rF .]Vo *9335.4a230 Given By U. S. SUPT. OF DOCUMENTS 3^ Union Calendar No. 815 84th Congress, 2d Session House Report No. 2189 THE GREAT PRETENSE A Symposium on Anti-Stalinism and the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party- May 19, 1956 (Original Release Date) May 21, 1956. — Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed Prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, U. S. House of Representatives Washington, D.C. , /^ i> Boston Public Library Superintendent of Documents JUL 3 1 1956 COMMITTEE ON UN-AMEraCAN ACTIVITIES United States House of Representatives FRANCIS E. WALTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman MORGAN M. MOULDER, Missouri HAROLD H. VELDE, Illinois CLYDE DOYLE, California BERNARD W. KEARNEY, New York JAMES B. FRAZIER, Jr., Tennessee DONALD L. JACKSON, California EDWIN E. WILLIS, Louisiana GORDON H. SCHERER, Ohio Richard Arens, Director Union Calendar No. 815 2d Session f ( No. 2189 THE GREAT PRETENSE A SYMPOSIUM ON ANTI-STALINISM AND THE 20TH CONGRESS OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY Mat 21, 1956. — Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed Mr. Walter, of Pennsylvania, from the Committee on Un-American Activities, submitted tlie following REPORT [Pursuant to H. Res. 5, 84th Cong.] i Public Law 601, 79th Congress The legislation under which the House Committee on Un-American Activities operates is rublic Law 601, 79th Congress (1946), chapter 753, 2d session, which provides : Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United State» of America in Congress assembled, * * * PART 2— RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Rule X SEC. 121. STANDING COMMITTEES ******* 17. Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine members. Rule XI POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES ******* (q) (1) Committee on Un-American Activities. (A) Un-American Activities. (2) Tlie Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommit- tee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (i) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propa- ganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guai*anteed by our Constitution, and (iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation. The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investi- gation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable. For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents and to take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any member designated by any such chairman, and ma^ be served by any person designated by any such chairman or member. RULES ADOPTED BY THE 84TH CONGRESS House Resolution 5, January 5, 1955 ******* Rule X STANDING COMMITTEES 1. There shall be elected by the House, at the commencement of each Congress, the following standing committees : *•***•* (q) Committee on Un-American Activities, to consist of nine members. Rule XI POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES 17. Committee on Un-American Activities. (a) Un-American Activities. (b) The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time, investigations of (1) the extent, char- acter, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American prop- aganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitu- tion, and (3) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation. The Committee on Un-American Activities shall report to the House (or to the Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investi- gation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable. For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Un-American Activities, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times and places within the United States, whether or not the House is sitting, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, to require the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, and to take such testimony, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person designated by any such chairman or member. VI CONTENTS Page Foreword 1 By Francis E. Walter, chairman. Nonviolent Violenck : Khrushchev's Program for Conquest 5 By Stefan T. Possony. Is Stalin's Russia Weakening? 15 By Whittaker Chambers. A Talk With Voroshilov 18 By William C. Bullitt. The Soviet Ultimatum 20 By Constantino Brown. First of the Oligarchs 23 By Harry Schwartz. Fear Stalks Russia's Rulers 26 By George Scherbatoff. The Lure of Peaceful Coexistence 32 By Anthony T. Bouscaren. New Pattern of Power 36 By Leon Dennen. No Change in Sight in Russia 39 By William Henry Chaniherliu. The Recent News From Moscow 41 By Max Eastman. The Risks of Anti-Stalinism 43 By Wladyslaw Knlski. No Softness in the Kremlin 49 By Eugene Lyons. Why You Can't Trust the Soviet Mind 51 By Gerhart Niemeyer. Smokescreen Over Moscow 58 By William Randolph Hearst, Jr. Khrushchev's Bid for Favor 60 By Robert G. Neumann. The Drive for Final Victory 63 By Ismail Ege. Behind the Fall of Joseph Stalin 67 By Nicholas N. Poppe. Newest Trick of the Kremlin 69 By Yuri Rastvorov. Red Dance of Death 71 By William Philip Siinms. The 20th Party Congress 74 By Nicholas S. Timasheff. The New Soviet Strategy : Toughest Challenge Yet 78 By the Re.search Institute of America. Khrushchev Copies Stalin 91 By Louis Budenz. American Communists Begin Their Crawl 94 By Frederick Woltman. Let's Not Get Complacent 96 By J. Addington Wagner. Intensifying the Soviet Offensive 99 By Francis J. McNamara. Stalinism Continues 103 By George Meany. Khrushchev's Heritage 108 By Matthew Woll. vn VIII CONTENTS Page The IMoTJisTTiNG Pressure of Natioxaltsm 113 By Lev Dobriansky. Stalinists Without Stalin » 118 By John S. Reshetar. The Kremlin's Call for Help 122 By James Burnham. Red China and the Purge of Stalin 125 By Kenneth Colegrove. The Impact on Mao Tse-tuxg 134 By Peter S. H. Tang. Courting the Neutralists 140 By Clarence A. Manning. Can Khrushchev SurviveV 145 By Franz Borkenan. Stalin in Cold Storage 149 By Robert J. Kerner. The Changing World of Soviet Eu^sia 164 By David J. Dallin. Out of Stalin's Shadow IGG By Gregory Klimov. A Major Triumph for Zhukov 1G8 By Boris I. Xicolaevslcy. Summation 172 By J. Edgar Hoover, THE GREAT PRETENSE A SYMPOSIUM ON ANTI-STALINISM AND THE 20TH CONGRESS OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY Foreword When bourgeois diplomats are preparing for war they begin to shout more strongly about "peace" and "friendly relations." If any Foreign Minister begins to defend to the death the "peace conference," you can be sure "his government" has already placed its orders for new dread- naughts and airplanes. A diplomat's words must have no relation to action — otherwise what kind of diplomacy is it? Words are one thing, actions another. Good words are a mask for the concealment of bad deeds. Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or iron wood. — Joseph Stalin, "Elections in Petersburg." The campaign of anti-Stalinism proclaimed by Nikita Kliruslichev at the recent 20th congress of the Soviet Communist Party has shaped itself into what may emerge as the most formidable challenge ever presented to the West by the Kremlin. The spectacle of Joseph Stalin's posthumous purge is all the more dangerous because of the confusion and deception which it engenders. At once, it reflects both the strength and the weakness of the present Soviet system ; the mounting confidence of the Soviet rulers who have succeeded Stalin and their concern with the variety of stresses which have resulted in the latest and most remarkable of the many convolu- tions of Soviet policy. The paradox at the heart of the anti-Stalinist campaign is best symbolized, perhaps, by the giant tomb of Stalin and Lenin on Mos- cow's famed Red Square. Inside it lies the body of Joseph Stalin enshrined as a demigod of Soviet communism. Outside it, unleashed by the very men he raised to power, rage denunciations of him as a madman guilty of the most horrendous crimes that history has ever known. The giant pile of marble commanding the walls of the Kremlin does more than honor the twin heros of communism It stands as a memorial to the vast empire which Stalin created and to the equally vast apparatus of power which his successors are per- petuating at the very time they revile the man from whom they inherited it. The desanctification of Stalin has understandably stimulated a furi- ous debate about its causes and its portents. The free world has good reason to try to ascertain the significance of the current developments in Soviet Russia, for the questions which they raise contain the key to the great issue of freedom or enslavement, the essence of the atomic age. The Committee on Un-American Activities has organized this sym- posium in an endeavor to provide an adequate explanation of and an indication of what the world may expect from the Soviet Union's 2 THS GREAT PRETENSE new course. The contributors are specialists in all the many aspects of the Soviet Union and tlie global conspiracy which it directs. Some of them are former officials of the Soviet Government and have seen both Stalin and his successors at close range. Others have been im- portant figures in the Communist apparatus in America. Those who themselves have not participated in the Soviet program of conquest are qualified to speak authoritatively on it by reason of direct personal experience or by long research and study. It is instructive that, while they vary in approach and emphasis, they agree, without exception, that the ultimate importance of anti-Stalinism will derive not from the disposition made of Joseph Stalin, but from the reaction to this by the West. Does the disenthronement of Stalin signify the abandonment of the Communist goal of world revolution? Is communism beginning a metamorphosis into a respectable political enterprise? Have Khrush- chev, Bulganin, and the men who rule with them and who share the odium for the crimes which they now lay upon Stalin suddenly be- come men of good will, renouncing violence and aggression ? Stalin's successors would like to hear a chorus of affirmative answers to these questions, and there are many who are willing to oblige them. It is these people, drawn to the supposed idealism of communism but repelled by the excesses of Stalin, that anti-Stalinism stretches forth to embrace. But it is evident, even this early, that, irrespective of the causes which may have produced it, anti-Stalinism is but a political artifice, fraudulent and more dangerous than any other produced by the Kremlin thus far. If it succeeds, history may some day replace the monuments to Stalin with more enduring monmnents to human gullibility. The significance of anti-Stalinism cannot be discerned in the specific internal conditions which may have precipitated its adoption; a ri- valry for power Avithin the Kremlin, severe pressures arising from a conflict between the Army and the Party, deep rumblings in the areas incorporated forcibly into the Soviet political structure and still aspiring for a return to independence. None of these in itself, nor all together, provides a total explanation despite the appeal they have to those who are inclined to regard the slightest tremor as presaging the disintegration of the Soviet totalitarian state. An examination of anti-Stalinism must first take into account the simple truth that, while it may be aimed against the memory of Joseph Stalin, it is not aimed against his legacy. While Khrushchev may re- pudiate Stalin as his political ancestor, he has not repudiated Stalin's establishment of the vast Soviet Communist empire which he himself now rules. The basis of Khrushchev's power, the basis from which he seeks to project new advances against the free world, is Stalin's Eussia; and the means by which he seeks to accomplish it, are Stalin's means. As long as this is true, the perpetuation of Stalin's memory or the annihilation of it can be of no real importance. The clue to this is a fact which too many in the free world have too long tried to ignore : Stalin was communism, as Lenin before him was communism, and as Khrushchev, after him, is commmiism, and all that has been done in their names is communism. The purported renunciation of Stalinism and the proclaimed return to Leninism can be regarded only as a piece of dialectical sleight of hand. Even to speculate about it implies a differentiation that, in reality, does not exist. THE GREAT PRETENSE 3 Ever since Stalin's accession to power, various observers have de- bated in all seriousness whether Stalin's program represented a con- tinuation of Lenin's, or whether that which Lenin had inaugurated was being corrupted by an irrational despot. The disputation is a sterile one. The threads of Stalinism and the threads of Leninism have been woven so tightly together into the fabric of communism as the world now knows it that they can be separated only if the entire fabric itself is torn apart. The Soviet and Communist empire which Stalin cre- ated stands firmly upon the foundations left to him by Lenin. To speak of a Stalinist "counterrevolution" is to discard history; the "counterrevolution" was Lenin's seizure of power from the Russian Social Democrats and the implantation of dictatorship upon the Russian people. The development of the Soviet Union since that time has been consistent and continuous. The goal of Lenin, and the goal of Stalin later, was to bring the rest of the world into the orbit of Communist power. The methods which Stalin used to accomplish this were not invented by him, but only perfected. Stalin's great contributions to the theory of com- munism dealt with the "Problems of Leninism." The purges, the famines, the mass oppression of Stalin's reign, were all part of the Leninist program too. It was Lenin who, at the Second World Con- gress of the Communist International, formulated the "Blueprint for World Conquest," as William Henry Chamberlin has aptly desig- nated it : a detailed description of Communist objectives and the methods for implementing them. And it was Lenin who formulated the "colonial" strategy, still followed at this very moment by the Soviet Union, of striking at the major Western nations from behind, by pro- voking uprisings in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. To regard Leninism as a supposed program of peace and Stalinism as one of war would be to blunder into a morass of fatal speculation. Neither was a program of war or peace in itself. They utilized one or the other as political exigencies required. It was Stalin who liked to pose as the great man of peace and who, in the course of this imposture, justified his pact with Hitler and the Red army's in- vasion of Poland and Finland as part of the pattern of bringing peace, Soviet style, to one nation after another. It was Stalin, too, who introduced the concept of collective security which gave rise to the ill-famed popular-front governments of the thirties. This was the prototype of the kind of "parliamentary democracy" which later brought the nations of Eastern Europe under the Soviet heel and which today Khrushchev is busy reviving. It is Stalin who must be credited Aviih the creation, too, of the Communist-led "Partisans of Peace" movement which Khrushchev is refurbishing as a colossal front organization for gathering in neutralists throughout the world. Just as "peaceful coexistence" has its origin in Stalin's reign, so, too, the concept of "collective leadership" represents no innovation. Stalin himself established collective government after the death of Lenin as the first step in his consolidation of power. With his liqui- dation of the men with whom he shared power, the device quickly became obsolete. To differentiate Leninism and Stalinism is to obscure the essence and substance of communism itself : the denial of God and the manifold values by which men must live if they are to remain civilized. The evil of communism does not depend u]3on the man, or the men, who 4 THE GREAT PRETENSE rule in its name. By its very character it is capable only of breeding further evil, regardless of who occupies the throne. When the verbiage is swept away, Khrushchev can be seen to offer the same alternatives that the Kremlin has always offered — capitulate or perish. His purposes are not to abandon the policies of Stalin but only to effect them better and to extend the achievements of Stalin still further. To do this, it is necessary to replace the crudeness of the Stalin era wnth craft and subtlety, to transform its wintry climate into sunny blandishments. Khrushchev already claims the right to speak for a majority of the world's population. Should one more country fall under his sway, that right will be incontestable. This is the great danger of the sweet reasonableness of anti-Stalinism. For there are many among this country's allies — and many w^ithin this country itself — whose sym- pathies, consciously or unconsciously, rest with the Soviet Union and the humanitarianism to which it pretends. It is Khrushchev's hope that the audience of the free world in its longing for an end to the threat of war will accept whatever fantasies are enacted on the Kremlin stage, and that it will forget that in the wings, committed to the service of Soviet peace, the military might of the Soviet Union remains intact. Interpreting the meaning of Khrushchev's statements properly re- quires perhaps a kind of simultaneous-translation machine. What comes through when the headphones are attached is the true cry re- sounding in the Kremlin : "The Vozhd is dead. Long live the Vozhd. Stalinism is purged; Stalinism endures." If we fail to heed that cry, Stalin, purged, will have won a victory greater than any which he con- summated as Russia's master. The Committee on Un-American Activities wishes to thank the con- tributors to this symposium for their splendid efforts to create an un- derstanding of the Soviet Union's new policy. It is the hope of the committee that their analyses may aid in establishing an effective program with which to countervail the dangers of anti-Stalinism — and in maintaining reason and vigilance in that diminishing part of the world that is still free. Francis E. Walter, Chairman. NONVIOLENT VIOLENCE: KHRUSHCHEV'S PROGRAM FOR CONQUEST By Stefan T. Possony Stefan T. Possony is professor of international politics at the Graduate School of Georgetown University and visiting professor at the Univer- sity of Pennsylvania. Born in Austria, Dr, Possony received his doctor of philosophy degree from the University of Vienna and has been a Car- negie fellow at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, N. J., and a member of the faculty of the National War College in Washington, D. C. A specialist in modern military and diplomatic history, Dr. Possony is the author of several books, among them. Strategic Air Power, A Century of Conflict: Communist Techniques of World Revo- lution, 1848-1950, and, with Prof. Robert Strausz-Hupe, International Relations in the Age of Conflict Between Democracy and Dictatorship. The 20th Party Congress of the Commimist Party of the Soviet Union sliould be analyzed under many different headings : Tlie Eco- nomic and Technical Development of Eussia; the Social Conditions of the Eussian Population and the Eussian Wage Earner ; the Eela- tionships Between the Soviet Union and Other Communist States, and Between the Kremlin and the Various Communist Parties of the Free World ; the Problems of Soviet Education ; the Nationality Problem Within the Soviet Union; the Attitudes of the Communist Leadership to "Bureaucratic" Versus "Democratic Centralism" ; Current Concepts of Economic Planning, Agriculture, Statistics, and Historiography ; and numerous additional questions which are of direct and indirect interest to the security of the United States. Without entering into a lengthy debate of these various problems, it should be pointed out that despite many difficulties, the Soviet leaders seem to expect that the rapid rate of increase of the Soviet economy will continue during the next 5-year period. They also seem to stand ready to execute a few domestic reforms and to improve management and productivity. The Soviets have been relatively frank about some of their critical problems, but it does not appear that they anticipate insuperable difficulties which would interfere with the sj'slematic and rapid development of Communist economic and military power. The proceedings of the congress, especially in the climactic desancti- fication of Stalin, seems to reveal that there are significant cleavages among Soviet leaders. It is quite true that, so far, the Soviet rulers apparently have succeeded in composing their differences, provided we disregard such incidents as Beria's execution and Malenkov's demo- tion. Moreover, these present rulers, outwardly at least, were able, disregarding minor details, to settle for a single "line" which is binding on all members of the Connnunist Party. It would be a grave mistake, therefore, to place serious hopes on con- flicts past, present, and future, presumed or real, tactical or strategic, 6 TPIE GREAT PRETENSE topical or personal, among the Communist Presidium. At the same time, it would be a mistake to overlook the very considerable changes which are occurring simply as a result of the disclosures on Stalin. There must have been weighty reasons for the Soviet leaders, most of wdiom are personally implicated in Stalin's crimes, to admit as much as they did. "While the disclosures were far from complete and in many details are of dubious validity, revelations of this type indicate that modifications of a significant nature are taking place and that the legitimacy of the regime possibly is becoming questionable. No one can predict what the ultimate results will be and how long they will be in coming. Unless historical experience no longer applies, disclosures of such a type always \*rre fraught with dire consequences. Accord- ing to historical precedent, the posthumous execution of Stalin could mean the beginning of a new revolutionary cycle in Russia. But it is impossible to predict at which point political changes will have gone far enough to be both meaningful and irreversible, nor what the nature and direction of these changes will be. Specifically, it cannot be forecast whether such changes will affect American security positively or negatively. ITence we must base our analysis on the hypothesis that, for the time being, the political complexion of the Soviet Govern- ment will not be altered extensively. By the same token, it is futile to speculate about the significance of the various intraparty conflicts. The manj' nuances between the speeches of the top Communists may be interpreted by Sherlock Holmes techniques of analysis. You can detect differences in atti- tudes, emphasis, wording, and possibly even conceptual frameworks. I feel, however, that the data are open to several sets of incompatible interpretations. Beyond noting that such differences exist, little pur- pose would be served in reconstructing synthetically political lines which could be imputed to some of the Soviet leaders. Speculaton is fascinating but cannot lead very far. With knowledge presently available, it is premature. Consequently, I want to restrict myself to one speculative remark only, namely, that personally. I consider Mikoyan's speech to be one of the keys to the understanding of the "new" Soviet line. I realize, of course, that Mikoyan's speech probably is characteristic more of "right wing" of the Soviet Communist Party than of the party in its entirety. Mikoyan may be considered almost as an opposition leader. On the other hancl, we must devote much attention to the one docu- ment which, at least in a general and official way, was agreed upon by all the comrades: The resolutions of the 20th Party Congress. These resolutions reflect many of the points expressed by virtually all speakers, including Mikoyan. Where he and the resolutions coin- cide in general meaning, Mikoyan's text which is the clearest and most outspoken, can be used profitably as a basis for interpretation. It is signiftcant that while dictatorship alhgedly has heen replaced hy '■^collective leadership^'''' and while the alove-mentioned shades of dijference exist, all these leaders seem to he saying more or^ less tlie same thing. Hence the Communist Party still is ^'■monolithic'''' in structure and spirit. Until further evidence unfolds prudence would seem to dictate that American observers should not assume that a mutation of that political animal, the Communist Party, has occurred. The crisis may not signify more than that a change in generations is happening. THE GREAT PRETENSE 7 Since it would be necessary to produce an entire book in order to spell out the meaning of Soviet policy in all its ramifications and since I do not have the competence to do so in most of the subject areas, I shall limit myself to an analysis of the one area which I believe I know best: The operational concepts of the present Communist leadership. ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATIONS Many comments have been made concerning supposed changes of the Communist operational doctrine. For example, it has been said that the Communists now recognize that the revolution must take different forms in different countries and that they no longer believe in the absolute necessity of violence as the main promoter of the Com- munist revolution ; in other words, a peaceful revolution has become possible. I believe these interpretations to be greatly overstated. The theory that the revolution perforce will assume variegated forms depending on circumstances and national characteristics, was enun- ciated as early as 1848 in the Communist manifesto and repeated by Marx in 1872, as quoted by Mikoyan. It also shows up in Lenin's and Stalin's writings. Naturally, this is nothing but commonsense. Not even the most dogmatic Stalinist ever supposed that a revolution in the United States would follow the precedent of the 1917 assault on the Winter Palace. The writings by quite a few American Commu- nists have dealt with this aspect of the problem for many years. The point was in no way lost on Stalin himself who was quite an inventor of revolutionary techniques. Likewise, the possibility that the revolution does not have to assume violent forms under all circumstances was envisaged by Marx and Engels. In some ways current formulations are little more than elaborations of Mao Tse-tung's concept of coalition government which in turn was not original with him, but harks back to the 4th Congress of the Communist International in 1924, if not to earlier dates. However, the "peaceful revolution" is purest Stalinism. In 1924, Stalin said that "In the remote future, if the proletariat is victorious in the most important capitalist countries, and if the present capitalist encirclement is replaced by a socialist encirclement, a 'peaceful' path of development is quite possible for certain capitalist countries, whose capitalists, in view of the 'unfavorable' international situation, will consider it expedient 'voluntarily' to make substantial concessions to the proletariat." ^ In 1951, at the end of Stalin's career, this line was repeated in Bolshevik, the key organ of the Soviet Communist Party.^ "Because of the increased strength of the U. S. S. E., because of the presence of the countries of peoples' democracy, because of the colossal extent of the organized mass movement for peace, because of the basic change in the relationship between the camp of peace, socialism, and democ- racy, and the camp of war and imperialistic reactions — a new war can be avoided if the people take the fate of peace into their own hands. To deny this possibility means to play into the hancls of the war- mongers, to sow abroad a feeling of hopelessness, despair, and fatalism, instead of inspiring the masses to struggle against the warmongers." * Stalin. Problems of Leninism, Moscow, 1940, p. 21. ■No. 11, June 15, 1951, p. 23. 8 THE GREAT PRETENSE Tims, the present rulers have made absolutely no break with Stalin on this important point. Their attempts to act as though they had em- barked on a new line are deceptive — deception, of course, was one of Stalin's favorite devices. There is quite a bit of obfuscation in this term "violence": Most phrasings, as I read them, seem to talk about armed uprisings which, ever since 1920 or so, have been considered to be exceptions rather than standard revolutionary practice. Current attitudes to other forms of violence, e. g., revolutionary wars and wars (waged by anybody) as creators of revolutionary situations, are not clearly spelled out. As always since the turn of the century, the Communists say that they are for "peace," but please note that this term has a dilferent meaning to them than to the free world. Yet the Communists do not say now that they have junked their doctrine of "just wars" and that they have become opposed to such just wars (e. g., national liberation wars), let alone that they would try to prevent them and, if they should occur nevertheless, would help the United Nations help arbitrate and settle those conflicts. The Communists have not become Fabian Socialists by any means. They merely have come to see that Fabian methods can be effective, and tliey have developed a highly sophisticated theory on the best and safest ways of applying violence. This concept could be para- phrased as follows : "The less non-Communists recognize that violence IS being employed, and the more imperceptible and indirect the man- ner of applying violence, the better the interests of the revolution can be served." The individual elements of the "new" line are old, albeit refurbished acquaintances. While the "new" line is nothing more than a rearrange- ment of old concepts, even this mixture is quite familiar. Essentially, the Communist leaders did not quite say what many of our observers believe they heard. Other observers do not know what was said before, for example in the resolutions of the Sixth and Seventh Comintern Congresses. now PEACEFUL IS "pEACEFUL" Let me follow up this point with a concrete example. The Com- munists did not foresxoear violence at all,, provided you go to the trouUe of reading the fine print. _ For instance, Mikoyan stated that in those cases where "the bourgeoisie possesses a strong military and police machine, it will undoubtedly impose on the proletariat an armed struggle to defend its domination. The proletariat must be prepared for this beforehand." Mikoyan further argued that Lenin •who had urged an armed uprising before and during AVarld War I, after the February revolution advanced the slogan of the "peaceful development of the revolution," only to urge again an armed uprising after the July events of 1917. Mikoyan asked the question whether Lenin was right when he advocated peaceful development or whether he was right only in those cases when he suggested an armed up- rising. He replied, "There can be only one answer : Lenin was right in every case." In the same speech Mikoyan pointed out that communism was suc- cessful in Yugoslavia through the waging of partisan and civil war. In Czechoslovakia, according to Mikoyan, the Communists came to THE GREAT PRETENSE 9 power "by peaceful means." In Bulgaria, Rumania, and Poland, lie says, there was no civil war. In all these cases, of course, Mikoyan omitted to mention a trifling matter, namely, that military conquest by the Red army — -which in the case of Bulgaria took the form of an unprovoked attack — was the essential prerequisite of subsequent Com- munist suc(!esses. We are confronted by complete distortion (or deception) when we read that, according to Mikoyan's interpretation, the Chinese revolu- tion, although in its preliminary phase a civil war, was accomplished by "peaceful means." Since Mikoyan has called for the opening of Russian archives to improve the quality of Soviet history writing, we can only hope that he will prolit from the documentary evidence and devote himself to a more thorough examination of modern history. In any event, the need for the application of violence against bourgeois nations with strong military and police force was reaffirmed. On the assumption that the Communists will not succeed in talking the United States into dismantling its security forces, this country will remain a strong power. Hence it will have to be subjected to violence — or else the world revolution will have to be called off. The Communists continue to proclaim that the revolution will occur. Hence if logic means anything, nonviolent methods of revolution, while perhaps feasible in some countries without military and police forces, are not applicable to the United States. Disregarding minor successes gained through ^''nonviolence^'' our country can he hrought down only through violence — this is the Communist position now, as it was their position before. The only change is that they seem to discern a possibility to mahe the process less painful and less risky to them- selves. It should be noted that all this talk about nonviolence refers at best to the initial stages of a revolution, i. e., to the seizure of power only. There is not the slightest suggestion that the Communists foreswear violent methods once they would have taken over the government. They still want to forge a classless society and they have not aban- doned the notion that the erstwhile ruling classes must be liquidated physically. In any event, the "counterrevolutionaries" would have to be exterminated; hence terror must remain a key element in Com- munist theory and practice. Despite all the verbal smokescreens, a nonviolent Communist revolution is a logical and practical im- possibility. THE CURRENT OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE In my estimation what the Communist leaders are talking about is quite simple; First, the inevitability of the Communist revolution, worldwide, is reasserted; moreover, the Gomm^inists have not deviated one iota from their desire to bring this revolution about. Second, for a revolution to be successful, the miiltary power of the capitalist na- tions, and this means, above all, of the United States, must be destroyed. Third, this destruction can take different forms. (a) Within the sphere of violent action, it could take the form of aggressive war launched by the Soviet bloc against the free world, a concept which would be in line with some of the thoughts expressed, at different times, by Lenin, Stalin, Frunze, Tukhachevsky, and with some variations, by Mao Tse-tung. However, in the past the Com- 10 THE GREAT PRETENSE munists liked this particular concept only when they could apply it against weaker states. They are not overly anxious to use it against stronger powers, and they do not seem to be so sure that under atomic conditions this concept has not become excessively "adventuristic." Note that the Communists still claim to be convinced of the idea that it will be the capitalist states who will launch an aggressive war against the Soviet Union. In this area, however, a serious problem arises: Wliile in the past Kussia could afford to let other nations attack her and, in the tradition of 1812, withdraw into the interior, only to gain military advantages from such a retreat, henceforth it would be dangerous to adopt a strategy allowing the opponent to strike the first blow, conceivably by means of an atomic surprise attack. In an atomic war the force which strikes second, may never be able to strike at all. The classical Russian military concept, therefore, does not seem to be applicable to a future major war. It is noteworthy that Stalin, himself, was the main advocate of the traditional Russian "counter- offensive" notion, and that he upheld it stubbornly in the face of nu- clear technology. If the Soviets still are wedded to this concept, they are acting as pure Stalinists. They may be caught here in an ideolo- gical trap, however, inasmuch as they find it politically most inadvis- able to proclaim the necessity of offensive revolutionary war against the United States. Nor can they admit that in the absence of such war, culminating in the physical destruction of American military power, the chances that the world revolution can be completed are al- most nil. This is an area where they are bound to be both secretive — and confused. I frankly do not believe that the Soviets mean it seriously when ilxej suggest that should a "capitalist aggressor" launch war, as Mikoyan says: * * * the best people of mankind will not allow civilization to perish. They will immediately unite, will put the aggressors into straitjackets, and will put an end to all wars and to capitalism at the same time. Nor can they possibly believe that atomic warfare only will "* * * destroy the outdated and pernicious regime of capitalism in its im- perialist stage." Obviously, the "straitjacketing" of the aggressor will be difficult after he has cut loose. Thue, the Communists call upon various forces to forestall war and they may be thinking about pro- voking the West into a war at a place and time of their choosing. They also talk about disarmament as a "decisive means of assuring a stable peace." Since, so far, they have not shown any sincerity with respect to disarmament, the conclusion may be permitted that this whole argument does not reflect their true operational doctrine with respect to atomic war, or that they have been unable as yet to drop ballast and to formulate a tenable, up-to-date strategic concept. Note that in recent years Russian military writers have disassociated them- selves from Stalin and emphasized the growing importance of sur- prise in a modern conflict. This whole complex presimiably is one of the primary areas of internecine conflict. (6) The' destruction of capitalist military power also could be ac- complished by nonviolent means, for example, by economic warfare, political disintegration, policy sabotage, and infiltration of military forces as programed by the Sixth World Congress in 1928 and prac- THE GREAT PRETENSE 11" ticed during the rerolutions of lOOrj and 1917, and during the Chinese revolution. The "nonviolent" destruction of "capitalist" military power, including to the extent practical, the disarmament of the United States alone is the presently preferred method. The o]dy novelty is that the Communists seem to estimate that their chances in this type of operation have improved. They propose that these presumably enlarged opportunities should be exploited to the utmost. If, indeed, the "capitalist" nations' military power could be disintegrated from within, be prevented from being increased, and be kept in a position of inferiority, and if then the "capitalist" govern- ments could be provoked into aggressive action, the victory of the Soviet bloc would be assured. At the same time the risks to the Soviet regime Avould be minimized. Thus they could have a tear with all its revolutionary results^ and yet violence would he reduced to a minimum. And, of course, all this would xoorh to 'perfection if, instead of actual fighting, the whole operation could he carried through hy atomic hlachmail — Communist infiltration into the governments of the free world he'ing developed as a method of insiiring that nations loill suc- cuml) to mere threats. Zhukov's speech and Eiissia's seeming adoption of a deterrence strategy of their own may be interpreted as a partial disclosure of such a concept. It may, indeed, be presumed that the feuding Soviet leaders will find it easiest to agree on the relatively "safe" strategy of atomic black- mail in preference to either retrenchment, indefinite postponement of revolutionary conflict, or preparations for offensive revolutionary war on a global scale. SUBSIDIARY AND IMPLEMENTING OPER.VTIONS To support this concept of "nonviolent" revolutionary expansion the Soviets propose to undertake a series of interrelated programs : First, under present circumstances, with communism ruling over 900 million people behind the Iron Curtain and controlling a huge net of Communists and crypto-Communists in the free world, the "organi- zation" and "class consciousness" of the revolutionaries should be strengthened to the maximum. This means that Communist parties in the free world should adopt more successful policies, and, in short, win elections. Through enlarged parliamentary presentation it is expected that the Communists will be able to influence and perhaps even deter- mine the political and strategic decisions of the free world as well as of military, budgetary, political, and economic legislation ; retard and deflect technological progress; reduce military force levels; paralyze military organizations ; disorient public opinion ; and vastly strengthen their infiltration and espionage posture — not to mention their other increased influences within the armed forces. With such an overall political position in many presently free countries, disarmament, mili- tary disintegration, and ultimately mutiny and rebellion, might move within the orbit of Communist capabilities. In addition, an improved intelligence coverage of the free world's strengths and weaknesses would enlarge their opportunities for successful action. There is no doubt in my mind that the Soviets evaluate their past successes in infiltration, policy sabotage, et ah, with a great deal of satisfaction and that they decided to make the most of this particular capability. It should be added that the Coimnunist leaders have shown 12 THE GREAT PRETENSE awareness of their lagging ideological impact. The success of this portion of the Soviet strategy is crucially dependent upon the con- tinued and rejuvenated ideological appeal of communism. It is, there- fore, not surprising that the Soviet leaders are calling for a new offensive effort on the "ideological front." The second part of this support strategy lies in the field of inter- national communism and international diplomacy. It involves the following objectives : (a) The strengthening and enlarged impact of the "partisans of peace," that is, the enlistment of a maximum number of non-Com- munist elements for a policy of "peace." In brief, surrender or non- resistance to Communist advances. (h) The strengthening of various international Communist and Communist-dominated organizations such as the World Federation of Trade Unions, particularly in fields which are of importance to mili- tary operations such as maritime transport, communications, oil pro- duction, etc. (c) Policies aiming to bring about a closer "cooperation" with Socialist parties, i. e., an attempt to establish domination over all "left" parties, and particularly over their leftwings — a factor which also would enhance Communist opportunities in elections and legislatures. (d) Policies designed to bring the military prostration of the free world, for example, through the setting forth of disarmament pro- posals, "ban the bomb" agitation, and the like. (e) The stimulation of strikes, uprisings, "liberation" campaigns, and other types of unrest in the so-called colonial and dependent areas, partly in order to get additional nations allied with the Soviet bloc, partly to disperse and weaken free-world military strengths and partly to deprive the free world of important sources of raw materials. Such colonial crises also are expected to produce cleavages among the lead- ing Western nations. (/) The stimulation of neutralism, especially in countries allied with the United States, partly in order to liquidate American bases in forward areas, partly to neutralize the effectiveness of American economic and military assistance programs, and partly to reduce the operational freedom of American forces overseas. (g) The stimulation of trade between the free world and the Soviet bloc, in order to accelerate industrial expansion of the Communist orbit and, at the same time, improve the living standards of the peoples under the Communist heel to such an extent that loyalties to the Com- munist regime could be rekindled. I did not notice any particular line against "proxy wars," limited and local actions conducted by satellite forces. In shorty lohat it all boils doion to is this: The Communists want to destroy the free-world 'political and military alliance system^ and they loant to xoedken^ to the maximum extent^ the military fower of the United States. It should be noted that the effectiveness of these programs will be dependent, to a considerable degree, on continued Communist successes in disorienting intellectuals, suborning education, and putting over deceptive propaganda. Within this overall program, of course, the Communists continue to pursue several special objectives, such as the reunification of Ger- many on their terms or, at least, the prevention of effective German THE GREAT PRETENSE 13 rearmament; the maintenance of chaos in France; the creation of unrest in the INIiddle East; the knittinn; of closer rehitions with the Africo- Asian bloc of neutralists, etc. Moreover, there are indications expressed clearly, for example, in the speech by Togliatti that the Soviets specifically hope to gain electoral success in Italy and in some free countries of Asia. It must be added that these two prongs of the current Communist political strategy — that is, the boring from within and from with- out — are mutually supporting. By stimulating a ^''peacefuV climate of opinion in the free nations and hy veiling and minimizing the con- tinuity of the threat^ the Comniunists hope to enhance their overall capahlities^ with the anticipated result that hoth the legal and illegal apparatuses of world communism and the relative poioer position of the Soviet hloc will mal-e further headway. The whole thing is con- ceived as a sort of circular process in which one success leads to another and failures can be minimized by compensatory advances in other areas. CONCLUSIOXS All in all, we are confronted with the following "novelties" : First, while Communist strategy in its essentials remains unchanged, hence- forth it will be applied with more dexterity and subtlety. The crudc- ness of the Stalin era is to be abandoned and to be replaced by more crafty methods of persuasion and seduction. Second, the concept of the need for violence in the revolutionary process has been reexamined and streamlined. Henceforth violence is to be applied under optimum conditions artifically created for the purpose. Moreover, as atomic blackmail materializes, a new category will be coming into existence : "Violent nonviolence." Third, "organization" and "class consciousness" always were con- sidered to be key elements of the revolutionary process. Previously, these two factors were held to enhance the effectiveness of violence. Under present conditions this concept has not been abandoned, but a significant variation has been introduced : To the extent that the Com- munists, their fellow travelers, and other revolutionaries can be "or- ganized" effectively and be deployed on the infiltratioii front, if I may use that term, to that degree violence can be reduced in intensity. The new idea seems to be that there is a sort of tradeoff between "violence" and "organization:" The less "organization" and infiltra- tion, the more violence is necessary; and conversely, in the measure that "organization" and infiltration have been developed successfully, violence can be dispensed with and extreme forms of violence may not need to go beyond hostile threats. This juxtaposition between violence and infiltration constitutes a clarion call to arms to the Communists in the free world. Under Stalin these foreign Communists were supposed to be little more than auxiliaries of the Soviet armed forces and of the Soviet state. Under the present leadership^ the foreign Communists are told that it is up to them to mal'e the transition to communism as painless and as ^''risk- free'*'' as possible. This, naturally, is a reiteration, with some modifica- tions, of the operational doctrine which was paramount during the period of 1918-23. Regardless of its historical origin, it is clear that the current Soviet strategy poses novel problems for the free world. 14 THE GREAT PRETENSE This is not the time to relax and to act on optimistic assumptions. If we want the evolution within the Soviet Union to move in the direc- tion of true peace, we must not relent. Under no circumstances should we take it for granted that our hopes are being realized or already have come true. We cannot but postulate that the threat not only remains unabated but is becoming ever more serious, if only because Communist strategy henceforth may be executed with greater skill. Commonsense tells us that we should never count our chickens before they have been hatched. The Soviet leaders may be finding out that some of their theories are not so true as they once believed. They may be falling out among themselves. The Russian peoples may be reasserting their demands for freedom and democracy. But the Soviet regime still is in power. The Communists still are our sworn and determined enemies. They still are plotting our perdition. Hence the price of liberty still must be paid in the currency of vigilance. If I may paraphrase George Washington, every American still must resolve for himself "to conquer or die, and trusting to the smiles of heaven upon so just a cause" must "behave with bravery and resolution." ^ • General Orders. August 23, 177G. IS STALIN'S RUSSIA WEAKENING? By Whittaker Chambers Whittaker Chambers, a former courier for the Soviet underground espionage apparatus in America, is known to millions of Americans for his courageous exposure of Soviet underground activities in the United States, particularly in the United States Government, and for his iden- tification of Alger Hiss as a secret Soviet agent. A distinguished writer and a former senior editor of Time magazine, Mr. Chambers has told the story of his years with the Communist Party and the motives for his final break with it in his compelling autobiography, Witness. Current developments in communism, following the 20tli Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, appear to divide anti- Communist opinion chiefly on two questions: (1) Will this weaken communism; (2) will it strengthen communism? I belong among those who an- swer : "Yes, over the long pull," to question 2. I simply believe that, 9 times out of 10, tanks and automatic rifles are more effective than stones or pop bottles, even though the stones are thrown at the Com- munist tanks by desperately valiant anti- Communists. I believe, too, that, 9 times out of 10, organization defeats no organization, that a tight, aggressive organization, such as the Soviet Government, defeats diffuse unrest or even such anti- Communist underground organiza- tion as we are sometimes told exists within the Communist empire. I do not, in general, believe that spontaneous revolts, even if locally ferocious, can succeed against a modern police state, like the Soviet Union, That is why I held the unpopular view that the West was right not to encourage the outbreaks in East Germany and elsewhere in 1953. For, unless we meant to support the insurrectionists with armies, tliey must fail. Reprisals would be gruesome. Resentment against the West would have been widespread and specific since our verbal encouragement of those whom we did not mean to support with force would have seemed irresponsible. Imagine yourself to be a Soviet national facing a Soviet tank with nothing in your hand but a stone, and the whole problem will be much more vivid than words can make it. Above, I have carefully said : 9 times out of 10. The question then becomes : Are the current developments in the Communist empire the 10th time that throws out all conventional reckoning? It would be wrong to dismiss lightly the views of those who hold that the Com- munist empire is now crumbling slowly or crumbling fast, or any view in between. It would be just as wrong not to ask for a careful audit of the evidence supporting those views. So far, what evidence I have seen seems to me sketchy, contradictory or highly speculative. Riots in Soviet Georgia and elsewhere in Transcaucasia (we have almost no details) followed the official demolition of Stalin. To many perfectly sensible people, they looked like the beginning of the end for com- munism. To me they looked like riots in Georgia. Recently stu- dents rioted at the University of Madrid. Other sensible people f ore- 15 16 THE GREAT PRETENSE cast the beginning of the end for the Franco government. Of the two cases, I should expect the Spanish riots to be more of a danger for the Spanish Government than the Georgian riots for the Soviet Gov- ernment, although the anti-Communist riots may well have been much bigger and the whole context more precarious. The difference lies not only in the riots, but in the fact that a vast power of public opinion in the West has consistently beset the Spanish Government while prac- tically the same body of the Western opinion has pretty consistently favored the Communist government. I am not talking, of course, about Communist opinion in the West, but about so-called enlightened opinion in which Communists make, at most, a tiny activating force. Do left liberals ever weary of pointing out that American Communists, for example, are statistically negligible ? In the body politic any unrest registers a degree of fever — perhaps more than 1°. But most of us cannot make an accurate reading be- cause most of us cannot even see the thermometer. We can simply, using our good sense, remember that even a temperature of 105 does not necessarily mean that the patient will die at dawn. In the case of communism, most of us would like the patient to die sooner. But that is a pious hope, not a reading of reality. In the absence of hard facts about what is happening in the Com- munist empire we can only: (1) check our views daily against such facts, or seeming facts, as leak through censorship; (2) bear in mind that, even so, our conclusions may be wrong; (3) use any special experience we may claim to try to bring the swiftly changing reality into focus. Using, in this way, what little experience I lay claim to, I get a picture rather different from that of many others whom I respect, and some of whom have much greater claims to expert knowledge. I see it this way. Stalin and Stalinism were morally outrageous. But that does not explain why they came to power. Nor is there space here to explain why I believe they came to power. Here I can only say: a specific set of historical factors made them possible because, to communism, they were useful. I can only add : in my opinion, a dif- ferent set of historical factors now makes them unfeasible because they have become an impediment to the advance of communism. In short, Stalin and Stalinism have outlived their usefulness to commu- nism. That is why the Kremlin is dumping them. But since Stalin- ism was morally outrageous, its liquidation has on communism (and on millions who are not Communist) the buoyant effect of a successful surgical operation. That is not the only effect of the operation. Its purpose, if I see it rightly, is to convince that same ''enlightened" opinion of the West that'^ communism is now something that any decent soul can coexist with, trade with, make friends with. It may take a little time, but the harvest, judging by the past, may be a fat one. It may soon follow that those who do not believe that com- munism has changed will find that they are the "indecent souls." Com- munism, in the name of decency and reason, will be rallying "en- lightened" opinion in the West precisely against those "indecent souls." The action will talce the form of popular fronts and a much vaster climate of good will. Need I point out that the "unenlightened," the "indecent," the men of "ill will" will then be those who distrust com- munism, fight it, insist that, while it often changes its masks, it has never been known to change its inherent character I THE GREAT PRETENSE 17 In brief, commimism's great change, dating from the 20th Congress, is a change of tactics, not of intentions. Communism is cleaning house in order to make its personnel, its formations, its tactics, more acceptable, efficient, up to date, and thus to hasten its project of dividing, wooing, and winning the West, preparatory to overrunning the West. That Communist purpose never changes. No doubt, the swing in the Communist line is much complicated by inner-Commu- nist and inner-Soviet factors which I have not touched on. No doubt, the Communist leaders are playing with forces that might, con- ceivably, get out of hand. Therefore, the question of the moment is : Will the surgical operation on Stalinism be successful? I believe it will. But nobody knows. Everybody is waiting to see. If it is suc- cessful communism will be a greater threat to the West than ever. A TALK WITH VOROSHILOV By William C. Bullitt William C. Bullitt served as American Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1933 until 1936. His distinguished career in Government service has also included the post of Ambassador at Large in 1941-42 and of special assistant to the Secretary of the Navy in 1942-43. Mr. Bullitt began his career as associate editor and foreign Washington correspond- ent for the Philadelphia Public Ledger and, in 1944, returned to this field as foreign correspondent for Life magazine. That same year he en- listed in the French Army as an infantry major. He was decorated with a Croix de Guerre with palm and was made commander of the French Legion of Honor. He is the author of Report to the American People and The Great Globe Itself. The present attempt of the Moscow commissars to masquerade as innocent victims of Stalin's sadistic brutality should deceive no one. A hyena that laughs remains a hyena. A wolf in sheep's clothing changes his coat but not his heart. Americans have been bamboozled so often by this Communist tactic that few are likely to be impressed by the present smiles and bleatings of the Kremlin gang. Any who are inclined to believe that there has been a change of heart in Moscow should remember that the men who are now attempting to prove them- selves amiable souls are the same men who carried out murders, tor- tures, and mass starvations for Stalin. To me they seem more repel- lent now when they are professing that they were always horrified by Stalin's lying and bloodthirsty brutality than they seemed when they were frankly gangsters. Many of them were murderous criminals on their own hook long before Stalin achieved supreme power. For example, Marshal Voro- shilov, who is today the Soviet Chief of State — the Soviet Union's Queen Elizabeth — has always been able to smile disarmingly and to pat children affectionately on the head, and is no doubt the nicest of the Communist lot. Just how nice he is seems to me worth relating at this time. One night in the winter of 1934 he was seated on my right at dinner and Marshal Budenny was on my left. They had drunk a bit of vodka and both were relaxed and gay. "You know, Bullitt," said Voroshilov, "Budenny is the man who won the civil war without ever knowing what he was figliting about." "That's true," laughed Budenny. "My motto has never been pro- letarians of the world unite; it has always been cavalrymen of the world unite. I don't care why I fight so long as I have a good war." We laughed, and Voroshilov then said, "I think the most extraor- dinary thing we ever did together was to capture Kiev without fighting." "What happened ?" I asked. "Well," said Voroshilov, "there were 11,000 Czarist officers with their wives and children in Kiev and they had more troops than we had, and we never could have captured the city by fighting, so we used 18 THE GREAT PRETENSE 19 propaganda and we told them that they would be released and allowed to go to their homes with their families and treated as well as possible by our army, and they believed us and surrendered." "What did you do then ?" I asked. "Oh," said Voroshilov, "we shot all the men and boys and we put all the women and the girls into brothels for our army." "Do you think that was a very decent thin^ to do ?" I asked. "i\Iy army needed women," said Voroshilov, "and I was concerned with my army's health and not with the health of those women ; and it didn't make any dill'erence anyhow, because they were all dead within 3 months." Voroshilov no doubt deserves his position as Chief of State of the Soviet Union, and is no doubt the most honorable and charming of Communists ; but that is exactly how honorable and charming he is. I hope that Americans who may become inclined to believe any promises now made by the Communist leaders will remember the fate of the Czarist oflicers and their wives and sons and daughters in Kiev. The present Soviet objective is clear. It is to lull us into a sleep of death while the Soviet Union achieves control of new areas without war, and prepares sufficient hydrogen bombs and intercontinental jet bombers to destroy our retalitory power by a sneak attack, so that some day it will be in a j)osition to blot us out with impunity. THE SOVIET ULTIMATUM By Constantine Brown Constantine Brown, syndicated columnist of tlie Washington Evening Star, was born in Sheldon, Iowa, and received a doctor of philosophy degree from the University of Berlin. He was a foreign correspondent for the Chicago Daily News from 1917 to 1931 and served as chief of that newspaper's bureau in Turkey, France, England, and the Middle East. Mr. Brown is known for a number of startlingly accurate pre- dictions in the realm of international affairs. He correctly forecast the beginning of World War II several months before Hitler's attack on Poland and warned of the attack of the Japanese at Pearl Harbor several weeks before it happened. Comrade Khrushchev, speaking at the opening of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party in Moscow gave the free world an ultimatum : choose between coexistence and war. He offered no other choice in the relationship between the free and the regimented world. It is against this background that the deflation of Joseph Stalin must be viewed. The Moscow meeting was attended not only by all the Soviet party bosses but also Communist leaders from all over the world, except Yugoslavia and the United States. Tito, who is playing a cagey diplomatic game, refused to send his representatives to Moscow. Our own commies could not obtain passports. The 20th congress is regarded as of greater importance than all previous ones. During Stalin's life, the party's reunion was a mere social function on a large scale. "The party leads but does not replace" was the slogan from the eighth congress in 1919. Through the Stalin regime all powers were concentrated in his hands. He was the state. The party statutes adopted in 1952 made the Soviet congress the "supreme organ" of the party, with the Secretary (Comrade Khrush- chev) holding all the aces. Actually the party has acquired real importance not because it is truly the "supreme organ" but because its secretary who lacks Stalin's personality decided that it would serve his best interests to represent it as such. The confusion which prevails these days in most of the free nations of the world gives the Reds ample opportunity to play their deadly game of chess. Chess is as much a national pastime in the U. S. S. R. as baseball is in America or cricket in England. Khrushchev is said to be a skillful player. "N^Hiether this is true, this reporter does not know. But it is only too obvious that he is a master on the interna- tional board. He has made no mistakes so far, and it would be tragic for our future if we did not realize that under present world condi- tions it might be possible for him to make a move which may check- mate us. We recognize the military strength of the U. S. S. B. as formidable. However, the allies which the Red imperialists have in all parts of the free world are as important pawns on the international chess board as the Soviet armed might. 