in which either highly enriched
uranium or plutonium was actually exported as opposed to simply
diverted.

This, interestingly enough, involved an inadvertent discovery by
German police in Tengen, Bavaria, of a vial containing some 5.6
grams of nearly pure plutonium-239. The supergrade material was
found in the garage of a gentleman, Adolf Jaekle, who was under
investigation for counterfeiting, and it really was just a serendipi-
tous discovery.

Although the origin of the material has not been determined defi-
nitely, there are indications that it was produced for non-weapons
purposes at the Soviet Nuclear Weapons Laboratory Arzamas-16.
Samples similar to the amount seized in Tengen may well have
been distributed by Arzamas to literally dozens of research labora-
tories in the former Soviet Union, as well as in Eastern Europe.

There are many important questions that remain about the
Tengen case, but I think what is most significant is the fact that
it was not a sting operation.

The next two cases that I'll discuss were sting operations. In
June of 1994, Bavarian authorities seized some 800 milligrams of
highly enriched uranium, enriched to 87.7 percent U-235. This ma-
terial was recovered in Landshut, Bavaria. A number of parties
were arrested in the case as part of the sting operation. There was
an interesting connection to the Czech Republic, which becomes rel-
evant when we look at a latter case. The material in this instance
appeared to have been produced for use as naval reactor or re-
search reactor fuel.

The last of the significant German smuggling cases occurred in
Munich on August 10, 1994 when Bavarian authorities seized a
suitcase that had been unloaded from a Lufthansa flight from Mos-
cow. Inside the suitcase was a metal container containing some 560
grams of mixed oxides of uranium and plutonium. This seizure,
which was also the result of a sting operation, was by far the larg-
est quantity of weapons-usable material, some 363 grams of pluto-
nium 239, that had been recovered at that point in time in the
west.

Two Spaniards and a Columbian were arrested at the airport in
connection with the case. Less well known, is that last month the
Russian Foreign Intelligence Service confirmed to German officials
that the material in question had been diverted from a research fa-
cility at Obninsk in Russia.

Although the Ministry of Atomic Energy today disputes the re-
port, I think there is good evidence that the Russian communique
to Germany was authentic.

Without going into the details of the case, it should be noted that
the Munich seizure was significant in demonstrating that sizable
quantities of weapons-usable material could be procured. The de-
mand in this instance, however, appears to have been artificially
created by German intelligence and security officials.

The last case that I will note in any detail took place on Decem-
ber 14, 1994 when Prague police, reportedly responding to an anon-
ymous phone tip, seized 2.72 kilograms of highly enriched uranium
from the backseat of a car parked on a busy street in the Czech
capital.

The police arrested the three occupants from the Czech Republic,
Belarus and Ukraine, all of whom, interestingly, had a nuclear in-
dustry background.

The seized material is interesting in part because it appears to
have been identical to the 800 milligrams of highly enriched ura-
nium that had been seized earlier that year in Landshut, Germany.
The case also resembles the Landshut seizure in that it too appears
to have been the result of a German sting operation, something
neither the Czechs nor the Germans are anxious to publicize.

There are at least four more cases that are of probable prolifera-
tion concern but don't meet the standards of unambiguous evidence
that we have used so far. I'll just mention these cases without dis-
cussing them.

The first one involves the seizure of a large cache of beryllium,
including a much smaller quantity of beryllium HEU alloy in the
basement of a bank in Vilnius, Lithuania in May of 1993.

There is the reported recovery in St. Petersburg in June 1994 of
some 3.05 kilograms of weapons-usable HEU, allegedly stolen from
a nuclear facility, most likely Electrostal, near Moscow, in March
of 1994.

Third, the seizure of six kilograms of enriched uranium, probably
20 percent U-235, in March of 1995 in Kiev, a case which is not
generally recognized, but I have reason to believe took place.

And finally, and this case has not been previously noted, at least
in the public domain, the diversion in January 1995 of one pluto-
nium pellet, or button, from the machine building plant at
Electrostal, near Moscow.

I think potentially the most serious of the cases is the one in St.
Petersburg because of the size. Initial press reports, however, in
the Russian press have not been followed by the release of more
detailed information, and it is not clear that any criminal inves-
tigation has taken place. And there is also some disagreement
among U.S. Government agencies about whether this theft actually
occurred.

The Vilnius case, which is discussed in considerable detail in my
full report, is intriguing mainly because of the possible complicity
of government authorities.

At issue in the March 1995 Kiev seizure is the level of enrich-
ment of the six kilograms of uranium. Although the U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy is inclined to characterize the fuel as low enriched,
the uranium for power reactors, I have been told by Ukrainian nu-
clear scientists that an analysis of the material by the Kiev Insti-
tute for Nuclear Research indicated an enrichment level of 20 per-
cent, consistent with much naval reactor fuel.

Although little has been released about the diversion of the plu-
tonium pellet from Electrostal, suspects have been apprehended, a
trial is planned probably for later this year. The case is intriguing
mainly because the material has not been recovered, and because
plutonium previously had not been known to be present at the
Electrostal facility.

Let me go into very briefly to a kind of summary of the patterns
of behavior, if in fact one can discern any.

Senator NuNN. Dr. Potter, it has been about 11 minutes, so you
have got some time to wrap up.

Dr. Potter. OK. Let me go right to the three main new threats
which are not adequately appreciated.

One concern is naval fuel. About 2 years ago I testified before
Congress about the danger posed by the lack of attention in Russia
to safeguarding fresh fuel for propulsion reactors, some of which
may be enriched up to 90 percent. In a nutshell, there has been
some progress made in this area. The potential for diversion, how-
ever, remains very great.

I don't think that we are moving quickly enough. There are bu-
reaucratic obstacles in both Russia and the United States.
Minatom is usually pointed to as the organization which moves at
a glacial pace. Unfortunately, the U.S. Navy may come in only a
very close second. And so there have been some difficulties in mov-
ing forward with the provision of CTR assistance in that area.

The second issue has to do with the potential for another Project
Sapphire. In November of 1994, it was widely believed that with
the successful conclusion of Project Sapphire, that the United
States had removed the last quantity of HEU from Kazakhstan.
That now is known not to be the case. Rather, in late 1995
Kazakhstan notified the International Atomic Energy Agency that
there were still 205 kilograms, and enormous quantity, of HEU at
the Semipalatinsk nuclear research site.

What is surprising and worrisome is that because Russia claims
that it owns most of the material, it refuses to allow Kazakhstan
to accept IAEA safeguards on the HEU, although Kazakhstan is re-
quired by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to have all of its nu-
clear facilities under safeguards.

Russia also refuses to specify when it will remove the material,
so the U.S. is confronted with a very difficult choice here. On the
one hand, failure to remove or safeguard the HEU would set a very
dangerous precedent whereby weapons-usable material would re-
side under ambiguous custody on the territory of a non-nuclear
weapons state party to the NPT. And in addition to being impru-
dent, such a situation would appear to be at odds with both
Kazakhstan' and Russians NPT commitment.

On the other hand, it may well be that the United States has
more confidence in the ability of Kazakhstan to protect the HEU
at Semipalatinsk than it does in Russia's ability to protect the ma-
terial if it were returned to the Luch Scientific Production Associa-
tion, which originally had control of the material, Luch, as I noted
earlier, is suspect because it was where the first significant diver-
sion took place.

The unanticipated discovery of another cache of hundreds of kilo-
grams of weapons-usable material is also a useful reminder that we
probably can expect to find further large undeclared quantities of
HEU in the non-Russian successor states. There are at least six or
seven of them which have HEU on their territory.

The last nuclear threat I would like to note may be the least ob-
vious. Indeed, until very recently it has received practically no at-
tention, perhaps because of the proper emphasis that has been
given to first enhancing security for nuclear weapons and fresh —
that is unirridiated — highly enriched uranium and plutonium.

It would be a mistake, however, to neglect the potential prolifera-
tion and terrorist risks posed by the enormous quantities of vir-
tually unsafeguarded spent nuclear fuel, especially that which was

never highly irradiated or has been sitting long enough to see its
radiation barrier decline greatly.

I think it needs to be emphasized that this spent fuel, containing
so-called reactor grade plutonium, can be used to fabricate nuclear
weapons. Moreover, spent fuel from certain kinds of reactors may
be especially attractive to would-be proliferants and terrorists with
access to a reprocessing technology because of the unusually large
proportion of HEU or plutonium present.

Spent navy fuel, for example, typically will have a large HEU
content, while that in fast breeders may contain significant quan-
tities of low irradiated plutonium.

The fast breeder reactor in Aktau, Kazakhstan, on the Caspian
Sea, across from Iran, poses a special risk. It has been in operation
since 1973, and has produced a very large quantity of low irradi-
ated plutonium, much of which remains on the plant site.

Although Kazakhstani nuclear authorities recognize the need to
upgrade safeguards at the facility and are cooperating with the
U.S. Government on this matter, a growing Iranian presence in the
city highlights the need for more rapid action.

Iran, it should be noted, has sought to establish a consulate in
Aktau since 1993, and Iranian vessels routinely call on the for-
merly closed nuclear city.

An even greater threat fi*om the perspective of Kazakhstani au-
thorities is posed by Chechen terrorists. Although this particular
danger may be exaggerated, the potential danger that could be
caused by terrorist attacks on or sabotage of civilian nuclear power
plants and spent fuel storage sites is enormous and should become
part of the calculus by which physical protection threat assess-
ments are made.

Such threats, however, currently are not reflected in the designs
of most civilian nuclear power sites in the post-Soviet states. In-
deed, one might argue that nuclear power plants and spent fuel
storage sites are potential Trojan horses, means for non-nuclear
weapons states or terrorists to deliver nuclear consequences by con-
ventional means or sabotage.

I'd like to conclude my remarks by emphasizing that most nu-
clear security problems are inextricably linked to the region's trou-
bled economic, political and social conditions. As such, they are un-
likely to be completely resolved without substantial progress to-
ward stabilizing the economy and renewing public trust in govern-
ment institutions and law.

This is not likely to occur soon, and the United States will thus
continue to face at least some threat of nuclear leakage from the
former Soviet Union for the foreseeable future. Unfortunately, this
danger is likely to grow before it recedes, and it is imperative for
the United States to commit resources commensurate with the
threat.

Thank you.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Dr. Potter.

Ms. Mullen.

TESTIMO^fY OF SARAH A. MULLEN,^ CHAIR, GLOBAL ORGA-
NIZED CRIME NUCLEAR BLACK MARKET TASK FORCE, CEN-
TER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Ms. Mullen. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee,
I appreciate the opportunity to present the views of the Nuclear
Black Market Task Force on this most serious national security
and public health and safety threat. Before I do so, however, I want
to say a few words about the task force itself.

The Nuclear Black Market Task Force is one of seven that com-
prise a 2-year project begun in September 1994 entitled Global Or-
ganized Crime and sponsored by the Center for Strategic and Inter-
national Studies.

Our task force is comprised of representatives from all key U.S.
intelligence, policy and law enforcement agencies that are involved
in tackling this problem, as well as representatives from the legis-
lative branch and from the private sector.

On behalf of Project Chair William Webster, Project Director
Arnaud de Borchgrave, who is here with me today, and CSIS, I
want to express our appreciation to those agencies and organiza-
tions that participated.

But I also want to state for the record that the opinions, conclu-
sions and recommendations expressed or implied in this testimony
and the report ^ are solely those of the Project.

Those of us in the nuclear business typically characterize the
risk equation for theft of a nuclear warhead or weapons-usable
fissile material using the following four factors: First, probability
that a theft will be attempted, or the threat; second, probability
that an attempt will succeed, or safeguards and security; third, the
probability of interrupting the theft sequence before contraband
reaches the end-user, or detection and interdiction; and finally, con-
sequences of the successful theft for national security and public
health and safety.

It was natural then for these four factors to drive our assess-
ment. We first evaluated the threat to U.S. interests posed by illicit
trade, including the link between organized crime and trafficking
in FSU origin materials.

We then evaluated preventive efforts, analyzed capabilities for
detecting, interdicting and prosecuting nuclear smugglers, and ex-
amined options for neutralizing a threat to detonate a device and
responding to knowledge that materials have been lost or stolen,
the worst case scenario.

Most of our projections are for only 2 years because uncertainties
abound, and we limited our analysis to weapons-grade nuclear ma-
terials and warheads, that is, the commodities that pose the most
serious threat.

My full statement has already been provided for the record, and
in the interest of brevity I will try to run very quickly through our
findings.

First, the probability. of theft of a nuclear weapon or bomb-quan-
tity of weapons-grade materials from the former Soviet Union is
growing. We are particularly concerned that a desperate, corrupt or

'The prepared statement of Ms. Mullen appears on page 230.
2 Exhibit No. 5 is retained in the files of the Subcommittee.

coerced official with authorized access could steal warheads or ma-
terials, or broker a theft.

It remains unclear whether the apparent lull in seizures of mate-
rial in 1995, and thus far in 1996, reflects improving counter-
measures and deterrence, or more effective concealment of traffick-
ing activity by more sophisticated marketers.

Second, the threat from the insider far exceeds the outsider
threat. Physical security of nuclear weapons in the FSU probably
could repel an attempt at forced entry, short of an attack by a
large, well-supported elite force.

But accountability procedures and other defenses against the in-
sider are weak or weakening at the same time that new factors are
compromising human reliability, collapse of the internal security
system, severe fiscal constraints, poverty, breakdown in discipline
and morale, and, of course, institutional corruption, which is perva-
sive.

The result increases both the probability of insider theft and the
probability that attempted thefts will succeed.

Third, the nuclear black market is nascent and inchoate at
present, with few buyers identified among the cases thus far. Inter-
ested buyers exist, however, especially in the Middle East, and
even one genuine transaction of direct-use materials, that is some-
thing well short of a formal market, constitutes an unacceptable
threat to national security.

Technical requirements suggest that traditional terrorist groups
are more likely to use a conventional explosive or other means to
disperse stolen radioactive materials than to improvise a nuclear
explosive device using stolen weapons-usable materials.

By contrast, anarcho-terrorists, like the Aum Shinrikyo, or a
technically sophisticated extortionist group, might be less daunted
by technical difficulties or political disincentives.

Fourth, materials are arriving in Western Europe by numerous
and shifting routes that render countermeasures expensive and
leaky. The task force concludes that the absence of smuggling re-
ports from other regions, notably the Middle East and Asia where
interested buyers exists, represents an information gap rather than
a lack of illicit activity.

Border crossing points in the Caucusus and in Central Asia are
poorly covered by Customs and police, and information from these
regions is not regularly available to U.S. authorities in the intel-
ligence and law enforcement communities.

Full implementation of the provisions of the Shengen accord will
only make matters worse by rendering much of western Europe es-
sentially without borders, and even at their best, border controls
can be expected to interdict no more than 10 percent of illicit traf-
fic.

Five, criminal elements are participating in nuclear trafficking,
but those trading in weapons-usable materials thus far appear low
level and localized. Given the severity of the consequences of a
thriving black market, however, the task force agrees that the
international community must address nuclear weapon and mate-
rials theft at whatever level it occurs.

Moreover, since corruption and criminality pervade Russia from
top to bottom, we cannot dismiss the likelihood that higher level

criminal elements operating on a global scale might become in-
volved.

Six, the nuclear black market threat would increase dramatically
if organized crime groups with far-flung international connections
were to become involved as middlemen. Knowledgeable observers
differ sharply, however, on whether organized crime will seek in-
volvement in this risky, tainted nuclear trade when it already has
other lucrative enterprises at work. Nonetheless, the international
law enforcement community must take extraordinary measures to
deprive thieves of this most dangerous avenue.

Seven, on balance, the likelihood of theft of nuclear materials is
outpacing improvements in protection. In that, I agree with my col-
leagues on the panel. And since much of this has already been cov-
ered, I'll skip over to the following point, and that is that several
seizures of materials that had been stolen months before and hid-
den away while the thieves awaited an opportunity for sale suggest
that some materials already are beyond western-assisted efforts to
improve material security in the FSU.

Eight, numerous activities that mitigate the threat are making
headway, but they fall short in terms of dollars and time when
compared to the magnitude and immediacy of the problem. More-
over, institutional measures are inadequate to the task of ensuring
that systems, equipment and procedures put into place with west-
ern assistance are maintained and implemented.

Nine, because the risk to U.S. interests associated with theft of
warheads exceeds the risk associated with theft of materials, pre-
ventive programs must seek innovative ways to address warhead
security. Absent an agreement to exchange sensitive stockpile data,
the U.S. lacks assurance that warheads are actually being disman-
tled and the materials removed from them are being securely
stored.

That said, activities designed to remove, secure and dispose of
material from warheads paradoxically, as Senator Nunn pointed
out, create opportunities for theft that require even more additional
precautions.

Ten, countermeasures must continue to emphasize securing ma-
terials and warheads at the source, because options for detecting,
interdicting and neutralizing these commodities once they are be-
yond the site perimeter are poor at best.

That said, since inadequate protection is inevitable in the near
to medium term, and some previously stolen materials presumably
already are available, attention and resources must be directed to
post-theft measures as well.

Eleven, a healthy synergistic partnership between law enforce-
ment and intelligence both here and abroad is essential to detec-
tion and interdiction. Recent improvements between these two com-
munities need to be preserved and expanded.

Twelve, bilateral cooperation on a case-by-case basis has been
and likely will continue to be the most effective form of interdiction
cooperation. U.S. law enforcement and intelligence authorities at-
tribute the success of this approach to its low-key non-political
character.

Thirteen, task force members generally agree that the following
elements are inadequate to the task: deployment of technical sen-

sors, specialized training of border control and other law enforce-
ment officials, profiles of thieves and traffickers, although Bill Pot-
ter is working toward that end, and detailed sharing and joint
analysis of relevant intelligence throughout the countries of origin,
transit and potential destination. I would add that the importance
of human intelligence in this equation cannot be overstated.

Lastly, plans and capabilities for neutralizing nuclear materials
or devices at the international level, in the worst case scenario, are
far less robust than at the national level, undermining both the
timeliness and effectiveness of a response to an incident outside the
United States.

The U.S., we believe, has no choice but to help if asked, but polit-
ical and safety risks abound, whether a neutralization effort abroad
fails or succeeds. For that reason, the U.S. should carefully craft
guidelines for responding to a request for such assistance.

In conclusion, let me highlight a few of our recommendations
that have particular salience.

Assured pursuit and prosecution. U.S., European and FSU law
enforcement agencies should make a political determination to pur-
sue and prosecute nuclear smugglers, and those that help them, to
the fullest extent of the law. This should be done with the same
determination mustered against terrorists, or when a law enforce-
ment officer is killed in the line of duty.

Unified law enforcement and intelligence response. Leaders of
these two communities must assign the highest priority to mitigat-
ing the nuclear black market, preserve and extend recent progress
toward cooperation, and rededicate their staffs to overcoming juris-
dictional disputes, which, I might add, have stood in the way.

Nuclear forensics. The task force believes that the United States
should pay increased attention to the problems posed by nuclear
material presented as physical evidence. Examples include conduct-
ing feasibility studies to determine whether a nuclear fingerprint
library, that is, baseline reference data on known materials, is at-
tainable, beginning with detailed forensic characterization of the
materials seized thus far, establishing a network of nuclear smug-
gling forensic labs in the United States for planning and executing
sample exploitation, providing aid in nuclear forensics to states
interdicting nuclear traffic, training, evidence handling kits, sam-
ple analysis, and the like.

Authority to assist non-nuclear FSU republics. Since Nunn-
Lugar funds can only be used in the nuclear republics, the United
States cannot use this vehicle to support establishment of effective
export and border controls in non-nuclear republics through which
contraband might pass. To cover all likely smuggling routes, the
Executive Branch must have clear and sufficient legislative author-
ity to aid in countering a nuclear black market wherever it exists.
I would add, the conditions attached to the Nunn-Lugar legislation
that make it more difficult to spend money in the former Soviet
Union are hindering institutionalization efforts that I alluded to
earlier.

Nuclear emergency collaboration. Technical collaboration be-
tween nuclear emergency specialists in the Department of Energy
and in Russia should be expanded, with a joint response team the
ultimate goal.

Domestically, expanded training and disabling nuclear devices
for DOD explosive ordinance disposal specialists, in conjunction
with DOE's nuclear emergency search team, NEST, could pay high
dividends.

Senator NUNN. Incidentally, I started pushing that idea in the
early 1980s. Then, with Senator Warner, we called it the risk re-
duction effort, and we presented it to President Reagan, and we
had a sheet of paper with all of our goals, and they took the first
half and ran with it and did well with that part of it, but it has
become more of an informational exchange than an)^hing else.

But this ability to have the United States and Russia begin bilat-
erally, maybe expanding to greater levels, anticipating what the re-
sponse would be to a threat or an actual seizure of a weapon or
production of a weapon by a terrorist group and how we would re-
spond and how they would respond is absolutely essential.

Ms. Mullen. In the remaining part of the study we intend to
run a scenario or two in which we will have various situations in-
volving nuclear materials, nuclear warheads, here, abroad, and try
to elucidate the difficulties in cooperation at the law enforcement
level, the political level, the intelligence level, et cetera. We think
that we'll have some tremendous lessons learned from those exer-
cises.

Finally, establishment of a multilateral nuclear technology
counterterrorist research program. In appropriate international
fora, and within the framework of the comprehensive test ban trea-
ty, the United States and other nuclear weapons states should ex-
plore the possibility of establishing a multilateral research program
to develop, test and assess novel technologies and techniques for
disabling nuclear weapons and devices.

That completes my testimony. Thank you.

Senator NuNN. Thank you very much, Ms. Mullen.

Dr. Bertsch, we are delighted to have you here. I appreciate all
the good work you have got going on.

TESTIMONY OF GARY BERTSCH,^ DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR
INTERNATIONAL TRADE & SECURITY, UNIVERSITY OF GEOR-
GIA

Dr. Bertsch. Thank you, Senator, and other Members of the
Subcommittee.

My colleagues and I at the University of Georgia, as you know,
Senator Nunn, are involved in a long-term study and assistance
project on nonproliferation export controls in the former Soviet
Union. Today we are releasing two reports — I have brought copies
for those who are interested — based upon this project.

One is our 1995 annual report on Russian Export Control Devel-
opment, and the other is a paper that Igor Khripunov and I have
written on restraining the spread of the Soviet arsenal. I ask that
these reports and my full statement be entered into the record. ^

Let me report that these two reports and my testimony empha-
size developments in Russia. We are, however, working on export

•The prepared statement of Mr. Bertsch appears on page 257.

2 See Exhibit No. 6a. which appears on page 665. Exhibit No. 6b. is retained in the files of
the Subcommittee.

control issues in the other new states of the former Soviet Union,
and that research will be reported fully in the fall.

I should note that I agree with most everything the other wit-
nesses have had to say this morning. It is clear that the disintegra-
tion of the former Soviet Union poses a threat of a massive tide of
conventional and unconventional weapons proliferation.

Here, however, my testimony will differ significantly from the
others. I believe that physical protection, counting and control are
critically important, but they will not be able to restrain all leaks
of weapons and weapons-related items and technology out of Rus-
sia and the new independent states.

Much of what is necessary for weapons development will reside
in enterprises that are becoming semi-independent exporters, in-
creasingly outside of direct state control. Unless effective export
control barriers are put in place, there is the potential for literally
hundreds of military industrial enterprise stretched across the map
that we have before us selling weapons, conventional and uncon-
ventional, and weapons-related items at, conceivably, bargain base-
ment prices.

Nonproliferation export controls provide a system of rules, norms
and behavior that can help deny the transfer of proscribed items.
This includes nuclear, chemical, biological, missile, dual use and
conventional weapons that might go to undesirable end-users.

The implementation of export control systems in the new states
of the former Soviet Union has the potential, we believe, of being
one of the most significant and cost-effective accomplishments in
the post-Cold War era in support of U.S. and global security inter-
ests.

And we note that there is some good news surrounding export
control developments in the former Soviet Union. First, Russia has
developed an impressive array of decrees, control lists and agencies
tasked to regulate weapons and weapons-related exports.

It has created a complex interagency system for export licensing
and the execution of export control policy. My written statement in-
cludes an organizational chart outlining this system.

Second, the Russian Federation has harmonized its export con-
trol lists — nuclear, missile, chemical, biological and dual use — with
those of the international regimes, and has joined .all of them ex-
cept the Australia Group as a full-fledged member. This, of course,
includes the Nuclear Suppliers Group (MTCR), the Missile Tech-
nology Control Regime, and the new Wassenaar Arrangement. Rus-
sia's joining the MTCR in 1995 is particularly timely and impor-
tant.

Third, there is growing maturity in Russian export controls. It is
evidenced by a number of facts, including the increasing number of
government decisions and agreements specifically conditioning
technology transfers on compliance with export control regulations.

An interesting example is the recent Russian decision, dated Feb-
ruary 8, 1996, where the Russian Space Agency and Defense Min-
istry agreed to participate in a project for modernizing U.S. space
launch facilities. This project will involve deliveries to the United
States of Russian-manufactured ground-based equipment.

The document governing this agreement specifies that such deliv-
ery should be in conformity with the existing legislation for control-

ling the export from the Russian Federation of equipment, mate-
rials and technologies used for developing missiles. The interagency
Russian Export Control Commission is identified as the agency to
be consulted by the Russian contractors.

Fourth, Russia's leaders recognize the importance of non-
proliferation export controls. Foreign Minister Primakov has said,
"The problem of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
affects the immediate interests of Russia, a situation in which new
states possessing weapons of mass destruction on the perimeter of
Russian borders looks unacceptable."

Another Russian official recently wrote, "In case of failure of
Russian export controls, Russia would be the first and major victim
of potential proliferation. That is why setting up an effective export
control system is a strategic imperative for this country, a matter
of vital importance, and even national survival."

Fifth, Russia's Customs Committee has been prioritized in terms
of funding in order to expand and professionalize it. Over the past
few years Russian Customs has reportedly grown from approxi-
mately 7,000 to 54,000 employees. U.S. Customs employs about
18,000 individuals. This is an astounding figure, and I intend to de-
termine what exactly it means, because it is most surprising in
terms of the budgetary problems, the training problems in Russia
today. But I think, and I'm sure our Customs people know much
more about it, and I'd like to find out, but moving in a few years
from 7,000 Customs officials in Russia to 54,000, as they have re-
ported it, is something that we ought to know more about.

Senator NUNN. I think they have had an awful lot of problems
with selling off of assets too, including raw materials and so forth
that go to the economic control of exports. I would guess you will
find that it is mixed in there, and it would be interesting to find
what their priorities are.

Dr. Bertsch. Certainly the people involved in export controls is
small, as I'm going to point out shortly.

Well, let me also note that some very important export control
difficulties and challenges remain.

First, there is no comprehensive export control law in Russia,
and it may take the Duma some time to get to it. The previous
Duma left over 500 pieces of uncompleted legislation.

The absence of an export control law affects enforcement. There
is evidence for this in a December 1995 ruling by the Moscow Arbi-
tration Court to overturn a fine which the Federal Service for Cur-
rency and Export Control had imposed. The court ruled that the
agency lacked a legal basis for levying the fine because it was oper-
ating under government decision rather than a Duma-approved
law.

Second, the export control system is the scene of continuous re-
vamping, tugs-of-war within the national government. This bureau-
cratic politics is undermining the cooperation needed for export
controls.

Third, agencies charged with export controls duties continue to
be severely underfinanced and understaffed.

Fourth, at present the export control offices and interests are no
match for the export oriented agencies that may want to allow pro-
liferation-related trade.

Victor Mikhailov, Minister of Atomic Energy, recently elevated to
full membership on Russia's Security Council, may now be even in
a better position to promote nuclear deals worldwide, projecting his
ministry as a savior of the national scientific and technological po-
tential of Russia.

Fifth, given the evolving business culture in Russia and the new
independent states, much weapons and weapons-related trade may
bypass the export control and licensing system altogether. Some ex-
porters simply smuggle goods through the porous borders of the
FSU.

As we look at this map here, remember that the border around
the Russian Federation is 40,000 miles, extremely porous, with
wars going on in places like Tajikistan, and as others have indi-
cated, vulnerable spots like the Caspian Sea fronting on Iran.

Illegal exports is one of the most serious problems facing Russia
and the newly independent states today. In 1995, Kazakhstan reg-
istered 406 cases of illegal export of raw materials and other prod-
ucts from the country.

In October 1995, a former defense minister of Kazakhstan and
a senior defense official were sentenced to 8- and 4-year jail terms
respectively for illegally exporting $2 million worth of weapons. I
think this is good news as well as bad news; good news that they
are being prosecuted.

In February 1996, the acting Russian Procurator General in
1994—95 was implicated and imprisoned for engaging in bribes and
illegal dealing through Balkar Trading.

Finally let me say that outside of Russia the export control con-
cerns are even greater. Small but dedicated groups of officials in
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine are earnestly trying to build
new export control systems, but all find it exceedingly difficult to
get the attention and resources required.

To summarize, smuggling and illicit trading in conventional and
unconventional weapons are definitely taking place in Russia and
the new independent dates. Export controls cannot completely stop
this, but they can help.

The United States, Grermany, Japan and other countries recog-
nize how important these controls are. Russia, Belarus, Ukraine,
Kazakhstan and others are tr3dng to build these systems. There are
some good signs and positive developments, but political support is
weak and the institutions are very fragile.

Let me conclude by saying that in spite of all of these sensitivi-
ties and difficulties, I believe that the United States and Russia
must do more to work together to control the spread of conven-
tional and unconventional weaponry.

I further believe that engaging Russia and the new independent
states and encouraging them to control the leakage of weapons and
weapons-related items should remain one of the most important
and long-term goals of U.S. security policy.

I also believe that the money invested in pursuit of this goal may
well prove to be the most cost-effective U.S. security policy in the
post-Cold War world.

The U.S. Government, through the cooperative threat reduction
program, has had considerable positive impact upon Russian and
NIS export control development. The amount of money spent in

Russia on export controls thus far is less than one-half the cost of
one Abrams tank. Let me repeat. The U.S. cooperative threat re-
duction support for Russian export control development and co-
operation has been less than one half the cost of one Abrams tank.
Yet, there has been some very good work coming from that very
small investment, and some real progress made.

Much more could be said about the positive impact that the U.S.
Government export control assistance is having in the new inde-
pendent states. Since I am part of a committee of the National Re-
search Council that is currently reviewing this and related items,
I will reserve my assessment of U.S. Government programs until
a later time.

For your information, the report of the National Research Coun-
cil Committee will be coming out in the fall.

Thank you.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much. I want to thank all of this
panel. This has been excellent testimony. I really think we have
enough information and enough suggestions here to really do some-
thing. The challenge is legislatively to come up with an updated
version and a legislative framework for the whole approach on pro-
liferation, I will be working with Senator Lugar along that line,
and with each of you.

In light of the number of very good suggestions here, and some
that we are already working on, it is time for a comprehensive leg-
islative framework updating what has been done as well as looking
down the road at future issues. Along that line, let me ask two or
three questions and then I'll defer to my colleagues.

The Central Asia and Caucus states border Iran and China, and
are close to Iraq, Syria, India and Pakistan. Little attention has
been paid to them.

Could any of you speak — Dr. Bertsch has already talked about
it — about how we would go about and whether we are doing enough
in those areas as opposed to Russia itself, both on export controls
and on working with them on getting control of nuclear materials,
terrorism, organized crime, et cetera? Would anyone like to com-
ment on that?

Dr. Allison. Senator, a 1-minute comment.

I think that the Russians have been themselves quite concerned
about the southern border, and in particular with the long border
with China in which there is very active trade back and forth.
There are even about a million people that they estimate moved
back and forth through the borders last year, often bringing goods
to Russia.

Most of the stuff you will see that says Adidas, or otherwise, on
the streets in Moscow will have been brought by entrepreneurs
who go to China, buy knockoffs that have been made by Chinese,
bring them on the train, and I agree with Gary, this is an area that
deserves considerable effort — but the border guards don't success-
fully prevent that from happening and the opportunities for actu-
ally moving across those borders is quite open.

Even General Nikolaev, whose job it is to be the border controls,
when I have talked to him about this says, Do you know how long
this border is and how many people we have?

So it is not all that different, if we take it here locally, than our
border with Mexico. It is certainly more porous than that.

Senator Nunn. What do you do about corruption? If you have got
thousands and thousands of agents and a huge percentage of them,
or even a substantial percentage, are corrupt in these law enforce-
ment areas, export control areas, you got porous borders even if
you have so-called theoretical security.

How is the question of corruption being addressed. Dr. Bertsch,
in Russia first, and Dr. Potter, or anyone else, and then the other
countries. Is it something that is high on their priority list, or is
it just rocking along.

Dr. Bertsch. It certainly is. Yeltsin has spoken out regularly
and recently outlining it as one of the highest priorities of the Rus-
sian Government, and they are prosecuting many, many corruption
cases. And I think you encourage them to do everj^hing that they
can, and you hope that the economic and political situation will im-
prove where there is a better environment so people can earn a
reasonable living without having to resort to bribery and taking
money at the borders and so forth.

But this is definitely a problem, it is going to be long-term, but
Russia is aware of it and I think they are working very hard on
it.

Senator NuNN. Dr. Potter?

Dr. Potter. I'm much less optimistic than Gary here. In fact, I
would give perhaps a cynical explanation for the vastly expanded
number of customs officials, that this is one of the most lucrative
jobs in the former Soviet Union. It is kind of the reverse Midas
touch, all that turns to gold we touch. And I think we are seeing
this. Maybe all the materials that have radioactive emissions one
attempts to touch.

I think the problem is a very, very substantial one that is not
going to disappear in the short term.

Senator Nunn. The problem of corruption, you mean?

Dr. Potter. The problem of corruption. And it affects how we try
to deal with physical protection, accountancy, even nuclear safety
assistance. Because I think it is much more of a cultural problem.
It is one of mind set.

And I think neither throwing money at the issue nor providing
technical assistance per se is really going to make a long-term dif-
ference. It requires really changing attitudes, changing what I
would refer to as a safeguards or safety culture.

Unfortunately, among the things that the U.S. Government
doesn't do very well is to either act quickly or to persist over the
long haul. And this is the reason why there needs to be a greater
partnership between government parties that address the issue of
de-nuclearization and nongovernmental organizations, which actu-
ally may be better placed to work over a longer period of time in
training individuals, building communities of specialists, trying to
inculcate new values.

So I think we have to do all of the things that the panelists have
discussed here, but I'm not sure even that will be enough. We real-
ly have to try to deal with long-term changes in attitudes, and
while money is a necessary condition, it is not a sufficient condi-
tion.

Senator NUNN. At the same time, we can't wait to work on these
areas with Russia until the corruption is gone. I mean, if we are
waiting for that, we are waiting forever. So it is a real dilemma
and a real challenge.

Excuse me, you wanted to comment?

Ms. Mullen. Yes. I wanted to make a point on what I referred
to as the institutionalization process and the safeguards in the
MPC&A program.

I agree with Bill that there does not exist in Russia or the other
Russian republics what we would call a safeguards culture. Protec-
tion was provided by the state and one didn't steal because one
knew that one would be in deep trouble if one did.

Today we are providing hundreds of millions of dollars worth of
assistance. Excuse me, we are not providing foreign aid, we are
doing cooperative measures.

What I think we need is some long-term vision, as well as a long-
term commitment, on the part of the U.S. Government to these
goals, and some form of transparency involved in the improvements
that we make so that we may protect or investment over the longer
haul.

That goes to the issue of the safeguards culture, and also to the
issue of corruption, which is pervasive. It is virtually a criminal
syndicalist state in the former Soviet Union right now.

Senator NuNN. Dr. Alhson?

Dr. Allison. Senator, I think on the corruption point, you are
correct that we can't wait for the culture to change. The culture ac-
tually is the problem, but that's the problem.

I think that the border guards are good, but we can't depend on
those either. I think, therefore, the urgency in concentrating the
material in the most limited number of sites, buying and taking all
that we can, and then controlling them, as I suggested, in all the
ways you would control material in a bank. I ttank that is really
the point.

Because in the current Russia, and other parts of the former So-
viet Union, people are free of unconstrained, basically uncon-
strained, and they wake up to this every day. I go to Russia prob-
ably every month or 6 weeks. You can even see it happening. Every
month you can see more people thinking: "Ah ha, I can just do
whatever I want."

And the notion of the constraints of law and order as they have
come to emerge over some long period of time, we should remember
our Wild West in the 19th century.

So I think that it is unfortunate that that's the environment and
that's the culture. I think that has to be dealt with over the long
term. I think in the immediate term for our interests the dan-
gerous things have to be captured and kept in the most limited
number of places.

And while I think we can have cooperative efforts to work with
Russians in this regard, I think we ought to think first about what
our interests are, and what we want them to do, and what would
motivate them to take the actions that we want taken for our inter-
ests, and we want to make sure we can monitor the action. That's
our task.

Senator NuNN. Let me ask one final question.

Dr. Potter, you enumerated seven cases, four outside, three in-
side, in terms of actual documented high certainty diversion of nu-
clear materials, illicit materials. That's what we know and that's
what you are certain enough to come here and testify to and put
on a piece of paper.

Can you deduct from that any scope of magnitude of what it is
we don't know and what likely is occurring out there that we don't
know? We are catching the amateurs. Some of them are very ama-
teurish, leaving doors open and responding to sting operations and
so forth, but does that tell us anjrthing about what may be going
on by people who are really pros?

Dr. Potter. I think it may be useful to look slightly beyond the
nuclear weapons-usable material sector per se in order to get a
sense of that.

One of the things that I had hoped to be able to mention, and
it is in my actual statement, is really indisputable evidence of a
much greater activity in the sensitive missile component area.

We know for a fact, you may ask Chairman Ekeus when he
comes here next week, about documents which clearly indicate Rus-
sian, and I believe Ukrainian, involvement in sensitive missile ex-
ports.

It is also the case that we have documented evidence that na-
tional governments are selling off state reserves of sensitive dual-
use nuclear-related materials.

I may disagree a little bit with Gary here, I think that while
there is progress being made in the export control field, that it is
not clear to me that you have the commitment, the political will
at the top.

And there is also a very fine line between what is legal and ille-
gal, what is government, state sanctioned exports, and what is il-
licit activity.

For those reasons, from what we know about the narcotics trade
where you only interdict a very small portion of what is in fact
being smuggled, it may be inferred that we probably are only
catching the dumber thieves. There probably is material that is al-
ready outside of the fence which is probably being diverted, or peo-
ple are waiting for a chance to divert it.

The last point I would make here is that we have to avoid the
assumption that the clever thief will necessarily go to the location
where most of the material is. Rather, one is likely, rationally, to
go to those sites where it is most accessible. And that may not be
in Russia. It may well be in Latvia, in Georgia, in Ukraine, in
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

So I think, unfortunately, there probably is a need to prepare for
future Project Sapphires. We are really only scratching the surface
of the problem.

Senator NUNN. Senator Lugar.

Senator LuGAR. Mr. Chairman, in the appendix to their study,
Dr. Allison and his associates have gone into some detail on the
HEU deal. They note that the Department of Commerce, quite
properly under our law, has gotten into antidumping rulings with
regard to highly enriched uranium, quite apart from uranium of all
sorts.

In part, as the study details, this came about because uranium
interests in our country said, logically, that if all of this Russian
uranium is going to be purchased by the U.S. Government, or
quasi-governmental situations, this is really going to be a drag on
the market.

In other words, for anybody producing uranium in this country,
or having supplies of uranium, suddenly, the supply could over-
whelm us. In short, our purchases and our reuse of this material
after it was blended down into low enriched uranium, might be ru-
inous to the commercial market.

So, in any event, one reason why the HEU Purchase Agreement
idea which, from a foreign policy and national security standpoint,
made a lot of sense, has come a cropper, is that we have purely
domestic Federal agencies involved.

From your own experience in the Department of Defense, Dr. Al-
lison, quite apart from the analysis you have here, who solves this
discrepancy between our national security and our domestic com-
mercial interets?

In other words, this is one of these problems that has gone on
now through two administrations, and may proceed on beyond to
yet another administration. And it doesn't seem to be getting re-
solved.

