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Full text of "The Great Ideas Vol II"

TIGHT BINDING BOOK 



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GREAT BOOKS 
OF THE WESTERN WORLD 

ROBERT MAYNARD HUTCHINS, EDITOR IN CHIEF 



THE GREAT IDE AS. -II 



MORTIMER J. ADLER, Associate Editor 

Mem*, ' ** Advisory Board: STRINGFELLOW BARR, SCOTT BUCHANAN, JOHN ERSKINE, 
'CLARENCE H. FAUST, ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, JOSEPH J. SCHWAB, MARXIAN DORBN. 
Editorial Consultants: A. F. B. CLARK, F. L. LUCAS, WALTER MURDOCH." " 
V/>U.ACB BROCKWAY, Executive Editor 



THE GREAT IDEAS 

A Syntopicon of 
Great Books of the Western World 



\ e - 

MORTIMER J. ADLBR, Editor in Chief 
WILLIAM GORMAN, General Editor 



VOLUME II 





WILLIAM BENTON, Publisher 

ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, INC. 
CHICAGO LONDON TORONTO 



COPYRIGHT IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA* 1952, 

BY ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, IN^'. 

COPYRIGHT 1952. COPYRIGHT UNDER INTERNATIONAL* COPYRIGHT UNION BY 

ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVE? UNDER PAN AMERICAN 

COPYRIGHT CONVENTIONS BY ENCYCLOPEDIA BKi^ANNICA, INC. 



GENERAL CONTENTS 



VOLUME I 

PREFACE ......... xi 

EXPLANATION OF REFERENCE STYLE .... xxxiii 

Chapters 1-50: ANGEL to LOVE .... .1-1081 

\ 

VOLUME II 

EXPLANATION OF REFERENCE STYLE ix 

Chapters 51-102.: MAN to WORLD ..... 1-1140 
Appendix I. BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ADDITIONAL READINGS . 1143 

Appendix II. THE PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF 

SYNTOPICAL CONSTRUCTION . . . . .1119 

INVENTORY OF TERMS ....... 1303 



EXPLANATION OF REFERENCE STYLE 



references have a uniform typographical style, but the manner 
JL of referring to particular works varies in certain respects. The Expla- 
nation of Reference Style describes the typographical construction of the 
references, with some comment on the variations. It is divided into four 
parts: 

I. General Typographical Style 
II. Style of Bible References 

III. Punctuation, Symbols, Abbreviations 

IV. Table of Authors, Titles, and Author's Divisions Cited 

I. GENERAL TYPOGRAPHICAL STYLE 

The two examples below illustrate the general typographical pattern of 
the references to Great Booths of the Western World ; and the headings 
above the examples call attention to the five elements commonly present 
in the construction of the references. 

Volume Author's Page 

Number Name Title of Work Author's Divisions Sections 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xxi 178a-200d 

41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 365b-378d 

(1) Volume Number: 

The volume number indicates in which volume of Great Boo/(s of the 
Western World the work or passage referred to can be found. Most vol- 
umes contain the work of one author. When a single volume contains the 
works of two or more authors, the volume number is given for each 
author. When the work of a single author is contained in two volumes, 
the volume number is assigned according to the contents of the volume. 

(2) Author's Name: 

The author's name immediately follows the volume number, except in 
the case of the American State Papers and the Federalist, which are in- 
cluded in Volume 43. Authors' names are usually given in shortened form. 

ix 



xii THE GREAT IDEAS 

sometimes places continuous reading matter in the a and c sections of the 
upper half of the page, or in the b and d sections of the lower half of the 
page. This occurs when a work or an author's division begins in the lower, 
or ends in the upper, half of the two-column page. Where continuous read- 
ing matter thus appears in discontinuous page sections, it is indicated by 
a,c or b,d. For example: 

14 PLUTARCH: Solon 64b,d-77a,c 

means that the work cited begins in the lower half of page 64 and ends in 
the upper half of page 77. 

Footnotes or notes are sometimes specifically cited by themselves in the 
references, in which case the page sections given correspond to their loca- 
tion on the pages referred to. When a footnote or a note is not specifically 
cited, the page sections given mark the beginning and the end of the text 
referred to. The reader is expected to consult the footnotes or notes indi- 
cated in the body of that text. 

Chaucer's works (in Volume 22) are printed in two columns; the inside 
column of each page contains the Middle English text, the outside column 
a Modern English version. Since both columns contain equivalent pas- 
sages, the references to this volume employ page sections (a and b) which 
divide each page only into an upper and a lower half. 

II. STYLE OF BIBLE REFERENCES 

All Bible references are to book, chapter, and verse in both the King 
James and Douay versions of the Bible. When the King James and Douay 
versions differ in the title of books or in the numbering of chapters or 
verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by 
a (/?), follows. For example: 

OLD TESTAMENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) II Esdras, 7:46 

In references to the Bible, a colon is used to separate chapter and verse 
numbers; and a comma separates the numbers of verses in the same chap- 
ter. For example: 

OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 6:1-4,16-18 



REFERENCE STYLE xiii 

III. PUNCTUATION, SYMBOLS, ABBREVIATIONS 
(i) Punctuation 

Diagonal line: When a series of references to one author includes two 
or more of his works published in the same volume, a diagonal line is used 
to separate references to one work from references to another. The diago- 
nal line is used in the same way to separate references to different books 
of the Bible. For example: 

OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 33:12-23 /Job, 11:7-9 

43 MILL: Liberty, 302d-303a / Representative Government, 327b,d-332d 

Semi-Colon: When a series of references includes the citation of two or 
more passages in the same work, a semi-colon is used to separate the refer- 
ences to these passages. For example: 

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1:12-14; 9:1-11 

38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK u, 403a-404a; 405d-406a 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART n, 265c-266a; PART iv, 346c-348a 

Comma: When a comma separates the title of a work, or an author's 
division of a work, from the page sections which follow, passages cited are 
only a part of the whole work or of the author's division indicated. For 
example, in the references: 

14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 36a-b; 44d-45c 
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART n, 73a-74b 

the passages from Plutarch are only a part of Lycurgus, and the passage 
from Swift is only a few pages from Part II of Gulliver's Travels. 

When the title of a work, or an author's division of a work, is not 
separated by a comma from the page sections which follow, the reference 
is to the whole work or to the whole of the indicated author's division. 
For example, in the references: 

14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus 32a~48d 
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART u 45a-87b 

the whole of Lycurgus and the whole of Part II of Gulliver's Travels 
are cited. 



XVI 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



Volume Number, Author, and Title 

5 SOPHOCLES (c. 495-406 B.C.) 
Oedipus the King 
Oedipus at Colonus 
Antigone 
Ajax 

5 EURIPIDES (c. 480-406 B.C.) 
Rhesus 
Medea 
Hippolytus 
Alcestis 
Heracleidae 
The Suppliants 
The Trojan Women 
Ion 
Helen 
Andromache 

5 ARISTOPHANES (c. 445-^. 380 B.C.) 

The Acharnians 
The Knights 
The Clouds 
The Wasps 
The Peace 
The Birds 

6 HERODOTUS (c. 484-^. 425 B.C.) 

The History 

6 THUCYDIDES (c. 460-^. 400 B.C.) 

Peloponnesian War The History of the Peloponnesian War 



Electra 

Trachiniae 

Philoctetes 



Electra 

The Bacchantes 

Hecuba 

Heracles Mad 

The Phoenician Maidens 

Orestes 

Iphigenia Among the Tauri 

Iphigenia at Aulis 

The Cyclops 



The Frogs 

The Lysistrata 

The Thesmophoriazusae 

The Ecclesiazusae 

The Plutus 



Author's Divisions Cited 



Line 



Line 



Line 



BOOK 



BOOK 



PLATO (c. 428-^. 348 B.C.) 
Charmides 
Lysis 
Laches 
Protagoras 
Euthydemus 
Cratylus 
Phaedrus 
Ion 

Symposium 
Meno 
Euthyphro 
Apology 
Crito 



Phaedo 

Gorgias 

The Republic 

Timaeus 

Critias 

Parmenides 

Theaetetus 

Sophist 

Statesman 

Philebus 

Laws 

The Seventh Letter 



except Republic 

and Laws, BOOK 



REFERENCE STYLE 



xvn 



Volume Number, Author, and Title 

8 ARISTOTLE (384-322 B.C.) 

Categories 

Interpretation On Interpretation 

Prior Analytics 
Posterior Analytics 
Topics 

Sophistical Refutations On Sophistical Refutations 

Physics 

Heavens On, the Heavens 

Generation and Corruption On Generation and Corruption 

Meteorology 
Metaphysics 

Soul On the Soul 

Sense and the Sensible On Sense and the Sensible 

Memory and Reminiscence On Memory and Reminiscence 

Sleep On Sleep and Sleeplessness 

Dreams On Dreams 

Prophesying On Prophesying by Dreams 

Longevity On longevity and Shortness of Life 

youth, Life, and Breathing On Youth and Old Age, On 

Life and Death, On Breathing 

9 ARISTOTLE 

History of Animals 

Parts of Animals On the Parts of Animals 

Motion of Animals On the Motion of Animals 

Gait of Animals On the Gait of Animals 

Generation of Animals On the Generation of Animals 

Ethics Nicomachean Ethics 

Politics 

The Athenian Constitution 

Rhetoric 

Poetics On Poetics 

10 HIPPOCRATES (fl. 400 B.C.) 
The Oath 

Ancient Medicine On Ancient Medicine 

Airs, Waters, Places On Airs, Waters, and Places 

Prognostics The Boof( of Prognostics 

Regimen in Acute Diseases On Regimen in Acute Diseases 

Epidemics Of the Epidemics 

Injuries of the Head On Injuries of the Head 

Surgery On the Surgery 

Fractures On Fractures 

Articulations On the Articulations 

Instruments of Reduction 



Author's Divisions Cited 

CHAPTER, Line 

BOOK, CHAPTER, Line 
CHAPTER, Line 

BOOK, CHAPTER, Line 



CHAPTER, Line 



BOOK, CHAPTER, Line 
CHAPTER, Line 

BOOK, CHAPTER, Line 

CHAPTER, paragraph 

BOOK, CHAPTER, Line 

CHAPTER, Line 



r paragraph 

paragraph, APPENDIX 
BOOK, SECTION, paragraph, CASE 



paragraph 



XX 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



BOOK 



BOOK 



BOOK 



TRACTATE, CHAPTER 

BOOK, paragraph 

BOOK, PREFACE, CHAPTER 
PREFACE, BOOK, CHAPTER 



PROLOGUE, PART, QUESTION, ARTICLE, 
ANSWER, CONTRARY, REPLY 



Volume Number, Author, and Title 

15 TACITUS, P. CORNELIUS (c. yy-c. 117 A.D.) 

The Annals The Histories 

16 PTOLEMY (c. ioo-<. 178 A.D.) 

The Almagest 

16 COPERNICUS, NICOLAUS (1473-1543) 

Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres 

16 KEPLER, JOHANNES (1571-1630) 

Epitome Epitome ofCopernican Astronomy: IV and V 

The Harmonies of the World: V 

17 PLOTINUS (205-270) 

first-Sixth Ennead The Six Enneads 

18 AUGUSTINE, SAINT (354-430) 

The Confessions 
The City of God 
Christian Doctrine On Christian Doctrine 

19 AQUINAS, SAINT THOMAS (c. 1225-1274) 

The Summa Theologica, First Part; 
Part I of the Second Part, Questions 1-48 

20 AQUINAS, SAINT THOMAS 

The Summa Theologica, Part I of the Second 
Part (continued), Questions 49-114; Part II 
of the Second Part, Questions 1-46, 179-189; 
Third Part, Questions 1-26, 60-65 ; Supplement 
to the Third Part, Questions 69-99 

21 DANTE ALIGHIERI (1265-1321) 

The Divine Comedy, HELL, PURGATORY, PARADISE 

22 CHAUCER, GEOFFREY (c. 1340-1400) 

Troilus and Cressida 
[The Canterbury Tales] 

The Prologue 

The Knight's Tale 

The Miller's Prologue 

The Miller's Tale 

The Reeve's Prologue 

The Reeve's Tale 

The Coo%s Prologue 

The Cooks Tale 

Introduction to the Man of Law's 
Prologue 

The Prologue of the Man of Law's 
Tale 



Author's Divisions Cited 



PROLOGUE, PART, QUESTION, ARTICLE, 
ANSWER, CONTRARY, REPLY 

Number of Canto, Line 



BOOK, STANZA 

Line, except prose parts (see below) 
The Tale of the Man of Law 
The Wife of Bath's Prologue 
The Tale of the Wife of Bath 
The Friar's Prologue 
The Friar's Tale 
The Summoner's Prologue 
The Summoner's Tale 
The Clerffs Prologue 
The Clerks Tale 
The Merchant's Prologue 
The Merchant's Tale 
Epilogue to the Merchant's Tale 



REFERENCE STYLE 



xxi 



Volume Number, Author, and Title 

22 CHAUCER> GEOFFREY (continued) 

[The Canterbury Tales] 
The Squire's Tale 
The Words of the Franklin 
The Franklin's Prologue 
The Franklin's Tale 
The Physician's Tale 
The Words of the Host 
The Prologue of the Pardoner's Tale 
The Pardoner's Tale 
The Shopman's Prologue 
The Shipman's Tale 
The Prioress's Prologue 
The Prioress's Tale 
Prologue to Sir Thopas 
Sir Thopas 
Prologue to Melibeus 

23 MACHIAVELLI, NICOLO (1469-1527) 

The Prince 



Author's Divisions Cited 



The Tale of Melibeus 

The Monf(s Prologue 

The Monks Tale 

The Prologue of the Nun's Priest's Talc 

The Nun's Priest's Tale 

Epilogue to the Nun's Priest's Tale 

The Second Nun's Prologue 

The Second Nun's Tale 

The Canon's Yeoman's Prologue 

The Canon's Yeoman's Tale 

The Manciple's Prologue 

The Manciple's Tale 

The Parson's Prologue 

The Parson's Tale 

L'Envoi 



paragraph 



23 HOBBES, THOMAS (1588-1679) 

Leviathan Leviathan, or, Matter, Form, and Power 

of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil 

24 RABELAIS, FRANQOIS (c. 1495-1553) 

Gargantua and Pantagruel 

25 MONTAIGNE, MICHEL EYQUEM DE (1533-1592) 

The Essays 



paragraph 



CHAPTER 



INTRODUCTION, PART, CONCLUSION 



BOOK 



26 SHAKESPEARE, WILLIAM (1564-1616) 
1st Henry VI The First Part 

of King Henry the Sixth 
2nd Henry VI The Second Part 

of King Henry the Sixth 
3rd Henry VI The Third Part 

of King Henry the Sixth 
Richard III The Tragedy of 

King Richard the Third 
The Comedy of Errors 
Titus Andronicus 
The Taming of the Shrew 
The Two Gentlemen of Verona 
Love's Labour's Lost 
Romeo and Juliet 



Richard II The Tragedy of King 

Richard the Second 
A Midsummer-Night's Dream 
King John The Life and Death of 

King John 

The Merchant of Venice 
1st Henry IV The First Part of 

King Henry the Fourth 
2nd Henry IV The Second Part of 

King Henry the Fourth 
Much Ado About Nothing 

Henry V The Life of King Henry the Fifth 

Julius Caesar 

As You Li{e It PROLOGUE, ACT, SCENE, EPILOGUE, Line 



xxii THE GREAT IDEAS 

Volume "Number, Author, and Title Author's Divisions Cited 

27 SHAKESPEARE, WILLIAM 

Twelfth Night Twelfth Night; Antony and Cleopatra 

or, What You Will Coriolanus 

Hamlet Hamlet, Prince ofDenmar\ Timon of Athens 

The Merry Wives of Windsor Pericles Pericles, Prince of Tyre 

Troilus and Cressida Cymbclinc 

All's Well That Ends Well The Winter's Tale 

Measure for Measure The Tempest 

Othello Othello, the Moor of Venice Henry VIII The Famous History 

King Lear of the Life of King Henry 

Macbeth the Eighth PROLOGUE, ACT, SCENE, EPILOGUE, Line 

Sonnets Number of Sonnet 

28 GILBERT, WILLIAM (1540-1603) 

Loadstone On the Loadstone and Magnetic Bodies PREFACE, BOOK 

28 GALILEO GALILEI (1564-1642) 

Two New Sciences Concerning the Two New Sciences DAY 

28 HARVEY, WILLIAM (1578-1657) 

Motion of the Heart On the Motion of the Heart and Blood in Animals 

Circulation of the Blood On the Circulation of the Blood 

On Animal Generation On the Generation of Animals 

29 CERVANTES, MIGUEL DE (1547-1616) 

Don Quixote The History of Don Quixote de la Mancha PART 

30 BACON, SIR FRANCIS (1561-1626) 

Advancement of Learning 

Novum Organum PREFACE, BOOK, APHORISM 
New Atlantis 

31 DESCARTES, RENE" (1596-1650) 

Rules Rules for the Direction of the Mind Number of Rule 

Discourse Discourse on the Method PART 

Meditations Meditations on First Philosophy Number of Meditation 

Objections and Replies Objections Against 

the Meditations and Replies DEFINITION, POSTULATE, AXIOM, PROPOSITION 

The Geometry BOOK 

31 SPINOZA, BENEDICT DE (1632-1677) 

Ethics PART, PREFACE, DEFINITION, AXIOM, PROPOSITION, DEMONSTRATION, 

SCHOLIUM, COROLLARY, LEMMA, POSTULATE, EXPLANATION, APPENDIX 



REFERENCE STYLE 



xxia 



Volume Number, Author, and Title 

32 MILTON, JOHN (1608-1674) 
[English Minor Poems] 

Christs 'Nativity On the Morning 

ofChrists Nativity and The Hymn 

A Paraphrase on Psalm 114 

Psalm 136 

The Passion 

On Time 

Upon the Circumcision 

At a Solemn Music^ 

An Epitaph on the Marchioness of 
Winchester 

Song on May Morning 

On Shakespear. 1630 

On the University Carrier 

Another on the Same 

VAllegro 

11 Penseroso 

Arcades 

Lycidas 

Comus 
Paradise Lost 
Samson Agonistes 
Areopagitica 



Author's Divisions Cited 



Line, except Sonnets and Psalms 



Death of a Fair Infant On the Death of 

a Pair Infant 

Vacation Exercise At a Vacation Exercise 

The Fifth Ode of Horace The Fifth Ode 

of Horace, Lib, I 
Sonnets, i, vn-xix 
'New Forcers of Conscience On the New 

Forcers of Conscience under the Long 

Parliament 
Lord Gen. Fairfax On the Lord Gen. 

Fairfax at the siege of Colchester 
Lord Gen. Cromwell To the Lord Generatt 

Cromwell May 1652 
Sr Henry Vane To Sr Henry Vane the 

Younger 
Mr. Cyriad( Skinner To Mr. Cyriac^ 

Skinner upon his Blindness 
Psalms, I-VIH, LXXX-LXXXVIII 



33 PASCAL, BLAISE (1623-1662) 
The Provincial Letters 
Pensees 

Vacuum Preface to the Treatise on the Vacuum and 

New Experiments Concerning the Vacuum 
Great Experiment Account of the Great Experiment 

Concerning the Equilibrium of Fluids 
Equilibrium of Liquids and 
Weight of Air Treatises on the Equilibrium of 

Liquids and on the Weight of the Mass of the Air 
Geometrical Demonstration On Geometrical 

Demonstration 
Arithmetical Triangle Treatise on the Arithmetical 

Triangle 
Correspondence with Fermat Correspondence with 

Fermat on the Theory of Probabilities 

34 NEWTON, SIR ISAAC (1642-1727) 

Principles Mathematical Principles 

of Natural Philosophy 
Optics 



BOOK, Line 
Line 



Number of Pense'e 



DEFINITION, SCHOLIUM, LAW, COROLLARY, BOOK, RULE, 
LEMMA, PROPOSITION, PHENOMENON, HYPOTHESIS 

BOOK 



XXIV 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



Volume Number, Author, and Title 

34 HUYGENS, CHRISTIAAN (1629-1695) 

Light Treatise on Light 

35 LOCKE, JOHN (1632-1704) 

Toleration A Letter Concerning Toleration 

Civil Government Concerning Civil Government, Second Essay 

Human Understanding An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 



Author's Divisions Cited 



PREFACE, CHAPTER 



CHAPTER, SECTION 

INTRODUCTION, BOOK, 

CHAPTER, SECTION 



35 BERKELEY, GEORGE (1685-1753) 

Human Knowledge The Principles of Human Knowledge 

35 HUME, DAVID (1711-1776) 

Human Understanding An Enquiry Concerning Human 

Understanding 

36 SWIFT, JONATHAN (1667-1745) 

Gulliver Gulliver's Travels 

36 STERNE, LAURENCE (1713-1768) 

Tristram Shandy 

37 FIELDING, HENRY (1707-1754) 

Tom Jones The History of Tom Jones, A Foundling 

38 MONTESQUIEU, CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE (1689-1755) 

The Spirit of Laws 

38 ROUSSEAU, JEAN JACQUES (1712-1778) 

Inequality On the Origin of Inequality 

Political Economy On Political Economy 

The Social Contract 

39 SMITH, ADAM (1723-1790) 

Wealth of Nations An Inquiry Into the 

Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 

40 GIBBON, EDWARD (1737-1794) 

Decline and Fall The Decline and Fall of the 

Roman Empire, Chapters 1-40 

41 GIBBON, EDWARD 

Decline and Fall The Decline and Fall of the 

Roman Empire (continued), Chapters 41-71 



PREFACE, INTRODUCTION, SECTION 



INTRODUCTION, SECTION, DIVISION 



PART 



BOOK 



INTRODUCTION, BOOK 



REFERENCE STYLE xxv 

Volume Number, Author, and Title Author's Divisions Cited 

42 KANT, IMMANUEL (1724-1804) 

Pure Reason The Critique of Pure Reason 

Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals Fundamental 

Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals 

Practical Reason The Critique of Practical Reason 

Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics Preface 

and Introduction to the Metaphysical Elements 

of Ethics With a Note on Conscience 
Intro. Metaphysic of Morals General Introduction 

to the Metaphysic of Morals 
The Science of Right 
judgement The Critique of Judgement 

43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE Line 
43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION Number of Article, Line 
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. ARTICLE, SECTION, AMENDMENT, Line 

43 [HAMILTON, ALEXANDER (1757-1804), MADISON, JAMES (1751-1836), 

JAY, JOHN (1745-1829)] 
THE FEDERALIST Papers, by NUMBER 

43 MILL, JOHN STUART (1806-1873) 

Liberty On Liberty 

Representative Government 

Utilitarianism 

44 Bos WELL, JAMES (1740-1795) 

Johnson Life of Samuel Johnson, L.L.ZX 

45 LAVOISIER, ANTOINE LAURENT (1743-1794) 

Elements of Chemistry PREFACE, PART 

45 FOURIER, JEAN BAPTISTS JOSEPH (1768-1830) 

Theory of Heat Analytical Theory of Heat 

45 FARADAY, MICHAEL (1791-1867) 

Researches in Electricity Experimental Researches in Electricity 

46 HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH (1770-1831) 

The Philosophy of Right PREFACE, INTRODUCTION, PART, paragraph, ADDITION 

The Philosophy of History INTRODUCTION, PART 

47 GOETHE, JOHANN WOLFGANG VON (1749-1832) 

Faust, Parts I and II DEDICATION, PRELUDE, PROLOGUE, PART, Line 

48 MELVILLE, HERMAN (1819*1882) 

Moby Dic\ Moby Dic{; or, The Whale 



xxvi THE GREAT IDEAS 

Volume Number, Author, and Title Author's Divisions Cited 

49 DARWIN, CHARLES (1809-1882) 

Origin of Species The Origin of Species by Means of 

Natural Selection 
Descent of Man The Descent of Man and Selection in 

Relation to Sex 

50 MARX, KARL (1818-1883) 

Capital 

50 MARX, KARL and ENGELS, FRIEDRICH (1820-1895) 

Communist Manifesto Manifesto of the Communist Party 

51 TOLSTOY, LEO (1828-1910) 

War and Peace BOOK, EPILOGUE 

52 DOSTOEVSKY, FYODOR MIKHAILOVICH (1821-1881) 

The Brothers Karamazov BOOK, EPILOGUE 

53 JAMES, WILLIAM (1842-1910) 

Psychology The Principles of Psychology 

54 FREUD, SIGMUND (1856-1939) 

The Origin and Development of Repression 

Psycho- Analysis The Unconscious 

Hysteria Selected Papers on General Introduction A General 

Hysteria, Chapters i-ro Introduction to Psycho- Analysis 

The Sexual Enlightenment of Beyond the Pleasure Principle 

Children Group Psychology Group Psychology 

Psycho- Analytic Therapy The and the Analysis of the Ego 

Future Prospects of Psycho- The Ego and the Id 

Analytic Therapy Inhibitions^ Symptoms, and Anxiety 

14 Wild" Psycho- Analysis Observa- War and Death Thoughts for the 

tions on " Wild" Psycho-Analysis Times on War and Death 

The Interpretation of Dreams Civilization and Its Discontents 

Narcissism On Narcissism New Introductory Lectures New 

Instincts Instincts and Their Introductory Lectures on Psycho- 
Vicissitudes Analysis 



THE GREAT IDEAS: II 
Chapters 51-101: MAN to WORLD 



Chapter 5 u MAN 



INTRODUCTION 



WHETHER or not the proper study of 
mankind is man, it is the only study in 
which the knower and the known are one, in 
which the object of the science is the nature of 
the scientist. If we consider every effort men 
have made in response to the ancient injunction 
"know thyself," then psychology has perhaps a 
longer tradition than any other science. But by a 
stricter conception of science, more is required 
than individual insight or self-consciousness. 
Definitions, principles, analyses applicable to all 
men must be established, and it has been 
questioned whether the method of introspec- 
tion suffices for this purpose. What methods 
should be used by the psychologist depends in 
part upon the precise object and scope of his 
inquiry. According as different subject matters 
and different methods define psychology, there 
seem to be several disciplines bearing that 
name, each with its own tradition in western 
thought. 

In one conception, psychology begins with 
the dialogues of Plato and with Aristotle's trea- 
tise On the Soul. As Aristotle's title indicates, 
^nd as the Greek roots of the word "psychol- 
ogy" connote, the soul rather than man is the 
object of the science. Anthropology, Kant later 
suggests, would be a more appropriate name for 
the science of man. The Greek inquiry into the 
soul extends, beyond man, to all living things. 
It is because "the soul is in some sense the prin- 
ciple of animal life," Aristotle writes, that "the 
knowledge of the soul admittedly contributes 
greatly to the advance of truth in general, and, 
above all, to our understanding of Nature." 

Nevertheless, psychology for the Greeks isj 
principally concerned with the study of m 
The analysis of the parts or faculties of the hu- 
man soul is an analysis of the properties of hu- 
man nature the powers which man has and the 
characteristically human acts or functions he 



can perform. The methods by which this analy- 
sis is developed are, for the most part, the same 
methods which the Greek philosophers use in 
physics. "The study of the soul," Aristotle 
writes, "falls within the science of Nature." The 
definitions of the psychologist, like those of the 
physicist, give "a certain mode of movement 
of such and such a body (or part or faculty of a 
body) by this or that cause and for this or that 
end." In the case of the human soul, however, 
the psychologist can employ a method not ap- 
plicable to other things. The human intellect is 
able to examine itself. Mind can thus know 
things about mind which are not otherwise ob- 
servable. 

The subject matter of psychology narrows 
somewhat when, at a later moment in the tradi- 
tion, the study of mind tends to replace the 
study of man. This narrowing takes place grad- 
ually. Though Descartes identifies soul with 
mind or intellect, he treats of the passions and 
the will as well as thought and knowledge. Dif- 
fering from Descartes with regard to body and 
soul, Hobbes and Spinoza also give as much at- 
tention to the emotions as to ideas and reason- 
ing. But with Locke, Berkeley, and Hume there 
is an increasing tendency to analyze the con- 
tents of consciousness and the acts of the under- 
standing, treated exclusively as a faculty of 
thinking or knowing. Where in the earlier tra- 
dition the observation of human behavior and 
the behavior of other animals appears to be use- 
ful in psychology, here the main source of 
psychological knowledge seems to be intro- 
spection. 

The Principles of Psychology by James and the 
writings of Freud represent a return to the 
broader conception of the science. According 
to James, "it is better ... to let the science be 
as vague as its subject ... if by so doing we can 
throw any light on the main business in hand.'* 



1 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



If psychology "takes into account the fact that 
minds inhabit environments which act on them 
and on which they in turn react" and "takes 
mind in the midst of all its concrete relations, 
it is immensely more fertile than the old-fash- 
ioned 'rational psychology,' which treated the 
soul as a detached existent, sufficient unto it- 
self, and assumed to consider only its nature 
and properties. I shall therefore feel free," James 
goes on to say, "to make any sallies into zoology 
or into pure nerve-physiology which may seem 
instructive for our purposes." 

Though in the hands of James and Freud the 
scope of psychology extends no further than 
the range of topics Aquinas covers in his trea- 
tise on man and his treatise on human acts and 
passions, their return to the study of man as a 
whole is accompanied by an interest in or in- 
vention of new methods, experimental and clin- 
ical. "As a science," Freud writes, "psycho- 
analysis is characterized by the methods with 
which it works, not by the subject matter with 
which it deals." Those who distinguish between 
science and philosophy in terms of empirical 
research date the beginning of psychology from 
the inception of these new methods. They re- 
gard most psychological writings earlier than 
James and Freud as works of speculation or phi- 
losophy. 

Controversy over the validity of conclusions 
in psychology sometimes turns on the conflict- 
ing claims of rival methods to be the only way 
of arriving at the truth; and sometimes, as with 
Kant, the issue of method seems to be subor- 
dinate to the issue of subject matter. Kant ad- 
mits the possibility of an empirical psychology 
which would confine its inquiries to the phe- 
nomenal processes of thought and feeling, be- 
cause with respect to such an object "we could 
call in aid observations on the play of our 
thoughts," and thence derive "natural laws of 
the thinking self." But, he goes on to say, "it 
could never be available for discovering those 
properties which do not belong to possible expe- 
rience." 

What Kant calls "rational psychology" aims 
at what is for him impossible, namely, knowl- 
edge of the reality or substance of the soul it- 
self. It is impossible, he says, to make "any dog- 
matical affirmation concerning an object of ex- 
perience beyond the boundaries of experience." 



Kant's critique of rational psychology thus ap- 
pears to be based on the same principles which 
underlie his critique of metaphysical assertions 
concerning God's existence and the freedom of 
the will. 

Those principles are in turn based on an elab- 
orate theory of the human faculties, such as 
sense, understanding, and reason, and the role 
they play in the constitution of experience and 
knowledge. But Kant does not regard his own 
theory of the faculties as psychology. Writers 
like Locke and Hume, on the other hand, seem to 
make their psychology certainly in its princi- 
pal concern with how the content of the mind 
is acquired and formed the basis for apprais- 
ing the validity of all other knowledge. They 
do not question the validity of psychology it- 
self. They seem to assume that self-knowledge 
has unique advantages over all other inquiries. 

THESE ISSUES of the scope and validity of psy- 
chology are in one sense more relevant to the 
chapters on KNOWLEDGE, MIND, and SOUL than 
to this one. Their relevance here is limited by 
their connection with the main issues about the 
nature of man. Not merely the tradition of psy- 
chology, but the whole tradition of western 
thought seems to divide on the question of 
man's essence. 

The question can be put in a number of ways. 
Is man a rational animal, and does that defini- 
tion imply that only man has reason ? Does it 
imply that man has free will, and that only man 
has free will? Like the question about the dis- 
tinction between living and non-living things 
or the similar question about the difference be- 
tween plants and animals, this question can also 
be asked in terms of the contrast between dif- 
ference in kind and difference in degree. Does 
man differ essentially or in kind from other ani- 
mals, or do all animals possess the same funda- 
mental properties ? Does man differ from the 
others only in the degree to which he possesses 
some of these shared qualities ? 

Some, like Darwin, think that "the differ- 
ence in mind between man and the higher ani- 
mals, great as it is, certainly is one of degree and 
not of kind. We have seen," he writes, "that 
the senses and intuitions, the various emotions 
and faculties, such as love, memory, attention, 
curiosity, imitation, reason, etc., of which man 



CHAPTER 51: MAN 



boasts, may be found in an incipient, or even 
sometimes in a well-developed condition, in the 
lower animals. They are also capable of some 
inherited improvement, as we see in the domes- 
tic dog compared with the wolf or jackal. If it 
could be proved that certain high mental pow- 
ers, such as the formation of general concepts, 
self-consciousness, etc., were absolutely peculiar 
to man, which seems extremely doubtful, it is 
not improbable that these qualities are merely 
the incidental results of other highly-advanced 
intellectual faculties; and these again mainly the 
result of the continued use of a perfect lan- 
guage." Such a view clearly takes the position 
that man varies from other animals in the same 
way that one species of animal varies from an- 
other. 

Those who take the opposite position do not 
always agree on the precise nature of the differ- 
ence in kind. For the most part, they attribute 
rationality to man alone and use the word 
"brute" to signify that all other animals totally 
lack reason, no matter how acute their intelli- 
gence or the apparent sagacity of their instinc- 
tive reactions. Milton, for example, in com- 
mon with many others, describes man as 

... a creature who not prone 

And brute as other creatures, but endued 

With sanctity of reason, might erect 

His stature, and upright with front serene 

Govern the rest, self-knowing, and from thence 

Magnanimous to correspond with heaven. 

Those who find a difference in kind between 
man and other animals also tend to think that 
human society and human language are essen- 
tially different from the beehive or the ant 
mound, from bird calls, jungle cries, or parrot- 
ing, because they are the work or expression of 
reason. Unlike Darwin, some of them find in 
human speech not the cause of man's apparent 
difference in kind from other animals, but the 
consequence of his real difference in kind his 
distinctive rationality. The fact that man does 
certain things that no other animal does at all 
means to them that man possesses certain pow- 
ers which no other animal shares to any degree, 
even the slightest. They would therefore inter- 
pret Darwin's admission that an anthropoid ape 
could not fashion "a stone into a tool" or "fol- 
low a train of metaphysical reasoning, or solve a 
mathematical problem, or reflect on God, or 



admire a grand natural scene," as an indication 
that the ape totally lacked human reason or 
intellect, however acute his animal intelligence. 
But the writers who agree that man is radically 
different from the brutes do not all agree in the 
account they give of human reason; nor do they 
all affirm free will as the natural accompaniment 
of rationality. 

Locke, for example, begins his essay on Hu- 
man Understanding with the remark that "the 
understanding . . . sets man above the rest of 
sensible beings." Men and other animals alike 
have the powers of sense, memory, and imagi- 
nation, but, he says, "brutes abstract not. . . . 
The power of abstracting is not at all in them." 
This power of having"general ideas is that which 
puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and 
brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties 
of brutes do by no means attain to." But Locke 
denies that man has free will in the sense of a 
free choice among alternatives. Rousseau, on 
the other hand, declares that "every animal has 
ideas . . . and it is only in degree that man dif- 
fers, in this respect, from the brute. ... It is 
not, therefore, so much the understanding that 
constitutes the specific difference between the 
man and the brute, as the human quality of free 
agency . . . and it is particularly in his conscious- 
ness of this liberty that the spirituality of his 
soul is displayed." 

James agrees with Locke that "it is probable 
that brutes neither attend to abstract charac- 
ters nor have associations by similarity," but it 
is the latter fact which James himself makes the 
principal distinction between man and brute. 
"We may," he asserts, "consider it proven that 
the most elementary single difference between 
the human mind and that of brutes lies in this 
deficiency on the brute's part to associate ideas 
by similarity." James enumerates "other clas- 
sical differentiae of man besides that of being the 
only reasoning animal." Man has been called, 
he says, "the laughing animal" and "the talking 
animal," but these distinctive traits, like hu- 
man reasoning, James regards as "consequences 
of his unrivalled powers ... to associate ideas 
by similarity." 

Reason and speech are for James the effects, 
where for Adam Smith they are the cause, of 
man's peculiarly human attributes. "The pro- 
pensity to truck, barter, and exchange one 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



thing for another," Smith writes, is "common 
to all men, and to be found in no other race of 
animals." This seems to him to be a "necessary 
consequence of the faculties of reason and 
speech" which are peculiar to man. Hobbes, as 
we shall see presently, takes still another posi- 
tion, since he explains man's reasoning power in 
terms of his faculty of speech, a faculty which is 
possessed by no other animal. 

Despite all these variations in theory or ex- 
planation, writers like Locke, Rousseau, James, 
Smith, and perhaps Hobbes seem to agree that 
man and brute differ in kind. On that point 
they agree even with writers like Plato, Aris- 
totle, Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, 
Kant, and Hegel who hold, as they most defi- 
nitely do not, that man has a special faculty of 
mind, reason, or intellect. The contradictory 
position is, therefore, not to be found in the 
denial of some particular theory of reason, but 
rather in the denial that any faculty or attri- 
bute which man possesses warrants our calling 
him "rational" and other animals "brute." 

THE ISSUE is sharply drawn between these con- 
tradictory positions. Yet it is avoided by those 
who go no further than to see in human civiliza- 
tion certain distinctive features, such as the arts 
and sciences, or law, government, and religion. 
Mill, for example, discussing the sentiment of 
justice, finds its root in the natural impulse "to 
resent, and to repel or retaliate, any harm done 
or attempted against ourselves, or against those 
with whom we sympathise . . . common to all 
animal nature." Man differs from other ani- 
mals, he writes, "first, in being capable of 
sympathising, not solely with their offspring, 
or, like some of the more noble animals, with 
some superior animal who is kind to them, but 
with all human and even with all sentient be- 
ings. Secondly, in having a more developed in- 
telligence, which gives a wider range to the 
whole of their sentiments, whether self-regard- 
ing or sympathetic. By virtue of his superior 
intelligence, even apart from his superior range 
of sympathy, a human being is capable of ap- 
prehending a community of interest between 
himself and the human society of which he 
forms a part." 

A view of this sort would seem to leave open 
the question whether such typically human de- 



velopments signify the possession by man of 
special powers which set him apart as different 
in fynd. While admitting extraordinary differ- 
ences between the behavior or accomplishments 
of men and other animals, this view does not re- 
ject the possibility that such accomplishments 
may represent merely wide differences in de- 
gree of power, which give the appearance of 
differences in kind. 

As we have already observed, the issue about 
man and brute cannot be separated from the 
controversy about the so-called "higher facul- 
ties" of man. Except for the view that man is a 
purely spiritual being, who merely inhabits or 
uses a physical body, no theory of human na- 
ture doubts that man, as a living organism, pos- 
sesses in common with plants and animals cer- 
tain bodily powers or functions. The vegetative 
functions which Galen calls "the natural facul- , 
ties" are indispensable to human as to all other 
forms of corporeal life. Similarly, the powers of 
sensitivity and appetite or desire are obviously 
present in man as in other animals. To the ob- 
server, who sees only the externals of human 
and animal behavior, men and the higher ani- 
mals appear to react to the physical stimulation 
of their sense organs with a similar repertoire of 
bodily movements, which vary only as their 
skeletal structure and their organs of locomo- 
tion differ. They also manifest outward signs of 
inner emotional disturbance sufficiently similar 
to warrant treating emotions like fear and rage 
as common to men and other animals. 

On all this there seems to be little dispute in 
the tradition of the great books. But difficult 
questions arise when the inner significance of 
these external movements is considered. Both 
men and animals have the familiar sense organs 
and such powers as touch, taste, smell, hearing, 
and vision. But do sensations give rise to knowl- 
edge in the same way for both men and ani- 
mals ? Do the powers of memory and imagina- 
tion extend an animal's range of apprehension 
as they do man's? Do these powers affect the 
perception of present objects in the same way 
for men and animals? 

Such questions are not readily answered by 
observation of external behavior alone. What 
seems to be called for a comparison of human 
and animal experience cannot be obtained. 
The difficulty of the problem becomes most in- 



CHAPTER 51: MAN 



tense when a special faculty of knowledge or 
thought is attributed to man, for animal and 
human sense perception, imagination, or even 
emotion may be incommensurable if a special 
factor of understanding or reason enters into all 
human experience and is totally absent from 
that of animals. 

In the ancient and mediaeval periods, the sen- 
sitive faculty, including the interior sensitive 
powers of memory and imagination, is generally 
distinguished from another faculty, variously 
called "intellect," "reason," or "mind." Writers 
like Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Lucretius, Au- 
gustine, and Aquinas have different conceptions 
of intellect or mind, in itself and in its relation 
to sense and imagination, but they do not ques- 
tion its existence as a separate faculty. The range 
of the sensitive powers does not extend to ideas 
or intelligible objects, nor is sensitive memory 
or imagination for them the same as rational 
thought. 

Not only does it seem unquestionable in the 
ancient and mediaeval tradition that man has 
these two distinct faculties of knowledge, but it 
is generally assumed that other animals have to 
a greater or less degree, the power of the senses 
alone. Only men can understand as well as per- 
ceive; only men can know the universal as well 
as the particular; only men can think about ob- 
jects which are neither sensible nor, strictly, 
imaginable objects such as atoms and God, the 
infinite and the eternal, or the intellect itself. 
The affirmation of an essential difference be- 
tween reason and sense seems to be inseparable 
from the affirmation of an essential difference 
between men and brutes. 

DOUBTS OR DENIALS with regard to both affir- 
mations achieve considerable prevalence in 
modern times. But though the two affirmations 
appear inseparable, they are not always denied 
together. Montaigne, for example, does not so 
much doubt that men have reason as he does 
that other animals lack it. He considers the mat- 
ter in the light of external evidences, in terms 
of the comparable performances of men and 
animals. The light of reason seems to shine in 
both. 

He repeats many stories from Plutarch and 
Pliny which supposedly reveal the comparable 
mentality of animals and men. One is the story 



of the hound who, following the scent, comes to 
a triple parting of the ways. After sniffing along 
the first and second paths and discovering no 
trace of the scent, the hound, without a mo- 
ment's hesitation or sniffing, takes up the pur- 
suit along the third trail. This, Montaigne sug- 
gests, is a kind of syllogizing; as if the dog rea- 
soned thus with himself: "1 have followed my 
master by foot to this place; he must, of neces- 
sity, be gone by one of these three ways; he is 
not gone this way nor that; he must then in- 
fallibly be gone this other." 

It is noteworthy that Aquinas tells exactly 
the same story in order to make the point that 
such appearances of reasoning in animals can be 
explained as instinctively determined conduct. 
"In the works of irrational animals," he writes, 
"we notice certain marks of sagacity, in so far 
as they have a natural inclination to set about 
their actions in a most orderly manner through 
being ordained by the supreme art. For which 
reason, too, certain animals are called prudent 
or sagacious; and not because they reason or 
exercise any choice about things." That such 
behavior is not the work of reason, he claims, 
"is clear from the fact that all that share in one 
nature invariably act in the same way." 

Unlike Montaigne, Machiavelli seems to im- 
ply that men and brutes are alike not in having 
reason, but in lacking it. The passions control 
behavior. Intelligence exhibits itself largely as 
craft or cunning in gaining ends set by the pas- 
sions. Man is no less the brute in essence be- 
cause in the jungle of society he often succeeds 
by cunning rather than by force. He may have 
more cunning than the fox, but without armor 
he also has less strength than the lion. The 
prince, Machiavelli remarks, "being compelled 
knowingly to adopt the beast, ought to choose 
the lion and the fox, because the lion cannot 
defend himself against snares and the fox can- 
not defend himself against wolves." 

For the most part, however, the modern dis- 
sent from the ancient and mediaeval view takes 
the form of denying that reason and sense are 
distinct powers. In its most characteristic ex- 
pression, this denial is accompanied by a denial 
of abstract ideas as in the writings of Hobbes, 
Berkeley, and Hume. Their position, discussed 
more fully in the chapter on UNIVERSAL AND 
PARTICULAR, is that men only" give the appear- 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



ance of having abstract or general ideas because 
they employ common names which have gen- 
eral significance. 

Language, according to Hobbes, is the root 
of all other differences between man and brute. 
Sense and imagination are "common to man and 
beast." Reasoning, or the "train of thoughts," 
can take place in any animal which has memory 
and imagination. But that type of understand- 
ing which Hobbes describes as "conception 
caused by speech" is peculiar to man. His state- 
ment that "by the help of speech and method, 
the same faculties" which belong to both men 
and beasts "may be improved to such a height 
as to distinguish men from all other living crea- 
tures," would seem to imply that Hobbes re- 
gards man as superior to other animals only in 
degree. Yet, on the other hand, he enumerates 
a variety of institutions peculiar to human life, 
such as religion, law, and science, which imply a 
difference in kind. 

Like Hobbes, Berkeley thinks that men use 
general names but do not have general or ab- 
stract ideas. But he seems much less willing than 
Hobbes to assert man's clear superiority, even 
on the basis of man's attainments through the 
power of speech. If the fact that "brutes ab- 
stract not," he says in reply to Locke, "be made 
the distinguishing property of that sort of ani- 
mals, I fear a great many of those that pass for 
men must be reckoned into their number." 
Hume goes further than either Berkeley or 
Hobbes. Agreeing with them that man has no 
faculty above sense and imagination, and hence 
no faculty which animals do not also possess, he 
alone explicitly draws the conclusion which that 
implies. 

"Animals as well as men," he writes, "learn 
many things from experience and infer that the 
same events will always follow from the same 
causes." Such inferences, in animals or men, are 
not "founded on any process of argument or 
reasoning." They are the result of the operation 
of custom and instinct. "Were this doubtful 
with regard to men, it seems to admit of no 
question with regard to the brute creation; and 
the conclusion being once firmly established in 
the one, we have a strong presumption, from all 
the rules of analogy, that it ought to be univer- 
sally admitted, without any exception or re- 
serve." 



But if custom and instinct underlie the ap- 
pearance of reasoning in both men and animals, 
it may be asked, says Hume, "how it happens 
that men so much surpass animals in reasoning, 
and one man so much surpasses another?" His 
answer seems to be entirely in terms of degree 
of the same factors. The same sort of difference 
which obtains between a superior and an infe- 
rior intelligence among men obtains between 
men and other animals. 

All the evidence which Darwin later assem- 
bles on the characteristics of human mentality is 
offered by him in proof of the same point. But 
to those who think that man alone has an intel- 
lect or a rational faculty, over and above all his 
sensitive powers, such evidence remains incon- 
clusive. As in the case of the dog, whose behav- 
ior Aquinas and Montaigne interpret different- 
ly, the same observed facts seem to be capable 
of quite opposite explanation by those who hold 
opposite theories of human and animal intelli- 
gence. 

Is THERE INTERNAL evidence, obtained from 
man's introspective experience of his own 
thought, which can resolve the controversy ? As 
Descartes sees it, the interpretation of such 
evidence also seems to depend on the prior 
assumption one makes about the sameness or 
difference of men and btutes. 

"We cannot help at every moment experi- 
encing within us that we think," he writes; "nor 
can anyone infer from the fact that it has been 
shown that the animate brutes can discharge all 
these operations entirely without thought, thdt 
he therefore does not think; unless it be that 
having previously persuaded himself that his 
actions are entirely like those of the brutes, just 
because he has ascribed thought to them, he 
were to adhere so pertinaciously to these very 
words, 'men and brutes operate in the same way, 1 
that when it was shown to him that the brutes 
did not think, he preferred to divest himself of 
that thought of his of which he could not fail 
to have an inner consciousness, rather than to 
alter his opinion that he acted in the same way 
as the brutes." 

On the other hand, Descartes continues, those 
who hold "that thought is not to be distinguished 
from bodily motion, will with much better rea- 
son conclude that it is the same thing in us and 



CHAPTER 51: MAN 



in them, since they notice in them all corporeal 
movements as in us; they will add that a differ- 
ence merely of greater and less makes no difference 
to the essence, and will infer that, though per- 
chance they think that there is less reason in the 
beasts than in us, our minds are of exactly the 
same species." 

THE ISSUE concerning the senses and the rea- 
son is more fully discussed in the chapters on 
MIND and SENSE, and also in the chapters on 
IDEA and UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR, where 
the problem of abstract ideas or universal no- 
tions is considered. The issue concerning soul in 
general and the human soul in particular be- 
longs primarily to the chapter on SOUL, and 
also to the chapter on MIND. But like the issue 
about sense and intellect, its bearing on the 
problem of man's nature deserves brief com- 
ment here. 

The question is not whether man has a soul, 
but whether only man has a soul; a rational 
soul; a soul which is, in whole or in part, imma- 
terial; a soul capable of separate existence from 
the body; an immortal soul. If soul is conceived 
as the principle of life in all living organisms 
as Aristotle conceives it then having a soul 
docs not distinguish man from plants or ani- 
mals. If, furthermore, the rational soul is 
distinguished from the sensitive and vegeta- 
tive soul in the same way that men are distin- 
guished from brute animals and plants, namely, 
by reference to certain powers, such as intel- 
lect and will, then the statement that men 
alone have rational souls would seem to add 
nothing to the statement that men alone are 
rational. 

But if the human soul, through being ra- 
tional, confers a mode of immaterial, or spirit- 
ual, being upon man, then man's possession of 
such a soul sets him apart from all other physi- 
cal things, even further than the special power 
of reason separates him from the brutes. The 
position of Lucretius illustrates this distinction 
in reverse. He does not deny that man has a 
soul. Unlike other living things which also 
have souls, man's soul includes a special part 
which Lucretius calls "mind." He describes it 
as the part "which we often call the understand- 
ing, in which dwells the directing and govern- 
ing principle of life, [and] is no less part of the 



man than hand and foot and eyes are parts of 
the whole living creature." 

So far as his having this special faculty is con- 
cerned, man is set apart. But for Lucretius noth- 
ing exists except atoms and void. Consequently, 
"the nature of the mind and soul is bodily," 
consisting of "seeds exceedingly round and ex- 
ceedingly minute, in order to be stirred and set 
in motion by a small moving power." In his 
physical constitution man does not differ in any 
fundamental respect from any other composite 
thing. The materiality of his soul, furthermore, 
means that it is as perishable as any composite 
body. 

At the other extreme from Lucretius, Des- 
cartes conceives man as a union of two sub- 
stances. "I possess a body," he writes, "with 
which I am very intimately conjoined, yet be- 
cause, on the one side, I have a clear and dis- 
tinct idea of myself inasmuch as I am only a 
thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the 
other, I possess a distinct idea of body as it is 
only an extended and unthinking thing, it is 
certain that this I (that is to say, my soul by 
which I am what I am), is entirely and abso- 
lutely distinct from my body and can exist 
without it." Nevertheless, "sensations of pain, 
hunger, thirst, etc." lead Descartes to add: "I 
am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a 
vessel, but ... I am very closely united to it, 
and so to speak so intermingled with it that I 
seem to compose with it one whole." 

Only man has a dual nature, thus compound- 
ed. Other living things, Descartes seems to hold, 
are merely bodies, having the structure and op- 
eration of complex machines. If, like the "auto- 
mata or moving machines . . . made by the in- 
dustry of man," there were "such machines, 
possessing the organs and outward form of a 
monkey, or some other animal without reason, 
we should not have . . . any means of ascertain- 
ing that they were not of the same nature as 
those animals." 

It is indifferent to Descartes whether other 
animals are conceived as automata or whether, 
because they have life, sensation, and imagina- 
tion, they are granted souls. "I have neither 
denied to the brutes," he writes, "what is vul- 
garly called life, nor a corporeal soul, or organic 
sense." What he has denied is thought, and it is 
this one factor which makesjt impossible for a 



8 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



machine to imitate human speech and action. 
It is this one factor which also requires man's 
soul, unlike that of the brute, to be an incor- 
poreal substance. 

Unlike sensations and passions,acts of thought 
and will, according to Descartes, cannot be func- 
tions of bodily organs. "Even though I were to 
grant," he says, "that thought existed" in dogs 
and apes, "it would in nowise follow that the 
human mind was not to be distinguished from 
the body, but on the contrary rather that in 
other animals also there was a mind distinct 
from their body." When Descartes affirms man's 
uniqueness, he is therefore affirming more than 
that man alone has reason and free will. He is 
affirming that of all things man alone is "formed 
of body and soul" not a corporeal soul, but a 
spiritual substance. The angels, in contrast, are 
simply spirits. 

The remark of Plotinus, that "humanity is 
poised mid way bet ween the gods and the beasts," 
applies with somewhat altered significance to the 
Cartesian view. But there are other concep- 
tions of the human constitution which, though 
they preserve the sense of man's dual nature, 
do not make him a union of two separate sub- 
stances. 

Spinoza, for example, gives man special status 
in the order of nature by conferring on him 
alone participation in the divine mind. "The 
human mind," he writes, "is a part of the infi- 
nite intellect of God." The human body, on 
the other hand, is "a mode which expresses in a 
certain and determinate manner the essence of 
God in so far as He is considered as the thing ex- 
tended." Man is thus "composed of mind and 
body," but for Spinoza this duality in human 
nature is a duality of aspects, not a duality of 
substances. 

There is still another way in which a certain 
immateriality is attributed toman. In Aristotle's 
theory, the soul is not a substance in its own 
right, but the substantial form of an organic 
body. This is true of all kinds of souls whether 
of plants, animals, or men. But when Aristotle 
enumerates the various powers which living 
things possess such as "the nutritive, the ap- 
petitive, the sensory, the locomotive, and the 
power of thinking" he assigns to man alone, 
or "possibly another order like man or superior 
to him, the power of thinking, i.e., mind." Fur- 



thermore, of all the parts or powers of the soul, 
thinking seems to Aristotle to afford "the most 
probable exception" to the rule that "all the 
affections of soul involve body." 

Apart from thinking, "there seems to be no 
case," he says, "in which the soul can act or be 
acted upon without involving body." Whereas 
the sensitive powers are seated in bodily organs 
and cannot act except as bodily functions, the 
intellect is immaterial. It has no bodily organ 
which is comparable to the eye as the organ of 
vision and the brain as the organ of memory and 
imagination. The act of understanding is not a 
function of physical matter. 

According to this theory, man as a whole is a 
single substance, composite of correlative prin- 
ciples of being matter and form, or body and 
soul. But man differs from all other physical 
substances which are similarly composite in that 
he has a faculty and mode of activity separate 
from matter. In the later development of this 
theory by Aquinas, the immateriality of the in- 
tellect becomes the basis for arguing that the 
rational soul of man can exist apart from matter 
when the composite human substance is dis- 
integrated by death. 

As indicated in the chapters on IMMORTALITY 
and SOUL, this is not the only argument for the 
immortality of the soul. We are not here con- 
cerned, however, with the various arguments 
and their merits, but only with the fact that 
certain conceptions of man's constitution at- 
tribute to man something more than the power 
of rationality, namely, the distinction of having 
a spiritual and immortal life. 

His FUTURE AND his past color the present life 
of man and alter the aspect under which he 
conceives his place in the general scheme of 
things. Immortality promises release from mu- 
tability as well as salvation from death. With an 
immortal soul, man belongs to eternity as well 
as to time. He is not merely a transient charac- 
ter in the universe. His stature and his dignity 
are not the same when man regards himself as 
completely dissolvable into dust. 

The question of man's past or origin is, per- 
haps, even more critical in its bearing on man's 
present status. Ancient poetry and history con- 
tain many myths of man's kinship with the 
gods. The heroes trace their lineage back to the 



CHAPTER 51: MAN 



gods. Through them or through the progenitors 
of the race, man conceives himself as of divine 
descent or, at least, as having more affinity with 
the immortal gods than with all other earth- 
bound things. 

In the Descent of Man, Darwin paints a dif- 
ferent picture of human origin. Two proposi- 
tions determine its general outlines. The first, 
already stated, is that man belongs to the ani- 
mal kingdom without any differentiation ex- 
cept in degree. Not only in anatomy, physiol- 
ogy, and embryology are there marks of man's 
affinity with the mammals; man's behavior and 
mentality also show, according to Darwin, that 
man possesses no attribute so peculiarly human 
that some trace of it cannot be found in the 
higher forms of animal life. 

The second proposition is that man's origin 
on earth has come about by a process of natural 
variationfromananceslral type, exactly as other 
new species of plants or animals have originated 
by descent with variation from a common an- 
cestor. This theory of the origin of species is dis- 
cussed in the chapter on EVOLUTION. Its special 
application to the human species involves the 
notion of a common ancestor for both man 
and the anthropoid apes, and the disappearance 
not only of the ancestral form, but of the inter- 
mediate varieties the so-called "missing links" 
in the chain of variation. 

These two propositions are logically interde- 
pendent. If the proposition is false that man 
differs from other animals only in degree, the 
proposition cannot be true that man originated 
along with the anthropoid apes by descent from 
a common ancestor. Conversely, if the Darwin- 
ian theory of man's origin is true, it cannot be 
true that men and brutes differ in kind. But 
though the truth of each of these two proposi- 
tions implies the truth of the other, the prob- 
lem of the difference between man and other 
animals has a certain logical priority over 
the problem of man's origin, simply because 
more evidence is available to solve it. That ques- 
tion calls for an examination of man as he is to- 
day in comparison with other extant species; 
whereas the other question necessarily requires 
the collection and interpretation of historical 
evidence, which may have some bearing on hy- 
pothetical missing links. 

It should be added that if, in regard to the 



first question, the evidence favored the affirma- 
tion of a difference in kind, that would not en- 
tail the denial of biological evolution, though it 
would necessarily challenge the Darwinian the- 
ory of how such evolution took place. One al- 
ternative to the Darwinian hypothesis is the 
theory of emergent evolution, according to 
which lower forms of life may give rise to new 
organic forms which are not only higher but 
are distinct in kind. 

Whether or not Christian theology and some 
theory of biological evolution can be reconciled, 
there seems to be an inescapable contradiction 
between Darwin's view of man's origin and the 
Judaeo-Christian conception of man as a special 
creation, special above all in the sense that "God 
created man in his own image." 

As God is in essence a perfect intelligence and 
a spiritual being, man, according to Aquinas, 
"is said to be to the image of God by reason of 
his intellectual nature." In all creatures "there 
is some kind of likeness to God," but it is only 
in man that that likeness is an image. Man's 
finitude, imperfection, and corporeal existence 
make the image a remote resemblance; yet, ac- 
cording to the theologians, it is precisely that 
likeness which separates man from all other 
earthly creatures and places him in the com- 
pany of the angels. 

But man is no more an angel than he is a 
brute. He is separated from the one by his body 
as from the other by his reason. Nor docs he in 
the present life have the spiritual existence of a 
disembodied and immortal soul. To these three 
negatives in the definition of man not an an- 
gel, not a brute, not a soulthe Christian theo- 
logian adds a fourth, drawn from man's past. 
Man is of the race begotten by Adam, but he 
does not have the attributes which Adam pos- 
sessed before the fall. 

The dogma of man's fall from grace is dis- 
cussed in the chapter on SIN. Here we are con- 
cerned only with its implications for the under- 
standing of man's present nature, as not only 
being deprived of the extraordinary gifts of 
life and knowledge which Adam lost through 
disobedience, but as also being wounded in 
perpetuity by Adam's sin. Weakness, ignorance, 
malice, and concupiscence, Aquinas declares, 
"are the four wounds inflicted on the whole of 
human nature as a result of 'our first parent's 



10 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



sin." Man in the world is not only disinherited 
from Adam's gifts, but with the loss of grace, he 
also suffers, according to Aquinas, a diminution 
in "his natural inclination to virtue." 

THERE ARE OTHER divisions in the realm of man, 
but none so radical as that between Eden and 
the world thereafter. As retold by Plato, the 
ancient myths of a golden age when men li ved 
under the immediate benevolence of the gods 
also imply a condition of mankind quite differ- 
ent from the observable reality, but they do 
not imply a decline in human nature itself with 
the transition from the golden age to the pres- 
ent. The modern distinction between man liv- 
ing in a state of nature and man living in civil 
society considers only the external circum- 
stances of human life and does not divide man 
according to two conditions of his soul. Other 
dichotomies such as that between prehistoric 
and historic man, or between primitive and 
civilized man are even less radical, for they 
deal even more in gradations or degrees of the 
same external conditions. 

These considerations lead us to another phase 
of man's thinking about man. Where the pre- 
vious problem was how man differs from every- 
thing else in the universe, here the question is 
how man is divided from man. If men are not 
equal as individuals, to what extent are their 
individual differences the result of the unequal 
endowment of the natures with which they are 
born, and to what extent are they the result of 
individual acquirement in the course of life? 

The range of human differences, whether in- 
nate or acquired, may itself become the basis 
for a division of men into the normal and the 
abnormal, a division which separates the feeble- 
minded and the insane from the competent and 
sane. From a moral and political point of view, 
this is perhaps the most fundamental of all clas- 
sifications. It must be admitted, however, that 
traditionally the problem of the difference be- 
tween men and women and the problem of the 
difference between the ages of man from the 
extreme of infancy to the extreme of senility 
seem to have exercised more influence on the 
determination of political status and moral re- 
sponsibility. 

One other differentiation of man from man 



seems to have significance for the theory of hu- 
man society and the history of civilization. That 
is the division of men into groups, sometimes 
by reference to physical and mental traits which 
separate one race from another whether these 
traits are supposed to be determined biologi- 
cally as inheritable racial characteristics or are 
attributed to environmental influences; some- 
times by reference to the customs and ideals of 
a culture. Both sets of criteria appear to be used 
in the traditional discussion of the opposition 
between Greek and barbarian, Jew and gentile, 
European and Asiatic. 

THE ULTIMATE questions which man asks about 
himself are partly answered by the very fact of 
their being asked. The answer may be that man 
is the measure of all things; that he is sufficient 
unto himself or at least sufficient for the station 
he occupies and the part he plays in the struc- 
ture of the universe. The answer may be that 
man is not a god overlooking the rest of nature, 
or even at home in the environment of time 
and space, but rather that he is a finite and de- 
pendent creature aware of his insufficiency, a 
lonely wanderer seeking something greater than 
himself and this whole world. Whatever answer 
is given, man's asking what sort of thing he is, 
whence he comes, and whither he is destined 
symbolizes the two strains in human nature- 
man's knowledge and his ignorance, man's great- 
ness and his misery. 

Man, writes Pascal, is "a nothing in compari- 
son with the Infinite, an All in comparison with 
the Nothing, a mean between nothing and ev- 
erything. Since he is infinitely removed from 
comprehending the extremes, the end of things 
and their beginning are hopelessly hidden from 
him in an impenetrable secret; he is equally in- 
capable of seeing the Nothing from which he 
was made, and the Infinite in which he is 
swallowed up. 

"Man," Pascal goes on, "must not think that 
he is on a level either with the brutes or with 
the angels, nor must he be ignorant of both 
sides of his nature; but he must know both." In 
recognizing both lies his wretchedness and gran- 
deur. "Man knows that he is wretched. He is 
therefore wretched, because he is so; but he is 
really greater because he knows it." 



CHAPTER 51: MAN 11 



OUTLINE OF TOPICS 

PAGE 

1. Definitions of man: conceptions of the properties and qualities of human nature 13 

i a. The conception of man as essentially distinct, or differing in kind, from brute 

animals: man's specific rationality and freedom 15 

i b. The conception of man as distinguished from brutes by such powers or properties 

as abstraction or relational thought, language and law, art and science 16 

ic. The conception of man as an animal, differing only in degree of intelligence and 
of other qualities possessed by other animals 

2. Man's knowledge of man 17 

2a. Immediate self-consciousness: man's intimate or introspective knowledge of 
himself 

2b. The sciences of human nature: anthropology and psychology; rational and 
empirical psychology; experimental and clinical psychology 

(1) The subject matter and scope of the science of man 

(2) The methods and validity of psychology 18 

(3) The relation of psychology to physiology: the study of organic factors in 

human behavior 

(4) The place of psychology in the order of sciences: the study of man as pre- 

requisite for other studies 

3. The constitution of man 

30. Man as a unity or conjunction of matter and spirit, body and soul, extension 
and thought 

(1) Man as a pure spirit: a soul or mind using a body 19 

(2) Man's spirituality as limited to his immaterial powers or functions, such as 

reason and will 

3#. Comparisons of man with God or the gods, or with angels or spiritual substances 20 
y. Man as an organization of matter or as a collocation of atoms 

4. The analysis of human nature into its faculties, powers, or functions: the id, ego, and 

super-ego in the structure of the psyche 

40. Man's vegetative powers: comparison with similar functions in plants and 

animals 21 

4#. Man's sensitive and appetitive powers: comparison with similar functions in 
other animals 

4? . Man's rational powers: the problem of similar powers in other animals 22 

4^. The general theory of faculties: the critique of faculty psychology 23 

5. The order and harmony of man's powers and functions: contradictions in human 

nature; the higher and lower nature of man 

50. Cooperation or conflict among man's powers 24 

5& Abnormalities due to defect or conflict of powers: feeble-mindedness l neuroses, 

insanity, madness 25 



12 THE GREAT IDEAS 

PAGE 

6. Individual differences among men 25 

6a. The cause and range of human inequalities: differences in ability, inclination, 
temperament, habit 

6b. The differences between men and women: their equality or inequality 27 

6c. The ages of man: infancy, youth, maturity, senescence 28 

7. Group variations in human type: racial differences 29 

ja. Biological aspects of racial type 

7#. The influence of environmental factors on human characteristics: climate and 
geography as determinants of racial or national differences 

jc. Cultural differences among men: Greek and barbarian, Jew and gentile, European 

and Asiatic 30 

8. The origin or genealogy of man 31 

8a. The race of men as descendants or products of the gods 

8. God's special creation of man 

Sc. Man as a natural variation from other forms of animal life 

9. The two conditions of man 

ga. The mylh of a golden age: the age of Kronos and the age of Zeus 

gb. The Christian doctrine of Eden and of the history of man in the world 32 

(1) The condition of man in Eden: the preternatural powers of Adam 

(2) The condition of man in the world: fallen man; corrupted or wounded 

human nature 

(3) The Christian view of the stages of human life in the world: law and grace 33 

gc. Secular conceptions of the stages of human life: man in a state of nature and in 

society; prehistoric and historic man; primitive and civilized man 

10. Man's conception of himself and his place in the world 

loa. Man's understanding of his relation to the gods or God 

lob. Man as the measure of all things 35 

ice. Man as an integral part of the universe: his station in the cosmos 

i CM?. The fmiteness and insufficiency of man: his sense of being dependent and 
ordered to something beyond himself 

ice. Man's comparison of himself with other creatures and with the universe as a 

whole 36 

n. The theological conception of man 37 

1 1 a. Man as made in the image of God 
lib. The fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man 
i ic. God incarnate in human form: the human nature of Christ 38 

12. Man as an object of laughter and ridicule: comedy and satire 

13. The grandeur and misery of man 39 



CHAPTER 51: MAN 



13 



REFERENCES 

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page 
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the 
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas- 
sage is in section d of page 12. 

PAGE SECTIONS : When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the 
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES : Psychology, 116a-H9b, the passage 
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is 
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left- 
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of 
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half 
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164. 

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS : One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, 
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer- 
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d. 

BIBLE REFERENCES : The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James 
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King 
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA- 
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46. 

SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially 
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit- 
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited. 

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of 
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface. 



1. Definitions of man: conceptions of the prop- 
erties and qualities of human nature 

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1:20-30 / Psalms, 

8:5-9 

5 SOPHOCLES: Antigone [332-375] 134a-b; [683- 
684] 137a 

5 EURIPIDES: Suppliants [195-213] 260a-b 

6 TnucvDiDESiPeloponnesian War, BKi,368b-c; 
BK iv, 461d-462a; BK v, 506b-c 

7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 116c-d / Symposium, 157b- 
159b / Gorgias, 270d / Republic, BK ix, 425c- 
427b / Timaeus, 452c-454a; 466a-467d / 
Critias, 485b-c / Laws, BK i, 649d-650b; BK 
iv, 685a-c; BK v, 686d-687c; BK vi, 704a-b; 
BK vn, 715b; 723c-d 

8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK v, CH i [i28 b i5~i6] 
178b; CH 3 [132*1-9] 182d; [i32 a i7-22] 183a; 

CH 4 [i33 B '5-23l 184b l ('33 a28 -33l We; 
[i33 b 8-i3] 184d; CH 5 [134*8-17] 185b-c; CH 7 
[i36 b i9-22] 188d; BK vi, CH 3 [140*32-37] 
193c / Heavens, BK n, CH 12 [292^-11 ] 384a / 
Metaphysics, BK i, CH i [980*22-981*27] 499a-d 
/ Soul, BK ii, CH 3 [4i4 b i7-2o] 644d; [415*7- 
12] 645b; BK in, CH 3 [427 b 7-'4l 659d-660a; 
[428*20-24] 660c; CH 10 [433*8-13] 665d / 
Memory and Reminiscence, CH 2 [453*5-14] 
695b 



9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK i, CH i 
[488*6-10] 9a; [488*27] 9b; [ 4 88 b 20-2 7 ] 9d; 
CH ii [492*31] 14b; CH 16 [494 b 28] 17a; BK n, 
CH i [497 b 32~498*4] 20b; BK in, CH ii 
[5i7 b 27J 42b; CH 19 [521*3] 45d; CH 22 
[523*14-15] 48c; BK iv, CH 9 [536 b i-8] 63a-b; 
BK vin, CH i [588*i8- b 4] 114b,d; BK ix, CH i 
[6o8*io- b i9] 133b,d-134a / Parts of Animals, 
BK i, CH i [64^5-8] 164b-c; BK n, CH 7 
[653*29- b 2] 178c-d; CH 10 [656*4-13] 182a-b; 
CH 14 [658*15-27] 184d-185a; [658^-8] 185b; 
CH 16 [659 b 28]-cH 17 [66o b 3] 186d-187c; BK 
in, CH i [662 b 2i-22] 190a; CH 6 [669*18-20] 
197c; [669 b 4-5] 197d-198a; CH 10 [673*4-10] 
201d-202a; [673*28] 202b; BK iv, CH 10 
[686*25-687 b 5] 217d-219a; [689 b ii-i2] 221c; 
[690*28-30] 222b / Gait of Animals, CH 4 
[706*19-25] 244d-245a; CH 5 [7o6 b 8-io] 24Sb 
/ Generation of Animals, BK i, CH 20 [728**! 4- 
21] 268d; BK n, CH 6 [744*27-31] 285c; 
[745 b i6-i9] 286d; BK iv, CH 4 [772 b i-8] 
314b-c; CH 8 [776^3-27] 318d-319a; BK v, 
CH 2 [78^17-23] 323d-324a; CH 7 [786 b i5~22] 
328c-d / Ethics, BK i, CH 7 [io97 b 7-n] 342d- 
343a; [io97 b 23-io98*7] 343a-b; CH 13 [1102* 
27-1103*3] 347d-348c; BK HI, CH 2 [nn b 6- 
12] 357b-c; BK vn, CH i [1145*15-33] 395a-b; 
CH 3 [ii47*25- b 5] 397c-ct; BK vin, CH 12 



14 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



1 



(1. Definitions of man: conceptions of the proper- 
ties and qualities of human nature.) 



[1162*16-25] 414c; BK ix, CH 9 [n6 
423b; [ii70 a i6-i8] 423d-424a; BK x, CH 7 
[H77 b 26-ii78 a 8] 432c; CH 8 [ii78 b 23-27] 433c 
/ Politics, BK i, CH 2 [1253*1-39] 446b-d; CH 5 
[125^15-25] 448b; BK vn, CH 13 [i332 a 39~ b 7] 
537a-b; CH 15 [i334 b i2-28] 539c-d / Rhetoric, 
BK i, CH i [i355 b i~3] 594d / Poetics, CH 4 
[i4 4 8 b 4-24] 682c-d 

12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 3 108b-c; CH 
9 114c-116b; CH 23 128c-d; en 28, 134a-d; BK 
ii, CH 8, 146a-147a; CH u 150a-151b; BK iv, 
CH 5, 228c-229b; CH n 240d-242d 

12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK n., SECT i 256b,d; 
BK in, SECT 4 260b 261a; BK iv, SECT 4 264a; 
SECT 24 265c-d; SECT 29 266a; BK v, SECT 5 
269b; SECT 16 271c-d; BK vi, SECT 23 276b; 
BK vn, SECT 13 280c; SECT 55 283b-c; BK 
vin, SECT 12 286b-c; SECT 34 288a-b; BK ix, 
SECT i 291a-c; SECT 9 292b~d; SECT 23 293c; 
BK x, SECT 6 297a-b; BK xi, SECT 8 303a-b; 
BK xii, SECT 30 310a b 

14 PLUTARCH: Pompey, 512c-d 

15 TACITUS: Histories, BK n, 219d; BK iv, 
271b 

17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR i la-6b; TR iv, 
CH 14 18a-c / Third Ennead, TR in, CH 4 94c- 
95c; TR iv, CH 2 97d-98a / Sixth Ennead, TR 
vii, CH 4-6 323c-325a 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK xm, par 12 
113b-d; par 35-37 120b-121a / City of God, 
BK v, CH ii 216c-d; BK vii, CH 23, 256b-c; 
BK xi, CH 26-28 336d-338d / Christian Doc- 
trine, BK i, CH 8 626c-627a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, QQ 75- 
83 378a-440b 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISU, vin [91- 
148] 117d-118c 

23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH xvn, 24a-c; CH 
XVHI 25a-26a passim 

23HoBBEs: Leviathan, INTRO 47a-d; PART i, 
76c-d; 79b-d; 83a; 84c-86b; PART ii, 99a-b; 
104d; 138d-139a; 141a-b 

24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i, 
la,c; 65c-d 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 119b-d; 207a-c; 215a- 
232c esp 216c-219a, 231d-232c; 381b c; 462d- 
463a 

27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT n, sc n [314-322] 
43d; ACT iv, sc iv [31-66] 59a-c 

28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 454a 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 20c-d 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv 51b-54b pas- 
sim / Meditations, ii 77d-81d 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART ii, AXIOM 1-2 373c-d; 
PROP 10-13 376c-378c; PART iv, PROP 18, 
SCHOL 429a~d; PROP 35 433b-434a; APPENDIX 
447a-450d 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK n [345-353] 118b- 
UQa; BK in [80-216) 137-140a; BK iv [288- 



369] 158b-160b; BK vn [519-640] 228b-231a 
/ Samson Agonistes [667-709] 354a 355a / 
Areopagitica, 384a 

33 PASCAL: Pensees, in 194a; 115 194b; 125-183 
195b-204b; 365 236a; 396-424 240b-243b / 
Vacuum, 357a-358a 

35 LOCKE: Civil Government, en vi, SECT 67 
39c-d; CH vii, SECT 77 42b / Human Under- 
standing, BK n, CH xxvn, SECT 8 221a-222a; 
BK in, CH vi, SECT 22 273d-274a; SECT 33 
278b-c; en x, SECT 17 295d-296b; CH xi, 
SECT 20 304c-d; BK iv, CH iv, SECT 13-16 
326d-328d; CH vn, SECT 16-18 344a-c; CH 
xvi, SECT 12, 370c-371a; CH xvn, SECT i 
371c-d 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART iv, 151b-152a; 159b- 
160a 

36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 383a-384a; 394a 

37 FIELDING: 70tf7/ofl,lb-d;187d-188d;205a-c 

38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i, ld-2d; 
BK xxm, 187d; BK xxvin, 259b 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 329a-348a,c passim 
esp 329a-334a,c, 343a-345c 

39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK i, 71b-d; BK n, 
147d-148a; BK v, 343a-d 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 409d-410a 

42 KANT: Pute Reason, 199c-200c / Fund. Prin. 
Metaphysic of Morals, 270c-d; 271d-273b; 
284b-285a / Practical Reason, 316c 31 7a; 
348a-b / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 
372a-b; 373d / Science of Right, 400b,d-402a 
esp 401b-402a; 421c-422d /Judgement, 479a-c; 
571c-572a; 583b-c; 584d-585c; 587a-588a; 
591b-592d 

43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: [7-9] la 
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 6 38d-41c passim; NUM- 
BER 10, 50b-d; NUMBER 15, 65b-c; NUMBER 
17, 69c; NUMBER 27, 95d; NUMBER ^4, HOc-d; 
NUMBER 37, 120d-121a; NUMBER 49, 160a; 
NUMBER 51, 163b-c; NUMBLR 55, 174c-d; 
NUMBER 57, 177b-c; NUMBER 71, 214b-c; 
NUMBER 76, 226d-227b 

43 MILL: Liberty, 273d; 294a-297b esp 295a-b / 
Utilitarianism, 448d-449b; 459c-464d 

44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 377d; 403a 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 190 
66a b; par 209 69d; par 270, 86d-87b [fn i]; 
ADDITIONS, 34 122a b; 121 136c-d / Philosophy 
of History, INTRO, 178a-179d 

47 GOETHE: Faust, PROLOGUE [280-292] 8a; 
PART i [1110-1117] 27b-28a; [3240-3250] 79b; 
PART ii [8082-8131] 197a-198a 

48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 84b-85a; 236a-239a; 
306a; 313b-314a; 343a; 345b-347b 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 286a-287b; 287d; 
291a; 302b; 310a-314a esp 310a-d, 312a-b; 
319b-d; 349d; 597c 

50 MARX: Capital, 98a; 159a 

50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 431b-c 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 689b-c 

52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK in, 
54a-b; BK v. 127b-137c 



la 



CHAPTER 51: MAN 



15 



53 JAMES: Psychology, 49b-50a; 712b-737a pas- 
sim, csp 716a-717b, 721a, 730a, 736b-737a; 
826a-827a 

54 FREUD: Group Psychology, 684d-686c esp 686c 
/ War and Death, 758a / Civilization and Its 
Discontents, 787a / New Introductory Lectures, 
883b-c 

la. The conception of man as essentially dis- 
tinct, or differing in kind, from brute 
animals: man's specific rationality and 
freedom 

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1:20-30 esp 1:26-30; 

5:1-2; 9:6 
APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 17:1-9 (D) OT, Ec- 

clcsiasticus, 17:1-9 

7 PLATO: Protagoras, 44a-45a / Timaeus, 452d- 
453a 

8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK i, en i [980*22- 
b 27J 499a-b / Soul, BK n, CH 3 [4i4 b i7-2o] 
644d; [415*7-12] 645b; BK in, CH 3 [427^ -14] 
659d-660a; [428*20-24] 660c; CH 10 [433*8- 
13] 665d / Memory and Reminiscence, CH 2 
[453*5-14] 695b 

9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK vm, CH i 
[588*i8- b 4] 114b,d / Parts of Animals, BK i, 
CH i [64i b 5~8] 164b-c; BK iv, CH 10 [686*27- 
33] 217d-218a; [687*4-10] 218c-d / Generation 
of Animals, BK n, CH 6 [744*27-31] 285c / 
Ethics, BK i, CH 7 [io97 b 2 3-1098*7] 343a-b; 
en 13 [1102*27-1103*3] 347d-348c; BK in, en 
2 [nu b 6 12] 357b-c; BK vn, CH i [1145*15 33] 
395a-b; CH 3 [ii47 a 25- b 5l 397c-d; BK ix, CH 
9 [i i70 ft i6 -i 8] 423d-424a; BK x, CH 7 [1177^6- 
ii78' l 8] 432c; CH 8 [i i78 b 23-27] 433c / Politics, 
BK i, CH 2 [1253*1-39] 446b-d; CH 5 [i254 b i5- 
25] 448b; BK vn, CH 13 [1332*39^7] 537a-b; 
CH 15 [i334 b i2-28] 539c-d 

12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 3 108b-c; 
en 6 110c-112b; CH 9 114c-116b; CH 16 121d- 
122d; en 28, 134a-d; BK n, CH 8, 146a-147a; 
BK in, CH 7, 183c-184a; BK iv, CH i 213a- 
223d; CH 5, 228c-229b; CH 7, 233a-b 

12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK n, SECT 16 259a; 
BK in, SECT 1 6 262d-263a,c; BK v, SECT 16 
271c-d; BK vi, SLCT 23 276b; BK vm, SECT 7 
286a; SECT 41 288d; BK ix, SECT 9 292b-d 

17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR i la-6b esp en 10, 
5a / Third Ennead, TR in, CH 4 94c-95c / Sixth 
Ennead, TR vii, CH 4-6 323c-325a 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK xin, par 12 
113b-d; par 35-37 120b-121a / City of God, 
BK v, CH n 216c-d; BK vii, CH 23, 256b-c; BK 
vm, CH 6, 269a; BK xi, CH 26-28 336d-338d / 
Christian Doctrine, BK i, CH 8 626c-627a; CH 
22 629b-630a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, A 
i, REP 2 14b-15b; Q 18, A 2, REP i 105c-106b; 
A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 19, A 10, ANS 117d-118b; 
Q 23, A i, ANS and REP 2-3 132c-133b; Q 30, 
A 2, REP 3 168a-169b; Q 59, A 3, ANS 308b- 
309a; Q 72, A i, REP 1,3-4 368b-369d; QQ 75- 



83 378a-440b; Q 86, A 4, REP 3 463d-464d; 
Q 91, A 3, REP 1-3 486b-487d; Q 92, A r, ANS 
488d-489d; Q 96 510a-513c esp A i 510b-511b, 
A 4 512d-513c; PART i-n, PROLOGUE 609a,c; 
Q i, AA 1-2 609b-611b; Q 6, A 2 646a-c; Q n, 
A 2 667b-d; Q 12, A 5 672a-c; Q 13, A 2 
673c-674c; Q 15, A 2 682a-c; Q 17, A 2 687d- 
688b 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 50, 
A 3, REP 2 8b-9a; Q no, A 4, REP 3 350d-351d; 
PART in SUPPL, Q 79, A i, ANS 951b-953b 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, xxvi [112-120] 
39b; xxxi [46-57] 46c; PURGATORY, xxv [34- 
78] 91d-92a; PARADISE, v [19-24] 112b; vn 
[121-148] 116b-c 

22 CHAUCER: Knight's Tale [1303-1333] 181b- 
182a 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 184b-c; 215a 232c esp 
216c-219a, 231d-232c 

27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT iv, sc iv [32-39] 
59a 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART i, 41b,d; PART 
iv 51b-54b passim; PART v, 56a-b; 59a-60c / 
Meditations, n 77d-81d esp 78b-c; iv 89a-93a 
/ Objections and Replies, 156a-d; 209b; 226a-d; 
276c 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART 11, AXIOM 2 373d; PART 
in, PROP 57 414d-415b; PART iv, PROP 35, 
SCHOL 433d-434a; PROP 37, SCHOL 1-2 434d- 
436a passim 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK vii [449-549] 227a- 
229a; BK vm [369-451] 240a-242a; BK ix 
[549-566] 259b; BK xn [63-110] 320b-321b 

33 PASCAL: Pensees, 140 199a-b; 339-348 233a- 
234a; 418 243a 

35 LOCKE: Civil Government, en vi, SECT 56-63 
36d-38c; CH xiv, SECT 163-164 63a-c / Human 
Understanding, BK n, en xi, SLCT JQ--II 145d- 
146a; en xxvn, SUCT 8 221a-222a; SECT 12 
223a-b; BK in, CH vi, SECT 26-27 274d-276a; 
CH x, SECT 17 295d 296b; CH xi, SECT 20 
304c-d 

38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i, ld-2b 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 337d-338c; 357c-358b 
/ Social Contract, BK i, 393b-c 

39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK i, 6d-7b; 8a-b 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 164a-165c / Fund. Prin. 
Metaphysic of Morals, 264d-265a; 279b,d; 
281c-282c / Practical Reason, 291a-293b; 316c- 
31 7a / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 
378b-c / Science of Right, 400b,d-402a esp 
401b-402a; 420d-421a /Judgement, 584d-585c 

43 MILL: Liberty, 294a-297b 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 21 
17a-c; PART i, par 47 24a-b; PART n, par 132 
46b-47a; par 139 48d-49b; ADDITIONS, 4 
116a-d; 10 117d-118a; 22 120c-d; 28 121b; 62 
126a / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156c; 
168b-d; 178a-b; 186a; PART i, 257d-258a; 
PART in, 304d-305a 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 287b-c; 319b-d; 
331b-332a 



16 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



\b to \c 



(I. Definitions of man: conceptions of the proper- 
ties and qualities of human nature, la. The 
conception of man as essentially distinct, or 
differing in kind, from brute animals: man's 
specific rationality and freedom.) 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE 11, 689c- 
690a 

52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v, 
127b-137c passim 

\b. The conception of man as distinguished 
from brutes by such powers or proper- 
ties as abstraction or relational thought, 
language and law, art and science 

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 2:19-20 
5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound [442-506] 44c- 

45a 
5 EURIPIDES: Suppliants [195-213] 260a-b / 

Trojan Women [665-672] 275d 

7 PLATO: Laches, 35b-d / Protagoras, 44a-45a / 
Theaetetus, 534d-536a esp 535d-536a / Laws, 
BK ii, 653a-c 

8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK v, CH i [i28 b i5-i6] 
178b; CH 3 [i32 a i-9] 182d; [i32 tt i7-22] 183a; 
CH 4 [133*15-23] 184b; CH 5 [134*8-17] 185b-c 
/ Heavens, BK n, CH 12 [292 b i-n] 384a / 
Metaphysics, BK i, CH i [98o b 25-98i a 27]499b-d 
/ Soul, BK in, CH 3 [427 b 7~i4] 659d-660a; 
[428*20-24] 660c / Memory and Reminiscence, 
CH 2 [453-5-14] [695b 

9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK i, CH i 
[488 b 2o-27] 9d; BK iv, CH 9 [536 b i-8] 63a-b; 
BK vin, CH i [588 a i8- b 4] 114b,d; BK ix, CH i 
[6o8 a io- b i9] 133b,d-134a / Parts of Animals, 
BK ii, CH 10 [656*8-9] 182a; CH 16 [659^8] 
CH 17 [66o b 3] 186d-187c; BK in, CH 6 [669 a i8- 
20] 197c; CH 10 [6?3 a 4-io] 201d-202a; BK iv, 
CH 10 [686*25-687%] 217d-219a esp [686 b 24] 
218b, [687 a 4-23] 218c-d / Generation of Ani- 
mals, BK n, CH 6 [744*27-31] 285c; BK v, CH 
2 [78i b i7-23j 323d-324a; CH 7 [786^5-22] 
328c d / Ethics, BK i, CH 7 [io97 b 7-n] 342d- 
343a; BK in, CH 2 [nn b 6-i2] 357b-c; BK VH, 
CH i [ii45 R i5-33] 395a-b; CH 3 [ii47 a 25- b 5l 
397c-d; BK vin, CH 12 [i 162^6-25] 414c; BK 
ix, CH 9 [n69 b i7-i9] 423b / Politics, BK i, CH 
2 [i253 a i~39] 446b-d; BK VH, CH 13 [1332*39- 
b 7J 537a-b / Rhetoric, BK i, CH i [i355 b i-3] 
594d / Poetics, CH 4 [i 448^-24] 682c-d 

12EpicTETUs: Discourses, BK i, CH 3 108b-c; 

CH 28, 134a-d; BK iv, CH n 240d-242d 
12 AUHELIUS: Meditations, BK in, SECT 16 262d- 

263a,c; BK ix, SECT 9 292b-d 
23 MACIHAVELLI: Prince, CH xvm, 25a 
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 52 b; 53a-b; 

54a; 54c; 57d; 59b-c; 63a; 79b-d; PART n, 

lOOac 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 215b-216b; 218a-c 
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 427d-428a 
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 20c-d / 

Novum Organum, BK n, APH 35, 163d-164a 



31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART v, 59c-60b / 
Objections and Replies, 226a-d 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK vin [369-451] 
240a-242a; BK ix [549-566] 259b 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, INTRO, SECT 
i 93a-b; BK n, CH xi, SECT 4-11 144d-146a 
esp SECT 10 145d; BK in, CH i, SECT 1-3 
251b,d-252a; CH vi, SECT 33 278b-c; BK iv, 
CH xn, SECT n, 361c-d; CH xvin, SECT n, 
384b 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 
n 407b-408a 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 4, 
452b-c 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341d; 349d-350a 

39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK i, 6d-8b 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 164a-165c; 199c-200c / 
Practical Reason, 316c-317a / Pref. Metaphysi- 
cal Elements of Ethics, 372a b / Intro. Meta- 
physic of Morals, 386b-d / Judgement, 479a-c; 
602b,d [fn i] 

43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 448a-449c 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 211 
70a-c; ADDITIONS, 26 121a-b; 121 136c-d; 157 
142b-c / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 168b-d 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 278a-279a; 294c- 
304a esp 294c-d, 297a-298a, 304a; 311d; 
320a-b; 349d; 591d-593c 

50 MARX: Capital, 85b-c; 86b-c 

52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v, 
122d-123a; BK vi, 167c-d 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 85a-b; 677a; 678b-686b 
esp 678b, 683b-684a, 686a-b; 691a-b; 704a- 
706b esp 706b; 873a 

54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 385b-c / 
Unconscious, 429c-d / General Introduction, 
616b -c / Civilization and Its Discontents, 778a 

Ic. The conception of man as an animal, differ- 
ing only in degree of intelligence and of 
other qualities possessed by other ani- 
mals 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, 

Q 79, A i, ANS 951b-953b 
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 52b; 53a-b; 53d- 

54a; 59b; 64a-c; 79c; PART ii, 112d-113a; 

PART iv, 267b 
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 207a-c; 215a 232c esp 

216c-219a, 231d-232c 
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 35, 163d- 

164a 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK ix [549-566] 259b 
35 LOCKE : Human Understanding, BK in, CH vi, 

SECT 12 271d-272b; CH x, SECT 17 295d-296b; 

CH xi, SECT 20 304c-d; BK iv, CH xvi, SECT 

12, 370c-371a 
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT ix 487b- 

488c 
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 334b,d-338d; 348d- 

349c 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 199c-200c 

43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 448a-449c; 469b-d 



2 to 2*(1) 



CHAPTER 51: MAN 



17 



49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 286a-319d csp 
287a-b, 294c, 304a-305c, 319b-d; 331b-332a; 
591d-592a 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 689c- 
690a 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 677a; 690b 

54 FREUD: Sexual Enlightenment of Children, 
121d; 122c 

2. Man's knowledge of man 

2a. Immediate self-consciousness: man's inti- 
mate or introspective knowledge of him- 
self 

7 PLATO: Charmides, 7b-c; 8b-d / Phaedrus, 
116c-d / Philebus, 629b-c 

8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK in, CH 4 [429^-9] 661d; 
[429^5-29] 662b; [430*2-9] 662b-c 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK ix, CH 9 [ii7o a 28- h i] 
424a 

12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH i, 105a-b; 

CH 27, 133a-b 
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK xi, SECT i 302a b 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 3 72a; 
par 7 73a / City of God, BK xi, en 26 336d- 
337b; CH 27, 337d-338a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 87, 
A i, ANS 465a-466c; A 2, ANS 466c-467b; A 4, 
ANS 468b-d 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 
112, A 5, ANS and REP 1,5 359c-360c 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xvm 
[49-60] 80b-c 

23 HOBBRS: leviathan, INTRO, 47b-d 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 6d-7a; 69d-70c; 177d- 

181d esp 180b-d; 253d-254a; 319d-320b; 

322b-323b; 388c-389c; 48Sc-486a; 520b 522a 

29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART n, 332b 

30 BACON: Advancement of learning, 54b-c; 88c- 
89b 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 51c-52a / 
Meditations, n 77d-81d / Objections and Re- 
plies, 207b; 224b,d; 276b-c 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 19-23 382b- 

383c 

33 PASCAL: PensSes, 396-399 240b 
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH i, 

SECT 1-8 121a-123a esp SECT 7-8 122c-123a; 

CH ix, SECT 1-2 138b-c; CH xix 175b-176b; 

CH xxi, SECT 30 185a-c; CH xxm, SECT 15 

208c-d; SECT 32-33 212c-213a; CH xxvn, 

SECT 9 222a-b; BK iv, CH ix, SECT 2-3 349a-c 
35 HUME: Human Understanding SECT i, DIV 8, 

454a-b; SECT vn, DIV 51-53 472b-474b 
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 349b-c 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 32a-c; 55a-56c; 99a-101b; 
121a-123b / Practical Reason, 292d [fn i]; 
307d-310c / Judgement, 599d-600d 

43 MILL: Liberty, 303b-c 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 5 
13a-c; par 7 14a-c; PART i, par 35 21a-b; 
ADDITIONS, 5 116d-117a; 22 120c-d; 25 121a / 



Philosophy of History, PART i, 257d-258a; 
PART n, 278a-c; PART HI, 304a-b; 310d 
47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [3217-3239] 79a-b; 
PART n [11,433-452] 278a-b 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 688b- 
689b; 693d-694c 

52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK xi,341c 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 121a-b; 122b-126a; 191a- 
197a esp 193a, 196a-197a; 221b; 223b 224a; 
233a-b 

54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 383b c / 
Unconscious, 429c-430c / General Introduction, 
451a-b; 620a / Ego and Id, 702d-703a 

2b. The sciences of human nature: anthropol- 
ogy and psychology; rational and em- 
pirical psychology; experimental and 
clinical psychology 

8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK vi, CH i [1026* 
5-6] 548a / Soul, BK i, CH i 631a-632d; BK n, 
CH 4 [415*14-22] 645b-c 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 13 [1102*5-25] 
347b-c 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 261c-269b passim 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 54b-c 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i 451a- 

455b passim; SECT vm, DIV 65 479b-480a 
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 329a-330b 
42 KANT: Pure Reason, la-4a,c esp Ib-d / Fund. 

Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 253b-254b; 271a-c 

/ Practical Reason, 294a-b; 307d-310c / Intro. 

Metaphysic of Morals, 388a-c / Judgement, 

599d-600d 
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par n 

15a-b 

53 JAMES : Psychology, xiiib-xiva; la-4a; 120a-l 29b 

54 FRLUD: Unconscious, 431b-d / General Intro- 
duction, 451a-453a esp 451b-452a / Group 
Psychology, 664a 665a / New Introductory 
Lectures, 864a-868d esp 868b-c; 873c-d 

2^(1) The subject matter and scope of the 
science of man 

8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK i, CH i 631a-632d 
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 87 

464d-468d 
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 49d-SOb; 

54b-c 
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, INTRO, SECT 

1-4 93a-94b 
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i 451a- 

455b 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 329a-331d 
42 KANT: Practical Reason, 294a-b / Intro. 

Metaphysic of Morals, 388b-c / Judgement, 

599d-600d esp 600d 
53IAMES: Psychology, xiiib-xiva; 3b-4a; 120a- 

121a; 129b; 236a; 825a [fn i] 
54 FREUD: Unconscious, 428a-429c esp 429b / 

General Introduction, 452a-454b; 467b-d; 

550a-b; 606a / Group Psychology, 664a-665b 

/ New Introductory Lectures*, 866a-b 



18 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



2b(2) to 3a 



(2b. The sciences of human nature: anthropology 
and psychology; rational and empirical 
psychology; experimental and clinical psy- 
chology.) 

23(2) The methods and validity of psychology 

8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK i, CH i 631a-632d; BK 11, 
CH 4 [415*14-22] 645b-c 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 13 [1102*5-25] 
347b-c 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 87 

464d-468d 
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xvm 

[49-60] 80b-c 
23 HOBBKS: Leviathan, INTRO, 47b-d; PART n, 

163a 
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 49d-50b; 

54b-c 
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 145 

441d-442a; SECT 148 442b-d 
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 8 

454a-c; SECT ix, DIV 82 487b-c 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 55a-56c; 121a-123b; 
126c d / Practical Reason, 292d [fa i]; 294a-b; 
307d-310c I Judgement, 599d-600d 

43 FLDERALIST: NUMBER 79, 234b-c 

52 DOSTOLVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK xn, 
386c-387d 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 17b-18b; 56a~66a passim; 
121a-129b esp 126a-129b; 146a; 165a; 235b- 
236a esp 236b [fn i]; 259a-b; 822b; 825a [fn i] 

54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 
Analysis, 13c-14a / Unconscious, 429b-c; 434c 
/ General Introduction, 451d-452a; 548a-550c 
esp 550a-b; 606a-b / Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, 639a-b; 661c-662b / Ego and Id, 
706d-707a 

2b(3) The relation of psychology to physiol- 
ogy: the study of organic factors in 
human behavior 

7 PLATO: Phaedo, 240d-242b / Timaeus, 474b- 
475d 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vn, CH 3 [246 b 20- 
248*8] 330a-d / Soul, BK i, en i [40^2^19] 
632a-d; BK n, CH i 642a-643a; CH 9 [42^22- 
26] 653b; BK in, CH 4 [429*28- b 4] 661c-d; CH 9 
[432 b 26-433*i] 665c / Sleep 696a-701d esp 
CM i 696a-697c / Dreams 702a-706d passim, 
esp CH 2 703a-704d 

9 ARISTOTLE: Pans of Animals, BK n, CH 4 
175b-176a; CH 7 [653 b i~7] 178d-179a; BK in, 
CH 6 [669*18-20] 197c; BK iv, CH 10 [686 b 22- 
29] 218b-c / Motion of Animals, CH 7 [70i b i3]- 
CH 8 [702*22] 237a~c; CH n 239a~d 

10 HIPPOCRATES: Sacred Disease, 155d-160d esp 
159a-c 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of 'Things, BK HI [94-829] 
31b-40c 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologiea, PART i, Q 75, A 
3, REP 3 380c-381b; A 4 381b-382a; Q 76, A 5 
394c-396a; Q 84, AA 7^8 449b-451b; Q 85, A 7 
459c-460b; PART i-n, Q 41, A i, ANS 798b-d 



28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 271a-b; 296d / 
Circulation of the Blood, 321d-322a; 322c-d / 
On Animal Generation, 431d-432a 

30 BACON: Advancement of learning, 48d-50b 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART v, 60b-c; PART 
vi, 61c / Meditations, vi, 99d / Objections and 
Replies, 207d-208a; 209c 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 14 380c; PROP 
16-17 380d-381d; PROP 26, DEMONST 384a-b; 
PART v, PREF 451a-452c; PROP 39 462a-c 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 338a 

42 KANT: Judgement, 538d-539a 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE 11, 689c- 
690a 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 2b-4a; 7a; 9a-56a esp 9a-b, 
52a-53b; 66b-71a passim; 690b 

54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 154c-155a / 
Unconscious, 429a-b; 431c-d / General Intro- 
duction, 451d-452a; 605b-606b / Inhibitions, 
Symptoms, and Anxiety, 721a / New Intro- 
ductory Lectures, 872c-d 

2b(4) The place of psychology in the order of 
sciences: the study of man as prerequisite 
for other studies 

7 PLATO: Charmides, 7b-c; 8b-d / Phaedrus, 
116c-d / Phaedo, 240d-242b / Republic, BK n, 
316a-b; BK iv, 350a-b / Philebus, 629b-c 

8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK vi, CH i [1026* 
5-6] 548a 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 13 [1102*5-25] 
347b-c / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 2 [1356*21-29] 595d 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, INTRO, 47b-d 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 69d-70c; 259a-260b; 

308c-d 

28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 443b 
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 51c~52a / 
Meditations, n 77d-81d / Objections and Re- 
plies, 207b 

33 PASCAL: Pensees, 66 180b; 144-146 200b 
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, 87d; INTRO 

93a-95d 
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 7-8 

453c-454c 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 329a-330b 
42 KANT: Pure Reason, la-4a,c esp Ib-d / Practi- 
cal Reason, 307d-310c; 331a-332d I Judgement, 
511a-512a; 599d-600d 
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 4 12d- 

13a; par 19 16d-17a 

54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 868b d; 
874a-c; 883c-d 

3. The constitution of man 

3<*. Man as a unity or conjunction of matter 
and spirit, body and soul, extension and 
thought 

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 2:7 

APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 9:14-15; 15:11 

(D) OT, Boo^of Wisdom, 9:14-15; 15:11 
NEW TESTAMENT: Romans, 7:14-23; 8:4-13 / 

/ Corinthians, 15:36-49 



3* /o 30(2) 

7 PLATO: Cratyluf, 93b-d / Phaedrus, 124b-d / 
Phaedo, 231b-234c / Republic, BK in, 338a- 
339a / Timaeus, 453b-c / Laws, BK v, 686d- 
687c 

8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BKVII, CH 10 [i(>35 b 
13-32] 559a-b; BK vm, CH 3 [1043*29^4! 
567d; CH 6 569d-570d; BK XH, CH 10 [1075** 
34-37] 606d / Soul, BK i, CH i Uo3 ft 2- b i9] 
632a-d; CH 5 [4io b io-i6] 640c; U" b 5-i8] 
641 c-d; BK ii, CH 1-2 642a-644c 

9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK i, CH 5 [i254 a 33~ b 7] 
448a 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [94-176] 

31b-32b; [370-395] 34d-35a 
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 3 108b-c; 

BK iv, CH ii, 240d-241b 
12 AURELIUS : Meditations, BK iv, SECT 21 265b-c; 

BK vn, SECT 55 283b-c; BK ix, SECT 8 292b; 

BK xii, SECT 30 310a-b 
14 PLUTARCH: Romulus, 29a-b 

17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR i la-6b / Second 
Ennead, TR i, CH 5, 37c / Fourth Ennead, TR 
HI, CH 19-23 151d-154b esp CH 20 152b 153a; 
TR vii, CH i 191c-d; CH 8, 197c-198b / Sixth 
Ennead, TR vn, CH 4-6 323c-325a 

18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK v, CH n, 216c; 
BK ix, CH 8-17 289d-295c passim; BK x, CH 
29 316d-318b; BK xm, CH 16 367a-d; CH 19 
369c-370c; BK xiv, CH 2-3 377a-378d; CH 5 
379c-380b 

19 AQUINAS : Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 8, A i, 
REP 2 34d-35c; A 2, REP 2 35c-36b; QQ 75^76 
378a-399b; Q 118, A 2, ANS and REP 2 601c- 
603b; A 3, ANS 603b-604b; Q 119, A i, ANS 
604c-607b; PART I-H, Q 4, A 5, REP 2 632c- 
634b; Q 17, A 4, ANS and REP 3 688d-689c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART HI, Q 2, 
A i, ANS and REP 2 710a-711c; A 5 715a~716b; 
Q 17, A 2, REP 4 808d-809d; PART HI SUPPL, 
Q 79, A I-Q 80, A 2 951b-958b 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xxv 
[34-78] 91d-92a 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 311a-b; 432 b-d; 538a- 
543a,c 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 48d-49c 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 5ld-52a; 
PART v, 60b-c / Meditations, 11 77d-81d; vi, 
98c-99a; 99d-100a / Objections and Replies, 
119d-120a; DBF vi-vn 130c-d; DBF x 130d; 
PROP iv 133c; 135d-136b; 152b,d-156a; 
170b c; 207d 208a; 209c; 224d 225d; 231a- 
232d; 248 b; 276b-c 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART u, PROP 10-13 376c- 

378c; PART HI, PROP 2 396c-398b; PART v, 

PREF 451a-452c 
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 512 262a 
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, CH HI, 

SECT 4, 113b; BK n, CH xxvii, SECT 6-8 220c- 

222a esp SECT 8, 221d-222a; SECT 15 224b-c; 

SECT 21 225d-226a; SECT 27-29 227d-228c; 

BK iv, CH in, SECT 6 313c-315b passim 
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vii, DIV 

52 472c-473c 



CHAPTER 51: MAN 



19 



36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 229b 230a; 270b; 
277a-b 

37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 198a-c 
42 KANT: Judgement, 557c-558b 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART i, par 47-48 
24a-c; ADDITIONS, 2 115d 

53 JAMES: Psychology, la-4a esp 2b-3a, 4a; 84a- 
93b esp 88a-90b; 116a-119b; 130a; 139a-140a; 
208a-b; 221a-226a esp 221a-222b, 225b-226a 

54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 154c-155a 



Man as a pure spirit: a soul or mind 
using a body 

7 PLATO: Cratylus, 93b-d / Phaedrus, 124b-126c 
/ Meno, 179d-180b / Phaedo, 231b-234c; 
250a-d / Timaeus, 452d-454a 

12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK iv, CH 11, 240d- 
241a 

13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK vi [724-751] 230b-231a 

17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR i la-6b esp CH 
5-7 2d-4a / Second Ennead, TR i, CH 5, 37c 
/ Third Ennead, TR iv, CH 2 97d-98a / Fourth 
Ennead, TR vn, CH i 191c-d / Sixth Ennead, 
TR vn, CH 4-6 323c 325a 

18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xm, en 16 367a- 
d; CH 19 369c-370c 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 29, 
A i, REP 5 162a-163b; Q 75, A 4 381b-382a; Q 
76, A i, ANS 38Sd-388c; A 4, ANS 393a-394c; 
A 7, ANS 396d-397d; Q 118, A 3, ANS 603b-604b 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, 
Q 79, A i, ANS and REP 4 951b-953b 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 51c-52a; 

PART v, 60b-c / Meditations, n 77d-81d; vi, 

98c-d / Objections and Replies, 119d-120a; 

DEF vi-vn 130c-d; DEF x 130d; PROP iv 133c; 

135d-136b; 152d; 155c-156a; 207d-208a 
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART in, PROP 2 396c-398b; 

PART v, PREF 451a-452c 
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH 

xxvii, SECT 6-8 220c-222a esp SKCT 8, 221d- 

222a; SECT 21 225d-226a; SECT 28-29 228a-c 
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 2 413b; 

SECT 89 430b-c; SECT 135-142 440a-441c; 

SECT 148 442b-d 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 186a-b 
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART i, par 35 

21a-b; par 47 24a-b; ADDITIONS, 5 116d-117a; 

22 120c-d; 25 121a; 28 121b / Philosophy of 

History, PART in, 310d 
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 28a; 380b-381a 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK vn, 295b-c 
53 IAMES: Psychology, 220b-226a 

Man's spirituality as limited to his im- 
material powers or functions, such as 
reason and will 

8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK i, CH 4 [408^8-29] 638c; 
CH 5 [4ii b i3-i8] 641c-d; BK n, CH 2 [4i3 b 24- 
29] 643d-644a; BK in, CH 4-5 661b-662d 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 7, A 2, 
REP 2 31d-32c; Q 29, A i, REP 5 162a-163b; Q 
75, A 2 379c-380c; AA 5-6 382a-384c; Q 76 



20 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



Ibto 4 



(da. Man as a unity or conjunction of matter and 
spirit, body and soul, extension and thought. 
3a(2) Man's spirituality as limited to his 
immaterial powers or functions, such as 
reason and will.) 

385c-399b passim; Q 77, A 5 403d-404c; Q 78, 
A i, ANS 407b-409a; Q 79 413d-427a; Q 80, A 2 
428a-d; QQ 82-83 431d-440b; Q 84, A i, ANS 
and REP i 440d-442a; A 2, ANS 442b-443c; A 
6, ANS 447c-449a; Q 85, A i, ANS 451c-453c; 
Q 86, A i, REP 3 461c-462a; Q 87, A i, REP 3 
465a-466c; Q 91, A i, ANS and REP i 484a- 
485b; Q 96, A 2 511b-d; Q 98, A i, ANS 516d- 
517c; Q 118, A 2, ANS 601c-603b 

3. Comparisons of man with God or the gods, 

or with angels or spiritual substances 
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1.26-27; 5:1-2; 9:6 / 
Job, 4:16-21 / Psalms, S.^-(D) Psalms, 8:6 
APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 2:23 (D) OT, 

Boo{ of Wisdom, 2:23 

NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 22:23-30 / / Corin- 
thians, n 7 / Hebrews, 2.7 / James, 3:9 / 
II Peter, 1.3-47 Revelation, 22:8-9 (D) Apoc- 
alypse, 22:8-9 
7 PLAIO. Protagoras, 44a-45a / Republic, BK vi, 

382c / Timacus, 476a-b 
9ARis>ToiLL. Parts of Animals, BK iv, en 10 

[68627-33]217d-218a 
10 HIPPOCRATES Sacred Disease, 155c-d 
12 EPICTEIUS' Discourses, BK i, en 3 108b-c; 
CH 12, 119b-120a, CH i\ 120d-121c; BK 11, 
CH 16, 158b-d 

18 AucusTiNi : Confessions, BK vi, par 4 36a-b; 
BK xn, par 20 103c-d; BK xin, par 32 119a-b 
/ City of God, UK vin, CH 25 283b-c, BK ix, 
CH 8 17 289d 295c; BK MI, CH 21 357a b; 
CH 23 357d-358a, BK xin, ni i 360a-b, BK 
xvi, CH 6 426c-427a / Christian Doctnne, BK i, 
CH 22, 629b-c; CH 23 630a-c; en 30 632c-633b; 
CH 33 633d-634b 

19 AQUIN\S: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 7, A 2, 
REP 2 31d-32c; Q 30, A 2, RLP 3 168a-169b; 
Q 47, A 2, ANS 257b~258c; QQ 50-64 269a-338d 
passim; Q 75, A 7 384d-385c; Q 93 492a 501 c; 
Q 96, A 2 511b-d; QQ 106-107 545c-552b pas- 
sim; Q 108, A i, ANS 552c-553c; A 8 561a-562a; 
Q 112, \ i, REP 4 571d-573a, Q 117, A 2, REP 3 
597c 598c; A 3, ANS 598c-599b; Q 118, A 3, 
ANS 603b-604b; PART MI, Q 4, A 5, RLP 6 
632c634b 

20 AQUINAS' Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 50, 
A 6 lla 12a, PART in, Q 6, A 3, REP 2 742a- 
743a 

21 DAML' Divine Comedy, PARADISE, vn [121- 
148] 116b c; xxix [13-84] 150b-151a 

23 HOBBES: leviathan, PART n, 162c; PART in, 

183d 184a 
27 SHAKESPEARE. Hamlet, ACT n, sc n [314-324] 

43d 
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK n [345-353] 118b- 



119a; BK iv [358-393] 160a-161a; BK v [388- 
450] 183b-185a; [469-505] 185b-186a; BK vi 
[320-353] 203a-204a; BK x [888-908] 293b- 
294a 

33 PASCAI- Pcnsees, 140 199a b; 418 243a 
35 LOCKE- Human Understanding, BK n, CH x, 
SECI 9 143a-c; CH xxm, SECT i \ 207d-208b, 
BK iv, CH in, SECT 17 317c; si-cr 2^ 320a c 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECI 81 
428c-d 

36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 394a 

42 KANT Pure Reason, 33a-d / Practical Reason, 

350c-351b 
47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [482-517] 14a-b; [602- 

736] 16b-19b passim; PART n [8094-8097] 

197a 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK vn, 295b-c 
53 JAMES: Psychology, 745a 

3c*. Man as an organization of matter or as a 
collocation of atoms 

7 PLATO: Sophist, 567a-568a / Laws, BK x, 761 b 

8 ARISIOILE: Generation and Corruption, BK n, 
CH 6 [334 tt io-i5] 435a / Soul, BK i, CH 2-5 
633a-641d 

10 GALPN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 12 172d- 

173c 
12 LucRhiius- Nature of Things, BK n [251-203] 

18b-d; BK in [()j-8(x)] 3lb-41a; BK iv [722- 

817} 53d-54d; [877-<)6i| 55d-56d 
17 PLOIINUS* Third Enncad, IR i, CH 3 79b-c / 

Fourth Ennead, IR vn 191c-200c csp CH 1-4 

191c-193c, CH 8, 195b-196a, 196c-197c 
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 75, 

A i 378b-379c, Q 84, A 2, ANS 442b-443c, 

A 6, ANS 447c-449a 
23 HoBBi'S. Leviathan, INTRO, 47a; PART i, 49a-d; 

80a b, PART iv, 251a-b 

31 DLSC MU i s Objections and Replies, 226a-d 
35 LCX.KL. Human Understanding, BK n, CH 

xxvn, SECI 21 225d-226a, SLCT 28 29 228a-c; 

BK iv, en in, si ci 6 313c 315b; CH x, SECT 5 

350a-b; SK.I 10 351b-352a, snt.i 17 353b-c 
35 Bi RKELEY- Human Knowledge, si.er93431b, 

SLCT 137 440b-c; SECT 141 441a-b 
42 KAN i Pure Reason, 126c-d / Judgement, 557c- 

559d; 575b 578a, 578d-582c; 599d-600d 
46 HFCLL Philosophy ofllntory, PART i, 255d 
51 TOLSIOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 689c- 

690a 

53 JAMKS: Psychology, 95a-119b 

54 FRKUD: New Introductory Lectures, 829a b 

4. The analysis of human nature into its facul- 
ties, powers, or functions: the id, ego, 
and super-ego in the structure of the 
psyche 

7 PLATO: Republic, BK iv, 350a-353d 

8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK ii-in 642a-668d 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, QQ 77- 

83 399b-440b 
31 DESCARIES: Meditations, vi 96b 103d passim 



40 to 4 



CHAPTER 51: MAN 



21 



42 KANT: Judgement, 465c-467a; 475b-d 
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 287a-302b passim 
54 FREUD: General Jntioduction, 501d-504b; 
531d-532b / Group Psychology, 681a-b / Ego 
and Id, 701d-708c esp 702c, 706d-707d; 715a- 
716c / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 
721d-722c / New Introductory Lectures, 830a- 
840a csp 836c-838d 

4a. Man's vegetative powers: comparison with 
similar functions in plants and animals 

7 PLATO: Republic, BK v, 361c-362a / Timaeus, 
469d-471d 

8 ARISTOTLE: Generation and Corruption, BK i, 
CH 5 417b-420b / Soul, BK n, CH 2 [413*20- 
b i3] 643b-d; CH 4 645b-647b; BK in, en 9 
[432 b 8-io] 665a; CH 12 [434*22-26] 667a-b 

9 ARTS TO I'LL : History of Animals, BK vm, CH i 
[588 b 2 3-589*8] 115b / Generation of Animals, 
BK i, en 23 271b-d; BK n, CH i [735*13-24] 
275d-276a; CH 4 [740^-711*5] 281c-282a / 
Ethics, BK i, CH 7 [1097^3-1098*1] 343b; 
CH 13 [iio2*33- b i3] 347d-348a 

IOGALCN: Natural Faculties 167a-215d esp BK 
i, CH i 167a-b, CH 5 8 169b-171a 

17 PLOTINUS: Third Enncad, TR iv, CH 2 97d- 
98a / Fourth Ennead, TR in, CH 19, 152a; 
TR ix, CH 3, 206b 

18 AUGUST INL: City of God, BK vn, CH 23, 
256b-c; BK xiv, CH 26 395d-396c 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 18, 
A 3, REP 3 106b-107c; Q 76, A 4, ANS 393a-394c; 
Q 78, AA 1-2 407b-410a; o 96, \ 2 511b-d; o 98 
516d-519a; Q 118, A i 600a-601c; A 2, REP 2 
601c-603b; Q 119 604c-608d; PART i-n, Q 17, 
A 8 692a-c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 50, 
A 3, RKP i 8b-9a; PART in SUPPL, Q 80, A \, 
ANS and RFP 4-5 959c-963a 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xxv 
[34-8 4 ]91d-92b 

24 RABLLAIS: Gargantua and Pantagrucl, BK in, 

143a-144c 
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 427d-428b 

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 27, 
158ab 

31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 207a; 
244b-c 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 256a-257c 

54 FREUD: Sexual Enlightenment of Children, 121 d 

4b. Man's sensitive and appetitive powers: 
comparison with similar functions in 
other animals 

7 PLATO: Republic, BK n, 319c-320c; BK iv, 
351b-353d / Timaeus, 466a-467d / Theaetetus, 
534d-535b / Philebus, 620b-622b / Laws, BK 
vn, 715b-c; BK xn, 796a-b 

8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK i, en 5 [41 1^7-3 1] 641d; 
BK n, en 2 [4H n 2o- b i3] 643b-d; BK n, CH 
5-BK in, CH 3 647b-661b / Sense and the Sensi- 
ble 673a-689a,c 



9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK iv, CH 8- 
10 59d-64b; BK vm, CH i [588*18-589*10] 
114b,d-115b; BK ix, CH i [6o8 a io- b i9] 133b,d- 
134a / Parts of Animals, BK n, en 16 [660*13]- 
CH 17 [660*23] 187a / Motion of Animals, 
en 6-1 1 235d-239d esp en 10 238c-239a / 
Generation of Animals, BK in, CH 2 [753*7-16] 
294a-b / Ethics, BK i, CH 7 [io97 b 23-i098 8 2o] 
343a-c; CH 13 [iio2 b i 3-1 103*3] 348a-c; BK 
in, CH i [nn a 2i- b 3] 357a-b; en 2 [im b 7-9] 
357b; CH 10 [1118*17 b 7J 364d-365a; BK vi, 
CH 2 [i 1 39*17-21] 387d; BK vn, CH 3 [i 147*^3-5] 
397d/ Politics, BK i, CH 2 [1253*9-15] 446b-c 
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH i 167a-b 
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK iv [522-721] 

51a-53d; [1192-1208] 59d-60a 
12 EpicrtTus: Discourses. BK i, en 3 108b-c 
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK in, SECT 16 262d- 
263a,c; BK ix, SECT 9 292b-d 

17 PLOIINUS. First Ennead, IK i la 6b passim / 
Third Ennead, IR iv, en 2 97d-98a / Fourth 
Ennead, TR in, CH 19 151d~152b; IR iv, CH 
20-21 167d 168c; en 23-25 169c 171b; CH 28 
172a-173b; TR ix, CH 3 206a b 

18 AUGUSTINE Confessions, I>.K x, par n 74a-b / 
Cit\ of God, BK v, en 9, 215a; BK vn, CH 23, 
256bc 

19ApuiN\s: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 75, 
A 3, ANS 380c 381b; Q 76, A 3, ANS 391a 393a; 
A 5, ANS 394c-396a; Q 78, A i 407b-409a, AA 
3-4 410a-413d; QQ 80-8 1 427a -t31d; Q 91, 
A 3, REP 1,3 48bb-487d; Q Qf>, \ 2 511b d; 
P\RT i n, Q 22, A 3 722d-723b 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, P\RT i n, Q 50, 
A 3 8b-9a; P\RT in, Q 2, A 2, RH> 2 711d-712d; 
Q 18, A 2, ANS Slid 812b; PARI in ST PPL, Q 79, 
A 2, RLP 3 953b-955c 

21 DANIE. Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xxv 
[34-84] 91d-92b 

22 CH \UCER: Knight's Tale [1^03-1333] 181b- 
182a / Manciple's Tale [17,104-144! 490a-b 

23 HOBBFS. Leviathan, PARI i, 49a 54c; 61a-c; 
64a-c, PMII n, 139a; 141a-b; P\RI iv, 267b 

24 R \BLLAIS. Gargantua and Pantagrnd, BK in, 
192b-d 

25 MONIAIGNL: Essays, 285c-292d; 424d-425c 

27 SHAKLSPLARE. King l^ear, ACT iv, sc vi 
[109-191] 274c-275b 

28 H \RVEY. On Animal Generation, 347c-d 

30 BACON: Novum Orgunum, BK n, APII 27, 
157b-c; APH 40, 173c-d 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, xn, 19a 20d / Discowse, 
PART v, 59a-b / Objection* and Replies, 156a d 

31 SPINOZA' Ethics, PART in, PROP 57, SCHOL 
415b 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK vm [369-451] 
240a-242a 

35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH vn, SECT 77-81 
42b-43a / Human Understanding, BK n, CH ix, 
SECT 11-15 140b-141a; CH x 141b-143d pas- 
sim, esp SECT 10 143c-d; CH xi, SECT 4-7 144d- 
145b 



22 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



(4. The analysis of human nature into its faculties, 
powers, or functions: the id, ego, and super- 
ego in the structure of the psyche. 4b. Man's 
sensitive and appetitive powers: comparison 
with similar functions in other animals.) 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT ix 487b- 
488c 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART iv, 147b-148b 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 331a-b; 337d-338d; 

348d~349c 
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 164b-c / Intio. Mctaphysic 

of Morals, 386b-d / Judgement, 479a-d 
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 121 

136c-d 

48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic^, 134b-135a; 244a- 
245b; 286b-288a; 289b-291a 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 261c-262a; 287d- 
291c; 294c; 301c-302b; 304a-313a; 568d-571b 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE 11, 689c- 
690a 

52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK in, 
54a-b 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 49a-50a; 198b-199b; 702a- 
b; 704a-706b; 712b-737a 

54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 
Analysis, 20a-d / Narcissism, 400c-401d / 
Instincts 412a-421a,c esp 413a-415b / General 
Introduction, 569c-585a esp 574a-d, 579b- 
581c, 584b c / Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
639a-663d esp 640b-c, 647a-648a, 651d- 
654c, 659d-66tc / Ego and Id, 708c-712a esp 
708d-709b / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anx- 
iety, 720b-721a; 737b-738a; 752a / Civiliza- 
tion and Its Discontents, 782a-d [fni]; 784d- 
785a / New Introductory lectures, 840a-853b 
esp 843d 844c, 846a-850a, 850d-851d 

4c. Man's rational powers: the problem of simi- 
lar powers in other animals 

7 PLATO: Laches, 35b-c / Republic, BK in, 338a- 
339a; BK iv, 352b-353d / Timaeus, 452c-454a 
/ Thcaetettis, 535b-536a / Laws, BK n, 653a-c; 
BK vii, 723c-d 

8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK v, en 3 [i}2 a i7-22] 
183a / Metaphysics, BK i, en i [98o b 25-27J 
499b; BK ix, CH 2 571c-572a; en 5 573a-c; 
en 7 [1049*5-12] 574c-d / Soul, BK n, CH 3 
[4i4 b i7-2o] 644d; [415*7-12] 645b; BK HI, en 
3-8 659c-664d; CH 10 [433*8-13] 665d / Mem- 
ory and Reminiscence, CH 2 [453*5-14] 695b 

9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK i, CH i 
[488 b 2o--27] 9d; BK iv, CH 9 [536 b i-8] 63a-b; 
BK vin, CH i [588*1 8- b 4] 114b,d / Parts of Ani- 
mals, BK i, CH i [64^5-10] 164b-c; BK ii, CH 16 
[659 h 28]-cn 17 [66o b 3] 186d-187c; BK in, CH 
6 [669*18-20] 197c; CH 10 [673*4-10] 201d- 
202a; BK iv, CH 10 [686*25-687^5] 217d-219a 
/ Generation of Animals, BK v, CH 7 [786 b i5- 
22] 328c-d / Ethics, BK i, CH 7 [io97 b 23-io98 a 
20] 343a-c; CH 13 [no2 b i3-i 103*3] 348a-c; 
BK in, CH 2 [ini b 6-9] 357b; BK vi, CH i 



2 [ii39 b i4] 387b-388b; BK vn, 
CH 3 [ii47 b 2-5] 397d; BK ix, CH 9 [1170*16- 
18] 423d-424a; BK x, CH 7-8 431d-434a pas- 
sim, esp CH 7 [ii77 b 26-i 178*8] 432c, CH 8 
[ii78 b 23-3i] 433c / Politics, BK i, en 2 [1253* 
7-18] 446b-c; BK vn, CH 13 [i332 B 39~ b io] 
537a-b; CH 15 [1334^-28] 539b-d / Rhetoric, 
BK i, CH i [i355 b i-3] 594d 
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 12, 173a-c 
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 6 110c-112b; 
CH 28, 134a-c; BK n, CH 8, 146a-b; CH n 
150a-151b; BK in, CH 7, 183c-184a; BK iv, 
CH 6-7, 231d-233b; CH 7, 234d-235a 
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK in, SECT 16 262d- 
263a,c; BK v, SECT 16 271c-d; BK vi, SECT 23 
276b; BK vni, SECT 7 286a; SECT 41 288d; 
BK ix, SECT 8-9 292b-d; BK xi, SECT i 
302a-b 

17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR iv, CH 2 97d-98a 
/ Fifth Ennead, TR i, CH 10, 213d-214a 

18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK v, CH n 216c-d; 
BK vn, CH 23, 256b-c; BK XH, en 23, 357d 
/ Christian Doctrine, BK i, CH 8 626c-627a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, A i, 
REP 2 14b-15b; Q 7, A 2, REP 2 31d-32c; Q 59, 
A 3, ANS 308b-309a; Q 76, A 5, REP 4 394c- 
396a; Q 78, A i, ANS 407b-409a; A 4, ANS and 
REP 4-6 411d-413d; Q 79 413d-427a; o 80, A 2 
428a-d; Q 81, A 3 430c-431d; QQ 82-89 431d- 
480c; Q 96, A 2 511b-d; Q 118, A 2, ANS 601c- 
603b; PART i-n, Q 12, A 5 672a-c; Q 13, A 2 
673c-674c; Q 15, A 2 682a-c; Q 17, A 2 687d- 
688b 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 50, 
A 3, REP 2 8b-9a; AA 4-5 9a-10d 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xvm 
[19-75] 80a-c; xxv [34-84] 91d-92b 

23 HOBBES: leviathan, PART i, 52b; 53a-b; 54a; 

57d; 59b; 63a; PART n, lOOa-c 
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 119b-d; 184a-c 

27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT iv, sc iv [32-39] 
59a 

28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 427d-428a 

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 35, 
163d-164a 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, xn, 19a-20d / Discourse, 
PART i, 41b,d; PART iv, 51d-52a; PART v, 
56a-b; 59c-60b / Meditations, 71b-d; 11 77d- 
81d / Objections and Replies, 156a-d; 209b-c; 
226a-d 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, AXIOM 2 373d; PART 
in, PROP 57, SCHOL 415b 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK vn [499-528] 
228a-b; BK vin [369-451] 240a-242a; BK ix 
[549-566] 259b 

33 PASCAL: Pensees, 339-349 233a-234a; 365 236a 
/ Vacuum, 357a-358a 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, INTRO, SECT i 
93a-b; BK i, CH i, SECT i 95b,d-96a; CH in, 
SECT 12 115b-116a; SECT 17 117a-c; SECT 23 
119b-120a; SECT 25 120c-d; BK n, CH vi 
131b-c; en xi 143d-147b esp SECT 8-n 145b- 



CHAPTER 51: MAN 



23 



146a; CH xxi, SECT 5-6 179c-180a; SECT 15-16 
181c-182a; CH xxvn, SECT 12 223a-b; BK iv, 
CH xiv, SECT 3-4 364d-365a; CH xvn, SECT 
1-3 371c-372b 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vm, DIV 
62 478b-c 

38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i, ld-2b 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 337d-338c; 349b-c / 
Social Contract, BK i, 393 b-c 

39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK i, 6d-8b 

41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 150c 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 164a-165c; 199c-200c / 
Fund. Prin. Mctaphysic of Morals, 264d-265a; 
271c-d; 279b; 281c-282c; 284d-285a / Practi- 
cal Reason, 303b-d; 316c-317a / Pref. Meta- 
physical Elements of Ethics, 372a-b / Judge- 
ment, 465c-467a csp 466a-c; 474b-475d; 
479a-d; 522b; 568c-575b esp 568c-d, 570c- 
571c, 572b-575b; 584d-585c; 587d-588a; 
602b,d [In i] 

43 MILL: Liberty, 294a-297b 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 4-5 
116a-117a; 121 136c-d / Philosophy of History, 
INTRO, 156c; 168b d; 186a; PART i, 257d- 
258a; PART in, 304d-305b 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 278a-b; 287a-b; 
292a-294c; 296c-300a esp 297d-298a, 299b; 
312a-313a; 319c; 331b-332a; 591d-592a 

50 MARX: Capital, 8Sa-d 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 689c- 
690a 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 85a b; 184a-187b csp 186a- 
187a; 664a-693b esp 664a-b, 677a-686b, 691a; 
873a 

54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 363b-364b; 
367b-c; 377c-379c csp 379a-b; 384c-385c / 
Unconscious, 429c-d / General Introduction, 
532a 

4</. The general theory of faculties: the critique 
of faculty psychology 

8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK u, CH 2-3 643a-645b; 
CH 5 [417*21-418*6] 647d-648d; BK in, CH 9 
664d-665c 

10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 1-2, 
167a-b; CH 4 169a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 77 
399b-407a; Q 78, A i 407b-409a; A 4, ANS 
411d-413d; Q 83, A 2, REP 2 438a-d 

20 AQUINAS : Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 
49, A 3, ANS and REP 2 4b-5a; A 4 5a-6a; Q 50, 
A 2 7c-8a; Q 54, A i 22d-23d; Q 56, A i, ANS 
30a-c; Q no, A 4 350d-351d 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, iv [1-18] 
57c 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 49d-50b esp 
50b; 54b 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, xn, 18b-20d / Medita- 
tions, iv 89a-93a; vi, 98d-99a; 101d-102a / 
Objections and Replies, 135b-c 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 48-49 391a- 
394d 



35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, CH i, 
SECT i 95b,d-96a; CH in, SECT 12 115b-116a; 
SECT 17 117a-c; SECT 23 119b-120a; SECT 25 
120c-d; BK n, CH xxi, SECT 6 179d-180a; 
SECT 15-20 181c-183a 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 8, 
454b-c 

42 KANT: Judgement, 461a-475d esp 466a-c, 474b- 

475d 
53 JAMES: Psychology, la-2a; 17b-18b 

5. The order and harmony of man's powers 
and functions: contradictions in human 
nature; the higher and lower nature of 
man 

APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 9:15 (D) OT, 

Boo\ of Wisdom, 9:15 
NEW TESTAMENT: Romans, 5-8 csp 7:15-25 / 

Galatians, 4-5 /James, 4:1-3 
7 PLATO: Phaedo, 231b-234c / Republic, BK iv, 

350a-355a; BK ix, 421a-427b; BK x, 431b-434a 

/ Timacus, 466a-c / Laws, BK v, 686d-687c 
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 7 |iog7 b 22- 

1098*17] 343a-c; BK vn, CH 6 [1150*1-5] 400c 
12 EPIC FETUS: Discourses, BK in, en 24 203c- 

210a; BK iv, CH n 240d-242d 
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK i, SECT i 253a; 

BK in, SECT 6 261a~c; BK iv, SECT 27 266a; 

SECT 39 267a; BK v, SECT 26 272c; BK vn, 

SECT 13 280c; BK ix, SECT i 291a-c; SECT 7-8 

292b 

17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR iv, CH 2 97d 98a 
/ fourth Ennead, TR iv, cti 18 166d-167b / 
Sixth Ennead, TR iv, CH 15, 304c-d 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK vm, par 10-11, 
55d; par 19-24 58b 60a; BK xin, par 12 
113b-d / City of God, BK xi, CH 26-28 336d- 
338d; BK xm, CH 3 361a-c; CH 15 366c-d 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 77, 
AA 4-7 403a-406b; Q 95, A 2 507c 508a; 
PART i -ii, Q 13, A i, ANS 672d-673c; Q 16, A i 
684b-d; Q 17, A 4 688d-689c 

20 AQUINAS : Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 82, 
A i 168a-d; A 4, REP i 170b-171a; Q 85, A i, 
ANS 178b-179b; Q 91, A 6, ANS 212c-213c 

22 CHAUCER: Manciple's Talc [17,104-144] 490a-b 

23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH xvm, 25a 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 63a; 85b 86b esp 
86b; PART n, 141a-b 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 105c-107a; 161a; 162b; 
326b-327b; 381b-c 

27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT i, sc iv [23-38] 
36a-b / Troilus and Cressida, ACT HI, sc n [82- 
106] 121a-b / King Lear, ACT iv, sc n [38-50] 
270d-271a / Macbeth, ACT iv, sc in [1-132] 
303b-304d / Coriolanus, ACT iv, sc vn [28-57] 
384c-d 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 20c-d 

31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 207d-208a 
33 PASCAL: Penstes, 106-117 193b-194b; 125-183 

195b-204b; 396-424 240b-243b; 532 265a 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART iv, 151b-152a 



24 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



5a 



(5. The order and harmony of man** power* and 
Junction*: contradiction* in human nature; 
the higher and lower nature of man.) 