20 THE GREAT PRETENSE 21 The open Communists preach pnblicly the themes they receive directly from Moscow: "Peace, coexistence, colonialism, rotten mo- nopolism, etc." Anyone who takes the trouble to read the Daily Worker will see the reflection of Moscow's propaganda throughout that newspaper. The "dormant Communists," the tools of the political and military secret services of the Soviet Union, gather vital information in all the fields of our activities. At the same time, they are instrumental in the policy of subversion, which is one of the main weapons used by the Muscovites and their associates. The cases involving Hiss, "Wliite, Maclean and Burgess, and Ponte- corvo have lifted only a tiny corner of the veil covering Moscow's sinister activities. They were spectacular because the men involved held highly responsible positions. It is difficult to say how many more "cells" may exist here and particularly in France and Italy, where the Communists have been in office since soon after the war and were thus able to pack the various ministries and sensitive services with their own stooges. How important is the infiltration of the "dormant Com- munists"' in schools, places of worship of all denominations, and among those afflicted with intellectual indigestion only the future will tell. Members of the House and Senate who attempt to bring the hard facts to the surface are clobbered as enemies of freedom of expression who want to bury the Bill of Rights in congressional investigations. Comrade Khrushchev counts on allies inside America, and even more in other free countries, as much as on his armed forces to achieve the goals set out by Lenin even in the early clays when it looked as if bolshevism would be only a passing phase in the history of the world. Any impression that the U. S. S. R. is headed for serious domestic troubles is minimized by those long trained to follow and interpret Kremlin mo"ves and intrigues. These observers in Washington say that Khrushchev had to push his predecessor off his pedestal in order to establish himself as the real leader in the minds of the 200 million Russians. Khrushchev would not have dared, according to the consensus of offi- cial observers, to move to discredit Stalin unless he had the 100 percent backing of Marshal Georgi Zhukov, who was recently elevated to the Politburo and holds the armed forces in his grip. Zhukov hates Stalin and his memory because soon after the war, the Red dictator, fearing the marshal's popularity, detailed him to minor commands amounting to practical exile, first in the Ukraine and later in the heart of Russia. The deflation of Stalin has also an international political connota- tion. There is no doubt in anybody's mind that the present directorate in the Kremlin, of which Khrushchev is the sparkplug, wants to create the impression that the leopard has changed its spots. AVliile the ultimate Soviet objectives have not changed, the tactics of the directorate are such as to convey the impression to the free world that the period of aggressiveness is over and that henceforth Russia Avants to consolidate its present boundaries and improve its internal position. To make this strategy convincing, it was essential to show the ruthless mistakes of the previous regime led by Stalin and seconded by Beria. The Soviet shift is particularly important insofar as the peoples of the Middle East are concerned. The Soviet press and Soviet diplo- 22 THE GREAT PRETENSE mats at Ankara, for instance, miss no opportunity to tell the Turks that the frictions of the past were caused only by the two megalo- maniacs, Stalin and Beria, and their henchmen. Khrushchev is cer- tainly more wily than Stalin. He gives the impression of a good- humored grandpa. He realizes that his people can easily be convinced that a leader such as Stalin can become overnight a good-for-nothing so and so. This was fully demonstrated in the downfall of the Czar in 1917. For more than 700 years the Russian people never questioned the divine rights of the emperors, regardless of how good or bad they were. The czars were not only autocratic sovereigns but also headed the Russian Orthodox Church. As such they commanded not only respect but the veneration of the people, who until the revolution were devout Christians. Yet the atheistic Bolsheviks had no serious trouble in destroying both the temporal and spiritual power of those who had ruled for 700 years, and Lenin and his successor Stalin took over. Khrushchev decided that if it was relatively easy to do away with the former rulers of Russia who had enjoyed the subservience and loyalty of their people for centuries, there should not be any trouble in doing away wnth the Stalin myth. The Red dictator was feared but not loved by the people. The troubles reported to have occurred in the Caucasus are not taken seriously by qualified Washington observers. The Georgians, like all mountaineers, are strongly individualistic. Their language and script are even different from Russian. During the empire the actual authority of the governor general sent from St. Petersburg seldom extended much farther than the cities of Batum, Tiflis, and others. The Czarist troops never ventured too far in the mountain fastnesses where local chieftains ruled their various tribes. After the 1917 revolution Georgia became a sovereign republic for about 3 years until it was conquered by a Red army sent from Moscow. But the Red armies, like those of the czars, did not extend their domi- nation over the mountain tribes. Stalin, Beria, and other powerful men in the Kremlin were native Georgians. They took care of their followers in the cities. It is probable that these hangerson who must now get off the gravy train are causing some disturbances, not so much because the dead leaders are being vilified as because their own positions are menaced. Rebellions in a police state are not likely to be successful. Pistols and machineguns are of no avail against tanks and planes. So long as the army headed by Zhukov remains solidly behind Khrushchev there is no reason to hope that there will be any dramatic changes in theU.S.S.R. FIRST OF THE OLIGARCHS By Harry Schwartz Harry Schwartz is Soviet affairs specialist for the New York Times. Dr, Schwartz graduated from Columbia University and later received master of arts and doctor of philosophy degrees there. During the war he was employed by the State Department as a research expert on Soviet economics and then was assigned to the Soviet Economic Intel- ligence Branch of the Office of Strategic Services. Dr. Schwartz taught economics at the University of Syracuse from 1946 to 1950 and, in 1951, joined the staff of the New York Times, for which he had been writing since 1947. He is the author of numerous books, including the classic on the subject, Russia's Soviet Economy. To obtain a proper perspective on tlie current situation in the Soviet Union let us begin by considering briefly the immediate background of the 20th Congress. This includes at least these elements: 1. The enormous political victories gained by the Soviet bloc this past year in Asia and the Middle East. As a result the congress opened at a time when Communist influence in the world was greater than ever before in history. American foreign policy, in failing to prevent these victories, has shown itself lacking in the bold imagina- tiveness and flexibility whose use by Moscow have made possible the Communist gains. We overlook this situation at our dire peril. 2. The rapid progress in heavy industry and armaments produc- tion, and to a much lesser extent in raising living standards, through- out the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc generally. Communist economic and military power are today at historic peaks, and in some respects Soviet military output — as in jet plane production — appear to be not only quantitatively but also qualitatively ahead of the free world. Here again is another explanation of the note of supreme confidence which marked the 20th congress. 3. Within the Soviet Union, the 3 years between Stalin's death had been marked by a new stabilization of the struggle for power, with Nikita S. Khrushchev emerging as first of the oligarchs. More- over the beginnings had been made for the overthrow of the Stalin myth which has been the most publicized — though it is not necessarily the most important — development of the congress. Turning to the significance of the congress itself, we may say that it presents us with great dangers but also with great opportunities. If we fail to plan our policy to take account of these dangers, the free world faces certain defeat in the years not too far ahead. If we properly take advantage of the opportunities, we may yet secure a world in which our children and our grandchildren can live in peace and safety for many years to come. The dangers posed by the 20th congress decisions arise from the following : 1. World communism is now embarked upon the most skillful and seductive foreign policy in its history. It appears to the world wear- ing a mask of friendship, benevolence, and love of peace as never 23 24 THE GREAT THETENSE before. It stretches out the hand of friendship to Socialists, ignoring the past Communist attacks upon and murders of Socialists. It ap- peals to every element and every country that can possibly be induced to turn against the United States. The ultimate objective is clearly to isolate the United States politically, break up our alliances and friendships with foreign peoples, and cut off the vital sources of foreign raw materials upon which so much of our industrial might is dependent. It is clear that our present foreign policy is dangerously lacking in the elements needecl to meet this type of political courtship, in- filtration, and seduction. The bitter defeats we have suffered this past year teach us we must radically reform our foreign policy so that it can adequately counter this campaign of the Communist world. We can no longer afford having much of the world view us as a Nation which talks onh'- about armaments and the "brink" of war while Moscow talks of peace, economic aid, friendship, and the like. The help of the Congress will be needed for such a changeover for what is needed are greater and more effective economic and technological aid to underdeveloped countries, radical lowering of the immigration and entrance bars set up by this country which give the Communists material for charging us with having an iron curtain, and similar measures requiring congressional approval. 2. The rapid development of the heavy industrial strength of the Communist world, and particularly of the Soviet Union, is intended by the 20th congress to continue at full speed. Within a historically short time, perhaps in 20 years, the Soviet Union expects to pass the United States in total volume of industrial production, while it ex- pects the Communist bloc as a whole to exceed our output much sooner. The past Communist progress makes it dangerous to assume these objectives will not be achieved. Communism has yet to prove that it can give people a decent standard of living or freedom, but it has al- ready proved abundantly that it can increase the output of steel, electricity, guns, atomic bombs, and the like. Under these conditions, it is clear that any serious depression or re- cession in the United States or the free world could have dire con- sequences. At the same time, however, the Communist increase in heavy industry is so rapid that we must look again at what new, rich areas of the free world can be built up to augment our strength so that we can remain industrially stronger than the Communist world. Countries like Brazil, Canada, India, and the like come to mind. The great opportunities opened uj) before us arise from these cir- cumstances : 1. The Soviet leaders have been forced to reveal the truth about Stalin's bloody crimes, though not yet the whole truth. Khrushchev and company cannot escape the verdict of history for their own re- sponsibility as Stalin's closest coconspirators. A new wave of shock, reexamination, and self-questioning has been set up throughout the Communist world. What will come out of this period of shock can- not be foretold, but our national policy must be planned so as to help direct the course of this reexamination so that its results weaken Com- munist oppression. A stupid policy on our part, and there has al- ready been at least one major stupidity, could backfire and result in the revelation of the Stalin horrors strengthening, not weakening, world communism. THE GREAT PRETENSE 25 2. Moscow has challenged us to a competition in helping the poorer nations of the world, in raising standards of living, in extending international cooperation and friendship. Let us accept this chal- lenge. We have the wealth, the history of raising living standards, and the tradition of freedom required. But to do this we must not be afraid to meet the Communists head on, to expose our system for the most direct and the most widespread possible comparison with the Soviet system. The Soviet rulers dare not tell their people the truth about our prosperity and freedom. We must endeavor in every way to get that message across to the Soviet people so as to expose the venomous Soviet lies of the past and present. For that reason we must encourage, not deter, the widest possible exchange of Americans and Russians, Americans and Eastern Europeans, and the like. Nor must we forget the responsibility which we as the richest Nation on earth owe to the underdeveloped nations to share our know-how, to trade with them on mutually beneficial terms, and the like so that all humanity may enjoy the benefits of modern science and industry. 3. The Soviet Union at the 20th Congress and before posed as the great enemy of colonialism. Here is our opportunity to expose the Soviet Union as the major colonial power on earth today. The riots in Georgia in March testified more to the continuing strength of Georgian national feeling than to love of Stalinist dictatorship. If freedom is good for India and Burma, why is it not good for Uzbekistan and Armenia, for the Ukraine and Latvia, and for all the people whose freedom has been taken from them by the czars or their Communist successors ? No page of Stalin's bloody history is darker than the page which tells of his crimes against the Soviet minorities. We should make sure this is taken into account, without, however, forgetting that the Russian people, too, have been the victims of Communist terror and exploitation. To sum up : The 20th Communist Congress in Moscow will go down into the history of the future as the beginning of the final destruction of the free world, or as the beginning of the restoration of liberty and democratic rule in that great area which has been deprived of it so long. Our policy must face up to past mistakes which could be truly catastrophic if continued in the future. But for that we shall require courage to correct past erroi'S, generosity in helping our broth- ers of every continent, and a renaissance of our own best traditions of freedom. 77722—56 FEAR STALKS RUSSIA'S RULERS By George Scherbatoff George Scherbatoff served with the Russian Imperial Navy for 2'/^ years, first as chief petty officer and later as ensign. In the spring of 1919, at the age of 21, he escaped from Lenin's new Russia and, for the next 8 years, lived in England (where he attended Oxford Univer- sity) and in France. In 1927 he immigrated to the United States. He enlisted in the United States Navy in October 1942 as an ordinary seaman, and was commissioned a lieutenant the following February. He now has the rank of commander, United States Navy Ready Re- serve. Commander Scherbatoff was present at the Yalta Conference in 1945 and later that year was assigned to liaison with Soviet forces at Dairen and Port Arthur. Subsequently, he served as assistant naval adviser to the Secretary of State at the Paris Peace Conference in 1946 and at the Council of Foreign Ministers in New York, 1946-47. Placed on Reserve status in July 1947, he returned to active duty with the Navy in 1951 to serve as the Navy member of the State Depart- ment's Psychological Operations Board. The opening words of Kliruslicliev's spoecli addressed to the 20th congress of the CPSU are significant in that they describe the prob- lems facing the Soviet leaders and Stalin's successors at this time: The period separating us from the 19th party congress — said Khrushchev — is not a very long one — 3 years and 4 months. But on account of the importance of events that happened in that period in our country and beyond its frontiers, this is one of the important periods in the history of the CPSU, in the history of its struggle for the consolidation of the might of our country, for the building of the Communist society and for peace in the whole world * * *. Kruslichev in these few lines outlined the great difficulties confront- ing the Presidium at this time. "On account of events that happened in that period," by that he meant — Stalin's death; Beria's quest for power and removal, which resulted in the Ked Army replacing, tem- porarily, the police apparatus and becoming the No. 1 force within the Soviet Union; and Malenkov's demotion. "Its struggle for the consolidation of the might of our country" — continued Khrushchev, here we see the danger from beyond the Soviet Union: (a) the satel- lite countries, China and southeast Asia, and (h) the free nations. The above-quoted part of Khrushchev's speech gives an indication of possibly the real reason and significance of the 20th congress. In a paper written soon after Malenkov's downfall — February 10, 1955 — ■ this writer indicated that the developments, at that time, in the Soviet Union were dictated by three fears haunting the Soviet leaders: (1) Fear of the free nations and particularly the United States; (2) fear of Red China; and (3) fear of the Soviet Army and the Soviet people. Fear of the free nations and the United States was probably one of the main reasons for Malenkov's demotion. Upon Stalin's death, Malenkov became the key figure in the Soviet hierarchy. It was 26 THE GREAT PRETENSE 27 ISIalenkov who at Stalin's funeral made the customary oration. At that time he stressed the point of peaceful coexistence with other nations as well as the necessity to change the economic policy within the Soviet Union and give more priority to the production of consumer goods and to raising the standard of living of the Soviet population. In touching on domestic problems, he said : Our main task is ceaselessly to sti'ive for further improvement in tlie material welfare of the workers, the collective farmers, the intellijientsia and aU the Soviet people. It is a law for our party and government to Implement the duty of striv- ing for the good of the people for the maximum satisfaction of its material and cultural needs. Thus we see that Malenkov was probably the chief advocate among the Presidium members of a policy aimed at appeasing the free world and particularly the Soviet people. That policy was dictated by the fact that after Stalin's death the Soviet leaders were not sure of the armed forces' and Soviet people's allegiance to the new regime; they needed time to straighten out their personal differences and ambi- tions within the new administration and secure their control over the Soviet Union. This became even more urgent after Beria's down- fall and a temporary disorganization, in the top echelon, of the ex- tremely complicated police apparatus of the Soviet Union. The new administration needed che full support of the armed forces to carry out their plans, and were thus obliged to kow-tow to the military leaders who had never been trusted and were always kept under con- trol and suspicion, both by the party and the police. A few weeks after Stalin's death, Malenkov, with the support of the other members of the Presidium, proceeded to implement his new poli- cies. The Soviet Union's foreign policy took on a more friendly ai:)proach to the free- world countries and advocated the establishment of closer ties both in the political and economic fields. Within the Soviet Union proper a higher priority was given to the manufactur- ing of consumer and household goods. By the same token, heavy industry was relegated to second i^lace. Collective farmers were en- couraged to show more initiative and given more freedom in the agricultural field. By these changes, the Soviet leaders hoped to tem- porarily appease the outside world and their own people and thus buy the necessary breathing spell needed for the reorganization of their administration and the consolidation of their power. Unfortunately for Malenkov. the Ked Chinese leaders, elated over their success at Geneva and in Indochina, were carried away by their newly acquired importance; Chou-en-Lai made provocative state- ments about the United States and Formosa, and the Chinese Reds attacked the Tachens. The United States accepted Eed China's chal- lenge by sending poMerful naval and air units toward the China coast and Formosa. Thus, the Pacific area was suddenly transformed into a potential war theater. In the worried minds of the Presidium members this spelled two things : (a) danger of a war at the wrong time and the wrong place, and (h) the Soviet Union's industrial and political unpreparedness for a ^ya^. It also spelled a failure of the Malenkov policies. The Pre- sidium was then forced temporarily to postpone its policy of "satisfy- ing the material and cultural needs of the people" and once more to give priority to heavy industry and production of war materials. 28 THE GREAT PRETENSE More tlian ever tlie Soviet leaders needed an army wliicli could be counted upon to fij^ht for the Soviet Government and defend Com- munist interests. Tlie memory of tlie "Great Surrender" at the begin- ning of World War II, in the last months of 1941, was only too vivid in their minds, when nearly 5 million military men and guerrilla forces surrendered to the Germans. The Soviet leaders were fearful lest the same catastrophe might repeat itself. After the Kremlin bosses had carefully appraised the situation, it became evident that drastic changes were imperative even at the sacri- fice of temporarily postponing the appeasement of the people and particularly the agricultural segment of the population. Thus, Ma- lenkov was replaced by a man supposedly representing the armed forces. At this point the Soviet leaders were forced to compromise. They did not dare give that high position to a regular army man and national hero; they needed both a trusted party and a quasi-military man. Marshal Bulganin became their choice for the top post in the Soviet Union, and, in effect, Khrushchev became his nominal deputy. As a gesture to the people, and in order to obtain the Ked army sup- port. Marshal Zhukov, a national hero, was given the highest military job in the country. With these changes accomplished, the Communist leaders were con- fronted with a complex and herculean job : (1) They had to continue their policy of spreading communism primarily in Asia and then throughout the world ; (2) They had to reaffirm their control over all their satellite coun- tries, including China, and have them coordinate their actions with Moscow ; (3) With the support of the Soviet army, the people had to be kept appeased until such time as another police force and apparatus could be rebuilt by the party — strong enougli to keep the people and i)ossibly the armed forces under control ; and, finally (4) They had to settle their personal differences and establish a unified Presidium (Politburo). The Soviet rulers proceeded to lay .the groundwork for implement- ing the above program by first tackling the problem of appeasing the free world and removing the immediate danger of war. The "Summit Conference" at Geneva, invitations freely issued by Khrushchev to visit the Soviet Union, statements to the effect that a new era has been initiated behind the Iron Curtain, and numerous other actions and statements were all aimed at appeasing and lulling the free world away from a hot war. On the other hand, the spreading of communism had to continue for the following reason : In a report made in 1951, this writer described the Soviet regime and its leaders, the Politburo, as an expression of a political pseudo-religion, whicli works for the realization of a Avorld society tlirougli the establishment of one social group — world pro- letariat. But the proletariat, continued the report, is identified Avith the Communist — Bolshevik Party, which in turn is ruled and guided by the Soviet leaders (the Politburo or present Presidium) who alone knows where mankind is going and whose belief in its infallibility and righteousness is combined with extraordinary flexibility. It is a regime which is forced by its own teachings and beliefs to extend its rule over all peoples ancl nations. The conflict between the Com- munist-Bolshevik bloc and the free world is not so much a contest THE GREAT PRETENSE 29 for territory as a contest for men's minds. The Soviet leaders would prefer to take over every new nation or state from within by subver- sion or revolution. Furthermore, they cannot accept a "compromise" concerning any territory that does not guarantee: (a) its right to continue Communist-Bolshevism; (h) subversion everywhere; and (c) the possibility, at a more favorable moment, of successfully wag- ing war (local) in order to incorporate more people under its power. The free world, on the other hand, can accept a compromise only if it is accompanied by reliable "guaranties." But the Communist-Bolshe- vik bloc cannot give sucli guaranties without sacrificing its essential nature. The above is one of the underlying principles of the Communist- Bolshevik strategy. Thus within the recent months, the Soviet lead- ers openly reaffirmed its historic policy that communism has to and will conquer the world. "Within the last few months we witness the Soviet leaders traveling far and wide through the Eastern European and Asiatic countries, making extravagant otters and promises, and carrying out an extensive anti-free world propaganda, at which they are past masters. It should be mentioned at this time that the Soviet Union, as a dictator- ship, can provide the Soviet leaders with vaster economic and financial means to support their Communist propaganda vis-a-vis those coun- tries tottering on the edge of communism, than the free nations. The latter, because of their democratic structure have to take under con- sideration — the needs of their ovrn population, congressional or parlia- mentary agreement and legislation, and careful balancing of their economic system, prior to providing or subsidizing any other nation with such support which would tend to counterbalance the Commu- nist propaganda. The Soviet leaders, by exercising a complete and ruthless control over their peoples, can carry out promises to other nations which, at times, miglit be even detrimental to the well-being of their own population, but would serve to strengthen their own posi- tion abroad and that of the Communist Party. In order to reaffirm their control over the satellites we witness Khrushchev and other members of the Presidium proclaiming the slogans that communism within the Soviet Union is an accomplished fact ; that it is an established force supported by Soviet war produc- tion, scientific developments and war machine, whose program cannot be arrested and will eventually outstrip the free nations. Then we come to the last obstacle confronting the Soviet leaders — ■ their own armed forces and the Soviet people. This, in this writer's opinion, is the principle and underlying reason for the pronounce- nients made at the 20th congress and again quite recently at a closed session of nearly a thousand party leaders, when Stalin was so strongly denounced. We must remember that the Soviet population was al- ways predominantly agricultural and even now nearly 48 percent of the population consists of collective farmers and agricultural work- ers; also, many factory workers only quite recently had lived on the land and still have close ties with it. For nearly 40 years, the farm- ers and agricultural workers have lived on promises that have never materialized, starting with the original slogan of the Bolshevik Party in 1917 of "all land to the peasants." They can never forget the ruth- less measures used by Stalin in the 30's to"^ force the farmers into col- lective farms and slave labor. The oppressive surveillance by the 30 THE GREAT PRETENSE brutal and all-powerful Soviet political police is still fresh in tlieir memories. Finally, as mentioned above, hardly a year ago the new Malenkov policy of "satisfying the material and cultural needs of peo- ple" had been once more reversed in favor of heavy industry and war material production. We must also realize that the armed forces are the people ; they come from the population of the Soviet Union. Even when they don the Eed Army uniform, they cannot forget all the broken promises of the last 39 years. In 1941, when the Germans attackecl the Soviet Union, millions of Russians, both military and civilian, saw in the foreign invaders liberators from their native oppressors. It was only when the Germans began to reveal their ob- jective of enslaving the people of Russia, that the Soviet military ceased to surrender. The army and the people felt they had no altern- ative but to fight for tlieir homeland. This upsurge of patriotism was praised and exploited by Stalin. After the war was over and the Soviet regime saved, the Red Army and the Russian people were once more doubled-crossed. After Stalin's death and in the struggle for his succession, the Soviet leaders were compelled to call upon the army to eliminate Beria. Thus the Red Army leaders found themselves dragged into the present struggle for power. Quite recent rumors and information leaking out of the Soviet Union stress the fact that some important functions of the Soviet secret police have been transferred to the Soviet Army or abolished, such as the recent curtailment of the special MVD troops, the abolishment of the special three-man boards (Troikas), which could sentence a Soviet citizen to forced labor without a hear- ing, etc. This is an indication of a struggle between the Soviet lead- ers and the military, the first trying to rebuild another Beria-type police organization, the second fighting against it with the realization that such a force could be used by the party to keep the military and the people under control. In considering the above facts, it is evident that the Soviet leaders are confronted with a great problem within the Soviet Union proper. They need the emphasis on the heavy industry and war material production for furthering of Communist objectives and they also need the support of their armed forces and the Soviet people. They fully realize that the changes made after Malenkov's demotion once more disillusioned their population. They feel that the Soviet people have not forgotten the only too recent horrors of the Stalin regime. Thus at this time they have to reassure the people that Stalin's regime is of the past and that dictatorship is out ; that a new era is in the making within tlie Soviet Union and that if the Soviet people are denied the right to take advantage of these changes at this time the free nations should be blamed; that it is their policy of curtailing any progress made by the Soviet Union and supi:)orted, if necessary, by another war that is resi)onsible for the hardships inflicted upon the Soviet people. The Soviet leaders need the full support of the Red army and its leaders, the only force at this time which can be depended upon to protect them and their interests in case of an emergency arising either outside or within the Soviet Union. To that end the Soviet military are showered with privileges not accorded to others and are also fed a powerful propaganda about the warmongering and capitalistic ambitions of the free nations and in particular of the United States. THE GRFAT PRETENSE 31 These are, in this writer's opinion, the predominant reasons for the pronouncements made at the 20th Congress of the CPSU and more recently at the secret meeting of the party leaders. In conclusion it should be emphasized that, although the tactics and methods might have changed, the objectives are still the same, as far as the Soviet leaders and the Communist-Bolshevik Party are concerned. In achieving these objectives, war itself is definitely not ruled out but more subtle methods are being employed. The struggle between the free and the Communist worlds has now moved away from preoccupation with military forces and has become a global contest essentially of political, economic, and psychological forces. During the last war this writer, as an officer in the United States Navy, had ample opportunities of discussing these problems with the Soviet military of all ranks, both outside of Kussia and several times in the country itself — such as in Murmansk in the spring of 1944 dur- ing the transfer of the U. S. S. Milwaukee to the Soviet Navy and later at Yalta during the 1945 conference, when the Soviet Govern- ment for the first time lifted the Iron Curtain and allowed the crews of United States ships anchored in Sevastopol and Yalta, numbering about 1,500 men, to mix freely with their military personnel in those jDorts. At all times the Russians expressed a sincere desire for the establishment of friendly ties with the United States and emphasized their unwillingness to fight another war unless forced to protect their homeland. The above would tend to prove that we in the United States are given at this time a great opportunity to persuade both the Soviet people and their armed forces that it is the Communist leaders and their Communist objectives that are responsible for the conditions existing in Soviet Eussia and in the world today. As far as the free nations are concerned, efi^ective disarmament could be accomplished and international tensions would diminish if the Government of the Soviet Union would give convincing proof of its desire to live in peace with other nations. THE LURE OF PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE By Anthony T. Bouscaren Anthony T. Bouscaren holds degrees from Yale University and the University of California. He is director of the political science department of Marquette University and has taught at the University of San Francisco and Loyola University. His work has won him the Christopher award, the Freedom Foundation citation, and the Daugh- ters of American Revolution award. Among his books are A Guide to Anti-Communist Action, Imperial Communism, and America Faces World Communism. In addition, he has contributed to a wide range of publications, including the Journal of Politics, the Western Political Quarterly, the American Mercury, and the Freeman. A veteran of the United States Marine Corps in World War II, he received two Distin- guished Flying Crosses. He is now a major in the Marine Corps Reserve. The leaders of the Soviet Union have laimched a new tactical ma- neuver which is fraught with dangers for the United States. As a result of the February 1956, meeting of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the forces of international communism have adopted new tactics to accomplish three objectives: (1) Appeasement of dis- content within the Soviet sphere; (2) extension of neutralism abroad through a united front with socialism; (3) weaken and discredit anti- Communists within the United States. Communist leaders hope to convince non-Communists that "peace- ful coexistence" is possible, and not only that, desirable. Soviet dic- tator, Nikita S. Khrushchev, told the 20th congress that "war may not be inevitable." By this he meant that "peaceful coexistence" is pos- sible if the United States does not resist future Soviet aggi-ession and Communist subversion. In other words, we can have coexistence by making the same kind of concessions that were made at Munich, Yalta, Potsdam, Panmunjom, and Geneva. Unfortunately, wishful thinkers and advocates of peace-at-any-price misconstrued Khrushchev's remarks to mean that tlie forces of inter- national communism had abandoned Stalin's doctrine of force and violence against non-Communist states. Nothing could be farther from the truth. On February 14, 1956, dictator Khrushchev told the 20tli congress in Moscow : "It is true that we recognize the necessity for the revolutionary transformation of capitalist society into Socialist society. This is what distinguishes revolutionary Marxists from re- formists and opportunists. There is not a shadow of a doubt that for a number of capitalist countries the overthrow of the bourgeois dictatorship by force and the connected sharp aggravation of the class struggle is inevitable." Khrushchev went on to point out that Communist conquests of countries like France and Italy might be accomplished peacefully through the formation of popular fronts with the Socialists. This has particular relevance to Italy, where most Socialists have already placed themselves at the disposal of the Italian Communist Party. 32 THE GREAT PRETENSE 66 Insofar as Soviet foreijo;!! policy is concerned the general approach of the 20th congress doctrine is to appear to be more conciliatory, and to encourage non-Communist states to make concessions in the name of "peace." In this way, the Communists hope to gain control of the Chinese Nationalist islands of Quemoy and Matsu, obtain diplo- matic recognition for Communist China, extend Nehru-style neutral- ism throughout all Asia, neutralize Germany through promises of unity, exploit Middle East tensions by inciting both sides, and gain respectability and prestige by visits to Western countries on the pattern of the INIalenkov-Khrushchev-Bulganin visits to Great Britain. It is likely that the U. S. S. R. will suggest such a visit to the United States in the not too distant future. This together with the recent visits of Soviet farm and cultural delegations to the United States serves to strengthen the Soviets not only from the point of view of prestige in foreign policy, but from the point of view of strengthening their position at home. When the peoples behind the Iron Curtain realize that the United States is less and less interested in their plight, and more and more interested in fraternizing with their dictators, they tend to lose hope. With reference to the United States, the Soviet objective is to smear leading anti-Communists, discredit the loyalty-security pro- gram, dismantle the framework of anti-Communist legislation, and demand an end to further nuclear weapons tests. In many instances, the "spirit of Geneva" is being utilized as the basis for these cam- paigns. At the end of January 1956, Eugene Dennis, executive sec- retary of the Communist Party of the United States, delivered an important address in Carnegie Hall in New York which may easily have been inspired by advance notice of what was going to happen at the 20th congress of the U. S. S. R. In this address Mr. Dennis called for a united front between Communists and "liberals" to fight for "peace," end "fear and hysteria," and restore "civil liberties." Actually the Geneva "summit" conference of July 1955, seems to have laid the groundwork for the 20th congress meeting. A number of examples come to mind of how the American Communists have suc- ceeded in encouraging prominent non-Communists to join them or to promote their objectives since Geneva. At the end of 1955 several hundred prominen.t Americans signed a Communist-inspired petition to the Supreme Court urging that it declare unconstitutional the Internal Security Act of 1950. The Christmas amnesty appeal for jailed Communists was signed by many well-known non-Communists. A United States Senator, a governor, and a prominent writer were among a score of distinguished Americans who sent greetings to the recent convention of the National Lawyers' Guild in Detroit. The NLG has been cited as a Communist-controlled organization. Prominent scientists have signed Communist-inspired petitions demanding that nuclear weapons tests be ended; several leading intellectuals have praised a book by John Wexley defending the Rosenberg atomic spies. This books was published by Cameron & Kahn who also published the Matusow book. Well-known intellec- tuals have subscribed to the Communist thesis that the FBI should be deprived of its informants within the Communist Party and that fear and hysteria have characterized the loyalty-security program. Many of these intellectuals wish to abolish the entire program. The willingness of several jprominent universities to invite Communist 34 THE GREAT PRETENSE speakers sucli as Joseph Clark and ITerljert Aptlieker to speak on the campus is, according to the Daily Worker, another example of how the "forces of peace" and the "forces for civil liberties" are gaining ground in the new era since Geneva. One of the most interesting aspects of the 20th congress meeting was Dictator Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin. It appears that the new "soft" Soviet line would be facilitated by this attack on Stalin and Stalin's policies. Already many Americans are concluding that with the advent of Khrushchev and the departure of Stalin, terror has ended in the Soviet Union and dictatorship is being modified. Act- ually there has been no basic change inside the Soviet Union. The slave-labor camps, the emphasis on heavy industry and the military, and the entire apparatus of terror remains intact. There is some evidence that hunger and discontent at home prompted Khrushchev to denounce Stalin. If Khrushchev can con- vince the peoples of the U. S. S. R. that their unhappy plight is due to Stalinism, he may be able to appease them for the time being. It is also conceivable that Khrushchev is preparing a purge of his politi- cal enemies by associating them with Stalin. This purge of pro- Stalinites is even more likely to occur outside the Soviet Union. Kecent issues of the Daily Worker for example contain somewhat con- flicting interpretations of Stalin's status by editor Alan Max. chair- man William Z. Foster, and Josepli Clark, Various letters to the editor also indicate a certain amount of confusion among the party faithful about future attitudes. It is even conceivable that a shakeup in party leadership may occur in 105G in somewhat the same fashion that it did in 1945 when Earl Browder was replaced as party chairman by William Z. Foster. What can the United States do to frustrate the objectives of the international Communist movement as outlined at the 20th congress of the Communist Party of the U. S. S. K. ? Our Government should make it very clear to the American people and to freedom-loving peoples throughout the world that there is no btisic change in Soviet policies. The Soviets want us to lower our guard and distract our attention to side issues. This is precisely the time to step up anti- Communist efforts both at home and abroad. This means more vig- orous prosecution of anti-Communist legislation, stepped-up exposure of Communist activities by congressional committees, and published warnings by governmental officials of the dangers inherent in the new Communist tactics of the united front. There must be no re]:)iti- tion of Communist penetration of American society such as took place in the 1930's. In this respect, the current activities by the United States Government against the Daily Worker and Communist Party headquarters throughout the United States are a step in the right direction. New legislation should be enacted providing a 15-year jail sentence and a $10,000 fine for those convicted of advocating the violent overthrow of the United States Government or belonging to an organization so advocating. Use of mechanical devices in Federal cases involving security should also be acted upon. The United States should x>fiss to the offensive in the anti-Communist effort at home. In the realm of foreign policy, the United States has a unique op- portunity to pass on to the offensive, in order to take advantage of the weaknesses within the U. S. S. R., and the confusions in Marxist THE GREAT PRETENSE 35 ranks throughout the worhl. Plans must be readied to give maxhnum assistance to revolts on the East German pattern. The long-neglected Sarnoff plan for "cold warfare" against communism should be carried out. Trade between nations of the free world and the Communist bloc which might in any way strengthen communism should cease. The 200 items declassified in 1954 at the insistence of France and Bri- tain should be restored to the list of nontradeable goods. Fraterniza- tion with Soviet diplomats and officials should be kept to an absolute minimum. We must not permit ourselves to be maneuvered into another Big Power conference where the basis for success is the parti- tion of a small country and the establishment of a "neutral" nations commission, as happened at Panmunjom and Geneva. We should make clear our support of Free China, including the offshore islands, and overseas Chinese harassed in such areas as Singapore and In- donesia. This support of Free China must logically involve an American willingness to defend Nationalist China diplomatically, especially in the U. N., and to use every weapon to prevent admittance of Communist China into that organization. We must also make clear our support of the Republic of Korea, and consider appropriate sanctions against those who persistently violate the Panmunjom agree- ment. Support of freedom in Asia includes also such anti-Com- munist governments as South Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, the Philip- pines, and Pakistan. Our aid programs in Asia should take into con- sideration the consistently pro-Chinese Communist positions of states like India, Burma, and Indonesia. In Europe we should resolutely push forward in the integration of German armed forces with exist- ing NATO forces. Where possible, we should disassociate ourselves from colonial regimes in the Mediterranean area, to prevent Com- munists from being confused with bona fide nationalists. Our foreign-policy theme must be liberation from Communist tyranny, and opposition to a world half slave and half free. If the peoples behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains know for a certainty that we stand on their side, without compromise, the forces which caused Khrushchev to denounce Stalin will grow, and revolts on the East German pattern will become a possibility. And this time we must be prepared to act. THE NEW PATTERN OF POWER By Leon Dennen Leon Dennen is familiar to a wide audience as foreign correspondent for the Newspaper Enterprises Association. Born in New York City, he was educated in the United States and in Russia. Mr. Dennen is the author of several books on Soviet affairs and has contributed to numerous magazines in the United States and abroad. Moscow's widely publicized campaign against Stalin's ghost has, for the present at least, completely overshadowed the Kremlin's revival of militant leninism as a world Communist faith. Yet in their "abandoning" Stalinism and by reviving the ''pure" cult of Lenin the new Soviet rulers — who for more than three decades served as Stalin's willing tools and executioners — are making communism even more formidable as a global antidemocratic force. The tragic truth is that the latest strategic shift in Soviet policy confronts the free world with problems more fearsome than before. No Communist doubletalk, hoAveA-er subtly disguised or sugar-coated, can obscure the fact that the Soviet Union is a dictatorship dynami- cally engaged in a totalitarian process of expansion. The real- politik of communism — whether Leninist, Stalinist, or of the so- called Khrushchev variety — is based on a total disregard of Western moral concepts. The Communist ideologists regard human decency and the free world's ethical criteria as superfluous ballast — little more than a "capitalist" myth. They believe that "capitalism" — "Western civilization with all its political, economic, religious, and cultural institutions — is doomed to perish. And they are convinced of the ultimate triumph of the Communist dictatorship throughout the world. As a correspondent for the NEA, T recently visited some of the world's trouble spots where Soviet agents are now feverishly expand- ing their activities on behalf of the Kremlin. The gains they have made since Stalin's death in 1953, especially since the Geneva "summit" conference, seemed incredible. This I found to be particularly true of the Middle East where Red subversion, like the all-devouring Biblical plague, now haunts the strife-torn Arab world. Egypt and especially Syria, Israel's neighbors, are virtually in Moscow's grip. From Cairo to Damascus the Kremlin's agents and fifth columns, who thrive on chaos and confusion, seek to intensify disorder and revolt in an area rich in oil resources and strategically important to the defense of the West. Thus, while Nikita S. Krushchev, first secretary of the Russian Communist Party, Premier Nikolai Bulganin and their henchmen in Europe and the United States preach "coexistence" in the West, they feverishly prepare for new Korea-style explosions in the Middle East. Wliy, then, are Stalin's former henchmen so anxious to dissociate themselves from the dead tyrant while relentlessly pursuing his poli- 36 THE GREAT PRETENSE 37 cies? To anyone who has followed the tortuous twists and turns of Soviet policy since the Bolsheviks seized power in Kussia in 1917, the answer seems obvious : 1. Stalin's uneasy successors seek to avoid responsibility for their own crimes aoainst the people of Eussia and the satellite countries by placing all the blame on the dead dictator. 2. By denouncing — in words but not in deeds — Stalin's aggressive and treacherous policies, the new Kremlin rulers hope to win on this side of the Iron Curtain a new aura of respectability and a new con- fidence, esjoecially among the intellectuals and leftist groups of Europe and among the rabid nationalists of Asia and Africa. In evaluating the Kremlin's "new" line one important fact must thus be kept in mind : Krushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan are not de- nouncing Stalin because they have suddenly become devotees of human decency, truth, or justice. The contrary is true. By de- throning Stalin and enthroning Lenin again the Soviet leaders hope, as a matter of fact, to make communism more palatable to gullible millions at home and abroad. Here is what Khrushchev, Stalin's successor, said in his speech to the recent 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Part}' — the con- gress that ostensibly dethroned Stalinism and enthroned Leninism: We believe that after seeing for themselves the advantages that communism holds out, all working men and vi-omen on earth will sooner or later take the road of the struggle to build a Socialist society. As in the case of Hitler's Mein Kampf or Stalin's Problems of Leninism, a careful study of Khrushchev's speech would soon reveal the true aims and plans of the new Kremlin oligarchs. Indeed, the new boss of world communism made it clear beyond the shadow of a doubt that the destruction of western civilization and Communist mastery of the world are the final goals of Leninism. "World imperialism," Lenin once said, "cannot live side by side with a victorious Soviet Union." This dictum of the father of Bolshevism has been the guiding principle of the Soviet rulers — from Stalin to Khrushchev — for close to four decades. And by "world imperialism" Lenin, of course, meant non-Communist western society. While, however, declaring a permanent war against the free world, the Communist rulers and their stooges in the United States and else- where have also proclaimed themselves as the outstanding champions of peace. Their propaganda seeks to identify the Soviet Union and its satellite parties with peace in the minds of the peoples of the world. Yvlien it suits Soviet foreign policy they even speak of the "peaceful coexistence"' of communism and capitalism. The reason for this de- ception is not far to seek : peace as merely a slogan and peace as a goal of policy are entirely difl'erent concepts.' To Communists peace is but a phase of the constant conflict which they are waging v.'ith the non- Communist world. As outlined by Khrushchev in his speech at the 20th congress, Soviet policy and strategy in the coming months can be fairly accurately described as : 1. An intensive Communist drive in the Middle East and in the so-called colonial countries of Asia and Africa. This means that while Moscow, with the help of Red China, expands eastward the situation will be frozen in the West, and little will be done to unite Germany. 38 THE GREAT PRETENSE 2. Priority for Soviet Enssia's heavy intlustry at the expense of consvimer goods. This will substantially increase the Communist bloc's war potential and at the same time enable Moscow to extend an economic and political stranolehold on Ked China, India, Indochina, North Korea, Egypt, and other Asian, middle eastern, and Latin American countries. 3. The creation of a new international organization which, however loosely formed, will remain firmly under Soviet control. This new organization will be broad enough to embrace Yugoslavia's Marshal Tito, Egypt's Premier Abdul Gamal Nasser, Prime Minister Nehru of India, and some of the pro-Soviet Socialist and nationalist pai ties of Europe, Asia, and Africa. This, in brief, I believe, will be Moscow's program in the coming months. I am not suggesting, of course, that the situation behind the Iron Curtain has remained frozen since Stalin's death. To millions who have suffered from the tyrant's purges, from the bloody collecti- vization campaign, and the like, Stalin's disappearance has given new hope. Everywhere in the Red world humanity is beginning to stir, and it is for the free world to give the people of Russia and the satel- lite countries a helping hand in their effort to free themselves of the yoke of dictatorship. A clear distinction must be made between the people and their oppressors. But whether the Kremlin rulers will find it expedient to continue their denunciations of Stalin — whether they adopt a "soft" or "hard" policy toward the free world — one thing is clear : We shall be building our world on quagmires if we build it on ignorance of Soviet realit3\ We might be plunged into a nuclear war if we do not understand the Soviet rulers and their satellites in the United States and throughout the world. AVe shall certainly lose the cold war if we continue to gaze upon Stalin's uneasy successors through rose-colored glasses, ignoring the economic and spiritual contradic- tions between Soviet totalitarianism and western democracy. NO CHANGE IN SIGHT IN RUSSIA By William Henry Chamberiin William Henry Chamberiin, author and lecturer, has been associated with the Wall Street Journal, the New Leader, the New York Herald Tribune, and the Christian Science Monitor, for which he was Moscow correspondent and later chief Far Eastern correspondent. He graduated from Haverford College and is a member of the Academy of Political Science. Among his books are Soviet Russia, The Russian Revolution, The Russian Enigma: an Interpretation, and The European Cockpit. The campaign against Stalin's political memory launched by Sta- lin's political heirs is probably the most important development in Eiissia since Stalin's death 3 years ago. It is certain to have big repercussions, both in the Soviet Union and abroad. By a process of ironic retribution the dead Stalin is now being given the same treatment that he meted out to so many of his victims. He is being cast in the role of scapegoat, in the hope of whitewashing and strengthening the regime of the group that has taken over his power. Every indictment of Stalin's arbitrariness, of his "cult of personality," eveiy revelation of his acts of cruelty and oppression is designed as an assurance to the Soviet people that their sutferings were due to one man, that things will be better and easier in the future. There are indications that there are differences of opinion among the new Soviet rulers about how fast and how far it is safe to go in the transformation of Stalin from a mortal god into a paranoid tyrant. At the Communist Party congress which took place late in February Nikita Khrushchev, most powerful figure in the new ruling group, in his opening speech referred to Stalin only once, without either praise or blame. But after Trade Minister Mikoyan, in a speech which was with- held from publication for 2 days, openly accused Stalin of specific crimes and blunders, KhrushcheA^ api:)arently went still further in a secret speech to the congress delegates, the main points of which seem to have been deliberately "leaked" to foreign diplomats. Perhaps the future will indicate more clearly whether some internal feuds in the new party leadership were obscurely reflected in the apparent differences about the speed and thoroughness with which the Stalin legend was to be demolished. The influence of the Red Army leader- ship seems to be felt in the debunking of Stalin as the "military gen- ius" who won the war against Hitler and in the exposure in Khrush- chev's private speech of the execution of Tukhachevsky and other marshals of the Red Army as an injustice, based on forged evidence. It is clear that the repudiation of Stalin is being exploited for the ends of Soviet foreign policy. It is distinctly a concession to Tito, who had been excommunicated from the Communist fold by the dead dictator. For neutralists in countries like India and Indonesia, for Socialists in Western Europe who may be susceptible to the appeal 39 4.0 THE GREAT PRETENSE of a united front with tlie Communists the memory of Stalin is a useful sacrificial scapegoat. It would be a grave and dangerous blunder for the United States to accept at face value the criticisms of Stalin as proofs of a new friendlier phase in Soviet foreign policy. What the Soviet leaders say about Stalin is of minor im^Jortance, so long as the fruits of Stalinism are maintained. There has been no change in Russia in such basic Stalinite methods as the forced regimentation of the peasants in collective farms, the denial of such basic human rights as freedom of speech, press, voting, and trade-union organization. Nor is there any apparent willingness on the part of the new Soviet rulers to relinquish their grip on the vast territories in Eastern and Central Europe which Stalin took by force and held in violation of solemn pledges to respect the self- determination of peoples. The example of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic era which followed shows that a "settling down" of a revolutionary regime at home does not necessarily mean a less aggressive and expansionist foreign policy. The United States should stand firmly for the reunion of Germany in freedom and the liberation of the satellite states as advance conditions for any "relaxation of international tension." THE RECENT NEWS FROM MOSCOW By Max Eastman Max Eastman has been an editor of the Reader's Digest since 1941 and has emerged as one of the most penetrating critics of communism and its regimentation of the arts. He studied at Columbia University and later taught there as an assistant in the department of philosophy. Among his books are Artists in Uniform, Leon Trotsky, Marxism — Is It a Science? and Marx and Lenin, the Science of Revolution. In addi- tion, he is the translator of the basic writings of Leon Trotsky, includ- ing The Real Situation in Russia, The History of the Russian Revolu- tion, and The Revolution Betrayed. Lies and terror are the two principal instruments with which the Kremlin's tyranny is maintained. A relaxation of either one is good news to those who care about freedom. And in the recent news from Russia there are signs of a relaxation of both. A decree by the dictators that their subjects need no longer believe some of the lies they have been told about Stalin is far from an open invitation to discuss the truth. But it is a loosening of the bonds, a setting in motion of impulses of integrity and decency, tliat may in the long run prove difficult to hold in check. Even more significant, perhaps, than this new example of truth by decree, is the news that riots against such a party decree were not put down with firearms, nor followed (so far as is now known) by arrests and executions. If the Tiflis rioters carried placards, as we are told, demanding the removal of the present heads of government, that is important news. It refutes very completely the reports of gullible tourists that there is no discontent behind the Iron Curtain, that all is lovey-dovey between the people and their oppressors. It seems probable to me that an increasing discontent among the people was one of the causes of this sudden exhumation of the raw Stalin from the mound of flowery lies under which he lay buried. The "collective leadership" needs a scapegoat. AVlien Stalin needed a scape- goat he shot a few hundred engineers, or poets, or factory managers, or shipped a few hundred thousand "saboteurs*' to die in Siberia. His successors haven't the nerve to do that, being ordinary gangsters and not prodigies of cruelty and fraud. But they don't have to do it. They have a scapegoat right on hand who is already dead. "Don't blame us for your troubles, it's Stalin's fault," was all they had to say. I think they have been intending to say this ever since Stalin died — or, as now seems quite probable, was put to death. There was a risk in it, however, for they had been the agents of Stalin. They carried out his brutish, stupid and, as they now confess, insane behests. I thing one reason they feel bold enough to say it now is that they are sitting pretty in the world conflict. They have a firm hold on the principal land mass of the planet. Our policy of "acquiescence under insult" has convinced them that they are in no military danger. They 41 77722—56 i 42 THE GREAT PKETENSE can take over the rest of the world gradually and by the Trojan-horse method, by weakeninfj our ideological resistance, winning more and more of the so-called liberals to a tolerance of tyranny. The biggest obstacle on this path, the objection most often met by Khrushchev and Bulganin on their parade through foreign countries, was probably the long record of lies and bloody cruelties by means of which, under Stalin, their power had been built up. To dissociate themselves from these horrors, to get clear of their own past, was a first essential step in the new policy of world conquest by winning stupid friends and influencing weak people. The lesson for us in all this, it seems to me, is that we should strengthen and clarify our stand against the tyrants. We should draw the line more sharply than ever between free life and totalitarian party rule, between truth by decree and truth arrived at by open study and discussion, betAveen a regime of "collective leadership," which is another name for gang rule, and any true system of govern- ment, whether democratic or monarchical. We should make plain, as we have not, our solidarity with the discontented people of the Soviet Union and her enslaved satellites. We should abide., as we never have, by Eisenhower's promise to "use every political, every economic, every psychological tactic to see that the liberating spirit, in the nations conquered by communism, shall never perish." Every sign of popular unrest in Russia is a good sign for us. So is every sign of weakness in the Kremlin's power. But if we face the fact that w^e are at present losing the cold war, we are being de- feated by the totalitarians on a world scale, these signs will not weaken us and cause us to fall back on pious hopes and self-deceptions. They will strengthen our ideological, diplomatic, political, and eco- nomic attack, which should be, like that of the Communists against usj openly proclaimed and aggressive. THE RISKS OF ANTI-STALINISM By Wladyslaw Kulski Wladyslaw Kulski, professor of international relations at Syracuse University, was born in Warsaw and educated at Warsaw and Paris. He was a member of the Polish diplomatic corps from 1928 to 1945. His last post was that of Minister Plenipotentiary in London, Dr. Kulski came to the United States in 1948 and became a citizen in 1953. He has also taught at the University of Alabama. He has written various articles on the Soviet Union for Foreign Affairs and the American Journal of International Law. His book. The Soviet Regime, Communism in Practice, published by the Syracuse University Press in 1954, has been acknowledged as one of the foremost works on the Soviet Union and international communism. What is the significance of the SOth Congress of the Cuinninnist Party of the Soviet T'^nion for the free countries and in pardcuhir for the United States ? The present leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union began at the congress tlie process of downgrading Stalin. If this process of defacing the central figure and the symbol of 28 years of Soviet and Communist history is successful, this will offer a telling proof of the efficacy of the party monopoly of public information and of the psychological power wiiich this monopoly gives the ruling politicians in molding at will the minds of the controlled populations. Then we could draw the conclusion that the Soviet population's opinions concerning foreign afi'airs might also be manipulated at will. If tiie foreign Communists, to whom other sources of infor- mation are readily available, accept this new i^arty line, we niay con- clude once again that they do not dare to think for themselves and are in fact nothing but the obedient stooges of a foreign govermnent, stooges ready to follow the most extraordinary zigzags of the Soviet policy. However, the process of downgrading Stalin involves possibly cer- tain risks. After all, the present 11 leaders of the party (members of the Presidium of the Central Committee) owed their own careers to him and efi'ectively helped him during the various purges in eliminat- ing an untold number of people. Can they successfully wash off their hands of the responsibility for the Stalinist purges and the forced labor camps which they have not abolished after his death? Can they claim his succession, while denigrating their former master whom they had publicly extolled at the previous 19th Congress (Oc- tober 1952) ? What other title to power have they except the fact of being selected by Stalin as his closest collaborators ? If the highest military officers had political ambitions, could they not step in and point to the present political leaders' own responsibility for the Stalinist period? This question cannot be answered, because we do not know to what extent the Soviet military officers would be able to plot despite the close supervision by the totalitarian police machinery — Hitler's generals failed in July 1944. Neither do we 43 44 THE GREAT PRETENSE know whether those Soviet marshals and o;enerals are not devoted and fully indoctrinated party members. Moreover, a revolt carried against the Presidium of the Central Committee would be a rebellion against the party; would the military leaders assume the risk of losing the services of foreign Communists, a valuable asset for the Soviet foreign policy ? Foreign Communists have been already placed in a vulnerable posi- tion by the party repudiation of the Stalinist legend. They blindly followed throughout 28 years the Soviet Party's instructions dur- ing the whole period of Stalin's dictatorship, including the highly embarrassing era of 1939-41 of the Soviet-Nazi cooperation. Their new bosses in Moscow now publicly acknowledge the errors commit- ted by Stalin. This makes the foreign parties look rather foolish; moreover a rank-and-file foreign Communist or a sympathizer might raise the question : "How may any foreign Communist Party feel sure that the new party line dictated by Moscow is correct or will ever be correct, if it is now admitted that infallible Stalin committed gross mistakes?" "We should take cognizance of the fact that their quasi- religious faith in Moscow's monopoly of wisdom is now wide open to attack. It is interesting that IMao Tse-Tung, who is the leader of the Chinese Party, included in his greeting address read at the 20th Congress ft rather malicious sentence. While paying tribute to the Soviet Party, he said that that party was "nurtured with care by Stalin and his closest collaborators." He had been most probably appraised of the intention to downgrade Stalin and yet he pointed to his role and the close association between Stalin and his former assistants who are now his heirs. The campaign against Stalin is related to the process of the reha- bilitation of some of Stalin's victims — Kosior, Voznesensky, Bela Kun, the surviving old Bolsheviks, the pre-1938 leaders of the "Polish Com- munist Party, etc., etc. However, the party leaders made it clear at the Congress that they reserved for themselves the right to pick up freely the names for rehabilitation and to leave the other victims of Stalin's purges confined to the Communist place of damnation. The two Stalinist terms of opprobe: Trotskyites and Bukharinites (the third: Zinovievites, was added after the congress in an article in Pravda) remained the terms of opprobe under his successors. Thus the present leaders have a free choice at their convenience to dub some of Stalin's victims good Ivcninists and to continue to call the others Trotskyites, Bukharinites, or Zinovievites. More- over, they themselves proceeded after Beria's affair with a wide purge which resulted in the dismissal of many members of the central committee. Neither were those dismissed members given the oppor- tunity to defend themselves before the congress (if they were alive) nor was the congress allowed to discuss the matter. Thus the process of rehabilitation is hardly an honest reappraisal of the Stalinist purges. The 20th congress opposed the concept of the collective leadership to Stalin's cult. HoAvever, the speeches made it clear that the collec- tive leadership was vested in the Presidium of the Central Committee, but not in the whole central committee and even less in the congress itself, this so-called "supreme'' organ of the party. A. N. Shelepin, the secretarj'-general of the Communist Youth League, stated it, when THE GREAT PRETENSE 45 paying homage to tlie collective leaders; lie referred to "the glorious and leading center of the party : the Presidium of the Central Com- mittee." The first article in Pravda, devoted to an open criticism of Stalin (March 28), was careful to distinguish between the denounced cult of personality and the continued importance of having leaders to direct the masses. Thus the Soviet "democracy" is ruled by 11 professional politicians instead of the former 1. Moreover, Khrush- chev seemed to be more "equal" than his remaining 10 colleagues on the Presidium. He submitted to the congress the report on behalf of the central committee; he alone indulged in a discussion from the floor, interrupting the speakers with the self-assurance of a boss ; his depth and penetration were praised. It is too early to attempt to measure the width of the margin of his greater "equality." The 20th congress was more than a national convention of the Soviet Party. It was attended by top delegates of 39 foreign Com- munist parties, including the Chinese and the satellite parties. Many other parties, which could not send delegates, forwarded their loyal greetings (the American party wrs among them). This gathering of foi-eign delegates was a sort of a Comintern congress in this sense tliat foreign parties were provided with new instructions by their Soviet elder brothers (of course, this was an excellent opportunity to give them not only publicly recorded but also secret instructions). M. E. Saburov, 1 of the 11 members of the Presidium, made it clear: "The creative working out by the central committee of the most im- portant issues of the ^larxist-Leninist theory allows our own party and the Communist parties in foreign countries to follow a correct orientation in their practical work. * * *" The foreign Conununist parties were assigned a new role which corresponded to the requirements of the current Soviet foreign policy. This policy aiming at the "peaceful" weakening and subversion of the non-Soviet world, the foreign parties were tokl to apply the tactics of a united front. They must make a great effort to win the confidence of as many as possible non-Communist parties and organizations in order to work together for peace (this meaning in the Soviet parlance the support of the Soviet foreign policy). None of the non-Commu- nist parties and organizations was expressly excluded, while socialists and "progressive" Catholics and Protestants were deliberately men- tioned. Moreover, the foreign Communists must also cooperate with the socialists for another purpose: a peaceful transition to socialism. The offer addressed to the socialists provides the best test of the sincerity of this revival of an old Stalinist trick of the Popular Front which Stalin had recommended in the thirties. Both Khrushchev and other speakers did not hesitate to call socialists : opportunists and reformists, terms which are far from flattering in the Communist jargon. He acknowledged frankly that a peaceful transition was impossible in any country where the opposition to "socialism" (actu- ally to Communists) was strong and vigilant, and conceded that a forcible revolution remained there the only form of transition. The "peaceful" transition to socialism was thus confined to countries where the forces opposed to communism would be divided and weak. Even so Khrushchev added an ominous reservation : "The indispensable and decisive condition of all forms of transition to socialism is the political leadership of the working class headed by its advanced 46 THE GREAT PRETENSE detacliment. Without this condition the transition to socialism is impossible." The Communist Party must be in all cases in control, while the other parties, in particular socialists, are relegated to the position of mere helpers in this peculiar "peaceful" transition. His colleagues at the congress were even more obliging by citing past examples of such a peaceful transition : in the Baltic countries in 1940 (the peaceful transition took there the form of the Soviet annex- ations) ; in Eastern Europe after the last war (the peacefulness of this transition was guaranteed by the Soviet troops) ; and in Czecho- slovakia in 1948. Those examples should be remembered by all those who are or will be invited by the Communists to cooperate. One of the 11 members of the Presidium, M. A. Suslov, was no less clear concerning the present Soviet foreign policy : "* * * the foreign policy of the Soviet State is conducted with a deep attachment to principles and at the same time with an utmost flexibility." The sense of this definition could be rendered, without being unfair to Suslov, by saying that tlie strategic objectives remain the same (principles), but that tactics should be very flexible. This is the key to the under- standing of the i:)Ost-Stalinist foreign policy. Many speakers, includ- ing Marshal G. K. Zhukov, stressed the necessity of having strong and fully modern armed forces. Of course, they knew that strong armed forces represented a valuable diplomatic asset even during the period of a peaceful coexistence. However, the debates at the congress seem to indicate that other means will be used to disrupt the western coalition and to multiply the number of noncommitted nations. Khrushchev advanced the conce]:)t of a peace zone, this meaning a cooperation between the Soviet-Chinese bloc and all noncommitted nations. Such states, as Yugoslavia (Marshal Tito sent a greeting dispatcli to the 20th congress on behalf of his Communist I^eague), India, Burma, Indonesia, and Afghanistan, were spoken of with a particular warmth. But the invitation to cooperation was extended to practically all states, including those which are allied to the United States. France in particular was offered once again a joint opposition to the German rearmament as a platform of mutual understanding. The congress seemed to attach a very great importance to all under- developed areas in Asia, Near East, Africa, and Latin America. The congress speakers appealed to them in the name of the local national- isms, the old resentments against this or other Western Powers, their need for an economic and technical assistance, mutual trade. It appears that the Soviet Union intends to advance there not so much under the Avornout Marxist flag but under the banner of "have not" nations. It might be in the most vital interest of the United States to meet this potentially dangerous challenge both through a psycholog- ical adjustment and an effective assistance. The attack against the West, in particular against the United States, is waged on the two fronts : the one of disrupting or at least weakening the ties among the committed nations, and the other of creating a gulf between the West and all underdeveloped countries. The Soviet-Chinese relations were dealt with in an interesting state- ment. Khrushchev said that out of 21 billion rubles spen. during the past 5 years on the Soviet assistance to other members of the bloc only 5.6 billions went to China (a population of 600 millions) and over 15 billions to the Eastern European satellites (about 100 million peo- ple). Does it only mean that the Chinese economy was not able to THE GREAT PRETENSE 47 absorb more of the capital investment, or does it imply that the U. S. S. 11. considered investments in Eastern Europe as safer? For the evaluation of the future Soviet international potential one should pay attention to the high goals of further industrial develop- ment, goals defined in the new 5-year plan approved by the 20th Con- gress. The Soviet leaders reaffirmed the ultimate goal of the quick development of heavy industries, as defined by Stalin in 1946; this target, which they plan to reach throughout the next few 5-year plans, is to attain and surpass the American level of industrial production per head of the population. The Soviet population being more numerous than the American (an exact comparison is impossible, because the U. S. S. R. has never disclosed since the war the total figure of its population) , this target implies that the Soviet Party aims at placing in 15 or 20 years the United States in a position of indus- trial inferiority with all the ensuing consequences. This raises the vital question of how the United States and other western nations could hasten their own pace of industrial development. The new program for training skilled manpower is just as import- ant, as the sheer increase in the size of the Soviet industrial j)lant. The Congress speakers stressed the utmost importance of the new technology and advised their managerial-engineering personnel to adopt tlie "Western technology whenever the latter was superior to the Soviet. But they outlined also a program for training young people. The fees for the three upper grades of secondary schools and for the university education are to be abolished. A universal secondary education is to be introduced during the next 5 years. These two reforms mean that the Soviet Union is determined to tap all human resources for talents and to provide its young people with secondary education. The programs of the secondary schools are to be altered to make room for a more intensive teaching of mathematics, natural sciences, technology and practical trades, all this at the expense of humanities and social studies. Higher schools (universities) will include a much higlier proportion of engineering and similar estab- lishments. Thus the basic aim is to produce a much higher number of scientists, engineers, and highly skilled workers. A. N. Nesmey- anov, the president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, asked the Con- gress to encourage the pure science research, as the fountainhead of applied sciences and technology. Thus we are confronted with a challenge to a competition of brains and skills. It would be unwise for the United States and otlier western nations to sit idly in the face of this challenge; the outcome of this particular competition might be of a decisive importance for the final balance sheet of the wliole peaceful coexistence. Three domestic aspects of the new Soviet policies require a com- ment. Despite Beria's fall and a certain curtailing of the former powers of the political police, Khrushchev asked his comrades to give full trust and support to "our Chekists" (as he called the em- ployees of the State security organs). The poltical police continues to be an important tool of government. Although the composition of the Presidium of the Central Com- mittee Avas not modified and the same 11 men remained its full mem- bers, for the first time in the Soviet history a genuine professional military officer, Marshal G. K. Zhukov, was elevated to the high rank 48 THE GREAT PRETENSE of an alternate member of the Presidium. Thus a marshal was in- cluded among the first-class political leaders. This seems to point to the political ascendency of the highest military hierarchy. On the morrow of the 20th congress the Central Committee and the Soviet Government issued on March 10 a joint decision which re- versed the former, more lenient policy toward the peasants (a policy inaugurated in 1953). The decision "advised" the collective farms to reduce the subsidiary plots of land reserved for the private use of the peasants to the size of kitchen gardens and to get rid of the peas- ants' private ownership of their livestock (usualy one cow and a few smaller domestic animals). The famous battle over the cow, lost by Stalin, was reopened. A policy, more ruthless than any Stalinist, was inaugurated. Of course, the peasants have one weapon of de- fense, namely, to go slow with their collective work. They had used this weapon against Stalin with the result, which his successors duly acknowledged in 1953, namely, a deep agricultural crisis with its serious shortages of agricultural products. The purpose of the new policy is to take away from the peasant his only independent source of income and to force him under the threat of starvation to devote his whole time to the collective work. The offensive against the peasantry, if it fails, will result in the aggravation of the agricultural crisis. If it is successful, it will finally reduce the peasant to the status of an agricultural laborer fully working for the collective farm. The new peasant policy, the esteem in which the political police continues to be held, the political leadership concentrated in a few hands, the governmental control over citizens' thoughts, the com- pletely passive role of the congress itself where the leaders made speeches and the rank-and-file delegates applauded and unanimously voted for the resolutions proposed by their elders, do not prove that the basic nature of the Stalinist regime has been changed. His ideas are alive, and only his name is in the process of being erased from the party honor roll. No one, who has a sense of responsibility, could venture to pre- dict whether the post-Stalinist regime may or may not survive with- out abandoning his basic ideas and policies while throwing overboard his name and authority. It is too early to attempt to give an an- swer to this question, while even the Soviet leaders themselves can- not be sure about it. It is safer, however, not to expect spectacular developments and relax our own vigilance. We should rather act on the assumption that the Soviet Communist Party will solve this problem to its satisfaction and will continue basically the same foreign and domestic policies with such adjustments which any regime must currently make. Only thus we shall not be disappointed in our high but perhaps ill-founded hopes and be ready for any occurrence. NO SOFTNESS IN THE KREMLIN By Eugene Lyons Eugene Lyons served from 1928 to 1934 as United Press correspondent in Moscow. An astute student of communism in Russia and in America, he is the author of Assignment in Utopia; The Red Decade; Stalin, Czar of All the Russias; and most recently. Our Secret Allies: the Peoples of Russia. He was one of the founders and the first president of the American Committee for Liberation From Bolshevism, which now operates radio station Liberation in Munich. Formerly editor of the American Mercury, Mr. Lyons is at present a senior editor of the Reader's Digest. The free world must be on guard against being confused, divided, and psycliologically disarmed by recent gestures of moderation in the Kremlin. "We must avoid mistaking a change of line for a change of heart. The fact that the Red dictatorship will temporarily have sev- eral heads instead of one doesn't make it any less despotic at home or any less of a menace to Avhat remains of the free world. The high command of Avorld communism has not retreated one inch from its immediate objective of expanding its Red empire — by blood- less seizure of povrer where possible, by force and violence elsewhere — or its ultimate objective of world dominion. These fixed commitments have not been renounced or reduced by anything said at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev and company are revamping tactics and slogans, while standing pat on strategy and goals. If anything, the proceedings of the congress reveal a firmer and more self-confident dedication to the worldwide triumph of communism than ever before. The policies set forth at the congress amount to an adaptation of Stalin's party line of the mid-thirties — the period of united fronts and peaceable coexistive which in our country went under the slogan of "Communism is 20tli Century Americanism." Those who profess to see something new and unprecedented in recent developments sim- ply have failed to do their homework in Soviet history. Take the statement that war is not inevitable. Moscow was saying that very thing 20 years ago. There was even talk of awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to Stalin's front man abroad, Maxim Litvinov. The same is true of the pronouncements about achieving commu- nism through parliamentary methods. Such methods have been used for nearly 40 years, through Communist Parties in democratic coun- tries posing as conventional political parties. Has the world for- gotten that this is precisely how Plitler took over in Germany? The force and violence comes after the victory at the ballot box to make it permanent. : The present change in line is intended, precisely as in the 1930's, to facilitate the infiltration of free governments; cynical miited fronts with leftwing but non-Communist groups; the subversion of trade unions; the luring of well-meaning but soft-headed individuals into camouflaged Commmiist outfits. 49 50 THE GREAT PRETENSE There is only one real and meaningful difference. It is that Soviet Russia and its world apparatus of power are today vastly stronger, larger, more self-confident than two decades ago. There menace to everything we cherish is therefore incalculably greater. We cannot afford soporific self-deception. The recent riots in Soviet Georgia and disturbances elsewhere in the Communist prison-land are significant. They show that despite nearly 40 years of terror and indoctrination, the peoples of Russia have retained a capacity to protest — and remember that in demon- strating against the regime a Soviet citizen risks his life. Our obligation is to deepen the gulf that divides the Kremlin oligarchs from their subjects; to let the masses behind the curtains know that free and civilized men outside will settle for nothing less than their liberation from the Red yoke. The changes in party line, especially the denunciation of Stalin, are symptons of internal ten- sions, not only in the general population but in the military ranks and in the ruling Communist Party. If we have any political sense and some remnants of the will to survive, we will exploit the situation by stepping up political and psychological warfare. Those who want us to relax, who counsel policies of accommoda- tion that would freeze the status quo of a world half enslaved, are betraying our civilization. WHY YOU CAN'T TRUST THE SOVIET MIND By Gerhart Niemeyer Gerhart Niemeyer, a native of Germany, is professor of political science and a member of the staff of the Soviet study center at the University of Notre Dame ; his special assignment is a graduate course in Commu- nist ideology. Previously, he was associated for 2 years with the Coun- cil on Foreign Relations on a special project on Soviet-American rela- tions. From 1950 to 1953, he was a planning adviser of the Department of State. He has also taught at Princeton, Oglethorpe, Yale, and Columbia Universities. He is coauthor with John S. Reshetar of a study made under the auspices of the University of Pennsylvania For- eign Policy Research Institute which will be published in May under the title of "An Inquiry Into Soviet Rationality." Part of the following article is reprinted from U. S. News and World Report. At the recent Congress of the Russian Communist Party, Khrush- chev, Bulganin, Mikoyan, and Zhukov made important speeches the combination of which amounted to the proclamation of a "new line" of communism. As the Communist leadership resembles the hierarchy of a church, and their pronouncements play the role of a dogma, it may be permissible to paraphrase the essence of the "new line" in forms recalling religious authority. Thus paraphrased, they could be rendered as follows : "You have heard it said that Communists advocate violent revo- lution. But I say to you that violence is necessary only where capital- ism is strong and offers resistance to the Socialist revolution. Other- ^ wise, parliamentary methods will be perfectly suitable to Communist purposes." "You have heard it said that in the phase of imperialistic capital- ism war is inevitable. But I say to you that war is not inevitable; rather the striving of the forces of capitalism for war is inevitable. The anti-imperialistic forces, on the other hand, are inherently peace- ful. The anti-imperialist forces have irresistible power and will blanket the imperialist countries with atomic bombs if attacked." "You have heard it said that frightful collisions must occur between Socialist and capitalist countries. But I say to you, contradictions oc- cur only between capitalist countries. The relation between expand- ing Socialist and declining capitalist countries is properly called co- existence." "You have heard it said that the Soviet Union endangers peace. But I say to you, the peace of the world is endangered by the setting- up of blocs, 'positions of strength' and foreign airljases. Peace is de- fended by the group of peace-loving states in the Socialist camp and those other states in Asia which have made nonparticipation in blocs the principle of their foreign policy." "You have heard it said that Communists were hostile to Social Democrats and other Socialists. But I say to you that we want all Socialists to help us in our cause, which is the cause of peace." "You have heard it said that the Communist system had a per- sonal dictator. But I say to you that the leaders of communism co- 51 52 THE GREAT PRETENSE operate with each other to make the Conimiinist Party more mono- lithic than ever." While this may be an unusual form of paraphrase, it is an accurate condensation of the major speeches delivered at the 20th congress, in- sofar as they proclaimed a new departure in Communist doctrine. The important question now is : Precisely what in this line is new? Neio is the idea that a Socialist revolution might proceed by parlia- mentary methods. But note that, if any society dares to resist the Communists, the latter will use violence. And further note that the concept of a proletarian dictatorship after the Communist seizure of power has not. been abandoned. In this respect, rem.emher that Hitler came to power by parliamentary procedure and did not make revolution by lawless force until after he had obtained control of the government. Neio is the renunciation of the notion that war between capitalist and Socialist countries is inevitable. But note that this idea is merely divided into two parts, one of which assigns the desire for aggression to capitalist states while the otlier one declares that the Socialist camp will, if resisted, make total atomic war on the capitalist nations. Further note that Leninism calls on Communists always to hide their aggressive moves under the cloak of defense. Neio is the idea of cooperation with other Socialists, and especially Social Democrats. But note that the Communists carefully main- tain the distinction by which they alone are truly revolutionary, while Socialists are "o])portunists," Further note that to the true revolu- tionaries alone belongs the leadership of the combined forces. Not new is the idea of coexistence, long established in Leninist theory and practice as authentically Communist tactics. Note that Communists always have considered coexistence compatible with the betrayal and eventual destruction of their coexisting partners. , Not new is the protest against "aggressive blocs," foreign airbases, and "positions of strength." Note that the Soviet bloc is not defined as a bloc. Further note that the chosen principle of the Soviet-led group of nations is neutralism. Not new in Communist doctrine is the principle of collective leader- ship. Note that Communist doctrine speaks of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and of the Communist Party as the vanguard of the proletariat. Further note that the dictatorship of one man arose not from a Communist principle, but from the Soviet system in which the party alone claims to possess the truth about history, and the truth is what the leaders proclaim to be in the interest of the party. Re- member that, in that system, one man's power resulted from the struggles between different versions of that "truth" and is likely to emerge again in time to come. Unchanged remains the Leninist principle that history is nothing but a culminating class struggle and that class conflicts are essentially irreconcilable. Note that Communists consider Socialists who believe that class conflicts could be mitigated as traitors to the cause. Unchanged remains the dogma that class conflicts can be ended only by a proletarian dictatorship. Note that proletarian dictatorship is defined in Leninism as the rule — unrestricted by law and based on force — of Communists over non-Communists. THE GREAT PRETENSE 53 Unchanged remains the notion that Communist morality derives from tlie interests of the class struj^gle. Note that the interests of the class struggle are defined by the "Socialist fatherland," Soviet Russia. Unchanged remains the basic contradiction in Communist thinking between their concept of an absolute truth that renders the Com- munist goal correct and inevitable, and the idea that truth must be defined by the party leadership in the interests of the party. Note that, on this double notion of truth, nobody but a Communist under discipline can by definition be right. What is the significance of the changes which the 20th congress of the Russian Communist Party introduced ? Some interpret them as concessions made under pressure to a restive public opinion. Some go so far as to see in this confession of weak- ness the beginning of the end for the Soviet regime. Others regard these developments as the passing of that revolution- ary regime from a period of "excessive zeal" to one of "maturity" and "respectability." They believe that from now on, the Soviet Union will settle down to become more and more like western systems : collec- tive participation in political decisions, concern for justice and respect for human dignity, inclination to tolerance and a live-and-let-live attitude. A third interpretation regards the "new line" as Russia's substitute for a policy of force, a flexible tactic adapted to the major weaknesses of the West that is likely to yield the Communists considerable advan- tages. They read the changes as a sign that Russia has determined to avoid a shooting war from now on. I incline to find some truth in all of these views. There can be little doubt that the new line was adopted in answer to dangerous pressures and tensions within the Communist ranks. We can also expect that the Soviet rulers will increasingly dress themselves, as it were, in the garb of western values in order to convince their opponents that there is no reason to fear, and every reason to collaborate with, Soviet policies. And this, I agree, is a tactic against which we and our allies are least well equipped to defend ourselves. By contrast, I do not believe that this is the beginning of the end of the Soviet regime. Nor can I see in the new line a turn of the Soviet rulers to a rational and reasonable system of government. Finally, I do not assume that the new line necessarily precludes an eventual shooting war. The reasons for my position are as follows : First, regarding the ability of the Communist Party to maintain its rule over a vast empire : The Soviet system is one in which a small, disciplined, and strictly centralized group wields political control over all nonpolitical activities and institutions, includng adminstra- tion, military forces, religion, economy, science, education, and so forth. They have scattered and isolated their opponents and infiltrated every institutional position within which an opposition might gain a posi- tion of strength. Thus, no matter how much hostility their rule might create, they can deal with their enemies one by one, always retaining the advantage of the inside lines. The Soviet system of strategic controls was developed step by step, as the Bolshevik Party established its rule first ever Russia, then over all Communist parties in the world, finally over hundreds of millions of non-Russian peoples whom they govern through indigenous Com- munist parties. The key to this power position, as Lenin discovered 54 THE GREAT PRETENSE is the "monolitliic unity'" and iron discipline of tlie Communist ruling class itself. As long as this body of rulers stays united — and is not defeated by an outside enemy — there is no reason to assume that they cannot maintain their power indefinitely. They have faced enormous difficulties in the past and must expect them in the future. Still, as long as the forces of anti-Communist op- position have no organization or cohesion, the unified and disciplined forces of communism will be able to outmaneuver them. To be united for this purpose, the forces of communism must undergo a similar process at the hand of its central leadership. Communist unity means conformity to the doctrinal line decided upon by a handful of men at the top. Hence, as long as the small clique of leaders does not split irreparably, the forces of communism will continue to hold an advan- tage over any opposition, and the end of the Soviet regime is not yet in sight. This, at least, is how I see the matter. The present changes are a logical way to meet the difficulties arising from the death of Stalin. The terror he practiced caused not only popular discontent but also considerable insecurity and fear among even leading Communists. At his death, all these endangered leaders made moves to strengthen themselves so as to forestall a renewal of the threat to their safety. In these maneuvers, no individual proved strong enough to gain a decisive advantage over the others, so that a kind of balance of power resulted. This is the situation that has been officially labeled "collective leadership." As long as a balance of power among leading Communists was in- escapable, it is a sign of strength rather than weakness that the key people succeeded in agreeing on an ideological formula under which the unity of the central power could be maintained. Thus the attack on Stalin is a device of Comminiist leadership that kills 2 birds with 1 stone. It provides a doctrinal foundation for unity at the top of the Communist Party in a situation in which no single individual possesses the power to unify the party through his personal authority. At the same time, it furnishes a scapegoat on which can be loaded all the causes for dissatisfaction with the regime. In both respects, the cen- tral power is likely to be strengthened. The attack on Stalin does not bar a future return to individual leadership when some one individual has amassed sufficient strength to ascend the throne. Not only do the Soviet rulers highly praise Lenin — who brooked no opposition to his individual will — but they also uphold the rule of Stalin "in the early years after Lenin's death," i. e., up to about 1934. In other words, all they have done is to set up a distinction between "bad" individual leadership and "good" in- dividual leadership. This leaves open the road for any future indi- vidual Communist potentate to joass off his rule as being in accord with the practice of Lenin and the early years of Stalin. This view of the recent Soviet developments is borne out by the reaction of Communist parties outside of Russia. There was, and to some extent still is, obvious confusion. The uncertainty of Commu- nists about the exact interpretation of the new line, however, has sub- jected them even more to the central power as they hastened to strike the "correct" note. The new turn has served to expose unreliable ele- ments and has given occasion to some purges. Supposedly inde- pendent factions of communism have now fallen in line. Even the Chinese Communists — who after all do maintain an individual dicta- THE GREAT PRETENSE 55 torship — are conforming to tlie now orthodoxy. It is clear that they all are persuaded that there can be no Communist unity apart from the dogma of the infallibility of the Presidium. Given this dogma, they accept the new line as a necessary doctrine to cover a regroup- ment of forces in a new situation. Secondly, regarding the alleged new reasonableness of the Soviet Government : If unity of the party is the key to the power situation, Leninist doctrine is the key to the vmity of the party. The party, in announcing an anti-Stalinist "reform," has also declared its determina- tion to hold fast the doctrine of Lenin. Leninist indoctrination re- mains the core of Communist education. The rector of Tiflis Uni- versity was purged — during the same week in which the condemna- tion of Stalin's purges was broadcast — because his students had dropped the obligatory course in dialectic materialism. Since this course is based on a book written by Stalin, the rector may have had a point, but also his purge is all the more significant. Nor could there be any conceivable basis of party unity outside of Leninist doctrine. From the beginning, Communists have identi- iied themselves, as distinct from other Marxists, in terms of Lenin's ideas. For the sake of Leninist orthodoxy, they have disciplined themselves, purged themselves, accused and submitted to accusation, confessed and accepted execution. Leninist theory is a full-fledged w^orld view which provides not only the formula identifying the Com- munist movement as a whole, but also the purpose of life, thought, action for each individual Communist. It substitutes for religion, and in this capacity furnishes a raison d'etre for Communists in- dividually as well as collectively. It is a combined emotional and intellectual force holding Communists together. Now we need only recall the salient points of Leninist doctrine in in order to realize that a regime based on this doctrine can never be- come politically rational in the sense of devoting itself to the common good, justice, the dignity of man, and deference to the will of the people. Briefly condensed, these salient points can be put as follows : (1) The overriding political reality is the struggle of classes which by its nature is irreconcilable. (2) The class struggle can come to an end only in the victory of the proletarian class and the suppression of all other classes. (3) The class struggle can be waged only by those who possess true revolutionary consciousness, i. e,, not by the masses but only by theoretically advanced Communists. (4) Correct theory puts the Communist leaders in possession of the truth about history, which in turn lends invincible force to the Com- munist movement. Still, truth is concrete and therefore must be con- tinuously redefined by the party leadership. (5) History moves forward hj way of revolutions. The only true proletarian revolution is one setting up the dictatorship of the prole- tariat, which is the rule — unrestricted by law and based on force — of Communists over all whose consciousness still shows non-Communist traces. (6) Morality and all values are completely relative. Communist morality derives from the requirements of the class struggle as defined by the party leadership and is identical with party discipline. In this doctrine there is no such thing as human nature, since men are nothing but i)arts of antagonistic classes. Hence the dignity of the 56 THE GREAT PRETENSE hiiman^person as sucli is a concept that would not occur to a Communist. Nor does the notion of the common good make any sense to him. The state is to him not an institution for the common good but only an instrument of the ruling class. The will of the people, in Communist views, is either irrelevant or harmful, since the people by themselves are inca]oable of the "right" kind of consciousness. Justice, in the Communist perspective, is a mere pretense, so is common morality. Truth is identical with the decisions of the party leadership and can therefore never be shared with non-Communists. On the other hand, the class struggle sooner or later requires methods of force which no Communist faithful to Lenin's teachings can renounce. Leninist doctrine thus explicitly and emphatically denies that there is any common ground between Communists and non- Communists. Truth, logic, morality, political order, justice, peace, and other values are tools of class antagonism. Only the class struggle itself, the un- compromising and total antagonism between groups owing nothing to each other, is a reality which Communists admit sharing with non- Communists. In the conduct of the class struggle, Leninism requires of its ad- herents the flexible and uninhibitecl exploitation of the very values they deny. Communists are committed to wage their war not only by illegal but also by legal means, participating in parliamentary, labor union, judicial, educational, cultural, and international activi- ties. In lieu of open proclamation of their goals and objectives, they are required to conceal their identity behind the cover of pretended loyalty to their opponents' values and institutions. From the be- ginning, they have been taught to ally themselves with popular human aspirations and yet never to forget that their allies are also their enemies. The present emphasis on cooperation and apparent reasonableness is a natural course for Communists in a world in which the scare of war tends to become a motive overriding all others. Underneath the veneer of reasonableness, however, the Communist mind continues to move in a world that does not know of any common interests, values, and principles linking Communists with non-Communists. No matter how long or extensively the Soviets may cultivate coopera- tive relations with the rest of the world, we can therefore be sure that these relations are not founded on a common rationality or morality. The relations between Communists and non-Communists are bound to remain deeply irrational, incalculable, and fraught with danger. Finally, regarding the prospect of a shooting war: It is true, of course, that the Communist Party prefers to attain its goal without having to risk the uncertainties of a war. Who would not prefer it this way ? Still, Communist doctrine has always taught that, as the class enemy is in possession of the means of force, his resistance must sooner or later be broken by force. The 20th party congress an- nounced that the Communist seizure of power may be peaceful, but only where no resistance is offered. What is more, the dictatorship of the proletariat — the key concept of Communist revolution — is explicitly conceived as rule based on lawless force. As Communist thinking ahvays considers force among the methods to be used in the class struggle, it will not rule out war from its methods. THE GREAT PRETENSE 57 Communists regard their conflict with non-Commnnists as one that will continue to a decisive end. Tlieir philosophy admits of no possible compromise. Their deep and total hostility to every society other than one controlled by Communists combined with their con- trol over the resources of a powerful Russia implies war as the ultima ratio of their policy. At any rate, it would be extremely unwise if we were to count confidently upon their determination not to wage war. One ma}^ safely assume that they will carefully analyze the odds but one cannot be too sure to know what combination of circumstances would appear most favorable to the Communist mind. It is true that the restiveness of the peoples under their control renders any involve- ment in war dangerous to the Soviet regime. Still, they show full awareness of this danger in the way in which they have laid long- range groundwork for blaming any future v,'ar on their enemies and enlisting on their side the desires for peace. For this, if for no other reason, I would be inclined to view their present tactics as an addi- tional weapon rather than a substitute for an eventual shooting war. The new line introduced by the 20th congress could become a substitute for a shooting war only if it would bring about the wholesale and ultimately decisive erosion of Western strength and determination. Great as our danger may be, this is a development I refuse to assume. ^2— 5G- SMOKESCREEN OVER MOSCOW By William Randolph Hearst, Jr. William Randolph Hearst, Jr., a distinguished newspaperman in his own right, now heads the vast publishing organization founded by the late William Randolph Hearst, Sr. Mr. Hearst was recently awarded a Pulitzer Prize for a series of exclusive interviews with all of Russia's present rulers which he obtained while visiting Moscow at the time of Malenkov's dismissal as premier. Eecent internal developments in Kussia, centering on the down- grading of Stalin as a historical Russian figure, should be approached by Americans with the utmost wariness. In my opinion, we are not justified at this j^oint in drawing any deep conclusions from these events. That they are important and Avill have wide-scale ramifica- tions, no one can doubt ; but it is difficult for outsiders to fathom the mysterious processes of Communist logic, and we may do ourselves more harm than good by leaping to conclusions before we have addi- tional concrete evidence on which to base our judgment. It seems to me that the concerted assault on Stalin's reputation stems from some internal situation involving the present leadership about which we in the West can only speculate. I am further con- vinced that we are only witnessing the first stages of this inner Com- munist drama and that the current trend will continue for some time to come, manifesting itself in other ways besides the denigration of the late dictator. It is certain to have widespread repercussions inside Russia. The Russian people are not accustomed to being consulted about the moves of their higher leadership, and perhaps it is a mark of their growing sophistication that they are obviously being conditioned through all the agencies of propaganda to the new campaign against Stalin. We were present in ]\Ioscow last year when Malenkov suddenly re- signed the position of Premier; this caused a sensation in the West, but only those who Avere there at the time can testify that it created scarcely a ripple in the capital of the Communist world. Now, how- ever, the anti-Stalin campaign is underway behind a smokescreen of explanations laid down by the highest Communist leaders starting with Nikita Khrushchev. It would seem that public opinion does matter in the Soviet Union after all. Otherwise, why the intensive drive to make the people understand why the leadership has embarked on a program that must be baffling, to say the least, to the average Russian. I have thought about this a great deal in recent weeks, but no easy explanation on this new campaign presents itself. In fact, I do not 3'et understand why the present Communist leadership found it necessary to launch the new phase at the present time. Things seem to be going well in Russia ; there are no signs that I know of indi- cating internal unrest; and yet the leadership chose this particular moment to strike at the reputation of a man they had x^reviously glori- fied to the skies. 58 THE GREAT PRETENSE 59 Some of you may remember that a year ago last February, after returning from a visit to Russia, I said I believed we were facing a new kind of struggle with the Communist world that might prove more difiicult for us to wage successfully than a military conflict ; that it would be more subtle than the cold Avar under Stalin, and that a more flexible and imaginative American j)olicy would be required to meet the challenge. Those conclusions appear more valid to me today than ever. The events of the past year have underlined their truth, it seems to me. We do need a more flexible and imaginative policy, but I would not like to see us draw any hasty conclusions from the fact that the dead Soviet dictator is now under heavy attack from his former collabo- rators and colleagues. One thing I would caution against ; in our propaganda, and in our Voice of America broadcasts, we shoukl not seem to be criticizing the present Russian leadership because they, in turn, have started to criticize Stalin. Even by implication we should not give the im- pression that we are defending Stalin or his reputation. The Rus- sians, after all, are only repeating what we have been saying about Stalin for a generation. Let them continue on their mission of idol destruction. We should be ready to capitalize on the situation when the opportunity ofiers, but we should not rush into action with ill- considered ventures that could conceivably boomerang. KHRUSHCHEV'S BID FOR FAVOR By Robert G. Neumann Robert G. Neumann is associate professor of political science at the University of California. He has just returned from a year of teach- ing at the Universities of Bordeaux and Strasbourg. While in Europe he also lectured at the Universities of Madrid, Brussels, Munich, and the Saar. Dr. Neumann is the author of a widely used university text- book, Europe and Comparative Government, and contributes regularly to the Los Angeles Times. Startling and incredible news is coming from the Soviet Union these days. Riots are reported from several cities, especially from Joseph Stalin's and former Police Chief Lavrenti Beria's home state of Georgia. An increasingly intensive campaign is underway to debunk Stalin, to show his arbitrariness, his ruthlespness, his "errors." This campaign is being slowly aped, though with some evident reluctance, in the European satellite countries, though not in China. It is only natural that the West should be groping for an explana- tion. Walter Lippmann opined in a recent column (the Times, March 21) that these policies must indicate substantial structural changes within the Soviet Union, although he does not offer any shred of evidence for such an explanation as he himself admits. That such a structural change might be found in a new and domi- nating role of the Soviet army, replacing the Communist Party, is offered as a possible speculation by Mr. Lippmann, but that also with- out any evidence and, as he clearly indicates, without much conviction on his part. It is my profound belief that the acceptance of the thesis of a far- reaching structural and policy change in the Soviet Union is one of the most dangerous errors that the West can commit. In fact it is precisely the error which we are meant to accept. At this point the reader is entitled to ask : What evidence have you ? If by evidence is meant a photostatic copy of a secret Kremlin memo- randum in which Party Boss Nikita Khrushchev expounds his secret plans, then we must admit that we have none. But if by evidence is meant the ability to assemble all known facts and show one consistent pattern which makes sense, then we have quite a good deal. The first thing to remember is that the attacks against Stalin are only the most recent acts in a chain of events wliich go straight back to the old dictator's death in 1952. At that time Stalin's policies had evidently led to an impasse and hence had failed. In Eussia itself a big, new purge was shaping up, leading to a state of paralysis which overhung the country. Once before there had been such a situation. The great purges which began in 1934, which eventually killed off the entire high command of the Red army, almost all the remaining old Bolsheviks, a good part of the intellectual, scientific, and managerial classes, lasted imtil 1938. 60 THE GREAT PRETENSE 61 Finally tlie purgers themselves had to be purged and the last two NKVi) chiefs, Yagoda and Yezhov, disappeared in the execution cellars of Lubianka Prison. Their successor, Beria, restored order and a reasonable measure of calm. The next big series of trials began to shape up in 1952, among them the fantastic "doctors' trial" with its unlikely accusation, its anti-Semitic overtones, and its murky, Graustarkian atmosphere. This time Stalin himself had to disappear, and soon after his death the purger, Beria, was purged. Sliortly after Stalin's disappearance from the scene life began to become a little easier in Russia. This policy was actually inaugurated by Georgi Malenkov but he was the former private secretary of Stalin and hence too tainted by the past. He stepped down. But the most significant changes occurred in the external relations of the Soviet Union. The new masters of the Kremlin proceeded to broaden the Communist basis of operation. The first stej:) was the surprising pilgrimage by Party Boss Nikita Khrushchev and Premier Nikolai Bulganin to Belgrade, and their attempts to make peace with Marshal Tito, whom they had so recently denounced as a "Fascist beast in the pay of the Anglo-American warmongers." Next came a call to other leftwing parties in Western Europe, especially in France, inviting them to join the Communists in a new popular front. And in the last few weeks, before and during the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the call went out from on high that contrary to Stalin's prediction international war was neither inevitable nor even likely and that henceforth the conflict between East and West would be carried out on the battlefield of peaceful economic competition. All these actions are designed to make communism more acceptable, more respectable, in the eyes of the non- Communist left and of Asia. The debunking and condemnation of Stalin are to give assurance that the period of terror is over. The call to economic competition is to reassure the peace-hungry people of Europe that no danger of war comes from the East. The peace with Tito is to demonstrate that there could be several roads to socialism and communism and the left- wing parties cooperating with the Communists need no longer fear to be swallowed up. Plow effective is this concerted campaign? Evidently it is much too early to tell, but the chances are that it could be very effective. Asia, winch has known imperialism only in the Western European sense and which often cannot imagine an even more dangerous and frightening Russian imperialism, is often only too ready to see the good in Communist activities and potentialities. In Europe, most of the leftwing leaders have so far shown them- selves immune to the Russian siren calls. Only in recent days has the Congress of the Socialist International, the association of Socialist Parties all over the world, gone on record against a new popular front and any collaboration with the Communists. But among the leftist and especially Socialist voters and party members, particularly in France and Italy, there is a nostalgia for the old popular front days or for the dream, in fact the illusion, of proletarian unity which the Communists keep dangling before their eyes. 62 THE GREAT PRETENSE In tlie recent French elections of January 1956, a few Socialist office seekers ran on joint tickets with the Communists although they faced the threat of expulsion from their party. Now in the light of Russia's supposedly "reasonable" line, the pressure for making common cause with the Communists is becoming more intensive among the Socialist rank and file. All over the world the Communists are pressing hard for the popu- lar front in Europe and "friendly cooperation" in Asia. Already they have some success. India's Prime Minister Nehru, ever ready to see the good in the East and the bad in the West, has already enthusi- astically proclaimed the "end of the cold war." The Stalinist attempt to break the free world by threat and violence has failed. Now the free world is to be corroded from the inside. The present radical face-lifting operation in Russia is to create the false impression that the Communists have become "parlor-ripe," that the need for an anti-Communist policy and for the exclusion of Com- munists from free governments has disappeared. I^t us give the devil his due. Only a very firmly established regime, supremely sure of itself, could undertake such a radical, tactical turn- about. The ability of the Comnumist leaders to plan their policies far ahead should serve us as an important lesson. The Romans already knew the rule : ab hoste discimus, let us learn from the enemy. In past years when an East- West war seemed a very real possibility, as for instance during the Berlin blockade, the danger was great. But today the danger is infinitely greater, namely the danger that the radiant sun of Moscow's "reasonableness" could achieve what Stalin's cold steel could not achieve. Never before has it been more important that the West should remain united and that its policies be truly "allied," the result of constant and close consultation and of a real meeting of the minds. THE DRIVE FOR FINAL VICTORY By Ismail Ege Ismail Ege, before his break with the Soviet dictatorship, was an im- portant official of the Soviet military intelligence apparatus. Turkish by birth, he joined the Russian Communist Party in 1921. He attended the Leningrad Military School of Communications and Electro Tech- nical College, and in 1938 graduated from the General Staff War College in Moscow with the rank of major. He served from 1940 to 1942 as chief of the fourth section of the Red Army's General Staff Intelligence Department. During an intelligence assignment as press attache of the Soviet Embassy in Turkey, Major Ege renounced his Soviet citizenship and was granted political asylum by the Turkish Government. The U. S. S. Iv. does not exist in a social vaciuun. It is encircled by a number of countries which have difl'erent ideological concepts and diti'erent politico-economical foundations. These countries range from primitive semi-feudal societies with traditions rooted in the past or with aspirations of rising nationalism to highly civilized and de- veloped states organized on the principals of modern democracy and free enterprise. Ever since the day the Soviet system was born in Russia, Communist rulers have recognized these facts and have had to take them into consideration. The Soviet system's final goal is victory of communism all over the world. Peace and war, subversion and infiltration, promises and threats, major and minor changes of party line are only means used to reach that final goal. Even the name of the U. S. S. R. has no geographic significance, recognizing no permanent boundaries. The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union did not change this final goal. On the contrary, the resolutions adopted by the congress stressed the goal once more by stating that the decisions of the congress "lead the people of the U. S. S. R. to new victories in the building of communism." The new line adopted by the congress was based not on a rejection of the final goal of communism, but on a renunciation of Stalin, who has always been considered by many Communists to be an orthodox Marxist. The desanctification of Stalin is a major change in Communist strategy. This desanctification was not born overnight. It had already started during the last years of the late dictator's life, began to gather momentum immediately after his death, and finally was officially announced during the congress. There was nothing surprising about it. For Stalin, with his personal dictatorship, with his bloody intrigues and purges, with his treachery and ignorance, with his maniacal lust for power, was neither popular within the U. S. S. R. nor outside its boundaries. For the reasons outlined above, it is clear that the problem of inter- national relations between the totalitarian U. S. S. R. and the rest of the world has become a problem of major importance, i. e., a problem of special interest for the leaders of the Communist Party of the 63 64 THE GREAT PRETENSE Soviet Union. The importance of the U. S. S. E.'s international re- lations became more acute and more significant after the Second World War in connection with further developments in the U. S. S. R. and on the world scene. It is no exaggeration to assert that the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the U. S. S. R. gave more time and consideration to problems dealing with the international situation than to those dealing with internal policy. Even before the congress, the Soviet Union had started attackmg the West in political and eco- nomic fields, making extraordinary efforts to win the sympathy of the so-called neutral bloc and the colonial countries, to fan the flames of war in the Middle East and to mobilize all its own resources for a decisive blow to the free world. Meanwhile, the unpopular name of Stalin has been a significant obstacle to the present rulers of the U. S. S. R. in accomplishing this new phase of Soviet aggression. In order to deceive the world and camouflage their aggression, they had to rid themselves of Stalin's name. That is one of the reasons for his denunciation. To explain this denunciation with such devices as the weakness of the U. S. S. R., personal quarrels among the top leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in their fight for power, or a coming revolution in the U. S. S. R., I am afraid is a little premature and prirnitive, despite articles which have appeared lately in many news publications. In the first place, the U. S. S. R. today is not weak. It is strong. It is strong economically and technically. It is strong militarily. All available data on the economical, technical, and military potential of the Soviet Union supports this contention. To close our eyes to the facts, to dream and hope for some miracle such as immediate revolution in the U. S. S. R., to underestimate this most powerful enemy is very dangerous. Despite the denunciation of Stalin, the great human drama, world conflict, the struggle between the free world and the totalitarian Soviet bloc continues on even greater scale, for now entire continents are at stake. The dictatorship of one man has been replaced for a time with the dictatorship of a group. Khruschev and company are pursuing the same goal as Stalin did. Communist world domination. The West, especially the United States, must not fall victim to illusions about this so-called new Communist Party line in the Soviet Union. America must remain as strong economically, technically, and militarily as ever before and be ready to defend its freedoms. Another reason for the denunciation of Stalin by the present Com- munist rulers is the problem of reeducating the new Soviet generation in the spirit of loyalty to the Communist Party. Contrary to the wrong idea sometimes maintained in the West, such words and phrases as nationalism, democracy, dictatorship, freedom, colonialism, im- perialism, materialism, religion, idealistic currents in philosophy, marketing of goods, the history of mankind, science and technology are known not only to Western society. They are known to the edu- cated generation o"f the Soviet Union too. It is true, of course, that these great words are defined in accordance with Communist Party doctrine. Nevertheless, they are known in the U. S. S. R. It is my opinion, based on my own experience, that more than a few educated Soviets don't pay too much attention to Communist dogina and in- terpret and understand these ideas according to their own individual abilities, acquired knowledge, personal inclinations and life ex- THE GREAT PRETENSE 65 periences. And tliis way of tliiiikino- leads some individuals to a spiritual revolt against dogma. Wlien Hitler's armies invaded the Soviet Union, Soviet citizens did not want to fight for Lenin's or Stalin's dogmas and Stalin was forced to appeal to the national and religious traditions of the Soviet people, and particularly the Russian people, in order to defend his dictatorship. Stalin was never popular, even among the rank and file of Communist Party members. As a result of the last war, the Soviet young generation saw many foreign countries, had a chance to com- pare their own living conditions with those countries outside of the Soviet Union, came into personal contact with foreigners and learned to understand "real" life, having seen it with their own eyes. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, penetrating Soviet society from top to bottom, could not pass these facts by. In order to win the sympathies of these discontented thousands and thousands of people, and in order to mobilize them for further worlv in the name of the Communist goal, it became necessary to denounce Stalin. Tlie above-mentioned reasons, in my opinion, are the main reasons for the new line adopted by the 20th Communist Party congress. The meaning and possible results of the new line : MEANING 1. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has radically changed its strategy. The new strategy is directed toward winning allies among neutral and colonial countries in Asia and Africa. It is directed also toward establishing popular fronts by appealing to the Socialist parties of Europe. 2. The Soviet Union has launched a new type of aggression. On the face of it, it is a peaceful competition in economic and political fields. The Soviet leaders realize what nuclear weapons are, that no- body wants a new world war with its disastrous effects, and are trying to capitalize on this situation for their own profit. 3. Soviet huihan resources have been mobilized to fulfill tasks adopted by the 20th party congress. The regime has already started a gradual softening of its governing policy by promising greater participation for the people, and especially party members, in govern- ment and party organs. POSSIBLE RESULTS 1. It is quite possible that some countries of Asia and Africa will fall prey to the new line adopted by the congress. This is dangerous. 2. It is possible, too, that sme Socialist parties in Europe will fall victim to the new line, accepting it at its face value. This is very dangerous. 3. A large part of the population of the Soviet Union is likely to support the new line for, to the ordinary Soviet citizen, the name of Lenin still remains a symbol of the championing of their interests. It is my opinion that nobody is going to fight to restore the "good name" of Stalin. Plere and there in the U. S. S. R. local demonstra- tions against Khrushchev and company can occur, using the name of Stalin as an excuse. But there is no sign of real revolution or anything close to it. If Khrushchev and company had not been confident of the results of their line, they would not have launched it. 6G THE GREAT PRETENSE \ 4. The new line accepted at the 20th Communist Party congress is ' from one point of view a progressive step forward for the following reasons: The Soviet people did hear from Khrushchev and his col- leagues that Stalin was a dictator, a maniac, a murderer, a Red tsar. That is a very good lesson for all who venerated, for whatever reason, the late dictator. The Soviet people know well that the men who are denouncing Stalin today were only a short time ago his admirers and equally responsible for his crimes. It is not unlikely that in the future there might emerge a group denouncing, this time, Khrushchev and company, and it is quite logical that this will lead to criticism of Soviet leadership, one day to the denouncing of Lenin, too. At any rate, seeds have been planted for the denunciation of many aspects of Communist policy in the U. S. S. K. 5. The new line accepted by the congress will undoubtedly create chaos (it has created it already) among foreign Communist parties. It will take some time and much fighting before they will adjust to a new line. 6. The new line will create chaos among the satellites, too. 7. The free world is going to feel more Soviet infiltration and sub- version because of increasing Soviet economic and political collabora- tion with other countries. 8. It is also possible that in the future G. Malenkov, A. Mikoyan, and L. Kaganovich will be removed by Klirushchev as Stalin's ac- complices. The field will then be left to Khrushchev, Voroshilov, Zhukov, and Molotov, all of whom are Russians by national origin. The reason behind this thinking is that Malenkov and Mikoyan are, historically speaking, more responsible for Stalin's crimes than Khrushchev himself; besides which Mikoyan is of Armenian origin and Kaganovich is a Jew. In summary, the new line accepted by the 20th Communist Party congress of the Soviet Union presents a danger and a challenge both to the United States and to the world at large. A principal objective of the new line is isolation of the United States from the rest of the world. This danger and challenge must be met in the proper manner. There is no reason for relaxation or optimism. BEHIND THE FALL OF JOSEPH STALIN By Nicholas N. Poppe Nicholas N. Poppe was born in China and educated in Russia. From 1925 to 1941 he was professor of far eastern languages at the Univer- sity of Leningrad and from 1934 until 1943 a member of the Academy of Sciences of the U. S. S. R. A specialist on Outer Mongolia and Russian Central Asian areas, Professor Poppe conducted numerous expeditions in the Mongolian "People's Republic" and Siberia. He is the author of 20 books and more than 100 articles on the Soviet Union. Now a citizen of the United States, he is en the faculty of the University of Washing- ton and is associated with research for the university's inter-Asia project. The most outstanding feature of the 20th Congress of the Com- munist Party of the U. S. S. R. is the posthumous dethronement of Stalin, followed by a repudiation of most of his deeds. The "great and infallible leader"' of yesterday has suddenly become a cruel blundering creature. The party congress also denounced the principle of individual dictatorship as anti-Marxist, and declared that hence- forth leadership will be collective. This new development poses sev- eral questions. First of all, does this mean that Soviet communism is becoming less aggressive and more moderate? Everyone who knows the U. S. S. E. and the strategy and tactics of communism will emphatically deny this. The ultimate aim of communism, namely, the S])read of communism all over the world, will remain the same. Khruschchev himself unequivocally stated at the congress that a clam might sooner whistle than will Leninist principles be abandoned. This demonstrates clearly that the slogan of peaceful coeixstence and the sweet words spoken by Soviet leaders touring in foreign countries have no real value. The immediate future will show that the so-called collective leadership will be no less difficult to deal with than Stalin was. Only the methods will change. While Stalin based his policies on undisguised brutality, the new leaders of the U. S. S. K. will camouflage their activities with friendly gestures and sweet words. The denunciation of w^orship of personality will certainly be inter- preted in some foreign countries as a fundamental change in Soviet communism. The purpose of Khrushchev's offer of cooperation made to all Socialist Parties, including the Social Democrats, is to facilitate the activities of Communist Parties in other countries. It will certainly require great efforts on the part of the United States Legislature or that of any other democratic nation, to forbid the activities of a party "peacefully cooperating'' with some non-Communist groups and using "purely parliamentary methods." In brief, Khruslichev''s speech has, to a certain degree, deprived our judiciary of its strongest weapon against the Communist Party which hitherto has been labeled as an organization aiming at the violent overthrow of the United States Government. Now it has officially become a nonviolent party em- ploying parliamentary methods. 67 68 THE GREAT PRETENSE Kliriislicliev's speech also demonstrates that the menace of military aggression has become less acute. Instead, subversion and infiltration will undoubtedly increase, especially in countries which may be lulled by the present sweetness of the Soviets into relaxing their vigilance. By posthumously discrowning Stalin, the present leaders have also given their "toiling masses" new hope that things may gradually be- come different. At any rate, the Communist Party of the U. S. "S. R. has found a new scapegoat on which they can put the blame for all the failures and shortcomings of the past. One might ask with regard to the defamation of Stalin whether it will affect the other Communist countries, especially Eed China. The East European satellite countries hardly deserve mention in this context, because none of them has ever been ruled by a dictator as worshipped as Stalin was. Of course, they will automatically change to collective leadership with not much fuss about it. Eed China is ruled by Mao Tse-tung who plays a role somewhat similar to the one which_ Stalin played. There are as many pictures of Mao displayed in China as there were portraits of Stalin in tlie U. S. S. R. The "works" of both Stalin and Mao has been published in millions of copies. Will Mao really fall? Red China is different from the East European Communist coun- tries, because it is not a satellite but an ally of the U. S. S. R. So far the Soviets have not forced any decisions on Mao and his Communist Party. The Soviets have been cautious enough not to antagonize the Chinese Communists and make them enter the road to Titoism. It should be also remarked that the Soviet press always mentions Red Cliina first and the satellites last, although the mention of China should alphabetically fellow that of Albania and Bulgaria. It is improbable that the Soviets will demand that the Chinese Communists demote Mao. Similar to their present tolerant attitude toward Tito, they will not interfere with Mao's position. However, communism strives for a uniformity which by far exceeds the Gleichschaltung of the Nazis. The Chinese Communists themselves often declare that "the Soviet Union of today is China of tomorrow." China is swarm- ing with Soviet advisers and aids. It is to be assumed that they will try to make the idea of collective leadership attractive to the Chinese. If they succeed in achieving their purpose by peaceful means, Mao will surrender part of his responsibilities to a group of which he will become a member. There is no doubt that Chou En-lai will become another member of that group. The time is opportune for such a change, because the Chinese Communists are facing serious problems posed by the collectivization of the farms. Besides, Mao is no longer young and his health is not very good. He might even like the new idea, because in the case of ill success he will not be blamed for it as would be a leader who failed. But if he and his group refuse to change over to collective leadership, this will cause a split between Red China and the U. S. S. R. On the other hand, if he refuses but some other leaders of the Red Chinese accept the new line of collective leadership, this may result in civil war in China. However, it is rather to be expected that the solution will be a peaceful one. Either will Mao voluntarily accept the principle of collective leadership or the Soviets will leave him alone for the remaining years of his life in the same manner as they follow a soft line in their j)resent relations with Tito. NEWEST TRICK OF THE KREMLIN By Yuri Rastvorov Yuri Rastvorov, former lieutenant colonel in the Red army, was the chief Soviet agent in Japan at the time he placed himself under the protection of the United States Army as a political refugee in January 1954. A protege of Lavrenti Beria, Stalin's chief of the secret police who was executed after the dictator's death, Colonel Rastvorov was trained on the Japan desk of a special Soviet Foreign Office section under the direct control of Beria's MVD organization. Drafted into the army in 1939, he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the military intelligence service in 1941 and 2 years later was assigned to the secret political police in Moscow. In 1946 he was assigned to Japan, ostensibly as an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but actually in charge of the Soviet espionage apparatus there. 1. By their rejection of Stalin and his past mistakes, the Kremlin leaders hope to win the approval of the Western World and further their overt policy of peaceful coexistence. It is a new trick to lull the Western World into a belief in their sincerity. I do not agree with the thesis presented in the press to the effect that the denunciation of Stalin may have been forced bj' Zhukov and other army leaders, as I do not feel that the army has enough influence to atfect Kremlin policies seriously. 2. It is my opinion that the denunciation will ultimatel}^ have a favorable reaction amono; the people of the U. S. S. K., especially among Great Kussians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians, who sufl'ered most under Stalin's rule. By exposing the evils of Stalin and re- turning to the principles of Lenin, the new leaders expect to find favor with the Soviet people, particularly those millions who were personally affected by the crimes of the Stalin regime. They hope to become the symbol of a rebirth of justice in the U. S. S. K., and are confident that with the aid of their tremendous propaganda machine, this may be ac- complished in a relatively short period of time. 3. The people of the Georgian Republic may represent an exception to the above, since they enjoyed a favored position under Stalin. Dur- ing my service in the Soviet MVD, I frequently heard complaints voiced by individuals who had spent many years in Georgia and wit- nessed the economic and political privileges accorded there. The Kremlin leaders undoubtedly anticipated the opposition which re- portedly arose in Georgia as a result of the denunciations, and were prepared with appropriate counter-measures. 4. I do not believe that the present Kremlin leaders had any role in Stalin's deatli. Although it would be a mistake to assume that they had been entirely deceived, I believe that with very few exceptions, Stalin's associates and members of the central committee were unaware of the true nature of his endless purges and criminal acts. In addi- tion, being a master of intrigue, Stalin established a fantastic appara- tus of counterintelligence organizations, which made it virtually im- 69 70 THE GREAT PRETENSE possible to undertake any practical steps against liim. Lastly, toward the end of his life Stalin surrounded himself with fawning, trusted individuals, among whom he sowed the seeds of insecurity and suspi- cion, so that they dared not organize any opposition. 5. I feel that the Kremlin deliberately permitted the information on the denunciation of Stalin to leak to the public, since it has every means at its disposal to keep such secrets indefinitely. One indica- tion that such was the case was the reading of extracts of Khrushchev's speech at closed meetings of local Communist parties throughout the Soviet Union. However, I do not believe that the Soviet leaders will make a public statement on the same theme, or that they will actually publish Khrushchev's speech. 6. We may anticipate the following additional developments as a result of Khrushchev''s speech : (a) Probably certain individuals will be publicly purged as scape- goats. (h) There will be a continuing resurrection of Stalin's purge vic- tims, and their restoration in Soviet history as heroes of the revolution. The resurrection might even extend as far as Leon Trotsky. 7. In summation, I do not feel that the denunciation of Stalin repre- sents or anticipates any basic changes in Soviet goals, nor does it in- dicate a sincere effort on the part of Soviet leaders to atone for loast crimes against their peox^le. RED DANCE OF DEATH By William Philip Simms William Philip Simms, foreign editor emeritus of the Scripps-Howard newspapers, has a long-established reputation as an authority on Soviet affairs. During the First World War, he was at the Czar's head- quarters and has revisited the Soviet Union numerous times since the revolution. He was in Russia in 1937 during Stalin's purge of the Red Army — one of the excesses which is figuring prominently in the current desanctification of the late dictator. Faces may change inside tlie Kremlin, and so may Soviet tactics, but Moscow's goal of world domination has not swerved an inch since, the Eed dance of death began back in 1917. Because that is so ; because the goal is more shrewdly camouflaged than in the past, and because Russia is militarily more capable than ever of carrying it out, the United States and the West are in graver peril at this moment than at any time since the Bolshevik revolution. The notion that Khrushchev, Bulganin, Molotov, and company have suddenly got religion, and are now somehow different from what they were w4ien they were Stalin's hatchet-men, will be rank poison if swallowed by the American people. When a real change comes to Moscow, we won't have to guess at it. The w^hole world will know it. As long as Russia holds on to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Esto- nia, Lithuania, and her other conquests ; as long as she refuses to accept ■ any kind of mutually cheat-proof arms limitation plan ; as long as she continues to conspire with Communist nationals in every country in the world to overthrow their own governments, she clearly has not changed one iota. When the Kremlin's bosses grant freedom of speech, press, and re- ligion; when they welcome a multiparty political system and insure genuinely free elections ; when Russian workers are at liberty to move to any part of the Soviet Union and engage in any kind of work they please; or go into business for themselves if they prefer; when they permit their own people to travel abroad and foreigners to come and go in Russia as foreigners are permitted to move about the free world, then we will know there has been a change. So long as the U. S. S. R, hides everything she does behind an iron curtain, and everything she thinks behind gobbledygook, she cannot be trusted. Deceit, lying, and double-crossing have been among her chief instruments of national policy from the outset. 4: * * * :N 4: * Basic Communist policy was laid down by Leon Trotsky at Brest-" Litovsk in 1918. It was : Not peace, not war, but keep the free world in a constant state of eruption until strife-weary peo]5les everywhere fall into Russia's clutches out of sheer desperation. But the jack-booted Germans refused to stop the war on any such arrangement as that. Instead, they mashed Russia's face into the mud 71 72 THE GREAT PRETENSE and tore the country apart. Whereupon Lenin wrote his famous postscript to the Trotsky ukase: Peace, he said, would have to be accepted but only to give the Reds time in which to stage a decisive comeback. "The proletariat of the world," he added, "will come to our assistance." Then we will lay the bourgeoisie and the imperialists low. The biggest irony of the present moment is that Trotsky's brains were bashed in because he held that Stalin was not a true follower of Lenin. For now come Khrushchev, ]\Iolotov, and other Stalinites to say, in effect, that Trotsky and the vast horde of liquidated Trotsky- ites were right all the time. Which means, if it means anything at all, that Khrushchev and his comrades haven't the slightest intention of abandoning the Lenin- Trotsky concept of not war, not peace, but world domination through international conspiracy. How, under the circumstances, any in- formed person can believe that recent events in Moscow are a hopeful sign, is beyond this observer's ken. Khrushchev, et al., do not say Stalin was wrong insofar as he sought to promote world revolution. On the contrary, they denounce him for butchering better Bolsheviks than he and falling down on his real job which was plotting the downfall of free nations. It would seem, therefore, that the most that can be said for the latest Moscow spectacular is that it is just another different, but typical, Communist zigzag. More powerful than ever before and better organized everywhere for international sabotage and boring from within, there is consider- able evidence that Khrushchev and his fellow conspirators now believe they can achieve their goal without actual war — that is, without a war in which Russia herself would be directly or legally involved. All around the globe — in Western and Southern Europe, in Asia, Africa and the Americas, and in all the strategic islands of the seas, their agents are turning every national difficulty to ISIoscow's advantage. In a number of trouble spots blood is already flowing. In others, sinister preparations are clearly under way. Everywhere hidden hands are helping to foment racial, religious, and social strife and political rebellion. Nothing is neglected, however insignificant, which will soften up the free world against The Day. Moscow is not entirely without reason in feeling cocky. Under the terms of the Russo-German truce of 1918, Russia lost one-quarter of her population and arable land, one-third of her factories, three- fourths of her coal production and her railway system. Today, just 38 j^ears after, approximately two-thirds of the total world population are either Reds, pinks, fellow-travelers or sympathetic neutrals. Small wonder that Khrushchev now o^^enly boasts of "our certain vic- tory" over the other third. ******* European intelligence reports reveal that Khrushchev and his co- conspirators believe that Soviet atomic bombs now fully counter- balance ours. From that, they conclude that they have little to fear from an atomic war because both sides realize that such a war might well prove fatal to both. That being so, "conventional" armies and .weapons may now be said to have come back into their own. THE GREAT PRETENSE 73 This makes Kliruslicliev's present drive for conventional arms reduc- tion especially interesting;. One reason for it, of course, is its propa- ganda value but most likely there are others more important still. By a sort of package deal Russia might hope to obtain some kind of a ban on atomic weapons which would leave the way open for her to hold on to hers without the allies being able to catch her at it. Secondly — and perhaps the most important — any further reduction of the already skeletonized forces of Western Europe would leave that whole area at the mercy of the powerful fifth columns everywhere rampant. Some of Western Europe's ke}" countries — which, at the same time, are ke}' countries in NATO — already live in fear of a Red coup from within. In them are enormous Communist populations, trained and disciplined in the use of conventional weapons, sabotage, and violence. The Spanish civil war revealed how easily these could be secretly aided by Moscow. Thus, what happened to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and other countries taken over by the Communists, could also liaj^pen there. Until we can eliminate all guesswork, and until some of the things enumerated above actually offer proof that there has been a genuine change of heart as well as of faces in the Kremlin, for us to enter into any bargain with it as tlie result of wishful thinking would be the deepest folly. Meantime, 10 years and $50 billion worth of trying, ought to have convinced us that true friendship cannot be bought. In my humble opinion the greatest possible service we can do for our own people, for our allies, for the cause of world peace and mankind in general is to make the United States itself as nearly invincible as humanly pos- sible. If we do that, and are as just as we are powerful, loyal friends, of their own accord, will gladly rally round us. We won't have to go, moneybags in hand, seeking them. 77722—56- THE 20TH PARTY CONGRESS By Nicholas S. Timasheff Nicholas S. Timasheff was born in St. Petersburg and received a degree of doctor of laws from the University of St. Petersburg in 1914. Later, he taught at the School of Economics of the Polytechnic Institute of Petrograd and the University of Prague and at the Sorbonne. He is now professor of sociology at Fordham University. This year he is teaching at the University of Groningen in Holland as a visiting profes- sor. Dr. Timasheff is the author of 14 books and numerous articles which have appeared in professional journals in the United States and Europe. The 20tli congress of tlie Communist Party and its aftermatli have made final the debunking of Stalin which had begun soon after his death. Stalin is now explicitly accused of having replaced the "Len- inist doctrine of collective leadership" by personal leadership aggra- vated by an imposed cult of the leader's personality ; of having com- mitted terrible blunders during the months preceding Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union; of having usurped the glory of victory; of having ruled by terrorism under which nobody, including his closest lieutenants, could feel safe; of having given wrong interpretations to the economic doctrine of socialism, etc. Although the official slogan is now back to Lenin, Lenin has also been debunked, tliough partly and implicitly. In Khrushchev's first speech at the congress the doctrine was unfolded according to which communism can be achieved by peace- ful means, not necessarily by violence ; consequently, there can be many varieties of Communist society. This is contrary to Lenin's teaching expressed with great strength in his State and Eevolution (1917) and emphasized in later works (as well as in those of Stalin) . That teach- ing explicitly rejected a statement made by INIarx in 1872 in Amster- dam to the eil'ect that in countries like England and the United States communism might be achieved by democratic means. Some interpreters have been inclined to see in the statements of Khrushchev a symptom of the fact that he had achieved the same supremacy as Stalin (and, let us say, Lenin). It is, however, more probable that the views expressed at the congress are shared by all the members of the ruling group, though perhaps some (Khrushchev, Bul- ganin, and INIikoyan) desire a debunking to the bitter end, wdiile others (Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovitch) would prefer not to go too far. The victory of the first grouiD over the second is probably due to the decisive influence of Zhukov, who, without belonging to the narrow group of the policymakers, represents the views of the majority of the marshals and of the top army generals. One may now better undei^tand the causes of the demotion of Malenkov: he was so close to Stalin that, were he still the official head of the Soviet Government, the complete debunking of Stalin would have been very difficult to explain to the people. 74 THE GREAT PRETENSE dO Why liave the lenders of the Soviet Union decided to debunk Stalin and to correct Lenin ? Obviously, for the sake of appeasement, both within and outside. Within, the situation remains tense as it had been throughout the postwar period. Outside the Soviet Union the clec- laration of the possibility of the peaceful advancement of communism is desicned to prepare a better climate for tlie unfolding of the new, bold, and more dangerous policy than Stalin's had been. The main problem to be discussed here is. Will the retreat from some positions firmly occupied by the Communist leaders during the almost 40 years of their rule over Eussia achieve the desired effects? This problem must be explored in four directions: the impact of the new doctrine (1) on the internal situation, (2) on the international rela- tions, (3) on the so-called foreign (i. e., non-Eussian) parties, and (4) on some groups of intellectuals in the free world, especially in the United States. 1. The goal to appease the people within the Soviet Union may be partly reached. Eank-and-file citizens will probably start thinking along the lines suggested by the congress speeches and by the millions of agitators now at work. But in the Soviet Union the masses mean very little; what matters are the attitudes of more sophisticated peo- ple, especially of the gigantic bureaucracy, civilian and military. These persons are, however, intelligent enough to ask themselves, and to discuss with close friends, the cjuestions. Where were all the Khru- shchevs, Bulganins, etc., when Stalin was committing his evil deeds; were they not loyally serving and helping him in place of trying to destroy him? From recent articles in the Pravda one can already guess the line of defense of those now in power. Of course, they saw the evil and wanted to destroy Stalin's rule ; but among his lieutenants there was another monster, Beria, wlio loyally served and helped Stalin, had at his disposal the apparatus of the political police, and would have annihilated anj'one claring to counter Stalin's policies. Now they have got rid of him and have not allowed anyone to take over his position ; therefore, now the reversal of the wrong policies is possible and will be undertaken. Whether this explanation will be readily accepted is subject to doubt. Moreover, even the appeasement of the masses remains dubious. On the one hand, the new rulers dis- play no tendency to change the economic structure and policy : heavy industry will continue prevailing and, tlierefore, the supply of con- sumer goods will remain unsatisfactory, both quantitatively and quali- tatively ; moreover, not only will there be no retreat from the collec- tivization of the homesteads, but, quite probably, Khrushchev's pet idea, that of transforming the collective farms into ''agrotowns" will be partly put in operation. On the other hand, promises of a sub- stantial liberalization of criminal law, criminal procedure, and police practices still remain promises. 2. In international relations, the new policy will facilitate the formation of alliances between the Communists and Socialists in free countries. These alliances, as shown by experience, alwa3's result in the absorption of the latter by the former. In this way, here and there Marxian majorities could be returned to parliaments, and then the jjeaceful transformation of the corresponding countries in Marxian societies could be performed without violence, as well as their shift from the camp of free society to that of .Communist society. The 76 THE GREAT PRETENSE danger is tlie greater since, from tlie twenties on, tlie decisive differ- ence between communism and socialism was asserted to concern itself with the attitude toward violence — positive on the part of the former, negative on the part of the latter. If this difference is gone, the merger of the two parties inspired by Marxism will no longer be very difficult. There are, of course, other differences between the two : the Socialists are now satisfied with planned economy, while the Communists insist on integral collectivization of tli« means of production. Therefore, the Socialists can promise no more than remuneration of work pro- portionate to one's contribution, while the Communists promise re- muneration according to needs and thereby complete social and eco- nomic equality of the citizens. But the Communists could easily concede that, for the time being, they would be satisfied wath the more moderate program of the Socialists. Pineau's speeches prove that the reconciliation of the Connnunists and Socialists is no longer impossible. 3. The foreign Communist parties will be in an embarrassing posi- tion ; splits in their midst are possible. But, most probably, the new policy proclaimed in Moscow will prevail; it is an easier and less dangerous policy, and the rank-and-file members will prefer it. But a certain danger for the worldwide dominance of Moscow over the international Communist movement is involved : some Communist parties, not only in the free world, but perhaps among the satellites, could choose the plan of molding communism according to their preferences, the following the now officially approved example of Yugoslavia. Of course, the leaders of the free world should miss no opportunity to strengthen and help such developments, 4. Among the intellectuals of the free world, including the United States, a new wave of movements sympathetic to communism may be expected. Such movements are always based on the combination of two ideas: (1) the assumption that the Marxian doctrine has discov- ered "iron laws" of social evolution, the unfolding of which neces- sarily will lead to tlie triumph of communism, and (2) the assumption that, in pure form, the Communist ideal is a fair approximation to social justice. The forces of attraction have been commonly balanced by repulsion caused by the doctrine of violence and the terroristic practice of the Soviet rulers. Now that violence is declared to be only an ultima ratio, and the condemnation of Stalin's terrorism implies a promise to display more regard to human rights, this balance may be disturbed, in the minds of many. Consequently, a new wave of conversions to communism may be expected. This wave should be arrested both by preventive and repressive means, in other words, by relentless explanation of the evils of communism and of the lofty ideal of freedom, and by the elimination of Communists and sympa- thizers from all jjositions where they could be actually dangerous. Moi"e vigilance than ever will be required. But are not the changes in the Communist doctrine so drastic that, after all, the general attitude of the American Government and public opinion toward communism could be revised? The answer is "no," because the changes still remain on the surface. The Communist doc- trine never included the proposition that the ultimate victory of com- munism could come only through war ; it always included the proposi- tion that this victory would come by inner necessity ; and since Stalin's THE GREAT PRETENSE 77 time it has included, implicitly, the proposition that this victory could come only under Russian leadership (Lenin thought differently) and, therefore, will result in a world ruled from Moscow. There is no symptom whatsoever that these basic propositions would no longer be accepted; this is conspicuously manifested in the fact that there is no talk of letting the peoples of the satellites freely choose their social and political order. What has changed, is tactics, not strategy. Consequently, for the Western World the question is that of adjusting to the new situation its tactics, but not of revising its basic strategy of firm and relentless opposition to any advance of communism. THE NEW SOVIET STRATEGY: TOUGHEST CHALLENGE YET By the Research Institute of America The Research Institute of America, with a 600-man staff and $5 million annual budget, advises more than 300 clients and is one of the largest organizations of its kind in the world. As early as April 1953 the insti- tute warned its members to watch for one Nikita S. Khrushchev to emerge as top man in Russia. Its report on the Challenge of Soviet Russia, presented here in slightly condensed form, was started at the time of the Geneva Conference last July. "It is not a happy one," declared Leo Cherne, the institute's executive director. "We found little to be happy about, for a free society rarely meets any crisis promptly or in its early stages adequately." These are the hard facts : Economic and military strength of the Moscow-directed one-third of the globe is rising steadily. The new Soviet leaders' domestic and foreign policies are far more subtle and shrewd than those of Stalin. Most important, the new Soviet policies have been astonishingly successful. It adds up to this : Eight now, we and our allies are losing the battle against world communism. Here are the conclusions of the Research Institute's experts who, with Harry Schwartz, the New York Times specialist on Russia, have been closely following developments behind the Iron Curtain — the shifting events which culminated in the new policy statements pro- claimed at the 20th Communist Party Congress in Moscow this February. THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP Wlien Stalin ruled the Soviet empire with an iron fist, Khrushchev and Bulganin helped execute his policies — and his opponents. When the aging Stalin conducted Soviet foreign policy in full battle dress, Khrushchev and Bulganin were among his toughest lieutenants. But Stalin's rigidities during his last years resulted in strong anti-Com- munist countermoves by the West. So, in order to weaken Western resistance to the Communist advance, the new Soviet leaders have gone back to the more flexible — and effective — policies that Stalin himself used in the 1930's, while pretending to repudiate Stalin's policies and actually destroying his place in Soviet mythology. Chalking up Communist gains in India, Indonesia, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, the new Soviet leaders have also largely resolved the domestic problem of Stalin's succession, and they have done so with- out wrecking the Stalinist system and without an excess of bloodshed and purges. Only one of the original contenders for Stalin's throne, Beria, had to be shot, and only two, ]\f alenkov and Molotov, had to be humiliated publicly. Despite the talk in Moscow about "collective leadership," the fact is that Khrushchev controls the reins of power. He alone in the Soviet Union today stands above criticism and need not acknowledge 78 THE GREAT PRETENSE 73 past mistakes (all errors can now be blamed on Stalin and "Beria, who are safely dead) , even thonc'h at least one colossal Khrushchev boner — the enormous program to plow and plant 75 million acres of grain in arid parts of Siberia — proved to be an expensive folly last year. Khrushchev, like Stalin in the early days, is busy accruing personal prestige and downgrading possible opponents while putting his own followers into positions of power. He does not yet have the enormous prestige that Stalin enjoj^ed after he led Russia to victory against Hitler. Khrushchev may not have the time to win a comparable posi- tion of absolute supremacy — he is over 60, Stalin was well under 50 when control slipped from Lenin's dying hands. Khrushchev, unlike Stalin, has to listen to — even if not heed — the members of his "team" before making decisions. But Khrushchev has the tremendous ad- vantage of Stalin's experience and can therefore avoid the foreign policy blunders of his predecessor while working for absolute dicta- torial control. Khrushchev — unlike Stalin — must take notice of the interests of key groups Avho control great power levers in the state, particularly the army. Tlie unprecedented elevation of Marshal Zhukov to the top dozen of Soviet rulers is the most vivid proof. Stalin was far too aware of the possibility of a military coup d'etat to give such stature to a military man. Today, the promotion of Zhukov to a high party post assures solid militarj^ support of the regime ; also, some of Zhu- kov's immense popularity, won in wartime, now rubs off on the ruling clique. But Zhukov's promotion puts him too close to the throne for Khrushchev's comfort — if anything goes wrong. KHRUSHCHEV — LIMITED DICTATOR To sum up : Khrushchev rules "Russia today, but only with the advice and consent of his immediate colleagues in the Presidium of the Cen- tral Committee of the Communist Party. The members of this body give every evidence of understanding that an out-and-out battle among them could destroy the whole Soviet power position as well as en- danger their own lives. There are still rivalries and disagreements, but these are now being subordinated to the task of increasing world- wide Communist power. Should Khrushchev die, should Soviet foreign policy be forced to suffer a major setback, the quiescent struggle for Stalin's mantle could flare up again, as it did in the spring of 1953. But for the time being, there is stability — a tremendous asset to the Soviet State. WITIIIX RUSSIA : LESS UXREST One of the great assets of the "West after "World "War II was the restlessness and resentment of the stanchest anti-Communists of all : the people of Kussia who live under the boot of totalitarianism. A "Western policy of strength kept alive the spark of freedom in the Russian people. That spark may now be going out because of the inertia of the "West. Should it expire, the "West will have lost its army of allies who live on the enemy's home ground. "\Vhy has this happened? First, at Geneva last summer, whatever the intent of the "Western leaders, the impression was given to the whole world, including the people behind the Iron Cui'tain, that .we 80 THE GREAT PRETENSE actually believed in tlie possibility that tlie Eussian leaders wanted to coexist with us. The people most discouraged by the spurious spirit of Geneva were the anti-Communists behind the Eussian curtain. Second, Stalin's successors have realized that accumulated pressure under a sewer cover can blow the lid sky high. To lessen the pres- sure under their regime, they have gone part of the way toward meet- ing some of the basic grievances of the Eussian people. The new leaders have sharply increased peasants' incomes by rais- ing prices paid for farm produce, including grain, livestock products, potatoes, etc. They have increased the supply of food and consumer goods for the population, going so far even as to buy large quantities of meat and butter abroad to make up for deficient home production. They have given greater priority to housing construction. And they have cut the average workweek down to 46 hours, with further reduction promised. They have curbed the power of the secret police and executed some of the"^ highest police leaders. They have loosened the shackles on the intellectuals so that writers can write somewhat more freely and scientists can communicate more easily with foreign scientists. They have promised a number of major additional concessions in the next year or two: the end of tuition fees in high schools and colleges, higher pay for the lowest paid workers, higher pensions for the millions of aged pensioners whose government ftayments now are so completely inadequate that even men and women of 75 and 80 must work to avoid starvation. The upper ranks of the Soviet bureaucracy have been oriven a device to permit them to pass on their superior status to their chil- dren. This is the system of boarding schools — Soviet Etons and Harrows — which Khrushchev announced will be set up to train the Soviet leaders of tomorrow. An effort is being made to heal the deep wounds left by Stalin's purges of the 1930's. Many of the victims are to be rehabilitated, and where such rehabilitation is posthumous, suitable recompense will presumably be made to the victims' surviving families. All this adds up to a considerable revolution for a period of 3 years. It has not been accomplished without cost, including a substantial inflationary pressure which is causing Khrushchev great concern. The economic concessions — which still leave the Soviet standard of living and the degree of freedom in the Soviet Union far from satis- factory to its own people — have probably strengthened the regime at home on balance, but they raise the question of whether the population will not demand more. The problem will be particularly acute in the next few years when the Soviet leaders expect to be able to reduce high prices only slowly. A great deal depends on what the West will do to increase the internal pressures against the Eed regime. Strong opposition to Soviet moves in Asia and the Middle East would help to reactivate a spirit of resistance inside the Iron Curtain. RED MILITARY STRENGTH Stalin's successors have essentially ended American nuclear monopoly and created what is for all practical purposes a military stalemate. In the past 3 years they have produced powerful hydrogen bombs, and long-distance jet bombers capable of delivering such bombs THE GREAT PRETENSE 81 to American cities. They hint, aiul possibly not without some justi- fication, that they are ahead of the United States in developing long- range guided and ballistic missiles. These are historic accomplish- ments. They have fundamentally changed the world balance of power as against what it was when Stalin died in March 1953. In these accomplishments lies much of the explanation for the Soviet leaders' present genuine confidence. EED DirLOMACT ASCENDING Stalin's successors have made deep inroads among the neutral nations of the world. Khrushchev and Bulganin's trip to India, Burma, and Afghanistan raised Soviet prestige greatly in those coun- tries. The swap of Czechoslovak arms for Egyptian cotton, plus the all-out Kremlin support for the Arab nations in their dispute with. Israel, have greatly heightened Soviet influence throughout the stra- tegic and oil-rich Middle East. Pakistan, a key link in the free world chain of alliances in Asia, has been softened up by trade offers from Eussia and sweet words from Communist China. Marshal Tito's regime in Yugoslavia, once clearly an ally of the free world because of Stalin's excommunication of Tito, has been nudged out of the Western camp closer to the Soviet bloc. The result of these and similar measures has been that the prestige of the West, particularly the United States, has j)lummeted in many parts of the world while Moscow's and Peiping's influence has soared. At the 20th Communist Party Congress in IMoscow in February 1956, Khrushchev and company unveiled their plans for exploiting the new world situation for their own benefit. The long-range Com- munist strategy is now based on the following premises : No major nuclear war is likely for the foreseeable future. This is the meaning of Khrushchev's new dictum that there is no "fatal in- evitability" of war. Russia intends to keep militarily strong, and its leaders do not exclude the possibility of little wars which might grow into big ones. Soviet leaders now base their plans on the assumption that a military stalemate exists between them and the free world, and that therefore, other weapons — political and economic in the main — must be relied on to attain their goals. SOVIET PROGRESS TO DATE The economic power of the Soviet bloc will grow very rapidly dur- ing the foreseeable future, increasing the Communist potential for victory. This rapid growth is already exerting a tremendous mag- netic effect upon the underdeveloped countries now searching for quick roads to industrialization. Communist influence will grow in the underdeveloped countries if the Communist nations can show the ability to increase production, raise standards of living, health, and education, and to modernize formerly backward areas. You should know that particular importance is being attached to North Korea where, with great cooperation from other Communist coun- tries, Moscow is trying to create a showplace of economic recovery intended to contrast with inflation-ridden South Korea. Should the plan succeed, it could exercise tremendous influence over all Asia. The Communist confidence in their ability to grow rapidly in the 82 THE GREAT PRETENSE future is largely based on the beanstalking of the Soviet economy in the past 10 years. Perhaps the most dramatic evidence — though not entirely pertinent to the future — is the record of the Soviet produc- tion increase between 1945 and 1955 as shown below : Commodity Unit 1945 1955 Coal - Million metric tons do 149.3 19.4 4.3.2 S.9 12 3 1.6 64.5 390.1 Petroleum .. 70.7 Electricity Billion kiiowiitt-hours. Million metric tons,-. . _do 170.2 Pis iron 33.3 Steel 45.2 Cotton cloth .■5.9 Leather shoos 297.4 The expansion shown in this table cannot be sustained since it was the result of very special conditions. It was easier to rebuild war- damaged plants after 1945 than it is to build new ones from scratch. The Russians moved billions of dollars worth of machinery and raw materials from Eastern Europe and Manchuria to their own factories. The level of productivity in the early postwar years was so low that it was comparatively easy to raise it rapidly. Yet, even after allow- ance has been made for such special factors, it is clear that an impres- sive job of industrial reconstruction and expansion was accomplished in Russia this past decade. NEW RUSSIAN ECONOMIC GOALS The Soviet leadership fully realizes that their country has tremen- dous reserves of untapped raw materials, particularly in the area beyond the Urals. In the past few years they have found extensive deposits of iron ore, coal, petroleum, bauxite, rare metals, uranium, and the like. The great rivers of Siberia have an enormous electric power potential. All these vast resources are scheduled to be exploited in the years immediately ahead. The final goal is not only to out- produce the United States but also to turn out more steel, coal, elec- tricity, and the like, per capita, than this country. Of course, these ambitious goals are set in comparison with present United States output figures. They ignore the further expansion which will inevitably occur in this country. Plowever, even in these terms, the advances which Soviet leaders are seeking are impressive (same units as above) : _ _ Commodity Soviet Russia United States, 1055 actual: 1955 actual 1960 goal 1905 probable goal ' 448 ..- - Coal -. 390.1 70.7 170.2 33.3 45.2 593 135 320 53 68.3 700 332 . Petroleum Electricity _ Pig iron 200 623 - 600 70.9 . 70 106 - Steel 90 'Research Institute estimates based on Soviet statements. The essential point of this table is that by 1965 Soviet leaders hope to come very close to the output levels now prevailing in the United THE GREAT PRETENSE S3 States. Tliis means that unless we can maintain an equal rate of expansion the gap between the two economies will have been narrowed sisfnificantly within these next 10 years. Moreover, since the great bulk of Soviet production goes for capital equipment and arms— not for passenger cars and other consumer dur- able goods — they expect to surpass the United States in machinery output earlier than 19G5. So far as armaments go, of course, the maintenance of a high leA'el of preparedness will be far less burdensome on the Soviet economy when and if it produces 70-90 million tons of steel than is true now. Of course there is no certainty that the Soviet leaders will reach the indicated goals by IDGO and 1905. They are counting on a substantial increase in productivity through the widespread introduction of auto- mation, and on an ability to continue giving heavy industry a higher priority than consumer goods. The odcTs are that rapid Soviet economic growth will continue. The Soviet leaders' perspectives go beyond their own country to the Communist bloc as a vrhole — a bloc which now embraces over one-third of mankind. For the longer pull, Moscow hopes tliat Communist China will become one of the world's great economic powers. Already the addition to Communist power provided by Eastern Europe and Communist Asia is not negligible, and the Communists intend it shall grow as the following table shows (same units as above) : United States, Britain, France, West actuul: Germany 1C55 Commodity Total Soviet Bloc 1955 actual i 1960 goal » 862 5 - --- Coal £30 85 240 60 1,255 336 --- Petroleum Electricity Steel 163 823 - -- 425 160 2 - 91 > Research Institute estimates. SOVIET STRATEGY AGAINST THE WEST The Communist leaders believe that the phenomenal economic progress of the free world, particularly the United States, is nearing its end, and a major capitalist depression is in the offing. Khrushchev ended his analysis of the current state of world capitalism with the declaration that "capitalism is steadily moving toward new economic and social upheavals." If the difficulties they hope for come, the Soviet Union and its allies will know full well how to take advantage of the economic, social, and political disorganization they would pro- duce. It does not matter that Soviet hopes for a full-scale depression are doomed to disappointment — at least as far as the United States is con- cerned. Several of the economies of Western Europe continue to show a slower rate of economic progi*ess ; even more significant is the fact that they are far more vulnerable to the possibility of recession than is the United States. And Russia is no longer betting blindly on the inevitabilitj' of an economic collapse in the West. Soviet leaders now regret Stalin's earlier adventures — such as the Korean war — which forced the West to rearm. This rearmament, they 84 THE GREAT PRETENSE have now come to believe, is tlie main reason why the depression has not come about. In part, the Soviet campaign for disarmament now is motivated by the belief that any substantial decline of Western arms production could really mean a collapse of western economies ; at the same time they argue publicly that for them a decline in arms would be helpful in freeing resources for developing their economy. The result of this caution is that Communist theorists have decided that world capitalism — meaning the United States and Western Europe — has a fatal weakness aside from the possibility of a full-scale depression. This is the United States and western dependence on imported raw materials from Asia, Africa, and South America. A writer in Pravda recently pointed out that well over half of all the free world's reserves of such vital resources as oil, iron ore, manganese, chrome, tin, diamonds, cobalt, copper, bauxite, uranium, lithium, graphite, natural rubber, and other major raw materials is to be found in the underdeveloped countries. In the Communist view, any tactic which tends to cut the United States and Western Europe off from these raw materials sources strikes at the real foundations of western strength. Also, the narrower the raw material base available to the Western World the narrower the market for the West's manufactured products and the more intense the rivalries of western countries for the available sources and markets. It is from this reasoning that the current and so far effective. Communist propaganda and aid campaign has proceeded in the underdeveloped countries. On the basis of all these factors. Communist leaders now believe that, by using a varied series of tactics, they can conquer world ca]:)ital- ism without exposing themselves unduly to the risk of an all-out nu- clear war. With greatly expanded resources at their disposal, the Communists now are ready to play for the long pull as they have never done before, taking temporary disadvantages in stride if that be necessary. Economic, psychological and political warfare — all closely coordinated — will be stepped up. The objective will be to wreck all Western political and military alliances, weaken or destroy political and economic links among free nations, incite wars or near- wars wherever possible, and create Communist or Communist-domi- nated governments wherever possible. THE NEW ECONOMIC WAR Economic weapons to be used against us include : Communist offers of greatly increased trade to countries which drop the embargo on strategic exports to the Communist bloc. Offers of Soviet aid in industrialization — in the form of technicians, know-how, and capital goods in return for domestic agricultural and raw material surpluses. Available, too, will be Communist loans on easy terms with long repayment periods and interest at 2 percent or less. Atomic energy will spearhead this aspect of the Soviet offensive. Reactors, uranium and atomic know-how will be offered to every un- derdeveloped country that will play ball with Moscow. Egypt and Yugoslavia have already accepted such offers. No country is going to get Soviet aid as charity. Along with the technicians will come the ready crew of agents, spies, and propa- gandists. Every gift grant will be tied to Soviet strategy. Moreover, ..^^ 'fe How Communists Menace Vital Materials v^^ df^ IjNIOl^ r SoMlST REPU8UCS \/-^ ^ N O q<^T H / COAL AMERICA LEAD' ANTIMONY cobalt/ manganes • V": " OIL LEAD ANTIMO MA TUNfii^EM A LEAD ANTIMbfW M EJUNI C A COPP* ;anese P'Op-»d b, Roiearch In.litute of A-r Copyright 1956 INDUSTRIAL Dli^MO( C< CipPPEI! Tir CHR( MANGiyNES beryll\um Techniques Being Used in Each Red "Thrust" ( I JSouth America: Subversion. Infiltration of political movements, univer- — silies and trade unions. Economic penetration. Attacks on U.S. as "colonial exploiter." Discouragement ol production by threat of dumping own com- petitive supply at ruinous prices— e.g.. antimony, manganese, tungsten. ( /Jwettero Europe: Remtroduction ol popular-front tactics. East-West trade — Iield out as bait. Use ol threat to withhold coal supply. Subversion. Rousing French fears ol Germany Tempting Germans with reunification 4 MANGANE^f iOnGSTEi! % NATURAL RUBE ^ANTIMOf^^ /T^NGShN /^•- re::;^. ( 3 ) *'"'!'= Encouragement of nationalist terrorists. Stirring up racial ten- ^— ^ sions. Psychological warfare against U.S. and West based on colonialism and color. > ^Uu./ (^J Middle East: Shipments ol arms. Oflers of technical assistance (e.g., Egypt's ^—^ Aswan Dam). Purchase of economic surpluses (Egyptian cotton). Encourage- ment of nationalist terrorists and dissolution of French empire. ©South Asia: Loan of teclinicians, offers to provide know-how for industriali- zation. Support of territorial claims (Goa, Kashmir). Liberal trade terms and aid. Anti-Western propaganda based on past history of colonialism. ©Southeast Asia: Guerilla warfare. Ever-present menace of Chinese militarv power. Trade, Especially purchase of economic surpluses (Burmese rice). Technical assistance. Liberal economic aid. Anti-Western propaganda based on past history ol colonialism. AUSTRAL 1 A C3'" THE GREAT PRETENSE 85 we often don't get legitimate credit for our aid, -wliile local Communists in recipient countries malve sure that every incoming Soviet brick sounds like a housing development. Offers of stable markets in Communist areas at prices guaranteecl for long terms to countries having particularly valuable rav^ materials. This tactic will be particularly attractive to underdeveloped countries now enjoying the high prices of the present boom period, but fearful of a ])ossible bust around the corner. Where politically desirable, and taking the other extreme, the Com- munists will be ready to dump other key commodities at prices well below comparable western levels. Cost of production will be ignored in such dumping where the political prize is important enough. Disorganization of some international markets which is likely to result from American disposal of some agricultural surpluses — cotton almost immediately — will be used by the Communists to cement eco- nomic bonds with countries hurt by the American program. The Communist maneuvers with respect to Egyptian cotton and Burmese rice already illustrate these possibilities. In all this, remember the great Communist advantage : the State has a free hand in disposing of its resources. Neither the necessity of making a profit nor the domestic needs of the people hamper the Krem- lin's ability to engage in free-wheeling economic warfare. In the past, the Soviet Union promised much, delivered little. But now we can expect fewer token deliveries, fewer empty promises. Instead, there will be genuine offers of long-term aid — with completion of de- livery contingent on the continuation of a favorable attitude toward the Soviet Union, thus tying long-term apron strings to the USSR. Moscow puts such high priority on the political gains it expects to win from these tactics, that it will make delivery even at great cost. But Soviet resources are not limitless, and the magnitude of what the Communists can do in this direction will grow only as their domestic production increases. Any sharp setback in their domestic econo- mies — such as a major crop failure — would necessarily affect this cam- paign. But for the time being the outlook is for an indefinite and rapid expansion of this kind of economic warfare — starting, to be sure, from a very low present level of foreign trade and assistance. THE NEW POLITICAL WAR At the 20th party congress, Khrushchev acknowledged that there may be different roads to socialism. Kather than all countries being bound by the Soviet pattern, Moscow now calls for Communist united fronts with all leftists. Socialists, and the like all over the world. This is not a new line, as some suppose, but the reactivation of one of Uenin's early policies. It was also used effectively by the Stalin regime during the "popular front" period of the late 1930's, For the most part, however, under Stalin even the slightest deviation from his line was denounced and severely punished. Notably, the powerful Socialist parties of Western Europe were denounced as "fascists," "agents of the capitalists," etc., and where the Communists seized power in Eastern Europe, Socialists were among the first victims mur- dered or imprisoned. The result has been that this past decade the Socialist parties of West Europe, except in Italy, have been among the most important anti-Communist bulwarks. 