I know that the Vice President of the United States, Al Gore, has
discussed this HEU purchase with Mr. Chernomyrdin, and so we
know it has reached that level of attention in our government. But
this is one that seems to be beyond our governmental expertise to
resolve, maybe short of the President himself.

What suggestions could you make to help us in that?

Dr. Allison. I think, Senator, unfortunately you are developing
the complexities of the situation, and there are none of these cases
that I think have silver bullets, they all have costs and they have
disadvantages as well as pluses.

But I think the one line answer to the question is to buy and
take through the HEU deal. It will take some heavy lifting at the
center if it is going to be done. And I think that the fact that it
has been left to both interagency differences of opinion, and to the
quasi-public, Enrichment Corporation (whose interests in it, if I
were running it, would be mixed, because I would have mostly a
commercial interest, as well as a security interests), it means that
those tradeoffs are not easily made.

I think in Cold War terms sometimes, that we used to keep stra-
tegic stockpiles of things that were valuable to us. So the notion
of buying the highly enriched uranium, storing it here as a strate-
gic stockpile by the U.S. Government, and then diluting it and sell-
ing it into the market at a rate that we judge to be in our interest
is a reasonable notion. There it becomes an economic question of
how much you sell into the market and what effect that has on al-
ternative suppliers of fuel for civilian reactors in the United States.

But I think that the security argument for buy and take seems
to me to be compelling, and I think it would then require real ini-
tiative at the center, and real initiative in the Senate, because it
would cost money up-front, even though you would be getting it on
the back end.

Senator LUGAR. Is this something that we should address
through legislation? In other words, should the Congress do some-
thing that cannot be easily handled administratively by the Presi-
dent now?

Dr. Allison. I think that there are some very important legisla-
tive components of it, because one of the questions that has been
raised is whether actually USEC, this agent, should be totally
privatized and then left to carry out this deal, in which case it will
be principally driven, as it should be as a private business, by its
economic interests.

And, as my colleague. Dr. Falkenrath, has pointed out in this ap-
pendix, that set of incentives is different from the incentives we
would have as American citizens in this material being bought,
taken, and stored here securely.

The case that I always ask myself about, that wasn't in Bill's list,
is this Project Sapphire. There, as you Senators here know very
well, about 20 nuclear weapons equivalent, about a thousand
pounds, of highly enriched uranium was there in Kazakhstan. The
question was: Do we buy and take it or do we leave it. Those are
the two choices.

Now, it was clear that Iranians were in Kazakhstan looking
around, so other people would be interested in this. We chose. We
bought it, we took it, we have it in Oak Ridge now. We paid for
it, an amount that is reported to be about $20 million. This is
about a million dollars per equivalent weapon. That highly en-
riched uranium is there now, valuable in that we are more secure,
and valuable because over time it could be diluted and become fuel.

So I think as a version of a strategic stockpile situation there
may be a legislative initiative here that would make considerable
sense.

Senator NUNN. It is tougher on plutonium, isn't it, in terms of
the economics of it? That's where you don't get the pay-back.

Dr. Allison. With the plutonium, you have to tell a kind of Jap-
anese story, I think, and we have in our list of things to be done
a plutonium bank, which would be a different proposition. It is
clear that the Government of Japan, wrongly in the view of most
American experts, has been in the business of preserving a pluto-
nium option in the expectation that this would be fuel for some
21st century nuclear program.

Actually, I don't believe that at all. But to the extent that the
Japanese Government has believed it, they have put several billion
dollars into this activity, and therefore a version of a plutonium
bank for the plutonium problem would seem to me to be one way
of addressing that.

But I agree very much, that is a much harder problem, because
we don't have a story that our experts would today believe that
would say we are going to get much value back out of the pluto-
nium.

We have the problem, as was pointed out earlier, as do the Euro-
peans, or anybody else with civilian reactors which are producing
plutonium. We have got the problem of disposing of it as well.

Senator LuGAR. Elsewhere in your study, one of the authors
points out that even if one hundredth of one percent is missing,

this is more than allegedly we thought the North Koreans had pro-
duced.

When you think of the great exertions we have gone to with re-
gard to the North Korean program, what we are trying to deal with
here today is awesome. Whatever materials happen to be acquired
by or produced in India and Pakistan are dwarfed by the output
of a couple of Russian laboratories that are poorly secured by the
admission of the Russian Government. The entirety of all that Brit-
ain, France and China are supposed to have, is subsumed by the
materials problem in the states of the former Soviet Union.

So, in other words, maybe this problem is almost too big for peo-
ple in our government, and we include ourselves, to come to grips
with. But we are talking about massive amounts of materials. And
we know that it is poorly secured. Maybe our expenditure of money
and time on this problem is just too small.

Maybe we just have to accept in this world the fact that this
stuff is going to get out, that we will have to come to grips as
human beings with the fact that a lot of people around the world
will have access to these materials from this time forward.

But the importance of this hearing is that it allows us an oppor-
tunity to come to grips with the fact there is still a chance at this
point in history, if we are wise enough, to be able to contain much
of it. Even if we could not see much else, but if we saw that point
alone, it would be a step forward in terms of safety of the Russian
people and our people.

The failure to deal with this problem today almost surely will
mean that even the best border controls, and the best effort of cus-
toms, FBI, and CIA, will never be able to put the proliferation
genie back in the bottle.

What I'm trying to come to grips with is how you develop the po-
litical will and the money to deal with this problem in a time frame
that you are suggesting, given the budget constraints that we have,
and the priorities in defense, education, the environment and so
forth. How do you highlight this problem vis-a-vis all the rest of
our priorities when it is only dimly present on the radar screen
today?

Dr. Allison. I would say I do not think that you are too pessi-
mistic, and I would agree with you that this may be one of the last
moments for dealing with this.

Ms. Mullen. I would add to that that the programs in the De-
partment of Defense and Department of Energy got off to a slow
start for a variety of bureaucratic reasons on both sides. But mo-
mentum is achieved at the moment, and it would best if we can
capitalize on that as soon as possible, as the political situation may
prevent that from happening in the future.

Dr. Potter. If I could reiterate a point that Graham made, we
definitely do have to focus on securing material at the source, and
I think most parties recognize that now.

One of the most useful things that the Department of Energy's
approach has going for it is the emphasis increasingly on tr3dng to
make more indigenous the process, to transfer the responsibilities
to the Russian and CIS side. For example, there are training cen-
ters that are being set up, there are facilities, there are plants

which are manufacturing equipment, and it relates to this whole
issue of trying to change the mind set.

We can only do so much, and we have to focus in on a few of
the key issues, which principally is securing the material at the
source, and then try to move the ball over to the Russian court.
That's the approach that we need to really pursue.

Dr. Bertsch. I would add that while we can be critical and con-
cerned about what has been accomplished, we have to recognize
that this was really a new undertaking, and again, all of us ap-
plaud you, Senator Lugar and Senator Nunn, for what you got
started. And I think that we should not overlook the important
progress that has been made.

You have some very committed, dedicated, people on the other
side working on these issues, and the important thing is that the
United States stay the course on this. The worst thing that could
happen would be to lose this engagement and have the Russians
and others conclude that it is not worth trying to cooperate with
the United States and let thein go their own way. That should be
avoided at all costs.

Dr. Allison. If I could make one other comment. I think your
proposition that we are almost certain to fail to some extent is cor-
rect. Indeed, I think the evidence that Bill has presented is that
some material will get out, and therefore this is unfortunately a
task that we are going to live with for a very, very long time. So
it is going to have to be an all-layer defense.

So I think we need to start at the source. That's the most impor-
tant. Once it gets loose from that, it's harder. Then as it is being
moved in Russia, then at the borders, then when it gets to Poland
or to the Czech Republic or to Germany, then when it is on the
seas, then when it is coming into our borders, then when we find
it. That's the hardest.

So, I mean, at every layer. I don't think that this is a problem
that is going to go away. We are going to have to become accus-
tomed to dealing with it in a multi-layer effort. But the efficiency
of protecting it at the source relative to trying to patrol our borders
and inspect every package that is coming and every truck that is
driving across from Mexico is clean. As we know, we are not very
good at catching marijuana or heroin, so I don't see why we are
going to be more successful with this material if it gets loose.

Senator LuGAR. Let me just make one final point. Years ago, dur-
ing President Carter's Administration, the whole subject of wire-
tapping as a tool of counterintelligence in this country arose with
regard to terrorism.

And this was one that the civil liberties community, as well as
Senators, wrestled with a good long while.

Now, in due course legislation was provided for several courts
here in the District of Columbia to give wiretapping authority to
the FBI for very specific intrusions into phone conversations of sus-
pected terrorists. And, in fact, the FBI has been remarkably effec-
tive over the course of the last 15 or 16 years in this respect, with
a minimal amount of intrusion into everybody else's private con-
versations.

But I mention that because, in earlier testimony, people have
speculated on what happens in this country in the event that a nu-
clear event is threatened or occurs?

And then the public rises up and asks whoever is President at
that point, why did you let this happen, why is Cincinnati history?
And potential reactions and associated fears could change our de-
mocracy ver}', very substantially.

But that's another potential cost in terms of our basic laws of
governance that is at stake if we are not successful in dealing with
materials of mass destruction back at the source. At each prolifera-
tion checkpoint point things become more difficult.

Senator NuNN. Senator Lugar, you are absolutely right. I think
that is a very vivid example.

Can you imagine the demands for legislation that would happen
if one of our great American cities was history and literally mil-
lions of people were killed? Can you imagine the legislative ap-
proach after that?

We have that same thing facing us with the biological-chemical
challenge and how you deal with that, because very few cities in
this country could even begin to deal with a chemical or biological
attack, and the first people, by all accounts, that would die, would
be the policemen and firemen that would rush in to try to deal with
the aftermath of that kind of situation.

We haven't even begun to deal with that, and the military right
now is the only group that has that capability to protect their own
troops. Somehow we have got to get that capability out there in the
fire departments, the police departments all over the cities of this
country, and the military is the only one that can help on that
right now.

That's part of the debate on the anti-terrorism bill, and you have
got an interesting phenomena — the left and the right coming to-
gether in the House against that bill for different reasons.

But if we are going to preserve our liberties in this world in the
next 10 or 15 years the way we treasure them, we are going to
have to get out in fi-ont of these situations and avoid them with
some modest but essential steps that recognize reality.

The other big area is the distinction between law enforcement
and that jurisdiction here and intelligence, military, NSA, all of
that, in this information age we live in. The whole age of informa-
tion.

You can't draw the lines the way we have drawn them before
anymore. I don't think you can do it in biological and chemical
fields either. We have got to think through that. I don't have an-
swers. We are not ready to legislate on it.

The civil libertarian point of view needs to be taken into real ac-
count here. You can't ignore it. It is valid.

But we have had lines drawn in the past, domestic, foreign.
Those lines are being erased out there every day. And if we ever
have a biological attack or a nuclear attack in this country, you will
see all the lines not only de facto but dejure disappear. So it is a
real challenge to get out- in front.

I appreciate the panel being here today, every one of you. And
I look forward to working with Senator Lugar and Senator Roth
and others in putting together an updated package, and a look to

the future of where we go legislatively in this gigantic challenge
that I think has been properly identified as the most important na-
tional security threat we face.

If you combine it all, if you combine nuclear, chemical, biological
and terrorism, organized crime and the breakup of the Soviet em-
pire, putting all that together in one package, there is nothing else
that comes close as a security threat. We have to realize that, be-
cause we are still thinking of another world.

I thank all of you for being here, and we will now call our next
panel, and we will look forward to working with all of you as we
develop this new approach.

Let me call our second panel of witnesses this morning. I appre-
ciate your patience.

Our first witness is Andrei Glukhov, former deputy chief of the
Ukrainian Nuclear Regulatory Agency and currently with the
Battelle Pacific Northwest National Laboratory here in the United
States.

Mr. Glukhov will discuss some of the problems he saw with the
physical protection of fissile material in Ukraine and describe the
particulars of a nuclear diversion case.

Our next witness is Joshua Handler. Mr. Handler is a research
coordinator for disarmament issues at Greenpeace. He will describe
his eyewitness accounts of security at Russian nuclear submarine
bases, which are a major leakage point for nuclear material.

Our next and final witness, is Glenn Schweitzer, founding direc-
tor of the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow.
His book, Moscow DMZ, the story of the international effort to con-
vert Russian weapons science to peaceful purposes will be out, I
understand, next week. Mr. Schweitzer will describe his first-hand
knowledge of the plight of weapons scientists from the former So-
viet Union, a matter of enormous importance.

I'll ask of you to hold up your right hand and take the oath.

Do you swear the testimony you give will be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?

Mr. Glukhov. I do.

Mr. Handler. I do.

Mr. Schweitzer. I do.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Glukhov, we appreciate you being here and
we'll ask you to lead off this morning.

We'll just take our witnesses in the order you are seated, if that's
all right.

TESTIMONY OF ANDREI GLUKHOV,^ FORMER DEPUTY CfflEF,
UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR REGULATORY AGENCY, CURRENTLY
WITH BATTELLE PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATIONAL LABORA-
TORY

Mr. Glukhov. Thank you very much. Senator Nunn and Mem-
bers of the Subcommittee, for the opportunity to report on the state
of security of the nuclear facilities in Ukraine.

First of all, let me present just some brief information about my-
self, because this is my first presentation before the U.S. Senate
Committee here.

^The prepared statement of Mr. Glukhov appears on page 270.

I was raised in Obninsk, a Russian nuclear city that was men-
tioned today several times, and earned a master's degree in nuclear
engineering.

In 1981, I started to work at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant
as a reactor operator, and I was extensively involved in the mitiga-
tion and recovery efforts following the April 1986 disaster. In 1989,
I left Chernobyl as a deputy chief of the nuclear safety division to
become a nuclear safety inspector with former Soviet Union regu-
latory authorities.

And following Ukrainian independence in 1991, I went to work
for the Ukrainian regulatory authority, the State Committee on
Nuclear and Radiation Safety, as the head of the Division of Safe-
guards, Safe Transport and Physical Protection of Nuclear Mate-
rials. I stayed in this position for 4 years.

In April 1995, approximately 1 year ago, I left my position with
the recently established Ministry for Environmental Protection and
Nuclear Safety in order to emigrate to the United States.

During my period in Ukraine, I worked very closely with many
of the leading national and international nuclear authorities, in-
cluding the regulatory, operational organizations, utilities and nu-
clear facilities in former Soviet republics, and other countries.

And I cooperated pretty extensively with several U.S. informa-
tional organizations, like the International Atomic Energy Agency,
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the U.S. Department of
Energy, and some other organizations, including the non-technical
organizations like the Monterey Institute for International Studies,
and so on.

In July of last year, I joined Pacific Northwest National Labora-
tory, international nuclear safety programs, and I am actively en-
gaged now in nuclear safety projects, because the Pacific Northwest
Lab is the primary contractor to the U.S. Department of Energy in
implementation of the nuclear safety projects in Ukraine.

In my present job I'm not involved in the physical protection is-
sues, so I'll share my previous experience and present the view
from inside, let's say.

In my presentation I'll concentrate the attention mostly on the
following issues: Nuclear facilities, the locations of nuclear mate-
rials in Ukraine, state regulations, the State's role in physical pro-
tection, the current status of physical protection of nuclear material
at the facilities and under transport. And I'll try to analyze the ef-
fectiveness of the physical protection system and its drawbacks, I'll
present some examples of the unauthorized use of nuclear material,
and I'll describe also briefly the international cooperation in this
area.

First of all, I would like to stress that I will cover in my presen-
tation just civil nuclear activity in Ukraine, because the military
nuclear facilities in Ukraine, they are not under control of any civil
agencies, authorities, organizations, ministries and so on in
Ukraine. They report directly to the Ministry of Defense in
Ukraine, and the Ministry of Defense makes a decision to classify
their facilities as a military or a civil facility. I'll provide some ex-
amples a little bit later.

At the present time, Ukraine has pretty a extensive nuclear pro-
gram, and this represents the fifth place in Europe, after France,

the United Kingdom, Russian Federation and Germany. There are
five nuclear power plants, 15 operational units, three research re-
actors, three research facilities, I would say several mining and
milling enterprises for radioactive ore processing in Ukraine, and
about 5,000 enterprises use radioactive sources and devices.

I do not speak here about the huge problem with nuclear waste,
especially accumulated after the Chernobyl accident in the
Ukraine. This is a special issue. But the common issue for all of
these materials is that all of them should be effectively protected,
and the physical protection issue for all the nuclear materials in
Ukraine, that's a very important issue.

As you know, all the nuclear facilities Ukraine inherited from the
former Soviet Union and the Moscow, the Soviet Union, maintained
the full centralized control of the nuclear industry. And therefore,
for one of the first tasks for an independent Ukrainian authority
was to identify, first of all, all locations of nuclear material in order
to get an information where, what and how much nuclear material
should be controlled.

And initial accounting was taken in 1992, and since that time
the initial inventory of the nuclear material in Ukraine was cor-
rected several times, and even new locations of the nuclear mate-
rial were identified in the Ukraine.

And one of the examples, one of the research reactors in Ukraine
is located in the Crimea region, and there is a naval academy
there. And during the last year, approximately 1 year ago, it was
on a technical visit by the regulators to the site, and the additional
amount of nuclear material was identified and discovered, and even
one more location of the material. The material was located in a
separate laboratory and was in an experimental research
subcritical facility with low enriched uranium.

It was possible to keep this facility from the civil authorities be-
cause the Ministry of Defense keeps control of this facility. And as
I said before, the military decides what data it wants to provide
and how much access to allow to their facilities.

In addition, one more case, one more institution in Kiev, the cap-
ital city of Ukraine, was recently identified as an owner of depleted
uranium. This example showed that the questions where, what and
how much are not finally answered, and even today Ukraine
doesn't know for certain. There is no high percent guarantee, I
would say, how much and what the former Soviet Union might
have left in Ukraine.

In addition, there are some Russian controlled facilities, espe-
cially in the Crimea region, and there is no information are some
of them nuclear or not, is nuclear material available there or not.
They are under control of the other states, as I said.

Senator NuNN. It has been about 10 minutes, if I could get you
to summarize, if you can.

Mr. Glukhov. ok. Special attention to the nuclear facilities in
Ukraine should be paid to the highly enriched uranium. Of course,
that's clear. And one of the facilities, the Kharkov Institute of
Physics and Technology, in Ukraine possesses a highly enriched
nonirradiated uranium in bulk form, that makes it most attractive
for theft and smuggling. The overall declared but not verified
amount of uranium there exceeds four tons. That includes the ura-

nium ore, but almost one ton of that is enriched uranium, and that
includes highly enriched uranium.

The state control of the physical protection issues is maintained
by several state authorities, the operational organizations, regu-
latory agencies, Minister of Internal Affairs, that provides guard
forces. State security service provides personal screening and inves-
tigations. The Ministry of Justice provides legal order of punish-
ment and so on.

There is a law in Ukraine on the use of atomic energy and radi-
ation protection, and Ukraine is a party to the convention on phys-
ical protection of nuclear materials.

But it seems everything was done logistically, and the system
should work properly, but unfortunately this is not the reality. The
economic crisis in Ukraine has very seriously influenced the capa-
bilities of state agencies and operators to fulfill international and
national requirements.

And the main problem is the economy crisis in Ukraine. There
is a very serious lack of funds in the state agencies for physical
protection issues, and therefore lack of people there, the technical
people, qualified people who work this. And just as an example, the
state regulatory agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Administration,
has just two technical people and one secretary to regulate all the
physical protection issues in Ukraine. I don't speak here about the
operational organization and at the facilities level. They have a lit-
tle bit more, but it is far fi"om enough.

And this situation is very hard and difficult, and the result of
that is there is no methodology yet developed in Ukraine with re-
spect to physical protection, no scientific support also in Ukraine,
because all the scientific institutions left in Russia.

There is a very simple approach on the state level now to the
physical protection, that is like three G, guns, gates and guards.

And at the facility level, the situation is different also. The nu-
clear power plants, there is a paradox here. The nuclear power
plants, they possess low enriched uranium, but they guard it better
than the research facilities. Because research facilities do not
produce any significant revenue, and they cannot afford to spend
more money for physical protection than nuclear power plants.

But even this situation shows that the security system at a rel-
atively satisfactory facility is far from effective. The incident at the
Chernobyl plant in 1993 proved the insufficiency of the protection
system. The two fuel rods, each three and a half meters long, were
cut off from a fresh fuel assembly in the reactor building, and the
reactor building is the highest priority protected area, and these
rods have never been found.

So this shows that the nuclear power plants are not protected
well enough, and the situation of the research facilities, which have
so-called category one material, I mean highly enriched uranium,
they have not better, at least, in some cases even worse nuclear
physical protection systems.

Another case shows the transparency of the borders of the former
Soviet republics. This case was described today by Dr. Potter, about
the smuggling of six kilograms of submarine fuel that was seized
in Kiev in March 1995. Ukraine doesn't have submarines, the nu-

clear submarines, so this shows that the material was very likely
brought from outside.

In the very end, just one more example that would show the
transparency of the borders, even on the official level, during the
official transit of nuclear materials to the territory of Ukraine.

During the official transit of spent nuclear fuel from Hungary to
Russia on the Ukraine-Hungary border, the Hungarian guards
leave special trains on the last stop on the Hungarian territory,
and the Ukrainian guards take control of an unguarded train on
the first stop on the Ukrainian territory.

This takes place because there is no Ukrainian-Hungarian agree-
ment allowing for armed military people to cross the borders of the
two countries. As a result, the special train carrying tons of highly
radioactive spent fuel is not protected during several miles on its
journey. The spent fuel itself is not a good aim for the theft, but
it is very attractive from the point of view of terrorism or sabotage
and so on.

Some more words, briefly, about the international cooperation.
The United States had its very first agreement with Ukraine on
the U.S. Department of Defense and Ukrainian State Committee
on Nuclear and Radiation Safety concerning the development of
state systems of control, accounting and physical protection of nu-
clear materials to promote the prevention of nuclear weapons pro-
liferation from Ukraine. That was concluded in December 1993.
And at the present time the main aspects of U.S. -Ukraine coopera-
tion include methodological support, transfer of regulatory prac-
tices and experiences, training of agents in the area of inspection
activities, training of operators in material control and accounting,
equipment procurement, delivery and installation at the model fa-
cilities, and coordination with other donor countries.

So far the U.S. side is involved in four facilities in Ukraine in
assisting the Ukraine with four facilities, and two of them — even
three of them — are the most sensitive, that's three research reac-
tors. And the main priority should be paid to these reactors.

But the cooperation is not moving fast enough, sometimes due to
not enough capabilities from Ukrainian side to accept the help pro-
vided by the United States side. In other cases, there are some
delays between the agreements and equipment deliveries to
Ukraine and installation.

But now the situation is getting better. But what I would rec-
ommend to coordinate in more seriously, I would say, coordinate
the U.S. assistance on the facility level, on the state level in
Ukraine, and even within the United States the assistance should
be coordinated more carefully within the U.S. agencies providing
their support to Ukraine, and on the level of the national labs.

Thank you very much.

Senator NuNN. Thank you very much. I'm going to take about a
3-minute break. I have several groups outside I need to see briefly,
and I'll come right back.

[Brief pause.]

Senator NuNN. Mr. Schweitzer, we appreciate your patience
again, you and Mr. Handler. We are glad to have you here. The
area you are involved in is, to me, one of most important and I look
forward very much to your testimony.

TESTIMONY OF GLENN E. SCHWEITZER,^ DIRECTOR, OFFICE
FOR CENTRAL EUROPE AND EURASIA, NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF SCIENCES, FOUNDING DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CENTER IN MOSCOW

Mr. Schweitzer. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with
you the role of Russian scientists and engineers in the prohferation
of weapons technology.

Much attention has been given to the possible consequences of a
brain drain, and technical specialists are also involved in the sale
and smuggling of dangerous items.

Since others have already discussed sales and smuggling, I will
talk about other routes for the transfer of weapons know-how, in-
cluding the brain drain.

During the past several years I have had the opportunity to visit
dozens of former weapons laboratories throughout Russia. While
living in Moscow for 27 months, on a daily basis I discussed with
Russia's former weaponeers proliferation and conversion.

I met with missile guidance specialists who had tried to go to
North Korea. I had discussions with nuclear physicists while they
were being actively recruited by the Iranian Government. I knew
nuclear weapons designers who made repeated trips to China. I en-
countered electronics engineers who had long-term contracts for
work in Syria. And I was acquainted with material specialists who
were working on joint projects with rocket designers in India. In
addition, I knew aerospace engineers who regularly participated in
the arms bazaars in the Middle East.

Also in the building where I lived in Moscow, I was surrounded
by a strange collection of people. A Libyan chemical engineer lived
across the hall from me. A Chechen businessman lived nearby, and
he entertained his many Middle East friends in our building.

Above me and below me were unmarked offices with heavy steel
doors and often hurley guards which entertained visitors regularly
from Southeast Asia.

My testimony is based largely on my experiences and discussions
and my observations of these and other people in the former Soviet
Union. Of the more than one million scientists and engineers who
participated in the Soviet effort to design and to build weapons of
mass destruction, 60,000, according to my estimates, should be of
proliferation concern.

This includes roughly 30,000 from the aerospace complex, 20,000
from the nuclear weapons complex, and 10,000 who participated in
BW/CW activities. Of course, many more are in a position to par-
ticipate in smuggling activities.

Initially, international concern focused on the likelihood of a
weapons brain drain. In fact, most of these specialists are still af-
filiated with state institutions in Russia.

Many of them, however, perhaps 25 percent, have left their insti-
tutions for more lucrative activities in the shops and offices and on
the streets of Russia. Some have retired, at least formally; and a
very, very small number have emigrated to Israel, the United
States, and Western Europe.

'The prepared statement of Mr. Schweitzer appears on page 277.

Despite such reassurances that emigration is rare, the many
short-term visits by Russian speciaHsts to rogue states, and the in-
creasing presence of representatives of those states in Russia,
should raise security alarms.

The overwhelming majority of the 60,000 have no interest in par-
ticipating in proliferation activities which are not approved by their
governments. They are fiercely loyal to their countries. They are
well aware of the dangers of weapons of mass destruction in unreli-
able hands. And they are very proud of their contributions to pre-
vention of a catastrophic global war during the last 50 years.

However, as the economic conditions continue to deteriorate, the
hands of more and more specialists remain idle for longer and
longer periods of time, and the temptations to turn wherever for
economic relief grow.

The deteriorating conditions of the laboratories throughout the
country add to the seriousness of the problem. Many of the best
young scientists have left the laboratories for other pursuits. The
physical conditions are disgraceful.

Many of the laboratories simply do not operate. Scavengers have
removed whatever fixtures and equipment will come loose, heat
and light are erratic and unreliable, and in most institutes in the
country many of the scientists do little more than put in token ap-
pearances at their worksites.

Of course, there are exceptions. While I do not have personal
knowledge, I assume that some of the military laboratories are still
operating at a high level of performance. Most of the other excep-
tions, however, are directly linked to foreign collaboration.

Having a foreign grant means to a Russian researcher not only
a steady paycheck, but it means that somebody really cares wheth-
er or not the researcher comes to work.

A recent report from the Institute of Experimental Physics in
Sarov, or Arzamas-16, that forced layoffs are now beginning is
worthy of note. During the last 5 years 5,000 employees have left
the Institute of Experimental Physics, and now there apparently
will be more in their footsteps. What do all these people do in a
town where the entire economic base is two nuclear installations?

In short, the likelihood that former Soviet weaponeers will trans-
fer weapons know-how to rogue states is greater than it was when
the Nunn-Lugar initiative was undertaken 5 years ago, for several
reasons.

First, the financial situation among many of the scientists of
greatest concern has worsened.

Second, the laboratory conditions for conducting civilian activi-
ties as an alternative have declined substantially.

Third, the rogue states have an ever increasing presence in Rus-
sia with ready access to weaponeers.

Meanwhile, there is an overarching feeling within the Russian
population that they have been misled by false promises of western
assistance, and particularly American assistance.

Many scientists and engineers have simply abandoned their last
hope that they would continue to be the beneficiaries of subsidies.

Now a few words about the impact of American programs. Amer-
ican organizations are clearly having a positive impact in reducing
the likelihood that many key weaponeers will be involved if trans-

fers of know-how. The centerpiece of the American effort is the
International Science and Technology Center in Moscow. Its pro-
grams have provided challenging civilian alternatives for more
than 11,000 weaponeers, most of whom are from the core 60,000.

Senator Nunn. Most of whom are from

Mr. Schweitzer. The core 60,000.

Senator NuNN. Of the core you have identified?

Mr. Schweitzer. Yes. There are some participants in projects
who probably are not that critical from the proliferation point of
view, but the bulk of those 11,000 are ft-om this core 60,000 which
I have estimated.

Senator NuNN. We get criticism over here, particularly in the
Congress, saying, basically, that money used there is just subsidiz-
ing these scientists, they are continuing to work in their old work,
they are just getting money from America and going out and mak-
ing all of these weapons while they are doing it.

How would answer or address that criticism?

Mr. Schweitzer. The criticism I think is that the weaponeers
are not working full time on projects for which we are putting up
the money?

Senator NuNN. Correct, they are still making weapons or partici-
pating in their old endeavors while they are getting U.S. subsidies.
That's the criticism.

Mr. Schweitzer. They are working part-time on these peaceful
projects. It is unrealistic to think that the key weaponeers are
going to totally abandon their toe-hold in a stable job for civilian
activities which have uncertain funding futures.

And so I look at these part-timers as in a transition stage, and
they certainly are not leaving the country, which was the objective.

Senator Nunn. Right.

Mr. Schweitzer. But I think if we continue the program long
enough, they will make the transition to civilian pursuits — if they
know that they will have a job for more than 2 years.

Senator NuNN. But it is also a lot better to have them in Russia
working even on Russian weapons than it is to have them in rogue
states and terrorist groups around the world.

Mr. Schweitzer. Well, that was the purpose of the Center, but
I still think we ought to try to wean them entirely from the weap-
ons work because of the feedback loops.

In addition to providing support for the projects, the ISTC has
succeeded in changing dramatically the approach to research man-
agement and financial accountability throughout the country.

The difficult issues of foreign access to sensitive facilities and to
intellectual property rights have been agreed to; and as a multilat-
eral organization, the ISTC is well-positioned to withstand the po-
litical barbs that will surely be thrown at the United States in the
national security area as the Russian Government changes its com-
plexion.

A second aspect of the American approach that deserves mention
is the activity of American firms which are emplo3dng Russian sci-
entists and engineers to work on their civilian projects.

And finally, a number of programs of the Department of Energy,
NASA, and the Department of Defense also engage former Soviet
weapons scientists and engineers.

Several comments about the future. In general, the U.S. Govern-
ment is on the right course in trying to help ensure the contain-
ment of weapons know-how within the former Soviet Union. There
are weaknesses in the American approach. For example, the con-
tinuing reference in Washington and overseas to the U.S. efforts as
foreign assistance efforts, we heard it this morning; the inconsist-
encies in the U.S. approach to protecting intellectual property
rights under various programs; the overemphasis that the Amer-
ican program is supporting basic research rather than supporting
research with near-term applications that can contribute to eco-
nomic growth; and finally, the constant statement by American offi-
cials about available funds, which the Russians interpret as mean-
ing funds available for them.

But these problems can be corrected. A more serious problem is
the great uncertainty as to the continued interest of the Russian
Government in cooperation and nonproliferation activities as that
government adopts a more conservative stand.

Therefore, my first suggestion is that U.S. efforts should be more
sharply oriented toward indigenization of activities in Russia as
rapidly as possible. Bill Potter mentioned this.

Given economic realities, indigenization does not mean that the
U.S. should terminate funding of programs in Russia. Quite the
contrary, American money is essential as a leverage for encourag-
ing important Russian specialists to aggressively pursue the goals
of nonproliferation.

Indigenization does mean that Russian specialists, and not
Americans, should be out fi'ont in projects; and it does mean that
a greater proportion of American funds should reach the region,
rather than being siphoned off by American intermediary organiza-
tions.

The goal should be the development of a strong nonproliferation
constituency in Russia that is determined to carry forward impor-
tant programs even as American specialists fade from the scene.

My second suggestion has to do with the ISTC. It took an enor-
mous amount of diplomatic energy to establish the ISTC, and sev-
eral very senior Russian officials have repeatedly told me that
never again will the Russian Federation agree to such sweeping
concessions to support a western oriented organization in their ter-
ritory: Diplomatic status for the staff; blanket customs and tax ex-
emptions; even income tax waivers for the participants in projects;
and legalized access to sensitive facilities and sensitive accounting
records. Therefore, we should take advantage of this opportunity
because it is not going to be there again.

At the same time, the transfer of funding responsibility for this
program from the Pentagon to the Department of State, much
smaller overall budget, will surely encounter financial difficulties.

I hope that the Department of Energy and the Department of De-
fense would be prepared to provide supplemental funds going
through the ISTC for programs which those departments think are
important, such as research on techniques for destroying chemical
weapons, methods to safeguard fissile material, and so forth.

The most immediate funding concern is the follow-on to the 2-
year projects that were funded by the ISTC. Two years is simply
not enough time to convince a key weapons person to shift careers.

Perhaps a second project will do it, but right now there are many
who are on the fence and who need another little push to persuade
them that their future really is in the civilian sector.

Finally, there are many gaps in our understanding of the state
of weapons scientists and engineers throughout the region. Surely
U.S. Government auditors will ask the question, how successful are
we in using funds provided by the U.S. Government to stem pro-
liferation?

This question cannot be answered simply by querying project
participants what will they do at the completion of a project, al-
though this is a start. This question goes to the very heart of the
role of institutes and enterprises, into the attitudes of government
officials, directors and bench scientists, and to their actions, during
a time of political and economic turmoil.

Nevertheless, the question deserves an answer. To this end, I
suggest establishing in Moscow, within the framework of the ISTC,
an appropriate policy research program led by experienced special-
ists in the United States, Europe, Japan, and Russia. It should pro-
vide important feedback concerning the potential proliferation
throughout the region and the impact of foreign collaboration. Such
information is critical in determining an effective strategy for nu-
clear containment of both people and materials.

Senator NuNN. Thank you, Mr. Schweitzer, for your testimony
and for your excellent suggestions.

Mr. Handler, you are the most patient one of our witnesses this
morning. You have had to wait until the very end, but we welcome
you and welcome your testimony. I know you have had some first-
hand experience that is going to be enlightening to us.

TESTIMONY OF JOSHUA HANDLER,i RESEARCH
COORDINATOR FOR DISARMAMENT ISSUES, GREENPEACE

Mr. Handler. Thank you very much again for this opportunity
to testify. Senator, and yes, I am in the uncomfortable position of
being the last thing between you and lunch so I will try to be brief
and submit my longer statement and other materials for the
record.

My job, as I understand it, is to provide a bit of a grunt-side view
of work in the former Soviet Union on these questions, particularly
Russia, and I would like to begin with a little bit of background to
let you know some of the activities that I have been up to.

First, Greenpeace opened an office in the Soviet Union in 1989.
Since February 1990, I have been to Russia over a dozen times, my
trips have ranged from 1 week to 4 months, and I have spent prob-
ably about 18 months living and working there. Most recently, I
spent most of 1994-1995 living and working out of Moscow.

During these visits I have had an opportunity to travel to several
of the closed areas of the former Soviet Union, in the north and far
east. And I think we probably need the larger map up there.

Particularly a lot of my work has been involved — you had a map
that covered more of Russia previously, if you can find it. But if
not, if you recall, I spent a lot of time working in the peninsula

^ The prepared statement of Mr. Handler apf)ears on page 284.

around the Murmansk area, and also in the far east near Vladivos-
tok, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii, where the naval facilities are.

The purpose of my visit was to investigate problems in the Soviet
Russian submarine force, the future or Russian nuclear forces, and
to promote our work on nuclear disarmament.

I have had the opportunity to talk with a wide variety of Russian
Government officials, military officers of flag rank and below, mili-
tary-industrial complex managers, reporters and specialists, and
local officials, about these questions and this question of loose
nukes in the former Soviet Union.

As you may recall, we are the only organization ever publicly
identified as being approached to get a nuclear warhead from the
former Soviet Union. In the summer of 1991, in East Germany, ap-
proaches were made to us to obtain such a warhead, and this has
been relatively widely publicized in the press. I can go into that
more later if you so desire.

In any event, our experiences are rather unique, and it is a greet
pleasure to try to summarize some of them for you here today.

In terms of our experiences with loose nukes in Russia, I would
like to break it down into several parts. First is the general secu-
rity and safety of radioactive materials. In general, you may recall
the control of radioactive materials was poor in the former Soviet
Union. The Chelyabinsk disaster is well known, the dumping of ra-
dioactive waste in the ocean.

But in addition to these major problems, there are many stories
of minor ones that are instructive to your inquiry, since the critical
question is not the diversion of tons of material, but how smaller
amounts will leak it.

You may recall in 1990-1991 there were lots of reports in the
Russian press about small bits and pieces of radiation being found
around the country. In 1992, we had some very interesting experi-
ences in the Khabarovsk region, discussing with the Institute their
efforts to get this problem under control. And they described to us,
the experts in this institute, the results of their survey in the
Khabarovsk Kray, where they had found three sources of ionizing
radiation, each reading 30 Roentgens an hour, which were found in
a small town near Komsomolsk.

Two of the sources were found in the yards of apartment build-
ings. The third one was at a dump in the vicinity of the town.

In another case, a source reading 100 Roentgen an hour was
found at a road-side dump. These levels of radiation are lethal. You
usually measure levels of radiation in micro-Roentgens.

With a record of controlled radioactive materials like this, it is
not surprising to find that Chechen fighters put a radioactive ce-
sium source in Izmailovsky Park in Moscow in late November 1995.

So within that general context, I'd like to turn to the military
and our experiences with the military.

In regards to our investigation of problems with the Russian sub-
marine fleet, our investigation suggests the military's control of its
radioactive material was also rather poor, and similarly, it has not
improved much at all in the last 5 years.

Again, there were the obvious big safety problems. And if I could
take the first photo here.^

This is a photo of an Echo II SSGN whose reactor exploded at
the Chazhma Bay shipyard in August 1985. This was near Vladi-
vostok, and here you see it tied up at the Pavlov facility.

About seven million curies of radiation were released. The ten of-
ficers inside the reactor room were wiped round the inside like but-
ter, as it was described to me by officers we interviewed in the far
east.

The waste fi-om this accident was scooped up and put into a fall-
out trace that went over the peninsula. The next photo. Here you
can see some Geiger counters clicking away at levels that are about
50 to 100 times over backgrounds when we were in this area in the
early 1990s.

And the final photo shows the two Geiger counters near the
small waste site, temporary burial site, where the materials from
the submarine were put. The site was not guarded.

Senator NUNN. Were the materials buried? Was this under-
ground?

Mr. Handler. Well, of sorts. They scooped out a trench and put
most of the materials in it.

Senator NuNN. Just a light burying then?

Mr. Handler. Right. Some of the bits and pieces of the fuel rods
were taken to a nearby official site at the tip of the peninsula.

Here you can see at the edge the reading also were many times
background. It is hard to make out the barbed wire around the fa-
cility, but you can kind of see it there.

But in any event, people would walk through this area gathering
mushrooms, a favorite Russian pastime.

And in general, as the next photo shows, the Navy is still facing
big problems taking care of their radioactive waste. Here you have
some photos of the reactor compartments in decommissioned sub-
marines that are just tied up at a bay in the area as well. This
problem will only grow.

Now, I'm not suggesting, obviously, somebody is going to make
off with a reactor compartment from the submarine here, but what
is interesting about this experience is, in talking to the workers at
these plants, they frequently relate the problem that there are no
portal monitoring facilities at these plants. Either that or they
don't work. So if you are leaving the facility, you just walk around
them, walk through if they don't work.

And obviously, this means that, though our initial concern was
about the health and safety of these workers, if has obvious impli-
cations for the security of radioactive or fissile materials that
would be on the premises of the facility.