37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 198a-c; 205a-c 

38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i, ld-2b 
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 337d-338d 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 164a-165c / Fund. Prin. 
Metaphvsic of Morals, 282b-283d / Practical 
Reason', 292a 293b; 316c-317a / Intro. Meta- 
physic of Morals, 385c-386b / Judgement, 584d- 
585c; 587a-588a 

43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 55, 174c-d 
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 448a-450a 

46 HhGhL: Philosophy of Right, PART ii, par 139 
48d-49b / Philosophy of History, PART in, 
304b-306b 

47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [1110-1117] 27b-28a; 
[3217-3250] 79a-b 

48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic1(, 204b-205a 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 304a-305a; 316a- 
317a 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK vm, 304b-305a 

53 JAMES: Psychology, la-b; 188b-191a; 717a 

54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 377c-382a, 
esp 379c-d / General Introduction, 590c-d; 
592b 593b; 615c-616c esp 616b c / Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle, 640b-d / Group Psy- 
chology, 689d-690c / Ego and Id, 699a-c; 71 Ib 
/ Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 746c- 
747b esp 747a / New Introductory Lectures, 
830a 832c; 834 b-c 

5a . Cooperation or conflict among man's pow- 
ers 

NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 5:29-30; 26:41 / 
Mar\, 9:43-47; 14:38 (D) Marf(, 9:42-46; 
14:38 / Romans, 7:18-23 / Galatians, 5:16-26 
/ Ephesians, 4:17-18/7 Peter, 2:11 

7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 128a-d / Republic, BK i, 
308b 309b; BK in, 338a-339a; BK iv, 346a- 
355a; BK ix, 425c-427b / Timaeus, 453b-454a; 
474b-d; 476a-b / Laws, BK i, 641a-b; 649d- 
650b 

8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK in, en 6-13 662d 668d 

9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH n 239a-d 
/ Ethics, BK i, CH 7 [1098*3-7] 343b; CH 13 
347b-348d; BK v, en u [ii38 b 5-i3] 387a,c; 
BK ix, CH 4 [n66 b i2-24] 419d-420a / Politics, 
BK i, CH 5 [i254 a 33- b 8] 448a 

12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 2-5 106d- 

llOc; BK in, CH 2, 177c-178a; CH 15 190a-191a; 

CH 24 203c-210a; BK iv, CH i 213a-223d 
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK i, SECT i 253a; 

BK iv, SECT 33 266c-d; BK vn, SECT 13 280c; 

SECT 55 283b-c; BK vm, SECT i 285a-b; 

SECT 39 288c; BK ix, SECT i 291a-c; SECT 8 

292b 

17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR iv, CH 18 166d- 
167b / Sixth Ennead, TR iv, CH 15, 304c-d 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK vm, par 10-11 
55c-56b; par 19-27 58b-60c; BK x, par 39 



81b-c; BK XHI, par 47, 123d-124a / City of 
God, BK xin, CH 3, 361c; CH 15 366c-d; BK 
xiv, CH 5-10 379c-385d; BK xix, CH 12-14 
517b-520d; CH 21, 524c-525a / Christian Doc- 
trine, BK i, CH 24 630c-631a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 81, 
A 3 430c-431d; Q 84, A 3, ANS 443d-444d; Q 
91, A 3, ANS and REP i 486b-487d; Q 95, A i, 
ANS 506b-507c; A 2 507c-508a; Q 96, A 2 
Sllb'd; PART i-n, Q 37, A i, ANS 783d-784c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 77, 
AA 1-2 145a-147c; QQ 82-83 168a-174b; PART 
n-ii, Q 29, A i, ANS 530b-531a; A 2 531a-d; 
PART in, Q 15, A 9, REP 3 794c-795b; PART HI 
SUPPL, Q 96, A ii 1063d-1064d 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, iv [1-18] 
57c 

22 CHAUCER: Parson's Tale, par 12, 503b 

23 HOBBES: Jjeviathan, CONCLUSION, 279a-c 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 5a-6c; 36c-41a esp 39b- 
40a; 159a-162c; 274d-276a; 344a-347c; 405c- 
406a 

26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard II 320a-351d esp ACT 
v, sc v [1-41] 349d-350a / Merchant of Venice, 
ACT i, sc ii [11-24] 408b-c 

27 SHAKESPEARE: Othello, ACT i, sc in [329-337] 
212c 

28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 347c-d 

30 BACON: Advancement of learning, 72 b; 78a d 

31 DESCARTES: Meditations, i 75a-77c; iv 89a- 
93a csp 90b-91b; vi, 102d-103a / Objections 
and Replies, 155d-156a; 207d-208a; 209c 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART m, PROP 1-2 396a- 
398b; PART iv, PROP 7, COROL 426b; PROP 60 
442d-443a 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK vm [561-594] 
244b-245a; BK xi [466-543] 309b-311a 

33 PASCAL: Pensees, 125-131 195b; 411-413 242a 
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 239b 

38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK i, 393b-c 
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 192b 

42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 
282b-283d / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of 
Ethics, 368d-369a / Intro. Metaphysic of 
Morals, 390b,d-394a,c / Judgement, 509c-d 

43 MILL: Liberty, 293b-302c passim / Utilitarian- 
ism, 448a-450a 

44 BosvvELL:/oAwjow, 135c-d; 455a 

47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [354-521] lla-15a; 

11110-1117] 27b-28a; [3217-3250] 79a-b 
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 311a-314b csp 312a- 

313a, 313d-314b; 318d-319a 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 15a-b; BK vi, 
235a-238c; BK xn, 554b 555c; BK xm, 577a- 
578b; BK xiv, 605b-d; BK xv, 630c-631a 

52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK n, 39a- 
40a, BK in, 53b-54b; BK iv, 95b-100c; BK v, 
127b-137c passim; BK vi, 164b-d 

53 JAMES Psychology, 199b-204b esp 199b-200b; 
717a-718a; 734b-735a; 799a-800a 

54 FREUD: Interpretation ofDreams, 370b; 379a- 
380d / Narcissism, 407a-408a; 409d-410b / 



5b to 6a 



CHAPTER 51: MAN 



25 



Unconscious, 433c / General Introduction, 
589c-591a; 635b-c / Ego and Id, 702c-d; 
704a-d; 708d-712a passim, csp 711c-d; 715b- 
716c / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 
720a-722c esp 721d-722c / Civilization and 
Its Discontents, 785b [fn i); 787a-788b; 790a- 
791d; 797c-799a; 800d-801a / New Introduc- 
tory Lectures, 837d-839b 

5b. Abnormalities due to defect or conflict of 
powers: feeble- minded ness, neuroses, 
insanity, madness 

5 AESCHYLUS: Choephoroe [1021-1076] 80a-d 
5 SOPHOCLES: Ajax 143a-155a,c esp [1-330] 
143a-146a 

5 EURIPIDES: Orestes 394a-410d csp [1-423] 
394a-398b 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK in, 96b-98a 

7 PLATO: Republic, BK ix, 416a-417b / Ttmaeus, 
474b-d / Laws, BK vi, 71 2b 

8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, en 8 [9 b 34~io a 6] 15a 

9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK iv, CH 10 
[686 b 22~29] 218b-c / Ethics, BK in, CH 10 
Jni8 a i7- b 7]364d-365a; BK vn, CH i [1145*27- 
33] 395a b; CH 3 [1147*10 19] 397b; en 5 
399a-d; CH 6 [ii 49^4-1 i5o a 8] 400b-c 

12 KpicrtTus: Discourses, BK i, CH 5 llOb-c; BK 
ii, CH 15 155c-156b 

12 AURLLIUS: Meditations, BK in, SECT i 259b,d 

13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK vn [323-405] 245a-247b 
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 84, 

A 7, ANS 449b-450b; Q 115, A 5, REP i 590d- 
591c; PART i-n, Q 6, A 7, REP 3 650a-d; o 10, 
A 3, ANS and REP 2 664d-665c; Q 24, A 2 727d- 
728c; Q 28, A 3, ANS and REP i 742a-d; Q 31, 
A 7 757c-758b; Q 37, A 4, REP 3 785d-786d 
23 HOBBLS: Leviathan, PART i, 66d-67b; 68b-d; 
69b-c 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 5a-6c; lOb-llb; 25c- 
26d; 36c-41a; 166a-167a; 235b c; 274d-276a; 
316b-c 

26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard HI 105a-148a,c 

27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT iv, sc v 59c-62a; 
ACT v, sc ii [236-255] 70b c / Othello, ACT iv, 
sc i [1-59] 229d-230b / King Lear, ACT iv, 
sc iv [1-19] 272b-c; sc vn [16-82] 276d-277c 
/ Macbeth, ACT v, sc i 306b-307a; sc in [37- 
56] 308a-b 

28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 347c-d 

29 CLRV ANTES: Don Quixote esp PART i, la-3b, 
PART ii, 205a-209d 

31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 155d- 
156a 

35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH vi, SECT 60 37d- 
38a / Human Understanding, BK n, CH xi, 
SECT 12-13 146a-c; BK iv, CH iv, SECT 13-16 
326d-328d esp SECT 13 326d-327a 

37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 109c 

44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 13a-14a; 214b-c; 354c- 
355a 

47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [4405-4612] HOa- 
114b 



48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 122b-124a; 136a-b; 
232a-236a; 380b 381a; 388b 389a 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 299c 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 510b-d; 515a- 
517a; 524c-527a; BK xv, 616a-617a 

52 DOSTOLVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK H, 21d- 
22b; BK xi, 337a-348d; BK XH, 364b-369a 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 23b-26b esp 25b-26b; 
32a-34a; 35b-37a; 132a-137b esp 137a; 147b- 
149a; 241b-258b csp 242a, 244b, 251b-252a, 
258a-b; 749a-750b; 753b-754b; 799b-807a; 
818a-819a; 828b-829a 

54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 
Analysis, 7a-8b / Hysteria, 35b-c; 52d-53c; 
81d-86c; 97b-106c; llla-115a / Interpretation 
of Dreams, 176a-d; 328c; 364c-d; 370b-c; 
380d-382a / Narcissism, 409c-d / Unconscious 
433c / General Introduction, 558a-c; 585b 
623b esp 586a-592b, 593c-595b, 600b-c, 604c- 
606a, 616b-c, 623a-b; 624b-d; 627a-b; 635b-c 
/ Group Psychology, 690a 691c / Ego and Id, 
713a-715a / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxi- 
ety, 721c; 722b-723d; 728b-731d passim; 
746c-748a / New Introductory Lectures, 81 2a; 
830d-832a; 872a-d 

6. Individual diflferences among men 

6a. The cause and range of human inequalities: 
differences in ability, inclination, tem- 
perament, habit 

APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 33:10-15; 38:24-34 
(D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 33:10-15; 38:25-39 

NLW TESTAMENT: Romans, 12:3-8 / / Corin- 
thians, 12/II Timothy, 2:20-21 

4 HOMLR: Iliad, BK xni [723-734] 95d 96a / 
Odyssey, BK vin [165-185] 223d-224a; BK xiv 
[199-232] 262b-c 

5 SOPHOCLES. Ajax [1226-1263] 153c-154a 

5 EURIPIDES: Rhesus [105-108] 204a / Electra 
[358-400] 330b-d / Heracles Mad [632 636] 
370c / Iphigenia at Aulis [558-572] 429d- 
430a 

5 ARISTOPHANES: Progs [1482-1499] 581d-582a 

6 TIIUCYDIDLS: Pcloponncsian War, BK i, 370a-c; 
383d-384a; BK in, 425b-c 

7 PLATO: Euthydemus, 70c / Gorgias, 274a-275c 
/ Republic, BK n, 316c-320c; BK in, 329c- 
330a; 339b-341a; BK v, 357b 360d; BK vi, 
373c-375b; 383c-d; BK vni, 404a-405c; BK ix, 
421a-c / Theaetetus, 540c-541a / Statesman, 
605d 608a / Laws, BK vi, 699d-700b; 704a-c 
/ Seventh Letter, 809c-810d esp 810c 

8 ARISTOFLE: Categories, CH 8 [8 h 25-9 R i3] 13d- 
14a; [9 b 9~io ft io] 14c-15a / Posterior Analytics, 
BK i, CH 34 122c / Memory and Reminiscence, 
CH i [449 b 3~9] 690a; [450*25^12] 691a-c 

9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK vn, CH i 
[582*5-16] 107c-d; CH 2 [583^-14! 108c / 
Parts of Animals, BK iv, CH 10 [686 b 22-29] 
218b-c / Generation of Animals, BK i, CH 18 
[725^5-726*6] 266a; BK iv, CH 3 [767*35- 



26 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



6a 



(6. Individual differences among men. 6a. The 
cause and range of human inequalities: 
differences in ability, inclination, tempera- 
ment, habit.) 

769 b io] 308d-311b / Ethics, BK HI, CH 5 359c- 
361a passim, esp [ni4 a 32- b 25] 360c-d; BK vi, 
CH 13 [ii44 b i-i4J 394b; BK VH, CH 7 400d- 
401c / Politics, BK i, CH 5-6 447d-449b; BK 
in, CH 13 481b-483a; CH 17 486c-487a; BK v, 
CH 12 [i3i6 B r-io] 518d-519a / Rhetoric, BK i, 
CH 6 [i?63 b i-3] 604c; CH 9 [i367 a 32- b 8] 
610a-b; CH 10 [1369*5-28] 612b-c; CH 12 
[I372 b 8-i373 ft i7) 616b 617a; CH 15 [1377*6-8] 
621d; BK ii, CH 2 [I378 b 28-i379 a 3] 623d- 
624a; CH 5 [n82 b i9-22] 628d; CH 16-17 638b- 
639a; BK in, CH 7 [i4o8 n 27~33] 659b-c 
10 HIPPOCRATES: Airs, Waters, Places, par 3-7 
9c-12a; par 10 13b-14a; par 12-24 14b-19a,c 
/ Epidemics, BK in, SECT in, par 14 59b / 
Sacred Disease, 155d-156a 
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [231-322] 
33a-34b 

12 EPICTLTUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 2-3 106d- 
108c; CH 5, HOb; BK 11, CH 15, 156a-b; BK in, 
CH 6, 182a-b; CH 24, 203c-206a 

13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, DK xi [243-295] 334b-336a 

14 PLUTARCH: Pompey, 512c-d 

17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR HI, CH 1-3 lOa- 
lla / Fourth Ennead, TR iv, CH 17, 166d / 
Fifth Ennead, TR ix, en i 246c-d 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 85, 
A 7 459c-460b; o 96, AA 3-4 512a-513c; Q 113, 
A 2, REP 3 576d-577d; PART MI, Q 46, A 5, 
ANS 815d-816d 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, vn 
[121-123] 64a; PARADISE, vm [91-148] 117d- 
118c 

22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK n, STANZA 
5-7 22a-b / Tale of Wife of Bath [6691-6788] 
274b-276a / Clerks Tale [8269-8317] 302b- 
303a / Parson's Tale, par 27-28, 514b-515a 

23 HOBDCS: Jonathan, PART i, 60a 61a; 61c-d; 
66d-67a; 67d-68c; 71a; 84c-d; 94b-c; PART n, 
112d; 154a 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 17c-18c; 60a-c; 63d-64b; 
71d-72b; 126b-127c; 150b-151a; 240a-c; 264b- 
265a; 279b-c; 310d 312a; 317b-c; 367b-368a; 
451a-c; 491d-493a; 513a-514a 

26 SHAKESPEARE: Merchant of Venice, ACT i, sc i 
[1-104] 406a-407b; sc n [39-133] 408c-409b; 
ACT iv, sc i [40-62] 426a / 1st Henry IV, ACT i, 
sc in [1-21] 437d-438a; ACT HI, sc i [165-191] 
451d-452a; sc n [93-161] 453d-454c / 2nd 
Henry IV, ACT iv, sc in [92-135] 492b-c / 
Much Ado About Nothing, ACT i, sc in [1-41] 
506d-507a; ACT in, sc i [47-116] 514d-515c 
/Julius Caesar, ACT i, sc n [33-47] 569d; [97- 
161] 570b-571a; [192-214] 571b-c; sc in [89- 
iii] 573c-d; ACT iv, sc i [1-40] 587a-c; sc in 
[1-123] 588b-589c; ACT v, sc v [68-75] 596a,c 
/ As You Like It, ACT iv, sc i [1-20] 617a-b 



27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT i, sc n [66-86] 
32b; ACT n, sc n [307-324] 43d; ACT iv, sc iv 
[31-66] 59a-c / Troilus and Cressida, ACT i, sc 
n [19-31] 105b; [201-270] 106d-107c / Mac- 
beth, ACT in, sc i [92-108] 295d-296a / Antony 
and Cleopatra, ACT n, sc in [10-39] 321c-d; 
ACT v, sc n [76-100] 347a-b / Cymbeline, ACT 
iv, sc n [2-5] 472c 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 76a-78a / 
Novum Organum, BK i, APH 42 109d; APH 
53-58 lllc-112b 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART i, 41b,d / Medi- 
tations, 70b-d 

33 PASCAL: Pensees, 7 173a; 97 190b 
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, en vi, SECT 54 36c 
/ Human Understanding, BK 11, CH x, SECT 8 
142d-143a; CH xi, SECT 2 144a-c; BK HI, CH 
vi, SECT 26-27 274d-276a 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vm, DIV 
66 480b-c; SECT ix, DIV 84, 488b,d [fn i] 

36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 191b-192b; 269b- 
273a 

37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 274a-b 

38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i, 2b-d 
passim; BK vm, 52a; BK xiv, 102b,d~104a; 
BK xv, llla-b 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality 323a 366d esp 329a- 
334a,c, 347a-b, 348b,d-363a,c / Social Con- 
tract, BK i, 387b,d-390d esp 388b-c; 394d; 
BK in, 411c 412c 

39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK i, 7d-8a; 54d- 
55b; 71b-d; BK v, 340c-343d 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 343c-d 

41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 31b,d-32a 

42 KANT: Judgement, 525c-532a esp 526a-d, 528c- 
530c; 586a-587a 

43 FtDERALisr: NUMBER 10, 50b-c 

43 MILL: Liberty, 293b-302c passim / Representa- 
tive Government, 336b-c; 346c-348c; 384a- 
387d / Utilitarianism, 448a-449c; 472d-473a 

44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 8a-c; HOd; 124d-125d; 
145d-146a; 283c; 413c-d 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 200 
67c-68a; ADDITIONS, 126 137a-b / Philosophy 
of History, INTRO, 166b-168a; 184b-d; 196d- 
199d; PART i, 222d; 250a-c; PART HI, 289b-d 

47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [1064-1141] 26b-28a 

48 MLLVILLL: Moby Dic^, 54b-55a; 59a-60b; 
83a-88b; 107a-b; 117a-131a; 137b-138a; 317a- 
321a; 417b-418a 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 266a-271a 

50 MARX: Capital, 25c-d 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 15a-b; 53c-d; 
BK v, 215b-c; BK vn, 278c; 281a-d; 283d- 
284a; BK ix, 349d; BK xi, 480a-482b; BK 
xni, 576a-b; 578b; BK xv, 632d-633a 

52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov esp BK i 
la-15a,c, BK n, 18b-21b, 32d-37b, 38d-40b, 
41c-45d, BK in, 53c-62a, 63d-64c, BK iv, 91c- 
92b, 95b-100c, 105c-107a, BK v, 109a-114b, 
BK vii, 180a-189a, BK x, 272a-274d, BK xi, 
368a-c, BK XH, 370b-372d, 373c-374b, 376b- 



6b 



CHAPTER 51: MAN 



27 



d, 380d-382b, 393a-c, 395d-396a, EPILOGUE, 
402a-404c 

53 IAMES: Psychology, 14b-15a; 197b-198a; 201b- 
202a; 274a-275a; 315a-b; 345 b; 381 a; 431b- 
432a; 448a-b; 484a-496b; 686b-690a; 691a-b; 
692b 693a; 759b-760b; 795b; 79 7a; 798b- 
801a; 826a-827a; 856b-858a 

54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 
Analysis, 18c-d / General Introduction, 594d- 
595b; 600b-c / Group Psychology, 681b / 
Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 744b- 
745b / War and Death, 758d-759c / Civiliza- 
tion and Its Discontents, 775c-776a; 787d-788b 



6b. The differences between men and women: 

their equality or inequality 
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1:26-30; 2:18-25; 

3:16; 5:1-2 

NEW TESTAMENT: / Corinthians, 11:1-16; 14:34- 

35 / Galatians, 3:28 / Ephesians, 5:22-33 

/ Colossians, 3:18-19 / / Timothy, 2:9-15 / 

I Peter, 3:1-7 

5 AESCHYLUS: Seven Against Thebes [181-202] 

29a-b 

5 EURIPIDES: Medea [263-266] 214b; [401-430] 
215c-a; [1086-1092] 221b / Andromache [269- 
273] 317c-d; [929-953] 323a-b / Hecuba [1177- 
ii 86] 362d-363a / Phoenician Maidens [193- 
201] 379d / Iphigenia Among the Tauri [1052- 
1066] 420c / Iphigenia at Aulis [558-572] 
429d-430a 

5 ARISTOPHANES: Lysistrata 583a~599a,c / Thes- 
mophoriazusae [785-847] 609b-610b / EC- 
clesiazusae 615a-628d 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK 11, 56c; BK iv, 
153a-b; BK vm, 275b; BK ix, 311a-b 

7 PLATO: Cratylus, 89d-90a / Symposium, 157b- 
158b/ Meno, 174d-175c / Apology, 208d-209a 
/ Republic, BK v, 357b-360d; BK vn, 401b-c / 
Timaeus, 442d; 452d-453a; 476b-d / Critias, 
480a / Laws, BK vi, 711b-d; BK vn, 720d- 
721a; 721d-722d; BK vm, 734a-735a 

8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK x, CH 9 586a-c 

9 ARISTOTLE : History of Animals, BK i, CH 7 
[49i b 3-5] 13a; BK n, CH 3 [5oi b 20-22] 24a; 
BK HI, CH 20 [522*12-22] 47a-b; BK iv, CH n 
[538 a 22- b i5] 64d-65a,c; BK v, CH 8 [542*32- 
33] 69a; CH 14 [545 b 26-3o] 72c; BK vn, CH 3 
[583 b i4-29] 109b-c; BK ix, CH i [6o8*2i- b 2o] 
133b,d-134a / Generation of Animals, BK i, 
CH 19-20 266c-269c; BK iv, CH 6 [775*5-27] 
317a-b; BK v, CH 3 J783 b 8-784*io] 325c-326a 
/ Ethics, BK VH, CH 7 [ii50 b i-4] 401a-b; 
[ii5o b i2-i6] 401b; BK vm, CH 7 [ii58 b i2-29] 
410c-d; CH 10 [n6o b 32-i 161*2] 413a-b; CH n 
[1161*23-24] 4I3c; CH 12 [1162*15-29] 414c-d 
/ Politics, BK i, CH 2 [i252*26- b 9] 445c-d; 
CH 5 [i254 b i3-i5] 448b; CH 12 453d-454a; 
CH 13 [i259 b 29-i26o*3i] 454b-d; BK n, CH 5 
[1264*1-7] 459d / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 5 [1360* 
38-1361*12] 60lb-c; CH 9 [1367*17-18] 609d; 



BK HI, CH 7 [1408*27-29] 659b-c / Poetics, 

CH 15 [1454*15-24] 689a-b 
10 HIPPOCRATES: Aphorisms, SECT vn, par 43 

142d 
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [1350- 

1360] 78c-d 

12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 16, 122b-c 

13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK iv [554-570] 182b-183a 

14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus-Numa, 62d-63c 

15 TACITUS: Annals, BK HI, 53a-b / Histories, 
BK iv, 285d-286a 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK xm, par 47, 
123d-124a / City of God, BK xn, CH 21 357a-b; 
BK xix, CH 14, 520c-d; BK xxn, CH 17 603a-c 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 92 
488d-491d; Q 93, A 4, REP i 494c-495b; A 6, 
REP 2 496b-498a; Q 96, A 3, ANS 512a-c; Q 99, 
A 2 520a-d; Q 115, A 3, REP 4 588c-589c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, 
Q 81, A 3 966a-c 

22 CHAUCER: Wife of Bath's Prologue 256a- 
270a / Tale of Wife of Bath 270a-277a esp 
[6612-6627] 273a-b / Clerks Tale [8808-8814] 
312b / Merchant's Tale [10,110-164] 335b- 
336a / TaleofMelibeus, par 14-16 405a-407b 
/ Nun's Priest's Tale [15,258-272] 457a 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 109c-110a 

24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK HI, 
159b-d; 164d-165c; 191c-193c; 195a-196b 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 84a-b; 188c-191c; 399c- 
d; 406a-434d passim 

26 SHAKESPEARE: 3rd Henry VI, ACT i, sc iv 
[128-142] 75d-76a / Comedy of Errors, ACT n, 
sc i 152a-153b / 1st Henry IV, ACT n, sc in 
[105-115] 444b / Julius Caesar, ACT n, sc i 
[261-309] 577b-c; sc iv 579d-580b 

27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT HI, sc i [122-157] 
48b-c / Troilusand Cressida, ACT v, sc n [107- 
112] 136a / All's Well That Ends Well, ACT i, 
sc in [62-94] 146"b-c / Othello, ACT n, sc i 
[101-167] 214c-215a; ACT in, sc iv [103-106] 
228c; ACT iv, sc in [60-108] 236c-237a / King 
Lear, ACT iv, sc n [59-68] 271a-b; sc vi [109- 
135] 274c-d / Cymbeline, ACT n, sc v 463a-c; 
ACT in, sc iv [19-35] 466d-467a; [156-168] 
468b-c / Sonnets, xx 589b 

29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART i, 123c-124a 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 84b-c 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK iv [288-301] 158b- 
159a; [440-502] 162a-163a; [634-658] 166a-b; 
BK vin [452-594] 242a-245a; BK x [144-156] 
277b; [867-936] 293b-294b / Samson Agonistes 
[210-214] 344a; [871-902] 358b-359a; [997- 
1060] 361b-362b 

35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH VH, SECT 82 43b 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vm, DIV 
66, 480b 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART i, 29b-31a; PART in, 
98b 99a; PART iv, 163 a; 166b 

37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 30a-32a esp 30d-31a; 
100b-102a; 120c-121a,c; 126d-127b; 203 b; 
219a-b; 219d-220a; 235b^238d; 283b c 



28 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



6c 



(6. Individual differences among men. 6b. The 
differences between men and women: their 
equality or inequality.) 

38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK vn, 47c; 
50d; BK xvr, 116a-c; BK xxm, 189d-190a; 
BK xxvi, 217d-218a 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 346a / Political Econ- 
omy, 367d-368a 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Pall, 92d-93b 

42 KANT: Science of Right, 404d; 419c-420a; 
436d-437c 

43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: AMENDMLNTS, 
xix 19d 

43 MILL: Liberty, 311a-312a; 317c-d / Representa- 
tive Government, 387d-389b 

44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 132a; 165b-c; 312a; 312c; 
391c-392a; 537a-c 

46 HEGLL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 165- 
166 59d-60a; ADDITIONS, 104 133d; 106-107 
134a-b / Philosophy of History, PART i, 222d 

47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [3522-3535] 86a; 
[3978-3985] 97a; PART n [9127-9134] 222a 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 257c; 264d-265a; 

372d-373c; 383b-384d; 562a-567c esp 566a- 

567b; 584c-585d; 588d-589a 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 51d; BK iv, 

184b; BK vi, 263b-264b; BK vn, 287a-b; BK 

xi, 488b-c; BK xn, 543b-544a; BK xv, 639a-b; 

EPILOGUE i, 659b; 660d-661b 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 691b-692a; 720a; 887b 
[fn 3 ] 

54 FREUD: Narcissism, 405b-406a / Ego and Id, 
705a-706a; 707d / Civilization and Its Dis- 
contents, 785a [fn i] / New Introductory 
Lectures, 853b-864a esp 854a-855a, 862a- 
863c 

6c. The ages of man: infancy, youth, maturity, 
senescence 

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 17:15-19; 18:9-15; 
21 : 1-8; 27:1 / Deuteronomy, 34:7 / / Kings, 
1:1-4 (D) III Kings, 1:1-4 / /^ 3 2: ^ 9 / 
Proverbs, 20:29 / Isaiah, 65:20 (D) Isaias, 
65:20 

APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 14:17-18 (D) OT, 
Ecclesiasticus, 14:18-19 

NEW TESTAMENT: John, 21:18 / / Corinthians, 
13:11 

4 HOMER: Iliad, BK xxm [448-499] 165d-166b; 
[566-649] 167a-168a; [785-792] 169c; BK xxiv 
171a-179d esp [349-551] 175a-177a 

5 AESCHYLUS: Agamemnon [71-82] 52d 

5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus at Colonus [1211-1248] 
125b-c / Antigone [631-767] 136c-137d / 
Philoctetes [96-99] 183a 
5 EURIPIDES: Alcestis [629-705] 242c-243a 
5 ARISTOPHANES: Acharnians [676-718] 463a-c 
7 PLATO: Laches, 31c / Symposium, 166a / 
Meno, 174b-175c / Republic, BK i, 295d-297b; 
BK n, 320c-321d; BK iv, 353b-d; BK vi, 380d- 
381a; BK vn, 398c-401d/ Timaeus, 471d-472a 



/ Theaetetus, 514b-c / Laws, BK n, 653 b-c; 
655b-656c; 659c-d; BK vn, 713d-714a; 
723c-d; BK xn, 796a-d / Seventh Letter, 802b 

8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK HI, CH 2 [117*26-34] 
164a / Physics, BK vn, CH 3 [247 b i 3-248*6] 
330c-d / Soul, BK i, CH 4 [408^8-29] 638c / 
Memory and Reminiscence, CH i [45o a 26- b 9] 
691a-b 

9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK 11, CH i 
[5oo b 25~50i a 4] 23a-b; CH 4 24a-b; BK in, CH 
ii [5i8 ft 6- b 2 9 ] 42c-43c; BK iv, CH 9 [536^-8] 
63a-b; CH 10 [537^4-20] 64b; BK v, en 14 
[544 b i3-27] 71b-c; [545^6-30] 72c; BK vii, 
CH 1 106b,d-108a; CH 5 [585*33]-^ 6 [585^9] 
lllb'd; en 10 [ 5 87 b 5-i8] 113d-114a; BK vm, 
CH i [ 5 88 a 24- b 5] 114b,d / Parts of Animals, 
BK iv, cn 10 [686^-30] 218a-c / Gait of Ani- 
mals, CH ii [7io b i2-i8] 248d / Generation of 
Animals, BK i, CH 18 [725^8-25] 265d-266a; 
CH 19 [727 n 2-io] 267a-b; BK iv, en 2 [766^7- 
34] 308b; CH 6 [775*9 - ? - 8 ] 317a-b; CH 8 
[776 b i5-28] 318d-319a; BK v, en i [778^0- 
779 b i3l 321a-d; [780*14^10] 322b-d; CH 3 
[78i b 3o-782 a 2o] 324a-b; CH 3 [783 b 2]~cn 4 
[785*7] 325c-327a / Ethics, BK i, CH 3 [io 9 4 b 
29-1095*12] 340a-b; CH 9 [io99 b 33-iioo } V)| 
345b-c; BK in, CH 12 [1119*34^19] 366a,c; 
BK vi, CH 8 [ii42 n i2-i9] 391b; BK x, CLI ^ 
[i i74 n i-4] 428b / Politics, BK i, CH 1 3 [i 259^9- 
I26o a 33] 454b 455a; BK vii, en 14 [i3$2 h }6- 
41] 537c-d; BK vni, CH 7 [i342 b i8~33] 548c / 
Rhetoric, BK i, CH 5 [i36i b 6-i5] 602a-b; BK ii, 
en 12-14 636a-638a 

10 HIPPOCRATES: Injuries of the Head, par 18 
69a b / Aphotisms, SECT i, par 13-14 131d; 
SECT n, par 39 133c; par 53 133d; SLCT in, 
par 3 134a; par 18 134d; par 24-^1 135a-b; 
SLCT vi, par 6 140c; par 29-30 141a; par 57 
141d; SECT vn, par 82 144a / Sacred Disease, 
157b-158b 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [445- 
458] 35d-36a; BK iv [1037-1057] 57d; BK v 
[222-234] 64a 

13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK vin [152-174] 263a-b; 
[510-520] 272b-273a 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par 7-13 2c- 
4c; par 30-31 8b-9a / City of God, BK xxi, 
CH 16 573b-574a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 77, 
A 8, REP 3 406b-407a; Q 96, A 3, ANS 512a-c; 
PART i-n, g 34, A i, REP 2 768c-769d; Q 40, 
A 5, REP 2 795d-796c; A 6 796c-797a 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 

94, A I, REP tO CONTRARY 221a-d; PART III 

SUPPL, Q 70, A i, REP 7 893d-895d 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xvi [85- 
105] 77d 

22 CHAUCER : Reeve's Prologue [3862-3896] 224a-b 

23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH xxv, 36b 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 53d; 60 b; 78b-c 

24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i, 
14c-19a 



6c to Ib 



CHAPTER 51: MAN 



29' 



25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 43a-c; 63d-64b; 72b-c; 
74b; 156d-158a,c; 185d-188d; 339a-d; 394a- 
395b; 406a-408b; 432d-434a; 535c-536a 

26 SHAKESPEARE: 1st Henry VI, ACT n, sc v [i- 
16] 12d-13a / 2nd Henry VI, ACT v, sc i [161- 
174] 66d / 2nd Henry IV, ACT m, sc n [321- 
357] 486d-487a / Henry V, ACT i, sc i [22-69] 
533b-c / As You Life It, ACT n, sc VH [137- 
166] 608d 609a 

27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT ii, sc 11 [197-209] 
42c-d / Troilus and Cressida, ACT n, sc n [163- 
173] 115b / King Lear 244a-283a,c esp ACT i, 
sc i [291-312] 247c-d, sc ii [48-53] 248b-c, 
[75-79] 248c-d, sc HI [12-21] 249d-250b, sc 
iv [258-344] 252c-253c, ACT 11, sc iv [148- 
158] 260a, ACT iv, sc vn 276c-277d / Mac- 
beth, ACT v, sc in [20-28] 307d 

28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 450a-b 
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 70b-c 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK xi [527-543)3100- 
311a 

35 LOCKE: Civil Government, en vi 36a-42a pas- 
sim 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vm, DIV 
66, 480b 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 127a-128a 
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 352b-353b 

38 MONTESQUILU: Spirit of Laws, BK xxm, 188a 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 336a-b / Social Con- 
tract, BK i, 387d-388a; BK 11, 402d 

39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 309d-310a 
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 79, 234c-d 

43 MILL: Liberty, 271d-272a 

44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 8b; 55c-56a; 126d; 128b; 
146b-d; 360b; 381a; 407d-408a; 422c 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 169d; 
187d-188b; 203d-206a,c; PART i, 222d; 257c- 
d; PART ii, 259a-b 

47 GOETHE: Faust, PRELUDE i [184-213] 5a-b; 
[2337-2365] 56b-57a; [4076-4087] 99b; PARTII 
[6685-68!8] 164a-166b; [10,331-344] 251b- 
252a 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 297b; 562c 563a 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK in, 132b-c; 
153d-154b; BK iv, 168d-169b; 171c-d; BK v, 
206d-207b; BK vm, 305b-310d passim; BK x, 
391d-394d; 400c-401d; BK xn, 559d; BK 
xnr, 584c; EPILOGUE i, 659d-660b 

52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK i, 7a- 
8d; BK v, 117c-127b; BK vi, 167c-168a; BK x 
272a-297d; EPILOGUE, 411b-412d 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 206b-207a; 242a; 270a; 
409a-b; 413b [fn 2]; 431b-433a; 649b-650a; 
711b-717a 

54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 
Analysis, 15a-16c; 17b-18a / Sexual Enlighten- 
ment of Children 119a-122a,c passim / Interpre- 
tation of Dreams, 191b-193a; 238b-246b pas- 
sim, esp 238c-239a, 241b-c, 243a-c / Narcis- 
sism, 400a-b; 406b-407c; 410b / General 
Introduction, 495a-496b; 526d-527b; 528d- 
531d; 572d-576d; 579b-584d; 592c; 594d- 



599d; 612d-614b / Beyond the Pleasure Princi- 
ple, 641d-643c esp 643b-c; 644d-645a; 651 b-c 
/ Group Psychology, 685b-686a; 693a-c / Ego 
and Id, 704d-706c / Inhibitions, Symptoms, 
and Anxiety, 725d<726a; 738b-740c; 743a- 
744a; 746c-747a; 751d-753c / Civilization and 
Its Discontents, 768b-d / New Introductory 
Lectures, 855b-863c esp 855d-858d, 860b- 
861c; 869a-870c 

7. Group variations in human type: racial dif- 
ferences 

la. Biological aspects of racial type 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK ii, 69b-d; BK in, 
91b-c; 113d; 114a-b; BK iv, 128a-c; 131b-c; 
143b-c 

9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK in, CH 9 
[517*12-20] 41c; CH 22 [523*17 19] 48c; BK 
vn, CH 4 [584 b 8-i5] HOb / Generation of Ani- 
mals, BK ii, CH 2 [736*9-13] 276d; BK v, en 3 
[782 b 30-783 tt 2] 324d-325a 
10 HIPPOCRATES: Airs, Waters, Places, par 3-7 
9c-12a; par 12-15 14b-15c; par 19-24 16c- 
19a,c 

26 SHAKESPEARE: Titus Andwnicus, ACT iv, sc 
n [51-127] 188b-189a; ACT v, sc i [20-53] 
192c-d 

27 SHAKESPEARE: Othello, ACT i, sc n [62-81] 
208b-c; sc in [9^-106] 210a 

38 MONTLSQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xiv, 
102b,d-104c 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 546d 

41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 49d 
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 113a 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART iv, 352a- 
353a 

48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic1(, 304a-305a 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 342a-359d esp 
348c-350b, 356a-359d; 562d-565a passim; 
573d-576d; 578a-589d esp 583b-584d, 586a, 
589c-d; 591a-c 

Ib. The influence of environmental factors on 
human characteristics: climate and geog- 
raphy as determinants of racial or na- 
tional differences 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 31d*32a; BK in, 
91 b-c; BK ix, 314a,c 

7 PLATO: Laws, BK v, 696d 

9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK vii, CH 7 [i}27 b i9-38] 

531d-532a 
10 HIPPOCRATES: Airs, Waters, Places, par 3-7 

9c-12a; par 12-13 14b-15a; par 15-16 15b-16a; 

par 19-21 16c-17b; par 23-24 18a-19a,c 
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK vi [1106- 

ni3]94d-95a 
14 PLUTARCH: Solon, 72d / Pompey, 512c-d 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 279b-c 

26 SHAKESPEARE: Henry V, ACT in, sc v 547a-c 
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART n, 79a-80a; PART iv, 

168a-b 



30 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



(7. Group variations in human type: racial differ- 
ences. lb. The influence of environmental 
factors on human characteristics: climate 
and geography as determinants of racial or 
national a iff erences.) 

36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 203a-204a; 224a-b; 

295b-296b 
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xiv 102b,d- 

108d; BK xv, llla-b; BK xvi, 116a-120a; BK 

xvii, 122a-124d passim; BK xvui, 125a-129c; 

BK xxi, 153a-154a; BK xxin, 190c-d 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 349a / Social Contract, 
BK in, 415b-4l7c 

39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK iv, 291a-c 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 45d; 87d-88a; 
397c-398a; 409d-412c esp 410a-411a 

41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 220b-223c passim, 
esp 221b-c; 338b-c; 341b 342c; 778a [n ij 

43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER n, 55d-56b 

46 HI,GI:L: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 346 

lllb / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 190b- 

201a,c; PART i, 235c-d; 236d-237a; 251d- 

252d; PART n, 259d-260a 
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 267a-c; 268b-269a; 

343c-344a; 356b-358d; 584a-b 

lc. Cultural differences among men: Greek and 
barbarian, Jew and gentile, European 
and Asiatic 

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 12:1-4; 15; 17:1-18:19; 
26:1-6; 27:46; 35:9-13 / Exodus, 34:1-17 / 
Leviticus, 26 / Deutewnomy, 7:1-8; 10:15; 
14:1-2; 26:17-19; 28:1-10,58-65 /Judges, 14- 
16 / Ruth I I Kings, 8:38-43,51-53; n:i- 
10 (D) /// Kings i 8:38 -43,51-53 ; 11:1-10 / 
/ Chronicles, 17:21-24 (D) I Paralipomenon, 
17:21-24 / Esther (D) Esther, 1:1-10:3 / 
Ezetyel, 37:21-22 (D) Ezechiel, 37:21-22 / 
Daniel, 1:1-8 

APOCRYPHA: Rest of Esther (D) OT, Esther, 
10:4-16:24 / II Maccabees, 6:1-11; 11:22-26 
(D) OT, // Machabces, 6:1-11; 11:22-26 

NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 10:5-6 / Acts, 15:1- 
29 esp 15:9, 15:17; 16:16-24 / Romans, 2:9- 
29; 3:29-30; 4:11-12; 10:12 / / Corinthians, 
1:22-24; 12:13 / Galatians, 3:26-29; 4:21-31 
/ Ephesians, 2:11-22 / Colossians, 3:9-11 

4 HOMER: Iliad, BK iv [422-445] 28a-b 

5 EURIPIDFS: Medea 212a-224a,c / Andromache 
315a-326a,c esp [147-244] 316c-317b, [445- 
453] 319a-b, [590-601] 320b / Hecuba [1196- 
1201] 363a / Iphigenia Among the Tauri 
411a-424d / Iphigenia at Aulis [1395-1401] 
437d 

6 HERODOTUS: History la-314a,c passim, esp BK 
i, 12d-13b, 35b-c, BK n, 57d-58a, 61d, 69b-d, 
BK HI, 97d-98a, BK iv, 137a-138c, 140d-141a, 
BK v, 163d-164a, BK vn, 216b-d, 232d- 
233d, 253b-254a, BK vm, 264c, 287c-d, BK 
ix, 291c-292a, 298a-302c, 305d-306a, 308d- 
310c 



6 THUCYDIDES : Peloponnesian War, BK i, 350b- 
d; 366a-c; 370a-c; BK n, 395d-397d; BK 
vm, 589d-590a 

7 PLATO: Crutyhis, 106b-c / Republic, BK iv, 
350c-d; BK v, 357d-358a; 367b-368c / States- 
man, 582d-583b / Laws, BK i, 645b 647c 

9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK i, CH 2 [i252 b 5-9] 
445d; CH 6 [1255*28-37] 448d-449a; BK in, CH 
14 [1285*17 29] 483b-c; BK vn, CH 7 [i327 b i9~ 
38] 531d-532a 

10 HIPPOCRATES: Airs, Waters, Places, par 16 
15d-16a; par 23 18a-c 

14 PLUTARCH: Thcmistocles, 99b-c / Marcellus, 
254c-256b / Flamininus, 303a-310d 

15 TACITUS: Annals, BK n, 23d 24a / Histories, 
BK v, 295d-296a 

18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK i, CH 1-17 129d- 
140b; BK iv, en 34 206d-207a,c; BK xvi, CH 
1 6 433c-434a; CH 18 434c; CH 21-28 435a- 
440b; CH 32, 442b-c; BK xix, en 22 
525b-c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 98, 
AA 4-5 242b-244b; QQ 102-105 270b 321a 
passim 

22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK n, STANZA 
3-7 22a-b / Tale of Man of Law [4631-4644] 
238a / Prioress's Tale [13,418-620] 392a- 
395b 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART iv, 267c-d 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 44b-48a; 91d-98b esp 
93b-94a 

26 SHAKESPEARE: Merchant of Venice, ACT i, sc 
in 409c 411b; ACT n, sc in 414a-b; ACT in, 
sc i 418d-420a; sc in 423b-d; ACT iv, sc i 
[386-400] 429c-d 

31 DESCARTLS: Discourse, PART 11, 46b-c 

37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 266c-269b 

38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xiv 
102b,d-108d; BK xv, HOa-d; BK xvi, 116a- 
120a; BK xix 135a-146a,c passim; BK xxi, 
153a-c 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 352b / Social Contract, 
BK n, 402d-403a 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 99c; 179d-183a; 
207b-208d; 260d-261a; 402a; 409d-410a 

41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 32d-34c; 35b-36c; 
222d-226a passim, esp 224b; 300a-c; 336c- 
339b passim; 341b-343a; 508d-509d 

42 KANT: Judgement, 504a-b 

43 MILL: liberty, 300d-302c; 307d-308c 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 351 
112a-b / Philosophy of History 153a-369a,c 
passim, esp INTRO, 161a-c, 174b-d, 176b, 177b- 
178a, 182d-183a, 183d-188b, 192a-194a, 196d- 
199d, PARF i, 211a-221a, 222a 233a, 235c-d, 
245d-247b, 250a-c, PART n, 276d-277a, 277d- 
278a, 279c-d, PART in, 289b-d, 312c-313a, 
PART iv, 352a 353a 

48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic1(, 17a-19a; 36b-46a; 
60b 65a; 350b-354b 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 323a-b; 571b- 
577d esp 573b-c, 575d, 577b-c; 584a-b 



CHAPTER 51: MAN 



31 



51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK in, 140d-141b; 
BK iv, 171b; BK vni, 309b-c; BK ix, 358b-365c 
passim, esp 362d-363a; BK xi, 497c-499c; 
515c-521c; BK xm, 575d-577a; BK xv, 624d- 
626d 

52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v, 
123b425c 

54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 882c-d 

8. The origin or genealogy of man 

8a. The race of men as descendants or products 
of the gods 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK n, 79c-80a 

7 PLATO: Protagoras, 43d-45a / Symposium, 
157b-158b / Timaeiis, 452c-454a; 466a-467d 
/ Laws, BK ix, 743a-b 

12 EPICTLTUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 3 108b-c; 

en 6, llla-c; CH 13 120b-c; CH 17, 123d; BK 

HI, en n 187a-b; CH 24, 204b-c 
14 PLUTARCH: Alexander, 553d-554b 

17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR i, CH 5 37b-c 

18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK HI, CH 4 170c 

48 MLLVILLE: Moby Dic\, 345b-346b 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 265d 

8b. God's special creation of man 

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1:26-27; 2:7,18,21-23; 

5:1-2 / Job, 10:8-12 / Psalms, 8:4-6; 100:3; 

119:73; 139:14-16 (D) Psalms, 8:5-7; 99 : 35 

118:73; 138:14-16 / Isaiah, 29:15-16; 43:7; 

45:12 (D) Jsaias, 29:15 16; 43.7; 45:12 / 

Jeremiah, 27:5 (D) Joemias, 27:5 / Mala- 

chi, 2:10 (D) Malachias, 2:10 
APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 2:23; 6:7; 10:1 

15:10-11 (D) OT, Bool^ of Wisdom, 2:23; 

6:8; 10:1; 15:10-11 / Ecclesiatficus, 17:1-3; 

33:10-13 (D) OT, Ecclestasticus, 17:1-3; 

33:10-14 / // Maccabees, 7:23,28 (/)) OT, 

II Machabees, 7:23,28 
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 19:4 / Mar^ 10:6 / 

Acts, 17:24-29 / / Corinthians, 15:45 / Colos- 

sians, 3:10 

18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK vn, CH 29-30, 
261a-c; BK x, CH 31 319b-d; BK xn, CH 10-13 
348b-350d; CH 20-21, 356d-357b; CH 23 357d- 
358a; CH 26-27 359a-360a,c; BK xm, CH 24 
373d-376a,c; BK xxn, CH i 586b,d-587b / 
Christian Doctrine, BK i, CH 22, 629b-c 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 72, 
A i, REP i 368b-369d; Q 73, A i, REP 3 370a- 
371a; Q 75, A 6, REP i 383c-384c; QQ 90-92 
480c-491d; Q 118 600a-604b 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xvi [85- 
90] 77d; xxv [34-78] 91d-92a; PARADISE, vn 
[64-84] 115d-116a; [121-148] 116b-c; xm [52- 
87] 126a-b 

22 CHAUCER: Monffs Tale [14,013-020] 434b 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART HI, 176d; PART iv, 
251a-b 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 41b-c; 
54b-c 



^ 31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART v, 56a-b / Medi- 
tations, in, 87d-88d 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK i [650-659] 107b; 
BK n [345-353] 118b-119a; BK vn [139-161] 
220a-b; [499-550] 228a-229a; BK vin [452- 
499] 242a-243a; BK xi [497-511] 310a-b 

35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH n, SECT 6 26b-c; 
CH vi, SECT 56-57 36d 37a 

37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 187d-188a 

41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 228a 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 265d; 590b 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 689b 

52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v, 
120d-121c 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 420a 

54 FRLUD: General Introduction, 562d 

8c. Man as a natural variation from other forms 
of animal life 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 334b,d 

42 KANT: Judgement, 578d-580a esp 579b-c 

47 GOETHE: Faust, PART n [8245-8264] 201a; 

[8321-8326] 202b-203a 
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 253a-287b esp 

253a-254a, 255a-c, 265a-d, 284c 285c; 331a- 

341d esp 341a-d; 590a-591d; 596d-597a,c 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 689c- 

690a 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 51b-52b; 95a-98a 

54 FREUD: General Introduction, 509d-510a; 
562d; 591d-592a / New Introductory Lectures, 
881a 

9. The two conditions of man 

9a. The myth of a golden age: the age of Kro- 
nos and the age of Zeus 

5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound 4Qa-51d 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK n, 80a 

7 PLATO: Cratylus, 92b-d / Timaeus, 444c-446b 
/ Critias 478a-485d / Statesman, 586c-589c 
/ Laws, BK iv, 681b-d 

13 VIRGIL: Eclogues, iv 14a-15b / Georgics, i 
[118-146] 40a-41a / Aeneid, BK i [254-296] 
HOa-llla; BK vin [306-336] 267a-268a 

14 PLUTARCH: Numa Pompilius, 59d-60b 

15 TACITUS: Annals, BK in, 51b 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, xiv [94-120] 
20c-d; PURGATORY, xxn [130-154] 87d-88a; 
xxvin [136-148] 97c 

24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK in, 
143b-d 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 215b 

27 SHAKESPEARE: Tempest, ACT n, sc i [143- 
168] 532d-533a 

29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART i, 27b-28a; 
PART n, 208a-c 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 71d-72a 
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT xi, DIV 

106-107 499b-500b 
37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 268c-d 
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 188c 



32 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



96. The Christian doctrine of Eden and of the 
history of man in the world 

9(1) The condition of man in Eden: the pre- 
ternatural powers of Adam 

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis^ 1:26-30; 2:7-25 
APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 1:13-16; 2:23- 
24 (D) OT, Boo{ of Wisdom, i :i3~i6; 2 123- 
25 / Ecclesiasticus, 17:1-15 (D) OT, Beck- 
siasticus, 17:1-13 

18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xi, CH 12 329b-c; 
BK xii, CH 21 357a-b; BK xm, CH i 360a-b; 
CH 13-14 366a-c; CH 23 372a-373c; BK xiv, 
CH 10-13 385b-388c; CH 15-17 388d-391a; 
CH 21-24 392b-395b; CH 26-27 395d-397a; 
BK xxii, en 30, 617c-618a 

19 AQUINAS : Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 76, 
A 5, REP i 394c-396a; QQ 94-102 501c-527a,c 

20 AQUINAS : Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 89, 
A 3 200d-201d; Q 109, A 2, ANS 339c-340b; 
A 3, ANS 340c-341b; A 4, ANS 341c>342a; A 8, 
ANS 344d-346a; PART 11-11, Q 2, A 7, ANS 396a- 
397c; Q 5, A i, ANS 410a-411b; PART in, Q i, 
A 3, REP i 704d-706a 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xxvm 
[91 1 -xx ix [56] 97a-98a; PARADISE, VH [64-93] 
115d 116a; xm [31-87] 125d-126b 

22 CHAUCER: Monl(s Tale [14,013-020] 434b / 
Parson's Tale, par 18, 507a-b 

23HoBBEs: leviathan, PART in, 191b-192c; 
PART iv, 250c-d 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 17d 18a 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 68, SCHOL 
445a-b 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK i [650-654] 107b; 
BK in [56-371] 136b-143b; BK iv [32-538] 
153a-164a esp [131-171] 155a-156a, [205-392] 
157a-161a; [610-775] 165b-169a; BK v [i- 
560] 175a-187b; BK vii-vin 217a-246b esp 
BK vin [1-560] 232a-244a; BK ix [1-1004] 
247a~269a; BK xi [45-71] 300a-b; BK xn 
[63-110] 320b-321b 

33 PASCAL: Pens&s, 560 272b 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 179d- 
180c; PART HI, 304d-306a 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK vn, 275a 

52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v, 125a~ 
126a 

9b(2) The condition of man in the world: fallen 
man; corrupted or wounded human na- 
ture 

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 3 esp 3:15-19; 6:5-13; 
8:21 / Job, 5:7; 8:9; 14-15 passim; 25:4-6 / 
Psalms, 8; 14:2-3; 39:5-6,11; 51:2-5; 53:1-3; 
103:13-15; 144:3-4 (D) Psalms, 8; 13:2-3; 
38:6-7,11-12; 50:4-7; 52:1-4; 102:13-15; 
143:3-4 / Proverbs, 20:9 / Ecclesiastes esp 
2:18-26, 3:19, 5:16-19, 6:1-12,7:20, 7:27-29, 
9:3 (D) Ecclesiastes esp 2:18-26, 3:19, 5:15- 
18, 6:1-11, 7:21, 7:28-30, 9:3 / Jeremiah, 
17:9 (D) Jeremias, 17:9 



9b to 95(2) 

APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 1:13-16; 2:1- 
i2,23-24~(D) OT, BooJ^of Wisdom, 1:13-16; 
2:1-12,23-25 

NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 15:10-20 / Marl^, 
7:14-23 / John, 8:3-8 / Romans, 3:9-23; 
5:12-21; 7:14-24; 8:20-23; 9:29 / / Corinthi- 
ans, 3:1-4; 15:21-22 / Galatians, 3:22; 4:1-3; 
5:19-21 / Ephesians, 2:1-5 / I John, 2:15-17 

18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xii, CH 22 357c; 
BK xm, CH 3 361a-c; CH 10 364a-c; CH 13-14 
366a-c; CH 23 372a-373c; BK xiv, CH i 376b,d- 
377a; CH 3 378a-d; CH 12 387a-b; CH 15-26 
388d-396c; BK xxi, CH 12 571a-c; CH 15 572c- 
573b; BK xxii, CH 22-23 606d-609a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 17, 
A 9, REP 3 692d-693d 

20 AQUINAS : Summa Theologica, PART I-H, QQ 81- 
83 162d-174b; Q 85, A i, ANS 178b-179b; A 3 
180b-181b; A 5 181d-182d; Q 91, A 6, ANS 
212c-213c; Q 109 338a-347d passim; PART 
HI, Q 8, A 5, REP i 760a-d; QQ 14-15 784a- 
796a 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, xiv [94-120] 
20c-d; PURGATORY, in [16-45] 56a-b; x [121- 
129] 68c-d; xvi [52-114] 77b-78a; xxvm [91- 
96] 97a; PARADISE, vn [19-148] 115b-116c; 
xm [31-87] 125d-126b 

22 CHAUCER: Monffs Tale [14,013-020] 434b / 
Second Nun's Prologue [15,497-552] 461b-462b 
/ Second Nun's Tale [15,788-822] 467a-b / 
Parson's Tale 495a-550a esp par 18 506b-507b, 
par 53 S26b-527a 

23 IIOBBES: Leviathan, PART in, 191b-193c pas- 
sim; 195d; PART iv, 250c-251b; 253b-255b 
passim 

24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK n, 
81a-b 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 238c 

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 52, 
195a-d 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK i [1-26] 93b-94a; 
BK ii [496-505] 122a; [1021-1033] 133b; BK HI 
[167-216] 139a-140a; [274-343] 141b-143a; BK 
iv [304-320] 159a-b; BK vn [542-547] 229a; 
BK ix [780-1189] 264b-273a; BK x [103-117] 
276b-277a; [229-414] 279b-283b; [585-640] 
287a-288b; [720-844] 290a-292b; [1046-1104] 
297a-298b; BK xi [45-71] 300a-b; [84-98] 
301a; [162-180] 302b-303a; [251-262] 304b- 
305a; BK xi [334]-BK xii [649] 306b-333a 

33 PASCAL: Pensees, 430 245a-247b; 434-435 
248a-251a; 439-450 251a-253a; 560 272b 

37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 38d 

44 Bos WELL: Johnson, 482a 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 14 

118c-d / Philosophy of History, PART in, 304d- 

306a 

50 MARX: Capital, 354b 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK vn, 275a 

52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK HI, 
54a-b; BK v, 125a426a; 127b-137c passim; 
BK vi, 165b-169c 



9b(3) to 10* 



CHAPTER 51: MAN 



33 



96(3) The Christian view of the stages of 
human life In the world: law and grace 

NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 5:17-44 / Lufy, 
16:16-17 / John, 1:17; 3:3-8 / Acts, 10 ; 13:38- 
39 / Romans, 2-8 / // Corinthians, 3; 5:17 / 
Galatians / Ephesians, 2:14-15; 4:17-24 / 
Phihppians, 3:8-10 / Colossians, 2-3 / // Tim- 
othy, i :8-io / Hebrews / I Peter, i -.1-2:10 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK xm, par 49- 
51 124a-d / City of God, BK x, CH 14 307c- 
308a; CH 25 313c-314c; BK xn, CH 22 357c; 
BK xv-xvin 397b,d-507a,c esp BK xv, CH 1-3 
397b,d-399c, CH 21 415b-416a, BK xvi, CH 
26 438c-439a, CH 37 444b-445a, BK xvn, 
CH 1-4 449a-455c, BK xvm, CH n 477c-d; 
BK xx, CH 4 532b-c; BK xxi, CH 16 573b- 
574a; BK xxn, CH 30, 618c-d / Christian Doc- 
trine, BK in, CH 33 670b-c 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 51, 
A 2, REP i 276b-277a; Q 73, A i, REP i 370a- 
371a 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 98 
239b-245b; QQ 106-167 321a-330d; PART ii-n, 
Q i, A 7, REP 4 385c-387a 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, vn [19- 
148] 115b-116c 

22 CHAUCER: Parson's Tale, par 53 S26b-527a 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK in [56-415] 136b- 
144b esp [130-134] 138a, [227-238] 140b; BK 
xi [1-21] 299a-b; [251-262] 304b-305a; BK xi 
[}34]-BK xn [649] 306b-333a 

33 PASCAL: Pensees, 560 272b; 655 292b; 699 
302b 

J2 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v, 
127b-137c passim 

9c. Secular conceptions of the stages of human 
life: man in a state of nature and in so- 
ciety; prehistoric and historic man; 
primitive and civilized man 

4 HOMER: Odyssey, BK ix [105-141] 230b-c 

5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound 40a-51d esp 
[196-256] 42b-d [442-506] 44c-45a 

6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK i, 349a- 
354b 

7 PLATO: Protagoras, 44a-45a / Symposium, 
157b-159b / Republic, BK n, 311b-c / Laws, 
BK in, 663d-667b 

9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK n, CH 8 [1269*4-8] 
465a 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [925- 
1457] 73b-80a,c 

13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK vin [306-336] 267a-268a 
IS TACITUS: Annals, BK in, 51b 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 84c-86b; 94b-c; 
PART iv, 267c-268a 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 91d*98b esp 93b-94a; 
237d-238c; 440b-443d 

26 SHAKESPEARE: As You Like It 597a-626a,c esp 

ACT II, SC I [l-20] 603c-d, ACT HI, SC II [11-90] 

609d-610c 



27 SHAKESPEARE : Cymbelinc, ACT HI, sc ill 
465c-466c 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 20c-d 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 37, SCHOL 2 
435b-436a 

35 LOCKE: Toleration, 16a-c / Civil Government, 
CH n 25d-28c esp SECT 14-15 28b-c; CH HI, 
SECT 19 29b-c; CH VH, SECT 94 46a-c; CH ix 
53c-54d 

38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i, 2b-3a; 
BK vm, 52a 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 329a-366d esp 329a- 
334a,c, 362a-366d / Social Contract, BK i 
387b,d-394d esp 393b-c; BK n, 398a-b; 400d- 
401a 

39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, INTRO, Ib-c; BK i, 
6a-d; BK in, 163d-164a; BK v, 309a-311c 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 53b-c; 86b,d-96d 
passim, esp 88d, 89d, 92c-d; 398d-399a; 
409d-414a passim, esp 409d-410a; 566a-b; 
632b-634a,c 

41 GIBBON: Decline and Pall, 86d-87b 

42 KANT: Pure Keason, 222b-c / Science of Right, 
402c; 405d-406c; 408c-409c; 412c-414c; 433c- 
434d; 435c-436b; 450d-451a 

43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 51, 164c-d 

43 MILL: Liberty, 272a / Utilitarianism, 472b-c 

44 BOSWELL: Johnson, HOd; 124d-126a; 164d; 
204c-205a; 209a; 2Kb; 221c-d; 311b; 408d- 
409a; 510b-c 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 187 
65a-c; par 194 66c-d; par 256 79d-80a; ADDI- 
TIONS, 126 137a-b; 129 137c / Philosophy of 
History, INTRO, 171c-172b; 179d-182c; 188c; 
196d-199d; PART i, 209b; 235d-236a; 240a-b; 
243d-244c; PART n, 260b-261a; 267b-268b; 
PART iv, 317d-318a 

48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 9b-23b; 136b-137a; 
171b; 221b-223b; 354a 

49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 13c / Descent of 
Man, 314c-316a; 317c-d; 320a-330a,c passim, 
esp 323a-b, 328d-330a,c; 349b-d; 351a-355d 

50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 421c 
54 FREUD: War and Death 755a-766d passim, 

esp 759c-d, 763a-766c / Civilization and Its 
Discontents, 776c-782d esp 776c-777b, 780d- 
781a; 788d-789b 

10. Man's conception of himself and his place 
in the world 

Wa. Man's understanding of his relation to the 
gods or God 

OLD TESTAMENT 

NEW TESTAMENT 

4 HOMER: Iliad 3a-179d esp BK i 3a-9a,c, BK n 
[340-447] 13b-14c, BK iv [1-183] 24a-25d, 
BK v 30a-39a,c, BK vin 51a-56d, BK xiv-xv 
98a-llld, BK xvi [431-461] 117a-b, [843-867] 
121c-d, BK xvm [1-137] 130a-131c, BK xx-xxi 
142a-154d, BK xxiv [513-551] 176d-177a / 
Odyssey 183a-322d 



34 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



10* 



(10. Man's conception of himself and bh place in 
the world. 1 Oa. Man's understanding of bis 
relation to the gods or God.) 

5 AESCHYLUS: Suppliant Maidens [86-103] 2a-b 
/ Persians [798-831] 23d-24a / Seven Against 
Thebes 27a-39a,c / Prometheus Bound 40a-51d 
/ Agamemnon 52a-69d / Choephoroe 70a-80d 
/ Eitmenides 81a-91d 

5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [863-910] 107b-c 
/ Oedipus at Colonus 114a-130a,c csp [258-291] 
116c-d, [959-999] 123b-c, [1751-1753] 129d / 
Antigone 131a-142d / Ajax 143a-155a,c csp 
[430-459] 146d-147a, [666-677] H8d, l74 8 - 
783] 149c-d / Trachiniae 170a-181a,c csp [94- 
140] 171a-b, [1264-1278] 181c / Philoctetes 
[441-463] 186a; [1316-1347] 193d-194a 

5 EURIPIDES: litppolytus 225a-236d esp [936- 
1466] 232d-236d / Alcestis [962-996] 245c / 
Suppliants 258a-269a,c esp [195-245] 260a-c, 
[734-749] 264d / Trojan Women 270a-281a,c 
csp [895-990] 277c-278b, [1277-1283] 280d 
/ Ion 282a-297d esp [237-451] 284a-286c / 
Helen 298a-314a,c esp [711-721] 304d-305a / 
Andromache [1070-1288] 324b-326a,c / Electra 
327a-339a,c esp [1233-1359] 338b-339a,c / 
Bacchantes 340a-352a,c / Heracles Mad [1301- 
1356] 376b-d / Orestes 394a-410d esp [316- 
347] 397a-b, [1625-1693] 410b-d / Iphigenia 
Among the Tanri 411a-424d esp [378-391] 
414b, [57 -575] 416a, [903-911] 419a, [1435- 
1499] 424a-d / Iphigenia at Aulis [1034-1035] 
434c; [1279-1335] 436d-437a 

5 ARISTOPHANES: Clouds [356-411] 492b-493c 
/ Birds [1189-1266] 557c-558b; [1494-1765] 
5GOc-563d / Plutus 629a-642d esp [76-146] 
630a-d 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 7b-10a esp 9d- 
lOa; 12d-13b; 20b-22a;39a-d;40d-41a; BK in, 
98b-c; 99a; BK iv, 124d-125a; 159d; BK vn, 
217c; 224d-225a; 250b; BK vm, 262b-c; 279d- 
280a; BK ix, 309d 

6 TuucYDiDES-.Peloponnesian War, BKV,506b-c 

7 PLATO: Cratylus, 94a; 106b / Phaedrus, 125b- 
126c / Ion, 144b-145c / Euthyphro 191a-199a,c 
/ Apology, 206b-d / Phaedo, 222b-d / Repub- 
lic, BK ii, 314c-d; 320c-324c / Timaeus, 447a- 
477a,c passim / Critias 478a-485d / Theaetetus, 
530b-531a/ Laws, BK i, 650a-b; BK 11, 653b-c; 
BK iv, 682d-683d; BK v, 686d-689c passim; 
BK vn, 721a-c; BK x 757d-771b 

8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK i, CH n [105*2-6] 148c 
/ Metaphysics, BK i, CH 2 [982 b 28-983*5] 
501a-b 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vn, CH i [1145*15-33] 
395a-b; BK vin, CH 7 [ii58 b 29-i 159*1^] 
410d-411a / Rhetoric, BK n, CH 5 [i383 a 33~ b 8] 
629c-d; CH 17 [i39i a 3o- b 3] 638d 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK n [581-660] 
22b-23b; [1090-1104] 29a; BK HI [978-1023] 
42d-43b; BK v [146-234] 63a-64a; [1161-1240] 
76b-77b; BK vi [43-79] 80d-81b 



12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 3 108b-c; 
CH 6 110c-112b; CH 12 118d-120b; CH 14 120d- 
121c; CH 17, 123c-124a; BK n, CH 8 146a-147c; 
BK iv, CH i, 218b-219d; en 3 224b-d; CH 4, 
226d-228a; CH 7 232c-235a 

12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK n, SECT i 256b,d; 
SECT 3-4 257a-b; SECT 11-13 258a-c; BK HI, 
SECT 6 261a-c; SECT 13 262c; BK v, SECT 8 
269d-270b; SECT 27 272d; BK vi, SECT 40 
277d; SECT 42 278a-b; SECT 44 278b-c; BK 
ix, SECT i 291a-c; BK xn, SECT 2 307b; 
SECT 5 307d-308a; SECT 23 309a b; SECT 30 
310a-b 

13 VIRGIL: Aeneid 103a-379a esp BK ix [77-122] 
281a-282a, BK x [96-117] 304b-305a, [621- 
632] 319a-b 

14 PLUTARCH: Numa Pompilius, 50d-51c / Corio- 
lanus, 189a-c 

15 TACITUS: Annals, BK in, 59d-60c; BK vi, 
91b-d; BK xvi, 179d; 183d / Histories, BK i, 
189d-190a; BK n, 235a-c 

17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR ix, CH 9, 71a 
/ Third Ennead, TR n, CH 8-9 86c-88a 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions la-125a,c passim / 
City of God 129a-618d / Christian Doctrine, 
BK i 624a*636a,c; BK n, CH 7 638d-639c 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 8, 
A 3, ANS and REP 4 36b-37c; Q 17, A i, ANS 
lOOd-lOld; Q 22, A 2, REP 4-5 128d-130d; QQ 
23-24 132b-143c; Q 83, A i, REP 2-4 436d- 
438a; Q 103, A 5, REP 3 531b-532b; A 8, REP 
1-2 533d-534b; Q 116 592d-595c; PART i-n, 
QQ 1-48 609a-826a,c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, QQ 
49-114 la-378a,c 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy esp PARADISE, i [94- 
142] 107b-d, vn [19-120] 115b-116b, xix [40- 
66] 135c-d 

22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK i, STANZA 
30-35 5a-b; BK in, STANZA 89 66a; BK iv, 
STANZA 136-155 106a-108b; BK v, STANZA 
259-267 154a-155a / Knight's Tale [1251- 
1274] 180b-181a; [1303-1333] 181b-182a / 
Tale of Man of Law 236b-255b esp [4869- 
4931] 242b-243b, [5240-5253] 249b / Friar's 
Tale [7056-7085] 281a-b / Franklin's Tale 
[11,177-206] 353b-354a / Prioress's Tale 391a- 
395b / Tale ofMelibeus, par 17 407b-408a / 
Monffs Prologue 432a-434a / Mon%s Tale 
434a-448b / Nun's Priest's Tale [15,236-256] 
456b-457a / Second Nun's Tale 463b-471b / 
Parson's Tale 495a-550a esp par i 495a-b, 
par 12, 503b-504a, par 52-56, 526a-528a, par 
103 549b-550a 

23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH xxv, 35a-b 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 54b-c; 78d-83a; 
PART n, 113b-c; 159d-164a,c; PART iv, 254b; 
260b-c; 272b-c 

24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK iv, 
265a-d 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 98b-99a; 208a-294b esp 
209a-212d, 233a-234a, 246a-258b 



100 to 



CHAPTER 51: MAN 



35 



26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard II, ACT v, sc 11 [23-40] 
346c-d 

27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT i, sc n [129-134] 
32 d; ACT in, sc HI [36-96] 53d-54b / King 
Lear, ACT iv, sc i [30-37] 269d; sc n [46-81] 
271a-b; sc vi [34-80] 273d-274b / Antony 
and Cleopatra, ACT n, sc i [1-8] 317d / Pericles, 
ACT in, sc i [1-26] 433c-434a / Cymbeline, 
ACT v, sc iv [1-151] 481a-482c; sc v [425-485] 
488bd 

29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART n, 267b-c; 
408c 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 80b-81a 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv 51b-54b pas- 
sim / Meditations, m 81d*89a passim; iv 89a- 
93a / Objections and Replies, 122a-b; 123c-d; 
142b-c; 213b-214d; 226d-227a; 229c-d 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 25, COROL 
365b; PROP 29, SCHOL 366b-c; APPENDIX 
369b-372d; PART n, PROP 5 374c-d; PROP 10 
376c-377a; PART iv, PREF, 423a-b 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK in [80-134] 137a- 
138a; BK iv [411-439] 161b-162a; BK v [224- 
245] 180a-b; [506-543] 186a-187a; BK x [610- 
640] 287b-288b / Samson Agonistes [373-419] 
347b-348b; [667-709] 354a-355a / Areopagit- 
ica, 394b-395b 

33 PASCAL: Provincial Letters, 78b-80b / Pensees, 
389 239b; 425-555 243b-270a 

35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH n, SECT 6 26b-c 
/ Human Understanding, BK n, CH VH, SECT 
5-6 132c-d 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 155-156 
444b-d 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vm, DIV 
78-81 485c-487a; SECT xi, DIV 106-109 499b- 
501a 

38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i, la-2b; 
BK xn, 85d-86a 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 366b-d / Social Con- 
tract, BK iv, 435a-439c 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 292d-296c; 409b 

41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 258a; 259b-260a 

42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 
278b-279d / Practical Reason, 291a-292a; 
325a-328b; 334a-335c; 345c-d / Intro. Meta- 
physic of Morals, 383b,d-384a,c / Judgement, 
502d-503a; 594d [fn i] 

43 MILL: Liberty, 296b-d 

44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 392d-393a; 394a-c; 481d- 
482d 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 158c- 
160b; 169d; PART i, 224a-225a; 236a-c; 245d- 
246c; PART n, 263d-265c; 266d; 268b-271c; 
280b-281b; PART in, 291b-292b; 303c-307b; 
308a-b; PART iv, 322a-c; 339b-d; 349c- 
350c 

47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [354-517] lla-14b; 
[1810-1815] 43a; PART 11 [8582-8590] 209a 

48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 28a-36b; 84b-85a; 
123a-b; 306b-307a; 318b; 380a-381a; 396b- 
397a 



49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 302b-303d 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 50b-c; BK v, 
196a-198b; 216d-218b; BK ix, 357d-358b; 
BK xiv, 608a-b; BK xv, 631a-c; EPILOGUE 11, 
675a-676b; 680b-c; 684b-d 

52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK in, 
54a-b; 64c-67a; BK v, 121d-137c passim; BK 
vi 146b,d-170d; BK vii, 177b-180a; 185a-c; 
BK xi, 313c-314d; 337a-346a passim 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 203a-204b 

54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 246c-247d / 
General Introduction, 582a-b / Civilization 
and Its Discontents, 771a-b; 793c 

10. Man as the measure of all things 

7 PLATO:' Cratylus, 85a-86d / Theaetetus, 517b- 
532a esp 517b-c, 522b, 525a-526c, 531b-c; 
534b / Laws, BK iv, 683a 

8 ARISTOTLE : Metaphysics, BK iv, CH 5-6 528c- 
531c; BK x, CH i [io53*3i- b 3] 580a; CH 6 
[1057*7-11] 584b; BK xi, CH 6 [io62 b i2- 
io63 b i4] 590d-592a 

23 HOBBES: leviathan, PART i, 50a 
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART n, 279d- 
280b 

lOc. Man as an integral part of the universe: 
his station in the cosmos 

7 PLATO: Laws, BK x, 767c-768c 

12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 2 106d-108b; 
CH 12 118d-120b; CH 14 120d-121c; BK n, 
CH 8 146a-147c; BK in, CH 13 188b-189c; CH 
24 203c-210a; BK iv, CH i 213a-223d 

12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK n, SECT i 256b,d; 
SECT 4 257b; SECT 9 257d; SECT 16 259a; BK 
iv, SECT 14 264d; SECT 23 265c; SECT 48 
267d-268a; BK v, SECT 3-4 269a; SECT 8 
269d-270b; BK vi, SECT 40-46 277d-278d; 
BK vii, SECT 9-10 280b-c; SECT 13 280c; BK 
vin, SECT 27 287c; SECT 34 288a-b; BK ix, 
SECT i 291a c; SECT 9 292b d; BK x, SECT 6-7 
297a-c; BK xn, SECT 30 310a-b 

17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR n, CH 14 
89b-d 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 25, COROL 
365b; PROP 29, SCHOL 366b-c; PROP 31 366d- 
367a; PART n, PROP i-io 373d-377a; PROP n, 
COROL 377b-c; PART in, 395a-d; PART iv, 
PROP 2-6 425a~426a; APPENDIX, vi-vni 
447c-d; xxvi 449c; xxxn 450c-d; PART v, 
PROP 40, SCHOL 462d 

10</. The finiteness and insufficiency of man: 
his sense of being dependent and or- 
dered to something beyond himself 

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1:26-30; 3:16-24 / 
Numbers, 23:19 / Deuteronomy, 8:3 / Job, 
4:17-21; 9; 12-14; 2 5 / Psalms, 8; 39:4; 
103:14-16; 119-120; 139:1-16; 144:3-4 (D) 
Psalms, 8; 38:5; 102:14-16; 118-119; 138:1-16; 
143:3-4 / Proverbs, 16:33; 20:2 4 / 
17:5-8 (D) Jeremias, 17:5-8 



36 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



Wdto 10<? 



(10. Man's conception of himself and bis place in 
the world. lOd. The finiteness and insuffi- 
ciency of man: his sense of being dependent 
and ordered to something beyond himself.) 

APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 9:14-17; 16:26 
(D) OT, Bool( of Wisdom, 9:14-17; 16:26 / 
Ecclesiasticus, 18:7-11; 33:10-15 (D) OT, 
Ecclesiasticus, 18:6-10; 33:10-15 

NEW TESTAMENT: Luty, 4:4 / Romans, 14:7-9 / 
7 Corinthians, 2-3 / James, 4:13-16 / I Peter, 
1:24 
3 AESCHYLUS: Suppliant Maidens [86-103] 2a-b 

5 EURIPIDES: Alcestis [962 996] 245c / Sup- 
pliants [195-245] 260a-c; [734-749] 264d / 
Heracles Mad [1301-1356] 376b-d 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 7b-8a; 20b-21a; 
46c-d; BK n, 65b; BK in, 98b c; 99a; 103d- 
104b; BK iv, 153b-d; BK VH, 252b-c; BK ix, 
291bc 

7 PLATO: Phaedo, 246c / Laws, BK i, 650a-b; 
BK vn, 721a-c; BK x, 767c-768c 

8 ARISTOILP: Metaphysics, BK XIT, CH 10 [1075* 
i2-24]605d606a 

12 RpicThrus: Discourses, BK iv, en 7 232c- 

235a 
12 AURLLIUS: Meditations, BK n, SECT 3 257a-b; 

SECT 17 259b-d; BK HI, SECT 10 261d-262a; 

BK iv, SECT 33-36 266c-d; BK v, SECT 10 

270c-d; SECT 33 273b-c; BK vn, SECT 44-50 

282b-283a; BK xii, SECT 32 310c 

14 PLUTARCH: Aemilius Paulus, 225b-c; 229a-c 
/ Sulla, 370c-371b / Demetrius, 739c-740d; 
744b-c 

15 TACITUS: Annals, BK in, 49c; BK iv, 68d-69b; 
BK vi, 91b-d / Histories, BK i, 194a-c; BK n, 
232d-233a; BK iv, 281a-b 

17 PLO-IINUS: Third Ennead, TR n, CH 9, 87d 

18 AUGUSTINL: Confessions, BK i, par 1-2 la-c; 
BK iv, par 15-19 23a-24b; BK v, par 1-2 27a-c; 
BK vii, par 16-17 48c-49a; BK ix, par 23 -26 
68a-d; BK x, par 7-8 73a-c; par 33-40 79d- 
81c; BK xii, par 10 lOlc; BK XHI, par 9 112c-d 
/ City of God, BK xii, CH i 342b,d-343c; BK 
xix, CH 4-10 511a-516d / Christian Doctrine, 
BK i, CH 38 635c-d 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica* PART i, Q 12, 
A i, ANS 50c-51c; A 8, REP 4 57b-58b; Q 60, 
A 5, ANS 313b-314c; PART i-n, Q 2, A 3 617b- 
618a; A 8 621c-622b; Q 3, AA 6-8 627b-629c; 
Q 5, A 3 638b 639a; A 5 640b-641a 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, vn [61-96] 
lOb-c; PURGATORY, HI [16-45] 56a-b; x [121- 
129] 68c-d; xi [1-30] 68d-69a; xvi [52-105] 
77b-d; PARADISE, vn 115a-116c 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 163d-164a 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 6d-10a passim; 149b-d; 
208a-294b esp 213a-215b, 231d-234a, 251c- 
252b, 269d-270a, 294a-b; 503b-d; 514d-515a; 
520b-d; 528c-529b 

31 DESCARTES: Meditations, HI 81d 89a passim 
/ Objections and Replies, 122a-b; 214a-d 



31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, APPENDIX 369b- 
372d; PART iv, PREF 422b,d-424a; PROP 2-6 
425a-426a 

32 MILTON: Sonnets, xvi 66b-67a / Lord Gen. 
Cromwell 69a<b / Mr. Cyriac\ Stunner 70a / 
Paradise Lost, BK vi [168-188] 200a / Samson 
Agonistes 339a-378a esp [164-175] 343a-b, 
[373-419] 347b-348b, [667-704] 354a-355a 

33 PASCAL: Pensees, 72 181a-184b; 205 21 la; 208 
211b; 227 213a; 233 213b-216a / Geometrical 
Demonstration, 439b 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH n, 
SECT 3 128b-c; CH vn, SECT 5-6 132c-d; CH 
xv, SECT 12 165b-c; CH xxni, SECT 12-13 
207a-208b; BK iv, CH xiv, SECT 1-2 364b-c 

38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i, la-2b 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 366b-d 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 270, 
85c; par 340 HOb-c / Philosophy of History, 
INTRO, 162a-170b; 196d-198b; PART n, 266d; 
280b-281b; PART in, 304c-306c 

47 GOETHE: Faust, PROLOGUE 7a-9b; PART i 
[652-655] 17b; [997-1010] 25b 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 50b-c; BK v, 
196a-198b; BK vi, 243d-250a; 262c; BK VIIT, 
303a-305b; BK xiv, 605b-d; BK xv, 631a-c; 
EPILOGUE i, 646d-647b; 650b-d; 659c-d; 
671c-672a; EPILOGUE n, 692c-694d 

We. Man's comparison of himself with other 
creatures and with the universe as a 
whole 

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 447b-455c esp 452c-453c; 

466a-b / Philcbus, 618c-619c 
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vi, CH 7 [ii4i a 2o- b 2] 
390a-b / Politics, BK i, CH 8 [1256! 5-22] 450c 
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK vi [647-652] 

89a 
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK n, CH 5, 143d- 

144a; BK in, CH 13, 189a 
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK iv, SECT 4 264a 

16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 915b-916a 

17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR ix, CH 7 69c-70a 
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 17, 

A 8, REP 2 692a-c 

22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK i, STANZA 
31-35 5a-b; BK v, STANZA 263 154b / Tale of 
Man of Law 236b-2S5b esp [4610-4623] 237b, 
[4701-4729] 239a-b 

24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK in, 
135b-139b 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 213d-215a; 259a-d 

27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT 11, sc 11 [303-331] 
43d; ACT in, sc i [122-132] 48b; sc iv [53-63] 
55a-b; ACT iv, sc in [17-33] 58a-b / King 
Lear, ACT in, sc n 262d-263d; sc iv 264a- 
266b esp [105-114] 265b / Macbeth, ACT v, 
sc v [16-28] 308d-309a / Antony and Cleo- 
patra, ACT v, sc ii [76-100] 347a-b / Pericles, 
ACT i, sc i [41-55] 422b; ACT n, sc i [i-ii] 
427b / Tempest, ACT iv, sc i [148-158] 543b 

29 CERVANTES : Don Quixote, PART n, 237c; 427a 



CHAPTER 51: MAN 



37 



30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 50c-51d 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART 11, PROP 13, SCHOL 
378a-c 

32 MILTON: Sonnets, vn 63b / Paradise Lost, BK 
iv [411-735] 161b-168b esp [411-491] 161b- 
163a, [721-735] 168a-b; BK VHI [249-559] 
237b-244a / Samson Agonistes [164-175] 
343a-b; [667-704] 354a-355a 

33 PASCAL: Pensees, 72 181a-184b; 347-348 233b- 
234a 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH 
xxm, SECT 12-13 207a-208b; BK in, CH vi, 
SECT 12 271d-272b esp 272b; BK iv, CH xvi, 
SECT 12, 370c-371a 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART i 3a-42a; PART n 45a- 
87b; PART iv, 172b-173a 

36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 383a-384a; 394a 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 349b-c 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 175b [fn i] / Fund. Prin. 
Metaphysic of Morals, 271d-273b esp 271d- 
272c; 274a-277b / Practical Reason, 327d- 
328b; 348a-b; 360d-361d / Pref. Metaphysical 
Elements of Ethics, 373d / Judgement, 583b-c; 
584d-587a; 591b-592d 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 168b*d 

47 GOETHE: Faust, PROLOGUE [280-292] 8a; 
PART i [652-655] 17b; PART ii [11,404-419] 
277b 

48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{ esp 84b-85a, 123a-b, 
168a-b, 171b, 204a, 209b, 236a-239a, 313b- 
314a, 318a, 319a-b, 341b-343a, 347b, 353b- 
354b, 360b-361a, 363a-364a, 370b-371b, 
381a, 409b-410b 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK in, 156d; 162b- 
164a,c; BK v, 217b-218b 

52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v, 
117c-127b passim 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 655a-659a esp 655b-657b 

54 FREUD: General Introduction, 562c-563a / New 
Introductory Lectures, 874a 

11. The theological conception of man 

1 la. Man as made in the image of God 
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1:26-27; 5:1; 9:6 
APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 2:23 (D) 

OT, Boo\ of Wisdom, 2:23 / Ecclesiasticus, 

17:1-3 (D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 17:1-3 
NEW TESTAMENT: / Corinthians, 11:7; 15:49 / 

// Corinthians, 3:18 / Colossians, 3:8-10 / 

James, 3:9 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK vi, par 4 36a-b; 
BK xin, par 12 113b-d; par 32 119a-b / City 
of God, BK xi, CH 26-28 336d-338d; BK XH, 
CH 23 357d-358a; CH 27, 359c-d / Christian 
Doctrine, BK i, CH 22 629b-630a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART i, Q 3, A 
i, REP 2 14b-15b; Q 14, A 2, REP 3 76d-77d; 
Q 32, A i, REP 2 175d-178a; Q 35, A 2, REP 3 
189d-190d; Q 59, A i, CONTRARY 306c-307b; 
Q 72, A i, REP 3 368b-369d; Q 77, A 2, REP i 
401 b-d; Q 88, A 3, REP 3 472c-473a; Q 91, A 4, 



REP 1-2 487d-488c; Q 93 492a-501c; Q 106, 
A i, REP 3 545d-546d; PART I-H, PROLOGUE 
609a,c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART i-ii, Q 55, 
A 2, REP 3 27a-d; Q no, A 4, ANS 350d-351d 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, v [19-24] 
112b; vn [64-84] 115d-116a 

22 CHAUCER: Iroilus andCressida, BK v, STANZA 
263 154b 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 41 b-d 

31 DESCARTES: Meditations, in, 88c-d / Objec- 
tions and Replies, 214a-d 

32 MILTON: Paradise Ijost, BK iv [285-294] 158b; 
[356-365] 160a-b; BK vn [519-528] 228b; BK 
xi [466-522] 309b 310b / Areopagitica, 384a 

33 PASCAL: Pensees, 430-431, 246b-247b; 434- 
435, 249b-251a 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 168b-d; 
PART in, 304d-305b; 310d 

47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [486-517] 14a-b; [614- 
685] 17a-18a 

54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 790d 

lib. The fatherhood of God and the brother- 
hood of man 

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 4:1-15 / Leviticus, 
19:11,13-18,33-34 / Deuteronomy, 10:17-19 / 
Psalms, 82:6; 103:13 (D) Psalms, 81:6; 
102:13 / Isaiah, 2:1-4; 45 :II ~ I 3I 63:15-16 
(D) Isaias, 2:1-4; 45:11-13; 63:15-16 / Micah, 
4:1-5 (D) Micheas, 4:1-5 / Malachi, 2:10 
(D) Malachias, 2:10 

APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 13:15-17; 25:1 (D) 
OT, Ecclesiasticus, 13:19-21; 25:1-2 

NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 5:38-48; 12:46-50; 
19:19; 22:39; 23:8-9; 25:34-40 / Mar\, 12:31- 
33 / Luke, 10:27 /John, 1:12; 8:41-42; 13:34- 
35; 15:12-17 / Acts, 17:22-34 esp 17:24-26 / 
Romans, 3:29; 8:14-19; 12; 13:8-10; 14:10-13 
/ // Corinthians, 6:17-18 / Galatians, 3:26-28; 
5:13-14 / Ephesians, 2:13-22; 3:6,14-15; 4:1- 
6,25; 5:1-2 / Colossians, 3:9-14 / / Thessa- 
lonians, 4:9-10 / / Peter, 1:22; 2:17 / I John, 
2:9-11; 3:1-2,10-18; 4:7-11,20-21; 5:1-2 

12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 9 114c-116b; 
CH 13 120b-c; BK in, CH ii 187a-b; CH 22, 
199b-d; CH 24, 203c-204c; 207a-b 

12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK HI, SECT 4 260b- 
261a; SECT n 262a-b; SECT 13 262c; BK vi, 
SECT 42 278a-b; BK ix, SECT i 291a-c 

18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XH, CH 2i-*2 
357a-c; CH 27, 359d / Christian Doctrine, BK i, 
CH 22 629b-630a; CH 30 632c-633b 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART n-n, QQ 
25-27 501 a- 52 7a; Q 29, A 3, ANS 531d-532c; 
A 4, ANS 532c-533a; Q 44, AA 2-3 593d-595b; 
A 7 597b-598a; Q 184, A 2, REP 3 629d-630d 

22 CHAUCER: Parson's Tale, par 31 517b-518b 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 31d-32a 

44 Bos WELL: Johnson, 392b-c 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART in, 
308a-b; 310d-311a 



38 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



Ik/012 



(11. The theological conception of man. lib. The 
fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of 
man.) 

48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 84b-85a 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 196a-198b; 
213a-218b; BK xi, 525c-526b 

52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v, 
117c-137c passim; BK vi 146b,d-170d pas- 
sim 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 887a-b 

54 FREUD: Group Psychology, 674c-d 

lie. God incarnate in human form: the human 
nature of Christ 

NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 1:18-25; 2:11; 11:18- 
19; I3--54-5 6 ; M:; 16:13-17; 17:1-9; 22:41- 
46; 26:63-66; 27:26-54 / Marl^ 3:9-12; 6:2-3; 
14:61-62; 15:15-39 / Lu{e, 1-2 esp 1:26 38, 
2:8-12; 5:18-26; 7:33-34; 11:27-28; 22:67 70; 
23:2447; 24:2-7,36-43 / John, 1:1-18 csp 
1:14; 1:30-34; 5:16-47 esp 5:27; 6:42; 8:12-28; 
10:22 38; 11:27; 14; 19:25-34; 20:24-21:14 / 
Romans, 1:3-4; 8:3 / // Corinthians, 5:16 / 
Galattans, 4:4 / Ephesians, 2:14-16 / Philip- 
fians, 2:5-8 / Colossians, 1:12-20 / / Timothy, 
2:5; 3:16 / Hebrews, 1:1-6; 2:14-18; 4:14-15; 
5:7-8; 7:20-25 / I John, 1:1-4; 2:18-29; 4:2-3 
/ II John, 7-11 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK v, par 20 32d- 
33a; BK vn, par 13-14 47c-48b; par 24-25 
50d-51c; BK x, par 67-70 88b 89a; BK xi, 
par 4 90a-b / City of God, BK ix, en 15 293a- 
294a; CH 17 295a-c; BK x, CH 20 311b-c; CH 22 
312a b; en 24 312d-313c; en 27-29 315b- 
318b; BK xi, CH 2 323a~c; BK xxi, CH 15-16 
572c-574a / Christian Doctrine, BK i, CH 11-14 
627b-628b; CH 34 634b-c 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART i, o 51, 
A 2, REP i 276b-277a; A 3, REP 5 277a-278c; 
Q 95, A i, REP i 506b-507c; PART i-n, Q 5, A 
7, REP 2 642a-d 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART in, QQ 
i 26 701b,d-846d esp QQ 4-15 730c-796a, Q 
26 845a 846d; PART in SUPPL, Q 76, A i, ANS 
939d 941a; Q 95, A 3, ANS 1045b-1046d; A 4, 
ANS 1046d-1047d 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xxix 
[106-120] 98d-99a; xxxi [76-126] 101c-102a; 
xxxn [28-48] 102c-d; PARADISE, n [37-45] 
108a; vn 115a-116c; xin [31-87] 125d-126b; 
xxxin [76-145] 157a-d 

22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK v, STANZA 
264 154b / Prioress's Tale [13,383-417] 391a-b 
/ Parson's Tale, par 12-13 503b-505a 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART in, 182a*b 

32 MILTON: Christs Nativity la-7b / The Passion 
10b-12a esp [15-21] lOb-lla / Upon the Cir- 
cumcision 12b 13a / Paradise Lost, BK in [56- 
415] 136b-144b esp [238-241] 140b, [281-343] 
141b-143a; BK xi [22-36] 299b 300a; BK xn 
[355-465] 327a-329a 



33 PASCAL: Pens&s, 512 262a; 553 268a-270a; 
763-765 322a; 785 325b; 862 342b-343a 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 308a-b 

41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 134a-161a,c esp 
134a-138a; 230d-231a 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART in, 306b 
307b; 308a-b 

52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v, 
127a-137c 

12. Man as an object of laughter and ridicule: 
comedy and satire 

5 ARISTOPHANES: Acharnians 455a-469a,c / 
Knights 470a-487a,c / Clouds 488a-506d / 
Wasps 507a-525d / Peace 526a-541d / Birds 
542a-563d / Frogs 564a-582a,c / Lysistrata 
583a-599a,c / Thesmophonazitsae 600a-614d / 
Ecclesiazusae 615a-628d / Plutus 629a-642d 
7 PLATO: Phaedo, 237b-c / Phtlebiis, 629a-630c 

12 Luciiii'iius: Nature of Things, BK in [978 
1052] 42d-43c; BK iv [1073-1191] 58a-59d; 
BK v [1007-1010] 74b 

14 PLUTARCH: Antony, 774a-b 

22 CHAUCER: Miller's Prologue 211a-212b / Mil- 
ler's Tale 212b-223b / Reeve's Prologue 224a- 
225a / Reeve's Tale 225a-232a 

23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH XVH, 24a-c; CH 
xvin 25a-26a 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 59b-c; 63c 

24 RABELAIS: Gaigantua and Pantagruel 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 6d lOa passim, esp 6d- 
7a; lOb-llb; 42a-b; 145d-147b; 159a-162c; 
165c-167a; 168d~169a; 208a-295a csp 213a- 
219a, 231d234a, 251c-252b; 300d-301c; 
308c-d; 326b-327b; 388c-395b; 424d-426b; 
478c-482b; 538a-543a,c 

26 SHAKESPEARE: Comedy of Errors 149a-169d 
/ Tamng of the Shrew 199a-228a,c / Love's 
Labour's Lost 254a-284d / Midsummer -Night's 
Dream 352a-375d / 1st Henry IV, ACT 11, sc iv 
[510-550] 449a-c / 2nd Henry IV, ACT iv, sc 
in [92-135] 492b-c / Much Ado About Nothing 
503a-531a,c / As You Life It 597a-626a,c 

27 SHAKESPEARE: Twelfth Night la-28d / Merry 
Wives of Windsor 73a-102d / Troilus and 
Cressida, ACT n, sc in [1-82] 115d-116c / All's 
Well That Ends Well, ACT iv, sc in [76 87] 
164c / Measure for Measure, ACT n, sc n [no- 
123] 183b; ACT in, sc 11 [234-245] 191d-192a; 
[275-286] 192b / King Lear, ACT in, sc n [80- 
95] 263d 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver 3a-184a esp PART u, 71a-76b, 
PART iv 135a-184a 

36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy 191a-556a 

37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 59c-d; 173b-c; 186c- 
189a,c; 205a-c; 274a-b; 275d-276a 

38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xxv, 208d- 
209a 

47 GOETHE: Faust, PRELUDE [109-132] 3b-4a; 
PROLOGUE [280-292] 8a; PART i [1202-1209] 
30a; [1868-2054] 44b-48b; [3251-3344] 79b- 
81b; PART ii [4917-4922] 122a; [5061-5064] 



13 



CHAPTER 51: MAN 



39 



125a; [5457-5470] 134b-135a; [6956-6966] 
170b 



13. The grandeur and misery of man 

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1:26-30; 3:17-19; 11:1- 
9/77 Samuel, 14:14 (D) II Kings, 14:14 / 
7 Chronicles, 29:15 (D) 7 Paralipomenon, 
29:15 / Job esp 3:1-26, 5:7, 7:1-21, 14:1-12, 
15:14-16, 21:23-26, 25:4-6, 29:1-30:31 / 
Psalms, 8:4-8; 39:4-6,11; 49:12-14; 51:2-5; 
89:47-48; 103:13-16; 144:3-4 (D) Psalms, 
8:5-9; 38:5-7,11-12; 48:13-15; 50:4-7; 88:48- 
49; 102:13-16; 143:3-4 / Ecclesiastes passim / 
Isaiah, 40:6-8 (D) Isaias, 40:6-8 

APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 9:1-3,13-16; 
10:1-2 (D) OT, BooJ( of Wisdom, 9:1-3,13- 
16; 1 0:1-2 / Ecclesiasticus, 8:7; 10:9-11; 14:17- 
19; 17:1-4,30-32; 40:1-11 (D) OT, Ecclesi- 
asticus, 8:8; 10:9-13; 14:18-20; 17:1-4,29-31; 
40:1-11 

NEW TESTAMENT: Romans, 7:21-25 / Hebrews, 
2:6-8 /James, 4:14 / 1 Peter, 1:24 

4 HOMER: Iliad, BK vi [144-151] 41c; BK xvn 
[420-455] 126b-d 

5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound [442-506] 44c- 
45a 

5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [1186-1195] 
HOb-c; [1524-1530] 113c / Oedipus at Colo- 
mis [1211-1248] 125b-c / Antigone [332-375] 
134a-b / Trachimae [94-140] 171a-b 

5 EURIPIDES: Suppliants [195-245] 260a-c; [734- 
749] 264d 

5 ARISTOPHANES: Kirds [685-692] 551b-c 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 2b; 7b-8a; 20b- 
21a; BK v, 160c-d; BK vn, 224d-225a; 252b-c; 
BK ix, 291b-c 

7 PLATO: Republic, BK n, 322a-b / Timaeus, 
476a-b / Laws, BK vi, 704b 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK n [1-61] 
15a-d; BK in [31-93] 30b-31b; [1053-1075] 
43c-d 

12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, en 3-4 108b- 
HOa; CH 24 129a-d; CH 28 133b-134d; BK n, 
en 16 156b-158d; BK in, CH 22 195a-201a; 
CH 24 203c-210a 

17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR in, CH 3 93d-94c 
/ Fourth Ennead, TR in, CH 8 145d-146d 

18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK ix, CH 14-15 
293a-294a; BK XH, CH i, 343a-c; BK xm, en 
10 364a-c; BK xix, CH 4-10 511a-516d; CH 20 
523d-524a; CH 27 529a-d; BK xxi, CH 15 
572c-573b; BK xxn, CH 22-24 606d-612a 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, xxvi [49-142] 
38c-39c 

22 CHAUCER: Knight's Tale [1303-1333] 181b- 
182a / M on1(s Prologue 432a-434a esp [13,971- 
996] 433b-434a / Monffs Tale 434a-448b esp 
[13,997-14,004] 434a, [14,679-684] 446b-447a 

23 HOB BBS: Leviathan, PART i, 76c-d; 79c-d 



25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 149b-d; 381 b-c; 528c- 
529b 

26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard II 320a-351d 

27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet 29a-72a,c / Troilusand 
Cressida 103a-141a,c / King Lear 244a-283a,c 
/ Timon of Athens 393a-420d / Henry VIII, 
ACT in, sc n [350-372] 572c-d 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 49b 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK n [496-505] 122a; 
BK xi [466-529] 309b-310b / Samson Agonistes 
[164-175] 343a-b; [667-709] 354a-355a 

33 PASCAL: Pensees, 72 181a-184b; 103 192b- 
193a; 125-183 195b-204b; 195 209b-210b; 199 
210b; 351 234a; 366 236a; 386 239a; 397-424 
240b-243b; 430-431 245a-247b; 434-435, 
249a-251a; 443 251b; 510-511 261b; 513-517 
262a-263b; 524-555 264a-270a; 693, 301b 

36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 383a-384a; 394a 
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 337d-338c; 363a-366d 

/ Social Contract, BK i, 393 b-c 
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 633d-634a,c 
42 KANT: Practical Reason, 300a-d; 321b-329a 

esp 327d-328d; 345a-347a; 360d-361d / 

Judgement, 584d-586a; 587a-588a; 591b-592d 
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 58b-c; 94d-95d; 102a-b; 

102d-103a; 312b; 362c-363a; 401a-b; 540b- 

542a 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART i, par 39 
21d; PART in, par 358 113c; ADDITIONS, 22 
120c-d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 165a- 
170b; PART n, 280b-281b; PART in, 285a-b; 
304c-306c; 310d 

47 GOLTHE: Faust esp DEDICATION ^J-PRELUDE 
[78] la-3a, PROLOGUE [280 -292] 8a, [300-329] 
8b-9a, PARTI [354-517] lla-14b, [606-807] 16b ' 
21a, [1064-1117] 26b-28a, [1178-1237] 29b- 
30b, [1544-1571] 37b-38a, 11583-1706] 38b- 
41a, [1765-1815] 42a-43a, [1851-1867] 44a-b, 
[3217-3250] 79a-b, [MB 1 -^^^] 84a-b, [4405- 
4612] 110a-114b, PART n [8094-8131] 197a- 
198a, [9695-9944] 235a-241b, [11,219-272] 
273a-274a, [11,384-419] 277a-b, [11,573-603] 
281b-282a, [11,934-12,111] 290b-294b 

48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 54b-55a; 59a-60b; 
84b-85a; 88b-91a; 107a-b; 313a-314a; 318a; 
343a; 403a-b; 418a-4l9a 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 597a,c 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace esp BK vi, 235a- 
238c, 243d-250a, 262c-263a, BK vn, 294b 4 
BK vin, 303a-305b, 311a-313a, BK ix, 355c- 
358b, BK x, 430a-b, 439b-440a, BK xi, 
514c-d, BK xiv, 605b-d 

52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK in, 
54a-b; BK v, 127b-137c 

54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 246c-248c / 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 654a-c / Civiliza- 
tion and Its Discontents 767a-802a,c esp 771c- 
776b, 778d-779a, 799a-802a,c / New Introduc- 
tory Lectures, 853a-b 



40 THE GREAT IDEAS 

CROSS-REFERENCES 

For: Other discussions of the difference between men and other animals, see ANIMAL ic-ic(2); 
KNOWLEDGE yd; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION i, 6b; MIND 33-3^ SENSE 2c; WILL 6c. 

Matters relevant to the science of psychology and its relation to other sciences, see KNOWL- 
EDGE 5e; MIND 6; SOUL 53-5 b. 

The issues concerning matter and spirit in the constitution of man, see ELEMENT 5f; MATTER 
2d, 33, 4c~4d; MIND 2a-2e; ONE AND MANY 3^4); SOUL 3a~3d;and for comparisons of 
human with angelic nature, see ANGEL 4; SOUL 4d(2). 

Discussions bearing on the analysis of human faculties or powers, see ANIMAL ic(i)-ic(2), 
8d; DESIRE 30-3^2); EMOTION i, ic; HABIT 3; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION i-ia, ic, 
5; MIND ia-ig(3); SENSE la-id; SOUL 2c(i)-2c(3), 43; WILL 3a, pa. 

The problem of harmony and conflict in human nature and the discussion of human ab- 
normality, see EMOTION 33, 3c; MEDICINE 6a-6c(2); MIND 8-8c; ONE AND MANY 3^5); 
OPPOSITION 4-46; WILL 90. 

Another consideration of the cycle of human life, see LIFE AND DEATH 6b-6c; and for the 
consideration of human immaturity, or childhood, see FAMILY 6c, 6e; MIND 4b. 

The relation of men and women in the domestic community, and for the place of women in 
the state, see FAMILY 5a~5c. 

Matters relevant to the problem of individual and racial differences, see ANIMAL 10; EVOLU- 
TION ib; MIND 43. 

The issue concerning the ultimate origin of man, see EVOLUTION ya-yb. 

Other statements of the myth of a golden age, see LABOR la; PROGRESS ic; TIME 8b; and for 
the distinction between prehistoric and historic man, or for the progress of historic man, 
see ART 12; EVOLUTION yc; TIME 8a. 

The distinction between man in a state of nature and in a state of civil society, see LAW 4b; 
LIBERTY ib; NATURE 2b; STATE 3c; and for the consideration of man as a social animal, see 
FAMILY i; STATE 3b(i). 

Other discussions of the condition of Adam before and after original sin, and of the condition 
of the human race as a result of Adam's sin, sec GOD pc; JUSTICE ib; SIN 3~3c; VIRTUE AND 
VICE 8b; WiLLye(i); and for theological doctrines concerning man's life on earth and 
his immortal destiny, see HISTORY 53; IMMORTALITY 5d~5g; PUNISHMENT 5d; SIN 6c-6e. 

The teaching of Christian theology concerning Christ, see GOD 90-9^3) ; ONE AND MANY 6c. 

Matters relevant to man's understanding of himself, his place in the world, and his relation 
to God or the gods, see DESIRE yb; GOD 3-3^ WORLD 2. 

The tragedy or comedy of humsn life, see HAPPINESS 4b; POETRY 4b. 

ADDITIONAL READINGS 

Listed below are works not included in Great Booty of the Western World, but relevant to the 
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups: 

I. Works by authors represented in this collection. 
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection. 

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult 
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas. 

AQUINAS, Summa Theologies PART H-II, QQ 161- 
L 165 

PLUTARCH. "That Brute Beasts Make Use of Rea- DANTE. Convivio (The Banquet), FOURTH TREATISE, 

son," in Moralia CH 23-28 

AUGUSTINE. On Nature and Grace F. BACON. "Of Nature in Men," "Of Youth and 

AQUINAS. Quaestiones Disputatac, De Veritate, Q 18 Age," in Essays 



CHAPTER 51: MAN 



41 



HOBBES. The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic 
. The Whole Art of Rhetoric. BK n, CH 14- 

'9 

KANT. Anthropologie 

J. S. MILL. A System of Logic, BK vi, CH 3-4 

FREUD. An Outline of Psychoanalysis 

II. 

THEOPHRASTUS. The Characters 

CICERO. De Finibus (On the Supreme Good), iv-v 

HORACE. Satires 

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. Against the Logicians, BK i 

(Concerning Man) 
BOETHIUS. Contra Eutychen (A Treatise Against 

Eutyches and Ncstorius) 
ERIGENA. De Divisione Naturae, BK iv 
IBN GABIROL. The Improvement of the Moral Quali- 
ties 

ABAILARD. Ethics (Scito Teipsttm) 
BONAVENTURA. Breviloquium, PART n (9-1 1), iv 
PETRARCH. On His Own Ignorance 
ALBO. The Book of Principles (Sefer ha-l^armi), 

BK in, CH 1-7 

NICOLAS OF CUSA. De Docta Ignorantia, BK in 
G. Pico DELLA MIRANDOLA. Oration on the Dignity 

of Man 
LUTHER. A Treatise on Christian Liberty 

. The Magmfaat 

ViviiS. A Fable About Man 

CALVIN. Institutes of the Christian Religion, BK i, CH 

15; BK n, CH 1-3 

BEN JONSON. Every Man in His Humour 
MOLIERE. Le misanthrope (The Man-Hater) 
MARVELL. Dialogue Between the Soul and the 

Body 

DiiFot. Robinson Crusoe 
POPE. Essay on Man 
LAMLITRIE. Man a Machine 
BUH J ON. "On Man," m Natural History 
HARTLEY. Observations on Man, His Frame, His 

Duty and His Expectations 
FERGUSON. An Essay on the History of Civil Society, 

PART i, SECT i-iv 
VOLTAIRE. Candide 
. "Contradictions," "Man, Woman," in A 

Philosophical Dictionary 

. The Huron, or Pupil of Nature (L'ingenue) 

GOLDSMITH. The Deserted Village 
HELVTIUS, A Treatise on Man 
KAMES. Sketches of the History of Man 
BENTHAM. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals 

and Legislation, CH 7 
J. G. FICHTE. The Dignity of Man 

. Addresses to the German Nation, iv-vin 

SCHLEIERMACHER. The Christian Faith, par 60-6 1 



D. STEWART, Elements of the Philosophy of the 

Human Mind, PART in, CH 2 
. Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of 

Man 

GOGOL. The Overcoat 
KIERKEGAARD. Either /Or 

. Concluding Unscientific Postscript 

. The Sickness Unto Death 

SCHOPENHAUER. The World as Will and Idea, VOL i, 

BK IVJ VOL III, SUP, CH 31-32 

. On Human Nature 

COMTE. System of Positive Polity, VOL iv, Theory of 
the Future of Man, CH i, 3-4 

LOTZE. Microcosmos, BK iv, CH 4-5; BK vi, CH 2, 4-5 

RENOUVIER. Essais de critique generale, n, PART i 

T. H. HUXLEY. Man's Place in Nature 

. Methods and Results, vn 

G ALTON. Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its De- 
velopment 

MEREDITH. Earth and Man 

C, S. PEIRCE. Collected Papas, VOL vi, par 238-271 

WUNDT. Outlines of Psychology, (20-21) 

ROYCE. The World and the Individual, SERIES n (6-7) 

SANTAYANA. Reason in Common Sense, CH 12 

MARK TWAIN. What Is Man? 

FRANCE. Penguin hland 

UN AMU NO. The Tragic Sense of Life 

JUNG. Two Essays on Analytical Psychology 

. Psychological Types 

SHAW. Bacl( to Methuselah 

BUBLR. I and Thou 

CHESTERTON. The Everlasting Man 

B. RUSSL.LL. What I Believe, en i 

FRAZLR. The Golden Bough, PART i; PART vi, 
NOTE (The Crucifixion of Christ); PART vn 

. Man, God, and Immortality, PART i-n 

SPEARMAN. The Abilities of Man 

J. S. HALDANL. The Sciences and Philosophy, LECT 
vi-x 

M. R. COHEN. Reason and Nature, BK n, CH 4 

JASPERS. Man in the Modern Age 

BLONDEL. V action 

DEWEY. Human Nature and Conduct 

. freedom and Culture, CH 2 

MARITAIN. Ransoming the Time, CH i 

NIEBUHR. The Nature and Destiny of Man 

J. S. HUXLEY. Evolution, the Modern Synthesis, CH 10 

T. S. ELIOT. Pour Quartets 

CASSIRER. An Essay on Man 

LUBAC. Surnaturel 

WEISS. Nature and Man 

SARTRE. Existentialism 

KEITH. A New Theory of Human Evolution 

WIENER. Cybernetics 

VON WEIZSACKER. The History of Nature 



Chapter 51: MATHEMATICS 



INTRODUCTION 



TT is necessary for us to observe the difference 
J. between problems in mathematics and the 
problem of the truth about mathematics. In 
the case of any science in physics, logic, or 
metaphysics, as well as mathematics it is one 
thing to examine the discourses or treatises of 
the scientists on the special subject matter of 
their field, and quite another to examine dis- 
cussions of the science itself, its scope, branches, 
and unity, its objects, its methods and its rela- 
tion to other disciplines. The chapter on 
QUANTITY deals with the subject matter of 
arithmetic, geometry, and other branches of 
mathematics; here we are primarily concerned 
with the nature of mathematical science itself. 

Sometimes reflections on the nature of a sci- 
ence are expressed by experts in its subject mat- 
ter who comment on the scientific enterprise in 
which they are engaged in prefaces or inter- 
spersed remarks. Sometimes such reflections are 
the commentary on a particular science by 
those who may claim to speak with competence 
on the processes of the human mind, the nature 
of knowledge or of science in general, but who 
claim no special competence in the particular 
science under consideration. This is usually the 
commentary of philosophers who may assert 
their right to make all knowledge, as well as all 
reality, their province. The same man may, of 
course, be both a mathematician and a philoso- 
pher; as, for example, Plato, Descartes, Pascal. 

In the case of mathematics, the disparity be- 
tween discourse in and about the science could 
hardly escape notice. Even if no preliminary 
rule of caution were laid down, we should be 
struck by the contrast between the agreement 
mathematicians have been able to reach in the 
solution of their problems and the disagreement 
of the commentators on basic questions about 
mathematics. To this there may be one signif- 
icant exception. Mathematics is honored for 



the precision of its concepts, the rigor of its 
demonstrations, the certitude of its truth. 
Even its detractors like Swift or Berkeley 
concede the exactitude and brilliance of math- 
ematics while questioning its utility; or they 
admit its intellectual austerity while challeng- 
ing some application of its method. Its "clear- 
ness and certainty of demonstration," Berkeley 
writes, "is hardly anywhere else to be found." 

This general agreement about the quality oi 
mathematical thought may explain why in all 
epochs mathematics has been looked upon as 
the type of certain and exact knowledge. Some- 
times it is taken as more than a model for other 
sciences; it is regarded as the method of pure 
science itself or as the universal science. Some- 
times its excellences are thought to be qualified 
by the limited or special character of its objects; 
or it is contrasted with other disciplines which, 
employing different methods, deal with more 
fundamental matters no less scientifically. But 
always the conclusions of mathematics serve to 
exemplify rational truth; always the method of 
mathematics represents the spirit of dispas- 
sionate thought; always mathematical knowl- 
edge symbolizes the power of the human mind 
to rise above sensible particulars and contin- 
gent events to universal and necessary rela- 
tionships. 

Mathematics means this not only to mathe- 
maticians and philosophers, but also to moral- 
ists and statesmen. "The objects of geometrical 
inquiry," writes Alexander Hamilton, "are so 
entirely abstracted from those pursuits which 
stir and put in motion the unruly passions of the 
human heart, that mankind, without difficulty, 
adopt not only the more simple theorems of 
the science, but even those abstruse paradoxes 
which, however they may appear susceptible of 
demonstration, are at variance with the natural 
conceptions which the mind, without the aid 



42 



CHAPTER 52: MATHEMATICS 



43 



of philosophy, would be led to entertain upon 
the subject. . . . But in the sciences of morals 
and politics, men are found far less tractable.' 1 
This, Hamilton points out, is not due merely 
to the passionate interest in their problems. 
"It cannot be pretended," he says, "that the 
principles of moral and political knowledge 
have, in general, the same degree of certainty 
with those of mathematics." 

ADMIRATION FOR MATHEMATICS often extends 
beyond enthusiasm for its exemplary virtues 
or delight in its intellectual beauty to the rec- 
ognition of its influence on the whole history 
of thought. Yet here differences of opinion be- 
gin to appear. 

In the ancient world Plato and Aristotle 
represent opposite estimates of the importance 
of mathematics for the rest of philosophy. For 
the Platonists, Aristotle says, "mathematics has 
come to be identical with philosophy, though 
they say that it should be studied for the sake 
of other things." He complains of those stu- 
dents of science who "do not listen to a lecturer 
unless he speaks mathematically." They make 
the error of supposing that "the minute ac- 
curacy of mathematics is ... to be demanded in 
all cases," whereas, according to Aristotle's 
own view, "its method is not that of natural 
science." 

In the modern world, thinkers who are both 
mathematicians and philosophers, like Des- 
cartes and Whitehead, represent a return to the 
Platonic point of view; while Kant, even more 
than Aristotle, insists that the philosopher is 
grievously misled if he tries to follow the meth- 
od of mathematics in his own inquiries. White- 
head charges Aristotle with having deposed 
mathematics from its high role "as a formative 
element in the development of philosophy" a 
demotion which lasted until, with Descartes 
and others in the iyth century, mathematics 
recovered the importance it had for Plato. 

Attempting to qualify his own enthusiasm, 
Whitehead admits that he would not "go so far 
as to say that to construct a history of thought 
without a profound study of the mathematical 
ideas of successive epochs is like omitting Ham- 
let from the play which is named after him. 
That would be claiming too much. But it is 
certainly analogous to cutting out the part of 



Ophelia. This simile is singularly exact. For 
Ophelia is quite essential to the play, she is 
very charming and a little mad. Let us grant 
that the pursuit of mathematics is a divine mad- 
ness of the human spirit, a refuge from the 
goading urgency of contingent happenings." 

For Kant the madness lies not in the pursuit 
of mathematics itself, but in the delusion of 
the philosopher that he can proceed in the 
same way. "The science of mathematics," Kant 
writes, "presents the most brilliant example of 
how pure reason may successfully enlarge its 
domain without the aid of experience. Such 
examples are always contagious, particularly 
when the faculty is the same, which naturally 
flatters itself that it will meet with the same 
success in other cases which it has had in one." 
The expectation naturally arises that the meth- 
od of mathematics "would have the same suc- 
cess outside the field of quantities." But phi- 
losophers who understand their own task, Kant 
thinks, should not be infected by the "confi- 
dence ... of those who arc masters in the art 
of mathematics ... as to their ability of achiev- 
ing such success" by applying its method in 
other fields. 

"The exactness of mathematics," Kant holds, 
"depends on definitions, axioms, and demon- 
strations. . . . None of these can be achieved or 
imitated by the philosopher in the sense in 
which they are understood by the mathema- 
tician," because, according to Kant, the valid- 
ity of the mathematician's definitions and 
demonstrations ultimately depends on the fact 
that he is able to construct the concepts he uses. 
The point is not that mathematics obtains its 
objects from reason rather than experience, 
but rather that it obtains them from reason by 
construction; as, for example, Euclid begins by 
constructing a triangle which corresponds with 
his definition of that figure. 

Hence, Kant maintains, "we must not try in 
philosophy to imitate mathematics by begin- 
ning with definitions, except it be by the way of 
experiment In philosophy, in fact, the defi- 
nition in its complete clearness ought to con- 
clude rather than begin our work"; whereas in 
mathematics we cannot begin until we have 
constructed the objects corresponding to our 
definitions. "It follows from all this," Kant con- 
cludes, "that it is not in accordance with the 



44 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



very nature of philosophy to boast of its dog- 
matical character, particularly in the field of 
pure reason, and to deck itself with the titles 
and ribands of mathematics." 

DIFFERENCES OF opinion about mathematics 
represent, for the most part, philosophical con- 
troversy concerning the nature of science or the 
objects of its knowledge. Mathematicians who 
engage in such controversy assume the role of 
philosophers in doing so, for mathematics itself 
is not concerned with questions of this sort. But 
there are some questions about mathematics 
which seem to call for a close study of the sci- 
ence itself and even for proficiency in its sub- 
ject matter and operations. They are questions 
about the scope of mathematics and about the 
divisions of the science, in relation to one an- 
other and to its unity. On these issues, mathe- 
maticians disagree not only with philosophers, 
but among themselves and in their capacity as 
mathematicians. 

These issues usually involve different inter- 
pretations of the history of mathematics. The 
problem is not one of the origin of mathematics. 

The ancient opinion, found in Herodotus, 
Plato, and Aristotle, that the mathematical 
arts, especially geometry, were first developed 
by the Egyptians, is of interest because of the 
questions it raises about the circumstances of 
the origin of mathematics. Herodotus seems to 
suggest that geometry arose as an aid in the 
practice of surveying land. "From this prac- 
tice," he says, "geometry first came to be known 
in Egypt, whence it passed into Greece." Aris- 
totle, on the other hand, separating from the 
useful arts those which "do not aim at utility," 
thinks the latter arose "first in the places where 
men first began to have leisure. That is why the 
mathematical arts were founded in Egypt, for 
there the priestly caste was allowed to be at 
leisure." 

The Greek development of mathematics very 
early distinguishes between the pure sciences of 
arithmetic and geometry and their useful ap- 
plications in the arts of measurement. The 
Greeks conceived mathematics as essentially 
speculative rather than practical or productive. 
They also divorced it from empirical investiga- 
tion of the sensible world. As arithmetic is con- 
cerned with numbers, not with numbered 



things, and geometry with figures, not with 
physical shapes, areas, or volumes, so Plato 
points out that music and astronomy belong to 
the mathematical sciences when they deal not 
with audible harmonies but with their numeri- 
cal ratios, not with visible celestial motions but 
with their geometrical configurations. 

Provoked by Glaucon's interest in the use- 
fulness of the mathematical arts, Socrates ex- 
cludes their utility as being of no interest to the 
philosopher. He recommends arithmetic and its 
sister disciplines only so far as these sciences en- 
tirely ignore the world of sensible things. The 
reason why the philosopher "who has to rise out 
of the sea of change and lay hold of true being 
. . . must be an arithmetician," he explains, is 
that arithmetic can have "a very great and ele- 
vating effect," when it compels "the soul to 
reason about abstract number" and rebels 
"against the introduction of visible or tangible 
objects into the argument." In the same way, 
only when it concerns itself with "knowledge of 
the eternal," not with measuring earthly dis- 
tances, will geometry "draw the soul towards 
truth, and create the spirit of philosophy." The 
astronomer, like the geometer, "should employ 
problems, and let the heavens alone, if he 
would approach the subject in the right way"; 
and, like the astronomer, the student of harmony 
will work in vain, if he compares "the sounds 
and consonances which are heard only" and so 
fails to "reach the natural harmonies of num- 
ber." 

About the non-empirical or non-experimen- 
tal character of mathematics there has been little 
dispute. It is seldom suggested that the growth 
of mathematical knowledge depends upon im- 
provement in methods of observation. But on 
the relation of mathematics to physics, which 
raises the whole problem of pure and applied 
mathematics, or of mathematical and experi- 
mental physics, there has been much contro- 
versy, especially in modern times. 

Bacon, for example, adopts the ancient divi- 
sion of mathematics into pure and mixed, the 
former "wholly abstracted from matter and 
physical axioms." Though he regards mathe- 
matics as a useful instrument in physics "the 
investigation of nature" being "best conducted 
when mathematics are applied to physics" he 
also insists upon the primacy of physics and 



CHAPTER 52: MATHEMATICS 



45 



upon its essentially experimental character. 
Physics has been corrupted, he says, by logic 
and by mathematics when these seek to domi- 
nate instead of to serve it. "It is a strange fatal- 
ity that mathematics and logic, which ought to 
be but handmaids to physics, should boast their 
certainty before it, and even exercise dominion 
against it." 

The certainty and clarity which Hume is 
willing to attribute to mathematics cannot, in 
his opinion, be extended to mathematical 
physics. "The most perfect philosophy of the 
natural kind," he thinks, "only staves off our 
ignorance a little longer. . . . Nor is geometry, 
when taken into the assistance of natural philos- 
ophy, ever able to remedy this defect, or lead 
us into the knowledge of ultimate causes, by all 
that accuracy of reasoning for which it is so 
justly celebrated. Every part of mixed mathe- 
matics," Hume continues, "proceeds upon the 
assumption that certain laws are established by 
nature in her operations; and abstract reason- 
ings are employed, either to assist experience 
in the discovery of these laws, or to determine 
their influence in particular instances, where it 
depends upon any precise degree of distance or 
quantity," When mixed with physics, mathe- 
matics remains subordinate at best an aid in 
the formulation and the discovery of the laws 
of nature. 

A different view seems to be taken by the 
great mathematicians and physicists of the ijth 
century. Galileo, Descartes, and Newton tend 
to make mathematical analysis an integral part 
of physics. As the structure of the world is 
mathematical, so, too7 must the science of 
nature be mathematical. Geometry, says 
Descartes, is "tlie science which furnishes a 
general knowledge of the measurement of all 
bodies." If we retain the ancient distinction 
between geometry and mechanics, it can only 
be in terms of the assumption, "confirmed by 
the usage" of these names, that "geometry is 
precise and exact, while mechanics is not." 

In the preface to his Mathematical Principles 
of Natural Philosophy, Newton also says that 
"geometry is founded in mechanical practice, 
and is nothing but that part of universal me- 
chanics which accurately proposes and demon- 
strates the art of measuring." What is called 
"rational mechanics" must not be confused 



with the manual arts of measurement which are 
imperfect and inexact; and it is therefore wrong 
to distinguish geometry from mechanics as that 
which is perfectly accurate from that which is 
less so. "But since the manual arts are chiefly 
employed in the moving of bodies, it happens 
that geometry is commonly referred to their 
magnitude, and mechanics to their motion." 

Newton himself does not abide by this dis- 
tinction. His aim is to subject all the phenome- 
na of nature "to the laws of mathematics" and 
to cultivate mathematics as far as it relates to 
natural philosophy. "I offer this work as the 
mathematical principles of philosophy, for the 
whole burden of philosophy consists in this 
from the phenomena of motions to investigate 
the forces of nature and from these forces to 
demonstrate the other phenomena." He regrets 
that he has not been able to deduce all the phe- 
nomena of nature "by the same kind of 
reasoning from mechanical principles." 

Fourier goes even further. "Mathematical 
analysis," he says, is "as extensive as nature it- 
self." Mathematical analysis has "necessary re- 
lations with sensible phenomena." In laying 
hold "of the laws of these phenomena," mathe- 
matics "interprets them by the same language 
as if to attest the unity and simplicity of the 
plan of the universe, and to make still more 
evident that unchangeable order which presides 
over all natural causes." This much had been 
said or implied by Descartes and Newton. But 
in addition to all this, Fourier, from his own 
experience in developing a mathematical the- 
ory of heat, comes to the conclusion that "pro- 
found study of nature is the most fertile source 
of mathematical discoveries." Mathematics it- 
self benefits from its alliance with physics; it in- 
creases in analytical power and in the generality 
of its formulations as physical inquiries extend 
the range of phenomena to be analyzed and for- 
mulated. 

THE RELATIONS OF mathematics to physics are 
considered in the chapters on ASTRONOMY, ME- 
CHANICS, and PHYSICS. Mathematical physics 
must be examined in the light of the opinion 
that mathematics and physics are separate sci- 
ences, distinct in object and method. Further- 
more, whereas some of the major contributions 
to mathematics appear in the* great books of 



46 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



physics or natural philosophy (e.g ., Archimedes, 
Kepler, Newton, Fourier), even more funda- 
mental formulations of the science occur in great 
books devoted exclusively to mathematics: 
Euclid's Elements (on geometry), Apollonius' 
treatise On Conic Sections, Nicomachus' Intro- 
duction to Arithmetic, Descartes' Geometry, and 
Pascal's mathematical papers. Others belonging 
to this latter group are listed in the Additional 
Readings. The great modern advances in math- 
ematics are exemplified by the works of Gauss, 
Lobachevski, Hamilton, Riemann, Boole, De- 
dekind, Peano, Frege, Cantor, Hilbert. 

It would be both natural and reasonable to 
inquire about the relation between the great 
works of mathematics included in this set and 
the equally great treatises or monographs, listed 
in the Additional Readings, which represent for 
the most part the contributions of the igth cen- 
tury. But since the major question which im- 
mediately confronts us in such an inquiry con- 
cerns the relation of modern to ancient math- 
ematics, we can examine the problem in terms 
of the works included in this set, for they repre- 
sent both the continuity and the discontinuity 
in the tradition of mathematical science. 

Galileo and Newton are disciples of Euclid 
and Archimedes; Fourier is a disciple of Newton 
and Descartes. But Descartes is the great in- 
novator. He seems to be quite self-conscious of 
his radical departure from the ancients and 
from the state of mathematics as he found it in 
his own day. Yet the truth and power of his 
mathematical discoveries seem so evident to 
him that he cannot doubt the ancients must 
have had some inkling of it. 

"I am quite ready to believe," he writes, 
"that the greater minds of former ages had 
some knowledge of it, nature even conducting 
them to it. We have sufficient evidence that the 
ancient Geometricians made use of a certain 
analysis which they extended to the resolution 
of all problems, though they grudged the secret 
to posterity. At the present day also there 
flourishes a certain kind of Arithmetic, called 
Algebra, which designs to effect, when dealing 
with numbers, what the ancients achieved in 
the matter of figures. These two methods," he 
claims, "are nothing else than the spontaneous 
fruit sprung from the inborn principles of the 
discipline here in question," 



Descartes does not regard his success as con- 
sisting in the advance of mathematical truth 
through discoveries based upon principles or 
conclusions already established. Nor would he 
even be satisfied to say that his use of algebra in 
developing analytical geometry created a new 
branch of mathematics. Rather, in his own 
view, it tended to unify all existing branches 
and to form a single universal method of analy- 
sis. In effect, it revolutionized the whole char- 
acter of mathematics and laid the foundation 
for the characteristically modern development 
of that science since his day. "To speak freely," 
he writes, "I am convinced that it is a more pow- 
erful instrument of knowledge than any other 
that has been bequeathed to us by human agen- 
cy, as being the source of all others." 

One need not quite agree with Bertrand Rus- 
sell that pure mathematics was not discovered 
until the iplh century, in order to perceive 
that the discoveries made in that century carry 
out the spirit of the Cartesian revolution. If 
one understands the difference between the 
universal mathematics of Descartes and the 
separate sciences of arithmetic and geometry as 
developed by the ancients; if one understands 
the difference between the theory of equations 
in Descartes and the theory of proportions in 
Euclid; if one understands how algebraic sym- 
bolism, replacing numbers by letters, frees both 
arithmetic and geometry from definite quanti- 
ties, then the profound discontinuity between 
modern and ancient mathematics begins to be 
discernible. 

There are other differences contributing to 
that discontinuity, such as the modern treat- 
ment of the infinite, the invention of the cal- 
culus, and the theory of functions. But what is 
of prime importance for the purpose of under- 
standing the nature of mathematics, its ob- 
jects, and its methods, is the perception of the 
discontinuity in any one or another of its mani- 
festations. Here is a fundamental disagreement 
about the nature of mathematics which is not 
an issue between philosophers disputing the 
definition of the science, but rather an issue 
made by the actual work of mathematicians in 
ancient and modern times. 

In his Battle of the Booty ancient and 
modern Swift sees only the great poets and 
philosophers of the two epochs set against one 



CHAPTER 52: MATHEMATICS 



47 



another. The battle between the ancient and 
the modern books of mathematics might be as 
dramatically represented. In such affairs there 
is a natural tendency to prejudge the issue in 
favor of the modern contender. That prejudice 
has reason on its side in certain fields of knowl- 
edge where the perfection of new instruments 
and the discovery of new facts work to the ad- 
vantage of the latecomer. But it is questionable 
whether in this dispute over the nature of 
mathematics the same advantage prevails. 

When the issue is fairly explored by an exam- 
ination of the differences between the great 
masterpieces of ancient and modern mathemat- 
ics, it may be found impossible to say that truth 
lies more on one side than on the other, or that 
one conception of mathematics is more fruitful 
than another, because the two versions of the 
science may seem to be incommensurable in 
their aims, methods, and standards of accom- 
plishment. 

ONE EXAMPLE WILL illustrate this incommen- 
surability. The ancient notion of number, as 
may be seen in Nicomachus' Introduction to 
Arithmetic, limits the variety of numbers. A 
number always numbers a number of tilings, 
even though we can deal with the number itself 
apart from any set of numbered things. It is al- 
ways a positive and integral quantity which, 
excepting unity itself, "the natural starting 
point of all numbers," contains a multitude of 
discrete units. 

Numbers are classified according to the way 
in which they are constituted of parts and ac- 
cording to the constitution of these parts. The 
primary division of numbers is into even and 
odd. "The even is that which can be divided 
into two equal parts without a unit intervening 
in the middle; and the odd is that which cannot 
be divided into two equal parts because of the 
aforesaid intervention of a unit." 

The even numbers are capable of subdivision 
into the even- times-even, the odd- times-even, 
and the even- times-odd; and the odd into the 
prime and incomposite, the secondary and com- 
posite, and the number which, in itself, is sec- 
ondary and composite, but relatively is prime 
and incomposite. The peculiarities of these 
types of number are explained in the chapter 
on QUANTITY. There are still further classifica- 



tions of numbers into superabundant, deficient, 
and perfect; and of the parts of numbers in rela- 
tion to the numbers of which they are parts. 

Finally, numbers are considered in terms of 
their geometrical properties, to be observed 
when their units are disposed discretely in spa- 
tial patterns, and in one, two, or three dimen- 
sions. There are linear, plane, and solid num- 
bers, and among plane numbers, for example, 
there are triangular, square, pentagonal, hexag- 
onal numbers, and so on. 

The arithmetic operations of addition, sub- 
traction, multiplication, and division are per- 
formed in the production of numbers or in the 
resolution of numbers into their parts. But 
though any two numbers can be added to- 
gether or multiplied, the inverse operations 
cannot always be performed. A greater number 
cannot be subtracted from a less, for subtraction 
consists in taking a part from the whole, and 
leaving a positive remainder. Since division is 
the decomposition of a number into its parts, a 
number cannot be divided by one greater than 
itself, for the greater cannot be a part of the 
less. 

In short, in Nicomachus' theory of numbers 
what later came to be treated as negative num- 
bers and fractions can have no place. Nico- 
machus will not carry out arithmetical opera- 
tions in all possible directions without regard 
to the result obtained. He refuses to perform 
these operations when the results which would 
be obtained do not have for him the requisite 
mathematical reality. He does not find it re- 
pugnant to reason that subtraction and divi- 
sion, unlike addition and multiplication, are not 
possible for any two numbers; as, for exam- 
ple, subtracting a larger from a smaller number, 
or using a divisor which does not go into the 
dividend evenly, and so leaves a fractional re- 
mainder. On the contrary, Nicomachus finds it 
repugnant to reason to perform these opera- 
tions in violation of their proper meaning, and 
to produce thereby results, such as negative 
quantities and fractions, which are for him not 
numbers, i.e., which cannot number any real 
thing. 

Understanding the nature of square numbers, 
Nicomachus would be able to understand a 
square root, but he would not; see why the op- 
eration of extracting the square root should be 



48 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



applied to numbers which are not square. 
Hence another kind of modern number, the 
irrational fraction which is generated by such 
operations as the extraction of the square of pos- 
itive integers which are not perfect squares, 
would never appear in Nicomachus' set of num- 
bers; nor would the imaginary number, which 
is the result of applying the same operation to 
negative quantities. 

When the arithmetical operations are per- 
formed algebraically, with unknowns as well as 
definite quantities, the solution of equations 
requires the employment of terms which Nico- 
machus would not admit to be numbers nega- 
tives, fractions (both rational and irrational), 
imaginaries, and complex numbers, which are 
partly real and partly imaginary. Descartes 
finds nothing repugnant in these novel quanti- 
ties. On the contrary, he would find it repug- 
nant not to be able to perform the basic arith- 
metical operations without restriction. Algebra 
would be impossible, and with it the general 
method of analysis that proceeds in terms of the 
purely formal structure of equations from 
which all definite quantities have been exclud- 
ed. It would also be impossible to do what Des- 
cartes thinks essential to the unity of mathe- 
matics, namely, to represent geometrical opera- 
tions algebraically and to perform most alge- 
braic operations geometrically. 

Geometrical loci cannot be expressed by alge- 
braic formulae or equations, unless there are as 
many numbers as there are points on a line. The 
number series for Nicomachus, without frac- 
tions and irrationals, is neither dense nor con- 
tinuous. There are fewer numbers than there 
are points on a line. And without the use of 
zero, negative numbers, and fractions none 
of which would be regarded as numbers by 
Nicomachus it would be impossible for Des- 
cartes to construct a set of coordinates for the 
geometrical representation of equations, where- 
by all the points in a plane have their unique 
numerical equivalents. 

The Cartesian synthesis of algebra and geom- 
etry, which in his view vastly increases the 
power of each, violates the ancient distinction 
between continuous and discontinuous quanti- 
tiesmagnitudes (like lines and planes) and 
multitudes (or numbers). Euclid, for example, 
treats the irrational or the incommensurable 



always as a relation of magnitudes, never of 
multitudes, or numbers; for him certain geo- 
metrical relationships cannot be expressed nu- 
merically. Arithmetic and geometry are not 
even coordinate, much less co-extensive sci- 
ences. Arithmetic is the simpler, the more ele- 
mentary science, and is presupposed by geom- 
etry. 

Other examples arising from the innovations 
of Descartes might be employed to show the 
chasm between the arithmetic and geometry of 
the ancients, and modern mathematics such as 
the treatment of infinite magnitudes and num- 
bers, the theory of functions, and the method of 
the calculus. But the multiplication of examples 
does not seem necessary to suggest that there 
may be no answer to the question, Is Descartes 
right, and Nicomachus and Euclid wrong? or to 
the question, Are the modern innovations im- 
provements or corruptions of the mathematical 
arts and sciences ? 

These questions are not like questions con- 
cerning the truth or falsity of a proposition in 
mathematics or the validity of a proof. A given 
theorem in Euclid must, in the light of his defi- 
nitions, axioms, and postulates, be either true 
or false; and accordingly Euclid's demonstra- 
tions or constructions are either cogent or falla- 
cious. The same rules apply to Descartes. But 
whether Euclid's or Descartes' conception of 
the whole mathematical enterprise is right 
seems to present a choice between disparate 
worlds, a choice to be made by reference to 
principles and purposes which are themselves 
not mathematical. 

Modern mathematics may be much more 
useful in its physical applications, especially in 
the analysis and calculation of variable notions 
or quantities. It may have a special elegance 
and simplicity, as well as greater unity and even 
systematic rigor. But it may also purchase these 
qualities at the expense of the kind of intelli- 
gibility which seems to characterize ancient 
mathematics as a result of the insistence that 
its objects have an immediately recognizable 
reality. Ancient mathematics never occasioned 
such an extreme remark as that made by Ber- 
trand Russell about modern mathematics 
that it is "the science in which we never knoWj 
what we are talking about, nor whether what 
we are saying is true.'* 



CHAPTER 52: MATHEMATICS 



49 



THE QUESTION OF the reality of the objects of 
mathematics is in part a problem for the math- 
ematician and in part a question for the philos- 
opher. The problem for the mathematician 
seems to be one of establishing the existence of 
the objects he defines. This can be illustrated 
by reference to Euclid 's Elements. 

The basic principles, as Euclid expounds the 
science, seem to be threefold: definitions, postu- 
lates, and axioms or common notions. The 
axioms are called "common notions" because 
they are truths common to other branches of 
mathematics as well as to geometry. The com- 
mon notions are called "axioms" because their 
truth is supposed to be self-evident. In contrast, 
the postulates are peculiar to geometry, for they 
are written as rules of construction. They de- 
mand that certain operations be assumed possi- 
ble, such as the drawing of a straight line or a 
circle, or the transposition of a figure from one 
portion of space to another without alteration 
of its form or quantity. 