86 THE GREAT PRETENSE Now Krushchev has changed the line and is wooing the Socialists, inviting their leaders to Moscow, and loudly asserting that the im- portant thing is the unity of all workers' parties. The immediate chief target is France, where the goal is the formation of a Communist- Socialist government which would take France out of NATO. But ultimately the campaign could have repercussions all over the world, from Japan to England — the Soviets hope — with leftist Socialists and Communists working together in far stronger force than the Com- munists could attain alone. Some top Socialist leaders in Europe have already indicated they will not allow the wool to be pulled over their eyes. But there is less understanding of the true nature of communism among the leaders of the new Asian countries, such as India, Burma, and Indonesia, who are primarily socialistic in their orientation. Communist assurances that how a nation becomes socialist is unimportant can be a potent force in bringing those countries closer to the Soviet Union. Ad- dressing the British workers, the Soviet leaders take the position that past hostility to the Laborites was Beria's crime, and say in effect that Kussia wants nothing more than a Labor Britain. It should be noted that on this issue, the Soviet leaders have pre- tended to take a leaf from Tito's book. Actually, the policy is Lenin's but Khrushchev knows that countries like India prefer to think it's Tito's, hence this expedient camouflage — made possible by the fact that Tito has been urging such proposals for a year or more. THE NEW PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR The desegregation crisis in the Southern States has given the world Communist movement a giant propaganda handle which it has latched on to with its customary resourcefulness. Every new tension between Negroes and whites in the South is being publicized among the ma- jority of the world's people who are colored. Needless to say, the extraordinary progress made by the Negro in the United States over the last 90 years and particularly in the most recent past, is virtually unknown among the nations being beset by Soviet prapaganda. The result has already been a greater and greater hostility to the United States. To a lesser but still significant extent the similar struggle in South Africa is serving the Communist cause. And because the United States is a major buyer of South African uranium, diamonds, and other minerals, this country will be blamed more and more for not exerting economic pressure against the rulers of South Africa. The South African problem is a particularly potent propaganda weapon in India, because Indian natives of South Africa are among the victims of South Africa's policies. Soviet Problems and Weaknesses The picture painted above is not an encouraging one, but it is offset to some extent by the difficulties faced by the Communist leaders. 1. Soviet agriculture is still very sick. Khrushchev has staked his prestige on being able to just about double Soviet food production by 19G0 through his virgin lands wheat program, his corn-hog pro- gram, and other measures. Most of his program failed last year, but an extraordinarily good harvest in the Ukraine saved the day. THE GREAT PRETENSE S7 He is now gambling that ■weather in Siberia will permit liis virgin lands program to begin producing results this year. ^Vnother repe- tition of last year's drought there, plus a poorer harvest in the Ukraine, could shake even his position. But there is no foreseeable danger of widespread starvation. The Soviet Union has enough bread ; what its people want are more meat and dairy products for a better quality diet. 2. Khrushchev's ambitious industrialization program for the next 5 years, plus his aid commitments to China, Eastern Europe, and such countries as India, are likely to strain the Soviet economy greatly. A tremendous capital-construction program must be carried out in the now unpopulated wastes of Siberia to achieve the production goals. Krushchev is counting on major productivity gains, but he may soon find he cannot do all the things his program calls for and that he will have to cut back on some elements of his economic plans. Tra- ditionally in such a situation the Communists have cut down consumer goods and investment in agriculture. But to do so again would raise serious problems of popular morale as well as throw more fuel on fires of domestic inflation. The pledge to raise low-wage rates and low pensions will have to be fulfilled soon and will add appreciably to the gap between consumer demand and available goods. 3. The entire system of wages and salaries must be revised in order to raise work norms and to increase tlie pressure on workers and executives to do a good job. But any such wholesale revision in the Tage and salary structure inevitably means stepping on many toes. Kaganovich has already said the changes must be made slowly, a sure tip-ofi of the Soviet leaders' fears on the matter. 4. Tlie Chinese Communists have recently socialized their industry and trade and collectivized their agriculture with a speed that is without parallel, and so far with only relatively minor resistance. But as the full implications of this socialization are felt by the people affected, resistance may rise sharply. Peiping's demands on its people are sharpening as industrialization and its capital requirements are speeded up. There covild be internal difficulties in China which would cause Peiping to turn to Moscow for more help — appeals that might well come at a time when Moscow's own resources are strained. As the Chinese hear about Soviet offers of assistance all over the world, some of them at least must wonder why there isn't more generous aid for China. 5. One weakness, not to be discounted, is the Kremlin's adherence to Communist dogma. For instance, after the 20th Party Congress, Khrushchev announced his intention of proceeding with the abolition of personal farm plots, even though these have proved to be much more productive per acre than the collective farms. Here, realism is being ditched for dogma — a step which must be chalked up as a weakness of the system. The Challenges to the United States On balance, it's difficult to be encouraging about the foreseeable future, even when the weaknesses of the Communist world are taken into account. However, the free world's great assets of wealth anci freedoni are still as important as ever. To a large extent, the out- come will depend on the kind of policy Washington and its allies 88 THE GREAT PRETENSE formulate in response to a whole range of sharpened challenges from the Kremlin. 1. Who will win the educational race? The Russians expect to overtake our economic superiority by producing more engineers, tech- nicians, and scientists. This manpower challenge is already near the point of crisis. With a current shortage of engineers, we find fewer high schools teaching mathematics, physics, etc., so that fewer graduates are eligible for scientific study in the colleges. The Russians, on the other hand, are concentrating their state- controlled educational system on producing technicians, to the neglect of other studies. The importance of their lead is sometimes exaggerated. Too manj^ Russian tecluiicians spend their time at paper work, and thus largely waste their training. Also, Russian techni- cians tend to overspecialize, thus making themselves obsolete when retooling and conversion are required. Nevertheless, Russian gains in the training of technicians make our own deficiencies seem appalling. 2. Who will win the economic race ? We must resist the temptation to scolf at Russian hopes that their production will ever outstrip ours. There are clear warnings, both in the past and in the present : The Russian hopes for a collapse of the United States economy are doomed to be disappointed. And yet, even a series of recessions' slowing down our growth, could be an invaluable aid to the Soviets during these next 10 years. It may never become necessary for the Russians to fully match United States economic strength. The moment of historic peril will actually come much sooner : if and when the Russian workers' stand- ard of living can be raised above that of the French and Italian work- ing class. Our task really is to prevent even that much of a narrowing of the gap between the West and the Soviets. 3. Foreign trade and investment: We are already engaged in com- petition for trade ties with other countries. Foreign aid giveaways are not a suflicient answer to this challer.ge. Postwar gifts aimed at emergency stabilization did their job in preventing Communist cap- ture of depressed and disillusioned countries. But for the long haul, the pattern will have to be "trade not aid." Here the challenge is, who can offer the best terms, who can ab- sorb more of the products that the underdeveloped countries want to sell — the state economy of Russia or the free economy of the West? 4. Can Russia choke us off from vital raw materials? Clearer recognition of this Soviet policy will bring a variety of response from the United States. INIore attention will be given to stockpiling and to the development of substitute materials. But the main test will continue to be whether Americans are sufficiently adept at the inter- national game to keep our lifelines oi)en in the face of a fivefold pincer action by the Russians : Guerrilla warfare, as in the jungles of Malaya, whose tin and rub- ber we need. Bribery, with gold or guns, as in the Middle East where oil is the prize. Support of nationalist aspirations, as in north Africa, whose terri- tory provides important military bases or impinges on commercial lanes for the West. Endorsement of territorial claims— for example, to Kashmir and Goa, in the case of India which is the source of most of our manganese. THE GREAT PRETENSE 89 Political penetration through neutralism or poi^ular front govern- ments — techniques that have been cultivated in France, Italy, In- donesia, Ceylon, and so forth. 5. The need for domestic unity. The Russians are not abandoning any of their old weapons merely because they have devised new ones. They will continue to use the fifth column tactics of espionage and infiltration into government agencies, unions, political parties, church groups, fraternal organizations, etc. The popuUir front tactic that proved so successful in tlie thirties has been dusted otY again. Inside the United States, the Communists will seek every opportunity to en- large and exploit new internal tensions like those in the South over integration. Part of the new challenge is whether or not our domestic disputes can be resolved quickly and with a minimum of violence. 6. Who will win the psychological war ? The Kremlin's effort now is to identify Eussians as bloodbrothers of the Asians. They are uti- lizing history eil'ectively — identifying the West with colonialism ; re- minding Asians tliat Russia only recently emerged from the status of an underdeveloped nation herself; stressing the United States exclu- sion of immigration under the McCarran Act, etc. These are keyed to immediate pressures felt by the Asians. Ignorance abroad is a major Soviet asset, which they compound with their propaganda. As an illustration, India's first public opin- ion poll in "West Bengal sliowed 31 percent thinking the United States was "willfully preparing for war" and only 2 percent thinking the Soviet was preparing. 7. Is time on the Kremlin's side? The Russians have reason to be- lieve that the longer the current situation lasts, the more tempted people in many countries will be to accommodate themselves to a pat- tern that favors the Soviet. This trend has already started in Asia. Cambodia has broken her ties with the United States on the assumption that Red China's star is ascending. Great Britain has written off Formosa on the assumption that Chiang Kai-shek can't win. Even Pakistan, which the United States has helped at the price of increased Indian hostility, is interested in deals with Russia. Trade paves the way to political accommodation. Unless we can counter this trend, the danger is that our allies will drift into neutralism, and the neutrals will drift into a pro-Soviet orientation. Washington and the free world are not without resources to oppose these challenges successfully. We're still far out front as an economic power ; we have no designs on the well-being of other nations ; we do not seek to impose our ideology on Asians. These assets have not yet been brought to bear effectively in the war of resistance to Communist domination. Whether we can close ranks and intensify our resistance on a more organized basis is the fundamental challenge of our time, it is now clear. 8. Can the United States take the lead ? The basis for a potentially powerful counteroffensive is sketched out in Bertram D. Wolfe's Six Keys to the Soviet System, published this month. Wolfe points out that we, not the Communists, are today the advocates of agrarian re- form. We, not they, are the advocates of a genuine peace, with dis- armament under full safeguards and controls. We, not they, are the champions of the rights and freedom of the worker — freedom to move, to change jobs, to organize, to assemble, to elect and control his own 77722—56 7 90 THE GREAT PRETENSE officials, to strike. It is we, not they, who support the most powerful loyalty in the modern world — nationalism — and wlio are the advocates of self-determination. "In short," says Wolfe, "the main weapons that the Bolsheviks thought they could use in the early days against the rest of the world — nationalism, labor rights, agrarian reform, abolition of poverty, an economy of abundance, anti-imperialism — are now in our hands." It is up to us to use them. KHRUSHCHEV COPIES STALIN By Louis Budenz Louis Budenz, former managing editor of the official Communist news- paper, the Daily Worker, is one of the highest ranking American Com- munists to break with the party. He has since made invaluable con- tributions to America's security by providing detailed information about Communist policies and leaders. A native of Indianapolis, Ind., Mr. Budenz holds a law degree from Indianapolis Law School, and has taught at Notre Dame, Fordham, and Seton Hall Universities. Based on his personal experience as a Communist official, he is the author of several books on communism, among them. This Is My Story, Men Without Faces, and the Techniques of Communism. Nikita Klirushcliev's "new line" is of a similar character to the suc- cessful maneuvers by Joseph V. Stalin in 1936 and in World War II. In other words, Khrushchev, the new Stalin, is attempting to cover up the Communist wolf with sheep's clothing. In 1936, Stalin produced the Stalinist constitution for Soviet Russia, which "guaranteed" freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assemblage, and freedom of demonstration. This was an ironic trav- esty, as the present Communist leaders now acknowledge, as none of these "guaranties" was granted any of the enslaved peoples under Soviet rule. At that time, Stalin was pictured as "becoming demo- cratic" and communism was represented as "changing." In World War II, Stalin "dissolved" the Communist International. Again this act was represented as a profound "change" in communism. As a matter of fact, Moscow's control of the Communist Parties of the world remained the same as ever, and the alleged "dissolution" of the Communist International was a tragic farce. Both of these Stalinite maneuvers prepared the way for the debacles of Yalta and Potsdam, and the conquest of one-third of the world by Soviet power. Khrushchev's "new line" is given to a Communist international ap- paratus as well disciplined and blindly obedient to Moscow's directives as it was under Stalin. The Cominform organ. For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy, of February 24 signalizes this fact by announcing that Khrushchev's report was adopted by the 20th Con- gress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union "unanimously," just as Stalin's reports were previously adopted. The Communist Parties of the world, including that of the United States, are immediately conforming to "the new line." Khrushchev''s talk of taking over certain countries by parliamentary means is merely the old tactics under a new guise, the tactics of the "popular front." Even here Khrushchev indicates that he is resorting to Aesopian language, for he declares in effect for the violent over- throw of the Government of the United States, just as Lenin does specifically in State and Revolution and Stalin in the Foundations of Leninism. 91 92 THE GREAT PRETENSE The new Stalin repeats this thought when he says that "in countries where capitalism is still strong and where it controls an enormous military and police machine, the serious resistance of reactionary forces is inevitable. There the transition to socialism will proceed amid conditions of an acute class revolutionary struggle." And this "revolutionary class struggle" or "class war" according to Marxism- Leninism must end in the establishment of the Soviet dictatorship by violence. The one country above all which is clearly indicated in Khrushchev's words — the country "where capitalism is still strong" — is the United States of America. The present tactics of the Kremlin, as those of the "popular front," are therefore designed to beguile America again into unguardedness regarding the "peaceful coexistence" schemes of Soviet Kussia and to bring about the collapse of nation after nation under Soviet power as took place as the result of the "popular front," particularly after World War II. The so-called "devaluation" of Stalin is for the same purpose. Khrushchev does not repudiate the fundamentals of Marxism-Len- inism, as set down by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. To the con- trary, he reaffirms them, stating that he stands on "Lenin's principles" and on "the bedrock principles of Marxism-Leninism." Khrushchev does not even repudiate the great purge trials. On this he says : "The Trotskyites-Bukharinists, and the champions of bourgeois nationalism, sought to break the Leninist unity of our party and got it in the neck." The sole criticism of Stalin is that he forwarded "the cult of the personality," but that cult is still being advanced in the laudation of Khrushchev's report by the Communist press of the world as "a pro- found analysis'' and in other similar terms. It must be remembered that Stalin came into power by stressing that "the will of the party" must be observed, making certain that "the will of the party" was his will. In a similar manner, Khrushchev now talks of "collective leadership" while making certain that the "collective leaders" are under his control. That the criticism of Stalin is merely a maneuver is brought forth strongly by the article in Pravda of IMoscow of March 28 and William Z. Foster's article in the Daily Worker of the same date. Pravda refers to the "great services" rendered by Stalin to "our party, the working class, and the international labor movement." It declares that "he fought actively, especially in the first years after Lenin's death, to- gether with the other members of the central committee, for Leninism, against the distorters and foes of Lenin's teachings. Stalin was one of the strongest Marxists * * *." In a like vein, Foster writes that "Stalin, in his earlier years, earned an outstanding reputation as a Marxist * * *." It is therefore clear that Stalin's "classic" works for guiding the Communists — The Foundations of Leninism and the Problems of Leninism written in his earlier years — remain guides for study and action for the Communists of the world. This is important, for it shows that communism remains the same in its determination to establish the world Soviet dictatorship, first undermining this Natipn by putting it in an unguarded position in its attitude toward Soviet Russia and its fifth column in this country. THE GREAT PRETENSE 93 It is obvious, then, that the Communists will seek : 1. To persuade American opinion and American leadership that ''more and more Genevas" are advisable, to bring about "peaceful coexistence." 2. That "peaceful coexistence," as the Communists have previously stated over and over again, can be assured only by the installment plan surrender by the United States of its defenses, including an expansion of "East-West trade" to build up the Soviet war machine, recognition of Red China, and the seating of that regime on the Security Council — which would be the greatest blow the United States ever gave itself. To these would be added the necessity for the disarming of the United States, including the giving up of our airbases abroad. 3. To persuade the American Nation that the Communist Party is a genuine party and not a conspiracy — which tactic if it were sucessful, would lead to the restriction of congressional inquiries into subversion and a weakening of security regulations. AMERICAN COMMUNISTS BEGIN THEIR CRAWL By Frederick Woltman Frederick Woltman, columnist for the Scripps-Howard Newspaper Alliance, has received a wide range of citations for his writings on domestic and international communism. Mr. Woltman was awarded the Pultizer prize in 1947 for his articles on the Amerasia case. The fol- lowing is a reprint of a column published on March 22, 1956. The Communist Party, which for decades hailed Stalin as the "greatest living" Marxist-Leninist and symbol of peace, is preparing for the big crawl. Its hour of humiliation is at hand. A major upheaval has already started to rock the American com- rades since the 20th Congress of the Russian Communist Party a few weeks ago blasted their idol off his pedestal. HEADS DUE TO ROLL Soon their breast-beating and wails of confession ("self-criticism" in Red terminology) will fill the air. Most of the party's leaders, in prison or out, will knuckle under to the Kremlin's new version of his- tory. Namely, that their hero was really a terroristic, homicidal maniac and military bungler who nearly lost Russia to the Nazis. Some heads are expected to roll. Particularly that of the 75-year- old William Z. Foster, party chairman and Stalin's tool here ever since the Soviet dictator ousted Jay Lovestone in 1929 and put the Foster faction in control. Indeed, Eugene Dennis, reemerging as party secretary after his prison term, has already virtually pushed Foster out in the cold. Fhotos of Stalin are coming down fast off the walls of local Commu- nist offices. It's only a question whether Foster will get the same merciless shel- lacking — and expulsion — ^he handed out to his rival, Earl Browder, in 1945 when a drastic party line shift was ordered in Moscow, DOUBLETALK COMING There will be a transitional period of near-death agonies. There will be an outpouring of millions of words of doubletalk to sell anti- Stalinism to the rank and file which had been fed Stalinism every morning for breakfast. In the windup, the Communist Party will be thoroughly committed to the new look : to convince the American people, including capital- ists, that the Soviet chiefs are just a bunch of good guys. And it was all Joe Stalin's fault. 94 THE GREAT PRETENSE 95 WENT OFF DEEP END The crawling process began last week. Alan Max, editor of the CP mouthpiece, the Daily Worker, came up with a declaration that would have cost him his neck last month. Maybe, Mr. Max said, admitting he was bothered and confused, "we went overboard in defending things like the idea of Stalin as infallible, in opposing any suggestion that civil liberties were being fully respected in the Soviet Union, in discouraging serious discussion and criticism of Soviet movies, books, etc." This unprecedented confession of kow-towing to Stalin was fol- lowed by an equally astonishing Worker dispatch from Moscow Sun- day. The 20th Congress, it said, had condemned "glorification of Stalin" as "very harmful" to the party and the Soviet Union. For 20 years ! This, the article said, led to a Stalin "cult," which must never again happen to any Communist Party. And that's what makes it tough for the American Red chieftains to get themselves off the hook. For on December 16, 1949, they put out a special Daily Worker edition eulogizing Stalin on his 70th anniversary. No words, or holds, were barred. Stalin was "the organizer of the world working class for peace," the "plain man of the people," the military genius who "saved millions of American boys" by his successful defense of Stalingrad. A SIMPLE SOLDIER Stalin was "a man with the head of a scholar, with the face of a simple working man, in the clothes of a simple soldier. * * *" "Compared to this master theoretician and organizer," gushed Foster, "the capitalist politicians of our times are illiterates and mere rule-of -thumb blunderers." Yet, time and again, they "repeated their ignorant and malicious lie about Stalin's Totalitarianism,' meaning by this mystifying gib- berish that Stalin dictates what people shall think or do," Dictates ? The 20th Congress said he shot people for less. LET'S NOT GET COMPLACENT By J. Addington Wagner J. Addington Wagner, of Battle Creek, Mich., is national commander of the American Legion. An attorney by profession, he served as national vice commander of the Legion for 1952-53 and as chairman of the Legion's Americanism commission for 1953-54. A graduate of Wash- ington-Lee University Law School, Mr. Wagner served as assistant attorney general of the State of Michigan in 1940-41. The American Legion and its national commander have arrived at the following evaluation of the recent developments in Russia, the significance of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party in Moscow and the address of Nikita Khrushchev on February 24, 1956. In substance, Khrushchev's address contained three basic parts : 1. The denunciation of Stalin and the cult of one-man rule. 2. The idea that it is no longer necessary for the Communists to resort to civil revolt, force, and warfare to accomplish their goals; rather, these can be accomplished by parliamentary per- suasion and ballots. 3. The contention that the new collective regime in Eussia wants to be friendly with the United States. Khrushchev in publicly denouncing Stalin and the creed of one- man dictatorship took a calculated risk. He risked provoking unrest, uprisings, and even open rebellion by the followers of Stalin within the Soviet Union and satellite countries. Against this risk he must have balanced the knowledge that ultimate control of the situation rested with the Red army, and the belief that the army leaders would be drawn more solidly into the net of collective dictatorship because of their natural resentment of one-man dictatorship. He must have reasoned also that within the Soviet Union there were followers of Stalin who disagreed personally but not in principle with the Khrush- chev group and who sought to seize powder for themselves. Finally, he must have reckoned that in the minds of people throughout most of the world, terrorism and brutality and suppression of freedom were linked with the name of Stalin and the Stalin regime. It is logical to assume that Khrushchev concluded the odds favored the new strategy. He aimed at two vital objectives — internally, the elimination of any practical opportunity for Stalin's followers to oust his own group ; and externally, an increase in sympathy and sup- port of the present Soviet leaders on the part of uncommitted and non-Communist peoples who would be led to believe that Khrushchev and his confederates were opposed to the terrorism of Stalin but had been powerless to do anything about it. Recent reactions of leaders in some non-Communist nations would indicate that Khrushchev's move was well-conceived. Soviet leaders have good reason to feel elated over their successes since World War II. They have seen millions of people in vast areas 96 THE GREAT PRETENSE 97 of the earth enveloped in the silent darkness behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains. In recent months they have derived further satis- faction from the visit of Khruslichev and Bulganin to India and other nations of tlie East. They count as gains for their side the current turmoil in the Middle East, the trend toward neutralism and popular fronts in Greece and Italy, and recent Communist successes in France. The announced emphasis upon parliamentary persuasion would ap- pear to be an attempt to attract the non-Communist left, Socialists, and other nonbelligerent radicals and liberals to the side of com- munism against the common foe — capitalism. Such a shift might open a new avenue of deceit through which the Soviet leaders could use all of these groups, and pacifists as well, for the promotion of world communism. For example, the people of India, long committed to a policy of pacifism, might well be enlisted actively in the Commu- nist fold by means of this device. It is likely that this also represents an attempt to divert attention from the new, complex, and subtle tactical line which is designed to carry communism into non-Communist nations througli the back door ratlier than the front. It should be remembered that tlie Soviet spokesmen have not ruled out altogether the tactic of aggressive war and civil revolt. They have merely stated it is not now necessary. They have not said that it may not become necessary in the future. Undoubtedly Khrushcliev hopes that non-Communist nations will become complacent and let their guard down. This neAv policy pronouncement does not really repre- sent a change in Communist doctrine ; the Communists have always indicated a preference for taking over nations by parliamentary in- trigue and subterfuge. Wliere this cannot be done, historically they resort to force and violence and warfare. The 20th Congress and Khrushchev's address may present a change in emphasis or tactics but not in basic Communist doctrine. Neither is the stated desire for friendly relations with capitalist nations a contradiction of Soviet doctrine. In the past, Soviet lead- ers have mouthed desires for peaceful coexistence and have promoted peace offensives whenever it suited their purposes and they needed time. It is logical to assume now that Khrushchev, as was true with his predecessors, hopes to divide, confuse, and weaken the opposition to communism throughout the world. Through such a policy Soviet Kussia would gain time in which the vast Communist empire now developing could entrench itself and gain greater economic and po- litical cohesion. Khrushchev undoubtedly seeks, through this new tactical line, to develop the seductive, peaceful coexistence program throughout the world into a nonresistance movement as it relates to Communist aggression. In conclusion, the recent developments appear to us to be changes in tactics and not in basic Communist doctrine and objectives. The latter remain the same — to establi^i a w^orld Communist society to the exclusion of all others resulting in the destruction of human dig- nity and the subjugation of man to the state and all states to the Kremlin. Were it otherwise, were Khrushchev sincere, long before now, he and the present so-called collective dictatorship would have availed themselves of the opportunities provided at the "Summit Con- 98 THE GREAT PRETENSE ference" and since to evidence their sincerity by deeds rather than the usual empty words. The Communist mind has so defined its world that it shares neither truth nor logic nor morality with the rest of mankind. If, in ruling out certain courses for Soviet policy, we attribute to them reasons like our own, we are making a fatal error. If we assume that our own polvcies and statements convey the same meaning to them as to us, we are certain to be mistaken. Any policy aimed at an "understanding" between the Soviet Union and the United States is based on a total lack of knowledge of the ultimate Communist objectives. The So- viets may be able to "understand" us in a concrete contempt, but an "understanding" — even in a hostile sense — as the basis of a sustained reciprocity of policies is something we cannot expect. Peace in the sense of international order based on a minimum of common values and the ensuing restraint of national aspirations is not possible with an adversary who basically rejects the very right of other societies to exist. The greatest danger threatening America today is the complacency of many of our citizens and people throughout the world in the midst of inexorably rising periol. INTENSIFYING THE SOVIET OFFENSIVE By Francis J. McNamara Francis J. McNamar.i is director of the American sovereignty campaign of the Veterans of Foreign Wars and executive director of the VFW's un-American activities committee. Before this, he was editor of the newsletter Counterattack. He served in the United States Army for over 5 years in World War II, entering as a private and rising to the rank of major. Later he was employed by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Organization in China. He graduated from St. John's College, Brooklyn, and received a master of arts degree from Niagara University. "Without reliable information from within the Kremlin itself, it is impossible to know with absolute certainty the reasons for the attacks on Stalin by the present rulers of the Soviet Union. Analysis of probable causes is possible, how^ever, and the significance of this startling development for the non-Communist world is all too dan- gerously clear. To a large extent, the criticism may be an outgrowth of the struggle for power that has been taking place in the Soviet Union. It indi- cates that Khrushchev, although he is the top man today, has not been able to grasp Stalin's total power. Other forces have compelled him to attack the idea of one-man rule and also Stalin's ruthless purges of his adversaries, real or imaginary. In doing so, they have made it virtually impossible for Khrushchev or a successor to seize absolute control for some time, at least — and they have also gone far to protect themselves from liquidation in the near future. It has been suggested that the attacks on Stalin are due to terrific pressure on the Communist government from the masses of the people in the Soviet Union who hate communism. Reason alone would in- dicate that there is extensive unrest and resentment among the en- slaved peoples of the Soviet Union, and that it has become more widespread and troublesome since Stalin died. There is also much evidence and testimony to support this belief — despite reports to the contrary from recent visitors to the Soviet Union. It is highly unlikely, however, that mere criticism of Stalin and attempts to blame him for the evils of Communist rule would end the seetliing resentment of millions of people. It seems unreasonable, too, to assume that Kiirushchev and his cronies are so naive that they believe attacks on Stalin for his deviations from Communist doctrine would save their regime if it Avere seriously threatened by domestic opposition to communism. The current criticism of Stalin holds out so many long-term advan- tages for communism that it appears that this sudden switch in the Communist line was adopted primarily as part of an intensified, worldwide Communist ideological offensive against the West under the new "collective" Kremlin leadersliip. It is designed to strengthen the Communist Party within the Soviet Union, to strengthen the 99 100 THE GREAT PRETENSE Soviet Union as a world power and to assist native Communist Parties in all nations — to make communism more attractive and palatable to people everywhere, and thus hasten Moscow's conquest of the world. The anti-Stalin movement greatly increases the danger of Com- munist imperialism to the United States and all the free world for the following reasons : The international Communist conspiracy will benefit from better and wider utilization of its top leaders' collective brainpower. The keymen in Moscow, like Communist officials everywhere, will now have less fear and a greater feeling of security than in the past. This in itself will improve the quality of their service to the Communist cause, provided, of course, the new leadership demonstrates that it is collective and opposed to both Stalin's terroristic practices and his near psychopathic suspicions. There are many ideological INIarxists in the world who have refused to cooperate with national Communist Parties and the Soviet Union because of Stalin's practices. Some of these people have even been vigorously "anti-Communist" (i. e., the anti-Stalin brand). The new line on Stalin opens up the possibility of the conversion of many of these people to active support of the U. S. S. K., and the Communist Parties of their native lands. This possibility is of special significance because of the strong bid Moscow is now making to establish a united front with the Second International (world Socialist movement), and because it has ordered its national affiliates to set up united fronts in their respective coun- tries with all possible political groups, right, left or center. Criticism of the Soviet leader who did so much to arouse the world against communsm obviously gives Communists much greater oppor- tunity for successful application of their united-front tactics. Whether or not it will bring about limited or full cooperation between Communist and Socialist Parties, only the future will tell. But it clearly creates a possibility in this field that did not exist before. It also holds out the possibility that Communists who defected from the party in the past because of things Stalin did may now be brought back to the fold. Alan Max, managing editor of the Daily Worker, has expressed confidence that this will be one result of the new ap- proach. In a recent issue of the Communist newspaper, he ans\yered a question about the possibility of the attacks on Stalin creating a break in the party with these words : Far from a split, there's going to be a lot of discussion and as a result many people who left the party will come back. The criticism of Stalin will complete the return of Tito to the main- stream of the Communist movement. The Yugoslav newspaper, Borba, has hailed Moscow's attacks on Stalin. Since the 1948 break, Tito has steadfastly maintained that he is the true follower of Lenin, while Stalin was a perverter of the master's teachings. The new line deprives Tito of any ideological excuse for continued separation from the Cominform. Neutralism, which aids communism and weakens the free world, will be strengthened by Communist criticism of Stalin. Those who could remain indifferent to the world struggle when one of the pro- tagonists was so blatantly evil a man as Stalin, will find no trouble in continuing to do so with the new and "nicer" Soviet leaders. Others THE GREAT PRETENSE 101 who might have been tempted to become neutral before will feel a much stronger pull in that direction now. As a result, it will now be more difficult for this country and its allies to convince the uncertain and the wavering of the reality and the seriousness of the Communist threat. In this country, in West Germany, Brazil, the Philippines, and Greece, to give just a few examples, native Communist parties (some of them outlawed) are now trying to legitimize themselves. The anti- Stalin line will help them. It will induce many soft-thinking liberals to support this effort on the grounds that it is a "civil liberties" issue. The criticism of Stalin will make it much easier for the Kremlin to sell its "peaceful coexistence" line to non-Communists in all parts of the world. Many people will tend to associate the repudiation of Stalin's purges and his violations of Lenin's principles of collective leadership with rejection of all he stood for — aggression, revolution, etc., outside the U. S. S. E., as well as his internal policies. This will promote softness on communism and willingness to try to get along with Moscow instead of firmly opposing it on all fronts. It will also promote fellow traveling, demands for additional conferences with Soviet leaders, more exchange delegations, etc. — all of which serve Moscow by helping to disarm the free world psychologically. An additional result of this will be that Communists will find it easier to recruit new party members than they have for some years past. The path of the criticism of Stalin will not be smooth. In spite of the fact that all national Communist Parties have accepted the new line, it has aroused criticism, dissatisfaction, and questioning in Communist circles in this country and abroad. Communist Parties have wisely decided to let all, or a good bit, of this come out in the open. They have not tried to suppress it and thereby harden resent- ment and make it dangerous. By letting the dissatisfied blow off steam, they have made it easier to bring them around to the new position. In spite of some opposition, the revision of Stalin's status will be carried out successfully by Khrushchev and his aides. There will be unrest for a time, there will probably be some defections, but they will not be large scale or enough to oft'set the gains the Kremlin will make through this change. Communists are primarily devoted to an ideology and its embodi- ment in the Communist world rather than to any one man, no matter how much he may have been idolized as a leader. As long as the new Kremlin leaders show they can promote that ideology and strengthen its physical manifestations they will retain the support of Commu- nists everywhere. These men have lielj^ed sell many lies to both their Communist adherents and the free world. They should not have too much trouble selling the true statement that Stalin was a murderer, terrorist, and violator of Lenin's teachings. The significance of the new Communist approach to Stalin — and of other developments at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union — may be summarized in two propositions : ^ 1. The new leadership of the Soviet Union is collective to a con- siderable extent; it is clever and it is completely dedicated to the extension of Communist power by any and all means. It has criticized 102 THE GREAT PRETENSE Stalin only for his abuse of Communists, not for his aggressions, rapes of other lands, or any crimes against non-Communists. 2. The United States faces a particularly dangerous period, one in which revolution and violence will continue, but one in which purely military force will not have its former effectiveness. The Communists intend to make this a period in which the most important weapons will be the ones they know best how to use — internal subversion, deceitful diplomacy, and political and ideological warfare. On both the national and international fronts there will be stepped-up pressure to soften up on communism. The United States Government will be increasingly criticized by its allies and groups of its own citizens for being too rigid and unyielding in matters relating to the Kremlin and its Connnunist fifth column in the United States. The anti- Communist fiber of the American people and their leaders will be more severely tested than ever before. STALINISM CONTINUES By George Meany George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO, ranks as one of labor's most forthright spokesmen against communism. Recognizing the importance of maintaining free labor movements abroad, Mr. Meany was instru- mental in the establishment of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. He was chosen president of the AFL in 1952 to fill the post left vacant by the death of William Green and was unanimously elected president of the combined AFL-CIO at its first convention in New York City in December 1955. Today, the gravest threat to freedom of thought and all other basic human freedoms is to be found in the totalitarian philosophy and movement fostered and financed by the Soviet dictatorship. The gen- uine fighter against conformism must recognize that communism is its most perilous expression. In our opposition to even the slightest con- formism in our own country, we must therefore guard against cooper- ating with Communists, whose dogmas and deeds are the very negation of freedom of thought. Our country plays a vital role in the international arena. The eyes of the world are on all our institutions. We must spare no effort and lose no time in eliminating any antidemocratic expressions in our way of life. In this connection, I can assure you that labor will yield to none in acting to eliminate from our country race prejudice in every form, in every field of human endeavor, in every part of the land. Thank God that in our democracy no one has to conform even with the highest Government official. Wishful thinking and leap-year po- litical partisanship have caused some to paint a distorted picture of the last congress of the CPSU. We have been asked to believe that the free world — in comparison with the Communist orbit — is today stronger than it was a year ago; that Moscow has been forced, as a result of our increased strength, to revise its strategy and go about the world seeking friends on a new basis. Frankly, I do not believe this is true. In addition, I find it hard to believe any one in official posi- tions of responsibility in our Government really thinks this is true. What are the facts ? Despite all the world-shaking noise made at the 20th Communist Congress, and, on many occasions before, about re- forming the Soviet system, it remains the same — a monolithic one- party dictatorship in the hands of a narrow clique whose policies are always unanimously approved by those handpicked by the Communist ruling group to represent the people. This system is maintained by a ruthless police state. It holds many millions in slave-labor camps and prisons. It maintains its stranglehold through a continuing purge by firing squads and a complete denial of the democratic rights of labor, and the fundamental human rights proclaimed in our country's Bill of Rights. For the people behind the Iron Curtain, the dictatorship is no less oppressive when it is run by 11 tyrants trained in the Stalinist school than when it was run by a single despot. 103 104 THE GREAT PRETENSE The Soviet system is today further away from ours than it ever was, because in our country democracy has been making headway. Hence, there is no basis whatsoever for the conclusion that the Kremlin now realizes that it must bring its system closer to ours. Surely we must realize this is not the first time that the Russian Communists have revised their strategy. Surely there are some of us who remember June 21, 1941, when Moscow changed its mind about Hitler being a great patriot defending the German people and world peace. The Russian Communists have been constantly revising their strategy. But neither at the 20th. nor at any other, party congress have they changed their basic and ultimate aim — the conquest of the entire world and its transformation on the Soviet slave pattern. If the present world crisis could be dealt with simply on the basis of diplomatic pacts between nations, it would not be so serious. We would then be dealing with paper perils and a pen-and-ink crisis. I do not belittle the value of pacts — especially if and when they are genuinely in the service of peace and freedom. But the mere conclusion of a pact is in itself no proof of its etfectiveness as a force for peace. The Molo- tov project for a "collective security'' pact as well as the Warsaw pact do not mean that Moscow is copying our mutual-security program. NATO seeks peace and has helped preserve peace and security. Their "mutual security" programs aim at strengthening the forces of Com- munist aggression and dividing the democratic world. Russia, without doubt, has many serious weaknesses in agriculture, industry, and its relations with its satellites. Unfortunately, the lead- ership of the democratic world has not done enough to exploit these weaknesses and im]:>air the prestige and power of the Communist war- lords. Self-deception in regard to the 20th Communist Party Con- gress would only aggravate this failure on tlie part of the free world. The recent congress under Khrushchev did not foreswear a single one of its old basic policies of intolerance toward non-Communists and violence as a means of getting results. The anemic posthumous purge of Stalin does not constitute a repudiation of, or a break with, his basic policies for agriculture, the primacy of heavy industry, and secondary attention to consumers' goods. Furthermore, the congress has reas- serted unanimously that the foreign policy of the U. S. S. R. has been continuously correct and for peace — during and after Stalin. This, of course, means Soviet policy in regard to disarmament, as well as its policy toward Germany, Korea, and Indochina. Had the 20th Communist Congress decided on a genuine and serious purge of Stalin and Stalinism, it would have acted not merely against the dead despot but first of all against the leading surviving Stalin- ists. However, it is precisely these figures who constitute the present so-called collective leadership. Make-believe rehabilitation of some of those assasinated by the Stalin regime does not eliminate the roots of the evil. But what else can one expect from those who have for decades been the sinister agents and servile accomplices of Stalin in his Avorst crimes against the peoples now behind the Iron Curtain in Europe and Asia and against the peace of the world ? These successors to Stalin know there is deepgoing resentment and embitterment among the Russians and other peo^^les over the un- THE GREAT PRETENSE 105 bridled Communist terrorism. They are trying to fool the Soviet people by putting all blame on their dead leader, whom they but yesterday worshipped as an infallible deity. In typical Stalinist fashion, Khrushchev is now making a scape- goat of Beria — his comrade and partner in crime, whom he had placed before the firing squad. Only when the Soviet peoples mete out full justice to these criminals will the U. S. S. K. begin to have a system closer to ours. If the Communist top leaders in the Kremlin have agreed, at least for a while, to stop shooting each other, it does not follow that they will stop shooting at us. To the extent they can really close their ranks, they are even more dangerous to world peace and freedom. There is not the slightest reason for freedom-loving people any- where to rejoice over Khrushchev and Mikoyan saying that, under special circumstances, the Communist revolution might be achieved through parliamentary means and without resorting to violence. To- morrow, as yesterday in the case of Czechoslovakia, it will be the Kremlin that will' decide what are such "peaceful" special circumstances. Moreover, the so-called Khrushchev revision of the dogma does not mean that a "peaceful" Communist revolution will do anything else but destroy the democratic parliamentary system and replace it with a Soviet type of one-party totalitarian dictatorship. Yes, we can look at Czechoslovakia as an infamous example of a "peaceful" Communist revolution. Only those free men who want to commit suicide should swallow this Khrushchev revision pill. These new tactics are only a new variant of the tactics of infiltration employed by Moscow. The aim of the new line is to fool the people — especially the workers — of the non-Communist countries into united fronts with Moscow's agen- cies abroad. Its aim is to get its Communist agents into cabinets of popular front governments. The 20th Communist Congress boasted that socialism has triumphed in the U. S. S. R. and that it will triumph through the world. If what they have in Russia today is socialism, then I am sure many of our friends in Britain, France, Italy, and other free countries, who consider themselves democratic Socialists, have no desire to attain such a "paradise," regardless of what road is offered to them — whether it be the Lenin road, the Stalin road, or the Khrushchev road. And now let me say a few words about the Tito road and where it is leading. In the last 7 years, this road has been paved not with Soviet goldbricks but with American gold. Since 1948, the Tito regime has received about a billion dollars of American economic and military aid. Before the Khrushchev-Tito reunion in Belgrade last June, Tito was denouncing the U. S. S. R. as terroristic state capitalism. Tito then strutted as the model neutralist and opponent of all blocs. But since this reunion, Tito has moved very fast toward Moscow — so fast that he has dropped his mask. On February 19, the 20th Russian Communist Congress received from Tito a heart-warming message — lavish in praise of the Soviet Union as a "great Socialist country" working "for the benefit of a further peaceful development of international relations and coopera- 77722—56 8 106 THE GREAT PRETENSE tion." This message empliasized that "the gradual and uninterrupted improvement" in his relations with Moscow is the road which "is the most healthy one for the restoration of mutual and firm trust and co- operation" between the Yugoslav and Russian Communist dictator- ships. On March 3, the Kremlin-controlled "World Federation of Trade Unions, which we of world free labor consider the most dangerous spearhead of the international Communist conspiracy, announced that Tito's so-called unions had been reaffiliated with it. This is most sig- nificant. It shows far more clearly where Tito is going than any pact he signs with Turkey and Greece or any promise he gives to Wash- ington. Our overseas colleagues who had ilhisions about Tito's unions being free and different from Moscow's Communist labor fronts should now awaken to reality. I submit that the time has come for our State Department to reexamine thorouglily the entire problem of further American aid to the Tito regime. Let the American people be told just how the arming and feeding of the 1956 model of the Tito dictatorship with American dollars can help the cause of peace and freedom. Some might argue that we should not criticize Tito, lest we push him into Moscow's corner or into Khrushchev's arms. In this regard, there is ample evidence that Tito does not need any pushing. He is already well on his way into the arms of Khrushchev. The present enormous Soviet power makes this "new" line all the more dangerous to the free world. The trade unionists of the free world, especially in Britain, where Khrushchev and Bulganin will soon visit, have no illusions about the 20th Communist Congress. They will never forget that in the very years when Britain helped liberate more than 500 million people from colonialism, Communist Russia has put under a new colonialist yoke more than half a billion people in Europe and Asia. If there were the beginnings of a real change inside Russia and its relations with other peoples, the Moscow regime would begin to move in the following direction : (1) Abolish the one-party system in the U. S. S. R. and restore the right to organize free trade unions and democratic political parties. (2) Agree to internationally supervised free elections in all areas of dispute and tension — Germany, Korea, the satellites, etc. (3) Release all political prisoners and close all concentration camps. (4) Agi'ee to disarmament through international inspection and supervision of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction. (5) Cease all subversive and espionage activities through the Cominform and all its agencies. (6) Apply in the Middle East and elsewhere the five principles Khrushchev and Bulganin hailed in their tour of India and at the 20th Congress. (7) Agree to withdraw Marshal Rokosovsky from control of the Polish Army. (8) Accept the proposals made by the West (which they rejected at Geneva) for free exchange of ideas and cultural material between the U. S. S. R. and the free countries. Our free labor movement and our democratic academic community can render a really great service to our country by helping it develop THE GREAT PRETENSE 107 clarity and unity of purpose and much greater Initiative in the struggle for peace and freedom. Our country has much more to sell than seeds, farm machinery, and automobiles. We have very effec- tive means with which to quarantine communism or any other des- potism. We have the ideals and the ideas; the devotion to human dignity and liberty; the military potential and infinite capacity to help transform countries peacefully into areas of well-being and free- dom for the great mass of people. KHRUSHCHEV'S HERITAGE By Matthew Woll Matthew Woll is a vice president of the AFL-CIO and president of its union label and service trades department. Born in Luxembourg, he served as AFL vice president for approximately 32 years; during World Wars I and II he was also on the War Labor Board. Mr. Woll organized Labor's League for Human Rights and he served as chairman of its free trade union committee since its creation. Khrushchev and the rest of the ruling coterie were conceived, nursed, and raised in the filing cabinets of the Stalinist bureaucracy. They were and are the Stalinist bureaucracy. There is so much Stalinist poison in their blood and marrow ! Even when they try to have the free world believe that not only Stalin but also Stalinism is dead, the present Kremlin rulers employ the worst methods of Stalinism. For instance, Malenkov, who along with Molotov, Beria, and Khrush- chev, was one of Stalin's closest lieutenants, thus lashed out at Beria while addressing the 20th Communist congress : It is known that the imperialists had a high stake in the worst enemy of our party and people — Beria. The unmasking of this dyed-in-the-wool agent of imperialism and of his accomplices was a great victory for the party and its collective leadership. An inherent and distinct feature of the Stalinist technique of Party leadership is the practice of labeling as foreign agents, as imperialist tools, all those who differed wuth the "line" of the ruling clique at any particular moment. Malenkov— and through him the 20th Congress — - continues this vicious Stalinist practice while trying to make the free world and Soviet peoples believe that the Stalinist system is gone. Moreover, during the entire party convention, the present most likely successor to Stalin, Khrushchev, did not find it necessary to make any admission of a single one of his own errors: in regard to his false proposals for reorganizing the agricultural economy, the phony panacea of exploiting virgin lands, his bloody purge in the Ukraine, his own big role in cult building, etc. Thus, while he and his ilk were demagogically condemning the cult whose hero is dead, they were actually facilitating and building up the emergence of a new cult — of course, with a hero who is alive. How desperate the present rulers of Eussia are to build illusions about them abroad is illustrated by the following which Malenkov stressed at the Congress : Socialism will win in peaceful competition, we are convinced of this, but not by exporting revolutions, not by guns and invasions, but because it repre- sents a higher type of social organization of labor than capitalism, and is, therefore, able to provide for mankind a much higher standard of living than can be done by capitalism. This boasting is an attempt to eliminate free-world criticism of the Kremlin for having made its biggest gains through fraud, force, and the financing and fomenting of violent revolutions in other 108 THE GREAT PRETENSE 109 lands. Not even in Russia did the Bolsheviks come to, and consoli- date, their power without resort to fraud, force, and unending terror. Nowhere in the world has communism come to power in any other way. If Moscow were really sincere in its latest pronouncement for peace, it would, demonstrate its sincerity by giving up the loot it has gained at the point of the gun or through its international subversive Communist conspiracy. Suppose a holdup man who has managed to grab and amass a vast amount of loot were to come to his com- munity and say : "Fellow citizens, I am now strong. I am now rich. Henceforth, I shall take nothing by gun or blackmail from you." Let us assume, for the moment, that this holdup man was sincere in his plea. Would that make him an honest and law-abiding citi- zen ? Would that entitle him to treatment as such by the community ? Would not the first requirement for justice and future honesty be that the community demand and secure the return of the loot to the rightful owners? Would not the next task of the community be to consider the most effective steps to prevent the gunman of yesterday from resuming his holdup and burglary profession tomorrow? All of this aside from the problem of punishing the criminal for the crimes he has already perpetuated ! Some years ago, there was a trial, at Nuremberg, of the Nazi leaders for their bestial crimes against humanity. We submit that Khrushchev and company are likewise guilty of countless savage crimes against humanity. Only when the Soviet peoples, together with other nations, put these inhuman criminals, now running the Kremlin, on trial for the crimes they, side by side with Stalin, perpe- trated, will mankind be able to applaud a truly new day in Russia. Khrushchev, Malenkov, Mikoyan, and Molotov were at least as close to and collaborators of Stalin as Goebbels, Goering, and Himmler were to Hitler. In this connection, the countries which have been robbed of their national freedom by the Soviet dictators, the peoples thousands of wdiose nationals have been murdered or sent to slave-labor camps by the Communist rulers, should be the first ones to tell the world how they feel about Malenkov's boasting about his own political honesty and the virtues of his associates in crime. That Khrushchev and company do not have the slightest intention of disgorging or giving any restitution is confirmed by the 20th con- gress pledge coming in a palatable and even beguiling form. We refer to the oft-repeated Kremlin pledge not to interfere in the in- ternal affairs of other countries. This promise is only a cover for the Soviet dictators' insistence that no one should propose to restore national and democratic freedom to the countries which they have enslaved. And, of course, as in the days of Stalin, it is the United States, which the Kremlin considers the decisive obstacle to its drive for dominating the entire world. Our country continues to be the princi- pal target of hostile Soviet policy. This time, Moscow seeks to flank, or to get around, America as the obstacle to the Communist plans for world conquest. The Kremlin is, for the moment, relying on such in- filtration, softening, and flanking tactics rather than on a direct frontal assault. Hence, Malenkov declared : The elimination of tlie clanger of war, the safegiiarclins of peace between the peoples — all this depends largely on whether one succeeds in putting an end to 110 THE GREAT PRETENSE the antagonism in the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States and resolutely sets out to promote friendship between the Soviet and American peoples. Our initiative to improve seriously relations between the Soviet Union and the United States has