In terms of security of military controlled non-bomb fissile mate-
rials, not very much is known about this, problem and it may in-
volve mainly naval fuel stored at sites near Vladivostok, near
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii, near Murmansk and at Severodvinsk.

So clearly problems do exist. Bill Potter described some of them
earlier. This was widely reported in late 1993 when in this inside

1 Exhibit No. 9e. is retained in the files of the Subcommittee.

job the naval fuel rods were taken from the Rosta/Sevmorput facil-
ity on the outskirts of Murmansk.

I could use the next photo at this point if you don't mind.

This was not entirely a surprise to us. We had visited Murmansk
earlier in 1993. Murmansk is the largest town north of the arctic
circle, approximately half million people live there. And here in the
background you can see the facility in question. You can just see
the mast of the aircraft carrier Gorshkov that is tied up at the
Rosta facility.

A little bit to the left you can see two distinctive masts coming
out of one of the service ships that are used to offload and refuel
nuclear powered submarines. It is in that area the fuel was stolen
from.

When we were visiting this area in 1993, we had an informal in-
vitation by local businessmen who had some friends at the base to
visit the aircraft carrier Grorshkov which was tied up at Rosta. We
were only stopped in ear our endeavor by several tough looking
elder women who were part of the plants militia, the very babush-
kas who are derided in the Russian press as being inadequate
guards for this facility.

To my mind, the problem was not the babushkas, who looked
sufficiently alert and intimidating to raise the alarm, but the gap-
ing holes in the fencing and the dilapidated nature of the facility
which made it easy for anyone to wander off the nearby road and
get quite far inside.

This is a waterside photo of the same facility. You could see the
perimeter fence, how there are some rather large holes in the back-
ground. And I can assure you the fences that have holes are also
quite easy to get through. And we can talk about that further if
you so desire.

In this regard, it is good news that the DOE has finally been able
to move forward on working on this question, that is the security
of fresh naval fuel. It should be noted, though, it was actually
mainly the U.S. Navy, and particular Admiral Demars, that naval
reactors, not the Russian Navy, that was the obstacle in working
on this problem. I think somebody mentioned earlier the U.S.
Navy, particularly naval reactors, has been very reluctant to get in-
volved in helping the Russian Navy solve its nuclear problems.

Senator NUNN. You are right, the U.S. Navy doesn't want to get
near the Russian submarines and their safety, because the U.S.
Navy has had an exemplary safety record all of these years and
they don't want to touch anything.

But I think there has to be a broader look at this by the Navy,
and I think there has to be a sufficient buffer to their reputation
by the national interest expressed in the United States and Rus-
sian navies working together.

We have got a lot that we could teach them, and a lot that we
could help them on, and relating it to our own national interest is
an important dimension of that.

Mr. Handler. I agree that's the way to go forward.

In terms of the security of MinAtom controlled fissile materials
and radioactive and materials, I think that has been very ade-
quately covered by some of the earlier presenters. I absolutely
agree with the GAO official who spoke earlier. I too have been to

Obninsk. It is very easy to take out one of these disks containing
fissile materials if you are a worker, put it in your pocket and walk
out of the plant. No portal monitoring was in evidence, even though
there was some of the perimeter security that he showed earlier.

In terms of security of nuclear warheads, finding out on-ground
information about the problems of warhead safety and security has
been the most difficult task. Press reports about stolen or sold war-
heads have been hard to verify, and I have come to generally dis-
count them. That is not to say, however, we may not yet uncover
warheads which the authorities know are missing, mainly due to
accidents probably, but don't want to discuss.

For example, I had the opportunity to discuss the safety, security
and accounting procedures for nuclear warheads with a member of
the staff of the Twelfth Directorate of the Ministry of Defense,
which, I'm sure you know, its functions are similar to what the
DNA does here. It is a unit to provide security for nuclear weapons
that are in the service units here in the United States.

The conversation overall was rather helpful when it came to the
question of how warheads were tracked, reporting procedures fi'om
units which have nuclear warheads and physical security. It made
me feel by a bit more reassured that it was unlikely a warhead or
two got lost in the shuffle when tactical nuclear weapons were
brought back from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics
in the 1990-1992 time frame.

However, the discussion of nuclear weapons safety was rather
less comforting. An official remarked how the Soviet Union had
never had nuclear weapons accidents like had happened with U.S.
nuclear forces, and to avoid such accidents nuclear weapons were
never transported by air.

I pointed out to him, however, that the Soviet record was hardly
unblemished, and I had recently learned that a ballistic missile
submarine had lost a warhead off Kamchatka in 1977. I would say
based on what we know about the general Soviet safety record, the
conversation left me with the feeling there might have been a few
nuclear weapons accidents where nuclear weapons were damaged
or lost and were recovered, but are yet to be publicly admitted.

Also, I think the members of the Twelfth Directorate are quite
frank in admitting that the security of transport of nuclear weap-
ons for them is still an issue, and also the possibility of an inside
job from somebody that used to work in the Twelfth Directorate.

So where is this problem, this problem with the security of radio-
active versus fissile materials or nuclear warheads? Based on my
experiences, and looking into the rather voluminous testimony and
reports on this question, I would say the problem could be charac-
terized as follows from the most serious to the least worrisome: the
poor civilian, military and MinAtom control of radioactive mate-
rials is a big problem, as several people have discussed here today.

If anything, safety and security programs need to be expanded
to cover more sites, including radar and waste facilities, academic
institutions and industrial enterprises.

It is way too easy for a worker or military personnel who is look-
ing to make ends meet to get hold of a highly radioactive source,
thinking they have something valuable, and walk out with it.

Second, MinAtom military and civilian controls of fissile mate-
rials is also a big problem. A major problem seems to exist at the
non-weapons military and civilian facilities, institutes and research
centers of the MinAtom complex.

Radiation control safety has never been very good here. In this
case, poor radiation safety means poor nuclear security. The main
dangers is a knowledgeable insider, as several people have noted,
taking out fissile materials, or unknowledgeable insider taking out
fissile or highly radioactive materials. And a similar problem exists
at navy fresh fuel storage sites.

Third, military or MinAtom control of disarmed, disassembled or
dismantled nuclear weapons at military storage sites, or MinAtom
weapons facilities, is a lesser problem. To date, there does not seem
to be any evidence that the various bits and pieces of fissile mate-
rial found outside these facilities came from them. They have come
from MinAtom non-weapons or civilian facilities, or the navy fresh
fuel facility.

Military and civilian control of nuclear weapons. This issue, obvi-
ously, was the one that motivated you. Senator, and everybody else
in the period of the post-August coup attempt to get a handle on
this.

The problem with nuclear warhead security is worrisome, al-
though as serious as the situation with fissile and radioactive ma-
terial.

I would like to leave you with some general objections based on
our experiences over there.

First, you must realize major and petty corruption was endemic
to Soviet life. This whole business with the Mafia is not new. It
was how people got by in a situation of constant scarcity. With this
historical and social background, it is a small psychological step for
a worker to bring bits and pieces of radioactive materials out of a
plant on the supposition that it is of value somewhere.

This is not accusing anybody of dishonesty. I don't want a mis-
understanding here. It is just the background is very important to
understand.

Life in the military and officer corps has degraded. Low pay or
lack of pay is common, as many people have mentioned. Although
I have been struck by the professionalism and commitment of offi-
cer I have dealt with, the danger of an inside job will remain until
either better times come or better physical and accounting controls
are put on warheads and fissile materials and radioactive mate-
rials.

Life for the workers, particularly around outlying military sup-
port facilities in the areas I visited is very poor and very hard.
These were not pampered parts of the Soviet military-industrial
complex even during the heydays of the Soviet Union. There is
plenty of economic motivation to take any radioactive or fissile ma-
terials of any possible value to help make ends meet.

Second to last here, we must look at this problem of Gulags ver-
sus gizmos. I think as a matter of our policy and Russian policy,
we want to avoid promoting a form of security that emphasizes the
Gulag mentality, particularly that which may involve an infringe-
ment of human rights. As you may know, we are facing this prob-

lem now with FSB arresting a retired naval officer that has helped
out in inquiries in the northern fleet.

To solve this problem, we need more gizmos or gadgets. This is
best accomplished by increased emphasis on technical security and
better accounting and control measures.

Also, an outside civilian oversight control is important. In this
case, it must be considered a step backwards that GAN is no longer
allowed to oversee military nuclear facilities.

In the public debate, problems of radioactive material control,
fissile material control, and the security of nuclear weapons are all
mixed up. Control of radioactive materials and fissile materials at
civil sites and non-weapons MinAtom sites is very problematic.
Control of weapons and dismantled weapons is more assured.

The best way to assure weapons and fissile materials used in the
warhead manufacturing process do not fall into the wrong hands
is to continue the disarmament process, consolidate and reduce the
number of warheads.

The best way to ensure fissile materials do not fall into the
wrong hands is to continue to improve security and counting at
MinAtom and military sites, and work with MinAtom to stop pro-
ducing ever growing quantities of fissile materials, particularly plu-
tonium, as Senator Glenn mentioned earlier.

Finally, collectively, the DOD, DOE, the MOD, MinAtom, and
aside from all the sundry government officials involved from the
state department, foreign ministry, presidential staff, et cetera,
have been slowly crawling up the learning curb.

The pace to many has been too slow, but working in Russia and
with Russians can be frustrating, exasperating, and generally dif-
ficult, even if you are not dealing with highly sensitive issues like
nuclear materials and warhead and millions of dollars.

And, of course, it must be remarked the Russians sometimes find
this equally trying. Both Mr. Mikhailov and Mr. Carter both enjoy
reputations as being rather strong-minded and opinionated people.

The problems we are facing will not be worked out in 6 months
or a year. The arsenals and nuclear complexes both sides have con-
structed are just too large. We must be patient, stay the course,
and keep our eyes on the prize, A steady and safe reduction in the
nuclear threat represented by greater reduction in the nuclear
weapons arsenals of the United States and Russia, and greater con-
trol of and transparency surrounding nuclear materials.

In conclusion, I want to again congratulate you. Your undertak-
ing is truly historic, and we will gain nothing and in fact lose much
if the U.S. and Russian Governments, and the U.S. Congress and
the Russian Duma, stop supporting the cooperative threat reduc-
tion program.

Regardless of who comes next in Russian or U.S. politics, both
countries have an interest in further reducing their nuclear arse-
nals and in ensuring safe, secure and transparent storage of nu-
clear materials. Stopping "or slowing the CTR program, just as in
fact someone noted here earlier today, is probably starting to reach
its full stride, and reducing the level of cooperation when so much
progress is finally being made would be a grave mistake. Thank
you.

Senator NUNN. I think your summary at the end is excellent. I
agree with you completely, and you stated it very, very well.

I know each of you have been here a long time this morning, and
I appreciate your patience. Your suggestions will be of tremendous
help to us.

As I mentioned, I think that we have had enough testimony here
this morning to really update and put together a legislative ap-
proach that will perhaps lay a foundation for years to come. And
Senator Lugar and I will be working on that and we'll be calling
on you.

I'd like to ask Mr. Glukhov about Ukraine in terms of insider
threat. What is the threat as you would gauge it based on your ex-
perience of nuclear materials being sold from the inside of these fa-
cilities?

Mr. Glukhov. I mentioned in my presentation there is no meth-
odology in the Ukraine developed to define exactly the threat. This
is so-called design basis threat, which is the background for devel-
opment of all the physical protection issues.

Historically in the former Soviet Union the threat was considered
mostly as a potential theft from the facilities, and not only the nu-
clear material but just the state property, let's say, from the facili-
ties and so on.

And this is still quite a problem I would say, but at the same
time I would distinguish — I would separate probably two sides of
the theft problem and so on.

First is theft from the nuclear facilities, from the nuclear facili-
ties in the countries. And the second is the theft from the coun-
tries.

So, I mean, the transfer of the nuclear materials through the bor-
der of the state, and so far that's just my comment.

I don't know, maybe in the recent few months the situation has
been significantly improved. But last year the main attention was
paid to the physical protection of the facilities, let's say to install
the fence, to install some equipment, x-ray machines, metal detec-
tors and so on. But the attention was not made in a certain degree
to the border control of the state, and as far as I know, so far there
is no control for the fissile materials on the borders of the Ukraine.

Senator NuNN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Schweitzer, have you run into while you were there, or do
you think it has gotten worse since you left, in Russia, scientists
just not being paid at all, that their paychecks just don't come?
They are working for the state. Do you sense any point of despera-
tion here by some of the community that is having that kind of
problem, if any?

Mr. Schweitzer. Well, I think right now there are a number of
institutes which aren't meeting their payrolls. Some of them, in-
cluding Arzamas-16, are 2 to 4 months behind in meeting the pay-
rolls, let alone the low levels of payrolls. So, yes, it is a very real
problem right now, and it has been a problem for a long time.

The most extreme problem is in Georgia where there are 2,000
high tech weaponeers which President Shevardnadze is trying des-
perately to keep hold of, and they make $2 to $5 a month in a good
month. And so you have, not in Russia, but in some of these pe-
ripheral states really an explosive situation.

Senator NUNN. Is terms of know-how, how would you rate the
dangers of scientists and technicians actually leaving and going to
another country and going to work versus the possibility of staying
there in Russia and basically selling information that is easily
transportable now in this age of information?

Which of those is more likely to occur, or both?

Mr. Schweitzer. It is awfully hard to find a Russian who wants
to live in Iraq or North Korea or Libya, no matter how desperate
he is. So I think the likelihood of permanent emigration is close to
zero, not entirely zero but close to zero, for Russia itself.

Now, in the other peripheral countries, Georgia, some of the
central Asian countries, you have to worry. But their knowledge is
important but is not as dangerous as in Russia. But it is worri-
some.

Senator NuNN. Mr. Handler, how much corruption did you run
into in terms of your experience there relating to the naval bases
or others, and how much evidence, if any, of what I would call more
of an organized criminal effort? Did you get into that very much?

Mr. Handler. A little in a tangental way. There are business-
men every where in Russia, and I think you said it rather well ear-
lier. The problem probably isn't so much organized crime but dis-
organized crime. And also, what I described, there was already a
vast network that took place in the Soviet Union with the black
market.

So it is very easy now to integrate the acquisition of fissile mate-
rials or radioactive materials into that network. Where previously
it had no value, and you were more interested in distributing or-
anges or other commodities in short supply, now this thing has
value, and you already had access to these facilities, perhaps
through fi-iends or neighbors. So in that sense it has been a con-
cern to us, though I don't have any direct experience with it per
se.

Senator NuNN. Mr. Schweitzer, did you learn much about the re-
cruiting methods or the procurement of information methods of
countries like Iran and Iraq while you were there? Could you tell
how they are going about requests for getting scientific technical
information in this area?

Mr. Schweitzer. The most relevant experience I had was again
in Georgia. I visited Georgia several days after the President of
Iran was there with a large entourage. And I met with the nuclear
physicists whom the Iranian Government was recruiting during the
visit of the Iranian leadership to that country. They had specific of-
fers in hand, and when I met with them 2 or 3 days later they were
thinking them over — in a very negative fashion, but they were
thinking them over.

Senator NuNN. And they talked about it?

Mr. Schweitzer. They talked to me about it.

Senator NUNN. What were the offers? What were they supposed
to do? Did they have a clear vision of what they were supposed to
do for the money?

Mr. Schweitzer. No, not really. They were told they would work
on the civilian nuclear program in Iran, and it was very vague
what they would do. That's one reason they were very hesitant.

Senator NUNN. You said you talked to some of the scientists who
had been on the plane that was going to North Korea before it was
intercepted. What was their intent? What was their state of mind?

Mr. Schweitzer. They were apprehended in the airport actually
before they left for North Korea, and I met with them a few
months later. It was my impression that the Russians had had ex-
changes with North Korea for many years. This wasn't something
that started from zero. Now, maybe the missile guidance angle was
new.

But my impression was that these people were going there sim-
ply because they had nothing to do at their institute. They were
being offered $25,000 a year, I was told. I'm not sure how much
of that went to the institute and how much went to the scientists.

But they were basically doing it for financial reasons, and it was
their impression that the North Koreans were trying to develop a
space communications program.

I think in that case one or more Russian ministries and the insti-
tute had endorsed the visit, but at the last minute the foreign min-
istry found out about it and put a thumb in the dike.

Senator NuNN. So they weren't going over there without permis-
sion, they weren't trying to slip out of the country as such in their
own minds?

Mr. Schweitzer. My impression was they were going for a cou-
ple of years with the approval of their institute surely, and prob-
ably a parent ministry with which they had a loose relationship.
The visit probably hadn't been staffed by everybody, and particu-
larly I think the foreign ministry became nervous. That was my im-
pression.

Senator Nunn. Mr. Glukhov, I know you pointed out all sorts of
problems in Ukraine about materials and money and expertise and
so forth and so on, physical facilities and so forth. But what about
the attitude of the Ukrainian authorities? Do you think they them-
selves see proliferation and loss of this material and weaponry as
a threat to their own country?

Mr. Glukhov. I'm sorry, threat for?

Senator NuNN. The authorities. Do you think they view this
whole question of proliferation as one of a threat to the Ukraine?
Do they see it as a serious problem? Are they addressing it with
a degree of priority and seriousness?

Mr. Glukhov. No, I don't think it is a serious problem. That's
just my personal view on the problem.

The current situation in the Ukraine, the authorities involved in
the protection of nuclear materials and the nuclear facilities, they
have enough rights to do that just on the paper, as I said. Because
there is a big difference between their legal rights and their capa-
bilities to do the work.

Senator Nunn. But how seriously do they take it? Is this a high
priority for Ukrainian officials?

Mr. Glukhov. That's again my personal view, but it seems to me
that they could pay more than attention to that and to take it more
seriously than it is now, even now on the highest governmental
level. So one of the U.S. roles in this area I see is just to explain
how serious it could be and to use any chance to try to convince
them to pay more attention on the physical protection issues.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Glukhov, Mr. Schweitzer, and Mr. Handler,
we appreciate very much your being here. We appreciate your testi-
mony, and we hope you will continue to give us the benefit of your
experience and your expertise as we work our way through this
there legislatively and continue this series of hearings.

All of your testimony and all the previous testimony — I know you
all did an excellent job of summarizing — your original statements
will be part of the record without objection.

I would also like to acknowledge the help given to the Sub-
committee by a number of the Department of Energy labs, particu-
larly the Los Alamos, Livermore and Sandia labs. They have all
been enormously helpful. We are going to continue to work with
them. We have a statement from the Los Alamos lab included in
the hearing record.^

I have been very pleased with the laboratory and their laboratory
program. I think a lot of progress is being made there. Senator Do-
menici has been very involved in that, and I know that a lot of peo-
ple in the labs have worked very, very hard on that.

I recommend the Los Alamos testimony, which we didn't hear
today, but I think any of you interested in that would find it fas-
cinating to read.

Next week we will examine the demand side for fissile mate-
rials — who are the buyers. We will have government witnesses tes-
tifying about what their agencies are doing to counter the threat
of the spread of nuclear material from the former Soviet Union.

Our first witness will be the Director of Central Intelligence,
John Deutch. Dr. Deutch will discuss which countries and which
sub-national groups are looking for fissile materials and what the
U.S. intelligence organizations are doing to counter the diversion of
materials from the former Soviet Union.

Also, I am pleased to announce that Ambassador Rolf Ekeus will
be with us. He is the Executive Chairman of the U.N. Special Com-
mission. He will brief us on his work and the latest findings in his
work on Iraq.

The next panel of witnesses next week will include two well
known experts on the threat of weapons of mass destruction, Gary
Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms, and
David Kay, former chief of the U.N. inspection teams in Iraq.

Our final panel will consist of government experts who will tell
us about what their agencies are doing to combat nuclear diversion
from the former Soviet Union, including Charles Curtis, Depart-
ment of Energy, Frank Miller, Department of Defense, and Douglas
Browning, Assistant Commissioner for the Office of International
Affairs, U.S. Customs Service.

So this will be our next week's hearing, and we will certainly
again thank our witnesses today for an excellent testimony, and
particularly our last panel who sat here for quite awhile. We appre-
ciate very much your patience.

Thank you very much. We look forward to working with you.

[Whereupon, at 1:25 p.m. the hearing was adjourned subject to
the call of the Chair.]

'The prepared statement of the Los Alamos Lab appears as Exhibit No. 31 and is retained
in the Subcommittee files.

GLOBAL PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 20, 1996

U.S. Senate,
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,

Committee on Governmental Affairs,

Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room
SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Nunn, Ranking
Minority Member of the Subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Glenn, and Levin.

Staff Present: Daniel S. Gelber, Chief Counsel to the Minority;
John F. Sopko, Deputy Chief Counsel to the Minority; Alan
Edelman, Counsel to the Minority; Mark Webster, Investigator to
the Minority, Mary D. Robertson, Assistant Chief Clerk to the Mi-
nority; Richard Kennan (Customs Detailee); Renee Pruneau
Novakoff (CIA Detailee); Jim Christy (AFOSI Detailee); Harold
Damelin, Chief Counsel to the Majority; Michael Bopp, Counsel;
Carla J. Martin, Chief Clerk; Ken Myers (Senator Lugar); Rick Val-
entine (Senator Smith); Ian Brzezinski (Senator Roth); Max H.
Delia Pia (Senator Levin); Leonard Weiss (Senator Glenn); Randy
Rydell (Senator Glenn); John Guest (Senator Lieberman); and
Denny Watson (CIA Detailee to Armed Services Committee).

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR NUNN

Senator NuNN. The Subcommittee will please come to order. Sen-
ator Roth has been delayed this morning.

And Senator Lugar was going to be here but has Agriculture
Committee business to attend to. So we will have other Senators.
Senator Levin and others will be coming in.

I think Senator Lugar has an prepared statement that I would
ask unanimous consent to put in the record, and without objection
it will be.

[The prepared statement of Senator Lugar follows:]

prepared statement of senator RICHARD G. LUGAR

Mr. Chairman, the United States needs a comprehensive approach for combating
the threat posed to the United States by the proHferation of nuclear weapons and
nuclear materials from the states of the former Soviet Union and the enhanced pros-
pects of nuclear terrorism on American soil.

when Chechen rebels placed a package of radioactive material in a Moscow park
last month, it marked the first act of nuclear terrorism in the post-Cold War era.

Chechen separatists took credit for placing a 30-pound package containing small
amounts of Cesium-137 at the entrance to a Moscow park. Although the container
was not equipped with explosives needed to disperse the cesium, the Chechens have

(69)

demonstrated a credible terrorist threat to employ nuclear material attached to ex-
plosives as radiological dispersion devices in Russia.

Chechen leaders have claimed for over a year that they possess some type of nu-
clear weapon, including two "backpack nuclear weapons." Cesium can be absorbed
into the food chain and is potentially a cancer-causing agent. While this material
could be used to poison air and water systems and make hundreds, if not thousands,
of Russians sick, its primary use as a terrorist device would be to frighten popu-
lations.

Last year's act at a Moscow park crossed a new threshold in terrorism. Dem-
onstrating on Russian television and ability to penetrate Moscow's increased secu-
rity, Chechen rebels are now in a position to panic the Russian public by issuing
similar threats of radiological contaminants.

If Moscow has become the first nuclear terrorist target, the incident in the park
underscores the fact that nuclear terrorism should not be viewed as a phenomenon
limited to foreign countries. In the last 2 years, attacks on our own soil — at the
World Trade Center and in Oklahoma City — brought home the reality of terror.
Those tragedies would have been even more devastating had nuclear materials been
used.

Although the likelihood of all-out nuclear war has declined as a result of the end
of the Cold War, the risk of a nuclear detonation in the United States might well
be higher if nuclear terrorists gain access to the torrent of nuclear materials awash
in Russia and the other states of the former USSR. The Grerman government re-
ported more than 700 cases of attempted nuclear-material smuggling in Russia be-
tween 1991 and 1994, and, in 1993, the Russian government reported more than
900 attempts at illegal entry into Russian nuclear facilities.

No American citizen can feel safe unless this leakage of nuclear material is
stemmed. This is not an issue where the American public can accept political rhet-
oric or a piece-meal approach; specific policies must be devised to counter this direct
threat to the security of the United States. Absent a U.S. response to this threat of
nuclear leakage that is as focused, serious, and vigorous as America's Cold War
strategy, Americans m.ay have every reason to anticipate acts of nuclear terrorism
against American targets before this decade is out.

Given that the risks to the United States of living in a world of proliferating nu-
clear materials would be great, it is worth asking: Is the United States doing
enough to try to contain the nuclear leakage threat? Is the United States allocating
resources to this problem at a commensurate with the threat and the risks?

In August, I held two hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee focus-
ing on the lack of controls over nuclear materials in Russia and other former Soviet
states. Experts testified that we faced a real national security threat, perhaps the
greatest direct threat to the security of the United States. As a result of these hear-
ings, I asked Dr. John Holdren, one of our witnesses, to develop an outline of a com-
prehensive plan to reduce the threat of nuclear theft and smuggling in the former
Soviet Union.

Dr. Holdren is Professor of Energy at the University of California, Berkeley;
Chairman of the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences; and a Member of the President's Commission of Advi-
sors on Science and Technology.

In his report entitled "Reducing The Threat of Nuclear Theft in the Former Soviet
Union: Outline of a Comprehensive Plan," Dr. Holdren lays the foundation for a con-
sidered and comprehensive U.S. response to this burgeoning, direct threat to the se-
curity of the United States. I commend this study to the Subcommittee and ask that
it be included at this point in my printed remarks. ^

Lastly, I would suggest to the Chairman that Dr. Holdren's recommendations
serve as the basis for Subcommittee consideration of appropriate legislation to meet
the challenges posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Senator NUNN. Before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, we
had a defense strategy that proved to be successful and made a
great deal of sense. We knew who our enemy was, we knew where
he was located, and to a great extent what type of weapons he had.

He knew the same about us. We assumed the Soviet Union was
sane and interested in survival. They assumed the same about us.
The result was a very dangerous, but relatively stable, balance that

'Exhibit No. 10 is retained in the files of the Subcommittee.

avoided not only world war but avoided for over 45 years the use
of any nuclear weapons.

Now with the emergence of democracy in Eastern Europe, the
new sovereignty of a number of states that were part of the Soviet
Union, and the break-up of the Soviet empire, we are less pre-
occupied with the Cold War or the threat of an all-out nuclear war.
But, we have new challenges, new threats, and increasingly unpre-
dictable adversaries.

As we discussed last week and will throughout this series of
hearings, the loss of the command structures of the Soviet Union
seriously affected that region's ability to protect and secure its
huge arsenal of weapons of mass destruction — nuclear chemical, as
well as biological, as well as the delivery means, including missiles.

Economic dislocation has added to that and has caused great con-
cern that weapons scientists and their lethal technology may also
be for sale around the world.

Today we look at who is tr3dng to obtain these weapons, mate-
rials and know-how; how they are going about it and our efforts to
deal with it.

As our distinguished panelists discuss these challenges to our na-
tional security, I believe that a few conclusions will become clear.

Our new adversaries are in some way more dangerous than the
Cold War threats we faced. Today we have to face the possibility
that weapons of mass destruction may become accessible to a group
willing to do the unthinkable. The Director of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, John Deutch, will review the present state of the
threat in the Middle East and elsewhere and discuss the
weaponization of these regions.

Much of the technology that is critical to the weapons program
is available through an emerging black market, or through dual-
use market. Experts David Kay and Gary MilhoUin will discuss
their concerns that weapons technology and material are becoming
increasingly available for the right price. Efforts to prevent these
groups and nations from obtaining destructive power are difficult
and require both extreme and constant vigilance.

Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, Executive Director of the U.N. Special
Commission that is conducting investigations of the Iraqi weapons
build-up will explain the difficulties he has confronted, including
the pattern of deception that Iraq continually employs that makes
his job so difficult and so challenging.

Our hearings this month are part of a larger effort by this Sub-
committee that began in 1994 and will continue throughout this
year. This Friday we will convene the Subcommittee to hear the
Subcommittee staff explain some of their recommendations, as well
as the recommendations of many experts and observers who have
testified before the Subcommittee over the last year. Then we will
hear from a panel of representatives from government agencies dis-
cuss these issues with a look toward the future.

On Wednesday, March 27, the Subcommittee will turn to our do-
mestic preparedness: How well are we equipped to respond to a
chemical, biological or nuclear terrorist incident in the United
States?

We will examine efforts by our government to prepare for the un-
thinkable moment, which we hope and pray will never arrive.

When we receive a credible threat of the deployment of a weapon
of mass destruction, how will we react? Will we have thought about
it in advance? Will we have coordinated in advance with our own
agencies and with certain governments around the world. Wit-
nesses will include local and Federal Government representatives
responsible for responding to such incidents.

Finally, I would note that last October this Subcommittee pre-
sented its first investigative report on the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction. That staff report was one of the most exten-
sive reviews of the sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway system
last year, which killed 12 and injured over 5,000, and would have
literally killed thousands of more if the delivery system had been
more sophisticated.

The attack by the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo is believed to be
the first terrorist deplojonent of a chemical weapons of mass de-
struction on a civilian population. Coincidentally, that tragic attack
occurred on March 20, 1995. One year to the day later I can say
that we have left the realm of the unthinkable. These are no longer
theoretical concerns.

Our Nation must provide thoughtful and determined leadership
in the international community as we deal with this threat. I hope
these hearings help provide a broader understanding of this chal-
lenge, and I also hope these hearings will produce recommenda-
tions that help provide a framework for our Nation as we provide
the world leadership which is absolutely essential.

Dr. Deutch, we are glad to have you here today. As we do with
all witnesses before this Subcommittee, if you will rise we'll give
you the oath.

Do you swear the testimony you give before the Subcommittee
will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so
help you, God?

Director Deutch. I do.

Senator NUNN. Thank you. Dr. Deutch will start off today's dis-
cussions on which countries may be developing nuclear weapons
programs and how they are getting materials and know-how. And
I also understand he will discuss the potential for countries to use
the former Soviet Union as a weapons supermarket.

Dr. Deutch, we are pleased to have you. We appreciate your
being here, and we look forward to your testimony and the ques-
tions.

Director Deutch. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, with your permission I would like to submit my
rather extensive prepared testimony for the record. It includes a
very thorough discussion of the points that you and this Committee
are interested in, including a chronology of past events in the di-
version of nuclear materials, if that's suitable.

Senator NuNN. That will be fine. It will be part of the record
without objection.

I have read your entire statement, and it is very helpful and I
don't want you to feel you have to cut it too short. We would appre-
ciate some summary, but you take the time you feel you need.

Director Deutch. Thank you very much.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN DEUTCH,i DIRECTOR, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Director Deutch. I am pleased to appear here on the important
subject of the potential for diversion of strategic nuclear materials,
plutonium and highly enriched uranium, suitable for making nu-
clear explosive devices.

I have a very simple three-part message. First, the diversion
threat is real. We have been lucky so far.

Second, there are serious customers for strategic nuclear mate-
rials who are up to no good.

Third, every dollar the United States spends to improve material
protection, control and accountability, or to reduce the stockpile of
highly enriched uranium or plutonium in Russia, is an important
contribution to reducing this threat.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to deal briefly with each of these
points in turn.

What is the diversion threat from Russia? The Russians have
made a number of efforts to control their nuclear weapons and nu-
clear material stockpile, which grew so large in the former Soviet
Union.

Let me give you some examples of positive steps that have been
taken. Most of the nuclear weapons located in Eastern Europe,
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan have been returned to Russia.

Some progress has been made in improving the security facilities
in the Russian nuclear weapons complex. Construction of state
storage facilities for nuclear materials is proceeding, although slow-
ly, at a location near Ozersk.

Much of the progress is due to the assistance provided and the
encouragement provided by the United States, primarily the De-
partment of Defense and Department of Energy, to the cooperative
threat reduction program funded with Nunn-Lugar funds.

However, due to severe resource shortages, the Russian nuclear
weapons complex is deteriorating, and it continues to be a serious
threat for diversion of nuclear technology and materials to other
proliferating countries in the world.

First of all, the Russians simply do not have the resources allo-
cated to maintaining security at their weapons complex, or facili-
ties to provide adequate material accountability.

Second, personnel have been told by MinAtom, the Russian Min-
istry of Atomic Energy, that they cannot rely solely on government
funds to support their activities at the Russian nuclear weapons
complex.

These circumstances invite the diversion of materials from the
weapons complex to other locations. Up to the present, we have
seen numerous reports, most of them bogus, of strategic nuclear
materials from the Russian stockpile being offered for sale, mostly
in Western Europe.

However, a few of these cases have involved weapons-usable ma-
terial in small quantities that are significantly less than what is
required for a nuclear explosive device.

However, these few cases show what can happen and serve as a
warning to us. As I mentioned, we have included in my testimony,

' The prepared statement of Director Deutch appears on page 302.

attached to it, a chronology of all of these reports that we have fol-
lowed for the last 3 years.

Next, Mr. Chairman, let me turn to who are the customers for
this strategic nuclear material.

Obtaining strategic nuclear materials adequate for making a nu-
clear explosive device is the central hurdle for those who are seek-
ing a nuclear capability. We know that enormous efforts have been
made by Iraq and North Korea to produce indigenously adequate
amounts of strategic materials for weapons.

Without going into detail in open session, we believe that several
nations at one time or another have explored the possibility of pur-
chasing strategic nuclear materials as the simplist and quickest
and cheapest way to acquiring nuclear weapons capability.

Prominent examples include Iran and Iraq. To a lesser extent.
North Korea and Libya. Clearly, for terrorists or sub-national
groups, the only practical way to acquire nuclear weapons is either
to steal or purchase a device, or to purchase the strategic nuclear
materials and then address the much simpler problem of construct-
ing a device from the highly enriched uranium or plutonium.

Third, let me turn to what can be done to reduce the threat.

First, this threat is real and we should not deny its existence.

Second, if a significant act of diversion occurs, either the sale of
some nuclear device or a meaningful amount of strategic nuclear
materials from the Russian complex, we will face a crisis of enor-
mous proportions, and we will devote energy and resources greatly
in excess of the cost a reasonable cooperative threat reduction pro-
gram would impose on us today.

In some sense, making these efforts today is insurance about
having to make a much larger and much more dangerous resource
commitment in the future.

What would be the elements of a prudent and effective cooperate
threat reduction program that would reduce the threat from diver-
sion of materials or devices from the Russian complex?

Although this is not entirely an intelligence judgment, my pre-
vious experience tells me the following measures are most impor-
tant. We must do everything we can to reduce the strategic nuclear
material inventory productive capacity for producing these mate-
rials in Russia.

For example, we should consider converting the plutonium pro-
duction reaction — the one I believe at Krasnyorsk — to a mixed-
oxide plutonium burner. This would at the same time reduce the
Russian plutonium inventory and the production capability of Rus-
sian plutonium production reactors.

Second, we should continue the existing program of Russian
weapons dismantlement and construction of a safe plutonium stor-
age facility.

Third, we should take all steps to improve material, protection,
control and accountability systems at Russian nuclear facilities
through a program designed to minimize the risk of diversion from
those facilities that are most a threat for loss of material or tech-
nology or facilities.

Both the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy
have the mission and the technical capability to carry out such
threat reduction programs.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to say that I agree with mem-
bers of this Committee, with you and Senator Lugar, Graham Alh-
son, other experts who have testified before you, the prospects of
nuclear diversion from Russia is a major national security threat
to the United States. I commend this Committee and all of its
members for addressing this issue forthrightly.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Nunn. Thank you. Dr. Deutch.

The first question on chemical and biological weapons, you men-
tioned the nuclear threat and the threat coming out of the former
Soviet Union of leaking materials, know-how and so forth; what
about chemical and biological from the same source, and what is
the demand for chemical and biological in the world?

Director Deutch. Mr. Chairman, I thought my remarks were re-
quested to be restricted to nuclear, but let me say a word about
chemical and biological.

First of all, the demand for chemical and biological is broader in
the terrorist world and in the world of rogue nations.

Second, the technology required to make chemical agents or bio-
logical agents is a great deal simpler because one does not have to
pass that very high hurdle of getting strategic nuclear terms — the
highly enriched uranium and plutonium.

Thirdly, a lot of the equipment, the technology needed to make
these chemical or biological agents, can be obtained from dual-use
equipment or dual-use technology.

So for a nation or group that is trying to make this material, like
you mentioned the Japanese terrorist group making sarin, it can
be obtained and done without recourse to diverting equipment or
technology from Russian sources. So it can be done more simply
and cheaply just using dual-use widely available equipment and
technology.

Senator NuNN. If you had to list the dangers in terms of a terror-
ist group carrying out mass destruction, or attempt to carry out
mass destruction, in this country, or in our allied countries, which
would you list as the highest threat? Would it be the use of nu-
clear, would it be chemical, or would it be biological? Which is the
most likely?

Director Deutch. For a terrorist group, I think the judgment of
all experts would be chemical first, biological second, nuclear third.
That would be, I think, the order.

None of them are happy prospects, let me say. But I think from
the point of view of threat, it would be in that order, sir.

Senator NUNN. Is that because it is easier for a terrorist group
to get chemical weapons, and then biological? uclear would be
more difficult for them? Harder for them to transport that mate-
rial?

Director Deutch. The chemicals are the weapon of choice for a
terrorist group. Biological requires greater care of the material
until it is used. It has, in my judgment, some greater problems of —
well, basically, care before it is used.

Nuclear, the reason that I would want it third is because of the
issue of having to acquire illegally or surreptitiously a device or nu-
clear material.

Senator NUNN. You mentioned the Iranians. Can you confirm
that Iran is surreptitiously trying the buy weapons fi-om the former
Soviet Union, weapons as such, or is it more likely to be materials?

Director Deutch. Mr. Chairman, I wouldn't want to go beyond
the remarks that I have made here in my statement in open ses-
sion on that subject. I think that what I would say is that we do
know that the Iranians have fi'om time to time been interested in
acquiring materials and devices fi'om basically surreptitious
sources.

Senator NuNN. Any other countries you could list this morning
in open session that would full into that category of trying to ac-
quire nuclear materials or devices?

Director Deutch. Iran and Iraq, and to a lesser degree Libya and
North Korea.

Senator NuNN. What about Sjrria, are they on that list?

Director Deutch. They are not on the list that I have mentioned
to you this morning, no, sir.

Senator NuNN. What list are they on? [Laughter.]

You are not prepared to say anything about any other countries
this morning?

Director Deutch. I prefer not to go further this morning, sir.

Senator Nunn. To what extent are we equipped to deal with a
sub-national threat, I guess you would call it a terrorist threat,
that is, a small group that is able to obtain weapons technology or
material, and these groups are less likely to be using these weap-
ons as a deterrent and are much more likely to put them to use
in terms of blackmail.

How well are we equipped to deal with this kind of threat now,
in your evaluation?

Director Deutch. Very poorly, sir. The ability for our country, or,
I might say, any other country in the developed world, to protect
their infrastructure from a terrorist attack based on nuclear, chem-
ical or biological weapons is very, very small be indeed.

I must say, Mr. Chairman, that that vulnerability of the infra-
structure has always been true. That is not something which has
recently changed.

What is entirely different today is the fact that we see a growth
in international terrorism, most recently exhibited, of course, in
these terrorists bombing events in Israel.

But throughout the world, as I have testified on numerous occa-
sions, we see a growth in, as you have just mentioned, terrorist or-
ganizations willing to take on acts against civilian populations and
against countries throughout the world that make this issue of in-
frastructure vulnerability much more serious.

Senator NuNN. To what extent do these kind of groups, for in-
stance the groups in Israel or the groups that carried out the at-
tack in New York on the World Tried Center, to what extent do the
groups like that need to have national support, that is support
from a sovereign state in order to be able to work? Can they oper-
ate on their on, or do they require support from a state?

Director Deutch. I think to one degree or another they all re-
quire some support from sovereign States. They require that be-
cause they need sanctuaries for their training, their headquarters,
and their planning activities. They require that to get the resources

and the locations where they can undertake and plan their oper-
ations.

Senator NUNN. But actually Aum Shinrikyo did not.

Director Deutch. Well, that was a national group operating, in
that case, within Japan, although we know that they have activi-
ties elsewhere in the world.