Euclid's definitions include the definition of 
a straight line and a circle. His first two postu- 
lates, therefore, seem to ask us to assume that 
space is such that these defined geometrical 
objects exist in it as they are defined; or, in 
other words, that objects corresponding to the 
definitions have geometrical reality. But there 
are many definitions of a triangle, of an equi- 
lateral triangle, of a parallelogram for which 
Euclid states no postulate demanding that we 
assume the geometrical reality of the object 
defined. Hence before he undertakes to demon- 
strate the properties of these figures, he finds it 
necessary to prove that they can be constructed. 
Until they are constructed, and the construc- 
tion demonstrated, the definitions state only 
possibilities to which no geometrical realities 
are tyown to correspond in the space deter- 
mined by Euclid's postulates. 

In his first constructions, Euclid can employ 
only the definition of the figure itself, his axi- 
oms, and those postulates which permit him to 
use certain mechanical devices the straight 
edge and the compass, which are the mechani- 
cal equivalents of his postulates that a straight 
line can be drawn between any two points and 
a circle described with any radius from any 
point upon a plane. When, for example, in the 
first proposition of Book I, Euclid thus demon- 



strates the construction of an equilateral tri- 
angle, he has proved the geometrical existence 
of that figure, or, in other words, its reality in 
the space of his postulates. 

A number of questions can be asked about 
this and many other similar demonstrations. 
The postulates being assumptions, their truth 
can be questioned and an effort made to prove 
or disprove them. This type of questioning led 
to the development of the non-Euclidean 
geometries. After centuries of trying unsuc- 
cessfully to prove Euclid's postulate about par- 
allel lines, geometers like Lobachevski and Rie- 
mann postulated other conditions concerning 
parallels, with consequences for the properties 
of other geometrical figures. 

The interior angles of a Euclidean triangle, 
for example, equal the sum of two right angles; 
in certain non-Euclidean triangles, they add up 
to more or less than two rights. One interpreta- 
tion of this situation is that the truth of con- 
clusions in geometry is entirely dependent on 
arbitrary assumptions. Another is that the sev- 
eral variants of the parallel postulate indicate 
the selection of different spaces in which to 
construct figures; and under each set of spatial 
conditions postulated, there is only one body of 
geometrical truths concerning the properties 
of the figures therein constructed. 

Another type of question concerns the logi- 
cal, as opposed to the geometrical, conditions 
of geometrical proof. In his essay On Geometri- 
cal Demonstration, Pascal declares the geometric 
method to be the most perfect available to 
men, for it "consists not in defining or in prov- 
ing everything, nor in defining or proving 
nothing, but in maintaining itself in the mid- 
dleground of not defining things which are 
clear to all men and in defining all others; and 
not proving everything known to men, but in 
proving all the other things." This method, it 
seems, is not restricted to the subject matter of 
geometry; to Descartes and Spinoza, at least, it 
seems to be the method for demonstrating any 
theoretical truth. Descartes presents "argu- 
ments demonstrating the existence of God and 
the distinction between soul and body, drawn 
up in geometrical fashion"; and as its title page 
indicates, the whole of Spinoza's Ethics is set 
forth "in geometrical order." 

It may be questioned whether the postulates 



50 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



which Descartes adds to his definitions and 
axioms, or those which Spinoza introduces be- 
ginning with Proposition 13 of Book II, func- 
tion as postulates do in geometry, i.e., as rules 
of construction; it may similarly be questioned 
whether Spinoza is following the geometrical 
method in Book I where he proceeds without 
any postulates at all. But the more general 
question concerns the criteria for testing the 
consistency and the adequacy of the primitive 
propositions the definitions, axioms, postu- 
lateslaid down as the foundation for all that 
is to be demonstrated. The investigation of this 
problem calls for an examination of the whole 
process of proof, from which has developed the 
modern theory of mathematical logic that chal- 
lenges the universality and adequacy of the 
traditional logic of Aristotle, and asserts that 
mathematics and logic are continuous with one 
'another essentially the same discipline. 

THE ISSUES RAISED by mathematical logic or 
the logic of mathematics are considered in the 
chapters on HYPOTHESIS, LOGIC, and REASON- 
ING. Here we must turn finally to one other 
question which is of interest principally to the 
philosopher rather than the mathematician. It 
concerns the objects of mathematics. It is a 
question about their reality or mode of exist- 
ence which cannot be answered by the mathe- 
matical proof of a construction. 

When, for example, Euclid constructs an 
equilateral triangle, the figure established can- 
not be the one imperfectly drawn upon paper. 
The postulated permission to use a ruler and 
compass does not remove the imperfection of 
these mechanical instruments or the inaccuracy 
in their physical use. The triangle whose prop- 
erties the geometer tries to demonstrate must 
be perfect, as no actually drawn figure can be. 
The philosophical question, therefore, concerns 
the reality or existence of this ideal, perfect 
figure. The same question can be asked about 
pure numbers numbers apart from all num- 
bered things. 

Are the objects of mathematics purely in- 
telligible beings existing apart from the sensible 
world of material things ? Or are they ideal enti- 
ties not in the sense of existing outside the 
mind, but in the sense of being ideas in the 
mind itself rather than perceptible particulars? 



As indicated in the chapters on BEING, FORM, 
and IDEA, Plato and Aristotle seem to answer 
these questions differently. But there are fur- 
ther differences among those who regard math- 
ematical objects as having being only in the 
mind. 

Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, and James, for 
example, think of the objects of mathematics 
as universals formed by abstraction from the 
particulars of sense and imagination. "The 
mathematical, " such as numbers and figures, 
Aquinas writes, "do not subsist as separate 
beings." Apart from numbered things and 
physical configurations, numbers and figures 
"have a separate existence only in the reason, 
in so far as they are abstracted from motion and 
matter.'* Hobbes, Berkeley, and Hume, on the 
other hand, deny abstract ideas or universal 
concepts. "Let any man try to conceive a tri- 
angle in general," Hume declares, "which is 
neither isosceles nor scalenum, nor has any par- 
ticular length or proportion of sides; and he 
will soon perceive the absurdity of all the scho- 
lastic notions with regard to abstraction and 
general ideas." 

Despite these differences, there seems to be 
general agreement in the tradition of the great 
books that the truths of mathematics are ra- 
tional rather than empirical; or, in the lan- 
guage of Kant and James, a priori rather than a 
posteriori. But the meaning of this agreement 
is not the same for those who think that truth 
in mathematics does not differ from truth in 
other sciences and those who think that mathe- 
matical truths stand alone precisely because they 
are not about matters of fact or real existence. 

Plato, for whom all science is knowledge of 
purely intelligible objects, regards the mathe- 
matical sciences as inferior to dialectic in the 
knowledge of such objects "because they start 
from hypotheses and do not ascend to princi- 
ples." The students of such sciences, Plato 
writes, "assume the odd and the even and the 
figures and three kinds of angles and the like 
in their several branches of science; these are 
their hypotheses, which they and everybody 
are supposed to know, and therefore they do 
not deign to give any account of them either 
to themselves or others; but they begin with 
them, and go on until they arrive at last, and 
in a consistent manner, at their conclusion." 



CHAPTER 52: MATHEMATICS 



51 



For Aristotle, what differentiates mathe- 
matics from physics and metaphysics is the 
special character of its objects. Physics and 
metaphysics both deal with substances as they 
exist outside the mind, whereas the objects of 
mathematics are abstractions. Though figures 
and numbers "are inseparable in fact" from 
material substances, they are "separable from 
any particular kind of body by an effort of ab- 
straction." This does not deny, for example, 
that physical things have perceptible figures. 
It merely insists that the geometer does not 
treat figures as sensible, but as intelligible, that 
is, as abstracted from matter. Nevertheless, the 
truths of mathematics, no less than those of 
physics and metaphysics, apply to reality. All 
three sciences arc further alike in demonstrat- 
ing their conclusions rationally rather than by 
experiment. All three employ induction to ob- 
tain their principles, though metaphysics alone 
attains to the first principles of all science. 

For Kant, "mathematical cognition is cogni- 
tion by means of the construction of concep- 
tions." To explain this he cites the example of 
the construction of a triangle. "I construct a 
triangle, by the presentation of the object 
which corresponds to this conception, either 
by mere imagination (in pure intuition) or 
upon paper (in empirical intuition); in both 
cases completely a priori without borrowing 
the type of that figure from any experience. . . . 
We keep our eye merely on the act of the con- 
struction of the conception, and pay no atten- 
tion to the various modes of determining it, for 
example, its size, the length of its sides, the size 
of its angles." The a priori character of such in- 
tuitions, on which rests the a priori character of 
mathematical truths, does not mean that math- 
ematics has no relevance to experience. Arith- 
metic and geometry are like physics, according 
to Kant; they are sciences of experience or 
nature but like pure (as opposed to empirical) 
physics, they are a priori sciences. Since Kant 
holds that experience itself is constituted by a 
priori forms of perception, he can ascribe the 
validity which mathematics has for all possible 
experience to the "a priori intuition of the 
pure forms of phenomena space and time." 

Bertrand Russell rejects this "Kantian view 
which [asserts] that mathematical reasoning is 
not strictly formal, but always uses intuitions, 



i.e., the a priori knowledge of space and time. 
Thanks to the progress of Symbolic Logic . . . 
this part of the Kantian philosophy," Russell 
holds, "is now capable of a final and irrevocable 
refutation." Leibnitz, before Kant, had advo- 
cated "the general doctrine that all mathemat- 
ics is a deduction from logical principles," but, 
according to Russell, he had failed to substanti- 
ate this insight, partly because of his "belief in 
the logical necessity of Euclidean geometry." 
The same belief is, in Russell's opinion, the 
cause of Kant's error. "The actual propositions 
of Euclid ... do not follow from the principles 
of logic alone; and the perception of this fact," 
he thinks, "led Kant to his innovations in the 
theory of knowledge. But since the growth of 
non-Euclidean geometry, it has appeared that 
pure mathematics has no concern with the 
question whether the axioms and propositions 
of Euclid hold of actual space or not." 

Russell asserts that "by the help of ten prin- 
ciples of deduction and ten other premises of a 
general logical nature (e.g., 'implication is a 
relation'), all mathematics can be strictly and 
formally deduced." He regards "the fact that 
all Mathematics is Symbolic Logic" as "one of 
the greatest discoveries of our age; and when 
this fact has been established, the remainder of 
the principles of Mathematics consists in the 
analysis of Symbolic Logic itself." Though this 
view of mathematics may not be worked out 
in detail except in such treatises as Russell's 
Principles of Mathematics and in the Principia 
Mathematlca^ on which he collaborated with 
Whitehead, the conception of mathematics as a 
purely formal science, analogous to (if not 
identical with) logic, does have some anticipa- 
tions in the great books. For James, as for 
Locke and Hume, mathematics is strictly a 
science of the relations between ideas, not of 
real existences. "As regards mathematical judg- 
ments," James writes, "they are all 'rational 
propositions' ... for they express results of com- 
parison and nothing more. The mathematical 
sciences deal with similarities and equalities ex- 
clusively, and not with coexistences and se- 
quences." Both James and Locke, however, 
differ from Hume in thinking that there are 
sciences other than those of number and quan- 
tity which can demonstrate their conclusions 
with certitude. 



52 THE GREAT IDEAS 

The foregoing discussion indicates some of ern philosophers, especially Berkeley, Hume, 

the differences among philosophers concerning and Kant, raise against the notion of infinite 

the objects of mathematics, the conditions of quantities seem to favor the ancient rather than 

its truth, and its relation to other sciences, the modern tenor of mathematical thought. 

These disagreements do not seem to take the Though the reasons they give do not derive 

form of an opposition between ancient and from the same principles as those to which Plato 

modern thought, like that between ancient and Aristotle appeal, they, like the ancients, 

and modern mathematicians concerning the appear to insist upon a certain type of intel- 

nature of their science. The two oppositions do ligibility in the objects of mathematics, which 

not run parallel to one another. seems to have been sacrificed in the mathe- 

On the contrary, the objections which mod- matical development initiated by Descartes. 



OUTLINE OF TOPICS 

PAGE 

1. The science of mathematics: its branches or divisions; the origin and development of 

mathematics 53 

la. The distinction of mathematics from physics and metaphysics: its relation to logic 

ib. The service of mathematics to dialectic and philosophy: its place in liberal 

education 54 

ic. The certainty and exactitude of mathematical knowledge: the a priori founda- 
tions of arithmetic and geometry 

id. The ideal of a universal ma thesis: the unification of arithmetic and geometry 55 

2. The objects of mathematics: number, figure, extension, relation, order 

20. The apprehension of mathematical objects: by intuition, abstraction, imagina- 
tion, construction; the forms of lime and space 

2b. The being of mathematical objects: their real, ideal, or mental existence 56 

2C. Kinds of quantity: continuous and discrete quantities; the problem of the 
irrational 

3. Method in mathematics: the model of mathematical thought 57 

30. The conditions and character of demonstration in mathematics: the use of 
definitions, postulates, axioms, hypotheses 

3#. The role of construction: its bearing on proof, mathematical existence, and the 

scope of mathematical inquiry 58 

y. Analysis and synthesis: function and variable 

3^. Symbols and formulae: the attainment of generality 

4. Mathematical techniques 

40. The arithmetic and algebraic processes 

4^. The operations of geometry 59 

4<r. The use of proportions and equations 

40*. The method of exhaustion: the theory of limits and the calculus 

5. The applications of mathematics to physical phenomena: the utility of mathematics 

50. The art of measurement 60 

5^. Mathematical physics: the mathematical structure of nature 



CHAPTER 52: MATHEMATICS 53 



REFERENCES 

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page 
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the 
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas- 
sage is in section d of page 12. 

PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the 
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES : Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage 
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is 
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left- 
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of 
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half 
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164. 

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, 
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer- 
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d. 

BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James 
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King 
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA- 
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) II Esdras, 7:46. 

SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially 
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit- 
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited. 

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of 
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface. 



, . . , . 31 DESCARTES: Rules, iv, 5c-d; 6c-7c; xiv, 31c- 

1. The science of mathematics: its branches or 32a / Disf01trset PAR r If 43b . c; PART IIf 47b . d 

divisions; the origin and development 31 SPINOZA: Mies, PART i, APPENDIX, 370b-c 

of mathematics 34 NEWTON: Principles, la-b 

5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound [442-472] 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, en XH, 
44c-d esp [459-460] 44d SECT 7 360b-c; SECT 15 363a-b 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK n, 70b-c 35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT iv, DIV 

7 PLATO: Charmides, 7d-8a / Phaedrus, 138c-d 20 458b; SECT VH, DIV 48 470d-471c; SECT 
/ Gorgias, 254a-c / Republic, BK vn, 391b- xn, DIV 131 508d-509a 

397a / Timaeus, 451b-c / Statesman, 581a / 41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 290a; 299b 

Philebus, 633b-634b 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 5d-6b; 17d-18d; 46a-c; 

8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 7 68a-69c esp 68c-69a; 211c-218d / Practical 
103c-d; CH 27 119b / Metaphysics, BK i, CH i Reason, 295b-d; 330d-331a / Judgement, 553d 
[98i b i3~24] 500a; CH 9 [992*29-34] 510c; BK n, [fn i] 

CH 3 513c-d 46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 40 

11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i, 812b-813d; 122d-123b / Philosophy of History, PART i, 

BK n, 831d-832a 219a 

16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK i, 5a-6a 53 JAMES: Psychology, 874a-878a 

16 COPERNICUS : Revolutions of the Heavenly _, . 

Spheres BK i 510a-b la * ^ e distinction of mathematics from phys- 

17 PLOTIN'US: Fifth Ennead, TR ix, CH n, 250c-d ics and metaphysics: its relation to logic 

18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH 38 7 PLATO: Euthydemus, 75b / Republic, BK vi, 
654b-c 386d-388a; BK vn, 391b-398c 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 35, 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 12 
A 8, ANS 779c-780c [77^7-34] 107a; [78*10-13] 107b-c / Physics, 

23HoBBEs: Leviathan, PART i, 72a-d; PART iv, BK n, CH 2 [193*22-194*11] 270a-c; CH 9 

268c-d; 269b [200*15-29] 277c-d / Heavens, BK i, CH 10 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 46a-c [279 b 32-28o*n] 371b-c / ^Metaphysics, BK i, 



54 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



\bto\c 



(1. The science of mathematics: its branches or 
divisions; the origin and development of 
mathematics, la. The distinction of mathe- 
matics from physics and metaphysics: its 
relation to logic.) 

CH 8 [989^9-990*8] 508a; CH 9 [992 ft 29~ b 9] 
510c-d; BK n, CH 3 [995*15-20] 513d; BK in, 
en 2 [996*21-36] 514d-515a; BK iv, CH i 522a; 
BK vi, CH i 547b,d-548c; BK xi, CH i [io59 b i5- 
21 ] 587c-d; CH 3 [io6i tt 29- b i2] 589c-d; CH 4 
589d-590a; CH 7 592b-593a; BK xn, CH 8 
[io73 b i~7] 603d / Sow/, BK i, CH i [403 b io-i6] 
632d 
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vi, CH 8 [1142*12-19] 

391b 
16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK i, 5a-6a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, o i, A i, 
REP 2 3b 4a; Q 7, A 3, ANS 32c-33c; Q 44, A i, 
REP 3 238b-239a; o 85, A i, REP 2 451c-453c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Thcologica, PART n-n, Q 9, 
A 2, REP 3 424b-425a; PART in, 0.7, A 12, REP 
i 754c-755c 

23HoBBLs: Leviathan, PART i, 56b-57a; 58a-c; 

59b-c; 72a d; PART iv, 267a-b; 268c-269a 
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, SECOND DAY, 

190b-c 

30 BACON: Advancement of learning, 46a-b 

31 DESCARTLS: Rules, n, 2d-3b; iv 5a-7d; vm, 
12b 13a; xiv, 31c 32a / Discourse, PART n, 
46c-47a / Meditations, 70b-c; i, 76b-c / Ob- 
jections and Replies, 128d-129a; 169c-170a 

33 PASCAL: Geometrical Demonstration, 445a-b 

34 NEWTON: Principles, la 2a 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH in, 
SECT 29 322c-323a; CH xn, SECT 7 13 360b- 
362d passim 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vn, DIV 

48 470d-471c 
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 335b- 

337a 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 5a-9a; 15c-16c; 17d-19a; 
211c-218d csp 215d-217a; 243c-248d passim, 
csp 244d-245a, 248c / Practical Reason, 
295b-d; 311d-313d / Pref. Metaphysical Ele- 
ments of Ethics, 376c-d 

43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445b-c 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 867a-870a esp 869a-870a 

\b. The service of mathematics to dialectic and 
philosophy: its place in liberal education 

7 PLATO: Republic, BK vi, 386d-388a; BK vn, 
391b-398c; BK vm, 403a-d / Timaeus, 448b- 
450a; 453b-454a; 458b-460b / Theaetetus, 
515a-d / Philebus, 633a-63Sa / Laws, BK v, 
691d-692a; 695c-697a; BK vn, 728b-730d 

8 ARISTOTLE: Heavens, BK HI, en i [299*1- 
30o a i9) 390b-391c; CH 7-8 396d-399a,c / 
Generation and Corruption, BK n, CH i [329*5- 
24] 428d-429a / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 5-6 
503d-506b; CH 8 [989 b 29-99O*32] 508a-c; CH 
9 [992*24~ b 9] 510c-d; BK xn, CH 8 [1073^-7] 



603d; BK xiv, CH 3 622d-623d; CH 5-6 624d- 

626d / Soul, BK i, CH 4 [408^3-409*9] 638d 
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vi, CH 8 [1142*12-19] 

391b 

11 NICOMACIIUS: Arithmetic, BK i, 811a-813d 
16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK i, 5b-6a 
16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly 

Spheres, BK i, 510a-b 

16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 863b-872b passim 

17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR in, CH 3 lOd-lla 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK iv, par 30 26b-c 
/ Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH 16, 644d-645d; 
CH 38-39 654b-655b 

23HoBBEs: Leviathan, PART i, 56b-57a; 59b-c; 
PART n, 164c; PART iv, 268c-d; 269b 

24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i, 
27d; BK iv, 278b 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 70a-d 

28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, SECOND DAY, 
190b-c 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 16a-b; 
46a-c 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, n 2a-3b; iv 5a-7d; xiv, 
29a-b / Discourse, PART i, 43b-c; PART n, 
46c-48b / Geometry, BK i, 297a-b 

31 SPINO/A: Ethics, PART i, APPENDIX, 370b-c 

33 PASCAL: Pensecs, 1-2 171a 172b / Gcomcttical 
Demonstration, 442a-446b 

34 NEWTON: Principles, lb-2a 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 97a-b 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15c-16c; 46a-c; 211c-218d 

esp 215a-c / Judgement, 551a-552c 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 47b-48d 
53 JAMES: Psychology, 882a 883a 

f. The certainty and exactitude of mathemati- 
cal knowledge: the a priori foundations 
of arithmetic and geometry 

7 PLATO: Philebus, 633b-634b 

8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, en 27 
119b / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 2 [982*25-28] 
500c; BK n, CH 3 513c-d; BK xin, CH 3 609a- 
610a 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 3 [io94 b i2-28] 
339d-340a 

11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i, 811a 814b 
16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK i, 5b-6a 
23HoBBEs: Leviathan, PART i, 56b; 59b-c; 

PART iv, 268c-d; 269b 
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FOURTH DAY, 

252ab 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 61b-c; 65b 
/ Not/urn Orgunum, BK i, APH 59 112b-c 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, n 2a-3b; iv 5a-7d / Dis- 
course, PART i, 43b-c; PART n, 47b-c; PART iv, 
52d-53a; PART v, 54c / Meditations, i, 76b-c; 
v, 93a-95b / Objections and Replies, 128a-129a 
/ Geometry, BK n, 304a-b 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, APPENDIX, 370b-c 
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 1-2 171a-172b; 33 176b / 

Geometrical Demonstration, 430a-434a; 442a- 

446b 



\d to 2a 



CHAPTER 52: MATHEMATICS 



55 



35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH 11, 
SECT 9-10 311b-c; CH in, SECT 18-20 317d- 
319c passim; SECT 29 322c-323a; CH iv, SECT 
6-9 325a-326b; CH xn, SECT 1-8 358c-360c 
passim, esp SECT 7 360b-c; en xm, SECT 3 
364a 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 118 
436b-c 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT iv, DIV 
20 458a-b; SECT vn, DIV 48 470d-471c; SECT 
xn, DIV 131 508d-509a 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 118b-119a 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 5a-8d; 15c-16c; 31b-d; 
35b-36a; 46a-b; 68a-69c; 86b-c; HOa; 211c- 
218d / Practical Reason, 295b-d; 312c-d; 
330d-331a / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of 
Ethics, 376c-d / Science of Right, 399a-b / 
Judgement, 551a-552a 

43 FEDERALIST: NUMBLR 31, 103c-104a; NUMBER 
85, 257d-258d 

43 MILL: Liberty, 283d-284b / Utilitarianism, 

445b-c 

45 LAVOISIER: Elements of 'Chemistry, PREF, la; 2b 
45 Fou RI E R : Theory of Heat, 1 73a- b 
53 JAMES: Psychology, 175a-176a; 874a-878a; 

879b-882a 

Id. The ideal of a universal ma the sis: the unifi- 
cation of arithmetic and geometry 

7 PLATO: Meno, 180d-182c / Theaetetus, 515a-c 

8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 6 [4 b 2o-5*i \\ 9a-c 
/ Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 7 103c-d / Meta- 
physics, BK n, CH 3 513c-d; BK vi, CH i 
[io26 ft i8--27] 548b; BK xi, en 7 [io64 b 6-9] 
592d-593a; UK xm, CH 2 [1077*9-10] 608b; 
CH 3 [i<>77 b i7-23] 609a 

11 EUCLID: Elements, BK n 30a-40b; BK v 81a- 

98b; BK vn, DEFINITIONS, 16-19 127b 
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK n, 831d 841c 
16 KEPLER: Harmonies of the World, 101 2b- 

1014b 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 58a-c 
31 DLSCARTES: Rules la-40a,c csp n, 2d-3b, iv 
5a-7d, vi 8a-10a, xiv-xxi 28a-40a,c / Dis- 
course, PART 11, 46c-48b; PART in, 50d / 
Geometry 295a-353b esp BK i, 295a-298b 
33 PASCAL: Arithmetical Triangle, 447a 456a 
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 109b-llla 
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 68a-69c 
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 172a-173b 

2. The objects of mathematics: number, figure, 
extension, relation, order 

7 PLATO: Charmides, 7d-8a / Meno, 176d 177a; 
180b-183c / Republic, BK vi, 387b-c; BK vn, 
393d / Philebus, 633d 

8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, en 6 9a lla; en 8 
[io tt n-i6] 15a-b / Physics, BK iv, CH n [2i9 b 5- 
8] 299b / Metaphysics, BK in, CH i [<)96 ll i3- 
15] 514c; CH 5 520c-521b passim; BK vn, CH 2 
[io28 b i8-28] 551a-b; BK xi, CH 3 [io6i a 29- b 4] 
589c 



9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK i, CH 2 

595b 
11 EUCLID: Elements, BK i, DEFINITIONS la-2a; 

BK VII, DEFINITIONS, 1-2 127a; BK XI, DEFINI- 
TIONS, i 301a 

11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i, 811d-812b 

16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK i, 5a-b 

18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH 38 
654b-c 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 7, 
A 3, ANS 32c-33c; A 4, ANS 33d-34c; Q 30, A i, 
REP 4 167a-168a; Q 85, A i, REP 2 451c-453c 

23 HOBBES: leviathan, PART i, 72a-d 

30 BACON: Advancement of learning, 46a-c 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, n, 3a-b; iv, 7a-b; vi 8a- 
lOa; xiv, 30d-33b / Discourse, PART n, 47b-d; 
PART iv, 52d-53a / Meditations, i, 76b-c / 
Objections and Replies, 217b-d / Geometry, 
BK n, 304a 306a; 316a-b 

34 NEWTON: Principles, la b 

35 LOCKL: Human Understanding, BK n, en xn, 
SECT 3-5 147d-148b 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 118-132 

436b-439c 
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT xn, DIV 

131 508d-509a 
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 46a-c; 62a d; 68a-69c; 

2llc213a 
53 JAMES: Psychology, 874a-878a esp 874a 

2a. The apprehension of mathematical objects: 
by intuition, abstraction, imagination, 
construction; the forms of time and space 

7 PLATO: Meno, 180b-183c / Republic, BK vi, 
387b-d; BK vn, 393a-394a / Theaetetus, 
535b-c 

8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 18 
lllb-c / Metaphysics, BK ix, CH 9 [ic>5i tt 2$- 
33] 577b-c; BK xm, CH 3 609a-610a / Memory 
and Reminiscence, CH 2 [452 b 7~23] 694b-d 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK in, CH 3 [iii2 b 2o-24] 
358d; BK vi, en 8 [ii42 tt i3-iQl 391b 

11 EUCLID: Elements, BK i, POSTULATES, 1-3 2a 
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i, A i, 

REP 2 3b-4a; Q 85, A i, REP 2 451c-453c 
31 DESCARTES: Rules, xiv-xv 28a~33d / Dis- 
course, PART n, 46d / Meditations, v, 93a-d; 

vi, 96b-d / Objections and Replies, 217b-d; 

218c; 228c d 

33 PASCAL: Pensees, 1-2 171a-172b 
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, CH i, 

SECT 16 99b-c; BK n, CH xm, SECT 5-6 149b-d; 

CH xvi 165c-167c passim 
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 

15-16 409a-d; SECT 12-13 415b-c; SECT 118- 

122 436b-437c 
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT xn, DIV 

122 505c-d; DIV 124-125 506a 507a esp 

DIV 125, 507b [fn i] 
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 16a-c; 17d-18d; 24d-25b; 

31b d; 35b~36a; 46a-c; 55c-56a; 62a d; 68a- 

69c; 86b-c; 87b-c; HOa; 211c-212a / Practical 



56 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



2b to 2c 



(2. The objects of mathematics: number, figure, 
extension, relation, order. 2a. The appre- 
hension of mathematical objects: by intui- 
tion, abstraction, imagination, construction; 
the forms of time and space!) 

Reason, 295b-d / Science of Right, 399a / 
Judgement, 551a-553c 

52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v, 
121a-b 

53 IAMES: Psychology, 302a-304b; 549a-552a esp 
552b [fn ij; 869a-870a; 874b-878a passim 

2b. The being of mathematical objects: their 
real, ideal, or mental existence 

7 PLATO: Phaedo, 228b-230c; 242c-243c / Re- 
public, BK vi, 387b c; BK vn, 391b-398c / 
Theaetetus, 535b-c; 541b-d / Sophist, 562c / 
Phtlebus, 636b-c / Seventh Letter, 809c-810b 

8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK i, 01141 [49 b 32- 
37] 68c / Posterior Analytics, BK i, en 10 J76 b 39- 
77*3] 105d; CH 13 [79*6-10] 108c; ciu8 [81*40- 
b 5) lllb-c / Topics, BK vi, CH 6 [i43 b n -33] 
197b-c / Physics, BK u, en 2 [i93 b 23-i94*n] 
270a-c; BK in, CH 5 [204*8-34] 282a-b; BK iv, 
CH i [2o8 b i9-24] 287b-c; en u [2i9 b 5-8] 299b; 
CH 14 [223*21-29] 303a / Heavens, BK in, 
CH i [299*1-300*19] 390b-391c; CH 7 [306*1- 
b 2] 397b-d /'Metaphysics, BK i, CH 5 (985 b 22- 
986*21] 503d-504b; CH 6 [987 b io-34] 505c- 
506a; cn8 [989 b 29-99o*32] 508a c; CH 9 [9$i b 
9~992 b i8] 509d-511a; BK in, CH i [995 b i3- 
18] 514a; [996*13-15] 514c; CH 2 [996*22-36] 
S14d-515a; [997^2-998*19] 516b-d; CH 5 
[iooi b 26]-cii 6 [ioo2 b 25] 520c-521c; BK vn, 
CH 2 [io28 b i8-28] 551a-b; en 10 [io35 b 
32-1036*12] 559b-c; CH u [io36 b 32-i 037*4] 
560b-c; BK xi, CH i [io59 b 2-i3] 587b-c; CH 2 
[io6o ft 36- b i9] 588c-d; CH 3 [io6i*29- b 4] 589c; 
BK xn, CH i [1069*30-37] 598b; BK xn, CH 10 
[io75 b 25]-BK xin, CH 3 [io78 b 5] 606c-610a; 
BK xin, CH 6-9 611d-618c; BK xiv 619b,d- 
626d / Soul, BK in, CH 7 [431^3-19] 664b 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 6 [1096*17-19] 
341b; BK vi, CH 8 [1142*13-19] 391b 

11 EUCLID: Elements, BK i, POSTULATES, 1-3 2a 
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i, 811a-812a; 
813d-814b 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 19 76a-b 
/ Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH 38 654b-c 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 5, 
A 3, REP 4 25a-d; Q 10, A 6, ANS 45c-46d; Q u, 
A i, REP i 46d-47d; A 3, REP 2 49a-c; Q 30, A i, 
REP 4 167a-168a; Q 44, A i, REP 3 238b<239a; 
Q 85, A i, REP 2 451c-453c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 7, 
A 12, REP i 754c-755c; PART in SUPPL, Q 83, 
A 2, ANS 976c-978c; A 3, REP 2 978c-980d 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, xiv, 30b-32a / Discourse, 
PART iv, 52d-53a / Meditations, i, 76b-c; v, 
93a-d; 96a / Objections and Replies, 169c-170a; 
217b-d; 218c; 228c-229a 



31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, APPENDIX, 370b-c 

33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 373a-b 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, CH in, 
SECT 6 113c-d; BK in, CH in, SECT 19 259c- 
260a; BK iv, CH iv, SECT 5-8 324d-325c 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 
12-16 408a-409d; SECT 12-13 415b-c; SECT 
118-128 436b-438d passim, esp SECT 121-122 
436d-437c, SECT 125-126 438a-c 

35 HUME : Human Understanding, SECT iv, DIV 20 
458a-b; SECT xn, DIV 122 505c-d; DIV 124-125 
506a-507a esp DIV 125, 507b [fn i] 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 16a-c; 24a-33d esp 31d- 
32c;35b-36a; 46a-c; 62a-d;87b-c; 91c-d;94b- 
95a; 211c-213a esp 211c-212a / Practical Reason, 
295b-d; 312c-d / Judgement, 551a-553c 

45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 183a b 

53 JAMLS: Psychology, 874a-878a esp 875a-876b; 
880b881a 

2c. Kinds of quantity: continuous and discrete 
quantities; the problem of the irrational 

7 PLATO: Meno, 180d-181c / Republic, BK vin, 
403a-d / Parmenides, 499d-500c / Theaetetus, 
515a-c 

8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 5 [3 b 32~4*9] 8a-b; 
CH 6 [4 b 23-5*i4] 9a-c; CH 8 [io b 26 -11*14] 15d - 
16b / Physics, BK iv, CH 4 [2ii*29- b 4] 290c; 
CH 5 [2i2 b 3~6] 291d; BK v, CH 3 [227*10-34] 
307d-308b; BK vi, CH 1-2 312b,d-315d / 
Heavens, BK i, cn i [268*6-11] 359a; BK in, 
CH i [299 a i-3oo tt i9] 390b-391c; CH 7 [306*26- 
b 2] 397c-d; CH 8 [3o6 b i7-26] 398a / Generation 
and Corruption, BK i, CH 2 [3i5 b 25~3i7*i7] 
411b 413a; BK 11, CH 10 [337^2-34] 439b-c 
/ Metaphysics, BK i, en 2 [983*11-20] 501b-c; 
BK n, en 2 [994^3-26] 513a; BK in, CH 4 
[100^7-25] 520b-c; BK v, CH 6 [1015^5-1016* 
17] 536b-c; [ioi6 b 6~32] 537a-b; CH 13 [1020* 
9-14] 541b; BK vin, CH 3 [io43 b 33-io44*i4] 
568b-d; BK x, CH i [1052*15-37] 578b,d; CH 3 
[1054*20-29] 581a; BK xi, CH 12 [io68 b 26- 
io()9 ft i8] 597d-598a,c; BK xiv, CH i [io87 b 34- 
1088*14] 620a-b 

11 EUCLID: Elements, BK v, DEFINITIONS, 4-5 
81a; BK vn, DEFINITIONS, 2 127a; 20 127b; 
BK x 191a-300a esp PROP i 191b-192a 

11 ARCHIMEDES: Sphere and Cylinder, BK i, AS- 
SUMPTIONS, 5 404b / Spirals, 484b / Quadra- 
ture of the Parabola, 527a-b 

11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i, Slid 812a 

17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR iv, CH 7, 52c / 
Fourth Ennead, TR u, CH i, 139d / Sixth En- 
nead, TR i, CH 4 253b-254b; TR in, CH 13, 
287d-288a; CH 15 289a c 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, A i, 
REP 1 14b-15b; Q 7, A 3, REP 3-4 32c-33c; A 4, 
ANS 33d-34c; Q 11, A 2, REP 2 47d-48d; Q 30, 
A 3, ANS 169b-170c; Q 42, A i, REP i 224b- 
225d; Q 48. A 4, REP 3 262a-263a; Q 52, A i 
278d-279b 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART 11-11, 



3to3a 



CHAPTER 52: MATHEMATICS 



57 



Q 24, A 4, REP i 491d-492b; PART in, Q 7, 

A 12, REP i 754c-755c 
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 139c- 

153a passim; THIRD DAY, 201a-202a 
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 52d-53a / 

Meditations, v, 93b 
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 15, SCHOL 360b- 

361d 

33 PASCAL: Geometrical Demonstration, 434a- 
439b 

34 NEWTON: Principles, BK i, LEMMA i 25a; 
LEMMA ii, SCHOL, 31a-32a 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xv, 
SECT 9 164b-d; en xvi, SECT 3-4 165d-166b 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 123-152 

437c-439c 
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 66d-72c; 124d-125b; 

135a-137a,c; 152a-d; 161d-163a 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 469a-d 

3. Method in mathematics: the model of math- 
ematical thought 

7 PLATO: Meno, 179d-183a / Republic, BK vi, 
387b-d / Theaetetus, 515b-c 

8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK i, CH 41 [49** 
32-50*4] 68c / Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 10 
104d-105d / Physics, BK n, en 9 [200*15-29] 
277c-d / Metaphysics, BK in, CH 2 [996*22- 
36] 514d-515a; BK ix, on 9 [1051*22-34] 
577b-c; BK xi, CH 3 [io6i a 29- b 4] 589c; BK 
xni, CH 3 609a-610a 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK in, CH 3 [ni2 b 2o-24] 
358d 

11 ARCHIMEDUS: Method 569a-592a esp 569b- 

570a 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 56b; 58a-c; 59b c 
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FOURTH DAY, 

252a-b 

30 BACON: Advancetncnt of Learning, 65b / 
Novum Otganum, BK i, APH 59 112b-c 

31 DESCARTES: Rules la-40a,c csp n 2a-3b, iv, 
5c-7d, xiv-xxi 28a-40a,c / Discourse, PART H, 
46c-48b / Meditations, 73a / Objections and 
Replies, 128a-129a / Geometry 295a-353b esp 
BK i, 295a-298b, BK n, 304a-306a, 316a-317a, 
BK in, 331b, 353a 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, APPENDIX, 370b-c 

33 PASCAL: Pensees, 1-3 171a-172b / Geometrical 
Demonstration, 430a-434a; 442a-446b / Arith- 
metical Triangle, 451b-452a; 458b-459b; 464a- 
466a 

34 NEWTON: Principles, BK 11, LEMMA 2 and 
SCHOL 168a-170a 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH n, 
SECT 9-10 311b-c; CH in, SECT 18-20 317d- 
319c passim; SECT 29-30 322c-323c passim; 
CH iv, SECT 6-9 325a-326b; CH vn, SECT n, 
340c-341a; CH XH, SECT 1-8 358c-360c passim; 
SECT 14-15 362d-363b; CH xvn, SECT n 378b 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 
12 408a-b; SECT 19 410c; SECT 118-132 436b- 
439c passim 



35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT iv, DIV 20 
458a-b; SECT vn, DIV 48 470d-471c; SECT XH, 
DIV 131 508d-509a 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 118b-119a 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 5a-8d; 17d-18d; 46a-b; 
211c-218d / Practical Reason, 302d-303b; 
330d-331a / Science of Right, 399a-b 

43 MILL: Liberty, 283d-284a 

45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 2b 

45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 172a-173b 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 469a-d; 

EPILOGUE n, 695b-c 
53 JAMES: Psychology, 175a-176a; 874a 878a 

a. The conditions and character of demonstra- 
tion in mathematics: the use of defini- 
tions, postulates, axioms, hypotheses 

7 PLATO: Mcno, 183b-c / Republic, BK vi, 386d- 
388a; BK vn, 397c-d 

8 ARibTorLh: Prior Analytics, BK i, CH 41 [\(?> 
32-37] 68c / Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH i 
[71*1-16] 97a-b; CH 2 [72*22-24] 98d; CH 5 
101b-102b; en 10 104d-105d; CH 12 106c-107c; 
CH 23 [84^9] llSb-c; CH 24 [8 5 n 2o-3i] 
116b<c;[85 b 4-i 4 ]116d-117a; [86*22-30] 117d- 
118a; en 31 187^3-39] 120a; BK n, CH $ [91*1- 
5] 124b; en 7 [92^12-25] 126c-d; CH 9 [9^21- 
25] 128a-b / Topics, BK i, CH i [roi a 5~i7] 
143c-d; BK v, en 4 [i ^32-34] 183b; BK vi, 
0114 [i4i b 3-22J194d-195a; BKVII, CH 3 [153*6- 
n] 208a-b; BK vin, cn i [157^1-3] 213a; en } 
[i58 l) 29-i59 tt i] 215c / Sophistical Refutations, 
cn n [I7i b i2-i8]236b;[i7i b 34-i72' l 7]236d/ 
Physics, BK n, CH 9 [2oo tt i5-29] 277c-d / 
Heavens, UK in, CH 4 (302 b 27-3i] 394a / 
Metaphysics, BK HI, CH 2 [996*2 1-36] 514d- 
515a; [990 h i8-2ij 515b; CH 3 [998^5-27! 
517a; BK v, cn 5 [1014*36^1] 534c; BK vn, 
CH 10 [io^b ll 2 -i}| 559b-c; BK xi, CH 3 [io6i a 
29^4] 589c; cn 4 [io6i b i7-25] 589d-590a; CH 
7 [io63 b 36-io64 ft 9] 592b; BK xni, CH 2 [io77 b 
il-cH 3 [1078^2] 608d-609d; BK xiv, CH 2 
[1089^2-26] 621c-d 

9 ARISTOTLE: Generation of Animals, BK 11, CH 6 
[742 b 23-33] 283d-284a / Ethics, BK vn, CH 8 
[ii5i tt i5-i9] 402a 

11 EUCLID: Elements la-396b esp BK i, DEFINI- 
TIONS-COMMON NOTIONS la~2a 

11 ARCHIMEDES: Sphere and Cylinder, BK i, DEFI- 
NITIONS-ASSUMPTIONS 404a-b / Spirals, 484b 
/ Quadrature of the Parabola, 527a-b / Method, 
569b-570a; PROP i 571a-572b csp 572b 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica t PART i, Q 85, 
A 8, REP 2 460b-461b 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 56b; 58a-c; 
59b-c 

28 GILBERT: Loadstone, PREF, Ib-c 

28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FOURTH DAY, 
252ab 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, n, 3a; xiv-xxi 28a-40a,c 
/ Discourse, PART i, 43b-c; PART n, 46d; 47b-c; 
PART iv, 52d-53a / Mediations, 70b-d; 73a; 



58 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



(3. Method in mathematics: the model of mathe- 
matical thought. $a. The conditions and 
character of demonstration in mathematics: 
the use of definitions, postulates, axioms, 
hypotheses.) 

v, 93a-d / Objections and Replies, 128a-d / 
Geometry, BK 11, 304a-b; 316a-b; BK in, 353a 

33 PASCAL: Pensees, 1-5 171a-173a / Vacuum, 
365b-366a; 373a-b / Geometrical Demonstra- 
tion, 430a-434a; 442a-446b / Arithmetical 
Triangle, 451b-452a; 458b-459b; 464a-466a 

34 NEWTON: Principles, la-b 

34 HUYGENS: Light, PREF, 551b-552a 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xvi, 
SECT 4 166a-b; BK iv, CH i, stcr 9 308c-309b; 
CH n, SECT 9-10 311b-c; en in, SECT 29, 322c; 
CH vn, SECT ii, 340c-341a; CH xn, SECT 1-8 
358c-360c passim; SECT 14-15 362d-363b 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 
12 408a-b; SECT 15-16 409a-d; SECT 118 
436b-c 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vn, DIV 
48 470d-471c; SFCT xn, DIV 131 508d-509a 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 17d-18d; 46a-b; 68a-69c; 
91c-d; llOa; HOd-llla; 211c-218d / Practical 
Reason, 302d-303b; 330d-331a / Pref. Meta- 
physical Elements of Ethics, 376c-d 

43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 31, 103c 
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445 b-c 

45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, 2b 
53 JAMES: Psychology, 869a-870a; 874a-878a 

3. The role of construction: its bearing on 
proof, mathematical existence, and the 
scope of mathematical inquiry 

7 PLATO: Meno, 180b-182c / Republic, BK vi, 
387b-c 

8 ARISTOTLE: Heavens, BK i, CH 10 [279^32- 
280*12] 371 b-c / Metaphysics, BK ix, CH 9 
[1051*22-34] 577b-c 

11 EUCLID: Elements, BK i, POSTULATES, 1-3 2a; 

PROP i 2b-3a 

23 HOKBES: leviathan, PART iv, 267a~b 
31 DESCARTES: Rules, xiv-xvin 28a-39d / 

Geometry, BK n, 304a-306a; 316a-b; BK in, 

331b-332b 

33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 373a b 

34 NEWTON: Principles, la-b 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 31b-d; 68a-69c; 86b-c; 
91c-d; 94b-95a; 211c-215a; 217c-d / Science 
of Right, 399a-b / Judgement, 551a-553c 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 673b 

3c. Analysis and synthesis: function and vari- 
able 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK in, CH 3 [ni2 b 2o-24] 
358d 

11 ARCHIMEDES: Sphere and Cylinder, BK n, 
PROP i 434b-435b; PROP 3-7 437a-443b / 
Method, 569b-570a; PROP i, 572b 

11 APOLLONIUS: Conies, BK ii, PROP 44-47 710b- 



713a; PROP 49-51 714b-726a; BK in, PROP 54- 
56 793b-798b 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, iv, 5c-7a; vi 8a-10a; xn, 
20d-23b; 24a-b; xm 25b-27d; xiv, 31a-33b; 
xvi-xxi 33d-40a,c / Objections and Replies, 
128a-d / Geometry 295a-353b csp BK i, 296b- 
297b, 298b-304a, BK n, 308a 314b 

33 PASCAL: Geometrical Demonstration, 430a 

34 NEWTON: Principles, BK i, LEMMA 19 57b-58b 
/ Optics, BK in, 543a-b 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH xn, 
SECT 15 363a-b; CH xvn, SECT n 378b 

45 L\VOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, la; 2b 
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 172a-173b; 196a- 
251b 

3</. Symbols and formulae: the attainment of 
generality 

8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK i, CH 41 
[49^2-37] 68c / Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 
10 [76 b 39-77 a 2] 105d 

11 NICOMACIIUS: Arithmetic, BK n, 832a 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 56a 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, xiv-xxi 28a-40a,c / Dis- 
course, PART n, 46d; 47b-d / Geometry 295a- 
353b esp BK i, 295a-298b, BK n, 314a-b, BK 
in, 353a 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH in, 
SECT 19 318b-319a 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 
16 409b-d; SECT 121-122 436d-437c 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 68a-69c; 211d-212a; 
212d-213a 

45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 172b-173b; 181a-b; 
233b-240b 

4. Mathematical techniques 

4a. The arithmetic and algebraic processes 

8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK vm, CH 14 [i63 b 2}-28] 
222b 

11 EUCLID: Elements, BK vii-ix 127a-190b 

11 ARCHIMEDES: Measurement of a Circle, PROP 
3 448b-451b / Conoids and Spheroids, LEM- 
MA 455b-456a; LEMMA to PROP 2 456b-457b 
/ Spirals, PROP 10-11 488a-489b / Sand- 
Reckoner 520a-526b 

11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i, 814b-821d 

16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK v, 990a b 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 56a; 58a-b 

28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, SECOND DAY, 
193bc 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, xvi 33d-35c; xvm 36b- 
39d / Discourse, PART 11, 46d; 47b-d / 
Geometry, BK i, 295a-296a 

33 PASCAL: Arithmetical Triangle 447a-473b esp 
451b-452a, 458b-459b, 464a-466a / Corre- 
spondence with Fermat 474a-487a passim 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH 
xvn, SECT ii 378b 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 
19 410c; SECT 121-122 436d-437c 



CHAPTER 52: MATHEMATICS 



59 



42 KANT: Pure Reason, 17d-18d; 68a-69c; 212d- 

213a; 217c-d 
53 JAMES: Psychology, 874b-876b 

4b. The operations of geometry 

7 PLATO: Meno, 180b 183c / Republic, BK vi, 
387b-c 

8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 7 [7^29-33] 12c-d 
11 EUCLID: Elements, BK i-iv la-80b esp BK i, 

POSTULATES 2a, PROP 1-4 2b-4b, PROP 9-12 
7a-9a, PROP 22-23 13b-15a, PROP 31 19b, 
PROP 42 24b-25a, PROP 44-46 2Sb-28a, BK n, 
PROP 14 40a-b; BK vi 99a~126a esp PROP 9-13 
106b-109a, PROP 18 112a-b, PROP 25 119a-b, 
PROP 28-29 121a-123a; BK XI-XHI 301a-396b 

11 ARCHIMEDES: Sphere and Cylinder, BK i-n 
403a-446a / Measurement of a Circle 447a- 
451b / Conoids and Spheroids 452a-481b / 
Spirals 482a-501a / Quadrature of the Parabola 
527a-537b / Boof( of Lemmas 561a-568b 

11 APOLLONIUS: Conies 603a-804b esp BK i, 
PROP 11-13 615a-620a 

28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 
149d-150d 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, xvi 33d-35c; xvm 36b- 
39d / Discourse, PART iv, 52d-53a / Geometry 
295a-353b esp BK i, 295a-296a, 297b 298b, 
BK ii, 304a-308a 

34 NEWTON: Principles, la-b; BK i, LEMMA 15- 
PROP 29, SCHOL 50a-75b esp LEMMA 19 57b- 
58b 

42 KANT: Judgement, 551a-552a 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 550b [fn i]; 673b; 876b- 
878a 

4c. The use of proportions and equations 

8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK n, en 17 
[99*8-10] 135a / Topics, BK vin, CH 3 [i58 b 29- 
351 215c 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK n, CH 6 [1106*26-36] 
351d-352a; BK v, CH 3 [n3i a 3O- b i5] 378d- 
379b 

11 EUCLID: Elements, BK v-vi 81a-126a esp BK v, 
DEFINITIONS, 5 81a, 7 81a-b, BK vi, PROP 23 
117a-b; BK vn, DEFINITIONS, 20 127b; PROP 
11-14 134b-136a; PROP 17-22 137a-140a; 
PROP 33 145a-146a; BK vin, PROP 1-13 150a- 
161b; PROP 18-27 163b-170a; BK ix, PROP 8-13 
174a-180a; PROP 15-19 181a-183b; PROP 35-36 
188b-190b; BK x, PROP 5-9 195a-198b; PROP 
ii 199b; PROP 14 201a-202a; BK xi, PROP 25 
320b-321b; PROP 32-34 327b-332b; PROP 37 
335b-336a; BK xu 338a-368b 

11 ARCHIMEDES: Conoids and Spheroids, PROP 4 
459b-460b 

11 APOLLONIUS: Conies 603a-804b passim 

11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK I-H, 821d-831d; 
BK n, 841c-848d 

16 KEPLER: Harmonies of the World, 1012b- 
1014b 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, vi 8a-10a; xiv, 28b-29a; 
xvm-xxi 36b-40a,c / Discourse, PART ii, 



47b-d / Geometry 295a-353b esp BK in, 33 2 b- 
341b 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xiv, 590a-c 

4d. The method of exhaustion: the theory of 
limits and the calculus 

11 EUCLID: Elements, BK x, PROP i 191b~192a; 
BK xu, PROP 2 339a-340b; PROP 10-12 351b- 
359a; PROP 18 367a-368b 

11 ARCHIMEDES: Sphere and Cylinder, BK i, AS- 
SUMPTIONS, 5 404b; PROP 13-14 411a-414a; 
PROP 33-34 424b-427a; PROP 42 431b-432b; 
PROP 44 433a-b / Measurement of a Circle, 
PROP i 447a-448a / Conoids and Spheroids, 
PROP 4 459a-460b; PROP 21-22 470a-471b; 
PROP 25-30 473a-479b / Spirals, PROP 18-20 
492b-495b; PROP 24-27 496b-500a / Equilib- 
rium of Planes, BK, i, PROP 6-7 503b-504b / 
Quadrature of the Parabola 527a-537b esp 
PROP 16 533b-534a, PROP 24 537a-b / Method 
569a-592a passim 

16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK v, 973a~975a; 979b- 
983b 

28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, SECOND DAY, 
193b-194d; THIRD DAY, 205b-d; 224b-c 

31 DESCARTES: Geometry, BK n, 316b-317a 

33 PASCAL: Equilibrium of Liquids, 395a*b 

34 NEWTON: Principles, BK i, LEMMA i-n and 
SCHOL 25a-32a esp LEMMA n, SCHOL, 31a-b; 
BK n, LEMMA 2 and SCHOL 168a-170a 

45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 172b; 177a; 181a-b; 

221a-248b 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 469a-d; 

EPILOGUE n, 695b 

5. The applications of mathematics to physical 
phenomena: the utility of mathematics 

7 PLATO: Republic, BK vn, 391b-398c; BK vin, 
403b-d; BK ix, 424d-425b / Timaeus, 448b- 
450a; 453b-454a / Statesman, 585a-b / Phile- 
bus, 633c-d / Laws, BK v, 691d-692a; 695c- 
697a; BK vn, 728b-730d 

8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 9 
[76-3-25] 104b-d; CH 13 [78^1-79*16] 108b-c; 
CH 27 [87*32-33] 119b / Physics, BK n, CH 2 
[194*7-11] 270b-c; BK vn, CH 5 333a-d / 
Heavens, BK ii, CH 14 [297*4-7] 388c/ Meteor- 
ology, BK in, CH 3 477a-478a; CH 5 480a- 
481c/ Metaphysics, BKIII, CH2 [997 b i2-998 a i9] 
516b-d 

9 ARISTOTLE: Gait of Animals, CH 9 247a-248a 
/ Politics, BK v, CH 12 [1316*1-17] 518d-519a 

11 ARCHIMEDES: Equilibrium of Planes 502a< 

519b / Floating Bodies 538a-560b 
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i, 812d-813a 
14 PLUTARCH: Marcellus, 252a-255a 
16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly 

Spheres, BK i, 510b 

16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK v, 964b-965a 
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK v, par 3-6 27c- 

28c / Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH 29 650d- 

651c 



60 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



5a to 5b 



(5. The applications of mathematics to physical 
phenomena: the utility of mathematics.) 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 35, 
A 8, ANS 779c-780c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART n -n, Q 9, 
A 2, REP 3 424b-425a 

23 HOBDES: Leviathan, PART i, 73b; PART iv, 
267a-b; 268c-d 

24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK iv, 
278b 

28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 131d- 
132a; SECOND DAY-FOURTH DAY 178a-260a,c 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 46b-c 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, iv, 7a-b; xiv, 31b-d / 
Discourse, PART i, 43b-c / Objections and Re- 
plies, 169c-170a / Geometry, BK n, 322b-331a 

34 NhwroN: Principles, ,la-2a; DEF vui 7b-8a; 
COROL n 15a-16b; BK i, PROP 69, SCHOL, 
131a; BK in 269a-372a 

34 HUYGENS: Light 551a-619b 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 120 
436d; SECT i }i 439b c 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT iv, DIV 
27 460c-d 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART n, 78b; PART in, 94b- 
103a 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 661c-662c 

42 KAN r: Pure Reason, 68a-69c / Practical Reason, 

300d [fn i]; 330d-331a / Judgement, 551a-552a 
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 169a-173b; I75b; 

177a-251b esp 183a-184a 
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 831b-c 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 469a-d; BK 

xiv, 589c-590c; 609b; EPILOGUE n, 694d-695c 
53 JAMES: Psychology, 348a-359a; 882a-884b 

5a. The art of measurement 

5 ARISTOPHANES: Birds [992-1020] 555a-b 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK n, 70b-c; BK iv, 
139b-c 

7 PLATO: Republic, BK x, 431b-d / Statesman, 
594a-595a / Philebus, 633a-634d / Laws, BK 
v, 691d-692a; 695c-697a 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK iv, CH 12 [220^5-31] 
300c-d; CH 14 [223 b i2-224 fl i] 303c-d; BK vn, 
CH 4 330d333a / Heavens, BK n, en 14 
[298"! 5 20] 389d / Metaphysics, BK in, CH 2 
[997 b 27-3$] 516c; BK v, CH 6 [ioi6 b i8-3i] 
537b; BK x, CH i [io52 b i 5-1 053*31] 579a- 
580a 

11 EUCLID: Elements, BK v 81a-98b esp DEFINI- 
TIONS, 5 81a, 7 81b; BK VH, DEFINITIONS, 20 
127b 

11 ARCHIMEDES: Sand-Reckoner 520a-526b 
13 VIRCJIL: Aeneid, BK vi [847-853] 233b-234a 
16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK i, 14a-28b; BK n, 
38b-39b; BK v, 143a-144a; 165a-176a; BK vn- 
vin, 233a-258b 

16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly 
Spheres, BK i, 532b-556b; BK n, 558b-559b; 
567b; 586b-621b; BK iv, 705a-725a 



19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, A 
5, REP 2 17c-18b; Q 10, A 6, ANS and REP 4 45c- 
46d; Q 66, A 4, REP 3 348d-349d 

28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK iv, 85c-89c; BK v, 
92a-95a 

28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 
136d-137c; 148d-149c; 164a-166c; THIRD DAY, 
207d-208c 

28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 286c-288c 

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 44-48 
175d-188b 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, xiv, 31b-33b / Geometry, 
BK i, 296a 

33 PASCAL: Great Experiment 382a-389b 

34 NEWTON: Principles, la-b; LAWS or MOTION, 
SCHOL, 20a-22a; BK n, GENERAL SCHOL 211b- 
219a; PROP 40, SCHOL 239a-246b 

34 HUYCJLNS: Light, CH i, 554b-557b 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xvi, 
SECT 8 167c 

39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK i, 14b 
42 KANT: Judgement, 497a-498d esp 498b-d 
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i, 

14a-c; 33b-36a; 41a-44d; PART in, 87d-90a; 

91a-95a; 96b 103b 
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 184b-185b; 249a- 

251b 
50 MARX: Capital, 20b 

5b. Mathematical physics: the mathematical 
structure of nature 

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 448b-4SOa; 453b-454a; 
458a-460b 

8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 9 
104b-d; CH 13 [78^1-79*16] 108b-c / Physics, 
BK ii, CH 2 [194*7-11] 270b-c / Heavens, BK 
in, CH i [299*1-300*19] 390b-391c / Meta- 
physics, BK i, CH 9 [992*29 - b 9] SlOc-d; BK n, 
CH 3 [995*15-17] 513d; BK in, CH 2 [997 b i2- 
998*19] 516b-d; BK xn, CH 8 [io73 b i-i7] 
603d-604a; BK xin, CH 3 609a-610a 

11 NIOOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i, 812b-d; 813d- 
814a 

16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK i, 5b-6a 

16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 863b-872b / Har- 
monies of the World, 1023b-1080b passim 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i, A 
i, REP 2 3b-4a; Q 32, A i, REP 2 175d-178a; 
PART i-n, Q 35, A 8, ANS 779c-780c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-H, Q 9, 
A 2, REP 3 424b-425a 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 72a-d; PART iv, 

268c-d 
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 

131b-132a; 133b; FOURTH DAY, 245b-d; 

252a b 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 46b-c / 
Novum Organum, BK 11, APH 8 140b 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, iv, 7a-c / Discourse, PART 
i, 43b-c; PART in, 50d / Objections and Replies, 
169c-170a 

33 PASCAL: PensSes, 119 195a 



5b CHAPTER 52: MATHEMATICS 61 



34 NEWTON: Principles, la-2a; DBF vm 7b-8a; 42 KMIT: Judgement, 551a-552a 

BK i, lllb; PROP 69, SCHOL, 131aj BK in, 45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 169a-b; 172a-173b; 
269a; GENERAL SCHOL, 371b 372a 175b; 177a; 183a 184a 

34 HUYGENS: Light, PREP, 551b~552a 45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 831b-c 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 119 52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v, 
436c 121a-b 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT iv, DIV 53 JAMES: Psychology, 126a~b; 348a*359a; 675b; 
27 460c-d 876a-b; 882a 884b 

CROSS-REFERENCES 

For: The relation of mathematics to other arts and sciences, /^ASTRONOMY 2c; MECHANICS 3; 

METAPHYSICS 3b; PHILOSOPHY ib; PHYSICS ib, 3; SCIENCE 5c. 
The quality of necessity in mathematical truth, and for the theory of the a priori foundations 

of arithmetic and geometry in the transcendental forms of space and time, see NECESSITY 

AND CONTINGENCY 4d; SENSE ic; SPACE 43; TIME 6c. 
The controversy over the character and existence of the objects of mathematics, see BEING 

?d(3); QUANTITY i; SPACE 5. 
The discussion of the mental processes by which mathematical objects are apprehended, see 

IDEA la, 2f-2g; KNOWLEDGE 63(3), 6c(4); MEMORY AND IMAGINATION la, 6c(2)-6d; 

SENSE 53; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 2b. 
The consideration of the specific objects of mathematical inquiry, such as numbers and 

figures, ratios and proportions, continuous and discontinuous quantities, finite and infinite 

quantities, see INFINITY 3a~3c; QUANTITY ib~4c, 7; RELATION id, 53(3); SPACE 3a~3C. 
The general theory of mathematical method or logic, see DEFINITION 6a; HYPOTHESIS 3; 

JUDGMENT 8b-8c; LOGIC 43; REASONING 6b; TRUTH 4c; and for the particular techniques 

of arithmetic, geometry, algebra, and calculus, see MECHANICS 3b-3d; QUANTITY ib, 

6b; RELATION 53(3); SPACE 3d. 
Other discussions of applied mathematics or mathematical physics, and of the role of meas- 

urement, see ASTRONOMY 2c; MECHANICS 3; PHYSICS 3, 4d; QUANTITY 3d(i), 6-6a, 6c; 

SCIENCE 5c. 



ADDITIONAL READINGS 

Listed below are works not included in Great Booty of the Western World, but relevant to the 
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups: 

I. Works by authors represented in this collection. 
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection. 

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult 
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas. 

J. S. MILL. A System of Logic, BK i, CH 5 

*' . An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's 

AQUINAS. On the Trinity ofBoethius, QQ 5-6 Philosophy, CH 27 
HOBBES. Six Lessons to the Savilian Professors of 

Mathematics " 

NEWTON. The Method of Fluxions and Infinite Series R. BACON. Opus Majus, PART iv 

. Universal Arithmetic ORME. Treatise on the Breadth of Forms 

BERKELEY. A Defence of Free Thinking in Mathe- SUAREZ. Disputationes Metaphysicae, iv (9), x (3), 

matics XL (3, 5-6), XLI (4), XLVII (13) 

KANT. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic, par BARROW. Lectiones Mathematicae 

6-13 . Thirteen Geometrical Lectures 

HEGEL. The Phenomenology of Mind, INTRO LEIBNITZ. Early Mathematical Manuscripts 



62 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



SACCHLRI. Euclides Vindicates ( Vindication of Euclid) 

VOLTAIRE. "Geometry," in A Philosophical Dic- 
tionary 

EULER. Elements of Algebra 

CARNOT. Reflexions snr la metaphysique du calciil in- 
finitesimal 

GAUSS. Vntersuchungen uber Cohere Anthmeti^ 

SCHOPI NMAUhR. The World as Will and Idea, VOL 11, 
SUP, en 1 3 

DE MORGAN. On the Study and Difficulties of Mathe- 
matics 

COMTE. The Philosophy of Mathematics 

. The Positive Philosophy, BK i 

LOBACIIEVSKI Geometrical Researches on the Theory 
of Parallels 

WIIEWELL. The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, 

VOL I, BK II, CH 11-12, 14 

G. PLACOCK. A Treatise on Algebra 

B. PEIRCE. An Elementary Treatise on Curves, func- 
tions, and Forces 

W. R. HAM [LI ON. Lectures on Quaternions 
RICMVNN. Vbcr die Ilypothcsen wclchc do Geometric 

zu Grundc liegen (The Hypotheses of Geometry) 
BOOLE. A Treatise on Different tal Equations 

. A Treatise on the Calculus of Finite Differences 

DEDLKIND. E*sa\s on the Theory of Numbers 
CLIM-ORD. Preliminary Sketch of Bujuaicrrnons 
. On the Canonical Form and Dissection of a 

Ricrnann's Surface 
JLVONS. On Geometrical Reasoning 
LEWIS CARROLL. Euclid and His Modern Rivals 
GIBBS. Collected Wor{s 

C. S. PEIRCE. Collected Papers, VOL in, par 553-5621, 
609-645 

FREGE. Grundgesetze der Anthrnetu\ 
BURNSIDE. Theory of Groups of Finite Order 
CANTOR. Contributions to the Founding of the Theory 

of Transfmitc Numbers 
HILBERT. The Foundations of Geometry 
PtANo. Arithmetics Pnncipia 

. Formulatt e de rnathernatique 

, Anthmelica generate e algebra elementarc 

BONOLA. Non-Euclidean Geometry 

E. W. HOBSON. The Theory of Functions of a Real 

Variable and the Theory of Fourier's Series 



O. VhBLLN and LENNES. Introduction to Infinitesimal 

Analysis 

KLLIN. Famous Problems of Elementary Geometry 
. Elementary Mathematics from an Advanced 

Standpoint 
Poi!Nfc\RL Science and Hypothesis, PARI 11 

. The Value of Science, PART i, cir i; PART u 

. Science and Method, BK i, en 2-3; BK n, en } 

C \SSIRLR. Substance and Function, PARI i, en 2 3; 

Sl'P \I 

E. V. IIuNTiNoroN. The Continuum, and Other Types 
of Serial Order 

. The Fundamental Propositions of Algebra 

J. \V. YOUNG Lectures on Fundamental Concepts of 

Algebra and Geometry 
JOUKDMN. The Nature of Mathematics 
O. Vi BLI N and YOUNG. Projativc Geometry 
B. RIJSSLIL. Pumiplt''; of Mathematics, en i 

. Philosophical E**ay*, en 3 

. My*tia*m and Logic, CH ^-5 

. Intfoductionto Mathematical Philosophy, rn 18 

N. R. (^\\ii'Bi i L. What Is Scicmt'V* en 6-7 
MARI i MN . in Introduction to Philosophy, p \R i 1 1 ( ]) 

. Thta this, (Confirmations of a Sage, vi 

NIC on Foundation* of G comet t y and Indm tion 
\YiniriiL\n. A Treatise on Uwretuil Algebra 

. An IntrodiKtion to Mathematics 

. Science and the Modem \Votld< CH 2 

Ci. N. I.LNVIS. The Anatomy of Sucine, LSSAY i-n 
IIiiHLRi and A(.KIRMAN. Gmneknge der thcorcti- 

schen Logil{ 

Burn \\ \\. Poetr y and Mathematics 
M. R. COHLN Reason and Nature, BK n, en i 
A. E. TA\LOR. Philosophical Studies, en in 
CJILSON. The Unity of Philosophical tiipcncnce, CH 5 
DEWEV. Logic, the Theory of Imjmry, en 20 
C \KN\P. Foundation * oflj)gic and Mathematics 
BLLL. The Development of Mathematics 
G. II. H\RDV. A Course of Pure Mathematics 

. A Mathematician's Apology 

K \S\ER and NLWM\N. Mathematics and the Imag- 
ination 

G)URAM ,md ROBBINS. What It Mathematics'? 
WEYL. The Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural 
Science 



Chapter 53: MATTER 



INTRODUCTION 



A^TER we came out of the church," says 
Roswcll in his Life of Johnson, "we stood 
talking foi some time together of Bishop Berke- 
ley's ingenious sophistry to prove the non- 
existence of matter, and that everything in the 
universe is merely ideal. 1 obseived that though 
we are satisfied his doctrine is not tiue, it is im- 
possible to refute it. I shall never forget the 
alacrity with which Johnson answeicd, striking 
his foot with mighty fotte against a large stone, 
till he rebounded from it, T lefule it thus.'" 

But Berkeley's argument anticipated Dr. 
Johnson's style of refutation. "I do not argue," 
he says, "against the existence of any one thing 
that we can apprehend either by sense or reflex- 
ion. That the things 1 see with my eyes and 
touch with my hands do exist, icallv exist, I 
make not the least question. The only thing 
whose existenc e I deny is that \\h\chphtlosophers 
call Matter 01 corporeal substance. And in do- 
ing this there is no damage clone to the rest of 
mankind, who, 1 dare say, will never miss it/' 

The rest of mankind does need to be in- 
structed, however, that when they use the 
word "matter," they speak of nothing. They 
may from careless habit suppose they arc refer- 
ring to the most obvious something there is in 
the world the solid, massy, concrete stulf of 
which tangible, visible, movable, and moving 
things aic made. Of them, Berkeley would ask 
how they know such stuff exists. It is not itself 
perceptible. 

We perceive a variety of qualities colors, 
shapes, temperatures, textures, sizes, or exten- 
sionsbut these, Berkeley argues, have their 
being in being perceived. Even if certain of these 
sensible qualities, sometimes called "primary," 
such as figuie, size, or weight, arc supposed to 
belong to bodies when they are not actually 
being sensed, they are not matter, but only Us 
properties. Matter itself is not sensible. Those 



who assert its existence postulate it as a sub- 
stratum or support for the sensible qualities 
they perceive. 

The question, therefore, is whether such a 
substratum is a necessary or an unnecessary hy- 
pothesis. Berkeley does not deny the existence 
of beings which cannot be directly sensed. He 
affirms the existence of the human spirit or 
mind, of minds other than his o\\n, and the 
spiritual being of God. These must be inferred 
to exist in order to explain the phenomena of 
our sensible experience and the experience of 
our own activities in thinking, imagining, will- 
ing. If, in addition, the existence of matter or a 
material substance were necessary to explain 
the phenomena, Berkeley would not object to 
affirming its existence by inference, even if it 
could in no way be directly perceived. 

His argument therefore involves, first, a 
denial of Locke's distinction between primary 
and secondary qualities. Supposing it to be gen- 
erally agreed that colors, sounds, odors have no 
actual existence except in the perceiving mind, 
he denies that perceptible figure, size, or mo- 
tion can exist otherwise. "It ha\mg been shown 
th.it none e\ en of these can possibly exist other- 
wise than in a Spirit or Mind which perceives 
them, it follows that we have no longer any 
reason to suppose the being of Matter." 

Matter is not needed as a substratum or sup- 
port for the qualities we peiceive. This is the 
second mam point in Berkeley's argument. 
"Though we give the materialists their external 
bodies, they by their own confession are never 
the nearer k'.owmg how our ideas are produced ; 
since they own themselves unable to compre- 
hend in what manner body can act upon spirit, 
or how it is possible it should imprint any idea 
in the mind. Hence it is evident that the pro- 
duction of ideas or sensations in our minds can 
be no reason why we should suppose Matter or 



63 



64 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



corporeal substances, since that is acknowl- 
edged to remain equally inexplicable with or 
without this supposition." 

BERKELEY'S ARGUMENTS against matter, which 
occupy the greater part of his Principles of Hu- 
man Knowledge, may not have the same force 
when they are applied against different theories 
of matter. Berkeley seems to regard his attack 
on materialism as the refutation of an error at 
the root of skepticism, atheism, and irreligion. 
He also thinks materialism creates difficulties 
for the sciences. But are all affirmations of mat- 
ter to be lumped together as materialism in the 
same sense! Are Aristotle, Plotinus, Descartes, 
Spinoza, and Locke materialists in the same 
sense as Lucretius, Hobbes, and perhaps Marx? 
Does it make no difference whether bodies are 
said to be the only real existences, or whether, 
in addition to bodies, immaterial substances or 
spiritual beings are also said to exist ? 

Does it make no difference how matter is 
conceived whether as a self-subsistent sub- 
stance in its own right, capable of existing apart 
from any qualities except extension and motion 
which belong to its very essence, or merely as 
one factor in the constitution of bodies, the 
factor of potentiality which, as will be presently 
explained, has no existence apart from the 
forms which actualize it? Are skepticism, athe- 
ism, and irreligion to be associated with all 
affirmations of matter, in view of the fact that 
theologians like Augustine and Aquinas seem to 
think that a sound view of matter supports the 
truths of religion against the errors of the 
materialists? 

There seem to be, in short, three distinct 
positions to which Berkeley's blanket denial of 
matter stands opposed. The diametrically op- 
posite view seems to be the blanket denial of 
anything except bodies, or of anything which 
cannot be reduced to a property or function of 
matter. The atomism of Lucretius, discussed 
in the chapter on ELEMENT, may be taken as 
representative of this view, though Engels 
would insist that materialism can be dialectical 
rather than atomistic or mechanical. 

Between the two extremes, there appear to 
be two middle positions which are alike insofar 
as both affirm the immaterial as well as the 
material. Although they are alike in asserting 



the existence of spiritual substances, they may, 
of course, define the nature of these immaterial 
things differently, and differently interpret 
their relation to the realm of matter. But, as 
theories of matter, their principal difference 
consists in the way in which they conceive the 
being of bodies, material substances, or the 
bodily mode of substance. 

In the conceptions of Descartes and Locke, 
for example, it is matter which gives actuality 
to sensible bodies. We have "no other idea or 
notion of matter," Locke writes, "but some- 
thing wherein those many sensible qualities, 
which affect our sense, do subsist." The entire 
substance of sensible bodies consists of matter. 
All their properties derive from the essence or 
nature of matter. But in the conceptions of 
Aristotle and Plotinus, bodies would not exist at 
all if they were composed only of matter, for 
matter is no more than a capacity for being, not 
something which by itself actually is. Sensible 
bodies derive their being and all their attributes 
from the forms which matter assumes when its 
potentialities are actualized. Matter totally de- 
void of form is not the nothing Berkeley calls it, 
but it is so near to nothing that Plotinus says it 
is "more plausibly called a non- being ... a bare 
aspiration towards substantial existence." 

These theories of matter or corporeal being 
seem to be as contrary to one another as to- 
gether they are contrary to Berkeley's doctrine. 
Yet each of the two middle positions leans 
toward one of the opposite extremes. 

The conception of matter seems to be very 
much the same in the complete materialism of 
Lucretius and Hobbes and in the view of Des- 
cartes, Spinoza, and Locke. In the former, only 
bodies exist. In the latter, bodies do not com- 
prise the whole of existence, but matter is the 
whole substance of bodies. The separation of 
body and mind, or matter and spirit, into dis- 
tinct substances, or modes of substance, leaves 
matter the same kind of stuff that it is in a 
world which admits of no other reality. Atom- 
ism, furthermore, may be common to both 
theories, at least to the extent that it is held 
that the complex bodies we perceive are com- 
posed of minute and insensible particles. Un- 
like Lucretius, Locke may not insist upon the 
absolute indivisibility of the particles, or upon 
the eternity of the uncreated atoms of matter; 



CHAPTER 53: MATTER 



65 



but he, like Hobbes and Newton, carries the 
division of the familiar bodies of sense-expe- 
rience down to parts which cannot be perceived 
and yet have, in a way, a more ultimate reality 
as units of matter than the complex bodies they 
constitute. 

"Had we senses acute enough to discern the 
minute particles of bodies, and the real con- 
stitution on which their sensible qualities de- 
pend," Locke writes, "I doubt not but that 
would produce quite different ideas in us; and 
that which is now the yellow color of gold, 
would then disappear, and instead of it we 
should see an admirable texture of parts, of a 
certain size and figure." 

At the other extreme, Berkeley's complete 
denial of matter has less in common with the 
view of Aristotle, Plotinus, Augusline, and Aqui- 
nas than the theoiy of Descartes, Spinoza, and 
Locke has with the materialism of Lucretius 
and Hobbes. They would appear to be close 
enough, for one seems to hold that matter is 
almost non-being and the other that matter is 
simply nothing at all. But where Berkeley de- 
nies any role to matter, Aristotle and those who 
take his view affirm matter to be an indispen- 
sable factor in the constitution of physical 
things. They do not question the reality of bod- 
ies or their existence apart from mind. On both 
of these points they are as opposed to Berke- 
ley as they would be if they were complete 
materialisls. Nevertheless they lean toward 
Berkeley rather than toward the other extreme 
in one respect. Where Berkeley denies the 
existence of matter, they deny its substantiality. 
Where Berkeley says matter has no being, they 
say it has the lowest grade of being on the 
very verge of not being! 

IN SPITE OF ALL the differences noted, the idea 
of matter has a certain constant meaning 
throughout the tradition of the great books. 

It is generally associated with the idea of 
quantity, and especially the basic magnitudes, 
such as time, space, and mass. Sometimes it is 
said that the essence of matter itself is exten- 
sion; sometimes that bodies not matter itself 
have the property of tridimensionality. But 
in either case that which is or has matter in it 
necessarily occupies space. 

The manner of that occupation is also gener- 



ally agreed upon. Two bodies or two distinct 
quantities of matter cannot occupy the same 
place at the same time. A body may not be im- 
penetrable in the sense of being indivisible, but 
so long as it remains the whole that it is, it offers 
resistance to other bodies tending to move into 
the place it occupies. 

There is another connection between matter 
and quantity. To those who ask what makes two 
otherwise identical things two in number or 
what is involved in the merely numerical dif- 
ference of things alike in every other respect 
the usual answer is in terms of matter. Matter is 
traditionally spoken of as "the principle of in- 
dividuation." Aquinas, for example, holds that 
angels, unlike physical substances, cannot differ 
from one another as do numerically distinct in- 
dividuals. Because they are immaterial, they 
can differ only as do species or kinds. "Such 
things as agree in species," he writes, "but differ 
in number, agree in form, but are distinguished 
materially. If, therefore, the angels be not com- 
posed of matter and form, it follows that it is 
impossible for two angels to be of one species; 
just as it would be impossible for there to be 
several whitenesses apart, or several humanities, 
since whitenesses are not several, except in so 
far as they are in several substances." 

The way in which matter is related to in- 
dividual differences can be exemplified in works 
of art. Two coins, stamped out of the same kind 
of matter by the impression of the same die, 
may differ in no other discernible respect than 
that they are two of the same kind. Their 
ttvoness seems to be somehow related to the fact 
that each consists of a distinct quantity of mat- 
ter. But it may be asked how two units of mat- 
ter have the distinction of being two while they 
differ in no other respect. One answer to this 
difficult question is that their distinction con- 
sists in their occupying different places. In the 
Platonic theory of the origin of many particu- 
lars all participating in the same form, diversity 
of place seems to play the role which matter 
plays for Aristotle and Aquinas. 

Plato's doctrine of the receptacle, which is 
discussed in the chapter on FORM, is sometimes 
interpreted by conceiving the receptacle as 
space, and sometimes by conceiving it as mat- 
ter. The receptacle, it is said in the Timaeus, is 
that which, "while receiving all things, never 



66 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



departs at all from her own nature and never 
in any way, or at any time, assumes a form like 
that of any of the things which enter into her." 
This, according to Plotinus, means that "its one 
form is an invincible formlessness.'* 

But Plotinus, who combines Plato's doctrine 
of the receptacle and the forms with Aristotle's 
theory of potentiality and actuality, holds that 
it is matter, not space, which is "the receptacle 
and nurse of all generation." He says that 
"recipient and nurse" is a better description 
of matter than the term "mother," for that 
term "is used by those who think of a mother as 
matter to the offspring, as a container only, 
giving nothing to them." In his own view, mat- 
ter is more than space or mere receptivity. He is 
willing to admit the "parallel with mother- 
hood" only to the extent that "matter is sterile, 
not female to full effect, female in receptivity 
only, not in pregnancy." 

TRADITIONALLY, the distinction between uni- 
versal and particular is understood as a distinc- 
tion between the intelligible and the sensible. 
This indicates another traditional meaning of 
matter or the material. The realm of sensible 
things is the realm of bodies. But the atoms 
which are the elementary bodies are also usually 
called "insensible particles of matter." This, 
however, can be interpreted to mean, not that 
a definite material mass or bulk is in itself ab- 
solutely intangible or imponderable, but that, 
because of the limitation in our senses, it is im- 
perceptible to us. On this interpretation it 
would then seem possible to say that all bodily 
existence is sensible existence. 

But if we ask about the sensibility of matter 
itself, rather than of bodies large or small, 
questions arise which are more difficult to 
solve. On one theory of matter, matter devoid 
of form is as insensible as it is unintelligible, yet 
forms which are not material, that is, not in 
matter, are also insensible but not unintelligi- 
ble. On the contrary, they are regarded as more 
perfectly intelligible than embodied forms. 
How, then, does matter which is itself insensi- 
ble cause the forms which it assumes to become 
sensible when they are materialized ? 

The theory of matter which does not regard 
it as a co-principle with form seems to be con- 
fronted with a different problem of sensibility. 



It is supposed that some of the qualities which 
we sense in bodies are actually in them whether 
we sense them or not such properties as size, 
figure, weight, motion. Other sensible qualities, 
such as colors, odors, temperatures, or sounds, 
are supposed to be effects produced by the mo- 
tions of material particles acting on the sensitive 
apparatus of animals. This distinction between 
what Locke calls "primary and secondary quali- 
ties" found also in Lucretius and Descartes- 
is more fully considered in the chapters on 
QUALITY and SENSE, but here it calls attention 
to the problem of how matter, devoid of certain 
sensible qualities, causes these qualities to arise. 

For Lucretius the peculiar difficulty of the 
problem seems to lie in the fact that the sensi- 
tive animal is itself nothing but a material sys- 
tem. All its powers and acts are conceived as 
functions of matter in motion. How, then, does 
moving matter within the organism generate 
certain qualities which do not belong to moving 
matter outside the organism? For Locke the 
problem raises a difficulty of still another sort. 
Secondary qualities, such as colors, sounds, 
odors, exist only as sensations in the mind. In 
corporeal substances, or bodies, such qualities, 
he writes, "are nothing but the powers those 
substances have to produce several ideas in us 
by our senses; which ideas are not in the things 
themselves, otherwise than as anything is in its 
cause." Though they result from the impact of 
moving particles on the bodily sense-organs, 
they do not belong to the world of matter at all, 
but to the realm of spirit. How, then, do the 
motions of matter cause effects which exist 
only in the immaterial domain of mind ? 

These questions indicate some of the prob- 
lems of matter as an object, condition, or cause 
of knowledge. They also show how the nature 
of the problem varies with different concep- 
tions of matter, both in itself and in its relation 
to mind. There are still other problems which 
confront those theories of mind which separate 
reason or intellect from the sensitive faculty. 

In such theories the consideration of mat- 
ter's relation to mind goes beyond the question 
of the origin of sensations. It takes sensations 
and images as somehow the functions of living 
matter the acts of the various sense-organs 
and the brain. But sensations and images, be- 
cause they are acts of corporeal organs, have the 



CHAPTER 53: MATTER 



67 



same limitation which belongs to everything 
material. As matter is said to cause the individ- 
uality or numerical diversity of bodies, so is it 
said to make sensations and images "particular 
intentions of the mind" that is, capable of 
representing only particular objects, not gener- 
al kinds or classes. Hence such theories face the 
problem of the relation of sensations and images 
to the "universal intentions of the mind," its 
general concepts or abstract ideas. 

ONE MORE TRADITIONAL meaning of matter re- 
mains to be mentioned. The sciences of physics 
or mechanics are concerned with change or mo- 
tion. They are not concerned with mutability 
in general, but with the kind of mutability that 
is manifested by material things. Material 
things are never conceived as unmovable or un- 
changeable. 

The question whether matter itself is immu- 
tablehas different meanings for different theories 
of matter. On the theory (discussed in the 
chapter on CHANGE) that matter and form are 
together principles of change in changing sub- 
stances, it is neither matter nor form but the 
substance composite of matter and form which 
changes. Those who think that the motions of 
the physical world are without beginning and 
end, attribute a similar eternity to matter and 
conceive it as imperishable. The theologians 
who think that God can annihilate whatever 
He creates, do not hold that mattcris indestruct- 
ible, but they nevertheless attribute everlast- 
ing endurance to matter in God's plan. Aquinas, 
for example, in his treatise on the end of the 
world, describes the final conflagration which 
will purge the material universe but leave its 
matter in existence under the forms of the ele- 
ments and the heavenly bodies. "The world 
will be renewed," he writes, "in such a way as 
to throw off all corruption and remain forever 
at rest." Hence nothing can be "the subject of 
that renewal, unless it be a subject of incorrup- 
tion," such as "the heavenly bodies, the ele- 
ments, and man." 

On other theories of matter the fact that mo- 
tion is regarded as an intrinsic property of bod- 
ies seems to be similarly consistent with the 
notion that matter itself is immutable or inde- 
structible. This indestructibility may be con- 
ceived in terms of the absolute indivisibility of 



the atoms, as in Lucretius and Newton; or, as in 
Spinoza, it may be established by the uncreated 
and eternal nature of God. "By body," Spinoza 
writes, "I understand a mode which expresses in 
a certain and determinate manner the essence of 
God in so far as He is considered as the thing 
extended." 

In the modern development of the science of 
mechanics the law of the conservation of mat- 
ter seems to be another expression of the same 
insight. "We may lay it down as an incontest- 
able axiom," Lavoisier writes, "that in all the 
operations of art and nature, nothing is created; 
an equal quantity of matter exists both before 
and after the experiment." What appears to be 
the destruction of a body is merely the trans- 
formation of its matter into another physical 
condition, without loss of mass unless there is an 
equivalent gain in energy. The total quantity 
of matter and energy remains constant through- 
out all physical changes. 

But though change or motion seems to be in- 
herent in the material world, the mutability of 
bodies, as well as the immutability of matter, 
seems to be differently conceived according to 
different conceptions of matter. The difference 
between the physics of Aristotle and the phys- 
ics of Descartes can be expressed in terms of 
contrary definitions of motion, or divergent 
notions of causality, but neither of these differ- 
ences is fully intelligible apart from the vari- 
ance of these theories from one another on the 
nature of matter. 

When matter is an actual substance, whose es- 
sence is extension and whose chief property is 
local motion, the principles of physics are me- 
chanical. The laws of mechanics, with time, 
space, and mass as their fundamental variables, 
seem to have a universality adequate for de- 
scribing all natural phenomena. All changes in 
material things are either the local motions of 
bodies or the result of the local motions of their 
parts. Motions are determined in their magni- 
tude and direction by the impressed force which 
one body exerts upon another and the resistance 
of that other. Motion is itself completely ac- 
tual, as matter is; and the only type of cause to 
which physics need appeal is the efficient cause, 
that is, the push or pull of one body upon 
another. 

Physicists who share this Conception of mat- 



68 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



ter may not agree, as Descartes and Newton do 
not, in their mechanical formulations. They 
may or may not be atomists. They may, like 
Lucretius, think that local motion is an abso- 
lutely intrinsic property of the eternal parti- 
cles; or, like Descartes and Newton, they may 
think that God first imparted motion to matter 
at the world's creation. They may hold that all 
subsequent motions issue therefrom in a con- 
tinuous chain of cause and effect. But when 
matter is the only factor in the constitution of 
bodies, and one body differs from another only 
in its quantitative determinations, the conse- 
quence for physical theory seems to be one or 
another sort of mechanical formulation. 

When matter is nothing more than a body's 
potentiality for change, and when neither what 
the body is nor how it changes can be explained 
by reference to its matter alone, physical theory 
seems to be constructed in other than mechani- 
cal terms. Its concepts and principles resemble 
those of biology. It finds natural tendencies or 
desires, and ends or final causes, in the motion 
of inert as well as animate bodies. 

Central to Aristotle's physics are his theory 
of the four causes, discussed in the chapter on 
CAUSE, and his theory of the four types of 
change, discussed in the chapter on CHANGE. 
But even more fundamental is his definition of 
motion as the actualization of that which is 
potential in a respect in which it is potential. 
With motion so defined, the principles of phys- 
ics must include the correlative factors of po- 
tentiality and actuality which Aristotle con- 
ceives in terms of matter and form. 

REMOVE MATTER entirely from a thing and, 
according to Aristotle, you remove its capacity 
for physical change. Remove form, and you re- 
move its existence, for nothing can exist with- 
out being actual or determinate in certain re- 
spects. When a thing changes physically, it 
loses certain determinate characteristics and 
acquires others. The determinations it acquires 
it had previously lacked, yet all the while it 
must have had a capacity for acquiring them. 
The thing is * 'capable both of being and of not 
being," Aristotle says, "and this capacity," he 
goes on to say, "is the matter in each." The 
matter of an existing substance is thus con- 
ceived as that which has certain forms (the 



respects in which the substance is actually de- 
terminate), and lacks certain forms which it can 
assume (the respects in which the substance is 
both indeterminate and potential). 

As the chapter on ART indicates, Aristotle 
frequently uses artistic production to afford a 
simple illustration of his theory of matter and 
form as principles of change. When a man sets 
out to make a bed, he chooses material, such as 
wood, which can be shaped in a certain way. 
The same wood could have been made into a 
chair or a table. With respect to these various 
possible determinations in structure, the wood 
is itself indeterminate and determinable. 

Before the artist has worked on it produc- 
tively, the wood is in a state of both privation 
and potentiality with regard to the form of a 
bed, a chair, or a table. The transformation 
which the artist effects consists in his actualiz- 
ing certain potentialities in the material for 
forms or determinations which the material at 
the moment lacks. When the bed is made, the 
wood or matter which is now actually in the 
form of a bed may still have the potentiality 
for being remade into a chair or table. 

The wood, of course, remains actually wood 
throughout these artificial changes, as it does 
not when it suffers the natural change of com- 
bustion. This indicates that though the wood 
may be called matter or material by the artist, 
it is not matter, but a substance, a thing com- 
posite of matter and form; for when the wood is 
reduced to ashes by fire, the matter which had 
the form of wood assumes another form. 

In the analysis of accidental change, which 
artistic production illustrates, it suffices to 
treat a composite substance, like wood or iron 
or bronze, as the material principle. But in the 
analysis of substantial change, when matter it- 
self changes from being one kind of matter to 
being another in the coming to be or perishing 
of composite substances, the material principle 
must be pure matter matter totally devoid of 
form. Where a whole substance can be re- 
garded as the matter or substratum of accidental 
change (in quality, quantity, or place) the sub- 
stratum of substantial change, which Aristotle 
calls "generation and corruption," must be 
matter in a condition of absolute indeterminacy 
and pure potentiality. 

Referring to this ultimate substratum as "the 



CHAPTER 53: MATTER 



69 



underlying nature," Aristotle says that it "is an 
object of scientific knowledge by analogy. For 
as the bronze is to the statue, the wood to the 
bed, so is the matter and the formless before re- 
ceiving form to anything which has form, and 
so also is the underlying nature to substance, 
i.e., the actually existing." 

ARISTOTLE'S DEFINITION of matter as "the pri- 
mary substratum of each thing, from which it 
comes to be without qualification, and which 
persists in the result" not only signifies an ob- 
ject which the physicist must apprehend ana- 
logically (i.e., by comparisson with substantially 
formed matter like wood and bronze), but also 
indicates that matter, by definition, must be in 
itself both unintelligible and non-existent. 
What Aristotle calls "the primary substratum" 
is later called by Plotinus "primal matter," by 
Augustine "formless matter," and by Aquinas 
"prime matter." Since they all agree that that 
which is without form lacks all determination 
and actuality, they deny that it can have exist- 
ence by itself or be an object of knowledge, 
either by sense or reason. 

Augustine and Aquinas go further. They 
deny even to God's omnipotence the power of 
creating matter without form. They speak of 
matter not as created, but as concretized, that is, 
united at the very instant of its creation with 
the forms it must assume in order to exist. God 
"made formless matter of absolutely nothing, 
and the form of the world from this formless 
matter," Augustine writes. Yet He "created 
both simultaneously, so that form came upon 
matter with no space of time intervening." 

IN THE TRADITION of Aristotle's physics and 
metaphysics, especially as developed by Aqui- 
nas, matter and form become basic analytic 
terms, often having a significance remote from 
their original meaning in the analysis of change. 
The conception of prime (or formless) matter 
as the substratum of substantial change leads to 
the designation of the formed matter underly- 
ing accidental change as "second matter." This, 
in turn, is called "signate matter" when, con- 
sidered as the matter of an individual substance, 
it is viewed as having the limiting determina- 
tions of individuality. 
"Matter is twofold," Aquinas writes, "com- 



mon, and signate or individual; common, such 
as flesh and bones; and individual, as this flesh 
and these bones." When the intellect forms 
concepts of different kinds of physical sub- 
stances, it abstracts "from the individual sensi- 
ble matter, but not from the common sensible 
matter." In defining the nature of man, for 
example, we abstract, Aquinas says, from "this 
flesh and these bones, which do not belong to 
the species as such, but to the individual"; but 
we do not abstract from the fact that man, con- 
sisting of body and soul, is a thing of flesh and 
bones. 

To say that man consists of body and soul is 
to indicate that common matter enters into the 
definition of man as a physical substance. Bur in 
distinction from definitions of this type, which 
are proper to physics, mathematical and meta- 
physical definitions carry the abstraction from 
matter still further. In mathematics, Aquinas 
declares, the intellect abstracts "not only from 
individual sensible matter, but also from com- 
mon sensible matter." In conceiving numbers 
and figures, the intellect does not, however, ab- 
stract from matter entirely, but only from in- 
dividual intelligible matter. The common intel- 
ligible matter which is represented by "sub- 
stance as subject to quantity" underlies all 
mathematical notions. "But some things," 
Aquinas maintains, "can be abstracted even 
from common intelligible matter, such as being, 
unity, potency, act and the like, all of which can 
exist without matter." Such abstraction char- 
acterizes the concepts of metaphysics. Aquinas 
thus differentiates the three speculative sci- 
ences of physics, mathematics, and metaphys- 
ics in terms of three grades of abstraction, each 
distinguished by the type of matter from which 
the concepts of the science are abstracted. 

With one exception physical matter is not 
said to be of different kinds when it exists under 
different forms. The one exception for both 
Aristotle and Aquinas is the matter of terres- 
trial and celestial bodies. 

Basing his inference on the observations avail- 
able to him, Aristotle holds that the heavenly 
bodies are eternal "not subject to increase or 
diminution, but unaging and unalterable and 
unmodified." Immutable in every other way, 
they are, however, subject to local motion. 
Since they are eternal, both their matter and 



70 THE GREAT IDEAS 

their motion must be different from that of difference between celestial and terrestrial mat- 
perishable terrestrial bodies. "All things that tcr or motion, and as the chapter on ASTRON- 
change have matter," Aristotle writes, "but OMY shows, by so doing he not only gives im- 
matter of different sorts; of eternal things those petus to the Copernican system, but also paves 
which are not generable but are movable in the way for Newton to frame laws of motion 
space have matternot matter for generation, applicable to matter everywhere in the uni- 
howevcr, but for motion from one place to verse. Because their matter is the same, it is 
another." That motion from place to place is, possible, Kepler insists, to explain the motion of 
unlike terrestrial motion, circular; it has the the heavenly bodies by the same principles 
appropriate characteristic of endlessness. which account for the motion of bodies on 
Kepler challenges this theory of a radical earth. 

OUTLINE OF TOPICS 

PACE 

1. The conception of matter as a principle of change and as one constituent of the being 

of changing things: the receptacle or substratum 71 

\a. Matter and the analysis of change: prime and secondary matter; privation and 
form; participation and the receptacle 

ib. Matter in relation to the kinds of change: substantial and accidental change; 

terrestrial and celestial motion 72 

ir. Matter and the distinction between individual and universal: signate and com- 
mon matter; sensible and intelligible matter 

2. The conception of matter as extension, as a bodily substance, or as a mode of substance: 

atoms and compound bodies 73 

2d. The properties of matter: hypotheses concerning its constitution 

2b. The motions of matter or bodies 

2c. Matter as the support of sensible qualities 74 

id. The diremption of body and mind, or matter and spirit 

3. The existence of matter 

30. Matter as the sole existent: materialism, atomism 

$b. Matter as the most imperfect grade of being or reality 75 

y. Matter as a fiction of the mind 

$d. The relation of God to matter: the creation of matter and its motions 

4. Matter as an object or condition of knowledge 

40. The knowability of matter: by sense, by reason 

4^. The role of matter in the concepts and definitions of the several sciences: the 

grades of abstraction in physics, mathematics, and metaphysics 76 

4c. The material conditions of sensation, imagination, and memory 

4*/. The material conditions of thought: the relation of matter to the existence and 
acts of the mind 

5. Matter in relation to good and evil 77 

6. Criticisms of materialism and its consequences 



CHAPTER 53: MATTER 71 



REFERENCES 

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page 
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265 28 }] 12d, the 
number 4 is the number of the volume m the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas- 
sage is in section d of page 12. 

PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the 
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 J AM LS : Psychology, 1 16a-l 19b, the passage 
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of paee 119. When the text is 
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left- 
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of 
thepagc. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half 
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164. 

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, en, 
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer- 
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-28^] 12d. 

BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James 
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King 
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA- 
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) 11 Etdras, 7:46. 

SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially 
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intcimit- 
tcntly rather than continuously in the work or passage cited. 

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the PAplanaiion of 
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface. 



. . . _ and REP 2 20d-21b; Q 7, A i, ANS 31a-d; A 2, 

1. The conception of matter as a principle of ANS and Rpp 31d , 32c . Q A 2 REp 

change and as one constituent of the 7 6d-77d; Q 15, A 3, RLP 3 93b-94a; Q 18, A 4, 

being of changing things: the receptacle RFP 2 _ 3 107 d-108c; Q 47, A r, ANS 256a-257b; 

or substratum o 86> A 3 46 3b-d; PART i-n, Q 10, A i, REP 2 

7 PLATO: Ttrnaeus, 455c-458b 662d 663d 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK i, en 4-9 262a 268d; 20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 
BK m, CH7 [207 b }5-2o84] 286c / Metaphysics, 52, A i, ANS 15d-18a; PART in, Q 2, A i, ANS 
BK i, en 6 [987 b i9]-cn 7 [988 b 5J 505d-506c; and REP 2 710a-711c 

CH 8 [988 b 22-989 b 24] 506d-508a; BK n, en 3 28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK i, 25b 

[995*15-17] 513d; BK v, en 2 [1013*24-27] 35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK HI, CH x, 

533b; CH 4 534d-535c; BK VH, CH 3 551b- SECT 15 295a c 

552a; CH 7-17 555a-566a,c esp CH 7-9 555a- 35 BERKELEY : I Juman Knowledge, SECT ii415a-b 

558a, CH 17 565a-566a,c; BK vin 566a-570d; 42 KANT: Pure Reason, 72c-76c esp 74b-76c; 

BK xii, CH 10 [io75 a 25-33] 606a / Soul, BK 186b-d / Judgement, 565b-d; 566d-567a 
in, CH 5 [430*10-14] 662c 

12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK VH, SECT 23 281b; la - Matter and the analysis of change: prime 

BK xn, SECT 30 310a-b and secondary matter; privation and 

16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK i, 5b form 5 participation and the receptacle 

17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR vin, CH 10, 7 PLATO: Timaeus, 455c-458b 

32a-b / Second Ennead, TR iv-v 50a-60c; 8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK i, CH 4-9 262a-268d; 

TR VH, CH 3 64b-c / Third Ennead, TR vi, BK n, CH i [i93 a 9~ b 2i] 269b-270a; CH 3 

CH 7-19 110d-119a / Sixth Ennead, TR in, [i94 b i6-i95 a 2i] 271a-d; BK n, CH 7-BK in, 

CH 2-8 281c-285d CH 3 275b-280c; BK iv, CH 2 [209 b i-2io a i3J 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK xn, par 6 lOOb-c; 288b-289a; CH 4 [2ii b 5~2i2 a 2] 290c-291a; CH 
par 14 102b 9 [2i7 a 2o- b 26] 297a-c; BK vi, CH 10 [240 b 8- 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, 241*26] 324c-325b / Pfeavens, BK i, CH 3 360d- 
A 2, ANS and REP 3 15c-16a; Q 4, A i, ANS 362a; BK in, CH 2 (3oi b 33-302 a 9] 393b; BK 



72 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



la to Ic 



(1. The conception of matter as a principle of 
change and as one constituent of the being 
of changing things: the receptacle or sub- 
stratum, la. Matter and the analysis of 
change: prime and secondary matter; priva- 
tion and form; participation and the recep- 
tacle) 

iv, OF i 5 403d-404d / Generation and Corrup- 
tion 409a~441a,c esp BK i, CH 3 413c-416c / 
Meteorology \ BK IV,CH 12 [389 b 22-39o*7] 493d- 
494a / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 6 [g87 b 30-988*8! 
506a; BK n, CH 2 f994 ft i-6] 512b; (994 R i9- b 8J 
512c-d; BK in, en 4 [999 a 24- b 24J 518a-c; BK 
v, en 4 [ioi4 b 27-ioi5 B io] 535a-b; CH 6 [1016* 
17 24) 536c-d; BK vi, 0112 [io26 b 27-io27 a i5] 
549a-b; en 3 [io27 b i5-i7J 549d; UK vir, CH 
7-9 555a-558a; BK vin, CH i [1042*24 - b 7J 
566b d; CH 46 568d-570d; BK ix, CH 7 574c- 
575a; BK xi, en 9[io65 b 2o-$<5]594a-b; BK XH, 
CH 2 5 598c-601a; CH 10 (1075*25 ''24] 606a-c 
9 ARISTOTLE: Generation of Animals, BK i, CH 20 

[72</io|-cn 22 ]73o b 33] 269b-271a 
12AuRi'.iius: Meditations, BK vir, SECT 23 
281b 

16 KLPLKR: Harmonies of the World, 1078a-b 

17 PLOIINUS: Second Ennead, TR in, en 18- 
TR v, CH 5 49c-60c / Third Ennead, TR vi, 
CH 7 ig llOd 119a / Sixth Ennead, TR in, 
CH 2 8 281c-285d; TR v, on 8 307d 308c 

18 A IK; us TIN i-.: Confessions, UK xn, par 36 
99d lOOc; par 8 lOla b; par 14-16 102b-103a; 
par 24 26 104c-105b; par 28 31 105c 107a; 
par 38 40 108d llOa; BK xiu, par 48 124a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, P\RI* i, Q 3, A 
2, ANS 15c-lti,-i; A 8, ANS 19d-20c; g 4, A i, 
ANS and RLP 2 20d-21b; g 5, A }, UUP 3 
25a-d; g 7, A 2, REP 3 31d 32c; Q 9, A i, ANS 
38c 39c; Q 29, A 2, REP 3-5 163b-164b; Q 45, 
A 2, REP 2 242d-2<r4a; A 8 249b 250a; g 46, 
A i, RKP 6 21>0a-252d; Q 47, A i, ANS 256a- 
257b; g 48, A 3, ANS 261b~262a; g 66, A i 
343d-345c; Q 77, A i, RKP 2 399c 401b; Q 
84, A }, RKP 2 443d-444d; g 86, A ^ 463b d; 
Q 92, A 2, REP 2 489d 490c; A 3, RLP i 490c- 
491 b; A 4, ANS and REP i 491 b-d; g 103, A i, 
REP 2 528b-529a; g 104, A i, ANS and RKP 1-2 
534c-536c; g no 564c-568b; g 117, A 3 598c- 
599b; PART i-n, g 22, A i, RLP i 720d- 
721c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, g 60, 
A i 49d-50c; g 85, A 6 182d-184a; PART ii-n, 
Q 24, A ii, ANS 498b-499c; PART in SUPPL, 
Q 92, A i, REP 12 1025c-1032b 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, vn [121- 
148] 116b-c; xiu [52-87] 126a-b 

28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK i, 25b 

28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 407c-409b; 

412a-415b; 494a-496d csp 494b, 495c 496a 
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK HI, CH x, 

SECT 15 295a-c 

35 BERKELEY : Human Knowledge, s ECT 1 1 415a-b 
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 74b-76c; lOOd-lOlb 



\b. Matter in relation to the kinds of change: 
substantial and accidental change; ter- 
restrial and celestial motion 
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK HI, CH i [2oo b 26- 
2oi a i4] 278b-c; CH 3 [202 b 22 -29] 280c; BK iv, 
CH 9 296b-297c esp [2i7*2o- b 26] 297a-c; BK 
v, CH 1-2 304a-307b / Heavens, BK i, CH 2-5 
359d-364a; CH 9-12 369a-375d; BK n, CH 4 
[287 b i5-2i] 379b; BK iv, CH 3 [3io b 22-3ii a i2] 
402b c; en 4 [3i2 ft 3-22J 403c-d / Generation 
and Corruption 409a-441a,c esp BK i, CH 4 
[320*2-6] 41 7a / Metaphysics, BK vn, CH 7-9 
555a-558a esp en 7 [1032*15-22] 555a-b; BK 
vin, CH i [io42*24- l) 7] 566b-d; CH 4 [1044^*2]- 
CH 5 [1044^9] 569a-c; BK ix, en 7 [1049*19- 
b i] 574d-575a; CH 8 [io5o b 2o-28] 576c-d; 
BK xi, CH ii [io67 b i]-cn 12 [ro68 b 25] 596a- 
597d; BK xii, CH 25 598c-601a csp CH 2 [io69 b 
24-27] 599a / Soiil, BK i, CH 3 



16 PIOLIIMY: Almagest, BK i, 5a-6a; 8b; lOb-llb; 

BK xui, 429a-b 
16 CopbRNicus: Revolutions of the Heavenly 

Spheres, BK i, 517b-518a; 519b-520a 

16 KKPLKR: Epitome, BK iv, 888b-890b; 894a; 
929b-930b 

17 PLOIINUS: Second Enncad, TR i, CH 1-4 35a- 
37b; TR iv, CH 6 51d-52a; TR v, CH 6 103b- 
104a / Third Ennead, TR vi, CH 8-19 lllc- 
119a 

19 AQUINAS: Sunima Theologica, PART i, g 7, A 
2, ANS and REP ^ 31d-32c; g 45, A 2, REP 2 
242d-244a; g 46, A i, REP 1,3,5 6 250a-252d; 
48, A 3, ANS 261b-262a; g 55, A 2, ANS 
289d 290d; g 66, A i, ANS 343d-345c; A 2 
345d-347b; g 84, A 3, REP i 443d-444d 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, g 49, 
A 4, ANS 5a-6a 

28 GILBERI: Loadstone, BK vi, HOb-c 

lr. Matter and the distinction between individ- 
ual and universal: signate and common 
matter; sensible and intelligible matter 

8 AKISTOILL: Metaphysics, BK i, CH 6 [987** 19- 
988 n i6] 505d-506b; BK in, en 3 [998 a 2o- b i3] 
517a-b; CH 4 [999*24-1000*4] 518a-d; CH 6 
[1003*5 -16] 521d*522a,c; BK vn, CH 10-11 
558a*561a; CH 15 [io39 b 27~3i] 563d; BK vni, 
CH 6 [1045*33-36] 570a-b; BK x, CH i [1052* 
28-37] 578< ^ BK XII CH 4-5 599d-601a; BK 
xiu, CH 10 618c-619a,c / Soul, BK n, CH i 
[412*6-8] 642a 

12 AURFLIUS: Meditations, BK xii, SECT 30 
310ab 

17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR iv, CH 2-5 
50b-51d / Sixth Ennead, TR in, CH 3 282a~c 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, A 
2, RLP 3 15c-16a; A 3, ANS 16a-d; Q 4, A i, 
REP 3 20d 21b; Q 7, A i, ANS 31a d; g 14, 
A n, ANS 84c-85c; g 15, A 3, REP 4 93b~94a; 
Q 29, A i 162a-163b; A 2, REP 3 163b-164b; 
A 3, REP 4 164c-165c; Q 47, A 2, ANS 257b- 



Itolb 



CHAPTER 53: MATTER 



73 



258c; Q 50, A 4, ANS 273b-274b; Q 56, A i, 
REP 2 292a-d; o 65, A 3, ANS 341c-342b; Q 
75, A 4, ANS 381b 382a; A 5, ANS 382a-383b; 
A 7, ANS 384d~385c; Q 76, \ 2 388c 391a; Q 85, 
A i, REP 2 451c-453c; Q 115, A i, ANS and RLP 
1-3 585d-587c; o 119, A i, ANS 604c 607b 
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, P\RI in, Q 2, 
A 2, ANS 711d-712d; A 3, REP 3 713a-714c 

2. The conception of matter as extension, as a 
bodily substance, or as a mode of sub- 
stance: atoms and compound bodies 

10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 12 172d- 
173c 

12 LUCRLTIUS: Nature of 'Things, BK i [146-448] 
2d-6c; [483 634] 7a-8d 

17 PLOTINUS: Second Efinead, TR iv, CH 7, 52c; 
CH 12 54c-55b; IR vn, CH 3 64b c / Thnd 
Enncad, TR i, CH 2, 78d; TR vi, CH 7, Ilia; 
CH 12, 114b-c; CH 16-19 116c-119a 

23 HOBBIES: Ist'iathan, PARI iv, 271d-272a 

28 CiALiLFo: Two New Sciences, FIRST PAY, 131d- 
132a 

31 DhscARii-s: Rules, xiv 28a 33b / Medita- 
tions, n 77d 81d esp 78c d, 80b-d / Objections 
and Replies, 114d 115a,c; DEI- vn 130c d; 
153c 154b; 231a 232a 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 14, COROL 2- 
PROP 15 360a-361d; PART n, OFF i 373a; PROP 
2374a 

34 NKWION: O/tf/rt, BK in, 537a~b; 541b 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH 
xni, si-cr 11-27 150d-154d passim; en xxni 
204a-214b passim; BK HI, CH x, SECT 15 
295a c; BK iv, CH x, SECT 9-19 351b 354c 
passim 

35BFRKILKY: Human Knowledge, SUCT 9-17 

414d-416b passim; SECT 37 41 9d; SLCT 50 

422c;sbcr9i-96430d431d 
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SKCI* xn, DIV 

123 506a 
42 KAN i : Pure Reason, 15b c; 99a lOOd esp 

lOOc-d / Judgement, 580c-d 
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREP, 

3b-4a 
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 850b,d- 

855a,c 
53 IAMES: Psychology, 876a-b; 882a-884b 

2a. The properties of matter: hypotheses con- 
cerning its constitution 

8 ARISTOTLE: Heavens, BK HI, CH 4 [303*3^8] 

394b-d / Generation and Corruption, BK i, CH 

2 410d-413c; CH 8 423b-425d / Metaphysics, 

BK i, CH 4 [Q85 b 3-i9J 503c-d 

10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 12 172d- 

173c 
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [146-920] 

2d-12b; BK n [^3-990) 19b-27c 
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 936a-937a 
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART iv, 271d-272a 
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK n, 29c-30a 



28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, SECOND DAY 
178a-196d passim 

30 H\CON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 8 140b; 
APH 2s 155a-d; APH 40 170c-173d; APH 48 
179d 188b 

31 Di-scARThs: Meditations, n, 78c-d; 80b d / 
Objections and Replies, DEF vn I30c-d; 154a; 
231a232a 

31 SPINOZ\: Ethics, PART i, PROP 14, COROL 2- 
PROP 15 360a 361d; PROP 25, COROL 365b; 
P\RT n, ni:i- i 373a; PROP 2 374a 

34 NEWTON: Principles, DEF i 5a; DEF in 5b; 
BK n, PROP 40, SCHOL, 246a b; BK in, RUI i 
in 270b-271a; PROP 6, COROL in iv 281b; 
PROP 7 281b 282b; CI-NFRM. SCHOL, 371b / 
Optus, BK ii, 479b 485b; BK in, 531a 543b 
esp 541b 543a 

34 HUYRENS: Light, CH HI, 566b*569b; CH v, 
60 Ib 603b 

35 LOCKK: Human Understanding, BK n, CH iv 
129b 131a; en vin, SECT 7-26 134b 138b 
passim; en xin, SI-CT 21-27 152d-154d; CH 
xxi, shcr 2-4 178c 179c; SECT 75 200b-d; 
en xxni, si-.cr 1-^2 204a 212d passim; m 
xxxi, SFCT 2 239b d esp 239d; BK in, en vi, 
SI-.CT 5, 269b-c; SECT 21 273c-d; en x, SECT 
15 295a-c; BK iv, en in, SECT 6 313c- 
315b 

35 RI-RKELFY: Human Knowledge, SECT 9-18 
414d-416c passim; SECT 37 419d; SECT 47 
421c 422a; SECT 85 429c; SECT 91 430d- 
431a 

42 KANT: Pine Reason, 99a-100d esp lOOc-d; 
137a-140c; 152a d 

45 LAVOISIKR: Elements of Chemistry, PART i, 
9a-10c; 12d 13d; 16b c 

45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 169b-170a 

45 FARAD \Y: Researches in Electricity, 273a-276a; 
386c 390d; 604c-632d esp 604c 607a,c, 626c- 
632d; 819a c; 850b,d-8S5a,c 

46 Hi- GEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 160c d 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 

695c 
53 JAMLS: Psychology, 68a-b 

2b. The motions of matter or bodies 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK iv, CH 6-9 292c- 

297c / Generation and Corruption, BK i, CH 8 

423b-425d 
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 12 172d- 

173c 
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [329-397] 

5b-6a; [951-1113] 12d-14d; BK n [62-332] 

15d-19b; BK in [177-205] 32b-c 
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 47, 

A i, ANS 256a-257b; Q 115, A i, ANS and REP 

3,5 585d-587c 
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 50a-b; PART iv, 

268d; 271d 272a 
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 

157b-171b; THIRD DAY-FOURTH DAY 197a- 

260a,c 



74 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



2cto3a 



(2. The conception of matter as extension, as a 
bodily substance, or as a mode of substance: 
atoms and compound bodies. 2b. The mo- 
tions of matter or bodies.) 

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK i, APH 66 
114d-115c; BK ii, APH 35-36 162a-168d; APH 
40 170c-173d; APH 48 179d-188b 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART v 54b-60c / 
Objections and Replies, 114d-115a; DEF vn 
130c-d; 231a-b 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, LEMMA 1-7 378c- 
380b 

34 NEWTON: Principles la-372a / Optics, BK in, 
541 b 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xxi, 
SECT 2-4 178c-179c; CH xxm, SECT 17 209a; 
shCT 22 209d; SECT 28-29 211b-212a 

38 MONT tsguieu : Spirit of Laws, BK i, Ib 

45 LAVOISIKR: Elements of Chemistry, PART i, 

41bc 

45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 169a-b 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE 11, 694d- 

695c 
53 JAMES: Psychology, 882a; 883a-884b passim 

2c. Matter as the support of sensible qualities 

8 ARISTOTLE Sense and the Sensible, CH 4 
[442 ft 3o- b 24] 680a-c; CH 6 [445 b 4 -44 6a2 <>] 
683b684c 

12 LucKbnus: Nature of Things, BK n [398-477] 
20a-21a; 1730-885] 24b-26b; BK iv [522-721] 
51a53d 

17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR iv, CH 8-13 
52c 55d / Third Ennead, TR vi, CH 6-19 109d- 
119a / Fourth Ennead, TR vn, CH 8, 196a b 
/ Sixth Ennead, TR i, en 29 267c-268b 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 49b-d; 57a-b; 
PART HI, 172b 

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 40 
170c-173d 

31 DESCARTES: Meditations, n, 78c-d; 80b-d / 
Objections and Replies, DEF vn 130c-d; 228c- 
229b; 229d-230c; 231a b 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH 

VHI, SECT 7-26 134b-138b passim; CH xxm 

204a-214b passim, esp SECT 1-6 204a-205c, 

SECT 15 208c-d 
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 7-21 

414b-417a; SECT 37 419d; SECT 49 422b; 

SECT 73 427b-c; SECT 76-78 427d-428b; 

SECT 91 430d-431a 
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT xn, DIV 

122-123 505c-506a esp DIV 123 506a 
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15b-c; lOOc-d 
53 JAMES: Psychology, 185a; 331 a; 503a 

2d. The diremption of body and mind, or mat- 
ter and spirit 

17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR i la-6b csp CH 
3-7 ld-4a / Sixth Ennead, TR iv, CH i 297b-d; 
CH 4-6 299a-300b 



19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 76, 
A 4 393a-394c 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 48d-50b 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 51d-52a / 
Meditations, n 77d-81d passim; vi 96b 103d 
passim / Objections and Replies, DEF vi-vn 
130c; DEF x 130d; PROP iv 133c; 153c-155c; 
224d-225d; 231a-232d; 248b 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 14, COROL 2 
360a; PROP 15, SCHOL 360b-361d; PART n, 
PROP 1-7 373d 375c; PROP 10-13 376c-378c; 
PART in, PROP 2 396c-398b; PART v, PREF 
451a-452c 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH 
XHI, SECT 16 151d-152a; CH xxm, SECT 5 
205a-b; SECT 15-32 208c-212d passim; CH 
xxvn, SECT 27 227d-228a; BK iv, CH in, 
SECT 28 322a-c; CH x, SECT 9-19 351b-354c 
passim 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 18-20 
416b-417a 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 84a-93b esp 88a-90a; 95b- 
98a; 115a 119b csp 118b-119b; 139a-140a; 
221a-226a esp 221a 222b, 225b-226a 

3. The existence of matter 

3<*. Matter as the sole existent: materialism, 
atomism 

7 PLATO: Sophist, 567a-568a 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK n, CH i [i93 R 9~28] 
269b-c / Heavens, BK in, en 4 [3<>3 B 3- b 8] 
394b-d / Generation and Corruption, BK i, CH 
2 410d-413c; CH 8 423b-425d / Metaphysics, 
BK i, CH 3 (983 b 7]-CH 4 [o85 h 2i] 501d-503d; 
CH 8 [988^3-989^0] 506d-507d; BK vn, CH 
13 [1039*2-11] 562d; BK xn, CH 10 [io75 B 25~ 
I076 ft 5] 606a-d 

10 GALLN: Natural Faculties, BK i, en 12 172d- 

173c 
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [146-634] 

2d-8d 
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK ix, SECT 39 295a; 

BK x, SECT 6 297a-b 

17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR iv, en i 50a-b; 
CH 7, 52c / Third Ennead, TR i, CH 3 79b-c / 
Fourth Ennead, TR vn, CH 2-4 192a-193c / 
Sixth Ennead, TR i, en 25-30 265b-268c 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK v, par 19-21, 
32c 33b; par 25 34b-c; BK vn, par 1-2 43b- 
44a; par 7 45a-d 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 47, 
A i, ANS 256a-257b; Q 50, A i, ANS 269b- 
270a; Q 75, A i, ANS 378b-379c 

23 HOBBLS: Leviathan, PART in, 172b; PART iv, 

269b-272b 
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 8 

140b 
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH x, 

SECT 8-17 351a-353c passim 
53 JAMES: Psychology, 95b-98a; 106a; 671b 

[fn i); 882a-884b 



3b to 4* 



CHAPTER 53: MATTER 



75 



3. Matter as the most imperfect grade of be- 
ing or reality 

7 PLATO: Republic, BK ix, 423c-424a 
12AuRELius: Meditations, BK ix, SECT 36 
294d-295a 

17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR VIH, CH 4-5 
28c-29c; en 7-8 30c-31c / Second Ennead, 
TR iv, CH 5 51b-d; CH 15-16 56c-57c; TR v, 
CH 4-5 59c-60c / Third Ennead, IR vi, en 
11-14 113a-116a 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK XH, par 3-8 
99d-101b; par 15 102b-c 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, A 
8, ANS and REP 3 19d-20c; Q 4, A i, ANS and 
REP 2 20d-21b; Q 5, A 3, REP 3 25a<d; Q 7, A 2, 
REP 3 31d-32c; Q 14, A n, REP 3 84c-85c; 
Q 15, A 3, REP 3 93b-94a; Q 46, A i, RU.P i 
250a-252d; Q 84, A 3, REP 2 443d-444d; 
Q 103, A i, REP 2 528b-529a; Q 115, A i, REP 
4 585d-587c 

21 DANTL: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, xxix 

[13-36) 150b-c 
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, en 

xxi, SECT 2 178c; CH xxin, SECT 28 211b~d 
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT xn, DIV 

123 506a 

3c. Matter as a fiction of the mind 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 1-96 
413a 431d passim; SECT 133 439c 440a 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT xn, DIV 
123 506a 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 85d-91d csp 88b-c 

44 Bos WELL: Johnson, 134c-d 

5d. The relation of God to matter: the creation 
of matter and its motions 

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 1-2 
APOC RYPH A : Wisdom of Solomon, 11:17 (D) 
OT, Boo{ of Wisdom, 11:18 

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 448b-449a; 450b-451b; 
458a-b; 466a-b 

8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK xn, CH 6 
[107^19-32] 601c; CH 10 [io75 b i6-24] 606c 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [146-158] 
2d 3a; BK v [146-194] 63a-c 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK vn, par 7 45a- 
d; BK xi, par 7 90d-91a; BK xn, par 3-9 
99d-101c; par 15-16 102b-103a; par 24- 
26 104c-105b; par 28-31 105c-107a; par 
38-40 108d-110a; BK xnr, par 45 123a; par 
48 124a / City of God, BK xi, CH 23 334c- 
335c 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 8, A 4, 
ANS and REP i 37c-38c; Q 15, A 3, REP 3-4 
93b-94a; Q 16, A 7, REP 2 99a-d; Q 44, A 2 
239b-240a; Q 45, A 2, REP 2 242d-244a; A 
8 249b-250a; Q 46, A i esp REP 1,3,5-6 250a- 
252d; Q 47, A i, ANS 256a-257b; Q 65, A 3 
341c-342b; Q 66 343d-349d; o 75, A 5, REP 
1,4 382a 383b; Q 84, A 3, REP 2 443d 444 d; 



Q 91 484a-488c; Q 92, A 2, REP 2 489d-490c; 
A 4 491b-d; Q 103, A i, REP 2 528b 529a; 
Q 105, AA 1-2 538d-540c; Q no, A 2, ANS 
56Sd-566d; Q 117, A 3, ANS and REP 2 598c- 
599b 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 85, 
A 6 182d-184a 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, vn [121- 
148] 116b-c; xm [52-84] 126a-b; xxix [13-45] 
ISOb-c 

22 CHAUCER: Knight's Tale [2987-3016] 209a b 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 17b~d 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART v, 54d-56b 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 15 360a 361d; 
PART n, DEI J i 373a; PROP 2 374a; PROP 7, 
SCHOL 375b-c 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK in [694-735] 150b- 
151b csp [708-735] 150b-15lb; BK v [468-505] 
185b-186a; [577-599] 187b-188a; BK vn [59- 
640] 218b-231a csp [70-108] 218b-219b, [192- 
386] 221b-225b 

34 NhwroN: Optics, BK in, 541b-543a 

35 LOCKI:: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xxi, 
SECT 2 178c; CH xxiii, SECT 28 211b-d; BK 
iv, CH x, SECT 9-19 351b-354c 

35 BLRKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 67- 

79 426b-428b passim; SECT 91-94 430d- 

431c 
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT xii, DIV 

M2, 509d[fn i] 
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156d- 

157b 

4. Matter as an object or condition of knowl- 
edge 

4a. The knowability of matter: by sense, by 
reason 

7 PLATO: Phaedo, 228d 229c / Republic, BK ix, 

423c-424a / Timaeus, 456a-458a 
SARisTon.t: Physics, BK i, CH 7 [191*8-11] 
266d / Metaphysics, BK vn, CH 15 [io39 b 2o- 
I04o ft 8] 563c-564a; BK ix, CH 7 [i049*i9- b i] 
574d-575a / Soul, BK in, CH 4 (429 b io-4^o n 9J 
661d-662c 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [265-328] 
4b 5a; BK n [80-141] 16a-d 

17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR vin, CH 9 31c- 
32a / Second Ennead, TR iv, CH 10 53b-d; CH 
12 54c-55b 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK xu, par 3-6 
99d-100c 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, 
A 3, ANS 16a-d; Q 14, A u 84c-85c; Q 15, A 3, 
REP 3-4 93b 94a; Q 50, A i, ANS 269b*270a; 
Q 57, A i 295a-d; Q 66, A i, REP i 343d-345c; 
QQ 84-86 440b-464d; Q 87, A i, ANS 465a- 
466c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, 
Q 92, A i, ANS and REP 12 1025c-1032b 

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK i, APH 66 
114d-115c 



76 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



(4. Matter as an object or condition of knowledge. 
4a. The knotvability of matter: by sense, 
by reason.) 

31 DESCARTES: Meditations, i-n 75a-81d passim; 
vi 96 b 103d passim / Objections and Replies, 
229d*230c 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 15, SCHOL 360b- 
361d 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding BK n, en vm, 
SECT 7 26 134b-138b passim; CH xxni, SECT 
5 205a-b; SECT 15-17 208c-209a; SECT 22-32 
209d 212d; BK iv, CH HI, SECT 6 313c 315b; 
SECT 9-17 315c-317c passim; SECT 23-27 
320a 322a passim; CH vi, SECT 14 335d- 
336b 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 16-24 
416a-417d; SECT 54 423b 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XH, DIV 
123 506a 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 186b-d 

46 H EG EL: Philosophy of Right, PART i, par 52 
25a-c 

48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 231a 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 140b-145a; 502a 503b pas- 
sim 

4&. The role of matter in the concepts and defi- 
nitions of the several sciences: the grades 
of abstraction in physics, mathematics, 
and metaphysics 

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 455c-458b 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK n, CH 2 270a-271a; 
cii 7 9 275b 278a,c / Meteorology, BK iv, 
en 12 493d-494d / Metaphysics, BK n, CH 3 
[995*15 20) 513d; BK in, CH ^ [998*20- 
b i4J 517a-b; BK vi, en i [io25 l) 28 1026*6] 
547d-548a; BK vn, en 10-11 558a-561a; en 
15 [ 10 $o. h 20 -1040*8) 563c-564a; CH 175663- 
566a,c; BK vm, CH 2 3 566d 568d; CH 6 
569d-570d; UK x, CH 8-9 585b-586c; BK xi, 
CH 7 [1064*19-281 592c; BK xn, CH 9 [io74 b 
37-1075*2] 605c; BK XIH, CH 2 [io77 b nj- 
cu 3 11078*31] 609a-d / Soul, BK i, CH i 
[40 j*i 5 - b i 9] 632b-d; BK in, CH 7 [4$i b i3-i9] 
664b 

9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i 
[641*14-31] 163d-164a 

16 PTOLLMY: Almagest, BK i, 5b 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i, A i, 
KBP 2 3b 4a; Q 3, A 3, ANS 16a-d; Q 18, A 4, 
REP 3 107d-108c; Q 29, A 2, REP 3 163b-164b; 
Q 50, A 2, REP i 270a 272a; Q 75, A 4 381 b- 
382a; Q 85, A i, REP 2 451c-453c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART ii-n, Q 
9, A 2, REP 3 424b-425a 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 43d-44c / 
Novum Organum, BK i, APH 51 lllc; APH 66 
114d-115c; BK n, APH 8 140b 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, xn, 19a-c; xiv 28a 33b / 
Objections and Replies, 169c-170a 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 50 
422c; SECT 118-131 436b-439c 



4c. The material conditions of sensation, im- 
agination, and memory 

7 PLATO: Meno, 177b-c 

8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK i, CH i [403*5-20] 
632a b; BK n, CH 12 [424*25- b i9] 656a-d; BK 
in, CH 3 [429*4-7] 661b; CH 4 [429*29 b 4] 
661c-d / Sleep, CH i [454*1-12] 696b-c 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK n [398-477! 

20a-21a; [730-864] 24b-26a; BK iv [26-268] 

44b-47d; [324-336] 48c; [522-817] 51a-54d 
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 75, 

A 2, ANS 379c-380c; A 3, ANS and REP 2 380c- 

381b; Q 76, A 5, ANS 394c-396a; Q 78, A 3, 

ANS 410a-411d; Q 84, A 2, ANS 442b-443c; 

A 6, ANS 447c-449b; A 7, ANS 449b-450b; 

A 8, REP 2 450b-451b; Q 86, A 4, REP 2 463d- 

464d 
23HoBBEs: Leviathan, PART i, 49a-51b; 62b; 

PART HI, 172b-d; PART iv, 258b-c; 261a; 

262a-b 
31 DhscARTLs: Rules, xn 18b 25b passim / 

Meditations, vi 96b-103d passim 
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 17-18 380d- 

382b 

34 NhwroN: Optics, BK HI, 518b-519b; 522a 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH i, 
SECT 23 127b; CH vm, SECT 4 133d; CH x, 
SECT 5 142a-b; SECT 10 143c-d; CH xxix, 
SLOT 3 234b c; CH xxxm, SECI 6 249a-b 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 18 20 

416b-417a; SECT 25 417d-418a; SECT 102 

432d-433a 
35 HUML: Human Understanding, SECT xn, DIV 

123 506a 
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i, 

14a 
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 85d-87a / Descent 

of Man, 568d-569a 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 2b-3a; 13a-19b esp 15b- 
17b, 19a-b; 26b-42a; 49b-50a; 98b-106b 
passim; 348a-359a esp 348a, 358a-b; 367a- 
373a esp 368b-369a, 370a b; 427b-433a esp 
428b"430a; 453a; 455b-457a; 459a-479a pas- 
sim, esp 460a-464a, 469a; 497a-501b; 520a- 
521a; 758a-759a 

54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 351c-352d 
esp 352a-b / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 
646b-648a esp 646c-d, 647d-648a 

4d. The material conditions of thought: the 
relation of matter to the existence and 
acts of the mind 

8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK i, CH 4 [4o8 b i8-32] 
638c-d; BK HI, CH 4-5 661b-662d; CH 7 
[4}i*i4- b i9]663d-664b 
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [94-176] 

31b-32b; BK iv [722-817] 53d-54d 

17 PLOTINUS : Fourth Ennead, TR VH, CH 8, 195b-c 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, A i, 

REP 2 14b-15b; Q 7, A 2, REP 2 31d-32c; Q 14, 

A 2, REP 1-3 76d-77d; A n, REP i 84c-85c; 

Q 50, A 2, ANS 270a-272a; Q 55, A 2, ANS and 



5 to 6 



CHAPTER 53: MATTER 



77 



REP 2 289d-290d; Q 57, A i, REP 3 295a-d; Q 
75, A 5 382a-383b; Q 76 385c-399b; Q 77, A 
5 403d-404c; A 8 406b-407a; Q 79, A 3 416a- 
417a; QQ 84-^8 440b-473a esp Q 84, A 6-Q 85, 
A 3 447c-457a; Q no, A 2, REP i 565d-566d; 
Q 117, A 3 598c-599b; PART i-n, Q 22, A i 
720d-721c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 85, 
A 6 182d-184a; PART in SUPPL, Q 92, A i, 
ANS and REP 10 1025c-1032b 

23HoBBEs: leviathan, PART i, 49a-d; 52b-c; 
54b-c; PART n, 162c; PART iv, 262b 

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK i, APH 51 lllc 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, xn, 18b-20d; xiv-xv 
28a-33d / Discourse, PART iv, 53b; PART vi, 
61c / Objections and Replies, 215b-c; 229d- 
230c 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, en 
xxvn, SECT 27 227d-228a 

42 KANT: Puie Reason, 23a-24a csp 23b; 34a-b; 
36b-c; 45d 46a; 48d-49a; 63a; 63d-64a; 69c- 
72c; 81b-83b; 85d-91d; 95a-d; 115b-c; 117b- 
119a; 173b-174a; 187a-c / Fund. Prin. Mefa- 
physic of Morals, 281c 282d / Pi actical Reason, 
349b-350c esp 350b-c / judgement, 542b-543c; 
570b-572c;604a-b 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 288c-d 

50 MARX: Capital, llb-c 

53 JAMES: Psychology, xiiib-xiva; 2b 3b; 8a-67a 
esp 9a-12b, 15b-17b, 43a-44a, 46a-47a, 51b- 
52a, 53a-54a, 66b-67a; 69b-73b; 82b; 84a- 
93b esp 84a-85a, 88a-90b, 91a-93a; 116a-119b 
csp 119b; 151a-153a; 291a-295b; 367a-373a 
esp 368a-369a, 370b 371a; 455b 456a; 690a-b; 
758a-759a; 827b 835a; 856b 858a 

54 FRLUD: Hysteria, 87a / Interpretation of 
Dreams, 154d-155a; 367b c; 382a-c; 384c- 
385a / Unconscious, 431c-d / Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, 646b-649c 

5. Matter in relation to good and evil 

7 PLATO: Phaedo, 224a-226c; 231c-234c / 7Y- 
maeus, 452d-453b; 474b-d / Statesman, 587a- 
589c 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK i, CH 9 [i 91^5-1 92*24] 
267d-268c / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 6 [988*7-16] 
506a-b 

12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 9 114c-116b 



12 AURELIUS: "Meditations, BK in, SECT 3 260b; 
BK ix, SECT 36 294d-295a 

17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR vin 27b-34a csp 
CH 3-5 28a-29c, CH 7, 30d / Second Ennead, 
TR iv, en 16 57b-c / Fifth Ennead, TR ix, CH 
10, 250c / Sixth Ennead, TR vii, CH 27-29 
334d-336b 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK v, par 19-21, 
32c 33b; BK vn, par 1-7 43b-45d; par 18-22 
49a-50a; BK xni, par 45 123a / City of God, 
BK xi, CH 23 334c-335c 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, o 3, A 2, 
ANS 15c-16a; Q 4, A i, ANS and REP 2 20d*21b; 
PART i-n, Q 17, A 8, REP i 692a c 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, i [97-142] 
107b-d; xin [52-87] 126a-b 

41 Gi BBON : Decline and Fall, 330a-b 

6. Criticisms of materialism and its conse- 
quences 

7 PLATO: Sophist, 567a-568a 

8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK i, CH 2-5 633a 641d 

9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i 
K>40 b 5-64i a 33] 163a-164b 

10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, en 12 172d- 

173c; UK n, CH i, 185a; CH 6 188c 191a 
17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR i, en 2, 78d; 

cn 3 79b-c / Fourth Ennead, IR vn, CH 68, 

194bl97b 
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 75, 

A i, REP i 378b-379c; Q 84, A i, ANS 440d- 

442a; A 6, ANS 447c 449b 
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 355b-d; 

495c-496d 
35 BERKELLY: Human Knowledge, SECT 21 

417a; SECT 35 419c; SI:CT 50 422c; SUCT 85 88 

429c 430b; SECT 92 96 431a-d; SECI 102 

432d-433a; SECT 133 439c-440a; SECT 141 

441a-b 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 126c-d / Judgement, 
558b-559d; 579d-580a; 582b-c 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK in, 140b; 
143a-c; BK x, 449b-c; BK xi, 469a-472b; 
BK xin, 570d; BK xiv, 589c-590c; 609b; 
EPILOGUE n, 678a-b; 689c 690a; 694d-696d 

53 JAMES: Psychologv, 5a; 8b 9a; 84a-119b; 
291a-295b; 655b-656a; 745a-b; 823a-825a 

54 FREUD: New Introductory lectures, 882b 884c 



CROSS-REFERENCES 

For: Other considerations of matter as a principle of change, see ART 2b; BEING 7b(5); CHANGE 
2a; FORM id(i)-id(2); and for the theory of celestial and terrestrial matter as distinct in 
kind, see ASTRONOMY 8a; BEING 7b(3); CHANGE 7c(4); WORLD 6a. 

The conception of matter as potentiality in relation to form as actuality, and for the theory of 
physical substances as composite of matter and form, see BEING 7b(2), 7c(3); FORM 2c(i)- 
2c(3); INFINITY 4c; MAN 33; MIND 2b; ONE AND MANY 3b(4); SOUL 3c. 

Considerations relevant to the doctrine that matter is the source of numerical diversity or the 
principle of individuality in material things, see SAME AND OTHER. la; UNIVERSAL AND 
PARTICULAR 3. 



78 THE GREAT IDEAS 

For: The conception of matter or extension as a substance, or as a mode of substance, see BEING 
7b(4); FORM 2d; MAN 33; MIND 2d; SOUL 3c. 