failed so far to meet with due understanding and support in the United States. In order to hold their countrymen more firmly in line, the 20th Com- munist Party Congress blamed the United States for the tension be- tween Moscow and Washington. In fact, Malenkov even went fur- ther in carrying out the not-so-peaceful Khrushchev line. He assured his countrymen that they need not fear war with the United States, because : There is no doubt that a third world war will lead to the complete downfall of the world capitalist system. Well, well ! Wlio of us has forgotten how Hitler boasted about his thousand-year Keich? We have not. Khrushchev and his aides-de- camp have. Recent events in darkest Russia have again put the world spotlight on its domestic affairs. No doubt there are deepgoing forces of dis- integration in the ideology and state structure of the barbaric Soviet dictatorship. If only the leadership of the western democratic world would cor- rect its own errors — particularly in the realm of colonialism; if our western statesmen would only learn to cease their desperate efforts to appease the blustering Khrushchev dictatorship; if they could only begin to give serious thought on how to exploit the glaring internal contradictions and fatal weaknesses of the Communist "paradise" ; the immediate future of mankind would then be infinitely brighter. It is clear that the Kremlin oligarchy is not sitting idly by. It is working overtime to appear in a new and better light than did Stalin — its "infallible leader" of yesterday. That explains the emphasis placed by the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the U. S. S. R. on so-called collective leadership as the new cure-all. The overlords in the Kremlin want to look different and better to their own people and abroad than did Stalin whose crimes can no longer be hidden from the Soviet peoples. Hence, this question of so-called collective leader- ship should be examined in the light of the theory, the practice, and the history of the Soviet Communist movement to date. After his overthrow of the democratic government of Russia and seizure of power, Lenin buried the theory of the proletarian dictator- ship and replaced it with the practice of dictatorship by the Com- munist Party over the workers, the peasants, and the entire Russian nation. After the death of Lenin, Stalin, in his effort to take his master's place, operated for a number of years on the basis of a collective leader- ship running the party. For a while, there was the so-called Troika of Stalin, Zinoviev, Kamenev. Then it became a new Big Three — Stalin, Bukharin, and Rykov. Soon there followed the wave of bloody purges. Throughout these developments, Stalin not only sur- vived, but continually strengthened his position and power through vilest intrigue and barbaric terror. He then came to attain absolute power, while surrounded by the present hierarchs in the Kremlin whom he permitted to survive. Stalin trained the creatures now THE GKEAT PRETENSE 111 ruling tlie Soviet empire to be servile and sinister lackeys, partners in all his crimes against the Russian and other peoples. At the height of his career, at the apex of his power, Stalin exercised his ruthless dictatorship over the country through his iron dictatorship over the only permitted party, the all-powerful Communist Party. Thus did the IMarxist-Leninist theory of the dictatorship of the prole- tariat become the dictatorship of the Communist Party and then the dictatorship of its general secretary. When Stalin died, there was, at first, panic in the ranks of his accomplices. A new Troika came to the fore. It was Malenkov, Beria, and Molotov. Within a week, there was a crisis in the Kremlin hierarchy. Malenkov was relieved of his post as general secretary. Krushchev replaced him. The struggle over succession to Stalin became increasingly intense. Beria began to build a machine and popular favor for himself. All the others in the Communist Party Presidium ganged up on him. Beria was soon placed before a firing squad, by his own colleagues, partners, and closest friends for years. In true Stalinist fashion, they unanimously denounced him as a "fascist dog and agent of imperialism." Khrushchev swiftly, but carefully and shrewdly, moved to the fore. He relieved Malenkov from his office of Premier. He forced Malenkov to admit "voluntarily," publicly, and "joyfully" that he was incom- petent. Tins was also in the true Stalinist tradition. Khrushchev then assigned Malenkov to the office directing electric power. This is exactly the assignment given to Rykov by Stalin before the latter placed him before a firing squad. He forced Malenkov to confess errors in agricultural policy for which he himself was to blame. At the recent Communist Congress, Malenkov was forced to go through this self-degradation once more. This performance can only mean more trouble for Malenkov at any time Khrushchev finds it necessary for furthering the concentration of power in his own hands. Soon it was the turn of Molotov, the closest colleague and most con- sistent supporter of Stalin. Khrushchev forced him to admit a grave error in tlie matter of basic theory over the Socialist nature of Soviet society. Molotov also was forced to repeat this self-flagellation at the 20th Communist Congress. Thus, out of the first post-Stalin Troika, one has been murdered by his partners, and the other two are still permitted to survive, but have been forced into an inferior position. Out of the second Troika (Khrushchev, Malenkov, Molotov), two are in an inferior position, after demotion and public self-flagellation, and only one is at the top — Klirushchev. But though Khrushchev has made great headway in gaining power and consolidating his position, he is still far from having attained the peaks of Stalin's power. He, therefore, must still do what Stalin had to do in the first years of his dictatorship — beat the drums of collective leadership. It would be far more accurate to call it a collected leader- ship, collected primarily by Khrushchev. That this is so is confirmed by the wave of purges, and removals conducted by Khrushchev on the eve of the 20th Party Congress. It is further confirmed by the fact that, in preparation for the 20th Congress, there had been removed, or there have disappeared, at least one-quarter of the Central Committee (that is, the "collective leadership") elected by the 1952 112 THE GREAT PRETENSE 19th Congress of the Communist Party. The rioting in Stalin's native Republic of Georgia shows that more internal conflict is ahead in the U. S. S. R. And the final proof of the inexorable trend toward 1-man dicta- torship in the 1-party system is provided by the new "collective leadership" chosen by the recent 20th Party Con^^ress. The new "collective leadership'' is more than ever a Khrushchev combination, though not yet an abject creature in the full Stalinist sense. That process will continue. It takes time. No one can fix the definite date for Khrushchev to arrive at his power destination. He may be murdered in the process — very likely by one of his closest collaborators of today or by a fanatical Stalinist who just can't take what the idol- worshippers of yesterday are now doing to Stalin. But if Khrushchev does meet such a fate, it will not change the nature of bolshevism one bit. Such an incident would only lend further proof that communism is nothing but 20th century cannibalism. THE MOUNTING PRESSURE OF NATIONALISM By Lev E. Dobriansky Lev E. Dobriansky studied at New York and Fordham Universities. He has taught at New York University and is now professor of Soviet Economics of the Georgetown University Graduate School. He has written extensively on Soviet affairs and was president of the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America in 1949. Dr. Dobriansky has testified extensively before various congressional committees and has written over 200 articles, book reviews, and pamphlets on Soviet politics and economics. This analysis of developments in tlie Soviet Union since tlie 20tli Congress of the Communist Party has been developed primarily on the bases of the Caucasion demonstrations, the colonial captivity of the non-Russian nations in the Soviet Union, and the portent of these phenomena for American policy and operations. It appears almost in the nature of an empirical law that every Moscow crisis, turning point, or "shocking development" worthy of world attention is attended by serious reverberations and reciprocal effects in some non-Russian country in the U. S. S. R. This is not difficult to understand once the basic duadic character of the Soviet Union is grasped. Since the formation of the Soviet Union by force in 1922, practically all critical changes have been accompanied by tensions or political cross-tides in the non-Russian nations. The death of Stalin, for example, encouraged a workers' rebellion in East Germany, disturb- ances in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Ukraine, and strikes in the slave labor camps of Karaganda, Vorkuta, and Norylsk where, typi- cally the inmates are predominantly non-Russian nationals. It will be recalled further, that the gravest charge lodged against Beria was that he had "activated bourgeois-national elements in union repub- lics." Years of intensive campaign against Trotskyism will remain only episodic and minor in comparison to the permanent Moscow campaign against inextricable non-Russian nationalism. The recently reported demonstrations in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijen also support the expansive pattern of persistent non- Russian opposition. They cannot be construed as evidence of pro- Stalin sentiments, any more than the mass Ukrainian welcome given to the invading German armies in World War II was "pro-Hitler." Whether under Stalin or the dictatorship of the present collective leadership, the Caucasian environment has always been a smoulder- ing, hostile anti-imperialist and anti-colonial caldron for Moscow. Almost immediately after the 20th Congress — the period in which the third anniversary of Stalin's death occurred — a most opportune occa- sion offered itself for a further display of non-Russian dissent and resistance to the imperialist Moscow Government. It was only nat- ural that students bred in "the antiquities of independent Georgian history" and workers, rather than functionaries or bureaucrats, led 113 114 THE GREAT PRETENSE the demonstrations in Tiflis. Also, it was highly significant that the intense press campaign against "bourgeois nationalism" was not con- fined to the Caucasus but was extended also to the Baltic areas and Turkestan which likewise are important strategic parts of the broad non-Russian periphery of the Soviet empire. It is quite understandable why Georgia was the most eligible center of such anti-Soviet Russian demonstrations; and it was here that swift action was taken by Moscow. For failure to suppress "elements of nationalism" the Tiflis University rector, Viktor D. Kupradze, was immediately placed under severe censure and the party leader at the institution, Sergei M. Dzhorbenadze, was dismissed. About 15,000 trained agitators descended on Georgia to expound not only the sins of the Stalin "personality cult" but even more the sins of "bourgeois nationalism." This conformed completely with the Moscow propa- ganda line, developed by Stalin and perpetuated by the present dicta- torial oligarchy, which denounces non-Russian nationalism as "another remnant of bourgeois ideology." At the same time, the controlled Georgian press, led by the party newspaper, Zarya Vostoka (Dawn of the East), counterposed local nationalism with proletarian patriotism and complained vigorously about the lack of party diligence in "vigorously suppressing the slight- est manifestation of elements of nationalism." Significant, too, was the overflowing output of published adulation for Georgia's "Russian elder brothers." In the Moscow lexicon this usage is an oft-used expression of the totalitarian "big brother" myth cultivated by traditional Russian political racism which, in this case, is pointedly betrayed by the his- torical fact of Georgia's long national preexistence to the late emer- gence of the Russian nation. Under Moscow's economic colonialism the relative material con- dition of the non-Russian nations has been conspicuously low and poor. But this cannot be regarded as a direct cause of the unrest and periodic uprisings in these areas. The real cause is the continuous and unabated struggle for national liberation and independence of these formerly free countries. The House of Representatives may well take pride in having created the Select Committee To Investigate Com- munist Aggression, which, in a monumental way, officially uncovered the basic forces at work in the monolithic structures of the Soviet Union. The significance of the 20th congress can be perceived only if the organization of the Soviet Union itself is understood. Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan — as, indeed, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Byelorussia, Ukraine, Turkestan, and others — are no more minorities or areas of "local nationalism" than is Poland or Hungary in terms of the entire totalitarian Russian Empire. Each of these constitutes a separate conscious nation with its own distinctive culture, language, history, customs, mores, and religion, all of which are sup- ported by a geographical contiguity. Each has tasted national inde- pendence ; and each has been fully exposed to most, if not all, of these Moscow-sponsored barbarities contained in the Trojan Horse of in- ternational communism : genocide, manmade famines, purges, Russi- fication, lingual defacement, anti-Semiti«m, deportations, political racism, and distortion of national histories. THE GREAT PRETENSE 115 The non-Russian nations constitute a clear majority of the popula- tion of the U. S. S. R. It is no wonder, then, that in the living spirit of Noah Jordania, the great president of independent Georgia whom Stalin both hated and feared, every Georgian patriot, at the mere men- tion of Stalin, is seized with this consuming thought — "Whatever history may say about him, to Georgians and Georgia he will always remain a traitor to his native country and a man who denied and rejected all that Georgia and Georgians have always stood and fought for." Non-Russian nationalism, considered in terms of population, geog- raphy, tradition, and aspiration, is undoubtedly the most powerful single anti-Communist force in the empire, and is unquestionably one of the factors responsible for the supposed anti-Stalinism launched at the 20th congress. On the surface, the deglorification of Stalin seems aimed at modera- tion and reasonable treatment in the interest of accelerated socio- economic activity. Another, but less important, reason is the satis- faction delivered to the army for the purges sustained in the lOoO's. The role of the military has increased, but it is naive to think that its type of leadership can be converted into a target of governmental cleavage. The thircl and most pressing immediate factor is the use of desanctification by those engaged in the inner struggle for indi- vidual power. As in numerous other actions, this has followed a zigzag course since the death of Stalin, with resanctification utilized as late as last December. If the dynamics of historical leadership in relation to dictatorships are observed, its future long-run course should indicate the level of the indefinite contest before the tactic of desanctification falls into complete obsolescence. Outside the Soviet Union, the exhibition staged at the 20th Con- gress is intended to gain support for popular- front movements, and serve as an appeal to neutral nations, while further confusing the anti-Communist countries. However, taking into weighted consid- eration both the internal and external aspects of this apparent change, one cannot help concluding that substantively no real change has oc- curred ; the basic Stalinist matrix remains. While recognizing the limits to which even the collective leadership can go without seriously imperiling the foundations of its own dicta- torship, and that of the empire, the present rulers are in pursuit of the same goals and are employing substantially the same basic means to achieve them. In this process they are resorting to the margin of opportunism that the institutional framework of totalitarian rule affords and which, at different times, even Stalin availed himself of. When it was convenient or necessary, the Stalin regime likewise made recourse to popular front techniques, peaceful coexistence, the tem- porary placation of non-Russian nationalism, appeasement of the mil- itary, and adjustments in doctrinal interpretations. It is this margin that accommodates the zigzag patterns of action which so frequently confuse and disarm various circles in the free world. Current exam- ples of the utility of this margin in Moscow's propaganda efforts are the various types of planned tours, moderately reduced censorship, state visits, economic offers, and the like. This margin evaporates, however, at the thought of abolishing, for example, the Iron Curtain which is an institutional necessity for the type of Russian totalitarian rule w^hich holds the Communist empire together. 116 THE GREAT PRETENSE The essential Stalinist character of the present oligarchy is seen clearly in relation to the force of non-Russian nationalism. First, it should be noted that A. I. Mikoyan, a Kremlin leader who was born in Armenia, initiated the main critical attack upon Stalin. The prop- aganda inference that Moscow clearly wished to be drawn is that one non-Russian Kremlin leader commenced the attack upon another, but from the patriotic non-Russian viewpoint, both Stalin and Mikoyan, as lifelong advocates of Russian imperialism stand as traitors to the nations of their birth. Ukrainians, Georgians. Armenians, and other non-Russians cannot be expected to accept such men as being reason- able and without criminal liability. Khrushchev's reputation in Ukraine is summed up in the title "Hangman of Ukraine." As Mos- cow's chosen satrap in Ukraine during the thirties and after World War II, Khrushchev built his record which brought him to his present position. That record is dominated by criminal responsibility for mass murders, deportations, induced famine and bloody purges. Kaganovich's liquidation of millions of peasants resisting collectivi- zation and de-Ukrainianization could scarcely be forgotten. Miko- yan's leading hand in the Caucasian purges of the twenties cannot be erased from the Caucasian mind. Despite the criticisms of the 20th congress, Stalin is still being praised for his "fight against the hostile grouping of Trotskyists, Bukharinites, and bourgeois nationalists." Whatever subsequent action might be taken on the first two, one can be certain that even the greatest allowable margin of propaganda luxury cannot possibly in- clude dispraise of Stalin on the third count. The portents of the 20th congress may be summarized as follows : (1) The oligarchical dictatorship remains substantively Stalinist with little risk assumed in its present desanctification approach. The political maneuvers are being effected within safe margins of totali- tarian rule which precludes any genuine liberalization of the basic institutional framework. However, the margins are adequate enough to allow for a variety of flexible tactics, including disarmament con- cessions. These presently pose an even greater threat to the vigilance, security, and anti-Communist unity of free nations ; (2) In the short-run secure in itself, the collective leadership is skillfully playing for time to achieve the consolidation of its vastly expanded empire, a substantial increase in industrial output, marked advancement in military armament, and disunity in and among free nations through deeper infiltration and the exploitation of regional rivalries ; (3) In view of these general conditions, supported by the Com- munist-induced passivity of the free world, the prospect of any wide- spread revolt in the Communist empire is exceedingly remote. Mani- festations of national patriotism as demonstrated in the non-Russian nations, which Moscow dubs as "bourgeois nationalism" but which we in America respect as the love of God and one's native country, will constantly reappear in diverse forms. Underground activity, which recently received further substantiation by the Red Banner, an organ in Ukraine, calling for the surrender of "armed anti-Soviet bands" in the Rovno region, will continue ; (4) The effect of the desanctification campaign on the Comunist Party in the United States will be minimal. The shock produced by THE GREAT PRETENSE 117 the Stalin-Nazi pact was incomparably greater, but this arm of Mos- cow remained largely intact for the continuance of its conspiratorial work. With the revival of the popular-front technique and growing public relaxa.tion fomented by the illusory spirit of peaceful co- existence, the danger of its activities may increase ; and (5) In our operational incapacity to meet adequately the chal- lenges and twists of Moscow, we are increasingly exposing ourselves in the short run to a peril of psychological isolation based on "too little and too late." The developments following the 20th congress are a case point, where the maneuvers are unmasked. Moscow floods Asia and Africa with issues of the piopaganda magazine, Soviet Union, showing pictorially a framed paradise of nations in the U. S. S. R., while we fail to implement the McCormack resolution passed by Con- gress for the purpose of bringing to full light the colonialism and imperialism of Moscow since 1920. These and numerous other impor- tant cases point to the pressing need for moral strength and imagina- tion that would release the energy of our rich traditions and render progressively insecure the hold of Moscow on the captive nations in its vast and aggressive empire. STALINISTS WITHOUT STALIN By John S. Reshetar John S. Reshetar is a staff member of the Foreign Policy Research Insti- tute of the University of Pennsylvania, and has taught also at Princeton University, Amherst College, San Diego State College, and the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pa. In 1950 and 1951 he was a mem- ber of the Russian interview project in Germany and Austria. Dr. Reshetar is the author of The Problems of Analyzing and Predicting Soviet Behavior, published in 1955, and, with Dr. Gerhart Niemeyer, of An Inquiry Into Soviet Rationality, to be published by the Frederick C. Prager Co. this year. The very effective employment of a variety of economic and politi- cal weapons by the ruling circle of the Soviet Union since 1953, and especially since Malenkov surrendered the premiership in February 1955, has naturally led to much speculation and wishful thinking re- garding the possibility of the Soviet regime's having rejected the Stalinist heritage. Among the events which are cited in support of this view are the rapprochement with Communist Yugoslavia in June 1955, the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty, the participa- tion of the Soviet Union in the Geneva meeting of the heads of gov- ernments in July 1955, the establishment of diplomatic relations with the German Federal Republic, the visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin to India, Burma, and Afghanistan, the return of the Porkkala naval base to Finland, the conclusion of certain kinds of economic agree- ments with non-Soviet countries, and the renewed sending of scien- tific and cultural delegations to the non- Soviet world. The culmi- nating event in this chain was the "desanctification" of Stalin by name at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956. It is always most tempting and easy to contrast the more suave and effective meth- ods of Khrushchev and Bulganin with the last decade of Stalin's reign and its blatant and arrogant Russian nationalism and fool- hardy aggressive policies such as the Berlin blockade, the excommuni- cation of Tito, and the reckless atempt to seize all of Korea. However, it should be recalled at the outset that Stalin before the onset of old age had demonstrated no mean amount of suaveness and ability to modify tactics. It was Stalin who proclaimed the doctrine of "socialism in one country" when his position in the struggle with his opponents required him to do so and thus gave the appearance of having abandoned Trotsky's doctrine of world revolution. It was Stalin who denounced the French throughout the twenties and early thirties only to conclude an alliance with France in May 1935. It was Stalin who belittled and sneered at the League of Nations only to join it in 1934 and be expelled from it in 1940. It was Stalin who gave the appearance of being a foe of fascism only to ally himself Note. — This statement Is based, In part, upon a lengthier study of the CPSU at its 20th Congress prepared as a supplement to the English-language edition of Boris Meissner'e book on the party which is to be published in 1956 by Frederick C. Praeger. 118 THE GREAT PRETENSE 119 with Hitler for nearly 2 years. It was Stalin who launched the most ruthless of antireligious campaigns during the first 5-year plans but in 1943 granted the Russian Orthodox Church a measure of toleration in order to employ the Moscow Partiarchate as an instrument of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. It was Stalin who dissolved the Comintern in May 1943 only to embark upon a policy of expansion and conquest of which the Comintern had been able only to dream. Thus Stalin's policies and those of Khrushchev and Bulganin and who- ever happens at the moment to be participating in the "collective leadership" should not be contrasted superficially by limiting the com- parison to the post- World War II period. Indeed, it is not certain that the campaign to "desanctify" Stalin can succeed in actual practice whatever its external appearance might be. This campaign, which began in the summer of 1953 with the proclamation of the "collective leadership" and with oblique attacks on the "cult of the individual," was not undertaken in the interests of pure historical accuracy. Like all Soviet actions, it must remain a highly controlled operation and must not be permitted to get out of hand. The Soviet ruling circle cannot permit the reappraisal of Stalin to become a means of attacking the regime itself. Thus a dilemma has presented itself to the Soviet rulers: they could have refused to reappraise Stalin and fail to convey to their own subjects their desire to dissociate themselves from his memory or they could, as they did, embark upon a "desanctification" campaign with the con- sequent risk of creating considerable confusion in the minds of the believers and reinforcing the cautious cynicism which has become a marked characteristic of the average Soviet citizen. Thus there has resulted a serious ideological crisis which made itself felt in the failure to adopt a new party program at the 20th Con- gress in February 1956 despite the decision of the 19th Congress in October 1952 that such a document was to be prepared and submitted to the 20th Congress. Stalinism and its interpretation of Marxism- Leninism have left such a profund imprint upon the Soviet rulers that it is unlikely that they can, in fact, divest themselves of its fundamental tenets and influence despite their pretensions in the matter. In addition to the ethical aspect of this question which is present, since those who have denounced Stalin once vied with each other in singing and proclaiming his wisdom and glory, there is the practical question of whether they can effectively quote Lenin against the memory of a man who justified his own actions with quotations from Lenin. The Report of the Central Committee delivered by Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congress, on February 14, 1956, reflected no small indebtedness to Stalin although he was mentioned only twice in the course of Khrushchev's 7-hour speech. The unacknowledged in- debtedness is evident in a number of instances. In the realm of eco- nomic policy Stalin's practice of giving priority to the development of heavy industry was vigorously readopted by Khrushchev and Bulganin following Malenkov's removal from the premiership. Khrushchev, like Stalin, is concerned with reorganizing agriculture and his bold and costly program of bringing the not always moist virgin and fallow lands of Central Asia and Siberia under cultiva- tion call tx) mind Stalin's collectivization program since both have 120 THE GREAT PRETENSE involved substantial population movements. The policy of sending scientific and technical delegations abroad, which was adopted anew in 1955, is also from Stalin's book since he was a firm believer in ac- quiring capitalism's knowledge and did so on a grand scale in the late twenties and thirties sending Mikoyan and others to the United States and learning much from American industry. When Khrush- chev observed that "the more actively the people will defend peace, the greater is the guarantee that there will be no new war," he was merely repeating what Stalin had said in countless interviews and public statements after World War II. When Khrushchev stated that "the establishment of a new social system in one or another coun- try is the internal affair of the people of those countries" and that "it is amusing to think that revolutions are made to order," he was merely paraphrasing with less skill but with no greater candor Sta- lin's famous March 1, 1936, statement to Roy Howard that "the export of revolution is nonsense." Wlien Khrushchev called for the use of parliament by the Communists in democratic countries in order to obtain power and for their allying with other groups, he was merely restating Stalin's popular-front line of the thirties. On the surface, a modification appears to have been made by Khrush- chev concerning the question of the use of violence by Communists. Khrushchev quoted Lenin to the effect that "all nations will come to so- cialism, that is inevitable, but all will not come to it in the same way." To illustrate this "variety" Khrushchev cited the "form of people's democracy" and the "original contribution" of the Chinese Commun- ists as well as Tito's Yugoslavia. He admitted that "we recognize the necessity of revolutionary transformation of capitalist society into Socialist society" and went on to point out that it was this factor which distinguished "revolutionary Marxists from reformists and oppor- tunists." Despite the "concession" to obtaining power by means of a parliamentary coalition, Khrushchev stated flatly that "there is no doubt that for a number of capitalist countries the violent overthrow of the bourgeois dictatorship and the related sharp intensification of the class struggle are inevitable." Khrushchev added that "I^eninism teaches that ruling classes do not surrender power voluntarily [and] * * * the greater or lesser degree of the acuteness of the struggle, the application or nonapplication of violence in the transition to so- cialism depends not so much upon the proletariat (i. e. upon the Com- munists) as upon the degree of resistance of the exploiters, upon the application of violence by the class of exploiters itself." Not satisfied with clarifying this point once, Khrushchev, after stating that parlia- ments may be used to obtain power, observed that "of course, in those countries in which capitalism is still strong, in which it controls an enormous military-police apparatus, serious resistance by the reaction- ary forces is inevitable." Actually, Khrushchev's supposed modifica- tion of Leninist theory was, for the most part, formulated by Stalin more than two decades earlier, in the interview which he granted to H. G. Wells in 1934 and which was published in the October 27, 1934, issue of the New Statesman and Nation. At that time Stalin told Wells: "You are wrong if you think that the Communists are en- amoured of violence. They would be very pleased to drop violent methods if the ruling class agreed to give way to the working class. But the experience of history speaks against such an assumption." THE GREAT PRETENSE 121 The Soviet image of the "capitalist" world cannot be said to have changed fundamentally since Stalin's death despite Khrushchev's de- nial of the "fatal inevitability" of new wars. Yet he added that "of course, there remains in force the Leninist position that so long as im- perialism (capitalism) exists there is preserved the economic basis for the outbreak of war." This can hardly be said to constitute a com- plete renunciation of the Leninist-Stalinist doctrine that imperialism and capitalism breed wars, despite Mikoyan's criticism of Stalin's last work. Economic Problems of Socialism in the U. S. S. R., on the grounds that it incorrectly emphasized the contraction of capitalist production. Much that Khrushchev said, however, was borrowed from Stalin's last work, especially the emphasis upon the "profound contradictions" of capitalism and the belief that "the struggle within the imperialist camp for markets and spheres of influence will become even more acute." Khrushchev placed special importance upon the "principal contradiction between the United States of America and Great Britain" which was one of Stalin's convictions expressed in his last published work. The ties which bind Stalin's successors to their late mentor appar- ently cannot, in fact, be severed entirely without also denying most of the Leninist heritage. Of course, it is possible under the Soviet system to adopt your opponent's program although you have denounced and discredited him — as Stalin did with Trotsky. Thus it is possible for the members of the Soviet ruling circle to be Stalinists without Stalin even in denying him. 77722— 56^-=r9! THE KREMLIN'S CALL FOR HELP By James Burnham James Burnham haa written extensively about the political and eco- nomic philosophies which have manifested themselves in the totalitarian regimes of the past decades. Among his best-known works are The Managerial Revolution, The Machiavellians, and, more recentl}'. The Web of Subversion, an absorbing analysis of the Communist infiltra- tion into the United States Government. He has studied at Princeton and Oxford Universities and has been a member of the philosophy department of New York University since 1929. 1. In conjunction with the 20th congress of the Soviet Communist Party, the Soviet Union and world communism are executing their sharpest tactical turn since 1930, under "anti-Stalinist" slogans for "collective leadership" in place of "the cult of personality." The re- sulting disturbances within the Communist movement, among some sections of the Soviet population, and in world public opinion are also sharper as well as more widespread than at any time since that year. 2. From an internal standpoint, the new turn expresses the failure of the Communist elite to solve the problem of the succession to Stalin. The call for a "collective leadership" means merely that the factional conflicts within the Soviet Party and empire have not been settled. An interim compromise solution (a kind of "directorate") is proposed, in order to permit the struggle of factions and tendencies to mature, and thus ultimately to establish a regime on a firm, univocal basis. Meanwhile, by purging Stalin posthumously, the directorate offers a scapegoat to the masses, and bids for the support of the ofHcer corps, whose honor and professional skill Stalin had offended. 3. Externally, the tactics of the new turn are designed to enlist the helj) of the non-Communist world in solving the internal Soviet prob- lems and in furthering the advance of the world revolution. 4. There has been no change in the objective of the Communist en- terprise: a Communist monopoly of power throughout the world. There has been no change in their fundamental strategic estimate, or in their dehnition of the United States as the main enemy. Nor has there been any change in their principal methods. All forms of vio- lence, from individual terror through to guerrilla and full-scale war, continue operative. The Communists are conducting guerrilla fight- ing in southeast Asia, shelling Quemoy and Matsu, and instigating vio- lent riots in many localities. They are supporting terror and war in Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria, and are trying to provoke full-scale war in the Middle East. 5. The new turn makes increased use of certain "right" tactics, many of them taken over from the popular-front days of the 1930's. These include a rightist rhetoric for Communist propaganda, with emphasis on negotiation, disarmament, peace, trade, the peaceful road to so- 122 THE GREAT PRETENSE 123 cialism, popular-front alliances, and so on. "Anti-Stalinism" is dis- played outside the Soviet empire as a proof that communism and its parties everywhere are now under a new leadership that is good, legal, and peaceful. The aims of this rightist, conciliating emphasis are: (1) to induce the non-Communist world to complete the "legitimiza- tion" of the postwar Communist conquests in Eastern Europe and the Far East; (2) to relieve external pressures while the Communists try to solve their more critical internal problems; (3) to increase trade in order to bolster the Soviet economy and to provide it with strategic goods in which it is deficient ; (4) to get non- Soviet Communist Parties accepted in all countries as normal, legitimate political organizations, thus able to infiltrate and undermine more effectively than when they are regarded as illegal or outlaw groups; (5) to encourage the non- Communist nations to weaken their military defenses; (6) to give the Communists a freer hand in pursuing the extension of their power by political warfare. 6. By welcoming the new turn or accepting any of its elements, the free world, and the United States specifically, would merely be helping the Soviet Union and world communism to achieve their objectives. 7. The new Communist turn appears as a demonstration of strength only because the non-Communist nations, and specifically the United States, are supine anr' passive in face of it, and have offered no coun- terpolicy. In truth, the neAv turn is a symptom not of strength but of grave internal weakness; or, more exactly, of grave potential weakness if the non-Communist nations were capable of meeting it resolutely, and of mounting an offensive to enlarge and exploit the present Communist vulnerability. A modest, quite feasible beginning for such action would include such steps as the following : 7.1 A propaganda campaign could be directed at Communists and the Communist youth, inside and outside the Iron Curtain, by all technical means — not only radio, but leaflets, pamphlets, balloons, phonograph records, and so on. This campaign would begin by re- viewing the full story of Stalinist infamy — which now, for the first time, would be listened to — and proving that the present leadership is itself totally implicated in that infamy, and therefore self-con- demned. 7.2 Drawing on the lesson of our failure in the June 1953 East G'erman uprisings, we could use our technical apparatus as the com- munications system of the dissidents and potential dissidents within the Soviet sphere. We could try to spread all news from all sources (including our secret intelligence sources) concerning every demon- stration or disturbance, so that each dissident will realize that he is not alone, and will derive moral strength from his awareness that many others in many places are with him. 7.3 We could try to "politicalize" the disturbances and the party discussion (itself a disturbance) by suggesting key political ideas, aims, and slogans that are relevant to the present situation. These cannot be decided in the abstract, but must be tested in action. Ji. relevant objective for the party membership, which could be ad- vanced by slogans together with supporting history and propaganda, might be the revival of inner-party democracy, free discussion, free- dom for "tendencies," etc. ; or even freedom for an ox)positiou party. 124 THE GREAT PRETENSE In the universities, the right to choose "elective" courses, to criticize official dogma, or to form "independent student organizations'' might get dynamic response at this stage. 7.4 It is apj)arent that most disturbances so far have taken place in the non-Russian regions (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, etc.), and express the local nationalism that is never far from the surface. Nationalist feeling is still plainer in the captive nations of Eastern Europe. Working closely with the exile groups, it should be possible to give more meaning and direction to this nationalist sentiment, which (whatever its momentary form) is implicitly directed against tlie oppression of imperial and Bolshevik Moscow. Special measures to establish some direct contact would seem now in order. 7.5 The deep ideological shock of the anti-Stalin turn provides a natural occasion for moves to induce defections both from the Soviet Union and from Communist Parties in non-Soviet countries, including the United States. 7.6 To all potential dissidents, and to the Soviet military, the "West should make clear that a genuine, lasting agreement would always be ready for a Kremlin regime that gave up bolshevism's doctrine and apparatus of world revolution, that released the captive nations to the free decisions of their own citizens, and that entered into normal intercourse with the rest of the world. RED CHINA AND THE PURGE OF STALIN By Kenneth Colegrove Kenneth Colegrove is professor emeritus of political science at North- western University, and has taught also at Oberlin College, Syra- cuse University, and the University of California. He is the author of several prominent books on public affairs, among them. Militarism in Japan, and The American Senate and World Peace. For the past 20 years, he has prepared the articles on communism, democracy, civil liberties, Asia, and Soviet Russia for the World Book Encyclopedia. During World War II, Dr. Colegrove served as consultant to the Office of Strategic Services in Washington and, in 1946, went to Japan as a consultant to General MacArthur on constitutional questions. He also served as a consultant on Far Eastern policy for the Department of State. In 1954 Dr. Colegrove became editor in chief of the Institute of Fiscal and Political Education of New York. The sudden assault on the Stalin cult in the Soviet Union has sig- nificance for Eed China. For years, the Communist Party in China has followed the Marx-I^nin-Stalin doctrine as the only "science of revolution." The dictator Mao Tse-tung has frequently voiced his loyalty to the Moscow dictatorship. He has acknowledged the undis- putecl leadership of the world revolution by Soviet Russia. For years, Radio Peiping has faithfully echoed the propaganda of Raclio Moscow. Thus, the logic of events would demand that the Red dic- tatorship in China should join the collective dictatorship of Moscow in the posthumous purge of Stalin. Khrushchev's and Mikoyan's attack on Stalin in the 20th Con- gress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow was briefly reported in the Communist press in China. Likewise, the Pravda editorials were published without comment. All of this greatly excited Chinese intellectuals, but it meant little to the toiling masses of China who give small attention to politics. In the meanwhile, the puppet dictatorships in the satellites of East- ern Europe had vociferously followed the Moscow line, and had ex- coriated Stalin as a monster of bad faith and crime. For nearly 2 months, however, Mao Tse-tung was silent. In his lavish greetings to the 20th Congress, read to the Congress on February 15, 1956, by Mar- shal Chu Teh, Mao had heaped fulsome praise on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union "nurtured with care by Stalin and his closest col- laborators." If Mao had been warned of the purge of Stalin, he may have sought to soften the blow. News of long discussions in the Peiping Politburo leaked out. But it was not until April 5 that Peiping People's Daily, Mao's mouthpiece, published an editorial deflating the Stalin myth. National pride was assuaged by Mao's tardiness in following the Moscow line. But the delay failed to conceal the inevitable necessity for this falling into line. 125 126 THE GREAT PRETENSE The Chinese aspect of the new phase in Communist strategy can be partly explained in connection with 10 generally accepted con- clusions regarding the "collective leadership" in Moscow. These con- clusions are: (1) The Marx-Lenin doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat is a rigid and well-nigh immutable thesis of the "science of revolution." Lenin revised Marxian socialism in a large degree and made possible the "victory of socialism" in Russia. Stalin added little to Marx- Leninism. Hence, he can be eliminated from the group of founders without destroying the fundamental doctrine. (2) Marx-Leninism or Communist doctrine rigidly insists on class war, the inevitable armed struggle between democratic capitalism and Marxian socialism, the overthrow of bourgeois democracy by force, the leadership of the Communist Party as the "vanguard of the masses," and the creation of the dictatorshii) of the i:)roletariat. Lenin made doubly clear the thesis of "inevitable war" between the capitalist states and Soviet Russia in his Report of the Central Committee at the Eighth Part^^ Congress (1919). Communist doctrine also repudi- ates all reforms or amelioration of the working class by parliamentary action. Finally, it insists that all Communist Parties in all countries must support the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. After the death of Lenin in 1921, Stalin merely repeated the Leninist doctrine. (3) Lenin initiated and sanctilied the strategy of opportunism, a tactic which Stalin practiced on numerous occasions. As Lenin ex- plained to his fellow Communists in his Left- Wing Communism : An Infantile Disorder (1917) , the revolution could be advanced on various occasions by a temporary submergence of Communist doctrine in order to form alliances with Socialists and other left-wing groups. But eventually. Socialists must be drawn into the revolutionary movement led by the Commimist "vanguard." Lenin's use of "opportunism" was to persuade German Communists to infiltrate the Socialist and the labor movements in Germany. Stalin used opportunism in 1934 when he called for a "common front" against Hitler in all parliamentary countries. Again, in 1918, he employed this strategy in his gigantic hoax of "peaceful coexistence." The call of the 20th congress for a "united front" of Communist and Socialist Parties is only another use of Leninist opportunism. (4) The trend in modern totalitarian dictatorship has been toward one-man rule. Mussolini was the one supreme leader of Italian fascism; Hitler, of German nazism; and Lenin, of the Bolshevik revolution. The "collective dictatorship" of 1924-28 in Soviet Russia gave way to the one-man rule of Joseph Stalin. The present "col- lective leadership" in the Soviet Union is a contradiction as flagrant as would be the statement that Engels was a coequal of Marx as the founder of Marxian socialism. Rule by the elite in the present century has always led to one-man dictatorship. (5) Within the presidium of the Communist Party in Moscow today there is a grim struggle for power. In 1953, the "collective leadership" liquidated Beria, as ruthlessly as Stalin purged his enemies. Khrushchev emerged as the No. 1 Communist, but he has had only 2 years in which to consolidate his power. THE GREAT PRETENSE 127 (6) The presidium of the Communist Party, since the death of Stalin, has not greatly expanded the base of its power regardless of the claims of Khrushchev. The membership of the Communist Party, as announced by Khrushchev at the 20th Congress, as 6,795,- 897 full members and 419,609 candidate members, is about the same as it was at the death of Stalin. An empire of 215,000,000 people is still ruled by a party numbering only 3,5 percent of the population. (7) In the meantime, the "collective leadership" is keenly aware of the need for conciliating a new class or group of classes in the So- viet Union. The rise of classes in the so-called "classless state" has seldom been fully described. In 1936, Leon Trotsky, the inveterate enemy of Stalin, called attention to these classes in his The Revolu- tion Betrayed. More recently, the scholar W. W. Kulski has given a good analysis in his The Soviet Regime: Communism in Practice (University of Syracuse Press, 1954). Even under Lenin, there were two classes : the workers and the peasants. Stalin added a third class, the "intelligensia" whom he called a "stratum." Today, there are some eight classes as follows : (1) members of the party presidium, Council of Ministers, Central Committee, and marshals in the Soviet Army; (2) the middle bureaucracy of the party and Soviet Gov- ernment, generals in the Soviet Army, scientists, editors, artists, and musicians; (3) lower bureaucracy of the party and Soviet Govern- ment, colonels in the Soviet Army, factory managers and professors in universities; (4) party members, junior officers, foremen of fac- tories, managers of kolkhozy, and teachers; (5) Komsomol members, students in universities, commissioned officers, Stakhanovites, and labor heroes; (6) students in preparatory schools, petty officers, and factory and mine workers; (7) soldiers and peasants; and (8) slave laborers. The income of the first 3 classes is large ; the income of the next 2 classes is also comparatively large. The city worker has a higher income than the peasant, while slave laborers, numbering possibly 10 million, receive almost no income. The upper bureaucra- cy and the experts are a class to be reckoned with. Even the party presidium cannot ignore them. They do not want to be purged, in Stalin fashion. They want higher incomes and more consumers' goods even at the expense of industrialization and large armaments. (8) In repudiating Stalin, the collective leadership did not reject Marx-Leninism. On the contrary, the 20th Congress lavished praise upon the leader of the Bolshevik revolution and on the doctrine of leninism. In other words, the fundamentals of Communist dogma remain the same. (9) The Presidium of the Party employed two phases of "oppor- tunism." First, it revived the Stalin slogan of "peaceful coexistence," and it resorted to the propaganda device of declaring that war be- tween democratic capitalism and Soviet Russia is not inevitable. Sec- ond, the dictatorship revived the Leninist trick of calling for alliances of Communist parties with left-wing parties in democratic states. This strategy w^as immediately carried out, in March 1956, by Com- munist overtures for a "united front" made to the Council of the Socialist International (the descendant of the old Second Interna- tional) meeting in Zurich. In trade unionism, the Communists re- newed their drive to capture a strategic British labor union, the Amal- gamated Engineering Union. 128 THE GREAT PRETENSE (10) In o;eneral, following the 20tli congress, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union seems to seek the following goals: (1) to trick the armed democracies into relaxing their gnard by use of the propaganda trick of "peaceful coexistence"; (2) to undermine constitutional gov- ernment everywhere by a "united front" with left-wing Socialists in all countries; (3) to continue the destruction of parliamentary gov- ernment in France and Italy by means of the Communist Parties in those countries; (4) to continue the infiltration of labor unions in all democracies, especially in Sweden, Finland, Great Britain, India, Brazil, and the United States; (5) to undermine the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other democratic defenses against Commu- nist aggression; (6) to force neutralization upon West Germany by refusing agreement of the Great Powers regarding German unifica- tion except through a solution that would leave the German Federal Republic helpless in the face of Soviet propaganda and aggression; (7) to promote neutralism especially in Asia under the leadership of Premier Nehru of India; (8) to promote East-West trade in order to bolster up the national economy of Soviet Russia, the East European satellites and Red China; (9) to fan the flame of Asiatic nationalism to attack western influence in Korea, Japan, Southeast Asia, the Mid- dle East and North Africa; (10) to exploit the Arab-Israeli dispute in a manner to destroy Western prestige; (11) to promote Soviet colonialism by economic aid to Asiatic and Latin American countries ; (12) to crush the free Republic of China on Formosa; and (13) to employ the United Nations as a sounding board for Communist propaganda. The records of the 20th congress, as published in Pravda, do not indicate that the "collective leadership" struck down anj^ of the funda- mental dogma of Marxian socialism, or more accurately, of Marx- I^ninism. Nikita Khrushchev, the undisputed theoretician and sec- retary of the Communist Party, laid great stress on Leninism as the creed of modern communism. As already noted, the strategy of a "united front" is an opportunistic device used by Lenin, while the trick of "peaceful coexistence" is another propaganda falsehood em- ployed by Stalin. In the psychological battle to capture men's minds during the cold war, the "collective leadership" is now displaying the same flexible strategy successfully employed by Lenin, Stalin, Zinoviev and the Third International, A genuine change of heart can only be shown by "deeds, not words." And good deeds in Soviet foreign policy are conspicuously lacking. Soviet repudiation of in- ternational law and the sanctity of treaties was not corrected by any- thing said at the 20th congress. By resorting to the "opportunism" of Vladimir Lenin, and by re- iterating the 'peaceful coexistence" of Joseph Stalin, the Communist Party poses today a new and greater challenge to the democracies than at any other time in the life of modern communism. Having won half of Europe and Asia to communism, the Moscow Presidium has chosen the most efl'ective means for taking advantage of the weakness of democracies stemming from their emphasis on independent think- ing and individualism, inaction and idealistic tolerance. It remains to be seen whether the "collective leadership" in the Kremlin can effectively purge Soviet education and tradition of the Stalin myth. The purge of Stalin in the East European satellites THE GREAT PRETENSE 129 will, of course, follow any success of the Moscow Presidium in the Soviet Union. But what about Red China and southeast Asia ? Today, the Soviet orbit includes 215 million people in the Soviet Union and 93 million in the East European satellites, or a total of 308 million people. Communist Yugoslavia, with a population of 17 million, is partly in this orbit. It is only a matter of guess whether France and Italy will enter the Communist sphere. Communist Asia contains 573 million people in Ked China, 10 million in North Korea, 13 million in Viet Minh and 2 million in Mongolia, making a total of 698 million. Again, it is only a matter of conjecture when India, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia, with another 400 million people, will enter the Communist sphere, in spite of all the efforts of John Foster Dulles and the United States Department of State to keep these states witliin the free world. While JNIao Tse-tung has ever been the faithful ally of Soviet Russia, it has remained for Premier Jawaharlal Nehru, the leader of Asiatic neutralism, to emerge as the most effective col- laborator of Soviet imperialism in Asia. Neutralist Asia today is more than halfway on the road to Soviet communism. The situation in Red China and Asia, following the purge of Stalin, can conveniently be surveyed v/ithin the several categories already employed in the analysis of the 20th congress. (1) Mao's campaign to strike down the Stalin cult in China is far less complicated than the self-imposed task of the Moscow Presidium. To Chinese intellectuals, of course, Stalin has been a foreign, not a national, hero. It would be more difficult in China to purge Sun Yat- sen, whom the Chinese Reds have falsely made a Communist hero. Among the pictures of Lenin, Stalin and Mao, displayed in the offices of Chinese Communists, the image of Stalin is already quietly disap- pearing. In some headquarters, the picture of Marx is taking his place ; in others, none. (2) Marx-Leninism is deeply written into the literature of Com- munist China. As a young student in Peiping, Mao Tse-tung eagerly conned the writings of Lenin as well as of Marx and Engels. Ever since his schooldays, Mao has been a careful follower of Marx-Lenin- ism and also of Stalinism. In the "conquest of power" in China, he modified Soviet dogma only to the extent of adapting it to China. With Moscow's consent, he made the peasant the basis of the Chinese "revolution." But when the Communist industrialization of China began, the city workers came into their own, although they numbered less than 3 percent of the peasant population. Indeed, in article 1 of the 1954 constitution, which speaks of the People's Republic of China as a "people's democratic state led by the working class and based upon the alliance of workers and peasants," the industrial worker is named ahead of the peasant. All of this is a reversion to Leninism wholly consistent with Mao's Communist education. The writings of Mao show a faithful reflection of the T^ninist doctrine. His On Contradiction (1937), the Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War (1938), The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party (1939) and On the New Democracy (1940) loyally repeat the theses of the "class warfare," the "dictatorship of the pro- letariat," the "monolithic" character of the Communist Party, the "two-camp" view of the world and the "inevitable war" between capi- talist democracy and the Communist regime. Mao, like his European- 130 THE GREAT PRETENSE educated henchmen, Chu Teh and Chou En-lai, looks up to the Soviet Union as tlie "fatherhmd of the revolution" or the "elder brother of Communist China." (3) As to Lenin's strategy of "opportunism," Mao has followed every gyration of the Communist Party line as soon as announced from Moscow. His essay on the Unity Between the Interests of the Soviet Union and the Interests of Mankind (1939) was a cynical de- fense of the infamous Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement and the subse- quent division of Poland between Hitler and Stalin. In 1948, he faithfully collaborated v/ith Stalin's false propaganda of "peaceful coexistence." In 1950, he fell in line with Moscow's conspiracy to instigate Asiatics to war upon the United Nations as well as all West- ern Powers seeking to preserve the independence of free nations in Asia. As a result, 2 million Chinese "volunteers" were sent against the American and South Korean troops under the United Nations flag in Korea. (4) Once Mao Tse-tung won the leadership of the Communist "revolution" in China, his regime has followed the trend of all modern totalitarian states in acceptance of the one-man dictatorship. (5) FiVer since the long march toward Yenan in 1934, Mao has had no rival in the Chinese Politburo. On occasion, he has used the purge as ruthlessly as Stalin, as witness the "suicide" of Kao Kang, the use of Red terrorism and the rise of gigantic slave labor camps. (6) The Communist Party in China numbers only 6,500,000 mem- bers in a population of 575 million. This constitutes an even less percentage of the total population than the Communist Party in the Soviet Union. (7) Economic classes have appeared in the supposedly "classless re- public" of China. But the pressure of the experts and intellectuals is not so great upon the Chinese Politburo as the pressure of the Russian upper classes on Khrushchev and Bulganin. (8) There is no indication that Mao has retreated from any of the fundamental principles of Communist doctrine. In many respects, Mao Tse-tung is the most sincere Communist who ever read Karl Marx. Unquestionably, he meant exactly what he said in tlie official textbook of Chinese communism. The Role of the Communist Party in the National War, when he admonished his countrymen in the fol- lowing words: "The theory of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin is a univer- sally applicalile theory * * * We should not only learn Marx-Leninist words and phrases, but also study Marx-I^eninism as the science of revolution." Up to the present moment, the basic training in all schools of the Communist Party of China is Marx-Leninism and its application to China. (9) The opportunistic tactics of the 20th congress are an old story to Mao. In 1948, he fell in line with Stalin's propaganda of "peaceful coexistence." He collaborated with the same propaganda when Khrushchev and Bulganin revived this slogan previous to the Geneva "summit conference" in the summer of 1955. As for the proposal of the 20th congress for a "united front" with leftwing Socialists, this is an old device which Mao has frequently used with the full permission of Moscow. (10) Since the days of 1937, when Mao established his first capital in sandblown Yenan, he has synchronized his foreign policy with that THE GREAT PRETENSE 131 of the Soviet Union. During tlie Second World "War, with Stalin's blessing, IVIao showed more interest in keeping the Nationalist troops of Chiang Kai-shek out of North China than in defeating the Japanese invader. When, in 1945, Stalin violated the Sino-Chinese agreement and delivered the arms of the Japanese armies in Manchuria to Mao instead of to Chiang Kai-shek, the Soviet dictator fulfilled Mao's pre- diction of Stalin as "China's greatest friend." This treachery, as well as the withdrawal of American aid to the Eepublic of China, led to Mao's conquest of continental China. A few years later, the "friendship of the elder and younger brothers" led to the intervention of Eed China in the Korean war, instigated by Soviet Russia, followed by the persistent efforts of the U. S. S. R. to push Red China into the seat of the Republic of China in the United Nations. History offers no example of a more complete collaboration of two sovereign states. There is little on the political horizon today to indicate any lessening of the alliance between the Soviet Union and Red China. Predictions that Mao would become another Tito were unrealistic when made, and are now utterly exploded. In 1949, Mao himself journeyed to Moscow to negotiate the new treaty of alliance. This alliance has thrived in spite of the failure of the Soviet Union to redeem in full measure its pledges of economic assistance to the industrialization of Red China. The refusal of the United States and of the Colombo nations to extend economic and technical assistance to Red China has retarded the grandiose schemes of China's 5-year plans to socialize and industrial- ize China in the life of one generation. The dependence of Red China on Russian support is partly indicated by the fact that the annual steel production of Soviet Russia and the East European satellites is 57 million tons, while the output of Chinese still mills is barely 1.8 million tons. A striking example of the collaboration