What I'm saying is the Islamic organizations, Islamic terrorist or-
ganizations — Hesbola or the Gamat, Hamas — have organizations
spread in many countries and they do find that assistance and
sanctuary from a variety of different countries.

Senator NuNN. You mentioned in your full statement that what
we know you have mentioned, certainly, is alarming, but you also
mentioned — I don't remember the exact words — what we don't
know.

If you looked at the spectrum of intelligence now and with what
we actually know about what is going on in this area, and I'm talk-
ing about the demand side, the people trying to purchase the mate-
rials and weapons of mass destruction, and then you looked at the
unknown, how confident are you that we are anywhere near know-
ing what is going on out there in terms of what is really happening
in groups tr3dng to get hold of this kind of material and weapons?

In other words, how big is the world that we don't know about?

Director Deutch. Always a hard question to answer, but let me
try and say two things.

This issue of the spread of weapons of mass destruction to both
national and sub-national groups is a matter of extraordinarily
high priority in our collection efforts, and our anal3dic efforts. But
especially in of our collection efforts.

But I would say to you that there is not a place in the world
where we have presence — speaking about the intelligence commu-
nity broadly now — where this question is not on the minds of our
men and women who are are serving, who are on our collection sys-
tem.

So this is certainly a subject that we are placing enormously high
priority to get whatever information we can.

Having said that, it is not the kind of subject where I would
want to give you or any other person categorical assurance that we
know everything that is going on or not. As you just mentioned in
your opening statement, in a curious way it makes you wish for the
old Cold War where you knew the kind of target you were dealing
with and the problems you had in penetration it and the issues you
were facing.

Today to learn what the intentions are of possibly very deter-
mined, although small, terrorist groups is extremely difficult and
requires greet ingenuity, and I might say courage, by our officers.

So I would say to you we are certainly placing tremendously high
priority on the subject, but I cannot with confidence say that we
know all that is going on.

Senator NuNN. One of the areas that has come to our attention
where it seems to me at this point at least we are most deficient
it would be be in the central Asia area, the Caucuses countries,
southern Russia, those areas where we have not had the kind of
presence economically, politically, or otherwise, that we have had
on the western side.

Would you share that? Or are we working that problem in a
more diligent way than is apparent to me at this time.

Director Deutch. Well, I would say to you, sir, I will put in a
plug for Secretary Christopher. I think that you also want to look
at our diplomatic presence and our open presence there, as well as
whatever small efforts we may have. There are also very important
open press and broadcasts which come out of these parts of the
world.

Quite frankly, we regard these parts of the world as being ex-
tremely important for preserving security, not only from the point
of view of the issue we are discussing here today, but all of those
central Asian republics are moving toward democracy, trying to
move toward democracy, trying to improve their economies.

So these are important countries for our government to interact
with and engage with, and we certainly try to do that in our col-
laborative efforts with them.

Senator NuNN. I guess my question is are we doing as much
there as we are doing in other parts of Russia and other parts of
the former Soviet Union?

Director Deutch. Well, let me say, again I want to make very
clear that I think it starts with our diplomatic presence there,
which I do worry about. That is an important part for what we do
because we need their policy guidance and presence there.

But I would say to you that if we could in private review our ef-
forts there, I think you would see that our collaborative efforts
there are quite strong and that we do see it as an important area
compared to many.

Senator NuNN. Let me switch to Senator Glenn here, and then
I'll have a few more questions before we wrap it up. I know you
have done a great deal of work in this area and we appreciate your
leadership.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR GLENN

Senator Glenn. We have been following this a long time.

Dr. Deutch, the administration appears to have made up its
mind to send $368 million worth of military equipment to Pakistan.

This is quoted in the morning paper, from a high administration
official in the Washington Post this morning I understand: "Despite
clear evidence that Pakistan has once again violated U.S. non-
proliferation laws, this time by purchasing ring magnets from
China for their nuclear weapons material production facility."

I don't think there is any doubt this is against our own non-
proliferation laws.

But what is the CIA's or your own analysis of the likely impact
of the administration decision on India, and specifically on the
forthcoming Indian elections; any opinion on that?

Director Deutch. I have not come here this morning prepared
with an assessment of Indian reaction to the policy move that you
have mentioned. I can certainly provide that for you. Senator.

Senator Glenn. If you would, I would appreciate it and we could
have it for the record. Thank you.

I'm very concerned about this. I have followed this for a long
time. I think that some of the actions going on now are decisions
being made, quoting a high administration official, that they had

made up their mind on this. I just think these prohferation activi-
ties violate our laws and I think it is the wrong direction. But we
have fought this out on the Senate floor and lost on the Brown
amendment, and a number of other things which I know you have
followed.

Do we know where all the weapons are that were former Soviet
weapons that might now be in independent states, former members
of the Soviet Union?

Director Deutch. I think that we have a fairly good confidence
that the Russians and we do know where these weapons are and
where they are located, where they are planned to go to. I think
that's one of the positive steps that have happened as a result of
our cooperative threat reduction program and the Nunn-Lugar pro-
gram. I do think that we have a fairly good fix on that.

Senator Glenn. Not only ballistic missiles but shorter range tac-
tical missiles? I mean tactical weapons, not missiles.

Director Deutch. I'm sorry, sir, I was thinking of nuclear de-
vices, is what I was thinking of, and the answer to that I would
say is largely yes but not entirely.

Also, I want to mention that in the production complex there are
always devices that are in a partial state of fabrication or rework
and so on, so there is a whole lot of piece part issues that you have
to worry about too.

But respect to the location of weapons that were formerly in mili-
tary units, the answer to that I would say is we are fairly confident
of it and we believe the Russians have a fairly good handle on it.

Senator Glenn. In times past we were very concerned about
Pakistan or others developing what at that time we referred to as
an Islamic bomb. We used to refer to it that way and it was re-
ferred to it internationally, some of the meetings, that way.

Is there any indication that Iraq is working with others to spread
nuclear weaponry to other countries, or giving them nuclear infor-
mation or technology that would let other countries or groups de-
velop a weapon?

Director Deutch. Iraq?

Senator Glenn. Iraq.

Director Deutch. I think at the present time Iraq is mostly try-
ing to preserve whatever capability it can in light of the U.N. sanc-
tions. You will be hearing more from a witness who is more directly
involved in that.

But I think right now I would have to say, no, we don't know of
efforts for Iraq to export technology or materials elsewhere.

Senator Glenn. One of these that disturbed in your statement
also and I think it is really a red flag for us.

You said that the Russians, "May not know where all their mate-
rial is located."

Director Deutch. Yes. I think that that refers especially to with-
in the complex. As the complex deteriorates in terms of its perform-
ance in terms of its operations and support for operations, the ac-
countability will eventually suffer, and may never have been as
good as it is at our complexes.

Senator Glenn. It is one thing for us to be using the Nunn-
Lugar money — which I support and voted that concept — of helping
them to take their weapons down and dismantle them.

But this made me wonder whether if they don't even know where
all their material is located, whether maybe we wouldn't be well
advised to take some of that Nunn-Lugar money and instead of
putting it just on weapons dismantlement, bringing them off the
missiles and so on, helping Russia to somehow find out where all
their material is. We could have loose nukes all over the place if
they don't know where all their material may be, or potential loose
nukes, that is, if they haven't been put into weapons yet.

Director Deutch. Senator Glenn, in my comments I explicitly
said that I think that expenditures on materials protection, ac-
countability and control in Russia makes tremendous sense if it is
on a risk-based basis. Don't do it for every place, but in those
places where you think there is a serious problem I think that is
a very cost-effective way to reduce this threat.

Senator NUNN. We have the Nunn-Lugar money right there. It
is there now being used, without having to try and get a new ap-
propriation for that.

Do you think it would be good to take some of that money and
use it for this purpose?

Director Deutch. Well, this is wildly afield from an intelligence
question, but being both a loyal ex-member of both the Department
of Energy and the Department of Defense, I would say that either
agency could carry this out very, very well.

My point is it is something the country you should do. That's as
far as I should go. I can't give you offsets right here. Maybe pri-
vately. Senator.

Senator Glenn. One of the other things that I think you had in
your statement was that a Russian source said that it would be
possible for them to substitute dummy warhead, dummy bomb, and
avoid detection for probably up to 6 months. That's disturbing also.

Director DEUTCH. That depends on the precise control system
that they have in place.

Senator GLENN. What is the danger as you see it if somebody
came into some plutonium. It takes a large industrial complex to
put a weapon together. There are a lot of things that have to be
done, the facets on the bomb, and there is a lot of experimenting.
It is a big industrial operation. Even if you have the plutonium, it
is still a big industrial operation to get the thing done.

What is the danger of people having plutonium, and let's say
having plutonium that could be put into a dust or powder of some
kind, if that was spread around Times Square or something like
that; is this a danger that we should be looking into? Is it really
a hazard?

Director Deutch. Well, On a per gram basis, I wouldn't think it
would be as lethal as chemical or biological under the same cir-
cumstance. But let me say to you, building a sophisticated nuclear
device requires a tremendous amount of ingenuity and a tremen-
dous amount of engineering capability.

Building less sophisticated devices which don't give you the opti-
mum yields-to-weight ratio, it is not all that impossible. Designs
are known.

So while I would say to you yes, it does take some engineering
talent and some facilities and some milling and some dealing with
knowing how to deal with plutonium, that we should not think that

this requires the kind of cahber that our weapons laboratories or
Russian weapons laboratories have to produce a crude nuclear de-
vice. I wouldn't say it was trivial, but I wouldn't want to overesti-
mate its difficulty.

Senator Glenn. No, and agree with you, and then I was just re-
calling when you said that, years ago, I guess, Mr. Chairman, it
has been maybe 12 of 14 years ago, we had a student from Prince-
ton came in and had some plans, and he talked to Dr. Weiss, our
Committee staff director at that time, and he had a plan for a nu-
clear weapon.

It was what we called the ash can device at that time. And Len
looked at it and he thought, well, it looked like it might work to
him, although he is not a bomb designer, so we had Dr. Taylor
come down, who is a bomb designer, and he said, yes, this probably
would have worked.

He was a student. So it just backs up what you were saying. I
wanted the Department of Energy to hire the kid at that time and
put him under some control so he wasn't out loose, but they didn't
do it.

Then we had a second time when he came up. He had found a
lot of stuff out at Los Alamos in the library, in the open stacks of
the library. You may recall some of those times too.

We came to know him on the Committee as Rotow-1 and Rotow-
2. But it backs up what you are sajdng about they can design a de-
vice, it might not be as sophisticated, might not make as efficient
use of the fissile material, but it still would go off.

Director Deutch. Exactly. The only thing which surprises me
about your story is that the student came from Princeton and not
MIT. [Laughter.]

Senator Glenn. When I said Princeton, I thought maybe there
was a mistake here.

How do you keep up with these things? I don't know whether we
can get into this in open session or not.

It seems to me a lot of this stuff we are into now is not things
you get by overhead satellite and things like that.

Much of this has to be developed by information sources that are
human, and that takes a long time to develop and to check out and
all that sort of thing.

Is that a major problem?

Director Deutch. I would say, as I mentioned in response to an
earlier question, that I am thoroughly satisfied, and I believe you
would be thoroughly satisfied, about the awareness of this problem
in the human collection tasking system, and actually what is going
on in the field.

I don't believe that there is an3rwhere in the world where one of
our men or women officers aren't aware of the severity of this prob-
lem. I would also say this is something which is not recent. This
had been put into the community for some number of years now.

I would also say that our development of a nonproliferation cen-
ter has assured an all-source multi-agency approach to the analysis
of questions and the tasking on these kinds of issues.

So I think a tremendous amount of progress has been done since
the time, really, of Mr. Gates as director, to build a real serious
post-Cold War nonproliferation intelligence capability on both the

collection and analysis side, including all agencies, not just the
Central Intelligence Agency.

Senator Glenn. I have come to the conclusion over the last few
years that as bad as nuclear weapons are, that we are gradually
coming to the point where chemical weapons may be the biggest
dangerous that we have run into in the near future. We can keep
up a lot easier with nuclear weapons and nuclear developments
than we can with chemical weapons.

Judge Webster, one of your predecessors out there sat right
where you are sitting back a few years ago and testified that a very
credible chemical weapons factory — and he was testifying as to how
difficult it is to keep up with some of the chemical weapons devel-
opment all over the world — and he testified that a very credible
chemical weapons factory for a terrorist group, or even for a larger
group than that, even a nation, could be set up in a space about
the size of this hearing room right here.

Would you concur with that, that they are that small and that
easy to set up.

Director Deutch. Yes.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. Thanks, Senator Glenn.

Senator Levin, I'll yield to you in just a minute. Let me ask a
couple other questions and then I'll let you wind up the questions
with Dr. Deutch.

Dr. Deutch, the Presidential Commission chaired by Harold
Brown, and first our departed friend and colleague, Les Aspin, and
then Warren Rudman succeeded in that role, their job was to ap-
praise the roles and capabilities of the U.S. intelligence community.

And they recently released a report that recommends more co-
operation is needed between the law enforcement and intelligence
communities; do you agree with that?

Director Deutch. Yes.

Senator NuNN. What legislative changes, if any, would be needed
to develop the kind of cooperation the Brown Commission rec-
ommends? Do you need anything in the way of legislation, or is
this primarily management, executive branch?

Director Deutch. First of all, I don't think that this is a problem
which could be solved by legislation. There has been a long history,
going way back to the times of J. Edgar Hoover and Dulles about
problems between the FBI and the CIA in particular.

I think that they have gotten tremendously better. They have
gotten a great deal better in recent years. And I would say that
today we have important mechanisms in place.

I regularly meet with Louis Freeh. I regularly meet with Janet
Reno. My deputy, George Tenet, meets every other week with
Jamie Gorelic.

We have had a very important, and I might say positive, ex-
tremely positive, meeting in Rome for the first time, some of our
agency personnel and legal FBI persons abroad.

All indications that I have on the tremendously important issues
that we are discussing here — infrastructure, vulnerability to terror-
ist attack, terrorism against the United States in any form, and
counterintelligence — I would say that the cooperation is moving
smartly.

We are assigning FBI officers in CIA, CIA officers in FBI in this
area. I'm quite positive about it, and I cannot imagine a person
who has been more cooperative in this matter than Louis Freeh
has been with me, or that Janet Reno, or, of course, my beloved
Jamie has been, in these matters.

So I am quite optimistic about it, and I regard serving law
forcement as being one of the important post-Cold War objectives
of the intelligence community we are looking to them as being an
important customer for foreign intelligence that we can provide.

Senator NuNN. I'm told there are currently over 100 organiza-
tions, offices and government agencies that are involved in one way
or the other in the weapons of mass destruction proliferation effort,
counterproliferation effort of the U.S. Government.

Is it feasible to carve out a coordinated policy on proliferation
with so many players involved?

Director Deutch. It is certainly something we have to do. We
have to make sure that we have in place an efficient and effective
serious policy apparatus for doing that, and that I think is an abso-
lute requirement.

Senator NuNN. The Brown-Rudman Commission has rec-
ommended that a global crime committee, chaired by the Presi-
dent's national security advisor, be formed that would, among other
things, oversee U.S. Government efforts to combat weapons of mass
destruction proliferation that involves criminal activity.

Do you have any thoughts on this proposal this morning?

Director Deutch. I don't have any thoughts on this proposal this
morning, but I think that the direction — this was one of three com-
mittees that were recommended by the Aspin-Brown Commission.
One of them had to do with a group chaired by the national secu-
rity advisor to broadly twice a year look at priorities in the na-
tional security intelligence area. That I certainly endorse myself as
Director of Central Intelligence.

Another was a consumer committee, which would be run by the
deputies, which I also endorse in the national security area.

Something is needed to coordinate better foreign intelligence that
relates to global crime and terrorism, and how that is organized,
I would want to await talking with the Attorney General that I
have not done before reaching a position myself.

But the proposal made by the Brown Commission is entirely rea-
sonable. Something like that is needed.

Senator NuNN. On Monday the Washington Post published an ar-
ticle on coordination among the CIA, FBI and State Department.
It mentioned regular meetings between you and Director Freeh,
and between representatives of the CIA and the Justice Depart-
ment.

Was that reasonably accurate in terms of the description that
there is coordination going on, or what else can you tell us about
the coordination, particularly between the CIA and FBI where
there has been so much history of problems?

Director Deutch. I hope this doesn't get me in trouble, Mr.
Chairman. I have not read that article. But I do think we have a
very solid coordination at all levels, and participation of officers at
all levels.

I'll be happy to provide you a thorough description of all that.
But as I say, I do meet, to the extent that you have just read it,
and that is accurate.

I meet with Louis Freeh regularly. I talk to him all the time. I
meet with Janet Reno with high frequency. My deputy, George
Tenet meets bi-weekly with Jamie Gorelic.

We have a committee called the Joint Intelligence Community
Law Enforcement which meets on a regular basis at the working
level. We have people in each others counterterrorism centers, and
efforts like that.

I think that this is something which is getting better fast. So I
am optimistic about it, and I do think it is important for the intel-
ligence community to see that law enforcement is the kind of im-
portant policy customer that we are so accustomed to dealing with
in the national security area.

Senator NUNN. Can you say anything in open session — and if you
would rather reserve this I certainly understand — but can you say
anything about cooperation between our intelligence community
and the Russian intelligence community, your counterparts, regard-
ing proliferation, weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological
or nuclear.

Director Deutch. No.

Senator NuNN. Thank you. I assume that's something you pursue
though, in general.

Could you take off your intelligence hat and answer one policy
question based on your memory when you were in the arena where
you could have opinions on policy.

Director Deutch. You make me blush.

Senator NuNN. I know you compartmentalize those opinions now
and put them in the deep resources of your brilliant mind.

But the whole question of purchasing HEU, that is a focal point,
has been. It was I thought an extraordinary accomplishment to get
Ukraine to basically make the HEU agreement with Russia.

That helped get Ukraine out of the nuclear business. It was a
tremendous breakthrough that I don't think the administration has
gotten enough credit for.

But it all depends now on the HEU being purchased and the rev-
enue flowing and the materials flowing. And we have this U.S. En-
richment Corporation now involved.

Can you comment on that? It doesn't appear to be working well,
and it seems to me this needs some real attention at very high lev-
els. Because if this one falls through, if this one collapses, the
chances of getting this kind of cooperation and getting people out
of the nuclear business and keeping some confidence in terms of
U.S. economic commitments, it seems to me we'll be setting our-
selves up for a real bad blow.

Would you comment on that?

Director Deutch. Well, I think the first point is, anything we can
do to blend down highly enriched uranium and burn it in nuclear
reactors around the world is something which reduces this threat
and is important to do, and I believe it is also economically attrac-
tive.

Just as I mentioned in the case of plutonium, if there is raw plu-
tonium around in the world, using mixed oxide fuel and burning

it in reactors I believe is important from the point of view of non-
proliferation, and I believe it can be economically advantageous, es-
pecially with respect to Russian plutonium. So I greatly favor both
of these efforts. Both efforts.

I have not checked into the precise circumstances where we are
today on United States Enrichment Corporation's efforts, Mr. Tim-
ber's efforts, to actually realize that.

I believe that there are a couple of problems still in the way of
having that happen which are involved with — the last person I
have spoken to about this in detail is Senator Domenici. So I think
that those can be managed, and they are important to be managed
because that deal has both got nonproliferation benefits and eco-
nomic benefits and security benefits, it is a triple win, so we should
make that happen as best we can.

Senator Nunn. Well, the United States cannot simply turn it
over to a private corporation and assume market forces are going
to take care of it. It has too much of a governmental purpose to
be able to do that.

It seems to me that we ought to use the market as much as we
possibly can, but I get the impression that we are allowing the
market to dictate some of this when we should be looking at it in
a much broader sense.

Director Deutch. Mr. Chairman, I have to go and refresh myself
on this, but I think that the issue is a trade issue. That is, is it
a fair trade practice to take in highly enriched Russian uranium
and introduce it into the market without having a cost associated
with it.

But if you want to talk about this, let me get myself refreshed
on that.

Senator NuNN. OK. I'll get back with you.

Senator Levin.

Senator Levin. I would 3deld to Senator Glenn for just one ques-
tion.

Senator Glenn. I had another commitment I had to go to and
wanted to follow-up on a previous question.

I asked about the U.S. reported decision to sell $368 million
worth of military equipment and transfer that to Pakistan and the
impact that might have on India.

Was your answer to indicate that you just didn't have in posses-
sion today a CIA analysis of the impact on India, or that such a
study has not been done?

Director Deutch. I don't have it available to me today.

Senator Glenn. Has such a study been done?

Director Deutch. I think the answer is yes, but I just am not
informed on it. I'll have to get back to you briefly.

Certainly the assessment of Indian reaction has been done. I just
don't know what the status is.

Senator Glenn. Has that been given to the administration.

Director Deutch. Well, if it has been done it certainly has been
given to the administration, yes.

Senator Glenn. It has been passed along? They are fully aware
of your opinion then of what the impact on India would be?

Director DEUTCH. I have to reserve until I can give you an accu-
rate answer to that. Senator. I don't know what document exists

and what document has been given. If there has been a document,
it has been distributed. But I'll be happy to do that. I can do that
in an hour's time.

Senator Glenn. I would appreciate it. I'd like to know whether
they are aware of what your opinion is of what the Indian reaction
might be on that. If you can provide that for us, either classified
or unclassified, I would appreciate it.

Director Deutch. Well, I must say the community has been very,
very closely involved in providing information to policy makers on
this subject, so I'm confident that there is a piece on the Indian re-
action, and I'll get back to you on it, sir.

Senator Glenn. All right. Well, I presumed something like that
had been done. I couldn't see how they could possibly go ahead
without that kind of CIA analysis in hand at least. If it hasn't been
done and given to them, it certainly should be.

Director Deutch. I'm just not informed at the moment, sir, and
I will be back to you before the end of the day.

Senator Glenn. OK, fine. Thank you very much.

Thank you. Senator Levin.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN

Senator Levin. Welcome. I want to follow-up on Senator Nunn's
question about cooperation with Russian intelligence, because there
have been public statements that we have started cooperation with
the Russian Government.

And I think the statements also said including law enforcement
relative to nuclear smuggling.

Is that not true, that we have indeed begun cooperative meas-
ures with the Russian Government and said so publicly?

Director DEUTCH. There is no question about the fact that we
have had discussions and cooperative efforts, certainly in the law
enforcement area, with the Russian Government on this issue.

They are also concerned about questions of the kind we have
been discussing here this morning.

Senator Levin. Is there any reason, if in fact we are cooperating
with Russian intelligence, that such a general statement cannot be
made publicly, without getting into the details of it?

I see you are uncomfortable, which is

Director Deutch. Well, I mean, yes, it is not the kind of subject
that I would want to open up.

Senator LEVIN. Let me go to Israel. Are we cooperating with Is-
raeli intelligence?

Director Deutch. Yes.

Senator Levin. Because there was an article recently that said,
according to some sources at least, that some in the United States
now see Israeli intelligence as a rival.

There was a Los Angeles Times article. I sent you a copy of this.
And some U.S. sources, without identifying them, are saying that
the Mossad has done little recently to help U.S. efforts to track
down international terrorists.

Are we indeed cooperating with Israeli intelligence, the Mossad?

Director Deutch. We certainly are, and I think that it is known
that I have just come back fi-om Israel to work out with them a

more robust and more effective counterterrorism program, for ex-
ample. #

Senator Levin. Was that successful?

Director Deutch. It was very successful.

Senator Levin. Are we satisfied with the level of Israeli coopera-
tion in this area?

Director Deutch. Counterterrorism, absolutely.

Senator Levin. Now let me go back to Russia.

What is the reason that, if in fact there is a joint effort with the
Russian Government, including their intelligence people, that can-
not be just confirmed without getting into details? I want to follow-
up on Senator Nunn's point there.

Director DEUTCH. Because my judgment is that that's not a sub-
ject that I would want to discuss in open session.

Senator Levin. Will you give us for the record then what in fact
is going on, if anything, with Russian intelligence in terms of a
joint counterterrorist effort and a joint nuclear smuggling effort?

Director Deutch. Absolutely,' I'll be happy to do that. We will
give you for the record what is going on between intelligence serv-
ices on cooperation on terrorism, counterterrorism and counter-
smuggling efforts, nuclear smuggling efforts.

Senator Levin. You have indicated in your testimony that of the
numerous reports describing diversion of weapons-usable material,
that only a few actually have involved weapons-usable material,
and the quantities have been significantly less than that needed for
a weapon.

We had testimony on that issue previously. Senator Nunn
showed some pictures the other day as to what quantities would be
necessary for a weapon, and it was some small multiple of pluto-
nium disks shaped like a little hockey puck.

Director Deutch. That's probably a plutonium device that he has
in mind. And I think that we all agree that this is small in volume
and weighs a few tenths of a pound.

Senator Levin. So we are literally talking about a relatively
small number of hockey puck-size items; is that correct?

Director Deutch. Yes, sir.

Senator Levin. Would they be relatively easy to smuggle across
a border, something that small and easily transportable?

Director Deutch. You could take a briefcase and put in a couple
of them and pass through a border, unless there was specifying de-
tection equipment or devices, or some other inspection scheme, and
I would think it would be pretty easy, yes, sir.

Senator Levin. Or there could be 100 different briefcases with
one, right? You don't need to put a dozen in one briefcase, you
could have 100 different people with one per briefcase?

Director Deutch. Correct.

Senator Levin. And if even a small number of those even crossed
the border relatively easily, would you agree you would have
enough then for a nuclear weapon?

Director Deutch. You could have enough for a nuclear weapon
in one briefcase.

Senator Levin. You indicated that in the past 2y2 years there
was some material stolen from Russian facilities to outside coun-
tries and Germany. There was a seizure of six grams of plutonium.

Czech police seized under three kilos of highly enriched uranium
in December of 1994.

Where were those items going to? Do we know?

Director Deutch. I don't at this time. Each one of them had a
different destination and a different degree of planning for who the
customer was. I can find that information out.

Let me say to you that the general picture that this should con-
vey, it seems to me, is how lucky we are and how great this threat
is.

Senator Levin. That was my next question. If in fact it is so easy
to transport something like that in a suitcase, we can presume that
if we have caught a few, that there are a number that we haven't
caught; would that be safe to say? Is that a fair assumption? Do
you assume that?

Director Deutch. I would not go that far. I would not be pre-
pared to say in other circumstances — I see your point — but you
might say, well, there have been a lot of bogus cases, a few actual
cases which actually involved enriched material.

Is it possible that some significant quantity has gotten through,
enough to make a device or so, I would not reach that conclusion
today.

Again, I would focus on, boy, is this ever a warning that we have
got real troubles here, and that it is worthwhile in making invest-
ments in the materials protection and accountability control system
inside Russia.

Senator Levin. You have not reached a personal conclusion as to
whether or not it is likely that a half dozen hockey puck-sized plu-
tonium buttons have been crossing borders illegally, if we have cap-
tured two or three of them?

Director DEUTCH. Well, one of them was grams. That's not that
size.

I think only one of these, the Czech case that you mentioned,
was what I would call a quantity that begins to be the size of a
hockey puck. They were all smaller than that yet.

But my own personal conviction, although I don't have certainty
on this, I can't bank it, I would say we have not yet — I can say to
you that we don't have a confirmed case.

Senator Levin. I mean your own belief

Director Deutch. I would say no. But that I regard as good luck.

Senator Levin. I think we all agree here that to prevent such
smuggling is what the major focus must be. But I was interested
in whether or not you think it is likely that that has already oc-
curred.

Director Deutch. No.

Senator Levin. Your answer is no, and that's fine. But we have
got to keep it that way, if in fact your assumption is correct.

Senator NUNN. I think the biggest problem in that area is that
we don't believe there is an accurate inventory, so if some were
missing, there is no invemtory that would give anyone confidence
that the alert system would really work, that you would know what
was missing.

Director Deutch. I agree with that. I would be looking for this
on the recipient side not on the loss side.

Senator LEVIN. And whatever we can do to achieve that inven-
tory, I take it, would be highly desirable.

Director Deutch. On a risk-based basis. To do it for the whole
Russian complex would be out of the question, but to do it with the
high-risk areas would not be.

Senator Levin. In your prepared statement you say that the in-
telligence community is taking measures to aggressively support
U.S. Gk)vernment efforts to ensure the security of nuclear materials
and technology.

But then, near the end of your statement, you say that more can
and must be done.

Would you give us specific suggestions, on page 13, I believe.

Director Deutch. Just give me one second, Senator. I did men-
tion two or three items.

Senator Levin. Specifically as to what more we can do?

Director Deutch. More money, and more support for materials
protection, control and accountability efforts, consideration of as-
sistance to the Russians, if they will do it, in converting their plu-
tonium production reactors to burning plutonium.

So I do have some specific considerations that policy makers
might consider.

Senator Levin. Would that be part of Nunn-Lugar, the second
piece particularly? Do you know offhand if Nunn-Lugar funds
would be eligible to do that? I could ask the master here.

Director Deutch. I'm going to get myself in tremendous trouble.
Senator Levin, if I begin commenting on DOD programs and
money.

Senator NUNN. I think it would be eligible. I don't think there
is any question about it being eligible. It is a matter of reaching
an agreement with the Russians and making sure that it is finan-
cially feasible, and that the plan is technically feasible too.

Director Deutch. Well, it is technically feasible. The issue is
whether the Russians would be willing to carry it through to com-
pletion and make sure that it happens.

Senator NuNN. What I mean by that is technically feasible in
terms of the plan they lay down and whether they want us to fur-
nish the money. Sometimes they want us to furnish the money but
the plan doesn't appear to be either effective or efficient.

Director DEUTCH. And that's the part you have to tie down.

Senator Levin. Thank you, and thanks for your good work.

Director Deutch. Good seeing you, Senator.

Senator NuNN. Dr. Deutch, thank you for being here. We appre-
ciate it very much and we look forward to continuing to work with
you, and I will follow-up on those meetings we discussed.

Director Deutch. Yes, sir. Nice to see you. Thank you.

Senator NuNN. As our next witness, I would like to call Ambas-
sador Rolf Ekeus.

I am pleased this morning, on behalf of our entire Subcommittee
and the Senate, to welcome Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, Executive
Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission established
by the Security Council for the disposal of Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction.

Ambassador Ekeus has had a long and distinguished diplomatic
career which has included postings as First Secretary and Counsel

of the Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations, and Al-
ternate Representative of Sweden to the United Nations Security
Council.

Ambassador Ekeus has also been very active in arms control and
nonproliferation issues, having served as Ambassador and Perma-
nent Representative of Sweden to the Conference on Disarmament,
Chairman of the Committee on Chemical Weapons in 1984 and
1987, and Sweden's Chief Delegate to the biological weapons con-
vention in 1986, and the nuclear nonproliferation treaty in 1985.

In 1991, Ambassador Ekeus was named as the Executive Chair-
man of the United Nations Special Commission. The commission
was established after the Persian Gulf War to investigate and dis-
pose of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

To date, the Special Commission has issued 18 substantive re-
ports to the Security Council which have detailed Iraq's efforts to
develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

Ambassador Ekeus is here today to share with the Subcommittee
some of the Special Committee's recent findings as to the situation
in Iraq.

Ambassador Ekeus, we are honored to have you here today. We
are not swearing you in today. We have special exceptions for for-
eign and international officials.

We very much appreciate you taking your time to be with us
today and share your thoughts, and then we will certainly have
questions for you. So the floor is yours for whatever you would like
to say.

As you know from our conversations, and conversations with our
staff, this Subcommittee is really looking at the broad threat of
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological,
as well as nuclear, and the delivery means in terms of third coun-
tries, and also in terms of terrorist groups and organized crime.

We have been looking into this subject for some time and your
comments this morning will be of tremendous help to us. We appre-
ciate your being here.

TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR ROLF EKEUS, EXECUTIVE
CHAIRMAN, UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION

Ambassador Ekeus. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

It is an honor for me to be here. I will make my presentation fo-
cusing, obviously, upon the Iraqi issue and maybe draw some gen-
eral conclusions from that.

First of all, after the Gulf War the Special Commission was set
up to deal with weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, which Iraq
could retain.

We were to address, together with the IAEA, the International
Atomic Energy Agency, four items. These were chemical, biological
and nuclear weapons and missiles with a range of about 150 kilo-
meters.

Our tasks were simplified into two main components. Task No.
1 was to identify and eliminate these weapons, production capabili-
ties, including research and development facilities and components.

Task No. 2 was to establish a control system in Iraq to certify
and ascertain that Iraq would not acquire any of these prohibited
items again.

Concerning the first task, we are close to completion, but we
have not completed it yet. And it is now 5 years since this work
was started after the Gulf War.

And one can ask, first of all, why is it not concluded? When I was
asked by the United Nations to take on that task, I studied the Se-
curity Council resolution, the cease-fire resolution which con-
stitutes the whole cease-fire arrangement afl:er the Gulf War, and
it stated, concerning the weapons, that if the Security Council con-
cludes that Iraq has fulfilled its obligations in relation to the weap-
ons we have just discussed, the prohibition against imports, the ex-
isting prohibitions against imports from Iraq — that is, in other
words, the oil embargo — shall no longer be in force.

I think the members of the Council, the governments backing the
Council, and indeed those who had the task to implement the reso-
lution, could only draw one conclusion, that this would be a quick
fix if you counted that Iraq with a three million barrel a day export
of oil before the war, according roughly to the OPEC arrangement,
would lose more than $15 billion per year in lost export income.

Over 5 years, it has not been possible for Iraq to export $75 bil-
lion in round terms. Of course, the oil is still in the ground so it
is money in the bank, but still, Iraq has not been able to make use
of $75 billion because of its efforts to retain their prohibited weap-
ons.

And then comes the question, can these weapons be of such enor-
mous value, after, also, the very thorough bombing which took
place during the Gulf War. And I guess this raises the significance
of the missing pieces enormously.

I can only venture in this open forum some guesses about the
policies of the leadership in Iraq. I believe that they put enormous
value on the option of keeping or acquiring nuclear, biological and
chemical weapons and the capability to deliver these. And I will,
shortly, describe what they were aiming at.

But we should recall that in January 1991, just days before the
land war broke out in the gulf, Iraq had a biological weapons pro-
gram which had produced a large amount of biological warfare
agents. They had filled them in missile warheads. The warheads
had been moved out to the active missile force. So it was fully de-
ployed for use.

There were 25 such warheads filled with anthrax, botulinum,
and something called aflatoxin.

They had a number of biological bombs. That is 150 to 200 bombs
which were brought out to two of the air bases. So they were also
deployed and completely alert.

Iraq had similar arrangements in the chemical weapons field. It
had 50 missile warheads filled with chemical agents. And it had,
as we now know, underway a crash program to produce one nu-
clear device.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Ambassador, could I ask you one question
there? I don't want to interrupt you often.

But do you have any evidence, (1) that they attempted to use
those biological or chemical warheads? And (2) if not, do you have
any personal opinion, conjecture or ideas as to why they did not
use that chemical and biological capability?

Ambassador Ekeus. Well, it is clear that when the biological pro-
gram was conceptualized, (it started very early, 1974 as a matter
of fact, but it was revitalized mid- 1985 more aggressively), the di-
rection given, according to documents we have found in Iraq, docu-
ments signed by the now deceased Hussein Kamel, who was Min-
ister of Industry and also for some time Minister of Defense after
the war, was that these weapons should constitute a thunderbolt
and be used in a surprise attack. That was the overall instruction
for the team that started the production of these weapons.

Iraq also later provided us with another document about the use
of the biological and chemical weapons. This document gave au-
thority, launching authority, to the local commanders in the case
of an attack on Baghdad with weapons of mass destruction.

I have no reason to doubt that statement, but I would underline
that that is probably not the only scenario for application of such
weapons.

Then to the more specific question, Iraq had this capability, but
what happened was, as we all know, a very aggressive and success-
ful air campaign. This focused upon — as I understand it, the deci-
sion-making and control communications and order systems. This,
I believe, tended to confuse the decision-making process with re-
gard to application of these weapons.

It was clear that tactically these weapons would have been prac-
tically useless against the coalition, considering its protective sys-
tems, which were well-known and well-applied. Also from the Euro-
pean theater we know about these defensive measures quite well,
and Iraq must have been aware of that.

However, I have had conversation with the Deputy Prime Min-
ister of Iraq, Tariq Aziz, in which he made references to his meet-
ing with Secretary of State James Baker in Geneva just before the
outbreak of the war. He, Tariq Aziz, says that Baker told him to
the effect that if such weapons were applied — there would be a
very strong reaction from the United States.

Tariq Aziz did not imply that Baker mentioned what type of re-
action. But he told me that the Iraqi side took it for granted that
it meant the use of maybe nuclear weapons against Baghdad, or
something like that. And that threat was decisive for them not to
use the weapons.

But this is the story he, Aziz, tells. I think one should be very
careful about bu3dng it. I don't say that he must be wrong, but I
believe there are strong reasons that this may be an explanation
he offers of why Iraq lost the war in Kuwait. This is the story
which they gladly tell everyone who talks to them. So I think one
should be cautious at least about buying that story. I think still it
is an open question. I'm sorry. It was a long answer to a very short
question.

Senator Nunn. Thank you.

Ambassador Ekeus. So what we had to deal with was a consider-
able capability in January 1991. Since then we have cleaned up
most of it. I will just give a short description of what we have not
cleared up.

But the concern is the same; the value in Iraqi eyes of this option
appears to be high. I guess that the idea is that these weapons give
you certain political clout. They can give you the possibility not

necessarily to use them, but through their very existence to intimi-
date in various respects states in the region, including through
veiled threats.

But that is a speculation on my part. We have to understand
that the Iraqi Government does not consider the Gulf War was a
war with an ending, the struggle is still going on. It was a battle
of Kuwait, not a war of Kuwait.

Concerning the commission's first task, what now remains prob-
lematic to us, is that Iraq still may keep some biological warheads,
missile warheads with biological agents or empty warheads exist-
ing together with biological warfare agents capable to be filled into
these warheads.

Iraq explains that these warheads, which were produced before
the war and filled in December-January of 1990-1991, were de-
stroyed unilaterally and secretly by Iraq in July 1991 to prevent
our inspectors from finding them.

We have asked for proof. We have been shown various pits in the
sand where such destruction had taken place, but it has not been
possible for our weapons specialists to put together and get a co-
herent counting of these warheads, or to confirm whether they had
been biological warheads or not.

We have not seen any written instruction from the leadership
about orders to destroy these weapons. Even less, we haven't seen
any report from the field ordering the destruction from the leader-
ship.

We are talking about strategically important weapons. And all
our experience is that these decisions are registered and the imple-
mentation of these decisions are even more carefully recorded, nor-
mally there are three or four signatures on one missile destruction
report, for instance. These are things which are normally carefully
done. However, concerning the alleged destruction of biological
weapons, we haven't seen any paperwork supporting it, as we have
not seen any physical evidence. We are not satisfied. We have had
some interviews with individuals, but the answers have been vague
and contradictory. So we must draw the conclusion that we have
not accounted for these weapons which we know were produced.

We have a similar situation with regard to prohibited missiles of
the Russian SCUD type. The Soviet SCUD missile was the back-
bone of the system. We have accounted for we feel something like
818 SCUDs, which made us satisfied because that was almost ex-
actly the number the Soviet Union delivered to Iraq over the years.

Some were used in the Iran war, of course, some were used in
the Gulf War, and many of them were destroyed by the Special
Commission after the war.

But it now appears from recent findings that Iraq managed to in-
digenously produce SCUD-t)rpe engines. Iraq had the capability to
produce airframes. Iraq can also produce the missile warheads. We
are talking about SCUD-type missiles, the modification of which
became Iraq's so-called Al Hussein, with increased range from 300,
to maybe even 600 kilometers, as we all know.

There are some bottlenecks, in Iraq's capabilities. Iraq has not
been able to produce guidance and control systems. But we under-
stand that Iraq has been using the spare part kits from the Soviet
deliveries to put into those homemade type of missiles.

The other bottleneck is rocket fuel. But Iraq has been vigorous
in trying to import it, as you know. They have also been trying to
indigenously produce some. But we are not totally sure.