Atomism as a theory of matter and as a materialistic philosophy of nature, see ELEMENT 53- 
5h; MIND 2e; and for discussions bearing on materialism as a philosophy of nature, society, 
and history, see ELEMENT 5; HISTORY 43(2); MAN 3c; WILL 5c. 

Matter in relation to mind, or body in relation to soul, see MAN 3a; MIND 2a-2e; SOUL 3c, 
3e; and for the discussion of immaterial substances, spirits, or beings which exist apart 
from matter, see ANGEL 2, 3b; BEING 7X2); ETERNITY 43; FoRM2a,2d; GoD4c; MAN 33(1); 
MIND 2a; SOUL 3a~3c. 

The theological problems of matter, its creation and conservation, see GOD 73; WORLD 46- 

4 e( ')- . 

The physical properties of matter or bodies and the laws of their motion, see ASTRONOMY 
8c(}); MECHANICS 43, 53-5^2), 6a-6e; QUANTITY 5d~5c; SPACE la-id; and for the prob- 
lem of the infinity of matter or of an infinite body, see INFINITY 43-4^ 

Matter as an object of knowledge, see KNOWLEDGE 53(2). 

Matter in relation to sensation and to sensible qualities, see ELEMENT 50; MECHANICS 4b; 
QUALITY i; SENSE 3^3). 

Matter in relation to thought, abstract ideas, or definitions, see DEFINITION 6a; FORM 3c; 
IDEA 2g; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6c(i); MIND 13(2); SENSE 53; UNIVERSAL AND 
PARTICULAR 40. 



ADDITIONAL HEADINGS 

Listed below are works not included in Great Boofy of the Western World, but relevant to the 
idea and topics with which this chapter deals, These works are divided into two groups: 

I. Works by authois it-presented in this collection. 
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection. 

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult 
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas. 

SUAREZ. Disputationes Metaphysicae, v ($), x (3), 

* xii (3), xm-xv, xvi (i), xxvi (2), xxvii, xxx 

AQUINAS. On Being and Essence (4), xxxi (8, 10, 13), xxxiv (5-6), xxxv (3, 6), 

. On the Power of God, Q 4 xxxvi 

. De Natura Matenae et Dimensionibus Inter- JOHN OF SAiNr THOMAS. Cursus Philosophies Tho- 

minahs misticus, Phtlosophia Naturahs, PART i, QQ 2-3, 

DESCARTES. The Principles of Philosophy, PART i, 9, n 

7-8, 11-12, 62-65; PART n, 22-23; PART ni 4^~ DIGBY. The Nature of Bodies 

102; PART iv, 1-27, 31-48 MALEBRANCHK. De la recherche de la veritc*, BK in 

HOBBES, Concerning Body, PART n, CH 8 (n), CH 8 (2) 

BERKELEY. Three Dialogues Between Hylas and LEIBNITZ. New Essays Concerning Human Under- 

Philonous standing, APPENDIX, en i 

KANT. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science VOLTAIRL. "Matter," in A Philosophical Dictionary 

]. S. MILL. An Examination of Sir William Hamil- HOLBACH. The System of Nature 

ton's Philosophy, CH 12-13 J. PRIESTLEY and PRICE. A Free Discussion of the 

ENGELS. Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outline ofClas- Doctrine of Materialism and Philosophical Neces- 

steal German Philosophy sity 

SCHOPENHAUER. The World as Will and Idea, VOL 

** in, SUP, CH 24 

EPICURUS. Letter to Herodotus BUCHNKR. Force and Matter 

ERIGENA. De Divisione Naturae HELMIIOLTZ. Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects, 

JUDAH HA-LEVI. Kitab al Khazari vn 

CRESCAS. Or Adonai, PROPOSITIONS 10-12, 16, 19- LANGE. The History of Materialism 

24 B. STEWART. The Conservation of Energy 



CHAPTER 53: MATTER 



MAXWELL. Matter and Motion 

LOTZE. Metaphysics, BK n, CH 5-6 

PLANCK. Das Prinzip der Erhaltung der Energie 

C. S. PEIRCE, Collected Papers, VOL vi, par 238-286 

PEARSON. The Grammar of Science, CH 8 

MACH. "On the Principle of the Conservation of 

Energy," in Popular Scientific Lectures 
BERGSON. Matter and Memory, CH 4 
PLEKHANOV. In Defense of Materialism 

. Essays in the History of Materialism 

MEYERSON. Identity and Reality, en 4-5, 7-8 
LENIN. Materialism and Empiriocriticism 
CASSIRER. Substance and Function, SUP iv 
WEYL. Space Time Matter 
WHITEHEAD. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of 

Natural Knowledge, CH 15 



79 

r. The Nature of Existence, CH 34 
STOUT. Mind and Matter 
BROAD. The Mind and Its Place in Nature, CH 4 
DESCOQS. Essai critique sur rhylemorphisme 
G. N. LEWIS. The Anatomy of Science, ESSAY iv 
B. RUSSELL. Principles of Mathematics, CH 53 

. The Problems of Philosophy, CH 2-4 

. Mysticism and Logic, CH 7 

. The Analysis of Matter, CH 1-14 

McDoucALL. Modern Materialism and Emergent 

Evolution 
SANTAYANA. Scepticism and Animal Paith, CH 19-20 

. The Realm of Matter, CH 2-3, 10 

LRNZF.N. The Nature of Physical Theory, PART iv, 

CH 15 
KONINCK. Leprobleme de rindeterminisme 



Chapter 54: MECHANICS 



INTRODUCTION 



MECHANICS, taken as the name for just 
one of the physical sciences, would 
merit no place on a small list of basic, focal 
terms. But the word "mechanics" means more 
than that. In the tradition of western thought 
it signifies a whole philosophy of nature, and it 
connotes a set of fundamental principles under 
which, it has been thought, all the physical 
sciences can be unified. 

The principles of mechanics have been ap- 
plied not only in statics and dynamics, which 
are concerned with the action and reaction of 
bodies at rest or in motion, but also in acoustics 
and optics and the sciences of heat, magnetism, 
and electricity. They have been extended to 
astronomical phenomena to constitute what is 
called "celestial mechanics." They have been 
thought to govern the action or motion of in- 
visible particles or waves as well as the familiar 
Jx)dies of ordinary experience. In the range and 
variety of the phenomena it covers, mechanics 
-would seem to be co-extensive with physics. 
Such at least appears to be its scope at one stage 
in the development of natural science. 

We shall presently consider the dissatisfac- 
tion with the mechanical point of view which 
causes scientists in our own day to hail the 
replacement of "classical mechanics" by the 
"new physics" as a great advance in science. 
The intellectual significance of this change can 
be compared with that earlier revolution in the 
1 7th century when the new natural science 
founded on the achievements of Galileo, Huy- 
gens, and Newton replaced the physics of Aris- 
totle which had long reigned as the traditional 
philosophy of nature. What Einstein calls "the 
rise and decline of the mechanical point of 
view" thus seems to provide an apt title for the 
story of three stages in the history of science, in 
only one of which does the whole of physics 
appear to be dominated by mechanics. 



One way, then, of understanding the impor- 
tance of mechanics is in terms of that story. 
Other chapters, such as ASTRONOMY, CHANGE, 
ELEMENT, MATTER, PHYSICS, SPACE, and TIME 
and perhaps also CAUSE and HYPOTHESIS 
tell part of that story, especially the part which 
turns on the differences between Aristotle s 
physics (which is neither experimental nor 
mathematical) and modern physics (which is 
both). This chapter focuses on issues which fall 
largely within modern physics issues belong- 
ing to that part of the story which, in the great 
books, begins with Galileo, Huygcns, and New- 
ton and runs to Fourier and Faraday. The story 
itself does not end there, but the point to which 
Faraday carries it suggests the sequel in Clerk 
Maxwell and Einstein, just as Galileo's point of 
departure reflects antecedents in Aristotle. The 
great books state the issues sufficiently well, 
though they do not tell the whole story. That 
can be fully documented only by a host of sup- 
plementary scientific classics in various fields, 
such as the works listed in the Additional 
Readings. 

IN MODERN TIMES it is accepted that physics 
should be both experimental and mathematical. 
No one questions the ideal of unifying the 
physical sciences and finding the unity in na- 
ture's laws. But the question is whether that 
unification can be achieved under the aegis of 
mechanics; and the issue is whether physics 
should gather its experimental findings to- 
gether under purely mathematical formula- 
tions or should also try to give those mathe- 
matical formulae a mechanical interpretation. 
The issue involves more than a question of 
scientific method. It concerns the ultimate aim 
of natural science and the kind of concepts it 
should employ to fulfill this aim. Should the 
scientist seek to do no more than describe the 



80 



CHAPTER 54: MECHANICS 



81 



phenomena of nature in terms of the simplest 
and most universal mathematical relations? 
Or should he go beyond description to an ex- 
planation of the phenomena in terms of their 
causes? 

When the issue is thus stated as a choice be- 
tween being content with description or striv- 
ing for explanation, it appears to be broader 
than the question whether physics should or 
should not be mechanical. Even granted that 
explanation is desirable, does it necessarily fol- 
low that physical explanation must employ the 
principles and concepts of mechanics? Aris- 
totle's physics, it can be argued, provides a 
negative answer. His various physical treatises 
represent a natural science which tries to ex- 
plain the phenomena without doing so me- 
chanically, just as it tries to describe the phe- 
nomena without doing so mathematically. 

That the connection of these two features of 
Aristotle's physics is not accidental seems to be 
indicated by the conjunction of their opposites 
in modern physics. When in the i7th century 
the physicist describes natural phenomena in 
mathematical terms, he explains them if he 
tries to explain them at all in mechanical 
terms. "The laws of Mechanics," writes Des- 
cartes, "are the laws of Nature." Huygens 
opens his Treatise on Light by referring to op- 
tics as the kind of science "in which Geometry 
is applied to matter"; but he at once expresses 
the desire to advance this branch of mathe- 
matical physics by investigating "the origin 
and the causes" of the truths already known, in 
order to provide "better and more satisfactory 
explanations." Such explanations, he thinks, 
will be found only if we conceive "the causes 
of all natural effects in terms of mechanical 
motions." He declares it his opinion that "we 
must necessarily do this, or else renounce all 
hopes of ever comprehending anything in 
Physics." 

Galileo and Newton, as will be noted, do not 
unqualifiedly share Huygens' view that it is 
proper for the mathematical physicist to in- 
quire about causes. But they would agree that 
if any explanation is to be given for laws of na- 
ture expressed in mathematical form, one or 
another type of mechanical hypothesis would 
be required to state the causes. Postponing for 
the moment the consideration of whether the 



investigation of causes belongs to mathematical 
physics, let us examine what is involved in giv- 
ing a mechanical explanation of anything and 
why this type of explanation tends to occur in 
the causal interpretation of mathematically 
formulated laws of nature. 

Two points seem to constitute the essence of 
mechanical theory. Both are fundamental no- 
tions and both are philosophical in the sense 
that they do not seem to result from the find- 
ings of experimental research. The first point is 
an exclusive emphasis upon efficient causes, 
which means the exclusion of other types of 
causes, especially final and formal causes, from 
mechanical explanation. As the chapter on 
CAUSE indicates, efficient causality consists in 
one thing acting on another. But not every sort 
of action by which one thing affects another is 
mechanical. According to the doctrine, an ef- 
ficient cause is mechanical only if it consists in 
a moving body acting on another by impact, or 
if it consists in a force exerted by one body to 
cause motion in another or to change its quan- 
tity or direction. The notion of a force which 
does not work through the impact of one mov- 
ing thing upon another raises the problem of 
action-at-a-distance to which we shall return 
subsequently. 

f The second fundamental point is an exclu- 
(sive emphasis upon quantities. Mechanical ex- 
planation makes no references to qualities or 
other attributes of things. Paradoxically this 
point is sometimes expressed in terms of a dis- 
tinction between primary and secondary qual- 
ities; but, as the chapters on QUANTITY and 
QUALITY point out, the primary qualities are 
alljquantities. According to Locke, they are 
"solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and 
number"; according to Newton, "the universal 
qualities of all bodies whatsoever" are "exten- 
sion, hardness, impenetrability, mobility, and 
inertia." Others, like Galileo and Descartes, 
give still different enumerations, but the point 
remains that the only attributes of bodies which 
have mechanical significance are measurable 
quantities. Such secondary qualities, for exam- 
ple, as colors and tones belong to the physical 
world (as it is mechanically conceived) only by 
reduction to the local motion of particles or 
waves having certain velocities, lengths, or 
other quantitative attributes. 



82 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



We need not be concerned here with what 
sort of reality is assigned to secondary qualities, 
or how their presence in experience is ac- 
counted for. These problems are discussed in 
other chapters, such as QUALITY and SENSE. 
However they are solved, the philosophy of 
mechanism excludes from the physical world 
whatever does not consist in, or cannot be re- 
duced to, quantities of matter (or mass), mo- 
tion, or force, and such related quantities as 
those of time and space (or distance). 

The two points of mechanical theory are ob- 
viously connected, for the kind of cause which 
mechanical explanation employs to the exclu- 
sion of all others consists in a quantity of mo- 
tion or of force. Just as obviously, mechanical 
explanation, dealing only in quantities and in 
causes which are quantitatively measurable, is 
precisely the type of explanation which would 
seem to be appropriate if one felt called upon 
to give an interpretation of the mathematical 
relationships which the mathematical physicist 
formulates as laws of nature. These mathemat- 
ical laws are after all statements of the relations 
among physical quantities which have been 
subjected to experimental determination or 
measurement. 

As A PHILOSOPHICAL theory the mechanical 
view of nature antedates modern physical sci- 
ence. The atomistic conception of the world, 
which Lucretius expounds, contains both of the 
fundamental points of mechanism the doc- 
trine of primary and secondary qualities and 
the doctrine that all effects in nature are pro- 
duced by efficient moving causes. 

The controversy over mechanism is also an- 
cient. Aristotle denies both points of doctrine 
in his criticism of the Greek atomists, Democri- 
tus and Leucippus; and in the exposition of his 
own physical theories he states an opposite 
view. To qualities and qualitative change he 
assigns physical reality. He explains change in 
terms of four types of causes, not one. He does 
not exclude the mechanical type of cause in 
his explanation of local motion. On the con- 
trary, with respect to local motion his theory 
that a body in motion must be directly acted 
upon by a moving cause throughout the period 
of its motion, seems to be more mechanical 
than the modern theory that no cause need be 



assigned for the continuing uniform motion of 
a body along a straight line but only for a 
change in its direction or velocity. 

What is new in modern times is not the phil- 
osophical doctrine of mechanism, but the in- 
troduction of mechanical explanation into ex- 
perimental and mathematical physics, and the 
controversy about whether it belongs there or 
can be defended as useful. The so-called rise 
and decline of the mechanical view in modern 
physics is connected with experimental discov- 
eries and mathematical formulations. It is not an 
alternation between success and failure on the 
level of philosophical argument concerning 
the ultimate truth of mechanical conceptions. 
When these conceptions arc rejected, it is not 
for the sake of returning to opposite notions in 
physical theory, such as those of Aristotle, but 
rather because, as Einstein says, "science did 
not succeed in carrying out the mechanical 
program convincingly, and today no physicist 
believes in the possibility of its fulfillment.*' 

There is a touch of prophecy in the conversa- 
tion Swift imagines taking place between Aris- 
totle and the physicists of the iyth century. 
According to Swift, when Aristotle was con- 
fronted with Descartes and Gassendi, he "freely 
acknowledged his own mistakes in natural phi- 
losophy, because he proceeded in many things 
upon conjecture, as all men must do; and he 
found that Gassendi, who had made the doc- 
trine of Epicurus as palatable as he could, and 
the vortices of Descartes, were equally exploded. 
He predicted the same fate to attraction, where- 
of the present learned are such zealous as- 
serters. He said that new systems of nature 
were but new fashions, which would vary in 
every age; and even those who pretend to dem- 
onstrate them from mathematical principles, 
would flourish but a short period of time, and 
be out of vogue when that was determined." 

BOTH GALILEO and Descartes re-state the phil- 
osophical doctrine which first appears in an- 
cient atomism, but both re-state it in a way 
that suggests its utility for an experimental 
investigation of nature. It is significant that 
Galileo's statement occurs in the context of his 
concern with the nature and causes of heat. He 
wishes to explain, he writes in // Saggiatorc, 
why he thinks that "motion is the cause of 



CHAPTER 54: MECHANICS 



83 



heat." To do this he finds it necessary to ques- 
tion a prevalent notion "which is very remote 
from the truth"- the belief that "there is a 
true accident, affection, or quality, really in- 
herent in the substance by which we feel our- 
selves heated." He denies the physical reality 
of heat as an inherent quality of bodies on the 
same ground that he denies the physical reality 
of other qualities. "I do not believe," he de- 
clares, "that there exists anything in external 
bodies for exciting tastes, smells, and sounds, 
but size, shape, quantity, and motion, swift or 
slow; and if ears, tongues, and noses were re- 
moved, I am of the opinion that shape, quan- 
tity, and motion would remain, but there 
would be an end of smells, tastes, and sounds, 
which, apart from the living creature, I regard 
as mere words." 

Descartes' statement of the doctrine is bold- 
er, perhaps, in its suggestion of a mechanical 
program for physical research. "Colors, odors, 
savors, and the rest of such things," he writes, 
are "merely sensations existing in my thought." 
They differ from the real properties of bodies 
just as much as "pain differs from the shape and 
motion of the instrument which inflicts it." 
The true physical properties, such as "gravity, 
hardness, the power of heating, of attracting 
and purging" consist, in Descartes' opinion, 
"solely in motion or its absence, and in the con- 
figuration and situation of [bodily] parts." 

As a philosophical doctrine, the mechanical 
view is not necessarily tied to atomism. Des- 
cartes opposes atomism as plainly as does Aris- 
totle. Furthermore, Newton, who is an atomist, 
disagrees with both Descartes anH the^Greek 
atomists on one fundamental point in mechan- 
ical theory. The ancient atomists make the ac- 
tual motion of one particle in collision with 
another the indispensable cause of a change of 
motion in the latter. Descartes likewise requires 
one motion to be the cause of another and ex- 
plains gravity in terms of actual bodily motions. 
Newton rejects Descartes' mechanical hypoth- 
esis of material vortices as the cause of gravita- 
tion. He seems to have this in mind, and to put 
Descartes in the same class with Aristotle, when 
he says that "hypotheses, whether metaphysi- 
cal or physical, whether of occult qualities or 
mechanical, have no place in experimental 
philosophy." 



The force of gravity, according to Newton, is 
a power of attraction which one body exercises 
on another without the first being in motion or 
coming into contact with the second. Newton 
acknowledges the problem of action-at-a-dis- 
tance which his theory raises. For the most part 
he lets it stand as a problem which does not af- 
fect the mathematical results of his work. But 
in the Queries he attaches to his Optics he sug- 
gests, by way of solution, the hypothesis of an 
ether as the continuous medium through which 
gravitational force is exerted. In the opinion of 
later physicists, Newton's hypothesis is no less 
mechanical than Descartes'. Nor does there 
seem to be any philosophical grounds for pre- 
ferring one hypothesis to the other. 

But Newton's quarrel with Descartes is not 
on a philosophical issue. It turns on which me- 
chanical conception, if any at all is to be of- 
fered, fits best with the mathematical laws of 
terrestrial and celestial motion which Newton 
had succeeded in formulating as universal laws 
of nature. Those mathematical laws, moreover, 
had the merit of fitting the observed phenom- 
ena and so, of realizing the scientific ideal of 
accurate description stated in the most gen- 
eralized form. Newton's triumph over Des- 
cartes, then, is a triumph in mathematical and 
experimental physics, not a triumph in philos- 
ophy. 

Pope's couplet 

Nature and Nature's Laws lay hid in Night, 

God said, Let Newton be, and all was light 

records that triumph, and celebrates the illu- 
mination of nature by the mechanical as well 
as the mathematical principles of Newton's 
physics. Newton's picture of the world domi- 
nates the mind of a century and controls its 
science. Locke speaks of "the incomparable 
Mr. Newton" and of "his never enough to be 
admired book"; Hume refers to him as the 
philosopher who, "from the happiest reasoning 
. . . determined the laws and forces, by which 
the revolutions of the planets are governed and 
directed"; and even Berkeley, who challenges 
his theories of space, time, and attraction, re- 
grets that he must take issue with "the author- 
ity of so great a man," a man "whom all the 
world admires" as the author of "a treatise on 
Mechanics, demonstrated and applied to 
nature." 



84 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



NEWTON'S ACHIEVEMENT is to have accom- 
plished an extraordinary synthesis of all that 
was good in previous scientific work, and a 
sweeping criticism of all that was considered 
stultifying. That so many and such varied 
phenomena should be organized mathemati- 
cally by a theory as simple as Newton's, is alto- 
gether impressive. Equally astonishing is the 
predictive power of Newton's laws and the ex- 
planatory power of his mechanics, not to men- 
tion the technological fruits of the latter in 
mechanical engineering and the invention of 
machinery of all sorts. Whatever difficulties are 
implicit in the Newtonian mechanics sub- 
sequently to become, with new discoveries, 
more and more perplexing the scope and 
grandeur of Newton's book gives mechanics a 
commanding position with respect to the fu- 
ture of science for at least two centuries. 

In the century between the publication of 
Newton's Mathematical Principles and the pub- 
lication in 1787 of Lagrangc's Mecanique analy- 
tique, "the notion of the mechanical explanation 
of all the processes of nature," writes White- 
head, "finally hardened in to a dogma of science." 
In the next century, the mechanical dogma 
spreads from physics and chemistry through- 
out the whole domain of natural scienceinto 
biology and psychology and even beyond 
that, into economics and sociology. Books bear 
such titles as The Mechanistic Conception of 
Life, The Mechanism of Human Behavior, So- 
cial Statics, Social Dynamics. At the end of the 
i pth century, James notes the conquests which 
are being made on all sides by the mechanical 
idea. "Once the possibility of some kind of 
mechanical interpretation is established," he 
writes, "Mechanical Science, in her present 
mood, will not hesitate to set her brand of 
ownership upon the matter." 

James himself testifies to the persuasiveness 
and success of the mechanical dogma, though 
not without some resentment. "The modern 
mechanico-physical philosophy, of which we 
are so proud," he says, "because it includes the 
nebular cosmogony, the conservation of ener- 
gy, the kinetic theory of heat and gases, etc., 
etc., begins by saying that the only facts are col- 
locations and motions of primordial solids, and 
the only laws the changes in motion which 
changes in collocation bring. The ideal which 



this philosophy strives after," he continues, 
"is a mathematical world-formula, by which, 
if all the collocations and motions at a given 
moment were known, it would be possible to 
reckon those of any wished-for future moment, 
by simply considering the necessary geometri- 
cal, arithmetical, and logical implications." 

Laplace had in fact pictured a lightning cal- 
culator who, given the to taTcbnfigu ration of 
the world at one instant, would be able to bring 
the whole future "present to his eyes." And 
James quotes Helmholtz to the effect that the 
whole problem of physical science is "to refer 
natural phenomena back to unchangeable at- 
tractive and repulsive forces whose intensity 
depends wholly upon distance. The solubility 
of this problem is the condition of the com- 
plete comprchcnsibility of nature." 

In commenting on this, James admits that 
"the world grows more orderly and rational 
to the mind, which passes from one feature of 
it to another by deductive necessity, as soon as 
it conceives it as made up of so few and so sim- 
ple phenomena as bodies with no properties 
but number and movement to and fro." But 
he also insists that it is "a world with a very 
minimum of rational stuff. The sentimental 
facts and relations," he complains, "are butch- 
ered at a blow. But the rationality yielded is so 
superbly complete inform that to many minds 
this atones for the loss, and reconciles the think- 
er to the notion of a purposeless universe, in 
which all the things and qualities men love . . . 
are but illusions of our fancy attached to acci- 
dental clouds of dust which will be dissipated 
by the eternal cosmic weather as careless as they 
were formed." 

WITH THE 20TH CENTURY a change occurs. The 
dogma of mechanism may continue to spread 
in other sciences and gain even wider accept- 
ance as a popular philosophical creed, but 
within the domain of the physical sciences, cer- 
tain mechanical conceptions become suspect 
and a wholesale rejection of classical mechanics 
(which becomes identified with Newtonian 
physics) is called for. 

Einstein, for example, quotes the passage 
from Helmholtz that James had cited, in which 
Helmholtz goes on to say that the vocation of 
physics "will be ended as soon as the reduction 



CHAPTER 54: MECHANICS 



85 



of natural phenomena to simple forces is com- 
plete." This "mechanical view, most clearly 
formulated by Helmholtz," Einstein concedes, 
"played an important role in its time"; but, he 
adds, it "appears dull and naive to a twentieth 
century physicist." 

Einstein reviews the assumptions which 
physicists had to make in order to construct a 
mechanical theory of light, gravitation, and 
electricity. "The artificial character of all these 
assumptions," he says, "and the necessity for 
introducing so many of them all quite inde- 
pendent of each other, was enough to shatter 
the belief in the mechanical point of view. . . . 
In the attempt to understand the phenomena 
of nature from the mechanical point of view," 
he continues, "throughout the whole develop- 
ment of science up to the twentieth century, 
it was necessary to introduce artificial sub- 
stances like electric and magnetic fluids, light 
corpuscles, or ether." According to Einstein, 
"attempts to construct an ether in some simple 
way" have been "fruitless"; but what is more 
important in his opinion, such failures "indi- 
cate that the fault lies in the fundamental as- 
sumption that it is possible to explain all events 
in nature from a mechanical point of view." 

Does this mean that the contemporary physi- 
cist has found another and better way of ex- 
plaining nature ? Is there a non-mechanical way 
of explaining the phenomena, which fits the 
mathematical laws of experimental physics; or 
does discarding mechanics mean relinquishing 
all efforts to explain nature ? 

Eddington suggests an answer. "One of the 
greatest changes in physics between the nine- 
teenth century and the present day," he writes, 
"has been the change in our ideal of scientific 
explanation. It was the boast of the Victorian 
scientist that he would not claim to understand 
a thing until he could make a model of it; and 
by a model he meant something constructed of 
levers, geared wheels, squirts, and other appli- 
ances familiar to the engineer. Nature in build- 
ing the universe was supposed to be dependent 
on just the same kind of resources as any human 
mechanic. . . . The man who could make gravi- 
tation out of cogwheels would have been a hero 
in the Victorian age." Today, however, Ed- 
dington continues, "we do not encourage the 
engineer to build the world for us out of his 



material, but we turn to the mathematician to 
build it out of his material." 

We may turn to the mathematician's con- 
struction of the world in his terms; but in the 
tradition of western thought, mathematically 
formulated laws of nature are not, with the 
single exception perhaps of the Pythagoreans, 
regarded as explanations of why things behave 
as they do or how they work. The change from 
the i pth to the 20th century with respect to 
"our ideal of scientific explanation" cannot, 
then, be the substitution of the mathematical 
for the mechanical account of why and how. 
The shift from mechanics to mathematics is 
rather a shift from explanation as the scientific 
ideal to the statement of laws which, while hav- 
ing maximum generality, remain purely de- 
scriptive. What Eddington means by building 
the world out of the material of mathematics 
seems to be the same as what Galileo means, 
four centuries earlier, when he says that the 
book of nature "is written in mathematical 
language." The materials are such symbols 
as "triangles, circles, and other geometrical 
figures." Without the help of these, Galileo 
writes to Kepler, nature "is impossible to com- 
prehend." 

But does the mathematical comprehension of 
nature mean a causal explanation of it ? More 
explicitly than Eddington, Galileo insists that 
explanation at least in the sense of stating the 
causes is not the business of the mathematical 
physicist. In a passage which cannot be read too 
often or examined too closely, he names three 
opinions which the philosophers have expressed 
about "the cause of the acceleration of natural 
motion." Some, he says, "explain it by attrac- 
tion to the center, others to repulsion between 
the very small parts of the body, while still 
others attribute it to a certain stress in the sur- 
rounding medium which closes in behind the 
falling body and drives it from one of its posi- 
tions to another. Now all of these fantasies," 
he continues, "and others too, ought to be ex- 
amined, but it is not really worthwhile." 

They ought to be examined by philosophers, 
perhaps, but debating them is not worthwhile 
in "those sciences where mathematical demon- 
strations are applied to natural phenomena." 
Perfectly defining the program of mathematical 
physics, Galileo sets himself a limited task: 



86 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



"merely to investigate and to demonstrate 
some of the properties of accelerated motion 
(whatever the cause of this acceleration may 
be)." It should be noted that of the three opin- 
ions about causes which Galileo mentions, the 
first, which anticipates Newtonian attraction, 
is no less summarily dismissed than the third, 
which summarizes the Aristotelian theory. 

"What I call Attraction," Newton later 
writes, "may be performed by impulse or by 
some other means unknown to me. I use that 
word here to signify only in general any force 
by which bodies tend towards one another, 
whatsoever be the cause." It is well known, he 
asserts in the same passage of the Optics, "that 
bodies act one upon another by the attractions 
of gravity, magnetism, and electricity"; but, 
he goes on, "how these attractions may be per- 
formed I do not here consider." 

Newton's attitude toward causes and expla- 
nation would seem to be identical with Gal- 
ileo's. Galileo calls opinions about causes "fan- 
tasies" and dismisses them; Newton calls them 
"hypotheses" and seems to banish them as 
resolutely. "Hypotheses are not to be regarded 
in experimental philosophy," he declares in one 
place; and in another, having just referred to 
predecessors who feigned hypotheses "for ex- 
plaining all things mechanically," he says that, 
on the contrary, "the main business of natural 
philosophy is to argue from phenomena with- 
out feigning hypotheses." 

The task of the physicist who is both experi- 
mental and mathematical in his method, New- 
ton plainly states, is "to derive two or three 
general principles of motion from phenomena, 
and afterwards to tell us how the properties 
and actions of all corporeal things follow from 
those manifest principles. [This] would be a 
very great step in philosophy, though the 
causes of those principles were not yet dis- 
covered. And therefore," he says of his own 
work, "I scruple not to propose the principles 
of motion above mentioned, they being of very 
general extent, and leave their causes to be 
found out." 

The two or three principles of motion men- 
tioned in this passage from the Optics are the 
foundation of Newton's other great work, the 
Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy. 
Its title indicates the clearly conceived inten- 



tion of its author to limit himself to the pro- 
gram of mathematical physics on which both he 
and Galileo seem to agree. He will not try to 
define "the species or physical qualities of 
forces"; he will only investigate "the quantities 
and mathematical proportions of them." In 
the General Scholium with which the Mathe- 
matical Principles concludes, Newton disavows 
once more any knowledge of the cause of grav- 
ity. "To us it is enough," he says, "that gravity 
does really exist, and acts according to the 
laws which we have explained, and abundantly 
serves to account for all the motions of the 
celestial bodies, and of our sea." Admitting that 
he has "not been able to discover the causes . . . 
of gravity from phenomena," Newton flatly 
reiterates his policy: "I frame no hypotheses." 

IN VIEW OF THIS policy, how does the name of 
Newton come to be associated with the tri- 
umph of the mechanical point of view in phys- 
ics? Why do contemporary scientists like Ein- 
stein identify Newtonian physics with classical 
mechanics? If a mathematical physicist, like 
Newton or Galileo, refrains from guessing at or 
asserting causes, how can he be charged with 
having indulged in the impurity of a mechani- 
cal explanation of the phenomena, and with 
having foisted a mechanical conception of the 
universe upon mankind ? 

The answer to these questions, so far as New- 
ton is concerned, may be partly found in his 
own writings. He did not, it seems, entirely 
disavow an inquiry into the cause of attractive 
force, as in itself either misguided or irrelevant 
to science. "We must learn from the phenom- 
ena of nature," he tells us, "what bodies attract 
one another, and what are the laws and proper- 
ties of the attraction, before we enquire the 
cause by which the attraction is performed." 
This statement postpones, but does not ex- 
clude, an inquiry into causes. In another state- 
ment, Newton even gives us a reason for the 
postponement. "In mathematics," he says, "we 
are to investigate the quantities of force with 
their proportions consequent upon any condi- 
tions supposed; then, when we enter upon 
physics, we compare those proportions with 
the phenomena of nature, that we may know 
the several kinds of attractive bodies. And this 
preparation being made, we argue more safely 



CHAPTER 54: MECHANICS 



87 



concerning the physical species, causes, and 
proportions of the forces." 

These remarks of Newton do not give the 
whole answer. For the other and perhaps more 
important part of it, we must go to the actual 
development of physical science in the iyth 
century. The steps in this development 
largely discoveries and formulations made by 
Galileo, Huygens, and Newton lead to crises 
from which the scientists could not extricate 
themselves without discussing causes the 
causes of gravity and of the propagation of 
light. We may thus be able to understand why 
Newton could not abandon the search for 
causes; and why, in the Queries he appended to 
the Optics, he proposes a mechanical hypoth- 
esis in order to explain how the attractive force 
of gravity exerts itself across great distances, 
and also defends his mechanical theory of light 
against the equally mechanical but different 
hypothesis of I luygens. 

It might well be argued that, though Gal- 
ileo's pure position initiated modern mathe- 
matical physics, it was the persistence of im- 
purity in the worrying about causes, or even 
the inescapability of such concern, which 
caused great scientific advances to be made. 
The concern about causes seems to provide, 
time and time again, the pivot for new discov- 
eries. The causes arc not found, but new hy- 
potheses are made, and these, when employed, 
'lead to wider, more general results in the form 
of more inclusive, unifying laws. We see this 
happen not only in the study of gravitation and 
light, but also in the investigation of heat and 
electricity. The concern of Faraday, for ex- 
ample, to explain electrical attraction and re- 
pulsion in terms of the action of contiguous 
particles, and to establish the existence of phys- 
ical lines of force, leads to Maxwell's theory of 
the electro-magnetic field; and his field equa- 
tions, combined with Faraday's speculations 
concerning the relation between electrical 
and gravitational attraction, lead to the at- 
tempt, on the part of contemporary physics, 
to construct a unified field theory covering all 
physical phenomena. 

Physics may return in the 20th century to 
the purely mathematical character it had at the 
beginning of its modern development. But as 
may be seen in any introduction to recent 



physics written for the layman, it is necessary 
to mark the influence of mechanical concep- 
tions upon scientific discovery and thought, in 
order to understand the difference between the 
unifying mathematical laws of the i7th and the 
20th centuries. As we retrace the steps we see 
how fertile is the interplay between mathe- 
matical insights and mechanical hypotheses. 

As FOURIER TELLS the story of "rational me- 
chanics," the "discoveries of Archimedes" be- 
gin the science. "This great geometer," he says, 
"explained the mathematical principles of the 
equilibrium of solids and fluids. About eighteen 
centuries elapsed before Galileo, the originator 
of dynamical theories, discovered the laws of 
motion of heavy bodies." Statics and dynamics 
are related as the two parts of mechanics when 
that is conceived narrowly as the science which 
treats of the local motions of inert or inanimate 
bodies. The rest or equilibrium of bodies, which 
is the subject of statics, can be thought of as a 
limiting case of their motions, to which the 
principles of dynamics apply. 

In the eighteen centuries between Archime- 
des and Galileo, little progress is made in me- 
chanics. So far as statics is concerned, Archime- 
des, according to Galileo, by the "rigor of his 
demonstration" established the science in all its 
essentials; "since upon a single proposition in 
his book on Equilibrium depends not only the 
law of the lever but also those of most other 
mechanical devices." Pascal may later enlarge 
statics, by showing in his treatise On the Equi- 
librium of Liquids that "a vessel full of water is 
a new principle of Mechanics, a new machine 
which will multiply force to any degree we 
choose"; in other works Pascal extends these 
conceptions further, as in his treatment of the 
pressure of air. But at the time of Galileo, it 
could be said that although Archimedes had 
offered an exemplary model of mathematical 
physics, no progress was made until the work of 
Galileo's immediate predecessors. 

Not without assistance from certain prede- 
cessors like Stevin, Galileo founds the science 
of dynamics. It may be wondered why, with 
the start made by Archimedes, no earlier ap- 
plication of his principles and method had been 
made. The answer may be found in the physics 
of Aristotle. His theory of the four elements 



88 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



carried with it a doctrine of natural motions to 
different natural places, drawn from the ob- 
servation of fire rising, stones dropping, air 
bubbling up through water. Such a doctrine 
would prevent the search for laws of motion 
applicable to all bodies; and the general char- 
acter of Aristotle's physics, treating qualities 
as well as quantities, seems to have discouraged 
the application of mathematics even to the 
study of local motions* 

The mathematical expression of the laws of 
motion is Galileo's objective. His interest in 
the new astronomy which affirmed the motion 
of the earth led him, he told Hobbes, to the 
careful Study of movements on the earth. His 
aim is simply to describe with precision the mo- 
tions to be found in a child's play stones 
dropped and stones thrown, the one the natural 
motion of free fall, the other the violent motion 
of a projectile. It is clear to observation that the 
motion of a freely falling body is accelerated. 
But though, as a mathematical physicist, Gal- 
ileo refrains from asking why this is so, he is not 
satisfied to know simply that it is so. He wants 
to know the properties of such acceleration. 
What is the relation of the rate of increase in 
velocity to the durations and distances of the 
fall f How much increase in velocity is acquired 
and how fast? What is the body's velocity at 
any given point in the fall? Similarly, when 
Galileo turns to projectiles, he wants to know, 
not merely that their trajectory is consistently 
curvilinear, but precisely what curve the path 
of the projectile describes. 

Galileo succeeds in answering all these ques- 
tions without being perturbed by any of the 
philosophical perplexities connected with space 
and time; nor does he allow questions about the 
forces involved in these motions to distract him 
from his purpose to "demonstrate everything 
by mathematical methods." With mathemati- 
cal demonstration he combines observation and 
experiment and uses the latter to determine 
which mathematical conclusions can be ap- 
plied to nature which principles can be em- 
pirically verified as well as mathematically de- 
duced. 

ONE OF GALILEO'S principles, however, seems 
to outrun ordinary experience and to defy ex- 
perimental verification. In the interpretation 



of his experiments on inclined planes, Galileo 
expresses an insight which Newton later formu-^ 
lates as the first law of motion, sometimes called 
the "law of inertia." It declares that "every 
body continues in its state of rest, or of uniform 
motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to 
change that state by forces impressed upon it." 
Though Newton describes his method as one of 
"making experiments and observations, and in 
drawing general conclusions from them by in- 
duction," the law of inertia seems to be an ex- 
ception; for it is difficult to say, as Hume does, 
that "we find by experience that a body at rest 
or in motion continues forever in its present 
state" that is, unless it is acted on by some 
new force. 

The condition introduced by "unless** raises 
Poincare"s question: "Have there ever been ex- 
perimcnts on bodies acted on by no forces?" 
If not, and if they are impossible, then James 
may be right in saying that "the elementary 
laws of mechanics" are "never matters of ex- 
perience at all, but have to be disengaged from 
under experience by a process of elimination, 
that is, by ignoring conditions which are always 
present." Because "the idealized experiment 
[which it calls for] can never be performed," 
the law of inertia, according to Einstein, can 
be derived "only by speculative thinking con- 
sistent with observation." 

In any case, the first law of motion initiates a 
new departure in physics. So far as local motion 
is concerned, Aristotle and his followers look for 
the cause which keeps a moving body in motion 
or a stationary body at rest. According to Gal- 
ileo and Newton, uniform motion continues 
naturally without cause. Only a change in the 
velocity or direction of that motion requires a 
cause, such as a force impressed upon it. 

How radical this innovation is may be judged 
from its consequences in celestial mechanics, 
which in turn lead to a completely unified 
dynamics for both celestial and terrestrial mo- 
tions. These advances are the work of Newton's 
mathematical genius, but the ground for them 
had been laid by the investigations of Galileo. 
Galileo had resolved the curvilinear motion of 
a projectile into the imparted rectilinear mo- 
tion and the deflecting pull of gravity. This 
composition of forces sometimes called the 
"parallelogram law" explains why the path of 



CHAPTER 54: MECHANICS 



89 



the projectile is a parabola. The path of the 
planets in their orbits, Kepler had previously 
shown, is another conical curve an ellipse. 
But Kepler, lacking the first law of motion, 
could theorize physically about the cause of the 
planetary orbits only by looking for a force, 
projected outward from the sun, which would 
sweep around to keep the planets moving in 
their paths. On the other hand, a follower of 
Galileo, as Whitehcad points out, would seek 
"for normal forces to deflect the direction of 
motion along the curved orbit." He would look 
for a force pulling the planet off its own rec- 
tilinear course inward toward the sun. 

That is precisely what Newton did. When 
the problem, which others had been able to 
formulate, was put to Newton, he simply went 
to his study for the solution. He had solved that 
problem some years before. He had found the 
law of the force which, attracting the planets 
to the sun, would produce their elliptical paths 
and the other proportionalities stated in Kep- 
ler's purely descriptive laws. 

With that single discovery, Galileo's terres- 
trial dynamics becomes a celestial one, too; and 
the traditional separation of the heavens from 
the earth is overcome. Newton goes even fur- 
ther. He guesses, and then shows by arithmetic, 
that the force deflecting the planets around the 
sun and the moon around the earth, is the same 
force which makes apples fall and stones heavy 
in the hand. He generalizes this insight in his 
famous inverse-square law: "Every particle of 
matter attracts every other particle of matter 
with a force proportional to the mass of each 
and to the inverse square of the distance be- 
tween them." 

Accordingly, the world can be pictured as 
one in which material particles each have posi- 
tion in absolute space and a determinate veloc- 
ity. The velocity of each particle causes the 
change of its position, and changes in velocity 
are caused by forces, the amounts of which 
are determined by positions. From his laws of 
motion and this simple law of force Newton is 
able, by mathematical deduction, to account 
for the perturbations of the moon, the oblate- 
ness of the earth, the precession of the equi- 
noxes, the solar and lunar tides, and the paths 
of the comets. 

But is Newton's law of force as simple as it 



appears to be at first? Its mathematical mean- 
ing is plain enough, and its application to 
measured phenomena reveals its descriptive 
scope. When we ask, however, about its physi- 
cal significance, we raise difficult questions con- 
cerning the nature of this attractive force and 
how it operates. To call it the "force of gravity" 
and to point out that this is a familiar force 
which everyone experiences in his own person 
hardly answers the question. 

GALILEO WOULD NOT have tried to answer it. 
In his Dialogues Concerning the Two Great Sys- 
tems of the World, one of the characters, Sim- 
plicio, refers to that manifest cause which 
"everyone knows is gravity." To this Salviati 
replies: "You should say that everyone knows 
it is called gravity. I do not question you about 
the name," he continues, "but about the es- 
sence of the thing"; and that, he concludes, is 
precisely what cannot be defined. 

A physicist like Huygens, who expects the 
explanation of natural effects to be expressed in 
the familiar mechanical terms of bodily impact, 
has other objections. "I am not at all pleased," 
he writes to Leibnitz about Newton, "with any 
theories which he builds on his principle of at- 
traction, which seems to me absurd." What 
shocks Huygens is a scandal that Newton him- 
self cannot avoid facing. It is the scandal of ac- 
tion-at-a-distance of the force of gravity be- 
ing propagated instantaneously across great dis- 
tances and producing effects at some remote 
place but no effects along the way. Newton rec- 
ognizes the strangeness of such a force. In a 
letter to Bentley, he echoes Huygens' protest 
to Leibnitz. "That gravity should be innate, 
inherent and essential to matter," he says, "so 
that one body may act on another at a distance 
through a vacuum, without the mediation of 
anything else, by and through which their ac- 
tion and force may be conveyed from one to 
another, is to me so great an absurdity, that I 
believe no man who has in philosophical mat- 
ters a competent faculty of thinking, can ever 
fall into it." 

The absurdity of action-at-a-distance seems 
to be recognized by common sense and philoso- 
phy alike. "No action of an agent," Aquinas 
remarks, "however powerful it may be, acts at 
a distance except through a medium"; and 



90 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



Kant, who regards Newtonian physics as the 
model of a rational science of nature, speaks of 
"a force of attraction without contact" as a 
"chimerical fancy" which "we have no right to 
assume." How can Newton avoid this absurdity 
without violating his rule of method in mathe- 
matical physicsnot to frame hypotheses? 

Newton's dilemma can perhaps be stated in 
the following alternatives: either the inverse- 
square law of gravitational attraction is to be 
treated as a purely mathematical, and hence a 
purely descriptive, proposition of great sim- 
plicity and generality; or it must be given phys- 
ical meaning by a causal explanation of how 
gravitational force operates. On the first al- 
ternative, Newton can avoid framing hypoth- 
eses, but the physical meaning of the' concepts 
he employs to state the mathematical law is 
then left dark. On the second alternative, he 
can solve the mechanical problem created by 
such words in his law as "attracts" and "force," 
but only by going beyond mathematical phys- 
ics into the realm of mechanical hypotheses. 

Newton seems to take the first alternative in 
his Mathematical Principles of Natural Philos- 
ophy, and the second in his Optics. There he 
proposes the hypothesis of an ethereal medium 
to explain the attractive force of gravity. "Is 
not this medium," he asks, "much rarer within 
the dense bodies of the sun, stars, planets, and 
comets, than in the empty celestial spaces be- 
tween them ? And in passing from them to great 
distances, doth it not grow denser and denser 
perpetually, and thereby cause the gravity of 
those great bodies towards one another, and of 
their parts towards the bodies; every body en- 
deavoring to go from the denser parts of the 
medium towards the rare? . . . And though this 
increase of density may at great distances be 
exceeding slow, yet if the elastic force of this 
medium be exceeding great, it may suffice to 
impel bodies from the denser parts of the me- 
dium towards the rarer, with all that power 
ivhich we call gravity." 

The hypothesis fits the law of gravitation if, 
is Maxwell points out, "the diminution of pres- 
sure [in the ether] is inversely as the distance 
from the dense body." Newton recognized, ac- 
cording to Maxwell, that it then becomes nec- 
essary "to account for this inequality of pres- 
sure in this medium; and as he was not able to 



do this, he left the explanation of the cause of 
gravity as a problem for succeeding ages. . . . 
The progress made towards the solution of the 
problem since the time of Newton," Maxwell 
adds, "has been almost imperceptible." 

THE PROBLEM OF the mechanical properties of 
an ethereal medium occurs in another form in 
the field of optics. Here it is complicated by the 
rivalry between two theories of light New- 
ton's corpuscular theory and Huygens' undu- 
latory or wave theory. Each involves a mechan- 
ical hypothesis one concerning the motion of 
particles emitted from the light source, and one 
concerning the wave-like propagation of the 
light impulse through a medium. Both theories 
involve the motion of particles. In their ex- 
planation of the oar which appears bent in the 
water, both appeal to the action of the particles 
in the refracting medium on the light corpus- 
cles or the light waves. 

Both theories, furthermore, are expressed by 
their authors in a mathematical form which 
permits the deduction of quantitative facts 
like the equality of the angles of incidence and 
of reflexion, the bending of the light ray in re- 
fraction according to the law of sines, and the 
recently discovered fact of the finite velocity 
of light. Huygens' book gives prominence to 
the explanation of the strange phenomena of 
double refraction found in "a certain kind of 
crystal brought from Iceland" Iceland spar. 
But both theories seem to be equally compe- 
tent in dealing with the established facts of 
reflexion and refraction, and the new facts 
about dispersion. 

For a century at least, their rivalry resembles 
that between the Ptolemaic and Copernican 
theories at a time when they seemed equally 
tenable so far as accounting for the phenomena 
was concerned. Later, new discoveries, such as 
those by Young and Fresnel, tend to favor the 
wave theory of light; but the rivalry continues 
right down to the present day. It remains un- 
resolved, at least to an extent which prompts 
Eddington, in reviewing contemporary con- 
troversy about the nature of light and electric- 
ity, to suggest the invention of the word "wav- 
icle" to signify the complementary use of both 
particles and waves in the modern theory of 
radiation. 



CHAPTER 54: MECHANICS 



91 



Unlike the rivalry between the Ptolemaic 
and Copernican systems, which seemed for a 
while to be entirely a matter of different mathe- 
matical descriptions of the same phenomena, 
the conflict between these two theories of light 
involves from the very beginning an issue be- 
tween diverse mechanical hypotheses to explain 
the phenomena. That issue is argued not only 
with respect to the adequacy of either theory to 
explain such phenomena as the rectilinear prop- 
agation of light and its different behavior in 
different mediums; but it is also debated in 
terms of the underlying mechanical concep- 
tions. As gravitational force acting at a distance 
raises a mechanical problem which Newton's 
ether is not finally able to solve, so Huygens' 
ether as the medium through which light is 
propagated in waves raises mechanical prob- 
lems which, if insoluble (as they seem to be), 
contribute even more heavily to the general 
scientific scandal of mechanics. 

The two authors take different attitudes 
toward hypotheses and mechanical explanation. 
Huygens, as we have seen, begins his book with 
the express intention to "investigate . . . the 
causes" and to express them "in terms of me- 
chanical motions/' Newton, on the other hand, 
begins his with a reiteration of his disavowal of 
hypotheses. "My design in this book," he 
writes, "is not to explain the properties of light 
by hypotheses, but to propose and prove them 
by reason and experiments." Nevertheless, 
Newton's explanation of how the prism pro- 
duces from white light the band of colors in the 
spectrum seems to require the assumption of 
a distinct kind of light corpuscle for each color; 
and, in addition, the assumption that, although 
all light particles have the same velocity when 
they travel together making white light, sepa- 
rate particles for different colors are differently 
refrangible, that is, differently susceptible to 
the action of the particles in the refracting me- 
dium of the glass. 

Perhaps only in Newton's somewhat arti- 
ficially restricted sense of the word "hypoth- 
esis" could these assumptions escape that de- 
nomination. In any case, the existence of Huy- 
gens' rival theory prevented his escaping a 
controversy about hypotheses. In the Queries 
attached to his Optics, he engages in that con- 
troversy with an acumen which shows another 



rkf lit 



HUYGENS' WAVE THEORY requires what any- 
body would have to call an hypothesis and re- 
quires it from the very start. "It is inconceiv- 
able," he writes, "to doubt that light consists 
in the motion of some sort of matter." He im- 
mediately rejects the notion that light rays con- 
sist in the "transport of matter coming to us 
from the [luminous] object, in the way in which 
a shot or an arrow traverse the air" if for no 
other reason, because "the rays traverse one 
another without hindrance." The similarity 
between the phenomena of light and the phe- 
nomena of sound suggests to him the "way that 
light spreads," and causes him to extend the 
mechanics of sound conceived as a wave mo- 
tion to light. 

"We know that by means of air, which is an 
invisible and impalpable body," Huygens ar- 
gues, "sound spreads around the spot where 
it has been produced, by a movement which is 
passed on successively from one part of air to 
another; and that the spreading of this move- 
ment, taking place equally on all sides, ought 
to form spherical surfaces ever enlarging and 
which strike our ears. Now there is no doubt 
at all that light also comes from the luminous 
body to our eyes by some movement impressed 
on the matter which is between the two. ... If, 
in addition, light takes time for its passage . . . 
it will follow that this movement, impressed on 
the intervening matter, is successive; and con- 
sequently it spreads, as sound does, by spherical 
surfaces and waves; for I call them waves from 
their resemblance to those which are seen to 
be formed in water when a stone is thrown into 
it." 

Huygens is aware, however, that the analogy 
between light and sound is far from perfect. 
"If one examines," he says, "what this matter 
may be in which the movement coming from 
the luminous body is propagated, one will see 
that it is not the same that serves for the prop- 
agation of sound. . . . This may be proved," 
he goes on, "by shutting up a sounding body 
in a glass vessel from which the air is with- 
drawn." An alarm clock beating its bell in a 
jar without air makes no sound, but a jar with- 
out air is no less transparent than one with air. 
Since when "the air is removed from the vessel 
the light does not cease td traverse it as before," 
and since waves have to be waves of something, 



e mnine 



onrl 



H74* roe f\r <air l-hir 



92 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



must be waves of a substance, says Huygens, 
"which I call ethereal matter." 

This ether, a transparent medium permeat- 
ing the whole universe, proves to be what Ein- 
stein calls the enfant terrible in the family of hy- 
pothetical physical substances. Postulated by 
Huygens in order to explain light mechanically, 
it in turn calls for a mechanical account of its 
own extraordinary properties. Huygens does 
not avoid this new problem, but neither does 
he undertake to solve it completely. 

Suppose "one takes a number of spheres of 
equal size, made of some very hard substance, 
and arranges them in a straight line, so that 
they touch one another." Then, says Huygens, 
"one finds, on striking with a similar sphere 
against the first of these spheres, that the mo- 
tion passes as in an instant to the last of them, 
which separates itself from the row, without 
one's being able to perceive that the others 
have been stirred." This type of motion in the 
ether would account for "the extreme velocity 
of light" and yet "this progression of motion 
is not instantaneous," as the motion of light 
also is not. 

"Now in applying this kind of movement to 
that which produces light," Huygens contin- 
ues, "there is nothing to hinder us from esti- 
mating the particles of the ether to be of a sub- 
stance as nearly approaching to perfect hard- 
ness and possessing a springiness as prompt as 
we choose." Beyond this Huygens does not go. 
"It is not necessary to examine here," he says, 
"the causes of this hardness, or of that springi- 
ness. . . . Though we shall ignore the true cause 
of springiness we still see that there are many 
bodies which possess this property; and thus 
there is nothing strange in supposing that it 
exists also in little invisible bodies like the par- 
ticles of the ether." 

But difficulties which Huygens did not fore- 
see make his ether more than a strange supposi- 
tionalmost a mechanical impossibility. Huy- 
gens had thought that light waves are trans- 
mitted in the ether in the way that soundwaves 
are in the air, that is, longitudinally, the direc- 
tion in which the individual particles vibrate 
being the same as the direction of the wave mo- 
tion itself. But when, in the i9th century, it 
was found that the phenomena of the polariza- 
tion of light could not be explained by the cor- 



puscular theory, but only by the wave theory 
(thus shifting the scales decisively in favor of 
the latter), it was also found that the wave 
theory could explain polarization only on the 
assumption that the motion of the ether par- 
ticles which produce the light waves is not 
longitudinal, but transverse, that is, in a direc- 
tion perpendicular to the waves produced by 
the vibration of the particles. 

As Fresnel pointed out at the time, "the 
supposition that the vibrations were transverse 
was contrary to the received ideas on the nature 
of the vibration of clastic fluids." They had all 
involved, as in the case of air as the medium for 
sound, a longitudinal transmission. The charac- 
ter of the ether is changed by the requirement 
that its particles vibrate transversely. It ceases 
to be an air-like ether and must be imagined as 
a jelly-like ether. 

The task which Huygens had postponed 
that of giving a mechanical explanation of the 
ether he had posited in order to state the me- 
chanics of light becomes in consequence far 
more difficult, if not impossible. In their efforts 
to construct "the ether as a jelly-like mechani- 
cal substance, physicists," according to Ein- 
stein, had to make so many "highly artificial 
and unnatural assumptions," that they finally 
decided to abandon the whole program of me- 
chanical explanation. 

OF NEWTON'S TWO objections to the wave 
theory of light, the second by itself seems to 
create an insuperable difficulty for Huygens' 
ether, even before the realization that it must 
be a jelly-like medium. 

Newton's first objection is that any wave 
theory is inconsistent with the fact of the rec- 
tilinear propagation of light. "If light consisted 
in pression or motion, propagated either in an 
instant or in time, it would bend into the shad- 
ow; for," he points out, "pression or motion 
cannot be propagated in a fluid in right lines, 
beyond an obstacle which stops part of the 
motion, but will bend and spread every way 
into the quiescent medium which lies beyond 
the obstacle. . . . The waves, pulses or vibra- 
tions of the air, wherein sound consists, bend 
manifestly, even though not so much as the 
waves of water." 

This objection loses its force when, in the 



CHAPTER 54: MECHANICS 



93 



1 9th century, light's bending is experimentally 
discovered. But Newton's other objection gains 
force when, two centuries after he made it, a 
jelly-like density is imposed upon the ether by 
the experimental facts of polarization. This 
second objection does not point to the inade- 
quacy of the wave theory with respect to the 
phenomena which must be described, but rath- 
er calls attention to its inconsistency with ce- 
lestial mechanics. 

Light travels through inter-stellar space. But 
so also do the planets. Newton's astronomy ac- 
counts for the motion of the planets with great 
precision, only on the supposition of no resistance 
from a medium. "To make way for the regular 
and lasting motions of the planets and comets," 
he writes, "it is necessary to empty the heavens 
of all matter, except perhaps . . . such an ex- 
ceedingly rare ethereal medium as we de- 
scribed above." Here he refers to the ether he 
himself had posited as a possible cause of gravi- 
tational attraction. Its resistance, he thinks, 
is "so small as to be inconsiderable." The 
"planets and comets and all gross bodies [can] 
perform their motions more freely in this 
ethereal medium than in any fluid, which fills 
all space adequately without leaving any 
pores." Such "a dense fluid . . . serves only to 
disturb and retard the motions of those great 
bodies, and make the frame of nature languish." 
Since it "hinders the operations of nature," and 
since "there is no evidence for its existence," 
Newton concludes that "it ought to be rejected." 

The next conclusion follows immediately. 
"If it be rejected, the hypotheses that light 
consists in pression or motion, propagated 
through such a medium, are rejected with it." 
Newton would seem entitled to draw these con- 
clusions because, no matter how slight the den- 
sity of ethereal matter, the use of the ether in 
the wave theory of light involves some interac- 
tion between the particles of ether and the par- 
ticles of matter. Unless such interaction takes 
place, no explanation can be given of the 
change in the velocity of light when it enters 
a medium like glass or water. Since in Newton's 
universe there is no difference between terres- 
trial and celestial matter, Newton cannot ac- 
cept an ether which interacts with the matter 
of glass or water, but does not interact with the 
matter of the planets. 



This objection of Newton's, pointing to an 
inconsistency between the kind of ether re- 
quired by the wave theory of light and the un- 
retarded motion of the heavenly bodies, ap- 
pears not to have been answered, but only 
waived, at the time of the wave theory's as- 
cendancy. The famous Michelson-Morley ex- 
periment on ether drift later re-opens Newton's 
penetrating query about the ether. But this 
occurs at a time when physicists are prepared to 
give up not only the ether, but also with it the 
mechanical explanations of gravity and light 
which it had brought into conflict with one 
another. 

BEFORE THE MECHANICAL dogma runs its 
course, it has a career in other fields of physical 
inquiry. The phenomena of heat, magnetism, 
and electricity are explored and explained un- 
der its inspiration. The history of these sub- 
jects is marked by a very rash of hypotheses. 
Each time mechanical explanation is attempted 
for a new domain of phenomena, new sub- 
stances are added. 

The postulated entities calorific, magneti- 
cal, and electric fluids- are unobservable and 
without weight. In Newton's terms, they are 
"occult"; though, it must be added, they are 
no more occult than the ether Newton himself 
postulated to explain gravity or the ether Huy- 
gens postulated to explain light. In fact, each 
of these new substances seems to resemble the 
aeriform or fluid ether, just as each is con- 
ceived, as the gravitational or optical ether was 
earlier conceived, in the context of the issue of 
action-at-a-distance as opposed to action-by- 
contact. They would seem to be unavoidable 
in a mechanical account of the radiations of 
heat, magnetism, and electricity. 

The phenomena of heat, Lavoisier writes, arc 
"difficult to comprehend . . . without admit- 
ting them as the effects of a real and material 
substance, or very subtle fluid Where- 
fore," he continues, "we have distinguished 
the cause of heat, or that exquisitely elastic 
fluid which produces it, by the term of caloric." 
Lavoisier declares himself "unable to determine 
whether light be a modification of caloric, or 
if caloric be, on the contrary, a modification of 
light." But in terms of observed effects he does 
attribute ether-like properties to caloric. "This 



94 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



subtle matter," he says, "penetrates through 
the pores of all known substances"; for "there 
are no vessels through which it cannot escape." 

The theory of caloric serves its purpose be- 
fore it gives way to the theory of heat as molec- 
ular motion, a conception which can be inte- 
grated with the molecular, or kinetic, theory of 
gases. "The development of the kinetic theory 
of matter," writes Einstein, "is one of the 
greatest achievements directly influenced by 
the mechanical view." It is all the more strik- 
ing, therefore, that in the opening pages of 
Fourier's Analytical Theory of Heat wherein 
he reviews the triumphs of explanation 
achieved by Newton and his successors 
Fourier should so flatly assert: "But whatever 
may be the range of mechanical theories, they 
do not apply to the effects of heat. These make 
up a special order of phenomena which cannot 
be explained by the principles of motion and 
equilibrium." 

It is equally striking that Lavoisier seems to 
have anticipated not only the mechanical 
theory of heat, but the possibility of a purely 
mathematical treatment of the phenomena. 
"We are not obliged to suppose [caloric] to be 
a real substance," he writes; it is sufficient 
"that it be considered as the repulsive cause, 
whatever that may be, which separates the 
particles of matter from each other, so that we 
are still at liberty to investigate its effects in an 
abstract and mathematical manner." 

The second of these two things is precisely 
what Fourier proposes to undertake, but he 
disavows any interest in the first, namely, the 
explanation of heat in terms of the mechanical 
separation of particles by repulsion. In language 
which resembles Newton's disavowal of concern 
with the cause of attraction, Fourier declares 
that "primary causes are unknown to us, but 
are subject to simple and constant laws, which 
may be discovered by observation." 

In another place he writes: "Of the nature 
of heat only uncertain hypotheses could be 
formed, but the knowledge of the mathemati- 
cal laws to which its effects arc subject is inde- 
pendent of all hypothesis." Fourier's aim, 
therefore, with respect to "the very extensive 
class of phenomena, not produced by mechani- 
cal forces, but resulting simply from the pres- 
ence and accumulation of heat," is "to reduce 



the physical questions to problems of pure anal- 
ysis" and "to express the most general condi- 
tions of the propagation of heat in differential 
equations." He expresses his indebtedness to 
Descartes for "the analytical equations" which 
that mathematician "was the first to introduce 
into the study of curves and surfaces," but 
"which arc not restricted to the properties of 
figures, and those properties which are the ob- 
ject of rational mechanics." These equations, 
he insists, "extend to all general phenomena," 
and "from this point of view, mathematical 
analysis is as extensive as nature itself." 

This strongly worded statement aflirms the 
mathematical character of nature as the sup- 
port and justification fora purely mathematical 
physics. If Fourier's remarks about causes and 
hypotheses arc reminiscent of Newton in his 
mathematical mood, how much more is Fou- 
rier's faith in pure mathematical analysis rem- 
iniscent of Galileo. Like Galileo, and unlike 
Newton, Fourier never deviates from his indif- 
ference to causes and never softens his judg- 
ment of the incompetence and irrelevance of 
mechanics to the subject he is investigating. 
His trust in mathematical analysis, which is 
able by itself to yield and organize physical 
discoveries, not only revives the spirit of Gal- 
ileo, but also seems to have inspired Clerk 
Maxwell to turn from a mechanical to a mathe- 
matical theory of electricity. 

Certain of Fourier's mathematical achieve- 
ments, such as his theory of dimensions, prove 
useful to Maxwell. More important, perhaps, 
is the fact that Maxwell's predictions about the 
propagation of electro-magnetic waves, later 
experimentally verified by Hertz, are the result 
of mathematical analysis. With such a demon- 
stration of the power of mathematics to work 
fruitfully with experiment, and without any aid 
from mechanical hypotheses, Maxwell gives up 
the attempt to formulate a mechanics for his 
equations describing the electro-magnetic field. 
He is quite content to let his field theory state 
the mathematical structure of the phenomena. 

BETWEEN FOURIER and Maxwell comes Fara- 
day. One of the greatest experimenters in the 
whole tradition of science, Faraday discovers 
the phenomena whose mathematical structure 
Maxwell later develops. He prepares the way 



CHAPTER 54: MECHANICS 



95 



for Maxwell's application to electricity and 
magnetism of the method Fourier had prac- 
ticed. His speculations concerning the relation 
of electrical and gravitational force point ahead, 
beyond Maxwell, to the possibility of a field 
theory which might unify all physical phenom- 
ena under a single set of mathematical laws. 

Faraday sees no incompatibility between ex- 
perimentation and speculation. On the con- 
trary he says that "as an experimentalist I feel 
bound to let experiment guide me into any 
train of thought which it may justify; being 
satisfied that experiment, like analysis, must 
lead to strict truth, if rightly interpreted; and 
believing also that it is in its nature far more 
suggestive of new trains of thought and new 
conditions of natural power." Faraday's faith 
seems to have been amply justified. His experi- 
ments not only discovered a stunning number 
of new facts, but the speculations to which they 
led transformed the whole mode of thinking 
about electricity and magnetism, and, to some 
extent, the whole of physics. 

The Elizabethan Gilbert, with his bold and 
brilliantly handled thesis that the earth is a 
magnet, had made magnetism appear some- 
thing more than a random phenomenon occa- 
sionally met with in nature. But not until 
Faraday's discovery of diamagnetism, an- 
nounced in a memoir On the Magnetic Condition 
of All M after > would anyone have dared to say 
that "all matter appears to be subject to the 
magnetic force as universally as it is to the 
gravitating, the electric and the chemical or 
cohesive forces." Of electricity, he can only 
predict, as the result of his protracted experi- 
mental investigations, that "it is probable that 
every effect depending upon the powers of in- 
organic matter . . . will ultimately be found 
subordinate to it." 

These remarks indicate the controlling 
theme of Faraday's researches, namely, the 
convertibility and unity of natural forces. It 
seems to have been suggested to him by the 
discovery that both electrical and magnetic 
forces obey the same simple inverse-square law 
as the force of gravitational attraction. The 
fact that certain forces obey the same law or 
that their action can be described by the same 
equations, would not of itself reveal whether 
one of these forces is primary or all are de- 



rivative from some other primary force. But it 
would suggest questions to be asked by experi- 
ment. 

Gilbert compares magnetism and electricity 
but he is not able to convert one into the other. 
Oersted, before Faraday, is the first to establish 
one aspect of their convertibility. He shows 
that an electric current has a magnetic effect. 
Faraday succeeds in showing the reverse that 
a magnetic current has electrical power. He 
expresses his fascination with such reversibili- 
ties in his remarks on the electrical torpedo 
fish. "Seebeck," he writes, "taught us how to 
commute heat into electricity; and Peltier has 
more lately given us the strict converse of this, 
and shown us how to convert electricity into 
heat. . . . Oersted showed how we were to con- 
vert electric into magnetic forces, and I had 
the delight of adding the other member of the 
full relation, by reacting back again and con- 
verting magnetic into electric forces. So per- 
haps in these organs, where nature has pro- 
vided the apparatus by means of which the 
fish can exert and convert nervous into electric 
force, we may be able, possessing in that point of 
view a power far beyond that of the fish itself, 
to reconvert the electric into the nervous force." 

Faraday demonstrates still another such re- 
versibility in nature. The nature of his discov- 
ery is indicated by the titles of the papers in 
which he announces it: On the Magnetization 
of Light and the Illumination of Magnetic Lines 
of Force and The Action of Electric Currents on 
Light. These papers, in his opinion, "established 
for the first time, a true, direct relation and 
dependence between light and the magnetic 
and electric forces"; and he concludes them 
with an explicit statement of the central theme 
of all his researches and speculations. 

"Thus a great addition is made," he writes, 
"to the facts and considerations which tend to 
prove that all natural forces are tied together 
and have one common origin. It is no doubt 
difficult in the present state of our knowledge 
to express our expectation in exact terms; and, 
though I have said that another of the powers 
of nature is, in these experiments, directly 
related to the rest, I ought, perhaps, rather to 
say that another form of the great power is 
distinctly and directly related to the other 
forms." 



96 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



ONE FORM OF the "great power" remained to 
be connected with such "other forms" as those 
of light, heat, electricity, and magnetism. That 
was the power of gravitational force. Faraday 
comes to this last stage of his speculations con- 
cerning the unity of nature's powers in terms 
of his conception of "lines of force" and of what 
later came to be called "the field of force." 

The earliest theories of electricity and mag- 
netism, in an orthodox atomistic vein, had con- 
ceived them as exerting an influence by means 
of the effluvia which they emitted. Newton, for 
example, speculates on "how the effluvia of a 
magnet can be so rare and subtle, as to pass 
through a plate of glass without any resistance 
or diminution of their force, and yet so potent 
as to turn a magnetic needle beyond the glass." 
When electrical conduction is later discovered, 
effluvia arc replaced by fluids, on the analogy of 
caloric as the fluid conductor of heat. But when 
Faraday finds that he can induce from one cur- 
rent to another, he becomes interested in the 
dielectric, non-conducting medium around the 
circuits. He is strongly averse to any theory 
which involves action-at-a-distance, and so he 
argues that induction takes place by the action 
of contiguous particles. To support that argu- 
ment he shows experimentally that electrical 
induction can "turn a corner." 

From his study of all the phenomena of mag- 
netism, Faraday forms the conception of "lines 
of force" and concludes that there is "a center 
of power surrounded by lines offeree which are 
physical lines essential both to the existence of 
force within the magnet and to its conveyance 
to, and exertion upon, magnetic bodies at a 
distance." He says of this "idea of lines of 
force" that "all the points which are experi- 
mentally established with regard to [magnetic] 
action, />., all that is not hypothetical, appear 
to be well and truly represented by it"; and 
he adds: "Whatever idea we employ to repre- 
sent the power ought ultimately to include 
electric forces, for the two are so related that 
one expression ought to serve for both." 

Subsequently Faraday satisfies himself as to 
the physical reality of electrical lines of force 
in addition to the magnetic lines. The com- 
pulsion of his interest in the unity of nature then 
drives him to speculate about gravitational 
force. He begins by admitting that, "in the case 



of gravitation, no effect sustaining the idea of 
an independent or physical line of force is 
presented to us; as far as we at present know, 
the line of gravitation is merely an ideal line 
representing the direction in which the power 
is exerted." But encouraged, perhaps, by New- 
ton's repeated references to "the attractions of 
gravity, magnetism, and electricity," and by 
Newton's letter to Bentley which he interprets 
as showing Newton to be "an unhesitating be- 
liever in physical lines of gravitating force," 
Faraday goes to work experimentally. 

The report of these researches On the Possible 
Relation of Gravity to Electricity opens with the 
re-statement of Faraday's central theme. "The 
long and constant persuasion that all the forces 
of nature are mutually dependent, having one 
origin, or rather being different manifestations 
of one fundamental power, has made me often 
think of establishing, by experiment, a connex- 
ion between gravity and electricity, and so 
introducing the former into the group, the 
chain of which, including also magnetism, 
chemical force and heat, binds so many and 
such varied exhibitions of force together by 
common relations." His experiments, he tells 
us, unfortunately "produced only negative 
results," but that docs not shake his "strong 
feeling of the existence of a relation between 
gravity and electricity." 

THOUGH FARADAY FAILS to prove "that such 
a relation exists," he does bequeath, as a legacy 
to 20th century physics, the problem of a field 
theory which would embrace both gravita- 
tional and electrical force. But whereas Faraday 
conceives the problem mechanically in terms 
of the physical reality, as well as unity, of all 
lines of force, in which contiguous particles 
act on one another, those who inherit the prob- 
lem from him cease to concern themselves with 
the physical existence of "lines of force" and 
their mechanical basis in the action and reac- 
tion of bodies. Influenced by the amazing gen- 
erality implicit in Maxwell's field equations, 
they proceed to search for a purely mathe- 
matical statement of nature's structure. 

In the judgment of the 20th century physi- 
cist mathematics may at last succeed in doing 
precisely what mechanics, from Newton to 
Faraday, kept promising but forever failing to 



CHAPTER 54: MECHANICS 



97 



do. If the unity of nature can be expressed in 
a single set of laws, they will be, according to 
Einstein, laws of a type radically different from 
the laws of mechanics. Taking the form of 
Maxwell's equations, a form which appears "in 
all other equations of modern physics," they 
will be, he writes, "laws representing the 
structure of the field." 

In saying that "Maxwell's equations are 
structure laws" and that they provide "a new 
pattern for the laws of nature," Einstein means 
to emphasize their non-mechanical character. 
"In Maxwell's theory," he writes, "there arc no 
material actors." Whereas "Newton's gravita- 
tional laws connect the motion of a body here 
and now with the action of a body at the same 
time in the far distance," Maxwell's equations 
"connect events which happen now and here 
with events which will happen a little later in 
the immediate vicinity." Like the equations 
which describe "the changes of the electro- 
magnetic field, our new gravitational laws are," 
according to Einstein, "also structure laws de- 
scribing the changes of the gravitational field." 

The heart of the difference between a "struc- 
ture law" and a mechanical law seems to be con- 
tained in Einstein's statement that "all space 
is the scene of these laws and not, as for me- 
chanical laws, only points in which matter or 
changes are present." This contrast between 
matter and space brings to mind the difference 
between physics and geometry. Yet Einstein's 
repeated reference to "changes" in these space- 
structures also reminds us that the electrical 
and gravitational fields are not purely geomet- 
rical, but physical as well. 

The structure laws of the new physics may 
be geometrical in form, but if they are to have 
any physical meaning, can they entirely avoid 
some coloring by the mechanical conceptions 
which have been traditionally associated with 
the consideration of matter and motion? At 
least one contemporary physicist appears to 
think that mechanics survives to bury its un- 
dertakers. After describing the development in 
which geometry progressively "swallowed up 
the whole of mechanics," Eddington observes 
that "mechanics in becoming geometry re- 
mains none the less mechanics. The partition 
between mechanics and geometry," he con- 
tinues, "has broken down and the nature of 



each of them has diffused through the whole"; 
so that "besides the geometrisation of mechan- 
ics, there has been a mechanisation of geom- 
etry." 

According to this view, it is not mechanics, 
but classical mechanics, which the new physics 
has abandoned. The character of the mechanics 
seems to have altered with the character of the 
mathematical formulations. Field theory, deal- 
ing with contiguous areas and successive events, 
avoids the problem of action-at-a-distance and 
also apparently that problem's classical solution 
in terms of the action of contiguous particles. 
But another sort of mechanics may be implicit 
in the field equations which connect events in 
one area with events in the immediate vicinity. 
If those equations had been available to him, 
Newton might have expressed his theory of a 
variably dense ether analogous to the modern 
conception of a variably filled or variably 
curved space in terms of structure laws de- 
scribing the gravitational field. 

WE ARE LEFT with a number of questions. Is the 
story of mechanics the story of its rise and de- 
cline or the story of its changing role now 
dominant, now subordinate; now more mani- 
fest, now more concealed at all stages in the 
development of a physics which is committed 
to being both mathematical and experimental? 
Do the status and character of mechanical con- 
ceptions change with changes in the form of the 
mathematical laws which describe the phenom- 
ena ? Can physics be totally devoid of mechan- 
ical insight and yet perform experiments which 
somehow require the scientist to act on bodies 
and to make them act on one another? Could 
a pure mathematical physics have yielded pro- 
ductive applications in mechanical engineering 
without the intermediation of mechanical no- 
tions of cause and effect ? 

Whichever way these questions are answered, 
we face alternatives that seem to be equally 
unsatisfactory. Either experimental physics is 
purely mathematical and proclaims its disin- 
terest in as well as its ignorance of causes; or 
physics cannot be experimental and mathe- 
matical without also being mechanical, and 
without being involved in a search for causes 
which are never found. l 

To the layman there is something mysterious 



98 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



about all this. He stands in awe of the physi- 
cist's practical mastery of matter and its mo- 
tions, which he naively supposes to depend 
upon a scientific knowledge of the causes, while 
all the time the scientists protest that the causes 
remain unknown to an experimental and 
mathematical physics. Mechanical explana- 
tions may be offered from time to time, but the 
various "forces" they appeal to can be under- 
stood only from their effects, and are nothing 
more than verbal shorthand for the formulae 
or equations which express the mathematical 
laws. Yet they remain cause-names, and seem 
to stimulate advances in science both experi- 
mental and mathematical almost as a conse- 
quence of the exasperating elusiveness of these 
hidden causes. 

Certain philosophers hold a view which sug- 
gests that the clue to the mystery may lie in 
the word "hidden." Causes exist and we can 
control them to build machines and explode 
bombs, but we cannot with our senses catch 
them in the very act of causing, or perceive the 
inwardness of their operation. If the fact that 
they are thus unobservable means that they 
are occult, then all causes are occult not least 
of all the mechanical type of cause which con- 
sists in the impact of one body upon another. 
In the century in which physicists tried to 
avoid the scandal of forces acting at a distance 
by postulating mechanical mediums through 
which one body acted directly on another, 
philosophers like Locke and Hume express their 
doubts that such causal action is any less oc- 
cult than Newton had said Aristotle's causes 



were. 



"The passing of motion out of one body into 
another," Locke thinks, "is as obscure and un- 
conceivable, as how our minds move or stop our 
bodies by thought. . . . The increase of motion 
by impulse, which is observed or believed some- 
times to happen, is yet harder to understand. 
We have by daily experience, clear evidence of 
motion produced both by impulse and by 
thought; but the manner how, hardly comes 
within our comprehension; we are equally at a 



loss in both." In Locke's judgment we will al- 
ways remain "ignorant of the several powers, 
efficacies, and ways of operation, whereby the 
effects, which we daily see, are produced." If 
scientific knowledge is knowledge of causes, 
then "how far soever human industry may ad- 
vance useful and experimental philosophy in 
physical things, scientifical will still be out of 
our reach." 

When we try to observe efficient causes at 
work, what do we see ? Hume answers that we 
only see one thing happening after another. 
"The impulse of one billiard-ball is attended 
with motion in the second. This is the whole 
that appears to the outward senses." Nor can 
we form any "inward impression" of what takes 
place at the moment of impact. "We are ig- 
norant," he writes, "of the manner in which 
bodies operate on each other"; and we shall 
always remain so, for "their force or energy is 
entirely incomprehensible." 

As the chapter on CAUSE indicates, Aristotle 
holds an opposite view of the matter. What 
takes place in efficient causation may be im- 
perceptible, but it is not incomprehensible. All 
causes may be occult so far as the senses are 
concerned, but they are not obscure to the in- 
tellect. But Aristotle would also insist that the 
action of efficient causes cannot be understood 
if they are totally isolated from other causes- 
material, formal, final. A purely mechanical 
physics, in his opinion, defeats itself by its basic 
philosophical tenets, which exclude all proper- 
ties that are not quantitative and all causes ex- 
cept the efficient. Only a different metaphysics 
one which conceives physical substances in 
terms of matter and form, or potentiality and 
actuality can yield a physics which is able to 
deal with causes and explain the phenomena; 
but such an Aristotelian physics, from the mod- 
ern point of view, stands condemned on other 
grounds. It is not experimental. It is not pro- 
ductive of useful applications. It is not mathe- 
matical; nor is it capable of comprehending all 
the phenomena of nature under a few simple, 
universal laws, 



CHAPTER 54: MECHANICS 99 

OUTLINE OF TOPICS 

PAGE 

1. The foundations of mechanics 101 

i a. Matter, mass, and atoms: the primary qualities of bodies 

ib. The laws of motion: inertia; the measure offeree; action and reaction 

ic. Space and time in the analysis of motion 102 

2. The logic and method of mechanics 

20. The role of experience, experiment, and induction in mechanics 

zb. The use of hypotheses in mechanics 103 

2c. Theories of causality in mechanics 

3. The use of mathematics in mechanics: the dependence of progress in mechanics on 

mathematical discovery 

3. Number and the continuum: the theory of measurement 
3#. The geometry of conies: the motion of planets and projectiles 

y. Algebra and analytic geometry: the symbolic formulation of mechanical 

problems 104 

$d. Calculus: the measurement of irregular areas and variable motions 

4. The place, scope, and ideal of the science of mechanics: its relation to the philosophy of 

nature and other sciences 

40. Terrestrial and celestial mechanics: the mechanics of finite bodies and of parti- 
cles or atoms 

4#. The explanation of qualities and qualitative change in terms of quantity and 
motion 

4^. The mechanistic account of the phenomena of life 

5. The basic phenomena and problems of mechanics: statics and dynamics 105 

50. Simple machines: the balance and the lever 

5^. The equilibrium and motion of fluids: buoyancy, the weight and pressure of air, 
the effects of a vacuum 

y. Stress, strain, and elasticity: the strength of materials 

^d. Motion, void, and medium: resistance and friction 

$e. Rectilinear motion 106 

(1) Uniform motion: its causes and laws 

(2) Accelerated motion: free fall 

5/! Motion about a center: planets, projectiles, pendulum 

(1) Determination of orbit, force, speed, time, and period 

(2) Perturbation of motion: the two and three body problems 



100 THE GREAT IDEAS 

PACE 

6. Basic concepts of mechanics 106 

6a. Center of gravity: its determination for one or several bodies 
6b. Weight and specific gravity: the relation of mass and weight 

6c. Velocity, acceleration, and momentum: angular or rectilinear, average or 

instantaneous 107 

6d. Force: its kinds and its effects 

(1) The relation of mass and force: the law of universal gravitation 

(2) Action-at-a-distance: the field and medium offeree 

(3) The parallelogram law: the composition of forces and the composition of 

velocities 108 

6e. Work and energy: their conservation; perpetual motion 

7. The extension of mechanical principles to other phenomena: optics, acoustics, the 

theory of heat, magnetism, and electricity 

ja. Light: the corpuscular and the wave theory 

(1) The laws of reflection and refraction 

(2) The production of colors 

(3) The speed of light 

(4) The medium of light: the ether 109 
7& Sound: the mechanical explanation of acoustic phenomena 

yc. The theory of heat 

(1) The description and explanation of the phenomena of heat: the hypothesis 

of caloric 

(2) The measurement and the mathematical analysis of the quantities of heat 
jd. Magnetism: the great magnet of the earth 

(1) Magnetic phenomena: coition, verticity, variation, dip 

(2) Magnetic force and magnetic fields 

ye. Electricity: electrostatics and electrodynamics no 

(1) The source of electricity: the relation of the kinds of electricity 

(2) Electricity and matter: conduction, insulation, induction, electrochemical 

decomposition 

(3) The relation of electricity and magnetism: the electromagnetic field 

(4) The relation of electricity to heat and light: thermoelectricity 

(5) The measurement of electric quantities 



CHAPTER 54: MECHANICS 



101 



REFERENCES 

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page 
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK u [265-283] 12d, the 
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas- 
sage is in section d of page 12. 

PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the 
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES : Psychology, 116a-l 19b, the passage 
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is 
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left- 
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of 
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half 
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164. 

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS : One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, 
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer- 
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d. 

BIBLE REFERENCES : The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James 
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King 
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA- 
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46. 

SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially 
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit- 
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited. 

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of 
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface. 



L. The foundations of mechanics 

[a. Matter, mass, and atoms: the primary quah- 
ties of bodies 

8 ARISTOTLE: Heavens, BK HI, CH 4 [303 B 3- b 8] 

394b-d / Generation and Corruption, BK I, 

CH 2 410d-413c; CH 8 423b-425d 
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 12, 173a-b 
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [146-328] 

2d-5a; [483-634] 7a-8d; BK n [333-568] i9b- 

22b 
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 115, 

A i, ANS and REP 3,5 585d-587c 
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 72a-d; PART HI, 

172a-b; PART iv, 269d 

28 GILBERT : Loadstone, *K n, 29c-34b esp 29c-30a 
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 

134a-153a passim 

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK i, APH 66 114d- 
115c; BK n, APH 8 140b; APH 48 179d-188b 

31 DESCARTES: Meditations, n, 78c-d / Objec- 
lions and Replies, DEF vn 130c-d; 231a-232a 

33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 367a-368b 

34 NEWTON: Principles, DEF i 5a; DEF m 5b; BK 
i, PROP 73, SCHOL 133b-134a; BK n, GENERAL 
SCHOL, 218a-219a; PROP 40, SCHOL, 246a-b; 
BK HI, RULE HI 270b-271a; PROP 6, COROL 
HI-IV 281b; PROP 7 281b 282b / Optics, BK 



n, 479b-485b; BK in, 520a-522a; 52 8b; 53 la- 

543a esp 537a-b, 541b-542a 
34HuYGENs: Light, CH i, 558b-560a; CH m, 

566b-569b; CH v, 601b-603b 
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH iv 

129b-131a; CH vm, SECT 7-26 134b-138b 

passim; CH xm, SECT 11-27 150d-154d pas- 

sim; CH xxi, SECT 2-4 178c-179c; CH xxm, 

SECT 7-17 205d-209a passim; SECT 22-32 

209d-212d; CH xxxi, SECT 2, 239d; BK in, 

CH x, SECT 15 295a-c 
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 9-18 

414d-416c passim; SECT 50 422c; SECT 102 

432d 433a 
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREP, 3b- 

4a; PART i, 9a-15c passim, esp 9b-c, 13a b; 

16b-c; 41b-c 

45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 169a-170a 
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 685d 686c; 

850b,d-855a,c 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 68a-b 

54 FREUD: Narcissism, 400d-401a 

, - . f . 

The laws o f motion: inertia; the measure 

of force; action and reaction 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vm, CH 10 [266*27- 
267*21] 354b-d / Heavens, BK in, CH 2 
[30i*2i- b 3i] 392c-393b 



102 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



\c to la 



(1. The foundations of mechanics, Ib. The laws 
of motion: inertia; the measure of force; 
action and reaction!) 
9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH 2-4 233c- 

235c / Gait of Animals, CH 3 243d-244a / 

Generation of Animals, BK iv, en 3 [768 b i6-24] 

310b-c 
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK n [80-99] 

16a-b; [184-250] 17b-18b 
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 894a-895b; 899a- 

900a; 905a-906b; 933b-934b; 936a-937a; 

938b-939a 
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART HI, Q 84, 

A 3, REP 2 985d-989b 
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 50a; 72a-d; PART 

iv, 271d 

28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK 11, 56b-c 
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY, 

209a-210a; 224d-225d; FOURTH DAY, 240a-d 
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK H, APH 35-36 

162a-168d passim; APH 48 179d-188b 

34 NEWTON: Principles, DLF in 5b; LAWS OF 
MOTION 14a-24a; BK u, PROP 40, SCIIOL, 
246a-b / Optics, BK in, 541b-542a 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, en 
xxi, SECT 2-4 178c-179c; en xxm, SECT 17 
209a 

35 BLRKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT in, 

434d 
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT iv, DIV 

27, 460c; SECT vii, DIV 57, 475d-476b 

[fn 2] 

38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i, Ib 
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 169a-b 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 695a-c 

If. Space and time in the analysis of motion 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vi 312b,d~325d 
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY, 

201a202a 
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 45 46 

176a-179a 

33 PASCAL: Geometrical Demonstration, 434a- 
439b 

34 NLWTON: Principles, DEFINITIONS, SCHOL 8b- 
13a; UK in, GENERAL SCHOL, 370a~371a / Op- 
tics, UK in, 528b 529a; 542a-543a 

35 BERKLLEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 110-117 
434b-436a 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 24a-29d; 74b-76c; 160b- 

163a 

45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 249a-251b 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 469a-d 

2. The logic and method of mechanics 

28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, SECOND DAY, 
179c d; THIRD DAY, 200a-b; 202d 203a 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 34b / No- 
vum Oiganum, PREF 105a-106d; BK i, APH 8 
107c-d; APH 50 lllb; APH 64 114b; APH 70 
116b-117a; APH 82 120d-121b; APH 99-100 



127b-c; APH 121 132b-d; BK n 137a-195d / 
New Atlantis, 210d-214d 
31 DESCARTES: Rules, vin, 12b 13a / Discourse, 
PART vi, 61d 62c 

33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 355a 358b passim; 365b- 
366a 

34 NEWTON: Principles, la-2a; BK i, PROP 69, 
SCHOL 130b-131a; BK in, 269a-b; RULES 
270a-271b; GENERAL SCHOL, 371b-372a / Op- 
tics, BK in, 531b; 543a-b 

34HuYGENs: Light, PREF, 551b-552a; CH i, 
553b-554a 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH in, 
SECT 16 317a-c; SECT 25-29 321a-323a passim; 
CH xn, SECT 9-13 360d-362d 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 104 

433a-b; SECT 107 433d-434a 
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT iv, DIV 

23-27 459a-460d esp DIV 26-27 460b-d; SECT 

vn, DIV 57, 475d-476b [fn 2] 
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 6b c; 17d-18d; 32a; 69c- 

72c esp 71b-72a 

45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 169a 170a 
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 440b,d; 

758a-759c; 831a-d; 850b,d-855a,c esp 850b,d- 

851c 
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 239c 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 882a-884b 

54 FREUD: Instincts, 412a-b 

2a. The role of experience, experiment, and 
induction in mechanics 

28 GILBERT: Loadstone, PREF, la-b; BK i, 6a-7a 

esp 6d-7a; BK 11, 27b-c 
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY, 

200a-b; 207d-208a 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 16a; 33d- 
34b;42a-c 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, vin, 12b-13a / Discourse, 
PART vi, 61d-62c 

33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 356a-357a 

34 NEWTON: Principles, BK i, PROP 69, SCHOL 
130b 131a; BK in, RULL iv 271b; GENERAL 
SCHOL, 371b-372a / Optics, BK i, 379a; BK in, 
542a; 543a-b 

34 HUYGENS: Light, CH i, 553a 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH in, 
SECT 16 317a-c; SECT 25-29 321a 323a passim; 
CH xn, SECT 9-13 360d-362d 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 58-59 

424a-b; SECT 104 433a-b; SECT 107 433d- 

434a 
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT iv, DIV 

24-27 459b-460d esp DIV 26 460b-c; SECT 

vn, DIV 57, 475d-476b [fn 2] 
42 KANT: Pute Reason, 6b-c; 227b-c 
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREF, Ic- 

2b; PART i, 23c; PART in, 87b-c 
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 175b; 181b; 184a 
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 385 b-c; 

440b,d; 467a-b; 607a,c; 659a; 774d-775a 
53 JAMES: Psychology, 864a 



2b to 3t> 



CHAPTER 54: MECHANICS 



103 



26. The use of hypotheses in mechanics 

12 LUCRETIUS : Nature of Things, BK v [509-533] 

67d-68a 
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FOURTH DAY, 

240d-241c 

33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 367a-370a 

34 NEWTON: Principles, BK in, RULE iv 271b; 
GENERAL scHOL, 371b-372a / Optics, BK i, 
379a; BK in, 528b; 543a 

34 HUYGENS: Light, PREF, 551b-552a 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH in, 
SECT 16 317a-c; CH xn, SECT 12-1 } 362a-d 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 50 422c; 
SECT 105-106 433b-d 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vn, DIV 
57, 475d-476b [fn 2] 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 118b-119a 
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 227b-c 

45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i, 9d- 

lOb 

45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 181b; 184a 
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 467a-b; 

607a,c; 758a-759c; 777d-778c; 850b,d-855a,c 

esp 850b,d-851c 
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 239c 

53 JAMES : Psychology, 884a-b 

54 FREUD: Narcissism, 400d-401a 

2c. Theories of causality in mechanics 
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [509-533] 

67d-68a 
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY, 

202d-203a 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART v, 59a 
34 NEWTON: Principles, DEF vm, 7b~8a; BK i, 
PROP 69, SCHOL 130b-131a; BK in, RULE i-n 
270a; GENERAL SCHOL, 369b-372a / Optics, 
BK in, 528b-529a; 531b; 541b-542a 

34 HUYGENS: Light, CH i, 553b-554a 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xxi, 
SECT 1-4 178b-179c; BK iv, CH in, SECT 25-26 
321a-c 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 50-53 
422c-423a passim; SECT 60-66 424b-426a; 
SECT 102-109 432d-434b 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT iv, DIV 
24-27 459b-460d esp DIV 26 460b-c; SECT vn, 
DIV 55, 474c-d; DIV 56-57 475a-d esp DIV 57, 
475d [fn 2]; SECT vm, DIV 64, 478d 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 118b-119a 

45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 169a; 183a-b 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 687d; 

695b-c 
53 JAMES: Psychology, 885b-886a 

3. The use of mathematics in mechanics: the 
dependence of progress in mechanics on 
mathematical discovery 

8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 9 
104b-d; CH 13 [78 b 3 1-79*1 6] 108b-c / Physics, 
BK ii, CH 2 [194*7-11] 270b-c; BK vn, CH 5 



333a-d / Metaphysics, BK xin, CH 3 [1078*5- 

17] 609b-c 
11 ARCHIMEDES: Equilibrium of Planes 502a- 

519b / Floating Bodies 538a-560b / Method 

569a-592a 

14 PLUTARCH: Marcellus, 252a-255a 
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK v, 964b-965a 
19 AQUINAS : Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 35, 

A 8, ANS 779c-780c 
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 72a-d; 73b; PART 

iv, 268c-d 
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 

131b-132a; 133b; SECOND DAY -FOURTH DAY 

178a-260a,c 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 46b-c 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, iv, 7a; xiv, 31c-d / Dis- 
course, PART i, 43b-c; PART in, 50d / Objec- 
tions and Replies, 169c-170a / Geometry, BK n, 
322b-331a 

34 NEWTON: Principles, la-2a; DEF vm 7b-8a; 
BK i, PROP 1-17 and SCHOL 32b-50a; PROP 30- 
98 and SCHOL 76a-157b esp PROP 69, SCHOL 
130b-131a; BK 11 159a 267a; UK in, 269a-b 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, stcr w, DIV 
27 460c-d 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 94b-103a 
42 KANT: Judgement, 551a-552a 

45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 169a b; 172a-173b; 

175b; 177a; 182b-184a; 249a-b 
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 831a-d 

50 MARX: Capital, 170a-c 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 469a-d 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 675b; 876a-b; 882a-883a 

3tf. Number and the continuum: the theory of 
measurement 

11 EUCLID: Elements, BK v 81a 98b rsp DLMNI- 
TIONS, 5 81a; BK vn, DEFINITIONS, 20 127b; BK 
x, PROP 1-2 191b-193a; PROP 5-9 195a-198b 
11 ARCHIMEDES: Measurement of a Cm If, PROP 3 
448b-451b / Conoids and Spheroids, PROP 3-6 
458b-460b / Equilibrium of Planes, BK i, 
PROP 6-7 503b-504b 
16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK i, 18b-20b 
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY, 

197b-200a; 205b 206c 
31 DESCARTES: Rules, xiv, 31b-33b / Geometry, 

BK i, 295a-296b 

34 NEWTON: Principles, BK i, LLMMA i 25a 
42 K\NT: Judgement, 551a-552a 
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 183a-b 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 469a-d 

3^. The geometry of conies: the motion of 
planets and projectiles 

11 ARCHIMEDES: Quadrature of the Parabola 

527a-537b 

11 APOLLONIUS: Conies 603a-804b 
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK v, 975a-979b 
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, SECOND DAY 

191c-195c; FOURTH DAY 238a-260a,c passim, 

esp 238b-240a 



104 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



3c to 4<r 



(3. The use of mathematics in mechanics: the de- 
pendence of progress m mechanics on 
mathematical discovery. 36. The geom- 
etry of conies: the motion of planets and 
projectiles!) 

31 DESCARTES: Geometry, BK i-n, 298b-314b 

34 NEWTON: Principles, BK i, PROP 11-29 and 
SCHOL 42b-75b esp PROP 11-13 42b-46a; BK 
in, PROP 13 286a-b; PROP 40 337b-338a 

34HuYGENs: Light, CH v, 583b-598a; 604b- 
606b; CH vi, 607b-611a 

42 KANT. Judgement, 551a-552a 

3<r. Algebra and analytic geometry: the sym- 
bolic formulation of mechanical prob- 
lems 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, iv, 5c-d; xiv, 30d-33b; 

xvi 33d-35c; xvm 36b-39d / Geometry 295a- 

353b esp BK i-n, 298b-314b, BK n, 322b- 

331a 
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK i, LEMMA 19 57b- 

58b 

34 HUYGENS: Light^ CH vi, 610a-b 
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PREP, la 
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 172a-173b; 177a- 

251b 

3</. Calculus: the measurement of irregular 
areas and variable motions 

11 ARCHIMEDES: Equilibrium of Planes, BK i, 

PROP 7 504b / Quadrature of the Parabola 

527a-537b 
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK v, 973a-975a; 979b- 

983b 
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, SECOND DAY, 

193b-194d; THIRD DAY, 205b-d; 224b-c 

33 PASCAL: Equilibrium of Liquids, 395a-b / 
Geometrical Demonstration, 434b-435b 

34 NEWTON: Principles, BK i, LEMMA i-n and 
SCHOL 25a*32a esp LEMMA n, SCHOL, 31a-b; 
BK ii, LEMMA 2 and SCHOL 168a-170a 

45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 172b; 177a; 181a-b; 

183a-b; 221a-248b 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 469a-d; 

EPILOGUE ii, 695b-c 

4. The place, scope, and ideal of the science of 
mechanics: its relation to the philosophy 
of nature and other sciences 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 72a-d 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 16a-b; 33d- 
34b / Novum Organum, BK i, APH 74 118b; 
BK n, APH 9 140b-c / New Atlantis, 210d- 
214d 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, iv, 7a; v, 8a / Discourse, 
PART v, 54d-56a; 59a 

34 NEWTON: Principles, lb-2a; BK i, PROP 69, 
SCHOL 130b-131a / Optics, BK in, 541b-542a 

34 HUYGENS: Light, CH i, 553b-554a 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 9, 
454c-d 



36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 94b-103a 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 32a; 69c-72c esp 71b-72a 

/ Judgement, 563a-564c 
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 169a-b; 172a-173b; 

182a-184a 

45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 468d-469a 
53 JAMES: Psychology, 69b-70a; 882a-886a esp 

883a-884b; 889a-890a 

4a. Terrestrial and celestial mechanics: the 
mechanics of finite bodies and of parti- 
cles or atoms 

9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH 3 [699*11]- 

CH 4 [7oo ft 5] 234a-235a 
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 888b-905a passim; 

919b; 929a-933a; 935b; 940b-941a; 959a- 

960a 
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FOURTH DAY, 

245b-d 

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK H, APH 5 138b- 
139a; APH 35 162a-164a; APH 36, 165c-166c; 
APH 46, 178c; APH 48, 186c-d 

34 NEWTON: Principles, BK HI, RULES 270a-271b; 

PROP 7 281b-282b / Optics, BK in, 539a- 

542b 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xm, 563a-b; 

EPILOGUE ii, 694d-696d 

4b. The explanation of qualities and qualitative 
change in terms of quantity and motion 

8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK i, CH 4 [985 b 3~i9] 

503c-d / Sense and the Sensible, CH 4 [442*30- 

b 24] 680a-c 
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 2, 167b- 

168b 
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK ii [398-521] 

20a-21c; [677-687] 23c-d; [730-1022] 24b- 

28a; BK iv [522-721] 51a-53d 
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 49b-d; PART in, 

172b 

31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 231a-b 
34 NEWTON: Optics, BK i, 431a-455a esp 450a- 

453a 

34 HUYGENS: Light, CH i, 553b-554a 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK ii, CH vm, 
SECT 4 133d; SECT 7-26 134b-138b; CH xxi, 
SECT 3 178d; SECT 75 200b-d; CH xxm, SECT 
8-9 206a-c; SECT n 206d-207a; SECT 37 213d- 
214b; CH xxxi, SECT 2 239b-d esp 239d; 

BK III, CH IV, SECT 10 261b-dj BK IV, CH II, 

SECT 11-13 311c-312b; CH in, SECT 6, 314b; 

SECT 12-14 316a-d; SECT 28 322a-c 
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 25 417d- 

418a; SECT 102 432d-433a 
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 169b; 182a-b 

4c. The mechanistic account of the phenomena 
of life 

7 PLATO: Phaedo, 240d-242b / Sophist, 567a- 
568a 

8 ARISTOTLE: Sense and the Sensible, CH 4 

a-c 



5to5d 



CHAPTER 54: MECHANICS 



105 



9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i [640** 
5-641*19] 163a-164a / Motion of Animals, 
CH 7 [70i b i-3<>] 236d-237b; CH 8 [702*22]- 
cn 10 [703 b i] 237c-239a / Gait of Animals 
243a-252a,c / Generation of Animals, BK n, 
CH i [734 b 3-2o] 275a-b; CH 5 [74i b 5-io] 282c 

10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH I2-BK n, 
CH 8 172d-195c esp BK i, en 12 172d-173c, 
BK n, CH 3, 185a, CH 6 188c-191a; BK in, CH 
14-15, 213b-214c 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK n [865- 
1022] 26a-28a; BK in [94-869] 31b-41a; BK v 
[783-836] 71b-72a 

23 HOB BBS: Leviathan, INTRO, 47a-b 

28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 355b-d; 
495c-496d 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART v, 56a-60b 

34 NEWTON: Optics, BK i, 384b-385b; 428a-b; 
BK HI, 518b-519b; 522a 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH ix, 
SECT ii 140b-c; CH x, SECT 10 143c-d; CH 
xi, SECT ii 145d-146a; CH xxvn, SECT 5 
220b-c; BK iv, CH in, SECT 25 321a-b 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 337d-338a / Political 

Economy, 368d-369a 
42 KANT: Judgement, 571c-572a; 575b-578a; 

578d-582c 

45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i, 14a 
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 440 b,d; 

540a-541a,c 

49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 89b-c 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK x, 449b-c; 
EPILOGUE n, 689c-690a 

53 IAMES: Psychology, 5a-6b; 9a-17b; 44a-52a; 
68a-71a; 95b-98a' 

54 FREUD: Instincts, 412c-414c / Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, 651d-657d passim, csp 
651d, 652d; 659d-661c esp 660a / Ego and 
Id, 708d-709b; 711c-d 

5. The basic phenomena and problems of me- 
chanics: statics and dynamics 

5a. Simple machines: the balance and the lever 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vin, CH 4 [255*20-22] 
339d 

10 HIPPOCRATES: Fractures, par 31, 87c 

11 ARCHIMEDES: Equilibrium of Planes, BK i, 
POSTULATES, 1-3 502a; 6 502b; PROP 1-3 
502b-503a; PROP 6-7 503b-504b 

14 PLUTARCH: Marcellus, 252c-d 

16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 933b-934b; BK v, 

970b-972a 
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, SECOND DAY, 

178b-180c; THIRD DAY, 209a-210a; FOURTH 

DAY, 258c d 

33 PASCAL: Equilibrium of Liquids, 390a 394b 

34 NEWTON: Principles, COROL n 15a-16b; LAWS 
OF MOTION, SCHOL, 23a-24a 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT iv, DIV 
27, 460c 

50 MARX: Capital, 181a 



5b. The equilibrium and motion of fluids: 
buoyancy, the weight and pressure of 
air, the effects of a vacuum 
8 ARISTOTLE: Heavens, BK iv, CH 6 404d-405a,c 

10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 16, 181a d; 
BK n, CH 1-2, 183b,d-184c; CH 6 188c-191a; 
BK in, CH 14-15, 213b-214c 

11 ARCHIMEDES: Floating Bodies 538a-560b 

28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRS r DAY, 135b- 

138b; 163a-166c 
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 48, 180a 

33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 359a-365b / Great Experi- 
ment 382a-389b / Equilibrium of Liquids 390a- 
403a / Weight of Air 403a-429a 

34 NEWTON: Principles, BK n, PROP 19-23 and 
SCHOL 194b-203a; PROP 36 226a-231b; HY- 
POTHESIS-PROP 53 and SCHOL 259a 267a; BK 
in, PROP 41, 356b-357b/ Optics, BK in, 518a-b 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH 
xxm, SECT 23-24 209d-210c 

45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i, lOc- 
12d; 15c-16d; PART m, 88d-89d; 96b 99a 

5c. Stress, strain, and elasticity: the strength of 
materials 

28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 131a- 

139c; SECOND DAY 178a-196d passim 
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 48, 

180a-d; 187d 
34 NEWTON: Principles, LAWS OF MOTION, SCHOL, 

21b-22a; BK n, PROP 23 and SCHOL 201b 203a 

/ Optics, BK in, 540b-541a 

34 HUYOENS: Light, CH i, 558b-559b 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, en 
xxm, SECT 23-27 209d-211b 

45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PARTI, 14c- 

15c; PART in, 96b 99a 
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 192a-b 

5d. Motion, void, and medium: resistance and 
friction 

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 460c-d 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK iv, CH 6-9 292c-297c 
/ Heavens, BK in, CH 2 [301*2 i- b 3i] 392c 393b 
/ Dreams, CH 2 [459*28-34] 703b 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [329-448] 
5b-6c; [951-1051] 12d-14a; BK n [142-166] 
16d-17a; [225-242] 17d-18a; BK vi [830-839] 
91b-c 

16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 857a-b 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 84, 

A 3, REP 2 985d-989b 
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK vi, HOc 
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 134a- 

135b; 157b-171b; FOURFH DAY, 241d-243c 
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 8 140b; 

APH 36, 167b-c; APH 48, 186a; 187a; 187c 
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK n 159a-267a passim, 

CSp GENERAL SCHOL 211b-219a; BK III, PROP 

6, COROL in 281b; PROP 10 284a-285a / 
Optics, BK HI, 521b-522a; 527a-528b 



106 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



5e to 



(5. The basic phenomena and problems of me- 
chanics: statics and dynamics, id. Motion, 
void, and medium: resistance and friction.) 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK H, CH XIH, 
SECT 22-23 153b-d; CH xvn, SECT 4 168b d 
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 71b-72a 

5e. Rectilinear motion 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK v, CH 4 [228 b i 5-229*7] 
309d-310a; BK VIH, CH 8 [261*27-26?$] 348b- 
349c / Heavens, BK i, CH 2 [268 b i5-24] 359d 

28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 157b- 
171b; THIRD DAY 197a-237a,c 

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 48, 
186b-c 

34 NEWTON: Principles, LAW I-H 14a-b; BK i, 
PROP 32-39 81a-88a; BK n, PROP 1-14 159a- 
189a passim 

5e(l) Uniform motion: its causes and laws 

28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 162c- 
163a; THIRD DAY, 197b-200a 

34 NEWTON: Principles, DEF m-iv 5b-6a; LAW i 
14a; COROL iv-v 18a-19a; BK H, PROP i, 
COROL 159a; PROP 2 159b 160a; PROP 5-6 
165a-167a; PROP 11-12 183a-184b 

5e(2) Accelerated motion: free fall 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK iv, CH 8 [215*24- 

216*21] 295a-d / Heavens, BK in, CH 2 [301** 

16-31] 393a-b 
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK n [225-242] 

17d-18a 

16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK i, lOb-llb 
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 115, 

A i, REP 3 585d-587c 
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 157b- 

171 b; THIRD DAY, 200a-237a,c 
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 36, 

166b-c; APH 48, 181d 
34 NEWTON: Principles, DEF iv 6a; LAW n 14a~b; 

COROL vi 19b; BK i, PROP 32-39 81a-88a; BK 

n, PROP 3-4 160b-165a; PROP 8-10 170a-179a; 

PROP 13-14 184b-189a; PROP 32-40 and SCHOL, 

219a-246b esp PROP 40, SCHOL 239a-246b; 

PROP 41-50 and SCHOL 247a-259a 

5/. Motion about a center: planets, projectiles, 
pendulum 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK VIH, CH 8-10 348b- 
355d / Heavens, BK i, CH 2 359d-360d; CH 4 
362a-c; BK n, CH 3-12 377c-384c / Metaphys- 
ics, BK XH, CH 8 603b-605a / Soul, BK i, CH 3 
[4o6 b 26-407 b i3] 636b-637b 

16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 895b-905a passim; 
913a; 914b-915a; 918b-928a passim; 933a- 
946a csp 939a 940b; BK v, 965a 966a / Har- 
monies of the World, 1015b-1023a 

28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FOURTH DAY, 
240ad 

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 36, 
167b-r; APH 46, 177c-178a; APH 48, 186b-d 



34 NEWTON: Principles, DEF v 6a-7a; LAWS OF 

MOTION, SCHOL, 19b~20a; BK I, LEMMA I-II 

and SCHOL 25a-32a; PROP 1-3 and SCHOL 32 b- 
3Sb esp PROP 3, SCHOL 35b; PROP 46 lOla-b; 
BK n, PROP 51-53 and SCHOL 259a~267a csp 
PROP 53, SCHOL 266a-267a; BK m, PHENOM- 
ENA 272a-275a; PROP 13 286a-b 

5/(l) Determination of orbit, force, speed, 
time, and period 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [614-649] 

69a-c 
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 905a-907a; BK v, 

968a-985b esp 975a-979b 
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 

166d-168a; 171b-172d; THIRD DAY, 203d- 

205b; 235b-d; FOURTH DAY 238a-260a,c 

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 48, 
186bd 

34 NEWTON: Principles, LAWS OF MOTION, SCHOL, 
19b-22a; BK i, PROP 1-17 and SCHOL 32b-50a; 
PROP 30-31 and SCHOL 76a-81a; PROP 40-42 
88b-92b; PROP 46-47 and SCHOL 101a-102a; 
PROP 51-56 105b Ilia; BK n, PROP 4 161b- 
165a; PROP 10 and SCHOL 173b-183a; LEMMA 
3-PROP 1 8 189b-194b; PROP 24-GENERAL 
SCHOL 203a-219a; BK in, PROP 1-5 and SCHOL 
276a-279a; PROP 13 286a-b; PROP 20 291 b- 
294b; LEMMA 4-PROP 42 333a-368b 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xiv, 
SECT 21 159a-d 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT in, 
434d 

5/(2) Perturbation of motion: the two and 
three body problems 

16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 920b 921b; 922b- 

926a; 957b-959a 

28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK n, 54c-d; 55c-56b 
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK i, PROP 43-45 92b- 

lOla; lllb; PROP 57-69 and SCHOL lllb-131a; 

BK in, PROP 5, COROL HI 279a; PROP 12-14 

and SCHOL 285a-287b; PROP 21-39 294b-333a 
45 FARADAY : Researches in Electricity, 817a-b 

6. Basic concepts of mechanics 

6a. Center of gravity: its determination for one 
or several bodies 

11 ARCHIMEDES: Equilibrium of Planes 502a- 
519b / Method, PROP 6 578a-579a; PROP 8-9 
580b-582b 

31 DESCARTES : Objections and Replies, 231c~d 

33 PASCAL: Equilibrium of Liquids, 393b-394a 

34 NEWTON: Principles, COROL iv 18a-19a; BK HI, 
HYPOTHESIS I-PROP 12 285a-286a 

6b. Weight and specific gravity: the relation of 
mass and weight 

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 462d-463c 

S ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK iv, CH 8 [216*12-20] 
295c-d / Heavens, BK i, CH 3 [269 b i8-270*i2] 
360d-361b; CH 6 [273*22-274*18] 364c-365b; 



6c to 6d(2) 



CHAPTER 54: MECHANICS 



107 



BK HI, CH 2 [301*2 i- b 32] 392c-393b; BK iv, 

CH 1-3 399a-402c 
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [358-369] 

5c; BK ii [80-108] 16a-b; [294-296] 18d 
16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenly 

Spheres, BK i, 52 la 
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK v, 970b 
19 AQUINAS : Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 26, 

A 2, ANS 734d-735c 
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART iv, 2 7 Id 
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK vi, 115d-116a 
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 

158b-c; 160a-164a passim 

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 24, 
154d-155a; APH 35, 163c-d; APH 36, 166b-c; 
APH 40, 172a-b 

31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 231b 232a 
34 NEWTON: Principles, DBF i 5a; BK n, PROP 24 

203a 204a; BK in, PROP 6 279b-281b; PROP 8 
282b-283b; PROP 20 291b-294b passim 
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART in, 

88d-89d 

45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 249a-251b 
45 FARADAY : Researches in Electricity, 632a 

6c. Velocity, acceleration, and momentum: an- 
gular or rectilinear, average or instan- 
taneous 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK iv, CH 8 [215*24- 
216*21] 295a-d; BK v, CH 4 [228*20-229*7] 
309b-310a; BK vi, CH 1-2 312b,d-315d; BK 
vii, CH 4 330d-333a 

28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 166d- 
168a; THIRD DAY, 197b-c; 200a-207d; 209a- 
210a; 224b-225d; FOURTH DAY, 240a-d; 243d- 
249b 

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 46, 177d- 
178d 

34 NEWTON: Principles, DBF n 5b; DEF vn-vin 
7a-8a; LAW n 14a-b; COROL in 16b-17b; LAWS 
OF MOTION, SCHOL, 20a~22a; BK i, LEMMA 10 
28b-29a; LEMMA n, SCHOL, 31b-32a; PROP i, 
COROL i 33a / Optics, BK in, 540a-541b 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT iv, DIV 
27, 460c 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 470d-471a; 
BK xiv, 589d 

6d. Force: its kinds and its effects 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vu, CH 5 333a-d; 
BK viu, CH 10 [266*25-267*20] 353c-354d / 
Heavens, BK in, CH 2 [30^2-32] 392d-393b 

9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH 3 234a-c 
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 938b-939a; BK v, 

969a-971b 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 105, 
A 4, REP i 541c-542a; PART i-n, Q 23, A 4 
726a-727a 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 84, 
A 3, REP 2 985d 989b 

28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK n, 26d-40b passim 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, ix, 15c / Objections and 
Replies, 231c-232a 



34 NEWTON: Principles, DEF ni-vm 5b-8a; DEF- 
INITIONS, SCHOL, lla-13a; LAW n 14a b; BK i, 
LEMMA 10 28b-29a; PROP 6 37b-38b; BK in, 
PROP 6, COROL v 281b; GENERAL SCHOL, 371b- 
372a / Optics, BK in, 531b; 541b-542a 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 103-106 
433a-d 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 118b-119a 

45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 338a-b; 
514d-532a; 595a; 603d; 646b 655d; 670a- 
674a; 685d-686b; 817a-818d; 819b,d; 850b,d- 
855a,c esp 855a,c 

54 FREUD: Narcissism, 400d-401a 

6d(l) The relation of mass and force: the law 
of universal gravitation 

16 KEPLER: Epitome* BK iv, 910b 
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK n, 51c-52c 

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 24, 
154d-155a; APH 36, 166b-c; APH 40 170c-173d 

31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 231c-232a 

34 NEWTON: Principles, BK i, PROP 69-93 an< ^ 
SCHOL 130a-152b csp PROP 75-76 134b-136a; 
BK in, PROP 1-7 276a-282b esp PROP 7 281b- 
282b; GENERAL SCHOL, 371b / Optics, BK HI, 
531b-543a csp 541b-542a 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 103-106 
433a-d 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vn, DIV 

57, 475d [fn 2] 
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 850b,d- 

855a,c esp 855a,c 

49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 239c 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 695c 
54 FREUD: Narcissism, 400d-401a 

64(2) Action-at-a-distance: the field and medi- 
um of force 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vin, CH 10 [266^7- 

267*21] 354b-d / Heavens, BK in, CH 2 

[3oi b i6~3i] 393a b / Dreams, CH 2 [459*28- 

34] 703b 
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK vi [906- 

1089] 92b-94c 
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 897b-905a esp 900b- 

901b; 906a-b; 922a b; 934b 
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 8, A 

i, REP 3 34d-35c 
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK i, lOa-c; BK n, 26d- 

40b esp 30a-32c; 42b-43c; 45d-47b; 51a-c; 

54d-55c; BK v, 102d-104b; BK vi, 112d 
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY, 202 d 

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 37 168d- 
169c; APH 45 176a-177c; APH 48, 183a-c; 186a 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, ix, 15c / Discourse, PART 
v, 55c 

34 NEWTON: Principles, DBF V-VIH 6a-8a; BK i, 
PROP 69, SCHOL 130b-131a; BK in, GENERAL 
SCHOL, 371b-372a / Optics, BK in, 507a-516b; 
520a-522a esp 521a-b; 531b-542a passim 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT vn, DIV 
57, 475d [fn 2] 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 227b 



1U8 



UKbAl 



(6d. force: its kinds and its effects. 6d(2) Action- 
at-a-distance: the field and medium of 
force) 

45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i, 9b-c 
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 441a-442b; 

451a-454a; 463d-465d; 513d-514c; 521a-524a; 

528c-532a; 604b-c; 631b-c; 648b-d; 685d- 

686c; 816b,d-819a,c; 819a-d; 824a-b; 832a c; 

840c-842c; 855a,c 

6i/(3) The parallelogram law: the composition 
of forces and the composition of veloci- 
ties 

16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK v, 969a 970a 

28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY, 

224d-225c; FOURTH DAY, 240a-d; 243d-249b 

passim 

34 NLWTON: Principles, COROL I-H 15a-16b 
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 691b 692a; 

788c-793c; 817a-b 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xin, 570d 
53 jAMhs: Psychology, 105a 

6e. Work and energy: their conservation; per- 
petual motion 

28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK n, 56b-c 
31 DESCARFLS: Rules, xm, 27c 

33 PASCAL: Equilibrium of Liquids, 392b-394b 

34 NLWTON: Principles, COROL n 15a-16b; LAWS 
OF MOTION, SCHOL, 23a~24a 

45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 582b-584a; 

837b c; 837d-840c 
53 JAMES: Psychology, 884a 

7. The extension of mechanical principles to 
other phenomena: optics, acoustics, the 
theory of heat, magnetism, and electric- 
ity 

la. Light: the corpuscular and the wave theory 

8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK n, CH 7 [418*26-419*24] 

649b-650b 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK iv [364- 
378] 48d-49a 

16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 896b; 901a-903a; 
922b-926a passim 

17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR v 183a~189b 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 53, 
A 3, ANS and REP 2 283b-284d; Q 67 349d- 
354a; Q 104, A i, ANS and REP 1,4 534c-536c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, 
Q 92, A i, REP 15 1025c 1032b 

28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK 11, 43a-b 

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 36, 
167a-b; APH 37, 169a-c; APH 48, 185a-c / New 
Atlantis, 212d-213a 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART v, 54d-55b 

33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 366b-367a 

34 NEWTON: Principles, BK i, PROP 94-98 and 
SCHOL 152b-157b; BK n, PROP 41-42 247a- 
249b; PROP 50, SCHOL, 257b / Optics 377a- 



544a passim, esp BK i, 379a, BK n, 492a-495b 
BK in, 525b-531b 

34 HUYGENS: Light 551a-619b passim, csp CH i 
553a-563b 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK HI, CH iv, 
SECT 10 261b-d; BK iv, CH n, SECT 11-13 311c- 
312b 

45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i, 

lOb-c 
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 595a- 

607a,c; 817b-c 
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 239c 

7a(l) The laws of reflection and refraction 

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 454c-455a 

8 ARISTOTLE: Meteorology, BK in, CH 2-6 476b- 
482d / Soul, BK n, CH 8 [419^8-33] 651a 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK iv [269-323] 
47d-48b; [436-442] 49d-50a 

20 AQUINAS : Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, 
Q 82, A 4, REP 5 972d-974c 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xv [16- 
24] 75c 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, vm, 12b-13a / Geometry, 
BK n, 322b-331a 

34 NEWTON: Principles, BK i, PROP 94 152b-153b; 
PROP 96-98 and SCHOL 154b-157b / Optics, 
BK i, 379a-423b passim, esp 379a-386b, 409a- 
412a; BK H, 478b-479b; 485b-495b; BK HI, 
520b; 522b-530b passim 

34 HUYGENS: Light, CH n-vi 563b 619b esp CH 
ii-m 563b-575a 

7a(2) The production of colors 

7 PLATO: Meno, 177b-c / Timaeus, 465b-d 
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK n [730-841] 

24b-25c; BK vi [524-526] 87b 
16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 901b 
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 14, A 

6, ANS 80a-81c 

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 23, 
154a-b 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART v, 55c-d / Objec- 
tions and Replies, 231b 

34 NEWTON: Optics, BK I-H 379a-506b passim, 
esp BK i, 424a-428b, 440a-441b, 453a-455a, 
BK n, 481a~482a; BK in, 519a-b 

48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic^, 144b-145a 

7<z(3) The speed of light 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK iv [176-208] 

46c-47a; BK vi [164-172] 82b-c 
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 148b- 

149c 

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 46, 
178a-b 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART v, 55b 

34 NEWTON: Principles, BK i, PROP 96, SCHOL, 
155a / Optics, BK i, 379b; BK n, 488b-492a 

34 HUYGENS: Light, CH i, 554b-557b; CH HI, 
570a-575a 

45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 81 7b 



7*(4) to 7d(2) 



CHAPTER 54: MECHANICS 



7 a (4) The medium of light: the ether 

8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK 11, CH 7 [418*27-419*24) 
649b-650b; BK in, CH 12 [434 b 22-435 a n] 
667c-668a / Sense and the Sensible, CH 3 676a- 
678b; CH 6 [446"20-447 B i2] 684c-685c 
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [449-508] 
67a-c 

16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 857a-b; 901a-b 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Thcohgica, PART i, Q 14, A 

6, ANS 80a-81c 
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 48, 

186a 

33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 366a-367a 

34 NEWTON: Principles, BK in, GENERAL SCHOL, 
372a / Optics, BK in, 520a-522b; 525b-529a 

34 HUYGENS : Light) CH i, 553b-560b esp 557b- 

560b 
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 595b [fn 2] 

Ib. Sound: the mechanical explanation of 
acoustic phenomena 

7 PLATO: Meno> 177b-c / Timaeus, 471 b 

8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK n, CH 8 650c-652c 

9 ARISTOTLE: Generation of Animals, BK v, CH 7 
328c-330b 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK iv [524- 
614] 5la-52b 

17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR v, CH 5 186b d 
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FIRST DAY, 

172b-177a,c 

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 46, 
178a; APH 48, 185a-c; 186a / New Atlantis, 
213b 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, xin, 25c 

34 NEWTON: Principles, BK n, PROP 41-50 and 
SCHOL 247a-259a passim / Optics, BK HI, 
525b-526a 

34 HUYGENS : Light, CH i, 554b-558b passim 
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 485b-486b 

7c. The theory of heat 

7c(l) The description and explanation of the 
phenomena of heat: the hypothesis of 
caloric 

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 462c-d / Theaetetus, 533b-c 

8 ARISTOTLE: Heavens, BK n, CH 7 380c-d 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [592- 

613] 68d-69a; BK vi [132-322] 82a-84c; [848- 

905] 91c-92b 
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 67, 

A 3, ANS and REP 1,3 351b-352a; Q 104, A i, 

ANS 534c-536c 

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK 11, APH 10-20 
140c-153a; APH 24, 154c-d; APH 26, 157a; 
APH 33, 161c; APH 36, 168b-d; APH 48, 182 b; 
183d; 184d-185a; APH 50, 190b-192b 

31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 231a-b 
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK in, GENERAL SCHOL, 

372a / Optics, BK m, 516b-518b; 520a-b; 
541a-b 



109 



45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i, 

9a-16d 

45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat 169a-251b passim 
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 812b-c; 

813b-815b; 857a 858d 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xin, 587b-c; 

EPILOGUE n, 687d 

7c(2) The measurement and the mathemati- 
cal analysis of the quantities of heat 

33 PASCAL: Great Experiment, 388a 

45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i, 

14a-c; 33b-36a; PART HI, 99d-103b * 
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 184b 185b 

Id. Magnetism: the great magnet of the earth 

10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 14, 177a- 

178c 
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK vi [906- 

1089] 92b-94c 
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK i, 23b-25d; BK vi 

106a-121a,c 
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 36, 

166c-167a; APH 45, 176b-c; APH 48, 183b-c 
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 100a-102a 
45 FARADAY: Researches th Electricity, 286a-294a; 

697b-757d 

7</(l) Magnetic phenomena: coition, verticity, 
variation, dip 

7 PLATO: Ion, 144b / Timaeus, 471 b-c 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vm, CH 10 [266^0- 
267*2] 354b-c 

16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 897b-898b; 935a- 
936a; 941b-942a 

28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK i-v 3a-105d pas- 
sim 

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 25, 
155c-d; APH 35, 163c-d; APH 36, 166c-167a; 
APH 37, 169b-c; APH 42, 174b-c; APH 45, 
176b-c; APH 48, 182c; 183b-c; 184a; 185a-d 

45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 595a*600a; 
607a-669d; 673b,d-757d; 812b-c; 813b-815b; 
855a-866a,c 

7(1(2) Magnetic force and magnetic fields 

16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 897b-898b; 935a- 

936a; 941b-942a 
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK n, 26d-43c esp 38a- 

39b; 45d-47b; 54d-55c; BK v, 102d-105d 
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 37, 

169b-c; APH 45, 176b-c 

34 NEWTON: Principles, BK i, PROP 69, SCHOL, 
130b; BK n, PROP 23, SCHOL 202b-203a; BK 
in, PROP 6, COROL v 281b; PROP 7, COROL i 
282a / Optics, BK in, 53 Ib 

45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 281c-282c; 

298d-301a; 302a-d; 528c-532a; 603d-604c; 

679a-b; 690a-697b; 758a-795d; 816b,d-824b; 

830b848a,c 
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic% 376b-379a 



110 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



7eto7e(5) 



(7. The extension of mechanical principles to 
other phenomena: optics, acoustics, the 
theory of heat, magnetism, and electricity) 

7e. Electricity: electrostatics and electrody- 
namics 

28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK n, 26d-34b 

34 NEWTON: Principles, BK in, PROP 7, COROL i 

282a; GENERAL SCHOL, 372a / Optics, BK in, 

531b; 542a 
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 514d-528c 

7e(l) The source of electricity: the relation of 
the kinds of electricity 

45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 269a-273a; 

277a-316a esp 281d-282c, 302a-d, 315d-316a; 

386c-422a,c; 433a-440a,c; 532b-539b; 541b,d- 

594d; 813a-b; 824b-830b esp 826a-b, 829d- 

830a 
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 89b-c 

7e(2) Electricity and matter: conduction, in- 
sulation, induction, electrochemical de- 
composition 

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 48, 

181b-c 
45 FARADAY: Reseafthes in Electricity, 265a- 

269a; 273a-277a;306a; 309a-312a;312c-313d; 

314b; 315a-b; 319b,d-345d; 361a-432d; 



440b,d-514c;' 515a-d; 522b,d-532d; 541b,d- 
584a,c; 8 24 b 830 b; 848b,d-855a,c 

7*(3) The relation of electricity and magnet- 
ism: the electromagnetic field 
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK n, 26d-34b 
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK in, PROP 7, COROL i 

282a 

45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 266b-d; 
269a-302d; 305d-306a; 307a-309a; 313d- 
314c; 315a; 520b-521a; 528c-532a; 595a; 
615a-619c; 658b,d-667c; 685d-686b; 759c- 
788c; 795b,d-813a; 816b,d-819a,c 

7i(4) The relation of electricity to heat and 
light: thermoelectricity 

34 NEWTON: Principles, BK in, GENERAL SCHOL, 

372a / Optics, BK HI, 516b-517a 
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 305b-d; 

306d-307a; 313d-314a; 314c-d; 315a; 404b- 

405a; 476a-506a; 515d-516a; 518a-d; 561b,d- 

569b; 580d-582b; 595a-607a,c 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 687d 

70(5) The measurement of electric quantities 

45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity, 277d- 
279a; 316b-318c; 366d-371d; 377d-390d; 
444a-451a; 465d-467a,c; 768d-773d; 778b,d- 
788c 



CROSS-REFERENCES 

For: Considerations relevant to the basic concepts and laws of mechanics, see CHANGE 7d; QUAN- 
TITY 53-56; SPACE 2a; TIME i. 

Discussions of the role of experiment, induction, and hypotheses in physical science, see 
EXPERIENCE 5a~5c; HYPOTHESIS 40-40!; INDUCTION 5; LOGIC 40; PHYSICS 4a~4d; SCIENCE 
5a~5e; and for the physicist's treatment of causes, see CAUSE 2, $b, 6; NATURE 30(3); 
PHYSICS 2b; SCIENCE 40. 

The general theory of applied mathematics or mathematical physics, see ASTRONOMY 20; 
MATHEMATICS 5b; PHYSICS ib, 3; SCIENCE 5C. 

Other discussions of the mathematical ideas or operations which are applied in mechanics, 
see MATHEMATICS 43-40!; QUANTITY 3o!(i), 4C, 6b. 

The relation of mechanics to the philosophy of nature and to other natural sciences, see 
PHILOSOPHY ic; PHYSICS 2; SCIENCE ic. 

Other treatments of the problem of qualitative change, see CHANGE 6a-6b; QUALITY 33, 3c; 
QUANTITY la. 

Mechanism as a philosophy of nature, man, and history, see ANIMAL ic; ELEMENT 5e~5g; 
HISTORY 43(2); MAN 30; MIND 2e; WILL 50; WORLD ib. 

Other discussions of motion and its laws, see ASTRONOMY 8c-8c(3); CHANGE 7~7d; MATTER 
2b; and for the related consideration of the void and action-at-a-distance, see ASTRONOMY 
3b; ELEMENT 5c; SPACE 2b(2)-2c. 

Another discussion of mass and weight, see QUANTITY 5d; for another discussion of velocity, 
acceleration, and momentum, see QUANTITY 5c; for another discussion offeree, see QUAN- 
TITY 5e; and for another discussion of the composition of forces, see OPPOSITION 3d. 



CHAPTER 54: MECHANICS 



Hi 



ADDITIONAL READINGS 

Listed below are works not included in Great Boo^s of the Western World, but relevant to the 
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups: 

I. Works by authors represented in this collection. 
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection. 

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult 
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas. 



I. 

KEPLER. Dioptri^ 

DESCARTES. The Principles of Philosophy, PART u, 
6-7, 19, 24-27, 48-64; PART in, 48-102, 121-125; 

PART IV, 2O-27, 133-187 

HOBBES. Concerning Body, PART iv, CH 30 

. Examinatio et Emendatio Mathematicae Hodi- 

ernae 

. Dialogus Physicus 

I IUYGENS. Travaux divers de statique et de dynamique 

de 7659 a 1666 

. Percussion 

. Uhorloge a pendule 

. Sur la cause de la pesanteur 

. Force centrifuge 

. Question de I' existence et de la perceptibilite du 

mouvement absolu 
BERKELEY. De Motu 

KANT. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science 
GOETHE. Beitrage zur OptiJ^ 

. Theory of Colours 

HEGEL. Science of Logic, VOL n, SECT n, en i 
FARADAY. The Various Forces of Matter and Their 

Relations to Each Other 

II. 

EPICURUS. Letter to Pythocles 
R. BACON. Opus Majus, PART v 
NICOLAS OF CUSA. The Idiot, BK iv 
STEVIN. Uart ponderaire, ou la statique 
BOYLE. New Experiments Physico- Mechanical 
. A Defence of the Doctrine Touching the Spring 

and Weight of the Air . . . Against the Objections of 

Franciscus Linus 

WALLIS. Mechanica: sive, De Motu 
GUERICKE. Experimenta Nova 
LEIBNITZ. Discourse on Metaphysics, xv-xxn 
. Philosophical Worfy, CH 20 (On Nature in 

Itself) 
. New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, 

APPENDIX, CH 4-5 

VOLTAIRE. Letters on the English, xiv-xvn 

EULER. Mechani^ 

D'ALEMBERT. Traite de dynamique 

FRANKLIN. Experiments 

J. PRIESTLEY. Experiments and Observations on Dif- 
ferent Kinds of Air 

. Experiments and Observations Relating to Vari- 
ous Branches of Natural Philosophy 



CARNOT. Principes fondamentaux de requilibre et dn 

mouvement 

LAGRANGE. Mecanique analytique 
GALVANI. De Vinbus Electricitatis in Motu Muscu- 

lari Commentarius 
RUMFORD. An Experimental Inquiry Concerning the 

Source of Heat 

LAPLACE. Mecanique celeste (Celestial Mechanics) 
POINSOT. Siemens de statique 
T. YOUNG. Miscellaneous Wor^s, VOL i, NUMBER in, 

VII, IX-X, XVII-XVIII 

FRESNEL. Theorie de la lumiere 

PONCELET. Cours de mecamque 

AIRY. Gravitation 

W. R. HAMILTON. Dynamics 

WHEVVELL. The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, 

VOL i, BK in, CH 5-10 
JOULE. Scientific Papers 
HELMHOLTZ. Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects, 

VII 

W.THOMSON and TAIT. Treatise on Natural Philoso- 
phy 

TYNDALL. Light and Electricity 

REULEAUX. The Kinematics of Machinery 

MAXWELL. Theory of Heat. 

. A Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism 

. Matter and Motion 

RAYLEIGH. The Theory of Sound 

STALLO. Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics, 
CH 2-6, 9-12 

CLIFFORD. The Common Sense of the Exact Sciences, 
CH v 

BALL. A Treatise on the Theory of Screws 

GIBBS. Collected Worlds 

C. S. PEIRCE. Collected Papers, VOL vi, par 35-87 

KELVIN. Lectures on Molecular Dynamics and the 
Wave Theory of Light 

. Popular lectures and Addresses 

PEARSON. The Grammar of Science 

APPELL. Traite de mecamque rationnelle 

HERTZ. The Principles of Mechanics 

MACH. History and Root of the Principle of the Con- 
servation of Energy 

. The Science of Mechanics 

. "On the Principle of the Conservation of 

Energy/' in Popular Scientific Lectures 

BOLTZMANN. Principe der Mechani\ 

B. RUSSELL. Principles of Mathematics, CH 54, 56- 

59 
PAINLEVE". Les axiomes de la mecamque 



112 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



SANTA VAN A. Reason in Science, CH 3 
DUHEM. V evolution dc la mecanique 

. Lcs origines dc la statique 

. fitudes sur Leonard de Vinci 

ENRIQUES. Problems of 'Science ', CH 5-6 
HEAVISIDE. Electromagnetic Theory 
MEYERSON. Identity and Reality, CH 2-3, 10 
POINCARE*. Science and Hypothesis, PART in; PART 
iv, CH 12-13 

. Science and Method, BK in 

CASSIRER. Substance and Function, PART i, CH 4; 

SUP VII 

CURIE. Traitc 1 de radioactivitS 

E. T. WHITTAKER. A Treatise on the Analytical Dy- 
namics of Particles and Rigid Bodies 

. A History of the Theories of Aether and Elec- 
tricity 

RUTHERFORD. "Radio-active Substances and Their 
Radiations 

EDDINGTON. Space, Time, and Gravitation 

EINSTEIN. Relativity: The Special and the General 
Theory 

. Sidelights on Relativity 

. The Meaning of Relativity 



LEVI-CIVITA. Pragen der tfassischen und relativi sti- 

schen Mechanit^ 
PLANCK. Das Prinzip der Erhaltung der Energie 

. Treatise on Thermodynamics 

. "The Place of Modern Physics in the Me- 
chanical View of Nature," in A Survey of Physics 
WHITEHEAD. Science and the Modern World, CH i-iv 
BRIDCMAN. The Logic of Modern Physics, CH 3 
SCHRODINGER. Collected Papers on Wave Mechanics 

. Four Lectures on Wave Mechanics 

BOHR. Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature 
BROGUE. An Introduction to the Study of Wave Me- 
chanics 

DIRAC. The Principles of Quantum Mechanics 
HEISENBERG. The Physical Principles of the Quantum 

Theory 

NAGEL, On the Logic of Measurement 
M. R. COHEN. Reason and Nature, BK 11, CH 2-3 
C. G. DARWIN. The New Conceptions of Matter 
LENZEN. The Nature of Physical Theory, PART i, in 
BCRGSON, Time and Fiee Will 

. Creative Evolution, CH i, 4 

. Two Sources of Morality and Religion, CH 4 

WIENER. Cybernetics 



INTRODUCTION 



MEDICINE is the name of an art, of a 
science or group of sciences, and of a 
learned profession whose members are profi- 
cient in these sciences and experienced in the 
practice of the art. By derivation it is also the 
name for curative drugs, physics, or other rem- 
edies prescribed by the physician. The archaic 
usage of the English word "physic" as the name 
for the art, practice, and profession of what is 
now generally called "medicine" suggests what 
the word's Greek root signifies, namely, that 
the physician, no less than the physicist, is a 
student of nature. 