of Soviet Russia and Red China was the support that both Communist regimes gave to North Korea in its attack on the Republic of Korea. The armistice of 1953 which both regimes guided, was, in the words of the United Nations' senior delegate, a "victory for Red China." Adm. C. Turner Joy also added : "The truce in Korea, making Red China the first nation in history to fight the United States to an inconclusive ending, profited Red China in prestige and influence throughout Asia." He added that it "assisted, rather than deterred, subsequent aggression in Indochina by releasing Communist war material and technical assistance from the Korean front to be used against Dienbienphu" (How Communists Negotiate, p. 177). The admiral's account, however, fails to give due credit to Soviet Russia, which liad blocked Korean unity in the first place, had trained the Korean Red army, had instigated the invasion of 1950, and had supplied both the N^orth Koreans and the Chinese "volunteers'" with weapons of war. More than this, within the United Nations, and with the support of neutralist India, the Soviet Union did much to block the efforts of General MacArthur for a victory of the free world and to demoralize the defense of the democracies. The teamwork of Soviet Russia and Red China, assisted by Premier Nehru, was well nigh perfect. Anotlier striking example of the "elder brother" leadership of the Soviet Union was the Geneva Conference of 1954, at which France admitted defeat in Indochina and surrendered more than half of 132 THE GREAT PRETENSE Vietnam to Communist rule. For 6 years, botli EecT China and Soviet Russia had friven assistance to the guerrilla troops of Moscow- trained Ho Chi Minh. The contribution of Soviet Russia to the Communist victory, however, was far greater than that of Red China. On orders from Moscow, the Communist Party in France had j)ro- moted the demoralization of the French determination to resist, while Soviet propaganda against so-called American and British "imperialism" had retarded prompt assistance from the United States and had induced a strange timidity in the British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden. The Geneva Conference of 1954 was dominated by Molotov, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, who set the terms for the French surrender. Again, the teamwork between the "elder and younger brothers" was well-nigh perfect. No picture of communism in Asia is complete without due con- sideration of Premier Jawaharlal Nehru of India. The vociferous ovation extended to Khrushchev and Bulganin by large sections of the Indian people, on the occasion of the dictators' visit to India in 1955, shows that Nehru's collaboration with the U. S. S. R. is highly popular in many quarters of his country. Nehru's personal philosophy verges toward communism. Indeed, in the days of Gandhi, he was famil- iarly called the "little Stalin" in Congress Party circles. Today, he is one of the most valuable assets of the Soviet Union. As leader of the neutralist bloc in the United Nations as well as in Asia, he has been of immeasurable assistance to Russian foreign policy and the Commu- nist world conspiracy. Nehru's leadership received a slight setback in 1955 at the Bandung Conference. Through his enormous prestige, he had succeeded in bringing delegates of 28 Asian and African states to meet Chou En-lai, the premier of Red China, in order to concert measures to pull large sections of the free world away from their alliance with the Western democracies. To the dismay of the Indian premier, Chou En-lai was compelled to listen to some plain speaking by a few Asiatic delegations. State Minister Fadhill al-Jamali of Iraq de- clared that "Communism is a subversive religion," and that Com- munists "confront the world with a new form of colonialism much deadlier than the old one." Premier Sir John Kotelawala of Ceylon also condemned "Soviet colonialism." In addition, he declared : "The local Communist parties in Asia regard themselves as agents of the great Communist powers of Russia and China * * * Their loyalty is to Moscow and Peiping, and their role in Afro-Asian affairs has been to create as much disruption as possible * * * so that at the appro- priate time we can be transformed into satellites of the Soviet or Com- munist China." He also asserted that if the Communist powers "are in earnest about their desire for 'peaceful coexistence,' one would ex- pect them to convince us of their good faith by disbanding the Com- munist parties in every country of the Afro-Asian region." At Bandung, the few pro- West nations of Asia were able to block the proposal of Nehru and Chou to condemn American support of the Republic of China on Formosa against a Red Chinese invasion. But the defeat of the Communists at Bandung has been only a temporary setback. In the general election in Ceylon on April 6 and 7, 1956, the pro-West National Party of Kotelawala met a crushing defeat at the hands of the People's United Front, a "united front" of Com- THE GREAT PRETENSE 133 munists and Socialists. The downfall of Kotelawala in Ceylon is the first victory for the widespread "united front" jjroposed by the 20th Congress at Moscow. Similar victories are in the offing, not only in Asia, But also in Europe, Latin America and Africa. In 1919, after the defeat of communism in Germany, Lenin quipped that "the road to Paris lay through Peiping." With the as- sistance of Stalin, Zinoviev and Veltmann-Pavlovich, he developed the remarkable strategy that has already won half of Asia for communism. Lenin, however, never abandoned the other roads to world revolution, nor have his successors in the Kremlin abandoned these roads. The "united front" proposed by the 20th Congress is an old technique. The "united front" exists today in all democratic coun- tries. It exists even in the United States, although here only in em- bryo form. But defenders of liberty should not forget that an embryo generally grows in strength and size. As for Asia, it is wishful think- ing to expect the purge of Stalin to cause any tlisruption of the per- formance of the team of the "elder and younger brothers." The Com- munist powers today are bound together by a common doctrine, by a common strategy and by a common self-interest in the Communist conspiracy for world conquest. THE IMPACT ON MAO TSE-TUNG By Peter S. H. Tang Peter S. H. Tang, a native of Anhwei Province, China, was attached during World War II to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of tlie Chinese National Government and to Chinese Embassy in Moscow. Following World War II, he came to the United States to study at Columbia Uni- versity. He received a Ph. D. degree in 1952. Dr. Tang was naturalized in 1955 and has worked for the Voice of America as a radio script writer. At the present time, he is a consultant to the Chinese history project of Columbia University and is research associate in the Far Eastern and Russian Institute of the University of Washington. Dr. Tang is the author of two forthcoming books, one on Russo-Chinese relations in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia, and the other on the domestic and foreign policies of the Chinese Communist Government. The current anti-Stalin drive emanating from tlie Kremlin lias caused considerable embarrassment and is requiring considerable read- justment in party thinking and organization throughout the Com- munist world. WHiile the reaction from the various Communist countries is still in its early stages, the Communists throughout the world have unanimously sought to present a favorable picture of the vitality of the Communist Party because it has the courage to engage in criticism and self-criticism on such a sensitive subject. Behind this facade, however, lie many crucial and highly debatable problems. The full import of the anti-Stalin line for Communist China will be slow in making itself felt. But on two crucial points, an estimate of its significance can be offered at this time. The first has to do with the position of leadership of Mao Tse-tung within the Communist Party of China (CPC). Mao was the unchallenged leader of the CPC during all the latter years of Stalin's rule, when Stalin allegedly was committing his worst excesses. Will Mao, then, be tarred with the same brush, and will an alternative leadership rise to challenge him within the CPC? The second has to do with the solidarity of the Moscow-Peiping Axis. Will the internal turmoil now going on within the CPSU, and its repudiation of some of Stalin's policies and actions, be seized upon or taken advantage of by the Chinese Communists to gain a greater freedom of action for themselves, to increase their in- fluence in determining the overall policies of the Soviet camp, and to lessen their subservience to INIoscow ? To both these questions, the evidence to date suggests a negative answer. Neither Mao's position within the CPC nor the firmness of the INIoscow-Peiping connection seems likely to be shaken by the events of the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU. 134 THE GREAT PRETENSE 135 I. LEADERSHIP OF THE CPC Tlie charge of being a lienchman of Stalin's and therefore guilty of the deviation of individualism can no more be used to weaken the position of Mao Tse-tung in China than that of Khrushchev in the Soviet Union. From the very inception of the Communist Party of China, its leadership was faithful to the instructions of the Communist International and submissive to its judgments as the regulations of the Comintern required. With the ascendency of Stalin to supreme power in the Communist world, the loyalty of the Chinese Communists to the Communist cause was often confounded, as in many other coun- tries, with their loyalty to the Stalin leadership. However, a dif- ferentiation should be made for the purpose of clarity: Mao's allegiance has been to the Kremlin leadership as such, for the sake of the world Communist cause and not necessarily to Stalin as an individual. It is true that Mao had personally glorified Stalin as immortal, and his works as a sure guide for the Chinese Communists. He even yielded to Stalin the major credit for the long-fought and hard-fought victory in China,^ as though he were only another puppet ruler placed in power by the Red Army, w]\en in fact his own strength and prestige as the successful leader of the No. 2 Communist power were growing to new heights. But his ostensible subservience to Stalin the idol, Stalin the demigod, reflected his faithfulness to the party line rather than any personal loyalty to, or dependence upon, Stalin. He simply used the party jargon then prevailing under the auspices of the Kremlin. If Mao is guilty of worshipping at Stalin's throne, he is not alone in this crime. In fact many others — the present Soviet leadership included — have surpassed him in this respect. In any case, Mao has a better excuse for having been taken in by the Stalin cult. In the first place, his reverence for the late Soviet dictator was partly in- tended to signify acceptance and respect for the leaclership of the Soviet Party as such. Secondly, distance offers some excuse for Mao's supposed ignorance of Stalin's behind-the- scenes terrorism. Mao's allegiance to the Soviet Party leadership irrespective of the personalities involved has, indeed, been well demonstrated in recent years. In official messages after the death of Stalin, he expressed his continued loyalty first to the Malenkov leadership, and more recently, in a congratulatory message to the 20th Congress of the CPSU, to the Khrushchev leadership. Thus, since Mao's primary concern has been his dedication to the Communist cause centered in Moscow, he can scarcely be charged with the guilt of Stalin, who has been accused of placing himself above the P^rty- If Mao was not simply Stalin's henchman in China, neither can he be considered guilty of imitating Stalin by making himself a per- sonal dictator in China. In his own leadership, INIao has steadfastly observed many of the scruples and amenities which Stalin ruthlessly ignored. ' For a detailed discussion see Peter S. H. Tang. Stalin's Role in the Communist Victory In China, American Slavic and East European Review, vol. XIII, No. 3, October 1954, p. 387. 136 THE GREAT PRETENSE First of all, as already noted, Mao declined the full credit of his victory on the mainland. In the many long years that Stalin held sway over the Communist world, Mao, as top man in the Chinese Communist hierarchy, deferred to Stalin as the supreme idol. Prior to the victory in China, it is true, the link to Stalin and the Kremlin was not given prominence in Mao's pronouncements or the literature of the Communist Party of China. But as a laborer in the party vineyard for the glory of the party, Mao's function and achievement lay in his successful implementation of Stalin's strategy for Com- munist revolution in China. When control of the Chinese mainland finally rested in his hands, he then declared himself, along with other* Chinese Communists, to be among Stalin's disciples and followers. Secondly, in his rise to power and in his maintenance of his au- thority, Mao did not stoop to the Stalin tactics of bloody purges among his own close associates. Stalin had eliminated not only his former rivals such as Trotsky, but also his one-time allies — Kamenev, Zinoviev, Bukharin — in the 1930's, and later his subordinates — Mar- shal Tulchachevsky, and Politburo member, Voznesensky. Mao, on the other hand, with the possible exception of Jao Shu-Shih, whose fate is still unknown, spared Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Li-san, Ch'en Shao-yii (Wang Ming), and Chang Kuo-t'ao, who have been objects of his most searing criticism. It is even possible that Kao Kang's life might have been spared, had he not committed suicide.^ Thirdly, in the matter of collective leadership, Mao was not slow to follow the lead of Moscow, where joint signatures have been appear- ing on state papers and where party congresses and conferences have been called regularly since Stalin's death. As a matter of fact Mao has not monopolized as much power as Stalin had, despite the fact that his position and prestige in Com- munist China are comparable to those of Stalin in the U. S. S. R. Wliether Mao's reported ill health or his greater trust in his lieu- tenants was the cause, it is known that Mao delegated considerable power to Liu Shao-ch'i as early as 1945 in the matter of the drafting of the party constitution. It was Liu who gave the draft constitution to the 7th Party Congress at Yenan and who later, in September 1954, went before the National People's Congress to present the final draft of the state constitution. In the Soviet Union under Stalin, the state constitution was not only attributed to Stalin, but also bore his name in common reference. In a similar manner, Chou En-lai, as Mao's Premier since the founding of the Peiping regime on October 1, 1949, has enjoyed the spotlight in the national and the international scenes. The fact that Mao does not officially concentrate all the reins of power in his own hands does not mean that his star in China is waning. Instead he has been very much occupied with the problems he considers vital to the future of his regime. At a meeting of local party secretaries following the 6th Plenum of the Central Committee in July 1955, he talked about expediting the process of agricultural cooperativization or collectivization. More recently he compiled and edited 176 articles and wrote the introduction for the publication brought out in the party central organ on December 27, 1955. Hence, «For a fuller story see Peter S. IT. Tan?. Power Struggle in the Chinese CP : The Kao-Jao Pudge, Problems of Couimuuism, vol. IV, No. 6, Koveuiber-December 1955, pp. 18-25. THE GREAT PRETENSE 137 it woiilJ seem that Mao feels himself above the struggle for power and prefers to devote himself to more vital problems and to make more lasting constributions to party and cause. Because he has been scrupulous in his relations with his close associ- ates and in handling party and state affairs, Mao is not likely to face any direct challenge to his leadership from within his own party. In fact, the leadership of the Communist Party of China has shown great stability over the years by contrast with that of the Soviet party. The so-called Big Five of the CPC— Mao, Liu, Chou, Chuh Teh, and Ch'en Yiin — have long been recognized as the top leaders, regardless of the official positions they have held. And there appears to be little likelihood of any change in the immediate future. The form of oligarchic rule known as "collective leadership," while it may only recently have been restored in actual operations in the Soviet Union, has been in effect in Communist China for some time. Of course, it is not to be inferred that under the principle of collective leadership the rulers are necessarily equals. Mao's preeminence among them is unchallenged. Mao's long-standing and virtually undisputed leadership within the party itself, it should be noted, owes much to the manner in which it was won. Mao has achieved his position not so much through in- trigue and ruthlessness as through his successful management of the revolutionary struggle. The unequivocal support given him by his immediate associates is based mainly on respect, rather than fear. In line with the new Soviet policy, therefore, Mao will undoubtedly seek to discourage the excessive personal worship which has up to now been directed toward him. He would certainly prefer an exalted place in Communist history to the forced and short-lived type of glorification won at such cost by Stalin. Nevertheless, the deep- rooted admiixition on the part of his close cohorts and especially his comrades in arms is not likely to be lessened by the current down- grading of Stalin. Mao's position in his own party, therefore, is much closer to Lenin's rather than Stalin's in the Soviet party. The core of Mao's popu- larity is probably to be found in his personality, his methods of leader- ship, and his achievements in leading the party to victory. Mao's conduct has also resembled Lenin's more than Stalin's in being less self-seeking, and relying less on force than on persuasion in his deal- ings with his close associates. His fighting record for the party against its external enemies, and his steadfast devotion to the party program at any given period may also be considered as the traits of Lenin at his best. It is true that Mao is inferior to Lenin as a party theorist, since his basic thought lacks both the originality and the worldwide influence of I^nin's. But Mao surpasses any previous Chinese Communist leaders and may well overshadow those who will succeed him. Hence, he is much more likely to be regarded by his followers as a lesser Lenin rather than another Stalin. For all these reasons, it is inconceivable that Mao should face a serious challenge to his leadership from within his own party as a result of the current anti-Stalin drive. By the same token, there are no immediate indications that the Soviet party or its "collective leadership" in the Kremlin will challenge Mao. Ever since 1931, when he established the principal effective 77722—56 10 138 THE GREAT PRETENSE Communist base of operations in Kiangsi, Mao has been the de facto symbol of communism in China, holding the substance of power in the party more effectively than any previous leader. It would be the sheerest irony if the Soviet leadership were to risk a break with Peiping at this time not merely because of the rising power of the monolithic Chinese party, but because the Soviet Com- munists are themselves in the throes of a basic reconsideration of the leadership and policies of a whole era. The Soviet leadership is even now engaged in a desperate effort to heal the wounds which resulted from Stalin's expulsion of Tito from the Cominform in 1948. Not only are they repudiating Stalin directly, but they also find it neces- sary to rehabilitate such East European Communist leaders as Rajk of Hungary, Rostov of Bulgaria, and Slansl^ of Czechoslovakia, for alleged Titoist conspiracy. If the present Soviet leadership attempted to foster or take advan- tage of the current anti-Stalin drive to dethrone or denigrate Mao, they would not only have committed a greater blunder than Stalin's, but they would undo the very goal of party unity and united-front appeal which they have been trying to accomplish in turning their backs on the rigidity and the personal idiosyncrasies of Stalin's policies. n. SOVIET-CHINESE RELATIONS The evidence to date also gives no indication that Peiping will try to take advantage of the current drive against Stalin to obtain a greater degree of freedom from control by Moscow, and freedom to folloAv an independent line of development in its theory and practice. On the contrary, the Chinese Communists have been prompt to accept and publicize the new line from Moscow, and to reaffirm their loyalty to the Soviet Union and its Communist Party as the leader of the Communist world. Moscow first broke the official silence on the anti-Stalin drive initiated by Khrushchev in his secret report to the 20th Party Con- gress in an editorial in Pravda on March 28, 1956. Almost immedi- ately, the editorial was reproduced, although without comment, in the People's Daily and broadcast in full by Iladio Peiping. Then, on April 4, People's Daily followed up with an editorial of its own, based on discussions of the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC. It joined in criticizing Stalin, while at the same time lauding the bold and forthright action of the Soviet party. This obvious attempt to justify the Soviet party, and to defend its prestige at such a critical juncture leaves no doubt that the Chinese Communists are fully cognizant of the need for Communist interna- tional solidarity. Indeed, the editorial concluded with a reiteration of Communist China's unshaken faith in the Socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union. There is a deeper reason for believing that the current anti-Stalin drive in Moscow will not give rise to any "tugging at the leash" on the part of Peiping. Whatever constraint the Chinese Communists may have suffered under the rigidity of Stalin's policy had already been eased, and the role of the Chinese Communist Party had already been considerably increased in importance by Stalin's successors. Under Stalin's i^ersonal dominance, Mao and the CPC failed to re- ceive their full share of credit for their contributions to the cause of THE GREAT PRETENSE 139 world communism. In spite of the enormous human and material sacriiices of the Chinese Conununists in fighting Stalin's war in Korea, Peiping's coleadership was not officially recognized until after the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to the Chinese Communist capital in September 1954. Shortly afterward, Molotov made the first official announcement in his foi-eign policy report to the Supreme Soviet.* Since that time recognition of Peiping's status as second only to that of Moscow has continued uninterrupted. At the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956, at least two members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Kaganovich and Kirichenko, reiterated this specific point, so important to the standing and prestige of the Chinese Communist Party. As the two leading Communist powers, both Communist China and the Soviet Union are basically interested in advancing the cause of world communism and in strengthening themselves for that purpose. In view of their overriding community of interest, the discussion of the character and deeds of Joseph Stalin will surely not be allowed to develop into differences of view which will threaten the primary goal. ]\Iao Tse-tung, for the reasons indicated, seems certain to retain his leading position in Communist China, while applying the principle of collective leadership in the Leninist tradition. And the Chinese Communists are not likely to weaken in the least their close collabora- tion with, and loyalty to, Moscow in carrying forward the cause of world communism. *ror further discussion Pee Peter S. H. Tang. Communist China Today: Domestic and Foreign Policies (to be published iu New York by Praeger in summer 1956), ch. X. COURTING THE NEUTRALISTS By Clarence A. Manning Clarence A. Manning was born in New York City and received degrees from Columbia University, where he is now associate professor of Slavic languages. In 1948 the Ukrainian Free University at Munich conferred upon him the honorary degree of doctor of philosophy. Dr. Manning is a member of the School of Slavonic Studies of the Univer- sity of London, and before World War II he was a foreign member of the Slavonic Institute of Prague and a visiting professor at the Uni- versity of Sofia. Among his best known books are The Story of the Ukraine and The Forgotten Republics, the latter dealing with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. It is difficult to evaluate definitely the results of the resolutions adopted at tlie 20th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party, the purpose of the attacks on Stalin by Khrushchev, the first secretary of the party, and by Mikoyan, an Armenian by origin, and the recent dis- turbances in the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, ostensibly as a protest against the attacks on the beloved hero and greatest son of Georgia, Josepli Stalin. However, these developments seem to indi- cate the following : As regards those resolutions affecting the internal administration of the U. S. S. R. the congress continued the chief policies of Stalin, the enforced and speedy industrialization at the expense of the well-being of the population. It also approved the further strengthening of the armed forces and the favorite scheme of Khrushchev, the union of the kolkhozes into larger agrogorods, to place the agricultural population more firmly under the control of the party and to approximate it as closely as possible to the position of the factory workers. The party thus reaffirmed the favorite policies of Stalin in the thirties. Despite declarations of emphasis on the need for an improvement of Soviet legality and the elimination of so-called abuses, Pravda is still continuing its atiacks on Trotskyists, Zinovyevists, rightwiiig clevia- tionists and bourgeois nationalists. There is neither in this paper nor in the decrees of the party any intimation that the U. S. S. R. has given up its general purpose of achieving world domination for the Com- munist Party of the U. S. S, R. despite its pleas for coexistence. Any changes are therefore really superficial and as the journey of Khrushchev and Bulganin and the actions of the U. S. S. R. in the Middle East show, peaceful coexistence in the Soviet sense is something far removed from that peace which the Western World is seeking. It is very obvious that the Soviet Union is merely changing its tactics to turn the neutralists against the free world. The relations between the Government of the U. S. S. R. and the Communist Party have taken different forms during the last 35 years, as the party has oscillated between dominating the Government secret- ly and openly assuming the commanding role. Yet there has been no variation in the party's real power. Stalin as an official of the party 140 THE GREAT PRETENSE 141 before 1941 was as all poNveif iil as he was later when during the war he assumed personal and open responsibility. The disarmament pro- posals presented before tlie league of Nations calling for total dis- armament did not visualize the disbanding of the forces of the then NKVD which were at the time civilian, paramilitary, and totally mili- tarized, depending upon the section and the immediate purpose of the section. A Soviet ban on atomic weapons incorporated now in a treaty signed by the Soviet Government would not by Soviet practice and theory prevent the transfer of the atomic weapons to any other Ministry than that of war which would be empowered to use them at the will of the Central Committee without regard to any treaty con- cluded by the Soviet Government. This division of control between the party (controlled by the Great Russian element) and the Government with the latter continually sub- ordinate renders void and unreliable all definite agreements made with other normal governments like that of the United States on all subjects. It is supported by the still unrepudiated view of Communist scholar- ship that truth varies with the general line and purpose of the party but always works for the one goal of Communist triumph. The resolutions seem to provide openly and tacitly for new tactics toward the problem of the nationalities, the most sore point in the Soviet system and the point which is most baffling to Western practice which seems to equate the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union in its legalistic thinking. Georgia (Gruzia) after existing as an independent state for about 2,000 years, finally acknoAvledged the suzerainty of the tsar as a vassal state and was then definitely annexed by Tsar Paul in 1800, Other principalities inhabited by Georgians were annexed still later. In 1917-18 the Georgian people declared their independence but they were finally forced to submit to communism and were brought into the U. S. S. R. as the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. Stalin was born in Georgia and was at first a nationalistic and anti- Russian revolutionist but he quickly accepted the banner of Lenin and commenced the process (perhaps under Great Russian pressure) of adopting completely the Great Russian program. In the beginning he was surrounded by a number of Georgian friends. The most prominent of these, Sergo Ordzhonikidze, died mysteriously in 1937 and most of the rest of this group disappeared in one way or another. At the end of World War II, he praised the Great Russians as the cause of Soviet victory. Later in the fifties he repudiated the linguistic theories of the half-Georgian, half-Scottish philologist, Nikolay Marr, as much on communistic as on philological grounds. On Stalin's death the only outstanding Georgian in the Soviet serv- ice was Lavrenty Beria in charge of the MVD. Beria apparently tried to assert his authority but he was accused of cooperating with the capitalistic world and misapplying the nationality problem and was executed, not without a suspicion that there was opposition to a second Georgian control of the Russians. Naturally this created a situation where tlie nationalistic elements (bourgeois nationalists) and the Georgian Communist admirers of Stalin could make common cause at least in certain fields. This ex- plains the meaning of some of the remarks in the Communist paper Zarya Vostoka, that the Georgians were not second-class citizens, 142 THE GREAT PRETENSE althoiigli they were urged to give up their nationalistic feelings and the attacks on nationalism have increased in the last days. Apparently this nationalistic agitation has been smouldering since the deaths of Stalin and Beria not only in Georgia but in the other Caucasian Republics (Armenia and Azerbaizhan) and perhaps in other Asian Soviet Republics. The desire for combating this may have inspired the unprecedented journey of the pro-Soviet Armenian Catholicos of Etchmiadzin to interfere in the election of tlie Catholicos of Cilicia, the ecclesiastical spokesman for the Middle East Armenians outside of the Armenian Soviet Republic. On the other hand, the Armenian Mikoyan at the congress defended the Ukrainian historians against the Russian scholars. Khrushchev himself had been the autocrat of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic for some 12 years before his promotion to Moscow. During this period he had prepared a group of Russian and Russianized Ukrainian Com- munists loyal to himself and when he moved to Moscow, he placed his own Ukrainian protege Kirichenko in charge of Ukraine and took with him many of his former associates. Ukrainian opposition to Moscow and to communism had been marked for years and it has not yet subsided, especially since Western Ukraine (Eastern Galicia) was only incorporated in the U. S. S. R. in 1939. In addition the Ukrainians have the largest and best or- ganized emigration with well over 1 million in the United States and Canada, mostly American and Canadian citizens. They also form the second largest group in the U. S. S. R. next after the Great Russians. They have been since 1917 the recognized leaders of the non-Russian peoples in the U. S. S. R. and have been most severely persecuted under both Stalin and Khrushchev. Millions M'ere starved in an artificial famine in 1932-3-3 and most of the leading Ukrainian writers and pro- fessors were liquidated in the thirties. The Ulcrainians are Slavs and the tsars always denied them a right to individual existence and history. At first the Soviets tried to capitalize on this by forming the Ukrainian Soviet Republic at the end of the civil war during which the Ukrainians tried unsuccessfully to maintain their independence which they had declared on January 22, 1918 and defended stubbornly for nearly 3 years. At the end of the twenties and in the thirties the Soviets commenced to destroy the Ukrainian intelligentsia, Communist and anti-Communist alike, and to adapt the people by force to the Russian pattern. After World AVar II and the death of Stalin, this same process continued but under different slogans and by different methods. In 1954 on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav concluded between Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky of the Zaporozhian Host (then the representative of Ulvrainian power) and Tsar Alexis, a treaty which opened Ukraine to INIuscovite interference, the All-Union Communist Party issued a new series of theses for the celebration. These created a wholly mythical theory of an origi- nal union of Ukraine and Russia and described the later separation of the two peoples under Papal-Polish influence and their final re- union, thanks to the Soviets and they stressed the debt that the Ukrainians owed to the Great Russian brothers. These theses were folloAved by the cession of the Crimea by the Russian Soviet Republic to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. The remarks of Mikoyan on the THE GREAT PRETENSE 143 value of the Ukrainian Conununist historians are still another step in the same direction and not a new iiniovation of the 20th Congress. However we must note that not one good word was said for the ardent old Ukrainian Communists who had been executed by Stalin or had committed suicide to escape arrest as Skrypnyk, Connnissar of Edu- cation in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Khrushchev is obviously trying to placate at least part of the Ukrainian opposition by kind words and by stressing the Slavic heritage of the Ukrainian people to drive a wedge between them and the other non-Russian peoples of the U. S. S. R. We may expect the same methods to be applied to the third Slavic Soviet Republic, that of Byelorussia, which is smaller and less nationally organized, al- though its emigration is active in the United States and the West. This policy of Khrushchev and Bulganin is really a continuation of the policy of Stalin when he succeeded in introducing the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Soviet Republics to charter membership in the United Nations. Since it is Soviet theory that only the Communists have a right to speak for any people, they will be able, in case of there being an opportunity, to extend the same "privileges'' to such Slavic satellites as Poland, and Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria and with little trouble also to Hungary, Rumania, and Albania where there are strong Slavic elements. The resolutions of the congress thus represent a change of tactics but not of goal. That is, to create under the guise of Soviet patriotism a single type of Communist culture and thinking with the minimum concessions to popular opposition. It is obviously the desire of the new leaders to remove from them- selves any stigma attached to the name and methods of Stalin for his sternness and energy but they have shown no tendency to rehabilitate any individuals wlio defended principles that Stalin did not accept and promulgate. Even those old Bolsheviks who have been restored to favor or whose memories have been honored are those who zealously supported Stalin's efforts to expand the Soviet influence into Ukraine and fought against ITkrainian rights. We cannot expect from the new face of the Communist U. S. S. R. any real concessions wdiich may end or even reduce the present ten- sions. Any relaxation will come from a weakening of the will of the free nations to resist a peaceful Soviet aggression and from a reduc- tion of their strength until the Soviets are again ready to take an active and perhaps military offensive made possible through trickery and chicanery. We can expect, however, that the Communist Party in the United States will e:vert itself to secure a new group of fellow travelers from among the more intellectual and idealistic circles who will be willing to urge a greater tolerance of communism and more kindness to and confidence in the "Russian" people. It would be a great moral victory for the TTnited States, if we would exclude from our vocabulary the word "Russia" except in dis- tinct reference to the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic and use "Soviets" or "Soviet Union" for the realm as a whole. The All-Union Communist Party by establishing a separate section for the RSFSR is again trying to prove that it is the mouthpiece of the peoples of the world but it has taken no steps to change its basically 144 THE GREAT PRETENSE Great Biissian character and wliatever kind words it may address to the underprivileged peoples, it has still the intention of bending them to its will. The present facet of Soviet policy is giving the United States a new opportunity to seize the initiative by calling for the independence of both the satellites and the non-Russian Soviet Republics and to turn the Soviet efforts to appeal to the nationalism of the underprivileged nations of Asia and Africa against Moscow. The Soviets are hoping that by kind words, personal letters, and friendly visits to the leaders of the democratic world, they will lull to sleep suspicions and be free to resume their intrigues. There is no evidence that Khrushchev and his friends were ever anything but the most ruthless and willing agents of Stalin and their speeches and actions offer abundant proof that they have not given up the idea of world domination. More than ever, it is the time for the free world to show that its ideals are real and that the whole world including the Soviet areas can be and must be set free, if the ideals of the United Nations and of humanity are to be made real. CAN KHRUSHCHEV SURVIVE? By Franz Borkenau Franz Borkenau, born in Vienna, was active in left-wing German politics during the twenties and emigrated to England after the rise of Hitler. After the war, he retured to Germany to serve for a time as professor of history at the University of Marburg. He now lives in Switzerland and possesses a world-wide reputation as an interpreter of events within the inner circles of Soviet power. He is the author of several books, among them: The Spanish Cockpit, World Communism, and European Communism. The following article is reprinted from the New Leader, The members of the Moscow Presidium, who once vied with one another in cringing adulation of Joseph Stalin, now compete for the honor of heaping the most mud on the dead lion's grave. They ex- plain that the hymns they sang to him in his lifetime were sung with NKVD men at their backs, ready to shoot. There is no such alibi for the Communists and fellow-travelers of the West, who have now been told that everything they have been saying for a quarter of a century was dictated by one of the worst monsters in history. Will they go on serving Khrushchev as they served Stalin? No doubt they will, explaining that, since Khrushchev has confessed Stalin's sins (though not his own), everything is now different. Is it really ? Do the unpublished charges Khrushchev made against Stalin at the secret session of the 20th party congress reflect a genuine change of heart, as the Yugoslav press eagerly claims and as many sincere friends of peace eagerly hope ? Or is something quite differ- ent now in progress? There cannot be the slightest doubt that the "debunking"'' of Stalin is the focal point of a great upheaval through- out the Soviet Union, both in high party circles and among the masses. But in the U. S. S. R. such dramatic developments rarely mean what they seem to mean, and icy dispassion is required in analyzing them. We do not need Nikita Khrushchev to teach us that Stalin killed millions and shattered the lives of tens of millions. Nor do we need the Soviet Presidium to learn that Stalin committed many grievous mistakes both at home and abroad. But we should utilize all our past knowledge in assessing the present "disclosures." The first fact which strikes the experienced student of Soviet affairs is that many of Khrushchev's anti-Stalin charges, as reported in the w^estern press, are demonstrably untrue. Did Stalin attempt to direct the conduct of World War II from a globe because he was unable to read an ordinary map? Stalin was for several years chief political commissar on one of the hottest south- ern fronts in the civil war. Did he remain completely ignorant of map-reading after this experience? Did Stalin really trust Hitler so much that he at first ordered Soviet troops not to answer German fire? Only 10 weeks before, he had rec- ognized, on the very day of the Belgrade uprising, the new anti- 145 146 THE GREAT PRETENSE German Government of Yugoslavia. True, he later retracted that recognition — precisely out of fear of an imminent German attack, of which, Khrushchev now pretends, he was completely unaware. In 1936, so the story runs, Stalin and Zhdanov decided on the great purges. Keally? Zhdanov at the time was the youngest candidate (not full) member of the Politburo, and in the later purges Malenkov played a larger role. But Malenkov is alive and Zhdanov is dead, so guilt is shifted to Zhdanov. Some of the stories now being dramatically disclosed are true, of course. But Stalin, too, made sure all his slanders of his enemies con- tained some measure of fact. The new anti-Stalin charges are a con- coction of falsities and true facts, precisely on the Stalin model. So much for the Soviet "change of heart." In the past, such concoctions have served only one function: the annihiliation of some intra-party adversary. The same is true today, judging by the furious conflicts Stalin's denigration is obviously rous- ing within the U. S. S. R. Murder is again stalking the party offices of the U. S. S. R. (How strange, incidentally, that the very healthy Polish Party Secretary Bierut went to his deathbed almost immedi- ately after hearing Khrushchev's speech at the 20th congress ! Who, in the last analysis, is behind the furious anti-Stalin campaign, which, if pushed further, will threaten many leading heads? Not Khrushchev — that much is clear. Of all the present members of the Presidium, he was the closest to Stalin in the days of the notorious "doctors' plot" ; note that the group of officers who were supposedly the intended victims of the plot — Marshals Konev and Vasilyevsky in the first place — have since enjoyed Khrushchev's support and reciprocated in turn. If Khrushchev now hurls a torch into the dry, inflammable wood of the Stalin heritage, it is to obscure his own responsibility be- hind the fires of a general conflagration. Ever since Stalin's death, his standing had had its marked ups and downs, which Soviet experts noted in puzzled surprise. Where Khrushchev stood was easy to see. He had demoted Malenkov in February 1955; Stalin's birthday in December was the first suitable occasion on which he could demonstrate his own personal devotion to the old master. And, lo and behold, the Soviet press, which had marked Stalin's previous birth and death anniversaries with awkward words or near silence, now broke out in impressive and universal praise of the dead dictator. On the first day of the party congress, Khrushchev mounted the ros- trum and condemned in general terms, as he had before, the "cult of personality"; meanwhile, both before and during the Congress, he was manipulating everything so that the elections to the Central Com- mittee and changes in the police brought him a substantial organiza- tional victory. Amid this triumphal march, and amid his own con- demnations of the personality cult, he did not once speak of Stalin. What happened between Stalin's birthday anniversary, December 21, and Khrushchev's opening speech at the Congress, February 14? (For a partial answer, see Boris I. Nicolaevsky's article, p. 10. — Ed.) Far more interesting, what happened between Khrushchev's public speech on February 14 and his secret speech on February 24 ? Between the last two dates, there was a tremendous event, the sig- nificance of which was hardly understood in the West: namely, the THE GREAT PRETENSE 147 speecli by Anastas Mikoyan. Instead of indulging in anonymous re- jections of the past, Mikoyan got up and called Stalin the culprit by name. This was only the beginning. Ke then named two victims, Antonov-Ovsevenko, a close collaborator of Trotsky in 1917, and Kossior, boss of the Ukraine from 1930 to 1937. Mikoyan spoke di- rectly of the crime of having exterminated Kossior and all his friends. Who exterminated those friends ? The entire Congress knew. It was Nikita Khrushchev, who, a few months after Kossior's arrest, was sent by Stalin to exterminate Kossior's supporters. In so doing, Khrushchev built up the Ukrainian team which to this day provides him with political mamelukes, and created a personal stronghold in the Ula-aine which has enabled him, under Stalin and afterward, to weather all crises. Thus, in the Kremlir, in the presence of more than 1,200 delegates and of the entire higher party and state bureaucracy, Mikoyan charged Khrushchev with having built his personal power on mass murders concocted by Stalin and himself. In effect, Mikoyan called Khrush- chev a murderer to his face. No wonder it took the Soviet press 2 days to publish the speech, in obviously garbled form. Khrushchev was shaken. He understood that the most brilliant organizational successes were insufficient and that his reconstruction of the police was still not far enough advanced to ward off such a blow. Mikoyan, whose speech also made it amply clear that he did not ac- cept Khrushchev's ideas on the imminent collapse of the West, spoke for a substantial current of thought which advises caution both at home and abroad. Broadly, ISIikoyan continued to hold the same views as Malenkov, who is also far from being broken. On the other side was IMolotov, also obviously in conflict with Khrushchev. Khrushchev could not eliminate him either, because of the sympathies he enjoys in certain Army circles. There may have been still other focuses of resistance, not yet apparent to us. In any case, Khrushchev could not strike as Stalin used to do, as he himself did within the scope of his own limited assignments under Stalin. Thus, Khrushchev decided that there was only one way to counter the onslaught of his enemies. He must head his adversaries off. He must put himself at the head of the anti-Stalin movement and do so in such a way as to hold a sword of Damocles over all heads (for who in the Kremlin can plead "not guilty" to some share in Stalin's crimes?). This was a counsel of despair, for Khrushchev's secret speech has alienated him from his old Stalinist friends, who until the end of 1955 at least regarded him as the defender of their hero and as their own champion. Did not Kaganovich, at the congress itself, cautiously voice their protests against overdoing anti-Stalinism ? Khrushchev can hardly have anticipated the revolt in Tiflis, where furious youths, no doubt instigated by local magnates who felt threat- ened by an anti-Stalin purge, tore his and Bulganin's pictures from the walls and shouted "hail to Stalin !" He can hardly have expected that the Tiflis press and radio would openly rebel against anti-Stalin- ism and praise Stalin highly for all the world to see. Khrushchev is now obviously caught in a pincers. On the one hand is a right-wing opposition led by Mikoj^an, which genuinely seeks to break one-man rule and intra-party terrorism. On the other hand, old Stalinists 148 THE GREAT PRETENSE openly revolt against their old comrade, Khruslichev, now a traitor to their cause. Will Khrushchev survive? That is unpredictable. One can only say how, if at all, he can survive ; by destroying his intra-party enemies. The organizational supremacy of Khrushchev has begun under omi- nous ausjDices, and at present only one thing seems certain : Khrush- chev's survival is a question of who will succeed in — to use Stalin's favorite expression — "physically liquidating" whom. STALIN IN COLD STORAGE By Robert J. Kerner Robert J. Kerner, director of the Institute of Slavic Studies of the University of California, is an authority on the modern history of Cen- tral and Eastern Europe. He has studied at the Universities of Berlin, Vienna, Moscow, and Paris, and has lectured at the Universities of Chicago, Columbia, Iowa, Hawaii, Colorado, and Prague. Before coming to the University of California he was a member of the faculty of the University of Missouri. In 1952 he spent 3 months studying the areas along the Iron Curtain. Dr. Kerner is the author and editor of 20 books and more than 100 articles on Central and Eastern Europe and was one of the founders of the Journal of Modern European History. For the time being, the Presidium has put Joseph Stalin in cold storage, both physically and spiritually. He has been purged post- humously. A rare honor in Moscow. There is a good reason for that, and the interpretation most likely to be adequate is that the members of the Presidium fear the ground swell in the rank and file of the Communist Party and in the people as a whole. The current developments pomt to these conclusions: 1. The public purging of Stalin was forced upon the 11 members of the Presidium by the strenuous opposition in the Communist Party and Ji the peoples behind the Iron Curtain against the Communist regime as organized and operated by Joseph Stalin. The present Presid.ium, basically the same as the old Politburo to 1952, in purging Stalin is in fact committing moral suicide in the minds of the Russian and satellite peoples because they are at least accomplices to the crimes which they allege Stalin committed and therefore are just as culpable as Stalin. At the same time they know they are purging a demigod, in other words, they are iconoclasts, smashing an icon which for nearly three decades they all worshipped. One can draw the conclusion that the Presidium is catching at straws to save itself. The Presidium having yielded to the tidal wave of opposition to the Communist regime have thrown Stalin to the lions and have started something they cannot stop. How far it will go cannot be foreseen at present. It might lead to a revolution in which the Communist regime might disappear in the dust of conflict or it might lead to such drastic changes in the Communist leadership in the government as to cripple it in its effec- tiveness before the non-Communist world. 2. A weapon that can overthrow even the strongest governments is that of the general strike. In 1905, on October 20, the Russians bsgan a general strike which undermined the bases of the Tsarist monarchy. It was a spontaneous, elemental, and unorganized movement. It caught the Russian people, inexperienced, unprepared, and untrained to take over the government. It was in the midst of this disorder that the institution called the Soviet originated as a political weapon. Objective historical research will conclude that this great opportunity 149 150 THE GREAT PRETENSE of the Russian people to destroy tlie monarchj^ tlirougli nonviolent means was transformed into an act of violence in which the govern- ment, better armed than the strikers, could eventually win out. It was something similar to this idea which the sailors at Kronstadt in 1920 inaugurated — joined by the sabotaging peasants — that forced Lenin to adopt the new economic policy in March 1921, which acted as a hypodermic to Commiinist ideas of that day and led to a capital- istic-Communist compromise in the ensuing 8 years. On June 16, 1953, a strike began in Berlin against increasing norms of hours in which on placards the strikers carried the following slogans : We call a general strike; we want butter, not a people's army. Berliners unite. Go out on a general strike. For Wednesday we call a general strike. This is a rising of the people. Objective analysis of this incident in Berlin and in East Germany leads to the conclusion that these strikers defeated the German Com- munist government in East Germany and that it was only when the Soviet Army was ordered to conquer the rioters that peace was finally obtained for the German Communist government which had fled from Berlin. Here again the strikers turned a nonviolent demonstration which really had won its cause into a violent demonstration against superior armed forces. Analysis of these attempts indicates that the most powerful weap- on — many times more powerful than the atom bomb — is the general strike with the qualification that it must remain nonviolent and that radical elements in it which favor violence shall be restrained. A nonviolent general strike could overthrow the Communist rule behind the Iron Curtain in a week. It is also Icnown that Russian soldiers and Russian officers in the Soviet Army in East Germany refused at times to fire upon the riot- ing Germans. It is known from the little that has emerged on the Communist side that 18 officers and men were shot for refusing to carry out orders by the Red Army. ^Vliat was the reaction of the West? For the most part, the high commissioners of the Allied Powers were absent from Berlin and the military command was actually interested in localizing the moral neutrality of the West by broadcasting that — neither the Allied authorities nor West Berlin authorities have in any manner whatsoever either directly or indirectly incited or fostered such demonstrations. The British Foreign Office was reported as feeling that — there was no excuse for or intention of intervening physically, but some ob- servers thought the West should offer immediate moral encouragement to the East Berliners, President Eisenhower in his press conference on June 17, in answer to the question whether there was anything he would care to say about the uprising in East Germany replied : The uprising in Berlin this morning ought to be a good lesson for most of us * * *. He knows nothing more about it. His dispatches are a little behind the papers this morning. In other words, the Western Powers and even dominant Western public opinion was confused. The events were unexpected as this observer can personally testify for he discussed the matter of an THE GREAT PRETENSE 151 uprising a year before in Berlin with those our Government had chosen as specialists in the matter of Communist policy in East Ger- many and in Russia. One can only describe Western policy as "active inactivity" or neutralism. The question before us at present is will the Western Powers be prepared and understand the situation behind the Iron Curtain with a positive policy, if the Russian and satellite peoples begin to take things in their hands. They plainly missed the boat in June 1953. Will they miss the. boat in 1956 and 1957 ? If the Russian and satellite peoples can be encouraged to undertake a nonviolent general strike the Communist regime will disappear in a week. This is one way, the least expensive way, the least bloody waj^, to prevent a third world war or minor peripheral wars. 3. It is apparent that under slave conditions and under barbarous labor laws and fake labor unions the Communist apparatus of Russia is able to produce weapons of vv'ar sufficient to put them into a posi- tion of threat against the West and particularly the United States. The population must work or starve. One of these days it may pre- fer to starve in order to end its slavery. This is a great opportunity for the governments of Western Europe, England, and France, and ourselves to work out a positive policy of encouraging the Russian and satellite peoples to do for themselves with the most powerful weapon in their hands what no third world war can ever accomplish with all its atomic horrors. This positive policy can be used without any fear of retaliation by the Presidium for the simple reason that it is using every method it can to bring about a revolution in the Western World and it can easily be answered that the Western Powers are doing nothing else w^hen they encourage the people behind the Iron Curtain to resort to nonviolent methods of overturning the governments behind the Iron Curtain. This means that governments and especially that in Washington should get together on a positive policy by public announcement and through radio channels indicating, obliquely if necessary, that they have no objection to the Russian and satellite peoples taking matters into their own hands and transforming the Communist dictatorships into truly democratic governments and that they sympathize with their desire for freedom from Communist dictatorship. This does not mean that the Western Powers should not continue to perfect their armaments, but it does mean that they should utilize the least expensive, the most justified morall}^, method to bring about peace in the world to save the oppressed and subjugated Russian and satellite peoples from a regime which both they and the peoples in the Western World abhor. The Presidium has been forced by the peoples behind the Iron Cur- tain to start something they cannot stop. Will the Western World reply in terms of neutralism or will it morally encourage them in evei'j way, short of violent methods, to carry out a peaceful revolution be- hind the Iron Curtain ? The policy^ of the Kremlin in recent days and especially since the 20th Congress of the Communist Party indicates no change in the fundamental strategic objectives: the world revolution. It indicates only a change in tactics; the advocacy of the united front (a sign of 152 THE GREAT PRETENSE weakness, both in the internal and in the foreign situation) . Khrush- chev, belongs to the remnants of Zhdanov's war faction. He will be aggressive in every way, but he knows Moscow is not yet ready for a third world war. He will push things short of a third world war. Meanwhile if he can pick off several countries with "peaceful coexist- ence" and "united front," he will do so. In our foreign policy, there should be found room for a positive and vigorous advocacy of liberation of the peoples behind the Iron Curtain and a strong policy of helping economically those countries which want to be saved. When Stalin died the Presidium showed its great fear of a revolu- tion when it exhorted that there should be no "panic" ("Panika") . It feared the rank and file of the Communist Party and the populace who definitely made it felt that they did not want a continuation of the Stalinist regime. Some concessions were then made, others (not all carried out) were promised. This observer has always taken the stand that the best information pointed to the fact that 60-80 percent of the Communist Party and the overwhelming majority of the people would eventually revolt unless radical changes were made in the Com- munist regime. Competent observers were aware of the changes which the people wanted when their soldiers surrendered in vast numbers at first to the Nazi armies in 1941. When the latter did not bring the changes, but, rather, further oppression, they then fought for "Kus- sia," but not for the "regime." Now the Presidium is mouthing the phrase "collective leadsership," talking about "discussions" in the lower party ranks, and openly decrying the Stalin regime, although its members were his "comrades-in-arms," loyal, and faithful executors of liis all-powerful will. Such a situation one of these days might lead to a "general strike," as in 1905, and the bulk of the rank and file of the Communist Party would be found among the "strikers." So Stalin must be reviled and purged. However, in spite of the "collective leadership" and the reviling of Stalin, there is no doubt that Khrushchev controls the Communist Party apparatus, and hence the Government. This treatment of Stalin helps with the Yugoslav Communists, who have been definitely shifting toward Moscow, but it does not quite deceive the Socialist leaders in Europe. Will it de- ceive Paris, London, and Washington ? There is at present no proof that any basic or fundamental changes have taken place in Moscow's foreign or domestic policy. Khrush- chev's statement: "* * * those who wait for that must wait until a shrimp learns to whistle," carries sufficient authority on this matter. Only superficial and tactical changes have been made. "Peaceful coexistence" and "relaxation of international tensions," which serve the need of a "breather" for the leaders in the Kremlin, are temporary in character until they are able to prepare for the final con- flict with what remains of the free world. Small wars in the Near and Middle East and in Africa and Southeast Asia, in Moscow's opin- ion, are apparently not in contradiction with the aims of "peaceful coexistence" and "relaxation of international tensions." The advocacy by British and French foreign policy planners that a real change has taken place in the Kremlin's foreign policies has received a cruel blow by recent events in the Near and Middle East and Africa. Their policies would abandon the captive peoples, give up what is left of Free China, and possibly even consent to such a Euro- THE GREAT PRETENSE 153 pean pact as would lead to a bloodless conquest of the remainder of Europe. In simple lanoua<ije, they have been fooled. In still simpler lano;uage, they have been jjiven the Moscow runaround. Thus far, also in doubtful application of these slogans, Soviet foreign policy has created 2 Koreas, 2 Indochinas, 2 Germanys, and is developing 2 Chinas. To expect the Kremlin to agree to a united non-Communist Ger- many subject to a guaranty by the West against aggression is to expect too much. To expect Moscow to accept effective international inspection by air to avoid sudden atomic and nuclear attack is too optimistic. Although some minor agreements maj' be made — whose significance will be exaggerated for political purposes — it may not be amiss to point out, as has often been done, that no real peace can be obtained, if one of the Great Powers directs subversive action in all other countries in order to disrupt their governments and expand the domain of communism. We know that the leaders of these Communist parties (including the American Communist Party) in 1949 took the traitorous oath of fealty to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union— of which they are only branches — to the effect that they would welcome the Red army when it crossed their frontiers and would carry out the IMoscow- type of Communist