We know that they successfully produced some homemade mis-
siles. They flight-tested some. The flight-tested missiles, we, to-
gether with the U.S. Government and others who have supported
us in counting — thought were Soviet, so we took it off of the Soviet
accounting inventory.

Now it may be that some flight tested missiles were homemade,
and thus there may be some former Soviet delivered missiles still
unaccounted for.

In that respect, we are concerned that at least six such missiles,
maybe up to 15 or 16 are still not accounted for. And if they now
have a missile that has a range of 600 kilometers and biological
warheads, we have a problem. And that's what we are concerned
about.

In the chemical area we have a similar problem.

Senator NUNN. So if you look at the missiles that you have evi-
dence were produced, and do not have evidence were destroyed;
and if you look at the biological weapons that you know were pro-
duced; and also, chemical, that you have not been able to verify de-
struction; the combination means that Iraq still may have the ca-
pacity, even today, to be able to fire SCUD missiles with chemical
or biological warheads?

Ambassador Ekeus. Yes, that is our concern. Obviously, Iraq is
now under tight control, but I think the capability is probably a
passive capability. But it can be done we fear, or rather we cannot
give reasonable assurances to the Security Council that we have
accounted for all weapons in that respect. So this is our problem
today.

I should mention, as we are talking about proliferation that these
capabilities, on which we have good knowledge about now, were
very much based upon foreign supplies to Iraq.

The biological warfare agents could only be produced with the
help of imported material like, first of all, fermenters and spray
dryers. Some homemade fermenters have been produced and can
be produced in their industry, but the quality is slightly doubtful.

The same goes with the chemical weapons production lines, both
with regard to key precursors for chemical weapons agents, and
with regard to equipment like chemical reactors, heat exchangers
and such equipment. They have been imported to a considerable
degree.

That means that we have had to keep a close look out on present
activities. In early November the Jordanian Government stopped a
large shipment which turned out to be guidance and control sys-
tems. They were stopped the day before they were to enter into
Iraq. This was done through collaboration between us and the Jor-
danian Government. And this was, obviously, a great success for
our working system.

Iraq denied that this material was for them, but our inspectors
carried out a preliminary investigation which made it clear that in-
deed the material was procured by Iraqi, not necessarily by high
officials but by Iraqi missile production establishments.

During this investigation, some of the junior Iraqi staff leaked,
under the pressure guess of interrogation, that another shipment
of such guidance and control system had entered Iraq earlier dur-
ing 1995, and that through a decision in October 1995, these sys-
tems had been thrown into the Tigris River. In late December our
inspectors, together with the Iraqis, managed to fish out from the
river most of the components from that shipment.

The guidance and control equipment, according to preliminary
analysis, is technically advanced, coming from strategic range
intercontinental missiles.

The downside fi-om the Iraqi point of view is that all these sys-
tems appear to be too advanced to be usable in the designs Iraq
is working on for the time being. So I think it was a prudent deci-
sion to throw them away.

But it demonstrates that there are super-quality items which are
capable of being bought on the market and could end up in Iraq.
It also demonstrates that Iraq has the financial clout and the capa-
bility to make such purchases.

We have also found out that Iraq has imported, or tried to im-
port, advanced technical material usable for the production both of
nuclear weapons and/or for missiles.

These exports to Iraq have been detected and afterwards blocked,
and the same goes for the chemical area. It should also be noted
that Iraq has had considerable financial resources available for
these imports.

To block and to prevent Iraq from carrying out this, we have put
in place, by fulfilling our second task, a monitoring system in Iraq,
with whiich we are satisfied. We don't say that it is the ultimate,
but it is a good system which is based upon inspections by inter-
national experts, scientists, biologists, chemists, nuclear physicists
and missile specialist stationed in Baghdad.

We have built inside an old hotel in Baghdad a monitoring cen-
ter, which we try technically to protect as much as possible.

There is also this Commission team working on inspecting the
various facilities in Iraq. We have several hundred sites under
monitoring. We have put cameras in these facilities. These cameras
are state-of-the-art. They send real-time imagery continuously to
the Baghdad monitoring center so that we can follow what goes on
inside the facilities. Through that system we have managed to
catch Iraq in the act, using machines to produce components for
missiles. We have blocked this production and also destroyed the
machines as a consequence.

The monitoring system has shown to be a solid and effective one.

Thanks to the U.S. Government, we have at our disposal a U-
2 stationed in Saudi Arabia which is running missions over Iraq all
the time, using alternately a high resolution camera and a sweep
camera. This operation is essential to our work.

The German Government has provided us with a large number
of helicopters which are based in Baghdad. These are run by the
monitoring center. The helicopters serves as a platform both for
moving our teams very quickly out to sites for no-notice or surprise
inspections and for close-range photography.

We also use a large number of sensors, chemical sensors and
other state-of-the-art sensors, several of them provided to us by the
U.S. Defense Department.

These systems taken together — not each one of the components
is a marvel — make up, I think, quite a solid program.

There is one piece missing, and that is an export-import control
system, which the Commission has developed together with the
IAEA and which is now in front of the Security Council. When im-
plemented, it will make it obligatory for all member states of the
United Nations to notify the Special Commission and the IAEA of
all dual-capable exports to Iraq.

We have listed items which it is necessary to report upon. They
are close to the estabUshed list, like the one the missile technology
control regime has, a list which we have been using. But we have
added Iraq-specific items to that list.

The same goes with the chemical list, which was based upon the
Chemical Weapons Convention's alert list.

In addition, we have listed equipment, characteristic of the case
of Iraq, and some chemicals.

If the mechanism is adopted and approved by the U.N. Security
Council, it will be operative soon. This will give us a solid possibil-
ity to keep track of what is going on in Iraq.

Our method to support the mechanism is to tag all sensitive
items, machines, machine tools and also weapons. Thus we tag all
their FROG missiles to see to it that they are not modified or used.

We are now in the process of starting to tag Iraq's surface-to-air
missiles. We have, to our dismay, detected that Iraq has been
working on redesigning Sam-2s (surface-to-air missiles), from their
purported purpose for the air defense system into surface-to-surface
mode, or use pieces of them to build a two-stage missile system,
which could have a longer range capability.

So this tagging will help us to detect if some new items are com-
ing up. If you see a machine which is untagged and not reported,
we obviously have reason for great concern.

If the export-import system is put into the context of the internal
monitoring, we will be in a position where it will be practically im-
possible for Iraq to revitafize and reestablish its weapons produc-
tion system.

And finally, Mr. Chairman, I would only underline that in this
work we have had strong support from the Department of State,
from the Pentagon, with techiiology, personnel, and very generous
and very effective support and good cooperation.

Thank you.

Senator Nunn. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. That is
very interesting and very informative testimony.

I understand that in the last 10 days your inspectors have had
five stand-offs with Iraqi authorities over access to various sites.

Can you bring us up to date on this, the nature of the sites and
how you have been able to resolve that, and how serious an impedi-
ment this is to your being able to carry out your job?

Ambassador Ekeus. We have, as I indicated, serious concern
about the remnants of the missile program in Iraq, because if they
have that, they can deliver biological and chemical warfare agents.

And on the basis of careful analysis over some long time, we
identified a program Iraq has had to protect and hide these mis-
siles, missile components and mobile missile launchers which may
remain in Iraq after the war.

So we have put together, as we sometimes do, a specialized team.
For this type of inspection, we don't use the residential monitoring
team, which is more focused on existing production facilities in
Iraq, but an international inspection team to go into Iraq.

That team went into and targeted the Presidential Security
Guard, the Republican Guard, and other security-related organiza-
tions in Iraq. Because of the information given to us from various
sources, we know something about the efforts to hide missiles, and
these are linked to these institutions and organizations.

Therefore we tasked our team to go to the sensitive headquarters
and other installations of the Presidential Security Guard and the
Republican Guard.

Our teams were blocked at the entrance of the first such site for
more than 12 hours. We tried to cover the site, of course, with the
help of our vehicles, and cover the vicinity of the site, which was
a large one, also using helicopter support to detect if anjdhing
would move out from the back of the site.

The modus operandi from Iraq is to keep the missiles and
launchers, as we understand it, on trucks where they can move
them with 3 minutes notice, and at least on highways, travel at a
speed of 60 kilometers an hour.

So time is important. A few minutes means that we may lose it.
And I see David Kay is sitting behind me. He has experience from
that time when Iraq moved calutrons in the same fashion, out of
the back of a facility when he blocked the front door.

Our helicopter was forced to halt its mission because its fuel was
depleted. We are concerned that during that period things moved
out. However, we continued our inspections of a series of such fa-
cilities. The team was blocked repeatedly.

We started off with an inspection which was more focused on
documents in a building, which turned out to be, half of it at least,
the Ministry of Irrigation.

Iraq used the argument that the sovereignty of the State of Iraq
was under siege by our request to go into that building. So there
Iraq blocked us for 18 hours, which made the inspection difficult.

We complained to the Security Council, and after some hesitation
the Council coughed up a letter where it stated that the Iraqi ac-
tion at the two first sites were in violation of Iraq's obligation to
give immediate, unconditional, unrestricted access, which is in the
Security Council resolution.

Iraq, in spite of this reaction, continued to block a series of in-
spection activities directed against the Special Forces and Repub-
lican Guard.

In this we saw a pattern of refusal. The Security Council yester-
day adopted a statement where it severely criticized Iraq for its
violation of its obligation.

However, the Commission will continue its search, and we hope
now that Iraq will follow its obligations set out in the Security
Council's resolutions.

Senator NUNN. Does your Commission have the tools it needs to
do the job in terms of manpower, money, machines, and tech-
nology? Do you have enough tools to really do the job?

Ambassador Ekeus. At times we feel that we are doing very well.
We have, I think, access to some of the world's best and most expe-
rienced weapons specialists in support of us. Governments provide
them free of charge. We pay certain per diems and so on.

We have good quality technology given to us. Our problem is the
cash. The United States has, or the Congress, has authorized the
United States to provide the United Nations the sum of $200 mil-
lion overall for the implementation of Security Council Resolution
687.

But this money we have to recall is Iraqi frozen assets. The Secu-
rity Council has stated that no more than $200 million could be
given from any given holding of frozen assets.

From this $200 million, the Commission has received something
like $65 million. The rest goes to the Compensation Commission for
the Victims of the War.

This money has now run out, so we have fundamentally no
money at all. We have some cash reserves up until the mid-sum-
mer. We calculate our costs in cash terms at $2 million a month,
which I think is a very cheap operation. But thanks to the fact that
we get so much "in kind" support, it is possible to keep the num-
bers so low.

I have become a fund raiser, so now I have to travel to capitals
and ask for cash. And I was in the Gulf States late last year. I vis-
ited all the capitals and received some promises from the Gulf Co-
operation Council, which has decided in principle to give us finan-
cial backing.

However, the numbers could be limited. They will not give us full
backing. We have indeed a considerable concern that the GCC
states will not cover our cash needs in full.

While they can afford it, they say that a limitation of contribu-
tions could be a matter of principle. As some of the GCC member
states maintain that the Commission's tasks and that its financing
are not of regional but indeed of a global concern.

The Commission's cash needs amount to $25 to $30 million per
year. So we have a great concern indeed with regard to our financ-
ing, because shortcomings in this respect would force us to close
down our operations very quickly.

Senator Nunn. You mentioned that Iraq was working to produce
a nuclear device before the Gulf War.

Based on your examination since you have been in your present
job, how close, in your judgment, did they come to having a nuclear
device?

Ambassador Ekeus. Well, the beauty of this device was that Iraq
intended to use existing nuclear material in the country which was
under safeguards, and some of which was — we have our nuclear ex-
perts here so I should defer to them really, but fundamentally Iraq
had enough material for one device.

The problem was technical. Of course, first of all, they didn't
want to have a bomb, because they knew a bomb on an airplane
would be shot down. It was only one device we are talking about.

They had very httle fissionable material; enough for one device in-
side the country for the crash program.

So Iraq had to have one missile, and the missile organization
was tasked to build a 1,250 millimeter diameter missile. The war-
head weight had to be something like 890, 900 kilograms. So it was
important to boost and give enough shoulders, and so to say, power
to that missile to deliver a nuclear device.

At the same time, the persons who made the warhead, the nu-
clear warhead, had to shrink it from its very heavy type of war-
head — we are talking about 2,000 kilos or something — down to 900
kilo or 800 kilos.

So they had to work from two ends to meet, boost up the missile
and shrink down the warhead to get a usable device to deliver to
one of their enemies in the region, or to use for intimidation and
threat.

Iraq had been quite successful, according to what our nuclear
specialists say, in shaping the warhead, and they were better in
their designs than expected.

They were working on an implosion design. They were, according
to the documents we have found, and those the IAEA has picked
up, they were on the right track, if I may say so.

However, I don't want to say that they were absolutely right in
everything they were doing, but technically the programming was
going in a sound direction to get the right type of weapon.

So then it is a question of timing. The instruction was that this
device should be ready by April 1991. They started the crash pro-
gram in August 1990.

The decision from Hussein Kamel was that it should be ready by
April 1991. When we ask the Iraqi specialists about that, an inter-
nal quarrel is breaking out about whether this was feasible. Some
say the target was ridiculously short. Others insist that they would
have been able to succeed, at least within the time frame of 1991,
for this one device. But that is still an open question.

Senator Nunn. One of the questions in the alternative. Senator
Levin, as you no doubt recall, during the Gulf War coalition forces
bombed a suspected weapons site which the Iraqis later claimed
was a baby formula factory.

Criticism has been leveled against the coalition forces for carry-
ing out that bombing based on the Iraqi's allegation of what it was.

And also, I think your Commission has been criticized by some
for allegedly failing to inspect the site.

Did you inspect the site, and did you come to any conclusions
about the site and what it was really being used for?

Ambassador Ekeus. We have quite good knowledge now of that
site. It was indeed a facility which was delivered to Iraq in the
early 1980's, and it was imported from France.

It never worked properly during that time. We now know that
some of Iraq's biological weapons specialists were loaned to that fa-
cility to work on it. Officially it was a baby milk factory. It never
succeeded in producing anything financially viable because the raw
material for the production cost more than the product they pro-
duced from it. So it was financially a negative venture. When our
inspectors detect such financially negative ventures, we became
highly suspicious.

100

For example, the big and now recognized biological warfare pro-
duction facility at Al Hakam was a facility which, according to
Iraqi officials, was used to produce cattle feed from single-cell pro-
tein. And there the raw material and the input material cost some-
thing like 4 or 5 times the value of the output products. When we
inspected that facility our inspectors became concerned that this
cattle feed facility was something else.

The baby milk factory financial record was not as absurd, but it
was still in the negative. So first of all we were concerned about
that.

When I arrived in May 1991, I passed by that facility. I already
knew then about the controversy, so I took a hasty look at it.

It was then totally and very thoroughly bombed. We later on in-
vestigated this and carried out a full inspection. It never contained
a fermenter, which is the backbone in biological warfare agent pro-
duction.

Senator NUNN. It did not.

Ambassador Ekeus. It did not. It contained three spray dryers,
two very powerful spray dryers, which are an essential component
also for weapons, comes next, so to say, in the food chain of produc-
ing a warfare agent.

Senator Nunn. Do those dryers have any use whatsoever in a
milk formula factory.

Ambassador Ekeus. We had no proof that they had been used for
weapons production. They were maybe used in the very unsuccess-
ful production of baby milk. But as I said, the output was very lim-
ited.

To date, we have carried out five inspections of that facility.
First, a detailed one which made us suspicious. I mentioned the
reason why.

Second, we decided to put it under our systematic monitoring. So
the second inspection was a so-called baseline inspection where
specialists study the characteristics and capability of the facility
and make out protocols how it should be inspected in the future.

The third was a tagging mission, during which our inspectors
tagged all sensitive equipment, including the spray dryers, obvi-
ously, and other equipment which could be used in biological weap-
ons production.

Then we also have our monitoring inspections of the factory,
which is on the control list and it will continue to be controlled.

So we don't say it is a weapons production facility, but certain
capabilities exist there, and therefore you must keep an eye on it.

Senator NuNN. Senator Levin.

Senator Levin. First, Ambassador, let me thank you for the great
work that you and the Commission have been doing. It is critically
important work and you don't get enough credit for it.

Are you able to say with certainty whether or not Iraq now has
in its possession warheads with biological or chemical material in
it?

Ambassador Ekeus. We know that Iraq produced large amounts
of biological agents. At least one, the anthrax-t3q)e, according to the
biologists, has a considerable shelf life. It can be potent many,
many years, reasonably stored, not only with expensive or fancy

101

storage. But with reasonable storage, it can be kept potent many
years.

Iraq has told us it destroyed that agent secretly in 1991. I draw
a comparison with the large amount of chemical agents which have
been produced which were handed over to us and destroyed under
international control. But Iraq for some reason destroyed this bio-
logical agent secretly, if they destroyed it at all.

But we have no proof, we have no documentary evidence of de-
struction, and we have not even a credible witness. We have, of
course, people who have been brought to us saying, "I was involved
in destruction." But their answers are very, very vague and con-
tradictory.

So we don't say they retained biological warfare agents, but we
know Iraq acquired agents and we don't know that these weapons
have in any credible way been eliminated. Our conclusion is that
we have to be concerned and insist on clarifying the issue.

Senator Levin. Is that another way of saying that you cannot
state with confidence that they do not have warheads with chemi-
cal and biological agents?

Ambassador Ekeus. Precisely so.

Senator Levin. Now, as to the missiles to deliver such warheads,
you have tried to count those missiles. You said there were 800
plus.

Were the 25 deployed missiles with biological warheads and the
50 deployed missiles with chemical warheads part of the 800?

Ambassador Ekeus. We thought so. I mean, what happened, Iraq
retained some couple of hundred missiles when the war was over.
They had used a large amount, but they had something like that —
less— below 200, I think.

But then again, unfortunately, Iraq — now we are talking about
not the warhead but the missile, the engine — and it destroyed,
again secretly some, and handed over some to us. Some were hand-
ed over in the summer of 1991 and some in March 1992. These
missiles were destroyed under our control.

But the fact that Iraq had secretly destroyed some missiles, cre-
ated these dark numbers which have given us a problem in count-
ing.

We have had good support, however, of a document which we
picked up, which was a sort of inventory of all the Russian-deliv-
ered SCUDs. This document has helped us in counting some
SCUDs and some modified SCUDs, Al Hussein missiles.

That document, which has been inspected forensically by a cou-
ple of international agencies to ensure it is genuine, has helped us
to account for 818 which were imported from the Soviet Union at
that time. The Russian Federation has confirmed the correctness of
that.

The problem is, however, that Iraq then appears to have pro-
duced some SCUD-type homemade missiles, and when we counted,
we also counted what had been observed through national technical
means of flight tests, internal flight tests in Iraq.

And the problem is now that what I thought maybe was a Soviet
made missile I saw flying and ticked it off of the inventory, may
have been a homemade one. And Iraq has also admitted that it has

102

successfully tested homemade missiles, even if they say they kept
the numbers very low.

Senator Levin. My question though has to do with the 25 de-
ployed missiles that you said had biological warheads and the 50
deployed missiles that had chemical warheads.

Are they part of that inventory or homemade? Do we know?

Ambassador Ekeus. How I understand the situation, in Decem-
ber 1990/January 1991, was that in December Iraq filled 50 war-
heads with chemical warfare agents at the Muthana site, and they
filled 25 warheads with biological warfare agents. These warheads
were then brought to the missile force with its missiles.

Senator Levin. Were the warheads placed on the missiles?

Ambassador Ekeus. They can take them off and put them on
again. I mean, that is they keep the warheads separate and they
put them together.

Senator Levin. Do we know whether they ever were assembled
at the missile site?

Ambassador Ekeus. No. Unless there is some recent information
I have not read, don't know. We only know that that was what Iraq
told us. They say they brought the warheads to their missile force.
So we don't know to which degree they were put together.

Senator Levin. So in terms of missiles, since we don't know how
many homemade missiles there were, it is still possible that Iraq
did not destroy all of the missiles that it had at the end of that
war; is that correct?

Ambassador Ekeus. That's our concern, yes, exactly. They pro-
duced something like 80 engines. They say they discarded 53 be-
cause of low quality, and kept some of these engines. And we don't
know if there are other components.

Senator Levin. Which leads into the conclusion that despite your
great efforts, we are yet not confident that they do not have either
the warheads or the missiles currently in their possession.

Ambassador Ekeus. We are not confident, and that's why we car-
ried out this inspection that the Chairman referred to just earlier.

Senator Levin. You said that part of the 818, or part of the in-
ventory, had to do with the missiles which were used in the Iran
war.

How do we now how many missiles were used in the war be-
tween Iraq and Iran?

Ambassador Ekeus. Well, they were used in two modes during
the war against Iran. The early deliveries, which came in the early
1980's, were used in what we call a tactical mode. They were
throwing away missiles, I must say, because at one million dollars
apiece, roughly, it was no cheap thing. And it is very difficult, I
have been told through national technical means to decide exactly
what is a SCUD and what is a FROG. If it is used in the short
trajectory, one can sometime read the plume because there is much
more fuel burning with a SCUD. When it hits, it creates a bigger
plume.

But we have used what we call the SCUD-file, which indicates
how Iraq released from its inventory missiles for use and thus
consumed in war.

However, during the later stage of the Iran/Iraq war it became
relatively easy to count the missiles used. Iraq then modified the

103

SCUDs into Al Hussein missiles, making it possible to attack Tehe-
ran in the so-called war of the cities.

We have solid numbers with regard to the amount of missiles
used against Iran. So that is easy.

The more insecure part is, obviously, the early stages. But we are
quite confident in that the data is reasonably sound concerning the
earlier use of missiles.

Senator NUNN. Your conversations with Aziz that you told us to
be cautious about, I'd like to just ask a question about it. We will
be cautious about it.

Allegedly, he says Baker told him that if weapons of mass de-
struction were used, there would be a strong reaction. This was be-
fore the war, this alleged conversation.

Ambassador Ekeus. Yes.

Senator Levin. So what was your understanding of what Baker
would have been referring to since the war hadn't started yet? Was
he talking about used anywhere against any enemy? Or used when
and used where? What was he trying to impart to you?

Ambassador Ekeus. Well, I read that part also in Baker's mem-
oirs. But it is not interesting what he thinks of Iraq's decisions. It
is more interesting what Iraq believes he was saying.

And what they told me — again, I don't say they, the Iraq's, be-
lieved it — but they told me that they felt it was clear that he,
Baker, warned them against the use of chemical weapons.

Senator Levin. Where and when?

Ambassador Ekeus. Well, there were two possibilities. Either
against the coalition force which was assembled, and even if the
war had started they knew very well what was coming. Or maybe
more seriously, against civilians in cities, in say Israel or Saudi
Arabia, which were both subject to attacks by missiles, that is con-
ventionally armed missiles.

I guess the reference was to, first of all, chemical weapons, which
it was well known that Iraq had. The biological weapons were, of
course, in dispute to some degree. Now we know they also had
these weapons in their arsenal.

Senator Levin. My last question has to do with the tagging of
the missiles that you have referred to.

Do we have monitors there, ongoing monitoring of those missiles
to see that they are being used for defensive purpose, which appar-
ently they are allowed under the agreement, and not being used to
get ready for offensive use?

Ambassador Ekeus. The Security Council decided in the cease-
fire provisions that Iraq should be allowed to keep shorter range
missiles.

Senator Levin. Do we have monitoring of that, regular monitor-
ing?

Ambassador Ekeus. We are monitoring that very, very carefully,
because it creates a serious problem for us, the generosity, if I may
say so, of the Security Council, for two reasons. One is that they
then can keep a large stock of missiles with a range of say 100 to
120 kilometers. The FROG missile, I guess, has a shghtly shorter
range.

We have tagged each one of Iraq's FROGs. These missiles are
kept at military installations. We have arranged our control so that

104

we call up the missiles, tag them, and then we regularly, on a ran-
dom basis, inspect them, and count them against our inventory to
see that none have been consumed through cannibalization or re-
verse engineering, or disappearing, so to say, in the framework of
such activities.

The same, because of the most recent disclosures, will be applied
to the surface-to-air missiles. So it is sensitive for us to enter air
defense installations. It is not our job to inspect Iraqis air defense.

One must admit that Iraq has a legitimate right to take care of
its air defense. So there we are working on methods to bring out
these surface-to-air missiles, from their deployment, tag them out-
side air defense installations, and then allow them to be taken back
to their operational positions.

Senator Levin. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NuNN. Thank you, Senator Levin.

Mr. Ambassador, we appreciate very much you being here. You
have been a tremendous help to us. I know you are a very busy
man. We appreciate the testimony and the information, and most
of all, the job you and your team are doing, and I hope you will
convey on behalf of this Subcommittee to your whole team how
much we appreciate the effort they are making on behalf of the
United Nations and on behalf of stability.

Ambassador Ekeus. Thank you very much.

Senator NuNN. Our next two witnesses, and final witnesses of
the day, are Gary Milhollin and David Kay.

Mr. Milhollin is a well-known specialist in the export control
field. He is editor of the Risk Report, which is a bi-monthly publica-
tion that describes how proliferating nations are legally and ille-
gally obtaining the materials that they need to develop their weap-
ons program.

Mr. Milhollin's publication is focused on China, Iran, India, and
Pakistan. Mr. Milhollin will give us an overview of the countries
that are developing nuclear weapons programs and how they are
obtaining materials for the program.

Dr. Kay is well-versed in the field of nuclear technology and pro-
liferation. For 8 years Dr. Kay was head of the evaluation section
of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

He has also served as Secretary General of the Uranium Insti-
tute in London, which provides research services on the supply, de-
mand and trade of uranium and nuclear fuel.

Dr. Kay is perhaps best known for his service as the deputy lead-
er of the Iraqi Action Team of the IAEA, and I believe that was
from 1991 and 1992.

He was chief inspector for three inspections to determine Iraqi
nuclear weapons production capability following the end of the Per-
sian Gulf War.

Dr. Kay led teams that found and identified the scope and the
extent of the Iraqi uranium enriched activities, located the major
Iraqi center for assembly of nuclear weapons, and seized large
amounts of documents on the Iraqi nuclear program.

And Dr. Kay, I understand, will discuss the lessons he learned
from the Iraqi experience, and particularly the implications for
nonproliferation strategies.

105

We swear in the witnesses before our Subcommittee, if both of
you will stand and take the oath.

Do you swear the testimony you give before the Subcommittee
will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so
help you, God?

Dr. Kay. I do.

Mr. MiLHOLLIN. I do.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

Dr. Kay, I think you are going to lead off this morning. We ap-
preciate very much you both being here and sharing your time with
us, and we appreciate your patience this morning.

Also, we'll have your full statements as part of the record, both
of them without objection. To the extent that you can summarize,
we would appreciate it.

TESTIMONY OF DAVID A. KAY,i SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,

HICKS & ASSOCIATES

Dr. Kay. Thank you very much. It is an extensive statement and
I will only try to very briefly summarize its highlights.

With the end of the Cold War and the Soviet threat, a broad con-
sensus is emerging that U.S. foreign and defense policies and budg-
ets can now be premised on the absence of any threat to the United
States or its allies, and that such timely detection of any newly de-
veloping threat will allow us to devise defensive measures after the
threat emerges.

It is in this light that I think what the Subcommittee is doing
in exploring the case of Iraq is extremely important, because I
think the lesson of Iraq offers significant warning about the ability
to accurately anticipate future threats.

Both the International Atomic Energy Agency and national intel-
ligence authorities failed to identify a program as comprehensive
and extensive as the Iraqi one that Ainbassador Ekeus has de-
scribed.

Let me just, because I don't want to repeat Ambassador Ekeus,
draw very sharply for you what the Iraqis were doing.

The nuclear program involved $10 billion of expenditures over a
decade. It had over 15,000 people involved. There were more than
25 major sites of which only six were known at the time that
Desert Storm broke out.

Senator NuNN. We knew six out of 25.

Dr. Kay. Yes, six out of 25. The balance were discovered during
the course of inspections.

Senator Nunn. After the war.

Dr. Kay. After the war. This was a program that explored five
major routes for enriching uranium. It was a program that, as Am-
bassador Ekeus said, in fact had a crash program launched in Au-
gust of 1990 at the time of the invasion of Kuwait to produce a sin-
gle nuclear device by April of 1991.

I certainly have no doubt that in fact if the war had not inter-
vened, the Iraqis would have achieved a single nuclear device be-
fore the end of 1991. That should cause many of us some pause.

'The prepared statement of Dr. Kay appears on page 324.

106

In the biological area, the biological area was one largely un-
known at the time.

Senator NUNN. Could I interrupt just on that one point?

What would have been the likely delivery means for that weap-
on, had they had one in 1991? Was that going to be missile deliv-
ered, plane delivered, or a crude delivery system? How do you

Dr. Kay. They were tr3dng to get a missile delivery system, be-
cause they had great respect for the air defenses and the air oper-
ations of the United States.

But the fact is, even if they had not achieved that, the possession
of a single nuclear device, if it had to be truck delivered, in the
proximity of Kuwait, the borders of Saudi Arabia, would have had
considerable intimidation value — and remember, we wouldn't have
been sure that they only had one at that point.

Senator NuNN. Right.

Dr. Kay. If one had gone off, ask yourselves about what it would
have done to U.S. war aims, and to our allies. Warfare in the mod-
ern age is coalition warfare. How the Saudis would have reacted
to an Iraqi nuclear device remains one of the largest unanswered
questions of that period of time.

The biological area, the two sites that were attacked, turned out
to be two sites that were at the time of the war inactive.

Four other sites have now been discovered through the course of
inspection. These were unknown at the time the war started.

The combined estimate was in fact there was not any more than
a biological research program at the time of the war.

We now know that there were tens of thousands of liters of botu-
lism toxin, anthrax, and a much lesser amount of aflatoxin, as well
as research on at least four other toxins going on. This was an ex-
tensive program.

The chemical warfare program of Iraq was immense. I remember
the first time I saw the site that was used for chemical warfare,
a place called Muthana, larger than the District of Columbia, and
as far as you could see chemical weapons and chemical weapon
bunkers.

It is often forgotten, too, that the Iraqis have considerable oper-
ational experience in the chemical area. They used them against
their own population, the Kurds. They used them in Iran. In fact,
one of the ironies is that Iraq actually has more experience with
the tactical use in combat operation of chemical weapons than the
combined forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and this remains
true to this day.

The missile program was extensive, but I hope you take away
from Ambassador Ekeus' statement the nature of the surprise in
the recent revelation about that program. Up until 6 months ago,
it was generally thought by most specialists that we understood the
Iraqi ballistic missile program, that it was a SCUD-derived pro-
gram.

We now know two things that are terribly important. Before the
war they were already producing — I don't like the phrase because
it sounds too friendly — home-grown missiles of their own. That is,
engines and air frames that were not supplied by the Soviet Union.

The second thing we know is that as late as 4 months ago they
were successfully obtaining parts for a more advanced program.

107

and those parts came, as Ambassador Ekeus has testified, from
strategic missiles disassembled by the former Soviet Union. That
should cause us all a great deal of pause.

I guess in the short time I have for a statement, I would really
like to focus on a couple of things.

One, why did we fail before the war to appreciate that? Let me
here concentrate on the nuclear area, which I know best.

IAEA safeguards failed to detect the Iraqi program prior to the
war. The reason for this is that in fact those safeguards were not
focused upon the type of program that the Iraqis decided to pursue.
The assumption was that under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Trea-
ty, if a state was going to pursue a nuclear weapons program, it
would remain outside the treaty, like India and Pakistan, or that
if they were going to do it within the treaty, they would do it in
a totally clandestine manner separate from their declared peaceful
nuclear activities and the IAEA would have no attempt to detect
it.

In fact the Iraqis did something quite different. Their major nu-
clear weapons research program was conducted at exactly the same
site that was inspected twice a year by the International Atomic
Energy Agency. The safeguards simply missed it.

What had happened is that the technology had changed, the di-
version, deception and denial techniques that were used by the
Iraqis were far more advanced than anyone gave them credit for
in the 1980s, and they fooled and defeated international inspec-
tions.

That is a lesson that ought to shake our confidence and hope-
fully, imbue far greater work to improve a treaty that is as vital
to our national security, far more than we have in the past.

Senator NUNN. Would you say that is being done? Have we
learned those lessons? Are they being applied to IAEA inspections
now?

Where are we on the scale of having learned our lessons and suc-
cessfully implementing the results of those lessons?

Dr. Kay. Senator Nunn, I think you have put your finger on ex-
actly the right point.

Learning lessons and implementing them are a two-step process.
I think at the intellectual level a lot has been learned. The imple-
mentation, however, has been extremely flawed.

A major program called 93 plus 2, which was to improve safe-
guards so it could deal with an Iraqi-type of operation, has run into
major resistance from the Board of Governors of the International
Atomic Energy Agency. It is now being applied in a way that essen-
tially would not have detected the Iraqi program. And it is only
being applied in those states that agree to have the enhanced safe-
guards.

It should be no surprise that states that Director Deutch dis-
cussed this morning are states that are not open to that type of ad-
vanced inspection. It is the implementation and pressure to do that
that must continue.

And here I must say, we as a country deserve a considerable re-
sponsibility for the difficulties the agency is facing. First of all, the
International Atomic Energy Agency grew out of the Eisenhower
initiative of atoms for peace. It is an organization with a divided

108

mandate, the promotion of nuclear energy, and on the other side
the concern with safety and safeguards.

Many of the states that are members of the agency are concerned
with promotion and not at all that concerned or interested in safe-
guards.

For example, during my period in Vienna, members of the Board
of Governors — this is the governing body of the International Atom-
ic Energy Agency — included Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, India, Libya, and
Egypt. These are states that have less than a full commitment to
wanting to have effective safeguards.

It is probably little known in this body that during the 1980s,
and indeed in the case of North Korea up through the earlier
1990s, the IAEA was providing technical assistance to the "peace-
ful" nuclear programs — and I use peaceful in a very limited sense,
declared peaceful programs — of those same exact states.

In fact, in the case of Iraq, the same facilities and the same indi-
viduals that we discovered after the war had been involved in the
Iraqi nuclear weapons program were the recipients of technical as-
sistance before the Gulf War broke out. This is a divided mandate
that makes the implementation of effective inspections very, very
difficult.

I think there are some things on a more optimistic side, things
that have been accomplished after the war that in fact we should
recognize. I would particularly single out the role of UNSCOM led
by Ambassador Ekeus.

First of all, UNSCOM was a remarkably single focused organiza-
tion. Its responsibility was to find, destroy, render harmless or re-
move the weapons of mass destruction, and then monitor Iraq.

It had no role to promotion of a peaceful Iraqi biological, chemi-
cal or nuclear program after the war. This allowed it to be focused.

Second, it is a unique institution in the U.N. system. It is the
only time that the Security Council has created a subsidiary of the
Council. And the credit for this — and credit really is due and is not
always given — is owed to U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering and
Sir David Hanney, the British ambassador at the time, who both
insisted on this. It has made it very remarkable.

Ambassador Ekeus doesn't report to the Secretary General of the
U.N., he reports to the Council. And let me tell you in some very
practical ways how that made a difference in the first months after
the war.

UNSCOM installed the first cipher system ever used on a U.N.
door. Now, this seems piddling, particularly in a city like Washing-
ton where you get used to cipher locks. But it was a major break-
through at the U.N. You couldn't do that. That indicated you didn't
trust other U.N. staff members to go in certain rooms.

UNSCOM bought the first secure communications system. Am-
bassador Ekeus made the first request for national technical means
satellite imagery to be provided.

UNSCOM efforts for the first time resulted in agreement that
you could interrogate members of a country about their weapons
program. And I could go on and on, and some of them are very
small but terribly important in my view.

We took in the first hand-held GPS system. Why? We asked the
Iraqis to take us to a location and, to no one's great surprise, at

109

least not mine, they took us to another location. The ability to whip
out a GPS and say, so sorry, we are not where you think we are,
or where you say we are, we are here, made a difference. That had
been turned down previously by the IAEA because it would indi-
cate lack of confidence in the partners that you were dealing with
in a host state. So there are a number of things that were possible
because UNSCOM reported directly to the Security Council.

I would also like to single out, because here again I think there
has been remarkable leadership on the side of the United States
as well as Ambassador Ekeus and the people involved deserve cred-
it. The fusing of national technical means of U.S. intelligence with
international inspectors allowed us to find what we have found in
Iraq.

Most of my time essentially was spent in Iraq during the first
4 months after the Gulf War. This was a time in which they were
engaged in maximum efforts to keep us away from their nuclear
program, as well as chemical and biologicals.

If it had not been for national technical means, information pro-
vided by the United States and other countries to UNSCOM, there
would not have been any lapse in my team having located the
calutrons and the other programs, or the documents on the Iraqi
nuclear program, for that matter.

There were tremendous risks taken in providing that intelligence
information. It is a lesson that in fact I think this Committee, with
regard to nuclear terrorism and terrorism in general, has got to
think about how you deal with the issue.

Intelligence that cannot be shared is intelligence that will not be
used. And very often in these fields we are going to have to depend
on either other governments or international agencies to help the
U.S. in this pursuit of terrorism.

It is something that I feel very strongly about, although I realize
there are others who have negative feelings about the sharing of
intelligence in general. The visceral reaction against such sharing
after predominates.

I would in the last couple of minutes, like to highlight a few
things that I think really need legislative attention.

We have come out of a period of over 40 years in which we devel-
oped a well-developed methodology for understanding the Soviet
threat. We were lucky, quite frankly. We faced a large bureau-
cratic, risk-averting opponent.

The result was a national intelligence estimation procedure that
allowed the U.S. to cope with the Soviet threat and Soviet inten-
tions as they developed.

We often forget that in fact that process failed us at critical
times. It failed to anticipate the Soviet deployment of missiles and
nuclear weapons to Cuba. It failed to anticipate the Soviet invasion
of Czechoslovakia. It failed to anticipate the Soviet invasion of Af-
ghanistan. But on balance it worked.

I would argue that now we have lost our intelligence focus. We
do not have a validated threat. And yet we are still using the same
estimation process that stood us well in the Cold War.

As you turn to the issue of anticipating terrorism, or anticipating
whether countries will develop missiles, biological or chemical ca-
pabilities, to rely on the very rigorous and almost fossilized esti-

110

mation process that we have used for 40 years I beheve holds us
up to extreme hazards. And this would be on the top of my agenda.
I think it is a lesson that comes out of Iraq, but it is a lesson that
we are going to have to apply in other areas.

That is a very quick summary, Senator.

Senator NUNN. What would you do to change that? Did you have
a chance to look at the Brown-Rudman report and whether any of
this is covered in that report? Or have we got anything in writing
that would reflect your views as to what needs to be done to change
the intelligence operation?

Dr. Kay. The Brown-Rudman report is fundamentally a report of
moving around boxes on an organizational chart. I'm talking about
a more fundamental issue.

Now, I will say in that report you do find a call for changing the
NIC, the National Intelligence Council, into a national intelligence
estimation agency, or something to that effect which says, in fact,
you have got to broaden NIC so that it is capable of dealing with
threats other than weapons threats.

I actually think the problem is much deeper. It is an intellectual
process.

If you look at the development of ballistic missiles, take the case
of Iraq as an example, and ask if you had estimated their linear
development, as was done, you were very satisfied with the answer
when we first went into Iraq at the end of war. Don't worry, you
are only concerned with the 818 SCUD missiles that they bought
from the Soviet Union.

It did not anticipate that because of the availability of tech-
nology, technical expertise from other countries, access to illicit ma-
terials, that in fact they would be able to jump-start a home-grown
technology program. And that is genuinely the problem we face
today.

I am concerned, for example, although I spend most of my time
focusing on nuclear issues, that the leakage of relatively small
amounts of technology from the Russian biological weapons pro-
gram would allow states and groups to jump far ahead in the bio-
logical program far faster than we have ever anticipated. Similarly
if four kilograms of plutonium were to leak from Russian stockpiles
it would immediately become a serious threat.

So I, in fact, think the diffusion of the threat, the loss of the
threat basis, creates an intellectual vacuum in our national esti-
mation process, and we are too happy, we are too secure in the
process that stood us in good stead during the Cold War to break
that out-dated intellectual mold.