There is one other historic use of "medicine" 
which indicates its scope and connections in the 
western tradition. When mediaeval institutions 
first shaped the university, the basic divisions 
of learning then embodied in its structure re- 
flected different uses of learning as well as dif- 
ferences in subject matter. The three faculties 
of medicine, law, and theology not only disci- 
plined their students in different branches of 
knowledge, but also trained them for distinct 
applications of knowledge to practice. 

The faculty of medicine represented all the 
natural sciences, especially those which have 
come to be called "biological sciences," just as 
the faculty of law or jurisprudence represented 
all the moral sciences and their later offshoots, 
now called "social sciences." The doctor of 
medicine was concerned with knowledge bear- 
ing on the relation of man to nature, as the 
doctor of laws was concerned with knowledge 
bearing on the relation of man to man, and the 
doctor of theology with knowledge bearing on 
the relation of man to God. 

It is a curious accident that the word "doc- 
tor," which in origin signified the competence 
to teach others who might practice in each of 
these great fields of learning, has come in popu- 
lar usage to designate, not the teacher, but the 



practitioner, and chiefly the practitioner in 
only one of the learned professions. Medicine 
may not deserve the implied emphasis upon the 
learning of its practitioners, but there would 
be some truth in granting it the distinction of 
being the oldest of the professions in the sense 
that it comprises a group of men who not only 
share a common training in the relevant sciences 
and arts, but who also have adopted a code of 
practice and obligated themselves to perform a 
service to their fellow men. 

The Hippocratic Oath, sworn to in the name 
of "Apollo the physician and Aesculapius, and 
Health . . . and all the gods and goddesses," is 
the first explicit formulation of a professional 
ideal. In the collection of writings attributed to 
Hippocrates, The Law explicitly indicates as 
The Oath implies that there arc intellectual as 
well as moral conditions to be fulfilled by those 
who would dedicate themselves to the service 
of health. Only those who have satisfied all req- 
uisites for the study of medicine and by dili- 
gent application have acquired a true knowl- 
edge of it shall be "esteemed physicians not 
only in name but in reality." 

The same high conception of medicine ap- 
pears in the Bible. We read in Ecclesiasticus: 
"Honor the physician for the need thou hast 
of him: for the most High hath created him. 
For all healing is from God, and he shall receive 
gifts of the king. The skill of the physician shall 
lift up his head, and in the sight of great men 
he shall be praised. The most High hath created 
medicines out of the earth, and a wise man will 
not abhor them. . . . The virtue of these things 
is come to the knowledge of men, and the most 
High hath given knowledge to men, that he 
may be honored in his wonders. By these he 
shall cure and shall allay their pains, and of 
these the apothecary shall make sweet confec- 
tions, and shall make up ointments of health, 



113 



114 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



and of his works there shall be no end. For the 
peace of God is over all the face of the earth." 

FIVE OF THE authors of the great books Hip- 
pocrates, Galen, Gilbert, Harvey, and Freud 
belonged to the profession of medicine. They 
were major figures in its history. Practitioners 
of its arts, they were also contributors to the 
sciences concerned with health and disease. 
Three others combined medicine with other 
pursuits. Copernicus studied medicine at Padua 
and devoted considerable time to its practice; 
Locke was Lord Shaftesbury's personal physi- 
cian; James took a medical degree at Harvard 
after years spent in the biological sciences. Still 
another, Rabelais, not only studied and prac- 
ticed medicine, but also edited the Aphorisms 
of Hippocrates and Galen's little treatise on the 
medical art. His knowledge of medicine and his 
observation of its contemporary practices can 
be readily discerned in his comic exaggerations 
of anatomical and physiological detail, and of 
regimens of diet or exercise. 

The discussion of medicine in the great books 
is not limited to its professors or practitioners. 
Montaigne has many doubts about medical 
diagnosis and the possibility of charting the 
causes of disease or the remedies which cure. 
The patient's ignorance permits the physician 
to claim credit for his successes and to blame 
fortune for his failures. 

Montaigne, characteristically, delights in ob- 
serving that the doctors disagree. He offers, as 
"one example of the ancient controversy in 
physics," the following: "Herophilus lodges the 
original cause of all disease in the humours; 
Erasistratus, in the blood of the arteries; As- 
clepiades, in the invisible atoms of the pores; 
Alcmaeon, in the exuberance or defect of our 
bodily strength; Diocles, in the inequality of 
the elements of which the body is composed, 
and in the quality of the air we breathe; Strato, 
in the abundance, crudity, and corruption of 
the nourishment we take; and Hippocrates 
lodges it in the spirits." There is no great dan- 
ger, he adds, "in our mistaking the height of 
the sun, or the fraction of some astronomical 
computation; but here where our whole being 
is concerned, 'tis not wisdom to abandon our- 
selves to the mercy of the agitation of so many 
contrary winds." 



Such commentary as this bears more on the 
history of medicine than on the abiding prob- 
lems of its science or art, which, from Hip- 
pocrates to Freud, have been more generally 
agreed upon than the theories proposed for 
their solution. Of similar historical significance 
are the passages in the great works of history 
which describe the phenomena of disease as 
they appeared to contemporary observers, the 
plagues which ravaged Athens, Rome, and 
London, or the maladies which afflicted emi- 
nent individuals. Poetry, as well as history and 
biography, contributes to this record. The 
novels of Tolstoy and Fielding, the plays of 
Shakespeare, the tales of Cervantes and Chau- 
cer, the Greek tragedies, and the Homeric epics 
furnish evidence of both the constant and the 
changing elements in the conception of disease, 
the vocation of medicine, and the social accept- 
ance of the physician. 

The history of medicine is an epitome of the 
history of the natural sciences. The researches 
of the Hippocratic school inititate specific 
methods of empirical investigation, such as the 
systematic collection and comparison of obser- 
vations and the painstaking record of individ- 
ual case histories. The fundamental concepts of 
medical theory reflect the philosophy of nature 
and of man. Conflicting notions of the causes of 
disease focus major issues in biology, such as the 
controversy in which Galen engages with As- 
clepiades and Erasistratus in the defense of 
what he supposes to be Hippocrates' and Aris- 
totle's organic view of nature against mech- 
anism and atomism. 

Medicine, moreover, provides some of the 
clearest examples of the interdependence of 
theory and practice, for the rules of the healing 
art put theories to work and to the test; and 
as the rules are refined or altered by the ac- 
cumulated experience of particular cases, in- 
ductive insight leads to new theoretical gener- 
alizations. As the work of Dr. Harvey illus- 
trates, biological science is both the source and 
the reflection of medical knowledge. Medicine 
also affords Bacon and Descartes the prime 
example of a useful application of the knowl- 
edge gained by the new methods they propose. 

More than engineering or the invention of 
mechanical utilities, medicine represents for 
them knowledge in the service of mankind. 



CHAPTER 55: MEDICINE 



115 



That science shall bear fruit in technology "is 
not merely to be desired," writes Descartes, 
"with a view to the invention of an infinity of 
arts and crafts . . . but principally because it 
brings about the preservation of health, which 
is without doubt the chief blessing and the 
foundation of all other blessings in this life . . . 
It is true that the medicine which is now in 
vogue contains little of which the utility is re- 
markable; but, without any intention of de- 
crying it, I am sure that there is no one, even 
among those who make its study a profession, 
who does not confess that all that men know is 
almost nothing in comparison with what re- 
mains to be known." 

The subsequent history of medicine, some of 
the great documents of which are cited in the 
list of Additional Readings under the names of 
Jenner, Bichat, Virchow, Claude Bernard, and 
Koch, seems to substantiate Descartes' proph- 
ecy. But it also seems to be true that the 
major problems of medical practice are not 
greatly altered or diminished by the tremen- 
dous increase in our knowledge of the causes of 
specific diseases and our vast store of well 
tested remedies. 

What sort of art medicine is; to what extent 
the physician should let nature run its course; 
with what restraint or prudence the physician 
should apply general rules to particular cases; 
whether health is better served by the general 
practitioner treating the whole man or by a 
specialist treating a special organ; how the re- 
lation of the physician to his patient is itself a 
therapeutic factor and underlies the effective- 
ness of his skill in all other respects; to what 
extent mind and body interact both in the ori- 
gin and in the cure of disease these are the 
problems of medicine concerning which Hip- 
pocrates and Galen can converse with Osier and 
Freud almost as contemporaries. 

THE DISTINCTION made in the chapter on ART 
between the simply productive and the coop- 
erative arts associates medicine with agriculture 
and teaching, and separates these arts, which 
merely help a natural result to come about, 
from the arts which produce an effect that 
would never occur without the work of the 
artist, Plants grow and reproduce without the 
help of farmers. The mind can discover some 



truth without the aid of teachers. Animals and 
men can preserve and regain their health with- 
out the care of physicians. But without shoe- 
makers or house builders, shoes and houses 
would not be produced. 

The art of medicine does not produce health 
in the sense in which the shoemaker produces a 
shoe, or the sculptor a statue. These other arts 
imitate nature by embodying natural forms or 
functions in materials wherein they do not nat- 
urally arise. An art like medicine seems to imi- 
tate nature by cooperating with natural pro- 
cesses. It follows the course of nature itself and, 
by working with it, enables the natural result 
to eventuate more surely than it might if art 
made no attempt to overcome the factors of 
chance. 

Socrates expresses this understanding of the 
physician's art when he uses the metaphor of 
midwifery to characterize his own method of 
teaching. As it is the mother who labors and 
gives birth, so it is the student who is primarily 
active in the process of learning. The teacher, 
like the midwife, merely assists in a natural 
process which might be more painful, and might 
possibly fail, without such help. "The teacher," 
writes Aquinas, "only brings exterior help as 
does the physician who heals; just as the interior 
nature is the principal cause of the healing, so 
the interior light of the intellect is the principal 
cause of knowledge. 

"Health," he continues, "is caused in a sick 
man, sometimes by an exterior principle, name- 
ly, by the medical art; sometimes by an interior 
principle, as when a man is healed by the force 
of nature. . . . Just as nature heals a man by al- 
teration, digestion, rejection of the matter that 
caused the sickness, so does art. . . . The exte- 
rior principle, art, acts not as a primary agent, 
but as helping the primary agent, which is the 
interior principle, and by furnishing it with in- 
struments and assistance, of which the interior 
principle makes use in producing the effect. 
Thus the physician strengthens nature, and em- 
ploys food and medicine, of which nature makes 
use for the intended end." 

The subordination of the medical art to na- 
ture seems to be the keystone of the whole 
structure of Hippocratic medicine. It is im- 
plied in the emphasis which Hippocrates places 
on the control of the patient's regimen, espe- 



116 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



cially the elements of his diet, the exercise of 
his body, and the general circumstances of his 
life. Even in the treatment of acute diseases, 
Hippocrates looks to the regimen first, pre- 
scribing changes or special articles of diet. 

Medicines or drugs perform an auxiliary 
function. Surgery is always a last resort, to be 
used primarily in the treatment of injuries, and 
not to be employed in diseases which will yield 
to a course of regimen and medication. There 
is an element of violence in surgery which puts 
it last among the means of an art which should 
work by cooperating with nature rather than 
by operating on it. And among medicines, 
those are preferable which, like ptisan, a special 
preparation of barley water, derive their effi- 
cacy from properties similar to those of normal 
nutriment. 

According to Flippocrates, the control of 
regimen is not only the primary factor in ther- 
apy, but also the original principle of medicine. 
In the treatise On Ancient Medicine, he points 
out that "the art of medicine would not have 
been invented at first, nor would it have been 
made the subject of investigation (for there 
would have been no need for it), if when men 
arc indisposed, the same food and other articles 
of regimen which they eat and drink when in 
good health were proper for them, and if no 
other were preferable to these. . . . The diet 
and food which people in health now use would 
not have been discovered, provided it suited 
man to eat and drink in like manner as the ox, 

the horse, and all other animals What other 

object, then, has he in view who is called a 
physician, and is admitted to be a practitioner 
of the art, who found out the regimen and diet 
befitting the sick, than he who originally found 
out and prepared for all mankind that kind of 
food which we all now use, in place of the for- 
mer savage and brutish mode of living?" 

THE SAME CONCEPTION of medicine's relation to 
nature seems to be fundamental in Galen's 
thought. He attributes to Hippocrates his own 
reformulation of the insight that the art of 
healing consists in imitating the health-giving 
and healing powers of nature itself. The medi- 
cal doctrines which he criticizes were based on 
the atomism of Epicurus. They regarded the 
body as a complex piece of machinery. When it 



gets out of order, it needs a mechanic and me- 
chanical remedies to fix it. On the contrary, it 
seems to him, the living body is an organic 
unity, not an aggregation of atoms, or a system 
of interlocking parts. 

"Nature is not posterior to the corpuscles, 
but a long way prior to them," Galen writes. 
"Therefore it is nature which puts together the 
bodies both of plants and animals; and this she 
does by virtue of certain faculties which she 
possesses these being, on the one hand, attrac- 
tive and assimilative of what is appropriate, 
and, on the other, expulsive of what is foreign. 
Further, she skillfully moulds everything dur- 
ing the stage of genesis; and she also provides 
for the creatures after birth, employing here 
other faculties again." 

Nature, according to Galen, works not by 
the external impact of part upon part, but by 
its faculties or powers for the performance of 
natural functions and the production of natural 
effects. Galen's polemic against the mechanists 
thus leads him to reverse the usual statement. 
Where Hippocrates looks upon nature as the 
model for art to follow, Galen calls Nature the 
artist, in order to set his view in sharp contrast 
to all mechanical conceptions. "Instead of ad- 
miring Nature's artistic skill," he declares, 
"they even go so far as to scoff and maintain 
that . . . things have been made by Nature for 
no purpose!" Nature, Galen holds, produces 
effects according to its powers and in con- 
formity to its needs. It seems to work with in- 
telligence and for an end, not blindly and by 
chance. The true art of medicine, therefore, 
borrows its method from "Nature's art." 

The conception of nature as an artist may be 
taken metaphorically or literally, but the in- 
sight controlling the practice of medicine re- 
mains the same. The physician is a servant, not 
a master, of nature. Aristotle's doctrine of final 
causes, summarized in the maxim Galen so often 
repeats that "nothing is done by Nature in 
vain" furnishes a principle for physiological 
research, as well as the rules of medical art. 
Whether because of faulty observation on his 
part, or because of a failure to apply his own 
principle, Galen leaves to Harvey one of the 
great discoveries which can be credited to close 
attention to final causes. Always observant of 
the relation between structure and function, 



CHAPTER 55: MEDICINE 



117 



always questioning the purpose which bodily 
organs serve, Harvey establishes the fact that 
the blood circulates, and finds therein the reason 
for the structure of the heart, its motions, and 
its relation to the lungs. 

It may also be possible for a principle to be 
carried to excess. Montaigne, for example, ex- 
presses his distrust of medical theory and the 
physician's remedies by an unqualified trust in 
nature's own resourcefulness. Drugs, especially 
purgatives, do violence to nature. "Men dis- 
turb and irritate the disease by contrary oppo- 
sitions; it must be the way of living that must 
gently dissolve, and bring it to an end. The 
violent gripings and contest betwixt the drug 
and the disease are ever to our loss, since the 
combat is fought within ourselves, and that the 
drug is an assistant not to be trusted, being in 
its own nature an enemy to our health, and by 
trouble having only access into our condition. 
Let it alone a little; the general order of things 
that takes care of fleas and moles, also takes 
care of men, if they will have the same patience 
that fleas and moles have, to leave it to itself." 

Nor is there any need for an art of medicine 
when nature can do better by herself. "We 
ought to grant free passage to diseases; I find 
they stay less with me, who let them alone; and 
I have lost some, reputed the most tenacious 
and obstinate, by their own decay, without 
help and without art, and contrary to its rules. 
Let us a little permit Nature to take her own 
way; she better understands her own affairs 
than we.*' The Hippocratic doctrine seems to 
occupy a middle ground between this view of 
nature as an unerring artist and the opposite 
extreme which permits all sorts of tampering 
and tinkering with the machinery of the body. 

THE ART OF MEDICINE "consists in three things," 
writes Hippocrates: "the disease, the patient, 
and the physician. The physician is the servant 
of the art, and the patient must combat the 
disease along with the physician." With regard 
to diseases, the physician must "have two spe- 
cial objects in view ... to do good, and to do 
no harm." 

This celebrated summary indicates the two 
kinds of knowledge which the physician should 
possess. He should know about disease in gen- 
eral, so that he can classify diseases according to 



their special causes, their symptoms, and the 
typical course each seems to take. Such knowl- 
edge underlies the doctor's diagnosis of the pa- 
tient's malady. That in turn determines his 
prognosis of the stages through which the illness 
will run, from its onset through various crises or 
turning points to its sequelae or consequences. 
Upon the accuracy of his diagnosis and the cer- 
tainty of his prognosis may depend the effec- 
tiveness of any remedy the physician prescribes 
in the individual case. 

But individual cases are seldom completely 
alike. The physician must therefore know the 
patient as an individual, and all the relevant 
circumstances of his life as well as the particular 
characteristics of this instance of the disease; 
even though its general characteristics are fa- 
miliar to him from much experience in the 
treatment of similar cases. The Bool^ of Prog- 
nostics and the treatise Of the Epidemics in the 
Hippocratic collection seem to combine both 
these kinds of knowledge. They enumerate the 
symptoms by which diseases can be recognized 
and their future foretold. They also set forth 
individual case histories from which such gen- 
eralizations can be drawn. 

The practice of medicine thus appears to re- 
quire more than scientific knowledge of health 
and disease in general, and more than general 
rules of art. It requires the sort of experience 
which can be gained only from actual practice. 
Without prudence born of experience, general 
rules can be misapplied, for no general rule, in 
medicine as in law, fits all cases alike. The most 
famous of Hippocratic aphorisms conveys a 
sense of the hazards of medical practice: "Life 
is short, and Art long; the crisis fleeting; ex- 
periment perilous, and decision difficult. The 
physician must not only be prepared to do what 
is right himself, but also to make the patient, 
the attendants, and the externals cooperate." 

To persuade the patient to cooperate is the 
first maxim governing the physician's relation 
to his patient. Plato contrasts the right and 
wrong relation between doctor and patient by 
comparing the practice of the physicians who 
treated slaves and those who treated free men. 
"The slave-doctor," he says, "prescribes what 
mere experience suggests, as if he had exact 
knowledge, and when he has given his orders, 
like a tyrant, he rushes off with equal assurance 



118 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



to some other servant who is ill. . . . But the other 
doctor, who is a freeman, attends and practices 
upon freemen; and he carries his enquiries far 
back, and goes into the nature of the disorder; 
he enters into discourse with the patient and 
with his friends, and is at once getting informa- 
tion from the sick man, and also instructing him 
as far as he is able, and he will not prescribe for 
him until he has first convinced him; at last, 
when he has brought the patient more and 
more under his persuasive influences and set 
him on the road to health, he attempts to ef- 
fect a cure." 

In the treatment of mental diseases, as Freud 
points out, the proper development and man- 
agement of the relationship between patient 
and physician is itself a major factor in psycho- 
therapy. "It presupposes a profound interest for 
psychological incidents, as well as a personal 
sympathy for the patient," he writes. "It re- 
quires the full consent and the attention of the 
patients, but above all, their confidence, for the 
analysis regulaily leads to the inmost and most 
secretly guarded psychic processes." Since fears, 
anxieties, or other temperamental dispositions 
on the part of the patient may affect the course 
of an organic ailment, the patient's confidence 
in the physician and, even more generally, his 
emotional response to the physician's character 
play an important role in the successful treat- 
ment of bodily ills as well as of mental or func- 
tional disorders. 

Hippocrates recommends that the physician 
cultivate prognosis, not only for the guidance 
of his own actions, but also for the sake of the 
patient. "By foreseeing and foretelling, in the 
presence of the sick, the present, the past, and 
the future, and explaining the omissions which 
patients have been guilty of, he will be the more 
readily believed to be acquainted with the cir- 
cumstances of the sick; so that men will have 
confidence to entrust themselves to such a phy- 
sician." 

THE RELATION OF physician and patient raises a 
question about the organization of the practice 
of medicine, to which opposite answers have 
been given in both ancient and modern times. 
Herodotus reports a high degree of medical 
specialization in Egypt. "Medicine is practised 
among them on a plan of separation," he writes; 



"each physician treats a single disorder, and no 
more: thus the country swarms with medical 
practitioners, some undertaking to cure diseases 
of the eye, others of the hand, others again of 
the teeth, others of the intestines, and some 
those which are not local." The fact that the 
next paragraph begins a discussion of funerals 
can hardly be taken as revealing the attitude of 
Herodotus toward specialization, though his 
comment on the Egyptian practice does imply 
a contrast to Greek medicine. 

One sentence in the Hippocratic Oath "I 
will not cut persons laboring under the stone, 
but will leave this to be done by men who are 
practitioners of this work" indicates some di- 
vision of labor in the organization of Greek 
medicine. But apart from the special tasks and 
skills of surgery, the Hippocratic conception of 
the physician's work favors the practice of gen- 
eral medicine rather than specialization. The 
man, not the disease, is to be treated, and to 
treat him well the physician must examine the 
man as a whole, not merely the organ or bodily 
part in which the disorder seems to be located. 
The Hippocratic formula for getting a case his- 
tory calls for an inquiry into the background of 
the individual's life, his antecedents, his occu- 
pation, his temperament, "the patient's habits, 
regimen, and pursuits; his conversation, man- 
ners, taciturnity, thoughts, sleep, or absence of 
sleep, and sometimes his dreams, what they are 
and when they occur; his picking and scratch- 
ing; his tears." From these as well as from the 
symptoms, says Hippocrates, "we must form 
our judgment." 

The defense of general practice against spe- 
cialization is part of Galen's argument with his 
adversaries. Treatment of the disordered part 
as if it could be isolated from the living unity 
of the whole man is, to Galen, one of the de- 
plorable consequences in medical practice of 
atomism or mechanism in medical theory. 

This issue is argued again and again in the 
history of medicine, with each side pressing the 
advantages in its favor. Montaigne, for exam- 
ple, states the case for the specialist by analogy 
with the advantages of specialization in other 
arts. "As we have doublet and breeches makers, 
distinct trades, to clothe us, and are so much the 
better fitted, seeing that each of them meddles 
only with his own business, and has less to 



CHAPTER 55: MEDICINE 



119 



trouble his head with than the tailor who un- 
dertakes them all; and as in matter of diet, 
great persons, for their better convenience, 
have cooks for the different offices ... so also 
as to the cure of our maladies." With Freud 
and the development of a greater awareness of 
the psychological origin of many bodily dis- 
orders, a new factor enters into the argument. 
It tends to favor the general practitioner who, 
from his acquaintance with the patient as a per- 
son, may be better able than the specialist to 
detect hidden psychological causes. 

THE CONCEPTION of disease is usually deter- 
mined by the conception of health. The ab- 
normality is judged and measured as a devia- 
tion from the norm. Hippocrates uses the out- 
ward appearance of man in a healthy condition 
as the standard for discerning the visible signs 
of illness. The physician, he says, "should ob- 
serve . . . first the countenance of the patient, 
if it be like those of persons in health, and more 
so, if like itself, for this is the best of all; where- 
as the most opposite to it is the worst." He 
should also take note when he finds the patient 
reclining in a posture which resembles the nor- 
mal disposition of the healthy body. "To find 
the whole body lying in a relaxed state" is a 
more favorable sign than to find him "upon his 
back, with the hands, neck, and the legs ex- 
tended." 

The history of medicine, especially on the 
side of its science and theory, if not so much 
with regard to its art and practice, can be told 
in terms of refinements in the classification of 
diseases and progressive discovery of their spe- 
cific causes, both internal and external, predis- 
posing and exciting. But the analysis of diseases 
according to their aetiology and by reference 
to the typical picture of the disease process 
leaves unanswered the general question about 
the nature of disease as a loss of health. 

Apart from its causes and its symptoms, its 
modes and its patterns, what is disease ? This is 
the question of major speculative interest in the 
tradition of the great books. The answers given 
have a certain uniformity in spite of the vary- 
ing terms in which they are expressed. 

The humoural hypothesis of ancient medical 
theory, for example, conceives health as that 
condition of the body in which the physiologi- 



cal elements are in a proper proportion or bal- 
ance, and in which the various parts or powers 
function harmoniously with one another. As 
health is harmony or good order in the body, so 
disease consists in imbalance and disharmony 
an excess or defect with consequent dispropor- 
tion of the elements, or the disorder of con- 
flicting bodily processes. 

In the Timaeus, Plato first states this theory 
in terms of the four physical elements. "There 
are four natures out of which the body is com- 
pacted, earth and fire and water and air, and 
the unnatural excess or defect of these, or the 
change of any of them from its own natural 
place into another . . . produces disorders and 
diseases." He then considers the diseases which 
result from excess or defect of one or another 
of the four humours blood, phlegm, black and 
yellow bile. 

The humoural hypothesis, which Hippoc- 
rates and Galen share with Plato and Aristotle, 
undergoes many transformations in the history 
of medicine. The four elements or humours are 
replaced by other physiological factors, such as 
the hormones or internal secretions, or the ele- 
ments of modern biochemistry. But constant 
throughout these changing formulations is the 
conception of health as an equilibrium, and of 
disease as its loss through disorder and dispro- 
portion. 

This broad conception of health and disease 
seems to apply to mental as well as bodily ills. 
There is not only a basic continuity between 
Plato's and Freud's discussion of the bodily ori- 
gin of mental disorders and the psychic origin 
of physical ailments; but the Freudian emphasis 
upon conflict and disintegration in the neurotic 
character milder forms of the schizophrenia 
or "split personality" which characterizes in- 
sanityalso appeals to harmony as the princi- 
ple of health. The language of modern psychi- 
atry which refers to "the integrated personal- 
ity" or "the well-balanced and adjusted indi- 
vidual" defines the norm or the ideal of mental 
health. 

The various kinds and degrees of mental dis- 
order, especially those which seem to be en- 
tirely functional rather than organic, represent 
abnormalities which, though they differ in 
cause, symptom, and tendepcy, have in com- 
mon some excess or defect in the psychic struc- 



120 THE GREAT IDEAS 

ture or some unresolved conflict in the nature addition to insisting that the patient shall help 

of man. Freud's psychoanalytic method in the to cure himself, it is directed toward the reso- 

treatment of mental ills places psychotherapy lution of conflict, restoring the harmony which 

in the main tradition of medical practice; for in is health. 



OUTLINE OF TOPICS 

PAGE 

1. The profession of medicine, its aims and obligations: the relation of physician to pa- 

tient; the place of the physician in society 121 

2. The art of medicine 122 

20. The scientific foundations of the art of medicine: the contrast between the 
empiric and the artist in medicine 

2b. The relation of art to nature in healing: imitation and cooperation 

2C. The comparison of medicine with other arts and professions 123 

3. The practice of medicine 

yt. The application of rules of art to particular cases in medical practice 

3#. General and specialized practice: treating the whole man or the isolated part 124 

y. Diagnosis and prognosis: the interpretation of symptoms; case histories 

$d. The factors in prevention and therapy 

(1) Control of regimen: climate, diet, exercise, occupation, daily routine 

(2) Medication: drugs, specifics 125 

(3) Surgery 

4. The concept of health: normal balance or harmony 126 

5. The theory of disease 

50. The nature of disease 

5& The classification of diseases 127 

y. The disease process: onset, crisis, after-effects 

5</. The causes of disease: internal and external factors 

(1) The humoural hypothesis: temperamental dispositions 128 

(2) The psychogenesis of bodily disorders 
5^. The moral and political analogues of disease 

6. Mental disease or disorder: its causes and cure 129 

6a. The distinction between sanity and insanity: the concept of mental health and the 
nature of madness 

6b. The classification of mental diseases 

6c. The process and causes of mental disorder 

(1) Somatic origins of mental disease 130 

(2) Functional origins of mental disease 

6d. The treatment of functional disorders: psychotherapy as a branch of medicine 

7. The historical record on disease and its treatment: epidemics, plagues, pestilences 131 



CHAPTER 55: MEDICINE 



121 



REFERENCES 

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page 
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the 
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas- 
sage is in section d of page 12. 

PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the 
upper and lower halvesof the page. For example, in 53 JAMES : Psychology, 116a*119b, the passage 
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is 
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left- 
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of 
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half 
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164. 

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, 
SECT) arc sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer- 
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d. 

BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James 
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or vrrses, the King 
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA- 
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46. 

SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "csp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially 
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit- 
tently rather than continuously in the works or passage cited. 

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of 
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface. 



1. The profession of medicine, its aims and 
obligations: the relation of physician to 
patient; the place of the physician in 
society 

APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 38:1-15 (D) OT, 

Ecclesiasticus, 38:1-15 

5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound [442-506] 
44c-45a csp [478-483] 44d 

5 ARISTOPHANES: Plutus [400-414] 633d 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK n, 65c; BK in, 
117a-118a 

7 PLATO: Charmides, 7d; lOd-lla / Lysis, 21d; 
22d-23a / Laches, 27c / Protagoras, 55d-56a 
/ Symposium, 155d-156b / Gorgias, 261a-d; 
268d-270b; 287c-288a / Republic, BK i, 
298a-b; 303a-304a; BK m, 335b-338a / 
Statesman, 599a-b; 600b-d; 601d-602c / 
Laws, BK iv, 684c-685a; BK ix, 745a-b / 
Seventh Letter, 803c-804b 

8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK i, CH 10 [104*33-37] 
147d; BK n, CH 2 [110*14-22] 154d; CH 3 [no b 
16-19] ISSc; BK v, CH 7 [i36 b 33~i37 a 7] 189a 

9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i [639** 
16-21] 161d-162a / Politics, BK i, CH 9 [i257 b 
25-30] 451d; [1258*10-14] 452b; CH 10 [i258 a 
23-33] 452b-c; BK in, CH 6 [i278 b 36-i279* 
2] 476b; CH n [i28i b 4o-i282 a 6] 479d; CH 16 



] 485d-486a; BK vn, CH 2 [1324** 
27-31] 528d 

10 HIPPOCRATES: The Oath xiiia-b / Ancient 
Medicine, par 1-5 la-2d; par 7 3a / Prognostics, 
par i 19a-b / Regimen in Acute Diseases, par 
2-3 26d-27c / Epidemics, BK i, SECT n, par 5 
46c-d / Fractures, par 36, 89a / Articulations, 
par 44, 105a; par 78, 119d / Aphorisms, SECT 
i, par i 131a / The Law 144a-d 

10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 14, 178d- 
179a; BK in, CH 10 207b-d 

13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK xn [391-397] 364b 

15 TACITUS: Annals, BK vi, 98d 

17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR in, CH 5, 96a-b 

18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK i, CH 14 
627d-628b 

22 CHAUCER: Prologue [411-444] 166b-167a / 
Tale ofMelibeus, par 10, 403a 

24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i, 
29b-c; BK n, 76b; 124d-125b; BK in, 186a-b; 
BK iv, 232a-233b; 234a-c 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 365b-379a,c esp 375b-d; 
401b-402c; 523c-524a; 532a-b 

27 SHAKESPEARE: All's Well That Ends Well, 
ACT i, sc i [14-36] 142a-c; sc HI [227-262] 
147d-148b; ACT n, sc i {71-189] 149b-150c; 
sc HI [46-57] 151d-152a / Macbeth, ACT iv, 
sc HI [140-159] 304d-305a 



122 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



2 to 2b 



(1. The profession of medicine, its aims and obli- 
gations: the relation of physician to patient; 
the place of the physician in society.) 

28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 267b,d-268d 

29 CERVANTES : Don Quixote, PART u, 345a-346b 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 50c-53d 
esp 52d-53a 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART vi, 61b-c 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART i, 3a-b; PART iv, 155b- 
157a 

36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 412a-414b 

37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 33c-34c; 70c-71b; 
86a-c; 161d-162b 

38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xxix, 266a 

39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK i, 44c 
44 Bos WELL: Johnson, 13b-c; 261a-b 

47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [997-1010] 25b; [2011- 

2036] 47b-48a; PART n [7345-7348] 180a 
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 323c-d 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 38b-d; 43d- 
44a; 45b-c; BK v, 215c-d; 225c-227a; BK vm, 
307a-c; BK ix, 372a-373b; 374c-d; BK x, 448d; 
449b-c; 464a-d; BK xi, 524c-525a; BK xn, 
533d-534a; 535b-c 

52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK xn, 
356d-359c 

54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 
Analysis, 19d / Hysteria, 64b-c; 71d-72b; 
78b-81c passim; 107a-c / Psycho- Analytic Ther- 
apy, 125b-127a,c esp 127a,c/ "HW Psycho- 
Analysis 128a-130d esp 130b-c / General 
Introduction, 449a-b; 451b-c; 623d-625b esp 
624d-625a / Ego and Id, 713b [fn i] / New 
Introductory Lectures, 866b-c; 870d-871a 

2. The art of medicine 

2a. The scientific foundations of the art of 
medicine: the contrast between the em- 
piric and the artist in medicine 
APOCRYPHA: Eccksiasticus, 38:1-15 (D) OT, 
Ecclesiasticus, 38:1-15 

7 PLATO: Charmides, 6d-7b / Lysis, 17c-18a / 
Phaedrus, 136b-c / Gorgias, 261a-262a; 280d- 
281c; 287d-288.b / Republic, BK i, 303a-304a; 
BK in, 337b-c / Theaetetus, 516a / Statesman, 
601d-602c / Phikbus, 633b-c / Laws, BK iv, 
684c-685a; BK ix, 745a-b 

8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 13 
[79*10-16] 108c; BK n, CH 19 [100*3-9] 136c / 
Meteorology, BK iv, CH 12 493d-494d / Meta- 
physics, BK i, CH i [981*5-24] 499b-c / Sense 
and the Sensible, CH i [436*16-^2] 673b / Youth, 
Life, and Breathing, CH 27 [48o b 2i~3i] 726d 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 6 [1096*29-33] 
341c; CH 13 [1102*15-26] 347c; BK n, CH 2 
[1104*1-9] 349b-c; BK HI, CH 3 [ni2*3o- b 2o] 
358b-c; BK vi, CH i [ii38 b 25-34J 387b; CH 7 
[1141*20-34] 390a-b; CH 10 [n 42^4-1 143*4] 
392b; BK x, CH 9 [1180^3-28] 435b-c / 
Politics, BK HI, CH n [i28i b 4o-i282*6] 479d; 



CH 15 [1286*10-15] 484b; CH 16 
485d-486a; BK vn, CH 13 [i33i b 3o-38] 536c 
/ Rhetoric, BK i, CH 2 [i355 b 26~32] 595b; 
[1356^8-32] 596b-c 

10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 1-8 la- 
3b; par 12-15 4b-5d; par 20-24 7b-9a,c / 
Airs, Waters, Places, par 1-2 9a-c / Prognostics, 
par i 19a-b; par 25 26a,c / Regimen in Acute 
Diseases, par 2-3 26d-27c; par n, 31d-32a / 
Epidemics, BK i, SECT n, par 5 46c-d; SECT in, 
par i 49c-d; BK in, SECT in, par 16 59b-c / 
Surgery, par i 70b / Fractures, par 31, 87a-b / 
Articulations, par 10, 94d; par 58, 112d / 
Aphorisms, SECT i, par 1 131a / The Law 144a-d 

10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 13, 175c- 
177a; BK n, CH 8-9 191b-199a,c esp CH 9, 
195c-196a 

17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR ix, CH 14 74b-d 

18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xxn, CH 24, 
610c-611a; CH 30, 618a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 57, 
A 3, ANS 297b-298a; Q 117, A i, ANS and 
REP i 595d-597c; PART i-ii, Q 14, A 4, ANS 
679b-d 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 371c-372b; 377a-d; 

450d-451a; 523c-524a 
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK n, 27b-c 
28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 289d-292a esp 
289d, 291d-292a / Circulation of the Blood, 
305a-d / On Animal Generation, 376d-377a 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 5b-c; 48d- 
49b; 50c-51d; 52b-d; 53a-b; 56c-57b / 
Novum Otganum, BK i, APH 1-9 107a-d; APH 
64 114b; APH 66, 114d-115a 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART vi, 61b-c; 66d- 
67a 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT v, DIV 36, 
465a-d [fn i] 

36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 412a-414b 

37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 157a 158a 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK ix, 372a-373b 
54 FREUD: Psycho- Analytic Therapy, 123b-125a 
esp 123b,*125a / "Wild" Psycho- Analysis 
128a-130d esp 130b-d / General Introduction, 
451b-c; 549d-550c; 606c-d / New Intro- 
ductory Lectures, 871 d 

2b. The relation of art to nature in healing: 
imitation and cooperation 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK in, 117a-c 

7 PLATO: Symposium, 155d-156c / Gorgias, 
260a-262a / Republic, BK m, 335c-337a / 
Timaeus, 475c-d / Statesman, 599a-b 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK n, CH i [i92 b 8~3i] 
268b,d-269a; [i93 b i2-i7] 269d-270a; CH 2 
[194*22-27] 270c; CH 8 [199^6-31] 277a / 
Metaphysics, BK vn, CH 7 [io32 b 6-29] 555c-d; 
CH 9 [1034*8-29] 557b-c 

10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 3 ld-2b; 
par 20 7b-d /. Prognostics, par i 19a-b / In- 
juries of the Head, par 17 68d-69a / Surgery, 
par 15 73b-c / Fractures, par 1-3 74b,d-76a / 



2c to 3a 



CHAPTER 55: MEDICINE 



123 



Articulations, par 2-3 92a-c; par 14 96d-97d; 
par 42 104b-c / Aphorisms, SECT i, par 1 131a; 
SECT n, par 4 132b; par 51 133d 

17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR iv, CH 31, 175a 

18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH 30 
651c-d 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 117, 
A i, ANS and REP i 595d-597c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 51, 
A i, ANS 12b-13c 

24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK in, 
207c-d 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 52c-d; 368d-369a; 369c- 
370a; 528c-529b 

27 SHAKESPEARE: King Lear, ACT iv, sc iv [1-15] 
272b-c 

28 HARVEY: Circulation of the Blood, 305a-d / 
On Animal Generation, 438c 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 53b-d / 
Novum Organum, BK i, APH 1-9 107a-d 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART vi, 61b-c; 66d- 
67a 

36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 195b 

37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 34b; 86b-c 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 336b-337a 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK ix, 372a-373b; 
BK x, 449b-c 

54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 
Analysis, 2a / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and 
Anxiety, 746b-c 

2c. The comparison of medicine with other 
arts and professions 

7 PLATO: Charmides, 6d-7b / Lysis, 17c-18a / 
Phaedrus, 136b-137c / Gorgias, 260a-262a; 
268d-270b; 282c-d; 289c-d / Republic, BK i, 
298a~299a; BK in, 337b-338a; BK v, 36 Id- 
362a / Theaetetus, 515d-517b; 525d / Sophist, 
556d-558d / Statesman, 599a-602c / Philebus, 
633b-c / Laws, BK iv, 684c-685a / Seventh 
Letter, 803c-804b 

8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK i, CH 3 144a-b; BK v, 
CH 7 [136^33-137*7] 189a; BK vi, CH 5 [142^0- 
143*9] 196b-c / Physics, BK i, CH 8 [i9i a 33- b 9] 
267b; BK n, en i [i92 b 23~32] 268d-269a; 
[i93 b i3-i9] 269d-270a; CH 8 [ 

/ Metaphysics, BK vn, CH 7 
555b-d 

9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i 
15-24] 161d-162a / Ethics, BK i, CH i [1094*6- 
9] 339a; CH 6 [1096*29-33] 341c; CH 7 [1097* 
15-23] 342c; CH 13 [1102*15-26] 347c; BK n, 
CH 2 [1104*1-9] 349b-c; BK HI, CH 3 [1112*30- 
b i9] 358b-c; BK v, CH n [ii38*29- b 4] 386d- 
387a; BK vi, CH i [ii38 b 25-34] 387b; CH 7 
[1141*20-34] 390a-b; CH 12 [1143^1- 1144*5] 
393b-c passim; CH 13 [n 45*6-12] 394d; BK x, 
CH 9 [Ii8o b 7-ii8i b 7] 435b-436a / Politics, 
BK i, CH 9 [i257 b 25-3o] 451d; [1258*10-14] 
452b; CH 10 [1258*23-33] 452b-c; BK n, CH 8 
[i268 b 33-37] 464d; BK in, CH 6 [i278 b 36- 
1279*2] 476b; CH n [I28i b 40-i282*6] 479d; 



CH 15 [1286*10-15] 484b; CH 16 [i287*32- b 3] 
485d-486a; BK vn, CH 2 [i324 b 27~3i] 528d; 
CH 13 [i33i b 30~38] 536c / Rhetoric, BK i, 
CH i [i355 b 9~ I 4] 594d-595a; CH 2 [i355 b 26- 
36] 595b; [1356^8-35] 596b-c 
10 HIPPOCRATES : Ancient Medicine, par i la-b; 
par 9 3b-d / Regimen in Acute Diseases, par 3 
27a-c / The Law, par 1-3 144a-d 

13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK XH [391-397] 364b 

14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 34b / Pericles, 129b-d / 
Demetrius, 726a-d 

17 PLOTINUS: Fifth Ennead, TR ix, CH n 250c- 
251a 

18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH 30 
651c-d 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 117, 
A i, ANS and REP i 595d-597c; PART i-n, Q 14, 
A 4, ANS 679b-d 

24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK n, 
76b-c; BK HI, 186a-c 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 450d-451a 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 5b-6a; 50c- 

51d; 52d-53b; 77d-78d 
33 PASCAL: PensSes, 33 176b 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 112b-113a 

37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 86a-c; 90b 
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK i, 44c 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK x, 448d 
54 FREUD: Hysteria, 108a-b 

3. The practice of medicine 

3*. The application of rules of art to partic- 
ular cases in medical practice 

7 PLATO: Statesman, 599a-b; 600b-d / Laws, 
BK iv, 684c-685a 

8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK i, CH i [981*5-24] 
499b-c 

9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i 
[639 b i6-2i] 161d-162a / Ethics, BK n, CH 2 
[1104*1-9] 349b-c; BK in, CH 3 [ni2*3o- b 2o] 
358b-c; BK vi, CH i [ii38 b 25-34J 387b; CH 7 
[ii4i b i4-2i] 390c-d; BK x, CH 9 [n8o b 7~23] 
435b-c / Politics, BK in, CH 15 [1286*10-15] 
484b; BK vn, CH 13 [i33i b 30-38] 536c / 
Rhetoric, BK i, CH 2 [i356 b 28-32] 596b-c 

10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 12 4b-c; 
par 20-21 7b-8a / Airs, Waters, Places, par 2 
9b-c / Regimen in Acute Diseases, par 18 34d- 
35b / Epidemics, BK i, SECT in, par i 49c-d; 
BK in, SECT in, par 16 59b-c / Articulations, 
par 10 94d-95a; par 71, 117c / Aphorisms, 
SECT i, par 9 131c 

12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK n, CH 17, 159a-b 
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 52a-53c 
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 112b-113a 

36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 372b-373a 

37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 70c-71b 
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 60b-c 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK ix, 372a-373b 

54 FREUD: Hysteria, 32a-c / General Introduction, 

607a-b / New Introductory Lectures, 871 d 



124 

(3. The practice of medicine.) 

36. General and specialized practice: treating 
the whole man or the isolated part 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK n, 65c 

7 PLATO: Charmides,~2&3b / Phaedrus, 136b-c 
/ Gorgias, 282c-d / Timaeus, 474d-475d / 
Laws, BK x, 767d 

10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 20 7b-d 
/ Epidemics, BK i, SECT HI, par i 49c-d / 
Injuries of the Head, par 20 69d 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 373c-d 

44 Bos WELL: Johnson, 350c-d 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 250c 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK ix, 372a-373b 

52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK xi, 
340c-d 

54 FREUD: Hysteria, 62b-c / General Introduction, 
451b-452a; 620b-c / New Introductory Lec- 
tures, 871d-872a 

3r. Diagnosis and prognosis: the interpreta- 
tion of symptoms; case histories 

OLD TLSTAMENT: Leviticus, 13-14 
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 44d-45a 

6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK 11, 399c- 
400c 

7 PLATO: Protagoras, 59b-c / Laws, BK iv, 684c- 
685a 

8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK n, CH 27 
[70*3-39] 92a-c passim / Prophesying, CH i 
[463 a 3- b io] 707b-708a 

9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK iv, CH 10 
[537 b i4~2o] 64b; BK vn, CH 12 [588*10-12] 
114c; BK vin, CH 18 [6oi b 6-8] 127c; CH 21 [6o3 b 
20-24] 129c; CH 23 [6o4 a i2]-CH 24 [6o4 b 2o] 
13Qa-c / Rhetoric, BKI, CH2 [i357 b i4~2i]597b-c 

10 HIPPOCRATES: Airs, Waters, Places, par 10-11 
13b-14b / Prognostics 19a-26a,c csp par i 
19a-b, par 15 22d~23a, par 25 26a,c / Regimen 
in Acute Diseases, APPENDIX, par 9-14 38b 40d 
/ Epidemics, BK i, SECT 11, par 5 46c-d; SECT 
HI, par I-CASE xiv 49c-53d; BK in, SECT i-n 
53d-56d; SECT in, par i6-cASE xvi 59b-63d 
/ Injuries of the Head, par 5 65a; par 8 65c; 
par 10-12 65d-67a; par 19 69b-c / Fractures, 
par 5 76d-77a / Articulations, par 10 94d-95a; 
par 26 99a-b; par 30 99c-100b; par 51 109a-b; 
par 54 Ilia; par 57 llld-112b; par 58, 112d; 
par 59 113b / Instruments of Reduction, par 
4-24 122d-126c passim / Aphorisms, SECT i, 
par 2 131a; par 12 131d; SECT 11 132b-134a 
passim; SECT iv, par I7-SECT v, par 15 135d- 
138b; SECT v, par 30-SECT vn, par 86 138d- 
144a,c passim 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK vi [1138- 
1214] 95b-96b 

19 AQUINAS : Summa Thcologica, PART i, Q 13, 
A 5, ANS 66b-67d; A 6, ANS 67d-68c; Q 57, A 3, 
ANS 297b-298a; A 4, ANS 298a~299a 

24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK in, 
197a 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 370c-d; 372b-373b; 

531d-532b 
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 49b-50b; 

52a; 52c d 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 112b-113a; 114b; 
PART iv, 156b-157a 

37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 33c-34a; 70c-71b; 
14Sb-146a; 157a-158a; 373c-d 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 38c-d; BK vni, 
307a-c; BK ix, 372a-373b; BK xi, 524c-525a 

52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK xi, 
340c 

54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 
Analysis, lb-2b / Hysteria, 31b-d; 38d-40a; 
50b-c; 54b-56c; 60b-62c csp 60b-d; 87a-90d 
esp 87a-d / Psycho -Analytical Therapy, 124b / 
"Wild" Psycho- Analysis,' 128a-l29d esp 129c-d 
/ Interpretation of Dreams, 151a-c / General 
Introduction, 550d-557a esp 556a-b; 593b-c; 
605b-607b passim, esp 606c-607b / New 
Introductory lectures, 872d-873a 

3^. The factors in prevention and therapy 

3</( 1) Control of regimen: climate, diet, exer- 
cise, occupation, daily routine 

OLD TESTAMENT: Proverbs, 16:24; 17:22 
APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 30:25; 31:19-22; 

37:29-31 (D) OT, Ecclcsiasticus, 30:27; 

31:22-27137:32-34 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK n, 64c-d 

7 PLATO: Protagoras, 50d / Symposium, 155c-d 
/ Gorgias, 261a d; 289c-d / Republic, UK HI, 
334b-337a; BK w, 345b-c / Timaeus, 474d- 
475d / Laws, BK n, 656b-c / Seventh Letter, 
803c-804b 

8 ARISTOTLE: Heavens, BK n, CH 12 [292*14- 
b i8] 383d-384b 

9 ARisroTLb: History of Animals, BK vn, CH 12 
114c; BK vin, CH 21 [6o3 b 25-34J 129d / Ethics, 
BK ii, CH 2 [1104*10-26] 349c-d; BK vi, CH 7 
[ii4i b i4-2i] 390c-d / Politics, BK vn, CH n 
[i33 a 34-4 I ] 535a; CH 16 [i335 b i2-i9] 540c; 
CH 17 [1336*4-39] 541a-c; BK vni, CH 4 [i338 b 
39-1339*10] 544b-c / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 6 
[1362*29-33] 603a; CH 7 [1364*3-5] 605b 

10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 3-11 Id- 
4b; par 13-16 4c-6b; par 20 7b-d / Airs, 
Waters, Places, par i 9a-b; par 3-7 9c-12a; 
par 9-10 12d-14a; par 12 14b-d; par 15 15b-c; 
par 19-21 16c-17b / Regimen in Acute Diseases 
26a-44a,c esp par 9 29d-30c, APPENDIX, 
par 1 8 41a-d / Epidemics, BK i, SECT i, par i 
44a-b; SECT n, par i 45a-c; par 7-8 47a-c; 
BK in, SECT in, par 1-2 56d-57a; par 15 59b 
/ Surgery, par 20 73d / Fractures, par 7 77c- 
78a; par 9 78c-d; par 36 88d-89a / Articula- 
tions, par 9 94b-c; par 50, 108b-d; par 55 
llla-c; par 58 112b-113a; par 81 120d / 
Aphorisms, SECT i, par 3-11 131a-c; par 13-19 
131d-132a; SECT n, par 4 132b; par 16-17,22 
132d; par 36 133b; par 38,45 133c; par 49-50 



3d(2) to 3d(3) 



CHAPTER 55: MEDICINE 



125 



133d; SECT in, par 1-19 134a-d; SECT v, par 
16-29 138b-d; SECT vn, par 56 143a; par 66 
143c / Ulcers, par i, 145a / Sacred Disease, 
160b-d 

10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK 11, CH 8 191b- 
195c 

14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 34b-d; 40c-42a / Cae- 
sar, 583d-584b 

22 CHAUCER: Nun's Priest's Tale [14,827-852] 
450a-b 

24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i, 
26d-29d; 48d-49a; BK n, 68a-69a,c; BK in, 
134d-135a; 152a-153b; 188d-191c 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 66c-67a; 374a-375a; 
524b; 527a-528a 

28 HAPVEY: On Animal Generation, 433c 

29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART n, 345a-346b 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 26c-d; 
47a-b; 53d-54a / New Atlantis, 201b; 211b- 
212c 

32 MILTON: Paradise Ijost, BK xi [524-534] 310b- 

311a 
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART iv, 163a 

36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 525a-526b 

37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 70c-71b; 145b-146a 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 335a-b; 336d-337a 

39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK iv, 293d-294b 
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 171c-d 

48 MELVILLE: Moby Dicl(, 353b-354a 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 356d 357b 

50 MARX: Capital, 324a-325c 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 52d; BK v, 
215c-d; BK ix, 372a-373b 

54 FREUD: Hysteria, 64d~65a 

3</(2) Medication: drugs, specifics 
APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 16:12 (D) 
OT, Boof( of Wisdom, 16:12 / Ecclesiasticus, 
38:4-8 (D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 38:4-8 
4 HOMER: Iliad, BK iv [188-219] 25d-26b; BK v 
[899-906] 39c; BK xi [842-848] 81c 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK iv, 143a; 157a 
dTuucYDiDEs: Peloponnesian War, BK n, 

400b-c 

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 474d-475d / Statesman, 
601d-602a 

9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK in, CH 21 
[522 b 9~i3] 47d; BK iv, CH 5 [53o b 6-io] 57b; 
BK vin, CH 21 [6o3 b 9-i6] 129c; CH 24 [604** 
26-29] 130c; CH 26 131a; CH 29 [607*21-34] 
132c-d; BK ix, CH 6 [6i2 b i5~i8] 138b / Ethics, 
BK vi, CH i [ii38 b 25-34] 387b 
10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 13 4c~5a; 
par 24 8d-9a,c / Regimen in Acute Diseases, 
par i 26a-d; par 4-7 27c-29c; par 14-17 32c- 
34c; APPENDIX, par n 39c-40b; par 16 40d; 
par 26-39 43a-44a,c / Fractures, par 27, 85b-c; 
par 29 85d-86a / Articulations, par 36 101 d; 
par 63 114d-115b / Aphorisms, SECT n, par 22 
132d/ Ulcers, par 1 145a-c; par 4-13 146b-149b 
/ Fistulae, par 2-12 150b-152d / Hemorrhoids, 
par 2-3 152b,d-153b; par 6-7 153d-154a,c 



10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 13, 176a- 
177a; CH 14, 179a-b; BK n, CH 9, 195d-196a; 
BK in, CH 13, 209c 

22 CHAUCER: Prologue [411-444] 166b-167a / 
Tale ofMelibeus, par 10, 403a 

24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i, 
26d; BK n, 92b-c; 96a-d; 124d-125d; BK in, 
140 b; 173d 174a; 189a c; 196d; 225a; 226d; 
BK iv, 246d-247a; 310d-311c 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 90d-91b; 365b-379c pas- 
sim, esp 369c-370a 

27 SHAKESPEARE: All's Well That Ends Well, 
ACT i, sc in [227-262] 147d-148b; ACT n, sc i 
[71-189] 149b-150c; sc in [46-57] 151d-152a 
/ King Lear, ACT iv, sc iv [I-IQ] 272b-c 

28 GILBERT: Loadstone, BK i, 19c-21c; BK n, 
35b-c 

28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 297d 

30 BACON: Advancement of learning, 26c-d; 

47a-b; 51d-53d esp 53a-c / New Atlantis, 

201b; 212c 
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 108b-109a; 112b- 

113a; PART iv, 156b-157a; 161b-162a; 169a 

36 SrERNE: Tristram Shandy, 372b-373a 

37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 63a-c; 76b; 83b 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 336d-337a 
44 BOSWELL '.Johnson, 257c-d 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 323c 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 38b-d; BK v, 
215c-d; BK vin, 337d-338a; BK ix, 372a- 
373b; 374a-d; BK x, 449b-c; BK XH, 533d- 
534a; 535b-c; BK xiv, 595a-b; BK xv, 630b 

54 FREUD: Hysteria, 40a-b 

3</(3) Surgery 

4 HOMER: Iliad, BK xi [842-848] 81c 

7 PLATO: Republic, BK in, 336a-b / Statesman, 

599a-b; 60 Id- 60 2a 

9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK in, CH 4 
[5 I 4 a 34~ b 5l 38c; BK vin, CH 21 [6o3 b 5-i6] 
129b-c; BK ix, CH 50 [63i b i9-632*32] 157a-c 
10 HIPPOCRATES : Prognostics, par 23 25a-b / 
Regimen in Acute Diseases, par 7 28d-29c; 
APPENDIX, par 2-6 35d-37a; par n 39c-40b; 
par 24 42d; par 29 43a-b / Injuries of the 
Head, par 9 65c-d; par 13-21 67b-70a,c / 
Surgery 70b,d-74d esp par 2 70b, par 4 71a-b, 
par 6 71b, par 10 72a-b / Fractures 74b,d- 
91d esp par i 74b,d-75a, par 47-48 90d-91d / 
Articulations 91b,d-121d esp par 61 113d- 
114a, par 79 120b / Instruments of Reduction 
121b,d-130d esp par 40 129d-130c / Aphor- 
isms, SECT v, par 68 140a; SECT vi, par 22 
140d; par 31 141a; par 47 141c; SECT vn, 
par 46,48 142d; par 53 143a; par 87 144c / 
Ulcers, par 14-17 149b-150a,c / Fistulae, par 5 
151a-b / Hemorrhoids, par 2-6 152b,d-154a 
18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK i, CH 14, 
627d-628a 

24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK n, 
119b-c; BK in, 196c 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 330b-d; 373a-b 



126 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



(3< The factors in prevention and therapy. 

3</(3) Surgery.) 
28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 289d-290a / 

On Animal Generation, 376d-377a; 438b-c 
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 52b-c / New 
Atlantis, 211d 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 113b; PART iv, 
148b 

37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 70c-71b; 162a-c 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 336d-337a 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK x, 464a-465c 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 844a 

54 FREUD: Hysteria, 81b-c 

4. The concept of health: normal balance or 
harmony 

7 PLATO: Charmides, 2d-3b / Symposium, 155d- 
157a / Meno, 175b / Gorgias, 282c-283a / 
Republic, BK HI, 334b-337a; BK iv, 355b-d; 
BK ix, 422c-d; 427a / Timaeus, 472a-c; 474d- 
475d / Philebus, 616d-617a / Laws, BK v, 
690a-c 

8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 8 [8 b 25-9 a 28] 13d- 
14b / Topics, BK HI, en i [n6 b i7-22] 163a-b 
/ Physics, BK VH, CH 3 [246 a io- b i9] 329c-330a 
/ Metaphysics, BK v, CH 20 [io22 b io-i3] 544a 
/ Soul, BK i, CH 4 (407 b 3 1-408*2] 637c; BK n, 
CH 2 [414*4-14] 644a-b / Sense and the Sensible, 
CH 5 [445*16-31] 683a-b 

9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK HI, CH 19 
[52o b i9-52i a i4] 45c-46a; BK vn, CH i [58i b 
25-582*4] 107b-c / Parts of Animals, BK i, 
CH i [640*4-7] 162d; BK n, CH 5 [65i a 37- b i8] 
176c; en 7 177c-179a; BK iv, CH 2 [677*5- b i] 
206d-207b / Ethics, BK n, CH 2 [1104*10-26] 
349c-d; BK v, CH i [1129*12-25] 376b-c; CH n 
[1138*28-32] 386d; BK vi, CH 12 [i 143^1- 
1144*5] 393 b-c passim / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 5 
[i 3 6i b 3 -26] 602a-b; CH 7 li&fu-^ft] 
605b 

10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 13-19 

4c-7b / Regimen in Acute Diseases, par 9, 

29d / Sacred Disease, 156b-c 
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK n, CH 8, 

194c-d; CH 9, 195c-196a 
12 LUCRETIUS : Nature of Things, BK in [558- 

565] 37b 
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK v, SECT 8 269d- 

270b 
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xix, CH 13 519a- 

520a; BK xxn, CH 24, 610c-611a / Christian 

Doctrine, BK i, CH 16 628c-d 
20 AQUINAS : Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 49, 

A 2 2b-4a; A 3, REP 3 4b-5a; A 4, ANS 5a-6a; 

Q 50, A i, ANS and REP 2-3 6a-7b; A 3, REP 2 

8b-9a; Q 51, A i, ANS 12b-13c; Q 52, A i, 

ANS and REP 3 15d-18a; A 2, ANS 18a-19a; 

Q 54, A i, ANS 22d-23d; Q 73, A 2, ANS 120d- 

121c; A 3, ANS 121c-122b; Q 82, A i, ANS and 

REP i 168a-d 



24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK HI, 
137d-139b; BK iv, 234a-235a; 239d-240a 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 233c-236a; 368d; 369d- 
370a 

28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 296d-297a / 

On Animal Generation, 493a-b 
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 50c-51d; 

72b 
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK xi [524-543] 

310b-311a / Areopagitica, 407b 
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART iv, 155b-156a; 170b- 

171b 
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 412a-417a 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 336b~d / Political 
Economy, 368d-369a 

39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK iv, 293d-294b 
42 KANT: Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 

368d-369a /judgement, 509c-d 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK x, 449b-c 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 799a-b 

54 FREUD: General Introduction, 635b-c 

5. The theory of disease 

5a. The nature of disease 

6 THUCYDIDES : Peloponnesian War, BK n, 
400b-c 

7 PLATO: Lysis, 21d / Republic, BK iv, 354d- 
355c; BK vin, 409a; BK x, 435a-d / Timaeus, 
472a-474d 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vn, CH 3 [246*10- 
b i9] 329c-330a 

9 ARISTOTLE: Generation of Animals, BK v, CH 4 
[784*3 i- b 34] 326b-d / Ethics, BK n, CH 2 
[1104*10-19] 349c; BK v, CH i [1129*12-25] 
376b-c 

10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 14 5a-c; 
par 1 6 5d-6b; par 19 6d-7b / Fractures, par 31, 
87a / Sacred Disease, 159b 
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK n, CH 8, 193d; 
194c-d; CH 9, 195c-196a; BK in, CH 12 208b- 
209b esp 208d 
17PLOTiNus: Second Ennead, TR ix, en 14 

74b-d 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 71, 
A i, REP 3 105d-106c; Q 72, A 5, ANS 115a- 
116b; Q 73, A 2, ANS 120d-121c; A 3, ANS 
121c-122b; Q 77, A 3, ANS 147c-148b; Q 82, 
A i, ANS and REP i 168a-d; A 4, REP 2 170b- 
171a; Q 88, A i, ANS 193a-194b; PART in 
SUPPL, Q 8 1, A 4, REP 4 966d-967d 
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 528c-529b 
28 HARVEY: Circulation of the Blood, 305a-d 
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK xi [477-543] 

309b~311a 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART iv, 155b-157a 
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK iv, 293d-294b 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK ix, 372a-b 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 799a-807b csp 799a-800a, 
806a-b; 815a 

54 FREUD: Narcissism, 403a-b 



5b to 5d 



CHAPTER 55: MEDICINE 



127 



5b. The classification of diseases 

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 472a-474d 

8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK iv, CH 3 [i23 b 34~37] 
172c 

9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK vm, CH 
18-27 127b-131b / Ethics, BK vn, CH 8 [ii5o b 
29 -35] 401c-d 

10 HIPPOCRATES : Airs, Waters, Places, par 3-6 
9c-lla / Regimen in Acute Diseases, par 1-2, 
26c-d / Epidemics, BK i, SECT in, par 2 49d- 
50a / Injuries of the Head, par 4-8 64d-65c / 
Fractures, par 31, 87a / Articulations, par 51 
109a-b; par 61 113d-114a / Aphorisms, SECT 
in 134a-135b 

10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK n, CH 8, 193c- 
194c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 73, 
A 3, ANS 121c-122b; A 7, ANS 124d~125c 

30 BACON: Advancement of learning, 51d 52a 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART HI, 112b 113a; PART 
iv, 155b-157a 

54 FREUD: Hysteria, 87a-d; 114d / General Intro- 
duction, 605b-606d passim, csp 606c-d 

5c. The disease process: onset, crisis, after- 
effects 

OLD TESTAMENT: Leviticus, 13-14 
6TnucYDiDEs: Peloponnesian War, BK n, 
399c-400c 

10 HIPPOCRATES: Prognostics 19a-26a,c esp par 
15-20 22d-24c / Regimen in Acute Diseases, 
APPENDIX, par i 35c-d; par 9-15 38b-40d; 
par 22 42b-c / Epidemics 44a-63d esp BK i, 
SECT in, par 2-3 49d-50b / Injuries of the 
Head, par 19 69b-c / Fractures, par 31 86d- 
87d / Articulations, par 69 116b-117a / Aphor- 
isms, SECT i, par 7-12 131b-d; SECT n, par 13 
132c; par 23-32 132d~133b; SECT in, par 28 
135a b; SECT iv, par 22-82 136a-137d esp 
par 30 136b, par 36 136b-c, par 64 137b 

10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 14, 177c 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [487- 
505] 36b-c; BK vi [1138-1214] 95b-96b 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 51d-52a 

37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 86a-c 

48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 350b-354a 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 256c 

54 FREUD: Narcissism, 402d-403a / General In- 
troduction, 618c 

5</. The causes of disease: internal and external 
factors 

OLD TESTAMENT: Leviticus, 26:16 / Numbers, 
12:10-15; 16:46-50 / Deuteronomy, 28:21- 
22,27-28,35,58-62 / // Kings, 5:27-(D) IV 
Kings, 5:27 / / Chronicles, 21:14-15 (D) 
I Paralipomenon, 21:14-15 / // Chronicles, 
26:18-21 (D) // Paralipomenon, 26:18-21 / 
Job, 2:7 / Psalms, 107:17-20 (D) Psalms, 
106:17-20 



APOCRYPHA: // Maccabees, 3:27-29; 9 (D) OT, 

II Machabees, 3:27-29; 9 
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 9:32-33; 17:14-18 

/ / Corinthians, 1 1 125-30 

4 HOMER: Iliad, BK i [33-100] 3b-4b 

5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [1-215] 99a- 
lOla 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 32c-d; 38a-b; 
BK n, 64c-d; BK iv, 135c-d; 157a 

7 PLATO: Symposium, 155d-157a / Republic, 
BK 11, 318c-319a; BK HI, 334b-335d; BK iv, 
345b-c; BK vm, 412d; BK x, 434d-435c / 
Timaeus, 472a-474d; 476b-d 

8 ARISTOTLE: Meteorology, BK iv, CH 7 [384 tt 
25-34] 488c 

9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK in, CH 15 
[5 I 9 bl 5~ I 9l 44c; CH 19 [521*10-32] 46a-b; 
BK vn, CH i [58i b 22-582 a 5] 107b-c; CH 12 
114c; BK vin, CH 18-27 127b-131b passim; 
CH 29 132c-d / Parts of Animals, BK n, 
CH 5 [65i*37- b i8] 176c; CH 7 [653 b i-7] 178d- 
179a; BK in, CH 7 [67o b 5-ii] 199a; BK iv, 
en 2 [677 tt 5- b i] 206d-207b / Generation of 
Animals, BK iv, CH 7 317d-318b; BK v, CH 4 
[7 8 4 tt 3i- b 34l 326b-d / Ethics, BK n, CH 2 
[1104*10-19] 349c 

10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par i la-b; 
par 3 Id 2b; par 6 2d-3a; par 9-11 3b-4b; 
par 13-22 4c-8d / Airs, Waters, Places, par 
i-io 9a-14a esp par 10 13b-14a; par 22 17b- 
18a / Regimen in Acute Diseases, par 9-10 
29d-30d; APPENDIX, par i 35c-d; par 6 36c- 
37a; par 17 40d-41a / Epidemics, BK i, SECT i, 
par i 44a-b; SECT n, par 7-8 47a-c; BK in, 
SECT in, par 1-2 56d-57a; par 15 59b / Surg- 
ery, par 20 73d / Articulations, par 12 96a-b; 
par 58, 113a / Aphorisms, SECT n, par 51 133d; 
SECT in, par 1-19 134a-d; SECT v, par 16-24 
138b-c / Fistulae, par i 150a / Hemorrhoids, 
par i 152b / Sacred Disease 154a-160d esp 
155d-156a 

10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH u, 172b-c; 
BK n, CH 8-9 191b-199a,c esp CH 8, 194c-d, 
CH 9, 195c-196a 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK vi [769- 
829] 90c-91b; [1090-1137] 94d-95b 

17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR ix, CH 14 74b-d 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, o 81, 
A i, ANS 163a-164d; Q 82, A 2, ANS 168d- 
169c; A 4, REP 2 170b-171a; Q 83, A 4, ANS 
173c-174b; Q 85, AA 5-6 181d-184a 

22 CHAUCER: Prologue [411-444] 166b-167a 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART 11, 148d; 151b-c; 
152b 

24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i, 
53a-c 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 367b-368a; 371c-d 

28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 296a-d / Cir- 
culation of the Blood, 305a-d; 316c-d; 321d- 
322a / On Animal Generation, 386d-387a; 
407a; 423 b; 433a-c; 455d-456a; 493a-b 



128 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



5d(l) to 5<? 



(5. The theory of disease. 5tt. The causes of 
disease: internal and external factors.) 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 49d-50b; 
52b-d 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART vi, 61c 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK xi [477-548] 309b- 
311a 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 112b-113a; PART iv, 

155b-157a; 161b-162a; 163a 
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 413b-414b 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 336a-337a esp 336b-c; 
364b-c 

39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK i, 34d-35b 
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 70d-71a 

44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 306d-307a 

48 MELVILLE: Moby Dtc{, 350b-351b 

49 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 9d lOa / Descent 
of Man, 256a; 325c-327a passim; 351a-355a; 
356d-357b 

50 MARX: Capital, 115c; 118b-124a; 142b,d 
[fn 4]; 178b [fn i]; 194b-195b; 204a-c; 229c; 
236c-237d; 324a-330d passim 

51 TOLSTOY : War and Peace, BK i, 52d 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 69a-b; 535a; 895a 

54 FREUD: General Introduction, 604c-605c 

5</(l) The humoural hypothesis: temperamen- 
tal dispositions 

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 472a-474d 
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK iv, CH 2 
[677V b i] 206d-207b 

10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 13-20 
4c-7d; par 22 8a-d; par 24 8d-9a,c / Airs, 
Waters, Places, par 10 13b-14a / Regimen in 
Acute Diseases, APPENDIX, par i 35c-d; par 
3 35d-36a; par 5-6 36b-37a / Epidemics, BK 
HI, SECT HI, par 14 59b / Aphorisms, SECT in, 
par 2 134a; par n 134b; par 14 134c / Sacred 
Disease, 155d-160d esp 159a-b 

10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK 11, CH 8-9 
191b-199a,c 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [487- 
505! 36b-c 

14 PLUTARCH: Alexander, 542a-c 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 119, 
A i, REP 3 604c-607b; PART i-n, Q 46, A 5, 
ANS and REP i 815d-816d 

20 AQUINAS : Summa Theologica, PART i-u, Q 73, 
A 2, ANS 120d-121c; A 3, ANS 121c-122b; Q 77, 
A 3, ANS 147c-148b; Q 82, A i, REP i 168a-d; 
A 4, REP 2 170b-171a; PART HI SUPPL, Q 80, 
A 3 958b-959c; Q 82, A i, ANS and REP 4 
968a-970c 

22 CHAUCER: Prologue [411-444] 166b-167a 

24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK HI, 
138a-d 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 371c-d 

28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 435b-c 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 26c-d; 

52b-c; 77a-c 
32 MILTON : Samson Agonistes [599-605] 352b 



36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 112b-113a; PART iv, 
163a 

36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 380a; 412a-417a 
esp 412a-414b 

37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 283a-b 

5d(2) The psychogenesis of bodily disorders 

APOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 30:21-24 (D) OT, 

Eccksiasticus, 30:22-26 
7 PLATO: Charmides, 2d-3b / Timaeus, 474d- 

475c 
10 HIPPOCRATES : Epidemics, BK in, SECT m, 

CASE xi 62b-c; CASE xv 63b-c / Sacred 

Disease, 158a 
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [147- 

160] 32a 
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 117, 

A 3, REP 3 598c-599b; PART i-n, Q 28, A 5, 

ANS 743c-744b 
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 36c-42a; 234c-235a; 

332d-333c; 532a-b 

28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 296d / Circu- 
lation of the Blood, 321d<322a 
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 49d-50b 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART iv, 163a 

37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 253d 
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 350c-d 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK in, 142d; BK v, 
220b-c; BK vi, 247d-248a; BK vn, 301b- 
302d passim; BK ix, 373a-b; BK xm, 567d- 
568c esp 568b; BK xv, 617a-b 

52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK xi, 
331d-332a 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 132a-135b esp 132a-b; 
847b-848a 

54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 
Analysis, lb-6b esp 4c-5a / Hysteria, 25a-59d 
esp 25a-27a, 30a-d, 35b-c, 37d-38d, 56b-58c; 
82d-83c; 88c-89c; 90b-d / Narcissism, 403a-c 
/ Repression, 426b-c / General Introduction, 
572a-b / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 
718a-719d; 728c-729a / New Introductory 
Lectures, 852a-b 

5e. The moral and political analogues of 
disease 

OLD TESTAMENT: Psalms, 147:3 (O) Psalms, 
146:3 / Isaiah, 1:4-6 (D) Isaias, 1:4-6 / 
Jeremiah, 8:21-22; 30:12-17; 33:6; 46:11 (D) 
Jeremias, 8:21-22; 30:12-17; 33:6; 46:11 
5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King 99a-113a,c esp 
[1297-1415] lllb-112b 

7 PLATO: Gorgias, 268b-c / Republic, BK iv 
345a-d; 354d-355c; BK vin, 409a; 412d; BK 
x, 435a-d / Timaeus, 474b-d / Sophist, 556d- 
558d / Laws, BK iv, 684c-685a; BK v, 690d- 
691b 

8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK iv, CH 4 [ioo8 b 
25-32] 528b 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK n, CH 2 [1104*10-26] 
349c-d; BK v, CH n [ii38 B 29- b 4] 386d-387ar 
BK vn, CH 8 Jii5o b 29-ii5i a 4] 401c-d 



6to6c 



CHAPTER 55: MEDICINE 



129 



12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK v, SECT 8 269d- 
270b 

14 PLUTARCH: Agesilaus, 495c-d / Phocion, 
605a-b / Aratus, 834d 

15 TACITUS: Annals, BK in, 57d-58b 

18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK i, CH 14 
627d-628b; CH 16 628c-d 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 71, 
A i, REP 3 105d-106c; Q 72, A 5, ANS 115a- 
116b; Q 73, A 2, ANS 120d-121c; A 3, ANS 
121c-122b; Q 77, A 3 147c-148b; Q 82, A i, ANS 
and REP i 168a-d; A 4, REP 2 170b-171a; Q 88, 
A i, ANS 193a-194b 

22 CHAUCER: Tale ofMelibeus, par 10, 403a 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 68d-69a; PART 
u, 148c-153a 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 330b-d; 462c-465c pas- 
sim; 504c-505d 

27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT in, sc iv [144- 
152] 56a-b / Othello, ACT in, sc in [321-333] 
225c-d 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 112b-113a 

36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 215b-216a; 380a 

38 ROUSSEAU: Political Economy, 368d-369b / 
Social Contract, BK HI, 419c-d 

39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK iv, 293d-294b 
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 38, 122b-123c 

6. Mental disease or disorder: its causes and 
cure 

6a. The distinction between sanity and in- 
sanity: the concept of mental health and 
the nature of madness 

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 474b-d 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vn, CH 3 [247 b i- 
248*9] 330b-d / Dreams, CH 2 [46o B 32- b i8] 
704b-c 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vn, CH 5 399a-d passim 
10 HIPPOCRATES : Sacred Disease, 159a-b 

12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK 11, CH 15 155c- 
156b 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 84, 
A 7, ANS 449b-450b; Q 115, A 5, REP i 590d- 
591c; PART i-n, Q 6, A 7, REP 3 650a-d; Q 10, 
A 3, ANS and REP 2 664d-665c; Q 24, A 2, 
ANS 727d-728c; Q 28, A 3, ANS and REP i 
742a-d; Q 37, A 4, REP 3 785d-786d; Q 48, 
AA 3-4 824c-826a,c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 74, 
A 5, REP i 131d-132b 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 66d-67b; 68b-69c 

24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK in, 
201b-d 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 166a-167a; 235b-c 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 72b 

31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 155d- 
156a 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 44, SCHOL 

437d-438a 
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xi, 

SECT 13 146b-c; CH xxxm, SECT 3-4 248c-d 



35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT n, DIV u, 

455b-c 
37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 68c-d 

43 MILL: Liberty, 299d-300b [fn i] 

44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 13c-14a; Hid; 354c-355a 
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 388b-389b 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 525c 

52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK xn, 
356d-359b 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 137a; 241b-258b esp 242a- 
244a; 749a-750b; 799a-807a esp 799a-800a, 
806a-b 

54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 
Analysis, 18c-19a / Hysteria, 86a-d; 102a- 
106c / Interpretation of Dreams, 174d-176d; 
289a-b; 364c-d / Narcissism, 399b-d / Un- 
conscious, 433c; 440a-442b / General Intro- 
duction, 593c; 624c-625d; 633d-635c esp 
635b-c / War and Death, 760b / New Intro- 
ductory lectures, 81 2a; 830d-832a 

6b. The classification of mental diseases 

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 474b-d 

9 ARisTorLE: Ethics, BK vn, CH 5 399a-d passim 
10 HIPPOCRATES: Sacred Disease, 159b-c 
23 HOBBLS: Leviathan, PART i, 67b; 68c-d 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 241b 

54 FREUD: Hysteria, 60b-61c; 87a-d / Narcissism, 
403b-d / General Introduction, 451d; 568c; 
605b-606d esp 606c-d; 620c-d 

6c. The process and causes of mental disorder 

NEW TESTAMENT: Marl^ 9:17-29 (D) Mar\, 

9:16-28 

5 AESCHYLUS: Choephoroe [1021-1076] 80a-d 
5 SOPHOCLES: Ajax [1-332] 143a-146a 

5 EURIPIDES: Bacchantes 340a-352a,c esp [847- 
1326] 347b-351b / Heracles Mad [815-1145] 
371d-374d esp [822-873] 372a-c / Orestes [i- 
426] 394a-398b 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK 11, 86b; BK in, 
95d-98a; BK vi, 199c-201c esp 201b-c 

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 474b-d 

8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 8 [9 b 34-io a 6] 15a 
/ Dreams, CH 2 [46o a 32- b i8] 704b-c 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vn, CH 5 399a-d passim 
10 HIPPOCRATES: Sacred Disease 154a-160d esp 

155d-156a, 159a-b 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [487- 
505] 36b-c 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 115, 
A 5, REP i 590d-591c; PART i-n, Q 6, A 7, 
REP 3 650a-d; Q 10, A 3, ANS and REP 2 664d- 
665c; Q 24, A 2, ANS 727d-728c; Q 28, A 3, 
ANS and REP i 742a-d; Q 37, A 4, REP 3 785d- 
786d; Q 48, AA 3-4 824c-826a,c 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 67b; 68b-71b 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 235b-c 

26 SHAKESPEARE: Midsummer-Night's Dream, ACT 
v, sc i [1-27] 370d-371a 

27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT n, sc 11 [171- 
221] 42b-d; ACT in, sc iv {102-144] 55d-56a; 



130 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



6c(i) to 6d 



(6. Mental disease or disorder: its causes and 
cure. 6c. The process and causes of mental 
disorder.) 

ACT iv, sc v [1-75] 59c-60b; [154-200] 61b-d; 
ACT v, sc ii [237-254] 70b-c / King Lear, ACT 
n, sc iv [274-289] 261c-d; ACT in, sc iv 
264a-266b; ACT iv, sc iv [1-19] 272b-c; sc 
vi [80-294] 274b-276c; sc vn [14-82] 276d- 
277c / Macbeth, ACT v, sc i 306b-307a; sc 
in [^7-54] 308a-b 

28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 347c 

29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote esp PART i, la-3b, 
32c-33a, 83a c, 88b 89a, PART n, 205a-209d f 
252c-257a, 258d 

31 DESCARTES: Meditations, i, 75d 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 44, SCHOL 

437d-438a 
35 LOCKK: Human Understanding, BK n, en xi, 

SECT 13 146b-c; en xxxin, SECT 3-4 248c-d 
37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 68c-d 
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 598a-b 
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 127a-b; 214b-c; 356b-c 
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic\, 122b-124b; 135a- 

138a; 232b-235a; 306a-307a 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xv, 616a-617a 

52 DOSTOIEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK i, 4c- 
5a; BK n, 21d-22b; BK in, 62d 63b; BK xi, 
337a-348d passim; BK xn, 364d-365d; 376a- 
377b 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 132a 138b passim, esp 
13 7a; 244b-252a passim, esp 251b-252a; 
258a-b; 533a-538b; 753b-754b; 800a 806b 
passim; 828b-829a 

54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 
Analysis, lb-19a esp 4a-5a, 6a-b, 8a, 14b, 18b- 
19a / Hysteria, 25a-106c passim, esp 25a-27a, 
35b-c, 37d-38a, 53b-c, 81c-87a, 93d-96a, 97b- 
106c; 110d-118a,c / Narcissism, 402d-404d / 
Unconscious, 440a-443d esp 440a-b / General 
Introduction, 451d-452a; 546b~623b esp 567d- 
569c, 585b-591a, 593b-596b, 599d-600d, 
602d 607b, 611a-615a, 616b-c / Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, 641a-c; 648d-650a esp 
649c / Group Psychology, 690d-691c; 695b- 
696a,c / Ego and Id, 712c-715c; 716d-717a,c 
/ Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 720a- 
752c esp 720a-723d, 744b-747b / Civilization 
and Its Discontents, 774c-d; 798c-799a / 
New Introductory Lectures, 830d 832a; 866b- 
867a 

6c(l) Somatic origins of mental disease 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK HI, 96c 

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 474b-d 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vn, CH 3 [247^3- 
248*6] 330c-d 

9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK n, CH 7 
[653 b i-7] 178d-179a / Ethics, BK vn, CH 3 
[H47'i4-i 7 ]397b 

10 HIPPOCRATES: Sacred Disease, 155d-160d esp 
159a-b 



12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [459- 

4751 36a 
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 84, 

A 7, ANS 449b-450b; Q 115, A 5, REP i 590d- 

591c 

23 HOB BBS: Leviathan, PART i, 68c 

27 SHAKESPEARE: King Lear, ACT 11, sc iv [106- 
ii3]259cf ( 

28 HARVEY :\On Animal Generation, 347c 

30 BACON: Advancement of learning, 49d-50b 

31 DESCARTES: Meditations, i, 75d 

31 SPINOZA: Ethtky, PART iv, PROP 39, SCHOL 
436c-437a; PROP\44, SCHOL 437d-438a 

32 MILTON: Samson Ahonistes [599-605] 352b 
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PAR\T w, 163a 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Mum, 291a; 299c; 318b 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EMJ xi, 524c-527a 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 2b-3a; 23b-/Uvh esp 25b; 
32a-34a; 35b-37b; 40b-41a 

54 FREUD: Hysteria, 60d-61a; 90d-97b esp 94b- 
95d; lllb-115a esp 114a-115a / Narcissism, 
403a-d / General Introduction, 604c-606a esp 
605c-606a / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 
641a; 649c / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and 
Anxiety, 744b-745d / Civilization and Its 
Discontents, 773a-b 

6c(2) Functional origins of mental disease 
54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 
Analysis la-20d esp 4a-5c, 7a-9a, 18b-19a / 
Hysteria, 25a-106c passim, esp 25a-27a, 35b- 
c, 37d-38d, 52c-53c, 81c-87a, 97b-106c / In- 
terpretation of Dreams, 364d-365c; 370b-c; 
380d-382a esp 381d-382a / Narcissism, 406d- 
41 Ob esp 409c d / Repression, 425c-427a,c / 
Unconscious, 434c-436b / General Introduction, 
546b-623b esp 550d-569c, 577a-591a, 599d- 
600d, 604c-605b, 611a-615a, 620b-623b / 
Group Psychology, 690c-691c / Ego and Id, 
699a-c; 704d; 712c-714a / Inhibitions, Symp- 
toms, and Anxiety, 720a-752c esp 720a-723d, 
728b-731d, 746c-747b 

6d. The treatment of functional disorders: 
psychotherapy as a branch of medicine 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [31-93] 
30b-31b esp [87-93] 31b; [510-522] 36c-d; 
BK vi [1-42] 80a-c 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 38 
786d-789d 

24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK in, 
188d-191c 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 37c-39a; 401b-406a 

27 SHAKESPEARE: King Lear, ACT iv, sc iv 
[1-19] 272b-c / Macbeth, ACT v, sc i 306b- 
307a esp [79-83] 307a; sc in [37-54] 308a-b 
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 77d-78d 
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 127a-b; 284c-d; 297d- 

298a; 354c-355a 

48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 357b-358b 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xv, 614a-d; 
616a-618b esp 616b, 617a-b, 618b 



CHAPTER 55: MEDICINE 



131 



52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK n, 
21d-23c 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 132b; 135a-b 

54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 
Analysts la-20d csp 2a-3a, 6c-7a, 8d-9a, lOc- 
lla, 13c-14a, 19a-20c / Hysteria, 26c-d; 30d- 
81c esp 30d-31a, 59d-81c; 106c-lllb csp 
107a-108b / Psycho-Analytic Therapy 123a- 
127a,c / "Wild'' Psycho- Analysis 128a-130d 
/ General Introduction, 449a-452a; 545a- 
550c; 560c-561b; 563a-566a; 606a-c; 623c- 
638a,c / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 643d- 
644a / Group Psychology, 695c / Ego and Id, 
712c-713a esp 713b [fn i] / Inhibitions, Symp- 
toms, and Anxiety, 748b-d / New Introductory 
Lectures, 840a; 864a-873d esp 871a-873d 

7. The historical record on disease and its 
treatment: epidemics, plagues, pesti- 
lences 

OLD TESTAMENT: I^eviticus, 13-14 
4 HOMER: Iliad, BK iv [188-219] 25d-26b; 
BK v [899-906! 39c; BK xi [842-848] 81c 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 44d-45a; BK n, 
64c-d; 65c; BK in, 117a-118a; BK iv, 135c-d; 
157a 

CTHUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK n, 
399b-401b; BK m, 438d 

7 PLATO: Republic, BK in, 335c-336a 
9ARISTOTLU: Hhtoty of Animals, BK vni, CH 

19 [6o2 b i2-i9] 128c / Politics, BK in, CH 15 
[i286 a io-i5)484b 

10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 1-3 la- 
2b / Regimen in Acute Diseases, par i 26a-d 



/ Epidemics 44a-63d / Sacred Disease, 154a- 
155d; 160b d 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [459- 
525] 36a-d; BK vi [769-829] 90c-91b; [1138- 
1286] 95b-97a,c 

14 PLUTARCH: Romulus, 26d-27a / Camillus, 
113d / Pericles, 138b-140c / Coriolanus, 179c- 
180a / Timoleon, 212c-d / Pyrrhus, 31Sc / 
Caius Marius, 334c / Sulla, 386c-d / Agesilaus, 
492d / Alexander, 549a-c; 575d-576d / Caesar, 
583d-584a; 593c-594a / Marcus Brutus, 812c 

15 TACITUS: Annals, BK xvi, 178d-179a / 
Histories, BK n, 239c-d; BK iv, 292c-293a 

23 HOIJUES: Leviathan, PART i, 69c-71a; PART 
iv, 260d 

24 RAUELAIS: Gargantita and Panfagruel, BK n, 
124a-b 

25 MONTAKJNE: Essays, 343c-344a; 3b5b 368c; 
371c-372b; 508a-509a; 529b 537d passim 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning 50c 53d 
esp 52d-53d / New Atlantis, 200d-201d 

36 SIT.RNE: Tristram Shandy, 41 2a 414b 

38 MoMTLsyiiiEu: Spirit of Laws, BK xiv, 
106b-107a 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 336c-d; 364 b c 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Pall, 114a,c 

41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 70a-71a,c; 298a- 
300a; 355a-c 

44 BOSWLLL: Johnson, 7a; 13a-14a 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, UK v, 222b; 225c- 
227a 

54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 
Analysis, 6a-b / Hysteria, 107a / Genet al 
Introduction, 550d 55 la 



CROSS-REFERENCES 

For: Discussions bearing on learned professions or professional education, see EDUCATION 53, 6; 

LAW 9; RHETORIC 6. 
The general theory of art which underlies the consideration of medicine as an art, see ART 

3, pa; EXPERIENCE 33; KNOWLEDGE 8a. 
The theory of signs involved m the interpretation of symptoms, sec LANGUAGE 10; SIGN AND 

SYMBOL 46; and for other matters relevant to medical diagnosis and prognosis, see HY- 
POTHESIS 4b, 4d. 
Another discussion of health and disease, see LIFE AND DEATH 53, 5c; and for the special 

problems of mental disease and the methods of psychopathology, see EMOTION 3a, 3c~3d; 

MAN 5b; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 2e(3)-2e(4), 5c; MIND 2c(i), 8a-8c; WILL pb. 
Discussions relevant to the comparison of mental health or sanity with happiness, see 

HAPPINESS 23; JUSTICE ib. 



132 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



ADDITIONAL READINGS 

Listed below are works not included in Great Boofy of the Western World, but relevant to the 
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups: 

I. Works by authors represented in this collection. 
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection. 

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult 
the Bibliography ot Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas. 



I. 

PLUTARCH. "Rules for the Preservation of Health," 

in Moralia 
GALEN. On Medical Experience 

. Opera Omma 

F. BACON. "Regimen of Health," in Essays 

DOSIOEVSKY. The Idiot 

FREUD. The Dynamics of the Transference 

. The Employment of Dream Interpretation in 

Psycho -Analysis 
. Recommendations for Physicians on the Psycho- 

Analytic Method of Treatment 
. An Outline of Psychoanalysis 

II. 

CELSUS. DC Medicina (On Medicine) 

AVICENNA. The Canon of Medicine ', BK i 

MAIMONIDLS. Regimen Sanitatis 

BARrnoLONfAEUs ANciucus. O/i Medicine 

R. BACON. On the Errors of Physicians 

BOCCACCIO. Decameron, PROEM 

PARACELSUS. The Diseases That Deprive Man of His 

Reason 
. On the Miners' Sickness and Other Miners' 

Diseases 

. Sct'en Defensiones 

VtsALius. The Epitome 

BURTON. The Anatomy of Melancholy 

MOLIERE. Le medecin malgre lui (The Mot ^-Doctor) 

. Le maladc imaginaire (The Hypochondriac) 

RAMAZZINI. De Morbis Artlfaum (The Diseases of 

Workers) 



VOLTAIRE. "Physicians," in A Philosophical Dic- 
tionary 

IENNLK. An Inquiry into the Causes and Ejffec ts of the 
Vanolae Vaccinae 

BICIIAT. General Anatomy, Applied to Physiology and 
Medicine 

HAHNI-MANN. Organon of the Rational An of Heal- 
ing 

LM-NNEC. Mediate Auscultation 

VIRI.HOW. Cellular Pathology 

(). W. HOLMES. Currents and Counter-Cm rents m 
Medical Science 

BERNARD. Introduction to E\perimcntal Medicine 

KOCH. The Aetiology of Tuberculosis 

S. W. MITCIILLL. Doctor and Patient 

CHEKHOV. Ward No. 6 

OSLER. Aeqitanhmtas 

P. M. JANET. The Major Symptoms of Hysteria 

ROMAINS. Doctor Knoc1{ 

M\NN. The Magic Mountain 

S. LEWIS. Arrow smith 

GROOKSIIANK. Individual Diagnosis 

SHAW. Doctors' Delusions 

E. ALLEN. Sex and Internal Secretions 

CANNON. The Wisdom of the Body 

GIBSON. The Physician's Art 

B. RUSSELL. Religion and Science, CH 4 

ZILUUURG. The Medical Man and the Witch During 
the Renaissance 

BEST and TAYLOR. The Physiological Basis of Med- 
ical Practice 

BUCHANAN. The Doctrine of Signatures, en 3-6 

FEARING. The Hospital 



Chapter 56: MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 



INTRODUCTION 



/CONCERNING memory and imagination, 
V^/ the tradition of western thought seems to 
be involved in less dispute than it is on other as- 
pects of human and animal life. There are, as 
we shall see, points of difficulty and debatable 
theories. But these arise only within the frame- 
work of certain fundamental insights which 
are widely, if not universally, shared. Here at 
least we can begin without having to deal with 
verbal ambiguities. Unlike many of the words 
which are the traditional bearers of the great 
ideas, "memory" and "imagination" have a 
constant core of meaning in almost everyone's 
discourse. 

It is understood that memory and imagina- 
tion depend upon sense-perception or upon 
previous experience. Except for illusions of 
memory, we do not remember objects we have 
never perceived or events in our own life, such 
as emotions or desires, that we have not ex- 
perienced. The imagination is not limited in the 
same way by prior experience, for we can 
imagine things we have never perceived and 
may never be able to. 

Yet even when imagination outruns percep- 
tion, it draws upon experience for the materials 
it uses in its constructions. It is possible to 
imagine a golden mountain or a purple cow, 
though no such object has ever presented itself 
to perception. But, as Hume suggests, the 
possibility of combining a familiar color and a 
familiar shape depends upon the availability of 
the separate images to be combined. 

"When we think of a golden mountain," 
Hume writes, "we only join two consistent 
ideas, gold and mountain^ with which we were 
formerly acquainted ... All this creative power 
of the mind amounts to no more than the fac- 
ulty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, 
or diminishing the materials afforded us by the 
senses and experience." A congenitally color- 



blind man who lived entirely in a world of 
grays would not be able to imagine a golden 
mountain or a purple cow, though he might be 
able to imagine things as unreal as these. 

Because of their dependence on sense-per- 
ception, memory and imagination are usually 
regarded as belonging to the same general fac- 
ulty as the external senses. Not all writers, 
however, conceive of a generic power of sense, 
which they then divide into the exterior senses 
such as sight, hearing, and touch, and the in- 
terior senses such as memory and imagination. 
Some, like Hobbes, treat imagination as "noth- 
ing but decaying sense," and use the word 
"memory" to "expiess the decay, and signify 
that the sense is fading, old, and past." 

The image, whether it is a memory-image or 
fancy-free, re-produces or re-presents sensory 
material. It may be less vivid, less sharp in out- 
line, and less definite in detail than the sensa- 
tion or perception from which it is derived. 
But in one important respect the image does 
not differ from the original sense-impression, 
That is the respect in which ideas or concepts do 
differ from sense-impressions at least accord- 
ing to those who hold that ideas or concepts 
have a certain universality and abstractness 
which is not found in sensations and sensory 
images. Those who, like Berkeley and Hume, 
call sensations or images "ideas" deny the ex- 
istence of abstract ideas or universal notions 
precisely because they, too, agree that sense- 
impressions or sensory images are always par- 
ticular in their content and meaning. 

THE FUNDAMENTAL controversy about what an 
idea is and the verbal confusion occasioned by 
the ambiguity of the word (which appears in 
the chapter on IDEA) do not seem to affect the 
understanding of the nature, of images or their 
role in the activities of memory and imagina- 



133 



134 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



tion. As William James points out, in discussing 
the "blended" or "generic" image which is 
somehow associated with abstract or universal 
meaning, "a blurred thing is just as particular 
as a sharp thing, and the generic character of 
either sharp image or blurred image depends 
on its being felt with its representative function" 
He speaks of this function as "the mysterious 
plus, the understood meaning," but he denies 
the possibility of universal or abstract images, 
whatever may be the truth about ideas which 
are not images at all. Certainly those who 
deny the presence of anything abstract or uni- 
versal in the understanding do so on the ground 
that the content of the mind is basically sen- 
sory, whether the mind is perceiving or remem- 
bering, imagining or thinking. 

The controversy about the nature of the 
mind does not seem to affect the conception of 
memory or imagination. As neither is confused 
with sense-perception, so neither is confused 
with rational thought. This remains the case 
whether the theory of mind looks upon the 
intellect as a faculty separate from the sensitive 
faculty (including memory and imagination), 
or conceives the understanding as a single fac- 
ulty which is active in judgment and reason- 
ing as well as in perceiving, remembering, and 
imagining. 

This and related issues are considered in the 
chapter on MIND. Except for one point, per- 
haps, such issues can be ignored here. Sensation 
is attributed to both animals and men to all 
organisms which give evidence of having sense- 
organs or some sort of sensitive apparatus. 
Whether all animals, even those which have 
the most rudimentary scnsorium, also have 
memory and imagination may be disputed; but 
no one doubts that the higher animals, with 
central nervous systems and brain structures 
resembling those of men, can remember and 
imagine as well as perceive. 

All agree, furthermore, that memory and 
imagination require bodily organs, though the 
assignment of these two function* to the brain 
as their organic seat is more uniformly a tenet 
of modern than of ancient physiology, and can 
be more clearly expounded as the result of mod- 
ern researches in neurology. But the question 
whether the memory or imagination of men 
and other animals differs more than their bodies 



do, elicits opposite answers from those who 
affirm that man alone has reason and those who 
deny that man has powers of knowing or think- 
ing not possessed by other animals to some 
degree. 

Nevertheless, if man alone is considered, the 
nature of memory and imagination is clear. 
The object remembered or imagined need not 
be physically present to the senses like the ob- 
ject perceived. The object imagined need not 
be located in the past like the object remem- 
bered; nor, for that matter, need it have any 
definite location in time and space. It need 
have no actual existence. It may be a mere 
possibility, unlike the object which cannot be 
known without being known to exist. As the 
object of memory is an event which no longer 
exists, so the object of imagination may be 
something which has never existed and never 
will. 

Thus memory and imagination greatly en- 
large the world of human experience. Without 
them, man would live in a confined and narrow 
present, lacking past and future, restricted to 
what happens to be actual out of the almost 
infinite possibilities of being. Without memory 
and imagination, man could be neither a poet 
nor an historian; and unless he had an angelic 
sort of intellect which in no way depended on 
sense-experience, he would be impeded in all 
the work of science, if memory and imagination 
did not extend the reach of his senses. 

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL analysis of memory usually 
divides it into a number of separate acts or 
phases. Recollection presupposes the retention 
of the material to be recalled. The ingenious 
experiments of Ebbinghaus that James reports 
using the memorization of nonsense syllables 
to isolate the factors influencing memory 
seem to show that retention is affected by the 
strength of the original associations. But re- 
tention is also affected by the interval between 
the time of learning and the time of revival. 
The amount of forgetting seems to be a func- 
tion of two separate factors: the force with 
which the material to be recalled is originally 
committed to memory, and the lapse of time. 
That retention is not the same as recall may 
be seen from Ebbinghaus' experimental dis- 
covery of the fact that forgetting is never com- 



CHAPTER 56: MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 



135 



ptete. Material which lies below the threshold 
of recall is nevertheless retained, and manifests 
its presence by its effect on attempts to relearn 
the material which appears to have been for- 
gotten. 

Nothing can be utterly forgotten if, as 
Augustine suggests, what seems to be forgotten 
remains in the memory. He considers the effort 
men make to remember a forgotten name. 
"Where docs that name come back from," he 
asks, "except from the memory? For even 
when it is through being reminded of some- 
thing else that we recognize someone's name, it 
is still by memory that we do it, for we do not 
hold it as some new thing learned, but by mem- 
ory we are sure that this is what the name was. 
But, were the name utterly blotted out of 
mind," Augustine argues, "we should not re- 
member it even if we were reminded. For if we 
had utterly forgotten it, we should not even be 
able to think of looking for it." 

Freud considers forgetting from another 
point of view. He describes the psychoanalytic 
method at its inception as a "talking cure" in- 
volving efforts in reminiscence. The things 
which we have put out of mind, he claims, are 
"hindered from becoming conscious, and forced 
to remain in the unconscious by some sort of 
force." He calls this "repression." Freud ob- 
served that it occurred when" a wish had been 
aroused, which was in sharp opposition to the 
other desires of the individual, and was not 
capable of being reconciled with the ethical, 
aesthetic, and personal pretensions of the pa- 
tient's personality. . . . The end of this inner 
struggle was the repression of the idea which 
presented itself to consciousness as the bearer of 
this irreconcilable wish. This was repressed 
from consciousness and forgotten." 

On this view things which have been put 
out of mind because we find them unpleasant 
to contemplate, things which are repressed in 
order to avoid conflict, are not forgotten when 
they cannot be consciously remembered. Nor 
ire they below the threshold of recall in the 
sense that our retention of them has been so 
weakened by time that no effort at recollection 
can revive them. On the contrary, they may be 
capable of quite vivid revival when the emo- 
tional obstacles to recollection are removed. 
Freud applies his theory of the "obliviscence of 



the disagreeable" to such everyday occurrences 
as the forgetting of familiar names as well as 
to the repression of memories connected with 
the emotional traumas of early life. 

Recollection is distinct not only from reten- 
tion, but also from recognition. The illusion 
known as dtjh vu consists in the experience of 
intense familiarity with a place or scene that, so 
far as one can recall, has never been witnessed 
before. In contrast, normal recognition depends 
upon previous acquaintance with the object 
being cognized again, />., re-cognized. The fact, 
noted by many observers, that recognition may 
or may not be accompanied by recollection of 
the previous circumstances, indicates the sep- 
aration of recall and recognition as acts of 
memory. Whereas recollection is remembering 
through the recall of images, recognition con- 
sists in remembering at the very moment 
of perceiving. Both, however, depend upon 
what seems to be memory's fundamental act 
retention. 

WITH REGARD TO retention, there are two prob- 
lems which have been the subject of inquiry 
throughout the whole tradition. The first con- 
cerns what is usually called "the association of 
ideas." From Aristotle through Hobbes and 
Hume to James and Freud, there have been 
various formulations of the laws of association 
and various interpretations of what such laws 
signify about the mind. Ebbinghaus, for ex- 
ample, used nonsense syllables in order to meas- 
ure the effect upon retention of the associations 
formed by repetition of a series of sounds. All 
meaning had been removed in order to avoid 
the influence upon recollection of associations 
resulting from meaningful connections of the 
sort which exists among ordinary words. The 
repetition of nonsense syllables in pairs or series 
illustrates association by contiguity or succes- 
sion. According to most writers, the elements 
of experience become associated through other 
modes of relation also, such as their similarity 
or contrast with one another in any significant 
respect. 

It is not the association itself which is re- 
membered. Rather it is through the association 
of one part of experience with another that 
memory seems to work, one particular tending 
to recall others with which it has been asso- 



136 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



ciatcd in one or more ways. Recollection seems 
to occur through activating connections which 
have been formed and retained. The modern 
differentiation of controlled and free association 
indicates two ways in which this can happen- 
either by a purposeful pursuit of the past or by 
the apparently chance recall of one thing by 
another. The ancients make a parallel distinc- 
tion between reminiscence and reverie. The 
former is a process in which recollection resem- 
bles reasoning in proceeding step by step 
through a series of related terms; the latter is 
more like daydreaming or spontaneous fantasy. 

The second problem can be stated, perhaps, 
as the mystery of retention itself. In describing 
the capacity of the memory to hold the innu- 
merable things which are not now in mind but 
can be recalled, the ancients speak of memory 
as "the storehouse of images." Every variety 
of thing which can be perceived can be "stored 
up in the memory," says Augustine, and "called 
up at my pleasure. . . . When I speak of this or 
that," he goes on, "the images of all the things 
I mention are at hand from the same storehouse 
of memory, and if the images were not there I 
could not so much as speak of the things . . . 
The things themselves are not brought into 
the memory; it is only their images which are 
seized with such marvellous speed, and stored 
away marvellously as if in cabinets, and as mar- 
vellously brought forth again when we re- 
member." 

The marvel of memory deepens into a mys- 
tery when we ask what the metaphor of the 
storehouse literally means. Where actually are 
the images when they are not actually in mind ? 
If an image is by its nature an act of conscious- 
ness, whereby we apprehend objects not im- 
mediately present to our senses, how do images 
exist outside of consciousness during intervals 
when they do not function in remembering, 
imagining, or other acts of knowing? Their 
return to consciousness seems to imply that 
they have been retained, but where and how 
is the problem not solved by the metaphor of 
things stored away in a capacious barn. 

The physical storehouse docs not require any 
fundamental transformation in the being of the 
things it holds between periods when they are 
actually in use. The memory does. This prob- 
lem of the nature and causes of retention Wil- 



liam James seems to think can be solved only 
in terms of the retentive power of nervous 
tissue what he calls "physiological retentive- 
ness" though in the view of others the prob- 
lem becomes no easier (and may even be more 
complicated) when it is transferred from mind 
to matter. On either view, there seems to be 
no question that changes in the brain are some- 
how causally connected with the activity of 
memory and imagination, especially retention 
and recall. Aquinas, for example, observes that 
the imagination and memory may be "hin- 
dered by a lesion of the corporeal organ ... or 
by lethargy," an observation many times 
extended by more recent investigations of 
the brain pathology underlying amnesia and 
aphasia. 

JAMES' TREATMENT of retention as somehow 
based on pathways traced in the brain, with 
recall the result of a retracing of these paths, 
tends to emphasize the affinity between mem- 
ory and habit. His theory, discussed in the 
chapter on HABIT, that the plasticity of matter, 
certainly living matter, underlies learning or 
habit formation, while the inertia or retentive- 
ness of matter, especially the neural matter of 
the brain, explains memory or the persistence 
of habits during periods of disuse, seems almost 
to identify habit and memory. Ice skating 
after many years of absence from the sport is 
as much remembering how to ice skate as recit- 
ing a poem committed to memory in youth is 
the exercise of an old habit. 

Not all conceptions of habit and memory 
permit this fusion of the two or even their 
affinity as related aspects of the same phenom- 
enon. Aquinas, for example, restricts memory 
to an act of knowledge. The performance popu- 
larly called "reciting from memory" would not 
be for him an act of memory, though it might 
involve memory if the recitation were accom- 
panied by knowledge of the time or place and 
occasion when the poem was first learned. Such 
knowledge would be a memory, but the recita- 
tion itself would not be, any more than ice 
skating is. These performances represent the 
exercise of habits of skill or art. 

In view of this, Aquinas raises the question 
whether the act of knowledge, of the sort in- 
volved in reconsidering a geometric proof 



CHAPTER 56: MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 



137 



learned at some earlier moment and now re- 
called to mind, is an act of memory. The knowl- 
edge of the proof which is retained by the in- 
tellect during periods when it is not actually 
exercised, he would call an intellectual habit or 
habit of knowledge. But should the recollec- 
tion of this retained knowledge, or the activa- 
tion of this intellectual habit, also be called an 
act of memory ? Aquinas answers No, on the 
ground that no reference to the past need be 
involved in reworking a geometrical problem 
solved at some earlier time. But if the individual 
also happens to recall when he first solved the 
problem, that is another matter. Even so, 
Aquinas claims that "if in the notion of mem- 
ory we include its object as something past, 
then the memory is not in the intellectual, but 
only in the sensitive part." The intellect is said 
to remember only in the sense of recalling a 
truth retained by habit, and "not in the sense 
that it understands the past as something here 
and now." 

Memory is considered in still another way in 
relation to speculative truths about scientific 
or philosophical matters. The question is one 
of the origin of such knowledge. In the usual 
conception of memory as knowledge of past 
particulars, one traditional view, found in Aris- 
totle, holds that "out of sense-perception comes 
to be what we call memory, and out of fre- 
quently repeated memories of the same thing 
develops experience" the generalized experi- 
ence which gives rise to induction and the 
apprehension of the universal. But in the tradi- 
tion of the great books we also find a more radi- 
cal and, perhaps, less familiar conception of 
memory as the chief source of knowledge. 

This is Plato's doctrine of reminiscence, in 
which all learning is a kind of remembering of 
knowledge already present in the soul. All 
teaching takes the form of helping the learner 
to recollect things he may not be aware he 
knows, by reminding him through a process of 
questioning which awakens the knowledge al- 
ready latent in him. 

In the Meno, Mcno asks Socrates, "What do 
you mean by saying that we do not learn, and 
that what we call learning is only a process of 
recollection?" Socrates undertakes to show 
Meno what he means by taking a slave boy who 
appears not to know the solution of a certain 



geometrical problem and merely by question- 
ing him, without ever giving him a single an- 
swer, getting the slave boy to find the right 
solution for himself. Meno assures Socrates that 
the slave boy had never been taught geometry. 
Since the boy was not told the answer, he must 
have always known it, and needed only some re- 
minding to remember what he knew. Socrates 
suggests the explanation that the boy's soul 
always possessed this knowledge, bringing it 
from another life. 

Before he undertook the demonstration with 
the slave boy, Socrates had proposed this hy- 
pothesis. "The soul, being immortal, and having 
been born again many times, and having 
seen all things that exist . . . has knowledge of 
them all; and it is no wonder that it should be 
able to call to remembrance all that it ever 
knew about virtue, and about everything; for 
as all nature is akin, and the soul has learned all 
things, there is no difficulty in her eliciting, or 
as men say learning, out of a single recollection 
all the rest, if u man is strenuous and does not 
faint; for all enquiry and all learning is but rec- 
ollection." 

Though he differs from Plato in his concep- 
tion of the soul and the origin of the knowledge 
which it innately possesses, Augustine seems to 
hold a similar view. As he examines his own 
memory, it appears to contain much that has 
not been implanted there by sense-experience. 
Certain things, referred to by words he under- 
stands, he says, "I never reached with any 
sense of my body, nor ever discerned them 
otherwise than in my mind; yet in my memory 
have I laid up not their images, but themselves. 
How they entered into me, let them say if they 
can; for I have gone over all the avenues of my 
flesh, but cannot find by which they entered." 
If the seeds of learning are in the soul at its 
creation, memory can draw from these "sem- 
inal reasons" the full fruit of knowledge. 

THE DOCTRINE OF reminiscence changes the 
meaning of both learning and memory at the 
same time. When learning consists in remem- 
bering knowledge not acquired in this life, then 
the activity of memory cannot be, as it is usually 
conceived, a recollection of knowledge pre- 
viously acquired in this life by learning. In 
order to understand a dot trine in which famil- 



138 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



iar meanings are so profoundly altered, it is 
perhaps necessary to understand the problem it 
tries to solve. 

That problem exists only for those who make 
an absolute distinction between particular sen- 
sory images and universal ideas or abstract con- 
cepts. Those who, like Hobbes, Berkeley, or 
Hume, deny universals or abstractions as any 
part of the mind's content, see no special prob- 
lem in the origin of that part of the mind's con- 
tent which is not received as sense-impressions. 
The original impressions are somehow external- 
ly caused, and all the rest of the mind's con- 
tentits images and memories and all con- 
structions of the sort Locke calls "complex 
ideas" then arise by natural derivation from 
the original sense-impressions. 

But those who, on the contrary, maintain 
that ideas or concepts are not images of any sort, 
cannot avoid the problem of how the mind 
comes by its ideas. One solution of this problem 
attributes existence to ideas as intelligible ob- 
jects, and attributes to the mind the power to 
apprehend them by direct intuition, just as the 
senses directly apprehend sensible objects. But 
if ideas, whether or not they exist outside the 
mind, cannot be apprehended intuitively, then 
what is the origin of the ideas whereby the mind 
understands intelligible objects? 

To this question, the doctrine of reminis- 
cence is one answer. Another answer is the doc- 
trine of abstraction, as formulated by Aristotle 
and Aquinas. Locke and James also seem to 
recognize a distinction in kind between abstrac- 
tions and other mental content, but they do 
not appear to find any need for a special power 
to perform the act of abstracting general ideas 
or universal concepts from the sensory particu- 
lars of perception and imagination. Aquinas, 
however, thinks that a special faculty called 
**the active intellect" must be postulated to 
account for the mind's possession of the ideas or 
concepts whereby it actually understands what 
it cannot perceive or imagine. 

THESE THEORIES are considered in the chapters 
on IDEA and MIND. But just as the doctrine of 
reminiscence is relevant here for its bearing on 
the discussion of memory, so the doctrine of 
abstraction which posits an active intellect is 
relevant to the discussion of imagination. 



"Imagination," writes Aristotle, "is differ- 
ent from either perceiving or discursive think- 
ing, though it is not found apart from sensation 
or judgment without it. That this activity is 
not the same kind of thinking as judgment is 
obvious. For imagining lies within our own 
power whenever we wish (e.g., we can call up 
a picture, as in the practice of mnemonics by the 
use of mental images), but in forming opinions 
we are not free; we cannot escape the alterna- 
tives of falsehood or truth." 

The point is not that images cannot be false. 
They frequently are, as (according to Aristotle) 
sensations never are. But the falsity of our imag- 
inations involves a judgment that things really 
are as we imagine them to be. If imagination is 
not accompanied by judgment, the question of 
truth or falsity does not arise, for in pure imag- 
ination we are not concerned with the way 
things actually exist, but with the possible, />., 
the imaginary rather than the real. "Everyone 
knows the difference," says James, "between 
imagining a thing and believing in its existence." 

Conceiving imagination as an activity de- 
pending upon the prior activity of the senses, 
Aristotle holds that imagination is "incapable 
of existing apart from sensation." In this he 
docs not differ from other psychologists. But 
he also holds that rational thought, which for 
him is quite distinct from imagination, cannot 
exist apart from imagination. "To the thinking 
soul images serve as if they were the contents of 
perception. . . . That is the why the soul never 
thinks without an image." 

Aristotle is here saying more than that a 
special faculty of mind or intellect abstracts the 
universal form or what Aquinas calls "the in- 
telligible species" from the sensory matter of 
the image, or what Aquinas calls "the phan- 
tasm." Aristotle is, in addition, insisting that 
the act of understanding is always accompanied 
by imaginative activity. The kind of thinking 
which depends upon the abstraction of ideas 
from imagery also depends upon the presence 
of images when the thinking takes place. "The 
faculty of thinking," says Aristotle, "thinks the 
forms in the images"; or, as Aquinas expresses 
it, "for the intellect to understand actually, not 
only when it acquires new knowledge, but also 
when it uses knowledge already acquired, there 
is need for the act of imagination. . . It must of 



CHAPTER 56: MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 



139 



necessity turn to the phantasms in order to per- 
ceive the universal nature existing in the indi- 
vidual." The cooperation of the imagination 
with the intellect is shown, furthermore, by the 
fact that "when the act of imagination is hin- 
dered by a lesion of the corporeal organ ... we 
see that a man is hindered from understanding 
actually even those things of which he had a 
previous knowledge." 

Augustine, on the contrary, refers to things 
"which we know within ourselves without im- 
ages." When we consider numbers, for example, 
"it is not their images which are in [our] mem- 
ory, but themselves." The question of image- 
less thought of thinking abstractly without 
the use of images seems to be peculiarly insist- 
ent in sciences like mathematics, metaphysics, 
and theology, in which the conceivable may 
not be imaginable. The objects peculiar to 
these sciences seem to require the scientist to 
do without imagery, or, as Aquinas says, "to 
rise above his imagination." 

This may be true even in physics. Atoms, 
according to Lucretius, are conceivable, but 
they are no more imaginable than they are per- 
ceptible. If we need images to think of them, 
we must use imagery in a metaphorical way, 
picturing the atom as the smallest particle im- 
aginable only more so! To the objection that 
there must be imageless thought if we can think 
of incorporeal beings, of which there can be no 
images or phantasms, Aquinas replies that we 
do so "by comparison with sensible bodies of 
which there are phantasms." 

ARISTOTLE'S THEORY that the operations of 
thinking are always dependent on (though not 
reducible to) acts of imagination, does not im- 
ply that imagination is always accompanied by 
abstract or rational thought. Normally, human 
thinking and knowing is a work which com- 
bines both sense and intellect, both reason and 
imagination, but sometimes even in man imag- 
ination may be active without judgment or rea- 
soning. Brute animals, according to Aristotle, 
ire largely guided by their imaginations "be- 
cause of the non-existence in them of mind." 
But when imagination takes the place of 
thought in men, it is "because of the temporary 
eclipse of their minds by passion or disease or 
sleep." 



Dreaming seems to be the striking case of 
imagination divorced from reason's judgment 
or control. It has long been suspected that ani- 
mals also dream, but the question whether they 
can distinguish their dreams from their waking 
perceptions may prove forever unanswerable. 
Philosophers and psychologists have, however, 
asked themselves whether there is any way of 
being certain of the difference between waking 
thought and the phantasmagoria of dreams. 

Descartes, for example, asks, "How do we 
know that the thoughts that come in dreams 
are more false than those that we have when we 
are awake, seeing that often enough the former 
are not less lively and vivid than the latter?" It 
seems to him that "there are no certain indica- 
tions by which we may clearly distinguish wake- 
fulness from sleep." Even as he writes these 
words, he can almost persuade himself that he 
is dreaming. Yet he does find one probable sign 
whereby to tell dreaming from waking. "Our 
memory," he observes, "can never connect our 
dreams with one another, or with the whole 
course of our lives, as it unites events which 
happen to us while we are awake." 

Aquinas finds other evidences of the differ- 
ence. When a man is fully asleep, he does not 
dream at all, for his imagination is inactive as 
well as his senses and his mind. But as sleep 
passes gradually into waking, his faculties begin 
to act again, not merely the imagination, but 
the reason also, so that "a man may judge that 
what he sees is a dream, discerning, as it were, 
between things and their images. Nevertheless, 
the common sense remains partly suspended, 
and therefore, although it discriminates some 
images from reality, yet it is always deceived in 
some particular. Even while a man is asleep, his 
sense and imagination may be to some extent 
free, and similarly the judgment of his intellect 
may be unfettered, though not entirely. Con- 
sequently, if a man syllogizes while asleep, when 
he wakes up he invariably recognizes a flaw in 
some respect." 

APART FROM QUESTIONS of truth and falsity, or 
reality and illusion, the nature and causes of 
dreaming are perennial themes in the tradition 
of western thought. As different suppositions 
are made concerning the cause of dreams, so dif- 
ferent interpretations are given of their content. 



140 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



When it is supposed that the dream is in- 
spired by the gods or is a divine visitation, it 
becomes a medium of divination or prophecy 
a way of foretelling the future, or of knowing 
what the gods intend in general, or for the 
guidance of some particular man. In the great 
books of ancient poetry and history, and in the 
Old Testament as well, dreams, like oracles, are 
interpreted as supernatural portents, and figure 
as one of the major sources of prophecy. Aris- 
totle discounts both the fulfillment of dreams 
and their non-fulfillment, "for coincidences do 
not occur according to any universal or general 
law." Regarding prophetic dreams as mere co- 
incidences, he does not find it surprising that 
"many dreams have no fulfillment." From 
the fact that "certain of the lower animals 
also dream," he thinks "it may be concluded 
that dreams are not sent by God, nor are they 
designed for the purpose of revealing the 
future." 

Instead, Aristotle proposes natural causes for 
the origin of dreams. Slight stimulations of the 
sense-organs awaken the dream process and de- 
termine its content. "Dreamers fancy that they 
are affected by thunder and lightning, when in 
fact there are only faint ringings in their cars 
... or that they are walking through fire and 
feeling intense heat, when there is only a slight 
warmth affecting certain parts of the body." 
Lucretius similarly explains dreams by natural 
causes, but attributes their content to events 
which have dominated the thought of waking 
life. 

"On whatever things we have before spent 
much time," he writes, "so that the mind was 
more strained in the task than is its wont, in our 
sleep we seem mostly to traffic in the same 
things; lawyers think that they plead their cases 
and confront law with law, generals that they 
fight and engage in battles, sailors that they 
pass a life of conflict waged with winds." This 
is true even of animals. "Strong horses, when 
their limbs are lain to rest," Lucretius contin- 
ues, "yet sweat in their sleep, and pant forever, 
and strain every nerve as though for victory. 
, . . And hunters' dogs often in their soft sleep 
yet suddenly toss their legs, and all at once give 
tongue, and again and again sniff the air with 
their nostrils, as if they had found and were 
following the tracks of wild beasts." 



IN THE TRADITION of the great books, modern 
writers like their ancient forebears appeal thus 
to sensation and memory as the natural causes 
of the origin and content of dreams. But, ex- 
cept for daydreams or waking fantasy, they do 
not observe that dreaming may be even more 
profoundly a product of desire. If Freud's ex- 
traordinary insight on this point is supported 
by all the evidences he assembles in his great 
work, the Interpretation of Dreams , then the 
lateness of this discovery may be thought even 
more extraordinary than the theory itself. 

The theory is not simply that the content of 
dreams is determined by desires. When Oedi- 
pus tells Jocasta of his fear that in taking her to 
wife he has unwittingly married his mother, 
she tells him to fear not, for "many men ere 
now have so fared in dreams also." If that is so, 
then such dreams do not call for the interpreta- 
tion which Freud gives. If there arc men who 
suffer from what Freud calls "the Oedipus com- 
plex," involving repressed incestuous desires, 
then the expression of those desires in dreaming 
will not take the form of imagining them to be 
actually fulfilled. 

On the contrary, Freud's theory of dream 
symbolism holds that "the dream as remem- 
bered is not the real thing at all, but a distorted 
substitute." Beneath what he calls "the mani- 
fest dream-content" the actual moving im- 
ages which occupy the dreaming consciousness- 
lie "the latent dream- thoughts" which are dis- 
torted in the actual dream. This distortion "is 
due to the activities of censorship, directed 
against the unacceptable unconscious wish- 
impulses . . . invariably of an objectionable 
nature, offensive from the ethical, aesthetic, or 
social point of view, things about which we do 
not dare to think at all, or think of only with 
abhorrence." The repressed desires or wishes, 
the loves or fears, which the dreamer refuses to 
acknowledge consciously must, therefore, ap- 
pear in dreams in a disguised form. The imagery 
of dreams seems to Freud to be a kind of lan- 
guage in which the repressed materials of thought 
and feeling employ a special symbolism to ex- 
press what the moral censor will not permit us 
to express in the ordinary language of our con- 
scious thought or social conversation, 

As ordinary language contains symbols con- 
ventionally agreed upon, so Freud finds that 



CHAPTER 56: MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 141 

the recurrence again and again of certain images more, which Freud mentions in his enumera- 
in the dreams of neurotic patients, and of nor- tion, comprises the sexual organs and acts. In 
mal persons as well, gives them the character of contrast to all the others, these, he says, "are 
conventional symbols. "The number of things represented by a remarkably rich symbolism, 
which are represented symbolically in dreams ... An overwhelming majority of symbols in 
is/* according to Freud, "not great." They dreams are sexual symbols." 
are, he says, "the human body as a whole, par- Freud points out why it would be a mistake 
ents, children, brothers and sisters, birth, to treat dream symbols like the words of an 
death, nakedness and one thing more. The ordinary language. "Their object is not to tell 
only typical, that is to say, regularly occurring, anyone anything; they are not a means of 
representation of the human form as a whole is communication; on the contrary, it is impor- 
that of a house. . . . When the walls are quite tant to them not to be understood.'* Wresting 
smooth, the house means a man; when there their secret from such symbols is a remark- 
are ledges and balconies which can be caught able achievement. Aristotle's remark, which 
hold of, a woman. Parents appear in dreams as Freud quotes, that "the most skilful intcr- 
emperor and empress, fyng and queen, or other preter of dreams is he who has the faculty of 
exalted personages . . . Children and brothers observing resemblances," seems to be borne 
are less tenderly treated, being symbolized by out in the Freudian method of discovering the 
little animals or vermin. Birth is almost invar- latent content of the dream symbolism. But 
iably represented by some reference to water. Freud's therapeutic use of what can thus be 
. . . For dying we have setting out upon a discovered makes the psychoanalytic method 
journey or travelling by train. Clothes and urn- a thing totally unanticipated by any of his 
forms stand for nakedness." The one thing predecessors. 



OUTLINE OF TOPICS 

PAGE 

1. The faculties of memory and imagination in brutes and men 143 

\a. The relation of memory and imagination to sense: the a priori grounds of possible 
experience in the synthesis of intuition, reproduction, and recognition 

\b. The physiology of memory and imagination: their bodily organs 144 

ic. The distinction and connection of memory and imagination: their interdepend- 
ence 

id. The influence of memory and imagination on the emotions and will: voluntary 
movement 

2. The activity of memory 145 

2a. Retention: factors influencing its strength 

2b. Recollection: factors influencing ease and adequacy of recall 

2c. The association of ideas: controlled and free association; reminiscence and 
reverie 

2d. Recognition with or without recall 146 

2e. The scope and range of normal memory: failure or defect of memory and its 
causes 

(1) Forgetting as a function of the time elapsed 

(2) The obliviscence of the disagreeable: conflict and repression 

(3) Organic lesions: amnesia and the aphasias 

(4) False memories: illusions of memory; dejh vu fc 147 



142 THE GREAT IDEAS 

PAGE 

3. Remembering as an act of knowledge and as a source of knowledge 147 

30. Reminiscence as the process of all learning: innate ideas or seminal reasons 

3^. Sensitive and intellectual memory: knowledge of the past and the habit of 
knowledge 

y. The scientist's use of memory: collated memories as the source of generalized 

experience " 1 48 

3^. Memory as the muse of poetry and history: the dependence of history on the 
memory of men 

4. The contribution of memory: the binding of time 

40. Memory in the life of the individual: personal identity and continuity 
4#. Memory in the life of the group or race: instinct, legend, and tradition 

5. The activity of imagination, fancy, or fantasy: the nature and variety of images 149 

50. The distinction between reproductive and creative imagination: the representa- 
tive image and the imaginative construct 

5& The image distinguished from the idea or concept: the concrete and particular 

as contrasted with the abstract and universal 150 

y. The pathology of imagination: hallucinations, persistent imagery 

6. The role of imagination in thinking and knowing 151 

6a. Imagination as knowledge: its relation to possible and actual experience 

6^. The effect of intellect on human imagination: the imaginative thinking of 
animals 

6c. The dependence of rational thought and knowledge on imagination 

(1) The abstraction of ideas from images: the image as a condition of thought 

(2) The schema of the imagination as mediating between concepts of the 

understanding and the sensory manifold of intuition: the transcendental 
unity of apperception 152 

6d. The limits of imagination: imageless thought; the necessity of going beyond 
imagination in the speculative sciences 

7. Imagination and the fine arts 

ja. The use of imagination in the production and appreciation of works of art 

7& The fantastic and the realistic in poetry: the probable and the possible in poetry 

and history 153 

8. The nature and causes of dreaming 

8tf. Dreams as divinely inspired: their prophetic portent; divination through the 
medium of dreams 

$b. The role of sensation and memory in the dreams of sleep 154 

8r . The expression of desire in daydreaming or fantasy 

8d. The symbolism of dreams 155 

(1) The manifest and latent content of dreams: the dream-work 

(2) The recurrent use of specific symbols in dreams: the dream-language 
8*. Dream-analysis as uncovering the repressed unconscious 



CHAPTER 56: MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 



143 



REFERENCES 

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page 
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-285] 12d, the 
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas- 
sage is in section d of page 12. 

PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the 
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAXIES : Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage 
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends m the lower half of page 119. When the text is 
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left- 
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of 
thepage. For example, m 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half 
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164, 

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the mam divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, en, 
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer- 
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-28}] 12d. 

BIBLE REFERENCES: The references arc to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James 
and Doiuy versions differ in title of books or in the numbciing of chapters or verses, the King 
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA- 
r: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) II Esdras, 7:^6. 



SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially 
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" sigmiies that the topic is discussed intermit- 
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited. 

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of 
Reference Style; for general guidance m the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface. 