revolution. The leaders of the Communist Party of Soviet Russia disagree only on how and when and in what detail these general, fundamental objectives should be carried out. Hence, they must have a dictator, for a dictatorship over the prole- tariat without a dictator cannot long exist. The recent "collective leadership" under Malenkov from March 6, 1953, to February 8, 1955, was a faihire, if not also a farce. If Khrushchev does not achieve dictatorship, the conflict in the Kremlin will go on until someone does. Will he destroy the Malenkov faction by stages as Stalin did the Trotslv3'ites, or will he do it very soon with a swift, bloody and gi- gantic purge. Immediately after the Second World War, when Stalin began to age, the Zhdanov and Malenkov factions fought to work out the party line. Khrushchev belonged to the Zhdanov faction. This faction came out on top in 1946 and pushed the one headed by Malenkov out of the picture, but was not strong enough to destroy it, perhaps as a result of Stalin's influence. An example of the character of the Zhdanov faction's foreign policy, which led to the dangerous blockade of Berlin and the Tito-Stalin quarrel, which lost Yugoslavia to Moscow, was revealed early in 1948 by Voznesensky, in the following words "To prevent the possibility of appearance within the near future of new imperialist aggression against the socialist homeland and the beginning of a third world war, it is necessary that the aggressor imperialist countiy be disarmed, militarily and economically, and that the antiimperialist countries rally together." Here it is seen what they really think of world disarmament and what chance there is under Khrushchev to get it. One type can always 15 X THE GREAT PRETENSE be had without altercation — the disarmament of the West — but not of the "workers' state," Zhdanov's furious and impulsive drive in foreign and domestic policy ended in his mysterious death in Id-LS. From 1948, Malenkov grew in power and prepared to take over Stalin's legacy. Anti-Malenkov forces were not strong enough to prevent Malenkov from becoming Prime Minister. They were strong enough to reduce the Presidium from 25 men to 10 men which would give the Old Guard (Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Khrushchev, and Bulganin) a chance to dominate it and to deprive Malenkov of his position as the head of the secretariat of the central committee and in two steps to make Khrushchev first secre- tary, the most powerful position in Soviet Russia, the position from which Stalin really ruled Russia. They all feared Beria. He lost his position and his life. Thereafter Khrushchev rose steadily to leadership and began to overshadow Malenkov. The last 2 weeks of January and the first week of February furnished the occasion for legalizing Khrushchev's right to be the leader in the Kremlin and the opportunity to set up a real dictatorship in his per- son, instead of the collective leadership of the Malenkov regime. During these 3 weeks a juncture of decisive events was sparked and precipitated by Khrushchev's and Bulganin's visit to Peiping in September and October 1954. In his speech of September 30, 1954, Khrushchev exhorted the Red Chinese to action : "* * * the Soviet people expresses its deep sympathy to the great Chinese people in its noble cause and supi^orts its de- termination to liberate its brothers who are still languishing under the yoke of the Kuomintang clique on the island of Taiwan." But Khrushchev indicated that liberation of Formosa was not all that his faction suggested. In the official message from the Moscow Presidium, it was expressly stated: "* * * the Chinese People's Re- public has transformed itself into a powerful factor in the liberation of all oppressed peoples against the forces of imperialist reaction and colonial enslavement for their freedom and national independence.'' A great nation thereupon took upon itself to defend its security in the Far East, symbolized by Formosa and the Pescadores, and by doing so to help save against Red Chinese aggression what was left of a great and free people — the Nationalist Chinese. When that occurred, it would be only logical that Peiping demanded more definite assurances of help from Moscow. Thus the Malenkov faction and the Khrushchev faction came to grips. Undoubtedly the latter demanded that Peiping be supported with additional assurances and assistance in its provocative policy, most likely, no matter what the consequences, while the Malenkov grouji shrank before such a gamble. This appears at present the most probable immediate cause of the seizure of power by the Khrushchev faction. The war party, consisting of Khrushchev, Molotov, Voroshilov, Bul- ganin, Kaganovich, and Zhukov, is in power, but it is not in a position to make war at once because of the serious internal situation. Its objective is to prepare for it as fast as possible and to risk it, if it is necessary. THE GREAT PRETENSE 155 It is instructive to examine the character and the origins of the cold war in context of the present climacteric in the Kremlin. In the history of Soviet foreign policy one may discern the "first •wave of tlie world revolution" from 1918-27, so dubbed by Radek, one of its leading participants. It will be remembered that this took place as the First "World War ended and, because that war brought devasta- tion, confusion, and human misery, Moscow was full of ardent hope that out of it the world revolution would be kindled and save the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. This first wave of the world revolu- tion fizzled. The great opportunity was lost. The Politburo in Mos- cow which directed the Third International failed to bring about a Communist revolution in Germany in 1923 and lost the chance to con- trol and transform the national revolution into a Communist revolu- tion in China in 1927. It had also the untoward serious result that reaction was encouraged and justified thereby in Germany, Japan, and China. Out of this eventually emerged the Anti-Comintern Pact to oppose the Comintern (or Third International). The Second World War left still greater degrees of devastation, confusion, and human misery. After El Alamein in Africa, Stalin- grad in Russia, and the naval battle of Midway in the Pacific in 1942 the anti-Comintern powers, Nazi Germany and Japan, were doomed to defeat. For the Politburo came the time of great decisions in the 2 years that followed. WHiat would be the actual foreign policy of Moscow after the war? At the end of this time, in the last half of 1944 and the first 2 or 3 months of 1945, there emerged from the Politburo the cold war policy as the tactical phase of the second wave of the world revolution. This was the second great opportunity of Moscow, of the plotters and directors of the world revolution. The origins of any complex event are not easy to trace and, in this particular case, the records of the Politburo are not available. These origins must be pieced together like a jigsaw puzzle. When the pieces are brought together, however, they give us a picture which is unmis- takable in its character, even if some of the detail is missing and will be missing until the Politburo archives are opened up, whether that be after the world revolution has swept triumphantly over what is left of the Western Powers or another Russian revolution topples the Soviet edifice. The foreign policy of Soviet Russia cannot be diagnosed only from the notes issued by its Foreign Office, or the speeches of its foreign ministers or other high officials. That policy was determined in the Politburo (to 1952) or Presidium (since 1952) of the central com- mittee of the Commvuiist Party of the Soviet Union. It is not the policy of the Government, but of the Communist Party which controls it. Here are the lines of action that lead not only to the Foreign Office and over 40 embassies and other conventional diplomatic insti- tutions, but to 53 Communist Parties all over the world and to the most extensive and expensive espionage and propaganda system ever created. In other words, in the Soviet Union the non-Soviet world faces the origins of both the conventional diplomatic, as well as the unconventional, secret revolutionary elements, which together make up the foreign policy of the Kremlin. To study only the one or the other, is to arrive at an inadequate and untenable diagnosis, particu- larly as has been the custom of Western foreign offices to respond only 156 THE GREAT PRETENSE to tlie conventional elements in that policy, either ont of ignorance or fear. Trained Western diplomats and statesmen find themselves in a quandary because of this, and their failures to understand the actual policies of the Kremlin or publicly to explain them to their people are only too obvious. For the most part, they seem to be about as intelligent in facing this new phenomenon in international rela- tions as a physicist or a chemist would be these days, if he knew noth- ing about atomic and nuclear energy. Much less excusable, however, is the competent scholar, who does not need to face uninformed or misguided electorates. The importance and quality of his Avork will depend, as in the case of scientists, engineers, and physicians, upon the accuracy of his diagnosis and interpretation. Time will prove that, in spite of attacks from whatever quarter and however inspired. So far as this scholar is concerned, his research indicates that the origins of the cold war can be traced back to the last half of 1944 and the first 2 or 3 months of 1945. It was certainly under formula- tion during that time in the Politburo and was launched as a full- fledged policy immediately after the Yalta Conference in February of that year. It confirmed the fundamental long-range objective of Moscow to carry out the world revolution as far as possible as a result of the political, economic, and social upheaval caused by the Second World War. Concessions by the Western Powers, including all efforts to make the Soviet Union feel that they desired her cooperation, were so much grist for the Soviet mill, but they could not deter the men in the Kremlin from making use of the very great opportunity to increase the domain of communism. It is true that Russia had suffered gigantic losses and great devastation in the war, but it was clear to anyone that she emerged as a great power — the strongest power in Europe and Asia, second only to the United States. In contrast to the first wave of the world revolution in 1918, the second wave of the world revolu- tion had tremendous possibilities for success and in this the Kremlin judged correctly. Alongside this fantastic opportunity, the matter of a postwar loan of $6 billion from the United States requested by Stalin in 1944 could not be decisive. This sum was not a small matter to us. The American economic experts, who first unotlicially broached the matter, themselves figured on the extension of a postwar credit of at most about three and a half billion. It would take time to plan postwar policy in the midst of war and to negotiate such a loan or credit. At any rate, even that favorably inclined group realized that Moscow had suddenly put brakes on such plans when on September 6, 1944, the Keel Army swept over Nazi-satellite Bulgaria, which had been neutral to Soviet Russia and at war only with Britain and the United States. Technically correct, Bulgaria had sent delegates to the two last-named powers in Cairo to sue for peace, while Russia and Bulgaria were still neutral. Moscow simply announced the Bulgarians had violated their neutrality, declared war on Bulgaria, overran the war- weary state, and put a left wing cabinet in power. Thereupon the negotiations were brought to Moscow, and British and American officials were given the cold stare both in Moscow and in Sofia, Bulgaria, in violation of the agreements made at the Conferences of Moscow (November 1, 1943) and Teheran (December 1943). A firm grip upon the first satellite had been secured. The question of the loan is not a substan- THE GREAT PRETENSE 157 tial factor in the origins of the cold war. At most, it could have played only a minor role — as a minor irritant — in the grandiose plans of the Kremlin. It could have helped to mature these plans sooner, but it was not vital to their plans. How do we know tht the cold war originated at the time indicated above, namely, the last half of 1944 and the first few months of 1945, that is, before Nazi Germany had been finally conquered and before Soviet Russia had entered the war against Japan ? ^ The Bulgarian episode — even with its wider implications of its sig- nificance for the problem of the Turkish Straits — might have been passed over on the old belief that the first swallow does not mean spring. There continued the refusal of Moscow to make an arrange- ment about Poland, after the rupture of relations in April 1943. Actually, the Kremlin was preparing the Communist setup to take over Poland before the end of the war. It recognized the Commu- nist-controlled Lublin committee on January 5, 1945. Thus, a second satellite was being launched on its way. In the meanwhile, and con- tinuing into the spring of 1945, Moscow applied pressure on Presi- dent Benes' London government, forcing it steadily into a type of coalition favorable to the Communists, thus launching a third satel- lite. The agreements at the Yalta Conference (February 2-11, 1945) gave territorial concessions (subject to the Soviet Union's entry into the war with Japan) and liberally satisfied the greatest part of Mos- cow's demands. It initiated serious controversies about reparations and Germany's future. Two weeks after the Conference of Yalta, Moscow started the fourth satellite on its way, namely, Rumania. Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky arrived in Bucharest (February 27-28), gave the King an ultimatum while Red soldiers paraded the streets, overthrew the liberal coalition government, and began the Communist-controlled government under Premier Groza. In JNIarch the Soviet Government began to play a lone hand in the previously agreed to interallied dis- cussions regarding the occupation of Germany. Here were the begin- nings of the long effort, not yet concluded, of making a satellite of all Germany. On March 21 Moscow suddenly initiated a war of nerves against Turkey by denouncing the old treaty of alliance and by demanding a new treaty regarding the Turkish Straits, in which it let it be known that it sought their control. The Yalta agreement regarding the setting up of a new government in Poland was violated when Soviet Russia signed an alliance with the Polish Lublin Gov- ernment in April. In June Moscow forced Czechoslovakia to sur- render to Soviet Russia the Province of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia as a part of the L^kraine. At the Potsdam conference in July, Premier Stalin remarked : A freely-elected government in any of these countries [i. e. the future satel- lites] would be anti-Soviet and that we cannot allow. Communist parties are always minorities, and that is why they have never won a free election and why they never will. Foreign Minister Molotov has just proved this again beyond a doubt regarding Ger- many, It is not too much to say that the entire Soviet edifice every- where would collapse, if such a thing as a free election could be held in Communist-controlled countries. 158 THE GREAT PRETENSE After months of discussion behind the scenes, the Politburo ordered on August 19 the state planning commission to prepare the fourth 5-year plan (1945-50) with its major stress on heavy industry, chiefly war industry, thus emphasizing the "might" of Soviet Russia and dis- regarding the production of consumer goods for the masses whose chief guardian the Communist parties deign to be. This has been followed to the present day. Such were some, although not all, of the verifiable events in con- ventional diplomacy which trace accurately the origins of the cold war. Turning now to the unconventional, subversive, revolutionary events which make up a huge seg-ment if not the most important part of the actual foreign policy of the Kremlin, there will be time only to trace that connected with the American Communist Party. To trace the actions of the French, Italian, and Chinese Communist Parties, which follow along general lines under different conditions, is impossible here at this time. It should be noted that the Communist Party of the United States had the greatest, ultimate task in the strongest great power. How it faced that task en orders from Mos- cow will now be described from Communist sources and even that must be done more briefly than the speaker desires because of the limitation of time. The Communist Party leader, Earl Browder, was released from prison when President Roosevelt commuted his sentence of 4 years to 14 months on May 16, 1942, "in the interests of national unity." He had violated Federal passport regulations. As a leader he had to be skillful — to change with INIoscow from opposing American assist- ance in the war (1939-41) to demand suddenly and enthusiastically full assistance when Soviet Russia was attacked by Nazi Germany in June 1941. For him, as for Stalin, the same imperialist war had become suddenly a war of liberation. There is every indication he followed the party line as laid down in Moscow and when the Decla- ration of Teheran (December 1, 1943) was agreed upon between Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill, he interpreted this not as a mere temporary diplomatic document, but as the enunciation of a long-range, post- war platform of peaceful :;ooperation of the Great Powers — for, had they not declared : We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations to make a peace which will command the good will of the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the world and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations. On these fundamentals, Browder persuaded the leaders of the Com- munists Party to adopt a new party line of cooperation with demo- cratic elements, even liberal capitalists, abandoning class warfare and the idea of a Communist Negro state on the soil of the United States, and dissolving the so-called political party, i. e., the Communist Party on May 20, 1944, as such, retaining its essentials as the Commu- nist Political Association. It will be remembered that the Third International had been dissolved in June 1943 on the order of Stalin. Thereupon in speeches and in books, especially his Teheran: Our Path in War and Peace, Browder elaborated this type of peaceful cooperation, stressing the postwar need for the United States of con- siderable foreign trade and new markets and equally for the Soviet Union as a possible gainer therefrom while it was being rehabili- THE GREAT PRETENSE 159 tcatecT after the war. lie was opposed by WilHam Z. Foster, one of the vice presidents of the party, and by Sam Darcy, formerly of San Jose, Calif., on the ground that this was an abandonment of Marxism and amounted to selling out to the National Association of Manu- facturers. But Foster's letter outlining his opposition (January 20, 1944) was suppressed by Browder, and officially the Teheran party line of the American Communists was adopted at a secret meeting of the national committee on February 8, 1944. At that time, Foster bowed to the decision, because he received directions from abroad to acquiesce, while Darcy was later expelled from the party, and Foster was most responsible for that. On INIay 20, the Communist Party of the United States was formally dissolved, and the Communist Political Association formed. Like the dissolution of the Third International, the dissolution of the Communist Party of the United States was formal; the activity continued in other ways. Full public coopera- tion with the Roosevelt administration (as well as with its election in November 1944) was to be the policy. Moscow, according to avail- able evidence, received a full report of the February 8, 1944, meeting. The American Communist Party — its rank and file— knew nothing about Foster's letter. In March, the French Communist Party en- dorsed Browder's Teheran party line. While the Teheran party line was being developed, the Dumbarton Oaks Conference of the three Great Powers sought agreement (Au- gust 21 to September 28, 1944) on a basis for a world security organi- zation from which less than a year later was to emerge the Charter of United Nations. Here the basic demand of Moscow — "unanimity of the three powers" — i. e., the veto in the Security Council, took on an ominous significance. Moscow would not yield the right legally within the United Nations to prevent any action which it considered not in its interests, in which, of course, must be included its basic interest to propagate, encourage, and direct the world revolution. Stalin always held the view and reiterated to Stassen later that if "one side does not want cooperation, the result will be conflict, war." Logically, with the veto in its hand, Moscow could use it if the others would not cooperate or would not compromise or concede, or would not appease. This right finally was riveted into the charter. With the threat of or the actual use of the veto, much could be done and was done in the last decade along the line of the basic objectives of the Russian Communist Party. In April 1945, Jacques Duclos wrote an article in the Cahiers du Communisme (Notebooks of Communism), the theoretical journal of the French Communist Party, entitled "On the Dissolution of the Communist Party of the United States of America." The two leaders of the French Communist Party were Maurice Tliorez and Jacques Duclos. Thorrez had recently returned from Moscow and had said that sooner or later there must be French and American social up- heavals "similar to those that transformed Russia almost 30 years ago" and that "in its great line the Russian experience must be applied to every country." Duclos, it has been asserted, had also been in Moscow, but that has not been authenticated. Necessarily the article had been written and handed in to the printer in March, and was the result of the latest information from Moscow. It was a sharply critical attack on Browder's Teheran party line and revealed that 160 THE GREAT PRETENSE Duclos must have had thorough knowledge of the report of the secret meeting of February 8, 1944, inchiding among other things Foster's letter of January 20, 1944, which even then the rank and file of the American Communists did not have. Duclos charged that Browder's leadership had liquidated^ the independent political party of tlie working class in the United States that it amounted to — • a notorious revision of Marxism * * * ^ revision which is expressed in the concept of a lonj^^-term class peace in the United States, of the possibility of the suppression of the class struggle in the postwar period and of the establishment of harmony between labor and capital — • and that — • by transforming the Teheran Declaration of the Allied Governments, which is a document of diplomatic character, into a political platform of class peace in the United States in tlie postwar period, the American Communists are de- forming in a radical way the meaning of the Teheran Declaration and are sowing dangerous opportunist illusions which will exercise a negative influence on the American labor movement, if they are not met with the necessary reply. He went on to state that — nothing justifies the dissolution of the American Commx;nity Party— and that — Browder's analysis of capitalism in the United States is not distinguished by a judicious application of Marxism-Leninism. The American Press (Frederick Woltman and Nelson Frank in the New York World-Telegram) revealed the story of the Duclos article on IMay 22 and thus forced the Communist ncAvspaper in New York, the Daily Worker, on May 24, to publish a translation of the Duclos article with an introduction by Browder, who w^rote that the — end of the war in Europe would require a fundamental review of all problems by American Marxists — and— to know clearly how we stand as we enter a new period of sharpening struggles, crisis, and profound changes. He opened the matter for discussion to the rank and file. With this brusk directive from Moscow, how could Browder retreat and save part of his line, and how could he prevent Foster from driving him from the supreme command of the American Communists? Having had knowledge of this directive for several weeks, these leaders now entered into a public conflict, the greater part of which has been nar- rated in Communist publications. It should be added that at this time Dmitri INIanuilsky, Stalin's right-hand man directing the former Third International affairs, had passed through New York on his way to the United Nations Charter meeting in San Francisco in possession of details regarding the new directive. Under him was Gerhart Eis- ler, alias Hans Berger, as the resident Comintern agent. To nar- rate in detail, step by step, the entire story would be to write a volume. Suffice it to indicate that, in true Bolshevik fashion, Browder, the most popular of leaders with countless friends, was suddenly isolated as they abruptly turned against him and the Teheran party line. Browder's opposition took over the June 2 meeting of the national board of the Communist Political Association, followed by the na- THE GREAT PRETENSE 161 tional committee, June 18-20. Here and in public debate in the Daily Worker the essentials of the controversy were brought out. Step by step the bitter opposition led by Foster forced Browder to yield nearly all the ideas in his Teheran line except the one of — supporting the development of American markets in the world scene— whose purpose in his mind was to prevent unemployment and de- pression and create postwar trade as an incentive to peace. The na- tional committee rejected this because — such a pledge would have been a signal that the Soviet Union genuinely intended to cooperate with the United States instead of sabotaging and undermining it, as the new line intended. Browder, himself, testified : I was met with the flat assertion that markets are not the key to full employ- ment, that a program for markets would be an effort to help capitalism solve its contradictions, and this is not permissible. Just as Foster now let it be known he had previously "been told there were tips from abroad that we should stand by Browder's [Teheran] line [in 1944]," so now he declared : It may be stated that Stalin is one of those who thinks that an economic crisis after thi war is inevitable in the United States. Stalin is right in his forecast of an American postwar crisis. To help create such an economic crisis in the United States was a part of the world revolutionary policy of Stalin. The special na- tional convention of the party was opened on July 26, 1945. The next day the 93 delegates voted unanimously to resurrect the Communist Party. On July 28, William Z. Foster was elected national chairman of the newly reconstituted Communist Party. Browder was deposed after agreeing to obey all decisions, and on February 5, 1946, he was expelled from the party. The new party line, however, had nothing in common with ""peaceful coexistence" or "peace" in any shape or form. It was schemed to prevent American intervention in the pi'og- ress of the world revolution. Briefly the new Foster world revolution party line, still intact to the present day, cherished its total inclusion as a segment of the world revolution. Capitalism was decadent and unable to overcome its basic contraditions. The depression — a grand opporunity in new world revolution party line — w^as coming according to Stalin. This would paralyze the United States. Total demobilization of American Armed Forces, so that the world revolution might more easily overrun Europe and Asia, was demanded to assist this fundamental objective. Radical reforms were advocated, including steps toward the full realization of a Negro national state on American soil. The sum total was a vast American segment of the worldwide cold war inaugurated in Moscow as a tactic in its main strategy for a world revolution. The new program bristled with class war and racial conflict. It was a fighting revolutionary program. How persistent this policy has been, to use only one illustration, is shown by the demands made down to the present day by Molotov for Europe and Cliou En-lai for Asia that our forces, together with our airbases and fleets, get out of Europe and Asia. Although a volume of evidence can be Ijrought out regarding this sudden drastic and decisive change in the American Communist Party 77722—56 12 162 THE GREAT PRETENSE line, a study of the Communist Parties in other important countries bears the same testimony. The cold war, as a tactical segment in the second wave of the world revolution was initiated in Moscow, and was fully formulated at least by February and March, 1945. The American Communist, personally most involved in carrying out this directive here for Moscow, was William Z. Foster, still head of the Communist Party of the United States. In the Communist theoretical journal, Political Affairs, for September 1955, he states that the Tru- man doctrine and the Marshall plan in 1947 "precipitated the cold war." It has already been pointed out that he precipitated the Ameri- can internal segment of the cold war in 1945. It will, also, be remem- bered that it was the original intention of our Government that Kussia and the border states be included in the Marshall plan in 1947 which involved vast billions of assistance for the reconstruction and re- habilitation of Europe. This, Russia rejected and forced its satellites to do the same. In the same article, entitled "Geneva : Background and Perspectives," Foster, attacking the followers of the Browder- Teheran line, which he destroyed in 1945, states : This is the trend which has illusions that at Geneva there was a liquidation of the basic antagonisms between the forces of democratic progress and those of reactionary monopoly capital. All this is akin to the poisonous class collabora- tionist ideas cultivated by Browder following the Big Three agreement at the wartime conference (November 1943) at Teheran. This was written after the "Conference of Smiles" at Geneva in July 1955, and is a good example of the Communist definition of "peaceful coexistence" by Foster. Having written this in August he anticipated by a few weeks even Khrushchev's famous statement of September 17 to the effect : * * * if anyone believes our smiles involve abandonment of the teachings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin [i. e., the world revolution], he deceives himself poorly. Those who wait for that must wait until a shrimp learns to whistle. This was not only notice to the world that the second wave of the world revolution was still on, but it was a specific notice to Communist comrades, wherever they were, that whatever diplomatic agreements might be made at Geneva, if any at all, they were merely like the diplomatic agreement at Tehran. These agreements changed nothing in their basic strategy. They represented only tactical moves made necessary by internal conditions or made facile due to the stupidity or gullibility of uncritical, popular opinion followed by some statesmen on the opposite side. In the same journal, Political Affairs, in the October issue, Foster makes the charge that the United States, because of its actions in 1947, had forced Soviet Russia — to strain its every resource in order to meet the urgent war threat that came from American imperialism. Then— the ensuing bitter struggle to build up a military force capable of defending the regime and its people against the new aggressors, required a superhuman effort, and it entailed much underplay of the consumers' goods industries, the assump- tion of many strict self-disciplines by the people, and the acceptance of lower living standards by the masses than otherwise would be necessary. This is an interesting and also a total falsification of history. The cold war, which Moscow initiated and not the United States, forced THE GREAT PRETENSE 163 Soviet Eussia to arm while the United States had almost completely demobilized itself — as urged in 19-15 by the American Communist Party. And then when the United States once more began to arm in 1948-49, it clid so to defend itself against the advance of the world revolution. When forced to do this, it became an aggressor in the language of the men in the Kremlin and Foster. The United States, by this sophistry, is to blame for the reasons why Moscow seeks "peaceful coexistence" for tactical reasons, other- wise in Foster's words the Communist leaders of the Kremlin would — utilize their soaring production wholly for the improvement of the living and cultural standards of the masses ; they vv'ill develop their general well-being at a rate and upon a scale hitherto unknown in the world. All this was why these countries fought so hard to bring Geneva to pass, and it is also why they are working so tirelessly now to see to it that the conference shall produce the great peace that the masses hope for — the liquidation of the threat of atomic war and the end of the murderous strains and tensions of the cold war. Then he adds another interesting hint : This rapid development of the Socialist lands will raise and inspire the fight of the labor movement to higher and more effective levels in all the capitalist countries. If only the capitalist countries, it may be added, w^ho did not start the cold war and who really want to end it more than the men in the Kremlin, would cooperate, yield, and appease. He has painted a most optimistic future for them for he writes : They dread the revolutionary example of such a demonstration of the effective- ness of socialism for the working masses. Before he ends his article he pays his compliments to^ the ultrareactionary character of the Meany group of misleaders now dominating the A. F. of L. and soon to have their inlluenee spread further through the cur- rent merger of the A. F. of L, and the CIO.* * * who "echo" the policies "of Wall Street." He concludes with an idea wdiich makes "peaceful coexistence" look pale, when he suggests the formation of a "great labor- farmer party worthy of a labor movement with some 16 million members * * *" to fight "against the war- mongers and arms profiteers," "first within the Democratic Party" and then in his future labor-farmer party. All of this evidence points clearly to the fact that "peaceful coexist- ence" can be purchased by the West only in yielding to the world revo- lutionary objectives of Moscow. In other words, it can be purchased by the Western Powers, if they commit national suicide. The cold war, which is still in progress, is a war in all the elements and phases of civilization and society. Its purpose is to communize the w^orld, and as such it will not end unless the Soviet empire triumphs or col- lapses. The leaders in the Kremlin cannot give it up without their disappearance from the stage of history. THE CHx^NGING WORLD OF SOVIET RUSSIA By David J. Dallin David J. Dallin was a participant in the early Russian revolutionary movement. Arrested in 1909 while a student at the University of St. Petersburg, he was exiled from 1911 to 1917. He returned to Russia after the revolution and was an opposition member of the Moscow Soviet until 1921, when he was again forced to leave his native country. Since then, he has lived in Germany, Poland, and France. At the pres- ent, he makes his home in the United States. He has written extensively on Soviet affairs for magazines and newspapers. He is the author of Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, The Big Three, The New Soviet Empire, Soviet Espionage, and, in collaboration with Boris Nicolaevsky, Forced Labor in Soviet Russia. The following article is reprinted from the Changing World of Soviet Russia just published by the Yale University Press. Addressing the 20tli congress of his party in February 1956, Nikita Khrushchev acted as the recognized actual head of both party and gov- ernment. He stressed the fact that under his rule, in obvious contrast to Stalin's era, the Presidium has started to function regularly, and that Khrushchev's report, his program, and even certain alterations in the official Communist theory were the product of the collective work of the supreme body of the Soviet Communist Party. The revision of Lenin's theories which Khrushchev proposed was indicative of the beginning of chipping off the old philosophy rather than of the development of new theories. He warned against the in- terpretation of "Lenin's thesis of the decay of imperialism in a simpli- fied fashion" ; he did not substitute for it, however, a new philosophy which would reconcile the tremendous progress of the West in the last decades with the obsolete theory of "decaying" capitalism. He accepted Tito's thesis that, contrary to the old leninism-Stalinism, there exist various roads, even peaceful roads, to socialism, and that civil war is not the only path of a collectivist transformation. He stretched out his hand to Socialist parties and in the case of certain countries accepted the view that parliaments may help transform "backward" societies into Socialist ones. These concessions to moderation, these retreats from orthodox com- munism, symptomatic as they are, did not mean a real moderating of Soviet policy. "Wliile Khruschev's pronouncement scarred the rounded monolithic theory of old communism, it did not smooth the way to a happier coexistence of the various nations. In practical foreign affairs Khrushchev remained as aggressive as ever. Carried away by his notion of Soviet-Communist grandeur, he tremendously and dangerously exaggerated the power of his own camp and mini- mized the force of his adversaries. According to Khrushchev — and here he followed in the footsteps of Stalin — the West is hopelessly torn by crises and dissensions, of which the antagonism between the United States and Britain is the most important. In the face of this great weakening of capitalism, war between the Soviet world and the West 164 THE GREAT PRETENSE 165 is no longer inevitable: the Socialist transformation of the remaining capitalist countries may now be achieved without military conflicts. In this res^oect Khrushchev paid tribute to the genuine and general antiwar sentiments which exist in Russia among all strata of the popu- lation. But his aggressiveness in foreign joolicy, and the preservation of many vestiges of the old internal policies, did not augur well for Russia's evolution in the near future. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the ascendance of Khrushchev has meant simply a return to Stalinism. It did not. Stalin's era, a separate chapter of Russian history, was closed forever. Though gradually restored to an honorable place, and even quoted, Stalin occupied last place among the gods in the Communist pantheon. Many acts of his which had been accepted with a shrug of the shoul- ders, which had evoked surprise at home and had made Russia a laughing stock abroad, were being undone. The ridiculous claims that practically every invention and discovery of the world had been made by Russians were no longer put forth. Contempt for the West — "it is not becoming to bow before the West" — was succeeded by a flow of Soviet delegations going abroad to study progressive capitalist economy. The Soviet claim that Russia "single-handedly" defeated Germany in the second World War was likewise dropped, and tlie role of the Western allies was stressed. At home, scientific charlatans of the type of Trolim Lysenko, formerly favorites of Stalin, were de- throned. The grim GPU-NKVD, now renamed the Committee of State Security, had less power than under Stalin; the Government tried, if reluctantly, to introduce some reforms and create at least the impression of a new legality. And considerable numbers of labor- camp inmates were released. Repudiation of Stalin's policy toward Yugoslavia, recognition of the Bonn regime, and withdrawal from Austria marked the new Soviet course under Khrushchev-Bulganin. However, all reforms and improvements were kept within narrow limits. So long as the urge for a new empire prevails, no large-scale determined evolution toward a new mode of life can be expected. Zigs follow zags; ups follow downs. Progress or expansion, the old dilemma — this curse of the people of Russia has remained in force, and grandiose expansion has remained precept number one. In this way, international issues disrupt Soviet internal affairs and infringe on the priority of the transition to communism. It would be erroneous to assume that these developments are hidden from Soviet sight. On the contrary, every ranking member of the regime knows that the narrow limits of Soviet progress at home are imposed by the situation of the U. S. S. R. in the family of nations — a situation dic- tated by the precepts of Communist expansion rather than by the security needs of the Soviet people. OUT OF STALIN^S SHADOW By Gregory Klimov Gregory Klimov, an engineer by profession, was attached to the staff of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany after World War II. From this vantage point, Major Klimov witnessed the Soviet despolia- tion of Eastern Germany, in defiance of the Potsdam Agreement, and saw the Soviet repudiation of its wartime alliances long before the West realized the nature of the cold war being directed against it. After his defection to the West, Major Klimov wrote an account of his experiences: The Berlin Kremlin, published in English as The Terror Machine. The Berlin Kremlin enjoyed a spectacular success in its German edition, and a motion picture based upon it, A Road With No Return, received first prize at the 1954 Berlin Film Festival. Major Klimov now resides in New York City, where he is completing a new book. Power, dealing with events in the Soviet Union after Stalin's death. The dethronement of Joseph Stalin throws an unfavorable light on the present rulers of the Soviet Union, in particular, on those men who were Stalin's closest lieutenants. One cause for the current Soviet new policy is, undoubtetlly, a fierce struggle between two groups within the leadership of the Presidum (the successor to the Politburo). One group consists of those who much share Stalin's ignominy ; the other consists of those Avho would benefit, rather than suer, from the process. Tliis would include the army, which has acquired increasing importance since the liquidation of Lavrenti Beria. The expediency of anti-Stalinism was accepted by the majority of the present leadership of the U. S. S. R. under the pressure of prac- tical necessity. But this does not conceal the rivalry between the party or the Presidium itself, and these tensions may have even more serious effects in the future. It is true that the campaign of anti-Stalinism may engender some confidence among the people of the IT. S. S. R., but whether tliis will be sufficient to offset the dangers that the party faces in its own ranks is a still unanswered question. Tlie leaders of the Soviet Union must still rule from strength ; and for this reason, they were forced to wait for more than 2 j^ears before ]:)roceeding with the desanctification of Stalin. Nevertheless, despite the ap]:>aratus of power by which it con- tinues to suppress the Soviet people, the Soviet Government must, to a certain degree, reckon with the sentiments of their subjects. In the minds of the Soviet people, the name of Stalin has become identified with the worst features of their plight. Repudiation of the tyrant may serve to hold incipient mutiny more easily in check. Foreign policy considerations are an equally important determinant. Stalin's name, without the living Stalin to enforce his policies, served in many respects as a handicap to his successors. Beyond this, one cannot omit the conclusion that the present rulers did not want to remain permanently in the shadow of Stalin. The mountains of 166 THE GREAT PRETENSE 167 adulating literature, motion pictures, and other memorials to him made it impossible for them to surpass Stalin as long as he continvied to be venerated. With Stalin banished, the new leadership could claim credit for its own accomplishments and thereby indulge the excessive vanity which characterizes all despots. The current campaign against Stalin raises the possibility that the Soviet system may be weakened in some respects for the time being, but this, in turn, is no guaranty of any radical change in the structure of Soviet power. It means simply that the leadership of the U. S. S. R. does not have the monolithic unity that Stalin imposed upon it and that a further internal struggle for ascendancy probably can be ex- pected. The increase in the army's influence may result in a change in the pattern of Soviet expansionism. Until now, the party has apj^eared as the more aggressive force, while the army adheres to a more na- tionalist and defensive role. It should be remembered that in Hitler's Germany the army, compared with the Nazi Party, was a moderate element. In the IJ. S. S. R. this tendency is more pronounced because the army views the problem of war more realistically than the party. Nevertheless, Soviet ideological warfare will, undoubtedly, continue without interruption. It is in this area that current Soviet strategy provides the greatest opportunity for the West, and it is essential that this opportunity be seized upon resolutely by the nations that the Kremlin still seeks to vanquish. A MAJOR TRIUMPH FOR ZHUKOV By Boris I. Nicolaevsky Boris I. Nicolaevsky was historian of the Revolutionary Archives in Moscow from 1919 to 1920. A Social Democrat, he was forced into exile in 1921. He is coauthor with David J. Dallin of Forced Labor in the Soviet Union. The following article is reprinted from the New Leader. The Soviet Union today is witnessing political changes of tremen- dous importance. It has, quite probably, embarked on a major new era in its history. Official Soviet press accounts made it clear that the 20th Commu- nist Party Congress had been marked by a brutal and successful attack on Stalin, and on the structure he created in the party. This liquida- tion of the Stalinist heritage had, it was also clear, been virtually decided in advance. "V-VHiat official accounts left in doubt were the lengths to which this liquidation would go, and the forms and tempo it would take. The latest reports emerging from Moscow through various channels show unmistakably that this liquidation of the Stalin legacy is pro- ceeding so rapidly and, as regards intraparty relations, is being carried out so thoroughly that it must be compared to a mightly ava- lanche. Where will it stop ? As yet, these changes have not been reflected in the major policies of the Soviet regime. The postcongress decrees on collective farms indicate the regime's desire to retain the main lines of its old farm policy. Nor has there been any sign of changes in foreign policy thus far. But it definitely cannot be said that there will be no such changes : The break with all the ideological premises on which the party's work was based has been too decisive, and the changes in the very founda- tions of intraparty relations have been too far-reaching, for major party policies to remain unchanged for any prolonged period. In my last article The 20th Congress and Soviet Foreign Policy, NL, March 19, I said that a decisive influence on the behavior of the Soviet ruling clique was its desire to create a sort of "united front" within the party for the sake of pursuing an active foreign policy. But this is only a partial explanation. Stalin also created such "united fronts," with the help of the great purges of 1937-38 and the projected new purge, early in 1953, which was aborted by his death. The at- tempts in the last months of 1955 and in January 1956 to restore the Stalin cult show that certain elements in the Soviet ruling group sought to create the foreign-policy "united front" by the use of Stalin's methods. What compelled them to abandon this attempt? _ What forces made it necessary in February to undertake a decisive liquida- tion of the Stalin legacy, discrediting Stalin in such a manner that any return to high-handed Stalinist methods of intraparty rule is psychologically impossible ? The newspaper reports on Khrushchev's speech at the closed session of the congress are somewhat unclear and contradictory. Much of 168 THE GREAT PRETENSE 169 their information is unquestionably second- or third-hand and not completely accurate. But the stream of reports from various sources suggests that the essential story they tell is correct. IVIalenkov's re- marks in England remove any doubt. The articles by non-Soviet Communists, especially those by East German party boss Walter Ulbricht, are a reliable means of determining what Khrushchev said : Those portions of western press accounts which coincide with the accounts of foreign Communists can be considered accurate. The most important of Khrushchev's statements were his admissions of the falsity of two key Stalin myths: (1) the charges on which Marshal INIikhail Tukhachevsky and his associates were condemned to death and thousands of the best officers of the Red Army were wiped out, and (2) the legend that Stalin was a brilliant strategist and statesman who won the war against Hitler virtually singlehanded. Stalin, it now develops, was a criminal who destroyed the flower of the Red Army and basely slandered the people whom he murdered. He was a shallow, vain man who knew nothing of military matters but arrogated to himself the glory of those who, despite all his blund- ers and crimes, managed to rescue the U. S. S. R. from the blind alley into which he had led it. These two points, however, do not exhaust the accusations which Khrushchev, by implication at the very least, leveled at Stalin. If the charges against Tukhachevsky were false, then the charges against other victims of the purges must also have been false — above all, those who were condemned in the three main trials in 1936-38. Nor can all this be confined to intraparty purges. In the light of Khrushchev's revelations, all of Stalin's actions must be reviewed — as well as the actions of his "comrades-in-arms," who were accomplices in his crimes. The entire system which permits such criminals to set up an unlimit:ed despotism over a nation of 200 million must be condemned as in- tolerable in human society. What induced Krushchev to make such disclosures ? He must have foreseen their shattering effect abroad, as well as further difficulties for the regime at home. His closest colleagues in the Presidium must also have realized this. Wliy, then, did they nevertheless feel com- pelled to discredit Stalin in this manner ? The answer must be sought in the struggle that raged within the party on the eve of the congress. Careful study of the Soviet press discloses several extremely interesting facts. As I have said, the last months of 1955 and January 1956 were marked by attempts in the Communist press to restore the Stalin cult, which had suffered severe blows while Malenkov was in power. One of the most glaring of these attempts was the popularization of the term "party of JNIarx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin." Pravcla used this term for the last time on January 23. It was used in an article on the Ukrainian Communist Party Congress, where Ukrainian Party Sec- retary Kirichenko employed it to conclude his report. Kirichenko, a member of the All-Union Party Presidium, is one of Khrushchev's most devoted adherents. In other words: In mid- January, when Kirichenko flew from Moscow to Kiev for the Ukrainian Party Con- gress, Khrushchev still favored glorification of Stalin. But after January 23 this term disappeared forever from the col- umns of Pravda, and soon afterward Stalin's name disappeared alto- 170 THE GREAT PRETENSE getlier. Janimrj^ 23 was, then, a turning point. About this time some event occurred which ended the attempts to glorify Stalin in the Mos- cow press. (Such attempts continued for some time in the provincial press. ) "W^iat could this event have been ? ISIuch remains unclear, but one set of facts should be noted. In Mos- cow on or about January 23 was held the party conference of the Moscow Military District. The main issue at the conference was "the state of party-political work and the tasks of the political organs and party organizations" in the Army. The rapporteur on this issue was Marshal Kirill Aloskalenko, commander of the Moscow Military Dis- trict. Pravda published an item of several lines on this conference. It reported that Defense Minister Zhukov had spoken, stressed that he had been "warmly received by those present," but said nothing about the content of the speech. A much more detailed report appeared in Red Star, daily newspaper of the Defense ISIinistry. Here we learn that the entire activity of the Ministry's political administration was subjected to criticism at the conference. Despite restrained language, the critical speeches by several sj^eakers are most striking. Zhukov's own speech was quite restrained, but nevertheless quite definite. He, too, criticized the ac- tivity of the political administration, whose chief, Colonel- General Zheltov, and his assistant were present. After reading the report of this conference and of Zhukov's speech, one must conclude that the Defense Minister dealt a well-prepared blow to the political administration of his ministry becavise that admin- istration was pursuing a political line which he opposed. One can- not help matching this with the results of the elections to the party central committee at the 20th Congress : Not one of the leading oper- atives of the political administration was elected either a member or a candidate of the central committee. This event, imparalleled in Soviet history, testifies to the complete victory scored by Zhukov. Zheltov and the entire staff of the political administration were selected by Bulganin when he was Defense ISIinister. They remained in the Ministry to watch over Zhukov after Bulganin became Premier. Zhukov's si:)eech at the Januarj^ conference marked the crushing of this group ; Zheltov and his closest aides wnll surely be replaced soon. Zhukov is fast becoming, if he has not already become, unchallenged master of the Defense ISIinistry. This struggle continued the old fight between Bulganin and Zhukov, which started 15 years ago. In the winter of 1941-42, Stalin entrusted Zhukov with the defense of IVIoscow, but appointed Bulganin political observer to watch him. From the start, Zhukov disliked the cunning, two-faced Bulganin and friction arose between them. Stalin needed Zhukov at that time and had to yield to his wishes. Bulganin was removed — but did not forget his defeat. In tlie fall of 1944, he became a member of the state defense committee and Stalin's closest adviser on political and police matters in the army. Soon he was able to take his revenge on Zhukov. In May or June 1946, Zhukov was removed from the Defense IMinistry and sent into virtual exile — first in Odessa, then in Sverdlovsk. Now Zhukov has evened the score. His election as a candidate member of the i^arty Presidium underscores the extent of his triumph. THE GREAT PRETENSE 171 Some of tlie confusing aspects of Bulganin's behavior ]ust before and during the 20tli congress may be related to this struggle. The foreign press noted Bulganin's disappearance from the limelight for several weeks before the congress. Perhaps Bulganin's absence from all sorts of meetings and receptions at that time was connected with Zhukov's struggle against him. The beginning of Bulganin's tem- porary disappearance coincides roughly with Zhukov's speech at the conference of the Moscow Military District. It should also be added that at the 20th Congress Bulganin was by no means as important as he had been in preceding months. His re- port did not touch on any major policy matters, and he confined his role to that of an economic specialist. Could this have been a kind of protest against the new course ? Zhukov's victory now gives him control of all party political and party police work in the Defense Mini&lry — work which has hereto- fore been in the hands of the party political apparatus selected by Bulganin and traditionally anti-Zhukov. How far that apparatus went can be judged by the history of "World AVar II recently published by the Institute of History of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, prepared by scholars who had risen under the aegis of the Bulganinist political administration. I am referring to Essays on the History of the Great Patriotic War of 194:1-45, which was officially sent to press on September 20, 1955, 7 months after Zhukov became Defense Minister. These essays are saturated with the old anti-Zhukov sentiment which Bulganin cultivated in the Ministry. Stalin's wartime role is exalted, almost more than while he was alive ; at every opportunity, the authors stress his "military wisdom, unbending will, and courage." Zhukov's role, on the other hand, is systematically minimized; there is no men- tion, for example, of his part in organizing the defense of Leningrad and Stalingrad, to which Zhukov himself saw fit to refer in his con- versation a year ago with William Eandolx^h Hearst, Jr. Now, of course, this sort of thing will cease. The aspects of the situation that I have dealt with here cannot, of course, explain completely the complex struggle which preceded the regime's sharp reversal of policy and Khrushchev's dramatic speech. Zhukov's struggle against Bulganin is only one episode in the vast and complicated struggle for power now in progress. But it is an impor- tant episode, vital to an understanding of the struggle as a whole. SUMMATION J. Edgar Hoover, Director of Federal Bureau of Investigation The Communist leopard frequently changes his spots, but the same blood — bad blood — continuously flows through his veins. Recently, we have witnessed another spectacular about-face in the Communist line. Joseph Stalin, who ranked with Marx, Engels, and Lenin as an untouchable saint in the godless Soviet temple, has been exposed by his own worshipers as a power-crazed tyrant, a pathologi- cal fraud, and a coldhearted executioner. When Moscow broadcast this new party line, Communists through- out the world were quick to comply. Here in the United States, the Communist Party made a new entry in its ledger: Joseph Stalin, whom it had openly proclaimed as the greatest man of his generation, was less than mortal — his feet were of clay. To the uninformed, this is truly a remarkable development. Such drastic changes of opinion usually are developed over a long period of time. Yet, this should have been no surprise coming from a movement which has no moral principles, which lives by expediency, and which will make any move to advance the Communist cause. Since integrity never has been a Communist stumbling block, the Kremlin has succeeded in rewriting history time and again before its followers' eyes. For example, during the period of the Nazi- Soviet Nonaggression Pact, American Communists not only expressed opposition to United States intervention, but they also did their utmost to disrupt our defense eiTorts. Then, on June 22, 1941, the pic- ture radically changed. Adolph Hitler rudely rejected Stalin's com- panionship, thereby converting World War II into the "great demo- cratic war against fascism." The defrocking of Stalin has brought repercussions in Communist circles throughout the world. It is one thing to smash an idol, yet quite another to dispose of his disciples. Here in the United States, confusion and disillusionment have developed in the Communist Party. There is no danger that the umbilical cord will be severed. The party in America still is a dedicated child, completely dependent upon the proud parent in Moscow. Through the years, however, the top functionaries of the Communist Party, USA, have been strong followers of the Stalin myth. To speak against "Joseph the Great" used to be blasphemy and treason. In some nations, those who op- posed Stalin by word or deed were publicly eradicated. In this coun- try, anti-Stalin influences in the party were strongly castigated and expelled. Now that the pendulum has swung in the other direction, we find peoples behind the Iron Curtain placing flowers on previously un- marked graves. In the United States, however, the Communists are confronted with a unique problem. To publicly apologize to expelled 172 THE GREAT PRETENSE 173 party memljers would be most embarrassing. Tt would openly expose the direct line which connects the Soviet Union with Communist headquarters here. Still, the ])arty in America must follow Moscow's example and bare its chest. Having been blindly led into this situa- tion, the Communists within our borders find themselves trapped by their own intellectual dishonesty. Already, motions have emerged within the party to censure its program of the last 10 years. But at this point the American Communist Party cannot risk its faces — and it has an unlimited number of them — by openly whipping its most prominent disciples of Stalin. There is a temporary, yet important, advantage to the free world in the Soviet admissions that discrimination and atrocities took place under Stalin's regime. America's Communist leaders now are con- fronted with a truth which they long had suspected. Questions have been asked — an extreme type of behavior in party circles. But inertia is a difficult force to overcome. Minds which are accustomed to continuous slumber are seldom able to remain active very long. After the first flush of bewilderment, the Communists in the United States have begun settling down into the same familiar rut. While one corner of the party's mouth parrots the Moscow line, the other proclaims, "We are a bona fide political party, dedicated to the ideals of equal opportunity for all." By American standards, however, they are a most ususual breed of politicians. The methods they employ to get out the vote are puzzling indeed. In recent months, the united front campaign, always a dangerous Communist tactic, has received even greater emphasis. Former Com- munists who dropped out of the party and some who were expelled have been approached to renew their memberships. In other instances, non-Communist individuals and organizations have been approached by party leaders under the pretext of wanting to assist in promoting a mutual objective. The Communists are confident that if they can openly cling to the coattails of reputable groups, eventually they will succeed in wearing the entire suit. One of the party's most effective propaganda platforms continues to be its front organizations. If America's resistance can be softened by the lies shouted from these hives of concealed communism, the party will be in a better position to launch a frontal attack upon our Government. Amercan Communists have announced that they stand on a plat- form of "jobs, peace, equal rights, and democracy." But they omit the two most important words — "Moscow style." When the Com- munist smirk begins to change to a smile, as is the case right now, we would be well advised to refocus our sights. Behind those chang- ing spots, the same bad blood still flows through the leopard's veins. o BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRAR^^ lillll 3 9999 05445_5416_ m.