Senator Nunn. Thank you very much. Dr. Kay. I'll come back
with other questions.

Mr. Milhollin.

TESTIMONY OF GARY MILHOLLIN,i DIRECTOR, WISCONSIN
PROJECT ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL

Mr. Milhollin. Thank you. Senator.

Again I would like to say that I'm pleased to be here, and I com-
mend the Subcommittee for its interest in this subject.

iThe prepared statement of Mr. Milhollin appears on page 333.

Ill

Senator Nunn. Well, thank you for all your help over the years.
You have been a very valuable resource for all of these questions
for a long time. We appreciate you being here.

Mr. MiLHOLLlN. Thank you. Probably when it comes to North
Korea I will plow some ground that we have explored together be-
fore.

I'd like to begin — the Subcommittee has asked me to sort of give
a world tour of what the threat is.

I'd like to begin with the concept of the rogue nation. That is a
new term that is in vogue to describe the proliferation threat, and
it normally includes Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea.

I would just like to say that I think it ignores a lot of prolifera-
tion, and it is probably not a helpful term.

First of all, it ignores China, which I regard as possibly — well,
I won't say the greatest — but one of the greatest proliferation
threats we now see. As far as we know, it is the only country that
still targets U.S. cities with nuclear missiles.

It is a country that is still cgnducting nuclear tests to miniatur-
ize warheads so they will fit on ICBMs that are capable of reaching
the United States. And China is, as we all know, still proliferating
by helping other countries advance their programs.

I have attached to my testimony some material fi-om my publica-
tion called the Risk Report, which catalogs Chinese exports to the
Islamic world from 1980 to 1994. It is summarized on a chart
which I have attached.

And it shows that from 1980 to 1994 the Chinese exported nu-
clear technology to Algeria, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, and missile tech-
nology to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.

And since 1994, the end of that particular table, we know that
missile components and poison gas ingredients have gone to Iran
from China, and that missile components and nuclear components
have gone to Pakistan.

I would say the important thing about this data is that it shows
that China has not changed since 1980 in its behavior. Since 1980
it has been promising to clean up its act, but it really hasn't.

And one thing that concerns me is that over the years the United
States has not found a successful strategy for getting this behavior
changed. And I must say, I don't see one in the offing.

The magnets to Pakistan takes me to South Asia, where I will
just say that I think the situation there is growing worse. Pakistan
apparently is intending to boost its capability to enrich uranium
with these magnets.

India has recently made preparations to test. Both countries are
on the verge of deploying missiles which are nuclear capable. And
both of them are still shopping.

I have also attached to my testimony some pages that indicate
what the shopping lists of these countries are, what they are look-
ing for in the nuclear and missile areas.

This data comes fi'om a Pentagon study, and it comes fi^om a na-
tional trade database that contains tender offers by companies
looking for things.

And by looking at the status of a country's program, and by look-
ing at what it is trying the buy, you can pretty much figure out
what they are looking for.

112

So what we see is that there is still a lot of shopping going on,
and if we remember a little bit of history, we remember that these
countries — Pakistan, India — built their whole programs with im-
ports. That goes for missiles and nuclear capability. They imported
everything, essentially.

For example, India's intermediate stage missile has a first stage
that was derived from a U.S. space launcher, a second stage that
was derived from a Soviet surface to air missile, and a guidance
system that was built with the help of the German Space Agency.
Other than that, the missile is indigenous.

I would just like to sum this up by emphasizing that we do need
to worry about more than four rogue nations, and I'm afraid that
by restricting our attention to four rogues, with which we don't do
much trade anyway, it really makes it easier for us to allow exports
to everybody else.

I was shocked in 1995 when Commerce Secretary Brown gave a
trade promotion speech in India at the Indian Institute of Science
in Bangalore. That's one of the biggest, most sophisticated rocket
research institutes in India. It is developing rockets that are big
enough to deliver a warhead anywhere in the world.

Senator NUNN. What year was that?

Mr. MiLHOLLlN. That was in January of 1995. I don't know what
Mr. Brown had in mind selling them

Senator NuNN. This is Commerce Secretary Brown?

Mr. MiLHOLLlN. Yes. Ron Brown.

I think that gives the wrong message. It gives the message that
we only care about the four rogues we are not dealing with any-
way, and we don't really care about anybody else.

The second point I would like to make is about the nonprolifera-
tion treaty. It has just been renewed. That was hailed as a large
victory. But it has to be more than just a piece of paper. And for
it to be more than a piece of paper, somebody has to stand up and
complain when it is violated.

China signed it in 1992, but just appears to have broken it by
exporting the magnets, which have been discussed in the news-
papers, to Pakistan.

Article 3 of the treaty forbids the export of things like these
magnets to countries like Pakistan without inspection, which China
did not require.

We haven't heard a peep so far out of the U.S. Government about
it, not an official peep.

What bothers me is that this is the same reaction we had when
Iraq tried to smuggle nuclear weapon detonators out of the United
States before the Gulf War. We didn't make a peep about that ei-
ther.

Because at that time our strategy was constructive engagement
with Iraq. The argument that the State Department made was that
we needed to bring Iraq into the community of nations, and that
trade with Iraq would give us leverage.

We hear the same argument today about China. I think in the
case of Iraq we were lucky. If Saddam had not invaded Kuwait, we
would be facing a nuclear-armed Iraq today. Even by the most con-
servative estimates of its ability to produce nuclear weapons, it
would have them now.

113

So I think that we should defend the treaty and complain about
this export to Pakistan. I think we should impose sanctions on
China because of this export to Pakistan, and we certainly should
not reward Pakistan's behavior by announcing, as apparently we
have just today — I'm sorry, we didn't announce today, but appar-
ently we are getting ready to announce — that we are going to go
through with arms exports to Pakistan.

I'll just go on to Iran and Iraq briefly. I think Iraq has been cov-
ered thoroughly this morning.

I'd like to introduce this chart at this time. This is a graphic
showing where Iraq managed to buy most of its dual-use equip-
ment before the Gulf War.

The graphic shows that Germany contributed about 50 percent
of the sensitive technology that Iraq imported, with Switzerland,
Italy, and France close behind.

The Iraqis set up a rather sophisticated supply network in Eu-
rope, which I'm told still exists, in the sense that a lot of companies
figured out ways to get things to the Middle East without getting
caught or without getting stopped by export controls.

And I think it is fair to assume that these companies have not
forgotten what they learned. These companies and countries don't
share our view of Iran. And I suspect, although I can't prove, that
if you sent Mr. Ekeus into Iran and he did the same kind of inven-
tory that he has done in Iraq, we might find the same kind of ma-
chinery supplied by the same countries in Iran that actually wound
up in Iraq. I can't prove that, but I have a hunch that it is true.

I'd like to point out that there is one thing worse than smug-
gling, which is the focus of this hearing, and that is direct supply.
Because with direct supply you get manuals, you get training, and
you get back-up.

We learned as a result of COCOM that that was critically impor-
tant. We learned after the end of the Cold War that the Soviets
could get things. But they didn't get parts, they didn't get back-up,
they didn't get manuals, and often it was very risky for them to
rely on equipment that they smuggled, because it wound up being
junk after 6 months.

So my point is that direct supply is critically important, and we
see in the case of Iraq that Iraq succeeded, and I think we have
to worry that Iran is on the same path, because Iran is looking for
exactly the same thing.

I'd like to say that since this hearing has focused on Russia, that
it is disturbing that Iran appears to be in line for a research reac-
tor from Russia, which would be about the size that India and Is-
rael used to make their first nuclear devices, about 20 to 50
megawatts. And also, Iran seems to be getting about 2,000 tons of
natural uranium, for which there is no peaceful use in Iran that
I can think of. Now, this is all direct over-the-table supply from
Russia, which should concern us very much.

Another suggestion I have for the Subcommittee in that connec-
tion is that if, for example, a couple of warheads worth of material
is successfully diverted from Russia, I think we should have an
agreement with the Russians to go after it.

It is not as if it went into outer space. It is going to be in the
country somewhere. If it goes to Iran, I think we should try to get

114

it back. I'm not prescribing at this time the exact means, but a
thief takes no title in the law. So there ought to be an understand-
ing between us and the Russians that we will jointly pursue things
that go astray.

Senator NUNN. You mean if it is taken out of Russia illegally.
You are not talking about direct supply, but if is taken out ille-
gally?

Mr. MiLHOLLlN. That's right. I'm talking about the case where
something gets out illegally, somebody sells a couple of warheads
worth, and if we know where it is we should go after it.

Senator NuNN. I have felt for some time, and in fact I proposed
way back in the early 1980s, what I call the whole risk reduction
effort with then the Soviet Union that related to this kind of inci-
dent where you might have a terrorist group or — I don't know, if
we can't use the word rogue nation, we could use a broader term —
what term do you suggest I use here?

Mr. MiLHOLLlN. A nation.

Senator NuNN. Anyway, that takes control of a nuclear weapon
illegally; and that we have a working group with Russia on a
standing basis to plan how we would jointly react to that kind of
situation. I think that that kind of concept would be more applica-
ble now than it would have been even back in the early 1980s, be-
cause it is much more likely to happen now.

Mr. MiLHOLLlN. Yes. And I think it is a very good idea to have
thought through that process before you are confronted with it.

Senator NuNN. Tell me what term I am going to use now instead
of rogue nation? I mean, your point is well made, but

Mr. MiLHOLLlN. I hate the term proliferant country, but that one
seems to be better than rogue nation. I guess I would say a
proliferant state.

Senator NuNN. Proliferant state.

Mr. MiLHOLLlN. Although I guess I'm not thrilled with that one
either.

I have just a couple more points to make here. I'll make them
quickly.

I think we have to have a global policy that applies to everybody
because only a global policy works.

We can't export to lots of people. We can't hold our nose and ex-
port to the Chinese and expect the Europeans to join us on Iran.
The Europeans now are following the same kind of policy toward
Iran we are following with China. We are holding our nose and ex-
porting. We can't export our stuff and then expect our trading part-
ners to not export theirs. Iran may be a rogue to us, but to others
it is a valuable customer.

Finally, I'd like to talk about the pending export of super-
computers to Russia's nuclear weapons design laboratories. Convex
Computer Corporation wants to sell three powerful American
supercomputers to Arzamas-16 and Chelyabinsk-70, which are
doing nuclear weapons development for the Russians.

I think that this is a mistake, and I think that — well, I think the
machines would greatly boost Russia's ability to continue to de-
velop nuclear weapons after the test ban goes into effect, if it does.
And I don't think it is in our interest, given the circumstance of
our relations with Russia now and how we can predict they are

115

going to be in say a year or two, to boost Russia's ability to make
nuclear weapons.

So I'd like to end there.

Senator NUNN. Let me ask you a question about China, particu-
larly in relation to proliferation of weapons. What kind of strategy
would you advocate vis-a-vis China? You mentioned you would em-
ploy sanctions on the alleged sale of magnets to Pakistan.

I know that talks are going on. I mean, we are not ignoring that
situation, but certainly there hasn't been very much in the public
about it from the administration, but certainly it is not being ig-
nored.

Mr. MiLHOLLlN. I agree.

Senator Nunn. So what is the kind strategy you would employ
with China. And the main question, how would you get our allies
to go along, and the nations in Asia to go along, because you cer-
tainly would have to do it on a world-wide cooperative basis if you
were going to have very much effect, wouldn't you?

Mr. MiLHOLLlN. Well, I think that you can separate our disagree-
ments with China into different categories. I think in the case of
human rights you get into the question of regime survival in China
if you start talking to China about democracy.

But in the case of proliferation you are just talking about money.
They are making money selling things. And so it seems to me that
what you have to do is convince them that it is more profitable to
have a good relationship with the United States and have access
to our market than it is to do these marginal proliferation deals.

So I think our policy ought to be to deny them our market, pro-
gressively, or to some particular extent, or some particular mar-
kets, to the extent necessary to make it more expensive for them
to proliferate than not to proliferate.

Senator NuNN. You are saying on a rifle-shot basis to begin with
an escalation capability; is that the way you would do it?

Mr. MiLHOLLlN. Yes, I would.

Senator NuNN. Would you cut off MFN, something that blunt?

Mr. MiLHOLLlN. If it looked as if it were necessary and nothing
else would work, I would be willing to suspend it for a period of
time to see if there is a reaction on the other side.

But the Chinese surplus with us is rising. It is a tremendous
benefit to them strategically, and economically. It is a benefit we
could deny, and I think we should condition their access to our
market on decent behavior. Because the United States still has an
enormous market. That's one of our greatest strategic assets, and
we should use it to advance our own interests. So I think we ought
to deny China access.

Senator Nunn. Would you use that also on the human rights
agenda? This is one of the things you have to decide when you go
into one of these is how far you are going to go.

Because I would share with you the view on proliferation. I think
that is very, very dangerous and I think we ought to be very firm
on that. And I also certainly share the aspirations of groups in
America and around the world that want China to do much better
on human rights.

But the question is what do you use sanctions for and how far
do you go. Do you keep using them over and over again, and do

116

you set up a series of hoops they have to jump through, including
proHferation, which I tend to agree with, and also human rights?

Mr. MiLHOLLiN. I'm waffling a little on human rights I'm afraid.
I think proliferation is easier to do because it is money against
money. Human rights is harder to do because it is money against
politics.

Senator NuNN. You think we would be more successful if we
dealt with proliferation than we would if we dealt with human
rights on a sanction basis?

Mr. MiLHOLLlN. I think so, because it seems to me that we are
asking for things the Chinese could do, at least from their point of
view, probably more easily than they could modify their attitudes
toward democracy.

Senator NuNN. Dr. Kay, do you have any observations on that in
terms of particularly China, but in general, if you would comment.

Dr. Kay. Senator Nunn, I guess I differ with Gary in that I find
the term rogue useful, because in fact to me rogue means someone
who doesn't live by the norms of international society.

I would include China as a rogue state. I think Gary is abso-
lutely right that in the case of the Chinese much of their behavior
is dominated by money. I don't find that a comforting justification.

As Director Deutch testified, the Russian labs themselves have
been told they have to provide money for their own operation.
Money is one of the dangerous corrosive things in fact that is mak-
ing proliferation much more serious today.

The Chinese behavior I think broadly with regard to proliferation
is dangerous. I would point out their supply of advanced cruise
missiles to Iran.

From our own perspective, the supply of these things are going
to cost us money to counter. You are going to be asked to appro-
priate money for more advance-capable cruise missile defense for
U.S. ships serving in the Gulf because of the newly supplied cruise
missiles.

The Chinese are supplying the Iranians with advanced sea-based
mines. That is going to cost money to counter.

I think at the very minimum we ought to set against money the
Chinese make from trade with the U.S. the cost that we are going
to have to engage in to counter the threat that result from Chinese
weapon sales to rogue nations. And I agree with Gary's basic
premise that in fact the easiest way to do that is to say some sort
of dollar for dollar, or I would prefer a ratio. But if you are going
to do this, it is going to cost you money, it is not going to be addi-
tional revenue, to bring home to the Chinese Government the seri-
ousness of their proliferation behavior.

But we are up against — one of the problems that those of us who
have been concerned with proliferation, as you have, for a number
of years know well. Every time a proliferation event occurs, there
is somewhere else in the U.S. Government, someone dealing with
a bilateral political relationship, or a bilateral trade relationship,
that says, well, yes, but we have this other issue at stake.

What we have not done is accepted the overriding importance of
stopping proliferation. I am afraid until we see the first actual case
of the use of a nuclear device, or a large biological or chemical

117

weapon, it is going to be awfully hard for policy makers to under-
stand this.

Proliferation is different than trade. Proliferation is different
than human rights.

If you are dead, that's an irreversible state. And proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction in terms of the insecurity they create
and the threats they pose to the U.S. mean that we are vulnerable
now for the first time. You have done an excellent job in this series
of hearings of making, I think, the American people understand, as
our allies have, that we are going to have to deal with the pro-
liferation threat and treat it seriously. And seriously is demand for
roguish-type behavior.

Mr. MiLHOLLlN. Senator, I would like to add something to that
if I could.

I'd like to say also, as an additional inducement to the Chinese,
they should be denied access to high technology from the United
States that could be used for military purposes, or for weapon of
mass destruction purposes, if their behavior continues to be as it
is.

The two things they want from us most are access to our market,
and they want the technology necessary to modernize their military
and modernize their production facilities. And we have the power
to deny both of those things to them.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Milhollin, what about your concerns regard-
ing Dubai as a route for materials to Iran? I notice it in one of your
risk assessments. You say Dubai is the commercial gateway to
Iran. Could you give us a little of your feeling on that?

Mr. Milhollin. Yes. I have given you some pages out of our pub-
lication called the Risk Report, which lists the Iranian companies
operating in Dubai. It lists 22 of them that operate in Dubai's Free
Trade Zone. That zone is designed to promote re-exports.

Let me say, those companies are not on any prohibited trading
list accessible to U.S. companies. So a U.S. company could sell U.S.
products to those Iranian companies in Dubai and have it go on to
Iran without knowing the difference.

I think that is a big risk. In fact, Iran imports more through
Dubai than it does its own ports.

So I think it is quite likely that U.S. goods are going to Iran
today through Dubai, which does not have an adequate export con-
trol system. And Russian goods as well. I guess I must say that I
think the solution to that is

Senator NuNN. You mean sensitive material doesn't require an
export license to go to companies in Dubai, even Iranian compa-
nies?

Mr. Milhollin. That's right. Well, since the massive decontrol of
exports which the Commerce Department has managed to achieve,
a lot of very capable technology can go out without an export li-
cense. For example, a supercomputer operating, I think, up to
about 7,000 what are called million operations per second can go
out without an export license to one of these companies in Dubai,
which could then re-export it to Iran.

Senator NuNN. You are saying export controls only work in re-
gard to the nation and not to the company, not to the company ori-

118

gin? An Iranian company an3rwhere in the world can get away with
what an Iranian company in Iran cannot?

Mr. MiLHOLLiN. I'm saying that it depends on the laws of the
place where the company is when it imports the item.

If an Iranian company in Dubai imports something from the
United States, and the exporter doesn't know it is an Iranian com-
pany, and the goods go to Dubai, then whether they go out of
Dubai is up to Dubai.

Senator NUNN. You are saying if they don't know it is an Iranian
company?

Mr. MiLHOLLIN. Yes. If they do know it is an Iranian company,
then it would be illegal to send it because Iran is under an embar-
go.

The trouble is our exporters don't have a way of figuring out who
these folks are.

Senator NuNN. Who they are dealing with?

Mr. MiLHOLLIN. Yes.

Senator NuNN. Dr. Kay, with respect to the nuclear program in
Iraq, you mentioned and you have talked about the clandestine
successes they had in masking a lot of what was going on.

Could you just give us a couple of the things they did that fooled
the inspectors? I'm talking about before the war.

Dr. Kay. That's right, before the war, there were several dif-
ferent types of things they did.

First of all, with regard to facilities, the Iraqis had become well
aware of national technical means capability for looking at facili-
ties, so they started building buildings inside of other buildings.
That is, from the outside as an inspector — and there was a building
such as this at al-Tuwaitta where inspections were routinely car-
ried out — you saw an innocuous building that looked like a ware-
house or similar building.

Inside that building, after the outer shell had been built, the
Iraqis produced a building that was designed to aid in the research
regarding getting special nuclear material.

They rearranged the physical shapes of buildings. They buried
electric cable. A major site that was struck during the war, the site
where they were going to produce their first large amount of nu-
clear material, had enough electricity to power a city of 150,000
buried underground over a distance of about 25 kilometers.

So that in fact the inspectors, and before the intelligence agen-
cies of the world, when they looked at this site saw what looked
just like an innocuous warehouse with essentially no power going
into it. They had no triple security fences around it. The reason is
there was a very large security exclusion zone surrounding the fa-
cility.

With regard to the import of material — and this gets directly
back to your previous question — the Iraqis routinely declared that
material that we now know went to their nuclear weapons program
was in fact going to other innocuous places in Iraq.

The University of Baghdad was a major recipient. The Census
Bureau was a major recipient.

Under export control licensing, once it is cleared for that facility
no one goes around and sees if the device is really at that facility.

119

And in the case of Iraq, it was redirected and never went to those
facihties.

The largest thing, and one that still continues and worries me
the greatest, is that export controls are based on the premise that
in fact the country has to acquire something that is uniquely recog-
nized as dangerous.

And in the modern industrial modular world of industrial proc-
essing, if I were to ship from a supplier say in Georgia to a country
a computer numerically controlled lathe, as long as it didn't have
a laser alignment system and some very unique properties, that
would be perfectly legal. It was legal before the war, and in fact
there is a U.S. company — not from Georgia, I should add — that in
fact shipped computer numerically controlled lathes.

These were licensable in the United States as long as they didn't
have the laser alignment system. They were, however, shipped to
the same compan^s subsidiary in Germany, where the laser align-
ment system was added, and that was legal in Germany, and then
they were shipped on to Iraq.

Systems integration occurred in many of our allies' countries
with equipment coming from other places, and it occurred also in
Iraq. This is very difficult for export controls to take account of. It
is very difficult for IAEA inspectors. Because such equipment never
enters any database.

There was a great deal of equipment that we found after the war
that we had absolutely zero knowledge that the Iraqis had obtained
before the war.

Senator NUNN. Don't we have to reinstitute some kind of inter-
national export control regime?

Dr. Kay. I think we need to reinstitute a regime that at least
tracks material. Export controls, as far as I'm concerned, really
only serve three purposes. They don't stop a program. They make
it more expensive. They delay it as a rogue nation tries to reverse
engineer or get it from somewhere else. And most importantly, they
allow you to track and know where a country is going and not have
surprises.

We are very vulnerable today to surprises, because in taking the
export control regime that existed during the Cold War apart, we
simply don't know where a lot of goods are going today. And so if
you don't know where the threat is, you don't know who the rogue
regimes are, and you don't know what these states are obtaining,
you are asking to be seriously surprised somewhere down the road.

Senator NuNN. Ambassador Ekeus — and I'll ask both of you
this — in an op-ed — and I did not get to ask him this question — but
in an op-ed he wrote last April, he stated that, "The existing safe-
guard system under the nonproliferation treaty, the NPT, can no
longer control the proliferation of nuclear weapons."

He also suggested that a system under which advanced countries
would share technologies with developing countries in exchange for
open and spontaneous inspection by the United Nations of any sus-
pect facilities in developing countries under question.

What do you think of that idea? In other words, not tr3dng to
control the technology exports as much as you try to focus on com-
plete transparency. I assume what he is talking, about time, any
place demand inspections.

120

Mr. MiLHOLLlN. I would say that you need to do both. Because
the problem with not having export controls and counting on pick-
ing it up when it arrives is that somebody can get it and then lock
the door. And then you have two choices, you either go to war or
you don't.

That's what the Iraqis were planning to do. They were planning
to throw out the inspectors and divert the material. And if that
happens, you have a simple choice of going to war. Not everybody
is willing to go to war because a five-axis machine tool got diverted.

The second point is that I agree that we do need an open, trans-
parent system, such as the one that we have in Iraq. I think Iraq
is instructive, because even with all the powers that Mr. Ekeus
has, he is not able to find everything. And nothing like that power
exists in any other country.

The only special inspection that was requested was in North
Korea, and the North Koreans denied the inspectors access. They
slammed the door and nothing very bad happened to them.

I think that may be a lesson. I think it would be hard now for
the agency to go into another country, and demand a special in-
spection, and if the door slammed to avoid the precedent of North
Korea. That's the cost of, I think, our agreement with North Korea.

Senator NUNN. Dr. Kay.

Dr. Kay. Senator, I hesitate to disagree with Ambassador Ekeus,
for whom I have a great deal of respect, but I do in this case.

I don't disagree with his judgment that the current nonprolifera-
tion treaty is inadequate to prevent the proliferation of weapons.
I disagree with the answer.

There are some countries that I would not be happy with supply-
ing technology to regardless of what sort of inspection rights they
gave to me. Ajid those are states that I would call rogue states.

I would not think unlimited inspections would give me confidence
that I could find a clandestine program in Iran today.

And here let me refer — it is in my paper and Gary just men-
tioned it — after 5 years of the most rigorous type of inspection
rights I can imagine, we still cannot give Senator Levin an answer
with regard to whether the Iraqis have biological weapons still ca-
pable of being mounted on missiles today.

Senator NuNN. Well, I think he gave an answer that they still
do have that potential.

Dr. Kay. They have the potential, but we can't say they do re-
gardless of this.

If you had been holding these hearings in March of 1990 and I
had been asked to testify and you had asked me the question, what
sort of inspection rights would I like to have, and I described the
rights that we now have in Iraq — use of national intelligence, zero
notice inspection, go anywhere and all that — I doubt that you
would have thought that I was on this planet, because that seemed
way beyond that.

If you had then asked nie, with those rights would I be confident
that I would discover an Iraqi program, and I would have said,
well, I'm not sure. I would probably get tipoffs to it but not fully
understand it.

The fact of the matter is the game of clandestine hiding, and par-
ticularly Iraq is an easy case, and we ought to be aware of this.

121

Iraq reached for a world-scale program. They would have today, if
the war had not intervened, been producing enough nuclear mate-
rial for between 10 and 20 nuclear weapons a year, and they pro-
duced biological weapons in 10,000 liter lots.

The weapons program we have got to be worried about is an Iran
that has two to three nuclear weapons.

Senator Nunn. One-ses and two-ses.

Dr. Kay. One-ses and two-ses, and inspection simply cannot work
at that level.

I would be happy to have far more rigorous inspection rights and
loosening export controls for a broader range of states, and I think
that is a way that we ought to explore. But we should be clear as
to the level of confidence that will give us. It will not work on small
programs, the types of programs we see today in Iran.

Senator NUNN. And it probably wouldn't work on one country, a
rogue country if we can use that term again.

Mr. MiLHOLLIN. I'm sorry.

Senator NUNN. But Dr. Kay has a much broader definition of
rogue than you did.

Mr. MiLHOLLIN. Yes. I think I would agree with his definition of
rogues.

Senator NuNN. He just has a broader definition of it.

But if you took a country that was trying to help terrorist groups
with biological or chemical weapons, it would be very, very hard to
get to that in an inspection, wouldn't it?

Dr. Kay. Yes, it would. And if you took a case — and here we have
consistently ignored this — trans-national cooperation in weapons
programs. It is widely reported now in the open literature that the
Pakistani design for its first nuclear device was a design provided
by the Chinese. I assume that to be true. That ought to be a wake-
up call for the type of collaboration you may be seeing in the years
ahead.

Senator NuNN. If you listed other countries that you would be
concerned about. Dr. Kay, that may be doing the same kinds of
things that we did not detect in Iraq before the war, could you give
us an idea of what those countries might be, or at least give us an
indication of the number of countries that you would have on that
kind of suspect list?

Dr. Kay. I would separate them into two categories. I think the
rogue states, identified by Director Deutch, certainly would be high
on my priorities list.

But I would also say that we ought to recognize we are coming
to the end of an era of nonproliferation. The largest, most effective
tool against nonproliferation for the last 25 years has been the con-
fidence that our friends and allies have had in the U.S. guarantee
of their security.

The U.S. extended security guarantee gave states that had the
imminent technical capability of easily producing weapons of mass
destruction the confidence that they didn't have to go down that ex-
pensive and dangerous path.

Senator NUNN. For instance, Japan.

Dr. Kay. For instance. As I look around the world today, I see
a number of states worried about — and let me make this com-

122

pletely bipartisan — not the U.S. defense posture of today, but the
U.S. defense posture after next.

Because that's the time frame they have to think about. And par-
ticularly if you are in Asia, but also in parts of Western Europe,
as you look around, wondering whether in fact that security guar-
antee is going to be able to give you the confidence that you had
over the last 40 years, I worry about those states.

Now, I would address that by in fact addressing the nature of
our defense posture, rather than nonproliferation controls. But too
often those of us concerned with nonproliferation put to one side
U.S. defense policy and we look at the nonproliferation treaty and
export controls and we ignore the contribution made to peace in
this world by the willingness of this country to guarantee the secu-
rity of others with great confidence for a 40-year period. I think
that deserves attention.

Senator NUNN. I think that is a very, very important point. One
of the real paradoxes there is some of the same people we have dif-
ficulty getting to cooperate in a nonproliferation agenda are the
ones we have been protecting for 40 years.

Dr. Kay. That's right. They have benefited from our protection.

Senator NuNN. Do either of you have any other points you would
like to make before we close out today? We are going to be working
to get up a series of recommendations, perhaps even a legislative
framework in this area, and we would welcome your comments as
we go along on a continuing basis.

Senator Lugar and I, and Senator Roth and others, Senator
Glenn, are going to be working together on that over the next few
weeks.

But do you have any other points you would like to make here
today?

Mr. MiLHOLLlN. I just have one comment about the conversation
between Secretary Baker and Tariq Assize, which is apparently of
interest to the Subcommittee.

I think, if I can find it, I have a copy of something like a tran-
script of that, or a summary of that conversation in my files, which
the Subcommittee might like to see rather than relying on second-
hand reports.

I think there may be another way to look at that exchange. It
may be that our message to the Iraqis was that if chemical weap-
ons were used against our troops, the American public would de-
mand more than simply retaking Kuwait, that they would demand
personal retribution against Saddam himself.

That's not the same as a nuclear attack, but that the war
couldn't be stopped without Saddam himself being made to answer
for the use of chemical weapons.

So personally I think that that's probably as plausible an inter-
pretation of that exchange as the interpretation that we were
threatening to use nuclear weapons.

Senator NuNN. You have what purports to be a transcript for
that?

Mr. MiLHOLLIN. I think so, yes. I'm just relying on my memory,
which — well, I know I do have an account of that, a direct account,
which I could try to find.

123

Senator NUNN. Well, that would be very helpful. We appreciate
that.

Do either of you want to go any further in terms of why you
think, Dr. Kay, that the Iraqis did not use chemical or biological
weapons when they clearly had the capability of doing so?

Dr. Kay. Let me start with saying I don't know. It is a question
I asked the Iraqis in various dialogues with them. My personal be-
lief — and it is nothing more than that — is that there were two fac-
tors at work. I think the Iraqis were genuinely concerned that if
they used chemical or biological weapons anywhere in the theater,
that the Israelis would respond with a nuclear attack on Baghdad.

That they genuinely thought the Israelis would view that as such
a life threatening threat to their national security that they would
respond.

And this is individual discussions with Iraqis, you have to real-
ize, who were involved in their nuclear weapons program. They had
a far greater apprehension about the willingness of the Israelis to
react than they did about our reaction.

I do think that in the inner circles of Baghdad Gary is right,
there was a concern about the escalation of war aims that would
occur, that in fact we might well go to Baghdad.

I down play that, because you have to realize the Iraqis them-
selves, to a considerable extent, in the inner circle did not under-
stand how overwhelming and how quickly Desert Storm would be.

Once the war started, I think the proximate answer for what
happened is they simply lost control of it. They didn't know where
things were.

It was a very dangerous period, and we may have been very
lucky. To emphasize, as Ambassador Ekeus told you, we now know
those weapons were deployed with, at least the Iraqis say, limited
release authority. In the chaos of those 4 days accidents could have
occurred.

Senator NuNN. Didn't he say release authority based on an at-
tack on them with a weapon of mass destruction?

Dr. Kay. Limited release authority. But you well understand,
Senator Nunn, that in the fog of war reports of what happens are
often amplified or, quite frankly, wrong.

And in the degraded command and control system that the Iraqis
had after the coalition air campaign, a report of the use of a nu-
clear weapon on Baghdad could have mistakedly occurred. In fact,
there is in the open press the report, as you probably recall, that
the first time a fuel air explosion was used in the Kuwaiti theater
of operation, British SAS forces came up on the net and said, it
looks like the yanks have nuked them.

Mis-appreciation of events occur. And you had forward deploy-
ment of these weapons, and you had limited release authority.

So understanding exactly what happened is important. I simply
think we don't have the pieces yet to draw a competent conclusion.

Senator NuNN. If the Iraqis were that concerned and you may be
exactly right here, but if they were that concerned about a nuclear
response from Israel in the event of chemical or biological use by
them, what use did they believe those chemical and biological
weapons were going to be over the long haul for them anyway, if
they were that deterred by the possibility of Israel?

124

Dr. Kay. I think they saw them as serving two purposes. They
saw them as weapons of intimidation against other Gulf States. I
mean, after all, you have to understand Iraqi security policy is not
directed primarily at Israel. It is directed at Iran and the Gulf
States. And those weapons would have been effective intimidations.

From the one document that was seized most recently, it speaks
of using these weapons as a blitzkrieg, a thunderbolt weapon in an
opening campaign.

Well, this is a campaign that you win by intimidation, one use
of chemicals, one use of biologicals, even one use of a nuke and the
Saudi Kingdom, or others, cave.

And I think they did not believe that the Israelis would go to war
to protect the Saudis.

Senator NUNN. Dr. Kay, you have been in Iraq an awful lot. Are
you surprised that Saddam Hussein is still the leader there and
has survived thus far?

Dr. Kay. No, sir, I am not. The brutality you see when you are
there, the courage that it would take, and probably the uselessness
of standing up and trying to remove him is such that I'm not sur-
prised.

Saddam Hussein, when he is ultimately removed, will be re-
moved by a bullet from the gun of a relative or a security guard.

Senator NuNN. Somebody close to him.

Dr. Kay. Very close to him. You just don't get the opportunity
otherwise.
, Senator NuNN. If anyone close to him is still left.

Any other comments? We appreciate very much you being here,
and thank you for your tremendous help in the Subcommittee de-
liberations. We appreciate it.

We will have a hearing on Friday of this week, and we will have
our staff report at that time. And we'll have the Federal Govern-
ment response to the issues raised by the witnesses today and in
our previous hearings.

We will hear from the Department of Defense, the Department
of Energy, the Department of State, CIA, FBI and the Customs
Service.

Then next Wednesday we will hold a hearing to examine the ca-
pabilities of the U.S. Government to respond to a nuclear, chemical
or biological terrorist threat within the United States, and particu-
larly how we would handle the situation if we actually had such
an attack.

Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 1:25 p.m., the hearing was adjourned subject to
the call of the Chair.]

GLOBAL PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION

FRIDAY, MARCH 22, 1996

U.S. Senate,
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,

Committee on Governmental Affairs,

Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:06 a.m., in room
342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Nunn, Ranking Mi-
nority Member of the Subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn and Smith.

Staff Present: Daniel S. Gelber, Chief Counsel to the Minority;
John F. Sopko, Deputy Chief Counsel to the Minority; Alan
Edelman, Counsel to the Minority; Mark Webster, Investigator to
the Minority, Mary D. Robertson, Assistant Chief Clerk to the Mi-
nority; Richard Kennan (Customs Detailee); Renee Pruneau
Novakoff (CIA Detailee): Jim Christy (AFOSI Detailee); Harold
Damelin, Chief Counsel to the Majority; Michael Bopp, Counsel;
Carla J. Martin, Chief Clerk; Ken Myers (Senator Lugar); Rick Val-
entine (Senator Smith); Ian Brzezinski (Senator Roth); Max H.
Delia Pia (Senator Levin); Randy Rydell (Senator Glenn); John
Guest (Senator Lieberman); and Denny Watson (CIA Detailee to
Armed Services Committee).

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR NUNN

Senator Nunn. Let me start by thanking Senator Roth, who is
not able to be here today, for his cooperation and for the coopera-
tion of his majority staff in allowing us to have this hearing today.
Senator Roth and I have had an unusual relationship for a number
of years. We have been switching back and forth as Chairman of
this Subcommittee every time the Senate control moves from Re-
publicans to Democrats or vice versa, so we have had splendid co-
operation and approached all these matters in a completely non-
partisan, bipartisan fashion, and I am very grateful for his support.

Last week, the Subcommittee heard experts set forth the threat
posed by an emerging nuclear black market in the former Soviet
Union. These experts, including the General Accounting Office, de-
tailed the various inadequacies in the protection and control of the
lethal materials at civilian and military installations in the former
Soviet Union.

This morning, the staff of the Subcommittee releases its report
which documents even further the ease with which fissile materials
and related technology can be diverted and smuggled from the
former Soviet Union to parts unknown. The Director of the CIA,

(125)

126

John Deutch, perhaps best framed the concern when he commented
at our hearing earher this week, "We have been lucky so far."

Framing the concern is not nearly as difficult as fashioning a
proper response, and that is what the hearing is about today. How
do we respond? What do we do? How much can we do? What is our
responsibility and what are the available avenues to implement
that responsibility?

Unfortunately, this national security concern poses unique chal-
lenges which are, in many ways, more complicated than our Cold
War challenges. During the Cold War, we could rely on a relatively
stable mutual deterrent strategy. Both superpowers recognized and
respected each other's destructive capabilities. Both superpowers
had a real stake in avoiding escalation. Both superpowers had a
real stake in avoiding leakage of materials, know-how in terms of
nuclear weapons.

Now we must focus not just on Russia but on the numerous na-
tions in the former Soviet Union that either possess fissile material
or may provide the routes with which to obtain these very destruc-
tive materials. Our focus must include not just nations in the
former Soviet Union but subnational groups, organized crime, and
rogue states elsewhere in the world, all of whom are potential bro-
kers, sellers, and purchasers of remnants of the Soviet military em-
pire.

The staff recommendations we will discuss today include many,
but just a few of them that I think deserve highlighting here. We
will hear the others later. The Department of Energy should step
up its efforts to foster a culture of security in the civilian installa-
tions in the former Soviet Union.

In light of the serious security problems at naval facilities in
Russia, both the Departments of Defense and Energy should make
progress in this area a very high priority. I understand well the
Navy's reluctance to get involved, because the Navy has had a
splendid safety program over the years, but this is more than a
matter just affecting the U.S. Navy. The question of how those
naval ships and vessels and reactors are handled by the former So-
viet navy, now Russian, is a matter of tremendous interest and se-
curity to the entire world. One agency or individual must be given
authority to coordinate our government's shotgun approach to
training on this overall issue.

The United States must step up its liaison activities with foreign
authorities with respect to deployment of technical assistance, such
as portal monitors to shore up border controls, and I believe that
both the U.S. Customs Service and Energy Department will be dis-
cussing that technical capability to monitor smuggling of nuclear
materials today.

The Southern tier of the former Soviet Union must receive great-
er attention, as it is a likely and largely ignored transit route for
smugglers and has regional proximity to many of the states of con-
cern to the United States, and, indeed, to the world.

The staff, in their report, recommend a greater commitment of
resources by the Congress and the administration to promote pro-
grams that keep Soviet fissile materials secured and accounted for
and nuclear weapons scientists away from the rogue states and or-
ganized criminal groups who seek their services.

127

The role of U.S. industry in assisting former weapons scientists
in laboratories to convert to civilian activities should be increased.
Only a relatively small portion of the approximately 60,000 weap-
ons scientists in the former Soviet Union are involved in current
programs. U.S. industry must increase its self-policing in general
counter-proliferation, and the government must find ways to both
educate and give incentives for that kind of behavior by our indus-
try.

Legislative reforms the staff recommends include stiffening pris-
on sanctions for export violations when the export involves weap-
ons of mass destruction or their components. The staff also rec-
ommends that Congress should consider developing a specific
mechanism, including tax or customs duty incentives targeted to
U.S. corporations willing to invest in or work directly with former
Soviet weapons scientists and laboratories in converting to civilian
activities.

Finally, I would observe that >as we fashion countermeasures, we
must keep in mind that the United States will never be able to ad-
dress this challenge alone. The vast majority of work and resources
must come from within the nations of the former Soviet Union.
Their security is the primary security at stake, although ours is
certainly involved, also. Our role must therefore be to serve as both
a partner and a catalyst in this worldwide effort.

In a few moments, the Minority staff from the Subcommittee will
summarize the result of its investigation, which encompasses hun-
dreds of interviews, fact-finding trips to Europe, and briefings from
dozens of domestic and foreign officials. The statement, in addition
to setting forth conclusions, also outlines recommendations of the
staff as well as other ideas forwarded to the Subcommittee by nu-
merous experts in the proliferation field.