1. The faculties of memory and imagination 

in brutes and men 

7Pi.Aio: Theaetetus, 538d-541a / Philebus, 
621a-b 

8 ARISTOILE: Memory and Reminiscence, en i 
690a-692b; en 2 [453*5 14] 695b 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VH, en 3 [n47 b $ 6] 
397d 

10 GALEN: Natural Facilities, BK i, CH 12, 173a-b 

17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR in, en 25-31 
154d-158c; TR iv, CH 1-17 159a-166d passim; 
TR vi, CH 3 190b-191c 

18 AucusriNE: Confessions, BK x, par 12-36 
74b-80d 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 78, 
A 4 411d-413d 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 51, 
A 3 14b-15a 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 49a-54c esp 50a-d; 

PART iv, 258b-c; 267b 
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 229d-230b 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 32d; 55a-d 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, xn, 19d-20d / Discourse, 
PART i, 41d / Meditations, vi, 96b-97a; 98d- 
99a / Objections and Replies, DBF n 130a~b; 
208d-209a; 209b-c 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 17, SCHOL 
381 b-d; PROP 18, SCHOL 382a-b 



35 LOCKR: Human Understanding, BK n, en x 

141b-143d esp SECT 10 143c-d 
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341d-342a 
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 41c-42b; 54b-55a; 58a-b; 

194d-195a / Judgement, 542b-543c 
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 291d 292b; 412d; 

480c-481b 

53 JAMLS: Psychology, la 2b; 396a; 413a; 418a-b; 
421a-433a esp 424b-427a; 484a-501b 

54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 352a-d / 
General Introduction, 527a 

la. The relation of memory and imagination 
to sense: the a priori grounds of possible 
experience in the synthesis of intuition, 
reproduction, and recognition 

7 PLATO: Theaetetus, 523d-524a; 538d-541a / 
Philebus, 621a-b 

8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK n, CH 19 
[99 b 36-ioo a 6] 136b-c / Metaphysics, BK i, CH i 
{98o*28- b 24] 499a-b / Soul, BK HI, CH 3 
[428*5-16] 660b; [428 b io-4299] 660d-661b / 
Memory and Reminiscence, CH i 690a-692b 

9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH 7 (7oi b 
I3J-CH 8 [702*20] 237a-c / Rhetoric, BK i, CH n 
[1370*28-31] 613c 

17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR m, CH 29 
157b-d; TR iv, CH 8, 161d-162b; TR vi 189b : 
191c 



144 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



\b to Id 



(1. The faculties of memory and imagination in 
brutes and men. la. The relation of mem- 
ory and imagination to sense: the a priori 
grounds of possible experience in the syn- 
thesis of intuition, reproduction, and recog- 
nition.) 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 12-17 
74b-75d; par 25 77c-d 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 78, 
A 4, ANS and REP 4 411d-413d; Q 81, A 3, REP 
3 430c-431d; Q 84, A 7, REP 2 449b-450b; Q 
in, A 3, ANS and REP 1-2 570b-571b 

23 HOBBF.S: Leviathan, PART i, 49a-50d; 52b-c; 
54b-c; PART iv, 258b-c; 262a-b 

28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 332a-335a 
esp 334c-d 

31 DESCARTLS: Rules, XH, 19a 20d / Medita- 
tions, vi, 97a / Objections and Replies, DEF n 
130a-b 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART 11, PROP 17-18 380d- 
382b; PROP 48, SCHOL 391b-c; PART in, 
POSTULATE 2 396a; PART v, PROP 21 458a 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, en i, 
SECT 15 98d-99a; en in, SECT 21 118b-119a; 
BK n, CH i, SECT 17 125c-d; en n, SECT 2-3 
128a-c; CH x, SECT 1-7 141b-142d csp SECT 
2 141b-c, SECT 7 142c-d; en xu, SECT 8 
148c-d; CH xxxin, SECT 36-37 213c-214b; 
BK iv, en xi, SECT 4-8 355b-356d; SECT n 
357b-c 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 28-33 
418b-419a; SECT 36 419c-d; SKCT 41 420c 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT n 455b- 
457b; SECT vn, DIV 49 471c-d; DIV 61 477c- 
478a 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 48d 55a esp 48d 49a, 
54b-55a; 61a-64a; 85d-89c passim; 115b-c / 
Practical Reason, 319c-320b /Judgement, 552c- 
553c 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 2b; 13a; 324a; 391a; 422a- 
424a; 453a~456a; 480a b; 483b-484a; 497a- 
501b esp 499a-501a 

54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 351c-352d / 
General Introduction, 518c-d / Ego and Id, 
700b-701d esp 700b-d 

Ib. The physiology of memory and imagina- 
tion: their bodily organs 

8 ARISTOTLE : Memory and Reminiscence, CH i 
(449 b 24-29) 690b-c; [45o*26- b i2] 691a~c; CH 2 
[453"i5- b n] 695 b-d / Dreams, CH 2-3 703a- 
706d 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 78, 
A 4, ANS 411d-413d; Q 84, A 6, REP 2 447c- 
449b; A 7, ANS 449a-450b; A 8, REP 2 450b- 
451b 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 50a-51b passim; 
PART in, 172c; PART iv, 258b-c; 261a 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, xn, 19d-20a / Meditations, 
vi, 96b-97a / Objections and Replies, DEF n 
130a-b; 208d-209c 



31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 17-18 380d- 
382b: PART in, POSTULATE 2 396a 

35 LOCKE : Human Understanding, BK n, CH x, 
SECT 5 142a-b; SECT 10 143c-d; CH xxvn, 
SECT 27 227d-228a; CH xxix, SECT 3 234b-c; 
CH xxxin, SECT 6 249a-b 

36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 234b-236b 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 2b-3a; 13a-b; 15a-17b; 
32a-37b passim, esp 33a, 36b; 70a-71a; 367a- 
373a; 423a-424a; 427b-434b; 497a-501b 

54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 352a-d; 
375b-376a passim; 378a-b / Unconscious, 
431c-d / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 646b- 
647c 

\c. The distinction and connection of memory 
and imagination: their interdependence 

7 PLATO: Theaetetus, 523d-524a 

8 ARISJOTLE: Memory and Reminiscence, CH i 
690a-692b 

9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH 7 [7oi b 
13] CH 8 (702*21] 237a-c / Rhetoric, BK i, CH n 
[i37o ft 28-33]613c-d 

17 PLOIINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR HI, CH 28-31 
156d-158c 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 12-18 
74b-76a; par 23 77a-b 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 78, 
A 4, ANS and RLP 3 411d-413d; Q 93, A 6, 
REP 4 496b-498a 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 50, 
A 3, REP 3 8b-9a 

23 HOBBES: leviathan, PART i, 50a-c; PART iv, 

258b-c 

31 DLSCARTES: Rules, vn, lOb-c; xu, 19a-20d 
31 SIMNOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 18, SCHOL 

382a b; PART iv, PROP 34, SCHOL 433a-b 
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, en x, 

SECT 2 141b-c; SECT 7-8 142c-143a 
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT i, 413a 
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT v, DIV 

39 466c-467a 
42 KAN i : Pure Reason, 194d-195a 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 424b-427a esp 424b-425a, 
427a; 430a-431a; 480a-b 

54 FREUD: Ego and Id, 700b-701a 

Id. The influence of memory and imagination 
on the emotions and will: voluntary 
movement 

4 HOMER: Iliad, BK xxiv [480-516] 176b-d / 
Odyssey, BK iv [183-189] 201a; BK xv [389- 
402] 270a 

8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK in, CH 3 [427 b 2i-24] 
660a 

9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH 6 [700** 
I5]-CH 8 [702 a 22] 235d-237c; CH n 239a-d 
/ Rhetoric, BK i, CH n [i37o tt 28- b 29] 613c- 
614b; BK n, CH 5 [i382 a 2i-22] 628b; [1383* 
13-19] 629b 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK iv [877- 
891] 55d 



Itolc 



CHAPTER 56: MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 



145 



12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK ix, SECT 7 292b 

13 VIRGIL: Aencid, BK i [194-207] 108a-b; [441- 
493] 115a-116b; BK n [1-12] 124a 

17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR in, CH 28 
156d-157b 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK vm, par 25-27 
60a-c; BK x, par 30 79b-c 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 81, 
A 3, REP 2 430c-431d; PART i-n, Q i, A i, REP 
3 609b 610b; Q 17, A 7 690d-692a; Q 32, A 3 
760d-761c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 13, 
A 3, REP 3 782b-783b 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 61a-b 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 36c-40a; 236b-d; 316b-c 

27 SHAKESPEARE: Othello, ACT HI, sc in [321- 

480] 225c-227b / Macbeth, ACT i, sc vn [i- 

28] 289b-c; ACT n, sc i [33-61] 290d-291a; 

ACT in, sc n [8-36] 296c-d; sc iv [38-108] 

298a-d 

29 CLRVANTES: Don Quixote, PART i, 57c-58d; 
PART n, 285a-288c esp 286c-287b 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 55b-d; 
67ab 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, XH, 19d-20a 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART in, PROP 12-57 400b- 
415b passim; PART iv, PROP 9 13 426d 428a; 

PART V, PROP 34, DEMONS r 460c d 

35 LOCKE: Human Undei standing, BK n, CH 
xxxin 248b-251d passim, esp SECT 7-15 
249b-250c 

36 SriLRNu: Tristram Shandy, 194a 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341d; 345d-346b 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 210b-c 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 13a-15a; 704b-705a; 759a- 
760a; 767b-792b esp 767b-768a, 771a, 773a-b 
[fn i], 792b 

54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 353b; 363b- 
364d esp 363d-364a; 377c-378d 

2. The activity of memory 

7 PLATO: Theaetctus, 538d-541a 

8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK iv, en 5 [i25 b i5~i9] 
174d / Memory and Reminiscence 690a-695d 

!7PLoriNus: Fourth Ennead, TR in, en 25-31 

154d-158c passim; TR iv, CH 1-17 159a-166d 

passim; TR vi, CH 3 190b-191c 
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 12-36 

74b-80d 

23 HOBBES: leviathan, PART i, 53a-c 
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 18, SCHOL 

382a-b; PART v, PROP 11-13 456a-b 
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH x 

141b-143d; CH xix, SECT i 175b-c 

53 IAMES: Psychology, lb-2b; 421a-451b 

54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 352a-c / 
General Introduction, 527a-b 

2a. Retention: factors influencing its strength 

7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 138d-139a / Gorgias, 262a 
/ Republic, BK vn, 399c / Timaeus, 446b-c 
/ Theaetetus, 540d-541a 



8 ARISTOTLE: Memory and Reminiscence, CH i 
U49 b 3-9] 690a; [450*26^12] 691a-c 

17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR in, CH 29 
157c-d; TR iv, CH 8, 161d 162b; TR vi, CH 3 
190b-191c 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 12-14 
74b 75a; par 16 75b-c; par 20-27 76b-78c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 50, 

A 3, REP 3 8b-9a; Q 51, A 3 14b-15a 
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 53a 
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 236c 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 61d-62c / 
Novum Organum, BK H, APH 26 156a I57a 

31 DESCARTES: Meditations, n, 81d / Objections 
and Replies, 208d-209a 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH x, 
SECT 3-6 141c-142c; CH xxix, SECT 3 234b-c 

36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 234b-236b 

53 JAMES: Psychology, lb-2a; 277a; 421b-424a 
passim, esp 422a, 424a; 427b-441a esp 428b; 
448b-450a; 849a-b 

54 FREUD: Hysteria, 27a-28c / Interpretation of 
Dreams, 145b; 155a-157a esp 155c; 369a-b / 
Civilization and Its Discontents, 769a-770c 

2b. Recollection: factors influencing ease and 

adequacy of recall 
7 PLATO: Symposium, 165c-166b / Timaeus, 

446b-c / Philebus, 621a-c 
SARISIOTLL: Topics, BK vm, CH 14 [i63 b i7~ 
34] 222b-c / Memory and Reminiscence, CH i 
[M9 b H)l 690a; en 2 692b-695d 
9ARisioTLt: Rhetoric, BK in, cn 9 [1409*35- 

b 8] 660d-661a 

18 AUGUSIINE: Confessions, BK x, par 12-14 74b- 
75a; par 16-18 75b-76a; par 25-36 77c-80d 
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 53b-c 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 59a-b; 
62b-c / Novum Organum, BK n, APH 26 156a- 
157a 

31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 208d*209a 
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART v, PROP 11-13 456a-b 
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, CH in, 

SECT 21 118b-119a; BKII, CHX, SEcr2l41b-c; 
SECT 7 142c-d 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK x, 422b 

53 JAMES: Psychology, lb-2b; 163a-b; 362b-364a; 
371a-372a; 382a-385b esp 382b-383a; 423a- 
424a; 427b-431b esp 428a-b; 433a-434a; 
438a-440b 

54 FREUD: Hysteria, 32c-33d / Interpretation of 
Dreams, 156b-157a;353d-354a/ Unconscious, 
438b-d / General Introduction, 485a-486a; 
488c-489c; 566c-567b / Ego and Id, 697d- 
698d; 700b-c 

2c. The association of ideas: controlled and 
free association; reminiscence and rev- 
erie 

7 PLATO: Republic, BK v, 361a 

8 ARISTOTLE: Memory and Reminiscence, CH 2 
[45i b io-453"3il 693a-695d 



146 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



2dto2e(3) 



(2. The activity of memory. 2c. The association 
of ideas: controlled and free association; 
reminiscence and reverie.) 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 52b 53b; 67d; 

69b-c 
26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard II, ACT v, sc v [1-41] 

349d-350a 
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART i, la 3b; 

18d-19b; 50b-52d; 134b-135d 
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 143a,c 
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART 11, PROP 18 381d-382b; 

PART in, PROP 14-17 400d-402a 
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH 

xxxin 248b-251d 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 30 418c 
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT in 457c- 

458a; SECT v, DIV 41-45 467d-469c passim 
36ST&RNE: Tristram Shandy, 193a-194b; 319a- 

320b; 393a-394a 
42 KAN r: Pure Reason, 51c-d / Judgement, 493c-d; 

528c-529b 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 292d-293a 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK 11, 82a-d; BK in, 

125b c; 146d-148c; BK vi, 254a; BK vn, 

293c-295a; BK x, 394d; 422b-c; 443c-444a; 

464a-465c csp 464d-465a; BK xiv, 608c-d; 

BK xv, 615a-616a 

53 JAMKS: Psychology, 360a-395a esp 370a-385b; 
667a-678b passim; 827a-835a 

54 FREUD: Hysteria, 65a-67b csp 66c-67b; 74a- 
79d csp 74a-77b / Interpretation of Dreams, 
180b 181b; 253d-254a; 347b-350a csp 348a- 
349a; 352b-c; 375b-376a / Repression, 423c-d 
/ General Introduction, 486b-489c esp 486d- 
488a 

2d. Recognition with or without recall 

7 PLATO: Theaetetus, 538d 541a 
18 Aur.usriNts.: Confessions, BK x, par 27-28 

78bd 
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, en in, 

sbCT2i 118b-119a; BK n, CH x, SECT 2 141b-c; 

SECT 7 142c-d 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 163b; 384a; 440b-441a esp 
441b-442b [fn 2] 

54 FREUD: Hysteria, 33c; 79a-d passim 

2e. The scope and range of normal memory: 
failure or defect of memory and its causes 
4 HOMER: Odyssey, BK ix [82-104] 230a 

7 PLATO: Ph'aedrus, 138c-141a,c / Philebus, 
621a-b 

8 ARISTOTLE: Memory and Reminiscence, CH i 
[4502(>~45i a i9] 691a-692b 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK HI [830- 
869] 40c-41a 

17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR in, CH 29, 
157c-d 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 12-36 
74b-80d 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xxxi 
[91-111] 101d-102a; xxxm [79-102] 105a-b; 



PARADISE, i [1-12] 106a; xxxm [46-75] 
156c-157a 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 15a-16c; 236c-d; 316a- 
317a; 465c-466c 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH x, 
SECT 4-5 141d-142b; CH xxix, SECT 3 234b-c; 
BK ni, CH in, SECT 2 254d-255a 

36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 234b-236b 
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 88d 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BKIII, 129d-130b 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 131a; 179a-b; 216a-b; 
240a 258b; 443a-450a; 841 b- 842 a; 844b 

54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 155a-156a; 
341b-345b passim / General Introduction, 
453b-456a esp 454b-455b; 526d-527c; 561c- 
562b 

2e(l) Forgetting as a function of the time 
elapsed 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 18 75d- 
76a 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART HI SUPPL, 

Q 98, A 7, REP 3 1076d-1077b 
23 HOBBES: I^eviathan, PART i, 50b-c 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 404a-b 

26 SHAKESPEARE: Henry V, ACT iv, sc in [40- 
67] 556a-b 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH x, 

SECT 5 142a-b 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK x, 422b-c 

53 JAMES : Psychology, 438a-b 

2e(2) The oblivisccnce of the disagreeable: 
conflict and repression 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 177d-180b esp 180a-b; 

236b-d 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 312b 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 200c-d; BK 

ix, 355d-356a; BK xiv, 605c-d; BK xv, 616a- 

617a; 630b-c 

54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 
Analysis, 6d-8b; 13a-b / Hysteria, 65b-66a; 
82b-d / Interpretation of Dreams, 343c-345a 
esp 344d-345a; 346d-347a; 378b-380d esp 
378b-379a / Repression, 422d-425b / General 
Introduction, 464b-467a; 472c-475a esp 474a; 
566a-567a; 579d / Inhibitions, Symptoms, and 
Anxiety, 720a-d; 732 b-c / New Introductory 
Lectures, 811a-b 

2e(5) Organic lesions: amnesia and the apha- 
sias 

8 ARISTOTLE : Memory and Reminiscence, CH i 
[45o a 26- b i2] 691a-c; CH 2 [453 b i-n] 695d 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 84, 
A 7, ANS 449b-450b 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH x, 

SECT 5, 142b 
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 299c 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 25b-26b; 32a-34a; 35b- 
37b; 241b-258b esp 251b>252a, 258a-b; 447a; 
448a-b; 490a-493a passim 

54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 770a 



2<?(4) to Ib CHAPTER 56: MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 

2e(4) False memories: illusions of memory; 



147 



8 ARISTOTLE: Memory and Reminiscence, CH i 

[451*8-12] 692a 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK vn, 293c-295a; 
BK x, 393a-b 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 241a-b; 442a 

54 FREUD: General Introduction, 597b-599b esp 
597b-d 

3. Remembering as an act of knowledge and 
as a source of knowledge 

7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 124c-126c / Meno, 179d- 
183a / Phaedo, 228a-230d / Republic, BK vi, 
374d-375a 

8 ARISTOTLE : Posterior Analytics, BK n, CH 19 
[99 b 34~ioo a 9] 136b-c / Topics, BK n, CH 4 
[m b 24-3i] 156d-157a / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 
i [98o a 28-98i a i] 499a-b / Memory and Rem- 
iniscence, CH i 690a-692b 

17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR in, CH 25-31 
154d-158c passim; TR iv, CH 1-17 159a-166d 
passim; TR vi, CH 3 190b-191c 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 12-36 
74b-80d / Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH 9 
640c-d; CH 14, 643b; BK iv, CH 5, 677b-c 

19 AQUINAS : Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 78, 
A 4, ANS and REP 5 411d-413d; Q 79, AA 6-7 
419b-421c; Q 84, A 3, REP 3 443d-444d; Q 89, 
A 6, REP i 478b-d 

20 AQUINAS : Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, 
Q 70, A 2, REP 4 896a-897d 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, v [34- 
42] 112c 

23 HOB BBS: Leviathan, PART i, 53a-d 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 32d; 61 d- 
62c 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, HI, 4d; vn, lOb-c; vm, 
14b; xi 17b-18b; xn, 18c; 19d-20d / Dis- 
course, PART i, 41d / Meditations, v, 95d / 
Objections and Replies, 125a-b 

33 PASCAL: Penstes, 369 236b 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, CH in, 

SECT 21 118b~119a; BK n, CH x, SECT 2 141b-c; 

SECT 8 142d-143a; BK iv, CH i, SECT 8-9 

308b-309b 
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART i, par 69, 

30b-c 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 145a; 396a-397a; 424b- 
427a; 450a-451b 

54 FREUD: Unconscious, 428d / General Intro- 
duction, 484c-486a esp 485a-b 

3*. Reminiscence as the process of all learn* 
ing: innate ideas or seminal reasons 

7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 124c-126c / Meno, 179d- 
183a; 188d-189a / Phaedo, 228a-230d / 
Theaetetus, 515d-517b 

8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK n, CH 19 
[99 b 2o~33] 136a-b / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 9 
[992 b 24-993 a n] 511a-c / Memory and Rem- 
iniscence, CH 2 [451*19-452*13! 692b-693d 



10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK i, CH 12, 173a-b 
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK n, CH n, 150a~c 

17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR n, CH 4, 8b-c 
/ Fourth Ennead, TR HI, CH 25-26 154d-156c; 
TR iv, CH 5 160d-161b 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 10 73d- 
74a; par 16-19 75b-76b; par 26-38 78a-81a / 
City of God, BK vm, CH 6, 269b-c / Christian 
Doctrine, BK i, CH 9 627a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 54, 
A 4, ANS and REP i 287b-288a; Q 55, A 2 289d- 
290d; Q 57, A i, REP 3 295a-d; Q 58, A i 
300c-301a; Q 60, A 2, ANS 311a-d; Q 84, A 3 
443d-444d; A 4, ANS 444d-446b; A 6, ANS 
447c-449a; Q 89, A i, REP 3 473b-475a; Q 117, 
A i, ANS and REP 4 595d-597c 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 264b-265b 

28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 333d-334d 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, Ib-c 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, iv, 5c-d; 6d; vi, 8d-9a; 
vm, 13c-d / Discourse, PART v, 54c; PART vi, 
62a / Meditations, n 77d 81d passim; in, 
83b; 88c-d / Objections and Replies, 120c-d; 
140c; 215b-c; 224b,d-225a 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART v, PROP 23, SCHOL 

458c-d 
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, 90d-91b; BK 

i 95b,d-121a,c passim, esp CH i, SECT 15-16 

98d-99c, SECT 23 101b-102a, CH HI, SECT 21 

118b-119a; BK n, CH i, SECT i 121a-b; SECT 6 

122b-c; CH ix, SECT 6 139a 
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT n, DIV 

17, 457b,d [fn i] 
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 113b-115a / Practical 

Reason, 352c-353a 
53 JAMES: Psychology, 851a-862a esp 851a-852b, 

856a-860a; 867a-868a; 879b 880a; 889a-b; 

897a<b 

. Sensitive and intellectual memory: knowl- 
edge of the past and the habit of knowl- 
edge 

7 PLATO: Theaetetus, 538d-544a 

8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK n, CH 4 [m b 24-3i] 
156d-157a; BK iv, CH 4 [125*4-14] 174c; 
BK vm, CH 2 [i57 b n-i6] 214a / Soul, BK in, 
CH 5 [43o a 2o-25] 662d / Memory and Reminis- 
cence, CH i [449 b 3-45o a 26] 690a-691a; CH 2 
[45i a i9- b 6] 692b-d 

17 PLOTINUS : Fourth Ennead, TR in, CH 25-31 
154d-158c passim 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 16-19 
75b-76b; par 23-25 77a-d; par 30 79b-c; par 
36 80c-d / City of God, BK xxn, CH 30, 618a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 54, 
A 5 288a-d; Q 77, A 8, REP 4 406b-407a; 
Q 79, AA 6-7 419b-421c; Q 89, A 6, REP i 
478b-d 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 51, 
A 3 14b-15a; PART in SUPPL, Q 70, A 2, REP 4 
896a-897d 

23 HOB BBS: Leviathan, P^RT i, 53a-54a; 60a-b; 
65c 



148 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



Icto 



(3. Remembering as an act of knowledge and as a 
source of knowledge. 36. Sensitive and 
intellectual memory: knowledge of the past 
and the habit of knowledge.) 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, in, 4c-d; xi 17b-18b 
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 18, SCHOL 
382a-b; PART v, PROP 21 458a 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, CH in, 
SECT 21 118b-119a; BK n, en x, SECT 2 141b-c; 
SECT 7-8 142c-143a; BK iv, CH i, SECT 8-9 
308b-309b; CH xi, SECT 11 357b-c; CH xvi, 
SECT 1-2 366d-367a 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341d 
53 JAMES: Psychology, 324a; 424b-427a esp 424b- 
425b [fn 3]; 433a-434a; 450a-451b 

3c. The scientist's use of memory: collated 
memories as the source of generalized 
experience 

8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK n, CH 19 
[99 b 34-ioo a 9] 136b-c / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 
i [ 9 8o ft 28 98i b i3]499a-500a 
28 GILBERT: loadstone, PREF la-2d 
28HARVKY: Motion of the Heart, 273d / On 
Animal Generation, 332a~335c esp 334c-d 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 59a-b / 
Novum Organum, PREF 105a-106d; UK 1 107a- 
136a,c esp APII 11-26 107d-108d, APH 97-98 
126c 127b, APH 105 128b-c 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, in, 4c-d; vn 10b-12a pas- 
sim; vin, 14b; xvi 33d-35c / Discourse, PART 
n, 47c-d 

33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 355a-358b 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 385a-b; 677b-678a 

5d. Memory as the muse of poetry and history: 
the dependence of history on the mem- 
ory of men 

4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [484-493] 14d-15a / 
Odyssey, BK i [i-io] 183a; BK vin [62-82] 
222d-223a; [469-520] 226d-227b 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, la,c; BK in, 114a 

6 TnucYDiDts: Peloponnesian War, BK i, 353d- 
354c; BK v, 489a-b; 500d-501a 

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 443d-444c / Critias, 479a-b 

13 VIRUIL: Aeneid, BK vn [641-646] 254a 

14 PLUTARCH: Pericles, 128d-129a 

15 TACITUS: Annals, BK in, 48c; BK iv, 66b-d 
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, 11 [1-9] 2c; 

PARADISE, i [1-12] 106a; xxxin [46-75] 156c- 

157a 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 71c 
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 41b-42a; 199c-d; 305b- 

306a 
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 13d- 14b; 

32d; 33b; 34c; 38c-39a 
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 626 286b 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART iv, 169a 

36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 193a-194b 
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 88c-d; 296a; 
354c-d; 413b-d 



41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 337c; 501c-503a 

passim, esp 502a 
44 BOSWEI.L: Johnson, Ib-c; 3d-4a 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 153a- 
154c; 181a-182a; PART i, 239c-240a; 247d- 
248a 

47 GOETHE: Faust, DEDICATION la-b 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK in, 134a-c; BK 
ix, 366d-367b 

4. The contribution of memory: the binding 
of time 

4a. Memory in the life of the individual: per- 
sonal identity and continuity 

4 HOMER: Odyssey, BK ix [82-104] 230a 

7 PLATO: Phaedms, 138c-140a / Republic, BK vi, 
374d-375a / Philebus, 614a-c 

8 ARISTOTLE : Soul, BK in, CH 5 [430*20-25] 
662d 

9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK 11, CH 12 [1389*20- 
24] 636c; CH 13 [1390^-10] 637b-c 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK in [670- 
678] 38d; [830-869] 40c-41a 

13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK i [441-493] 115a-116b; BK 
ii [1-12] 124a; BK vi [703-751] 229b-231a 

17PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR in, CH 25-31 
154d-158c passim; TR iv, CH 1-17 159a-166d 
passim 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK xi, par 17-38 
93b-98c esp par 36-38 97d-98c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, 
Q 87, A i 997b-998c; o 98, A 7 1076d-1077b 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xxxi- 
xxxiii 100d-105d passim 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 15a-16c; 236b-237a; 

316a-317a; 465c-466c 
31 DESCARTES: Meditations, vi, 103a-d 
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH 

xxvn, SECT 9-26 222a-227d passim, esp SECT 

20 225c-d 
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 544c-545d 

47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [779-784] 20b 

48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic\, 19a-20a 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 297a-c 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK x, 394d 

52 DOSTOEVSKY : Brothers Karamazov, EPILOGUE, 
411b-412c 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 145a; 154a-155b; 213a- 
259b esp 214a-216b, 229a-230a, 240a, 258b- 
259a; 396a-397a; 412b-413a; 418a; 421a-422a 

54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 
Analysis, 12c / War and Death, 760a-b / 
Civilization and Its Discontents, 769a-770c esp 
770b-c 

4b. Memory in the life of the group or race: 
instinct, legend, and tradition 

OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 3:15; 12:14-20; 13:1- 
16; 17:14; 20:8-11 / Leviticus, 23:24-25 / 
Numbers, 15:38-41 / Deuteronomy, 4:32-40; 
5:15; 6; 7:18-19; 8:2-659:7; 15:12-15; 16:1- 



5to5a 



CHAPTER 56: MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 



149 



12; 24:17-22; 32:7 /Joshua, 1:12-13; 3:14- 
4:9 (D) Josue, 1:12-13; 3:14-4:9 / Esther, 
9:25-32 / Psalms, 102:12; 135:13 (Z>) Psalms, 
101:13; J 34 :I 3 / Ecclesiastes, 1:11; 2:16; 9:5 / 
Isaiah, 44:21; 46:9 (D) Isaias, 44:21; 46:97 
Malachi, 4:4 (D) Malachias, 4:4 

APOCRYPHA: / Maccabees, 14:16-49 (D) OT, 
/ Machabees, 14:16-49 

NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 26:6-13 / Marl^ 
14:3-9 / Lu1$, 22:19-20 / / Corinthians, 
11:23-25 
7 PLATO: Laws, BK vn, 716a-b; 717d-718c 

13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK i [441-493] 115a-116b; BK 
in [84-191] 149b-152a 

15 TACITUS: Annals, BK HI, 60d-61a 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-ii, Q 97, 
A 2 236d-237b 

26 SHAKESPEARE: Henry V, ACT iv, sc in [40- 
67] 556a-b / Julius Caesar, ACT in, sc 11 [79- 
82] S84c 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART n, 46b-c 

33 PASCAL: Pensees, 626 286b 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART rv, 169a 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 88b-d; 97c-98c; 
398b; 413b-d; 544c-545c; 627b-d 

41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 527d-528a,c 

43 MILL: Representative Government, 424c-425b 
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 

356 113a-b / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 

153b-c; 181a-182a; 186d-190b; PART i, 227b-c; 

230c-231b; 239c-241a; PART n, 259b-c; 261b; 

263d-266a 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 318a-c; 570b-571b 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE i, 647b-c 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 717a-719a esp 718b-719a; 
722b-725a esp 724b-725a; 731b; 851b; 853a- 
858a 

54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 
Analysis, 4a-b / Instincts, 413c / Unconscious, 
439d / General Introduction, 509a-513d pas- 
sim, esp 512b-513b; 526c-d; 591d-592b; 
599a-b; 608c-d; 613a / Group Psychology, 
686c-689b esp 688d-689a, 689b [fn ij; 692a- 
693a / Ego and Id, 706c-708b esp 707b, 708b 
/ War and Death, 763b-c; 764d-765a / Civili- 
zation and Its Discontents, 795b-796c; 800a-b 
/ New Introductory Lectures, 834b-d 

5. The activity of imagination, fancy, or fan- 
tasy: the nature and variety of images 

7 PLATO: Sophist, 577a-b / Philebus, 623d-624c 

8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK HI, CH 3 659c~661b; 
CH n [433 b 3 2 -434 a 9l 666d 

9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK i, CH n [i37o B 28- b 29] 
613c-614b 

13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK vin [18-25] 259b 

17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR in, CH 31 158b-c 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 13-14 74c- 
75a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 12, A 
9, REP 2 58b-59a; Q 78, A 4, ANS 411d-413d; 
Q 84, A 6, ANS and REP 1-2 447c-449a 



21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, XVH 

[1-45] 78c-79a 
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 49a-52b; 61a-b; 

PART HI, 172b-d; PART iv, 258b-d; 261a; 

262a-c 

25 MONTAIGNE : Essays, 14c-15a 

26 SHAKESPEARE: Romeo and Juliet, ACT i, sc 
iv [96-103] 291c / Richard II, ACT v, sc v [i- 
41] 349d-350a / Midsummer-Night's Dream. 
ACT v, sc i [1-22] 370d-371a 

30 BACON: Advancement of learning, 66c-67b 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, xn, 19d-20a / Meditations, 
n, 79a-c; vi, 96b-97a; 98d-99a 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART 11, PROP 17, SCHOL 
381b-d; PROP 40, SCHOL 2 388a-b; PART v, 
PROP 34, DEMONST 460c-d 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK v [95-113] 177b 
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH n, 

SECT 2 128a-b; CH xi, SECT 6 145a; CH XH, 
SECT I-CH xm, SECT i 147b-149a; CH xin, 
SECT 4-6 149b-d; SECT 27 154c-d; CH xiv, 
SECT 24-31 160b 162a passim; on xv, SECT 
2-3 162c-d; CH xvi, SECT 1-2 165c-d; SECT 5 
166b-c; en xvn, SECT 3-7 168b-169c; CH 
xxii, SECT 2 201a-b; CH xxni, SECT 3? -37 
212d-214b passim; BK in, CH xi, SECT 15 
303b-c; BK iv, CH iv, SECT 5 324d 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 
10 406d-407b; SECT i, 413a; SECT 5 414a-b 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT n, DIV n, 
455b-c; DIV 13 455d-456b; SECT v, DIV 39, 
466c-d 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 173b-174a / Judgement, 
493c-d; 528c-529c 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 153a c; 
155b; PART i, 219d-221a; 254b-d 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 292a-b 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK n, 105d-106b; 
BK vn, 294b-29Sa; 297a-298a; BK vin, 
318b-c; BK xi, 523d-524c; BK xn, 542d- 
543a; 544a-b; BK xiv, 601c-602d; 605c-d 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 480a-501b 

54 FREUD: General Introduction, 483b; 597b- 
599d esp 599b-d / New Introductory Lectures, 
877d 

5a. The distinction between reproductive and 
creative imagination: the representative 
image and the imaginative construct 
7 PLATO: Sophist, 577c 

12 LUCRETIUS : Nature of Things, BK iv [722- 
748] 53d-54a 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 14 74d-75a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 12, 
A 9, REP 2 58b-59a; Q 78, A 4, ANS 411d-413d; 
Q 84, A 6, REP 2 447c-449a 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 50 d; PART iv, 
262a-c 

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK i, APH 60 112c 
113a 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 54a-b / 
Meditations, i, 76a b; nn 82d-83b 



150 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



5b to 5c 



(5. The activity of imagination, fancy t or fantasy: 
the nature and variety of images. 5a. The 
distinction between reproductive and crea- 
tive imagination: the representative image 
and the imaginative construct?) 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 49, SCHOL, 
392c-d; 393c-d 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK v [95-113] 177b 
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xxn, 

SECT 2 201a-b; CH xxx 238a-239b passim 
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 

10, 406d-407a; SECT i, 413a 
35 HUME: Hitman Understanding, SECT n, DIV 

13 455d-456b; SECT v, DIV 39-40 466c-467c 
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 89b-c; 173b-174a; 211c- 

212a / Judgement, 493c-495a,c; 528c-529b 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 480a-b 

54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 270c-271a 

5b. The image distinguished from the idea or 
concept: the concrete and particular as 
contrasted with the abstract and uni- 
versal 

7 PLATO: Cratylus, 108c-lllc; 113c-114a,c / 
Phacdrus, 126b-c / Republic, BK in, 333c-d / 
Thcaetetus, 534d-536a / Seventh Letter, 809c- 
810d 

8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 18 
lllb-c; CH 31 120a-c; BK n, CH 19 [100*15- 
b 5J 136d / Metaphysics, BK i, CH i [980*28- 
98i b i3] 499a-500a; CH 9 [990^-15] 508d; 
BK in, CH 4 [999 a 24- b 5J 518a-b / Soul, BK n, 
CH 5 [4i7 b i7~28] 648b-c; BK in, CH 8 [432*9- 
14] 664c-d 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vn, CH 3 [ii47 b 3-6] 
397d 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 16-19 
75b-76b; par 23 77a-b 

19 AQUINAS: Stimma Theologica, PART i, Q 55, A 
2, Rjip 2 289d-290d; Q 75, A 2, REP 3 379c- 
380c; A 3, RKP 2 380c-381b; Q 81, A 3, ANS 
430c-431d; Q 84, A i, ANS and REP i 440d- 
442a; A 2, ANS and REP i 442b-443c; AA 6-7 
447c-450b; Q 85, AA 1-2 451c-455b; Q 86, A i, 
ANS 461c-462a; PART i-n, Q 17, A 7, ANS 690d- 
692a; Q 29, A 6, ANS and REP 1,3 748b-749a 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, 
Q 70, A 2, REP 3 896a-897d 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART iv, 262a-b 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 53b / Medi- 
tations, n, 79a-c; 80a-81d; in, 82d-83b; vi, 
96b-97a; 98d-99a / Objections and Replies, 
DEF n 130a-b; 136d-137a; 137d; 138d; 211d- 
212a; 218c-d 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 44 389b 390a; 
PROP 48, SCHOL 391b-c; PROP 49, SCHOL, 
391d-392c; PART v, PROP 34, DEMONST 460c-d 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xi, 
SECT 8-9 145b-c; CH xxxii, SECT 8-9 244d- 
24Sa; BK in, CH vi, SECT 32-33 277c-278c; 
BK iv, CH VH, SECT 9, 339a-b 



35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 
6-19 405d-410c passim, esp SECT 12-16 408a- 
409d; SECT 25-27 417d-418b esp SECT 27 
418a-b; SECT 89 430b-c; SECT 135-142 440a- 
441c esp SECT 140 440d-441a, SECT 142 441b-c 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341c-342a 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15d-16c; 23a-24a; 34a-c; 
115b-c /Judgement, 542b-543c; 570c-572b 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 155b; 
PART i, 219d 220a; 230c-231b; 254b-d 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 305a-311a esp 307b-308b, 
311b-312b [fn i]; 480b-484a 

54 FREUD: Unconscious, 442b-443d 

5c. The pathology of imagination: hallucina- 
tions, persistent imagery 

7 PLATO: Theaetetus, 520c-522b 

8 ARISTOTLE: Memory and Reminiscence, CH 2 
[453*15-31] 695b-d / Dreams, CH 2 [460*31- 
b 27J 704b-d 

14 PLUTARCH: Marcus Brutus, 816d-817c 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 17, 
A 2, REP 2 102a-d; Q 51, A 2, ANS 276b-277a; 
Q 54, A 5 288a-d; Q 84, A 6, REP i 447c-449a; 
A 8, REP 2 450b-451b; Q in, A 3, ANS and 
REP 4 570b-571b 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 53, 
A 3, ANS 21d-22d 

22 CHAUCER: Miller's Tale [3611-3617] 219b 

23 HOBBES: leviathan, PART i, 50d; 51b-52b; 
80a; PART in, 172c-d; 174b; PART iv, 258b d; 
261a 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 36c-41b; 237a-b; 405d- 

406a 
27 SHAKESPEARE: Macbeth, ACT n, sc i [33-61] 

290d-291a; ACT in, sc iv [38-121] 298a-299a 
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote esp PART i, ld-2b, 

4b-c, 18d-22a, 44b-46b, 50b-52d, 134b-136a, 

PART ii, 285a-288c 
31 DLSCARTES: Rules, xn, 22c-23a / Meditations, 

i, 75c-77c / Objections and Replies, 209c 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 44, SCHOL 
437d-438a 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK v [95-128] 177b- 
178a / Samson Agonistes [599-605] 352b 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT n, DIV 

n,455b-c 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 598a~b 
44 Bos w ELL :/o toon, 13c-d; 114b-115a 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 196d- 
197c 

47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [4405-4612] 110a-114b 

48 MELVILLE: MobyDic^, 148b-150a; 232b-235a 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK n, 109d-110a; 
BK vn, 293c-294a; BK xi, 524c-527a; BK xv, 
616a617a 

52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov^ BK xi, 
337a-348d 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 274a; 490a-493a; 506a- 
507a esp 507b-508b [fn i]; 515a-520a; 527a- 
538b esp 527a-533a; 662a-663a [fn i]; 747b 
[fn 3]; 842b-844a 



CHAPTER 56: MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 



6 to 6c(\) 

54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 
Analysis, 3a-d / Hysteria, 76d; 86a-d; 102b- 
106b esp 106a-b; 115a-117d / Interpretation of 
Dreams, 176b-c; 354c-355b / General Intro- 
duction, 551b-552a; 597b-600b esp 599d- 
600b / Ego and Id, 700c 

6. The role of imagination in thinking and 
knowing 

6a. Imagination as knowledge: its relation to 
possible and actual experience 

7 PLATO: Republic, BK vi, 383d-388a / Sophist, 
575d-577b 

8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK in, CH 3 659c-661b 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 14 74d- 
75a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 46, 
A i, REP 8 250a-252d 

23 HOB BBS: Leviathan, PART i, 50a-54c 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 55b-d 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, XH, 19d-20d; xiv, 28a-d 
/ Discourse, PART iv, 54a-b / Meditations, n, 
79a-81d; vi, 96b-97a; 98d-99a / Objections 
and Replies, DEF n 130a-b 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 17, SCHOL 
381b-cf; PROP 26, COROL and DEMONST 384b; 
PROP 40, SCHOL 1-2 387b-388b; PROP 44, 
COROL i and SCHOL 389c-390a; PART iv, DEF 
6 424b; PROP i, SCHOL 424d-425a; PART v, 

PROP 34, DEMONST 460c-d 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 72c-88a; 227a-230c 
53 JAMES -.Psychology, 285a-287b esp 285b; 480b; 
520a-521a; 617a-625a passim, esp 621a 

6b. The effect of intellect on human imagina- 
tion: the imaginative thinking of animals 

8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK in, CH 3 [429*4-8] 661b; 
CH n [433 b 32-434 B n] 666d-667a / Memory 
and Reminiscence, CH 2 [453*5-14] 695b 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vn, CH 3 [ii47 b 3-6] 
397d 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 78, 
A 4, ANS and REP 4-5 411d-413d; Q 81, A 3, 
ANS and REP 2-3 430c-431d; Q 84, A 2, REP i 
442b-443c; A 6, REP 1-2 447c-449a; Q 85, A i, 
REP 4 451c-453c; PART i-n, Q 17, A 7 690 d- 
692a; Q 29, A 6, ANS 748b-749a 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 50, 
A 3, REP 3 8b-9a; Q 51, A 3 14b-15a 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 52b; 53a-b 
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 229d-230b 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 55 bd 

31 DESCARTES: Meditations, vi, 96d-97a 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xi, 

SECT ii 145d-146a 
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341d-342a 
42 KANT: Judgement, 479a-c 
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 292a-294b esp 

292a-293a; 296c-297b 
53 JAMES: Psychology, 665a-666b; 678b 686b 

esp 681b-682a, 686a-b 



151 



6c. The dependence of rational thought and 
knowledge on imagination 

7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 126b-c / Republic, BK in, 
333b-d; BK vi-vn, 383d-398c / Seventh Letter, 
809c-810b; 810d 

8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK i, CH i [403*2-15] 
632a-b / Memory and Reminiscence, CH i 
[449 b 30-45o a i4] 690c-d 

17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR in, CH 30-31 
157d-158c 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 75, 
A 3, REP 2 380c-381b; Q 84, AA 6-8 447c- 
451b; Q 85, A i 451c-453c; A 7, ANS 459c- 
460b; Q 88, A i, ANS 469a-471c; Q 89, A i, 
ANS and REP i 473b-475a; A 5, ANS and REP 
4 477a-478b 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-ii, Q 51, 
A i, ANS 12b-13c; Q 52, A i, ANS 15d-18a; 
PART in, Q ii, A 2 773a-d 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 52b-54c; 66c-67a 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, vn, lOb-c; vni, 13a-b; 
14b; XH, 18c; 19a-20d; xiv, 28a-d; 30b 31a / 
Discourse, PART i, 41d / Meditations, ii, 79a-c; 
vi, 96b-97a / Objections and Replies, 136d- 
137a 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 40, SCHOL i 
387b-388a 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 14a-108a,c esp 14a-15c, 
23a-33d, 41c-42b, 48d-51d, 53b-55a, 56d- 
59b, 61a-64a, 66d-93c; 194d-195a / Judge- 
ment, 542b-543c 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 158a-161a; 301a-302a; 
328a 331b esp 328a-b, 331a b; 549a-550a; 
677a-678b 

54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 367b-c; 
385b-c / Unconscious, 442b-443a / Ego and 
Id, 700b-701a; 701d 

6c(l) The abstraction of ideas from images: 
the image as a condition of thought 

8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 31 
[87 b 39-88i7] 120a-c / Topics, BK vi, CH 4 
[i4i b 2-i4] 194d-195a; BK vni, CH i [156*4-6] 
211d-212a / Soul, BK HI, CH 7 [43i a i4- b i9J 
663d-664b; CH 8 [432*2-14] 664c-d / Memory 
and Reminiscence, CH i [449 b 3o-45o a 25] 690c- 
691a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 55, 
A 2, REP 2 <289d-290d; Q 70, A 3, ANS 365b- 
367a; Q 75, A 2, REP 3 379c-380c; A 3, REP 2 
380c-381b; A 6, REP 3 383c-384c; A 7, CON- 
TRARY 384d-385c; Q 76, A i, ANS 385d-388c; 
Q 79, A 4, REP 3 417a-418c; Q 84, AA 6-8 447c- 
451b; Q 85, A i 451c-453c; Q 86, A i, ANS 
461c-462a; PART i-n, Q 29, A 6, ANS and RXP 
1,3 748b-749a 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-ii, Q 50, 
A 4, REP 1,3 9a-10b 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 53 b 
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK i, CH i, 
SECT 15 98d-99a; BK *ii, CH xi, SECT 8-9 



152 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



6V(2) to la 



(6c. The dependence of rational thought and 
knowledge on imagination. 6c(l) The 
abstraction of ideas from images: the image 
as a condition of thought.) 
145b-c; CH xn, SECT i, 147b-c; CH xxxii, 
SECT 8-9 244d-245a; BK iv, CH vn, SECT 9, 
339a-b 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 
6-19 405d-410c passim, csp SECT 12-16 408a- 
409d; SECT 97-100 431d-432c 
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT xn, DIV 
122 505c-d; DIV 124-125 506a-507a csp DIV 
125, 507b [fn i] 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341d-342a 
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 254b-d 
53 JAMES: Psychology, 305a-308a; 330a-331b 

6c(2) The schema of the imagination as me- 
diating between concepts of the under- 
standing and the sensory manifold of 
intuition: the transcendental unity of 
apperception 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 14a-108a,c esp 48d-55a, 
61a-64a, 66d-93c; 193a-195a / Practical 
Reason, 319c-320b / Judgement, 542b-543c 
53 JAMES: Psychology, 232b 235a passim 

6d. The limits of imagination: imageless 
thought; the necessity of going beyond 
imagination in the speculative sciences 

7 PLATO: Symposium, 167a-d / Republic, BK vn, 
388a-398c esp 396d-398c / Statesman, 595a-c 
/ Seventh Letter, 809c-810b 

8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK in, CH 7 [43i b i2-i9] 
664b / Memory and Reminiscence, CH i 
[449 b 3o-45o a io] 690c-d 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK i [265-328] 
4b-5a; [599-612] 8b-c; BK n [80-141] 16a-d; 
[308-332] 19a-b 

18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK n, CH 2 323a-c 
/ Chtistian Doctrine, BK i, CH 7 626b-c 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i, A 9 
8d-9c; Q 12, A 3 52c 53b; Q 75, A i, ANS and 
REP 1-2 378b-379c; A 2, CONTRARY 379c- 
380c; A 3, ANS 380c-381b; Q 84, A i, ANS and 
REP 2 440d-442a; A 2, REP i 442b-443c; A 6 
447c-449a; A 7, REP 3 449b-450b; Q 85, A i, 
ANS and REP 2 451c-453c; QQ 87-89 464d- 
480c; Q 93, A 6, REP 4 496b-498a; PART i-n, 
Q 17, A 7, REP 3 690d-692a 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 52c; 54b-c; 
78d-79a; 80a-b; PART n, 162b-d; PART iv, 
262a-b 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 55b d / 
Novum Organum, BK i, APH 48 HOd-llla 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, iv, 6b-7d; xiv, 30b-31a / 
Discourse, PART n, 46c-47a; PART iv, 53b / 
Meditations, 72b-c; i 75a-77c; n, 79a-c; iv, 
89a-b; vi, 96b-97a / Objections and Replies^ 
128d-129a; 215b-c; 217c-d; 218c-d 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 8, SCHOL 2 



356d-357d passim; PROP 15, SCHOL 360b- 
361d; APPENDIX 369b~372d passim 

32 MILTON : Paradise Lost, BK v [544-576] 187a b 

33 PASCAL: Pense'es, i 171a-172a 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH i, 
SECT 24 127b-c; CH xiv, SECT 26 160c-d; CH 
xv, SECT 12 165b-c; CH xvn, SECT 7-21 169b- 
173d esp SECT 15 171b-172a; CH xxix, SECT 
16 237b-238a; BK in, CH i, SECT 5 252b-c; 
CH vi, SECT 9 270d-271a; BK iv, CH vn, SECT 
9 338d-339b; CH xvi, SECT 12 370b-371a 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 
6-19 405d-410c; SECT 27 418a-b; SECT 135- 
142 440a-441c passim 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341c-342b 
42 KANT: Pure Reason, la-b; 15c-16c; 17d<19a; 
19d-20c; 85d-93c; 211c-212a; 217d-218a; 
227a-230c / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 
264d / Science of Right, 399a / Judgement, 
497a-502d; 506a-511a esp 506d, 509d-510a; 
578a-b; 603b-d 

45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART i, lOc 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 257c- 
258a 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 158a-161a esp 158b-159a; 
301a-302a; 549a-550b 

54 FREUD: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 661d- 
662b / Civilization and Its Discontents, 769b- 
770b esp 770a 

7. Imagination and the fine arts 

la. The use of imagination in the production 
and appreciation of works of art 

9 ARISTOTLE : Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i 

[639 b i2-2o] 161d-162a; [640*29-33] 162d 
18 AUGUSTINE : Confessions, BK xi, par 7 90d-91a 
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 67b-c; PART iv, 

262c 

26 SHAKESPEARE: Midsummer-Night's Dream, 
ACT v, sc i [1-27] 370d-371a / Henry V, PRO- 
LOGUE 532b,d; ACT in, PROLOGUE 543c-d 

29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART n, 285a-288c 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 32d; 38c- 
39a 

31 DESCARTES: Meditations, i, 76a-b 

36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 198a-b 

37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 280a; 296b,d-298a 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 173b-174a / Judgement, 
473a-c; 482b-483d; 491a-c; 493c-495a,c; 
498b-502d; 506a-511a esp 506d, 509d 510a; 
523c-524a; 525c-532a esp 528c-530c 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 153a-c; 
PART i, 254b-d; PART n, 263d-265c 

47 GOETHE : Faust, DEDICATION la-b 
50 MARX: Capital, 85c 

52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK x, 
284b-d 

54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 
Analysis, 18d / Interpretation of Dreams^ 
181a-b; 383d / General Introduction, 483c; 
600d-601b / Group Psychology, 692c-693a 



Ib to 80 



CHAPTER 56: MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 



153 



76. The fantastic and the realistic in poetry: 
the probable and the possible in poetry 
and history 
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK 11, 73a-b 

6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK i, 354b 

7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 140a-d / Ion 142a-148a,c 
esp 145d-148a / Republic, BK n, 320d-324c; 
BK x, 427c-434c / Sophist, 561b-d; 577d-579d 

9 ARISTOTLE: Poetics, CH 8 [i45i a i6]-CH 9 
[I 45 i b 39] 685d-686c; CH 15 [i 4 54 a 23- b 9] 
689b-c; CH 17 [1455*21-35] 690c; CH 24 
[i46o a i2- b 2] 696b-c; CH 25 [i46o b 6-i46i a 8] 
696d-697c; [i46i a 3i- b 25] 697d-698c 
14 PLUTARCH: Theseus, la-b/ Coriolanus, 189b-c 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, xvi [124-136] 
23d; xxiv [79]-xxv [151] 35b-38a; xxvm 
41b-43a; xxxn [1-12] 47c; PARADISE, x 
[28-48] 120c-d; xxxin [49-75] 156d-157a 

22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK n, 
STANZA 147-149 40b-41a / Prologue to Melt- 
beus 400b-401a 

23 HOBBES: leviathan, PART i, 67b 
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 41b-c 

29 CERVANTES : Don Quixote, PART i, 183d-193a 
esp 184a-d, 186b-d; PART 11, 208d-209d; 
212a-215b esp 213b c; 237b c 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 38c-39b 

31 DLSCARTES: Discourse, PART i, 43a-b 

37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 19a-20a; 49b-50c; 

152a-155b 
40 GIBBON: Decline and Pall, 186c-d; 345c; 

471c-d 
44 BGSW ELL: Johnson, 446c-447a 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 153a-b 

47 GOETHE: Faust, PART n [7428-7433] 181b- 
182a 

48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 150a-152a 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK in, 134a-c 

8. The nature and causes of dreaming 

7 PLATO: Republic, BK ix, 416a-c / Timaeus, 
454d / Theaetetus, 520c-521b 

8 ARISTOTLE: Dreams 702a-706d 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK iv [722- 

822] 53d-55a; [962-1036] 56d-57c 
14 PLUTARCH: Marcus Brutus, 817b-c 

18 AUGUSTINE : Confessions, BK x, par 41-42 
81c-82a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 17, 
A 2, REP 2 102a-d; Q 84, A 8, REP 2 450b-451b 

22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK v t 
STANZA 36-37 125a; STANZA 52-55 127a-b; 
STANZA 183 144a; STANZA 245 152a / Nun's 
Priest 1 s Tale [14,889-15,162] 451a-455b 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 50d-51d; PART iv, 
258b-c 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 290b-c; 533d-534a 

26 SHAKESPEARE: Romeo and Juliet, ACT i, sc iv 
[49-103] 291a-c / Midsummer-Night's Dream , 
ACT n, sc ii [145-156] 360b-c; ACT iv, sc i 
[191-223] 369d-370b 



27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT n, sc n [260- 
266] 43b 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 51c; 53c-54b 
/ Meditations, i, 75d-76a; vi, 103a>d / Objec- 
tions and Replies, 143a,c; 209c 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK v [95-128] 177b- 
178a 

35 LOCKE : Human Understanding, BK n, CH 

xix, SECT i, 175c 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 295b 
42 KANT: Judgement, 560b 
44 Bos WELL: Johnson, 443c 
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 220c- 

221a 

48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 94a-95b 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE i, 672b 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 387b-388a; 534a-535a; 
643b [fn if 

54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 
Analysis, lla-13a / Interpretation of Dreams 
135a-387a,c esp 137a-139b, 168d-174d, 231b- 
232b, 234b-236b, 252c-253a, 262c-278a, 
294d-295b, 336d-340a, 346d-347b, 350a-b, 
356a-360d, 363b-377c / General Introduction, 
476a-544d esp 478b-482c, 495d-497a, 532d- 
535d; 618b-c / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 
641c-d; 649d-650b / New Introductory lec- 
tures, 807b,d-818b esp 812d-813c, 817a-818b; 
820c-822b 

8a. Dreams as divinely inspired: their pro- 
phetic portent; divination through the 
medium of dreams 

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 20:3-7; 28:10-22; 
31:10-13,24; 37:1-11; 40-41 / Numbers, 12:6 
/ Deuteronomy, 13:1-5 / Judges, 7:13-15 / 
/ Samuel, 28:6,15 (D) l Kin g s i 28:6,15 / 
/ Kings, 3:5-15 (D) /// Kings, 3:5-15 / 
// Chronicles, 1:7-12 (D) II Paralipomenon, 
1:7-12 / Job, 4:13-21; 7:13-15; 33 : i4-i6 
/ Ecclesiastes, 5:7 (D) Ecclesiastes, 5:6 / 
Jeremiah, 23:25-32; 29:8-9 (D) Jeremias, 
23:25-32; 29:8-9 / Daniel, 2; 4:4-37; 7-8; 
10-12 (D) Daniel, 2; 4; 7-8; 10-12 / Joel, 
2:28-29 

APOCRYPHA: Rest of Esther, 10-11 (D) OT, 
Esther, 10:4-11:12 / Wisdom of Solomon, 17; 
18:13-19 esp 18:17-19 (D) OT, Boo\ of 
Wisdom, 17; 18:13-19 esp 18:17-19 / Ecclesias- 
ticus, 34:1-7 (D) OT, Ecclesiasticits, 34:1-7 / 
// Maccabees, 15:11-16 (D) OT, // Macha- 
bees, 15:11-16 

NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 1 120-21 ; 2:12-13, 19- 
23; 27:19 / Acts, 2:17-18; 18:9-10 

4 HOMER: Iliad, BK i [59-67] 3d; BK n [1-75] 
lOa-d / Odyssey, BK xix [509-581] 294c- 
295a,c 

5 AESCHYLUS: Persians [176-230] 17a-d / Prome- 
theus Bound [442-506] 44c-45a esp [484-486] 
45a; [645-657] 46d-47a / Choephoroe [523- 
552] 75b-c 

5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [976-986] 1081) 



154 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



oato&c 



(8. The nature and causes of dreaming. 8a. 
Dreams as divinely inspired: their pro- 
phetic portent; divination through the me- 
dium of dreams) 

5 EURIPIDES: Iphigenia Among the Tauri [42- 
66] 411c-d; [1234-1283] 422b-c 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 8a-10a; 25b-31a; 
47a-c; BK H, 78d-79c; BK in, 95d; 103b-104b; 
116a-b; BK iv, 154c-d; BK v, 170c-d; BK vi, 
205d 206a; 208b; 211a; BK vn, 218b-220b 

7 PLATO: Crito, 213b-d / Timaeus, 466d-467c 

8 ARISTOTLE: Prophesying 707a-709a,c 

13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK HI [147-179] 151a-152a; 
BK viii [26-93] 259b-261b 

14 PLUTARCH: Themistocles, 98d-99a / Alcibiades, 
174a-d / Coriolanus, 185b-186a / Pelopidas, 
239d-2Wc/Aristides, 268a-d / Pyrrhus, 329c-d 
/ Cimon, 398d-399b / Lucullus, 411a-b / 
Eumenes, 473a-b / Agesilaus, 483a-b / Pom- 
fey, 514d-515a; 532b; 534d-535a / Alex- 
ander, 548d-549a / Caesar, 601d-604d / 
Demosthenes, 702c-703b / Cicero, 721c-722a 
/ Demetrius, 727b-d / Marcus Brutus, 816d- 
817c 

15 TACITUS: Annals, BK H, 26c; BK xi, lOlb; 
BK XH, 112cM13a; BK xvi, 176b-d 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK in, par 19-20 
18b-19a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 12, 
A H, ANS 59d-60d; Q 86, A 4, REP 2 463d- 
464d 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 7, 
A 8, REP i 750d-751d 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, XXXH [124]- 
XXXIH [90] 49a-50c; PURGATORY, ix [1-69] 
65d-66c; xix [1-69] 81c-82a 

22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK v, STANZA 
53 127a; STANZA 177-185 143b-144b; STANZA 
207-217 147a-148b; STANZA 245 152a / Nun's 
Priest's Tale [14,976-15,162] 452b-455b 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART in, 165d-166a; 
173c; 175c; 176d-177b; 184a-185a passim; 
186cd 

24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK HI, 
150d-156c 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 533d-534a 

26 SHAKESPEARE: Julius Caesar, ACT H, sc H 
[75-94] 578d-579a 

27 SHAKESPEARE: Cymbehne, ACT v, sc iv [30- 
151] 481c-482c; sc v [426-465] 488b-d 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 54c-55a 
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK vm [283-499] 

238b-243a / Areopagitica, 389a-b 
40 GIBBON: Decline and Pall, 294d-296b 
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 244c- 

245a; PART H, 263d-265c 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 643b [fh i] 

54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 
Analysis, lie / Interpretation of Dreams, 137b- 
138d; 145d-146a; 178b-179c esp 179d [fn 2]; 



383d-384a; 387a,c / General Introduction, 
477b-d 

Bb. The role of sensation and memory in the 
dreams of sleep 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK VH, 219b 
8 ARISTOTLE: Dreams 702a-706d 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK iv [722-822] 
53d-55a; [962-1036] 56d-57c 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 84, 
A 8, REP 2 450b-451b 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, 
Q 70, A 2, REP 3 896a-897d 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 50d-51d 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 36d-37a; 229d-230b; 

333b-c 
27 SHAKESPEARE: Macbeth, ACT v, sc i 306b- 

307a 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK iv [797-809] 169b- 
170a; BK v [95-121] 177b-178a 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH i, 

SECT 17, 12Sc 
42 KANT: Judgement, 560b 
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic\, 19a-20a 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK n, 86a; BK in, 

147c-148c; BK xi, 481a-482a; BK xiv, 601a- 

602d 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 535a-536a 

54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 
Analysis, 12c / Interpretation of Dreams, 139b- 
ISSa'esp 141a-b, 145d-146c, 149c-153c; 173c- 
174b; 189d-190b; 205c-237b passim, esp 
205d-206a, 210d-212d, 215b, 228b 232b; 
250c-251c; 297c-298a; 351a-356d esp 353b- 
356b; 362b-363a / General Introduction, 478d- 
483a esp 480b-482a; 497d-499a; 526c-527c; 
532b-c; 538d-539a / New Introductory Lec- 
tures, 809d 

Sc. The expression of desire in daydreaming 
or fantasy 

7 PLATO: Republic, BK v, 361a 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 52d-53a; 67d; 
69b-c; PART n, 138d-139a 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 14c-15a; 37b; 177c-d; 
405d-406a 

26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard II, ACT v, sc v [1-41] 
349d-350a 

29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART i, lb-2b; 18d- 
19b; 50b-52d; 134b-135d 

33 PASCAL: Pensees, 82-88 186b-189b 

47 GOETHE: Faust, PART H [10,039-066] 245a-b 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK n, 82a-d; BK 
in, 125b-c; 146d-148c; BK vi, 254b-c; BK x, 
394d; BK xi, 497c-499c esp 498c-d; BK xn, 
542d-543a; 544a-b; BK xiv, 60 1 a 602 d; BK 
xv, 615c-617a 

54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 
Analysis, 18c / Hysteria, 115b-116c esp 115c 
/ Interpretation of Dreams, 333c-d / General 
Introduction, 483 b-d; 599b-d 



Sd to 



CHAPTER 56: MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 



155 



Bd. The symbolism of dreams 

8</(l) The manifest and latent content of 
dreams: the dream-work 

4 HOMER: Odyssey, BK xix [509-581] 294c* 
295a,c 

5 AESCHYLUS: Persians [176-230] 17a-d / 
Choephoroe [523-552] 75b-c 

5 EURIPIDES: Iphigenia Among the Tauri [42- 
66] 411c-d 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 25b-c; 28c-29a; 
47a-c; BK 11, 78d 

7 PLATO: Crito, 213b-d / Phaedo, 221d-222a 

8 ARISTOTLE: Prophesying, CH 2 [464 b 7~i8] 
709c 

14 PLUTARCH: Pyrrhus, 329c-d / Cimon, 398d- 
399b / Eumenes, 473a-b / Alexander, 548d- 
549a / Demosthenes, 702c-703b / Demetrius, 
727b-d 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, ix [i- 
69] 6Sd-66c; xix [1-69] 81c-82a; XXVH [91- 
108] 95c 

22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BK v, STANZA 
52-55 127a-b; STANZA 177-185 143b-144b; 
STANZA 207-217 147a-148b; STANZA 245 152a 

26 SHAKESPEARE: 2nd Henry VI, ACT i, sc n 
[17-55] 36c-37a / Richard III, ACT i, sc iv 
114d-117c / Romeo and Juliet, ACT i, sc iv 
[49-103] 291a-c / Julius Caesar, ACT H, sc n 
[75-90] 578d-579a 

27 SHAKESPEARE: Cymbeline, ACT v, sc v [426- 
465] 488b-d 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK v [28-128] 176a- 

178a 
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART n, 263d- 

265c 



51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK n, 86a; BK vi, 
249a-250a; BK xi, 481a-482b; BK xn, 561c-d; 
BK xiv, 608a-b; EPILOGUE i, 672b; 673d- 
674a,c 

54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 
Analysis, llc-12c / Interpretation of Dreams, 
178a-205c csp 189b-190a, 194b-d, 204c-d; 
252c-340a esp 252c-253a, 332a-333b, 336d- 
340a; 356d-373a passim / General Introduc- 
tion, 489c-504d csp 489c-494d; 513d-526c esp 
513d-519d; 532d-544d passim, esp 536c-539a, 
541b-542b / New Introductory Lectures, 809b- 
810b; 812d-814d; 816b-818b 

8d(2) The recurrent use of specific symbols in 

dreams: the dream-language 
54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 
Analysis, 12c-d / Psycho- Analytic Therapy, 
123d-124a / Interpretation of Dreams, 173a- 
174d; 178b-179c; 230b-231c; 265a-272c; 
277b-298a esp 278d-285c / General Introduc- 
tion, 504d-513d; 516a-518c; 523a-526c / New 
Introductory Lectures, 813d; 815a-817a 

8e. Dream-analysis as uncovering the re- 
pressed unconscious 

54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 
Analysis, lla-13a / Interpretation of Dreams, 
178a-205c esp 178a-179c, 204c-d; 282d-283a; 
285c; 294d-295a; 319d-320c; 340a-387a,c 
esp 345c-350a, 356d-358c, 365a, 383d-384a, 
386b-387a / General Introduction, 483d-494d 
esp 486b-c, 488b-c, 489c-490a; 501c<504d 
esp 504b-d; 519d-524a passim; 531d-532c; 
538d-539b; 585a; 635a / New Introductory 
Lectures, 808d-813b esp 811a-812b, 812d 



CROSS-REFERENCES 

For: The discussion of memory and imagination in relation to the faculties of sense and under- 
standing, desire and will, see DESIRE 53; IDEA ic, 2e-2f; SENSE 3b(2), jdfa). 

The controversy over the distinction between image and idea, see IDEA 2f-2g; MIND ia(i); 
SENSE id, 53; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 4d. 

Other discussions of the association of ideas, and of reverie or daydreaming, see DESIRE 53; 
IDEA 56; RELATION 4f. 

The consideration of memory as knowledge of the past, see KNOWLEDGE 6b(2); TIME 6e; 
TRUTH 33(2); and for the distinction between memory and intellectual habit, see HABIT i, 
5d; MIND 4c. 

The doctrine of reminiscence which identifies learning with remembering, or for the doctrine 
of innate ideas, see IDEA 2b; KNOWLEDGE 6c(3); MIND 4d(2). 

The role of memory in science, history, and poetry, see EXPERIENCE 2a-2b; HISTORY i; 
INDUCTION 2; POETRY 2. 

The problem of personal identity, see SAME AND OTHER ib; SOUL id. 

The theory of racial memory in relation to instinct and tradition, see HABIT 36; LANGUAGE 
3c; POETRY 3. 



156 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



For; The function of imagination in thinking and knowing, see MIND ia(2); REASONING ic; 
and for the doctrine that universal concepts are abstracted from sensory images, see IDEA 
2g; SENSE 53; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 4C. 

The theory of the transcendental unity of apperception, to which memory or imagination 
contributes, see KNOWLEDGE 6b(4); ONE AND MANY 4b; SENSE ic, 3^5). 

The imagination as a factor in art, see ART 5; and for another discussion of the probable and 
the possible in poetry, see POETRY 83(2). 

Other discussions of dreams, their causes and meaning, see DESIRE 53, 6c; LANGUAGE 10; 
PROPHECY 30; SIGN AND SYMBOL 6a; and for the theory of conflict, censorship, and repres- 
sion involved in the Freudian interpretation of dreams, see DESIRE 4a~4d, 6b. 

Matters relevant to the psychopathology of memory and imagination, see DESIRE 
EMOTION 3a~3b; MAN 50; MIND 8b; SENSE 4d(2); TRUTH 33(2). 



ADDITIONAL READINGS 

Listed below are works not included in Great floods of the Western World, but relevant to the 
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups: 

I. Works by authors represented in this collection. 
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection. 

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult 
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas. 



I. 

HOBBES. The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic, 

PART I, CH 3 

HuMfc. A Treatise of Human Nature, BK i, PART i, 

SLOT Hi; PART III, SECT V~VII 

FREUD. The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, CH 
1-7 

. Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious 

. Leonardo da Vinci 

II. 

CICERO. Academics, n 

ALBERTUS MAGNUS. De Memoria ef Reminiscentia 
G. F. Pico DELLA MIRANDOLA. On the Imagination 
MALEBRANCHE. De la recherche de la veritt, BK n 
LEIBNITZ. New Essays Concerning Human Under- 
standing, BK II 

. Monadology, par 26-28 

HARTLEY. Observations on Man, His Frame, His 
Duty and His Expectations, VOL i, INTRO; PROP- 
OSITION 8-14, 79-94 

VOLTAIRE. "Imagination," in A Philosophical Dic- 
tionary 

T. REID. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, in 
BLAKE. Songs of Innocence 

. Songs of Experience 

COLERIDGE. Diographia Literaria, CH 13 

BROWN. Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human 

Mind, VOL n, pp 354-405 

DE QUINCEY. Confessions of an English Opium-Eater 
LAMB. "Dream-Children," in The Essays ofElia 
J. MILL. Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human 
Mind, CH 7, 10 



W. HAMILTON. Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, 

VOL i (30-33) 

BAIN. The Senses and the Intellect (Intellect) 
SPKNCER. The Principles of Psychology, VOL i, PART 

II, CH 5-8; PART IV, CH 6; VOL II, PART IX, 
CH 3 

EMERSON. Natural History of Intellect 

HLRING. Memory 

TAINE. On Intelligence 

TYNDALL. Scientific Use of the Imagination 

LEWIS CARROLL. Alice's Adventures in Wonderland 

. Through the Looting-Glass and What Alice 

Found There 

S. BUTLER. Unconscious Memory 

SULLY. Illusions, CH 10 

GALTON. Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its De- 
velopment (Mental Imagery, Associations, Psy- 
chometric Experiments, Anti-Chamber of Con- 
sciousness, Visionaries, Number Forms) 

ROMANES. Mental Evolution in Animals 

EBBINGHAUS. Memory 

C. S. PEIRCE. Collected Papers, VOL vi, par 494-504 

STEVENSON. "A Chapter on Dreams," in Across the 
Plains 

HODGSON. The Metaphysic of Experience, VOL i, en 2 
(3-4. 6), 3 (3-4), 7 (5), 8 (4); VOL m, CH i (2 (c)), 

2 > 3 (5). 4 (3)> 5 
STOUT. Analytic Psychology, CH 1 1 

. Manual of Psychology, BK iv, CH i 

RIBOT. Diseases of Memory 

. Essay on the Creative Imagination 

WOODWORTH. Psychological Issues, CH 4, 7 
TITCHENER. Lectures on the Experimental Psychology 

of the Thought-Processes 



CHAPTER 56: MEMORY 

BRADLEY. Collected Essays, VOL i (13, 18) 

. Essays on Truth and Reality, CH 3, 12- 

'3 
BERGSON. Matter and Memory 

. Dreams 

. Mind-Energy, CH 4-5 

JUNG. Instinct and the Unconscious 

PROUST. Remembrance of Things Past 

B. RUSSELL. The Analysis of Mind, LECT 8-9 

BROAD. The Mind and Its Place in Nature, CH 5 



AND IMAGINATION 



157 



SANTA Y ANA. Soliloquies in England and Later Solil- 
oquies, CH 29 

. Scepticism and Animal Faith, CH 17 

JAENSCH. Eidetic Imagery and Typological Methods 
of Investigation 

LOWES. The Road to Xanadu 

JONES. Nightmare, Witches, and Devils 

JOYCE. Ulysses 

. Finnegans Wake 

WERTHEIMER. Productive Thinking 



Chapter w METAPHYSICS 



INTRODUCTION 



IN this chapter, as in MATHEMATICS, we must 
distinguish controversies about the science 
we are considering from controversies in it. But 
here the situation is complicated by many am- 
biguities. In the tradition of western thought, 
the name of science has never been denied to 
mathematics, no matter how its subject matter 
has been defined or what conception of science 
has prevailed. But controversies about meta- 
physics often begin, in modern times at least, 
by questioning our right to use the word "sci- 
ence" when we speak of metaphysical inquiry 
or speculation. The challenge usually implies 
that metaphysics cannot be regarded as a body 
of valid knowledge because the peculiar objects 
it has chosen to investigate are not susceptible 
to scientific inquiry. 

If experimentation were the sine qua non of 
scientific knowledge, it would follow, of course, 
that a discipline which could not perform ex- 
periments or even less rigorous types of empiri- 
cal research could not be called a science. But 
by that standard mathematics would also be 
ruled out. It does not seem to be the case, how- 
ever, that mathematics and metaphysics stand 
or fall together. 

Hume, for example, admits the one and ex- 
cludes the other. If we are persuaded of his 
principles concerning science, what havoc, he 
says, must we make when we run over our li- 
braries. "If we take in our hand any volume; of 
divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let 
us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning con- 
cerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain 
any experimental reasoning concerning matter of 
fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the 
flames; for it can contain nothing but sophistry 
and illusion." 

Nor does Kant make experimentation or em- 
pirical research indispensable to valid and cer- 
tain knowledge. On the contrary, pure, as op- 



posed to empirical, physics is for him like 
mathematics in having the superior status of 
a priori knowledge. They are both sciences in 
the highest sense of the term because they con- 
sist of valid synthetic judgments a priori. Kant, 
therefore, does not exclude metaphysics from 
the ranks of science because he thinks that 
"metaphysic, according to its proper aim, con- 
sists merely of synthetic propositions a priori." 
Not the method of metaphysics, nor the form 
of its propositions, but the character of its ob- 
jects seems to be the cause of its frustration, 
reducing it to what Kant calls an "illusory dia- 
lectic" rather than a valid science. 

It might be supposed that those who take the 
opposite view that metaphysics is a science, 
even, perhaps, the highest of the sciences 
would agree in defining its objects or the scope 
of its inquiry. This docs not seem to be the case, 
any more than it seems to be true that all those 
who criticize metaphysics conceive its subject 
matter in the same way. 

Following what he takes to be the traditional 
conception of metaphysics in the mediaeval 
schools, which appears to him to be continued 
in the writings of Descartes, Leibnitz, and 
Wolff, Kant says that "metaphysic has for the 
proper object of its inquiries only three grand 
ideas: God, Freedom, and Immortality." This 
also seems to be at least part of what Hume has 
in mind when he refers to "school metaphysics" 
and associates it with "divinity," by which he 
means theology, natural or sacred. Yet we find 
William James saying that "Hume is at bottom 
as much of a metaphysician as Thomas Aqui- 
nas," because he is engaged in speculations con- 
cerning the relation or lack of relation, the iden- 
tity or lack of identity, in the discrete elements 
of immediate experience. Here the question 
seems to be not about God, freedom, and im- 
mortality, but about the existence of enduring 



158 



CHAPTER 57: METAPHYSICS 



159 



substances underlying all perceptible qualities, 
or about a fixed order of reality behind the se- 
quence of phenomena in experience. According 
to James, "the whole question of interaction 
and influence between things is a metaphysical 
question, and cannot be discussed at all by 
those who are unwilling to go into matters 
thoroughly." 

In the Preface to his Principles of Psychology \ 
James declares his plan to limit his own in- 
quiries to what can be known by the empirical 
methods of the natural sciences. Psychology 
like physics must assume certain data. The dis- 
cussion of these assumptions, he says, "is called 
metaphysics and falls outside the province of 
this book The data assumed by psychol- 
ogy, just like those assumed by physics and the 
other natural sciences, must sometime be over- 
hauled. The effort to overhaul them clearly and 
thoroughly is metaphysics; but metaphysics 
can only perform her task well when distinctly 
conscious of its great extent." The implication 
seems to be not that metaphysics is impossible 
but rather that metaphysics, as James conceives 
it, does not yet exist in any mature or satisfac- 
tory development. "Only a metaphysics alive 
to the weight of her task," he writes, can hope 
to be successful. "That will perhaps be centu- 
ries hence." 

WE CANNOT FULLY explore the issue concerning 
the objects of metaphysics without observing 
that other names are used in the tradition of 
the great books to designate the discipline which, 
rightly or wrongly, claims to be the highest 
human science. The Greeks initiated the con- 
ception of a discipline which should be preemi- 
nent because it deals with first principles and 
highest causes. It not only searches for wisdom 
about the ultimate realities; it also lays the 
foundations for all other sciences. But the 
Greeks do not have one name for this discipline, 
nor is "metaphysics" even among the various 
names they use. 

Aristotle, whose Metaphysics is the first great 
book to have this word in its title, never uses 
the word to refer to the science which he is try- 
ing to define and establish. In the opening chap- 
ters, he speaks of it under the name of wisdom, 
for "all men suppose what is called Wisdom to 
deal with the first causes and the principles of 



all things." There are other theoretical sciences, 
such as physics and mathematics, which investi- 
gate causes or deal with principles, but they do 
not reach to the highest causes or first prin- 
ciples, nor do they take all things in their 
most universal aspect as the object of their 
inquiry. 

Though "physics also is a kind of Wisdom," 
says Aristotle, "it is not the first kind"; and 
elsewhere he says that "both physics and mathe- 
matics must be classed as parts of Wisdom." 
Physics deals only with material things in mo- 
tion; and "the mathematician investigates ab- 
stractions" objects which, except as abstract- 
ed, cannot exist apart from matter and motion, 
"If there is something which is eternal and im- 
movable and separated from matter, clearly the 
knowledge of it belongs to a theoretical science 
not, however, to physics nor to mathematics, 
but to a science prior to both." It is that science 
which is the highest part of wisdom. 

Aristotle gives two names to the supreme 
form of human wisdom or the highest of the 
theoretical sciences. He denominates it both 
from the position it occupies in relation to all 
other disciplines and also in terms of the kind 
of substance which it alone investigates. If there 
is "no substance other than those which are 
formed by nature, natural science (i.e., physics) 
will be the first science, but if there is an im- 
movable substance, the science of this must be 
prior and must be first philosophy." But this 
highest science also deserves to be called "the- 
ology" as well as "first philosophy." There are, 
Aristotle says, "three theoretical philosophies, 
mathematics, physics, and what we may call 
theology, since it is obvious that if the divine 
is present anywhere, it is present in things of 
this sort," />., the eternal, immutable, imma- 
terial. 

THERE is STILL another name for the highest 
speculative discipline in the Greek conception 
of the order of the sciences. "Dialectic" is the 
name which Plato gives to the search for first 
principles and for the knowledge of the most 
intelligible realities. As appears in the chapter 
on DIALECTIC, Aristotle contrasts the dialecti- 
cian and the philosopher as respectively con- 
cerned with opinion and knowledge, but Plato 
regards the dialectician as preeminently the 



160 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



philosopher. Not only does dialectic belong to 
the realm of knowledge rather than opinion, 
but in the realm of knowledge, mathematics 
occupies the lower, dialectic the upper part. 
The mathematical sciences build upon hypoth- 
eses which they do not and cannot establish. 
Dialectic uses hypotheses only "as steps and 
points of departure into a world which is above 
hypotheses, in order that she may soar beyond 
them to the first principle of the whole; and . . . 
by successive steps she descends again without 
the aid of any sensible object from ideas, 
through ideas, and in ideas she ends." 

Despite all the relevant differences between 
Plato and Aristotle concerning being and be- 
coming, reason and sense, the intelligible and 
the sensible, it seems possible to compare the 
knowledge which Plato calls "dialectic" with 
what Aristotle calls "first philosophy" or "the- 
ology." 

Both, for example, proceed from first princi- 
ples and establish the foundations of the infe- 
rior sciences. On its downward path, dialectic, 
according to Plato, brings the light of reason to 
bear on the understanding of the hypotheses 
which are the principles of mathematics. Though 
Aristotle thinks that mathematics rests on ax- 
ioms or self-evident truths, he also says that "it 
must be the business of first philosophy to ex- 
amine the principles of mathematics" because 
the mathematician only uses them in a special 
application without investigating their general 
truth. Furthermore, the question concerning 
how the objects of mathematics exist is a ques- 
tion for the first philosopher, not the mathema- 
tician. 

In the Sophist, Plato, to illustrate the differ- 
ence between the sophist and the dialectician 
or philosopher, develops an analysis of such 
terms as being and non-being, true and false, 
same and other, one and many, rest and motion. 
These, it seems, are the fundamental concepts 
in the philosopher's knowledge of the ultimate 
reality. But these are also the fundamental con- 
cepts in Aristotle's Metaphysics. In the mediae- 
val period when "metaphysics" generally re- 
places "dialectic" as the name for the first phi- 
losophy, the so-called transcendental terms- 
such as being, essence, other, one, true, good ILK 
treated as the basic metaphysical concepts; and 
what is characteristic of them as abstractions 



helps to characterize the nature of metaphysics 
as a science. 

The word -"metaphysics" comes into use as a 
result of the title supposedly given by the Alex- 
andrian librarians to the work in which Aristotle 
treats the problems of the first philosophy. The 
word is short for "the books which come after 
the books on physics." Plotinus uses the word 
and connects it with the Platonic meaning of 
"dialectic. "In the training of the metaphysi- 
cian he says, dialectic is the ultimate study. 

Dialectic, according to Plotinus, "is the meth- 
od, or discipline, that brings with it the power 
of pronouncing with final truth upon the nature 
and relation of things what each is, how it dif- 
fers from others, what common quality all have, 
to what kind each belongs and in what rank 
each stands in its kind and whether its being is 
real-being, and how many beings there are, and 
how many non-beings to be distinguished from 
beings." But we must not think of dialectic, 
Plotinus declares, "as the mere tool of the meta- 
physician." It goes beyond metaphysics as vision 
or contemplative wisdom goes beyond discur- 
sive reasoning and demonstration. "It leaves to 
another science all that coil of premises and 
conclusions called the art of reasoning." 

THE QUESTION which Plotinus raiseswhether 
there is a higher science or form of knowledge 
than metaphysics is naturally considered by 
the great Christian theologians. In part their 
answer resembles that of Plotinus; in part it 
differs. Where Plotinus speaks of dialectic as ' * the 
most precious part of philosophy" because it 
transcends reasoning and argument and reaches 
the sort of immediate apprehension of reality 
which cannot be expressed in words, theologians 
recognize the supremacy of mystical knowl- 
edge a foretaste in this life of what the vision 
of God will be like in the life to come. But, un- 
like Plotinus, they do not think such knowl- 
edge, here or hereafter, is natural wisdom. Rath- 
er it is supernatural knowledge, the divine gift 
to man of a contemplative wisdom to which 
his nature cannot attain by its own unaided 
powers. 

The subordination of metaphysical science to 
knowledge which is both supernatural and non- 
scientific (i.e., neither discursive nor analytical 
nor demonstrative) is considered in the chap- 



CHAPTER 57: METAPHYSICS 



161 



ters on THEOLOGY and WISDOM. Another subor- 
dination of metaphysics, considered there also, 
must be mentioned here as well. That is the 
subordination of metaphysics to theology. Both 
metaphysics and theology may be conceived as 
sciences which are engaged in reasoning and ar- 
gument and in trying to demonstrate conclu- 
sions from principles. But one is merely a hu- 
man science working with the principles of rea- 
son, whereas the other is what Aquinas calls 
"sacred doctrine," in order to signify that its 
principles are articles of religious faith. 

In the hierarchy of human sciences, meta- 
physics remains supreme the first philosophy. 
It suffers only by comparison with theology in- 
sofar as the latter rests upon divine revelation 
and, since it enjoys the certainty of faith, es- 
capes the insecurity of reason. Though meta- 
physics and theology differ in their principles 
and somewhat in their methods, they do not 
differ entirely in their subject matter. Both, 
for example, may treat of God and of the exist- 
ence of immaterial and imperishable beings. 
Aquinas, therefore, must face the objection that 
there is no need for any knowledge in addition 
to metaphysics because "everything that is, is 
treated of in philosophical science even God 
Himself, in that part of philosophy called theol- 
ogy, or the divine science, by Aristotle." To 
this he replies by giving two reasons for sacred 
theology. 

It is necessary, he says, "for the salvation of 
man that certain truths which exceed human 
reason should be made known to him by divine 
revelation. Even as regards those truths about 
God which human reason could have discov- 
ered, it was necessary that man should be taught 
by a divine revelation; because the truth about 
God such as reason could discover, would only 
be known by a few, and that after a long time, 
and with the admixture of many errors." Fur- 
thermore, he continues, there is no reason "why 
those things which may be learnt from philo- 
sophical science, so far as they can be known by 
natural reason, may not also be taught us by 
another science so far as they fall within reve- 
lation. Hence the theology included in sacred 
doctrine differs in kind from that theology 
which is a part of philosophy." 

These two kinds of theology are traditionally 
distinguished as natural and sacred. When Fran- 



cis Bacon divides the sciences "into theology 
and philosophy," he adds that "in the former 
we do not include natural theology." Natural 
theology is the divine part of philosophy, yet 
it is clearly distinct from sacred theology or 
what Bacon calls "inspired divinity." 

This distinction, in whatever language it is 
made, raises two problems. The first concerns 
the relation of natural to sacred theology, es- 
pecially with regard to the scope of natural 
theology and the precise nature of its independ- 
ence of sacred doctrine. On this question there 
seems to be considerable difference between 
such writers as Augustine and Aquinas, or Bacon 
and Descartes. As already noted, the various 
issues involved are reserved for discussion in 
the chapter on THEOLOGY. The second problem 
is directly pertinent to metaphysics alone. The 
question is whether metaphysics and natural 
theology are identical in subject matter or scope, 
or whether natural theology is only a part of 
metaphysics. 

Aristotle seems to answer this question when 
he suggests that "first philosophy" and "theol- 
ogy" are interchangeable designations for the 
highest branch of speculative knowledge. To 
the extent that he declares this science to be an 
inquiry concerning the existence and nature of 
immaterial and imperishable substances, his 
definition of the object of metaphysics would 
seem to justify the title of theology. 

Descartes, who also separates metaphysics 
from physics by reference to the immateriality 
and materiality of the substances which are their 
objects, even more explicitly seems to give the 
whole of metaphysics a theological character. 
In the Preface to his Meditations on the First 
Philosophy, he says that he is concerned to treat 
of "God and the human soul"; for, as he ex- 
plains to the professors of Sacred Theology of 
the Sorbonne, "I have always considered that 
the two questions respecting God and the soul 
were the chief of those that ought to be dem- 
onstrated by philosophical rather than theo- 
logical argument." 

Though he adds the freedom of the human 
will to the existence of God and the immortal- 
ity of the soul, Kant's definition of the objects 
of metaphysical speculation similarly makes 
metaphysics an inquiry into things which lie 
outside the realm of physics and associates it 



162 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



with the traditional subject matter of theology, 
at least in the sense that here reason tries to 
prove propositions which are the main tenets of 
religious faith. In his Preface to the first edition 
of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant remarks that 
when reason "finds itself compelled to have re- 
course to principles which transcend the region 
of experience," it "falls into confusion and con- 
tradictions. . . . The arena of these endless con- 
tests is called Metaphysic." 

IF NOTHING IMMATERIAL exists, if there are no 
beings apart from the changing things of sense- 
experience, or if, although such things exist, 
they cannot be known by reason proceeding in 
the manner of speculative science, does it follow 
that metaphysics must also be denied existence, 
at least as a speculative science? The answer 
seems to be clear. If the declared objects of a 
science do not exist, or if those objects are un- 
knowable by the methods which that science 
proposes to follow, then it seems difficult to de- 
fend its claims to be a valid science against those 
who challenge them. The controversy over the 
validity of metaphysics would thus appear to 
turn on the truth or falsity of the two "ifs" 
just mentioned. 

But the matter cannot be so resolved if 
natural theology does not exhaust the whole of 
metaphysics; that is, if metaphysics considers 
objects other than the immaterial, and if it in- 
quires into their nature rather than their ex- 
istence. Aristotle's definition of the subject 
matter of the first philosophy seems to contain 
an alternative conception of metaphysics, one 
which may be quite consistent with the con- 
ception of it as theology, but which, however, 
gives it problems to solve in the realm of physi- 
cal things. 

"There is a science," Aristotle writes, "which 
investigates being as being and the attributes 
which belong to being in virtue of its own na- 
ture." This definition of the first philosophy 
seems to differentiate it from mathematics and 
physics as sharply as the other definition in 
terms of immaterial and imperishable sub- 
stances. The other sciences, according to Aris- 
totle, do not treat of "being qua being uni- 
versally." The properties of anything which is 
"in so far as it has being, and the contraries in 
it qua being, it is the business of no other sci- 



ence to investigate; for to physics one would 
assign the study of things not qua being, but 
rather qua sharing in movement"; and math- 
ematics is concerned with the attributes of 
things insofar as they are "quantitative and 
continuous." These sciences "mark off some 
particular kind of being, some genus, and in- 
quire into this, but not being simply, nor qua 
being. . . . Similarly, these sciences omit the 
question whether the genus with which they 
deal exists or does not exist, because it belongs 
to the same kind of thinking to show what it is 
and that it is." 

Only the first philosophy "does not inquire 
about particular subjects in so far as each has 
some attribute or other, but speculates about 
being, in so far as each particular thing is." Its 
subject matter, then, includes all existing 
things as existing, and involves not only the 
question how anything which exists exists (i.e., 
the properties of being), but also the question 
whether certain things, whose existence can be 
questioned, do in fact exist. Whatever truths 
hold good for all things qua being such as the 
principle that the same thing cannot both be 
and not be in the same respect at the same time 
belong to the first philosophy, even though, 
as in this case Aristotle points out, the law of 
contradiction may also belong to logic as the 
principle of demonstration. 

THIS BROADER CONCEPTION of the first philoso- 
phy explains, as its restriction to natural the- 
ology could not explain, why the central books 
in Aristotle's Metaphysics treat of sensible, phys- 
ical substances; their nature as substances; the 
distinction between substance and accident, 
form and matter, potentiality and actuality, as 
principles of the composite nature of changing 
substances; and the properties of such ex- 
istences in virtue of their having being, e.g., 
their unity and divisibility, their sameness and 
otherness. 

Aristotle does not inquire whether such sub- 
stances exist. He seems to take their existence 
as unquestionable, for he frequently refers to 
physical things as "the readily recognized sub- 
stances." But in addition to the question "how 
sensible substances exist," there are such ques- 
tions as "whether there are or are not any be- 
sides sensible substances. . . and whether there 



CHAPTER 57: METAPHYSICS 



163 



is a substance capable of separate existence, 
apart from sensible substances, and if so why 
and how." These latter questions lead to the 
concluding books of the Metaphysics which in- 
quire into the existence of the non-sensible, the 
immaterial, the immutable. If Aristotle's the- 
ology begins here, then theology is only a part 
the crowning part, perhaps of a larger science 
whose object is not a special realm of being, but 
all of being. 

Hobbes and Bacon go further than Aristotle 
in the direction of opposing the identification 
of metaphysics with theology. Where Aristotle 
seems to admit theological subject matter as a 
part of the first philosophy, they exclude it 
entirely. 

Hobbes does not use the word "metaphysics" 
in his own classification of the sciences; he em- 
ploys it only as a term of derogation to refer to 
scholastic doctrines which he repudiates. His 
own classification makes philosophia prima that 
branch of natural philosophy which is prior to 
the mathematical and mechanical sciences. The 
latter deal with determinate quantity and mo- 
tion. The antecedent science deals with "quan- 
tity and motion indeterminate" These "being 
the principles or first foundation of philos- 
ophy," the science which deals with them "is 
called Philosophia Prima" 

Bacon distinguishes between first philosophy 
and metaphysics and between metaphysics and 
natural theology. First philosophy, he says, is 
"the common parent of sciences." It is con- 
cerned with "axioms, not peculiar to any sci- 
ence, but common to a number of them" and 
also with "the adventitious or transcendental 
condition of things, such as little, much, like, 
different, possible, impossible, entity, nonen- 
tity, etc." Natural theology, which is the divine 
part of philosophy because it inquires about 
"God, unity, goodness, angels, and spirits," is 
separate from the rest of natural philosophy. 

"But to assign the proper office of metaphys- 
ics, as contra-distinguished from primary phi- 
losophy and natural theology," Bacon writes, 
"we must note that as physics regards the 
things which are wholly immersed in matter 
and movable, so metaphysics regards what is 
more abstracted and fixed; that physics sup- 
poses only existence, motion, and natural ne- 
cessity, whilst metaphysics supposes also mind 



and idea. ... As we have divided natural phi- 
losophy into the investigation of causes and the 
production of effects, and referred the investi- 
gation of causes to theory, which we again di- 
vide into physical and metaphysical, it is nec- 
essary that the real difference of these two be 
drawn from the nature of the causes they in- 
quire into." Physics, according to Bacon, in- 
quires into efficient and material causes; meta- 
physics, into formal and final causes; and as 
mechanics is the practical application of physi- 
cal theory, so what Bacon calls "magic" is the 
practical doctrine that corresponds to the meta- 
physical theory of forms. 

AGREEMENT OR disagreement concerning the 
subject matter and problems of that which 
claims to be the highest human science, how- 
ever named, does not seem to be uniformly ac- 
companied by agreement or disagreement con- 
cerning the status and development of the dis- 
cipline in question. 

There seems to be some similarity, for ex- 
ample, between Plato's dialectic as an inquiry 
into forms and Bacon's notion of metaphysics 
as concerned with formal causes a similarity 
which Bacon himself observes. But where Plato 
seems to think that dialectic exists, to be taught 
and learned, Bacon's judgment is that this part 
of metaphysics, if not the part dealing with 
final causes, has not yet been developed because 
the right method has not been employed. 

Again, Aristotle's conception of metaphysics 
as concerned with the primary axioms, the 
universal principles applicable to all existence, 
and the transcendental properties of being, 
seems to bear some resemblance to Bacon's 
primary philosophy. But Bacon writes as if 
Aristotle's Metaphysics^.^ not been written, or 
at least as if it had not succeeded, as Aristotle 
might have supposed it had, in establishing the 
science which Bacon finds for the most part in 
a defective or undeveloped condition. 

If we turn to natural theology, either as a 
part of metaphysics (with Aristotle), or as 
separate from metaphysics (with Bacon), or 
as identical with metaphysics (with Descartes), 
we find the same situation. Aside from some 
verbal and some real differences concerning the 
objects of the inquiry, Aristotle, Bacon, and 
Descartes think that the existence of beings 



164 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



apart from the sensible world of matter and 
change can be demonstrated and that some- 
thing can be known of their nature whether 
they are called immaterial substances, spirits, 
and intelligences, or God, angels, and souls. 

With some alterations in language and 
thought, Plato and Plotinus, Augustine and 
Aquinas, Spinoza and Locke can be added to 
this company. They are theologians in that sense 
of "theology" which implies a rational knowl- 
edgewithout religious faith, and either by in- 
tuition or demonstration of beings which re- 
ally exist, yet are not sensible or material or 
mutable or finite. Spinoza, for example, docs 
not use the word "metaphysics," but he holds 
that "the human mind possesses an adequate 
knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of 
God." Although Locke's use of the word "meta- 
physics" is derogatory, and though the pur- 
pose of his Essay Concerning Human Understand- 
ing is to prevent human inquiries from extend- 
ing beyond man's capacities, he attributes 
greater certainty to our knowledge of God and 
the soul than to our knowledge of bodies, and 
finds no greater difficulty in our speculations 
about spirits than about particles of matter. 

"Experimenting and discovering in ourselves 
knowledge, and the power of voluntary mo- 
tion, as certainly as we experiment, or discover 
in things without us, the cohesion and separa- 
tion of solid parts, which is the extension and 
motion of bodies," Locke writes, "we have as 
much reason to be satisfied with our notion of 
immaterial spirit, as with our notion of body, 
and the existence of the one as well as the other. 
... But whichever of these complex ideas be 
clearest, that of body, or immaterial spirit, this 
is evident, that the simple ideas that make them 
up are no other than what we have received 
from sensation or reflection; and so is it of all 
our other ideas of substances, even of God 
himself." 

As we have already seen, Hume and Kant 
deny metaphysics (so far as it is identified with 
what is traditionally natural theology) the 
status of a valid theoretical science. For them 
it is incapable of taking its place beside physics 
and mathematics. Hume, in addition, denies 
validity to metaphysical speculation concern- 
ing causes and substances in the natural order. 
Unlike Hume, who simply removes metaphysi- 



cal problems from the realm of questions worth 
thinking about, Kant does not reject the 
problems but rather offers alternative methods 
of stating and solving them. He hopes thereby 
to accomplish a reformation rather than an ab- 
olition of metaphysical inquiry. 

The existence of God, freedom, and im- 
mortality must be affirmed, Kant thinks, in 
the order of practical, not speculative reason. 
They are indispensable "conditions of the nec- 
essary object of our will .... that is to say, con- 
ditions of the practical use of pure reason." 
Yet, he adds, "we cannot affirm that we know 
and understand, I will not say the actuality, but 
even the possibility, of them." 

Furthermore, by redefining metaphysics to 
mean "any system of knowledge a priori that 
consists of pure conceptions," Kant not only 
gives his fundamental treatises in morals and 
ethics a metaphysical character, but sees the 
possibility of a genuine metaphysic emerging 
from the Critique of Pure Reason. Once "the 
dogmatism of metaphysic" has been removed, 
"that is, the presumption that it is possible to 
achieve anything in metaphysic without a pre- 
vious criticism of pure reason. ... it may not 
be toodifficult to leave a bequest to posterity in 
the shape of a systematical metaphysic, carried 
out according to the critique of pure reason." 

Kant's transcendental philosophy, and es- 
pecially what he calls "the architectonic of 
pure reason," is in a sense that metaphysic al- 
ready begun. In subject matter, if not in its 
method or conclusions, it resembles the tradi- 
tional inquiry concerning the universal prin- 
ciples and transcendental properties of being. 
The objects of natural theology are, of course, 
excluded as being beyond the power of reason 
to know in a speculative manner. 

Metaphysics as a possible science is for Kant 
"nothing more than the inventory of all that is 
given us by pure reason, systematically ar- 
ranged. . . . Such a system of pure speculative 
reason," he says in his original preface to the 
Critique, "I hope to be able to publish under 
the title of Metaphysic of Nature" And in the 
last pages of the Critique, wherein he criticizes 
all speculative efforts in the sphere of natural 
theology, Kant reaffirms "the speculative and 
the practical use of pure reason" to constitute 
"a Metaphysic of Nature and a Metaphysic of 



CHAPTBR 57: METAPHYSICS 165 

Ethics." The former, he says, is "what is com- theory of the criteria of valid knowledge) 

monly called Metaphysic in the more limited could determine in advance of any examina- 

sense." Both together "form properly that de- tion of metaphysical discussion whether the 

partment of knowledge which may be termed, matters to be discussed fall within the range of 

in the truest sense of the word, philosophy, questions concerning which the human mind 

The path which it pursues is that of science, has the power to find and validate answers, 

which, when it has once been discovered, is But if this supposition is untenable in itself; or 

never lost, and never misleads." if it is untenable because psychology and epis- 

temology, when they are treated as the first 

CONTROVERSIES ABOUT metaphysics can be dis- philosophy, themselves presuppose a meta- 
tinguished from metaphysical controversies physics or conceal their metaphysical presuppo- 
that is, disputes within the field of metaphysical sitions; then no alternative remains but to judge 
thought. We have confined our attention to metaphysics directly by its fruits, 
the former throughout this chapter. But it may In that case, the issues surveyed in this chap- 
not be possible to judge, much less to resolve, ter require an examination of the metaphysical 
the issues about the scope, methods, and valid- discussions to be found in such chapters as 
ity of metaphysics without engaging in, or at GOD, ANGEL, IDEA, SOUL, IMMORTALITY, 
least facing, issues which are themselves meta- WILL (which are relevant particularly to the 
physical. problems of natural theology) ; and (as relevant 
The only way to escape this would be to to other parts or problems of metaphysics) such 
suppose that psychology (as an analysis of the chapters as BEING, CAUSE, FORM, MATTER, 
powers of the mind) or epistemology (as a ONE AND MANY, RELATION, SAME AND OTHER. 



OUTLINE OF TOPICS 

PAGE 

1. Conceptions of the highest human science: dialectic, first philosophy, metaphysics, 

natural theology, transcendental philosophy 166 

2. The analysis of the highest human science: the character of dialectical, metaphysical, 

or transcendental knowledge 167 

20. The distinctive objects or problems of the supreme science 

2b. The nature of the concepts, abstractions, or principles of the highest science 

2c. The method of metaphysics: the distinction between empitical and transcen- 
dental methods 

2d. The distinction between a metaphysic of nature and a metaphysic of morals: 
the difference between the speculative treatment and the practical resolu- 
tion of the metaphysical problems of God, freedom, and immortality 168 

3. Metaphysics in relation to other disciplines 

30. The relation of metaphysics to theology 

3& The relation of metaphysics to mathematics, physics or natural philosophy, 
psychology, and the empirical sciences 

y. The relation of metaphysics to logic and dialectic 

4. The criticism and reformation of metaphysics 169 

44. The dismissal or satirization of metaphysics as dogmatism or sophistry 

4#. Reconstructions of metaphysics: critical philosophy as a propaedeutic to meta- 
physics 



166 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



REFERENCES 

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page 
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK 11 [265-283! 12d, the 
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas- 
sage is in section d of page 12. 

PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the 
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES : Psychology, 116a 119b, the passage 
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is 
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left- 
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of 
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half 
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164. 

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, 
SF.CT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer- 
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d. 

BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James 
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King 
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA- 
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46. 

SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially 
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit- 
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited. 

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of 
Refcicncc Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface. 



. Conceptions of the highest human science: 
dialectic, first philosophy, metaphysics, 
natural theology, transcendental philos- 
ophy 

7 PLATO: Charmides, 7d-13d / Symposium, 
167a-d / Republic, BK vi-vn, 383d-398c / 
Timaetts, 476a-b / Parmenides 486a Slid esp 
491a-d / Sophist, 561d-574c esp 571a-c / 
Statesman, 585c / Philebus, 611d-612b; 633a- 
635a esp 634b 635a / Seventh Letter, 809c- 
810d 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK i, CH 9 [i92*33- b 2] 
268c-d; BK n, CH 2 [i94 b 9-i5) 271a; CH 7 1198* 
22-31] 275b-c / Heavens, BK in, CH i [298** 
13-24! 390a-b / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 1-2 
499a-501c; BK n, CH i 511b,d-512b; BK in, 
CH i [995*2^27! 513b,d-514b; CH 2 [996*18- 
997*34] 514d-516a; BK iv, en 1-3 522a-525a; 
BK vr, CH i 547b,d-548c; BK xi, CH 1-4 
587a-590a; CH 7 592b 593a / Soul, BK i, CH i 
[4o 3 b io-i7] 632d 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vi, CH 7 390a-d 
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i, 811a-813a 

16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, PREF, 5a-b 

17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR in 10a-12b 

18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK vin, CH 1-12 
264b,d-273a 



19 AQUINAS: Sumtna Thcologica, PART i, Q i, A i 
3b 4a; A 8, ANS 7c-8d 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i n, Q 57, 
A 2 36a-37b; PART n n, Q 45, A i, ANS 598d- 
599d 

23 HOBHLS: leviathan, PART i, 72a-d; PART iv, 
269b272b 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 15d; 40a- 
48d esp 40a-41b, 43a-c, 44c-45a / Novum 
Oiganum, BK n, APII 9 140b-c 

31 DKSCARTES: Discourse, PART iv 51b-54b 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 40, SCIIOL 2 
388a-b; PROP 47, SCIIOL 390c-391a; PART v, 
PROP 25-42 458d-463d 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i 451a- 
455 b passim 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, la-13d; 19a; 115d-117d; 
120b [fn i]; 172d-174a; 243c-250a,c esp 246a- 
248d / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 
253b-d; 264b-d esp 264d / Pref. Metaphysical 
Elements of Ethics, 365a-366a / Intro. Meta- 
physic of Morals, 387a-388d esp 388a-c; 
390b,d-391a / Judgement, 551a-552c; 603d- 
607c esp 606d-607c 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 165a-b 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 197b 

53 JAMES: Psychology, xiiib-xiva; 95a 

54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 874a 



Itolc 



CHAPTER 57: METAPHYSICS 



167 



2. The analysis of the highest human science: 
the character of dialectical, metaphysi- 
cal, or transcendental knowledge 

2a. The distinctive objects or problems of the 
supreme science 

7 PLATO: Charmides, 7d-13d / Republic, BK v, 
368c-373c; BK vi-vn, 383d-398c esp BK vn, 
396d-398c / Timaeus, 476a-b / Sophist, 564d- 
574c / Philebus, 633a-635a esp 634b-635a 
/ Seventh Letter, 809c-810d 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK i, CH 9 [i92 a 33~ b 2] 
268c-d; BK n, CH 2 [i94 b 9-i5] 271a; en 7 
[198*22-31] 275b-c / Heavens, BK in, CH r 
[298 b i3~24] 390a-b / Metaphysics, BK i-iv 
499a-532d; BK vi, CH I-BK vn, CH i 547b,d- 
551a; BK xi, CH 1-8 587a-593d; BK xn, 
CH i 598a-c / Soul, BK i, CH i [4<>3 b io-i7] 
632d 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vi, CH 7 390a-d 
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i, 811a-813a 

16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, PREF, 5a-b 

17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR in, CH 4-6 lla- 
12b 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 5, A 2, 

ANS 24b-25a; Q 11, A 2, REP 4 47d-48d 
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART iv, 269b-272b 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 42c-46a; 
60b-c / Novum Organum, BK n, APH 9 140b-c 

31 DESCARTES: Meditations, 69a-71a,c; i-n 75a- 
81d 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 40, SCHOL 2 
388a-b; PROP 47 390c-391a; PART v, PROP 25- 
33 458d-460c 
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XH, DIV 

132 509a-d 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, la-4a,c; 6c-d; 19a; 120b 
[fn i]; 249a-b / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of 
Morals, 253a-d / Practical Reason, 351b-352c 
/ Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 388a-c / Judge- 
ment, 603d-607c esp 606d-607c 
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 165a-b 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 694c-d 
53 JAMES: Psychology, xiiib-xiva; 89b-90a; 118b; 
141a; 258b-259b esp 259b; 291a 

2b. The nature of the concepts, abstractions, 
or principles of the highest science 

7 PLATO: Republic, BK vi-vn, 383d-398c / 
Sophist, 564d-574c / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d 

8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK iv, CH 6 [127*26-40] 
176d-177a / Metaphysics, BK iv, CH 2 [1003* 
33- b i9J 522b-c; BK v, CH 7 537c-538b; BK ix, 
CH 6 [i<>48 a 3i- b 8] 573c-574a; BK xi, CH 3 
589a-d; BK XH, CH 4-5 599d-601a / Soul, 
BK i, en i [403 b io-i7] 632d 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i, A 8, 
ANS 7c-8d; Q n, A i 46d-47d; Q 13, A 5 66b- 
67d; Q 16, AA 3-4 96b-97c; Q 48, A 2, REP 2 
260c-261b; Q 85, A i, REP 2 451c>453c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 57, 
A 2 36a 37b 



23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART iv, 269 b- 2 72 b 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 43a-46a esp 
44c-45a; 60b-c 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv 51b-54b pas- 
sim / Objections and Replies, 128d-129a 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 40, SCHOL 2- 
PROP 41 388a-c; PROP 47 390c-391a; PART v, 
PROP 25-26 458d-459a; PROP 28 459b 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 
6 405d-406a; SECT 17 409d-410a 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 342b 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 6c-d; 215d-216d; 245c- 
249c / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 
253b-c; 264d; 270c-d / Practical Reason, 330d- 
331a; 351b-352c / Pref. Metaphysical Elements 
of Ethics, 365a / Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 
388a-c / Judgement, 467d-468b 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 884b-886a 

2c. The method of metaphysics: the distinction 
between empirical and transcendental 
methods 

7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 134a-c; 139d-140b / Re- 
public, BK vi-vn, 383d-398c esp BK vn, 396d- 
398c / Parmenides 486a-511d esp 491a-d / 
Sophist 551a-579d esp 552b-c, 553d-554a, 
561b, 570c-571d / Statesman 580a-608d esp 
580d, 582d-583c, 586c-589c, 591a-d, 594d- 
596a / Philebus, 610d-613a / Seventh Letter, 
809c-810d 

8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK n, CH 3 513c-d; 
BK iv, CH 2 [1004*25-31] 523b-c; CH 4 [ioo5 b 
35-1006*28] 525a-c^cii 7 [1012*18-24] 532a-b; 
CH 8 [ioi2 b 5-8] 532c; BK vi, CH i [io25 b i-i8] 
547b,d; BK ix, CH 6 [io 4 8 a 25- b (;] 573c-574a; 
BK xi, CH 5 [io6i b 34-io62 ft i9] 590a-c; CH 7 
[io63 b 36-io64*9] 592b / Soul, BK i, CH i 
[402 B io-22] 631b 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i, A 8, 

ANS 7c-8d 
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART iv, 269b-c 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning^ 44c-45a 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, iv 5a-7d / Discourse, 
PART n, 46c-47b; PART iv 51b-54b passim / 
Meditations, 69a-71a,c passim; i-n 75a-81d 
/ Objections and Replies, 119c; 126a-b; 128a- 
129c; POSTULATE i-n 130d-131a; POSTULATE 
vii 131c; 167a-c; 206c-207b; 237b-238b; 
239a 240a; 242c-244c; 245b-246a 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 40, SCHOL 2 
388a-b; PROP 44, COROL 2 and DEMONST 390a; 
PROP 47 390c-391a; PART v, PROP 25-26 
458d-459a; PROP 28 459b; PROP 29, SCHOL 
459c-d; PROP 31 459d-460b 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT XH, DIV 
132 509a-d 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 19a; 121a-d; 249c-250a,c 
/ Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 253a-d; 
263d-264d esp 264d; 277d-279d / Practical 
Reason, 298d-332d; 349b-351a / Pref. Meta- 
physical Elements of Ethics, 365a-366a 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 9S% 



168 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



Idtoic 



(2. The analysis of tb* highest human science: the 
character of dialectical, metaphysical, or 
transcendental knowledge.) 

2d. The distinction between a metaphysic of 
nature and a metaphysic of morals: the 
difference between the speculative treat- 
ment and the practical resolution of the 
metaphysical problems of God, freedom, 
and immortality 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 5a-d; 15c-16c; 33a-d; 120b 
[fn i); 124d-128a; 143a-145c; 152a-153c; 164a- 
171a esp 169c-170a, 170c-171a; 177b-192d 
csp 177b-179c; 200c-209d; 218d-223d; 234c- 
240b esp 239a-c; 241d-242c; 246a-250a,c 
/ Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 253a-d; 
263d-264d; 277d-287d csp 277d-279d, 283d- 
285a / Practical Reason, 291a-293c esp 292a- 
293b; 296a-d; 301d-302d; 307d-314d; 331a- 
337a,c; 340a-342d; 344a-349b esp 344a-c, 
348b-349b; 351b-352c; 353a-354d / Intro. 
Metaphysic of Morals, 386b-388d esp 386d- 
387a,c, 388a-d; 390b,d-391a / Judgement, 
568c-570a; 588a-613a,c passim, esp 607c, 
609b-610a 

3. Metaphysics in relation to other disciplines 

3>a. The relation of metaphysics to theology 

18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK vm, CH 1-12 
264b,d-273a / Christian Doctrine, BK n, CH 40 
655b-656a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i 
3a-10c csp A i 3b-4a, AA 4-6 5a-7a, A 8 7c- 
8d; Q 2, A 2 esp REP i lld-12c; Q 12, AA 12-13 
60d-62b; Q 32, A i 175d-178a; Q 39, AA 7-8 
209a-213a; Q 46, A 2 253a 255a; Q 84, A 5 
446c-447c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART n-ii, Q 2, 
A A 3-4 392d 394b; Q 45 598c-603c passim 

23 HOB BBS: Leviathan, PART i, 83b; 84a; PART 
ii, 163a-b; PART in, 165b; PART iv, 247d; 
269b-271c 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 155a-c 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 4c; 15d- 
16b; 19d-20a; 39d 40c; 41b-d; 44c-45a; 
95d-101d / Novum Organum, BK i, APH 65 
114b-c 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART i, 43c / Medita- 
tions, 69a-71a,c / Objections and Replies, 125b- 
126b; 283d-284d 

33 PASCAL: Pensees, 543 266a 

39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 335b-337a 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 307b-310a passim, 
esp 308b-309a; 670b-c 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 119a-c; 177b-192d esp 
190a-c; 238b-240b / Practical Reason, 346b- 
347a; 351b-352c / Judgement, 599d-600a; 
600d-601c; 604d-606d esp 606a-d; 607d- 
609b 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 158c- 
160b; PAT HI, 308c-309d 



A. The relation of metaphysics to mathemat- 
ics, physics or natural philosophy, 
psychology, and the empirical sciences 

7 PLATO: Republic, BK vi-Vn, 386d-398c / 
Philebus, 634b-635b / Seventh Letter, 809c- 
810a 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK i, CH 9 [i92*33- b 2] 
268c-d; BK n, CH 2 [i94 b 9~i5] 271a; CH 7 
[198*22-31] 275b-c / Heavens, BK in, CH i 
[298 b i3~24] 390a~b / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 8 
[989 b 29-99o a 8] 508a; CH 9 [992 a 24- b 9] 510c-d; 

BK II, CH 3 (994 b 3l]-BK III, CH 2 [997*34] 

513c-516a; BK iv, CH 1-3 522a-525a; BK vi, 
CH i 547b,d-548c; BK xi, CH i 587a-588a; CH 
3 [io6i*29]-cH 4 [io6i b 34] 589c-590a; CH 7 
592b-593a; BK xn, CH i [io69 a 3<>- b 2] 598b-c; 
CH 8 [io73 b i~7] 603d / Soul, BK i, CH i [403 b 
10-17] 632d 
11 NICOMACHUS: Arithmetic, BK i, 812b-813d 

16 PTOLEMY: Almagest, BK i, 5a-6a 

17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR in 10a-12b 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i, A 8, 
ANS 7c-8d; Q 85, A i, REP 2 451c-453c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 
57, A 2 36a-37b; PART n-ii, Q 45, A i, ANS 
598d-599d 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 72a-d 

30 BACON: Advancement of learning, 15d; 42c- 
44c / Novum Organum, BK n, APH 9 140b-c 

31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 128d-129a 
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 335b-337a 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, la-13d; 15c-16c; 17d-19a; 
211c-218d esp 215d-216d; 243c-248d passim, 
esp 245c-246b / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of 
Morals, 253a-d; 254b-c; 264b-d / Practical 
Reason, 292d-293b; 295b-d; 307d-310c; 311d- 
313d; 330d-332d esp 331a-332d; 351b-352c 

43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445b-c 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 182d- 
183c 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 197b; EPI- 
LOGUE n, 694c-d 

53 JAMES: Psychology, xiiib-xiva; 90a; 118b; 
884b 886a esp 886a 

f. The relation of metaphysics to logic and 
dialectic 

8 ARISTOTLE: Sophistical Refutations, CH u 
[172*12-22] 237a / Metaphysics, BK HI, CH i 
[995 b 4-io] 513d-514a; CH 2 [996 b 26-997*i4] 
515b-d; BK iv, CH 2 [ioc>4 b i8-27] 523d; CH 
3 524b-525a; BK xi, CH i [1059*23-26] 587a; 
CH 3-4 589a*590a esp CH 3 [io6i b 9~i2] 589d; 
CH 8 [io64 b 23-29] 593a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q i, A 8, 
ANS 7c-8d 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan^ PART i, 72a-d; PART iv, 
269b-c 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 43d-46a; 
57b-58b 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341b-342b 

39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 335b-337a 



4 to 



CHAPTER 57: METAPHYSICS 



169 



42 KANT: Pure Reason, 36d-37d / Fund. Prin. 

Metaphysic of Morals, 253b c 
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 165a-b; 

182d-183c 
53 JAMES: Psychology, 671a-672a; 852a; 873a- 

874a; 881b-886a esp 881b 882a, 884b-886a; 

890a 

4. The criticism and reformation of meta- 
physics 

4a. The dismissal or satirization of meta- 
physics as dogmatism or sophistry 
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 49d; 52a-b; 54b- 

c; 56b-d; 57c-d; 59a-60a; 71a-b; 80b; 84a; 

PART ii, 163a-b; PART in, 183c-d; PART iv, 

247d; 267a-272b; 274a-b; 276c 
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 240a-246a; 257d-264a 
30 BACON: Advancement of learning, 40a-c; 

57d-58b; 60a-c / Novum Organum, BK i, 

APH 62-65 H3b-114c; APH 71 117a-c 
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK in, CH x, 

SECT 2 291d-292a; SECT 6-14 293a-295a; BK 

iv, CH vm, SECT 9 347d-348a 
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 

6 405d-406a; SECT 17 409d-410a; SECT 97 

431d-432a; SECT 143 441c-d 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 6-7 
453b-454a passim; SECT vm, DIV 62, 478c; 

SECT XII, DIV Ip, 509d 

36 SrhRNE: Tristram Shandy, 329b-336a; 421b- 
422b 

39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 335b-336c 

CROSS-REFERENCES 

For: Statements in other contexts concerning the highest human science, see DIALECTIC 2a, 4; 
PHILOSOPHY 2b; SCIENCE 13(2); THEOLOGY 33; WISDOM la. 

Discussions relevant to the objects, problems, and concepts of metaphysics or the highest 
human science, see BEING 2, 3, 4-43, 7a~7b, 7c, 70!, 76, 8a-8b; CAUSE 53, 5tl; GOD 2b-2c, 
6b; GOOD AND EVIL la-ib; IDEA if; IMMORTALITY 2; KNOWLEDGE 6a(i), 63(4); LIBERTY 
43; MIND lof; NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY i, 2a-2b; ONE AND MANY i-ib; RELATION 3; 
SAME AND OTHER i, 2c, 2e; SOUL 4b; TRUTH ib-ic. 

Considerations relevant to the nature of metaphysical concepts or abstractions, see BEING i ; 
DEFINITION 6a; IDEA id, 2g, 4^4); MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6d; SIGN AND SYMBOL 3d. 

The method or character of metaphysical thought, see KNOWLEDGE 6c(4) ; LOGIC 4d; PHILOS- 
OPHY 3a~3b; REASONING 6a; TRUTH 4C. 

The relation of metaphysics to theology, see KNOWLEDGE 6c(5); THEOLOGY 2, 33, 43; 
WISDOM la, ic; and for the relation of metaphysics to mathematics and physics, see 
MATHEMATICS la; NATURE 4b; PHILOSOPHY 2b; PHYSICS la; SCIENCE 13(2). 

The problem of principles common to metaphysics and logic, see PRINCIPLE ic; and for the 
statement of the law of contradiction, see OPPOSITION 2a. 

Criticisms of metaphysics, and for the substitution of psychology or epistemology for meta- 
physics as the first philosophy, see DIALECTIC 2c, 3C, 6; KNOWLEDGE 5d~5e; MAN 2b(4); 
PHILOSOPHY 3d, 6b; SOUL 53; THEOLOGY 5. 

Considerations relevant to a metaphysic of morals, and for the solution therein of the prob- 
lems of God, freedom, and immortality, see GOD 2d; IMMORTALITY 33; NECESSITY AND 
CONTINGENCY 4b; PHILOSOPHY 23; WILL 



41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 526c-527a 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, la-4a,c; 20b-c; 36a-37d; 
109b-c; 120c-121c; 129c-130a; 133d; 157d; 
187c 188b; 192a-b; 218d 222b esp 221c 222b; 
229b-c / Practical Reason, 299d; 304d-305a; 
335b-c / Judgement, 600d-601c; 607d-608c 

47GohTHE: Faust, PART i [1948-1963] 46a-b; 

[4343-4367] 107a-b; PART n [7843-7846] 191a 
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic1(, 115b-117a; 255a 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK vi, 243b 
53 JAMES: Psychology, xiva; 90a; 227b; 235b; 

702a-b 

4b. Reconstructions of metaphysics: critical 
philosophy as a propaedeutic to meta- 
physics 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART iv, 269b<c 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART n, 46c-48b; 
PART iv 51b-54b / Meditations, 72b,d; i 7Sa- 
77c / Objections and Replies, 237b-238b pas- 
sim; 267a-277a,c passim 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO 405a- 
412a,c passim, esp SECT 21-25 411b-412a,c; 
SECT 133 439c-440a 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 
7-10 453c-455b; SECT xn, DIV 116, 503d-504a 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, la-13d; 15c-16d; 19a- 
22a,c; 101d-102b; 133c-134d; 146a-149d; 
157d; 196b-197c; 218d-227a; 248d 250a,c / 
Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 270c-d; 
273d 274a / Practical Reason, 292d-293b; 
296a-d; 307a-d; 331a-332d / Judgement, 567c- 
568a 



170 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



ADDITIONAL READINGS 



Listed below arc works not included in Great Boofy of the Western World, but relevant to the 
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups: 

I. Works by authors represented in this collection. 
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection. 

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult 
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas. 



I. 

AQUINAS. On the Trinity ofBoethius, QQ 5-6 
HUME. A Treatise of Human Nature, BK i, PART iv, 

SECT m-iv 
KANT. De Mundi Sensibilis (Inaugural Dissertation) , 

SECT v 
. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic, par 

1-5, 40-60; SCHOLIA 

. Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science 

HEC;F.L. Science of Logic, VOL i, BK i 

W. JAMES. Some Problems of Philosophy, CH 2-3 

II. 

MAIMONIDKS. The Guide for the Perplexed, PART i, 
CH 33-36 

BONAVENTURA. Itlnerarium Mentis in Deum (The 
Itinerary of the Mind to God) 

SUAREZ. Disputationes Metaphysicae, esp i 

MALEBRANCHE. Dialogues on Metaphysics and Re- 
ligion 

LEIBNITZ. Philosophical Wor^s, CH 1 1 (On the Reform 
of Metaphysics and on the Notion of Substance) 



VOLTAIRE. "Metaphysics," in A Philosophical Dic- 
tionary 

SCHOPENHAUER. The World as Will and Idea, VOL n, 
SUP, CH 17 

COMTE. The Positive Philosophy, INTRO 

LOTZE. Metaphysics, INTRO 

C. S. PEIRCE. Collected Papers, VOL vi, par 318-394 

A. E. TAYLOR. Elements of Metaphysics 
BERGSON. The Creative Mind, CH 6 
SANTAYANA. Dialogues in Limbo, CH 10 
HEIDEGGER. Was ist Metaphysiltf 
WHITEHEAD. Process and Reality, PART i, CH 3 (2); 

PART H, CH 9 (4) 

T. WHITTAKER. Prolegomena to a New Metaphysic 
MARITAIN. The Degrees of Knowledge, INTRO; 

CH4 

. A Preface to Metaphysics, LECT ii-m 

CARNAP. The Unity of Science 

. Philosophy and Logical Syntax, i 

GILSON. The Unity of Philosophical Experience, CH 
12 

B. RUSSELL. Mysticism and Logic, CH 5 

. An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, CH 25 



Chapter $S: 



INTRODUCTION 



TN the tradition of the great books, the word 
JL "mind** is used less frequently than "rea- 
son," "intellect," "understanding," or "soul." 
There are still other words, like "intelligence," 
"consciousness," and even "spirit" or "psyche," 
which often carry some part of the connotation 
of the word "mind. "Certain authors use "mind" 
as a synonym for one or another of these words, 
and give it the meaning which other writers ex- 
press exclusively in terms of "reason" or "un- 
derstanding." Some discuss mind without ref- 
erence to soul, some identify mind with soul or 
spirit, and some conceive mind as only a part of 
soul or spirit. 

For the purpose of assembling in a single 
chapter references to all discussions which fall 
within the area of meaning common to all these 
terms, it was necessary to adopt some single 
covering word. Our choice of "mind" is partly 
the result of its present currency, partly the 
result of the fact that it is somewhat more neu- 
tral than the others and therefore less prejudi- 
cial to the conflicting theories which are juxta- 
posed in this chapter. 

Words like "reason" or "intellect" usually 
imply a sharper distinction between the func- 
tions or faculties of sensation and thought than 
does the word "mind." Imagination and mem- 
ory, for example, are attributed to the un- 
derstanding in the writings of Locke and 
Hume, whereas, in the analytical vocabulary of 
Aristotle and Aquinas, imagination and mem- 
ory belong to sense, not to reason or intellect. 
Similarly, words like "soul" or "spirit" usually 
connote a substantial as well as an immaterial 
mode of being, whereas "mind" can have the 
meaning of a faculty or a power to be found in 
living organisms. 

The adoption of the word "mind" is purely 
a matter of convenience. It begs no questions 
and decides no issues. The relations between 



what is here discussed and the matters con- 
sidered in the chapters on SOUL, SENSE, MEM- 
ORY AND IMAGINATION, remain the same as they 
would be if "reason" or "intellect" were used in 
place of "mind." Different formulations of 
these relationships are not affected by the 
words used, but by different theories of what 
the mind is, however it is named. 

Before we consider the diverse conceptions 
of the human mind which are enumerated un- 
der the seven main divisions of the first section 
in the Outline of Topics, it may be useful to 
examine the elements of meaning more or less 
common to the connotation of all the words 
which "mind" here represents. Even here we 
must avoid begging the question whether mind 
is a peculiarly human possession. Other animals 
may have minds. Mind may be, as it is on one 
theory, a universal property of matter. Ac- 
cording to another theory, there may be super- 
human minds or intelligences, or a single abso- 
lute mind, a transcendent intelligence. 

What, then, does the universe contain be- 
cause there is mind in it, which would be lack- 
ing if everything else could remain the same 
with mind removed ? The facts we are compelled 
to mention in answering this question should 
give us some indication of the elements of 
meaning common to "mind" and all its syno- 
nyms. 

FIRST is THE FACT of thought or thinking. It 
there were no evidence of thought in the world, 
mind would have little or no meaning. The 
recognition of this fact throughout the tradi- 
tion accounts for the development of diverse 
theories of mind. None of the great writers 
denies the phenomenon of thought, however 
differently each may describe or explain it; 
none, therefore, is without some conception of 
mind. t 



171 



172 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



It may be supposed that such words as 
"thought" or "thinking" cannot, because of 
their own ambiguity, help us to define the 
sphere of mind. But whatever the relation of 
thinking to sensing, thinking seems to involve 
more for almost all observers than a mere re- 
ception of impressions from without. This seems 
to be the opinion of those who make thinking a 
consequence of sensing, as well as of those who 
regard thought as independent of sense. For 
both, thinking goes beyond sensing, either as 
an elaboration of the materials of sense or as 
an apprehension of objects which are totally 
beyond the reach of the senses. To the extent 
that this insight is true, the elements or aspects 
of thought discussed in the chapters on IDEA, 
JUDGMENT, and REASONING have an obvious 
relevance to the various theories of mind dis- 
cussed in this chapter. 

THE SECOND FACT which seems to be a root 
common to all conceptions of mind is that of 
knowledge or knowing. This may be ques- 
tioned on the ground that if there were sensa- 
tion without any form of thought, judgment, 
or reasoning, there would be at least a rudi- 
mentary form of knowledge some degree of 
consciousness or awareness by one thing of 
another. Granting the point of this objection, 
it nevertheless seems to be true that the dis- 
tinction between truth and falsity, and the 
difference between knowledge, error, and ig- 
norance, or knowledge, belief, and opinion, do 
not apply to sensations in the total absence of 
thought. The chapter on KNOWLEDGE reports 
formulations of these distinctions or differences. 
Any understanding of knowledge which in- 
volves them seems to imply mind for the same 
reason that it implies thought. 

There is a further implication of mind in the 
fact of self-knowledge. Sensing may be aware- 
ness of an object and to this extent it may be a 
kind of knowing, but it has never been ob- 
served that the senses can sense or be aware of 
themselves. Take, for example, definitions of 
sense, or theories of sensation and the objects of 
sense. Such definitions and theories must be 
regarded as works of reflective thought; they 
are not products of sensation. 

Thought seems to be not only reflective, but 
reflexive, that is, able to consider itself, to de- 



fine the nature of thinking and to develop theo- 
ries of mind. This fact about thought its re- 
flexivity also seems to be a common element 
in all the meanings of "mind." It is sometimes 
referred to as "the reflexivity of the intellect" 
or as "the reflexive power of the understand- 
ing" or as "the ability of the understanding to 
reflect upon its own acts" or as "self-conscious- 
ness." Whatever the phrasing, a world without 
self-consciousness or self-knowledge would be a 
world in which the traditional conception of 
mind would probably not have arisen. 

THE THIRD FACT is the fact of purpose or in- 
tention, of planning a course of action with 
foreknowledge of its goal, or working in any 
other way toward a desired and foreseen objec- 
tive. As in the case of sensitivity, the phenom- 
ena of desire do not, without further qualifi- 
cation, indicate the realm of mind. According 
to the theory of natural desire, for example, 
the natural tendencies of even inanimate and 
insensitive things are expressions of desire. But 
it is not in that sense of desire that the fact of 
purpose or intention is here taken as evidence 
of mind. 

It is rather on the level of the behavior of 
living things that purpose seems to require a 
factor over and above the senses, limited as 
they are to present appearances. It cannot be 
found in the passions which have the same limi- 
tation as the senses, for unless they are checked 
they tend toward immediate emotional dis- 
charge. That factor, called for by the direction 
of conduct to future ends, is cither an element 
common to all meanings of "mind" or is at least 
an element associated with mind. 

It is sometimes called the faculty of will 
rational desire or the intellectual appetite. 
Sometimes it is treated as the act of willing 
which, along with thinking, is one of the two 
major activities of mind or understanding; and 
sometimes purposiveness is regarded as the very 
essense of mentality. Considerations relevant 
to this aspect of mind are discussed in the chap- 
ter on WILL, 

THESE THREE OR FOUR FACTS thought, knowl- 
edge or self-knowledge, and purpose seem to 
be common to all theories of mind. More than 
that, they seem to be facts which require the 



CHAPTER 58: MIND 



173 



development of the conception. They are, for 
the most part, not questioned in the tradition 
of the great books; but they are not always 
seen in the same light. They are not always re- 
lated in the same way to one another and to 
other relevant considerations. From such dif- 
ferences in interpretation and analysis arise the 
various conflicting conceptions of the human 
mind. 

The conflict of theories concerning what the 
human mind is, what structure it has, what 
parts belong to it or what whole it belongs to, 
does not comprise the entire range of contro- 
versy on the subject. Yet enough is common to 
all theories of mind to permit certain other 
questions to be formulated. 

How does the human mind operate? How 
does it do whatever is its work, and with what 
intrinsic excellences or defects? What is the 
relation of mind to matter, to bodily organs, 
to material conditions? Is mind a common 
possession of men and animals, or is whatever 
might be called mind in animals distinctly dif- 
ferent from the human mind ? Are there minds 
or a mind in existence apart from man and the 
whole world of corporeal life ? 

Such questions constitute the major topics 
of this chapter. Other topics which appear here, 
such as the moral and political aspects of mind, 
are reserved for discussion in the many other 
chapters devoted to the great ideas of moral 
and political thought. Still others, like the 
problem of insanity the loss or derangement 
of mind are obviously relevant here even 
though the more general consideration of psy- 
chopathology belongs elsewhere, c.g. t in the 
chapter on MEDICINE. 

The intelligibility of the positions taken in 
the dispute of the issues which are here our ma- 
jor concern depends to some degree on the di- 
vergent conceptions of the human mind from 
which they stem. It seems necessary, therefore, 
to examine the seven notions of mind which 
appear in the great books. This will at least pro- 
vide the general context for the reader's further 
explorations, even if it is not possible to trace 
the implications each of these notions may have 
for the great controversial issues. 

Seven is, of course, a fiction of analysis. There 
are, from one point of view, more perhaps as 
many as there are, among the great authors, 



thinkers who have dwelt at length on the sub- 
ject. From another point of view, there may be 
fewer than seven, for when the lines are drawn 
according to certain basic differences, several 
of these theories appear to be variants of a 
single doctrine. 

"THAT IN THE SOUL which is called mind," 
Aristotle writes, is "that whereby the soul 
thinks and judges." For him, as for Plato, the 
human intellect or reason is a part or power of 
the soul of man, distinct from other parts or 
faculties, such as the senses and the imagination, 
desire and the passions. Though the human soul 
is distinguished from the souls of other living 
things by virtue of its having this part or pow- 
er, and is therefore called by Aristotle a "ra- 
tional soul," these writers do not identify mind 
and soul. As soul is the principle of life and all 
vital activities, so mind is the subordinate prin- 
ciple of knowledge and the activities of think- 
ing, deliberating, deciding. 

Within the general framework of this theory, 
many differences exist between Plato and Aris- 
totle and between them and others who share 
their views. These differences arise not only with 
respect to the soul of which the intellect is a 
part, but also with respect to the power or ac- 
tivity of the intellect itself. For example, the 
distinction which Aristotle initiates, between 
mind as an active and as a passive power, is 
more explicitly formulated by Aquinas in his 
theory of the active intellect and the intellect 
as potential. 

The human intellect, Aquinas writes, "is in 
potentiality to things intelligible, and is at 
first Ufa a clean tablet on which nothing is written^ 
as the Philosopher says. This is made clear from 
the fact that at first we are only in potentiality 
towards understanding, and afterwards we are 
made to understand actually. And so it is evi- 
dent that with us to understand is in a way to be 
passive'' But the forms of things, or what 
Aquinas calls their "intelligible species," are 
not actually intelligible as they exist in ma- 
terial things. He therefore argues that in addi- 
tion to the "power receptive of such species, 
which is called the possible intellect by reason 
of its being in potentiality to such species," 
there must also be another intellectual power, 
which he calls the active of "agent" intellect. 



174 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



Nothing, he says, can be "reduced from po- 
tentiality to act except by something in act" 
or already actual. "We must therefore assign 
on the part of the intellect some power to make 
things actually intelligible, by the abstraction 
of the species from material conditions. Such is 
the necessity for positing an agent intellect." 

The more explicit formulation which Aqui- 
nas gives of the distinction between the active 
and the possible intellects as distinct powers has 
further consequences for the analysis of three 
states of the passive or possible intellect dis- 
tinguished by Aristotle. The intellectual power 
which is receptive of the intelligible species may 
either be in complete potentiality to them, as it 
is when it has not yet come to understand cer- 
tain things. Or it may be described as in ha- 
bitual possession of the intelligible species when 
it has previously acquired the understanding of 
certain things, but is not now actually engaged 
in understanding them. In the third place, the 
potential intellect may also be actual or in act 
whenever it is actually exercising its habit of 
understanding or is for the first time actually 
understanding something. 

In this traditional theory of mind, many 
other distinctions are made in the sphere of 
mental activity, but none is thought to require 
a division of the mind into two distinct powers, 
or even to require the discrimination of several 
states of the same power. Just as Plato regards 
the intuition or direct apprehension of intelligi- 
ble objects as an activity of the same intelli- 
gence which is able to reason discursively about 
the ideas it can contemplate, so Aristotle and 
Aquinas assign three different activities to the 
intellectual power which apprehends intelli- 
gible objects, not by intuition, but only as the 
result of the abstraction of forms from matter 
by the active intellect. 

Once the possible intellect is actualized by 
the reception of the abstracted species, it can 
act in three ways. It can express in concepts the 
species which have been impressed upon it. 
This the first act of the intellect is concep- 
tion. Its second and third acts of judgment 
and of reasoning consist in forming proposi- 
tions out of concepts and in seeing how one 
proposition follows from others in inference or 
proof. 

Unlike abstraction and conception, which 



Aquinas assigns to the active and the possible 
intellect respectively, conception, judgment, 
and reasoning do not, in his opinion, require 
distinct powers. Nor do the two kinds of 
thought or reasoning which Aquinas calls * 'spec- 
ulative" and "practical." The speculative and 
practical intellects, he maintains, "are not dis- 
tinct powers," for they differ only in their ends. 
The speculative intellect "directs what it ap- 
prehends, not to operation, but to the sole con- 
sideration of truth"; the practical intellect 
"directs what it apprehends to operation" or 
action. But to the nature of intellect as a power 
of apprehension, "it is accidental whether it be 
directed to operation or not." 

NOT ALL THE foregoing distinctions are made, 
or made in the same way, by Plato, Aristotle 
and other authors like Plotinus, Augustine, or 
Aquinas, who stand together in regarding mind 
as only a part of the human soul. Lucretius be- 
longs with them on this point, though he differs 
radically from them on the issue of mind and 
matter. Mind, for him, is only "the directing 
principle" of the soul, "the head so to speak, 
and reigns paramount in the whole body." It is 
only the thinking or deciding part of the soul. 
But Plato, Aristotle, and their followers make 
a distinction in kind between sensations or 
images and universal ideas or abstract concepts. 
Sense and intellect are for them distinct facul- 
ties of knowing and have distinct objects of 
knowledge. For Lucretius, on the other hand, 
thinking is merely a reworking of the images 
received by the senses. In this one respect at 
least, Lucretius is more closely associated with 
the theory of mind to be found in Hobbes, 
Locke, and Hume. 

In the consideration of mind, agreement on 
one point seems everywhere to be accompanied 
by disagreement on another. Locke does not 
agree with Lucretius or Hobbes about the ma- 
teriality of mind; and though he agrees with 
Berkeley that mind is a spiritual entity, he does 
not agree with him, any more than he agrees 
with Hobbes and Hume, about the abstraction 
of general concepts from particular sense-im- 
pressions. Plato and Aristotle agree that the 
senses and the intellect or reason are quite dis- 
tinct, but they do not agree about the relation 
of these faculties, especially not on the extent 



CHAPTER 58: MIND 



175 



to which the mind can act independently of 
sense and imagination. Augustine seems to share 
Plato's doctrine of reminiscence as an account 
of how the senses recall actively to mind ideas 
it has always somehow possessed. Aquinas 
adopts Aristotle's doctrine of abstraction as the 
quite contrary account of the role the senses 
play in providing the materials on which the 
mind works to obtain ideas. But Augustine and 
Aquinas come together on another point in 
which they depart alike from Aristotle and 
Plato. They distinguish with precision between 
the intellect and will as separate faculties of 
the soul, whereas Plato and Aristotle treat 
thinking and willing (or knowing and loving) 
as merely diverse aspects of mental life. 

THE SAME SITUATION prevails with respect to 
the other theories of mind which we must now 
consider in their own terms. Descartes, for ex- 
ample, resembles Plato and Augustine on the 
point on which we have seen that they together 
differ from Aristotle and Aquinas, namely, the 
relation of mind or reason to the senses or imag- 
ination. Yet he is also closer to Aristotle and 
Plato in a respect in which they together differ 
from Augustine and Aquinas, namely, in re- 
garding thinking and willing as acts of the mind 
rather than as belonging to completely sepa- 
rate faculties. 

These agreements and differences occur in 
the context of a basic opposition between Des- 
cartes and all the other writers so far men- 
tioned. Unlike all of them, he identifies the 
human mind with the rational soul of man. In 
the dual nature of man, he says, "there are cer- 
tain activities, which we call corporeal, e.g., 
magnitude, figure, motion, and all those that 
cannot be thought of apart from extension in 
space; and the substance in which they exist is 
called body Further, there are other activi- 
ties, which we call thinking activities, e.g., un- 
derstanding, willing, imagining, feeling, etc., 
which agree in falling under the description of 
thought, perception, or consciousness. The sub- 
stance in which they reside we call a thinking 
thing or the mind, or any other name we care, 
provided only we do not confound it with cor- 
poreal substance, since thinking activities have 
no affinity with corporeal activities, and 
thought, which is the common nature in which 



the former agree, is totally different from ex- 
tension, the common term for describing the 
latter." Descartes denies that brutes possess 
thought, but "even though I were to grant," 
he says, "that thought existed in them, it would 
in nowise follow that the human mind was not 
to be distinguished from the body, but on the 
contrary that in other animals also there was a 
mind distinct from their body." 

The two components of human nature are, 
according to Descartes, each of them substances 
a res cogitans or a thinking substance and a res 
extensa or an extended substance. Descartes uses 
the phrases "rational soul" and "mind" inter- 
changeably. Reason or intellect the capacity 
to think is not a power of the soul. Nor is 
thinking an act which the soul sometimes per- 
forms, sometimes does not. It is the very es- 
sence of the soul itself, even as extension is the 
essence of body. Just as bodies cannot exist 
without actually having three dimensions, so 
the mind cannot exist without thinking. 

Though it is literally translated into English 
by "I think, therefore I am," Descartes' cogito, 
ergo sum can be rendered by "Thinking is; 
therefore, the mind is," or by the strictly 
equivalent statement, "The mind exists; 
therefore, there is thinking." It is precisely this 
equation of the mind's existence with the 
activity of thought which Locke challenges. 
"We know certainly, by experience," he writes, 
"that we sometimes think, and thence draw 
this infallible consequence, that there is some- 
thing in us that has the power to think; but 
whether that substance perpetually thinks or 
not, we can be no farther assured than ex- 
perience informs us I grant that the soul in 

a waking man is never without thought, be- 
cause it is the condition of being awake: but 
whether sleeping, without dreaming, be not an 
affection of the whole man, mind as well as 
body, may be worth a waking man's considera- 
tion. . . . Methinks every drowsy nod shakes 
their doctrine, who teach that the soul is 
always thinking." 

What is striking about this disagreement is 
that Locke and Descartes agree in their con- 
ception of man as a union of two distinct sub- 
stancesthe union of a material substance or 
body with a spiritual substance, a mind or soul. 
It is not surprising, however, that Berkeley 



176 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



should hold the Cartesian view against Locke. 
Considering the flow of time in terms of the 
succession of ideas, Berkeley affirms it to be "a 
plain consequence that the soul always thinks.'* 
To try to "abstract the existence of a. spirit from 
its cogitation" is, he adds modestly, "no easy 
task." He might have said it is impossible, for 
since he holds that bodies do not exist and that 
man consists of mind or spirit alone, he need 
not hesitate to assert that the mind cannot 
cease to think witJiout ceasing to be. Neither 
he nor Descartes is, in James' opinion, "free to 
take the appearances for what they seem to be, 
and to admit that the mind, as well as the body, 
may go to sleep." 

Despite these differences, Descartes, Locke, 
and Berkeley seem to agree on the range of ac- 
tivities within the sphere of mind. The mind is 
a thinking substance for Descartes, yet it also 
senses and imagines, suffers passions, and exer- 
cises acts of will. What Descartes says in terms 
of acts, Locke says in terms of powers. Mind 
has many distinct powers, among which Locke 
includes all the cognitive faculties (not only the 
powers of abstract thought and reasoning, but 
also those of sense and imagination), and such 
voluntary faculties as choosing and willing. 
Berkeley also includes the whole range of psy- 
chological phenomenasensation, imagination, 
memory, the passions, reasoning, and choice. 