After the staff report, we will hear from a panel of government
witnesses from our various important government departments
who will discuss what the U.S. Government is doing in response to
this threat, and also, I would certainly invite our government wit-
nesses to react to any of the recommendations made by staff. I
know you have not examined all of them. I would not anticipate
you would be able to respond to all of them, but any observations
you have regarding pro or con of these recommendations would be
very helpful.

It is my hope that these hearings will provide a context within
which to critically examine our efforts to reduce the risk posed by
the proliferation of these very lethal materials and weapons, which
I consider to be our No. 1 national security danger and challenge.

Senator Lugar has an prepared opening statement. He has been
a partner in this. He and I have worked together in this area for
a long time. He could not be here this morning, but we will place
his prepared opening statement in the record without objection.

[The prepared opening statement of Senator Lugar follows:]

PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR

Nothing could be more central to U.S. security than ensuring that nuclear weap-
ons and the materials needed to make them do not fall into the hands of radical
states or terrorist groups. The control of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium
(HEU) — the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons — is perhaps the most serious
and urgent security challenge facing the United States in the coming decade. The

128

problem is most serious in the former Soviet Union, where economic and poUtical
transformations, coupled with the dismantlement of tens of thousands of nuclear
weapons, pose enormous new challenges. The urgency of the problem is as undeni-
able as the canisters of weapons-usable HEU found in a car parked in Prague in
December 1994.

Meeting this challenge will require a comprehensive program of action on many
fronts. We have developed some proposals to stimulate discussion on such a com-
prehensive program. We want to present these proposals to our panel of witnesses
for their considered reactions as one means of trying to develop some legislative ini-
tiatives in this area. All told, the efforts encompassed in these proposals would cost
the United States and the international community several billion dollars over the
next decade or more. Although substantial, these sums would be tiny compared to
the hundreds of billions the United States spends each year to try to ensure its se-
curity, and they would be small in relations to the security benefits of improving
the protection of nuclear materials. The costs of failing to act — in terms of higher
defense budgets and lower security in the future — would be far higher than the cost
of timely action now.

There are six key elements in this program effort to come to grips with the
threats posed by the proliferation of plutonium and HEU. We will ask our witnesses
to react to each of these elements:

(1) Ensuring that all nuclear weapons and potential nuclear weapons materials
are secure and accounted for. This is the first line of defense in any effort to reduce
the risks of nuclear theft. Both facility-level upgrades and national-level regulatory
and accounting systems are essential. Funding should be provided for an expanded,
comprehensive effort that could accomplish all the most needed security and ac-
counting upgrades within a very few years, and should provide the flexibility to
spend this money to maximum effect. An intense focus on building a new "safe-
guards culture" in the former Soviet Union and on consolidating nuclear materials
at a smaller number of sites is also needed. The latter effort should include in-
creased efforts to convert research using HEU to proliferation-resistant low-enriched
fuel. Purchases of HEU from research facilities that no longer require it should also
be considered.

(2) Undertaking new steps to stop nuclear smuggling. Once material has been sto-
len, the second line of defense is to prevent it from being smuggled into the hands
of a rogue state or terrorist group. This requires expanded international cooperation
involving police, intelligence, customs, and border agencies, including timely infor-
mation-sharing as well as provision of training and equipment. Regional analysis
centers where seized materials could be analyzed should be established, specialized
law enforcement units focusing on nuclear smuggling should be set up in key coun-
tries, and additional equipment and training should be provided to border guards
and customs agencies.

(3) Dismantling and monitoring nuclear weapons and materials. A broad regime
of information exchanges and mutual inspections — including monitoring to ensure
that warheads are being dismantled and the resulting nuclear material securely
managed — is needed to build confidence in the size and security of each side's nu-
clear stockpiles and the progress of nuclear arms reductions.

(4) Stopping the build-up of potential bomb materials. Ending the relentless
growth in the stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear materials worldwide is a critical
aspect of any comprehensive plan to reduce the risks of nuclear theft. Intensified
efforts are needed to negotiate a global agreement to end production of fissile mate-
rials for weapons, and to find ways to replace the energy provided by Russian pluto-
nium-production reactors, so they can be shut down.

(5) Getting rid of excess stockpiles of bomb materials. With the dismantlement of
tens of thousands of nuclear warheads, both the United States and Russia have
hundreds of tons of bomb materials they no longer need. The U.S. is purchasing 500
tons of HEU from Russian weapons over 20 years, blended to proliferation-resistant
low-enriched uranium for civilian reactor fuel — a deal that reduces proliferation
risks, provides incentives for dismantlement, and provides much-needed hard cur-
rency for the Russian economy, all at little or no net cost to the U.S. taxpayer.
There are strong security arguments for buying even more HEU, and faster.

Excess plutonium poses more difficult issues. Plutonium cannot be blended to a
proliferation-resistant form in the same way HEU can, and either using it as fuel
in nuclear reactors or permanently disposing of it will require subsidies of hundreds
of millions or billions of dollars. All plutonium disposition options will take years
to implement, making secure, safeguarded interim storage the first priority. Tech-
nologies do exist that would make it possible to transform excess weapons pluto-
nium into forms that pose no more proliferation risk that spent fuel from commer-
cial nuclear reactors: What is needed now is the political will to choose one of these

129

technologies and push it through to implementation, including providing the sub-
stantial subsidies needed to get the job done.

(6) Providing new jobs for the nuclear cities. Desperate economic conditions for
those charged with guarding and managing nuclear weapons and weapons-usable
materials would drastically increase the risk of nuclear theft. Just this situation
may now be developing, as the only mission of the ten nuclear "closed cities" in the
former Soviet Union — producing nuclear weapons and their essential ingredients —
has largely vanished. New businesses for these cities are urgently needed. Among
other steps, the Industrial Partnering Program (IPP) should be expanded, and busi-
ness development conferences should be organized in the major nuclear cities, bring-
ing together ideas, investors, and sources of possible subsidies.

This plan would involve a wide array of major programs, each of which should
be carefully coordinated so as to exploit available synergies. For example, the large
sums of money involved in HEU purchases could finance other nuclear security ob-
jectives: The U.S. might agree, for example, to purchase an additional 100 tons of
HEU, if Russia agreed to spend the resulting income on financing an agreed ap-
proach to disposition of 50-100 tons of plutonium, or on improved security and ac-
counting measures at particular nuclear sites.

The problem is urgent, and solutions are available. The time for action to address
the threat of nuclear theft is now.

Senator NUNN. An opening statement by Chairman Roth will of
course, also be placed in the record.

[The prepared opening statement of Senator Roth follows:]

PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROTH

This morning we continue our series of hearings on the global proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, and focus on the questions, "How do we, and how
should we, respond to the black market for nuclear weapons, materials and tech-
nology."

Over the past two weeks, we have examined the material protection, control and
accounting — or "MPC&A" — systems for nuclear materials within the former Soviet
Union, as well as the demand for such materials and related technology. What we
saw, and what we heard, were troubling. On March 13th we saw a 7ault containing
nuclear materials monitored by a crude device comprised of sealing wax and string.
We saw decommissioned nuclear submarines and reactor compartments rusting in
a quiet Russian bay. And we heard about the vulnerability of the massive cache of
highly enriched uranium and plutonium generated during the Soviet era — enough
to produce several thousand nuclear weapons.

Two days ago we heard of Iraqi efforts to frustrate United Nations' inspections
of its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons capabilities. We heard further that
other rogue nations have acquired nuclear materials and technology, often by pur-
chasing from other countries items illegal to export from the United States.

In addition to these gloomier elements of the proliferation equation, we also heard
heartening news. Rather than curse the shadowy recesses of the nuclear bazaar, the
governments of the newly independent states and our Nation have already under-
taken successful, cooperative efforts to shore up the security of nuclear materials.
We will hear more of these enlightened efforts today. These hearings are thus not
meant to lay blame at the feet of the former Soviet Union or our federal agencies.
They are meant to draw attention to complex problems and to formulate a strategy
to solve them.

We have not chosen an easy task. The supply of nuclear weapons, materials and
technology is difficult to control, and the potential demand for these items is vast
and constantly evolving. As the dynamics of our international community evolve, so
does the potential demand for weapons of mass destruction. In this sense, nuclear
proliferation is as much a symptom of regional insecurity as it is a cause of global
unrest. And like the MPC&A issues we addressed on March 13th, the demand for
nuclear materials is colored by the unsettled political and economic climates of the
newly independent states.

Following the Cold War, we left an era of deadly but controlled nuclear stand-
off and entered a less orderly world where the acquisition of nuclear weapons con-
stitute realistic ambitions not only for rogue nations but also for terrorist organiza-
tions whose principal targets are America and its allies. In this new era, we are
faced with threats that are more diffuse but equally, if not more, lethal than the
old. These include the reawakening of ethnic hatreds, religious radicalism and the
globalization of criminal and terrorist networks.

130

Every week, we read in the papers of nations seeking to develop or acquire nu-
clear weapons, or to hide their steps towards proliferation. Iran, Iraq, Libya and
North Korea, are only a few that have taken steps to develop indigenous nuclear
programs. In the case of Iraq, we were fortunate to identify and cripple its nuclear
capabilities during the Gulf War and through the cease-fire terms that followed.
However, as Ambassador Ekeus indicated on Wednesday, Iraq now may be attempt-
ing to rehabilitate its nuclear program. What we learn from these events is the need
for constant vigilance.

Moreover, potential customers of the nuclear black market are not limited to
rogue nations. They also include terrorist organizations and other sub-national
groups. Last fall, our Subcommittee learned that the Aum Shinrikyo, a terrorist or-
ganization based in Japan, attempted to procure nuclear materials and, perhaps,
weapons. Fortunately, its attempts were thwarted by Japanese authorities. Also last
fall, the Chechen resistance movement announced that it had buried a container of
nuclear materials in a Moscow park. Again, fortunately, the materials were secured
without harm after the Chechen group revealed their location. Nevertheless, these
cases illustrate that the demand for nuclear materials is more than conjecture.

To date, there have been but a handful of documented cases involving the traffick-
ing of sizable quantities of weapons-grade nuclear material from the former Soviet
Union. And there have been no instances of a rogue state or terrorist organization
threatening to detonate an actual nuclear weapon or dispersal device. But the provi-
dence we have experienced does not diminish the frightening potential of the nu-
clear black market. Nor does it excuse us from a rigorous inspection of the programs
our government has adopted to address these threats.

Let me again thank Senator Nunn and his staff for their work on these important
issues. Their efforts to piece together this confusing puzzle deserve our praise and
respect and demand our attention. For in a world where there are weapons of terri-
fying power and men of depraved heart and void of conscience, someone must stand
guard. We cannot rely on good fortune alone to protect us from the danger of nu-
clear proliferation.

Senator NuNN. Our first panel of witnesses this morning are
members of the Subcommittee staff, Deputy Chief Counsel John
Sopko and Staff Counsel Alan Edelman. They will present their
staff report on nuclear diversion. Both of them have done an enor-
mous amount of work in this.

John and Alan, I will ask both of you to stand. Let me give you
the oath before you begin testifying.

Do you swear the testimony you will give before the Subcommit-
tee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help you, God?

Mr. SoPKO. I do.

Mr. Edelman. I do.

Senator NuNN. Your entire statement will be part of the record
and we tell you that in advance so we can give you maximum in-
centive to summarize.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN F. SOPKO,i DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL TO
THE MINORITY, PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVES-
TIGATIONS, U.S. SENATE

Mr. Sopko. Thank you. Senator. I do not think we need that
much incentive in light of our extensive witness list today.

If you recall, Senator, back in May of 1994, you articulated some
of your fears when we had the hearing that brought in the FBI Di-
rector, the Director of the GermanBKA, and the Director of the Or-
ganized Crime Unit of the Russian MUD about the potential at
that time of nuclear smuggling.

Unfortunately, the concerns that you raised then have become a
reality. We have seen a deterioration of conditions and the concerns

* The prepared staff statement of Mr. Sopko and Mr. Edelman appears on page 355.

131

of proliferation have raised. Reports from Europe detail known di-
versions of weapons-grade nuclear material, as the murky outline
of a nuclear black market begins to take form. Flyers advertising
circulate Russian weapons scientists in the Middle East. We have
an example of one which has been confirmed by government
sources to actually have been a real flyer that was circulated in the
Middle East and elsewhere soliciting jobs for out-of-work Soviet
weapons scientists. Such activities document our worst fears con-
cerning the brain drain.

The staff statement that appears in the appendix and is intro-
duced today encompasses a summary of the results of a 2-year in-
vestigation that included two fact-finding missions to Europe, hun-
dreds of interviews with members of our intelligence and law en-
forcement communities, as well as an equal number of interviews
with foreign officials, smugglers, scientists, and foreign policy ex-
perts. This is our third interim staff report on this subject, Senator
Nunn.

On the basis of the investigation, the staff believes that what is
currently known about illicit trafficking in nuclear weapons and
know-how demonstrates a threat this Nation cannot ignore. The
specter of what we do not know, however, is even more ominous.
However, certain conclusions are evident this morning and the staff
will make them.

The threat of nuclear diversion and trafficking from the former
Soviet Union is our Nation's No. 1 national security threat. The
threat is not theoretical but real, as evidenced by documented sei-
zures of weapons-usable uranium and plutonium in both the former
Soviet Union and elsewhere in Europe; as well as by the revela-
tions that Russian guidance systems for ICBMs have been discov-
ered in Jordan and Iraq.

The staff also concludes that there may be caches of weapons-
grade material unaccounted for in the former Soviet Union that
neither U.S. authorities or intelligence officials nor their counter-
parts in the former Soviet Union have been able to identify or ver-
ify-

Russia and the governments of the former Soviet Union have in-
creased their resolve in efforts to combat nuclear theft and improve
the protection and control of nuclear materials. That is a change
since May of 1994 and that is a positive event. Yet despite their
successes and their efforts to protect material and contain smug-
gling, the likelihood of diversion appears to be outpacing the ability
to secure these lethal materials.

The staff also concludes that efforts by the U.S. Government and
particularly the Departments of Defense and Energy to work with
Russia and the former Soviet Union to better control and safeguard
their vast stockpile of fissile material and weapons have been suc-
cessful and should be encouraged and expanded to meet this ever-
growing challenge to our national security.

Senator as mentioned in the course of these hearings, there is
broad consensus that nuclear material contained in the civilian re-
search institutes, reactors and power plants, is most vulnerable to
illicit diversion. The staff confirmed these concerns and found that
the civilian nuclear industry in the former Soviet Union, (1) does
not know the exact amount of fissile material produced or have an

132

effective material counting system currently in place for this mate-
rial. And (2), it does not have an adequate national program for
physical security of fissile material and has only recently started
to devote resources and attention to the insider threat in their fa-
cilities.

In interviews with the staff, leading officials from Russia's two
nuclear regulatory agencies, MinAtom, the Ministry of Atomic En-
ergy, and Gosatomnadzor, GAN, admitted that the weakest mate-
rial protection control and accountability systems are in the civilian
research centers. The essence of the problem is that most civilian
facilities do not have complete and accurate inventories of their nu-
clear materials.

GAN officials admitted to the staff when we visited their offices
that they did not know how much material was located in the civil-
ian facilities in the former Soviet Union. In fact, the staff was told
that these facilities kept their inventory in terms of ruble value,
not the weight of the material. At one facility, plant officials admit-
ted their inventory of small disk-shaped fuel elements containing
plutonium and highly enriched uranium was estimated and could
be off by tens of thousands of fuel elements.

It was not unusual under the Soviet regime for facility managers
to withhold some nuclear material from their official accounting
system. By withholding excess material, managers could, if nec-
essary at a later time, make up for any shortfalls in meeting their
production quotas. As a result, many nuclear facilities may have
large unaccounted for caches of nuclear materials. If such nuclear
material was never counted in the first instance, its improper di-
version now will never be detected.

The staff was also told of instances in which GAN inspectors
have opened sealed canisters which purported to contain nuclear
material only to find the containers empty.

In addition to poor accounting systems, the staff found that the
civilian nuclear facilities are also notorious for their poor or non-
existent physical protection systems.

To respond to these problems, the U.S. Government has enacted
a number of programs. One of the most successful is the lab-to-lab
program run by the Department of Energy which will be discussed
in more detail later in the hearing.

The staff had a number of recommendations in response to these
problems. No. 1, Congress should consider additional funding to the
Department of Energy to cover the cost of new cooperative security
ventures with those labs and facilities that have just recently
joined the joint lab-to-lab program that the Department of Energy
is running. The staff has been advised that to adequately respond
to this opportunity would require an additional $25 million in ap-
propriations.

The staff also recommends that the Department of Energy devote
more attention to the issue of corruption and insider complicity
when designing security systems in the former Soviet Union. The
staff learned that there were technical means currently available
and others that could be developed with minimal additional re-
search that would increase the difficulty for an insider to override
a security system.

133

In addition, the staff recommended that the government continue
its efforts to improve and develop an independent regulatory agen-
cy, such as GAN, in the former Soviet Union which can act as an
outside observer and make certain the systems are currently being
run in a proper way in the former Soviet Union.

The General Accounting Office, if you recall from their testimony
last week, recommended that for the short-term problem, the De-
partment of Energy should consider the deployment of large num-
bers of portal monitors in the former Soviet Union. In order to en-
courage Russian support for such an effort, they also suggested the
purchase and use wherever possible of indigenously produced mate-
rial.

Although the civilian sector is the main area of concern to most
experts, we cannot forget the Ministry of Defense and those mate-
rials and warheads currently under their control. As a senior U.S.
military and intelligence officer told the staff, "The more we learn
about security in their military complex, the more concerned we be-
come."

The staff has confirmed that security at some nuclear weapons
field sites may be suspect. For example, the staff recently inter-
viewed a former Russian military officer who had been assigned to
a nuclear weapons field base whose weapons were, by definition, in
a constant state of readiness. The officer stated that despite gates,
guards, and a security system which limited access to the warhead
facility, a base insider would be able to gain access to the storage
facility and steal a warhead without being detected.

The officer provided an account of overall base security which
was equally disturbing. Particularly, the officer noted that it was
common occurrence for the base to suffer electrical outages, some-
times because they did not pay their utility bills, that is, the Min-
istry of Defense did not pay its utility bills so their electric power
was cut off. When that happened, it would affect any special alarm
systems for warhead storage facilities.

The outer gates at the base, according to the officer, were guard-
ed not by soldiers but by civilians. The base in question held ap-
proximately 20 Scud-B nuclear warheads and an unknown number
of other nuclear artillery shells.

Russian officials have also privately confided that security is par-
ticularly suspect at certain weapons component and warhead dis-
assembly facilities. Ironically, Senators, the other key component of
our security system is the CTR program and its successes in the
dismantlement of the former Soviet weapons systems may actually
be posing new challenges, unforeseen challenges for the United
States and the West.

Ambassador James Goodby, the chief negotiator for the CTR pro-
gram, has publicly written and told the staff that our progress in
dismantling the thousands of weapons once targeted at the United
States and our allies has heightened the risks of theft and diver-
sion of the dismantled components and this new risk needs to be
urgently addressed.

In the view of many experts, upon dismantlement, these weapons
actually become more attractive to theft and diversion. A potential
smuggler no longer has to deal with the difficult and dangerous
task of dismantling a weapon. Weapons are then easier to trans-

134

port and hide, and a smuggler no longer has to deal with what is
generally assumed to be better security at the actual military facili-
ties where the warheads are located.

As indicative of this problem, last Wednesday, we heard testi-
mony that Russian-made missile components, including sophisti-
cated guidance systems for long-range missiles, were discovered in
transit to Iraq. The staff has learned that these parts came from
the dismantlement process in the former Soviet Union.

Although the CTR program is intended to increase the security
surrounding this process, we heard major complaints on its slow-
ness. It is a difficult system, we recognize, but the staff rec-
ommends greater efforts in this area.

The staff also heard of a project to construct a centralized storage
facility in Mayak, Russia, to store up to 50,000 containers of fissile
material from dismantled warheads as well as 12,500 dismantled
nuclear warheads. Rather than multiple sites located across the
former Soviet Union, a number of centralized facilities would be
better for security. It has been a daunting challenge to try to de-
velop a centralized storage system. There again have been com-
plaints concerning its slow progress, but we recognize that a good
deal of blame for delays in constructing the facility must lie with
the Russians and their own legal and construction system.

Nevertheless, the staff makes the following recommendations
concerning the former Soviet military facilities. We recommend
that the managers of the CTR program and Congress should con-
tinue their monitoring of the storage facility construction program
at Mayak to ensure its completion in a timely manner, as well as
overall efforts to increase security over the dismantling process.

The staff recommends that funding of the CTR program should
not be cut back. Rather, it should be increased. Despite initial
delays in implementation of the CTR program, it has demonstrated
overall improvement in the speed and efficiency of its operations
over time.

Lastly, in light of the serious security problems at Naval facili-
ties that were highlighted by the staff inquiry, as well as last
week's hearing, both the Departments of Defense and Energy
should increase their efforts in this area and make it one of the
highest priorities.

At this time. Senators, Mr. Edelman will discuss a number of
other issues, particularly those issues dealing with the trafficking
in nuclear material that we uncovered on our investigation.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Edelman?

TESTIMONY OF ALAN EDELMAN,i COUNSEL TO THE MINOR-
ITY, PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, U.S.
SENATE

Mr. Edelman. Stolen or diverted nuclear material presents a na-
tional security threat only if it can reach those who want it. As evi-
denced by the numerous seizures in Europe, poor border controls
in Russia and the Newly Independent States make it easy to smug-
gle nuclear material out of or into most any country. The facts of
the 1994 nuclear smuggling cases in Prague and in Munich dem-

1 The prepared staff statement of Mr. Sopko and Mr. Edelman appears on page 355.

135

onstrate the ease with which material can transit the region. The
defendants in these cases used planes, trains, and automobiles to
transport their material and no one ever detected their deadly car-
goes.

Law enforcement officials in the Czech Republic told the staff
that the material seized in the Prague case, approximately 2.75
kilograms of highly enriched uranium, was transported by two indi-
viduals, a Czech national and a Russian national, by train from
Russia to Prague.

Senator NuNN. Let me ask a question at this point. We are
critiquing pretty seriously the former Soviet Union, including Rus-
sia, in terms of a lot of different material controls, export controls.
Did you take a look at how good our export controls are here?
Could we detect nuclear material coming in and out?

Mr. Edelman. I do not think in many respects that we are all
that much better, probably. I think if you went to U.S. airports
around this country, you would be hard pressed to find monitors
to detect nuclear material. So ih that sense

Senator NUNN. Do you think it is more likely to happen there
now with the economic strain they have and the transitions they
are going through, but in terms of really protecting our own, we
are not that great, either, is that what you are saying?

Mr. Edelman. I think we are not that great, nor are the coun-
tries of Western Europe. We have talked with law enforcement offi-
cials from Western European countries who told us quite frankly
that there are probably no countries, or a handful at most, that
may have any kind of detection devices at their border crossings for
this type of material.

Senator NuNN. I think we are going to hear from U.S. Customs
on some of their plans this morning on that.

Mr. SOPKO. Actually, Senator, I think the U.S. Customs Service
will announce today that they have a new program in this area
that is going to go into effect very soon, I think this week. Concern-
ing these particular monitors, I think I will let them describe them
in more detail.

Mr. Edelman. The staff also learned that two of the defendants
in the Munich case — which, as you recall, was the case in which
defendants were arrested as they arrived in Germany on a Luft-
hansa flight from Moscow with a plutonium-uranium mixture —
prior to that flight had brought a smaller sample of plutonium to
Munich from Moscow by train, and that took place 1 month before
they were actually arrested.

A more detailed description of the Prague and Munich cases is
found in Appendix B to our staff statement. The information set
forth in the Appendix was obtained by the staff during two fact-
finding missions to Europe and includes the analysis of numerous
documents which heretofore were unavailable to Western law en-
forcement and intelligence sources.

The staff obtained access to files, records, and individuals that
show some of the people and the networks that were used to obtain
the smuggled nuclear material. The staff confirmed the identity of
some of the key individuals involved, as well as new information
concerning the source of the material in Russia. To our knowledge,
this information has never been published in the United States.

136

These cases have been down-played by some analysts because
the offenders were viewed as "amateurs", not smart enough to spot
a sting operation in the process. In the staffs opinion, however,
these cases are all the more significant for exactly that reason.

It is disturbing to us that amateurs could identify a source in
Russia, obtain weapons-usable nuclear material, and easily trans-
port it out of the former Soviet Union. Lacking any supporting
criminal organization, these amateurs were able to pass through
the border controls of various countries of Eastern and Western
Europe and ultimately negotiate with individuals for the delivery
of nuclear material. Indeed, if amateurs could accomplish that
much, then the possibility of what could be accomplished by crimi-
nal organizations or groups working perhaps in complicity with
rogue nations is a terrifying prospect.

In some respects, the amateurs of these cases represent a new
type of security threat. These people were not Mafia types, mem-
bers of organized crime groups, or even professional smugglers
even. Rather, they were a t3^e that seems more and more preva-
lent among the dislocated economic systems of Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union, people who buy, sell, or broker anything
they can get their hands on in order to obtain a profit.

For example, the chief defendant in the Prague case was a
former Czech nuclear physicist who left the nuclear industry be-
cause of its low pay and decided to open his own bakery. Having
failed at that business, he turned to the import-export business.

Similarly, the two main defendants in the Munich case were a
failed construction entrepreneur turned importer-exporter and a
former medical doctor who had turned to brokering military goods.

These cases also represent a new type of threat in that they in-
volve the first known instances of individuals with access to nu-
clear material being willing to steal to order. Previous cases in-
volved insiders who seized a moment of opportunity to walk off
with material which they hoped they could sell to someone at some
later point in time. But in both the Prague and Munich cases, sup-
pliers on the inside promised a continuing supply of material to
brokers who could sell it on the outside. These suppliers also be-
came involved in setting the price at which the material would be
sold to its ultimate buyer.

In the Prague case, the Czech defendant traveled to Russia to
participate in negotiations with his suppliers concerning the terms
for obtaining uranium and its transportation. After obtaining a
sample, the defendant ultimately found a buyer who wanted to be
supplied with five kilograms per month. The staff has learned that
the defendant went back to his suppliers and was told that they
could, in fact, deliver 40 kilograms within a short time frame and
up to one ton of uranium over a longer period.

In the Munich case, the defendants constantly consulted with
their suppliers while they were negotiating the terms of a deal with
their buyers. These suppliers provided the defendants with a small
sample of plutonium to bring to the buyers. However, the suppliers
constantly demanded prepayment for any ultimate deal.

The staff has learned that the reason the defendants had such
a small amount of plutonium with them when they were arrested
at the Munich airport was because they had had to purchase it

137

with their own money. When their buyers refused to provide pre-
payment, one of the defendants sold his own car in order to obtain
enough money to buy a small amount from the suppliers for deliv-
ery to the buyers.

Sensing what he termed "the chance of a lifetime", the defendant
was hoping that by proving he could deliver a small amount of plu-
tonium, he could convince the buyers to provide at least some pre-
payment for later shipments. The staff has learned that the defend-
ants planned to deliver as much as 11 kilograms of plutonium.

As important as these cases may be, they, as almost all of the
known diversion cases, had no U.S. nexus on which to base a direct
involvement on the part of U.S. law enforcement. Thus, training
and technical assistance to our foreign counterparts has become a
key component of our government's overall program to address the
illicit trafficking problem.

Indeed, almost every U.S. agency involved in nuclear safety, law
enforcement, and proliferation has elected to help train FSU and
Eastern European personnel as one step in the direction of fulfill-
ing its mandate. While the staff found that a number of the train-
ing programs being provided appear to be very effective and bene-
ficial, there is no comprehensive plan for the government's overall
training effort.

As a result, the staff has learned that U.S. training and technical
assistance may not target priorities of the former Soviet Union.
Moreover, particular agencies' efforts may be duplicative of other
U.S. efforts and those of other countries or international organiza-
tions. And finally, few of the agencies have developed a system to
do follow-up reports or audits to determine whether the individuals
trained or the equipment provided is being used as planned.

The staff recommends in light of this that one agency or individ-
ual be given the responsibility to oversee all nuclear smuggling and
law enforcement-related training and technical assistance. Regard-
less of where this function should reside, it should include over-
sight of law enforcement, intelligence, and AID, as well as military-
related assistance in order to avoid duplication of efforts. It should
also include an effective system of vetting trainees, monitoring pro-
gram effectiveness, and follow-up audits to ensure that training is
being used for intended purposes.

The Prague and the Munich cases show how easy it is to smuggle
nuclear material even in the highly developed regions of Europe.
However, the staff found widespread concern among nonprolifera-
tion experts that the Southern tier states of the former Soviet
Union are just as likely as Europe to be used as a transit route for
nuclear materials coming out of Russia; indeed, perhaps even more
so.

The geography of the region supports a basis for these concerns.
This region of the former Soviet Union borders Iran and China and
is close to Iraq, Syria, India, and Pakistan. In addition, the region
is full of already established narcotics and conventional weapons
smuggling routes.

Members of the staff have visited some of the borders in the
Caucasus and have seen unprotected borders in Armenia and Geor-
gia. The staff has been told that Azerbaijan has few, if any, border
guards along its border with Iran and that the fence between the

138

two countries is largely dismantled. Official U.S. Customs Service
trip reports reviewed by the staff describe similar problems in
Kazakstan, Kjo-gyzstan, and Turkmenistan.

U.S. Customs officials who visited Turkmenistan witnessed bor-
der guards waving cars through into Iran. Witnesses have told the
staff that bribing border guards is also easy and routine. We have
been told that "for a bottle of vodka, you can get across the border
without papers, and for $100, a carload of goods and travelers can
be arranged to cross without any inspection."

The problems of this region are perhaps best summed up by a
former Azerbaijani official who told the staff, "An3rthing can be
brought in or taken out of the country for the right price."

The staff has learned also that officials from proliferant states
are trying to induce nuclear specialists fi-om the Southern tier to
help them in their nuclear programs and are seeking high tech-
nology and dual-use nuclear materials from the region. Since 1992,
Iranian officials regularly have sponsored scientific exchanges with
nuclear specialists in Georgia and Kazakstan and have regularly
visited this region. News reports also claimed that officials fi*om
North Korea, Iraq, and Iran had been in Uzbekistan in 1992 to re-
cruit nuclear scientists.

Iranian-owned export-import businesses have sprung up in many
of these countries. Indeed, it was reports of Iranian interest in ob-
taining uranium from Kazakstan that led to the United States op-
eration known as Project Sapphire, which involved the purchase of
approximately 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium fi-om the
Kazakh government. Ironically, the staff was told by Kazakh offi-
cials that after the conclusion of Project Sapphire, the Kazakh gov-
ernment was berated by a senior Pakistani official for not selling
this uranium to Pakistan.

Although proliferation specialists in the U.S. readily admit that
this is a problem area, until recently, the nonproliferation commu-
nity has paid little attention to the region. Traditionally, the re-
sources that are spent on the former Soviet Union have been ear-
marked for Russia first and then the other nuclear states, Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Only a small amount of funding is di-
rected to the remaining states of the former Soviet Union, espe-
cially those in the Southern tier.

The staff believes that such a policy is short-sided and could be
ignoring one of the key areas of the nuclear black market. The staff
recommends that additional attention and resources be given to the
potential for nuclear smuggling from and through the Southern
tier. Training and technical assistance should be increased to these
Newly Independent States. Additionally, our intelligence and law
enforcement communities should devote more resources to collect-
ing and analyzing information pertaining to smuggling operations
and organized crime activities in that region.

The end of the Cold War has left many within the Russian de-
fense industry, including skilled nuclear weapons scientists, with
little or no work or income. Scientists in the civilian sector have
fared little better. During our conversations with the directors of
the Kurchatov Institute, the staff was informed that top scientists
there make the equivalent of $30 a month. The lack of pay or jobs

139

has created an atmosphere where some scientists may be forced to
look for work elsewhere.

The staff has obtained a copy of this flyer, which it confirmed
was circulating in the Middle East in 1994. It is from a company
called the Hong Kong Sun Shine Industrial Company. The com-
pany claims in its ad that it can sell Chinese weapons, including
rocket guns, rocket launchers, amphibious tanks, and middle- and
short-range guided missiles. The staff has confirmed through gov-
ernment sources that this company was, in fact, involved in illegal
arms trading.

Perhaps the most shocking statement in the advertisement,
though, is the following, where the company states, "We have de-
tailed files of hundreds of former Soviet Union experts in the field
of rocket, missile, and nuclear weapons. These weapons experts are
willing to work in a country which needs their skills and can offer
reasonable pay."

The Russian military has also been affected by the economic
problems besetting the country at large. General Maslin of the Rus-
sian Ministry of Defense's 12th Main Directorate has stated that
salaries for military troops in charge of nuclear warheads have
sometimes been a month or two overdue.

Indeed, in our interview with the Russian officer from the nu-
clear field base, the staff was told that black market activity in-
volving all types of commodities was common among the troops as
a way to make money. The officer stated that this activity started
from the very top, including the base commander, and that the
troops would sell anything, including base equipment and even ar-
mored personnel carriers.

In fact, the officer told the staff that some of the base's training
warheads may have been dismantled and their components sold on
the black market. Training warheads are exact replicas of nuclear
warheads except for the fact that they do not contain the fissile
material. According to the officer, at the time his base was
denuclearized, no orders were ever given as to what to do with
these training warheads. As a result, they remained on the base for
over a year with no guidance as to their disposition. The officer told
the staff that he saw one warhead that had been buried for lack
of anything better to do with it. The others, he surmised, had prob-
ably been sold off.

U.S. efforts to improve the security of weapons and fissile mate-
rial in the former Soviet Union have enjoyed substantial successes
and are gaining momentum, but the challenges and dangers con-
tinue to grow. Worsening economic dislocation in the former Soviet
Union has caused threats that have simply outpaced our efforts at
protection and control of nuclear materials and technology.

Fissile material leakage into an emerging nuclear black market
has become a reality. There is a real possibility that former Soviet
weapons scientists and their lethal know-how will be lost to rogue
nations. These weapons of unimaginable destructive power appear
increasingly within the grasp of nations, groups, and individuals
willing to do what we dare not even imagine.

In light of this new threat, we must be willing to rethink our
Cold War strategies, critically analyze our international conven-

140

tions and treaties and forge new policies that are responsive to this
new challenge.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes our formal statement and we
would be happy to respond to any questions you have for us.

Senator NuNN. You mention the Southern tier and the inatten-
tion that is given the Southern tier, and then on page 30 of your
staff statement — you did not give this orally, I do not believe, but
you say, "The problem of inattention to the Southern tier is exacer-
bated by the paucity of trained regional specialists and qualified
linguists in the U.S. Government to design and implement pro-
grams there."

You go on to say, "Part of this is due to misplaced bias in U.S.
Government personnel policies against regional expertise. Many ex-
perts in the U.S. Government who desire to become regional spe-
cialists believe they will be penalized for doing so."

Could you elaborate on that while we have our government wit-
nesses here, because I would like for them to also respond to that
when they testify. Does that mean we are discouraging specialists
inadvertently in those areas?

Mr. Edelman. It seems we are encouraging people to become
generalists rather than specialists. We have been told that people
in the Intelligence Community are only assigned to areas like this
for a short period of time and that if you end up being a specialist
in an area such as the Southern tier for any more than a few years,
it can end up being a death knell, perhaps, for your career in the
Foreign Service or in the Intelligence Community.

As well, we would note that the Brown Commission report, which
is the report of the Commission on Roles and Capabilities of the
U.S. Intelligence Community, has also cited this as a weakness. It
recommends that analysts be encouraged to remain with their sub-
stantive areas of expertise rather than having to constantly rotate
to other areas or to serve in management positions in order to be
promoted.

Senator NuNN. You have a lot of recommendations. Have you
captured all the recommendations beginning on page 49? Does that
capture all the recommendations that are made in the whole re-
port, page 49, 50, and 51, 55, 56? Is that the summary of all of
them?

Mr. Edelman. Yes. I believe this attempts to summarize in one
space in the staff statement the recommendations that are scat-
tered throughout.

Senator NuNN. If you had to choose the three or four most impor-
tant recommendations, you have probably 40 or 50 here, counting
those that are given by other people, what would be the three or
four most important ones?

Mr. SOPKO. Senator, I think probably the most important one is
to increase the funding for the Department of Energy's MPC&A
program, as well as for the Department of Defense

Senator NUNN. Tell us what those initials mean for people who
are not familiar.

Mr. SoPKO. I am sorry. Material protection, control, and account-
ability. Senator, it is a lot cheaper to protect the material at the
source. Basically, you have two programs out there working aggres-
sively in this area. One is the CTR program, which is the threat

141

reduction program, the Nunn-Lugar program. It focuses more on
the miHtary side. On the civihan side, where the greatest threat
exists, you have the lab-to-lab program or the MPC&A program in
the Department of Energy.

Senator NUNN. I believe you overall have given that program
good marks, right?

Mr. SOPKO. That is correct, Senator.

Senator NuNN. You have some suggestions, but you found that
the Department of Energy is doing a good job overall?

Mr. SoPKO. That is correct, Senator. But actually, they are start-
ing — their success has actually overtaken themselves. There are
more Russian laboratories coming on board, more institutes who
want to cooperate with the Energy Department. The problem is
that funding has not kept pace with it. We believe that Energy has
the structure available that can actually increase and expand to in-
corporate new resources.

But on the other hand, Senator, that is just one element. I think
this has to be a multi-agency and a multi-focused approach. That
is protection at the source, at the facilities. You also have to worry
about if it does leave that place, that facility, the next line of de-
fense is going to be at the borders.

So I would think the second major recommendation is we need
a very aggressive and coordinated — and I emphasize coordinated —
response to technical assistance and training for those countries,
either Russia, the Baltics, the Southern tier, to try to stop potential
material diversion at their borders. That is going to be difficult,
just like our trjdng to stop drugs at the U.S. border has been ex-
tremely difficult and some have said we have not been too success-
ful, but you still need to emphasize that.

The third point, and I think this was made by Dr. Bertsch from
the University of Georgia, is you have to assist these countries in
setting up some type of export control system, a realistic export
control system, to stop the "legal" sale of material and technical
know-how. I think those would probably be the three most impor-
tant.

The fourth one is probably developing GAN or some independent
agency that can monitor

Senator NuNN. You mean in Russia?

Mr. SoPKO. In Russia, as well as in the Ukraine or the other
countries. Those would be the three or four major recommendations
I would make, probably in addition to the Southern tier, which ev-
eryone we have spoken to in and out of the government, in Europe,
in Russia, and elsewhere is that is the area we are missing right
now.

Senator Nunn. Would you name the countries you are talking
about in the Southern tier?

Mr. SoPKO. As you can see from the border. Senator, they stretch
all the way from Kazakhstan, which borders China; Kyrgyzstan,
which borders China; Tajikistan, which borders China and Afghan-
istan; Uzbekistan, which borders Afghanistan; Turkmenistan,
which borders Afghanistan and Iran. Then you go through the Cas-
pian Sea and you go up to Georgia and the countries in that region
there, Azerbaijan, Armenia — my eyes are not that good. Senator.

142

Senator Nunn. Would someone also turn the map around so that
Senator Smith can see it?

Mr. SOPKO. But when we talk about that Southern tier, that is
what we are talking about, not going toward Western Europe. Be-
cause ironically, Senator, as some of the witnesses previously said,
that is where your best law enforcement is going to be, in Ger-
many. It is going to be in the Baltics. It will be that area. Why
would a smuggler go that way if the proliferators we are worried
about are in the South?

Senator NuNN. You really have to go both ways, though, do you
not? You are saying the priority now, the biggest gap is in the
South?

Mr. SoPKO. That is correct, Senator. I am not sajdng, ignore the
West and the Baltics, but we ought to emphasize we have to focus
down there in the South.

Senator NuNN. When you say go both ways, you mean law en-
forcement go both ways.

Mr. SoPKO. Law enforcement.

Senator NuNN. But in terms of smuggling, they are more likely
to go the way of least resistance and that is the Southern tier.