Hume takes a similar view, though in his 
case one basic qualification must be added. He 
does not conceive the mind as a soul or a spirit 
or any other sort of substance. He even has 
some difficulty with the notion of its continuity 
or identity from moment to moment in the 
flow of experience. Yet, he says, "it cannot be 
doubted that the mind is endowed with several 
powers and faculties, that these powers are dis- 
tinct from each other. . . . There are many ob- 
vious distinctions of this kind, such as those 
between will and understanding, the imagina- 
tion and the passions, which fall within the 
comprehension of every human creature." What 
the mind is or how it exists, we may not be 
able to say; but Hume thinks that "if we can go 
no farther than this mental geography, or de- 
lineation of the distinct parts and powers of the 
mind* it is at least a satisfaction to go so far." 

Descartes' theory of mind seems to serve as a 
point of departure in another direction from 



that taken by Locke. Spinoza agrees that the 
mind is a thinking thing. He agrees that man 
consists of an individual body united with an 
individual mind. But he differs from Descartes 
on the meaning of substance. By its very na- 
ture, substance is infinite; and because it is in- 
finite, there can be only one substance, which 
is God. Finite individual things, whether bod- 
ies or minds, do not exist as substances, but as 
modes of the divine attributes. 

"The human mind is a part of the infinite 
intellect of God, and therefore," Spinoza de- 
clares, "when we say that the human mind per- 
ceives this or that thing, we say nothing less 
than that God has this or that idea." He in- 
cludes love and desire, as well as perception and 
imagination, among the affections of the mind, 
even calling them "modes of thought." He 
adds, however, that these do not exist apart 
from the idea of the thing loved or desired, 
"though the idea may exist although no other 
mode of thinking exist." 

OF THE REMAINING three of the seven concep- 
tions of mind here being considered, two bear 
certain resemblances to theories already men- 
tioned. 

Hegel's view of the human mind as a phase 
or dialectical moment of the Absolute Mind or 
Spirit seems comparable to Spinoza's concep- 
tion of the human mind as a part of God's in- 
finite intellect. The Hegelian theory of mind, 
developed in such works as the Phenomenology 
of Mind and the Philosophy of Mind, is re- 
flected in his Philosophy of History and in his 
Philosophy of Right. The expression of his view 
of mind appears, therefore, in the chapters on 
HISTORY and STATE, as well as here. 

There seems to be similar justification for 
associating the views of William James with 
those of Locke and Hume. Willing to posit a 
soul "influenced in some mysterious way by 
the brain states and responding to them by 
conscious affections of its own," James goes on 
to say that "the bare phenomenon, however, 
the immediately known thing which on the 
mental side is in apposition with the entire 
brain-process is the state of consciousness and 
not the soul itself." 

What the soul is and whether it exists belong 
to metaphysics. So far as psychological obser- 



CHAPTER 58: MIND 



177 



varion and analysis are concerned, the phenom- 
ena of mind are to be found in the stream of 
thought or consciousness. States of mind are 
states of consciousness. James uses the words 
"feeling" or "thought" to cover every type of 
mental operation, every state of mind, every 
form of consciousness, including sensations and 
emotions, desires and wishes, as well as concep- 
tion and reasoning. 

Locke and Hume distinguish powers of the 
mind according to different types of mental 
operation. James tends rather to analyze the 
mind in terms of its diverse states according 
to different types of mental content. But he 
also lays great stress on the dynamic inter- 
connection of the various elements of con- 
sciousness in the continuous flow of the stream 
of thought. 

Freud too presents an analysis of different 
types of mental content, and accompanies it by 
a theory of the different layers of mind or 
psychic structure. He holds, for example, that 
"we have two kinds of unconscious that 
which is latent but capable of becoming con- 
scious, and that which is repressed and not 
capable of becoming conscious in the ordinary 
way. . . . That which is latent, and only un- 
conscious in the descriptive and not in the 
dynamic sense, we call preconscious\ the term 
unconscious we reserve for the dynamically un- 
conscious repressed, so that we have three 
terms, conscious (Cs), preconscious (Pcs), and 
unconscious (Ucs)." 

Like James, Freud is concerned with the 
dynamic interaction of various mental opera- 
tions or contents. In addition, a further point of 
similarity exists between them. James says that 
"the pursuance of future ends and the choice 
of means for their attainment are ... the mark 
and criterion of the presence of mentality . . . 
No actions but such as are done for an end, and 
show a choice of means, can be called indubi- 
table expressions of Mind." Freud goes further 
in the same direction. By identifying "psychic 
energy in general" with what he calls "libido," 
he implies that mind in its most primitive form 
has entirely the aspect of desire or seeking. It 
expresses itself in "two fundamentally different 
kinds of instincts, the sexual instincts in the 
widest sense of the word . . . and the aggressive 
instincts, whose aim is destruction." 



FINALLY, THERE is the theory in which mind is 
neither one of the faculties of the soul, nor it- 
self a thinking substance; nor is it a soul or 
spirit with a diversity of powers. "All our 
knowledge," Kant writes, "begins with sense, 
proceeds thence to understanding, and ends 
with reason beyond which nothing higher can 
be discovered in the human mind for elabo- 
rating the matter of intuition and subjecting it 
to the highest unity of thought." These three 
faculties have distinct functions for Kant. The 
sensitive faculty is a faculty of intuition. The 
faculty of understanding is a faculty of judg- 
ment and scientific knowledge. The faculty of 
reason, when properly employed, performs a 
critical and regulative function in the realm of 
thought, but when employed beyond the prov- 
ince of its power leads thought into blind 
alleys or dialectical frustrations. 

Mind is not one of these faculties, nor is it 
the being in which these faculties inhere. The 
notion of mind seems to have significance, for 
Kant, primarily in a collective sense. It repre- 
sents the unity and order of the triad of cogni- 
tive faculties. The faculties of feeling and will 
which Kant adds to these in his enumeration of 
"the higher faculties" belong to the "tran- 
scendental ego," but they do not fall within that 
part of the transcendental structure which is 
mind. Kant's distinction between the specula- 
tive and the practical use of reason, and his dis- 
tinction between the moral and the aesthetic 
judgment, involve different relationships be- 
tween mindor its triad of faculties and 
these other faculties. 

THE FOREGOING SURVEY of conceptions of the 
human mind gives some indication of the way 
in which other questions about mind are an- 
swered. 

With regard to the relation of mind and 
matter, for example, the theories of Descartes, 
Spinoza, Locke, and James seem to affirm a 
duality of substances, or of modes of substance, 
or at least of realms the physical and the 
mental. They are confronted by the problem 
of the relation which obtains between the two 
their independence or interaction. 

"Mental and physical events," writes James, 
"are, on all hands, admitted to present the 
strongest contrast in the entire field of being. 



178 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



The chasm which yawns between them is less 
easily bridged over by the mind than any inter- 
val we know. Why, then, not call it an absolute 
chasm," he asks, "and say not only that the 
two worlds are different, but that they are in- 
dependent?" 

James thinks that to urge this theory of the 
complete independence of mind and body "is 
an unwarrantable impertinence in the present state 
of psychology '." He prefers the common -sense 
theory that each acts on the other somehow. 
But earlier writers who consider body and mind 
as distinct substances, find grave difficulties in 
the way of conceiving their interaction. "How 
our minds move or stop our bodies by thought, 
which we every moment find they do," is, ac- 
cording to Locke, "obscure and inconceivable." 
According to Hume, there is no "principle in 
all nature more mysterious than the union of 
soul with body." He interprets one conse- 
quence of the union to be that "a supposed 
spiritual substance acquires such an influence 
over a material one, that the most refined 
thought is able to actuate the grossest matter. 
Were we empowered by a secret wish, to re- 
move mountains, or control planets in their 
orbit; this extensive authority," Hume thinks, 
"would not be more extraordinary, nor more 
beyond our comprehension." 

Denying that bodies exist, Berkeley never- 
theless argues that even if they did, they could 
exert no influence upon mind. "Though we 
give the materialists their external bodies," he 
says, "they by their own confession are never 
the nearer knowing how our ideas are pro- 
duced; since they own themselves unable to 
comprehend in what manner body can act upon 
spirit, or how it is possible that it should im- 
print any idea in the mind. Hence it is evident 
that the production of ideas or sensations in our 
minds can be no reason why we should suppose 
matter or corporeal substances, since that is 
acknowledged to remain equally inexplicable 
with or without this supposition." 

Those who deny the existence of matter, 
like Berkeley, or the existence of anything im- 
material, like Lucretius or Hobbes, are con- 
fronted by problems of their own. Berkeley 
must explain the mind's perception of bodies 
or why the mind thinks of matter. Lucretius 
must explain perception, thought, and choice 



as functions of material particles in motion. 

The reduction of mind to matter raises a 
question which leads in the opposite direction. 
Why may it not be supposed that thought and 
feeling arc present in the universe wherever 
matter is an atom of mind inseparably con- 
joined with every atom of matter, as in the 
"mind-stuff" or "mind-dust" theory which 
William James considers and criticizes? Still 
another formulation of the relation of mind 
to matter is found in the theory of Aristotle 
and Aquinas, according to whom the rational 
soul is "the substantial form of an organic 
body," but the intellect one of its powers 
is not united to matter in any way. Mind is 
said to be immaterial in that understanding or 
thought does not require a bodily organ. 

The angelic intellect, according to Aquinas, is 
a "cognitive power which is neither the act of a 
corporeal organ, nor in any way connected 
with corporeal matter." The human mind is 
not so completely divorced from matter, for, 
though man's intellect "is not the act of an 
organ, yet it is a power of the soul, which is the 
form of the body." Among all bodily forms, 
the human soul alone has the distinction of pos- 
sessing "an operation and a power in which cor- 
poreal matter has no share whatever." But 
Aquinas also maintains that "the body is neces- 
sary for the action of the intellect, not as its 
organ of action, but on the part of the object" 
the phantasm or image produced by the sen- 
sitive faculty. He conceives this dependence in 
the following manner. "For the intellect to 
understand actually . . . there is need for the 
act of the imagination and of the other powers" 
that are acts of bodily organs. "When the act of 
the imagination is hindered by a lesion of the 
corporeal organ, for instance, in a case of frenzy, 
or when the act of the memory is hindered, as 
in the case of lethargy, we see that a man is hin- 
dered from understanding actually even those 
things of which he had a previous knowledge." 

The problem of body and mind is discussed 
more fully in the chapter on MATTER. Other 
problems involved in the theory of mind simi- 
larly occur in other chapters as well as in this 
one, e.g., the problem of mind in animals and 
men (in the chapters on ANIMAL and MAN) ; the 
problem of the existence of minds superior to 
that of man (in the chapters on ANGEL and 



CHAPTER 58: MIND 



GOD); the problem of the origin of ideas in the 
human mind (in the chapters on IDEA and 
MEMORY AND IMAGINATION). It should be 
noted, however, that agreement or disagree- 
ment on the nature of the human mind does 
not always determine agreement or disagree- 
ment with respect to these other questions. 

Sharing the view that the mind is a spiritual 
substance, Locke and Descartes do not agree 
about innate ideas or principles. Locke tends 
to agree with Aristotle when he says that the 
mind is a tabula rasa, "void of all characters, 
without any ideas. How comes it to be fur- 
nished?" he asks. "Whence has it all the ma- 
terials of reason and knowledge? To this I 
answer in one word, from Experience. In that 
all our knowledge is founded; and from that it 
ultimately derives itself. Our observation em- 
ployed either about external sensible objects, 
or about the internal operations of our own 
minds, is that which supplies our understand- 
ings with all the materials of thinking." 

But Locke does not accept Aristotle's sharp 
distinction between the faculties of sense and 



reason, nor does he find it necessary to adopt 
Aristotle's notion of an active intellect to ex- 
plain how the mind abstracts general ideas from 
the particulars of sense-perception. So far as his 
theory attributes to mind the power of sense, 
Locke has more affinity with Berkeley and 
Hume than with Aristotle; yet on the question 
of abstract ideas or the distinction between men 
and brutes, he is as much opposed to them as 
they are to Aristotle. 

These few observations may be taken as a 
sample of the many intricately crossing lines oi 
thought which make the complex pattern of the 
traditional discussion of mind. With few excep- 
tions, almost any other choice of authors and 
topics would provide similar examples. That 
fact, combined with the fact that almost every 
major topic in this chapter leads into the dis- 
cussion of other great ideas, tends to make the 
chapter on MIND a kind of focal point for per- 
spective on the whole world of thought. It is 
not surprising that this should be the case, for 
on any theory, mind is somehow the place of 
ideas or, as Aristotle says, "the form of forms." 



OUTLINE OF TOPICS 

I. Diverse conceptions of the human mind 

10. Mind as intellect or reason, a part or power of the soul or human nature, distinct 
from sense and imagination 

(1) The difference between the acts of sensing and understanding, and the ob- 

jects of sense and reason 

(2) The cooperation of intellect and sense: the dependence of thought upon 

imagination and the direction of imagination by reason 

(3) The functioning of intellect: the acts of understanding, judgment, and 

reasoning 

(4) The distinction of the active and the possible intellect in power and function 
ib. Mind as identical with thinking substance 

(1) The relation of the mind as thinking substance to sense and imagination 

(2) Thinking and willing as the acts of the thinking substance 

ic. Mind as a particular mode of that attribute of God which is thought 

(1) The origin of the human mind as a mode of thought 

(2) The properties of the human mind as a mode of thought 

id. Mind as soul or spirit, having the power to perform all cognitive and voluntary 
functions 

(1) The origin of the mind's simple ideas: sensation and reflection 

(2) The activity of the understanding in relating ideas: the formation of com- 

plex ideas 



PAOB 

182 



183 



184 



180 THE GREAT IDEAS 

PAGE 

ie. Mind as a triad of cognitive faculties: understanding, judgment, reason 185 

(1) The relation of understanding to sense or intuition: its application in the 

realm of nature; conformity to law 

(2) The relation of judgment to pleasure and displeasure: its application in the 

realm of art; aesthetic finality 

(3) The relation of reason to desire or will: its application in the realm of free- 

dom; the summum bonum 

if. Mind as intelligence or self-consciousness, knowing itself as universal: the unity 
of intellect and will 

ig. Mind as the totality of mental processes and as the principle of meaningful or 
purposive behavior 

(1) The nature of the stream of thought, consciousness, or experience: the va- 

riety of mental operations 

(2) The topography of mind 

(3) The unity of attention and of consciousness: the selectivity of mind 

2. The human mind in relation to matter or body 186 

2a. The immateriality of mind: mind as an immaterial principle, a spiritual substance, 
or as an incorporeal power functioning without a bodily organ 

2b. The potentiality of intellect or reason compared with the potentiality of matter 
or nature 

2c. The interaction of mind and body 

(1) The physiological conditions of mental activity 

(2) The influence of mental activity on bodily states 187 
2d. The parallelism of mind and body 

2e. The reduction of mind to matter: the atomic explanation of its processes, and 
of the difference between mind and soul, and between mind and body 

3. Mind in animals and in men 188 

yz. Mind, reason, or understanding as a specific property of human nature: com- 
parison of human reason with animal intelligence and instinct 

3& Mentality as a common property of men and animals: the differences between 

human and animal intelligence in degree or quality 189 

y. The evolution of mind or intelligence 

4. The various states of the human mind 

40. Individual differences in intelligence: degrees of capacity for understanding 

4^. The mentality of children 190 

^c. The states of the possible intellect: its potentiality, habits, and actuality 

4< The condition of the mind prior to experience 

(1) The mind as completely potential: the mind as a tabula rasa 

(2) The innate endowment of the mind with ideas: instinctive determinations 

(3) The transcendental or a priori forms and categories of the mind 191 
4*. The condition of the human mind when the soul is separate from the body 

4/! Supernatural states of the human intellect: the state of innocence; beatitude; the 
human intellect of Christ 



CHAPTER 58: MIND 181 

PAGE 

5. The weakness and limits of the human mind 191 

50. The fallibility of the human mind: the causes of error 

5^. The natural limits of the mind: the unknowable; objects which transcend its 

powers; reason's critical determination of its own limits or boundaries 192 

y. The elevation of the human mind by divine grace: faith and the supernatural 

gifts 193 

6. The reflexivity of mind: the mind's knowledge of itself and its acts 

7. The nature and phases of consciousness: the realm of the unconscious 194 

70. The nature of self-consciousness 

7^. The degrees or states of consciousness: waking, dreaming, sleeping 

7^. The conscious, pre-conscious, and unconscious activities of mind 195 

8. The pathology of mind: the loss or abeyance of reason 

80. The distinction between sanity and madness: the criterion of lucidity or insight 

8^. The causes of mental pathology: organic and functional factors 

8c. The abnormality peculiar to mind: systematic delusion 196 

9. Mind in the moral and political order 

90. The distinction between the speculative and practical intellect or reason: the 
spheres of knowledge, belief, and action 

9#. The relation of reason to will, desire, and emotion 

9^. Reason as regulating human conduct: reason as the principle of virtue or duty 197 

yd. Reason as the principle of free will: rationality as the source of moral and political 

freedom 198 

9*. Reason as formative of human society: the authority of government and law 199 

9/ The life of reason, or the life of the mind, as man's highest vocation: reason as 
the principle of all human work 

10. The existence of mind apart from man 200 

100. The indwelling reason in the order of nature 

lob. Nous or the intellectual principle: its relation to the One and to the world-soul 
IDC. The realm of the pure intelligences: the angelic intellect 
lod. The unity and separate existence of the active or the possible intellect 
loc. Mind as an immediate infinite mode of God 
io/. Absolute mind: the moments of its manifestations 201 

(1) The unfolding of mind or spirit in world history 

(2) The concrete objectification of mind in the state 

log. The divine intellect: its relation to the divine being and the divine will 



182 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



REFERENCES 

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page 
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 I IOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the 
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas- 
sage is in section d of page 12. 

PACJE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the lettcis a and b refer to the 
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES : Psyehology,116a-ll9b t the passage 
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is 
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left- 
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of 
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half 
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends m the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164. 

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, 
spcr) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, arc gi\en in cer- 
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265 283] 12d. 

BiBLh REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James 
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters 01 vciscs, the King 
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TLSTA- 
MENr: Nehcmiah, 7:45 (D} // Esdras, 7:46. 

SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially 
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit- 
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited. 

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of 
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The deaf Ideas, consult the Preface. 



1. Diverse conceptions of the human mind 

. . n 
la. Mind as intellect or reason, a part or power 

of the soul or human nature, distinct 
from sense and imagination 

7 PLATO: Republic, BK iv, 350a-353d; BK vi, 
386d-388a; BK vn, 392c-393c; BK ix, 421a c 
/ Timaeus, 466a-467a / Theaetetus, 534d- 
535c 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vn, CH 3 [247 b i- 
248"9J 330b-d / Soul, HK IT, CH 2 [41 ^24-26] 
643d-644a; en 3 [4i4 b i4~2o] 644d; [414^3- 
415*13] 645a-b; BK in, CH 3-8 659c-664d 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 7 [1097^4- 
1098*7] 343b; BK ix, CH 4 [1166*1028] 
419b-c;cn8 [ii68 b 28-n69 a i2]422b-d; CH9 
[i 170*16-18] 423d-424a; BKX, CH 7 [ii77 h 26- 
H78' 1 8] 432c / Politics, BK vn, CH 15 
f i H4 b 8-28] 539b-d 

12 L VCRETWS: Nature of Things, BK in [136-160] 

31d-32a 
12 F.PICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 6, llla-b 

17 PLOHNUS: First Ennead, TR i, CH 7 3d-4a / 
Fifth Ennead, TR HI, CH 2-3 216b-217b 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 11-36 74a- 
80d esp par 21 76c-d; BK xni, par 12 113b-d 
/ City of God, BK vn, CH 23, 256b-c; BK vin, 
CH 6, 269b-c; BK xi, CH 27, 337d-338a; BK 



xix, on 18 523a-b / Christian Doctrine, BK i, 

en 8 626c-627a 
19 AguINAS . Summa Theologies, PAR r i, Q 75, 

A ^ ANS 38 o c -381b ; Q 76, A 3, CONTRARY 

391a-393a; Q 78, A i, ANS 407b-409a; Q 79 

413d-427a 
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xxv 

[61-84] 92a-b 
42 KANT: Pure Reason, H3b-115c csp 113c-114b; 

248d-250a,c / Judgement, 551a-552c 

J he differencc between the acts of sens- 
in S anc * understanding, and the objects 
of sense and reason 

7 PLVTO: Phaedo, 224a-225a; 228a-230c; 231c- 
232a / Republic, BK vivn, 383d-398c / 
Timaeitt, 447b-d; 457b-458a / Theactctus, 
534d-536b / Sophist, 565a-569a csp 568a-569a 
/ Philcbus, 634b-635b 

8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, en 18 
lllb-c; CH 31 120a-c; BK n, CH 19 136a-137a,c 
/ Topics, BK 11, CH 8 [ii4 ft i8-26] 159d-160a / 
Physics, BK i, en 5 [i88 b 26-i8g a 9] 264b c; BK 
vn, CH 3 [247 b i-248 a 9] 330b-d / Metaphysics, 
BK i, CH i [98o a 28-98i b i3l 499a-500a; CH 5 
foSC^v-c^i] 504d 505a; CH 6 I987 ft 29- b i8j 
505b-d; BK in, CH 4 [999 8 24- b 5] 518a-b; BK 
vn, en 10 [1035^5-1036*12] 559b-c; CH 15 



1*(2) to 

563c-564c; BK vm, CH 2 [i(>43 a i2-28] 567c-d; 

CH 3 [io43 b 28-33] 568b; BK x, CH 9 586a-c; 

BK xi, CH 7 [1064*4-9] 592b / Soul, BK n, CH 5 

[4i7 b i7-28] 648b-c; BK in, CH 8 664b-d 
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK iv [353-521] 

48d-51a esp [469-521] 50b-51a; [722-756] 53d- 

54a 
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 6, HOc- 

lllc 

17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR i, CH 7 3d-4a / 
Third Ennead, TR vi, CH 2, 107b-c / Fourth 
Ennead, TR in, CH 23 153d-154b; TR vi, CH 
1-2 189b-190b; TR vn, CH 8, 195b-196a / 
Fifth Ennead, TR in, CH 2 216b-c 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK in ; par 10 15b-d; 
BK iv, par 15-17 23a-c; BK vn, par 23 50b-c / 
City of God, BK vm, en 6, 269b c; BK xix, 
CH 18 523a-b 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 12, 
A 3, ANS 52c-53b; Q 13, A i, REP 3 62c 63c; 
Q 14, A ii 84c-85c; Q 18, A 2, ANS i05c-106b; 
A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 55, A 2, RLP 2 289d- 
290d; Q 57, A i, REP 2 295a-d; A 2, ANS and 
RLP i 295d-297a; Q 75, A 3, RLP 2 380c-381b; 
A 5, ANS 382a-383b; Q 76, A 2, REP 4 388c- 
391a; Q 79, A 5, RKP 2 418c-419b; A 6, UUP 2 
419b-420d; Q 84, A i, ANS and RKP 2 440d- 
442a; A 2, ANS and REP i 442b-443c; AA 6-8 
447c-451b; Q 85, A i, RLP 3 451c-453c; A 2 
453d-455b; Q 86, A i 461c-462a; PART i TI, 
Q i, A 2, REP 3 610b-611b; Q 2, A 6, ANS 619d- 
620d; Q 29, A 6 748b-749a 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-ii, Q 50, 
A 3, REP 3 8b-9a; PART in SUPPL, Q 70, A 2, 
RI.P 3 896a 897d 

la(2) The cooperation of intellect and sense: 
the dependence of thought upon imag- 
ination and the direction of imagina- 
tion by reason 

7 PLATO: Phacdrus, 126b-c / Phaedo, 228a-230c 
/ Republic, BK in, 333b-d; BK vi-vn, 383d- 
398c / Theaetetus, 535a-536b / Seventh Letter, 
809c-810d 

8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, en 18 
lllb-c; BK 11, CH 19 136a-137a,c / Physics, BK 
vn, CH 3 [246 b 2o-248 a 8] 330a-d / Soul, BK i, 
CH i [403*2-10] 632a; BK in, CH 7 [431*1 4J-ui 
8 [432 a i3] 663d-664d / Sense and the Sensible, 
CH 6 [445 b 4~i8] 683b-d / Memory and Rcminis- 
ccnce, CH i [449 b 3o~45o a 25] 690c-691a 

18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xix, CH 18 
523a-b 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 75, 
A 3, REP 2 380c-381b; Q 79, A 4, REP 3 417a- 
418c; Q 81, A 3, ANS and REP 2-3 430c-431d; 
Q 84, A 2, CONTRARY and REP i 442b-443c; 
A 3, ANS 443d-444d; A 4, ANS 444d-446b; A A 
6_8 447c-451b; Q 85, A i 451c-453c; A 5, REP 
2 457d-458d; A 7, ANS 459c-460b; Q 86, A i, 
ANS and REP 2 461c-462a; A 4, REP 3 463d- 
464d; Q 88, AA 1-2 469a-472c; Q 89, A i, ANS 



CHAPTER 58: MIND 



183 



and REP i 473b-475a; A 5, ANS and REP 4 
477a-478b; Q 91, A 3, REP 1-3 486b-487d 
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-ii, Q 50, 
A 3, REP 3 8b 9a; A 4, REP 1,3 9a-10b; Q 51, 
A i, ANS 12b-13c; Q 52, A i, ANS 15d-18a; 
Q 56, A 5, ANS 33c-34b; PART HI, Q 11, A 2 
773a-d 

10(3) The functioning of intellect: the acts of 
understanding, judgment, and reasoning 

7 PLATO: Phaedo, 228a-230c / Republic, BK vii, 
392a-394a / Theaetetus, 535a-536b; 537d-538a 

8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 4 [2*4-10] 6a / 
Interpretation, CH i [16*9-18] 25a-b / Prior 
Analytics^ BK i, CH i 39a-d / Metaphysics, BK 
vi, en 4 |io27 b i8-28] 550a,c; BK ix, CH 10 
577c-578a,c / Soul, BK i, CH 3 [407*25-33] 
636d-637a; BK in, en 6 662d-663c 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK iv [353-521] 
48d-51a esp [469-521] 50b-51a 

17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR vi, CH 2, 107b-c 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK xni, par 37 120d- 
121a / Christian Doctrine, BK 11, CH 31 651d- 
652b 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 13, 
A 9, ANS 71b-72c; Q 14, A 7, ANS 81d-82b; Q 
46, A 2, REP 3 253a-255a; Q 58, A 3 301d- 
302d; A 4, ANS 302d-303c; Q 59, A i, REP i 
306c-307b; Q 79, AA 8-9 421c-423d; A 10, 
REP 2-3 423d-424d; Q 82, A 4, REP i 434c- 
435c; QQ 84-89 440b-480c; PART i-n, Q i, A 
4, REP 2 612a-613a; Q 5, A i, REP i 636d-637c; 
Q 15, A 4, REP i 683b-684a; Q 16, A i, REP 3 
684b-d 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 90, 
A i, REP 2 205b-206b; PART n-ii, Q i, A 2, 
REP 2-3 381a-c; Q 8, A i, RFP 2 417a-d; Q 180, 
A 6 613a-614d; PART in, Q n, A 3 773d- 
774c; PART in SUPPL, Q 92, A i, ANS 1025c- 
1032b 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 32d; 56b; 
59b-61d esp 59c / Novum Organum, BK i, 
APH 48 HOd-llla 

la(4) The distinction of the active and the 
possible intellect in power and function 

8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK in, CH 4-5 661b-662d 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 54, 
A i, REP i 285a-d; A 4 287b-288a; Q 55, A 2, 
REP 2 289d-290d; Q 79, AA 2-5 414d-419b; 
Q 84, A 4, ANS and REP 3 444d-446b; A 6 447c- 
449a; Q 85, A i 451c-453c; Q 87, A i 465a-466c; 
Q 88, A i, ANS and REP 2 469a-471c; Q 117, 
A i 595d-597c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 50, 
A 4 9a-10b; A 5, REP 1-2 lOb-d; Q 67, A 2, 
ANS 82c-83b; PART HI, Q 9, A i, ANS 763b- 
764c; A A 3-4 765b-767b; Q 12, A i, ANS and 
REP 3 776c-777b; PART in SUPPL, Q 92, A 3, 
REP n 1034b-1037c 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 31, SCHOL 366d- 
367a 



184 THE GREAT IDEAS 

(1. Diverse conceptions of the human mind.) 

Ib. Mind as identical with thinking substance 
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 51d-52a; 



PART v, 56a-b / Meditations, 71b-d; 11 77d- 

81d; iv, 89b; vi, 98c-d / Objections and Replies, 

114d-115a,c; DBF vi-vn 130c-d; PROP iv 133c; 

13Sb-136b; 152b,d-156a; 207a; 208c-d; 209c; 

224d-225d; 248b; 249d-250b; 261a-b; 276b-c 
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH i, 

SECT 9-25 123a-127d; CH xix, SECT 4 176a-b 
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 2 413b; 

SECT 26-27 418a-b; SECT 98 432a; SECT 135- 

142 440a-441c passim 
53 JAMES: Psychology, 130b-131a; 221a-226a esp 

221a222b 

lb(l) The relation of the mind as thinking 
substance to sense and imagination 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, vm, 13a-b; 14b; xn, 
18b-c; 20a c; xiv 28a-33b passim / Discourse, 
PART i, 41d; PART iv, 53b; PART v, 59a-60c / 
Meditations, n 77d-81d; vi 96b-103d esp 96b- 
98c, 99d-101a / Objections and Replies, DEF 
i-n 130a-b; POSTULATE n 131a; 136d-137a; 
137d; 207d-208a; 209c; 215b-c; 218c-d; 224d- 
225d; 229d 230c 

35 BKRKKLKY: Human Knowledge, SECT 2 413b; 
SECT 158-139 440c-d 



\b to \d(l) 

380d-382c; PROP 40 387a-388b; PROP 48-49 
391a-394d; PART in, PROP 1-2, DEMONST 
396a-c; PROP 3 398b-c; PROP 9-14 399b-401a; 

PART V, PROP 23, SCHOL 458c-d 



Thinking and willing as the acts of the 
thinking substance 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, in 3b~5a; xi 17b-18b; xiv 
28a-33b passim / Meditations, in 81d-89a esp 
81d-82a; iv 89a-93a passim; vi, 101d-102a / 
Objections and Replies, DEF i-n 130a-b; 13 7d; 
162b; 170d; 218c-d 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 2 413b; 
SECT 26-28 418a-c; SECT 138-139 440c-d 

lc. Mind as a particular mode of that attribute 
of God which is thought 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 14 359d-360a 
PROP 25, coROL365b; PROP 29-31 366b-367a; 
PART n, AXIOM 2 373d; PROP i, sciioL 374a; 
PROP 5 374c-d; PROP 10, COROL 376d; PROP 
11-13 377b-378c; PROP 20 382d; PART in, 
PROP i 396a-c; PROP 2, DEMONST 396c; PART 
v, PROP 40, SCHOL 462d 

lc(l) The origin of the human mind as a mode 
of thought 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 14, COROL 2 
360a; PROP 25, COROL 365 b; PROP 29-31 366b- 
367a; PART n 373a-394d passim, esp PROP i 
373d-374a, PROP 5-6 374c-375a, PROP 10, 
COROL 376d, PROP 11-13 377b-378c 

lr (2) The properties of the human mind as a 
mode of thought 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, DBF 3 373b; AXIOM 
2-3 373d; PROP 11-13 377b-378c; PROP 17-19 



\d. Mind as soul or spirit, having the power to 
perform all cognitive and voluntary func- 
tions 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH i, 
SECT 4 121d-122a; SECT 10 123b-d; CH vi 
131b-c; CH ix 138b-141a passim, esp SECT i 
138b-c, SECT 15 141a; CH xi, SECT I-CH xn, 
SECT 1 143d-147d; CH xix 175b-176b; CH xxi, 
SECT 5-6 179c-180a; CH xxiir, SECT 5 205a-b; 
SECT 15 208c-d; SECT 1 8 209a; SECT 22 209d; 
SECT 28-32 211b-212d; BK iv, CH xiv 364b- 
365a 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 2 413b; 
SECT 7 414b-c; SECT 26-28 418a-c; SECT 89 
430b-c; SECT 135-142 440a-441c passim 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 194d-195a 

53 JAMES: Psychology, la; 118b-119b; 221a-226a 
esp 221a-222b 

ld(l) The origin of the mind's simple ideas: 
sensation and reflection 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH i, 
SECT 1-8 121a-123a; SECT 23-25 127b-d; CH 
n, SECT 2 128a-b; CH in, SECT i 128d-129a; 
CH vn 131c-133b; en xi, SECT i7-cn xn, 
SECT i 147a-d; CH xn, SECT 8 148c-d; CH xiv, 
SECT 31 161d 162a; CH xvn, SECT 22 173d- 
174a; CM xvni, SECT 6 174c-d; CH xx, &ECT 
1-2 176b-c; SECT 15 177d; CH xxi, SECT 4 
178d-179c; SECT 75 200b-d; CH xxni, SECT i 
204a-b; SECT 5 205a-b; SECT 15 208c-d; 
SECT 29-30 211d-212b; SECT 32-37 212c-214b; 
CH xxv, SECT 9 216d; SECT n 217a 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT i, 
413a 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT n, DIV 
12-14 455d-456b 

ld(2) The activity of the understanding in re- 
lating ideas: the formation of complex 
ideas 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH n, 
SECT 2 128a-b; CH vn, SECT 10 133a-b; CH xi, 
SECT 6-7 145a-b; CH xn, SECT I-CH XHI, 
SECT i 147b-149a; CH XHI, SECT 4-6 149b-d; 
SECT 27 154c-d; CH xiv, SECT 27 160d-161a; 
SECT 30-31 161c-162a; CH xv, SECT 2-3 
162c-d; CH xvi, SECT 1-2 165c-d; SECT 5 
166b-c; CH xvn, SECT 3 168b; SECT 5 168d- 
169a; CH xvni, SECT i 174a; SECT 6 174c-d; 
CH xxn, SECT 2 201a-b; SECT 9 202c-203a; 
CH xxni, SECT 15 208c-d; CH xxx, SECT 3 
238c-d; CH xxxn, SECT 12 245b-c; BK in, 
CH n, SECT 3 253c; CH v 263d-268a; CH vi, 
SECT n 271b-d; SECT 26-51 274d-283a; CH 
xi, SECT 15 303b-c; BK iv, CH iv, SECT 5 
324d 



CHAPTER 58: MIND 



185 



35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT i, 413a 
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT n, DIV 

13-14 455d-456b; SECT in, DIV 18 457c-d; 

SECT v, DIV 39, 466c-d; DIV 40, 467b 
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 10lb-102a esp lOld- 

102a 

le. Mind as a triad of cognitive faculties: under- 
standing, judgment, reason 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15c-16a; 34a-41c csp 38c- 
41c; 51d-52b; 59c-64a esp 60a-c; 89c-94b; 
108a-113b csp llld-113b; 115b-c; 119a-b; 
129c-130c csp 130b-c; 166c-171a; 173b-174a; 
187a-c; 193a-200c csp 193a-195a, 199b-c / 
Fund. Prin. Metaphystc of Morals, 281c-282d 
/ Practical Reason, 329a-d; 343a; 349b-350c 
/ Judgement, 461a-475d esp 461a-462d, 464c- 
467a, 472c-d, 474b-475d; 542b-543c; 570b- 
572c; 604a-b 

le(l) The relation of understand! ng to sense or 
intuition: its application in the realm of 
nature; conformity to law 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 14a-108a,c csp 15b-c, 
16a-c, 22a,c, 23a-24a, 30b-c, 31a-d, 34a-c, 
37b-39c, 41c-42a, 45d-46a, 47c-48a, 48d-51d, 
53b-55a, 58a-64a, 64d-65c, 94d 95d, 98c, 
101b-107b; 109d-112d; 115b-c; 164a-171a / 
Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 275b; 281 c- 
282d csp 282b-c/ Practical Reason, 292a-293b; 
296a d; 301d-302d; 319c 320b; 329b-c / Intro. 
Metaphystc of Morals, 383c-d; 385a-c; 386d- 
387a,c / Judgement, 461a-475d esp 464c-465c, 
474b-475d; 482d-483d; 492c-d; 542b-544c; 
550a-551a,c; 562d-563b; 570c 572b; 609b- 
610a 

le(2) The relation of judgment to pleasure and 
displeasure: its application in the realm 
of art; aesthetic finality 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 101b-107b csp 102b-103a 
/ Judgement, 461a-475d esp 467d-473a, 474b- 
475d; 480d-482b; 486d-491c; 493c-495a,c; 
497a-501b; 542b-544c; 546d-548c; 558a-b; 
559a 560c esp 560b-c; 562a-564c csp 562a-d; 
567c-568c; 570b-572c; 577b; 584d-585a; 
588c; 597b-599b 

10(3) The relation of reason to desire or will: 
its application in the realm of freedom; 
the summttm bonum 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 164a-171a csp 164a-165c; 
234c-240b esp 236b-240b / Fund. Prin. Meta- 
physic of Morals, 264d-265b; 271c-d; 275b; 
279b; 281c-283b esp 282d-283b; 284d-285a 
/ Practical Reason, 292a-293b; 296a-d; 301d- 
302d; 303b-304b; 307d-314d csp 314a-d; 
315c; 319c-321b; 327d-329c; 337a-355d csp 
337a-338c, 343b-d, 348d-355d / Pref. Meta- 
physical Elements of Ethics, 367c / Intro. Meta- 
phy sic of Morals, 383c-d; 386b-387a,c; 388a-d; 
390b / Judgement, 461a-475d esp 465a-c, 



474b-475d; 483d-484b; 587a-588a; 594b- 
595c; 601d; 604d-606d esp 606a-d; 60 7c; 
609b-610a 

I/. Mind as intelligence or self-consciousness, 
knowing itself as universal: the unity of 
intellect and will 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 4-9 
12d-14d; par 13 15c-d; par 21 17a-c; par 27 
18d; PART i, par 35 21a-b; par 66 29a-c; PART 
in, par 353-360 112b-114a,c; ADDITIONS, 4 
116a d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 160d- 
161a; 170b-d; PART in, 306b 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 235a-238a esp 236a-237b 

Ig. Mind as the totality of mental processes and 
as the principle of meaningful or pur- 
posive behavior 

53 JAMES: Psychology, la-9a esp la, 5a-b, 6b-7a; 
51a-b; 121b-122b 

54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 383b / Un- 
conscious, 428a-430c csp 428d-429b / General 
Introduction, 452a-c; 467c-468a 



The nature of the stream of thought, 
consciousness, or experience: the variety 
of mental operations 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 43a-44a; 51a-52a; 90b-93a 
esp 92b; 140b-184a esp 140b-141a, 145a, 
146a-b, 157b-161a, 165a-167b; 300a-311a csp 
300a-b, 307b-308a, 311a; 313a-314a; 315a- 
319a esp 317b-319a; 323a-327a esp 326a-b 
[fn i]; 360a; 381b-385b; 396a-397a; 421a-427a 
esp 424b-426a; 452a-457a; 480a-b; 502a- 
505b; 561a; 664a-666b; 767a; 851a-862a csp 
852b-853a 

54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 180c-181b; 
337a-b; 348a d; 351d-353b esp 352d; 363c- 
364b; 375a-385c esp 375b-376a, 377c-380d, 
383b-c, 384a-385c / Unconscious, 442b-443d 
/ General Introduction, 452a-c / Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, 646b-648b / Ego and Id, 
700a-701d / New Introductory Lectures, 835d- 
836a; 837d-838c 

lg(2) The topography of mind 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 9a-15a esp 13a-14a; 17b- 
49b esp 43a-44a, 47b-49b 

54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 351b-353b; 
382a-c / Unconscious, 430d-432c / Ego and 
Id, 701d-703a / New Introductory Lectures, 
836c-d; 839b d 



The unity of attention and of conscious- 
ness: the selectivity of mind 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 91a; 184a-187b; 260a-286a 
esp 260a 262a, 264b 265a, 270b 272b; 388a; 
445a-446a; 606b-610b esp 608a-609a; 692a- 
693b; 773a-774a; 830a; 862b-863b [fn 2] 

54 FRLUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 375b-c / 
Unconscious, 438c-d / Ego and Id, 698d-699b 
[fhi] 



186 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



2. The human mind io relation to matter or 
body 

2a. The immateriality of mind: mind as an 
immaterial principle, a spiritual sub- 
stance, or as an incorporeal power func- 
tioning without a bodily organ 

7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 124b-126c / Phaedo, 223b- 
225c; 231c-234b / Timaeus, 452d-453b; 
466a-b 

8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK i, CH 4 (4o8 b 18-29] 638c; 
CH 5 [4ii b i3-i8] 641c-d; BK n, CH 2 [4i3 b 24~ 
29] 643d-644a; BK in, CH 4 [429io- b 23] 661b- 
662 a; CH 5 662od 

9 ARISTOTLE: Generation of 'Animals, BK n, CH 3 
[736"25- 3 o] 277c 

17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR vi, CH 2, 107b-c 
/ Fourth Ennead, TR vn, CH 8, 195b-196a; 
197cl98b 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK vn, par 2, 43c-d 
/ City of God, BK vm, CH 5, 268c-d; BK xix, 
CH 18 523a-b 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Thcologica, PART i, Q 3, 
A i, REP 2 14b-15b; Q 7, A 2, REP 2 31d-32c; 
Q 75, A 2 379c-380c; A 3, REP 2 380c-381b; 
A 5, ANS 382a-383b; A 6 383c-384c; Q 79, A i, 
REP 4 414a-d; A 2, REP 2 414d*416a; A 3, REP 3 
416a-417a; A 4, REP 4-5 417a-418c; A 5, REP 
1-2 418c-419b; A 6, REP 1-2 419b-420d; Q 83, 
A i, REP 5 436d 438a; Q 84, A i, ANS 440d- 
442a; A 2, ANS 442b-443c; A 4, ANS 444d- 
446b; A 6, ANS 447c-449a; Q 85, A 6, ANS 
458d-459c; Q 87, A 3, REP 3 467b-468a; Q 89, 
A i, ANS 473b-475a; PART i-n, Q 2, A 6, ANS 
619d-620d; Q 35, A 5, ANS 775d-777a 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 50, 
A 4 9a-10b; Q 53, A i, ANS and REP 2-3 19d- 
21a 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xxv 
[61-84] 92a-b 

28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 494a-b 
31 DESCARTES: Rules, xn, 20a-b / Discourse, 
PART iv, 51d-52a; 53b; PART v, 59a~60c / 
Meditations, 11 77d-81d; vi 96b 103d csp 98c- 
99a, 99d, 101d-102a / Objections and Replies, 
114d-115a,c; 119d-120a; DEF VI-VH 130c-d; 
DEP x 130d; PROP iv 133c; 135d 136b; 152b,d- 
156d; 207d-208a; 209c; 224d-225d; 231a- 
232d; 261a-b; 276b-c 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART v, PREP 451a-452c 
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH 
xxin, SECT 5 205a-b; SECT 15-22 208c-209d; 
SECT 28-32 211b-212d esp SECT 32 212c-d; 
CH xxvii, SECT 12-14 223a-224b passim; SECT 
27 227d-228a; BK iv, CH HI, SECT 6 313c- 
315b 
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 26 418a; 

SECT 137 440b-c; SECT 141 441a-b 
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 186a-b 
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART i, par 48 

24b-c 
53 JAMBS: Psychology, 130a; 221a-223a 



2 to 2c(l) 

2b. The potentiality of intellect or reason com- 
pared with the potentiality of matter or 
nature 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vn, CH 3 [247 b i- 
248 B 9) 330b-d / Metaphysics, BK ix, CH 2 
[K>46 a 37- b 24] 571c-d; CH 5 573a-c / Soul, BK 
HI, CH 5 662c-d; CH n [434*16-22] 667a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 7, A 
2, ANS and REP 2-3 31d-32c; Q 14, A 2, REP 3 
76d-77d; A 8, ANS 82c-83b; Q 19, A i, ANS 
108d-109c; Q 50, A 2, REP 2-4 270a-272a; Q 
55, A i 289a~d; A 2, ANS 289d-290d; Q 58, A i, 
ANS 300c-301a; Q 75, A 5, REP 1-2 382a-383b; 
Q 79, A 2 414d-416a; A 6, ANS 419b-420d; Q 
84, A 2, ANS and REP 2 442b-443c; A 3, REP 1-2 
443d-444d; Q 85, A 5, REP 3 457d-458d; Q 87, 
A i, ANS 465a-466c; Q 91, A 3, REP 2 486b- 
487d; PART I-H, Q 2, A 6, ANS 619d-620d; Q 
22, A i, ANS and REP i 720d-721c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 50, 
A 4, REP 1-2 9a-10b; Q 55, A i, ANS and REP 5 
26b-27a; PART HI, Q 9, A 3, ANS and REP 3 
765b-766b; PART HI SUPPL, Q 92, A i, ANS and 
REP io 1025c-1032b 

28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 494a-b 
53 JAMES : Psychology, 153a 

2c. The interaction of mind and body 

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 452d-453b; 474b-476b 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK HI [94-829] 

31b-40c 
17 PLOTINUS : First Ennead, TR i, CH 5-7 2d-4a 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 48d-50b 
esp 48d-49c 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART v, 60b-c; PART 
vi, 61c / Meditations, vi, 99d / Objections and 
Replies, 207d-208a; 209c 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART v, PREF 451a-452c 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH HI, 
SECT 28 322a-c 

36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 229b-232a 
42 KANT: Judgement, 538d-539a 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 281a-282c 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 2b-4a; 8a-52b esp 8a-9a, 
14b-15a, 19a-b, 47b-49b, 51b-52a; 82b; 84a- 
94b esp 89b93a; H6a-119b; 139a HOb; 
208a-b; 222b 223a; 259a; 288a 289b; 311a; 
450a-451b; 694a; 742b 755a; 758a-759a; 
827b-835a esp 829b-830a 

54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 154c-155a / 
Narcissism, 402d-404b passim / Instincts, 412b- 
414c esp 413d-414a / General Introduction, 
451c-452a; 605b-606a / Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, 639a-640d; 646 b- 65 la / Ego and 
Id, 700a-703a passim, esp 702d-703a / New 
Introductory Lectures, 829a-c 

2c(l) The physiological conditions of mental 
activity 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vn, CH 3 [240*20- 
248*9] 330a-d / Soul, BK n, CH 9 [421*19-26] 
652d / Dreams 702a-706d 



2c (2) to 2e 

9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK iv, CH 10 

[686 b 22-29] 218b-c 
10 HIPPOCRATES: Sacred Disease, 155d-160d esp 

159a-c 
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK iv [722-776] 

53d-54b 
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK in, SECT i 

259b,d 
19 AQUINAS : Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 84, 

A 7, ANS 449b-450b; A 8, REP 2 450b-451b; 

Q 85, A 7, ANS 459c-460b 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 48d-50b 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, xn, 19a-20d / Objec- 
tions and Replies, 207d-208a; 208d-209a; 
209c 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 14 380c; PROP 
16-17 380d-381d; PROP 26 384a-b; PART v, 
PREF 451a-452c passim; PROP 39 462a~c 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK H, CH i, 
SECT 23 127b; CH xix, SECT i, 175b; CH xxvn, 
SECT 27 227d-228a; CH xxxm, SECT 6 249a-b; 
BK iv, CH in, SECT 28 322a-c 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 18-20 
416b-417a; SECT 50 422c 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 288c d; 299c; 
595d-596a 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE H, 689c- 
690a 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 2b-3a; 9a-73b; 152a-153a; 
157a-b; 166b-167a; 367a-373a esp 370a-b; 
380a b; 381b-383b; 387b-388a; 413b 420b; 
427b-430b; 453a; 455b-456a; 497a-501b; 
506a-507a; 520a-521a; 533a-538b; 690a-691b; 
758a-759a; 829b; 865a 

54 FREUD: Hysteria, 87a / Interpretation of 
Dreams, 351b-352c; 378a<b; 382a-c / Uncon- 
scious, 431d / General Introduction, 586c-d / 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 639b-d; 646b- 
648a 

2c(2) The influence of mental activity on bodily 

states 

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 474d-475b 
9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH 7 [70 i b 

I3J-CH 8 [702 a 22] 237a-c; CH 11 239a-d 
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK HI [136-176] 

31d-32b 
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 18, 

A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 117, A 3, REP 3 598c- 

599b 
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 36c-40d; 234c~235a; 

332d-333c; 532a-b 

28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 296d / Circu- 
lation of the Blood, 321d-322a; 322c-d 
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 48d-50b 
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK H, CH xxi, 

SECT 5, 179c; BK iv, CH HI, SECT 28 322a*c; 

CH x, SECT 19 354a-c 
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT VH, DIV 

51-52 472b-473c; DIV 57-58, 475c-476b 
42 KANT: Judgement, 538d-539a; 560b 
44 BOSVTEI.L: Johnson, 350c-d 



CHAPTER 58: MIND 187 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK in, 141d-142a; 
142d; BK v, 213c-d; BK vi, 247d-248a; BK ix, 
350d-354a passim, esp 351d-352a, 353b-d; 
BK XIH, 567d-568c esp 568 b; BK xv, 617a-b; 
618a-b 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 3a-b; 64a-67a; 132a-134b; 
694a 699a; 767a-794a esp 767b-768a, 787a- 
794a; 827b-835a esp 828a 830a; 841a 848a 
passim, esp 842a-b, 847b 848a 

54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 
Analysis, Ib 6b esp 4c-5a / Hysteria, 25a 59d 
esp 25a-27a, 30a-d, 35b-c, 37d-38a, 56b- 
58c; 82d-83c / Narcissism, 403a-c / Repres- 
sion, 426b-c / General Introduction, 572a-b / 
Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 718a- 
719d; 728c-729a / New Introductory Lectures, 
852a-b 

2</. The parallelism of mind and body 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, DEF 2 355a; PROP 
14, COROL 2 360a; PROP 25, COROL 365 b; 
PART n, PROP 1-2 373d-374a; PROP 5-7 
374c-375c; PROP 11-13 377b-378c; PROP 
15-28 380c-384c; PART in, PROP 2 396c- 
398b; PROP 10-14 399c-401a; PART v, PROP i 
452d 

53 JAMES : Psychology, 84a 90b esp 84b 85b, 88a- 
90a; 96a-b; 116a 119b esp 119b 

2e. The reduction of mind to matter: the atomic 
explanation of its processes, and of the 
difference between mind and soul, and 
between mind and body 

7 PLATO: Phaedo, 241d-242b / Sophist, 567a- 
568a 

8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK i, CH 2-5 633a-641d 
passim, esp CH 2 [4O3 b 3 1-404*30] 633a-c, 
[405*7-13] <*4b 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK n [251-293] 

18b-d; [865-990] 26a-27c; BK in [94-829] 

31b-40c; BK iv [722-817] 53d-54d; [877-961] 

55d-56d 
17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR ix, CH 5, 

68b / Third Ennead, TR i, CH 2, 78d; CH 3 

79b-c / Fourth Ennead, TR VH, CH 8, 195b- 

196c 
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 84, 

A 2, ANS and REP 2 442b-443c; A 6, ANS 447c- 

449a 
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 49a-d; 52c; PART 

n, 162c 
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 224d- 

226d; 261a-b 
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK iv, CH in, 

SECT 6 313c-315b; CH x, SECT 5 350a-b; SECT 

10 351b-352a; SECT 17 353b-c 
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 93 

431 b; SECT 137 440b-c; SECT 141 441a-b 
42 Kw. Judgement, 599d-600d 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 95a-107b esp 95b-98a; 
115a-118b esp 117a-118b 

54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 829a-b 



188 

3. Mind in animals and in men 

3*. Mind, reason, or understanding as a specif- 
ic property of human nature: comparison 
of human reason with animal intelligence 
and instinct 

5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound [442-444] 

44c 
5 SOPHOCLES: Antigone [332-375] 134a-b; [683- 

684] 137a 
5 EURIPIDES: Suppliants [195-213] 260a-b / 

Trojan Women [665-672] 275d 

7 PLATO: Protagoras, 44a-c / Timaeus, 452c- 
454a 

8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK v, en 3 [132*17-22] 
183a / Physics, BK n, en 8 [199*20-23] 276c / 
Metaphysics, BK i, en i [98o*28- b 27] 499a-b 
/ Soul, BK n, CH 3 [414^7-20] 644d; [415*7- 
12] 645b; BK HI, CH 3 [427 b 7-i4] 659d-660a; 
[428*20-24] 660c; CH 10 [433 a 8-i3] 665d / 
Memory and Reminiscence, CH 2 [453*5-14] 
695b 

9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK i, CH i 
[488 b 2o-27] 9d; BK VIH, CH i [588*i8- b 4] 
114b,d / Parts of Animals, BK i, CH i [64^5- 
8] 164b-c / Generation of Animals, BK i, CH 23 
[73i*24- b 8] 271c-d; BK n, en 6 [744*27-51] 
285c / Ethics, BK i, CH 7 [i 097^3-1 098*7] 
343a-b; CH 13 [1102*33-1103*3] 347d-348c; BK 
in, cH2[nu b 6-i2]357b-c; BK vi, en 2 [1139* 
17-26] 387d; BK vii, CH 3 [n47*25- b 5] 
397c-d; BK ix, CH 9 [1170*16-18] 423d-424a; 
BK x, CH 7 [ii77 b 26-i 178*8] 432c; CH 8 [ii78 b 
23-32] 433c / Politics, BK i, CH 5 [i254 b 2o- 
25] 448b; BK vn, CH 13 [i332*39- b io] 537a-b; 
CH 15 [i334 b i2-28] 539c-d / Rhetoric, BK i, 
CH i [i355 b i-3] 594d 

12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 3 108b-c; CH 
6 110c-112b; CH 9 114c-116b; BK n, CH 8, 
146a-147a; BK HI, CH 7, 183c-184a; BK iv, CH 
7, 233a-b 

12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK in, SECT 16 262d- 
263a,c; BK v, SECT 16 271c-d; BK vi, SECT 23 
276b; BK vin, SECT 7 286a; SECT 41 288d; 
BK ix, SECT 9 292b-d 

17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR i, CH 7-13, 4a-6b 
esp CH 10, 5a / Third Ennead, TR HI, CH 4 
94c-95c; TR iv, CH 2 97d-98a / Fifth Ennead, 
TR i, CH 10, 213d-214a / Sixth Ennead, TR 
vii, CH 4-6 323c-325a 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par n 74a-b; 
BK xin, par 37 120d-121a / City of God, BK v, 
CH ii 216c-d; BK vn, CH 23, 256b-c; BK VIH, 
CH 6, 269a; BK xi, CH 27, 337d-338a; BK 
xxix, CH 24, 610c-d / Christian Doctrine, BK i, 
CH 8 626c-627a; CH 22, 629b-c 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 3, 
A i, REP 2 14b-15b; Q 18, A 2, REP i 105c- 
106b; A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 30, A 2, REP 3 
168a-169b; Q 59, A 3, ANS 308b-309a; Q 76, 
A 5, REP 4 394c-396a; Q 78, A 4, ANS and 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



REP 4-6 411d-413d; Q 79, A 5, REP 3 418c- 
419b; A 6, REP i 419b-420d; A 8, REP 3 421c- 
422b; A 10, REP 2 423d-424d; Q 83, A i, ANS 
436d-438a; Q 84, A 2, REP i 442b 443c; Q 86, 
A 4, REP 3 463d-464d; Q 91, A 3, REP 1-2 
486b-487d; Q 96, A i, REP 4 510b-511b; A 2, 
ANS 511b-d; Q 115, A 4, ANS 589d-590c; Q 118, 
A 2, ANS and REP 2 601c-603b; PART I-H, 
PROLOGUE 609a,c; Q i, A i, ANS 609b-610b; 
Q 10, A 3, ANS 664d-665c; Q 12, A 5 672a-c; 
Q 13, A 2, REP 3 673c-674c; Q 17, A 2 687d- 
688b 

20 AQUINAS : Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 50, 
A 3, REP 2 8b-9a; Q 110, A 4, REP 3 350d-351d; 
PART in SUPPL, Q 79, A i, ANS 951b-953b 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, xxxi [40-57] 
46c; PURGATORY, xxv [52-84] 91d 92b; PAR- 
ADISE, v [19-24] 112b 

23 HOB BBS: Leviathan, PART i, 57d; 59b-c; PART 

n, lOOa-c 
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 119b-d; 184a-c 

27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT iv, sc iv [32-39] , 
59a 

28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 428a; 454a 

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 35, 
163d-164a 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART i, 41b,d; PART 
iv, 51d-52a; PART v, 56a-b; 59a-60c / Medita- 
tions, 71b-d; ii 77d-81d / Objections and Re- 
plies, 156a-d; 209b; 226a-d; 276c 

31 SPINO/A: Ethics, PART in, PROP 57, SCHOL 
415b 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK vin [379-411] 
240b-241a; BK ix [549-566] 259b 

33 PASCAL: Pensees, ^39-348 233a-234a; 365 
236a; 397 240b / Vacuum, 357a-358a 

35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH vi, SECT 56-58 
36d-37b; CH xiv, SECT 163-164 63a-c / 
Human Understanding, INTRO, SECT i 93a-b; 
BK ii, en xi, SECT 4-1 1 144d-146a csp SECT 
lo-n 145d-146a; CH xxvn, SECT 12 223a-b; 
BK in, CH vi, SECT 26-27 274d-276a; SECT 
29 276b-d; CH x, SECT 17 295d-296b; CH 
xi, SLCT 20 304c-d; BK iv, CH xvn, SECT i 
371c-d 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART iv, 151b 152a; 159b- 
160a 

38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i, ld-2b 
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 336b-c; 337d-338a; 
341d; 349b-c / Social Contract, BK i, 393b-c 
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 409d-410a 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 199c-200c / Fund. Prin. 
Metaphysic of Morals, 256d-257a; 264d-265a; 
281c-282c / Practical Reason, 316c-317a / 
Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 372a-b 
/ Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 386b-d / 
Judgement, 479a-c; 584d-585c; 587a-588a; 
602b,d [fn i] 

43 MILL: Liberty, 294d-295b 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 21 
17a-c; PART in, par 262-264 83d-84a; ADDI- 



3* *> 4* 



CHAPTER 58: MIND 



189 



TIONS, 4 116a-d; 121 136c-d; 157 142b-c / 

Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156c; 168b-d; 

178a-b; 186a; 198a; PART i, 258a; PART in, 

304d-305b 
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 287a-c; 319b-c; 

331b-332a 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE 11, 689c- 

690a 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 85a-b; 678b-686b csp 
686a-b; 691a-b 

54 FREUD: Unconscious, 429c-d 

3. Mentality as a common property of men 
and animals: the differences between hu- 
man and animal intelligence in degree 
or quality 

9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK vm, CH i 

[588*18^4] 114b,d; BK ix, CH 7 [612^8-32] 

138b-c / Parts of Animals, BK iv, CH 10 

[686*22-687*23] 218b-d 
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [1028- 

1090] 74c-75b 
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 52b; 53a-b; 53d; 

54a; 63a; 64a-c; 79c; PART 11, lOOa-c; PART 

iv, 267b 
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 215a-232c esp 216c-219a, 

231d-232c 

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 35, 
163d-164a 

31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 209b; 
226a-d 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK VHI [369-397] 
240a-b 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK 11, CH 
xxvn, SECT 8 221a-222a; BK in, CH vi, SECT 
12 271d-272b esp 272b; SECT 22 273d-274a; 
BK iv, CH xvi, SECT 12, 370c-371a 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT ix 487b- 
488c 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 337d-338a 

42 KANT: Judgement, 602b,d [fn i] 

43 MILL: Utilitarianism, WSa-MQc passim ;469c-d 
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 287a-303d esp 

287a-c, 294c; 319b-d; 591d-592a 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 689c- 
690a 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 5a-6b; 13a-15a passim; 
47b-51a passim, esp 49b-50a; 85a-b; 676b- 
677a; 678b-686b; 690 b; 691a-b; 704a-706b; 
873a 

54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 385 b-c 

3c. The evolution of mind or intelligence 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 337d-342c; 348d- 

349c 
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 281a-c; 286c-288d; 

299b-c; 320a-330a,c esp 320a-321b, 328b-d; 

349b-d; 566b-567b; 59 Id -5 92 a 
53 JAMES: Psychology, 41b; 51a-52b; 95b-98a; 

800b; 851a-861a esp 851a-b, 857b-858a, 

859a-860a; 878a; 890a-897b esp 897a-b 



54 FREUD: Instincts, 413a-d / General Introduc- 
tion, 591d-592b / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 
647a-648a / Ego and Id, 707b-708b esp 708a-b 

4. The various states of the human mind 

4a. Individual differences in intelligence: de- 
grees of capacity for understanding 

4 HOMER: Odyssey, BK vin [165-185] 223d~224a 

5 ARISTOPHANES: Frogs [1482-1499] 581d-582a 

7 PLATO: Republic, BK v, 358a-360c; BK vi, 
373c-375b; 383c-d; BK vn, 401b-c / Theaete- 
tus, 513a-d; 528a; 540c-541a / Seventh Letter, 
809c-810d esp 810c 

8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 34 
[89 b io-i5] 122c / Topics, BK vin, CH 14 [163** 
8-16] 222a 

9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK iv, CH 10 
[686 b 22-29] 218b-c / Rhetoric, BK HI, CH i 
[1404*15-19] 654b; CH 2 [1405*7-9] 655b / 
Poetics, CH 22 [1459*5-7] 694< * 

12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK HI, CH 6, 182a-b 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK iv, par 31 26c- 
27a; BK xm, par 47, 123d-124a 

19 AQUINAS : Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 89, 
A i, ANS 473b-475a; Q 117, A i, ANS 595d-597c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 10, 
A 4, REP i 771b-772a 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 60a-61a; 66c-67a; 

67d-68c; 84c-d; PART n, 154a-b 
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 60a-c; 65a; 71d-72b; 

150c-151a; 240a-c; 319c-320a 
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART i, 41b,d 
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 13, SCHOL 

378a-c; PART v, PROP 38-39 461d-462c 
33 PASCAL: Penstes, 1-2 171a-172b; 7 173a 
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH x, 

SECT 8 142d-143a; CH xi, SECT 2 144a-c 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT ix, DIV 
84, 488b,d [fn i] 

36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 235b-236a; 269b- 
270a; 271b-273a 

39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK i, 7d-8a 

42 KANT: Judgement, 525c-532a esp 526a-d, 
528o530c; 586a-587a 

43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 79, 234b-d 

43 MILL: Liberty, 297c-299a / Representative 
Government, 385b-d 

44 Bos WELL: Johnson, 20c; 283c 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 166 
59d-60a; ADDITIONS, 107 134a-b / Philosophy 
of History, INTRO, 166b-168a 

47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [522-613] 15a-17a 
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 266c; 566a-567b 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK vi, 263c-d; BK 

xv, 639a-b 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 14b-15a; 274a-275a; 315a- 
b; 345b; 381 a; 431b-432aesp432b-433b[fn ij; 
678b; 686b-690a; 691b-693a passim 

54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 787d- 
788b [fn 3] 



190 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



4 to 4d(2) 



(4. The various states of the human mind.) 

4b. The mentality of children 

7 PLATO: Laches, 3Sd / Apology, 200c-d / 
Gorgias, 261a-c / Republic, BK 11, 320c-321d 
esp 321d; BK iv, 353b-c 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK r, CH i [i84 a 2i- b i4] 
259b; BK vii, CH 3 [2^ 13-248%] 330c-d / 
Memory and Reminiscence, en i [45o a 26- b 9J 
691a-b 

9 ARISTOTLE: History of Animals, BK vni, CH i 
[588 a i8- b i] 114b,d / Parts of Animals, BK iv, 
CH 10 [686 h 22-29] 218b-c / Ethics, BK i, en 3 
[i094 b 29-io95 a i2] 340a-b; BK in, CH 12 fni9 a 
34~ b i9] 366a,c; BK vi, en 8 [ii42 a i2-i9J 
391b; BK x, CH 3 [1174*1-4] 428b 

12 LUCRETIUS -.Nature of Things, BKIII [445-450] 
35d 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par 7-13 2c-4c 
/ City of God, BK xxi, CH 16 573b-574a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 85, 
A i, ANS 455b-457a 

23 HOBBLS: Leviathan, PART i, 60b 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 72b-73c 

27 SHAK ESP FARE: Troilus and Cressida, ACT n, 
sc IT [163-173] 115b 

35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH vi, SECT 54-63 
36c-38c passim / Unman Understanding, BK i, 
CH i 95b,d-103d esp SECT 15-16 98d-99c; CH 
u, SECT 22 llla-b; BK n, en i, SECT 1-8 121a- 
123a csp SECT 6-8 122b-123a; SECT 21-22 
126d-127a; CH ix, SECT 5-7 138d-139b; en 
xi, SECT 8-9 145b-c; CH xxxin, SECT 7-10 
249b-d 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 
14 408d-409a 

35 I IUME : Human Understanding, SECT iv, DIV 33, 
463c-d 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xir, 559d 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 270a; 413b [fn 2); 456b- 
457a; 684b-685a 

54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 241 b-c; 
363b-364b; 379d-380b / Narcissism, 400a / 
General Introduction, 526d-527b / Civilization 
and Its Discontents, 768b-c 

4c. The states of the possible intellect: its po- 
tentiality, habits, and actuality 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vii, CH 3 [247 b i- 
248*9] 330b-d / Soul, BK n, CH i [4i2 a 6-i2] 
642a; [4i2 8 22-28] 642b; CH 5 [4i7 a 2i-4i8 a 6] 
647d-648d; BK in, CH 4 [429 b 5~43o B 2] 661d- 
662b 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 19, 
A i, ANS 108d-109c; Q 34, A i, REP 2 185b- 
187b; Q 79, A 4, REP 2 417a-418c; AA 6-7 419b- 
421c; A 10, ANS 423d-424d; A 12, ANS 425c- 
426b; Q 84, A 7, REP i 449b-450b; Q 86, A 2, 
ANS and REP 2 462a-463a; Q 87, AA 1-3 465a- 
468a 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 31, SCHOL 
366d-367a 



4d. The condition of the mind prior to experi- 
ence 

4^(1) The mind as completely potential: the 
mind as a tabula rasa 

8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK HI, en 4 [429^3-4 30*2] 
662a-b 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 79, 
A 2, ANS 414d-416a; Q 84, A 3 443d-444d; A 6 
447c-449a; Q 89, A i, REP 3 473b-475a; Q 117, 
A i, ANS 595d-597c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in, Q 9, 
A i, ANS 763b-764c 

33 PASCAL: Pensees, 327 231a-b 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, 90d-91b; BK i 
95b,d-121a,c csp en i, SECT i 95b,d-96a, 
SECT 15 98d-99a, SECT 23 101b-102a, CH n, 
SECT 22 llla-b, CH in, SFCT 23 119b 120a; 
BK n, CH i 121a-127d csp SECT 2 121b-c, 
SECT 6 122b-c, SECT 9 123a, SECT 17 125c d, 
SECT 20-25 126d-127d; CH ix, SECT 6 139a; 
en xi, siicr 16-17 147a-b 

35 HUME: Hitman Understanding, SLOT n 455b- 
457b 

36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 234b-235a 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 49b-50a; 852b-861a esp 
852b, 859b 860b' 

4d(2) The innate endowment of the mind with 
ideas: instinctive determinations 

7 PLATO: Phacdrus, 124a-126c csp 126a-c / 
Meno, 179d-183a; 188d-189a / Phaedo, 228a- 
230d 

8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH i 
97a-d; BK 11, CH 19 [99 h 2o-33] 136a-b / 
Metaphysics, BK i, CH 9 [9<;2 l) 2 j-993 ll n] 51 la c 

12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 22, 127c-d; 
BK IT, en n, 150a-c 

17 PLOTINUS: First Enncad, TR n, CH 4, 8b-c / 
Fourth Ennead, TR in, CIT 25, 155b; TR iv, en 
5 160d-161b / Fifth Ennead, TR in, CH 2, 216b 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 10 73d- 
74a; par 16-19 75b-76b; par 26-38 78a-81a / 
City of God, BK VTII, en 6, 269b-c / Christian 
Doctrine, BK i, CH 9 62 7a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 84, 
A 3 443d-444d; A 4, ANS 444d-446b; A 6, 
ANS 447c-449a; Q 89, A i, RLP 3 473b-475a; 
Q 117, A i, ANS 595d-597c 

28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 333d-335a 
esp 334c-d 

30 BACON: Advancement of learning, lb-c 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, iv, 5c-d; 6d; VIH, 13c-d / 
Discourse, PARF iv, 53 b; PART v, 54c / Medi- 
tations, ii-iii 77d-89a csp in, 83b; vi, 96d- 
97a / Objections and Replies, 120c-d; 140c; 
215b-c; 224b,d 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART v, PROP 23, SCHOL 
458c-d 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, 90d-91b; BK i 
95b,d-121a,c esp CH i, SECT i 95b,d*96a, 
SECT 15 98d-99a, SECT 23 101b-102a, CH in, 



4</(3) to 5a 



CHAPTER 58: MIND 



191 



SECT 21 118b-119a; BK n, CH i, SECT 9-25 

123a-127d esp SECT 9 123a, SECT 17 125c-d, 

SECT 20-24 126d-127c; CH ix, SECT 6 139a; 

CH xi, SECT 16-17 147a-b 
35 HUME: Hitman Understanding, SECT n, DIV 17, 

457b,d [fn i] 
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 58c-59b; 113c-118a / 

Practical Reason, 352c-353a / Judgement, 551a- 

552c 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 49b-50a; 767b 

54 FREUD: General Introduction, 512b-513b; 
526d; 532b; 599a-b / Group Psychology, 
688d-689b / Ego and Id, 707c 708b esp 708b/ 
Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 72 la 

4</(3) The transcendental or a priori forms and 
categories of the mind 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 14a-108a,c csp 14a-15c, 
22a,c, 23a-24a, 25b-c, 27c, 28d-29d, 32a-c, 
34a-c, 37b-39c, 41c-45b, 48d-51d, 52c-55a, 
56d 59b, 61a-62c, 65d-66d, 94b 95a, 99a- 
lOlb; 146a; 186d-187a; 192a-b / Practical 
Reason, 307d 308b; 349b-350c 

53 jAMhs: P*vchohgy, 628b-631a; 8Sla-852a; 
859a 882a 'esp 859b~861b, 865b, 867a 868a, 
879b; 886b 889a esp 889a 

4e. The condition of the human mind when the 
soul is separate from the body 

7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 124a-126c / Phaedo, 223a- 
225c; 246d-247b / Republic, BK x, 440d- 
441a,c 

8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK in, en 5 [43o n 2o-25] 
662d 

12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK iv, SECT 21 265b-c 

13 VIKGIL: Acneid, BK vi [724-751] 230b-231a 

17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR in, CH 18 
151b-c; TR in, CH 25-TR iv, CH 5 154d-161b 

18 AUGUSTINL: City of God, BK xxn, en 30, 
618a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 77, 
A 8 406b-407a; Q 89 473a-480c 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xxv 

[i-io8j 91b-92c csp [79-84] 92b 
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART v, PROP 21 458a; PROP 

23 458b-d; PROP 40 462c-d 
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 233d 
44 Bos WELL -.Johnson, 192d-193c 

4/. Supernatural states of the human intellect: 
the state of innocence; beatitude; the 
human intellect of Christ 

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 2:17-20; 3:4-7,22 / 

Exodus, 33:11-23 / Ezefyel, i; 10 (D) Eze> 

chiel, i; 10 
NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 5:8 /John, 14:19-21 

/ / Corinthians, 13:12 / // Corinthians, 12:1-4 

/IJohn,y.2 

18 AUGUSTINE : Confessions, BK ix, par 25 68c / 
City of God, BK x, CH 2 299d-300a; CH 28 
316b-d; BK xxii, CH 29 614b-616d 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 84, 



A 5 446c-447c; Q 86, A 2, REP i 462a-463a; Q 
94 501c-506a; Q 101 522c-523d 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART HI, Q 5, 
A 4 739a-740b; Q 6, A 2 741c-742a; QQ 9-12 
763b-779d; PART in SUPPL, Q 92 1025b-1037c 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, v [1-12] 
112a-b; vn [64-84] 115d-116a; xin [31-111] 
125d-126c; xiv [1-66] 126d-127c; xv [57-84] 
128d-129b; xxi [82-102] 139a-b; xxxn [159]- 
xxxin [145] 156a-157d 

5. The weakness and limits of the human mind 

5a. The fallibility of the human mind: the 
causes of error 

7 PLATO: Phaedo, 224a-225a / Republic, BK vn, 
388a-389d / Theaetetus, 536c-544a / Sophist, 
557b-558d csp 558b 

8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK n, CH 21 87d- 
89 b / Posterior Analytics, BK i, CH 16-18 
109b-lllc / Sophistical Refutations, CH i 
[i65 a i3-i8] 227c / Metaphysics, BK iv, CH 5 
[ioo9 a i5-ioio' 4 i4] 528c-529d; CH 6 [1011^-13] 
530d; CH 7 [ioi2 a i8-22] 532a; BK ix, en 10 
[I05i b i8-io52 a 4] 577d-578a,c; BK xi, CH 6 
[io62 b i2-24] 590d-591a / Soul, BK n, CH 6 
[418*6-18] 648d-649a; BK in, CH 3 [427^-15] 
659d-660a; [ 4 28 tt 5-42 9 a 2] 660b-661a; CH 6 
[43o a 26- b 5] 662d-663a; [4^o b 26-3o] 663b-c; 
CH 10 [433 a 2i-28] 665d-666a / Dreams, en 2 
[46o a 33- b 27] 704b-d 

9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK in, CH 7 [i4o8 tt 2o- 
25] 659b 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK iv [353- 
521] 48d-51a esp [469-521] 50b-51a 

12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK vn, SECT 55 
283 b-c 

18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xi, CH 2, 323c; 
BK xix, CH 18 523a-b / Christian Doctrine, 
BK i, CH 9 627a; CH 12 627c-d; BK in, CH 28 
668a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 17, 
A i, ANS and REP 2 lOOd-lOld; A 3 102d-103c; 
Q 84, A 8 450b-451b; Q 85, A i, REP i 451c- 
453c; A 6 458d-459c; Q 89, A 5, ANS 477a- 
478b; Q 94, A 4 505a-506a 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 
53, A i, ANS 19d 21a 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, xin [88- 
142] 126b-d 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 57d-58a; 58d-60a 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 14c-15a; 271a-276a csp 
273b-274a; 287b-292d; 497c-d; SOOb-d; 517d- 
518b 

26 SHAKESPEARE: Troilus and Cressida, ACT v, 
sc n [106-114] 136a 

28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 268a-c / On 
Animal Generation, 333 b-c 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 2c-4c; lla- 
15a passim; 27a-c; 38d-39a; 51c-d; 60a 61c 
esp 61b-c; 90b-d / Novum Organum, BK i 
107a-136a,c passim, esp-APH 38-68 109c-116a 



192 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



(5. The weakness and limits of the human mind. 
5a. The fallibility of the human mind: the 
causes of error.) 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, H, 3a; vnr, 13a-b; xn, 
22c-23b / Meditations, i-n 75a-81d csp n, 
80a, 80d-81a; in, 83a; iv 89a 93a; vi, lOOa- 
103d / Objections and Replies, 141a; 142c; 
215b 216c; 229d-230d 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 17, SCHOL 
381 b-d; PROP 24-31 383c-385c; PROP 40, 
SCHOL 2-pROP 41 388a-c; PROP 44, COROL i, 
SCHOL 389c-390a; PROP 47, SCHOL 390c-39Ia; 
PROP 49, SCHOL 391d-394d 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK VHI [179-197] 
236a-b 

33 PASCAL: Penstes, 82-^8 186b-189b; 365-366 
236a; 394-395 240b / Geometrical Demonstra- 
tion, 440b-441b 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xi, 
SECT 3 144c-d; CH xxi, SECT 60-70 194a-197b 
passim; CH xxx, SECT 2 238b-c; CH xxxm 
248b-251d csp SECT 18 251a-c; BK in, CH ix, 
SECT 21 290c-291a; CH x, SECT 16 295d; CH 
xi, SECT 4 300c; BK iv, CH xvn, SECT 9-13 
377d-378c; CH xx 388d-394c 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 
1-4 405a-d 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 6, 
453c; SECT v, DIV 45 469c; SECT VH, DIV 48 
470d-471c 

36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 194a; 234b-236b 
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i, Id 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, la-b; 108a-d; 109b-c; 
129c-173a esp 133c-d; 193a-b; 200c-209d; 
229b-c; 233d-234b / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic 
of Morals, 260d-261b; 283d-284d 

43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER i, 29d; NUMBER 37, 
118c 

43 MILL: Liberty, 274b-293b passim; 293d 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 122b-125b; 241a-b;361a-b; 
460a-469a esp 462b-464a, 468b-469a; 508a- 
520a esp 508a; 610b-625a passim, esp 618b- 
621a, 625a 

54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 148d-149a; 
210c-d; 337a-c; 379b-d / General Introduction, 
453b-476a,c passim; 602b-c / War and Death, 
760d-761a / New Introductory Lectures, 
819b-c 

5b. The natural limits of the mind: the unknow- 
able; objects which.transcend its powers; 
reason's critical determination of its own 
limits or boundaries 

OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 33:12-33 / Job, 9:21; 
11:7-9; 26:14; 28:12-21; 36:26; 37:14-23; 
38:1-42:6 / Psalms, 139:1-6 (D) Psalms, 
138:1-6 / Proverbs, 20:24; 25:3; 27:1 / EC- 
clesiastes, 3:11; 6:11-12; 8:7,16-17; 9:11- 
12; 11:2-6 (D) Ecclesiastes, 3:11; 6:11-7:1; 
8:7,16-17; 9:11-12; 11:2-6 / Isaiah, 55:8-9 
(D) Isaias, 55:8-9 



APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 9 .-9-18-- (D) 
OT, Boo{ of Wisdom, 9:9-19 / Ecclesiasticus, 
1:1-3; 18:4-7; 24:27-29 (D) OT, Ecclesiasti- 
cus, 1:1-2; 18:4-6; 24:37-39 
NEW TESTAMENT: Mar\, 13:31-37 / John, 1:18 
/ Acts, 1:6-7 / Romans, 11:33-34 / f Corin- 
thians, 2:16 / / Timothy, 6:14-16 / James, 
4:13-15 

5 AESCHYLUS: Suppliant Maidens [86-95] 2a ' D 
5 SOPHOCLES: Ajax [1419-1421] 155c 
5 EURIPIDES: Helen [1137-1150] 309a 

7 PLATO: Parmenides, 489d-491a 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK n, CH 4 [196*5-7] 272c; 
[i96 b 5-7] 273a / Metaphysics, BK i, CH 2 
[982 b 28-983 R n] 501a-b; BK n, CH i [993*30- 
b n] 511b,d; BK XH, CH 7 [io72 b i3~29] 602d- 
603a 

9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK i, CH 5 
[644 b 2o-645 a 4] 168c-d / Ethics, BK x, CH 7 
[H77 b 29-i 178*2] 432c 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK iv [469-521] 
50b-51a 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par i la-b; BK 
vi, par 6-8 36c-37c / City of God, BK vm, 
CH 6, 269b-c; BK x, CH 31 319b-d; BK xn, 
CH 7 346c-d 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q i, A i 
3b-4a; Q 3, A 4, REP 2 16d-17c; Q 12, A 4 53b- 
54c; AA n-i2 59d-61c; Q 29, A i, REP i 162a- 
163b; Q 32, A i 175d-178a; Q 46 250a-255d; 
Q 50, A 2, ANS 270a-272a; Q 79, A 4, ANS 417a- 
418c; Q 84, A 5 446c-447c; AA 7-8 449b-451b; 
Q 85, A 8 460b-461b; Q 86 461b-464d; Q 88 
468d-473a; Q 94, AA 1-2 501d-504a; Q 117, 
A 2, ANS and REP i 597c-598c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 68, 
A 2 89c-90c; Q 91, A 4 210c-211c; Q 93, A 2 
216c-217b; Q 109, A i 338b-339c; Q 112, A 5 
359c-360c; PART H-II, Q 2, A 3 392d-393c; 
Q 8, A i 417a-d; Q 9, A i 423c-424b 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, VH [61-96] 
lOb-c; PURGATORY, in [22-45] 56a-b; x [121- 
129] 68c-d; PARADISE, n [46-148] 108b-109b 
passim; iv [28-48] Ilia; xix [40-90] 135c- 
136a; xxi [82-102] 139a-b 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 49a; 52c; 54a-c; 

78d-79a; PART n, 163a 
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 80b-82b; 209a-c; 212a- 

215a; 238c-239c; 267c-268a; 271b-273b; 291b- 

294b; 497b-502c passim, esp 501d-502c 
28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 273c-d / On 

Animal Generation, 389b; 492c 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 2c-4c; 
17b-c; 41b-d; 54b-c; 96d-97b / Novum Or- 
ganum, BK i, APH 1-2 107a-b; APH 9-10 107d; 
APH 21 108b-c; APH 37 109b-c; APH 48 HOd- 
llla; BK n, APH 15 149a 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART i, 43c / Medita- 
tions, i 75a-77c passim; in, 86d-87a; iv 89a- 
93a; vi 96 b- 103d passim / Objections and Re- 
plies, 112a-c; 123d-126b; 168d-169a; 215d- 
216c; 259a-b 



5bto 6 



CHAPTER 58: MIND 



193 



31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, AXIOM 5 373d; PROP 
24-31 383c-385c 

32 MILTON -.Paradise Lost, BK v [544-576] 187a-b; 
BK vi [296-301] 202b; BK vn [109-130] 219b- 
220a; BK vin [114-130] 234b-235a / Samson 
Agomstcs [293-314] 346a-b 

33 PASCAL: Pensees, 72 181a-184b; 184-241 205a- 
217b 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, 87d; INTRO 
93a-95d; BK n, CH i, SECT 5 122a-b; SECT 24 
127b-c; en ii, SECT 3 128b-c; CH vir, SECT 10 
133a-b; CH x, SECT 9 143a-c; en xiv, SECT 26 
160c-d; CH xv, SECT n 165a-b; CH xxn, 
SECT 9 202c-203a; CH xxiri, SECT 12-13 207a- 
208b passim; SECT 36 213c-d; BK rrr, CH m, 
SECT 2 254d-255a; CH vi, SECT 9 270d-271a; 
CH xi, SECT 23 305a-b; BK iv, CH in 313a- 
323d; CH vi, SLCT 4-16 331d-336d passim; 
CH x, SECT i9354a-c; CH xn, SECT 9-13 360d- 
362d passim; CH xiv, SECT 1-2 364b-c; en 
xvi, SECT 12 370b-371a; CH xvm, SECT 7 
383b 

35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTUO, SECT 
1-3 405a-c; SECT 81 428c-d; SECT 101 432c-d 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, si-,cr i, DIV 2 
451b c; DIV 6-10 453b-455b passim; SECT 11, 
DIV 13-16 455d-457a; SECT iv, DIV 26 460b-c; 
DIV 29 461a-d; SECT v, DIV 36, 464d-465a; 
SECT vn, DIV 57, 475b-c; DIV 60 477a~c; SECT 
vin, DIV 62, 478c; DIV 71-72 482c-483c; DIV 
81 487a; SECT xi, DIV no 501a-b; SECT xn 
503c-509d passim, csp DIV 130 508c-d 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 308c-d 

42 KANT: Pure Reason la-250a,c csp la-13d, 15c- 
16c, 19a, 20a, 25b-26b, 27b-28b, 29d-33d, 
53b-54b,93c-99a, 101b-107b, 129c-130a, 133a- 
134d, 146a-149d, 153a-c, 157d, 175b [fn i], 
196b-197c, 200c-209d, 215d-216c, 217d-218a, 
219a-227a, 229b-c, 230c-235a, 247a-b, 248d- 
250a,c / Fund. Pnn. Metaphysic of Morals, 
260d-261b; 281c-282d; 283d-287d / Practical 
Reason, 296a-d; 307d-308b; 309b; 310d 314d; 
331a-332d; 335c-337c csp 33 7a c; 354d-355d 
/ judgement, 461 a-c; 465a-c; 497a-498b; 
547b-d; 551a-552c; 564a-c; 570b-572b; 574b- 
577a; 579a; 581a-b; 584c-d; 599d-600d; 603a- 
604b 

44 BoswhLL:/o^/wo>2, 126b; 129a 

47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [354-376] lla-b; [558- 
565] 15b; [602-655] 16b-17b; [1064-1067] 26b; 
[1765-1784] 42 b; [1810-1815] 43a; PART n 
[4917-4922] 122a; [11,433-452] 278a-b 

48 MELVILLE: Moby Dtc{, 244b-245b; 272b- 
276b esp 276a-b; 366a-b 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 50b-c; BK v, 
196a-197c; EPILOGUE n, 693d-694d 

52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v, 
120d-121c 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 223b-224a; 262a-269a; 
388a; 400a-b; 822b 

54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 383 b-c / 
Unconscious, 430b-c 



5c. The elevation of the human mind by divine 
grace: faith and the supernatural gifts 

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 15; 17:1-19:23; 22:9- 
18; 26:1-6; 46:1-4 / Exodus, 19; 24 csp 24:12- 
18; 31:1-11; 33:11-23 / Numbers, 12 /Joshua, 
37~ 8 ; 5 : M-6:5-(^) Jowe, 3:7-8; 5:1^-6:5 
/ Judges, 6:11-24 / / Kings, 3:5-151 4 :2 9~345 
9:1-9; i9-(D) /// Kings, 3:5-15; 4- 2 9-34; 
9:1-9; 19/7 Chronicles, 17--- (/)) / Paralipome- 
non, 17 / Isaiah, 6(D) Isaias, 6 / Ezetycl, i; 
10 (D) Ezechiel, i; 10 / Daniel, i; 7-12 

NEW TESTAMENT: Matthew, 17:1-9 / Lu%e, 2:25- 
35 /John, 1:1-18 / Acts, 2:1-21; g:r-3; 10:44- 
47/7 Corinthians, 2:6-16; 14 / // Corinthians, 
12:1-9 / Revelation (D) Apocalypse 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK i, par i la-b; BK 
vi, par 6-8 36c-37c; BK ix, par 23-25 68a-c; 
BK x, par 65 87d-88a / City of God, BK x, 
CH 2-3 299d-301a; BK xi, CH 2 323a-c; BK 
xix, CH 18 523a-b; BK xxn, CH 29, 614b-d / 
Christian Doctrine, BK in, CH 37, 674c-d; BK 
iv, CH 15-16 685c-686c 

19 AQIJINVS: Summa Theohgica, PART i, Q i, A 

1 3b-4a; Q 2, A 2, REP i lld-12c; Q 12 50b-62b; 
Q 32, A i 175d-178a; Q 79, A 4, ANS and REP i 
417a-418c; Q 84, A 5 446c 447c; Q 86, A 4, REP 

2 463d-464d; Q 105, A 3 540c-541b 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, QQ 
68-69 87c-101c; Q 109, A i 338b-339c; PART 
ii-n, QQ 8-9 416d-426c; Q 45 598c-603c 

21 DANrt: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, n [34-45] 
108a; xiv [34-66] 127b-c; xix [40-66] 135c-d 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 209a-c; 212a-d; 238c- 
239c; 267c-268a; 292a-294b esp 294a-b 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 17b-c; 
19b-c; 39d-40a; 41b-d; 54b-c; 55b-c; 95d- 
97b 

31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 125b- 
126a; 168d-169a 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK xn [552-587)3313- 
332a 

33 PASCAL: Pensees, 202 211a; 430-435 245a-251a; 
881 345b 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 190d-191a 
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 394a-b; 395a-b 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 50b-c; BK v, 
196a-198b; BK xi, 525c-d 

52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK i, 
13c-d; BK vn, 189a-191a,c csp 191a,c 

6. The reflexivity of mind: the mind's knowl- 
edge of itself and its acts 

7 PLATO: Charmides, 8b-9d 

8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK xn, CH 7 
[io72 b i3-29] 602d-603a; CH 9 [io74 b 35- 
1075*4] 605c / Soul, BK in, CH 4 [429 b 5-9] 
661 d; [429 b 25~43o a 9] 662 b-c; CH 6 [43o b 2i- 
26] 663b / Memory and Reminiscence, CH 2 
[452^3-28] 694d-695a 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK ix, CH 9 [ii7o a 28- b i] 
424a 



194 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



7 to 7b 



(6. The reflewityo/mmd: the mind's knowledge 
of itself and its acts.) 

12EpicTETus: Discourses, BK i, CH i, 105a-b; 

CH 17 122d-124a; CH 20, 126c-d 
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK xi, SECT i 302a-b 

17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR ix, CH 3, 137c-d 
/ Fifth Ennead, TR HI, CH 1-6 215d-219b 

18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xi, CH 26 336d- 
337b 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 14, 
\ 2, REP 1-3 76d-77d; Q 16, A 2 95c-96b; Q 28, 
A 4, REP 2 160c-161d; Q 56, A i, ANS 292a-d; 
Q 85, A 2, ANS and REP i 453d-455b; Q 86, A 

1, REP 3 461c-462a; Q 87 464d-468d; Q 88, A 

2, REP 3 471c-472c; Q 89, A 2, ANS 475a-d; 
PART i-ii, Q 17, A 6 690 b-d 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xvm 

[49-60] 80b-c 
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 51d-52a / 

Meditations, n 77d-81d esp 77d-79a; vi, 96d- 

97a / Objections and Replies, 162b; 207b; 209d- 

210b; 276b-c 
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 21, SCHOL 383a; 

PROP 23 383 b-c; PROP 27-29 384b-385a 
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, 87d; INTRO 

93a 95d; BK n, CH i, SECT 1-8 121a-123a; 

SECT 10 123 b-d; SECT 24 127b-c; CH vi 131b-c; 

CH ix, SECT 1-2 138b-c; CH xi, SECT 14, 

146d; CH xiv, SECT 4 155d-156a; CH xix 175b- 

176b; CH xxi, SECT 30 185a-c; CH xxm, SECT 

i 204a-b; SECT 5 205a-b; SECT 15 208c-d; 

SECT 32 212c-d 
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 7-9 

453c-455a passim 
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 349 b-c 

41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 150c 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15d-16c; 31a-32c; 49c- 
51d; 55a-56c; 99a lOlb; 120c-129c esp 121a- 
123b, 126a-128b; 200c-204c / Fund. Prin. 
Metaphysic of Morals, 271a-c; 281c-282d / 
Practical Reason, 292a-c; 307d-310c; 337a-b / 
Judgement, 600c-d 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART n, par 138 
48c-d / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 160c- 
161a; 165a-b; PART i, 257d-258a; PART n, 
259a-b; PART HI, 306a-b 

52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK xi, 341c 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 121a-b; 122b-126a; 177a- 
178a; 191a-b; 196a-197a; 222b-224a; 685a- 
686a 

54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 180b-181b; 
383b-c / Narcissism, 408c-409a / Unconscious, 
429c-430c 

7. The nature and phases of consciousness: the 
realm of the unconscious 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 43a-44a; 90b 93a esp 92b; 
98a-115a esp 107b-114b; 146a-167a esp 154a- 
155b, 157b-161a, 165a-167a 

54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 197d-198a; 
367b-c; 382a 385c esp 384a-385c / Uncon- 
scious 428a-443d esp 428b-429b, 430d-431d, 



436b-437a, 438c-d, 439d, 442b-443a / General 
Introduction, 452a-c; 531d-532c esp 532b ; 566c- 
567b / Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 646b- 
647c / Ego and Id, 697b-702c esp 697b-698d, 
700a-701d / War and Death, 760a-b / Civiliza- 
tion and Its Discontents, 769a-770c / New 
Introductory Lectures, 834d-838c esp 83 6 b 837 d 

la. The nature of self-consciousness 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, 51d-52a / 

Meditations, n, 77d-79a 
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK 11, en 

xxvn, SECT 9-26 222a-227d passim; BK iv, 

CH ix, SECT 2-3 349a-c 
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 121a-123b / Practical 

Reason, 292d [fn i] 
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART H, par 137- 

140, 48a-50a / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 

160c-161a; 165a b 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 297 a- c 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 688a- 

689b 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 147a-149a; 188a-197a esp 
191a-197a; 204b-259b esp 205a-206a, 213a- 
240a; 471b-472b; 685a-686a 

54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 767d- 
768d 

lb. The degrees or states of consciousness: 
waking, dreaming, sleeping 

7 PLATO: Republic, BK v, 370d-371b; BK ix, 
416a-c 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK vn, CH 3 [247 b i3~ 
248*6] 330c-d / Metaphysics, BK xn, CH 7 
[io72 b i3-29] 602d-603a / Soul, BK n, CH i 
[412*22-28] 642b / Sleep, CH i [454*1-6] 
696b-c; [454^3-27] 697b; CH 2 [455^-13] 
698a-b; [456*26-29] 699a; CH 3 [456^-17! 
699c/ Dreams, CH i 702a-703a; CH 3 [46o b 28- 
461*8] 704d-705a; [461*31^11] 705c; [462*15- 
31] 706b-d 

12 LucRE-nus: Nature of Things, BK iv [749- 
776] 54a-b; [907-1036] 56a-57c 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 84, 
A 8, CONTRARY and REP 2 450b-451b; Q 86, 
A 4, REP 2 463d-464d 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART in SUPPL, 
Q 82, A 3, ANS 971a-972d 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 50d-51d 
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 176c-180b; 290b-c 
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART iv, Sic; 53c-54b 
/ Meditations, \, 75d-76b; vi, 103b-d / Objec- 
tions and Replies, 162 b 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART n, PROP 49, SCHOL, 
393b-c 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK v [28-128] 176a- 
178a esp [100-109] 177b 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH i, 
SECT 10-19 123b-126c; CH xix 175b-176b 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART i, 220c- 
221a 

48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic\, 19a-20a; 115b'117a; 
149a-150a; 313a b 



7c to 



CHAPTER 58: MIND 



195 



51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK HI, 147c-148c; 
BK xr, 481a-482b; 524c-527a; BK xm, 583d; 
BK xiv, 601c-602d 

52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK xx, 
337a-346a 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 98a-103b; 107a-114b esp 
108b-109b; 130a-139a esp 130a-132a, 137a- 
139a; 154a-b; 261a-262a; 643 b [fn i]; 836a- 
850a passim, esp 839b-840b 

54 FREUD: Interpretation of Dreams, 137a-176d 
passim, esp 149c-153c, 157a-164d, 169b-174d; 
229d-230a; 234b-235c; 314c-320c esp 315b, 
319c-320b; 332a-340a esp 336d-340a; 352d- 
357c esp 353d-354a, 357a; 358d-359d; 366d- 
370a esp 367c-d; 373a-377b / Narcissism, 
408d-409a / General Introduction, 477d-483d 
esp 478b-d; 485a-486a; 518c-519c esp 519b; 
535a-c; 537a-539b esp 538d-539a; 617b-c / 
Ego and Id, 703b / New Introductory Lectures, 
811d-812c 

7c. The conscious, pre- conscious, and uncon- 
scious activities of mind 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 8b-9a; 74b-78b; 107a- 
114b; 295b 298a; 774a; 849a-b 

54 FREUD: Origin and Development of Psycho- 
Analysis, 5b-c / Hysteria, HOb-c / Interpreta- 
tion of Dreams, 348a-c; 352d-353b; 367b-d; 
369a-370d; 377c-385c passim, esp 382a-383c, 
384a-385c / Repression, 422a-42Sb / Uncon- 
scious, 430d-443d esp 433b-c, 436b-437c, 
438b-439b / General Introduction, 452a-c; 
453b-476a,c passim, esp 455b, 473b-475a; 
484a 491b esp 485a-486a, 489d; 499b-504d 
esp 502d-504d; 512b-c; 531d-532c; 537a-539b 
esp 537b-c, 538d-539b; 558d-568a esp 558d- 
561b, 566a-567d; 586b-d / Ego and Id, 697d- 
701d; 703a-c / New Introductory Lectures, 
835a-839b esp 835c-836d 

8. The pathology of mind: the loss or abeyance 
of reason 

5 AESCHYLUS: Choephoroe [1021-1064] 80a-c 

5 SOPHOCLES: Ajax 143a-155a,c esp [282-345] 
145d-146b 

5 EURIPIDES: Bacchantes 340a-352a,c esp [847- 
1297] 347b-351a / Heracles Mad [815-1145] 
371d-374d / Orestes [1-423] 394a-398b 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vn, CH 5 399a-d passim 
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK vn [323-405] 245a-247b 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 84, 
A 7, ANS 449b-450b; Q 115, A 5, REP i 590d- 
591c; PART i-n, Q 6, A 7, REP 3 650a-d; Q 24, 
A 2, ANS 727d-728c; Q 28, A 3, ANS and REP i 
742a-d; Q 37, A 4, REP 3 785d-786d; Q 48, AA 
3-4 824c~826a,c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 74, 
A 5, REP i 131d-132b 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy ', HELL, xxx [1-33] 
44c-d 

27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT iv, sc v 59c-62a; 
ACT v, sc ii [236-255] 70b-c / King Lear, ACT 
H, sc iv [274-289] 261c-d; ACT in, sc iv 264a- 



266b; ACT iv, sc iv [1-20] 272b-c; sc vi [8o~ 
294] 274b-276c; sc vn [14-82] 276d-277c / 
Macbeth, ACT v, sc 1 306b-307a; sc HI [37-46] 
308a 

31 DESCARTES: Meditations, i, 75d 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 44, SCHOL 
437d-438a 

48 MELVILLE: Moby Dicl(, 148b-150a; 306a-307a 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 513d-515a; 
524c-527a 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 241b-258b; 818b 819a 

54 FREUD: Hysteria, 86a-d; 90a b / Interpretation 
of Dreams, 174d-176d; 364c-d / War and 
Death, 760b / New Introductory Uctures, 
830d831a 

8a. The distinction between sanity and mad- 
ness: the criterion of lucidity or insight 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK HI, 96b 98a 
10 HIPPOCRATES: Sacred Disease, 159a-b 
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 10, 

A 3, ANS and REP 2 664d-665c 
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 67b; 67d; 68b-c; 

69a 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 166a-167a; 235b-c 

26 SHAKESPEARE: Midsummer-Night's Dream, 
ACT v, sc i [1-27] 370d-371a 

27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT n, sc n [171-221] 
42b-d; ACT HI, sc iv [137-144] 56a; ACT iv, 
sc v [1-75] 59c-60b; [154-200] 61b d / King 
Lear, ACT iv, sc vn [14-82] 276d-277c 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xi, 
SECT 13 146b-c; CH xxxm, SECT 3-4 248c-d 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT n, DIV n, 
455bc 

43 MILL: Liberty, 299d-300b [fn i] 

44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 13c-14a; Hid; 354c-355a 
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic^ esp 122b-123b, 135a- 

138a 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xi, 525c 

52 DOSTOEVSKI '.Brothers Karamazov, BKxi,337a- 
348d passim; BK xii, 356d 359c; 364d 365d 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 137a; 241b-244a esp 244a; 
749a-750b esp 750b; 799a-806b esp 799a- 
800a, 806a-b 

54 FREUD: Hysteria, 86c / Interpretation of 
Dreams, 364c-d / Narcissism, 399b-d / Un- 
conscious, 433 b-c; 440a-442b / New Introduc- 
tory Lectures, 812a-b 

8^. The causes of mental pathology: organic 
and functional factors 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK n, 86b; BK vi, 
199c-d; 201b-c 

7 PLATO: Timaeus, 474b-d 

8 ARISTOTLE: Categories, CH 8 [o, b 34-io*io] 15a 
/ Physics, BK vn, CH 3 [247 b i3-248*6] 330c-d 
/ Soul, BK in, CH 3 [429*4-8] 661 b / Dreams, 
CH 2 [46o*32- b i6] 704b-c 

9 ARISTOTLE : Parts of Animals, BK n, CH 7 
[653 b i-7] 178d-179a 

10 HIPPOCRATES : Sacred Disease 154a-160d esp 
155d-156a, 159a-b 



196 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



Scto9l> 



(8. The pathology of mind: the loss or abeyance 
of reason. 8b. The causes of mental pathol- 
ogy: organic and functional factors.) 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART i, Q 84, 
A 7, ANS 449b-450b; Q 115, A 5, REP i 590d- 
591c; PART i-n, Q 6, A 7, REP 3 650a~d; Q 10, 
A 3, ANS and REP 2 664d-665c; Q 28, A 3, ANS 
and REP i 742a-d; Q 37, A 4, REP 3 785d-786d; 
Q 48, AA 3-4 824c-826a,c 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 68b-71b 

27 SHAKESPEARE: King Lear, ACT n, sc iv [106- 
113] 259c 

28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 347c 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 49d-50b 

31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 155d-156a 
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 598a-b 

44 BOSWRLL: Johnson, 127a-b; 355a; 356b-c 

48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic/(, 135a-136b 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 299c; 318b 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK xv, 616a-617a 

52 DOSTOLVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK i, 4c-d; 
BK n, 21d-22b; BK in, 62d-63b; BK xi, 337a- 
348d passim; BK XH, 376a-d 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 3a; 25b-26b; 32a-37b 
passim; 40b-41a; 258a-b; 533a-538b 

54 FREUD: Hysteria, 81c-87a; 97b-106c / Inter- 
pretation of Dreams, 176a-d; 380d-382a csp 
381d-382a / General Introduction, 451d-452a; 
547b-549d; 616d-623b passim; 627a-b/ Group 
Psychology, 690c-691c / Ego and Id, 716d-717a 
/ Civilization and Its Discontents, 774c-d / New 
Introductory Lectures, 81 2a; 866c-867a; 872b-d 

8c. The abnormality peculiar to mind: sys- 
tematic delusion 

29 CERVANTES : Don Quixote esp PART i, la-3b, 
50b 52d, PART n, 205a-209d 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, UK n, CH xi, 

SECT 13 146b-c 

44 Bos WELL -.Johnson, 13c-14a 
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic^, 232b-236a 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK x, 391d-394d; 
BK xi, 510b-d; 515a-517a; 525c 

52 DOSFOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK xi, 
337a-346a passim 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 242a-244b; 527b-528b 
[fn 3]; 818b-819a 

54 FREUD: Hysteria, 86a-d; 102a-106c / Nar- 
cissism, 408a-d / General Introduction, 547b- 
550c; 620c-622a csp 620c-d / Civilization and 
Its Discontents, 774c-d 

9. Mind in the moral and political order 

9. The distinction between the speculative 
and practical intellect or reason: the 
spheres of knowledge, belief, and action 

8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK n, CH i [993 b 2o- 
23] 512a / Soul, BK i, CH 3 [407*22-30] 636d- 
63 7a; BK in, CH 7 663c-664b; CH 9 [432*26- 
433*6] 665c 



9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH 7 [701*6- 
39! 236b-d / Ethics, BK vi 387a-394d passim, 
esp CH i [ii39 a 3J-CH 2 [ii39 b i3J 387b-388b, 
CH 5 389a-c, CH 7 390a-d, CH 8 [1142*11-19] 
391b/ Politics, BK vn, en 14 [1333*16-29] 538a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART i, Q 79, 
AA n-12 424d-426b; Q 86, A i, REP 2 461c- 
462a; PART i-n, Q 3, A 5 626b-627a; Q 9, A i, 
REP 2 657d-658d; Q 38, A 4, REP 2-3 788d- 
789b 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART i-n, Q 57, 
A 5, REP 3 39a-40a; Q 94, A 4, ANS 223d-224d; 
PART II-H, Q 8, A 3 418c-419a; Q 9, A 3 
425b d; Q 45, A 3 600c-601a; PART HI, Q 13, 
A i, RKP 3 780a-781b 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 16d-17a; 
18a-b; 42a-c; 55b-d; 65d-66a; 86b-c / Novum 
Organum, BK n, APH 4 137d-138b 

31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 126a-b; 
243c-d 

33 PASCAL: Pensees, 265-290 221b 225a 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, INTRO, SECT 

5-6 94b 95a; BK iv, CH xi, SECT 8 356b-d; 

CH xiv 364b-365a 
35 BERKLLLY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT 

2405b 
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT v, DIV 

34, 464b; SECT xn, DIV 126-128 507a-508a 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 190c-191a; 240b-243c / 
Fund. Pnn. Metaphysic of Morals, 253a-255d; 
260d-261b; 264b-d; 271a-c; 283d-287d / 
Practical Reason, 291a-297c; 300d [fn ij; 307d- 
314d esp 310d-311d; 319c-321b; 329a 337a,c 
e.sp 329a-330c; 343a-d / Intro. Metaphysic of 
Morals, 388a-d; 390b,d-391a / Judgement, 
461a-475d esp 463a-467a, 474b-475d; 523d- 
524a; 596c-598b; 599d-607c 

43 MILL: Representative Government, 346c-347a 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PREF, 6a-7a; 
ADDITIONS, i 115a-d; 4 116a-d / Philosophy of 
History, PART iv, 360d-361a; 362d 

47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [1224-1237] 30b 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 15a-b; 47b-c; 

BK ix, 361d-365c 
53 JAMES: Psychology, 655a-661a passim, esp 

656b; 729a-730a; 86 5 b 

9b. The relation of reason to will, desire, and 
emotion 

5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus at Colonus [658-660] 

120c 
5 EURIPIDES: Hippolytus [373-430] 228b-d 

7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 120a-c; 128a-129d / Phaedo, 
224a-226c; 230d-234c / Gorgias, 275b-280d / 
Republic, BK iv, 346a-355a; BK ix, 425c-427b 
/ Timaetts, 466a-467b 

8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK v, CH i [129*10-16] 
179a / Metaphysics, BK ix, CH 5 573a-c; CH 7 
[1049*5-12] 574c-d / Soul, BK i, CH 3 [407*34- 
b 4] 637a; BK in, CH 10 665d-666d 

9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals, CH 7 236b- 
237b / Ethics, BK i, CH 13 [no2 b i3~i 103*10] 



9* to 9c 

348a-d; BK n, CH 6 [noo^S-i 107*6] 352a-c; 

BK HI, CH 12 [iii9*35- b i9] 366a,c; BK vi, CH 

2 387d-388b; BK ix, CH 4 [n66io-28] 419b-c; 

CH 8 [n68 b 28-n69 a i2] 422b-d / Politics, BK 

vn, CH 14 [i333 8 i7-29] 538a; CH 15 [i334 b 8- 

28] 539b-d 
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, CH 4 108d-110a; 

BK n, CH 18 161a-162b; CH 23 170a-172d 
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK vn, SECT 55 

283b-c 

18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK iv, par 15-17 
23a-c; BK vin, par 19-24 58b-60a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 14, A 
8, ANS 82c 83b; Q 16, A i, ANS 94b-95c; A 4 
97a-c; Q 57, A 4, REP 3 298a-299a; Q 59, A 2 
307c-308b; Q 79, A i, REP 2 414a-d; A 2, REP 2 
414d-416a; A n, REP i 424d-425b; Q 80, A 2 
428a-d; Q 81, A 3 430c-431d; QQ 82-83 431d- 
440b; Q 93, AA 6-8 496b-500c; PART i-n, 
Q 6, A 2 646a-c; Q 9, A i 657d-658d; Q 10, A i, 
REP 3 662d-663d; o u, A 2 667b-d; Q 12, A 5 
672a-c; Q 13, A 2 673c 674c; Q 15, A i, REP 3 
681b d; A 2 682a-c; o 16, A i, REP 3 684b-d; 
A 2 684d 685b; Q 17 686b,d-693d; Q 19, AA 
3-6 704c-708a; Q 26, A i, ANS 734a d; Q 28, 
A i, ANS 740b-741a; A 2, ANS and RIU> 2 741a- 
742a; Q 30, A i 749a-d; A 3 750d 751c; Q 31, 
A 3 754a-d; Q 46, A .\, REP 1,3 815b d; Q 48, 
A 3, REP 1,3 824c-825b 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART I-H, Q 50, 
A 5, ANS and RLP 3 lOb-d; Q 56, A 4 32b-33c; 
A 5, REP i 33c-34b; Q 60, A i, ANS 49d-50c; 
Q 72, A 2, REP 1,4 112b-113a; Q 74, AA 5-10 
131d-137c; Q 77, AA 1-3 14Sa-148b; Q 90, A i, 
ANS and REP i 205b-206b; PART H-II, Q 45, 
A 2, ANS 599d-600c; PART in, Q 18, A 2 811d- 
812b 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, xxxi [46-57] 
46c; PURGATORY, xvi ii [19-75] 80a-c 

22 CHAUCER: Troilus and Cressida, BKIV, STANZA 
8299a 

23 HOBBL.S: Leviathan, PART i, 64a-c; PART ii, 
141a-b; CONCLUSION, 279a-c 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 184b-d; 200d-205b; 
232b-238d passim; 273d-276a; 432a-d; 486b- 
495a 

26 SHAKESPEARE: Merchant of Venice, ACT i, so 
ii [13-20] 408b-c 

27 SHAKESPEARE: Troilus and Cressida, ACT n, 
sc ii [51-68] 114a-b; [163-182] 115b-c; ACT 
in, sc ii [74-81] 12 la / Othello, ACT i, sc in 
[322-337] 212b-c / Sonnets, CXLVII 608d 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 27a-c; 
55b-d; 66c-67b; 78a-b 

31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART in, 50b 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART ii, PROP 48, SCHOL 
391b-c; PART iv, PROP 18, SCHOL 429a-d; AP- 
PENDIX, n 447b; PART v, PREF 451a-452c 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK vin [521-594] 
243b245a 

33 PASCAL: Pensees, 412-413 242a; 423 243b / 
Geometrical Demonstration, 440b 



CHAPTER 58: MIND 



197 



35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH xxi, 
SECT 69 196d-197a; BK iv, CH xx, SECT 12 
392c 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 337d-338a; 343d-345c 
/ Social Contract, BK i, 393b-c; BK n, 400a-c 

42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 
256b; 264d-265a; 271c-d; 279b; 282d-283b; 
284d-285a / Practical Reason, 303b-304b; 
314a-d; 315b-c; 341c-342a / Intro. Metaphysic 
of Morals, 385c-386d /Judgement, 483d-484b; 
586a-587a 

43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 15, 65b-c 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 24 
17d-18a; par 29 19a-b; PART i, par 71 31b-c; 
ADDITIONS, 4 116a d / Philosophy of History, 
PART iv, 350b-c 

47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [354-807] lla 21a; 
[1064-1117] 26b-28a; [^217-3250] 79a-b; PART 

11 [11,404-510] 277b-280a 

52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK HI, 
50c-62a 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 796a-b; 816a-819a esp 
817b 

54 FREUD: Hysteria, llOc / Interpretation of 
Dreams, 353a-b / General Introduction^ 590a- 
593b passim, esp 592d-593a / Ego and Id, 
702c-d; 704a-c; 706d-707c; 715a-716c / In- 
hibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety, 720a-722c / 
Civilization and Its Discontents, 773c; 800d- 
801a / New Introductory Lectures, 837b-839b 
esp 838a-c; 843d-846a esp 845b 

9c. Reason as regulating human conduct: rea- 
son as the principle of virtue or duty 

7 PLATO: Protagoras, 59c 64a / Phaedrus, 120b-c; 
128a-129c esp 129b-c / Republic, BK iv, 346a- 
355a / Laws, BK i, 643c-d; 650b; BK m, 669b- 
670c; BK iv, 681b-682c; BK xn, 792c-d 

8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK i, CH 5 [4io b io-i6] 640c 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 7 [io97 b 23- 
1098^8] 343a-c; CH 13 [i 102^1 3-11 03*1 o] 
348a-d; BK n, CH 6 [1106*14-1107*9] 351c- 
352c esp [no6 b 35-i 107*3] 352c; BK in, CH 

12 [ni9 a 35- b i9] 366a,c; BK vi, CH 2 387d- 
388b; CH 5 389a-c; BK ix, CH 4 [1166*10-28] 
419b-c; CH 8 [n68 b 28-n69 a i2] 422b-d; BK x, 
CH 7 [1177*11-18] 431d;[ii77 b 26-ii78 a 8] 432c; 
CH 8 [1178*16-24] 432d-433a / Politics, 
BK vn, CH 13 [i332*39- b io] 537a-b; CH 14 
[1333*17-29] 538a; CH 15 [i334 b 8-28] 539b-d 

12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK n, CH 18 161a- 
162b; BK in, CH 2 177c-178d; CH 26, 212d- 
213a,c; BK iv, CH 5, 228a-229a; CH 8 23 5 b- 
237d 

12 AURELIUS: Meditations 253a-310d esp BK ii, 
SECT 15-17 259a-d, BK in, SECT 3 260b, SECT 
6 261a-c, SECT 8-9 261d, SECT 12 262b-c, 
SECT 16 262d-263a,c, BK iv, SECT 4 264a, 
SECT 12 264c, BK v, SECT 9 270b-c, SECT 26 
272c, BK vi, SECT 16 275b-d, SECT 32 277a-b, 
SECT 40 277d, BK vn, SECT 14-16 280d, SECT 
33 282a, SECT 55 283 b-c,* BK vni, SECT 7 286a, 



198 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



9cto9d 



(9. Mind in the moral arid political order. 9c. 
Reason as regulating human conduct: rea- 
son as the principle of virtue or duty.) 

SECT 39-41 288c-d, SECT 48 289c, SECT 54 
290b, BK ix, SECT 9 292b-d, BK x, SECT 8 
297d-298a, SECT 33 300c-301a, BK xi, SECT i 
302a~b, BK xn, SECT 2-3 307b-d 
14 PLUTARCH: Numa Pompilius, 50b-c / Solon, 
66b-d / Pericles, 121a-122a / Timoleon, 197c- 
198a / Cato the Younger 620a-648a,c esp 646b- 
647b / Dion, 798b-d 

18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xix, en 4, 512a; 
en 14 520a-d 

19 AQUINAS: Siimma Theologica, PART i, Q 18, 
A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 21, A 2, RLP i 125c-d; 
Q 95, A 2 507c-508a; Q 98, A 2, ANS and REP 
3-4 517d 519a; PART i-n, Q 24, A i 727b-d; 
Q 45, A 4, ANS 812b-813a 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 56, 
A 3, ANS 31a 32b; A 4 32b 33c; Q 63, A i 
63a-64a; Q 74, AA 5-10 131d-137c; Q 90, A i, 
REP 3 205b-206b; PART in, Q 5, A 4 739a- 
740b; Q 15, A 4 790d-791c; A 6, REP 2 792c- 
793c 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY 53a~105d 
esp xv [4o]-xvin [75] 75d-80c 

22 CHAUCER: Tale of Melibeus 401a-432a / 
Parson's Tale, par 12, 503b 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 91b-92d 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 21d-22a; 117d-118c; 

184b-d; 488b-489c 
27 SHAKESPEARE : Hamlet, ACT in, sc n [68-79] 

49c-d / Troilus and Cressida, ACT n, sc n [33- 

50] 113d-114a / Othello, ACT i, sc in [322-337] 

212b-c 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 26a-27c 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 14-17 428a-d; 
PROP 18, SCHOL 429a-d; PROP 23 24 430c-d; 
PROP 26-28 431a-c; PROP 59 442b-d; PROP 61 
443a-b; PROP 63 443d-444a; APPENDIX, iv 
447b-c; PART v, PREF 451a-452c; PROP 1-20 
452d-458a 

33 PASCAL: Pensees, 146 200b; 252-253 219b- 
220a; 347 233b-234a 

35 LOCKE: Civil Government, en n-in 25d-29d 
passim; CH vi, SECT 57-63 36d-38c / Human 
Understanding, BK 11, CH xxi, SECT 46-54 
189d-192c; SECT 69 196d-197a 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART iv, 159b-160a; 165a-b; 
173b 

38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK i, 393 b-c 
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 190c-d; 236d-237a / 
Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals 253a-287d 
esp 255a, 256d-257d, 260a-261d, 265c-266d, 
269c, 272a-b, 274a-277b, 279c-d, 283d-287b 
/ Practical Reason, 297a-314d esp 307d-314d; 
321b-329a / Pref. Metaphysical Elements of 
Ethics, 373d; 378d-379a / Intro. Metaphysic of 
Morals, 386b-d; 388b-c; 390b,d-391c; 392b- 
393a / Judgement, 571c-572a; 586a-587a; 
596c-597d; 605d-606b [fn 2] 



43 MILL: Liberty, 276b-d 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 170c- 

171c; 189a-b; PART n, 280b-281b; PART in, 

312d-313a; PART iv, 353c-d 
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 304a-305a; 310c- 

312c esp 310d, 311d-312a; 592b-593b 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE i, 646b-c 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 13b-15a; 202a-b; 807a- 
808a; 816a-819a esp 817b, 819a 

54 FREUD: General Introduction, 625a-d / Ego 
and Id, 702c-d / New Introductory Lectures, 
840a 

9d. Reason as the principle of free will: ra- 
tionality as the source of moral and 
political freedom 

7 PLATO: Phaedo, 230d-234c / Republic, BK iv, 

347d-348d; BK ix, 425c-427b / Theaetctus, 

528c-531a / Laws, BK ix, 754a-b 
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK in, CH 1-2 355b,d- 

358a; BK vi, CH 2 387d-388b 
12 KPICTETUS: Discourses, BK 11, en 2 140c-141c; 

BK in, CH 5 180d-181d; BK iv, en i 213a- 

223d 
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK 11, SECT 2 257a; 

SECT 5-10 257b-258a; SECT 16-17 259a-d; BK 

vi, SECT 32 277a-b; SECT 40-46 277d-278d; 

BK vn, SECT 68-69 284c-d; BK XH, SECT 2 

307b 
17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR i, en 10 82b / 

Sixth Ennead, TR vni, CH 2-3 343c-344b 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Thcologica, PART i, Q 59, 
A 3, ANS and REP i 308b-309a; Q 83, A i 436d- 
438a; A 3 438d-439c; PART i-% Q 13, A 2, ANS 
673c-674c; A 6, ANS 676c 67?b; Q 17, A i esp 
REP 2 686d-687c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Thcologica, PART i-ii, Q 50, 
A 3 8b-9a; Q 77, A 8, REP 3 151c-152a 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY, xvi [52- 
84] 77b-d; xvin [40-75] 80b-c 

27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT in, sc n [61-79] 

49c-d 
31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 228c 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 65-73 444b- 
447a; PART v, PROP 42 463b-d 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BKIX [335-375] 254b- 
255b; BK xn [79-90] 321a / Areopagitica, 
394b-395b 

35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH vi, SECT 57-63 
36d-38c / Human Understanding, BK n, CH 
xxi, SECT 7-13 180a-181b esp SECT 13 181b; 
SECT 46-54 189d-192c; SECT 69 196d-197a 

38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK i, 393 b-c 

42 KANT: Pure Reason, 237a-b / Fund. Prin. 
Metaphysic of Morals, 280b-c; 282b-285a / 
Practical Reason, 291a-b; 292a-c; 296a-d; 
302a-d; 307d-311d / Pref. Metaphysical Ele- 
ments of Ethics, 378b-c / Intro. Metaphysic of 
Morals, 390b; 393a / Science of Right, 400b,d- 
402a 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 4 12d- 
13a; par 29 19a-b; PART i, par 66 29a-c; par 71 



9e to 9f 



CHAPTER 58: MIND 



199 



31b-c; PART in, par 187 65a-c; ADDITIONS, 24 
120d-121a / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 
158c-d; 160c-162a; 168b-d; 170c-171c; PART 
in, 311b-d; PART iv, 316d-317a; 350b-c; 
353c-d; 359b; 360c-361a; 364d 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 688a- 
690a 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 706b 

9e. Reason as formative of human society: the 
authority of government and law 

7 PLATO: Republic 295a-441a,c csp BK iv, 350b- 

354b / Laws 640a-799a,c esp BK i, 650a-b, 

BK in, 669b-670c, BK iv, 681b-682c, BK ix, 

754a-b 
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK v, en 6 [ii34 a 35- b i] 

382b / Politics, BK i, CH 2 [1252^7-125^38] 

446a-d; BK vn-vin 527a-548a,c 
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK in, SECT 4 260b- 

261a; BK iv, SECT 4 264a; SECT 24 265c-d; 

BK ix, SECT 9 292b-d; BK xi, SECT i 302a-b 
14PruTARCH: AemiUits Paulus, 217d-218a / 

Phocion, 604b,d-605d 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, o 21, 
A 2, REP i 125c-d 

20 AQITINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i -n, g 90, 
A i 205b 206b; g 97, A i, ANS and RFP i 
236ad 

23 HOBBF.S: Leviathan, PART i, 54c; 86b-87b; 
91b-92b; 96b; PART n, lOOa c; 132a b 

30 BACON- Advancement of Learning, 20c-d 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, P\RT iv, PROP 35-37 433b- 
436a; PROP 40 43 7a; PROP 7$ 446c-447a; 
APPFNDIX, xrr-xvi 448b 449c 

35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH n 25d-28c 
passim, csp SECT 6, 26b, SLCT 9-10 27a-b 

38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i, ld~2a; 
2d;3c 

38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK i, 393b-c; 
BK n, 400a-c 

42 KANT: Intro. Metaph\sic of Morals, 389a-b / 
Science of Right, 397a 399a; 416b 417a 

43 FtuLRALisr: NUMBER 49, 161a 

43 MILL: Representative Government, 327b,d- 
332d passim / Utilitarianism, 469c-d 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PRF.P, 6a-7a; 
PART in, par 187 65a-c; par 212 70d-71a; 
par 258, 81c-82d [fn i]; par 272 89d-90c; 
ADDITIONS, 47 124a-b; 157 142b-c; 164 144c- 
145a; 184 149a / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 
170c-178a; PART in, 311b-d; PART iv, 316d- 
317a; 350b-c; 353c-d; 364a-c 

49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 318c-d; 322a 

54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 880a~b 

9/. The life of reason, or the life of the mind, 
as man's highest vocation: reason as 
the principle of all human work 

7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 124b-126c / Symposium, 
167a-d / Phaedo, 224a-225c / Republic, BK vi, 
380d-381a; BK vn 388a-401d / Timaeus, 
475d-476b / Theaetetus, 528c-531a / Philebus 



609a-639a,c esp 633a-639a,c / Laws, BK v, 
690a-c / Seventh Utter, 808c-809a 

8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK i, CH 1-2 499a- 
SOlc; BK xii, en 7 [io72 b i4-29] 602d-603a 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK i, CH 5 [io95 b i6-i8] 
340d; CH 7 [io97 b 23-io98 a i8] 343a-c; CH 8 
[1098^-1 099*6] 344a-c; BK vi, CH 12 [1144* 
i-6] 393c; BK x, CH 7-8 431d-434a / Politics, 
BK vn, CH 3 [i325 b i4~32] 529d-530a; CH 14 
[i333 a i7-29] 538a 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK n [1-61] 
15a-d; BK in [1-93] 30a-31b; [307-322] 34a-b; 
[1053-1075] 43c-d; BK v [1-54] 61a-d; [1113- 
1135] 75c-d; BK vi [1-42] 80a-d 

12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK i, en 2, 106d; BK 
n, CH n 150a-151b; CH 17 158d-161a; BK in, 
CH 10 185d-187a; CH 15 190a-191a; CH 19 
192c-d; CH 22 195a-201a; BK iv, CH 4-6 
225a-232c; CH 8 235b-237d 

12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK n, SECT 16-17 
259a-d; BK in, SECT 4 260b-261a; SECT 6 
261a-c; SECT 8-12 261d-262c; BK iv, SECT 3 
263b-264a; SECT 16 264d; BK v, SLCT 9 
270b-c; SECT 16 271c-d; BK vi, SECT 12 274c; 
BK ix, SECT 41 295c; BK x, SECT 12 298c-d 

17 PLOTINUS: First Ennead, TR iv, CH 2-4 12d- 
14c / Third Ennead, TR vm, CH 4, 130d-131a; 
en 6 131d-132b 

18 ALH;IISIINE: City of God, BK xix, CH 19 
523b-d 

19 AQUINVS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 12, 
A 8, REP 4 57b-58b; Q 26, A 2, ANS and REP 2 
150c-151a; Q 88, A i, ANS 469a-471c; PART MI, 
g i, A i, REP 3 609b-610b; g 3, AA 3-8 624b- 
629c; Q 21, A 2, REP 2 718a-d 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PARTI-II, Q 66, 
A 5, REP 1-2 79b-80c 

22 CHAUCER: Prologue [285-308] 164a-b 
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 231d-238a; 395d 
27 SHAKESPEARE: Pericles, ACT in, sc n [26-42] 
434d435a 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 18a-b; 
27b-d; 69d-76a passim, esp 70b-d, 71b-c, 
72b-c, 73d-74a 

31 DESCARTES: Rules, i, Id / Discourse, PART i, 
41d-42a; PART in, 49d-50b 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART iv, PROP 26-28 431a-c; 

APPENDIX, iv 447b-c; ix 448a; xxxn 450c-d; 

PART v, PROP 24-40 458d-462d 
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 346-348 233b-234a 

35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT i, DIV 5 
452d-453b 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 94b 99b 
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 645c-d 

42 KANT: Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 
256d-257d; 268c-270c esp 269c / Practical 
Reason, 337a-338c / Judgement, 508c-509a; 
591b-592a; 596c-597d 

43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 448b-450a; 451c-d 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART iv, 350b-c 

47 GOETHE: Faust, PART i [354-517] lla-14b; 
[1194-1201] 29b 



200 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



10 to We 



(9. Mind in the moral and political order. 9f. 
The life of reason, or the life of the mind, 
as man's highest vocation: reason as the 
principle of all human work.) 

48 MELVILLE: Moby DicJ(, 255a 
54 FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents, 779d- 
780b 

10. The existence of mind apart from man 

10*. The indwelling reason in the order of 
nature 

12 AURELIUS: Meditations 253a-310d esp BK n, 
SECT 4 257b, BK in, SECT 13 262c, BK iv, 
SECT 10 264c, SECT 40 267a-b, SECT 45-46 
267b-c, BK v, SECT 8 269d-270b, SECT 30 
273a, BK vi, SECT i 274a, SECT 9-10 274b-c, 
SECT 36 277c, SECT 38 277c-d, SECT 40 277d, 
SECT 42-44 278a-c, SECT 58 279d, BK vn, SECT 
9-11 280b-c, SECT 75 285c, BK viu, SECT 7 
286a, SECT 34 288a-b, BK x, SECT 6-7 297a-c, 
BK xn, SECT 5 307d-308a, SECT 30 310a-b 

IQb. Nous or the intellectual principle: its rela- 
tion to the One and to the world-soul 

7 PLATO: Cratylus, 93c; 101d-102a / Phaedrus, 
136b / Phacdo, 240d-242b / Timaeus, 455a- 
456a / Sophist, 567a-569a / Philebus, 618b- 
619d 

8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK i, CH 4 [188*5-12] 
263b; BK in, CH 4 [203*23-33] 281a-b; BK 
viu, CH i [25o b 23-26] 334b; CH 5 [256 b 2o-27] 
341d / Metaphysics, BK i, en 3 [984 b 8-22J 
502d; CH 7 [988 b 6-i6] 506c-d; CH 8 [989*30- 
b 2i] 507c-d 

13 VIRGIL: Georgics, iv [219-227] 89b / Aeneid, 
BK vi [724-734] 230b 

17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR ix, CH i, 66a-d 
/ Third Ennead, TR viu, CH I-TR ix, CH i 
129a-136d / Fourth Ennead, TR iv, CH 16 
165d-166b / Fifth Ennead 208a-251d esp TR 
i, CH 3-7 209b-212c, TR in, CH 1-12 215d- 
223c, CH 1 6 225b-226a, TR iv, CH 2-TR v, 
CH 3 227b 230a, TR v, CH 7 231d-232b, CH 12, 
234c, TR vn 238a-239b, TR ix, CH 3-9 247b- 
250b / Sixth Ennead, TR n, CH 20-21 278d- 
280a; TR vn, CH 13-24 328b-334a; CH 36-42 
339c-342d; TR viu, CH 17-18 351c-352c 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 158a-c; 
PART iv, 364b-c 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 222b-223a 

lOc. The realm of the pure intelligences: the 
angelic intellect 

8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK xn, CH 8 603b- 
605a esp [1073*36-39] 603d 

16 KEPLER: Epitome, BK iv, 890a-895b esp 
890b-893b; 897a; 914a-b; 93 Ob; 932a-933a / 
Harmonies of the World, 1080b-1085b 

17 PLOTINUS: Third Ennead, TR v, CH 6 103b- 
104a 



18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK xn, par 12 
101d-102a; par 16 102d-103a; par 20 103c-d 
/ City of God, BK x, CH 2 299d-300a; BK XXH, 
CH i 586b,d-587b; CH 29, 614b-d 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 7, A 2, 
ANS and REP 2 31d-32c; Q 10, A 3, ANS 42c- 
43b; Q 12, A 4, REP 2 53b-54c; Q 50 269a- 
275a esp A i, ANS 269b-270a, A 2, ANS 270a- 
272a, A 5, ANS 274b-275a; Q 54 284d-288d; 
Q 55, A 2, ANS 289d-290d; Q 56, A 2, ANS 
292d-294a; Q 57, A i, ANS 295a-d; A 3, ANS 
and REP 2 297b-298a; Q 58, A i, ANS 300c- 
301a; A 3, ANS 301d-302d; Q 6r, A 2, REP 3 
315c-316a; Q 64, A i, ANS 334a-335c; Q 65, A 
4, ANS 342b-343c; Q 75, A 7, REP 2-3 384d- 
385c; Q 79, A i, REP 3 414a-d; A 2, ANS 414d- 
416a; A 8, ANS 421c-422b; A 10, ANS 423d- 
424d; Q 84, A 2, ANS 442b-443c; A 3, REP i 
443d-444d; A 7, ANS 449b-450b; Q 85, A i, 
ANS 451c-453c; A 5, ANS 457d-458d; Q 87, A i, 
ANS and REP 2-3 465a-466c; A 3, ANS 467b- 
468a; Q 89, A 3, ANS and REP i 475d-476c; 
A 4, ANS 476c-477a 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 50, 
A 6, ANS and REP i lla-12a; Q 51, A i, REP 2 
12b-13c 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, vn [67-96] 
lOb-c; PARADISE, i [103-126] 107b-c; n 
[112-138] 109a; vni [97-114] 118a; xin [52- 
72] 126a; xxvni 148d-150b; xxix [37-45] 
150c; [67-85] 151a 

30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK n, APH 15 149a 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK i [116-142] 96a-b; 
BK n [142-159] 114b; BK v [404-413] 184a; 
[469-505] 185b-186a 

33 PASCAL: Pcnsees, 285 224a 

35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK n, CH x, 

SECT 9 143a-c; BK in, CH vi, SECT 12, 272a; 

BK iv, CH in, SECT 6, 315a-b; SECT 23 320a-c; 

SECT 27 321d-322a; CH xvi, SECT 12, 371a 
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT 81 

428c-d 

IQd. The unity and separate existence of the 
active or the possible intellect 

8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK in, CH 5 esp [430*18-22] 
662c-d 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 76, 
A 2 388c-391a; Q 79, AA 4-5 417a-419b; Q 84, 
A 4, ANS and REP 3 444d-446b; Q 88, A i, 
ANS and REP i 469a-471c; Q 117, A i, ANS 
595d-597c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 50, 
A 4, ANS 9a-10b 

10*. Mind as an immediate infinite mode of 
God 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 14, COROL 1-2 
360a; PROP 21-23 364a-365a; PROP 29-31 
366b-367a esp PROP 31, DEMON ST 366d; 
PART n, PROP i, SCHOL 374a; PROP 5-7 374c- 
375c; PROP io-n 376c-377c 



10//o 



CHAPTER 58: MIND 



201 



10/. Absolute mind: the moments of its mani- 
festations 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, INTRO, par 24 
17d-18a; par 27 18d; par 29-30 19a-c; par 33 
20b d; PART i, par 35 21a-b; PART in, par 
156-157 57d; par 259 82a; par 262 83d-84a; 
par 321 106c-d; par 340-360 110b-114a,c; 
ADDITIONS, 100 133a; 153 141d; 194 150c-d / 
Philosophy of History, INTRO, 156d-157b; 
160b-162a; 163a; 169d-170b; 177d-178d; 
179b-d; 182d-183a; 186c-188b; 189d-190b 

10/(1) The unfolding of mind or spirit in 
world history 

46 HEGLL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 
340-360 110b-114a,c; ADDITIONS, 153 141d / 
Philosophy of History 153a-369a,c esp INTRO, 
153a-190b, 203a-206a,c, PART iv, 368d-369a,c 

10/(2) The concrete objectification of mind in 
the state 

46IIECFL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 
156-157 57d; par 257-259 80b 82a; par 270 
84d 89c; par 274 92a; par 289 97b-d; par 
360 113d-114a,c; ADDITIONS, 152 141c-d; 157 
142b-c; 164, 144c-d / Philosophy of History, 
INTRO, 170c 176b; PART i, 230a 

lOg. The divine intellect: its relation to the 
divine being and the divine will 

8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK xii, en 7 [io72 b 
14-29] 602d-603a; CH 9 605a d 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK x, CH 8 [ii78 h 8-23] 
433b-c 

12 KPICTKTUS: Discourses, BK n, CH 8, 146a 
17 PLOTINUS: Second Ennead, TR ix, CH i 65d- 
66d 

CROSS-REFERENCES 

For: Matters relevant to the conception of reason or intellect as a faculty distinct from sense and 
imagination and also from will, see BEING 8a-8b; IDEA 2b; KNOWLEDGE 6c(3); MAN la, 
4b~4c; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 5b, 6b-6c; SENSE la-id; SOUL 2c(2)-2c(3); WILL i, 
5a(i); and for the further distinction of the various intellectual powers and acts, see 
EXPERIENCE 2b; IDEA ib, 2g; JUDGMENT i; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6c(i); SENSE 53; 
UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 2b, 4c~4d. 

Matters relevant to the conception of the human mind as a thinking substance, see BEING 
7^4); FORM 2d; IDEA 2b; MAN 33(1); SOUL ic. 

Matters relevant to the conception of the human mind as a finite mode of an attribute of 
God, see BEING 70(4); IDEA ic; MAN 33; NATURE ib. 

Matters relevant to the conception of the human mind as soul or spirit performing all 
psychological functions, see IDEA ic, 2c-2f; MAN 33; ONE AND MANY 43; SENSE id, 53. 

Matters relevant to the conception of the human mind as a triad of cognitive faculties, see 
IDEA id, 2b; JUDGMENT 1-4, 8d; KNOWLEDGE 6b(4); MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6c(2); 
ONE AND MANY 4b; PRINCIPLE 2b(3); SENSE 30(5); SOUL id; WILL 53(4); and for the 
consideration of its transcendental or a priori forms and cstegories, see EXPERIENCE 2c-2d; 
QUALITY i; QUANTITY i; RELATION 4c; SENSE ic; SPACE 43; TIME 6c. 



18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK xni, par 12 
113b-d / City of God, BK vin, CH 6 268d- 
269c; BK xi, CH 21 333a-d; BK xii, CH 17-18 
353a-354d; CH 23 357d-358a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, 3 3, A i, 
REP 2-3 14b-15b; o 14, AA 1-4 75d 79a esp 
A 4 78b-79a; A 8, ANS 82c-83b; Q 16, A 5, REP 
i 97c-98b; Q 18, AA 3-4 106b-J08c; Q 19, A i, 
ANS 108d-109c; A 3, REP 6 lK)b-lllc; A 4, 
ANS lllc-112c; Q 26, A 2 150c iSla; Q 46, A 2, 
REP 3 253a-255a; o 50, A i, ANS 269b-270a; 
Q 54, A 2, ANS 285d-286c; Q 55, A i, ANS 
289a-d; A 3, ANS and REP i 291a-d; Q 59, A 2, 
ANS 307c-308b; Q 79, A i, ANS 414a-d; A 2, 
ANS 414d-416a; A 4, ANS and REP 1,5 417a- 
418c; A 5, REP 3 418c-419b; A 10, REP 2 
423d-424d; Q 84, A 2, ANS 442b 443c; A 4, 
Rtp i 444d-446b; A 5 446c-447c; Q 85, A 4, 
ANS 457a-d; A 5, ANS 457d-458d; g 87, A i, 
ANS 465a-466c; A 3, ANS 467b-468a; Q 89, A 
i, ANS and REP 3 473b 475a; A 4, ANS 476c- 
477a; Q 93, AA 6-8 496b-500c; Q 105, A 3 
540c-541b; PART I-H, Q i, A 4, REP i 612a- 
613a; Q 5, A 6, REP 2 641a 642a; Q 19, A 4 
705b-c; Q 40, A 3, REP i 794c-795a; Q 46, A 
4, REP 2 815b-d 

20 AOUINAS: Summa Thcologica, I'ART i-n, Q 51, 

A I, RtP 2 12b-13c| I'ART III, Q 6, A 2, ANS 

741c-742a 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, P/VRATJISE, xv [37-84] 
128d-129b; xxxin {82-145] 157a-d 

31 DESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 122a b; 

228a-c 
31 SPINOXA: Ethics, PART i, PROP 17, SCHOL 

362c-363c; PROP 32-33 367a-369a; PART n f 

PROP i 373d-374a 
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 53a-b / Practical Reason, 

303b-304a; 350c-d / Judgement, 612b-d 



202 THE GREAT IDEAS 

For: Matters relevant to the conception of the human mind as self-consciousness, see HISTORY 
43(3); IDEA if; SOUL id. 

Matters relevant to the conception of the mind as consciousness or as a psychic structure in- 
cluding conscious and unconscious processes, see DESIRE 23, 5a~5c; EXPERIENCE i, 2a; 
MAN 4; ONE AND MANY 43; SOUL 20; WILL 30. 

The general problem of the relation of body and mind, or matter and spirit, see ELEMENT 56 ; 
MAN 33-33(2), 3c; MATTER 4c~4d; SOUL 3C~3d; 3nd for the condition of the human mind 
when the soul is separated from the body, see SOUL 4d. 

The distinction between real and intentional existence, or being in nature and being in 
mind, see BEING 7d, yd (2); FORM 23; IDEA 6a-6b; KNOWLEDGE i; and for the difference 
between change in matter and change in mind, see CHANGE 6d. 

Other comparisons of human and animal mentality, see ANIMAL ic, ic(2) ; EVOLUTION 7^3) ; 
LANGUAGE i; MAN m-ic; SENSE 2c; and for the relation of reason and instinct, see 
HABIT 3c. 

The mind's knowledge of itself in relation to the nature and method of psychology, see 
IDEA 2d; KNOWLEDGE 53(6); MAN 23-2^4); SOUL 53-5^ 

Other discussions of the weakness and limits of the human mind, see KNOWLEDGE 53-56; 
TRUTH 3d~3d(i), 73; snd for the consideration of the training of mind, habits of mind, 
intellectusl virtues, and supernatural gifts, see EDUCATION 53-5^ GOD 60(2); HABIT 5c- 
5d; KNOWLEDGE 6c(5) ; PRUDENCE i ; RELIGION 13; SCIENCE ia(i) ; VIRTUE AND VICE 23(2), 
8e; WISDOM ic, 23. 

Other discussions of sleep and dresms, see DESIRE 53; LIFE AND DEATH 5b; MEMORY AND 
IMAGINATION 83-80; SIGN AND SYMBOL 63; and for mstters relev3nt to the theory of the 
repressed unconscious, see DESIRE 3b(2), 6c; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 20(2); OPPOSI- 
TION 4c; SIGN AND SYMBOL 6a. 

Other discussions of psy chops thology and the causes 3nd cure of mental disorder, see EMO- 
TION 3c~3(J; MAN 5b; MEDICINE 63-6d; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 5c. 

Matters relevant to the distinction between the speculative and practical intellect, or the 
pure snd practical reason, see JUDGMENT 2; KNOWLEDGE 6e(i); PHILOSOPHY 23; PRUDENCE 
2a-2b; SCIENCE 33; TRUTH 2c; WISDOM ib; and for the bearing of this distinction, and 
the bearing of reason's relation to will and desire, on the differentiation of knowledge, 
belief, and opinion, see DESIRE 5b; EMOTION 3b; GOD 2d; IMMORTALITY 33; KNOWLEDGE 
4b; METAPHYSICS 2d; OPINION 2a-2b; WILL 30-3^1), 3b(3), 5^4). 

The moral and politicsl aspects of mind, see DESIRE 6a; EMOTION 43-43(2); LAW ib; LIBERTY 
3b; SLAVERY 7; STATE 13; TYRANNY 5d; VIRTUE AND VICE 5b. 

The consideration of the existence of mind, resson, or intellect apart from man, see ANGEL 2, 
3d; GOD 5f; IDEA ic; NATURE 33; SOUL la; WILL 43; WORLD 6c. 

ADDITIONAL READINGS 

Listed below are works not included in Great Booty of the Western World, but relevant to the 
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups: 

I. Works by authors represented in this collection. 
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection. 

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult 
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas. 

AQUINAS. Summa Contra Gentiles, BK n, CH 73-78 

* . On Spiritual Creatures, AA 9-10 

PLUTARCH. "That Brute Beasts Make Use of Rea- . Quaestioncs Disputatae, De Veritate, QQ 10, 15; 

son," in Moralia De Anima, AA 3-5 
AUGUSTINE. On the Trinity, BK x . The Unicity of the Intellect, III-VH 



CHAPTER 58: MIND 



203 



DANTE. Convivio (The Banquet), THIRD TREATISE, 

CH 2, 3 (3), 4(11) 
DESCARTES. The Principles of Philosophy, PART i, 

7-8, 11-12, 52-53, 62-65; PART iv, 196-197 
HUME. A Treatise of Human Nature, BK i, PART HI, 

SECT XVI 

KANT. De Mundi Scnsibilis (Inaugural Disserta- 
tion) 

HEGEL. The Phenomenology of Mind, v 
. The Philosophy of Mind, SECT i 

II. 
PETER LOMBARD. The Pour Boo\s of Sentences, BK i, 

DIST3 

MAIMONIDES. The Guide for the Perplexed, PART i, 
CH 31-32; PART ii, CH 37 

ALBERTUS MAGNUS. On the Intellect and the Intel- 
ligible 

BONAVENTURA. Itmerarium Mentis in Deum (The 
Itinerary of the Mind to God) 

DUNS SCOTUS. Opus Oxoniense, BK i, DIST 2, 03 

PETRARCH. On His Own Ignorance 

FICINO. Five Questions Concerning the Mind 

PARACELSUS. The Diseases That Deprive Man of His 
Reason 

SUAREZ. Disputationes Metaphysicae, xxx (14-15), 
xxxv, XLIV (4) 

BURTON. The Anatomy of Melancholy, PART i, SECT 

I, MEMB II, SUB-SECT 9~I I 

JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS. Cursus Philosophicus Tho- 
misticus, Philosophia Naturalis, PART iv, OQ 9- 
ii 

MALEBRANCHE. De la recherche de la veritS, BK i, 
CH i (i); UK in (i), CH 1-4 

LEIBNITZ. New Essays Concerning Human Under- 
standing 

. Monadology 

VAUVENARGUES. Introduction a la connaissance de 
Vesprit humain 

VOLTAIRE. "Wit," "Spirit," "Intellect," "Mind 
(Limits of Human)," in A Philosophical Diction- 
ary 

T. REID. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, 
i, CH 5-8 

D. STEWART. Elements of the Philosophy of the 
Human Mind 

COLERIDGE. Biographia Literaria, CH 5-8 

SCHOPENHAUER. The World as Will and Idea, VOL i, 

BK IJ VOL II, SUP, CH 15; VOL III, SUP, CH 22 

BROWN. Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human 
Mind 



J. MILL. Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human 
Mind, CH 1 6 

BAIN. The Senses and the Intellect 

E. HARTMANN. Philosophy of the Unconscious 

TAINE. On Intelligence 

CLIFFORD. "Body and Mind," in VOL 11, Lectures 
and Essays 

LOTZE. Microcosmos, BK v 

. Metaphysics, BK HI, CH 5 

ROMANES. Animal Intelligence 

T. H. GREEN. Prolegomena to Ethics, BK 11, CH 2 

C. S. PEIRCE. Collected Papers, VOL vi, par 238-286 

FRAZER. The Golden Bough, PART vn 

C. L. MORGAN. Animal Life and Intelligence 

WUNDT. Outlines of Psychology, (15-17, 22) 

LOEB. Comparative Physiology of the Brain and Com- 
parative Psychology 

P. M. JANET. The Major Symptoms of Hysteria 

HOLT. The Concept of Consciousness 

BERGSON. Matter and Memory, CH 3 

. Creative Evolution, CH 3-4 

. Mind-Energy, CH i, 7 

MARITAIN. Reflexions sur Vintelligence et sur la vie 
propre 

. Theonas: Conversations of a Sage, i, in 

STOUT. Mind and Matter 

BOSANQUET. Three Chapters on the Nature of Mind 

BROAD. The Mind and Its Place in Nature, CH 3, 
7-10, 13-14 

PIERON. Thought and the Brain 

DEWEY. Experience and Nature, CH 2, 6-8 

G. N. LEWIS. The Anatomy of Science, ESSAY vm 

WOODBRIDGE. Nature and Mind 

. The Realm of Mind 

JUNG. Two Essays on Analytical Psychology 

. Instinct and the Unconscious 

. Mind and the Earth 

SPEARMAN. The Abilities of Man 

LASHLEY. Brain Mechanisms and Intelligence 

C. I. LEWIS. Mind and the World Order 

WHITEHEAD. The Function of Reason 

R. M. and A. W. YERKES. The Great Apes 

SHERRINGTON. The Brain and Its Mechanism 

BLONDEL. La pensSe 

THURSTONE. The Vectors of Mind 

BLANSHARD. The Nature of Thought 

S ANT AY AN A. Reason in Common Sense, CH 5-6 

. The Realm of Spirit 

B. RUSSELL. The Analysis of Mind 

. Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits, PART 

i, CH 6; PART ii, CH 7 



Chapter 59: MONARCHY 



INTRODUCTION 



OF all the traditionally recognized forms of 
government, monarchy is the easiest to 
define and to identify. As the word indicates, it 
is government by one man. It is indifferent 
whether that man is called king or prince, 
Caesar or Czar. Of all such titles, "king" is the 
most frequent; and in consequence monarchy 
is often called kingship or referred to as the 
royal form of government. 

When monarchy is thus defined in terms of 
the principle of unity, other forms of govern- 
ment, such as aristocracy or oligarchy and de- 
mocracy, tend to be characterized as govern- 
ment by the few or the many. But the numeri- 
cal criterion by itself is obviously inadequate. 
To those who distinguish between aristocracy 
and oligarchy, it makes a difference whether the 
few who rule are selected] for their pre-emi- 
nence in virtue or in wealth. A tyranny, like a 
monarchy, may be government by one man. 
Hence those who wish to use the word "mon- 
arch" or "king" eulogisticaily cannot be satis- 
fied with a definition that fails to distinguish 
between king and tyrant. 

It has been said by Aristotle, for example 
that the perversion of, or "deviation from, 
monarchy is tyranny; for both are forms of one- 
man rule. But," he adds, "there is the greatest 
difference between them; the tyrant looks to 
his own advantage, the king to that of his sub- 
jects." Both Aristotle and Plato also say that 
as tyranny is the worst form of government, so 
monarchy at the opposite extreme is the best. 
But though in their opinion tyranny is always 
the worst form of government, Aristotle at 
least does not seem to think that monarchy is 
always under all conditions best. 

Further complications appear when other 
views are taken into consideration. The chap- 
ters on CITIZEN, CONSTITUTION, and GOVERN- 
MENT discuss the basic opposition between ab- 



solute and limited government in the various 
terms in which that opposition is traditionally 
expressed: royal as opposed to political, des- 
potic as opposed to constitutional government; 
or government by men as opposed to govern- 
ment by law. That opposition seems to be rele- 
vant to the theory of monarchy, certainly to 
any conception of monarchy which tends to 
identify it with absolute rule, or which sees 
some affinity between royal and despotic gov- 
ernment. 

The word "despotic" is, of course, some- 
times used in a purely descriptive rather than 
a disparaging sense. Used descriptively, it desig- 
nates the absolute rule exercised by the head of 
a household over children and slaves, neither of 
whom have any voice in their own government. 
Aristotle sometimes characterizes the royal 
government of a political community as des- 
potic to signify its resemblance to the abso- 
lute rule of the father or master. lie expresses 
the same comparison in reverse when he says 
that "the rule of a father over his children is 
royal." 

The derogatory sense of "despotic" would 
seem to apply to those cases in which grown 
men are ruled as if they were children, or free 
men as if they were slaves. The great issue con- 
cerning monarchy, therefore, is whether royal 
government is despotic in this sense. Always, or 
only under certain conditions? And if despotic, 
is it also tyrannical? Is monarchy in principle 
the foe of human liberties ? To all these ques- 
tions there are opposite answers in the great 
books of political theory. Where Hegel says 
that "public freedom in general and an heredi- 
tary monarchy guarantee each other," others, 
like Rousseau and Mill, identify the freedom of 
citizenship with republican or representative 
government. 

This central issue is complicated not only by 



204 



CHAPTER 59: MONARCHY 



205 



the various meanings of "despotism" (discussed 
in the chapter on TYRANNY), but also by varia- 
tions in the meaning of the word "monarchy" 
as it is used by different writers. The word is 
even used by the same writer in a number of 
senses. Rousseau, for example, says in one place 
that "every legitimate government is repub- 
lican," and in another that "monarchical always 
ranks below republican government." But he 
also treats monarchy or royal rule as one form 
of legitimate government. He describes the 
king, in whose hands all political power is con- 
centrated, as only having "the right to dispose 
of it in accordance with the laws." He distin- 
guishes not only between king and tyrant, but 
also between king and despot. 

To avoid what may be only verbal difficulties 
here, Kant suggests the use of the word "auto- 
crat" to signify "one who has all power" and 
who in his own person "is the Sovereign." In 
contra-distinction "monarch" should signify 
the king or chief magistrate (sometimes called 
"president") who "merely represents the sov- 
ereignty" or the people who "are themselves 
sovereign." 

SOME POLITICAL theorists distinguish between 
absolute and limited (or constitutional) monar- 
chy. This in turn raises new problems of defini- 
tion and evaluation. 

Is absolute government always monarchical 
in form, so that absolute government and abso- 
lute monarchy can be treated as identical? 
Hobbes, who seems to think that government 
by its very nature must be absolute, neverthe- 
less treats aristocracy and democracy along with 
monarchy as forms of absolute government. 
Furthermore, as Rousseau points out, "the Ro- 
man Empire saw as many as eight emperors at 
once, without it being possible to say that the 
Empire was split up." The absolutism of the 
government was not diminished by the fact 
that two or more Caesars often held power at 
the same time. The triumvirates were also ab- 
solute dictatorships. 

It would seem, therefore, that the principle 
of absolute government can be separated from 
the principle of monarchy. But can monarchy 
as a form of government be separated from 
absolute rule? 

The question is not whether, in a republic, 



the monarchical principle is present in the sense 
that one man may hold the office of chief execu- 
tive. On the issue of a single as opposed to a 
plural executive, Hamilton and Madison and 
with them Jefferson emphatically favor the 
principle of unity in the executive branch of 
the government. "Energy in government," ac- 
cording to The Federalist, "requires not only a 
certain duration of power, but the execution of 
it by a single hand." The qualities essential to a 
good executive, such as "decision, activity, se- 
crecy, and dispatch," Hamilton says, "will gen- 
erally characterize the proceedings of one man 
in a much more eminent degree than the pro- 
ceedings of any greater number; and in pro- 
portion as the number is increased, these quali- 
ties will be diminished." 

Yet the authors of The Federalist, and JerTcr- 
son too, are equally emphatic in insisting upon 
the difference in kind, not degree, between the 
power granted the President of the United States 
and that enjoyed by the King of Great Britain. 
For them, monarchies and republics are funda- 
mentally opposed in the spirit of their institu- 
tions. Despotism is inherent in the nature of 
monarchy not only absolute, but even limited 
monarchy. 

If the Constitution of the United States does 
not set up a constitutional monarchy, even 
though it provides for one man as chief execu- 
tive, then a constitutional monarchy must have 
some other principle in it which distinguishes it 
from a republic. That may be hereditary suc- 
cession to the throne; or it may be a certain 
symbolic identification of the king with the 
state. But in a monarchy, no matter how at- 
tenuated, so long as it does not become purely 
and simply constitutional government, the 
king also seems to retain some degree of des- 
potic power the absolute power exercised by a 
sovereign person who is free from the super- 
vision of law. 

Aristotle takes a similar view. Enumerating 
five types of kingly rule, he sets one form apart 
from all the rest the form in which one man 
"has the disposal of everything. . . . This form 
corresponds to the control of a household. For 
as household management is the kingly rule of 
a family, so kingly rule is the household manage- 
ment of a city or of a nation." The other forms 
are all, in one way or another, kingships accord- 



206 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



ing to law. Of these, most clearly exemplified 
in the Spartan constitution, Aristotle says that 
"the so-called limited monarchy, or kingship 
according to law ... is not a distinct form of 
government, for under all governments, as for 
example, in a democracy or aristocracy, there 
may be a general holding office for life, and one 
person is often made supreme over the admin- 
istration of a state." 

Whether or not there is a supreme command- 
er or a chief magistrate, elected or hereditary, 
the government is not distinctively royal if the 
man called "king" is subject to the laws and if 
the other men in the state are not his subjects 
but his fellow citizens. For somewhat different 
reasons, Hobbes agrees with the view that only 
absolute monarchy is monarchy. When the king 
is limited in power, he says, the sovereignty is 
always "in that assembly which had the right 
to limit him; and by consequence the govern- 
ment is not monarchy, but either democracy or 
aristocracy; as of old time in Sparta, where the 
kings had a privilege to lead their armies, but 
the sovereignty was in the Ephori" Hobbes 
uses the government of one people over another 
people the mother country over colonies, or 
the conqueror over a subjugated nation to 
illustrate what he means by absolute monarchy. 
This suggests a significant parallelism between 
the problems of monarchy and the problems of 
empire. 

IF THERE WERE universal agreement on the 
point that only absolute monarchy is truly 
monarchy, the issue concerning monarchy could 
be readily translated into the basic opposition 
between rule by men and rule by law. But such 
agreement seems to be wanting, and the prob- 
lems of monarchy are, in consequence, further 
complicated. 

Plato, for example, distinguishes in the States- 
man between three forms of government ac- 
cording to established laws, of which one is mon- 
archy. Monarchy is better than aristocracy and 
democracy, obviously not with respect to the 
principle of the supremacy of law, but simply 
because government by one seems to be more 
efficient than government by a few or many; 
just as tyranny is the worst form of government 
because, in violating or overthrowing the laws, 
one man can succeed in going further than a 



multitude, which is "unable to do either any 
great good or any great evil." 

But all these forms of government, good and 
bad, better and worse, are compared by Plato 
with a form of government which he says "ex- 
cels them all, and is among States what God is 
among men." It seems to be monarchical in 
type, but, though not lawless like tyranny, it is 
entirely above the need of written or customary 
rules of law. "The best thing of all," Plato 
writes, "is not that the law should rule, but 
that a man should rule, supposing him to have 
wisdom and royal power." Whether such gov- 
ernment can ever exist apart from divine rule, 
or perhaps the advent of the "philosopher king," 
the point remains that Plato seems to conceive 
monarchy in two quite distinct ways both as 
an absolute rule and also as one of the legally 
limited forms of government. 

Montesquieu separates monarchy from abso- 
lute government entirely. At the same time, he 
distinguishes it from republics, whether aristoc- 
racies or democracies. According to him, mon- 
archy is as much a government by law, as much 
opposed to despotism or absolute government, 
as are republics. Monarchies and republics are 
the two main kinds of constitutional govern- 
ment, just as aristocracies and democracies arc 
the two main kinds of republic. 

Where Aristotle holds that constitutional 
monarchy is not a distinct type of government, 
Montesquieu holds that absolute monarchy does 
not deserve the name of "monarchy," but 
should be called "despotism" instead. He criti- 
cizes Aristotle's fivefold classification of king- 
ships, saying that "among the number of mon- 
archies, he [Aristotle] ranks the Persian empire 
and the kingdom of Sparta. But is it not evi- 
dent," he asks, "that the one was a despotic 
state and the other a republic?" Since Montes- 
quieu's own view of monarchy involves, in 
addition to a king, a body of nobles in whom 
intermediate and subordinate powers are vested, 
he thinks no true notion of monarchy can be 
found in the ancient world. 

Hegel agrees with Montesquieu that con- 
stitutional monarchy is the very opposite of 
despotism, but he goes much further than Mon- 
tesquieu in the direction of identifying mon- 
archy with constitutional government. For him 
constitutional monarchy is the ultimately true 



CHAPTER 59: MONARCHY 



207 



form of government. "The development of the 
state to constitutional monarchy is the achieve- 
ment of the modern world." He thinks Mon- 
tesquieu was right in recognizing that the an- 
cient world knew only the patriarchal type of 
monarchy, a kind of transference of familial 
government to larger communities still organ- 
ized on the domestic pattern. But according to 
Hegel, Montesquieu himself, in stressing the 
role of the nobility, shows that he understands, 
not the type of monarchy which is "organized 
into an objective constitution" and in which 
"the monarch is the absolute apex of an organ- 
ically developed state," but only "feudal mon- 
archy, the type in which the relationships re- 
cognized in its constitutional law are crystal- 
lized into the rights of private property and the 
privileges of individuals and corporations." 

It may be questioned, however, whether 
Hegel's theory of constitutional monarchy 
avoids the issue raised by republicans who think 
that monarchy is inseparable from some form of 
absolutism, or that monarchy, if entirely devoid 
of absolutism, has no special character as a form 
of government. In spite of his acceptance of the 
traditional distinction between constitutional 
government and despotism, Hegel seems to re- 
gard the sovereignty of the state as absolute in 
relation to its own subjects at home no less 
absolute than is its sovereignty in external af- 
fairs vis-b-vis foreign states. The crown is the 
personification of the absolute sovereignty of 
the state at home. The absolute power of the 
state comes into existence only in the person of 
a monarch who has the final decision in all 
matters. 

"The sovereignty of the people," writes He- 
gel, "is one of the confused notions based on 
the wild idea of the 'people.' Taken without its 
monarchy and the articulation of the whole 
which is the indispensable and direct concomi- 
tant of monarchy, the people is a formless mass 
and no longer a state." Hegel thus dismisses the 
notion of popular sovereignty (which to Rous- 
seau, Kant, and the Federalists is of the essence 
of republican government) as inconsistent with 
"the Idea of the state in its full development." 
A profound opposition, therefore, exists be- 
tween Hegel's theory of constitutional mon- 
archy and republican theories of constitutional 
government. Even though the issue cannot be 



stated in terms of government by men vs. gov- 
ernment by laws, a monarchy as opposed to a 
republic still seems to represent the principle of 
absolutism in government. 

THERE is STILL another conception of a type 01 
government which is neither a pure republic 
nor an absolute monarchy. What the mediaeval 
writers call a "mixed regime" is not a constitu- 
tional monarchy in the Hegelian sense, nor is it 
what Aristotle means when he uses that term. 
The mediaeval mixed regime is a combination 
of two distinct principles of government the 
royal principle^ according to which absolute pow- 
er is vested in the sovereign personality of an 
individual man; and the political principle, ac- 
cording to which the supremacy of law reflects 
the sovereignty of the people, who have the 
power of making laws either directly or through 
their representatives. 

This conception of a mixed regime of gov- 
ernment which is both royal and political ap- 
pears at first to be self-contradictory. In Aris- 
totle's terms, it would seem impossible to com- 
bine the supremacy of law, which is the essence 
of constitutional government, with the suprem- 
acy of a sovereign person, which is the essence of 
royal government. The mixed regime would 
also seem to be impossible in terms of Ilobbcs' 
theory of the indivisibility of sovereignty. 
Impossible in theory, the mixed regime never- 
theless existed as a matter of historic fact in 
the typical mediaeval kingdom, which derived 
its character from the feudal conditions under 
which it developed. 

Does not the fact of its historic existence re- 
fute the incompatibility of the principles which 
the mixed regime combines? The answer may 
be that, like a mixture of oil and water, royal 
and political government can only exist as a 
mixture in unstable equilibrium. Originating 
under feudal conditions, the mixed regime tends 
toward dissolution as these conditions disappear 
with the rise of the modern nation-state. It first 
tends to be supplanted by a movement toward 
absolute monarchy. Then, in the course of re 
action and revolution, it tends toward constitu- 
tional monarchies or republics through added 
limitations on the power of the throne. 

These historic developments seem to indicate 
that the principles of the mixed regime are ulti- 



208 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



mately as irreconcilable in fact as they are in 
theory. 

Montesquieu's remark that the ancients "had 
not a clear idea of monarchy" can be inter- 
preted to mean that they did not have the con- 
ception of a mixed regime. Before the accidents 
of history brought it into existence, it is unlikely 
that anyone would have conceived of a govern- 
ment both royal and political. Montesquieu 
does not adopt the mediaeval description of a 
mixed regime, which, as stated by Aquinas, is 
"partly kingdom, since there is one at the head 
of all; partly aristocracy, in so far as a number 
of persons are set in authority; and partly de- 
mocracy, />., government by the people, in so 
far as the rulers can be chosen by the people, 
and the people have the right to choose their 
rulers." Yet Montesquieu's theory of monarchy 
seems to be determined by characteristics 
peculiar to the mediaeval kingdom. 

This seems to be the point of Hegel's obser- 
vation, already quoted, that Montesquieu's 
theory of monarchy identifies it with the feudal 
kingdom. The point is confirmed in another 
way by the fact that Montesquieu's ideal of 
monarchy is the government of England at the 
end of the lyth century, which, he says, "may 
be justly called a republic, disguised under the 
form of a monarchy." Locke's conception of the 
English government in his own day tends to 
clarify this point. 

The form of a government, says Locke, "de- 
pends upon the placing of the supreme power, 
which is the legislative." When the power of 
making laws is placed in the hands of one man, 
then it is a monarchy. But, according to Locke, 
"the legislative and executive power are in dis- 
tinct hands ... in all moderated monarchies 
and well-framed governments." 

What Locke here calls a "moderated mon- 
archy" (intending to describe the government 
of England), seems to be the mixed regime, the 
form of government which Fortescue had ear- 
lier called a "political kingdom," and Bracton 
a regimen regale et politicum.Tht legislative pow- 
er is in the hands of the people or their repre- 
sentatives. If it belonged exclusively to the 
king as a right vested in his sovereign person, 
and not merely as the people's representative 
or, in the language of Aquinas, their vice- 
gerentthe government would be in form an 



absolute monarchy. If, on the other hand, the 
king were merely a representative, the gov- 
ernment would be a republic. 

The sovereign character of the king in a 
mixed regime seems to stem from his unique 
relation to the laws of the land. In one way, he 
is above the laws, and has certain powers not 
limited by law; in another way, his whole pow- 
er is limited by the fact that he does not have 
the power to make laws in his own right or 
authority. When a people are free and able to 
make their own laws, Aquinas writes, "the con- 
sent of the whole people expressed by custom 
counts far more in favor of a particular observ- 
ance, than does the authority of the sovereign, 
who has not the power to frame laws, except as 
representing the people." But Aquinas also 
says that the sovereign is "exempt from thelaw> 
as to its coercive power; since, properly speak- 
ing, no man is coerced by himself, and law has 
no coercive power save from the authority of 
the sovereign." 

The coercive power of the law belongs to the 
sovereign as executive, not legislator. Admit- 
ting the king to a share in legislative power, 
Locke conceives his essential function that 
which belongs to him alone as executive. The 
absoluteness of this executive power Ix)cke de- 
fines in terms of the royal prerogative, that 
"being nothing but a power in the hands of the 
prince to provide for the public good in such 
cases which, depending upon unforeseen and 
uncertain occurrences, certain and unalterable 
laws could not safely direct." Prerogative, he 
then goes on to say, is the power "to act ac- 
cording to discretion for the public good with- 
out the prescription of law, and sometimes even 
against it." 

Locke thus gives us a picture of the mixed 
regime in which the king's sovereign power is 
limited to the exercise of an absolute preroga- 
tive in performing the executive functions of 
government. In the executive sphere, the king's 
power is absolute, yet his sovereignty is not ab- 
solute; for in the legislative sphere, he either 
has no voice at all where ancient customs pre- 
vail, or, in the making of new laws, he can count 
himself merely as one representative of the 
people among others. 

The extent of the prerogative permitted the 
king depends upon the extent to which mat* 



CHAPTER 59: MONARCHY 



209 



ters are explicitly regulated by law. When in 
the infancy of governments the laws were few 
in number, "the government was almost all 
prerogative," as Locke sees it. He thinks that 
"they have a very wrong notion of government 
who say that the people have encroached upon 
the prerogative when they have got any part of 
it to be defined by positive laws. For in so doing 
they have not pulled from the prince anything 
that of right belonged to him, but only declared 
that that power which they indefinitely left in 
his or his ancestors' hands, to be exercised for 
their good, was not a thing they intended him, 
when he used it otherwise." 

Here we see the seed of conflict between sov- 
ereign king and sovereign people in the com- 
bination of incompatible principles that con- 
stitute a mixed regime. As the king, jealous of 
his prerogative, tries to maintain or even ex- 
tend his power, royal and political government 
tends toward absolute monarchy. As the people, 
jealous of their sovereignty, try to safeguard 
their legislative power from royal usurpations, 
the mixed regime tends to dissolve in the other 
direction. This happens as it moves toward re- 
publican government through various stages of 
limited or constitutional monarchy in which 
the sovereignty of the king becomes more and 
more attenuated. 

When the king's prerogative includes the 
power of calling parliament into session, noth- 
ing short of revolution may resolve the issue; 
for, as Ix)ckc observes, "between an executive 
power in being, with such a prerogative, and 
a legislative that depends upon his will for 
their convening, there can be no judge on 
earth." 

IN THE DISCUSSION of monarchy, as in the dis- 
cussion of democracy or other forms of govern- 
ment, the fundamental terms and issues do not 
have the same meaning in the various epochs of 
western thought. The continuity of discussion 
in the tradition of the great books must be 
qualified, especially in the field of political 
theory, by reference to the differing historic 
institutions with which their authors are ac- 
quainted and concerned. Ancient and modern 
controversies over the merits of monarchy in 
relation to other forms of government seem to 
be comparing institutions of government as dif- 



ferent as the ancient and modern forms of the 
democratic constitution. 

In the ancient world, the choice between 
purely royal and purely political government 
underlies the meaning and evaluation of mon- 
archy. In the modern world, with its heritage 
from the feudal institutions of the Middle 
Ages, either the mixed regime or constitutional 
monarchy is thought to offer a third alterna- 
tive. The praise of monarchy may therefore be 
the corollary of a justification of absolute gov- 
ernment or the absolute state, as with Hobbes 
and Hegel; it may be accompanied by an attack 
on absolute or despotic power, as with Locke 
and Montesquieu; or in defense of purely re- 
publican principles, monarchy may be attacked, 
as by Rousseau and the Federalists, without 
differentiation between its absolute and limited 
forms. 

This does not mean that there is no conti- 
nuity between ancient and modern discussion. It 
seems to exist with respect to both elements in 
the idea of monarchy the unification of gov- 
ernment through its having one head, and the 
Tightness of absolute power. On the point of 
unity, Plato's argument that monarchy is the 
most efficient of the several forms of govern- 
ment which are otherwise equally just, seems to 
be paralleled by modern arguments for a unified 
executive in the constitution of a republic. It is 
also reflected in the reasoning of Montesquieu 
and Rousseau concerning the greater compe- 
tence of monarchies to govern extensive terri- 
tories. On the point of absolute power, there is 
some continuity between ancient and modern 
discussions of government by men versus gov- 
ernment by law. But here there seems to be 
greater similarity between ancient and modern 
arguments against giving sovereignty to an in- 
dividual human being than there is between 
the modern defense of monarchy and ancient 
speculations concerning royal government. 

Taking different shape in Hobbes and Hegel, 
the argument for the necessity of absolute gov- 
ernment seems to be peculiarly modern. It is 
not simply the point made by the ancients, that 
under certain circumstances it may be right for 
the man of superior wisdom to govern his in- 
feriors in an absolute manner, as a father gov- 
erns children, or a god men. The point is rather 
that the very nature o government and the 



210 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



state requires a unified repository of absolute 
power. Hobbes does not ask whether the mon- 
arch in whose hands such power is placed de- 
serves this by reason of personal superiority to 
his subjects. Hegel explicitly repudiates the 
relevance of any consideration of the mon- 
arch's particular character. Neither Hobbes nor 
Hegel argues for the divine right of kings, or 
their divine appointment; though Hegel does 
insist that the constitution itself, which estab- 
lishes the supremacy of the crown, is not some- 
thing made by man, but "divine and constant, 
and exalted above the sphere of things that are 
made." 

That kings have absolute power by divine 
right is another peculiarly modern argument 
for absolute monarchy. "Not all the water from 
the rough rude sea," says Shakespeare's Rich- 
ard II, "can wash the balm off from an anointed 
king. The breath of worldly men cannot depose 
the deputy elected by the Lord." According to 
the theory of divine right, the king is God's 
vicar, not, as Aquinas thinks, the vicegerent of 
the people. The theory of the divine right of 
kings does not seem to be a mediaeval doctrine. 
It appears later in such tracts as those by Bar- 
clay and Filmer, which Locke undertakes to 
answer. 

The controversy involves its adversaries in 
dispute over the interpretation of Holy Writ. 
The anointing of Christian kings is supposed to 
draw its significance from the establishment of 
this practice among the ancient Hebrews. But 
the story of the origin of the Hebrew kingship 
can be given an opposite interpretation. 

The people of Israel, after the leadership of 
Moses and Aaron, first submitted their affairs 
to the government of judges, and "there was 
no king in Israel, but every one did that which 
seemed right to himself." Later they went to 
Samuel, their judge, saying: "Make us a king 
to judge us like all the nations." This displeased 
Samuel. Samuel prayed unto the Lord, and the 
Lord said unto Samuel: "Hearken to the voice 
of the people in all that they say unto thee; for 
they have not rejected thee, but they have re- 
jected me, that I should not reign over them." 
The Lord then describes the tribulations the 
people will suffer at the hands of an earthly 
ruler with absolute power, a punishment they 
deserve for wanting to be ruled by a king, in- 



stead of by God and God's law, administered 
for them by judges. 

THE GREAT POEMS and histories of ancient 
Greece and Rome would seem to indicate that 
the divinity of kings is not a modern notion. 
The deification of emperors and kings certainly 
appears to be a common practice. But the as- 
sumption of divinity by kings is not supposed 
to signify divine appointment, or election by 
the gods; nor do the rulers of the ancient world 
justify their absolute power as a god-given right. 

Furthermore, in the political theory of Plato 
and Aristotle, the analogy between royal rule 
and divine government works in the opposite 
direction. According to their view, the right to 
absolute government depends upon a radical 
inequality between ruler and ruled. If a god 
were to rule men on earth, as in the myth retold 
in Plato's Statesman, he would govern them 
absolutely, deciding everything by his wisdom 
and without recourse to written laws or estab- 
lished customs. If there were a god-like man, or 
if a true philosopher were to become king, he 
too would deserve to be an absolute monarch. 
It would be unjust, says Aristotle, to treat the 
god-like man merely as a citizen, and so to treat 
him as no more than "the equal of those who are 
so far inferior to him in virtue and in political 
capacity." It would also seem to be unjust for a 
man who does not have great superiority over 
his fellow men to rule them like a king, instead 
of being merely a citizen entitled to hold public 
office for a time. 

Aristotle frequently refers to royal govern- 
ment as the divine sort of government, but he 
does not justify its existence except when one 
man stands to others as a god to men. Though 
some of the historic kingships which Aristotle 
classifies are absolute monarchies, none is royal 
government of the divine sort. That seems to 
remain for Aristotle, as for Plato, a purely hy- 
pothetical construction. 

Actual royal government has a patriarchal 
rather than a divine origin. It is the kind of 
government which is appropriate to the village 
community rather than to the city-state. The 
kingly form of government prevails in the vil- 
lage because it is an outgrowth of the family. 
That is why, says Aristotle, "the Hellenic states 
were originally governed by kings; the Hellenes 



CHAPTER 59: MONARCHY 



211 



were under royal rule before they came to- 
gether, as the barbarians still are." 

In thinking that absolute or despotic govern- 
ment befits the servile Asiatics, but not the free 
men of the Greek city-states, Aristotle takes a 
position which has a certain counterpart in the 
views of Montesquieu and Mill. These modern 
opponents of absolute monarchy do not assert 
that constitutional government is uncondition- 
ally better than despotism. For certain peoples, 
under certain conditions, self-government may 
not be possible or advantageous. "A rude peo- 
ple," Mill writes, "though in some degree alive 
to the benefits of civilized society, may be un- 
able to practice the forbearance which it de- 
mands: their passions may be too violent, or 
their personal pride too exacting, to forego pri- 
vate conflict, and leave to the laws the aveng- 
ing of their real or supposed wrongs. In such a 
case, a civilized government, to be really ad- 
vantageous to them, will require to be in a con- 
siderable degree despotic; to be one over which 
they do not themselves exercise control, and 
which imposes a great amount of forcible re- 
straint upon their actions." Montesquieu seems 
further to suppose that different races largely 
as a result of the climate in which they live 
are by nature inclined toward freedom or servi- 
tude. The Asiatics are for him a people whose 
spirit perpetually dooms them to live under 
despotism. 

In contrast, Mill's conditional justification of 
absolute government demands that despotism 
serve only a temporary purpose. It must seek 
not merely to keep order, but by gradual steps 
to prepare the people it rules for self-govern- 



ment. "Leading-strings are only admissible," he 
says, "as a means of gradually training the 
people to walk alone." When they have reached 
that stage of development where they are able 
to govern themselves, the despotic ruler must 
either abdicate or be overthrown. 

There is a deeper contrast between Mill on 
the one hand, and Aristotle and Plato on the 
other, one which goes to the very heart of the 
issue concerning royal and political govern- 
ment. Both Aristotle and Plato seem to be say- 
ing that if the superior or god-like man existed, 
then royal government would be better than the 
best republic, even for the civilized Greeks. In 
calling royal rule the divine form of government, 
they imply that it is the ideal, even if it can never 
be realized. This Mill most emphatically denies. 

The notion that "if a good despot could be 
ensured, despotic monarchy would be the best 
form of government, I look upon," he writes, 
"as a radical and most pernicious conception of 
what good government is." The point at issue 
is not whether the good despot the god-like 
ruler or philosopher king can be found. Sup- 
pose him to exist. The point then to be made is 
that the people ruled by "one man of super- 
human mental activity" would of necessity 
have to be entirely passive. "Their passivity is 
implied in the very idea of absolute power. . . . 
What sort of human beings," Mill asks, "can be 
formed under such a regimen?" Men must 
actually engage in self-government in order to 
pass from political infancy to maturity. When- 
ever it is possible, representative or constitu- 
tional government is therefore better than ab- 
solute monarchy. 



OUTLINE OF TOPICS 

i. The definition of monarchy and the classification of the types of kingship 
la. The distinction between royal and political government 

(1) Absolute or personal rule contrasted with constitutional government or rule 

by law 

(2) The theory of absolute government: the nature of absolute power; the rights 

and duties of the monarch; the radical inequality between ruler and 
ruled in absolute government 

ib. Modifications of absolute monarchy: other embodiments of the monarchical 

principle 

(i) The combination of monarchy with other forms of government: the mixed 
regime 



2I 4 



212 THE GREAT IDEAS 

PAGE 

(2) Constitutional or limited monarchy 215 

(3) The monarchical principle in the executive branch of republican government 
ic. The principle of succession in monarchies 

2. The theory of royalty 

20. The divinity of kings 

2b. The analogy between divine government and rule by the best man: the philos- 
opher king 

2C. The divine institution of kings: the theory of the divine right of kings 216 

2d. The myth of the royal personage: the attributes of royalty and the burdens of 
monarchy 

3. The use and abuse of monarchical power 217 

30. The good king and the benevolent despot in the service of their subjects: the 
education of the prince 

3^. The exploitation of absolute power for personal aggrandizement: the strategies 

of princes and tyrants 218 

4. Comparison of monarchy with other forms of government 

40. The patriarchical character of kingship: absolute rule in the family or tribe, 

and paternalism in the state 219 

4^. The line which divides monarchy from despotism and tyranny 

4?. The differences between kingdoms and republics with respect to unity, wealth, 
and extent of territory 

4^. The defense of monarchy or royal rule 

(1) The necessity for absolute government 

(2) Monarchy as the best or most efficient of the several good forms of govern- 

ment 220 

(3) The preference for the mixed regime: defense of royal prerogatives as abso- 

lute in their sphere 

4*. The attack on monarchy or absolute government 

(1) The paternalistic or despotic character of monarchy: the rejection of benev- 

olent despotism; the advantages of constitutional safeguards 

(2) The justification of absolute rule or benevolent despotism for peoples in- 

capable of self-government 

(3) The illegitimacy of absolute monarchy: the violation of the principle of 

popular sovereignty 

(4) The illegality of royal usurpations of power in a mixed regime: the limita- 

tions of royal prerogative in a constitutional monarchy 221 

5. The absolute government of colonies, dependencies, or conquered peoples 

50. The justification of imperial rule: the rights of the conqueror; the unifying and 
civilizing achievements of empire 

5#. The injustice of imperialism: exploitation and despotism 222 

6. The history of monarchy: its origin and developments 



CHAPTER 59: MONARCHY 213 



REFERENCES 

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page 
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the 
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas- 
sage is in section d of page 12. 

PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the 
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES : Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage 
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is 
printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left- 
hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of 
the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half 
of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164. 

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, 
SECT) arc someiimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer- 
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d. 

BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James 
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King 
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA- 
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45 (D) // Esdras, 7:46. 

SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially 
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit- 
tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited. 

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of 
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface. 



The definition of monarchy and the classifi- la. The distinction between royal and political 

cation of the types of kingship government 
4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [198-206] 12a 

6H B RODOTus://s/ory. BKm,107c-108c 1^(1) Absolute or personal rule contrasted 

7 PLATO: Republic, BK iv, 356a / Statesman, th constitutional government or rule 

598b-604b b y law 

9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK in, CH 7 [1279*33-34] 5 AESCHYLUS: Prometheus Bound [322-326] 

476d; CH 14 483a-484a; BK iv, CH 10 [1295* 43c 

3-18] 495a / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 8 [i365 b 38- 5 EURIPIDES: Suppliants [399-456] 261d-262b 

1366*3] esp [1366*1-3] 608b 6 HERODOTUS: History, BK in, 107c-d; BK vn, 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 95, 233a-d 

A 4, ANS 229b-230c; Q 105, A i 307d-309d 7 PLATO: Statesman, 598b-604b / Laws, BK in, 

23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH 1 3a-b; CH iv, 7a-b; 670c-676c; BK iv, 680d-682c; BK ix, 754a-b 

CH ix 14c-16a; CH xix, 29c-d / Seventh Letter, 805d 

23 HOB BBS: Leviathan, PART n, 104d-105a; 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK v, CH 6 [ii34 a 3o- b 8] 

106d-107c; PART in, 228b 382a-b/ Politics, BK i, CH i [1252*6-16] 445a-b; 

35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH x, SECT 132 CH 5 [i254 a 34- b 9] 448a; CH 7 [i255 b i6-2o] 

55a-b 449b; CH 12 453d-454a; BK HI, CH 15-17 

58 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK n, 4a; 484b-487a; BK iv, CH 4 [1292*4-37] 491b-d; 

7c-d; BK xi, 75b-76c CH 10 [1295*9-24] 495a-b; BK v, CH 10 

58 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK in, 410b; [131^37-1313*10] 515c 

412c-d; BK iv, 427d 14 PLUTARCH: Romulus, 27d-28a / Caesar, 

10 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 24b 591d / Cato the Younger, 638b-639a 

12 KANT: Science of Right, 450a-c 15 TACITUS: Annals, BK i, la-2b; BK in, 51b-c; 

16 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 273, 61c-62a 

91c-d; par 281 95b-d / Philosophy of History, 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 81, 

INTRO, 174a-d A 3, REP 2 430c-431d 



214 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



(la. The distinction between royal and political 
government. la(l) Absolute or personal 
rule contrasted with constitutional govern" 
ment or rule by law.) 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 90, 
A i, REP 3 205b-206b; Q 95, A i, REP 2 226c- 
227c; Q 96, A 5, REP 3 233d-234d 
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 114b-115a; 

131d-132a; 149d-150a 

35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH iv, SECT 21 
29d; CH vii, SECT 90-94 44d-46c; CH xi 
55b-58b; CH xiv 62b-64c; CH xvui, SECT 
199-202 71a-72a 

38 MoNTtsguiEu: Spirit of Laws, BK n, 4a; 

8b-d; BK in, 12a-d; BK v, 29a-31b; BK vi, 

33a-35a; 36a-37b; 37d-38b; BK vin, 54a-b 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 323d-324a; 357b-c; 

358b-d / Social Contract, BK in, 408c; 419a-c 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 24b,d-28b passim, 
csp 25a-c; 51b-d; 154a-c; 592a 

41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 73d-75a 

42 KANT: Science of Right, 438b; 450b /Judge- 
ment, 547b-c 

43 DI-.CLA RATION OP INDEPENDENCE: la-3b pas- 
sim 

43 MILL: Liberty, 267d-268b / Representative 
Government, 339d-340c; 341d-350a passim 

44 \\osvj\LLL\Johnson, 195c-d 

46 1 1 EG I-.L: Philosophy of Right, PART HI, par 
286 96c 97a; ADDITIONS, 171 146b-c / Philoso- 
phy of History, PART i, 208b-c; 213b~214d; 
PART n, 262a-c; PART in, 301c-302a 

la (2) The theory of absolute government: the 
nature of absolute power; the rights and 
duties of the monarch; the radical in- 
equality between ruler and ruled in ab- 
solute government 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK vi, 195d-196c; BK 
vii, 238c 

7 PLATO: Statesman, 598b-604b / Laws, BK iv, 
679c-680d 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vin, CH 10 [ii6o b 2-6]^ 
412d; CH n [n6i a ii-23J 413b-c / Politics 
BK i, CH 5 447d-448c; en 12-13 453d-455a,c 
passim; BK in, en 13 [1284*3]-^ 18 [i288 b 7] 
482a-487a,c; BK v, CH 10 512d-515d 

14 PLUTARCH: Romulus-Theseus, 30c-d / Agesi- 
laits, 480b,d-481a 

15 TACITUS: Histories, BK n, 239b 

23 HUBBES: leviathan 47a-283a,c esp PART I-H 
49a-164a,c 

26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard II, ACT iv, sc i [115- 
y8] 342c-344d 

27 SHAKESPEARE: Macbeth, ACT i, sc iv [15-27] 
287c 

30 BACON: New Atlantis, 208a-b 

33 PASCAL: Pensees, 330 231b-232a 

35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH n, SECT 13 
28a-b; CH in, SECT 17 28d-29a; CH iv 29d- 
30b; CH vii, SECT 90-94 44d-46c; CH xi, 



1*(2) to \b(\) 

SECT 135-139 55d-58a; CH xiv, SECT 163 
63a-b; CH xv, SECT 172-174 65b-d 

38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i, 3b-c; 
BK ii, 4a; 8d-9a,c; BK in, 12a-13c; BK iv, 
15a-c; BK v, 26c-31b; BK vi, 33d-34b; 39d- 
40d; BK vin, 54a-b; BK xv, 109a; BK xix, 
137c-d; BK xxv, 211c-d 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 359a-c / Social Con- 
tract, BK i, 388b-389d 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 26b-28b passim, 
esp 27b-c; 50a; 51c-d; 153c-155b passim 

41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 73d-75a esp 74d; 
173c-d; 219c-220a,c; 307a-c; 317b-d; 320d- 
321b 

42 KANT: Science of Right, 438b 

43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 45, 148a 

43 MILL: Liberty, 267d-268a; 321a-b / Repre- 
sentative Government, 339c-341a; 341d-344d 
passim 

44 BOSWKLL: Johnson, 120a-c 

48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic\, 107a-b 

\b. Modifications of absolute monarchy: other 
embodiments of the monarchical princi- 
ple 



The combination of monarchy with 
other forms of government: the mixed 
regime 

5 AESCHYLUS: Suppliant Maidens [359-422] 5b- 
6b 

6 TIIUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK n, 
391c-d 

7 PLATO: Laws, BK in, 671c-672c; BK iv, 
680d-681a; BK vi, 699d-700b 

9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK n, CH 6 [i265 b 26- 
i266' l ^o] 461 b-d; CH 9 [i27o b 7-i27i*26] 
4C6d-467c; en n 469a-470b 

14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 34d-35d 

15 TACITUS: Annals, BK iv, 72a-b 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 81, 
A 3, REP 2 430c-431d 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-H, Q 95, 
A 4, ANS 229b-230c; Q 105, A i 307d-309d 

23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH xix, 27a-b 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 103d-104a; 151c- 

152a; PART in, 228a-b 
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, en x, SECT 132 

55a-b; CH xm, SECT 151-152 59d-60b; CH 

xiv 62b-64c; CH xix, SECT 212-223 ^ a ' 

76d esp SECT 223 76c-d 
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK n, 7c-8c; 

BK v, 32a; BK xi, 75b-78a 
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK in, 410c-d; 

414d-415b; BK iv, 427d 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 26d-28b csp 28a-b; 
342c; 630d 

41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 71d; 81c-d; 217d- 
219a; 403 b-c; 428a 

43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 17, 70a-d; NUMBER 70, 

213b-c; NUMBER 71, 216a~b 
43 MILL: Representative Government, 351a-c 



\b(2) to 2b 



CHAPTER 59: MONARCHY 



215 



44 Bos WELL: Johnson, 178a-c; 390a-b 
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART HI, par 
273, 90d-91d; par 286, 96d / Philosophy of 
History, PART iv, 342b-d; 356d-357a 

lb(2) Constitutional or limited monarchy 
7 PLATO: Statesman, 598b-604b / Laws, BK 

in, 667c-d 

9 ARLSTOTLE: Politics, BK in, CH 14 [1285*3-16] 
483a-b; CH 15 [i285 b 34-i286 a 5] 484b; CH 15 
[i286 b 27]-cn 16 [i28; a io] 485b-c; BK iv, 
en 10 [1295*15-17] 495a; BK v, CH n [1313* 
18-33] 515d-516a / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 8 
[i 366*1-13] 608b-c 

23 IIoBBts: Leviathan, PART n, 106d-107c 
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH vn, SLCT 94 

46a-c; CH xvm, SECT 200 71a-c passim 
40 GIBHON: Decline and Fall, 622d-623a 

42 KANT: Science of Right, 439c-440b; 441b-c 

43 MILL: Representative Government, 343c-344a 
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 273 

90c92a; par 281 95b-d; par 283-284 96a-b; 
par 286 96c-97a; par 292-293 98a-b; par 300 
lOOb; ADDITIONS, 170-172 145d-146d / Phi- 
losophy of History, PART i, 208b-c; PART iv, 
342b-d; 368c-d 



The monarchical principle in the execu- 
tive branch of republican government 

38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xi, 72b 
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK in, 414d- 
415a 

43 FbDhRALIST: NUMBER 37, 118d-119b| NUM- 

BER 48, 157b-c; NUMBER 67 203b-205b; NUM- 
BER 69-70 207a-214b passim 
43 MILL: Representative Government, 350d-351a; 
356b-357a; 409d-413d passim 

ic. The principle of succession in monarchies 

OLD TESTAMENT: Judges, 8:22; 9 // Kings, i 
(D) III Kings, i / / Chronicles, 11:1-3; 23:1 
(D) I Paralipomenon, 11:1-3; 2 3 :i 

APOCRYPHA: / Maccabees, 9:28-30 (D) OT, 

/ Machabees, 9:28-30 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK v, 167b-168a; BK 
vi, 194d-195b; 196d-199a; BK vn, 214b-d; 
252c-253a 

9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK HI, CH 15 [i286 b 22-28] 
485a 

14 PLUTARCH: Numa Pompilius, 49b-52c / Pyr- 
rhus, 318a / Lysander, 363d-366a / Agesilaus, 
480b,d-482a / Agesilaus-Pompey, 538b,d-539a 

15 TACITUS: Annals, BK vi, 98b-d / Histories, 
BK i, 193c-194a 

23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH xix, 29c-d 

23HoBBEs: Leviathan, PART n, 106b d; 107b; 
108a-109a 

26 SHAKESPEARE: 1st Henry VI, ACT 11, sc v 
[33-129] 13b-14a / 2nd Henry VI, ACT n, sc n 
43c-44c / 3rd Henry VI, ACT i, sc i [50-188] 
70b-71d / Henry V, ACT i, sc n 534a-537b 

33 PASCAL: Pensees, 320 229b-230a 



35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH x, SECT 132 

55a-b 
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK v, 28b-d; 

BK xxvi, 222b-d 

38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK in, 413d-414a 

39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK HI, 165c- 
166a 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 30b-c; 61b-c 
68b,d-69b; 161c; 430b-c 

41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 194a-b; 204b- 
205a; 212d~213c; 223c-d; 445b; 508c-d 

44 Bos WELL: Johnson, 347d-348c 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 
280-281 94d-95d; par 286 96c-97a / Philoso- 
phy of History, PART iv, 325a-b; 344c; 355c-d 

2. The theory of royalty 

2a. The divinity of kings 

APOCRYPHA: Judith, 6:2 (D) OT, Judith, 6:2 / 
Wisdom of Solomon, 14:16-21 (D) OT, 
Boot{ of Wisdom, 14:16-21 

4 HOMLR: Iliad, BK i [254-287] 5d-6a 

5 AESCHYLUS: Persians [623-680] 21c 22a 

13 VIRGIL: Eclogues, i [6-10] 3a; iv [15-17] 14b; 
v [20-80] 16b-18b; ix [46-49] 30b / Georgics, 
i [24-42] 37b-38a / Acneid, BK i [286-296] 
HOb-llla; BK vi [791-805] 232a-b; BK vni 
[126-142] 262b-263a 

14 PLUTARCH: Romulus, 28a~29c / Numa 
Pompilius, 50b-52c / Alexander, 553b-554b 

15 TACITUS: Annals, BK i, 4c-d; BK iv, 73b-d; 
80c-d 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 82b-c 

26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard II, ACT iv, sc i [162- 
242] 343b-344a 

27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT iv, sc v [123- 
125] 60d-61a / Pericles, ACT i, sc i [103-104] 
422d 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 28b-d; 154d esp 
712c [n 100] 

2b. The analogy between divine government 
and rule by the best man: the philosopher 
king 

7 PLATO: Republic, BK n-vii 310c-401d esp BK 
v-vi, 368c-383a / Statesman, 586c-590a; 598b- 
604b / Laws, BK iv, 679c-681d / Seventh 
Letter, 801b; 806b-c 

9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK i, CH 12 [i259 b io-i7] 
454a; BK HI, CH 13 [1284*3-18] 482a-b; [i284 b 
25-34] 482d-483a; CH 15 484a-485b; CH 17 
[1288*7-34] 486d-487a; BK vii, CH 14 [1332^ 
16-26] 537b-c 

14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 47a-48c / Numa Pom- 
pilius, 50b-52c; 59c-60b / Themistocles, 99b-c 
/ Phocion, 605b-d / Dion, 784d-785a 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 103, 
A 3 530a-c 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 164c 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 20d-21a; 
74d-75a 



216 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



2cto2d 



(2. The theory of royalty. 2b. The analogy be- 
tween divine government and rule by the 
best man: the philosopher king.) 

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART 11, PROP 3, SCHOL 
374b-c 

35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH xiv, SECT 165- 
166 63c-64a 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART i, 28b-29a 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 338d-339a 
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 49, 160a 

2c. The divine institution of kings: the theory 

of the divine right of kings 
OLD TESTAMENT: Deuteronomy, 17:14-20 esp 
17:15 / / Samuel, 2:10; 9:15-10:13; 10:18- 
19,24; 12:12-14,17-19; 15:1,17; 16:1-13; 24:4- 
10; 26:7-12 (D) I Kings, 2:10; 9:15-10:13; 
10:18-19,24; 12:12-14,17-19; 15:1,17; 16:1-13; 
24:5-11; 26:7-12 / // Samuel, 1:13-14; 5:12; 
7:8,11-16; 12:7; 23:1 (D) II Kings, 1:13-14; 
5:12; 7:8,11-16; 12:7; 23:1 / / Kings, 16:2 
(D) III Kings, 16:2 / // Kings, 9:i-7,i2-(D) 
IV Kings, 9:1-7,12 / I Chronicles, 28:1-10 
(D) I Paralipomenon, 28:1-107 II Chronicles, 
9:8 (D) // Paralipomenon, 9:8 / Nehemiah, 
13:26 (D) II Esdras, 13:26 / Isaiah, 45:1-6 
(D) Isaias, 45:1-6 / Daniel, 4:17,25,32 
(D) Daniel, 4:14,22,29 

APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 9:7 (D) OT, 
BooJ^ of Wisdom, 9:7 / Ecclesiasticus, 17:17; 
47:11 (D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 17:14-15; 47:13 
NEW TESTAMENT: Acts, 13:21-22 
14 PLUTARCH: Numa Pompilius, 50b-51c 
23HoBBEs: Leviathan, PART n, lllb-112b; 

123a-b; PART in, 225c-d 
26 SHAKESPEARE: Richard II, ACT i, sc n [37-43] 
323a; ACT in, sc n [54-62] 336a; sc in [72- 
100] 338c-d; ACT iv, sc i [102-242] 342c- 
344a 

35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH i, SECT i 25a-c; 
en VHI, SECT 112 51a-b; CH xix, SECT 231- 
239 78c-81b 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART i, 29a; PART iv, 182b 

37 Fi ELDING: Tom Jones, 268c-269a 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 358d-359a 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 33b-c; 292d-293b 
esp 759d [n 22] 

41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 204d-205a; 209c 
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 

279, 93d 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE n, 680b-c 

2d. The myth of the royal personage: the at- 
tributes of royalty and the burdens of 
monarchy 

OLD TESTAMENT: Judges, 9:7-20 / Job, 34:18-20 
/ Proverbs, 14:28; 20:2; 21:1; 25:3 

APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 7:1-6 (D) 
OT, Book, of Wisdom, 7:1-6 / Ecclesiasticus, 
10:10-18; 11:5; 4o:i-4~(Z>) OT, Ecclesiasti- 
cus, 10:12-22; 11:5; 40:1-4 



4 HOMER: Iliad, BK in [161-224] 20c-21b; BK 
ix [96-114] 58a-b 

5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King [572-602] 
104c-d 

5 EURIPIDES: Medea [115-130] 213b / Iphigenia 
at Aulis [12-33] 425b; [442-453] 428d-429a 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 7b-8a; BK 11, 85d- 
86b; BK in, 93c; BK vin, 281d-282a 

7 PLATO: Laws, BK in, 669b-674d 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vin, CH 7 [ii58 b 29~ 
H59 a 5] 410d-411a; CH n [1161*11-23] 413b-c 
/ Politics, BK in, CH 13 [1284*3-18] 482a~b; 
[i 284^5-34] 482d-483a; BK v, CH n [13 14*37- 
I3i5 b n]517b-518c 

12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK v [1136- 
1141] 76a 

12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK i 253a-256d; BK 
vn, SECT 36 282b 

14 PLUTARCH: Romulus, 27c-28d / Numa 
Pompilius, 51b-c / Pericles, 121c-d / Alexander 
540b,d-576d passim / Cleomenes, 661b-d / 
Tiberius Gracchus, 678b-d / Demosthenes, 
697c / Demetrius, 727a-b; 732a-c; 742c-743b 
/ Aratus, 835b-c / Artaxetxes, 847b-d 

15 TACITUS: Annals, BK in, 52c; 58a b; BK iv, 
73b-74a; BK xi, 104a-c / Histories, BK i, 
193a-c; BK 11, 224c-d 

23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, la-b 

24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i, 
35a-36a; S8a-59d; BK in, 131b,d-133b 

25 MONTAIGNL: Essays, 126b-131a; 311c; 327d- 
329d; 436c-439c; 443d-446a; 451d-452a 

26 SHAKESPEARE: 3rd Henry VI, ACT i, sc n 
[29-34] ?3b; ACT ii, sc v [1-54] 81d-82a; 
ACT in, sc i [61-65] 85b / Richard II 320a- 
351d esp ACT in, sc n [27-90] 335d-336b, 
[144-177] 337a-b, sc in [61-209] 338c-340a, 
ACT iv, sc i [162-334] 343b-345a / King John, 
ACT iv, sc n [208-214] 396d / Merchant of 
Venice, ACT iv, sc i [184-197] 427c / 1st 
Henry IV, ACT in, sc 11 [29-91] 453b-d / 
2nd Henry IV, ACT in, sc i [1-31] 482d-483a; 
ACT iv, sc v [19-47] 494c-d; ACT v, sc n [122- 
145] 499b / Henry V, ACT iv, sc i [104-301] 
552d-554c 

27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT i, sc in [10-28] 
34c; ACT in, sc in [1-23] 53b-c / King Lear 
244a-283a,c / Macbeth, ACT i, sc vii [16-25] 
289c / Antony and Cleopatra 311a-350d 

28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart, 267a-b 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, la-2c; 20d- 
25c / New Atlantis, 205d-207b 

32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK n [430-456] 
120b-121a 

33 PASCAL: Pensees, 139 196b-199a; 308 228b 

35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH xvin, SECT 202 

71d-72a passim; SECT 205-206 72a-c; CH xix, 

SECT 224 76d-77a 
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK n, 8d-9a,c; 

BK in, 12a-13c; BK iv, 15a-b; BK v, 26c-29a; 

BK vr, 39d; 42a-b; 43c-d; BK xir, 93d-94a: 

94d-95b 



CHAPTER 59: MONARCHY 



217 



38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 358d-359c / Social 
Contract, BK HI, 412d-413a; 414c-d 

39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK v, 356b,d 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 28b; 154b-155b; 
156b-157d; 329c; 547a-b; 572a-c 

41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 39b-40a; 194a-d; 
297c d; 307b-c; 317b-321b 

43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 67, 203b-c; NUMBER 
69, 207c; 210a; NUMBER 70, 213b 

43 MILL: Liberty, 275b-c / Representative Govern- 
ment, 341d-342b; 363b-d 

44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 125c; 154c; 155a; 155d; 
216b; 251b-d; 333b-c; 335c; 344a-b 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 281- 
282 95b-96a; ADDITIONS, 173 146d 

47 GOETHE: Faust, TART i [2211-2244] 52b-53b; 
PART ii [4761-4875] 118b-121a; [10,242-259] 
249b-250a; [10,455-500] 254b-255b 

48 MELVILLE: Moby Dic{, 81a-82b; 93b-94a; 
107a-109b; 395a-b 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, ld-2b; 49b; 
BK n, 87b-d; BK in, 135c-137c; 141b-142d; 
147c-150a; 157a-161b; BK v, 230b-234a; BK 
vi, 257c-259a passim; BK vin, 308d-309a; 
BK ix, 342a-346a; 348c-349c; 382a-388a,c; BK 
x, 405b-406c; 444a 450a; 456a-459d; 465c- 
468a,c; BK xi, 497c-499c; 518c-d; BK xn, 
536a-537b; BK xm, 573b-c; 574b 

3. The use and abuse of monarchical power 

$a. The good king and the benevolent despot 
in the service of their subjects: the edu- 
cation of the prince 

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 41 133,39-40 / Exodus, 
18:21-26 / Deuteronomy, 1:13; 17:14-20 / 
Judges, 9:8-15 / / Samuel, 15:10-35 -(D) 
/ Kings, 15:10-35 / II Samuel, 23:3 (D) 
II Kings, 23:3 / / Kings, 4:29-34; 11:26-40; 
14:1-20 (D) /// Kings, 4:29-34; 11:26-40; 
14:1-20 / // Chronicles, 1:7-12 (D) II Para- 
lipomenon, 1:7-12 / Psalms, 2 esp 2:10-12; 72 
(D) Psalms, 2 csp 2:10-13; 7 1 / Proverbs, 
8:15-16; 14:28,35; 16:10-15; 17:7; 20:26,28; 
25:2-5; 28:2,15-16; 29:2,4,12,14; 31:4-5 / 
Ecclesiastes, 10:4-7,16-17 /Jeremiah, 23:3-6 
(D) Jeremias, 23:3-6 / Ezetycl, 45:9 (D) 
Ezechiel, 45:9 

APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 1:1; 6; 9 (D) 
OT, Bool( of Wisdom, i :i ; 6; 9 / Ecclesiasticus, 
10:1-4,14; 41:17-18 (D) OT, Ecclesiasticus, 
10:1-4,17; 41:21-22 / / Maccabees, 14 (D) 
OT, / Machabces, 14 

4 HOMER: Iliad, BK ix [1-172] 57a-58d 

5 AESCHYLUS: Suppliant Maidens [359-422] 5b- 
6b / Persians [647-680] 21d-22a; [759-786] 
23b-c 

5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the Kittg [1-77] 99a-d / 
Antigone [162-210] 132c-d; [658-745] 136d- 
137c 

5 EURIPIDES: Suppliants [339-358] 261 b-c / 
Iphigenia at Aulis [334-375] 427d-428b 



6 HERODOTUS: History, BK in, 108b-c 

7 PLATO: Republic, BK i, 303a-304c; BK n-iv, 
316a-356a; BK vi-vn, 383c-401d / Statesman, 
598b-608d / Laws, BK iv, 679c-680d / Seventh 
Utter, 801b; 806b-c; 814b-c 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vin, CH 10 [1160*36- 
b 9]412c-d;cH n [n6i*u-2i]4l3b~c/ Politics, 
BK i, CH 13 454a-455a,c passim; BK in, CH 14 
[i285 b 3-i9J 483d-484a; en 15 484b-48Sb pas- 
sim, esp [i286 b 8-i2] 484d-485a; CH 18 487a,c; 
BK v, CH 10 [i3io b 33-i3ii ft 8] 513b; CH n 
[I3i4 a 37-i3i5 b n]517b-518c 
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK i 253a-256d 

14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus 32a 48d esp 47a-48c / 
Solon 64b,d~77a,c csp 68d-70d / Poplicola, 
80d-81c / Poplicola-Solon, 86d-87a / Pencles, 
129a-141a,c csp 129c-130a / Agesilaus, 480b,d- 
481a / Alexander, 542d-544a / Phocion, 
605b-d / Demetrius, 742c-743b / Dion, 782c- 
788b 

15 TACITUS: Annals, BK xm, 125d-126a / His- 
tories, BK i, 198b-c; BK n, 215c-d; BK iv, 
290ad 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 
105, A i, REP 2 307d-309d 

21 I^)ANTE: Divine Comedy, PURC.ATORY, vn [61- 
136] 63a-64a; x [70-96] 68a-b; PARADISE, xm 
[88-in] 126b-c 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, INTRO, 47b-d; PART n, 
143d; 153a-159c; 164a,c 

24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK i, 
26d-30c 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essavs, 131b 132a; 314c-316a; 
386b-388c; 436c-439c 

26 SHAKESPEARE: 1st Henry IV 434a 466d esp 
ACT i, sc ii [218-240] 437c-d, ACT in, sc ii 
[93-161] 453d-454c / 2nd Henry IV 467a-502d 
esp ACT v, sc ii [122-145] 499b / Henry V, 
ACT i, sc i 533a-d; ACT iv, sc i [10^-321] 
552d-554d 

27 SHAKESPEARE: King Lear, ACT in, sc iv [27- 
36] 264c/ Macbeth, ACT iv, sc in [i-i39J303b- 
304d 

29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART n, 340b- 
343a; 345a-348c; 352b-356d; 360d-364a; 
366d-369b 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, lb-2c; 20d- 
25c; 74d-75a;94b-c/ New Atlantis, 205d 207b 

35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH vn, SECT 94 
46a-c; CH vin, SECT 105-112 48c-51b passim; 
CH xiv 62b-64c; CH xvin, SECT 200 71a-c; 
SECT 202 71d-72a 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART in, 112a-113b 

37 FIELDING: Tom Jones, 268c-269a 

38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK iv, 14d; 
BK xii, 93c-95b 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 357b-c / Social Con- 
tract, BK in, 412d-414d 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 31b-32d; 50a-b; 
85d-86a; 260a-b; 284a c; 288b-289a; 338d- 
340c; 341d-342c; 343c-344a,c; 448c-449c; 
577a-580d esp 577d-578a; 638a-646d passim 



218 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



(3. The use and abuse of monarchical power. 
3tf. The good king and the benevolent des- 
pot in the service of their subjects: the educa- 
tion of the prince.) 

41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 102b-104b; 176c-d; 

504c-505c 
43 MILL: Representative Government, 342a-344d; 

351c-354b 
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 171 

146b-c / Philosophy of History, PART i, 21 2d- 

213a; 243b-c; PART iv, 361d-362a 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 9c-10d 

3b. The exploitation of absolute power for 
personal aggrandizement: the strategies 
of princes and tyrants 

OLD TESTAMENT: / Samuel, 8:11-18 (D) / 
Kings, 8:11-18 / II Samuel, 11:6-12:13 (D) 
II Kings, 11:6-12:13 / / Kings, 12:1-15; 21 
(D) III Kings, 12:1-15; 2I / H Chronicles, 10 
(D) II Paralipomenon, 10 / Isaiah, 1:23; 3:14- 
15; 10:1-3; i4.'4-6-(O) Isaias, 1:23; 3:14-15; 
10:1-3; 14:4-6 / Jeremiah, 22:1-23:2 (D) 
Jeremias, 22:1-23:2 / Eze^iel, 22:27; 46:18 
(D) Ezechiel, 22:27; 46:18 / Daniel, 5:1-12; 
6:7-8 / Micah, 3:1-3; 7:3-4 (D) Micheas, 
3:1-3; 7:3-4 / Zephaniah, $'$--(0) Sophonias, 

APOCRYPHA: Judith, 2:1-12 (D) OT, Judith, 
2:1-6 / Ecclesiasticus, 8 \2(D) OT, Ecclesiasti- 
ens, 8:2-3/7 Maccabees, 1:41-64; 10:22-46 
(D) OT, / Machabees, 1:43-67; 10:22-46 

5 EURIPIDES: Iphigenia at Aulis [334-375] 427d- 
428b 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 23b-24a; 35b-37a; 
BK in, 107c-d 

7 PLATO: Republic, BK i, 301b-304c; BK 11, 311b- 
313a / Laws, BK HI, 672d-674d; BK iv, 681b- 
682c / Seventh Letter, 811b-813d 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK v, CH 6 [ii34 ft 3o- b 8J 
382a b; BK vm, CH 10 [n6o a 36- b n] 412c-d; 
[n6o b 23-}3] 413a / Politics, BK iv, CH 10 
[1295*18-23] 495a-b; BK v, CH 10-11 512d- 
518c / Rhetoric, BK i, CH 8 [1366*3-6] 608b 

14 PLUTARCH: Pyrrhus, 319b-d / Agesilaus, 482a- 
484a; 489b-c; 495a-b / Pompey, 521a-b / 
Demetrius, 742c-743b 

15 TACITUS: Annals, BK i, la-5a; BK in, 58d-59a 
/ Histories, BK i, 195a; 197a-c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 
105, A i, REP 2,5 307d-309d 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, XXVH [55-136] 
40a 41b; PURGATORY, vi [58-151] 61b-62c; 
xx [34-96] 83c-84a; PARADISE, xix [115-148] 
136b-c 

23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince la-37d 
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i, 76d 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 51a-55d 

26 SHAKESPEARE: 1st Henry VI la-32a,c / 2nd 
Henry VI 33a-68d / 3rd Henry VI 69a-104d 
esp ACT ii, so vi [1-30] 83b-c, ACT in, sc 11 



[124-195] 87c-88a / Richard III 105a-148a,c / 
Richard II 320a-351d esp ACT HI, sc iv [29- 
90] 340c-341a / King John 376a-405a,c / 1st 
Henry IV, ACT iv, sc HI [52-105] 459d-460b / 
2nd Henry IV, ACT iv, sc v [178-225] 496b-d 
27 SHAKESPEARE: Macbeth 284a-310d 

35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH VH, SECT 90-94 
44d-46c passim; CH vm, SECT in 50d-51a; 
CH xi, SECT 138 57b-c; CH xiv, SECT 161-166 
62d-64a; CH xvm, SECT 199-202 71a-72a; 
SECT 210 73b-c 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART i, 37a-b 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 357a-c; 359 b-c/ Social 
Contract, BK i, 391a; BK in, 412d-413a; 415d- 
416a 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 25a-26d; 29b-c; 
38a-c; 42b,d-43b; 60a-c; 70c-71b; 142c; 
155a-b 

41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 39b-40b; 113c- 
114a; 173b-174a 

43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: la-3b 
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 4, 35b; NUMBER 22, 

83c; NUMBER 75, 223c-d 
43 MILL: Representative Government, 366a-c 
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART in, 300c- 

302a 
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK i, 9c-10d 

4. Comparison of monarchy with other forms 
of government 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK HI, 107c-108d 

7 PLATO: Republic, BK iv, 356a; BK vm 401d- 
416a esp 402a-d; BK ix, 416a-421a / Statesman, 
598b-604b / Laws, BK in, 670d-676c 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK vm, CH 10 412c-413b 
passim, esp [1160*31-36] 412c / Politics, BK HI, 
CH 7 476c-477a; CH 15 [i286 a 23- b 22] 484c- 
485a; CH 17-18 486c-487a,c; BK iv, CH 2 
[I289 a 26- b 4] 488b-c; CH 4 [!292 a 4~37] 491b-d 
passim; BK v, CH 10 [i3i2 a 40- b 9] 514d-515a 

20 AQUINAS : Summa Theologica, PART i-ii, Q 95, 
A 4, ANS 229b-230c; Q 105, A i, ANS 307d-309d 

23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH i, 3a 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART 11, 104b-108b; 
112b-c; 154b-c; PART HI, 228b; PART iv, 
273a-c 

35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH x, SECT 132 
55a-b 

38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK ii-iv, 4a- 
16a; BK v, 25a-26d; BK v-vi, 30a-43d; BK vn, 
47d-48a; BK ix 58b,d-61d; BK xn, 90b-c; BK 
xni 96a-102a,c passim 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 359a~b / Social Con- 
tract, BK in, 409a-410c; 412c-414d; 415d 

42 KANT: Science of Right, 450a-d 

43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 9, 48b-d; NUMBER 17, 
70a-d ; NUMBER 22, 83 b-d; NUMBER 39, 125b-d 
passim; NUMBER 69 207a-210c passim; NUM- 
BER 70, 213b-c; NUMBER 84, 252b-253a 

43 MILL: Representative Government, 338d-339a; 
341d-355b passim, esp 346a-c; 363b-364d; 
366a-367c 



4a to 4</(l) 



CHAPTER 59: MONARCHY 



219 



46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 273 
90c-92a; par 279, 94b-d; ADDITIONS, 165 
145a-b / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 174a- 
175c 

4*. The patriarchical character of kingship: 
absolute rule in the family or tribe, and 
paternalism in the state 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 35c-d 

7 PLATO: Statesman, 581a-c / Laws, BK in, 
664d-666c 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK v, CH 6 [ii34 b 8-i7l 
382b-c; CH 11 [ii38 b 5-i4] 387a,c; BK vm, 
CH 10 [n6o b 23-32] 413a; CH n [1161*11-23] 
413b-c; BK x, CH 9 [n8o b 3-7J 435b / Politics, 
BK i, CH i [i252 B 6-i6] 445a-b; CH 2 [i252 b i6- 
24] 445d-446a; CH 7 [i255 b i6-2o] 449b; CH 12 
[i259 a 37J-CH 13 [1260*14] 453d-454c; BK in, 
CH 6 [i278 b 30-i279 a 2] 476a-b; CH 14 [i285 b 29~ 
33] 484a; BK v, CH 10 [i3io b 3V-i3ii a 8] 513b 

18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK xix, CH 12, 
517c-d; CH 13-17 S19a-S23a 

23 HOB BBS: Leviathan, PART i, 68a; PART n, 
109b-llld; 121a; 155b 

26 SHAKESPEARE: Taming of the Shrew, ACT v, 
sc n [136-179] 227d-228a,c 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 34a / New 
Atlantis, 207b-209d 

35 LOCKE: CM Government, CH i, SECT 1-2 
25a-c; CH vi 36a-42a; CH vn, SECT 86 43d-44a; 
CH vin, SECT 105-107 48c-49d; SECT 110-112 
SOc-Slb; CH xiv, SECT 162 63a; CH xv 64c-65d 

36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 216b 

38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK i, 3b; BK 
xvi, 118a-c; BK xix, 140a-c 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 357a-b; 359b-c / Politi- 
cal Economy, 367a-368c / Social Contract, BK 
i, 388a; BK in, 414c 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Pall, 412c-413b 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART HI, par 273, 
91c-d; ADDITIONS, in 134d-13Sa / Philosophy 
of History, INTRO, 172b-d; PART i, 211b-c; 
212c-d 

53 JAMES: Psychology, 731 b 

54 FREUD: Group Psychology, 686c-687d; 689a 

4b. The line which divides monarchy from 
despotism and tyranny 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK in, 107c-d 

6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK i, 352c-d 

7 PLATO: Republic, BK ix, 418d-419a / States- 
man, 590c-d; 598b-604b / Laws, BK in, 672d- 
674d 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK v, CH 6 [ii34 B 3<>- b 8] 
382a-b; BK vm, CH 10 [ii6o a 36- b n] 412c-d; 
[ii6o b 23-32] 413a / Politics, BK in, CH 7 476c- 
477a esp [1279^-10] 476d-477a; CH 8 [i279 b i6- 
17] 477a; CH 14 [i285 a i7~ b 3] 483b-d; BK iv, 
CH 2 [i289 a 26- b 4J 488 b-c; CH 4 [i292 a i5-i9J 
491c; CH 10 495a-b; BK v, CH 10 [i3io a 39- 
I3ii a 8] 512d-513b; [i3i2 a 40- b 9] 514d-515a; 
515c-d; CH n 515d-518c 



passim, esp [I3i4 a 37-i3i5 b n] 517b-518c / 
Rhetoric, BK i, CH 8 [1366*1-3] 608b 

14 PLUTARCH: Romulus-Theseus, 30c-d / Lycur- 
gus, 34d / Demetrius, 742c-743b / Dion, 
783 b-d; 784d-785a 

15 TACITUS: Annals, BK xn, 115d / Histories, 
BK i, 193c-194a 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 95, 
A 4, ANS 229b-230c; Q 105, A i, REP 2,5 307d- 
309d 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 105a; 150c 151a; 
PART iv, 273a-c; CONCLUSION, 280d 

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 27a 

33 PASCAL: Pensccs, 15 174a 

35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH n, SECT 13 
28a-b; CH vn, SECT 90-94 44d-46c passim; 
CH vin, SECT 107 49b-d; CH xiv 62b 64c 
passim; CH xvin, SECT 199-202 71a-72a; CH 
xix 73d-81d 

38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK n, 4a; 7c- 
9a,c; BK in, 12a-13c; BK v, 25d-29a; 30a-31b; 
BK vi, 33a-34d; 36a-37b; 37d-38c; BK vn, 
46a; 47d; BK vin, 53a-d; BK ix, 60a-61a; BK 
xi, 75a-b; BK xxv, 211c-d 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 357b-c / Social Con- 
tract, BK in, 412d-413a; 419b-c 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 24b; 32c-33a 

44 Bos WELL : Johnson, 195c-d 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 286 
96c-97a; par 302, lOlb / Philosophy of History, 
PART iv, 342 b-d 

4c. The differences between kingdoms and re- 
publics with respect to unity, wealth, 
and extent of territory 

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 148a 

38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK n, 4a; BK 

v, 25c-d; 31b-33a,c; BK vn, 44d-46a; 50a-b; 

BK vin, 56b-57c; BK ix, 58b,d-61a passim; 

BK xi, 75b-76a; BK xin, 99d; BK xv, 112d- 

113a; BK xvin, 125a-c; BK xx, 147a-d 
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK n, 400a; BK 

in, 412c-414d; 415b-417c 
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 9, 47d-48d; NUMBER 

14, 60d-61b; NUMBER 39, 125b-d; NUMBER 48, 

157b-c; NUMBER 75, 223c*d 

43 MILL: Representative Government, 330a-c; 
346a-c; 350b-355b passim; 363b-364d 

44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 260b 

4d. The defense of monarchy or royal rule 

44(1) The necessity for absolute government 

4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [198-206] 12a 

5 EURIPIDES : Suppliants [399-456] 261d-262b 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK in, 108b-c 

9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK in, CH 13 [i283 b i7- 

23] 481d; [i284 a 3-i7] 482a-b 
15 TACITUS: Histories, BK i, 193c-d 
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART i-n, 97c-107c; PART 

n, 112b-d; 113c-115a; 130d-132b; 148c-153b; 

CONCLUSION, 280c-281a 



220 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



4</(2) to 



(44. The defense of monarchy or royal rule. 4</(l) 

The necessity for absolute government.) 
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 330 231b-232a 
35 LOCKE: Civil Government ', en vn, SECT 90-94 

44d-46c passim 
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 68b,d-69b 

42 KANT: Science of Right, 439c-440a 

43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 9, 47b-c; NUMBER 55, 
174c-d 

52 DOSFOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK v, 
130dl31b 

4d(2) Monarchy as the best or most efficient 
of the several good forms of government 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK in, 108b-c 

7 PLATO: Republic, BK ix, 419a / Statesman, 
602d-604b / Laws, BK iv, 679c-680d 

9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK HI, CH 13 [1284*3- 
b 34l 482a-483a; en 15 484a-485b; CH 17 
[1288*7-34] 486d-487a; BK iv, CH 2 [1289*30- 
33] 488b 

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i, Q 103, 
A 3 530a-c 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART r-ir, Q 
105, A i, REP 2 307d-309d 

23 HoBHhs: Leviathan, PART n, 105c-106d; 
119a-b; 129b-130a; 158b c 

37 FIEMHNC;: Tom Jones, 268c 269a 

38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK v, 25c-d 
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract , BK HI, 409a-410a; 

412c-414d 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 622d 623a 

41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 74d-75a; 81c-d 

42 KANT: Science of Right, 450b~d 

43 MILL: Representative Government, 341d-344d; 
352b-353d passim; 363b-364d 

44 BoswKLL:/0A;w0/i, 120a-c; 255a-d 

46 HKUP.L: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 281 
9Sb d; par 283 96a b; par 292-295 98a b; 
par 300 lOOb; ADDITIONS, 170 145d-146a / 
Philosophy of History, INTRO, 174a-175c; PART 
iv, 368c-d 

4</(3) The preference for the mixed regime: 
defense of royal prerogatives as absolute 
in their sphere 

7 PLATO: Laws, BK in, 671c-672c 
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK iv, 72a-b 
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theohgica, PART I-H, Q 

95, A 4, ANS 229b-230c; Q 105, A i, ANS 307d- 

309d 
23 HoBBhs: leviathan, PART in, 228a b 

35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH xin, SECT 151- 
152 59d-60b; en xiv 62b-64c; CH xvn, SECT 
200 71a-c passim; CH xix, SECT 223 76c-d 

36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 216b 

38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xi, 69c- 

75a; BK xix, 142a-146a,c 
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract^ BK in, 414d- 

415b 

43 MILL: Representative Government, 353d-354b 

44 Bos WELL -.Johnson, 178a-c 



4e. The attack on monarchy or absolute gov- 
ernment 



The paternalistic or despotic character 
of monarchy: the rejection of benevolent 
despotism; the advantages of constitu- 
tional safeguards 

5 EURIPIDES: Suppliants [399-456] 261d-262b 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK in, 107c-d 

7 PLATO: Laws, BK in, 671c-674c; BK iv, 681d- 
682c; BK ix, 754a b 

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK v, CH 6 [ii34 a 24- b i7] 

382a-c/ Politics, BK i, CH 7 [i255 b i6-2o] 449b; 

BK in, CH 15-16 484b-486c 
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, en n, SECT 13 

28a-b; CH vii, SECT 90-94 44d-46c; en xn, 

SECT 143 58c-d; CH xiv, SECT 162-163 

63a-b 
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xi, 69c- 

84d csp 70a-71a 
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 357a-b / Political 

Economy, 367a-368c passim / Social Contract, 

BK in, 408b-c; 412c-414d 
40 GIB BON: Decline and Fall, 24b; 32c-34a; 

68b,d-69b; 522a-S23a,c; 523d-524a 

42 KANT: Science of Right, 450a-d 

43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 47 153c-156d; NUMBER 
48, 157c 

43 MILL: Liberty, 267d-269a / Representative Gov- 
ernment, 341d-344d passim; 348c-349a 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART HI, par 286, 
96d-97a; ADDI TIONS, 180 148b / Philosophy of 
History, INTRO, 173c; 174c-d 

4e(2) The justification of absolute rule or 
benevolent despotism for peoples in- 
capable of self-government 

15 TACITUS: Histories, BK i, 191d-192a; 193c- 

194a; BK iv, 290a-d 
35 LOCKE: Civil Government \ CH vni, SLCT 105- 

no48c-50d 
38 MONTLSQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xv, llOa- 

lllc; BK xvn, 122a-123b; 124c-d 
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 324a-b / Social Con- 

tract, BK ii, 402d-403a 
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 513b-c 
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 9, 47b-c 
43 MILL: Liberty, 272a / Representative Govern- 

ment, 329c; 338d-341d; 344c; 351c-353d; 

363b-d; 436b-442d passim, esp 436b-437a 
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 174a-b; 

198b-199c; PART in, 300c-301c 

4^(3) The illegitimacy of absolute monarchy: 
the violation of the principle of popular 
sovereignty 

35 LOCKE: Civil Government^ CH vn, SECT 90-94 
44d-46c passim, esp SECT 90-93 44d-46a; CH 
vni, SECT 105-112 48c-51b passim; CH xi 55b- 
58b passim; CH xv, SECT 172-174 65b-d; CH 
XVIH, SECT 199-202 71a-72a 

38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK vni, 54a 



4<?(4) to 5a 



CHAPTER 59: MONARCHY 



221 



38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 356b-359a / Social 
Contract, BK i, 387b,d-391b; BK n, 395d- 
396a 

42 KANT: Science of Right, 436c; 437c-d; 439a- 
441d; 450d-452a 

43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: la-3b esp 
[1-28] la-b, [109-121] 3a-b 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 279, 
93d-94d 

4e(4) The illegality of royal usurpations of 
power in a mixed regime: the limitations 
of royal prerogative in a constitutional 
monarchy 

9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK v, CH 10 [i3i2 b 37- 

1313*16] 515c-d 

14 PLUTARCH: Tiberius Gracchus, 678b-d 
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 

105, A i, REP 2,5 307d-309d 
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH vin, SECT m- 

112 50d-51b passim; CH xi 55b-58b passim; 

CH xiv 62b-64c; en xvn 70c-71a 
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK 11, 7c-9a,c; 

BK v, 29a-c 
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK n, 395d-396a; 

BK in, 418a-419c; 424a-c 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 24b,d-28b esp 
27b-d 

41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 74c-d 

42 KANT: Science of Right, 445a-c 

43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: la-3b 

43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 48, 157b-c; NUMBER 84, 
252b-253a 

43 MILL: Liberty, 267d-268b 

44 Bos WELL -.Johnson, 120a-c 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 286 
96c-97a 

5. The absolute government of colonies, de- 
pendencies, or conquered peoples 

OLD TESTAMENT: Joshua, 9 esp 9:18-27 (D) 
Josue, 9 esp 9:18-27 / Judges, 6:1-6 / / Kings, 
9:20-23 (D) III Kings, 9:20-23 / // Kings, 
23:30-35; 24:12-16; 25:5-30 (D) IV Kings, 
23:30-35; 24:12-16; 25:5-30 

APOCRYPHA: / Maccabees, i m-64; 8:1-13; i :2 3~ 
46 (D) OT, / Machabees, 1:43-67; 8:1-13; 
10:23-46 / II Maccabees, 5:11-7:42 (D) OT, 
II Machabees, 5 : 1 1-7 142 
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 16b-20b; 30b-31a; 
31d-32a; 35c-36a; 37b-40b; BK in, 109d-lllb; 
BK vi, 186a-191c 

6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK i, 353d; 
BK n, 403c-404a; BK in, 425a-428d; BK v, 
504c-507c; BK vin, 579d-580b 

7 PLATO: Laws, BK vi, 698c-d 

9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK HI, CH 13 [i284 a 36- b 2] 
482c; BK viz, CH 2 [i324 ft 35-i325 a i5] 528b- 
529a; CH 14 [i333 b io-i334 a io] 538c-d 

14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 47d-48c 

15 TACITUS: Annals, BK iv, 76a; BK xi, 104a-c; 
106a-d; BK xn, 117c-d; 122a-c; BK xin, 139c- 



140d; BK xiv, 149a-b; BK xv, 162c 163a / 

Histories, BK i, 191d-192a; BK iv, 290a-d 
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK iv, CH 14-15 

196b 197a; BK v, CH 12, 216d 218a 
23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH in-vin 3c-14c; CH 

XVIH, 25d-26a; CH xx 30a-31c 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PARTII, 107a; 107c; 108d- 
109a; HOb-llla; 119a-c; 126d-127a; 131c 

24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK in, 
131b,d-133b 

35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH xvi 65d-70c 
passim 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART i, 24b-25a; PART in, 
102b-103a; PART iv, 182b-183a 

38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK x 61b,d- 
68d; BK xi, 83c-84c; BK xxi, 170c>171d 

38 ROUSSEAU: Political Economy, 380a-b 

39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK iv, 239a-279b 
esp 239a-240b, 267c-272a; 288b-c 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 14d-15a; 26a c; 
147a-b; 245d-246c; 518b-519a; 632d-633a 

41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 216c-d 

42 KANT: Science of Right, 413d; 454a-455a 

43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: [7-98] la- 
3a 

43 MILL: Representative Government, 436b-442d 
passim 

44 Bos WELL: Johnson, 511c d 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART in, 299a-c 

5a. The justification of imperial rule: the rights 
of the conqueror; the unifying and civi- 
lizing achievements of empire 

5 AESCHYLUS: Persians [852-908] 24b-d 

6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK i, 358d- 
360c; 367a-369a; BK n, 402b-404a; BK v, 504c- 
507c; BK vi, 514b-d; 530d-532b 

13 VIRGIL: Eclogues, iv 14a-15b / Aeneid, BK i 
[254-296] HOa-llla; BK vi [845-853] 233b- 
234a; BK vin [714-731] 278a-b 

14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 47d-48c / Flamininus 
302b,d-313a,c / Alexander, 566a-b 

15 TACITUS: Annals, BK xi, 106a-d; BK xni, 
139c-140d / Histories, BK i, 191d-192a; BK iv, 
286c-287a; 290a-d; BK v, 301c-d 

18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK iv, CH 14-15 
196b-197a; BK v, CH 12, 216d-218a 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, HELL, n [13-27] 2d; 
PARADISE, vi [i-m] 113c-114d 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, HOb-llla; CON- 
CLUSION, 279d-281a 

35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH iv, SECT 22-23 
30a-b; CH vn, SECT 85 43c-d; CH xv, SECT 172 
65b-c; CH xvi 65d-70c 

38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK x, 61b,d- 
63d; BK xv, HOa-d 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 355c-d / Social Con- 
tract, BK i, 389d-390d 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 12a-24a,c esp 12a-b, 
14c-16c, 18a, 21c-22c; 255c-d; 608b,d-609a; 
620a; 638a-639a 

41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 285a-b 



222 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



( 5. The absolute government of colonies, dependen- 
cies, or conquered peoples. 5a. The justifi- 
cation of imperial rule: the rights of the 
conqueror; the unifying and civilizing 
achievements of empire.) 
43 MILL: Representative Government, 353c-354b; 

436b-442d passim 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART HI, par 351 
112a-b / Philosophy of History, PART i, 208b-d; 
241d-250a; PART 11, 281d-282a; PART in, 
302b-d 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK x, 466b-d; BK 
xi, 498c-499a 

5b. The injustice of imperialism: exploitation 
and despotism 

6 HERODOTUS: History, BK vi, 189d 

6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK in, 

424d-429b; BK v, 504c-507c; BK vi, 529b- 

533a 
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK vn, en 2 [i324 b 23~4i] 

528d-529a; CH 14 [i3*i6-i^4 R n] 538a-d 

14 PLUTARCH: Lucullus, 409b-410d / Agesilaus 
480b,d-499a,c 

15 TACITUS: Annals, BK i, 17c-d; BK 11, 39d-40c; 
BK iv, 76a; 82d-83a; BK xn, 122a-c; BK xiv, 
149a-b 

18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK i, PREP 129a-d; 

BK iv, CH 14-15 196b-197a 
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 440b-443d 

35 LOCKE: Toleration, 13c-d / Civil Government, 
CH xvi 65d-70c 

36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART iv, 182b-183a 

38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK vin, 56d- 
57c; BK x, 62b-63a; BK xv, 109b-c; HOa-d 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 355c-d / Social Con- 
tract, BK i, 389d-390d 

39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK iv, 253a-255a 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 23c-d; 33d-34a,c; 
551a-b; 631a-633a 

41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 420c; 505b-c 

42 KANT: Science of Right, 413d; 454a-455a 

43 DECLARATION o* INDEPENDENCE: la-3b 

43 MILL: Representative Government, 436b-442d 
passim 

44 Bos WELL -.Johnson, 179c 

46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 172 

146c-d 
50 MARX: Capital, 372c-374a; 379a-383d passim 

6. The history of monarchy: its origin and 
developments 

OLD TESTAMENT: Deuteronomy, 17 114-20 / 1 Sam- 
uel, 8-31 esp 8, 10:17-19 (D) I Kings, 8-31 
esp 8, 10:17-19 / // Samuel (D) II Kings 
/ I Kings-(D) III Kings / II Kings~(D) 
IV Kings 
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK i, 23b-24b; BK HI, 



92b-c; 93c; 108b-109b; BK iv, 152d-153b; BK 
vi, 195d-196c 

6 THUCYDIDES : Peloponnesian War, BK 11, 
391c-d 

7 PLATO: Laws, BK in, 672c-674d 
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK i, CH 2 

445d-446a; BK n, CH 6 [1265^4-39] 461b; 
CH 9 [i27o b 7]-cn 10 [i27i b 26] 466d-468a; CH 
n 469a-470b; BK in, CH 14 483a-484a; CH 15 
[i286 b 8-22] 484d-485a; BK v, CH 10 512d- 
515d / Athenian Constitution, CH 3 553c-554b; 
CH 14-16 558d-560a 

14 PLUTARCH: Theseus, 9a-d/ Romulus, 20c-28a 
/ Lycurgus 32a-48d / Poplicola 77a-86a,c / 
Agesilaus 480b,d-499a,c / Caesar, 600a-603c 
/ Cleomenes, 657a-663c/ Demetrius, 731c-732c 

15 TACITUS: Annals, BK i, la-2b; BK in, 51b / 
Histories, BK i, 191d-192a 

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART i-n, Q 
105, A i 307d-309d 

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, vi [i-ni] 
113c-114d 

23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART n, 103d-104a; 148d- 
149a; 150b-151a; PART iv, 273a-b; 275a-278d 

26 SHAKESPEARE: 1st Henry VI la-32a,c / 2nd 
Henry VI 33a-68d / 3rd Henry VI 69a-104d / 
Richard HI 105a-148a,c / Richard II 320a-351d 
/ King John 376a-405a,c / 1st Henry IV 434a- 
466d / 2nd Henry IV 467a-502d / Henry V 
532a-567a,c 

27 SHAKESPEARE: Henry VIII 549a-585a,c 

35 LOCKE: Civil Government, en vi, SECT 74-76 
41b-42a; CH vni, SECT 105-112 48c-51b; en 
xiv, SECT 165-166 63c-64a 

38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xi, 69d- 
78a; BK xxx -xxxi 269a 315d 

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 359a-c / Social Con- 
tract, BK in, 410b-c 

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall passim, esp 24b,d- 
34a, 50a-51b, lllb-113a, 153c-155d, 240b- 
251d, 290c-297a, 523a-524a, 608b,d-624c, 
625c-626a 

41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall passim, esp 71d- 
75b, 194a-d, 204b-220a,c, 223c-224b, 288a,c, 
495b-506d, 557c-558c 

42 KANT: Science of Right, 451d-452a 

43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 17, 70a-d; NUMBER 26, 
92c-d; NUMBER 84, 252b-253a 

43 MILL: Liberty, 267d-269a / Representative Gov- 
ernment, 340d-341c; 346a-c; 352a-b; 353c-d; 
363b-d; 429d-430a 

46 HEGLL: Philosophy of Right, PART in, par 286 
96c-97a / Philosophy of History, INTRO, 174c-d; 
PART ii, 261b-263d; PART in, 293b-294c; 301c- 
302a; PART iv, 324b-327a; 342a-345b; 355c- 
358b; 368c-d 

50 MARX: Capital, 356c 

51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK vi, 238c-243d; 
260a-262a; EPILOGUE n, 675a-683b 



CHAPTER 59 : MONARCHY 223 



CROSS-REFERENCES 



For: Discussions relevant to the distinction between royal and political government, see CITIZEN 
2b; CONSTITUTION i; GOVERNMENT ib; LAW 73; SLAVERY 6b; TYRANNY 5. 

Other considerations of the mixed regime and its distinction from the mixed constitution, 
see CONSTITUTION 33, 5b; DEMOCRACY 3b; GOVERNMENT 2b. 

Monarchy in relation to other forms of government, see ARISTOCRACY 2a; DEMOCRACY 3c; 
GOVERNMENT 2-2e; OLIGARCHY 2; STATE 6a; TYRANNY 2a, 43; and for the compari- 
son of monarchy with domestic or despotic government, see FAMILY 2b; GOVERNMENT ib; 
TYRANNY 4b. 

Another discussion of government in relation to the wealth and territorial extent of the state, 
see STATE 4a~4c; WEALTH pf. 

Matters relevant to the theory of the royal prerogative, see GOVERNMENT 36 ; LAW ye. 

The controversy concerning the legitimacy or justice of absolute monarchy, and for the 
statement of the issue in terms of the doctrine of natural rights and popular sovereignty, 
see CONSTITUTION 3b; DEMOCRACY 40; GOVERNMENT ig(i)-ig(3); JUSTICE 9c~9d; LAW 
6b, yb; LIBERTY id, ig; STATE 2c; TYRANNY 5a~5c. 

Matters relevant to the justification of absolute rule when it takes the form of a benevolent 
despotism, see DEMOCRACY 4d; GOVERNMENT 2c; PROGRESS 4b; SLAVERY 6b-6c; TYRANNY 

,, 4b : 

The issues concerning imperialism as a form of absolute rule, see GOVERNMENT 5b; LIBERTY 
6c; REVOLUTION 7; SLAVERY 6d; STATE lob; TYRANNY 6. 



ADDITIONAL READINGS 

Listed below ate works not included in Great Boofy of the Western World, but relevant to the 
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works arc divided into two groups: 

I. Works by authors represented in this collection. 
IT. Works by authors not represented in this collection. 

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult 
the Bibliogiaphy of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas. 

MARSILIUS OF PADUA. Defensor Pads 

** WYCLIFFE. Tractates de Officto Regis 

PLUTARCH. "Of the Three Sorts of Government FORTESCUE. Governance of England 

Monarchy, Democracy and Oligarchy," in Mo- ERASMUS. The Education of a Christian Ptince 

ralia CASTIGLIONE. The Boo^ of the Courtier 

AQUINAS. On the Governance of Rulers LA BOETIE. Anti-Dictator, the Discours de la servi- 

DANTE. On World-Government or De Monarchia tude volontaire 

F. BACON. "Of the True Greatness of Kingdoms BODIN. The Six Bootes of a Commonweale 

and Estates," in Essays BELLARMINE. The Treatise on Civil Government (De 

MILTON. The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates Laicis) 

. Defence of the People of England MARLOWE. Edward the Second 

HOBBES. Behemoth HOOKER. Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity 

SPINOZA. Tractates Politicus (Political Treatise), en MARIANA. The King and the Education of the 

6-7 King 

BERKELEY. Passive Obedience W. BARCLAY. De Regno 

JAMES i. The Trew Law of Free Monarchies 

** . An Apologiefor the Oath of Allegiance 

DEMOSTHENES. Philippics . A Premonition to all Christian Monarches, Free 

. De Corona (On the Crown) Princes and States 

BRACTON. De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae . A Defence of the Eight of Kings, Against 

(On the Laws and Customs of England) Cardinall Perron 



224 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



CAMPANELLA. A Discourse Touching the Spanish 
Monarchy 

CORNEILLE. Cinna 

PRYNNE. The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and 
Kingdomes 

HUDSON. The Divine Right of Government 

FILMER. The Anarchy of a Limited or Mixed Mon- 
archy 

. Patriarcha 

SE"VIGNE. tetters 

BARROW. A Treatise of the Pope's Supremacy 

BOSSUET. Politique tiree des propres paroles de /' fieri- 
ture Sainte 

A. SIDNEY. Discourses Concerning Government 



VOLTAIRE. "King," in A Philosophical Dictionary 
BURKE. Reflections on the Revolution in Prance 
PAINE. Common Sense, n 

. Rights of Man, PART i 

MAISTRE. Du pape 

PUSHKIN. Boris Godunov 

BAGEHOT. The English Constitution 

FRAZER. The Golden Bough, PART i; PART n, CH i; 

PART in, CH 2-5 

FIGGIS. Theory of the Divine Right of Kings 
MAURRAS. EnquSte stir la monarchic 
HOCART. Kingship 
B. RUSSELL. Power, CH 5 
A. J. CARLYLE. Politica 



Chapter 60: NATURE 



INTRODUCTION 



N 



ATURE is a term which draws its mean- 
ing from the^ other terms withjwtiich it 
is associated by implication or contrast. Yet 
it is noFone bfaHxed pair oTtcrms, Ifkclieces- 
sity and contingency, one and many, universal 
and particular, war and peace. When things are 
divided into the natural and the artificial, or 
into the natural and the conventional, the op- 
posite of the natural does not represent a loss or 
violation of nature, but rather a transformation 
of nature through the addition of a new factor. 
The unnatural, on the other hand, seems to be 
merely a deviation, a falling away from, or 
sometimes a transgression of nature. 

Most of the terms which stand in opposition 
to nature represent the activity or being of 
man or God. As appears in the chapter on 
MEDICINE, Galen thinks of nature as an artist. 
Harvey later develops this notion. But with 
these two exceptions, the traditional theory of 
art conceives it not as the work of natureTbut 
ofjnan." Despite other differences in the great 
books on the theory of art, especially with re- 
gard to art's imitation of nature, there seems 
to be a common understanding that works of 
art are distinguished from productions of na- 
ture by the fact that man has added something 
to nature. A world which man left exactly as 
he found it would be a world without art or 
any trace of the artificial in it. 

The ancient authors who contrast the natural 
and the conventional and the modern authors 
who distinguish man's life in a state of nature 
from his life in civil society seem to imply that 
without something done by man there would 
be nothing conventional or political. Locke ap- 
pears to be an exception here. He thinks that 
there is a natural as well as a civil, or political, 
society. Natural society is the society of "men 
living together according to reason without a 
common superior on earth, with authority to 



judge between them.** Unlike Hobbes or Kant 
or Hegel, Locke docs not think that the state 
of nature is necessarily a state of war. But this 
difference between Locke and others does not 
affect the point that the political institutions of 
civil society are things of man's own devising. 

There may be, among the social insects, na- 
tural organizations such as the bee-hive and 
the ant-mound. It may even be, as Locke sup- 
poses, that in a state of nature, "men living to- 
gether according to reason" would constitute 
a society. But in neither case does the society 
we call "a state" result. States differ from one 
another in many features of their political 
organization. In this sense the state or political 
community is conventional rather than natural; 
its institutions are humanly contrived. 

The social contract theory of the origin of 
the state is not necessarily involved in the 
recognition that the state is partly conven- 
tional. Aristotle, for example, who regards the 
state as natural he speaks of it as "a creation 
of nature" does not think of the political 
community as natural in the sense in which a 
bee-hive is natural. That men should form 
political communities is, in his view, the result 
of a natural desire, a tendency inherent in the 
nature of man as a political animal. But what 
form the political community will take is at 
least partly determined by the particular ar- 
rangements men voluntarily institute. Man- 
made laws are conventional, but so also are 
other institutions which vary from state to 
state or change from time to time. 

THE ISSUES IN political theory raised by any 
consideration of what is and is not natural 
about society or the state are discussed in other 
chapters, e.g., FAMILY and STATE. What is true 
in this connection is likely to be true of each of 
the other fundamental oppositions in which 



225 



226 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



the notion of nature is involved. The issues 
raised by the relation of art to nature are, for 
example, considered in the chapter on ART; 
those raised by the distinction between nature 
and nurture are considered in the chapter on 
HABIT, and so on. Here we are concerned not 
with the theoretical consequences of different 
conceptions of nature, but with the various 
meanings of the term itself as it is used in dif- 
ferent contexts. 

Common to all meanings is the notion that 
the natural is that which man's doing or making 
has not altered or enlarged. The distinction 
between nature and nurture confirms this. 
Man's activities are the source of modifications 
in his own nature as well as in the nature of 
other things. The human nature man is born 
with undergoes transformations in the course 
of life: the acquirement of knowledge, the 
formation of habits (which are often called "sec- 
ond nature"), thempdification of instincts. The 
sum of these changes represents what nurture 
adds to nature. 

When changes of this sort are looked at col- 
lectively they give rise to the notions of culture 
or civilization two more terms which present 
a contrast to nature. In Rousseau and others 
we meet the feeling that man may have lost, 
not gained, by exchanging the natural for the 
civilized life. The ideal of a return to nature in- 
volves more than a return to the soil, or an 
exodus from the city to the country. In its most 
radical form, this ideal calls upon man to divest 
himself of all the artifices and conceits with 
which he has thought to improve on nature 
"by renouncing its advances," Rousseau says, 
"in order to renounce its vices." 

But why, it may be asked, is the whole world 
which man creates not as natural as the materi- 
als which man finds to work with the resources 
of physical nature and the native equipment 
which is man's nature at birth ? If man himself 
is a natural entity, and if all human activities 
are somehow determined by human nature, 
then why are not the works of art and science, 
the development of political institutions, the 
cultivation of human beings by education and 
experience, and all other features of civiliza- 
tionwhy are not all these just as natural as 
the falling stone, the flourishing forest, or the 
bee-hive ? Why, in short, should there by any 



contrast between the works of nature and the 
works of man ? 

THIS QUESTION points to one of the fundamen- 
tal issues in the traditional discussion of nature. 
Those who uphold the validity of the contrast 
defend its significance in terms of something 
quite special about human nature. If man were 
entirely a creature of instinct if everything 
man did were determined by his nature so that 
no choices were open to him and no deviation 
from the course of nature possible then the 
human world would seem to fade into the rest 
of nature. Only on the supposition that man 
is by nature rational and free do those human 
works which are the products of reason or the 
consequences of free choice seem to stand in 
sharp contrast to all other natural existences or 
effects of natural causes. 

Of these two factors rationality and free- 
dom the element of freedom is usually the 
one most emphasized. The line is drawn be- 
tween that which natural causes determine and 
that which man determines by his own free 
choice. The laws of nature are often conceived 
as expressing an inherent rationality in nature 
itself, but they also state the uniformity of 
nature's operations. Such maxims of nature as 
'nature docs nothing in vain,' 'nature abhors a 
vacuum,' or 'nature does nothing by jumps' are 
usually interpreted as describing nature's in- 
variable way of doing things. Aristotle's dis- 
tinction between things which happen natu- 
rally and those which happen by chance turns 
on the regularity of the events which result 
from causes in the very nature of things. The 
natural is that which happens either always or 
for the most part. 

Hence, even if there is rationality of some 
sort in the structure of nature, that supposition 
does not seem to affect the position of those 
who connect human reason with human free- 
dom and who, in consequence, divide the 
things which happen as a result of man's free 
choice from everything else which happens in 
the course of nature. This may be exemplified 
by the Greek understanding of the difference 
between 'nature and convention. The laws of 
Persia vary from the laws of Greece, the po- 
litical institutions of the city-states vary from 
those of the Homeric age, customs and consti- 



CHAPTER 60: NATURE 



227 



tutions differ from city to city. Unlike such 
conventions, "that which is by nature,'* Aris- 
totle writes, "is unchangeable and has every- 
where the same force, as fire burns both here 
and in Persia." The conventional is the vari- 
able, the natural the uniform. The variability 
of conventions, moreover, seems to suggest that 
they are products of freedom or choice. 

The difference between the bee-hive and the 
human city is that one is entirely a creation of 
nature, a social organization entirely deter- 
mined by the instincts of the bees, so that 
wherever bees form a hive, it is formed in the 
same way; whereas the human city involves 
something more than a natural desire of men, 
since when these political animals associate in 
different places, they set up different forms of 
government and different kinds of law. The 
same comparison can be made between the 
spider's web or the beaver's dam and such 
products of human art as cloth and houses. The 
variability of the works of reason, as opposed 
to the uniformity of instinctive productions of 
all sorts, implies the factor of choice in reason's 
work. 

THE CONCEPTION OF nature which tries to 
separate the natural from what man contributes 
thus seems to depend upon the conception of 
man. Controversies concerning man's difference 
from other animals, especially the dispute 
about human freedom (considered in such 
chapters as MAN and WILL), bear directly on 
the issue of the naturalness of the things which 
result from man's doing and making. 

Spinoza, for example, in holding that human 
actions constitute no exception to the reign of 
necessity throughout nature, removes any 
ground for distinguishing the effects of human 
operation from other effects. Man exercises no 
freedom of choice; nor does man in any other 
way introduce a new principle into the order 
or process of nature. Hobbes and Locke concur 
in the denial of free will, but they separate the 
inventions of man's mind or his social institu- 
tions from what happens without human con- 
trivance in the realm of thought or action. The 
difference between simple and complex ideas 
for Locke seems to parallel the ancient distinc- 
tion between nature and art. 

At the other extreme from Spinoza, Kant 



separates the order of nature and the order 
of freedom into worlds as radically asunder 
as the Cartesian realms of matter and mind. 
The world of nature is the system or order of 
the objects of sense "the sum total of phe- 
nomena insofar as they ... are connected with 
each other throughout." For Kant this means 
two things which are strictly correlative. Na- 
ture is the object of the theoretic sciences and 
it is also the realm of time, space, and causality. 
Like Spinoza, Kant identifies the order of na- 
ture with the order of causal necessity. But, 
unlike Spinoza, Kant places the moral and po- 
litical life of man in an order unconditioned by 
time, space, and causality. This realm of free- 
dom is the sphere of the moral or practical 
sciences. The natural or theoretic sciences do 
not extend to what Kant calls the "supersen- 
sible" or the "noumenal" order the world of 
things lying outside the range of sense-experi- 
ence. 

There is an alternative to Spinoza's location 
of all events within the order of nature and to 
Kant's separation of the realm of nature from 
the domain of freedom. It takes the form of 
Aristotle's or Aquinas' distinction between the 
natural and the voluntary. The voluntary is in 
one sense natural, in another not. It is natural 
in the sense that what happens voluntarily in 
the realm of animal and human motions pro- 
ceeds from causes as natural as those responsible 
for the motions of inert bodies. A voluntary 
act, according to Aquinas, comes from "an in- 
trinsic principle," just as the falling of a stone 
proceeds from "a principle of movement in the 
stone." But among the factors responsible for 
voluntary acts is "knowledge of the end" 
knowledge of the object being sought. The 
sphere of the voluntary can therefore be equat- 
ed with the sphere of conscious desire, t.e. 9 
with desire aroused by an object known, wheth- 
er known by sense or reason. The natural in 
the sense in which it is distinguished from the 
voluntary is the sphere of motions in line with 
natural desire, i.e., with tendencies founded in 
the very nature of a body or organism and un- 
accompanied by any awareness of the goal 
toward which it is thus inclined to move. 

Aristotle's distinction between natural and 
violent motion (which Galileo and other phys- 
icists adopt) seems to throw light on a double 



228 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



use of the term 'natural' here. Galileo treats 
the motion of a freely falling body as natural, 
in contrast to the motion of a projectile. In the 
former case, it is the nature of heavy bodies to 
gravitate toward the earth; whereas in the lat- 
ter case, in addition to the motion of gravita- 
tion, another motion is imparted to the body 
when it is shot from a gun a motion which 
does not proceed from the body's own nature 
but is caused by the motions of other bodies. 
In terms of this distinction, voluntary motions 
are natural rather than violent. In fact, the 
violent is sometimes thought to be even more 
opposed to the voluntary than to the natural, 
in the sense that a man acting contrary to his 
will under external coercion suffers violence. 
When he does what he wishes, his conduct is not 
only voluntary but natural, i.c. 9 free from the 
violence of external forces. 

It is necessary to consider the additional dis- 
tinction between the voluntary and the free. 
Animals acting from desires caused by the per- 
ception of certain objects act voluntarily, but, 
in the theory of Aristotle and Aquinas, only 
men freely choose among alternative objects 
of desire or between means for accomplishing 
an end. The effects of voluntary action differ 
from other natural events only because knowl- 
edge enters into their determination. But that 
which happens as the result of man's free choice 
is determined neither by his nature nor by his 
knowledge. Hence whatever comes into exist- 
ence through man's choice stands apart from 
all that is naturally determined to exist. 

One other matter bears on this consideration 
of the natural in relation to the voluntary and 
the free. Spinoza excludes the operation of 
final causes, as well as free choice, from the 
order of nature. Purposes or ends are not prin- 
ciples of nature. Aristotle, on the other hand, 
thinks that final causes are operative in every 
part of nature. He finds them in the sphere of 
inert bodies which naturally tend toward cer- 
tain results. He finds them in the sphere of 
animal and human motions, where the final 
cause or end may be an object of conscious 
desire. 

So far as the search for causes is concerned, 
nature presents the same kind of problems to 
the physicist as to the biologist or psychologist. 
I n only one sense are final causes peculiarly pres- 



ent in human conduct; that is the sense in 
which the change effected is not the ultimate 
end, but only a means to some further end 
desired. Here there is an extrinsic final cause 
as well as a final cause intrinsic to the change 
itself. It may be with regard to this special 
sense that Bacon says of final causes that they 
are "more allied to man's own nature than to 
the system of the universe." Yet Bacon, far 
from denying their presence in the scheme of 
things, assigns the investigation of final causes 
to metaphysics (as a branch of natural philoso- 
phy) rather than to physics. For him the ascer- 
tainment of final causes does not discover a 
purpose in the nature of things. Rather it looks 
to God's plan and providence. 

WE HAVE so FAR dealt with that consideration 
of nature which opposes the natural to the 
works of man. The discussion of nature also 
moves on a theological plane. Here, on one 
traditional view, the natural is not opposed to, 
but rather identified with the work of God. 
"Things which are said to be made by nature," 
Plato writes, "are the work of divine art." 
Those who conceive the universe as God's 
creation, and think of God alone as uncreated 
being, tend to use the word "nature" collec- 
tively for the whole world of creatures and dis- 
tributivcly for each type of thing which has 
its being from God. 

The distinction between the supernatural 
and the natural has many interpretations in 
Christian theology, but none more basic than 
that which divides all being into the uncreated 
and the created. On this view, the order of 
nature includes more than the world of physi- 
cal, sensible things. It includes the spiritual 
creation angels and souls as well. Immaterial 
beings are no more supernatural than bodies. 
They, too, are created natures. Only God is un- 
created being. 

Those who do not have or who deny a doc- 
trine of creation use the word "nature" in a 
less and in a more comprehensive sense. The 
Greek philosophers, for example, seem to re- 
strict the natural to the physical, /.., to the 
realm of material, sensible, changing things. 
Change is an element in the connotation of the 
Greek word phusis, of which natura is the Latin 
equivalent. As Greek scientists conceive the 



CHAPTER 60: NATURE 



229 



study of nature, it is the business of physics to 
investigate the principles, causes, and elements 
of change. 

Things which are thought to be untouched 
by change, such as the objects of mathematics, 
self-subsistent ideas, or separate forms; or 
things which are thought to be eternal and im- 
mutable, such as immaterial substances or in- 
telligences, do not belong to the realm of phys- 
ics or natural science. In Aristotle's classification 
of the sciences such beings are the objects of 
mathematics and metaphysics, or theology. 
Since, for him, whatever is both sensible and 
mutable is also material, the realm of nature 
includes no more than the whole material uni- 
verse, celestial as well as terrestrial. 

The more comprehensive sense of nature ap- 
pears in Spinoza's identification of nature with 
the infinite and eternal substance of God. "Be- 
sides God," says Spinoza, "no substance can be 
nor be conceived. . . . Whatever is, is in God, 
and nothing can either be or be conceived 
without God." All finite things are modes of 
the divine substance or, more precisely, of the 
attributes of God, such as extension and thought. 
Nature, therefore, is the totality of finite 
things, both material and immaterial. But na- 
ture exceeds even this totality, for the infinite 
substance of God is greater than the sum of its 
parts. 

To make this clear, Spinoza employs the 
distinction between natura naturans and natura 
naturata. "By natura naturans we are to under- 
stand that which is in itself and is conceived 
through itself, or those attributes of substance 
which express eternal and infinite essence; that 
is to say, God in so far as He is considered as a 
free cause. But by natura naturata I understand 
everything which follows from the necessity 
of the nature of God, or of any one of God's 
attributes in so far as they are considered as 
things which are in God, and which without 
God can neither be nor be conceived." 

Viewed under the aspect of time rather than 
eternity, the order of nature (i.e., natura na- 
turata) is as much an order of ideas as it is an 
order of things. "The order and connection of 
ideas is the same as the order and connection of 
things," Spinoza writes. "Whether we think of 
nature under the attribute of extension or un- 
der the attribute of thought, or under any 



other attribute whatever, we shall discover one 
and the same order, or one and the same con- 
nection of causes." 

Except perhaps for the Stoics, like Marcus 
Aurelius and Epictetus, Spinoza seems to stand 
alone in this conception of nature as all-embrac- 
ing. The Stoics too regard nature as the system 
of the universe, with man a part of its cosmic 
structure, and with God or divinity inherent 
in nature as the rational principle governing all 
things. But with or without reference to God 
and creation, thinkers like Descartes and Hume 
tend to identify nature not with the totality of 
finite things, but with the world of bodies in 
motion or changing sensible things. 

For Descartes, nature does not include the 
realm of thought or thinking substances, though 
these, like bodies, are finite and dependent 
creatures of God. For Hume, nature seems to 
be that which lies outside experience in a way, 
the reality which underlies appearances. Where 
Spinoza thinks that the system of ideas is as 
much a part of nature as the system of bodies 
in motion, Hume speaks of "a kind of pre- 
established harmony between the course of na- 
ture and the succession of our ideas." 

Hume's distinction between knowledge of 
the relation between our own ideas and knowl- 
edge of matters of fact or real existence seems 
furthermore to imply that nature is the reality 
known (however inadequately) when we assert 
certain things to be matters of fact. Here we 
perceive another meaning of nature, defined 
by another basic opposition, this time between 
the real and the ideal or the imaginary. It is in 
this sense that mediaeval writers oppose entia 
naturae, i.e., natural or real beings, to entia 
rationis, or things which have their being in the 
mind. 

THIS DISTINCTION, like most of the others in 
which nature is concerned, does not have uni- 
versal acceptance. Kant, as we have seen, far 
from making nature the reality which exists 
independently of our experience or knowledge, 
conceives the realm of nature as identical with 
all possible experience. "We possess two ex- 
pressions," Kant writes, "world and nature, 
which are generally interchanged. The first 
denotes the mathematical total of all phenom- 
ena and the totality of their synthesis. . . . And 



230 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



the world is termed nature, when it is regarded 
as a dynamical whole when our attention is 
not directed to the aggregation in space and 
time ... but to the unity in the existence of 
phenomena." 

On quite different principles of analysis, 
Berkeley also treats as natural things the ideas 
or sensations which "are not produced by, or 
dependent on, the wills of men." Natural be- 
ings do not exist apart from the mind, but un- 
like imaginary ones, natural beings are those 
ideas which are not subject to our will or the 
human mind's own constructive activities. 
Such ideas are produced in our minds immedi- 
ately by God. 

To the question whether "Nature hath no 
share in the production of natural things," 
Berkeley answers: "If by Nature is meant the 
visible series of effects or sensations imprinted 
on our minds, according to certain fixed and 
general laws, then it is plain that Nature, taken 
in this sense, cannot produce anything at all. 
But, if by Nature is meant some being distinct 
from God, as well as from the laws of nature, 
and things perceived by sense, I must confess 
that word is to me an empty sound without any 
intelligible meaning annexed to it. Nature, in 
this acceptation, is a vain chimera, introduced 
by those heathens who had not just notions of 
the omnipresence and infinite perfection of 
God." 

Berkeley's view represents one extreme po- 
sition on a theological issue of the utmost diffi- 
culty. According to him God is not only the 
creator or first cause, but the sole cause of 
everything which happens in the course of na- 
ture. There are no natural causes. Nature has 
no productive power. Everything is the work 
of God or the work of man nothing the work 
of nature. 

Within the limits of this issue, the other ex- 
treme consists in denying not the creativity of 
God, but the role of divine causality in the 
production of natural effects. It relegates them 
entirely to the efficacy of natural causes. Lu- 
cretius, of course, denies both the creation of 
the world and the intervention of the gods in 
the processes of nature. But others, like Des- 
cartes, seem to say that once God has created 
the physical world, once He has formed matter 
into bodies and given them their initial impe- 



tus, their motions henceforward need only the 
laws of nature which God laid down for them 
to follow. For everything that happens in the 
course of nature, natural" causes, operating un- 
der these laws, suffice. 

There is a third position which distinguishes 
between the work of God in the creation of 
nature, and the work of nature in the produc- 
tion of effects of all sorts, such as the natural 
motions of bodies or the propagation of animals. 
But though it ascribes efficacy to natural agents 
or second causes in the production of natural 
effects, it also regards natural causes as instru- 
mental to the hand of God, the first or principal 
cause of everything which happens as well as 
of everything which is. Aquinas seems to hold 
that God acts alone only in the original crea- 
tion of things; whereas in the preservation of 
created natures and in their causal interaction, 
God works through secondary, or natural, 
causes. 

"Some have understood God to work in 
every agent," Aquinas writes, "in such a way 
that no created power has any effect in things, 
but that God alone is the immediate cause of 
everything wrought; for instance, that it is not 
fire that gives heat, but God in the fire, and so 
forth. But this is impossible. First, because the 
order of cause and effect would be taken away 
from created things, and this would imply a 
lack of power in the Creator Secondly, be- 
cause the operative powers which are seen to 
exist in things would be bestowed on things to 
no purpose, if things produced nothing through 
them. . . . We must therefore understand that 
God works in things in such a manner that 
things have also their proper operation." 

In other words, according to Aquinas, "God 
is the cause of action in every agent." Further- 
more, "God not only moves things to operate 
. . . but He also gives created agents their forms 
and preserves them in being." With regard to 
the being of things, Aquinas holds that God 
"established an order among things, so that 
some depend on others, by which they are con- 
served in being, though He remains the princi- 
pal cause of their conservation." 

WITH REGARD TO NATURE itself this theological 
doctrine raises two sorts of problems. The 
first concerns the efficacy of natural causes, 



CHAPTER 60: NATURE 



231 



which are sufficient for the scientist to appeal 
to in explaining natural phenomena, yet are 
insufficient by themselves for the production 
of natural effects. The second concerns the 
distinction between the natural and the super- 
natural, now not in terms of the created and 
the uncreated, but in terms of what happens 
naturally (or even by chance) as opposed to 
what happens as a result of God's intervention 
in the course of nature. 

Miracles, for example, are supernatural rath- 
er than natural events. They are not pro- 
duced by natural causes; nor do they happen 
by accident. They are attributed by the theo- 
logian to divine causality, yet not in such a way 
that violence is done to nature. "The term 
miracle" Aquinas explains, "is derived from 
admiration, which arises when an effect is 
manifest, whereas its cause is hidden. ... A 
miracle is so called as being full of wonder; in 
other words, as having a cause absolutely hid- 
den from all. This cause is God. Therefore 
those things which God does outside the causes 
which we know arc called miracles." 

The miraculous is that which is beyond the 
power of nature to accomplish. "A thing is said 
to be above the ability of nature," Aquinas 
writes, "not only by reason of the substance 
of the thing done, but also because of the man- 
ner and the order in which it is done"; and 
"the more the power of nature is surpassed, the 
greater the miracle." Aquinas distinguishes 
three grades of miracles. 

The first, he says, surpasses nature "in the 
substance of the deed; as, for example, if two 
bodies occupy the same place, or if the sun 
goes backwards, or if a human body is glorified. 
Such things nature is absolutely unable to do; 
and these hold the highest rank among mir- 
acles. Secondly, a thing surpasses the power of 
nature, not in the deed, but in that wherein it 
is done; as the raising of the dead, and giving 
sight to the blind, and the like. For nature can 
give life, but not to the dead, and it can give 
sight, but not to the blind. Such hold the 
second rank in miracles. Thirdly, a thing sur- 
passes nature's power in the measure and order 
in which it is done; as when a man is cured of a 
fever suddenly by God, without treatment or 
the usual process of nature. . . . These hold the 
lowest place in miracles." 



Though "each of these kinds has various de- 
grees, according to the different ways in which 
the power of nature is surpassed," no miracle, 
according to Aquinas, transgresses the order of 
nature in the sense of accomplishing the im- 
possible. Unlike the impossible, which would 
destroy nature, the improbable can be elicited 
by God's power within the general framework 
of nature. 

Hume, on the other hand, thinks that "a 
miracle is a violation of the laws of nature." 
And since, in his view, a firm and unalterable 
experience has established these laws, the proof 
against a miracle, from the nature of the fact, is 
as entire as any argument from experience can 
be. "Why is it more than probable," he asks, 
"that all men must die; that lead cannot, of 
itself remain suspended in the air; that fire con- 
sumes wood, and is extinguished by water; un- 
less it be, that these events are found agreeable 
to the laws of nature, and there is required a 
violation of these laws, or in other words, a 
miracle to prevent them ? 

"Nothing is esteemed a miracle," Hume con- 
tinues, "if it ever happens in the common 
course of nature. . . . There must, therefore, be 
a uniform experience against every miraculous 
event, otherwise the event would not merit 
that appellation. And as a uniform experience 
amounts to proof, there is here a direct and 
full proof, from the nature of the fact, against 
the existence of any miracle; nor can such a 
proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered 
credible, but by an opposite proof which is 
superior." 

Hume does not think that miracles can be 
proved against our uniform experience of the 
order of nature. But he also thinks that they 
are "dangerous friends or disguised enemies to 
the Christian religion" who would try to defend 
its beliefs "by the principles of human reason. 
. . . The Christian religion not only was at first 
attended with miracles," he declares, "but even 
at this day cannot be believed by any reason- 
able person without one. Mere reason is in- 
sufficient to convince us of its veracity: and 
whoever is moved by Faith to assent to it, is 
conscious of a continued miracle in his own 
person . . . which gives him a determination to 
believe what is most contrary to custom and 
experience." 



232 



THE GREAT IDEAS 



ONE OTHER TRADITIONAL conception of nature, 
implicit in much of the foregoing, should be 
noted. The various senses of the term so far 
explicitly considered are alike in this: that they 
justify the use of the word "Nature" with a 
capital N and in the singular. This other sense 
of the term appears when we speak of each 
thing as having a nature of its own, and of the 
world as containing a vast plurality and radical 
diversity of natures. 

In this sense we attribute a nature even to 
things which are contrasted with Nature and 
the natural. We speak of the nature of God 
and the nature of freedom, the nature of art, 
the nature of reason, the nature of ideas, the 
nature of the state, the nature of customs and 
habits. This could, of course, imply a theory 
that things which are not completely natural, 
nevertheless have a natural basis, as art, the 
state, or habit. Another meaning, however, 
seems to be involved. 

The phrase "nature of" appears almost as 
frequently in the great books as the word "is," 
and frequently it is unaccompanied by any ex- 
plicit theory of Nature or the natural. The 
discussion of the nature of any thing seems, for 
the most part, to be a discussion of what it is. 
To state the nature of anything is to give its 
definition; or if for any reason definition in a 
strict sense cannot be given, then the attempt 
to state the nature of the thing consists in try- 
ing to say what characterizes this thing or kind 
of thing, in distinction from everything else 
or all other kinds. 

Enumerating the senses of the term 'nature,' 
Aristotle gives this as the fifth meaning. The 
first four comprise senses which distinguish the 
natural from the artificial or the immutable, 
and which indicate that the natural or the 
physical has an immanent principle of move- 
ment in itself and involves matter or potency. 
The fifth sense is that in which 'nature* means 



"the essence of natural objects"; and, as he goes 
on to say, this implies the presence in them of 
form as well as matter. "By an extension of 
meaning from this sense of 'nature' every es- 
sence in general has come to be called a 'nature,' 
because the nature of a thing is one kind of 
essence." This is the sixth and most general 
sense, according to which the nature or es- 
sence of anything is the object of definition. 

Does each individual thing have a nature 
peculiarly its own, even if it cannot be defined ? 
Or is a nature or essence always something 
common to a number of individuals, according 
to which they can be classified into kinds, and 
the kinds ordered as species and genera? Do 
John and James, for example, have individual 
natures in addition to the common nature 
which they share through belonging to the 
human species; and does their human nature 
entail certain properties which are generic rath- 
er than specific, /'.., which seem to be de- 
termined by their having the generic nature 
common to all animals as well as the specific 
nature common to all men ? 

Such questions about individual, specific, 
and generic natures raise problems of definition 
and classification which are discussed in the 
chapter on EVOLUTION. They also raise prob- 
lems about the existence or reality of the tynds 
which men define and classify. Are they merely 
what Locke calls "nominal essences," or do our 
definitions signify real essences, t.e. t the natures 
of things as they really are ? Is the real world 
one which, as William James says, "plays right 
into logic's hands"? Does Nature consist of a 
hierarchy of natures or distinct kinds; or is it a 
continuum of things all having the same nature 
and differing from each other only individually 
or accidentally, but not essentially? These 
problems are discussed elsewhere, in such chap- 
ters as ANIMAL, DEFINITION, EVOLUTION, LIFE 
AND DEATH, and SAME AND OTHER. 



OUTLINE OF TOPICS 

PAGE 

I. Conceptions of nature 234 

la. Nature as the intrinsic source of a thing's properties and behavior 

(1) The distinction between essential and individual nature: generic or specific 

properties, and individual, contingent accidents 

(2) Nature or essence in relation to matter and form 235 



CHAPTER 60: NATURE 233 

PAGE 

ib. Nature as the universe or the totality of things: the identification of God and 

nature; the distinction between natura naturans and natura naturata 235 

ic. Nature as the complex of the objects of sense: the realm of things existing under 
the determination of universal laws 

2. The antitheses of nature or the natural 236 

2a. Nature and art: the imitation of nature; cooperation with nature 

2b. Nature and convention: the state of nature and the state of society 237 

2c. Nature and nurture: the innate or native and the acquired; habit as second 
nature 

2d. Natural and violent motion 238 

2e. The natural and the unnatural or monstrous: the normal and the abnormal 

2/i The order of nature and the order of freedom: the phenomenal and the noumenal 

worlds; the antithesis of nature and spirit 239 

3. The order of nature 

30. The rationality of nature: the maxims and laws of nature 

3^. Continuity and hierarchy in the order of nature 240 

y. Nature and causality 241 

(1) The distinction between the regular and the chance event: the uniformity 

of nature 

(2) The determinations of nature distinguished from the voluntary or free 

(3) Teleology in nature: the operation of final causes 242 

(4) Divine causality in relation to the course of nature: the preservation of 

nature; providence; miracles 243 

4. Knowledge of nature or the natural 244 

40. Nature or essence as an object of definition 

4& Nature in relation to diverse types of science: the theoretic and the practical 

sciences; natural philosophy or science, mathematics, and metaphysics 245 

4^ . Nature as an object of history 

5. Nature or the natural as the standard of the right and the good 246 

50. Human nature in relation to the good for man 

5#. Natural inclinations and natural needs with respect to property and wealth 

y. The naturalness of the state and political obligation 247 

$d. The natural as providing a canon of beauty for production or judgment 

6. Nature in religion and theology 248 

6a. The personification and worship of nature 
6b. Nature and grace in human life 



234 THE GREAT IDEAS 



REFERENCES 

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page 
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: Iliad, BK n [265-283] 12d, the 
number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas- 
sage is in section d of page 12. 

PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the 
upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES : Psychology, 116a-l 19b, the passage