Mr. SoPKO. That is easier. Senator. We have spoken to people
and some members of the staff have traveled down there. You can-
not even tell where the borders are, and particularly the internal
borders. You can go from Russia into Kazakhstan and not know
you are in it. There is no border control there, very little for the
most part. Then you go from Kazakhstan right into the next coun-
try. There is no border control down there, or minimal, at best.

Senator NuNN. Mr. Edelman, do you have any other highlights
or recommendations that you would like to emphasize?

Mr. Edelman. Perhaps the other recommendation would be with
respect to the scientists, particularly the weapons scientists who re-
main in Russia and who have very little income and little opportu-
nities or ways to feed their families and yet have some of the most
deadly knowledge known to man.

I think we heard from Dr. Schweitzer last week that there were,
he thought, over 60,000 of these scientists which he termed a pro-
liferation threat in terms of having the ability to help a country
construct these kinds of weapons. The longer that these people re-
main without an ability to put food on the table for their families
or clothe their children, the more we face a threat that these people
may go elsewhere.

Senator NuNN. We have some efforts underway. The Nunn-Lugar
program funds laboratories. The Japanese have put money in that.
The Europeans have. How many Russians are we emplojdng in
those laboratories?

Mr. Edelman. I am not sure of the numbers.

Senator NuNN. Then you have the Energy Department's lab-to-
lab. Do you know how many of these 60,000 — I believe 30,000 of
those 60,000 were aerospace means of delivery-type scientists and
about another 30,000 were either nuclear, chemical, or biological,
as I recall the breakdown.

Mr. SoPKO. Senator, on pages 35 and 36, we reference it. I be-
lieve at least 11,000 former weapons scientists have participated in
the International Science and Technology Centers, and I believe

143

another 2,000 have been involved in the U.S. Industrial Coalition,
which is part of the Energy Department's Industrial Partnering
Program.

Those are numbers of people who have been involved. The prob-
lem is the funding levels and whether these people are committed
to continue their involvement in these programs. If I am not mis-
taken, I believe the funding level is either flat or has gone down
for both of those programs.

What I think Dr. Schweitzer commented on is you are trying to
convince Russian scientists or a Russian weapons specialist to actu-
ally give up working in a field he has been working in for 20 or
30 years; to give up his retirement system; to give up his health
and benefits system, to work on a program which Congress has
said it may fund for only a year. You need a long-term commitment
from us that this is something that they should be working in, and
I think that is the point.

We may have had 12,000 or 20,000 people involved, but for how
long? And how great is that commitment to get into the civilian
sector, to start using their techniques of developing bombs to be
used for civilian or peaceful purposes?

Senator NUNN. I think everybody would acknowledge that no
matter what we do, even if everything you recommend we do, we
do correctly and we fund correctly, most of the work has to be done
within these countries, is that right?

Mr. Edelman. Yes, we would agree with that.

Senator Nunn. So we are kidding ourselves if we think we are
going to solve their problem. But it also is true the biggest security
threat is to those countries, even though it is a security threat to
us, too, so they have a great deal of incentive to work on their own
problems.

My question is, you talked to probably hundreds of different offi-
cials in Russia and Eastern European countries and some of the
Southern tier countries. What is the attitude generally speaking in
terms of their willingness to tackle their own problems and to put
their own resources into this crucial area?

Mr. Edelman. On the law enforcement side, I would say that the
law enforcement officials that we have spoken to do recognize this
is a problem, are concerned about the diversion and smuggling of
these materials, and have devoted efforts to stop it and to stop it
before it gets out of the former Soviet Union and into other coun-
tries. In fact, Russian law enforcement authorities have made nu-
merous arrests within the borders of Russia of individuals who had
stolen material from various facilities throughout the country, so
there does seem to be both an appreciation of the problem and a
willingness and determination to go after it on the law enforcement
side.

Mr. SOPKO. I think with the laboratories. Senator, you are seeing
a commitment, and I am certain the Department of Energy can
give you more examples, but you are having more laboratories and
facilities interested in participating with the United States and
they are making that commitment.

I think you see a commitment from the higher officials. President
Yeltsin has called for this conference next month which is going to
be dealing with the whole issue of nuclear security and he will be

144

meeting with President Clinton and other world leaders on this
issue.

Senator NUNN. Senator Smith?

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SMITH

Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me just commend you and your staff for the tremendous
service I think you have done for your country, as well as the free
world, in bringing this matter to our attention in the amount of de-
tail that you have.

I just want to follow up for a few moments on the brain drain
issue. You mentioned the 60,000 scientists. Are there more of these
scientists coming out of the pipeline anywhere? Are the Russians
still producing these scientists, still educating them and sending
them out into the pipeline, only to be frustrated and to move on,
or is there an end to this? Are there just 60,000, or is that number
fluid?

Mr. SOPKO. Senator, the 60,000 number was actually a number
that I believe Dr. Schweitzer, who ran the Moscow center, was the
initial Executive Director, came up with. There are millions of sci-
entists who were involved in the weapons and nuclear programs.
He has said they have identified about 60,000 who have that tjrpe
of capability that we should be concerned about from a proliferation
point of view.

Senator NUNN. Mainly those involved with weapons of mass de-
struction or the means to deliver those weapons of mass destruc-
tion.

Mr. SoPKO. That is correct.

Senator Nunn. That is the 60,000, I think.

Mr. SoPKO. Yes. He is identifying probably 60,000 who have the
unique capabilities.

Senator NuNN. But I think Senator Smith is asking a very im-
portant question. He is saying if we were to capture all that 60,000,
are we going to have 10,000 more next year? Is there a never end-
ing supply of them?

Mr. SoPKO. Probably there are other people entering the system.
Their schools are still producing scientists. But whether you have
the people who still have those years of experience, because we are
talking about 60,000 people who have experience in making this
material and these weapons. I do not have a direct answer to that.
There probably are some, but a lot less, coming down the pipeline.

Senator Smith. When you talk in your report here about the fact
that this project, the Department of Energy's Industrial Partnering
Program, your point is, though, that it is not enough, that it is not
long-term enough and scientists are not interested or they are not
able to get people to come into this because it is not long-term. But
even in the short term, it is better than $30 a month, is it not?

Mr. SoPKO. That is correct. Senator.

Senator Smith. So you are getting some benefit from that?

Mr. SoPKO. Absolutely, Senator.

Senator NuNN. One of the frustrating things here, and there is
a legitimate point, some of the critics. Senator Smith, of this pro-
gram have said, look, some of those people are working part-time
and they are going over to their normal job and they are continuing

145

to work to, let us say, build weapons and so forth for Russia. The
question then becomes, are we subsidizing Russia's continued mili-
tary efforts?

The answer to that is, it is a mixed answer because the answer
is partially yes, but what you are trying to do is wean them away.
But the main thing you are trying to do is not to get them to quit
working in Russia. That would be a desirable goal. But the main
thing is not having them end up in Libya or North Korea or Iran
or Iraq or some country like that. So if you can keep them in Rus-
sia, we know we are going to have a continued Russian nuclear
threat for a long, long time to come.

Senator Smith. That was my next point, and I did come in late
and I apologize for that and it may have been addressed

Senator NUNN. No, that had not, but that is a key point in the
debate up here on the Hill, I think.

Senator Smith. What evidence do we have of who is going where?
Are any of them in North Korea, in Iran, or in Iraq?

Mr. Edelman. There is a report which has been confirmed and
was discussed a little bit at last week's hearing that Russian au-
thorities had stopped a planeload of, I believe it was missile sci-
entists who were on their way to North Korea. The plane was
stopped before it left Russia and the scientists never left the coun-
try. So there was that one instance involving North Korea.

As well, the staff has obtained a copy — I do not know if we have
the blow-up here — but a copy of a flyer that was circulating in the
Middle East in 1994 in which a Hong Kong company is advertising
the fact that, as they claim, they have detailed files of hundreds
of former Soviet Union weapons scientists, including nuclear weap-
ons scientists, who are, according to the ad, available to work in
other countries for, what they say, reasonable pay.

Senator Smith. When these people emigrate, which is probably
not a very good word, but leave these countries, is there any at-
tempt to stop them by Russian authorities or are they just simply
allowed to go?

Mr. SOPKO. They are trying to stop them. Senator, but a lot of
times, people just sort of drop out of the system. I think what Dr.
Schweitzer mentioned last time in talking to other people is it is
not so much the fear of people emigrating, because very few Rus-
sians want to go and live in Iran or Iraq, either. It is more their
giving away their techniques on like a 2-week trip. They go for a
vacation or go for a month or two and then come back.

The Russians, and I think the other Newly Independent States,
are looking at that, but they cannot stop people from travel any
more than we can here, and I do not think we would want to rec-
ommend them shut their borders totally to emigration.

Senator Smith. What are these countries offering them? I as-
sume by your testimony some of them are getting there to these
countries, hopefully not as many as we might expect, but what does
Iran have to offer these folks?

Mr. Edelman. I think it is mainly just more money than they
can make doing what they are presently doing; or perhaps that
they can do what they are not presently doing in the Soviet Union.
Many of these individuals are unemployed, or even if they are em-

146

ployed, as we mentioned, are getting basically the equivalent of
about $30 a month.

We should also point out that given today's advanced tech-
nologies, a lot of these scientists do not even have to leave the
country in order to provide help to some of these countries that we
are concerned about. We have seen reports where scientists in Rus-
sia have been giving advice and answering technical questions to
outside countries over the Internet, basically, and they get paid on
the basis of their help through answering detailed technical ques-
tions over worldwide communications links.

Mr. SOPKO. Senator, everything, just to add, that they offer,
these countries or groups, as we found out with the Aum Shinrikyo
when we did that hearing, that they were trying to recruit Russian
and Ukrainian scientists and may have actually succeeded in that,
they give these scientists something to do in their field. Many of
these laboratories and facilities have no money, so they have actu-
ally stopped research. You may be on the pa3a'oll of such and such
a metallurgical institute, but there is nothing in the institute any-
more. Everyone has stolen all of the components. No one is getting
paid. It is an empty building.

You are a scientist who has devoted your life to studying some
type of field. You are approached by somebody who says, look, if
you want to continue your research, we will fund it. That is what
the Aum Shinrikyo was doing. They were in the Ukraine and Rus-
sia offering money asking scientists to continue their research.
They were sa3ang they were very interested — here is money for a
research paper. And, as a scientist or a professional who is faced
with either doing nothing versus continuing his research, that is an
offer that he may not refuse. It may not just be the money. It may
be professional pride and experience.

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, I just want to ask one more fol-
low-up question on this point and then I would be happy to yield
back.

I guess the obvious question for all of us here is you have painted
a pretty grim picture, a sobering picture of what the situation is.
I guess the question is, is it reversible? Have so many now gone
to these countries that we are now going to have to gear up in a
mode that prepares us to perhaps in the next few years consider
these nations capable of using these weapons — capable, if not nec-
essarily intending — but capable of using these weapons against us
because of these scientists or are we in a position that we can re-
verse this by simply stopping any future brain drain, as well as
materials. Obviously, it is not just the scientists. It is the mate-
rials, as well, so I would combine materials and scientists both in
that question.

Mr. Edelman. I guess we should point out in the context of all
this discussion, and it was pointed out by Dr. Schweitzer last week,
and he has had far more experience in this area than we have, but
he stated that the vast majority of Russian scientists that he has
talked with and dealt with in the centers over the years he was
there, are very loyal citizens to their countries and do not want to
get involved with countries like Iran or Iraq and want to stay in
their own country and work there, if at all possible.

147

But nevertheless, it does not take all that many to create a real
concern. You do not have to have 60,000 scientists in your country.
A few dozen or 100 or so are probably more than enough to cause
real damage.

Senator Smith. That is my point, though. Are the few dozen
there already?

Mr. Edelman. Unfortunately, I do not know how much real hard
information we have in terms of how many may have gotten out
and where they may have ended up, and that is a real challenge
for our Intelligence Community and our country to determine.

Senator Smith. I have a couple more questions, but go ahead.

Senator NuNN. Is there anything else you want to add before we
call our next panel?

Mr. SOPKO. Senator, briefly, I just wanted to mention that we do
have a series of statements for the record that have been provided
by a number of institutions and individuals and we would ask that
they be made part of the hearing record. We thank them very
much for their assistance, and they are very good statements we
recommend people reviewing.

Senator NuNN. Without objection.

John and Alan, you have done a superb job. This represents lit-
erally thousands of hours of your time in the last 12 to 16 months,
and we appreciate very much your thorough report.

Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, as they leave, could I just ask one
question? On your sources, you feel very confident and comfortable
with the sources of most of your information, I assume?

Mr. SoPKO. That is correct, Senator. Many times we cannot iden-
tify them for their own protection.

Senator Smith. Obviously.

Mr. SoPKO. But we feel very confident of our sources.

Senator NuNN. I would also invite the attention of our Executive
Branch witnesses over the next couple of weeks, if you can, to the
recommendations that have been made. There are too many to re-
spond to here today. There are probably 40 or 50 of them. We will
be studying them here. There are a number of them I know that
I already completely endorse, but they bear close study.

I would ask you to study the ones within your range of expertise
in terms of the agencies and please give us your pros and cons of
it. We would just like your frank assessment. Senator Smith, Sen-
ator Lugar, and I, and perhaps Senator Roth, are thinking in terms
of updating the whole Nunn-Lugar legislation and putting together
a much more comprehensive approach to this problem in the over-
all. You and I had discussed that once before.

This set of recommendations, 40 or 50 of them here, are not just
staff recommendations but GAO recommendations and experts that
we had testify last week, will be those that will be our beginning
point to see which parts of them need legislative attention, and
even those that do not, whether we can make legislative rec-
ommendations to the Executive Branch in this respect.

Mr. SoPKO. Senator, if I could just add, you asked for the staff
to contact all of the witnesses who previously appeared and testi-
fied before the Subcommittee to give get their recommendations.
There is an additional document that we would ask to be offered
into the record, which is a series of letters from all of those wit-

148

nesses with their recommendations. It is called "Recommendations
for Improvement Submitted by Subcommittee Witnesses." We
would ask that this be included in the record. ^

Senator NUNN. Good. We will put that in the record following
your recommendations so we will have them all in one group. With-
out objection, that will be done.

Mr. SOPKO. Thank you, Senator.

Senator NuNN. Our next witnesses, in this order, if you could
sort of be arranged from left to right, we will call on you in this
order, and if all of you will remain standing because I will swear
in all the witnesses as we do before the Subcommittee.

Our witnesses are Thomas McNamara, who is the Assistant Sec-
retary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State;
Frank Miller, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
International Security Policy, Department of Defense; Charles Cur-
tis, Deputy Secretary, Department of Energy; Robert Blitzer, Sec-
tion Chief, Domestic Terrorism/Counterterrorism, Federal Bureau
of Investigation; Connie Fenchel, Director, Strategic Investigations
Division, U.S. Customs Service; and Dr. Gordon Oehler, Director,
Nonproliferation Center of the Central Intelligence Agency.

If all of you will hold up your right hand, please, those who are
going to testify, I will swear you in.

Do you swear the testimony you will give before the Subcommit-
tee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help you, God?

Mr. McNamara. I do.

Mr. Miller. I do.

Mr. Curtis. I do.

Mr. Blitzer. I do.

Ms. Fenchel. I do.

Mr. Oehler. I do.

Senator NuNN. Thank you. I know all of you have very thorough
statements which we have studied and will study with great care.
In the interest of being able to have as much exchange as possible,
I would ask that you summarize your statements somewhere be-
tween 5 and 10 minutes. We will not be exact on that, but hope-
fully to give us a chance for discussion, if you could do that.

Mr. McNamara, we will start with you.

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS E. McNAMARA,2 ASSISTANT SEC-
RETARY, BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, DE-
PARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. McNamara. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to address the Sub-
committee and I would like to summarize what I have already sub-
mitted. There is an expanded version of my statement, which I
would request be included in the record.

Senator NUNN. All the statements will be part of the record,
without objection.

Mr. McNamara. The breakup of the Soviet empire radically
changed the proliferation landscape. We are, in a sense, victims of
our own success. The end of the Cold War and dramatic reductions

' See Exhibit No. 14 which appears on page 717.

^The prepared statement of Mr. McNamara appears on page 424.

149

in nuclear weapons have borne the seeds of a new nuclear danger.
Nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-usable materials did not
disappear when they have fulfilled their political purpose; nor do
the scientific knowledge and technical skills that produced those
weapons disappear.

Thousands of nuclear weapons and hundreds of tons of weapons-
usable uranium and plutonium have been rendered excess by our
success in reducing nuclear arsenals. A proliferator or a terrorist
needs only a few kilograms of plutonium — roughly an amount the
size of a soda can — to destroy a city. It is thus imperative that we
protect nuclear materials, control nuclear technology, and redirect
weapons scientists to peaceful pursuits.

The Soviet system for protecting and controlling nuclear mate-
rials worked within their totalitarian police-state structure. As the
nations of the former Soviet Union move to democratic forms of
government, they confront the complex task of protecting nuclear
materials within free societies. They also face economic dislocation
and the emergence of organized crime. Both the temptation and the
means to divert nuclear materials, therefore, have increased sig-
nificantly.

The security of nuclear materials and technology has been a top
priority foreign policy objective of both the Congress and the Presi-
dent for two consecutive administrations. The vision and leadership
of you — Senator Nunn — and Senator Lugar, have been critical to
the Executive Branch efforts. Our mutual commitment is clearly
demonstrated in legislation sponsored by Senators Nunn and Lugar
establishing the $1.5 billion Cooperative Threat Reduction (CRT)
program for the former Soviet Union.

This shared sense of purpose and priority is also reflected in leg-
islation establishing the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund,
and the fiscal year 1996 Department of Energy appropriation for
nuclear material security upgrades.

The President has involved himself and all levels of the Execu-
tive Branch in this endeavor. Vice President Gore's excellent rela-
tionship with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin has allowed us to
make great strides in adding dozens of additional sites to our nu-
clear material security upgrade program. These two men have
taken a personal and direct interest in the programs.

Secretary Christopher and the heads of every other agency in-
volved and every other agency represented here, and other senior
officials throughout the government have taken a personal interest,
and personal roles in this effort. With respect to the State Depart-
ment, Deputy Secretary Talbott, Under Secretary Davis, myself,
and my entire bureau are deeply engaged in the subject.

Moreover, the President has appointed Ambassador Morningstar
as his assistance coordinator for the Newly Independent States,
and Ambassador Jim Goodby as his principal negotiator and spe-
cial representative for nuclear security and dismantlement. All of
these activities are coordinated by the National Security Council.

From the beginning, this adminstration has pursued a strategy
that combines diplomatic initiatives, arms control efforts, technical,
and law enforcement initiatives to reduce these new risks that are
arising. Many U.S. agencies are involved, but there is a simple core
logic behind the multifaceted effort. That is, nuclear weapons, nu-

150

clear materials, and nuclear expertise must be properly secured.
Excess quantities of nuclear material must be reduced and every
effort must be made to ensure that the gains we have made in
arms control become irreversible.

Let me outline the major elements of the administration's strat-
egy. First, we ensured that new nuclear weapon states did not
emerge from the breakup of the Soviet Union. The Ukraine,
Kazakstan, and Belarus joined the NPT and agreed to remove all
nuclear weapons from their territory. Removal is completed in
Kazakstan. It is progressing well in the Ukraine and Belarus.
Through our CTR program, we have worked to ensure that these
and other Russian strategic systems are dismantled in a timely
and safe manner in Russia.

The second element — dismantling nuclear weapons — eliminates
one problem but creates another, as has been mentioned earlier,
large stockpiles of nuclear materials from the dismantled weapons.
Theft of nuclear materials would save a would-be proliferator hun-
dreds of millions of dollars and years of sophisticated engineering.
Therefore, we are working to reduce the stockpiles of nuclear weap-
ons grade materials in the former Soviet Union, and working with
Russia and the other states on ways to render the nuclear material
from dismantled nuclear weapons unusable for future nuclear
weapons.

Third, we are working to secure existing stockpiles with effective
systems of nuclear materials protection, accounting, and control.
This involves creating independent regulatory authorities and im-
plementing facility specific security measures.

Fourth, we must also be able to interdict thefts so that nuclear
materials are not handed over to terrorists or governments seeking
nuclear weapons. We are assisting these new countries to create ef-
fective customs and export control systems and we are helping
them to write new laws, establish new agencies, and develop the
technical capabilities to implement effective controls. We have also
initiated international cooperation to combat nuclear smuggling.

Finally, the threat of nuclear proliferation does not stem from
nuclear materials alone. Soviet nuclear weapons programs em-
ployed thousands of scientists and engineers with expertise invalu-
able to terrorists or rogue states. Through the science and tech-
nology centers in Russia and the Ukraine and the Industrial
Partnering Program, the IPP program, we are funding cooperative
projects with Western scientists that engage thousands of scientists
throughout the former Soviet Union in constructive, peaceful
projects.

This multi-faceted approach to the security problem requires the
coordinated efforts on the part of many agencies. These efforts cost
money. The CTR and related programs have already paid huge
dividends for U.S. security. Hundreds of nuclear materials are no
longer mounted on missiles targeted on the United States. Tons of
nuclear materials are already out of reach of smugglers and terror-
ists. The continuation of these programs, however, is vital to the
safety of the American people and we need to continue them.

We know that the resources are not unlimited, however. Hard
choices need to be made and priorities need to be established. Some
facilities in Russia, and in other countries, are far less secure than

151

some others. A small number of civilian facilities pose the greatest
risks and these have received the highest priority attention. We
have assured ourselves by addressing their needs. We have also de-
veloped an agreed plan to upgrade security at these locations and
assistance is flowing to implement that plan. Specifics on the plan
are contained in a number of reports, including one that was re-
leased at the Hyde Park Summit last year.

Security at military facilities is better, allowing longer-term solu-
tions, such as purchase of the HEU from the weapons for resale as
power reactor fuel, construction of new storage facilities for pluto-
nium from the dismantled warheads, and development of long-term
plans for disposition of plutonium. We are pursuing all of these
things with the Russians.

But resources are not the only limiting factor. Russia is proceed-
ing very cautiously, in what they see as a very sensitive area. Some
in Russia are wary of too close cooperation with the United States.
The pace, in fact, is slower than we would like, but the progress
has been real and we think it is, getting better as time goes by.

We know that nuclear weapons grade material is at risk and we
know that there are covert networks out to acquire sensitive tech-
nology for weapons of mass destruction. We also know that crimi-
nals have obtained at least small quantities of nuclear material in
the past few years. The international community sees this threat
and is taking steps necessary to meet it. We have no evidence that
a successful transaction involving weapons-usable material has oc-
curred or that an extensive nuclear black market has yet devel-
oped.

To our knowledge, nuclear smuggling almost always results in
the arrest of the traffickers. Indeed, most cases involve flim-flam
artists peddling bogus, though sometimes dangerous, material. But
the danger from even one successful case of diversion, whether it
involves a nuclear weapon, weapons-usable nuclear materials, or
the technical expertise of nuclear scientists is most serious.

We are attacking the problem at every level and using the full
range of tools available to us. We will have to combat this problem
for the remainder of this century and beyond. Resources must be
applied not only to the high profile activities that dominate popular
fiction on this topic, but also to the more mundane and more effec-
tive efforts to secure nuclear material at the source. We also need
to reduce the supply of weapons-usable material. This is going to
be a very long-distance run and we are in it for the long haul.

I would like to note that there is a global convergence of views
regarding the importance of this issue. Our concern is mirrored by
that of the government of Russia. The most dramatic evidence of
this convergence of views is President Yeltsin's initiative in
convoking next month's Moscow Nuclear Summit. This initiative
was warmly and immediately accepted by President Clinton and
the other P-8 leaders.

Next month, the focused attention of the world and its leaders
will be on these issues in Moscow.

Just let me close by saying that today, we are focused on nuclear
issues, but I want to also note the serious threat presented by
chemical and biological weapons in the hands of terrorists and
rogue states. One important thing we can do quickly to help meet

152

this throat is for the Senate to move with all due haste to ratify
the Chemical Weapons Convention, since the CWC provisions will
make it more difficult for terrorists and rogue states to obtain
chemical weapons and easier for governments to take action, collec-
tively and individually, to fight terrorists and rogue states seeking
such weapons.

Mr. Chairman, I would now like to defer to my colleagues to de-
tail the roles of their agencies in implementing the President's pol-
icy on this very critical issue.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. McNamara.

Mr. Miller.

TESTIMONY OF FRANK MILLER,* PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSIST-
ANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, Senator Smith, I am pleased to be
able to represent the Defense Department at today's hearings.

Senator NuNN. Senator Smith, if any particular question comes
up while they are testifying, feel free to inquire.

Mr. Miller. My boss. Assistant Secretary Ash Carter, is dis-
appointed not to be here today. As you know. Assistant Secretary
Carter and Secretary Perry have been the key drivers in the De-
fense Department and within the U.S. Government in a lot of the
Cooperative Threat Reduction efforts. Assistant Secretary Carter is
in Moscow today undertaking discussions with the Russian govern-
ment on some of these very issues.

The Defense Department has long agreed with the central
premise of this hearing, that is, that the breakup of the Soviet
Union, while greatly diminishing the possibility of a mass orga-
nized nuclear attack on the United States, has at the same time
created a unique and new danger for the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction.

Over the last 5 years, through the Cooperative Threat Reduction
program, which is more popularly known as the Nunn-Lugar pro-
gram, the Department of Defense has devoted $1.5 billion to reduce
the threat posed by the dangerous nuclear chemical and biological
weapons legacies of the Cold War and we are requesting over $300
million more in fiscal year 1997.

We have not undertaken this effort out of altruism but we have
undertaken it because it truly represents defense by other means.
Reducing these threats now is the best way to be sure we will not
have to face them in the future.

The Secretary of Defense puts it this way. "When I am chal-
lenged by the Congress, which I am, to justify the expenditure of
defense funds for what some of them consider non-defense pur-
poses, I tell them that these programs are an example of defense
by other means, that is, we are strengthening our own security by
helping the Russians reduce their nuclear weaponry. These are the
benefits of engagement."

The Vice President has praised the Nunn-Lugar program for its
contributions to defense conversion, peaceful employment of weap-
ons scientists, dismantling of strategic systems, and protecting nu-

' The prepared statement of Mr. Miller appears on page 438.

153

clear weapons and materials, as well as tearing down the old and
weary monuments to the Cold War that helped keep our nations
locked in nuclear competition for generations.

Given the potential for former Soviet nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons to threaten the United States, our armed forces,
and our allies, this danger deserves more public attention than it
has received, and partly as a result of the misperception of the
threat, the Congress itself cut the fiscal year 1996 Cooperative
Threat Reduction budget by 20 percent last year.

Every year, the CTR program has battled misconceptions that it
is foreign aid and that it helps the Russians more than it helps us.
Of course, as the quote from Secretary Perry I used a few moments
ago demonstrates, that is not true, and for this reason the Depart-
ment welcomes these hearings and the opportunity they represent
to highlight the serious threat posed by proliferation and our re-
sponses as a government to them.

Senator Nunn, you and Senator Lugar deserve special apprecia-
tion for your foresight in giving the Department of Defense the
tools necessary to address this top security priority. You recognized
this threat in the fall of 1991 and your strong support for our De-
partment's efforts have made our successes possible.

We set ourselves a series of objectives at the beginning of the
Nunn-Lugar program and I would like to briefly indicate what
those objectives were and the progress we have made to date on
them.

First, it was to prevent the proliferation of other nuclear states,
to prevent the Soviet Union from producing many nations that
were nuclear weapons states, and we are on the verge of complet-
ing this goal. The last nuclear warhead left Kazakstan last year,
and Belarus and Ukraine are on track to be nuclear weapons-free
this year.

Second, stimulate and hasten nuclear reductions. Thanks in
large part to U.S. efforts, including those under CTR, the launchers
for over 3,400 strategic nuclear warheads formerly aimed at the
United States no longer exist and reductions in strategic offensive
launchers throughout the former Soviet Union are ahead of the
START I Treaty schedule.

Third, safeguard weapons in Russia, what we call weapons pro-
tection, control, and accounting or PC&A. The Russian Ministry of
Defense's transport and storage of nuclear weapons destined for
dismantlement is safer and far more secure thanks to DOD's co-
operation with the Russian Ministry of Defense.

Fourth, safeguard weapons-usable material, what is called, as
was said earlier, MPC&A, material protection, control, and ac-
counting. Whether in civil or military facilities, efforts funded ini-
tially by the Department of Defense and now by the Department
of Energy are designed to ensure that bomb-grade materials are
not diverted into the hands of proliferators. We have enjoyed some
major successes in this area. For example, the agreement to pur-
chase blended down highly enriched uranium removed from Soviet
nuclear weapons for use in U.S. power reactors, and the removal,
as indicated earlier, of over 20 bombs' worth of material from
Kazakstan through Project Sapphire.

154

Nevertheless, we need to do more in this area. Cooperation in
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan has been quite good, but better
cooperation from the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy is nec-
essary to make significant progress on this challenging program.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Miller, let me ask you one question here.
This one has to be approached carefully, and I do not advocate nec-
essarily spending so-called Nunn-Lugar money on this, but I do
think that the Russian naval problems, both with reactors and
some of the bases and the material going into those reactors, is a
source of great concern, not just from a smuggling and terrorism
basis, but also environmental concern, in terms of dumping, ocean
dumping. I know Senator Stevens has been very concerned about
this.

Mr. Miller. Yes, sir.

Senator NuNN. Our Navy has been extremely reluctant to even
come within 4,500 miles of that situation because our Navy, under-
standably, has had almost a perfect safety record, remarkable, and
I commend them for it. But somebody at the DOD level is going
to have to say, what is in the national interest here, particularly
since the Russian navy, at least at some points in time, has been
very anxious for our cooperation. Part of that is because they want
some money, but part of it is also a question of expertise.

I would hope that DOD, and you can talk to Secretary Perry and
Ash Carter about this, would take a look at how we could get our
Navy to really start communicating with the Russian navy and
having exchange with the Russian navy and buffer them institu-
tionally from the charge that they fear, which is, I understand it,
that somehow if something goes wrong over there and they come
anywhere near it, and they think things will go wrong, it is their
fault.

Mr. Miller. Yes, sir.

Senator Nunn. There ought to be a way, institutionally, to do
that, and it has to be cautious. It has to be step-by-step. It does
not have to involve any money at the beginning. You have to deter-
mine that as you go along.

But I think for us to sit here and watch this situation develop,
and our staff documented some of the real problems in the naval
handling of material, the Russian navy, and Senator Stevens has
over and over again talked about the problems environmentally in
terms of dumping some of these reactors, for us to just watch that
and to let an institutional, an understandable institutional psychol-
ogy block some of the best experts in the whole world, which is the
U.S. Navy in terms of safety of this kind of a situation, to let that
continue indefinitely it seems to me is unacceptable.

Mr. Miller. Senator, I think I can say to you we are not going
to let that continue, but what we are doing

Senator NuNN. It has been going on for a long time.

Mr. Miller. It has indeed. Senator.

Senator Nunn. I remember when the Russians were here back
several years ago, it was not this administration but a previous
one, they were here and the Russian navy, some people had plans
of all the blueprints of some of the things they were building and
some of the things they were doing, sat in a hotel room in Wash-
ington for 3 or 4 days and could not get a meeting with anybody.

155

It is the kind of stuff we would have paid Dr. Oehler and his crowd
bilhons of dollars to find out, and they were sitting over in a hotel
room and nobody would even talk to them.

Finally, we got some people at the NSC to talk to them, but it
is an institutional psychology, and you know it. Somebody has to
break through it and at the same time protect our Navy from any
kind of charge that if something goes wrong over there and they
have had any contact, that it is their fault. I do not know how you
do it, but it is a challenge that somebody has to tackle.

Mr. Miller. It is a challenge. We are working on it. We are
working on it cooperatively with the Department of Energy. I will
say that there is one thing that we have to get past with the Rus-
sian navy and that is there is a bit of the Cold War mindset still
in the Russian navy

Senator Nunn. No doubt.

Mr. Miller [continuing]. And part of that is to say, if we are
going to give you some access to our facilities, we want reciprocity
and we want access to U.S. facilities. Senator, you and Senator
Smith know full well that U.S. Navy nuclear propulsion is the most
advanced in the world and there are things that we do not want
anybody to see in that.

Senator NuNN. And we do not need their help in safety, too. I
mean, it is just a world of realism. They do need our help in that
regard.

Mr. Miller. Yes, sir. We need to get past their idea that there
has to be full reciprocity and transparency in the naval nuclear es-
tablishment, so we are working on that with the Department of En-
ergy.

Senator NuNN. Good.

Mr. Miller. The fifth area, sir, it has been hit on several times
today, is the prevention of the diversion of talent. The original leg-
islation which established the Cooperative Threat Reduction pro-
gram highlighted the threat embodied by weapons scientists from
the former Soviet Union emigrating to places that would employ
them in the building and use of nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons around the world.

The International Science and Technology Center in Moscow,
which also serves Minsk and Almaty, Kazakstan, and the Center
in Kiev, which were initially funded by CTR legislation and are
now managed by the State Department, have not only created
peaceful employment for over 10,000 weapons scientists and engi-
neers, but also have ensured that they are not recruited abroad to
serve rogue states' weapons programs. And I would subscribe sure-
ly to the comments by the Committee staff that this has to be an
ongoing effort. You cannot give them one pot of money and say that
is it.

Sixth, we have been catalyzing the conversion of the oversized
Soviet weapons establishment. Defense conversion efforts under
CTR have been quite successful, although they represent a small
portion of the program's budget. Secretary Perry refers to defense
conversion as win- win-win — a win for U.S. security, a win for Rus-
sia's economy, and a win for the converted firms.

Congressional reaction to these programs has not always been
positive, but defense conversion's impact on the proliferation threat

156

cannot be ignored. We are providing profitable commercial work for
defense plants and that reduces the pressure to produce more
weapons for the Russian MOD or to export those weapons to
proliferators. DOD's efforts in this area are complimented by activi-
ties carried out by the Department of Commerce, by OPIC, by the
State Department, and by the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency.

Seventh, we are stimulating the elimination of chemical and bio-
logical weapons capabilities. We have a good effort underway to
jump-start Russia's commitment to eliminate its chemical weapons
stocks and we are developing projects to support destruction and
ultimately conversion of Russia's chemical weapons production fa-
cilities. We also have a project underway in Kazakstan to eliminate
a former Soviet biological weapons facility.

Eighth, strengthen export controls. First under the Nunn-Lugar
legislation and now under State Department auspices, there is a
modest program underway to strengthen the legal, procedural, and
hardware tools available to control exports of dangerous weapons,
materials, and dual-use technologies. Outside of Russia, coopera-
tion with recipients has been excellent.

And last, there is the work of strengthening the hand of the U.S.
Government to detect and interdict smuggling into the United
States and that is a role for other agencies.

Of these nine missions, the material protection, control, and ac-
counting and the weapons protection, control, and accounting are
probably most relevant for today's discussion. In our view, the un-
secured weapons material is one of the most serious problems on
the list and not enough is being done and much more is possible,
but in our view, the principal problem is not technology or money.
The main obstacle is getting the cooperation of some authorities in
Russia, especially in MinAtom.

In other countries and in other Russian agencies, cooperation is
strong. It is important to recognize that threat reduction takes
place in a political context, as the case with Ukraine today dem-
onstrates. Ukraine decided to live up to its commitments to return
the nuclear weapons on its territory because the United States is
building a broad, strong relationship with Ukraine, including in the
defense field. We promised that Ukraine would be more secure
without nuclear weapons than with them and we have lived up to
that promise through strong political, economic, and security as-
sistance.

In Russia, some officials in government, including some senior
ones, continue to believe that threat reduction is somehow more in
the interest of the United States than it is in Russia's interest. Se-
curity services in Russia wrongly suspect that secrets are leaking,
whereas, in fact, all programs take fully into account Russian de-
sires to safeguard sensitive information. Over time, in a manner
that varies from Russian agency to Russian agency, this suspicious
attitude affects our ability to get cooperation.

But it is important, as you have indicated. Senator, for all ele-
ments of the Russian government to realize that the weapons and
material and the problems they create belong to them. We cannot
address the situation without their help and active participation.

157

I should note that we have had some recent progress in our deal-
ings, and in DOE's dealings, I should say, and Secretary Curtis can
talk to it, with MinAtom, but that is not enough and we need to
keep it sustained.

Finally, sir, and it is nothing that you have not heard before
from any agency, we need money. We are requesting $327 million
in fiscal year 1997 and we believe we need every penny of it.

Senator NUNN. You said million, not billion, did you not?

Mr. Miller. I said million, sir, million.

Mr. Curtis. It is unusual from the Department of Defense to
speak in millions.

Mr. Miller. Not these days.

Senator SMITH. Pocket change.

Mr. Miller. The problem is large and the opportunities are great
and there will be a threat to reduce for many years to come. We
have only scratched the surface, for example, in the surface of the
chemical and biological fields.

Mr. Chairman, I have brought four photos to demonstrate CTR
at work. This is a picture of carving up Bear bombers in Russia,
weapons systems that we used to watch flying down our coasts and
now are being eliminated with American assistance.

The next picture is of Project Sapphire, which you know is a com-
bined interagency project. This is the nuclear material being loaded
on board U.S. Air Force aircraft, flying out of Kazakstan under
pretty bad weather conditions, and that was a major success, as I
said, over 20 bombs' worth of material.

Senator NUNN. That particular shipment, the Sapphire oper-
ation, if it had gotten in the wrong hands, if that material had got-
ten in the wrong hands, it was the equivalent of making about 20
bombs?

Mr. Miller. Potentially 20 bombs, yes, sir.

There has been some discussion of the Mayak nuclear weapons
storage facility. That has been stored for a long time. There is now
progress there. This shows that there is work underway right now
to start building the foundations of the Mayak facility.

Senator NuNN. That is the one that is taking so long, in plans
and starting?

Mr. Miller. Yes, and we are now beginning to have some break-
throughs as a result of the Vice President's work with Prime Min-
ister Chernomyrdin.

Senator NUNN. What is going to be the advantage of that fi-om
our security point of view when that is built, because that is a lot
of money?

Mr. Miller. This will hold up to 25,000 containers of fissile ma-
terial drawn from weapons in a single, centralized, well-secured fa-
cility.

Senator NUNN. The advantage is not having that same material
spread in insecure facilities all over Russia?

Mr. Miller. Yes, sir. That is right.

Senator Smith. Who guards it?

Mr. Miller. That, I beheve, will be guarded by the Russian Min-
istry of Atomic Energy, but it will have, we believe, state-of-the-art
intrusion detection systems and the rest. There is a lot of work to

158

do here, Senator Smith, and a lot of work to do with the MinAtom
people to get this project from what you see there to something

Senator Smith. But you feel it is secure?

Mr. Miller. We will not fund or help fund a design that does
not provide for security in the most state-of-the-art way.

And finally, this is just a picture of a rail car. We are working
with the Russian Ministry of Defense to improve the safety of the
rail cars that they use to transport nuclear weapons both back
from three other independent states and within Russia, so that if
there is an accident, that we do not get leakage of plutonium, so
we do not have a nuclear accident, and also that helps protect
these cars' interiors against terrorists. And that program, as I said,
with the Russian Ministry of Defense is going very, very well.

I should say. Senator Smith asked, is all of this reversible? Could
bad things happen? I would be remiss if I did not say that while
it is not the subject of toda/s hearing, in addition to our DOD pro-
liferation activities to cut off proliferation at the source, we are un-
dertaking a substantial counter-proliferation initiative to assist
other agencies first in halting proliferation if it occurs, that is on
route from the source to other end users. We are also ensuring that
our armed forces are upgraded so that they are fully capable of
dealing with contingencies in which our opponents would possess
weapons of mass destruction.

Sir, that concludes my remarks.

Senator NuNN. One other question here, and this would also go
to the Department of Energy, too, and probably the FBI, and that
is we will have in next week's hearing, Wednesday, we will have
a hearing about what happens, God forbid, if we in this country
had a terrorist attack using chemical, biological, or nuclear and
how would we respond to it, and I am afraid the answers we are
going to get are going to